

Resistance and Liberation

In *Resistance and Liberation*, Douglas Porch continues his epic history of France at war. Emerging from the débâcle of 1940, France faced the quandary of how to rebuild military power, protect the empire, and resuscitate its global influence. While Charles de Gaulle rejected the armistice and launched his offshore crusade to reclaim French honor within the Allied camp, defeatists at Vichy embraced cooperation with the victorious Axis. The book charts the emerging dynamics of *la France libre* and the Alliance, Vichy collaboration, and the swelling resistance to the Axis occupation. From the campaigns in Tunisia and Italy to Liberation, Douglas Porch traces how de Gaulle sought to forge a French army and prevent civil war. He captures the experiences of ordinary French men and women caught up in war and defeat, the choices they made, the trials they endured, and how this has shaped France's memory of those traumatic years.

Douglas Porch is Distinguished Professor Emeritus and former Chair of the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. His previous books include *Defeat and Division: France at War, 1939–1942*, *Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War*, *The Path to Victory: The Mediterranean Theater in World War II* (published in the UK as *Hitler's Mediterranean Gamble*), and *The French Secret Services: From the Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf War*.

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Douglas Porch

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France at War, 1942–1945

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Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8EA, United Kingdom
One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia
314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre,
New Delhi – 110025, India
103 Penang Road, #05–06/07, Visioncrest Commercial, Singapore 238467

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Preface

The first volume of this study of France in the Second World War tracked the collapse of the Third Republic in a disaster which, depending on the view of contemporaries and historians since, combined strategic miscalculation with a deficit of political will and popular resilience. US Ambassador to France William Bullitt was hardly alone in attributing France's rapid downfall in 1940 to French political divisions and the "sullen apathy" of the French political class. In this spirit, France's defensive strategic posture anchored in the Maginot Line and the forward defense of the Dyle–Breda Plan was calculated to draw British forces back onto the Continent, and force Hitler to expend his military energy on the margins in Poland and the Baltic, while the German economy would rapidly asphyxiate. Unfortunately, hopes for the success of this strategy had already been undone by the Nazi–Soviet Pact of August 1939. In the Phoney War interim, rather than summon a spirit of *union sacrée* that had forged French resolve in 1914, in the view of historian and participant/observer Marc Bloch, the government had filled the winter stalemate of 1939–1940 with concrete and propaganda puffery characterized by "its irritating and crude optimism, its timidity, and above all, the inability of our rulers to give a frank definition of their war aims."¹ The precipitous German offensive of May–June 1940 had revealed a shattering deficit of mental resilience in the Allied high command that had failed to modernize its doctrine, as well as a dearth of combat motivation and preparation among Allied soldiers. As a result, the Alliance had crumbled in the face of what was in effect a sixteen-division German strategic raid. In the process, Anglo-French Phoney War strategy had been exposed as little more than "wishful strategic thinking" layered over a flawed net assessment, applied by Allied armies neither operationally, tactically, nor spiritually prepared to deal with German strategic and tactical surprise.² A battlefield panic of two French divisions at Bulson near Sedan had kindled a moral and positional collapse from which French arms never recovered. In this way, Hitler's Operation *Fall Gelb* exposed the breathtaking inadequacies of the French operational and tactical doctrine of *colmatage* (plugging the gap), the absence of an air–land battle concept, *château* generalship which straightjacketed battlefield initiative and adaptation, fragmented

and unsystematic intelligence assessment and integration into operational planning, undermotorization that limited mobility, and antiquated and fragile communications and logistical systems designed for static front warfare. The inability of a disorientated French High Command to reassert control over a rapidly collapsing battlespace in the face of relentless German pressure, combined with the evacuation of British troops at Dunkirk and Saint-Nazaire, and the fall of Paris, which many French soldiers took to signal the termination of their contractual obligations to the French state, rattled morale, strained Alliance relations, and opened the door to defeatists in Bordeaux keen to exit the conflict, terminating *la Troisième* on their way out. Philippe Pétain's 17 June 1940 announcement that he planned to seek an armistice delivered the *coup de grâce* to the morale of a French nation psychologically unprepared to deal with catastrophic military setbacks and catapulted Charles de Gaulle to London to organize an external resistance known as *la France libre*.

France's astonishing 1940 collapse reverberated globally, because it also exploded flawed calculations and Grand Strategy hypotheses in London, Washington, and Moscow upon which the security of the UK, United States, and Soviet Union had been anchored. As Michael Neiberg notes, France's fall "shattered the US assumption that they need not concern themselves with the periodic firestorms of the Old World." In this way, Washington's effective engagement in the war dated not from the December 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, but rather from the May–June 1940 collapse of the postulation that the defense of the Western Hemisphere could be outsourced to the French army and the Royal Navy. "The France policy that the Roosevelt administration developed emerged from an atmosphere of deep fear," writes Neiberg. "Working with Vichy appeared to some of those officials like a piece of driftwood worth clinging to in stormy seas. Their reflexive dislike of Charles de Gaulle, optimism that they could manipulate successive French leaders, and suspicion of de Gaulle's links to communists and socialists caused them to hold on to this failed approach, even long after public criticism of it had become almost impossible for the administration to answer."³

The quandary for France emerging from the *débâcle* of 1940 had been how to rebuild French military power, protect the empire, and resuscitate France's global status and influence, which were now on life support? This task was complicated by the fact that, without agreement on what had gone wrong – whether the *débâcle* had been strategic, moral, or merely the result of an operational/tactical "military misfortune" – the formula for renewal segregated French men and women into bitterly opposing camps. While de Gaulle rejected the armistice and launched his offshore crusade to reclaim French honor within the Allied camp, defeatists at Vichy embraced cooperation – deceptively marketed as "neutrality" – with the victorious Axis as a pragmatic accommodation to Europe's historical trends. Launched at Montoire on 24 October 1940,

Vichy's sham "neutrality" also sought to gain concessions that would ease the rigors of Occupation, and allow the repatriation of roughly 1.8 million French POWs, while achieving influence within the framework of Hitler's New Order in Europe. This POW liberation effort met with only modest success, so that, after the Germans repatriated the wounded, the sick, and those required to keep France functioning, around a million French soldiers remained incarcerated in Germany for the remainder of the war. Furthermore, as the "protecting power," Vichy failed to defend the Geneva Convention protections of French soldiers who rotted in the drudgery of *Oflags* and *Kommandos*, tormented by thoughts that their wives and girlfriends were sleeping around. In the meantime, statues of Marianne, symbols of the Republic, had been crated carefully in town hall basements and attics, in case they might be needed in future, as streets and squares named for Jean Jaurès and Émile Zola, and even Pierre Curie and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, were renamed. Civil servants who had refused to recant their Masonic, Socialist, Radical or Communist pasts had been sacked, providing a nucleus of leadership for a growing if still minuscule popular resistance. Clucking housewives clutching ration cards queued outside of shops, complaining that refugees were stealing bicycles and driving up prices, while speculating about whether unused sugar coupons would be valid next month. Meanwhile, their men, if they had managed to escape capture in 1940, were beginning to resemble tramps. Paunchy German security police combed the *quais* of railway stations in the *zone occupée*, finding fault in the most meticulously ordered "papers," in a game whose goal was to make their interlocutor miss his or her train. Communications between the "free" and "occupied" zones were strictly limited to "family matters." Vichy only feebly objected as Alsace-Moselle had been progressively annexed into the Greater Reich and roughly 120,000 of its military-age citizens conscripted into the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS. Allied bombs fell on cities. The war, some said, was going to last ten years.

As Vichy collaboration snowballed, de Gaulle sought to shift *la France libre*'s outsider position as "minor ally" toward the center of Allied politics as France's unique, legitimate political representative. To accomplish this, he had gradually to impose himself on London as a political actor, rather than a mere military auxiliary, and buck the strong headwind of FDR's strategy of Vichy engagement, while simultaneously coming to embody French hopes as the symbol of resistance to Axis occupation. His campaign had stumbled at the starting gate, with failure to rally Dakar in September 1940, followed in July 1941 by the repatriation to French North Africa (AFN), with British connivance, of most of the Vichy garrison in the Levant. These setbacks had been recouped at least spiritually by the heroic stand at Bir Hakeim in May–June 1942, which advertised that the resolve of *les Forces françaises libres* transcended their diminutive numbers and exotic recruitment. This offered a tentative step toward rehabilitating

France's martial reputation and hence political clout, symbolized in the 13 July 1942 rebranding of the Gaullist movement as *la France combattante* (Fighting France) under the *Comité national Français*, a bid to incorporate the internal resistance. At least in theory, this broadened de Gaulle's political constituency, and gave his renegade movement a degree of momentum on the eve of Operation Torch.

Nonetheless, Vichy's delusional slither toward Axis salvation had failed to cancel it diplomatically in Washington, which had sought in vain to secure an "invitation" from Vichy's *Délégué général* in AFN Maxime Weygand to preempt a potential Axis penetration of the region that replicated the infusion of Japanese troops into French Indochina. With Weygand's November 1941 recall to France at German insistence, American Minister in Algiers Robert Murphy was tasked with preparing the ground for an American invasion, which Roosevelt was determined to carry out. The result was the "group of five," which historian of AFN Christine Levisse-Touzé categorized as a metaphor for a collection of intelligence agents, saboteurs, propagandists, and civil and military conspirators who emerged after or before April 1942 to undermine cooperation with the Axis in AFN, and eventually neutralize the Vichy response to an Anglo-American invasion. While Operation Torch was "too big to fail," and the French command in AFN too muddled and understrength to respond effectively to the unanticipated Anglo-American invasion, the notion reinforced by cheerful intelligence reports that a significant "resistance" in AFN indicated that the region awaited Allied liberation quieted opposition to Roosevelt's plan in the cabinet and among US military chiefs. Unfortunately, a consequence of the hesitation and equivocation of Vichy proconsuls in AFN, in particular that of the Army commander in AFN Alphonse Juin, was a bloody and, many concluded, unnecessary Tunisia campaign, an account of which begins this volume.

At the turn of the New Year 1943, the Allies progressively gained the upper hand in the Battle of the Atlantic, Axis operations against Suez and Stalingrad folded, and the Allies secured AFN, whose allegiances and military potential nevertheless remained in doubt. On an operational level, the perfection of amphibious operations as demonstrated by Torch, combined with the Allies' command of North Africa, threatened the Axis' southern European glacis, that included a Vichy rump of bypassed, demilitarized, and progressively Nazified diehards, who nevertheless remained fully capable of inflicting pain on their own population. The effort by a divided France, amid civil war, burdened with a fractured army and scuttled navy to emerge from the conflict as anything other than a second-tier, if not third-tier, courtesy power would require de Gaulle to pursue a strategy of disruption that would rattle alliance cohesion. In this respect, Torch and the "Darlan deal," superseded by what would become Washington's politically counterproductive, even practically farcical 1943

approval of the clueless Henri Giraud to lead France's exile movement, would mark an important turning point in the war. The Anfa Conference of January 1943 would make increasingly clear that, although Washington and London had pooled their resources to defeat the Axis, Anglo-American discord over how to accommodate France as military ally and political partner threatened to rattle the alliance. In fact, a lack of consensus in Washington over the future of Europe meant that, as noted by Hilary Footitt and John Simmonds, "the Allies failed to find any way of translating their massive military power into political control." This disjuncture of inter-allied statecraft and strategy left the door ajar for Charles de Gaulle to impose his own vision for France's political future, and begin to erect the mechanisms for a new French regime to fill the void left by ill-defined Allied policy in the wake of the precipitous August–September 1944 German exit from France.⁴

De Gaulle's quest to resuscitate a French army would aim to rehabilitate France's martial reputation, prevent civil war from breaking out on liberation, and assert France's interests in post-war Europe. Torch and the subsequent Anfa Conference would launch the modernization of French conventional forces composed at this stage of the war principally of *l'armée d'Afrique*, whose coerced conversion to Gaullism would be freighted with lingering *Maréchalist* loyalties. But these soldiers had few options – their commander Alphonse Juin had concluded in November 1942 that rallying to the Allies gave France the best chance of clinging to empire, the foundation of national grandeur and *l'armée d'Afrique's raison d'être*. AFN would also give de Gaulle a base of operations independent of vexatious Churchillian constraints. Even so, his quarrels with the Anglo-Americans would escalate, triggered by his apprehensions about Churchill's designs on the French empire, in particular the Levant, and amplified by FDR's obstinate refusal to recognize de Gaulle and the *Comité français de libération nationale* (CFLN), and to associate resistance in France with Allied operational planning. Picking quarrels also became a tactic to shed the image of "the squatter on the banks of the Thames," and deliver a degree of separation from his Allied sponsors, which the Prince de Condé of the era of the French Revolution – with whom de Gaulle and his exile army were sometimes inauspiciously compared – never managed to achieve. De Gaulle's embrace of the internal resistance, through his agents Jean Moulin and Pierre Brossolette, was aimed further to reinforce his democratic bona fides, as had been his public November 1942 Albert Hall pledge to restore the French Republic. This aligned *Gaullisme de guerre* with the Western Allied goal of restoring democracy. But, also, his embrace of the internal resistance defending the sacred soil of the Hexagon rebutted the charge by the "Victor of Verdun" that the external resistance had abandoned the French people.

Vichy's dogged, if naive and fruitless, attempts to strike up a cozy collaboration with the Axis allowed such figures as Fritz Todt, Fritz Sauckel, and Albert

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Speer to levy more exacting demands on the French economy and manpower now that Axis occupation blanketed the entire country from November 1942. This policy of exploitation in the face of craven Vichy acquiescence was bound to produce popular backlash, in the form of a growing resistance movement, best exemplified by a spontaneous flight of young French labor conscripts into the *maquis*, in the process transforming resistance in France in 1943–1944 from a largely urban to a rural phenomenon. This emergence and expansion of an internal resistance opened opportunities for the Gaullists. Presented as a patriotic *levée en masse*, resistance in France rhetorically at least associated the French people with their own liberation, and would help to legitimize Charles de Gaulle in the eyes of the Allies as a democratic leader with a popular mandate. The Allied “interface services” – special operations branches – were poised to nurture and promote resistance in France as elsewhere in Europe, seeing it as holding the potential to furnish an extra dimension of military power and propaganda as a clandestine armed struggle. In this way, a growing popular resistance inside France promised to become a force multiplier, demonstrating a popular rejection of Vichy that would boost de Gaulle’s standing in the Alliance. A mushrooming resistance also validated his demands that the CFLN, the de facto French exile government from June 1943 seated in Algiers, be included in Allied planning for the invasion of France. Finally, a growing resistance movement held out hope that resistance-occupied “cleared zones,” similar to those in Greece and the Balkans, might permit the Gaullists to establish territorial authority within France independent of Anglo-American invasion forces.

However, the perils of internal resistance were also considerable, beginning with the fact that resistance in France formed a fissiparous crusade, one often captured on the local level by strong-willed leaders, some under communist influence, who nurtured their own political agendas, as the September 1943 liberation of Corsica was to reveal. This independence and willingness to ignore or reject CFLN authority was reinforced by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) that financed, armed, and “advised” them. A second problem became how to militarize, configure, and lead a largely spontaneous tsunami of young fugitives who had collected in remote areas of the country to support a conventional invasion. Third, this resistance–special operations tandem served only to increase the divisiveness and violence of the occupation, as brutal population control methods evolved by the Germans initially for Eastern and Southeastern Europe, as well as the troops and intelligence services who applied them, were imported into France. The German occupation would be reinforced by repressive formations such as the French police, the thuggish *Milice* or the *Groupe mobile de réserve* (GMR), backed by networks of informants and “snitches,” mobilized by an increasingly

desperate and collaborationist-minded Vichy government. Therefore, the French reaction to a growing resistance movement was often ambiguous, when not openly hostile, because actions of resistance brought down retribution on the civilian population. At the same time, French economic collaboration had justified intensified Allied bombing of the Hexagon, whose subsequent collateral damage and high number of civilian casualties were exploited both by Vichy and by the Germans to reinforce their anti-Allied message, and caused Pétain's increasingly precarious government to double-down on collaboration, in a hollow hope of gaining concessions from a Hitler who was ever more desperate and on the defensive.

Finally, the explosion of the internal resistance would complicate the resurrection of a unified liberation army. With an eye to London and Washington, D. C., de Gaulle might tendentiously argue that French soldiers had never ceased to fight the Axis, as illustrated by the courageous defense of Bir Hakeim. But not only were the diminutive *Forces françaises libre* reliant largely on colonial subjects impressed in the few backwoods colonies that the Free French had managed to subvert, but also the liberating rhetoric of the Atlantic Charter of August 1941 promised a post-war world of generalized freedoms of the soon-to-be United Nations, which threatened France's empire. Because de Gaulle's claim to be France's legitimate leader hinged on his staunch defense of empire as a central pillar of French grandeur and influence, the Allied position potentially posed an existential threat not only to de Gaulle's base of support, but also to France's future as a global power.

Forging a French army from *les Forces françaises libres*, the overwhelmingly Muslim *armée d'Afrique*, and the internal resistance, all with different experiences, and representing often opposing political attitudes and aspirations, as well as levels of combat experience, would pose a political and institutional challenge. The Gaullist solution to the incongruity of France being liberated behind a spearhead of colonial praetorians was that, once onshore in France, sub-Saharan African levies would be switched out with a *levée en masse* of patriotic French resisters, militarized as *les Forces françaises de l'intérieur* (FFI). Not only would this "whitening" of France's army of liberation resurrect the metropolitan French army, but also *l'armée d'Afrique* could serve as a mechanism to corral and discipline very politicized "fifis." De Gaulle's objective also was to rebuild French civil-military relations, a tall task as defeat in 1940 and the exile of a small Armistice Army to the *zone libre*, followed by its dissolution in November 1942, had severed the links between the French people and their army.

Therefore, a lack of consensus among Allied leaders on the fate of post-war Europe and hence France's role in it that would on occasion find de Gaulle at loggerheads with the "Anglo-Saxons"; heavily armed resistance factions often

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led by “feudals” with their own political agendas, enabled in de Gaulle’s view by the Allied “interface services”; and the lack of a strong conventional army to impose order, shoo the Wehrmacht off the property, and stake out an occupation zone in Germany and Austria all raised serious questions about what war termination would hold in store for France.

Abbreviations

AAA	Anti-aircraft artillery
AC	Armistice Commission
ACC	Allied Control Commission
ACI	Advisory Council for Italy
AD	Armored Division
ADD	Amis de Darlan
AEF	French Equatorial Africa
AFAT	Auxiliaires féminines de l'armée de terre
AFHQ	Allied Forces Headquarters
AFN	Afrique française du nord/French North Africa
AMFA	Administration militaire forces armées
AMGOT	Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories
ANZAC	Australian and New Zealand Army Corps
AOF	French West Africa
AS	Armée secrète
ASDIC	Anti-submarine Detection Investigation Committee
Ast	Abwehrstellen
ASW	Anti-submarine warfare
ATS	Auxiliary Territorial Service
AWOL	Absent without leave
Bat d'Af	Bataillon d'infanterie légère d'Afrique
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BCRA	Bureau central de renseignements et d'action
BCRAA	BCRA Algiers
BCRAL	BCRA London
BCRAM	BCRA Militaire
BDM	Bund Deutscher Mädel (Band of German Maidens)
BDS	Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (German Security Police)
BEF	British Expeditionary Force
BFL	Brigade française libre
BFO	Brigade française libre d'Orient

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BIA	Bataillon d'infanterie aéroportée
BLM	Brigade légère mécanique
BM	Bataillon de marche/bataillon médical
BMA	Bureau des menées antinationales
BMC	Bordel militaire de campagne
CAD	Civil Affairs Division
CAF	Corps d'armée français
CCFA	Commandant en chef français en Allemagne
CCS	Combined Chiefs of Staff (US and UK)
CCZN	Comité de coordination de la zone nord
CDL	Comité départemental de libération
CDM	Camouflage du matériel
CDN	Comité de défense nationale
CEF	Corps expéditionnaire français (in Italy)
CEFEO	Corps expéditionnaire français d'Extrême-Orient
CFA	Corps franc d'Afrique
CFLN	Comité français de libération nationale
CFT	Corps féminin des transmissions
CGM	Commandement des goums marocains
CGT	Confédération générale du travail
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIGS	Chief of the Imperial General Staff
CLI	Corps léger d'intervention
CLL	Comité local de libération
CLN	Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale (Italian National Liberation Committee)
CNF	Comité national français
CNI	Commissariat national à l'Intérieur
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CNR	Conseil national de la résistance
COMIDAC/COMAC	Comité d'action en France
COMZ	Communication zone
COS	Chief of Staff
COSSAC	Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
CP	Command post
CPDN	Comité permanent de la Défense Nationale
CRA	Centre de ralliement et d'accueil
CRS	Compagnies républicaines de sécurité
CSAR	Comité secret d'action révolutionnaire (Cagoule)
CSDN	Comité supérieur de la Défense Nationale
CSTM	Commandant supérieur des troupes du Maroc
CSTT	Commandant supérieur des troupes de Tunisie

List of Abbreviations

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CUAR	Comité d'Unité d'Action Révolutionnaire
CVF	Corps des volontaires françaises (female volunteers for la France libre)
DAA	Détachement de l'Armée de l'Atlantique
DAF	Détachement d'armée française
DAF	Deutsche Arbeitsfront (German Labor Front)
DAL	Deutsch-Arabische Lehrabteilung (Arab volunteers for the German Army)
DB	Division blindée (Armored Division)
DBLE	Demi-brigade de la légion étrangère
DCA	Défense contre aviation (Anti-aircraft)
DCr	Division cuirassée de réserve
DDT	Dichlorodiphényltrichloroethane
DFL	Division française libre
DGER	Direction générale des études et recherches
DGSS	Direction générale des services spéciaux
DI	Division d'infanterie
DIA	Division d'infanterie algérienne
DIA	Division d'infanterie alpine
DIC	Division d'infanterie coloniale
DIM	Division d'infanterie du Maroc
DLM	Division légère mécanique
DMA	Division de marche d'Alger
DMC	Division de marche de Constantine
DMI	Division motorisée d'infanterie
DMI	Division de marche d'infanterie
DMM	Division de marche du Maroc
DMM	Division marocaine de montagne
DMN	Délégué militaire national
DMO	Division de marche d'Oran
DMOS	Délégué militaire pour les opérations de zone sud
DMR	Délégué militaire régional
DMZ	Délégués militaires de zone
DP	Displaced person
DSM	Direction de sécurité militaire
DSPG	Direction du service des prisonniers de guerre
DSS	Direction des services spéciaux
EAC	European Advisory Commission
ELAS	Greek People's Liberation Army
EMDN	État-major de la défense nationale
EMFFI	État-major des Forces françaises de l'intérieur
ESG	École supérieure de guerre

xxiv List of Abbreviations

ETO	European Theater of Operations
FAF	French Air Force
FAFL	Forces aériennes françaises libres
FANY	First Air Nursing Yeomanry
FEC	French Expeditionary Corps
FFC	Forces françaises combattantes (Fighting France forces)
FFI or “fifis”	Forces françaises de l’intérieur
FFL	Forces françaises libres
FFO	Forces françaises de l’Ouest
FG	Feldgendarmerie
FL	La France libre
FN	Front national
FNFL	Forces navales françaises libres
FTP	Francs-Tireurs et Partisans
FTS	French Training Section
G2	Military intelligence
G3	Military operations
GCE	Groupement de commandement et d’engin
Gestapo	Geheime Staatspolizei (secret police)
GFP	Geheime Feldpolizei (Wehrmacht secret field police)
GHQ	General Headquarters
GMC	General Motors Truck Company
GMR	Groupe mobile de réserve
GPRF	Gouvernement provisoire de la république française
GQG Air	Grand Quartier Général Air
GSS	Groupe spécial de sécurité
GTL	Groupement tactique de Lorraine
GTM	Groupement de tabors marocains
HC	High command
HCM	Hôpital chirurgical mobile
HJ	Hitlerjugend (Hitler Youth)
HP	Horse-power
HQ	Headquarters
HSSPF	Höherer SS- und Polizeiführer (senior Nazi Party official in command of SS, Gestapo, or police units)
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
ID	Infantry Division
IPS	Instruction personnelle et secrète
IS	Intelligence Service
ISU	Italian Service Units (Italian POWS in Allied service)
JAG	Judge Advocate General

List of Abbreviations

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JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JRC	Joint Rearmament Committee
KdS	Kommando der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD
KG	Kriegsgefangener (POW)
KHD	Kriegshilfsdienst (female auxiliary service)
KIA	Killed in action
LCA	Landing Craft Assault
LCP	Landing Craft Personnel
LFC	Légion française des combattants
LRDP	Long Range Desert Patrol
LSH	Landing Ship Headquarters
LST	Landing Ship, Tank
LVF	Légion des volontaires français contre le bolchévisme
MBE	Member of the British Empire
MBF	Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich (Commander of occupation forces in France)
MEW	Ministry of Economic Warfare
MI5	Military Intelligence 5 (counterintelligence, UK)
MI6	Military Intelligence 6 (or SIS, foreign intelligence, UK)
MIA	Missing in action
MNPGD	Mouvement national des prisonnier de guerre et des déportés
MO	Maintien de l'ordre (Vichy plan)
MO	Medical orderly
MOD	Ministry of Defence (UK)
MP	Member of Parliament
MP	Milice patriotique
MP	Military Police (US)
MRP	Mouvement Républicain Populaire
MSR	Mouvement social révolutionnaire
MMLA	Mission militaire de liaisons administratives
MUR	Mouvements unis de la résistance
NAAFI	Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes
NAP	Noyautage des administrations publiques
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	Non-commissioned officer
NKVD	People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (USSR)
NS	National Socialist
NSDAP	Nazi Party

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NSKK	Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrkorps (National Socialist Motor Corps)
OAS	Organisation armée secrète
OB West	Oberbefehlshaber West (High Commander in the West)
OCM	Organisation civile et militaire
Oflag	Offizierslager (POW camp for officers)
OG	Operational Group
OKW	Oberkommando der Wehrmacht
ORA	Organisation de résistance de l'armée
ORCG	Organe de recherche des criminels de guerre
Orpo	Ordnungspolizei (ordinary police, German)
OSS	Office of Strategic Services (US)
OVRA	Organizzazione di Vigilanzae Repressione dell'Antifascismo (Italian secret police)
PCF	Parti communiste français
PCR	Radio receiver
PCT	Poste central de tir
PDG	Prisonnier de guerre
PM	Prime Minister
PNB	Parti national breton, or Strollad Broadel Breizh
POW	Prisoner of war
PPA	Parti populaire algérien
PPF	Parti populaire français
PPSh-41	Pistolet-pulemyot Shpagina-41
PR	Propagande révolutionnaire
PR	Public relations
PT	Physical training
PTSD	Post-traumatic stress disorder
PTT	Postes, télégraphes et téléphones
PWE	Political Warfare Executive
PX	Post Exchange
Pz	Panzer
PzD	Panzer Division
Pz.Kpfw.	Panzerkampfwagen (tank)
RAA	Régiment d'artillerie d'Afrique
RAD	Reichsarbeitsdienst (Reich Labor Service)
RAF	Royal Air Force
RCA	Régiment de chasseurs d'Afrique
RCP	Régiment de chasseurs parachutistes
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
RDF	Radio Direction Finding

List of Abbreviations

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RI	Régiment d'infanterie
RIC	Régiment d'infanterie coloniale
RNP	Rassemblement national populaire
RP	Resistance point
RPF	Rassemblement du peuple français
RSHA	Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Security Main Office)
RTA	Régiment de tirailleurs algériens
RTM	Régiment de tirailleurs marocains
RTS	Régiment de tirailleurs sénégalais
RTST	Régiment de tirailleurs sénégalais du Tchad
RTT	Régiment de tirailleurs tunisiens
SA	Sturmabteilung (Nazi party paramilitary wing)
SACMED	Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean
SANA	Section automobile nord-africaine
SAQJ	Service algérien des questions juives
SAS	Special Air Service
SBD	Scout Bomber Douglas
SD	Sicherheitsdienst (security police)
SDPG	Service diplomatique des prisonniers de guerre
SEAC	South East Asia Command
SFHQ	Special Forces Headquarters
SFIO	Section française de l'internationale ouvrière (French Socialist Party)
SGDA	Secrétariat général de la défense aérienne
SGJ	Secrétariat général à la Jeunesse
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
SHD	Service Historique de la Défense
SIGINT	Signals intelligence
SIM	Servizio Informazione Militari
Sipo	Sicherheitspolizei (security police)
SMERSH	Red Army Counterintelligence (from 1942)
SIS	Special Intelligence Service (MI6)
SNCF	Société nationale des chemins de fer français (French national railways)
SO	Special Operations
SOE	Special Operations Executive
SOF	Special operations forces
SOL	Service d'ordre légionnaire
SPOC	Special Project Operations Center
SR	Service de renseignement (intelligence service)
SRA	Services de renseignement et d'action

xxviii List of Abbreviations

SS	Schutzstaffel (Protection Squads)
SSA	Section sanitaire automobile féminine
SSM	Service de sécurité militaire
ST	Surveillance du Territoire
STO	Service du travail obligatoire
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TOE	Théâtre d'opération extérieure
TOO	Theater of Operations
TTD	Tactical target dossier
USAAF	US Army Air Force
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
VIP	Very important person
VP	Volontaire de place
WAAF	Women's Auxiliary Air Force
WAC	Women's Army Corps (US)
WAKO	Waffenstillstandskommission (German armistice commission)
WIA	Wounded in action
WRNS	Women's Royal Naval Service (UK)
WS	Winston Special (convoys around the Cape to Egypt)
ZOAN	Zone d'opérations aériennes nord
ZOF	Zone d'occupation française