States- and Taxman: Frederick I Barbarossa and The Holy Roman Empire in the Twelfth Century

by

Avi Chen Ming Friederich
Class of 2022

A thesis submitted to the
faculty of Wesleyan University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Bachelor of Arts
with Departmental Honors in Medieval Studies and Government

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments

To Jeff Rider, without whom this thesis would have never seen the light of day. Your patience, guidance, council, edits, and many meetings were invaluable to me and one of the best things that has happened to me over the course of my four years at Wesleyan. It was a joy talking about Modern as well as Medieval Europe with you in our weekly meetings.

To Peter Rutland, who took me on as an advisee and has been the most accessible advisor one could ask for. Your answers, sources, and insights, which you shared with me came from an unmatched breath of knowledge, without which the extent of interdisciplinarity I attempted to show in this thesis would have not been possible.

To Alan V. Murray, who graciously responded to a clueless college student across the pond, who was wondering where to begin his thesis, with the article that started this journey.

To Elizabeth Hepford and Cecilia Miller, who both introduced me to academic writing from disparate, yet equally as effective, perspectives.

To my dad and my friends Tanya Phanich and Magine Slonaker, who have been my editors-in-chief and ever-helpful consultants in all matters.

To Olin Memorial Library and its staff, to whom I owe a thank you for managing an expansive collection of literature, but also for finding the most obscure German texts from across the world and sending them to my fingertips.

To my housemates, Tanya, Shawn, Chunyue, Shoko and Dabin, of 88 Home Avenue, who created the ideal atmosphere to write and provided much needed company as writers and supporters alike.

To Max Gibson and Sandy Kanjanakuha, who, as the best of friends, nudged and shoved me into directions, I never dared to explore.

To my mom and sister, who support me at every step of my way, be it before, during or beyond my time at Wesleyan.

To my friends, who have stuck with me through thick and thin.

Genealogical Chart of the Hohenstaufen Imperial Family



The Staufen Imperial Family in Loud, *The History of the Expedition Frederick and Related Texts*, xii.

Introduction

Unde diu cogitans quod non esset tutum

Cesari non reddere censum vel tributum,

Vidua pauperior tibi do minutum,

De cuius me laudibus pudet esse mutum.[1]

- Archipoeta

This poem, which was written by the Archpoet, an anonymous poet, who worked as a notary for one of Barbarossa's archchancellors between 1158 – 1167, refers to Frederick I Barbarossa, king of Germany and emperor of the Holy Roman Empire in the latter half of the twelfth century, whose praise and opprobrium I will sing in this thesis.[2] But why do I write about Barbarossa? I was confronted with this question after I presented part of my research for this thesis at a conference by one of the members in the audience. The answer I gave, did not satisfy me, it went along the lines of 'why not' and 'he was great.' And although Frederick and his reign has been covered extensively, I wanted to explore for myself where that greatness stemmed from and how significant the Holy Roman Empire was in the twelfth century among its peers. The poem above already alludes to one of the main subjects of this thesis: the economy, particularly state

[1] And so, after long reflection that it would be unsafe / not to pay the emperor tax or tribute, /more impoverished than the widow, I make my tiny offering / to you whose praises I should be ashamed to not sing. See translation in Peter Godman, "THE ARCHPOET AND THE EMPEROR," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 74 (2011): 43.
[2] Ibid., 31.

income through taxation and other means. After narrating Barbarossa's life and his political policies, starting at the beginning of his reign as German king to his watery end in the Saleph river, I go on to estimate not only his, but also the size of the economies of the greatest powers of Europe in the twelfth century. To economically contrast the empire to other realms, was one way I tried to measure the empire's grandeur. Another method I explored was to determine its political makeup and if it fit not only among the most developed kingdoms of its time, but also how it compared to modern state theory. I then expand on this thought and attempt to detect traits of the Holy Roman Empire within the Third Reich, which Hitler designates as its ideological successor state, and the Bundesrepublik Deutschland of today. Hereby, I also expand Charles Tilly's time frame of state formation by another ~ 250 years. A thesis on Barbarossa would not be complete without the Third Crusade, which I not only dissected historically, but also highlight as act into which the political and economic efforts of Frederick I Barbarossa culminate. By looking at Barbarossa's reign through the lenses of government, economy and history, this thesis seeks to prove that Frederick's Holy Roman Empire rivalled its neighboring kingdoms, states, and realms, economically and politically.

Chapter One - The Life and Political Agenda of Frederick I Barbarossa

The First Half of Barbarossa's Reign (1152 – 1168)

Frederick I Barbarossa was elected king of Germany on March 4, 1152. Just thirty years earlier his election would have been strongly influenced by the church, yet it lost its right of lay investiture at the Concordat of Worm in 1122, giving the secular rulers of Europe more power. Theoretically, the election process to become king of Germany was superfluous, as succession to the German throne occurred hereditarily.[3] Yet, elections were still held for the purpose of legitimizing the ruler, as the strongest princes of Germany were given the opportunity to show or deny their support for the future king. This process was rather an election by acclamation, than a democratic election by vote. Oftentimes, the kings-to-be chose the electors themselves, an act we nowadays would consider as 'rigging' the electoral process.[4] Barbarossa's election was not different, if not even more corrupt.

The rise of Frederick Barbarossa commences with his uncle Conrad III, who became undisputed king of Germany in 1138 and was Barbarossa's immediate predecessor. Conrad had two sons, Henry VI Berengar and Frederick IV of Swabia. Before departing on the Second Crusade in 1147, Conrad had his son Henry elected as king of Germany to secure the succession of his lineage. In an unfortunate sequence of events, Henry Berengar passed away in 1150, shortly

[3] Heinrich Mitteis, *Die deutsche Königswahl und Ihre Rechtsgrundlage bis zur Goldenen Bulle*, (Brünn: Rudolf M. Rohrer Verlag, 1938), 36 – 46.
[4] Ibid., 66 – 74.

followed by Conrad's death in 1152, leaving a seven-year-old Frederick IV as rightful heir to the throne. Due to Frederick IV's young age, Barbarossa seized the opportunity to put forth his own claim to the throne. Frederick Barbarossa, who was related to the ruling house as Conrad's nephew, was able to rally more support than his young political adversary, therefore denying the claim of the previous ruler's son.[5] Because he was not expected to rule, Barbarossa was never taught Latin and throughout his rule had to rely on translators to make up for his lack of education. His ascension to power occurred at a rapid pace, as he was elected only two and a half weeks after Conrad's death. His coronation followed five days later, in Aachen on March 9, 1152. Given the speed with which he was elected and crowned, the historian John B. Freed argues that his election had "all the earmarks of a coup d'état" that transferred ruling power from one branch of the Hohenstaufen, the ruling house, to another.[6] The fact that Frederick Barbarossa did not ask the pope for the confirmation of his election, as was the custom at the time, supports Freed's claim. Instead, Barbarossa merely informed Pope Eugenius (1088 – 1153)[7] of his new position. Although his electors are largely unknown, three important figures stand out among them: Henry the Lion (1129 – 1195), Welf VI (1115-1191) and Berthold IV (1125 – 1186).[8] They were Frederick's most loyal electors and as such were rewarded: Henry the Lion

[5] John B. Freed, *Frederick Barbarossa: The Prince and The Myth* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), xix.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Pope from 1145 – 1153.
[8] Henry the Lion was the duke of Saxony and a member of the House of Welf, Welf VI was an uncle of Barbarossa and a member of the House of Welf, Berthold IV was the duke of Zähringen (parts of Swabia and Burgundy today). See Joachim Ehlers, "Friedrich I. Barbarossa," in *Die deutschen Herrscher des Mittelalters: Historische Portraits von Heinrich I. bis Maximilian I. (919-1519*), ed. Bernd Schneidmüller and Stefan Weinfurter (München: Beck, 2003), 232.

received the kingdom of Bavaria; Welf VI was offered the duchy of Spoleto, the margraviate[9] of Etruria[10] and the principality of Sardinia; and Berthold IV becoming the king's deputy in Burgundy and Provence.[11] As we can see from these territories that he distributed among his electors, Barbarossa's rule had already encompassed the three principal kingdoms of the Holy Roman Empire: Germany, Italy and Burgundy.

The Holy Roman Empire in 1189 in Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire*, 180 – 81.

In his *Gesta Friderici Imperatoris* also known as *The Deeds of Frederick Barbarossa*, Bishop Otto von Freising describes the first eight years of Barbarossa's reign as the most peaceful period of his imperium. Interestingly, the

[9] Territory ruled by a military commander, the Margrave, who was responsible for defending one of the border provinces of the HRE.
[10] Ehlers uses" Tuszien," which would mean the ancient region of the Etruscans named Etruria/Tyyhenia in Central Italy, but also could refer to the region of Tuscany.
[11] Ehlers, "Friedrich I. Barbarossa," 232.

historian Jonathan Lyon argues that the small number of members of the houses Hohenstaufen and Welf were responsible for this peace.[12] At the time of Frederick's coronation, the House Welf had very few male members, there was Barbarossa's maternal uncle Welf VI with his very young son and Henry the Lion, who did not have any siblings or children. At that point, the childless Barbarossa only had one male sibling, his ten-year younger half-brother Conrad of Hohenstaufen.[13] Although Berthold had the support of his house of Zähringen, he was the weakest of the four, and unlike Welf and Henry not in a position to contest Barbarossa's rule. Therefore, the three most powerful men of the kingdom at the time had to rely on each other, as their personal family network was very limited. Barbarossa's first wife, Adelaide von Vohburg (1125 – 1187), was accused of having committed adultery, and the marriage was consequently annulled after one year (1152 – 1153).[14] The couple remained childless. He married his second wife Beatrice I, Countess of Burgundy, in 1156. Barbarossa fathered the first of his eleven children only in 1062/3 and was thus without a potential heir for the first decade of his reign.[15] His other family members were also out of the picture, as his sister Beatrice of Lorraine (1123-1195) was married to Matthias I (1119 – 1176), Duke of Lorraine, and Conrad of Hohenstaufen (1135-1195), his half-brother, was too young to assist in shaping Barbarossa's policies after his coronation. Thus, Frederick I had to rely on his cousin Henry the

[12] Jonathan R. Lyon, *Princely Brothers and Sisters*: *The Sibling Bond in German Politics, 1100-1250*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 103.
[13] See the Genealogical Chart of the Hohenstaufen Imperial Family on page vi.
[14] Otto von Freising and Rahewin, *The Deeds of Barbarossa*, trans. and ed. Charles C. Mierow (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), Book II, ch.11/xi, 122.
[15] Freed, *The Prince*, xx.

Lion and his uncle Welf VI, who were also disconnected from other family structures, in aiding him to rule his kingdom. Because Frederick married the countess of Burgundy, Berthold's position as the king's deputy in Burgundy was undermined after Barbarossa's coronation and second marriage. Given these factors, Lyon argues that the peace delineated by Otto von Freising was shaped largely by Frederick I, Welf VI, and Henry the Lions' mutual dependence on one another, which meant that any conflict between them would harm all involved parties.[16] The peace lasted until Henry the Lion grew too powerful and began to rival Barbarossa's authority as king and emperor, which culminated in decade-long power struggles between the two. This conflict will be further addressed later in this chapter.

Another historian, Karl Jordan, has viewed the peace as part of the goal of Barbarossa's political policy of *reformatio imperii*. The policy's objective was "that the Roman Empire was to be restored to its former power and glory."[17] To commence this rebuilding effort, the restoration of peace had to become one of Barbarossa's principal goals. Furthermore, the *Pax Romana* was certainly a period which Barbarossa wished to recreate. To achieve his peace, Frederick "undertook a royal progress through his dominions" in Germany and Burgundy, with the aim to make his presence known among his subjects as well as hold court to disseminate peace throughout his kingdom.[18] From Aachen, where he was crowned, he travelled to Sinzing, Utrecht, Deventer in the Low Lands, Cologne,

[16] Lyon, *Princely Brothers and Sisters*, 89 – 105.
[17] Karl Jordan, *Henry the Lion: A Biography*, (Oxford: New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1986), 42.
[18] Jordan, *Henry the Lion: A Biography*, 43.

Dortmund, Soest, Paderborn, Corvey, Goslar, Merseburg, where he held his first diet, Erfurt, near Regensburg, Augsburg, Ulm, Speyer, Worms, Fulda, Würzburg, where he held his second diet, Nuremberg, Bamberg, Mainz, Trier, Metz, Hohenburg, Colmar and Mulhouse in Alsace, Besançon in Burgundy and Constance.[19] Although it was not unusual for a king at the time, Frederick did not have a capital or principal residence which he frequented; instead he "spent his reign in the saddle."[20] To administer and rule his large empire, he relied on his princely kinsmen and clerical advisors, who judged and kept order in his place.[21] He held forty-one diets between 1152 and 1160 to resolve conflicts pertaining to German territories, such as in Merseburg (1152), Würzburg(1152), Whitsun (1153), Speyer (1153) and Goslar (1154).[22] Because Henry the Lion was often involved as one of the parties in these disputes, these pacification measures not only secured peace, but also strengthened the bond between the house of Welf and the house of Hohenstaufen. For example, in one of these courts, Frederick forced Henry II Jasomirgott to transfer the kingdom of Bavaria into the Lions' paws, due to Henry's support of Barbarossa's election. Jordan claims that the newly established trust and collaboration between the houses of Hohenstaufen and Welf "provided the most important precondition for the success of Hohenstaufen's external policy."[23] Therefore, the rise of Henry the Lion's power was necessary to achieve the political goal of peace in Frederick's dominion but would later disrupt

[19] Jordan, *Henry the Lion: A Biography*, 43 – 44 and Freed, *The Prince*, 90.
[20] Freed, *The Prince*, 89.
[21] Ibid., 90 – 91.
[22] Ibid., 90 – 92.
[23] Ibid., 46.

that peace as well. Furthermore, the *Landfriede*[24] of 1152, which was a law of the Holy Roman Emperor, decreed that to establish peace, the magnates "were responsible for the apprehension and punishment of criminals and […] other disputes in their own territories."[25] This edict was in effect until the end of Frederick's reign, as he reaffirmed it in 1187.[26] The delegation of power to local rulers helped maintain order and reduced friction between the magnates and the king, thus establishing peace in the royal and imperial realm.

Therefore, the short "*pax Germaniae"* that greatly benefited Barbarossa's early years of reign was probably caused by a multitude of factors. Lyon's argument of mutual dependency compounds with Frederick's political goal of recreating the Roman Empire to establish the peace. Furthermore, Frederick throughout his reign always sought for compromise among his subjects, which kept internal disorder at a minimum. Instead, Barbarossa's chaos was about to unfold on the lands south of the Alps.

The First Italian Campaign – *Romzug* and Northern Italy (1154 – 5)

To restore the Holy Roman Empire, Frederick Barbarossa sought to be crowned as emperor by the pope as well as incorporate all of Italy into the empire. At this point he was only in control of some parts in the north. Seven months after his coronation, Barbarossa announced at the Würzburger Hoftag, the court at Würzburg, that he would lead a military campaign into Italy within the next two years.[27] Although proclaimed well in advance, the *Romzug*, as his first Italian

[24] Roughly translates into 'peace of the land.'
[25] Freed, *The Prince*, 102 – 103.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid., 46.

campaign was to be known, was ill-equipped and was met with heavy resistance by the people of Rome. This led to a secret coronation on Saturday June 18, 1155, by Pope Adrian IV, instead of on the usual Sunday, which further angered the Romans and quickly turned into small armed skirmished between them and Frederick's men. [28] In addition, many of the other Italian cities also resisted imperial influence and Frederick I had great difficulty trying to subdue them and integrate them into the empire. These conflicts foreshadow the big battles between the Lombard League and the empire in the upcoming Italian campaigns. Upon his return to Germany, after his coronation as Holy Roman Emperor, Frederick realized he needed more support in order to carry out his foreign as well as domestic policies. [29] Apart from tying "the most powerful magnate (Henry the Lion) in the German kingdom" to himself by transferring Bavaria, he was able to secure support from other strong German princes such as Frederick of Rothenburg and Conrad of Hohenstaufen by enfeoffing them with imperial territories. On the European stage, Frederick I sought for support from Spain, England, France, Denmark, and Hungry by written correspondence and exchanging ambassadors, but with little success. [30] However, his reputation quickly deteriorated after March 24, 1160, when Pope Alexander III excommunicated Frederick because of his support of the Antipope Victor IV.[31] Barbarossa saw Adrian IV's death in 1159 as an opportunity to install a pope who would act in the interests of the empire and thus pushed back against the French and English-backed Pope Alexander III.

[28] Freed, *The Prince*, 149.
[29] Ibid., 233.
[30] Ibid., 272.
[31] See Ibid., 250 – 275.

Consequently, relations with Rome as well as France and England suffered drastically. Additionally, his plan of *reformation imperii* was in danger, as he struggled to lay legitimate claim to his empire as an excommunicated ruler.

The Second and Third Italian Campaign – Northern Italy (1158 – 1163)

Milan's refusal to recognize Barbarossa as emperor during the *Romzug* prompted him to put his domestic alliances to good use and shaped his policy toward the rebellious cities in the second and third Italian campaigns. His goals were to punish Milan for the "destruction of his seal, the failure to supply him with adequate provisions, its subjugation of Como and Lodi, and its support of Tortona," and to stop the formation of a coalition between the Italian city-states.[32] He came better prepared for the task than he had been during the *Romzug* by assembling a larger and better-equipped force as well as garnering support and troops from other Italian cities that Milan had attacked or exploited in the past.[33] His initial siege of Milan was successful, as the city capitulated fairly quickly[34] and Frederick was able to enforce his regalian rights throughout Northern Italy again. The regalian rights will be looked at more in-depth in subsequent chapters. Unfortunately for Barbarossa, the Milanese continued to rise up against the imperial reign and launched a campaign to successfully destroy the city Lodi in early 1159.[35] Furthermore, its ally Crema, a fortress, defied the imperial decree to

[32] Freed, *The Prince*, 217.
[33] See Ibid., 217 – 222.
[34] Milan on September 8, 1158, and Crema on January 26, 1160.
[35] Freed, *The Prince*, 242 – 3.

dismantle its defensive structures by February 2, 1159.[36] This led Barbarossa to launch his third Italian campaign, which was based on a strategy of attrition and resulted in Milan "being starved into submission" until its unconditional surrender in early March 1162.[37] The city was plundered and razed in the days following the surrender and Barbarossa demanded further reparations and hostages.[38] Thus, most of Northern Italy became part of the empire in the spring of 1162[39] and Frederick I was able to establish a German administration for those territories.[40] These two campaigns can be categorized as part of Frederick's overall policy to reinstate the Roman Empire, as he could not afford to have rebellious uprisings in his domains if he wished to maintain the peace.

Fourth Italian Campaign – Southern Italy (1166 – 7)

After conquering the north, Barbarossa set his sights on Southern Italy, which was controlled by the kingdom of Sicily. Although the third campaign in 1163 was successful in conquering Milan, the opposition in Italy[41] mounted and domestic support for Barbarossa's Italian campaigns dwindled. This meant that Barbarossa was not able to raise a sufficient military force to challenge the Sicilians.[42] In addition, instead of trying to gain the sympathy and support of the northern Italian communes, Barbarossa instated an administration that was crueler

[36] Freed, *The Prince*, 240.
[37] Ibid., 284 – 288.
[38] Ibid., 289.
[39] Apart from the castle of Garda, which was besieged until the summer of 1163. See Freed, *The Prince*, 292.
[40] Freed, *The Prince*, 292.
[41] The formation of the Veronese League in April 1164 to counter Barbarossa led by Byzantine-supported Venice as well as the uprising/revolts of allied Italian communes, which suffered under the harsh imperial rule. See Freed, *The Prince*, 315 – 317.
[42] Freed, *The Prince*, 315 – 317.

and more exploitative than the one that had existed before his third campaign.[43] Barbarossa's harsh policies and cruel commanders in Lombardy led to uprisings and let to the establishment of the Lombard League sometime around 1166.[44] This order was a wealthy and mighty coalition of Italian city-states and a successor of the earlier Veronese League. In addition, Paschal III succeeded Frederick's antipope, Victor IV, who passed away in 1164, and while Barbarossa's army regrouped in Germany, the new antipope, Pope Alexander II, seized the opportunity to return to Rome from his exile on November 23, 1165.[45] Frederick used his time in Germany to strengthen his legitimacy as ruler by building a "dynastic continuity between Charlemagne and the Staufer."[46] Besides canonizing Charlemagne, the first emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, he commissioned the Cappenberger Barbarossakopf portraying the Staufer family at its pedestal and the head of Barbarossa prominently on top.[47]

"Cappenberger Barbarossakopf," Web Gallery of Art, accessed April 5, 2022, https://www.wga.hu/html_m/zzdeco/1gold/12c/09g_1100.html.

[43] See Freed, *The Prince*, 317 – 320.
[44] Ibid., 338.
[45] Ibid., 335.
[46] Ibid., 334.
[47] Ibid.

Having put his domestic affairs in order, Barbarossa set his sights once more on establishing his own pope in Roman and conquering the Norman kingdom of Sicily. A court was held in February 1166 in Nuremberg, where it was decided that another campaign to Italy should be launched with the goal to conquer Sicily and install Paschall III as the rightful pope in Rome.[48] As his domestic forces had been significantly weakened over the course of his largely unsuccessful first, second and third Italian campaigns, Barbarossa needed to hire mercenaries. He was the first to employ the Brabanters or Brabançons, who were known for their ruthlessness on the battlefield. They saw their first combat in Barbarossa's service at the Battle of Monte Porzio in 1167.[49] These "adventurers and criminals without professional training" came from the Brabant, which was part of the empire[50] (a part of Belgium and the Netherlands today) and fought mainly on foot.[51] The imperial army crossed the Alps in October 1166 and reached Bologna by February 10, 1167.[52] To address the revolts caused by the formation of the Lombard League, Barbarossa only sent out the bishop Hermann of Verden in May 1167 to Pavia, which remained loyal to the empire.[53] Freed suggests, that Barbarossa may have assumed that the coalition of city-states would self-disintegrate due to their history of hostility against one another.[54]

---

[48] Freed, *The Prince*, 335.
[49] Julia Knödler, "Brabançons," in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Medieval Warfare and Military Technology*, ed. Clifford J. Rogers, William Caferro, and Shelley Reid (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 168.
[50] A province of Belgium from 1830 – 1995 and nowadays split into the provinces Noord-Brabant (Netherlands), Walloon Brabant and Flemish Brabant (both Belgian). See "Brabant | Historical Duchy, Europe | Britannica," accessed April 5, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/place/Brabant.
[51] Knödler, "Brabançons," 168.
[52] Freed, *The Prince*, 337.
[53] Ibid., 339.
[54] Ibid.

Barbarossa continued to lead his army to Rome, where he defeated the Roman army at the aforementioned Battle of Monte Porzio. As a result of the battle, Pope Alexander fled Rome and made way for Paschal's ascension to St. Peter's seat.[55] After a weeklong siege of St. Peter's cathedral, Frederick Barbarossa was able to crow Paschal III as pope over all of Christendom on July 30, 1167.[56] It seemed like Barbarossa had successfully championed Paschal III against Alexander III, the favorite of France and England. Frederick also agreed to a peace pact with the defeated Romans, which gave Rome the status of an imperial city governed by fifty senators appointed by Barbarossa. In return, Rome did not have to pay any imperial fees or taxes. Thanks to this arrangement and its relative integration into the Holy Roman Empire, the city remained loyal to the empire longer than the rest of Italy.[57]

However, Frederick's triumph was short-lived. Scholars now believe that an epidemic of dysentery wiped out thousands of Barbarossa's men starting on August 2, 1167.[58] This caused Frederick to retreat hastily back to Germany on August 6, but the retreat was interrupted by a blockade in Pontremoli, which led

[55] Freed, *The Prince*, 338 – 340.
[56] Ibid., 342.
[57] Ibid., 343.
[58] Ibid., 344. Previously it was believed that malaria was the primary cause of the epidemic, as Rome was located near mosquito-ridden swamps. Yet, the incubation period of Malaria was too long to have been the result of the storm that caused the outbreak on August 2, 1167.

Barbarossa to outlaw the cities of the Lombard League in a public address in September of that year.[59]



The Lombard League in "Lombard League," *Wikipedia*, uploaded February 22, 2022, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Lombard_League&oldid=1073387751.

This meant, that the cities were not under imperial protection and seen as enemies of Barbarossa. He had, however, no means to enforce his proclamation, as all his attempts at conquest south of the Alps had failed. Therefore, in the following months Frederick Barbarossa was chased by the armies of the league across Northern Italy, until he could finally slip away across the Alps on March 9, 1168.[60]

The Second Half of Barbarossa's Reign (1168 – 1187)

After his return from Italy, Barbarossa spent the longest continuous period of his reign in Germany, lasting from March 1168 to September 1174, and shaped

[59] Freed, *The Prince*, 345.
[60] Ibid., 348.

his policies that would play a major role in the latter half of his sovereignty.[61] He spent this long period in Germany because "the kingdom was in disarray," as the German high nobility was ignoring summons to court and did not show up at royal declarations, undermining the emperor's authority as ruler.[62] Another issue with which Frederick had to deal with were the deaths of his soldiers and nobles caused by the epidemic at the end of his last Italian campaign. The loss of these men meant that he had to enfeoff their lands to his remaining princes, strengthening their power even further. Given the problems arising around him, he feared for the future and stability of the empire and decided to have his second son, Henry VI, elected as co-king of Germany on August 15, 1169.[63] His first son, Frederick IV, suffered from poor health and Barbarossa did not think he was fit to rule. Despite still being excommunicated and shunned by his nobility, Barbarossa managed to increase the territorial holding of his house and gained stronger influence in Bohemia.[64]

The Fifth Italian campaign (1174 – 1179)

However, Antipope Paschal III passed away on September 20, 1169, which reinvigorated the conflict over the papacy.[65] Given the domestic troubles Barbarossa was facing, he reached out to Pope Alexander III in 1170 in the hope of finding a compromise.[66] Although, Frederick was willing to "desist from any

[61] Freed, *The Prince*, 349.
[62] Ibid., 350. In May 1168 two Saxon lords did not respond to the summoning to court and on July 10, his closest relatives and rulers did not show up to the 'Golden Liberty,' during which Frederick granted the rights of rule over Wuerzburg to the bishop of Wuerzburg.
[63] Freed, *The Prince*, 352.
[64] Ibid., 378.
[65] Ibid., 350.
[66] Ibid., 353.

further measures against the pope and to accept the validity of ordinances and to enforce them," he did not want to show his reverence publicly.[67] This made it impossible to resolve the papal schism, which meant he once again saw himself forced to embark on an Italian campaign to crush the Lombard League and install a pope, who saw the German-led empire favorably.

The fifth Italian campaign was a half-hearted last hurrah by the emperor to attempt to overcome the Lombards by destroying the newly founded city Alessandria.

The Position of Alessandria in "Alessandria location on the Italy map," OnTheWorldMap.com, accessed April 5, 2022, https://ontheworldmap.com/italy/city/alessandria/alessandria-location-on-the-italy-map.html.

[67] Freed, *The Prince*, 353 – 4.

He took an army of around 8,000 soldiers across the Alps in September 1174.[68] Most of his men were mercenaries, as few German noblemen accompanied Frederick.[69] The make-up and small size of his army made it difficult for the German to pose a serious threat to his Italian opposition. Therefore, he needed support from his Italian allies, such as Pavia and Margrave William of Montferrat (1115 – 1191), who supplied him with another 12,000 men to besiege Alessandria.[70] The imperial army laid siege to the city for four and a half months from October 29, 1174 to April 13, 1175. Frederick negotiated a truce on April 10, which he broke by attempting to take the city by tunnels the next day. His soldiers were spotted and killed, which led to an exodus of his mercenaries and Barbarossa's retreat to Pavia, his base in Italy, where he rested and brokered a peace with the Lombard League. Just like the truce, the peace fell apart almost as soon as it was agreed upon, as Barbarossa's demand for Alessandria's destruction was unacceptable to the league. This led Barbarossa to again call for German nobles to support his campaign.[71] In the spring of 1176, notably, Barbarossa begged for Henry the Lion's support for his campaign, which Henry refused to give. Most historians, including Arnold von Lübeck, a contemporary of the Lion and the author of the *Chronica Slavorum*, saw this as the turning point in the relationship between the emperor and his mightiest vassal.[72] Despite his cousin's

[68] Freed, *The Prince*, 379.
[69] Ibid., 380.
[70] Ibid., 381.
[71] Ibid., 387.
[72] Stefan Weinfurter, „Die Entmachtung Heinrichs des Löwen," in *Heinrich Der Löwe Und Seine Zeit: Herrschaft Und Repräsentation Der Welfen 1125-1235: Katalog Der Ausstellung, Braunschweig 1995*, ed. Jochen Luckhardt, Franz Niehoff, and Herzog Anton-Ulrich-Museum Braunschweig, (München: Hirmer, 1995), 180.

refusal to come to aid, Barbarossa met the Lombard forces at the Battle of Legnano on May 29, 1176. The Lombards bested the imperial forces and quickly put an end to Frederick's aspirations in Italy. Barbarossa's defeat led to the Peace of Venice on July 22, 1177, which included a fifteen-year peace between the empire and the Kingdom of Sicily, as well as a six-year peace with the Lombard League.[73] Furthermore, the treaty settled the papal schism by requiring Frederick to formally recognize Alexander III as pope. As the new steward of the papacy and defender of Christendom, moreover, Frederick had to help Alexander reclaim his place in Rome. Although the city of Rome was generally in favor of the empire, its citizens preferred independence from all warring parties and even stayed neutral during Frederick's Italian campaigns after the *Romzug*. This meant that Frederick had to send his Archbishop and Archchancellor Christian I with an army to march on Rome to secure Alexander's entry into the city.[74] Barbarossa was able to install the pope in Rome, where he was formally elected at the Third Lateran Council in March 1179.[75] With the help of Roman nobles, however, the Byzantine Emperor Manuel I (1118 – 1180)[76] captured Christian in late September 1179 and squashed any lasting imperial influence over Rome.[77] Shortly after, Alexander III passed away, complicating Frederick's quest to hold on to the papacy.

[73] Freed, *The Prince*, 407.
[74] Ibid., 422.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Byzantine emperor from 1143 – 1180.
[77] Freed, *The Prince*, 422.

Conflict with Henry the Lion (1178 – 1181)

His reinstitution into the church helped Barbarossa to secure his power in the empire. While Christian was helping Alexander, Frederick returned to his domains and had himself crowned king of Burgundy in Arles on July 30, 1178.[78] The coronation was a signal of strength in his otherwise weak claim of authority over the territories of the Holy Roman Empire and a way to recover some of the prestige lost after his humiliation in Italy.[79]

This changed, however, when the emperor ousted his cousin Henry the Lion. Instead of helping his king and emperor during the fifth Italian campaign, Henry, selfishly, made efforts to expand the borders of his duchies in Saxony and Bavaria. This endeavor oftentimes led to conflicts with other German princes, which had to be resolved by the emperor. In one such dispute between the Lion and Archbishop Philip of Cologne, both laid claim to some of the Saxon territories, so that the matter had to be brought in front of the imperial court in November 1178.[80] Although the emperor had often sided with his cousin in the past, Henry's refusal to come to his aid during the fifth Italian campaign the previous year swayed Frederick to rule against Henry, which had already led to the transfer of some of Henry's southern lands to Welf VI.[81] Henry decided to challenge the emperor's authority by not appearing to two of the set court dates and by refusing to pay a 5,000 pound fine to Frederick, which prompted

[78] Freed, *The Prince*, 419.
[79] Ibid.
[80] Weinfurter, "Die Entmachtung," 181.
[81] Freed, *The Prince*, 432.

Barbarossa to outlaw Henry the Lion on June 29, 1179.[82] This was followed by battles between Henry and the German princes, who attempted to strip him of his lands. Despite his status as an outlaw, Henry still had supporters within Germany in 1179 and was able to defeat his adversaries and inflict major damage to the imperial forces. On July 25, 1180, Frederick raised an army of his own to challenge his cousin and over the course of the next year defeated most of Henry's lords and archbishops.[83] Barbarossa dispossessed Henry of Bavaria and transferred it to the house of Wittelsbach, who would rule over the Kingdom of Bavaria until the end of World War I in 1918.[84] Over the course of the next year, Henry first retreated to Saxony, then to the city of Lübeck and finally to Stade, as the imperial forces marched further and further north. Frederick marched into Lübeck in August 1181, and the Lion submitted to the emperor on November 11, 1181.[85]

Lübeck and Stade in "Lübeck" Britannica, accessed April 6, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/place/Lubeck, cropped & edited by author.

[82] Freed, *The Prince*, 433.
[83] Ibid., 436 – 7.
[84] Ibid.
[85] Ibid., 440.

Although Frederick ruled that Henry could keep Braunschweig and Lüneburg as well as some of his Saxon territories, Henry and his family were exiled for at least two years.[86] Henry spent most of this time in England with his father-in-law, Henry II, the king of England. Many historians argue that Germany could have been united in the Middle Ages, had Barbarossa taken over direct rule of Saxony and Bavaria.[87] However, the king of Germany had to re-enfeoff Henry's possessions to other noblemen, "because he was dependent, politically and militarily, on the princes and not because he was legally prohibited from doing so."[88]

Autumn of the Reign (1183 – 1187)

In 1183, the truce with the Lombard League ran out, which called for a new agreement. Due to internal strife and conflict, the League was in a weaker position than after its victory over the empire in 1176. Barbarossa took the opportunity to resolve the problem of Alessandria, which he re-founded as Caesarea (the city of the emperor) and incorporated into the empire.[89] This meant peace negotiations could begin, which cumulated in the Peace of Constance on June 25, 1183. Frederick had to recognize the Lombard League, restore the rights it enjoyed before the decades long conflict, and grant it partial autonomy.[90] In

[86] The exact length is heavily debated among historians, with two being the most agreed upon, but some mention spans as long as a lifetime or seven-year exile. See Freed, *The Prince*, 440.
[87] Freed, *The Prince*, 442.
[88] Ibid. It has been argued that the *Leihezwang*, which regulates that a vacant fief had to be re-enfeoffed after a year and a day, prompted Barbarossa to distribute Henry's lands.
[89] Freed, *The Prince*, 423.
[90] Ibid., 426.

return, the cities swore to be loyal to the emperor, to pay the *fodrum* upon Frederick's arrival in Lombardy, and to pay 15,000 pounds to Frederick.[91]

The rest of the 1180s were shaped by Frederick's ambitions to create favorable conditions for his son to ascend onto the throne and to showcase the might of his own rule. One such example was the court that took place at Mainz on May 10 – 11, 1184, a huge celebration with attendees from all over the empire. It has been claimed that "no assembly of Frederick's predecessors could compare to Frederick's court in Mainz, which was renowned and famous throughout the entire Roman world."[92] It was an opportunity for the emperor to show off his wealth and cultivate an image of knighthood, which the sixty-one-year-old Frederick exemplified by taking part in tournaments and knighting his sons during the occasion. Additionally, he went on a tour of Italy in 1185, with the intention to display the close relationship the empire had built with its former archenemies, the Lombard League. During this expedition, Frederick even entered an alliance with Milan on February 11, which among other things put Milan under the empire's protection in return for a yearly payment of three hundred pounds.[93] This caused animosity with the newly elected Pope Urban III, who was already hostile towards Frederick. The pope's resentment stemmed from the fact that the emperor had captured and slaughtered some of Urban's men during the Italian campaigns and he had coronated his son Henry VI as co-king without the consent of the papacy.[94]

[91] Freed, *The Prince*, 426.
[92] Ibid., 446 – 7.
[93] Ibid., 458 – 9.
[94] Ibid., 462.

The archbishop of Cologne, Philip, saw this as an opportunity to side with Urban III against the emperor. After Henry the Lion was exiled, the archbishop became the most powerful man in the German kingdom after Frederick.[95] In 1187, the emperor ordered that a bridge be built across the Mosel, which prompted Philip to fortify Cologne and forbid the imperial army to trespass into his lands out of fear that Barbarossa might confront him militarily.[96] Barbarossa had expressed the intention to aid the French king, Philip Augustus, in his war against King Richard the Lionheart of England, which necessitated the bridge.[97] But although Frederick had signed a treaty of friendship with the king of France, he did not have "any intention of intervening militarily in the conflict between the Angevins and Capetians [the ruling houses of the England and France], something that he had avoided throughout his reign."[98] Therefore, Philip was probably correct in assuming that the bridge was built with the intention to squash domestic uprisings. Philip's ban on imperial soldiers passing through his lands gave Frederick Barbarossa enough reason to call him to court and confront and charge him for his conspiracy against the empire. Philip must not have learned from the mistakes of the Lion a decade earlier and also failed to respond to two summonses. As consequence, Frederick made him swear a triple oath on March 27, 1188, to clear himself from his wrongdoing and he was forced to tear down the walls of Cologne as a sign of his submission.[99]

[95] Freed, *The Prince*, 468.
[96] Ibid., 470.
[97] Ibid., 442.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid.

In the meantime, Saladin captured Jerusalem on October 2, 1187, and Pope Urban III died on October 20, 1187, which probably prolonged the conflict between Philip and Barbarossa. Saladin's actions prompted the launch of preparations for a Third Crusade by the major powers of Western Europe.

The Third Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa (1189 – 1190)

Barbarossa spent the last chapter of his life marching into the Levant for Christendom. This was not his first crusade, as he already had accompanied Conrad III in the Second Crusade as his chief lieutenant.[100] Most of what we know today about Barbarossa's crusade stems from the *Historia de Expeditione Frederici Imperatoris*, a contemporary account by unknown authors, which narrates the events of the Third Crusade from the perspective of Frederick's army.[101]

The Third Crusade was launched by the papal bull *Audita Tremendi* authored by Pope Gregory VIII (1100 – 1187)[102] on October 29, 1187.[103] The unknown author of the *Historia* summarizes the pope's demands and promises, which he defines as:

[100] Graham A. Loud, "Frederick I Barbarossa of Germany (1122-1190)," in *The Crusades to the Holy Land: The Essential Reference*, ed. Alan V. Murray (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2015), 106.
[101] The historian Graham A. Loud has translated and edited the *Historia de Expeditione Frederici Imperatoris* as well as other texts about Frederick's crusade and compiled them in his volume *The Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa: The History of the Expedition of the Emperor Frederick and Related Texts*, Crusade Texts in Translation 19 (Farnham, Surrey, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010). For a more in-depth discussion about the author and the text, see Loud's Introduction of this volume.
[102] Pope for 2 months from October 21 – December 17, 1187.
[103] Loud, *The History of the Expedition*, 37 – 41.

> to free the land of Jerusalem and the Holy Sepulcher of the Lord from the hand of the barbarians. He [Pope Gregory VIII] promised everyone pardon for their sins and certainty of eternal blessedness through entry of the kingdom of Heaven for those who faithfully undertook the journey of salvation overseas against the common enemies of the church.[104]

These goals and guarantees were the same as those proposed by Pope Urban II (~1035 – 1099)[105] during the Council of Clermont in 1095, which had launched the First Crusade almost a century earlier.[106] The call was heard by Barbarossa, who proceeded to take the cross, which is the act of committing to going on crusade, on March 27, 1188, exactly thirty-six years after his coronation.[107] Then, after assembling an army, Barbarossa left for the Holy Land from Regensburg on May 10, 1189.[108]



Barbarossa's path to the Byzantine Empire in Loud, *The History of the Expedition*, ix.

[104] Loud, *The History of the Expedition*, 37.
[105] Pope from 1088 – 1099.
[106] See Edward Peters, *The First Crusade the Chronicle of Fulcher of Chartres and Other Source Materials*, 2nd ed. The Middle Ages Series (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 47 – 101. Furthermore, see Jonathan Riley-Smith, "Crusading as an Act of Love," *History* (London) 65, no. 214 (1980): 177 – 92, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-229X.1980.tb01939.x, for an interesting exploration of martyrdom and reasoning to go on crusade.
[107] Loud, *The History of the Expedition*, 44 – 45.
[108] Ibid., 47.

Although Barbarossa sailed to Vienna via the Danube, arriving in the city around a week after his departure, he and his army mostly travelled on land to the Levant.[109] A week later, on May 25, the crusaders arrived outside of Pressburg, where they camped for four days.[110] The journey continued to Hungary, where they were "received by the illustrious King Bela of Hungary" (~1148 – 1196)[111] in Gran, now Eszergom, on June 4, 1189.[112] Then, the crusader army passed the village of St. George, now Čalma, on June 24 and then Sirmium, now Mitrovica, on June 28, not without struggle, as they lost some men and horses while crossing the river Drau, now Drava. Barbarossa's army reached the Byzantine Empire on June 1, after traversing the river Sava. The following three weeks were especially arduous, as Barbarossa's men had to march through rough terrain, deal with food shortages and with ambushes by "the Greeklings [*Greeculi*], Bulgars, Serbians and the semi-barbarous Vlachs."[113] They arrived in Nish, now Niš, on July 27, where they stayed for "three or more days because of the market," presumably to replenish their supplies.[114] Some soldiers and knights saw the extended stay as an opportunity to steal and ravage the city, to which Barbarossa quickly put an end, as he had engaged in a pact with the Byzantine Emperor to observe the peace in his territory.[115] Before moving on from Nish, Barbarossa structured his army into four divisions, each led by one of his noblemen and the fourth by himself, in

[109] Loud, *The History of the Expedition*, 47.
[110] Ibid., 47.
[111] King of Hungary and Croatia from 1172 – 1196.
[112] Loud, *The History of the Expedition*, 59.
[113] Ibid., 60.
[114] Ibid., 61.
[115] Ibid., 64. More on the pact between the two emperors in the Conclusion of this thesis.

preparation for combat.[116] The combat came in the form of more ambushes all along the route to Sofia, which the army entered on August 13.[117] Almost two weeks later the imperial forces arrived in Philippopolis, where a fifth army division was created.[118] After setting up camp in Philippopolis, Barbarossa sent Berthold IV, who was instrumental in getting Barbarossa elected as king many decades ago, to conquer the "very wealthy city Berrhoë," now Stara Zagora, at the end of August or beginning of September 1189.[119] After the successful capture of Berrhoë, the crusaders under Berthold IV's command looted the city and returned to the main army with plenty of booty. In the meantime, the Byzantine Emperor had taken imperial envoys hostage and was withdrawing from the pact, which guaranteed the crusader's safe passage through the Byzantine Empire. Therefore, Barbarossa had to remain in Philippopolis for another month until a new deal had been struck.[120] After finally leaving Philippopolis on November 5, 1189, the army reached Adrianople, now Edirne, on November 22.[121] They hibernated in Adrianople for fourteen weeks and spent the winter conquering more cities, among them Dimotika, now Didymoteicho, and forcing Greek prisoners to drink wine that had been poisoned by their countrymen.[122] Furthermore, Barbarossa continued to negotiate with the Byzantine Emperor to achieve more favorable conditions for his passage through his empire. Only on March 2, 1190, the crusaders commenced their journey and arrived in Gallipoli on March 21, from

[116] Loud, *The History of the Expedition*, 65.
[117] Ibid., 67.
[118] Ibid., 65, 69 – 73.
[119] Ibid., 73.
[120] Ibid., 71 – 79.
[121] Ibid., 80.
[122] Ibid., 81 – 88.

where they planned to cross the Dardanelles Strait, referred to by the anonymous author of the *Historia* as the Bosporus.[123] The whole army reached the other side of the straits on March 29, and continued their pilgrimage, entering Philadelphia, now Alaşehir, around April 18.[124] After facing more hostility from the locals during their next leg of the journey, which passed through mountainous terrain, the crusaders reached Philomelium, now Akşehir, on May 7.[125]



Barbarossa's path through the Sultanate of Rum in Loud, *The History of the Expedition*, x.

Between Philomelium and Iconium, now Konya, which they reached on May 17, the army was involved in multiple armed confrontations with the Seljuks, who are identified as Turks in the text.[126] At this point in the journey, the author writes that if he had to "describe in full the many troubles, oppressions, hunger and

[123] Loud, *The History of the Expedition*, 95.
[124] Ibid., 96 – 97.
[125] Ibid., 100 – 104.
[126] Ibid., 105 – 112.

thirst, tricks and deceits, insults and attacks, that the army of Christ patiently endured," they would "leave the legendary Homer, the eloquent Lucan or the Mantuan poet himself […] speechless."[127] These words show the arduous journey to the Holy Land, and gives us a glimpse of the constant struggle that Barbarossa's army had to endure.



Topographical Map of Turkey in "Topographical Map of Turkey," Gif Map, accessed April 7, 2022, https://www.gif-map.com/maps/asia/turkey/topographical-map-of-turkey.gif, cropped by author.

Looking at this topographical map of Turkey, we see how difficult the terrain was that Frederick had to pass through. However, the army made quick progress and arrived in the plain of Seleucia, around the town that is now Silifke, on June 10, 1190.[128] On this fateful day, "[t]he emperor, who was unruffled by any danger, wanted to alleviate the dreadful heat and to avoid the mountain peaks by swimming across the fast-flowing river of Seleucia."[129] In this river, which is

[127] Loud, *The History of the Expedition*, 113 – 114. Homer was a tenth-century Greek poet, who is known for composing the Iliad and the Odyssey. Lucan was a first-century Roman poet and is the author of the epic Pharsalia. Loud identifies the Mantuan poet as Virgil, who is also a first-century Roman poet and is famous for writing the epic Aeneid.
[128] Loud, *The History of the Expedition*, 115.
[129] Ibid., 116.

now called Göksu, "[h]e [Frederick I Barbarossa] who had so often escaped great dangers died miserably," as he was swept away by the current.[130] Here, the crusade and the life of Frederick Barbarossa end and the chapter of his son Henry VI's reign over the Holy Roman Empire begins.[131]

[130] Loud, *The History of the Expedition*, 116. The text states that, although all help came too late, his nobles were able to recover Barbarossa's body.

[131] Barbarossa's army started to split up under the leadership of Frederick VI of Swabia (1167 – 1191), Duke of Swabia from 1170 – 1191. Nevertheless, Frederick VI managed to lead a portion of the army to Antioch, now Antakya, on June 20, 1190. They continued to join the rest of the Western crusading forces at the Siege of Acre, but were devastated by disease, weakening their force significantly. The death of Frederick VI during the siege in January 1191 finally put an end to the German Third Crusade. See Loud, "Frederick I Barbarossa of Germany," 107 – 108. (Loud states that Frederick V led the crusaders, but this must be a typo in the source).

Chapter Two - Barbarossa's Economy

The Holy Roman Empire rarely draws any attention in the discussion of economic policies and the rise of financial instruments in the European Middle Ages. Instead, its neighboring kingdoms and states take the limelight, such as England, France, the Italian city-states and Flanders. This is despite the fact that it was the largest empire in Western Europe by landmass spanning from the Low Countries in the north, to Rome in the south, and from Strasbourg in the west to Vienna in the east.[132] In this chapter I argue that Frederick Barbarossa consciously implemented financial policies to strengthen his empire. Furthermore, I attempt to show that the Holy Roman Empire was economically on par with the other European powers. The first part of the chapter gives an overview of the realms with strong economies in Europe and a brief description of their institutions and policies. Next, Frederick's different financial and economic mechanics and policies are analyzed and explained. Lastly, the empire is compared to the other European realms in terms of annual income, which will be the metric used to determine the size of the economy.

[132] See the map of the empire on page 5.

The Economies of the Western States during Frederick Barbarossa's Reign

I. Kingdom of England

England is widely considered to have been the most powerful of the European states in the twelfth century. Henry II (1133 – 1189), another red-haired ruler, was king of England and his rule almost overlapped completely with Barbarossa's.[133] Henry changed the course of Europe by conquering Ireland and parts of France, instigating the murder of Thomas Becket in the Canterbury Cathedral and establishing the foundations of English common law and government.[134] Henry II also administered one of Europe's largest economies of the time. Since the country was based on a manorial system, England's largest revenue stream came "from the royal demesne as specified in fixed county-farm payments audited in the Exchequer and recorder in the pipe rolls."[135] The royal demesne or domain were lands owned and taxed directly by the king of England.[136] The Exchequer, sometimes referred to as treasury, was England's institution for collecting taxes and was founded by King Henry I at the beginning

[133] Nicholas Vincent, "Introduction: Henry II and the Historians," in *Henry II: New Interpretations*, edited by Christopher Harper-Bill and Nicholas Vincent (Boydell & Brewer, 2007), 1.
[134] Ibid., 1 – 23.
[135] Nick Barratt, "Finance and the Economy in the Reign of Henry II," in *Henry II: New Interpretations*, edited by Christopher Harper-Bill and Nicholas Vincent (Boydell & Brewer, 2007), 243 – 4. For a more in-depth explanation of manors see Michael M. Postan, *The Medieval Economy and Society: An Economic History of Britain, 1100-1500* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 73 – 110.
[136] "royal demesne," Miriam Webster, accessed March 29, 2022, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/royal+demesne.

of the 12th century.[137] It used the pipe rolls, also referred to by the illustrious name of the Great Rolls of the Exchequer, to record "the yearly accounts of the sheriffs, who were the chief financial officers for individual counties."[138] Based on the pipe rolls and James Ramsay's *History of the Revenues of the Kings of England, 1066-1399*, the historian Nick Barratt has calculated the average annual state revenue of Henry II to be £18,000 with an annual revenue of £13,300 before 1165/6 and £20,400 for the years after that.[139] Barratt attributes this change to the Assize of Clarendon in 1166, which expanded the legal authority of judges and enabled Henry to gain more income from the prosecution of wealthier criminals, who had previously been immune from prosecution.[140] In addition, the act created the *cartae baronum*, a survey, similar to the Domesday Book commissioned by William the Conqueror the previous century, with the purpose of assessing the English landholdings, making it easier to tax the estates. The king's financial authority did not end at collecting taxes from manors; he was able to control the money supply through the royal mints and exchanges and had the "ability to authorize large-scale expenditure such as castle-building, withdraw money from circulation through taxation or overseas campaigns, and stimulate the local economy through the purchase of provisions, stock or victuals."[141] Henry II thus

[137] "Exchequer| British Government Department | Britannica," accessed March 29, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Exchequer.
[138] Pipe Rolls| British Government Department | Britannica," accessed March 29, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Pipe-Rolls.
[139] Barratt, "Finance and the Economy in the Reign of Henry II," 249.
[140] Ibid., 251 – 3.
[141] Barratt, "Finance and the Economy in the Reign of Henry II," 243. See N. J. Mayhew, "Money and Prices in England from Henry II to Edward III," *The Agricultural History Review* 35, no. 2 (1987): 121 – 32 for a more in-depth look into prices, inflation, and money supply of Henry's reign.

controlled extensive governmental institutions, such as the Exchequer, which formed a well-organized financial administration sufficient to support Henry II's ambitions, such as his conquests.

II. Kingdom of France

King Louis VII (1120 – 1180) reigned over France for all but the last decade of Barbarossa's rule, when Phillip II Augustus (1165 – 1223) sat on the French throne.[142] Louis VII's rule was shaped by his failure in the Second Crusade, his conflict with Henry II and his support of Pope Alexander III against Barbarossa's will.[143] The origin of Louis's dissension with Henry stemmed from the marriage of Louis' ex-queen Eleanor of Aquitaine (1122 – 1204) to Henry, which transferred large portions of French lands to his control, and Henry's ascension to the throne of England, making him France's most powerful vassal (since he was also the duke of Normandy).[144] France, like England, extracted its income primarily from its manorial system.[145] The historian John F. Benton convincingly discussed the annual revenue of the kingdom of France in *The Revenue of Louis VII* , citing several other historians and their calculations of France's state income. First, he notes that a certain Conan, provost of the

[142] Louis VII reigned from 1137 – 1180 and Philip II from 1180 – 1223.
[143] See Marcus Bull, "The Capetian Monarchy and the Early Crusade Movement: Hugh of Vermandois and Louis VII," *Nottingham Medieval Studies* 40 (January 1, 1996), 26 and James Naus, "Louis VII and the Failure of Crusade," in *Constructing Kingship*, The Capetian Monarchs of France and the Early Crusades (Manchester University Press, 2016), 85, 102 and Jean Dunbabin, "Henry II and Louis VII," in *Henry II: New Interpretations*, edited by Christopher Harper-Bill and Nicholas Vincent (Boydell & Brewer, 2007), 51.
[144] Naus, "Louis VII and the Failure of Crusade," 102 – 3.
[145] See Karine van der Beek, "The Effects of Political Fragmentation on Investments: A Case Study of Watermill Construction in Medieval Ponthieu, France," *Explorations in Economic History* 47, no. 4 (October 1, 2010), 4. A possible explanation to the findings: political fragmentation and competition, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eeh.2010.03.002.

cathedral of Lausanne and a contemporary to Philip Augustus, reported that Louis' annual revenue was an absurdly high sum of 228,000 livre parisis.[146] Benton notes that the pound sterling of England had contained twice as much silver as the livre parisis at the time, which would put Henry II's annual revenue only at 36,000 livre parisis to Louis VII's 228,000 at an exchange rate of 2:1.[147] This must have been an exaggeration, given that Henry II showed that he was able to mobilize and supply his armies more effectively than the French monarch by means of resource superiority.[148] Benton cites the historian Marcel Pecaut, who calculated that Louis VII had an annual revenue of 60,000 livre parisis.[149] Pecaut gives a detailed breakdown of income streams for around 20,000 livre parisis as seen in Fig. 1 and estimates that Louis received another 40,000 livre parisis from minting, tolls, agricultural procedures, feudal dues and exceptional taxes, such as those levied for Louis' crusades, which Pecaut could not exactly calculate.[150]

Great estates	4,800
Towns	2,600
Paris	800
Medium and small landed property	1,100
Woods and forests	500
Fairs and markets	1,320
Market tolls and road and river tolls, etc.	2,750
Quitrents, etc.	200
Prévôts (High justice)	5,700
Ecclesiastical domain (*regalia*)	500
	20,270 l.p.

Fig. 1 in Benton, "The Revenue of Louis VII," 86.

[146] John F. Benton, "The Revenue of Louis VII," *Speculum* 42, no. 1 (1967), 84 – 5. https://doi.org/10.2307/2856101.
[147] See Ibid., Benton adds that in the 13th century the livre parisis was even weaker and was exchanged at a rate of 4:1 for the pound sterling, which still would mean that France had more than twice as large of an annual revenue than England.
[148] Dunbabin, "Henry II and Louis VII," 49.
[149] Benton, "The Revenue of Louis VII," 87.
[150] Ibid., 86 – 7.

Benton agrees with this figure, and if we take Benton's estimate for Henry II's annual income of £25,000 and a better exchange rate than 2:1[151], it is possible that Louis's and Henry's annual revenues were approximately equal, or that Henry, France's most powerful and wealthiest vassal, had slightly higher revenues than his lord. Nevertheless, Benton concluded that "the monarchy of Louis VII […] and France as a whole w[ere] in a position to resist foreign invasion."[152] Sources suggest that Louis's son was even wealthier and transformed the kingdom into an even stronger power in Europe.

Philip II, also called Philp Augustus, was king of France from 1180 – 1223. According to the military historian Jim Bradbury, he was a very capable and intelligent leader as he was able to consolidate all the warring parties under his rule to achieve extensive governing authority.[153] He strengthened and utilized his power for the sake of "reforming and streamlining royal administration, and therefore [increased] royal wealth and resources," which allowed him to secure the role of protector of his realm by building a better military apparatus.[154] He also supplemented the kingdom's income by expanding the number of churches affected by regalian rights and the capacities of the imperial court, and created extensive accounts of his fiscal activities.[155] Unlike Louis, Philip was not limited

[151] It has been suggested that after 1158, English penny weight was harmonized with the French *deniers*, which were valued at half or a quarter of a penny. See Martin Allen, "Henry II and the English Coinage," in *Henry II: New Interpretations*, edited by Christopher Harper-Bill and Nicholas Vincent, (Boydell & Brewer, 2007), 266.
[152] Benton, "The Revenue of Louis VII," 91.
[153] Jim Bradbury, *Philip Augustus: King of France, 1180-1223* (London; New York: Longman, 1998), 217.
[154] Ibid., 246.
[155] John W. Baldwin, *The Government of Philip Augustus: Foundations of French Royal Power in the Middle Ages* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986),137-44, 166-75, 305-6. The regalian right was "the right claimed by a monarch to the estates, income and other dues of a

by financial hardship and relied on his economy to openly confront Henry in 1186.[156] The English king, who was in his late fifties by the time of Philip's ascension, was forced to concede large parts of his French territories to the young and ambitious king.

III. Italian City-States

The Italian city-states posed a threat to Barbarossa and the other European powers, not only by forming the Veronese and later Lombard League, but also because they possessed some of the strongest economies of the 12th century. Importantly, the Italian city-states, which called themselves *universitates*, gained special rights during Barbarossa's reign that allowed them to "raise an army and enforce the death penalty, and […] mint coins, sign commercial charters with other independent states, and requisition foreign merchants' goods."[157] Although all these cities collated in a league, this section will look at Venice and Milan individually, as each city differed in its economy and structure. These two were chosen because they were probably the strongest cities within the league. Venice "emerged, more or less spontaneously, […] in the second half of the eighth century," and even then, already had merchants operating in places such as "Rome, North Africa and Jerusalem."[158] Over the next several centuries, it

vacant bishopric." See Christopher Corèdon, and Ann Williams, *A Dictionary of Medieval Terms and Phrases*, (Boydell & Brewer, 2004), 236, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7722/j.ctt14brrmq.23.

[156] Dunbabin, "Henry II and Louis VII," 61 – 2.

[157] Stephan R. Epstein, *The Rise and Fall of Italian City-States* (London: LSE Research Online, 2000), Introduction p.1. For a more in-depth look into the status of statehood of these cities, see Chris Wickham, *Sleepwalking into a New World: The Emergence of Italian City Communes in the Twelfth Century*, Course Book, The Lawrence Stone Lectures 7, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400865826, who analyzes them through a Weberian (Max Weber) lens.

[158] Michael McCormick, "Where do trading towns come from? Early medieval Venice and the northern *emporia*," in Post-Roman Towns, Trade and Settlement in Europe and Byzantium, ed.

continued to expand its influence and commercial activity. Beginning in 1141 the republic started to engage in treaties with other Italian cities, granting them a military alliance, while taking annual tributes in return.[159] Interestingly, when Venice helped found the Lombard League in 1167, it did not have a land-based military but instead pledged its strong navy.[160] Due to spotty records, the exact wealth of Venice must be determined by certain financial activities carried out by the republic. For example, in 1171, the doge, or ruler, of Venice, Vitale Michiel found himself in conflict with the Byzantine Empire, which accused Venice of having destroyed one of its settlements.[161] To raise an army, the doge had to force the citizens of Venice to lend him money. Because the income stream from the Rialto market, which was one of the major sources of Venetian income, was already committed to paying back debts for the next ten years, the government quickly incurred a budget deficit. One reason for this deficit was due to Venice being one of the main financiers of the Lombard League. Despite these financial troubles, Venice was still able to construct a navy with 120 ships and crew within three months, speaking volumes of its economic capability. However, Vitale Michiel had to retreat shamefully from Byzantium, as the plague broke out on his ships and the Byzantine emperor had tricked him into unfruitful negotiations. This caused disarray in Venice, as the economy had been run into the ground and the people's distrust of the doge grew.

Joachim Henning, *The Heirs of the Roman West*, Vol. 1 (Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2007), 44, 48.

[159] John J. Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 1st Vintage Books, (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 94. The first treaty was with the city of Fano, which gave an annual tribute of 1,100 measures of oil to the republic.

[160] Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 103.

[161] Ibid., 104 - 10.

After constitutional reforms in the wake of this disaster, the wealthy Sebastiano Ziani was elected as the new doge. To rebuild the economy, he refused to pay the government bonds that had been given out to finance Michiel's navy. Surprisingly, this was not as unpopular as expected, as "the bondholders were all Venetian citizens; they loved money but they loved Venice more."[162] Then, following the defeat of Barbarossa and the Treaty of Venice in 1177, Venice not only prospered by the increased commerce generated by the entourages of both Barbarossa and the pope, but also through treaties with both, which granted exemptions from imperial tolls and indulgences to its churches.[163]

The Italian city-states, but especially Venice, are known for the popularization of loans, which contributed largely to both Sebastiano Ziani's wealth and to the economy of the republic.[164] Standard loans were set at a 20% per annum interest rate, while the rate for a sea loan, which was the most popular type of loan in the late twelfth century and used for seafaring and trade, was set higher due to the increased risk of these ventures.[165] Venice requested a loan of 40,000 *lire* from its citizens in 1187 for the purpose of financing the siege of Zadra (the source refers to it as Zara), as the city rebelled against Venice the previous year.[166] Only six months later, the republic requested another loan for a

[162] Norwich, *A History of Venice*, 110.
[163] Ibid., 115 – 16.
[164] Frederic C. Lane, "Recent Studies on the Economic History of Venice," *The Journal of Economic History* 23, no. 3 (1963): 316. See Pompeo Molmenti, *Venice: Its Individual Growth from the Earliest Beginnings to the Fall of the Republic*, trans. Horatio F. Brown (Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1906), 148. The first voluntary loan by the republic was occurred in 1164 for the volume of 1500 silver marks with a runtime of 11 years given out by Venetian patricians.
[165] Lane, "Recent Studies on the Economic History of Venice," 316.
[166] Ibid., 316. And "Siege of Zara | European History | Britannica," accessed April 11, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/event/Siege-of-Zara.

war against the Hungarian king but was only awarded with 16,105 *lire*.[167] Since these loans had runtimes of more than a decade, we can assume that they were not requested at a frequent pace. Apart from these domestic income streams, we must also look at Venice's *Stato da Màr* or State of the Sea, or colonial empire, which produced a large additional amount of income.[168]

A Venetian *lira* was divided into 20 *soldi* of 12 *denari* each.[169] The *denari* corresponded to the French *dernier*, which determined the amount of silver in the livres parisis.[170] Therefore, to estimate the exchange rate between the Venetian *lira* and the pound sterling, the same 2:1 to 4:1 exchange rate is used as in the section above for the livres parisis. Given this exchange rate, the income of Venice solely from loans for the year 1187 was 56,105 *lire* or £25,052.50 - £14,026.25. This is an impressive sum, especially compared to the average annual total income of England and France of around £25,000. In addition, one must not forget that Venice was a member of the Lombard League and thus allied with other rich Italian city-states, which as conglomerate were able to pose a significant threat to the kingdoms and empires in the East and West.

Another of the cities in the league was Italy's largest city, Milan.[171] Although it was not as ideally located for trade as Venice, with its access to rivers, the sea and land routes, the in-land city was on a river and its central

[167] Molmenti, *Venice: Its Individual Growth*, 148.
[168] Lane, "Recent Studies on the Economic History of Venice," 321.
[169] William A. Shaw, *The History of Currency, 1252 to 1894*" (London: Clement Wilson, 1896), 310. The *denari* was the equivalent to the French *dernier*.
[170] John Bell Henneman Jr., "Currency," in *Medieval France*, ed. William W. Kibler and Grover A. Zinn (New York: Garland Pub., 1995), 280 – 281. The author notes that the silver content varied across localities, but for the purpose of estimating the economies, I assume that it stayed relatively constant.
[171] See Img. 1 of the Appendix for a map of Milan.

position was advantageous for transalpine trade. [172] In the twelfth century, it specialized in the trade of cloth and metal. And although Milan was destroyed and the inhabitants exiled by Barbarossa in 1162, the city quickly recovered by 1167.[173] The exact revenue of Milan is harder to track, but the wealth of its rulers may give us some idea of its economic prowess. Like Venice, the city designated itself as a commune, and was run by a city government. The government was formed by members of aristocratic families, who received the rank of *capitaneale* or consuls from the archbishopric of Milan with *signorili* or seignorial rights.[174] Some of the ruling families, such as the da Rhò, were also vassals of the archbishopric. They were thus able to extract the tithe from their fiefs in the Milanese diocese, and considering that Milan was the most populous city in Italy, this privilege made them very wealthy.[175] The tithe is a tax by the church, amounting to one tenth of all one's earnings made in a year; some religious groups, such as The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, still require its payment by their members today.[176] The Burri owned almost half of the diocese and were accordingly quite well-off.[177] Yet, not all consuls came from aristocratic families with large fiefs, as there were several judicial consuls without any properties to their name.[178] Thus, even when one looks at the ruling class, it is

[172] McCormick, "Where do trading towns come from?," 48 and Wickham, *Sleepwalking into a New World*, 22.
[173] Wickham, *Sleepwalking into a New World*, 33.
[174] Ibid., 42. and Andrea Castagnetti, "Feudalità e Società Comunale. II. 'Capitanei' a Milano e a Ravenna," in *La Signoria Rurale in Italia Nel Medioevo*, Atti Del Secondo Convegno Di Studi, Pisa, 6-7 November 1998, Studi medioevali (11) (Pisa: ETS, 2006), 120. Seignorial rights were rights of a lord/ a lordship.
[175] Wickham, *Sleepwalking into a New World*, 42.
[176] "What Is Tithing," The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, accessed March 31, 2022, https://www.churchofjesuschrist.org/comeuntochrist/article/what-is-tithing.
[177] Wickham, *Sleepwalking into a New World*, 42 – 44.
[178] Ibid., 46.

hard to guess at an annual revenue for the city. However, considering that Milan was a wealthy commercial hub, had the resources to completely rebuild the city within five years, and supplied a large number of troops to the Lombard League to defeat Barbarossa decisively in 1176, we can assume that its economy was smaller than Venice's, but not inconsiderable.

IV. Flanders

The County of Flanders, which was ruled by Thierry of Alsace (1099 – 1168) and his son Philip I (1143 – 1191) during Barbarossa's reign, rose to economic prominence in the mid-twelfth century "by spending beyond its means in order to import both grain to feed its urban and even rural population and industrial raw materials to provide them with jobs."[179] In return, it sold woolen cloth to all parts of Europe and was an important place of exchange and transit of goods between England, France, the Low Countries, Northern Italy and the Holy Roman Empire.[180] Flanders became especially economically intertwined with England, which was its primary supplier of the wool which was necessary to weave the woolen cloths.[181] Thierry of Alsace strove to be on good terms with the kingdoms of both France and England. [182] However, his son and successor, Philip I, first rallied against Henry II, king of England, with the help of France until he was paid off by Henry and assumed a neutral status to maintain Flemish independence. Philip then tried, less successfully, to influence Philip Augustus,

[179] David Nicholas, "Of Poverty and Primacy: Demand, Liquidity, and the Flemish Economic Miracle, 1050-1200," *The American Historical Review* 96, no. 1 (1991): 19. https://doi.org/10.2307/2164016.
[180] Ibid.
[181] Ibid., 34 – 6.
[182] Dunbabin, "Henry II and Louis VII," 52.

the king of France, with the help of Henry, who refused, and finally played the role of an independent entity, as he tried to broker a peace between the two kingdoms in order for them "to forget their differences and go to the aid of Outremer [go on crusade] in 1187."[183]

Due to the increased trade volume and its role as a major commercial hub, by 1127, Flanders had established four thirty-day long fairs in Ypres, Lille, Mesen, and Torhout, which rotated in such a way that there was always a fair ongoing somewhere in Flanders from the end of February to the beginning of November.[184] Interestingly, a comital account, the *Gros Brief*, covers the same year, 1187, of the excessive Venetian loans.[185] It describes how the urban centers of Flanders, such as Ghent and Bruges, expanded by "importing grain and reselling it at a considerable profit to the poor in the cities and rural areas alike."[186]

Furthermore, Flanders actively diked its shoreline to win more land. The basic principle of diking is the erection of a tall wall, a dike, some distance away from the original shoreline or in swampy areas to dry these areas out and create polders, lands reclaimed from bodies of water. Diking is necessary to regain the lands lost by floods, but also to acquire new patches of cultivatable land. This method was exploited by the Counts of Flanders, who had "regalian right on

[183] Dunbabin, "Henry II and Louis VII," 52.
[184] David Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders* (London: New York: Longman, 1992), 111-12.
[185] Ibid., 32. For a more in-depth analysis of the *Gros Brief*, see Adriaan Verhulst and M Gysseling, *Le Compte général de 1187, connu sous le nom de "Gros brief", et les institutions financières du comté de Flandre au XIIe siècle* (Bruxelles: Commission royale d'histoire = Brussel : Koninklijke commissie voor geschiedenis, 1962).
[186] Nicholas, "Of Poverty and Primacy: Demand, Liquidity, and the Flemish Economic Miracle, 1050-1200," 32 – 3.

flooded lands and simply kept it as it was reclaimed," thus becoming increasingly rich in the process.[187] Even though Flanders underwent two harsh famines in 1124-5 and 1197, the (taxable) population grew.[188] Based on the *Gros Brief*, Benton estimated that the annual revenue of Flanders was "well under 10,000 Flemish pounds."[189] Benton adds, that the Flemish pound was comparable "to those of the French crown," which would mean that the County of Flanders was taking in only a couple thousand pounds sterling each year and had a much smaller economy compared to England, France or Venice.[190]

The Economy of the Holy Roman Empire under Frederick Barbarossa

The following overview of the economy of the Holy Roman Empire in the latter half of the twelfth century will be split into two parts. I will look, first, at the economy of the kingdom of Germany and then at the economy of Barbarossa's Italian holdings. This overview will show that the empire possessed an economy that was roughly equal to that of England, France, and the Italian city-states, by employing its own unique financial tools to generate a significant income.

Barbarossa's German Economy

The rise of a money economy was widespread in Europe in the twelfth century, which meant that it also became one of Barbarossa's primary economic

[187] Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders*, 99.
[188] Ibid., 108 – 9.
[189] Benton, "The Revenue of Louis VII," 85.
[190] Ibid.

concerns. What is meant with the rise of a money economy? A definition is given by the British medievalist and economic historian Michael Postan, who describes it not as the rise of money, which replaced the barter economy, but as the increase in volume of money transactions.[191] We can detect this rise by looking at the number of mints in Germany shortly before and during Frederick's reign. In the decades leading up to Frederick's election as king in 1152, there were only about a dozen mints.[192] By the end of his reign and into the reign of his son Henry VI, there were 215 mints, an increase of almost 180 percent. This was before the mints were 'unified,' which occurred when the mint at Schwäbisch Hall started issuing the Heller, which replaced all the different currencies and denominations minted at the other mints.[193] Frederick was the architect of this proliferation of mints, as he commanded the bishoprics to erect a mint, whenever it was suitable for the city, town, or the neighboring province.[194] In fact, most (106) of the 215 mints were operated by the clergy, while the rest were controlled by either German lords and princes (81) or Frederick himself (28).[195]

The bishoprics' power over the mints was part of a broader imperial policy, which concerned episcopal cities. As part of this policy, Barbarossa granted these cities some of his imperial rights, such as royal jurisdiction, freedom to construct mills, and the permission to organize city markets at appropriate

[191] Michael M. Postan, "The Rise of a Money Economy," *The Economic History Review* 14, no. 2 (1944): 134. https://doi.org/10.2307/2590422.
[192] Karl J. Leyser, "Frederick Barbarossa and the Hohenstaufen Polity," *Viator* 19 (January 1, 1988): 154.
[193] Ibid.
[194] Johannes Fried, "Die Wirtschaftspolitik Friederich Barbarossas in Deutschland," *Blätter für deutsche Landesgeschichte* 120 (1984): 204.
[195] Leyser, "Frederick Barbarossa and the Hohenstaufen Polity," 154.

locations and times.[196] Because it was an agrarian economy, it was important to control the mills, which converted grain to bread, one of the primary victuals. Furthermore, some parallels can be drawn between the Flemish markets and those of these cities, as both were regulated with respect to location and time. Although most German markets were smaller than the Flemish ones and probably did not operate continuously throughout a period of months, they were still established by the emperor or the episcopal polity.[197] Thus, the German markets give us some insight into imperial economic policy, as it was apparently important to have control over fixed places of trade.

Another factor affecting Frederick Barbarossa and the surrounding European economies was an increase in urbanization, and the foundation of *terrae imperii* in the HRE. The increase in the number of cities led to the expansion of the population and therefore a larger tax base. A cause for this increased urbanization in the Holy Roman Empire was Barbarossa's targeted economic intervention. For example, in 1180, he granted an arbitral award to the Archdiocese of Cologne described in Johannes Fried's article *Die Wirtschaftspolitik Friederich Barbarossas in Deutschland*.[198] The citizens of Cologne were in a dispute with their archbishop, Philip von Heinsberg[199], who sought to regulate the right of construction on certain public spaces, the market and the towpath. Towpaths are trails running parallel to a river, from which boats

[196] Fried, "Die Wirtschaftspolitik Friederich Barbarossas in Deutschland," 204.
[197] At Aachen, Frederick gave permission for two fairs to be held, which upped the total number of fairs in the region to ten or eleven, which were spread out throughout the year. (very similar to Flanders) See Freed, *The Prince*, 373.
[198] Fried, "Die Wirtschaftspolitik Friederich Barbarossas in Deutschland," 205.
[199] This is the same Philip that rebelled against Barbarossa's plan to build a bridge across the Mosel.

could be towed. Therefore, the issue had to be arbitrated by the emperor, who had to find an optimal solution by negotiating between the dynamic economic actors and the static *Hoheitsrecht*, or rights of the sovereign.[200] In this case, he ruled that the citizens were to keep their right of construction, in exchange for a one-time payment of 300 marks (~ £211.20) to the church, which were to be invested so as to yield a ten percent rate of return (how exactly that return rate is to be achieved is not further specified).[201] This policy benefited both the church and the citizens, which created incentives for the peasantry to consider moving into towns. Further, the creation of *terrae imperii* contributed to increased urbanization, as Barbarossa equipped these imperial lands with extensive infrastructure. More on the *terrae imperii* will be described later in this chapter.

It is assumed that the mark refers to the Cologne mark, the most common currency at the time of Barbarossa's reign, which according to the German numismatician Walter Hävernick has an exchange rate of one Cologne mark (avg. weight 233.855g) to 160 *denari* (avg. weight 1.46g) with a silver content of 97.5%.[202] Assuming the English Short Cross penny, which was introduced by King Henry II in 1180, was made entirely out of fine silver and with a weight of around 1.5 grams and 240 pennies to a pound, the pound had a fine silver content of around 360 grams.[203] Yet, it is reasonable to assume that the fine silver content

[200] Fried, "Die Wirtschaftspolitik Friederich Barbarossas in Deutschland," 206.
[201] Ibid.
[202] Walter Hävernick, *Der Kölner Pfennig im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert: Periode d. Territorialen Pfennigmünze*, Nachdruck der Ausgabe Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1930 (Hildesheim, Zürich [etc.]: Olms, 1984), 44, 51.
[203] The loan occurred after the Henry II's coin reform in 1180, which introduces the Short Cross penny, which weighs about 1.5 g and is 1/240 of a pound. See Allen, "Henry II and the English Coinage," 268, and "1 Penny – John," Numista, accessed April 13, 2022, https://en.numista.com/catalogue/pieces55927.html. This penny contains 92.5% silver, with 20.82

of each penny was not 100 percent due to impurities. It was often the case that these impurities occurred internally, during the mining process, but also externally, as a method of the ruler to enrich him/herself. Thus, to make a more accurate guess, we may deduct around 10 percent, putting a pound at around 324 grams.[204] Knowing the silver content of a *denari*, gives us a silver content of around 228 grams for one Cologne mark, which was thus worth around £0.704 or 169 Short Cross pennies.

Fried claims that such arrangements, as the one made in Cologne, were the beginnings of the *Rentenkapitalismus* or rent capitalism. Rent capitalism is a theory proposed by the Austrian geographer Hans Bobek as a transitional step between the feudal agrarian economy and 'productive' capitalism, which sees the city as a predatory parasite extracting rents or payments from its rural surroundings.[205] Although nowadays, the theory is mostly utilized in the Middle Eastern context, it does seem to apply to Barbarossa's economic policy.[206] However, we must keep in mind that most "economic" decisions were also based on political considerations. The last chapter mentioned that Frederick enfeoffed his closest allies with territories in return for their support of his royal claim. Another example would be Frederick's enfeoffing Henry the Lion with Goslar,

grains (1.349 g) of fine silver per coin. See Img. 2 of the Appendix for a picture of the Short Cross penny.

[204] See the example in footnote 38.

[205] Hans Bobek, "Zum Konzept des Rentenkapitalismus," *Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie* 65, no. 2 (1974): 73.

[206] See Eckart Ehlers, "Rentenkapitalismus und Stadtentwicklung im islamischen Orient: Beispiel: Iran," *Erdkunde* 32, no. 2 (1978): 124.

which was a rich town as it controlled over the Rammelsberg silver mines, to further guarantee his support and the peace.[207]

Nevertheless, rent capitalism does come into play when Barbarossa's personal ambitions are considered. Acting neither as king nor as emperor, but rather as the head of his family, Frederick saw the opportunity to achieve supremacy over the increasingly politically independent lords of his kingdom by making the Hohenstaufen the richest and most influential house in Germany.[208] He achieved his ambition by what we today would consider outright corruption, exploiting his superior standing to purchase feudal properties belonging to the church to enrich his house because the church would not willingly oppose the sale of its lands to the emperor.[209]

Frederick I handled the economics of his empire with less finesse than his personal enrichments, but with similar efficiency. One of his foremost goals was to create more imperial properties through "inheritances, trades, buyouts or force," which he then transformed into *terrae imperii*.[210] These "imperial lands" transitioned away from manorialism and instead focused on an administrative center based at a castle or *Kaiserpfalz*[211] and an adjacent market or city.[212] Barbarossa expanded the infrastructure of these *terrae imperii* further by establishing buildings such as mints, churches and hospitals, which boosted both

[207] Jordan, *Henry the Lion*, 43.
[208] Fried, "Die Wirtschaftspolitik Friederich Barbarossas in Deutschland," 200.
[209] Ibid.
[210] Ibid., 213.
[211] Kaiserpfalz/ Königspfalz: Temporary, secondary seats of Barbarossa distributed across the empire (Minimum buildings: palace, imperial chapel, an estate. Also: imperial/royal residence) See T. Asche, *Die Kaiserpfalz Zu Goslar, Am Harz, Im Spiegel Der Geschichte* (Goslar: Koch, 1892), 1 – 2.
[212] Fried, "Die Wirtschaftspolitik Friederich Barbarossas in Deutschland," 213.

their economic and political influence over their surroundings.[213] Again, these were not purely economic actions, but a result of his policies to unite the commercial and administrative hub of a region within a *terrae imperii*.[214] The administration was often put in the hands of the local diocese.

To promote urbanization and the expansion of his imperial lands, which were beneficial for the empire and its finances as marketplaces and strong imperially controlled political entities, Barbarossa undertook measures to aid the merchant class. The merchants were essential to attract people, especially foreigners, to the markets of the cities and *terrae imperii* to generate revenue.[215] Furthermore, the merchants were the only ones able to supply Barbarossa's traveling court adequately, and thus sometimes received royal privileges from Frederick.[216] Fried also states that sometimes cities were founded for the sole purpose of securing the traveling court financially. One example of such a city is Gelnhausen, which was founded in 1170, and then registered on the itinerary of Barbarossa's court.[217]

Frederick seems to have had some understanding of financial liquidity and debt. He was the first German king to pawn off royal property for the sake of gaining liquid assets.[218] In addition, he also gave out loans in exchange for collateral.[219] It is unclear, whether he profited from these interactions, as usury was a contested subject for Christians at the time. Although he certainly did not

[213] Fried, "Die Wirtschaftspolitik Friederich Barbarossas in Deutschland," 214.
[214] Ibid., 214.
[215] Ibid., 222.
[216] Ibid.
[217] Ibid., 223.
[218] Ibid., 202.
[219] Ibid.

invent taking on debts, he was the German ruler who popularized it as financial tool.[220] For example, he wrote many letters to the Patriarch of Aquileia in 1177 asking him to take on Venetian loans in the name of the empire.[221]

Frederick Barbarossa was most easily able to extract resources continuously from his royal possessions and imperial churches.[222] He made use of his rights by requesting the payment of the *Servitien,* a tax on the imperial churches, more than any ruler before him and taxed, for example, the complete income of the Archdiocese of Mainz in 1184 including its newest harvest.[223] His greed seemed boundless, as he reinstated the *Jus Spolii,* or Right of Soil, which was the right to claim the property of deceased clergymen, as an additional income stream.[224] Naturally, his policies were not popular among the clergy, so much so that the abbot Heinrich von Lorsch decided to give away his entire estate of 306 marks (~ £215) in 1167, shortly before his death, in order to avoid it falling into the hands of Barbarossa. Fried argues that after a while, Frederick realized the damage he was causing and, in a few cases, such as with the Archdiocese of Cologne issued a 'tax refund,' for the sake of maintaining a sustainable source of income. Some other taxes he levied were in the form of customs and tolls, such as a toll in Frankfurt for incoming goods, as well as a toll of four pennies for every ship passing Neustadt and Aschaffenburg (but only for two weeks from 8th – 22nd

[220] Fried, "Die Wirtschaftspolitik Friederich Barbarossas in Deutschland," 203.
[221] Ulf Dirlmeier, "Friedrich Barbarossa – auch ein Wirtschaftspolitiker?," *Vorträge und Forschungen: Friedrich Barbarossa. Handlungsspielräume und Wirkungsweisen des staufischen Kaisers* 40 (1992): 510.
[222] Fried, "Die Wirtschaftspolitik Friederich Barbarossas in Deutschland," 202.
[223] Ibid., 200 – 201.
[224] Ibid., 201.

August, around the Assumption of the Virgin (15th August)).[225] In addition to taxing the church heavily, Barbarossa also accused whole communities of Jews with invented crimes in order to extract fines from them. He also issued fines for not attending one of his courts, which totaled £100 for a prince and £10 for anyone else.[226] Freed cites Otto von Freising, who mentioned that Barbarossa levied similar fines on anyone who angered him. In an extreme case, the Archbishop Philip of Cologne had to pay a fine of 2,200 marks (~ £1,550) for double non-attendance and "for imposing a levy on the Jews in defiance of the emperor's command."[227] This is not to say that Barbarossa changed his sentiment towards the Jews: rather this was a fine for challenging imperial orders.

Thus, Frederick came up with many creative ways to increase the state's, but also his own, income in Germany. He often enforced existing laws, which his predecessors had let fall into abeyance and in the end, he probably created the wealthiest Holy Roman Empire up to date. Furthermore, he popularized lending and the use of debt as financial instruments, which would become important economic devices in the future.

Barbarossa's Italian Economy

The *Instituta regalia et ministerial camerae regum Longobardorum* was the basis of the royal economic administration of Lombardy reaching back to Charlemagne and was still applied by the Ottonian dynasty of the tenth century

[225] Freed, *The Prince*, 370.
[226] Ibid., 94.
[227] Ibid., 472.

and early eleventh century.[228] Unfortunately, the Palatinate of Pavia, which housed all documents of the centralized financial administration, was destroyed in 1024 and thereafter little evidence survives suggesting how Italy was administered financially by the emperors.

Although, Postan maintains that just the volume of money transactions increased, Carlrichard Brühl argues that with the increase in the number of documents from about 1150 a monetary economy started to develop.[229] This differs from Postan's definition, as it meant that more and more people used money to pay for things instead of bartering with natural goods, at least in Italy. Yet, payments by goods did not entirely disappear, as the *curie que pertinent ad mensam regis Romanorum* shows.[230] This document, commonly referred to as *Tafelgüterverzeichnis*, was the "draft of a letter sent by a canon of Aachen to someone of high rank in the king's entourage," and lists the payments of twenty-eight Lombardian imperial holdings, *Tafelgüter*, of which nine were money transactions (ranging from 200 (~ £140) to 2,000 Marks (~ £1,400)) and nineteen were transfers of goods.[231]

However, the economic fate of imperial Italy under Barbarossa was decided at the Diet of Roncaglia in November 1158. One of the key points was that the cities of Lombardy had to grant the imperial rights and belongings, so

[228] Carlrichard Brühl, "Die Finanzpolitik Friedrich Barbarossas in Italien," *Historische Zeitschrift* 213, no. 1 (August, 1971): 17.
[229] Ibid., 18.
[230] Ibid.
[231] Ibid., 19 – 20. and Leyser, "Frederick Barbarossa and the Hohenstaufen Polity," 157.

called regalia, to the emperor.[232] These rights included ownership and right to exercise

> dukedoms, marches, counties, consulates, mints, market tolls (*thelonea*), forage tax (*fodrum*), wagon tolls (*vectigalia*), gate tolls (*portus*), transit tolls (*pedatica*), mills, fisheries, bridges, all the use accruing from running water, and the payment of an annual tax, not only on the land, but also on their own persons.[233]

After the regalia were reinstated into Barbarossa's hands, he would sometimes waive these rents for an annual fee, the *fictum* or *pensio*.[234] The highest known *pensio* was paid by the city Piacenza, located between Parma and Milan, and amounted to £1,050.[235] *The Deeds of Frederick Barbarossa* state that Barbarossa's annual income increased by 30,000 talents thanks to these regained regalia.[236] Furthermore, the Diet released a report on how to levy taxes, which was derived from Roman law.[237] Although he gained a significant sum through the regalia, Barbarossa's highest income in Italy came from the *fodrum*.[238] The *fodrum* was a tax that was levied irregularly throughout imperial Italy, for example Lombardy had to pay it every time the emperor arrived in the region, it was levied in the region around Verona whenever he was passing through,

---

[232] Brühl, "Die Finanzpolitik Friedrich Barbarossas in Italien," 21 and See Ibid., 22 for a list of these regalia (in Latin).
[233] von Freising, *The Deeds of Barbarossa*, Book IV, ch.7/vii, 238.
[234] Brühl, "Die Finanzpolitik Friedrich Barbarossas in Italien," 24.
[235] Ibid., 25.
[236] von Freising, *The Deeds of Barbarossa*, Book IV, ch.8/viii, 238.
[237] Brühl, "Die Finanzpolitik Friedrich Barbarossas in Italien," 23.
[238] Ibid., 25. See also "Frederick I | Biography, Barbarossa, Crusades, & Facts | Britannica," accessed April 2, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Frederick-I-Holy-Roman-emperor.

Ravenna paid the tax every two years, and Matelica every three years.[239] Furthermore, the tax rate changed constantly and even differed between the various communes.[240] Therefore, we cannot determine how much the *fodrum* was worth at any given time, but have sufficient evidence to say that it must have been the largest imperial income stream in Italy. In some places, such as Milan, a *Steuerkataster*, a tax registry listing all taxable property, was established.[241] The *Steuerkataster* was an advanced financial device, perhaps comparable to a miniature version of the Domesday Book of William the Conqueror. Another important tax was the *hostanditiae*, which was less a tax and more a payment required to evade *Heeresfolge*, the participation in military campaigns.[242] The *histanditiae* was often paid by the vassals belonging to the clergy, but also by some cities and lower vassals, who were able to free themselves from participation in a military campaign even though their feudal lord was required to participate in it.[243]

Barbarossa also raised funds in Italy through political action. When the cities of Milan and Crema rebelled against the emperor, the commune of Cremona requested the destruction of Crema. The commune paid the empire £11,000 in 1159 to fulfill this task.[244] Shortly after, Barbarossa successfully besieged Crema and it had to capitulate in early 1160.[245] In addition to Cremona, the cities of

[239] Gertrud Deibel, "Die italienischen Einkünfte Kaiser Friedrich Barbarossas," *Neue Heidelberger Jahrbücher* (1932), 47.
[240] Deibel, "Die italienischen Einkünfte Kaiser Friedrich Barbarossas," 48.
[241] Dirlmeier, "Friedrich Barbarossa – auch ein Wirtschaftspolitiker?," 509.
[242] Ibid., 49 and Brühl, "Die Finanzpolitik Friedrich Barbarossas In Italien," 26.
[243] Deibel, "Die italienischen Einkünfte Kaiser Friedrich Barbarossas," 49.
[244] Ibid.
[245] See chapter 1.

Genoa and Pisa each paid the empire, in 1159 and 1164 respectively, to gain ownership rights over Sardinia.[246] However, Barbarossa did not always choose to increase the empire's funds. For example, in 1161 Frederick rejected the *histanditiae* of the archbishop of Salzburg.[247] The German medievalist Knut Görich discusses this topic extensively in his article *Geld und "honor," Friederich Barbarossa in Italien,* in which he highlights the process through which the emperor decided between money and expanding the honor and might of the empire.[248] Fried's opinion on the matter was that Barbarossa "did not conduct politics in Italy to amass riches for us or our sons, but solely for the restoration of peace and expansion of the empire."[249]

Conclusion

As Gertrud Deibel already stated in 1932 in her article *Die Italienischen Einkünfte Friederich Barbarossas*, it is impossible to reconstruct the entire financial budget of the empire, as sources are incomplete and more often than not cite the event of a payment but not its value.[250] All one can do is conclude that the empire had many methods for raising a substantial amount of money during Frederick's reign. Furthermore, Barbarossa took a great interest in his economic policy, so much so that he sometimes directly intervened as arbitrator or money lender. In addition, his financial devices, which included a *Steuerkataster*, interpretations of Roman law, fines, and political payments, were the most

[246] Dirlmeier, "Friedrich Barbarossa – auch ein Wirtschaftspolitiker?," 509.
[247] Ibid., 510.
[248] Knut Görich, "Geld und 'honor.' Friedrich Barbarossa in Italien," *Vorträge und Forschungen: Formen und Funktionen öffentlicher Kommunikation im Mittelalter* 51 (2001): 177 – 200.
[249] Fried, "Die Wirtschaftspolitik Friederich Barbarossas in Deutschland," 196.
[250] Deibel, "Die italienischen Einkünfte Friederich Barbarossas," 21.

creative and progressive that the Holy Roman Empire had seen up until that point. And although the empire's financial budget cannot be traced fully, comparing the amounts Barbarossa received in fees and taxes to those paid in England and France suggest that the empire's economy was as great if not even greater than those of the other major European powers. Yet, the financial administration of the Empire under Barbarossa was not especially innovative: its *Steuerkataster*, for example, had been preceded by the Domesday Book, and the expansive debt market of the Italian city-states had anticipated its use of debt. However, the fact that Frederick Barbarossa was able to mesh and balance all these different financial tools to grow the empire's income is the most distinguishing factor of his financial administration.

Chapter Three - State Theories Explaining Barbarossa's Rule over the Holy Roman Empire in the 12th Century

The following chapter attempts to determine if past and current state theories would classify Frederick's Holy Roman Empire as a modern state in the contemporary understanding of the term. His empire suits this study because of its political infrastructure and size, and because his rule is considered to have been one of the most successful in the history of the Holy Roman Empire. The first part of this chapter looks at twelfth century understandings of a state, while the second part examines contemporary state theory. The next chapter will analyze the Holy Roman Empire of the twelfth century by comparing these theories to its structure. To determine if and in what sense Barbarossa's empire was a predecessor of the modern state, the Third Reich and the Bundesrepublik Deutschland are studied to figure out if any components of Frederick's rule have been kept.

Contemporary state theory

Although statehood as a term emerged in political discourse only in the late sixteenth to early seventeenth century, ideas about what we would call a state have been circulating for millennia.[251] The medieval theory of the state was set forth by Louis the Pious[252], son and successor of Charlemagne, in his "formulae

[251] See Quentin Skinner, "A Genealogy of the Modern State," in *The Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 162, 2008 Lectures,* ed. Ron Johnston (British Academy, 2009), 327.
[252] King of the Franks 814 – 840, Emperor of the Carolingian Empire 813 - 840 (co-ruled with Charlemagne).

status totius regni and *communis societas et status*."[253] Roughly translated, the formulas mean 'state of the whole kingdom' and 'general society and state.' Kleinschmidt argues that *status, regnum* and *communis societas* could be interpreted as the condition of an order (*status*) within a space (*regnum*) containing a group of peoples (*communis societas*).[254] Yet, he also states that the elements of this state theory, which he refers to as the socio-economic environment, were probably not as distinct as he makes them out to be, due to their interconnectedness.[255] More clearly defined was Louis the Pious' understanding of state authority, in which "the emperor – […] the Roman Emperor – was endowed with a universal authority destined to protect the universal Church […], to spread Christian faith, and to preserve its purity."[256] This understanding resulted in his nickname 'the Pious,' but it also detached the concept of the state from his title as king and attributed the origin of his power to a universal authority, whilst giving his office a mission. This meant that kingship did not necessarily have inherent power, but one that was legitimized through a third party, such as God. In his *Ordinatio Imperii* (817), moreover, Louis reformed the Frankish kingdom and decreed the "maintenance of integrity of the territory and the rule of succession to the throne by primogeniture."[257] Thus, from the ninth century onwards the foundations of a medieval German state were set.

[253] Harald Kleinschmidt, *Understanding the Middle Ages: The Transformation of Ideas and Attitudes in the Medieval World*, (Woodbridge, Suffolk; Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 2000), 313.
[254] Ibid.
[255] Ibid.
[256] François Louis Ganshof, "Louis the Pious Reconsidered," in *History* 42, no. 146 (1957), 174.
[257] Ibid, 175 – 76.

The French king Louis XIV most famously said, "L'état c'est moi!" but this notion already applied to rulers reigning over Italy, Burgundy, Flanders, and Germany in the twelfth century. This belief had its origin in early pagan tradition and the Christian Church. In the twelfth century, the divine right of kings or a precursor thereof was already championed by European rulers. One example stems from King Richard I's captivity at Holy Roman Emperor Henry VI's court. After the Third Crusade, Richard Lionheart was accused of killing the King of Jerusalem, Conrad of Montferrat, and captured by the Holy Roman Empire. Thus, it is said, that at Henry VI's court in Speyer in 1193, King Richard I uttered the words "I am born in a rank which recognizes no superior but God, to whom alone I am responsible for my actions," in response to being judged by Henry.[258] Thus, Richard the Lionheart claimed to be the highest authority on earth, second only to God. Yet, unlike Louis XIV, the twelfth century kings of Europe claimed to rule by divine right to legitimize their authority, rather than to secure absolute rule. Furthermore, the Medieval Church was a powerful and influential organization that was revered and respected by all strata of society. By tying their rule to god, the monarchs exploited the Church's influence to secure the legitimacy of their rule, without which their princes and lords would have had more reason to rebel and pose challenges to their authority.[259]

In fact, the power of a twelfth-century king was limited. For example, the Concordat of Worms imposed a limit on the extent of rule of the German kings in

[258] Jonathan Duncan, *The Dukes of Normandy, from the Times of Rollo to the Expulsion of King John by Philip Augustus of France* (London: Harvey and Darton, 1839), 290.
[259] See Henry the Lion's attempt at challenging Barbarossa's position in chapter 1.

1122, bringing an end to the Investiture Controversy, which had started as a dispute between Pope Gregory VII and King Henry IV in 1076 over the authority to appoint church officers, such as bishops and abbots. After an excommunication and several popes, Pope Callixtus II and the Holy Roman Emperor Henry V agreed at a court in Worms, that bishops needed to swear loyalty to the secular rulers but were to be appointed by the Church. Furthermore, the emperor renounced his right to appoint the pope. Therefore, the Investiture Controversy shifted the power balance of medieval Europe away from secular leaders towards the Church. As the conflict was carried out mostly between the pope and the German kings, this shift was felt most strongly in the German realm. Adding to this was the circumstance that all German kings attempted to have themselves crowned as Holy Roman Emperor; a coronation that had to be performed by the pope. As this procedure was controlled by the pope, this put an impactful limit on the power of the kings, while also straining the relationship between the kings and the papacy. Nevertheless, after the Concordat, the Church attempted to restrict the emperor's authority by intervening in elections (after Henry VI's death), decreeing political guidelines to prelates, and splitting the German nobility thanks to the predicament of "their dual allegiance to Empire and papacy."[260]

Although the kings of Europe declared themselves to be the highest judges and political rulers, they could not rule directly over all their state's territory by themselves. Therefore, they 'employed' their family as well as the nobility to help

[260] Heinrich Mitteis, *The State in the Middle Ages: A Comparative Constitutional History of Feudal Europe* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co., 1975), 308.

them with the tasks of government and administration.[261] The nobles worked in councils, while the lower nobility and upper-class citizens took on the more menial tasks of everyday affairs.[262] This division of labor was more advanced in some realms than in others. In England, for example, the governmental organization was stratified, into "the Exchequer, the King's Bench, the Common Pleas, Chancery, and Wardrobe," whereas the Holy Roman Empire had only a royal Chancery as the official institution to govern its territory.[263] The empire had its princes and noblemen as advisors, but unlike in England, they were not all organized in official institutions. Few records exist concerning the royal Chancery. It is thus shrouded in ambiguity, and we can assume that it was not fully able to administer every part of the empire. This is highlighted by the common occurrence of imperial fiefs being converted into allodial properties, as the empire did not keep records of its holdings. The conversion occurred according to feudal law, which was codified in the *Sachsenspiegel*[264] and states that lands had to be given to third parties independent of a superior landlord, which in most cases was the empire.[265] More on this process called *Leihezwang* in the next chapter. In conclusion, the rule of European kings was legitimized by their claim to their divine right, but exercising that rule effectively was largely

[261] Lyon, *Princely Brothers and Sisters*, 17 – 8.
[262] Mitteis, *The State in the Middle Ages*, 309.
[263] Ibid.
[264] The *Sachsenspiegel* (Saxon mirror) is a "German law book written about 1225 by Eike von Repgow (c. 1180 – 1235)." Although it was written after Barbarossa's death, it resembled a collection of laws and customs that were practiced in the previous centuries. See Madeline H. Caviness, "Sachsenspiegel," Grove Art Online, accessed March 20, 2022. https://www.oxfordartonline.com/groveart/view/10.1093/gao/9781884446054.001.0001/oao-9781884446054-e-7002217119.
[265] Mitteis, *The State in the Middle Ages*, 309.

dependent on their ability to consolidate and manage their councilors, nobility, and the Church to establish a functioning state.

Furthermore, the establishment of self-governing communes and cities resulting from increased urbanization, threatened to isolate certain parts of a kingdom or empire from the ruler's reign. According to Anthony Black, these communes developed their own laws, governed over the local ecclesiastic order, and naturalized new citizens.[266]

After the Concordat of Worms, rulers had difficulty basing their legitimacy on their role "as intermediaries between the ruled and the divinity."[267] Thus, they had to find new sources for their authority. Kleinschmidt argues that the most common method of establishing a state after the Investiture Controversy was through military dominance.[268] He reasons that victory on the battlefield showed the superiority of a people and their ruler's ability to effectively institutionalize governmental affairs. Additionally, having an institutionalized government meant having administrators with limited autonomy in one's service and a more complex ruling structure. Furthermore, successful battles established and sometimes expanded territorial boundaries, which is a predominant characteristic of sovereignty. This territorialization through military means was the most common form of rule and statehood in the twelfth century. The described shift from divine authority as ruler to rule by a monopoly of violence, also meant,

[266] Antony Black, *Guild & State: European Political Thought from the Twelfth Century to the Present*, (New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 46 – 49.
[267] Kleinschmidt, *Understanding the Middle Ages*, 324.
[268] Ibid.

however, that powerful noblemen had the ability to topple the current ruler and endanger the structure of the state.

Barbarossa, Henry VI, and Frederick II also sought legitimacy through establishing ruling dynasties. Consequently, they attempted to portray themselves as universal rulers, like the ancient Roman emperors and Charlemagne before them.[269] Universal rule meant that these emperors claimed some sort of "supremacy over all other monarchs," as their empires "dominated their wider worlds and were able to absorb many of their competitors and reduce them either to taxpaying provinces or tributary client kingdoms."[270] For Barbarossa and his successors, this endeavor is portrayed in their crusading aspirations, although as we now know these ventures proved futile[271] and ultimately weakened the Holy Roman Emperor's claim to statehood according to Kleinschmidt. Although some Holy Roman Emperors did not give up on the title of world ruler until the sixteenth century, they had to fight for their people and territory just like the other secular rulers, which made the title merely symbolic in nature and arbitrary in practice.[272]

Meanwhile in England, King Henry II strived to become the sole authority over all secular and ecclesiastical affairs through legislation. He codified this goal in The Constitutions of Clarendon in 1164. The 3rd and 11th clauses of the Constitutions read:

---

[269] Kleinschmidt, *Understanding the Middle Ages*, 324.
[270] Peter F. Bang, and C. A. Bayly, eds. *Tributary Empires in Global History*. Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 6 – 7.
[271] Henry VI died before he could set out on crusade. Frederick II was banished, yet was crowned King of Jerusalem in 1229, but only held the city until 1244. See Kleinschmidt, *Understanding the Middle Ages*, 325.
[272] Kleinschmidt, *Understanding the Middle Ages*, 325.

> 3. Clergymen charged and accused of anything shall, on being summoned by a justice of the king, come into his court, to be responsible there for whatever it may seem to the king's court they should there be responsible for; and (to be responsible) in the ecclesiastical court [for what] it may seem they should there be responsible for—so that the king's justice shall send into the court of Holy Church to see on what ground matters are there to be treated. And if the clergyman is convicted, or [if he] confesses, the Church should no longer protect him.
>
> 11. Archbishops, bishops, and all persons of the realm who hold of the king as baronies and are answerable for them to the king's justice and ministers; also they follow and observe all royal laws and customs, and like other barons they should take part with the barons in the judgements of the lord king's court, until the judgement involves death or maiming.[273]

These and similar statements found in the document manifest the view that the king of England is the highest judge of the land as well as the last instance in matters concerning both laymen and clergy. These policies did not deviate substantially from those of his father, Henry I, whose exercise of power was rooted in the established rule of William the Conqueror.[274] Nevertheless, the Constitutions spurred criticism, most vehemently by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Becket. Because he challenged ten out of the sixteen points, and thus royal authority, he was tried at the Council of Northampton in 1164 and

[273] Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, "Sources of English Constitutional History: The Constitutions of Clarendon (1164)," in *Church and State in the Middle Ages*, ed. Bennett D. Hill, (New York: Wiley, 1970), 120.
[274] Bennett D. Hill, ed., *Church and State in the Middle Ages* (New York: Wiley, 1970), 112.

fled into French exile until 1170. He still threatened Henry from France and tried to negotiate with him. Thanks to the support of the pope, a compromise was eventually reached, and Becket returned to England, where he was murdered by supporters of the king in Canterbury Cathedral on December 29, 1170. His martyrdom led to expansive concessions and retractions of the Constitutions in the following years, but also to advancements in English canon law due to negotiations with the Church.[275] Thus, historians such as Brooke, Cheney, and Morey have debated whether the Church or the King came out on top after Becket's murder.[276] Nevertheless, we observe that the power of royal authority, even that of the king of England, could be successfully challenged by the Church and its members. Thus, even the most powerful and modern realm in Europe, the kingdom of England, had its hands bound in legislative matters by the papacy and the Church.

The bishop of Chartres, John of Salisbury (1110s – 1180), was the first to formulate an extensive political theory in the Latin Middle Ages in his work *Policraticus: Of the Frivolities of Courtiers and the Footprints of Philosophers*. The following dissects the *Policraticus* to illustrate the ideal twelfth-century state according to John of Salisbury. Similar to Plato's *Republic,* in which Plato describes the essential qualities of a philosopher-king, Salisbury defines the traits of a ruler, the prince, in the *Policraticus*. His prince, who is the antithesis of a tyrant, must obey his laws, must derive his power from God and must serve the

[275] Charles Duggan, "From the Conquest to the Death of John: A Victory for Both Sides," in *Church and State in the Middle Ages*, ed. Bennett D. Hill (New York: Wiley, 1970), 141 – 44.
[276] Ibid. Duggan refers to the historians Christopher N.L. Brooke, Christopher Robert Cheney and Adrian Morey.

church as its highest minister, only second to the pope.[277] Salisbury reasons that "[i]f the properly constituted prince administers faithfully the office undertaken, such honour and such reverence are exhibited for him as to match that superiority which the head has over the other members of the body."[278] With this metaphor, John puts his work in line with the concept of *body politic*, which has been utilized by Western philosophers at least since Plato's *Republic*, and describes a state and its institutions as parts of a human body.[279] In John of Salisbury's *body politic*, which he heavily bases on Plutarch, a Greek philosopher in the first century AD, the prince is the head, the senate is the heart, the courtiers or assistants to the prince are the flanks, the judges and governors are the ears, eyes, and mouth, the officials, which include tax collectors and public servants, and the soldiers are each one of the hands and the peasantry, the merchants and the craftsmen form the feet.[280] Here, John of Salisbury lays out the institutions necessary for a healthy body and for a healthy republic. Because Salisbury derives his theory from the ancient Greek philosophers, he tries to envision the republic as the ideal state. However, during the twelfth century, the only republics were those of the Italian city-states. Thus, naturally, his ideal will only apply to Barbarossa's state to a certain degree, if at all.

Hence, we can conclude that the twelfth century state, modelling it after the kingdom of England, was ruled by a single ruler, whose government was

---

[277] John of Salisbury, *John of Salisbury: Policraticus*, edited by Cary J. Nederman, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 27 – 33. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511809453.
[278] Ibid., 33.
[279] "Body Politic | Definition, History, & Facts | Britannica," accessed April 11, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/topic/body-politic.
[280] Salisbury, *Policraticus*, 69ff., 81ff., 85ff., 91ff., 104ff., 125ff.

constituted of the ruler's family, nobility, and some form of council. In addition, legitimization of rule came either from an exhibition of strength or legislation derived from some precedent. However, the authority of the twelfth-century state was limited by the Church and the existence of semi-independent communes. Furthermore, this model has some overlap with John of Salisbury's *body politic*, which further defines these institutions and adds more, ultimately culminating in the necessary parts of an ideal republic.

Current state theory

Since the twelfth century, many thinkers have proposed theories to explain the state in its fullest detail. The most cited and probably most accepted definition of a state is the one Max Weber, the sociologist, provided in his lecture *Politik als Beruf*, in which he defines the state as: a human community in a specified area, which successfully claims the monopoly on legitimate physical violence for itself.[281] Pierson claims that every component of Weber's definition is still part of today's discourse on state theory.[282] He breaks these components down into nine categories: control of the means of violence, territoriality, sovereignty, constitutionality, impersonal power, the public bureaucracy, authority/legitimacy, citizenship, and taxation.

Pierson argues that the most important component of the monopoly of violence is not the violence per se, as most states do not govern exclusively through physical force, but the monopoly on it or control of it. Although he

[281] Max Weber, *Politik als Beruf*, (Germany: Drucker & Humblot, 1919), 4.
[282] Christopher Pierson, *The Modern State*, (Florence, USA: Taylor & Francis Group, 2011), 6 – 27.

concedes that no state has absolute control over violence – he points out that organized crime and domestic assault are not controlled by the state – he observes that the more controlled and the more centralized the violence in a state, the rarer the state has to exercise its right to violence.[283] Next, he notes that states govern a "clearly defined space," in opposition to early empires with "ill-defined frontiers."[284] This territoriality is closely linked to sovereignty, which is the notion that states have complete jurisdiction in the space they govern.[285] In the past, and as Thomas Hobbes argues, this jurisdiction is and should be held by one single entity or sovereign. Others, like Rousseau and to some extent Locke, have argued that "sovereignty resid[es] in the people" of a state.[286] In *The spirit of laws*, Montesquieu argued for "a check of power" that would divide the state's power in three: "the legislative; the executive in respect to things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive in regard to matters that depend on the civil law."[287] Thus, apart from a state's having control within its borders, sovereignty can be interpreted in many different ways. Next, Pierson suggests that a state must have a constitution that establishes the parameters of political conduct and the process for making laws.[288] Subsequently, in a modern state the people and the governing officials must be subject to the constitution and follow any law ratified by the state, which Pierson denotes as impersonal power.[289] To organize a modern

[283] Pierson, *The Modern State*, 7 – 9.
[284] Ibid., 10. An extension of territoriality is the emergence of the nation (-state).
[285] Pierson, *The Modern State*, 11 – 14.
[286] Ibid., 12.
[287] Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, *The Spirit of Laws*, trans. Thomas Nugent (England: G. Bell, 1905), 61 – 62.
[288] Pierson, *The Modern State*, 14 – 15.
[289] Ibid., 15 – 16.

state, public bureaucracy is needed. Weber's definition of bureaucracy, meant to employ expert civil servants, who work under clear rules and hierarchy with the goal to provide service to the public.[290] Pierson also notes that Weber emphasized the resiliency of bureaucracies, as their interconnected structures and strict order of procedures are difficult to dismantle. According to Pierson, authority and legitimacy is also required for a state to function. This means that a state's inhabitants do not object actively to the state's power in everyday dealings and procedures.[291] This definition is purposefully loose, as there is no threshold for protesting state action, nor for the degree to which citizens should believe in the legitimacy of the state, nor does Pierson define which methods function best to achieve this authority. One method involves encouraging the citizens to disengage from politics, which allows the state to act without much citizen involvement.[292] Another method uses media and propaganda to divert attention away from state action to another event, such as a war on a foreign continent.[293] With respect to participation in a state, Pierson turns to David Held, who defines citizenship as "a status which, in principle, bestows upon individuals equal rights and duties, liberties and constraints, powers and responsibilities within the political community."[294] Citizenship helps the state, as it shows who belongs and who does not belong to the political body and can be used to conscript an army to exercise

[290] Pierson, *The Modern State*, 16 – 18.
[291] Ibid., 18 – 22.
[292] Ibid., 20.
[293] It could be argued that the media around the war in Ukraine has been used as a tool to divert attention away from an US airstrike on Somalia on February 22, 2022 (This is not to imply that the war itself has been caused as diversion tool). See Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Carries Out First Airstrike in Somalia Since August," *The New York Times*, February 24, 2022, sec. U.S. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/us/politics/somalia-shabab-us-airstrike.html.
[294] Pierson, *The Modern State*, 22.

state violence, but it also weakens a state, as the state gives and maintains the rights of its subjects.[295] Pierson sees his last criterion, taxation, as important because it generates revenue for the upkeep of the state apparatus.[296] He views modern taxation as one of the "most basic constituents of the modern state" and distinguishes it from taxation practices of preceding states and empires, since modern taxes are "systematic, continuous, legal-rational, extensive, regularized and bureaucratized."[297] According to Pierson, then, a political entity can be categorized as a modern state if it controls the means of violence and possesses territoriality, sovereignty, constitutionality, impersonal power, a public bureaucracy, authority/legitimacy, citizenship, and taxation.

Although Weber's and Pierson's explanations of a state are probably the most common ones, there are, of course, others. The following thinkers are state theorist with an historical approach to explaining current states. First and foremost, the modern state theorist, Charles Tilly, is examined. He proposed that states originate through their monopoly on violence in his essay *War Making and State Making as Organized Crime*. Although he does not describe the modern state explicitly, he writes about the nation state, which is a modern form of statehood. Tilly declares that a state has four functions. First, a state has to make war to gain and defend its territory – to claim sovereignty by monopolizing violence. Second, a state is obligated to eradicate domestic rivals – to claim authority. Third, a state must protect its citizens. Lastly, a state must extract taxes

[295] Pierson, *The Modern State*, 24.
[296] Ibid., 24 – 27.
[297] Ibid., 24 – 25.

from its constituents to finance the previous three activities.[298] Furthermore, he proposes that the development of the nation state started in 1400, as "the European pursuit of larger, more permanent, and more costly varieties of military organization […] dr[o]ve spectacular increases in princely budgets, taxes and staffs."[299]

Another sociologist and historian, Gianfranco Poggi, understood the modern state in a broader context than Weber and defined it more clearly than Tilly. Although his understanding of the modern state is similar to Weber's, he places its origin in the 9th century and suggests that three systems of rule (feudalism, *Ständestaat* and absolutism) led to the modern state.[300] For the purpose of this thesis, his thoughts on the *Ständestaat* are the most relevant, as they describe some circumstances of Barbarossa's rule and link it to the creation of the modern state. He begins his explanation with the Carolingian empire, which, according to him, "undertook to reconstitute a comprehensive, translocal framework of rule," after the fall of Rome.[301] Interestingly, he mentions the early notion of "*Gefolgschaft*" or "followership," which refers to a tightly knit community resulting from the bond between warlord and his warriors.[302] Further, Poggi states that this 'nationalistic' idea of followership survives at least until Barbarossa's reign. Although *Gefolgschaft* lasts in Poggi's theory, feudalism does

[298] Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 181.
[299] Ibid., 178.
[300] Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction*, (Stanford, Cali.: Stanford University Press, 1978), 1, 16.
[301] Ibid., 18.
[302] Ibid., 19.

not survive and is replaced by "the polity of the Estates'," or *Ständestaat* as he calls it, around the year 1000.[303] He describes this stage of political development as one dominated by cities and towns, which grew in number and power from the eleventh century onwards. For example, he brings up the assassination of the Flemish Count Charles the Good in 1127 as proof that towns were able to create political structures beyond their town lines.[304] Charles died without an heir, which put Flanders in political turmoil. [305] After King Louis VI of France, "the overlord of the county," initially tried to impose William Clito on the Flemish as their new count, the cities of Lille, Ghent, Ypres, Bruges and Saint-Omer rose up and opposed the king's choice with their own counts. They were successful and Thierry of Alsace became count of Flanders in 1128 and ruled until his death in 1168. Furthermore, the system of *Ständestaat* harbored a duality of rule, which equated the ruling authority of the cities with that of their territorial ruler.[306] This was not quite a separation of powers, but more another piece of evidence that cities had become small self-contained political entities. Thus, the ability of cities to rule in a "more literate and legalistic" manner in comparison to the violent and unorganized rule during the feudal period resembled the "predominantly discursive, businesslike temper of the internal political processes of the modern state."[307] Poggi's defines the modern state as:

[303] Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State*, 36.
[304] Ibid., 41.
[305] Jeff Rider, *God's Scribe: The Historiographical Art of Galbert of Bruges,* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 15 – 6.
[306] Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State*, 48.
[307] Ibid., 57.

> a complex set of institutional arrangements for rule operating through the continuous and regulated activities of individuals acting as occupants of offices. The state, as the sum total of such offices, reserves to itself the business of rule over a territorially bounded society; it monopolizes, in law and as far as possible in fact, all faculties and facilities pertaining to that business. And in principle it attends exclusively to that same business, as perceived in the light of its own particular interests and rules of conduct.[308]

Thus, his emphasis on institutionalization aligns with the increased legal activity and discourse of the cities in the High Middle Ages. Additionally, Poggi claims that the strength of the *Ständestaat* system can be attributed to the weak development of "political-administrative structures of rule" in early modern Germany.[309] Under Poggi's definition, the Holy Roman Empire is not a modern state, as it falls within the *Ständestaat* system of rule. Instead, the Holy Roman Empire is merely on its way to fulfilling the requirements to be regarded as a modern state.

Another contemporary theorist, Samuel Finer, wrote *The History of Government from the Earliest Times*, in which he describes significant governmental systems from Ancient Mesopotamia to Modern Europe in three volumes. His work is relevant for this analysis, as he comments on Barbarossa and the Holy Roman Empire under his reign. Finer introduces two conditions of

[308] Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State*, 1.
[309] Ibid., 59.

survival for an empire: 'ready money' and bureaucracy.[310] He credits the fall of the Carolingian Empire in 888 to the absence of those two characteristics. Therefore, the Holy Roman Empire must have had these two qualities both before and after Barbarossa according to Finer, or it would have dissolved long before 1806. Yet, he continues by arguing that the empire did not have a "central bureaucracy, taxation system, or standing army" and was kept running only by the "energy, resources, and diplomacy of the German kings."[311] Consequently, bureaucracy was important, but did not have to be centralized for the empire to continue to exist. These points hold true for the rulers before Barbarossa, yet Finer notes that "had matters run an uninterrupted course – had Barbarossa not died on Crusade, had his son Henry VI also not died prematurely – […] the kingdom of Germany might have developed just as […] France under Phillipe-Auguste [also written as Philip Augustus]."[312]

The rule of Philip has been discussed in the previous chapter, which emphasized his intelligent control of government and expansive fiscal and economic policies, which created new revenue streams and allowed for a reform of the military. Finer thus sees Philip II as the great reformer of the Capetian monarchy, who put France on its course to modern statehood. Likewise, Finer holds Barbarossa in high regard, as he too "systemized the political structure of the kingdom,"[313] using conquered territories and imperial rights to bind noblemen

[310] Samuel E. Finer, *The History of Government from the Earliest Times*, (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 856.
[311] Ibid., 898.
[312] Ibid., 946.
[313] Ibid., 944.

systematically to his person by giving out regalian and land rights in exchange for homage and service. Furthermore, Finer suggests that Barbarossa had the political goals of growing his *Burgbezirke*[314] through the infeudation of his German princes as well as "rebuilding his domain for military backup."[315] The author points to the *Sachsenspiegel*, a compilation of feudal law at the time of Barbarossa's reign, as confirmation that these goals were partially accomplished. Thus, in Finer's opinion the German kingdom under Barbarossa was on the path to becoming a modern state, but due to his premature death, weak feudal law, and lackluster successor states, it did not experience a rapid state development as did France under Philip Augustus and his successors.

[314] Castle district (trans. by author).
[315] Finer, *The History of Government from the Earliest Times*, 944.

Chapter Four- Analysis (Part I): Was Barbarossa's empire a modern state?

It may not have been Holy nor Roman nor an Empire, as Voltaire once famously said, but it may have been a state. The theories elaborated in the previous chapter are applied in this one to determine if the Holy Roman Empire of Frederick I Barbarossa was a state according to modern state theory or twelfth-century ideas about a state. The next chapter will then examine the history of the empire after Barbarossa to see if his *Reich* had any long-term influence on the evolution of German political history. If it did, it could be concluded that it was at least a precursor to the modern German state, if not one itself.

Applied Modern State Theory

The following paragraphs examine Weber's and Pierson's definitions of a modern state in relation to Barbarossa's empire. Weber's theory is the most popular among state theorists today and is also one of the most comprehensive in describing a modern state. According to Weber, a state must have a monopoly of violence, territoriality, sovereignty, constitutionality, impersonal power, a public bureaucracy, authority/legitimacy, citizenship, and taxation.

The first characteristic of a state, according to Weber, is a monopoly of violence within its territory. Pierson modifies this somewhat by emphasizing that a monopoly of violence is secondary to the importance of having control over forceful action. He suggests, additionally, that it does not suffice to possess the right of violence: the state must also have the power to execute that right to be able to establish a monopoly over violence. For example, Iraq's current

constitution states in Article 9 I B: "The formation of military militias outside the framework of the [Iraqi] armed forces is prohibited."[316] Yet, the autonomous region of Kurdistan is home to two independent military forces controlled by the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) and the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) respectively.[317] Consequently, the Republic of Iraq is not in full control of violence and potential violent actors, and thus this is one of the reasons why it does not have a monopoly of violence within the territory it claims.

For Frederick, holding the monopoly of violence was important, as he made it his paramount task to "pacify the princes of Germany" and "to restore peace and maintain justice throughout the realm," according to Burchard von Ursberg and Otto von Freising.[318] These obligations were closely tied to Frederick's policy of *reformatio imperii*, which necessitated a peace to seriously attempt the reconstruction of the Roman Empire. The potential violent actors in the HRE were above all the princes, nobles, knights, and the Church. As emperor and king of Germany, all power was vested in Frederick; he topped the hierarchy of feudal lords, which meant that his princes and noblemen were his vassals. The transfer of power was enacted through granting fiefs, which were plots of land under the jurisdiction of the feudal lord. It could be argued that these vassals were left to reign free over their fiefs, which would mean that the state was did not

[316] "Iraq's Constitution of 2005," Constituteproject.org, 2005, Art 9, I B. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iraq_2005.pdf?lang=en.
[317] Michael J. Kelly, "The Kurdish Regional Constitution within the Framework of the Iraqi Federal Constitution: A Struggle for Sovereignty, Oil, Ethnic Identity, and the Prospects for a Reverse Supremacy Clause," 114 *Penn St. L. Rev.*, no. 2 (2010), 734.
[318] Björn Weiler, "The King as Judge: Henry II and Frederick Barbarossa as Seen by Their Contemporaries," in *Challenging the Boundaries of Medieval History*, ed. by Patricia Skinner, Studies in the Early Middle Ages (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2009), 119. https://doi.org/10.1484/M.SEM-EB.3.1922.

have a monopoly of violence, but Barbarossa's authority as their feudal lord superseded their power, which gave Barbarossa, and in turn the state, the monopoly.[319] Even though Barbarossa held the monopoly of violence, Björn Weiler states that he generally enacted justice by means of grand gestures and negotiations between his princes and other subjects.[320] One such grand gesture was Frederick's showcase of strength and chivalry during the court of Mainz in 1184. It fulfilled the purpose of deterring violence by touting the state's resources to all its allies and foes alike. The court featured a strong ruler - Frederick partook in the knightly tournament - as well as a demonstration of stability and military rule - the emperor knighted his sons during the occasion.

Otto von Freising also gives examples of Frederick's exercise of power in his *Deeds of Emperor Frederick*. Barbarossa was, for example, able to broker the long peace at the start of his reign by acts such as transferring Bavaria from Henry II Jasomirgott to Henry the Lion for purposes of stabilizing his rule through establishing strong partnerships.[321] Yet, in some cases Frederick also showed that he was also able to apply direct force onto his subjects, "as in 1163, when he ordered the destruction of the houses of those *ministeriales* who had attacked the canons of Aachen cathedral."[322]

Henry the Lion mounted a violent resistance against the empire after he was outlawed by Barbarossa on June 29, 1179, and Frederick lost control over his

[319] See André Munro, "state monopoly on violence," Encyclopedia Britannica, published March 6, 2013. https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-monopoly-on-violence.
[320] Weiler, "The King as Judge," 123.
[321] See von Freising, *The Deeds of Barbarossa*, Book II, ch.11/xi, 124.
[322] Ibid.

monopoly of violence at least until November 11, 1181, when Henry submitted to the emperor. Any infraction of the law, even a minor theft or robbery, disrupts the state's and the sovereign's monopoly of power, but what is important is the degree and duration of the disruption. Henry's rebellion was the longest violent domestic dispute during Barbarossa's rule, but it lasted for only roughly 6.2% of Frederick's reign as king of Germany. [323] Furthermore, Frederick was able to restore the peace after the affair and no change of regime or coup d'état followed the uprising. Thus, we can conclude that this episode had no long-term effect on Barbarossa's monopoly of violence.

The Church also posed a threat to Barbarossa's monopoly of violence, as it had the ability to hinder the emperor from enforcing his rule. In fact, it did intervene more than Frederick would have liked and excommunicated him briefly during the papal schism, limiting his control over his people. Yet, it seems that the Church's efforts to limit Barbarossa's power were a result of the emperor's foreign policies and actions and aimed only at influencing Frederick's actions outside of the empire without reducing his domestic influence. The Church could not ultimately pose a serious threat to Barbarossa's monopoly of violence, as it did not have an army or other means to enforce its own policies within the Holy Roman Empire. Instead, it operated through political pressure and by influencing other states such as the Italian city-states, France, and England.

To summarize, Frederick's monopoly of violence was threatened by the Church and by Henry the Lion, yet neither was able to overcome Barbarossa's

[323] Barbarossa ruled as king from March 3, 1152 – June 10, 1190 (13,977 days) and Henry's uprising only lasted for 866 days.

means, resources, and legal authority to monopolize violence within the Holy Roman Empire. Barbarossa's determination to rebuild and bring peace to his Roman Empire aided in his pursuit of maintaining a monopoly of violence, as otherwise these goals would have been unattainable. The next criteria for modern statehood may be more difficult to determine than the previous one, as it concerns the territoriality of the empire. To reiterate, territoriality describes the condition of a state governing over a clearly defined space. This does not mean that state borders need to be static; it just means that they must be known to the state and those bordering it. In an article published in 2018, Matthew Gabriele, a professor in medieval history, went as far as to say that "There Were No Borders in The Middle Ages."[324] He concedes that there were large political entities, but emphasizes that they "often simply didn't seem to matter a whole lot" to those traveling between them.[325] Although they might have not mattered for those traveling across the borders, they did matter to the European states. The politician and historian James Bryce divided the territory claimed by Barbarossa into four sections: 1. German territory, solely governed by Barbarossa; 2. Non-German territory, accepting Barbarossa as sole ruler; 3. outlying countries, governed by kings with an allegiance to the empire; and 4. other states, ruled by independent rulers, who acknowledge that the emperor was hierarchically above them, but over whom he had no control.[326] Bryce clarifies that the territories legitimately

[324] Matthew Gabriele, "There Were No Borders In The Middle Ages," Forbes, published November 5, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewgabriele/2018/11/05/no-borders-middle-ages/.
[325] Ibid.
[326] James Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire* (New York, London: The Macmillan Company, 1904), 182 – 3.

belonging to the empire are included in only the first and second categories, while the others remained largely independent. Some territories he mentions as belonging to the empire are Bohemia, Northern Italy, Switzerland, the kingdom of Burgundy and the kingdom of Poland.[327] These spaces may not fulfill the requirement of territoriality, however, as they did not have exact borders.

To draw exact borders on a map of the 12th century would be impossible, because they were based on geology, stories, and genealogies. Borders defined by geology means that states and smaller territories were determined by their natural frontiers, such as mountains and rivers. The position, name, and characteristics of each state was derived from its stories and especially its history. Meanwhile, genealogies legitimized rule and also established a dynasty for a certain area. The chronicles of Otto von Freising and Burchard von Ursberg were crucial within this context and in some ways defined the space the empire sought to control. If one uses a loose definition of territoriality, the Holy Roman Empire was in control of a clearly defined space under the rule of Frederick Barbarossa.

A third criterion for statehood is sovereignty. According to Poggi, this aspect would be fulfilled if the empire was only a sum of its towns and cities. Yet, overall, Poggi would not call the HRE a sovereign state since its towns and cities represent a source of conflicting authorities within its borders. It should be noted, however, that Frederick Barbarossa granted rights and privileges to these towns in order to increase the stability and power of his empire. His efforts to establish the *terrae imperii* throughout his empire highlights this. As mentioned in chapter 2,

[327] See Ibid. for a more comprehensive list.

the *terrae imperii* were imperial districts and ultimately imperial towns/cities, which derived their right of existence straight from the emperor.

Namur offers an example of a city's failure to resist Barbarossa's authority. Count Baldwin of Hainault claimed the city, but could not persevere against the other interested parties, such as the Count of Champagne and the King of France, without the help of his emperor. As sovereign, Barbarossa was able to help Baldwin secure Namur as his inheritance.[328] Cities do not seem to have threatened Frederick's authority and were not a source of rebellion.

As we saw in chapter 1, Barbarossa had trouble establishing his reign in Italy, yet the territories in Bryce's categories 1 and 2 widely accepted the rule of Barbarossa. Thus, it seems that the HRE was a sovereign state for the most part.

Weber believed that another characteristic of a state was a bureaucracy in which expert civil servants, who follow clear rules, hierarchy, and work for the public, are employed. This kind of bureaucracy does not seem to have existed in Barbarossa's empire. There were no rules that we know of in place to define the *camera*, and its hierarchy was very simple, with Frederick as leader. Barbarossa may, moreover, have instituted policies favoring his constituents, as we saw in chapter 2, but the *camera* was focused predominantly on strengthening the empire, the Hohenstaufen house, and Barbarossa's personal well-being.

Barbarossa's empire does appear more state-like, however, according to Poggi's institution-intensive definition of the state, which shifts the focal point away from the public good to the complexity of institutions. As mentioned in

[328] Weiler," The King as Judge," 124.

chapter 2, the members and services of Frederick's *camera* were relatively limited. Nevertheless, Leyser counts almost 1,200 surviving documents from his thirty-eight-year long reign, compared to the 789 surviving documents from King Louis II's[329] forty-three-year long reign,[330] and the 3,500 – 4,500 documents produced by the council of Henry II.[331] Barbarossa's bureaucratic apparatus thus seems to have been more complex than that of France at the time, but not as elaborate as England's, however, still lacked complexity to be called a fully-fledged governmental institution.[332] An analysis of the *camera* from 1167 – 1174 by the historian Walter Koch reveals that only a maximum of four to five councilors were active at any given time, including periods where only one or two persons could be found manning the council.[333] Conversely, the empire, divided into "counties, advocacies, immunities, burgraviates, *banni* and *mundeburdia*," without uniformity and hierarchical order, originating from the fall of the Carolingian empire, were too complex.[334] Thus, public bureaucracy and bureaucracy in general to the extent required by Poggi and Weber could not be found in the empire. Nevertheless, some bureaucracy existed and performed the tasks necessary to govern the empire.

[329] King Louis the Young (1120 – 1180) was King of the Franks from 1137 – 1180.
[330] Leyser, "Frederick Barbarossa and the Hohenstaufen Polity," 156. Yet, he also advises caution, as over the 1000 years since these documents have been issued, many must have been destroyed, lost, and forgotten, thus we will never know the exact number of total documents issued by each council.
[331] King Henry Curtmantle (1133 – 1189) was King of England from 1154 – 1189.
[332] Leyser, "Frederick Barbarossa and the Hohenstaufen Polity," 156.
[333] Walter Koch, *Die Reichskanzlei in den Jahren 1167 bis 1174: Eine diplomatisch-paläographische Untersuchung*, (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1973), 185 – 187.
[334] Ibid. *banni* and *mundeburdia* are only found in Leyser's work and may refer to banner fiefs and clerical advocates/episcopal sees.

Legitimacy is another characteristic of a modern state. As mentioned in chapter 1, Frederick Barbarossa was not the immediate heir to the German throne, but gained his legitimacy through bribes to strong princes, his swift coronation, and the long-lasting peace he established. Furthermore, he sought to be crowned emperor and was swiftly legitimized and granted authority by his coronation through the pope in 1155, only three years after his coronation as king of Germany in Aachen. His authority was questioned throughout his reign, especially after many of his Italian campaigns failed to achieve their objectives, but Barbarossa resolved domestic conflicts quickly and with much success, as he did, for example, when faced with the rebellion of Henry the Lion. Here, the empire's action overlaps with Tilly's theory, as one of his four functions of a state is the eradication of domestic rivals who claim authority. One could argue that the empire must be seen as separate from Barbarossa, especially as latter was excommunicated by Pope Alexander III in 1160 and legally lost authority as Holy Roman Emperor. However, the empire did not fall into disarray during Frederick's excommunication; instead, he legitimized himself by electing antipopes and avoided domestic instability by distracting his princes through repeated demands for their military support to invade Italy. Thus, the empire was defined by its reliance on its leader and seems to have been inseparable from Frederick I. The emperor himself seems to have been actively concerned with the issue of legitimacy, orchestrating his coronations, and ensuring that the state would live by crowning his son as co-king.

Next, the existence and extent of taxation in Barbarossa's state is discussed. The mechanics of levying taxes have been elaborate in chapter 2. To reiterate, Barbarossa raised taxes in Germany through various additions and reforms to tax laws devised by his predecessors. Thus, solely looking at the taxation in Germany fulfills Pierson's requirement and Tilly's last necessary state action. In Italy, the *Instituta regalia et ministerial camerae regum Longobardorum* was in effect and a *fodrum* was levied, however, tax collections often followed an irregular pattern. For example, the *fodrum* was only collected in Lombardy or Verona when the emperor was physically present. Nevertheless, the *fodrum* was not the only tax, as the Italians also had to pay a variety of tolls for markets and transportation. Furthermore, the emperor spent large parts of his reign in Italy and consequently must have consistently received the *fodrum*. All in all, the tax system of the empire fulfills the theorists' demand and was heavily developed under Frederick.

The feudal structure of the Middle Ages did not leave room for citizenship, thus the Holy Roman Empire, as well as its neighboring states, did not have citizens. One could argue that citizenship is a modern concept and that it would be unfair to judge the statehood of empire on this quality. The Ancient Greek *polis* or city-state gave out citizenships, however, and this institution was continued in the Roman Empire, which relied militarily and politically on giving out citizenships (*civis*).[335] However, Weber's meaning of citizen could be

[335] See Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship, Inequality, and Difference: Historical Perspectives*, The Lawrence Stone Lectures (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), 27 – 31 and Myles Lavan, "The Army and the Spread of Roman Citizenship," *Journal of Roman Studies* 109 (November 2019): 27–69, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0075435819000662.

interpreted to fit the peasant living on the empire's turf. While the idea can be entertained, the Holy Roman Empire of the twelfth century did not have citizens or rules in place to acquire citizenship.

The Holy Roman Empire did, however, clearly lack two other characteristics of a modern state: constitutionality and impersonal power. The Holy Roman Empire did not have a clearly defined constitution and Frederick Barbarossa and his *camera* did not operate strictly according to law. Instead, Frederick based his rule on that of his predecessors, the Carolingians and Ottonians, but most importantly on that of the Roman Empire. This is obvious from the language he uses in his letter to Saladin in May 1189, in which he demands the sultan to retract his claim on the Holy Land.[336] In the letter, he calls himself "Frederick, by the Grace of God, emperor of the Romans and forever Augustus […]," and exclaims:

> For we can hardly believe that you are unaware that these events of our time echo the writings of the ancients and the old histories. Surely you are not unaware of our predecessors' campaigns in both Ethiopias, Mauritania, Persia, Syria, Parthia -where our dictator Crassus met his premature fate at the hands of the Parthians - Judaea, Samaria, Maritima, Arabia, Chaldaea, and also Egypt, where, alas! the Roman citizen Antony, a remarkable man, who was endowed with all virtues except the splendour of self-control, served Cleopatra with immoderate passion, unfittingly for a knight sent on

[336] Ricardus, Helen J. Nicholson, and William Stubbs, ed., *Chronicle of the Third Crusade: a translation of the Itinerarium peregrinorum et gesta Regis Ricardi*, Crusade texts in translation 3 (Aldershot, Hants, England; Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1997), 50.

> such important business. Surely you are not unaware that Armenia and innumerable other countries are subject to our authority? This is well known to the kings on whose blood Roman swords are repeatedly intoxicated, and you also will discover from your own experience what our victorious eagles may do with God's help; what the cohorts of various nations may do, the Teutonic fury, seizing arms even in peace, the indomitable people from the source of the Rhine, the young Istrian who has never known flight, the lofty Bavarian, the cunning Swabian, the cautious Franconian, the Saxon, sporting with a sword, the Thuringian, the Westphalian, the agile Brabantine, the Lotharinian who does not know what peace is, the restless Burgundian, the lecherous Alpine, the Frisian flying madly ahead; the Bohemian, rejoicing beyond death; the Bolognese, fiercer than their wild beasts, the Austrian, the Bugresian, Illyrican, Lombard, Tuscan, those from the March of Ancona; the Venetian ship's mate, the nautical Pisan! In short, on that prearranged day, that day full of joy and delight and reverence for Christ, our right hand which you have accused of being weakened by old age will teach you that it has learnt to brandish swords.[337]

Furthermore, it was Frederick Barbarossa who introduced the term *sacrum imperium* (Holy Empire), which was then expanded to *sacrum Romanum imperium* (Holy Roman Empire) in 1184, near the end of his reign.[338] He believed

[337] Ricardus, *Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, 49 – 50.
[338] Vedran Sulovsky, "The Concept of Sacrum Imperium in Historical Scholarship," in *History Compass* 17, no. 8 (2019): 2 Group No. 1. https://doi.org/10.1111/hic3.12586.

his power was boundless because it was derived from God, as well as from Carolingian, Ottonian, and Roman precedent.[339] For example, he made Duke Vladislav II of Bohemia king over Bohemia in 1158, showing that he, Barbarossa, stood over any king and had the power to elevate others to kingship. [340]

Codified laws did exist in the empire. For instance, the *Sachsenspiegel* regulated the *Leihezwang*[341], which was "the need to grant at least banner fiefs[342] that had reverted, out again within a year and a day," and this law was respected when Barbarossa re-enfeoffed Henry the Lion's possessions after his defeat in 1181/2.[343] Leyser argues that although the *Leihezwang* applied only to banner fiefs, the practice also generally pertained to ecclesiastical fiefs. Frederick I ignored the custom in 1170, however, when he took the ecclesiastical lands of Frederick of Rothenburg for himself.[344] Barbarossa did not, in sum, feel restricted by law and his use of power was highly personal. Therefore, constitutionality and impersonal power were not characteristics of Barbarossa's state.

Modern Theory Verdict

The Holy Roman Empire does show clear signs of being a state according to parts of Weber's state theory, yet some of the attributes Weber considered necessary are partially or completely missing from the empire's state structure. The empire looks like more of a state form the point of view of Tilly's theory and

[339] R. H. C. Davis, R. I. Moore, and Joanna Huntington, *A History of Medieval Europe from Constantine to Saint Louis* (Oxfordshire, England: New York: Routledge, 2013), 358 – 59.
[340] Ibid., 361.
[341] Fief-obligation (trans. by author).
[342] Princely/secular fiefs, the other form of fiefs were ecclesiastical fiefs.
[343] Leyser, "Frederick Barbarossa and the Hohenstaufen Polity," 167.
[344] Ibid.

the empire seems to correspond to a certain degree to Poggi's *Ständestaat*. His modern state theory can be applied to the empire, however, only if one attributes more functions and competencies to Barbarossa's *camera* than it deserves.

Fascinatingly, the Holy Roman Empire held the monopoly of violence within its territory, despite not having a standing army or police force at its disposal. Furthermore, it had relatively clear borders, and its sovereignty within those borders was recognized by its neighbors and the Church. It also never lacked legitimacy and authority, as Frederick's rule was rarely questioned, and his will prevailed throughout his reign. This allowed for the establishment and extension of a tax system, which regularly filled the state's pockets.

Tilly devised his theory to conceptualize state-making and found war-making as cause and effect. Nothing in his theory suggests that these states are exclusively modern. On the contrary, he suggests that this development began in 1400, when "the European pursuit of larger, more permanent, and more costly varieties of military organization did, in fact, drive spectacular increases in princely budgets, taxes, and staffs."[345] Since Barbarossa's empire engaged in the four activities proposed by Tilly, the origin of this kind of state formation can be set much earlier than 1400. Tilly's understanding of the state has, however, been criticized for not giving a concise definition of a state; he only describes its action, and he lists some examples from which we can assume that he saw larger fiefs and regions as independent states. [346] One example is the territory he calls

[345] Tilly, "War Making and State Making," 178.
[346] Sverre Bagge, *State Formation in Europe, 843 – 1789: A Divided World*, (Abdingon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2019), 14, 22.

Brandenburg-Prussia, a region ruled by the Brandenburgian Hohenzollerns from 1618 – 1701, which was part of the Holy Roman Empire.[347] Originally founded as a union between the Margraviate of Brandenburg and the Duchy of Prussia, it ultimately became a central part of the Kingdom of Prussia in 1701. Thus, Tilly considers this rather loose and geographically discontinuous formation a state, as he does Russia, China, and the United States, all of which are land-based empires, which consisted of territorial independent units in their past (Russia was divided into principalities and duchies, China into kingdoms, and the United States into colonies).[348] Given that Tilly considers Russia, China and the United States to be states, the Holy Roman Empire should also be considered one according to his criteria.[349] Therefore, his theory does not only apply to states with origins in the 1400, but at least as far back as 1155 to the coronation of Frederick I Barbarossa as Holy Roman Emperor.

Yet, the HRE did not fulfill all of Weber's and Pierson's criteria for a modern state. It did not have a constitution, nor impersonal power, as Barbarossa shaped laws and customs to his benefit and without much oversight. Barbarossa's council could hardly be called a bureaucracy and even less so one that served the public. It was too small and managed too few state responsibilities to satisfy

[347] "Frederick I | Biography, Barbarossa, Crusades, & Facts | Britannica," accessed March 23, 2022. https://www.britannica.com/place/Germany/The-consolidation-of-Brandenburg-Prussia-and-Austria.
[348] Tilly, "War Making and State Making," 178. and Peter Haldén, "The Realm as a European Form of Rule: Unpacking the Warfare Thesis through the Holy Roman Empire," in *Does War Make States?: Investigations of Charles Tilly's Historical Sociology*, ed. Jeppe Strandsbjerg and Lars Bo Kaspersen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 154 – 180.
[349] For further information, see Haldén, "The Realm as a European Form of Rule," 154 – 180, which goes deeper into Tilly's omittance of the HRE and the issue of singling out individual regions belong to the empire, such as Brandenburg-Prussia or the holdings of the Austrian Habsburgs.

Weber's or Poggi's requirements. And although the HRE taxed its inhabitants, it neither had citizens nor did it award citizenship. Since Barbarossa's empire fails to meet all of Weber's and Pierson's conditions for a modern state, it is safe to say that it was not one. Nevertheless, it exhibits many of the traits found in a modern state. Thus, it seems like it might have been a predecessor to the modern states of today. The next chapter will explore this possibility further, by contrasting the Holy Roman Empire to its successor states.

Applied State Theory of the 12th Century

Although many modern theorists would not consider the HRE a state by today's standards, Barbarossa's contemporaries had a different opinion. Looking at England, the "modern" state had one ruler, a council, a dependency on the church, some legitimization of rule, taxation, and sovereignty, understood as the ability to manage domestic threats. Frederick Barbarossa was the sole ruler over the empire, fulfilling the first requirement. One could argue that the coronation of his son, Henry II, as co-king brought the state out of balance and this would be the case if one's focus was on the Kingdom of Germany, but Barbarossa remained the sole rule of the empire in his lifetime. The council of the empire was Barbarossa's *camera*, which albeit small, fulfilled some administrative tasks and aided Frederick's rule. One could suggest that the empire was dependent on the Church simply because Frederick had to be crowned emperor by the pope. Yet, the papal schism caused by Frederick showed that the Holy Roman Empire could operate independently and establish its own church, or at least its own papacy. Furthermore, one could hypothesize that if Henry the Lion had not refused to join

Frederick in his fifth Italian campaign, the disastrous defeat at the Battle of Legnano would not have happened. There would have been no Peace of Venice and no recognition of Alexander III as pope. Excommunication and the Lombard League proved strong enough to subjugate the empire to the rule of the Church, however. The previous section describes Barbarossa's legitimization through powerful acts, such as coronations and court gatherings, and his dominance over internal rivals. His rule was also legitimized, according to Kleinschmidt's theory, by crusading and continuous rule. Although, the crusade itself failed to legitimize Barbarossa, his taking the cross and the preparations for it certainly boosted Barbarossa's legacy as rightful emperor. Despite his death, the Holy Roman Empire lived on, and Frederick's legacy was able to secure and legitimize at least the first couple of years of Henry II's rule. As chapter 2 showed, the empire had an extensive tax system, thus fulfilling both Tilly's and Pierson's demand for one. Lastly, Frederick's victory over Henry the Lion showed that the emperor and the empire were capable of securing their domestic realms and exhibit sovereignty.

Contemporary Theory Verdict

As we see, the HRE under Barbarossa had the same qualities that made the kingdom of England a modern state at the time, and one may conclude that Frederick's empire was a "modern" state from the twelfth-century point of view. However, one contemporary, John of Salisbury, would argue against that verdict, as he saw the republic as an ideal state. But this comes to no surprise, as the bishop was an ardent adversary of Barbarossa's rule, thus may have targeted his theory specifically against the structure of the empire. Hence, his theory will be

largely disregarded in the verdict of if Barbarossa's state was a modern state of the twelfth century. When comparing the empire to England, it becomes evident that it certainly was its equal. Yet, this analysis is still necessary and important, as the HRE's significance as state is still underappreciated in today's research of the High Middle Ages in Europe. Holy Roman Empire deserves to be recognized as one of the most powerful realms in Europe at the time.

Chapter Five - Analysis (Part II): Comparing the Empire to the Third Reich and the Bundesrepublik Deutschland

The findings of the previous chapter suggest that the numerous characteristics of a modern state exhibited by the Holy Roman Empire hint that it may have been a predecessor of the modern state of Germany today. To test this possibility, the following chapter seeks to compare Frederick Barbarossa's Holy Roman Empire to the Third Reich (1933 – 1945) and the Federal Republic of Germany (1949 – present) as they represent the most notable 'modern states' on the territory of the empire. I have not compared Barbarossa's empire to the kingdom of Burgundy, which is now part of France, Italy and Switzerland, or to imperial Italy, which was dominated by the Italian city-states and is now part of France and Italy, since they did not evolve into a comparable political state. Modern Germany is, however, the ideological continuation of the empire. In German it is even called *Heiliges Römisches Reich Deutscher Nation* and almost territorially congruent with large parts of the empire. I have compared Barbarossa's empire to the Third Reich because it based itself ideologically on the Holy Roman Empire, the First Reich, and the German Empire (1871 – 1919), the Second Reich.

The First and the Third Reich

Hitler's decisions to call his state the Third Reich makes the ideological connection with the previous two German empires apparent. Not only were the Nazis eager to link their state to the preceding empires, but they also intended to

erase the period of the Weimar Republic (1918 – 1933) from memory. The link between Barbarossa's empire and the Third Reich was cemented when the German invasion of Russia was named Operation Barbarossa (22 June – 5 December 1941). The operation is known today as the largest military operation in history involving more than 10 million soldiers and causing millions of casualties.[350]According to the Kyffhäuser legend, Frederick Barbarossa never died and is asleep in a castle underground.[351] When he named the invasion Operation Barbarossa, Hitler was probably thinking of Friederich Rückert's poem *Barbarossa*, which tells the tale of how Barbarossa took the glory of the empire with him under the mountain and how it will return once he awakens: "Er hat hinabgenommen / Des Reiches Herrlichkeit, / Und wird einst wiederkommen, / Mit ihr, zu Seiner Zeit."[352] Hitler clearly sought to connect his Reich with Barbarossa's empire, the following investigates in what sense the Third Reich was a modern state and tries to reveal the remains of Barbarossa's political apparatus.

Nationalism formed the foundations of Hitler's Reich, but it also is the basis of the nation state, one form of the modern state. After the governments of Donald Trump, Boris Johnson and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, it is hard to maintain that the nation state and nationalism[353] have been drowned out by transnational and even international organizations and cooperation. Furthermore, because

[350] "Operation Barbarossa: The Biggest of All Time," The National WWII Museum | New Orleans, accessed April 2, 2022, https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/operation-barbarossa; David Stahel, *Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 450 – 51.
[351] See the poem by Friedrich Rückert, *Kranz Der Zeit* ... (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1817), 270 – 71.
[352] Ibid., 270, 3. stanza, lines 9 – 12.
[353] On nationalism, see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London; New York: Verso, 1983) and Ernst Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1983).

"Adolf Hitler is the prime example of nationalism pushed to the extreme […] [, as] he intended to 'nationalize' the German people," the Third Reich must be considered as an extreme form of nation state.[354]

The political philosopher and Holocaust survivor Hannah Arendt does not deny that Hitler rose to power by legal means and through the support of the people.[355] However, in her book *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (first published in 1951), she maintains that Hitler's regime was a successful totalitarian movement, which for her "meant the end of two illusions of democratically ruled countries in general and of European nation-states and their party system in particular."[356] Samuel Finer, in turn, refers to Hitler's Reich as "an ultra-nationalist Nazi Germany," which he sees as the "last and tragic development" of nationalism.[357] In addition, the Third Reich fulfills all or almost all of Weber's requirements for a state. The only characteristic of the modern state that might seem to be missing is impersonal power. Yet, it could be argued that article 48 of the constitution of Weimar legitimized any action taken by Adolf Hitler as the highest ruling authority. This fateful article, which allowed for the legitimate rise of the Third Reich, was originally designed as an emergency clause, but it was constantly reinforced under Hitler.[358]

---

[354] Peter Rutland, "Nationalism," in *The Encyclopedia of Political Science* (Congressional Quarterly Press, 2010), 1, The history of an idea.
[355] Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1966), 306.
[356] Ibid., 312.
[357] Finer, *The History of Government from the Earliest Times*, 1548.
[358] The significant middle portion of the law reads: "Der Reichspräsident kann, wenn im Deutschen Reiche die öffentliche Sicherheit und Ordnung erheblich gestört oder gefährdet wird, die zur Wiederherstellung der öffentlichen Sicherheit und Ordnung nötigen Maßnahmen treffen, erforderlichenfalls mit Hilfe der bewaffneten Macht einschreiten. Zu diesem Zwecke darf er vorübergehend die in den Artikeln 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 und 153 festgesetzten Grundrechte ganz oder zum Teil außer Kraft setzen. Von allen gemäß Abs. 1 oder Abs. 2 dieses

Did the Third Reich have state structures in common with Frederick Barbarossa's *Reich*? One similarity immediately comes to mind: both Barbarossa and Hitler were authoritarian rulers of their respective states. However, if one analyzes their positions more in-depth, it quickly becomes apparent that their political offices differed greatly. Barbarossa assumed the title of Holy Roman Emperor with authority over the kingdoms of Burgundy, Italy, and Germany, as well as that of king of the Germans, but he had to arbitrate and negotiate constantly between his princes and often feared for his position. After the death of Reichspräsident Paul von Hindenburg (1847 – 1934), the president of the Weimar Republic during his first year as chancellor, Adolf Hitler consolidated the two highest offices in the country, that of the *Reichspräsident* and his office of chancellor, *Reichskanzler*, into the office of *Führer und Reichskanzler des Deutschen Reiches* and later just *Führer*, the leader, of the Germans.[359] He completed his effort to achieve absolute authority by around 1938, having pushed out the opposition, primarily the social democrats, and having given executive powers to the *Schutzstaffel* (SS) and the *Sturmabteilung* (SA).[360] Barbarossa and Hitler thus drew their claims to sovereignty and authority from different sources.

Artikels getroffenen Maßnahmen hat der Reichspräsident unverzüglich dem Reichstag Kenntnis zu geben. Die Maßnahmen sind auf Verlangen des Reichstags außer Kraft zu setzen." In "Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs," 11. August 1919, III, art. 48. The last portion reads that the parliament can require that article 48 is to be abolished immediately, which would work in a democracy, but under Hitler's totalitarian regime the NSDAP, Nazi party, had total control of the state apparatus. Further discussion of the Weimar constitution, see Christoph Gusy, "Die Weimarer Verfassung zwischen Überforderung und Herausforderung," *Der Staat* 55, no. 3 (2016): 291 – 318.

The next parallel that can be drawn is of territoriality. The German historian Lothar Gall states that Germany has consistently lost territory since the 16th century and points notably to the loss of Austria in 1866/71 and the loss of 1/7 of its territory after World War I.[361] Therefore, by the time Hitler assumed power, many parts of Barbarossa's empire had already formed new states or been lost to neighboring states during the preceding centuries. As we know, Hitler did try unsuccessfully to recapture parts of Barbarossa's empire and to create a *"Lebensraum im Osten,"* his racist idea that the 'Arian' and Germanic peoples had the right to live in the regions of Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the territory of the Third Reich did overlap with core regions of the empire and the kingdom of Germany that had not been lost entirely to wars or partitions.

Interestingly, to secure their monopoly of violence, both, Barbarossa and Hitler organized and held grand events and displays. Hitler did this in much more dramatic fashion, but for similar reasons. Some examples would include the annual rallies of the Nazi Party on the *Reichsparteitagsgelände* in Nuremberg and the orchestration of propaganda films such as *Triumph of the Will* and *The Eternal Jew* with the purpose to showcase the strength of the Third Reich, but also to promulgate and disseminate antisemitism and pogroms against the Jews. The Nazi Party rallies, especially, could be compared to Barbarossa's large court gatherings. In both cases, the purpose of these events was to showcase the strength of the administration and its leader. Both Barbarossa's and Hitler's methods were effective in maintaining their monopoly of violence, although

[361] Lothar Gall, "Die Bundesrepublik in der Kontinuität der Deutschen Geschichte," *Historische Zeitschrift* 239, no. 3 (1984): 604.

Hitler was able to expand and organize much bigger acts than Barbarossa, thanks to modern technology and a more conscious idea of rule.

As we saw in chapter 2, Barbarossa had to invent a system of taxation that was derived from Ottonian and Roman precedent and one of the ways he raised money was by fining Jews. The Nazis were fortunate enough to inherit a taxation system, but their economic persecution of Jews was worse since they used existing institutions like the *Reichsbank* "for arbitrary expropriation of emigrating Jews from 1933 on."[362]

The HRE did not possess a public bureaucracy, citizenship or constitutionality and thus cannot be compared to the Third Reich or modern Germany in these ways.

The Third Reich was ideologically similar to the Holy Roman Empire yet did not, for the most part, operate in the same ways as Barbarossa's state. The legacy of Barbarossa's empire can be found in the territory of the Third Reich and its monopoly of violence, but grand events were not unique to Barbarossa, and it is likely that Hitler derived his marches, rallies, and propaganda from various precedents rather than deriving them directly from Barbarossa. It is also unclear whether the Third Reich should be seen as modern state. The Holy Roman Empire of the latter half of the twelfth century does not, in sum, seem to be a direct predecessor to the modern state of Nazi Germany.

[362] Albrecht Ritschl, "Financial Destruction: Confiscatory Taxation of Jewish Property and Income in Nazi Germany," *Economic History Working Papers*, no. 297 (April 2019), 4.

The Holy Roman Empire and the Bundesrepublik Deutschland

The Third Reich and the HRE have sometimes been seen as isolated states, which might not be historically accurate but is in line with Hitler's ideology. *The World Factbook* published by the CIA considers, interestingly, the German Empire to be the immediate predecessor of the Bundesrepublik Deutschland ("BRD") and does not mention Hitler's Reich in its list of succession of states.[363] Although some might have hoped that the *Zero hour* on 8th May 1945, which marked the end of World War II for Germany, meant the erasure of history before that date, this is not the case. Gall begins his essay on *Die Bundesrepublik in der Kontinuität der Deutschen Geschichte* by stating that the HRE and the BRD are "unvergleichbar," incomparable, due to the constant and sometimes complete changes in state structure, power structure and internal and external factors during the period separating them.[364] Yet, in the course of his essay he concedes that the BRD is in constant struggle and dialogue with its past, adopting some parts of it while trying to forget others.

The territory of the BRD is even smaller than that of Nazi Germany, but it is still congruent with Barbarossa's. The structures that allow the state to maintain the monopoly of violence have, however, changed drastically from Barbarossa's and Hitler's reign. The *Bunderegierung*, the Federal Government, observes a

[363] "Government, Independence, Germany," *The World Factbook*, Central Intelligence Agency, last updated March 16, 2022, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/germany/#government.
[364] Gall, "Die Bundesrepublik in der Kontinuität der Deutschen Geschichte," 603.

separation of powers, which was not the case in either Frederick's or Hitler's Reich.[365] The government of the current BRD could be seen as a continuation of Barbarossa's *camera*, or council. Frederick's government office does seem to have had functions that overlap with those of governmental offices today but very little is known about the *camera*. Given what is known about it, however, it was a very underdeveloped feature of Barbarossa's rule, and therefore can hardly be seen as a legacy of Frederick's state. It is also evident that Frederick Barbarossa's state left an even smaller mark on the state structure of the Federal Republic of Germany than the Nazi regime, which immediately preceded the BRD. Gall was right, the empire is incomparable to the modern state of today. This does not mean, however, that Barbarossa or his state have been forgotten. The king under the mountain lives on.

What remains?

Even though Barbarossa's empire had some of the characteristics Weber attributed to the modern state, they did not survive into the present. The Third Reich and the Bundesrepublik might share the same soil as the Holy Roman Empire, but not much beyond that. The states between Frederick Barbarossa's and Olaf Scholz's[366] have evolved, devolved, and changed countless times and to such a degree that nothing remains of the emperor's state apparatus. Yet, the emperor still makes appearances from time to time. Knut Görich attributes his enduring fame to the Kyffhäuser legend, which has been brought to life in the form of the

[365] "Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany," § 20, (2) GG.
[366] Current Chancellor of Germany (2021 – present).

Kyffhäuser Monument.[367] The structure was erected in 1896 to commemorate the reign of Emperor Wilhelm I (1797 – 1888).[368] So all that is left of Barbarossa are his monuments, his stories, and the hope that he will bring back the glorious past.

[367] "Kaiser Barbarossa: Der Mythos lebt," FOCUS Online, published June 4, 2015, https://www.focus.de/kultur/diverses/geschichte-kaiser-barbarossa-der-mythos-lebt_id_4727560.html.
[368] King of Prussia (1861- 1888) and First Emperor of the German Empire (1871 – 1888).

The Third Crusade as a Microcosm of Frederick Barbarossa's Holy Roman Empire

The logistics of the Third Crusade highlight the interplay of politics and economy in Frederick Barbarossa's Holy Roman Empire. Today, we think of medieval states, if we think about them at all, as a disparate conglomeration of independent states, duchies, and kingdoms. But when we think of the Middle Ages, we imagine jousting knights, mighty kings, and magnificent palaces. We also think of the violent pilgrimages to the Holy Land, the crusades. How is it possible, that these seemingly chaotic kingdoms and empires were able to amass enormous forces to march against an enemy they had never seen? The past chapters should have given us a sense that these states were not at all helpless, but often had some form of coherent government and economy. Nevertheless, the effort and planning involved in organizing a crusade were still tremendous. The following brings to light this process during the preparation and execution of Barbarossa's crusade.

To prepare and execute the crusade, Barbarossa had to rally his supporters, secure a safe route to the Levant, and ensure sufficient monetary funds for the undertaking. He also had to rely on the governmental structure he left behind to govern over the empire in his abstinence. To safely guide his followers into the Holy Land, Barbarossa's abilities as state leader and diplomat were vital since he had to negotiate for safe passage and nourishment along the way with other rulers. Obviously, raising and supplying an army on a journey over multiple months

required enormous funds, but as there were no banks and rarely any currency exchanges, the crusaders had to find ways to carry and spend their money during that journey.

Secure Support

The church's involvement in launching the Third Crusade in the Holy Roman Empire goes beyond the papal bull *Audita Tremendi*, as the church and its clerics helped Barbarossa by settling internal disputes, by providing aid and by representing the empire in negotiations. For example, the church and Pope Clement III (1130 – 1191)[369] got involved in the Trier Schism with the intention of settling Barbarossa's domestic issues, so that he could focus on going on crusade.[370] The Trier Schism went back to Pope Urban III, the pre-predecessor of Clement, who consecrated Folmar of Karden, then the archdeacon of Metz, as archbishop of Trier on June 1, 1186 against Barbarossa's will.[371] In June 1188, Pope Clement sent out two cardinals to summon Folmar to Rome.[372] Folmar did not comply with the three summons issued by the deadline (February 12, 1189), so Clement nullified Urban's decision more than three years later, removing the archbishop from his office and reinstating the clerics Folmar had cast out at the beginning of his administration. This action removed one of Frederick's worries before he set out on crusade.

Barbarossa also surrounded himself with clerics like his uncle Otto von Freising, whom Frederick commissioned to write the *Gesta Friderici Imperatoris*.

[369] Pope from 1187 – 1191.
[370] Freed, *The Prince*, 475.
[371] Ibid., 465.
[372] Ibid., 475.

Another important cleric for Barbarossa's reign was Bishop Godfrey of Spitzenberg-Helfenstein (1132 – 1190), who was his chancellor from 1172 – 1186 and took part in the negotiations surrounding the Treaty of Venice, the Peace of Constance, and the Trier Schism.[373] Furthermore, he advised Barbarossa in early December 1187 to take the "easier, even if longer" sea route to the Holy Land.[374] Although, Frederick rejected this proposal, Gottfried was able to aid the emperor in other ways; he preached, notably, the crusade at the council in Strasbourg in December 1187, which popularized the holy war among the German nobility.[375] Furthermore, to initiate negotiations with King Béla III of Hungary, Barbarossa sent Archbishop Conrad of Mainz to act as a representative of the empire.[376] Thus, we observe that clerics and the church were instrumental in preparing for Barbarossa's crusade as advisors, representatives and negotiators.

The logistics of the crusade and finding participants were made easier because Barbarossa had the authority to assemble court gatherings successfully. Many of his vassals showed up to court, as Frederick had harsh fines in place if they did not do so, as was mentioned in chapter 2. Furthermore, his authority as emperor probably was at its peak during the crusade preparations in 1187 – 1189 because, on the one hand, he had accepted Alexander III as pope in 1177 and thus received the backing of the papacy, and on the other hand, his dispute with the kingdom of Sicily, the conquest of which had been one of his targets during his

[373] Alfred Wendehorst, "Gottfried I," in *Neue Deutsche Biographie*, ed. Otto zu Stolberg-Wernigerode, Historische Kommission der Bayrischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1953), 667.
[374] Loud, *The Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa,* 44.
[375] Ibid., 43.
[376] Freed, *The Prince,* 480.

later Italian campaigns, had been settled by the marriage of his eldest son and eventual successor Henry VI with Constance (1154 – 1198)[377], heiress of the kingdom, in 1186.[378] These events gave Frederick a strong foundation to hold courts in preparation for the crusade. His first was the Christmas court at Strasbourg in 1187, which successfully recruited participants for his crusade.[379] Barbarossa himself took the cross at court in Mainz on March 27, 1188.[380] Murray argues that the reason for this delay was "to see how much enthusiasm there was for the enterprise before committing himself."[381] The court at Mainz also allowed Barbarossa to instruct and sent out his envoys to Kilic Arslan II, the Sultan of Rûm, Isaac II Angelos, the Byzantine emperor, Leo II, the King of Armenia, and King Béla III of Hungary with the objective of negotiating safe passage through their territory and the provision of markets to replenish the crusader's supplies along the route.[382] On May 26, 1188, he also sent an envoy, Count Henry II of Diez, to Saladin, the Sultan of Egypt and Syria, to convey a semblance of a declaration of war, should the sultan refuse to retreat from the Holy Land.[383] The

[377] Queen of Sicily from 1194 – 1198 and as wife of Henry VI, Holy Roman Empress from 1191 – 1197.
[378] Murray, *The Crusades to the Holy Land: The Essential Reference Guide*, 106.
[379] Ibid. The exact number of men who left with Barbarossa on Crusade is hard to determine, but the historian Alan Murray estimates that it included eleven bishops, twenty-eight counts and around four thousand knights; John B. Freed estimates the army was made up of 12,000 to 15,000 men including 3,000 knights; and Graham Loud agrees with modern estimates, but also provides figures from contemporary accounts, which claim that the army was made up of 90,000 – 600,000 men. See Murray, *The Crusades to the Holy Land: The Essential Reference Guide*, 106, Freed, *The Prince*, 481. And Loud, *The Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa*, 19.
[380] Murray, *The Crusades to the Holy Land: The Essential Reference Guide*, 106.
[381] Ibid.
[382] Freed, *The Prince*, 480. Kilic Arslan II was Sultan of Rûm from 1156 – 1192. Issac II Angelos was Byzantine Emperor from 1185 – 1195. Leo II (sometimes Leo I) was King of Armenian Cilicia from 1199 – 1219.
[383] Freed, *The Prince*, 480. Saladin was Sultan of Egypt and Syria from 1174 – 1193. See chapter 4 for an excerpt of a letter Barbarossa sent Saladin in May 1189 with these demands.

rulers sent envoys back to Barbarossa, who received them at a court in Nuremberg at the end of 1188.[384] Thus, the courts were vital for preparing the Third Crusade, as they simplified the process of diplomatic relations and aided in recruiting participants.

Secure Route

Another account of Barbarossa's Third Crusade, apart from the *Historia de Expeditione Friderici Imperatoris*, which was used in chapter 1 to retrace the crusader's path, is the *Historia Peregrinorum*, also known as the *History of the Pilgrims*. Written shortly after the end of the crusade by an unknown author, this account reveals some of the negotiations that occurred between the emperor and the Hungarians and Byzantines. The subjects of the deal between Barbarossa and King Béla III of Hungary were "the provision of markets, safe conduct along the way and a secure peace between the two of them."[385] The author of the account states that "[t]he King of Hungary responded speedily and favorably to the request of the emperor and pilgrims concerning this matter."[386] The negotiations with the envoy of Emperor Isaac II Angelos were more drawn out, as the Byzantines asked Barbarossa to send higher ranking envoys to Constantinople, "to receive fuller assurances from them [the envoys] there and to confirm the peace more fully."[387] Furthermore, the author of the *Historia Peregrinorum* records some of the clauses of the treaty between the two emperors. One of these clauses concerned itself with

[384] Freed, *The Prince*, 481. See also Murray, *The Crusades to the Holy Land: The Essential Reference Guide*, 106.
[385] Loud, *The History of the Expedition*, 144 – 5.
[386] Ibid.
[387] Ibid., 145.

the provision of markets, which were made accessible depending on the availability of goods and the needs of the regions through which the crusaders were to cross.[388] Another clause specified that "the pilgrims might be allowed to take fruit from the trees, vegetables from gardens, wood to make fires provided houses were not damaged, and fodder and straw for the needs of their horses."[389] Not only does this list show us some of the needs of Barbarossa's army, it also reveals a low meat diet, when there was an absence of markets, and the extent to which the crusaders were allowed legally to 'plunder.' The German historian and diplomat Ekkehard Eickhoff provides a full list of agreements made between Isaac II and Frederick I on February 14, 1190.[390] This agreement was negotiated after Frederick's army had already experience extensive ambushes and harassment by the locals of the Byzantine empire and thus includes clauses such as "The East-Roman (byzantine) emperor waives all claims for the damages done to his provinces by the crusader army," in order to not offend Frederick further. For transportation purposes, it was agreed that "[h]e [Isaac II Angelos] will provide enough ships for the crossing of the army at Gallipoli or between Sestos and Abydos. The exact number being 70 transportation vessels, 150 vehicles suitable for the transport of horses and 15 galleys, all with crew serving under the

[388] Loud, *The History of the Expedition of the Emperor Frederick*, 145.
[389] Ibid.
[390] Ekkehard Eickhoff, *Friedrich Barbarossa Im Orient: Kreuzzug Und Tod Friedrichs I*, Istanbuler Mitteilungen 17 (Tübingen: E. Wasmuth, 1977), 75 – 76. Translated by the author of this thesis. For the German original, please see the Appendix.

German emperor." The following map shows the positions of Sestos and Abydos, as well as Adrianople, where Barbarossa was camping at the time of the deal.

Barbarossa's Encampments in Nécropotame, *English: The Byzantine Empire on the Death of Emperor Basil II in (1025) in English*, uploaded May 20, 2008, trans. and modified from Image:Map_Byzantine_Empire_1025-de.svg. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_Byzantine_Empire_1025-en.svg. Further modified by author of this thesis to highlight the cities that the agreement discusses.

To further ensure the safety of Barbarossa's army during the crossing as well as on the journey through the Byzantine Empire, Isaac II "provide[d] a number of high-ranking hostages, of which six are members of the imperial family, six high-ranking court ministers and lofty citizens of the capital," and ensured that "there should be a four-day march distance between the Byzantine army and the German army until the latter has left the East-Roman territories."[391] The latter clause was included not only for the sake of Frederick's safety, but also in order to contain the damage the Germans could cause within Isaac's empire. This treaty also states that "[o]n the marching route of the army, enough food should be provided.

[391] Eickhoff, *Friedrich Barbarossa Im Orient*, 75 – 76.

Should this not be the case, the army may help itself."[392] Thus, Frederick's envoys, who served as state functionaries, were very effective in reaching agreements with other rulers to guarantee Frederick's army safe passage. However, the reality did look different, as this *Deal of Constantinople* would not have needed to be struck if Isaac's people had not constantly engaged the crusades in the armed entanglements described by the authors of the *Historia de expeditione Friderici imperatoris.* A letter to Leopold V (1157 – 1194), Duke of Austria (1174 – 1194), reveals Barbarossa's frustrations before the deal: "[t]ruly, because the burnt child dreads the fire, we can in the future have no confidence in the words and oaths of the Greeks," and he laments the "violat[ion] of all the oaths which are known to have been sworn by his chancellor at Nuremberg."[393] In another letter, this time sent to Barbarossa by Sibylla (~1159 – 1190), Queen of Jerusalem (1186 – 1190), in 1189, the queen discloses to Frederick that Isaac II is actively conspiring against the crusaders, as he had been bribed by "many presents very pleasing to the mortals" from "Saladin, the seducer and destroyer of the holy Name."[394] This explains the many raids on Barbarossa's army by the Byzantines and the reluctance of Isaac to honor his agreements with the Holy Roman Emperor. However, as we have seen in the case of the King of Hungary, most stages of the journey had been prearranged and took place without any issues.

[392] Eickhoff, *Friedrich Barbarossa Im Orient*, 75 – 76.
[393] Dana C. Munro, "Letters of the Crusaders," *Translations and Reprints from the Original Sources of European History*, Vol 1:4, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1896), 20-22.
[394] Ibid.

Secure Funds

How much did a crusade cost, who paid for it and how was the money transported and spent along the route?[395] Unlike the kings of England and France, Frederick Barbarossa did not levy the Saladin tithe in 1188 to pay for the Third Crusade. The Saladin tithe was levied for three years and was a tax "based on income and movables […] and also [on] a tenth of the alms of those who died during the ten years following 24 June 1184."[396] Instead, Frederick Barbarossa relied on the income of his domains, other taxes and on his men, who were required to carry a certain amount of money with them to be eligible to participate in the crusade. One source was certainly the fine levied on those who did not or could not participate and thus did not fulfill their *Heeresfolge*. The exact amount that had to be carried by the crusaders is disputed. The Swiss historian and diplomat Rudolf Hiestand cites Otto of St. Blasien, who gave an amount of three silver marks per person; the *Annales Marbacenses*, which indicate that each Crusader had to bring enough money for two years; and the *History of the Pilgrims*, which says that Barbarossa's men were required to carry enough money for one year.[397] On the basis of the figure given by Otto of St. Blasien, Hiestand

[395] Interestingly, when googling the 'cost of a crusade,' one of the first articles is by the *Workers*, the journal of the Communist Party of Britain Marxist-Leninist, or CPBML, a very minor British political party, which argues that the enormous cost of the crusades "contributed to the defeat of the papal system," and draws analogies to the government expenditures for the war in Iraq. The cost of a crusade remains an understudied topic, however, and there is no clear answer to how much crusading cost, just assurances that it was a very expensive undertaking.
[396] Fred A. Cazel, "The Tax of 1185 in Aid of the Holy Land," *Speculum* 30, no. 3 (1955): 385, https://doi.org/10.2307/2848077.
[397] Rudolf Hiestand, "Die Kriegskasse Des Kaisers? Gedanken Zum „Barbarossa-Fund" Aus Historischer Sicht," *VSWG: Vierteljahrschrift Für Sozial- Und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 78, no. 2 (1991): 191. Otto von St. Blasien wrote chronicles spanning from 1146 – 1209. The *Annales Marbacenses*, also known as Marbach Annals, are chronicles spanning from 631 – 1238.

and Murray calculated the minimum daily financial needs of a crusader in Frederick's army as being 2/3 penny per day.[398] Murray makes further estimations based on the *Längeres Kölner Dienstrecht*, "a set of regulations from around 1165 governing the service of the ministerial knights of the archbishop of Cologne," and determines an expense of one mark per month per knight, which, when combined with the expenses of their entourages means that the Crusade cost around 81,000 – 90,000 marks (~ £57,024 – £63,360).[399]

This huge sum had to be transported over a distance of around 2,600 kilometers/1,615 miles, which required different forms of currency. Murray suggests that the crusaders carried most of their wealth in form of coin, due to its practicality. Pennies were lighter (604.8g for the three marks in pennies) than ingots (the other major type of currency) and "could have been carried in [a] leather or cloth bag by an unmounted crusader along with other burdens without difficulty."[400] To carry larger sums, such as those required by the knights, the army utilized ships, carts, and pack animals. One could also buy smaller amounts of goods with pennies and did not always have to chip off a certain weight of silver from ingots.[401] Murray estimates conservatively that the crusaders carried a total of around 6 million silver pennies with them. Apart from ingots and coins,

[398] See Hiestand, "Die Kriegskasse Des Kaisers?," 191, and Alan V. Murray, "Finance and Logistics of the Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa," in *In Laudem Hierosolymitani: Studies in Crusades and Medieval Culture in Honour of Benjamin Z Kedar*, ed. Iris Shagrir, Ronnie Ellenblum and Jonathan Riley-Smith (Aldershot: Ashgate: 2007): 356 – 368.
[399] Murray, "Finance and Logistics of the Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa," 359 – 361. See Freed, *The Prince*, 481, who agrees with this estimate.
[400] Murray, "Finance and Logistics of the Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa," 363.
[401] Ibid. Most of the information pertaining to the monetary logistics of Barbarossa's crusade stem from the discovery of the Barbarossa Hoard, which is a hoard of coins and ingots that was buried by Barbarossa's men on their return journey to Germany and discovered between 1982 – 1985.

Murray states that other objects may have also been transported, such as "jewellry and gold or silver plate," as they had "a high intrinsic value," ideal for the exchange or purchase of goods.[402]

The crusaders spent most of their money to buy food supplies at markets provided by the various rulers of the territory through which they were passing. These markets were places where local producers tried to fulfill the needs of the crusading army.[403] However, issues arose when discussing the prices for goods, as Barbarossa's army had a variety of different currencies, with the largest share being the Cologne mark, that had to be exchanged. The *Deal of Constantinople* included clauses to regulate the exchange rate, but also to set the prices so that they "shall not differ from those that are offered as if Emperor Isaac himself would march through it," to prevent usury.[404] While the army was in Hungary, the author of the *Historia de expeditione Friderici imperatoris* notes that "[t]he Hungarian took considerable advantage of our men in one matter, the changing of money or silver, inasmuch as for two pennies of Cologne they gave as many as five of their own pennies, […] and for a penny of Regensburg or Krems they gave one Hungarian penny, which was barely worth one of Verona."[405] Food also became scarce on the latter parts of the Crusaders' journey, which meant that sometimes they were "obliged to pay 1 mark for a loaf [of bread]," which was "more than one hundred times what had been originally estimated as the

[402] Murray, "Finance and Logistics of the Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa," 364.
[403] Ibid., 364.
[404] Eickhoff, *Friedrich Barbarossa Im Orient*, 75 – 76. The exchange rate was harder to determine, as it was based on gold for higher denominations, a metal that the West did not use for their coins. See Murray, "Finance and Logistics of the Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa," 365.
[405] Loud, *The Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa*, 58 – 59.

necessary expenses for supplies for *one day*."[406] The scarcity of food and water proved to be a larger issue than a lack of money, as money was being resupplied from Germany and was obtained through plunder during successful sieges.[407] Nevertheless, figuring out how to transport the money was vital to making the crusade of Barbarossa "one of the best organized crusades of the twelfth century," according to Murray.[408]

Conclusion

The interplay between diplomacy, economy, and state during the Third Crusade, but also throughout Frederick Barbarossa's reign shows that it was not the backwater of twelfth-century Europe. On the contrary, it certainly held its own against the kingdoms of France and England. Despite his Italian campaigns, which were foreign policy fiascos, Barbarossa brought stability to the Holy Roman Empire. And although his government did not employ an extensive state infrastructure, he was able to administrate the vast territories of the empire with the help of his council and vassals. These structures also helped him to generate relatively high annual state incomes, far exceeding those of the Italian city-states or Flanders and on par if not slightly surpassing those of France and England. Despite the economic might of the empire under Barbarossa, it did not qualify as a modern state according to the requirements of modern state theory. Regardless, its contemporaries certainly did view the Holy Roman Empire as a modern state of their time. Thus, the Holy Roman Empire of the twelfth century deserves more

[406] Murray, "Finance and Logistics of the Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa," 366.
[407] Ibid., 367. For example, the siege of Ikonion yielded around 100,000 marks. See Murray, "Finance and Logistics of the Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa," 367.
[408] Murray, "Finance and Logistics of the Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa," 358.

attention and credit in our studies of the Middle Ages since it exhibited the qualities of an impactful past state.

Appendix

The Deal of Constantinople[409]

1) Der oströmische Kaiser verzichtet auf alle Ersatzansprüche für die in seinen Provinzen vom Kreuzheer angerichteten Schäden.

2) Er wird für die Überfahrt des Heeres bei Gallipoli (Gelibolu) oder zwischen Sestos und Abydos eine ausreichende Zahl von Schiffen bereitstellen, und zwar 70 Transportschiffe, 150 für den Transport von Pferden geeignete Fahrzeuge und 15 Galeeren, die mit voller Besatzung dem deutschen Kaiser zur Verfügung stehen werden.

3) Um einen maritimen Überfall auf das durch die Überfahrt über den Hellespont geteilte Kreuzheer auszuschließen, werden die zwischen Abydos und Konstantinopel stationierten Kriegsgaleeren währenddessen an Land gezogen.

4) Aus dem gleichen Grunde werden die byzantinischen Landstreitkräfte einen Abstand von vier Tagemärschen vom deutschen Heer halten, bis dieses oströmische Hoheitsgebiet verlassen haben.

5) Zwei Küstenstädte werden der deutschen Armee geöffnet. Übergriffe gegen deren Bewohner und ihr Eigentum haben zu unterbleiben. Offenbar war an Sestos und Abydos gedacht, wo mit dem Übersetzen des Kreuzheers gerechnet wurde.

6) Kaiser Isaak stellt eine Zahl hochgestellter Geiseln, darunter sechs Mitglieder der kaiserlichen Familie, sechs hohe Hofbeamte und vornehme Bürger der Hauptstadt. Ihre Gegenwart in der Armee soll deren sichere Überfahrt gewährleisten; sechs Persönlichkeiten, darunter der Pansebastos Eumathios selbst und drei Verwandte Isaaks, werden die Pilger weiter bis Philadelphia begleiten, während die übrigen Geiseln in Abydos entlassen werden.

7) Auf der Marschroute der Armee soll ausreichend Proviant bereitgestellt werden. Wo dies nicht der Fall ist, darf die Armee zur Selbsthilfe greifen.

8) Armeniern, Lateinern und Griechen im oströmischen Reich, die das Kreuzheer unterstützt haben, wird Straffreiheit zugesichert.

[409] See Ekkehard Eickhoff, *Friedrich Barbarossa Im Orient: Kreuzzug Und Tod Friedrichs I*, Istanbuler Mitteilungen 17 (Tübingen: E. Wasmuth, 1977), 75 – 76.

9) Der Wechselkurs der verschiedenen Münzsorten wird geregelt.

10) Wo Markt gehalten wird, sollen die Früchte des Landes zum gleichen gerechten Preis verkauft werden, als handele es sich um den Durchmarsch von Kaiser Isaak selbst.

11) Für die von Bischof Hermann von Münster, Marquard von Annweiler und den anderen kaiserlichen Gesandten in Konstantinopel erlittenen Schaden wird eine Sühne gezahlt, die von Kaiser Friedrich festgesetzt wird.

12) Alle Untertanen Kaiser Friedrichs, die seit Beginn der Feindseligkeiten von den Byzantinern gefangengesetzt worden sind, erhalten ihre Freiheit zurück.

13) Der Vertrag wird vom Patriarchen Dositheos gezeichnet und in seiner Gegenwart in der Hagia Sophia zu Konstantinopel von 500 vornehmen Bürgern der Stadt und des Reiches beschworen.

14) Dies alles soll so zügig bestätigt und beschworen werden, daß das Kreuzheer in 20 Tagen von Adrianopel aufbrechen kann.

Img. 1: Map of Milan in circa 1100



Map 2. Milan, c. 1100

Wickham, *Sleepwalking into a New World*, 35.

Img. 2: Short-cross penny

"Medieval Short Cross Silver Penny," The Royal Mint, accessed April 14, 2022, https://www.royalmint.com/our-coins/ranges/historic-coins/silver-historic-coins/medieval-short-cross-silver-penny/.

Bibliography

Literature

Arendt, Hannah. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1966.

Asche, Th. *Die Kaiserpfalz Zu Goslar, Am Harz, Im Spiegel Der Geschichte*. Goslar: Koch, 1892.

Bagge, Sverre. *State Formation in Europe, 843 – 1789: A Divided World*. Abdingon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2019.

Baldwin, John W. *The Government of Philip Augustus: Foundations of French Royal Power in the Middle Ages*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.

Bang, Peter F. and C. A. Bayly, eds. *Tributary Empires in Global History*. Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

Benton, John F. "The Revenue of Louis VII." *Speculum* 42, no. 1 (1967): 84 – 91. https://doi.org/10.2307/2856101.

Black, Antony. *Guild & State: European Political Thought from the Twelfth Century to the Present*. New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Publishers, 2003.

Bobek, Hans. "Zum Konzept des Rentenkapitalismus," *Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie* 65, no. 2 (1974): 73 – 78.

Bradbury, Jim. *Philip Augustus: King of France, 1180-1223*. London: New York: Longman, 1998.

Brühl, Carlrichard. "Die Finanzpolitik Friedrich Barbarossas in Italien." *Historische Zeitschrift* 213, no. 1 (August, 1971): 13 – 37.

Bryce, James. *The Holy Roman Empire*. New York; London: The Macmillan Company, 1904.

Bull, Marcus. "The Capetian Monarchy and the Early Crusade Movement: Hugh of Vermandois and Louis VII." *Nottingham Medieval Studies* 40 (January 1, 1996): 25 – 46.

Castagnetti, Andrea. "Feudalità e società comunale II. Capitanei a Milano e a Ravenna fra XI e XII secolo." In: *La signoria rurale in Italia nel medioevo*. Atti del Secondo Convegno di studi, Pisa, 6-7 novembre 1998. Studi medioevali (11) (Pisa: ETS, 2006): 117 – 215.

Cazel, Fred A. "The Tax of 1185 in Aid of the Holy Land." *Speculum* 30, no. 3 (1955): 385 – 392. https://doi.org/10.2307/2848077.

Cooper, Frederick. *Citizenship, Inequality, and Difference: Historical Perspectives*, The Lawrence Stone Lectures. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018.

Davis, R. H. C., R. I. Moore, and Joanna Huntington. *A History of Medieval Europe from Constantine to Saint Louis*. Oxford, England; New York: Routledge, 2013.

Deibel, Gertrud. "Die italienischen Einkünfte Kaiser Friedrich Barbarossas." *Neue Heidelberger Jahrbücher* (1932): 21 – 58.

Dirlmeier, Ulf. "Friedrich Barbarossa – auch ein Wirtschaftspolitiker?" *Vorträge und Forschungen: Friedrich Barbarossa. Handlungsspielräume und Wirkungsweisen des staufischen Kaisers* 40 (1992): 501 – 518.

Duncan, Jonathan. *The Dukes of Normandy, from the Times of Rollo to the Expulsion of King John by Philip Augustus of France*. London: Harvey and Darton, 1839.

Eickhoff, Ekkehard. *Friedrich Barbarossa Im Orient: Kreuzzug Und Tod Friedrichs I*. Istanbuler Mitteilungen 17. Tübingen: E. Wasmuth, 1977.

Ehlers, Eckart. "Rentenkapitalismus und Stadtentwicklung im islamischen Orient: Beispiel: Iran." *Erdkunde* 32, no. 2 (1978): 124 – 142.

Ehlers, Joachim. "Friedrich I. Barbarossa." In *Die deutschen Herrscher des Mittelalters: Historische Portraits von Heinrich I. bis Maximilian I. (919-1519*), edited by Bernd Schneidmüller and Stefan Weinfurter, 232 – 257. München: Beck, 2003.

Epstein, Stephan R. *The Rise and Fall of Italian City-States*. London: LSE Research Online, 2000.

Finer, Samuel E. *The History of Government from the Earliest Times*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Freed, John B. *Frederick Barbarossa: The Prince and The Myth*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016.

Fried, Johannes. "Die Wirtschaftspolitik Friederich Barbarossas in Deutschland." *Blätter für deutsche Landesgeschichte* 120 (1984): 195 – 239.

Gall, Lothar. "Die Bundesrepublik in der Kontinuität der Deutschen Geschichte." *Historische Zeitschrift* 239, no. 3 (1984): 603 – 613.

Ganshof, François L. "Louis the Pious Reconsidered." *History* 42, no. 146 (1957): 171 – 180. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-229X.1957.tb02281.x.

Godman, Peter. "THE ARCHPOET AND THE EMPEROR." *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 74 (2011): 31 – 58.

Görich, Knut. "Geld und 'honor.' Friedrich Barbarossa in Italien." *Vorträge und Forschungen: Formen und Funktionen öffentlicher Kommunikation im Mittelalter* 51 (2001): 177 - 200. https://doi.org/10.11588/vuf.2001.0.17657.

Haldén, Peter. "The Realm as a European Form of Rule: Unpacking the Warfare Thesis through the Holy Roman Empire." In *Does War Make States?: Investigations of Charles Tilly's Historical*

Sociology, edited by Jeppe Strandsbjerg and Lars Bo Kaspersen, 154 – 180. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316493694.007.

Harper-Bill, Christopher and Nicholas Vincent, ed. *Henry II: New Interpretations*. Boydell & Brewer, 2007.

Hävernick, Walter. *Der Kölner Pfennig im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert: Periode d. Territorialen Pfennigmünze*. Nachdruck der Ausgabe Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1930. Hildesheim; Zürich [etc.]: Olms, 1984.

Henneman Jr., John Bell. "Currency." In *Medieval France*, edited by William W. Kibler and Grover A. Zinn, 280 – 281. New York: Garland Pub., 1995.

Hiestand, Rudolf. "Die Kriegskasse Des Kaisers? Gedanken Zum „Barbarossa-Fund" Aus Historischer Sicht." *VSWG: Vierteljahrschrift Für Sozial- Und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 78, no. 2 (1991): 190 – 197.

Hill, Bennett D., ed. *Church and State in the Middle Ages*. New York: Wiley, 1970.

Jordan, Karl. *Henry the Lion: A Biography*. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1986.

Kelly, Michael J. "The Kurdish Regional Constitution within the Framework of the Iraqi Federal Constitution: A Struggle for Sovereignty, Oil, Ethnic Identity, and the Prospects for a Reverse Supremacy Clause." 114 *Penn St. L. Rev.*, no. 3 (2010): 707 – 808.

Kleinschmidt, Harald. *Understanding the Middle Ages: The Transformation of Ideas and Attitudes in the Medieval World*. Woodbridge, Suffolk; Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 2000.

Knödler, Julia. "Brabançons." In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Medieval Warfare and Military Technology*, edited by Clifford J. Rogers, William Caferro, and Shelley Reid, 168. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Koch, Walter. *Die Reichskanzlei in den Jahren 1167 bis 1174: Eine diplomatisch-paläographische Untersuchung*. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1973.

Lane, Frederic C. "Recent Studies on the Economic History of Venice." *The Journal of Economic History* 23, no. 3 (1963): 312 – 334.

Lavan, Myles. "The Army and the Spread of Roman Citizenship." *Journal of Roman Studies* 109 (November 2019): 27–69. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0075435819000662.

Leyser, Karl J. "Frederick Barbarossa and the Hohenstaufen Polity." *Viator* 19 (January 1, 1988): 153 – 176.

Loud, Graham A. *The Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa: The History of the Expedition of the Emperor Frederick and Related Texts*. Crusade Texts in Translation 19. Farnham, Surrey, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010.

Lyon, Jonathan R. *Princely Brothers and Sisters*: *The Sibling Bond in German Politics, 1100-1250*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013.

McCormick, Michael. "Where do trading towns come from? Early medieval Venice and the northern *emporia*." In Post-Roman Towns, Trade and Settlement in Europe and Byzantium, edited by Joachim Henning, 41 – 68. *The Heirs of the Roman West,* Vol. 1. Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110218848.1.41.

Mitteis, Heinrich.

Die deutsche Königswahl und Ihre Rechtsgrundlage bis zur Goldenen Bulle. Brünn: Rudolf M. Rohrer Verlag, 1938.

The State in the Middle Ages: A Comparative Constitutional History of Feudal Europe. Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co., 1975.

Molmenti, Pompeo. *Venice: Its Individual Growth from the Earliest Beginnings to the Fall of the Republic*. Translated by Horatio F. Brown. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1906.

Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat. *The Spirit of Laws*. Translated by Thomas Nugent. England: G. Bell, 1905.

Munro, Dana C. "Letters of the Crusaders." *Translations and Reprints from the Original Sources of European History*, Vol 1:4. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1896.

Murray, Alan V.

, ed. *The Crusades to the Holy Land: The Essential Reference Guide*. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2015.

"Finance and Logistics of the Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa." In *In Laudem Hierosolymitani: Studies in Crusades and Medieval Culture in Honour of Benjamin Z Kedar*, edited by Iris Shagrir, Ronnie Ellenblum and Jonathan Riley-Smith. Aldershot: Ashgate: 2007.

Naus, James. "Louis VII and the Failure of Crusade." In *Constructing Kingship*, The Capetian Monarchs of France and the Early Crusades, 85 – 111. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016.

Nicholas, David.

"Of Poverty and Primacy: Demand, Liquidity, and the Flemish Economic Miracle, 1050-1200." *The American Historical Review* 96, no. 1 (1991): 17 – 41. https://doi.org/10.2307/2164016.

Medieval Flanders. London; New York: Longman, 1992.

Norwich, John J. *A History of Venice*. 1st Vintage Books. New York: Vintage Books, 1989.

Postan, Michael M.

The Medieval Economy and Society: An Economic History of Britain, 1100-1500. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.

"The Rise of a Money Economy," *The Economic History Review* 14, no. 2 (1944): 123 – 134. https://doi.org/10.2307/2590422.

Peters, Edward. *The First Crusade the Chronicle of Fulcher of Chartres and Other Source Materials*. The Middle Ages Series 2nd edition. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998.

Pierson, Christopher. *The Modern State*. Florence, USA: Taylor & Francis Group, 2011.

Poggi, Gianfranco. *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction*. Stanford, Cali.: Stanford University Press, 1978.

Ricardus, Helen J. Nicholson, and William Stubbs, ed., *Chronicle of the Third Crusade: a translation of the Itinerarium peregrinorum et gesta Regis Ricardi*, Crusade texts in translation 3. Aldershot, Hants, England; Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1997.

Rider, Jeff. *God's Scribe: The Historiographical Art of Galbert of Bruges.* Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 200.

Ritschl, Albrecht. "Financial Destruction: Confiscatory Taxation of Jewish Property and Income in Nazi Germany." *Economic History Working Papers*, no. 297 (April 2019): 1 – 24.

Rutland, Peter. "Nationalism." In *The Encyclopedia of Political Science*. Congressional Quarterly Press, 2010.

Rückert, Friedrich. *Kranz Der Zeit* .... Stuttgart: Cotta, 1817.

Salisbury, John of. *John of Salisbury: Policraticus*, edited by Cary J. Nederman. Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511809453.

Shaw, William A. *The History of Currency, 1252 to 1894*. London: Clement Wilson, 1896.

Skinner, Quentin. "A Genealogy of the Modern State." In *The Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 162, 2008 Lectures*, edited by Ron Johnston, 325 – 370. British Academy, 2009.

Stahel, David. *Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Sulovsky, Vedran. "The Concept of Sacrum Imperium in Historical Scholarship." *History Compass* 17, no. 8 (2019): e12586. https://doi.org/10.1111/hic3.12586.

Tilly, Charles. "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime." In *Bringing the State Back In*, edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, 169 – 191. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511628283.008.

van der Beek, Karine. “The Effects of Political Fragmentation on Investments: A Case Study of Watermill Construction in Medieval Ponthieu, France.” *Explorations in Economic History* 47, no. 4 (October 1, 2010): 369 – 380, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eeh.2010.03.002.

von Freising, Otto and Rahewin. *The Deeds of Barbarossa*. Translated and Edited by Charles C. Mierow. New York: Columbia University Press, 1953.

Weber, Max. *Politik als Beruf*. Germany: Drucker & Humblot, 1919.

Weiler, Björn. “The King as Judge: Henry II and Frederick Barbarossa as Seen by Their Contemporaries.” In *Challenging the Boundaries of Medieval History*, edited by Patricia Skinner, 22:115–40. Studies in the Early Middle Ages. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1484/M.SEM-EB.3.1922.

Weinfurter Stefan. “Die Entmachtung Heinrichs des Löwen.“ In *Heinrich Der Löwe Und Seine Zeit: Herrschaft Und Repräsentation Der Welfen 1125-1235: Katalog Der Ausstellung, Braunschweig 1995*, edited by Jochen Luckhardt, Franz Niehoff, and Herzog Anton-Ulrich-Museum Braunschweig, 180 – 189. München: Hirmer, 1995.

Wendehorst, Alfred.“Gottfried I.” In *Neue Deutsche Biographie*, edited by Otto zu Stolberg-Wernigerode, 667 – 668. Historische Kommission der Bayrischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1953.

Wickham, Chris. *Sleepwalking into a New World: The Emergence of Italian City Communes in the Twelfth Century*, Course Book, The Lawrence Stone Lectures 7. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400865826.

Websites and Newspapers

Britannica

“Body Politic | Definition, History, & Facts | Britannica.” Accessed April 11, 2022. https://www.britannica.com/topic/body-politic.

“Brabant | Historical Duchy, Europe | Britannica.” Accessed April 5, 2022. https://www.britannica.com/place/Brabant.

“Exchequer | British Government Department | Britannica.” Accessed March 29, 2022. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Exchequer.

“Frederick I | Biography, Barbarossa, Crusades, & Facts | Britannica.” Accessed April 2, 2022. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Frederick-I-Holy-Roman-emperor.

“Germany | The Consolidation of Brandenburg-Prussia and Austria | Britannica.” Accessed March 23, 2022. https://www.britannica.com/place/Germany/The-consolidation-of-Brandenburg-Prussia-and-Austria.

"Pipe Rolls | British Government Department | Britannica." Accessed March 29, 2022. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Pipe-Rolls.

"Siege of Zara | European History | Britannica." Accessed April 11, 2022. https://www.britannica.com/event/Siege-of-Zara.

Caviness, Madeleine H. "Sachsenspiegel." Grove Art Online. Accessed April 13, 2022. https://www.oxfordartonline.com/groveart/view/10.1093/gao/9781884446054.001.0001/oao-9781884446054-e-7002217119.

Central intelligence Agency. "Government, Independence, Germany." *The World Factbook*. Last updated March 16, 2022. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/germany/#government.

FOCUS Online. "Kaiser Barbarossa: Der Mythos lebt." Published June 4, 2015. https://www.focus.de/kultur/diverses/geschichte-kaiser-barbarossa-der-mythos-lebt_id_4727560.html.

Gabriele, Matthew. "There Were No Borders In The Middle Ages." Forbes. Published November 5, 2018. https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewgabriele/2018/11/05/no-borders-middle-ages/.

Miriam Webster. "royal demesne," Accessed March 29, 2022. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/royal+demesne.

Munro, André. "state monopoly on violence." Britannica. Published March 6, 2013. https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-monopoly-on-violence.

Numista. "1 Penny – John." Accessed April 13, 2022. https://en.numista.com/catalogue/pieces55927.html.

Schmitt, Eric. "U.S. Carries Out First Airstrike in Somalia Since August." *The New York Times*, February 24, 2022, sec. U.S. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/us/politics/somalia-shabab-us-airstrike.html.

The National WWII Museum | New Orleans. "Operation Barbarossa: The Biggest of All Time." Accessed April 2, 2022. https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/operation-barbarossa.

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. "What is Tithing." Accessed March 31, 2022, https://www.churchofjesuschrist.org/comeuntochrist/article/what-is-tithing.

Constitutions

"Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany." May 8, 1949.

Constituteproject.org. "Iraq's Constitution of 2005." Accessed April 13, 2022. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iraq_2005.pdf?lang=en.

"Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs." August 11, 1919.

Pictures/Media

Britannica. "Lübeck and Stade." Accessed April 6, 2022. https://www.britannica.com/place/Lubeck.

Gif Map. "Topographical Map of Turkey." Accessed April 7, 2022. https://www.gif-map.com/maps/asia/turkey/topographical-map-of-turkey.gif.

Nécropotame. *English: The Byzantine Empire on the Death of Emperor Basil II in (1025) in English*. Uploaded May 20, 2008. Translated and modified from Image:Map_Byzantine_Empire_1025-de.svg. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_Byzantine_Empire_1025-en.svg.

OnTheWorldMap.com. "Alessandria location on the Italy map" Accessed April 5, 2022. https://ontheworldmap.com/italy/city/alessandria/alessandria-location-on-the-italy-map.html.

The Royal Mint. "Medieval Short Cross Silver Penny." Accessed April 14, 2022. https://www.royalmint.com/our-coins/ranges/historic-coins/silver-historic-coins/medieval-short-cross-silver-penny/.

Web Gallery of Art. "Cappenberger Barbarossakopf." Accessed April 5, 2022. https://www.wga.hu/html_m/zzdeco/1gold/12c/09g_1100.html.

Wikipedia. "Lombard League." Uploaded February 22, 2022. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Lombard_League&oldid=1073387751.

Further Reading

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities.* London; New York: Verso, 1983.

Corèdon, Christopher and Ann Williams. *A Dictionary of Medieval Terms and Phrases*. Boydell & Brewer, 2004). http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7722/j.ctt14brrmq.23.

Gellner, Ernst. *Nations and Nationalism.* Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1983.

Gusy, Christoph. "Die Weimarer Verfassung zwischen Überforderung und Herausforderung." *Der Staat* 55, no. 3 (2016): 291 – 318.

Mayhew, N. J. “Money and Prices in England from Henry II to Edward III.” *The Agricultural History Review* 35, no. 2 (1987): 121–32.

Riley-Smith, Jonathan. “Crusading as an Act of Love.” *History* (London) 65, no. 214 (1980): 177 – 92. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-229X.1980.tb01939.x.

Verhulst, Adriaan and M Gysseling. *Le Compte général de 1187, connu sous le nom de “Gros brief”, et les institutions financières du comté de Flandre au XIIe siècle*. Bruxelles: Commission royale d’histoire = Brussel: Koninklijke commissie voor geschiedenis, 1962.