Martin Dackling, Poul Duedahl
& Bo Poulsen
Reformer og ressourcer
Reforms and Resources
Rapporter til det 29. Nordiske Historikermøde,
bind 2
Rapporter til det 29. Nordiske Historikermøde, Aalborg, 15.-18. august 2017
Proceedings of the 29th Congress of Nordic Historians, Aalborg, 15-18 August 2017
Hovedredaktør: Poul Duedahl
Bind 2: Reformer og ressourcer / Reforms and Resources
Red. Martin Dackling, Poul Duedahl & Bo Poulsen
Serieredaktion:
Michael F. Wagner, lektor ved Institut for Kultur og Globale Studier,
Aalborg Universitet
Bente Jensen, arkivar ved Aalborg Stadsarkiv
Johan Heinsen, adjunkt ved Institut for Kultur og Globale Studier,
Aalborg Universitet
Michael Riber Jørgensen, museumsinspektør, Thisted Museum
Studier i Historie, Arkiver og Kulturarv / Studies in History, Archives and Cultural Heritage (vol. 7)
© Forfatterne og Aalborg Universitetsforlag
Grafisk tilrettelæggelse af indhold: Toptryk Grafisk ApS
Grafisk tilrettelæggelse af forside: akila v/ Kirsten Bach Larsen
ISBN: 978-87-7112-643-3
ISSN: 2246-2023
Det 29. Nordiske Historikermøde har modtaget støtte fra følgende fonde:
Det Frie Forskningsråd | Kultur og Kommunikation
Carlsbergfondet
A.P. Møller og Hustru Chastine Mc-Kinney Møllers Fond til almene Formaal
Clara Lachmanns stiftelse
HistorieLab | Nationalt Videncenter for Historie- og Kulturarvsformidling
Letterstedtska Föreningen
Institut for Kultur og Globale Studier | Aalborg Universitet
Omslagsbillede: Aalborg havnefront (foto: VisitAalborg)
Aalborg Universitetsforlag 2017
Indhold
Martin Dackling, Poul Duedahl & Bo Poulsen: Inledning 5
Johanna Widenberg: Kampen mot boskapssjukan i 1700-talets
svenska rike 11
Martin Dackling: Släktjordsfrågan i Sverige och Norge 1810–1860 43
Thierry Godbille, François Fulconis and Gilles Paché: Organization
of Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Global Supply Chain
Perspective 73
Sophy Bergenheim: “The population question is, in short, a question
of our people’s survival”: Reframing population policy in 1940s
Finland 109
Bo Poulsen: Campaign Country Going Green? Danish Government
Campaigns for Saving Energy and the Rise of Environmental
Concern, c. 1973-1995 143
Christian Widholm: Heritage and Imaginary Childhood Landscapes:
On the Impetus of Tourism Entrepreneurs in Stockholm
Archipelago 184
Jørgen Elsøe Jensen: Fødestrategier og civilisationsformer – en teori
om Norden i et civilisationshistorisk perspektiv 208
Bidragsydere 230
3
Inledning
Bidragen i denna antologi har tillkommit i anslutning till det 29.
Nordiska historikermötet i Aalborg i augusti 2017. Som läsaren
kommer att finna visar de sju ingående artiklarna på historieämnets stora bredd, både vad gäller ämnen, tidsepoker och tematik,
och ifråga om problemformuleringar, analysnivåer och teoretiska
verktyg. Den övergripande rubriken för bandet är reformer och
resurser, två begrepp som antologins artiklar på olika sätt förhåller
sig till. Reformer och historiska förändringar är centralt för historievetenskapen, men kan vara av mycket skilda slag: från snabba
historiska förändringar, till de mer trögrörliga strukturer som Fernand Braudel åsyftade med begreppet la longue durée. På liknande
sätt finns också en stor variation i vad som historiskt har betraktats
som resurser samt hur tillgång, användning och förståelse av dessa
gestaltat sig. I blickfånget för antologins artiklar står följaktligen
en rad olika resurser – från människor och djur till jord och energi
– som alla fogats in historiska förlopp och förändringar.
Sjuttonhundratalet brukar ibland beskrivas som epidemiernas
århundrade, men det var långtifrån bara människor som blev sjuka. I sitt bidrag analyserar Johanna Widenberg bekämpningen av
5
Indledning
boskapspest i Sverige under 1700-talet. Sjukdomar krävde många
offer bland lantbruksdjuren och smittspridningen var stor, inte
minst på grund av att djurbesättningar blandades på gemensamma sommarbeten. Till följd av detta började myndigheterna utarbeta olika bekämpningsmetoder. Vid sidan om enstaka exempel
på medicinska ingrepp, var de främsta åtgärderna avspärrning och
utslaktning i syfte att hindra spridning. Widenberg konstaterar att
sjukdomsbekämpningen i Sverige i stora drag följde samma mönster som andra europeiska länder, men pekar även ut säregenheter
som behovet att möta återkommande angrepp av mjältbrand och
att myndigheterna tidigt tog initiativ till utslaktningar.
Djur var en viktig resurs i den agrara ekonomin, en annan var
själva jorden. Hur ägande och tillgång till jord har reglerats i olika samhällen är därför en central historievetenskaplig fråga. I en
komparativt anlagd studie visar Martin Dackling hur brytpunkten från en släktbaserad till en individbaserad egendomsrätt tog
sig uttryck i debatterna om släktens rättigheter till jord i Sverige
och Norge mellan 1810 och 1860. Trots att den politiska debatten
i de två längderna hade många beröringspunkter fick de helt olika
följder: släktjordslagstiftningen avvecklades i Sverige, men behölls
– och är ännu gällande – i Norge. Dackling visar att en anledning
bakom de skilda utfallen var olika referenspunkter i diskussionen,
där den svenska debatten i högre grad berörde frågans ekonomiska sida, medan den norska mer uppfattades i en (identitets)politisk kontext.
Jordegendom kännetecknas av att den ovillkorligt är fixerad i
rummet, men de flesta resurser utmärks av att de kan transporteras och handlas med. I sin artikel diskuterar Thierry Godbille,
François Fulconis och Gilles Paché en central sådan handelskedja: den transatlantiska slavhandeln under tidigmodern tid. Deras
intresse rör framför allt frågan hur denna välkända triangelhan6
Indledning
del organiserades och deras analytiska fokus ligger på infrastruktur och logistik. Som system betraktat kan detta handelssystem
analyseras som en distributionskedja, vars existens berodde på
möjligheterna att samla kapital, existensen av en afrikansk bytesmarknad, behovet av arbetskraft i amerikanska kolonier samt en
fungerande sjöfartsindustri. Tolkad ur ett sådant perspektiv kan
den transatlantiska slavhandeln enligt författarna ses som den stora föregångaren till 1900-talets globala distributionskedjor.
Att människor hanterades som handelsvaror var specifikt för
slavhandeln. Att de också i andra sammanhang betraktats som
en viktig resurs framgår av Sophy Bergenheims artikel om befolkningsfrågan i Finland under 1940-talet. I ljuset av den politiska utvecklingen – särskilt erfarenheterna under vinterkriget –
framträdde denna som en nationell ödesfråga. Befolkningen var
totalt sett för liten för att kunna försvara sig gentemot angrepp,
och befolkningstillväxten var dessutom för låg. I artikeln undersöks politiska diskussioner inom Väestöliitto, en expertgrupp för
befolkningsfrågor bildad 1941. För att främja en ökad befolkning
verkade gruppen på olika sätt för att förbättra såväl befolkningens
kvantitet som kvalitet, och Bergenheim finner flera paralleller till
det befolkningsprogram som Alva och Gunnar Myrdal vid samma
tid introducerade i Sverige. I jämförelse med denna fick emellertid
den finska debatten en betydligt mer konservativ inramning, vilket Bergenheim relaterar till landets historiska erfarenheter.
När målet i vissa historiska sammanhang varit att öka en resurs,
har det i andra varit att minska beroendet av en annan. Danmark
har stundtals betraktats som ett föregångsland ifråga om energibesparing och miljöhänsyn, men hur väl stämmer denna bild?
Bo Poulsen undersöker i sin artikel sex statliga danska kampanjer mellan 1974 och 1995, samtliga med syfte att minska energiförbrukning. Poulsen visar att hänsyn till miljön inte spelade nå7
Indledning
gon framträdande roll i kampanjerna förrän slutet av 1980-talet.
Istället låg fokus på att spara pengar, både för det enskilda hushållet och för den danska staten. I kampanjmaterialet framhävdes energibesparing närmaste som en patriotisk handling. Först
mot 1980-talets slut förändrades anslaget och energibesparingen
rättfärdigades i högre grad av miljöhänsyn, vilket enligt Poulsen
kan förstås mot bakgrund av FN:s tilltagande arbete för hållbar
utveckling och Tjernobylkatastrofen 1986.
Som påtalats kan resurser vara av mycket olika slag. I Christian Widholms undersökning av kulturarvsentreprenörer står snarast immateriella resurser i centrum. Utgångspunkten i artikeln
är frågan hur historia används och ges mening. Diskussioner om
kulturarv aktiveras inte sällan i samband med stora samhällsomvandlingar, som ett sätt att fokusera på värdet av den egna identiteten. Med tre exempel från Stockholms skärgård framgår hur
ett specifikt maritimt kulturarv lyfts fram och används av olika
entreprenörer inom turistnäringen. Widholm påpekar särskilt
hur de minnen som aktiverats kan relateras till erfarenheter i de
(manliga) entreprenörernas barndom. Referenserna till barndomen fungerar därmed som ett slags emotionellt register med stort
inflytande över hur kulturarvet lyfts fram.
Samhällets fördelning av resurser kan analyseras i skilda tidsutsnitt, men också över längre tid. I sitt bidrag anlägger Jørgen Elsøe
Jensen ett långt tidsperspektiv och analyserar i ett flertusenårigt
perspektiv övergången mellan två civilisationsformer och därmed
förbundna födostrategier. Den äldre, klassiska, civilisationsformen kan spåras mycket långt tillbaka i tid, och utmärks av en stark
hierarkisk ordning där en elit med tvång försåg sig med nödvändiga resurser på övriga bekostad. Den yngre, främst utvecklad i väst,
utmärks enligt Jensen istället av en marknadsutveckling av resurser och ett ömsesidigt beroende, vilket gagnade en demokratisk
8
Indledning
och egalitär utveckling. Han knyter denna övergång till järnplogens införande i nordvästra Europa under framför allt 1100-talet,
vilket också fick stor betydelse för järnbrytning och järntillverkning i Norden.
Martin Dackling
Poul Duedahl
Bo Poulsen
9
Kampen mot boskapssjukan i
1700-talets svenska rike
Johanna Widenberg
Epizootiernas århundrade …
Det artonde seklet har ofta beskrivits som epidemiernas århundrade. Smittkoppor, dysenteri och andra farsoter härjade svårt bland
människorna i Europa.1 Under samma tid härjade också många
djursjukdomar i Europa. Aldrig tidigare hade så många lantbruksdjur dött i så många svårartade infektionssjukdomar. Situationen
inom djurhälsan påminde stort om den som rådde inom humanhälsan. Seklet kan därför med rätta beskrivas även som epizootiernas århundrade.2
Hur viktiga de stora lantbruksdjuren var i 1700-talets agrara
ekonomi kan inte nog understrykas. Svin, får, getter, nötkreatur
och hästar verkade som mat-, gödsel- och råvaruproducenter, och
de senare även som dragdjur. När kreaturen dog i stora skaror fick
det många samhälleliga konsekvenser. Jordbruket i de europeiska
länderna påverkades, och därmed livsmedelsförsörjningen. Andra
samhällssektorer där djuren och råvarorna hade en central roll berördes också: handel och hantverk, uppbördssystem och militärväsende.3
11
Johanna Widenberg
… och människornas kamp för att rädda djuren
Denna artikel handlar om den statliga epizootibekämpning som
uppstod och utvecklades i det svenska riket, alltså Sverige och Finland, under 1700-talet. Tidigare hade det funnits regelverk och rutiner för att bekämpa sjukdomsutbrott hos människor, såväl i det
svenska riket som i de andra europeiska staterna.4 Men till följd av
farsoternas härjningar bland de stora lantbruksdjuren i 1700-talets
Europa utformades alltså system för att motverka även djursjukdomar.
Den svenska epizootibekämpningen växte fram i mötet med de
två sjukdomar som gav upphov till störst förluster i den svenska
och finska nötkreaturstocken under perioden: boskapspest och
mjältbrand. Sjukdomarna härjade våldsamt i det svenska riket och
epizootibekämpningen blev med tiden ganska omfattande, sett till
organisation och verksamhet. De sjukdomsbekämpande insatserna kom att engagera en stor del av den dåtida statsförvaltningen.
I denna artikel skildras den statligt organiserade kampen mot
boskapspest och mjältbrand närmare. Frågan om vilka bekämpningsåtgärder som den svenska statsmakten och dess representanter förespråkade och genomförde för att hindra smittspridningen
kommer att besvaras, liksom frågan om varför olika åtgärder valdes i vissa situationer och varför de i praktiken kom att genomföras på vissa sätt.5 Framställningen kommer att lägga vikt vid internationella jämförelser. Förhoppningen är att kunna tydliggöra
särdragen i den svenska epizootibekämpningen, men också att
visa på likheter med andra länder.
Nya perspektiv på veterinärmedicinhistorien
Artikeln utgår från den forskning som presenteras i min kommande monografi Den stora kreatursdöden. Kampen mot boskapspest
12
Kampen mot boskapssjukan i 1700-talets svenska rike
och mjältbrand i 1700-talets svenska rike. Den är för närvarande under publicering och förväntas utkomma år 2017. Studien
grundar sig på ett stort empiriskt underlag. Alla de handlingar i
det svenska riket som under perioden 1710–1780 tillkom i korrespondensen kring boskapssjukan mellan statsledningen, landshövdingarna och medicinalverken (Collegium Medicum och
Sundhetskommissionen) har inventerats och analyserats. Därtill
har kungliga förordningar studerats, liksom medicinska skrifter,
tidskrifter och lantbrukslitteratur. Studien är den första i sitt slag
som tar ett helhetsgrepp om den svenska epizootibekämpningens
utveckling. Det regelverk som statsledningen utformade på området är förvisso beskrivet i tidigare veterinärmedicinhistorisk forskning. Några enskilda landshövdingars och medicinares insatser i
bekämpningsarbetet har också varit föremål för studium.6 Men
hur kampen mot de stora boskapssjukdomarna organiserades i sin
helhet har aldrig tidigare skildrats i forskningen.
Den veterinärmedicinhistoriska forskningen har genomgått stora förändringar under de senaste decennierna. En yngre forskargeneration, bestående av historiker, sociologer och andra forskare
med rötter inom humaniora och samhällsvetenskap, har så smått
börjat dominera forskningsfältet. Den yngre forskargenerationen
har riktat skarp kritik mot den äldre forskargenerationen, vilken i
huvudsak bestått av veterinärer. Nya teoretiska perspektiv har formulerats och etablerade sanningar inom forskningsläget har utsatts för prövning. Omvälvningen inom veterinärmedicinhistoria
har sin motsvarighet inom humanmedicinhistoria, och har också
samröre med den omsvängning inom humanvetenskaperna som
brukar omtalas i termer av the cultural turn. De nya perspektiven
som lanserats i den internationella forskningen har bidragit till att
ge en delvis annorlunda bild av epizootibekämpningens innebörd
och utformning under äldre tid, än den som tidigare var given.7
13
Johanna Widenberg
Den tidigare bilden av epizootibekämpningen, som presenterades av den äldre forskargenerationen under loppet av 1900-talet,
har av den yngre forskargenerationen kritiserats för att vara både
anakronistisk och elitistisk. Forskningen har kritiserats för att den
styrts av veterinärkårens intressen och genomsyrats av sökandet
efter den moderna epizootibekämpningens ”rötter”. Den har följaktligen kritiserats för att den oreflekterat utgått från moderna begrepp och förhållanden i sin skildring av äldre tiders sjukdomsbekämpning, och för att den lagt alltför stor vikt vid statsledningens
och statstjänstemännens idéer i kampen mot djursjukdomarna.8
Många teoretiska perspektiv har alltså lanserats av den yngre
forskargenerationen i polemik mot tidigare forskning, i syfte att
ge en mer rättvis bild av den statligt organiserade epizootibekämpningen i Europa. Det har i grunden handlat om en strävan
efter thick description – en utförligare skildring av den historiska
kontexten. Min forskning har tagit intryck av denna rörelse. Den
genomsyras följaktligen av två inom den nya forskningen ofta förfäktade perspektiv. De kallas här ”det synkrona perspektivet” och
”underifrån-perspektivet”.
Det synkrona perspektivet innebär att de sjukdomsbekämpande
åtgärder som företogs i 1700-talets svenska rike skildras utifrån de
föreställningar om boskapssjukdomar och sjukdomsbekämpning
som fanns i 1700-talets samhälle. Utgångspunkten är att de verksamma statstjänstemännen och djurägarna agerade utifrån tidens
egna synsätt när de utformade sina bekämpningsåtgärder, inte utifrån de uppfattningar vi har idag. Moderna diagnoser och nutida beskrivningar om sjukdomarnas egenskaper används i denna
artikel endast för att begripliggöra de historiska reaktionerna på
sjukdomarna ifråga.
Underifrån-perspektivet innebär att de sjukdomsbekämpande
åtgärder som statsledningen och statstjänstemännen genomförde
14
Kampen mot boskapssjukan i 1700-talets svenska rike
inte studeras som renodlade myndighetsprojekt, utan som resultat
av tillmötesgåenden, förhandlingar och kompromisser med olika
representanter för 1700-talets agrarsamhälle. Utgångspunkten är
att alla de människor som levde direkt eller indirekt av det som
lantbruket producerade hade intresse av att stävja sjukdomarnas
framfart. Däremot hade olika representanter ibland olika uppfattningar om hur bekämpningsåtgärderna bäst skulle gå till.
Boskapssjukan och de moderna diagnoserna
Boskapspest är en numera, sedan 2011, utrotad virusjukdom.
Sjukdomen spreds lätt genom kontakt med smittade djur eller
kontaminerade råvaror och hade mycket stor dödlighet; i Europa
dog drygt 80 procent av alla smittade djur.9 Boskapspest kunde
smitta många olika klövdjur, men i Sverige drabbade den endast
nötkreatur. Förutom stor smittsamhet och hög dödlighet gav sjukdomen bland annat upphov till hög feber, mun- och näsflöden och
kraftiga blodblandade diarréer.10 Sjukdomen kom ursprungligen
från Asien. I början av 1700-talet började den sprida sig västerut mot Europa. De flesta länder på den europeiska kontinenten
drabbades.11 Sjukdomen spred sig dock aldrig till Finland under
seklet. Sverige drabbades emellertid av åtta stora sjukdomsvågor
mellan åren 1721 och 1771. De södra landskapen drabbades värst
då smittspridningen från den europeiska kontinenten regelmässigt gick via Danmark. Sammanlagt orsakade sjukdomen drygt
350 000 nötkreaturs död i det svenska riket under 1700-talet.12
Mjältbrand orsakas av en bakterie. Sjukdomen har funnits i Europa sedan urminnes tider. Den kan smitta nästintill alla varmblodiga däggdjur, men särskilt känsliga är gräsätare som nötkreatur,
hästar, får och getter. Smittspridningen kan ske på olika sätt. Smittan kan överföras mellan djur, och via redskap och födointag, men
15
Johanna Widenberg
också genom kontakt med kontaminerad jord. Det ibland mycket
långsamma smittspridningsförloppet via jordsmitta är ett särdrag
för mjältbrand. Mjältbrandsbakterier bildar nämligen sporer i
kontakt med luft. Dessa sporer är motståndskraftiga och kan överleva i jord och mark under flera decennier. Betesdjur som vistas
på nedsmittade marker kan således angripas av mjältbrandsbakterier som legat vilande under mycket lång tid. Sjukdomen kännetecknas av hög dödlighet. Nästintill hundra procent av alla smittade nötkreatur dör. Sjukdomsförloppet hos nötkreatur och andra
gräsätare är oftast mycket hastigt och ger – om symptom överhuvudtaget hinner utvecklas – upphov till feber, mun- och näsflöden
och bölder. Sjukdomen påverkar också ofta de inre organen kraftigt, inte minst mjälten, där av sjukdomsnamnet. Mjältbrand kan
även smitta människor. Smittade människor drabbas av blåsvarta
hudutslag och ibland allmäninfektioner med feber. Dödligheten är
dock inte lika stor för människor som för betesdjur.13
Mjältbrand gav upphov till många stora sjukdomsutbrott i det
svenska riket under 1700-talet. Sjukdomen var väl spridd i både
Sverige och Finland. Vissa byar och socknar drabbades återkommande, andra mer sporadiskt. De flesta smittspridningsförlopp
uppstod i och med jordsmitta på betesmarken och fortsatte sedan
med kontaktsmitta mellan djuren i den närmaste omgivningen.
Ibland utvecklade emellertid mjältbranden mycket långvariga och
komplicerade smittspridningsförlopp, och spred sig då precis som
boskapspesten från djur till djur över väldigt stora områden. Särskilt svårt härjade sjukdomen i Finland under seklet, och just under 1760-talet även i Mellansverige.14
Boskapspest och mjältbrand gick ofta under samma namn i
1700-talets svenska rike. Sjukdomarna benämndes boskapssjuka,
kreaturssjuka, fäsjuka och ibland också boskapspest, kreaturspest
och fänadspest.15 Några statstjänstemän och medicinare menade
16
Kampen mot boskapssjukan i 1700-talets svenska rike
också att sjukdomarna i grunden utgjorde en och samma farsot.16
De flesta medicinare betraktade dock sjukdomarna som två olika varianter av boskapssjuka, och menade att det fanns många
egenskaper och symptom som skiljde varianterna åt.17 Oftast tolkades skillnaderna mellan sjukdomarna som uttryck för geografiska variationer, enligt det topografiska tankesätt som präglade
seklets medicinvetenskap. Boskapspesten, som ju härjade främst
i Skåne, kallades följaktligen för den skånska boskapssjukan. Den
ansågs vara identisk med den boskapssjuka som härjade på den
europeiska kontinenten. Ibland kallades den därför också för den
europeiska boskapssjukan. Mjältbranden, som ju härjade värst i
Finland, men även i Norrland och andra delar av Sverige, omtalades vanligtvis som den finska boskapssjukan. Den mjältbrand som
drabbade Mellansverige under 1760-talet, hölls vanligtvis för en
egen sjukdomsvariant, och kallades följaktligen för boskapssjukan
i Svealand.18
Olika smittspridning, olika smittbekämpning
Vad som utmärkte de olika sjukdomsvarianterna och hur de följaktligen bäst skulle bekämpas var en ständigt pågående debatt i
1700-talets svenska rike. Vissa egenskaper och särdrag var mycket omdiskuterade men i frågan om sjukdomsvarianternas olika
smittspridningsförlopp rådde i princip konsensus. Såväl medicinare som statstjänstemän och djurägare lade märke till att de huvudsakliga smittkällorna vanligtvis skiljde sig åt mellan de olika
sjukdomsvarianterna. De var således överens om att boskapssjukan i Skåne (boskapspesten) spreds via direkt eller indirekt kontakt
mellan djur.19 De bekämpningsåtgärder som riktades mot denna
sjukdomsvariant utformades således med kontaktsmitta i åtanke.
Resonemangen i detta hänseende återknöt till den under 1700-ta17
Johanna Widenberg
let alltjämt rådande antika sjukdomsläran, och smittan omtalades
följaktligen som contagion.20
Samtida betraktare lade också märke till att boskapssjukan i
Finland, Norrland och Svealand (mjältbranden) uppstod återkommande på särskilda platser och betesmarker. 21 De bekämpningsåtgärder som riktades mot dessa landsdelar utformades således
med någon form av miljöberoende smitta i åtanke. Även här gick
resonemangen tillbaka på antika läror och smittspridningssättet
omnämndes vanligtvis i termer av miasma. Begreppet betecknade
enligt tidens rådande föreställningsvärld oren sjukdomsalstrande
luft. Sådan luft kunde uppstå i blöta och smutsiga miljöer, som
gyttjiga vattendrag och sumpiga våtmarker.22 Den finska och mellansvenska boskapssjukan ansågs dessutom kunna spridas via
kontaktsmitta. Bekämpningen kom sålunda att präglas även av
denna insikt.
De kungliga förordningarna
Det fanns två grundläggande kungliga förordningar rörande boskapssjuka, till vilka alla andra instruktioner hänförde sig: förordningen från den 13 januari 1722 och förordningen från den 23
mars 1750.
Underlaget till förordningen från 1722 författades av landshövdingen i Kristianstad, Samuel von Hylthén, som en följd av boskapspestens framfart bland nötkreaturen i Skåne.23 Några särskilda sjukdomsvarianter eller djurslag nämndes emellertid inte i
texten. Förordningen gällde smittsamma sjukdomar hos alla stora
lantbruksdjur, i allmänhet. Men i praktiken utformades förordningstexten med boskapspesten för ögonen. Förordningen rymde nio paragrafer. Den första paragrafen förbjöd användningen av
kreatursfoder från smittade orter. Den andra paragrafen förbjöd
18
Kampen mot boskapssjukan i 1700-talets svenska rike
transporter av djur från smittade till obesmittade orter; bestämmelsen påverkade således oxhandel i riket. Den tredje paragrafen
förbjöd lösa hundar på orter där boskapssjuka härjade. Den fjärde
paragrafen stadgade att allt samröre mellan smittade och obesmittade orter skulle upphöra. Bestämmelsen innebar exempelvis att
smittade och obesmittade gårdar, byar och socknar som delade
betesmarker med varandra inte fick släppa samman sina djur. Den
femte paragrafen föreskrev nedgrävning av smittade och avlidna
djur och sanering av fähus, bås och redskap. Den sjätte, sjunde,
åttonde och nionde paragrafen preciserade vidare instruktioner
för hur djurägare, länsmän och andra lokala statstjänstemän skulle
agera och samverka vid smitta.24
Den kungliga förordningen från 1750 rymde tolv paragrafer.
Förbud och föreskrifter var ungefär desamma som i den första förordningen, men bestämmelserna beskrevs utförligare. Dessutom
infördes en nyhet, nämligen den sjunde paragrafen om sundhetspass. Bestämmelsen utgjorde en uppmjukning av det totala förbud
mot handel mellan smittade och obesmittade län som stadgats i
den första förordningen. Paragrafen stadgade att djur och djurprodukter som kom från obesmittade orter i län där boskapssjuka i
övrigt härjade, fick utföras från länet om länsmän eller andra statstjänare skriftligen intygade att de, liksom de orter de kom från, var
friska. Intygen fick endast utfärdas efter medgivande från statsledningen.25
Införandet av sundhetspass i 1750 års förordning var resultatet av fleråriga förhandlingar mellan statsledningen och olika intressegrupper bland undersåtarna. Oxhandeln i det svenska riket
stod för en stor del av den långväga spridningen av boskapspest i
det svenska riket, det var uppenbart för alla samtida betraktare.
Smittan hade vid ett flertal tillfällen följt i slaktoxarnas spår.26 De
flesta djurägare hade således intresse av att oxdrifter förhindrades
19
Johanna Widenberg
i tider av boskapssjuka. Men handeln var också oumbärlig för rikets näringar, ekonomi och välstånd. Oxhandeln led svårt av 1722
års förbud att forsla djur och djurprodukter mellan smittade och
obesmittade län. Oxmarknaderna i de södra landskapen ställdes
in och bönderna i Småland kunde inte sälja sina överskottsdjur.
I suppliker till överheten lät de upprepade gånger under 1700-talets första hälft påminna om sitt trångmål. Oxhandlarna i Småland
klagade också. De kunde inte genomföra de sedvanliga oxdrifterna
mot Göteborg, Karlskrona, Stockholm och Bergslagen. Slaktarna
och garvarna i Stockholm framförde också återkommande klagomål till statsledningen, ty stor brist på kött och hudar rådde i den
ständigt växande huvudstaden. Stor klagan kom också från militärgarnisonen i Karlskrona, där manskapet saknade nötköttet vid
utspisningen.27
Vid mitten av seklet såg sig statsledningen föranlåten att ingripa
mot den situation som uppstått till följd av 1722 års förordning,
och införa någon form av handelslättnad. Bestämmelsen om sundhetspassen i 1750 års förordning ska förstås mot den bakgrunden;
den utgjorde en kompromiss mellan olika intressen. Sundhetspass förekom i andra europiska stater och hade där bidragit till att
passivisera handelsförbudens mest kritiska grupper.28 Det svenska
systemet med sundhetspass var hårt reglerat, och statsledningen
avsade sig inte på något sätt kontrollen över oxhandeln, men det
innebar ändå en öppning i det totala förbud mot varuutbyten som
tidigare gällt vid boskapssjuka.
Utöver de förordningar som handlade om hur boskapssjukan
skulle hanteras inom riket, utfärdade den svenska statsledningen
en rad kungörelser som förbjöd handel med sådana länder som
drabbats av boskapssjuka. Det gällde förbud mot livdjurshandeln
men också restriktioner i handeln med djurprodukter. I praktiken riktade sig dessa kungörelser till de länder i Europa där bo20
Kampen mot boskapssjukan i 1700-talets svenska rike
skapspest just härjade. Syftet var förstås att hindra smittan från att
nå det svenska riket överhuvudtaget.29
Avspärrningar i gårdar och byar
Landshövdingar, kronofogdar och länsmän ansvarade för att åtskillnaden mellan sjuka och friska djur upprätthölls i län, socknar och byar, och för att kunna göra det företog de avspärrningar.
Ofta ordnades med fysiska hinder och vakthållning med manskap.
Färdvägar mellan städer och byar försågs med grindar och vaktposter. Och länsgränser och kuststräckor patrullerades.30 Men att
isolera och övervaka enskilda djurbesättningar var inte helt enkelt,
då gårdarna i Sverige och Finland ofta låg i byar. Inom byarna delade gårdsinnehavarna hägnader och betesmarker med varandra.
Några särskilda beteshagar fanns mycket sällan vid den här tiden.
Hägnaderna var istället till för att skydda byns gemensamma åkeroch ängsmarker mot såväl tama som vilda djur. Boskapen rörde
sig sålunda utanför de hägnade områdena, på den gemensamma
utmarken, eller på de åker- eller ängsgärden inom hägnaderna
som för tillfället inte brukades.
Att isolera en enstaka gårds djurbesättning under de agrara
omständigheter som rådde var således ytterst svårt. Förhållandet var särskilt komplicerat i det tättbebyggda Skåne. Här var det
till och med svårt att isolera hela byar. Hägnader och betesmarker var nämligen ofta gemensamma för flera byar. Många byar
låg i så kallade hägnadslag med varandra och hade fäladerna
som gemensamma sommarbeten.31 Det var ingen slump att boskapspesten härjade som värst i dessa områden; här blandades
regelbundet djurbesättningar med varandra. Vintertid fanns förvisso möjlighet att upprätthålla avspärrningar runt byarna. Då
stod ju djuren mest på fähus.32 Men sommartid var det nästintill
21
Johanna Widenberg
ogörligt. Dragdjuren behövdes i jordbruket och de övriga djuren
trängde bete. Djurägare och länsmän sökte hålla djuren inne i
fähusen så länge som möjligt på vårvintern, men när vårbruket
stod för dörren och fodertillgången började tryta tvingades de
så småningom släppa ut djuren. Ständiga överläggningar pågick i frågan om hur avspärrningarna bäst kunde bibehållas
under våren – och om det överhuvudtaget var möjligt. I vissa
fall gav djurägare, länsmän och landshövdingar gemensamt upp
inför övervakningsproblematiken och drog in alla avspärrningar, trots att dessa föranstaltades i de kungliga förordningarna.
De var ibland överens om att smittspridningen i praktiken inte
gick att hejda under rådande förhållanden.33 Men i vissa fall tog
landshövdingarna och länsmännen upp kampen med farsoterna och utökade avspärrningarna på vårkanten. Det skedde då
ofta mot byinvånarnas vilja. Dessa prioriterade jordbruket – och
rörligheten över markerna – och såg en utebliven betessäsong,
en dålig skörd och ett magert foderbord som en lika stor olycka
som fortsatt smittspridning.34 I det senare fallet bad landshövdingarna ofta om handräckning från regementena. Ryttare och
fotsoldater ålades att sätta upp så kallade cordons sanitaires runt
de smittade byarna, alltså vaktkedjor för att motverka smittspridning. Den militära närvaron till trots fungerade inte alltid
avspärrningarna. Styrkorna bestod ofta av lokalt manskap, med
nära band till de drabbade byinvånarna. De var därför ofta eftergivna gentemot de bönder som behövde passera avspärrningarna. En del avspärrningar blev emellertid mycket omfattande
och långvariga. Den största militära avspärrning som tillkom
i kampen mot boskapssjukan var den som landshövding Carl
Adlerfelt satte upp i Malmöhus län sommaren 1767. Den sträckte sig runt ett femtiotal byar och övervakades av 600 soldater
under flera månaders tid.35
22
Kampen mot boskapssjukan i 1700-talets svenska rike
Landshövdingen Carl Adlerfelt lät rita en karta över den avspärrning,
cordon sanitaire, som sattes upp runt Hököpinge och Eskilstorps byar
utanför Malmö sommaren 1767 för att skydda omgivningen från boskapssjukan. Kartan är unik i sin genre i Sverige. Riksarkivet, Kunglig
Majestäts kanslis arkiv, Landshövdingen i Malmöhus län till Kungl.
Maj:t, vol 29, bilaga i brevet 30 juli 1767. Foto: Riksarkivet, Stockholm.
Tillvägagångssättet att skilja de sjuka djuren från de friska och
hindra samröre mellan smittade och obesmittade orter var i grunden detsamma vid boskapspest och mjältbrand. Men vid mjält23
Johanna Widenberg
brand, då det var uppenbart att utbrottet orsakats av jordsmitta,
avspärrades ibland också den kontaminerade betesmarken. Övervakningsproblematiken komplicerades i sådana fall ytterligare för
länsmän, soldater och djurägare, när inte bara betesdjur skulle bevakas, utan även hela markområden.36
Boskapsmedicinen
Vanligtvis försökte man behandla och bota de sjuka djuren inom
avspärrningarna genom att ge dem medicinsk behandling. Detta gällde både vid boskapspest och mjältbrand. Vid påkommen
smitta vände sig landshövdingen till medicinalverken och bad om
förslag på verksamma botemedel. Medicinalverken sände då ofta
några medicinare till de drabbade byarna, för att bestämma sjukdomens art, dela ut läkemedel och ge behandling. Ofta engagerades provinsialläkare, fältskärer från militära förband eller medicinkunniga från universiteten.37 Dessa kom då i kontakt med den
folkliga läkekonst som fanns på landsbygden. Ibland omtalade de
den som underlägsen, men i praktiken visade de stort intresse för
den. På sina resor runt om i riket spred de exempelvis inte bara de
lärda behandlingar som fanns mot boskapssjuka, utan nedtecknade, utprovade och praktiserade också många folkliga kurer.38
Ympning, eller inokulation, alltså överföring av levande smittämne för att stimulera bildande av antikroppar, diskuterades i det
svenska riket under 1700-talet. Ympning var på modet i det lärda
Europa. Lyckade ympningsförsök mot boskapssjuka rapporterades exempelvis från England år 1750-talet. De blev omtalade och
fungerade förstås som inspiration.39 Ympning byggde på idén om
immunitet. Att boskapspesten – den skånska och europeiska boskapssjukan – gav upphov till livslång immunitet för de djur som
insjuknat och tillfrisknat, var känt sedan länge i Europa. Sedan
24
Kampen mot boskapssjukan i 1700-talets svenska rike
1740-talet var fenomenet också iakttaget i det svenska riket, även av
allmogen.40 Men ympning blev aldrig en av de viktigare bekämpningsåtgärderna mot boskapssjukan i det svenska riket. Metoden
debatterades livligt under några år i Collegium Medicum och ett
fåtal försök utfördes, men metoden vann aldrig myndigheternas
fullkomliga gillande. Detta berodde delvis på att medicinarna inte
alltid gjorde åtskillnad mellan den finska eller mellansvenska boskapssjukan (mjältbranden) å den ena sidan och den skånska och
europeiska boskapssjukan (boskapspesten) å den andra sidan.
Många medicinare menade exempelvis att det var vanskligt att laborera med sekret från smittade djur, då många människor hade
rapporterats smittade när de hanterat sina sjuka (mjältbrandssjuka) kreatur. Det mest omtalade ympningsförsöket i det svenska
riket gjordes också på mjältbrandssjuka djur, men i analogi med
de ympningsförsök som gjorts med boskapspest i andra europeiska länder. Medicinaren Barthold Rudolf Hast ympade ett föl med
ett smittämne från ett nötkreatur i Österbotten på 1760-talet.41 I
denna landsdel härjade inte boskapspest överhuvudtaget under
seklet, utan endast mjältbrand. Fölet dog och ympningsförsöket
omtalades som ett misslyckande. Åtgärden var förstås dömd att
misslyckas på förhand, då mjältbrand inte ger upphov till immunitet på samma sätt som boskapspest. Sammanblandningen av de
båda sjukdomsvarianterna gjorde sammanfattningsvis att ympning framstod som en ytterst tveksam bekämpningsmetod för den
boskapssjuka som härjade i riket.42
Utslaktning
Slakt av sjuka djur – stamping out – har i den tidigare forskningen
setts som en central del av 1700-talets statliga epizootibekämpning. Utslaktning förespråkades tidigt av de europeiska auktorite25
Johanna Widenberg
terna på området, bland andra italienaren Giovanni Maria Lancisi
och engelsmannen Thomas Bates. Utslaktning praktiserades också
av såväl påvestaten som den brittiska statsledningen i början av
1700-talet, med ett relativt gott utfall.43
Men utslaktning föreskrevs inte som bekämpningsåtgärd i de
svenska kungliga förordningarna. Den svenska statsmakten motsatte sig bestämt slakt vid boskapssjuka under 1700-talets första
hälft. Statsledningen och landshövdingarna sökte till och med hindra den slakt som företogs av djurägarna själva.44 Djurägarna runt
om i det svenska riket ägnade sig nämligen regelmässigt åt så kallad preventiv utslaktning, alltså avlivning av friska djur vid pågående boskapssjuka. Det gällde både vid boskapspest och mjältbrand.
De kungliga förordningarna förbjöd uttryckligen djurägarna att ta
tillvara något från de sjuka djuren; av smittskyddsskäl skulle dessa
grävas ned med hull och hår, oavsett om de självdött eller nedslaktats. Men förordningarna hindrade inte djurägarna från att ta tillvara delar från slaktade friska djur under pågående boskapssjuka.
Här fanns således ett utrymme för handling som djurägarna ofta
utnyttjade. Den preventiva slakten företogs helt enkelt för att rädda vad som räddas kunde när smittspridningen tog fart i omgivningen och de egna djurens liv var allvarligt hotade. Djuren, som
dragdjur betraktade, förlorades förvisso genom nedslaktningen.
Men värdefulla produkter som kött, hudar, horn, senor, inälvor
och blod kunde räddas och omsättas. Djurägarna kunde på så sätt
mildra sina ekonomiska förluster vid boskapssjuka. 45
Statsmakten betraktade emellertid den preventiva slakten som ett
onödigt slöseri med kreatursliv. Första delen av 1700-talet ägnade
sig myndigheterna således åt att kritisera djurägarnas utslaktningar. Men vid mitten av seklet ändrades detta. Boskapspesten härjade våldsamt i södra och mellersta Sverige, trots avspärrningar och
medicinska behandlingar. Ingen av de gängse bekämpningsmeto26
Kampen mot boskapssjukan i 1700-talets svenska rike
derna hade fungerat och statsledningen och landshövdingarna såg
sig desperat omkring efter andra lösningar. I det sammanhanget
började utslaktning alltmer framstå som ett möjligt alternativ. I
bakgrunden fanns förstås påverkan från den internationella litteraturen och förekomsten av positiva internationella erfarenheter
på området. Men stor inverkan hade med all säkerhet också de
inhemska traditionerna. De svenska djurägarna var vana vid, och
inställda på, slakt vid pågående boskapssjuka. Detta var något som
statstjänstemännen kunde utnyttja. En rad utslaktningsföretag
initierades sålunda av statsledningen och landshövdingarna i de
av boskapssjuka drabbade länen. Men nu handlade det inte om
att rädda ekonomiska värden, utan om att förhindra vidare smittspridning. Utslaktningarna kom därför i huvudsak att riktas mot
de sjuka djuren, de som bevisligen bar på smittan. Första gången
som utslaktning verkligen genomfördes av myndigheterna var år
1756 i Malmöhus län, närmare bestämt, på sätesgården Lindholmen med grannbyar. Utslaktningen lyckades i så måtto att smittspridningen avtog.46 Myndigheterna tog intryck av detta och fick
blodad tand. Omsider blev de också mer rigida i sin utslaktningsverksamhet. Under 1760-talet riktade myndigheterna åtgärderna
inte bara mot de uppenbart sjuka, utan även mot de friska djuren
i de sjuka djurens närhet, de som förmodligen bar på smittan men
ännu inte insjuknat. En rad utslaktningar av såväl sjuka som friska
djur genomfördes, exempelvis i Hallands län 1763, Kronobergs län
1763 och Malmöhus län 1767. I det sistnämnda länet utslaktades
inte bara nötkreatur, utan även får, getter, svin, hundar och katter,
detta för att undanröja alla potentiella smittbärare.47
Statsmakten och dess representanter var drivande i frågan om
utslaktning som bekämpningsmetod under 1700-talets andra
hälft. Det fanns som sagt en viss vana vid slakt ute i byarna, men
alla djurägare var inte odelat positiva till att använda systematisk
27
Johanna Widenberg
avlivning i bekämpningsarbetet. För att statstjänstemännen skulle
kunna räkna med djurägarnas stöd vid insatsen krävdes övertalning, eftergifter och förhandlingar. Den springande punkten var
den ekonomiska kompensationen. Statsledningen drog sig i det
längsta för att finansiera utslaktningarna med medel ur statskassan. För att lösa ersättningsfrågan – och samtidigt mildra bristen
på oxkött i riket – utfärdade statsledningen det så kallade kött-undantaget den 5 februari 1751. Det innebar ett undantag från de
kungliga förordningarnas bestämmelse om nedgrävning av sjuka
djur med hull och hår. Det tillät alltså djurägarna att ta tillvara
och omsätta de sjuka djurens kött, såvida det inte var allvarligt
påverkat av sjukdomen.48 Undantaget gällde fram till 1760-talets
första hälft, och de utslaktningsföretag som företogs under denna
tid finansierades huvudsakligen på detta sätt. Därtill bildade djurägarna sammanskott för att täcka sina förluster. Sammanskotten
utgjorde ett slags försäkringsförbund där alla som bidrog kunde
räkna med kompensation i händelse av förluster i samband med
boskapssjukan. Landshövdingarna och deras underlydande organiserade sammanskotten, men djurägarna ingick dem frivilligt; de
diskuterade och godkände dem på tings- och magistratsmöten.49
Undantaget från 1751 – rätten att ta tillvara delar av sjuka slaktade djur – drogs tillbaka vid mitten av 1760-talet när rädslan för
att köttet var smittsamt ökade kraftigt. Detta hade i sin tur att göra
med att medicinare runt om i det svenska riket allt oftare vittnade om att människor som hanterat sjuka djur vid slakt insjuknat
och dött.50 Det handlade förstås om mjältbrandssjuka djur, och
människor som smittats av mjältbrand. Men statsledningen och
medicinarna gjorde som tidigare nämnts inte alltid skillnad på de
olika varianterna av boskapssjuka, och undantaget från 1751 drogs
sålunda in, inte endast i de områden där människosmittan omtalades, utan i hela riket.
28
Kampen mot boskapssjukan i 1700-talets svenska rike
Diskussion – internationell utblick
I den tidigare veterinärmedicinhistoriska forskningen har man
ofta framhållit att alla de bekämpningsprogram som utarbetades i
de europeiska länderna under 1700-talet utgjorde olika nationellt
anpassade varianter av Giovanni Maria Lancisi idéer. Denne var
påvlig livläkare, och han utarbetade sina förslag om sjukdomsbekämpning när påvestatens nötkreatursbesättningar drabbades
av boskapspest i början av seklet. Lancisi inflytande har alltså bedömts som stort. I den veterinärmedicinhistoriska litteraturen beskrivs han ofta som den moderna epizootibekämpningens grundläggare.51
I den tidigare internationella forskningen har man studerat hur
epizootibekämpningen utvecklades i de länder där boskapspest
drog fram under 1700-talet, exempelvis i Frankrike, England,
Holland, hertigdömena Schlesvig-Holstein, Mecklenburg-Strelitz
och Preussen. Forskarna har påpekat att det pågick ett ständigt
kunskapsutbyte länderna emellan, dels kring sjukdomsläget, dels
kring bekämpningsåtgärderna. Forskarna har visat att verksamheten i de olika länderna utvecklade sig på liknande sätt under seklet och sålunda kom att innefatta avspärrningar, handelsrestriktioner, reseförbud, nedgrävning av avlidna djur med hull och hår,
sanering av fähus och utslaktningar av olika slag. De grundläggande åtgärderna var inriktade på kontaktsmitta; det var otvivelaktigt boskapspestens framfart på den europeiska kontinenten som
präglade regelverk och praxis.52
Det är tydligt att det försiggick ett erfarenhetsutbyte inom de europeiska staterna och att förhandlingar och kompromisser mellan
myndigheter, medicinare, handlare och djurägare var ett genomgående drag i den europeiska epizootibekämpningens utformning
i stort.53 Särskilt tydligt framgår detta av den nyare forskning som
liksom denna studie använt sig av kulturhistoriska angreppsätt och
29
Johanna Widenberg
underifrån-perspektiv. Så till exempel den tyske miljöhistorikern
Dominik Hünnigers forskning som visat att sjukdomsbekämpningen i Schleswig-Holstein formerades i en ständig förhandling
mellan styrande, näringsidkare och allmoge under åren 17451752. Påbuden anpassades efter rådande omständigheter och olika gruppers inflytande. De varierade således exempelvis mellan
strikta handelsförbud och rigida karantänbestämmelser, och handelslättnader och eftergifter gentemot oxhandlare och djurägare.54
Det kan således konstateras, att det fanns stora likheter mellan
den sjukdomsbekämpande verksamhet som fördes i många europeiska länder under 1700-talet och det bekämpningsarbetet som
uträttades inom det svenska rikets gränser. På några punkter sticker emellertid den svenska erfarenheten ut.
Det är exempelvis uppenbart att den utbredda förekomsten av
mjältbrand satte sin prägel på den svenska epizootibekämpningen under 1700-talet. De flesta åtgärder var inriktade på kontaktsmitta, men somliga insatser riktade sig också mot markbunden
smitta, exempelvis avspärrningar av kontaminerade marker. Här
spelade de många rapporterna om upprepade boskapsstörtningar på särskilda betesmarker i särskilt Finland, Norrland och Svealand stor roll. Dessutom hade rapporterna om människosmitta
från samma områden betydelse för statsledningens inställning till
rätten att omsätta kött från de sjuka djuren. Och inte minst fick
rapporterna från mjältbrandsdrabbade orter statsledningen och
medicinalverken att vackla i sin tro på immunitet och ympning.
Påståendet som varit allmänt förekommande i tidigare forskning
– att den svenska epizootibekämpningen formerades i mötet med
boskapspesten, precis som i så många andra europeiska länder –
bör således modifieras något: Den svenska epizootibekämpningen
växte fram i mötet med boskapspesten och mjältbranden.55
En annan säregenhet rör de svenska utslaktningsaktionernas
30
Kampen mot boskapssjukan i 1700-talets svenska rike
utformning och finansiering. För det första företogs de myndighetsorganiserade utslaktningarna i Sverige förhållandevis tidigt.
Den första utslaktningen genomfördes i Malmöhus län år 1756.
Men en ännu tidigare insats planerades i Södermanlands län redan
år 1750. Den genomfördes emellertid aldrig eftersom boskapssjukan där avstannade spontant.56 Dessa utslaktningsaktioner var hur
som helst relativt tidiga i en internationell jämförelse. I Storbritannien och påvestaten initierades förvisso stora utslaktningsaktioner
redan i början av 1700-talet, men i många andra länder företogs
sådana insatser först flera decennier senare – i exempelvis Frankrike först under 1770-talet och i Holland först under 1810-talet.57
För det andra finansierades de svenska utslaktningarna i hög
grad med sammanskott eller med rätten att tillvarata kött från de
slaktade djuren, och endast undantagsvis med statsmedel. Detta
medan de flesta storskaliga utslaktningsföretag i de andra europeiska länderna i huvudsak finansierades med statsmedel. Så exempelvis i Storbritannien, Frankrike och Holland.
För det tredje riktade sig de flesta utslaktningsaktionerna i det
svenska riket både mot sjuka och friska djur inom avgränsade områden. Utslaktningsföretagen i de andra europeiska länderna fokuserade i huvudsak på de märkbart sjuka djuren under 1700-talet.
Några av dem riktade sig också mot de misstänkt sjuka djuren.
Men de riktade sig under denna tid i regel inte alls mot de uppenbart friska djuren i de sjuka djurens närhet; åtminstone framgår
inte detta klart av tidigare forskning.
För det fjärde verkar utslaktningsinsatsen 1767 i Malmöhus län
utgöra ett särfall, just för att den systematiskt riktade sig mot alla
djurslag inom de drabbade byarna, inte bara nötkreaturen. Men
även här är den tidigare internationella forskningen på området
ganska otydlig, och därför svår att jämföra med.58
Kanske ska den svenska statsledningens något säregna linje i ut31
Johanna Widenberg
slaktningsfrågan hänföras till den väl utbyggda statsapparaten? I
tidigare internationell forskning har man menat att statsapparatens
karaktär inverkade stort på de sjukdomsbekämpande åtgärdernas
utformning.59 Den svenska statsledningen förfogade över en effektiv tjänstemannastab för att kunna organisera utslaktningarna och
väletablerade kanaler till undersåtarna för att kunna övertyga om
sammanskotten – kort sagt auktoritära och byråkratiska tvångsmedel för att övertala och verkställa. Den svenska statsapparatens
karaktär hade förmodligen viss betydelse. Men med all sannolikhet hade redan etablerade handlingsmönster på den svenska
landsbygden större betydelse för statsledningens agerande. Detta
tål att understrykas: förklaringen till att myndigheterna utformade och implementerade utslaktningsaktionerna på vissa sätt ska
inte bara sökas i själva myndighetsutövningen, utan framförallt i
förutsättningarna, det vill säga traditionerna, vanorna och förhållningssätten hos dem som berördes av åtgärderna.
Sammanfattning
Epizootibekämpningen i det svenska riket växte fram i mötet med
två mycket smittsamma och dödliga djursjukdomar: boskapspest
och mjältbrand. Boskapspestens våldsamma härjningar, främst i
södra Sverige, hade störst betydelse för verksamhetens utformning.
Bekämpningsarbetet styrdes i huvudsak av två kungliga förordningar rörande boskapssjuka, förordningen från 1722 respektive 1750.
Bekämpningen byggde först och främst på avspärrningar. Åtgärderna var alltså mest inriktade på att bekämpa kontaktsmitta, alltså smittoöverföring mellan djur eller mellan människor, redskap
och djur. Rikets gränser, hamnar, landsvägar, länsgränser, stadsportar, bygränser och fähus övervakades noggrant. Men inom de
olika avspärrningarna företogs också andra sjukdomsbekämpande
32
Kampen mot boskapssjukan i 1700-talets svenska rike
åtgärder. Djurägarna och medicinare sökte bota djuren med olika
medicinska kurer och ingrepp. Några enstaka ympningsförsök företogs också. Under andra hälften av 1700-talet blev det allt vanligare med utslaktningar. Såväl friska som sjuka djur avlivades på de
orter där boskapssjuka drog fram. Djurägarna kompenserades för
sina förluster på olika sätt, företrädesvis genom rätten att ta tillvara
på slaktköttet eller genom att bilda sammanskott, alltså ett slags
försäkringsförbund.
Den svenska epizootibekämpningen påminde till stora delar om
den sjukdomsbekämpning som utvecklades i de övriga europeiska
staterna under 1700-talet. Detta berodde på att de samtliga utgick
från allmäneuropeiska idéer om sjukdomar och smittskydd. Men
den svenska verksamheten rymde också en del särdrag. Förklaringarna till att verksamheten fick en särskild utformning i 1700-talets
svenska rike står att söka i den svenska statsapparatens auktoritära och byråkratiska karaktär, men framförallt i själva implementeringen av åtgärderna. Det var sålunda till stor del anpassningen till
boskapssjukdomarnas egenheter och agrarsamhällets krav som gav
den svenska epizootibekämpningen dess särskilda inriktning.
Bibliografi
Otryckta källor
Riksarkivet (RA), Stockholm: Kunglig Majestäts kanslis arkiv, delarkiv Kollegiers m. fl. landshövdingars, hovrätters och konsistoriers skrivelser till Kungl. Maj:t, serie Skrivelser från landshövdingar och serie Skrivelser från Kommerskollegium; Collegium
Medicums arkiv, serie A1A och serie E2; Sundhetskommissionens arkiv, serie E3.
Landsarkivet i Lund (LLA): Kristianstads läns landskanslis arkiv,
serie D1; Malmöhus Landskanslis arkiv, serie D1A.
33
Johanna Widenberg
Äldre tryck
Afhandling om någre Farsoter Ibland Hästar och Boskaps Kreatur,
som De sist förflutne åren, uti åtskillige Rikets Provincer warit
gångbare […], Utgifwen af Kongl. Collegium Medicum, (Stockholm: 1766).
Haartman, Johan, ”Bref ifrån Åbo dat. den 9 juli”, Inrikes Tidningar, 66 (3 aug. 1761).
Kalm, Pehr och Holstius, Israel, Kort Beskrifning Öfwer Den i Österbotn gångbara Boskaps Sjukan, […], (Åbo: 1754).
Rosenblad [Rosén], Eberhard, Tankar Om orsakerna til den Boskapsdöd, som på Christianstads Betes-Mark åhrligen plägar
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landskansli 23 juli 1767.
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landskansli 31 augusti 1767.
Svenskt Offentligt Tryck, ”Kongl. Maj:ts Nådige Förordning, Huru
förhållas bör, til förekommande af den på åtskille Orter i Riket
upkomne Boskaps-siukan Och Fänads-Pesten”, den 13 januari
1722.
Svenskt Offentligt Tryck, ”Kongl. Maj:ts Nådige Förordning, huru
Här i Riket bör förhållas, i anseende til then uti Italien, Holland,
Nederländerne, samt Schlesswig och Hollstein inritade smittosamma Boskaps-siukdomen”, 26 mars 1745.
Svenskt Offentligt Tryck, ”Kungl. Maj:ts Förnyade Nådiga Förordning Angående Boskaps siuka och Fänads Päst”, 23 mars 1750.
Svenskt Offentligt Tryck ”Slåtts-Canzliets Publication, angående
Boskaps-siukan på Seland, Jutland och Fyen”, 25 maj 1745.
34
Kampen mot boskapssjukan i 1700-talets svenska rike
Litteratur
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Brown, Karen och Daniel Gilfoyle, red. Healing the Herds: Disease,
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Castenbrandt, Helene. Rödsot i Sverige 1750–1900. En sjukdoms
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Christensen, Peter. “’In These Perilous Times’: Plague and Plague Policies in Early Modern Denmark”. Medical History 47
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Dunlop, Robert H. och David J. Williams. Veterinary Medicine: An
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Eriksen, Anne. “Cure or Protection? The Meaning of Smallpox Inoculation, ca 1750-1775”, Medical History 57 (2013).
Fisher, John. “To Kill or not to Kill: The Eradiction of Contagious
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sease, Livestock Economies, and the Globalization of Veterinary
Medicine. Aten: Ohio University Press, 2010.
Hünniger, Dominik. Die Viehseuche von 1744–52: Deutungen und
Herrschaftspraxis in Krisenzeiten. Neumünster: Wachholtz, 2011.
Huygelen, C. ”The Immunization of Cattle against Rinderpest in
Eighteenth-Century Europe”. Medical History 41 (1997).
Karasszon, Dénes. A Concise History of Veterinary Medicine. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1988.
Kilian, Hans. Die Bekämpfung der Rinderpest in Mecklenburg-Strelitz (1769-1780). Berlin: 1934.
Koolmees, Peter. “Trends in Veterinary Historiography”. I History
of Veterinary Medicine and Agriculture, red. Johann Schäffer.
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Koolmees, Peter. “Epizootic Diseases in the Netherlands 17132002: Veterinary Science, Agricultural Policy, and Public Response”. I Brown, Karen och Gilfoyle, Daniel, red., Healing the
Herds. Disease, Livestock Economies, and the Globalization of Veterinary Medicine. Aten: Ohio University Press , 2010.
Mantovani, Adriano och Riccardo Zanetti. ”Giovanni Maria Lancisini. De Bovilla Peste and Stamping Out”. Historia Medicinæ
Veterinariæ 18 (1993).
Persson, Bodil E. B. Pestens gåta. Farsoter i det tidiga 1700-talets
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Persson, Bodil E. B. Gud verkar med naturliga medel. Pestens härjningar i Skåne 1710–1713. Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2006.
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Reuterswärd, Elisabeth. ”Boskapspest och upproriska bönder. En
studie i boskapspestens härjningar 1767 i Bodarps och Håslövs
socknar i Skytts härad, Malmöhus län”. ALE 3 (1994).
36
Kampen mot boskapssjukan i 1700-talets svenska rike
Schoug, Ernst. ”Boskapspesten i Sverige på 1700-talet”. Svensk Veterinärtidskrift, 12 (1907).
Sköld, Peter. The Two Faces of Smallpox: A Disease and its Prevention in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Sweden. Umeå, 1996.
Spinage, Clive A. Cattle Plague. A History. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2003.
Tollin, Clas. “Landskapet på Kullahalvön före den agrara revolutionen”. I Skåne – kulturlandskab og landbohistorie. Bol og by,
Landbohistorisk tidsskrift 1 (2001).
Vallat, François. Les Bœufs Malades de la Peste. La Peste Bovine en
France et en Europe XVIIIe-XIXe siècle. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2009.
Waddington, Keir. “To Stamp Out ‘So Terrible a Malady’: Bovine Tuberculosis and Tuberculin Testing in Britain, 1890-1939”.
Medical History 48 (2004).
Weibull, Carl Gustaf. Skånska jordbrukets historia intill 1800-talets
början. Lund: Gleerup, 1923.
Widenberg, Johanna. ”Veterinärmedicinhistoria i omvandling”.
Historiskt Tidskrift 4 (2014).
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1, (2015).
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Carlsson Bokförlag, 2017, under publicering.
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37
Johanna Widenberg
NOTER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
38
Peter Sköld, The Two Faces of Smallpox. A Disease and its Prevention in Eighteenthand Nineteenth-Century Sweden (Umeå, 1996); Helene Castenbrandt, Rödsot i Sverige 1750–1900. En sjukdoms demografiska och medicinska historia (Göteborg, 2012).
Clive A. Spinage, Cattle Plague. A History (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum
Publishers, 2003), 3.
François Vallat, Les Bœufs Malades de la Peste. La Peste Bovine en France et en
Europe XVIIIe-XIXe siècle (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2009), 193–
221; Karl Appuhn,”Ecologies of Beef: Eighteenth-Century Epizootics and the Environmental History of Early Modern Europe”, Environmental History 15 (2010),
271–278.
Bodil E. B. Persson, Pestens gåta. Farsoter i det tidiga 1700-talets Skåne (Lund:
Nordic Academic Press, 2001), 265–272; Peter Christensen, “’In These Perilous
Times’: Plague and Plague Policies in Early Modern Denmark”, Medical History 47
(2003), 431–446.
Fokus i artikeln ligger på handelsrestriktioner, avspärrning, utslaktning och ympning. För en fullständig redogörelse av alla olika bekämpningsåtgärder som genomfördes och diskuterades under seklet, se den kommande monografin: Johanna Widenberg, Den stora kreatursdöden. Kampen mot boskapspest och mjältbrand
i 1700-talets svenska rike (Stockholm: Carlsson Bokförlag, 2017).
Exempelvis Ernst Schoug, ”Boskapspesten i Sverige på 1700-talet”, Svensk Veterinärtidskrift 12 (1907), 30–39; Carl Gustaf Weibull, Skånska jordbrukets historia intill
1800-talets början (Lund: Gleerup, 1923), 199–213; Elisabeth Reuterswärd, ”Boskapspest och upproriska bönder. En studie i boskapspestens härjningar 1767 i Bodarps och Håslövs socknar i Skytts härad, Malmöhus län”, ALE 3 (1994), 19–30.
Peter Koolmees, “Trends in Veterinary Historiography”, i History of Veterinary Medicine and Agriculture, red. Johann Schäffer (Giesβen: Verlaug der DVG,
2003), 235–243; Louise Hill Curth, The Care of Brute Beasts. A Social and Cultural
Study of Veterinary Medicine in Early Modern England (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 1–6;
Johanna Widenberg,”Veterinärmedicinhistoria i omvandling”, Historiskt Tidskrift
4 (2014), 698–707.
Karen Brown och Daniel Gilfoyle, red., Healing the Herds. Disease, Livestock Economies, and the Globalization of Veterinary Medicine (Aten: Ohio University Press,
2010), passim; Hill Curth, The Care of Brute Beast, 1–6, 142–161; Dominik Hünniger, Die Viehseuche von 1744–52: Deutungen und Herrschaftspraxis in Krisenzeiten
(Neumünster: Wachholtz, 2011), 11–20.
C. Huygelen, ”The Immunization of Cattle against Rinderpest in Eighteenth-Century Europe”, Medical History 41 (1997), 182–183.
Kampen mot boskapssjukan i 1700-talets svenska rike
10 Otto M. Radostits et al., Veterinary Medicine. A Textbook of the Diseases of Cattle,
Horses, Sheep, Pigs, and Goats (Edinburgh: Saunders Elsevier, 2007), tionde upplagan, 1237–1241.
11 Spinage, Cattle Plague, 103–146.
12 Widenberg, Den stora kreatursdöden.
13 Radostits et al., Veterinary Medicine, 815–819.
14 Widenberg, Den stora kreatursdöden.
15 Johanna Widenberg, ”Retrospektiv diagnosticering inom veterinärmedicinhistoria – exemplet boskapspest”, Historisk Tidskrift 1 (2015), 34–62. Se även Karen
Brown,”Conclusion”, i Healing the heards, red. Brown och Gilfoyle, 278.
16 Exempelvis Pehr Kalm och Israel Holstius, Kort Beskrifning Öfwer Den i Österbotn
gångbara Boskaps Sjukan (Åbo: 1754), 1–5; Johan Haartman, ”Bref ifrån Åbo dat.
den 9 juli”, Inrikes Tidningar 66 (3 aug. 1761).
17 Exempelvis Eberhard Rosenblad [Rosén], Tankar Om orsakerna til den Boskapsdöd, som på Christianstads Betes-Mark åhrligen plägar tima (Lund: 1749), 6.
18 Exempelvis Afhandling om någre Farsoter Ibland Hästar och Boskaps Kreatur, som
De sist förflutne åren, uti åtskillige Rikets Provincer warit gångbare […], Utgifwen
af Kongl. Collegium Medicum (Stockholm: 1766), 4, 49, 55.
19 Exempelvis Riksarkivet i Stockholm (hädanefter RA), Kunglig Majestäts kanslis
arkiv (hädanefter KM:s kanslis arkiv), Landshövdingen (hädanefter ldh) i Malmöhus län till Kungl. Maj:t (hädanefter KM), vol. 3, brevet 15 jan. 1722, med brevet
12 jan. 1722 som bilaga, s. 18–23; Afhandling om någre Farsoter Ibland Hästar och
Boskaps Kreatur, 4–28.
20 Robert H. Dunlop och David J. Williams, Veterinary Medicine. An Illustrated History (St. Louis: Mosby: 1995), 277-279.
21 Exempelvis RA, KM:s kanslis arkiv, Ldh i Österbotten till KM, vol. 15, brevet 17
sept. 1747, med Herman H. Hasts brev som bilaga; Afhandling om någre Farsoter
Ibland Hästar och Boskaps Kreatur, 63–70.
22 Exempelvis Bodil E. B Persson, Gud verkar med naturliga medel. Pestens härjningar i Skåne 1710–1713, (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2006), 24–25, 51; J. N. Hays,
The Burdens of Disease: Epidemics and Human Response in Western History (New
Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 2009 [1998]), 109.
23 Weibull, Skånska jordbrukets historia, 200.
24 Svenskt Offentligt Tryck, ”Kongl. Maj:ts Nådige Förordning, Huru förhållas bör,
til förekommande af den på åtskille Orter i Riket upkomne Boskaps-siukan Och
Fänads-Pesten”, den 13 januari 1722.
25 Svenskt Offentligt Tryck, ”Kungl. Maj:ts Förnyade Nådiga Förordning Angående
Boskaps siuka och Fänads Päst”, 23 mars 1750.
39
Johanna Widenberg
26 Exempelvis RA, KM:s kanslis arkiv, Ldh i Kronobergs län till KM, vol. 13, breven
28 maj och 12 juni 1750.
27 Exempelvis RA, KM:s kanslis arkiv, Skrivelser från Kommerskollegium, vol. 69,
brevet 23 nov. 1749; RA, KM:s kanslis arkiv, Ldh i Malmöhus län till KM, vol.
17, brevet 1 feb. 1750; RA, KM:s kanslis arkiv, Ldh i Gotlands län till KM, vol. 11,
brevet 29 juli 1752.
28 Vallat, Les Bœufs Malades de la Peste, 143-144; Dominik Hünniger, “Policing Epizootics. Legislation and Administration during Outbreaks of Cattle Plague in
Eighteenth-Century Northern Germany as Continuous Crisis Management”, i
Healing the Herds, red. Karen Brown och Daniel Gilfoyle, 79–80.
29 Exempelvis Svenskt Offentligt Tryck, ”Kongl. Maj:ts Nådige Förordning, huru Här
i Riket bör förhållas, i anseende til then uti Italien, Holland, Nederländerne, samt
Schlesswig och Hollstein inritade smittosamma Boskaps-siukdomen”, 26 mars
1745, och ”Slåtts-Canzliets Publication, angående Boskaps-siukan på Seland, Jutland och Fyen”, 25 maj 1745.
30 RA, KM:s kanslis arkiv, Ldh i Kronobergs län till KM, vol. 13, brevet 9 juli 1750;
Svenskt Offentligt Tryck, ”Allmän kundgiörelse”, utgiven av Malmö landskansli 23
juli 1767.
31 Se exempelvis Clas Tollin, “Landskapet på Kullahalvön före den agrara revolutionen”, i Skåne – kulturlandskab og landbohistorie. Bol og by, Landbohistorisk tidsskrift 1 (2001), 72–75.
32 Exempelvis RA, KM:s kanslis arkiv, Ldh i Kristianstads län till KM, vol. 7, brevet
20 nov. 1745.
33 RA, KM:s kanslis arkiv, Ldh i Kristianstads län till KM, vol. 9, brevet 2 april 1750;
RA, KM:s kanslis arkiv, Ldh i Malmöhus län till KM, vol. 17, brevet 8 april 1750.
34 RA, Collegium Medicums arkiv, serie E2, vol. 7, brevet 27 juli 1763; Svenskt Offentligt Tryck, ”Allmän kungiörelse”, utgiven av Malmö landskansli 31 augusti
1767.
35 RA, KM:s kanslis arkiv, Ldh i Malmöhus län till KM, vol. 29, ett flertal brev i juli
och augusti 1767.
36 Exempelvis RA, KM:s kanslis arkiv, Ldh i Åbo och Björneborgs län till KM, vol.
27, brevet 20 juli 1761.
37 Exempelvis RA, KM:s kanslis arkiv, Ldh i Åbo och Björneborgs län till KM, vol. 21,
brevet 15 maj 1745; Landsarkivet i Lund (hädanefter LLA), Malmöhus Landskanslis arkiv, serie D1A, vol. 40, brevet 25 feb. 1756, s. 232.
38 Exempelvis RA, KM:s kanslis arkiv, Ldh i Uppsala län till KM, vol. 26, brevet 9 juli
1759. Se även RA, KM:s kanslis arkiv, Ldh i Österbotten till KM, vol. 14, brevet 12
juni 1745.
40
Kampen mot boskapssjukan i 1700-talets svenska rike
39 Huygelen, ”The Immunization of Cattle against Rinderpest”, 183–187; Vallat, Les
Bœufs Malades de la Peste, 274-275; Anne Eriksen,“Cure or Protection? The Meaning of Smallpox Inoculation, ca 1750-1775”, Medical History 57 (2013), 516–536.
40 Exempelvis RA, KM:s kanslis arkiv, Ldh i Malmöhus län till KM, vol. 17, brevet 5
mars 1750. Se även Weibull, Skånska jordbrukets historia, 211.
41 RA, Sundhetskommissionens arkiv, serie E3, vol. 2, brevet 26 aug. 1761, s. 468–
469.
42 RA, Collegium Medicums arkiv, serie A1A, vol. 23, april 1768, s. 75–76.
43 Dunlop och Williams, Veterinary Medicine, 277-281: John Fisher, “To Kill or not
to Kill: The Eradiction of Contagious Bovine Pleuro-Pneumonia in Western Europe”, Medical History 47 (2003), 315–317.
44 Exempelvis RA, Collegium Medicums arkiv, serie E2, vol. 7, brevet 3 jan. 1746, s.
793–794.
45 RA, KM:s kanslis arkiv, Ldh i Kristianstads län till KM, vol. 7, brevet 27 nov. 1745.
46 LLA, Malmöhus Landskanslis arkiv, serie D1A, vol 40, brevet 25 feb. 1756, s. 232;
RA, KM:s kanslis arkiv, Ldh i Malmöhus län till KM, vol. 22, brevet 18 maj 1756.
47 RA, KM:s kanslis arkiv, Skrivelser från Kommerskollegium, vol. 128, brevet 31
okt. 1763; RA, KM:s kanslis arkiv, Ldh i Kronobergs län till KM, vol. 14, breven 21
nov. 1763 och 22 mars 1764. Se även Reuterswärd, ”Boskapspest och upproriska
bönder”, 25–27.
48 Bäst bevarat i LLA, Kristianstads läns landskanslis arkiv, serie D1, vol. 64, brevet
10 mars 1751.
49 Exempelvis RA, KM:s kanslis arkiv, Ldh i Hallands län till KM, vol. 20, brevet 25
nov. 1763; RA, KM:s kanslis arkiv, Skrivelser från Kommerskollegium, vol. 128,
brevet 17 nov. 1763; RA, KM:s kanslis arkiv, Ldh i Kronobergs län till KM, vol. 14,
brevet 22 mars 1764.
50 Exempelvis RA, Collegium Medicums arkiv, serie E2, vol. 16, brevet från Johan
Haartman, uppläst 2 sept. 1761, s. 349.
51 Dénes Karasszon, A Concise History of Veterinary Medicine (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1988), 293; Adriano Mantovani och Riccardo Zanetti, ”Giovanni Maria
Lancisini. De Bovilla Peste and Stamping Out”, Historia Medicinæ Veterinariæ 18
(1993), 97, 101.
52 Hans Kilian, Die Bekämpfung der Rinderpest in Mecklenburg-Strelitz (1769-1780)
(Berlin: 1934), 1–56; John Broad,”Cattle Plague in Eighteenth-Century England”,
Agricultural History Review 31 (1983), 104–115; Lise Wilkinson, Animals and disease. An Introduction to the History of Comparative Medicine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 35–64; Spinage, Cattle Plague, 219–446; Vallat, Les
Bœufs Malades de la Peste, 109–290; Hünniger” Policing Epizootics”, 76–91; Peter
41
Johanna Widenberg
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
42
Koolmees, “Epizootic Diseases in the Netherlands 1713-2002: Veterinary Science,
Agricultural Policy, and Public Response”, i Healing the Herds, red. Karen Brown
och Daniel Gilfoyle, 19–41; Hünniger, Die Viehseuche von 1744-52, 119–210.
Se exempelvis John Fishers forskningsöversikt i “To Kill or not to Kill”, 314–317.
Hünniger, Die Vieseuche von 1744-52, 9–18, 119–160, 213–215; Hünniger, ”Policing Epizootics”, 77, 79–85.
Wilkinson, Animals and disease, 35–64; Dunlop och Williams, Veterinary Medicine, 277–281.
RA, KM:s kanslis arkiv, Ldh i Södermanlands län till KM, vol. 16, breven 27 aug.,
17 sept. och 15 okt. 1750.
Spinage, Cattle Plague, 115, 141–143, 243–245; Koolmees, ”Epizootic Diseases in
the Netherlands 1713-2002”, 25–27. Se även Keir Waddington, “To Stamp Out ‘So
Terrible a Malady’: Bovine Tuberculosis and Tuberculin Testing in Britain, 18901939”, Medical History 48 (2004), 3.
Se till exempel Fisher, “To Kill or not to Kill”, 314–317; Spinage Cattle Plague,
103–145, 241–263, 324; Koolmees “Epizootic Diseases in the Netherlands 17132002”, 22–25.
Fisher, “To Kill or not to Kill”, 315–316.
Släktjordsfrågan i Sverige och Norge
1810–1860
Martin Dackling
Introduktion
Runt sekelskiftet 1800 infördes på olika håll i Europa ny civillagstiftning som på ett eller annat sätt utgick från upplysningens
idéer. Mest känd är Frankrikes Code civil (1804), men till samma
kategori räknas även Allgemeines Preussisches Landrecht (1794)
och Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch i Österrike (1811). Med
utgångspunkt i upplysningsidéer introducerade dessa lagverk
nya lagstiftningsprinciper med långtgående effekter, inte minst i
egendomsfrågor. Grovt uttryckt banades därmed väg för en liberal fastighetsrätt, byggd på ett starkt och individualistiskt präglat
äganderättsbegrepp, vilket stod i skarp kontrast med äldre tiders
kollektivt präglade egendomsrätt.1 Införandet av nya tankegångar
gick inte över en natt, snarare kan spänningen mellan äldre och
nyare egendomsprinciper sägas ha präglat stora delar av Europa
under hela 1800-talet.2 Detta är tydligt märkbart även i de nordiska länderna. Ännu vid ingången till 1800-talet präglades jordlagstiftningen i Sverige och Norge, från 1814 förenade i en union med
separata nationella parlament, av olika former av släktjordslagar; i
Sverige främst genom bestämmelserna om arvejord och bördsrätt,
43
Martin Dackling
i Norge med motsvarigheterna odelsjord och odelsrett. Under ett
drygt halvsekel, från ca 1810 fram till ca 1860, var denna lagstiftning mycket omdebatterad på båda sidor gränsen och föremål för
återkommande politiska angrepp.3 Utgången blev emellertid helt
olika: bördsrätt avskaffades medan odelsretten snarast gick stärkt
ur striden. Syftet med den här artikeln är att diskutera varför debatten fick så olika resultat och hur den politiska diskussionen om
släktjordlagstiftningen i Sverige och Norge kan förstås.
Historisk bakgrund
Som institutioner kan bördsrätten och odelsretten ses som variationer på samma idé: att behålla egendom inom vissa givna släktled.
Under förutsättning att jorden uppfyllt vissa kriterier, vilka jag återkommer till, har bördsrätten och odelsretten gett släktingar till jordinnehavaren långtgående rättigheter. Om denne önskade avyttra
jorden skulle det i första hand göras till närmaste släktingar, som så
att säga hade förtur till egendomen. Såldes jorden till någon utanför
släkten hade säljarens släktingar dessutom rättighet att inom en viss
tid lösa tillbaka jorden. Som institutioner var vare sig bördsrätt eller
odelsrett unika. Per Norseng visar att det under medeltid och tidigmodern tid går att finna liknande förköps- eller inlösningsbestämmelser i de delar av Europa som präglats av en germansk rättstradition. Företeelsen har gått under olika namn: danskans Lovbydelse,
franskans Retrait lignager, och Retraktrecht eller Familienvorkaufrecht i tyskspråkiga länder. Däremot saknas motsvarande institution inom romersk rätt, och den fick därmed mycket lite inflytande
i exempelvis Storbritannien.4
Likheterna mellan odelsretten och bördsrätten var stora, men
det fanns också påtagliga skillnader. Bördsrätt omfattade enbart
arvejord, varmed i princip avsågs ärvd jord, och förutsatte därmed
44
Släktjordsfrågan i Sverige och Norge 1810–1860
att egendomen passerat minst ett generationsskifte för att möjligheten att återbörda den till släkten skulle kunna uppstå. Arvejord
fick dessutom inte testamenteras bort. Odelsretten var däremot
tvungen att upparbetas genom flera på varandra följande generationsskiften, vilket successivt övergick till att uttryckas som en
fixerad tidsperiod. Under medeltiden var denna tid mycket lång;
enligt Magnus Lagabøters Landslov (1274) var det först i den fjärde generationen, eller efter 60 år, som egendomen blev odelsjord.5
Under tidigmodern tid sänktes dock hävdetiden successivt och genom en förordning 1771 sattes den till blott tio år.6 På liknande sätt
var lösningsfristen för klander när jord såldes utom släkten enligt Landsloven upp till 60 år, men tidsrymden krymptes parallellt
med hävdetiden. I 1771 års förordning uppgick den dock ännu till
15 år.7 I jämförelse med denna var den svenska bördsrätten mer
strikt. Preskriptionstiden var enbart ett år, förutsatt att den nye
ägaren sökt lagfart (fasta) på sitt förvärv.8 Baserat på huvuddragen
i den rättsliga utvecklingen är det rimligt att anta att släktjordlagstiftningens verkningar var olika i Norge och Sverige. Eftersom all
ärvd jord i Sverige var underställd bördsrätt är det troligt att lagstiftningen hade relativt stor räckvidd, samtidigt som den korta
preskriptionstiden innebar att tidigare ägares släktingar var tvungna att agera snabbt. Där det svenska systemet bara räknade med
två jordkategorier – arvejord och avlingejord – fanns i Norge en
mellankategori av egendomar på väg att vinna odel. Denna grupp
bör ha varit stor under medeltiden, då hävdetiden för att vinna
odel var mycket lång. I takt med att denna successivt sänktes närmade sig dock systemen varandra och mot slutet av 1700-talet bör
odelsretten snarast ha haft större betydelse än bördsrätten.
Trots att den skisserade utvecklingen pekar på en ökad betydelse för släktjordlagstiftningen över tid har den historiska forskningen framför allt analyserat dess funktion under medeltiden.
45
Martin Dackling
Utgångspunkten har dock ofta varit ett gemensamt nordiskt perspektiv. Den danske historikern Michael H. Gelting har diskuterat
likheterna mellan danskans lovbydelse, bördsrätten och odelsretten. Hans tes är att de har ett gemensamt ursprung och inrättades
först i slutet av 1200-talet.9 Helle Vogt har i ett annat sammanhang
diskuterat likheter och skillnader mellan odelsrett, lovbydelse och
bördsrätt med utgångspunkt i bestämmelserna i de tidigaste lagsamlingarna.10 Per Norseng pekar i en analys ut påfallande likheter
mellan odelsretten, bördsrätten och lovbydelsen under senmedeltid och övergången till tidigmodern tid, men understryker samtidigt odelsrettens särart, bland annat i den mycket långa hävdetiden.11 Han argumenterar för att odelsretten – trots dess plats i
samtida lagar – inte hade någon större betydelse under medeltiden
och knappast ens under 1500-talet.12 Å andra sidan har arkeologer betonat odalrättens betydelse även under förhistorisk tid, mot
bakgrund av bland annat analyser av runinskrifter.13
För medeltida förhållanden finns således en tydlig komparativ nordisk eller åtminstone skandinavisk forskning som belyst
släktjordlagstiftningens ålder, utveckling och variationer. Flyttas
fokus fram mot 1600-, 1700- och 1800-talen är situationen dock
en annan. Det finns få studier som över huvud taget analyserat
odelsrettens och bördsrättens sena historia, och bland de ansatser
som ändå gjorts saknas ofta ett komparativt anslag. Ett undantag
är Anna Hansen, som med exempel från jämtländska domstolsprotokoll visar hur begrepp som odelsjord levde kvar långt efter
landskapet 1645 blivit svenskt territorium under svensk lag.14 Den
enda större studien av bördsrätten är Christer Winbergs studie av
hur institutionen uppfattades och praktiserades under tidigmodern tid. Han understryker dess betydelse under 1500- och det tidiga 1600-talet, men skisserar även en utveckling där en äldre uppfattning om släktens kollektiva rätt till jorden successivt övergick
46
Släktjordsfrågan i Sverige och Norge 1810–1860
i en mer individualiserad äganderätt. En bakomliggande drivkraft
var en förändring i synen på jorden, från en släkttillhörighet till en
handelsvara.15 Detta fick konsekvenser för bördsrätten, som Winberg menar var så gott som obsolet långt innan den 1863 utgick ur
lagstiftningen.16 Odelsrettens politiska historia har nyligen belysts
av Håkon Evju, som i två artiklar analyserat hur odelsretten debatterades offentligt decennierna före och direkt efter 1814. Det fanns
en tydlig kritik mot bland annat osäkerhetseffekterna för ägandeförhållanden och mot att odelsretten drev fram många rättsliga
konflikter. Men institutet hade också sina försvarare, som framhävde hur odelsretten gav bönderna en särskild stolthet och känsla
för sin jord. Evju visar hur de norska förhållandena kontrasterades mot de danska: odelsretten framhölls som huvudorsak till att
Norge inte gått i samma feodala riktning som Danmark. Samtidigt
kom mycket av kritiken mot institutionen från en danskpositionerad tjänstemannaklass. Granskas argumenten framträder, hävdar
Evju, två grundläggande synsätt. För kritikerna var bördsrätten en
ekonomisk fråga och problemet definierades i äganderättsliga termer. Förespråkarna tog en politisk vinkling: jord hade en annan
betydelse än lösören och skulle behandlas därefter.17
För att summera, det saknas i stor utsträckning kunskap om odelsrettens och bördsrättens senare historia. Den rättsliga utvecklingens
grunddrag är kända, men knappast problematiserade. Att bördsrätten avvecklades i Sverige och odelsretten ännu är en del av norsk lagstiftning är kända fakta och framställs ibland som naturliga följder.
Ändå finns påtagliga likheter vad gäller de sätt varpå diskussionen
om släktjordlagstiftningen fördes i de två länderna under 1800-talet.
Tre faser kan identifieras. Att odelsretten var mycket omdebatterad
på 1810-talet är välkänt. I spåren av Napoleonkrigens ekonomiska
konsekvenser infördes 1811 starka restriktioner, som bland annat
sänkte preskriptionstiden till fem år och möjliggjorde för en ägare
47
Martin Dackling
att ta bort odelsegenskapen på sin egendom.18 Med den nya författningen 1814 gjordes emellertid ett lappkast och odelsretten skrevs
in i grundlagen, vars §107 föreskrev att ”Odels- og aasædes-retten
maa ikke ophæves”.19 Mindre känt är att också bördsrätten vid denna tid var under debatt, då en ledamot i bondeståndet vid 1812 års
riksdag krävde dess avveckling. Under de följande decennierna inträdde ett andra skede, då frågan om släktjordlagstiftningen ingick
i den omfattande översyn av civillagstiftning som initierades i båda
länderna under 1810-talet.20 För norsk del mynnade arbetet ut i
Loven om Odelsretten och Åsætesretten 1821, medan arbetet för
svensk del stannade vid lagutkast 1826. Därpå följde några lugna
decennier, då vare sig börds- eller odelsretten förekom på den politiska dagordningen. I slutet av 1840-talet inträdde så en tredje fas,
med omfattande politiska angrepp på de två institutionerna. Krav
på att ta bort odelsretten från grundlagen blev föremål för Stortingets debatter 1848, 1851, 1857 och 1860, samtidigt som yrkanden om
att avskaffa bördsrätten behandlades på samtliga svenska riksdagar
mellan 1850 och 1863.
Trots olika utfall var således den övergripande strukturen i
debatten om släktjordslagstiftningen likartad, vilket motiverar
en fördjupad jämförelse av hur diskussion och argument såg ut
i praktiken. Det komparativa anslaget ger dessutom möjlighet
att peka på likheter och skillnader i debatterna för att därigenom
fördjupa analysen. En utgångspunkt för en sådan granskning är
att de sätt varpå diskussionen fördes och de motiv som tillmättes
betydelse kan säga något om själva samhället under den aktuella
tidsperioden. Evjus kontrastering mellan ett ekonomiskt och ett
politiskt synsätt är här en viktig utgångspunkt, som också anknyter till Winbergs beskrivning av hur ett alltmer kommersiellt synsätt på jord utmanade bördsrättens principer. I det följande ligger
tyngdpunkten på debattens tredje fas, när frågan blev hett omde48
Släktjordsfrågan i Sverige och Norge 1810–1860
batterad i parlamenten. För att kunna se hur debatten utvecklade
sig fram till denna slutstrid skisseras även dess huvuddrag under
de två första faser som beskrivits ovan. Undersökningen utgår i
första hand från tre frågeställningar. Vilka argument fördes fram
emot respektive för släktjordlagstiftningen? Stod striden i första
hand mellan ett politiskt och ett ekonomiskt synsätt? Och hur stora likheter fanns mellan den svenska och den norska debatten?
Odelsretten från Eidsvoll till 1821 års Odelslov
Det ligger nära till hands att se 1814 års författning som en samtida
slutpunkt för diskussionen om odelsretten; att institutionen blev
skyddad i grundlagen innebar ju att det krävdes en kvalificerad
majoritet i Stortinget för en avveckling. Håkon Evju visar emellertid att Eidsvollförfattningen inte betraktades som ett definitivt
slut på debatten. Vid Stortingsmötet 1815–1816 bröts på nytt uppfattningarna mot varandra och odelsrettens kritiker pekade på hur
den försämrade såväl jordbrukets utveckling som befolkningstillväxten.21 Men försvaret utvecklades också, och de viktigaste tankegångarna i denna riktning stod Christian Magnus Falsen för. Denne hade spelat en avgörande roll vid mötet på Eidsvoll och var en
stark anhängare av odelsretten, vilket inte minst märks i den skrift
till odelsrettens försvar han publicerade 1815.22 Falsens syfte var
att beskriva ett samband mellan odelsretten och den nya fria konstitutionen och han drev sin tes genom en omfattande historisk
återblick, stadigt fäst på Norges storhetsperiod under medeltiden.
Odelsretten för Falsen var inte i huvudsak en familjerätt, utan
symboliserade en politisk rättighet. Oberoendet var centralt, och
odelsretten gjorde innehavaren fri i förhållande till staten.23 Falsen
pekade på hur rätten att delta i samhällslivet i det gamla norska
kungadömet inte var knuten till person utan till jorden och tolkade
49
Martin Dackling
en uppdelning i många små jordägare som en nödvändig förutsättning för nationens fortlevnad.24 Odelsretten hade hos den norska
befolkningen bevarat en förmåga till politiskt agerande, trots det
långvariga styret från Köpenhamn. Men odelsretten var också en
framtida garant mot uppkomsten av stora jordegendomar och –
än värre – en adel, som annars skulle tillskansa sig politisk makt på
de fria odelböndernas bekostnad och kasta in riket i stridigheter.25
”Grund-Ejendommenes lige Fordelning er Grundvolden til al borgerlig Fridhed”, fastslog Falsen.26 Det bonderomantiserande draget
hos Falsen är starkt, men resonemangets styrka ligger onekligen i
att han knöt samman historia, nutid och framtid.27 Odelsrettens
betydelse kunde knappast undervärderas och dess bevarande blev
för Falsen synonymt med att bevara det nya, fria Norge.
Falsens skrift renderade gensvar, men tycks inte ha fått någon
avgörande politisk följd under det följande Stortinget samma år.
Grundlagens §107 föreskrev att odelsretten inte fick upphävas,
men de närmare bestämmelserna återstod att klargöra. Falsen lade
ett eget förslag till Stortinget 1815, men hela frågan överläts till
den då nyligen inrättande Lovkommittén som arbetade med en ny
civillagstiftning.28 Då kommittén inledningsvis var överhopad av
arbete dröjde det till 1821 innan en ny lagstiftning kunde framläggas för Stortinget. I beredningen av förslaget konstaterades kort,
med hänvisning till författningen, att ”intet Spørgsmaal være om,
at Retten bør vedblive”, det var enbart formerna som nu var ifråga.29 Hävdetiden sattes till tio år, men preskriptionstiden förblev
fem år; det ansågs viktigt att ”ikke længere end nødvendig” låta
en förvärvare av odelsjord sväva i ovisshet om att få behålla sin
egendom eller inte.30 Förslaget bifölls i allt väsentligt av Stortinget.
Något diskussionsprotokoll för debatten finns inte, men av ett par
reservationer framgår att odelsretten fortsatt var omstridd. Kritikerna anförde att den fick negativa följder både för staten och en50
Släktjordsfrågan i Sverige och Norge 1810–1860
skilda och i lagtinget anfördes att ”Odelsretten er stridende imod
vor Grundlovs Aand, stridende imod det almindelige Retsprincip,
skadelig for Familierne og skadelig for Staten”, dessutom stred den
mot egendomsbegreppet, sänkte jordpriserna, hindrade egendomens förbättring och bröt ner moralen.31 Samtidigt erkände kritikerna betydelsen i att odelsretten var införd i grundlagen, något
upphävande av rätten i sig var det inte tal om.
Det är svårt att dra mer långtgående slutsatser baserat på det lilla
material som återgetts, men utifrån reservationerna är det tydligt
att odelsrettens motståndare använde en bred arsenal av argument
för att lägga tyngd bakom in kritik. Ekonomiska argument, som effekterna på jordpriserna och jordbrukets utveckling, förekom, men
politiska och familjerelaterade argument hade också sin givna plats.
Bördsrätten fram till 1826 års lagförslag
Till skillnad från odelsretten hade bördsrätten inte varit en politisk stridsfråga under 1700-talet. När frågan om dess upphävande
väcktes vid 1812 års riksdag av en bonderepresentant föll den heller
inte i god jord; när förslaget lästs upp i bondeståndet noterades ”ett
allmänt ogillande af hwad i detta Memorial blifwit framstäldt” och
försök gjordes att förmå representanten att återta förslaget.32 Det
är därför rimligt att anta att bördsrätten stöddes av en klar majoritet av bönderna. Förslaget tillsändes ändå så småningom de övriga
stånden, men blev inte föremål för någon mer långtgående diskussion.33 Bland de synpunkter som fördes fram finns ändå en tydlig
parallell till det mönster Håkon Evju finner i Norge. De ekonomiska argumenten låg tydligt till grund för kritikerna. Bördsrätten ansågs leda till lägre priser på jord, hindrade jordbruksutveckling och
utnyttjades för att pressa pengar av den nya ägaren – det vill säga
väsentligen argument av samma art som återfinns i den norska de51
Martin Dackling
batten. I likhet med den samtida norska debatten byggde försvararna i huvudsak sin argumentation på politiska grunder, men delvis
med annan riktning. Någon hänvisning till konstitutionen eller historisk gemenskap gjordes inte, men bördsrättens betydelse för att
upprätthålla egendomsförhållandena – som skydd för ”den mindre
besutne Medborgarens egendom” – poängterades, och bördsrätten
sades också vara ett uttryck för allmogens fosterlandskärlek.34 Någon förändring av lagstiftningen kom dock inte till stånd; precis som
i Norge överlämnades frågan i allmänna ordalag till beredning inom
den lagkommitté som 1811 tillsatts för att göra en översyn av civillagstiftningen.
Lagkommittén utarbetade under 1810-talet utkast på civillagens rättsbalkar, men först 1826 kunde dessa presenteras som ett
sammanhållet förslag. Den slutliga texten var starkt liberal, präglad
av lagkommitténs ledande kraft, häradshövdingen Johan Gabriel
Richert.35 Av lagtext, motiv och kommitténs efterlämnade protokoll
framgår att frågan om släktjordslagstiftningen utgjort den verkliga
stötestenen i lagförslaget. Huvudförslaget, förespråkat av en majoritet inom kommittén, var att de rådande begränsningarna i rätten att
disponera över arvejord skulle upphöra, men att bördsrättens däremot borde förbli.36 I sin motivering skisserade kommittén i liberal
anda en generell samhällsutveckling från ett samhälle där staten var
en förening av släkter till en ordning där grunden bestod av enskilda
medborgare. I det äldre släktsamhället hade jorden varit knuten till
släkten och bördsrätten ingått som ”en nödvändig beståndsdel i den
allmänna odalrätt, som från själfva samhällsförbundet var oskiljaktig”.37 I det moderna samhället var dock detta en anomali; odalrätten
var ett avslutat kapitel och kunde således inte längre utgöra ett motiv
för bördsrätten. I dess ställe satte kommittén ”den nyare bördsrättens egentliga princip”: en förmodad kärlek till förfädernas jord.38
Detta familjerelaterade känsloargument vävdes dock in i ett poli52
Släktjordsfrågan i Sverige och Norge 1810–1860
tiskt resonemang. När bönder arbetade jorden införlivades deras
personlighet med denna och när jorden överförts inom släkten blev
den för sin brukare som en teckning över släktens öden. Ur det lilla
följde så det stora, ty ”från fädernejordens minnen utvidgas synkretsen småningom till fäderneslandets” och ”kärleken till fäders jord
blir således alltid en djup grundval för kärleken till fäderneslandet”.39
Kommittén erkände att jordbrukaren visserligen ägde ”den medborgerliga bildning” att han kunde älska fäderneslandet även utan den
individuella affektionen, men manade till försiktighet: ”Fosterlandskänslan är ett band, som väfves af många trådar: ingen av dessa må
afskäras obetänksamt”.40
Lagkommittén omdefinierade med andra ord bördsrättens motiv och la den till grund för det politiska behovet att slå ett band
mellan staten och dess medborgare. Tanken på en gammal odalförfattning, där jordägandet haft central betydelse för samhällspositionen, var närmast helt liktydigt med Falsens skrift om odelsretten. I protokollen framgår dock att bördsrätten blottlade stora
meningsskiljaktigheter mellan kommittéledamöterna. Juristen
Anders Erik Afzelius yrkade i ett memorial på bördsrättens totala
upphävande och i hans text genljöd de ekonomiska argument som
tagits upp i 1812 års riksdagsdebatt – den försämrade jordbruksutvecklingen, oskicket att pressa den nye ägaren på pengar och lägre
jordpriser. Han framhöll dessutom att bördsrätten hade likheter
med fideikommisstanken, vilken principiellt underkänts av riksdagen några år tidigare.41 En annan ledamot, Olof Zenius, framhöll häremot behovet att hos befolkningen upparbeta en känsla
för staten och såg bördsrätten som ett verktyg för att hos jordbrukarna skapa en vördnad för den stat som skyddade dem i deras
jordbesittning.42 Richert erkände öppet bördsrättens brister, men
menade att en avveckling skulle leda till ett tunnare band till fäderneslandet.43 I motsats till Falsen hävdade han dock att den gamla
53
Martin Dackling
odalförfattningen var bruten: de svenska bönderna utgjorde inte
längre en egendomsadel. I likhet med Falsen frammanade han dock
ett framtida hot. Så länge bördsrätten bestod skulle allmogen, enligt
Richert, ”säkert bibehålla Sveriges mesta jord; och så länge skall ej
heller Svenska bonden förlora den rang, han äger framför de flesta,
kanske alla, andra länders jordbrukare”.44 Av naturliga skäl varnade
inte Richert för uppkomsten av en adelsklass, däremot innebar hans
resonemang att bördsrätten knöts till bondeklassens bibehållande
vid sin jord. Det var inte en fråga om att bevara konstitutionen eller
den allmänna samhällsordningen, snarare var Richerts formulering
direkt riktad till bönderna som grupp.
Slutstridens upptakt
Efter att 1821 års odelslagstiftningen godkänts i Norge och 1826 års
förslag till civillagstiftning lagts fram i Sverige stillades debatten och
under ett par decennier var släktjordsfrågan i princip borta från den
politiska dagordningen. I viss utsträckning berodde det på det utdragna arbetet med revidering av civillagsförslagen, vilket släpade
efter i båda länderna.45 Först i slutet av 1840-talet blossade frågan
upp igen. Den lagberedning som övertog Lagkommitténs arbete
bröt 1847 med den tidigare linjen och förespråkade istället bördsrättens fullständiga upplösning.46 Vid den efterföljande riksdagen 1850
blev frågan politiskt aktuell då en motionär inom bondeståndet
krävde bördsrättens avskaffande. Yrkandet föll, men frågan återkom
vid varje följande riksdag fram till 1863. Med en märklig samtidighet dök även odelsretten upp som politiskt tvisteämne i Stortinget
1848, för att åter behandlas 1851, 1857 och 1860. Mellan ländernas
debatter bör dock två skillnader noteras. Dels var sakfrågan olika
formulerad – i Sverige gällde den bördsrättens avveckling, i Norge
odelsrettens grundlagsskydd – dels kom yrkandena från olika håll.
54
Släktjordsfrågan i Sverige och Norge 1810–1860
I den svenska debatten kom propåerna från motionärer. Så var även
fallet när odelsretten debatterades 1848 och 1851, men 1857 och
1860 var det regeringen som lade proposition om odelsrettens utmönstring ur grundlagen. I praktiken utformades dock debatterna
i de två länderna i samma riktning: för eller emot en släktjordslagstiftning i börds- eller odelsrettens form.
De aktuella debatterna i Stortinget och riksdagen under dessa år
spänner över flera hundra sidor och det är inte möjligt att inom ramen för denna artikel analysera allt material. Istället har debatterna
ett enskilt år – 1860 – analyserats. Valet av år kan motiveras på flera
sätt. Debatterna det året var mycket omfattande och ger därmed ett
brett underlag att analysera. Frågan var vid det laget dessutom välkänd, varför argument och positioner bör ha varit tydliga. Händelser vid föregående session bör dessutom ha bidragit till att ge frågan
tyngd. En majoritet av Stortingets ledamöter hade 1857 röstat för
odelsrettens utmönstring ur grundlagen, men förslaget hade inte
kunnat samla den kvalificerade majoritet som krävdes vid grundlagsbeslut.47 Samma år hade riksdagen slopat de gamla restriktionerna för arvejord och dessutom avskaffat bördsrätten i städer.48 När
frågan åter kom på bordet 1860 är det därför rimligt att både kritiker
och förespråkare vinnlade sig om att föra fram sina argument.
Släktjordsdebatten 1860
Släktjordsdebatterna i Stortinget och riksdagen 1860 var omfattande och involverade många talare på båda sidor. Även om de i
praktiken rörde släktjordslagstiftningens vara eller inte vara, bör inledningsvis några formella skillnader mellan den svenska och den
norska debatten klargöras. Den norska debatten initierades av en
kunglig proposition, den gällde formellt endast att ta bort odelsretten ur grundlagen, och eftersom det var en grundlagsfråga be55
Martin Dackling
handlades den av hela Stortinget i en kammare. För svensk del
initierades frågan av flera enskilda motioner, med krav på allt
från restriktioner till en total avveckling av bördsrätten och den
behandlades av de fyra stånden var för sig. Den norska propositionen avstyrktes av konstitutionskommittén och föll slutligen med röstsiffrorna 47 mot 65 i Stortingets omröstning. För
svensk del avstyrkte lagutskottet först alla förändringar, men när
detta utlåtande återremitterades gjorde utskottet en kovändning
och yrkade på bördsrättens totala upphävande. Till lagutskottets
båda yrkanden fogades dessutom reservationer som gick ut på
en minskning av gruppen släktingar som skulle ha rätt att väcka
bördsklander (bördemannagruppen), vilket efter voteringar
inom samtliga stånd fick stöd av tre stånd; enbart borgarståndet röstade för en total avveckling. Där den norska debatten var
sammanhållen bestod den svenska följaktligen av åtta separata,
även om debatten inom borgarståndet var mycket kortfattad vid
båda tillfällena. I det följande behandlas dock den svenska debatten som en sammanhållen diskussion.
Att ur en flera timmar lång diskussion lyfta ut enskilda citat som
ensamma kan illustrera argumentationslinjerna är metodiskt svårt
och riskerar snedvrida bilden. I det följande görs därför först en
kvantitativ analys av debatten för att med den som underlag därefter fokusera på centrala punkter i debatten. Avsikten har varit att
identifiera vilka argument som användes av släktjordslagstiftningens försvarare och motståndare samt hur vanligt förekommande
dessa var i debatten. Vid genomläsningen av debattprotokollet har
argumenten identifierats och kodats, varefter den kodade texten
bearbetats.49 Argumenten har slutligen fogats samman i fyra kategorier: politiska, ekonomiska och familjerelaterade, samt argument som tagit sin utgångspunkt i lagstiftningen. Resultaten av
analysen presenteras i tablå 1 och 2.
56
Släktjordsfrågan i Sverige och Norge 1810–1860
Tablå 1. Översikt över Stortingets debatt om odelsretten 1860.
A. Rättsliga argument
1. Bevarande av äldre rättsstruktur
2. Rättslig koherens
3. Grundlag eller privaträtt
Argument till
försvar för
odelsretten
(andel)
21
18
1
1
Argumentriktade mot
odelsretten
(andel)
10
B. Politiska argument
1. Den allmänna opinionen
2. Säker äganderätt
3. Social struktur
4. Rationalitet, förnuftsstyre
5. Missbruk, moraliska följder
6. Samband med fosterlandskänslan
7. Övrigt
42
24
0
7
1
1
3
6
40
7
14
4
9
3
0
3
C. Ekonomiska argument
1. Effekter på jordpris och ersättningar
2. Hinder mot fri marknad
3. Misskötsel, brist på utveckling
4. Effekter på socioekonomisk struktur
5. Övrigt
24
7
6
0
11
0
44
20
7
11
1
4
13
10
3
0
N = 71
6
1
1
3
N = 70
D. Familjerelaterade argument
1. Emotionella band
2. Familjens sammanhållning
3. Släktbegreppet
7
3
Källa: Storthingstidende: Forhandlingar i Storthinget, 1860: 81–83.
57
Martin Dackling
Tablå 2. Översikt över riksdagens debatt om bördsrätten 1860.
A. Rättsliga argument
1. Bevarande av äldre rättsstruktur
2. Rättslig koherens
3. Hänvisning till rättsliga auktoriteter
Argument till Argument riktade
försvar för bördsmot
rätten
bördsrätten
(andel)
(andel)
25
12
6
0
15
7
4
5
B. Politiska argument
1. Den allmänna opinionen
2. Säker äganderätt
3. Social struktur
4. Rationalitet, förnuftsstyre
5. Missbruk, moraliska följder
6. Samband med fosterlandskänslan
7. Opinionen inom övriga stånd
8. Övrigt
37
15
3
4
2
0
1
7
2
51
12
8
4
13
5
2
5
1
C. Ekonomiska argument
1. Effekter på jordpris och ersättningar
2. Hinder mot fri marknad
3. Misskötsel, brist på utveckling
4. Effekter på socioekonomisk struktur
13
3
3
1
6
35
21
4
5
5
25
14
8
3
N = 71
2
0
2
0
N = 98
D. Familjerelaterade argument
1. Emotionella band
2. Familjens sammanhållning
3. Släktbegreppet
Källor: protokoll för Ridderskapet och Adeln (13 juni och 15 september), Prästeståndet (30 maj och 18 september), Borgarståndet (6 juni och 15 september) och Bondeståndet (2 juni och 15 september), 1860.
58
Släktjordsfrågan i Sverige och Norge 1810–1860
Inledningsvis finns det starka skäl att återigen betona likheterna
mellan debatterna. De enskilda argument och positioner som förekom i de två debatterna hade mycket stora likheter, men även
debatternas övergripande strukturer påminde om varandra. För
släktjordlagstiftningens kritiker var inte oväntat de ekonomiska
argumenten viktiga, medan förespråkarna hämtade mer stöd från
rättsliga argument eller med hänvisning till familjerelaterade värden. Någon påtaglig motsättning mellan ett ekonomiskt och ett
politiskt synsätt är dock svår att belägga, tvärtom rörde huvuddelen av debatten i båda länderna politiska argument. Vad döljer sig
då för konkreta argument bakom de fyra kategorierna?
De rättsliga argumenten tog naturligt sin utgångspunkt i respektive lands lagstiftning. I Stortinget byggde odelsrettens försvarare en stor del av sitt resonemang på vikten att bevara en
befintlig rättsstruktur. Odelsretten var bevisligen gammal och
skulle man förändra ”en 100aarig Institution, som har indforlivet sig i vor Nationalitet […] da maa man vel betænke sig”.50
Flera talare anmärkte också på vilka effekter en avskaffad odelsrett skulle ha för Åsætesretten, med risk att gårdar på billiga
villkor överfördes till en ny generation för att omgående säljas
på öppna marknaden utan möjlighet för släktingar att lösa den
åter.51 I debatten blev själva det faktum att odelsretten stod med
i grundlagen skäl nog för att motivera att den blev kvar där.
”Det blev antaget i Farens Stund, og i Farens Stund taler Mennesket alltid Sandhed”, som en representant uttryckte saken.52
Att odelsretten ansetts så viktigt att den grundlagsskyddats var
ett problematiskt faktum för dess motståndare. Deras resonemang utgick från att händelserna 1814 krävt enighet på ett sätt
som gjorde att rationella principer satts på undantag. Agerandet
på Eidsvoll var således inte fel i sig, men hade skett under extraordinära omständigheter. Nu var dock läget inte längre sådant,
59
Martin Dackling
och kritikerna inskärpte att odelsretten stod i strid med övriga
principer i grundlagen.53
Värdet av att bevara äldre rättsstruktur framfördes även någon
gång i den svenska debatten, men tyngdpunkten låg där istället
på att skapa enhetlighet i lagstiftningen. Det var emellertid en
ståndpunkt som kunde vinklas åt olika håll. Bördsrättens motståndare pekade på att restriktionerna mot att testamentera bort
arvejord hade avskaffats 1857, samt att bördsrätten i städerna röstats bort samma år. Att ha olika lagstiftning på landet och i städerna var inkonsekvent, och när arvejordens ställning försvagats
menade de att själva grunden ryckts bort även för bördsrätten.54
Det var dock i huvudsak bördsrättens försvarare som använde sig
av rättsliga argument. Deras utgångspunkt var att bördsrätten var
ett komplement till arvsrätten och särskilt till testamentsfriheten.
Om en ”onaturlig far” testamenterade bort halva sin egendom var
det, mycket naturligt att hans barn kunde börda det åter, hävdade
en talare i adelsståndet.55 Mats Persson i bondeståndet såg bördsrätten som lika betydelsefull som arvsrätten; så länge den senare
fanns borde även den förstnämnda äga stånd.56 Flera talare i den
svenska debatten lutade sig också på juridiska auktoriteter, särskilt
den redan nämnde J.G. Richert. Eftersom denna inom lagkommittén försvarat bördsrätten, men senare i lagberedningen ställt sig
bakom dess avveckling, kom hans skilda uttalanden märkligt nog
att användas av bägge sidor i debatten.57
Bland politiska argument intog utsagor om den allmänna opinionen en särställning i båda länderna. Grunderna för detta var
dock mycket olika. I den svenska debatten, särskilt inom bondeståndet, förekom ofta uppgifter om bördsrättens ställning i talarens hemort. Det är dock svårt att med ledning av detta sluta sig
till den allmänna meningen. Bondeståndets Gustaf Bjerkander
summerade att ”denna opinion inom alla orter är något blandad”,
60
Släktjordsfrågan i Sverige och Norge 1810–1860
och påpekade att från samma valdistrikt kunde komma representanter med helt olika bild av bördsrättens ställning i hembygden.58
I den norska debatten fanns en annan empirisk bas. I slutet av
1840-talet genomfördes på Stortingets initiativ en landsomfattande enkät, där bland annat landets Formandskaber (motsvarande
kommunstyrelser) fick ta ställning till om odelsretten skulle kvarstå i grundlagen. Totalt inkom strax över 370 svar, och en stor majoritet av dessa ställde sig positiva till att ha bestämmelserna kvar.59
För odelsrettens försvarare var detta givetvis starka papper och det
folkliga stödet var det mest använda argumentet i den norska debatten. Det hindrade emellertid inte motståndarna från att använda den folkliga opinionen som argument. De ifrågasatte värdet i
enkäten och påpekade dessutom att det från alltfler håll i landet
framfördes kritik mot odelsretten.60 Tanken att en avveckling var
förnuftsbaserad och en logisk följd i ett mer rationellt samhälle
återkom relativt frekvent.61 Tio år hade ändå passerat sedan enkäten om odelsretten, menade representanten Daae, en tid ”hvori
Oplysningen og Udviklingen er gaaet fremad”.62 Förnuft och känsla behövde dock inte ställas mot varandra, hävdade släktjordlagstiftningens försvarare; ”Fornuft uden Følelse er Lys uden Varme”,
som Simon Lie uttryckte saken.63
Bland de politiska argumenten lyfte odels- och bördsrättens belackare även fram dess negativa effekter på äganderätten. Under
preskriptionstiden levde en ny ägare i ovisshet om möjligheten att
på sikt få behålla sin införskaffade egendom. De osäkra egendomsförhållandena satte delvis samhällsförhållandena ur spel och kunde leda till ”Ingreb i en Mands Velfærd, som intet Ondt hade gjort,
uden ganske lovligt at kjøbe et Gods”.64 I den norska debatten ifrågasattes inte denna linje, men i den svenska förekom äganderätten
som ett argument för en bibehållen lagstiftning. En talare i bondeståndet anförde att bördsrätten var ”helig för äganderätten” och i
61
Martin Dackling
adelsståndet prisade greve Sparre den jordbrukande befolkningen
samt varnade för att ta bort institutioner ”som skydda jordegarne
i deras besittning af sin jord”.65 Ytterst handlade saken om vem lagen borde skydda – den nye ägaren eller den gamle (och dennes
släktingar).
De ekonomiska argumenten var i stor utsträckning liknande i
de två debatterna. Motståndarna framhöll släktjordslagstiftningens effekter på jordpriser och de ekonomiska ersättningar som
kunde tillkomma vid köp. Till följd av de osäkra besittningsförhållandena sades jordpriserna bli nedtryckta och lagen var därför till
nackdel för säljaren. När klander mot jordstransaktioner väcktes,
var det dessutom sällan i avsikt att verkligen inlösa egendomen,
utan syftade snarast på att avtvinga jordägaren en ersättning för
att lägga ned processen; ”Pung ud, eller jag driver Dig ud!”, som en
talare i Stortinget beskrev det.66 Flera talare påtalade att de osäkra
besittningsförhållandena hämmade jordbruksutveckling och att
lagstiftningen dessutom utgjorde ett marknadshinder. Även om
det sällan sades rätt ut, fanns i kritiken en underliggande tankegång om värdet av en fri marknad även för jord. Ett ovanligt tydligt exempel var statsrådet Stang, som på Stortinget menade att
”Odelsretten Indflydelse ligger i, at den hindrer fri Omsætning af
Jordegods og den frie Udvikling, der betinges af fri Omsætning”.67
Att missbruk förekom erkändes även av försvararna, som dock inte
alltid såg något skamligt i förfarandet. Den som köptes odelsgods
fick ju därav ofta betala ett lägre pris, därför var det inte orätt att
han fick betala en del till en klandrande släkting.68 Därutöver var
det flera som framhöll lagstiftningens socioekonomiska effekter,
att börds- och odelsretten hindrade såväl jordkoncentration som
egendomens alltför starka uppdelning.
Slutligen kan konstateras att familjerelaterade argument spelade en överraskande liten roll i den norska debatten, men utgjorde
62
Släktjordsfrågan i Sverige och Norge 1810–1860
en fjärdedel av argumenten bland de svenska bördsrättsvännerna.
Det centrala argumentet var dock detsamma: att det var en ädel
känsla att förbättra och överföra jord inom släkten.69
Konklusion – två bondestrategier?
Jag har i denna artikel betonat likheterna mellan den svenska och
den norska släktjordsdebatten mellan 1810 och 1860. Avslutningsvis finns därför skäl att återvända till den inledande frågan – varför
resulterade debatten trots likheterna i så olika beslut i början av
1860-talet? En möjlighet är att omformulera problemet till varför odelsretten höll stånd i Norge. Ett skäl var uppenbart konstitutionellt. Det var grundlagsskyddets krav på kvalificerad majoritet
som gjorde att odelsretten överlevde 1857 års debatt. Analysen av
debatten visar emellertid också på vilken betydelse den allmänna opinionen hade för Stortingets beslut. Det fanns en stark föreställning om att odelsretten hade starkt stöd ute i landet. En
tredje möjlig förklaring är ekonomisk. Odelsretten blev i exempelvis Falsens tolkning liktydigt med en homogen och självägande
bondeklass. Runt 1815 utgjorde de självägande bönderna bara 65
procent av landets jordbrukare, men denna andel steg till 85 procent runt 1860 samtidigt som böndernas inflytande i Stortinget
ökade kraftigt från 1850-talets mitt.70 Ett sätt att förklara odelsrettens ställning skulle då vara att koppla den till bondeklassens
stärkta ställning. Jämförelsen med Sverige komplicerar dock en
sådan tolkning. Även i den svenska debatten fanns uppgifter om
ett folkligt stöd för bördsrätten, och i likhet med Norge ökade de
självägande bönderna i antal under 1800-talet samtidigt som deras politiska maktställning tilltog.71 Frågan borde då närmast vara
varför Sverige avvecklade sin, i jämförelse med odelsretten, relativt
modesta bördsrätt.
63
Martin Dackling
En möjlig väg framåt är att ta fasta på en tydlig skillnad i hur
släktjordlagstiftningens sociala konsekvenser uppfattades i de två
debatterna. Argumentationen rörde sig i princip över både det
politiska och det ekonomiska fältet, men fick olika tyngdpunkt. I
den norska debatten gick en tydlig linje från Falsens vurm för lika
fördelning av egendom till 1860-talets debatt, där odelsretten anfördes som förklaring till Norges historia och rådande egendomsordning. Odelsretten sågs som en förklaring till norsk särart, det
främsta skälet till att ”det skadelige Lensforhold, som overalt ellers
existerede i Middelalderen” inte nådde Norge.72 Hotet mot böndernas jordinnehav hade dock fortsatt aktualitet i debatten. Gör
man jordegendom till handelsvara leder till ofrånkomligt till bondeklassens fall och uppkomsten av en penga-aristokrati, hävdade
flera representanter.73 Denna dimension av debatten var betydligt
mer nedtonad i Sverige, trots att Richert fört ett liknande resonemang angående bördsrätten. I såväl adels- som bondeståndet
framhölls tvärtom att bönderna inte alls var hotade; för varje år
visades tydligt hur bönderna erövrade en allt större del av Sveriges
jord, både genom skatteköp och förvärv av gammal frälsejord.74
Inom bondeståndet framhölls att bördsrätten snarast började utgöra ett hinder för böndernas fortsatta expansion, ”ty de samhällets
klasser, som hittills haft svårast att behålla sina fäders jord, skulle
i denna rätt finna ett skydd mot allmogens större förvärfsförmåga”.75 Bördsrätten kunde förvisso vara ett skydd för den svage, men
det var en beteckning som i allt mindre utsträckning kunde sättas
på de svenska bönderna och särskilt inte på deras representanter i
riksdagen. För en ekonomiskt allt starkare bondeklass, som börjat
markera sin höjda status med beteckningen hemmansägare, blev
bördsrätten snarast en belastning.76
En möjlig tolkning av de skilda politiska besluten runt 1860 är
således att de speglar två olika bondestrategier. Den norska slog
64
Släktjordsfrågan i Sverige och Norge 1810–1860
vakt om en traditionell bild, framhävde sin särart och höll en konservativ linje. Den svenska kan snarare betecknas som expansiv,
där bönderna stärkte sin självbild på bekostnad av andra samhällsgrupper.
Denna artikel bygger på forskning som bedrivits inom projektet
”Det ärvda problemet: arvsrättens politik i Skandinavien ca 18102010”, finansierat av Vetenskapsrådet.
Referenser
Parlamentariskt tryck
Stortingets handlingar
Stortinget 1821
Odelsthingets protokoll, 8 maj 1821
Lagthingets protokoll, 2 juni 1821
Stortinget 1854
Storthingets proposition 1854:66
Stortinget 1860
Storthingstidende: Forhandlingar i Storthinget, 1860: 81–83
Riksdagens handlingar
Riksdagen 1812
Ridderskapet och Adelns protokoll, 20 juni samt 21 juli
Prästeståndets protokoll, 22 juni samt 16 juli
Borgarståndets protokoll, 26 juni samt 18 juli
Bondeståndet protokoll, 30 april, 1 maj, 20 juni samt 16 juli
Lagutskottets handlingar, 22 juni 1812
65
Martin Dackling
Riksdagen 1860
Ridderskapet och Adelns protokoll, 13 juni och 15 september
Prästeståndets protokoll, 30 maj och 18 september
Borgarståndets protokoll, 6 juni och 15 september
Bondeståndets protokoll, 2 juni och 15 september
Lagutskottets betänkanden 1860:28, 49.
Tryckta källor och litteratur
Ambro, Carl Joachim, och Alf Kaartvedt, red. Det norske Storting
gjennom 150 år. Band 1, Fra Riksforsamlingen til 1869. Oslo:
Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1964.
Anners, Erik. Den europeiska rättens historia: några huvudlinjer.
Stockholm: Almqvist & Wicksell, 1980.
Dackling, Martin. Släktgårdens uppkomst: jord och marknad i Skaraborg 1845-1945. Göteborg: Göteborgs universitet, 2013.
Evju, Håkon. ”Property, Patriotism and Self-interest in the Debate
over Odelsretten, the Norwegian Retrait Lignager, 1759-1814”.
Journal of Intellectual History and Political Thought 1 (2012):
86–109.
Evju, Håkon. “Debating the moral and economic foundations of
a democratic polity: Odelsretten in parliament and the public
sphere, 1807-1821”. Scandinavian Journal of History 40:5 (2015):
653–676.
Falsen, Christian Magnus. Norges Odelsret, med Hensyn paa Rigets
Constitution. Bergen, 1815.
Gadd, Carl-Johan. Det svenska jordbrukets historia. Band 3, Den
agrara revolutionen 1700-1870. Stockholm: Natur och kultur/
LT, 2000.
Gelting, Michael H. ”Odelsrett – lovbydelse – bördsrätt – retrait lignager: Kindred and Land in the Nordic Countries in the Twelfth
and Thirteenth Centuries”. I Family, marriage and property devo66
Släktjordsfrågan i Sverige och Norge 1810–1860
lution in the Middle Ages, red. Lars Ivar Hansen, 133–165. Tromsø:
Department of history, University of Tromsø, 2000.
Gjerdåker, Brynjulv. Til odel og eige: odels- og åsetesrettane gjennom
eit millenium, med vekt på dei siste 250 åra. Oslo: NILF, 2001.
Hansen, Anna. ”Det jämtländska statsbytets betydelse för mäns
och kvinnors egendom”. I Hans & Hennes: genus och egendom
i Sverige från vikingatid till nutid, red. Maria Ågren, 113–138.
Uppsala: Historiska institutionen, Uppsala universitet, 2005.
Hommerstad, Marthe. Christian Magnus Falsen: stridsmannen.
Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2015.
[Lagkommittén]. Förslag till allmän civillag. Stockholm: 1826.
Liljewall, Britt. Bondevardag och samhällsförändring: studier i och
kring västsvenska bondedagböcker från 1800-talet. Göteborg:
Göteborgs universitet, 1995.
Marks von Würtemberg, Erik. ”Blick på den svenska lagstiftningen
allitfrån adertonhundratalets början”. I Minnesskrift ägnad 1734
års lag, del 1, 143–202. Stockholm: Svensk juristtidning, 1934.
Norseng, Per. ”Kommentarer till Christer Winberg”. Historisk
Tidsskrift (Oslo) 70 (1991): 275–281.
Norseng, Per G. “Odelsrett – the Norwegian retrait lignager”. I
Land, lords and peasants: peasants’ right to control land in the
Middle Ages and the early modern period: Norway, Scandinavia
and the Alpine region: Report from a seminar in Trondheim, November 2004, red. Tore Iversen och John Ragnar Myking, 199225. Trondheim: Dept. of History and Classical Studies, Norwegian Univ. of Science and Technology, 2005.
Peterson, Claes. ”Debatten om 1826 års förslag till en allmän civillag – en svensk kodifikationsstrid?” I Norden, rätten, historia:
festskrift till Lars Björne, red. Jukka Kekkonen, 245–263. Helsinki: Suomalainen lakimiesyhdistys, 2004.
Sandvik, Hilde. ”Frihet og likhet også for kvinner? Debatten om
67
Martin Dackling
ny sivillov og kvinnenes stilling i Sverige og Norge 1815-1845”.
I Demokratisk teori og historisk praksis: Forutsetninger for folkestyre 1750-1850, red. Hilde Sandvik, 243–274. Oslo: Scandinavian Academic Press, 2010.
Sandvik, Hilde och Dag Michaelsson, red. Kodifikasjon og konstitusjon: Grunnloven §94s krav till lovbøker i norsk historie. Oslo:
Pax, 2013.
Sundell, Jan-Olof. Svensk fastighetsrättshistoria. Uppsala: Iustus
förlag, 2007.
Vogt, Helle. The function of Kinship in Medieval Nordic legislation.
Leiden: Brill, 2010.
Winberg, Christer. Grenverket: studier rörande jord, släktskapssystem och ståndsprivilegier. Stockholm: Institutet för rättshistorisk
forskning, 1985.
Winberg, Christer. ”Jord och släkt i Sverige under 500 år”. Historisk tidskrift (Oslo) 70 (1991): 263-274.
Zachrisson, Torun. “The Odal and its Manifestation in the Landscape”. Current Swedish Archaeology 2 (1994), 219–238.
Østem, Sigurd. Odelsretten. Oslo: Olaf Norlis forlag, 1933.
NOTER
1
2
3
4
68
Jan-Olof Sundell, Svensk fastighetsrättshistoria (Uppsala: Iustus förlag, 2007), 45–
59.
Erik Anners, Den europeiska rättens historia: några huvudlinjer (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wicksell, 1980), 32–36.
För Sverige, se Martin Dackling, Släktgårdens uppkomst: jord och marknad i Skaraborg 1845-1945 (Göteborg: Göteborgs universitet, 2013), 42–51. Angående Norge,
se Brynjulv Gjerdåker, Til odel og eige: odels- og åsetesrettane gjennom eit millenium, med vekt på dei siste 250 åra (Oslo: NILF, 2001), 23–31.
Per Norseng, ”Kommentarer till Christer Winberg”, Historisk tidsskrift (Oslo) 70
(1991): 275–276. Se även Michael H. Gelting, ”Odelsrett – lovbydelse – bördsrätt
– retrait lignager: Kindred and Land in the Nordic Countries in the Twelfth and
Släktjordsfrågan i Sverige och Norge 1810–1860
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Thirteenth Centuries”, i Family, marriage and property devolution in the Middle Ages,
red. Lars Ivar Hansen (Tromsø: Department of history, University of Tromsø, 2000).
Gjerdåker, Til odel og eige, 13–14.
Sigurd Østem, Odelsretten (Oslo: Olaf Norlis forlag, 1933), 20.
Gjerdåker, Til odel og eige, 14, 19.
Christer Winberg, Grenverket: studier rörande jord, släktskapssystem och ståndsprivilegier (Stockholm: Institutet för rättshistorisk forskning, 1985), 105–108.
Gelting, “Odelsrett – lovbydelse”.
Helle Vogt, The function of Kinship in Medieval Nordic legislation (Leiden: Brill,
2010), 209–224.
Per G. Norseng, “Odelsrett – the Norwegian retrait lignager”, i Land, lords and peasants: peasants’ right to control land in the Middle Ages and the early modern period:
Norway, Scandinavia and the Alpine region : Report from a seminar in Trondheim,
November 2004, red. Tore Iversen och John Ragnar Myking (Trondheim: Dept. of
History and Classical Studies, Norwegian Univ. of Science and Technology, 2005),
203–205.
Norseng, ”Odelsrett”, 217.
Torun Zachrisson, “The Odal and its Manifestation in the Landscape”, Current
Swedish Archaeology 2 (1994).
Anna Hansen, ”Det jämtländska statsbytets betydelse för mäns och kvinnors
egendom”, i Hans & Hennes: genus och egendom i Sverige från vikingatid till nutid,
red. Maria Ågren (Uppsala: Historiska institutionen, Uppsala universitet, 2005),
114–119.
Winberg, Grenverket, 208–212.
Christer Winberg, ”Jord och släkt i Sverige under 500 år”, Historisk tidsskrift (Oslo)
70 (1991): 265.
Håkon Evju, ”Property, Patriotism and Self-interest in the Debate over Odelsretten,
the Norwegian Retrait Lignager, 1759-1814”, Journal of Intellectual History and Political Thought 1 (2012): 92–99, 101–102; Håkon Evju “Debating the moral and economic foundations of a democratic polity: Odelsretten in parliament and the public
sphere, 1807-1821”, Scandinavian Journal of History 40, no. 5 (2015): 666–669.
Evju, ”Debating the moral”, 656; Gjerdåker, Til odel og eige, 20–21.
Gjerdåker, Til odel og eige, 21.
Om dessa, se Claes Peterson, ”Debatten om 1826 års förslag till en allmän civillag
– en svensk kodifikationsstrid?”, i Norden, rätten, historia: festskrift till Lars Björne,
red. Jukka Kekkonen (Helsinki: Suomalainen lakimiesyhdistys, 2004), 245–263,
samt bidragen i Hilde Sandvik & Dag Michaelsson, red., Kodifikasjon og konstitusjon: Grunnloven §94s krav till lovbøker i norsk historie (Oslo: Pax, 2013).
69
Martin Dackling
21 Evju, ”Debating the moral”, 663–664.
22 Om Falsen, se Marthe Hommerstad, Christian Magnus Falsen: stridsmannen
(Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2015).
23 Christian Magnus Falsen, Norges Odelsret, med Hensyn paa Rigets Constitution
(Bergen, 1815), 23.
24 Falsen, Norges Odelsret, 32.
25 Falsen, Norges Odelsret, 33–34.
26 Falsen, Norges Odelsret, 48.
27 Hommerstad menar att skriften delvis kan se som ett publikfrieri inför Falsens
kandidatur till Stortinget 1815. Hommerstad, Christian Magnus Falsen, 161.
28 Evju, ”Debating the moral”, 664; Hommerstad, Christian Magnus Falsen, 167.
29 Odelstingets protokoll, 8 maj 1821, 566.
30 Odelstingets protokoll, 8 maj 1821, 570.
31 Lagtingets protokoll 2 juni 1821, 649–651, 653–654.
32 Bondeståndets protokoll 30 april 1812, 118.
33 Viss debatt förekom i bondeståndet och prästeståndet, medan adels- respektive
borgarståndet inte ägnade frågan något större intresse. Bondeståndet protokoll,
30 april (118–121), 1 maj (969–970), 20 juni (472–474) samt 16 juli (743); Prästeståndets protokoll, 22 juni (374–377) samt 16 juli (131–141); Ridderskapet och
Adelns protokoll, 20 juni (679) samt 21 juli (341); Borgarståndets protokoll, 26
juni (528–530) samt 18 juli (797).
34 Anders Erikssons memorial i Lagutskottet 22 juni 1812, 846.
35 Peterson, ”Debatten om 1826 års förslag”, 249–250.
36 Möjligen upplevdes förslaget radikalt, ty i sitt betänkande medtog även lagkommittén ett fullständigt förslag för den händelse arvejordsbetämmelserna skulle
komma att behållas.
37 Förslag till allmän civillag (Stockholm: 1826), Motiver, 116.
38 Förslag till allmän civillag, Motiver, 117.
39 Förslag till allmän civillag, Motiver, 117–118.
40 Förslag till allmän civillag, Motiver, 118.
41 Förslag till allmän civillag, Protokoll, 71–76.
42 Förslag till allmän civillag, Protokoll, 67–68.
43 Förslag till allmän civillag, Protokoll, 82.
44 Förslag till allmän civillag, Protokoll, 83–84.
45 Hilde Sandvik, ”Frihet og likhet også for kvinner? Debatten om ny sivillov og
kvinnenes stilling i Sverige og Norge 1815-1845”, i Demokratisk teori og historisk
praksis: Forutsetninger for folkestyre 1750-1850, red. Hilde Sandvik (Oslo: Scandinavian Academic Press, 2010), 245–250.
70
Släktjordsfrågan i Sverige och Norge 1810–1860
46 Erik Marks von Würtemberg, ”Blick på den svenska lagstiftningen allitfrån adertonhundratalets början”, i Minnesskrift ägnad 1734 års lag, del 1 (Stockholm:
Svensk juristtidning, 1934), 182.
47 Röstsiffrorna blev 64 mot 46, grundlagsförändringar krävde bifall från två tredjedelar av Stortingets ledamöter.
48 Dackling, Släktgårdens uppkomst, 42–48.
49 I praktiken var det nödvändigt att granska varje debatt flera gånger, eftersom kodningen förändrades genom hela läsningen allteftersom argumentens strukturer
klarnade. I tabellen har enbart de primära argumenten tagits med, jag har således
lämnat motargument mot något av de primära argumenten åt sidan.
50 Storthingstidende: Forhandlinger i Storthinget, 1860:82, 653 (Vig).
51 Storthingstidende: Forhandlinger i Storthinget, 1860:82, 650–651 (Balstad);
1860:83, 658 (Stamsøe).
52 Storthingstidende: Forhandlinger i Storthinget, 1860:82, 651 (Ueland); 1860:83, 657
(Simon Lie).
53 Storthingstidende: Forhandlinger i Storthinget, 1860:81, 646–648 (Motzfeldt).
54 Bondeståndets protokoll, 1860, 336–337 (Paul Andersson).
55 Ridderskapet och Adelns protokoll 1860, 199–200 (Lagercrantz).
56 Bondeståndets protokoll 1860, 190 (Mats Persson).
57 Jfr exempelvis Ridderskapet och Adelns protokoll 1860, 201–210 (Sparre och Dalman).
58 Bondeståndets protokoll 1860, 206 (Bjerkander).
59 En beskrivning av materialet finns i Storthingets proposition, No 66, 1854, 1–2.
60 Storthingstidende: Forhandlinger i Storthinget, 1860:82, 655 (Motzfeldt); 1860:85,
74 (Hoelstad).
61 Se exempelvis Bondeståndets protokoll, 1860, 336–337 (Paul Andersson).
62 Storthingstidende: Forhandlinger i Storthinget, 1860:82, 653 (Daae).
63 Storthingstidende: Forhandlinger i Storthinget, 1860:82, 656 (Simon Lie).
64 Storthingstidende: Forhandlinger i Storthinget, 1860:83, 658 (Stang).
65 Bondeståndets protokoll 1860, 339 (Heurlin); Ridderskapet och Adelns protokoll
1860, 181 (Sparre).
66 Storthingstidende: Forhandlinger i Storthinget, 1860:82, 649 (Schweigaard).
67 Storthingstidende: Forhandlinger i Storthinget, 1860:83, 659 (Stang).
68 Storthingstidende: Forhandlinger i Storthinget, 1860:83, 657 (Veseth).
69 Ridderskapet och Adelns protokoll 1860, 202–203 (Sparre).
70 Gjerdåker, Til odel og eige, 30. Carl Joachim Ambro och Alf Kaartvedt, red., Det
norske Storting gjennom 150 år. Band 1, Fra Riksforsamlingen til 1869 (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1964), 148–149.
71
Martin Dackling
71 Angående böndernas stärkta ställning, se Carl-Johan Gadd, Det svenska jordbrukets historia. Band 3, Den agrara revolutionen 1700-1870 (Stockholm: Natur och
kultur/LT, 2000), 194–210.
72 Storthingstidende: Forhandlinger i Storthinget, 1860:81, 644–645 (Jaaebeck).
73 Storthingstidende: Forhandlinger i Storthinget, 1860:83, 657 (Veseth, Simon Lie);
1860:84, 667 (Ueland).
74 Se exempelvis Ridderskapet och Adelns protokoll 1860, 212 (Raab).
75 Bondeståndet protokoll 1860, 204 (Nils Larsson).
76 Om hemmansägarbeteckningen, se Britt Liljewall, Bondevardag och samhällsförändring: studier i och kring västsvenska bondedagböcker från 1800-talet (Göteborg:
Göteborgs universitet, 1995), 314–322.
72
Organization of Transatlantic Slave
Trade: A Global Supply Chain
Perspective
Thierry Godbille, François Fulconis and Gilles Paché
Introduction
The transatlantic slave trade, although it is not the only kind of
slave trade, left an indelible mark on the minds, both in terms of
its length (it lasted over several centuries) and its intensity (it led to
the deportation of several millions human beings). A confusion is
sometimes made between slavery and the transatlantic slave trade,
and it appears necessary to distinguish the two notions. Slavery
is managed and maintained by large landowners, usually of aristocratic origins (even if often exiled, banished from their original
land for moral, religious or succession issues), or sons of wealthy
ship owners who moved to the Colonies upon order or recommendation from paternal authority. For these landowners, slavery
is primarily a means to increase production, and therefore their
fortune, and the slaves are vector of wealth growth, rather than the
direct source of increase in wealth linked to their resale. However,
the transatlantic slave trade resembles a transport trading activity, and more broadly logistics, to ensure the provision of work
forces necessary to the Colonies. It is obviously understood that
the transatlantic slave trade is morally blameworthy and has left
73
Thierry Godbille, François Fulconis and Gilles Paché
an indelible scar on the history of Humanity. Nevertheless, this
should not ban an in-depth analysis of its operating mechanisms,
and especially the set of operations having enabled its expansion.
The transatlantic slave trade consisted in the sufficient supplying
of Europe in products from the Colonies, and in return, to provide
the necessary labor to ensure the operation of plantations, based
on a proven economic model.1 This model is based on a remarkably effective logistical organization, which has yet never given rise
to a detailed study. The position taken here is that it is possible to
understand a certain number of historical phenomena in reference
to the manner with which flows are monitored within the frame of
trade. Indeed, prior research has already discussed the importance
of logistical management with a historical perspective, but by first
looking into military operations. One of the most emblematic
cases is the Liberation, in June 1944, of the European continent
occupied by the Nazis. The American strike force established, for
this occasion, an impressive armada, both military and logistical
(creation of artificial ports off the English coasts, as well as gigantic
warehouses to store supplies, etc.).2 The chapter opts for a different
working angle by looking at how a global supply chain was structured by the set of actors to guarantee the economic success of the
transatlantic slave trade. By global supply chain, we refer to the
set of operations and mechanisms that unfold at the international
level, and that enables to supply the clients with the products at
the right time, in the right quantities and at the right place. To do
so, the global supply chain relies on a set of infrastructures and
physical processes, such as the transport and storage, necessary to
the provision of products, from the raw material to the customer.
From a methodological point of view, this chapter draws on historical documents and in-depth studies conducted by specialists
in economic history that stress the key roles played by different ac74
Organization of Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Global Supply Chain Perspective
tors in the development of the transatlantic slave trade, but without explicit reference to the logistical process. Thus, we suggest
analyzing this historical phenomenon from the perspective of the
links established between the three principle areas: West Africa,
the European Continent, and the Americas. We will also examine the role of the suppliers ensuring maritime logistics (shipping,
auxiliary transport) and the customers (farmers in the Americas,
wealthy families in Europe, and African warlords). The aim is to
emphasize the roles played by key infrastructure aspects (European slave trade ports) and operations management (definition
of optimal transport conditions, traceability of streams by the
barbarous system of branding). Historical documents underline
that transatlantic slave trade was based on codified organizational
principles that were a developed and very important aspect of the
slave trade enterprise. However, it is hardly ever stated that the
slave trade enterprise also required and most importantly an effective global supply chain to maintain its profitability.
Founding Economic Principles of the Transatlantic Slave
Trade
The slave trade was a business activity designed to meet market demand. We have decided to analyze this activity from a purely operational standpoint as a link in the trade chain between Europe and
the Colonies, wherein the benefit of transporting slaves depended,
in part, on the value of the “bois d’ébène” (ebony wood), i.e. slaves.
The overall process was initially stimulated and regulated by mercantilist Europe. Many actors were involved, foremost being the
European states and many of their factories that could, through
the slave trade, find new market opportunities. Here, the theme
under study is the slave trade, an activity requiring commercial
75
Thierry Godbille, François Fulconis and Gilles Paché
transportation, not slavery itself, a more general phenomenon requiring a different analysis, with a decidedly more philosophical
view. We have adopted an analytical approach, that of logistics, in
this chapter. Transatlantic slave trade involved efficiently organized and integrated supply networks, for which data from many
reliable sources are available. The study of historical documents,
the Atlas of Slavery by Marcel Dorigny and Bernard Gainot for
instance3, shows how the approach adopted by transatlantic slave
trade organizers explicitly relied on a kind of flow control based on
known, present day concepts in logistical management.
The strategic objective of transatlantic slave trade was to supply Europe with products from the Colonies and provide needed
manpower for plantations in the New World. Key resources from
each country were: (1) Europe, providing fabric (raw and finished
textiles), wheat, jewelry, beads, alcohol (wine, spirits) and knives
and weapons; (2) Africa, providing slaves, mostly war prisoners
from tribal strife; (3) and the Americas, providing principally sugar, coffee, cocoa, indigo, cotton, and tobacco. The primary goal was
to trade and increase wealth. For instance, Robert L. Stein identified 500 families in Nantes, Bordeaux, La Rochelle, Le Havre, and
Saint-Malo who armed 2,800 ships bound for Africa.4 The objective was the transportation of slaves to American Colonies for future sale. Once there, the goal became buying raw materials and
then exporting those materials to Europe. Along the way, realizing
a comfortable added value was desirable. We can speak here of
downstream steering because it was the demand for labor from the
Colonies that initially induced this triangular trade.
Expansion of the Sugar Industry
A reading of Table 1, taken from Hugh Thomas, shows that the
76
Organization of Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Global Supply Chain Perspective
slave trade to American Colonies was primarily intended to provide labor for growing sugar.5 Sugar cane, originally from the East
Indies (Insulinde), gradually spread throughout the Pacific, reaching the South of China and India via Malaysia between the 15th
and 20th centuries BC. It continued its westward progression, and
roughly one thousand years later, via Europe, ended up in South
America.6 The development of slavery was a byproduct linked to
the “rapid” spread of sugar to new territories. This crop requires
arduous and seasonally intensive labor and naturally, farmers
wanted the cheapest labor possible. For Pieter Emmer, the transatlantic slave trade would have finally had a marginal importance
in terms of economic impact.7 It was considered that the system
established had first favored the spread of European values and
standards, such as private property, the nuclear family or free labor. If this spread is unquestionable, the economic expansion of
the New World should be remembered especially at the level of the
sugar industry, as well as the coffee industry.
Table 1. Slave Trade Destinations in the Americas
First slave use in the Americas
Percent (%)
Sugar plantations
45.4
Coffee plantations
18.2
Housework
18.2
Mining
9.1
Cotton fields
4.5
Cocoa fields
2.3
Building
2.3
Source: Adapted from Thomas, Slave trade.
77
Thierry Godbille, François Fulconis and Gilles Paché
Prior to the arrival of slaves from the African continent, forced
labor by Native American populations led to a genocide that the
Jesuit Bartolomé de Las Casas denounced in 1514.8 A different
system, one of “engagés”, i.e. European contract workers who accepted to leave their country for the Colonies, was then adopted
between the second half of the 17th century and the first half of
the 18th century.9 Far from negligible, it is estimated that this represented about 300,000 contract workers who, for all intents and
purposes were white slaves, and formed the basis for the Colonies’
economy. The long, difficult, and disorganized recruitment of the
engagés who were not urbanites, was costly and there was a high
propensity to mutiny because internees and guards were from the
same cultural, religious, and social backgrounds.
Over the course of time, risk increased and the operation’s profitability became significantly burdened, especially if one considers uncertainties related to the virulent struggle between imperial powers for colonial expansion. To sustainably increase the
strength of commitment among the engagés, increased wages and
reduced years of contracted service would have been necessary.
The need for an “elastic source of forced labor” was inconsistent
with the prevailing European mercantilism that could not support an activity involving too great an outflow of labor, manpower
being considered an asset. Despite this, in purely economic terms,
continuing to move enslaved Europeans to the Americas would
probably have been more profitable over the long term than organizing and funding expeditions to black Africa. The policy of
using engagés quickly reached its limits, however, particularly due
to very high mortality rates.
Thus, the staggering mortality experienced by trying to feed
the slave trade became a fundamental, problematic concern. As
stated by Fernand Braudel, one mustn’t abuse an already needy
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Organization of Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Global Supply Chain Perspective
world (i.e. Europe), a preexisting, slowly matured power is required.10 While clearly a second choice, Africans represented this
slowly matured power and provided an answer to overcoming
labor related difficulties. Colonial settlers made early calculations based on reasoning at three levels: (1) the captive amortization period was short (in Barbados in 1645, the purchase
price of slaves was repayable in a year and a half from proceeds);
(2) a slave represented available capital that could be mobilized;
(3) and a slave could also provide non-monetary benefits. This
reasoning was based on the premise (accepted at that time) that
a major source of slave labor was available in Africa and the only
element lacking was the appropriate external force to take advantage of this “natural” resource.
This idea sparked the beginning of the slave trade and resulted
in one of the largest population displacements in human history.
Starting in 1460 and continuing until about 1550, the slave trade
was intra-African and afterwards solely intended for the Iberian
Peninsula. It became transatlantic for the first time at the end of
the 16th century, as a response to needs of the new Portuguese
colony of Brazil. In 1672, Jacques Stuart (the future King James I
of England) founded the Royal African Company. Meanwhile his
cousin, Louis XV dissolved the Compagnie Royale d’Afrique (that
had been created under Richelieu, but was deemed too inefficient
in terms of triangular trade), and founded the Compagnie du
Sénégal in 1674. Both kings intended, firstly, to break the Iberian
domination on the African coasts and the Dutch transportation
monopoly. Secondly, they intended to supply labor to their own
North American based Colonies. When British and French actors entered the market, a model for streamlining and optimizing
flow developed and continually improved over the course of the
18th century.
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Thierry Godbille, François Fulconis and Gilles Paché
Meeting Needs
This is a correct, but simplistic vision of a complex reality. Today,
the moral component of 17th century transatlantic slave trade
involving slaves obscures the larger economic picture in the collective memory. Our modern vision of transatlantic slave trade is
biased because it stresses, above all, the ocean journey, and the
morally questionable use of humans as merchandise, ignoring the
events occurring “on the ground” at the three “tips” of the triangle. Upstream, at the European “tip”, capital, goods, men, and ships
were mobilized. This created many new opportunities for manufacturing, especially textiles, leading to, for example fame and
wealth in cities like Cholet in France. In Africa (the second “tip”),
local chiefs took advantage of intra or inter-tribal conflicts and established their dominion over the vanquished, selling or bartering them to slave traders. The third “tip”, the Colonies, benefitted
from the influx of labor to expand agricultural potential, promote
colonial transformation, and respond to demands for New World
products in Europe.
Transatlantic slave trade was, above all, a commercial activity
with a profit motive. It is therefore interesting to analyze it from
this perspective, applying entrepreneurial precepts that today are
called logistical processes. Transatlantic slave trade was complex,
required massive organization and high capital investment, and
produced unreliable and irregular profits, as historians have been
able to estimate in academic studies. If expected gain was high and
some shipments proved very profitable (for example, 138% profit
for the ship La Jeune-Aimée, sailing from Nantes in 178311), average overall profitability ran well below this figure. Here are two
examples of less profitable outcomes:
– First, trading in Holland between 1600 and 1815 generated
earnings of between 5 to 10% for 54% of all shipments (the Dutch
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Organization of Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Global Supply Chain Perspective
shareholders of the Midelburgsche Commercie Compagnie posted
an annual average gain of 2.1% between 1730 and 1790)12.
– Secondly, British trade was the most profitable due to the
country’s imperialistic experience, its well-established industry
that was better able to provide products for trade and the efficiency of its banking system. As a result, the return on investment hovered between 7.1 and 7.5% between 1785 and 1807.13
These results should be prudently interpreted because they are
averages, also keeping in mind that less risky investments existed in, for example, insurance which reported between 4 and 6%
profit, or land owning with a return of 5%. Profit was in no way
guaranteed. Trade activity had to, therefore, be optimized, which
was not easy since, in the 18th century, a strong supply and demand phenomenon existed in specific context: English arrival on
the African coast, hitherto a Dutch preserve, increased demand
for slaves while supply was relatively limited. The price for slaves
rose as a result, ultimately climbing six-fold between the mid17th century and 1712.14 In addition, in 1674, the French and
Caribbean slave trade operators reduced slave purchase prices
for plantation owners, stimulating sugar production, which in
turn reduced sugar prices on the global market. Consumption
was thus encouraged and, in response, boosted the slave trade
even further.
Operational Breakdown of the Transatlantic Slave Trade
Considering transatlantic slave trade from an operational standpoint may seem surprising. Yet, if we take care to analyze the
underlying exchange structures, it is indisputable that transatlantic slave trade functioned thanks to transportation management principles and, more broadly, relied upon workflow man81
Thierry Godbille, François Fulconis and Gilles Paché
agement on a vast geographical scale. It is thus possible to break
down the logistical process with reference to four interrelated
elements: (1) the European stage that provided the ability to raise
capital, man a ship, assemble a crew and collect cargo; (2) the African stage providing an exchange market of products for slaves;
(3) the American stage demanding slaves for sugar plantations
(and marginally for coffee and tobacco production) and selling
these same products for resale in Europe; and (4) the shipping
and storage industry that provided transportation and storage
capacities at the “tips” of the triangle on three different continents.
The European Stage
Around 200,000 to 300,000 livres tournois (a French monetary
unit) had to be collected before a ship left port. In current terms,
for example, in 1777, Ms. De Sabran bought a mansion in the Rue
Saint-Honoré in Paris for 300,000 livres tournois15, which today
would represent approximately five million euros. This money
gathering operation could last between a year and a half (in the
best case), and three years (in case of bad luck or malfunctions).
Return on investment was very slow. Many shareholders (craftsmen or eventually servants) were involved in any given operation, so that the ship owner would not be the main shareholder.
When the capital was fragmented the main resources for group
ownership were acquaintances, friends, and relatives. In France,
financing triangular operations primarily concerned powerful
ship owners who diversified their oceanic activities while continuing to pursue their traditional ship centered activities, for
example cod fishing, regular line navigation or tramping. Ship
owners faced two possibilities: maintaining old and already de82
Organization of Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Global Supply Chain Perspective
preciated ships (worth 15 to 20,000 livres tournois) or investing in newer and more powerful ships (worth 50 to 60,000 livres
tournois).16 Over time, the second option became the rule.
However, the ability to raise capital remained marked by differences depending on the ports. Therefore, in France, ship-owners and merchants of Atlantic ports were mostly outside the region, or even out of the country. In La Rochelle, the slave trade
was mainly the doing of the Protestants, and it benefited from
the financial support of members of the religious community.17
In Nantes, the slave trade was shared between a few rich families of the city, families from Brittany, Normandy and Paris, and
a significant colony of Dutch merchants. Finally, in Bordeaux,
the financing was practically only a family or community business. Amongst the most known cases, there are the Nairac and
Gradis families who respectively equipped 25 and 10 expeditions
from Bordeaux, and made an important contribution to the establishment of networks for the financing and the fitting out of
slave ships from Bordeaux, in direct competition with the port
of Nantes. Despite these differences in terms of financing, the
same trends are noticeable. On the one hand, the sums invested
were returned only 12 to 18 months later (except in the event of
a sinking). On the other hand, a well-organized ship-owner used
a minimum of two boats, one arriving in the West Indies in June,
while the other left France in August. This ensured the rotation
of boats, as well as bringing back different plants according to the
seasons.
Regarding the crews, they were particularly difficult to recruit.
Sailors were aware of the high mortality rates in transatlantic
slave trade.18 For example, there was a 17 to 18% death rate during the 18th century according to studies conducted on a sample
of 1,000 slave ships from Nantes, with higher mortality peaks for
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Thierry Godbille, François Fulconis and Gilles Paché
extended stays in African waters. This was minor compared to
the risk during excursions to the Indian Ocean and Asia where
crew mortality rates reached 50% among Portuguese sailors and
30% among Dutch sailors. The Compagnie des Indes crews sailing
from Lorient and La Rochelle into the same Far East waters averaged 28% mortality between 1644 and 1789. To make matters
worse, there had to be twice as many crewmembers on a slave
transport vessel as on a merchant vessel of equivalent tonnage.
Studies have established an average of 20 to 25 men for one hundred tons, although this figure decreased over the centuries. On
a slave vessel, there was an average of ten slaves per sailor.
Recruiting other high quality, diverse personnel was also vital.
A captain with strong maritime capabilities, excellent leadership
and proven trade experience in Africa was essential. He also had
to be able to recover debts in America. A cooper charged with
making barrels to store water or food (barrels were loaded in
bunches to limit congestion) had to be recruited. A carpenter
was also hired to mount partitions and false or lop decks to adapt
a vessel for human freight transport. Finally, a surgeon was needed (often a practitioner of comparatively poor technical quality
due to medical knowledge at the time) who was responsible for
assessing slave health prior to boarding and preservation of the
same during the voyage. The surgeon was also in charge of keeping the logbook, rigorously recording the number of deaths onboard, and the causes of death.19
Once these structural components were regrouped, a shipment of high barter value had to be pooled based on a classification of 110 to 115 products, including relatively expensive
elements like textiles imported from India, or metals, tools,
knives and firearms, porcelain, tobacco, brandy, spirits manufactured in Europe. “Guinéaillerie” (gold leaf, mirrors, beads, and
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Organization of Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Global Supply Chain Perspective
shells), although essential, was only a cargo complement. In the
end, shipyards, mines, textile mills, the steel industry, producers
of handicrafts, and dried fish or meat manufacturers, (to name
but a few of the trades included) throughout Europe, the Baltic,
and the southern Iberian Peninsula were involved in transatlantic slave trade.20 Though lacking in-depth studies on the subject,
in France, if sugar-refining activity is included, one worker out
of eight was more or less directly involved in transatlantic slave
trade during the second half of the 18th century.21
The African Stage
The role played by black Africa itself in the global movement
of Africans to the Americas (and to the Indian Ocean, North
Africa, and the Middle East) cannot be underestimated. Without a constant and large supply of “raw material”, the slave trade
would have neither begun, nor developed and persisted. Intertribal conflicts, raids, customary law, succession problems, convictions for debt, crime, adultery, etc., created sources of supply.
In addition, fierce competition among Western powers benefited
Africans who concentrate a captive resource. Africans seemingly
exercised a more pronounced control on transatlantic slave trade
than did Europe.22 When the slave trade was in its infancy and
disorganized, only 2% of the captives were kidnapped by slave
traders.23 Later, African chiefs entered the slave circuit as game
masters.
Captives and future slaves came from the hinterlands. The local African “suppliers” had to have relays and relationships, as
well as porters to barter goods. Funding an armed guard was,
therefore, essential to protect slave columns from raiders and to
avoid riots. According to Jan S. Hogendorn, if slave prices were
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Thierry Godbille, François Fulconis and Gilles Paché
200 to 600% higher on the coast than inland, it was due to additional expenses (food, equipment, taxes, intermediate handlers,
mortality) that profitability was inversely proportional to the
inland distance traveled by captured future slaves to reach the
coast.24 Having a position in local political hierarchies helped
providers of slaves maintain their business, and allowed them to
impose exchange prices during final negotiations.
The catchment area extended from the Sene-Gambia region to
today’s Angola and was, in fact, limited to a few sites that seem to
have been referral units where operations were carried out to group
the “goods”. These sites were indeed the real hubs of transatlantic
slave trade: Judah in Benin (now Ouidah) and Lagos in Nigeria
centralized nearly 60% of the offers, but also Loango in Congo and
Luanda in Angola. The possibilities for procuring slaves were relatively concentrated. Europeans had counters on the African coast
providing, in principle, goods only to vessels sailing under their
own colors. These hubs have been likened to fortified logistical
platforms intended, by design, to be protected from damage and
surprises, and for which rent was paid to local authorities.
The first hub was built in 1482 by the Portuguese Diogo de
Azambuja as, in theory, Portugal enjoyed by treaty the attendance
and operation monopoly of Africa. Thereafter, with the gradual eviction of Portugal (that ended in 1637), the English and the
Dutch built hubs for their benefit on what approximately corresponds to the current Ghanaian coast.25 England and the United
Provinces, of equivalent forces, were to be the dominant powers
for a long period, but benefiting from their constant disagreement,
the Danish and the Swedish were to, despite everything, manage
to dig in by implementing their own hubs. The Danish took this
opportunity to increase their share of the regional market, linked
to the gold trade, from 5 to 12% during the 18th century.26
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Organization of Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Global Supply Chain Perspective
Once arrived at a hub, the captain (as the boat owner’s representative) had to pay the “coutume” to the local broker. This
was a kind of entrance fee enabling a captain to begin real trading transactions. Brokers were generally Africans, sometimes of
mixed race, and were local supplier representatives. Any transaction started with establishing the composition for the purchase
of a captive. The standard measure was what Westerners called a
“pièce d’Inde”, corresponding to a healthy man of 15 to 35 years of
age, of good size, robust and without any impairment. Women,
children or elderly or disabled individuals led to discounts: three
children of between ten and fifteen years of age for two pièces
d’Inde, two children from five to ten years of age for one pièce
d’Inde, while old and ill individuals were valued at three quarters
of a pièces d’Inde. In brief, the consideration value depended on
local utility value assigned to the captive by the bidder.
Clustering could be prolonged due to a power balance firmly
favoring the seller who could temporarily restrict supply to push
up prices. Up to a year’s wait was not rare. The duration of an
operation depended on the moment and confrontation between
supply and demand conditions, but it has been estimated that
a good average was the accumulation of four to five slaves per
day. Sales were executed in batches, the shipmaster having neither the power, nor especially the time to choose the quality or
the composition of his cargo. Shipmasters negotiated for what
was proposed to them in terms of pièces d’Inde. For each slave, a
health check and branding (buttock, hip, chest, or shoulder) was
performed prior to boarding to indicate their affiliation and provide a kind of traceability. In the main compartment men were
chained in pairs and were separated from women and children,
who were held in different compartments.
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Thierry Godbille, François Fulconis and Gilles Paché
The American Stage
It is difficult to obtain entirely reliable figures; however, it is possible to estimate the number of voyages between Africa and the
Americas to over 54,000 during the entire transatlantic slave
trade, approximately amounting to 11 million slaves carried (see
Table 2). Upon arrival on New World shores (mainly Caribbean
islands for French ships27), slaves were routinely quarantined unless there were other arrangements with local authorities. This
quarantine was for cargo “refreshment”. The cargo was discharged
in designated places so the slaves could recover from voyage-induced fatigue. Food of higher quality than the sea rations was
provided. “Cosmetic” work to conceal lesions and injuries was
undertaken to make slaves appear more attractive for potential
buyers. Sales, after being advertised to local farmers, were done
either on land or on the ship. There were three different possibilities depending on the circumstances:
– The most common method was the batch-bound sale, forcing buyers to accept some individuals of high quality and others
of lesser value. This system favored selling all captives and avoided unsold slaves, also known as “cargo tails”;
– The second method consisted of stocking slaves in a specific
location and displaying them at a given time. Buyers rushed in
and removed “items” they had previously identified, and then led
the merchandise to the seller to determine the price. Slaves not
selected were then sold in sets at discounted prices;
– The third method was to sell slaves to most the creditworthy
colonists according to the highest and last bidder principle. If
this method proved to be the most profitable, it was not always
applicable because it depended heavily on the momentary equilibrium between supply and demand: many ships in the harbor
could bring down prices.
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Organization of Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Global Supply Chain Perspective
Table 2. Transatlantic Slave Carriers
Country
Portugal (including Brazil)
Voyages
Moved slaves
Percentage
30,000
4,650,000
42.3
Spain (including Cuba)
4,000
1,600,000
14.5
France (including West Indies)
4,200
1,250,000
11.4
Holland
2,000
500,000
4.5
Britain
12,000
2,600,000
23.6
British North America, USA
1,500
300,000
2.7
Denmark
250
50,000
0.5
Other
250
50,000
0.5
54,200
11,000,000
100
Total
Source: Adapted from Thomas, Slave trade.
On site in the Colonies, the owner’s correspondent played a determining role. Informed several months in advance of a ship’s
arrival, his role was to maintain a network, explore the market,
inform settlers of a forthcoming shipment arrival, and to learn
about the state of potential client finances. The owner’s correspondent was also responsible for negotiating, buying, and storing the
freight that was to return to Europe. Consisting of sugar, cocoa,
coffee, cotton, indigo and tobacco, this cargo was generally worth
one third of the slave sale value. The complement, which was debt
subject, was paid in the following months, or even in the following
years. It was not at all rare for “claim tails” (debt repayment) to
extend for one or more decades.
Focus on the Maritime Transport Operation
Naval architectural progress enabled significant improvement in
building quality to suit specific needs throughout the 18th centu89
Thierry Godbille, François Fulconis and Gilles Paché
ry. According to Jean Boudriot, these developments were threefold
prior to 1780.28 First, there was an increase in the average tonnage
that rose during the 18th century from 150 to 250 register tons; this
allowed accumulating more goods, transporting more slaves and
the food necessary for the Atlantic crossing. Second, the development of ship hulls providing greater resistance for voyages in tropical waters teeming with gnawing shellfish or worms, especially
during long term stationing off the African coast; from the middle
of the 18th century, hulls were doubled with copper plates, but this
highly effective system also increased vessel cost by 15%. Third,
greater speed was sought to reduce journey time, avoid enemies
in case of conflict, reduce the mortality rate and accelerate capital
turnover; in 1761, units departing for Africa had a more distinguished and superior gait than that of King Frigates.29
However, we should note the significant differences in performance between the various countries regarding the time for crossing the Atlantic. Indeed, even though the crossing usually took
from one to three months, and the average time was 66 days, the
logistical skills and resources could lead to significant disparities.
Therefore, while Dutch slave ships took 71 to 81 days to reach
the West Indies, Brazilian slave ships carried out the journey between Angola and Brazil in only 35 days, by taking advantage of
the smaller distance to travel.30 Some countries therefore had more
effective shipping than others; at least, this has been suggested for
the Baltic trade in the Early Modern period that the Dutch, unlike
the transatlantic slave trade, had a more effective management of
vessels than some of their counterparts in the trade.31 But the effectiveness of the transport from one country to another was also
strongly linked to the perfect organization in the hinterland and
ports, as in the case of Liverpool and its docks.
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Organization of Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Global Supply Chain Perspective
Between 1750 and 1800, Liverpool established itself as the major logistical center for transatlantic slave trade in England.32 This
is explained by an ideal location enabling the city’s merchants to
have access to finished products coming from all of England: textile from Lancashire and Yorkshire, metal items from Staffordshire
and Cheshire, as well as alcohol from the entire country. The city’s
merchants were also in close connection with London and Amsterdam, from which they returned with silk from India and Asia, and
glasswork from Venice. These products were exchanged in Western
Africa against slaves, which were then sold in the West Indies or
in the American colonies. In the early 1790s, the port of Liverpool
already controlled 80% of the slave trade in England and nearly 40%
in Europe. Each year, 130 vessels set off for America via Africa, and
Liverpool’s elite was then bound to this extensive trade, the success
of which depended on leading logistical infrastructures.
When examining the transport issue again, slave ships can, for
the most part, be likened to buildings with proved nautical qualities. They can, in no way, be likened to yachts; in their holds, traveling conditions were generally appalling, especially in inclement
weather, where slaves were chained in darkness, stench, and excrement. Although often exaggerated in stories, overcrowding levels remained high. The European average in the second half of the
18th century was 1.5 to 2.5 slaves per load ton (1.44 m3). For vessels
from Nantes, between 1707 and 1793, the average was 1.41 slaves
per ton.33 Regarding relations between crew and slaves, two rules
had to be observed: (1) there was an absolute prohibition on sailors
beating slaves; this did not, however, completely rule out complaints
of barbaric acts; (2) sexual abstinence for everyone (with separate
and distinctive living quarters), but stories had been related of some
misconduct on the part of captains or officers in the field.
Regarding slave mortality during the transatlantic trajectory
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Thierry Godbille, François Fulconis and Gilles Paché
(the “Middle Passage”), relatively reliable figures are available.34
Admittedly, mortality rates varied greatly from one slave shipment
to another, and strong variations are observed related to the point
of slave embarkation. The minimum, around 5%, appears to be
realistic, yet all the recorded rates seem roughly equivalent. British mortality was around 10%35, while the Dutch mortality ranged
from 16.1 to 10.1% over the centuries, with one third of deaths occurring during the first ten days of the voyage. Data developed by
Herbert S. Klein, Stanley L. Engerman, Robin Haines and Ralph
Shlomowitz from a sample of 332 Nantes shipments gave the results shown in Table 3 in terms of slave mortality rates.36 However,
the diversity of data should not allow us to forget the essential element: it is impossible to identify a positive relationship between
vessel crowding and Middle Passage mortality.37
Table 3. Mortality of 332 Nantes Slave Shipments
1597-1700
1701-1750
1751-1800
1801-1821
1822-1864
Overall
22.6%
15.6%
11.2%
9.6%
10.1%
11.9%
Source: Adapted from Klein, Engerman, Haines and Shlomowitz, “Transoceanic mortality”.
Mortality on slave ships was incontestably higher than that experienced during the transport of soldiers or prisoners being taken to
penal Colonies. Interestingly, it was also lower than that of crews,
especially thanks to the improvement in transport techniques.
Thus, the adoption by the British slave traders of the technique
of sheathing ships’ hulls with copper reduced the death rates of
slaves on the Middle Passage by about half.38 But drawing compelling conclusions from these numbers would be very unwise. On
one hand, convicts did most of their sailing in the temperate zone,
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Organization of Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Global Supply Chain Perspective
while the slave journey took place in tropical areas, thus more conducive to disease. On the other hand, slaves suffered the violent
psychological shock experienced by beings who are uprooted and
know nothing of their destiny. Suicide was a major cause of mortality during slave trading. Finally, slaves were confined in ships
for a few months while sailors lived on board for between one and
a half to three years. This comparison would probably be much
more relevant, and the results very different, if calculated in terms
of a ratio of mortality/distance or mortality/time spent on a ship.
The Transatlantic Slave Trade as a Global Supply Chain
The transatlantic slave trade is one of the first expressions of economic globalization, on a large scale and over a long period.39 At
an operational level, the organization of the three stages presented
above led to the implementation of a particularly effective logistics
between two continents, by heralding what were to then become the
global supply chains of the triumphant capitalism of the 20th century.40 The interest of a transatlantic slave trade analysis, pairing history,
and management, is thus to underline that the success of a project as
ambitious, independently of moral criticism, stems from a developed
entrepreneurial spirit. This entrepreneurial spirit led to the creation
of original logistical models, which were to be formalized later and
refined to constantly improve the turnover of products at a global
level. One of the best known is the hub-and-spokes model, of which
the transatlantic slave trade provides a remarkable illustration.
Supply Chain Framework
Referring to a supply chain comes down to naming a system of
offerings through which organizations deliver their goods and ser93
Thierry Godbille, François Fulconis and Gilles Paché
vices to their customers. This chain constitutes a network of interrelated organizations with a common objective.41 The effort made
to result in an integrated management, considered more effective,
of logistical activities involving several actors gave rise to an original approach which aimed to unite companies around a common
objective of value creation: the supply chain management (SCM).
The latter has been widely publicized since the 1990s, and it obviously reflects in the applied research, as shown by the hundreds of
articles and submissions during conferences on the subject every
year. Such enthusiasm has its roots in the companies’ will to meet
the customer’s demands in near real time, by being capable of
maintaining itself on a high level in the competitive environment
through the regular introduction of new products in satisfactory
conditions of cost and quality of service.42
The SCM-type approach has an integrative and systemic vision by nature rather than a functional and partitioned vision.
Indeed, it considers logistics above all according to a strategic
angle (and not instrumental), regarding an extended company
that goes from the suppliers’ suppliers, upstream, to the customers’ customers, downstream. As noted by John T. Mentzer,
William DeWitt, James S. Keebler, Soonhong Min, Nancy W.
Nix, Carlo D. Smith and Zach Zacharia, the SCM is indeed
defined as “the systematic, strategic coordination of the traditional business functions and tactics across these business
functions within a company and across businesses within the
supply chain, for the purposes of improving the long-term performance of the individual companies and the supply chain as
a whole”.43 Coordinating is using an articulated set of means
and resources to guide the activities of interdependent units to
achieve a goal of logistics performance.
If the interest of numerous managers for the theme of inte94
Organization of Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Global Supply Chain Perspective
grated management of supply chains appears to be very significant today, it is because many of them wish to see their company focus on the core business to meet the customers’ specific
demands and delegate a part of physical assets management to
external partners. More broadly, the design and production of a
product and/or a service requires the use of external skills, and
only a coherent grouping of several entities with complementary knowledge, with a common purpose, can face national, or
even global, competition. Good inter-organizational coordination in terms of flow of materials and goods consequently becomes a source of sustainable competitive advantage. It shows,
to take up the analysis of Togar M. Simatupang, Alan C. Wright
and Ramaswami Sridharan, the will of improved logistics synchronization the aim of which is to value the operational links
between actors to improve the value creation process.44
The reasoning is even more relevant when we place ourselves
at the level of global supply chains, extending over extensive
geographical areas. The stakes of global supply chains monitoring are known. It must be ensured that the contracts signed
with the various supply chain members are detailed and precise
in terms of responsibility regarding two major elements: (1) the
damage or theft of the product, during the transport or during
the loading and unloading stages; (2) the delay resulting from
the storage and transit stages. The packaging could potentially
require a specific design, suitable materials, well-specified rules,
and a limitation of the quantity depending on the nature of the
product and according to the regulation in force. In the end, a
global supply chain relies on the most economic and reliable
solution to bring a product to a given destination within the
set deadlines and security conditions. Contemporary history
has been influenced by the globalization of economies with one
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Thierry Godbille, François Fulconis and Gilles Paché
of the founding principles being the development of logistical
techniques aiming to remove borders and improve the flows of
international exchange. The case of the container is sufficiently
known to avoid going over it again.45 To a certain extent, the
transatlantic slave trade constitutes the first signs of globalization we know today, especially through an organization like the
hub-and-spokes model conceptualized in the 1960s.
Logistics and Geographical Spread
Although temporally distant, the decomposition of logistical
processes associated with transatlantic slave trade can be compared in structure and network organization (with reference to
“stars”, now well known in international logistics) to the huband-spokes model.46 In the 1970s, this model revolutionized
the airline industry, and is now widespread in air, rail, and sea
transport organizations.47 This model uses a procurement system that enables resource capturing in a geographical area. The
resource is then directed to another geographical area, playing
on the concentration phenomenon to reduce costs. The huband-spokes model corresponds to a network architecture based
on a central point with radiating spokes reaching peripheral
targets. François Fulconis, Gilles Paché and Gérard Roveillo
point out that the hub-and-spokes system, which differs from
a point-to-point system, was conceptualized in 1965 by Frederick W. Smith, a student at Yale University. Smith gave life to
this idea in 1971 by creating Federal Express (renamed FedEx
in 2000) a delivery company proposing a fast link service to
industrial customers in eleven cities in the United States. To
this end, he replaced the idea of point-to-point connections between the eleven cities and developed a single platform based
96
Organization of Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Global Supply Chain Perspective
in Memphis (Tennessee), connected to twenty-five cities, expanding volume effects and scale economies.48 Finally, through
flows mass and timing synchronization, implementation of a
hub-and-spokes strategy allowed an optimal use of transportation, including filling rate.
The hub-and-spokes model means that spatial proximity is
no longer a priority for organizing large-scale market exchanges. What matters is coordinating complex logistical operations
by conducting routing and then sorting operations (flows of
goods or people), to regroup and then transport them over
long distances, and finally ungroup and redirect to other destinations. Effectiveness is therefore measured at these different
levels. Applying this to transatlantic slave trade, the transport
sequence between bundling and unbundling was particularly
sensitive and had to be carefully managed. This was even more
problematic given that no vessel was designed exclusively for
transatlantic slave trade. Owners wanted to mobilize their ships
for other uses (such as deep-sea fishing) between slave/trading
runs. Furthermore, during the course of a triangular expedition, a ship starting from Europe carried, for example, building materials (wood from northern Europe, nails from Spain,
iron from Amsterdam, Saint Petersburg and London, copper
from Hamburg and Ostend, etc.), and once in Africa had to
be “transformed” into a person mover, making the whole case
extremely expensive and complicated. To absorb these fixed
costs, it was therefore essential to move large volumes of product through the “spokes”.
These large volumes of product required “capturing” the
goods over extensive geographical areas. All of Europe was
involved in transatlantic slave trade, as stated earlier. To give
an idea of the diversity of the good’s origins there were chains
97
Thierry Godbille, François Fulconis and Gilles Paché
from Spain, Sweden and Prussia, weapons from Holland and
Denmark, and textiles from Brittany, Normandy, Silesia, Utrecht, and Lancashire.49 Specifically examining the origin of the
goods loaded on the ship L’Amiral from Bordeaux in 1743, Eric
Saugera provides a clear vision of the vastness of a typical supply
area: the fabrics were from Hamburg, Amsterdam, Rouen and
Nantes, guns from London, shells and metal pipes from Amsterdam, powder, and hats from La Rochelle, eau-de-vie from
Saintonge, flour, and tallow from Nérac and rifle stones from
Saint-Savinien.50 This leads us to the traditional question of international logistics regarding the risk linked to global supply
chains, due to numerous links interconnecting a wide network
of supply chain members.51 The coordination of activities in the
transatlantic slave trade is very similar to that of companies.
Indeed, the aim is to improve its performance by accelerating
the capital turnover, in the presence of many actors who need
to synchronize their activities in the best possible manner.
The same organization had to be applied to the acquisition of
slaves and their subsequent transfer to a central hub for shipping to their final destination, bearing in mind the extremely
long distances and period implied by the “commercial” cycle.
Historical documents demonstrate that transatlantic slave trade
was based on codified, developed organizational principles.
Counters (slave trading ports) in Africa served as hubs where
slaves were grouped for export. Developing sufficiently large
clusters of slaves for export could take several months, so it was
essential to properly feed them. Thus, the need to procure and
manage a sufficient food supply was crucial. All this required
effective supply chain management, an idea that is also found
with John T. Dalton and Tin Cheuk Leung.52 Thus, they offer to
assess the comparative performances of different logistical cy98
Organization of Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Global Supply Chain Perspective
cles regarding the ship tonnage, number of crewmembers at the
voyage’s outset, number of slaves disembarked, and number of
days spent to cross the Atlantic Ocean. Our analysis, of a more
general nature, highlights the transatlantic slave trade and the
presence of desynchronized logistical flows with a process of
mass transport that managed to maintain an intact workforce
despite complications. In the end, well before the model was
conceptualized in the context of lean and agile supply chains,
the hub-and-spokes was probably the backbone of a redoubtable economically efficient machine that trafficked in human
beings.
Conclusion
The discovery of the New World and its colonization by the large
European maritime nations are at the root of an economic system that influenced, and still strongly influences, the minds. To
guarantee the exploitation of wealth and territories of America,
an abundant and cheap workforce appeared necessary. Therefore, neither the European migrants, too little in number, nor
the Indians, decimated by the exploitation and illnesses, were
sufficient for the task. To face the needs, a transatlantic slave
trade was organized as from the 16th century. European slave
traders left Europe with manufactured products to trade on the
African coasts for the captives provided by some unscrupulous
kingdoms and African slave traders. The European vessels then
transported their live commodity across the Atlantic, in a horrible voyage similar to deportation. The fact that this economic
system worked over several centuries, that the benefits of each
expedition comprised between 15 and 20%, and that the transatlantic slave trade contributed to the economic boom of sever99
Thierry Godbille, François Fulconis and Gilles Paché
al European ports, are unquestionable facts. Obviously, it is at
the cost of victims the number of which is impossible to establish, whether we are referring to the deaths of captives during
their walk to the coast, before embarking on the slave ships, or
the degrading and violent conditions in the Colonies.
This chapter has chosen an original perspective, at the junction of economic history and management. Its aim is indeed to
show that the transatlantic slave trade is based on a logistical organization in a specific good running order. We can even assert
that the transatlantic slave trade is the pioneer in global supply
chains that was to emerge in the 20th century. Our approach
is clearly part of the business history current, developed at the
University of Harvard in Alfred D. Chandler’s movement.53
This movement has already worked towards the rehabilitation
of an historical approach of companies’ management. However, it seems important to go further, by providing, from the
resorting to supply chain processes, an analytical perspective
with a universal aim of different historical phenomena. Indeed,
the dive into economic history can reveal the permanence of
organized economic systems that are also based on a constant
logistical performance. Here, we can allude to the logistics of
drug trafficking, or the logistics of weapon trafficking. Even
though this vision may be shocking, it must not hinder the researcher’s investigation, and must enable a productive dialogue
between economic history and management.
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
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Simatupang, Togar M., Alan C. Wright, and Ramaswami Sridharan. “The knowledge of coordination for supply chain integration,” Business Process Management Journal 8:3 (2002): 289–308.
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Solar, Peter M., and Klas Rönnbäck. “Copper sheathing and the
British slave trade,” Economic History Review 68:3 (2015): 806–
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Steckel, Richard H., and Richard A. Jensen. “New evidence on the
causes of slave and crew mortality in the Atlantic slave trade,”
Journal of Economic History 46:1 (1986): 57–77.
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An old regime business. Madison (WN): Wisconsin University
Press, 1979.
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1440-1870. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2015.
Unger, Richard W., ed. Shipping and economic growth 1350-1850.
Leiden: Brill, 2011.
Viles, Perry. “The slaving interest in the Atlantic ports, 1763-1792,”
French Historical Studies 7:4 (1972): 529–43.
Vulin, Bénédicte. “Le hub, élément fondamental des stratégies des
acteurs de l’express,” Les Cahiers Scientifiques du Transport 26
(1992): 147–68.
Zembri, Pierre. “Structure des réseaux de transport et déréglementation.” Flux 62 (2005): 21–30.
NOTES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Olivier Pétré-Grenouilleau, L’argent de la traite. Milieu négrier, capitalisme et développement: Un modèle (Paris: Aubier, 2009).
Michael McKell, “Planning operation Overlord,” Crescat Scientia 15 (2014).
Marcel Dorigny and Bernard Gainot, Atlas des esclavages. De l’Antiquité à nos
jours, 2nd ed. (Paris: Editions Autrement, 2013).
Robert L. Stein, The French slave trade in the Eighteenth century. An old regime
business (Madison, WN: Wisconsin University Press, 1979).
Hugh Thomas, The slave trade: The story of the Atlantic slave trade, 1440-1870
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2015).
Jean Crusol, Les îles à sucre, de la colonisation à la mondialisation (Bécherel: Les
Perséides, 2008).
Pieter Emmer, “The myth of early globalization: The Atlantic economy, 15001800,” European Review 11:1 (2003).
105
Thierry Godbille, François Fulconis and Gilles Paché
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
Nestor Capdevila, Las Casas, une politique de l’humanité: L’homme et l’empire de la
foi (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1998).
David W. Galenson, White servitude in colonial America: An economic analysis
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Michael L. Bush, Servitude
in modern times (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).
Fernand Braudel, La dynamique du capitalisme (Paris: Flammarion, 1985).
Thomas, Slave trade.
Johannes Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic slave trade, 1600-1815 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990).
Stephen D. Behrendt, “Crew mortality in the transatlantic slave trade in the eighteenth century,” Slavery & Abolition: A Journal of Slave and Post-Slave Studies 18:1
(1997).
Thomas, Slave trade.
Léonce Jore, Les établissements français sur la côte occidentale de l’Afrique de 1758
à 1809 (Paris: Société Française d’Histoire d’Outre-Mer, 1965).
Pierre Pluchon, La route des esclaves: Négriers et bois d’ébène au XVIIIe siècle (Paris: Hachette Littérature, 1980).
Perry Viles, “The slaving interest in the Atlantic ports, 1763-1792,” French Historical Studies 7:4 (1972); Jean-Michel Deveau, “La traite des Noirs à La Rochelle au
XVIIIe siècle” (PhD diss, Poitiers University, 1987).
Behrendt, “Crew mortality”; Erik Gøbel, “Danish shipping along the triangular
route, 1671-1802: Voyages and conditions on board,” Scandinavian Journal of History 36:2 (2011).
Richard H. Steckel and Richard A. Jensen, “New evidence on the causes of slave and
crew mortality in the Atlantic slave trade,” Journal of Economic History 46:1 (1986).
Olivier Pétré-Grenouilleau, Les traites négrières: Essai d’histoire globale (Paris: Gallimard, 2004).
Jacques Cauna, Au temps des Isles à sucre (Paris: Editions Karthala, 1987).
Phyllis M. Martin, The external trade of the Loango Coast, 1756-1870 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1972); Robin Law, “Royal monopoly and private enterprise in
the Atlantic trade: The case of Dahomey,” Journal of African History 18:4 (1977).
Daniel Mannix and Malcolm Courley, Black cargoes: History of the Atlantic slave
trade, 1518-1565 (New York, NY: Viking Press, 1962).
Jan S. Hogendorn, “Economic modelling of price differences in the slave trade
between the Central Sudan and the Coast,” Slavery & Abolition: A Journal of Slave
and Post-Slave Studies 17:3 (1996).
Jean-Michel Deveau, L’or et les esclaves (Paris: Karthala, 2005).
Deveau, L’or et les esclaves.
106
Organization of Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Global Supply Chain Perspective
27 Crusol, Les îles à sucre.
28 Jean Boudriot, Traite et navire négrier, L’Aurore, 1794 (Paris: Editions Ancre, 1984);
Jean Boudriot, Le navire négrier au XVIIIe siècle (Paris: Centre de Documentation
Historique de la Marine, 1987).
29 Deveau, L’or et les esclaves.
30 Olivier Pétré-Grenouilleau, Les traites négrières.
31 Richard W. Unger, ed., Shipping and economic growth 1350-1850 (Leiden: Brill, 2011).
32 Roger T. Anstey, The Atlantic slave trade and British abolition, 1760-1810 (London:
Macmillan, 1975).
33 Serge Daget, La traite des Noirs (Rennes: Editions Ouest-France Université, 1990).
34 Simon J. Hogerzeil and David Richardson, “Slave purchasing strategies and shipboard mortality: Day-to-day evidence from the Dutch African trade, 1751-1797,”
Journal of Economic History 60:1 (2007).
35 Anstey, Atlantic slave trade.
36 Herbert S. Klein, Stanley L. Engerman, Robin Haines, and Ralph Shlomowitz,
“Transoceanic mortality: The slave trade in comparative perspective,” The William
and Mary Quarterly 58:1 (2001).
37 Nicolas J. Duquette, “Revealing the relationship between ship crowding and slave
mortality.” Journal of Economic History 74:2 (2014).
38 Peter M. Solar and Klas Rönnbäck. “Copper sheathing and the British slave trade,”
Economic History Review 68:3 (2015).
39 Joseph E. Inikori, “Africa and the globalization process: Western Africa, 14501850,” Journal of Global History 2:1 (2007).
40 Tage Skjott-Larsen, Philip B. Schary, Juliana H. Mikkola and Herbert Kotzab,
Managing the global supply chain, 3rd ed. (Copenhaguen: Copenhagen Business
School Press, 2007).
41 Alexandre K. Samii, Stratégies de service. E-business, supply chain (Paris: Dunod,
2001).
42 Sunil Chopra and Peter Meindl, Supply chain management: Strategy, planning, and
operation, 6th ed. (New York, NY: Prentice Hall).
43 John T. Mentzer John T., William DeWitt, James S. Keebler, Soonhong Min, Nancy
W. Nix, Carlo D. Smith and Zach Zacharia, “Defining supply chain management.”
Journal of Business Logistics 22:2 (2001): 18.
44 Togar M. Simatupang, Alan C. Wright and Ramaswami Sridharan, “The knowledge of coordination for supply chain integration,” Business Process Management
Journal 8:3 (2002).
45 Jan C. Fransoo and Chung-Yee Lee, “The critical role of ocean container transport in
global supply chain performance.” Production & Operations Management 22:2 (2013).
107
Thierry Godbille, François Fulconis and Gilles Paché
46 Bénédicte Vulin, “Le hub, élément fondamental des stratégies des acteurs de l’express,” Les Cahiers Scientifiques du Transport 26 (1992); Kenth Lumsden, Fabrizio
Dallari and Remigio Ruggeri. “Improving the efficiency of the hub and spoke system for the SKF European distribution network,” International Journal of Physical
Distribution & Logistics Management 29:1 (1999); Shaofeng Liu, Dulekha Kasturiratne and Jonathan Moizer, “A hub-and-spoke model for multi-dimensional
integration of green marketing and sustainable supply chain management,” Industrial Marketing Management 41:4 (2012); Tinatin Akhvlediani and Katarzyna
Śledziewska, “Implications of the European integration: Revisiting the hypothesis
of ‘hub-and-spokes’ model,” Baltic Journal of Economics 17:1 (2017).
47 Pierre Zembri, “Structure des réseaux de transport et déréglementation.” Flux
62 (2005); Julien Nespola, “La conteneurisation du monde–méditerranéen.” Outre-Terre 23 (2009).
48 François Fulconis, Gilles Paché and Gérard Roveillo, La prestation logistique: Origines, enjeux et perspectives (Caen: Editions Management & Société, 2011).
49 Olivier Pétré-Grenouilleau, Les traites négrières.
50 Eric Saugera, Bordeaux port négrier, XVIIe-XIXe siècles (Paris: Editions Khartala,
1995).
51 Ila Manuj and John T. Mentzer, “Global supply chain risk management strategies,”
International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management 38:3 (2008).
52 John T. Dalton and Tin Cheuk Leung, “Dispersion and distortions in the trans-Atlantic slave trade,” Journal of International Economics 96:2 (2015).
53 Alfred D. Chandler, Strategy and structure: Chapters in the history of the American
industrial enterprise (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1962).
108
“The population question is, in short,
a question of our people’s survival”
Reframing population policy in 1940s Finland
Sophy Bergenheim
Introduction
In the nineteenth and twentieth century, population policy in Europe and the Nordic countries has been tightly intertwined with
several other policies, ideologies and lines of thought, such as eugenics (or racial hygiene, as it was called in the Nordic countries),
public health and family and gender policy. All of these various
forms of biopolitics have also been closely linked with nationalism
– ‘race’, for instance, was understood as synonym for nation or national (e.g., “the British race”),1 which also applies for ‘population’
and ‘people’.
In this paper, I study how Väestöliitto, the Finnish Population
and Family Welfare League, framed population policy. Väestöliitto
was founded in 1941, after Finland had undergone the Winter War
(1939–40) against the Soviet Union. While Väestöliitto officially
was a non-governmental expert organisation, it had close and official ties with the government (most notably the Ministry of Social
Affairs) and soon gained an established role in Finnish public policy, influential in several public policy areas, such as family welfare
and housing policy. The strong role but nevertheless non-govern109
Sophy Bergenheim
mental status of Väestöliitto makes it an interesting study subject
from the perspective of population policy, a central and multifaceted policy strand with marked nationalist features. In its population policy, Väestöliitto largely followed the population policy developed by the Swedish Social-Democrat couple Alva and Gunnar
Myrdal. However, Väestöliitto followed the Myrdalian model only
in form – the core ideology and rationale remained conservative
rather than progressive-reformist.
Research questions, material and methods
This article deals with the founding and first years of Väestöliitto;
the aim is to analyse how the actors behind Väestöliitto constructed population policy and its problems. The main focus is on the
founding phase 1940–41 and the following years 1942–43, during which the founders and actors of Väestöliitto diligently framed
population policy, its issues and its objectives. This will be complemented by a post-war follow-up, in order to form a more comprehensive picture of the population policy framing of Väestöliitto in
the 1940s.
I will approach this research problem through the following
research questions: What did Väestöliitto’s actors frame as the
main population policy objective in Finland? Respectively, what
did the actors of Väestöliitto define as the main population policy
problem? According to the organisation, who or what caused the
problem and why? What was perceived as the solution for these
problems, and, respectively, as the means for achieving the main
objective of population policy?
My primary source material consists of Väestöliitto’s archive material. I use Väestöliitto’s minute books with appendices and drafts
from 1940–43, the first official programme and rules of Väestöliit110
“The population question is, in short, a question of our people’s survival”
to from 1941, as well as annual reports and other printed material
directed at policy-makers, experts and the general public. The follow-up analysis is based on various published material from 1946,
with a similar broad target audience.
In my analysis, I draw upon a combination of methods. The
constructionist analysis of social problems, in accordance with
Malcolm Spector and John Kitsuse, problematises the problem nature of phenomena perceived as social problems. In other words,
it does not focus on social problems per se, but on the processes
through which phenomena are identified, defined and represented – i.e., constructed – as social problems and on the actors conducting these processes.2 Carol Bacchi’s WPR approach (What’s
the Problem Represented to be?) is a similar method of analysis. It
focuses on the way a phenomenon is represented, the actors’ presumptions, unproblematised aspects of the problem representation, and so forth.3 Following Spector and Kitsuse and Bacchi, I
will concentrate on similar focal points in order to analyse how
population policy and its problems were constructed.
As a systematic and structuring tool, I apply frame analysis, following Robert Benford and David Snow. Frames are sets of beliefs
and objectives through which actors interpret and label phenomena. Frame analysis, as defined by Benford and Snow, includes three
core tasks or stages of framing. ‘Diagnostic framing’ is the process
of identifying problems as well as the entities and causes the problems can be attributed to. ‘Prognostic framing’ entails finding solutions and strategies for solving problems. ‘Motivational framing’
serves as the final thrust for mobilisation, seeking either consensus
or action. In addition, framing has an interactive and discursive
feature, meaning that frames are defined or articulated as well as
amplified through specific discourses.4
111
Sophy Bergenheim
Population policy in Finland and Sweden
The Nordic countries share many characteristics in their population
and family policy development. Population policy, eugenics, public health and family policy have often been more or less the same
thing, and they have overlapped or intertwined with social policy
and social hygiene/medicine. Population and family policy as well
as public health were strongly influenced by race and degeneration
theories, which interlinked with nationalist ideas. The objective was
to study and cultivate the Nordic race, on the one hand, and control
and isolate the deviant and asocial, on the other. These objectives
translated into various positive and negative eugenic measures, such
as eugenic marriage legislation, sterilisations and mother contests.5
Many studies associate Finnish inter- and post-war population and
family policy, as well as its legacy in contemporary policies, with the
Swedish Social Democrat ‘power couple’ Alva and Gunnar Myrdal.6
Rightfully so, since Finnish experts and policy-makers explicitly referred to the Myrdals’ renowned population policy publication Kris i
befolkningsfrågan7, in which they promoted positive population policy: universal social and family policies that eased the economic and
social burden of child-rearing and thereby encouraged procreation.
These social policy reforms would ultimately raise productivity, as
quality of the population increased and the social costs of poverty,
unemployment and criminality decreased. In the Myrdalian vision,
the quality of the population was a public and national issue, and the
good of society preceded the good of the individual.8
Finland followed the Nordic development in several respects. It
did, for instance, adopt similar marriage and sterilisation laws in
1929 and 1935, respectively.9 However, Finland has a distinctively different political, cultural and social background compared to,
e.g., Sweden, which needs to be taken into account when analysing Finnish actors and developments. The Finnish development
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“The population question is, in short, a question of our people’s survival”
is marked by what I have labelled ‘underdog trauma’, rooted in its
history as an autonomous grand duchy under the Russian rule and
in neighbouring the powerful and hostile Soviet Union, against
which it fought in the Winter War (1939–40) and Continuation
War (1941–44) during the Second World War. In addition, immediately after Finland gained independence in 1917, it descended into a bitter civil war, in which the bourgeois White eventually
won over the socialist Red. The civil war left the Finnish society
with a deep class-based hostility and mistrust, which did not ease
until the 1940s.
These events have had a significant impact on the nation-building of Finland; one could say that nationalism has been particularly pronounced in the Finnish development. The so-called national
project dates to the nineteenth century, when the Finnish cultural
and political elite embarked on a nationalist and moral education
project. The goal was, in short, to civilise the Finnish people and
to strengthen the political and cultural status of Finland. After the
civil war, the classist feature of education was strengthened even
further, as the winning party sought to educate and control the
working class. This was mixed with eugenic ideologies, as the
working class was seen by some Whites as ‘degenerative material’.
Indeed, in interwar Finland, eugenic arguments served as tools for
class, gender and motherhood politics.10
Founding Väestöliitto: actors and context
19 November 1940, the Association of Finnish Culture and Identity took the initiative and invited Finnish social and health policy
associations to a consultation meeting on 9 December. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the prospect of founding an
umbrella organisation for associations engaged in population pol113
Sophy Bergenheim
icy.11 In a speech held at the Association of Finnish Culture and
Identity, V. J. Sukselainen noted how “the population question is
perhaps one of the most central issues regarding our nation’s survival” and how the time was fruitful for active population policy.12
As a result of the consultation meeting, a new association,
Väestöliitto, was founded on 14 February 1941. In addition to the
Association of Finnish Culture and Identity, the founding organisations consisted of 20 social and health policy organisations and
politically engaged associations (often with a nationalist stance),
for example Rising Finland, the Social Democratic Working
Women’s Association, the Social Policy Association in Finland,
the Finnish Society of Obstetrics and Gynaecology and General
Mannerheim League for Child Welfare. Sukselainen was elected as
the chair, and Aarno Turunen (Finnish Society of Obstetrics and
Gynaecology) and Elsa Enäjärvi-Haavio (Rising Finland) as vicechairs. The board also had two representatives of the Ministry of
Social Affairs, Niilo Mannio and Rakel Jalas. In 1943, Heikki von
Hertzen was appointed as the managing director of Väestöliitto.
The board members and managing director of Väestöliitto represented various fields of expertise. V.J. Sukselainen was a social scientist, trained in sociology and economics. He was also a politician: the
president of the centre-right Agrarian League (1945–64), one of the
biggest parties in Finland, Prime Minister (1957; 1959–61) and director general of the Social Insurance Institution (1954–71). Heikki von
Hertzen was legally trained with a background in the banking industry. Elsa Enäjärvi-Haavio and Rakel Jalas were both actively involved
in the association sector and women’s issues, and both were members
of the conservative National Coalition Party. Enäjärvi-Haavio was a
docent of folkloristics, and she was the prime figure behind Väestöliitto’s home aid activities. Jalas was a physician and psychiatrist, and
she was very involved in sexual education and family policy.
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“The population question is, in short, a question of our people’s survival”
Population policy was not a new topic. In the early twentieth
century, the neo-Malthusian discourse, fearing overpopulation,
was being challenged by a pronatalist discourse. In 1934, statistician Gunnar Modeen held a presentation at the Finnish Economic Association, in which he presented calculations predicting
a halt in Finnish population growth in the 1970s, which would
lead to serious economic difficulties.13 Also the Myrdals’ Kris i befolkningsfrågan (1934) attracted interest in Finland. In line with
these concerns, in 1937, the Finnish government appointed the
Population Policy Committee to address this development.14
Yet, according to Väestöliitto, the Finnish population policy discussion gained momentum only along the Second World War:
Not even the [Population Policy] Committee seized the
opportunity to wake our country into acknowledging
population policy issues. This task was performed by the
war. During the Winter War, the entire people of Finland was forced to note what the former Foreign Minister
Väinö Tanner crystallised in his radio speech on the day of
peace-making: “Our sole fault was that we were too few”.15
Framing the population crisis
The ‘population question’
The early minute books of Väestöliitto reveal meticulous diagnostic and prognostic framing. The core problem was constructed without hesitation, which was also reflected in the rhetorical
framing. The ‘population question’ formed a self-explanatory representation of Finland’s too small population as well as the looming halt in population growth and its consequences.
After the consultation meeting, the Central Commission on Pop115
Sophy Bergenheim
ulation Policy (hereinafter CCPP) was established as the governing
body until the official founding of the organisation. In December
1940, the CCPP sent a letter describing future activities to the Population Policy Committee and prospective member associations.
In your circles, as well as elsewhere in our country, you
surely have come to notice […] the startling fact: we are
too few.16
The sentence reflects the unproblematised views on the population
question. For one, Finnish people being “too few” was considered
a “fact”, and secondly, it holds the assumption that this fact was
generally acknowledged and accepted.
According to the same letter, the duty of the Finnish people
was to exploit the economic possibilities offered by the country,
to achieve a standard of living as high as possible, and from this
material basis cultivate a culture as developed as possible. The
letter presents statistical predictions that population growth will
come to a halt at four million around 1975. As a result, a threat
scenario is portrayed, in which Finland is occupied by other countries – i.e., the Soviet Union – and Finland, with such a
small population, is morally and physically incapable of defending itself.17 This was not an isolated and sporadic notion, but was
repeated and printed in Väestöliitto’s official programme.18
The factual nature of the population question is reaffirmed in the
above-mentioned letter. Firstly, it notes how it is a “self-evident truth
to every rational person” that a population of four million is incapable of gaining the production capital necessary for harnessing the
Finnish nature to serve man and culture. Secondly, it brings up how
“there are many among our people who are eager to refer to the economic difficulties the current generation is facing and who assume
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“The population question is, in short, a question of our people’s survival”
that a smaller population could live a better and more decent life”.
Such neo-Malthusian viewpoints are dismissed as false:
It must be made clear to them that poverty does not stem
from Finland having too large a population, and that unemployment in our country is not a result of an oversupply of workers. […] Poverty and unemployment are questions related to the economic organisation of the society,
not the size of the population.19
Väestöliitto’s official programme crystallises its alarmed nationalist and pronatalist perspective:
The population question in Finland is, in short, a question
of our people’s survival.20 [Original emphasis.]
The citizen as culprit
What, then, had led to the population question becoming an issue? Diagnostic framing consumed much of the CCPP’s time and
attention. The issues framed as the underlying reasons can be
roughly divided into two categories: the citizen as the culprit, and
society as the culprit (and the citizen as victim).
In his speech at the Association of Finnish Culture and Identity’s meeting in November 1940, Sukselainen shed some light on
the historical development:
[F]or a long time, people of more limited means have taken care of raising the future generations also for the part of
the wealthier. Now when they do not engage to the same
extent, it is essential to re-evaluate the situation. Every citizen must learn their responsibility in this sense.21
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Sophy Bergenheim
In other words, the reason behind the population question was
the citizens’ neglect of their reproductive duty, in particular the
wealthier individuals’. The ‘child limit’, i.e., voluntary refraining
from procreation, was perceived as a form of this neglect. The
CCPP admitted that raising a new citizen imposed an economical
strain on the caretaker. It was therefore possible for an individual
to raise their standard of living, i.e., to gain personal economic
advantage by refraining from child-rearing.
[I]t must be made clear that this is not to the advantage of
the national economy. For the part of the society, raising a
child is an investment in capital. It is a saving that starts to
grow interest as soon as the child engages in useful work
in the society. It is therefore clear that the rise in the standard of living that people have achieved by adhering to a
child limit and by neglecting to fulfil their part in maintaining the nation’s healthy growth, that advantage has
been achieved by hindering the economic development of
the society.22 [Original emphasis.]
The CCPP had formed divisions for preparing and organising certain tasks in regard to establishing the new organisation. One of
these divisions was the Public Health Division, which provided
the CCPP with a comprehensive experts’ report on the population
question and its underlying reasons from a medical point of view.
According to the report, it was necessary to focus on factors that
had an impact on birth rates (which should be increased) and death
rates (which should be lowered), in order to affect the development
of Finland’s population growth. The division outlined five factors
that had a negative effect on these objectives: a late marrying age,
childless (sterile) marriages, prevention of fertilisation, abortions,
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“The population question is, in short, a question of our people’s survival”
and maternal mortality and childbirth-related disabilities.23
According to the division, abortions were condemnable both
due to the deed itself, but also for the multiplicative effect, harming population growth. “Almost all” so-called criminal abortions
(i.e., medically induced miscarriage; abortions were illegal until
the Act on Induced Abortions in 195024) led to serious infections
that were difficult to cure and “very often” led to permanent sterility. This prevented new generations from being born – generations
that could have created yet new generations.25
Abortion and family planning developed into a central theme for
Väestöliitto in the 1940s–50s. It was tightly linked with normative
and eugenic conceptions of marriage, family and procreation. On
the one hand, Väestöliitto stressed how even single mothers should
be persuaded to keep their child rather than grant them an abortion – even though in general, Väestöliitto deemed sexual desire and
fertility control of single women as a ‘sexual problem’. On the other
hand, eugenic grounds for abortions were seen as a natural extension of the existing eugenic sterilisation and marriage legislation.26
According to the CCPP/Väestöliitto, the core factor behind the
population question was thus the reproductive duty of women of
fertile age. Any kind of deviation or neglect in this regard was perceived as individualistic and selfish, and therefore unpatriotic. The
rhetorical flipside of the coin was utilised as well, glorifying and
praising childbirth and -rearing:
Giving birth is the most valuable national service a woman can do for her country, and it is by no means effortless
or danger-free.27
Rakel Jalas used a similar wording in her book from 1941 dealing
with sexual health and family life:
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Sophy Bergenheim
Motherhood is the great task of the active years in a woman’s life. Other work is done only after she has fulfilled this
national duty.28
Representing reproduction as the civic duty of the mother had already been part of the Finnish Enlightenment and nation-building
project in the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century. Such
representations resurfaced strongly in the 1940s throughout the
Western world, as motherhood was stressed as the important and
primary duty of women.29 The Finnish word for national service, as
used by Väestöliitto and Jalas, refers explicitly to military service.
This created a pronounced nationalist analogy of the reproductive
woman as the female equivalent of the male soldier, performing
her national duty in defending her country.
The society as culprit and the citizen as victim
In this section, I will analyse the second causal category constructed by the CCPP, later reaffirmed by Väestöliitto in its programme,
among others. Namely, the diagnostic framing of the society as
culprit and citizen as victim.
According to Tim Knudsen and Bo Rothstein, Sweden and Denmark have attempted to unify or identify ‘state’, ‘society’ and ‘people’. Following Knudsen and Rothstein, Pauli Kettunen notes how
‘society’ in the Nordic countries refers first and foremost to the
moral relationship of the state to people and individuals, whereas
organisational forms linking together state and civil society come
secondary. The idea of a virtuous circle between economy, politics
and ethics, based on class compromise, can be seen as a constructive factor in the Nordic concept of society. The society is both a
subject and an actor, it has rights and duties, goals and values.30
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“The population question is, in short, a question of our people’s survival”
This largely reflects the views of Väestöliitto’s actors in the
1940s, with the exception that they also emphasised the organisational forms. In my source material, ‘society’ is used in an ambiguous sense. Depending on the context, it refers to a) the state, i.e.,
the public sector and government as a whole; b) the society in the
broad sense, encompassing both the state and other actors (e.g.,
employers) as well as societal structures; and/or c) the citizens as
a community, or the general public. In other words, ‘society’ and
‘individual’ or ‘citizen’ are not necessarily mutually exclusive: the
citizens as a community or the general public may victimise a specific sub-group of citizens.
A text by Heikki von Hertzen, in which he outlines the principles and practice of population policy,31 illustrates the blurred line
between the various forms of ‘society’ and its responsibilities. On
the one hand, he notes how the core reason behind the “population
problem” lies with the urbanisation of society, and how the state
has not realised its role in governing this change, thus distinguishing between ‘state’ and ‘society’. On the other hand, he attributes
the responsibility to the broader organisation of and atmosphere
in the society, thereby encompassing all aspects of ‘society’.
While Väestöliitto framed women who neglected their procreative duty as the main cause behind the population question, they
did not bear the blame all by themselves. The society was seen as
a partial culprit by not creating favourable conditions for them
to fulfil their duty, thereby victimising mothers and families. The
society had to do its part in lessening the economic burden of
child-rearing, so that economic hardships would not hinder couples from reproducing.
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Sophy Bergenheim
What is the relation between the standard of living between different individuals in the society, with or without
families? Does the society favour the former, or the latter[?] This is the core of the population question.32 [Original emphasis.]
[It] is essential to address the societal reforms that are necessary for providing each citizen the economic prerequisites, so that they can fulfil their duties in regard to future
generations and the economic and social well-being of
generations to come.33
Other societal actors played a role in the hardships of families as
well. As noted above, urbanisation was one of the core factors to
which the population question was attributed. Families and family
farms were less self-sufficient, work outside home was becoming
more commonplace, and children attended school for a longer period of time and therefore contributed less at home.34
The idea of the child limit was seen to be disseminated by the
general public; “uncomprehending” people had begun to portray
the child limit as a means for achieving a higher standard of living,
which had also translated to negative attitudes towards large families. “Everyone can now see the results in the current statistics.”35
This statement puts the blame on couples’ and mothers’ fellow citizens who had discouraged them from producing large families
and had lured them into seeking a higher standard of living by
refraining from reproduction.
The Public Health Division did not see the general public as the
sole factor to encourage child limits, but pointed the finger at the
state as well. In its experts’ report’s section on fertility control, it
notes how
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“The population question is, in short, a question of our people’s survival”
[t]he public, albeit silent, opinion seems to accept [contraception] as a means to control the family’s number of
children, and apparently even the society, primarily in order to prevent the more dangerous way for reducing the
number of children, criminal termination of pregnancy,
has somewhat given it its acceptance by establishing special consultation clinics that advise women, sometimes
even men, on how to prevent fertilisation.36
In addition to attributing the problem to the state as well as fellow
citizens, this statement reflects class-based conflicting viewpoints
– and the conservative nature of Väestöliitto. Whereas conservative and bourgeois women deemed contraception as selfish and
individualistic, left-wing women saw contraception as a means for
liberating working class women, burdened by constant childbirth
and violent and unhappy marriages, from both class and male oppression. The consultation clinic refers to the contraceptive consultation clinic in Helsinki, which was established in 1935 following the initiative of female left-wing city councillors. The clinic’s
doctors, however, delimited consultation to married women and
imposed strict criteria based on “medical indications”, to which
only few qualified. As a result, the clinic was closed in 1936.37
Childbirth-related health risks and maternal care in general was
another aspect where the society should support and protect its
citizens. The Public Health Division, for instance, stated that “it is
a matter of honour for each country to take as good care as possible of birth-giving mothers and to make childbirth as safe as possible through all usable means”.38
In short, Väestöliitto constructed four main external factors that
prevented citizens (i.e., women) from fulfilling their reproductive
duties: economic challenges, the child limit, hostile attitudes to123
Sophy Bergenheim
wards large families and early marriages, and health risks. The first
three were closely linked, since both economic challenges and general attitudes encouraged families to adhere to a child limit. All three
aspects of society played a part in sustaining these three factors.
Health risks, on the other hand, were seen as being only within the
sphere of the state. It did not provide adequate facilities (hospitals,
maternal care) in order to make pregnancy and childbirth as safe as
possible, and thereby neglected its important duty towards its citizens. All of these factors rendered (prospective) mothers victims of
circumstance – even though women were simultaneously seen as
the main cause behind the population question.
Addressing the population question
Mission: Elevating the number and quality of the population
In order to change the looming population development and to
hinder the population question from materialising, the CCPP/
Väestöliitto saw that there was only one solution: to elevate the
number and quality of the population. This section, in other words,
reflects the prognostic framing of Väestöliitto.
In its official rules from 1941, Väestöliitto states that its purpose
was to
spread information on the importance of the number and
quality of the population both for the nation’s existence as
well as its material and spiritual development, to follow,
in that sense, the development of Finland’s population,
and to affect, through awareness-raising education and by
furthering necessary societal reforms, the growth of the
population and the improvement of the population’s living conditions.39
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“The population question is, in short, a question of our people’s survival”
According to the CCPP, poverty and unemployment could not be
addressed through population control, but only through population growth. In order for Finland to offer its population the best
livelihood possible, production must increase, and the increase of
production can only be achieved through larger new generations.40
Similarly to the Myrdalian view, population growth was perceived
as a virtuous circle: the more people, the more production and
workplaces, and therefore also higher living standards. Higher living standards, for their part, removed obstacles for child-rearing,
and new citizens eventually meant yet an increase in production,
and so forth.
The ideal number of children per family was set at “at least six” –
four was defined as the “normal family” that society had the right
to demand its members to produce and maintain by themselves.41
This would elevate the population from four million to six million,
although the long-term goal was implied to be doubling the population, i.e., to eight million.42
The quality question was an issue that also the Ministry of Social
Affairs pushed Väestöliitto to focus on. Referring to the elevation of
the population’s quality, the Ministry emphasised the “social side of
population policy”. This, in turn, referred to improving living conditions and other conditions that should “meet satisfactory social requirements”.43 ‘Quality’ thus encompassed a broad gamut of themes,
many of which fell under the Myrdalian ‘positive population policy’:
improving standards of living in terms of housing, hygiene and economic situation, combatting infant mortality and childbirth- and
maternity-related health risks through prenatal, maternal and child
care, as well as improving public health in general. ‘Quality’ also referred to the improved composition of the society, as the upper socioeconomic classes performed their reproductive duty.
Negative eugenics was also a central feature in the quality objectives
125
Sophy Bergenheim
of Väestöliitto. The organisation was explicitly in favour of eugenic
compulsory sterilisation and abortion as well as the eugenic marriage
law, in order to protect the population from degenerative material.
Similarly, its conceptions of ‘people’, ‘population’ and ‘public health’ (in
Finnish, literally ‘people’s health’) included marked inclusive and exclusive features, which were linked with this eugenic understanding.44
According to the Public Health Division, compulsory sterilisation was
a measure through which the society limits or prevents
people from reproducing who have such criminal characteristics or illnesses which would, if inherited, render
their descendants as asocial, dependant individuals. Sterilisation, in other words, is used for improving the race.45
The Sterilisation Act of 1935 was deemed “a complete failure”, as
it had had “no social impact whatsoever”. The division favoured a
new sterilisation law, since “a properly implemented sterilisation
policy has a positive effect on the composition of the society”, even
if it naturally had a small negative impact on birth rates.46 Reforming the Sterilisation Act became one of Väestöliitto’s main objectives, particularly of Aarno Turunen, professor of obstetrics and
gynaecology, who drafted a letter for the Ministry of Social Affairs
with detailed reform suggestions.47 The form in 1950 did indeed
emphasise the eugenic qualities of the legislation, which led to a
peak in compulsory sterilisations in 1956–63.48
To conclude, the grand mission of Väestöliitto was to elevate the
number and quality of the population. Population growth was to
serve the national economy and improve the nation’s defensive position in its geopolitically challenging situation and location. Elevating the population’s quality referred to improving public health
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“The population question is, in short, a question of our people’s survival”
in its various forms, which entailed marked exclusive features and
negative eugenics as well.
Achieving these objectives required action on two fronts: education and knowledge production, and furthering and participating in
policy-making, which will be scrutinised in the following section.
Education and knowledge production
The Finnish word for ‘education’ (valistus) used by Väestöliitto
does not have an exact equivalent in English. It refers to awareness-raising as well as communication and distribution of knowledge (i.e., propaganda, as it was called at the time), and the same
word also refers to (E/e)nlightenment. However, it does not have a
dual meaning of education in the sense of school education.
In this article, ‘education’ is to be understood as raising the Finnish people’s awareness and to distribute knowledge regarding different aspects of the population question. This was a concrete form of
Väestöliitto’s own motivational framing – i.e., what the organisation
itself should do in order to further a healthy population policy. The
objectives of this work can be coarsely divided into two categories:
firstly, affecting the public opinion, and secondly, increasing the
general public’s knowledge on population policy matters.
One of Väestöliitto’s goals was to change the general atmosphere
so that the reproductive duty would be internalised as a general
norm. This was explicitly expressed in Väestöliitto’s programme:
The most important task of population policy education is
to remove the ideological conditions that allow the child
limit idea to spread. We have to achieve a change of mind
in regard to the home, children and the family, ‘a new
world view’ on these matters.49
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Sophy Bergenheim
This topic had, of course, already been raised during the preparatory stage. For instance, a newspaper report after the consultation
meeting read: “We have to stand up and fight against false prejudices and general misconceptions.”50 A letter describing future
activities noted how “the public opinion must be changed to understand that child-rearing is not, in the current conditions, a private matter, but a duty towards the nation and society.”51 This duty
aspect was reaffirmed in a draft for the short version of Väestöliitto’s programme, which calls for “making every healthy individual
understand their responsibility as procreators and securers of the
nation’s future”.52 Note the phrasing ‘every healthy individual’, referring to the quality aspect of population policy.
Population policy-related knowledge that Väestöliitto sought to
spread dealt with diverse themes. For example, the Public Health
Division saw that many pregnancies were terminated on dubious
grounds, since women were simply unaware of the dangers of the
procedure. This could be avoided through education.53 In the draft
for the short version of Väestöliitto’s programme, “in order to increase the number and elevate the quality of the population”, the
federation saw necessary to “give every citizen a basic education
in healthy sexual behaviour”. This basic education was to raise
children and young people into a “healthy and societally positive
direction”.54 This education aimed at raising healthy, reproductive
and child-rearing generations.
The population question in post-war Finland
Birth rates increased already during the war, and in 1945, the
baby boom was underway. This dampened the alarmed nature of
Väestöliitto’s pronatalism and transformed it into a family-positive focus. The main objective of Väestöliitto was to create a fam128
“The population question is, in short, a question of our people’s survival”
ily-friendly society both on the level of the state and individuals.
Or, as it formulated in an educational booklet directed at the general public:
We do not want ‘propaganda children’ in a society that is
unkind to them, nor in loveless homes in which they are
not cherished!55
The main objective of increasing the population remained unchanged, however. In Väestöliitto’s first annals56, published in late
1946, V. J. Sukselainen outlined the main tasks of population policy in post-war Finland. He emphasised how Finland differs from
Sweden in that the objective was to increase the size of the population, not merely maintain it at existing level. In this task, he
stressed the citizens’ responsibility – reproduction was still explicitly referred to as a civil duty. In particular, Sukselainen frowned
upon the better-off who neglected their responsibilities. Yet, citizens were still not the only one who bore duties: Sukselainen also
highlighted how the state and society had to provide social and
economic safety for families with children.57 He again brought up
the issue of how the economic burden of child-rearing should be
distributed more evenly among all taxpayers – a topic both he58
and Väestöliitto59 published about in 1950, as well as proposed a
reform bill as Member of Parliament, supported by Rakel Jalas,
among others.60
Throughout the 1940s, Väestöliitto framed urbanisation and
industrialisation as detrimental for population development. City
life was portrayed as unhealthy, cramped and detrimental to morals, and waged work in all its precariousness created an unstable
and discouraging environment for reproduction and family life.
This view was present the first annals of Väestöliitto, but a pro129
Sophy Bergenheim
nounced expression of this framing was presented in Homes or
Barracks for Children61, a housing policy booklet commissioned by
Väestöliitto and written by Heikki von Hertzen. Finland suffered
from a severe housing shortage resulting from the baby boom and
the war, in which the Soviet Union annexed large areas in Karelia and Northern Finland, leaving Finland with 400,000 evacuees
in need of settlement. Not surprisingly, housing policy – ensuring
good homes and living environments – soon developed into one
of the core foci of Väestöliitto.62
To summarise, the diagnostic and prognostic framing of
Väestöliitto remained intact during its first years, through the war
and in the post-war situation. The organisation was still markedly
pronatalist, and reproduction was still understood as a civil duty.
Respectively, the society had the responsibility of providing a family-friendly environment and eliminate all factors that discouraged procreation.
Conclusions: Productive population policy
During the nineteenth and twentieth century, interventionist
population policy and family policy have evolved in the Western
world from the idea of protection to the idea of production. Traditionally, bourgeois ideology has not favoured state or other public
intervention (cf. private, individual freedom). However, as Ritva
Nätkin has formulated, intervention became acceptable when it
was framed as protection. Who was protected, and from what, varied according to time and place. In terms of maternity protection,
women have been protected from, among others, the harms of
working life, industrialism and urban environments, decaying civilisation and morals, uncontrollable male sexual drive, and their
own unpredictable self (the so-called biology of the female body).63
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“The population question is, in short, a question of our people’s survival”
Finland itself has also been framed to require protection from
various threats, which has shaped the Finnish nation-building
process and given Finnish population and family policy a pronounced nationalist stance. In the nineteenth and early twentieth
century, Finland needed political and cultural protection from
Czarist Russia, which entailed cultivating the Finnish people and
civilisation. After the civil war, in the 1920s–30s, the perspective
of the winning party prevailed. The Finnish civilisation, race and
people needed to be protected from degeneration, and the threat
comprised of the Reds, the working class in general, as well as the
poor, delinquents and the hereditarily ill. This idea translated into
eugenic legislation, among others. In the 1940s, the Finnish nation
needed to be protected against the Soviet Union.
According to Ilpo Helén, in the 1930s–40s, the attempt to subject
the family under the bourgeois-national discipline transformed
from protection to a matter of organising the family to serve the
nation. The family became a population production unit, a reproductive factory. The people itself formed the core of the national
project, and the state adopted the role as the organ treasuring, calculating and effectivising the nation’s life force and life processes.64
Alberto Spektorowski and Elisabet Mizrachi have analysed
Myrdalian Social Democratic population policy and its rationale
for eugenics and sterilisation. They apply the concept of welfare
eugenics, which refers to an ideology that stems from and promotes welfare reforms, but also focuses on productive elements.
Due to the high cost of social reform, membership of or exclusion
from the community was not based on race, but on the productive
quality of the individual. Non-productive elements had to be defined and controlled; they were not denied social welfare, but their
right to procreate.65
In her reading of Alva Myrdal’s sociological contribution, Hed131
Sophy Bergenheim
vig Ekerwald concludes that Myrdal reframed the family, traditionally considered private and a conservative trope, and used
it for feminist and emancipatory purposes. As Ekerwald puts it,
Myrdal sought to make the private public. Rather than addressing
low fertility as a biological and private matter, Alva and Gunnar
Myrdal sought to address it through positive population policy,
which focused on the social and economic reasons behind low
population growth. Moreover, the Myrdals endorsed birth control: when families could control pregnancies, it would lead to a
positive attitude towards reproduction. Alva Myrdal also advocated working women’s right to marry and have children. According
to her, social and economic responsibilities and rights should be
the same for men and women. The economic burden of children
should also be borne by the entire society, not only families with
children. Following this ideology, the Myrdals also rejected the
conservative degeneration fears associated with the reproduction
of poor people.66
Väestöliitto largely adopted the framework of the Myrdalian
positive and productive population policy. The representatives
of the organisation indeed viewed family and reproduction as a
public, national issue. They promoted various social and economic means for making procreation more attractive – also for poor
families. Väestöliitto also became a pioneer in researching and
developing contraceptives for married women, precisely with the
rationale that birth control promoted marital happiness and thereby also positive attitudes towards reproduction. Väestöliitto also
embraced the Myrdalian notion that the good of the community
prevailed over the individual, and that population policy should
seek to foster productive citizens.
However, the difference between the Myrdals and the actors of
Väestöliitto was their core ideology. Whereas the Myrdals promot132
“The population question is, in short, a question of our people’s survival”
ed statist intervention for furthering progressive social reform,
Väestöliitto utilised a modern framing for solidifying conservative,
traditional values. It held tightly on to the bourgeois nuclear family model: it represented motherhood as the most important duty
of the woman, and respectively, advocated the male breadwinner
model. These goals were furthered, e.g., through family taxation,
child benefits and family-friendly housing, which would make the
housewife model economically possible and socially attractive.
The conservative perspective of Väestöliitto is connected with
the ‘underdog trauma’. Väestöliitto constructed elevating the number and quality of the population as a geopolitical matter of life and
death: the nation would not survive without a large, productive
people. The ‘population question’ was, in other words, an attempt
to politicise and depoliticise population policy. On the one hand,
Väestöliitto questioned the prevailing situation and discourse and
sought to initiate action; on the other, it framed the population
question as inevitable and represented its own solutions as the
only option.67
The population policy framing of Väestöliitto linked nationalism and pronatalism intrinsically together. The ultimate goal was,
as said, to increase the number and improve the quality of the population, and the prospect of a deviating development (i.e., a declining and degenerating population) was framed as a problem, the
‘population question’. In its diagnostic and prognostic framing, reproduction was perceived as a civic duty – something society had
the right to demand from its members. Respectively, neglecting
this duty was seen as a breach against the nation itself. However,
individuals were seen as a part of the society, and all parties involved played a role in the development, be it in causing the ‘population question’ or in solving it. The productive people, the society
and the nation were one and the same.
133
Sophy Bergenheim
References
Sources
Unprinted sources
Minute books 1940–47. Archive of Väestöliitto.
Printed sources
von Hertzen, Heikki. Väestökysymyksemme periaatteessa ja käytännössä. Vaasa: Oy Ilkan kirjapaino, 1942.
von Hertzen, Heikki. Koti vaiko kasarmi lapsillemme. Helsinki:
WSOY, 1946.
Jalas, Rakel. Sukuelämä terveeksi. Porvoo & Helsinki: WSOY, 1941.
Nieminen, Armas. “Viisi vuotta toimintaa terveen väestönkehityksen sekä kodin, perheen ja lasten yhteiskunnan hyväksi”. In
Väestöpolitiikkamme taustaa ja tehtäviä. Väestöliiton vuosikirja
I, by Väestöliitto, 86–115. Porvoo & Helsinki: WSOY, 1946.
Sukselainen, V. J. “Jälleenrakennnuskauden väestöpoliittiset tehtävät”. In Väestöpolitiikkamme taustaa ja tehtäviä. Väestöliiton
vuosikirja I, by Väestöliitto, 7–18. Porvoo & Helsinki: WSOY,
1946.
Sukselainen, V. J. Perhekustannusten tasaaminen. Porvoo & Helsinki: WSOY, 1950.
Väestöliitto. Väestöliitto 1941. Ohjelma. Säännöt. Helsinki:
Väestöliitto, 1942.
Väestöliitto. Toimintakertomus 1942. Helsinki: Väestöliitto, 1943.
Väestöliitto. Toimintakertomus 1943. Helsinki: Väestöliitto, 1944.
Väestöliitto. Kodin, perheen ja lasten yhteiskunta. Kansalaistietoa
väestökysymyksestä. Helsinki: Väestöliitto, 1946.
Väestöliitto. Väestöpolitiikkamme taustaa ja tehtäviä. Väestöliiton
vuosikirja I. Porvoo & Helsinki: WSOY, 1946.
Väestöliitto. Epäoikeudenmukaisuudet fyysillisten henkilöiden
verotuksessa korjattava. Helsinki: Painoteollisuus Oy, 1950.
134
“The population question is, in short, a question of our people’s survival”
Legislation
Marriage Act 234/1929.
Sterilisation Act 227/1935.
Decree on Sterilisation 228/1935.
Act on Induced Abortion 82/1950.
Literature
Bacchi, Carol. Analysing Policy: What’s the Problem Represented to
Be? Frenchs Forest: Pearson, 2009.
Benford, Robert D. and David A. Snow. “Framing processes and
social movements: An overview and assessment”. Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000): 611–639.
Bergenheim, Sophy. “From pronatalism to salvaging relationships:
The Finnish Population and Family Welfare League’s conceptions of marriage and divorce, 1951–1988”. Scandinavian Journal of History 42:5 (2017): 1–20. Electronic publication ahead of
print, doi: 10.1080/03468755.2016.1261444.
Bergenheim, Sophy. “Cherishing the health of the folk: Finnish
non-governmental expert organisations as constructors of public health and the ‘people’”. In Conceptualising Public Health.
Historical and Contemporary Struggles over Key Concepts, edited by Johannes Kananen, Sophy Bergenheim and Merle Wessel,
London & New York: Routledge, forthcoming.
Bergenheim, Sophy. “From barracks to garden cities. The Finnish Population and Family Welfare League as a housing policy expert in the 1940s and 1950s”. Science & Technology Studies
(forthcoming).
Ekerwald, Hedvig. “Alva Myrdal: Making the private public”. Acta
Sociologica 43:1 (2000): 333–352.
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Forssén, Katja. Children, Families and the Welfare State. Studies on
the Outcomes of the Finnish Family Policy, National Research and
Development Centre for Welfare and Health 92. Helsinki: Stakes,
1998.
Helén, Ilpo. Äidin elämän politiikka. Naissukupuolisuus, valta ja itsesuhde Suomessa 1880-luvulta 1960-luvulle. Helsinki:
Gaudeamus, 1997.
Hietala, Marjatta. “Eugenics and reform of the Marriage Law in
Finland”. In The Nordic Model of Marriage and the Welfare State,
edited by Kari Melby, Anu Pylkkänen, Bente Rosenbeck and
Christina Carlsson Wetterberg, 159–181. Copenhagen: Nordic
Council of Ministers, 2001.
Hietala, Marjatta. “From race hygiene to sterilization: The eugenics movement in Finland”. In Eugenics and the Welfare state.
Sterilization Policy in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland,
edited by Gunnar Broberg and Nils Roll-Hansen, 195–258. East
Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2005.
Hiilamo, Heikki, and Olli Kangas. “Trap for women or freedom
to choose? The struggle over cash for child care schemes in
Finland and Sweden”. Journal of Social Policy 38:3 (2009): 457–
475.
Kangas, Olli. “Lapsilisät: tuotantopalkkio vai kustannusten tasaus?”.
In Eduskunta hyvinvointivaltion rakentajana, by Tapani Paavonen
and Olli Kangas, 290–312. Helsinki: Edita, 2006.
Kettunen, Pauli. “The society of virtuous circles”. In Models, Modernity and the Myrdals, edited by Pauli Kettunen and Hanna
Eskola, 153–173. Helsinki: University of Helsinki, 1997.
Kettunen, Pauli. Globalisaatio ja kansallinen me. Kansallisen katseen historiallinen kritiikki. Tampere: Vastapaino, 2008.
Lin Ka and Minna Rantalaiho. “Family policy and social order –
comparing the dynamics of family policy-making in Scandi136
“The population question is, in short, a question of our people’s survival”
navia and Confucian Asia”. International Journal of Social Welfare 12:1 (2003): 2–13.
Lundqvist, Åsa. “Family policy between science and politics”. In
Gender Equality and Welfare Politics in Scandinavia: The Limits
of Political Ambition?, edited by Kari Melby, Anna-Birte Ravn
and Christina Carlsson Wetterberg, 85–100. Bristol: Policy
Press, 2008.
Malinen, Antti. Perheet ahtaalla. Asuntopula ja siihen sopeutuminen toisen maailmansodan jälkeisessä Helsingissä 1944–1948.
Helsinki: Väestöliitto, 2014.
Mattila, Markku. Kansamme parhaaksi: rotuhygienia Suomessa
vuoden 1935 sterilointilakiin asti. Helsinki: Suomen historiallinen seura, 1999.
Melby, Kari, Anu Pylkkänen, Bente Rosenbeck, and Christina
Carlsson Wetterberg. “The Nordic model of marriage”. Women’s
History Review 15:4 (2006): 651–661.
Melby, Kari, Anna-Birte Ravn, Bente Rosenbeck, and Christina
Carlsson Wetterberg. “What is Nordic in the Nordic gender
model?”. In Beyond Welfare State Models. Transnational Historical Perspectives on Social Policy, edited by Pauli Kettunen and
Klaus Petersen, 147–169. Cheltenham, UK / Northampton, MA,
USA: Edward Elgar, 2011.
Michel, Sonya. “Moving targets: Towards a framework for studying family policies and welfare states”. In Beyond Welfare State
Models. Transnational Historical Perspectives on Social Policy,
edited by Pauli Kettunen and Klaus Petersen, 119–146. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011.
Myrdal, Alva, and Gunnar Myrdal. Kris i befolkningsfrågan. Second edition, reprint. Stockholm: Bokförlaget Nya Doxa, [1934]
1997.
137
Sophy Bergenheim
Nätkin, Ritva. Kamppailu suomalaisesta äitiydestä. Maternalismi,
väestöpolitiikka ja naisten kertomukset. Helsinki: Gaudeamus,
1997.
Palomäki, Antti. Juoksuhaudoista jälleenrakennukseen. Siirtoväen
ja rintamamiesten asutus- ja asuntokysymyksen järjestäminen
kaupungeissa 1940–1960 ja sen käänteentekevä vaikutus asuntopolitiikkaan ja kaupunkirakentamiseen. Tampere: Tampere
University Press, 2011.
Spector, Malcolm, and John I. Kitsuse. Constructing Social Problems. New Brunswick & London: Transaction Publishers, [2001]
2009.
Spektorowski, Alberto, and Elisabet Mizrachi. “Eugenics and the
welfare state in Sweden: The politics of social margins and the
idea of a productive society”. Journal of Contemporary History 39:3 (2004): 333–352.
Teitelbaum, Michael, and Jay Winter. The Fear of Population Decline. San Diego: Academic Press, 1985.
NOTES
1
2
3
4
5
Michael Teitelbaum and Jay Winter, The Fear of Population Decline (San Diego:
Academic Press, 1985), 47.
Malcolm Spector and John I. Kitsuse, Constructing Social Problems (New Brunswick & London: Transaction Publishers, [2001] 2009).
Carol Bacchi, Analysing Policy: What’s the Problem Represented to Be? (Frenchs
Forest: Pearson, 2009).
Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing processes and social movements:
An overview and assessment”, Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000): 611–639.
For more detailed accounts of Nordic and Finnish eugenics and family policy, see,
e.g., Kari Melby et al., “The Nordic model of marriage”, Women’s History Review
15:4 (2006): 651–661; Kari Melby et al., “What is Nordic in the Nordic gender
model?”, in Beyond Welfare State Models. Transnational Historical Perspectives on
Social Policy, ed. Pauli Kettunen and Klaus Petersen (Cheltenham, UK / Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, 2011), 147–169; Marjatta Hietala, “Eugenics
138
“The population question is, in short, a question of our people’s survival”
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
and reform of the Marriage Law in Finland”, in The Nordic Model of Marriage and
the Welfare State, ed. Kari Melby et al. (Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers, 2001), 159–181; Marjatta Hietala, “From race hygiene to sterilization. The
eugenics movement in Finland”, in Eugenics and the Welfare state. Sterilization
Policy in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland, ed. Gunnar Broberg and Nils
Roll-Hansen (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2005), 195–258; Åsa
Lundqvist, “Family policy between science and politics”, in Gender Equality and
Welfare Politics in Scandinavia: The Limits of Political Ambition?, ed. Kari Melby et
al. (Bristol: Policy Press, 2008), 85–100.
See, e.g., Ka Lin and Minna Rantalaiho, “Family policy and social order – comparing the dynamics of family policy-making in Scandinavia and Confucian Asia”,
International Journal of Social Welfare 12: 1 (2003): 2–13; Katja Forssén, Children,
Families and the Welfare State: Studies on the Outcomes of the Finnish Family Policy
(Helsinki: Stakes, 1998), 23–25; Heikki Hiilamo and Olli Kangas, “Trap for women or freedom to choose? The struggle over cash for child care schemes in Finland
and Sweden”, Journal of Social Policy 38:3 (2009): 457–475.
Alva Myrdal and Gunnar Myrdal, Kris i befolkningsfrågan (Stockholm: Bokförlaget Nya Doxa, [1934] 1997).
Alberto Spektorowski and Elisabet Mizrachi, “Eugenics and the welfare state in
Sweden: The politics of social margins and the idea of a productive society”, Journal of Contemporary History 39:3 (2004): 344.
Marriage Act 234/1929; Sterilisation Act 227/1935; Decree on Sterilisation
228/1935.
Ritva Nätkin, Kamppailu suomalaisesta äitiydestä. Maternalismi, väestöpolitiikka
ja naisten kertomukset (Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 1997); Ilpo Helén, Äidin elämän
politiikka. Naissukupuolisuus, valta ja itsesuhde Suomessa 1880-luvulta 1960-luvulle (Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 1997). In addition, language played a crucial role in
Finnish racial hygiene, as the Finland-Swedish elite were among its strongest proponents; see, e.g., Markku Mattila, Kansamme parhaaksi: rotuhygienia Suomessa
vuoden 1935 sterilointilakiin asti (Helsinki: Suomen historiallinen seura, 1999).
Minutes dated 9 Dec 1940 (consultation meeting). Appendix A (dated 19 Nov
1940): Letter sent by the Association of Finnish Culture and Identity to Finnish
social and health policy associations regarding collaboration in population policy
issues. Archive of Väestöliitto.
Minutes dated 9 Dec 1940, Appendix A.
Olli Kangas, “Lapsilisät: tuotantopalkkio vai kustannusten tasaus?”, in Eduskunta
hyvinvointivaltion rakentajana, by Tapani Paavonen and Olli Kangas (Helsinki:
Edita, 2006), 291.
139
Sophy Bergenheim
14 Kangas, “Lapsilisät”, 291.
15 Väestöliitto, Väestöliitto 1941. Ohjelma. Säännöt (Helsinki: Väestöliitto, 1942), 1.
16 Minutes dated 18 Dec 1940 (meeting of the Central Commission on Population
Policy). Appendix A1 (dated 20 Dec 1940 (sic)): Letter describing future activities.
Archive of Väestöliitto.
17 Minutes dated 18 Dec 1940, Appendix A1.
18 Väestöliitto, Väestöliitto 1941, 18.
19 Minutes dated 18 Dec 1940, Appendix A1.
20 Väestöliitto, Väestöliitto 1941, 18.
21 Minutes dated 9 Dec 1940, Appendix A.
22 Minutes dated 18 Dec 1940, Appendix A1.
23 Minutes dated 8 Jan 1941 (meeting of the Central Commission on Population
Policy). Appendix C: Experts’ report of the Public Health Division to the CCPP.
Archive of Väestöliitto.
24 Act on Induced Abortion 82/1950.
25 Minutes dated 8 Jan 1941, Appendix C.
26 Helén, Äidin elämän politiikka, 35–43, 223–257; Sophy Bergenheim, “From pronatalism to salvaging relationships. The Finnish Population and Family Welfare
League’s conceptions of marriage and divorce, 1951–1988”, Scandinavian Journal
of History 42:5 (2017): 8–10.
27 Minutes dated 8 Jan 1941, Appendix C.
28 Rakel Jalas, Sukuelämä terveeksi (Porvoo & Helsinki: WSOY, 1941), 42.
29 Nätkin, Kamppailu suomalaisesta äitiydestä, 74–75; Helén, Äidin elämän politiikka, 217; Sonya Michel, “Moving targets: Towards a framework for studying family
policies and welfare states”, in Beyond Welfare State Models. Transnational Historical Perspectives on Social Policy, ed. Pauli Kettunen and Klaus Petersen (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), 133.
30 Pauli Kettunen, “The society of virtuous circles”, in Models, Modernity and the
Myrdals, ed. Pauli Kettunen and Hanna Eskola (Helsinki: University of Helsinki,
1997), 158–159.
31 Heikki von Hertzen, Väestökysymyksemme periaatteessa ja käytännössä (Vaasa:
Oy Ilkan kirjapaino, 1942).
32 Minutes dated 9 Dec 1940, Appendix A.
33 Minutes dated 9 Dec 1940, Appendix A.
34 Minutes dated 12 Dec 1941 (board meeting). Appendix 2: 2: Letter to the Ministry
of Social Affairs. Archive of Väestöliitto; von Hertzen, Väestökysymyksemme.
140
“The population question is, in short, a question of our people’s survival”
35 Minutes dated 9 Dec 1940 (consultation meeting). Appendix B: Newspaper report
10 Dec 1940 (based on V. J. Sukselainen’s speech at the consultation meeting).
Archive of Väestöliitto.
36 Minutes dated 8 Jan 1941, Appendix C.
37 Helén, Äidin elämän politiikka, 220–222.
38 Minutes dated 8 Jan 1941, Appendix C.
39 Väestöliitto, Väestöliitto 1941, 29.
40 Minutes dated 18 Dec 1940, Appendix A1.
41 Väestöliitto, Väestöliitto 1941, 18–19.
42 Väestöliitto, Väestöliitto 1941, 18–19; von Hertzen, Väestökysymyksemme.
43 Minutes dated 14 Feb 1941 (Väestöliitto’s founding meeting). Appendix: Letter
from the Ministry of Social Affairs (dated 11 Feb 1941). Archive of Väestöliitto.
44 For more on this topic, see Sophy Bergenheim, “Cherishing the health of the folk.
Finnish non-governmental expert organisations as constructors of public health
and the ‘people’”, in Conceptualising Public Health. Historical and Contemporary
Struggles over Key Concepts, ed. Johannes Kananen et al. (London & New York:
Routledge, forthcoming).
45 Minutes dated 8 Jan 1941, Appendix C.
46 Minutes dated 8 Jan 1941, Appendix C.
47 Armas Nieminen, “Viisi vuotta toimintaa terveen väestönkehityksen sekä kodin,
perheen ja lasten yhteiskunnan hyväksi”, in Väestöpolitiikkamme taustaa ja tehtäviä. Väestöliiton vuosikirja I, by Väestöliitto (Porvoo & Helsinki: WSOY, 1946),
110–111.
48 Mattila, Kansamme parhaaksi, 337.
49 Väestöliitto, Väestöliitto 1941, 19–20.
50 Minutes dated 9 Dec 1940, Appendix B.
51 Minutes dated 18 Dec 1940, Appendix A1.
52 Minutes dated 4 Apr 1941 (board meeting). Appendix: Väestöliitto’s programme
(draft). Archive of Väestöliitto.
53 Minutes dated 8 Jan 1941, Appendix C.
54 Minutes dated 4 Apr 1941, Appendix.
55 Väestöliitto, Kodin, perheen ja lasten yhteiskunta. Kansalaistietoa väestökysymyksestä (Helsinki: Väestöliitto, 1946), 3.
56 Väestöliitto, Väestöpolitiikkamme taustaa ja tehtäviä. Väestöliiton vuosikirja I
(Porvoo & Helsinki: WSOY, 1946).
57 V. J. Sukselainen, “Jälleenrakennnuskauden väestöpoliittiset tehtävät”, in
Väestöpolitiikkamme taustaa ja tehtäviä. Väestöliiton vuosikirja I, by Väestöliitto
(Porvoo & Helsinki: WSOY, 1946), 7–18.
141
Sophy Bergenheim
58 V. J. Sukselainen, Perhekustannusten tasaaminen (Porvoo & Helsinki: WSOY,
1950).
59 Väestöliitto, Epäoikeudenmukaisuudet fyysillisten henkilöiden verotuksessa korjattava (Helsinki: Painoteollisuus Oy, 1950).
60 Väestöliitto, Epäoikeudenmukaisuudet.
61 Heikki von Hertzen, Koti vaiko kasarmi lapsillemme (Helsinki: WSOY, 1946).
62 For more on this topic, see Sophy Bergenheim, “From barracks to garden cities.
The Finnish Population and Family Welfare League as a housing policy expert
in the 1940s and 1950s”, Science & Technology Studies (forthcoming); Antti Malinen, Perheet ahtaalla. Asuntopula ja siihen sopeutuminen toisen maailmansodan
jälkeisessä Helsingissä 1944–1948 (Helsinki: Väestöliitto, 2014); Antti Palomäki,
Juoksuhaudoista jälleenrakennukseen. Siirtoväen ja rintamamiesten asutus- ja
asuntokysymyksen järjestäminen kaupungeissa 1940–1960 ja sen käänteentekevä
vaikutus asuntopolitiikkaan ja kaupunkirakentamiseen (Tampere: Tampere University Press, 2011).
63 Nätkin, Kamppailu suomalaisesta äitiydestä, 53–55; Spektorowski and Mizrachi,
“Eugenics and the welfare state in Sweden”, 338.
64 Helén, Äidin elämän politiikka, 204–211.
65 Spektorowski and Mizrachi, “Eugenics and the welfare state in Sweden”.
66 Hedvig Ekerwald, “Alva Myrdal: Making the private public”, Acta Sociologica 43:1
(2000): 333–352.
67 Definitions for (de)politicisation derived from Pauli Kettunen, Globalisaatio ja
kansallinen me. Kansallisen katseen historiallinen kritiikki (Tampere: Vastapaino,
2008), 68.
142
Campaign Country Going Green?
Danish Government Campaigns for Saving
Energy and the Rise of Environmental
Concern, c. 1973-1995
Bo Poulsen
Introduction
Internationally, and not least nationally, Denmark is often put forward as a country at the forefront of environmental awareness,
energy savings, and the transition towards a cleaner pattern of energy consumption.1 Even critical voices like Danish Greenpeace
echoes the view of Denmark as a “frontrunner in energy transition”, and in 2013 the World Wildlife Fund presented the state of
Denmark with their ‘Gift to the Earth Award’ in recognition of
the efforts made to curb CO2-emissions.2 On the website of State
of Green, a government supported and public-private partnership
platform, this idea is summarized in a statement on behalf of the
Danish Energy Agency that “Denmark is a pioneer on greening
the energy system and has since the first oil crisis in 1973 had a
solid tradition for ever more energy efficiency and renewable energy oriented policies”.3 Further, in an article entitled ‘The history
behind Denmark’s energy transition,’ a commitment to environmental conscience is presented as integral to official Danish energy policies since the early 1970s: “Denmark was severely affected
by the oil crises of the 1970s. It was decided to take a new path to
143
Bo Poulsen
meet growing energy needs and, at the same time, to cater for environmental concerns”.4
Indeed much has happened in Denmark with regards to curbing energy consumption since the early 1970s. The total primary
energy consumption peaked in the late 1970s at a time when the
varying growth rates of GDP seemed closely tied in with growth
in energy consumption. Since then, GDP has grown substantially,
while the level of energy consumption has remained stable. In other words, Denmarks as an energy consuming unit has succeeded
in breaking the curve, entering a new track towards a much more
energy efficient society.5 According to government statistics, the
share of renewable energy sources by 2015 covered 56 percent of
domestic energy consumption.6
Equally over the past half century, there has been steady growth in
concern for the natural environment internationally. Both internationally and in Denmark, the negative environmental impact from
the rapid economic growth post World War Two has gained public
attention and political awareness and action since the 1960s.7 Thus,
in Denmark the administration of environmental issues became institutionalized from the 1970s onwards, while sustainability as an issue of its own entered the government administration from c. 1990.
This means that history of Danish energy policy as well as the
history of public environmental awareness to some extent has run
on parallel tracks through the last more than 40 years. However, as
we will see in this chapter, the Danish history of raising awareness
of sustainable energy consumption is far from linear, when looked
upon in a multi-decadal perspective.
This paper investigates more than 20 years of government led
attempts to have Danish consumers curb their energy use. Looking at previously unexploited campaign material a number of results emerge, qualifying, the notion of Denmark as a front runner,
144
Campaign Country Going Green?
when it comes to environmental awareness. The first attempts to
cut energy consumption came about as a direct consequence of the
international oil crises of 1973-74, and for the following 15 years
the government standing committee on energy savings issued a
string of energy saving campaigns, fueled entirely by an appeal to
common sense household economics and not least a significant
portion of patriotism. Environmental justification was almost entirely absent throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
This changed only from 1989 onwards, as government initiatives to curb the ever rising consumption of energy commenced
an extensive use of environmental justification.
This paper finally discusses the reason for this greening of government initiated Danish energy saving campaigns, which is seen
as an indirect result of the 1987 UN report, Our Common Future.8
The 1988 general election in Denmark led to the formation of a
new center-right government coalition (1988-1990), where recommendations from Our Common Future became part of the
new government program. The early 1990s witnessed a rare consensus on promoting environmental sustainability, which extended across traditional left-right party lines.
The Great Gamechanger
In the modern post-World War Two era, few events have had such
a profound impact on Danish society as the so-called first oil crisis
of 1973 and 1974. The oil crisis was a game changer in society and
in politics, which highlighted modern societies’ profound dependency on fossil fuels. In October 1973 the Yom Kippur War played
out between Israel on one side, and most of their Arab neighboring
countries on the other side. As Denmark along with many other
Western countries were looked upon as pro-Israel, the oil produc145
Bo Poulsen
ing so-called OPEC countries of the Middle East unleashed what
was partly a boycott on selling oil to the small Danish Kingdom
in Northern Europe. Prices soared, and there was a genuine fear
in the Danish government that the boycott would be total, resulting in a potentially devastating shortage of oil. Over the course of
the 1950s and 1960s Denmark had become increasingly reliant on
cheap oil from the Middle East for heating as well as for transportation. Denmark now found itself in the so-called first oil crisis of
1973.9 The later so prolific oilfields in the Danish part of the North
Sea were yet to be discovered, and the wind mill industry was yet
to take off as an important business and noteworthy source of sustainable and locally produced energy, hence Denmark was totally
dependent on foreign imports of fossil fuel. The number of cars
alone had risen more than tenfold from 1955, and by the early
1970s, more than 1,000,000 cars were registered in Denmark.10
As early as 19 October 1973, the social democratic Minister
for Trade and Commerce, Erling Jensen formed a ‘committee
concerning fuel saving information activity’ later known as Energispareudvalget, a standing committee for saving energy. Just
a fortnight later, 31 October prices soared, and the crisis became
very concrete.11 The government then enacted a series of measures
to save on energy, in particular mineral oil from the Middle East
and for the Danish consumers a new era had begun, and an era in
which saving energy became the order of the day.
One week later, the ministry of trade and commerce put forward
general speed limits of 60 km/h in towns and 80 km/h in the country side. A more profound chock treatment was the enforcement
of the so-called ‘car free Sundays,’ prohibiting cars from driving on
Sundays. This was in place from 25 November and lasted until 10
February 1974, while other types of consumption and modern life
in general was affected by restrictions on the lighting of shopping
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windows, Christmas decorations in the street, as well as deliveries
for private stoves heating with oil.12
Apart from the speed limits, these measures were all fairly
short lived and very unpractical for modern society. However, the
standing committee on energy saving continued to operate until
well into the 1990s, and the idea persisted for decades on that the
behavior of the everyday consumer could be altered through campaigns for a more prudish use of energy. The official arguments
would differ over the years, as we shall see in the following.
Material and methods
This paper analyzes the arguments presented in six different government backed campaigns for saving on energy in between 1974 and
1995. Four of these were initiated through the government standing committee on energy saving, the so-called Energispareudvalget,
whose campaign material is kept at the Danish public records office,
the Rigsarkivet (RA).13 From 1974-76, the committee was behind the
campaign, ‘Spar på energien – det lønner sig,’ while in 1978-79 a
follow up campaign was named ‘Spar på energien – det er nødvendigt.’ From 1979 until into the early 1980s, another campaign was
labeled ‘Spar på energien – lyt til energisten. Then most recently the
Energispareudvalget was backing the ‘Bilkørsel og miljø’ campaign
in 1995, where the environment is at the forefront for the first time.
In between however, the Danish government sponsored a three
year long campaign (1989-1991), ‘Vor Fælles Fremtid,’ which was a
specially assigned committee appointed by the Ministry for the Environment. Considering the extensive character and game changing environmental expression to emerge from this campaign, this campaign
will be discussed more extensively than the others in this paper.14
In the following, the argument presented in the campaign
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material is analyzed with an eye to the Toulmin model of argumentation. According to this, any argument presents a claim or
a conclusion. Considering the game changing nature of the first
oil crisis of 1973, the claim from the first government campaigns
was the call to consume less energy. The claim is backed by a fact,
which in the initial case was the statement that there was a lack of
oil, which then had become expensive. To enhance the strength
of the argument, the claim also needs a warrant. In the following, the typical warrant for the claim tells the consumer that saving energy is good for his or her own household economy or that
it would be beneficial for the overall economy of Danish society.
Another warrant would be that saving energy would be good for
the environment. Finally, the argument would frequently contain
backing for the claim. In case of the energy campaigns, a range of
beneficial side effects would tend to be enrolled. Toulmin’s model
has been criticized for not really grasping the complexity of many
arguments presented, but in this situation, where, by necessity of
being advertisements, the arguments are simple this model will be
used as a framework for opening arguments, where the warrants
are shifting over time.15
Save energy – it pays off
The first campaign under the umbrella of the committee for energy savings unfolded in 1974 and 1975 under the heading ‘Spar på
energien – det betaler sig’ which translates to ‘save on energy – it
pays off.’16 Much of the campaign was formed as posters, where the
claim to save energy, was backed by the warrant that it paid off to
follow the advice presented in the published material. However, it is
implicit that it paid off for the individual household. As a concrete
example the campaign stated that one family could save 2,000 Liters
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of hot water every year, provided they did their dishes in a tray filled
with water, as opposed to have the tap running with hot water.
Figure 1. One of the posters of the first campaign. The headline translates; ‘In the future we shall save on heating, and be comfortable.’ The
only hint of environmental awareness as such is the ‘PS’ at the bottom
right corner asking: ‘Did you consider that saving energy is an improvement for the environment as well?’ (source: RA. Energispareudvalget).
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One of the campaign adds was directed at insulation of houses, “…
to make the birds keep warm by themselves”. One suggestion was
that individuals could mount an extra layer of windows in winter,
while another proposal was geared towards insulation of attics. 10
cm. of insulation could provide savings of 1,000 Liters of oil, the
campaign claimed, indicating that with current prices such an investment was profitable already after one year.
Finally, as a mere backing of the central economic warrant for
the argument, however, the advertisement contained a PS: ”Did
you consider that saving oil, is also an improvement for the environment?” Why, this should be good for the environment is not
explained explicitly, but one can deduce from the concerns of the
1970s, that it relates to air pollution (Figure 1).
It is noteworthy that a collective noun, ‘We’ is used a lot in the
advertisement posters. Combined with the use of the Danish flag
in the shape of a drop of water – or perhaps a drop of oil, the reader
gets a sensation that the appeal is directed towards all Danes collectively, or in other words, as an appeal to patriotism. Saving energy becomes a patriot act, even if the concrete recommendations
are geared towards individual households in particular, secondarily at people’s work places.
‘Insuler NU’ for instance was a booklet 48 pages long, with a
number of recommendations such as how to secure window frames
from cold air using rubber linings or duct tape. This was followed
by more general appeals such as this one: ‘Has enough been done
to save energy, where you live and work?’ Again a ‘PS’ is inserted
at the bottom of the poster, drawing attention to the possible effect
on the environment, when energy savings are implemented.
In 1975 and 1976 the campaign continued, again with the same
dominant facts and warrant to back the claim to curtail energy
consumption. Air pollution was now explicitly addressed with the
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slogan: ‘don’t send energy up in the air – both lose their value,’ yet
the concerns of the environment was merely used as backing for
main warrants.17
Figure 2. Recommendations for farm houses focus on the attractiveness of keeping machinery, stoves and chimneys in prime condition.
Households in the countryside however, are also urged to think about
alternative sources of energy. (source: RA. Energispareudvalget).
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One of the novel posters from 1975 was the so-called Energi-sparegården, which translates as the Energy-save-farm (Figure 2). Here the targeted audience is people living in the countryside in general, and in particular farm households, which in
the 1970s still made up a sizeable part of total Danish households as well as some 100,000 farming units. Recommendations
for farm houses focus on the attractiveness of keeping machinery, stoves and chimneys in prime condition. Households in the
countryside however, are also urged to think about alternative
sources of energy. This suggestion is accompanied by a drawing
of a wind mill, but not the modern type of wind mill with delta wings. Rather, this 1975 drawing is accompanied by a 1920s
type windmill, which in its day had been a popular solution for
making one’s own electricity in the countryside, during a time
period, where electric wires from central power plants had not
yet reached every corner of the Danish countryside. Yet, by 1975
these wind mills attached to generators was largely a thing of the
past.
One advertisement read ‘Last winter we learned something
about saving energy.’ To sum up for those, who might have forgotten, the advertisement explained that heating had now become
more than twice as expensive as it had been the previous winter.
Moreover, the total Danish oil expenses had soared from 3 billion in 1973 to 9 billion Danish Kroner in 1975. “This will have
a serious impact on our foreign currency reserves,” the poster
stated, only to add: “and your wallet. Therefore, we need to save
energy. We cannot afford not to”.18 To make the point that everyone in the country is making a difference, the poster showed an
image from the Ministry of Housing, where an office corridor
just outside the personal office of the minister appears gloomy,
from the lack of effective lighting. The accompanying text ex152
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plained that the ministry recently called upon all employees in
the public sector to cut down on the use of heating and lights
everywhere possible.19
‘Save energy – it is necessary’
Another campaign was launched in 1978-1979, “Spar på Energien
– det er nødvendigt”, which translates as “energy savings is a necessity”.20 The timing and focus was no doubt related to the outbreak of the second oil crisis. With the Islamic revolution in Iran
overturning the shah and creating great political instability, 1978
saw another significant rise in oil prices World wide. Following the
outbreak of war between Iraq and Iran in 1980, the tense situation
in the Middle East continued into the early 1980s.
The focus in Danish government advertisement on energy
savings was completely on economics and very much on patriotism, no environmental concerns. The urgency now sprung from
the headlines of a series of posters with the message: “Denmark’s
new room temperature: 20 degrees Celsius”. The number ‘20’ was
shaped and coloured to remind the reader of the Danish national
flag. The accompanying text added to this. Now it was no longer the
pockets of individuals being targeted, but overall wellbeing of the
Danish nation state: “Denmark must lower energy consumption
with at least 5 percent. It is serious. Therefore, certain restrictions
have been imposed. However, there are still some percentages to
be earned voluntarily. We can do it: When everyone agrees to turn
down the heat everywhere and maintain a sensible temperature in
the living room at no more than 20 degrees, we will have saved a
great deal of what we have to save” (Figure 3).21
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Figure 3. The patriotic message is embedded in the Danish flag on
top of the ’20 degress’ (source: RA. Energispareudvalget).
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Campaign Country Going Green?
Compared to the previous campaign, the appeal to personal economic gains has vaporized into the chillier room temperature. Looking through the methodological framework of Toulmin, the claim is
the same, that energy consumption must be curbed. Nonetheless,
no factual reason for this is presented in the campaign material. The
committee on energy savings must have taken for granted that the
consumer was well aware that the dependency on foreign imports
of fossil fuels was draining the state economy. This is the reason the
warrant for the argument is centered on the consumer as a patriot
citizen, who is expected to act in the best interest of the country,
even if this should result in cold feet in one’s own living room.
This campaign was also geared to magazine spreads, such as the
one running the headline: “We have turned energy saving into a
sport”.22 Here, the reader encounters a number of private citizens
who all have a story to tell about how they have succeeded with saving energy in their homes. One family has taught their children to
turn off the lights, when they leave a room, while another family has
insulated their window and door frames. All the highlighted individuals were labelled with a noun, as they became the energisparere
– ‘the energy savers.’ In the magazine spread as well as in a leaflet for
car owners, the advert plays on the economic incentive to save money, while the patriotic aspects were less prominent that in the posters.
‘Save energy – listen to the ‘energist’’
The next campaign from the early 1980s was the most ambitious so
far in terms of outreach. “Listen to the energizer”, was the headline,
introducing small cartoon figures, the ‘Energisterne,’ which would
roughly translate into English as the ‘energizers’. The energizers appeared not only on posters and newspaper adds, but on more specialized leaflets. One of Denmark’s most popular writers and poets
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at the time was Benny Andersen, who had been commissioned to
write a number of short poems concerning energy savings.
Figure 4. The ‘Energizers’ in full swing advicing on how to save energy (source: RA. Energispareudvalget).
The energizer campaign was targeted at almost every corner of
Danish society, at least within the public sector. For the school
children special stickers and small comic strips with the energizers
were constructed. If anyone had to go to their General Practitioner, to a hospital or they went to the public library, they would be
met by posters and leaflets with information on how to save energy. Again there was a direct appeal to public moral and patriotic
duty. In some of the posters the energizer was red on a white back-
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ground, suggesting that this was particularly Danish. “Deep down,
you know how to minimize your energy bills”, the advert ran, suggesting that after almost a decade of being exposed to campaigns
for saving energy, the Danish consumers were now well equipped
to take the wise decision and cut down energy consumption. There
was a clear appeal to citizenship when the campaign continued:
“Like everyone else, you have a little energizer in you”.23
Vor Fælles Fremtid - Our Common Future in Danish
The government initiated committee, Vor Fælles Fremtid, came about
as the result of a broad majority decision in the Danish parliament
across party lines. From 1988-1990, the Danish government was
made up by a center-right coalition, where the Prime Minister represented the Conservative Party, (Det Konservative Folkeparti) while
the coalition partners were the Liberal Party (Venstre) and the somewhat smaller social liberal party (Det Radikale Venstre). Lone Dybkjær from Det Radikale Venstre held the post of Minister of the Environment. One aspect of the coalition agreement in 1988 dealt with
the issue of addressing the issue of sustainability, as this had been put
forward in the recent (1987) UN report, Our Common Future.24
In the spring of 1989 the government Standing Committee on
Environmental and Development issues initiated the formation
of a committee to “promote a campaign to raise awareness concerning sustainable development”. The committee was to plan and
oversee the campaign financed through government and private
funds. Furthermore, the work of the committee built on the experiences of the past government campaigns to save energy as well
as the most recent experiences with promoting the European Economic Council’s ‘Year of the Environment’ in 1987.25
The framework of the campaign was to promote “new solutions
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and collaborative patterns” to promote the principle of sustainable
development, as this had been coined in the Our Common Future
report. This included the desire to support global thinking coupled
with local action, as well as a promotion of knowledge of how society
is connected through ecology and economics. To be successful, the
government stipulated that these ideas should be embraced widely in
society by individuals, NGO’s and the corporate world.
The concrete activities were scheduled as TV-advertisements,
leaflets, newspaper ads and posters on public transportation, while
more targeted educational material was to be produced. Finally,
the dream was to foster new solutions and ways of living for individual citizens and families. The committee therefore should encourage funding applications for green projects from all around
Denmark from various interest groups, including the concept of
‘green city councils.’26
To ensure a broad sense of ownership to the campaign, the Minister for the Environment, Dybkjær appointed representatives for
the committee from across political and societal divides. In May
of 1989 appointed her younger party member, Elsebeth Gerner
Nielsen as Chair of the committee, and as well as Jonna Petersen from the same party.27 Gerner Nielsen was a fresh face on the
public arena, 29 years old, and when Dybkjær was asked by the
newspaper, Jyske Vestkysten, why she chose Gerner Nielsen, her
reply was firm: “I only appoint women to positions like this one, I
always do, and I always have done in my time in office as Minister
for the Environment. There are men in top positions everywhere
in society, so I can’t see there is anything wrong with that”.28 Indeed, this comment on gender was in tune with public sentiments
at the time and was not questioned in the reports from the conference. Only the tongue-in-cheek satirical commentator, ‘Teddy
the Troll’ commented that it was no news that women were asked
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to do the cleaning.29 Pia Kjærsgaard from the right wing populist
Fremskridtspartiet labeled it silly.30
The environment stayed in focus. The press conference to kick-off
the campaign was situated outdoors at the scrapyard of the recycling
company, Uniscrap, where the minister welcomed the press by saying
that “everyone needs to start thinking in a new way. We need to change
our behavior and live more eco-friendly”.31 She continued stressing
the tragedy that so few are choosing unleaded petrol for their cars.
Then she echoed some of the energy saving slogans from the previous
couple of decades since the first oil crisis of 1973-74, as the emphasized the need for shorter showers, while jeans perhaps could be worn
for more than one day before they went into the laundry. Everyone
knows we have environmental problems. Finally, the planning group
behind the campaign launched what in the press was dubbed ‘the ten
commandments,’ ideas where individuals could make a difference.
These were: 1) use unleaded petrol, 2) drive together in cars, 3) drive
less, 4) wash yourself less, 5) sort your garbage, 6) don’t use chemical
cleansing for the toilet – use boiling water instead, 7) use less detergent, 8) do the laundry less often, 9) recycle your leftover foods and
finally for 10) share freezers with your neighbour.32
Gerner Nielsen told the readers of another daily paper, Aktuelt, that
she was rather naïve herself when it came to environmental politics,
but as a child of the post-1968 era of environmental conscience, she
had grown up with the belief that human kind had to take action if
we were to have clean water 50 years ahead.33 The Christian oriented daily paper, Kristeligt Dagblad reported from the press conference
that Gerner Nielsen had made a plea for ‘spiritual compost’ in the way
Danes were thinking about the situation with the environment. She
explained that it “is so dire that we can no longer leave it to politicians
and experts to solve the issues at hand. The environment must and
shall be a common responsibility. However, the biggest barrier is the
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dominant lack of belief in the future. We no longer believe that we can
actually interfere and change the course. Therefore, we should initiate
a spiritual compost process, where fear and lack of action is turned
over, to be championed by public engagement and a belief that you,
and I, and we together are shaping the future”.34
The presence of Kirsten Toxværd, also appointed by Dybkjær, covered
the interests of the conservative party, while the journalist Bertel Bavngaard most likely was approved by the liberal party.35 By early July the entire committee was ready. In addition to four members appointed by the
minster herself, the list of members of the executive committee included
representatives from the Danish society for nature conservation, (Svend
Bichel, Danmarks Naturfredningsforening), the business council of the
labour unions (Hardy Hansen, LO/Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd),
the employers’ organization (Niels F. Gram, Industrirådet), the youth
organization of the social democratic labour movement (Anders Hasselager, DUF) and Margrethe Clausager from Dansk Folkeoplysnings
Samråd, an umbrella organization for educational institutions. The executive committee was backed by a board of 38 people representing as
many organizations, such as the Danish car owners’ society (FDM), the
association of Danish electricity plants (Danske Elværkers Forening),
Danish hunters’ association, the Organisationen for Vedvarende Energi
working for sustainable energy, the World Wildlife Fund, Greenpeace,
the Danish Chamber of Commerce and the Danish Tourist Board just
to name a few participants from across the traditional political divides.36
As the campaign gained momentum in 1990, many more organizations
followed suit, thus by the end of 1990 63 organizations had joined in.37
The daily management of the campaign was in the hands of a secretariat,
first headed by the social democrat, Ole Løvig Simonsen, later by the former development aid consultant, Lars Norman Jørgensen, who became
Secretary General in 1990.38
In the summer of 1989 the campaign was announced in a press release,
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where Minister Dybkjær pointed out that to solve environmental problems, the lawmakers should take initiatives, but in order to truly foster a
more sustainable development, citizens needed to take responsibility as
well and change their way of living. This was the way forward, she stated,
not only for the benefit of the environment, but also for ourselves, for our
children and for our grandchildren.39
”We must think in a new way…” the Minister specified, and the
Danes therefore should “think in totalities and change our behavior
in many ways. This goes for taking big decisions, but it also affects us
in our daily business of deciding on whether or not to buy unleaded
petrol, commodities that are sensibly packaged, taking short showers
etc.”40
One of the draws of participating in the campaign for Our Common Future was the special government grant to spend 21 million
Kroner on campaign activities in 1989, 1990 and 1991. 6 million Kroner was assigned to running the secretariat from 1989-1991, and the
rest to actual activities. 10 million Kroner was to be spent following
application from interested parties.
Miljøkaravanen – The environmental caravan.
To raise awareness, on the first outreach activities scheduled
for the summer months of 1990, was the so-called Miljøkaravanen (The environmental Caravan) visiting 16 towns around the
country, often in association with local town festivals. The tabloid
newspaper Ekstra Bladet reported from the kick-off event that was
launched at the small Port of Vedbæk North of Copenhagen. The
then minister for education, Bertel Haarder from the liberal party graced the opening, answering quiz questions and writing the
first sentences on what was planned to the World’s longest list of
environmental advice. “Don’t be late, when it comes to cleaning
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the World”, he wrote. Meanwhile though, the newspaper reported
a slip of the tongue of his, as he declared the recent invention of
energy saving light bulbs to be “a piece of shit”. Nonetheless, the
caravan signified that in practice as well as in theory, the ‘green issue’ was able to unite associations and politicians across party lines
in 1990. Thus the event in Vedbæk was co-sponsored by the Danish Train Service (DSB), the association of Danish housewives, the
Nepenthes NGO working to save the rain forest, while according
to the news report, most children were occupied by the presence
of a giant panda teddy bear with a sweaty man inside, representing
the World Wildlife Fund.41
The Green Families
Vor Fælles Fremtid initiated a campaign, where 26 families
around Denmark volunteered to live in a more sustainable fashion for more than 4 months in the fall of 1990. In the county
of South Jutland, the county administration advertised in the
newspapers to have families sign up. They received 90 applications, but could only select a few. This suggests that the chosen
families were very motivated to adjust their lifestyle. Each family
was handed a manual with ideas on how to be more sustainable,
and at the same time they were tasked to keep a diary with their
experiences. The green families project served the double purpose of advertise to other Danish consumers that green awareness was possible, and the action could be taken on a family
unit level. However, at the same time, the project was to inform
producers, green organizations and decision makers on possible
obstacles for meeting the requirements of a greener lifestyle.42
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Figure 5. One of the families involved in the Green Families project
(source: RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid, scrapbøger).
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One of the families taking part in the experiment was a mother and
daughter in Esbjerg, in West Jutland. The mother, Jane Lykke told
the regional newspaper, Vestkysten about their experiences with
the four month long project they were taking part in. The family
had moved to Esbjerg only six month earlier, and they found it a
very difficult town to shop in, when trying to be eco-friendly. As
supermarkets did not cater for their needs, they had had to shop
in smaller specialized shops. Jane Lykke readily admitted that she
missed Copenhagen, where she was used to many more ‘green’
commodities, and to find them she was using the Den grønne
forbrugerguide (the green consumer) a book by journalist, Kjeld
Hansen. “Our new bible”, Jane Lykke stated.
In Esbjerg both her and her daughter experienced eyes rolling
with shop assistants, implicitly declaring that they mother and
teenage daughter were ‘eco-fanatics’ (miljøfanatikere). Some had
responded in a friendly manner, when they asked about the availability of organic meat, but excused themselves that this was a no
go, because of the price.43
The Energy Weekend
For the weekend 24-25 November 1990 the campaign secretariat teamed up with the association of Danish bakers, the YMCA/
YWCA scouts organization to promote the use of ‘one’s own energy,’ for transportation in the weekend going to the church on
Sunday, or when heading for the local bakery to buy fresh bread
in the weekend. Boyscouts and girlscouts from all over Denmark
enlisted to distribute leaflets, such as the Energiavisen, the ‘energy
newspaper’ to the customers at bakeries, and the churchgoers in
the Danish Lutheran Church. In total more than 120 bakers took
part in the event.44
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To further stimulate interest, a number of the so-called ‘green
families’ had visits from energy consultants from their local electricity providers. This was set to stimulate interest in this service
from the various electricity companies.45
The energy weekend was planned months in advance, and the
press release was scheduled to go out on 22 November. As it turned
out, the Prime Minister Poul Schlüter, called a general election on
the same day, which undoubtedly curbed the attention of the general public towards the energy weekend. Nonetheless, several pieces of press coverage surfaced from the weekend over the next few
days.
Generational contract for the environment
In many ways, the campaign Vor Fælles Fremtid was riding on a
rising wave of green awareness around 1991. On the initiatives,
which appears to have been well received, were leaflets produced
to inform the business sector about ways in which they could cut
their energy consumption, and in turn cut expenses associated
with their production. One such case was in the Århus county in
East Jutland, where the leaflet, Rent Miljø (clean environment) was
sent out to more than 4,000 small and large businesses, sponsored
by the campaign, jointly with the employers’ association, the Confederation of Danish Industries (DA) and the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO). Here, some best practice examples of
companies that had succeeded in cutting the resource use. One
sports retailer had saved 34,500 Danish Kroner annually when
they switched to energy saving lightbulbs.46 On a somewhat larger
scale, the local brewery, Ceres had cut the water spending from
2.8 liters a year to 2.3 liters, which earned them a cost reduction
of 1 million Kroner, and a nearby dairy had succeeded in saving
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1.4 million Kroner a year, when they changed their cooling system
from water to air, while the cooling water they did use, was reused
for cleaning the plant.47
The regional chairman of the employers organization, Mogens
Boyter, even went so far as to proclaim that “in the 1990s the typical CEO in East Jutland will be an environmental activist”, and in
concrete terms he advocated that each and every company should
work out a dedicated environmental policy for their own internal
use. “When developing new products, processes and systems, we
need to look at the total environmental impact, or to put it in another way, the route of the product from cradle to grave. This is
to reduce the impact as much as possible. We should all be determined to leave East Jutland to the next generation, just as clean as
it was when we were young”.48
Mogens Boyter was a fairly flamboyant figure in East Jutland,
who combined his ownership of a factory producing toilet seats,
with a string of elected positions, including at one point the chairmanship of the local professional football team, AGF. However,
it is perhaps particularly noteworthy that he was also an active
politician rallying for the conservative party, whom he represented in the regional county council. A conservative appeal for
environmental activism on behalf of CEO’s would be rare before
the 1990s, and it has become rare again in the past one and a half
decades as well. Yet, at this moment in time, Boyter could issue a
statement that it was timely to be pro-environment, for the sake
of the environment, as much as for the sake of the corporations in
East Jutland, he was representing.
Approaching children
As an example of the approach to children, some of the protest
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songs of the 1960s for instance, were dusted and re-written to meet
the new challenge of addressing environmental problems. The social democratic youth association (DUI Leg og Virke) teamed up
with more liberal leaning association of free kindergartens (Frie
Børnehaver og Fritidshjem) to produce an environmentalist version of Tom Dooley, a folk song made popular by the Kingston
Trio in 1958, portraying the tragic hanging of Tom Dooley, who
perhaps did not commit the murder, for which he was sentenced
to death. In the 1990 version, we the people on planet Earth are
the perpetrators causing harm to the planet we inhabit. In English
translation the gloomy text reads: The sea is filled with oil / the forest is dead / The fish is dying in streams / the winter just rain and
sleet / the hour is near for the planet / the hour has come my friend
/ the time has come / we will preserve it / In a direct call for the
parent generation, the targeted audience for the children’s singing,
one of the sentences reads: We want to breathe the air / not having
water from cartridges / grownups use your senses / don’t you understand a thing?
In a Scandinavian song tradition, Norwegian composer, Nordahl Grieg’s Til Ungdommen (For the Youth) is even more famous.
Written in 1936, Grieg calls for fighting guns with knowledge seeking, and emphasizes the responsibility of people for changing their
own lives and conditions, as well as those of other people, for the
common good. Thus, the recognizable tune itself carries a number
of connotations, even if the text is different in the environmentalist
version:
The grown ups are polluting / more than they think / they
don’t consider / our common earth / they think they can
just / keep being dirty / without asking / you or me
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Following two verses of statements on the pollution from factories
and cars, the last verse again returns directly to the intended audience, the adult population:
Now we will thank you / who listened to us / asking all of
you / stand up against the pigs / stop pollution / it concerns
us all / otherwise the earth / will end on the dumpyard.
While the concrete impact of these protest songs can be difficult to
measure, there is no doubt the campaign as such made an impact
while it was in business from 1989-1991.
Vor Fælles Fremtid – policy making and the new
government
In the Danish parliamentary system, general elections can be called
by the Prime Minister, whenever he or she chooses, but it has to
be within 4 years from the last election. However, the 1970s and
1980s, were marked by the formation of coalition governments,
where the governing coalitions never had a majority of seats in
the parliament between themselves. Compromising with political parties outside the government was the order of the day, and
whenever a deadlock appeared, the Prime Minister would call a
new election. This happened again the end of 1990, which resulted
in a change of the composition of government. The center-right
coalition was dissolved, and the social liberal party, Det Radikale
Venstre left the government. However, the conservative Prime
Minister, Poul Schlüter was still able to cajole support for another
minority government consisting also of the liberal party.
As the campaign, Vor Fælles Fremtid was financed over three
years, activities continued unabated by the political turmoil, yet
168
Campaign Country Going Green?
in year three of the campaign, in 1991, the leaders of the campaign, Gerner Nielsen and Normann Jørgensen took sides against
the government in such issues as the planning of a bridge between
Denmark and Sweden. “The decision to build a bridge across The
Sound is not consistent with the ideas laid down in the Brundtland-report”, a press release ran. This was the case both in terms of
the decision making process as well as the anticipated environmental impact of the new bridge. As for the policy process, there ought
to have been a general election on a topic so important, while the
environmental risks associated with constructing a large bridge
was not thought through. The Vor Fælles Fremtid recommended
that, while it was desirable from an economic and cultural point of
view to strengthen the infrastructure between Denmark and Sweden, which at the time was connected only by way of ferry transportation, the environment would suffer from a bridge. While no
one new exactly, how significant the impact would be, measures
should be taken so as not to disturb the then current flow of water in The Sound, the salinity as well as the habitat changes which
might impact seal populations and bird populations in the area.
To safeguard nature, the Vor Fælles Fremtid recommended that
a tunnel was dug all the way between Copenhagen and Malmø in
Sweden, which would then not disturb The Sound.49
In the end though, the decision was maintained that the new
connection would consist of the combination of a tunnel for the
first third of the way from Denmark to Sweden, while a large
bridge was constructed for the remainder of the distance. There
is no indication whether or not, this interference with actual policy making, was questioned within the executive committee of the
campaign.
169
Bo Poulsen
Summary of activities
Towards the end of the campaign in 1991, the Chairman, Elsebeth
Gerner Nielsen summed up the result in a letter to the then conservative Minister of the Environment, Per Stig Møller, who represented the two-party minority government of the conservative
and liberal party (1990-1993).
Gerner Nielsen emphasized that c. 160 public lectures had been
held, targeting some 8-10,000 people around the country, which
added to the impact of 20 publications on sustainable consumption, sustainable farming, sustainable workplaces etc. In the area of
100,000 attendants of evening school for mature students had been
presented with leaflets, while television viewers had been watching advertisements, such as the ones for the activity, ‘Green Families’. 600 schools had been involved in raising children’s awareness
through specific targeted broadcasts from the national broadcast
corporation, Danmarks Radio. Eight different conferences under
the heading of sustainable farming, ‘Bæredygtigt Landbrug’ were
held in collaboration between the nature conservation movement,
The Agricultural Council’s educational association, and the liberal education association, (LOF). By then, some 620 local projects
had received support from the committee Vor Fælles Fremtid.50
Midway through the campaign some 201 local project had been
initiated, where exhibitions and happenings in schools had been
the most sought after activity.51
When it comes to focusing on the environment, and linking environmental concerns to the issues of energy policy, the Vor Fælles
Fremtid had provided a platform reaching out to many more
people than before, and the wave of green concern continued in
the years thereafter. Thus, when in 1995, the Energispareudvalget
again launched a campaign to save energy, the environment had
taken center stage, for the first time ever.
170
Campaign Country Going Green?
‘Car driving and the environment’
In 1995, the Energispareudvalget sponsored a campaign targeting
car drivers, under the heading Bilkørsel og Miljø, which translates
as car driving and the environment. Now, the dominant discourse
had changed completely. The claim of the argument was still, save
energy, but the environment had now taken center stage, as the
campaign opened with the following statement from the preamble
of a campaign leaflet:
”Today there is hardly anyone in doubt that we are facing significant problems with the global environment. Almost every day, we
hear about the greenhouse effect, the thinning of the ozone layer,
clearing of the rain forest, acid rain and the pollution of the sea
around us. A significant portion of these problems stems from our
consumption of energy for transportation”.
In other words, the claim of the campaign is to cut down the use
of petrol. The section cited above however, establishes a series of
facts (planet Earth suffers) which is backed by the warrant that we
as daily commuters have created a sizeable portion of the problem.
In this 1995 leaflet there is no reference to the notion that cutting down on energy consumption is beneficial for the economic
wellbeing of individuals. Rather the appeal is directed at factors
outside the family unit or even the nation. Car drivers instead are
urged to think globally, and internationally at any rate. As the preamble further stated: “We must follow the international call for
reducing our energy consumption with 50% during the next 50
years”.52
The whole text is very factual and the ideas presented are clearly
reflecting science based recommendations from the UN Climate
Panel. Carbon dioxide pollution is to be reduced with 25% by the
year 2030, catalyzers are already being installed in new cars, and
lead should be removed entirely from petrol sold in Denmark with
171
Bo Poulsen
a span of a few years. In addition the plan expressed the wishful
thinking that from 2030, we will have cars able to drive 50 km on
one liter of petrol. Nonetheless, the concrete recommendations for
what people can do themselves are in tune with the advice from
previous decades: Walk to the baker in the weekends instead of
driving, use public transportation when possible, and fill up the
car with people to and from work. Finally, chauffeurs are urged to
drive more calmly thereby saving as much as 20% fuel over a given
distance.
It is worth noting that the preamble of the leaflet was signed
by Ib Thyregod in his capacity as chairman of the Energispareudvalget. Thyregod is a Danish lawyer, who has also represented the
liberal party in the Copenhagen City Council. This suggests that
even if by 1995 the concern for the environment was shared across
left-right party division. From 1993-2001 Denmark was ruled by
a center-left coalition government with a rather strong minister
jointly for the environment and energy planning, Svend Auken
from the Social Democrats. At any rate, Thyregod from the liberal
party, traditionally the choice of farmers and people in rural areas,
appears not to have had quarrels signing a document underlining this new plan for changing the transportation patterns of the
Danes.
Conclusion
This paper has revealed a number of developments in the way in
which the Danish government tried to convince the citizens of
Denmark to save energy from 1974-1995. During the first wave
of campaigns, the environment was treated as a secondary issue,
which would also profit, as a side effect, from saving on energy, but
the environment disappears as a recognizable factor in campaigns
172
Campaign Country Going Green?
Figure 6. By the mid-1990s the green wave had swept across Danish
society. By then the style of car driving had become a means to help
save the planet (source: RA. Energispareudvalget).
for saving energy for the next almost 15 years until 1989. Around
1975 and 1980 in particular there was a particularly strong appeal
directed at the survival of the Danish state through prudent energy consumption, which then became an act of patriotic duty. Only
after the release of the UN report, Our Common Future in 1987,
did the environmental start to play a role for the way in which
campaigns to save energy were justified to the public.
The campaigns initiated through the Energispareudvalget became more and more distinct in terms of which audience they
tried to address. The campaigns of the 1970s were targeted pri173
Bo Poulsen
marily at changing the behavior of private citizens as home owners
and commuters, whereas from c. 1980 the campaigns using the
‘energizer’ cartoon figures had a wider ambition of targeting children in schools as well.
Eventually, the environment came to the forefront of arguments
for why to save energy in the late 1980s. The onset of the 19891990 campaign, Vor Fælles Fremtid was directly inspired by the
recommendations in the UN Report, Our Common Future. Now,
the citizens of Denmark needed to cut down on their energy consumption, and in general to lower their use of the scarce natural
resources of the planet Earth. The Vor Fælles Fremtid campaign
came about in 1988, when the parliamentary situation in Denmark led to the formation of a center-right government where the
Conservatives and the Liberal Party teamed up with the pro-environment social liberal party, Det Radikale Venstre. This campaign
became the most ambitious government campaign so far, trying
to reach out to all age groups and social groups in Danish society.
Open university lectures and open science conferences, leaflets,
children’s songs, Lutheran priests and bakeries around the country were all instruments in spreading the message, or the wave of
opinion that we should take better care of the environment, including the lessening of dependency on fossil fuel.
This change in discourse, or ways of arguing for saving energy however, was most closely related to the overall rise in environmental awareness, which had matured in most societies in the
Western World in the preceding decades.
During the 1960s a number of important developments took
place which was all linked to the future availability of sufficient
natural resources. In 1968, the American biologist Paul Ralph Ehrlich published the influential book, The Population Bomb, in which
he warned that the growth in the World’s population would even174
Campaign Country Going Green?
tually lead to overpopulation and a dire shortage of natural resources. Then in 1972 the United Nations held the so-called Stockholm Conference, which led to the Stockholm Declaration, where
the countries of the UN agreed that social and economic development was tied to the solution to a number of environmental problems, not least the availability of natural resources. The shortage of
resources was also the focal point of the book, Limits to Growth,
which also in 1972 prophesized that Planet Earth would run out
fossil fuel and other important natural resources within less than
half a century.53
Three main events catapulted the rise of the new environmental
discourse in policy as well as in the campaign material analyzed
above.
First of all, there was a reservation towards implementing nuclear power into the Danish energy supply, which was linked to
concerns of potential radioactive contamination if the power plant
leaked or was damaged. While this had been a concern throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the 1986 explosion at the Sovjet Union’s
nuclear power plant in Chernobyl, Ukraine, sent a shockwave
through all of Europe, as heightened levels of radioactivity was registered from Poland to Northern Sweden. In the case of Denmark
this event effectively shut down any further debate concerning the
implementation of nuclear power, putting further emphasis on alternative ways to meet the demand for energy.54
Secondly, the United Nation’s report, Our Common Future was released in 1987, making sustainability and sustainable development
buzzwords around the World. This was linked to the recent realization that the ever more extensive use of fossil fuel caused the release of
large amounts of CO2 into the atmosphere. The additional amounts of
CO2 would block more of the sun’s radiation from exiting the Earth’s
atmosphere, thereby leading to the greenhouse effect.55
175
Bo Poulsen
Thirdly, and this is perhaps speculative, by the late 1980s the
Danish oil and gas pipes from the North Sea had begun to supply
mainland Denmark with the country’s fossil fuel, thereby lessening the threat of unpredictable prices and supplies from the
OPEC Countries in the Middle East. This may also have played a
role in the way energy savings were presented. When Denmark
was now self-sufficient with oil and gas, it was no longer possible
to claim that the state finances were crippled by soaring prices
on fossil fuel.
Still, the Danish government did not play what one might call
‘the green card’ until the late 1980s when it comes to promoting
prudence in energy consumption. This is in line with the central
themes in post-oil crisis Danish energy policy as identified by
Mogens Rüdiger. According to Rüdiger, the security of supplies
was central until 1990, when the center-right government proposed a new energy plan, the so-called Energy 2000. Now suddenly the focus had shifted towards lowering CO2-emissions and
thereby prioritizing the environmental impact of energy consumption.56
What this also means, is that apart from the scant reference
to air pollution in the campaigns from the 1970s, the discourses prominent in government induced campaigns did not attach
themselves to the discourses of the environmental movement before the 1988 change in government, when the Vor Fælles Fremtid campaign a discourse of sustainability. In an international
context, this is early for a government led initiative to focus on
sustainability. Nonetheless, the claims made by the current energy awareness initiative State of Green, referred to in the opening
section of this article, the State of Denmark did not in any great
measure commit itself to environmental concerns right from the
time of the first oil crisis in 1973. When trying to sell energy pru176
Campaign Country Going Green?
dence to the Danes prior to 1988, household benefits and appeals
to the patriotic deeds associated with literally turning down the
heat were of paramount importance.
Acknowledgements
This article has benefitted from the comments from one anonymous reviewer, while previous drafts have profited from discussions with Robert Lifset and Verena Winiwarter in addition to
fellow members of the research project, ‘Ethics & Energy’ at Aalborg University (http://www.ethicsandenergy.aau.dk), funded by
the Forskningsrådet for Kultur og Kommunikation, (Danish Humanities Research Council) 2014-2018 (contract no. 4001-0302B_
FKK).
References
Archival material
Rigsarkivet, Copenhagen (RA):
RA. Energispareudvalget: Oplysningsmaterialer, pjece, brochurer
m.v. (1973-1995)
RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: Centrale dokumenter vedr. organisation
(1989-1992)
RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: 17A Presseklip, scrapbøger 1-5
RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: Pressemeddelser, korrespondance, klip mm.
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Toft, Erik, Hanne Rasmussen, and Hans-Carl Nielsen, eds. Hundrede Års Trafik. Trafikministeriet 1900-2000. Copenhagen:
Trafikministeriet, 2000.
Villaume, Poul. Danmarkshistorien Bd. 15 – Lavvækst Og Frontdannelser 1970-1985. Copenhagen: Gyldendal & Politken, 2005.
World Commission on Environment and Development. Our Common Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.
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NOTES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Jacob Norvig Larsen et al., ”Sustainable Communities and Housing in Denmark.”
In Sustainable Communities and Urban Housing, ed. Montserrat Pareja-Eastaway
and Nessa Winston (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 99-118.
Greenpeace Denmark, Accessed 1 June 2017: http://www.greenpeace.org/
denmark/da/nyheder/2015/Valget-skal-fastholde-Danmark-som-grontforegangsland-/ ; Danmarks Radio, Accessed 1 June 2017: https://www.dr.dk/
nyheder/viden/miljoe/danmark-modtager-verdensnaturfondens-klimapris, 21
October 2013
State of Green, “Danish Energy Agency,” Accessed 1 June 2017: https://stateofgreen.com/en/profiles/danish-energy-agency
State of Green, “The History Behind Denmark’s Green Energy Transition,” Accessed 1 June 2017: https://stateofgreen.com/en
Mogens Rüdiger, Energy Moving Forward (Copenhagen: DONG Energy, 2011),
76-77.
State of Green, “Danish Energy Statistics 2015: Renewables now cover 56% of electricity consumption,” Accessed 1 June 2017: https://stateofgreen.com/en/profiles/
danish-energy-agency/news/danish-energy-statistics-2015-renewables-now-cover-56-of-electricity-consumption, 12 July 2016.
Joachim Radkau, Nature and Power: A Global History of the Environment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Andrew Jamison, ”Miljøpolitik: Fra
Miljøbevægelse til Miljøinstitutioner,” in Humanøkologi. Miljø, Teknologi og Samfund, ed. Finn Arler (Aalborg: Aalborg University Press, 2002), 31-46.
World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 12.
Poul Villaume, Danmarkshistorien bd. 15 – Lavvækst Og Frontdannelser 19701985 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal & Politiken, 2005), 95; Nikolaj Petersen, Dansk
Udenrigspolitiks Historie bd. 6: Europæisk Og Globalt Engagement 1973-2006 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2006).
Erik Toft, Hanne Rasmussen and Hans-Carl Nielsen, ed., ”Antal køretøjer i Danmark. 5-årsoversigt, 1915-2000,” Hundrede års trafik. Trafikministeriet, 1900-2000
(Copenhagen: Trafikministeriet, 2000).
René Mejlby and Michael F. Wagner, ”De Bilfri Søndage 1973-74 – Den Psykologiske Overgang Fra Fritidsbilisme Til Samfundsbilisme,” Den jyske Historiker 127128 (2012): 241
René Mejlby and Michael F. Wagner, ”De bilfri søndage,” 239-241
RA. Energispareudvalget: Oplysningsmaterialer, pjece, brochurer m.v. (1973-1995)
1.
180
Campaign Country Going Green?
14 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid.
15 Olaf Tans, ”The Fluidity of Warrants: Using the Toulmin Model to Analyse Practical Discourse,” In Arguing on the Toulmin Model. New Essays in Argument Analysis
and Evaluation, ed. David Hitchcock and Bart Verheij (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2006), 219-230.16
RA. Energispareudvalget: Oplysningsmaterialer,
pjece, brochurer m.v. (1973-1995) 1. 1974/75.
17 RA. Energispareudvalget: Oplysningsmaterialer, pjece, brochurer m.v. (1973-1995)
1. 1975/76.
18 RA. Energispareudvalget: Oplysningsmaterialer, pjece, brochurer m.v. (1973-1995)
1. 1975/76.
19 RA. Energispareudvalget: Oplysningsmaterialer, pjece, brochurer m.v. (1973-1995)
1. 1975/76.
20 RA. Energispareudvalget: Oplysningsmaterialer, pjece, brochurer m.v. (1973-1995)
1. 1978-79.
21 RA. Energispareudvalget: Oplysningsmaterialer, pjece, brochurer m.v. (1973-1995)
1. 1978-79.
22 RA. Energispareudvalget: Oplysningsmaterialer, pjece, brochurer m.v. (1973-1995)
1. 1978-79.
23 RA. Energispareudvalget: Oplysningsmaterialer, pjece, brochurer m.v. (1973-1995)
1. 1980-82.
24 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: Centrale dokumenter vedr. organisation (1989-1992) 1:
m.m., Friluftsrådet, Memorandum, no date.
25 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: Centrale dokumenter vedr. organisation (1989-1992) 1:
m.m., The Ministry of the Environment, Appendix 1. 17 May 1989.
26 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: Centrale dokumenter vedr. organisation (1989-1992) 1:
m.m., The Ministry of the Environment, Appendix 1. 17 May 1989.
27 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: Centrale dokumenter vedr. organisation (1989-1992) 1:
m.m. Dybkjær L. to Friluftsrådet, 18. maj 1989.
28 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: 17A Presseklip, scrapbøger 1-5. Vestkysten, 4 July 1989.
29 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: 17A Presseklip, scrapbøger 1-5. Dagbladet Information, 4
July 1989.
30 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: 17A Presseklip, scrapbøger 1-5. Holbæk Amts Venstreblad,
4 July 1989.
31 The Danish word she used was ’miljørigtigt,’ which literally translates to environmentally correct. The Danish word for sustainable, bæredygtigt had not caught on yet.
32 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: 17A Presseklip, scrapbøger 1-5. Det fri Aktuelt, 4 July
1989.
181
Bo Poulsen
33 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: 17A Presseklip, scrapbøger 1-5. Aktuelt, 5 July 1989.
34 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: 17A Presseklip, scrapbøger 1-5. Kristeligt Dagblad, 4 July
1989.
35 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: Centrale dokumenter vedr. organisation (1989-1992) 1:
m.m. Dybkjær L. to Friluftsrådet, 18. maj 1989.
36 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: Centrale dokumenter vedr. organisation (1989-1992) 1:
m.m. Hansen, Ole Bjørn. to Friluftsrådet, 12 July 1989.
37 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: Centrale dokumenter vedr. organisation (1989-1992) 1:
m.m. Vor Fælles Fremtid, Annual Report 1990, p. 11.
38 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: Pressemeddelser, korrespondance, klip mm. pk 21.
39 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: Centrale dokumenter vedr. organisation (1989-1992) 1:
m.m. Hansen, Press release, Ministry of the Environment, 3 July 1989.
40 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: Centrale dokumenter vedr. organisation (1989-1992) 1:
m.m. Hansen, Press release, Ministry of the Environment, 3 July 1989.
41 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: 17A Presseklip, scrapbøger 1-5. Ekstra Bladet, 5 August
1990.
42 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: Centrale dokumenter vedr. organisation (1989-1992) 1:
m.m. Vor Fælles Fremtid, Annual Report 1990, p. 2.
43 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: 17A Presseklip, scrapbøger 1-5. Vestkysten, 2 August 1990.
44 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: Centrale dokumenter vedr. organisation (1989-1992) 1:
m.m. Vor Fælles Fremtid, Annual Report 1990, p. 4.
45 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: Centrale dokumenter vedr. organisation (1989-1992) 1:
m.m. Vor Fælles Fremtid, Annual Report 1990, p. 4.
46 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: 17A Presseklip, scrapbøger 1-5. Lokalavisen – Århus Syd,
week 39, 1991.
47 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: 17A Presseklip, scrapbøger 1-5. Århus Stifttidende, 18
September1991.
48 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: 17A Presseklip, scrapbøger 1-5. Århus Stifttidende, 18
September1991.
49 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: Centrale dokumenter vedr. organisation (1989-1992) 1:
m.m. Vor Fælles Fremtid Press release, 11 April 1991.
50 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: Centrale dokumenter vedr. organisation (1989-1992) 1:
m.m. Gerner Nielsen, E. to Møller, P. S. no date 1991.
51 RA. Vor Fælles Fremtid: Centrale dokumenter vedr. organisation (1989-1992) 1:
m.m. Larsen, Jens H. & Læssøe, Jeppe, ’Midtvejsrapport. Erfaringsindsamling og
evaluering af kampagnen Vor Fælles Fremtid,’ January 1991.
52 RA. Energispareudvalget: Oplysningsmaterialer, pjece, brochurer m.v. (1973-1995)
1. 1995.
182
Campaign Country Going Green?
53 Finn Arler, ”Introduktion Til Humanokologi.” In Humanøkologi. Miljø, Teknologi Og Samfund. ed. Finn Arler. (Aalborg: Aalborg University Press, 2002),
9-28.
54 Oluf Danielsen, Klimaet på Dagsordenen (Copenhagen: Multivers Academic,
2014).
55 Our Common Future, 12
56 Mogens Rüdiger, ”The 1973 Oil Crisis and the Designing of a Danish Energy Policy,” Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung (2014): 109.
183
Heritage and Imaginary Childhood
Landscapes
On the Impetus of Tourism Entrepreneurs
in Stockholm Archipelago
Christian Widholm
Introduction
There have been tendencies within the research field of critical heritage studies to regard the producers of heritage as almost manipulative. As such, the heritage producers have been treated as unprofessional historians that inoculate a distorted collective memory
in the minds of visitors at the heritage attractions.1 At the same
time it appears that tourism studies have treated the producers of
heritage as more or less neutral mediators of history. And instead
the focus of investigation in these studies has been how visitors
understand and consume heritage attractions. There are, however,
some tourism analysts that have come up with the idea that also
the heritage producers might influence our view on bygone days.2
Among the more critical researchers of heritage a rather common
point of departure is that heritage consists of myths, ideology, nationalism, parochialism, romanticism and hunger for profit.3
Despite the polemical tone among the critical researchers they rewardingly illuminate that heritage is a result of several intertwined
mental structures, such as those mentioned above. The following
tentative analysis, inspired by perspectives from critical heritage
184
Heritage and Imaginary Childhood Landscapes
studies, focus on one of these structures, memories of and notions
about childhood, articulated by heritage producers.
Method and material
Present study analyse three heritage entrepreneurs and their enterprises, all located in the Stockholm area. One of the entrepreneurs is Martin Eriksson, also known as the former pop-singer
E-type. For the sake of research ethics, I have strived not to reveal the identity of the other two entrepreneurs. I have conducted
traditional source studies, and also done observations and interviews. The interviews have been conducted in connection with the
observations. The empirical substance is somewhat limited. The
ambition is, however, to be able to discuss general social historical
questions through the use of this slightly narrow material. In other words, by pointing at a few concrete examples of how heritage
is constructed and managed I hope to highlight a larger context
about how collective memory is constructed and sustained.4
The main focus is to analyse commonplace acts within the heritage enterprises and in what ways these might be connected to
the impetus of the heritage entrepreneurs. Thus, I am not necessarily interested in matters that probably would be the answer to
the question of “What’s the motive behind your enterprise?” An
answer to this question would probably read: “I have a genuine
interest in history”, “I’m a natural entrepreneur” or “I want to contribute to the economic growth of this region” etc. Instead I want
to focus on the taken for grantedness in their enterprises, such
things that might seem trivial or idiosyncratic at face value, since
it is often that memories of and notions about childhood materializes in commonplace acts or in the seemingly banal. A methodological crux might be whether it is possible to analyse childhood
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memories. They can, some may argue, be flawed or just anachronistic constructions of contemporary times. In this investigation,
however, the veracity of the memories is of minor concern since
even an erroneous memory expresses a notion about childhood
that could be of interest for this study. And the reason for using
the term memory is that the informants sometimes expresses notions about childhood in terms of childhood memories. Thus, the
analysis aims to de-naturalize representations of childhood and to
present them as crucial elements of the enterprises at heritage attractions.
The heritage attractions analysed are all a part of the maritime
heritage sector. This circumstance influences the analysis and call
for caution when it comes to comparisons with other types of heritage, since the maritime heritage bears with it sedimented narratives, e.g. of naval battles and war heroes, that do not appear in the
same disguise in other types of heritage.
The concept of heritage
Before the 19th century, when nationalism became popular, heritage was only a concern for the wealthy elite, according to the
historian David Lowenthal.5 In Sweden the word heritage (the
19th century word “kulturarv”) was reactivated during the 1990s.
Before the 1990s it was more common to use terms like “our tradition” or just “our history”.6 Assuredly the new vocabulary from the
1990s seemed to have resulted in new practices, like the creation
of heritage attractions, and an increase in commodification of history.7 However, the increased interest in history and the commercial dimensions of it during this period was not a novelty. Already
during the late 19th century it was possible to capitalize on history
in an innovative manner. Scholars have called the practices during
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this phase The Invention of Tradition.8 These enterprises, says the
historian Peter Aronsson, originated from social upheavals. When
it comes to the Swedish context, we can e.g. understand Götiska
förbundet’s (a romanticist and nationalistic literary society during
early 19th century) romantic praise of seemingly archaic Swedish
farmers as personifications of positive Nordic virtues, i.e. an immaterial heritage, in the light of the loss of Finland in 1809. Another Swedish example is Artur Hazelius’ work to realize Nordiska
museet (the Nordic Museum) and Skansen (an open-air museum)
during the latter part of 19th century as a kind of therapy to ease
the trauma caused by industrialization and urbanization during
that period. Today, like then, our engagement in heritage can be
understood in the light of swift changes in world politics but also
as a result of more prolonged social transformations.9
David Lowenthal presents a similar line of reasoning and claims
that the heritage industry of today is fuelled by challenging social
transformations like migration, enhanced mobility, globalization
and changes in technology. Thus, we tend to use heritage as a way
to reach safety and to reassure ourselves that our identity has a
unique value. Uncertainty, loss and mourning are all conditions
that support heritage.10 Lowenthal also writes that heritage discourse is treacherous: it is self-congratulatory and an uncritical
“declaration of faith in [the] past”, not a serious investigation to
gain an understanding of the past.11 A similar perspective is presented by Bella Dicks who says that “history is dedicated to making
forgotten pasts understandable, while heritage aims to fashion the
past into forms that serve current needs”.12 This rather orthodox
division between professional historians and the amateurs from
the heritage industry appears to be relatively common among the
more critical researchers of heritage and it is probably most salient
in Lowenthal’s works.13
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The archaeologist and heritage researcher Laurajane Smith emphasize the aspect of action within heritage in her work Uses of
Heritage.14 Smith is not the only one who highlight this aspect, but
she probably does it more clearly than others. But in general there
seems to exist a unity among scholars that heritage is a practice
more than an objective entity.15 The prevalent view in the West,
says Smith, is however that heritage has to do with something tangible. According to Smith there is a discourse in the West, “authorized heritage discourse,” with global pretentions about how to
define heritage.16 This discourse usually demand material evidence
that proves a specific heritage. Thus, it preserves and restore places
and objects, e.g. by constructing tourism attractions, since a material heritage confirms with tangible evidence that “our” identity is
real.17 Smith says that “[t]he materiality of heritage” is “a brutally
physical statement […] of the possessors of that heritage”.18 At the
same time, we might add, heritage consists of elusive elements as
well, like nostalgia.
Heritage as nostalgia and childhood memories
The term nostalgia originates from the Swiss physician Johannes
Hofer who, during the late 17th century, diagnosed depressed students and soldiers scattered over Europe. The reason for their depression was homesickness. Hofer labelled the severe homesickness nostalgia. The word was a combination of the Greek words
“nostos”, meaning returning to one’s home, and “algos”, meaning
suffering, pain and mourning.19
A cursory reading of the theories on heritage and nostalgia indicates considerable overlapping. Today we do not treat nostalgia
as a psychiatric condition, but if that was the case it would probably be possible to diagnose advocates of heritage as well. Such
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striking similarities are to be found within the logics of nostalgia
and heritage.
According to Svetlana Boym nostalgia erupts in the wake of revolutions or during times of real or perceived socio-political instability and stress (cf. Aronsson och Lowenthal on heritage above).
Nostalgia, Boym says, is a defence mechanism.20 It offers comfort
and an imagined safe past during unsafe present times. Boym says
that nostalgia is “a mourning for the impossibility of mythical return, for the loss of an enchanted world with clear borders and values” and a longing for “a home that is both physical and spiritual,
the edenic unity of time and space”.21 In Boym’s The Future of Nostalgia this time-space is conveyed several times through references
to childhood memories.
The literary historian Joe Moran suggests that the heritage industry depends on notions about childhood. Moran claims that
heritage industry regards childhood as a Barthesian myth and as
such it is used to convey naturalness. It can be used by a variety
of actors with diverse agendas to cover social conflict. Thus, the
childhood myth can be mobilized to present an idyllic national
past.22 Historian Raphael Samuel has connected the heritage industry’s use of childhood with the advent of the middle class cult
of childhood during 19th century. It is this cult that has resulted in sentimentalization of the nursery and commodification of
old toys. In Great Britain, says Samuel, one of the latest childhood
cults coincided with the final decay of the British Empire during
1980s and 1990s that followed on urbanization and social transformations that started after the Second World War. It is during
upheavals like this that practices of heritage restore traditional values like patriotism and pastoralism and sanction acceptance of an
aristocratic and royal prerogatives.23
The first tenets of the childhood myth were formulated during
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18th, and 19th century when several transformations among upper and middle classes resulted in ideas that separated the world
of children from the world of adults. One of these transformations was the advent of the nuclear family which meant that parents were able to create emotional bonds to their offspring due
to the limited amount children. Another was the introduction of
educational institutions that separated children from the world of
adults for a fixed amount of years. And third, the development of a
market that commodified childhood, e.g. through children books,
toys, clothes etc.24
An additional aspect of childhood that makes it useful for the
heritage industry is its quotidian qualities. This is a convenient dimension for heritage which tend to present the past in in personal
and existential terms, not social and political. Thus, Moran argues,
childhood is idealized as a period of natural rhythms, a time apart
from adults’ worries, duties and appointments. Childhood nostalgia can be said to be a false consciousness constructed by the dominant ideology, but, Moran says, at the same time it is a feeling that
resonates of our most profound wish for a stabile identity, safety
and belonging.25
One of several hot tempered arguments in Lowenthal’s The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History highlights the centrality of
childhood references within the heritage discourse. Lowenthal
seems to be of the opinion that childhood elements in heritage are
tools in a conspiracy planned by those who want to legitimize their
specific version of the past.26 However, as we will see, the childhood card is not always flagged as a result of systematic, and conscious, strategies.
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Notions of childhood and maritime heritage in the
Stockholm region
An extensive demilitarization took place in the archipelago east of
Stockholm a few years after the end the Cold War and vast areas
were made available for cottage owners and the tourism enterprises. A similar process took place in other regions of the Baltic Sea
basin as well. Since the beginning of the 1990s political programs
on national and supra national level have been formulated to encourage the development of maritime heritage around the Baltic
Sea. The EU’s interest in this heritage has been expressed through
both symbolic and economic rhetoric: referring to the Hanseatic
League hopes have been voiced of a possibility to create a peaceful
and productive region that the Baltic Sea once was. In addition, the
development of maritime heritage attractions has been thought to
cure unemployment that followed upon deindustrialization and
demilitarization in the region. For the Baltic Sea nations the rhetoric has echoed that of EU’s, but the symbolic content expressed
on the national level has originated from national narratives and
references to a common European heritage have been few. Hence,
among both public and private stakeholders in Sweden the engagement in Swedish maritime heritage is still considerable.27
The significance of the constellation of heritage-childhood-tourism depends on the context. Thus, just to mention a couple of examples from the Baltic Sea region, in Latvia there is an increase
in the number of Russian tourists at the seaside resort of Jurmala.
During the Soviet Union this resort was a tremendously popular
destination for Russian tourists. With the fall of Soviet, however, the Russians disappeared, but after the turn of the century the
Russians are returning in large numbers for nostalgic reasons.28
Could it be that the Russian tourists want to return to the idyllic
holidays of their childhood? And in Germany several museums
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have opened based on the specific nostalgic register, Ostaliga, that
recalls the times in East Germany. One of the museums, DDR-Museum der Alltagskultur, opened in 2006 and it displays everyday
life of East Germany. According to Roberta Bartoletti, childhood
nostalgia is a crucial fuel for the existence of these museums.29
Let us now take a look into a tiny museum located in Stockholm archipelago. This is the place (see pictures below) where
Anders Franzén worked as an autodidact marine archaeologist
from 1950. He died in 1993. Franzén detected several ship wrecks
during his carrier as a marine archaeologist and in 1961 he was
one of the managers during the salvage of a regal ship Vasa that
sank in 1628. Franzén’s cabin could be regarded as the cradle of
the modern maritime heritage in Sweden, for without Franzén’s
achievements one of the most successful museums in Stockholm,
the Vasa museum, would not exist. And without the Vasa ship, the
crown jewel within the Swedish maritime heritage, the narrative
of the Swedish naval exploits would be far less tangible. Both the
Vasa ship’s so-called majestic materiality and Franzén’s seemingly
heroic achievements underline a core element in Swedish popular
history, that the Swedish fleet once ruled the waves of the Baltic
Sea.
However, almost nothing in and around Franzén’s museum refer to this grandiose naval history. Instead the interior of the cabin
conveys an atmosphere and the aesthetics of a boy’s bedroom from
roughly the middle of the 20th century.
The single room cabin is cosy and playfully overloaded with all
sorts of paraphernalia: maps, souvenirs, archaic weapons, modern
shell cases, posters, flags, toy models, figurines, a human skull, all
sorts of badges, a bunk bed etc. Very little here indicates that Franzén was a crucial agent in the construction of an imposing Swedish
national maritime history. The room conveys a feeling of privacy.
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The dimensions are almost cosy. The decoration and furnishing
look boyish.
Just outside the cabin at a jetty lies a boat that is used for ship
wreck tours. In this part of the archipelago there are many wrecks.
A customs office resided here from 1636 to 1927. This resulted
in busy shipping traffic and obviously a lot of losses of ships. The
tours have been running for a couple of years. There are basically
two types of tours: the cheaper one consists of a trip to locations
where wrecks lie on the sea bottom. The passengers watch films
from the wrecks, filmed by divers, and a recorded voice inform
the passengers about the story of the wrecks. The person telling
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Two glimpses (p. 193 and 194) of the interior from Anders Franzén’s museum. Photos by: Christian Widholm
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the stories, Herman Lindqvist, is a famous amateur historian (at
least in Sweden), known for his ability to dramatize bygone days.
The more expensive tour includes an ROV-vehicle that films the
wrecks live.
I have interviewed one of the managers of the ship wreck tours
who is also the curator of the Franzén museum. He is actually the
director of most of the touristic attractions at this destination. He
runs a tourist centre that resides in an old customs house that is
protected by the Swedish National Heritage Board. There is also an
exhibition in the house that displays how this community looked
like roughly one hundred years ago. The rent is paid by the municipality and the two employed get their salary from the jobcentre.
The manager that I interviewed is in his late 60s. He is a full-blown
entrepreneur with a neo-liberal perspective on business and politics. At the same time, he appears very conservative. He dislikes
the traces of modernization at this seaside destination, e.g. concrete piers and the petrol station, probably from the 1950s to the
70s. Thus, he wants to restore the place to what it looked like during the seemingly picturesque late 19th century.
As an obvious point of reference the Vasa ship was mentioned
a few times during the interview. Rather spontaneous, however,
without me asking about his childhood, he told me that he recalled
how thrilled he was, as a boy, when he watched the live television broadcast of the salvage of the Vasa ship in 1961. But at the
same time as this childhood memory probably is nurtured here, at
the Swedish Mecca of ship wrecks, he appeared to forcefully distance himself from anything that could be regarded as childish.
He told me that he was dissatisfied with the first recording of the
narrative that passengers listen to during the ship wreck tours. I
assume that the famous amateur historian overdramatized during
the recording, it is his distinguishing-mark, the informant touched
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upon this, and he said – obviously meaning that overdramatizing
is childish – that he did not want the ship wreck tours to resemble
“Bolibompa”, which is a tv-show for small children that has been
broadcasted for more than two decades in Sweden.
Another maritime heritage stakeholder in the Stockholm area is
Martin Eriksson. He is a well-known face in Sweden because of his
former carrier as the rather successful pop-singer E-type. Eriksson
is an entrepreneur in what we might call the Viking business. He
is the owner of the Viking restaurant “Aifur” in the tourist dense
Old Town of Stockholm and a former owner of a Viking shop, “Aifur’s plunder”, which also was located in the Old Town. Both the
restaurant and the shop appear as seemingly serious enterprises
with an ambition to uphold a healthy distance to so-called false
interpretations of the Viking world.30
On the homepage of the restaurant it is stated that: “Aifur Restaurant & Bar is named after the legendary Viking ship Aifur and the result of 15 years of accumulated knowledge and research about life, food and culture from the years 700–1100, merged
with skilled and knowledgeable staff ”.31 The ambition to live up to
rigid authenticity standards was also made salient in a newspaper
interview about the shop “Aifur’s plunder” when it opened in 2013:
”There is too much knick-knack [in the Old Town], there are plastic Viking helmets, clown Vikings, t-shirts with misspelled texts
and moose motifs. This is rubbish, nothing more nothing less.
[But my shop] is a serious Viking shop”.32 Among other objects,
the shop sold replicas of objects displayed at the National History
Museum in Stockholm and the cutlery that is used in the restaurant “Aifur”.33 The shop was, however, closed down one year after it
opened, in spite of the rigid authenticity standards.
Even though the business is presented as serious it also appears
to be somewhat playful, even boyish. For example, in the photo
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gallery of the restaurant’s homepage there are both conventional,
and seemingly serious, pictures of the restaurant interior and pictures of playful adult men dressed and armed as Vikings. Another
childhood element is memories of childhood that seem to have
been an important incentive for the Eriksson’s Viking interpretations:
If you understand [the Viking island] Birka you also understand [the lake] Mälaren [where the island is located]
and Sweden’s history, but you can’t ever understand it
fully. I’ve returned to Birka every summer since I was a
child and I’m still surprised [when I get there]. My Mother
was a history teacher, daddy wrote books and we went to
this place every summer, in our old sailing boat. To go for
walks, then my parents told me stories, and just to lay on
the deck, enjoying the sunshine and read books. Birka is
relaxation at the same time as it is a monument.34
Then the third heritage stakeholder. This real enthusiast is in his
70s with a character that differs a lot from Eriksson’s personae. He
is involved in the development of a heritage project in the outer
parts of the archipelago. The project which still is in a planning
phase aims to construct a heritage centre that will be more than a
tourist attraction. The plan is to erect a building that can be used
for education, research and tourism experiences. The prospectus
(which I will not reveal the source of for the sake of anonymity)
says that the centre will be
a knowledge centre for [the island] and the Baltic Sea. It
will make the maritime heritage visible and accessible at
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the place where it actually happened. It will be a place for
tourists to experience and to be inspired; a place for high
school pupils to learn and to understand; and a place for
researchers to create knowledge.
Every part of the project appears sincere and the architect drawings depict a rather vast but tasteful building with a discreet exterior that blends in with the surroundings. The project has received
funds from the Swedish National Heritage Board but the informant told me that more funds are needed and that both public
and private financiers will be contacted. During the interview this
heritage entrepreneur touched upon the problem of selfishness,
gentrification and privatizations which he thought is widespread
today. He implied that these evils threaten a dynamic archipelago
and also his project. He is a member of an association that has
published opinion letters to the local press. The association wants
the Swedish state to remain as the land owner of the island where
the project is located and where the informant has a cottage. Consequently, they oppose another association and the municipality
in favour of the privatization of the island. In a letter to the press
the informant and his peers express concern for the island’s future.
They fear the process of privatizations seen in other parts of the
archipelago where deserted islands, according to the letter, only
awakens three weeks of the year when cottage owners return to
their “summer paradise” with signs stating “private property”. And
the letter ends with a question to their antagonists: “Is this what
you call a living archipelago?”
During the interview the informant mentioned his seemingly
idyllic childhood summers on the island. He said that he used to
operate pilot boats and that he collected weather data for the Swedish National Weather Institute (probably he was in his late teens by
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then). He also told me how his newly renovated cottage looked like
when he was a child and that his father erected the house.
Childhood – an innocent trump card?
There is certainly a fair amount of playfulness within Martin Eriksson’s Viking interpretations. However, there is also a common relation to serious facts in all the enterprises presented above. The rigid fact standards connects to the new wave in Sweden of popular
interest in history that the historian Samuel Edquist has analysed.
This popular interest in history puts facts in the forefront. Thus,
the motto seems to be that real history has to do with facts, not
theory and problematizations – if professional historians wants to
deal with that it is up to them. In addition, Edquist says, the popular interest is characterized by the traits of an older version of
schoolbook history with a weakness for monarchs and war.35 The
heritage practices’ obsession with facts could be understood as a
business that wants to be regarded as serious and rational, or the
opposite of anything that might as childish. But, then, what about
the references to childhood?
Memories of and notions about childhood are represented in
several ways in the examples above. To some extent they resonate
of the theoretical perspectives stating that heritage is a quest for
safety and stability, and also, that it can be an expression the seemingly personal and genuine, thus a-political.
The setting for the enterprises in this study could not be seen as
a context in flux. But perhaps it would be possible to place them
within a framework of prolonged social transformations. In the
empirical examples we can trace both outright and implicit critique of these transformations: One of the informants thinks that
the infrastructure of the latter half of the 20th century, even though
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it can be regarded as rather old by now, is ugly at the destination of
his tourism business and instead he wants to promote the picture
of the supposedly picturesque society from the turn of the 20th
century. This informant’s opinions sometimes appear as disguised
expressions of rather salient political views. Implicitly, this informant also criticises the so-called radical history writing and heritage
practices of the 1970s when the age of Greater Sweden during the
17th century was devalued and the society of the turn of the 20th
century was presented as a highly unequal class society.36
Another informant criticizes privatizations and gentrifications
of the archipelago, which to some extent are results of demilitarization in the region and a general tendency among politicians and
associations of the civil society to advocate the sell-out of public
resources. The same informant, paradoxically, seems to lay claim
to the island as his own, since it was here he spent a good deal of
his upbringing. He knows the island and do not want anyone to
change the surroundings, apart from himself. The house his father built has been enlarged and modernized and now he wants
to erect a heritage centre that, even though it looks inconspicuous in the architect drawings, probably will stand out in the small
scale village on the island. And the entrepreneur in the Viking
business oppose turistification of the Old Town in Stockholm, i.e.
the commodification of the past, especially the age of the Vikings.
The decay of poor copies for sale in the Old Town is contrasted to
his genuinely personal memories of an idyllic childhood on the
Viking island Birka.
The Viking entrepreneur’s memories of a commitment in the
world of Vikings already during his childhood resemble a quality
hallmark of the knowledge he produces today about the Vikings.
The childhood references are a naturalization of that knowledge.
Thus, in front of a backdrop of childhood innocence disapproval
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of contemporary matters (e.g. mass tourism and commercialism)
is expressed at ease. A similar line of reasoning can be applied to
the wreck tour administrator. His sometimes overt political views
are toned down when the childhood trump card is flagged and his
determined opinions of contemporary society are endowed by a
touch of a-political innocence. At the same time, it is important to
uphold a distance to anything that could been seen as childish –
the heritage business is a serious matter.
At this stage I would like to remind of the unconscious dimension. To treat the childhood references as conscious strategies for
the benefit of one’s particular perspective on the past, present and
future is not fertile. Rather, it is probably a bit more productive to
treat the references as culturally constructed knee-jerks and conventions. And a possible political content in the childhood references should be regarded as side-effects.
The heritage entrepreneurs in this study represent a common
tone that resonates of memories of and notions about childhood.
Their childhood representations are not universal since it originates from the boys’ bedroom. And it is probably through an
analysis of this childhood discourse that it is possible to understand the reasons for the protection of Franzén’s cabin. Assuredly
the cabin seems to be a formidable display of authenticity, an
alluring circumstance for fact freaks, but the cabin is also a materialization of the common tone that helps recalling a particular
childhood. The tone may be vague, but it will easily seep through
the cracks of the official heritage discourses37 about everyone’s
right to their heritage and socio-economic arguments on regional development.
From this limited study it may not be possible to determine
whether the childhood references are parts of an impetus for the
heritage entrepreneurs. However, it is likely that the references
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make up of a tone, or an emotional register, which influences the
heritage enterprises.38 The references can be regarded as idiosyncratic. But to dismiss their importance as such would be a mistake since it is their idiosyncratic qualities that make them potent.
As expressions of something personal they tend not to be seen as
formulated from a system of systematic ideas. As idiosyncrasies,
they will probably not be questioned or even noticed, since the
childhood usually is looked upon as an element of the individual,
which makes it immune to the perpetual signifying contests on a
collective level in a given culture. Consequently, we tend to regard
childhood as a-political.
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NOTES
1
See e.g. Frans, F. J. Schouten, “Heritage as Historical Reality,” in Heritage, Tourism
and Society, ed. David Herbert (London: Mansell, 1995); David Lowenthal, Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998).
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2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Sabine Marschall, “Personal memory and a wider exploration of the tourism-memory nexus,” Journal of Tourism and Cultural Change 10:4 (2012).
Brian Graham and Peter Howard, “Introduction: Heritage and Identity,” in The
Ashgate research companion to heritage and identity, ed. Brian Graham & Peter
Howard (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012); Schouten, “Heritage as Historical Reality”.
The ethnographical approach is inspired by Carina Sjöholm’s method in her article
“Jakten på regional tillväxt,” Nordisk kulturpolitisk tidskrift 16 (2013).
Lowentahl, Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History, 63.
Lars-Erik Jönsson, Anna Wallette, and Jes Weinberg, Kanon och kulturarv: historia
och samtid i Danmark och Sverige, (Göteborg: Makadam in collaboration with
Centrum för Danmarksstudier, 2008), 9.
See e.g., Birgitta Svensson, ”På naturliga äventyr i kulturarvet,” in Nonstop! Turist
i upplevelseindustrialismen, ed. Tom O’Dell (Falun: Historiska media, 1999); Lotta
Braunerhielm, Plats för kulturarv och turism. Grythyttan: en fallstudie av upplevelser, värderingar och intressen (Karlstad: Karlstads universitet, 2006).
See Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence O. Ranger, The invention of tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P, 1983).
Peter Aronsson, ”Historiebrukets ekologi,” in Astrid Lindgrens världar. En studie
om kulturarv och samhällsutveckling, ed. Leif Jonsson, Leif (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2013), 107pp.
Lowentahl, Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History, 9–11.
Lowentahl, Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History, 121.
Bella Dicks, Heritage, place, and community (Cardiff: University of Wales Press,
2000), 60. A similar perspective can be found in Svensson, ”På naturliga äventyr i
kulturarvet,” 123.
Lowenthal is certainly not an advocate of heritage. See Heritage Crusade and the
Spoils of History, 122: ”To vilify heritage as biased is […] futile: bias is the main
point of heritage. Prejudiced pride in the past is not a sorry consequence of heritage; it is its essential purpose.”
Laurajane Smith, Uses of heritage, (New York: Routledge, 2006), 2, 3, 11 and 12.
Besides Smith’s Uses of Heritage this perspective is found in Lowenthal, Heritage
Crusade and the Spoils of History; Svensson, ”På naturliga äventyr i kulturarvet”;
Aronsson, ”Historiebrukets ekologi,” just to mention a few works.
Smith, Uses of heritage, 4.
Smith, Uses of heritage, 11–12; 48.
Smith, Uses of heritage, 53.
Adam Muller, “Notes toward a theory of Nostalgia: Childhood and the evocation
of the past in two European ‘heritage’ films,” New Literary History 37: 4, (2006).
205
Christian Widholm
20 Svetlana Boym, The future of nostalgia (New York: Basic Books, 2001), xiv.
21 Boym, The future of nostalgia, 8, 41–49.
22 Joe Moran, “Childhood and Nostalgia in Contemporary Culture,” European Journal of Culture Studies 5:2 (2002), 157.
23 Raphael Samuel, Theatres of Memory: Past and Present in Contemporary Culture
(London: Verso, 2012), 93.
24 Samuel, Theatres of Memory: Past and Present in Contemporary Culture, 93.
25 Moran, “Childhood and Nostalgia in Contemporary Culture,” 157–158.
26 Lowenthal, Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History, 4.
27 Beate Feldmann Eellend, Visionära planer och vardagliga praktiker: postmilitära
landskap i Östersjöområdet (Stockholm: Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis,
2013), 34–57.
28 A. Žemaitis, “History of Jūrmala”: http://www.onlatvia.com/history-of-jurmala-560 (Accessed October 25, 2016).
29 Roberta Bartoletti, ”’Memory Tourism’ and Commodification of Nostalgia,” in
Tourism and visual culture. Volume 1, Theories and concepts, ed. Peter Burns, Catharine Palmer and Jo-Anne Lester (Walingford: CAB eBooks, 2010).
30 During the time for this study the shop ’Aifur’s plunder’ was closed down. Thus,
no observation was possible.
31 Homepage for the restaurant ‘Aifur’: http://www.aifur.se/en_home (Accessed 25
October 2016)
32 Lundberg, Zandra, “E-type öppnar vikingabutik,” Aftonbladet, 30 September 2013:
http://www.aftonbladet.se/nojesbladet/article17571819.ab (Accessed 25 October
2016)
33 E-typeportalen. Unofficial homepage for E-type: http://www.e-typeportalen.
com/2013/12/besok-pa-martins-e-types-vikingaimperium/# (Accessed 25 October 2016)
34 Martin Eriksson, “E-Types guide till Birka”: http://www.birkavikingastaden.
se/2016/04/e-types-guide-till-birka/ (Accessed 25 October 2016)
35 Edquist, Samuel, ”Bilar, herrgårdar och krig,” Historisk tidskrift, 131:4 (2011),
777–778.
36 For a discussion on history and the radical 1970s see Peter Aronsson, Historiebruk: att använda det förflutna (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2004), 146pp. and 169.
37 C.f. the concept of “structure of feeling” in Raymond Williams, Marxism and literature (Oxford: Oxford U.P, 1977), 132.
38 C.f. Barbara Rosenwein’s concept of “emotional community”. Rosenwein says that
this community is a group in which people have a common stake, interests, values
and goals. The goals etc. are reached through representations of emotion with-
206
Heritage and Imaginary Childhood Landscapes
in in a system of norms and conventions. The childhood references in my study
can be treated as conventions. There are also interesting norms about childhood,
paradoxically a norm saying that you should not appear as childish. See Barbara
Rosenwein, Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages (New York: Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, 2006), 24–29.
207
Fødestrategier og civilisationsformer
En teori om Norden i et civilisationshistorisk
perspektiv
Jørgen Elsøe Jensen
Introduktion
I denne artikel redegør jeg for en ny teori om civilisationsfænomenet. Udgangspunktet er en konstatering af, hvad der i fællesskab
karakteriserer menneskers situation i de såkaldte civilisationer,
som er et liv i afhængighed af omfordelingssystemer. Dem findes
der to forskellige af, og dermed også to forskellige civilisationsformer. For at teorien kan blive konsistent, må man fastlægge betydningen af de centrale begreber, som er omdiskuterede, og hvordan
og de står i forbindelse med hinanden. På det eksterne niveau for
forklaring optræder civilisationsfænomenet i en fødestrategisk og
økonomisk-biologisk kontekst, hvor i menneskets natur og de biologiske rammer om livet har en final betydning. Den større hensigt er at beskrive og forstå de sociale relationer, der knytter sig til
civilisationsformerne og samtidigt forstå, hvorfor de er så varige.
Det korte svar er, at civilisationsformerne er en konsekvens af to
nyere generelle fødestrategier, som bygger på hver sin grundlæggende indstilling for kooperativ adfærd i menneskets natur: Den
ene bygger på slægtningefavorisering, mens den anden bygger på
reciprok altruisme. En sådan sammenkobling af civilisationsfæ208
Fødestrategier og civilisationsformer
nomenet med vilkårene for livet er en mulighed, som har åbnet
sig med de nye videnskaber om livet og om menneskets natur og
adfærd.
I den kognitive niche
Føde er grundlaget for, at alt liv kan opretholdes, og udnyttelsen
af eksistensmulighederne i et økosystem er selve selektionsfilteret i den naturlige evolution. Ad den vej er der opstået et væld
af forskellige arter og fødestrategier. For mennesket og dets hominine forgængeres vedkommende er Tooby og DeVores tese fra
1987 for længst accepteret.1 Teorien går ud på, at allerede for 6-10
mio. år siden begyndte de at indtage den såkaldte kognitive niche
i Jordens økosystemer. En biologisk niche defineres som den eksistensmulighed en organisme udnytter i et økosystem, og den kognitive tilføjelse udvider blot betydningen til også at omfatte den
aktivitet, som gør det muligt for en organisme at eliminere andre
organismers fikserede forsvar ved dels at forstå, hvad der er årsag
og virkning, og dels ved kooperativ handling.2 Til det anvender
homininerne deres evne til at danne mentale modeller af omverdenen gennem en intuitiv forståelse af fysik, biologi og psykologi.3
Det er lykkedes for homininerne at sammenfatte deres spredte
erfaringer i tre generelle fødestrategier og gennem tiden at udnytte deres potentialer i Jordens mangfoldighed af økologiske nicher
og skiftende naturgivne og selvskabte muligheder. Den slags fødestrategier, som ikke er et resultat af naturlig evolution, men af
erindring om erfaringer, kræver altid nye institutioner for at fungere, idet institutioner betegner det sæt af regler og normer for
adfærd, der skal til for at et omfordelingssystem kan fungere. Det
er med evnen til at tilpasse sin adfærd til sine egne fødestrategiers
institutionelle krav, at homininerne har påført sig biologisk, social
209
Jørgen Elsøe Jensen
og kognitiv evolution, men det er foregået inden for rammerne af
deres temmelig fikserede natur, som lægger rammerne for social
kooperation.
Den ældste af disse generelle strategier er ibrugtagningen af ild
til madlavning for o. 1.8 mio. år siden. Det er Richard Wranghams
fascinerende teori, at ild til madlavning ikke alene ændrede fordøjelsessystemet og igangsatte en hastig udvikling af hjernen, men
også fastlagde en varig mand-kvinderelation som et grundlag for
arbejds- og omfordeling.4 Denne strategi er så gammel, at en lang
række af dens følger for længst har fæstnet sig i arvemassen. De to
efterfølgende fødestrategier er derimod nye og forbundet med det
fænomen, vi kalder civilisation.
Om civilisation og civilisationer
Civilisation er et vanskeligt begreb, fordi det er blevet tillagt en
vilkårlighed af betydninger siden fremkomsten under 1700-årenes
borgerlige revolution. Dermed er det blevet umuligt at fastlæggende et betydningsindhold, som alle kan tilslutte sig.5 Fraværet af en
leksikal enhedsbetydning gør begrebet uanvendeligt i en videnskabelig sammenhæng med mindre meningsindholdet præciseres
i den aktuelle kontekst.6 Det er en forudsætning for at opstille en
konsistent teori om civilisationsfænomenet.
Civilisationer forstået som samfund med højere organisationsformer er blevet studeret siden 1800-årene, men det har hele tiden
været omdiskuteret, hvilke kriterier der må gælder for at udpege
dem. På deres hjemmeside oplister ISCSC (International Society
for the Comparative Study of Civilizations) omkring 30 anerkendte og forskellige og antyder dermed samtidig, at der findes mange
flere. I 1969 gav Norman Cantor denne fælles karakteristik, som
er almindelig accepteret, i det mindste i den angelsaksiske forsker210
Fødestrategier og civilisationsformer
verden. Civilisation betegner: “the functioning, integrated system
of ideas and institutions that constitute the whole way of life and
thought of a society over an extended period of time.” Videre hedder det hos Cantor, at civilisationer adskiller sig fra primitive kulturer i kraft af “… coherent ideas expressed in written form, and
institutions that allow for a complex organization and vocational
specialization in the society”.7 En sådan deskriptiv karakteristik
afgrænser en mængde, men den er uanvendelig til at kategorisere tilfældene i sammenlignelige grupper efter deres økonomiske
og institutionelle fællesskaber, og den er også uanvendelig til at
forklare fænomenet. Udpegning af en mængde fungerer som det
første nødvendige skridt, før en analyse af et materiale kan foregå.
Civilisationsfænomenet kan selvfølgelig studeres på samme
måde som alle andre historiske fænomener; det har blot en større
tidslig og rumlig skala. Derfor adskiller en empirisk funderet teori
om civilisation sig ikke fra andre lignende teoribygninger. De er
blot helhedsopfattelser, som fastlægger betydningen af de centrale
begreber, og hvordan og på hvilke abstraktionsniveauer de står i
forbindelse med hinanden. Empirisk funderede teorier er imidlertid deskriptive og statiske og må nødvendigvis betjene sig af et
eksternt forklaringsniveau, som kan redegøre for den skabende
dynamik. På det niveau er det evnen til at regulere sin adfærd for
at opnå biologiske fordele af nye fødestrategier, som tiltrækker sig
opmærksomhed. Civilisationsfænomenet må betragtes som et led
i menneskets og dets forgængeres lange historiske rejse gennem
selvpåført institutionel evolution i den hensigt at skaffe sig biologiske fordele af nye generelle fødestrategier. Det ligger i direkte forlængelse af Annalesskolen, hvis medlemmer for længst har peget
på, at en forklaring på civilisationsfænomenet kun kan gives ved
at inddrage alle andre relevante videnskaber. Målet for dem var et
integreret historiefag, ikke et isoleret.8
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Jørgen Elsøe Jensen
Min teori om civilisation tager udgangspunkt i en simpel iagttagelse om den mængde, der almindeligvis betegnes som civilisationer. I dem befinder mennesker sig en bestemt situation – at
leve i afhængighed af fungerende omfordelingssystemer for skabte
værdier. Jeg reserverer begrebet civilisation til at betegne selve livssituationen, som er et conditio sine qua non for civilisationsfænomenet, mens civilisationer betegner den mængde af fortidige og
nutidige samfundskonstruktioner, som fødestrategierne kommer
til udtryk i. Situation, forstået som generel fødestrategi, institutionel tilpasning og social samværsform, er forudsætningen for eksistens. Afskeden med selvforsyningsevnen træder dermed frem
som den centrale begivenhed, og den vigtigste opgave i al civilisationshistorie består i at beskrive og forklare det komplicerede samspil af forudsætninger og omstændigheder, som førte til afskeden
og realiseringen af et liv i afhængighed.
Civilisationsformerne
Afskeden er taget i to forskellige historiske sammenhænge, og selv
om den førte til den samme afhængighed af et omfordelingssystem, så adskiller de bagvedliggende strategier sig grundlæggende
fra hinanden. I den ældste har et segment fravalgt selvforsyningsevnen for i stedet at tage sig til rette af det, andre har produceret
(klassisk civilisation), i den yngste måtte geografisk adskilte producentgrupper samarbejde om at producere og udveksle nødvendighedsartikler til livets opretholdelse på et udviklet plan (vestlig
civilisation).
Den klassiske strategi knytter sig indirekte til det primitive jordbrug, som begyndte at udvikle sig i Den Frugtbare Halvmåne for
10.000-13.000 år siden. De primitive jordbrugeres mere effektive økonomi fik den konsekvens, at befolkningskoncentrationen i
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Fødestrategier og civilisationsformer
særlig frugtbare områder steg så meget, at den spontane sociale
kontrol begyndte at svigte.9 Det trak en rivalisering om ressourcerne med sig og åbnede en mulighed for, at eliter af krigere og
trosforvaltere kunne skille sig ud som et autoritært segment, der
betjener sig af tvang som et middel til at ekstrahere værdier til sig
selv.10 Afhængigheden er kun til fordel for dem, som tiltager sig
magt til at opkræve og har midlerne til betale et tjenerskab for
at gennemføre den, mens de udbyttede påtvinges et tab. Al klassisk civilisation er fast forankret i denne arkaiske økonomi, der
kan bredes ud over enhver form for produktion, således også den,
der er bærer af den vestlige civilisationsform. For den klassiske
fødestrategi er det derfor uden betydning, hvordan produktionen
foregår eller hvilket naturgrundlag, der udnyttes; klassiske civilisationers fællesnævner er alene ekstraktionen af værdier og det
socialpolitisk ulige forhold mellem mennesker, som Eric R. Wolf
allerede anførte i 1966.11 Det er en relation, der hersker mellem
vogtere og deres kreaturer.
Den elitære udbytning indvirker altid alvorligt på det menneskelige miljø i elitære samfund. Eliter ser med foragt på dem, de
udbytter, og de forsøger på alle måder at fastholde dem i en underordnet socialpolitiske situation, så de bliver ude af stand til at agere
politisk. Set fra deres synspunkt er den producerende del af befolkningen undergivne, man må holde i ave og skille sig ud fra – i rigdom, klædedragt, manerer, lokalisering. De mentale konsekvenser
for de udbyttede er om end endnu mere fatale. De befinder sig i et
fjendtligt socialt miljø, som præges af konstant undertrykkelse og
vilkårlighed. Det trækker dybe skygger af mistillid og misantropi
ind i deres sindstilstand. Det dystre mentale landskab medvirker i
høj grad til at gøre elitære samfund dysfunktionelle og økonomisk
tilbagestående, præget som de er af vold, undertrykkelse og stærke
sociale skel.12
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Jørgen Elsøe Jensen
Den vestlige strategi bygger derimod på samarbejde mellem geografisk adskilte, men gensidigt afhængige producenter, der udnytter hver sin naturressource og udveksler deres produktion af
nødvendighedsvarer over et marked. Denne strategi er integreret
i det jernforbrugende plovbrug, der udbredte sig i det transalpine
Nordvesteuropa i 1000- og især i 1100-årene.13 Plovbruget var i og
for sig blot en udvidelse af det samarbejde, almindelige mennesker altid har praktiseret, men på det langt mere sofistikerede plan,
som markedet tillod. De, der betjener sig af denne fødestrategi,
har overlevelse som primært sigte. Derfor udveksler de ligeværdige arbejdsværdier og deres samfund bliver ofte egalitære og demokratiske.14 Den gensidige afhængighed er civilisationsformens
domesticerende element, for de involverede må nødvendigvis tilpasse deres adfærd til de institutioner, der er nødvendige for funktionaliteten af det økonomiske arrangement. Vestlig civilisation
præges tilsvarende af moralske og tillidsskabende fællesskaber, der
værner sig mod fribyttere. De økonomiske og biologiske fordele
var gennemgribende. Karl Polanyi beskrev allerede i 1944 forskellene på de to omfordelingssystemer.15
Konsekvenserne af fødestrategier
Det civiliserede menneske må nødvendigvis tilpasse sin adfærd
til den fødestrategi, som opretholder den afhængige livssituation.
De tilhørende institutioner drejer sig kort og godt om at undgå et
sammenbrud for den fordelagtige økonomi og udnytte dens potentialer inden for den givne ramme af økologiske og historiske
omstændigheder. Derfor er de institutionelle miljøer lige så varige,
som fødestrategierne. Det er med evnen til institutionel tilpasning
af sin adfærd, at homininerne har opnået biologisk succes og samtidig modelleret på sig selv, fordi kravet om tilpasning selekterer
214
Fødestrategier og civilisationsformer
de fra, der ikke har den nødvendige kognitive og sociale kapacitet.
Resultatet kan med tiden fæstne sig som arveligt betingede egenskaber, men menneskets to civilisationsbærende fødestrategier har
udviklet sig inden for de sidste 6-10.000 år, så tilpasningen findes
udelukkende på et institutionelt niveau.
Det er fødestrategierne, som er civilisationsformernes varige
grundlag, og det er den sociale, mentale og kognitive tilpasning,
som er de varige følger. Derfor følger de to civilisationsformer hver
sit karakteristiske og ret ufravigelige spor og vil gøre det, så længe
de to fødestrategier eksisterer. Denne identifikation af det varige
har vidtrækkende konsekvenser for historiefaget, hvor der findes
en stærk tradition for at fortolke den historiske udvikling som en
konsekvens af tilfældigheder. De spiller imidlertid en underordnet rolle i forhold til det varige. Mennesket kan ikke undslippe de
krav, deres fødestrategier konfronterer dem med, men fordi de
udspringer i de to meget forskellige grundindstillinger for social
samarbejde i menneskets natur, altså slægtningefavorisering16 og
reciprok altruisme,17 selekterer de for vidt forskellige menneskelige egenskaber. De civilisationsbærende fødestrategier renskærer
to menneskelige arketyper.
Det er usædvanligt, at der inden for den samme art har udviklet
sig et segment, hvis grådighed og rovdyradfærd vender sig mod
en bred mængde af artsfæller, og det er måske lige så usædvanligt, at en bred mængde har fundet sammen i et fællesskab om
overlevelsen, men endnu ikke udviklet et effektivt værn mod sine
udbyttere. Fødestrategier tjener imidlertid et mål i den naturlige
verden, ikke et kvalitativt. Mennesket skaber selv sine adfærdsmiljøer på grundlag af den nedarvede natur og den adfærdsmæssige
selektion, som fødestrategierne kræver for at kunne fungere. Set
fra den synsvinkel er institutionel selektion og historie et artsspecifikt fænomen, der knytter sig direkte til vilkårene for livet, til
215
Jørgen Elsøe Jensen
mulighederne i den kognitive niche og til grundindstillinger og
basale kategorier i menneskets natur.
Som det blandt andet er blevet påpeget at Francis Fukuyama har
den klassiske strategi eksisteret gennem adskillige årtusinder, og
de mange kendte former for institutionalisering af magten er kun
et udtryk for, at den denne fødestrategi har haft tid til at udvikle en
bred vifte af organiserede tvangsmidler til at sikre ekstraktionen
og bekrige indre og ydre fjender.18 Ikke desto mindre så er disse
forskelle at regne for variationer og repetitioner over det samme
fødestrategiske grundtema, så de er blot et udtryk for den kreative indpasning af en arkaisk og elitær økonomi i mangfoldigheden
af Jordens historiske og naturgivne miljøer. Den vestlige civilisationsform har kun eksisteret i ca. 900 år, og den var oprindelig
kun udbredt i et ganske lille hjørne af verden, fordi plovbruget
var afgrænset af de naturgivne forhold, men til gengæld udbredt
blandt en stor gruppe af mennesker. Den eksisterede som en geografisk isoleret fødestrategi, der lige som alle mulige andre måder
at producere på kunne gøres til genstand for elitær udpresning.
Desuden fandtes ekstraktionen som en mulighed i det varebytte,
de gensidigt afhængige producenter måtte forlade deres overlevelse på. Det var den mulighed, der blev fristillet med den borgerlige
revolution i 1700-årene. Moderne vestlig civilisation kan med rette
betragtes som en hybrid af de to civilisationsformer.
Vestlig civilisation
Vestlig civilisation har sit ophav i det plovbrug, der udbredte sig i
Nordvesteuropa i 1000- og især i 1100-årene med et tyngdepunkt
ca. 1140-1170.19 Overalt fra Loire i Frankrig til samtidens Danmark
og fra England til ind i Østeuropa kom hjulploven i brug som det
centrale markredskab, og omlæggelsesprocessen fortsatte indtil al
216
Fødestrategier og civilisationsformer
brugbar jord var lagt under plov hen mod overgangen til 1300-årene og nogle steder i det af germanere koloniserede Østeuropa endnu længere.20 Plovbrug kræver en stenfri og fugtighedsbevarende
jord, og markafgrøderne var klimafølsomme. Det satte grænserne
for udbredelsen: Syd for Loire var det for varmt. Mod vest lå havet,
og mod nord og mod øst var det for koldt og dyrkningssæsonen
for kort. Plovbruget ebbede ud ved sine naturgivne og økologiske
grænser.
Omlæggelsen til plovbrug bestod af en transformationsperiode
og en ekspansionstid. Først flyttede de eksisterende landsbyer til
egnede steder for opdyrkning, hvis det var nødvendigt. Dernæst
flyttede nye generationer herfra ud i landskaberne til nye egnede
steder for opdyrkning. Antallet af landsbyer steg, og befolkningerne voksede formentlig til mere end det tredobbelte gennem hele
perioden indtil grænserne for vækst var nået. Gennem udbredelsestiden voksede agerjordens andel fra måske omkring 5% til hen
mod 30% i datidens Danmark, hvis østlige del især blev stærkt
opdyrket. Noget tilsvarende gjaldt overalt på de store nordvesteuropæiske agerbrugssletter. Hjulploven omstrukturerede agerbruget, som blev mere frugtbart, alt imens omlæggelsen åbnede
for vækst i de tre klassiske produktionsfaktorer, kapital, jord og
arbejde. Sammenhængen er enkel: Med hjulploven kunne langt
større arealer tages ind til opdyrkning end med den gammeldags
ard, og samtidig kunne brakperioderne nedsættes ved at overgå
fra tovangsbrug (et års besåning, et års hvile) til trevangsbrug (to
års besåning, et års hvile). De større marker og intensiveringen af
driften trak betydelig mere arbejde ind i agerbruget.
Før udbredelsen kunne komme i gang, måtte man imidlertid
først have løst et praktisk problem og overvinde en barriere fra
fortiden. Det praktiske problem bestod i, at hvis man ville nyde
fordelene af plovbrugets avancerede økonomi, måtte arbejdet de217
Jørgen Elsøe Jensen
les efter ressourcernes naturlige forekomst. Hjulploven forbrugte nemlig store mængder af jern,21 det slides ganske enkelt af de
skærende jerndele ved gangen gennem jorden, og samtidens jern
var slidsvagt og uhomogent på grund af fremstillingsmåden.22 I
lavlandene var skovene allerede trængt tilbage i århundrederne
forinden.23 Ofte var forekomsterne af malm til jernudvinding desuden af en dårlig kvalitet. Det store jernforbrug og ressourcernes
geografiske fordeling medførte, at agerbrugerne på de store sletter
allerede fra begyndelsen var ude af stand til selv at producere det
nødvendige redskabsjern. Træ og malm fandtes til gengæld i de
bjergrige randegne i det sydlige og østlige Frankrig, det vestlige
og sydlige Tyskland, i det vestlige England og i Norge, Sverige og
i Skånelandene. Her tog jernudvindingen stærkt til gennem 1000og især i 1100-årene, viser en ny norsk undersøgelse.24
I plovbrug fungerer jern både som et effektivt skæremateriale
og som et lager af energi, der forbruges under dyrkningsprocessen. Dets rolle kan forekomme os ubetydelig, men med omlæggelsen blev jern en økonomisk nøglefaktor, som overlevelsen afhang
af. Den ene gruppe havde brug for jern til at producere mad, den
anden havde brug for mad til at producere jern. Nogen måtte tage
sig af udvekslingen mellem de geografisk adskilte, men gensidigt
afhængige producenter. De slog sig ned sig, hvor to transportkorridorer mødtes, den ene fra det lokale opland, den anden fra
vejene over havet. I udbredelsesperioden blev der anlagt mellem
4-5.000 nye handelsbyer i Nordvesteuropa. Markedsøkonomi blev
til et omfordelingssystem for produktionsmidler og føde, som alles overlevelse afhang af. Inden for jernudvindingen gik en voldsom teknologiudvikling i gang styret af kapitalinteresser og magt
(højovne, den indirekte metode), og også skibsteknologien kom
under stærk udvikling.
Effekten var overvældende – massiv befolkningstilvækst, ud218
Fødestrategier og civilisationsformer
bredt markedsøkonomi, kooperativ adfærd, fredeligt samkvem
og kristne fællesskaber. Processen fremstår i det ydre som markante og synkrone forandringer i det nordvesteuropæiske kulturlandskab – flytning af eksisterende landsbyer og udflytning herfra
i mange nye, kirkebyggeri, især i det nyligt kristnede Sydskandinavien, nye åbne landskaber med overdrev og pløjede vange, nye
handelsbyer og funktionel tilpasning til handel i de eksisterende,
ny infrastruktur af veje mellem land og by og ruter over havet, og
i de omliggende højlande jernovne og trækulsmiler. Lugten af jord
og røg blandede sig med de visuelle indtryk af det nye kulturlandskab. Alle aspekter af den nye fødestrategi og det adfærdsregulerende miljø, der fulgte med, gav sig til kende, for kulturlandskaber
er altid en orkestrering af de fremherskende relationer mellem
mennesker og mellem mennesker og naturen.
Når overlevelsen afhænger af, at føde og produktionsmidler udveksles gennem et marked, er det nødvendigt at beskytte og sikre
systemets funktionalitet ved at opbygge og vedligeholde økonomiske institutioner, der sigter på at eliminere egoistisk adfærd. Det
drejede sig om at minimere transaktionsomkostningerne, som er
det centrale element i alle økonomiske institutioner.25 Det var den
barriere, man måtte overvinde, og ikke en teknologisk, for plovbruget havde man kendt til i mindst 1000 år og jernudvinding
endnu længere. Forudsætningen for det udbredte plovbrug var,
at folk domesticerede sig og lærte at leve i fred. Samtidig åbnede
det langt mere komplicerede jordbrug for, at bønder og købmænd
kunne lagdele sig efter deres evner til at håndtere deres bedrift og
for at planlægge, tale, regne og forhandle. Et lag af gårdmænd og
købmænd skilte sig ud, deres større husstandsøkonomi gav dem
en reproduktiv fordel frem for andre. Generation efter generation
af deres afkom måtte stræbe efter at opnå de samme fordele, for
der eksisterede stort set ingen muligheder for social avancement,
219
Jørgen Elsøe Jensen
og det fremmede konkurrencen og støttede middelklasseværdier som at være arbejdsom og orientere sig, for de, der klarede sig
bedst, fik også flest overlevende børn.26 Der var en klar selektion for høj intelligens i en række vestlige samfund fra middelalderen og til ind mod midten af 1800-årene.27 Plovbruget krævede
med andre ord en investering i både fysisk kapital i form af henlæggelser i husholdningernes investeringsfonde til redskabsjern,
bygninger, redskaber mv. og i social og human kapital i form af
de færdigheder, som var nødvendige for at vedligeholde den fordelagtige fødestrategi. Det var en erobring, måske den vigtigste i
menneskets historie, men den førte ikke til et effektivt værn mod
elitær udbytning.
Forudsætningerne og konsekvenserne
I og for sig bestod forskellen mellem primitiv og højere jordbrug
blot i skalaen af de adfærdskrav, som hørte til. De primitive jordbrugere opgav ikke selvforsyningsevnen, og deres fødestrategi
gav som sådan ikke anledning til civilisation, men deres arbejde
krævede, at de domesticerede sig og både akkumulerede social og human kapital. Det nordvesteuropæiske plovbrug krævede
en endnu højere grad af domesticering og udviklingen af sociale,
kognitive og intellektuelle færdigheder, fordi det er forudsætningen for, at fødestrategiens omfordelingssystem kan fungere. Plovbrug udbredte sig i et område af verden, hvor økonomisk fordel af
sofistikeret kooperation mellem fremmede kunne få fodfæste. De
mange forudsætninger opstod i hver deres kontekst, men skabte
på et tidspunkt og i en geografisk ramme det miljø, som fremmede evnen for social kooperation mellem fremmede, der er en
grundindstilling i menneskets natur. Plovbruget var en generel
fødestrategi, der forudsatte adfærdsmæssig tilpasning til de tilhø220
Fødestrategier og civilisationsformer
rende institutioner. Det er det redskab, mennesker må tage i brug
for at opnå økonomiske fordele af nye generelle fødestrategier. Set
fra den synsvinkel var Nordvesteuropas bønder og jernudvindere
Jordens første civiliserede almue.
Alle plovbrugets tekniske og driftsmæssige forudsætninger var
udviklet gennem et årtusinde forinden af de primitive jordbrugere selv, mens alle de øvrige forudsætninger i form af et marked,
infrastrukturer, handelspladser, omsætningsmidler og ejendomsret knyttede sig til de elitære behov. Plovbrugets udbredelse er
utænkelig uden eksistensen af klassiske civilisationer i denne del
af verden, som desuden udviklede sig i en særlig retning, fordi
den katolske kirke i høj grad medvirkede til den individualisering,
som førte til en kapitalisering af det ejede, og til den ejendomsret, der er et særkende for Europa.28 Handel har eksisteret i alle
elitære samfund, fordi eliter skiller sig ud gennem et demonstrativt forbrug. Men der er en grundlæggende forskel på, om det, der
handles med, er nødvendigt for livets opretholdelse eller til socialt
forbrug, om det er produktionsmidler og føde på den ene side eller
husgeråd, våben og luksusgenstande på den anden.
Med plovbruget blev fødeproduktionen afhængig af at forbruge
et lager af kulstof, som er bundet i et oparbejdet råstof. Vestlig civilisation indskriver sig i den lange historie om, hvordan mennesket
og dets hominine forgængere har evnet at bruge ild som et middel
til biologisk succes og tilpasset sin sociale adfærd som en konsekvens. Denne erfaring med en energiforbrugende produktion var
derfor temmelig uproblematisk at bygge videre på, da lejligheden
bød sig flere århundrede senere, det historiske forløb frem til denne hændelse i øvrigt ufortalt. Der fandtes et økonomisk potentiale
i at forene de sameksisterende civilisationsbærende fødestrategier, men deres institutioner er moralsk uforenelige. I opposition
til den traditionelle elite greb det vesteuropæiske borgerskab om
221
Jørgen Elsøe Jensen
produktionen og tilpassede plovbrugets institutionelle grundlag
til den variant af en ekstraktiv økonomi, som køb og salg via et
marked åbnede for. Siden spredte denne hybrid af to civilisationsformer sig til andre områder på Jorden med elitære samfund. Det
har givet anledning til en forbløffende syvdobling af Jordens befolkning i de 200 år mellem 1800 og 2000.29 Samtidig genererede
forbruget af nye lagre af ekstern energi og de teknologiske krav
i produktionen til arbejdskraftens uddannelse og udviklingen af
samfund med visse egalitære træk, men langt fra så markant som
inden for det oprindelige plovbrugsområde, hvor traditionen for
kooperation mellem fremmede er ældst. Vestlig civilisationsform
findes imidlertid ingen steder i rendyrkede udgaver, og den klassiske måde at tilegne sig værdier står som den moderne verdens
centrale politiske problem.
Konklusion
Plovbrug bredte sig ikke længere nord på end til datidens Danmark. Samtidens Norge og Sverige lå uden for det område, som
kunne opdyrkes med hjulplov. Til gengæld fik jernudvindingen en
stor betydning, først i det sydlige Norge, og allerede fra 1200-årene
især i Sverige på grund af de særlige gunstige ressourcer i Mellemsverige.30 Med plovbrugets udbredelse i datidens Danmark og
den stærkt tiltagende jernudvinding i de skandinaviske egne trådte folk i Norden ind i et nyt civilisatorisk fællesskab. Det knyttede
dem meget tættere sammen og forbandt dem med de øvrige regioner i Nordvesteuropa med et tilsvarende institutionsgrundlag.
Det ændrede sig ikke substantielt, da den økonomiske vækst, som
plovbruget genererede, gik i stå hen mod overgangen til 1300-årene. Det kunne ikke svare sig at opdyrke mere jord, for der måtte
være en balance mellem markjorder og græsgange af hensyn til
222
Fødestrategier og civilisationsformer
markjordenes gødningstilstand. Fødselsraten kom igen i balance med dødsraten. Pest blev bragt til verdensdelen i midten af
1300-årene og var her i 300-400 år, og det entreprenante borgerskab havde vanskeligheder med at organisere sig under den elitære
undertrykkelse før i 1600-1700-årene. Det borgerlige oprør hvilede på det, der var skabt i 1100-årene, både af produktionsformer,
infrastruktur, handel og menneskelige egenskaber. Endnu i dag
giver grænserne for udbredelsesområdet sig til kende som et skel
mellem demokratiske og autoritære traditioner, mellem mennesker der lever i tillid, og mennesker der lever i skyggen af eliter.
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Trivers, Robert L. Social Evolution. Menlo Park, California: Benjamin/Cummings, 1985.
Wickham, Chris J. Land and Power: Studies in Italian and European
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menneskeheden-er-blevet-genetisk-dummere-siden-1850
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NOTER
1
John Tooby and Irven DeVore, “The Reconstruction of Hominid evolution through strategic Modelling”, in The Evolution of Human Behavior: Primate models,
ed. Warren G. Kinzey. (Albany: SUNY Press, 1987), 183-237.
2 Stephen Pinker, The cognitive niche: Coevolution of intelligence, sociality, and
language. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107 (2010 supplement
2): 8994.
3 Stephen Pinker, The Blank Slate: The modern denial of human nature (New York:
Penguin Books, 2003), 220ff. Pinker, The cognitive niche, 8994.
4 Richard Wrangham, Catching Fire: How Cooking Made Us Human (London: Profile Books, 2010).
5 Walter B. Gallie, “Art as an Essentially Contested Concept,” Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1956): 97-114. Walter B. Gallie, ”Essentially Contested Concepts,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1956): 167-198. Walter B. Gallie, Philosophy
and the Historical Understanding (London: Chatto and Windus, 1964).
6 Fernand Braudel, A History of Civilizations. Translated by Richard Mayne (London: Penguin, 1995), 183f.
7 Norman Cantor ed., Western Civilization: Its Genesis and Destiny. (Vol. 1. Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Compagny, 1969), 8f.
8 Jensen, Civilisation, 2017.
9 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Jared Diamond, Guns,
Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York: Norton, 2002), 297ff.,
301, tabel 14.1
10 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why, 2013.
11 Eric R. Wolf, Bønder: En socialantropologisk oversigt over bondesamfundets udvikling (København: Hans Reitzel, 1973).
12 Jensen, Civilisation, 2017.
227
Jørgen Elsøe Jensen
13 For en gennemgang og litteraturhenvisning, se Jensen, Gensidig, 2010 og Jensen,
Civilisation, 2017.
14 Jensen, Gensidig, 2010.
15 Polanyi, The Great, 1944.
16 William D. Hamilton, ”The Genetic Evolution of Social Behavior,” Journal of Theoretical Biology 7 (1964): 17-52. Richard Dawkins, ”Twelve Misunderstandings
of Kin Selection,” Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie 51 (1979): 184-200. Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
17 Robert L. Trivers, ”The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism.” Quarterly Review of
Biology 46 (1971): 35–39, 47-57. Robert L. Trivers, Social Evolution (Menlo Park,
California: Benjamin/Cummings, 1985). Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). Robert Axelrod, The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New
York: Perseus Books, 2006).
18 Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 2011).
19 Georges Duby, Rural Economy and Country Life in the Medieval West (Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press, 1968), 63ff. Georges Duby, Krigare och bönder.
Den europeiska ekonomins första uppsving 600-1200. Translated by Michael Nordberg (Stockholm: Norstedts Förlag, 1981), 217. Jensen, Gensidig, 2010. Jensen, Civilisation, 2017.
20 Charles Higounet, Die deutsche Ostsiedlung im Mittelalter (Berlin: Siedler, 1986).
Rudolf Koetzschke and Wolfgang Ebert, Geschichte der Ostdeutschen Kolonisation
(Bibliographisches Institut Leipzig, 1937). Walther Kuhn, Geschichte der deutschen Ostsiedlung in der Neuzeit. 1-2. (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1955-1957). Walther Kuhn, ”Die deutsche Ostsiedlung,” in Leistung und Schicksal. Abhandlungen
und Berichte über die Deutschen Im Osten, ed. Eberhard G. Schulz (Köln/Graz,
1967), 19-35. Walther Kuhn, Vergleichende Untersuchungen zur Mittelalterlichen
Ostsiedlung (Köln/Wien: Böhlau-Verlag GmbH., 1973).
21 Grith Lerche, Ploughing Implements and Tillage Practices in Denmark from the
Viking Period to About 1800 (Herning: Poul Kristensen, 1994). Jensen, Gensidig,
2010, 209ff.
22 Vagn F. Buchwald, Iron, steel and cast iron before Bessemer (København: Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab. Historisk-filosofiske Skrifter 32, 2008).
Jensen, Civilisation, 2017.
23 Henry C. Darby, ”The Clearing of Woodland in Europe,” In Man’s Role in Changing the Face of the Earth, ed. William L. Thomas Jr., Lewis Mumford and Carl O.
228
Fødestrategier og civilisationsformer
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Sauer, Vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 183-216. Duby, Rural
Economy, 1968, 21, 69, 107f. Oliver Rackham, The History of the Countryside: The
full fascinating story of Britain’s landscape (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1986).
Chris J. Wickham, Land and Power: Studies in Italian and European Social History, 400-1200 (London: British School at Rome, 1994), 169, 193ff. Christopher C.
Dyer, Making a living in the Middle Ages: The People of Britain 850-1520 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 96. Peter Laufmann and Olaf Schulz, Deutschlands Wälder (München: Frederking & Thaler, 2010). Jensen, Civilisation, 2017.
Bengt Rundberget, “Jernets dunkle dimension. Jernvinna i sørlige Hedmark. Sentral
økonomisk faktor og premiss for samfunnsutvikling c. AD 700-1300,” (PhD diss.
Universitetet i Oslo, Det humanistiske Fakultet, 2013).
Carl Dahlman, The open field system and beyond: A property rights analysis of an
economic institution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). Jensen, Civilisation, 2017.
Gregory Clark, A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
Woodley, Anthony 2012. https://www.180grader.dk/Videnskab/
menneskeheden-er-blevet-genetisk-dummere-siden-1850
Jack Goody, The Development of the Family and Marriage in Europe (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1983). Jack Goody, The European Family: An Historico-Antropological Essay (Malden MA: Blackwell, 2000). Jensen, Civilisation, 2017.
Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations
Secretariat, The World at Six Billion, (New York: United Nations, 1999) tabel 1 p. 5.
Jensen, Gensidig, 2010.
229
Bidragydere
Sophy Bergenheim, ph.d. candidate
Department of Political and Economic Studies,
University of Helsinki
P.O. Box 54, 00014 University of Helsinki, Finland
sophy.bergenheim@helsinki.fi
Martin Dackling, fil.dr., forskare
Institutionen för historiska studier, Göteborgs universitet
Box 200, 40530 Göteborg, Sverige
+46 0705218378
martin.dackling@history.gu.se
Poul Duedahl, ph.d., lektor
Institut for Kultur og Globale Studier,
Aalborg Universitet
Kroghstræde 1, DK-9220 Aalborg Ø, Denmark
+ 45 9940 9141
duedahl@cgs.aau.dk
230
Bidragsydere
François Fulconis, assistant professor
CRET-LOG, Avignon University
337 chemin des Meinajaries, 84911 Avignon, France
francois.fulconis@univ-avignon.fr
Thierry Godbille, researcher
CRET-LOG, Aix-Marseille University
413 Avenue Gaston Berger, 13625 Aix-en-Provence, France
thierry.godbille@univ-amu.fr
Jørgen Elsøe Jensen, dr.phil., professor
Institut for Planlægning, Aalborg Universitet
Vestre Havnepromenade 5, 9000 Aalborg, Danmark
+45 22924760
joergenelsoe@gmail.com
Gilles Paché, professor, director of the University Press
CRET-LOG, Aix-Marseille University
413 Avenue Gaston Berger, 13625 Aix-en-Provence, France
illes.pache@univ-amu.fr
Bo Poulsen, dr.phil., lektor
Institut for Kultur og Globale Studier, Aalborg Universitet
Kroghstræde 1, 9220 Aalborg Ø, Danmark
+45 20582859
bpoulsen@cgs.aau.dk
231
Bidragsydere
Johanna Widenberg, fil.dr., forskarassistent
Avdelningen för agrarhistoria, Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet (SLU)
Box 7012, 750 07 Uppsala, Sverige
+46 0722336626
johanna.widenberg@slu.se
Christian Widholm, fil.dr.
Turismvetenskap, Södertörns högskola
141 89 Huddinge, Sverige
+ 46 086085027
christian.widholm@sh.se
232