MENTAL GAZE MONITORING AND FORM MANIPULATION: DISTINCT CONCEPTIONS OF LANGUAGE PRODUCTION AND ITS MANAGEMENT

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Abstract:
This study addresses the phenomenon called "spacing out" or "delay" to show that speaking and writing condition the language users to assume distinct conceptions of language production, thereby motivating significantly different (uses of) grammatical devices within as well as across languages. We demonstrate that *mental gaze monitoring* and *linguistic form manipulation* serve as language production management in the speech event and writing event conceptions, respectively.

Keywords: speaking, writing, conception of language production, spacing out, delay.

1. Introduction

We will analyse the phenomenon called "spacing out" (Swan 2005) or "delay" (Clark & Fox Tree 2002) to elucidate anew the fact that speaking and writing condition the language users to assume distinct conceptions of language production and thereby motivate significantly different (uses of) grammatical devices within as well as across

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languages. Observing that the relevant phenomenon primarily manifests in pragmatic markers and particles in Japanese, and in similar markers in English, we will demonstrate that those markers and particles serve to reflect the speaker's *mental gaze monitoring*, which is essential to the conception of speech production in English and Japanese. We will also show that *linguistic form manipulation* is an integral part of the conception of writing production.

Swan (2005: 504) points out: "In informal speech, we often 'space out' the different elements of a sentence, giving the hearer a little extra time to interpret each part before going on to the next" (e.g., *Last Wednesday **it was**, I was just going to work*; *It's terrible, **you know**, the unemployment down there*). In writing, however, more compacted forms (e.g., *Last Wednesday I was just going to work*; *The unemployment down there is terrible*) are preferred in which the relevant phrases are assorted in one clause. A comparable phenomenon is observable in Japanese. Complex evidential forms like *-(na)-nda-kedo* 'it is... but' or interjectory particles like *-ne* 'you know' often appear in informal speech to "space out" phrases or clauses, as will be shown later, but they are not ordinarily used in writing, though possible in personal letters. The speaking/writing difference common to the two languages is attributable to the distinct conceptions of language production.

Linguistic structure is, in principle, "understood as a temporal phenomenon" (Haselow 2016: 82) in speaking but as a spatial phenomenon (Lakoff 1987: 283) in writing. Although speaking and writing are both intended to accumulate the evoked meanings into "a coherent overall conception" of event or state (Langacker 2014: 22), speakers' and writers' immediate aims for language production are in fact very different. This study maintains that speakers basically aim to add linguistic units (words, phrases, or clauses) to the prior utterance ("add-on" in Biber et al. 1999: 1068), while writers, to compact as many words or phrases as possible into a smaller number of clauses or sentences. We must reconfirm that writing, in nature, allows us to produce far more

complex sentential structures than speaking by various compacting processes: 'movement', 'deletion', 'insertion', 'embedding', etc.

Speakers entertain a self-conception of engaging in adding one linguistic unit after another for semantic accumulations, but writers do one of compacting linguistic forms into a smaller number of linear forms usually referred to as clauses or sentences. This difference in conception is partly attributable to what Chafe and Danielewicz (1987: 96-97) point out: "speakers can focus their consciousness on only a limited amount of material at one time", while writers "need not limit the production of language to what can be focused on at one time". We will argue that the difference also stems from the language user's diverse conceptions of language production and its management in the basic human activities of speaking and writing.

Section 2 will observe that the phenomenon handled as "spacing out" or "delay" is mostly marked with pragmatic markers in English and with pragmatic particles as well as comparable markers in Japanese. Section 3 will next discuss how speakers conceptualize their own speech production and its management to show that those markers and particles serve to mark the speakers' monitoring of their own mental gaze directed to either the conceptual content or the addressee in the conception of speech production. Section 4 will subsequently discuss how writers conceptualize their own writing production and management and will demonstrate that linguistic form manipulation in the writing event conception corresponds to mental gaze monitoring as language production management in speech event conception. After summarizing the distinct characteristics of speaking and writing event conceptions, Section 5 will put a new emphasis on the importance of describing grammars of speaking and writing in an appropriate conception of language production in both practical and theoretical terms.

Even though speaking and writing are intended to effect meaning accumulation (roughly speaking, understanding) by addressees and readers in the short or long run,

their distinct conceptions of language production, its co-participant, management, and primary effect naturally motivate quite different grammars. This paper finally concludes that one major difference between the basic human activities of speaking and writing suggests itself as two distinct grammars concerned with the language user's mental attendance to language production itself, which typically manifests as mental gaze monitoring in speech and linguistic form manipulation in writing.

2. Pragmatic markers and particles in English and Japanese

The phenomenon called "spacing out" (Swan 2005) or "delay" (Clark & Fox Tree 2002) instantiates an integral part of speech production in English and Japanese. Mostly manifested in pragmatic markers or particles, it can hardly be considered to constitute an essential part of writing production. This section outlines the two above-mentioned studies, showing that neither of them can accommodate the versatile meanings and functions of pragmatic markers in general. Swan's notion of "spacing out" is, though very instructive and helpful, partially grounded on a misconception of speech event, reminiscent of Lakoff's (1987: 283) "Spatialization of Form Hypothesis." Clark & Fox Tree's "delay" reflects a facet of an appropriate speech-event conception but a number of pragmatic markers are, unlike *uh* and *um*, hard to see as merely marking a delay in speaking. It is also inappropriate to understand pragmatic markers as "editing expressions" (Clark 2002: 12; Clark & Fox Tree 2002: 78), because the notion of editing, germane to writing, is extraneous to speaking.

2.1 Spacing out

Giving the example sentences in (1), Swan (2005: 504) points out that speakers in informal speech often "space out" different elements of a sentence giving the hearer a little extra time to interpret each element before going on to the next.

(1)　　a.　　*Last Wednesday **it was**, I was just going to work, ...*

　　　　b.　　*It's terrible, **you know**, the unemployment down there.*

　　　　c.　　***George Best** — now **he** was a good player.*

d.   ***This guy*** *who rang up,* ***he****'s an architect. Well, ...*

e.   ***That couple*** *we met in Berlin, we don't want to send* ***them*** *a card, do we?*

f.   ***One of my brothers****, his wife's a singer,* ***he*** *says...*

g.   ***Me****, I don't care.*

h.   ***Myself****, I think you're making a big mistake.*

i.   ***You know*** *Sylvia. Well, she ...*

<div align="right">(Swan 2005: 504-505; emphasis original)</div>

As Swan indicates, speakers can intend to give their hearers a little extra time to interpret each element of his or her utterance before turning to the next. Writers, in contrast, do not ordinarily have such an intention, as is shown in (2), a written version of (1). In writing, if not meant to be a transcription of one's speech, the discourse pragmatic devices for "spacing out" are ordinarily left out, as in (2). In this sense, those devices can be seen as an integral part of speaking.

(2)   a.   *Last Wednesday I was just going to work, ...*

b.   *The unemployment down there is terrible.*

c.   *George Best was now a good player.*

d.   *This guy who rang up is an architect.*

e.   *We don't want to send a card to that couple we met in Berlin, do we?*

f.   *One of my brothers, whose wife is a singer, says...*

g.   *I don't care.*

h.   *I think you're making a big mistake.*

i.   *Well, Sylvia ...*

Most of the devices adopted for spacing out could roughly be viewed as "pragmatic markers" (Aijmer 2013; Aijmer et al. 2006; Fraser 1996) in a broadest sense. Aijmer et al. (2006: 101) view "discourse particles" as belonging to "the more general category of pragmatic markers", which is "defined negatively: if a word or construction in an utterance does not contribute to the propositional, truth-functional content, then we

consider it to be a pragmatic marker". Expressions such as *It was* and *you know* adopted in (1a-b) can be safely treated as pragmatic markers. The emphatic pronouns illustrated in (1g-h) can also be seen as pragmatic markers, because they are elements outside the argument structures involved and do not contribute to the propositional, truth-functional content.

On the other hand, the resumptive pronouns (*he* and *them*) and the "extraposed" or "left-dislocated" phrases (*George Best*; *This guy who rang up*; *That couple we met in Berlin*; *One of my brothers*) in (1c-f) could not be regarded as pragmatic markers: the former function as arguments contributing, though highly schematically, to the propositional, truth-conditional content, and the latter are non-arguments but have a propositional contribution to the content. On a similar ground, *you know* in (1i) can hardly be viewed as a pragmatic marker. Our discussion below will largely concentrate on examples with *bona fide* pragmatic markers instantiated in (1a-b).

Although Swan's notion of "space out" is instructive and helpful for understanding the relevant phenomenon that is an integral part of speaking, we have to say that the notion is partially based on a certain misconception of speech event. We do not space out speech and its parts, because they are anything but spatial; rather, speech is essentially temporal, as suggested in Clark's studies reviewed in the next section. As long as the product of speech is written or printed, it can be spatialized. Speech could also be spatialized mentally, as Lakoff's (1987: 283) "Spatialization of Form Hypothesis" indicates, but speakers ordinarily do not conceive of such spatial forms of speech when speaking and conversing. We need to look for a more factual account for the relevant phenomenon based on a more appropriate conception of speaking.

2.2 Delay

As Swan (2005: 504) notes, speakers can "space out" the parts of his or her utterance so that their hearers can have a little extra time to interpret each part, as exemplified in (1) above. However, parts of utterances are not only "spaced out" for addressees' sake

but also for speakers themselves. Clark and Fox Tree (2002) introduce the notion of "delay" for a comparable phenomenon exemplified by interjections *uh* and *um*. Here speakers can be interpreted as giving themselves a little extra time to construct each part of their utterance before going on to the next in Swan's terms.

Discourse markers (Fraser 1990; Schiffrin 1987), and more broadly pragmatic markers (Aijmer 2013; Aijmer et al. 2006; Fraser 1996), instantiated in (3) are used to make "clarifications" and introduce "delays" (Clark 2004: 365; Clark & Fox Tree 2002: 74). We can here go one step further to say that pragmatic markers can generally serve to "space out" the different elements of a sentence" (Swan 2005: 504). They precede, intervene between, or follow parts of a sentence, "taken to be separate and distinct from the propositional content of the sentence" (Fraser 1996: 168). In accordance with Swan's description of spacing out, pragmatic markers are characteristic of "informal speech" (Swan 2005: 504).

(3) Peter: and he's going to . go to the top, is he?

     Reynard: **well**, . **I mean this** . **uh** Mallet said Mallet was **uh** said some-

                  thing about **uh you know** he felt it would be a good thing if

                  u:h . if Oscar went, (1.2.370)

                                                              (Clark 2004: 365, emphases ours)

According to Clark (2004: 365), "what Peter and Reynard actually produced was" (3), while (4) is its written version that he says "is an example worthy of a playwright". Here as well, the pragmatic markers (or devices for "spacing out" in Swan's terms) found in (3) are mostly left out, which testifies that they are basically an essential part of speech but extraneous to writing.

(4) Peter: And he's going to go to the top, is he?

     Reynard: Well, Mallet said he felt it would be a good thing if Oscar went.

                                                                          (Clark 2004: 365)

Clark & Fox Tree's (2002) notion of "delay" is a temporal rather than spatial notion, reflecting a facet of the appropriate conception of speaking. However, pragmatic markers like *well*, *you know*, *I mean*, and so forth have a more specific meaning and function than *uh* and *um* do; they are hard to see as merely marking a delay in speaking. Meanwhile Clark (2002: 12) treats *I mean*, *or rather*, *you know*, *pardon*, *no*, *sorry*, *well*, *oh* etc. as "editing expressions," but the notion of editing itself belongs to writing and is by nature inappropriate to speaking. We need to seek a more semantic-functionally based explanation for the pertinent uses of the pragmatic markers in general.

2.3 Comparable phenomena in Japanese

The phenomenon treated as "spacing out" or "delay" can be found in Japanese as well. The sentences in (5) show our translations of English examples (1a-b) above; (1b) can, however, be translated into two different formulations exemplified in (5b-c).[1] The pragmatic particles highlighted with boldface (*-n-da-kedo-ne*, *-ne*, *-yo-ne*, or *-sa*) serve for "spacing out" or "delay" in Swan's (2005) and Clark & Fox-Tree's (2002) terms.

(5) a. *Sensyuu-no suiyoobi-**na-nda-kedo(-ne)**, sigoto-ni mukat-*
   last.week-GEN Wednesday-COP-EVD-though(-IP) work-to head.for-
   *te(i)-te**(-ne)**, ...*
   PROG-and(-IP)
   'Last Wednesday it was, I was just going to work, and....'

  b. *Hidoi-**yo-ne**, asoko-no situgyooritu(-wa).*
   be.terrible-FP-FP there-GEN unemployment:rate(-TOP)
   'It's terrible, you know, the unemployment there.'

  c. *Asoko-no situgyooritu**(-sa)** hidoi**(-yo)-ne**.*
   there-GEN unemployment:rate(-IP) be.terrible-FP-FP
   'The unemployment there, you know, it's terrible, isn't it?'

             (Our translation of the English examples in (2))

(6) corresponds to the written version of (5) and at the same time Japanese translations of the English examples in (2a-b). Note that the sentences in (6) are not accompanied by such pragmatic (specifically, interjectory) particles as found in the spoken version.

(6)   a.   *Sensyuu-no   suiyoobi,   watasi-wa sigoto-ni mukat-tei-ta.*

                last.week-GEN Wednesday I-TOP   work-to   head.for-PROG-PST

                'Last Wednesday, I was just going to work.'

    b.   *Asoko-no   situgyooritu-wa   hidoi.*

                there-GEN unemployment:rate-TOP be.terrible

                'The unemployment there is terrible. '

Likewise, the contrast between English examples (3) and (4) above, namely the spontaneous speech and its written version "worthy of a playwright" (Clark 2004: 365), can be translated as in (7) and (8), respectively. The spoken version in (7) has pragmatic markers highlighted with underline (*eeto* 'well' or *dakara* 'so') and pragmatic particles highlighted with boldface (*-ne* 'you know' and *-datte-sa* 'I hear so'), while the written version in (8) does not have any of the markers and particles.

(7)   Piitaa: *de itiban-ni nari-soona-no?*

                and first-to   become-be.likely-FP

                'And he's going to go to the top, is he?'

    Reinaado: <u>*eeto*</u> <u>*dakara*</u> *Maretto-wa... Maretto-ga it-te-ta-no-wa...*

                well I.mean Mallet-TOP   Mallet-NOM say-PROG-PST-NMLZ-TOP

                <u>*eeto*</u>-***ne***   *Osukaa-ga morae-tara ii-na*-***datte-sa***.

                well-you.know Oscar-NOM can.get-if   be.good-FP-QUOT-FP

                'Well, I mean, Mallet was... what Mallet said was... uh you know

                he said it would be a good thing if he won Oscar'.

                            (Our rough translation of the English example in (3))

(8)   Piitaa: *de   itiban-ni   nari-soona-no?*
            and first-to   become-be.likely-FP

            'And he's going to go to the top, is he?'

    Reinaado: *Maretto-wa Osukaa-ga morae-tara ii-na-tte-it-*

            Mallet-TOP Oscar-NOM can.get-if   be.good-FP-QUOT-say-

            te-ta.

            PROG-PST

            'Mallet said it would be a good thing if he won Oscar'.

Although there are some morpho-syntactic differences between pragmatic particles and markers, those Japanese devices for spacing out or delay can be functionally equated with pragmatic markers in English. Here as well, as far as they basically belong to speaking, which is not spatial but temporal by nature, they cannot be adequately treated as spacing-out devices alone. Nor is it sufficient to describe them as merely marking a delay in speech. Just as English pragmatic markers discussed in the previous sections, the related uses of Japanese pragmatic particles and markers call for a cognitive account based on an authentic speech event conception.

3. Speech event conception

We will here consider how a speaker conceptualizes his or her language production while actually speaking. Speaking is conceptualized as the speaker's adding on parts of an utterance to accumulate their evoked meanings into a composite conception of event or state along with monitoring his or her mental gaze directed to either (part of) the conception or the addressee. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 will first examine the speaker's conception of spontaneous speech production with regard to Japanese examples (5) and (7) above. Next Section 3.3 will look at the corresponding English examples.

3.1 Adding on for meaning accumulation

Language production in spontaneous speech is based on what Biber et al. (1999: 1068) call "the add-on strategy", whereby "the utterance neatly divides into a linear sequence of finite clause-like units, which follow in line without overlap or interruption."[2] Ironically, Biber et al. explain this important aspect of spontaneous speech in terms of 'neatly dividing the utterance' rather than 'putting together the units of the utterance.' As a matter of fact, each utterance is built up with its units being added on, not divided into a linear sequence of units. It has been noted before that such add-on units are to a very considerable extent prefabricated parts; therefore, utterances in everyday speech can be "viewed as a kind of pastiche, pasted together in an improvised way out of ready-made elements" (Hopper 1998: 166).[3]

In the above citation, Biber et al. view an "add-on" structure as "a linear sequence of finite clause-like units." However, the structure of speech need not be "linear" though that of writing is so. Here again, Biber et al. assume that parts of utterances to be added on are spatial. As noted in Section 2.1, speech is not spatialized unless it is written or printed. Speakers could spatialize it mentally by imagining it graphically but they do not necessarily conceive of such spatial forms of speech when actually speaking and conversing. Langacker (1997: 3) contends "linear order, more precisely described as temporal order, is a primary dimension of *phonological* structure". What matters here is "order", which is "temporal" rather than "linear".

The process that Biber et al. are to characterize in terms of 'adding on,' however, points to an important facet of speaking. Speakers cannot 'move' or 'delete' parts of an utterance, or 'embed' one part in another; all they can do is to add on parts of an utterance. To effect what corresponds to 'movement' or 'deletion', they have to redo the utterance by adding on its parts in different order or reproduce the utterance with the part to be 'deleted' missing. It should be noted here that those parts of an utterance are added on but their linguistic forms themselves do not necessarily shape a composite whole in the speaker's mind. The actual linguistic form (phonological or the

corresponding graphic image) of each part can be partially or totally forgotten once its meaning or concept is evoked and subsumed into a more holistic conception of event or state in which the speakers are currently engaged. In a more strict sense, what is actually added on is the evoked meaning or concept rather than the linguistic form of each part; the meanings or concepts added on are supposed to be accumulated into a coherent conception of event or state in the addressee's as well as speaker's mind.

We can see such add-on and accumulation of meaning in Japanese example (7), repeated below. In response to Peter's question, Reynard starts his utterance with pragmatic markers *eeto* 'well' and *dakara* 'so', which do not have any semantic contribution to the event conception (or propositional content in Fraser's (1996: 168) or Aijmer et al.'s (2006: 101) terms) that he intends to make Peter entertain as an answer to the question. Next Reynard adds on *Maretto-wa* 'Mallet (was)' and *Maretto-ga it-te-ta-no-wa* 'what Mallet was saying (was)', which are meant to evoke in Peters mind an image of 'Mallet in the past' and an event conception of 'Mallet's telling Reynard something in the past', respectively. These are presumably accumulated into one composite event conception closer to that event conception.

(7)   Piitaa: *de   itiban-ni   nari-soona-no?*
                   and first-to   become-be.likely-FP
                   'And he's going to go to the top, is he?'
        Reinaado: *eeto* *dakara* *Maretto-wa...* *Maretto-ga* *it-te-ta-no-wa...*
                   well I.mean Mallet-TOP   Mallet-NOM say-PROG-PST-NMLZ-TOP
                   *eeto-**ne***   *Osukaa-ga* *morae-tara* *ii-na-**datte-sa***.
                   well-you.know Oscar-NOM can.get-if   be.good-FP-QUOT-FP
                   'Well, I mean, Mallet was... what Mallet said was... uh you know
                   he said it would be a good thing if he won Oscar.'
                                            (Our rough translation of the English example in (3))

After inserting a pragmatic marker followed by a pragmatic particle (*eeto-ne* 'well, you know') with no propositional contributions, Reynard subsequently adds on *Osukaa-ga morae-tara ii-na* 'It would be good if (I) win Oscar' and concludes his utterance with a further pragmatic-particle sequence *-datte-sa* 'I hear so, I say'. The speech content of 'It would be good if (I) win Oscar' is located in the formerly evoked conception of 'Mallet's telling Reynard something in the past', both of which are thus accumulated into a composite whole of speech event conception.

The cognitive process of meanings (images or concepts) being added on and accumulated is primarily assumed to occur in addressees, who will conceive of one meaning after another that is evoked by each part of an utterance. In contrast, speakers may, before producing the utterance, envisage an image or conception of event or state, however vaguely, that they would like to share with their addressees.[4] At the same time, nonetheless, the process of adding on one meaning after another and accumulating them into a composite conception of event or state can also occur in speakers, so to speak, by rehearsing a meaning accumulation that is intended to take place in their addressees. The discussion below will focus on this speaker's facet of meaning accumulation.

3.2 Mental gaze monitoring as speech production management

The previous section explained that parts of an utterance and their evoked meanings are accumulated into a composite event conception in speakers as well as addressees. This explanation did not deal with the meaning and function of pragmatic markers and particles but merely characterized them as being not contributory to the composite event conception. We will here argue that pragmatic (interjectory and sentence-final) particles and some pragmatic markers (discourse markers and interjections) in Japanese serve to represent the speaker's self-monitoring of mental gaze.[5] Such mental gaze monitoring can be best understood as a management of speech production.[6]

Mental gaze is assumed to be directed either to the addressee (addressee-directed) or to the speaker's own conception of what he or she is talking about (conception-directed). Although not using such a term or notion as mental gaze, Leech and Svartvik (1975: 23) make a similar point about "the speaker's attitude": "Often we use in speech words or phrases like *well*, *you see*, and *kind of* which add little information, but tell us something of the speaker's attitude to his audience and to what he is saying". Mental gaze may be somehow related to the so-called "joint attention" (Moore & Dunham 1995) but differs in that the former is not necessarily shared. Mental gaze can be monitored in monologues as well as dialogues.

Mental gaze monitoring can be located in the function of the pragmatic markers and particles used in the Japanese examples given above. We will first look at the speech event conception of (5a) given in Section 2.3. In conversation settings, as can be diagramed in Figure 1, the conception consists of the addressee represented by the left-hand orange human figure, the speaker only partially represented by the right-most orange figure, and the conceptual content of what the speaker is trying to talk about, which is represented by the upper balloon. This representation largely amounts to the speaker's rehearsal of the meaning accumulation expected to occur in the addressee.[7]

Figure 1. Speech event conception in (5a)

The speaker first conceives of 'last Wednesday' and speaks it out as represented by a lower balloon in Figure 1(a). This and the ensuing balloons amount to adding on parts of utterances. Subsequently the speaker uses the interjectory particles *-n-da-kedo-ne* 'it was, you know' to monitor his or her mental gaze directed to the addressee, which is indicated with a red broken-line arrow in Figure 1(b). The speaker further conceives of his or her going to work and speaks it out as represented again by a lower balloon in Figure 1(c). And then the speaker adds the pragmatic particle *-ne* 'you know' to monitor his or her mental gaze directed to the addressee in Figure 1(d). This successive speech production results primarily in the accumulation of meaning: 'the speaker's going to work last Wednesday,' as indicated at the top of Figure 1(d).

Here, the speaker is depicted to conceive of one meaning after another by adding on the parts of an utterance that evoke those meanings, accumulating the meanings into a composite conception of event or state. More often than not, however, he or she may envisage a composite conception of event or state before producing the utterance that he or she would like to share with his or her addressee. The meaning accumulation depicted in the upper balloon of the diagrams, therefore, will amount to the speaker's rehearsal of such an accumulation as expected to occur in the addressee's mind.

The speech event conception in (5b) can also be diagramed in a similar way. The speaker first conceives of 'terrible' and speaks it out as a lower balloon, as diagramed

in Figure 2(a). Here too, this amounts to adding a part of the utterance. Subsequently the speaker uses the interjectory particles *-yo-ne* 'isn't it?' to monitor his or her mental gaze directed to the addressee, as indicated with a red broken-line arrow in Figure 2(b). The speaker further conceives of 'the unemployment there' and speaks it out again as a lower balloon, as in Figure 2(c). Here as well, the successive speech production ends up in meaning accumulation: 'the unemployment there being terrible', as shown in Figure 2(d).

Figure 2. Speech event conception in (5b)

The speech event conception of another formulation in (5c) can also be described in a similar manner. Here, the speaker first conceives of 'the unemployment there' and speaks it out, as diagramed in Figure 3(a). Next he or she adds the pragmatic particle *-sa* 'I say' to monitor his or her mental gaze directed to the addressee, as depicted in Figure 3(b), and then conceives of 'terrible' and speaks it out, as in Figure 3(c). The speaker concludes the utterance with the pragmatic particles *-yo-ne* 'isn't it?' to monitor

his or her mental gaze directed to the addressee, as in Figure 3(d). The primary effect of this successive speech production is again meaning accumulation: 'the unemployment there being terrible', as indicated in the top of this last figure.


Figure 3. Speech event conception in (5c)

We have so far seen that pragmatic particles mark addressee-directed mental gaze monitoring. In Reynard's speech event conception in (7), pragmatic markers are adopted to mark the monitoring of conception-directed mental gaze as well as pragmatic particles for marking addressee-direct mental gaze. First, the speaker, Reynard, uses the pragmatic marker *eeto* 'well' and *dakara* 'so' to monitor his mental gaze directed to his conception of what he is trying to talk about, which is indicated with a blue broken-line arrow, as diagramed in Figure 4(a). Reynard envisions a man named 'Mallet' and adds some parts of the utterance: *Maretto wa...*, *Maretto-ga it-te-ta-no-wa* 'Mallet was..., what Mallet said was', as in Figure 4(b). Next Reynard uses the pragmatic marker *eeto* 'well' to monitor his mental gaze to the conception of what

he is trying to say, as depicted in Figure 4(c), and then adds the pragmatic particle *-ne* 'you know' to monitor, this time, the mental gaze directed to the addressee Peter, as in Figure 4(d). Finally Reynard adds the part of the utterance: *Osukaa-ga morae-tara ii-na* 'It would be good if (I) win Oscar' as in Figure 4(e), and concludes the utterance with the pragmatic particles *-datte-sa* 'I hear so, I say' to monitor his mental gaze again directed to Peter, as in Figure 4(f). The primary effect of the overall utterance is meaning accumulation: 'Mallet's hope for Oscar'.


Figure 4. Reynard's speech event conception in (7)

As demonstrated so far, interjectory particles like (*-nda*)(*-kedo*)*-ne*[*sa*] '(it is [was]), you know [I say]' and sentence-final particles like (*-nda*)(*-tte*)*-yo*[*ne*/*sa*] '(I hear so), you know [I say]' and (*-nda*)*-yo-ne* 'isn't it?' mark addressee-directed mental gaze: the speaker uses these pragmatic particles to monitor his or her mental gaze directed to the addressee.[8] In contrast, interjections like *eeto* 'well', *anoo* 'um', and *maa* 'yeah' pragmatic markers like *yappa*(*ri*) 'still', *demo* 'but', and *dakara* 'so', and sentence-final particles like *-na(a)* 'I think' and *-ka*(*-na*) 'I wonder' mark conception-directed mental gaze: the speaker uses these pragmatic markers to monitor his or her mental gaze directed to the current conception of what he or she is trying to express.[9]

Notably, pragmatic particles and markers of addressee-directed mental gaze monitoring like (*-nda*)(*-kedo*)*-ne*[*sa*] '(it is [was]), you know [I say]', (*-nda*)(*-tte*)*-yo*[*ne*/*sa*] '(I hear so), you know [I say]', and (*-nda*)*-yo-ne* 'isn't it?' can hardly be employed in monologues. In fact, the utterances in (5), repeated below, with some of those particles or markers, are unnatural and even unacceptable as monologues of a sane person. Conversely, the sentences in (6), also repeated below, with no particles or markers of addressee-directed mental gaze monitoring are unnatural in dialogues and therefore can hardly be part of a conversation. Unlike those particles and markers of addressee-directed mental gaze monitoring, pragmatic markers and particles of conception-directed mental gaze monitoring like *eeto* 'well', *anoo* 'um', *maa* 'yeah', *yappa*(*ri*) 'still', *demo* 'but', *dakara* 'so', *-na(a)* 'I think', and *-ka*(*-na*) 'I wonder' can be adopted in monologues as well as dialogues instantiated in (7) above.[10]

(5)   a.   *Sensyuu-no   suiyoobi-**na-nda-kedo(-ne)**,   sigoto-ni mukat-*
last.week-GEN Wednesday-COP-EVD-though(-IP) work-to   head.for-
*te(i)-te**(-ne)**, ...*
PROG-and(-IP)
'Last Wednesday it was, I was just going to work, and....'

        b.   *Hidoi-**yo-ne**,   asoko-no situgyooritu(-wa).*
be.terrible-FP-FP there-GEN unemployment:rate(-TOP)

'It's terrible, you know, the unemployment there'.

    c.   *Asoko-no   situgyooritu(-sa)   hidoi(-yo)-ne*.

        there-GEN   unemployment:rate(-IP) be.terrible-FP-FP

        'The unemployment there, you know, it's terrible, isn't it?'

<div align="right">(Our translation of the English examples in (2))</div>

(6)   a.   *Sensyuu-no   suiyoobi,   watasi-wa sigoto-ni mukat-tei-ta.*

        last.week-GEN Wednesday I-TOP   work-to   head.for-PROG-PST

        'Last Wednesday, I was just going to work'.

    b.   *Asoko-no situgyooritu-wa   hidoi.*

        there-GEN   unemployment:rate-TOP be.terrible

        'The unemployment there is terrible '.

3.3 Analogous view of English pragmatic markers

In English as well, some pragmatic markers can be viewed as serving to represent the speaker's mental-gaze monitoring. Discourse markers *you know*, *I mean*, and *right*, and so-called tags represent the speaker's monitoring of his or her mental gaze directed to the addressee. Erman (2001: 1342), for instance, points out: "At the clause level, the speaker uses *you know* primarily to guide the listener in the interpretation of the message." On the other hand, interjections like *well*, *uh*, and *um* represent the speaker's monitoring of his or her mental gaze directed to the current conception of what he or she is trying to express. This characterization conforms with Aijmer's (2013: 5) description: "*Well* for instance 'remarks on' the planning going on in the speaker's mind or accompanies processes such as reformulation or revision" and "can be described as a reflexive 'utterance signal' ".

The speech event conception in English example (1a-b), repeated below, can be analyzed in the same manner as their Japanese translations, (5a-c) above. The speaker of (1a) first conceives of 'last Wednesday' and speaks it out: *Last Wednesday*. Subsequently the speaker uses the pragmatic marker or comment clause *it was* to

monitor his or her mental gaze directed to the addressee, which could be depicted with a red broken-line arrow as in Figure 1(b) above.[11] The speaker further conceives of his or her going to work and speaks it out: *I was just going to work*. This whole sequence of utterance is supposed to result in meaning accumulation: 'the speaker's going to work last Wednesday'.

(1)   a.   *Last Wednesday **it was**, I was just going to work, ...*

          b.   *It's terrible, **you know**, the unemployment down there.*

Likewise, the speaker of (1b) first conceives of 'something terrible' and speaks it out: *It's terrible*. He or she further employs the discourse marker *you know* to monitor his or her mental gaze directed to the addressee, which could be depicted with a red broken-line arrow as in Figure 1(b) above. The speaker finally verbalizes that terrible thing: *the unemployment down there*. The overall speech production results in meaning accumulation: 'the unemployment down there being terrible'.

Reynard's speech event conception in (3), repeated below, can also be described in a comparable way to that in its Japanese translation in (7). First Reynard uses the pragmatic marker *well* to monitor his mental gaze directed to his conception of what he is trying to talk about, which can be depicted with a blue broken-line arrow as in Figure 4(a). Next he adds the pragmatic marker or comment clause *I mean this* to monitor his mental gaze directed to the addressee Peter, which can be described with a red broken-line arrow as in Figure 4(d). Reynard adopts the interjection *uh*, again, to monitor his mental gaze directed to his conception of what he is trying to say. Next he envisions a man named 'Mallet' and adds some parts of the utterance: *Mallet said*, *Mallet was* and then adds the interjection *uh* to monitor his mental gaze directed to the conception of what he is trying to say. Subsequently he adds another part of his utterance: *said something about*, which is followed by another *uh* and the pragmatic marker *you know*. After adding yet another part of the utterance: *he felt it would be a good thing if*, Reynard adds the prolonged interjection *u:h* to monitor the mental gaze

directed to his conception. He concludes his speech production with the final part of the utterance: *if Oscar went*. The primary effect of the overall utterances is meaning accumulation: 'Mallet's hope for Oscar'.

(3)   Peter: and he's going to . go to the top, is he?

      Reynard: **well**, . **I mean this** . **uh** Mallet said Mallet was **uh** said some-

                 thing about **uh you know** he felt it would be a good thing if

                 u:h . if Oscar went, (1.2.370)

                                        (Clark 2004: 365, emphases ours)

4. Writing event conception

Section 3 demonstrated that a speaker conceptualizes his or her speech production as a process of adding on parts of an utterance to accumulate their evoked meanings into a composite conception of event or state along with monitoring his or her mental gaze directed to either (part of) the conception or the addressee. This section will show how writing is conceptualized. Unlike speakers who add on parts of utterances, writers put linguistic units in linear shapes (linearization) according to what he or she is trying to express, as will be shown in Section 4.1. The management of language production, while realized as mental gaze monitoring in speech, manifests itself as linguistic manipulation in writing: intentions to "delete", "move", "insert", or "embed" particular linguistic forms, as argued in Section 4.2.

4.1 Adding on for linguistic form linearization

Language production in writing is also partially based on Biber et al.'s (1999: 1068) "add-on strategy". Writers might produce internal speech, in which they add on parts of utterances, and put part by part in a word, phrase, or clause in writing. In this respect, writing production can be comparable to speech production. However, the two modes differ in their primary effect of language production. Adding parts of utterances in speaking is basically supposed to effect meaning accumulation at the time of speech, whereas adding words, phrases, or clauses in writing is first and foremost intended to

linearize those linguistic forms, with the accumulation of their meanings left up to readers to conduct in a later time of reading. Writing production is by nature spatial rather than temporal as long as its product is necessarily spatialized by being written or printed.

We will first examine the writing event conception with respect to English example (2a). First the writer may conceive of 'last Wednesday', as the speaker of (1a) does in the speech event conception, and write it down on the display as depicted in Figure 5(a) or otherwise on the paper with a pen. Next the writer conceives of 'his or her going to work' and writes it down, as in Figure 5(b).

Figure 5. Writing event conception in (2a)

What matters here is that the product of writing must be principally spatial linearization of linguistic forms. Ordinary conceptions of writing do not allow the linguistic forms to be aligned in such manners as depicted in Figure 6.[12]

Figure 6. Extraordinary writing event conception in (2a)

Writing can be produced by transcribing speech. Let us consider the case where one transcribes Reynard's utterance in English example (3). The writer (or transcriber) listens to the recording and writes down one part of the utterance at a time, as diagramed in Figure 7. Here the upper balloon represents sound images in the writer's mind. It may differ from person to person how many words they are to listen to as one part and to write it down in a row. Suppose that the writer first listens to *well I mean this uh Mallet said Mallet was uh* at a time and writes it down, as diagramed in Figure 7(a). Next he or she moves on to *said something about uh you know* and writes it down, as depicted in Figure 7(b).

Figure 7. Event conception of transcribing Reynard's utterance in (3)

Likewise, he or she turns to *he felt it would be a good thing if u:h* and writes it down, as in Figure 7(c). Finally *if Oscar went* is reached and written down, as in Figure 7(d). Once written down, the previously attended parts of the recording will be forgotten; the sound images gradually go away from the upper balloon in Figures 7(b-d).

While the product of writing is supposed to be linear, the orientation and direction of its linear structure can be of some variation in different languages. In English, the product of writing goes from left to right, while in Hebrew, for example, it goes from right to left. In Japanese, the writing product can be aligned vertically from top to bottom as well as horizontally from left to right.[13]

For instance, the conception of translating Reynard's utterance in (4), an English example given in Section 2.2, into Japanese may proceed in the way depicted in Figure 8. The writer (or translator) writes down a Japanese sentence that stands for what he or she understands from the English sentence in (4). The product of this writing event can be conceived of as vertically aligned lines, as seen on the display of the diagrams. This is in stark contrast with a horizontally aligned translation such as (8), given in Section 2.3, which would in Japanese and Chinese characters look like:

マレットは、オスカーがもらえたらいいなって言ってた。

Figure 8. Event conception of transcribing Reynard's utterance in (7)

Though too natural to mention, it should be noted once again that the product of writing on the display or paper can go either horizontally or vertically but the lines returned invariably run from top to bottom, not vice versa. This latter rule seems universal in modern human languages. These facts must have great influence on how the writing production is conceptualized in writers of any language.

Unlike speaking primarily aimed to effect meaning accumulation at the time of speech, writing is first and foremost conceptualized as linearizing linguistic forms either vertically or horizontally with their lines running from top to bottom in any case. Such meaning accumulation as assumed in speaking is largely postponed until readers later read and try to understand those linguistic forms. Writers are only engaged in meaning accumulation as a self-rehearsal of prospective reading, which has a very different effect from the case of speaking.

4.2 Linguistic form manipulation as writing production management
As argued in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, pragmatic particles and markers in Japanese and English can be viewed as marking the speaker's mental gaze monitoring, which can be best understood as the management of speech production. This section demonstrates that the management of writing production is realized instead as manipulations of linguistic forms. Mental gaze monitoring involved in speaking could be marked with

pragmatic particles or markers in writing as well, for instance, when we write a letter to a particular person. However, that should be understood as a verbatim transcription of an addressed speech rather than authentic writing. Writers' mental gaze, if any, would be directed to linguistic units (letters, characters, words, phrases, etc.) corresponding to those on the paper or display they are working on. It can be equated with the writers' conceptual (and actual) linguistic form manipulations: intentions to "delete", "move", "insert", or "embed" particular linguistic forms in the conception of writing event.

Here we will examine the writing event conception of English example (2b). First the writer may conceive of 'It's terrible', as the speaker does in the speech event conception, and writes it down on the display as depicted here or otherwise on the paper with a pen. Next the writer may specify that terrible thing, as he or she would if he or she speaks it out. The writing conception so far is depicted in Figure 9(a).[14]


Figure 9. Writing event conception of English example (2b)

Unlike a speaker, the writer may delete *it's*, as indicated with a green broken-line arrow in Figure 9(b), which amounts to a linguistic manipulation. The writer will perform further manipulations such as movement (the exchange of *terrible* and *the unemployment down there*) and insertion (adding of *is*), as depicted in Figures 9(c-d), to compact the overall product of writing. The primary effect of writing production is this compacting of linguistic forms, as indicated in orange letters in Figure 9(d).

For another instance, we will consider the case where the writer produces the writing or script in (4) from the transcription of recording in (3). After transcribing all the utterances by Reynard as diagramed in Figure 10(a), the writer performs linguistic form manipulations such as deletion, movement, or embedding on the transcription, which are depicted in Figures 10(b), 10(c-d), and 10(e), respectively. The primary effect of writing production is, here as well, the compacting of linguistic forms, as the orange letters indicate in Figure 10(f).

Figure 10. Writing event conception of English example (4)

As we have seen so far, writing is produced not merely by adding on but linearizing linguistic forms, and the management of writing production is shaped as linguistic form manipulations. The writing event conception thus differs to a much greater degree than linguists normally assume from the speech event conception. Both writing and speaking are basic forms or modes of human language production. Besides, their products cannot be clearly distinguished as one or the other: a transcription of speech is, for instance, a product of writing (transcription) as well as one of speaking. However, the producer's self-conceptions of the relevant language production at the time of production can be distinguished. Writers envision themselves as linearizing and manipulating linguistic forms to compact them, while speakers envisage themselves as adding on parts of each utterance to accumulate the evoked meanings into a composite whole conception of event or state along with monitoring their own mental gaze directed to the conceptual content or their addressees.

5. Distinct conceptions of language production motivating different grammars

Speech production and writing production are accompanied by different kinds of production management: mental gaze monitoring in speaking and linguistic form manipulation in writing. These distinct conceptions of language production motivate pragmatic markers and particles as well as phonological features in the grammar of speaking, on the one hand, and compacted and complex structures of linearized linguistic units in that of writing, on the other. The mental representations of relevant

linguistic units will naturally differ considerably between the two modes of language production. Different linguistic theories have proposed diverse linguistic representations (simpler ones diagramed in terms of "nested boxes", "a tree" (Langacker 2014: 18), or bracketing and more elaborated ones like "Functional Hierarchy", "Grammatical Constituency", "Conceptual Content", and "Coded Content" (Langacker 2014: 43). Some are merely "conceived metaphorically" (Langacker 2014: 18), while some are irrelevant to speaking or writing. Theories of each grammar should thus be analyzed and accounted for with reference to their appropriate conception of language production and its linguistic representation.

5.1 Grammars of speaking and writing described in an appropriate conception of language production

As demonstrated in Sections 3 and 4, language users have distinct conceptions of language production for speaking and writing, respectively. Adding on parts of utterances and mental gaze monitoring comprise essential components of the speech event conception. Conversely, those components are basically extraneous to the writing event conception. Instead, it is linearization of linguistic units and manipulations of linguistic form (deletion, movement, insertion, embedding, etc.) that are integral parts of the writing event conception.

Table 1 summarizes the two distinct conceptions of language production. In the speech event conception, the co-present participant in language production is a speaker or a speaker and addressee. The means of production is adding on of parts of utterances. The major production management is realized as mental gaze monitoring. The primary effect of production amounts to meaning accumulation. On the other hand, in the writing event conception, the co-present participant in language production is a writer alone.[15] The means of production is linearization of linguistic units (letters, characters, words, phrases, clauses, etc.). The chief production management is embodied in linguistic form manipulation. The primary effect of production amounts to compacting of linguistic forms.

Table 1. Distinct characteristics of language production in speaking and writing

	SPEAKING	WRITING
CO-PRESENT PARTICIPANT IN LANGUAGE PRODUCTION	speaker (and addressee)	writer alone
MEANS OF PRODUCTION	adding on of parts of utterances	linearization of linguistic units
PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT	mental gaze monitoring	form manipulation
PRIMARY EFFECT OF PRODUCTION	accumulation of meaning	compacting of forms

As long as language users conceptualize their language production quite differently in speaking and writing, the grammars that underlie those two different modes of language production will naturally be different accordingly. Therefore, the grammars of speaking and writing should, respectively, be described in an appropriate conception of language production. Pragmatic markers introduced in Section 2 are ancillary to speaking; so their meaning and function in "initial", "medial", and "final" position (Degand & Fagard 2011; Izutsu & Izutsu 2013) concern the grammar of speaking and thus are appropriately accounted for in the speech event conception.

Swan's (2005) notion of "spacing out" is based somewhat on the conception of writing; it is reminiscent of Lakoff's (1987) "Spatialization of Form Hypothesis". "Spacing" is first of all concerned with orthography and a system or rules of writing. Clark & Fox Tree's (2002) "delay" is, on the other hand, a temporal rather than spatial notion, reflecting a facet of the appropriate conception of speaking. However, pragmatic markers like *well*, *you know*, *I mean*, etc. are, unlike *uh* and *um*, hard to see as merely marking a delay in speaking. Rather, those pragmatic markers can be better described as markers of a speaker's mental gaze monitoring, which amounts to language production management in spontaneous speech. Our analysis of the relevant particles and markers on attentional management is more intrinsic to the conception of spontaneous speech production.

In the same vein, punctuation, capitalization, and other editing processes, peculiar to writing, will be treated appropriately in the writing event conception. So-called ellipsis, abbreviation, passivization, causativization, pronominalization, relativization, subordination, coordination, dislocation, insertion and so forth can only be described in terms of production management in writing. They are all extraneous to the product of spontaneous speech. We must not forget that those editing processes are what can only be done on linguistic forms once linearized in some way, not what can be done before the linearization. Therefore, any attempt to account for sentences excerpted from spontaneous speech in terms of editing processes will be misleading and inappropriate.

5.2 Implications for theories of grammars

Generative Grammar (e.g., Chomsky 1986) assumes that sentences are derived through syntactic operations such as "deletion", "movement", "insertion", "embedding", and so on; the theory can thus be viewed as being modeled more on language users' conception of writing. As argued in Section 3.1, such syntactic operations cannot be located in the conception of spontaneous speech production. The linguistic structures conventionally represented by means of tree diagrams or bracketing can hardly be recognized as configurations that parts of utterances manifest. The add-on structure of speech can hardly be dealt with in the Generative Grammar framework.

In contrast, Functional and Cognitive Linguistics (e.g., Clark 2004; Halliday 1987; Langacker 2014) can be seen as being modeled much more on language users' conception of speaking. They put as much value on linear order as hierarchical constituency of linguistic units. The conceptual structures assumed in Cognitive Linguistics, in particular, can help far more than Generative Grammar to explain the language produced in spontaneous speech. However, Cognitive Linguistics can sometimes posit many more structures than necessary for an account of spontaneous speech. Langacker (2014: 43), for instance, postulates four different structures for *the dog*, an expression very frequently employed in spontaneous speech (as well as in pre-

planned writing): "Functional Hierarchy", "Grammatical Constituency", "Conceptual Content", and "Coded Content". The four structures may be useful for linguistic descriptions in general, but they are redundant in overlapping one another with regard to many respects. Some facets of the structures are superfluous or irrelevant to spontaneous speech.

As long as speakers entertain a self-conception of engaging in adding one part of utterance after another for meaning accumulation, grammar of speaking does not require hierarchical linguistic structures but only presuppose conceptually ordered "add-on" (Biber et al. 1999) and "grouping" (Langacker 1997) of utterance parts. Only necessary constituency, if any, would be concerned with a verb or adposition (preposition or postposition) plus its complement nominal, a nominal plus its adnominal, and a clause plus a subordinating connective, but their constituency can be better treated simply as the relative order of those paired elements, not calling for a hierarchical concept of constituency.

As far as speaking is concerned, the hierarchical configurations including the notion of "embedding" reside in semantic contents treated as "Conceptual Content" or "Coded Content", not in functions or linguistic forms viewed as "Functional Hierarchy" or "Grammatical Constituency."[16] In writing, the linguistic forms, visible on the paper or display and susceptible to conceptual manipulations, could only be metaphorically (cf. Lakoff's (1987: 283) "Spatialization of Form Hypothesis") and metonymically (cf. Bolinger's (1977: 19) "one meaning, one form") understood to have hierarchical configurations.[17] However, notions or structures not germane to the speech event conception should not be brought into the grammatical theory of speaking. Just like 'spacing out' (Swan 2005) or 'editing' (Clark & Fox Tree 2002), embedding and hierarchical structures of linguistic forms should ideally be avoided in an explanation for the grammar of speaking.

Recent studies propose to recognize two distinct grammars: "Sentence Grammar" vs. "Thetical Grammar" (Heine et al. 2013; Kaltenböck et al. 2011; Kaltenböck & Heine 2014) or "Microgrammar" vs. "Macrogrammar" (Haselow 2016). Sentence Grammar (SG) and Thetical Grammar (TG) are respectively responsible for the production of "propositional concepts and clauses" and for the production of " "parenthetical" constructions and various extra-clausal units such as vocatives, imperatives, formulae of social exchange, and interjections" (Heine et al. 2013: 155).

The distinction of two grammars largely conforms with Fraser's (1996: 188) claim that "the sentence (read "semantic") meaning is comprised of two parts: A propositional content; and a set of pragmatic markers". He views the meaning as "the information encoded by linguistic expressions" and the propositional content as representing "a state of the world which the speaker wishes to bring to the addressee's attention" (1996: 167). He argues: "These pragmatic markers, taken to be separate and distinct from the propositional content of the sentence, are the linguistically encoded clues which signal the speaker's potential communicative intentions" (1996: 168). Thetical Grammar and Macrogrammar elements can therefore be safely equated with pragmatic markers in Fraser's sense.

We can now see that the two distinct grammars proposed correspond by and large to the grammar of directed or addressed speech production (typical of spontaneous speech) and the grammar of not specifically addressed writing production (representative of writing), respectively. Thetical Grammar (Kaltenböck et al. 2011) and Macrogrammar (Haselow 2016) largely reflect attentional management in the conception of addressed speech production. Sentence Grammar (Kaltenböck et al. 2011) and Microgrammar (Haselow 2016) concern linguistic form manipulation in the conception of writing production as well as adding on of utterance parts in the conception of speech production.

Kaltenböck et al. (2011: 876) see Sentence and Thetical Grammars as "two main domains of discourse grammar" that need to be "distinguished on account of the contrasting syntactic, prosodic, and semantic features each is associated with". Heine et al. (2013: 191) point out that Thetical Grammar elements "do not normally form constituents with units of SG [...], and they differ from adjuncts in being syntactically unintegrated or detached from the host clause or any other SG structure...."[18] However, the two grammars are not necessarily distinguished in linearized linguistic forms but in the meaning and function of those linguistic forms in the speech event conception.[19]

In fact, final particles, a kind of Thetical Grammar/Macrogrammar element, are morphosyntactically integrated and attached to the host clauses, as illustrated in the Japanese examples above. The elements of Thetical Grammar/Macrogrammar as well as Sentence Grammar/Microgrammar can be added on and linearized together in phonological or graphical representations, while those elements can be distinguished according to whether their meanings concern mental gaze monitoring or not. Such a distinction may or may not manifest itself in intonation or punctuation.

Fraser also implies that pragmatic markers are not necessarily separated from the rest of the sentence. Observing that pragmatic markers usually occur in sentence-initial position as in (9) but may also occur medially or finally as in (10), he points out that when occurring medially or finally, "the marker is set off by a comma intonation to distinguish it from a homophonous form used as part of the proposition" (1996: 170).

(9)   a.   **Unfortunately**, I am cold.

        b.   **Confidentially**, would you like a drink?

        c.   **Candidly**, he is married to his work. (=He is dedicated to his work.)

        d.   **I suspect** his mind rusted on vacation. (=I suspect he got a little out of practice.)

<div align="right">(Fraser 1996: 170)</div>

(10)   a.   John is, **I admit**, the best person by far for the job.

         b.   She was, **confidentially**, a bright scholar and a fantastic athlete.

         c.   Harry is going to go, **however**.

<div align="right">(Fraser 1996: 170)</div>

In some of his examples including (9d), however, pragmatic markers take place in initial and medial positions with no comma (intonation), as exemplified in (11) and (12), excluding (12b). Similar uses of *please* will be possible in final position as well.

(11)   a.   Can you **please** help me?

         b.   I'd like you to **please** sit down.

         c.   I (hereby) ask you to **please** leave.

         d.   May I **please** look at that vase.

<div align="right">(Fraser 1996: 174)</div>

(12)   a.   **Perhaps** you should sit down and rest a bit.

         b.   **Perhaps**, take an aspirin.

         c.   Why don't you **perhaps** see a doctor?

<div align="right">(Fraser 1996: 175)</div>

As argued above, one major difference between the event conceptions of speaking and writing suggests itself as the language user's mental attendance to language production itself, which we call language production management. This typically manifests as mental gaze monitoring in speech and linguistic form manipulation in writing. Whereas mental gaze itself can be directed to either the language user's conception or the recipient (typically an actual addressee and a potential reader), its monitoring is linguistically marked in the speech event conception but not in the writing event conception. The mental gaze in writing mostly manifests as linguistic form manipulation that is intended to lead the potential reader to a certain meaning accumulation.[20]

The two grammars indeed reflect the two distinct event conceptions of speaking and writing but they do not themselves shape distinct representations of linguistic units or forms. The units or forms of each grammar instead form a continuum and at the same time divide themselves into two parts, separable and distinguishable by means of phonological features or punctuations. The adding on parts of utterances in speech and the corresponding linearization of phrases or clauses in writing are understandable as being governed by a similar mechanism of Sentence Grammar or Microgrammar. The two distinct grammars exhibit stark contrast in what concerns the language production management: mental gaze monitoring and linguistic form manipulation.

6. Conclusion

This study analysed the phenomenon called "spacing out" or "delay" and demonstrated how it is intrinsic to a speaker's self-reflectional conception of language production and extraneous to a writer's self-reflectional conception of language production. Speaking and writing condition each language user to assume distinct conceptions of language production, whereby the speech event and the writing event conceptions motivate significantly different (uses of) grammatical devices within as well as across languages.

We demonstrated that the relevant phenomenon reflects *mental gaze monitoring*, which comprises an essential part of the speech event conception, speech production management, in English and Japanese. We also showed that *linguistic form manipulation* amounts to similar language production management in the writing event conception. This is one of the reasons that pragmatic markers adopted for mental gaze monitoring are somewhat misleadingly referred to as "editing expressions" even in otherwise excellent and insightful research such as Clark (2002) and Clark and Fox Tree (2002).

As long as the speech event and the writing event conceptions differ considerably from each other, grammars of speaking and writing should, respectively, be described in an appropriate conception of language production. Speaking is conceptualized as the

speaker's successive adding on of parts of utterances accompanied by mental gaze monitoring with a primary effect of immediate meaning accumulation, while writing is conceptualized as the writer's linearization and manipulations of linguistic units with the compacted forms of the units as a primary effect. The notion of "spacing out" (Swan 2005) rests on a spatial metaphor, while "delay" (Clark & Fox Tree 2002) reflects a temporal nature of speech. We hope to have shown that our analysis in terms of attentional management is more naturalistic and intrinsic to the conception of spontaneous speech production.

Notes

[1] We employ the following abbreviations in the morpheme-by-morpheme glosses of Japanese example sentences: COP (copula), EVD (evidentiality), FP (final particle), GEN (genitive), IP (interjectory particle), NMLZ (nominalizer), NOM (nominative), PST (past), PROG (progressive), QUOT (quotative), TOP (topic). These notations are largely based on *The Leipzig glossing rules: Conventions for interlinear morpheme-by-morpheme glosses* (https://www.eva.mpg.de/lingua/pdf/Glossing-Rules.pdf).

[2] Finite clause-like units, assumed here to be added on in speech, seemingly correspond largely to what Langacker (1997: 29 inter alia) calls "classical phonological constituents".

[3] Such a prefabricated aspect of language has been explored in the studies developed under the name of "usage based models of language" (Barlow & Kemmer 2000). It seems that Biber is among the linguists who agree with this usage-based approach to language; he is one of the contributors to the volume.

[4] In the same vein, Langacker (1997: 11) remarks: "The speaker has an integrated composite conception he wishes to express, and the addressee attempts to arrive at such a conception".

[5] In our previous studies (Izutsu & Izutsu 2013; 2014; 2017), we discussed pragmatic markers and particles with respect to the speaker's interaction with the addressee. In

the present discussion, we will take a broader perspective of the speaker's attendance in thinking, speaking, and caring in the speech event conception. In addition to speaking out by referring to each part of the conception, he or she wants the addressee to evoke, the speaker is supposed to attend to either the conception itself (thinking to see what it is like and how its parts can be named) or the addressee (caring to keep the addressee in communicative interaction).

[6] Clark & Krych (2004: 62) observe: "Speakers monitor not just their own actions, but those of their addressees, taking both into account as they speak", which they call "*self-monitoring*" and "*other-monitoring*", respectively. Our notion of metal gaze monitoring might be closer to the former but seems different in nature. It is not the monitoring of the speaker's own (let alone the addressee's) physical action but the monitoring of the speaker's mental gaze.

[7] The speaker's rehearsal of meaning accumulation in our discussion is closely associated with Langacker's notion of "coding" and its "intersubjective" and "dynamic" natures: "The transition between conceptual and semantic structure is effected by coding, i.e. the activation of linguistic units for interpreting conceptual and phonetic experience. Whether it is prompted by the conception (**encoding**) or by the sounds (**decoding**), the speaker and hearer must both carry out this task. The process is **intersubjective**, as each interlocutor assesses the other's experience through a partial simulation. It is also **dynamic**, as both meaning and expression unfold through time" (Langacker 2014: 25).

[8] Maynard (1993: 183) refers to -*yo* and -*ne* (-*sa* too) as "interactional particles" due to the "prominent interactional nature". Focusing her analysis on their occurrences at the sentence-final position, she attempts an explanation of -*yo* and -*ne* in terms of "Conversation Management" (1993: 209) and "Discourse Modality Manipulation" (1993: 219). She concludes that "ultimately through the particles *yo* and *ne* one expresses one's subjectivity, emotion and voice" (1993: 220).

[9] Some of the pragmatic markers exemplified here (*yappa(ri)* 'still', *demo* 'but', and *dakara* 'so') could be used to mark addressee-directed mental gaze monitoring as well. But in that case, they are far more likely to be accompanied by pragmatic particles of addressee-directed mental gaze monitoring such as *-ne* and *-sa*, or by vowel prolongation and light rising intonation with a similar monitoring effect. Fraser (1996: 169, fn. 3) points out that phonological features such as intonation and stress can represent the functions of pragmatic markers.

[10] The distinction between the conception- and the addressee-directed mental gaze monitoring should not be confused with the difference between monologue and dialogue. There can be diverse kinds of monologue (spoken out loud or internal) and dialogue (spoken out loud or internal pretended). The conception-directed mental gaze monitoring can be employed in both monologue and dialogue. The addressee-directed mental gaze monitoring can be adopted in an internal pretended dialogue as well as dialogue spoken out loud. Maynard (1993: 68-69) maintains that "although connectives such as *dakara* and *datte* may occur where logical relations exist in terms of truth conditional semantics, their essential function is to express the speaker's voice as reflected in all aspects of communication including semantic and pragmatic as well as interpersonal aspects". She further proposes that as is the case with connectives like *dakara* and *datte*, "the essential function of *yahari/yappari* is to express personal views and attitudes as characterized by aspect of Discourse Modality" (1993: 133). The speaker's voice, views, and attitudes can either be spoken out loud or internally and, in internal speech, the speaker can pretend that the utterances are part of dialogue as well as monologue.

[11] Here may arise a question: How do we know that *it was* is not directed to the speaker's own conception of what he or she is talking about? It can further pose another question: What are exactly the criteria for distinguishing between the conception- and addressee-directedness of pragmatic markers? It may also matter how consciously speakers entertain a speech event conception like the one that the present discussion argues for. We owe all these insightful questions to Ad Foolen. For the time being, they may not

necessarily be easy to answer clearly, but it will be helpful to consider the questions in the context of telephone conversation. Conversationalists do not see each other but can use deictic expressions (e.g., demonstratives, first and second pronouns, and so on) that require situated semantics, which implies that they envision their speech event at least semi-consciously. Next, if one conversationalist says *Last Wednesday **it was**, I was just going to work*, ... instead of *Last Wednesday I was just going to work*, the other conversationalist is more likely to feel he or she is treated as an addressee or audience; this suggests that *it was* manifests addressee-directedness. At the same time, the past tense in *it was* represents the speaker's reflection on the event in the past, part of the conception of what he or she is trying to talk about. It will thus be more suitable to see the conception- and addressee-directedness of pragmatic markers as a matter of degree, not as a question of one or the other.

[12] An alignment of linguistic form instantiated in Figure 6(a) can be employed for a different purpose. Bolinger (1977: 6-7), for example, adopts such an alignment to represent the intonation contour of example sentences.

[13] In a certain period of the modern time, it was also arranged from right to left, as is the case in Hebrew.

[14] This explanation might suggest that speaking would serve as the base of writing, but it is not necessarily the case. In fact, inner speech production in writing, which is supposed to precede the adding on or linearization of linguistic forms, may well differ from actual speech production (adding on parts of an utterance in speaking). The nature of such inner speech and the adding on or linearization of linguistic forms will need to be explored in a further in-depth research.

[15] We are very grateful to Günter Radden for reminding us that the writing event conception in a real time communication such as online chat can involve a reader in addition to a writer as co-present participant. The advent of such communication means must have more or less blurred the distinction between our conceptions of speaking and writing.

[16] Langacker himself maintains in another place (1997: 28): "The embedding in question is *conceptual* in nature, an essential aspect of the sentence's composite semantic structure". In a complex sentence involving multiple layers of embedding (*Alice says Bill thinks Chris believes Dave left*), he notes, the valence links between each verb and its following subject-verb constituent reflect the conceptual embedding: ['Alice's saying' ['Bill's thinking' ['Chris's believing' ['Dave's leaving']]]].

[17] Langacker (2014: 18) remarks: "Constituent structure is conceived metaphorically in terms of nested boxes (...) or equivalently, in terms of a tree...."

[18] We agree with Heine et al. (2013: 191) that Thetical Grammar elements do not normally form constituents with SG units. Langacker (1997: 23) notes on a sentence with a parenthetical insertion (*They were, I think, very cooperative*): the proposition marked by the higher-pitched sequence *they were very cooperative* symbolizes the foregrounded conceptual constituent, while the lower-pitched I THINK stands in the background. Further he argues: "The status of THEY WERE VERY COOPERATIVE as a complement of THINK is not obviated by their alignment in terms of foregrounding/backgrounding, which represents a different dimension of conceptual organization". Our interpretation of the phenomenon is, in accordance with Heine et al.'s view that the higher-pitched sequence no longer has to be seen as a constituent (complement) of *think*; the whole-part relation that amounts to such a constituency only resides between the conceptual contents of the higher-pitched sequence and the verb.

[19] Kaltenböck & Heine (2014: 361) acknowledge that "while the two domains are conceptually distinguished by both speakers and hearers, they interact with one another in a number of ways and to the extent that the resulting linguistic structures are not neatly separated from one another but rather have the appearance of a continuum".

[20] Discourse markers can be used in writing as well as speaking. They are, in nature, not only concerned with the speaker's conceptual content (as with Sweetser's (1990: 78) "content conjunction") but also with the speaker's attitude (as with Sweetser's

(*ibid.*) "epistemic conjunction" and "speech-act conjunction"). In this sense, discourse markers can be seen as serving a bridging role between the two distinct grammars.

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
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Résumé in English

This study addresses the phenomenon called "spacing out" or "delay" as a case study that demonstrates that speaking and writing condition the language users to assume distinct conceptions of language production, thereby motivating significantly different (uses of) grammatical devices within as well as across languages. We argue that the relevant phenomenon reflects *mental gaze monitoring*, an essential part of the conception of speech production in English and Japanese. Mental gaze monitoring serves as language production management in the speech event conception, while *linguistic form manipulation* amounts to the corresponding management in the writing event conception. Observing that the phenomenon treated as "spacing out" or "delay" is mostly indicated by pragmatic markers in English and by pragmatic particles as well as markers of comparison in Japanese, we discuss how speakers conceptualize their own speech production and management to show that those markers and particles serve to mark the speakers' monitoring of their own mental gaze directed to either the conceptual content or the addressee in the conception of speech production. Thereafter, we discuss how writers conceptualize their own writing production and management and demonstrate that linguistic form manipulation in the writing event conception corresponds to mental gaze monitoring as language production management in the speech event conception. Speaking is conceptualized as the speaker's successive adding on of parts of utterances accompanied by mental gaze monitoring with a primary effect of immediate meaning accumulation, while writing is conceptualized as the writer's linearization and manipulations of linguistic units with the compacted forms of the units as a primary effect. This study emphasizes that grammars of speaking and writing should, respectively, be described in an appropriate conception of language production because the speech event and the writing event conceptions differ considerably from each other.

Résumé in German

Die vorliegende Studie behandelt das "spacing out" oder "delay" genannte Phänomen in Form einer Fallstudie, die zeigt, dass Sprechen und Schreiben beim Sprachbenutzer bewirken, dass er je verschiedene Konzipierungen der Sprachproduktion vornimmt, was innersprachlich wie auch zwischensprachlich zur Verwendung deutlich verschiedener grammatikalischer Mittel führt. Es wird dargelegt, dass das fragliche Phänomen die sog. "Überwachung des mentalen Blicks" (*mental gaze monitoring*) als wesentlichen Teil der Konzipierung der Redeproduktion im Englischen und Japanischen widerspiegelt. Während die Überwachung des mentalen Blicks als Regler der Sprachproduktion bei der Konzipierung des Sprechvorgangs dient, regelt die "Manipulation sprachlicher Formen" (*linguistic form manipulation*) die entsprechende Konzipierung des Schreibvorgangs. Ausgehend von der Beobachtung, dass die als "spacing out" oder "delay" behandelten Phänomene im Englischen meistens durch pragmatische Marker und im Japanischen durch pragmatische Partikeln sowie vergleichbare Marker gekennzeichnet werden, wird diskutiert, wie Sprecher die Produktion und Regelung ihrer eigenen Rede konzeptualisieren, um zu zeigen, dass diese Marker und Partikeln dazu dienen, die Überwachung des mentalen Blicks des Sprechers zu markieren, der in der Konzipierung der Redeproduktion entweder auf den begrifflichen Inhalt oder auf den Adressaten gerichtet ist. Danach wird diskutiert, wie Schreibende die Produktion und Regelung ihres Schreibens konzeptualisieren. Es wird demonstriert, dass die Manipulation sprachlicher Formen bei der Konzipierung des Schreibvorgangs der Überwachung des mentalen Blicks als Regler der Sprachproduktion bei der Konzipierung des Sprechvorgangs entspricht. Sprechen wird konzeptualisiert als sukzessives Hinzufügen von Äußerungsbestandteilen durch den Sprecher, das von der Überwachung des mentalen Blicks begleitet wird, mit einem primären Effekt der unmittelbaren Anhäufung von Bedeutung, während Schreiben konzeptualisiert wird als Linearisierung und Manipulation sprachlicher Einheiten durch den Schreibenden, mit den verdichteten Formen der Einheiten als ein primärer Effekt. Die vorliegende Studie betont, dass Grammatiken des Sprechens und des Schreibens mit einer je angemessenen Vorstellung der Sprachproduktion beschrieben

werden sollten, weil sich die Konzipierung des Sprechvorgangs und die des Schreibvorgangs beträchtlich voneinander unterscheiden.

Stichwörter: Sprechen, Schreiben, Vorstellung der Sprachproduktion, Ausbringen (spacing out), Verzögerung (delay).

Résumé in French

Cette étude analyse le phénomène appelé "espacer (spacing out)" ou "retard (delay)" comme une méthode des cas qui démontre que l'acte de parler et l'acte d'écrire conditionnent des conceptions distinctes de production linguistique dans les utilisateurs de langues et motivent significativement différent(e)s (utilisations de) dispositifs grammaticaux non seulement à l'intérieur d'une langue, mais encore à travers différentes langues. Nous soutenons que le phénomène en question reflète la surveillance du regard mental (mental gaze monitoring), une partie essentielle de la conception de la production de parole en anglais et en japonais. La surveillance du regard mental sert comme la gestion de la production linguistique dans la conception de l'événement de parler, tandis que la manipulation de formes linguistique équivaut à la gestion correspondante dans la conception de l'événement d'écrire. Après avoir observé que le phénomène traité comme "espacer" ou "retard" est principalement marqué, en anglais, avec des marqueurs pragmatiques et, en japonais, avec des marqueurs comparables et des particules pragmatiques, nous discutons comment les énonciateurs conceptualisent leur propre production de parole et gestion de la production et montrons que ces marqueurs et particules servent à marquer la surveillance du regard mental, qui est orienté soit vers le contenu conceptuel, soit vers le destinataire, dans la conception de la production de parole. Ensuite, nous discutons comment les auteurs conceptualisent leur propre production d'écriture et la gestion de la production et démontrons que la manipulation de formes linguistiques dans la conception de l'événement d'écrire correspond à la surveillance du regard mental comme la gestion de la production de langage dans la conception de l'événement de parler. L'acte de parler est conceptualisé comme l'ajout successif de parties d'énoncés

qui est accompagné par la surveillance du regard mental et a un effet primaire d'accumulation immédiate de sens, tandis que l'acte d'écrire est conceptualisée comme la linéarisation et les manipulations d'unités linguistiques par les auteurs, dont résultent des formes compactées des unités. Cette étude insiste sur le fait que les grammaires de parler et écrire doivent être respectivement décrites dans une conception appropriée de chaque production linguistique, parce que les conceptions des événements de parler et écrire diffèrent considérablement l'une de l'autre.

Mots-clés: parler, écrire, conception de production linguistique, espacer, retard.

Résumé in Russian

В нашей статье анализируется явление, называемое "разбиение на фрагменты" ("spacing out") или "задержка" ("delay"), которое демонстрирует, что различающиеся между собой условия устной и письменной речи, в которых находятся пользователи языка, предполагают различные концепции порождения речи, объясняющие значительную вариативность в использовании грамматических средств как в пределах одного, так и в различных языках. Мы утверждаем, что соответствующее явление отражает *контроль мысленного взгляда* как основу концепции речепроизводства в английском и японском языках. Контроль мысленного взгляда управляет порождением языка в концепции события устной речи, в то время как *манипуляция языковой формой* – концепцией события письменной речи. Отмечая, что на явление, называемое "разбиение на фрагменты" или "задержка", указывают, главным образом, прагматические маркеры в английском языке, а в японском – прагматические частицы и маркеры сравнения, мы исследуем, как говорящие осмысляют своё собственное производство речи и управление им, с тем, чтобы показать, что вышеупомянутые маркеры и частицы служат цели маркирования того, что говорящие контролируют свой собственный мысленный взгляд, обращенный либо к концептуальному содержанию, либо к адресату в концепции производства речи. Далее мы обсуждаем, как пишущие осмысляют процессы

собственного производства письменной речи и управления им и показываем, что манипуляция лингвистической формой в концепции события письменной речи соответствует контролю мысленного взгляда, управляющего порождением языка в концепции события устной речи. Устная речь рассматривается как последовательное прибавление говорящим частей высказывания, сопровождаемое контролем за ментальным взглядом, с первичным эффектом непосредственного накопления значения, в то время как первичный эффект письменной речи предстаёт как осуществляемые пишущим линеаризация и манипуляции лингвистическими единицами с их сжатыми формами. Исследование показало, что грамматики устной и письменной речи должны описываться соответствующими концепциями порождения языка, поскольку концепции событий устной и письменной речи существенно различаются.