US20050052083A1 - Method for identifying faulty antivalent key or switch signals - Google Patents
Method for identifying faulty antivalent key or switch signals Download PDFInfo
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- US20050052083A1 US20050052083A1 US10/935,542 US93554204A US2005052083A1 US 20050052083 A1 US20050052083 A1 US 20050052083A1 US 93554204 A US93554204 A US 93554204A US 2005052083 A1 US2005052083 A1 US 2005052083A1
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- Prior art keywords
- signals
- key
- antivalent
- switch
- faulty
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
- H01H—ELECTRIC SWITCHES; RELAYS; SELECTORS; EMERGENCY PROTECTIVE DEVICES
- H01H9/00—Details of switching devices, not covered by groups H01H1/00 - H01H7/00
- H01H9/16—Indicators for switching condition, e.g. "on" or "off"
- H01H9/167—Circuits for remote indication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H03—ELECTRONIC CIRCUITRY
- H03K—PULSE TECHNIQUE
- H03K17/00—Electronic switching or gating, i.e. not by contact-making and –breaking
- H03K17/16—Modifications for eliminating interference voltages or currents
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H03—ELECTRONIC CIRCUITRY
- H03K—PULSE TECHNIQUE
- H03K17/00—Electronic switching or gating, i.e. not by contact-making and –breaking
- H03K17/18—Modifications for indicating state of switch
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a method for identifying faulty antivalent key or switch signals from an adtivalent key or switch of a control unit.
- control units are typically equipped with keys or switches that close or open two contacts simultaneously upon actuation, so as to ensure that safety-related functions operate properly.
- FIG. 1 shows a commercially available double-make key 1 that can be installed in a control unit for controlling safety-relevant functions.
- the two contacts 5 and 6 are closed at the same time when the key 7 is pressed. After the contacts are closed, the signals 2 and 3 have a high potential corresponding to an applied voltage U.
- the logical signal state (low level or high level) is monitored by an evaluation unit 4 . If a fault is not detected, then the two signals 2 and 3 have always the same logical signal state, i.e., both signals have either a high level or a low level.
- the evaluation unit 4 detects that the signals 2 and 3 are faulty, i.e., have a different logical state, then the evaluation unit 4 generates an error signal 12 , which depending on the actual application is either used to indicate the fault, with the safety-relevant functions nevertheless being activated (e.g., switch off a drive), or the error signal 12 is used to block a control command (e.g., switch on a drive). Since the two contacts 5 and 6 are closed when the key 7 is pressed, such key is also referred to as a double-make combination. This method for evaluating the switch state in the evaluation unit 4 has a significant disadvantage in that a double-fault is not detected.
- a double-fault can occur when signal 2 and signal 3 are interrupted due to, for example, a break in a wire.
- Other possibilities for double-faults are, for example, a short circuit between the two signal lines or simultaneous ground faults of the two signal lines.
- a switch provided with a double-make contact combination can also be used instead of the key 1 .
- FIG. 2 shows another type of a commercially available double-break contact key 1 ′ that can be installed in a control unit for controlling safety-relevant functions.
- the two contacts 8 and 11 are opened at the same time when the key 7 ′ is pressed. After the contacts are opened, the signals 2 and 3 have a low potential.
- the logical signal state (low level or high level) is monitored by an evaluation unit 4 . If a fault is not detected, then the two signals 2 and 3 have always the same logical signal state, i.e., both signals have either a high level or a low level.
- the evaluation unit 4 detects that the signals 2 and 3 are faulty, i.e., have a different logical state, then the evaluation unit 4 generates an error signal 12 , which depending on the actual application is either used to indicate the fault, with the safety-relevant functions nevertheless being activated (e.g., switch off drive), or the error signal 12 is used to block a control command (e.g., switch on drive). Since the two contacts 5 and 6 are opened when the key 7 ′ is pressed, such key is also referred to as a double-break contact combination. Disadvantageously, this method for evaluating the switch state in the evaluation unit 4 is also unable to detect a double-fault.
- a double-fault can occur when signal 2 and signal 3 are interrupted due to, for example, a break in a wire.
- Other possibilities for tool faults are, for example, a short circuit between the two signal lines or simultaneous ground faults of the two signal lines.
- a switch provided with a double-break contact combination can also be used instead of the key 1 ′.
- the key or -switch in a method for identifying faulty key or switch signals from an antivalent key or switch of a control unit, the key or -switch outputs two antivalent signals and the two outputted signals are identified as being faulty if both signals have the same logical state.
- the method of the invention can readily identify double-faults.
- keys or switches with a double-make contact combination or a double-break contact combination need no longer be installed in a control unit, and a single antivalent key or switch type can typically be used instead.
- Antivalent switches and keys refer hereby to switches and keys that perform an EXCLUSIVE-OR operation.
- the two signals are recognized as being faulty if both signals have the same logical state during a predetermined period of time. In this way, brief inconsistencies between the signals 2 and 3 can be suppressed when the key is pressed or the switch is actuated.
- the two signals are recognized as being faulty if both signals are applied longer than a predetermined period of time, after the key or the switch are actuated.
- signals resulting from inadvertent or accidental operations for example, when a tool drops on the key or switch, can be recognized.
- a control unit includes a controller connected with the control unit and an evaluation unit integrated in the controller.
- the control unit includes at least one antivalent key or switch that outputs two antivalent signals. The two outputted signals are identified as being faulty if both signals have the same logical state.
- the evaluation unit is integrated in the control unit, no additional hardware is required for the evaluation unit.
- a control unit includes an integrated evaluation unit and at least one antivalent key or switch that outputs two antivalent signals.
- the two outputted signals are identified as being faulty if both signals have the same logical state.
- a machine tool or production machine includes a control unit that includes a controller connected with the control unit and an evaluation unit integrated in the controller.
- the control unit includes at least one antivalent key or switch that outputs two antivalent signals.
- the two outputted signals are identified as being faulty if both signals have the same logical state.
- the operation of machine tools and production machines requires particularly stringent safety measures.
- the invention can be employed in many other technical areas where safety-relevant functions are required in the operation, for example industrial facilities, shipbuilding, submarines, vehicles, spacecrafts, airplanes, railroads, and other control applications.
- FIG. 1 shows a commercially available double-make contact switch
- FIG. 2 shows a commercially available double-break contact switch
- FIG. 3 shows an antivalent switch with an evaluation unit connected thereto, embodying the subject matter of the present invention.
- FIG. 4 shows a control unit with a controller connected thereto.
- an antivalent key 9 has a make-break contact combination, i.e., when the antivalent key 9 is actuated, a contact 8 is opened at the same time a contact 6 is closed. When the key 9 is released, the contact 8 is closed and the contact 6 is simultaneously opened.
- a voltage U is applied either to the signals 2 or to the signal 3 , so that the two signals 2 and 3 in a fault-free state have an antivalent logical signal level, i.e., when signal 2 has a logical high level, signal 3 has a logical low level, and conversely, when signal 2 has a logical low level, signal 3 has a logical high level.
- a faulty state is distinguished in that the two signals 2 and 3 have an identical logical signal level, i.e., the two signals have simultaneous either a logical low level or a logical high level.
- Single faults such as a short-circuit of one of the two signal lines of the signals 2 and 3 against ground, are either immediately detected or are detected after the key 9 is pressed.
- the functional components and the corresponding circuits required for the method are indicated in the exemplary evaluation unit 4 depicted in FIG. 3 . It will be understood that the method of the invention can also be performed with other functional components and other types of connections. If the two signals 2 and 3 have a logical high level, then the output of the logical functional AND-gate 13 , which logically combines the two signals, assumes a high level. As a result, the output of the functional OR-gate 17 , which implements a logical OR-function, also assumes a high level. The output signal of the functional OR-gate 17 is supplied to a turn-on delay circuit 18 , which after a predetermined period of time also supplies a high level signal.
- This signal is supplied to a functional OR-gate 19 , whose output then also transitions to a high level and thereby generates an error signal 12 .
- the turn-on delay circuit 18 whose output assumes a high level when the input signal has a high level for time period longer than a predetermined time period, is optional. However, the turn-on delay circuit 18 may be desirable for suppressing brief inconsistencies of the signals 2 and 3 when the antivalent key or switch is actuated.
- the two signals 2 and 3 have a logical low level, then the two signals 2 and 3 are inverted in the inverters 14 and 15 to produce a logical high-level at the output of the inverters 14 and 15 .
- the two high level signals applied to the inputs of the functional AND-gate 16 generate at the output of the functional AND-gate 16 a high level signal that is supplied to the functional OR-gate 17 .
- the evaluation of the signals corresponds essentially to the evaluation described above for the logical high level and will therefore not be discussed in detail.
- Faulty key and switch signals may also be generated by inadvertently or accidentally operating the key or switch.
- Such an inadvertent or accidental operation can occur, for example, when a tool is dropped on the key or switch or by bumping against the key or switch.
- unintentional actuation of the key or switch has no immediate effect, because the relevant safety function activated with the key or switch may not by immediately interrogated by a control unit of the machine, because the corresponding safety function is not relevant for the current process or machining operation.
- Such fault can also be detected by a suitable extension of the method.
- the method of the invention then checks how long the antivalent key or switch remains in the actuated or switched state.
- the signal level 2 assumes a logical low level when the key 9 is pressed, whereas the signal 3 assumes a logical high level.
- the inverter 20 and the functional AND-gate 21 operate to provide a logical high level as an output signal of the functional AND-gate 21 when the key 9 is pressed.
- a turn-on delay circuit 22 checks the length of time during which no interruption is detected when the key 9 is pressed.
- the functional OR-gate 19 generates an error signal 12 , i.e., the output of the functional OR-gate 19 transitions to a logical high level.
- FIG. 4 shows a control unit 10 that is connected via a link 23 for data exchange with a controller 11 that controls a machine 25 , for example a machine tool or a production machine.
- the control unit 10 includes a keypad with antivalent keys 9 , only one which labeled for sake of clarity.
- the evaluation unit 4 that executes the method of the invention is an integral component of the control unit 10 .
- the evaluation unit 4 ′ can also be an integral component of the controller 11 , as indicated by the dashed line in FIG. 4 .
- This has the advantage that the logical operations for the method can also be implemented in form of software in a microprocessor system that is already part of the controller 11 . It should be noted that a closed loop controller con be used instead of the controller 11 .
- the control unit can be implemented, for example, in the form of a control panel, a handheld control device, a handheld programming device, an operator console, an operating panel, a Mimic-Board, a cockpit, a control center, and the like.
- Machine tools in the context of the present invention can also include, for example, uniaxial or multi-axis lathes, milling machines, as well as drilling or grinding machines.
- Machine tools can further include processing centers, linear and rotary transfer machines, laser machines, rolling machines and/or gear cutters. These machines have in common that the material is machined along several axes.
- Production machines in the context of the present invention can include textile, paper, plastic, wood, glass, ceramic or stone processing machines, as well as machines used for forming, packaging, printing, conveying, lifting, pumping, transporting.
- fans, blowers, wind turbines, lifting gear, cranes, robots, production and assembly lines are also included under the term production machines in the context of the present invention.
Abstract
A method for identifying of faulty antivalent key or switch signals of an antivalent key or switch of a control unit is described. Two antivalent signals are outputted by the key or switch, whereby the two outputted signals are recognized as being faulty if the two signals have the same logical state. In this way, faulty antivalent key or switch signals can be ready be detected. The method can also detect brief inadvertent interruptions in the signals and short circuits and ground faults. The method can be used in particular with control units used to control machine tools and production machines.
Description
- This application claims the priority of German Patent Application, Serial No. 103 41 324.2, filed Sep. 8, 2003, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 119(a)-(d), the disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference.
- The present invention relates to a method for identifying faulty antivalent key or switch signals from an adtivalent key or switch of a control unit.
- Nothing in the following discussion of the state of the art is to be construed as an admission of prior art.
- In many technical fields, for example, in applications using machine tools and production machines, control units are typically equipped with keys or switches that close or open two contacts simultaneously upon actuation, so as to ensure that safety-related functions operate properly.
-
FIG. 1 shows a commercially available double-makekey 1 that can be installed in a control unit for controlling safety-relevant functions. The twocontacts key 7 is pressed. After the contacts are closed, thesignals evaluation unit 4. If a fault is not detected, then the twosignals evaluation unit 4 detects that thesignals evaluation unit 4 generates anerror signal 12, which depending on the actual application is either used to indicate the fault, with the safety-relevant functions nevertheless being activated (e.g., switch off a drive), or theerror signal 12 is used to block a control command (e.g., switch on a drive). Since the twocontacts key 7 is pressed, such key is also referred to as a double-make combination. This method for evaluating the switch state in theevaluation unit 4 has a significant disadvantage in that a double-fault is not detected. For example, a double-fault can occur whensignal 2 andsignal 3 are interrupted due to, for example, a break in a wire. Other possibilities for double-faults are, for example, a short circuit between the two signal lines or simultaneous ground faults of the two signal lines. It will be understood that a switch provided with a double-make contact combination can also be used instead of thekey 1. -
FIG. 2 shows another type of a commercially available double-break contact key 1′ that can be installed in a control unit for controlling safety-relevant functions. The twocontacts key 7′ is pressed. After the contacts are opened, thesignals evaluation unit 4. If a fault is not detected, then the twosignals evaluation unit 4 detects that thesignals evaluation unit 4 generates anerror signal 12, which depending on the actual application is either used to indicate the fault, with the safety-relevant functions nevertheless being activated (e.g., switch off drive), or theerror signal 12 is used to block a control command (e.g., switch on drive). Since the twocontacts key 7′ is pressed, such key is also referred to as a double-break contact combination. Disadvantageously, this method for evaluating the switch state in theevaluation unit 4 is also unable to detect a double-fault. For example, a double-fault can occur whensignal 2 andsignal 3 are interrupted due to, for example, a break in a wire. Other possibilities for tool faults are, for example, a short circuit between the two signal lines or simultaneous ground faults of the two signal lines. It will be understood that a switch provided with a double-break contact combination can also be used instead of thekey 1′. - It would therefore be desirable and advantageous to provide an improved method for identifying faulty antivalent key or switch signals, which obviates prior art shortcomings and is specifically unaffected by wire beaks and ground faults.
- According to one aspect of the present invention, in a method for identifying faulty key or switch signals from an antivalent key or switch of a control unit, the key or -switch outputs two antivalent signals and the two outputted signals are identified as being faulty if both signals have the same logical state.
- Advantageously, the method of the invention can readily identify double-faults. In addition, keys or switches with a double-make contact combination or a double-break contact combination need no longer be installed in a control unit, and a single antivalent key or switch type can typically be used instead. Antivalent switches and keys refer hereby to switches and keys that perform an EXCLUSIVE-OR operation.
- According to an advantageous embodiment of the invention, the two signals are recognized as being faulty if both signals have the same logical state during a predetermined period of time. In this way, brief inconsistencies between the
signals - According to yet another advantageous embodiment of the invention, the two signals are recognized as being faulty if both signals are applied longer than a predetermined period of time, after the key or the switch are actuated. In this way, signals resulting from inadvertent or accidental operations, for example, when a tool drops on the key or switch, can be recognized.
- According to another aspect of the invention, a control unit includes a controller connected with the control unit and an evaluation unit integrated in the controller. The control unit includes at least one antivalent key or switch that outputs two antivalent signals. The two outputted signals are identified as being faulty if both signals have the same logical state. When the evaluation unit is integrated in the control unit, no additional hardware is required for the evaluation unit.
- According to yet another aspect of the invention, a control unit includes an integrated evaluation unit and at least one antivalent key or switch that outputs two antivalent signals. The two outputted signals are identified as being faulty if both signals have the same logical state. By incorporating the evaluation unit as an integral component of the control unit obviates the need for additional hardware or software extensions outside the evaluation unit.
- According to still another aspect of the invention, a machine tool or production machine includes a control unit that includes a controller connected with the control unit and an evaluation unit integrated in the controller. The control unit includes at least one antivalent key or switch that outputs two antivalent signals. The two outputted signals are identified as being faulty if both signals have the same logical state. The operation of machine tools and production machines requires particularly stringent safety measures. However, it should be noted that the invention can be employed in many other technical areas where safety-relevant functions are required in the operation, for example industrial facilities, shipbuilding, submarines, vehicles, spacecrafts, airplanes, railroads, and other control applications.
- Other features and advantages of the present invention will be more readily apparent upon reading the following description of currently preferred exemplified embodiments of the invention with reference to the accompanying drawing, in which:
-
FIG. 1 shows a commercially available double-make contact switch; -
FIG. 2 shows a commercially available double-break contact switch; -
FIG. 3 shows an antivalent switch with an evaluation unit connected thereto, embodying the subject matter of the present invention; and -
FIG. 4 shows a control unit with a controller connected thereto. - Throughout all the Figures, same or corresponding elements are generally indicated by same reference numerals. These depicted embodiments are to be understood as illustrative of the invention and not as limiting in any way. It should also be understood that the drawings are not necessarily to scale and that the embodiments are sometimes illustrated by graphic symbols, phantom lines, diagrammatic representations and fragmentary views. In certain instances, details which are not necessary for an understanding of the present invention or which render other details difficult to perceive may have been omitted.
- Turning now to the drawing, and in particular to
FIG. 3 , there is shown anantivalent key 9 and anevaluation unit 4 that performs the method of the invention. It will be understood that an antivalent switch can also be employed instead of the depictedantivalent key 9. Unlike the double-make or double-break contact keys and switches depicted inFIGS. 1 and 2 , which include either a double-break contact combination or a double-make contact combination, an antivalent key has a make-break contact combination, i.e., when theantivalent key 9 is actuated, acontact 8 is opened at the same time acontact 6 is closed. When thekey 9 is released, thecontact 8 is closed and thecontact 6 is simultaneously opened. In this way, a voltage U is applied either to thesignals 2 or to thesignal 3, so that the twosignals signal 2 has a logical high level,signal 3 has a logical low level, and conversely, whensignal 2 has a logical low level,signal 3 has a logical high level. A faulty state is distinguished in that the twosignals signals - Single faults, such as a short-circuit of one of the two signal lines of the
signals key 9 is pressed. - The functional components and the corresponding circuits required for the method are indicated in the
exemplary evaluation unit 4 depicted inFIG. 3 . It will be understood that the method of the invention can also be performed with other functional components and other types of connections. If the twosignals delay circuit 18, which after a predetermined period of time also supplies a high level signal. This signal is supplied to a functional OR-gate 19, whose output then also transitions to a high level and thereby generates anerror signal 12. The turn-ondelay circuit 18, whose output assumes a high level when the input signal has a high level for time period longer than a predetermined time period, is optional. However, the turn-ondelay circuit 18 may be desirable for suppressing brief inconsistencies of thesignals - If the two
signals signals inverters inverters - Faulty key and switch signals may also be generated by inadvertently or accidentally operating the key or switch. Such an inadvertent or accidental operation can occur, for example, when a tool is dropped on the key or switch or by bumping against the key or switch. In many applications, such unintentional actuation of the key or switch has no immediate effect, because the relevant safety function activated with the key or switch may not by immediately interrogated by a control unit of the machine, because the corresponding safety function is not relevant for the current process or machining operation.
- Such fault can also be detected by a suitable extension of the method. The method of the invention then checks how long the antivalent key or switch remains in the actuated or switched state. In the afore-described embodiment, the
signal level 2 assumes a logical low level when thekey 9 is pressed, whereas thesignal 3 assumes a logical high level. Theinverter 20 and the functional AND-gate 21 operate to provide a logical high level as an output signal of the functional AND-gate 21 when thekey 9 is pressed. A turn-ondelay circuit 22 checks the length of time during which no interruption is detected when thekey 9 is pressed. If the logical signal level at the input of the turn-ondelay circuit 22 remains unchanged for a predetermined period of time, then the output of the turn-ondelay circuit 22 assumes a high level. As a result, the functional OR-gate 19 generates anerror signal 12, i.e., the output of the functional OR-gate 19 transitions to a logical high level. -
FIG. 4 shows acontrol unit 10 that is connected via alink 23 for data exchange with acontroller 11 that controls amachine 25, for example a machine tool or a production machine. Thecontrol unit 10 includes a keypad withantivalent keys 9, only one which labeled for sake of clarity. In the illustrated embodiment, theevaluation unit 4 that executes the method of the invention is an integral component of thecontrol unit 10. Alternatively, theevaluation unit 4′ can also be an integral component of thecontroller 11, as indicated by the dashed line inFIG. 4 . This has the advantage that the logical operations for the method can also be implemented in form of software in a microprocessor system that is already part of thecontroller 11. It should be noted that a closed loop controller con be used instead of thecontroller 11. - The control unit can be implemented, for example, in the form of a control panel, a handheld control device, a handheld programming device, an operator console, an operating panel, a Mimic-Board, a cockpit, a control center, and the like.
- Machine tools in the context of the present invention can also include, for example, uniaxial or multi-axis lathes, milling machines, as well as drilling or grinding machines. Machine tools can further include processing centers, linear and rotary transfer machines, laser machines, rolling machines and/or gear cutters. These machines have in common that the material is machined along several axes. Production machines in the context of the present invention can include textile, paper, plastic, wood, glass, ceramic or stone processing machines, as well as machines used for forming, packaging, printing, conveying, lifting, pumping, transporting. Furthermore, fans, blowers, wind turbines, lifting gear, cranes, robots, production and assembly lines are also included under the term production machines in the context of the present invention.
- While the invention has been illustrated and described in connection with currently preferred embodiments shown and described in detail, it is not intended to be limited to the details shown since various modifications and structural changes may be made without departing in any way from the spirit of the present invention. The embodiments were chosen and described in order to best explain the principles of the invention and practical application to thereby enable a person skilled in the art to best utilize the invention and various embodiments with various modifications as are suited to the particular use contemplated.
- What is claimed as new and desired to be protected by Letters Patent is set forth in the appended claims and includes equivalents of the elements recited therein:
Claims (6)
1. A method for identifying faulty key or switch signals from an antivalent key or switch of a control unit, wherein the key or switch outputs two antivalent signals and the two outputted signals are identified as being faulty if both signals have the same logical state.
2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the two signals are recognized as being faulty if both signals have the same logical state during a predetermined period of time.
3. The method of claim 2 , wherein the two signals are recognized as being faulty if both signals are applied longer than the predetermined period of time, after the key or the switch are actuated.
4. A control unit comprising a controller connected with the control unit and an evaluation unit integrated in the controller, wherein the control unit includes at least one antivalent key or switch that outputs two antivalent signals and wherein the two outputted signals are identified as being faulty if both signals have the same logical state.
5. A control unit comprising an integrated evaluation unit and at least one antivalent key or switch that outputs two antivalent signals, wherein the two outputted signals are identified as being faulty if both signals have the same logical state.
6. A machine tool or production machine comprising a control unit that includes a controller connected with the control unit and an evaluation unit integrated in the controller, wherein the control unit includes at least one antivalent key or switch that outputs two antivalent signals and wherein the two outputted signals are identified as being faulty if both signals have the same logical state.
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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DE10341324.3 | 2003-09-08 | ||
DE10341324A DE10341324A1 (en) | 2003-09-08 | 2003-09-08 | Method for detecting faulty antivalent push-button or switch signals |
Publications (1)
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US20050052083A1 true US20050052083A1 (en) | 2005-03-10 |
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ID=34223456
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US10/935,542 Abandoned US20050052083A1 (en) | 2003-09-08 | 2004-09-07 | Method for identifying faulty antivalent key or switch signals |
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DE (1) | DE10341324A1 (en) |
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US20070030595A1 (en) * | 2005-08-08 | 2007-02-08 | Yozo Tsukamoto | Abnormal state determination method and apparatus |
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CN106564381A (en) * | 2015-12-25 | 2017-04-19 | 中车大连机车车辆有限公司 | Electric locomotive key interlocking alarm device |
US20180296418A1 (en) * | 2015-08-10 | 2018-10-18 | MAQUET GmbH | Device and method for controlling at least one drive mechanism of an operating table |
CN111251890A (en) * | 2020-01-17 | 2020-06-09 | 中车株洲电力机车有限公司 | Heterogeneous redundancy control circuit and control method for urban rail vehicle and urban rail vehicle |
EP4202580A1 (en) | 2021-12-21 | 2023-06-28 | Abberior Instruments GmbH | Sensor circuit for a device carrying out a safety function, device and method for processing measured values of sensors |
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US20070030595A1 (en) * | 2005-08-08 | 2007-02-08 | Yozo Tsukamoto | Abnormal state determination method and apparatus |
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CN106564381A (en) * | 2015-12-25 | 2017-04-19 | 中车大连机车车辆有限公司 | Electric locomotive key interlocking alarm device |
CN111251890A (en) * | 2020-01-17 | 2020-06-09 | 中车株洲电力机车有限公司 | Heterogeneous redundancy control circuit and control method for urban rail vehicle and urban rail vehicle |
EP4202580A1 (en) | 2021-12-21 | 2023-06-28 | Abberior Instruments GmbH | Sensor circuit for a device carrying out a safety function, device and method for processing measured values of sensors |
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