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SUPPORTING CASE STUDIES

VOLUME III

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ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA

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ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA

Supporting Case Studies
(Volume III)

A Report prepared for the Army Research Office
under Contract No. DA-49-092-ARO-1.02,
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North America: The Revolutionary Period

by

John Shy

BACKGROUND

The American Revolution was the first successful colonial revolution in modern history before the 20th Century. There are of course certain differences between the American Revolutionary War and 20th-Century insurrectionary wars in the developing areas: (1) the great technological developments of the last century, particularly in weapons and communications; (2) the lack of any serious ethnic or racial division between American insurgents and the British army and government; and (3) the relative absence of American reliance on the kind of guerrilla doctrine and tactics which have been so visible in the more recent past. But at a deeper level of analysis, the differences recede and comparison becomes more promising. To reach this level, it is necessary to focus on the main actors in the American Revolution; that is, to distinguish between active insurgents, passive supporters, neutrals, loyalists, British military leaders, British political leaders, and the effective British public; and to analyze their perceptions, attitudes, behavior, and interactions with one another. At this level it becomes clearer that, while most of the American Revolution does not strictly qualify in terms of weapons and tactics as guerrilla warfare, the Revolution regarded structurally and behaviorally is comparable to contemporary problems of insurgency.

The British Empire of the 18th Century was comparatively decentralized in operation, though its structure was clearly hierarchical and potentially authoritarian. Its nexus was not primarily political, however, but cultural and commercial. Despite a number of points of chronic friction, its internal working had reached a delicate modus vivendi which was the basic reason for its political and economic success.

The Seven Years' War (1755-1763) brought the Empire to its apogee of power and prestige. Britain and her colonies had decisively won a war in an age when wars were severely limited. British control of the mainland was greatly expanded to include everything east of the Mississippi. War and territorial expansion also brought heavy public indebtedness in Britain and a need for new governmental arrangements and defense policies in the colonies. On both sides of the Atlantic, postwar readjustment triggered a sharp economic recession which made these problems more difficult and their solutions more urgent.

A series of crises, finally leading to open rebellion, developed from this postwar situation. Successive British governments approached these constitutional, military, and fiscal problems through greater centralization, emphasis on rationality and efficiency, and shifting some of the burden of taxation to the colonies themselves. Almost all colonial leaders regarded these measures as an immediate threat to the large degree of autonomy which the colonies had previously enjoyed, and an ultimate threat to the equal status within the Empire of individual colonists themselves. Resistance gained strength from the economic recession, which seemed somehow linked to the new British policies. By 1774, both the British government and most colonial leaders had reached the point where each believed that the objectives of the other were unlimited (i.e., complete subjection and virtual independence, respectively), and that the other had acted in bad faith during previous crises; each was also convinced that the other could not win a military struggle.

When war began (April 1775), Britain could draw on a population of about 7,000,000, while the insurgent colonies contained about 2,500,000, of whom about 500,000 were Negro slaves living south of Pennsylvania. The British economy was generally regarded as the soundest in the world; it depended primarily on overseas commerce, secondarily on agriculture and manufacturing. Its greatest strength was financial; the availability of great liquid wealth, and the confidence of investors in the government, made it possible to mobilize much of the potential strength of the country in cases of emergency. The economy of the rebellious colonies was basically subsistence agriculture conducted on an unlimited supply of land, but with the social elite of the colonies largely dependent for their wealth on overseas commerce--staple export in the South, commerce and shipping in the North.

Strategic geography had an important effect on the rebellion. Communications with the insurgent area from London were slow (1-3 months), but the urban centers of insurgency were especially vulnerable to British seapower. The area to be pacified was enormous

(about 250,000 square miles), but execrable overland communications increased the value of the strategic mobility which seapower provided. Moreover, the Hudson-Champlain corridor presented a strategic opportunity to divide the New England stronghold of insurgency from the rest of the colonies. Most of the other river systems acted as obstacles to overland movement by either side.

NATURE OF THE INSURGENT MOVEMENT

A tradition of comparatively broad participation in politics under the control of the social elite provided the insurrection with great popular strength, inasmuch as rebel leadership was almost completely of elite origins. A tradition of colonial particularism, however, made it difficult ever to mobilize and direct more than a fraction of this strength. The central organization of the rebellion was loosely unified on a representative basis, with a degree of control and discipline that ranged from fair to poor. Organization at the colony or state level tended to be highly centralized but no more than fairly efficient. Organization at the local level was representative in structure and spirit, and highly effective in operation. Military organization was tripartite: universally obligated militia served as local defense and police; volunteer or conscripted state forces participated as they were needed in mobile operations; and volunteer "regulars" served in two or three main armies.

Political doctrine drew almost exclusively on broad, rather than provincial, appeals: on the idea of equality (both for citizens within society and for governments within the Empire) as a "natural" right; on the concept of the "people" as the only legitimate source of political authority; and on the emphasis in British political theory since the 17th Century on the problem of tyranny and the right of resistance to it. Likewise, military organization and doctrine drew heavily on European models, though these were often--if reluctantly--adapted to both the strategic and the social circumstances of America.

Clothing, recruits, food, cash, cavalry, artillery, cadre, and other munitions were the critical items for the rebellion, in roughly that order of importance. Several logistical systems were tried, but all were considered more or less unsatisfactory, though obviously none was a complete failure. Essentially rebel logistics depended on voluntary local support; both coercion and profit were used, but neither was the primary means of procurement.

The major logistical difficulties were: inexperience, the comparatively low density of population, the lack of food and manpower surpluses in most areas of a subsistence economy, a chaotic currency system and shortage of foreign exchange, poor overland communication and a vast theater of operations, and the desire of rebel leaders to maintain large European-style armies constantly in the field.

The political objectives of the rebellion progressed quickly under pressure of war from considerable autonomy for colonial governments with the Empire to complete political independence. The military objectives were less clear; they oscillated between conventional strategic decision through tactical success on the one hand, and political decision through attrition, exhaustion, and demoralization on the other. In geographic terms, rebel objectives came to be resistance whenever possible to any movement of British troops, expulsion of government forces from any area not occupied in great strength, the positional defense of major port cities, and all-out defense of the Hudson Highlands.

The techniques and tactics of the rebellion involved using its considerable capability for irregular warfare, acquired through long experience of Indian and bush fighting, only as a last resort; yet it was used when necessary to great effect, especially at the beginning and the end of the war. Conventional operations were generally preferred because they were better adapted to area defense, had a markedly better psychological impact on the rebel army itself, were more prestigious in civilian and international eyes, were more in harmony with the socially conservative objectives of the rebellion, and seemed to promise political decision through military encounters in a way that irregular operations did not.

Rebel political warfare was extremely effective for a number of reasons: a comparatively well-developed newspaper press, most of which fell under rebel control; the comparatively high level of literacy and political awareness, especially in seaboard areas; the prolonged prewar controversy, which had served to politicize the mass of the population, to develop extralegal organizations performing quasi-governmental functions, and to create a web of contacts among these organizations; the high incidence within the rebel leadership of lawyers, who worked skillfully and incessantly to make the rebel case in the courts of colonial, British, and world opinion; the use of some of the ablest rebel leaders as diplomatic agents serving abroad; the use of arguments which were generally respected at the time throughout the Atlantic world; and the emphasis on the "corrupt" character of the

British government, an argument which was reinforced by a similar attack from the small but articulate opposition in Britain itself.

Terror, for the most part, was used selectively and on a limited scale. Extralegal "mob" coercion was aimed at loyal leaders; it generally stopped short of extreme violence only because threats, ridicule, and expulsion proved effective. In areas under rebel control, local committees conducted summary proceedings against "disloyal" persons, especially those who had furnished supplies or information to the government, employing a system of oaths, surveillance, expulsion, confiscation of property, and, when necessary, execution. During the last phase of the war, when the government attempted to establish control of large areas, previous restraints on terror broke down: all "disloyal" persons became targets for summary execution, and more than one government paramilitary formation was massacred. But more frequent throughout the war was a well-publicized restraint, even when reprisals against government might have been justified, in order to sharpen the contrasting images of British and rebel conduct. Both sides found their mutual interest in keeping terror aimed at regular military personnel to a minimum.

SUPPORT

Despite a great deal of research, it has proved exceedingly difficult to draw a trustworthy profile of those Americans who supported the rebellion. Any simple explanation in terms of social class or geographical location is clearly wrong. It was hardly an insurrection against the colonial elite, because a large segment of that elite led the rebellion throughout. Nor did the supposedly more radical and rebellious West lead or support the rebellion as much as did the seaboard, where the few port cities--Boston, Newport, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston--had been the centers of agitation before 1775.

A few general statements can safely be made, however. Rebel support was strongest in the oldest and socially most homogeneous colonies--Massachusetts and Virginia. Beyond that, it is easier to say who did not support the rebellion. Very few people connected with royal government--appointive office holders, contractors, close relatives--were rebels. Remote and newly settled areas tended to be at least passively loyal. Unassimilated minority groups everywhere tended to be loyal or at least apathetic:

1. Anglicans and Baptists in New England, who disliked the established Congregational Church;

2. Those Dutch and Germans who retained their linguistic identity in New York and New Jersey;

3. Quakers;

4. Germans and Scots-Irish in the Carolinas, who disliked the seaboard rebel leaders, although this situation was very complex and is open to major qualifications;

5. Highland Scots, recently settled, who were actively loyal;*

6. Negro slaves, who responded to appeals offering them their freedom;

7. Indians, who identified American frontiersmen as their major enemy.

A reasonable estimate is that 20%-25% of the population would have been ready, under appropriate circumstances, actively to support the government. In summary, rebel support tended to come from the most English, least threatened, or oppressed parts of colonial society. One exception is the official class, which was uniformly loyal; another may be Jews and Catholics, who seem to have been as rebellious as anyone else.

Local support for the rebels was most clearly affected by events in two major ways. One was the conversion to active rebellion of the victims of harsh government actions; these were men who usually had previously been neutral or even passively loyal. In almost every case, such harsh action was not dictated by policy, but rather was uncontrolled behavior by government auxiliaries-- Hessians (New Jersey 1776), Indians (upstate New York 1777), and especially "Loyalist" provincial troops. The other was the conversion of loyal elements into passive supporters of rebellion as a result of local rebel military success. Often this conversion was directly related to the withdrawal of protection by government forces and to a desire to save life and property. Finally, there is a modest possibility that prerevolutionary economic dislocations helped produce support for rebellion in those areas already economically declining with respect to other areas; Massachusetts and Virginia are the cases in point.

*Somewhat surprisingly since most of them had emigrated because of their Jacobite leanings.

Outside support for the rebellion came principally from France, the leading international rival of Britain, though it did not come from French Canada, where everyone expected some sort of counterpart insurrection. Recent British reforms had mollified the 100,000 French Catholics of Canada. These same reforms, however, had inflamed the anti-Catholic prejudices of the rebellious colonies. But neither American anti-Catholicism nor even a long history of regarding France as the enemy seriously inhibited the acceptance of French support when it came.

French support was covert until 1778 (after the first major American victory), and consisted of substantial sums of cash, munitions, volunteer officers, and to some extent the use of French ports. Munitions were the critical item, though the "powder crisis" was overcome before the arrival of French aid by trading through neutral West Indian ports. From 1778, French assistance was overt, adding a small army and all her naval power to the war. In 1779, Spain joined France, and by 1780 a general European "armed neutrality" had for Britain reduced the war in America to merely one theater of a global struggle.

The importance of French aid is still disputed. Of course French military and naval forces speeded victory, but increasingly historians of all viewpoints judge French aid as something less than critical to the continuation of rebellion. Only France allied itself directly with the American rebels, though Dutch financial support may have been as valuable as French military aid.

It should be noted that outside support was clearly motivated by anti-British, not by pro-American, considerations; balance-of-power, rather than ideological, arguments were employed, and even so the policy of support of rebellion was controversial within both the French and Spanish royalist governments. Only some of the foreign volunteer officers were ideologically motivated.

COUNTERINSURGENT RESPONSE

Three phases in the British effort to cut local support for rebellion may be distinguished and briefly described.

Phase I (mid-1774 to late 1775)

For almost a decade of agitation, successive British governments had defined the problem in America as one of law enforcement and the maintenance of order, with legal measures aimed at recalcitrant individuals. The immediate explanation for the failure of this policy was widespread local sympathy for these individuals, an attitude which paralyzed even the local judiciary. In early 1774, after the destruction of tea shipments in Boston harbor, the British government adopted a new policy: punishment and isolation of the center of insurgency--Boston. The policy assumed that the other colonies, and even rural Massachusetts, were disturbed by the extremity of the latest actions of Boston insurgents and would be intimidated by the example made of the Boston community. The policy was considered to depend upon the application of overwhelming force and the achievement of clear-cut success at a single point.

The policy assumption proved completely wrong. Coercive laws and the manifest intention to enforce them with troops gave insurgent leaders greater leverage than ever before outside Boston. Despite many misgivings, the Massachusetts countryside and other colonies concluded that they had no choice but to support Boston, since the new policy of community punishment and isolation seemed to threaten the political and legal integrity of every colony.

From this support, Boston acquired military force sufficient to make the first military encounters inconclusive (Lexington, Concord, Bunker Hill, and the siege of Boston), and susceptible to description as moral victories for the insurgents. Nothing did more to expand and consolidate rebel support throughout America.

Some aspects of the British performance may be noted. The outbreak of open fighting came in an attempt to break up an insurgent base area. British intelligence of the target was good, but it failed in two other critical respects. It could not prevent the transmission of every British order and movement throughout the civilian population, and it grossly underestimated the rebel will and capability for large-scale combat: "These people show a spirit and conduct against us that they never showed against the French, and everybody has judged them from their former appearance and behavior, which has led many into great mistakes," reported the British CinC for America after Lexington and Concord (April 19, 1775). Related to this failure was the psychology of the British command. The long period of relative inaction before the outbreak and the CinC's increasingly pessimistic estimates of

the situation during that period finally put him in the position of having to take some action in order to redeem himself in the eyes of his own government. The first setback between Concord and Boston prepared the way for the second at Bunker Hill (June 25, 1775), since an even more sensational battlefield success was required for redemption. A British general officer described why a tactically reckless assault was made at the latter:

The respect and control and subordination of government depends in a great measure upon the idea that trained troops are invincible against any numbers or any position of untrained rabble; and this idea was a little in suspense since the 19th of April.

Phase II (early 1776-early 1778)

When the attempt to isolate Boston from support elsewhere in the colonies failed, the British government found itself faced with what looked to be a fairly conventional war. The American rebels were organizing an army on European lines, and the game now seemed to be one of prolonged maneuvering in order to bring that army to a decisive battle. The principal base of British operations was shifted from Boston (a dead-end in terms of strategic geography) to New York, which was a superior port with access to the best lines of communication into the American interior. An incidental consideration, but no more than that, was the greater friendliness of the civilian population in the Middle Atlantic theater of operations as compared with New England.

The underlying policy assumption, which was not very closely examined at the time, was that success in conventional operations against the main rebel army would more or less automatically bring a restoration of political control in the wake of military victory.

The assumption proved to be not wholly wrong. A series of tactical successes through the summer and fall of 1776 not only secured the New York port area, but produced a striking collapse of resistance in New Jersey as well. Without any special effort by the British command, local rebel leaders fled or went into hiding as the main rebel army withdrew. The local rebel militia, which had firmly controlled the communities of New Jersey, tended to disintegrate and to be replaced by an improvised loyal militia. It is clear that almost every civilian in New Jersey believed that the rebellion would collapse completely and that it was not too soon to reach an accommodation with the royal authorities.

The government granted free pardon to all civilians who would take an oath of allegiance, and almost 5,000 Americans accepted the offer in a few weeks, including one signer of the Declaration of Independence.

The failure of the pacification campaign in New Jersey, after such a promising start, had two major causes, one external, the other internal.

The internal cause is neatly summarized in a pair of quotations from two British observers: one noted that the lenient policy toward the civilian population "violently offends all those who have suffered for their attachment to government"; the other noted "the licentiousness of the troops, who committed every species of rapine and plunder." British regulars and especially their non-English speaking German auxiliaries--products of the hard school of European warfare--tended to regard all civilians as possible rebels and hence fair game. Even if civilians avoided the regular foragers, they were not permitted to relapse into passive loyalty if they had ever shown the slightest sympathy for the rebel cause. Loyal bands of militia regarded retribution as their principal function and were determined that no rebel should escape, pardon or no pardon. In many cases, former neutrals or lukewarm rebels found no advantage in submission to government and came to see flight, destruction, or resistance as the only available alternatives.

The other, external cause of failure stemmed from the British attempt to control and live off the central part of New Jersey: brigade garrisons were deployed among towns, mainly for administrative convenience. Not surprisingly, the rebel main army, weak as it was, was able to achieve local superiority and exploit its excellent tactical intelligence to pick off two of these garrisons (Trenton December 26, 1776; Princeton January 3, 1777). The tactical effects were modest, but the strategic and psychological effects were enormous. British forces were withdrawn from all exposed locations and henceforth kept concentrated. The morale of rebels, already sensitized by harsh treatment, soared, while the morale of loyal civilians, now out of range of British regular support, dropped sharply. Almost all New Jersey quickly came under insurgent control. The international repercussions of Trenton and Princeton were likewise serious.

One noteworthy point: in the only intensive study made of a single community during this period (Bergen County), it is apparent that the local and bloody battles between rebel and loyal militia were related to prewar animosities between ethnic groups, political rivals, churches, and even neighbors.

The campaign of 1777 was essentially a continuation of the strategy of 1776: to bring the rebel main army to decisive battle and to quarantine New England insurgency by gaining control of the Hudson Valley. Civilian attitudes affected planning in two ways. Because the unexpected continuation of the war for another year strained British military manpower, one British force would move to Philadelphia, not only luring the main rebel army to defend its capital, but also permitting the recruitment of badly needed provincial troops from the supposedly friendly population. Another British force would move down the Champlain-Mohawk-Hudson corridor on the assumption that government supporters were numerous in that area, and Indian auxiliaries could terrorize those who were not. The campaign was a disaster, in large part because the intelligence estimates (gleaned mainly from exile sources) were grossly in error. The Canadian force simply drowned in a hostile sea (Saratoga October 17, 1777), which its Indian allies had done much to roil and its commander little to calm. The Philadelphia force could not assist it when unexpected local resistance in Pennsylvania slowed every movement. Other factors contributed to the disaster, especially a three-way failure to agree on the basic concept of the whole operation, which was attributable only in part to the slowness of transatlantic communications. But a primary cause was the miscalculation of time-space factors, to which an erroneous conception of the civilian environment within which military operations were to be conducted contributed materially.

Throughout this second phase of the war, the British military and naval CinCs were empowered to negotiate with rebel political and military leaders. These negotiations came to nothing, because the rebel military situation was never truly desperate except briefly at the end of 1776, and because rebel unity depended on adherence to political demands which the British government was not yet willing to concede. It has been argued that this diplomatic effort inhibited British military operations, but there is no direct evidence to support the contention. Equally plausible is the view that cautious British operations were a result of tactical lessons learned in America during the Seven Years' War and the opening battles of the Revolution.

Phase III (early 1778-late 1781)

The third and last phase of the war is most interesting from the viewpoint of isolating insurgents from civilian support. Escalation of the war, when Britain attacked France after the latter allied itself with the rebels following Saratoga, shifted the

focus of conflict to the West Indies, which were of great economic and strategic value to both powers. For more than a year, strategy on the mainland was defensive: occupation of New York and Newport plus naval blockade and coastal raids. During this pause, a general reevaluation of British strategy took place. For the first time, the civilian population came to be the major factor in planning. As never before, it was seen that loyal and neutral civilians had to be organized and protected before pacification could be achieved, and that the great pool of civilian manpower largely accounted for the surprising resilience of the rebel main armies. Because civilian response had so far been disappointing in New England and the Middle Atlantic states, because West Indian and mainland operations now had to be coordinated, and because earlier small-scale operations had produced a surprisingly favorable response from civilians in the southern colonies, it was decided to begin the new campaign of pacification in the South. By some British officials the South had always been seen as the soft underbelly of the rebellion, with its scattered population, its fear of slave uprisings, strong Indian tribes at its back, and a split between tidewater and upcountry societies in the Carolinas which approached a state of civil war. At last it was understood that the recruitment of loyal provincial troops merely for use in conventional operations often had deprived an area of the very people who might control it; high priority would now be given to the formation of local self-defense forces. The basic concept was to regain complete military control of some one major colony, restore full civil government, and then expand both control and government in a step-by-step operation. A heavy stream of advice from loyal American exiles supported the plan.

The new strategy was linked to the political situation in Britain itself. Increasingly, the government had justified a costly and controversial war to members of the House of Commons on the ground that Britain had an unbreakable commitment to defend loyal Americans against rebel vengeance. The government thus staked its political life on the success of pacification in the South. The decision, however, was not seen as a gamble so much as the pursuit of a logical course, because the government, especially the king and his principal war leader (Germain), had always believed that most Americans, given a chance to choose freely, would support the Crown. When Lord North, nominally prime minister, but in a weak position within his own government, expressed an opinion that the war was no longer worth its cost, the king rebuked him by saying that "this is only weighing such events in the scale of a tradesman behind his counter," and that American independence would surely lead to the loss, one after another, of the other British colonies.

The campaign began well. Amphibious attack captured Savannah (December 29, 1778) and led to a collapse of rebel resistance in the more densely populated part of Georgia. Twenty loyal militia companies were organized and 1,400 Georgians swore allegiance to the king. Yet certain problems appeared which would recur throughout the Southern campaign and which would never be solved. In attempting to clear rebel remnants away from pacified areas, British regulars pushed detachments to Augusta and toward Charleston, beyond the limit where they could be permanently maintained at that time. Subsequent withdrawal of these detachments led to the deterioration of loyal militia units left in these outlying areas and to an adverse effect on the future behavior of their loyal and neutral residents. Furthermore, regular commanders revealed themselves as unduly optimistic in deciding that any particular area had been pacified and could safely be left to defend itself. Finally, troops and even some commanders could not be made to treat civilians (except those actually in arms for the Crown) as anything but suspected rebels, despite explicit directives from London and headquarters to the contrary.

Large reinforcements in 1780 brought about the capture of Charleston (May 12) and its large rebel garrison; the other large rebel army in the Carolinas was destroyed at Camden (August 16). Now mounted forces successfully employed irregular tactics and achieved tactical mobility equal or superior to that of the rebels. Upcountry, loyal militia was organized district by district: men over 40 were assigned to local defense while those younger served as territorial auxiliaries. Every effort was made to meet the rebel threat by effective countermeasures at the local level. Moreover, the orders of the CinC to the Inspector of Militia show the spirit in which these measures were undertaken:

You will pay particular attention to restrain the militia from offering violence to innocent and inoffensive people, and by all means in your power protect the aged, the infirm, the women and children from insult and outrage.

In the end, the policy failed; the question is, why? Small groups of rebel irregulars could not be eliminated altogether. They hid in some of the least accessible swamps and mountains, or operated from unpacified prorebel locations on the periphery--in upper Georgia or southern North Carolina. These irregulars made complete physical security unattainable for many pacified areas. Rebel bands usually could achieve local superiority against any particular body of self-defense militia, and sometimes even against mobile detachments. In an action reminiscent of both

Trenton and Saratoga, a group of rebels quickly built up strength to wipe out an unsupported loyal force of 1,000 men at King's Mountain (October 7, 1780). Thus, neither side had the capability of fully protecting its supporters among the civilian population, and a ferocious guerrilla war spread throughout South Carolina and into Georgia and North Carolina. Areas thought to have been pacified quickly slipped out of control, sometimes because terrorized or overrun by rebel guerrillas, more often because loyal forces fought their own little wars of counterterror against rebels, rebel sympathizers, suspects, and anyone else they disliked.

Almost every British action appears to have exacerbated this situation. The chronic rough treatment of civilians by regulars simply could not be curbed to any significant extent. Moreover, the British force that had successfully employed irregular tactics (Tarleton) quickly acquired in the course of its operations a reputation for inhumanity which drove apathetic civilians toward the rebels for protection. A proclamation offering full rights of citizenship and pardon to all who would take the oath of allegiance, but declaring all others rebels, drove many paroled rebel prisoners out of the neutral position which they had assumed and back into active rebellion. At the same time, the conciliatory aspect of this policy infuriated loyal auxiliaries, militia, and irregulars, who increasingly ignored official policy and orders, and took matters into their own hands. A loyalist observer (who had defected some time before from the rebel side) described South Carolina as "a piece of patch work, the inhabitants of every settlement, when united in sentiment, being in arms for the side they liked best, and making continual inroads into one another's settlements." During this civil war, there was little difference between loyalists and rebels in terms of organization, tactics, or the use of terror. Pacification had failed well before a new rebel army was organized in central North Carolina.

The failure of pacification, and the reappearance of this large rebel force to the northward (Greene), led the British commander to return, almost with a sigh of relief, to more conventional operations. Priorities were shifted, mobile forces were concentrated, and the principal objective became the destruction of the rebel army through maneuver, battle, and pursuit. This new approach ended in disaster (Yorktown October 19, 1781) when the British temporarily lost command of sea lines of communication with the southern army. From that time on, all serious attempts to pacify the interior were given up, and only New York and Charleston were maintained as impregnable base areas until the end of the war (April 1783).

Certain aspects of the failure of pacification require emphasis. One is that neither British nor rebel leaders regarded the bloody civil war in the Carolinas as "favorable" to their side; both tried to curb it in order to gain political control and to prevent large-scale alienation of potentially friendly civilians. But it was beneficial to the rebels inasmuch as they could choose to operate in prorebel areas while the British were constrained to operate everywhere. Furthermore, the relative proximity of a large British regular army had a surprisingly unfavorable effect on civilian attitudes. One might say that civilians tended to overreact to the army. Depending on the particular circumstances, civilians were intimidated by it and so behaved "loyally," for which they later suffered; or they were disillusioned by its predatory conduct and lack of sympathy for the precarious position of the civilian; or they felt secure in its presence, and committed violent acts under its aegis which ultimately created prorebel sympathy; or they saw it as an alternative, a place of flight and refuge; or they were demoralized when it moved away and refused to protect them, their homes and families.

This last point may be the most important: every major British troop movement in the American Revolution created shock waves of civilian behavior in the surrounding area. Repeatedly loyal and neutral civilians responded excessively, prematurely, and unwisely (in terms of their own personal security) to the appearance of British troops, only to see those troops withdraw or move elsewhere. British leaders throughout the war assumed that civilian attitudes and behavior were more or less constants which could be measured by civilian actions on any specific occasion when they became visible. In fact, each of these occasions brought about a permanent change in the attitude and behavior of those civilians who were involved in, or even aware of, what happened; over time, these occasions had a major, cumulative effect. By 1780-1781, perhaps earlier in some places, most civilians, however weary, unhappy, or apathetic toward the rebellion they might be, were fairly sure of one thing: the British government no longer could or would protect them, and sooner or later the rebels would return. Under these circumstances, civilian attitudes could no longer be changed by British policies or actions.

The problem posed by outside support and the attempts made to block it can be described much more briefly.

Phase A (1774-1777) was characterized by covert outside support. The blockade of colonial ports was partially effective

but could not prevent the infiltration of low-bulk critical items (money, munitions, and cadre). It may be that the naval CinC was too lenient in unofficially permitting some noncontraband trade in the Carolinas and Chesapeake Bay area, but he believed that close blockade would alienate a potentially loyal region. There is no evidence, however, to indicate that this leak was crucial to the war in any way.

Phase B (1778-1783) was a period of global war for Britain, in which support for American rebels was overt and included 8,000-9,000 regular troops and seapower as great as Britain's own. Because Britain had retained no Continental allies after the Seven Years' War, it found itself unable to attack or divert outside support at the source (on the European Continent), and instead had to disperse most of its energy on the strategic defensive, fending off threats to India, Gibraltar, Minorca, the West Indies, and the home islands. Perhaps Britain could not have avoided going to war with France (1778), Spain (1779), and Holland (1780), but escalation in each case probably made a bad situation worse, and the evidence indicates that little serious thought or effort was given to the limitation of conflict. Escalation actually served to loosen the blockade of America and led to the final disaster at Yorktown, which ended the attempt to suppress rebellion, ultimately brought down the government, and weakened the monarchy itself.

Administrative machinery was clearly inadequate to cope with rebellion. Local officials were comparatively few: elective officials were often rebel leaders or sympathizers, while appointive officials were displaced by extralegal organizations which paralleled royal government. Militia was the only police force within an armed population, and the rebels quickly purged it and made it an effective instrument of insurgent local control. Those loyal civilians who might have been organized to perform police functions were ignored in 1775, recruited for conventional military service in 1776-1777, and, when finally employed as police in 1778-1781, behaved badly toward civilians and resisted playing their low-prestige role. Consequently government control was limited, except in New Jersey in 1776 and Georgia and South Carolina in 1779-1780, to the ground physically occupied by the regular army. And in those areas, even when long occupied, it proved impossible to return power to civil authorities.

Government attempts to deal with public opinion in the insurgent areas were largely ineffectual, despite the common cultural background of the government and the rebels. Local appeals were

often vitiated by troop misconduct, poor intelligence, and inapplicable assumptions about rebel psychology and colonial social structure. Use of foreign mercenaries and Indians probably did more to alienate civilians than to terrify them or assist military operations. Conciliatory appeals were invariably one or two steps behind the development of insurgent objectives. Finally, the government simply could not resolve the dilemma that harsh measures tended to alienate neutrals and rebel supporters, while conciliatory measures alienated actively loyal elements.

At home, the government was able to maintain strong public support despite its lack of military success against the rebellion. In particular, the outbreak of war muted some of the fairly vigorous criticism of government policy which was uttered before 1774, and the expansion of the war to include France further reduced criticism. But in its efforts to maintain public support for the war, the government had to promise more than it could produce and became increasingly committed to defense of loyal Americans as the justification for its strategic decisions. Consequently, public support was strong but brittle; it crumbled after the Yorktown disaster, when all hopes based on the alleged loyalty of most Americans suddenly evaporated.

British determination to prosecute the war was greatly strengthened by a sincere belief that loss of America would start an inevitable decay of the British international position and by mercantilist economic doctrine, which argued that British wealth and power depended on naval supremacy which in turn depended on control of the colonies and the exclusion of other European powers from access to them. Aristocratic concepts of administrative and political behavior may have weakened the government somewhat in its fight against the rebellion, but historians have too often exaggerated this facet of the war; British leaders were neither dolts nor dilettantes. It is barely possible that a sense of fighting fellow Englishmen may have inhibited military commanders in exploiting tactical success, but the contemporary code of war on balance aided the government, because it induced the rebels to fight in a more conventional way.

OUTCOME

In the end, the rebels achieved all their objectives. Yet, considering the disadvantageous strategic situation of 1781-1782, the government was able to conclude a surprisingly favorable peace, and Britain quickly regained its leading international

position.* Fears for British power were as misplaced as had been the hopes for loyal American support.

No simple lessons for the 20th Century emerge from the American Revolutionary War. Yet some general observations are warranted. Once the war had passed a certain point--a point that varied with the locality, but might roughly be placed in early 1777--it became extremely difficult to alter the behavior of the civilian population substantially, either by force or by persuasion. Though the British lacked the modern techniques of air power and social science, they had comparatively great military strength and their understanding of the political dimension of the conflict was more sophisticated than is usually recognized. They came to see the importance of pacifying the civilian population, but they could never resolve the dilemmas which actually doing it presented to them. In this connection, it should be noted that a common race and language did little either to diminish the alienation of the insurgents, or to prevent British miscalculation of the American response to shifts of policy and strategy. In other words, conflict itself seems to have nourished the kind of illusions and delusions that in the 20th Century are sometimes charged to a cultural or racial gap between insurgents and counterinsurgents.

British defeat has been explained in various ways: by poor leadership, by momentary French naval superiority, and by British psychological exhaustion. All such explanations suggest that, with more military power, more efficiently and more resolutely applied, a British victory would have been possible, even probable. The actual events of seven years, however, offer little support for this view. Though the insurgent effort fell far short of the ideal standards set for it at the time by American leaders (and later by American historians), its extraordinary endurance and resilience need to be recognized by anyone who would grasp what really happened.** Certainly the war could have been prolonged, perhaps indefinitely, especially with better luck against the French at sea. But when one focuses on the actors themselves, it becomes more apparent that the very continuation of warfare provided motivational fuel for insurgency, and that a true British victory was not likely short of physically destroying a great number of both the insurgents and their civilian supporters.

*This, of course, was primarily due to a series of British naval victories in the global war against France, Spain, and Holland, after the Revolution itself had been virtually decided at Yorktown.

**The important element of superb leadership, military and political, among the rebels contributed significantly.

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[NOTE: Quotations in the text have in some cases been modernized in minor respects.]

The American Civil War

by

Marshall Andrews

GENERAL

By its very nature the Civil War which embroiled the United States with the Southern Confederacy (1861-1865) produced guerrilla warfare of a most marked, brutal, and vicious kind. Not only were parts of the Confederacy occupied almost from the beginning by Union forces, against which sometimes desultory and sometimes violent guerrilla activities were invoked, but long-standing vendettas in some border states were simply continued under the aegis of war.

Furthermore, guerrilla tactics were employed by both sides, though more particularly by the Confederacy, against the communications of the other, using formally organized and recognized troop components. These operations were generally of two sorts: those of "partisan" commands regularly enlisted and under officers holding formal commissions, which disbanded between forays; and raids of cavalry units bent on crippling destruction, liberation of prisoners, or some other such objective. The former method was pursued generally by the Confederacy in Union-occupied territory, the latter generally by the Union in Confederate territory not yet occupied but accessible. Nevertheless, both methods were used at times by both belligerents.

Neither army ever succeeded, except in a very few minor and inconsequential cases, in isolating guerrillas or partisans from their bases of support, even though special Union counter-guerrilla bands were organized, some operating in Confederate uniform.

CONDITIONS AFFECTING GUERRILLA WARFARE

Since the fundamental basis of the Civil War was an irreconcilable political incompatibility, it was only to be expected that men of Union sympathies, many of them slaveholders, were caught in the secession of the 11 southern states forming the Confederacy. In like manner, not a few advocates of secession remained in the north, where their opposition to the Federal Government and its acts at times proved troublesome, not only in the border states but in the Midwest, New York, and New England.

With a few exceptions, Union men in the south were inhibited by the bellicose partisanship surrounding them from any overt acts in behalf of their convictions. The major exception was the separation from Virginia of its 40 western counties in 1861 and their admission as the 35th state of the Union in 1863.

In the other border states there was much unrest and some defiance of Federal authority; the governors of Kentucky, Missouri, Arkansas, Tennessee, Maryland, and Virginia refused to furnish troops to "coerce" their sister states. Subsequently Arkansas, Tennessee, and Virginia joined the Confederacy, while the other three states, though remaining in the Union, supplied military units to both sides.

East Tennessee, northern Alabama, and northern Georgia contained strong pro-Union factions. In Alabama and Georgia these factions were generally powerless until late in the war when Union troops reached them; in east Tennessee a situation existed almost comparable to that in West Virginia.

In the north, opposition to "coercion" of states, the war itself, and, in particular, Republican politics, resulted in much ill-feeling and no little disorder. Democratic and pro-southern secret societies, with a weird catalog of oaths, handshakes, and ritualistic mummery, rose up, especially in Kentucky, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. These were matched by Union societies with equally fantastic rituals but with the power of the Federal Government and the Union army behind them.

Thus the Knights of the Golden Circle, Sons of Liberty, Circle of Hosts, Union Relief Society, and the Order of American Knights annoyed, horsewhipped, and sometimes murdered Union men in the north. Collaterally, the Union League and the Order of the Stars and Stripes, among others, were retaliating with, or

initiating, similar outrages against southern sympathizers. In general none of these disorders got beyond the control of local authorities.

But with adoption of conscription for the Union army in 1863 anti-Union activity assumed a character considerably more threatening to the central government. In Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, pro-southern organizations assisted several thousands of conscripted men to desert and occasionally armed them to resist recapture. Wholesale resistance to the draft, sometimes with Democratic and other pro-southern support, took place in New York, New Jersey, and Delaware, and even in New Hampshire, Vermont, and Connecticut. The Illinois legislature, about to enact bills restoring the writ of habeas corpus and barring Negroes from the state, was prorogued by the Republican governor before the bills could be passed. The Indiana legislature attempted to recognize the Confederacy and cut all ties with New England, but was thwarted by the calculated absence of sufficient Republican members to prevent a quorum.

In the Confederacy, the States' Rights doctrine on which it was founded soon came into conflict with the rigid central control necessary in the prosecution of a war. Georgia's Governor Joseph E. Brown refused to permit Georgians to be drafted for military service outside of his state. In North Carolina Governor Zebulon B. Vance not only opposed conscription, but declined to permit foodstuffs to be exported for use of the Confederate army and, near the end of the war, made gestures toward a separate peace with the Union.

In addition to these generally political acts of nonconformity or resistance, guerrilla warfare of terrible ferocity, provoking acts of retaliation no more gentle, was tormenting the states of Missouri, Kansas, Kentucky, Arkansas, and Texas. In Virginia and West Virginia insurgency of another sort was under way: partly true guerrilla warfare in West Virginia and, in Virginia, the application of guerrilla tactics by organized military units, both Union and Confederate.

In some parts of the border country, especially the heavily forested mountains of eastern Kentucky and western West Virginia, relentless guerrilla fighting persisted long after the war. As late as the 1880s one of these border feuds almost brought Kentucky and West Virginia into armed conflict.¹

PREPARATION FOR GUERRILLA WARFARE

Although guerrilla warfare had been practiced with considerable effect by Patriots and Tories alike during the Revolution, its future possibility and the means of conducting or countering it apparently did not occur to the leaders of the young Republic.

Nowhere in the Acts of Congress or in Army Regulations is there specific recognition of guerrilla or partisan service until the Regulations of 1857, those in force, with amendments, during the Civil War. In the Regulations of that year appeared a brief section on "Partisans and Flankers," under Instructions for Cavalry. The duties of these forces, detached from the main column, were "to reconnoitre at a distance on the flanks of the army, to protect its operations, to deceive the enemy, to interrupt his communications, to intercept his couriers and his correspondence, to threaten or destroy his magazines, to carry off his posts and his convoys or, at all events, to retard his march by making him detach largely for their protection."

It was noted that "while these partisan corps fatigue the enemy and embarrass his operations, they endeavor to inspire confidence and secure the good will of the inhabitants in a friendly country and hold them in check in an enemy's country. . . . The partisan commander must frequently supply by strategem and audacity what he wants in numbers."

These instructions and admonitions were copied into the Confederate army regulations. But the small attention generally accorded guerrilla and partisan warfare in the military thinking of this country prior to the Civil War is well indicated by its treatment in a Military Dictionary published in 1861.

Under Guerilla (sic), one finds "See Partisan." At that heading no distinction between guerrilla and partisan is made; indeed, although the partisan is described as a detached soldier, he is defined as a guerrilla.

In its definition of "War" the same dictionary, after examining the dictates of international law and the common usages of war, declares that "the whole international code is founded on reciprocity" (emphasis in original). Therefore, it concludes, retaliation is both allowable and customary to restrain an enemy from excesses and violations of the laws of war. But, since the existence of war tends to place all the subjects of each belligerent power in a state of mutual hostility, the laws of nations had

sought to ameliorate the natural consequences of such a condition by legalizing the warlike acts only of those formally designated as military personnel by the state.

"Hence," this examination concludes, "it is that in land wars, irregular bands of marauders are liable to be treated as lawless banditti, not entitled to the protection of the mitigated uses of war as practiced by civilized nations."

With these inadequate, confused, and sometimes contradictory ideas of guerrilla warfare, the United States and the Confederacy entered upon a conflict that included guerrilla action from its first day. At the outset, especially in the border states and in quickly occupied areas of the south, guerrillas and suspected guerrillas captured by Union forces were summarily tried by court-martial and sentenced as criminals or, in some cases, executed. Unfortunately for this practice, the principle of retaliation also existed and Confederate threats to retaliate on Union prisoners generally put a stop to it except in those areas where sectional bitterness bred bloody excesses on both sides.

After Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck had been called to overall army command at Washington he sought the help, on August 6, 1862, of Dr. Francis Lieber, an international lawyer of high repute. Halleck wrote:

The rebel authorities claim the right to send men, in the garb of peaceful citizens, to waylay and attack our troops, to burn bridges and houses, and to destroy property and persons within our lines. They demand that such persons be treated as ordinary belligerents, and that when captured they have extended to them the same rights as other prisoners of war; they also threaten that if such persons be punished as marauders and spies they will retaliate by executing our prisoners of war in their possession. I particularly request your views on these questions.

Lieber promptly replied with a long brief in which he recognized the question as "substantially a new topic in the law of war" (emphasis supplied). After defining the term "guerrilla" and pointing out that it had been variously construed, and that activities of guerrillas were at the time disturbing the governments of both belligerents, he made these points:

1. As currently understood in the United States a guerrilla party was "an irregular band of armed men, carrying on an irregular

war. . . . The irregularity of the guerrilla party consists in its origin, for it is either self-constituted or constituted by the call of a single individual, not according to the general law of levy, conscription or volunteering," as well as in its disconnection from the army and its impermanency as an organization.

2. Guerrillas normally pillage from friend as well as from foe since, not being connected with the army, they can subsist in no other way.

3. Guerrillas destroy for the mere sake of destruction, since their operations can be directed at no overall strategic goal.

4. Associated with guerrillas is the idea of "necessitated murder," since the guerrilla cannot encumber himself with prisoners of war and expects to be killed in turn if captured, "thus introducing a system of barbarity which becomes intenser in its demoralization as it spreads and is prolonged."

5. Lax organization and dependence of the leader on the band leads to poor discipline and consequent lack of control over the band's actions.

6. The rising of a citizenry, whether or not uniformed and organized, to repel invasion is justifiable, but he who renews war within an occupied territory "has been universally treated with the utmost rigor of the military law" because he "exposes the occupying army to the greatest danger, and essentially interferes with the mitigation of the severity of war."

Lieber made the first clear distinction between guerrillas and partisans (pointing out that Halleck had failed to do so in his own work on international law published in 1861). The partisan, according to Lieber, was a regularly constituted soldier, detached from the main body, acting under legitimate orders, and entitled to treatment as a prisoner of war provided he had violated no recognized rules or usages of war in his partisan activities. Then he reached these conclusions:

The law of war, however, would not extend a similar favor to small bodies of armed country people, near the lines, whose very smallness shows that they must resort to occasional fighting and to occasional assuming of peaceful habits, and of brigandage. The law of war would still less favor them when they trespass within the hostile lines to commit devastation,

rapine, or destruction. . . . So much is certain, that no army, no society engaged in war, any more than a society at peace, can allow unpunished assassination, robbery, and devastation without the deepest injury to itself and disastrous consequences which might change the very issue of the war.²

Halleck, while commanding the Union Department of the Mississippi, with headquarters at St. Louis, Missouri, had already issued, on March 3, 1862, General Orders No. 2,³ warning "all persons" that "if they join any guerrilla band, they will not, if captured, be treated as prisoners of war, but will be hung as robbers and murderers." Anyone joining such an organization, the order declared, "forfeits his life and becomes an outlaw."

Copies of Dr. Lieber's opinion were distributed and, in some cases, incorporated in General Orders of Department commanders. This opinion, or its publication, in no way altered the attitudes of commanders toward guerrillas or their treatment, except by affording them support for stringent measures.

Most certainly it did not affect the conduct of the guerrillas themselves, whether their declared allegiance was to the Union or the Confederacy.

GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

It would be a sheer impossibility to describe, or attempt to discuss in detail, all of the guerrilla and partisan activities that took place, actually or by repute, during the Civil War. Such activities were reported constantly by commanders in the field, wherever the armies operated. Many of these activities were genuine guerrilla or partisan attacks; of some, rather complete records have survived. Yet a great many of those reported must have been purely alarmist, or devised by commanders to account for delays, losses, or failures.

On the basis of the written record, guerrillas were everywhere all the time, and fights with them consumed more time and powder than did the great pitched battles between armies. Research in this field leads to the suspicion that if all the guerrillas reported by Union officers to have been killed, wounded, and captured were added up the sum would more than equal all the guerrillas who ever fired a shot on both sides. The same suspicion with respect to Confederate reports must be withheld only because those reports are fragmentary and incomplete.

This is not to deny or to discount the fact that troops operating in the enemy's country were subject to constant and sometimes costly harassment. In every occupied area of the south, even in those of predominant Union sentiment, there were bands of guerrillas, perhaps only three or four men bent principally on pillage, which struck when and where they could and disappeared after each attack. Often these small bands were never officially identified, in which case their depredations would be attributed to known guerrillas. Sometimes they undertook more than they could handle and were wiped out in battle or captured and summarily executed; many of them ultimately joined and lost their identities in larger bands, accepting the new leadership and discipline to whatever extent they chose.

In any event, the results of guerrilla warfare and of partisan attacks employing guerrilla tactics were serious enough in themselves to need no embroidery. One historian of Civil War guerrilla activities, Virgil Carrington Jones, has estimated that Confederate guerrillas held back as many as 200,000 Union troops from the active armies. Col. John Singleton Mosby, himself a most active and successful Confederate partisan leader, wrote after the war that, with no more than 200 men, he was able at one time to force detachment of 30,000 troops from the Union Army of the Potomac.

In some of the border states whole counties were ravaged and depopulated by or in consequence of guerrilla warfare. Civil wars within the Civil War were fought, and commanders in both armies now and then turned against their own guerrilla bands with threats or direct action. This type of warfare will be examined first in order.

Guerrilla Warfare

When the US Congress in 1854 upset the 34-year-old Missouri Compromise by passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, it laid the foundation for perhaps the bloodiest and most disreputable episode in American history. The Missouri Compromise of 1820 had banned slavery north of latitude 36° 30'; the Kansas-Nebraska Act permitted admission of Kansas and Nebraska territories, both north of that line, as free states or slave, depending on the vote of their residents when sufficient population had been attained to warrant statehood.

Kansas, clearly able first to meet the population requirement, became a battleground for domination by both interests. Altruism, idealism, compassion, intolerance, vengeance, thievery, murder, duplicity, greed, all had their parts and all became inextricably mixed in the contest for Kansas. Slaveholders already there, reinforced by Missourians and adventurers from other parts of the south, collided not only with free-state Kansans but with numerous outsiders, some dedicated abolitionists, some fishing in troubled waters, and some imported and armed by the Emigrant Aid Society of New England.

This local war was at full heat when the greater war supervened. The local war was one of sudden forays in the night by forces of one complexion against the farms and homes of the other. Men were shot down before their families, their homesteads burned, their slaves seized, and their crops destroyed. John Brown, destined to achieve limited apotheosis at Harpers Ferry, Virginia, won hosannas in the north and execration in the south when he and his sons called out five proslavery men in the night at Pottawatomie, Kansas, and cut them down while their womenfolk were forced to look on.

It was war of guerrilla against guerrilla from which certain identifiable bands and leaders emerged. On the antislavery side were "Regulators," "Jayhawkers," and "Redlegs," led by such men as James H. Lane of Lawrence, Kansas, and Charles R. Jennison, a bloodthirsty expatriate New Yorker. Jim Lane was to become a Union brigadier general and Senator from Kansas when it was admitted as a state in 1861. Jennison got a colonel's commission in the Union army which lent a veneer of respectability to his stepped-up forays into western Missouri.

Proslavery forces were "Bushwhackers" and "Border Ruffians," whose leadership prior to the war is vague, but whose deeds were as atrocious as any committed in the name of abolition.

Among the Jayhawkers, perhaps in 1859 and certainly in 1860, was one William Clarke Quantrill,⁴ a young man from Ohio who had worked as schoolteacher, prospector, farmer, and, reputedly, under the alias Charlie Hart, as a professional gambler. At none of these various endeavors did he achieve the financial success he sought. Then his membership in the Kansas Jayhawkers threw rich opportunity his way.

Quantrill learned the lucrative trade, common enough in the border wars, of enticing slaves from their masters with promises of freedom, then returning them for the usual reward. The future

guerrilla leader, with a gang of associates in both Kansas and Missouri, was engaged in this remunerative enterprise when President Lincoln called for state troops to uphold the Union in April 1861.

While there were extreme elements in Missouri, especially along the Kansas border, the majority of its people were "conditional Unionists." This less than precise description meant that they were proslavery but had no wish to see the Union dissolved; if they could have had their way, Missouri would have remained neutral throughout the war. That, of course, was impossible, not only on its face, but because an undeclared state of war already existed between Missouri and Kansas, and active warfare had been going on in its western counties for five years.

President Lincoln, deploring this war within a war, nevertheless was forced to take sides in what he called "a pestilential factional quarrel." Jim Lane was a powerful Republican leader in Kansas, and slaveholding and secession were almost, if not quite, synonymous in the political semantics of the time. Abolitionists in Missouri and Kansas, the President said, were "utterly lawless . . . but, after all, their faces are set Zionward."

Missouri was quickly occupied by Union troops, with headquarters at St. Louis, and Missouri and Kansas militia were armed, uniformed, and mustered into Federal service. Union military strength in the Department of the Missouri averaged 50,000 throughout the war, fighting few major battles and dedicated almost exclusively to maintaining the authority of the central government.

The Jayhawkers and Redlegs under Lane and Jennison waited for no orders from Washington or St. Louis or anywhere else. Immediately on the outbreak of hostilities they began raiding in the guise of Union troops into western Missouri, burning towns and farmsteads, slaughtering civilians, and returning to Kansas with slaves and whatever other plunder they could cart away. General Halleck, soon after taking command at St. Louis in 1861, replaced many of their commanders, with the observation that "a few more such raids will make Missouri as Confederate as Eastern Virginia." Because of their political strength, Halleck could do nothing about Lane and Jennison, both of whom continued raiding into Missouri at will.

Among the numerous guerrilla bands operating in western Missouri ostensibly in support of the Confederate cause was one headed by Quantrill, the erstwhile Jayhawker. It included, then or later, some of the most unsavory characters spawned in the

general lawlessness of the border country. Among these were the Younger brothers and the James brothers, all destined for post-war notoriety as thieves and wanton murderers. Also among Quantrill's recruits were W.T. Anderson, George W. Todd, and David Pool, alike in their carelessness of human life, who were to become guerrilla leaders themselves and, under the license and provocations of guerrilla warfare, true homicidal psychotics.

In its early operations among the hills and dense woods and underbrush of western Missouri, Quantrill's gang had no vestige of official sanction. They were mostly young men (including one Negro who was extremely useful as a scout) who sought revenge for homes destroyed and kin slaughtered, or who joined Quantrill for adventure and plunder. It was not until August 15, 1862, that the gang was enlisted in the Confederate service by Colonel Gideon W. Thompson, one of several officers sent into the border states to stir up insurrection and enroll recruits. Quantrill was commissioned a Confederate captain and Anderson and Todd were elected lieutenants.

By the summer of 1862 the activities of Quantrill and other Confederate guerrillas in Missouri had become so troublesome that Brigadier General John M. Schofield, then in command at St. Louis, on July 22 issued General Orders No. 19, requiring all able-bodied men in Missouri to enlist in the (Union) State Militia, "for the purpose of exterminating the guerrillas that infest our state." Schofield also renewed Halleck's previous order that captured partisans were to be "shot down on the spot." This order, rather than mitigating the disorderly conditions in the state, no doubt increased them. Many men, sympathetic to the south but reluctant to take arms against the Union, were driven into hiding or into the ranks of one of the guerrilla bands. It most certainly had no effect in curbing the guerrillas.

Many organized military expeditions were sent into the border counties in an effort to stamp out the numerous guerrillas, as contrasted to the Jayhawker and Redleg raids solely for plunder and vengeance. None of these expeditions accomplished more than the destruction of a few more homesteads, the capture of a few questionable prisoners, and the shooting of citizens who may or may not have been guerrillas. The commander of one of these expeditions, Captain D.H. David of the Fifth Missouri Cavalry, let himself be ambushed by Quantrill. Returning to base, he declared: "We do not believe that guerrillas can ever be taken by pursuit, we must take them by strategy."⁵

With the advent of cold weather, with its rains and snows and defoliation of the guerrillas' natural cover, Quantrill led his band south into Arkansas.

His success during the first year of his operations may be attributed to several factors:

1. The difficult terrain from which he operated, in which concealment was easy, pursuit onerous, and ambushes of pursuing forces readily contrived.

2. The friendly attitude of much of the civilian population which had suffered greatly from Jayhawker and Redleg raids. Union sympathizers not subject to the same sense of outrage were terrorized by the guerrillas into cooperation with them and restraint toward their enemies.

A great many measures were placed in effect by the Union authorities to repress the guerrillas, and all of them failed. These measures included fines and imprisonment of actual or suspected guerrilla supporters, placing others under bond, burning the homes of guerrillas and their supporters, and summary execution of men found with arms who could not prove their loyalty. In many cases oaths of allegiance to the United States were required, which were cheerfully taken and as cheerfully disregarded, since those who took them considered them not binding, having been extracted under duress. None of these measures overcame the natural sympathy of those favoring the guerrillas or the fear of guerrilla revenge on the part of the loyal or neutral population.

Even with Quantrill gone south, guerrilla activities throughout Missouri continued during the winter. While none of these was as spectacular as his, or to any degree decisive, each of them was a harassment and a threat that had to be dealt with. As a result, Union detachments were out in all sorts of weather, mounts were worn out, men were dispirited, and more homes were burned, farms devastated, and citizens killed.

With the coming of spring in 1863, Quantrill returned from Arkansas and Indian Territory (now Oklahoma). For the first time he and his men began the practice of wearing Union cavalry uniforms, Quantrill identifying himself as "Captain Clarke" of the nonexistent Fourth Missouri Cavalry. This practice greatly assisted in surprising and ambushing Union troops and trains and led to confusion and suspicion among Union forces in the field. His successes and the glamor surrounding him and his band, added to the results of Union army, Jayhawker, and Redleg activities in the area, brought to him recruits in increasing numbers.

On June 16, 1863, Quantrill's men attacked and routed a detachment of the Ninth Kansas Cavalry near Westport, Missouri (the river landing at Kansas City), killing about 20 enemy troopers with no loss to themselves. The same day Brigadier General Thomas Ewing, Jr., assumed command of the new District of the Border, with headquarters at Kansas City, embracing all of Kansas north of the 38th parallel and the Missouri counties of Jackson, Bates, and Cass, between that parallel and the Missouri River.

The new District commander took prompt and drastic action. First he denounced the guerrilla bands of both sides, saying of the Jayhawkers and Redlegs that they were "stealing themselves rich in the name of liberty." All Kansas guerrillas were ordered arrested wherever found.

Against the Confederate guerrillas Ewing adopted in Missouri a two-pronged effort: (1) keeping them out of Kansas and (2) hunting them down and making their existence precarious in Missouri. The defenses in Kansas were strengthened and garrisons were placed at key towns to maintain constant counterguerrilla patrols. These methods proved no more successful in putting down the guerrillas than had those of his predecessors, and Ewing adopted the more fundamental tactic of striking at their bases.

On August 14, 1863, Ewing issued his General Order No. 10, ordering the arrest of all men and women "not heads of families" who were assisting the guerrillas in the three Missouri border counties. When arrested these people were to be taken to Kansas City for confinement, although the order did not specify how detachment commanders were to distinguish between those who had aided the guerrillas through sympathy and those forced to do so through fear. Wives and children of known guerrillas were to be deported from Missouri immediately, including women who were "heads of families." Guerrillas who voluntarily gave themselves up would be allowed to accompany their wives out of the state.

The deportation of women kin of known guerrillas already had been going on under a previous order of Schofield's and a number of these were confined in an ancient three-story brick building in Kansas City. This building collapsed August 13, killing five women and crippling one for life. Ewing had been warned that the building was unsafe, and the belief spread, not only among the Missouri guerrillas, but generally, that Union troops had deliberately undermined its walls.

At daylight August 21, 1863, Quantrill, with 300 to 400 guerrillas made up of his own gang reinforced by others, raided the town of Lawrence, Kansas, 35 miles southwest of Kansas City, perpetrating one of the bloodiest and most notorious atrocities of the border warfare. Lawrence, named after a Boston abolitionist, was established in 1854 by the Emigrant Aid Society of New England. Jim Lane's home was there, and the town had been the center of intense Free State activity in the prewar years.

Quantrill's raiders, although they had to march more than 40 miles through country patrolled by Union troops, achieved complete surprise. For three terrible hours the guerrillas held the town captive, looted all of its banks and most of its stores, murdered nearly 200 persons, most of them unarmed, and burned the business district and many residences, in all about 185 buildings.⁶ Among the residences burned was that of Jim Lane, in which the guerrillas claimed to have counted five pianos stolen from Missourians, a claim unsupported by any objective evidence but indicative of the prevailing state of feeling.

Quantrill led his guerrillas, with their loot and fresh horses taken in Kansas, in a masterly retreat back into Missouri. Not only were all Union troops within marching distance alerted and sent to intercept him, but many armed citizens joined in the chase. Covering his withdrawal with a rearguard of his best-mounted men, he lost only a few followers whose mounts gave out and left them afoot (Union claims ranging from 20 to more than 200 guerrillas killed on the retreat are discounted by their own inconsistencies). One thing is certain: those captured were promptly hanged by pursuing Jayhawkers and Redlegs. A subsequent report that one guerrilla was scalped by an Indian among the pursuers led to dreadful retaliation later.

Quantrill's apologists have maintained that the raid was in revenge for the collapse of the prison housing the guerrillas' womenfolk. General Schofield felt that it was in retribution for Ewing's General Order No. 10. Neither of these explanations takes into account the brief time that elapsed between either event and the raid itself. Planning and organization considered, it seems clear that Quantrill had prepared the raid well before either of those alleged provocations came into being. It was a deliberate, calculated act of warfare, with pillage and murder its principal objectives.

The consequences of the Lawrence raid were immediate and violent. Union cavalry commands pursued the guerrillas deep into their hiding places in western Missouri, but with small success.

Several "enemy" were reported killed in numerous skirmishes and attacks on farmsteads, but how many of these were guerrillas and how many innocent citizens cannot now be determined.

Of greater consequence were actions taken by Lane and Ewing. Having lost his home and barely escaping with his life, and being little short of a guerrilla himself, Lane called for an expedition by Kansas militia and citizens into Missouri to exact vengeance. The governor of Kansas appealed directly to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton for 1,000 stand of arms from the arsenal at Ft. Leavenworth, a request Stanton granted without consulting General Schofield. Lane's expedition was organized at a meeting at Leavenworth August 26 and the invasion of Missouri set for September 9.

Schofield at once directed Ewing: "Do not permit irresponsible parties to enter Missouri for retaliation." Ewing assured Schofield that he would oppose with dependable troops any invasion from Kansas. Meanwhile, Lane held another meeting at Leavenworth, at which it was agreed that armed parties should meet September 8 at Paola, Kansas, ready "to search for their stolen property in Missouri." Brigadier General Egbert R. Brown, commanding the District of Central Missouri, with headquarters at Jefferson City, forthrightly met this threat of lawless and bloody revenge. He issued Circular No. 6, dated September 3, declaring that armed bands of irresponsible Kansans entering Missouri would "be treated in the same manner as . . . other robbers, murderers, and marauders." If they refused to leave the district they were to be considered "open enemies warring against the Government."

Then General Brown disclosed his own intention to proceed with dispatch against Quantrill and called on citizens to arm themselves to protect their homes. He ended his circular with the resounding invocation: "Soldiers, remember Lawrence! . . . Guerrillas are outlaws and are to receive no quarters."

The final outcome of Lane's call for vengeance by direct and independent action was, in the face of this determined military opposition, perhaps a little anticlimactic. Schofield, aware that "so absurd a proposition as that of Mr. Lane could not have been made in good faith," told the Senator-General that he and his "lawless rabble" would be met by force if they attempted any invasion of Missouri. Several hundred people met at Paola as scheduled, listened to an impassioned speech by Lane, and then dispersed. General Schofield, whose "imbecility and incapacity," Lane had informed President Lincoln, were "most deplorable," had won hands down.

Quantrill and his gang remained safely hidden in the hills and tangled forests of western Missouri, and against them General Ewing directed General Order No. 11, dated August 25, 1863. Under this order, the northern part of Vernon County, Missouri, was added to the three counties depopulated under General Order No. 10. All hay and grain in the fields or under shelter was to be seized for the Government and moved out of the county. Finally, paragraph 3 of General Order No. 10, permitting guerrillas to surrender subject to banishment with their families, was rescinded.

The effect of these orders and activities on Quantrill and his adherents was exactly nothing. He continued sporadic raids in Missouri, ambushed a few of the many Union detachments sent to hunt him down, and lived well enough on the abandoned smokehouses, barns, and loose livestock of the dispossessed farmers.

In October, when his cover began thinning out, he moved south again, this time into the north Texas district of Brigadier General Henry McCullough, CSA, with headquarters at Bonham. McCullough accepted the guerrillas with some reserve. To General E. Kirby Smith, commanding the Confederate trans-Mississippi Department, he described their mode of warfare as "but little, if at all, removed from that of the wildest savage."

Kirby Smith suggested that McCullough use the guerrillas to round up deserters, who were numerous and had themselves collected into guerrilla bands preying on their own people. At this task Quantrill proved fairly successful, infiltrating the deserters, gaining their confidence, and bringing in several hundred of them.

Against guerrilla fighters of another sort, Quantrill's people were less successful. Sent out by McCullough to round up a band of marauding Comanche Indians, Quantrill was completely outguerrillaed and soundly beaten, with higher losses than he had suffered in any encounter with Union troops.

Ever since the Lawrence raid, tensions had been building up within Quantrill's rather loosely organized command. In addition to necessarily lax discipline, these apparently came from several causes, among them a natural gravitation of the men toward favored or admired lieutenants, and the general depression of morale following the Confederate defeats at Vicksburg and Gettysburg. While they were in Texas, several bloody internal fights had occurred, and at one time, when McCullough had placed Quantrill under arrest

and the guerrilla escaped, Bill Anderson, one of his most homicidal lieutenants, joined the troops sent out in a vain effort to recapture him.

The gang left Texas April 10, 1864, and soon after returning to Missouri, Quantrill quarrelled with another of his lieutenants, George Todd, and retired, leaving Todd in command. A few men went along with Quantrill, but the broken gang, now under Todd, Anderson, and a few other favored leaders, pillaged and ravaged with less system and greater maliciousness than before. The Kansas City Journal said of the fragmented gang's activities:

No loyal man can till a farm or raise a crop . . . or safely travel the highways. Should he venture to run the gauntlet from one military post to the next he does so at the risk of . . . assassination. In a word, the rebels hold the country, while the loyal people are besieged in the towns."

With one exception, the Missouri guerrillas after Quantrill's departure performed no military service. That exception was in support of the campaign of Confederate General Sterling Price to recapture the state in September 1864. Even in that endeavor their activities produced so little of military value and resulted in so much murder, pillage, and outright savagery that Price finally ordered them to leave his army.

In addition to the breakdown within the guerrillas' principal gang, other events had transpired which were to alter radically their mode and place of operations. While they were in Texas the 2nd Colorado Cavalry, a regiment of some 1,200 mountain men as hard and wily as the guerrillas themselves had been moved into western Missouri for the express purpose of hunting them down.

This command presented the guerrilla bands with something new: troops who not only would stand up and fight them, but who pursued them relentlessly into their fastnesses, putting pressure on them which never relaxed. Also operating against the guerrillas was the fact that, with Quantrill's departure they had broken up into smaller bands, the two principal ones commanded by Anderson and Todd, but many others of less than a half-dozen men each. None of these could bring to bear sufficient force or ingenuity to meet aggressive and determined pressure from seasoned, disciplined, and well-led troops unimpressed by the guerrillas' reputations.

The pressure of the 2nd Colorado, plus action of General Brown, now commanding the new District of Central Missouri, in relaxing Ewing's General Order No. 11, permitted many refugees to return to western Missouri, driving the guerrillas out of their old theater of operations. First they moved eastward, then north across the Missouri River. Anderson's men ambushed a 13-man Union patrol near Warrensburg in Johnson county and killed 12, leaving their bodies scalped and horribly mutilated. Other successes of the gangs were limited to stage robberies, attacks on single farmhouses, and murders of individual citizens, always pursued, further fragmented, and often thoroughly shot up. The return of refugees under Brown's relaxation of General Order No. 11 hindered them also, since most of these people were Unionists who refused to panic, now that they were backed by present and effective military force.

The appearance of the guerrillas north of the Missouri River coincided with the fiercely partisan presidential campaign of 1864. Thus the guerrillas were supported by secessionists who had been driven out of western Missouri by the Union depopulation orders and by such Copperhead organizations as the Order of American Knights. From another standpoint, they were provided with targets for their savagery not only by the inadequate and politically divided militia defending the area but by ardent Unionists who made themselves conspicuous by their activities, both verbal and physical, against their political opponents.

Here occurred the only effort known to have been made by Federal authorities to pit Union guerrillas against Confederate guerrillas in Missouri. It was an abject and most costly failure.

Major General William S. Rosecrans, now commanding in Missouri, commissioned as a Union captain a Missourian variously described as a "scout" and "detective," one Harry Truman,⁸ to apply guerrilla methods against the Confederates who had crossed the river. Truman organized a band of some 20 ruffians whom he commanded from a buggy reputed to have contained, besides himself, a jug of whisky and two prostitutes. Thus accoutered he swept through northwest Missouri, murdering and plundering Confederates and Unionists, Republicans and Democrats, alike. For a time his enthusiastic reports of resounding "victories" over enemy guerrillas kept his employers happy. But before long, Brigadier General Clinton B. Fisk, commanding the District of Northern Missouri, was flooded with cries of invective and alarm and petitions for relief from Truman's area of operations.

Fisk finally managed to put Truman and some of his followers under arrest. The erstwhile guerrilla, who had proved as dissolute as he was murderous, was convicted by a military commission in November 1864 of murder, arson, and larceny and sentenced to be hanged. His sentence was commuted to imprisonment by Rosecrans, and in March 1865 he was released by order of the Secretary of War, apparently as the result of pressure by the Union Leagues of northern and central Missouri. In May 1865 Truman was employed again, over Fisk's protests, by Major General G.M. Dodge, the latest commander in Missouri, and once more turned bandit. Dodge ordered him arrested on June 4, 1865, but from then on the record is silent.

By mid-July 1864, both Todd and Anderson, with perhaps 100 men altogether, were north of the Missouri, inflicting on the north central part of the state the most barbarous atrocities in the somber record of border guerrilla warfare. At one point they sought the aid of Quantrill, to whom they proposed capture and devastation of the fortified town of Fayette, north of the river in Howard county. When Quantrill rejected the venture as too hazardous, he once more departed after "an animated and heated argument."

Anderson and Todd undertook to attack Fayette on their own, with Anderson leading. Only 30 Union militia guarded the place from a blockhouse and Anderson roused no suspicion when his band rode in at 10:30 A.M., all in Federal uniforms. This advantage was stupidly squandered when one guerrilla could not resist banging away at a Negro soldier on a sidewalk, and the militia readied itself in its wooden fort. After a series of reckless mounted charges against this resolutely defended place, the guerrillas were beaten off with a loss of 13 killed and 30 wounded. This was a high toll of casualties relative to previous fights, but impossible to calculate relative to guerrilla strength present, since that is not surely known.

This humiliating defeat was avenged by an act of wanton cruelty three days later at Centralia, Missouri. Riding into the town early on the morning of September 27, 1864, Anderson's men had time to get themselves well saturated with whiskey before the westbound train from St. Louis rolled in at noon. Anderson and his men rushed into the train and drove the passengers, including 25 furloughed, sick, and wounded soldiers from Sherman's army, all unarmed, onto the platform. The soldiers were ordered to undress and then all were shot, those not succumbing immediately being clubbed to death. Some were scalped. Then the passengers were robbed, two who attempted to hide valuables being killed,

and the train was set on fire and started at full speed down the track. A freight train arriving not long afterward was stopped and its crew murdered.

Thirty minutes after Anderson left Centralia, Major A.V.E. Johnston rode in with 147 men of the 39th Missouri Mounted Infantry, a militia regiment. Appalled at what he saw and heard, Johnston left 36 men to guard Centralia and galloped off after the guerrillas. He found them without difficulty, since Anderson and Todd, who had rejoined, had laid an ambush and were waiting.

Johnston rode straight into the ambush and, when he discovered the guerrillas' presence, ill-advisedly dismounted his troops. The guerrillas, amazed and delighted, rode them down. After one volley, they turned and fled toward Centralia where the garrison joined their rout. Anderson and Todd pursued them until confronted by a Union blockhouse at Sturgeon, Missouri, where they abandoned the chase.

At a cost of three guerrillas killed and ten wounded by the single Union volley at the ambush, the guerrillas killed 124 of the Union militia, including Major Johnston. Him and some others they decapitated, many were indescribably mutilated, a large number were scalped. That night the guerrillas began retreating westward toward Howard county to escape the expected reaction which, in fact, promptly came. On the morning of September 28 they were overtaken by a large Union force with two pieces of artillery, which pressed them all day but broke off pursuit that night.

The guerrillas, now under tremendous pressure from all Union forces in northwestern Missouri, succeeded in recrossing the river when Price's advance toward Jefferson City forced a temporary Union concentration in that direction. Todd, scouting for Price near Independence, Missouri, was killed on October 21, 1864. Five days later Anderson, who had again recrossed the river on a career of brigandage independent of Price's campaign, was shot to death in a pitched battle with 150 militia near Albany in Ray county. Most notable among his effects was a fringe of human scalps on each bridle rein.

With Todd and Anderson gone and their bands split and leaderless, Quantrill emerged from his enforced retirement. But, since Price had been finally defeated and his broken army pursued into Texas, guerrilla warfare as a profitable profession in Missouri appeared finished. Quantrill, therefore, gathered together about

30 men of the old bands and moved into Kentucky, where political dissension and a long-standing state of guerrilla warfare promised a satisfactory harvest.

Early in December Quantrill and his 30 men began moving east and south, crossing the Mississippi into Tennessee the night of January 1, 1865. All the guerrillas were in US uniforms, and Quantrill, passing himself as Captain Clarke of the Fourth Missouri Cavalry, easily obtained food, forage, and shelter at Union garrisons along the way into Kentucky.

The Kentucky venture was ill-starred from the outset. Near Harrodsburg 11 guerrillas were killed or captured. From Harrodsburg, Quantrill moved into Nelson county, where he joined forces with the Kentucky guerrilla, Sue Mundy. Still pursued relentlessly by Union troops, they were overtaken again at Houstonville by Union troops; four guerrillas were killed, four captured, and the rest dispersed.

Finally making their way, assisted by southern sympathizers, into Spencer county south of Louisville, they spent February and March in petty raids of no military consequence and of little profit to themselves. Nevertheless, Quantrill's presence in the state stimulated extraordinary efforts on the part of Federal military authorities, especially since all guerrilla attacks, of whatever magnitude and wherever directed, were automatically credited to the terrible Missouriian.

Major General John M. Palmer, Union commander in Kentucky, baffled by the activities of Confederate sympathizers in keeping the guerrillas informed of his troop movements, organized a guerrilla command of his own. He commissioned one Edwin Terrill, leader of a small Union guerrilla band in Spencer county, to undertake the pursuit and capture or destruction of Quantrill. Terrill, a deserter from the Confederate army, acted promptly and made contact with Quantrill on April 13, 1865. He never lost contact, pursuing and harassing the Missouri gang without cessation.

Finally, on the morning of May 10, Terrill caught up with Quantrill resting on a Spencer county farm. The usually wary Missourians were taken completely by surprise and several were killed, while Quantrill was shot in the spine and partially paralyzed. He died in a military prison at Louisville on June 6. Ironically enough, Terrill was killed before Quantrill's death, while raiding near Shelbyville, Kentucky.

Before Quantrill's career was ended all the Confederate armies east of the Mississippi had surrendered, and before his death all land action had ceased and there was no more Confederacy. With all his daring, enterprise, and ruthlessness, and that of those who followed or imitated him, very little of direct military value was achieved by the Confederate guerrillas during the war. It is true that they did divert numbers of Union troops in pursuit of them, but these were principally local militia who probably would not have been called out of their states in any event. Union guerrilla bands in like manner achieved nothing decisive except the capture of Quantrill himself long after he had degenerated from a quasi-military factor to a mere bandit, and long after his services, however directed, could have produced anything of military value to the Confederacy.

Partisan Warfare

Unlike guerrilla warfare, which flared up immediately wherever troops entered hostile country, partisan warfare using guerrilla tactics began slowly and proceeded along more conventional lines. Prewar American military thought, as has been noted, made no distinction between the two, and adjustment to the distinction came slowly or, occasionally, not at all.

Partisan commands in both armies tended to be regarded by the other as guerrillas, and only the threat of retaliation induced caution in subjecting those captured to summary execution. Publication of Dr. Lieber's brief in 1862 had cleared the atmosphere, but not entirely. Individual commanders interpreted the distinction according to their own temperaments and the pressures upon them. As late as September 1864, six members of Lieutenant Colonel John S. Mosby's 43rd Battalion of Partisan Rangers were executed as "guerrillas" by Major General George A. Custer. Mosby waited until he had as many of Custer's men captive and executed them in retaliation.

Partisan operations were confined principally to Virginia and West Virginia, where Confederate partisans became exceedingly active as the war advanced, seriously interfering at times with Union lines of communication. With considerably less success a few Union partisan commands were organized, and occasional raids were made by formal Union cavalry commands against the Confederate rear.

Soon after hostilities commenced in 1861, secessionist residents of western Virginia, distressed by the pro-Union sympathies of their neighbors and menaced by approaching Union forces, petitioned the government at Richmond for authority to constitute guerrilla bands. Both the term and the methods of guerrilla warfare were repugnant to Confederate officialdom and all these requests were turned down. As acting Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin explained late in 1861: "Guerrilla companies are not recognized as part of the military organization of the Confederate States, and cannot be authorized by this department."

Nevertheless, the way had been opened by the Virginia legislature which, in 1861, authorized formation of ten Partisan Ranger companies in the state forces. Under this Act the first partisan organizations in the state and in West Virginia were assembled. Then, in the spring of 1862, the Confederate Congress authorized partisan units, and the way was opened for numerous organizations whose services were at times highly useful but which brought with them side effects which, in most cases, limited or cancelled out their military value.

There were, of course, in both Virginia and West Virginia, small guerrilla bands which with no shadow of legal sanction pursued a course of independent thievery and murder similar to that current along the western border. But at no time were the acts of these bands militarily important, or of consequence to anyone but their victims, except on occasions when their depredations were attributed to the organized partisans.

These latter grew in part from emulation of the tactics introduced by the Confederate leader of light cavalry, Colonel Turner Ashby, in 1861, in the Shenandoah Valley. After Ashby's death in battle, some of those who had served with him organized units of their own under the Partisan Ranger Acts. Independently of these, a few partisan units emerged naturally from the situation obtaining in a region divided against itself and, early in the war, largely occupied by enemy forces. Apparently the first of these appeared in Loudoun county, Virginia, an area of diverse background and conflicting sentiment.

The northern part of Loudoun county, under the shadow of the Catoclin mountain range, had been settled largely by Germans and Quakers from Pennsylvania. These people were industrious small farmers and ardently loyal to the Union. The fact that very few of them were slaveholders was beside the point; slavery was not an issue in the county, only some 5,000 slaves being held there at the onset of the war. The issue was unionism vs. secession, and that alone.

This division accounts, at least in part, for the fact that the first partisan units in the Eastern theater, both Union and Confederate, were raised in Loudoun county. The first of these was the 35th Battalion of Virginia Partisan Rangers, commanded by Elijah V. (Lije) White of Leesburg, organized in the fall of 1861 under the Virginia Partisan Ranger Act. It was countered in June of 1862 by formation in the upper section of the county of the Independent Loudoun Rangers, authorized specifically by Secretary Stanton under command of Samuel C. Means of Waterford.

Despite the loyalty of the section where Means's rangers were raised, their total enrollment throughout the war was only 120. This was due first to their having mounted themselves, at Stanton's order, on horses taken from secessionist Virginians, which made them highly unpopular among their neighbors. Second, they were repeatedly defeated by White's "Comanches," as they preferred to call themselves, and later by Mosby's command. Still, in conjunction with Major H.A. Cole's Maryland Cavalry Battalion, Means's rangers patrolled the Potomac and endeavored to cover the vital and sensitive Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. In a principal enterprise enjoined upon them by Stanton, that of ridding the county of "guerrillas," they were markedly unsuccessful. Means finally resigned his commission in April 1864, when the depredations of his command led to a sensible increase of anti-Union feeling in the county, and his unit was absorbed into the Union cavalry.

Other Confederate partisan units were organized in Virginia by Harry Gilmor of Baltimore who, like White, had served with Ashby, and, up in the northeastern corner of the new state of West Virginia, by John Hanson McNeill. This extremely diligent and effective partisan leader was born in Hardy County, Virginia, nearly 50 years before, and had migrated to Missouri, where he commanded a company of militia in Price's army early in the war. Although opposed to secession he, like so many of his kind, went along with his native state and took his three sons with him. After being wounded and captured, he escaped from a Union prison at St. Louis and returned to Hardy county.

Unlike White's Comanches, who attended first to affairs in Loudoun county and then served almost continuously with the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, Gilmor and McNeill directed their efforts primarily at Union army communications. McNeill succeeded in wrecking the rail line from Harpers Ferry to Winchester and, like Gilmor, nibbled unceasingly at the B & O, the Union's main east-west rail artery. Although their damage to the line was never permanent, they made travel on it precarious and, by

constantly damaging its right-of-way, made it impossible for the B & O to double-track its Baltimore-Washington branch, the Capital's only direct rail link with the north, until 1864.

McNeill was killed in October 1864, apparently accidentally by one of his own men, and his 23-year-old son Jesse took command. Meanwhile, Major General Philip H. Sheridan had begun his devastation of the Shenandoah Valley under orders of Lieutenant General U.S. Grant. Sheridan, in common with some other Union commanders, never regarded Confederate partisan commands as anything but guerrillas and bushwhackers. Not only was his execution of Grant's order thorough and meticulous, but he tended toward summary execution of partisans who fell into his hands; of McNeill's death he said: "This was fortunate, as he was one of the most daring and dangerous of all the bushwhackers in this section of the country."

Neither McNeill's death, Sheridan's devastations, nor his ruthlessness toward captured partisans relieved the pressure on his lines of communication. Couriers continued to be captured, railroad trains wrecked, track torn up, wagon trains looted and burned, bridges in his rear destroyed, and isolated detachments of his troops ambushed. This went on until Sheridan left the Valley and joined Grant on the James River.

Harry Gilmor was twice captured, the second time near the end of the war, but with his independent cavalry force he managed to make things miserable for travellers on the B & O and for Union commanders using northern Virginia wagon roads. Between them, Gilmor and McNeill captured three Union general officers whose value as media of prisoner exchange was high. White and Gilmor also scouted for the Army of Northern Virginia in its Second Manassas, Maryland, and Gettysburg campaigns. In the last, White served as part of the rearguard which held off Union attacks while the defeated army struggled to recross the flooded Potomac.

The best known and generally most successful Confederate partisan leader in Virginia was John Singleton Mosby, a Virginian who served for two years as a scout for Major General J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry command and has been credited with suggesting Stuart's ride around the Union army in June 1862. Almost from the beginning of his service, as a private, Mosby had considered the probable effectiveness of a partisan command free to operate on the Union lines of communication near Washington. After the Fredericksburg battle, Mosby suggested this possibility to Stuart during a cavalry incursion into Fairfax county, Virginia, in January 1863. The future partisan leader was permitted to remain behind with nine men.

From this small beginning Mosby built up a disciplined, efficient, and effective force which, until the end of the war, was a source of serious and constant harassment to Union forces in its vicinity. After the war General Grant was to write: "There were probably but few men in the South who could have commanded successfully a separate detachment, in the rear of an opposing army and so near the border of hostilities, as long as he did without losing his entire command." This Mosby did, increasing his nine-man detachment to a full battalion, eventually with its own artillery, captured, of course, from the richly supplied enemy.

Mosby first called attention to his new command the night of March 8, 1863, when he rode with 29 men into the midst of Union forces covering Fairfax Courthouse and snatched their commanding general from his bed. This dramatic exploit was followed by a series of lightning stabs at Union outposts. Parties sent to capture this new menace were successfully eluded or met head on and defeated.

One effect of the Fairfax capture was to alarm President Lincoln himself, who reasoned that if the lines about Washington were so fragile that they could be penetrated to a general's headquarters, the city itself could not be safe from raiders. The President personally ordered extraordinary efforts to take or kill Mosby, efforts which were to consume increasing numbers of troops as time went on.

Aside from his attacks on enemy outposts and frequent fights with pursuing cavalry, Mosby's principal concern from the outset of his partisan career was the Manassas Gap Railroad, the principal artery of supply for Union forces in the Valley. He began his attacks on this line in the spring of 1863 and kept them up until the Valley no longer was capable of supporting an army, Union or Confederate. At one time his attacks were so successful that the railroad was put out of operation entirely and Union forces in the Valley compelled to rely on long wagon trains, upon which Mosby pounced as eagerly as on the railroad. Finally, after the device of forcing prominent Confederate civilians to ride on every train had failed to stop Mosby, Grant ordered all buildings burned and all trees cut down along a strip of five miles on each side of the line.

In a last desperate effort to put an end to Mosby's forays, Grant instructed Sheridan in August 1864: "If you can possibly spare a division of cavalry, send them into Loudoun County to destroy and carry off all the crops, animals, negroes, and all men under fifty years of age capable of bearing arms." It was

November before Sheridan got around to this chore, but then he sent the cavalry division of Major General Wesley Merritt into the area in Loudoun and Fauquier counties between the Bull Run mountains and the Blue Ridge to carry out Grant's order.

The devastation that followed was complete, although no reliable statistics have survived. The rich "Loudoun Valley" was left desolate, not a mill or a barn standing, crops and livestock carried off or destroyed, and many homes burned. This rather increased local public support of Mosby than otherwise and his activities continued unabated until General R.E. Lee's surrender at Appomattox April 9, 1865. Mosby then entered into prolonged negotiations for surrender to the Federal authorities and finally gave up in disgust. Almost two weeks after Appomattox Mosby called his men together at Salem (now Marshall) and disbanded them. He never did surrender and was never called to account for his partisan activities.

Whatever advantages may have been achieved by the activities of organized independent partisan commands, and these were many, they were more than counterbalanced by numerous disadvantages. If all such commands had been conducted as were those of Mosby and McNeill, some of the disadvantages might not have arisen. But few of them were so conducted, and their reputations were engulfed in the tide of recrimination which flowed from the fierce and mutual violence inspired by the irresponsible acts of guerrillas and bushwhackers. Even so, the operations of the best of these commands, as well as those of the worst, inevitably led to devastation of sometimes large and important areas of land and the death or deprivation of their inhabitants of whatever political complexion.

From time to time throughout the war elements of army units already in the field were designated specifically to hunt down partisan bands, but rarely with much success.

In April 1862 25 former Jayhawkers, headed by Captain J. Carpenter of the 2nd Arkansas Cavalry, appeared in West Virginia. Calling themselves "Jessie Scouts," after the wife of Major General J.C. Frémont, they dressed in captured Confederate uniforms and announced their intention of ridding the state of partisans and guerrillas. In short order they degenerated into undisguised freebooters, preying on the population at a cost greater than that levied by all the Confederate partisan units put together. By July the Jessie Scouts had disintegrated, their leader shot

by a woman he was squiring, and their sponsor, Frémont, resigned from the army.*

Of vastly different metal were Sheridan's Scouts, daredevil Union soldiers who roamed the Shenandoah Valley in Confederate uniform during the campaign of 1864-1865, to gather information and to combat Confederate guerrillas. They took double risks, of course, for some were shot in error by Union troops, and others were executed by Confederate leaders whose commands they had penetrated. But Sheridan was able to reward them well out of Secret Service funds, and they were quite efficient, up to the end of Appomatox. The scouts were commanded by one of Sheridan's staff officers, Major Henry H. Young, 2nd Rhode Island Infantry, and were recruited in the main from the 17th Pennsylvania Volunteer Cavalry. It was Young and a detachment of his men who captured Confederate leader Harry W. Gilmer (mentioned supra) in 1865.⁹

To the outnumbered southern armies the principal disadvantage accruing from the activities of partisan bands was their drain on already inadequate human resources. As the attrition of battle cut more deeply into southern military manpower, increasing numbers of men, not only deserters but those with influence or not yet drafted, were drawn from the ranks. The adventurous life of the partisan, his share of the spoils of captured rail and wagon trains, his independence of strict discipline, appealed to entirely too many eligible soldiers. As a result, the Confederate Congress, at the request of Secretary Seddon, repealed the Partisan Ranger Act in February 1864. Lee promptly ordered that all partisan commands under his jurisdiction be disbanded, with one exception.

"I am making an effort," he notified Seddon, "to have . . . Mosby's battalion mustered into the regular service. If this cannot be done, I recommend that this battalion be retained as Partisans for the present. . . . Mosby has done excellent service, and from the reports of citizens and others I am inclined to believe that he is strict in discipline and a protection to the country in which he operates." Seddon agreed to this, and also retained young Jesse McNeill's company in partisan service in West Virginia.

*There were, however, many other more significant reasons for Frémont's resignation. This was at most a minor contribution.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The failure of US military authorities to recognize, define, distinguish between, and provide for partisan and guerrilla services, and for counters to them, permitted a situation to develop which was costly and discreditable to both sides in the American Civil War.

2. In all theaters, attempts to counteract partisan or guerrilla activities by attacks on or drastic dislocation of the civilian population failed of their purpose. Civilians sympathetic to the independent forces, or essentially neutral, were impelled by their own resentment of attacks on themselves to aid further the forces they considered friendly or not actively hostile. Civilians inimical to the independent forces were terrorized into aiding them and then were forced to suffer equally with their neighbors whatever general devastation was inflicted on civilian populations.

3. The tendency of independent commands to revert, either directly through their leaders or in spite of them, to unbridled thievery and murder was marked and mutually costly. In very few such commands, Union or Confederate, was discipline or control by higher authority ever successfully maintained.

4. Of all the counter guerrilla devices attempted during the war, only those proved effective which met the guerrilla bands with well-trained, disciplined, and hardy troops. These succeeded only when they maintained unrelenting pressure on the guerrillas and remained in possession of recovered land areas, so that friendly and neutral civilians were reassured and no longer subject to terrorization, and hostile civilians were unable to aid the guerrillas without detection.

5. Use of local militia units in counter guerrilla operations very rarely produced acceptable results. These units almost invariably were (1) untrained and ill-disciplined and unable to face a spirited attack; (2) their officers were unskilled and easily surprised and ambushed; (3) the loyalty of many was divided and the units therefore unreliable; and (4) local militia units of strong political sympathies often became little more than guerrilla bands themselves.

6. Guerrilla activity was confined almost exclusively to areas divided in political sentiment, where this activity itself was an expression of violent political differences.

7. Both belligerents found organized partisan warfare generally so unproductive of concrete military results that both largely abandoned it as an instrument of policy before the war ended.

Footnotes

1. One of the many presumed causes of the notorious Hatfield-McCoy feud was continuation of Civil War guerrilla warfare in which the West Virginia Hatfields were Confederates and the Kentucky McCoy's sided with the Union. Cf. Virgil Carrington Jones, The Hatfields and the McCoy's (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1948), pp. 13-16.
2. The full text of General Halleck's request and Dr. Lieber's reply will be found in Official Records (see Bibliography), Series III, vol. II, pp. 301-309. Dr. Lieber later compiled for the War Department a detailed brief on international "laws" of war, which was issued in 1863 as General Orders No. 100 and, until after World War I, was copied into US Army Field Service Regulations as the Rules of Land Warfare.
3. Literally scores of counterguerrilla General and Special Orders, circulars, and instructions were issued by Union commanders throughout the war. To cite all of them would place an unsupportable burden on available space, to say nothing of their redundancy. Those cited are indicative of the general tenor of all such documents, with the observation that those which bore most harshly on civilian populations seem to have been less effective in curbing guerrilla activities and most effective in arousing pro-guerrilla sentiment in the areas affected.
4. Often spelled Quantrell; the overwhelming bulk of evidence supports the spelling employed here.
5. Captain David's complaint had a long and sound basis in history. For instance, in 1250, Henry III of England sent the great soldier Simon de Montfort to put down an insurrection in Gascony and after a time received an account of his activities in which this appears: ". . . . Nor can they be checked by an army as in a regular war, for they only rob and burn, and take prisoners and ransom them, and ride about at night like thieves in companies." Quoted in Thomas B. Costain, The Magnificent Century (Garden City: Doubleday, 1962), p. 172.
6. Discrepancies among sources prohibit precise enumeration of the damage done at Lawrence. The mayor on the day of the raid claimed 60 killed. General Ewing's official report, dated August 31,

detailed 185 buildings burned and 140 unarmed persons killed, including 106 civilians, 14 recruits of the 14th Regiment, and 20 recruits of the 2nd Kansas Colored Volunteers, and 24 persons wounded. The provost marshal at Leavenworth reported to the Provost Marshal General August 25 that \$100,000 cash had been taken, \$2 million in property destroyed, and "up to the present time 150 dead bodies have been found and many more will doubtless be found in the ruins." A later newspaper account placed the killed at 183, and subsequent authorities, including the Encyclopaedia Britannica, seem to have settled on 150 deaths.

7. It is perhaps redundant to call attention to the parallel between this last observation and the conditions encountered in many insurgent-plagued areas today.

8. For the reassurance of possible skeptics, it should be noted that Captain Harry Truman's escapades are recorded in considerable, though inadequate, detail in Official Records (see Bibliography), Series I, Vols. 34, 41, and 48, passim.

9. Dupuy, R. Ernest and Dupuy, Trevor N., Compact History of the Civil War (Hawthorn, New York, 1960), 348 ff.

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North America; the Indian Wars

by

R. Ernest Dupuy

BACKGROUND

Guerrilla warfare between whites and Indians began with the first colonial settlements in North America. It ended only in 1892. Manifestly, it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss and analyze in detail nearly 300 years of Indian fighting. However, certain generalities are in order, particularly since this guerrilla warfare had some very distinct and individualistic peculiarities.

The pattern was that of the eviction of a primitive culture by one more sophisticated. The Indian possessed the land. The white man craved the land and threw the Indian out. The conflict raged along the western progression of the frontier of an expanding nation, gradually developing into the establishment of a coron sanitaire--a tenuous and thinly held series of frontier posts garrisoned by the US Army--across whose ill-defined border, from Canada to Mexico, forays by both sides stabbed from time to time.

On the Indian side, reactions to the white man's encroachments were tribal and piecemeal. With the exceptions of the confederations of Pontiac and Tecumseh, major concentrations of Indian forces toward a common goal did not exist. On the contrary, time and again through the long struggle various tribes--inspired by long-established animosities--acted as active allies of the white man against their red brethren.

To the Indian, conflict was second nature, war a game; raids of one tribe on another were common affairs, and treachery, murder, and torture normal concomitants of life. In fact, torture was to be considered an honor to the victim; the greater the warrior, the more atrocious his torture if captured.¹

The white man, subjected to Indian excesses, reacted violently and in kind. Almost from the beginning, frontiersman and Indian alike "counted coup" by scalping fallen adversaries. Without too much digression into the complicated and very ugly story of US-Indian relationships, it can be put bluntly that the white settler proved himself in numerous instances to be as bloodthirsty and as treacherous as his opponent.²

The white man early found that the Indian, brought up from infancy as a warrior, hunter, and tracker, roving far and fast, could not be overcome by the ponderous classical tactics and strategy of European warfare. The British Army in 1755, following Braddock's defeat, evolved rudimentary counterinsurgency tactics during the French and Indian War, borrowing from the Indian's book. Light infantry (notably the 80th "Light-armed" Foot and the 60th Foot--Royal American Regiment, now the King's Royal Rifles) as well as Rogers' Rangers, were the prototypes. This disciplined brush-warfare brought success at Bushy Run (1763) and crushed Pontiac's Rebellion.

However, the lesson was forgotten when the US Army first came into existence, as evidenced by the defeats of Harmor (July 15, 1790) and of St. Clair (November 3, 1791) by the Miami Indians in the Ohio Valley. Emboldened by their successes, the Miami chose to stand and fight Anthony Wayne's well-trained troops at Fallen Timbers (August 20, 1794) and suffered a smashing defeat.

Yet the professional American soldier prior to the Civil War--with four notable exceptions--was slow to recognize the necessity for really isolating the guerrilla. Sullivan's campaign of 1779 against the Six Nations was directed in accordance with George Washington's order against Indian supply bases; Sullivan's instructions were "to effect total destruction of their settlements and the capture of as many prisoners of every age and sex as possible."³ So Indian homeland holdings were ravaged, their settlements and agriculture destroyed, on a systematic "scorched earth" basis. William H. Harrison's campaign of 1811 against Tecumseh choked off British supply from Canada to the Shawnees and allied tribes. Andrew Jackson's Pensacola campaign of 1814 eradicated Hispano-British supply to the Creeks.

During the long drawn-out Seminole Wars Andrew Jackson, Zachary Taylor, and William J. Worth in turn tried to deprive the Indian of his bases of supply. Worth's campaign of 1841 was specifically directed against Seminole settlements and standing crops.

"The bands of Indians, which for years had lived from season to season in the enjoyment of abundance, celebrating their corn dances and festivals, harassing the white man as suited their convenience or inclination, were now driven in small parties to remote and unhealthy hiding places."⁴

However, in none of these instances was the final objective attained: round-up and destruction in combat of the guerrilla force.

Until the Civil War, the Indian problem had been regional. But by 1866 a radical change had taken place. Western expansion was in full flow. Transcontinental railway building gashed the plains, and the buffalo herds--the nomad Plains Indians' principal means of subsistence--were dwindling as white hunters massacred them wantonly to provide the railroad builders with meat and to obtain the hides for Eastern markets. Great wagon trains of emigrants were rolling westward on the Oregon, Santa Fe, and Bozeman trails. The gold and silver riches of Colorado, Nevada, Idaho, and Montana all incited white cupidity. The Plains Indians, their domain violated and their main food supply dwindling, quite naturally reacted violently, and the problem became a national one.

Outrages by red and white alike had already brought death and destruction along the frontier even before the Civil War ended. The massacre of a party of emigrants almost within eye-shot of Denver by a roving band of Sioux and Cheyennes in 1864 brought fierce and blind retaliation. An ex-clergyman named John M. Chivington disgraced the uniform he wore temporarily as colonel of the 1st Colorado Volunteer Cavalry by gathering a force of Colorado troops and cowboys and destroying on November 28, 1864, a peaceful village of Cheyennes and Arapahoes at Sand Creek, Colorado. A total of 300 Indians--225 of them women and children --were wantonly butchered and five score wet Indian scalps exhibited in a Denver theater.⁵ The Chivington massacre would long poison Indian-US relations.

"But for that horrible butchery," wrote Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, "it is a fair presumption that all subsequent wars with the Cheyennes and Arapahoes and their kindred tribes might possibly have been averted."⁶

Colonel Jesse Leavenworth, West Pointer, Coloradan cavalryman and later a respected agent to the Kiowas and Comanches, was of the opinion that "this atrocity destroyed the last vestige of confidence between red and white."⁷

For more than a decade following, bitter conflict would rage between recalcitrant Plains Indians and the Army, before the backbone of Indian resistance was broken and the red man ceased to be a major menace to law and order in the western United States. The fighting spread from the Canadian border south to the Rio Grande (and on one occasion beyond into Mexico), with--in 1868--an estimated 300,000 Indians roaming the plains.⁸ No less than 20 campaigns are noted in official records, with at least 729 distinct engagements of Regular Army troops, ranging from skirmishes of small detachments to pitched battle. (Encounters between settlers and state militia and the Indians are not included.)⁹

It was within this period that the Army first seriously undertook the complete isolation of the Indian guerrilla. From the congeries of campaigns we have selected two distinct operations: the Big Horn and Yellowstone expedition of 1876-1877, with its Powder River campaign as prelude; and the Nez Percé campaign of 1877. Both operations were against Northern Plains Indians--Sioux and Cheyenne in the first, and Nez Percé in the second.

ASSISTANCE TO THE GUERRILLA

Assistance lies in a special category, so far as the Indian Wars are concerned. Prior to 1815, the Indians were assisted by France, Spain, and England. French aid ceased with the conclusion of the French and Indian War.

English and Spanish assistance, supposedly ended by the conclusion (1815) of the War of 1812, actually continued for a few years in the South, for the benefit of the Seminoles. It was effectively, if high-handedly, ended by General Andrew Jackson's invasion of Spanish Florida in 1818, the capture of Pensacola and the arrest, court-martial, and execution of two British subjects --Alexander Arbuthnot and Robert C. Ambrister--on charges of aiding and abetting the outrages of the Indians. Arbuthnot was a trader who supplied arms and ammunition from his depot at Providence, Nassau; Ambrister a soldier of fortune who led Seminole guerrillas.

In these cases certain Indian tribes were acting in quasi-alliance with overseas nations, themselves overt or covert enemies of the Thirteen Colonies (later the United States). But after 1818 assistance to the Indian guerrilla came solely from the United States itself, his white opponent.

In 1823 the US Government, on the recommendation of War Secretary John C. Calhoun, adopted the removal policy, transfer of Eastern Indians trans-Mississippi. A permanent Indian frontier was established on the 95th meridian.

Was this an attempt to isolate the guerrilla? Only incidentally; the objective was to remove him from terrain coveted by the white man.

The removal policy was promulgated by President James Monroe in 1825 and put in operation by President Andrew Jackson the next year. The removal job fell to the Army, and a Bureau of Indian Affairs was established in the War Department to regulate the transfer and segregation of the Indian onto reservations.

"The United States, through its instrument, the Army, was in the paradoxical position of opposing and protecting the Indians, of taking their land from them and of guaranteeing their possession of the land. The military alone could not solve so complex a problem."¹⁰

To improve the situation, the Bureau of Indian Affairs was transferred in 1849 to the Department of the Interior and headed by a civilian Commissioner of Indian Affairs. The Army retained its basic mission of protecting the frontier. Actually, this division of authority was no improvement at all. The red man, now a ward of the government, became a crafty shuttlecock between two bickering agencies. The strong right hand of government, the Army, was charged with restraining his violence, while the Bureau, its left hand, supplied him on the reservation with food, shelter, and arms, and no one knew exactly where the responsibility of either began or ended.

The Army in the West was at the beck and call of US marshals, of the Department of the Interior and its Bureau of Indian Affairs, and of the Bureau agents in charge of the reservations, as a posse comitatus, to act against both Indian and white lawbreakers. Conversely, the civilian authorities might object and obstruct military operations regardless of Army opinion.¹¹ The use of US land and naval forces as a posse comitatus ceased (in principle, at least) with the passage of the prohibitive Act of June 18, 1878.

The Indian on his reservation was entitled to rations, blankets, and shelter. Furthermore, he was issued arms and ammunition for hunting purposes; of agriculture the Plains Indian knew little (the Nez Percé excepted). The reservation was both base of supply for hostiles and, when they returned to its borders with troops in hot pursuit, their sanctuary. The Indian was therefore enabled to choose his time of departure on the warpath--usually in the spring and summer, when the lush grasslands furnished food for his horses --and for his return when winter set in and made life on the plains unbearable. Corruption among Indian agents, on whom rested the responsibility for issuing rations and supplies, became widespread. White traders, whose livelihood depended upon the agent's nod for authority to do business with the fur-trading Indian, further

played upon the agent's venality by selling high-power repeating arms and liquor to the red man and splitting their exorbitant profits.¹²

Army opinion on the situation is of particular value to this discussion, since the Army was in last resort responsible for the quelling of Indian insurrection.

Stated General William T. Sherman, Commanding General of the Army, in 1866:

This brings me to the consideration of the question of the Indians, who, in nomadic and predatory bands, infest the whole country . . . sometimes in one place and then in another. These Indians are universally, by the people of our frontier and of our isolated territories, regarded as hostile, and we, the military, charged with a general protection of the infant settlements and long routes of travel, have to dispose our troops and act as though they were hostile; while by the laws of Congress, and the acts of our executive authorities, these Indians are construed as under the guardianship and protection of the general government, through civilian agencies. . . . Indians do not read, and only know our power and strength by what they see, and they always look to the man who commands soldiers as the representative of our government.¹³

Stated General Philip H. Sheridan, then commanding the Department of the Missouri, in 1868:

The present system of dealing with the Indian, I think, is an error. There are too many fingers in the pie, too many ends to be subserved, and too much money to be made; and it is in the interest of the nation and of humanity to put an end to this inhuman farce. The Peace Commission [Board of Indian Commissioners], the Indian Department, the military and the Indian make a balky team. The public treasury is depleted and innocent people plundered in this quadrangular arrangement in which the Treasury and the unarmed settlers are the greatest sufferers. . . .

The Army has nothing to gain by war with the Indians; on the contrary it has everything to lose. In such a war it suffers all the hardships and privation, exposed as it is to the charge of assassination if the Indians are killed, to the charge of inefficiency if they are not; to misrepresentation by the [Indian

Bureau agents who fatten on the plunder of the Indians, and misunderstood by worthy people at home who are deceived by these agents.¹⁴

Commented Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock, commanding the Department of Dakota, in 1872:

At present, while bodies of our troops are moving from the Missouri to the Yellowstone, or from Montana down the latter river, escorting railroad surveyors, it is notorious, and not attempted to be concealed by the Indians themselves, that their supplies and munitions of war to enable them to carry on campaigns against these troops are provided directly by the authority of the government at the different Indian agencies and at other points [trading posts] within reach, at which establishments the employees have to be protected by troops from insults and violence of the same Indians. Even now supplies are being distributed to these Indians, who do not attempt, even while receiving their subsistence, to conceal the fact that when they leave these depots of supply it will be for the purpose of joining in attacks upon our troops who are engaged elsewhere in the surveys mentioned, and who otherwise occupy a friendly attitude toward the Indians; and it is known that when the Indians return from such attacks for further supplies they do not hesitate to boast of their achievements against our troops on their last foray, or of their purpose of hostility in the next. . . . If arms are issued or sold to the Indians, they should be not our arms of precision, but only those of an inferior quality, yet suitable for the hunt.¹⁵

SANCTUARY FOR THE GUERRILLA

Hostile Indians time and again sought and found sanctuary both in Mexico and Canada. On two occasions US troops crossed the Mexican border in pursuit of raiders from the south. In 1873 Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie and his 4th Cavalry, with the oral sanction of General Sheridan and President Grant,¹⁶ raided Kickapoo, Lipan, and Apache villages in Mexico and captured a number of prisoners. The raid, covering in 32 marching hours 160 miles of Mexican territory south of the Rio Grande, was remarkable militarily, but contributed little toward permanent isolation of the hostiles. A diplomatic furor resulted, which subsided shortly; Mexico was having its own troubles with hostile Indians.

Of a different nature was General Crook's invasion of Mexico in pursuit of the Chiricahua Apaches, who had holed up in the Sierra Madre mountains. In 1883, these Indians conducted a number of raids across the US border, fleeing to their sanctuary after each occasion. Crook, after conferring with Mexican military leaders and obtaining their approval, with some 50 US troops and 200 Indian scouts crossed the border and succeeded in persuading the Chiricahuas to return to their reservation in the United States--a matter of remarkable personal leadership.

While Canadian sanctuary was several times sought and found by hostiles, no important raids from across the border ever occurred, and it does not appear that much international friction resulted.

PUBLIC OPINION¹⁷

Through the years public opinion in the United States concerning the Indian had hardened into two distinct categories. East of the Mississippi lived people by now long removed from direct contact and conflict with the Indian and lulled by the pleasant myth of the "noble red man." Apathetic in general, the altruistic Easterner, if he thought of the matter at all, ignored Indian excesses and the equally brutal white excesses of the frontier. The sentimental, looking through glasses tinted rosily by James Fenimore Cooper, laid the Indian troubles to Army "brutality."

Until 1876 little interest was evinced by the Eastern press. But one correspondent rode to his death with Custer at the Little Big Horn, and as a result of the furor stirred by that disaster five correspondents from prominent newspapers accompanied the troops during the later operations of the Big Horn and Yellowstone expedition. One might venture the opinion that General Sheridan's long-seated animosity toward newspapermen and his efforts to prevent their presence in the field actually worked against Army interest.

The Westerner, on the other hand, for a number of reasons--many of them valid--had become inculcated with a blind hatred of the Indian. There was more than a suspicion of genocide in the common frontier expression: "The only good Indian is a dead Indian," and time and time again the white people of the frontier areas exploded in savage reprisals for Indian excesses. The Colorado House, as late as 1880, actually considered--though it

did not pass--a bill offering rewards for "The Destruction of Indians and Skunks."¹⁸

TERRAIN

The combat zone of the conflicts to be considered comprised the states of Montana, the Dakotas, Nebraska, Wyoming, and Idaho, in the Great Plains province, the huge plateau sloping eastward from the foothills of the Rocky Mountains to the Missouri River. Semi-arid, semi-humid, this expanse of grazing land was accented by the Black Hills, an isolated mountain uplift situated astride the Wyoming-South Dakota border, by the Big Horn Mountains, and by the clay of the Bad Lands in the angle between the Missouri and White Rivers. Temperature range was wide; from 102° in blazing summer to 30° below zero in howling winter.¹⁹

OPERATIONS

The Big Horn and Yellowstone Expedition

Discovery of gold in the Black Hills in 1874 brought an onrush of prospectors into the territory allotted by treaty to the Sioux and Cheyennes of the Missouri and Platte basins. Indian unrest churned into all-out revolt, under the principal leadership of the Sioux chief Crazy Horse, and their medicine man and "elder statesman," Sitting Bull. By December 1875, the situation was far beyond the control of the Indian Bureau. A final order by the Department of the Interior for the return of all Indians to their reservations by January 31, 1876, was ignored, and the Army was called in to do the job.

Indian Strength and Tactics

Of some 50,000 Indians--men, women, and children--now on the loose, the hostiles in this area approximated 8,000 warriors, consummate horsemen mounted on hardy ponies. Not a few of these warriors were armed with the latest model repeating rifles. They had plenty of ammunition. The Plains Indians fought mounted, attacking in strength, in encircling charges, against an enemy whom they had thoroughly reconnoitered and who, usually, they had first enticed by strategem into a place and time of their own choice.

Surprise was their initial aim. They avoided night fighting. Although personally fearless in combat, they never hesitated to break off engagement if the combat was going against them. Conversely, when themselves surprised, their lack of discipline usually brought about precipitate flight.

War parties could cover more than 50 miles in a day, their progress screened by scouts and hunting parties far on their front, flanks, and rear. Communication between neighboring war parties and their outriders was maintained by an amazingly efficient system of smoke signals.

A weak point in Plains Indian security measures made their night encampments vulnerable to surprise. Few guards were posted, even over their pony herds. Principal reliance was placed on their numerous dogs, who gave immediate tongue at any untoward sound or scent.

Such were the adversaries whom the Regular Army was now ordered to round up and return to their reservations: the finest light cavalry in the world. They were scattered through the Big Horn Mountain area, holed up for the winter in tented villages lying in almost inaccessible and unexplored recesses. With the coming spring, Crazy Horse and his warriors would open hostilities.

US Forces

General Sheridan, commanding the Division of the Missouri, with troops scattered in 57 posts, was never able to field a force of more than an approximate 3,000 combat troops--cavalry and infantry. Officers and men included a proportion of veterans of the Civil War, who during the postwar period had had to unlearn the experiences of a mass army and conventional war, and relearn--at bitter cost--the complexities of Indian fighting. They were regulars, disciplined, and capable of rapidly assimilating recruit replacements. They were far superior to the Indians in pitched battle. These troops were equipped with single-shot breech-loading rifles, inferior to such modern repeating arms as were possessed by a substantial number of the hostile Indians.²⁰ However this was in part compensated for by superior marksmanship.

Field commanders were authorized to employ scouts, both white and red. Indians were utilized in considerable number, beginning in 1866 (Act of July 28), when 1,000 were authorized.²¹ White scouts, capable frontiersmen, were also employed freely. The most noted of these men was William F. Cody (Buffalo Bill).

Logistical handicaps were many. Frontier posts were dependent on the main base at St. Louis; the supply line was by river boat up the Missouri and its navigable tributaries. In the field, the troops depended on wagon and pack trains. Communications, beyond the few frontier towns by this time linked by telegraph, were limited to the dispatch rider and the vagaries of short-range, wigwag flag. The cavalry, hampered by personal equipment and grain-fed animals, were confined in radius of action to their supply trains. In consequence they never could compete successfully with Indian mobility. The infantry, although some amazing marches were made, was of course out of the picture against hit-and-run mounted guerrillas.

Sheridan planned a pincers offensive to trap the hostiles. Brig. Gen. George Crook lay at Fort Fetterman, Wyoming, on the North Platte. He would move generally north. Maj. Gen. Alfred H. Terry, moving by river boat up the Missouri to the Yellowstone, would concentrate at Fort Keogh, near the site of the present Miles City, and move south.

While Terry's command was slowly concentrating, Crook--with long experience in Indian-fighting--decided he would strike immediately, in the heart of winter, against the fast-riding, but thin-clad Indian. He moved out of Fort Fetterman with some 1,200 men, ten troops of cavalry and two companies of infantry, a wagon train and a pack train, on March 1, 1876. Five days later, on the Powder River, he parked his wagon train and infantry and rode north with his cavalry and the bobbing pack mules on one of the most amazing and gruelling forays US troops had ever made.

Officers and men were clad in a motley array of multiple layers of warm clothing and footgear--mostly civilian--completely lacking uniformity. Each individual was limited to the clothes he wore, plus one blanket, or buffalo robe, four days' rations, and 100 rounds of ammunition. Mess gear was nonexistent; a tin cup had to suffice. Animals would remain ungroomed and would subsist as did Indian ponies--on such grass as they could find, if necessary by pawing it up from under the snow. The pack train carried 15 days' half-rations and enough ammunition to supply each man with 50 rounds--and that was that.

Crooke, probably the first American soldier to adapt clothing to special climatic conditions, had made his plans well. His meticulous care that his troops be winter-clad was duplicated by his care of his pack train, with the aparejos individually fitted to each animal and his packers personally picked.

On March 16 Crook, casting across country under grueling conditions of cold and snow, found indications of Sioux well up the Powder River. Colonel Joseph J. Reynolds, sent scouting up the valley with six troops, at dawn next day found a large village of skin tepees in a cleft of the cliffs. He attacked at once in weather 30° below zero, but sent back no word to Crook of his find and intentions.

The cavalry swept through the village, cut out the pony herd, and, driving the dismounted warriors well away, began systematic destruction. Suddenly, for no reason ever discovered, Reynolds ordered immediate withdrawal. The troops panicked, the Indians came swirling back to their half-burned tepees, where food and furs were still intact, and regained the pony herd.²²

Crook, the fruits of victory lost, returned to his base. Encouraged by the outcome, Crazy Horse and his people welcomed the hundreds of new recruits who came streaming from the reservations to join them and prepared for a real campaign.

But Crook, his troops reorganized, was already in the field again by mid-June, accompanied by a force of friendly Shoshone and Crow warriors eager to hit their hereditary enemy the Sioux. At the Powder River a defiant note came in from Crazy Horse: if the troops crossed the river, it would be war.

Again parking his wagon train, which became a field fortress, Crook moved on June 17, with his command--1,100 regulars and 250 Indians--as mobile as a Tatar horde. It was a stripped-saddle affair again, with his two companies of infantry mounted on wagon-train mules.

Some 1,500 Sioux and Cheyennes were enticingly scattered in a broad canyon at the mouth of the Rosebud, with 5,000 more hidden in the hills above. Crook felt his enemy out. Crazy Horse's attempt to encircle the main command was foiled by judicious handling of reserves, and after a very serious pitched battle at odds of five to one, the Indians were driven off. Crook, however, had to fall back on his wagon train to refit.

Meanwhile the main campaign had commenced, as Terry moved from the Yellowstone; with him were Custer, with the 7th Cavalry, 1,000 strong, and Gibbon, with another 1,000, mostly infantry. Terry went with Gibbon. There was no communication between Crook and Terry; so the latter, when he found traces of a broad Indian train, had neither knowledge of Crook's Rosebud fight nor inkling that this was actually Crazy Horse's outfit. However,

Terry at once acted, sending Custer up the Rosebud with instructions to locate the Indian band and get south of them, while Gibbon halted at the mouth of the Big Horn to box them in.

But glory-hunting Custer, instead of encircling the Indians, followed close on the trail. On June 25, he plunged rashly, with but five troops of cavalry, into Crazy Horse's thousands encamped on the Little Big Horn, to die there with his entire command.

Crook, reinforced by another regiment of cavalry, took up pursuit of Crazy Horse by early August. Once again it was a stripped-saddle campaign; this time in the burning heat of a Plains summer which in September began to turn to torrential rain and freezing cold. Forced at last to turn back, with rations exhausted and with a great part of his animals used up, Crook sent a detachment of 150 of the best mounted men ahead toward Deadwood City, to get supplies. "Horsemeat March" was the name Crook's men applied to this grim hike.

The advance detachment discovered an Indian pony herd; further reconnaissance disclosed a large Indian village, one of Crazy Horse's. Hurrying a courier back to Crook, Captain Anson Mills attacked at dawn on September 9. On the best of his jaded animals, 25 mounted men charged into the village, while the others attacked on foot. The Indian pony herd was stampeded, most of the warriors scattered, except for one small group which kept fighting until their chief, American Horse, was mortally wounded. While Mills' detachment was still fighting them, Crook and his main command came up in an amazing forced march, just in time to meet and repel Crazy Horse himself, rushing to the rescue with 600 warriors.

This battle--Slim Buttes, September 9, 1876--was the first real body blow to the Sioux. The village tepees were crammed with food, ammunition, and furs, together with arms and equipment captured in Custer's disaster. Many 7th Cavalry horses were also found in the pony herd. Crook's command, their hunger satisfied by food, destroyed the village, and with the Indian horse herd moved on to Deadwood City, where they were royally received.

At the mouth of the Tongue River, Colonel Nelson A. Miles's command, some 800 infantry and 2 Napoleon guns, clashed with a large force of Sioux under Sitting Bull. A parley got no results; Sitting Bull demanded that the white man vacate the entire region. Miles attacked on October 24, drove the Indians away from their village, and then destroyed it and the large quantity of winter supply the Indians had accumulated. About 2,600 starving Sioux surrendered. Miles, unable to subsist them from his own stock, told them to report to the nearest agencies--Spotted Tail or Red

Cloud--which they did. The hard core of the band, under Sitting Bull, moved north, finally reaching and crossing the Canadian border.

Meanwhile Crook was again in the field, prepared for another winter campaign, and bucking bitter weather. A huge Cheyenne village was discovered in an ice-locked gorge of Crazy Woman Fork. Crook sent in Colonel Ranald Slidell Mackenzie with ten troops of cavalry. As usual, Indian security was poor, for the hostiles believed the place to be impregnable. Mackenzie's horsemen struck on November 24, 1876, in the dead of a frigid, moonlit night, spraying the lodges with rifle and revolver fire. Surprise was complete. But it was a hornet's nest; nude warriors, rifles in hand, wriggled out of their tepees. Some, swimming the icy stream, gathered on the cliff beyond; others climbed adjacent bluffs. Bitter fighting went on throughout most of the morning, but when Crook's main body came in after an amazing march of 26 miles in 12 hours, the surviving Cheyennes had given up and slipped away. In all 205 lodges were burned, with immense supplies of food, fur, and ammunition, and more than 700 ponies captured. This marked the end of Cheyenne resistance. Dull Knife, their chief, was rebuffed with disdain by Crazy Horse when he pleaded for help for his exhausted and broken survivors. So the Cheyennes surrendered formally to Crook and in droves enlisted to fight their former ally.

All effort was now concentrated on bringing down Crazy Horse and his remaining band. Miles, with his dogged infantry, and his two guns concealed in wagons, discovered the hostiles on January 6, 1877, their village ensconced on a commanding bluff on the Tongue River. Miles prepared to storm the cliff while the Sioux screamed down defiance. But Miles surprised them. Covers stripped from wagons disclosed his two fieldpieces, whose shells plastered the crest. Stunned, the Sioux put up but comparatively little opposition to the infantrymen climbing the slope and finally fled, leaving another rich haul of food, furs, and ammunition in Miles's hands. This was the last straw. Before spring was over Crazy Horse surrendered and the Big Horn and Yellowstone campaign had ended. So had Sioux resistance.

The Nez Percé Campaign, 1877

The Nez Percé tribe, agriculturalists as well as hunters, had dwelt peaceably in their broad domains in the states of Idaho, Oregon, and Washington since they first welcomed Lewis and Clark's expedition in 1804. Until 1877 it was their boast that they had never killed a white man nor broken a promise. Then the Government, abrogating old treaties, attempted to oust them. Part of the tribe submitted, but the southern branch, under their chief

Thunder-Rolling-Over-the-Mountain--commonly known as Young Joseph --refused to move from their fertile Wallowa Valley homeland.

Joseph tried to keep order among his people, but his hand was forced when in June 1877 a small party of his young braves went berserk and massacred white men, women, and children in a neighboring settlement. The entire tribe moved out--some 700 strong, of whom 300 were well armed, well mounted, and--exceptional among the Plains Indians--all sharpshooting hunters.

A small cavalry detachment, sent from Fort Lapwai, near Lewiston, Montana, to restore order and evict the Indians, found the tribe departed, and, rashly pursuing into White Bird Canyon on the Clearwater River, was ambushed and routed, losing a good third of its 90-odd officers and men on June 18.

Brig. Gen. Oliver W. Howard, commanding in the area, took the field with 227 men--detachments of infantry, cavalry, and artillery with a howitzer and two Gatling guns. He found the Nez Percé entrenched--a new departure in Indian fighting--on the far side of the Salmon River. Howard crossed to find the Indian position empty. Joseph had simply ridden away, crossed the river, and fallen on Howard's rear-guard detachment. Howard scurried back to rescue his men only to find the Nez Percé gone again.

On July 11 Howard found Joseph, again entrenched, on the south fork of the Clearwater. The troops' assault was repulsed. Howard was forced to dig in himself, and a mounted charge by Joseph actually captured his artillery. It took Howard two days of bitter fighting to recapture his guns (which the Indians did not know how to use). Then Joseph disengaged in a well-conducted delaying action and fled northeast, keeping a three-day lead over his pursuers.

Barred by the fairly well-populated area of Missoula and surrounding settlements from his original intention of making direct for Canada, Joseph hurried for the Great Divide of the Rocky Mountains, aiming for the Big Hole Basin, where he hoped to rest his horses and people. Howard tried to block him at Tacher's Pass, but Joseph outfoxed him. With a detachment of 45 warriors, riding through the night in columns of fours, Joseph passed an unsuspecting sentry who thought them to be a detachment of cavalry, and stampeded Howard's animals, including all the pack mules. Howard had to halt in place until the mules were replaced, while the Nez Percé pushed through the Yellowstone National Park.

Two parties of civilian campers were jumped, on the way, and two men killed, but Joseph scrupulously refrained from harming the white women present. The tribe passed through several settlements where again Joseph kept his men from doing any harm. On the contrary, at Stevensville he bought and paid for supplies furnished and reached Big Hole Basin safely.

But the telegraph--the "Singing Wires" of Indian jargon--had alarmed headquarters of the Department of the Platte at Omaha, and in response Colonel Gibbon, with 200 men and a howitzer, was moving on Joseph's resting place. Gibbon, reaching the Big Hole Basin on August 8, found the encampment and at dawn next day assaulted in complete surprise, for the Indians had posted no guards. Gibbon swept the camp, but Joseph rallied his warriors and a mounted charge threw the soldiers back onto a knoll where they were forced to entrench, separated from their wagon train, their howitzer, and reserve ammunition. The Indians captured the howitzer and the ammunition; had they known how to handle it, Gibbon might have shared Custer's fate on the Little Big Horn.

As it was, Gibbon's situation was desperate. But an Indian attempt to fire the tall prairie grass was frustrated when changing wind blew the flames back. After three days of battle Howard approached to the rescue. Warned by his scouts, Chief Joseph broke off action and disappeared. Behind him he left 89 dead, including some women and children. Gibbon had lost 29 men killed and 40 wounded.

But again the telegraph betrayed Joseph. Obeying hurried instructions, Colonel Samuel D. Sturgis, with eight troops of cavalry and a mountain gun, came racing northwestward from the Powder River country. Joseph crossed the Yellowstone River and halted in Canyon Creek, September 13. There Sturgis caught him by surprise, stampeding the Indian pony herd and driving off 400 animals. It was a bitter blow, but Joseph was able to hold his warriors together for a delaying action which enabled the tribe to escape along the Musselshell River to the Missouri.

The Indians crossed the Missouri, after a brief skirmish at Cow Island, then pushed northwest for Canada. Ahead went Joseph's plea for help to Sitting Bull and his Sioux in haven there. Joseph halted on Eagle Creek in the Bear Paw Mountains, 30 miles from safety. Almost half his warriors were dead or wounded, his pony herd depleted, and both food and ammunition running short. Sitting Bull might have helped him, but he never moved. Instead, on September 30--the third time the telegraph had woven its net--came Colonel Miles with 350 men--cavalry and infantry--and a howitzer.

Miles at once attacked, swept through the Indian camp, but for four days was unable to dislodge the Nez Percé from a deep ravine into which they had dug themselves. But their food was gone, the last cartridges were being expended, and the squaws, children, and wounded warriors whom Joseph would not desert were huddled in the cold Montana autumn, sprinkled by small arms fire and howitzer shells. To top it all, General Howard and his slow-moving column now joined Miles.

On October 5 a white flag waved from the gully. Then Chief Joseph, riding alone, rifle across his pommel, came into the Army lines to be received by both Miles and Howard with respectful handshakes. Only 70 warriors were left, together with 320 women and children. All were half-starved, a number of them sick or wounded.

"From where the sun now stands," said Joseph, right hand raised to the sky, "I fight no more forever!"

For 106 days this amazing self-taught field commander had matched the best the Army could pit against him, fought 11 battles, and held his warriors in battle through more than 1,500 miles of marching and combat. He well deserves a place on the long honor roll of American leadership in battle.²³

COMMENT

The two examples cited above indicate that success in anti-guerrilla operations depends on proper utilization of the following factors:

1. Unity of administrative and military command in the affected area. Division of responsibility between the War and Interior Departments was responsible for much of the dismal mismanagement of the Indian problem and opened the way for active assistance to the guerrilla.
2. Seizure of the initiative, which includes choice of time and place of military pressure. Not until winter operations were initiated in the Big Horn and Yellowstone campaign, putting the Indian at a serious disadvantage, did Government forces attain lasting success.
3. Unrelenting pressure, which gives the guerrilla little time for recuperation.

4. Adequate communication between government forces in the field. Lack of such communication brought confusion and disaster to Government forces in the Big Horn and Yellowstone campaign. Conversely, telegraphic communication linking frontier posts enabled weaving of a fatal net about the Nez Percé, despite the splendid field generalship of Chief Joseph.

Also worthy of consideration is indication that the strength ratio of government (regular) troops to guerrilla forces may not always be of vital import. This was definitely the case in the Big Horn and Yellowstone campaign, where the overall ratio of government forces to guerrillas was approximately three to eight, a refutation of the common assumption that to be successful government forces in an affected area must be far superior in strength to the guerrillas. On the other hand, deliberate piecemeal commitment of small bodies of government troops, inadequate for the task at hand, merely invites guerrilla resistance, which, if successful in the first encounters, gains confidence and attains esprit de corps. This was true at the opening of the Nez Percé campaign.

One other point must be considered, true not only in the examples cited but also in many other combats between Indians and white regulars: the killing of women and children by the troops. Many squaws and children fell in the attacks on Indian villages. They were present, they were in the line of fire, or the rush of mounted charges, some actually fought beside their men, and perforce some of them died. Many squaws and children died also as a result of exposure to the elements or of starvation. This was true in particular as an aftermath of the Crazy Woman Creek fight, when hundreds of hapless squaws and children were left shelterless and hungry in subzero weather. Casualties among squaws and children were also high in the finale of the Nez Percé campaign, when they were exposed to the gunfire sweeping the Indian position.

Such incidental casualties among noncombatants bear no relation to the deliberate murder which marked both Indian raids and white civilian reprisals. However, the stigma was not overlooked in anti-Army propaganda at the time and must be expected in any operations of regular troops against guerrillas.

Footnotes

1. An analogy might be drawn between the Indian nurturing his victim between phases of long drawn-out torture, and the attitude of the Japanese soldiers in World War II, who could beat an American prisoner of war to death, then, at his funeral, shed tears of genuine grief for a brave enemy.
2. For an impartial scrutiny see Loring Benson Priest, Uncle Sam's Stepchildren (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1942), passim.
3. R.E. Dupuy and T.N. Dupuy, Compact History of the Revolutionary War (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1963), p. 296.
4. Brig. Gen. John T. Sprague, as quoted by William A. Ganoë, History of the U.S. Army (New York: Appleton-Century, Crofts, 1942), p. 189.
5. U.S. Congress, H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 97, 40 Cong., 2 sess., p. 9.
6. As quoted by William H. Leckie, The Military Conquest of the Southern Plains (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), p. 24.
7. Ibid., 24.
8. Ganoë, p. 321.
9. Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903), vol. II, pp. 299-300.
10. Edgar Bruce Wesley, Guarding the Frontier, as quoted by Fairfax Downey, Indian Wars of the US Army (1776-1865) (Garden City: Doubleday, 1963).
11. For an interesting analysis of this confused situation see S.E. Whitman, The Troopers (New York: Hastings House, 1962), pp. 227, 233.
12. Priest, pp. 68, 70-71, 156.

13. Report, C.G. Army, 1866, p. 20.
14. Sheridan, report in Reports of the Secretary of War, 1868.
15. Hancock, report in Reports of the Secretary of War, 1872, pp. 41-42.
16. Fairfax Downey, Indian-Fighting Army (New York: Scribners, 1941), p. 114.
17. See Priest, pp. 81-92, for an analysis of American public opinion.
18. Ibid., p. 89.
19. Olin D. Paulin, Atlas of the Historical Geography of the United States (Baltimore: Carnegie Institution, 1932), p. 3.
20. Many officers, and such few enlisted men as could afford the expense, had equipped themselves with Winchester, Remington, and Henry repeaters. The fact that many--though only a minority --of the Indians were also equipped with these fine repeating weapons has perhaps been exaggerated in popular books about the West. It was a fact, nonetheless, which was bitterly resented by the rank and file of the Regulars.
21. The highest number in service was 474 in 1869. When the authorization lapsed in 1901, 75 Indian scouts were still on the rolls. Heitman, vol. 2, p. 619.
22. Reynolds was later permitted to retire for disability, despite Crook's rage.
23. Dupuy and Dupuy, Brave Men and Great Captains (New York: Harper, 1959), p. 234.

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The Philippine Insurrection, November 1899-July 1902

by

Linnea P. Raine

BACKGROUND

In November 1899 Americans were faced with their first experience with guerrilla warfare outside the continental borders of the United States. For the next three years the American forces had to pacify a hostile population, put down an insurrection, and institute a civil government, all the while struggling to overcome the problems of transport, disease, climatic conditions, inexperienced command, and an unfamiliar culture.

The Philippine archipelago, which had been discovered and conquered by the Spanish, encompasses over 1,000 inhabited islands, the largest of which and the center of the insurrection is Luzon, with a total population of approximately 7,000,000 in 1903. Manila, the political and population center, located in central Luzon, had over 200,000 inhabitants at that time.

The Islands provided a terrain well suited for guerrilla operations. Dense jungles afforded cover whence the insurgents could come at will to harass the American troops. Extensive mountain areas, especially along the western coast of Luzon, were utilized as supply bases and refuge. Numerous waterways, including the major rivers, the Rio Grande de la Pampanga (running southward from northern Nueva Ecija Province to Manila Bay) and the Rio Grande de Cagayan (flowing through Isabela into Cagayan Province in northern Luzon), provided both the guerrillas and the counterinsurgents with lines of communication and transportation.

Three Christian groups comprised the major portion of the opposition to American extension of sovereignty over the Philippines: the Tagalogs (3,000,000), inhabiting the eight provinces adjacent to Manila and filtering out to a number of other

provinces in Mindoro and Masbate, the center of the insurrectory area providing the greatest moral and military support; the Ilocanos, occupying the three provinces in northern Luzon (Ilocanos Norte, Ilocanos Sur, and La Union), who although suspicious of the Tagalogs gave strong support and excellent leadership to the cause; and the Visayans, who inhabited the islands known as the Visayas between Luzon and Mindanao and were the least active of the three. Also involved to varying degrees were the Negritos (Luzon), Moros (southern area of the archipelago),* and Igorots (northern Luzon, namely Bontoc, Kankanaï, and Ilongot). In and around Manila as well as the other important trade centers there lived a considerable foreign population. Intermarriage of Chinese and Spanish with the Tagalogs and other lowland people by the end of the 19th Century had produced a large mestizo class, which embraced Catholicism and became the spearhead in the revolt against Spain and the later insurrection against the United States.

Since 1565, when Legaspi colonized the Philippines, the archipelago had been subject to Spain, with Spanish influence, Catholicism, and the power of the friars extending from the "walled city" of Manila to the smallest and most remote barrio. Arbitrary and often repressive aspects of Spanish rule created much unrest, leading to over 30 major revolts. Three classes finally combined to lead the revolt against Spain--the native clergy, the Ilustrados (well-educated Filipinos), and the Caciques (large landholders)--all of whom desired to end the influence of the hated friar, the symbol of Spanish power. The revolutionary movement was manifested in the person of José Rizal, an accomplished author, scholar, and academician dedicated to the implementation of reforms in the Islands.

In 1896, while Rizal was in exile, a secret revolutionary society, the Katipunan, was formed, largely from the lower class Tagalog-speaking areas, by Andres Bonifacio. Estimates of its membership vary from 100,000 to 400,000. When its existence was discovered on August 26, 1896, the members openly revolted near Manila. The Spaniards, with 28,000 reinforcements, dispersed the rebels and put down the uprising in 52 days. After the execution of Rizal, the beloved figurehead of the people, by the Spanish, feelings again ran high and the conflict resumed. Without the tempering influence of Rizal, the leadership fell wholly to the Katipunan and the reaction against the Spaniards steadily increased

*Guerrilla operations in the Moro islands of the southern archipelago--Mindanao and Jolo--are not considered in this paper. The Moro cared not whether Spaniard or American was overlord. His armed resistance was to law and order which interrupted his own outlaw operations.

in violence and in scope. After Bonifacio was executed for treason by an opposing faction within the Katipunan forces, the command was assumed by Emilio Aguinaldo. Fighting continued for a year before the Pact of Biac-na-Bato was signed on November 14, 1897.

Under the terms of the pact, Aguinaldo was to be exiled and given, along with 30 other leaders, \$800,000, of which \$400,000 was immediately awarded and taken by him to Hong Kong, where it was to be kept intact in a bank for the eventual procurement of arms and supplies and the financing of a later rebellion. (This sum, in fact, was used for arms procurement under the auspices of an organization called the Hong Kong Junta created for such purposes.) In addition, the pact provided for freedom of the press and the right to form associations. Spain agreed to pay indemnities, undertake certain reforms, and declare a general amnesty.

Hostilities broke out again in March 1898, for Spain had refused to honor most of the terms of the pact. By April the revolt had spread to Cebu and Panay in the Visayas. Meanwhile, the United States had gone to war with Spain, and by May 1, Commodore George Dewey and his US squadron had arrived and destroyed Spanish naval power in the Battle of Manila Bay. Since Dewey had a limited number of sailors, he could not put any force ashore. Consequently, the 15,000 Spaniards remained in the city of Manila. Not until July 31 did the first American troops arrive.

Aguinaldo, who had been busy in Hong Kong and Singapore gathering arms and ammunition and organizing the Junta, returned to Manila on May 19 and announced resumption of hostilities against Spain. After conferring with Dewey aboard his flagship, he was put ashore at Cavite, where the insurgents had already gained control. The results of their discussions are a subject of great debate. While Aguinaldo insisted that Dewey promised to aid him in setting up an independent government, Dewey held that he had no promises. Unofficially, the United States had assumed an attitude of wait and see.

On April 27, 1898, Aguinaldo had sent orders from Hong Kong to all the insurgent chiefs to resume hostilities against the Spaniards. On May 24, he proclaimed the independent aims of the Filipinos, and on May 28, his army defeated and captured a small Spanish column. Thereafter, as chief after chief was told of the resumption of hostilities, the insurrection spread until all of Luzon was on fire. All the while Dewey provided them with arms and assistance. On June 12, from the temporary capital of Bacoor in Cavite, the Filipinos announced their independence and proclaimed a provisional government with Aguinaldo as President.

By the end of June Manila was surrounded, some 4,000 Spaniards were prisoners of the insurgents, Spanish troops were demoralized, and Aguinaldo had refused a request from Spain for his allegiance. At Bacoor, he had drawn to him a clique of radical Filipinos including the intellectual, Apolinario Mambini, who until his deportation in January 1901 was to serve as Aguinaldo's chief adviser, with an ever increasing amount of influence. Dewey had begun to realize that he had started something in providing support for Aguinaldo's activities against the Spanish. He had allowed the insurgents to take to the field to train and to conduct operations, thereby gaining a great deal of experience. He had expedited the accumulation of arms which could be turned on American troops. Most importantly, he had encouraged the growth of popular enthusiasm for the cause of independence.

During the summer of 1898 the situation became increasingly confusing, with both the Americans and the insurgents proclaiming the legitimacy of their respective governments. The situation remained uneasy while all parties waited for the war between the Spanish and the Americans to reach a close. On September 9 Aguinaldo moved his government north to Malolos, northwest of Manila on the Dagupan-Manila Railroad in the province of Pampanga, a Tagalog stronghold. The Tagalog provinces had been well organized for the insurrection, but north Luzon, the Visayas, and a major portion of southern Luzon were hesitant as the leaders in these areas were not enthusiastic about either the Spanish or the insurgents. "It was necessary to persuade them to join the Tagalog provinces for their support was essential to the success of the new government, because not only were the provinces of Northern and Southern Luzon and the southern islands wealthy and populous, but as long as they did not fly Aguinaldo's flag they denied his assertion that he was the chosen ruler not only of the Tagalogs about Manila but of all the people of the Archipelago."¹ Although he had wished to institute a government in which civil functions would be exercised by civil officials, in many instances it became necessary to have military commanders supersede civil officials in the various towns under insurgent control.

Incessant activity was maintained throughout this period: letters of encouragement sent to insurgent leaders; conferences with his aides convened; diplomatic recognition from foreign governments sought; and meetings of the revolutionary assembly arranged. On September 29 the assembly ratified Philippine independence. Aguinaldo's recognition and support were increasing rapidly in central Luzon. J.R.M. Taylor describes the effect that the leader had on the people while the capital was at Malolos:

. . . those who heard him followed him [emphasis added]. He is Asiatic, his voice and his manner, and his eloquence appealed to the Malay and the Chinese in them. It was of the soil and not like the speeches of the educated men around him [Ilustrados], cultivated and elaborate, based upon the recollection of things read and heard, echoes of foreign and alien voices.²

Throughout the fall of 1898 revolutionary tribunals were established in the Visayas. At the time of the signing of the Treaty of Paris in which the United States agreed to pay \$20,000,000 to Spain for the acquisition of the Philippines, Aguinaldo had a force of approximately 40,000 men as well as the increasing support of the population. When it became apparent that the property of the Church would be restored and that no mention was made of amelioration of the land problem by the new sovereign authorities, the hostility which had formerly been directed against Spain was transferred to the United States. From December through February of 1899 the situation smoldered as relations between the two groups grew steadily worse. On January 23, 1899, the Malolos Constitution (which had been approved by Aguinaldo) was proclaimed and Aguinaldo was elected President of the Philippines. The insurgents were preparing for what they knew was coming. By the time the Treaty of Paris was ratified by the Senate on February 6, hostilities between the Americans and the Filipino "Insurrectos" had been going on for two days.

Although the insurgents were extremely strong at the commencement of hostilities, the American superiority of numbers and arms in conventional warfare quickly reduced these early advantages. As the war progressed it became increasingly evident that Aguinaldo's army could not survive if the prevailing type of war continued. Morale began steadily to decline. Throughout the summer and fall of 1899 the insurgent army was driven northward and scattered, hiding in the mountains of the Zambales area. Finally, on November 12, at the new insurgent capital at Bayambang, Aguinaldo convened a council of war which a great number of Filipino leaders attended and announce the initiation of guerrilla operations.

American forces by this time had pushed the insurgents across Luzon, uniting in the mountains west of Mantaren. The long-thrust operations which they had been carrying out, explained Maj. Gen. Elwell Otis, Commanding General and Military Governor, helped the Americans gain knowledge of the area and laid the groundwork for establishment of permanent stations which he mistakenly felt confident the people would accept. But Aguinaldo had persuaded the inhabitants to offer resistance to the Americans. Attacks were

frequently made upon small US Forces in the territory throughout the following winter and spring. It was necessary, therefore, to send additional troops in to protect the peaceful elements from retaliation as much as for military reasons.

In December 1899, General Arthur MacArthur, who was in command of northern Luzon with the exception of Brig. Gen. Samuel B.M. Young's command in the northwestern provinces and a few other provinces, pursued the remains of Aguinaldo's northern army and guerrilla bands, giving "protection" as they moved through the area. During the winter of 1899-1900 insurrectory activity which had been held in check during the northern operations began to increase as some of the American units withdrew to Manila. The arrival of more troops from the United States meanwhile made possible the initiation of further operations in the south.

By May 5, 1900, when General Otis was succeeded by MacArthur as Military Governor, no large insurgent force was in the field at any one place and the Americans had occupied a large number of towns. The average strength of the US troops since August 31, 1899, had been 54,204 of which 1.56% were killed and 1.17% died from disease--a total of 2.73% losses for this period.

The summer of 1900 was a period of operational inactivity on the insurgents' part. The American command mistakenly believed that the war might be terminated and American sovereignty accepted, but this period lasted only the time necessary to organize for resistance against the Americans and support for the guerrillas in the field the groups of inhabitants throughout the archipelago. On June 3 the Taft Commission which had been appointed by President McKinley on April 7 arrived in the Philippines to observe and report results to the President through the State Department, succeeding the Schurman Commission of the preceding year. Acting on the assumption that the victories scored over Aguinaldo's conventional forces the previous fall and winter had sufficiently demonstrated the military superiority of the US Forces, General MacArthur, on June 5, recommended a general and complete amnesty, which was promulgated on June 21. Only 5,022 Filipinos presented themselves and took the oath of allegiance. As the total population numbered over 7,000,000, MacArthur was not pleased with his results. On June 21 a resolution for ending the war was presented by Pedro A. Paterno, a former member of the Malolos Cabinet. Although the hopes of the resolution were crushed with the reelection of McKinley later in November by the American people, its significance was considerable as it initiated reconciliatory discussions, which were to be resumed in December of 1900.

Meanwhile guerrilla activity broke out with renewed intensity in August 1900. A ditty sung by the soldiers at the time epitomized the Americans' bewilderment and frustration:

Oh is Mac the boss or
Is Mac the tool?
Is Mac the governor general
Or a hobo?
I'd like to know who'll be
Boss of this show--
Will it be Mac or Emilio
Aguinaldo?³

From personal observation of the situation and conditions in the field through the fall of 1900, MacArthur slowly came to realize the critical importance of local support to the continuing operations of the guerrillas. He was far more astute than his predecessor, having spent a large part of his time in the field. Otis was an administrator who came to the Philippines totally unprepared to undertake command of as thorny a problem as the conflict proved to be. As can be seen from the above, even MacArthur did not completely comprehend the nature of the problem until seven months after he assumed command. Refusing a suggestion from General Young to take harsh action against the population, MacArthur began to develop and implement his own solutions. On December 19 and 20 he announced his intent to deport certain prestigious Filipinos to Guam, and on December 21 proclaimed "Laws of War." On December 23 a newly formed group called the Federation Party, led by Padro Paterno, signed a party platform and began its end-the-war campaign throughout Luzon and other islands. In January the Philippine Municipal Code was issued, and MacArthur ordered the deportation of 26 Filipinos to Guam. From February until August the organization of all provinces thought to be loyal to the United States for civil government was developed. On March 24 Emilio Aguinaldo himself was captured by a detachment under the imaginative direction of Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston at Palanan, a small town in Isabela Province.

This event marked the gradual transition from military to civil government in the archipelago. Although the insurrection continued in some areas in southern Luzon and a few islands in the Visayas until July of 1902, the greater portion of the population had been pacified. By June 20, 1901, when the executive authority was transferred from the Military Governor to the Civil Governor, the American forces had been reduced to 42,000. In those areas still considered unsafe, the military commands continued to maintain authority.

On July 4 MacArthur was succeeded by Maj. Gen. Adna Chaffee, who was to have to deal with a wholly different and more ruthless set of problems in the persons of General Miguel Malvar, commander of the insurgents in the Batangas area, and General Vincente Lucban, leader of the scattered guerrillas on Samar. By October 1901, operations for the suppression of insurgent activities were in progress in the provinces of Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas on Luzon as well as on the islands of Mindoro and Samar. There were a few scattered bands elsewhere, but these were left to the native constabulary organized by the Americans. The operations against Malvar in the Batangas area were taken over by Brig. Gen. James F. Bell, the former Provost Marshal of Manila, who swiftly decided that stern measures would have a far greater effect on the population than an attraction policy. He pursued the scattered bands into the hills, searching out every hiding place and ultimately in April bringing Malvar himself to surrender.

Operations in Samar against Lucban were undertaken by Brig. Gen. Jacob Smith, following the infamous massacre of Balangiga on September 28. Until February Smith was to conduct an almost fanatical campaign on the island which eventually led to his court martial. But by April Samar was quiet.

By July 1902 the number of occupied stations had fallen from a peak of 552 to 195 and the number of troops from a peak of 70,000 to 34,000. On July 4 President Theodore Roosevelt issued a proclamation of peace and a general amnesty. Except for inconsequential bandit type activity insurgent activity had ceased and the role of counterinsurgent forces was terminated in the Philippines.

THE GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION

Aguinaldo's rebel forces or "Insurrectos," included almost all elements of the Filipino population. The Ilustrados had led the movement for reform under Spanish rule and had provided the leadership for Rizal's propagandist movement. Although many were sons of wealthy mestizo families of Spanish-Chinese-Filipino blood, some came from the peasant class in the outlying pueblos. From their travels and education abroad they had brought back to the Philippines ideas which had characterized the French and American revolutions. The Ilustrados had been the spearhead of the early revolt and wanted to keep control. The Caciques, the powerful land-owning "bosses" of the provinces, who contributed heavily to the military forces against both Spain and the United States, formed the bridge between the Ilustrados and the masses, or the

"tao." They were not humanitarians, for they had stood to gain both from eliminating the power of the friars and that of Spain. Rizal had been opposed to violent revolution largely because he understood this, fearing that if the Spanish were overthrown too quickly, before the Filipinos were properly prepared and educated, the tyranny of Filipinos over Filipinos ("caciquismo") might have been just as bad if not worse. Yet, without the cooperation of the Cacique class, Aguinaldo could not have gotten the material and moral support from the masses. He knew too that the Ilustrados were essential, for without them he could not ensure the success of the republic.

In order to secure the support of the Caciques in 1898, Aguinaldo had to attempt the type of operations which they favored, with a conventional field army. This was, in actuality, unsuited to Aguinaldo's army and it failed against the Americans. Hence in November 1899 he abandoned any attempt to confront the Americans with large masses of men directed by a single leader and rallied to his cause the people under the leadership of the Katiipunan. "In making this choice he showed he knew the nature of his people."⁴ He appealed to the hatred of routine and the lust for a wild life that lay deep in the heart of the masses, the so-called "tao"; he called for the aid of every leader of the people, even bandits and criminals.

The insurgents adopted a military policy based upon the idea of occupying a series of defensive positions and forcing the Americans to a never-ending repetition of tactical deployments. This strategy was carried out with great skill and some success for the next two years, since the guerrillas could hover close to the American camps and yet avoid close contact. Unfortunately the Americans interpreted the transition from conventional to guerrilla warfare as a defeat, and it took some time and many casualties to correct the miscalculation. When Aguinaldo and his government fled to the mountains of Zambales from Tarlac, and the members scattered to look for places of refuge, there were some 55,000 Americans in the Philippines. A year later some 69,000 troops were still engaged in trying to break the back of an insurrection that many argued was merely acts of banditry. Many American officers, including General Arthur MacArthur, expressed surprise that the "Tagalog Rebellion" continued after the forces had been scattered.

Reorganization of the guerrilla bands continued into the summer of 1901, at which time insurgent activity began to increase greatly. At the same time the insurgent forces were actively opposing and harassing counterinsurgent patrols sent out from the garrisoned towns, the civilian agents within the towns were

extending their influence over the local inhabitants. It became increasingly clear that the insurgents who had returned to their homes after the conventional war had not yet abandoned the cause of their fellow-natives and were now, if not overtly, covertly aiding the bands operating in the surrounding countryside.

Political Structure

The Filipino guerrillas combined terrorist tactics and guerrilla warfare with the objective of discouraging the American attempt to set up a sovereign government, by instituting a shadow government to which the population would maintain allegiance in every town occupied by the American troops. As a basis for insurrectionary tactics the alternative government was critical, for it provided the insurrection with a national character and an instrument for the control of the local population.

The establishment of municipal government under the Americans in 1899 and 1900 carried along with it support for the American forces. But insurgent governments had already been organized in these same barrios, and either the original officials remained or new ones were chosen who continued as the secret agents of the guerrillas. Often, town officials openly served the Americans while secretly aiding the guerrillas. In all matters touching the peace of the town, such as primitive road work, construction of streets and bridges, and the institution of schools which had been first organized by the American forces, their open activity was excellent. At the same time, however, they were exacting and collecting contributions and supplies and recruiting men for the guerrilla forces, as well as sending any obtainable military information to the insurgent leaders.

Throughout the area, wherever there was a guerrilla band the neighboring barrios contributed to its support and maintenance. Regardless of the fact of American occupation, the pueblos were the actual bases for all guerrilla activity. The towns, under the control of the dual officials, furnished the insurgents and also afforded them places of refuge. It was, in fact, one of the axioms of guerrilla tactics that a band should dissolve when pressed too hard and its members take refuge in the nearest barrio.

There were, then, two governments operating throughout the archipelago: the Katipunan-backed insurgent government to which the population covertly gave initially willing support and later forced involuntary support; and the municipal government set up by the American troops and later by the Taft Commission, to which the population overtly professed allegiance.

When the insurgents were retreating in the summer of 1899 and unable to influence the natives living in the various barrios, the American-sponsored municipal governments worked quite well. As soon as guerrilla warfare was initiated, however, the erstwhile insurgents returned to their native areas and began stirring up trouble and discontent among the native population.

MILITARY STRUCTURE

The insurgent territory was divided into zones, each commanded by a general, colonel, or lieutenant colonel. Each zone was then divided into subzones headed by majors. Finally, every subzone comprised four or five towns, each of which had an agent, usually the presidente or mayor of the pueblo, responsible to the commander of the guerrilla band operating from that particular pueblo. The agent was responsible for supplying the guerrilla leader, through a line of couriers organized by the native civilian municipal authorities, with food, supplies, recruits, and information on troop movements. The agents also had the power to grant exemptions from military duty to those natives who were in a position to make certain contributions or financial payments. The municipal police in each pueblo were also at the disposal of the guerrilla commander.

Each of these small guerrilla bands operated within the jurisdiction of the pueblo to which its members themselves belonged and remained hidden in the surrounding countryside in the jungle or volcanic ravines. Their abundant and well-hidden supplies were so efficiently provided for them through the agent by the natives living in the nearby American-occupied pueblos that they could have been sustained indefinitely.

On February 21, 1899, the Insurrecto government at Malolos issued a decree establishing universal conscription of all men between the ages of 18 and 35. Eventually, every able man from 16 years old unless occupied in some other suitable activity was classed as a guerrilla reserve and liable to the call to the field at any time. When one adds to this the number of collectors (pagulos), agents, spies, and bearers it is obvious that the insurrection utilized a considerable number of natives, many of whom had taken the oath of allegiance to the United States.

According to insurgent plans, there was to be one boloman to every two riflemen. At the end of Bell's operations in southern Luzon, 3,600 rifles were captured in three provinces. This

meant a minimum of 5,400 men operating in the field during Bell's campaign (using the above ratio), and from ten to an entire company of bolomen in every barrio of Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas.

LOGISTICS AND TRAINING

Forces were organized throughout the archipelago on a territorial basis. When the insurgents wished to mobilize an area, Aguinaldo would issue a proclamation, draw a few followers around him, loot the area, and extract money from the people, using either persuasion or terror (depending on the degree of sympathy obtained from the population in the affected area). As the insurrection grew, however, the means of sustaining his forces became more sophisticated.

The problem of food supply presented little difficulty as long as the guerrilla bands retained the support of the population. The greater part of the Filipino's diet consisted of rice, which could be easily carried, plus a little meat and fish. Only later, when MacArthur and his successor, Chaffee, instituted their respective measures did food become a critical factor. Clothing was nondescript. Shoes presented no supply problem as the peasant was accustomed to going barefooted. Uniforms had been abandoned to facilitate a quick change from insurgent to "amigo."

Lack of training, arms, and ammunition, which had proved grave disadvantages during the period of conventional warfare, continued to plague the guerrillas throughout the insurrection. These shortcomings were mitigated somewhat, however, by resort to the small bands operating sporadically from the recesses of jungle or volcanic ravines.

Money was provided by the "voluntary" taxes collected from the local inhabitants. In addition to these taxes, export duties were levied by the local insurgent commanders upon the hemp exported under their control. At least some of the money from these duties was sent to Manila and passed into the control of the Insurgent Commission operating there. From these funds such supplies as could be smuggled through American lines were delivered to the insurgents operating in the field. As ammunition was difficult to obtain most of it was locally manufactured; small arsenals sprang up throughout the archipelago. Arms consisted largely of rifles obtained with the money collected through taxes or confiscated earlier from the Spanish garrisons, and bolos, which were in abundance. Other types of support such as medical, food, and shelter, were obtained in the pueblo from which the band operated.

OBJECTIVES AND DOCTRINES

The Insurrectos' objective was to expel the American forces from the Philippines and to establish an independent government throughout the archipelago with Aguinaldo as president. Later, after the summer of 1901, when all of the areas except Batangas, Laguna, Tayabas, and Samar were pacified, the insurrection became little more than a situation in which to further the insurgent leaders' prestige or personal gain.

Action was directed toward the discouragement of the American authorities from attempting to set up municipal governments in the pueblos. Aguinaldo hoped that if the guerrilla bands could maintain harassing actions and the population displayed continuing animosity the American authorities would grow weary and return home.

The insurgent forces recruited from their pueblos operated in the vicinity of the town, and when they became tired or ill they would return to the town and their families, where they remained until time to return to the Insurrecto band. This would all be accomplished under the eyes of the counterinsurgents occupying the town.

Generally, the actions in the countryside were little more than skirmishes or encounters. Rarely would attacks be waged against the American garrison itself, with the one exception, Balangiga. On September 28, 1901, Company C of the 9th US Infantry stationed on Samar was attacked, and 44 of the Americans, including the commander, were massacred by a few hundred bolomen who had entered the town as "peaceful" inhabitants of the countryside. Although attacks such as this had been planned for use by the Insurrectos, this was the only instance where one was seriously executed.

As the conflict continued, brutality escalated, and each side utilized its respective governmental aspirations as rationalization. The Filipinos claimed that such actions as they were forced to commit were necessary, as they were fighting for the survival of their independence against overwhelming odds. The American forces felt that all natives were savages and that it was their duty to civilize them at any cost.

MILITARY TECHNIQUES

The techniques used by the guerrillas in the insurrection were set out in a pamphlet printed by one of the Filipino juntas established abroad.

The purpose of the guerrilla will be to constantly worry the Yankees in the Pueblos occupied by them, to cut off their convoys, to cause all possible harm to their patrols, their spies and their scouts, to surprise their detachments, to crush their columns if they should pass favorable places and to exterminate all traitors, to prevent natives to (from) vilely selling themselves for the invaders' gold.

The guerrillas shall make up for their small numbers by their ceaseless activity and their daring. They shall hide in the woods and in distant barrios and when least expected shall fall upon the enemy . . . but they shall be careful to never rob their countrymen.

We repeat that we must not give or accept combats with such a powerful foe if we have not the greatest chance for success . . . even as should we rout him three times or five times, the question of our independence would not be solved. Let us wait for the deadly climate to decimate his files and never forget that our objective is only to protract the state of war.⁵

The general guerrilla operational plan was to watch for small bodies of American forces, prepare an ambush for them, fire a few volleys at short range, and then, if the enemy appeared demoralized, the bolomen were to rush the troops.

LOCAL SUPPORT

The organization of a parallel government in the pueblos throughout the archipelago enabled the Insurrectos to secure support for the guerrilla bands as well as to present to the world an organization which demonstrated the Filipinos' ability to create and maintain a republic. Support was not entirely automatic, however, and much effort went in to maintaining it, largely directed by the Katipunan.

In 1898 Aguinaldo announced that the Katipunan had been disbanded as a separate organization, but warned the people that all Filipinos were Katipunan and liable to the society's punishments, which were cruel and awe-inspiring. Until the spring of 1901, the support of the population was generally sufficiently strong so that the repressive aspects of the society were in little evidence.

During 1900 the Katipunan was slowly organized throughout the archipelago in all towns, including those occupied by the counterinsurgent forces. It provided a valuable link between the guerrillas and the inhabitants of the towns. Its orders were to be carried out without question, for disobedience meant immediate punishment. The mystery surrounding its secret meetings appealed to the imagination of the people, and the secrecy of its deliberations and the ruthlessness with which its orders were executed aroused their fear as well as their awe. The organization presented different images, depending on the audience to which it was directing its focus: to Europe and the United States, it was an organization dedicated to the inception and the operation of a republic; to the inhabitants, its subjects, it was a mafia, an instrument of terror.

The government in actual control in the towns was the Katipunan, with a small group of leaders who controlled the actions of all the other members of the association, who were bound to them by an oath, violation of which was punished by death. The subordinate members in turn demanded absolute obedience from the rest of the community. Punishments were inflicted by a special band called the Mandudukuts or Mandukuts under the immediate orders of the local head of the Katipunan (usually the presidente appointed by the Americans). Despite its lofty aims the Katipunan's means of attaining its ends were so cruel that it finally became little more than a brutal instrument for imposing the will of a few on a terrified population. This was particularly the case in the four provinces last to be defeated in the insurrection.

As the resources of the country became nearly exhausted, the guerrillas still demanded the usual tribute in men, money, and supplies. When these were no longer given willingly, the guerrillas began to take them by force, striking terror into the hearts of those who did not follow the line. Only when a native had no more to lose, so reduced by circumstances that his life meant little, and driven to hate and rage, would he turn against the insurgents. Until this point was reached the dual governments continued to exist throughout Luzon.

After July 1901 and the surrender and/or capture of the prominent guerrilla leaders, control of insurgent affairs passed into the hands of men less scrupulous, often criminals and lardons (bandits) who roamed the countryside. This transition completely changed the character of the insurrection, which rapidly dissipated into a means for gratifying pride or an opportunity for personal gain.

As the insurrection wore on the threat of death came to be used as a means of obtaining the support of the local population. The leaders imposed such oppressive and unjust taxes upon the natives that it became necessary to introduce a reign of terror in order to dominate the taos completely and to collect involuntary contributions. The penalty for failing to pay one's taxes was death. These taxes were regularly collected by insurgent agents called pangolos, several of whom were located in every town and one in every barrio.

Each pangolo was required to hand over to the insurgents a payment proportionate to the numbers and the wealth of the people from whom he collected. In most instances the pangolos were officials of the town or barrio occupied by the American forces, placed in office by the counterinsurgents after they had voluntarily taken the oath of allegiance to the United States and promised to perform their duties faithfully.

J.R.M. Taylor in his report presents an extract (General Orders No. 259, Division of the Philippines, of 1901) from the written confession of a murderer on trial, which illustrates the methods of procedure employed in cases of refusal:

I carried a letter of authorization to act as a special agent, which means authority to commit murder. Each time a murder was ordered a letter was sent to one of four men (named) by one of the chiefs (naming them). Afterwards the letter was taken up and burned. If a man did not pay his contributions to the insurgent collector he was ordered to be killed /emphasis added/.

On January 6, 1901, the order had been given that, henceforth, all those who disobeyed the orders of the Katipunan were to be tried and sentenced. There must have been an extraordinary number of murders, for the amount recorded in the investigations of cruelty charges on the part of American soldiers is considerable. One item concerning the trial of seven men accused of committing murder in Taytay, Morong Province, provides the following information. General Chaffee in questioning the man for the Military Commission reported:

. . . . No native inhabitant of Taytay opened his lips to the American authorities concerning the crimes being committed and of which all had knowledge. It appears that, following the general instructions laid down by the insurgent chiefs, any man might be put to death by the local authorities if the public witnessed and approved the execution. Accordingly, many of the people of Taytay assembled at night to witness the execution of the selected victim, and stood by at a short distance until the dead was buried, when they dispersed and made no sign of what had been done. As in all like cases, the people were warned that certain death would fall upon anyone who disclosed the truth to the Americans.⁷

Further disclosed by the testimony was the fact that nearly all the inhabitants of the town were present at these proceedings and, moreover, that they would go as soon as they discovered one was going to take place. The chaplain would give confession and absolution before the victim was to be executed. At least three of the Taytay victims were buried alive. One of the men testified that this particular order was given by General Pio de Pilar and that it was obeyed because he (the executioner) would have been killed if he had not.

. . . . If the presidente had ordered you to kill every person in the crowd witnessing the execution of Felipe and Honorio, would you have obeyed his order?

When the order is from my superior I can not disobey. I can not refuse.

Chaffee's report alludes to "hundreds" of such occurrences.

No one in the town dared to disclose the presence of the guerrilla as it was fully realized that not even the American commander could prevent the secret assassination of the informer:

. . . any native found rendering voluntary service to Americans without contributing a large portion of his compensation to the insurrection, and any native who showed any friendship for Americans, or was suspected of being a spy for them, was, regardless of sex, marked for secret assassination by the insurgents or their emissaries.⁸

It was not surprising, therefore, that almost every native practiced complete obedience to the insurgent government, and only when incessant pressure was applied by the counterinsurgents was this bond broken and the insurrection ended.

OTHER TECHNIQUES

A less drastic method of obtaining the support of the natives was the utilization of superstition. In Manila one man was arrested for posing as Christ (with considerable success). In Batangas at least one native priest, taking a sacred image from the church and joining the guerrillas, enticed many men to follow him in order to obtain the protection of that particular saint. Figures of saints even began to be manufactured and pawned off upon the credulous as miraculous. They would be placed in trees or buried with perfume sprinkled around them so that even the most skeptical native could observe that the figures were not made by the hand of man. Then the "discoverer" of the miracle would collect contributions which went either to him or to the guerrillas. In July of 1902, Bell's provost marshal had 11 in his possession which had been used regularly in Batangas in order to obtain funds.

The unity of support given by the local population is essential to the success of guerrilla warfare. This unity existed for a time in central Luzon, for several reasons. First, it was far more natural to help men of their own blood, language, and thoughts rather than foreigners whom they did not trust, although the natives feigned aid to the Americans when it was temporarily expedient. Second, they had been told that the archipelago was about to be given its independence and they knew what would happen to any native who had been genuinely loyal to the counterinsurgent cause as soon as the leaders obtained the power which would inevitably fall into their hands. The insurgent leaders were threatening to release the ladrones of the hills and jungles upon the towns defended by American garrisons. Who knew how long a garrison would remain?

It is true that it would have taken only one traitor in each town to destroy the whole complex guerrilla network operating from it effectively. But no guarantees could be given for the informer's life. He would probably have had to denounce the organization through an interpreter, more than likely an active member of the organization, who would immediately report his action.

The taos or Filipino peasants, moreover, were led and directed by the wealthy class, whose orders they obeyed without question and without thought. To make this group desert the insurrection required (1) orders from the leading and directing group of natives (the Caciques and Ilustrados) or (2) that the penalties incurred by the informers and/or traitors should be so ruthlessly inflicted by the Americans that in every town and every barrio there would be witnesses of the counterinsurgents'

conviction. Prior to MacArthur's decision to issue his January proclamation, there had not been enough pressure put on the directing group. The American counterinsurgent leaders had decided to assume a wait-and-see attitude, hoping that the cruelty of the guerrillas and the ladrones would drive the population over to the American side. Although they knew that this would take longer, they had believed that it would be more effective.

OUTSIDE SUPPORT

To state it as simply as possible, the insurgents had almost no outside support, although two efforts to supply it are recorded. The Anti-Imperialist League founded in Boston in 1899, including such eminent Americans as Andrew Carnegie, Samuel Gompers, and David Starr Jordan, through literature, public meetings, leagues, and protests, attempted to provide moral support for the insurgents and many American Army officers believed that, more importantly, it gave material assistance to the guerrillas. Although it is easily proved that extensive moral support was given to the insurgents, it is far more difficult to ascertain whether assistance in the form of supplies or funds was made available to the insurgents. General H.W. Lawton, killed at San Mateo, hints at this in some of his correspondence. The Anti-Imperialist League did all in its power to approach the Insurrectos, applauding their spunk, telling them to be patient, that the Americans would never reelect President McKinley. One writer claims that Aguinaldo persisted in guerrilla warfare after fleeing to the mountains only because he felt sure Washington would call off the war after November 1900. There are a number of letters to this effect included in Aguinaldo's correspondence captured by the American forces. There seem to have been a few periods when a rise in the activities of the League were accompanied by increased activity on the part of the guerrillas. It must be remembered, however, that communication was not so highly developed then as to allow immediate and sensitive interaction. Consequently, it is rather difficult to attempt any measurement of relationship.

Perhaps, most important of all the effects the League did have was on the American soldier who, while struggling with an elusive enemy in thick jungles, beaten down with malaria and the like, was being betrayed back home. This, indeed, must have been maddening. Even if arms and supplies from the United States never reached the Filipinos, the above was enough to start rumors.

Sun Yat-sen, while residing in Japan, made another recorded effort to assist the newly created Philippine Republic in its fight for existence against the United States. Sun had secretly arranged for a shipload of arms to be sent from Japan as well as some Japanese officers to assist in the campaign. The Japanese officers did arrive, but the shipload of arms was lost at sea and with it went hopes for an effective military campaign against the counterinsurgents.⁹ When one of the Japanese officers were captured by Americans in Manila, Japan ceased all further activity.

All financial and diplomatic activities of the Insurrectos were handled by the various "Juntas," including the well-known Hong Kong Junta originated by Aguinaldo while he was in exile in that city. The Juntas received the money collected in voluntary contributions and bought weapons which were sent into the country during 1900-1901. It is conceivable that sizable donations were made by interested nations, but there is no evidence on this point.

AMERICAN FORCES AND LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS

The Americans employed almost two-thirds of the total US military force during the period extending from February 4, 1899, to July 4, 1902. Between June 30, 1898, and June 26, 1899, 63,426 men consisting of 29 regiments of Infantry, 8 batteries of Field Artillery, over one regiment of Cavalry, proportional numbers of Engineers, Signal, Medical, Ordnance and Quartermaster Corps personnel, were utilized in the Philippines

The problems encountered by the US command were unending. Food was a critical factor. The Americans could not subsist on rice as the major diet and still remain efficient. Because of the humid climate, fresh meat, if obtained, had to be slaughtered and eaten immediately. Most of the supplies had to be imported. Certain commodities, such as sardines, received special treatment for consumption in the archipelago. Early in the insurrection cured bacon had spoiled immediately upon arrival. Hard bread could not be kept for any length of time, and local fresh vegetables and fruit raised havoc on the men. Consequently, fresh vegetables from the United States were distributed as rapidly as possible, dehydrated vegetables were consumed extensively, canned meat distributed, and, eventually, frozen meat was shipped in from the continental United States and Australia.

Another situation harassing the American officers was transportation. Aguinaldo had inventoried all modes of transport and

forbade the natives to sell any without his permission. Consequently, it became increasingly difficult to obtain any carts or water buffalo, and even when the troops got possession of any that mode of transport was so slow that it proved militarily inefficient. Finally, American mules were shipped to the islands to fill in the gap. Later, horses arrived. Chinese coolies were used by the Medical Corps to facilitate the evacuation of the wounded.

A third source of worry was the lack of discipline among the American forces. A majority of the troops were Volunteers who had received little prior training and had almost no experience. As many had left home for the first time, their accounts to those they had left were full of exaggeration and faulty information. Since they were in a critically impressionable state the tensions and strain of their activities as well as sickness and weariness would produce cases of melancholia, depression, moodiness, and in some cases insanity.¹⁰ Sexton makes observations on the impact the volunteer had on public opinion at home through correspondence and "first hand accounts." Drunkenness was often a problem and, at such times, the Filipinos were mistreated, subjected to bullying, taunts, and ridicule. Instances were recorded of stealing and cheating. Aguinaldo used this situation for propaganda to elicit support for the insurgents.

ATTEMPTS TO CUT LOCAL SUPPORT

During the fall of 1900 it became apparent to General MacArthur that efforts to gain support of the villagers by conciliatory action had failed and that the only hope of success lay in cutting off the guerrillas from the support of the pueblos, for without such support the guerrillas would cease to exist.

As he said at the time: ". . . The 'skulking bands of Guerrillas,' as the remnants of the Insurgent army have been called, are mere expression of loyalty of the towns. They could not exist for a month without urban support. . . . Intimidation has undoubtedly accomplished much to this end, but it is more probable that the adhesive principle comes from ethnological homogeneity which induces men to respond for a time to the appeals of consanguineous leadership, even when such action is opposed to their own interests. . . ."11

It was at this time that General Samuel Young proposed to MacArthur that the European methods of dealing with rebellious

Asiatics might prove valuable in putting a halt to the increasing guerrilla activities in northern Luzon. Young was proposing a virtual military dictatorship throughout the archipelago. The stern repressive measures included the following: summary punishment by death to all caught with arms after taking the oath of allegiance to the United States; confiscation of all property belonging to the insurgent leaders; removal of all native office holders and replacement with American military; laying waste all parts of the country used as hiding places and supply bases; deportation of all persons whose presence in the country was deemed prejudicial to the interests of the United States; strict censorship of the press; and concentration of people living in rebellious areas in circumscribed zones.¹²

MacArthur felt that the measures were far too severe and developed a less stringent program. On December 31, 1900, he proclaimed "Laws of War" in English, Spanish, and Tagalog. The following provisions were spelled out in detail: all those who had alternately taken to the field and then returned to their barrios in civilian clothes would be brought to trial for murder upon capture; all known Insurrectos would be sent to Manila and imprisoned; fear of Insurrectos would no longer be accepted as a legitimate excuse for failure on the part of the local civilian population to give full cooperation and loyalty to American authorities; civilians who were not by overt actions loyal to the American authorities would be considered as being against the government, i.e., neutrals were to be considered enemies. The last was one of the most critical and far-reaching of all the provisions in terms of cutting support.¹³ Prior to this, on December 19-20, Washington had given permission to MacArthur to order deportation of all "irreconcilable" insurgents to Guam.

The effects of the proclamations were immediate. Apathy began to diminish and kidnappings and assassinations abated. The population still was not sure whether MacArthur would carry out the measures, until he ordered the deportation to Guam of 26 Filipinos, including Mambini (Aguinaldo's right-hand man) and the celebrated General Pio de Pilar, on January 7, 1901. This calculated move was excellent, for the Filipinos were shown by example that they would be held responsible for their actions. The deportation of prominent and popular agitators and the confinement of prisoners of war, pending cessation of hostilities, were relied upon to entice to the American side those who were interested in peace, either for public expediency or personal interest in a prisoner.

A few well-educated Filipinos (Ilustrados) who had filled cabinet positions under Aguinaldo's government, were held in

protective custody in Manila, where they had been taken upon their capture at Malolos when the insurgent army fled to the mountains in November 1899. One small group, headed by Felipe Buencamino and Pedro A. Paterno, had represented what might be called the pro-American element in Aguinaldo's cabinet. Earlier in June 1900 they had proposed a draft resolution for peace. During their imprisonment, the Americans treated them with great leniency and had managed to influence a number of the group to accept the idea of American sovereignty as outlined by the Schurman and Taft Commissions.

On December 23, 1900, this group issued their manifesto for the formation of the Federal Party. The manifesto urged the immediate acceptance of US sovereignty by all Filipinos, with the type of government outlined by the Schurman Commission, and announced the hope that the archipelago would be admitted as a state. (The American officers frowned at this last part.)¹⁴ With American civil and military assistance the party began spreading its influence throughout the Philippines. The party members from Manila traveled from barrio to barrio, making speeches, forming local groups, and enjoining the people and Insurrectos to come over to the American side.

MacArthur's proclamation had stated the liabilities and penalties; the Federal Party provided an avenue by which the insurgent leaders could surrender gracefully. Some of the guerrilla commanders had come to realize that further resistance was futile. But they had wanted proof that if they surrendered they would be treated as soldiers and not as criminals and not lose their prestige among the people. Such assurance could be far more effectively given by men of their own race and tongue than by the alien Americans, who were in no mood to bargain with or pamper them. The American troops had no respect for the insurgents' fighting power or purpose. The troops followed the guerrilla bands relentlessly with little fear or hatred, but with mounting weariness and growing irritation.

The soldiers' attitude was well expressed in several jingles of the time. The chorus of the most popular:

Damn, damn, damn the Filipinos,
Pockmarked kakiak ladrones.
Underneath the starry flag,
Civilize them with a Krag,
And return us to our own beloved homes.

Another cynical soldier viewpoint was:

He may be a brother of William H. Taft,
But he ain't no brother of mine.

The feelings of the Filipino population were a different story. They did not laugh. Both rich and poor, intellectual and ignorant peasant, had suffered greatly and found nothing ridiculous in those guerrilla bands who were formed from their own people. Although the bands had robbed, the natives considered it collecting contributions for support of the war. Although they had murdered, the natives looked on this as a natural right of the rulers, as it had been for the last 400 years. The guerrillas had fought in disguise to gain a slight advantage in dealing with a superior force. They were ill-clad and hungry because they were struggling in a fight for their cause. Although they were poorly armed, had only ineffectual ammunition, and would shoot, then run, they had fought bravely and forced the United States to send 69,000 well-armed and fairly well-supplied men to the Philippines to control them. Add to all of this the fear, intimidation, and terror and it is easy to understand the place the Insurrectos had taken in the esteem of the population. Often Federal Party members going into hostile areas were murdered simply because they belonged to the party.

The party communicated the Americans' warnings and promises to the guerrillas. They wrote letters to natives in the field telling them to surrender or be hounded to death or captured and treated as a parasite, promising them 30 pesos per rifle surrendered, and warning them of eventual devastation of the country and death to the inhabitants. A majority of guerrillas saw the point.

Meanwhile, happenings within the United States had produced some effect on the insurgency as well. The Paris Peace Treaty had been ratified by the Congress in February 1899 by only one vote over the required two-thirds majority. The greatest opposition had come from the Democratic Party, which questioned the desirability of initiation of US involvement in affairs so far from the continent. Certain well-educated, wealthy, and powerful citizens from both parties questioned the wisdom of such action as unsettled. When President McKinley won the election on November 4, 1900, however, it indicated to the Filipino leadership that the majority of US opinion was in accord with the administration. Three weeks later, in early December, some 2,000 insurgents took the oath of allegiance.

On March 23, 1901, Emilio Aguinaldo was captured by the American forces under the command of General Frederick Funston at Palanan. With his capture and the removal of his personality and strong leadership from the scene, the insurrection as it had been conducted for the past two years had reached an end.

RESULTS OF MacARTHUR'S OPERATIONS

From November 1899 to September 1900, 259 Americans were killed, 750 were wounded, and 55 captured. On the Filipino side during the same period 3,227 were killed, 694 wounded, and 2,864 captured. From May 5, 1900, until June 30, 1901, there were 1,026 encounters in which 245 Americans were killed, 490 wounded, 118 captured and 20 missing, 3,854 Filipinos killed, 1,193 wounded, 6,572 captured, 23,095 surrendered. During the same period 4,871 rifles were captured and 10,822 rebels surrendered. By July 14, 1901, 23,000 firearms had been captured.¹⁵ The above figures are probably too high, in all actuality, although the reported capture and surrender figures are assuredly accurate.

Although the improvement was not always progressive and there were times when the "quiet" provinces flared up again into insurrection, it was still possible to continue steadily to withdraw American troops from a pueblo and turn over whole provinces to the Philippine Commission. Starting in February 1901, province by province, the Commission took over the archipelago in order to establish a civilian government there. This continued through the spring and summer with the northern area finally completed in August.

By July 4, 1901, MacArthur was able to report that the insurrection was almost entirely suppressed. At that time there was no organized insurgent force above the Pasig River. All the Visayas were at comparative peace except for Samar. In southern Luzon disorders continued but were steadily diminishing.

At the end of the summer of 1901, the insurrection still continued in the important provinces of Batangas, and parts of Laguna and Tayabas that were adjacent to Batangas, Samar, Cebu, and Bohol. Miguel Malvar, the insurgent commander in Batangas, was still at large and created disturbances at every opportunity. On Samar, General Lucban's guerrillas were being pursued and scattered throughout the island by General R.P. Hughes.

Except for the provinces mentioned above, the archipelago was at peace and 30 provinces had been organized under the civil government. In these areas, the Insurrectos had surrendered or been captured, and it was considered safe for travelers to go from town to town in the daytime. The local populations were apparently friendly to the civil government and manifested no desire to continue the hostilities. Above all, at this point, they wanted peace and protection.

On July 4, 1901, William Howard Taft became the Civil Governor of the Philippines and MacArthur departed the archipelago, Maj. Gen. A.R. Chaffee being appointed in his place. From this point on the municipal and provincial civil governments as well as persons performing duties related to the civil government were under the jurisdiction of the Civil Governor. The Military Governor was henceforth relieved of all civil duties.

The authority of the Military Governor, however, continued to be exercised as before in those districts in which insurgent activity existed or in which public order was not sufficiently restored to allow the civil municipal governments to be established according to the lines laid down by the Commission.

In October 1901, operations against guerrillas were being conducted in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna in Luzon as well as on the islands of Samar and Mindanao. Some scattered, predatory remnants of guerrilla bands were active to a limited extent elsewhere, but these were left to the constabularies to clean up.

The major problem confronting the counterinsurgents during this last stage of the conflict was the person of General Malvar who, as stated earlier, commanded the insurgents in Batangas. General Chaffee was determined to begin operations which would end only in the surrender of this insurgent leader and his followers. Accordingly, it was decided to force natives of prominence, who had said they were against Malvar and proponents of peace, to use their influence against him. It was believed that without their influence Malvar would not be able to continue his operations. The enticements of the Federal Party members (whose powers expired December 31, 1901) during the year had had no effect on him. Consequently, on January 1, 1902, Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell was ordered to begin operations in Batangas which were to terminate upon the surrender of the recalcitrant general on April 16, 1902. By December of 1901, 639 points were occupied by the American forces. Present in the four provinces were 7,622 American and 680 native troops, with a garrison in practically every town.

The American force at each station, usually numbering less than 60 men, was not sufficient to supply guards for the supplies which had been collected. Few stations had more than one officer and usually he was a raw lieutenant. In Batangas, active scouting and patrolling were kept up, but because of the conditions and the impossibility of collecting any reliable information from the natives who were supporting the Insurrectos, little was accomplished. A town garrisoned in this manner would be fired into and the commander would be unable to order the punishment of the guerrillas who attacked.

Forcing the local population to support them, the guerrillas, in the meantime, did little but hide in order to escape observation by the American forces. This action had been advised by the Junta in Hong Kong, and perhaps Manila, in order to keep the Americans on the island as long as possible, hoping to wear out the patience of American public opinion. They hoped that the Americans would see that although the guerrillas were not strong enough to beat the occupying power, they still would rather starve and suffer than accept American sovereignty.

Occasionally, Malvar's men made long-range, harassing attacks on American garrisons, simply to demonstrate that the guerrillas were still protesting with arms. Often a small detachment would be attacked by an overwhelming number of Insurrectos; but they would never shoot at short range unless they were discovered or surprised. Even if they wanted to initiate a greater number of encounters, they were prevented from doing so by the shortage of ammunition (10 cartridges per man per year).

After late 1901 no American or pro-American Filipino was safe outside the garrisoned towns, as the guerrillas stepped up their activity. Americans were liable to be shot at any time, day or night, and consequently they never travelled alone. Almost the entire native population of the four provinces and the islands of Mindoro and Samar was a secretly organized camp, and whereas a garrison could protect a town and beat off attacks it could not provide defense against the "amigo" who covertly was engaged in guerrilla activities. Nor could it be spread very thin to protect the population and still retain effectiveness as a unit.

General Bell felt that the only way he could terminate the insurrection in the region under his command was by cutting off the income and the supplies of the insurgents and at the same time pursuing them with sufficient persistence and vigor to wear them out. Although he believed that there were elements of the population who contributed to the insurrection through fear, he felt that it was impossible for him to identify who these were as opposed to those who were not.

Three conditions further complicated the identification of true supporters. Some of the natives were so poor that even though they were sympathetic to the cause they had to be forced through intimidation to contribute to the insurrection. The rich, both sympathetic and unsympathetic, who all lived in towns under American occupation would easily provide the required contribution as it represented only a small per cent of their total income. In addition, there was a group unsympathetic to the insurrection who because they lived outside the garrisons had to

pay or lose their lives. At first it was impossible for Bell to distinguish them in operations to get weapons from the Insurrectos.

The insurgents had accumulated enough food, chiefly rice, for two years in the mountains and other hiding places. The counterinsurgent who confiscated it could bring it into the towns for the use of the people from whom it had been taken or else destroy it. But a large number of the poorer class were noncombatants, living with insurgents, aiding and assisting them. They, too, had food hidden which Bell did not want to confiscate or destroy. It was impossible for the counterinsurgent to identify which was the guerrilla food supply and which belonged to the poorer classes. Therefore, Bell felt that he must give these people an opportunity to "securely separate themselves and their supplies from the hostile natives."¹⁶ He did not want to make war on this poor element. He wanted to protect them from the vengeance of the others.

Most importantly, it was absolutely essential to make it impossible for the insurgents to procure food by forced contributions.

In order to give those who were pacifically inclined an opportunity to escape hardship, as much as possible, and preserve their food supply for themselves and their families, it was decided to establish zones of protection.

His directive read in part:

Immediately specify and establish plainly marked limits surrounding each town boundary a zone within which it may be practicable with an average sized garrison, to exercise sufficient supervision over and furnish protection to inhabitants (who desire to be peaceful) against the deprivations of armed insurgents. The limits may include the barrios which exist sufficiently near the town to be given protection and supervision by the garrison, and should include some ground on which livestock could graze, but so situated that it can be patrolled and watched. All ungarrisoned towns will be garrisoned as soon as troops become available.

Commanding officers will also see that orders are at once given and distributed to all inhabitants within the jurisdiction of towns over which they exercise supervision, informing them of the danger of remaining outside these limits, and that unless they move by December 25 (1901) from outlying barrios and districts, with all their movable food supplies, including rice, palay, chickens, livestock etc., to within the limits of the zone established at their own or nearest town,

their property (found outside of the said zone at said date) will become liable to confiscation or destruction. The people will be permitted to move houses from outlying districts should they desire to do so, or to construct temporary shelter for themselves on any vacant land without compensation to the owner, and no owner will be permitted to deprive them of the privilege of doing so. In the discretion of commanding officers the prices of necessities of existence may also be regulated in the interest of those seeking protection. As soon as peaceful conditions have been restored in the brigade these persons will be encouraged to return to their homes and such assistance be rendered to them as may be found practicable.¹⁷

It was deemed best not to force the people to enter the zones. But they were warned that unless they accepted this protection of their property which consisted almost entirely of food supplies, it would be liable to confiscation and destruction as it would otherwise be impossible to identify whether or not the supplies belonged to peaceful or hostile elements of the population.

To put an end to the vengeance of assassination it was decided to put to use the right of retaliation conferred by General Order 100, issued by President Lincoln in 1863. A circular telegram was published announcing the American forces' intention to retaliate "by the execution of prisoners in case any more prisoners were assassinated by insurgents for political reasons."¹⁸ It was not found necessary to do this, however, as the assassinations halted immediately.

As a result of the zoning campaign and retaliation, it became more and more apparent that people had been contributing through fear, for the power of the Insurrectos to collect voluntary contributions came to an abrupt halt when they lost the facility of intimidation. As the protective mechanism became more efficient many who had not entered the area of protection in the beginning were persuaded of its efficacy and moved to the area. The sentiment for peace grew stronger among the people, and a growing number began to volunteer assistance to the Americans. When native volunteers were deemed trustworthy they were armed and sent out into the mountains, from which they brought back arms and insurgents and hundreds of half-starving men, women, and children, who after release from the intimidating influence of the guerrillas gladly entered the zones of protection.

On December 10, 1901, the ports of Batangas and Laguna were closed to prevent the insurgents from importing any food from

Manila. Consequently, food began to run short in the protected areas as well, and the counterinsurgents began to import it. The native men were put to work on roads in order to buy the imported rice; those who didn't want to work on the roads were charged a road tax. The land was prepared for planting by working parties under the protection of patrols. The insurrection collapsed, however, before the spring planting time had arrived.

No one died of starvation nor experienced serious hunger in these districts, although at one time some 300,000 people were located within them.¹⁹

The most dramatic blow was to the pride of the mestizo ruling group (Caciques) who bitterly resented being treated like everyone else including the taos. To a man who could speak Spanish and who had always been the lord of his barrio, the possibility of having to cultivate a field with his own hands was an unthinkable and scandalous thing."²⁰

EFFECT ON THE INSURGENTS

The actions taken by the counterinsurgents in December 1901 provoked immediate alarm among the insurgents which was manifested by increased activity and resentment. In late December the number of skirmishes and sharp encounters increased a bit, but this only resulted in relentless pursuit (which Bell had suggested to accompany the other techniques by the Americans). The Insurrectos became so thoroughly demoralized by this and other measures that after January 10, 1902, there was no armed encounter of any importance.

Bell continued to pursue them persistently, not waiting for them to come out of hiding, penetrating into every mountain range, and searching every ravine and every mountain top. The American forces continually found their barracks and hidden food in the most unexpected and remote hiding places. They burned hundreds of small barracks and shelters as fast as the insurgents would build them. They destroyed their clothing and supplies. Finally, the guerrillas ceased to stay in one spot for longer than 24 hours. They were on the run.

Bell maintained as many as 4,000 troops in the field at one time, keeping them supplied in the mountains even where roads did not exist. They camped by companies at strategic points on trails, each sending three or four detachments with five- or six-days' rations to bivouac at points radiating several miles from the company

base. The detachments would leave their rations in charge of one or two men and search and scour the mountains both day and night. In this manner, it was rendered unsafe for the insurgents to travel at any time, and, no longer having any retreat in which to hide themselves, they became so scattered and demoralized that they were constantly being captured and surrendering in large numbers.

In this way, Bell finally succeeded in securing and sending into the zoned towns, or destroying, almost every pound of food which the insurgents possessed or could obtain. About the first of April (1902) it became increasingly difficult for the guerrillas to maintain themselves any longer. Their appearance when captured or surrendered indicated starvation and lack of medical attention. Many were so ill that they had to be immediately hospitalized for treatment.

Bell's men suffered much from dysentery, fever, etc. When Malvar finally surrendered in April, many of the American troops had been in the mountains for over a month without returning to a post. They could be kept supplied with food but not with clothing; consequently numbers of the men had to conduct their operations in rags and barefooted, which made them all the more susceptible to disease and fever.

On April 16, 1902, Malvar surrendered, and guerrilla warfare in the Philippine Islands drew to a close. Most of the population had turned against the once highly respected chief, and several hundred in Batangas had joined the Americans in the hunt for the leader. It was, supposedly, the realization that the people were against him that aided in bringing about his surrender.

Bell had captured or forced to surrender 8,000 to 10,000 people who had been actively engaged in the insurrection in one capacity or another. All were released after taking the oath of allegiance to the United States. By July 7, 1902, no political prisoners were left in this region.

On July 2 the office of Military Governor was terminated; on July 4 full and complete pardon and amnesty had been granted to all who had participated in the insurrection (with a few reservations).

OBSERVATIONS

The Insurrectos discovered that the financial resources of the United States were not exhausted by the prolonged rebellion of the population and that the killing of American troops was not the best way, ultimately, to secure the support of the party in the United States which Aguinaldo had proclaimed was in sympathy with the insurrection.

The guerrilla leaders, dependent on local support, were not able to sustain the continuing loyalty of the population. MacArthur's actions of January 1901 and the creation of the Federal Party ended voluntary support of the guerrillas. Most of the Insurrectos were either captured or surrendered. In the summer of 1901 only hard-bitten insurgents remained in the field, and these applied force and terror to elicit the essential support. Consequently, when Chaffee provided security and protection for the population coupled with confiscation and destruction of insurgent supplies, the insurrection was broken.

In effect four different techniques were utilized by the American forces to attempt to end the insurrection. First was the conventional military action in which General Otis used his "long thrust" approach, driving the guerrillas into the mountains and away from their home areas, then withdrawing when an area had been cleared. But this did not break support among the natives for the guerrilla cause and when the occupying forces withdrew the guerrillas returned. The second was through conciliatory moves including the granting of amnesty and setting up civil governments in each area. But the feeling for independence and hostility toward the Americans was too great, and Aguinaldo's shadow government flourished. Then MacArthur, realizing the degree of local support given in many cases most willingly to the guerrilla, coordinated harsh measures (deportation and "Laws of War") and conciliatory moves (Federal Party) in order to break voluntary support. These techniques together with the capture of Aguinaldo were largely successful in putting to an end guerrilla activity throughout the archipelago as the large majority of the population joined the American camp. In those remaining areas the lack of sympathy for the insurrection as well as the exhaustion of ready sources of supply for the guerrillas resulted in the necessity of obtaining support by force, creating a situation in which Chaffee's extremely harsh actions and the implementation of protection and control could be successful.

It is important to note that the repressive measures used later in the 1901-1902 period were directed toward a more ruthless

group of guerrillas and that it was possible to isolate them from the population by strong action. These same techniques probably would have proved counterproductive in the earlier phase as the sympathy of the population was generally with the guerrilla. The counterinsurgents would have had to intimidate an entire population, thereby alienating them and causing lasting resentment. In the Philippine situation, therefore, the institution of control and security was effective only when the population was providing involuntary support for the guerrilla.

From November 1899, Aguinaldo's policy was to keep the people with him either by making them feel that his cause was theirs or, if that plan failed (which it eventually did after January 1901), by making them fear the punishment of the agents of the Katipunan far more than that of the American forces. This policy ultimately failed because (1) the people grew weary of the exactions and abuses of the insurgent leaders--life came to mean so little that the loss of it became insignificant, and (2) the security and protection of the counterinsurgent forces prevented continued intimidation after January 1901.

Footnotes

1. J.R.M. Taylor, The Philippine Insurrection against the United States, Vol. II: May 29, 1898-July 4, 1902 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1906), p. 41.
2. Ibid., p. 54.
3. William T. Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Services Publishing Company, 1939), p. 251.
4. Taylor, op. cit., p. 27 HS.
5. Sexton, op. cit., p. 239.
6. Taylor, op. cit., p. 24 HS.
7. J.R.M. Taylor, Philippine Insurgent Records (in the custody of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, 1906), Exhibit 33, p. 291.
8. Taylor, op. cit., p. 24 HS.
9. For a detailed discussion of this aspect, see Marius Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 68-74.
10. For an interesting account of these problems, see Joseph L. Shott, The Ordeal of Samar (Indianapolis: Howard W. Sams and Co., Inc., 1964), opening chapter.
11. Sexton, op. cit., p. 247.
12. Ibid., p. 251.
13. Ibid., p. 252.
14. Ibid., p. 258.
15. Taylor, The Philippine Insurrection against the United States, Vol. II: May 29, 1898-July 4, 1902, p. 22 HS/E-L.
16. Ibid., p. 25 HS.
17. Ibid., p. 26 HS.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

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The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines:

The Hukbalahap, 1942-1955

by

Charles T.R. Bohannon

THE COUNTRY, THE AREA, AND THE PEOPLE

Composed of more than 7,000 mildly tropical islands, of which not more than 1,000 are inhabited, the Philippines stretch over some 1,200 miles from north to south, with the two principal islands, Luzon and Mindanao, lying at opposite ends. Less than a fifth of the islands' area is cultivated. Mineral wealth is substantial and little exploited. Agriculture is the principal occupation, employing nearly 68% of the labor force in 1955 (no great change from pertinent preceding years) and producing some 44% of the national income. Roughly speaking, out of every four acres under cultivation, two are used to grow rice, one grows corn, while the fourth grows the sugar, coconuts, hemp, and tobacco (as well as assorted garden produce) which are the principal Philippine earners of foreign exchange. The combination of predominantly subsistence agriculture, small landholdings (whether owned or sharecropped) subdivided each generation so that each heir may have his share, and strong family ties which militate against pioneering, dictate that the average man will have very little indeed.

Add to these factors the relatively good communications and relatively high educational level (meaning that most can read, many see movies, most listen to the radio, most know about voting and basic democratic theory), the conspicuous consumption of the wealthy, and the activities of self-seeking political agitators and demagogues (four or more generations of them in some areas) and the potential for insurgency is obviously high.

The people, some 18,000,000-20,000,000 of them at the time of the Huk (the commonly used abbreviation of Hukbalahap)

insurgency, are of basically Malayan stock, subdivided into 80 or 90 tribal or regional groups, with nearly as many different languages and dialects. Most are Christian, most speak, read, and write English, which is the lingua franca of the country, and most of those over 20 have vivid memories of the insurgency or the Japanese occupation during which it began.

Their Christianity was gained during some 350 years of Spanish rule. The wide spread of education, of English, and of knowledge of the basic mechanisms and ideals of democracy came during the years following the Philippine Revolution of 1896-1902, when self-government under American tutelage became the way of life. In 1936 the Philippine Commonwealth was instituted, and with it came almost complete internal autonomy, and politics became almost a disease. The years of World War II saw the Japanese occupation of the country, and saw, too, the development of a nationwide guerrilla resistance, unified to some extent by direction from MacArthur's distant headquarters. Some guerrilla forces were led by Americans, more by Filipinos, and all, except the Huk, clearly owed allegiance to democratic government and freedom. Less than two years after liberation (the return of American forces) began, full independence, as promised ten years before, was achieved on July 4, 1946, and the new nation, along with its legacy of democracy and of war wreckage, inherited the problem of a Communist insurgency.

Although "the HUK rebellion was, of course a produce of the total situation existing in the Philippines in the difficult postwar years"* it was a product of factors consistently misinterpreted by both sides until a government leader, Magsaysay, read them aright and finished the insurgency. The Huk insurgency may be divided into four phases, corresponding generally to their own efforts as well as those of their opponents.

THE HUKBALAHAP MOVEMENT

A "Third Force," April 1942-April 1946

The Hukbalahap movement grew out of the implantation by dynamic leaders of Communist doctrine and organizational techniques,

*R.M. Leighton, Ralph Sanders, and Jose M. Tinio, The Huk Rebellion: A Case Study in the Social Dynamics of Insurrection (Washington, D.C., Industrial College of the Armed Forces, March 1964).

among a people already predisposed to discontent and rebellion, in an area well-suited to guerrilla warfare, at a most propitious time--occupation of the country by a hated invader, the Japanese. Hukbalahap is a contraction of the Tagalog words for "Peoples Anti-Japanese Army," a name the movement bore from its organization in March 1942 until 1948 (after that the name was changed to Peoples Liberation Army, officially abbreviated as HMB)--but the shortened acronym of "Huk" still is commonly used.

Communism was not new in the Philippines. Agitation began about 1920, soon after the formation of the Comintern and reached the stage of formal Party organization in 1930. Generally speaking, it followed the classic Russian line, emphasizing the role of the urban proletariat. After a series of Communist-led strikes, the Party was outlawed, and several of its leaders imprisoned. While they were in prison the Socialist party emerged as a major factor, with significant leadership from top-flight intellectuals. The head of this party was a wealthy landowner, Pedro Abad Santos, a former member of the legislature and brother of a Supreme Court Justice, who in effect tutored several of those who were later to become the most popular leaders of Huk movements. After their release from prison the Communist leaders resumed their agitation, having some influence in at least three ill-conceived peasant uprisings, the Tanggulan, the Sakdal, and the Colorem. In 1938 the Communist and Socialist parties merged, and militancy (with a careful eye on government authority) became the order of the day.

However, it was the former Socialists who had influence in Huklandia, and it was they who organized peasant unions and strikes during the 1930s. In part at the urging of the Communist activists, in part because of unscrupulous opportunists, perhaps most because of the inexperience and philosophical poverty of many of their junior leaders, their principal organization, the "League of Poor Laborers," or AMT, at times resorted to crippling work-animals, murdering landowners, and destroying crops and mills.

These actions focussed in the province of Pampanga, the center of the insurgency. From Pampanga came many of the better field leaders of the Philippine Revolution of 30 years before--as well as the most effective of the Filipinos who fought against the revolution. It is characterized by large landed estates producing rice and sugar at fantastic profits to their owners, and by tenants holding grimly onto the tiny plots whose cultivation rights, under sharecropping, they have inherited from their

parents. It is a region where only the fortunate and the far-sighted prosper, where agitators risk a short shrift in the hope of spectacular personal success, where no one starves but few have enough to eat.

It was in Pampanga in March 1942 that the Central Committee of the PKP organized the Hukbalahap, as a coalition of existing guerrilla bands, under Luis Taruc, a seemingly humble yet charismatic Socialist agitator turned Communist. The initial force of some 500, armed in part from weapons lost by retreating regular forces, or captured from ambushed Japanese, grew rapidly. Part of this growth was with the help of "advisers" from the Chinese Eighth Route Army, who organized an all-Chinese unit, generally known as the Wa Chi, and, more importantly, made it possible for the Huk to draw support from the prosperous Chinese community in the Philippines. They assisted also in the establishment of training centers for the Huk soldiers and agents.

So rapid was the growth of the forces calling themselves Huk (not all of whom were Communist-led) that by 1943 they claimed as many as 10,000 men under arms. That spring, when they sought to hold their ground against a powerful Japanese offensive directed at their central stronghold of Mt. Arayat, they learned the lesson which all guerrillas must. They soon recovered, however, despite a similar but smaller lesson a year later and despite the increasing hostility of USAFFE guerrilla units--which were loyal to the commonwealth of the Philippines and to the United States. By May 1945 when active hostilities against the Japanese had ceased in their area the Huk probably had at least 15,000 men under arms, and by their own statements had killed more than 25,000 "enemies," mostly Filipinos, and participated in 1,200 combat operations.

The military movement of the Huk could not have achieved such success had there not been a parallel civilian organization. This took the form of ostensibly autonomous groups, the Barrio United Defense Councils (BUDC) which functioned at the lowest echelon of political geography in the Philippines. Headed by Communist cells as rapidly as Party members could be recruited and trained, these BUDC formed the effective shadow government wherever the Huk established their influence or control. They organized supply and intelligence activities, collected taxes and contributions, sought out spies and enemy collaborators, conducted propaganda and group indoctrination activities, tried and judged offenders, and even performed marriages.

To what extent the individual BUDC were controlled through the Party organization and to what extent they were controlled

by the Huk units operating in the area is not clear--almost certainly it varied from place to place and from time to time. What is certain is that they were an effective civil government in many areas, and one which rapidly grew upward as the Japanese were driven out. When American forces arrived provincial offices from governor down to postal clerk were held either by Huk-PKP officials or by those who had made their peace with them, in much of Pampanga, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal, and Laguna. Some of these provinces were the bases of strong anti-Huk guerrilla forces, whose leaders were too busy speeding the Japanese on their way to worry much about who held civilian offices. For the most part, the Commonwealth government refused to recognize these officials, appointing others, often chosen from the loyal guerrillas, pending elections scheduled for April 1946.

Recognition that the Huk, and the PKP, posed a real threat to the restoration of lawful government was sufficient to insure that some of the more prominent leaders, Taruc among them, were arrested (by the US Army's Counter-Intelligence Corps) and that others were liquidated by local leaders who had suffered from their depredations. It was not general enough to insure that the leaders were held, or that their followers were disarmed. The Huk squadrons in the field demanded to be incorporated as a body into the Philippine army; failing this, with the exception of one unit, they held to the field, refusing to obey orders from either the Commonwealth government or the US Army. Some hid their arms and dispersed temporarily. The organization itself remained under control of the leaders and actively recruited and gathered arms for the showdown which they felt was sure to come.

The PKP leaders were now in a position they would have considered impossible of achievement four years before. As one authority puts it:

For the Communists the Japanese occupation had been well-nigh an unblemished boon. The great majority of Filipinos in Central Luzon now regarded them as patriots, the one group that had kept alive the spark of freedom and harried the enemy until the Americans returned. The Huk had, in short, a mobilization base of mass popular support. They had, besides gained invaluable experience in guerrilla fighting and organization--a craft known to only a few specialists and (vicariously) scholars before the war, but destined to become a key to power in the emerging nations of Asia. And not only had they mastered the techniques of survival and of seizing power; they had learned the art of exercising it--

operating civil administration in large areas, administering justice, collecting taxes, conducting schools and other public services, maintaining their own law and order. If they should ever succeed in overthrowing the government, they would be prepared to install another in its place. Finally, the occupation had forced the Communists out of the cities and factories into the countryside, accelerating and completing the process begun by their association with the pre-war peasant protest movements. During the war most factories were closed, and those that operated were under tight Japanese control; cities and large towns were garrisoned and heavily patrolled. But in the barrios, in the plantations deserted by their owners, and in the rice fields and jungles, the Communists became a genuinely peasant party with far-flung roots in the countryside. In an overwhelmingly agrarian society, this was an indispensable passport to power.*

While carefully maintaining and building up their military power, the Huk-PKP leaders saw the national elections of April 1946 as the easiest means of securing recognition of their power. Accordingly they plunged into political activity. At the provincial and local levels they put up their own candidates. On the national level their leaders joined a coalition of liberal and progressive groups, the Democratic Alliance, which supported incumbent President Sergio Osmeña and Congressional candidates of the Nationalist Party (and of the Huk). Their own political organization was the National Peasants Union (PKM), a merger of the prewar Communist and Socialist Peasants Unions. Through the PKM, recognized as a legal political party, the Huks (whose control of the organization was carefully denied) gained an open mass base among the peasantry of Central Luzon. The pre-election campaign of 1946 was bitter and violent, with the Huks leading in the use of terrorism to influence the voting. Six of their Democratic Alliance candidates for Congress, including Taruc, Alejandrino, and Jesus Lava, were supposedly elected, but were denied their seats because of charges of fraud and terrorism. Roxas and the Liberals came to power. Taruc and Lava returned to the field to reactivate their armed forces, while other PKP leaders in Manila continued to work for "reforms" through ostensibly legal political processes.

*Op. cit., p. 27, edited.

Indecisive Insurgency, May 1946-December 1949

By conventional theoretical standards the Philippines in 1946 were clearly on the brink of revolution; by the end of 1949 any orthodox student of revolution would have said, as did the leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP), that a true revolutionary situation existed. By that time the worst of wartime misery had abated, few starved, but relatively few lived much above a bare subsistence level--any many of those few were ostentatiously wealthy. National leaders of prestige, as well as strident voices in the free press, were busily proclaiming that democracy had been raped in the elections just concluded, that the processes of legal government did not and could not work --indeed, there was an abortive revolt on behalf of the defeated presidential candidate. Many of the wartime guerrilla organizations still maintained some cohesiveness and remnants of organization, and few of their leaders thought well of either presidential candidate. Arms and ammunition were plentiful. Government troops who had been in the field against the Huk for four years, and had seen them get steadily stronger, were dispirited and discouraged, seemingly unwilling to seek encounters with the Huk.

In much of the Huk-controlled area Communists and socialists had been agitating and organizing for nearly 20 years. The Huk had an organized mass base in excess of 50,000 and 10,000 or 15,000 armed men, of whom a substantial portion had from 3 to 8 years in the field as guerrillas. The PKP had agents, leaders, and propagandists concealed in most levels of government and society.

The product of all these factors certainly should be success for the insurgents. The fact is, however, that despite all these advantages and their determined efforts, the Huk in four years had little success in expanding the area of contest. Even in the two islands of Negros and Panay, where the bulk of the workforce were sugar plantation laborers paid by the day, the Huk enjoyed no real success, although they captured a well-established union which embraced most of the workers. Even the personal efforts of one Guillermo Capadocia, a "founding father" of the PKP and the Huk movement, were not enough.

Although expansion forces of the movement sought to establish it in all the major islands and did succeed in creating several small local groups which broke up when submitted to pressure, the Huk created a viable insurgency only in three areas of Central Luzon.

One was Manila with its sprawling slums and suburbs, the de facto capitol of the Republic of the Philippines, and, until 1953, of the Huk-Communist movement as well. Badly damaged by the war, with perhaps half of its 2,000,000 population rootless transients, refugees, or unemployed peasants, Manila was the natural hotbed for any kind of politics, including revolution. The Communist foothold in the labor movement, established in the 1930s, was rapidly expanded after WWII. In fact, the steering committee of the labor union congress interlocked with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines, usually called the PKP.

A second was the highly diversified farming area south of Manila, which has been a hotbed of agrarian unrest for over 100 years. This hotbed has been systematically exploited by politicians, demagogues, and racketeers selling land which they did not own, as well as the site of many large church and private estates. Traditionally it is a land of violence, banditry, and local insurrection. The Huk were able to establish there an almost viable movement (at least one which the people did not actively oppose), but one which never satisfied the leaders with its accomplishments.

"Huklandia," the real heartland of the movement, consists of some 6,000 square miles, mostly included in four provinces north of Manila, and is the richest rice-growing area in the Philippines. It was in this valley, bordered by mountains, swamp, ocean, and Manila, that the Huk movement was born and flourished, and where some Huk activity persists today. Well over half of the population are small sharecroppers, wresting a marginal livelihood from plots which have been subdivided through inheritance, chronically in debt to usurers, and trained to discontent from earliest childhood. The failure of the Huk to win the overwhelming support of a population so well conditioned for revolution and so deprived is perhaps their greatest failure.

When the attempt to gain power through electoral politics failed in April 1946, Huk-PKP activity resumed in all areas. In Huklandia open hostilities began almost immediately, and it became apparent that the Huk had installed in local civil governments. Targets of military operation were usually selected to serve a political purpose, such as enforcing or expanding their control of the rural population. Raids, ambushes, and political executions sought to make clear that the Huk-PKM-PKP leaders were still in control and still fighting for the welfare of the peasants.

The PKP leaders who remained in Manila were more concerned with the urban population. Many of them were old-line Communist labor leaders, and the new confederation of unions, the CLO, seemed to them to offer better promises of success than carrying

on guerrilla warfare among the peasantry. Two factions emerged among the members of the Politburo (which was the body responsible to the Central Committee for day-to-day direction of the Party). One favored emphasizing the legal struggle through exploitation of the urban proletariat, the other favored emphasizing the struggle among the peasants. All were agreed on the ultimate objective--the seizure of national power by the PKP. All agreed on basic targets for attack, with major emphasis directed at "American imperialism" and at discrediting and weakening the legitimate government. Most were dedicated Communists, who probably placed the interests of the Party above their own, but each was convinced that his part in the effort was essential and must be emphasized.

As a result the Huk in the field operated until 1949 without overt sponsorship of the PKP and with relatively little effective direction from the Politburo. The PKP was, nevertheless, not only the parent body but the urban support element, furnishing intelligence, supplies, funds, and recruits to the Huk in the field. Only a little less covert were the PKP relations with the PKM (National Peasants Union) which was at once the shadow government and the mass base organization, and the principal support of the Huk. The indoctrination of all initiates, in both the Huk and the PKM, was patently Communist--but neither organization admitted during this period that it was dedicated to overthrow of the government by force. It was not until November 7, 1948 (the 18th anniversary of the founding of the PKP) that the Huk were officially converted into the Peoples Liberation Army (HMB), a name change to which few on either side except the excessively doctrinaire paid any attention. An ambush in April 1949, in which the widow of former President Quezon was killed, was the only combat action initiated by the Huk which aroused real public indignation, or called forth an intensive major military operation against them.

From their words, during this period, the Huk seemed content to bide their time and increase their strength until a national administration came into office which would grant their demands for reforms and protection. During the 1949 national elections they campaigned vigorously for presidential candidate Laurel, who five years before had been the Japanese puppet president, and the Huk's Public Enemy #1.

From its deeds, the government seemed little more determined to finish the Huks by force. Stern admonitions and announcements of a "mailed fist policy" alternated with amnesties and negotiations for surrender. Not until March 1948 were the Huk and the PKP proclaimed illegal associations--and the prewar ban on the

PKP was not invoked until 1951. Several large operations were mounted against known Huk headquarters with little effect, small detachments of government forces were scattered throughout Huklandia, existing in fact at the pleasure of the Huk, who could have easily overrun any of them at a time of their own choosing. Huk and government forces were about equal in numbers, and the soldiers' small superiority in weapons and communications were more than offset by the Huk's superiority in intelligence and cross-country mobility.

This is not to say that there was a general truce. Press reports for the period list 357 operations against the Huk, and 207 operations by the Huk against government forces or civilians. (The latter figure is almost certainly far too small.) The press also reported some 2,804 Huk killed in action, as against 149 members of the armed forces of the Philippines admitted killed. (Were the number of irregular forces supporting the government who were killed added to the government casualties, the ratio would be about 16 to 1, a figure which can be derived from reports of counterinsurgency operations elsewhere.) Add to this the number of civilians killed by both sides, and it is probable that not less than 5,000 died during these four years--a figure far lower than the 25,000 whom the Huk claimed to have killed during less than three years of war against the Japanese. Meanwhile, the Huk grew stronger, the forces of government seemed unable to make progress, and the people grew disgusted with both.

High Tide and Defeat, January 1950-December 1955

The defeat of the Huk-supported presidential candidate in the November 1949 election, the flagrant cheating and violence on both sides, and the general attitude of dissatisfaction with the government seemed to the PKP leaders evidence that a truly revolutionary situation had been reached. Accordingly a formal meeting of the enlarged Politburo was called in January 1950, the situation reviewed, and momentous decisions taken. These included the statement that a revolutionary situation (where the armed struggle for victory should be emphasized) existed, that the Huk should be converted into a regular army, which would seek to attack and destroy government forces and installations, and prepare for the final offensive; far-reaching and grandiose changes in organization.

Pursuant to these decisions a plan of operations and timetable were prepared. This called on the PKP and Huk to double their strength every three months, beginning June 1950, so that

by June 1951 they would have 172,000 Huk, organized into 35 divisions, spread throughout the Philippines. These were to be allowed several months for training and equipping, and then, on November 1, 1951, the final offensive for victory was to be launched. (Ironically, November 13, 1951, the date of the national elections, was in fact destined to mark the beginning of the end for the Huk.)

During the middle part of 1950, prospects for a successful communist overthrow of the government were very bright. Army estimates placed HMB strength at 12,800 equipped with 8,850 arms, and mass organizations at 54,200. The trade unions under the leadership of the CLO could count on a 100-thousand membership in seventy-six labor unions, or one fifth of the total labor force of the Philippines. Infiltration in the branches of the government had been going on smoothly. . . . To top it all, the government and the people were divided among themselves. . . .*

In the beginning things went well. The first Huk offensive in March 1950 seemed a resounding success. Some 10 to 15 attacks were staged in various parts of Huklandia and the area to the south of Manila with uniformly good results. The people and the government were badly shaken, and, for perhaps the first time, the real threat of the Huk was generally realized. For some years the Philippine Constabulary had been charged with primary responsibility for the campaign against the Huk; this was now given to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), specifically the army, and additional units were deployed to the contested areas, placing perhaps 20,000 government troops of all kinds in the field against perhaps 12,000-15,000 Huk.

There were several serious attacks against the newly deployed forces, and in August a second period of widespread attacks ensued. In one a provincial capitol was overrun and looted; in another provincial capitol, an army camp and hospital were wiped out and the patients murdered in their beds. Huk patrols came to the very edges of Manila, and the army felt compelled to establish what was virtually a defense perimeter across the land approaches to the capitol.

The ridiculous recruitment program was never implemented, nor were there serious attempts to establish "liberated areas" according to the doctrinaire "Maoist" theories of then-dominant

*Handbook on the Communist Party of the Philippines, pub. by Armed Forces of the Philippines, 1961.

PKP leaders. The reasons these directives were ignored are not clear, but one suspects that field leaders recognized the fallacies of the plans and felt too that the government and people were so divided that they might well be able to assume power by default. One suspects also that the Huk may never have realized their full strength, or had the determination to use it to the maximum. Almost certainly, given the requisite determination, they could have overrun Manila by a surprise attack in mid-1950, possibly capturing the president and many ranking civilian and military officials.

What seems to have been the tacit strategy of the field leaders might well have met with some success--probably the formation of an emergency coalition government in which they participated--had it not been for an unexpected reaction to their display of strength. Rather than negotiate, the government decided to try a new approach, that of appointing a Secretary of Defense who was aggressive, understood the people, had experience as a guerrilla, high motivation, and a willingness to accept and act on good advice. This man was Ramon Magsaysay, one of perhaps a dozen such men who had either not been employed in the campaign against the Huk, or were in positions too subordinate to be effective.

His appointment, the powers entrusted to him, and a few lucky breaks made an immediate change in the attitudes and effectiveness of the armed forces, the government, and the people. On October 28, 1950, 48 days after his appointment, Magsaysay, acting on information he personally secured from a Huk agent, ordered a raid on the secret headquarters of the PKP in Manila. A truckload and a half of Party files, some going back to 1942, were seized, as well as the members of the urban half of the Politburo and others. The importance of this capture can scarcely be overemphasized, for it not only disrupted the control echelon of the PKP, but made available excellent evidence on which to break up the subversive operations being carried out under a cloak of legality.

Perhaps even more significant in the long run was the re-orientation given the armed forces. Magsaysay made it clear that every soldier had three primary missions: to represent the government to the people in a favorable light by his actions as well as by words, to collect information, and to kill or capture Huks. Action was insisted upon, good actions rewarded, bad or omitted actions punished. He personally sought to be, and often seemed to be, everywhere at once, checking on implementation. At times there seemed some question as to who were the most confused by his whirlwind ways, the Huk or the AFP--but the AFP had the

better direction. Press coverage of the efforts of the AFP changed from bitterly critical to laudatory, and a major psychological operations program, designed to convince the people and the Huk that they should support the government, began.

One of the most potent claims of the Huk for support, after the 1949 elections, was their thesis that free and honest elections should not be held. As the time for the 1951 elections approached, they began a campaign against them, instructing their supporters to boycott the elections. Magsaysay countered with statements that with the President's approval, and the assistance of the armed forces and of all good citizens, the elections would be free and honest. Most candidates of the Party in power lost, and no one questioned the freedom of the elections, except in the areas where the Huk themselves drove voters away from the polls. Most important, the credibility of the armed forces as protectors of the people and the practical effectiveness of orderly democratic processes were firmly established in the minds of the people, including many of the Huk and their supporters.

Seen in retrospect, and indeed seen within a few months, it is clear that from then on the only chance for success for the Huk would have been a complete reversal in the actions of the armed forces. This did not occur. By the end of 1953 the strength of the Huk still in the field was estimated at 2,616, and these were hard pressed to stay alive. Until the end of 1955 there were no major encounters, and no substantial attacks launched by the Huk. Military actions were designed to track down or surprise those who still held out. In May 1954, Luis Taruc, the best-known field leader of the Huk, and at one time their field "generalissimo," surrendered. At the end of the period there were no more than three or four leaders, and an estimated 828 armed Huk, still at large.

In 1956 the AFP was withdrawn from the campaign and responsibility for the final mop-up given to the Philippine Constabulary. This fourth period in the Huk movement, which might be called "The Huk Smoulder On," continued in 1965. No major leader of the Huk armed forces was free. Those who were not dead have been imprisoned after due court action. On the morning these words were written (December 31, 1965), the Manila press carried prominently the story of how three minor Huk leaders of an assassination squad, recently become active in Pampanga, were ambushed and slain by PC the previous day. The war was long over, insurgency was not active, but not dead; it smouldered in the swamps and rice-lands of Huklandia still.

THE NATURE OF THE HUK MOVEMENT

Organization

While the Huk during the Japanese occupation included elements not already involved in, or subscribing to, the theory of the "class struggle," this was not true of the vast majority of those who were active thereafter. The leader elements were largely drawn from the prewar Communist and socialist parties, or from orthodox hard-line trade unionists in the tobacco and printing industries. To these must be added, of course, some adventurers, chronic malcontents, disappointed intellectuals, and opportunists. The rank and file of soldiery were drawn from the peasant class, mostly tenant farmers of rice. Most had enough schooling to read and write and to have some concept of how the government (which in the Philippines is largely patterned after that of the United States) is supposed to work. About half of the PKP leaders were middle-class intellectuals, the other half (who for the most part were also field leaders of the Huk) were of peasant or laborer origin, but with education usually of high-school level or above.

The political structure of the movement followed fairly orthodox Communist Party lines, although the details of organization changed from time to time. In its final form Party organization ran upward from barrio or shop cells through district committees, regional (usually three or more provinces) committees, to the national command structure. There the National Congress, which met but rarely, was the highest authority. In practice, final authority was exercised by the Central Committee which again met rarely, or by the Politburo, the small coterie of top leaders who theoretically met often. With the dislocation imposed by the full-scale hostilities which began in 1950, and with the arrest of many Politburo leaders that same year, day-to-day direction of the movement was technically in the hands of the Secretariat and its departments--Education, Organization, Finance, and Military. The Huk were the responsibility of the Military Department, while the PKM was under the jurisdiction of the Organization Department (then, a bureau) until it was outlawed in 1948. After PKM lost its value, civilian government was the responsibility of the Organization Department.

The real coordinating and control centers for both the military and civilian arms were the Regional Committees/Regional Commands (RECOs). Originally these were separate but overlapping, with the Commands subordinate to the Committees, but eventually they merged, and the politico-military distinctions were blurred.

Military organization was orthodox enough at lower levels --squads, platoons, squadrons--then theoretically into battalions, perhaps regiments. In practice, organization and command channels above the squadron level varied from time to time and place to place. Field Commands normally existed, as area organizations, subordinate to the Regional Commands mentioned earlier. Apparently, not all squadrons were subordinate to a Field Command, which might have no more than a few squads of village guerrillas under its control. There seemed to exist no rigid chain of command tying military and political elements together at the lower levels, or requiring the approval of lower political echelons before orders of a higher military command were obeyed. In practice, military authority rested in the Regional Command, which in turn supposedly took orders from a (national) Military Committee to which the commander belonged. Only briefly, and ineffectively, were there attempts to establish a single individual as commander in chief.

The military doctrine of the Huk, as it evolved, was virtually classical guerrilla and might be summarized as follows: Fight when and where there is a political purpose, when you can get supplies in no other way, or when you need to delay the enemy temporarily. Except in the last instance, never fight unless sure of achieving surprise and a cheap victory. Do not stand and fight if surprised, or to hold terrain.

The training of the Huk recruit was long on the principles of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism (their basic text) and woefully short on practical military subjects. Great stress was placed on education, always with a heavy political content, and this proved one of the more effective lures for recruits. It was only in the third phase, after the decision to undertake an all-out offensive, that military topics were given serious attention by the National Education Department, and by that time it was too late.

The logistic organization of the Huk was never developed as a separate entity. Instead they concentrated on financial matters. The PKP had an extensive and highly organized system for the collection of taxes, contributions, and loot, and for disbursing these to the units in the field. In practice it appears that most units maintained their own supply officers, with connections with the PKM shadow governments in their area, and obtained the bulk of their requirements from them. Medicines, military material not available through capture, and other manufactured items which could not be obtained as direct contributions were supposed to be purchased, either by the using unit or by representatives of the Manila headquarters. Cash for such purchases was supposed to be drawn from the National Finance Department--to which all

acquisitions of cash or valuta were supposed to be delivered. "Economic opportunism," as the holding out of loot for personal use was called, was a matter of real concern to the moralists at the national level, and at least two formerly respected minor leaders were liquidated for this deviation from the norm of Communist morality.

Objectives

The major objective of the Huk-PKP-PKM movement was the establishment of a Communist-Socialist government of the Philippines, affiliated with the international Communist bloc. How this was to be accomplished seems never to have been agreed upon, or even understood, by all of the important leaders. This was a weakness, but also a strength, for it precluded the commitment of all resources to a single course of action which almost certainly would have been both doctrinaire and impractical.

The political objectives of the movement were the organization of both rural and urban groups and the creation of so much discontent that these organized elements, backed by the military Huk, could take power locally and nationally. Whether this power was achieved through participation in the normal democratic processes, by swinging their votes in favor of candidates who would give them concessions, or through strikes and riots leading to the fall of the government, seemed not to matter too much to any except theoreticians.

Until the beginning of 1950 the military objectives were to remain alive and effective, to extend political influence through selective actions and to damage the enemy when this could be done cheaply. After the decision to "regularize" the Huk, multiply their strength 16-fold, and assume the final offensive, these became the nominal objectives. Actually, the military objectives seem to have changed little, but more emphasis was given to expansion and to aggressive action.

The Huk never had geographical objectives, as one normally thinks of them. They sought to control as many people and as much terrain as they could; they preferred to keep government forces away from their camps, schools, and headquarters, but after some sharp lessons from the Japanese they never attempted more than delaying actions.

Techniques

The military techniques of the Huk were in accordance with their doctrine. Probably the preferred type of operation was that in which 100 or 200 men would enter a small town where there were no more than a dozen or so armed representatives of government, disarm them, confiscate all military material, lay a heavy tax on the merchants, and leave without firing a shot. Next to this was certainly the ambush, usually at a bend in the road or trail. Sometimes they disguised themselves as government soldiers (they had no distinctive uniform, and as often as not were dressed in government uniform) and set up checkpoints on a highway to stop busses and trucks on which they would then levy for what seemed appropriate. On the rare occasions when they mounted major military operations they usually set up blocks to prevent reinforcement of the place under attack, and either infiltrated the target area or laid down a burst of fire followed by a wild charge. Invariably they pulled out before reinforcements could arrive. Perhaps their most effective military techniques were those they used to avoid contact with enemy forces, often outflanking and then following rather closely behind a government unit making a reconnaissance in force. Combat elements which held to the field moved their camps almost daily, not infrequently having a series of sites which they visited in turn. Always they avoided an encounter for which they were not prepared; when attacked they usually put up a brief delaying action from prepared positions while the main body withdrew. Militarily they were most distinguished by their survivability.

The political techniques of the Huk-FKP-PKM were based on the fact that the Philippines is, and has been for the last three decades at least, with the exception of the period of Japanese occupation, a functioning democracy patterned after that of the United States. Further, and this was and is important, winning national candidates usually profess a welfare-state philosophy, while incumbents practice it, at least just before elections. Finally almost everyone is keenly interested in politics, and is predisposed to believe that all politicians, except perhaps the candidates he personally favors, are congenitally dishonest and incompetent. The strategy of the movement was clear--to increase discontent with those in power, and offer support to their opponents in return for concessions--including positions for members of the Huk-FKP-PKM on the national tickets of the major parties.

While simultaneously denouncing the incumbents and supporting their opponents, the movement lost no opportunity to spread the belief that constitutional government never could or would

work--that only the "New Democracy" (of communism) could meet the just needs of the people. Finally, of course, there was the bogeyman of American imperialism to be injected into every issue. The field commanders were not too fond of this issue, however, because they usually lost support when the peasants began to believe the Huk were really anti-American.

Needless to say, the Huk-PKP-PKM used all of the applicable techniques of influencing elections (except, probably, outright vote-buying) from terrorizing voters to false registrations, to the theft, stuffing, switching, or destruction of ballot boxes. In every presidential election they supported a candidate, invariably one whom they had been bitterly denouncing a few months before, and invariably they hailed the defeat of their candidate as proof of the corrupt reactionary fascist-imperialist colonialist tendencies of those in power, and the futility of any system of government not based on the "New Democracy."

Their preferred propaganda medium was the Manila press, made available to them by skillful exploitation of gullible columnists and reporters, for this reached the literate, influential leaders who were their principal targets. To some extent they were able to employ commercial radio in the same way. Rumor and word-of-mouth propaganda was used extensively; so too were mimeographed newsheets and leaflets. During the first two years after the war an official party newspaper was openly published in Manila and was supplemented by a crypto-Communist newsheet of the labor congress.

Terror was selectively employed. On a few occasions substantial numbers of people in a particular community were systematically murdered, but these were exceptions which probably did more harm than good. There was no systematic program of assassination of government officials in rural (or urban) areas, but those in exposed areas usually cooperated with the Huk--or moved out. Urban terrorism was not attempted, except where directly connected with a contested labor strike.

SUPPORT FOR THE HUK-PKP-PKM MOVEMENT

Local Material Support

Most of the logistic requirements of the Huk were met through contributions from civilian supporters, either among the peasantry or in Manila. At times elements sought to grow their own rations,

either to support themselves in isolated locations, as at a school camp, because of difficulties in drawing them from the civilians, or for purposes of self-discipline. Cloth, medicines, flashlight batteries, etc., came originally from commercial sources, acquired through direct purchase or by donation of the purchasers. Money was collected in the form of taxes, seized in raids which were sometimes conducted specifically for this purpose, or by kidnapping wealthy individuals and holding them for ransom. Initially the Huk were armed with abandoned or captured American or Japanese weapons; they were largely re-armed at the end of the Japanese occupation with American equipment issued to guerrillas or stolen and sold to civilians. Throughout the second and third phases they were able to maintain a functionally adequate level of ordnance supply through capture and purchase of stolen arms and ammunition. Some home-made weapons were employed, but these largely dated from occupation days. They rather soon ran low on machine guns and mortars, for which they really had little need. Mines and booby-traps they employed rarely, for want of people trained in the use of explosives, and, in part at least, out of fear of injuring civilian supporters. Small arms and ammunition were never a major problem, nor should they be in a well-organized, well-led guerrilla movement.

Local Nonmaterial Support

The truly essential support for any insurgency is nonmaterial; it is the willingness of people to help, or at least not to hinder, the insurgents. Sometimes this is predicated on sympathy for the insurgents as individuals or as province-mates, sometimes on sympathy for their objectives, and sometimes purely on antipathy for the government or the administration. Finally, of course, there are those who help in the hope of future gain, or out of fear of punishment by the guerrillas.

All of these factors entered into the support given to the Huk-PKP-PKM. The peasants of Huklandia gave them information, food, shelter, and recruits for all of these reasons, and for a time in many areas were completely devoted to the ill-understood cause. Manila intellectuals gave them information and money and helped them in their psychological operations, as did the journalists who were their best disseminators of propaganda. This was done partly out of a spirit of joining the "wave of the future," partly out of sympathy for their professed objectives of a better life for all and a strong dislike for those who would repress these heroic idealists. The politicians gave them support in return for votes.

Outside Support

The Huk received virtually no direct material support from outside, nor did they need it. Their weapons and ammunition came from outside the country, but not to them. In the first two years after the Japanese occupation the PKP, largely through its labor front, the CLO, did receive substantial financial and propaganda assistance, largely through the US Marine Cooks & Stewards Union. Additional funds may have come in later, but this has not been proven. The principal outside assistance to the whole movement was propaganda made abroad, especially in the United States, to make the various components, from Huk to CLO, seem separate, legitimate, agrarian, or labor reform movements. In addition, American and Chinese advisers gave substantial assistance, especially in the field of domestic propaganda. Some Russian assistance was alleged (certainly several of the older leaders were trained in Russia before the war) but postwar Soviet involvement was never proven. There were many reports of sightings and even landings of unidentified submarines, presumably Chinese or Russian. Investigation never confirmed these. The reports themselves were subject to psychological exploitation by either side, and certainly many were "planted" for such exploitation.

THE COUNTERINSURGENT RESPONSE

Introduction

Throughout the entire period of Huk insurgency, the primary emphasis has been on fighting the Huk or on finding and finishing him. The approaches taken and the other techniques employed have varied through the four phases of the counterinsurgency. These correspond generally to those of the insurgency, i.e., Phase I, the Japanese occupation (1942-1945); Phase II, the Indecisive Insurgency (and counterinsurgency, it might well be added) (1946-1949); Phase III, Huk High Tide and Defeat (1950-1955); and Phase IV, Huk Smoulder On (1956 to date of this paper). Only in Phase III did the counterinsurgency forces place significant emphasis on isolating the guerrilla, and there the emphasis was on psychological rather than physical isolation techniques. For the purposes of the following discussion it should be considered that "local support" refers to material and intelligence support originating in Huklandia, Manila, and south Central Luzon, and sympathy or tolerance from people anywhere in the Philippines; while "outside support" refers to material support in interisland transport or to material or nonmaterial support originating outside the Philippines but designed to aid the Huk-PKP-PKM.

Denial of Support

Phase I

During Phase I police methods were employed to some extent. The Japanese sought to establish "neighborhood associations" which compelled people to watch and report on one another. They required passes for travel from place to place, they established frequent checkpoints along routes of communication, they conducted unexpected searches of small communities or sections of larger ones, they sought to plant agents and informers everywhere, and they used the most brutal and terroristic methods of interrogation and punishment on those suspected of supporting the guerrilla. In all of this they received some assistance from Filipinos who cooperated out of sympathy, hope of reward, or fear of punishment. After the nature and purpose of the Huk movement became apparent, some of these same measures were independently applied against suspected Huk supporters by other guerrilla units which regarded the Huk as an enemy second only to the Japanese. These measures were a nuisance, at times an intolerable nuisance, but they were ineffective. The vast mass of the people hated the Japanese and cooperated enthusiastically with the guerrilla, any guerrilla. In Huklandia the Huk, by and large, already commanded the support of substantial numbers of peasants, and not a few middle-class ideologues or "trimmers," and were never more than temporarily separated from them. The results of the isolation efforts of the Japanese--increased support for the Huk.

Phase II

During Phase II constitutional government, with all the civil liberties guaranteed by the Philippine (as by the US) laws, were in effect, so the police measures which could be used legally were sharply reduced. Checkpoints remained on the highways and functioned primarily as a means of obtaining "coffee money" for those maintaining them. Arbitrary arrest and detention were illegal, as was the use of force in interrogation. These things were practiced, but on a greatly reduced scale, extra-legally, and with the certainty of arousing public indignation if discovered. Occasionally isolated communities were searched, even destroyed. Persons against whom suspicion of collaboration with the Huk was strong, and who seemed unimportant, were often liquidated. The emphasis seemed to be on making people afraid to give support to the Huk. Intelligence agents were fairly active, and not a few suppliers were identified--but usually there was no legal way to punish them. In fact, it was no crime to be an

admitted Huk until 1948, and unless one were caught with an unregistered firearm, or actually identified as the probable perpetrator of a common crime, he could not legally be held. The result of these efforts to isolate the Huk from popular support, combined as they were with attempts to win political support, was again to increase support for the Huk.

Phase III

After Magsaysay became Secretary of Defense, early in Phase III, great emphasis was placed on the psychological separation of the Huk from the people. Every effort was made to establish credibility for the claim of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to be friends and protectors of the people, and to show that the Huk were really their enemy. Roving checkpoints, conducted with scrupulous honesty and courtesy, harassed Huk couriers and suppliers, as did agents surveilling likely sources of supplies such as medicines. There were occasional searches of communities known or believed to harbor Huk, but these again were so conducted as to give the minimum of offense. The only formally prohibited items were arms and ammunition. Those possessing stocks of other materials of obvious use to the Huk might expect to be required to explain their need for them. Intelligence made intensive efforts to discover regular Huk supply channels, and sometimes to introduce into them items which would compromise the supposed suppliers with their Huk customers.

No effort was spared in seeking the psychological isolation of the Huk. Where the demands for reform had some validity, the AFP sought to institute or encourage those reforms. When the Huk called for "land for the landless"--the AFP offered every Huk who would repent a chance to own his own land. In answer to accusations of injustice in the courts, AFP lawyers were made available to help those with cases against landlords which they could not afford to defend or prosecute. "Honesty in government and free elections!"--the 1951 elections were proof that government could and should work as it was supposed to--and proof that the Huk who remained in the field were the dupes or the hirelings of sinister foreign agents. The actions taken were far too many to enumerate here, but they effectively isolated the Huk from the sympathy or willing support of virtually all Filipinos outside Huklandia and from most of those in their area.

Phase IV

In Phase IV there seems to have been little effort to isolate the Huk from local support except through intelligence activities and occasional checkpoints.

The Japanese sought to cut off outside material support by patrolling the interisland waterways, as well as by ocean surveillance. They were notably ineffective. Similar measures, on a greatly reduced scale, persisted through Phases II and III, and on into Phase IV, although the principal target has always been commercial smuggling. These efforts have had little or no apparent effect on the Huk movement; they did not even stop the smuggling out of arms to Indonesia, Vietnam, and China in the late 1940s. Some support did enter through commercial channels, mostly through the port of Manila, in the 1940s. Counterintelligence methods, largely implemented through the Customs Secret Service, and in conjunction with military counterintelligence, effectively reduced this to an unimportant trickle.

Administrative Adequacy

During Phase I administrative adequacy was hampered by the administrative problems of the Japanese, as well as by the often enthusiastic sabotage of any Japanese effort by most of the Filipinos who supposedly were working with them. In theory, their control measures should have eliminated all support to the guerrillas except that received from isolated hill farmers; in practice they were seldom more than a nuisance.

Perhaps the greatest administrative handicap during Phases II, III, and IV has been the fact that the Philippines has been a functioning democracy with guaranteed civil liberties and elections every two years--elections in which, with one exception, the Huk and their supporters enthusiastically participated.

Aside from this the administrative problems were, and remain, formidable. The Japanese occupation left a shortage of trained administrators and a legacy of noncooperation. Entrenched bureaucracy with a "business as usual" attitude is always a formidable foe of effective counterinsurgency, and the Philippines was no exception to this rule. The legacy of the mutual distrust and suspicion left by the Japanese occupation resulted in the proliferation of secret investigative agencies. At one time in the late 1940s there were at least 17 intelligence, counterintelligence, or other investigative agencies involved in operations against the Huk-PKP-PKM, with coordination only on an ad hoc basis. Even when the campaign against the Huk was most effective, in the middle of Phase III, there were at least four such agencies operating more or less independently. None of them had really adequate support, money, facilities, or organization. Military and civilian agencies might or might not coordinate at provincial

level or below, depending largely on the personalities and political connections of the individuals involved.

The police contributed little to the counterinsurgency effort other than occasional surveillance and arrests--indeed, it occurred to no one, except a few ambitious police officers, that they had much to contribute other than in such technical fields as identification of handwriting, typing, bullets, etc. (Although the Philippine Constabulary and the Military Police Command, their postwar interim substitute, had the theoretical mission of law enforcement, they were and are not police, and their operations against the Huk were primarily of a military or intelligence nature.) Local police forces in Huklandia tended to be neutral, when they did not actively support the Huk.

Dealing with Public Opinion

In Phase I the Japanese in general cared nothing for public opinion. It was a concept entirely foreign to them. In Phase II there were limited attempts by the national government to influence public opinion, largely of the "we are good--they are dirty Communists" type. These were coupled with threats of sanctions against those mass media elements which seemed too openly sympathetic to the insurgents. Further, there was a constant barrage of press releases about government victories over the Huk and promises that they would be wiped out "within 60 days." These were not entirely self-seeking or self-delusionary, for they could have contributed to a loss of faith in the possibility of Huk success. Instead they served to lull those who opposed the Huk, and arouse the contempt of the Huk and of critical observers who realized their falsity.

In addition, of course, some military and civilian leaders in the field attempted to influence opinion against the Huk as the cause of the damage and inconvenience the civilians suffered. Too, there were deliberate attempts to cut off support for the Huk by terroristic activities, to make people afraid to support the Huk lest they be tortured or killed by government forces. This naturally had a profound effect on public opinion, both in the provinces and Manila, and contributed substantially to the growth of antigovernment (not necessarily pro-Huk) sentiment.

The efforts to influence public opinion made in Phase III have already been described. Each combat unit of battalion level had a team whose mission was to improve relations between civilians and soldiers. They assured that government objectives were

explained to the people and that any complaints the people might have against soldiers were promptly investigated. Conscientious and highly successful efforts were made to win the support of the mass media. Any reporter could go anywhere, anytime, with the blessings of the Secretary of Defense. If he came back with a story unfavorable to the AFP he was not asked to suppress it, but to observe the corrective action taken, so that he could present a balanced report. Within this policy framework, of course, efforts were made to insure that what the reporter saw was good.

The defeat which the Huk suffered may be attributed primarily to the success of government representatives in influencing public opinion, secondarily to their success in controlling the behavior of government representatives. In Phase IV there seems to be little or no effective effort to influence public opinion against the Huk, and, indeed, one reading the Manila press today might be excused for thinking that many contributors are again sympathetic to the Huk-FKP-PKM.

Until Phase III, efforts to influence public opinion outside the Philippines were largely confined to the efforts of Communists and fellow-travellers, primarily in the United States. Three books (one allegedly written by Taruc himself) appeared in the United States, which represented the Huk as heroic agrarian reformers, and their opponents as corrupt, fascistic, imperialistic, pro-Japanese oppressors. A number of articles conveying the same theme appeared in Communist and liberal publications. No great excitement was aroused however.

As part of his effort to win the support of the mass media, Magsaysay was most cooperative with foreign reporters. He was, in addition, a man uniquely able to win sympathy and support, perhaps especially from Americans. The resulting stories in the US press helped substantially in gaining American support, especially for matters outside normal routine.

Psychological Effects of Specific Incidents

There was scarcely an incident in the relations of the Free, the Axis, and the Communist worlds that did not have some psychological effect; just as there was scarcely an operation by, or against, the Huk that did not have a psychological effect, usually one greater than the material effect. There were four occurrences, however, which appear especially significant in their counterinsurgency importance.

The first of these is the campaign of the Nenita Unit from 1946-1948. This was a small group of Philippine Constabulary men who constituted themselves a hunter-killer team to track down and eliminate Huk leaders. As part of their program, they sought to instill terror into all who might support the Huk in their theater of operations. They did. They eliminated a significant number of Huk leaders. They received much publicity as relentless, almost omniscient Huk killers. This publicity did much to turn public opinion against the government which supported such activities, and the Huk increased their strength in the area of Nenita operations. Actually the Nenita unit was probably more scrupulous in its behavior than most of the government units active in the field, but the terror it created did more harm than good for the counterinsurgency.

The second was the 1949 presidential election. The incumbent, actually not a bad man, had been so vilified by the press and the political opposition including the Huk-PKP-PKM that he was grossly unpopular. His opponent, a Japanese puppet president five years before, was probably more unpopular except among a certain class of noisy would-be intellectuals. The Huk--his bitterest enemy a year or two earlier--decided to support him. Fraud and terrorism were rampant during the election. President Quirino, the incumbent, almost certainly would have been re-elected in a free and honest election, but as it was, the claim that he stole the election was plausible. Worse, it gave some credibility to the Huk claim that the corrupt administration could be eliminated only by force. Popular support for government dwindled alarmingly, but fortunately, support for the Huk did not grow in proportion. Toleration for them did--to too many people the administration and the Huk seemed almost equally evil. Had it not been for the dramatic changes in public opinion induced by the new Secretary of Defense in the latter part of 1950 the government might well have fallen.

The third significant occurrence was the appointment as leader of the effort against the Huk of an aggressive, popular, charismatic individual, who was then given almost a free hand in directing actions designed to defeat the insurgency and to win support for the government. This condition did not last long--he wrote a letter of resignation bitterly assailing the restrictions placed on his efforts two and a half years later--but it lasted long enough to bring about an almost complete victory over the insurgents. His greatest accomplishment was to convince the people that their government could and would function as it was supposed to--and to convince both the people and the armed forces that the latter were the friends and protectors of the people.

The fourth significant occurrence was the national election of 1951 (not presidential but for senators, governors, and congressmen). The Huk-PKP-PKM propaganda machine for months charged that the election would be meaningless, and ultimately called upon the people not to participate. Magsaysay, the AFP, and citizens' organizations (largely based on the Philippines Veterans Legion) vowed that the elections would be free and honest. They were palpably so and popular belief in the workability of constitutional democratic processes was renewed. This, almost certainly, was the turning point in the whole campaign.

The Moral Conflict

The Huk-PKP-PKM claimed to fight for the welfare of the masses. The government claimed to represent the people, to be subject to change in accordance with their will and with established processes, and to protect the rights of all. To the extent that the government failed, or seemed to fail, to live up to its claims, the Huk grew in strength. When it became evident that the government was effectively trying, and succeeding, in efforts to make good its claims, the Huk lost.

The Outcome

The Huk-PKP-PKM movement, perhaps since China the first truly indigenous Communist-inspired insurgency which had a chance of success, collapsed. It never had a real chance to take control of the country by force of arms--but it came perilously close to plunging the country into chaos. It failed because the people believed in a different form of government and because that government found a better leader, and trusted him more, than did the Communists.

Nevertheless the significance of the Huk approach to insurgency should not be minimized. Disorganized and indecisive as they were, their movement might very well have served as a model for Castro, and as a precursor of a type of insurgency far more generally applicable than that taught by Mao and his followers.

The counterinsurgency experience is equally important, for all that no more than perhaps 40,000 government forces were ever deployed against some 15,000 insurgents; for all that most of the mechanical gadgets of today were not available or not deployed. It was indeed "a war for the hearts and minds of the people," and clearly won on that battlefield.

The Irish Troubles, 1916-1921

by

Gunther E. Rothenberg

BACKGROUND

Armed insurrection can be carried out in various ways, and it appears that there are certain conditions in which such an insurrection can succeed even against the professional armed forces of the government when, for one reason or another, the government cannot employ its full strength.

A technique of insurrection suited to such a set of circumstances was successfully employed by the Sinn Fein in Ireland. Along with a long and bitter history of resistance to English government, Ireland offered a terrain which was suited for the operation of small bodies of rebels, forcing their opponents at the same time to disperse into isolated groups. Ireland is a predominantly agricultural country. There are no real industrial areas except for Cork, Dublin, and Belfast. A thin population is spread out over hamlets, villages, and small towns. Great stretches of bog and mountain land exist where modern communications were lacking. Terrain thus favored guerrilla fighters working in their own countryside against strange occupation troops. At the same time, except for Ulster, because of the almost exclusively nationalist nature of the rising, it could count on widespread tacit support--at the very least--from a homogeneous population.

Here then the Irish, employing a highly original revolutionary strategy combining political warfare with guerrilla tactics and terrorism, succeeded in gaining victory. It is not suggested that they beat the British army. They did, however, produce conditions which made it impossible for England to govern and to reconquer the island except at a price unacceptable for political reasons, both foreign and domestic, to the government of the day.

This pattern has been described by Professor Cyril Falls in A Hundred Years of War (p. 280) as the classic pattern of the new insurrectionary warfare, to be imitated later in Palestine, "John Bull's other Ireland."

HISTORICAL SUMMARY

The Irish republican nationalists, later to be known as the Sinn Fein movement, and their military arm, the Irish Republican Army, IRA, were in their nucleus the remnant of an organization which dated back to the days of the armed rising in Ireland in 1798. They had been part of the Invincibles who used dynamite and attacks on the English police to carry forward their political goals; they had not shied away from political assassination, such as the murder of Lord Frederick Cavendish and Mr. Burke in Phoenix Park in 1882. These men, connected with the Fenians, had now grown old, but their ideals and their tactical concepts had been taken up by the Irish Republican Brotherhood. Out of the IRB the later Sinn Fein movement emerged.

Between 1900 and 1916 the IRB cautiously but effectively moved to take over many phases of Irish political life. Although originally very small in numbers, a mere handful, their influence was quite out of proportion to their size. Their methods were conspiratorial and they were able to exploit the divisions among the Irish and the failures of governmental policies.

The Irish were divided, first, between Ulstermen and others. The Ulstermen, in general, preferred a continued union with Great Britain, and under the leadership of Sir Edward Henry Carson the Unionists were openly arming early in 1914 to prevent the introduction of Irish Home Rule, which meant for them submission to an Irish parliament. To the majority of Irishmen, on the other hand, the British were intruders in Ireland with a long record of exploitation and oppression. Nonetheless, it appears that the vast majority of the people were moderate nationalists who would have been at least temporarily content with free dominion status within the empire. Their leader was John Redmond.

Even so, opposition to the introduction of Home Rule led to the establishment of a volunteer movement in Ulster. The Volunteers, some 70,000 strong, armed with small arms, were allegedly drilled by officers holding the king's commission. The threat led in turn to the organization of Irish Volunteers in the south. The Irish Volunteers were overwhelmingly Redmondites and led by

moderate leaders such as Professor Eoin MacNeill. However, the IRB was able to infiltrate the Irish Volunteer command structure and assume a leading part. The Irish Volunteers were somewhat smaller, and much worse armed, than Carson's Volunteers.

In addition there existed in and around Dublin another Irish paramilitary force, potentially more revolutionary, but limited in its appeal. This was the Citizen Army, originally formed by Irish syndicalist labor leaders like James Larkin and James Connolly during a violent strike in 1913. Although Connolly and the IRB leaders were hostile in their domestic politics, they opposed British domination of Ireland. The CA, however, at best numbered some 2,000 men, mainly in the industrial centers of Dublin and Cork.

The outbreak of the war in 1914 changed the situation. Redmond decided to support the British government, and many of his followers joined the British forces as volunteers. Yet there was some discrimination. The men from the south of Ireland were not formed into a distinctive division, as the Ulstermen were, and although conscription was not imposed on Ireland until the spring of 1918 there was soon a renewed sense of grievance. The question of Ireland's position in the war had caused a split in the Irish Volunteers. The majority, some 20,000, followed Redmond; the residue, about 14,000, formed a new body, the Republican Volunteers. Professor MacNeill remained in command, though unknown to him the IRB assumed a stronger and stronger position within the Republican Volunteers.

Indeed the Supreme Council of the IRB had decided by 1915 that there should be a rising in Ireland before the end of the war. Consequently arrangements were set afoot to produce such a rising. The aim was not military victory, but rather to provide enough embarrassment for England to induce her to grant immediate Home Rule, which had been shelved at the outbreak of the war, or to make even wider concessions. At the same time, and a source of great anxiety to the leaders of the IRB, James Connolly, the labor leader, was also toying with the idea of a socialist coup against the government. Indeed, his open activities led the IRB to fear lest the authorities should take the alarm. After rather melodramatically kidnapping Connolly they let him into the secret that the IRB planned a rising in Easter Week 1916.

Arrangements for such a rising proceeded. John Devoy, an old Fenian veteran, was attempting to collect arms and money in the United States, while Sir Roger Casement was in Germany to recruit an Irish legion from the prisoners of war and to arrange for the Germans to send a ship with arms to Ireland. On the

whole the preparations were quite amateurish and could easily have been interrupted before the rising.

Since February 1916 British intelligence had been tapping Irish-German-American communications, but it did not inform the CinC Ireland of their findings. Finally, on the Monday previous to Easter Sunday naval intelligence finally informed the CO Southern Command, Ireland, that a German arms ship was nearing the coast and that arrangements had been made to intercept it. The CinC, General Sir John French, was then informed, but no serious countermeasures were prepared. Perhaps, as Patrick Henry Pearse, the commander of the insurgents, pointed out, the whole idea was so insane that no one would believe it.

There is no need to recapitulate the story of the Easter Rising here. Its general assumption was that (a) the mass of Volunteers would respond and (b) that if the rising could hold out for a week the mass of Irishmen would be inspired to join the revolt. Defeat might well follow; but the repression, with the fact that an attempt had been made, would reawaken and revivify the national spirit for independence. In the event only the last part of assumption (b) came true. Attempts to gain aid from the United States were foiled by the authorities there; the German arms ship was intercepted; and only a small number of men, less than 1,500 in all, joined the fighting which was almost entirely restricted to Dublin. The revolt, delayed by one day, broke out on Easter Monday, April 24, and lasted until Friday afternoon. The great mass of the people remained passive.

On the British side the failure to prevent the rising had been in large part due to that lack of coordination between the military and civilian branches of government in Ireland and England, a situation which was to persist. However, once the fighting started the use of artillery and the rapid arrival of reinforcements, combined with the lack of popular support, doomed the attempt.

The casualties amounted to some 60 volunteers killed in action and some 300 wounded. British losses were about 300 in all. On the whole, British reaction was rather mild. There were 16 executions of leading rebels. There were, to be sure, a large number of heavy prison sentences meted out by courts martial and a large number of Irish leaders, guilty or not, were placed in internment camps. However, measured by the standards of earlier and later ages, the repression was relatively light. Even so, it was enough to revive the national spirit and lay the basis for the future struggle.

In the immediate aftermath of the rebellion the government had a fleeting chance of isolating the guerrillas. There was much favorable sentiment for the government and resentment against the rebels who were blamed by the Irish for having caused senseless destruction. In Dublin and Cork prisoners marched to detention were jeered in the streets. However, the executions and the detention camps changed this in short order.

The prison, detention, and internment camps in fact became the school for the rebels. There the various shades of opinion consolidated; future leaders came to know each other; the empty old romanticism died and the new, and much more dangerous, Sinn Fein movement was born. In addition the prisoners soon became an embarrassment to the government. American support for the war was needed, and the Irish bloc in the United States was powerful. By the winter of 1916 the government released most of the internees; the convicts were largely released the following summer. They returned in triumph. If in the immediate aftermath of the revolt they had been jeered, they now returned as heroes. For the moment, however, they eschewed armed action and instead began to run for political office on the Sinn Fein ticket. After initial successes in the winter of 1917, popular support began to taper off early in 1918. At this point, however, the British government decided to extend conscription to Ireland. Opposition to this move united the country and led Mr. Lloyd George's government to abandon conciliation in favor of repression. On May 18, 1918, simultaneous raids resulted in arrests of almost all leaders in the Sinn Fein movement on the pretext of a German plot. Some escaped and went underground, and a new resistance movement developed. The Irish Volunteers, now known as the IRA, gained recruits; arms were again procured; an intelligence system was developed; and a secret arms factory, producing primarily ammunition was set up in Dublin. On January 21, 1919, the IRA undertook its first raid against a government arms depot, thus opening a long series of hostilities which did not end until the Truce of July 1921, followed by the Treaty of December 1921. In this second phase the rebels, forming a shadow government, enjoyed the support of the great mass of the Irish people in the South.

The objectives of the Sinn Fein rebellion were simple; to end English rule in all of Ireland and to establish an Irish Republic. The Sinn Fein were no longer interested in accepting Home Rule as a workable alternative.

In the end, of course, the Truce of June and the Treaty of December 1921 provided somewhat less. Above all they established the geographic division of the country, with the Northern Six

Counties, Ulster, being left out of the settlement. At the same time, the northern counties could opt for coming into the Irish Free State, while the new state accepted an Oath of Allegiance to the king and empire.

Although some members of the original Dail, notably Connolly, had vague left-wing ideas, the movement had almost exclusively nationalist objectives.

POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE SINN FEIN

The insurrectionary technique of the Sinn Fein combined terrorist tactics of guerrilla warfare with a design to boycott English government by setting up an alternative Irish administration and whenever possible inducing the Irish people to refer to this Sinn Fein organization. As a basis for insurrectionary tactics the alternative administration, both as a conception and as a fact, was enormously important. It gave the insurrection a national standing which it could not otherwise have won.

In the elections of 1918, while the obvious revolutionary tactics might have seemed to be to boycott the polls, Sinn Fein put up candidates in every constituency but two, and out of the 105 members of Parliament returned for Ireland 73 were Republicans. Thus the justice of the Sinn Fein claim to represent the feelings of the majority of the Irish people was demonstrated to the world. The Sinn Fein leaders proceeded at once to organize this legally elected majority into an Irish National Assembly (Dail Eireann). On January 21, 1919, the assembly proclaimed that "Ireland was a sovereign and independent nation," that a republic had been established in Easter Week of which the Dail constituted itself the continuation. An acting president, Cathal Brugha was appointed. Throughout the years of the rebellion the Dail continued to function, in whatever chequered circumstances, guiding the armed forces, IRA, providing a system of courts alternative to the British courts, levying taxes, and in general providing an alternative government.

The situation was, then, that there were two governments: the Dail Eireann, backed by the moral authority of the majority of the people and by its military arm, and that of the English authorities operating from Dublin Castle who tried, through the increasing use of force, to coerce the Irish into withdrawing their support from the Dail Eireann.

The provisional Irish government attempted to set up a complete governmental structure, though in practice it concentrated on support of the IRA, an Irish judicial system, and a tax system, dubbed the National Loan.

Undoubtedly the most important political activity of the Sinn Fein-IRA resistance was the setting up of the alternate government. This enabled them to exercise considerable influence within the country as well as to rally support abroad. One may say that in 1919-1920 the struggle divided between Ireland and the United States where Irish emissaries were seeking to get financial assistance, public support, and, if possible, US recognition of the Irish republican government. Similarly, the Sinn Fein movement was able--in part aided by the excesses committed by the government forces--to rally support in England and the empire.

MILITARY STRUCTURE AND DOCTRINE

The Irish insurrectionists organized a small force permanently under arms as their first line, backed up with what might be described as a militia of men coming out for a single operation and then hiding their arms and returning to their normal pursuits.

The IRA was small; the number of men in action over the greater part of the campaign was only about 10,000. The number engaged in any one action was usually less than 50; there were never as many as 200 engaged in any single operation, even in the burning of the Dublin Customs House.

The IRA was then divided into a general service militia built nominally on a normal army model, though its tactical force was a company of 50 to 100 men, usually based and recruited locally. Company officers were elected by their men and higher regimental officers by a meeting of company officers. The elections had to be ratified by IRA headquarters in Dublin.

Ultimately the whole organization was responsible to the Dail, to which the volunteers took an oath of allegiance. How far local action was autonomous and how far it was directed from headquarters is hard to ascertain. There seems little doubt, however, that all actions on a major scale were the result of general headquarters planning and were specifically ordered.

The core of the guerrilla activity were the Active Service Units, about 1,500, who were paid and on full-time service. A special elite body of picked men in Dublin, commanded by Michael Collins, was dubbed the "Squad" and specialized in actions against members of the British intelligence services.

The tactical doctrine of the IRA aimed at preventing the English government from ruling Ireland. The leaders did not believe that they could beat the forces of the Crown, nor that a general insurrection was desirable or possible. Therefore they resorted to two parallel activities. British administration was attacked by direct action, and the administrative, economic, and political life of the country was paralyzed by civil action such as civil disobedience.

The IRA rejected the use of armed masses in favor of entrusting military operations to a picked body of men and gave civilians only the job of supporting the fighters and obstructing British administration by civil methods. It adopted the principle of striking at individuals and avoiding large-scale actions. There were, however, notable exceptions. A successful drive, combining social ostracism and military action, was put on to force the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) to evacuate its barracks and concentrate in the larger towns. The attacks on the RIC were pressed because this body, thoroughly familiar with their districts, represented a real threat to the IRA. On the other hand troops from England, ignorant of the country and unacquainted with the people, were no substitute for the constables who knew every path and track and most individuals in their district. (Similar reasons motivated the special attacks on the members of the intelligence services.) Deprived of their ability to strike at the IRA directly, the troops were forced to resort to reprisals which in turn brought more hostility from the population.

In regard to the growing escalation of the war the existence of a national government was important. Actions which otherwise could be taken as gratuitous acts of terrorism can be shown to be parts of a plan to liberate Ireland from English rule. As Michael Collins proclaimed in An t-Oglach, the paper of the IRA, as early as January 1918, "The state of war which is thus declared to exist . . . entitles every volunteer to treat the armed forces of the enemy, whether soldiers or policemen, exactly as a national army would treat members of an invading army." In due course, this concept was extended to include civilian agents of the government. In Michael Collins's view England could replace her soldiers, but not her intelligence agents. This explains the assassination, for example, of Mr. Alan Bell, a magistrate who was busy ferreting out

the financial relations between Sinn Fein and various Irish banks. (For further details on this see below.)

Logistics problems were simplified by the small number of men under arms permanently. Money and supplies for these were found by the great mass of supporters as well as by the imposition of a national loan. The Sinn Fein movement had relatively small requirements for arms and ammunition. Some were procured in the United States, mainly automatic pistols, others were captured from the enemy. Grenades and bombs were in part locally manufactured. Rifles and shotguns were sometimes confiscated from local people, dynamite from local enterprises. On the whole, logistic requirements for the IRA were small, since no popular insurrection or major action was contemplated or undertaken. However, despite the relatively small logistic needs the IRA Active Service Units were running short on ammunition in the spring of 1921.

MILITARY TECHNIQUES

The insurrectionary techniques of the Sinn Fein and the IRA combined political (civil) and military elements. From the outset the IRA realized that it could not meet English regulars in open fight and issued instructions that "the method adopted should be to act in small numbers in suitable localities, thus compelling the authorities to disperse" in their search for attackers. To hamper the authorities, destruction of communications should be carried out widely; telegraph and telephone communications, railroads and roads, transport and gasoline stores were to be attacked. In general attacks were to be carried out at night, because this gave the IRA, familiar with the locality, an advantage.

An important aspect was the campaign to remove the RIC from the rural areas. The RIC, recruited among the Irish and well acquainted with their districts, were socially ostracized, harassed, their barracks attacked, their personnel murdered. This produced wholesale resignations from the RIC and led to its virtual withdrawal from the countryside, where the republican government effectively took over.

At the same time, the IRA struck particularly hard at individuals, military or civilian, regarded as intelligence agents. "To paralyse the British machine," wrote Michael Collins, "it was necessary to strike at individuals. Without her spies England was helpless. It was only by means of their accumulated and

accumulating knowledge that the British machine could operate." Regarding attacks on individuals, he considered that they shook the morale of the enemy and were a necessary act of war.¹

Against troops and large organized bodies of police, etc., the usual tactics were those of the ambush. Indeed by 1920, by which time personnel from most of the small outlying police stations, posts, etc., had been withdrawn into strongly fortified points, the IRA commonly used ambush tactics, carried out against truckloads of troops and convoys, usually in the countryside with grenades and small arms fire. Another method was the attack carried out in crowded city streets where the attackers could dash for cover in the side streets or merge into the population. The latter type of attack inevitably created high civilian casualties and was permitted only after a long debate within the highest levels of the Irish republican government.

Big operations like the burning of the Dublin Customs House in June 1921 were carried out mainly for political reasons and played a somewhat minor part.

The methods of direct attack were supplemented by other means. In the spring of 1920 Sinn Fein ordered dockers to refuse to handle military cargoes, and railwaymen were ordered to refuse to work trains carrying men or materials for the government. When the British in turn suspended the railway-workers this did not improve the situation since replacements were not available. According to General Sir Neil Macready, these transport strikes set back the British military effort severely. Even so, they were called off in December 1920, probably because the Sinn Fein could not carry the financial burden of supporting the dismissed men, coupled with the counterproductive effect the interruption of rail service was having on the population.

A weapon not used by the Sinn Fein was industrial sabotage. In the industrial north the pro-British Unionists were too strong; in Dublin it was not considered likely to have any effective results.

LOCAL SUPPORT FOR THE GUERRILLAS

By and large local support for the guerrillas came from the Catholic portions of the country. Historically it had its foundations in the bitter memories of the near wars of extermination fought by the English--the days of Elizabeth and Cromwell, the Famine, and other horrors. In the north, especially in the region around Belfast, there was a Protestant majority, and feeling

for the English connection was strong. It seems fair to say that eventually a majority of the Irish people supported the IRA guerrillas; yet at the outset this was not so. In the beginning the Sinn Fein movement was led by middle class intellectuals, supported by some farmers and professionals. Business people and large landowners generally were pro-British. In many ways support for the guerrillas came as a result of outrages and reprisals, both authorized and unauthorized, by forces of the crown. The great mass of the poor and semieducated gave but little support at first, but this changed when the reprisals and terror raids carried out by British troops after the retreat of the RIC from the countryside forced them out of their apathy. It must be said, however, that the majority of the people never were active supporters, though they may have sheltered the IRA and refused to give any information to the authorities.

It appears possible that if the British had been able to maintain successful control of the area and its government, and if they had not resorted to reprisals, they might have found a greater measure of support--or diminished the support given to the IRA.

The great mass of support was passive--refusal to cooperate with the authorities. At the same time, the Irish people relied more and more on the administration provided by the republican government. They shunned the British courts, they refused to pay their taxes, they generally applied to the alternative government in all cases. People of all political parties found it prudent to deal with the republican authorities who were able to constitute a real functioning government. Disobedience to the edicts of the republican courts, moreover, support of the English authorities, etc., were punished by death.

The Irish government asked for cooperation against the authorities, for food and shelter for its fighting men, for medical care, and for intelligence. It did not impress men into its ranks to do any fighting. There were more than enough volunteers at all times.

It should be noted that popular support reached new heights when in the summer of 1921 the fighting strength of the IRA had declined and the truce constituted a political and not a purely military victory for the Sinn Fein.²

OUTSIDE SUPPORT

In 1916 the German government had only a very limited interest in supporting the revolt. The arms ship was actually paid for by the Irish, and no German agents or other measures in support were present. Also in 1916 US authorities effectively interfered with Irish schemes to seize certain German liners tied up in New York for the transport of men and materiel.

In 1919 Irish efforts in the United States, though hampered by rivalry among the Irish emissaries, aimed at gaining financial assistance and public support, as well as recognition of the Irish Republic. The first aim was achieved, but though the US Senate did vote in 1919 to ask that the government hear the Irish case at Versailles, no official or semiofficial aid was ever given.

Unofficially, Irishmen and others in the United States subscribed to the Irish National Loan, and some supplies of arms were procured through private sources. Most important, in the end, however, was public opinion.

In England and the empire, sections of the public, mobilized by such papers as The Times, the Manchester Guardian, and the Daily Mail, were appalled at British actions in Ireland, especially at the policy of official reprisals authorized in 1921. In the United States the British found no support. Great Britain theoretically could muster the forces to put down the Irish, but her army was still convalescent after the most gruelling war in her history. Her foreign relations were likely to suffer from an all-out war in Ireland; her imperial affairs in India and in Egypt were tense; relations with the dominions were strained. Thus in the end the IRA won because it had reduced not the British army, but the British government, to a mood of retrenching its losses. And here the effect that the counterinsurrectionary responses had evoked abroad were all important.

THE COUNTERINSURGENT RESPONSE

The first British line of counterinsurgent action were the police. Before 1916 these consisted, outside of Dublin where the police were unarmed, of the Royal Irish Constabulary, a locally recruited body of some 6,000. In view of past history this was an armed body carrying revolvers and service rifles. No heavier weapons were available at first. In addition, there was a usual Criminal Investigation Establishment.

The RIC was backed up by a body of troops normally stationed in Ireland which had been augmented to some 20 battalions after the Easter Rising. In 1919 this force was enlarged, and when General Macready took over in April 1920 he further increased his forces to 46 battalions. By December he had 51 battalions and six cavalry regiments, as well as 100 heavy armored cars.

With the RIC practically ousted from the countryside and beset by numerous resignations the British government set up two new bodies of special police. The first were the notorious "Black and Tans." This body of men, actually members of the RIC recruited in England, were thus named after their motley uniforms, partly RIC dark green, partly khaki. More important were the Auxiliary Division of the RIC which the British raised about the same time. These men, all ex-officers, operated as a special force of shock-troops against the IRA. They received higher pay and allowances and ranked as sergeants in the RIC. The "Auxies" soon made a name for their brutality and were accused of employing torture to gain information. Various other armed government bodies in Ireland brought the total up to nearly 100,000 men.

The first phase of the conflict was an attempt by the British to prevent the Dail from establishing any machinery by government. The Dail and its subsidiaries were declared "illegal assemblies." Newspapers which published advertisements for the National Loan were suppressed; possession of nationalist literature was declared an offense. Many of the nationalist leaders were arrested; even more went underground. To achieve their end the British needed an intelligence apparatus, the backbone of which was supplied by the RIC. When this force was driven out of the countryside the British had to resort to other measures.

At first, for political reasons the British were unwilling to suspend the ordinary processes of civil law, though their enforcement had become impossible. In January 1920 a Curfew Order was introduced, followed later that spring by the raising of the Black and Tans and the Auxies. Although of military character, the latter were still a concession by the government. For political reasons Lloyd George considered that only "police measures" were called for in Ireland, and only in December 1920 was a "state of insurrection" declared in the south and west of the island. In addition the Crown Forces were declared to be "on active service." The death penalty was introduced for anyone possessing arms or ammunition, for anyone who took part in insurrectionary activities, and for anyone who sheltered a rebel. Permission was given for "official reprisals," largely the demolition of buildings where, or near where, assaults had taken place.

The policy of official reprisals was backed up by a policy of "unofficial reprisals," mainly carried out by the Black and Tans and the Auxies. These included the use of torture to obtain information and the killing of suspected Sinn Fein and IRA leaders. In addition, when the IRA tried to carry its activities into Ulster, the government winked on riots in Belfast where Protestant mobs attacked northern Roman Catholics, in many cases families who had taken no part in the campaign.

The policy of reprisals was unquestionably effective, though it was counterproductive by swinging many Irishmen, until then nonsupporters of the IRA, to their side. Official reprisals had to be discontinued because of their adverse effect on public opinion abroad. Unofficial reprisals and the use of torture continued and brought about counteraction. The most spectacular event was the raid by Collins's squad on Sunday, November 21, 1920, on the billets of a British intelligence unit of the Auxiliaries in which 21 British officers were killed.

The military were less implicated in these events. In fact, the commanding officers considered the employment of regular troops deleterious to their morale, and often opposed some of the police and Auxiliary excesses. Beyond that, relations between the various bodies, especially between the military commanders and the civilian authorities controlling the police, were poor, and cooperation not always perfect.

Despite the effectiveness of reprisals, the government began to feel the pressure of foreign and domestic disapproval and looked for a policy of limited concessions to isolate the guerrillas from their popular support. A proposed Bill for the Better Government of Ireland provided for partition and home rule with one parliament for the south and another for Ulster. This partition of the country was, at that point, unacceptable to the Sinn Fein, and the troubles continued. In the end, the Truce of July 1921 and the protracted negotiations that followed were forced on both sides by material and moral circumstances. On the Irish side the chief difficulty was the economic chaos into which the country had been thrown, together with the exhaustion of the IRA. In fact, the British military chiefs felt that although a prolonged and bitter campaign was still necessary, military victory could now be achieved, albeit with the employment of about 100,000 troops, armored cars, and heavy equipment.³ This was, however, deemed unacceptable by the British government, and the truce was signed.

On the Irish side, too, there was opposition to the truce, but IRA leaders, including Collins, believed that the country

was in no shape to sustain any further fighting. Defending his support of the truce before the Dail, Collins said, "We as negotiators were not in a position of dictating terms of peace to a vanquished foe. We had not beaten the enemy out of the country by force of arms."⁴ Even so, the Sinn Fein revolutionary strategy had been successful. It had produced conditions which made it impossible for England to hold and govern Ireland by any methods acceptable to the political leadership; thus by a combination of political action, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism it substantially achieved its goals.

ANALYSIS

Theoretically Ireland could no doubt have been conquered by methods similar to those used in South Africa, but in practice to embark upon such an operation would have involved a number of extremely serious political considerations. Experts believed that between 100,000 and 150,000 troops and police would be needed, the southern counties would have to be laced with a cordon of blockhouses and barbed wire, and the entire population of the areas would have to be screened and controlled. Neither domestic nor foreign policy considerations admitted such a course of action.

To sum up the factors contributing to the success of the Irish revolt it would appear that given certain favorable conditions it is practicable for a relatively small party of fighting insurgents to embark on a war against a status quo government with a professional army and that such an undertaking has a fair chance of success.

The most important of these factors are: (1) that the opposing army (police) be for one reason or another prevented from exerting its full strength; (2) that the general population be sympathetic to the guerrillas and prepared to give its secret or open support; (3) that the guerrilla organization be closely controlled and directed to a strategic-political plan; and (4) that the operations be maintained for a long enough period and on a rising scale so as to wear down both the political and military morale of the opposition.

It would seem that (2) is perhaps the most important, and here the fact that the Irish revolt was a national and not a social revolt became most important. The advantage of united popular support, open or tacit, is always denied to social insurgents, but often available to nationalist rebels, especially in an ethnic, religious, and historic homogeneous population.

In judging the success of the Sinn Fein-IRA revolt the enormous advantage and impetus that was given them by the initial slackness of the English counterinsurgent response cannot be discounted. From the outset the Sinn Fein-IRA pursued their course with energy and utter ruthlessness. On the English side there was reluctance to admit that an actual state of war existed. When all-out measures were finally used in 1920-1921 the British had to contend with such a high degree of consolidated national opinion that it became impossible to secure the respect, let alone the support, of the Irish population. Thus, though by June 1921 the fortunes of the IRA were at low ebb, many of its best fighting men killed or captured, its weapons lost or no longer serviceable, and stocks of ammunition running dangerously low, the military estimate of the effort required to reestablish English authority in Ireland was so high that it became politically impossible. To be sure, the threat of possible full-scale hostilities in case of a breakdown in treaty negotiations forced the Irish reluctantly to sign an agreement which fell short of their maximum objectives. But the revolt still must be considered a victory for revolutionary-political-guerrilla and terror techniques.

The importance of popular support in the success or failure of such an undertaking may best be illustrated by the second Irish Civil War, which broke out when a section of the IRA would not accept the Free State. In this war the rebels did not command the support of the majority of the country and suffered from its lack. Therefore, despite the general paucity of government resources they were soon eliminated as a serious force, though they continued to exist as a semiactive underground organization.

Footnotes

1. Dorothy McCardle, The Irish Republic (London: 1937), p. 319.
2. P. Beaslai, Life of Michael Collins (2 vols.; London: 1926), II, pp. 247-50.
3. Macready, Annals of an Active Life (London: 1924), pp. 561-563.
4. McCardle, p. 635.

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The German Experience in World War II

by

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During World War II Germany conquered and for up to five years held vast areas of Europe. In turn, this occupation encountered resistance movements on a vast scale, which, despite a comprehensive, sophisticated, and totally ruthless counter-insurgent response, the Germans were unable to eliminate, although on occasion they were able to contain it. While justice cannot be done in this short space to the complexities of the story, this paper will try to define two major types of resistance, outline their major achievements, and then describe and analyze the German response and the reasons for its failure.

Although anti-German activities in occupied Europe varied widely, their pattern was largely determined by three major factors which permit their classification into two major categories. In order of their importance these factors are: the geography of the country, the nature of German occupation policy, and the direction and scale of outside support. To a remarkable degree these factors differed between eastern and western Europe and permit a rough division of the resistance into Eastern and Western types.*

The highly civilized, thickly populated areas of western Europe, crisscrossed by a close communication network, administered by well-established civil services, etc., made the task of the German security forces relatively easier. The main pattern, though there were exceptions, was "underground" resistance, taking the form of propaganda, intelligence, and sabotage activities,

*The proximity of Britain to western Europe and of the USSR and the Red Army to eastern Europe has much to do with this distinction in addition to the other points noted in succeeding paragraphs.

while forces were prepared against the day on which they would operate in conjunction with an Allied landing. On the other hand, eastern Europe is mountainous, thickly forested, with extensive marshes in Poland and western Russia, relatively thinly inhabited, and with poor communications. Here existed opportunities for large-scale guerrilla activity along the traditional lines of armed resistance. The identification of the Eastern type with armed resistance, and of the western type with "underground" activities, is, of course, an oversimplification, but it is a serviceable one for the purposes of this study. Certainly, it was recognized as such by the Germans.

Differences in the East-West pattern of anti-German activities were also determined by the different nature of occupation policy. The Germans aimed at integration of western Europe in their "New Order," and whatever their ultimate designs, and except for the Jews, the lives of the ordinary citizens were rarely threatened while the routine business of government was continued by the national administration. Therefore the number of active resisters was, at the outset, quite small. While German policy in western Europe may be characterized as one of forced cooperation, Nazi policy in eastern Europe was one of open and brutal despoliation. The Slavic countries, especially Poland and Russia, were to provide land for colonization, as well as raw materials for German industry. Certain population groups were to be exterminated, while the "racially inferior" majority was to be reduced to helot status.

A recent version of events, current especially in Germany, holds that at the outset there was no resistance in the East and that it arose only due to German "mistakes." This version, like the Communist version of a spontaneous and general resistance led by party cadres, is a vast oversimplification. It greatly underrates the patriotism of Serbs, Poles, and Russians and also forgets that mass killings began with the entry of German troops. From the outset the people in eastern Europe were given much less of a choice than those of western Europe.

It is, of course, true that resistance, guerrilla, and partisan activities began slowly and on a small scale. In part this was due to the third determining factor: outside support. Here again there were differences between East and West. Although the possibilities of supporting resistance movements on the continent had been considered in Great Britain prior to 1940, it was not until late summer of that year that a special organization, the Special Operations Executive (SOE) was set up, as Sir Winston Churchill put it, "to set Europe ablaze." These were brave words but the means available to do it were at first totally inadequate.

Although the submarine, the development of air transport, and w/t communications had created new possibilities for the support of resistance groups, shortages of all kinds precluded any large-scale operations. Moreover the British, who up to 1944 played the leading role in the support of western resistance movements, did not really accept the value of vast underground armies. As they saw it, in western Europe at least, the Germans occupied a number of highly industrialized countries, and the main task of resistance groups was to gather intelligence and sabotage communications, industry, and depots. This initial concept changed very slowly, and it was only in early 1944 that Great Britain (and the United States) began to recognize the combat potential of the resistance groups, especially that of the various organizations organized in France. United, or at least coordinated, as the French Forces of the Interior (FFI), these groups were finally armed and supplied on a larger scale to act in conjunction with Allied landings. In Holland and Belgium, however, the resistance by and large remained in the intelligence and sabotage stage. In summary then, in western Europe the configuration of terrain, the nature of the German occupation, as well as the nature and direction of outside support created "underground" resistance movements which became military forces only in early 1944.

In contrast, the picture in the East was rather different. Partisan warfare was a central element in the Soviet theory of war. In his first Order of the Day Stalin called for "bands of partisans and saboteurs everywhere, blowing the bridges, destroying roads, telephones and telegraphs, setting fire to depots and forests. In territories occupied by the enemy, conditions must be made so impossible that he cannot hold out." But despite this order and despite the Soviet theory of partisan warfare, the fact was that the Soviets had neglected to establish a material and organizational base for such warfare. Therefore, the initial response was not highly effective, and during the dark days of the first war year partisan needs were low on the list of Soviet priorities.

By May 1942, however, a Central Staff to direct the partisans was established in Moscow, and support to the partisans increased rapidly. Terrain again proved a determining factor. Although partisans were active everywhere, they operated at their greatest strength and effectiveness in the forest areas--Leningrad province, Belorussia, and the northern Ukraine. By 1943, for instance, the German Army High Command War Diary (Kriegstagebuch) recorded 1,560 attacks against rail communications alone, followed by 2,121 in August, and 2,000 in September. Alexander Werth

estimates that at the height of the partisan movement, in later 1943, there were some 500,000 armed partisans in the Soviet Union.

If the entry of the Soviet Union greatly increased the scale of partisan warfare against the Germans, it also created new problems within the anti-German coalition. As early as 1928 a Comintern resolution had made it the duty of each Communist Party "to transform an imperialist war into a proletarian war against the bourgeoisie." Instructions on these lines were sent out the day of the German attack. One result was the entry of Communists into the resistance movements. In the West, while there remained doubts about their ultimate objectives, the Communists proved effective, devoted, and loyal fighters against the Germans. Unquestionably most of them hoped to establish Communist regimes in their countries after the war, but the Allies and their countrymen did not give them an opportunity to do so. In the East, however, and to some degree in Italy, Communist participation in the struggle against the Germans did become, in part certainly, a stage in an international civil war and led to deep rifts, even fighting, between various wings of the resistance movements.

The imposition of an anti-imperialist war on the war against the German occupation had particularly tragic consequences in Poland. The Polish resistance operated on the principle of not recognizing either the German or the Russian occupation, but establishing its own secret administration, army, and press. Despite considerable difficulties, it built up its own underground armed forces, and by May 1940 the Germans were already sufficiently alarmed to carry out special military operations against it. The invasion of the Soviet Union gave the Poles new opportunities, and they performed good service by destroying rail communications. Although Russia refused to render any assistance to the Polish Home Army (Armija Krajowa, AK), locally procured arms and supplies flown in by daring Polish air force pilots enabled it to build up considerable combat strength. In March 1944 some three understrength AK regiments engaged two German regiments.

However, large-scale reinforcements and supplies could come only from the Soviet Union, and relations with that power deteriorated rapidly. Although the Polish government in exile in London had established an effective communication system with the home front and, in contrast with many other exile governments, enjoyed broad popular support, the Soviet Union was determined not to allow the restoration of prewar Poland. In late 1943 the Russians organized a rival partisan army in Poland. One result of the break in relations between the Soviets and the Polish exile government

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was the Warsaw tragedy. In August 1944 the AK rose in Warsaw, hoping to liberate their capital before the arrival of the Russians so that a provisional government would already exist to shield the country from further direct foreign exploitation.* Lack of support and strategic miscalculations doomed the rising, but for several weeks the AK engaged elements of several German divisions, including armor. Though doomed by political circumstances, the Polish resistance must definitely be considered to belong in the Eastern, i.e., the traditional guerrilla, category.

The division between Eastern and Western types of resistance is also valid for Northern, Central, South-Central, and South-eastern Europe, of which little has been said up to now. Here the picture is indeed complicated. There were vast differences in terrain ranging from the mountains of Norway to the Danish plain, the Bohemian hills, and the rugged Alpine and Balkan areas. Here too German occupation policy fluctuated widely. On the whole, the Germans relied on a chain of puppet and satellite governments to do their bidding, while certain strategic areas were under direct German military administration. In addition, up to 1943, Italy shared in the occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece. In this vast area the nature of external support, and its effectiveness and direction, together with the intrusion of the civil war pattern within the resistance movements, provided additional complications. Nonetheless, it is possible to classify resistance activities in these parts of occupied Europe roughly into the Western and Eastern types.

In Norway and Denmark, despite the vastly differing terrain, the resistance was of the Western type. In both countries, considered to have a "Nordic" racial structure, German occupation policies were at first quite restrained and left much authority in the hands of the local administrations. Given the nature of the terrain, the Danish resistance was limited to "underground" activity, achieving public success only in the great Copenhagen strike of 1943 and in the successful evacuation of the Jewish population of Denmark to Sweden.

In Norway, on the other hand, the terrain was highly suitable for guerrilla warfare, but since Norway was considered to be outside the area of the intended Anglo-American landings, the SOE in cooperation with the exile government decided to concentrate on technical sabotage, including coup de main operations against certain German installations, including the experimental

*The advancing Russian armies deliberately halted on the Vistula, in sight of Warsaw, permitting the Germans to subdue the uprising.

heavy water plant. After 1944 an underground army (MILORG) of some 40,000 men was armed and equipped with help from Sweden to prevent any large last-minute destruction by fanatical German troops. In the event, MILORG did not see any combat action.

In occupied Czechoslovakia, divided into rump Bohemia-Moravia, the so-called Protectorate, and Fascist-ruled satellite Slovakia, resistance activities must mainly be regarded as of the Western type. Industrial sabotage and individual acts of terror were carried out. In 1942 a team parachuted in by the exile government assassinated the Protector, Heydrich, but this led to extremely heavy reprisals and this type of action was not repeated. In general German policy allocated Czechs an inferior place in the new order, but production from Czech industry was needed, and therefore a policy of "the sugar and the whip" was applied. Even so, repression in the Protectorate was very harsh, and about 350,000 Czechs were killed between 1939 and 1945. Resistance remained in the "underground" stage, except for an abortive Slovak rising late in 1944. But, though this enterprise was supported by contingents of the Slovak army, detachments from the Red Army, and an OSS team, the rising was suppressed. The theater of operations was not extensive enough to provide for adequate guerrilla mobility and was mopped up by convergent German columns. Here then was another example of the influence of terrain creating essentially an "underground" resistance movement.

Italy provided a mixed picture. Especially in northern Italy there occurred, after September 1943, an almost spontaneous eruption of partisan resistance against the newly installed German occupation and its Fascist supporters. The terrain was quite suitable for the traditional, i.e., Eastern, type of guerrilla warfare, especially in the Apennine and Alpine regions. But to sustain such an effort proved difficult, partially due to divisions among the Italians as well as differences between the partisans and the Allied commanders in southern Italy. In general terms the Allies wanted to confine the partisans to the disruption of German communications and to the preservation of Italian installations from destruction by the retreating enemy. The partisans, largely led or at least strongly influenced by Communist elements, wanted to create an anti-Fascist "Liberation Army," to play a determining role in shaping postwar Italy. These conflicts gravely impeded cooperation at various stages. Also, the ambitious plans of the partisans led to premature operations in large formations which usually became attractive targets for the Germans and Mussolini's restored forces.

In spite of these difficulties, however, the Italian partisans played a useful role as the Allies moved north of Rome and in the final stages of the war proved valuable auxiliaries of the Allied command, preventing the destruction of ports and industrial installations by the Germans.

The final area which we must consider are the Balkans, the traditional land of guerrilla warfare in the Eastern style. Major anti-German guerrilla operations took place in Yugoslavia, with Greece running a poor second. In mountainous Albania the Germans managed to establish a modus vivendi with considerable portions of the population and were even able to gather a certain amount of local support. Attempts to create a resistance movement here failed by and large.

Mountainous, with poor communications, and a long history of resistance to invaders, both Greece and Yugoslavia produced large popular guerrilla movements, but their effectiveness differed. In both cases the movements were divided between groups adhering to the royal government in exile and those led, or strongly influenced, by Communists. The Greek nationalist EDES group, some 10,000 strong, were nominally subordinate to the British Middle East Headquarters, but in fact some EDES forces collaborated with the Germans against the left-wing ELAS. On the other hand ELAS, some 30,000 strong, was considered to be operating primarily with the intention of seizing power at the moment of a German withdrawal. Under these circumstances active operations against the enemy lagged, though in balance ELAS was more effective than EDES. In July 1944 EDES, bolstered by some 2,500 British-trained reinforcements landed in a large-scale amphibious support operation, finally opened hostilities against the Germans. However, by this time the Germans were already withdrawing from Greece, and the summer campaign of 1944 merely set the stage for the opening of the Greek civil war.

Turning northward we find an initially comparable situation in Yugoslavia. Here, however, the Serb nationalist Chetniks led by Colonel (later General) Draja Mihailović were rapidly eclipsed by the Communist-led Tito partisans. Mihailović had been first in the field, but his desire to maintain his forces in being to permit eventual restoration of the prewar status of the country made him reluctant to engage the enemy. Some of his subordinates actually cooperated with the Germans and Italians. On the other hand, the partisans were able to capitalize on the brutal massacres perpetrated by Germany's Croatian satellites against the Serb population and to assume the leading role in a National Liberation Movement.

In many ways Tito's achievement was most remarkable. In almost complete isolation, opposed by as many as 350,000 enemy troops, he was able to build up a force of 80,000. In this he received no outside aid, because what little support SOE could provide until June 1943 went exclusively to Mihailović. A British mission finally reached Tito in September 1943, and that month his fortunes changed. The Italian surrender provided him with arms and supplies for several divisions, and from early 1944 on he received massive Allied supplies through the new SOE base at Bari. By the summer of 1944 his forces had grown into a regular field army.

The assessment of the military value of the various resistance and guerrilla movements was and still is a matter of considerable dispute. Yet, there can be little argument about the contribution that Tito made to the liberation of his homeland. While exact casualty figures inflicted on the Germans (and their supporters) by the partisans are not available, Axis casualties in the Balkans were undoubtedly very high. And while these include casualties inflicted by the Chetniks, the EDES and ELAS forces, the greatest percentage was without a doubt due to Tito's partisans.

In considering the general development of resistance movements one is struck by the great importance played by terrain and by the great acceleration in the tempo of the movements after 1943. The date 1943 constitutes the great psychological turning point. By 1943 it was clear that Germany could not win the war and that eventual liberation would come sooner or later. Without that hope to sustain the resistance movements it is most likely that the movements would have eventually given in. Here then was the great importance of outside support. It did not consist so much of supplies or agents, for neither of these were available in quantity until early 1944; its importance lay in the fact that it prevented a psychological isolation of the guerrillas and provided that spark of hope without which they might well have succumbed to German pressures.

In turn, the guerrilla and resistance movements, although the picture of their activities especially during the early part of the war tended to be overdrawn and overromanticized, provided inspiration for the Allies during the days when the initiative in the war seemed to lie exclusively with the Germans.

When we turn to analyze the German counterinsurgent response we find a most complex situation. In one sense, of course, the entire political and military machine of the Reich, its allies, satellites, and collaborators was part of this response. Even

so, primary responsibility for directing and carrying on counter-insurgent activities rested with the German intelligence, security, and police services.

During the Second World War these services were a curious and often competing mixture of military, paramilitary, and civilian organizations, a mix peculiar to Hitler's Germany. The major characteristics of this apparatus may be defined as: complexity of organization, rigidity and at the same time flexibility both operational and organizational, and above all a dualism of function which not only created a duplication of effort, but went far beyond the usual interservice rivalry and was rooted in basic differences of philosophy and in a real life and death struggle for power within the structure of the Reich.

As the German-occupied territories grew, intelligence, security, and police services multiplied and became more complex. Not only did organic units undergo frequent reorganization and modifications, but the number of special purpose units seem endless. While these units, often locally recruited, provided considerable flexibility, this was counterbalanced by the rigidity which ideology imposed upon them. Nazi ideology could not conceive any loyal cooperation with members of other nations, especially those regarded as racially "inferior." This concept, reinforced repeatedly by directives from the Führer, severely handicapped the utilization of such local troops in intelligence and security functions. At best the reliability of such troops was suspect and required close supervision by German officers and NCOs; at worst such troops turned against their employer when the tide of war turned. Even the loyalty of Germany's major allies was suspect.

Complexity of organization, ideological rigidity, and bitter rivalry were at their worst in the relations between the combined military-naval-air intelligence and security organization under the direction of the Amtsgruppe für Auslandsnachrichten und Abwehr (commonly called Abwehr) and the ever-growing apparatus controlled by the Reichsführer SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei, Heinrich Himmler. As RF/SS Himmler wanted to eliminate the Abwehr, indeed the army, and constitute his formations as the controlling instrument in a Nazi-occupied Europe. As a first step he envisaged elimination of the Abwehr, a goal he substantially achieved in 1944.

The Abwehr constituted one of the main branches of the German Combined Armed Forces Staff (OKW) and maintained its head office in Berlin. After 1939 branch offices (Abwehrstellen) were organized in the various occupied territories, reporting

directly to Berlin, though for local security purposes they fell under the jurisdiction of the regional armed forces commander (Wehrmachtsoberbefehlshaber). In addition the High Command of the Army (OKH) had a staff section, Oberquartiermeister IV (OQ IV) which was responsible for operational intelligence as well as security in the occupied territories.

In the German army, as in all other armies, the immediate security of an organization was in the hands of its commander, but there also existed a number of special intelligence and security troops. We are not concerned here with combat intelligence units, though they played an auxiliary role in the counter-insurgent effort, but with organizations acting primarily as counterintelligence and security units. Most important was the Geheime Feldpolizei (GFP), the nearest equivalent to the US CIC. This organization was established shortly before the outbreak of the war when Admiral Canaris, chief of the Abwehr, persuaded the OKW that the Abwehr needed a police of its own. Membership in the GFP was drawn from the civilian Criminal Police. The GFP, organized in groups ranging from battalion to regimental size, operated under the area commander and ultimately under the direction of the OQ IV of the OKH.

Abwehr and OKH also shared the services of a number of special purpose units of highly diverse organization, equipment, and function. Most notable was the Brandenburg Division, specially established for long-range penetration, sabotage, and antipartisan warfare. In the latter role, the Brandenburgers formed cadres for the Jagdkommandos (ranger detachments) which, after 1943, operated against the partisans in the Balkans and Russia. These detachments, however, were not numerous enough to affect seriously the outcome of operations.

In addition, the German army possessed a number of less well trained guard and security duties. In the early phases of the war these functions were performed by second-line troops, Landschützeinheiten, located in Germany as well as in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. During preparations for the Balkan campaign, and in the simultaneous planning for the invasion of the Soviet Union, the OKH expanded these units into organizations of division size, Sicherungsdivisionen, in anticipation of the need for greater protection of its rear areas. Nine such divisions were assigned initially to the German invasion forces, and in 1942 the number was expanded to 17. In addition, the personnel of these divisions was diluted with indigenous troops drawn from various ethnic subgroups of the Soviet Union. The combat value of these divisions, suffering from a lack of equipment, was not high, and the indigenous components required close supervision.

Competing at all levels with the armed forces security organization was the vast establishment of the RF/SS. Although in return for cooperation during his consolidation of power in 1933-1934 Hitler had promised that the armed forces would hold a military monopoly, the Führer never trusted his generals completely and countenanced the creation of a counterforce, Himmler's SS. The SS (Schutzstaffeln), originally merely an elite party guard, had by 1939 developed into a hybrid between a party militia, an elite corps, and a super police force. In addition to a pool of general members, serving part-time, it comprised fully armed and equipped divisions, the Verfügungstruppen, and it was linked to the German Police apparatus by Himmler's dual command function as well as by dual membership.

While the Verfügungstruppen, which included a special corps of concentration camp guards, were eventually to expand to an army of some 40 divisions, designated the Waffen SS, the most immediate challenge to the army was offered by the SS's own intelligence service, the Sicherheitsdienst (SD). In late 1939 the SD was formally amalgamated with the German police, already under Himmler's command, into a labyrinthine security and intelligence agency, the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA). The German police forces were divided into two main branches, the regular police (ORPO), and the security police (SIPO) which included the dreaded secret state police, the Gestapo. The RSHA thus combined party with state organizations and became Himmler's chosen instrument for the implementation of his vision: a Nazi-dominated continent, closely controlled by party and SS.

Excluding the administrative, economic, and ideological branches of the RSHA, the major division responsible for the counter-insurgent activities was Amt IV, the Gestapo, with IV B 4 entrusted with the liquidation of the Jewish population, while IV D was in charge of occupied territories. Amt V was the KRIPO, or Criminal Police, providing auxiliary services, while Amt VI was the external branch of the SD. Amt IV was supposed to be the main executive arm of the RSHA, but the line between staff and operational functions was neither clearly drawn nor in practice adhered to. To provide muscle for this agency, Himmler at the outbreak of war formed the regular police into special battalions and also constituted special units within the Waffen SS.

Himmler and the traditional-minded army generals had radically differing concepts of the aims and nature of German occupation policy, though it should be said at the outset that these applied mainly to the western areas and to the pre-1942 period. The army conceived the occupation essentially along the lines

laid down by the Hague Convention. Except where it was absolutely necessary, the administrative control was to be left in the hands of the national authorities, and there was no intention of changing the basic structure of the nation. To be sure, should the security of the army be endangered, the OKH was prepared to be ruthless and was willing to utilize such measures as the execution of hostages, collective responsibility, and other reprisals against the population. But such measures were traditional, had been employed in 1870-1871 and in World War I, and had some sanction in international law. In contrast, Himmler wanted to change the whole structure of the occupied countries to make room for the "New Order." His concept included the immediate arrest and extermination of certain population groups deemed inimical to the Third Reich--Jews, intellectuals, individuals considered hostile to Germany, and a system of "sugar and whip" for the remainder of the population. Racially "valuable" elements were to be selected to help contain the rest, which, especially in the case of the Slavs, was to be accorded no consideration. "What happens to a Russian or a Czech," Himmler stated, "does not interest me in the least."

Convinced that the army generals did not share his views in their entirety, a correct assumption, Himmler's police and security units entered Poland with the first wave of the fighting troops. In occupied Poland, a Höherer SS und Polizeiführer (SS/PF) acted as Himmler's personal representative, while actual control over the police and security units was exercised by a Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (BdS). The activities of the SS, as well as Himmler's intrusion into a sphere they regarded as their own, shocked the generals, and the OKH took steps to prevent a recurrence during the campaign in the West.

The army's stand was complicated by the widely differing types of occupation administrations. Some areas, like Alsace-Lorraine, were directly incorporated into the Reich and thus fell under the normal German police administration. Other areas, Holland and Denmark, for example, were until 1943 administered by civilian High Commissioners. Finally there were certain areas, occupied France or Serbia, for instance, which were under military administration. The case of France provides a typical instance of the struggle between the military and the SS for control of the counter-insurgent apparatus in a western country.

Initially the OKH had been able to insist that no police and security units subject to the RSHA (except for Waffen SS divisions under army command) entered France. However, Himmler managed to introduce a small Gestapo/SD detachment into Paris and the army

reluctantly accepted the accomplished fact. Meanwhile, in Germany Himmler continued to press for a greater role for his organization. In 1941 the army faced a series of attacks against its personnel by the French resistance, and finding itself short-handed called on the Gestapo to help out. The Gestapo/SD was to deal with the political and civilian side of the resistance, while the Abwehr and the GFP were to handle the military. Thus the opening wedge was made.

The preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union, and Hitler's growing disenchantment with the cautious generals gained Himmler greater influence, and in April 1942 he obtained authority to take over the police functions from the army in France. SS General Karl Oberg was appointed SS/PF and immediately set up a full-fledged apparatus, modelled on the RSHA. In all, the total number of Gestapo/SD offices in France reached 131, with an additional number of auxiliary command posts for special units and French collaborators. For the moment, the Abwehr was left alone, but the GFP was reduced to control of prisons and customs. The number of GFP groups in France was reduced from 25 to 2, its personnel either absorbed by the new organization or transferred to Russia.

In contrast with the gradual developments in France, Himmler held the upper hand from the outset in Russia, where his preeminent position in security and counterinsurgent functions was never questioned. The army played a purely subordinate role, furnishing troops and logistical support when called upon. In the Balkans, however, the army retained its control over the counterinsurgent operations, though here too it had to suffer SS interference. Toward the end of 1942 Himmler appointed SS General Erich v. Bach-Zelewski as Chef der Bandenbekämpfungsverbände (Chief of antibandit operations) and while this appointment was essentially a coordinating one, Bach-Zelewski inevitably assumed a measure of operational control, such as during the Warsaw rising of 1944.

Himmler, however, was not content with this success. He always intended to eliminate the Abwehr and finally achieved this goal in 1944. The Abwehr was well aware of his plans but, in the words of Trevor-Roper, "rotten with corruption, notoriously inefficient, politically suspect, it could do nothing." Much of this harsh indictment is true, and when some of the Abwehr leaders were found to be involved in the general's plot of July 1944, Himmler was able to eliminate many of the leading figures and substantially assume control of the organization. Himmler's victory, however, was short lived. By early spring 1945 the days of German occupation were numbered, most of western and eastern

Europe liberated, and even some of Himmler's trusted henchmen were entering into negotiations to save their skins.

Despite the internal struggle for power, it would be wrong to assume that the German counterinsurgent response was gravely impeded until 1944 and it scored some notable successes.

The response, like the resistance movements, falls into eastern and western patterns. In the West the whole native administrative apparatus, consisting of tens of thousands of officials, was made to serve the needs of the German occupation. To be sure, the total number of genuine Nazi collaborators was relatively small, but the cooperation of the great majority of officials, however reluctant, made the continued occupation possible and removed a great burden from the Germans. Whatever the motivation of individuals, and many if not most acted honorably, the total result tended to aid the counterinsurgent effort.

In the East, on the other hand, the German attack against the population, especially the intelligentsia, tended to demolish the local administrative structure which, in any case, was much less comprehensive than in the West. Here the Germans had to appoint new men, usually less efficient than the old, or do the job themselves. In either case it put greater stress on the Germans.

The East-West pattern also was present in the type of repression undertaken. In Russia, Poland, and the Balkans repressions were largely on a nonselective basis; in the West, while massacres like Oradour and Lidice were not uncommon, action was more selective. In the East special units, Einsatzgruppen, accompanied the German armies and immediately proceeded with the extermination of certain population groups. Follow-up operations continued, and the first ill-organized partisan groups were decimated during the winter of 1941-1942. When resistance continued, the Germans countered with a series of drives designed to clear out partisan-infested areas. Since the Germans did not have the manpower to hold such regions once cleared, these drives assumed the character of punitive expeditions. German regulars, SS and police troops, and their auxiliaries proceeded with utter ruthlessness. Usually few partisans but a great number of civilians were killed. For instance "Operation Cottbus," mounted in June 1943 in Belorussia, produced 4,500 suspects killed, but only 492 captured weapons, indicating that among the killed were numerous harmless peasants.

In the Balkans the Germans were at first content to follow the usual policy of taking hostages and reprisals for actual acts committed against occupation troops. These reprisals would in

all probability have generated further resistance, as they did in 1914-1918 in this region, but the German position was hopelessly compromised by the wholesale population massacres undertaken by the Croatian puppet government and its forces.

In the West, except for measures against the Jews, the policy was more selective. Nonetheless, the number of hostages killed was very high. In France, for instance, the total number of hostages executed reached 29,660, of which 11,000 were executed in the Paris region. Usually, the hostages were selected by the Gestapo/SD and shot by army or police units. In addition, suspects were transported to German concentration camps, a fate almost equal to, in some cases worse than, death. Again in the case of France, of 250,000 deportees only 35,000 returned; of 126,000 Dutch deportees only 11,000 survived. In order to heighten terror and fear, arrests were commonly made in the early morning hours and the arrestees disappeared without a trace. This policy, called Nacht und Nebel (night and fog) arrests, was considered a prime psychological weapon. In both East and West the Gestapo/SD used torture extensively.

Together with the initially amateurish security precautions of the resistance and the existence of traitors, the Germans managed to score considerable successes against outside aid to the resistance. Toward the end of 1941, for instance, the whole SOE organization in the unoccupied zone of France fell into a Vichy police-Gestapo net. In the same year, the Gestapo managed to arrest some SOE operatives in Holland and induced them to transmit fake radio messages to Britain. For over a year, carelessly convinced that the messages were genuine, the SOE continued to parachute agents and supplies into Holland to be promptly taken by the Germans. Similar, though less complete deceptions, were practiced by German radio squads, Funkspielkommandos, in Belgium. It is estimated that during 1942-1943 95% of all supplies sent to Holland, 30% of supplies to Belgium, and 10% of supplies sent to France fell into German hands.

Despite these temporary successes, the Germans failed to eliminate resistance in both East and West. Perhaps the most important reason for the German failure lay in the political sphere. Whatever German pretensions, Hitler essentially had nothing to offer to the peoples of occupied Europe. He had no intention of granting any freedom or self-administration to the occupied nations and thus could never gain a substantial measure of popular support. As he stated in his Secret Conversations: "A state can only be established and maintained by force." But as Clausewitz pointed out force always creates its own counterforce, and German ferocity embittered the population and stiffened the resolve of the resistance.

Moreover, despite the fact that the Germans did not trust the conquered people they had to rely on them. The shortage of German manpower forced occupation commanders to employ vast numbers of local civilians, not only in the administration, but also to work in German installations. This created a substantial security menace and undoubtedly compromised major antiguerrilla operations.

Allied with the rigid German ideology which underrated Germans was the tendency to underestimate the guerrilla, especially the armed guerrilla of the East. Until 1944, when guerrillas were operating in divisional strength, the Germans referred to them as mere bands to be dealt with by second-line troops and police units.

A feature of significance in the failure of the German counter-insurgent response was the overlapping and competing nature of the apparatus, though this played a role primarily at the upper command levels and was resolved, as we have seen, in Himmler's favor, by late 1944. Even so, it contributed to the stresses on the German machinery.

Finally, we must return to the psychological factor. The overall progress of the war, the continued improvement of chances for victory of the nations united against Hitler, could not be concealed from the population under German domination. Hope of relief from a monstrous tyranny kept alive the flame of resistance and aided in its downfall.

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Israel

by

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BACKGROUND

One of the most significant and interesting modern developments in guerrilla warfare is that of "underground resistance" in civilized and industrialized countries--indeed in great cities --where guerrilla operations in the normal sense would not appear to be practicable. Such operations were conducted between 1946 and 1948 between the Jewish community in Palestine (the Yishuv) and the British authorities in that country. Confronting an enemy whose strength they could never hope to match militarily, the Jewish resistance fighters adopted many of the techniques of the Irish rebellion. They resorted to ambushes and demolitions, though, given the nature of the country, they placed most of their emphasis on urban sabotage, where they used explosives to great effect. The aim of the Jewish insurgents was to make British rule so onerous and so costly, in men, prestige, and expense, as to force the authorities into reprisals which would turn enlightened opinion both in England and abroad against them. With Great Britain heavily overcommitted at this time in Greece, Turkey, and other areas, and virtually bankrupt in the aftermath of the Second World War, the Jewish rebellion succeeded. As in the Irish rebellion, success was due to a combination of political, guerrilla, and terrorist tactics.

Although similar in many instances to the Irish revolt, Jewish guerrilla operations differed in a number of factors. For one, the topography of Palestine was much less suitable for guerrilla warfare, and second whereas the Sinn Fein had enjoyed the support of the great mass of the Irish population, the Jewish community within Palestine actually was a minority, and the British could, and did, count on the support of the Arab majority. The roots of the Jewish rebellion are deep and tangled,

but there is no need to go into the long history of the Balfour Declaration (1917) and the Palestine Mandate (1922) here. Put at its simplest, the Jewish community felt that the British government was abandoning its policy of creating a Jewish "National Home" in Palestine and abandoning the Yishuv to permanent minority status in an Arab-dominated Palestine. The Jews believed that Arab revolts in 1920-1921, again in 1929, and finally between 1936 and 1939, had led Great Britain to make substantial concessions to Arab nationalist demands. These concessions, embodied in the famous White Paper of 1939, had been unacceptable to the overwhelming majority of the Yishuv, but the outbreak of the war in Europe caused most Palestinian Jews to declare a truce in their hostility to the administration.

When during the war, however, the administration continued to go ahead with the implementation of the White Paper, and when against all expectations the British Labor Party, elected to office in July 1945, continued the pro-Arab policy (which from the British point of view was based on the necessity of retaining Arab friendship, just as the original pro-Jewish policy had been based on the necessity of obtaining Jewish support), the Jewish population of Palestine, supported by Jews from abroad, slowly swung into opposition, and then open revolt, against the British administration. Although as early as 1938 certain Jewish elements had proclaimed that only arms could conquer Palestine, Jewish hopes on the whole had been based on the assumption that the British government favored the establishment of the National Home, interpreted generally as a Jewish state. The destruction of the Jewish population in Europe increased the urgency of desire for such a home, and when the British government refused to admit large numbers of Jewish survivors living in DP camps in Europe, the Jewish community swung into a campaign to force the British to change their mind. The aim was not--at first--to force the British out, but merely to induce the government to change its policy. However, as hostilities escalated, the aim became the creation of conditions which would cause Great Britain to surrender her mandate.

Just as the former pro-Jewish policy had necessitated the use of force to coerce the Arab majority to accept the establishment of the Jewish National Home, so now the White Paper policy necessitated the use of force to coerce the Jewish minority. Thus the position of the Arabs and Jews vis-a-vis the administration became reversed and the Jews found themselves engaged in a struggle for which they were not well prepared.

As indicated above, the Jews lacked the popular majority and the favorable topographical features which had helped the

Sinn Fein. They did, however, possess a good military organization, superior technical skill, a cadre of experienced leaders, and considerable support abroad. Above all, the Yishuv possessed all elements of self-government, constituting almost a state within the state.

TERRAIN

The territory comprising the mandated area of Palestine, excluding Transjordan, was less than 10,000 square miles in extent, about the size of Vermont. It was a tiny country, about 210 miles at its greatest north-south extent, about 60 miles east to west. The country was roughly divided into the following parts: the Galilee hill district, the central hill core formed by the hills of Samaria and Judea, the desert region of the Negev, the plains of Sharon along the coast from south of Jaffa to Acre north of Haifa, and the plain of Esdraelon between the uplands of Galilee and Samaria. Finally there was the narrow valley of the Jordan River.

Communications were limited. There was a railway, originally built during Allenby's advance from Egypt along the coastal plain to Lydda, a village inland about 12 miles from Jaffa, with connections to Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Haifa. On the other hand, during the Arab revolt the administration had found that the roads of Palestine for the most part skirted the hill district where the Arab bands operated and that there were large areas crossed only by paths inaccessible to motor traffic. Consequently, the military and civilian authorities started a program of road building designed to provide easy access for motorized troops to the hill area and to reduce the areas in which rebels could operate. The most important road was the coastal road from Jaffa-Tel Aviv to Haifa continued to the Syrian border. A direct road from Jenin in the heart of the hill area connected with Haifa. A series of roads were cut through the Carmel Hills, the Judean and Samaritan plateau regions. At important spots strongpoints, capable of withstanding attack with light arms and even mortar fire--so-called police fortresses--had been constructed.

These developments, together with the fact that the hill areas were almost entirely Arab and with certain other factors, compelled the Jewish insurgents to concentrate their military action primarily on urban sabotage. (I am solely concerned here with Jewish operation against the Mandate government; during the course of fighting against the Arabs, the Jews did of course

operate in the hills.) A final development which prevented any Jewish guerrilla use of the hill country was the almost total lack of cover. The hills were largely barren, and the wide availability of aircraft in the post-World War II period inhibited the movement of men and their effective concealment in such terrain.

HISTORICAL SUMMARY

The Jewish population of Palestine was divided into two major groups. The large majority were Zionists--i.e., wishing for the establishment of a Jewish National Home. This majority included all shades of political opinion from the left to the right. The non-Zionist minority included the extremely orthodox in religion, who believed that the return of Israel to the Holy Land would be arranged by the Messiah and that any political activity toward that end was desecration. They opposed Zionism for this reason. Another segment opposing Zionism, considering it an agent of imperialism, were the minute Communist and Trotskyite groups. There also existed a small circle of pacifists. The Zionists shared in the belief that, since the Mandate government had been unable, or unwilling as some maintained, to safeguard the Jews against attack, a defense organization had to be established.

The beginnings of such an organization, the Hagana, went back to the professional Jewish watchmen under the Ottoman regime. Gradually all Jewish settlements were provided with secret and illegal stores of arms and ammunition, originally collected for the purpose of supplementing the usually inadequate official protection afforded against Arab attacks. If it had not been for these illegal weapons a great many Jewish settlements would have been obliterated in 1929 and again in 1936-1939.

There is no doubt that, with a few exceptions discussed below, the secret arming of the Jews started with the quite genuine purpose of self-defense. During the dark days of World War II, the prospect of German occupation shifted the emphasis from self-defense against the Arabs to tactical guerrilla warfare, and for a short time the British army cooperated in the training of certain units and provided stores. However, this short-lived cooperation dissolved, and by 1946 the Jewish leaders were prepared to use their formations to fight the British administration.

This decision was not an entirely new departure. Already in the late 1930s the Revisionist party, so called because it

demanding a revision of the Mandate to include Transjordan in the scope of the National Home, had split from the World Zionist movement over the question of the use of violence. The revisionists argued that only by Jewish arms could the National Home be conquered, that reliance on the British was foolish, and that the official policy of self-restraint practiced by the Hagana which limited itself strictly to defense of life and property was self-defeating. The Revisionists formed their own underground army, the Irgun Zevai Leumi, which proceeded to acquire arms for offensive purposes, and beginning in 1938 started on a series of reprisals against the Arabs. Using mainly bombs, the Irgun attacked Arab crowds and inflicted very heavy casualties. The outbreak of the war, however, brought a cessation of these tactics.

The truce between the Irgun and the government declared at the outbreak of World War II led to a split in the Irgun. One group, led by Abraham Stern, a fanatic gunman poet, denounced the truce as a capitulation and founded its own organization, the "Fighters for the Freedom of Israel" (Lechy), commonly known as the Stern Gang. The Sternists did not respect the truce, but during the early years of the war, from 1939 to the end of 1943, their terrorism was no more than a sporadic nuisance. In all 8 Jewish, 6 Arab, and 11 British policemen were killed during this period. In 1943, finally, with active cooperation of the Hagana, the gang was temporarily broken up; Stern was shot while "trying to escape." The Irgun at the same time was largely quiescent, and by the end of 1943 both extremist terrorist groups were temporarily out of action.

In 1943, however, Menachem Beigin, a young Revisionist lawyer from Warsaw, arrived in Palestine and within a few months managed to resurrect the Irgun. At the same time, most of the imprisoned Sternist leaders managed to escape, and early in 1944 both groups were again ready for action.

By this time the truce between the British authorities and the Jewish community had broken down in general. The British authorities continued to implement the White Paper policy and prevented, as best they could, all "illegal" Jewish immigration to Palestine. Returning such immigrants to Europe, as was done on several occasions, or interning them on Mauritius aroused much bitterness. By this time news about the fate of the Jews in Europe became known, and this aroused a very strong reaction. All Jewish underground groups, the Hagana, the Irgun, and the Sternists, began to smuggle in Jewish immigrants and to protect their landing with armed force. At the same time the Irgun

continued its direct action, limiting itself, however, to the destruction of government installations and avoiding the taking of life. The Sternists, however, began to attack British officials. In August 1944 an abortive attempt was made on the life of the departing British High Commissioner, Sir Harold MacMichael, and in October Britain's Resident Minister in the Near East, Lord Moyne, was killed by two teen-age Stern terrorists.

The official Zionist movement, and its military arm the Hagana, watched these developments with concern. On the one hand, news of the Jewish catastrophe in Europe and the evident intention of the British government to carry out the White Paper of 1939 had led to the adoption of a more militant program, aiming definitely at the early establishment of a Jewish state. However, it was feared that the terror activities might be counterproductive, and for a while the official Zionist bodies and press exhorted the public to cooperate with the British police against the terrorists. However, relations between the British police and the ordinary Jewish citizen in Palestine were poor, and little came of this. Finally, however, the Hagana took direct action--intercepting terrorists, detaining them in private jails, etc.--and for the moment the situation was in hand.

The rather uneasy partnership between the Hagana and the authorities continued until the end of 1945 when their hopes that the end of the war and the victory of the Labor Party would bring about a change in Britain's Palestine policy collapsed. On December 30, 1945, the leaders of the Jewish Agency, the officially recognized executive body of the Zionist movement, informed the British High Commissioners that in view of British policy further cooperation against the terrorists would be futile. This decision inaugurated a new phase in Palestine's history which was to last to the end of the British Mandate. From then on the Hagana, which had teetered between supporting "illegal immigration" and collecting "illegal arms," and at the same time supporting the British both by furnishing manpower for the army, especially for special service units, and by suppressing the extremists of the Irgun and the Stern Gang, entered into the arena of combat. The Jewish revolt began in earnest.

THE HAGANA

The Hagana was sponsored more or less openly by the Jewish Agency and on occasion tacitly supported, or at least tolerated,

by the authorities. Since under the Mandate the British government gave both the Jewish and Arab communities a fair degree of internal self-administration, the Jewish members of the Palestine police, as well as of the various auxiliary police forces, were quite openly members of the Hagana. In addition, the Hagana had branches in all Jewish settlements in Palestine. Its political direction was by a committee composed of delegates from the various political parties within the Zionist movement represented according to their voting strength. Its military direction was in the hands of professional, nonpolitical appointees, comprising a Chief of Staff and several assistants.

Although started largely as a local self-defense organization the Hagana gradually evolved a conventional military structure. Some 80,000 members, with about 25,000 rifles, some 500 machine guns, a few mortars, and a fair complement of Sten guns and pistols, were divided about half and half into territorial (local) and field units. The former were primarily static and designed to defend Jewish settlements against attacks. Beginning in the late 1930s field units of battalion size were formed in the major areas of Jewish settlement (Tel Aviv, Haifa, the plain of Sharon, etc.) to provide a mass of maneuver. By late 1947 these units were formed into five brigades, the Palmach, organized in understrength companies with a fairly high proportion of automatic arms.

The military aim of the Hagana always remained subordinate to the political aim of the Jewish Agency, achievement of a Jewish National Home, and, as an intermediate goal, modification of the British White Paper policy. Geographically, while the Agency would have preferred implementation of the original Mandate policy, as it conceived it to be, it was ready to accept partition of the country in principle.

From its inception until 1947 the guiding military doctrine of the Hagana was defensive, to protect Jewish settlements but not to resort to offensive means, even in limited tactical situations. There was no expectation of being successful in a showdown with British forces. Only after several incidents revealed the hostility of these forces was the Hagana allowed to fire in self-defense. Self-restraint was the main directive of the Hagana during the 1936-1939 disturbances. When in protest against this policy the Irgun broke away in 1938 and began its outrages against the Arabs, the Hagana issued leaflets against the Irgun headed by the Sixth Commandment. The Irgun answered with the statement of Exodus xxi, 23: "Life for life, eye for eye."

Although the policy of self-restraint tended to break down as relations with the authorities deteriorated, Hagana operations in general were not directed against British personnel but rather at demonstrating to the authorities that (a) they could not prevent Jewish immigration, and (b) if, as was supposed, they had made concessions to the Arabs in order to avoid employment of force, even more force would have to be employed to put down Jewish resistance. The Hagana assumption was that its organization, intimately tied up with the Jewish state within the state, connected with almost all Jewish institutions and involving at some level almost every Jewish man, woman, and child in the country, could be broken only by wholesale massacre. And as the GOC Palestine, General D'Arcy, remarked: "You cannot disarm a whole people. I rather think the world will not stand for another mass murder of Jews."

Arms for the Hagana, the Irgun, and the Stern Gang as well were generally procured from abroad. Arms were brought in, hidden in barrels of cement or in agricultural machinery, run ashore at night from small ships, etc. Few arms were captured from the government. The availability of arms increased during World War II and considerable quantities were procured by purchase, and by occasional diversion, from military depots. A certain amount of small arms, including several types of hand grenades, some simple mortars, and a simple model of the Sten gun, were made in Palestine.

For financial support and supply the Hagana looked toward the general revenues of the Zionist movement and the self-tax imposed on the Jewish community at large. Training centers were set up at remote settlements, which also provided food and medical support; schools could be used as billets; the cooperative Jewish bus lines provided transportation, etc. The Irgun and the Stern groups did not enjoy this wide degree of support. But they too had their supporters and, given the psychological climate of the country, a wounded terrorist could count on the tacit support of those whom he met. The Irgun received some support from the Revisionist party, but, as did the Stern Gang, it also relied for a great part of its finances on bank holdups. These actions, usually against British-owned banks such as Barclay's, etc., nonetheless aroused a considerable amount of averse reaction and were resorted to only in case of absolute necessity.

THE IRGUN AND THE STERN GANG

In contrast with the Hagana, which had a kind of semilegal status, the Irgun was from the beginning organized on the strictly

conspiratorial lines of a terrorist underground movement. Its relations to the Revisionist party were much looser than those between the Hagana and the Jewish Agency. It took orders only from its own "High Command."

The Stern Gang was a completely terrorist organization, acknowledging no other political authority than that of its own leadership. With some exceptions, both the Irgun and the Stern group drew their membership from the Revisionist party.

Neither the Irgun nor the Stern Gang developed the elaborate command and organizational structure of the Hagana. Both were modeled largely on the IRA. A very small force permanently under arms was backed by a militia which might come out for a single operation. Both the Sternists and the Irgun had special units, drawn largely from oriental Jews, to be used for special operations against the Arab community. In doctrine as well as in organization, Irgun and Sternists drew deliberately on the Irish experience, especially the ideas of Michael Collins. In numbers the Irgun had some 6,000, the Sternists between 200 and 300 active members.

The Irgun believed in reprisals, but it operated in a most peculiar ideological climate combining patriotism and romantic chivalry with the archaic ferocity of the Books of the Maccabees. Throughout its struggle with the British the Irgun observed an elaborate "code of honor" which included, inter alia, that warning be given in writing or by telephone, before an installation was attacked; that during each action the "soldiers of the Irgun" had to wear identifying armlets in place of uniforms; that "executions" had to be preceded by a verdict of Irgun's military court and communicated in proper form to the accused; that after each action Irgun must take public responsibility for it by posters and radio announcements, and, finally, unconditional refusal to engage in acts of violence against the Hagana or any other Jew. In return, the Irgun claimed that its men, if captured, should be given prisoner-of-war status by the British.

The Sternists derided the Irgun's observance of underground etiquette as quixotic and phony. Sternists ambushed individuals and shot them on sight. However, the Sternists too made public announcements of their acts. But while the Irgun, at least initially, concentrated on installations, the Sternists always concentrated on individuals.

The two terrorist movements were unwilling to accept the partition of the country, indeed their aim was to carry the

Jewish flag across the Jordan and establish a Jewish state in Palestine and Transjordan. In general, both groups were in accord with the aims of the Revisionist movement, though the Stern Gang especially contained a considerable streak of mystic nihilism and adoration of violence as a solution for all problems.

MILITARY ACTION

The methods evolved by the Jewish resistance movements differed widely from those that had been adopted by the Arabs during the rebellion of 1936-1939. The Arabs, who were a majority, could operate in force and with comparative immunity in the hill districts and were assured of information and assistance when operating in the plains. Arab guerrillas were largely peasants or of peasant descent, ill-fitted for urban operations. The Jews, on the other hand, had to operate in a country in which they were the minority and mostly concentrated in the towns or in sharply defined rural settlements. Although able to meet the Arab in the hills on his own terms, the Jews chose, with some notable exceptions, the larger towns of the country--Jerusalem, Haifa, Tel Aviv--as their area for military action. By infiltration of the British administrative apparatus, moreover, Jewish organizations gained an important advantage through prior warning of moves against them and knowledge of weaknesses in the British protective setup.

All three groups, Hagana, Irgun, and Sternists, accepted the same reasoning, implicit rather than stated, that as Arab terrorism had forced the hand of the Mandatory power, so Jewish action could do the same. However, at the outset at least, the Hagana did not engage in any action deliberately designed to kill personnel. During the period of World War II and the immediate aftermath, the main aim of Hagana was the organization of "illegal" immigration and the accumulation of arms. When during the summer of 1945 it became clear that the British Labor Government would continue the White Paper policy and not only keep up the bars against Jewish immigration, but also deport such illegal immigrants as could be apprehended, Hagana took more direct action. In fact, despite attempts of certain Jewish Agency leaders to make a distinction, the fact is that from late 1945 on the Hagana embarked on an undeclared warfare whose methods were hardly distinguishable from those of the Irgun.

On October 10, 1945, the Hagana overpowered the guards at the Athlit detention camp and set free 170 persons destined for deportation. One British constable, the first English victim of the Hagana, was killed. On October 31, the Hagana staged its first country-wide sabotage action. Railways all over Palestine were paralyzed by blowing up bridges and switches; police patrol ships exploded in the ports of Jaffa and Haifa; bombs damaged the Haifa oil refineries. The British reaction was the deployment of over 30,000 troops for arms searches, which on occasion turned into major riots, killing Jews as well as British soldiers. By the end of 1945 the Hagana, as well as the Irgun, were blowing up police barracks and military installations throughout the country, a pattern continued in 1946.

The Sternists, too, cooperated. Their numbers were small, but they now came out in the open. In June 1946, for example, fighting squads of the Stern Gang attacked the government railway repair shops in Haifa which were under heavy guard, leaving 11 out of 30 attackers, including 4 girls, dead on the field.

The most famous incident, however, was the blowing up of a wing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, seat of the government's secretariat, on July 22, 1946. In accordance with Irgun practice, warning of the impending explosion was given by telephone, but it was disregarded. There were 91 persons killed, British, Arab, and Jewish, and 41 injured. The operation was denounced by the Jewish Agency, but in fact it had been carried out with the cooperation of the Hagana, which was becoming increasingly restive under its orders to attack the barriers to illegal immigration, rather than British personnel as such. In any case the British government and administration did not distinguish between these rather nebulous gradations of opposition but carried out reprisals against the entire Jewish population. During the last two years of the Mandate, relations between Jews and English became more and more poisoned. There were murders on both sides; atrocities were committed under the guise of reprisals; fanatic Jewish gunmen killed British soldiers in their sleep; British policemen and soldiers exploded devices which killed scores of Jewish civilians. Each act in turn made the maintenance of British rule less possible, because throughout the process of escalation the support given to the terrorist activities, and these now included those of the Hagana, solidified. To pursue a wholesale war against the Jewish population of Palestine was politically impossible. In many ways the parallel with Ireland was complete. Palestine became "John Bull's other Ireland."

POLITICAL WARFARE

A potent weapon in the hands of the Jewish resistance movement was the struggle for immigration. The plight of the Jewish survivors in the DP camps of Europe, their desire to go to Palestine, and British naval and military efforts to keep them out, became very powerful factors in the all-important support which the Zionist cause needed from people outside Palestine. This weapon became especially potent when on August 13, 1946, the British government announced that in the future illegal immigrants who managed to reach Palestine despite the naval blockade would no longer be held in detention camps in that country but be deported to "Cyprus or elsewhere." This decision brought about a series of deplorable incidents in which large numbers of troops, police, even armor were employed to transfer the immigrants from their ships to vessels carrying them to Cyprus. During the transfers, fully reported in the foreign press, there were incidents and a number of casualties. The immigrant ships kept coming. When the government decided in July 1947 to deport the immigrants from the ship Exodus back to Germany, the action aroused public and press reaction in Palestine and abroad and was also much criticized in England.

The deportation proceedings perhaps more than anything else turned foreign opinion against England and prevented the British from gaining any measure of popular support among the Yishuv. At the outset of the terrorist campaign, the moderates had argued against it because Zionism stood or fell by the support of enlightened foreign opinion and Jewish terrorism risked losing much of that support. The deportations, perhaps more than anything else, prevented this from happening and put England in the most unfavorable light.

LOCAL SUPPORT

As indicated above, the Jewish guerrillas operated mainly in the Jewish-settled areas of the country. The Jewish population of some 650,000 lived primarily in the coastal plain from Tel Aviv to Haifa and in the valley between Haifa and the Jordan, where the Jews were in the majority, though there were strong Arab enclaves. Tel Aviv was an all-Jewish city of some 170,000; in Haifa there were 84,000 Jews and some 70,000 Arabs. In Jerusalem there were some 100,000 Jews. There were strong Jewish groups in Galilee, but in the south the number of Jewish settlements was negligible.

The Hagana, and to a growing degree the Irgun, had the support of the entire community. Active sabotage actions were usually carried out by the Palmach, but the real strength of the Hagana rested on its mass membership in the Jewish urban and the some hundred rural settlements dotted all over the country. There all attempts at disarming the organization failed. To be sure, some arms were found, but any program of "disarming the Jews" (and such a program was indeed conceived and attempted) would have meant digging up the whole country from Dan to Beersheba.

Support for the terrorists varied, though it was always very strong. By 1946 support was almost solid with the exception of the extreme orthodox Jews of Jerusalem who still believed that political action was sacrilegious and the Communists who believed that the Jews as well as the British were instruments of imperialism. The other small, but significant, group not in favor of terrorism centered around the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and was in favor of a compromise with the Arabs, even if it meant abandoning the idea of a Jewish state.

The salaried middle class, a relatively small group, was on the whole strongly nationalist and tended to throw some support toward the Irgun. The Hagana, on the other hand, drew its support mainly from the working class, urban as well as rural. Its greatest strength perhaps, and its most solid support, came from its 40,000 members in the 100 or so collective settlements dotted all over the country. Their social and economic cohesion made it impossible for the government to gain any support whatsoever, while the terrorists were given whatever support the Jewish leadership desired them to have.

A significant element in the strength of the Irgun and the Sternists was the oriental Jewish communities. These, numbering about a fifth of the Jewish population, tended to be underprivileged, poorly educated, mainly lower working class. But their ability to pass as Arabs made them especially valuable for the Irgun and Stern operations. Finally, the terrorist groups drew increasingly on recent immigrants to the country, many of whom were survivors of the Nazi extermination camps. This was a body of people unwilling to compromise and unlikely to be deterred by any political or ethical considerations.

The Hagana was afforded almost total support by all official, and unofficial, Jewish organizations and institutions. It could call for transport, nurses, doctors, manpower, etc., almost at will--constituting in effect the army of a state within a state. This was particularly true in the settlements, but it operated

also in the cities where considerable pressure could be brought, and was brought, on individuals to support the cause. While most operations were carried out by the Palmach, support was given by almost every other able-bodied person in the country.

The situation differed somewhat in regard to the Irgun and the Stern Gang. Many members of the Hagana believed that the Revisionist party was Fascist in nature and opposed the activities of the terrorists at first because of internal ideological reasons. However, by 1946 the Jews of Palestine as a whole no longer regarded the terrorists as criminals, but at worst as misguided enthusiasts. They realized the necessity, from the administration's point of view, of tracking them down, but they were not prepared to assist the police. As relations between the Jews and the English worsened, this passive support turned to active support.

The relationships between the terrorist organizations on the one hand and between the Jewish Agency and the Hagana on the other varied. There was considerable ill feeling between the Hagana, heavily socialist, and the Irgun, which many of the Hagana members considered tainted with fascism. During the early stages of the terrorist campaign, from 1944 to early 1945, especially during the months following the murder of Lord Moyne, the Hagana provided the Palestine police with a list of some 400 Irgun and Stern members. It also tried to furnish the government with intelligence data regarding terrorist actions. In the end the Hagana took into custody and detained in special private prisons in collective settlements certain individuals considered particularly dangerous. This collaboration stopped when the British Labor Government indicated that it would continue the White Paper policy. From then on support for terrorism grew increasingly.

From late 1945 to the late summer of 1946 there was cooperation among all three underground organizations. After the blowing up of the King David Hotel the militant faction, then in control of Hagana, were temporarily superseded, and there was no longer cooperation (though also no collaboration with the authorities). Late in December 1947, when the British had announced their intention of ending the Mandate, cooperation among the three bodies, at this time above all against the expected Arab reaction, started again. Thus for nearly half of the period the terrorists enjoyed an alliance with the state within the state, and therefore active support of the great mass of the population; for the remainder they enjoyed at least a measure of tacit support and immunity from betrayal. In contrast

with other terrorist groups, with the Arabs of 1936-1939, with Ireland, Cyprus, Kenya, etc., the Jewish resistance movements never had to resort to a "death to the traitors and collaborators" campaign. This in itself illustrates the extraordinary intense and complete nature of popular support and explains why the administration was unable to isolate the guerrillas.

OUTSIDE SUPPORT

A distinction must be made between the support offered to Zionism in general (or Revisionism) and to the Jewish resistance movements in particular by the Jewish communities abroad, and the support offered to these movements by foreign governments and their agencies. Both existed in various degrees. Finally, there was a very strong element of general popular support abroad which tended to mobilize the two first-named groups into action.

Support by foreign governments directly to the terrorist movements, or even to the Hagana, was scanty. In the 1930s the Polish government, desirous of reducing the number of Jews in Poland, offered the Revisionist Youth Organization some training facilities and also sold the new Irgun a small quantity of arms, mainly Radom 9mm. pistols. At the end of World War II the French government, opposed to British policies in the Near East, provided a small quantity of war material for the Hagana, although most of this material arrived only in time to be used for subsequent Israeli hostilities with the Arabs.

While not giving direct support, many countries sympathized with the Zionist aims and welcomed the establishment of a Jewish state. By far the most important sympathizer was the United States, where representatives of the Irgun and the Hagana often vied for funds. As early as 1944 Irgun representatives made open appeals and were supported by some prominent Americans, Jews and non-Jews alike. In general, however, terrorism was officially deplored, while the policy of immigration, legal or illegal, was supported.

After receiving a report on the condition of Jewish DPs President Truman requested the British government to admit 100,000 refugees to Palestine, and in December 1945 both houses of Congress resolved in favor of free Jewish immigration to Palestine. The refusal of the British government to accede to these requests, the deportation of "illegal" immigrants, etc.,

provided considerable material for Zionist and Revisionist propaganda. By the beginning of 1947 Great Britain submitted the problem to the United Nations, which in November 1947 by a vote of 33 to 13, with the United States, France, and the Soviet Union voting together, recommended partition of the country. Since this solution was not acceptable to the Arab majority, the British declared that they would not proceed to enforce the decision but that they would depart on May 15, 1948, in effect leaving Arabs and Jews to their own devices. The final months of the Palestine Mandate were even more bitter and bloody, but the decision had been made and on the expiration of the Mandate a Jewish state was proclaimed and successfully defended.

In any case it would have been difficult for the British government to muster foreign support for its Palestine policy based on an implementation of the 1939 White Paper; the deportations and the great show of military force used to effect them was, some months after the end of the war, unacceptable to world opinion and was duly exploited by the underground movements as well as by the official Zionist and Revisionist groups.

It is much harder to determine accurately the amount of support given to terrorist and underground groups by nongovernmental bodies. Zionists, non-Zionists, Revisionists, and others were all moved by the plight of the surviving Jews and contributed large sums to various funds. Much of this money was used for the organization of illegal immigration, which constituted an important technique of fighting the Mandatory administration. Other money went for arms, medical supplies, etc., sent to the Jews of Palestine. Since by 1946 almost the entire community was involved in the struggle, it may be argued that supplies of almost any kind, indeed almost any support, constituted aid for the Jewish guerrillas.

The support tended to grow as the struggle grew in intensity. It was muted during the war years and in the immediate postwar period. But especially after the advent of the Labor Party to power, the British lost much support by inept handling of the situation. Attempts at reprisals against the entire population and the bungling of the question of "illegal" immigration were most important.

THE COUNTERINSURGENT RESPONSE

Forces at the disposal of the government in Palestine were numerous. The police forces included the Palestine police,

consisting of British, Jewish, and Arab constables and officers. In addition, there existed several auxiliary bodies, raised either in the 1936-1939 period or during World War II. These bodies, the Auxiliary Police, the Special Auxiliary Jewish Settlement Police, and the Railway Security Police, were predominantly Jewish. Under the Mandate Great Britain had limited permission to raise military forces in Palestine and Transjordan. These included the Transjordan Frontier Force and the Arab Legion, the latter originally a rural and urban constabulary. Both were predominantly Arab.

In addition, during and after World War II Great Britain had a large number of troops stationed in Palestine. Some of these forces, notably Australian and New Zealand troops, were highly sympathetic to the Jewish cause and could not be used. Indian troops could be and were used for police purposes. However, the core of the forces used by the government between the end of 1945 and the end of the Mandate were furnished by the 6th Airborne Division, several battalions of the Brigade of Guards, supported by two armored regiments. In all, inclusive of the Police Force, the government employed the equivalent of three war strength divisions in Palestine, backed by several air squadrons, naval craft, etc.

From the outset the British police were none too well liked and apparently not too efficient. Some of the original members were recruited from the Black and Tans, others came in via the regular army. They usually had to rely on the aid of their Jewish colleagues for dealing with the "natives," and thus their efforts were doomed from the beginning. Moreover, due to the autonomy granted the Jewish community and the failure of the large-scale action of June 29, 1946, the scope of government control was always limited.

The British administration and the Jewish population had never really become close friends, and despite their 20 years in the Holy Land the British had remained essentially foreigners and outsiders. Few of the English civil servants bothered to learn Hebrew or for that matter Arabic, and many got misleading impressions from servants, obliging subordinates, and the wealthy business class. Administrative machinery was inadequate for total surveillance of the Jewish population. The British required the support of the Jewish population to fight the terrorists and guerrillas, and this they were unable to obtain. Failure to obtain support resulted in part from the poor relations existing between the Jewish population and the individuals comprising the Mandatory administration. As General Sir John Gort,

High Commissioner, commented, the system of sending to Palestine officials from colonies in Africa or Asia produced curiously unhappy results. The imported Britons formed the top strata of the administration and held a virtual monopoly of higher posts. Their refusal to recognize that Palestine Jewry, highly literate, highly trained and professional, was unlike any other colonial population caused considerable difficulty. There were also points of friction at the lower end of the administrative scale. A particular frustration was the Palestine police whose behavior on many occasions was no credit to the British police system.

But these irritations, in part also due to Jewish sensitivity, were minor. Most important was the change in British policy. As long as the Jewish Agency, representing the political will of the majority of the Jews of Palestine, believed that the British government would eventually change its policy and continue its implementation of the Jewish National Home policy, it was possible for the Agency to order the Hagana to cooperate with the police in the suppression of the terrorists. This was also possible because the Hagana was strongly socialist oriented and both the Irgun and Sternists drew their membership largely from the right-wing Revisionist party. Therefore, from 1944 to the end of 1945 there existed an uneasy partnership between the administration and the Hagana via the Jewish Agency. When, however, it became clear that the Labor government would not reverse British policy, the Jewish Agency could no longer afford to give consistent support to the administration.

Thereafter the support of Jewish institutions and of the general public was given to the activists, and as we have seen above, within a few months Irgun and Hagana operations became, at least as far as the administration was concerned, indistinguishable. Realizing that these had the support of what constituted a Jewish state within Palestine, the authorities prepared a plan which comprised in effect destruction of the entire apparatus--political, economic, and military--of the Yishuv.

The plan had originally been conceived in 1943 by Sir Harold MacMichael, High Commissioner, and since then elaborated by the various services concerned. It included forcible disarmament of the Hagana, breaking of the various economic monopolies held by the Congress of Jewish Trade Unions, arrest of the leaders of the Jewish Agency and other political bodies, and breaking up of all Jewish political institutions. This plan, despite the opposition of the High Commissioner, Sir Alan Cunningham, was undertaken on June 29, 1946. Half-way through the planned operation public opinion and practical difficulties on

the spot--especially the reluctance of the British services to use extreme force--forced a halt to the operation, and this sealed the ultimate defeat of the administration.

With artillery, armor, and RAF units standing by to put down resistance, the headquarters of the Jewish Agency were occupied; 3,000 Jewish leaders of trade unions, political parties, cooperatives, etc., were arrested, and 27 settlements were searched. However, the troops were confronted with almost total passive resistance; many Hagana leaders had gone underground; arms stores were effectively hidden. Above all, the fact that the Hagana enjoyed the support of almost the entire population confirmed the old experience that a resistance movement based on the support of a population cannot be defeated by any traditional military operation short of a total extermination policy. And as neither the government, nor British public opinion, nor the international situation, allowed the latter alternative, the operation was doomed and the administration reduced to a series of ad hoc measures which could not gain victory but only lead to attrition, demoralization, and frustration among the government forces.

From then on the government used the gamut of counterinsurgency measures. By and large, however, the counterinsurgency effort was ill-directed and only served to inflame tempers more and more. As had happened before in the history of the Palestine Mandate, the administration's inability to appreciate the psychology of the people it was supposed to be administering exacerbated an already dire situation.

Aimed at halting illegal immigration, arresting "wanted" persons, and exerting pressure on the population in the hope that it would stop support of the guerrillas, searches, curfews, roadblock checks, etc., were made on a large scale. Non-possession of the identity card which had been in use since the Arab revolt in 1936 was taken as evidence that the person involved was either an illegal immigrant or a person on the run. Following incidents, the authorities proclaimed curfews, first from dusk to dawn, later curfews which kept people in their home all day as well. To enforce such a curfew, mainly in Tel Aviv and in the Jewish sections of Ahifa and Jerusalem, large bodies of troops and English police were moved in. Areas were systematically cordoned off; search parties looked for arms and inspected identity cards. In March 1947 statutory martial law was proclaimed, and Tel Aviv was kept under strict curfew for four days while the entire population was screened. The results were not highly productive; the irritation produced was great.

Cordon and search operations were also, and perhaps primarily, directed against Jewish settlements where arms were assumed to be hidden and where "illegal" immigrants were quartered. Then, too, the rural settlements were usually the quarters for the Palmach which the British alleged, not without foundation, was cooperating with the Irgun and the Sternists. Raids on settlements for arms and for "illegals" started on a large scale in 1943, that is when the threat of invasion was removed. In November 1943, for instance, three Indian battalions surrounded Rmata ha Kovesh in the Sharon Valley. The Jewish reaction was one of passive resistance. The settlers had to be dragged one by one into barbed-wire cages for interrogation. Sometimes, as on November 25, 1945, when raids took place in the vicinity of other areas of Jewish settlement, throngs of other Jews flocked to the settlement and further confused the troops. To a man they would refuse to produce any identity documents, answering all inquiries with the stereotyped reply: "I am a Jew of Palestine." On the whole these operations, which sometimes resulted in casualties, were highly counterproductive. They tended to confirm, rather than to reduce, support for the guerrillas.

In regard to finding arms the searches sometimes had more effect. On July 1, 1946, for instance, at Yagur near Haifa arms for about one Hagana battalion were discovered. These, however, belonged to a static unit and the loss did not for the moment influence the guerrilla units which were manned by Palmach, Irgun, and Stern personnel.

Other measures taken to divorce the population from the terrorists (or from the resistance movement) may be described as the application of special laws. Palestine was still under a series of special emergency laws, dating in part to the 1936-1939 era, in part the heritage of World War II. These gave the administration power to detain and intern suspects, first in Palestine, and beginning in 1944 in various British and British-occupied territories in East Africa. No trial was necessary; administrative process sufficed. At the same time, special military courts, operating under the emergency regulations, decreed draconic penalties for terrorists, for persons found carrying or concealing arms, and for persons associating with terrorists. Although these resulted in the execution of less than ten individuals, they created a furor throughout Palestine and considerable unfavorable publicity abroad. Again, they served to unite, not withdraw, Jewish support for the guerrillas. Another custom, under special legislation, was the imposition of fines on towns and villages. This, too, proved counterproductive. In collective settlements individuals were not affected; in the towns the municipality bore the brunt, and money

could be obtained from sources abroad. Fines too heightened resentments against the administration and were counterproductive.

As the government's efforts to separate the zealots from the general population failed, there was a feeling that if precise intelligence about the guerrillas could be obtained, the guerrillas could be isolated from the population and dealt with as individuals. To obtain such information the government created special units, mainly composed of officers seconded from the army, within the Palestine Police Criminal Investigation Department for the special interrogation of prisoners. Set up late in 1946 under the command of Colonel B. Ferguson, these groups operated outside the usual processes of even the state of emergency. Suspects were abducted in the streets, and torture was used during the interrogations. The exact number of instances and of the personnel involved are not quite clear, but there were at least two documented cases in 1947, and there may have been others. These, as well as the execution of several convicted Ir-gunists, led to further outrages. These in turn brought retaliation.

Another attempt to divorce the guerrillas from their support, undertaken without the consent of the government, were reprisals. In the spring of 1947 a series of bomb incidents, causing a large number of Jewish casualties, were perpetrated in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. It was believed that these were the work of a counterterror squad within the British Palestine Police Force, recruited largely from former members of Mosley's British Union of Fascists. These reprisals were unauthorized and too limited to affect Jewish will to resist. Nor did authorized reprisals affect the community. One such attempt was the boycott and nonfraternization policy against the Jews ordered by the GOC Palestine in 1946 and rescinded on pressure from London within a few days.

The Jewish community was in a position to surmise government intentions, blunt their effects, evade control measures, etc., because it had developed an internal state of its own. To be sure, at first this aided mainly the Hagana, but from 1946 on the Irgun as well as the Stern group were supported too.

Having failed in its only systematic attempt to break the total Jewish resistance and thus isolate the guerrillas, the administration fell into the temptation of fighting the entire population. In all fairness, it must be admitted that there was little the administration could do. Once the government had decided to implement the pro-Arab solution, the result was a

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vicious circle. The Jews could not accept the government's position and there was no political middle ground available. Again, the Irish parallel is striking.

To be sure, there were three periods in which the government could have gained and exploited wide cooperation, through the Jewish Agency, to isolate the guerrillas from local support. The first occasion was immediately after the outbreak of the war, the second after the murder of Lord Moyne, and the third after the King David Hotel incident. To gain any lasting results, however, the government would have had to reverse its policy regarding the White Paper and Jewish immigration and to afford a measure of conciliation on these points.

Attempts to block outside support could meet only with very limited success. The government was successful in sealing the land frontiers of Palestine, and its naval blockade intercepted the great majority of ships bound for Palestine with immigrants or warlike stores. However, the interception and subsequent internment and transfer of the immigrants was in itself highly counterproductive.

Attempts were made to cut off support for the guerrillas by turning public opinion outside Palestine against them. In 1943 the occasion of a court martial for two soldiers convicted of smuggling arms into Palestine was turned into an attack on the Hagana. American journalists had been specially invited to attend, and the prosecution accused the Jews of maintaining armed organizations to "sabotage the war effort." More productive was world reaction to the murder of Lord Moyne. This act overstepped the limits of useful guerrilla or terrorist activities. It was the signal for the second antiterrorist campaign launched by the Jewish Agency. Outside Palestine it produced a bad popular and press reaction. Even more, Lord Moyne had been a close friend of Winston Churchill, and the murder caused a revulsion which, for a time, led to a marked setback for Jewish aspirations.

Attempts to mobilize public opinion were also made after 1945, using two lines of attack: that the mass immigration of Jewish DPs would upset the economy of the country and that it would lead to armed Arab resistance. The first argument was not highly successful in achieving press or public acceptance, while the second was in part counterproductive by convincing many Jews, previously neutral, that if Arab violence, or the fear thereof, could sway British policy, it was time for Jewish counterviolence.

A last line, aimed at the diminution of the "illegal" immigration to Palestine, was the attempt in 1946-1947 to denounce the entire thing as a gigantic Zionist scheme foisted on the unwilling DPs. While a high degree of Zionist and Revisionist organization was present, the DPs were very strongly motivated, and their struggles to reach Palestine, often facing armed interception, disproved the story. In any case, coming hard on the genocide of World War II, the Jewish resistance in Palestine enjoyed a favorable press abroad. Moreover, diplomatic attempts undertaken by Mr. Bevin to influence the United States to withdraw its support for Jewish immigration also reacted against the government.

Because of its composition and nature, the English Palestine administration manifested an extraordinary inability to appreciate the psychology of the Jewish population. Although on the whole well meaning, and certainly intent on carrying out a pro-Jewish policy at least until 1939, the government was never able to gain the respect or the wholehearted cooperation of the majority of the population. This was due in part to the method of selection of personnel, already discussed above. Individual High Commissioners, especially General Gort and Cunningham, were well liked--but they could not overcome the gulf between the English administration and the Jewish community.

PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF SPECIFIC INCIDENTS

It is easy to see that certain incidents provided a turning point and had great influence on the support for the guerrillas. During the war the most important incident was the Struma affair of 1942. The Struma, a small unseaworthy vessel with some 800 refugees from Hitler's Europe, reached Istanbul, where the Turkish authorities held it pending word from the Palestine administration about the admission of the refugees. When this was refused the vessel was sent back into the Black Sea, where it sank with all aboard.

The sinking of the Struma brought to a focus all the resentment felt by Palestine Jewry against the British administration in Palestine and against the 1939 White Paper. Up to this time the terrorist activities had been genuinely deplored; after this incident Jewish opinion became more and more reconciled to the necessity first of noncooperation and subsequently of active violence against an administration which was regarded as irredeemably hostile.

The next decisive turning point was October 10, 1945, when the Hagana attacked the detention camp at Atlit. This evidence of armed hostility in turn strengthened British efforts to break Jewish resistance and led to the unsuccessful attempt to implement the total elimination of the Jewish state within the state. After this failed toward the end of July 1946, the pattern of resistance was set.

On January 31, 1947, the British government decided to evacuate all British women and children and all male civilians in nonessential positions. This indication that the British were prepared either to intensify their efforts or to give up the struggle (coming two weeks before Mr. Bevin referred the problem to the United Nations) had profound effects and greatly strengthened the determination of the guerrillas. The final incident, which perhaps did more than anything else to turn world opinion against the British, was the decision to return the refugees of the Exodus, in July 1947, to Germany.

Looking at this from the point of view of isolating the guerrillas, there were three occasions when the government gained the cooperation of the leading elements within the population and even their active support. The first period was immediately after the outbreak of World War II when cooperation with the Hagana led to the temporary elimination of the Stern Gang. The Struma incident ended this period. The murder of Lord Moyne provided the second opportunity, but again the unwillingness of the government to modify its basic policy regarding Jewish immigration and the White Paper ended this. The period following the King David Hotel incident brought about a third period of possible conciliation, though again the government was unwilling to pay the price, and on the part of the Jewish Agency hostility against the government had reached such proportion that it no longer could afford to take active measures against the terrorists, though it could still officially disown them. By this time, in any case, most of the Hagana would no longer have acted offensively against the Irgun.

COMMENT

No guerrilla campaign is possible without some powerful motivation which for the Jews was provided by the example of what happened in Europe and by their fear of what might happen under Arab domination in Palestine if the White Paper policy were implemented. In addition, guerrillas need an unpopular enemy. It is difficult to create widespread guerrilla activity

against a regime which is genuinely popular with the people. The British had never been popular; they rapidly became more and more unpopular after 1939.

On the British side the difficulty of grappling with guerrillas who were highly integrated with the population led to frustration and to a number of excesses. Yet in the end the British character prevailed. To implement the overall scheme to break Jewish resistance would have required the bombardment of Jewish settlements. This was theoretically possible and preparations had been made. But in the end the government was unwilling to see this through.

As in Ireland, the victory of the guerrillas came because the government forces were for various reasons unable to deploy their entire power. As in Ireland, one of the effects of terrorism was to force the government into ever mounting expenditures and an ever mounting cycle of repression which brought adverse political as well as local security results. Mounting costs might have been borne, internal security could have been improved and terror put down by greater violence, foreign pressure might have been withstood if the retention of the Mandate had been deemed essential to Britain's national existence. But it was not.

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The Hungarian Uprising, October 23-December 15, 1956

by

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INTRODUCTION

The following essay deals with the Hungarian uprising of 1956 from the point of view of the problem of isolating and combating insurgents. This particular perspective implies that the study will focus upon the strategies of Soviet and government forces in meeting the emergency created by the insurrection. The techniques of the insurgents, much publicized at the time of the uprising, will be peripheral to the subject under discussion. In essence, the study will attempt to answer three questions. First, what specific techniques were applied by the incumbents in combating and isolating the insurgents? Second, what conditions rendered these strategies effective or ineffective? Third, what conditions and strategies prevented the expansion of the popular rebellion into protracted, revolutionary warfare? In answering these questions shall be able to draw certain conclusions as to whether or not Communist governments (like Communist revolutionaries) operate on the basis of elaborate strategies in dealing with political adversaries and a hostile population.

The discussion of these themes will be restricted to the period October 23-December 15, marking the beginning and the approximate end of armed resistance. The ultimate purpose of the current project, it should be remembered, is to understand techniques of isolating armed insurgents from the population. The protracted political strife preceding and following the insurrection is therefore only of marginal relevance to the subject.

The sources of this study include samples from both the voluminous secondary literature on the subject and from the equally substantial documentary materials. The latter were of special significance, since most of the secondary literature

deals with the behavior and motives of the insurgents and with the political antecedents of the revolution. Thus in dealing with Soviet and government strategies I had to use sources like leaflets, the daily press during and after the revolution, radio monitoring records, and recorded interviews with participants. Many of these materials and a series of "Special Reports" from the days November 4-December 12 were made available by the courtesy of the staff of Radio Free Europe in Munich, whose assistance in this study I feel obliged to acknowledge. I further made use of documentary materials published by the Special Committee of the United Nations¹ and by the Hungarian government² following the revolution. I also have to make special reference to a series of highly revealing papers presented at a symposium sponsored by the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology.³

BACKGROUND

The Hungarian revolution of October 1956 was preceded by several months of popular unrest and, what is equally significant in this context, by a grave internal crisis of the ruling Communist Party, the origins of which went back to the years 1953-1954. These two factors, popular dissatisfaction and the crisis of the Party, interacted and were fed by one another, resulting finally in the explosion of October 23 and the following weeks of armed conflict. Popular defiance of the regime had been encouraged by the crystallization of an intraparty opposition around the figure of former Premier Imre Nagy, by the vocal criticism of a number of Communist intellectuals, and the increasingly evident vacillation and demoralization of the Security Police (AVH or AVO) in the face of compromising revelations about its operations.

The growing boldness of popular criticism of the regime and the outburst of the uprising itself were encouraged by popular perceptions of the international situation. The conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from a neighboring country engendered the belief that a similar solution would eventually be possible for Hungary, and in general, it appeared to demonstrate that negotiated settlements with the Soviet Union concerning the status of East-Central Europe were possible. At the same time, the 20th Party Congress and the ensuing Soviet declarations created the false illusion that the Soviets would henceforward refrain from the use of violence in settling intrabloc disputes.⁴ A third factor, not yet properly evaluated by the chroniclers of the revolution, was the admission

of Hungary to the United Nations in 1955. This event had been adequately propagandized as a diplomatic victory for the regime. Many Hungarians became suddenly aware of the existence of the organization without comprehending its powers and competence. In 1956 the belief was general ~~that~~ the United Nations could function to prevent foreign intervention even by major powers, and that the United Nations had unconditional jurisdiction over international disputes. The desperate radio messages of November 4-7 requesting the "rapid dispatch of U.N. troops" bears ample testimony to the misunderstanding of the powers and limitations of the organization. Last but not least, years of propaganda and a basically distorted view of the West were responsible for the generally held opinion that massive disorders in the Soviet bloc would be "exploited" by the United States and its allies. All these together created the unjustified notion that the freedom of action of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe was limited. T

The violent upheaval itself started on October 23 as a peaceful demonstration expressing sympathy for the victory of Gomulka in Poland. At 5:00 P.M. the crowd had swollen to at least 300,000. Between 5:00 and 7:00 P.M. this crowd marched in front of the parliament building and demanded the appearance of formerly deposed Premier Nagy. The mood of the crowd became violent around 8:00 P.M., about which time three events took place almost simultaneously: (1) a radio speech by First Secretary Kereš denounced the demonstrations, (2) the personal appearance of Nagy proved to be a disappointment, and (3) the Security Police made an attempt to disperse the crowd gathered in front of the radio building.

Apparently the first shots were fired at the radio building at 9:02 P.M. By midnight the same building was under siege by several hundred people who acquired arms by breaking into an arsenal, while several thousand people still blocked the main thoroughfares. The statue of Stalin was torn down, and the editorial offices of the central Party organ Szabad Nép were occupied without siege. At 2:00 A.M. (October 24) shots could be heard at several points of the city. At about the same time Soviet armored troops entered Budapest. At first their apparent intention was to guard bridges, government buildings, and the main streets. It is not clear whether they made an attempt to disperse crowds or were attacked by the revolutionaries. In any case they were engaged in heavy fighting by 6:00 A.M., October 24.

The following four days represented the first phase of the encounter between the population and the rapidly dwindling pro-government forces and their supporting Soviet troops. During

this period the AVH forces disintegrated, and the government headed by Nagy appeared willing to grant a number of concessions to the rebellious population. On October 29 a cease-fire was agreed upon. The next day Soviet troops were withdrawn from the capital and from the provincial cities. During the following days the government was expanded to include non-Communists. The days between October 31-November 4 were those of the victorious revolution. A process of rapid de-Communization was evident in the capital as well as in the countryside. All over the country compromised Communists and members of the Security Police were rounded up, in some cases subjected to lynch law.⁶

On November 1, however, reinforcements started to pour in from the Soviet Union. Preparations for an attack were evident on November 2 and 3. At 4:25 A.M. Soviet forces launched a massive offensive against the capital and a number of provincial cities. In Budapest, members of the Nagy government were forced to flee, and the formation of a new "Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government" was announced on the wave length of Radio Moscow. In the cities organized resistance ceased between November 11 and 14. Sporadic resistance continued in certain mountainous areas for at least three more weeks (see below). Thereafter, popular resistance took the form of strikes and occasional street demonstrations. Until the middle of December the majority of the labor force refused to take up their regular duties. Railroads and the public transportation system of the capital were effectively struck. On November 22-24 and December 3-9 the revolutionary forces could still organize impressive demonstrations. After the end of November, however, the morale of the population rapidly declined.⁷

The political liquidation of the revolution was guided by Soviet political advisers; their decisions were carried out by Soviet military personnel. It is significant to note here that during the revolution the Hungarian state apparatus had completely disintegrated. Like the rest of the population, members of the administrative apparatus adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude. The border guard and the regular police disappeared. Characteristically, for several weeks duties of traffic policemen in the capital were performed by Soviet troops. The only effective support to the Kádár government came from the remnants of the Security Police, but it appears that in the first days even the AVH personnel were used merely as auxiliaries and guides to the Soviet troops.⁸ Until the end of 1956 the Kádár government had not appeared as an independent factor in the political equation. In many instances, most notably in the case of the arrest and abduction of Imre Nagy and his entourage, the actions and orders of the government were blatantly ignored by Soviet authorities.

The political liquidation of the revolution involved (1) the dissolution of the Revolutionary and Workers' Councils that had sprung up in October, (2) the suppression of the free press and the reestablishment of government controls over communications, (3) the rebuilding of the state apparatus and official instruments of coercion, and (4) the ruthless hunting down, arrest, imprisonment, and execution of participants in the revolution.

After initial promises of amnesty (November 4 and 14), martial law was declared against perpetration of "counterrevolutionary" crimes. An "accelerated" criminal procedure was introduced for a broad range of political offenses on January 15, 1957. A decree issued on April 6, 1957, created a special People's Court Bench of the Supreme Court to conduct summary trials. In February 1957 all justices were admonished by the Prime Minister to resume work and to act as instruments of the proletarian state.⁹ Altogether about 1,000 executions and 22,000 detentions took place; 190,000 Hungarian citizens escaped to Austria and Yugoslavia.

A significant aspect of the political pacification of the country was the combination of repressive measures with economic concessions. Substantial grants from the Soviet Union enabled the Hungarian government not only to survive the adverse effects of strikes and destruction, but also to raise standards of living considerably in 1957. The houses destroyed by the Soviets in November 1956 were rapidly rebuilt during the next year.

Terrain and Communications

Hungary is one of the smaller countries of Europe, with a territory of 34,000 square miles and a population of 9,000,000. Most of the territory of the country is open, cultivated plain with the exception of two mountain ranges, one between Lake Balaton and Budapest (Bakony, Vértes, Pilis), the other following a northeastern direction from the capital along the Hungarian-Czechoslovak border (Börzsöny, Mátra, Bükk). There are also hills on the Austrian-Hungarian border near the town of Köszeg and in the south around the city of Pécs (Mecsek). Most of the hills are covered by thin forests, and thus average altitude is about 1,500 feet. They exceed an altitude of 3,000 feet at only two points, in the Mátra northeast of Budapest. The marshes of western and central Hungary, once the refuge of highwaymen and outlaws, had been gradually drained and no longer exist. The railway and road network is adequate and easily passable by military and armored vehicles.

The position of Budapest in Hungary is similar to the position of Paris in France or Vienna in Austria. Two out of the nine million Hungarians live in their capital and at least half of the industrial capacity of the country is located in and around the city. The capital is the center of the network of roads and railroads; travelers from the Central Plain to Western Transdanubia have to pass through Budapest. In addition Budapest has a near-monopolistic position of cultural and higher educational activities. Despite the efforts of the Communist government to the contrary, half of the students of universities are located in Budapest.

Except for its capital, Hungary has no cities with a population exceeding 200,000. The cities Miskolc, Debrecen, Szeged, and Győr, have a population of over 100,000. Miskolc, Debrecen, and Szeged, together with Veszprém and Pécs, are also university cities.

The Combatants

In the fall of 1956 the Hungarian armed forces are estimated to have been about 200,000 strong, consisting of nine infantry and two mechanized divisions, a small and antiquated air force and auxiliary services.¹⁰ There were in addition an estimated 40,000-90,000 combat troops organized separately as the mobile units of the Security Police ("blue AVH") and the units of the Border Patrol ("green AVO"). Members of the latter units were recruited by regular draft, though somewhat more selectively than in the case of regular army units. Recruits in the "blue AVH" and in the units guarding the Austrian and Yugoslav borders were supposed to be politically reliable. Officers and NCOs in these units were carefully selected and indoctrinated.¹¹

It is one of the remarkable facts about the revolution that the army played no role to speak of in the armed conflict. Troops sent to relieve the besieged radio building on October 23 refused to fire on the crowd. The armored brigade sent to besiege the insurgents at the Kilián barracks on October 25 defected under their commander, Colonel (later General) Maléter. Outright defection, however, was an exception rather than the rule. In most instances army personnel sympathized with the insurgents but did not join the insurrection in organized units. At the same time many members of the army, including officers, joined the insurgents as individuals.¹²

After November 4 many soldiers simply left their units and returned home or escaped abroad. To avoid trouble, the Soviets

demobilized the entire army after the revolution, and suspended the draft for 1956. Members of the border guard often acted in a similar manner. There were no organized units fighting on the side of the insurgents; on the other hand, defections and poor morale rendered most units ineffective. The "blue AVH" was more effective, though here too one may safely assume that the men fought only under the threat of being shot by their officers. Some of the enlisted AVH men fought to the bitter end (as the ones defending the party HQ on Köztársaság Square on November 1), because the insurgents in many instances failed to discriminate between professional and enlisted AVH-men and executed several of the latter category. On the whole, the hard core of progovernment Hungarian combatants was probably not more than 4,000-5,000 consisting mostly of AVH officers, NCOs, and some of the enlisted men in their mobile units.

The Soviet forces participating in the suppression of the uprising consisted originally only of the Second and Seventeenth Mechanized Divisions stationed in Hungary.¹³ By November 4 this number was increased to approximately six mechanized divisions, including 2,500 tanks and 1,000 supporting vehicles.¹⁴ It appears from various reports that in the first days of December these divisions were reinforced by infantry deployed mainly along Hungary's western border.¹⁵ The exact number of Soviet troops participating in the pacification of the country cannot be established.

An estimate of the number of actively engaged insurgents is even more difficult to arrive at. In Budapest and in some of the provincial cities probably one out of five adults participated in demonstrations or at least spoke out against the regime. The number of people carrying arms at one time or another was also substantial. (Some 100,000 small arms were reported to have been lost during the revolution.) But only a small minority of those who had acquired arms did actually and effectively use them. After October 28, for instance, university students were armed, but only a few of the many thousands of their numbers participated in the defense of the capital during the second Russian onslaught. The hard core of the defenders of the Kilián barracks, "Corvin Block," and Széna Square did not number more than 3,000-4,000. Altogether, I am inclined to put the number of those who actively fought the Soviets and the Hungarian AVH at 8,000-10,000.

Popular Support and the Scope of the Insurrection

The overwhelming impression that one gains from the literature on the Hungarian revolution, including official Hungarian documents, is that popular support for the uprising was widespread and nationwide. This is explicitly stated in the UN Report, together with the observation that after November 4 there was "no evidence of support for the Kádár government."¹⁶ The White Books published to support the argument that the uprising was the work of a small group of Fascist conspirators often slips into stating that on particular occasions large numbers of people sympathized with the insurgents. Thus in Volume II one finds references to "misled socialist masses" (p. 3), to "crowds" turning against AVH-men (p. 13), to an "enraged mob" (p. 95), then again to the "aggressiveness of crowds" and to "large masses of people" (p. 32) congregating to commit acts of violence.

Most of the fighting took place in Budapest. This is reflected in the casualty rates published by the Hungarian government. According to these, 78% of fatal casualties occurred in Budapest, 22% in the provinces; of the 12,971 wounded, 11,513 were registered in Budapest, 1,458 in the provinces.¹⁷ But the high concentration of casualties does not mean inaction in the provinces. On the contrary, the rebels of provincial towns and villages were often more active than in the capital, while the smaller provincial garrisons of the AVH were less effective in defending themselves and in many cases gave up without fighting. Thus according to official statistics 1,870 of the 2,929 arrests of Communists occurred in the countryside and only 1,059 in Budapest.¹⁸ In the villages there were no AVH garrisons and local Communists were incapable of rendering any form of resistance. Almost without exception village councils and collective farms were dissolved. The White Book registers acts of violence in 34 villages and notes that "countless members of councils and other democratic bodies were arrested in Budapest as well as in the countryside."¹⁹

COMBATING THE INSURGENCY, OCTOBER 23-OCTOBER 28

As already indicated, fighting between the AVH and the insurgents erupted on the night of October 23 and continued with varying intensity until October 29. In Budapest Hungarian government troops were reinforced by Soviet armored units on the morning of October 23. Nevertheless, the brunt of combating the insurgents fell on the "blue AVH" units. Soviet troops occupied

strategic points, but on October 24 and 25 did not initiate actions against the insurgents unless, and this was quite frequently the case, they were attacked by small groups attempting to demolish their armor. On October 26 and 27 Soviet troops were engaged in the siege of the Kilián barracks. They sustained about 70 casualties and did not press their attack thereafter. In the provinces Soviet troops remained confined to their quarters. With the exception of Debrecen they made no attempt to occupy cities or villages.

During the same period the insurgents resorted largely to hit-and-run operations. There was sniping from windows by insurgents equipped with small arms and attacks on Soviet military vehicles with hand grenades and "Molotov cocktails." At the same time insurgent positions were stabilized in the industrial district of Csepel, around the already-mentioned massive Kilián barracks in the Eighth District, and around the Széna Square on the right bank of the Danube. At these points the insurgents were able to hold their positions because of their possession of artillery and armor.

During the first days of the uprising the strategy of combating the insurgency rested on the fictional assumption that the rebels were a small band of social deviants intermingled with a few honest but misguided young people, and that the population though harboring legitimate grievances was on the side of the government. Accordingly, with the exception of the mass demonstration of October 25 when some AVH-men apparently lost their heads and machine-gunned the crowd, considerable effort was made not to retaliate against the insurgents in an indiscriminate manner. In the case of sniping, Soviet troops retaliated with machine guns rather than artillery. During the first days of the fighting, except in the vicinity of the Kilián barracks, material damage in the city was not substantial. In many cases the machine-gun duels between the Soviet troops and the insurgents attracted large crowds of curious bystanders who apparently felt safe to watch the battle from a certain distance.

The propaganda effort of the government was aimed at isolating the insurgents from the population and later at encouraging the insurgents to withdraw from the fighting by promises of impunity and by harping on various sentimental themes. After an initial harsh tone the government turned to cajoling instead of threatening, hoping to project an image of popular unity versus social deviation. The broadcasts of the morning of October 24 described the insurgents as "counterrevolutionary bands killing civilians, soldiers and AVH-fighters" (9:00 A.M.),²⁰ "murderous

gangs" and plunderers who broke into Közért markets and depots (12:22). In the afternoon of the same day, however, the emphasis changed. It was now conceded that the insurgents included besides the "obscure hoodlum element" also a number of misguided teenagers. Subsequent communications held out the prospect of returning home without fear of punishment. At 5:50 P.M. an interview with prisoners pointed out that two arrested teenagers would be allowed to go unpunished despite the fact that they were known to have been actively involved. A similar program was broadcast at 7:23. Both programs emphasized that only thieves, criminals, and Fascist elements would be subjected to punishment. (The interviewing reporter was able to point out the names of a few criminals possibly arrested as such and not as revolutionaries, but no Fascists or reactionaries could be named.) At noon October 24 an amnesty was proclaimed for those who would surrender before 2:00 P.M. During the next 72 hours this deadline was extended five times, and each time the insurgents were dramatically reminded that they had only a few more minutes to think. The repeated extension of the deadline and the accompanying reminders created ridicule and helped to underline the weakness and confusion of the government.

As in all wars and insurrections the government tried to convince the population that its troops were winning and the insurgents were losing. The first "victory" was announced at 11:24 and the news of the surrender of 120 insurgents (grossly exaggerated) was repeated at 12:19. At 2:08 P.M. it was reported falsely that the former attackers of the radio building were surrendering. At 3:00 P.M. a jubilant voice announced that "five jets had joined the fight against the counterrevolution." At 4:30 A.M. on October 25 the radio commented that "the counterrevolution has essentially been liquidated." At 1:13 P.M. it was announced that "the entire population is celebrating the victory over the counterrevolution."

The sentimental themes to divert potential insurgents from joining were intermingled with other propaganda communications. Most notable was the text read by the popular sports commentator Szepesi who called attention to the approaching date of the (Melbourne) Olympic Games, reminding his young listeners that as long as fighting continued Hungarian athletes were unable to train effectively. He also pointed out that unless fighting ended soon enough, the scheduled Hungarian-Swedish soccer game would have to be cancelled. Shortly thereafter (at 2:12 P.M., October 24) an address was read to "Hungarian wives and mothers," entreating them to prevent their "husbands from seeking their ruin in the streets and to hold back their sons from carrying murderous

weapons." A few minutes later (2:26 P.M.) the commentator remarked that "infants, children, women and old people are waiting for their milk, flour and bread."

COMBATING THE INSURGENTS AFTER NOVEMBER 4

The temporary victory of the revolutionaries created a new political and military situation. The Communist Party and the AVH, the keystones of Soviet control over Hungary, had disintegrated. The units of the army had either melted away or were drawing close to the victorious insurgents. Thus when the decision was made in Moscow to subdue the revolution it was evident that the operation would have to rest almost entirely on Soviet resources and capabilities.

The Soviet objective on November 4 was the rapid liquidation of the armed insurrection irrespective of costs in political and economic terms. It was no longer important (or possible) for the Soviet leaders to win popular support for their policies. What was foremost in their minds was the necessity of clearing up a fluid and internationally dangerous situation and presenting a fait accompli to the world within the shortest possible time.

Thus in contrast to October, the Soviet troops and their commanders made little pretense of being guests invited into a friendly country. The decrees issued by Soviet military commanders are curt and harshly worded; their tone reminds one of the language of wartime communications to the inhabitants of occupied territories. In some cases these instructions were issued through local Hungarian authorities (as in Miskolc or Nyiregyháza). In most places, however, the proclamations were signed by the local Soviet commander. In Budapest, Major General Grebenik issued the following order:

With a view to re-establishing order and normal life in Budapest, I command the following:

- 1) Those persons who are in possession of arms should immediately . . . hand them over to Soviet military units. . . . Persons who refuse to hand over their arms or attempt to hide them will be severely punished.
- 2) The public is allowed on the streets only between 0700 and 1900 hours.
- 3) Workers of factories and public services offices and other enterprises are ordered to resume work.

4) Local authorities are ordered to ensure the supply of food and fuel for the population. Stores will be open between 0800 and 1800 hours. Vehicles delivering food and fuel will operate with special permits both day and night.

The Military Commander of Soviet forces
in Budapest.²¹

The order of Major Kornusin, commander of the Soviet forces of Pécs, was worded in a similar vein:

Order of the Soviet Military Commander:

Today the Military Commander of Pécs has assumed his duties and issues the following order:

- 1) The counterrevolutionary National Committees must be dissolved.
- 2) The population must surrender all arms before 1900 hours, November 5. Those who fail to do so will be called to account in accordance with the emergency regulations.
- 3) Work will be resumed in all factories and offices in the morning of November 5.
- 4) Demonstrations and assembly are strictly forbidden. . . . Cultural establishments and places of amusement will remain closed until further notice.
- 5) The public will be allowed on the streets between 0700 and 1900. . . .
- 6) If Soviet soldiers are fired upon they will return it with all the weapons at their disposal.

During the second Soviet intervention propaganda was less important than during the October days. Even though Soviet forces captured Radio Budapest on the morning of November 4, practically no attempt was made to communicate to the population until November 8. The proclamation signed by Kádár and Münnich was first broadcast on the wave length of Radio Moscow's Balkan transmitter, later repeated a few times. Other than that no bulletins were issued and a concerted propaganda effort did not resume until the middle of December.

The aim of the Soviet attack was no longer to isolate the insurgents from noncombatants, but to terrorize the entire population. This was done by way of raising the risks of participation and support without trying to distinguish between active and passive involvement. In contrast to the first round of fighting in October, the Soviets returned the small-arm fire of the insurgents almost exclusively with heavy artillery. A shot

fired from a rifle was answered with volleys from seven-inch guns. Thus incidents of sniping had the consequence of the destruction of whole blocks of houses. Within 72 hours the houses on the main thoroughfares and intersections of Budapest were leveled to the ground. A similar procedure was followed wherever the Soviets met resistance in provincial towns.

The second aspect of terroristic warfare against the population was a high degree of randomness in applying punitive measures. In Budapest as well as in the provinces Soviet soldiers would fire indiscriminately into crowds, passers-by, and people standing in breadlines. In at least one recorded instance they stopped a truck on one of the main streets of Budapest and shot the driver without apparent reason.²³ In other instances they would pick up one or two wounded in hospitals at random and shoot them.²⁴

The campaign of general intimidation further involved deportations to the Soviet Union conducted in a similarly random manner. Arrest and transportation of suspected sympathizers started shortly after November 4 and continued until the end of the year.²⁵ Most reports of the conduct of these are emphatic that the arrests and deportations had no direct connection with the fighting.²⁶ Most frequently persons were picked up in the streets without an obvious pattern to explain who was being taken, although the majority of those arrested were between 15 and 35.²⁷ Some preference was also shown for young men wearing trenchcoats, berets, and beards.²⁸ In other instances, people were taken out of queues.²⁹ In one provincial city Russian soldiers accompanied by AVH-men in civilian dress conducted a house-to-house search. "There was apparently no pattern to their search, they went into every house and took one or two young men from each. Even if thirty persons were in the building they only took away one or two. They had no list of names with them."³⁰ Another way of terrorizing potential insurgents was to set up roadblocks and take away identity cards from young people to frighten them and to ensure that they would stay indoors.³¹ Arrested and deported persons were later released, and, as one report clearly points out, already in November "it was generally felt that the Soviets were using deportations to remove the threat of armed resistance . . . to force adamant workers to take up their tools."³² Testimony taken by the UN Special Committee also tends to corroborate the randomness of arrests and deportations.³³

Besides this campaign of massive intimidation the Soviets apparently decided to permit the potentially dangerous element to leave the country. It is true that during the revolution the border guard partly disintegrated and also that the Soviets, until

the end of November, had only armored units and no infantry to patrol the Austrian-Hungarian border. But while it would have been impossible to seal the border hermetically, they could have substantially reduced the number of escapees by applying their terroristic tactics against those attempting to cross the border or, as they did subsequently, by threatening the Hungarian guards in order to apply sterner measures. This they failed to do. Shooting incidents were rare. If and when they used their arms they fired in the air or at the ground.³⁴ Throughout most of November refugees were free to pass Soviet lines. On occasion they were held up by Hungarian AVH units, admonished, and sent to one of the neighboring cities from where they would immediately repeat their attempt to escape. As a result, about 190,000 individuals left the country in the weeks following the second Soviet intervention. Soviet control over the border began to be slowly tightened only after November 27.³⁵ On December 6 numerous shooting incidents were reported and Soviet troops began to lay spider mines in the border area.³⁶ Later in December Hungarian border guards began the systematic apprehension of escapees. Some of them were reported to be apologetic about it, saying they had to do it or else "it meant their own necks."³⁷

CONDITIONS ACCELERATING SOVIET SUCCESS

The single most important factor explaining the collapse of armed resistance was the overwhelming preponderance of the Soviet forces, the number of troops and the amount of resources that the insurgents were able to mobilize for the quelling of an insurrection with dangerous international implications. However, the question still remains to be answered: why did the armed insurrection collapse so rapidly, and why did it not develop into protracted revolutionary warfare? This question is particularly relevant because conditions of guerrilla operations were present and because initially efforts were made to continue the military phase of the insurrection.

During the first days of the uprising a number of commando units sprang up all over the country. After November 4 many of these units withdrew from the cities into the hilly areas. On November 10, the entire command of the National Guard moved from Budapest to the neighboring Pilis mountains and set up its headquarters in the village of Nagykovácsi.³⁹ The National Guard of Pécs moved out into the Mecsek hills on November 4. For days thereafter Radio Pécs, controlled by the Soviets, made references to military operations in the area, warning inhabitants not to aid

and shelter the partisans in the hills.⁴⁰ The insurgents of many Transdanubian localities retreated to the Bakony mountains. On November 21 sabotage actions were reported near the forest of Dabas (Bakony). Subsequently, the partisans appeared in the village of Padrag, asking for food and medical supplies.⁴¹ Considerable insurgent units survived in the B kk mountains. They descended upon the Soviet garrison of Miskolc twice in November and December, causing the Soviets considerable losses and material damage. But the last such action was repressed on December 12.⁴² Despite widespread popular identification with the objectives of the insurrection and the moral outrage felt at the fact of foreign intervention, the guerrilla effort petered out within a few weeks after the beginning of massive Soviet intervention without having engaged in significant harassing operations.

The answers as to the causes for the rapid collapse of the insurrection and the petering out of guerrilla operations must be tentative. But one may at least hypothesize that the single most important factor responsible for the ineffectiveness of the partisan movement was connected with the fluctuations of popular morale. As the RFE reports point out, after the first panic of November 4 popular optimism returned briefly and it was not before the end of the month that most individuals interviewed had characterized the situation as entirely hopeless.⁴³ It was only two or three weeks after the Soviet intervention that it had become obvious to all that no diplomatic or military assistance was forthcoming. At the same time the insurgents faced with no hope of success were suddenly confronted with the attractive alternative of being able to escape to the West. Once the chances of success declined, the outflow of active insurgents as well as of many of their potential supporters began. The choice was implicitly between Soviet concentration camps (a vision conjured up consciously by deportations) and the freedom and material comforts associated with Western societies. This the Soviets perceived, and they made little attempt to obstruct the escape of would-be guerrillas. Had the border been sealed, many of those who escaped would have been compelled to choose between deportation (or worse, execution) or fighting in the hills or in the underground.

A third factor one has to take into account in evaluating the outcome of the insurrection is Hungarian historical tradition. Series of national revolts, in particular the revolution of 1848, established a clear-cut pattern of revolutionary behavior. The events of October 23, the mass demonstration, the role of the intellectuals within it, the formulation of a definite number of demands by university students and the desire of communicating them through available mass media represented a close replica of

the events of March 15, 1848. (During the demonstrations one would often hear the exclamation: "This is like March 15." And many of the participants seemed to be consciously reenacting the events of the historical day, known to all Hungarians from their earliest school days.) The conduct of the strikes and the behavior of the working class had similarly been shaped by the experiences of the Socialist movement before World War I and at the time of the October revolution of 1918. The country had a strong tradition and experience in urban insurrections, strikes, and mass demonstrations. On the other hand there had been no tradition or example of guerrilla warfare in Hungarian history. (An attempt by Louis Kossuth to organize guerrillas against the Austrians and Russians was an abysmal failure. Among other reasons, officers refused to set up ambushes and commando raids.) Hungary had not had chetniks, hayduks, and komitachi in the Balkan tradition. Underground movements and conspiracies had been doomed to failure inevitably throughout history. The techniques of partisan warfare were associated in the public mind with traditional enemies of Hungarians. Thus the image of the partisan or guerrilla is not only alien but also negative, which made it easy to rationalize withdrawal in terms of national character and conventional standards of social conduct.

CONCLUSIONS

The examination of evidence concerning the Hungarian uprising indicates the existence of a Soviet political and military doctrine of combating insurgencies even though, for obvious reasons, the precepts of this doctrine have not gained the same prominence as various theories of revolution and revolutionary warfare. The political principles involved are probably part of the basic indoctrination of staff and general officers. Tactical details most likely appear in confidential manuals available for company and platoon commanders. A slipshod comparison of the events of 1956 with the military occupation of Eastern Europe suggests that no separate doctrines exist for combating domestic insurgencies and controlling hostile populations in times of war.⁴⁴ The essence of both appears to be a reliance on terror.

The use of the instrument of terror assumes the existence of a hostile population and of potential collaboration between insurgents and population. The basic objective of terror is not the isolation of the insurgents from the population but the intimidation of all by (1) measures to maximize the costs and risks of participation and (2) random acts of force to increase the general

feeling of insecurity and helplessness in the target group. The combination of these two techniques and the perfection of the second may be regarded as a Soviet (or probably Russian)⁴⁵ practical and doctrinal innovation. German and French forces made extensive use of terror as an instrument of pacification (during World War II and in Algeria respectively), but they restricted their campaign to setting horrifying examples by meting out punishments disproportionate to the act of violence committed. There is less evidence of extensive and sophisticated techniques to randomize acts of retaliation.

Such sophisticated use of terror involves a degree of selectivity within the basic pattern of randomness. Terror in the Soviet operational doctrine is random in picking the individual within the group, but tends to be selective in defining the target groups. The principal target groups of terror appear to be ones most closely identified with active opposition (in Hungary, young men between 15-35 in clothes indicating that they might be engaged in fighting), and appearing in strategically vulnerable places. (Arrests took place in the main thoroughfares of Budapest and not in small villages where there was no evidence of resistance.)

A further observation that one can make concerning the Soviet use of terror is that, however harsh were the measures of retaliation used, the insurgents were given a chance to withdraw from active participation. At no point did the Soviets create a situation where the choice would have been between perishing or continuing to fight. In the first phase of the insurrection they permitted the withdrawal of activists by promising impunity to all "misguided" participants (and the category was defined so broadly that practically everybody could be identified within it without, however, committing the government in any individual case). At the time of the second insurrection the withdrawal of active insurgents and sympathizers was encouraged by leaving the Western borders unguarded.

As a general conclusion one may say that terror is a strategic alternative to regular police methods, law enforcement, and the systematic isolation of the insurgents from the population. In this context we may hypothesize that terror is the more efficient strategy if and when, for some reason or other, the objective is the rapid military liquidation of an insurrection or guerrilla warfare. Therefore if a military commander is confronted with the need of securing vital communication lines during a crucial offensive, or a politician is faced with the necessity of a fait accompli in domestic or international relations, there will be strong pressure to apply terroristic tactics.

5

On the other hand, while more efficient militarily, terror is costly in political terms. While terroristic methods, given adequate manpower and resources, are more likely to succeed, they are also more likely to produce lasting popular bitterness and thereby make the task of political stabilization more difficult. The decision to use terror must always take into account the long-range damage it will cause politically. Military capabilities being equal, the choice is between rapid military and protracted political pacification on the one hand, and protracted military conflict but less protracted political pacification on the other.

The second drawback of the use of terror is the psychological strain it is apt to cause for the troops involved. There is some evidence that the suppression of the uprising created such psychological strains, even though no defections or serious breaches of discipline are known to have occurred.⁴⁶ But quite frequently Soviet soldiers showed considerable hesitation when confronted with large numbers of civilians, and in the first days of the uprising there was even some evidence of fraternization. As a consequence most of the troops originally stationed in Hungary were later withdrawn, and reinforcements came from Soviet garrisons. As uncorroborated rumors had it these soldiers were told they would fight at Suez against the imperialists.⁴⁷

To conclude, we may once more summarize the proportions of the paper. Initially we raised a question concerning Soviet techniques of combating insurgencies and found that these represent adaptations of techniques of "normal" political control to revolutionary situations. Accordingly, the Soviet principles of pacification can presumably be extrapolated from studies dealing with terror and propaganda under the Stalinist system. The study of the suppression of the Hungarian uprising could, of course, provide no clues as to changes in operational thinking since 1956. Second, we may conclude that the techniques of pacification were rendered particularly effective because of the psychological isolation of the insurgents and the absence of foreign assistance to sustain the military effort as well as popular morale. The same conditions were effective in preventing the expansion of the insurrection into protracted warfare and guerrilla operations. By implication this last proposition suggests that terrain and demographical factors played no significant role in determining the duration and basic strategies of the insurrection.

Footnotes

1. United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, New York, 1957.
2. Fehér Könyv (White Books) (Budapest: Government Printing Office, 1957-1958), Vols. I-IV.
3. Second Seminar on the Hungarian Revolution, June 6, 1958.
4. In this context it is particularly interesting to point out that many demonstrators on October 23 voiced the opinion that "Berlin was not possible in 1956."
5. U.N. Report, p. 6.
6. According to the White Book (Vol. III, p. 143) 2,929 persons were arrested by "counterrevolutionaries." The same source lists 234 party and AVH members as victims of the "white terror." More than half of these, however, appear to be casualties incurred during the armed fighting.
7. The RFE "Special Bulletins" from Vienna report signs of declining morale beginning December 9. The report of December 14 summarizes the morale of the Hungarian population as follows: November 4-11, panic and terror; November 12-December 10, hope; December 10, apathy.
8. U.N. Report, p. 101.
9. Ferenc Váli, Rift and Revolt in Hungary (Cambridge, Mass.: 1961), pp. 396-398.
10. Ibid., p. 72.
11. A description of the organization of the AVO (AVH) appears in Helmreich, Hungary (New York: Praeger, 1957), pp. 132-150.
12. This fact is evident from the texts of radio broadcasts on October 24 and 25. On the 24th (1:23 P.M.) Radio Kossuth announced that all who surrendered including military personnel would be amnestied. At 7:23 a radio report about prisoners indicated the presence of military officers among those arrested

fighting and wearing their uniform. On the next day (12:07 P.M.) the Minister of Defense called on all soldiers who "for some reason or another lost contact with their units" to report immediately.

See The Hungarian Revolution As Reflected in Radio Broadcasts (in Hungarian) (New York: Free Europe Press, 1957), pp. 26, 36, and 69.

13. U.N. Report, pp. 24 and 159.
14. Ibid., p. 76.
15. RFE Special Report from Vienna, November 27, 1956.
16. U.N. Report, pp. 10, 24, and 129.
17. White Book, Vol. III, p. 144.
18. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 143.
19. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 95.
20. The following quotations are taken from The Hungarian Revolution As Reflected in Radio Broadcasts and refer to the program of Radio Kossuth of Budapest.
21. RFE Radio Monitoring (typewritten, in Hungarian), Radio Kossuth, November 8, 1956.
22. Ibid., Radio Pécs, November 4, 1956.
23. RFE Special from Graz, November 26, 1956.
24. There is reliable evidence for at least two such incidents, one in Budapest, one in Tata. See RFE Special from Vienna, November 22, 1956.
25. See U.N. Report, pp. 123-127.
26. See U.N. Report, p. 103.
27. RFE Special from Vienna, November 23, and November 26, 1956.
28. RFE Special from Vienna, November 26, 1956.
29. RFE Special from Vienna, November 22, 1956.

30. RFE Special from Graz, November 26, 1956.
31. RFE Special from Graz, November 24, 1956.
32. RFE Special from Vienna, November 26, 1956.
33. U.N. Report, p. 103.
34. RFE Special from Vienna, November 24, 1956.
35. RFE Special from Vienna, November 27, 1956.
36. RFE Special from Vienna, December 6, 1956.
37. RFE Special from Vienna, December 28, 1956.

38. There is ample evidence, for instance, that peasants continued to bring free supplies to the inhabitants of cities, an unselfish act that rarely if ever had parallels in the history of modern Hungary.

39. Váli, pp. 322-323.
40. RFE Radio Monitoring, November 5, 4:30 P.M., p. 378.
41. RFE Special from Graz, November 21 and 24.
42. RFE Special from Vienna, December 14.
43. RFE Special from Vienna, December 9.

44. This is based on a comparison of the orders issued to the civilian population, the use of random killings and deportations to terrorize the population into unconditional submission.

45. A comparison of the Hungarian events with the pacification of Petrograd and Moscow after the Russian revolution of 1905 shows considerable similarities. Just as in the case of Hungary the government forces under General Trepov made extensive use of random shootings, arrests, and deportations.

46. There were widespread rumors of defections and Soviet troops fighting on the side of insurgents, but these could never be confirmed. On November 21, however, two Soviet soldiers defected to Austria.

47. RFE Special from Vienna, November 19, 20, 22, and 24.

A Summary of French Efforts at Isolating the Guerrilla
During the Algerian Conflict, 1956-1962*

by

Peter Paret

ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA FROM THE POPULATION

The most successful part of the French effort consisted in conventional police measures that kept the population under surveillance, controlled movement, contained rebel political action. Means employed were census of the population, passes, permits, traffic control, checkpoints, informers, raids, counterterror, etc.

Far less effective were the accompanying psychological measures: reeducation of prisoners, education of children and adults in the schools, propaganda in radio, films, and the press.

Equally ineffective in the long run were attempts to turn guerrillas against the population by compelling the people to fight on the side of the French against the FLN. The rebels

*The original terms of reference for this study did not include provision for a study of the French counterinsurgent experience in Algeria. Subsequently it has been felt that some reference to this experience would usefully contribute to the purposes of this study. Without resources in time and funds available to permit exploration in depth of this experience, HERO has asked Dr. Peter Paret to prepare this summary of French efforts to isolate the guerrilla forces in Africa, based upon his experience and research in preparing his books, Guerrillas in the 1960's, and French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria.

understood the element of constraint involved and did not regard the mass of collaborators as permanent enemies but rather as people to be won over.

Technically effective was the resettlement of the population in certain areas to create forbidden zones in which conventional military operations could be carried out without concern for hurting friendly or neutral inhabitants. However, the relocation centers to which these people were moved were inadequately planned, financed, and administered, and rapidly turned into centers of subversion and anti-French feeling.

ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA FROM OUTSIDE SUPPORT

The French naval and air blockade, and the sophisticated barriers along the Tunisian and Moroccan frontiers, kept shipments of arms and equipment to a minimum, prevented rebel units trained in foreign sanctuaries from coming to the help of the guerrillas, and handicapped rebel planning and coordination. But again, conventional military success was compromised by inadequacy in the civil sector. For the barriers to be effective they had to be backed by zones in which troops could operate freely, i.e., from which civilians had been evacuated. Yet far less money and expertise was invested in relocation than in constructing and manning the barriers. A major component of the system was slighted. Outside support was blocked, but within the country new and extremely favorable opportunities were provided to the guerrilla.

ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA DIPLOMATICALLY

Here the French failed completely.

SUMMATION

French military techniques, which have served as models for much recent US activity, proved reasonably successful in the narrow conventional context. If France had been able to invest more money, equipment, and men, they would have been even more successful. French political measures failed, because the population was not presented with a clearly superior

alternative to the FLN, and because some military techniques undercut political and psychological action. In theory the French understood the importance of nonmilitary measures in this type of conflict, but in practice these measures suffered from representing an unacceptable national policy, from being ill-conceived, and from being carried out too often as an afterthought.

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14.

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