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societas
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Europäische Forschungsgesellschaft für Ethik
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ethica

Institute of Social Ethics – Faculty of Theology

58th Annual Conference of Societas Ethica

VULNERABILITY & INTEGRITY

August 25–28, 2022

Faculty of Theology
Kirchgasse 9, Zurich

Book of Abstracts

https://www.societasethica.info/2022-annual-conference

BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

Societas Ethica | 58th Annual Conference 2022
Zürich
Vulnerability & Integrity
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The abstracts included here are ordered in alphabetical order by family name.

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The vulnerability of the present world versus the integrity of the good creation. Reflections on environmental ethics

Dr. Megan Arndt

Wissenschaftliche Assistentin am Lehrstuhl für Systematische Theologie (Ethik), Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg, Theologische Fakultät, Germany

Central to the doctrine of creation is a structural relation between integrity and vulnerability: the concept of a good, divinely ordained, and whole creation faces the fallen world. The fallenness of the world shows itself in biblical texts, theological reflection, as also in the natural sciences: if one looks at the "dead ends" of evolution, for example. Eco-theological approaches, trying to develop alternatives to a strict anthropocentrism and a dualism between God and the world, attempt to do this often through the doctrine of creation. This way, theological ethics receives a certain connectability to current environmental ethics and can take up older theological traditions that are more closely bound to nature, for example, via a desacralization of nature (which in no way should be naïve). Thus, something can be offered in contrast to the hostility of the body, which eco-theology finds present in the rest of theology at large. One can find pneumatological (Jürgen Moltmann), feminist-theological (Sallie McFague) and process-theological (Ian Barbour) approaches. The latter seeks an integration of theology and the natural sciences.

Things get theologically tricky though if the relation between vulnerability and integrity becomes unbalanced or discussed at an incorrect level: to demand that nature should have its own rights and that every intervention into nature needs to be justified, is a sign of a romanticization of nature or the wilderness, in which an untouched nature, that is not influenced by humans, is imagined as an ideal condition. Thereby, evolutionary mechanisms like the survival of the fittest (or of the better adapted) are declared as morally right without this being further considered. The use of the phrase "integrity of creation" in the context of the conciliar process has also been criticized because the concept of "integrity" was applied to the present world. Moreover, the wording would declare human beings as the preservers of something, which it is not in their power to preserve.

The doctrine of creation and the theological environmental ethics which refers to it, need to work towards the goal that the tension between the integrity of creation and the vulnerability of the present world becomes visible. A theological perspective reveals that the status of the complete integrity of the world cannot be achieved in the world as we actually find it. As basic theological motifs we have here the idea of a perfect original state in the past (although the original state already has the potential for the Fall within it), as also on the other hand eschatological or apocalyptic ideas imagining a future perfection. Humans cannot bring about the ideal state whole in its entirety through their ecology-minded or ecologically sustainable action. Responsibility is limited. This limitation can lead to lowering of the moral bar for human beings who usually face an unlimited area of responsibility: human beings cannot live without harming others (Albert Schweitzer), they must consider the consequences of their actions in the future (Hans Jonas) and in complex global contexts. To that effect, the responsibility of human beings is infinite and finite at the same time. This is helpful against the feeling of powerlessness and in regaining the capacity for action.

The distinction between the integrity of creation and the present fallen world is fundamental for every theological environmental ethics. This can also prevent us from falling into naturalistic fallacies. Moreover, the rejection of a romanticization of an original state of nature (or of humans living in complete harmony with nature) helps avoid an excessive and unreasonable skepticism with respect to modern technology.

In conclusion, the opposition of integrity and vulnerability demonstrates itself as highly beneficial for thinking further about the questions of environmental ethics theologically. In addition, the application of the concept of vulnerability to the human environment offers the chance for posing applied ethical questions in the field of environmental ethics. To appreciate the fragility and violability of humans and of non-human lives offers a starting point for transferring concepts of care and welfare to questions of

environmental ethics (Daniela Gottschlich/Christine Katz; Thorsten Moos). Thus, questions of environmental ethics can be discussed independently of questions of inherent values. This paper will execute this transfer by use of one exemplary case study from the field of environmental ethics, showing in this way the structural potential of the concept of vulnerability. The idea of vulnerability also has the capability to illustrate the tight interconnectedness between environmental and social ethics.

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Vulnerability as a good to be protected? Reflections on the Scope of Vulnerability as a Defense Concept against Germline Interventions in Medically Assisted Reproduction

Dr. Michael Braunschweig

Universität Zürich, Switzerland

In medical contexts, vulnerability basically has the status of a contingent condition to be overcome or treated (Boldt 2019): The fundamental physical and/or psychological vulnerability of human life forms the possibility condition of assistance in a broad sense. The restoration, as far as possible, of a state of physical and/or psychological integrity that has been damaged by acute impairments and assumed to be original or normofunctional form the occasion and the goal of medical therapy and intervention.

Vulnerability understood in this medical sense is also quite compatible with genetic interventions in the human germ line for the purpose of correcting hereditary diseases. While somatic gene therapy in principle hardly gives rise to any fundamental ethical discussions, the situation is different with interventions in the human germline (HGGE, human genetic germline editing). The ethical, legal, and social implications of HGGE are still considered to be considerable and reservations about HGGE remain strong. Nevertheless, the fundamental rejection and ostracism of any form of interventional germline modification has evolved in the international debate into a tendentially conditional stance, according to which the ethical approvability of germline interventions is primarily dependent on the safe and precise mastery of the technology (WHO 2021, ICHGGE 2021).

In my contribution, I start from the assumption that the sufficiently safe and precise mastery of technical gene modification for an application in the human germline is a question of time and does not represent an impossibility in principle. However, the mastery of HGGE does not yet answer the question of the conditions of ethical permissibility of corresponding applications. Whether applications of HGGE are ethically permissible will depend each time on the concrete individual situation and must be weighed up situationally. In this context, the concept of vulnerability has an important normative orientation function, as is evident from numerous conventions on bioethics, medical ethics, and research ethics (e.g., World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki, Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences).

The formulation of fundamental objections against the application of HGGE is also put forward, among other things, using and referring to a concept of vulnerability: according to this view, vulnerability is, for example, not merely an acute, chronic or structural deficiency to be overcome as far as possible, or an increased exposure to risk, but precisely a constitutive feature of the human condition that must remain unavailable to human action (e.g., Habermas 2001). Germline interventions, it is said, violate this limit of the unavailable. Vulnerability, one might summarize this position, belongs to a well-understood human integrity; a position I will call "integrist vulnerability."

I will first focus on the foundations of this position of a "defense of an integrist concept of vulnerability," analyze its hermeneutical, anthropological, and ethical premises, and finally relate it to the recent theological debate on the concept of vulnerability in questions of reproductive ethics (e.g., Clausen 2006; Keul 2020). In doing so, it is not only necessary to critically ask to what extent "vulnerability" threatens to become a non-specific "container term" in theological debates on reproductive medicine ethics (Walser 2019), but also to discuss, to what extent the concept of vulnerability in this integrist reading is suitable as a defensive concept in the face of increased claims to sovereignty and disposition with regard to

becoming life, which are also increased by the technological developments of assisted reproduction and which seem to be inherent in the paradigm of interpretation of "reproductive autonomy" that is dominant in liberal societies (Butler 2012).

The practical touchstone of these questions is the example situation of couples with a desire to have children who are pre-disposed by hereditary diseases. Involuntary childlessness can itself be understood as a vulnerability trait (ICPD 1994). To the extent that the desire for children could only be fulfilled using HGGE procedures (and these procedures were safely mastered in a sufficient sense), would their use be ethical? Would IVF or ICSI therapy in such cases even be ethically justifiable only under the condition of involving HGGE? How are the concepts of vulnerability and integrity to be understood more precisely in this context, what do they contribute conceptually to illuminating the ethical implications of HGGE? Is the recourse to "vulnerability" as a characteristic of (human) life to be protected suitable to set ethical limits to dreams of an optimization of the human being in view of its apparently tangible technical feasibility? Especially the latter must be carefully examined regarding a postulated moral duty of parents to apply HGGE in the sense of "procreative beneficence" (Savulescu et al. 2009) and to ask for the possibilities how far the conceptuality of vulnerability and integrity is also suitable for a differentiation of "therapeutic", "preventive" and "optimizing" (or enhancement) interventions or even makes it more difficult.

Keywords: human germline genome editing, reproductive autonomy, reproductive health, procreative beneficence, genetic enhancement, genetic disorders, vulnerability, integrity

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Spaces and circuits of vulnerabilization and resistence in a globalized world

Dr. Noelia Bueno Gómez

Department of Philosophy, University of Oviedo. Spain

Attending to the particular characteristics of the social construction of space and place in the era of the globalization, this proposal aims to identify and conceptualize those liminal spaces and circuits of vulnerabilization situated on the margins of the hegemonic spaces and circuits of power and capital.

Over the last few decades, the intensification of globalization has run parallel to an interconnectivity and interdependency of states, markets, groups of people and individuals. The effects of human exploitation of natural resources are felt across the globe (the new dimension of the risks described by Beck in the 1980s has now burst its limits); this situation requires an international and, to a certain degree, unanimous response, one that seems to recede ever further in the current context of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. To put it in other words: challenges are global but international institutions are ineffective, and international relations are fragmented. At the same time, the massive flows of forced migrants are not expected to decrease, but have ratherincreased due to the war in Ukraine; this trend is expected to continue due to global warming and other natural disasters.

People, power, and capital move quickly and constantly, but the spaces and circuits through which these movements take place, along with the movements themselves, are not always on the map. What we easily see are tourists' trips and the political and the business exchanges staged and prepared for viewing; we tend to see such trips and exchanges as disconnected from those movements, exchanges, environmental effects, and even the violence and exploitation associated with them. Liminal circuits and spaces are not usually considered as part of the visible globalization, and they usually push against or fall outside the laws. However, the life that passes through them is taken advantage of (expropriated) by the world economy and the world's power centers. They are not exceptions to a regularized norm, but rather a structural part of a status quo of inequality and exclusion, one in which biopolitics, necropolitics (Achille Mbembe), and the "pedagogies of cruelty" (Rita Laura Segato) prevail.

I argue those circuits and spaces, including refugee camps, routes of transit of legal or illegal migrants, peripheral settlements, detention centers for immigrants, certain prisons, lines at food banks, and other charity institutions share some common characteristics. The way in which they are instituted (or even institutionalized) – removed from the various national legal systems and lacking an efficient international legal system – and the very construction of the spatiality seen in them (transitory, precarious, uprooted, insecure) produce particular forms of vulnerability and exposure to violence and expropriation of life. They vulnerabilize the people forced to cross them, sometimes excruciatingly.

At the same time, strategies of resilience and resistance are developed every day in such liminal spaces and circuits. When we make the "counter-geographies of the globalization" (to adapt Saskia Sassen's expression), we need to consider such strategies as a result of human creativity, agency, and capacity to organize life in the most extreme circumstances. These experiences and learnings, which we may consider the "other face" of vulnerabilization if we are to avoid victimizing and stigmatizing people in these circumstances, are not only circumstantially interesting. It is from that point – and not from the hegemonic circuits and spaces – from where we have to reconsider today's enormous global challenges. It is not, therefore, just about re-mapping for justice, but about organizing the possibilities of survival.

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Portraiture and Anthropocentrism: Alice Neel's Humanistic Subversion of 'the Human'

Prof. Dr. Stephen S. Bush

Department of Religious Studies, Brown University, USA

Climate change has attuned us to the dire implications of anthropocentrism. Privileging the human over the environment has fostered exploitation and instrumentalization to catastrophic results: forest fires, floods, droughts, and forced migrations. Critical analyses of anthropocentrism have to address the various social institutions that instill it, and of these, art is one prominent site. Visual art so often positions the human both as the central figure depicted in art and as the centered gaze that views art.

Portraiture is especially significant. It takes the human figure as its subject matter, depicting it as focal, the foreground over and against the surroundings (Maes 2020; Pointon 2013; West 2004; Freeland 2010). Is this not then the anthropocentric art form par excellence? There is much truth to this, but the situation is more complicated than it initially appears.

Anthropocentricism holds that humans are categorically distinct from and of superior moral value to the non-human world. It reflects a problematic sort of integrity, the integral and bounded whole of the "human" vis-à-vis everything else. It fails to recognize the ways in which humans are interdependent with and constituted by their relationships with non-human things. Thus, we fail to see the mutual vulnerability of the non-human and human. The ethical mandate in response is to cultivate (individually and collectively) habits of attention that help us perceive humans as embedded in ecosystems and perceive humans (and other things) in their moral particularity, not as a valuable for their membership in a blank abstraction.

Portraiture relates to these ethical issues in complex manners. It pertains to the individual as a particular. So it draws our attention not to humanity as some denuded category, but to this one specific person. But of course, no person is only an individual. Everyone is always also a member of a category and we encounter each as such. We regard the one particular individual before us as a member of an economic class, a race, a gender, and a species.

Oftentimes, the primary point of the portrait is to position the individual, not just as an individual, but as a member of a group. The one commissioning the portrait wants to immortalize their wealth, status, and power. Thus, portraiture is implicated in the ideology of the ruling class (Berger 1990), which, since the dawn of the age of capital, has meant burnishing the sheen of the reputations of those especially responsible for colonialism, patriarchy, and class exploitation. And that is the very group that has been most responsible for pollution and climate change. The problem here isn't necessarily anthropocentrism, because the sitter is not an emblem of humanity writ large, but of a specific and privileged race, gender, class, and nationality. Nevertheless, even if no one portrait conveys a representation of humanity, as a genre, portraiture does.

A number of portraitists subvert the genre, and one such artist of significance is Alice Neel (1900-1984). Neel painted ordinary people from her working-class neighborhood from various races, classes, and walks of life. Prominent among her oeuvre are portraits of labor organizers and civil rights activists. She painted nudes of pregnant women, an unprecedented theme in art history. In these ways, she undermines the ruling class ideology of portraiture. Like all great portraitists, her paintings express the inner qualities of the subject through facial expression and body posture. She conveys the particularity of the individuals she paints. Nevertheless, in her dedication to portraiture as a genre, she remains very much a humanist. Even if no one of her works portrays anything as broad as "the human," her collection of portraits very much does establish the category of the human. She is explicit about this: "I have tried to assert the dignity and eternal importance of the human being" (Baum et al. 2021).

Nevertheless, a good number of her paintings undermine the category of humanity and thus challenge anthropocentrism. A characteristic feature of Neel's work is that she portrays certain areas of focus with detail, leaving other portions of the subjects' bodies less developed. This emphasizes the partiality of our grasp of each other. Our knowledge of the other is always incomplete. Certain features of their character we know with precision, but there are always obscurities and mysteries, unknown qualities. We can never take in the whole exhaustively. At an extreme, in a number of her works, Neel leaves portions of her paintings unfinished. The subject dissipates into the unpainted canvas and the background shows through their invisible body parts. These disruptions of the bodily integrity of the human subject subvert the anthropocentrism of the portraiture tradition by transgressing the boundary between the human and the non-human, showing the human to be an unstable, shifting concept, a species that merges with, and is mutually vulnerable with, the environment.

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Vulnerability, integrity, and disability

Dr. Jenny Ehnberg

Church of Sweden, Sweden

Vulnerability is a concept that has been receiving growing attention by theorists with different suggestions being made about how to best understand what makes us vulnerable as well as how that vulnerability plays out in different lives. A distinction is sometimes made between the kind of vulnerability that all humans have part in because we are embodied creatures with material and biological needs and the special kind of vulnerabilities that different groups experience because of features that pertain to them in different ways. For instance, it has been suggested that disability should be seen as a kind of special vulnerability that comes from a person's reduced physical or mental abilities. However, the question of how to understand vulnerabilities related to disability is a subject of debate in both theological and philosophical ethics.[1]

In theological discussions on disability, disability as well as vulnerability is related to an understanding of life as a gift.[2] Here a central claim is that because God has created all beings and freely given the gift of life our worth as persons is not dependent on our abilities, or disabilities, but is a consequence of God's loving gift. According to this logic, we are in an ontological sense dependent on God who has created every human being, but we are also dependent on each other in the sense that our ability to live flourishing lives is dependent on the relationships we have with others. Vulnerability comes from this fact of dependency and is an inescapable part of being human.

The idea that disability should not be seen as giving rise to special forms of vulnerability is sometimes presented as necessary to avoid that persons with disabilities are stigmatized by being labelled as different and in need of special treatment. This could be described as a kind of mainstreaming of the vulnerabilities of disability and would according to its proponents lead to awareness that the line between what is considered "normal" and "special" is the outcome of social and political decisions rather than something "natural".

In this paper I will go into discussion with this idea that the way forward is to revoke the category of special vulnerability in relation to disability. I will critically analyse the claim that by understanding vulnerability as universal rather than special we can avoid that persons with disabilities are perceived and treated as less than equal. In relation to this, I will argue that there is a certain harm that persons with disabilities are, and historically have been, more vulnerable to, namely, to not being included in the political community and thus to suffer the injury of not being treated as an equal, as a political subject on a par with others. Trying to capture the dynamics of this vulnerability I will use the concept of integrity in the context of being of being perceived and treated as a whole person, and I will also discuss what bearing a concept of human rights have on the discussion on the vulnerability of disability.

Keywords: Vulnerability, integrity, disability, theological ethics, political ethics, equality

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[1] See for instance Jackie Leach Scully's article entitled "Disability and Vulnerability: On Bodies, Dependence, and Power" in Mackenzie, Rogers, and Dodds (eds.): *Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy* and Reynolds, Thomas E.: *Vulnerable Communion. A Theology of Disability and Hospitality*.

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Vulnerability in the arena of strength: A critical discussion of theologies of vulnerability in the context of sports

Prof. Dr. Kristin Graff-Kallevåg

MF Norwegian School of Theology, Religion and Society, Norway

The relationship between religion and sports is a topic that has gained increased interest in the study of religion and theology over the last decades. This paper explores how the concept of vulnerability is interpreted in the intersection between the world of the sports and that of the church.

Athletes daily expose themselves to vulnerability – to the risk of failure, harm, and injuries. Competing implies emotional and physical exposure. This paper asks: What might experiences of human vulnerability mean in a sports setting, and how can religious and theological resources shed light on such experiences?

Conventionally, in the context of sports, the ideal is to be strong (Begel, 2000). Vulnerability is correspondingly typically seen as weakness and as something negative that needs to be combatted and overcome (Hägglund et al., 2019; Putukian, 2016). However, in recent research one can find a more complex and even affirmative view of human vulnerability, not only in ethics (Butler, 2006; Mackenzie et al., 2014) and theology (Culp, 2010; Gandolfo, 2015; Springhart and Thomas, 2017), but also in sports theory (Hägglund et al., 2019; Putukian, 2016). According to this view, there is an ambiguity inherent in vulnerability as part of human life. Beyond mere limitation, the condition of vulnerability also contains essential life-sustaining resources and may be a source for resilience, development, and flourishing life.

Vulnerability is, thus, a contested concept, not at least in the boundary space between sports and Christian faith. This paper examines critically how vulnerability is interpreted at this intersection between sports and religion, by presenting a qualitative empirical study of sermons delivered in Christian services taking place in the context of international sporting events (Graff-Kallevåg and Stålsett 2021; 2022). How are theological resources mobilized in these sermons to interpret experiences of vulnerability?

Theoretically, the analysis makes use of vulnerability theory (see above), as well as Jan-Olav Henriksen's theory about religion as orientation, legitimization and transformation (Henriksen, 2017).

The paper demonstrates that it is the conventional view of vulnerability as weakness that is dominant in these sports sermons; the focus is on vulnerability as a problem – as something the athlete needs to combat. In the sermons, theological resources are used to legitimize, rather than challenge, the conventional conceptualization of vulnerability as weakness in the world of sports. However, in some of the sermons there is also a critical potential of mobilizing theological resources for providing a more multi-faceted and even affirmative notion of vulnerability.

Against this backdrop, the paper argues that by adapting and legitimizing the conventional notion of vulnerability in sports instead of challenging it, the sermons miss an opportunity for a creative and constructive re-negotiation of the concept of vulnerability in the intersection between the world of the church and that of the sports. Yet, as the analysis also displays, there is potential for a more creative and generative expansion that provides resources for re-orientation and transformation. We argue that a more critical engagement with the conventional notion of vulnerability could open for a more expanded, generative and relevant theological notion of vulnerability in the arena of strength.

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Vulnerability, Integrity, and Ideologies of Security: Womanist and Feminist Approaches For Liberation Movements in the United States

Molly Greening, LaShaunda Reese, Dannis Matteson

Loyola University Chicago, USA

Keywords:
Global womanisms, US feminisms, security, carcerality, anti-militarism, abolition, political virtues, moral identity formation, borderlands, narrative ethics, feminist coalitions, liberation, vulnerability, integrity

In the United States, ideologies of security have long perpetuated domestic and international militarism, carceral structures, and social norms and practices that fuel the perceived need for security as wealth consolidation, border protection, violent policing and endless war. The so-called need to "close the window of vulnerability" as a euphemism for aggressive military tactics signifies a culture of security that interprets vulnerability as a weakness to eradicate because it leaves individuals, groups, and institutions open to exposure and potential harm (Sölle 1988).

At a time when Black Lives Matter protests continue to expose and confront our society's prioritization of property over human life, concepts of vulnerability are as critical as ever for advancing liberation movements on the ground. This is because vulnerability fundamentally questions our cultural infatuation with security which propels exploitative economic systems and political violence. Ideologies of security are rooted in liberalism's binding together of liberty to the protection of property and the political rights of the property-owning individual. The policing system, as an example, was created in direct relation to the protection of property. More broadly, the concept of security as the "protection of capital accumulation" expands the reach of security ideologies which infiltrate "public law, administrative science, political economy, public health, and urban planning" (McQuade 2018). Furthermore, ideologies of security hold racial capitalism in place, justifying violence against "dangerous" racialized groups and individuals for protection of white, wealthy individuals, as well as the property of corporations and government agencies.

This panel will present differing feminist and womanist approaches that confront ideologies of security in present day liberation movements in the US through the concepts of vulnerability and integrity.

The first presenter will do a critical read of **"**You Are Your Best Thing: Vulnerability, Shame Resilience, and the Black Experience", analyzing the anthology of perspectives offered in the struggle for Black and Brown bodies to navigate the dialectic of multiple overlapping and intermingling identities with the overarching negative imposition of inhabiting either a female body, Black body, or both. Since the inception of the first African slaves on to the 'New World', the Black body and being has always been placed in opposition to things such as 'communal security', 'safety', 'humanity'. What does it mean to reconceptualize vulnerability and shame in a way that not only 'fosters resilience' in a traditional manner, but is radically conducive to the surviving and further flourishing of one's identity and self in the twenty-first century? How can those historically labeled inhuman produce an authentically human perspective of existence beyond suffering? Grounding oneself firmly in the womanist theological tradition, the scholar examines the richness of contributions from Black women, men and non-binary persons, extrapolating consistent themes of reflection, self-awareness, self-acknowledgement, solidarity, community, reconciliation, love and pain.

Using the language of Frantz Fanon's 'zone of non-being', the scholar inquires into the ways in which those deemed less, those viewed as a security threat by the very nature of their being, maneuver the complex contradictory of 'being a Black body' in the midst of racial profiling, policing, and a heavily bias criminal justice system. The scholar then transitions, offering their own hermeneutical disposition on the concept of 'shame resilience', one that includes the building and expanding of identity beyond western conceptions of personhood, one that does not keep the self bound by mis-recognition of one's body and

being, but expands possibilities for not only surviving but flourishing. The scholar then broadens this interpretation and imagine a global re-conception of vulnerability that includes shame resilience in identity formation in the Caribbean and African countries, and how this re-conception can liberate not only those held at the hems of imposing narratives, but those benefiting from the negative imposition as well, re-imagining the notion of security as one that means 'safe and serene within one's self'. What can the shame and resilience of the oppressed say to those who manipulate life under the justification of ideological security?

The second presenter targets the cultural justification for building and maintaining carceral structures in the US based on the so-called need to protect the safety of white women. As a result, white women's experience and voices tend to distract from arguments for abolition movements. This presentation considers the potential for an understanding and practice of vulnerability that counteracts the security ideologies that center white women and opens to solidarity with abolitionisms. To do this, the presenter will turn to Dorothee Sölle, who articulated an understanding of vulnerability in reaction to US and European Christian support for the Arms Race in the 1980s. Analyzing the way in which the ideology of security seeps into our thoughts, feelings and behaviors, and, the ways that the Christian church so often perpetuates this pattern through what she calls "Apartheid theology," Sölle argues that people of faith must foster vulnerability personally, communally, and politically if we want genuine peace and justice.

As both a theological and political concept, Sölle's vision of vulnerability embraces a stance of openness and imagines new ways of tending to care and safety of our communities while acknowledging that being human inherently involves risk. The presenter will argue that Sölle's rendering of vulnerability would support more genuine solidarity with abolitionist movements, especially for white women, because it has the potential to unlock empathy for the *true* victims of the carceral state, as well as creatively imagining and building alternative forms of community safety and care. In the end, the presenter will consider how vulnerability might facilitate a de-linking from the ideology of security and the ways it molds our knowing, being, and doing among white women in the US in particular. The presentation will conclude by suggesting strategies to support and participate in abolition feminism away from centering white women's experiences and towards open, creative, collaborative and trust-fulled vulnerability.

The third presenter will explore ideologies of security and the moral relevance of vulnerability and integrity through the writings of Gloria Anzaldúa. Wounds and wounding figure prominently in Anzaldúa's theorizing, but her usage of the terms hold insights for how both vulnerability and integrity can be redefined and utilized for liberation. Describing herself as a *patlache* (queer) Chicana feminist, Anzaldúa theorized from her personal experiences growing up next to the hyper-militarized US/Mexico border. Writing in a mix of Spanish and English, she describes the US/Mexico border as an open wound, "*una herida abierta* where the Third World grates against the first and bleeds," (*Borderlands/La Frontera*, 25). The wounding that comes from this border, and the ideologies of security that maintain it, can be felt not just physically but also psychologically, sexually, and spiritually. Due to the necessary cultivation of a deep sensitivity and awareness for confronting the history and continuing legacies of these sites of collision, Anzaldúa claims the vulnerability of residing in the borderlands as an epistemologically advantaged standpoint for resisting dominant ideologies.

Particularly in her later works, she returns to the image of the wound as a site of possibility for connection and coalition building. "We are all wounded, but we can connect through the wound that's alienated us from others. When the wound forms a cicatrix, the scar can become a bridge linking people split apart," (*Light in the Dark*/*Luz en Lo Oscuro*, 21). The presenter will argue that critical reflections on storytelling are crucial for the ways that Anzaldúa shifts notions of integrity. The presentation will conclude with an example from "A Vision for Feminist Peace: Building a Movement Driven Foreign Policy," showing how intersectional feminist coalitions are shifting definitions of US national security.

Together, we will conclude with a reflection on how these approaches to vulnerability are activated in specific liberation movements citing examples where activists champion vulnerability against ideological security.

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The Concepts of Sexual Vulnerability and Integrity in Biomedical Ethics and Education

Dr. Elisa Groff

Institut für Geschichte, Theorie und Ethik der Medizin, Uniklinik Ulm. Germany
ICS, School of Advanced Studies, University of London. England

Thematic fields: biomedical ethics, sexuality and reproduction, gender medicine, medical education.
Abstract:

This paper seeks to explore the concepts of vulnerability and violation of a woman's integrity in contexts of sexual and reproductive health in relation to the four principles of medical ethics used in standard medical curricula (Beauchamp and Childress 2001; Bufacchi 2007; Pickles and Herring 2020). It will ask whether the moral duties of autonomy, beneficence, maleficence, and justice offer an adequate foundation for understanding issues regarding sexual vulnerability and integrity in clinical settings. Furthermore, it will deal with the issue of whether it is necessary to include additional concepts to illuminate the individual and context-specific dimensions of sexual health and wellbeing (Bassan 2014; Ursin, Timmermann, Steger 2021). Thus the present paper will look at the factors that make childbirth a site for potential vulnerability and loss of integrity, for example in case of „obstetric violence", and to what extent those factors are thematized in medical education and research. Accordingly, it will discuss how to further address the ethical challenges surrounding sexual vulnerability and integrity in modern medical curricula.

A recent descriptive cross-sectional study of 179 midwifery students' experiences from the Universities of Fulda and Jena in Germany has pointed to a curricular deficit in teaching "vulnerability" and "integrity" in clinical contexts of sexual and reproductive health (Schneider 2020). A first examination of the online contents of the German National Catalogue of Medical ILOs (Intended Learning Outcomes) appears to confirm the aforementioned lacuna. Moreover, 77.1% of students surveyed by Schneider reported that during their degree they witnessed episodes of "obstetric violence" which made them feel helpless and unprepared to react correctly and timely. Therefore, this paper will tackle the question of whether today's health professionals are adequately trained in identifying and analysing ethical challenges associated with "obstetric violence" by looking at the medical curricula offered at the University of Ulm as case study. The discussion will show that a consistent definition of "sexual vulnerability" and "integrity" in medical education and research is highly required at German-speaking universities.

Vulnerability and the infringement of personal integrity in relation to sexuality and reproduction are key issues that resonate with modern public debates today in biomedical ethics and health care, affecting different parts of the world and different gender categories. In 2014 the World Health Organization defined „obstetric violence" as any "neglectful, physical abusive, and/or disrespectful treatment during childbirth" in health care facilities. A German version of the document was published in 2015. Since 2008 on the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women, the worldwide day against violence in obstetrics is also celebrated. This campaign was initiated in Spain by the movement „Roses Revolution" and is today embraced worldwide on November 25. This holistic approach to childbirth and the ethical conceptualisations of woman's vulnerability and integrity as intimately connected and associated with contextual factors are not thoroughly addressed in medical curricula.

In sum, this paper argues that conceptualizing vulnerability and integrity not as categories *per se* but in context (Luna 2009), that is in relation to sexual and reproductive health, is crucial for designing ethical guidelines in gynaecological practices. Furthermore, empirical evidence in qualitative research can add to our understanding of ethical and practical challenges when it comes to identifying potential scenarios of infringement of personal integrity in relation to sexuality and reproduction, e.g. by looking at university foundation courses or awareness campaigns (also on social media, see the "Roses Revolution"). Future

health professionals and experts in ethics of medicine ought to be provided with the appropriate skills and knowledge not only to manage, but also to anticipate situations of violence in gynaecology and obstetrics.

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Vulnerability and Integrity in Hobbes's Leviathan

Prof. Dr. Ronnie Hjorth

Professor of Political Science, Swedish Defence University, Sweden

Hobbes claims in the preface to *Leviathan* that the intention behind the state is to protect and defend the citizens (L. p. 1). Without the state, he argues, the life of humans is 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short' (L. p 97[62]). It is clear enough that the Hobbesian state reduces vulnerability compared to the belligerent natural condition. Behind the contract and the establishment of the sovereign, there is a particular kind of equality among humans referred to as equality of fear (L. p. 94 [60]). Equality in this respect is foundational for the whole of Hobbes's theory but it is also relevant when it comes to vulnerability. This means that all are equal in the sense of being less vulnerable once protected by the state. This does of course not imply that all are equal in all other respects. Thus, Hobbes's theory of the contract is primarily concerned with the kind of vulnerability that is common to humans and not that which is particular for each individual person. In addition, there is in Hobbes's work, another dimension of vulnerability less explored. This, I label 'inner vulnerability' because it emerges from inside the person in response to external influence. In *Leviathan,* vulnerability of this kind concerns mainly two things, wrongful teaching and false religious beliefs. In this sense, some people are more likely to respond to false teachings and prophecies than are others. Similarly, in the age of the internet, some people are more vulnerable to fake news, false truth and conspiracies than are others.

The argument of this paper is that vulnerability in both these senses relates to integrity and the lack of integrity. As for the vulnerability common to all, the transformation from the natural condition to the state grants citizens a degree of integrity due to citizenship. When humans become citizens, they acquire rights and duties as well as civil liberties protected by the law. When a person is also a citizen that person benefits from a degree of integrity enabling a life in protected by the law; hence the option of living 'a retired life' (M&C p. 227). Moreover, integrity enables individuals to move freely between the private life and the public sphere. Integrity, then, brings with it the ability to draw the curtain when leaving the public stage and retreat into the private life. Moreover, this makes it possible for citizens to decide how much of ones privacy to be shown to others. As for 'inner vulnerability', citizenship is not sufficient. Even citizens to some extent invite their own vulnerabilities. Hobbes argues that citizen is 'not hindered to doe what he has a will to do" (L. p. 161 [108]) and, consequently, civil liberty depends on 'the silence of the law' (L. p. 168 [113]). Vulnerability caused by the choice of a person not hindered by the law is an 'inner vulnerability'.

While Hobbes did not elaborate the concepts vulnerability and integrity this paper shows that both concepts are applicable and at the heart of his political philosophy. The paper argues that these concepts improves our understanding of Hobbes and that his theory contributes to an improved understanding of how the concepts in everyday discourse. In addition, the paper defends and discusses two claims: First, that citizenship is central to hinder vulnerability because it sustains integrity. From citizenship flows the integrity not only of having rights, such as political rights, obligations and privileges but also of being free to move between the public sphere and the private. Hobbes presents privacy as something that originates in the contract and only possible when part of the public in the sense of being subject to the contract; hence, a person is either both private and public or neither private nor public. Second, that citizenship is not sufficient to secure the citizens from inner vulnerability. Hobbes's political philosophy does not tell what kind of information or situation a person should or should not freely decide. However, following Hobbes one should draw the red line when an 'inner vulnerability' restricted to the private sphere becomes public in the sense that it threatens not only the state but also the foundation of the state, i.e., the contract. The paper further explores these contentions and the conflicts they may arise.

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Christine M. Korsgaard's theory of moral agency: why we need to strive for psychic unity

Emma Jakobsson

Uppsala University, Sweden

This paper seeks to present and critically discuss some aspects of the theory of moral agency that is presented by Christine M. Korsgaard. Korsgaard claims that by understanding the idea of self-constitution[3] as a struggle for achieving psychic unity, the struggle is in itself a quest for unifying a person as a moral agent with the ability to act upon certain desires. In order to sort out which of those desires that are worth undertaking as an action, the person in question must have acquired psychic unity. Hence, psychic unity serves as the foundation for constituting a person as a moral agent. An underlying assumption then is that it is a teleological conception[4] of such psychic unity that is constituting the moral agent in Korsgaard's theory of moral agency. [5]

The problem here is with the assumption that psychic unity is required for achieving our status of being moral agents with the ability to act upon our desires. Specifically, the concern here is for how one achieves such unity in order to be the kind of moral agent that have the ability to act. It is also of concern here how this specific view of moral agency, as this kind of unification, also relates to the maintaining of some specific kind of integrity. Korsgaard claims that the function of a person, of a unified moral agent, is to preform her function well i.e. to be the kind of person that she is. This also means that she needs to maintain some sort of integrity in order to be a unified moral agent. [6]

It is assumed then that a living thing is to some extent arranged in relation to its parts which enables it to do what it does. This means, according to Korsgaard, that a living thing will have some sort of function and purpose which is to maintain and reproduce itself. [7] In order to be a good person we need to maintain a specific kind of integrity. The good person must continue to maintain who she is and if she is successful in doing so the result is to be unified which also encompasses what makes a good person have integrity. [8] The thing that is *you* is achieved through the continuing process of fulfilling the purpose of being a moral agent i.e. to be who you are. [9]

It is assumed by Korsgaard that in order to preformed an action, there needs to be an agent to which such movement is attributed. An essential part of being a moral agent is to be a unified moral agent which follows from whether or not I can attribute some action to be mine. So, in order to act upon my desires, my action must constitute me as an agent and that is only possible if I view it as some movement of my body

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[3] See for example Korsgaard M. Christine: *The Sources of Normativity.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996. for an elaborated discussion of the meaning behind the process of self-constitution and the paradox of self-constitution.

[4] Korsgaard claims "On this view, to be an object, to be unified, and to be teleologically organized, are one and the same thing. Teleological organization is what unifies what would otherwise be a *mere heap* of matter into particular object of a particular kind." Korsgaard M. Christine: *Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity and Integrity*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009. p. 28.

[5] Korsgaard: *Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity and Integrity.* p p.7- 9, 12-13, 28.

[6] Korsgaard: *Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity and Integrity.* p. 35-36.

[7] Korsgaard: *Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity and Integrity,* p. 15-16; Korsgaard. M. Christine: *The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical and Moral Psychology.* Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008. p. 133-134.

[8] Korsgaard: S*elf-Constitution: Agency, Identity and Integrity,* p. 213-214.

[9] Korsgaard: *Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity and Integrity,* p. 19, 25, 35, 41-42.

and mind. If an action is to be attributed as *my action*, it must be the result of my entire nature working as an integrated whole. Hence, the emphasis on psychic unity for being a unified moral agent. [10]

In conclusion then, the critical stance which this paper seeks to explore is how and to what extent one can derive moral agency from a metaphysical claim that follows from what the function of being a person and hence a living thing is. This critical stance also encompasses a specific skepticism towards the kind of conception of integrity Korsgaard believes can be integrated into her theory of moral agency.

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[10] Korsgaard: *Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity and Integrity,* p. 19.

Selbstbestimmte Sexarbeit als Carearbeit zwischen Erfahrungen von Integrität und Vulnerabilität

Prof. Dr. Sarah Jäger

Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Theologische Fakultät, Germany

Schlagworte: Sexarbeit, Carearbeit, Gerechtigkeit, Anerkennung, Axel Honneth

Sexarbeit oder Prostitution markiert ein kontroverses Thema für evangelische Sexualethik. Sexarbeit[11] ist auch deshalb ein solch vielgestaltiges Phänomen, da sie in ganz verschiedenen Formen auftreten kann: Das Spektrum reicht von Armuts- und Beschaffungsprostitution bis hin zur selbstbestimmt und versichert arbeitenden Sexarbeiter*in mit allen vorstellbaren Schattierungen dazwischen. In jedem Falle ist scharf zwischen Sexarbeit und Menschenhandel zu unterscheiden. Die folgenden Überlegungen konzentrieren sich ausschließlich auf freiwillig ausgeübte Sexarbeit. Dabei ist selbst der Terminus „Freiwilligkeit" ambivalent, gilt doch, dass die Gründe in die Sexarbeit einzusteigen, vielfältig sind und Faktoren wie Armut und der Mangel an anderen Erwerbsmöglichkeiten in diesem Zusammenhang ebenfalls häufig eine Rolle spielen.

In der evangelischen Sexualethik besteht bisher eine gewisse Übereinstimmung, „dass die Abspaltung der Sexualität von der Personalität eines Menschen als problematisch zu bewerten ist und Sexualität deshalb nach Möglichkeit innerhalb verbindlicher, monogamer Beziehung gelebt werden sollte"[12]. Alle diese Merkmale treffen im ersten Nachdenken nicht auf Sexarbeit zu. Es erscheint weiter problematisch, dass Sexualität als Ware und als käufliches Objekt behandelt wird, da sie sich häufig nicht auf den Körper allein reduzieren lässt, zugleich fordern Sexarbeitende Anerkennung für ihre Arbeit, in der sie weder Erfahrung von Unmündigkeit noch von Unterdrückung machten.[13] Doch was bedeutet das für den Umgang mit dem Phänomen? Welche Formen der Anerkennung, auch als berufliche Tätigkeit[14], sind möglich und ethisch geboten?

Für den Vortrag soll von einem Verständnis von Sexarbeit als Carearbeit ausgegangen werden.[15] Im gegenwärtigen Wirtschaftssystem werden Waren wie Dienstleistungen getauscht, gehandelt, verkauft, erworben und bezahlt, damit ist Sexarbeit Arbeit[16].

Unter Carearbeit lässt sich Sorge, als Befriedigung von Bedürfnissen und Interessen von Dritten und einem Selbst verstehen. Dies könnte – so erste Überlegungen – ebenso auf selbstbestimmte Sexarbeit zutreffen. Auch bei dieser handelt es sich um das Angebot und das Erbringen (erotisch-sexueller) Dienstleistungen.[17] Geht man weiter davon aus, dass Sexualität und das Erleben von Intimität und Erotik einen wichtigen Teil menschlicher Lebens- und Körpererfahrung darstellen, so kann Sexarbeit diese Bedürfnisse auch jenseits des Rahmens einer Liebesbeziehung befriedigen. Besonders deutlich wird dies im Blick auf Sexbegleitung oder Sexassistenz für Menschen mit Behinderung.

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[11] Sexarbeit stellt einen Oberbegriff für sämtliche Formen sexueller und erotischer Arbeit dar. Er bezeichnet eine konsensuelle sexuelle oder sexualisierte Dienstleistung zwischen volljährigen Geschäftspartner*innen gegen Entgelt oder andere materielle Güter. Prostitution dagegen als die explizit körperliche Ausübung, Erduldung und Stimulation von sexuellen Handlungen gegen Entgelt stellt einen Teilbereich von Sexarbeit dar.

[12] Vgl. Eleyth 2013, 395.

[13] Vgl. ebd.

[14] Leopold 2001.

[15] Vgl. Künkel / Schrader 2019.

[16] Vgl. Kirchhoff 1998, 36.

[17] Dabei sollen keinesfalls kapitalistische und strukturelle Macht- und Abhängigkeitsverhältnisse, die sich mit geschlechtlichen Zuschreibungen decken können, abgeblendet werden.

Integrität kann in Aufnahme der Überlegungen Axel Honneths[18] zum Thema der Anerkennung als Selbstverwirklichung oder Autonomie[19] und damit als potentiell verletzbar verstanden werden. Seine Ethik der Anerkennung setzt gerade an der menschlichen Integrität und am Sachverhalt ihrer Verletzlichkeit an. Integrität im Sinne Axel Honneths kann – so eine erste Annäherung – für Sexarbeit auf drei Ebenen eine

Rolle spielen:

Diejenigen, die Sexarbeit leisten ebenso wie diejenigen, die sie empfangen, machen dabei *leibliche* Erfahrungen von Vulnerabilität wie von Integrität. Sexualität stellt auch an dieser Stelle einen intimen Raum des Aufeinander Einlassens und des Berührtwerdens dar, begrenzt jedoch durch den bleibenden Dienstleistungscharakter. Dabei soll allerdings einer einseitigen und naiven Idealisierung ebenso gewehrt werden wie einer pauschalen Verurteilung von Sexarbeit als Form von Sexualität außerhalb einer Partnerschaft.[20] Wird Integrität weiter als Unversehrtheit und sexuelle Selbstbestimmung als Teil der Persönlichkeitsrechte verstanden, so kann Sexarbeit solche Erfahrungen ermöglichen.

Das Nachdenken über Sexarbeit als Carearbeit in dem Spannungsfeld von Vulnerabilität und Integrität bietet außerdem *strukturelle* Ansätze für eine ethisches Beurteilung von Sexarbeit jenseits einer Stigmatisierung. So liegt hier etwa eine Chance, Sexarbeitende nicht paternalistisch als Opfer zu verstehen, sondern vielmehr als autonome Individuen, die ein Recht auf Anerkennung haben. Dazu sind rechtliche wie politische Rahmenbedingungen nötig, die tatsächlich die Selbstbestimmung der Ausübung einer solchen Tätigkeit sicherstellen. Verletzung von Integrität und damit die Erfahrung von Vulnerabilität liegt im strukturellen Ausschluss von bestimmten Rechten innerhalb einer Gesellschaft, die andere selbstverständlich für sich in Anspruch nehmen. Dies trifft vielfältig auf Menschen zu, die in der Sexarbeit tätig sind.

Die dritte Ebene schließlich betrifft die *Lebensweise von Individuen und Gruppen*. Hier liegt eine evaluative Form von Missachtung der Integrität vor, wenn Individuen oder Gruppen der soziale Wert abgesprochen wird: „Damit ist gemeint, dass ihrer Art der Selbstverwirklichung innerhalb eines gegebenen sozialen Überlieferungshorizonts keine soziale Wertschätzung entgegengebracht wird."[21] Auf solche Erfahrungen machen Sexarbeitende massiv aufmerksam und beschreiben zugleich, dass ähnliche Missachtungen auch die Nutzer*innen von Sexarbeit treffen können.

Davon ausgehend zieht der Vortrag in Aufnahme einer Konsensethik Konsequenzen für eine ethische Auseinandersetzung mit Sexarbeit als Carearbeit und diskutiert Möglichkeiten ihrer Anerkennung.

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Vulnerability and Reproductive Trauma: A Theological Response

Prof. Margaret D. Kamitsuka

Emeritus Professor of Religion, Oberlin College, USA

The notion of vulnerability is increasingly discussed in feminist philosophy as a basis for an ethics that widens our sense of those whose deaths are grievable (Butler 2009) and creates conditions for respecting the psychological and corporeal integrity of others (Petherbridge). There is also growing interest in trauma theory from psychology (Herman) to philosophy of religion (Boynton and Capretto) to feminist theology (O'Donnell and Cross). Trauma and vulnerability are psychological and socio-political realities with import for reproductive bioethics. This essay gives a critical analysis of two misuses of the notions of vulnerability and trauma in conservative Christian discourses. I argue that these discourses 1) construct pregnant women as vulnerable and needing protection, in order to justify the imposition of anti-abortion laws; and 2) construct reproductive loss (miscarriage and abortion) as a kind of trauma that can only be alleviated by a recognition of the fetus's personhood. I will use some themes drawn from recognition theory to elucidate how ethicists and theologians might better apply notions of vulnerability and trauma when speaking of reproductive endings.

While miscarriage has long been a taboo topic in polite society, there has been an uptick in conservative Christian publications and online ministries focused on bereavement care for reproductive loss. An analysis of these discourses reveals subtle and not-so-subtle attempts to channel miscarriage grief into appropriate forms that cohere with a prolife understanding of maternal duty and fetal status. These Christian ministries present miscarriage univocally as a traumatic event for the prospective mother—a condition that can be lessened by accepting the view that what she lost was a person from the moment of conception, who is now safely in heaven (M.E.N.D).

Prolife discourses have long condemned abortion as an unjust killing, but a growing group of conservative Christians are adopting a different rhetorical strategy that purports to address compassionately the vulnerability of "*both* the woman and her unborn child" (Reardon, 24). These prolife advocates attempt to convince women with unwanted pregnancies that they are being manipulated and victimized by selfish partners, angry parents, and unscrupulous abortion providers. Post-abortion ministries try to convince women who have had abortions that even if they do not realize it, they are deeply traumatized. These women are offered repentance/healing programs and rituals, where they are encouraged to acknowledge not only the humanity of their aborted fetus but the trauma of their loss.

I reference recognition theory in making two points about the ethicality of framing reproductive loss as trauma. First, there is a problem of power. Judith Butler makes this point by linking recognition to the disciplinary, "normative conditions for the production of the subject" (Butler, 4), which seems to describe how Christian discourses construct people who have had an abortion as victims. Through the imposition of a particular prolife script, the trope of trauma is used to induce women to self-identify as injured mothers, thus conforming to a prolife stance on gender roles and fetal demise. The cultural penalty of not aligning oneself with this discursive post-abortion identity is stigmatization as a bad mother or an unrepentant sinner.

Second there is the problem of misrecognition. Prolife Christian discourse masks the medical complexities of pregnancy under the guise of normal, divinely ordained procreation. However, medically, pregnancy is risky. Statistics show that most women come away from pregnancy and birthing with many health complications (Elixhauser and Wier). Research affirms that the rate of spontaneous embryo loss is high, which makes the embryo's ontological status arguably ambiguous, from a philosophical and theological perspective (Devolder and Harris; Shannon and Wolter). Bodies that gestate as well as bodies that grow *in utero* are misrecognized when spoken of in terms of a default natural or God-ordained human process.

Misrecognition is also a factor from a phenomenological perspective. Pregnancy is a diversely experienced phenomenon that may be wanted or unwanted, meaningful or dutiful, fraught or stress-free, and responses to an ended pregnancy may range widely from regret to relief. The prolife insistence that miscarriages be mourned as a baby's death, or that abortion is murder, reflects "patterns of misrecognition" (Haker, 14) that says to the pregnant person: I do not recognize *your* sense of your own precarity; I only recognize the precarity of your fetus and *my* sense of your obligation to that fetus.

Theologically, I am concerned that the trope of trauma elides the real challenge of how vulnerability in pregnancy should be understood from the perspective of the Christian doctrines of creation and providence. Why would God ordain pregnancy to unfold in such a precarious way? Does asserting the grievability of so many lost unborn lives call into question God's providential justice? I explore a theological response by rereading the biblical Annunciation story in terms of reproductive precarity, which emphasizes recognizing power imbalances and the importance of women's reproductive agency.

Key words: vulnerability, grievability, miscarriage, abortion, Christian doctrine

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The Ethical Subject and Structural Sin – In Vulnerability, and Towards Restorative Integrity

Martin Langby

Faculty of Theology, Uppsala University, Sweden

Vulnerability is an inherent condition for humanity since we are vulnerable on several levels.[22] This paper focuses on the vulnerable ethical subject in a world of structural sin. By utilizing a view from Judith Butler of how the ethical subject is formed and upheld through relationships, a social ontology is used to ground moral responsibility towards others that is not only reflective but preemptive. Drawing upon the concept of structural sin from Brian Hamilton, human agency is conditioned and interpellated by it – thus limiting the possibility for morally good choices. Here, structural sin is understood as external *and* internal to the subject.[23] The position presented also relates to how Ryan Darr proposes that human agents have moral responsibility even when 'distorted' in a world of social (or structural) sin.[24]

Further, since the ethical subject is determined by structural sin, a view of integrity related to process is proposed since no unharmed ethical subject is present in this world. Integrity is seen as the functioning of a restorative relation – process – that lessens precarity (understood as situational vulnerability)[25]. This is performed towards, with, and through the other. By combining the concepts mentioned, a view of the relational ethical subject is presented that is not unharmed and never will be in this world, but where moral strife exists because of the social ontology.

Hamilton argues that Butler's concept of 'giving an account of oneself'[26] should be the foundation for moral responsibility since when posited towards the other, the subject is bound by the notion of giving an account of the self (or subject).[27] I call this 'reflective' since the claim reflects the other's speech address. Instead, my view suggests another part that complements and further grounds the moral responsibility towards others not only when a speech act is directed towards the subject but also from the social ontology presented. By being formed and upheld by each other socially, we are responsible for caring for each other that responsibility lies before any speech address. I call this notion 'preemptive' since it precedes the speech address by the other. The subject 'exists' before the physical person is born since the social conditioning of the person into a subject is already there,[28] named 'presocial' in Butler's terms.[29] The setting projected upon the subject is already determined before the subject can address others. We are not solitaries and never will be since we are formed by each other; we are vulnerable to and through each other.

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[22] Catriona Mackenzie, Wendy Rogers, and Susan Dodds, "Introduction: What Is Vulnerability, and Why Does It Matter for Moral Theory?," in *Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy*, ed. Catriona Mackenzie, Wendy Rogers, and Susan Dodds, Studies in Feminist Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

[23] Brian Hamilton, "It's in You: Structural Sin and Personal Responsibility Revisited," *Studies in Christian Ethics* 34, no. 3 (August 2021): 360–80, https://doi.org/10.1177/09539468211009764.

[24] Ryan Darr, "Social Sin and Social Wrongs: Moral Responsibility in a Structurally Disordered World," *Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics* 37, no. 2 (2017): 21–37, https://doi.org/10.1353/sce.2017.0031.

[25] Mackenzie, Rogers, and Dodds, "Introduction: What Is Vulnerability, and Why Does It Matter for Moral Theory?," 4.

[26] Judith Butler, *Giving an Account of Oneself*, 1st ed (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005).

[27] Hamilton, "It's in You," 378–80.

[28] Judith Butler, *Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?* (London; New York: Verso, 2009), 4.

[29] Butler, *Giving an Account of Oneself*, 25.

By acknowledging our vulnerability, we can try to lessen it in each other and thus in ourselves. This process should be directed towards social relationships that encourage freedom and equality since the ethical subject depends on others and our world's social structures. We are bound by each other through a reflective relationship. Butler presents this as 'ethical bonds'[30] and states that "The precarity of life imposes an obligation upon us."[31] This precarity is determined both before and during the existence of a person. Precarity is increased during unjust structures, which can be explained by structural sin. By shaping the subject, structural sin is understood to be what is not edifying for the social constitution of the other.

Butler writes that "If my fate is not originally or finally separable from yours, then the "we" is traversed by a relationality that we cannot easily argue against; or, rather, we can argue against it, but we would be denying something fundamental about the social conditions of our very formation."[32] From the concept of structural sin, we can analyze and further understand how the structuring of the subject formation is distorted, both from within and without. When these conditions are uncovered, measures can be taken to reduce the negative effects upon the world – and thus subject formation.

The social ontology that forms the ethical subject is crucial since its reflection is directed towards itself. If this is taken seriously, one cannot only wait to be addressed (as Hamilton suggests and Butler implies), even though one should answer claims directed towards the subject. As a complement, we should actively seek to reduce the precarity of others and,[33] albeit small but still significant degree, lessen the grip of structural sin in the world that shapes all of it. The latter is probably best performed by invoking structural changes through political means. Even if we cannot remove structural sin as a phenomenon, we can reduce it from a state of severe precarity to one of *more* integrity – even though it is a never-ending process. In order to do so, we must acknowledge our vulnerability and fallenness, conceptualize the ethical subject more aptly, and work preemptively towards more integrity; *together – through each other*.

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[30] Butler, 20.

[31] Butler, *Frames of War*, 2.

[32] Judith Butler, *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* (London; New York: Verso, 2004), 22–23.

[33] Butler, XVII–XIX.

Hospitality as Right and as Holiness: a discussion on two perspectives of hospitality

Lois Lindholm

University College Stockholm, Sweden

The concept of hospitality is widely used in academia. Two prevalent understandings can be found in varied fields such as political theory and theological ethics and will be discussed in this paper, through the work of Seyla Benhabib's *The Rights of Others*[34] and Luke Bretherton's *Hospitality as Holiness*[35]. Both thinkers offer important insights but at the same time present an all too limited view on hospitality. The aim of this paper is thus to critically discuss the above thinkers and to argue that a theological-ethical view on hospitality has more to offer.

Benhabib takes her starting-point from the Kantian hospitality in *Perpetual Peace,* which allows a person the right to entry another country and gives the visitor a right to 'not be treated as an enemy'.[36] But she opposes Kant who meant that this right does not mean a right to be treated as a guest, instead she argues that the right to hospitality should include a right to citizenship and suggests that even if not having fully open borders, we should at least have porous borders.[37] Whilst critiquing Kant, Benhabib's discussion does, in line with that of the 18th century philosopher, revolve around political and civil rights and laws and policies related to those, but does not touch on other viewpoints on hospitality. Thus, even if she presents a more generous account than Kant, Benhabib remains in a political dimension which seems a limited exposition of hospitality - since hospitality takes place in more dimensions than the political. This does not rule out to consider hospitality as a right, but such a perspective should be coupled with a view on the social aspect of hospitality, which could rather be affiliated with Martha Nussbaum's view on human rights – where rights are based in human dignity and *sociability*.[38]

Another view of hospitality is offered by Bretherton who discusses the subject in relation to ethical disputes that arise between Christians and non-Christians. Bretherton moves in theological and political landscapes. He ends up suggesting the hospice movement as a good example of the Christian practice of hospitality. Hospices have been able to offer a context in which different moral tradition can meet and find some consensus.[39] Even if Bretherton describes hospitality as being a part of the Church's rhythm of feasting and fasting and as having an eschatological forward-looking, he claims that the focal point of hospitality is the stranger. As in the case of Benhabib, Bretherton offers points of insight but can likewise be questioned for a limited view on Christian hospitality since his focus on vulnerable strangers risks omitting other groups - such as family and friends - and exclude other aspects of hospitality than that of vulnerability - such as fellowship and joy. For example, participants at the eschatological feast are considered to have been adopted as God's children, the feast is sometimes described as a wedding held among friends. Further, Bretherton presents the idea that Christian hospitality was inaugurated at Pentecost which seems to put a too strong emphasize on a new testament perspective.[40] What about aspects of hospitality in the Hebrew bible? Or the idea that God, as the creator, is the host who invites humans to share in the world and whose hospitality does not originate from a point of estrangement - but one of fellowship?

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[34] Seyla Benhabib, *The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens*, (New York: Cambridge University Press. 2004

[35] Luke Bretherton, *Hospitality as Holiness: Christian Witness Amid Moral Diversity*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).

[36] Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual peace: A Philosophical Essay,* (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1992), 137.

[37] Benhabib, *The Rights of Others,* 221.

[38] Martha Nussbaum, *Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species membership* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007), 159-160.

[39] Bretherton, *Hospitality as Holiness*, 183-189.

[40] Bretherton, *Hospitality as Holiness*, 143.

The language of showing hospitality to the stranger has a long tradition in Christian theology[41] and since Emmanuel Levinas introduced 'the Other' to ethics[42], that language has become even more emphasized. Welcoming the stranger with openness is of course a sympathetic call we should adhere to. Troublesome though is the inherent alterity in Levinas 'the Other' and that the subsequent ethical demand in the meeting with the stranger sets a certain limiting tone to discussions on hospitality. As much as that tone points to important aspects of the stranger, Christian theology and ethics has more to say on the topic – avenues which could enrich conversations that by now may have worn out 'the Other'. This paper takes part in a search of such routes.

Keywords: hospitality, rights, Christian hospitality, estrangement, fellowship

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Vulnerable Integrality

Jessica Ludescher Imanaka

Seattle University, Albers School of Business and Economics, Department of Management, College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Philosophy, USA

Abstract:

"I believe that Saint Francis is the example par excellence of care for the vulnerable and of an integral ecology lived out joyfully and authentically" (LS 10).

"When there is a general breakdown in the exercise of a certain virtue in personal and social life, it ends up causing a number of imbalances, including environmental ones. That is why it is no longer enough to speak only of the integrity of ecosystems. We have to dare to speak of the integrity of human life, of the need to promote and unify all the great values" (LS 224).

"The parable (of the Good Samaritan) shows us how a community can be rebuilt by men and women who identify with the vulnerability of others, who reject the creation of a society of exclusion, and act instead as neighbors, lifting up and rehabilitating the fallen for the sake of the common good. At the same time, it warns us about the attitude of those who think only of themselves and fail to shoulder the inevitable responsibilities of life as it is" (FT 67).

This paper explores the interdependence of vulnerability and integrity and proposes a framework of vulnerable integrality. The proposed framework arises from the author's sustained engagement with Catholic Social Teaching, particularly the encyclicals of Pope Francis, as they are informed by critique of structural injustices. However the paper does not purport to work exclusively within the Catholic Social Tradition. Rather, it draws insights from Pope Francis' writings, while integrating them with contemporary philosophical insights on virtue, vulnerability and precarity.

Pope Francis' model of integral ecology in *Laudato Si'* inspires the idea of vulnerable integrality as one that recognizes a connection between care for the integrity of creation and defense of vulnerable members of society ("cry of the earth / cry of the poor" 49). The integral ecology model takes us beyond fragmented approaches towards one that addresses "one complex crisis" (139) wherein environmental, social, political, economic, cultural, and justice issues intersect. The integration of these spheres with their challenges and potentialities does not presume an *integer* where harm is absent but rather a wholeness in which the brokenness of humanity and creation is encountered, embraced, and included. Ecological conversion opens us to the transformative orientation of integral ecology. Vulnerability before creation and God would serve as a step towards such conversion, calling us deeper into relationships of loving connection with other people and beings, especially in their vulnerability. (This process is experienced in the First Principle and Foundation and First Week of the Spiritual Exercises of Saint Ignatius; Pope Francis being a Jesuit arguably draws from the Exercises in Laudato Si'). So, while the term integrity connotes "wholeness" or "completeness", originally in Latin meaning "unharmed" (as in bodily integrity), in Laudato Si' the sense of wholeness incorporates the harmed, those who harm, the wounds of violence, and vulnerability as integral to creation as it is. From the Catholic Social Teaching viewpoint, these normative concepts of vulnerability and integrity exist in dynamic tension between sin and grace. Pope Francis' emphasis on what is "integral" moves beyond the connotation of virtue towards a sense of integration in a

holistic outlook: integrality. Vulnerability is integral to wholeness, as what precedes and remains in the whole, and the whole itself exists in a state of vulnerability: as vulnerable integrality.

While the Catholic Social Tradition has held a longstanding commitment to the most vulnerable members of society (with its preferential option for the poor), numerous philosophical studies have sought to establish the fundamental vulnerability of all life, in addition to considerations of special vulnerabilities and the ways that these are socio-politically produced and reproduced unjustly. Huth (2020) has persuasively argued that the construal of vulnerability as a central normative concept does much to ameliorate the problems with modern liberal and utilitarian theories, especially regarding the reconfiguration of autonomy as relational. Even so, Huth exposes an inner dialectic of the vulnerability concept that evades easy control by its purveyors and against which vigilance must be maintained, lest vulnerability enable discourses and practices of exclusion, stereotyping, social control, disempowerment, and power accretion. The framework of vulnerable integrality takes heed of these warnings and seeks to avoid excessive centering of vulnerability. The framework draws from Young's (2013) social connection model as well as Butler's (2021) theorizations of nonviolence to emphasize mutual empowerment through solidarity in relation to vulnerability (Vögele 2020). As opposed to a notion of integrity as invulnerability, we foreground "negative capability" as requiring and embodying virtues like integrity (Crossman and Doshi 2015). Finally, we round out this framework with an emphasis on moral imagination in relation to the good (Murdoch 1994; Wiinikka-Lydon 2020). These philosophical approaches complement and deepen the relationship between vulnerability and integrity in Pope Francis' writings in a framework we are calling: vulnerable integrality.

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Die Wahrung der Patient:inneintegrität durch die Berücksichtigung sozialer Vulnerabilitäten in der onkologischen Behandlungsplanung

Christine Mainka

PhD student, Arbeitsbereich Medizinethik / Institut für experimentelle Medizin
Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel / Universitätsklinikum Schleswig-Holstein, Germany
Co-Autorinnen und Projektleitende: **Claudia Bozzaro** (Medizinethik, Institut für experimentelle Medizin; Promotionsbetreuende), **Anne Letsch** (Internistische Onkologie, UKSH), **Katrin Liethmann** (Zentrum für Integrative Psychiatrie), **Claudia Schmalz** (Klinik für Strahlentherapie, UKSH)

Vulnerabilität und Integrität werden im bioethischen Kontext meistens als Eigenschaften eines Individuums verstanden: Menschen werden auf Grund bestimmter Merkmale als vulnerabel –im Sinne von schutzbedürftig – angesehen und es ist ein zentrales Gebot in der medizinischen Ethik die körperliche Integrität – im Sinne der Unversehrtheit – zu wahren. Wir möchten ausgehend von einem eher systemischen Verständnis von Vulnerabilität und Integrität zeigen, weshalb soziale und lebensweltliche Faktoren auch als Bestandteile von Vulnerabilität und Integrität in der klinischen Praxis stärker berücksichtigt werden sollten. Wir werden dies am Beispiel unseres SOFA-Projekts zeigen.

Im Rahmen des Vortrags sollen folgende drei Schritte dargestellt werden:

a) Zunächst wird die Ausgangsthese des Projekts vorgestellt.
Das SOFA-Projekts geht von der Annahme aus, dass die sozialen und lebensweltlichen Faktoren, wie z. B. die familiäre und finanzielle Situation, der Freundeskreis und der Wohnort, als fortwirkender Teil des Menschen ausgehend von seiner leiblichen Situation zu verstehen sind und in der Therapie Berücksichtigung erfahren müssen, um die **Patient:inneintegrität** zu wahren. Dabei gehen wir von anthropologischen Annahmen aus, die den Menschen als relationales Wesen verstehen, dessen leibliches In-der-Welt-sein über die eigenen körperlichen Grenzen der Haut hinaus, hinein in ein Beziehungsgeflecht von Menschen, Dingen und Räumen fortwirkt. Eine Medizin, die die Integrität der Patient:innen wahren will, muss die Situiertheit des jeweiligen Menschen innerhalb eines solchen Gefüges erkennen, anerkennen und berücksichtigen.

Das SOFA-Projekt hat die Entwicklung eines Screening-Instruments SOzialer und lebensweltlicher FAktoren für onkologische Patient*innen zum Ziel, um durch Antizipation / Berücksichtigung sozialer und lebensweltlicher Faktoren bei Entscheidungen vor einer onkologischen Therapie, in deren Verlauf als auch bei deren Beendigung eine Verbesserung der Behandlungssituation zu erreichen. Dafür nutzen wir empirisch erhobene Daten und kombinieren diese mit philosophisch-ethischen Ansätzen. Die Einbettung onkologischer Patient*innen in ein soziales Umfeld und die Berücksichtigung sozialer und lebensweltlicher Rahmenbedingungen sowie Einflussfaktoren werden im Rahmen multidisziplinärer Therapieentscheidungen onkologischer Behandlungsteams oft nur unsystematisch thematisiert und berücksichtigt. Dabei zeigen Unzufriedenheit mit der Versorgung, ungeplante Krankenhaus-Einweisungen, nicht erkannte Komplikationen, Nebenwirkungen sowie Therapieabbrüche, dass onkologische Therapien ohne Berücksichtigung **sozialer Vulnerabilitäten** nur schwer durchführbar sind.

b) Um diese Zielsetzung zu erreichen, muss geklärt werden was unter „sozialer Vulnerabilität" zu verstehen ist. Wir wollen daher in einem zweiten Schritt erste Überlegungen dazu vorstellen, wie soziale Vulnerabilitäten systematisch erkannt und definiert werden können.

Onkologische Patient:innen sind vornehmlich von körperlicher Vulnerabilität gekennzeichnet. Wir wollen die Form von Vulnerabilität, die aus der individuellen sozialen Situation der Patient:innen resultieren kann, fokussieren. Diejenigen lebensweltlichen Umstände, die eine negative Auswirkung auf die Therapie-Adhärenz haben, können als soziale Vulnerabilitäten bezeichnet werden. Die Eingrenzung

‚soziale Vulnerabilität' ist dabei als eine Form von Vulnerabilität neben anderen (z. B. der körperlichen Vulnerabilität) zu verstehen, die sich z. B. auf die finanzielle und familiäre sowie die Wohnsituation bezieht. Soziale Vulnerabilität kann als momentane, veränderliche, eher mittelfristige Situation, in der sich ein Mensch befindet, auftreten, aber auch als strukturelle, gesellschaftliche Vulnerabilität. Das Erfassen potentieller soziale Vulnerabilitäten ermöglicht eine deutlich individuellere Handlungsgrundlage bzw. Entscheidungsgrundlage für Behandlungskonzepte in der onkologischen Therapie. Um die soziale Vulnerabilität in systematischer Weise zu adressieren, werden wir die von Luna (2009) und Mackenzie et. al (2014) erarbeiteten Vulnerabilitätskonzepte nutzen. So können verschiedene lebensweltliche Herausforderungen der Patient:innen als Schichten von Verletzlichkeit (‚layers of vulnerability') nach Luna (2009: 123) verstanden werden. Diese Schichten sind zum einen immer kontextabhängig, zum anderen können sie sich summieren. Währenddessen teilen Mackenzie et al. die Ursprünge sozialer Vulnerabilität in drei (nicht streng voneinander abzugrenzende) Kategorien: inhärent, situativ, pathogen (2014: 7-9). Inhärente Gründe für Vulnerabilität liegen in der Person begründet (z. B. schwache Resilienz), während situative Quellen von Vulnerabilität sich etwa mit dem hier vorgestellten Verständnis lebensweltlicher bzw. sozialer Vulnerabilitäten decken. Situative Vulnerabilität kann kurzfristig, mittelfristig oder strukturell auftreten. Pathogene Ursprünge von Vulnerabilität meinen nach Mackenzie et al. solche, die überhaupt erst durch (evtl. wohlgemeinte) Schutzregelungen entstehen (ebd.).

c) In einem letzten Schritt wollen wir kurz auf die Risiken einer systematischen Erfassung sozialer Vulnerabilitäten eingehen.
Durch die Bestimmung vorliegender sozialer Vulnerabilitäten und deren Einbeziehung im Tumorboard besteht die Gefahr erneuter Exklusionstendenzen und sogenannter pathogener Vulnerabilitäten (Mackenzie et al. 2014: 9). Gemeint ist damit die Gefahr der Diskriminierung von Patient:innen, die bestimmte Lebensbedingungen aufweisen, welche in vielen Fällen eine Therapie erschweren mögen. Keinesfalls sollte deshalb schon im Voraus eine Entscheidung gegen eine bestimmte Form der Therapie nur anhand der vorherigen Zuordnung der Patientin zu einer bestimmten Gruppe, z. B. der Alleinstehenden oder der von Wohnungsunsicherheit Betroffenen, erfolgen. Wenn dem so wäre, würde auch von dieser Seite aus eine Verletzung der Integrität des erkrankten Menschen stattfinden.

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Können Menschen durch Roboter in ihrer moralischen Vulnerabilität erreicht und verletzt werden?

Prof. Dr. Arne Manzeschke

Evangelische Hochschule Nürnberg, Anthropologie und Ethik für Gesundheitsberufe, Germany

Können Menschen durch Roboter in ihrer moralischen Vulnerabilität erreicht und verletzt werden?

Problemskizze
Menschen interagieren zunehmend mit Robotern. Dabei geht es längst nicht mehr um einen rein instrumentellen Gebrauch der Technik. Sehr bewusst und geradezu programmatisch (etwa in der Förderpolitik des BMBF) werden Roboter als Interaktions- oder Kooperationspartner des Menschen avisiert: „Technische Systeme entwickeln sich immer mehr von reinen Werkzeugen zu kooperativen Interaktionspartnern. Das eröffnet vielfältige Chancen in unterschiedlichen Lebensbereichen. Sie werden Menschen zunehmend in Arbeitskontexten oder in Alltagssituationen unterstützen und einen wichtigen Beitrag leisten, ihre Produktivität, soziale Teilhabe, Gesundheit oder Alltagskompetenz zu stärken." (BMBF 2013)

Roboter als technische Systeme, die als ›verkörperte KI‹ verstanden werden können, agieren auf funktionaler Ebene in direkter Nähe mit dem Menschen. Zukünftig sollen sie auch sozial und emotional interagieren. Jenseits der Frage, ob die zugrunde liegende Hypothese, dass auf dieser verbreiterten Kommunikations- und Interaktionsebene die Roboter zu einer höheren Produktivität, zu mehr Sicherheit, menschlicher Freiheit und Teilhabe oder sogar zu einem ›guten Leben‹ beitragen, interessiert hier vor allem, ob in dem sich abzeichnenden Interaktionsverhältnis auch moralische Dimensionen eine Rolle a) spielen können bzw. b) spielen sollen. Während a) auch eine technische Frage ist, zeichnet sich bei der zweiten Frage b) ab, dass die Entscheidung über eine solche Konstruktion in jedem Fall eine moralische Frage darstellt.

Auch für die Europäische Union ist die Frage nach dem Umgang mit ›ever more sophisticated robots» eine veritable ethische Frage, die eine prompte Antwort verlangt: "Humankind stands on the threshold of an era when ever more sophisticated robots, bots, androids and other manifestations of artificial intelligence („AI") seem to be poised to unleash a new industrial revolution, which is likely to leave no stratum of society untouched. The development of robotics and artificial intelligence raises legal and ethical issues that require a prompt intervention at EU level." (EU 2015)

Die hier interessierende Frage lautet: Können Roboter Menschen in moralischer Hinsicht verletzen? Gilt also die moralische Vulnerabilität von Menschen, die stets relational zu denken ist, auch gegenüber Akteuren, von denen zunächst einmal angenommen wird, dass sie nicht den Status eine moralischen Akteurs haben?

Durchführung
In einem ersten Schritt ist zu fragen, ob sich das Problem anders darstellt, wenn man Roboter als moralische Akteure anerkennte. Hierbei wäre noch mal zu unterscheiden zwischen a) Roboter, denen ein gewisses moralisches Konzept einprogrammiert worden ist, und b) solchen, bei denen wir Menschen unterstellen, dass sie Moral mit ihrer künstlichen Intelligenz erlernen
Der Vortrag exponiert das Problem als ein Problem der angewandten Ethik. Im Feld der Forschung und Entwicklung von Robotern bilden die angedeuteten Überlegungen den konkreten, aber nicht immer expliziten Boden, auf dem Technikentwicklung betrieben wird. Anhand unterschiedlicher Konzeptionen von Ethik bzw. Moral in und mit Maschinen wird die Frage ausgearbeitet (Anderson/Anderson 2011; Lin et al 2017; Misselhorn 2018). Ziel ist nicht, eine abschließende Antwort zu geben, sondern vielmehr ein methodisches Reflexionsniveau zur Verfügung zu stellen, auf dem Technikentwicklung moralisch verantwortlich betrieben werden kann.

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Non-dichotomy between vulnerability and integrity. An alternative perspective from Chinese philosophy

Xin Mao

Uppsala University, Sweden

The often dichotomy between vulnerability as being exposed to harm, and integrity as being unharmed creates a framework for moral questions such as protection, responsibility, autonomy, relationality and ethics of care. The current talk, instead of looking at either concepts and their own moral implications, will rather examine the dichotomy between these two concepts and problems brought by such dichotomy. Seeing vulnerability and integrity as wound and unharmed in an antagonistic sense can create conceptual and normative problems.

First of all, vulnerability seen as negative status of individuals in society often encourages the individuals to seek reduction of such status in order to achieve a status of integrity. But on an ontological and conceptual level, vulnerability as being exposed to harm and integrity as unharmed represent two extremities of the spectrum, which is based upon a process of atomization of individuals in the society. The avoidance of exposedness of embodied experience as it might lead to harm, is often seen in accordance with the dominance of rationality. The either/ or leads to a closed individual sphere of security, which costs the modern society its important solidarity and results in alienated relation with nature.

Facing this challenge, some feminist philosophers developed the notion of vulnerability with an intention to recognize the essentiality of vulnerability and even see it as a base for a new humanism (Murphy 2011). They desire to balance the domination of autonomy in the tradition of western philosophy with vulnerability. Vulnerability, still as opposed to integrity, now is claimed to be a weapon against the male dominated conceptual system that relies on autonomy and integrity.

Yet many philosophers including feminist philosophers question the over-praised concept of vulnerability and claim for difficulty at a normative level to understand the precise relation between vulnerability and autonomy, as for them, the latter is after all needed to prevent any possible abuse of vulnerability as such.

In order to explore alternative possibilities for a relation between vulnerability and integrity that can address the above mentioned problems, I turn to Chinese philosophy for a conceptual reconstruction. Comparing to the Western counterpart of discussions on vulnerability and integrity, the Chinese philosophical tradition has been rarely discussed, yet one can find rich ideas concerning these two concepts in classic Chinese philosophical discussions. A brief review can show that, vulnerability (柔, 弱) and integrity (诚, 德), never had a relation of dichotomy. It needs to be indicated out that there are other possible concepts to translate vulnerability and integrity, but these four characters are the most often translations made by sinologists and Chinese philosophers.

First of all, vulnerability as 柔 can be seen as a meaning derived from the image of tender shoots from a tree. 弱 on the other hand is associated with two bows that are loss and cannot be used to defend oneself. 柔 and 弱 both made tremendous appearance in the classics in both Confucianism and Daoism where they are defined as continuous of life and the essence of Dao, the ultimate truth in universe. Turning towards the concept of integrity in Chinese thinking, I will mainly look at the related notion of 德 and 诚. Integrity as 德 has richer meanings in Daoism than in Confucianism, which will be the matter of focus for the current discussion. 德 in Daoism is signified with a picture of eyes in the middle of a road, which broadly means people's ability to follow Dao. As Dao is an invisible way of the universe, 德 is

people's understanding of the Dao. 诚 pictures words that pronounce Dao which is another way to express a human interpretation of Dao without obstruction. I will hence examine 诚 and 德, especially how they are stressed as people's way to follow Dao and its ultimate way of nourishing life.

Hence in the current paper, after locating the problems created by the dichotomy between vulnerability and integrity, I examine closely vulnerability as 柔 and 弱and integrity as 德 and 诚 in Chinese philosophy.

Following these tow conceptual clarification, I will locate the relation between vulnerability and integrity as characters of Dao and people's understanding of Dao. They together indicate the central theme of Chinese philosophical tradition, a dedication following the movement of the universe for eternal continuous of life.

I will then compare the relation between vulnerability and integrity in Chinese philosophy with their relation as dichotomy in western tradition, and analyse how from the alternative perspective of Chinese philosophy, the above mentioned two problems can be addressed. I will argue that by framing vulnerability and integrity as two inter-related ways to promote the eternal continuous of life, one can cast new light on the problem between autonomy and relationality, even the problem of the alienated relation between human embodiment and nature as a whole.

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Form, style and content. Sketching possibilities for a critique of the climate ethical discussion on individual moral responsibility for climate change

Emma Molin

University College Stockholm, Sweden

This paper is part of an ongoing PhD project which has as its overall aim to constitute a critique of the current climate ethical discussion on individual moral responsibility for climate change. As for his paper, I propose to begin the work of outlining-, and reflecting upon the possibility of such a critique by way of engaging polemically with Lauri Lahikainen's critical approach to the same moral theoretical question- that of individual moral responsibility for climate change. For this purpose I draw, as does Lahikainen, on the critical work of Theodor Adorno. However, I do so differently from Lahikainen, which is what creates the polemical feature of this text, and which hurls this paper in a direction different from his. As a help in this endeavour, I draw occasionally upon selected works of Fredric Jameson and Carl Cassegård respectively, as they have both engaged with Adorno, each in a way relevant for this thesis; Jameson by way of form and style and Cassegård by relating Adorno to climate change.

Beginning to map out his thesis on individual moral responsibility for climate change, Lauri Lahikainen suggested that the field of research commonly referred to as 'climate ethics' is, in fact, analytical climate ethics.[43] Thus, while there are, of course, other philosophical approaches to climate change, which do not draw upon an analytical Anglo-American tradition of thought[44], climate *ethics* (at least outside theology) seems to be that specific moral-theoretical thinking related to problems of for instance climate justice, geoengineering, population growth, future generations and the moral responsibility of individuals, states, corporations and other actors.[45]

However, as Lahikainen proposes that climate ethics is in fact *analytical* climate ethics, he does so not so much suggest this in order to take the specific analytical feature of climate ethics as an object of critique, but rather to bring to the fore an assumption which has hitherto (mis)guided it; namely that climate change is a result of disparate individual fossil emissions. Thus, Lahikainen's issue lies not with analytical philosophy, or analytical climate ethics »as such«, but with how analytical climate ethics portrays the reality of climate change. This since climate change, according to him, is not a result of disparate individual fossil emissions, but of capitalism. Which I agree to and which I also intend to side with, though I will perhaps not get all the way there in this paper.

The reason why this will have to wait is because I think that this critique, and the critical project itself, significantly alters if one also considers the very *form* for philosophical thinking itself. After all, Adorno himself held analytical philosophy to be linked with a "petty bourgeois scientific ethos".[46] Likewise Jameson holds Anglo-American analytical writing to be connected to a class ideology and to the (over) production of texts in which the reader can salute ready-made ideas.[47] For a less Marxist driven text, one can also turn to for instance Andrew Bowie's *German philosophy, a very short introduction*, where two of modernity's interrelated features are the rise of capitalism and the success of natural sciences and analytical philosophy's use of the latter's methods.[48] As such, I think a critique of the dominance of analytical thinking

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[43] Lahikainen, 2016, p. 15-16.
[44] Carl Cassegård's *Toward a critical theory of nature. Nature, capital and dialectics,* Bloomsbury Academics, 2021, is an example of one such approach.
[45] References will of course be provided in full in the paper.
[46] Theodor Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, Routledge, 1973, p. 29-30.
[47] Fredric Jameson, *Marxism and form. Twentieth-century dialectical theories of literature*, Princeton University press, 1974, p. xiii, 386.
[48] Andrew Bowie, *German philosophy. A very short introduction*, Oxford university press, 2010, p. 61,66, 114.

in climate ethics is not only warranted, but necessary, when departing from a Marxist critical-theoretical thinking such as Adorno's.

Therefore, I would like to suggest that, as critique aims at reified forms life; thought, language, relations, logic and economic- and social structures as well as practices to name a few, critique is relevant also for the analytical form of philosophizing itself- and begin there. This is not to say, however, that analytical philosophy is disposable.[49] Rather it is a matter of inquiring into its place along with a critique of instances where it is the dominant mode of thought. As it is in climate ethics. Such a critique is relevant, I argue, as capitalism is tied to climate change *and* to nature being divided into parts, which analytical philosophy contributes to. Thus, capitalism both in relation to philosophy and to other structures of our time needs critique, why one based a Marxist and continental tradition may respond to this.

Keywords; Critique, climate ethics, Theodor Adorno

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Patients in health care as data assemblages - a threat to human integrity?

Tabea Ott

Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nuremberg, Faculty of Humanities, Social Sciences, and Theology, Department of Theology, Germany

Patients in health care as data assemblages - a threat to human integrity?
The collection and storage of large data sets and the application of learning systems are revolutionizing health care. They come along with the great hope to improve diagnosis and treatment by more precise and more extensive measurements of human physical and psychological functioning. In this context, patients appear as "data assemblages". In diagnostic evaluation and assessment processes, the extracted health data gain a certain form of independence towards their source, the identifiable natural person. In medical "meaning-making processes", data are interpreted through human-machine interactions and are considered to be expressive about a person. Even the detection of mental deviation should become possible through the acquisition and evaluation of body parameters by learning systems. (Sheikh et al. 2021; Garcia-Ceja et al. 2018) In the future, this could allow diagnosis and treatment without a person having to speak.

These developments are associated with great hopes, e.g., for the treatment of comatose persons, but they also entail the risk that data will become "representatives" of a person. This means that data are used as an advocate for a person, while the person herself cannot relate to the data. The data become detached from a person's own narrative and self-reference, which cannot simply be achieved by including more or different types of data – such as so-called "lifestyle data". Health care that aims to draw an ever more integrated picture of a person must be sensitive to what constitutes human integrity and how it can be affected by the representative use of data. Furthermore, this paper argues that what is required when speaking about data usage in health care is a shift from data "representation" towards data "articulation". "Data articulation" takes seriously the open-endedness of a person's integrity. It attempts to interlink the data interpretation to a person's own relational narrative, which is itself unfinished and interwoven with otherness.

With critical reference to vulnerability theories, integrity is explored in the context of a person's openness, opacity and, theologically speaking, "Geheimnishaftigkeit" (mysteriousness) (Jüngel 2010). With regard to Wilfried Joest and Bernhard Waldenfels integrity is examined as a complex intertwining of self-reference and external reference. It is linked to the responsive and open-ended structure of identity formation. Drawing on Donna Haraway's "politics of articulation" (Haraway 1992), the paper finally explores how the collection and use of digital interpreted health data could harm a person's integrity if the complex interplay of self-reference and external reference is not sufficiently taken into account.

Key Words: integrity, vulnerability, data, health care, identity, representation, articulation

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Chaplaincy in health care and other institutions: presence in situations of vulnerability

Prof. Dr. Traugott Roser

Evangelisch-Theologischen Fakultät, Universität Münster, Germany

Co-author Dr. Nika Höfler

Background
Pastoral care in recent years has seen a growing demand to legitimize its access to health care institutions and position within a highly professional field. Traditional religious or legal arguments no longer seem valid in a secular and multifaith environment. Advocates of a spiritual care approach to health care chaplaincy argued that self-applied role descriptions of chaplains as strangers within the clinical context, offering time and presence without therapeutic goals and outside of hierarchical systems would lead to a self imposed exclusion from health care. Moreover, future funding pastoral care is heavily discussed. While in Germany clinical pastoral care still funded by mainstream churches, some European countries have included spiritual care as part of public health care, while others fund spiritual care by clinics and private institutions. In short: within the evidence-oriented context of health care, professional pastoral care needs evidence to legitimize its specific contribution.

Goals
We understand health care chaplaincy as a research-informed profession. With our research project we hope to identify factors for effectiveness of health care chaplaincy from within the practical field in three parts. Following a qualitative design, parts I and II develop categories of effectiveness that correspond to both theology and health care science. The central research question is: *What determines effectiveness of pastoral care in health care?* In Part III we hope to develop a reliable tool for quantitative measurement of effectiveness. The paper reports on parts I and II of the project.

Methods
Case reports written by chaplains gave access to self-reported practical experience. Case reports function as narrative reconstruction of reality as perceived from practicioners' point of view. 39 written case reports (21 by female chaplains) were analyzed following Grounded Theory Methodology. The conceptual construct of "vulnerability " emerged as the core category that shapes the entire material. Effectiveness of pastoral care is related to vulnerability in four main categories: a) a context of vulnerability, b) a condition of "otherness" of clinical pastoral care, c) the relationship between action and reaction, and d) strategies of action.

a) Chaplaincy is called in states of vulnerability in physical (somatic illness) and psychological dimensions (stress of adaption and coping) of the patient. Vulnerability also exists in the social structure of patients' family systems or in deficient communication between hospital and patient.
b) Chaplains act as representatives of religious teachings and at the same time expose themselves with their personal spirituality. Pastors are vulnerable in and because of their role, often met with trust and scepticism in equal measure: the social position is institutionally vulnerable, but at the same time lives from the fact that it is called upon in situations of institutional uncertainty.
c) Chaplains describe an interplay of action and reaction: clients react to spiritual offers, chaplains react to spiritual needs. Situations of vulnerability are dealt with the performance of rituals and counseling. Trust is generated by empathic, sensitive and resonating communication skills. Strategies of action in states of vulnerability frequently occur in gestures of bodily affection, ritual touching, and creating space (in terms of time and place) for experiences of vulnerability.
d) Chaplains describe positive changes: they are able to support clients in search for meaning, enduring the fragility of life and giving access to familiar forms of religiosity. One effect is that chaplains are vulnerable in their emotional and spiritual stability through the encounter with situations of suffering.

Consistent with the case report study, vulnerability also proves to be a core category in Part II, narrative interviews with patients and staff members, analyzed following Grounded Theory Methodolgy. For clients, it is also the context of vulnerability that causes the need for pastoral care, with the modification that it must be a *subjective* sense of vulnerability.

In Parts I and II of the research project we were able to describe that the specific contribution of health care chaplaincy is that chaplains are competent in dealing with vulnerability. We describe vulnerability as a genuine human condition that includes the possibility of being hurt, being the weak spot in systems or in relation to people. Vulnerability can be understood as sensitivity and susceptibility to mistakes and damage. Vulnerability has a potential for change. Vulnerability in chaplaincy occurs on all three levels involved (chaplains, clients, and the institution). It is manifest in physical, psychological, social and spiritual dimensions, due to the genuinely vulnerable situation dealing with illness and death for all those involved.

Discussion

Our empirical findings fit well within current theological and philosophical discourse on vulnerability. The Barcelona Declaration (1998) identified four fundamental ethical principles for a European bioethics law: Autonomy, Dignity, Integrity and Vulnerability. Vulnerability as the finiteness and fragility of life is the basis for the necessity of moral action: Vulnerability calls for 'care' as treatment, nursing and provision, because the vulnerable are those whose dignity, autonomy or integrity is threatened.

By identifying competence in dealing with vulnerability as the specific contribution of health care chaplaincy, we hope to establish a new, human rights-oriented rationale for spiritual care in the context of the bioethical discussion.

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Accompanying Refugees to Construct a Home Contributions of Spiritual Care to Integrity of Vulnerable Groups

Prof. Dr. Hansjörg Schmid

Swiss Center for Islam and Society (SZIG/CSIS)
University of Fribourg, Switzerland

Key words: refugees, home, integrity, chaplain, counselling, spiritual care, Islam

Refugees find themselves in a highly vulnerable situation. However, even during the asylum application process, their basic existential, security and social have to be met by host countries. These needs are closely related to the "home" a person has or seeks to have, which can be seen as a prerequisite for human integrity. In the context of migration and flight, the home becomes fluid and refugees are confronted by insecurity and instability. Moreover, they are in a transitional situation that is characterised on the one hand by memories of their home country and dealing with the history of their flight, and on the other hand by expectations for the future, but also by the everyday experience of waiting. In addition, the situation in asylum accommodations in host countries is characterised by spatial constriction as well as numerous tensions and conflicts in everyday life. Thus, a structural tension remains, since asylum accommodation can become a kind of home, but it will never be like the home that the refugees have left or aspire to reach. Nevertheless, refugees with their own agency can shape asylum accommodation as a kind of temporary home with their ability to act, but also through interactions with others.

In many Western countries, spiritual care is provided for refugees. Due to the highly diverse backgrounds of asylum-seekers, both an intercultural and interreligious approach are required. As there is a high portion of refugees with a Muslim background, Muslim chaplains play an important role in their accompaniment. Like other chaplains they counsel individuals on their life situation, but they can also play a crucial role in the "co-construction of home" (Börjesson & Söderqvist Forkby, 2020, 483), both in terms of space and relationships, by conveying home linguistically, culturally and religiously. In view of the particular situation in refugee accommodations and the needs of highly vulnerable beneficiaries, the usual methods of conversation-oriented spiritual care and non-directive counselling reach their limits, and chaplains also act or are expected to act as conflict mediators and religious authorities.

The paper is based on an empirical field research on chaplaincy for refugees undertaken in 2021. In this research, 30 qualitative interviews were conducted to explore how Muslim chaplains understand their interventions (mainly but not exclusively addressed to Muslims) and how these affect refugees both individually and in their social interactions within their accommodation. These effects are examined through the perspectives of different stakeholders such as beneficiaries, Christian chaplains, nurses, security services and other staff who were interviewed during the research. Since Muslim chaplaincy is still conceptually little defined, it is a suitable testing ground for new forms of roles and interventions in a highly diverse and sensitive context. Therefore, this field of practice is ideal for exploring the following questions: Which role does a home play in the integrity of vulnerable groups like refugees? Which approach of counselling and accompaniment in spiritual care is suitable in order to support refugees to shape a provisional home? How significant can a normative stance, e.g. of role model, advisor, guide or religious authority (e.g. imam), be in this process?

In order to explore these questions, the paper is structured as follows: The first part consists of a theoretical reflection based on studies from social work and anthropology which conceptualises the notion of home as key for vulnerable persons and looks at the supportive role of chaplains in home-building. In the second part, exemplary analyses of the interview material are used to examine how three Muslim chaplains accompany refugees, how they practice different styles of chaplaincy work and which effects of their intervention can be discerned. In the third part, the empirical results are brought into a conversation

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with the theoretical starting points and consequences for approaches to spiritual care and connections between counselling, vulnerability and integrity are explored.

The paper shows that understandings of integrity are highly context-dependent and culture-bound and that the mobilisation of spiritual resources can play a paramount role to reach integrity. Therefore, an openness of spiritual care and counselling to different cultural concepts and norms is necessary. Unilaterally autonomy-based counselling concepts do not provide a sufficient basis, but relationship, relationality, guidance and religious authority equally need to be integrated. In terms of intercultural and interreligious ethics, the aim of the paper is to question existing culture-bound presuppositions and to refer to practices in the context of a religion (in this case Islam) as a context of discovery from which consequences for broader ethical concepts can also be drawn.

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Die unsichtbare Vulnerabilität der Young Carers

Prof. Dr. Martina Schmidhuber

Institut für Moraltheologie, Universität Graz, Austria

Young Carers sind Kinder und Jugendliche, die ihre psychisch oder chronisch kranken Eltern oder andere erwachsene Angehörige zu Hause betreuen und pflegen.

Sie sind in vielen Ländern eine unsichtbare Gruppe, die diese unbezahlte Fürsorgearbeit wie selbstverständlich leistet. Young Carers sind aufgrund dieser Tatsache eine äußerst vulnerable Gruppe, wie durch bereits vorliegende Studien belegt wird: sie übernehmen große Verantwortung – meist über viele Jahre hinweg, ihre Lebensqualität ist aufgrund der verwehrten Kindheit und der großen Belastung durch Betreuung und Pflege reduziert, sie sind gefährdet, eine Co-Erkrankung zu entwickeln, sie sind sozial von Gleichaltrigen isoliert und häufig auf Psychotherapie im Erwachsenenalter angewiesen.

In einer qualitativen Pilotstudie wurde den alltäglichen Herausforderungen von Young Carers in Graz nachgegangen, um in weiterer Folge dieser vulnerablen Gruppe im direkten Umfeld Unterstützung bieten zu können. Im Vortrag wird die Studie der Universität Graz mit den vulnerablen Situationen der Young Carers vorgestellt, um anschließend zu zeigen, wie diese unsichtbare Vulnerabilität minimiert werden könnte.

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Wounded Integrity: The Resurrected Body

Prof. Dr. Sarah Stewart-Kroeker

Faculty of Theology, University of Geneva, Switzseland

Keywords: wounds; Christology; resurrection; queer feminist ethics

In the gospel of John, the resurrected Jesus appears to his disciples bearing his crucifixion wounds. Thomas, doubting, declares that unless he touches his hands and places his fingers into his side, he will not believe that Jesus has risen. Jesus acquiesces to this bold overture. Strikingly, the side-wound is penetrable, not closed over like the scar of a healed wound, but open. Thomas puts his fingers *in* the wound on Jesus's side. The resurrected Christ is not restored to the integrity of his pre-crucifixion body.

The significance of the resurrected wounds is not uncontroversial. Feminist and womanist worries about Christian theologies of sacrifice, suffering, and kenosis go back several decades at this point.[50] The contemporary feminist discussion of wounds and vulnerability more broadly takes place against this backdrop. Shelly Rambo has argued for the importance of allowing wounds to surface so that the Spirit can work in the after-life of trauma.[51] By contrast, Karen Kilby and Linn Tonstad think the turn to vulnerability often goes too far – beyond acknowledgment to affirmation.[52] In her recent book *God and Difference*, Tonstad criticizes how Sarah Coakley and Graham Ward treat wounds and the accompanying kenotic elements in gendered and sexed ways in Trinitarian relations. In "On Vulnerability," Tonstad rejects the valorization of both human and divine vulnerability. For Tonstad, the "reason Christianity exists is that people thought they saw the *resurrected* Christ. They did not see a human being who had survived great trauma, emerging scarred, but with his capacity to love intact. They did not see yet another instance of suffering vulnerability. They saw the one who was dead *alive*."[53]

What should we make of these distinct arguments about wounds and the accompanying attitudes toward vulnerability? What are the implications for resurrection bodies? The stakes are high: Christian moral imaginaries are shaped by eschatological hopes, and so the continuity between how we understand earthly vulnerability and our attitudes towards resurrected bodies matters for how we relate to vulnerable bodies. Tonstad's critiques mark a substantive set of difficult questions about wounding and vulnerability in Christian theology.

In *God and Difference*, Tonstad repeatedly returns to the image of the "womb-wound," the wound in Christ's side that has often been read as a vaginal image.[54] The vaginal valences are various: the wound is an opening that bleeds, evoking menstrual blood; it gushes water upon piercing, like water breaking in childbirth; it is an opening that can be penetrated, as by Thomas's fingers. Both Coakley and Ward deploy the erotic aspect of this penetrative imagery in the context of the intimate kenotic relations between members of the Trinity, which also serve as a model for human-divine relations. Tonstad objects that penetration and emptying as the presumed model for intimate relationships reflect a cis-heterosexual paradigm that reinforces divine masculinity and problematically valorizes kenotic self-emptying and suffering. For Tonstad, "the wound-womb in all its forms only extends divine phallicism."[55] So too, presumably, the resurrected "wound-womb," a point that seems obliquely confirmed in Tonstad's rejection

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[50] Barbara Andolsen, Delores Williams, and Emilie Townes have argued against the exploitative possibilities that such theologies contain. Others, like Sarah Coakley and Kristine Culp, have emphasized the importance of vulnerability.

[51] Rambo, *Resurrecting Wounds*.

[52] Kilby, "The Seductions of Kenosis"; Tonstad, "On Vulnerability."

[53] Tonstad, "On Vulnerability," 187.

[54] Tonstad, *God and Difference*, 13, 67-8, 190.

[55] Ibid., 190.

of the risen Christ as "scarred." For Tonstad, Christ's wound-womb associates violent wounding with feminization, thus reinforcing divine masculinity.

I agree that this is highly problematic, though I will argue a) that penetration may remain a site of erotic metaphorology provided it is not restricted by patriarchal cis-heterosexist norms and b) that the resurrection transforms the wounds and thus allows them to remain an uneasy site of subversive gendered reflection. The resurrected wounds refuse a logic of vulnerability that glorifies pain for its own sake – but precisely by refusing a passage from gruesome spectacle to spotless glory. The wounds remain wounds, but they are transformed from earthly wounds that cause pain and death. The wound's vaginal-erotic metaphorical associations are likewise transformed. The wound is no longer a site of fatal violence, but of intimate touch that restores relationship. And if in the chronology of his earthly life, the wounding is a violent act that "feminizes" the male body in pain, this is not so of the resurrected body, which rises with the vaginal wound present from the beginning of this new life, making Christ eternally androgynous. As troubled as the gendered aspects are (and remain), Christ's resurrected wounds claim bodily vulnerability as fundamental to earthly life and yet as transformable when they are part of a vision of resurrected bodily integrity. I argue that this contains constructive ethical possibilities for queer feminist attitudes toward the body.

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Integrity, Vulnerability, and Temporality

Prof. Dr. Christina Traina

Department of Theology, Fordham University, USA

The prompt asks for reflection on the presupposition that in human nature "there is something unharmed, some integrity (Latin *integer* for unharmed) that can be wounded or harmed" or altered through our vulnerability to others and the physical world. Modern visions of the human—for which the baseline reality is a mature, self-possessed, fully capable rational adult—can deal with childhood, senescence, and incapacity of all kinds only as subtractions from this vision. To the extent that "integrity" implies "wholeness," some of us can never fulfill this definition, even absent unjust structural vulnerabilities.

I plan to address a very narrow dimension of the call's prompt: how to speak of integrity in a way that accounts for the temporality and dynamism of individual human lives without relying on a subtractive vision of "compromised" human nature. The three main options affirm important elements of integrity but also have deficiencies. The first affirms either the infusion (within) or divine attribution (from without) of an often-ineffable quality called "dignity" that is an essential element of the human, is equally present in all phases of human life, and is a condition of integrity. This is helpful as a statement of social respect, but the mere assertion or declaration of integrity feels arbitrary and theoretical, even when its characteristics are enumerated. The second, process philosophy, puts vulnerability to change from without at the center of human nature, which honors human openness to the other but makes it difficult to speak of a preexisting integrity; change "happens" to the person that one currently is, and then in an instant, change will again happen to the changed person. It is difficult to locate integrity within a process of constant metamorphosis. The third, which seems to me to be the founding assumption of twentieth-century bioethics, is that we treat children, the elderly, and people with incapacities with dignity in honor of the integrity (seen mainly as rationality and autonomous agency) that they will have, that they once had, or that they would have had but for a misfortune, respectively. This is a useful step, but it implies that these groups lack full *de facto* integrity and are being granted it *de jure*. None of these options addresses integrity in different phases of life adequately.

This paper will focus particularly on children's integrity. Can we describe it in a way that does not depend on a sort of magical attribution of dignity, dissolve their identity, or simply borrow from their presumed future rationality and maturity? Solving this puzzle for children will help us with incapacitated and elderly adults, as well.

I will explore this question from two directions: Work on children's rights, exemplified by John Wall, and critical reflection on Augustinian theories of temporality and memory.

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Vulnerability, Integrity and Love

Prof. Dr. Björn Vikström

Åbo Academy University, Finland

In my paper, I aim to discuss the relationship between vulnerability and integrity through a theological elaboration of the concept of love. My ambition is to discuss how the passive, receptive and vulnerable, dimensions of human existence can be combined with the integrity and responsibility required for human agency.

In Western modernity, there has been a considerable tendency to pose the human subject as a sovereign and autonomous agent, capable of controlling and using nature and its resources for her or his own benefit. The critique of the autonomous subject has been a common trait in many postmodern or late modern endeavors in philosophy, sociology and theology. The German sociologist Harmut Rosa has elaborated an influential recent version of this critique, focusing on the concept of uncontrollability. Acknowledging the uncontrollability of the surrounding world, including other persons, is, according to Rosa, a pre-condition for the capability of the world to resonate with the perceiving human subject. Otherwise, the world is perceived only as a dead entity, composed of things at our disposal. This resonating relation to the world presupposes a vulnerability in the sense that the human subject accepts, that it is never fully in control neither of the world nor of itself.

The critique proposed by Rosa and others has its roots in the German idealism and its reaction to the scientific ideals of the Enlightenment. One key figure is Friedrich Schleiermacher and his stress on the religious-aesthetic experience of total dependence in relation to the Universe. In the aesthetical thinking developed during the German Idealism and Romanticism, one of the main points is to underscore, that nature speaks to the subject before the subject is able to understand, analyze, measure or control it. This idea of a fundamental belongingness to the totality of life has been a key element in the phenomenological-hermeneutical tradition, represented for example by thinkers such as Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. An important figure in the theological field is Paul Tillich, with his concept of "ultimate concern" and his ambition to elaborate the links between theology and aesthetics. There are also considerable affinities between Rosa's description of a resonance between the subject and the world, Martin Buber's "I-and-Thou"-relationship and Paul Ricoeur's notion "cogito blessé", a wounded subject.

These lines of thought have inspired current endeavors to vitalize the connections between philosophy, theology and aesthetics – and, at the same time, between knowledge, religion and art. The Danish philosopher of religion Dorthe Jörgensen argues in her recent books that aesthetics establishes the foundation for both philosophy and theology. As in German Romanticism, she presupposes a pre-linguistic experience of a belongingness and meaningfulness that can be interpreted in several ways in the fields of religion, philosophy and Art studies. One of the main questions in the esthetical thinking of Jörgensen is how the link between a fundamental passivity and a morally responsible activity can be established. Her solution, which I aim to discuss in my paper, is to avoid subjective aestheticism by stressing the universal characteristics of human experience. This raises the critical question, whether her position comes so close to a Kantian universalism, that it as a consequence runs the risk of being blind for the cultural, linguistic and contextual dimensions of human experience.

I propose a slightly different approach, where I elaborate the close relation between aesthetics and ethics in the thinking of Rosa and Jörgensen with the help of the concept of love. In line with many recent contributions to the reflection on love, I will in my paper argue for the need to elaborate expressions of love, where active and passive dimensions of love are able to enrich each other. A sharp distinction between God's love and human love, expressed for example by Anders Nygren in his famous book *Eros and agapé*, runs the risk of overemphasizing the sinfulness and the passivity of the human subject in relation to God. On the other hand, the neoplatonist notion of God as a supreme and perfect being is difficult to combine with the idea that God is love. Love as a longing for mutuality and intimacy presupposes a lack that can

never be wholly satisfied – because this would imply the end of love. To love is not to own or to control another person, but to experience mutual affection and care as a gift that never can be fully understood nor rationally motivated.

This presupposes an understanding of love where vulnerability and integrity are consciously kept in a fruitful and creative relation to each other through the interplay between conflicting, yet complementing terms: love is expressed as both a gift and a task, both as emotion and doing, spontaneity and rationality, care and mutuality, playfulness and justice, liberty and commitment.

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Moral Integrity and Individual Responsibility for Climate Change

Ilias Voiron

Institut de Recherches Philosophiques de Lyon (IRPHIL), Centre de la recherche Eugène Chevreul, France

In the climate ethical debate about whether there is an individual duty to reduce one's greenhouse gas emissions (carbon footprint), it has been argued there is not, because of its causal inefficacy (Johnson 2003; Sinnott-Armstrong 2005). Several kinds of arguments, some causation-based and others noncausation-based (Fragnière 2016), have been proposed to argue for an individual duty of reducing one's carbon footprint, a few of which draw on the notion of moral integrity : in spite of the (hypothetical) causal inefficacy of individual reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, moral integrity would ground a duty to do so (for example Lichtenberg 2010; Hourdequin 2010). In this talk, I want to assess this argument, by analysing the concept of moral integrity that is at stake and investigating how – if at all – it relates to a concept of (moral) vulnerability.

At least two types of argument draw on the concept of moral integrity. According to the first one, moral integrity urges us no to participate to a collective harm like climate change, even if we don't individually make any difference. The second one presupposes a collective obligation to mitigate climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions overall and argues, for the sake of consistency, for an alignment of one's individual behaviour with the morally required collective behaviour. Since these arguments are different, I will deal with them separately, with an emphasis on the second one, for which the concept of moral integrity seems more essential.

About the first argument, I will suggest that no appeal to moral integrity is necessary to make the participation to a collective harm morally bad: causal responsibility seems sufficient. The problem with climate change, though, is that it can be conceived as an overdetermined collective harm ; I will nevertheless try to show that, even in this case, moral responsibility only requires causal responsibility (if conditions such as agency and epistemic conditions are also fulfilled).
I will then turn more extensively to the second argument.

I will first make clear the structure of the argument as follows: (1) there is no causation-based individual duty of reducing one's carbon footprint; (2) there is a collective duty of reducing carbon footprints of all; (3) moral integrity is required ; (4) therefore, there is a non-causation-based individual duty of reducing one's carbon footprint. (We can find this kind of rationale in Hourdequin 2010). To assess whether this argument is convincing, the rest of my presentation will be dedicated to the value of the premises (3) and (4), under the presupposition that (1) and (2) are valid.

Interestingly, and problematically, the strategy of this argument is to appeal to the respect of the integrity of the moral agent, where climate ethical arguments generally appeal to the respect of the integrity of moral patients, i.e. of those vulnerable to climate change bad effects. In the latter case, integrity can be contextually conceived as the state of beings unharmed by climate change-induced effects, and vulnerability as an exposition, due to several factors, to climate change-induced risks. Without causation-based grounds for an individual duty to reduce one's carbon footprint, the argument we are interested in (uneasily) shifts towards the appeal to the integrity of *moral agents* themselves.

From here on, I will follow two lines of questioning to assess premises (1) and (2). First, is moral integrity an authentic *moral* concept, or is it a 'mere' psychological one? Second, does moral integrity *morally* require to reduce one's carbon footprint, as a consequence of the above presuppositions?

First, if moral integrity is often thought of as a virtue (Audi and Murphy 2006), it must be clarified whether this implies that preserving one's moral integrity is *morally required*, or whether it is only a reasonable advice for preserving one's psychological integrity. I will suggest that answering this question

depends on which ethical principles we refer to. More specifically, on the one hand I will suggest that moral integrity can be seen as a duty toward oneself, which raises morally challenging problems. On the other hand, it will appear that moral integrity might be conceived as a consequentialist-based virtue (Jamieson 2007), in which case the psychological aspect of moral integrity could be integrated to its moral aspect. In the first case, moral integrity needs a counterpart, namely 'moral vulnerability' of the self, to make sense ; but not in the second case, where 'moral' integrity is merely instrumental, without instrinsic moral value.

Second, to make sense of the mere possibility of a moral requirement of reducing one's carbon footprint for the sake of moral integrity, this concept must first have appeared – as it is the case – as an authentic moral concept, and not a mere psychological one. But then the applied question arises, whether in the context of climate change described above, moral integrity *indeed* requires that. I will suggest the hypothesis that in this context, moral integrity has essentially an instrumental value, outcome-oriented and not agent-oriented.

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Rethinking the integration of vulnerability and flourishing in the context of life circumstances

Dr. Martina Vuk

Interdisciplinary Institute of Ethics and Human Rights, University of Fribourg, Switzerland

The Covid-19 crisis added an intolerable burden to humanity, not only exposing common experience of vulnerability, but also raise an awareness of how to live a flourishing life in a time of crisis. This further postulate a question on the integration or separateness of the notion vulnerability and flourishing. The puzzling situation between these two notions, however, not only demonstrates the contemporary-oriented denial of vulnerability and appraisal of flourishing, but invokes a search for an adequate stance on the correlation between the concept of flourishing and vulnerability. Moreover, besides conventional agreements on the meaning of vulnerability as a condition of being easily wounded and flourishing as human desire for growth and happiness both concepts requires a pragmatic approach, one where human experience is in the midst of such reflection. Vulnerability and flourishing, in my view, are unique, complex, and ambiguous concepts. First, the notion of vulnerability, on the one hand, is not merely the universal natural capacity to be wounded as most contemporary dictionaries demonstrated but rather a complex and controversial term that does not hinder one from flourishing. It is a human condition accompanied by a degree of recognition or denial depending on the approach undertaken. Flourishing, on the other hand, when associated with quality of life, material and economic benefits, or happiness is an inconsistent and uncertain endeavor. Even the wealthiest and luckiest among humans are threatened by the vulnerability of the human condition expressed through anxiety, periods of darkness, despair, and grief. Going beyond its merely conceptual meaning, the correlation between vulnerability and flourishing as correlational notions within a lifespan intersects with a person´s life circumstances and social relationships. This character of vulnerability and flourishing applied to life circumstances and social relationships demonstrates every person in his or her own particular way of flourishing and vulnerability and binds together vulnerable and non-vulnerable individuals within such life circumstances. In other words, human flourishing concerning the context of life experience and circumstances indicates that flourishing is not only for autonomous self-dependent individuals; rather, it is inclusive of all humans including the "more than vulnerable" (e.g. people with disabilities, women, migrants). This outlines a framework where flourishing is not a sign of a perfectly lived life or life without suffering. Flourishing and vulnerability are, rather, indicators of integratity of life because of suffering and life despite suffering. Reaching towards a more realistic vision of vulnerability and flourishing as correlational depicts flourishing life not as utopian liberation of life from strivings, suffering, and oppression but rather as including a person´s earthly existence and the reality of life circumstances which, certainly, (besides the search for basic needs) are realities of one´s strivings for personal relationships (interdependency) in settings where these are not to be found.. The current article presents a brief interdisciplinary assessment of the concept of vulnerability and flourishing outlining their circumstantial and interdependent dynamic. This will be done by outlining a brief assessment of the notion of vulnerability, in the first part; the notion of flourishing in the second; and as a point of conclusion, the article set forward the structures of their collaboration and integration.

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”I See You”. Vulnerabitility and Integrity in Relation to Wide-Eye Surveillance

Prof. Dr. Susanne Wigorts Yngvesson

University College Stockholm, Sweden

Abstract
Smart technologies, political circumstances, economy, and globalization are some of the factors that form a new era of surveillance – a condition Shoshana Zuboff descibes as surveillance capitalism. Some of the most important issues about tomorrow's society and ethics concern these big arenas. But focus of this paper is not to address such big and complex matters, even though they are a necessary background out of which the limitations will be analyzed. Much of the inspiration for the discussion in this paper is influenced by philosophers, theologians, and scolars of political science, as they understand the practice of (potential) surveillance technologies as a re-mapping of the political as well as the human landscape. I will apply some examples from wide-eye surveillance in relation to vulnerability and integrity - two central sibling-concepts when it comes to interpretations of the human condition. Through this interaction I intend to show different interpretations of the concepts in focus, as well as the practise of surveillance.

The content of this paper refers to three points of the call for paper, namely: clarification of the concepts; the impact, and political ethics. The themes are intertwined as the theoretical discussion mirrors the impact and vice versa. However, during the procedural analysis, one overall question will frame the paper, namely: *How does vulnerability and integrity contribute to an understanding of what it means to be human in a surveillance society?* To reflect on this question I will take my starting point from a conceptual analysis of integrity and vulnerability from a theological and a philosophical interpretation (Buber; Tillich; Butler). Whereas Buber and Tillich, more or less, identify an essence of being, Butler makes no such claim. Despite the theoretical differences between them, all three argue for the importance of vulnerability: as vulnerable we become human beings, facing each others existence. It is, I will argue, from the position as vulnerable one can relate to the understanding of integrity, since to be *integer* one's integrity will become visible first when the integrity activates, when one faces a situation when the urge to protect or defend oneself occurs. A person's integrity will be recognized as, for example, a feeling, a conscience, as an embodied experience or as an opinion.

The second part of the paper concerns implications of integrity and vulnerability in relation to what it means to live in a surveilliance society. In this regard especially in relation to vision monitoring, for example the complexity of what CCTV's and face-scanning may entail in an existential, political and ethical sense. Finally, to be clear, the main issue for the analysis in this paper is not to address surveillance *per se*, but to apply the concepts of vulnerability and integrity for a deeper understanding of those concepts in relation to the applied discussion.

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