



27

Erfahrung und Analyse
Experience and Analysis

Beiträge
Papers

27. Internationales Wittgenstein Symposium
27th International Wittgenstein Symposium
Kirchberg am Wechsel
8. - 14. August 2004

Erfahrung und Analyse Experience and Analysis

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Johann Christian Marek
Maria Elisabeth Reicher



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Is Everything Nameable?

C. Anthony Anderson, Santa Barbara, California

The question of the title bears on a philosophical project involving the foundations of intensional logic – the logic which would govern reasoning concerning propositions, attributes, and individual concepts. One question which arises for such a theory is whether necessarily everything falls under a concept.

Say that something is (*descriptively*) *nameable* if there could be a definite description, understandable by an idealized human being, which denotes that thing. The idealization involved is to be of just the same sort as that which is in the background of the theory of recursive functions. That theory purports to capture the epistemological notion of a function computable in principle by a human being. Considerations of longevity, sufficient calculation material, and storage space are ignored on principle. But it is always supposed that the time and memory space required are finite.

Similarly, I construe the question of whether everything falls under a concept as equivalent to the question of whether everything is nameable by a finite but idealized human being. In this sense the natural numbers are all nameable. The question is vague if the limitations are not spelled out, but the hope is that both it and the corresponding question about nameability can be clarified by studying their interaction.

One fallacious argument for the negative is this: Any usable language has only countably many expressions and hence only countably many names or descriptions. Cantor showed that there are uncountably many real numbers. Hence, not every real number can have a name. The argument is fallacious. For any countable language, there are real numbers not named by any expression of that language. It doesn't follow that there is a real number that is not named by any expression in any language.

Again, we might consider Gottlob Frege's view about functions, of which his concepts are a special case. Frege thought that functions and concepts can't be named by "complete" expressions like proper names or definite descriptions without free variables. They are supposed to be "unsaturated" and the only expressions that can "stand for" them are *incomplete* expressions – expressions with free variables or with gaps. They are thus not nameable by closed expressions.

The only argument that Frege gives for his claim occurs in (Frege 1984). There he argues that if some part of a thought were not unsaturated then the thought would not hold together into a unity. The unsaturated part of the thought is the sort of thing that can be the sense of a predicate, an incomplete expression. Oddly, he is arguing that the *sense* of a predicate, not what it stands for, a concept, is unsaturated. But the sense too would be a function. However, even if he had succeeded in showing that some functions are unsaturated, it doesn't obviously follow that they can't be named. The difficulties that the idea caused for Frege are well-known: he was driven to say things like "The concept horse is not a concept" and then to apologize for the appearance of incoherence.

There was some speculation by Alonzo Church that perhaps not everything is nameable. In lectures on the logic of sense and denotation at Princeton in 1946, he

wondered whether there might not be "ineffable real numbers". In a similar vein, Kurt Gödel, in his Princeton Bicentennial lecture (Gödel 1986), conjectures that perhaps "all things conceivable by us are denumerable". Gödel plainly is contemplating the hypothesis that the set of all things which could be named or conceived by human beings is itself countably infinite – no larger than the set of natural numbers. One can and should be impressed if the intuitions of these two logician-philosophers coincide. But neither Church nor Gödel gives any reason for accepting the hypothesis.

For the *affirmative* answer, that everything *is* nameable, we might offer an argument whose central idea comes from Leibniz. Consider any thing X whatever. Consider all of X's attributes and take their conjunction, call it F. By the principle that no two distinct things have all their attributes in common, it follows that F uniquely picks out X. Then the description "The y such that y is F" would denote X. So X is nameable.

But, firstly, it's not in evidence that for just any collection of attributes whatever there is such a thing as the conjunction of all them – if the collection is infinite, as it certainly is in the case before us – and more pointedly we are requiring that the conjunction of attributes be expressible by a predicate understandable by a finite human being. Secondly, for somewhat subtle reasons about cardinality, it is even doubtful that there can *be* a collection consisting of all the attributes of a thing. And finally, it isn't clear that the principle used, the Identity of Indiscernibles, is true if taken to be about graspable attributes.

Browerian Intuitionists might argue that everything is nameable as follows. If there exists something of a certain sort, then one must be able to construct or exhibit an example. If then there were something that is unnameable or inconceivable, then it would have to be possible to, well, conceive of it. Contradiction. It follows that it is false that something is inconceivable. As Lloyd Humberstone pointed out to me, this is as far as the Intuitionist will go with this line of reasoning. The rest of us might be tempted to conclude that everything is conceivable. Even if one accepts the Intuitionist strictures in mathematics (as I do not), to have something convincing for the present purpose, one would have to extend the verificationism beyond mathematics along the lines sketched by Dummett. But so far there has been no clear indication of the details of such an account.

Graham Priest has given an interesting reconstruction of a version of Berkeley's argument that *esse* is *percipi* (Priest 1995). Here the variant is supposed to show that *to be* is *to be conceivable*. The argument turns crucially on an application of a principle governing Hilbert's epsilon operator. Where $A[x]$ is any formula, let us take as logical axiom:

$$(H) \exists x A[x] \supset A(\epsilon x)A[x]$$

The perhaps unfamiliar expressions of the form

$$(\epsilon x)A[x]$$

are given various informal readings by logicians. One example is "an x such that x has the property A." The epsilon operator might be thought of as forming an

indefinite description. Now given an arbitrary domain, we can assign to epsilon a choice function on the non-empty sets in the power set of the domain – a function that picks out some element from each such set. Such choice functions always exist by the Axiom of Choice. Logically such interpretations are impeccable – unless one thinks, as I do not, that the Axiom of Choice is itself peccable. Thus the Hilbert principle (H) is logically valid.

Consider “x is inconceivable”. Suppose that there is some x that has this property. By H, “epsilon x, x is inconceivable” – is inconceivable. But the very epsilon expression we have formed itself conveys a conception of that entity. Contradiction. Hence everything is conceivable.

This argument cannot be used to settle our question. The terms “epsilon x A [x]” have been assigned extensions or denotations, given a domain of quantification. But they have not been given understandable intensional meanings of the sort we require. The paraphrase into English “an x which is an A” conveys why the thing fails to do the trick – this is not a denoting expression. If we could actually conceptually specify the choice function to be assigned to epsilon, the argument would work. But if there is one choice function, there are many and we do not know which to pick out and assign. This is just our original problem over again.

Further, the semantics described supposes that we are given as the domain of discourse a certain set and the choice function is defined on its power set. But if we are considering everything whatever, there is no such set and in that context the Axiom of Choice is doubtful.

Timothy Williamson observes in his review of Priest's book (Williamson 1995) that the reconstruction of Berkeley is similar to the reasoning of König's Paradox, named after the logician Jules König. König tried to prove that not every set can be well-ordered, and hence that the Axiom of Choice is false. König's original reasoning is flawed in various ways, but when it is repaired, it appears at first sight that one can use it to prove something significant about nameability, viz. that every ordinal number is nameable. If this were correct, then we would not have answered our original question, but we would know that vast numbers of things are nameable – all the ordinal numbers, themselves too numerous to be collectible into a unified set.

The argument, in spite of its surprising conclusion, is tempting; I confess to having once been persuaded by it. But it is fallacious. I turn to a semi-formal reconstruction of that argument, using the occasion to fill in some of the background for being interested in the very odd question we are currently considering.

It is my interest in establishing a foundation for intensional logic which I take to require a theory of attributes, propositions, and individual concepts. It has turned out to be heuristically very useful to do so in conjunction with the construction of a theory of “possible languages”.

The theory builds on Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, formulated so as to allow individuals (non-sets). I assume a fixed interpretation and that the variables range over everything whatever. To that theory I add these primitive predicates (and others):

Den(X,Y,Z): X denotes Y in Z

Expr(X,Y,Z): X expresses Y in Z

To give the general flavor of the theory, I state four basic axioms governing the first two notions, Denotation and

Expression. Let us call something a possible language if something expresses something in it.

A1. Nothing expresses more than one thing in a possible language.

A2. Nothing denotes more than one thing in a possible language.

A3. If two things express the same things in the same or different possible languages, then they denote the same thing in the languages (if anything).

A4. If something denotes in a possible language, then it expresses something in that language.

There are of course some idealizations here. We have assumed that possible languages do not contain ambiguities and that denotation is fixed once and for all. I suppose the most daring assumptions are that the general ideas of denoting and expressing make sense. Contra-Quine, it is assumed that synonymy across languages makes sense.

The crucial principle for the König argument in this context involves the existence of possible languages:

(N) If there exists exactly one X, such that $A[X]$, then that X has a name in some possible language.

Formally: $\exists!X A[X] \supset \exists Y \exists Z (\text{Den}(Y,X,Z) \equiv A[X])$,

“If there is an expression that is satisfied by exactly one thing, then one could name that thing, presumably as ‘the thing that uniquely satisfies the expression’”.

Now it is a theorem of set theory that every non-empty set of ordinals contains a least - a least ordinal in the natural ordering of ordinals. It is a theorem schema that:

$\exists X (\text{Ord}(X) \wedge A[X]) \supset \exists Y \{ \text{Ord}(Y) \wedge A[Y] \wedge \forall Z [(\text{Ord}(Z) \wedge A[Z]) \supset (Y \leq Z)] \}$

Now suppose that some ordinal is unnameable. Then there is a least unnameable ordinal. So in some possible language, there is a name of the least unnameable ordinal. Contradiction. Therefore, every ordinal is nameable.

Have we succeeded in showing that the vast array of ordinal numbers are capable of being named one at a time? Some of the numbers are unimaginably huge.

Agreement about what defect, if any, is present here may be difficult to secure, since the argument involves the semantical notion of “denoting”. Of course there are other notorious arguments, even paradoxical arguments, involving the semantical notions of truth, definition, definability, and the like. Nevertheless I think that it is clear that this argument does not succeed in the present instance, and why.

We are supposing that we can discuss in full generality the notion of “denoting”, not denoting in this or that language, notions perhaps definable in each case using the method of Tarski, but just plain “denoting.” One may doubt that this makes good sense, perhaps holding that denotation for any particular language must be discussed in a meta-language, and denoting for this latter in a meta-meta-language, and so on, up. But this is not really firmly established. We seem to be able to discuss denoting and naming quite generally in English and the theory I have begun to sketch above takes it for granted that the general notion does make sense. I think that we should hold on to this idea as relatively secure.

What we cannot do in such a language is just to stipulate freely what is to denote what. In particular we cannot accept as generally valid in such a language the following principle about definite descriptions:

(D) $\exists!X A[X] \supset A\{ \iota X A[X] \}$,

“If there is a unique **A**, then the **A**-thing is an **A**”.

One might claim: “I just stipulate that the definite description shall denote the unique object given by the antecedent.” No, you can’t – not if the formula **A**[*X*] itself contains the predicate ‘Den’. For then you could not be certain that there would be no conflict between the proposed stipulation and the general notion of denotation as already given. The principle (D) is not to be trusted in full generality.

The principle (N) does not exactly involve this principle, but it turns on the idea that one can introduce a name or definite description in an *extension* of the original language, and fix its denotation in the manner stipulated. This is just as doubtful.

I conclude that none of these arguments, yea or nay, concerning the question of whether everything is nameable succeeds in showing anything one way or the other. Graham Priest’s Berkelian Argument does not succeed in settling our question. An argument that seems to show that anyway all the ordinal numbers are nameable itself fails. One important negative conclusion bearing on my project is that the tempting principle (N) should be rejected.

Considerations that might help decide the matter are welcome.

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Wittgenstein's Contribution to the Understanding of Predelusional States

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Towards the end of his life, Ludwig Wittgenstein wondered (OC 421) whether he might be shaken if things such as he does not dream of at present were to happen; in other words, Wittgenstein wondered (OC 517) whether it might be possible for something to happen that threw him entirely off the rails. Wittgenstein (Z 393) answered his own questions pointing out that "it is easy to imagine and work out in full detail events which, if they actually came about, would throw us out in all our judgments". In his opinion, if he were sometime to see quite new surroundings from his window instead of the long familiar ones, i.e., if things, humans and animals were to behave as they never did before, then he should say something like 'I have gone mad'. However, Wittgenstein added a crucial remark: "*aber das wäre nur ein Ausdruck dafür, daß ich es aufgebe, mich auszukennen*" ("but that would merely be an expression of giving up the attempt to know my way about").

Trying to distinguish what judgments cannot be revised on any evidence, Rush Rhees (Rhees 2003, 118-119) comments that Wittgenstein himself once put it in this way: assuming that door overlooks the street, if I walked through the door and found not street but green pastures, I should say 'I must be mad'. Although it is not at all clear where Wittgenstein's remarks end and where Rhees's begin, we can read that in this case I should not say 'After all I was mistaken': in fact, I should not try to think what the explanation could be because in such a case I should not know what was meant by an explanation. Up to this point, I agree with Rhees (or with Wittgenstein). But in a sense I do not agree with Rhees when he adds: "There is no move I could make' (I should not ever know what to ask). Which is the sense of: 'I could not continue the language-game'". I accept it does not mean anything to speak of doubting here, but only inasmuch as we are referring to the event in question; in every sense of the word, I cannot walk around those green pastures searching for an explanation which accounts for that transformation: if I did so, I would be cutting off the branch where that explanation lies. But it is just because I cannot doubt whether street may suddenly turn into green pastures that I may wonder, e.g., why I have encountered or perceived such a thing: so I may bring up explanations making reference to drugs, neurological disorders, sophisticated jokes or experiments, etc. If I convince myself, only to put an example, that I am suffering from the effects of a drug which someone put in my glass of water, I shall not think I have gone mad (and of course, it does not matter if in this case I fall prey to a paranoid way of thinking).

The point is that I was disorientated, but now I know my way about: and as I quoted above (cf. Z 393), Wittgenstein considered 'I have gone mad' as the expression of giving up the attempt to know my way about. In order to clarify how Wittgenstein uses the expression 'I have gone mad', we may go on reading that paragraph: "And the same thing might befall me in mathematics. It might e.g. seem as if I kept on making mistakes in calculating, so that no answer seemed reliable to me". As I see it, this means the individual in question has several options to orient herself, and it is up to her whether and when she gives up the attempt to know her way about; nevertheless, if she gives up such attempt,

she will face with a move logically ruled out in the game. 'Logically ruled out' and not 'logically impossible' because, as Rhees (ib, 49-50) remarked, that would change Wittgenstein's emphasis from noting what is and is not said, to talk of what can and cannot be said.

Regarding those things or events which might throw us entirely off the rails, Brendan A. Maher presented (Maher 1974) an hypothesis on the development of delusional systems: an hypothesis which, in my opinion, might help to explain how Wittgenstein's remarks can be applied in the research on delusions. According to Maher, many paranoid patients may suffer not from a thinking disorder but from a perceptual disorder: he refers to primary perceptual anomalies, fundamentally biological in nature, although probably fluctuating with current stresses. Some experiences are very important to the patient because they appear invested with unusual significance: this importance may be due, on the one hand, to the inevitable significance of any striking change in patterns of perceptual experience, and on the other hand, to the rather elementary psychological principle that the intensity of a stimulus will influence the perception of its significance. So the patient describes an experience which may be one that a normal observer has never had and hence may appear to be deviant or bizarre, but such experience will drive the patient to provide an explanation. Maher thinks the delusion is the hypothesis designed to explain those unusual perceptual phenomena, but far from being developed through the operation of strange cognitive processes, these explanations (or delusions) are derived by cognitive activity that is essentially indistinguishable from that employed by non-patients, by scientists, and by people generally. I think Maher is right when he adds that strange but pleasurable experiences may lead to the development of religious explanations; however, if these experiences are strange but distressing, they may lead the patient to identify a causative agent: and since no external causative agent is visible to the patient, he is left with the possibility of invisible agencies, i.e., with paranoid thoughts. Even if the explanation is threatening to the patient, a convincing explanation should be accompanied by a strong feeling of personal relief together with the excitement produced by an intellectual insight such as those made in the laboratory or in the study: this feeling of relief increases the probability that delusions will persist, but as in science, it will be very difficult for the clinician to overthrow the delusion when the patient has found a generally satisfactory theory of his own. That is why early detection of developing delusions, and the presentation of counter-evidence, before the "solution-relief" experience has been reached, would seem to be more likely to succeed than later interventions.

As I pointed out above, I accept that absence of doubt belongs to the essence of the language-game (cf. OC 370): in other words, I cannot make the question 'How do I know I shall find street and not green pastures behind that door?'. The absurdity of making this question relates to a certain way of acting, but I think such way of acting may be hindered if I carry on finding green pastures behind the door, i.e., if the (anomalous) perceptual experience or the (unlikely) event remains. Someone may explain herself a brief irregularity which is not compatible with her un-

grounded ways of acting (drugs, neurological disorders, sophisticated jokes or experiments, etc, can be brought up): she may look for an explanation because she still has not cut off the branch where her explanation lies, that is, she may think about an unusual anomaly through language-games which account for anomalies. While these language-games which account for anomalies are played, the individual in question is implying she cannot accept that street may suddenly turn into green pastures: so this individual is not justifying why she refuses to admit her discovery because our language-games rule out that possibility. Up to this point, we still share a language-game with her: since all of us are playing the same language-game, there is room for doubting or reasoning. However, as soon as she explains the unlikely event admitting its veracity, she is reacting in a different way: in such case it is our frame of reference itself what has been questioned, so we cannot talk in terms of doubts or reasons with that individual. If we follow Wittgenstein (OC 76), our task would be to give the statements that she would like to make here, but cannot make significantly.

Of course, someone may make surprising scientific discoveries, but inasmuch as we rate these discoveries "scientific", they cannot question science itself; nevertheless, those explanations Maher mentions in his paper question our frame of reference, so they are far from being ordinary explanations. In other words, I do not mean this author is wrong: I mean Wittgenstein places emphasis on a deeper level. In Maher's opinion, and bearing in mind the intensity of the experiences that they are developed to explain, delusions are rational hypotheses: from this standpoint, delusions should be seen for many paranoid patients as the reactions of normal and sane individuals to abnormal but genuine perceptual experiences, while Wittgenstein (Z 545) sees language-games as an extension of primitive behaviour. Wittgenstein affirms language-games are behaviour. Instinct. Assuming this point, delusional explanations should be seen, above all, as different reactions. As different and ungrounded ways of acting. I think this option is better than Maher's, at least from a descriptive point of view: clinical experience shows delusions often are too complex to be considered mere rational hypotheses.

By the way, one of the main features of predelusional states is their opaque nature: an opaque nature which makes their description very difficult. Predelusional states are those psychopathological events (disorders regarding emotion, cognition, consciousness, will and behaviour) which precede the appearance of the delusion. Nowadays, our glossaries do not include the diagnosis "predelusional state": this may be due, amongst other things, to the fact that such states often occur before the ill person is hospitalized. Besides, as Germán Berrios and Filiberto Fuentenebro suggest (Berrios and Fuentenebro 1996, 148-149), our language is not suitable to help those ill persons who suffer from this problem to describe their inner state; we should not forget Western culture's way of "talking about madness" is very poor in certain areas: only to put an example, the language of emotions is less developed than the language of will.

There are at least three kinds of cases which in my opinion, and basing myself on Wittgenstein's work, might lead to a predelusional state. The first two ones were suggested by Maher: according to this author (Maher 1988, 21-22), theories will be judged delusional by others if (1) the data upon which they are based are available to those who are judging but most observers do not experience puzzlement or sense the significance that the patient does, and (2) the data are not available to those who are judging. The first case may happen even when events do occur as expected, so Wittgenstein seemed to be referring to the second case

when he weighed up the possibility that things such as he does not dream of at present were to happen. Regarding these delusional theories based upon data unavailable to the public, Maher added they should develop whenever there is a real impairment in sensory functioning that has not been identified and diagnosed as such to the patient; a defect in the processes that select incoming information for processing; or the experience of disturbance in personal expressive behaviour that has not been given an independent diagnosis.

But since Maher's cases relate to explanations rather than to ungrounded ways of acting, I would like to place emphasis in the third option. I referred above to the case of the individual who thinks she keeps on making mistakes in calculating, so that no answer seemed reliable to her; as I understand this remark, Wittgenstein (cf. Z 393) is alluding to the loss of the confidence upon which language-games are based: after all, it is only an individual anomaly. This does not mean the person in question will be confident of her answers if she verifies them time and time again; it does not mean either she will be confident if she finds an explanation which justifies the answer (an explanation which justifies, e.g., why two plus two equals four): it just means she has lost the confidence or security indispensable to play that language-game. In other words, as soon as she loses the essential confidence, she is reacting in a different way: the game she is playing is no longer the game she always shared with her linguistic community. However, I think it would be hasty to state this individual is really playing a game. She is not playing a different game, i.e., a game which is played by another linguistic community: as I have just said, she is reacting in a different way. At first sight, her situation may lead to think of a child who cannot begin to take part in language-games because he cannot trust; nevertheless, I am referring to a person who mastered a certain language-game (or several language-games) a long time ago, but she cannot play it (or them) now. I have mentioned the case of the loss of confidence which allows us to calculate in order to show how my remarks relate to Wittgenstein's work (after all he places great emphasis on philosophy of mathematics), but I think there are examples which seem to lead straight to a predelusional state. Only to put a pair of examples, I would like to invite the reader to think about the case of someone who loses the confidence which allowed him to identify his relatives, friends and companions. Or to think about the case of someone who loses the confidence which allowed him not to doubt his own identity.

In my opinion, it would be very interesting to weigh up the possibility that some delusions are due to the loss of the confidence which allowed us to take part in a language-game: I think this is only one of the points which should lead clinical researchers to bear Ludwig Wittgenstein in mind more often than they did up to now.

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Analysis as the Vanishing of Value?

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At 6.42, Wittgenstein tells us that “there can be no ethical propositions.” Further, since ethics and aesthetics are one, this means that there can also be no aesthetic propositions either. In fact, no propositions can “express anything higher” (6.42), when “higher” is understood as a “value that is of value” or “the sense of the world” (6.4). What is in part at issue here is something that we experience: we experience people saying things about what is good with respect to both personal conduct and artistic production. We thus experience what we at first glance take to be ethical-aesthetic propositions. So why might we wonder about these propositions? We encounter such propositions every day and some of them give us no pause. Others, of course, trouble us immensely. It seems to be this “troubling” that leads us to wonder. It is especially troubling when someone else’s sense of the good clashes with our sense. Thus, that the problem of value arises is a seemingly natural phenomenon. But what would draw a philosopher into a fray over such value?

We can begin with the common story told about the Tractarian philosopher with respect to value: such a philosopher would endorse a stoic harmony with what is the case. Questions immediately arise in response to this story. What if going along with what is the case makes me unhappy? What if living under an illusion makes me happy? How are these possibilities ruled out? These questions are never entertained because the assumption is that if you are unhappy, then you are not in tune with reality, and if you are not in tune with reality, you are not happy. However, this is simply not what the *Tractatus* says. Rather, the *Tractatus* only says that *if* you are subject to some nonsense, the most a philosopher can do is show you that you have not assigned meaning to some signs in your propositions when you attempt to say something metaphysical (6.53). The *Tractatus* never says that we *must* do this or that we can *avoid* value or even that “what is the case” will, if seen, be valued in a positive manner, nor is it clear how such claims could be adequately defended on Tractarian terms.

Given 6.53 and the *Tractatus* itself, it nonetheless seems that the philosopher can engage in the process of analytic critique of value propositions. But this critique will always depend on more than just logic. For instance, what would *motivate* me, the philosopher, to attempt to show you anything? At the least, I must value the process of critique and/or I must value your well-being and find it impaired by your illusion. Further, I must present my analysis in a way that is likely to be successful in removing the illusion. There will thus be the need to *pitch* my analysis, and some of that pitch will rely upon what might – upon further analysis – be revealed as being just as illusory as the enervating illusion I wish to remove. And what will I have shown when I’m done? In a way, I will have shown an absence. But it will be an absence that, if successfully shown, will be immediately filled by some new sense of the world and so by some sense of value. Thus, the origin of analysis and its success depends on what we value.

And how exactly might I remove any possible confusion over such value? At the very least, I’ll have to confront the *location* of value. Where is the value you invoke to be found? It seems clear that we will find that there is no

object that “good” names. In fact, it’s highly likely that you will instead assert propositions – such as “The painting has large black lines” – and assign value to the fact pictured in the proposition or even to the proposition itself.

The notion of assigning value to a proposition itself seems odd, but this seems to be what motivates the comments in 6.4s: they are comments on proposition 6, which gives us the general form of proposition. Further, the 6.4s follow other comments that deal with the nature of this general form. The essence of the general form is that a proposition says *that* something is the case. All such propositions are *equal* in that they show the possibility of some “how” and say that it is true. Whether it is in fact true is a contingent matter. Thus, “how” the world is – that it is truly *this* way – is contingent. But what would it mean to say that it is *good* that it is this way?

Value in this sense would be an attempt to speak not to *how* something is but to *what* it is. It is as if, having said “how” something is, we then say not that it is true but that it is good. However, logically speaking, all propositions are of equal value. Of course, if all propositions are of equal value, then the idea that some cannot be of *more* value should be evident. So why does Wittgenstein continue his discussion of value? Is it because he is aware that this is *not* in fact evident to people or is it because a “value of value” is somehow necessary but not as a property of propositions?

It seems to me that the answer is both. He introduces a value that is of value not just so that we will see that *logic* cannot allow for it in the world but also because *thinking* (and so analysis) seems to need it. Thinking, unlike logic, is an activity. It is the activity of determinately meaning something. And the *Tractatus* is investigating the conditions for the possibility of such determinate meaning. One such condition is logic. Another seems to be value. Without value, we’d never be given to take up one action and not another.

However, if value cannot be a term in a proposition or attributed to a proposition as a whole, then that to which value is ascribed is not clear. It would seem as if a “value of value” can never apply simply to a single proposition but must instead show a non-logical relation that a single proposition has to *all others* that describe my world: it would have more value than them. But a single proposition can never have more value than the other propositions of the world. There is no fact in the world that “gives” it this value, the way a fact “gives” truth to a proposition. The value in question – a value that permeates all propositions just as logic does – must thus come from somewhere else. And what else, other than language and logic, is in a relation to the description of my world as a whole? The only answer available in the *Tractatus* is the subject. Thus, the standard move at this point is to claim that, since the subject is beyond the world and in relation to it, “value” simply shows the relation between subject and world, as “true” shows a relation between propositions and state of affairs. However, while truth is shown in a fact-fact relation, neither item in the value relation is a fact, and while the proposition that is true *depends* on the state of affairs pictured, the “subject of value” seems to *constitute* its world in part by delimiting it somehow.

What are we to make of this? First, it is important to distinguish between particular human agents who act (and so think) in the world and the subject. The subject does not appear to be subject to the principle of individuation. Further, the subject is simply a limit. It is thus not clear how the subject can have a relation to the world other than one of limiting it. How can it also value it? How can its being the limit of the world also give the world value? The most frequent move here is to claim that the subject is a will. However, while such a Schopenhauerian view is entertained in the *Notebooks*, it seems that it has been dropped in the *Tractatus*. This does not mean that value does not have a relation to the will; however, if it does, then the will is simply this same limit and it is not something that I control but to which I, the human agent, am subject. It would be, at most, an “alien will” (the characterization used in the *Notebooks*), one that “makes” me do things – as if I am forced to value things for reasons that cannot possibly (from the logical point of view) be clear to me. If this is so, however, then the less said about this will the better, since it is not there to be known. Anything said about it will be illusory, and it will take us from the task at hand, which is in part the removal of such illusions.

Wittgenstein, of course, speaks first not of the will but of *actions*. It is in actions that value must be found, and so the will involved in value is simply the will involved in action. Thus, the possibility arises of dispensing with the metaphysics of the will and simply focusing on actions. We can then ask: if value cannot be attributed to propositions, then how can it be attributed to actions, and how can an attribution of value to an action be (at the same time) an attribution of value that permeates the world? Actions, of course, are facts and so can be pictured by propositions. However, Wittgenstein seems to claim that there will always be a component of the action that is not available to picturing simply because it is not part of the logical structure of the world. It will be a component that is, logically speaking, not a component. It is thus “beyond the world” – with “world” understood in the technical sense as that which can be logically said. And insofar as *my* relation to the world is always found in my current action, the value of that action for me is simply the value of the world. We thus have the perplexing notion of a value that seems to come from “beyond” and that I experience and to which I can react, but that is not logically available to me or in the description of my action. It is entirely singular: it is there for *me*, but it is not there for *thought*. Yet although it is not there for thought, we find it has some impact on what we are given to think about. You might ask me, “Why do you think about value?” I might respond that I’m simply curious or that I simply value such thought. But although these responses mark a kind of certainty that I experience in my action, they cannot account for the certainty that is clearly there.

Yet even to say that I’m curious is to say too much, because it implies that value directs us to some end. Wittgenstein, however, is describing something that is not teleologically oriented. In fact, not only is it not oriented to some end; it’s not oriented to any kind of future at all. This notion of value takes into account the radical logical disjuncture between what is happening now and what will happen next. The absence of a future seems to point to something intrinsic and limited to the present moment: it’s a matter of how things are right now. Yet it is not simply a matter of *me* as the psychological entity that has preferences. For I can prefer something – such as cocaine – and find that preference bad. I could even find this act of “finding the preference to be bad” to be bad: perhaps I would prefer that I just get over my judgmental preferences. Yet this attempt to find a remove at which the evaluative process comes to an end could go on indefinitely, since there could always seem to be that extra vantage from which a more authentic value should arise.

In this, value is no less puzzling than consciousness. And just as there is no thinking subject according to the *Tractatus*, there might be no valuing subject. It could be that we should not speak of the subject that *does* value but that *is* value. And I – the human agent who thinks and speaks – am not the subject. Instead, I am subject to being subject. I am subject to subjectivity, meaning that I am destined to feel some particular, singular way over which I have no control but to which I can and must respond. If this is so, then value can never be a problem that I encounter and attempt to vanish through analysis. The attempt to say something logically sensible about value will perhaps vanish – the logical sense of what was said will be revealed to have never been there. But the experience will remain. Such experience is in part the source of the problems that we attempt to vanish. It is part of the task-setting nature of the world. It would thus be a feature of subjectivity and so something we encounter insofar as we are subject to such subjectivity.

So what vanishes upon analysis would not be value or the experience of value, which permeates the entire activity of analysis. Instead, such analysis suggests the need to actually experience something in order to find the value it has for one. This is a simple enough insight. But a condition for coming to experience many things would, perhaps, be coming to know them. Thus, the processes of investigating the world and of investigating the language by which we investigate it would be necessary conditions for such experience. We would need to experience the world and especially the language that makes it available to us in order to undo any pernicious hold such language and such a world might have. And such experience would be found in – what else? – analysis.

Phänomenalismus und Skeptizismus

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(1) Der Empirismus und das Problem der Wahrnehmung

Wilfrid Sellars formulierte einmal die Frage, ob das empirische Wissen eine Grundlage habe. (Sellars 1997, §8) Mit dem empirischen Wissen ist ein Wissen gemeint, das auf die Gegenstände der sinnlich wahrnehmbaren Welt zielt. Gibt es alle diese Dinge im Bereich meiner Wahrnehmung wirklich, oder bilde ich mir dies etwa nur in einem immerwährenden Traum ein, oder bin ich gar das Opfer listiger Täuschungen eines höheren Wesens? Mit solchen und ähnlichen Fragen versuchen Skeptiker seit jeher die kognitiven Vermögen als epistemische Gründe zu desavouieren – wenn auch zum Teil in methodischer Absicht.

Viele Empiristen entgegneten klassischerweise, dass man zur Begründung des empirischen Wissens auf etwas zurückgreifen kann, das sich als resistent gegenüber jeglicher Täuschung erweist. Gemeint ist das unvermittelt in der Wahrnehmung Gegebene – kurz die Sinnesdaten. Empiristen, die eine solche Begründbarkeit des empirischen Wissens annehmen, unterschreiben daher folgende These:

(ET1) Empirisches Wissen ist auf der Basis der Sinnesdaten begründbar.

Um etwaigen kantischen Intuitionen an dieser Stelle vorzubeugen, ist es sinnvoll, (ET1) in seiner explizit empiristischen Form darzustellen:

(ET2) Empirisches Wissen ist *allein* auf der Basis der Sinnesdaten begründbar.

Hiermit soll im übrigen nicht behauptet werden, dass man zur Begründung des empirischen Wissens nicht auf andere kognitive Vermögen, wie das konzeptuelle, zurückgreifen kann. Wie sich zeigen wird, bewegt sich der Phänomenalismus aber in der Tradition des Empirismus, weswegen hier nur die Möglichkeit einer solchen Begründung des empirischen Wissens untersucht wird.

Wer sich zu (ET) bekennt, bürdet sich schwere theoretische Verpflichtungen auf. Denn er muss einen Weg aufweisen, der von den zumindest *prima facie* mentalen (respektive internen) Sinnesdaten zu den zumindest *prima facie* physikalischen (respektive externen) Gegenständen führt. Der Phänomenalismus ist eine jener Bewegungen, die sich nicht vor dieser Bürde scheuen. Er lässt sich am besten vor der Folie eines skeptischen Einwandes gegen die (empiristische) Begründbarkeit des empirischen Wissens darstellen.

(2) Begründungsskeptizismus

Ein Begründungs- oder Rechtfertigungsskeptiker kann sich folgenden Argumentes gegen die (empiristische) Begründung des empirischen Wissens bedienen:

(P1) Das empirische Wissen ist indirekt – ist durch Sinnesdaten vermittelt.

(P2) Es gibt keinen deduktiven Schluss von Sinnesdaten auf die Existenz physikalischer Gegenstände. (Denn bei einem Schluss von Sinnesdaten auf physikalische

Gegenstände würde man über die Prämissen hinausgehen)

(P3) Es gibt keinen induktiven Schluss von Sinnesdaten auf die Existenz physikalischer Gegenstände. (Sinnesdaten machen nur künftige Sinnesdaten wahrscheinlich)

(P3) Es gibt keinen abduktiven Schluss von Sinnesdaten auf die Existenz physikalischer Gegenstände. (Warum sollten physikalische Gegenstände die beste mögliche Erklärung für Sinnesdaten sein und nicht etwa ein Täuscher-Szenario?)

(K) Also: Wissen über physikalische Gegenstände ist nicht alleine auf der Basis von Sinnesdaten begründbar.

Die skeptische Konklusion (K) ist aufgrund der Prämissen (P1)-(P3) unvermeidbar. Wenn empirisches Wissen indirekt – d. h. zumindest über Sinnesdaten vermittelt – ist, und wenn es keinen rationalen Schluss von Sinnesdaten auf physikalische Gegenstände gibt, dann ist eine Begründung des empirischen Wissens auf der Basis der Sinnesdaten nicht möglich.

Welche der Prämissen kann ein Phänomenalist nun angreifen, um (K) zu vermeiden? Zunächst könnte man (P1) angreifen. Diese Taktik kann man als direkten Realismus bezeichnen. (Vgl. Sellars 1991, 40ff.) Hier sei bereits erwähnt, dass der Phänomenalismus diesen Weg nicht einschlägt, sondern eine Gegenposition zum direkten Realismus darstellt.

(3) Direkter Realismus und das Argument von der Sinnestäuschung

Direkte Realisten behaupten eine Identitätsbeziehung zwischen Sinnesdaten und physikalischen Gegenständen – bzw. deren Oberflächen. Ein bekanntes Beispiel hierfür ist Moores Beweis einer Außenwelt, der genau von solch einer Beziehung ausgeht. (Moore 1969) Moore schließt auf die Existenz der Außenwelt, weil er glaubt, dass in der Wahrnehmung physikalische Gegenstände, bzw. deren Oberflächen, gegeben sind. Gegen diese Annahme kann man allerdings auf die Relativität der Wahrnehmung verweisen. Ein häufig verwendetes Argument in diesem Zusammenhang ist das Argument von der Sinnestäuschung:

(AS)

(P1) Wahrnehmungen physikalischer Gegenstände sind veränderlich.

(P2) Physikalische Gegenstände, bzw. deren Oberflächen, existieren kontinuierlich in Raum und Zeit.

(K) Also sind Wahrnehmungen physikalischer Gegenstände nicht mit Sinnesdaten identisch. In der Wahrnehmung sind keine physikalischen Gegenstände gegeben.

Phänomenalisten argumentieren klassischerweise mit (AS). Die Folge ist, dass sie eine andere Prämisse des skeptischen Argumentes gegen die (empiristische) Begründbarkeit des empirischen Wissens angreifen müssen.

(4) Phänomenalismus

Phänomenalisten behaupten daher eine mögliche Reduktion physikalischer Gegenstände auf (Akkumulationen von) Sinnesdaten. D.h. sie greifen (P2) an. Hierzu bedienen sie sich eines zuerst von Berkeley angeführten Gedankens: Wenn eine Außenwelt (mit physikalischen Gegenständen) existiert, können wir nichts von ihr wissen; wenn es keine Außenwelt gibt, haben wir die gleichen Gründe an sie zu glauben wie bisher. (Berkeley 1967, S. 49) Aus dieser Überlegung leiten Phänomenalisten ihre Grundthese ab:

(PT) Physikalische Gegenstände sind Akkumulationen von Sinnesdaten.

Man kann m.E. drei wesentliche Theoriestränge des Phänomenalismus unterscheiden: (i) den klassischen Phänomenalismus, wie er beispielsweise von Berkeley und Mill vertreten wird; (ii) den ontologischen Phänomenalismus Russells; (iii) den linguistischen Phänomenalismus, der im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert u.a. durch Ayer und Lewis prominent vertreten wurde. Ich stelle die These auf, dass es sich bei den genannten Positionen um eine Rezeptionslinie handelt, die in (iii) ihre methodologisch versierteste Form annimmt. Daher möchte ich (i) und (ii) hier nicht behandeln, sondern direkt zu einer Besprechung von (iii) übergehen. Auf eine detaillierte Abgrenzung der Positionen (i)-(iii) muss hier leider aus Platzgründen verzichtet werden.

(5) Linguistischer Phänomenalismus

Der linguistische Phänomenalist (im folgenden kurz: Phänomenalist) hebt (PT) auf ein anderes methodologisches Niveau (als beispielsweise der ontologische Phänomenalist). Anstatt von einer Reduktion physikalischer Gegenstände auf Sinnesdaten zu sprechen, weist er auf den propositional vermittelten Charakter der physikalischen Gegenstände hin. Nicht physikalische Gegenstände als solche stehen demnach im Fokus der phänomenalistischen Analyse, sondern Propositionen über physikalische Gegenstände. Hierbei sind Propositionen im Sinn sprachlicher Entitäten zu verstehen. Auf diese Weise sollen die wahrheitssemantischen Eigenschaften von Propositionen für die phänomenalistische Analyse ausgenutzt werden (worauf ich noch zurückkomme). In dieser sprachanalytisch modifizierten Form lautet (PT) demnach wie folgt:

(PTL1) Propositionen über physikalische Gegenstände sind analysierbar durch Propositionen über Sinnesdaten.

Wie ist nun das ‚ist analysierbar durch‘ in (PTL1) zu verstehen? Phänomenalisten weisen in diesem Kontext auf den Begriff der Definition hin: (Vgl. etwa Ayer 1936, S. 60) ‚ist analysierbar durch‘ müsste man demnach lesen als ‚ist definierbar durch‘. Folglich hätte man es mit einer Proposition über einen physikalischen Gegenstand (P-Proposition) im Definiendum und einer Proposition über Sinnesdaten (S-Proposition) im Definiens zu tun:

(PTL2) P-Propositionen sind definierbar durch S-Propositionen.

Was kann nun das ‚ist definierbar durch‘ bedeuten? Einen interessanten Vorschlag für einen Definitionsbegriff macht Ayer in seinen frühen Überlegungen zum Phänomenalismus. (Z. B. in Ayer 1936 und 1940)

(6) Alternative Sprachen

Nach Ayer kann man durch eine Definition den *Gebrauch* eines Sinnesdatenausdrucks für sinnesdatenterminologische Kontexte festlegen. Bekannt geworden ist dieser Ansatz als die Alternativsprachtheorie. Nach dieser Theorie ist die Sinnesdatenterminologie einfach zweckmäßiger für epistemologische Kontexte, da die Terminologie der physikalischen Gegenstände (des common sense) notorisch anfällig für Einwände aus der Relativität der Wahrnehmung ist. Daher solle man epistemologisch die Rede über Sinnesdaten der über physikalische Gegenstände vorziehen.

Probleme tauchen allerdings auf, wenn man die Frage aufwirft, was uns eigentlich in der Anwendung der Sinnesdatensprache rechtfertigt. Man sieht dann sehr schnell, dass man – um diese Sprache überhaupt anzuwenden – Annahmen über physikalische Gegenstände voraussetzen muss. D. h. aber, dass das eigentliche Ausgangsproblem – das Problem der Wahrnehmung – nicht gelöst wird. Denn eine Lösung dieses Problems erforderte eine Rechtfertigung der Rede über physikalische Gegenstände alleine auf der Basis einer Rede über Sinnesdaten. Wenn die Sinnesdatenterminologie aber nur eine andere Sprache ist, so wird der Kern des Problems – die Vermittlung zwischen Sinnesdatensprache und der Sprache der physikalischen Gegenstände – einfach übergangen. Eine Definition von P-Propositionen durch S-Propositionen kann also nicht einfach in der Einführung einer neuen Redeweise bestehen.

(7) Das Problem der Relativität der Wahrnehmung

Ein weiterer Versuch, das Problem der Wahrnehmung zu lösen, besteht darin, ein notwendiges Implikationsverhältnis zwischen P-Propositionen und S-Propositionen aufzuweisen. (Z. B. Lewis 1946) Mit anderen Worten: Es soll gezeigt werden, dass immer wenn eine P-Proposition wahr ist, auch eine S-Proposition wahr ist. Aufgrund der bereits erwähnten Relativität der Wahrnehmung ist klar, dass es sich hierbei nicht um eine einfache Implikation der Form

(A) Wenn P, dann S.

handeln kann. Ein weißer Tisch unter rotem Licht produziert beispielsweise keine weißen Sinnesdaten. Daher muss ein Verweis auf Standardbedingungen in der Implikation vorkommen, etwa:

(B) Wenn P, dann S, wenn Standardbedingungen vorliegen.

Den Verweis auf die Standardbedingungen kann man am besten im Sinn einer modalen Einschränkung (Möglichkeit!) verstehen. Das Problem bei dieser Analyse ist wiederum, dass sie zwar ein verlässliches Kriterium angibt, wann man von P-Propositionen sicher auf S-Propositionen schließen kann – zumindest solange man den Begriff der Standardbedingungen nicht problematisiert. Dennoch handelt es sich um keine Lösung des Problems der Wahrnehmung. Denn in (B) wird weiterhin eine als wahr angenommene Proposition über einen physikalischen Gegenstand vorausgesetzt. Dies verlangt alleine schon die semantische Form der Implikation.

Anstatt also zu zeigen, dass eine Rede über physikalische Gegenstände durch eine Rede über Sinnesdaten ersetzt werden kann, wird unter der semantischen Bedingung der Wahrheit einer Proposition über einen physikalischen Gegenstand gezeigt, dass diese unter Standardbedingungen die Wahrheit von Sinnesdatenpropositionen impliziert. Mit dieser Analyse wird nun aber nur dargestellt, dass Sinnesdaten eine notwendige Bedingung für physikalische Gegenstände sind. Eine Lösung des Problems der Wahrnehmung würde allerdings darüber hinaus erfordern, dass erwiesen wird, dass eine Rede über Sinnesdaten bereits hinreichend für die Rede von physikalischen Gegenständen ist. Der Phänomenalist muss somit auch folgendes zeigen:

(C) Wenn S, dann P.

Für die Durchführung der phänomenalistischen Analyse reicht demnach (A), respektive (B), nicht aus. Um Ayers Idee der Sinnesdatenterminologie nochmals aufzugreifen: Es reicht nicht aus, eine Sinnesdatenterminologie zu entwickeln. Darüber hinaus muss auch gezeigt werden, dass man in dieser Sinnesdatenterminologie über physikalische Gegenstände sprechen kann – also über Gegenstände in einer objektiv vorhandenen Außenwelt. Erst dann hat man gezeigt, dass sich empirisches Wissen phänomenalistisch begründen lässt. Die Definition einer P-Proposition durch eine S-Proposition hat demnach zwei Seiten: zum einen eine reduktive, bei der zu zeigen ist, dass P-Propositionen S-Propositionen implizieren; zum anderen eine konstruktive, die erfordert, dass S-Propositionen P-Propositionen implizieren.

(8) Das phänomenalistische Dilemma

Durch die bisherigen Überlegungen sollte deutlich werden, dass der Phänomenalist für eine Begründung für (PTL) ein wechselseitiges Implikationsverhältnis zwischen P-Propositionen und S-Propositionen erweisen muss. Mit anderen Worten:

(PTL3) P ist definierbar durch S gdw.: (i) Wenn P, dann S. & (ii) Wenn S, dann P.

Dieses wechselseitige Verhältnis ist dem Umstand geschuldet, dass eine einfache Reduktion auf Sinnesdaten nicht für eine Begründung des empirischen Wissens hinreicht. Wenn es nun aber der Fall ist, dass mittels (PTL3) die Bezugnahme auf die physikalischen Gegenstände der Alltagssprache eliminiert werden soll, dann kann in (ii) (also am Ende der Analyse) nicht das gleiche ‚P‘ stehen wie in (i). Dies legt nahe (PTL3) folgendermaßen zu verstehen.

(PTL4) P ist definierbar durch S gdw.: (i) Wenn P1, dann S. & (ii) Wenn S, dann P2.

Es scheint nun, dass der Phänomenalist annehmen muss: $P1 \neq P2$. Beispielsweise könnte man annehmen:

(P1) Dieser Tisch ist weiß.

(P2) Dort ist etwas weißes Externes.

Am Anfang der Analyse stünde somit (P1) als Proposition des Alltagsverständnisses. (P1) kann nun aber mittels (AS) angezweifelt werden, was der Phänomenalist mit dem Verweis auf die Evidenz der Sinnesdaten – also einer S-Proposition – kontert (die durch die P-Proposition unter Standardbedingungen impliziert wird). Nun könnte der Phänomenalist des weiteren versuchen, (P2) als einen Ausdruck über etwas deutlich Wahrnehmbares in der Außenwelt ins Spiel zu bringen, um damit den solipsistischen – und damit nicht-epistemischen – Raum der

subjektiven Sinnesdaten zu verlassen. Das Problem bei dieser Analyse ist, dass – gesetzt, sie würde funktionieren – sie nicht konsistent mit der Annahme ist, dass ein einheitliches P im Definiendum der Definition steht.

Ist es nun doch möglich, dass gilt: $P1 = P2$? Hier bestehen zwei Möglichkeiten:

(a) In (ii) wird eine Definition einer P-Proposition im Sinn eines physikalischen Gegenstandes der Alltagssprache geleistet. Diese Möglichkeit ist auszuschließen, da somit die phänomenalistische Analyse hinfällig wäre. Genau diese Art der Bezugnahme soll schließlich eliminiert werden.

(b) In (i) wird bereits ein Ausdruck analysiert, der nicht auf einen physikalischen Gegenstand Bezug nimmt. Dann wäre aber wiederum die Ausgangsbedingung der phänomenalistischen Analyse nicht erfüllt.

Wenn man also den Phänomenalismus als eine Theorie auffasst, die Sprache von Referenzen auf physikalische Gegenstände (des common sense) zu vermeiden, dann scheint er sich dadurch von vorneherein im Widerspruch zu einer möglichen Begründung des empirischen Wissens zu befinden. Denn Wissen kann nur im Fall objektiver Gültigkeit behauptet werden und genau diese wird bei einer bloßen Referenz auf Sinnesdaten eliminiert. Möchte der Phänomenalist dann wieder Objektivität herstellen, so ist er dazu gezwungen, seine Sinnesdatenterminologie wieder um regulative Aspekte zu erweitern. Mit anderen Worten: Aus Sinnesdatenpropositionen lässt sich kein empirisches Wissen ableiten, ohne auf die regulativen Begriffe Bezug zu nehmen, welche physikalische Gegenstände (zumindest in einem intersubjektiven Sinn) als solche konstituieren. Dieser Punkt wird noch deutlicher, wenn man sich den semantischen Charakter der Implikation vor Augen führt.

(9) Implikation und konservierter Realismus im Vorderglied

Die Wahrheitsbedingungen von Implikationen lauten bekanntermaßen: Eine Implikation ist falsch, wenn bei wahren Vorderglied das Hinterglied falsch ist und sonst immer wahr. Der Phänomenalist versucht sich diese semantischen Eigenschaften zunutze zu machen, indem er behauptet, dass wahre P-Propositionen wahre S-Propositionen implizieren. Darin liegt aber genau das Problem. Damit die Analyse sinnvoll ist, müssen wahre P-Propositionen im Vorderglied angenommen werden. D. h. wiederum, dass P-Propositionen nur dann S-Propositionen implizieren, wenn sie (die P-Propositionen) wahr sind. Damit wird der begriffliche Rahmen der P-Propositionen allerdings niemals (vollständig) verlassen. Er bleibt als konservierter Realismus im Vorderglied der Implikation erhalten.

(10) Fazit: Phänomenalismus und Skeptizismus

Kann der Phänomenalist empirisches Wissen auf der Basis von Sinnesdaten unter Standardbedingungen begründen? Die von den linguistischen Phänomenalisten hierzu vorgeschlagene Implikationsanalyse zur Definition von Propositionen über physikalische Gegenstände durch Propositionen über Sinnesdaten kann eine solche Begründung nicht leisten. Denn zu dieser Begründung müsste die Sinnesdatenterminologie alleine hinreichend sein, empirisches Wissen über intersubjektiv zugängliche Gegenstände zu artikulieren. Dies ist aber wiederum nicht

möglich, ohne einen entsprechenden begrifflichen Rahmen vorauszusetzen. Hierbei muss es sich nicht zwangsläufig um den begrifflichen Rahmen der common-sense-Gegenstände handeln. Dennoch muss bei der Konstitution dieser Gegenstände auf regulativ-begriffliche Sprachelemente zurückgegriffen werden, die über Sinnesdatenpropositionen und Standardbedingungen hinausgehen. Insofern kann der linguistische Phänomenalismus – zumindest soweit er hier vorgestellt wurde – keine überzeugende Antwort auf den Zweifel an der Begründbarkeit empirischen Wissens geben.

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The Practical Relevance of Phenomenology

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1. Introduction

The descriptive character of the phenomenological method seems to confine phenomenology's relevance for ethics to the role of accounting for the conditions which make possible the experience of ethical normativity in general.¹ Hence, on this view, the practical relevance of phenomenology pertains to the question of the ethical rather than to prescriptive ethical questions.² In other words, phenomenology can account for our ethical situation, but not for what we should do³; it can investigate that "primordial ethical experience" which makes possible particular ethical questions concerning what ought to be the case, but it cannot, and it is not meant to, deal with these questions themselves.⁴

The incompatibility between the descriptive character of the phenomenological method and the prescriptive questions raised by normative ethics goes some way towards explaining why most moral philosophers working on issues of normative ethics do not make appeal to phenomenology. Moreover, it can also explain the fact that most phenomenologists focus on epistemological and ontological questions or, when turning their attention to ethics, on the (meta-ethical) question of the ethical or on problems of moral psychology. Contrary to these positions, in this paper I argue that the phenomenological method is crucial for an adequate approach to the prescriptive questions of normative ethics.⁵

2. Phenomenological Value Theory

Phenomenological value theory seems to provide immediate support for the claim I defend in this paper or at least for the weaker assertion that phenomenology can approach issues of normative ethics. After all, Husserl, Scheler, de Beauvoir or the early Sartre provided phenomenological analyses of moral feelings with the aim of making explicit the values that make them possible and the relationships between these values. The hierarchy of values thus obtained was meant to guide evaluation,

justification and prescription. (Husserl 1988; Scheler 1973; Sartre 1992; de Beauvoir 2000)

For instance, in his *Notebooks for an Ethics*, Sartre's analyses of ethically relevant motivations make explicit the complex structure of means and ends that underlies action and base his claim that "elasticity" is an essential aspect of the values that guide a person's actions. (Sartre 1992, 243) This is contrasted with the rigidity of the obligations of a Kantian ethics, for which values are transcendent, absolute and based on a contradictory idea of freedom without anxiety. (Sartre 1992, 257) In this way, Sartre justifies the descriptive method of phenomenology as more appropriate for the task of accounting for morally relevant feelings and motivations. While it is true that such analyses account more appropriately for the values that structure these experiences, for their necessary conditions and their relationships, nevertheless, they cannot justify the ethical validity of these values and relationships.⁶

In order to claim that the values it makes explicit *ought to be followed*, phenomenology must assume that, by itself, in the process of offering an accurate account of ethically relevant experiences, the descriptive method also distinguishes between those values which are valid and those which are not. Hence, one must either presuppose a moral theory, or one must assume that we are in possession of a certain faculty, with the help of which we are somehow "spontaneously" able to determine which values are ethically valid and which are not. This is true not only of Sartre's or de Beauvoir's attempts to formulate an ethics of values, but also of Husserl's and Scheler's theories, in which "sensibility, impulse, and inclination are understood to be teleologically oriented toward rationality", making it possible to "elaborate a substantive moral realism, a concrete theory of the 'objective good', in which philosophy discovers a priori material values that serve as norms". (Crowell 2003, 19)

3. Phenomenology and Normative Ethics

Now the metaphysical assumption concerning the existence of a set of a priori material values that must be revealed by phenomenological analysis is particularly pernicious for an attempt to address issues of normative ethics. Thus, when the question is that of the evaluation of a particular prescriptive claim, to argue that such a claim is an expression of one of the given a priori values is to beg the question; moreover, it means to stop the evaluative process, contrary to Husserl's conception of phenomenology, as an essentially (self-)critical project guided by the ideal that "a philosopher seek to acquire knowledge as that philosopher's own, aiming at a knowledge for which each alone can answer from the beginning". (Barber 2001, 24)

By bracketing the presupposition of the existence of a priori material values, phenomenology will be able to investigate the presuppositions and constitution of the particular acts of valuation which are presupposed by those values. To be sure, this investigation will still be descriptive, making explicit the elements of such acts and

¹ In the "Introduction" to their recent collection *The Ethical*, Edith Wyschogrod and Gerald McKenny argue that the scope of ethics is not exhausted by prescriptive or "moral" questions: "Ethics, it can be argued, is less about moral questions, [...] than about the 'about', the manner in which their meanings are revealed, [...] the conditions for the disclosure of the ethical subject" (Wyschogrod and McKenny 2003, 1).

² For instance, talking about "the political" in Levinas, Robert Bernasconi notes that, despite the fact that Levinas seems to be in favour of ethics over politics, for him there is no ethics without politics; he then adds that Levinas's political thought "cannot be assimilated to what conventionally passes as political philosophy, but it was never intended to do so and that is its strength". (Bernasconi 1999, 86)

³ According to Martin Srajek, this represents a feature of the traditional Jewish view of ethics, a feature shared by both Levinas's and Derrida's ethical thought. (Srajek, 1998) Commenting on this book, Harry Lesser draws the distinction between ethics as dealing with our ethical situation and as dealing with prescriptive issues about what we should do. (Lesser 2002, 105) However, talking about the common element of Levinas's and Derrida's ethics, Lesser concludes that "whether we call this Judaism or humanism hardly seems to matter!". (Lesser 2002, 106)

⁴ As Christina Howells notes, for Levinas ethics is "prior to moral questions, and a *fortiori* to moral law, and concerned rather with a primordial ethical experience from which moral questions may derive". (Howells 1999, 124)

⁵ A different problem which seems to undermine phenomenology's relevance for ethics is the problem of accounting for the other. However, in this paper I only address the problem concerning phenomenology's descriptive character.

⁶ A more detailed presentation of this critique of Kant and of the argument that Sartre's ethics of value cannot offer appropriate answers to prescriptive questions of justification can be found in my text. (Baiasu 2003, 31-8)

revealing their necessary relationships. However, this will provide not only a better understanding of such ethical attitudes, but will also enable one to identify their normative grounds and, in this way, to guide the philosopher interested in the question of evaluation.

For instance, to take a simple example offered by Husserl, your admiration of a certain person may turn out to be based on your claim that that person is brave. In its turn, this claim is based on the “normative” judgement that a soldier should be brave and on the empirical claim that that person is a soldier. Moreover, Husserl says, the grounding normative judgement that a soldier should be brave is in its turn based on a “theoretical” claim that only a soldier which is brave is virtuous, a claim which simply reports a necessary feature of the virtuous soldier. Of course, there is also a further implicit normative judgement or “valuation” which can be made explicit by such an analysis and which asserts that only a virtuous soldier is a good soldier. (Husserl 1970, 81-9)

The aim of Husserl's argument in the context of this example is limited to showing that “every normative and likewise every practical discipline rests on one or more theoretical disciplines, inasmuch as its rules must have a theoretical content separable from the notion of normativity”. (Husserl 1970, 81-2) This is sufficient for an illustration of the way phenomenology can contribute to an evaluation of particular prescriptive ethical claims. Thus, a phenomenology of judgement can make explicit the presuppositions of such a claim, whether they are empirical, theoretical, normative or of some other kind. Despite the fact that phenomenology cannot itself establish whether these claims are valid and, hence, cannot provide a justification of the prescriptive assertion, it does not only offer an accurate understanding of such claims, but also guides the justificatory process. Moreover, in the case of two conflicting ethical judgements, a phenomenological analysis may discover that the source of the conflict is not the normative content of the judgements, but, say, their empirical presuppositions, in which case the conflict can be diffused without even making appeal to an ethical theory.

4. The Phenomenological Analysis of Ethical Judgements

A possible objection is that such an analysis is not in fact a phenomenological one, but simply an analysis in the usual sense of a process of separating the constitutive parts of a whole and arranging them in a certain order, in this case a logical order. However, the features which distinguish such an analysis as a phenomenological one cannot be so easily overlooked. Thus, as Husserl explains in the *Cartesian Meditations*, a first characteristic of an intentional analysis is “an uncovering of the *potentialities 'implicit' in actualities of consciousness*”; an intentional analysis does not simply organise already existing “data” of consciousness⁷, but makes explicit what is implicitly meant. (Husserl 1977, 46)

Secondly, in contrast to the usual analysis, a phenomenological analysis is not merely interested in providing an exhaustive inventory of the (actual or potential) elements of a whole. It makes explicit the constitutive elements of the intentional object and together with them it brings to light the intentional processes which make possible the

unity of the elements as parts of the same whole. Without this reference to the intentional processes, the elements would remain “anonymous”. (Husserl 1977, 47) In the example above, Husserl describes some of the constitutive elements of a prescriptive ethical claim. Given his assumption concerning the existence of a priori material values, one might expect that his analysis of the prescriptive claim would be undertaken in the form of a description of the grounding values presupposed by that claim, without any reference to their constitutive intentional processes.

However, in that early work Husserl is careful to avoid any assumptions concerning values. Thus, with regard to the normative presuppositions of the prescriptive claim, he refers constantly to the “valuation” or “approval” which constitutes them and he emphasises that his investigation has no justificatory aims: “Whether or not this valuation is in any sense ‘objectively valid’, whether we can draw any distinction between the subjectively and objectively ‘good’, does not enter into our determination of the sense of should-propositions”. (Husserl 1970, 84)

Thirdly, Husserl contrasts the usual analysis with the phenomenological analysis by pointing out that one of the aims with which the latter makes explicit the hidden, “correlative horizons” of the “*isolated subjective processes*” is that of determining the necessary “*horizon structure*” that makes possible the objectivity of the intentional object so constituted. (Husserl 1977, 48) In other words, a phenomenological analysis does not only organise “data”, it also determines the necessary conditions which make possible such data. Thus, in the example above, Husserl identifies theoretical presuppositions as necessary, constitutive elements of a normative claim.⁸ Finally, it is worth noting that what I have just said, following Husserl, concerning the distinguishing features of a phenomenological analysis of ethical judgements can be rephrased in the terms of post-Husserlian phenomenologies.

5. Conclusion

By making explicit the presuppositions of ethical judgements, phenomenology performs an interpretive function which is essential for an appropriate evaluation of those judgements. Moreover, by identifying the status of these presuppositions, that is, by establishing whether they are empirical, normative, theoretical, or of some other type, phenomenology provides an essential guide for the evaluation of the judgements' validity. It is in this twofold sense that phenomenology can play a vital role in an adequate approach to issues of normative ethics.⁹

⁷ This, of course, as Husserl acknowledges, does not mean that, with regard to certain claims, an intentional analysis may not also do what the usual analysis does. (Husserl 1977, 46)

⁸ A phenomenological analysis is not merely a description of the entities within a certain domain; nor is such a description merely undertaken with the aim of explaining the relation between entities in a scientific manner. As Barry Smith and David Smith note, phenomenology “seeks the description and structural analysis of consciousness, as opposed to an account of its causal origin in brain activity or elsewhere”. (Smith and Smith 1995, 9)

⁹ Work leading to this essay has been undertaken during the second year of my Simon Research Fellowship at the Centre for Philosophy, the University of Manchester (U.K.)

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Indexikalität, kognitive Dynamik und praktisches Überlegen

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1. Einleitung

Wir befinden uns in der Lage, an bestimmte Gegenstände in unserer Umgebung denken zu können. Und das gilt auch für den Fall, dass sich die betreffenden Gegenstände *nicht* in unserer unmittelbaren Sicht- oder Hörweite befinden. So vermag ich auch dann an mein Kind im Nebenzimmer zu denken, wenn ich es weder sehe noch höre. Unabdingbar für den Vollzug unserer intentionalen Fähigkeiten erweisen sich offenbar gewisse *gedankendynamische Kompetenzen*. Daher sehe ich mich in der Lage, mein Kind im Nebenzimmer auch über räumliche Veränderungen und über Zeitspannen hinweg *im Sinn* zu behalten. Es scheint eine ganz notwendige Bedingung der *Vorstellung* von meinem Kind zu sein, dass ich auf dasselbe nicht nur gestern und heute, sondern auch morgen und in einem Jahr, und zwar an ganz unterschiedlichen Orten und auf vielfältige Weise Bezug nehmen kann. Und eben dies gilt insbesondere mit Blick auf die *Erwartungen*, die ich mit ihm verknüpfe. Ich würde mich nicht dazu in der Lage sehen, wenn ich nicht eine ganze Reihe *spezifischer Erwartungen* mit seinem *Erscheinen* assoziieren könnte. Ich erkenne diese kleine Person vor mir *als* mein Kind, weil ich die Erwartung hege, dass es sich in der und der Weise benehmen wird und also ganz bestimmte Merkmale besitzt. Das erfordert rekognitionale Kompetenz, die beileibe nicht nur sprachliche Akte umfasst. Schließlich bin ich in der Lage, mein Kind aufgrund optischer Merkmale herauszugreifen aus einem Pulk von Kindern. Meine Wahrnehmungs- und Erfahrungsgehalte sind überaus feinkörnig und leistungsfähig. Sie ergänzen, modifizieren und variieren im Verein mit sprachlichen Bezeichnungsformen, Erinnerungen und Erwartungen unser Spektrum rekognitiver Fähigkeiten. Und schließlich erfordert es räumliches Orientierungstalent, dem Kind auf der Spur zu bleiben und es immer wieder, in ganz und gar unterschiedlichen Kontexten, *als dasselbe* zu erkennen.

Gedankendynamische Fähigkeiten erweitern das Spektrum der Debatten um indexikalische Gedanken mit Blick auf Verhaltensklärungen über die Zeit. Zudem soll im Folgenden argumentiert werden, dass kognitive Dynamik gerade auch für die Analyse *praktischer Überlegungen* eine ganz zentrale Rolle spielt. Hierzu wird zunächst eine skizzenhafte Rekonstruktion der bei dynamischen Einstellungen involvierten *Verstehensprozesse* notwendig, mit denen wir es immer dann zu tun haben, wenn wir *kontextabhängige* Ausdrücke in *kontext-unabhängiger* Weise in *jeweiligen Kontexten* und *über Kontexte hinweg verstehen*.

2. Indexikalität und gedankliche Dynamik

Beginnen wir zunächst mit einer kurzen Rückerinnerung. „Singularer Gedanken“ nennen wir diejenigen Bezugnahmen, die sich auf einzelne, hier: *empirische* Gegenstände richten. „Gedanken“ stehen zunächst ganz im Sinne Freges für den Gehalt propositionaler Einstellungen. Nun ist bekannt, dass Frege dem „Gedanken“ eine zweifache Aufgabe zudachte: Gedanken sind Träger des Wahrheitswertes und bestimmen die Wahrheitsbedingungen der Aussage. Sie dienen zugleich als *Objekte der Erkenntnis*. Frege-Gedanken sind, mit anderen Worten, *epistemische Objekte* und daher als Kandidaten

nicht nur einer *Bedeutungstheorie*, sondern auch einer Theorie des *Verstehens* zu behandeln: Frege-Gedanken bezeichnen das, was man *begreift*, wenn man einen sprachlichen Ausdruck *versteht*. Diese „elegante Lösung“ des *Informativitätsproblems* rief eine Reihe prominenter Kritiker auf den Plan: Offenbar wollen sich indexikalische und demonstrative Ausdrücke, Eigennamen und referentiell gebrauchte Kennzeichnungen nicht Freges Monismus fügen und zwingen zu Theorieformen der „Direktreferenz“, deren gemeinsamer Nenner darin besteht, das externe Bezugsobjekt als Ingredienz des propositionalen Aussagegehaltes zu beschreiben.

Wie steht es nun mit Verhaltens- und Verstehenserklärungen singularer Gehalte? Nehmen wir an, ich äußere den Satz „Du wirst von einem Bären angegriffen“ und Erwin äußert den Satz „Ich werde von einem Bären angegriffen“. Hier beobachten wir keine Variation des Bezugsgegenstandes, indessen bestimmen unterschiedliche Bedeutungsfunktionen den kognitiven Gehalt. Die Folgen sind absehbar: Während Erwin die Beine in die Hand nimmt, werde ich mehr oder weniger ruhigen Sinnes die Szenerie verfolgen. Wie John Perry zeigte, ist die sprachliche Rolle des Indikators vom wahrheitskonditionalen Aussagegehalt in *systematischer Weise* zu unterscheiden. Erstere gilt als Verhaltenskriterium. Letzterer bewegt sich vor dem Tribunal der Wahrheit, weshalb die unveränderliche Bedeutungsfunktion kein Bestandteil des *kontextabhängigen* Gedankengehaltes sein kann. Diese frege-sche Konsequenz wäre denn auch eine ärgerliche Kalamität, denn so wüssten wir nicht zu klären, weshalb wir bei identischem Bezug für einen entsprechenden Kontext mit unterschiedlichen, durchaus nachvollziehbaren Verhaltensformen konfrontiert werden.

Wir sollten kognitiven Inhalt und ausgedrückte Proposition systematisch unterscheiden und dies erinnert an die *phänomenologische Unterscheidung* von *Gehalt* und *Gegenstand intentionaler Akte*. In einem ersten Schritt könnte man von einer Differenz zwischen „*eigenschaftsabhängigen*“ und „*gegenstandsabhängigen*“ Inhalten sprechen. „*Glaubenszustände*“ werden mittels *kontext-unabhängigen Verfahrensweisen* (sprachlichen Bedeutungsfunktionen) identifiziert, die spezifische Eigenschaften auf beliebige Objekte in unterschiedlichen Kontexten in einer jeweiligen Welt abbilden.

Wenden wir uns nun „kognitiver Dynamik“ zu. Nehmen wir an, Erwin macht mich auf einer Party auf eine junge Dame mit Namen Lisa aufmerksam, die er als „Romantikerin“ ausgibt. Ich werde mich in der Lage befinden, die besagte Frau eine Stunde später anzusprechen und sie als Lisa, die Romantikerin wieder zu erkennen. Und auch eine Woche später oder ein Jahr später, nachdem ich mit ihr Freundschaft geschlossen habe und eine ganze Menge Informationen über sie besitze, werde ich seit jener Stunde auf der Party eine *gedankendynamische Bekanntschaft* mit ihr pflegen. In jenem Augenblick, als mich Erwin mit Lisa „bekannt“ machte, begann eine „kognitive Beziehung“, die in Zukunft die *Grundlage* meiner *Überzeugungen und Erwartungen* Lisa betreffend sein wird. Kognitive Dynamik erforscht die Bedingungen, unter denen eine Sprecherin über einen Zeitraum hinweg, in wechselnden *Kontexten* und *Perspektiven*, auf denselben Gegenstand Bezug nimmt.

Zunächst hat es den Anschein, als fügten sich unsere *momentanen Überzeugungszustände* ein in eine *zeitübergreifende Ordnung von Überzeugungszuständen*, die allesamt vom *selben* Gegenstand handeln. Sagen wir also, wir haben Dinge nicht nur *jeweils* im Sinn, sondern unsere Gedanken sind *in Bewegung*, sofern wir uns auf denselben Gegenstand in unterschiedlichen Raumzeitkontexten beziehen. Weshalb behaupte ich hier, dass sich unsere Gedanken bei zeitübergreifenden Bezugnahmen „in Bewegung“ befinden? Weil uns ein bestimmter Gegenstand nicht zweimal in *genau derselben Weise*, in *genau derselben räumlichen Wahrnehmungsperspektive und Situation* begegnet. Ich sehe diesen Tisch unter ganz verschiedenen Perspektiven und das ist ganz wörtlich zu nehmen: Wir nehmen unterschiedliche räumliche Wahrnehmungsperspektiven ein und hegen doch jedes Mal die *Erwartung*, den besagten Tisch als diesen und nicht als einen anderen zu erkennen. So vermögen wir bestimmten Gegenständen gedanklich auf der Spur zu bleiben und ihren Bewegungen quer durch Raum und Zeit zu folgen, weshalb wir sie nach einer Zeit ihrer Abwesenheit wieder erkennen können. Übrigens betrachten wir dieselbe Sache nicht nur unter verschiedenen Gesichtspunkten, sondern vor allem vermögen wir an einer altbekannten Sache immer wieder *neue und überraschende Aspekte und Merkmale* zu erkennen.

3. Zwei Modelle des gedanklichen Gehaltes

Verstehens- und Verhaltensinhalte hängen davon ab, in welcher *Weise* ich auf Lisa zu unterschiedlichen Zeiten Bezug nehme. Wir unterscheiden zwischen der Art und Weise, wie ich auf Lisa Bezug nehme und Lisa selbst, dem persistenten Gegenstand meiner Gedanken. Das Problem dabei ist, dass ich mich in ganz *unterschiedlicher Weise* auf Lisa beziehen kann und dennoch so etwas wie „*interne Identität*“ gewährleistet werden sollte. Die Reihen unterschiedlicher Gegebenheitsweisen und Wahrnehmungen können *diese* dynamische Identität nicht garantieren: Ich nenne Lisa heute beim Namen, morgen sage ich „Du“ und bezeichne sie übermorgen gegenüber einem Dritten scherzhaft als „Romantikerin“. Das geht so weit, dass ich mich irren und fälschlicherweise Lara für Lisa halten könnte. Dennoch wäre, sofern ich überzeugt bin, dass es sich um Lisa handelt, *interne Ko-Referenz* meiner Glaubenszustände gewährleistet. Dann aber hat es den Anschein, als wären weder *Gegebenheitsweisen* noch *Bezugsgegenstände* geeignete Kriterien interner Identität. Das Band, das alle meine Gedanken über Lisa zu Lisa-Gedanken macht, scheint eines zu sein, das über die Ebene der Unterscheidung zwischen *Gegenstand und Gegebenheitsweise* hinausreicht und in diesem Sinne so etwas wie eine *Metarepräsentation* darstellt. Es hat den Anschein, als handelte es sich um so etwas wie *höherstufige Abbildungsweisen* einer zeitlichen Reihe von Gegebenheitsweisen desselben Bezugsobjektes.

Ich schlage vor, zwei Modelle zur Identifizierung von repräsentativem Gehalt zu unterscheiden: Ich werde das erste „*grobkörnig*“, das zweite „*feinkörnig*“ nennen. Vertreter der grobkörnigen Position fühlen sich der Annahme verpflichtet, dass Bezugnahmen durch *singuläre Wahrheitsbedingungen* in Abhängigkeit *jeweiliger Kontextfaktoren* identifiziert werden. Diese Position betont die *Gegenstandsabhängigkeit* des singulären Gehaltes. Die kontextuelle Ergänzung dient als Sinnvollständiger, den bereits die erste Generation der Fregekritiker zu Recht an Freges Theoriewerk vermisse. Wichtig für unsere Zwecke ist nun aber folgende These des *grobkörnigen* Modells: Nehmen wir an, ich äußerte heute den Satz „Heute ist es

schön“ und morgen den Satz „Gestern war es schön“. Vertreter der *grobkörnigen Strategie* verteidigen die Ansicht, wonach beide Sätze *denselben Gedankengehalt* ausdrückten. Nun leuchtet ein, dass dieser Strategie sowohl Vor- als auch Nachteile innewohnen. Der Nachteil: Der zu zwei Zeitpunkten identische Aussagegehalt liefert offenbar keine zufriedenstellende Antwort auf die Frage, in welcher *Verstehenssituation* ich mich jeweils befinde. Der Vorteil: Wir hätten eine Antwort auf die Frage, was das einigende Band ist, das die jeweiligen Intentionen zusammenhält.

Wir unterscheiden hiervon das „*feinkörnige Modell*“, das in etwa Folgendes besagt: Der eigenschaftsabhängige Gehalt eignet sich nicht nur für *Verhaltenserkklärungen*, sondern stellt einen *entscheidenden Bestandteil des Urteilsgehaltes* dar. Das ist nun eine These, der ein Direktreferentialist widersprechen würde. Edmund Husserl, ein Vertreter des feinkörnigen Spezifikationsprinzips, war der Ansicht, dass *Variationen* auf der Ebene des Bedeutungsgehaltes zur Modifikation des Gesamtgehaltes führen. Der Urteilsgehalt zweier unterschiedlicher Aussagen, die sich auf denselben Gegenstand beziehen, unterscheidet sich für Husserl entsprechend Differenzen auf der Ebene des intentionalen Bedeutungsgehaltes. Führen wir uns diese These vor Augen: Unsere Standardsätze „Heute ist es schön“ und „Gestern war es schön“ drückten hier *nicht* denselben intentionalen Gehalt aus. Der Vorteil: Wir sprechen konsequent von Verstehensgehalt. Der Nachteil: Die zeitübergreifende Identität von intentionalen Zuständen wird nicht geklärt.

Husserls Modell erweist sich als nützliche Strategie zur *Rekonstruktion* von Gedankendynamik. Offenbar haben wir hierfür eigenschaftsabhängige Aspekte zu berücksichtigen, wozu nicht nur Bedeutungsfunktionen, sondern vor allem *Erfahrungs- und Wahrnehmungsgehalte* zu rechnen sind. So kann ich mich Lisa gegenüber in unterschiedlicher Weise benehmen und diese Verhaltensweisen werden in Abhängigkeit von Gegebenheitsweisen ermittelt. Dennoch werden diese feinkörnigen Einstellungs-differenzen, die mein Benehmen ihr gegenüber beeinflussen, nichts daran ändern, dass ich bei jedem Kontakt mit ihr der festen Überzeugung bin, *dass* es sich genau um jene Person handelt, die ich einst auf der Party kennen lernte. Das aber bedeutet doch: Es bleibt uns nichts anderes übrig, als auf das feinkörnige Verstehensmodell zu setzen und den Versuch zu unternehmen, von dieser Warte aus zeitübergreifende Identitäten zu konstruieren. Denn offenbar benötigt das feinkörnige Modell zur Erläuterung dynamischer Bezugnahmen gleichwohl die Berücksichtigung „grobkörniger“ Aspekte, die jedoch als *Verstehensinhalte* zu beschreiben wären.

Schauen wir zunächst, wie das hier favorisierte Modell *Kontextualität* darzustellen vermag. Zu den *kontextuellen Faktoren*, die den je nach Bezugskontext veränderlichen Erkenntniswert der feinkörnigen Überzeugungsstruktur verantworten, gehören *kognitive Elemente*. So halte ich eventuell den Satz „Dort geht Lisa über den Campus“ heute für wahr, morgen für unwahr. Nehmen wir weiterhin an, es handelt sich in beiden Fällen, entgegen meiner Ansicht, tatsächlich um Lisa. Die Bedeutung des Satzes ist dieselbe und der Sachbezug des hinweisenden Ausdruckes bleibt ebenfalls unverändert. Für die Bestimmung der *kognitiven Rolle* genügen hier nicht die *Identität des Bezugsobjektes* oder *des Sprechers* und schon gar nicht die *Identität der Gegebenheitsweisen*. Von entscheidender Bedeutung ist der *Kontextinhalt*. Doch sind es nicht *wahrheitskonditionale Faktoren*, sondern *subjektive Auffassungsweisen*, die uns die entsprechenden Hinweise zur Ergänzung der Verstehenssituation liefern. Und hierzu

gehören *nicht-sprachliche Erfahrungsinhalte des aktuellen Kontextes*. Daher schlage ich vor, die jeweilige *Apprehension des Kontextes* durch die betreffende Person systematisch zu berücksichtigen, was jedoch anderes als eine objektive Lokalisierung des bezuggenommenen Gegenstandes oder der bezugnehmenden Person ist. Kontextapprehension ist ein zentraler *Modus des Verstehens* und umfasst folgende Aspekte: 1.) die egozentrisch-praktische Orientierungskompetenz des Akteurs, 2.) Wahrnehmungen in einem momentanen Raumzeitkontext und 3.) sprachliche Gegebenheitsweisen. Schließlich wären 4.) gespeicherte Gegenstandsinformationen zu berücksichtigen: Lisa ist für mich, der ich sie seit einiger Zeit kenne, nicht nur die Person, die sich mir *jetzt und hier* in einer *bestimmten Weise* präsentiert, sondern die Summe der gemeinsamen Geschichte, meiner Erinnerungen und Kenntnisse, die ich über sie besitze. In „mental files“ bzw. Vorstellungsdossiers tragen wir Eigenschaften ein, die wir mit betreffenden Objekten assoziieren. Dossier-Eigenschaften sind leicht zu modifizieren. Trotz möglicher Verwirrungen und Fehleinschätzungen bin ich in der Lage, Lisa auf der Spur zu bleiben und sie immer wieder zu erkennen. Werde ich eines Besseren belehrt, streiche ich einfach falsche Eintragungen in meinem Lisa-Dossier und ersetze sie durch treffendere. Diese Kenntnisse sind Bestandteile meines *Bildes*, das ich von Lisa besitze – sie sind Bestandteil meiner *Erwartungen* an Lisa. Meine *zentrale Erwartung* indessen ist jene Überzeugung, dass es sich bei *dieser* Person, die ich *jetzt und hier* im Sinn habe, um eben *jene* Person handelt, die ich einst auf der *Party* kennen lernte.

4. Praktisches Überlegen und kognitive Dynamik

Wir sahen, dass Indexikalität und Gedankendynamik nicht nur eng zusammenhängen, sondern die Klärung ihres systematischen Zusammenhanges wichtige Erkenntnisse bei der Erörterung dynamischen Verhaltens in Aussicht stellen. Angenommen, Erwin trägt sich heute mit dem Gedanken, Lisa zu ihrem morgigen Geburtstag Blumen zu schicken. Erwin wird hierzu eine ganze Reihe praktischer Überlegungen anstellen, um seine Absicht zu verwirklichen. Er wird heute den Blumen-Dienst anrufen, um ein bestimmtes Bouquet zusammenstellen etc. Praktische Überlegungen besitzen sowohl *kontextbezogenen* als auch *situationsunabhängigen* Charakter. Je nach eigener Situation und Lage wird Erwin über seinen *Plan*, Lisa Blumen zu senden, in ganz unterschiedlicher, handlungswirksamer Weise nachdenken. Hier hängen situationsabhängige und situations-unabhängige Bestandteile in ganz ähnlicher Weise zusammen, wie dies bereits bei der Erörterung dynamischer Bezugnahmen deutlicher wurde.

Es scheint, dass der Gehalt praktischer Überlegungen selbst *dynamischen* Charakter hat. Indem wir darüber nachdenken, was zu tun ist und wie dies zu bewerkstelligen wäre, indem wir also praktische Überlegungen anstellen, überschreiten wir je schon die Grenzen indexikalischer Gegebenheiten im Hinblick auf Erwartungen, Vorstellungen und Intentionen. Nennen wir diesen letzteren, kontext-unabhängigen Aspekt „Idealität“, so könnte behauptet werden, dass wir in praktischen Überlegungen immer schon die Grenzen des Indexikalischen mit Blick auf Idealität hin überschreiten.

Praktisches Überlegen schließt also die Fähigkeit ein, kontextbezogene Gedanken gewissermaßen zu dynamisieren und ihren kognitiven Gehalt in dieser Weise anzupassen an die jeweils neuen Erfordernisse einer neuen bzw. einer geplanten Situation. In welcher Weise kann hier nun von einer „Dynamisierung“ intentionaler Inhalte gesprochen werden? Denkbar wären zwei Gründe hierfür: 1) Praktisches Überlegen setzt einen *Selbstbegriff, praktische (raumzeitliche) Orientierungsfähigkeit* und minimale Rationalität voraus. 2) Praktisches Überlegen erfordert zudem gedankendynamische Fertigkeiten, die für jene Kompetenz stehen, momentane kontextabhängige Glaubensinhalte auf „ideale“ (kontext-unabhängige) Erwartungshorizonte abzubilden. Dieses praktische Zusammenspiel von indexikalischen und idealen Aspekten ist eine fundamentale Bedingung unseres Lebens als tätige Personen.

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Searle über den Zusammenhang zwischen Intentionalität und Bewußtsein

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Einleitung

John R. Searle hat in seinem Buch *The Rediscovery of Mind* die Auffassung vertreten, daß es eine *begriffliche* Verbindung zwischen Bewußtsein im Sinne des erlebnishaften Charakters eines mentalen Zustandes und seiner Intentionalität gebe. Ein mentaler Zustand, so Searle, könne nur dann Intentionalität haben, wenn er – zumindest möglicherweise – bewußt sei. Intentionalität setze also die Anwesenheit von Bewußtsein voraus. Wir könnten daher das Problem der Intentionalität nicht getrennt vom Problem des Bewußtseins behandeln – im Gegenteil: eine vollständige Theorie der Intentionalität schließe eine Erklärung des Bewußtseins ein. (Vgl. Searle 1992, insbesondere Kap. 6 und 7; ähnlich argumentiert wird bereits in Searle 1990.)

Die Begründung, die Searle für seine – der landläufigen Meinung widersprechenden – Auffassung gegeben hat, macht an zentraler Stelle vom Begriff der „Aspektgestalt“ (*aspectual shape*) Gebrauch: Die begriffliche Verbindung zwischen Intentionalität und Bewußtsein, so Searle, sei der Tatsache geschuldet, daß ein Zustand mit Intentionalität zugleich ein Zustand mit einer Aspektgestalt sei. Searle erläutert die Rede von der Aspektgestalt folgendermaßen:

I have been using the term of art, “aspectual shape”, to mark a universal feature of intentionality. It can be explained as follows: Whenever we perceive anything or think about anything, we always do so under some aspects and not others. These aspectual features are essential to the intentional state [...]. Aspectual shape is most obvious in the case of conscious perceptions: think of seeing a car, for example. When you see a car, it is not simply a matter of an object being registered by your perceptual apparatus; rather, you actually have a conscious experience of the object from a certain point of view and with certain features. [...] And what is true of conscious perceptions is true of intentional states generally. A man may believe, for example, that the star in the sky is the Morning Star without believing that it is the Evening Star. [...] There is an indefinitely large number of true descriptions of the Evening Star [...], but something is believed or desired about them only under certain aspects and not under others. Every belief and every desire, and indeed every intentional phenomenon, has an aspectual shape. (Searle 1992, 156f.)

Wenn ein Zustand eine Aspektgestalt habe – so Searle weiter –, handle es sich um einen Zustand, der – zumindest möglicherweise – bewußt sei:

[T]he [...] presence of aspectual shapes [...] implies accessibility to consciousness. (Searle 1990, 274.)

Dieser Zusammenhang ergebe sich daraus, daß eine Aspektgestalt *irreduzibel subjektiv* sei:

The aspectual character is irreducibly subjective in the sense that no characterization in purely neutral third-person terms will ever be sufficient to express how the aspectual character seems to the agent [...]. (Searle 1990, 277.)

Zusammengefaßt lautet Searles Argument also folgendermaßen:

I. Wenn ein Zustand Intentionalität hat, dann besitzt er eine Aspektgestalt.

II. Wenn ein Zustand eine Aspektgestalt besitzt, dann ist er irreduzibel subjektiv.

III. Wenn ein Zustand irreduzibel subjektiv ist, dann ist er (möglicherweise) bewußt.

∴ IV. Wenn ein Zustand Intentionalität hat, dann ist er (möglicherweise) bewußt.

Ich möchte Searles Argument im folgenden untersuchen. Es wird sich herausstellen, daß es von mindestens einer falschen Prämisse Gebrauch macht. Die übliche Auffassung, nach der Bewußtsein und Intentionalität begrifflich unabhängige Eigenschaften mentaler Zustände darstellen, wird durch Searles Überlegungen nicht in Frage gestellt.

Die erste Prämisse

Die Plausibilität der ersten Prämisse hängt davon ab, in welchem Sinne wir Searles Begriff der Aspektgestalt lesen. Der von Searle angeführte Fall einer Person, die glaubt, der Morgenstern stehe am Himmel, ohne zugleich zu glauben, daß der Abendstern am Himmel stehe, legt nahe, daß eine Aspektgestalt genau dann vorliegt, wenn die Beschreibung des betreffenden mentalen Zustands einen intensionalen Kontext darstellt – d.h. einen Kontext, in dem der Austausch koextensionaler Termini eine Gefahr für die Wahrheit des Gesamtzusammenhangs darstellt. Die Intentionalität von Überzeugungsberichten wie „Verena glaubt, daß der Morgenstern am Himmel steht“ wird gemeinhin darauf zurückgeführt, daß sich der Gehalt von Überzeugungen aus *Begriffen* zusammensetzt. Da der Begriff des Morgensterns ein *anderer* Begriff ist als der Begriff des Abendsterns, können wir den Ausdruck „der Morgenstern“ nicht ohne weiteres gegen den Ausdruck „der Abendstern“ austauschen. Wenn Searle von der Aspektgestalt mentaler Zustände spricht, so scheint er demnach die Tatsache im Auge zu haben, daß wir – wenn wir an einen bestimmten Gegenstand denken – an diesen Gegenstand stets nur *unter einer bestimmten begrifflichen Perspektive* denken können – daß es jedoch niemals gelingt, *alle möglichen begrifflichen Perspektiven einzunehmen*.

Searle scheint mit der Rede von der Aspektgestalt eines mentalen Zustandes jedoch noch etwas anderes zu meinen – etwas, das nichts mit begrifflicher Perspektivität im erläuterten Sinne zu tun hat. Darauf deutet zumindest die Tatsache hin, daß Searle neben dem Morgenstern/Abendstern-Beispiel den Fall der visuellen Wahrnehmung ins Spiel bringt. Searle hat recht: Wenn ich ein Auto sehe, dann sehe ich nicht alle Seiten des Autos gleichzeitig, sondern lediglich eine bestimmte Seite. Ich sehe das Auto nicht von *allen* Standpunkten aus, sondern nur von *einem* Standpunkt – und zwar von meinem. Wenn Searle an dieser Stelle von der Aspekthafteit mentaler Zustände spricht, so scheint er demnach die Tatsache im Auge zu haben, daß wir – wenn wir einen bestimmten Gegenstand

wahrnehmen – diesen Gegenstand zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt stets *aus einer bestimmten räumlichen Perspektive* wahrnehmen – daß es jedoch niemals gelingt, zu ein und demselben Zeitpunkt *alle räumlichen Perspektiven* einzunehmen.

Es sollte klar sein, daß *räumliche* Perspektivität nicht dasselbe ist wie *begriffliche* Perspektivität. Die Tatsache, daß wir an einen Gegenstand stets unter einem bestimmten Begriff denken – daß es aber unmöglich ist, an ihn unter *allen* Begriffen zu denken, die auf ihn zutreffen –, erklärt sich aus dem Umstand, daß wir *kognitiv beschränkte* Wesen sind. Wer an einen Gegenstand unter allen Begriffen denken wollte, die auf ihn zuträfen, der müßte im Besitz all dieser Begriffe sein. Eine solche Situation ist unmöglich. Denn jedem Gegenstand entspricht eine *unendliche* Anzahl von Begriffen, die auf ihn zutreffen.

Die Tatsache, daß wir einen Gegenstand stets von einem bestimmten Standpunkt aus sehen, daß es aber unmöglich ist, ihn zur selben Zeit von *allen* Standpunkten aus zu sehen, von denen er sichtbar ist, erklärt sich aus dem Umstand, daß unsere Körper den Gesetzen der raum-zeitlichen Welt unterliegen. Wer einen Gegenstand von allen Standpunkten aus sehen wollte, von denen er sichtbar ist, der müßte sich zu ein und derselben Zeit an verschiedenen Orten aufhalten. Eine solche Situation ist unmöglich. Denn niemand kann sich zu ein und derselben Zeit an zwei verschiedenen Orten aufhalten.

Das, was wir von einem Ding *sehen*, ist – abgesehen von der Funktionstüchtigkeit unserer Augen, der Qualität der Lichtverhältnisse vor Ort usw. – eine Frage der räumlichen Relation, die zwischen uns und dem wahrgenommenen Ding besteht – ähnlich, wie das, was wir von uns im Spiegel sehen, davon abhängt, in welcher Entfernung und in welchem Winkel wir vor dem Spiegel stehen. Die Parallelität zwischen dem, was wir visuell wahrnehmen, und dem, was uns ein Spiegel darbietet, wird von der Fotografie genutzt. Man könnte daher sagen, daß man den Aspekt, den wir von einem bestimmten Standpunkt aus sehen, *fotografieren* kann: Der Aspekt, den ich von einem Auto aus meiner Perspektive sehe, läßt sich dokumentieren, wenn ich vor mein Auge einen Fotoapparat halte und auf den Auslöser drücke. Das, was ich dann nach wenigen Tagen in der Hand halte, ist eine mehr oder weniger präzise Dokumentation des Aspekts, unter dem sich mir das Auto dargeboten hat.

Im Falle der begrifflichen Perspektivität verhält es sich anders: Dieses Phänomen läßt sich nicht bildhaft dokumentieren. Der Grund dafür besteht darin, daß die „Aspekte“, unter denen sich Gegenstände dem Denken darbieten, nicht von *räumlichen* Verhältnissen abhängen. Wenn Verena an den Morgenstern denkt, ohne einen Gedanken an den Abendstern zu verschwenden, so liegt das nicht daran, daß sie sich an einer bestimmten Raumstelle befindet, von der aus etwa nur der „Morgenstern-Aspekt“ der Venus sichtbar wäre. Es liegt daran, daß Verena nicht weiß, daß der Begriff des Morgensterns und der Begriff des Abendsterns auf ein und denselben Gegenstand – die Venus – zutreffen. Verenas räumliche Position spielt in diesem Zusammenhang also gar keine Rolle. Begriffliche Perspektivität läßt sich daher nicht bildhaft, sondern nur *sprachlich* repräsentieren. Genau das geschieht, wenn wir sagen: „Verena glaubt, daß der Morgenstern am Himmel steht – aber sie glaubt nicht, daß der Abendstern am Himmel steht. Denn sie weiß nicht, daß der Morgenstern der Abendstern ist.“

Kurz und bündig läßt sich der Unterschied zwischen räumlicher und begrifflicher Perspektivität so zusammen-

fassen: Räumliche Perspektivität rührt von der Tatsache her, daß ein Gegenstand in einem Kontinuum unendlich vieler verschiedener Raumstellen eingebettet liegt; begriffliche Perspektivität resultiert dagegen aus der Tatsache, daß es unendlich viele verschiedene wahre Beschreibungen gibt, die auf einen Gegenstand zutreffen. Räumliche Perspektivität ist eine Sache des *empirischen* Raumes – begriffliche Perspektivität eine Sache des *logischen* Raumes.

Wenn wir Searles Rede von der Aspektgestalt nun im Sinne begrifflicher Perspektivität verstehen, so ist die erste Prämisse seines Arguments sicherlich wahr. Zumindest wird gemeinhin zugestanden, daß die vollständige Beschreibung eines intentionalen Zustandes einen intentionalen Kontext darstellt. Meint Searle mit „Aspektgestalt“ allerdings das Phänomen räumlicher Perspektivität, so ist die erste Prämisse falsch. Denn es ist kein universelles Merkmal intentionaler Zustände, Gegenstände aus einer bestimmten räumlichen Position heraus zu repräsentieren. Die Intentionalität eines mentalen Zustandes besteht nicht darin, daß er bestimmte sinnliche Eindrücke beinhaltet, die ein Gegenstand in unserem Wahrnehmungsapparat hinterlassen hat. Die Intentionalität eines mentalen Zustandes besteht darin, daß er einen semantisch bewertbaren Gehalt aufweist – einen Gehalt, von dem sich sagen läßt, daß er wahr bzw. falsch ist. Wenn Verena glaubt, daß der Morgenstern am Himmel steht, so mag es zwar durchaus möglich sein, daß ihr dabei im Geiste eine Abbildung der Venus vorschwebt. Die Tatsache, daß Verena derartige Visionen hat, ist jedoch weder hinreichend noch notwendig für die Intentionalität ihres Zustandes. Blicke Verenas inneres Theater geschlossen, würde dies an der Intentionalität ihres Zustandes nichts ändern – solange dieser einen semantisch bewertbaren Gehalt aufweist.

Die zweite Prämisse

Ich fürchte nun jedoch, daß wir Searles Rede von der Aspektgestalt im Sinne räumlicher Perspektivität lesen müssen. Denn nur unter dieser Interpretation ergibt die zweite Prämisse seines Arguments Sinn, die besagt, daß, wenn ein Zustand eine Aspektgestalt aufweist, er irreduzibel subjektiv ist. Versuchen wir es zunächst jedoch mit der „freundlichen“ Lesart des Begriffs der Aspektgestalt: Ist die These, daß ein mentaler Zustand, der begriffliche Perspektivität aufweist, irreduzibel subjektiv sei, richtig? Das kommt darauf an, was „irreduzibel subjektiv“ heißt. Searles Auskunft lautet: Irreduzibel subjektiv zu sein, bedeute, daß keine Beschreibung in einem neutralen „Dritte-Person-Vokabular“ hinreichend sei, um auszudrücken, wie die betreffende Aspektgestalt einer Person erscheine. Wenn wir die Aspektgestalt als diejenige begriffliche Perspektive auffassen, unter der eine Person auf einen bestimmten Gegenstand Bezug nimmt, scheint mir Searles Skepsis unangebracht. Denn es ist ziemlich einfach, einer Aspektgestalt in diesem Sinne zum Ausdruck zu verhelfen: Wenn Verena glaubt, daß der Morgenstern am Himmel steht, dann bringen wir die besondere begriffliche Perspektive, unter der Verena an die Venus denkt, mit Hilfe der Bezeichnung „der Morgenstern“ zum Ausdruck. Die Auffassung, daß wir die besondere begriffliche Perspektive, unter der eine Person auf einen Gegenstand Bezug nimmt, nicht durch neutrales „Dritte-Person-Vokabular“ in den Griff bekommen können, ist offenbar falsch: Das Vokabular, das wir benutzen, um die begriffliche Perspektive auszudrücken, die eine Person gegenüber einem Gegenstand einnimmt, ist das neutrale „Dritte-Person-Vokabular“. Die begriffliche Perspektive, unter der eine Person an einen Gegenstand denkt, ist demnach nichts „Unaus-

sprechliches“. Sie ist auch nichts, was anderen Subjekten unzugänglich wäre. Im Gegenteil: Wenn Markus unter dem Begriff des Morgensterns an die Venus denkt, und Verena ebenfalls unter dem Begriff des Morgensterns an die Venus denkt, so *teilen* sich Markus und Verena ein und dieselbe begriffliche Perspektive.

Unter der zweiten, „unfreundlichen“ Lesart der Rede von der Aspektgestalt, sieht die Sache anders aus. Wenn wir annehmen, daß die Tatsache, daß ein mentaler Zustand eine Aspektgestalt hat, bedeutet, daß er räumliche Perspektivität besitzt, ist es durchaus plausibel, von „irreduzibler Subjektivität“ zu sprechen. Räumliche Perspektivität zu haben, bedeutet, einen bestimmten *sinnlichen Eindruck* eines Gegenstandes aufzuweisen – eben denjenigen sinnlichen Eindruck, den wir uns von dem betreffenden Gegenstand aus einer bestimmten räumlichen Perspektive her verschafft haben. Die von einem bestimmten Gegenstand herrührenden *sinnlichen Eindrücke* lassen sich – im Gegensatz zu den auf einen bestimmten Gegenstand zutreffenden *Begriffen* – durch unser Alltagsvokabular nicht adäquat repräsentieren. So überfordert z.B. bereits der sinnliche Eindruck eines Laubwaldes unser sprachliches Ausdrucksvermögen. Unser Alltagsvokabular enthält weitaus weniger Farbbezeichnungen als unser sinnlicher Eindruck Farbnuancen. Wenn wir einer anderen Person unseren sinnlichen Eindruck vermitteln wollen, dann ist das beste, was wir tun können, sie an genau denselben Ort zu bringen, an dem wir gestanden haben, als wir auf den Laubwald geblickt haben. Worte allein werden einer dritten Person unseren sinnlichen Eindruck nicht vermitteln können.

Wenn Searle mit seiner zweiten Prämisse meint, daß sinnliche Eindrücke in dem beschriebenen Sinne *nicht mitteilbar* sind, so hat er sicherlich recht. Allerdings wird in diesem Fall seine erste Prämisse falsch. Denn wir müssen ja annehmen, daß Searle unter „Aspektgestalt“ räumliche Perspektivität versteht. Unterstellen wir dagegen, daß Searle unter „Aspektgestalt“ begriffliche Perspektivität versteht, so ist die erste Prämisse zwar richtig, die zweite jedoch falsch. Wie wir die Dinge auch drehen und wenden: Es scheint keine kohärente Interpretation von Searles ersten beiden Prämissen zu geben, unter denen sie zusammen wahr wären. Die dritte Prämisse (die ich unter der gegenwärtigen Interpretation von „irreduzibel subjektiv“ für wahr halte) kann das Argument demnach nicht mehr retten.

Man könnte nun einwenden, daß Searle etwas ganz anderes meine, wenn er von „irreduzibler Subjektivität“ spreche. Searle spiele hier nicht auf die Unausdrückbarkeit sinnlicher Eindrücke, sondern auf Quines Unbestimmtheitsthese an. Searle schreibt:

Behavioral evidence [...] always leaves the aspectual character of intentional states underdetermined. There will always be an inferential gulf between the evidence for the presence of the aspect and the aspect itself. (Searle 1990, 275.)

Wenn Searle *dies* unter „irreduzibler Subjektivität“ versteht, gibt es tatsächlich eine Möglichkeit, die beiden ersten Prämissen so zu interpretieren, daß sie zugleich wahr sind. Die erste Prämisse lautet dann:

I* Wenn ein mentaler Zustand Intentionalität hat, weist sein Gehalt begriffliche Perspektivität auf.

und die zweite Prämisse kann dann so gedeutet werden:

II* Wenn der Gehalt eines mentalen Zustandes begriffliche Perspektivität aufweist, so ist er (der Gehalt) selbst unter Berücksichtigung aller möglichen Anhaltspunkte unterbestimmt.

Die dritte Prämisse

Aber nun gibt es ein Problem mit der dritten Prämisse. Wenn wir „irreduzibel subjektiv“ als „selbst unter Berücksichtigung aller möglichen Anhaltspunkte unterbestimmt“ auffassen, lautet die dritte Prämisse so:

III* Wenn der Gehalt eines mentalen Zustandes selbst unter Berücksichtigung aller möglichen Anhaltspunkte unterbestimmt ist, ist dieser Zustand (möglicherweise) bewußt.

Es ist keineswegs klar, warum Unterbestimmtheit (mögliches) Bewußtsein impliziert. Sehen wir uns einen Fall an, der ähnlich gelagert ist: die Unterbestimmtheit des Gehalts wissenschaftlicher Theorien. Wenn wir Pierre Duhem Glauben schenken dürfen, gibt es zu jeder akzeptierten Theorie über ein bestimmtes Gegenstandsgebiet eine denkbare Alternative, die mit den zu erklärenden Daten ebensogut im Einklang steht. Bedeutet das, daß wissenschaftliche Theorien (möglicherweise) bewußte Phänomene darstellen? Natürlich nicht. Theorien haben nicht den Charakter von Erlebnissen – Theorien sind Aussagenverbindungen.

„Aber“, so könnte man an dieser Stelle einwenden, „natürlich sind wissenschaftliche Theorien möglicherweise bewußte Phänomene: wir können uns ihrer doch bewußt sein!“ Es sollte klar sein, daß dieser Einwand ins Leere geht. Denn wir dürfen die in Searles Argument erwähnte Eigenschaft, (möglicherweise) bewußt zu sein, nicht mit der Eigenschaft, (möglicherweise) als Gegenstand unseres Bewußtseins zu fungieren, verwechseln. In diesem, letztgenannten Sinne ist so gut wie alles bewußt – denn so gut wie alles kann in den Fokus unseres Bewußtseins geraten.

Fazit

Es gibt demnach drei Wege, auf denen Searles Argument scheitert: Entweder (a) Prämisse I ist wahr, aber Prämisse II ist falsch, oder (b) Prämisse II ist wahr, aber Prämisse I ist falsch (Prämisse III ist in diesen Fällen irrelevant), oder (c) Prämissen I und II sind wahr, aber Prämisse III ist falsch.

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Mind and (Bracketed) World (Could There Be an Externalist Epoché?)

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1. Wittgenstein's remarks (1953) concerning both rule-following and the unintelligibility of the idea of a private language are often taken as grounds for externalism about mental content. We can neither exercise conceptual capacities nor obtain contentful sensations or beliefs without an appeal to practices in a shared public language. Externalism about mental content (the thesis that our thinking gains content outside the realm of what is mental) can easily encourage epistemological externalism (the thesis that one does not need to acknowledge one's knowledge in order to know). If mental contents are world-dependent so could be an attitude towards contents, such as knowledge (see Williamson 2000, Vahid 2003). Externalism is a general way of thinking that favours the idea that mind and world are not independent variables and, therefore, our mental life is not indifferent to the way the world around us happens to be. Externalism is therefore a decisive departure from several Cartesian assumptions that have guided quite a number of philosophical preoccupations and objectives in the last centuries. In particular, a Cartesian model has informed ways of thinking about our experience of the world and of other people. In this work I examine a strategy to conceive of our experience in a noncommitting way: the endeavour to think of experience in a bracketed world. The idea, often labeled *epoché*, is that our thinking can take place with some amount of indifference concerning how the world is. We can think and have experience irrespective to whether the objects we experience and think about exist. An *epoché* assumes that it is possible to think about p without any commitment as to whether or not p is the case. Thought about whatever is in the scope of an *epoché* involves no more than the person who thinks. The world, and the objects we think about and experience, is kept outside as a methodological assumption that aims to clarify what is at stake when we think and experience.

The *epoché* method is one that intends to analyse experience (and thinking) in itself, isolating it from its surroundings in the world. As such, at least at first sight, the idea of an *epoché* contrasts with an externalist approach to knowledge and mental content. I shall maintain here that the contrast is indeed profound. In fact, the contrast will prove to be itself a good way to characterize the externalist perspective.

2. Descartes championed the idea that the price of certainty is to distance ourselves as much as possible from our predetermined judgments and our common ways of thinking. Safety for our beliefs can only be attained through a recoil into the mental realm that provides legitimacy (and content) to our thinking. The idea is that we can recoil to a sphere that is free of suspicious preconceptions and that enables us to start from scratch somewhere independent of those suspicious preconceptions; indeed independent of any preconception. This sphere, that we learned to identify with the mind, is understood as a neutral ground where our thinking happens. It is conceived as independent of however things are outside it: we do not know how things are but we can safely recoil to this mental realm. Descartes then envisaged a method for good thinking that would start out with the materials provided by the mind and proceed in a way to avoid the risks of stepping in shaky

territory. Mind is safe because it pre-exists every content and indeed it is what instills content into our thinking. The adequacy of what we think, whether or not our thoughts are true, is a matter of fact about which our beliefs can be fairly oblivious.

With his idea of the mental sphere, Descartes has encouraged an agenda to look for certainty that proceeds from the mind towards the world in order to counter the skeptical suspicion that the world becomes unattainable. This agenda has greatly shaped the philosophical endeavour ever since and is precisely what externalism intends to revert. Externalist typically springs from a deep suspicion of the Cartesian agenda: it is not a roadmap to exorcise skepticism but rather the toolkit that any skeptical challenge demands. Cartesian assumptions picture mind as an independent variable and in doing so they make the world irremediably alien to our processes of thinking and experiencing. If the content and the origin of our beliefs are mental, and therefore private, we can never attain certainty about the world: we are confined in a stage of representations. Moreover, externalism holds that the Cartesian, and the skeptic, have to defend a number of positive theses to give them right to maintain that mind is independent; for example, that content could be oblivious to the world or that our beliefs are not responsive to the world when they are formed (by a mechanism of reliability, for instance). The Cartesian skeptic, according to an externalist diagnosis, has to accept the burden of the proof in some matters before she can be entitled to a global doubt. So, for example, a Wittgensteinian externalist would require the skeptic to show her credentials before she engages in global doubt, for doubt cannot take place in a belief vacuum, and a Davidsonian externalist would ask her to prove that she could both understand what she is doubting and having a global doubt. In any case, the skeptic has to show that her position is available.

Externalism changes the philosophical landscape by focusing on how the world provides the furniture for the operations of the mind. Our mental life is not a starting point for our inquiry into the world, it is rather already fully world-dependent. Our mental operations are spread in the world for we cannot provide an account of them without appealing to the world. If mental content is in the world, there is no specified arena of the mental, mind is dissolved in our actions and inquiries in the world. So, for instance, we cannot wonder whether the future will resemble the past as a matter of fact in the world if we do not possess the concept of future and therefore of a clock and therefore of the regularities in the world: that the future resembles the past. The externalist argues for a conception of mind as something very different from an organ, a substance or an object in the world. Externalism then ascribes to the skeptic the burden to prove that her conception of mind is a workable one.

3. Skepticism is often related to a quietism about philosophical theses. Pyrrhonism attempted to achieve a position where no philosophical commitment had to be taken. The method envisaged was to appeal to an *epoché*, a state where we suspend judgement about something, usually a set of (philosophical) theses. The idea is akin to that of

abstaining from committing concerning something. For the Pyrrhonist, it is recommendable to abstain from commitment because of *diaphonía*, that is, because of the incorrigible difference of opinions. Whenever there is incorrigible *diaphonía*, an *epoché* is the most suitable attitude. The idea of the *epoché* is that we can recoil somewhere beyond the reach of the *diaphonía*, and the Cartesian move was to inaugurate a realm where we could, so to speak, put the rest of the world in *epoché*. A challenge, already for the Pyrrhonist, was to show that we can divest ourselves completely from *diaphonía* without the risk of ending up making any discourse impossible.

The idea of an *epoché* is a generalization of what McDowell (1982) called the highest common factor model for knowledge and perception where we replace items of perception (or knowledge) that could be wrong, like objects for we can hallucinate, by less committing ones like sensations. These less committing items are supposed to be intelligible highest common factors between, say, the object we think we perceive and an object of hallucination. Like with the *epoché*, it seems that fear makes us recoil to a realm that appears to be safer and the question of course is whether this realm is really both safe and intelligible. McDowell rejects the model on three grounds. First, it is not compulsory (his disjunctive conception of appearances is an alternative). Second, the highest common factor is a postulated item that can hardly be contentful without appealing to the world (that we intend to bracket). Third, it makes contact with the world through knowledge and perception a mystery, as the intentional items that are thought and perceived are short of being items of the world. Merleau-Ponty, who was a critic of any appeal to mental objects in our accounts of perception, remarked that to isolate appearances from what they are appearances of amounts to sign an insurance against doubt that costs more than the potential loss (1964, 58-9). We can attain certainty, but we will certainly not attain certainty about the world.

Husserl's phenomenological method involves the idea of performing an *epoché* to analyse experience so that we would rid ourselves of any preconceptions about, for example, the world and other people that we carry with us. Husserl's effort (1929, §44) is to think from a point of departure that abstracts away our commitments concerning anything that is beyond the reach of the thinker. His transcendental *epoché* is a method to consider experience in itself, free of whatever is projected in it by both commonsense and philosophical doctrines (see 1913, §32). The idea is that we would consider experience independently of any item beyond what is available in experience itself and therefore without any commitment to any existence claim. *Epoché* makes us focus on our intentional objects irrespective of the objects beyond the reach of our mental acts. The purpose is to acquire a relative neutrality concerning whatever is not at stake in our research exercise, for example, in our effort to look at experience. We can provisionally put aside our beliefs (for example, about the world and other people) while we investigate so that we can reap the benefits of the *epoché*. We could not live in a constant *epoché* but we can engage in one whenever an effort of phenomenological analysis is necessary. In the best construction I can think of, a Husserlian *epoché* is a method to consider experience as it appears to us and is no more than part of what is required for a general account of our experiences.

Now, I think this method is not really available to an externalist. The realm where we are taken when we perform an *epoché* is not one that is unfurnished by items of the world, if it is an intelligible realm at all. Christian

Beyer (2001, 2004) believes that we can reconcile the *epoché* method to an externalist perspective. He draws on the distinction between local and universal *epoché*. The latter requires one to *epoché* all existence claims regarding the external world at once, whereas the former requires one to bracket only *particular* existence claims. Universal *epoché* is connected to Husserl's belief in a separable realm of experience beyond any particular object; if intentional objects are intrinsically indexical or otherwise world-dependent, we are to restrict ourselves to a, perhaps more clearly methodological, local *epoché*. Beyer's (2004) diagnosis runs like this:

Only the universal *epoché* seems to conflict with [externalism]: if no extra-mental existence assumptions whatsoever are admitted, then phenomenologically there cannot be object-dependent indexical contents, as externalism would have it. By contrast, there may be some such contents, even many of them, without indexical content generally having to be dependent on a particular extra-mental object. Which leaves enough room for the method of local *epoché* to apply to any given particular case [...] Now we can apply the local *epoché* to specify the [content] of both veridical perceptions and hallucinations so as to bring out their *singularity*. [...] Husserl stressed that objectless representations such as hallucinations can in a sense be characterized as "representing an intentional object", provided that this characterization is understood to be made "under an existential assumption", as follows: "If the act of hallucination were veridical, it would successfully represent such-and-such an object (under such-and-such aspects)".

It seems that there is a representation, present in both cases, which is the product of a recoil towards the highest common factor. Beyer, however, further claims that an externalist reading of Husserl would be possible if we take the content (the noema) to be different in both cases. It seems to me that we can force an externalist reading but only at the expense of rendering whatever results of the *epoché* contentless: no item results from the *epoché*. If, on the other hand, we recoil further so that we find a proper highest common factor, the points McDowell raises against this model apply: it is not compulsory, it has to come with a proof that neutral contents are intelligible (which probably requires the intelligibility of private, world-indifferent content) and it renders the world inaccessible to the mind. So, with an *epoché*, Husserl cannot be made externalistically kosher, without an *epoché*, Husserl would have an analysis of content akin to the disjunctive conception of appearances that McDowell espouses.¹

4. Externalism seems to preclude most forms of *epoché*. How general should this rejection be? Sometimes we need to abstain from commitment in order to investigate something. If externalism is right about the worldly furniture of our minds, less world taken into consideration entails less content in our analysis. Maybe, however, there is something to gain when we take less mental content into account in our analysis of mental activity. If recoil would not take us to anything like a sphere of mental objects, we can abstain from some commitments while holding others (and so being contentful). Such efforts of *epoché* would be still granted but it is doubtful whether they are more than an exercise of careful selection of commitments.

¹ McDowell's appeal to intentionality could be taken as itself residually Cartesian. Davidson's externalism, for instance, manages to avoid any appeal to intentional relations. For the contrast between these positions concerning intentional relations consult Bensusan 2003. Thanks to FINATEC for financial aid.

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Explaining Emotional Action

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1. The Challenge

According to a widespread model of agency actions are events that are caused by reasons. Reasons are considered to be desires and beliefs which are taken to rationalize the action from the perspective of the agent.¹ That is, the action is rendered intelligible by citing what the deliberating agent herself took as reasons. Only those actions qualify as rational if they are done for the sake of something good: An action is either thought to be good because the agent desires it and entertains beliefs about the adequate means to satisfy his desire, or it is thought to be good because the agent believes or judges it to be good and therefore develops desires in light of that reasoned judgment.

Given the standard picture of rational agency, it is difficult to see how a whole range of emotions could serve as reasons. Consider the following examples:

- (1) John destroys the photograph of Martha out of anger.
- (2) Grieving Mary rolls in the clothes of her husband who just passed away.
- (3) William kisses Gail's sweater in a wave of love.

In this paper, I will be concerned with the question how we can make sense of such emotional actions.

2. Emotions Versus Beliefs and Desires

According to the standard model emotional actions need to be explained in one of the following two ways:

- (1*) John desires to destroy Martha's photograph. He thinks that tearing it apart is conducive to realizing his desire.
- (1**) John believes that it is good to destroy Martha's photograph. He therefore desires to tear it apart.
- (2*) Mary desires to roll around in her dead husband's clothes. She believes that rolling around in those pants of his satisfies her desire.
- (2**) Mary believes that it is good to roll around in her dead husband's clothes. She therefore desires to roll around in those pants of his.
- (3*) William wants to kiss Gail's sweater. He believes that kissing this green sweater of hers is a way of realizing his desire.
- (3**) William believes that it is good to kiss Gail's sweater. He therefore desires to kiss this green sweater of hers.

The problem with either version of the standard model is, however, that neither desires with means-end beliefs nor value judgments and informed desires are helpful in explaining emotional actions. None of the emotional actions seem to serve any purpose from the agent's perspective. The persons acting that way do not engage in any conscious reasoning process in which they take a desire of theirs or something they judge to be good as reason-providing.

Two morals have been drawn from this analysis:

- (1) Emotional actions are not performed for any reasons at all. They are simply arational. This conclusion presupposes that agents who act emotionally need not have any conscious desires, and therefore do not need any beliefs about how they might go about satisfying those desires.² They simply go ahead and act the way they feel like doing.
- (2) Emotions should be interpreted in terms of beliefs and desires, which qualifies the actions resulting from them as done for reasons. This conclusion resorts to the claim that action explanation does not have to capture the fact that the agent is in an emotional state. It is sufficient to explain an action by beliefs and desires the agent *inter alia* has. It is conceded that they can derive their sense from emotional attitudes. Hence, only a person who grieves, might have such desires like rolling around in the clothes of a dead person. But the action is explained by the actual desires and beliefs of the agent as those mental states that are informative as to why the agent is doing what she is doing.³ Therefore, the argument goes, the actions are done for reasons.

I will defend the view that both of these conclusions are unsatisfactory. I think that the first suggestion is wrong because it presupposes the correctness of the standard model. Emotional actions need not be arational just because rational actions are defined by the good they realize, and that the agent considers as reason-giving in conscious deliberation. That agents who feel drawn to such emotional actions are, in fact, responsive to reasons can also be brought out by the fact that John, for example, who vents his anger by destroying Martha's photograph, is reasonable enough not to destroy *her*, or something more precious than her photograph. We also rationally criticize agents who engage in such actions for too long, or who evidently act against their own best interests. Consequently, it cannot be the case that emotional actions are entirely disconnected from reasons.

The second attempt to re-interpret emotional actions in terms of beliefs and desires is no less defective: It resorts to bizarre beliefs that are not held by the agents in question. For example, to ascribe Mary the belief that it is good to roll around in the clothes of her dead husband seems uncalled for, and therefore unhelpful in explaining why she wants to do what she is doing. It is unlikely she entertains any such thought that she consciously takes as her reason for acting.

The question that needs to be answered then is what accounts for our understanding of such actions although the agents in question do not need to hold any conscious desires, value judgments and means-end beliefs. Intuitively, there is no doubt that we can render such emotional actions intelligible. But what is it about anger, grief, or love that bolsters that intuition?

¹ Cf. D. Davidson (1963) 3-19. See also D. Velleman (1992) 100-5, who elucidates the distinction between cognitivist and non-cognitivist interpretations of what renders an action good. Cf. J. Raz (1999) 22-45.

² This argument is presented by R. Hursthouse (1991) 59.

³ Such a re-interpretation in light of actions out of emotions is proposed by M. Smith (1998) 17-23.

3. Making Sense of Emotional Actions

A first step to provide an answer to this question is to come up with a better understanding of what emotions of this kind detect about the agent's environment and his relation to it. We then need to elucidate in a second step in what way emotions of that kind are connected to the agent's having a reason, and therefore move him to action.

Emotions are perceptions of features in our environment as salient. What is perceived as salient, that is, as something that calls for a reaction from the (emotionally) perceiving agent depends on the agent's relation to an object bearing those features.⁴

Emotions, such as love, anger, and grief, are special in that they are directed to non-propositional objects, that is, to persons. They presuppose that the agent has a positive relationship to another person that she deeply (that is, emotionally) values.

John's perception of Martha's behavior as calling for anger is connected to perceiving Martha as behaving in a way that questions John's positively valued relationship to her. For example, perceiving Martha hugging another man may be a feature that John perceives as salient in light of his previous evaluation of Martha and his special relationship to her.

John's anger need not be the expression of a desire, e.g., that Martha be nice to him, nor is it comparable to a frustrated desire. Even if she hasn't fulfilled his desires his anger is geared towards her as being the kind of person and displaying the kinds of attitudes that call his evaluation of her into question.

Similarly, Mary's perception of her husband as being dead is an (extremely) salient feature given the loving relationship she had with him. Again, her grief is not the expression of a (frustrated) desire or a wish that her husband should be alive. She need not even imagine him to be alive.⁵ She may grieve even if his death was a relief from a painful illness. Instead, in grieving she perceives the death of her husband as calling for a response in light of the loving relationship she had.

Along the same lines, Gail's sweater given her sudden absence strikes William as salient given his newly developed close and loving relationship to her. William's wave of love, however, need not entail any desires like wanting to be with Gail at that very moment, or wishing Gail well. Similarly, he does not have to entertain any belief about Gail's sweater. Given her absence and in light of his love to Gail William perceives her belongings as calling for an emotional response to express his affection to her.

Consequently, that certain properties are emotionally perceived the way they are depends on the agent's evaluative relation to the persons with whom those emotionally perceived properties are connected. Once we acknowledge that emotional perception is not only directed to salient features in our environment, but also results from our previous evaluations that we take for granted, we are in a better position to understand the strong motivational power issuing from such emotions I referred to in the examples. Since such emotions are the result of a perceived dissonance between a valued relationship and the actual events, they strongly motivate to reduce that dissonance.

They thus help the agent to adapt to a changed situation and make sense of his evaluation in light of that change.

To be sure, not all of us are inclined to perform actions of the kind I mentioned. Whether people are compelled to perform such actions depends, in part, on their temperaments, characters and personal history. But these individual differences notwithstanding once such a dissonance is strongly perceived it motivates to reduce it. It thus helps us to re-adapt to our environment.

Yet how can such emotions be reasons given that the actions they motivate cannot be interpreted in the guise of the good? Aren't they simply blind impulses without having any connection to the agent having reasons?

Emotional actions of the kind mentioned are unreflective actions, but this does not preclude them from being related to reasons that apply independently of the agent's conscious states. What makes these emotional actions conducive to rationalization is that they express the agent's responses to reasons without her being necessarily conscious of those reasons at the time of acting.

The reasons the agents in the examples respond to are the reasons derived from their having come to value a person and their relationship to her. Once agents come to value a person for reasons they have further reasons, that is, relationship-dependent reasons, to respond to what they have come to value and act accordingly.

Given that they have come to hold an evaluative stance towards a person with reasons, and given that this stance is now questioned in light of the new information they acquire about the person and their relationship to her, they face rational pressure to reconsider their evaluative stance and/or manifest it more strongly. In light of the fact that what they have come to value is now lost (dead), absent or discontinued to merit their positive evaluation, they are momentarily or forever unable to act according to what they have come to value. To make sense of their previous evaluation in light of that new information many agents are strongly motivated to resort to various kinds of ersatz evaluations.

In kissing the sweater of the beloved, we value that person in her absence by expressing our affection to something that belongs to her. In rolling around in the clothes of the person who passed away we express our suffering from the loss of value that the death of a person represents. We try to hold on to the value that person had for us by valuing objects that remind us of that person. Tearing apart the photograph of a person one is angry with is an expression of our devaluing the person for her behaviour. It is a civilized ersatz for actually destroying that person, thus withdrawing our initial positive evaluation of her.

Actions of that kind are not done to bring about something good or desired. This does not entail, however, that they are disconnected from value. They are done to establish evaluative coherence between what one has come to value and the new information questioning that very evaluation. Emotional actions of the kind mentioned are thus consequences of reasons that the agent once took as reasons for valuing a person and his relationship to her. As consequences of such reasons they need not be considerations that the agent takes as reason-giving at the time of emotionally acting on them. The actions are nonetheless rational in the sense that they can be explained by the reasons for which the agent came to value a person in light of the fact that he encounters new relevant information which now questions his evaluation.

⁴ Cf. A. Noe (2004) Ch. 5&6; see also J. Prinz (2004).

⁵ D. Velleman (2000) 264-5, maintains that emotional actions can be explained by wishes and imagination. Cf. P. Goldie (2000) 25-38.

4. Conclusion

There are emotional actions which are done for reasons. This does neither entail that the agents acted for particularly good reasons, nor that all emotional actions are done for reasons of that kind.

Reasons for action, however, are neither exhausted by what agents take as reasons at the time of acting, nor are they exclusively connected to the good purpose that an action is taken to serve. This result lends support to the view that there are various kinds of rational actions one of which is that some actions are done for reasons ensuing from an agent's evaluations when confronted with new information. Such actions are rendered intelligible by the function they serve: Evaluative coherence and re-adaption to new circumstances. I have to leave if for another occasion to sort out the difference between these various kinds of rational action.

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Über den Wert der Gefühle

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In der Philosophie hat sich weitgehend die Auffassung durchgesetzt, daß Gefühle mehr sind als arationale Empfindungen nach Art des Magendrückens oder (günstigenfalls) verworrene, unausgegrenzte Werturteile, die dringend nach einsichtiger Begründung verlangen. Schon Blaise Pascal (um nur einen älteren Autor zu erwähnen) hatte dem menschlichen Gemütsleben eine „eigene Logik des Herzens“ attestiert. Ein Gedanke, der im 20. Jahrhundert etwa von dem Phänomenologen Max Scheler (Scheler 2000, 31ff.) und dem analytischen Philosophen Ronald de Sousa weiterverfolgt wurde.

1. Der Gefühlsbegriff

Wenn in der philosophischen Literatur von „Gefühlen“ die Rede ist, dann sind in der Regel diejenigen Phänomene gemeint, die im angelsächsischen Sprachraum gemeinhin mit dem Terminus „emotion“ bezeichnet werden: also *keine* „bloßen Empfindungen“ oder *raw feelings* wie etwa Schmerzen oder farbige Nachbilder, sondern vielmehr (in derlei Empfindungen allenfalls *fundierte*) emotionale Phänomene wie z.B. Angst, Furcht, Bewunderung, Liebe, Haß, Eifersucht, Empörung, Wut, Scham, Ekel, Freude, Verlegenheit, Reue, Trauer, Liebeskummer oder Sehnsucht. Einige dieser Phänomene sind kurzzeitige seelische Episoden – etwa die Wut, die zum Ausbruch kommt, oder die Scham, die jemanden erröten läßt. Andere Gefühle haben eher den Charakter von Langzeit-Dispositionen – beispielsweise der latente Haß auf eine Person, die einen vor längerer Zeit erniedrigt hat. Manche Gefühle sind hinsichtlich ihres Objekts unbestimmt oder gar richtungslos, so z.B. die Angst, die einen plötzlich ohne ersichtlichen Grund überkommt. Andere haben ein ganz bestimmtes Objekt, beispielsweise die Person, die man liebt, oder die eigene Handlung, die man bereut. Einige Gefühle sind bewußt, andere hingegen – etwa das bereits erwähnte latente Haßgefühl – schlummern im Unbewußten.

Angesichts dieser ziemlich heterogenen Reihe von Merkmalen erscheint es unwahrscheinlich, daß sich der Gefühlsbegriff präzise durch die Angabe logisch notwendiger und zusammengekommen hinreichender Bedingungen definieren oder sich ins Korsett einer bestimmten Ontologie zwängen läßt – etwa, wie Richard Wollheim (2001, 23ff.) annimmt, der Dispositions-Ontologie. Statt dessen bietet sich eine Wittgensteinsche Diagnose des Phänomens an: „Gefühl“ scheint ein *Familienähnlichkeitsbegriff* zu sein, für dessen korrekte Anwendung es sehr wohl brauchbare Kriterien gibt, die aber nur in geeigneten Kontexten greifen und gelegentlich auch miteinander konfliktieren (Alston 1996, 486). Den Kern der Familie bilden die *paradigmatischen Fälle*, anhand derer man den Gefühlsbegriff *erlernen* kann. Das sind natürlich nicht so sehr latente Langzeit-Dispositionen, als vielmehr manifeste Gefühlserlebnisse und deren Verhaltensäußerungen. Diese paradigmatischen Fälle haben, scheint mir, allesamt den Bezug auf gewisse *Empfindungen* gemein, und zwar auf solche, die den Gefühlen den Ruf des Arationalen oder rein Triebhaften eingetragen haben: Es handelt sich hier nämlich um körperliche Empfindungen, mit denen wir allenfalls „hedonistische“ Werte wie *angenehm* (sprich: positiv) oder *unangenehm* (negativ) verbinden; man könnte sie als *emotionale Empfindungen* bezeichnen. Wer etwa

ängstlich disponiert ist, tendiert in gewissen Kontexten zu erhöhter Herzfrequenz und Adrenalinausschüttungen, die wiederum subjektiv als unangenehm empfunden werden. Angst *qua* Disposition manifestiert sich also in gewissen Erlebnissen, die mit negativen Empfindungen verbunden sind. Diese Erlebnisse können sich ihrerseits in bestimmten Formen des Ausdrucksverhaltens äußern, etwa im Aufsetzen eines ängstlichen Gesichtsausdrucks. Jene emotionalen Erlebnisse und diese öffentlichen Gefühlsartikulationen fungieren dann je nachdem als innere oder äußere Kriterien dafür, daß jemand Angst verspürt, und im Wiederholungsfalle auch als Kriterien für das Vorliegen einer Angstdisposition.

„Im Wiederholungsfalle“ – das besagt: wenn sie unter ähnlichen Umständen erneut auftreten. Was zählt dabei als Ähnlichkeit? Bestimmte Dinge, Ereignisse oder Situationen scheinen das negativ oder positiv empfundene Gefühlserlebnis regelmäßig auszulösen; diese auslösenden Faktoren erinnern das Subjekt an Dinge oder Konstellationen, die solch eine Empfindung (nach seinem Eindruck) bereits früher hervorgerufen haben. De Sousa spricht in diesem Zusammenhang von der „situativen Komponente“ eines „Schlüsselszenarios“; ich werde diese Komponente als *Schlüsselsituation* bezeichnen (de Sousa 1997, 298ff.). Angenommen etwa, ein Subjekt assoziiert ein ihm anschaulich gegebenes Objekt, etwa eine soeben wahrgenommene Spinne, mit einer Schlüsselsituation; das könnte hier z.B. das – vielleicht durch eine Warnung des Erziehers kommentierte – Krabbeln einer Spinne auf der eigenen Haut sein. Im Falle einer Angstdisposition tritt dann automatisch auch die entsprechende Angstempfindung auf, und man kann sagen, daß unser Subjekt sich in einem bewußten Zustand der Angst befindet. Das ängstlich disponierte Subjekt hat mit anderen Worten ein Angsterlebnis, sobald es sich mit einer Situation konfrontiert sieht, die es an eine einschlägige Schlüsselsituation erinnert.

Zu den Kriterien, die für emotionale Dispositionen charakteristisch sind, gehören demnach: Schlüsselsituationen, damit assoziierte (positive oder negative) emotionale Empfindungen als *phänomenale Momente* von bewußten Gefühlsepisoden sowie – nicht zuletzt – deren Verhaltensäußerungen. Letztere bilden eine weitere Komponente des Schlüsselszenarios. Außerdem ist anzumerken, daß ein und dieselbe emotionale Empfindung mit *verschiedenen* Schlüsselszenarien assoziiert sein kann, in Hinblick auf die das zugehörige emotionale Vokabular zu erlernen oder auch zu sublimieren ist: wie etwa bei der Lektüre eines literarischen Werkes, das uns ein bis *dato* unbekanntes Schlüsselszenario für ein schon vertrautes Gefühl vor den Blick bringt. Auch die *einzelnen Sorten* von Gefühlen bilden also Familienähnlichkeitsbegriffe, und die diversen zugehörigen Schlüsselszenarien stellen dem Subjekt Kriterien gleichsam für die Anwendung des betreffenden Gefühls bereit. Diese können, wie gehabt, auch miteinander konfliktieren. So kann sich Bewunderung z.B. auf das bewundernswert erscheinende Verhalten verschiedener Personen beziehen, und womöglich gar mit Blick auf diametral entgegengesetzte Aspekte ihres Verhaltens, etwa Brutalität und Sanftmütigkeit. Dies ist immer dann der Fall, wenn das Subjekt die widersprüchlichen Aspekte jeweils mit einem Schlüsselszenario für das Gefühl der

Bewunderung verbindet und dementsprechend emotional disponiert ist.


Nun liegt im Begriff einer emotionalen Disposition offensichtlich der Verweis auf ein entsprechendes Gefühlserlebnis beschlossen, also auf einen *Bewußtseinszustand*, der eine emotionale Empfindung involviert und die betreffende Disposition dabei je nachdem *initiiert* oder in dem sie sich *aktualisiert* – sofern sie schon besteht. Wer z.B. niemals mit den für Eifersucht charakteristischen Empfindungen auf ein bestimmtes Verhalten des Ehepartners reagiert oder wenigstens in hinlänglich pikanten Situationen so reagieren *würde*, der ist im hier relevanten Sinne auch nicht zur Eifersucht *disponiert*. Dagegen ist es begrifflich sehr wohl möglich, daß jemand ein Gefühlserlebnis hat, ohne die entsprechende emotionale Disposition zu besitzen beziehungsweise auch nur zu erwerben: Denken Sie etwa an einen Angestellten, der sich kurzzeitig über das Verhalten seines Vorgesetzten ärgert und allenfalls im Nachhinein, wenn überhaupt, eine Abneigung gegen ihn entwickelt. Das Konzept eines Gefühlserlebnisses ist also offenbar grundlegender als das einer emotionalen *Disposition* (Döring und Peacocke 2002, 95). Ich werde mich daher im Folgenden thematisch auf Gefühlserlebnisse beschränken.

Es ist inzwischen ein Gemeinplatz der Philosophie der Gefühle, daß sich Gefühlserlebnisse nicht nach dem Muster von Überzeugungen, Urteilen oder Wünschen modellieren lassen. Überzeugungen und Urteile zielen nämlich stets auf Wahrheit ab, und Wünsche stets auf etwas für das Subjekt irgendwie Gutes (Döring und Peacocke 2002, 90f.). Gefühlserlebnisse hingegen besitzen kein einheitliches formales Objekt, auf das sie allesamt abzielen. Vielmehr hat jede Sorte von Gefühlserlebnissen ihr eigenes, für das jeweilige Gefühl konstitutives Formalobjekt, wie z.B. Bewundernswürdigkeit, Liebenswertigkeit oder die Eigenschaft, furchteinflößend zu sein (de Sousa 1997, 206ff., 211). Es fällt auf, daß derlei Formalobjekte eine *evaluative* Komponente enthalten, also auf eine Bewertung des Gefühlsgegenstandes seitens des fühlenden Subjekts verweisen. Ich komme auf diese Wertbezogenheit der Gefühlserlebnisse noch zurück.

Daraus, daß sich die Gefühlserlebnisse nicht den Überzeugungen und Wünschen angleichen lassen, scheint nun *prima facie* zu folgen, daß das klassische Muster einer Handlungserklärung in Begriffen der *Belief/desire*-Psychologie keinen Raum für dergleichen wie rationales Handeln aus gefühlsbedingten Motiven läßt. Diese Schlußfolgerung erscheint mir jedoch bei genauerer Betrachtung unzulässig. Um dies zu verdeutlichen, werde ich die Gefühlserlebnisse nachfolgend mit den aussichtsreichsten Kandidaten vergleichen, die die Erkenntnistheorie für die Rolle des Rechtfertigungsfundaments von Überzeugungen anzubieten hat: den bewußten Wahrnehmungszuständen, sprich: den Wahrnehmungserlebnissen.

2. Gefühle und Wahrnehmungserlebnisse

Wahrnehmungserlebnisse lassen sich ebenfalls nicht nach Maßgabe der Überzeugungen und Urteile modellieren. Denn anders als bei doxastischen Zuständen ist es bei Wahrnehmungserlebnissen im Prinzip immer möglich, ihrem intentionalen Gehalt zu mißtrauen, *ohne* daß das Erlebnis deshalb aufgehört, ein Wahrnehmungserlebnis zu sein. Man denke etwa an die Müller-Lyer-Streckentäuschung:



Wir nehmen die beiden Strecken automatisch als ungleich lang wahr – und zwar selbst dann, wenn wir dem Augenschein aufgrund unseres Hintergrundwissens mißtrauen, also nicht das entsprechende Urteil fällen.

Dieser Befund illustriert gleichzeitig eine *zweite* Hinsicht, in der Gefühlserlebnisse bewußten Wahrnehmungszuständen gleichen: Beide Erlebnisarten sind oftmals *informationell eingekapselt*, d.h. das Auftreten der entsprechenden Erlebnisse in geeigneten Wahrnehmungssituationen ist weitgehend unabhängig von unserem jeweiligen Hintergrundwissen, soweit es die konkreten Wahrnehmungsumstände betrifft (*contra* de Sousa 1997, 258). Wer sich z.B. vor Schlangen fürchtet, der wird auch dann angesichts einer Blindschleiche Angst empfinden, wenn er weiß, daß Blindschleichen eigentlich harmlos sind. Die ängstliche Reaktion auf Schlangen ist in seinem Gehirn quasi fest verdrahtet.

Das impliziert freilich nicht, daß Wahrnehmungs- und Gefühlserlebnisse kraft ihres jeweiligen Gehalts nicht je schon in ein Netzwerk von Hintergrundüberzeugungen eingebettet wären. Das Gegenteil ist der Fall: Ohne gewisse Überzeugungen über Schlangen könnten wir weder bewußt Angst vor Schlangen empfinden noch auch Schlangen überhaupt als solche wahrnehmen. Dieser holistische Charakter ihres Gehalts bildet einen *dritten* gemeinsamen Zug zwischen paradigmatischen Gefühlen und Wahrnehmungserlebnissen.

Eine *vierte* Gemeinsamkeit ist das beiderseits involvierte Empfindungsmoment: *Es fühlt sich irgendwie an*, bewußt eine Schlange zu sehen, und *es fühlt sich irgendwie an*, sich davor zu fürchten.

Eine *fünfte* Hinsicht, in der Wahrnehmungs- und Gefühlserlebnisse einander gleichen, markiert der Umstand, daß sie manchmal *nicht-veridisch* sind, uns also in die Irre führen: Genauso wie manche Wahrnehmungserlebnisse sich erkenntnistheoretisch als Illusion oder gar Halluzination herausstellen, projizieren Gefühlserlebnisse gelegentlich formale Objekte auf die Realität, die entweder nicht zum intentionalen Gegenstand des betreffenden Gefühls passen – dies wäre das Analogon zur Illusion – oder die gar keinen Gegenstand haben, zu dem sie passen könnten, weil das Gefühl – wie eine Halluzination – gänzlich ins Leere schießt. Zu den illusorischen Gefühlen gehört beispielsweise jemandes Bewunderung für eine Person angesichts einer Leistung, die sie nie vollbracht hat. Als Exempel für ein Gefühlserlebnis, dem überhaupt kein Gegenstand entspricht, kann uns die Bewunderung für den Schöpfer einer kunstvoll anmutenden Gesteinsformation dienen, die in Wahrheit durch puren Zufall entstanden ist.

Wenn nun aber umgekehrt Gefühlserlebnisse – genau wie Wahrnehmungserlebnisse – manchmal sehr wohl *veridisch* sind, also ihren Gegenstand so erfassen, wie er wirklich *ist*, so ist schwerlich einzusehen, weshalb sie nicht auch als *rechtfertigende Gründe* (vernünftige Motive) für Überzeugungen infrage kommen. Wenn das stimmt, dann bietet die *Belief/desire*-Psychologie *doch* einen geeigneten theoretischen Rahmen, innerhalb dessen die Frage nach der Rationalität gefühlsbedingter Handlungen zu beantworten ist.

3. Gefühle als Rechtfertigungsgründe

Wir haben bereits gesehen, daß Gefühlserlebnisse formale Objekte besitzen, die so etwas wie Wertungen bezüglich ihres jeweiligen intentionalen Gegenstandes involvieren. Nun bezeichnet jedes formale Objekt meines Erachtens eine Bedingung, unter der das jeweilige Gefühlserlebnis seinem Gegenstand *angemessen ist* – oder *angemessen wäre*, je nachdem. Das gilt nicht nur für evolutionstheoretisch erklärbare Emotionen wie der Furcht vor einer drohenden Gefahr. Es gilt – obwohl einige Autoren (wie Steinfath 2002, 113f.) dies bestreiten – auch für Gefühlserlebnisse wie das der Bewunderung, also für Erlebnisse, die *prima facie* für ihr formales Objekt *konstitutiv* sind. Auch diese besitzen nämlich sehr wohl eine Dimension der Angemessenheit. Wenn ich z.B. jemanden für eine Tat bewundere, die er nie vollbracht hat, oder ihn für persönliche Eigenschaften liebe, die ich bloß auf ihn projiziere, dann ist das betreffende Gefühlserlebnis seinem Gegenstand doch wohl schlicht unangemessen: Er ist es nicht *wert*, so bewundert oder geliebt zu werden. Halten wir also fest:

1. Das formale Objekt eines Gefühlserlebnisses fixiert die Bedingungen, unter denen das Erlebnis seinem Gegenstand angemessen ist (zu ihm paßt).¹

Gleichwohl gibt es unbestritten Gefühlserlebnisse, die ihren Gegenstand unter weniger objektiven, also stärker subjektabhängigen Aspekten präsentieren als andere. Dies gilt beispielsweise für ästhetische Empfindungen, die der persönlichen Vorliebe des Subjekts etwa für einen gewissen Malstil entspringen. Man beachte jedoch, daß derlei Gefühlserlebnisse für ästhetische Subjekte mit *anderen* Vorlieben oder ästhetischen Standards immerhin *nachvollziehbar* sind. Das wäre ein Mirakel, wenn es keine Möglichkeit gäbe, eine ästhetische Empfindung *relativ zu gewissen Vorlieben und Standards* als ihrem Gegenstand angemessen zu beurteilen.

Tatsächlich können wir einfach nicht umhin, auf formale Objekte mit ihrer Dimension der Angemessenheit und Unangemessenheit zu rekurrieren, wenn es darum geht, Gefühlserlebnisse *verschiedener Sorten* voneinander abzuheben; eine Aufgabe, um die niemand herumkommt, der eine adäquate Theorie der Gefühle entwickeln möchte. Denn gemäß welchem Kriterium sollten wir Gefühlserlebnisse sonst klassifizieren? Gewiß nicht nach dem Kriterium des *Gefühlsgegenstandes*. Schließlich kann ein und derselbe Gegenstand Gefühle ganz unterschiedlicher Art auf sich ziehen. Ein anderes Unterscheidungskriterium ist aber weit und breit nicht in Sicht, d.h.:

2. Die einzige Möglichkeit, Gefühlserlebnisse zu klassifizieren, besteht im Rekurs auf formale Objekte.²

¹ Entsprechendes gilt für alle Formalobjekte. Wenn der jeweilige Gegenstand des φ -ens eine Eigenschaft *E* hat, dank derer das formale Objekt (*F*) des φ -ens zu diesem Gegenstand passt, dann ist das φ -en seinem Gegenstand angemessen. Beispiele für *F*: Wahrheit / Für's-Subjekt-gut-sein / die Eigenschaft, furchteinflößend zu sein. Beispiele für *E*: ein bestehender Sachverhalt / ein Nutzen für's Subjekt / Gefährlichkeit. Vgl. de Sousa 1997, 204ff..

Die Thesen 1 und 2 ziehen folgende Konsequenz nach sich:

3. Für jedes Gefühlserlebnis lassen sich (soweit es sich überhaupt klassifizieren läßt) Bedingungen der Angemessenheit formulieren.

Nun muß aber, was für veridische Wahrnehmungserlebnisse recht ist, für andere veridische Erlebnisse billig sein, d.h.:

4. Ein Erlebnis, das seinem Gegenstand angemessen ist, vermag das Urteil beziehungsweise die Überzeugung, daß der Gegenstand so ist, wie das Erlebnis ihn repräsentiert, zu *rechtfertigen* (vernünftig zu motivieren).

5. Also (wegen 3 und 4): Gefühlserlebnisse kommen als Rechtfertigungsgründe (vernünftige Motive) für Urteile und Überzeugungen infrage.

Da die formalen Objekte der Gefühle, wie schon hervorgehoben, eine evaluative Komponente aufweisen, dürfte es sich bei den durch sie gerechtfertigten Urteilen um *Werturteile* handeln. Wie bei den Wahrnehmungsurteilen erfolgt die Rechtfertigung in der Regel *nicht-inferentiell*, also direkt. Natürlich können die so resultierenden Überzeugungen mit anderen wertbezogenen Überzeugungen des Subjekts in Konflikt geraten; denken Sie etwa an das obige Beispiel, in dem jemand die Brutalität und die Sanftmütigkeit zweier Personen gleichermaßen bewundernswert findet. Die Möglichkeit solcher internen Konflikte stellt eine unweigerliche Konsequenz des *kriterialen* Charakters der Schlüsselszenarien dar, mit denen wir die Gefühlserlebnisse verbinden, auf deren Grundlage wir unsere Werturteile fällen.

Derlei Überzeugungskonflikte sind unbefriedigend und sollten im Regelfall dazu führen, daß wir die zugrundeliegenden Gefühlsmotive ihrerseits einer kritischen Bewertung unterziehen (Goldie 2000, 49). Nicht selten bedeutet dies, daß wir das System der internalisierten, also für uns zunächst einmal bindenden Werte einer kritischen Revision unterwerfen müssen. Eine zu ihrer Rolle als „Rechtfertiger“ komplementäre Funktion von Gefühlserlebnissen besteht also darin, daß sie unseren Blick auf Spannungen innerhalb unseres Wertesystems zu lenken vermögen.³

Es erscheint verlockend, nun noch einen Schritt weiterzugehen und zu behaupten, daß die paradigmatischen Gefühle nicht nur *wie* die Wahrnehmungserlebnisse als unmittelbare Rechtfertigungsgründe fungieren können, sondern *Wahrnehmungserlebnisse sind* – mit der Besonderheit, daß sie ihren Gegenstand unter einem evaluativen Aspekt präsentieren.

Gegen diese Gleichschaltung spricht allerdings der Umstand, daß es (weitere) gewichtige Unterschiede zwischen paradigmatischen Wahrnehmungserlebnissen und Gefühlen gibt. So weisen Gefühlsempfindungen (anders als Wahrnehmungsempfindungen) keinen intrinsischen Raum-Zeit-Bezug auf. Und die oben erwähnten persönlichen Vorlieben und Maßstäbe scheinen nur im Falle der Gefühlserlebnisse eine signifikante Rolle zu spielen. Sie bilden, wie Robert Solomon (1993, 19) es ausdrückt, ein „surreales“ Sonderelement, das zur perzeptiven Schicht unserer Wirklichkeitserfahrung noch hinzutritt.

² Die Eigenschaft *F* ist genau dann das Formalobjekt des φ -ens, wenn man es was nur dann (sinnvoll) φ -en kann, wenn man es als einen Träger (Einzelfall) von *F* auffaßt. In diesem Sinne macht der Glaube an das Vorliegen von *F* seitens des φ -ers sein φ -en verständlich. Vgl. ebd..

³ Solche internen Inkohärenzen treten aber natürlich auch im Bereich unserer nicht-evaluativen Überzeugungen auf.

Wir sollten uns daher mit der Schlußfolgerung begnügen, daß es neben Werturteilen eigentümliche emotionale Werterfahrungen gibt, die solche Urteile – und darauf basierende Handlungen – vernünftig zu motivieren vermögen. Pascals Idee einer „eigenen Logik des Herzens“ besitzt also jedenfalls *auch* eine erkenntnis- und handlungstheoretische Dimension.⁴

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⁴Für hilfreiche Anmerkungen danke ich Silvère Schutkowski und dem „philosophischen Stammtisch“.

Das visuelle Zimmer. Phänomenologische Fragen in Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie

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1. Phänomenologische Probleme in der Spätphilosophie?

Zu Beginn der 50er Jahre notiert Wittgenstein in den *Bemerkungen über die Farben*, es gebe keine Phänomenologie – „wohl aber phänomenologische Probleme.“ (ÜF III §248) Wo solche phänomenologischen Probleme im Kontext der Spätphilosophie ihren Ort haben könnten, ist allerdings nicht ganz einfach festzustellen¹: Die unhintergehbare Vielfalt der Sprachspiele ist mit der Auszeichnung einer phänomenologischen Sprache nicht vereinbar, und das Privatsprachenargument verabschiedet die Vorstellung, Sinnesdaten als private Gegenstände der Bezugnahme könnten in unseren Sprachspielen eine Rolle spielen. In den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* sind Sinnesdaten (wie etwa Farbeindrücke) ebenso wie Empfindungen, bloße Vorstellungen von Gegenständen und mentale Zustände gleichermaßen Gegenstand einer Analyse, die diesem traditionellen Inventar subjektiver Innerlichkeit den Status grammatischer Fiktionen zuweist (vgl. PhU § 307), und sie sämtlich an einen konstitutiv öffentlichen Symbolgebrauch zurückbindet.

Das Problem des Erscheinens und des Gegebenseins von Gegenständen und die Frage, wie eine phänomenologische Beschreibung möglich ist, sind damit aber nicht aus der Spätphilosophie verschwunden; allerdings stellen sie sich unter völlig veränderten Voraussetzungen: Sie werden nur noch in Verbindung mit Fragen des Symbolgebrauchs untersucht und sind daher aufs engste mit zentralen Fragen der Spätphilosophie verknüpft, insbesondere mit der Frage des Regelfolgens.

2. Das visuelle Zimmer (PhU § 398)

Die Frage, auf welche Weise das Objekt im Wie seiner Gegebenheit Gegenstand der Bezugnahme sein kann, greift Wittgenstein im § 398 der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* auf. Die Bemerkung verbindet die Kritik an einem bestimmten Subjektbegriff – der Vorstellung Sinnesdaten hätten einen ‚Besitzer‘ – mit der Frage nach der sprachlichen ‚Ausdrucksform‘, die auf solche Daten anzuwenden wäre:

„»Aber wenn ich mir etwas vorstelle, oder auch wirklich Gegenstände *sähe*, so *habe* ich doch etwas, was mein Nachbar nicht hat.« – Ich verstehe dich. Du willst mit dich schauen und sagen: »Nur *ich* habe doch DIESES.« – Wozu diese Worte? Sie taugen zu nichts. – Ja, kann man nicht auch sagen »Es ist hier von einem ‚Sehen‘ – und daher auch von einem ‚Haben‘ – und von einem Subjekt, also auch vom Ich, nicht die Rede? Könnte ich nicht fragen: Das, wovon du redest und sagst, nur du habest es, – inwiefern *hast* du es denn? Besitzt du es? Du *siehst* es nicht einmal. [...] Es ist ja auch klar: wenn du logisch ausschließt, daß ein Anderer etwas hat, so verlierst es auch seinen Sinn, zu sagen, du habest es. [...] Ich sagte ja, ich wisse in meinem Innern, was du meinst. [...] Ich glaube,

man kann sagen: Du redest (wenn du z.B. im Zimmer sitzt) vom ‚visuellen Zimmer‘. Das, was keinen Besitzer hat, ist das ‚visuelle Zimmer‘. Ich kann es so wenig besitzen, als ich darin umhergehen, oder es anschauen, oder darauf zeigen kann. Es gehört insofern nicht mir an, als es niemand anderem angehören kann. Oder: es gehört insofern nicht mir an, als ich ja darauf die gleiche Ausdrucksform anwenden will wie auf das materielle Zimmer selbst, in dem ich sitze. Die Beschreibung des letzteren braucht keinen Besitzer zu erwähnen, es muß ja auch keinen Besitzer haben. Dann aber kann das visuelle Zimmer keinen haben.“ (PhU § 398)

Der fiktive Gesprächspartner vertritt die These, daß Vorstellungen und Wahrnehmungen privat sind und daß man auf sie als Gegenstände zeigen kann. Wie an vielen Stellen der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* kann man die kritisierte Position nicht mit einer einzelnen Theorie identifizieren; vielmehr steht sie für einen Typus von Theorie. In Hinsicht auf die Frage nach dem Subjekt der Vorstellungen kann man die Position des fiktiven Gesprächspartners im Sinne des *Tractatus* als „solipsistisch“ bezeichnen, da sie beinhaltet, daß „die Welt *meine* Welt ist“ (TLP 5.62). Zum anderen stimmt die Auffassung des Gesprächspartners in gewissem Sinne (s.u.) mit der des „Privatsprachlers“ der *Bemerkungen* 243ff überein.

Gegen diesen Typus von Position führt der § 398 zunächst die Frage einer möglichen Gebrauchssituation an. Ein grundlegender Gestus der Spätphilosophie besteht darin, „Wörter von ihrer metaphysischen, wieder auf ihre alltägliche Verwendung zurück[zuführen]“ (PhU §116), und eine solche ist für die Äußerung des Gesprächspartners schwer vorstellbar („Wozu diese Worte? Sie taugen zu nichts.“). Damit ist seine Position ein Beispiel für einen Umgang mit der Sprache, der philosophische Probleme allererst erzeugt – hier die Vorstellung eines privaten Zugangs zur Welt –, indem er vom umgangssprachlichen Gebrauch gerade absieht. Demgegenüber verhält sich die Philosophie als Therapie, die diese Fragestellung wieder zum Verschwinden bringt (vgl. PhU § 255 und 133).

Zu belegen, daß eine Äußerung wie „»Nur *ich* habe doch DIESES.«“ tatsächlich in diesem Sinne „leerläuft“ (vgl. PhU § 132), erfordert den Rückgang auf einige Argumentationen, die im ersten Teil der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* großen Raum einnehmen. Sie widerlegen drei Vorstellungen, die sich im Ausspruch des Gesprächspartners verbinden: (1) die Vorstellung, Sinnesdaten seien (private) Gegenstände, (2) die Vorstellung, man könne auf private Gegenstände zeigen, sowie (3) die Vorstellung, Sinnesdaten hätten einen Besitzer, bildeten also eine Sphäre der Innerlichkeit, die das Subjekt ausmacht.

Erstens lehnt Wittgenstein die Vorstellung, Sinnesdaten seien Gegenstände strikt ab – Sinnesdaten nimmt man *per definitionem* nicht wahr („Du siehst es [das visuelle Zimmer] nicht einmal.“). Den Nachweis, daß das – selbst wenn es so wäre – keine Rolle spielte, erbringt aber erst das Privatsprachenargument.

Weder die Frage der privaten Ostension noch die des Solipsismus lassen sich – zweitens – ohne den Rekurs auf das Privatsprachenargument und die vorhergehenden

¹ Daß phänomenologische Fragen in den Schriften der Übergangszeit eine wichtige Rolle spielen, ist weitgehend unumstritten (vgl. Glock 1996, 383), bedeutsam für die Interpretation des Gesamtwerkes werden sie z.B. bei Hintikka/Hintikka 1990, Pears 1988 und Rigal 1992.

Passagen klären. Daß ostensive Definitionen im allgemeinen sprachliche Bedeutung nicht fundieren können, legt Wittgenstein zu Beginn der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* gegen das Augustinische Bild der Sprache dar: Weder ist das Benennen die einzige oder die grundlegende Funktion von Sprache, noch können ostensive Definitionen für sich genommen eine Bedeutungszuweisung leisten, da sie eines Kontextes bedürfen, um verständlich zu sein, einen Sprachgebrauch also bereits voraussetzen. Das Privatsprachenargument der §§ 243ff. bezieht diese Argumente auf die Frage der privaten Gegenstände, um zu zeigen, daß für solche Gegenstände ein entsprechender Kontext nicht vorstellbar ist, und daher das Referieren auf einen solchen Gegenstand keinem Zeichen Bedeutung geben kann².

Weshalb ein solcher Kontext nicht vorstellbar ist, gibt erst das Gedankenexperiment des § 258 an, das zu Recht als das eigentliche Kernstück des Arguments gilt. Es zeigt, daß ein privater Gebrauch (wie das Notieren des Zeichens „E“ im Tagebuch, wenn der Schreiber eine bestimmte Empfindung hat) kein Kriterium für die Unterscheidung von richtigem und falschem Gebrauch des Zeichens bereitstellen könnte. In diesem Sinn formuliert der § 380: „Auf den *privaten* Übergang von dem Gesehenen zum Wort könnte ich keine Regeln anwenden. Hier hängen die Regeln wirklich in der Luft; da die Institution ihrer Anwendung fehlt.“ (PhU § 380) Eine solche ist also – das ist das Ziel der Argumentation – für unseren Symbolgebrauch unabdingbar.

Damit fällt aber auch – drittens – das emphatische „Ich“ als Sphäre der Innerlichkeit. Denn das heißt, daß ein privater Gegenstand keine Funktion im Sprachgebrauch haben kann – er kürzt sich weg wie das „Ding in der Schachtel“ (PhU § 293): „[...] wenn du logisch ausschließt, daß ein Anderer etwas hat, so verliert es auch seinen Sinn, zu sagen, du habest es.“ Mit anderen Worten, eine solche Behauptung – Sinnesdaten seien privat – beruht auf der Verwechslung von Fragen des Sprachgebrauchs mit Sachfragen: Die Perspektivität, die etwa der Solipsist festzustellen meint, ist tatsächlich eine grammatische. Sie formulieren heißt, einen grammatischen Satz formulieren. Der Äußerung des Solipsisten kommt damit derselbe Status zu wie „Empfindungen sind privat.“ und „Patience spielt man allein.“ (vgl. PhU §248)

Das Privatsprachenargument und die vorhergehende Analyse der Ostension legen, kurz gesagt, fest: Jede Bezugnahme erfordert Symbolgebrauch, und jeder Symbolgebrauch ist konstitutiv öffentlich. Damit ist auch klar, daß Äußerungen der Art „Nur *ich* habe doch DIESES.“ als Bezugnahmen mißlingen, obwohl hier in einer nicht privaten Sprache, dem Deutschen, versucht wird, auf etwas hinzuweisen, das privat sein soll, das „visuelle Zimmer“. Weshalb das nicht funktionieren kann, formuliert bündig der § 253: „Die Antwort darauf ist, daß man durch das emphatische Betonen des Wortes »dieses« kein Kriterium der Identität definiert.“ (PhU § 253) Der Fall des visuellen Zimmers ist in gewisser Weise die Umkehrung der privaten Ostension: „Privatsprachliches“ Hinweisen auf einen „öffentlichen“ Gegenstand ist für Wittgenstein nicht möglich – nichts anderes besagt ja die Ablehnung der kontextfreien ostensiven Definition in den §§ 28ff der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*. Der Gegenstand wird dann aufgefaßt, als wäre er privat, das heißt, als könne der Sprecher das relevante Kriterium der Identität vor jedem Symbolgebrauch festlegen und auf diese Weise einen Sprachgebrauch begründen. Der

umgekehrte Fall liegt ganz ähnlich: Wer vom visuellen Zimmer spricht, behandelt einen „öffentlichen“ Gegenstand, das materielle Zimmer, als privat. Privatheit von Gegenstand und Ausdruck bedingen einander.

Das erklärt auch, weshalb es möglich ist, die Äußerung „Nur *ich* habe doch DIESES.“ in gewissem Sinne zu verstehen („Ich sagte ja, ich wisse in meinem Innern, was du meinst.“). Das hat seinen Grund darin, daß der Gesprächspartner sich seinen Gegenstand gleichsam erschleicht: Verständlich ist er nur, weil er in einer gemeinsamen Sprache über einen gemeinsamen Gegenstand gesprochen hat.

Daß die Rede über das visuelle Zimmer eigentlich eine über das materielle Zimmer ist, stellt die besondere Pointe der §§ 398ff dar: „Du deutest die neue Auffassung als das Sehen eines neuen Gegenstandes. [...] Du hast vor allem eine neue Auffassung gefunden. So als hättest du eine neue Malweise erfunden. [...]“ (PhU § 401) Die „phänomenologische Sprache“ wird damit zu einer Darstellungsweise unter anderen. In diesem Sinn kann auch die Bemerkung „[...] es gehört insofern nicht mir an, als ich ja darauf die gleiche Ausdrucksform anwenden will wie auf das materielle Zimmer selbst, in dem ich sitze.“ aufgefaßt werden: Wenn man über das visuelle Zimmer mehr sagen möchte, als daß es eben „dieses“ ist, wenn man also zu etwas wie einer phänomenologischen Beschreibung übergehen möchte, spricht man darüber in derselben Sprache, unserer Umgangssprache, wie über das materielle Zimmer. In dieser Sprache muß aber kein „Besitzer“ des Referenzobjektes angegeben werden, sodaß mit der Zwischeninstanz der Sinnesdaten-als-Gegenstände auch der Schluß auf die Annahme einer Subjektinstanz fällt³. Die Frage nach dem Besitzer des visuellen Zimmers wird zu einem Kategorienfehler, wie ihn der Schluß des § 398 beschreibt: Es ist, als wolle man den Besitzer des gemalten Hauses auf einem Landschaftsbild bestimmen.

Mit den Überlegungen der §§ 398ff. endet die Parallele zwischen Empfindungen, mentalen Zuständen, Vorstellungen und Sinnesdaten. Was für sie aus der Aberkennung des Status als innere Gegenstände folgt ist unterschiedlich.

3. Was heißt hier „phänomenologisch“?

In den zur Philosophie der Psychologie gehörigen Bemerkungen, die als zweiter Teil der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* veröffentlicht wurden, notiert Wittgenstein hinsichtlich des Verhältnisses von „Benehmen“ und „Seelenzustand“ (PhU II v 497): „Es ist hier wie mit einem Verhältnis: physikalischer Gegenstand und Sinneseindrücke. Wir haben hier zwei Sprachspiele, und ihre Beziehungen zueinander sind komplizierter Art. – Will man diese Beziehungen auf eine einfache Formel bringen, so geht man fehl.“ (PhU II v 499) Man hat verschiedentlich versucht, diese unterschiedlichen Sprachspiele zu bestimmen – v.a. um Wittgenstein gegen des Vorwurf des Behaviorismus in Schutz zu nehmen. Was bleibt, wenn ein letztlich solipsistischer Subjektbegriff als „grammatische[...] Fiktion“ (PhU § 307) entlarvt ist, hat die Kommentatoren v.a. hinsichtlich der mentalen Zustände beschäftigt. H.J. Schneider hat z.B. vorgeschlagen, mentale Zustände als „metaphorisch erzeugte Gegenstände“ (Schneider 1998, 209), d.h. weder als existent vorgefundene, noch als bloße Fiktionen zu behandeln. Für Fragen der

² Diese Formulierung des Privatsprachenarguments orientiert sich an einer Darstellung von Kenny (1973, 181).

³ Alternativ könnte man auch lesen: Der Schluß entfällt, wenn ich von Sinnesdaten als Gegenständen in der Umgangssprache rede. Der Satz ist aber in keinem Fall – wie Savigny (1996, 91) vorschlägt – dem Gegner in den Mund zu legen.

Wahrnehmung ist dieser Weg nicht gangbar und auch nicht notwendig, denn der ontologische Status des Referenzgegenstandes ist ja gerade nicht fraglich, wenn phänomenologische Beschreibungen vom materiellen Gegenstand selbst handeln. Fraglich ist vielmehr, worin sich phänomenologische Beschreibungen überhaupt noch von anderen Sprachspielen unterscheiden.

Die Antwort der Spätphilosophie lautet schlicht, daß wir in vielen Fällen tatsächlich keinen Unterschied machen zwischen einer phänomenologischen und einer physikalischen Sprache. In den *Bemerkungen über die Farben* heißt es lakonisch: „Daß es den Menschen so scheint, ist ihr Kriterium dafür, daß es so ist.“ (ÜF II § 98) Das Auseinandertreten der beiden Sprachspiele – desjenigen über das physikalische Objekt und desjenigen über die Art und Weise, wie es erscheint – ist nicht die Regel, sondern ein Ausnahmefall (ÜF II § 99). So wie das Thematisieren eines Aspekts („Ich sehe das jetzt als...“ (vgl. PhU II xi 521)) die Ausnahme ist, das Sehen eines Aspekts aber die Regel – und in diesem Regelfall spricht man eben nur von einem „Sehen“, nicht von einem „Sehen-als“.

Was unter diesen Bedingungen als phänomenologische Beschreibung gelten kann, zeigen die *Bemerkungen über die Farben*, etwa die Überlegung, ob es in einem Bild schwarze Glanzlichter geben kann (ÜF II §22) oder die Bemerkungen zu Grün als Zwischenfarbe zwischen Blau und Gelb (ÜF II §39ff)⁴. Diese Analysen zeichnen sich durch eine Verschmelzung symboltheoretischer Analysen mit der Untersuchung des Erscheinens aus: Die philosophische Beschreibung von Wahrnehmung ist auf diese Weise nicht von einer vielschichtigen Beschreibung des Symbolgebrauchs zu trennen. Dieser Umstand wird es im übrigen für Wittgenstein in seinen letzten Schriften notwendig machen, eine zentrale Frage der Spätphilosophie wieder aufzugreifen, die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von empirischen und grammatischen Sätzen: „Wo trennen sich hier Logik und Erfahrung [...]?“ (ÜF III § 4)⁵

Damit gibt es für die Spätphilosophie, um die eingangs zitierte Formulierung Wittgensteins wieder aufzugreifen, keine Phänomenologie – in dem Sinne daß es keine privilegierte Beschreibungssprache des Gegebenen und keine dem Symbolgebrauch vorgängige Bezugnahme gibt. Eines allerdings haben die Analysen der Spätphilosophie mit einer Phänomenologie kontinentaler Provenienz gemeinsam: Eine phänomenologische Beschreibung handelt nicht von der Repräsentation des Gegenstandes, sondern vom Gegenstand selbst.

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⁴ Daß die *Bemerkungen über die Farben* als phänomenologische Analysen gelesen werden können, hat überzeugend E. Rigal (1992, 10ff) dargelegt.

⁵ Vgl. dazu Rigal 1992, 12f.

Analysis and the Elucidatory Interpretation of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*

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1. The Elucidatory Interpretation

In a recent article, Marie McGinn has proposed an "elucidatory" interpretation of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* as an alternative to postmodernist (or "resolute") interpretations of the concept of elucidation in *TLP* 4.112 and 6.54. According to McGinn, the concept of elucidation is one that Wittgenstein "intends to oppose to the concepts of explanation and theory construction". (McGinn 1999, 498) She regards "the remarks in which Wittgenstein articulates his idea of philosophy, makes use of the comparison between pictures and propositions, develops the distinction between saying and showing, or explores the role of logic, are ones which exemplify the idea of philosophy as 'essentially ... elucidation.'" (McGinn 1999, 498) In fact, such an interpretation is made highly plausible by various statements from Wittgenstein's *Notebooks 1914-1916* such as the following: "Logic takes care of itself; all we have to do is to look and see how it does it" (*NB*, 11); "My difficulty is only an – enormous – difficulty of expression." (*NB*, 40); "We must recognize how language takes care of itself" (*NB*, 43); "That a sentence is a logical portrayal of its meaning is obvious to the uncaptive eye" (*NB*, 5); or again: "It is *evident* that we feel the elementary proposition as the picture of a situation. (*NB*, 25) Similarly, in the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein seems to regard the picture theory of propositions as something that simply can be seen: "It is obvious that a proposition of the form "*aRb*" strikes us as a picture. In this case the sign is obviously a likeness of what is signified." (*TLP* 4.012) Passages such as these convincingly support McGinn's view according to which elucidation has the function of making a difference in the perception of the phenomena of language without conveying any new information. At the same time, McGinn tries to eliminate some aspects of Wittgenstein's early thought from the elucidatory core of the *Tractatus*. In this sense, she understands Wittgenstein's views as to the existence of elementary propositions, of a general propositional form, and of simple objects, his theory of variables, and his view of analysis as elements of the *Tractatus* which do not belong to the elucidatory part of the work. (McGinn 1999, 500-501; 505-507) The present paper argues that this second part of McGinn's interpretation is problematic. In particular, this part of her interpretation reflects Wittgenstein's own retrospective critique of his earlier conception of analysis, which partially distorts the role of analysis in his earlier philosophy. Contrary to McGinn, in the early Wittgenstein there is a sense of analysis that is connected with the idea of the descriptive nature of philosophy and thus, indirectly, with the idea of philosophical elucidation.

2. Analysis and the Problem of Particular Logical Forms

On first sight, the suggestion to separate the idea of analysis from the elucidatory core of the *Tractatus* seems to correspond well with some of Wittgenstein's retrospective remarks. For example, in the *Philosophical Grammar* Wittgenstein writes:

The idea of constructing elementary propositions (as e.g. Carnap has tried to do) rests on a false notion of logical analysis. It is not the task of that analysis to dis-

cover a *theory* of elementary propositions, like discovering principles of mechanics.

My notion in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* was wrong: 1) because I wasn't clear about the sense of the words "a logical product is *hidden* in a sentence" (and suchlike), 2) because I too thought that logical analysis had to bring to light what was hidden (as chemical and physical analysis does). (*PG* I, Appendix 4, A, p. 210)

However, what exactly is the point of Wittgenstein's objection to his earlier conception of analysis? In conversations with the Vienna Circle, Wittgenstein is reported to have made the objection that "we cannot assume from the very beginning, as Carnap does, that the elementary propositions consist of two-place relations, etc." (*WVC*, 182) The *Philosophical Grammar* sees Wittgenstein's own earlier conception of analysis in the same perspective: "This is all connected with the false concept of logical analysis that Russell, Ramsey and I used to have, according to which we are writing for an ultimate logical analysis of facts, like a chemical analysis of compounds – an analysis which will enable us really to discover a 7-place relation, like an element that really has the specific weight 7." (*PG* II, III, sec. 15, pp. 311-312) Thus, Wittgenstein's critique seems not only to be directed at the idea of the existence of elementary propositions and simple objects; it also is directed at a determinate view as to the particular logical form of elementary sentences and, thus, of simple objects.

However, this second aspect of Wittgenstein's retrospective critique involves a partial misrepresentation of his earlier views. Seen from within Wittgenstein's early philosophy, the a priori character of logic excludes that logic answer questions concerning the particular logical forms of elementary sentences or the particular logical forms of simple objects. (cf. Blank 2000; 2002) This is the point of the distinction between "logic" and the "application of logic" in *TLP* 5.557. As Wittgenstein there emphasizes, both areas must "touch" each other without "overlapping" each other. Although this topological metaphor is difficult to decipher, it involves the idea that logic is what makes it possible to "invent" particular logical forms. (*TLP* 5.555) Moreover, the analysis of particular logical forms is the task of the application of logic, not of logic itself. For example, it cannot be decided a priori whether there are relational predicates, and thus relations, with 27 places. (*TLP* 5.5541-5542) Therefore, Wittgenstein thinks that we have "some concept of elementary propositions quite apart from their particular logical form." (*TLP* 5.555) Rather, "[i]f we know on purely logical grounds that there must be elementary propositions, then everyone who understands propositions in their unanalysed form must know it." (*TLP* 5.5562) Already in the *Notes on Logic*, Wittgenstein emphasizes this independence of the realm of logic from a theory of particular logical forms: "Not only must logic not deal with things, but just as little with relations and predicates." (*NB*, 98) Accordingly, there is a type of analysis that is irrelevant for logic: "Every statement about apparent complexes can be resolved into the logical sum of a statement about the constituents and a statement about the proposition which describes the complex completely. How, in each case the resolution is to be made, is an important question, but its answer is not

unconditionally necessary for the construction of logic." (NB, 101) Or, as the *Notebooks 1914-1916* put it: "Could it be said: Logic is *not* concerned with the analysability of the functions with which it works." (NB, 4) Thus, Wittgenstein's early conception of analysis cannot be adequately understood from the perspective of his retrospective critique.

3. Analysis and the Descriptive Nature of Philosophy

The early Wittgenstein distinguishes a conception of analysis that has to do with disentangling the compositional structure of given examples of propositions from a different conception of analysis that is connected with the idea of the descriptive nature of philosophy. From the beginning, Wittgenstein was aware of the fact that according to his own view of the nature of propositions the sentences of philosophy cannot be counted as descriptions in the proper sense. (cf. NB, 101) Nevertheless, in a programmatic passage in the *Notes on Logic*, Wittgenstein connects his a priori approach to logic with a characterization of philosophy as "purely descriptive". (NB, 106) There, Wittgenstein adds: "Philosophy consists of logic and metaphysics: logic is its basis." As Rush Rhees has emphasized, Wittgenstein in this passage does not say that logic is the basis of *metaphysics*. What Wittgenstein says is that logic is the basis of *philosophy*. (Rhees 1970, 24-25) More specifically, this passage does not suggest that metaphysics is something that is deduced from logic. Quite to the contrary: if in philosophy there are no deductions, there are no deductions *from* logic. The most plausible reading of this passage seems to be that metaphysics here is characterized as a *part* of logic.

This explains why the question around which much of the thought of the *Notebooks 1914-1916* turns is: "Can we manage without simple objects *in* LOGIC?" (NB, 9.5.1915) From this perspective, Wittgenstein connects the existence of simple objects with a type of analysis that leads to a kind of descriptive knowledge:

But it also seems certain that we do not infer the existence of simple objects from the existence of particular simple objects, but rather know them – by description, as it were – as the end-product of analysis, by means of a process that leads to them.

For the very reason, that a bit of language is nonsensical, it is still possible to go on using it – see the last remark. (NB, 50)

Interestingly, at this place Wittgenstein holds a view of the nature of philosophical sentences that – in contrast to the "austere" view of nonsense at the end of both the *Notebooks* and the *Tractatus* – could be called the "liberal" view of nonsense. According to this liberal view, nonsensical philosophical sentences do not have to be "thrown away" in a literal sense, but can have a communicative function because they convey information that, in some sense, can be characterised as purely descriptive. This descriptive aspect of philosophical analysis clearly distinguishes Wittgenstein early view of analysis from theory construction. More precisely, the type of analysis involved in this kind on knowledge is characterized as a kind of presuppositional analysis:

The question might however also be presented like this: It seems that the idea of the SIMPLE is already to be found contained in that of the complex and in the idea of analysis, and in such a way that we come to this idea quite apart from any examples of simple objects, or of propositions which mention them, and we realize the

existence of the simple objects – a *priori* – as a logical necessity.

So it looks as if the existence of the simple objects were related to that of the complex ones as the sense of $\sim p$ is to the sense of p : the *simple* object is *prejudged* in the complex. (NB, 60)

Obviously, the kind of analysis involved here does not have to do with disentangling the simple semantic components of complex signs. Thus, analysis in the sense Wittgenstein has in mind here does not give an answer as to the particular logical form of elementary propositions or of simple objects. Rather, the existence of simple objects is seen as something presupposed in the existence of the complex constituents of the world.

Moreover, the kind of descriptive knowledge reached through presuppositional analysis is seen as something that, in some sense, is already known. This becomes clear in a series of entries from the *Notebooks* in which Wittgenstein makes use of an everyday conception of tautology that diverges from his technical (truth-functional) conception of tautologies. In these passages, he characterises philosophical sentences as tautological in the sense that they do not convey any new information. For example, he writes, "A definition is a tautology and shews internal relations between its two terms!" (NB, 18) In a later entry, he applies this insight to his view about the nature of propositions. There, he states that "complex sign" and "proposition" are equivalent and adds, "Is it a tautology to say: *Language* consists of *sentences*? It seems it is." (NB, 52) Moreover, analytic knowledge concerning the existence of simple objects is characterized as something that is in this sense tautologous:

Is it, A PRIORI, clear that in analysing we must arrive at simple components – is this, e.g., involved in the concept of analysis –, or is analysis ad infinitum possible? – Or is there in the end even a third possibility?

This question is a logical one and the complexity of spatial objects is a logical complexity, for to say that one thing is part of another is always a tautology. (NB, 62)

Finally, the same conception of the tautological nature of philosophy is expressed when Wittgenstein states, "Simply the happy life is good, the unhappy bad. And if I *now* ask myself: But why should I live *happily*, then this of itself seems to me to be a tautological question; the happy life seems to be justified, of itself, it seems that it *is* the only right life." (NB, 78)

Thus, for the early Wittgenstein philosophical sentences are descriptive and tautological at the same time, in the sense that they direct attention to what already is implicitly known. They can be at the same time nonsensical and communicatively effective because they create no new insights but rather influence the perception of what we already know. The type of analysis that is involved in this philosophical strategy, therefore, can make a difference in our perception of the phenomena of language without conveying new information. This closely corresponds to the role McGinn ascribes to philosophical elucidation. Thus, although in Wittgenstein's early view there is a type of analysis that does not belong to logic and therefore is irrelevant for philosophy, there is another conception of analysis at work in the *Tractatus*, which is not adequately represented in Wittgenstein's retrospective remarks. This type of analysis aims at making implicit knowledge about the nature of propositions explicit. Therefore, the idea of logical analysis should be seen as a part of the elucidatory core of the *Tractatus*.

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Logic and the Nothing: Carnap's Critique of Heidegger and the Analytic/Continental Divide

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1.

Philosophy in the latter half of the 20th century was marked by a split between analytic and continental philosophy. In this paper I will argue that one of the most important origins of this split is to be found in Carnap's critique of Heidegger in his 1932-article "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language", and that the reason for Carnap's critique of Heidegger is not confined to what both Carnap and Heidegger considered strictly philosophical issues, but is connected with Carnap's self-understanding as being part of a progressive socialist movement, and the fact that Heidegger in this period showed sympathy for Nazism. Further I argue that the advent of Nazism plays an important causal role for the establishment of the analytic/continental-divide.

2.

Carnap's critique of Heidegger is found in a part of his article entitled: "Metaphysical Pseudo-Statements". Carnap here wants to show that although metaphysical statements seem to be meaningful statements, they are not. To show this he uses "...a few sentences from that metaphysical school which at present exerts the strongest influence in Germany." (Carnap 1959, 69). These sentences are taken from Heidegger's "What is Metaphysics?" from 1929. About his selection Carnap writes in a footnote: "We could just as well have selected passages from any other of the numerous metaphysicians of the present or of the past; yet the selected passages seem to us to illustrate our thesis especially well." (Carnap 1959, 69) These remarks of Carnap's suggest a certain casualness in the choice of Heidegger, but as I will show, there are strong reasons for Carnap to choose exactly Heidegger.

Carnap's critique of Heidegger is build upon his conception of logic and language. With the modern predicate logic we have, according to Carnap, a tool to make philosophy scientific. Modern logic has made it possible for philosophy to make a fresh start, and become used logic. This should be done by reducing all of our knowledge to "observation sentences" which are simple predicative statements with a method of verification, and to the logical connections between these sentences. This is all there is to meaning. Anything else someone might connect with a word is just attaching certain emotions to the word, something which has nothing to do with its meaning.

The problem with metaphysics is that it does not keep this in mind. In metaphysics, language is used in a way that is not reducible to observation sentences. And unfortunately, our natural language is not constructed logically correct, so it is possible to express sentences that are meaningless, although they are grammatically correct.

According to Carnap, this is what happens in Heidegger's text. Heidegger simply misconstrues the logical form of the word "nothing" when he uses it in sentences like "What about this Nothing?", "Where do we seek the Nothing?", "Anxiety reveals the Nothing.", and, especially, "The Nothing itself nothings." (ibid.). What Heidegger misunderstands is that he uses the word

"nothing" as if it were a substantive, whereas it is in reality a logical particle that expresses a negative existential quantification, as can be shown by logical analysis.

Carnap notes that Heidegger himself is aware that his questions and answers conflict with logic, when he writes: "Question and answer in regard to the Nothing are equally *absurd* in themselves.... The fundamental rule of thinking commonly appealed to, the law of prohibited contradiction, general 'logic', destroys this question." (quoted in: ibid., 71) And: "If thus the power of the *understanding* in the field of questions concerning Nothing and Being is broken, then the fate of the sovereignty of 'logic' within philosophy is thereby decided as well. The very idea of 'logic' dissolves in the whirl of a more basic questioning." (quoted in: ibid., 71-72). Which leads Heidegger to conclude: "The alleged sobriety and superiority of science becomes ridiculous if it does not take the Nothing seriously." (ibid., 72). From this Carnap concludes: "Thus we find here a good confirmation of our thesis; a metaphysician himself here states that his questions and answers are irreconcilable with logic and the scientific way of thinking." (ibid.)

3.

Carnap's conception of scientific philosophy is connected with the *Neue Sachlichkeit*-movement of his time (Friedman 2000, p. 18). Carnap describes this conviction in the foreword of his major work *The Logical Structure of the World*, in which he describes his book as belonging to a certain scientific atmosphere. The negative side of this atmosphere is the break with traditional philosophy, but, more important, the positive side is that it gives the modern philosopher the austere attitude of a scientific researcher. And Carnap sees his attitude as being part of a larger cultural movement: "We sense an inner kinship between the attitude on which our philosophical work is based and the spiritual attitude that currently manifests itself in entirely different spheres of life. We sense this attitude in trends in art, especially in architecture, and in the movements that concern themselves with an intelligent reshaping of human life: of personal life and the life of the community, of education, of external organization at large.... The belief that this orientation belongs to the future inspires our work." (quoted from Friedman 2000, 17) But there are indeed forces working against this attitude: "We cannot hide from ourselves the fact that trends from philosophical-metaphysical and religious spheres, which protect themselves against this kind of orientation, again exert a strong influence precisely at the present time. Where do we derive the confidence, in spite of this, that our call of clarity, for a science free of metaphysics, will prevail? – From the knowledge, or, to put it more cautiously, from the belief, that these opposing forces belong to the past." (ibid.)

Heidegger is exactly one of these opposing forces belonging to the past, being, according to Carnap, a reactionary because of his insistence on discussing metaphysics. But not only that: Also politically there is a deep opposition between Carnap and Heidegger.

4.

For Carnap, a form of socialism is connected with his *Neue Sachlichkeit*-attitude (Carnap 1963, 23). This somehow conflicts with Carnap's view on philosophy as being a pure science that is neutral with respect to moral and political issues. According to Carnap's view on meaning, such issues are meaningless, since they have no method of verification. Criticising Neurath, who was critical of this neutralist attitude to philosophy, Carnap writes: "In our view, logic, including applied logic, and the theory of knowledge, the analysis of language, and the methodology of science, are, like science itself, neutral with respect to practical aims, whether they are moral aim for the individual or political aims for a society... We...insisted that the intrusion of practical and especially political points of view would violate the purity of philosophical methods." (ibid.) The curious point is that in spite of his official view, that philosophy is neutral with respect to political aims, he nonetheless writes: "Philosophy leads to an improvement in scientific ways of thinking and thereby to a better understanding of what is going on in the world, both in nature and society; this understanding serves to improve human life." (Carnap 1963, 24) Thus Carnap does not consider his *Neue Sachlichkeit*-attitude as being political, but nonetheless as part of progressive socialist movement.

It is this progressive, scientific and socialist way of thinking that is threatened in what is nowadays called "Old Europe": Threatened by the return of an irrational, metaphysical way of thinking, the ultimate expression of which is Nazism. On his coming to USA, Carnap writes: "I was not only relieved to escape the stifling political and cultural atmosphere and the danger of war in Europe, but also very gratified to see that in the United States there was a considerable interest, especially among the younger philosophers, in the scientific method of philosophy, based on modern logic, and this interest was growing from year to year." (Carnap 1963, 34)

Thus, for Carnap, coming to USA was a fresh start, an escape from old European culture, Nazism and metaphysics – in a way similar to how he sees Logical Positivism and the *Neue Sachlichkeit*-movement as a break away from the old culture and philosophy with all its metaphysics. These are to be replaced by a new, progressive, scientific way of life.

5.

Heidegger only once commented on Carnap's attack, and this not in a published form. His "reply" is to be found in his notes for his 1935-lecture series *Introduction to Metaphysics*, but it does not occur in the first publication of it. It was not until 1983 it was published in the *Gesamtausgabe* of Heidegger's works. This means that it was first published well after the deaths of both Carnap and Heidegger. This indicates that it was not a matter of importance to Heidegger to answer Carnap, and his "reply" also shows that he does not take Carnap's criticism very seriously. However, interestingly enough, in his "reply" he agrees with Carnap! Only he turns the table, and considers this to be a criticism of Carnap. He writes on Carnap's article:

Here the most extreme flattening out and uprooting of the traditional theory of judgement is accomplished under the semblance of mathematical science... a mode of thinking according to which truth is no longer disclosedness of what is and thus accommodation and grounding of Dasein in the disclosed being, but truth is rather

diverted into *certainty* – to the mere securing of thought, and in fact the securing of mathematical thought against all that is not thinkable by it. The conception of truth as the securing of thought led to the definitive profaning of the world. The supposed "philosophical" tendency of mathematical-physical positivism wished to supply the grounding of this position. It is no accident that this kind of "philosophy" wished to supply the foundations of modern physics, in which all relations to nature are in fact destroyed. It is also no accident that this kind of philosophy stands in internal and external relation with Russian Communism. And it is no accident, moreover, that this kind of thinking celebrates its triumph in America. (cited from Friedman 2000, 22)

So Heidegger does indeed agree with Carnap on Carnap's conception of his own philosophy! Where he differs is in whether to see the Logical Positivist conception of philosophy as being a progress, or as being a decline – and indeed Heidegger sees Logical Positivism as the ultimate expression of the decline of Western Philosophy!

6.

A central element of Heidegger's philosophy is the distinction between being (*Sein*) and beings (*Seiende*), also called *the Ontological Difference*. According to Heidegger, the problem of Western metaphysics is that it only thinks beings as beings, that it only asks the question what beings *are*, but not the question what it means *that* there is anything at all. Western metaphysics has only asked *what* beings are, and has given answers such as "everything is matter", or "everything is spirit". But it forgot to ask the more fundamental question of being.

Science only investigates beings. As Heidegger writes: "What should be examined are beings only, and besides that – nothing; beings alone, and further – nothing; solely beings, and beyond that – nothing."¹ (Heidegger 1929, §7) This is what leads Heidegger to ask the question: "What about this Nothing?" (ibid.) What is it that science does not want to know, when it secures itself as investigating only beings qua beings?

To answer this question, Heidegger starts with what he terms "the common nothing" which is defined as: "...the complete negation of the totality of beings." (Heidegger 1929, §16) But how can we comprehend what the totality of beings mean? Heidegger's point is: We cannot! But even though we cannot *comprehend* it, we *are* indeed in the midst of the totality of beings. And although we are not able to comprehend it, we can "*feel*" it, in what Heidegger terms "attunements" (*Stimmungen*).

The most important of these attunements is *anxiety*. Heidegger distinguishes between anxiety and fear. Whereas fear is fear of *something*, anxiety *does not* have an object. Anxiety is exactly fear of – nothing. But *this* nothing is not the negation of the totality of beings. In anxiety, everything slides away and turns against one. All beings become alien to one. *This* is what Heidegger means by the phrase "Nothing itself nothings". But in this alienation, the beings disclose themselves in their original openness – *that* they are beings rather than nothing. But the thinking of beings as beings, determined by what they are, veils the original openness. This thinking hides that it is necessary to transcend the beings in their totality to be able to get close to them – a transcendence that is being

¹ Problematically, the English translation of Carnap's text, misses the whole point of the ontological difference, and writes "being" instead of "beings" in Carnap's citation from Heidegger.

made possible by being held out in nothing. It is this being held out in nothing that makes the disclosure of beings possible which constitutes Heidegger's notion of truth.

And it is exactly such a notion of truth that has been forgotten through the history of Western metaphysics, and especially by Carnap. It is this forgetting of the disclosing of being that destroys all relations to nature. And, unfortunately, this way of thinking is prevalent in both Russian Communism *and* in America. Which is why they, according to Heidegger, metaphysically are on the same footing.

7.

After WWII the conception of philosophy as logical analysis of language – or in short: analytic philosophy – came to dominate Anglo-American philosophy, in large part because of the influence of Carnap and the other Logical Positivists. In 1935 Carnap fled to USA under the impression of the growing Nazism in Europe. Here he exerted a profound influence on Quine, whom for a generation dominated American philosophy. Because of this influence, Carnap's critique of Heidegger has been taken over unquestioned, along with his way of philosophising. This meant that generations of Anglo-American philosophers did not read Heidegger at all, since it had once and for all been shown to be meaningless nonsense. On the continent, Heidegger was one of the few important philosophers left, and thus came to have a profound influence on Continental philosophy in the latter half of the 20th century.

Today, the political frontiers are not the same as they were in the 1930s. Nazism is, fortunately, no longer a living threat, and a Carnapian form of rationalist socialism does not seem a viable option either. The sharp line that divided analytical and continental philosophy also seems to have blurred. So today we perhaps have the opportunity to think the relationship between analytic and continental philosophy anew – as is the theme of this symposium.

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Does Metaphor Force Us to Study the Nature of Thought?

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The subject of metaphor and its relations to other classical tropes has been the focus of much interest since Aristotle's *Rhetoric* where the philosopher presented his highly influential theory of tropes. Regardless of the significance that Aristotle's philosophy has for contemporary thinkers, it is neither ancient philosophy nor contemporary rhetoric that is concerned with the subject of metaphor nowadays. But why bother with metaphor anyway? Would not it be enough for its appraisal to admit its importance to poetic activity? One of the most fundamental, and at the same time obvious reasons for not ignoring metaphor is the fact that metaphor together with the rest of the tropes is in a very large proportion central to our ordinary language use. A traditional assumption would be to treat the presence of metaphoric utterances as a kind of a linguistic misbehavior that violates certain rules of cooperative use of language. Most of the time yet we communicate using metaphors without causing any communication-jams. Where is the problem then, if metaphors cannot, as Davidson argues, be explained via their semantic content? Can the pragmatics of communication shed light on the understanding of that phenomenon? Before I present Grice's opinion on metaphor, I would like to describe some of Davidson's ideas presented in his very well known article "What metaphors mean" where he argues for a non-semantic treatment of metaphor.

I. Semantics of metaphor – Davidson on metaphorical meaning

The constant presence of metaphor in language requires obvious consideration and for a long time a semantic account contributed most to the study of metaphor. There are two traditional approaches to the interpretation of metaphor that are both usually construed as semantic theories. The "comparison theory" posits a comparison or similarity between two objects and takes every metaphor to be a condensed or elliptic simile while the "interaction view" involves opposition or interaction between two semantic contents. Within the "interaction theory" metaphors are special uses of linguistic expressions where one "metaphorical" expression (*focus*) is embedded in another "literal" expression (*frame*), such that the meaning of the focus *interacts* with and changes the meaning of the *frame*, and vice versa (see Levinson 1983, 148). The semantic theories of metaphor relate to what seems to be natural for every user of language, that is the ability to differentiate between literal and metaphorical uses of language. Every such theory *implicite* assumes the existence of such utterances, that is, utterances in which the speaker means metaphorically something that is different from what the expressed sentence means literally. This very assumption raises problems that are expressed in a set of questions. Why do we use expressions metaphorically instead of saying exactly and literally what we mean? How do metaphors work, *that is*, how is it possible for speakers to communicate to hearers when speaking metaphorically inasmuch as they do not say what they mean, and above all, how can we recognize that a certain utterance should be understood metaphorically rather than literally if we cannot refer to anything like metaphorical meaning? The matter of metaphorical meaning becomes a crucial factor for the critique of the above-mentioned theories expressed intensely in

Davidson's distinction between what words mean and what they are used to.

According to Davidson metaphor belongs exclusively to the domain of use (Davidson 1984, 247). For Davidson the idea of additional metaphorical meaning and the concept of metaphor as a vehicle for conveying ideas are both wrong and mistaken when concerning the phenomenon of metaphor. In a metaphorical utterance there is no modification of meaning in any of the elements of the metaphoric expression. Metaphorical utterances mean simply what they say and their composite elements bear only the meanings that they have in literal utterances. Thus metaphors cannot be paraphrased, as a paraphrase, whether possible or not, is appropriate to what is said. So a metaphor does not say anything beyond its literal meaning. But given that it still remains necessary for a theory of metaphor to explain the fact that the recognition of metaphoric significance of certain utterances takes place within linguistic processing, it may involve the inference to the meaning intended by the speaker as distinguished from the meaning of the sentences as uttered (Searle 1993, 83). For Davidson it involves an exercise of the hearer's interpretive activity. When theories assume that they provide a method for deciphering an encoded content of a metaphor, they just tell us something about the *effects* metaphors have on us. The common error of those theories, as Davidson describes it, is that they fasten on the contents of the thoughts a metaphor provokes and they read these contents *into* the metaphor itself. He argues that a metaphor by making a literal statement inspires an insight, evokes a certain response. There is no requirement that the meaning induced by the sentence, that is the interpretation the hearer imposes on it, corresponds with a meaning intended by the speaker. Davidson explicitly denies any such correlation. The problem then is how we should understand the process of producing that insight if we cannot appeal either to a special meaning or to a specific cognitive content according to Davidson's judgment. Whatever the author of the metaphor may have intended to communicate, he must have done it via the literal meaning of the utterance. As it is only when a sentence is taken to be false we accept it as a metaphor and start to look for the hidden implications (Davidson 1984, 258).

The problem is that Davidson explains neither how we can arrive at these "hidden implications" nor how the metaphor is related to what it makes us see, that is aspects of things we did not notice before, surprising analogies and novel similarities. At the same time Davidson does not want to be associated with the tradition of considering metaphors as "confusing, merely emotive, unsuited to serious, scientific, or philosophic discourse" (1984, 246). On the contrary, he professes that "metaphor is a legitimate device not only in literature, but in science, philosophy and the law" (1984, 246).

There are two important points in Davidson's argumentation against metaphorical meaning that are crucial for our further discussion:

1. Aspects of language which are not context-independent are not aspects of language meaning, but of language use.
2. Metaphorical interpretation is context-bound, hence it is not a question of meaning but of use.

II. Pragmatics of metaphor – Grice's theory of conversational implicature

Grice's concept of implicature is, generally speaking, a theory of how people *use* language. The notion of implicature provides an explicit account of how it is possible to mean, in a general sense, more than what is actually 'said' (i.e. more than what is literally expressed by the conventional sense of the linguistic expression uttered)¹ (Levinson 1983, 97). It allows to claim that natural language expressions tend to have simple and unitary senses, but this stable semantic content often has a context-specific set of implicatures. The character of a conversational implicature depends on whether the maxims of conversation are being observed or exploited. Grice argues that maxims are formulations of a set of overarching assumptions guiding the conduct of the conversation that arises from rational considerations and that they are general principles underlying the efficient co-operative use of language. There are four maxims – of *Quality*, *Quantity*, *Relevance* and *Manner* – that jointly express a general *Cooperative Principle*. These maxims specify what participants have to do in order to converse in a maximally efficient, rational and co-operative way. To converse that way we should always speak clearly and relevantly, while providing sufficient information. It may be difficult to imagine that ideal situation, but Grice argues that even though no one really speaks that way the whole time, when talk does not proceed according to these maxims, the principles are still being adhered to at some deeper level of conversation. Metaphors are interpreted or rather recognized as floutings of the maxim of Quality², especially it's one more specific maxim: *do not say what you believe to be false*. So when during conversation, I would hear "Man is a wolf" or "You are the cream on my coffee" then without rejecting the assumption that the speaker is observing the overall Cooperative Principle, I would have to think of what he is implicating when saying that, given the circumstances. The calculation that a particular conversational implicature is present requires contextual and background information and knowledge of what has been said. The semantics provide only a characterization of the literal meaning or conventional content of the expressions; from this, together with details of context and background knowledge, the pragmatics provides an interpretation. There may be various possible specific explanations of a conversational implicature; the list of these implicatures may be open (Grice 1989, 40).

Grice does not present or acquire any theory of metaphor. What he is interested in, among other things, are the conditions governing conversation. When he says that the metaphor is an example of flouting the maxim of Quality, he takes a metaphor as an expression that taken literally is a categorical falsehood. The effect that an appearance of such an utterance has when conversation is to be held is that it forces the speaker to work out the implicature. But this characterization gives just a criterion that allows participants to recognize the metaphor, but not to explain its nature. The criterion itself is only partial, as other tropes like irony or metonymy are taken to be either equally conversationally inadequate or they share with metaphor the same property of flouting the maxim of Quality. In general, Grice gives us the description of how any trope or non-literal use of language as in the examples "Man is a wolf" and "You are the cream on my coffee" triggers the need for inference. He gives us the principles of recognition, but not the principles of interpretation. As to infer implicatures in cases like those with flouting the conversational maxim, we need to know how to determine what kind of trope the expression is and then apply reasoning characteristic to that trope.

Davidson argues that to construe the metaphor we must know what effect it has on us. But it seems that to describe the effect metaphors have on us, as Grice showed, it is not sufficient to appeal either to the nature of language or language use. The metaphoric expressions that we perceive in language are manifestation of our most fundamental capacity for analogical reasoning. The effect that metaphors have on us forces us then to examine the nature of thought.

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¹ Grice uses the phrase *what is said* as a technical term for the truth-conditional content of an expression.

² The maxim of Quality: try to make your contribution one that is true, specifically (i) do not say what you believe to be false (ii) do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence (Levinson 1983, 101).

Is Nagel Davidsonible?

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1. Are Phenomenological Factors Non-Physical?

In “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, Nagel holds that if we attribute “conscious mental states” to some organism, inevitably we are also committing ourselves to the claim that “there is something like to *be* that organism – something it is like *for* the organism” (Nagel 1991, 422)¹ So, according to his view, an organism’s consciousness and the *subjective* way in which that organism copes with its environment – the phenomenological element – are conceptually dependent. Therefore, every explanation of the mental must take into account the presence of these phenomenological properties. However, Nagel continues, physicalist approaches are unsatisfactory, since the subjective factors of organisms’ experiences are not liable to be explained physically. Any physical approach will leave out these phenomenological properties. Inner experiences, the product of the relation with the world, are not identical to physical structures.

The Nagelian reasons to follow this path stem from his conception of experience. For him, inner experiences are necessarily restricted to a certain point of view. There are no experiences without particular “systems of representation”. As he himself comments, bats and ourselves have different points of view because we have a different physical apparatus to answer to the world than bats. For bats have structures as sonars and wings which do not exist in human bodies. Therefore, the variation in points of view is promoted by physical distinctions. Since we have not the physical structure of bats we will never take up the bat’s point of view and, accordingly, we will never know what it is like to be a bat.

Nagel also states that our knowledge of the physical world, in contrast to the way we grasp mental states, is free from any point of view. A physical description of an organism tells us how this organism is without any particular lens. And, for this reason, it leaves out phenomenological elements and, consequently, its conscious mental states. For inner experiences can only be seen with particular lenses. Thus the subjective character of experiences is not identical to physical structures.

That mental phenomena cannot be identified with physical events implies that human beings are their bodies plus something else. The problem, therefore, is to explain satisfactorily what this “something else” is. A way of doing this is to appeal, as Descartes did, to a dualism of substances. That is to say, this “something else” would be a substance different from the physical substance. Therefore, according to that view, human beings would be “mental substances” plus “physical substances”. To hold the existence of two substances in turn means to hold also that these substances are self-sufficient. Then our knowledge of mental states does not require any knowledge of physical states. So, if we are disposed to accept the plausibility of an externalist conception of mind – the thesis that the specification of some mental state must involve the environment too or, as Putnam (1975) puts it,

“meanings just ain’t in the head” – this path will appear untenable.

The mental and the physical appear to be in constant interaction. Mental states depend upon physical structures to occur – without brain processes there is no room for mental states – as well as many bodily movements are caused by mental states. So, an account of the mental must be compatible with these interactions. However, while the dualistic account appears to ground the intuition that there is a deep contrast between the mental and the physical, it seems that it leaves us without an answer to the question of how the mind and the world are related. For how can something non-physical interfere with something physical and vice-versa?

In addition, we could be suspicious of the very idea of substance and, therefore, doubt whether it gets us further concerning the attempt to explain the mental/physical contrast. Another distinct problem we could have with the Cartesian approach is that it refuses the causal closure of the physical world. For the acceptance of the existence of a mental substance entails that we can have two systems being physically equivalent such that in one of them the physical laws work very well whereas in the other they do not – in virtue of the presence of mental states in the latter.

An attempt to save the intuition that there are phenomenological elements of the mental which cannot be grasped by a physical description suggests strongly a dualism of substances. However, as we tried to point out in the last paragraphs, this route appears to be not an alternative easy to swallow. And, if we reject the Cartesian landscape, the only route apparently available is a materialistic view according to which all that exists is physical. This perspective in turn leaves us with the alternative that if there is something special to the mental domain – as phenomenology – it must be physical. But, if we accept as a whole the Nagelian reasoning, this is false. So, would it be possible, in opposition to Nagel, to save the phenomenology of our mental states in front of a materialistic background? Or can there be a background which is neither materialistic nor dualistic?

2. Can Phenomenology Be Non-Conceptual?

As we stated earlier, Nagel holds that the way we know physical states, in opposition to mental states, is free from whatever particular point of view. As he himself says, physical events are

a domain of objective facts *par excellence* – the kind that can be observed and understood from many points of view and by individuals with differing perceptual systems (p. 425).

So, he seems to accept the idea according to which the world is itself without a point of view. Accordingly, someone’s point of view should be understood as the product of one’s contribution plus the world’s contribution. Otherwise, the distinction between the world without and with some point of view would not make sense. In addition, since phenomenological factors are understood as the world with a particular point of view, they will have no

¹ All quotes here are to page numbers of Nagel’s paper unless indicated otherwise.

objectivity. They will not reach the world as it is in itself but with some dust, so to speak.

Davidson (1984) argues against this Nagelian image, according to which the world is free from points of view but accessible through many points of view. In his own terminology, this image is committed to the dualism between conceptual schemes and empirical content. Davidson says that this image depends on the presupposition – which he believes to be false – that we can be justified in holding that an organism has a different point of view without having beliefs in common with it. So, if this assumption is false, the same will happen with the Nagelian notion of the world as free from points of view. In short, the reasons to hold this thesis is because in a situation where we have no shared beliefs with some organism, we will never recognize this organism as having any point of view.

The rejection of the dualism between empirical facts and conceptual schemes seems to entail the following restriction: if we can say something about the subjective way organisms cope with their external environment it has to be inside the bounds of the conceptual. That is to say, we cannot explain inner experiences appealing to a relation which comprises an authority outside our concepts².

In the first section we tried to suggest that the Nagelian conception of phenomenology as non-physical prompts us in the direction to the complicated notion of dualism of substances. In this present section in turn we suggested that Nagel's view hangs on a false premise: the dualism between conceptual scheme and empirical content. But does that mean that we have to give up any notion of phenomenology?

3. Why not Phenomenology?

It seems that the intuition which instigates the talk about phenomenology is the feeling that conscious states have something which cannot be grasped by any physical explanation. It is the belief that there is some difference between the physical description of, for instance, someone's perception of the colour red and the very experience of redness. One strategy, the Nagelian one, is to suppose that the way organisms cope with the world includes something outside the conceptual domain. It would be something non-conceptual which defines the experience of redness. So, if the defense of a notion of phenomenology depends on this supposition, the very idea of phenomenology seems to vanish together with it. But would not there be an alternative route? Why not a phenomenology understood as inside the bounds of the conceptual? It is exactly this path that we will suggest in the next paragraphs.

Let's consider a particular situation where one person asserts that another is acting. That assertion commits itself to the idea that there is something in advance of the bodily movements – the mental states – which are responsible for the observed bodily movements (it would be strange to hold, for example, that heart beats are genuine actions). When we ascribe mental states to an agent we are also ascribing to it the ability to envisage different alternatives and to choose to act according to one of them. Of course in many situations in virtue of an external impediment – as,

for instance, a physical barrier – it is not possible to act upon the choice. However, even so, the ability to be conscious of different alternatives remains and, in a situation where there is not an external impediment, it will enable the agent in question to behave in a specific way. So, those conscious states will ground the idea that persons are responsible for their actions and, accordingly, the fact that many times we are free to act.

It seems that this way of thinking can be extended to our practices of justification as a whole. Because, as in the case of actions, the very assumption that there are reasons in favor or against some statement only makes sense to agents which are free to hold different statements. So, as in the case of actions, since believing is always believing some particular statement and not another, beliefs necessarily endorse responsibility. Then freedom seems to be a central notion to understand the functioning of our conceptual practices. If we remove this notion, our very ability of recognizing world states seems to vanish. The notion of freedom in turn has no room in our explanation of physical behaviour. For physical objects behave according to physical laws and, therefore, in a deterministic way. Thus, the fact that mental states are conceptually dependent on the notion of freedom entails an image according to which the world is sharply divided into mental and physical events. So, it seems we save the idea that inner experiences involve something non-physical without going outside the conceptual domain.

To say that we cannot understand mental processes without the notion of freedom is equivalent to the thesis that we can only understand the way we cope with the world with the mediation of the notion of freedom. That is, we have inner experiences about the world in so far as it is tenable to attribute some degree of freedom to us. Otherwise, there would be nothing distinctively mental and, therefore, we would be deterministic beings or, in other words, automata. There is a fact about what it is like to be a human being because we can make choices and be responsible for them. But does not appealing to the idea of something distinctively mental have the risk to fall in a dualism of substances?

A tempting way to follow in order to get away from a charge of dualism is to embrace a type identity between mental and physical states. So, according to this view, for each mental type (as desiring) there would be a unique physical type identical to it (as the discharge of a certain kind of nerve cell) and vice-versa. In other words, this reductionist view holds that we can know psychophysical laws between mental and physical events. However, a reductionist route does not take into account the intuition that there is a difference between perceiving and the respective physical description of it. Because for a reductionist landscape any peculiar mental feature is always a certain peculiar physical structure.

Another way to be a monist is to accept the plausibility of Davidson's anomalous monism (Davidson 1980). This route in turn appears to be at hand if we are disposed to reject the idea of non-conceptual content. For the notion of non-conceptual content seems to presuppose the notion of psychophysical laws. When someone asserts that conscious states are constituted by non-conceptual contents, one is holding that there is some object outside the conceptual sphere which gives us some specific mental representation. So, this way of conceiving subjective experiences hangs on the idea that we can know nomic relations between the mental and the physical. We can know, given some physical state, what conscious mental state will appear in a person after the

² In Pedroso (2003) is suggested a way of understanding the belief in non-conceptual contents as committed to the dualism between institution and application of rules which appears false if we accept the plausibility of Wittgensteinian remarks concerning rule-following.

perception. Therefore, it becomes clear why Nagel cannot accept Davidson's anomalous monism since it rejects the very idea of psychophysical laws.

But if we jettison the idea that what is distinctive in the phenomenological domain is devoid of non-conceptual factors, a Davidsonian route appears tempting. For if we repel the idea of psychophysical laws then we can also hold that mental explanations have their own place. Physical descriptions will never replace mental descriptions once and for all. The difference between the physical description of the experience of a red patch and the very experience of redness is maintained. However the rejection of the notion of non-conceptual contents entails something Nagel was not apt to accept. It is the idea that animals don't have conscious states³. Can we afford this?

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³ Cf. Davidson (2001) where he makes exactly this move.

Experience, Thought, and Language. Some Reflections on Bermúdez's Approach to Nonlinguistic Cognition

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1. Introduction

A common starting point for a theory of mind has been the contrast between sensory experience and conceptual thinking, not as something to be taken for granted, but as something to be clarified and explained. Since the linguistic turn in philosophy, however, this approach no longer appears so straightforward. This turn consisted not merely in giving the old contrast a new clothing by replacing "thought" by "language". The important change lies in the fact that experience is now contrasted with a highly specific form of cognition, namely the ability to speak a language, thereby opening up the space for a third category on the map of fundamental mental activities. Instead of a twofold distinction we thus get a threefold distinction between experience, nonlinguistic thinking and language-based reasoning.

This paradigm shift raises the question of how to develop a specific theory of nonlinguistic thinking. In his recent book *Thinking without Words* (2003), José Bermúdez takes up this problem and highlights its importance for a general theory of the mind. Drawing on a wealth of empirical data, Bermúdez argues that a theory of nonlinguistic thinking must not be "minimalist" in the following sense: it should not deny that nonlinguistic thinking shares some important features with language-based reasoning; in particular, it may involve the formation of structured thoughts with a propositional content. This makes the concepts we use in explaining human behaviour, like "belief" and "desire", also suitable as tools for explaining the behaviour of nonlinguistic creatures.

In this paper I will argue that we can – and should – go a step further in rejecting a minimalist approach to nonlinguistic thinking. We should not only accept that animals and prelinguistic infants have propositional attitudes, we should also grant that they have the ability to use primitive concepts. This is an issue that Bermúdez deliberately sets aside in his book. Without taking a stance on this question, however, his attack on minimalist explanations remains half-hearted, or so I shall argue. In the end the old contrast between experience and conceptual thinking still retains its force.

2. The minimalist approach

The linguistic turn in philosophy is generally considered to have been a methodological innovation, but it was much more than that. In philosophy of mind it had a tremendous impact on how the basic types of cognitive activity should be defined. The basic idea here was that language is not just a tool for *expressing* one's thoughts, but a *medium* or *vehicle* in which we form our thoughts. The language that plays this cognitive role could either be a public language, like English, or it could be an "inner code" with its own syntax and semantics. In the latter case, the language-of-thought-hypothesis could be taken to apply to *all* kinds of reasoning (see Fodor 1975, ch. 3). In the former case, the claim was meant to apply only to higher-level cognition and to thoughts that are accessible in introspection.

In what follows, I am concerned with the claim that language is a medium of *certain forms* of thinking, but not of thinking in general. (I will come back to Fodor's hypothesis below.) Taken in this form, the claim implies that a different strategy is needed for dealing with nonlinguistic forms of cognition. One idea that seems useful at this point is Gilbert Ryle's distinction between "knowing-that" and "knowing-how". It suggests that a more general distinction along this line might be drawn between two concepts of "thinking": propositional thinking or "thinking-that", and nonpropositional thinking or "thinking-how". This suggestion has been exploited by various theories for which Bermúdez uses the label "minimalist approaches".

An example how this strategy may be implemented is provided by Michael Dummett's theory of *protothoughts* (see Dummett 1988, ch. 12). This theory rests on two assumptions. Dummett assumes that a mental act should count as a genuine act of thinking only if it has a content that can be assessed as true or false. Furthermore he assumes that this truth-oriented form of thinking presupposes that language is the medium in which these thoughts are formed. Thus, Dummett is forced to deny that thoughts formed without language can be assigned a propositional content that would make them true or false. He therefore introduces the term "protothoughts" for those acts of cognition that are not genuine thoughts according to his theory.

Protothoughts are said to differ from genuine thoughts by being tied to current perceptions and current activities. They occur, for instance, when an animal decides whether it should fight or flee, or when we try to estimate the speed and direction of oncoming traffic. They cannot occur "free of the environment" or independently of what we are doing. Most importantly "they do not have the structure of verbally expressed thoughts" (Dummett 1988, engl. transl.: 122). They can be mistaken only in the sense that they lead to successful or unsuccessful behaviour, but "it would be ponderous to speak of truth or falsity in application to them" (*ibid.*).

These are strong claims, and Dummett says little in support of them. He tries to convince us by examples that a lot of nonlinguistic reasoning *can* be analysed as a context-bound activity that is success-oriented, but not truth-oriented. But what should motivate us to accept this kind of analysis? Additional force can be gained here from a principle that Gareth Evans introduced and called the "Generality Constraint" (Evans 1982, 100f). It says that in attributing thoughts to others (or to ourselves) we attribute to a person the capacity to entertain a whole *range* of thoughts structurally similar to the one we actually ascribe to her. For instance, one cannot attribute to a child the belief that mother has gone out, unless there is a range of similar thoughts that one would be willing to attribute to the child as well, e.g. mother is in the garden, father has gone out, etc. The claim here is not just that the ability to *ascribe* a thought to someone is subject to the Generality Constraint, but the ability to *form* a thought with a

propositional content. Propositions are compositionally structured entities, and there is no way that one can grasp them without grasping their structure, and hence without the ability to entertain a range of thoughts that share this structure.

Building on this principle, we may see the minimalist position as derivable from the following argument:

- (M1) All propositional thoughts are compositionally structured.
- (M2) Thoughts that are compositionally structured have a conceptual content.
- (M3) Thoughts that have a conceptual content occur only in subjects capable of expressing them verbally in their language.

Therefore: All propositional thoughts occur only in subjects capable of expressing them verbally in their language.

I will use this argument in what follows as background for considering how the minimalist position may be criticised. Objections will have to be directed at one of the three premises. One might also dispute more than one premise, of course, but we should first of all try to single out what seems to be the weakest link in this chain.

3. Bermúdez's attack on the minimalist approach

In his book *Thinking Without Words*, Bermúdez claims that the current practice in studies of animal behaviour and developmental psychology is at odds with the minimalist approach. Scientists in these areas, he says, frequently make use of psychological explanations that involve the attribution of beliefs and desires to nonlinguistic creatures. This is done with certain restrictions however. Psychological explanations of this order are appealed to only in those cases where lower-type explanations fail. Such lower-type explanations would be explanations in terms of instincts or conditioning processes, or some other function that can be described as an invariant response to some detected stimuli. But there are types of intelligent behaviour that "cannot be understood in the context-bound and essentially perceptual manner proposed by the minimalist account." (Bermúdez 2003, 62)

One example of a behaviour that requires a full-blooded psychological explanation, discussed in detail by Bermúdez, is a classical study by Tolman, Richie, and Kalish about the navigational skills of rats locating food in a maze (ibid., 103ff). In these experiments the structure of the maze and its position in the environment is changed in such a way that simpler types of explanations of how rats succeed in locating the food under varying conditions are ruled out. The only explanation left is that rats are not just following a trail they somehow remember, but that they are using thoughts with a particular structure. From examples like this Bermúdez draws the following general moral:

The practice of giving psychological explanations of the behavior of nonlinguistic creatures rests crucially on those thoughts being structured. Psychological explanations can only be predictively useful and genuinely explanatory if the thoughts that they involve are composed of distinguishable thought-constituents that can feature in further thoughts. (Bermúdez 2003, 95)

An advocate of the language-of-thought-hypothesis might take this observation to be a vindication of his position. Bermúdez, however, has set aside this option

already. This hypothesis, he says, would not give us any clues about how to solve the epistemological problem of *which* thoughts we should attribute to nonlinguistic creatures. To this extent it will not give us "the whole story" about how forms of intelligent behaviour that rats are capable of are to be explained (ibid., 31).

Let us, then, return to the minimalist approach. If we look back at the argument supporting this position, we see that Bermúdez has no objection to the first premise. On the contrary, he emphasises that we ascribe a propositional content to nonlinguistic thoughts whenever the empirical data indicate that these thoughts have a compositional structure. It is rather one of the other premises (M2) or (M3) that he must reject.

There are only a few hints in the present book that indicate which option Bermúdez chooses here. The clearest hint is the following reference to his earlier book on the *Paradox of Self-Consciousness* (1998):

I proposed that genuine concept mastery involves an ability not simply to make judgments involving those concepts but also to justify those judgments and to reflect on the grounds for them. Since these are paradigmatically language-dependent activities, it follows that concept mastery requires the possession of a language. (Bermúdez 2003, ix)

Bermúdez picks up this thread later when he endorses a certain view of human cognition that he takes from Andy Clark. According to Clark, what is distinctive about human cognition is that it provides us with a "second order dynamics", i.e. a "cluster of powerful capacities involving self-evaluation, self-criticism and finely honed remedial responses" (ibid., 158). We may take this as suggesting that second-order capacities are essential for concept-possession. Unless a subject has those capacities we should not treat her as a concept-user; and since second-order capacities are acquired together with the capacity to speak a language, only linguistic creatures qualify as concept-users.

We may conclude, then, that Bermúdez also accepts the third premise in the argument supporting the minimalist position. What he must reject, therefore, is the second premise (M2). On his view, there can be no necessary connection between having thoughts with a compositional structure and being a concept-user. Compositional thoughts must have *some* thought-constituents, that is clear, but these constituents need not be concepts. They might be what Dummett calls "protoconcepts". In this case, it is arguable, however, that the thoughts formed would not be genuine thoughts either, but merely protothoughts. It seems, therefore, that the minimalist has not been yet defeated.

4. Primitive concepts

As I pointed out at the beginning, the nature of nonlinguistic thinking becomes an acute problem when we divide the realm of cognitive activities not just into two, but into three basic categories: experience, nonlinguistic thinking, and language-based reasoning. A proper theory of nonlinguistic thinking must therefore answer two questions: How is this form of thinking related to the level of experience? And how is it related to the level of linguistic thinking?

It seems to me that both the minimalist approach, criticised by Bermúdez, and the view offered by him as an alternative, fail in providing adequate answers to both questions for the following reason: each of them intro-

duces a criterion for drawing the distinction between nonlinguistic and linguistic thinking, but they do not tell us what their criterion is for distinguishing between sensory experiences and thinking in general.

What kind of criteria do we have for drawing this latter distinction? How do we distinguish, for instance, between a sensory experience – e.g. a sensory experience of red – from the belief that a red object is before one's eyes? There are only two promising candidates for drawing this distinction:

- (a) experiences – in contrast to beliefs and thought episodes – do not have a propositional content, and
- (b) experiences – in contrast to beliefs and thought episodes – do not have a conceptualised content.

If one follows the minimalist line, one cannot use criterion (a) for separating experiences and non-linguistic thoughts, because one uses this criterion already for distinguishing between non-linguistic and linguistic thinking. Conversely, if one follows Bermúdez line, one cannot use criterion (b). As long as we have another choice here, this is no problem. A minimalist can characterise experiences by the fact that they do not involve any concepts, not even protoconcepts, whereas Bermúdez might characterise them in terms of the fact that they do not have a propositional content.

But do we really have that choice? As Bermúdez makes clear, we are not considering here two approaches that are in competition with each other. There is no conflict between them apart from the fact that they disagree about *how much* a minimalist account explains. According to Dummett and other “minimalists”, such an account applies to *all* types of nonlinguistic thinking; for Bermúdez it covers only a part of it. There is no question of completely rejecting the minimalist approach. Bermúdez fully acknowledges its merits when he says that it “allows us to avoid some of the key problems that arise in explaining how nonlinguistic creatures can have states with propositional content”, that “low-key psychological explanations” of the minimalist type “are frequently applicable” and that “many cases of thinking without words (no doubt, in fact, the majority of such cases) are *not* best described as involving structured and context-independent thoughts that are linguistically expressible” (Bermúdez 2003, 62, my emphasis).

The upshot of his book therefore comes to be this: what we need is a *complex* theory of nonlinguistic thinking that will be partly minimalist and partly propositional. But how can these two approaches be integrated into a single theory? And what will be the criterion in such a theory that distinguishes nonlinguistic thoughts from the realm of experiences?

At this point, I think, what is needed is an account of the *constituents* of nonlinguistic thoughts that accords with both explanatory models. These constituents cannot be full-blown concepts that require a second-order dynamics and hence a language. Neither can these constituents be protoconcepts in the sense of Dummett, however. If they were just protoconcepts they would only lead to the formation of protothoughts, not to genuine thoughts with a propositional content.

The alternative that might fit both models is to say that nonlinguistic thoughts involve *genuine* concepts, but concepts of a *primitive* sort. They are primitive in two respects: they do not presuppose a second-order dynamics, and they are part of a conceptual framework that is much simpler than the concepts associated with language-based reasoning. This explains why nonlinguistic thoughts – even though they have a compositional structure – have only relatively few inferential relations to each other. And it explains how nonlinguistic creatures can satisfy Evans's Generality Constraint, since the generality it requires depends on the conceptual framework within which we apply the constraint.

I conclude, then, that contrary to what Bermúdez suggests, we should not give up the second premise of the minimalist argument. What has to go is the assumption that concept-possession is a privilege that only language-users enjoy. The common feature of both linguistic and nonlinguistic thinking is that concepts are required to form thoughts of any kind. A theory of primitive concepts will therefore shed the most light on the specific nature of nonlinguistic cognition. And the old contrast between experience and thought keeps its force.

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Biological Kinds and the Causal Theory of Reference

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1. Introduction

Theories of reference often invoke causal factors in quite general ways. For instance, the reference of a term may be inherited from other members of a linguistic community. In this paper, I am not concerned with and will not challenge these general causal-historical determinants of reference. The focus of my critique is on causal theories of reference for *natural kind concepts*. The original picture of how reference to a natural kind is established is given by Putnam (1975). The idea is that we pick out a sample of the kind by ostension or stereotypical description and the referent is that natural kind to which the sample belongs.

This original account had to be modified and refined. Natural kinds in science may not be observable, even though their effects are. Thus, reference to a natural kind may be established by describing its causal effects. Stanford and Kitcher (2000), however, point out that if we say that the referent is that kind which causes the observable properties, then 'cause' cannot be the *total* cause of the properties (otherwise the kind would necessarily have the stereotypical properties). They solve this problem of picking out the relevant subset of the total cause by offering a very sophisticated causal theory of natural kind concepts. On their account, reference is determined based on a set of samples of the kind and a set of foils, and a set of stereotypical properties that is shared by all members of the kind, but not by all foils. A further relevant refinement of causal theories is that they are not purely causal theories of reference. It is nowadays acknowledged that apart from causal factors descriptions also have an impact on how the reference of natural kind concepts is determined (Devitt and Sterelny 1999, Stanford and Kitcher 2000).

I criticize the causal theory based on an example from biology — the homology concept. Nowadays there are actually two distinct homology concepts used, which differ in reference. Thus, a theory of reference determination has at least to account for the difference between these two natural kind concepts. I argue that the standard tools of causal theories — samples, foils, and their properties — cannot do this job. My proposal is that even in the case of natural kind concepts, reference is determined based on other factors as well.

2. Phylogenetic and Developmental Homology

For the purposes of this paper, I can only give a very brief discussion of the two homology concepts; a detailed argument as to why they are actually two distinct concepts is given by Brigandt (2003) and Brigandt (n.d.). My discussion will explain why we have two natural kind concepts that differ in reference without invoking the core features of the causal theory — samples and their stereotypical properties. Instead, the difference is explained in terms of the scientific use of these two concepts and the epistemic and explanatory goals for which they are used. I start with the phylogenetic homology concept, which is the original homology concept that emerged in the 19th century and is still used in current comparative and evolutionary biology.

The phylogenetic homology concept is a relation used for the comparison of organisms and their structures. Two structures in different species are *homologous* to each other in case they are inherited from one and the same structure in the common ancestor. For example, the wing of bats is homologous to the arm of humans because they are both derived from the forelimb of the mammalian ancestor. In fact, even the individual bones of the human arm perfectly correspond to and are thus homologous to the bones of the bat wing. Homologous structures are the 'same' or the 'corresponding' structures in different species. Homology is an equivalence relation and thus the structures that are homologous to a particular structure form an equivalence class. The members of such a class of mutually homologous structures are called *homologues*. Homologues are often given the same name even if they consist of structures from very different species. For instance, we just talk about 'the' epithalamus (a part of the brain), referring to a structure that exists across the large and diverse group of vertebrates.

A class of homologues is a *natural kind*. As a class of homologues is an equivalence class of the 'is homologous to' relation, the homology concept actually defines a whole set of natural kinds. Thus homology is in fact a natural kind concept. Homologues form a natural kind for the following reason. Homologues, e.g., the forelimb of land-living vertebrates, are inherited from a particular structure in the common ancestor. The common ancestry ensures that many of the properties that hold for some homologues hold for all homologues. Morphological, histological, and developmental features can be (inductively) inferred from one homologue to the homologous structure in other species. Thus homologues are a natural kind in that we can project their properties. This is very important for comparative and evolutionary biology, and the reason why *homology individuates characters*. Individuating characters and structures by means of homology (rather than other principles) allows for unified and general descriptions of the properties of organisms that apply to large groups of organisms. By telling us what the different homologues of an organism are, homology breaks an organism down into its natural parts. Homology literally carves nature at its joints. Whether something is really a part of an organism depends on whether we can identify the same part in other organisms and species. The fact that homology is a natural kind concept is also shown by the fact that biologists were originally unclear about the 'essence' of homology that makes two structures homologous. The homology concept was introduced in pre-Darwinian comparative biology, and metaphysical notions such as Platonic ideas were sometimes invoked to explain what makes two structures homologous. With the advent of Darwinism it became clear that common ancestry is the defining feature of homology. Nowadays not only morphological structures are viewed as homologous, but also tissue types, cell types, genes, and proteins. This is the reason why homology is viewed by some biologists as the most important concept of biology.

The discussion so far was about the phylogenetic homology concept as still used in comparative and evolutionary biology. In the last few decades, however, a new homology concept emerged among biologists with a developmental perspective on evolution. Evolutionary

developmental biology is a relatively new field that tries to synthesize knowledge from the historically separate fields evolutionary and developmental biology. I call this new homology concept the *developmental homology concept*. It is a distinct concept because evolutionary developmental biology uses its homology concept for different purposes than traditional evolutionary and comparative biology. The traditional phylogenetic homology concept is used to make *inferences* and obtain unified descriptions of different species. Evolutionary developmental biology, however, is not primarily interested in the comparison and classification of organisms. Instead, the focus is on the explanation of how structures originate in development. The goal is to have a *causal-mechanistic explanation* of why the same (homologous) structures develop in different organisms such as in parent and offspring. The phylogenetic homology concept makes reference to common ancestry, but notions such as common ancestry or the inheritance of 'genetic information' do not yield any causal understanding of why and how structures emerge in subsequent generations — and the latter is what is important for a developmental approach (Wagner 1989, Roth 1991). The phylogenetic homology concept can be used to make inferences, but it does not underwrite causal-mechanistic explanations.

A consequence of this conceptual difference is that the two homology concepts have a different extension. Developmental homology has a larger extension in that it includes so-called *serial homologues*. Sometimes an organism has a structure that occurs repeatedly, for instance hair in mammals, leaves in plants, the vertebrae in vertebrates, or the segments in segmented animals. This multiple occurrence of the same structure is called serial homology. Thus structures within one and the same individual (rather than structures of different species) are serially homologous. Biologists using a developmental homology concept acknowledge the existence of serial homologues (Wagner 1989, Roth 1991). The existence of a repeated pattern is an important starting point for developmental research. The question is whether this pattern is due to some underlying developmental commonality, e.g., something like a duplication of genes or a duplication of a developmental program (at work in different parts of an organism). The developmental homology concept is intended to give a causal-mechanistic account of why the same structures develop and re-appear *within* and *between* organisms. Serial homologues are one instance where the 'same' structure re-occurs and call for a developmental explanation. The traditional phylogenetic homology concept, however, does not include serial homologues. The reason is that phylogenetic homology is used for the comparison of *different species*, and comparative biologists sometimes reject the very idea of serial homology on this ground (Ax 1989).

3. Toward a Broader Account of Reference Determination

My brief discussion of the phylogenetic and developmental homology concept explained their difference—including the difference in reference—based on how these concepts are embedded in the conceptual practices of these fields and for what scientific purposes they are used. The phylogenetic homology concept supports inferences and is used to obtain unified comparative knowledge of different species. The developmental homology concept underwrites causal-mechanistic explanations and is used to explain why structures reappear in subsequent generations and sometimes several times within an individual. My

claim is that these pragmatic and epistemic aspects of concepts are a crucial factor of reference determination, and that standard causal theories of natural kind concepts do not address these factors adequately. To be sure, causal theories can acknowledge that these factors have *some* influence on reference determination. Epistemic and pragmatic aspects can be claimed to influence which samples and stereotypical properties are used, while the latter are the real determinants of reference. However, my point is that samples and stereotypical properties *alone* do not determine the reference of natural kind concepts, and that instead the epistemic and pragmatic aspects of concepts have a *direct* influence on reference that goes beyond picking out certain samples and properties.

Sophisticated causal theories such as Stanford and Kitcher (2000) view samples, foils, and some of their properties as the core determinants of the reference of natural kind concepts. While samples surely played a role when the phylogenetic homology concept emerged, samples, foils, and properties alone cannot account for reference. In fact, these factors are not even sufficient to account for the *difference of reference* between the phylogenetic and the developmental homology concept. Proponents of the causal theory might try to argue that the reference of developmental homology is fixed by means of samples (and properties) that actually include serial homologues, while phylogenetic homology is defined using (besides standard homologues as samples) alleged serial homologues as foils. However, this does not fit biological practice. Labeling alleged serial homologues as foils was of no importance for 19th century comparative and evolutionary biologists, but their comparative research agenda determines the extension of 'homology'. The current debate with developmental biologists about the existence of serial homologues is not the *origin* but the *consequence* of the existence of two different homology concepts. When nowadays an evolutionary biologist insists that there are no such things as serial homologues, then this is not a statement that fixes the reference of her homology concept, but it is just the expression of the previously established fact that her homology concept does not refer to serial homologues.

One could point out that current causal theories allow for descriptive factors as determinants of reference. So the difference between phylogenetic and developmental homology could be explained by using theoretical statements about the referents of these two concepts. Maybe this is the case. Some descriptions of homologues surely have an impact on the reference of 'homology'. But if by descriptive elements one has some necessary or sufficient properties in mind that the user associates with the concept or that are analytically linked to the concept, then it is not clear whether this can really yield a satisfactory account. The discussion of the last section tried to make clear that there are actually two distinct concepts of homology in use, but it did this neither by relying on samples and foils, nor by invoking any special descriptions of homologues. Our best evidence for there being two concepts that differ in reference is the fact that these two concepts are used for different epistemic and theoretical goals. And my claim is that the reference of these concepts is determined by the way these concepts are embedded in different conceptual practices.

My critique of standard causal theories of the reference of natural kind concepts was based on one example—the phylogenetic and the developmental homology concept. But I think that the same point applies to other natural kind concepts as well. Another likely candidate is the species concept, which has figured prominently in philosophical

discussion as an example of a natural kind concept. My assumption is that a close look at how reference is actually determined by scientists and their practice in the case of species and other examples reveals that real cases cannot be adequately accounted for by current causal theories of reference. My proposal is that even in the case of natural kind concepts we need a broader account of reference fixing. Apart from samples, stereotypical properties, and descriptions of a kind, there are other factors that have a crucial influence on reference. These are aspects of how concepts are scientifically used and for what epistemic purposes they are used.

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Leibniz und Whitehead über Perzeption

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1. Vorbemerkung

Viele Leibnizleser und sogar manche Leibnizforscher haben Probleme mit dem Terminus Perzeption. Perzeptionen sind zunächst wohl Wahrnehmungen und sie sind damit auf den die Sinne bezogen. Diese Bedeutung kommt bei Leibniz auch vor, doch sie stellt eher einen Grenzfall dar, denn wenn Leibniz davon spricht, dass die Monaden dank ihrer Perzeptionen die ganze Welt widerspiegeln, d.h. alle anderen Monaden samt deren Perzeptionen, dann kann es sich wohl nicht um sinnliche Wahrnehmung handeln, sondern um eine andere wesentlich abstraktere Art von Beziehung der Monaden untereinander.

Bisher hatte mancher Leibnizforscher angenommen, dass diese Konzeption von Perzeption typisch für Leibniz ist, der damit einen Terminus aus der philosophischen Psychologie in die Ontologie verfrachtet hat, um ihn als Werkzeug für seine sehr abstrakte Metaphysik zu verwenden. Bei der Lektüre eines Textes von Francis Bacon, den Whitehead in seinem Buch *Science and The Modern World* zitiert, wird jedoch sofort klar, dass es schon vor Leibniz eine Bedeutung des Wortes *perception* gab, die mit Sinneswahrnehmung nichts zu tun hat, sondern sich im Gegenteil gerade von dieser Bedeutung klar abgrenzt.

2. Bacons Text

Der Text, den Whitehead in seinem Buch zitiert und den er auch grundlegend für seine Philosophie hält, lautet:

It is certain that all bodies whatsoever, though they have no sense, yet they have perception: for when one is applied to another, there is a kind of election to embrace that which is agreeable, and to exclude or expel that which is ingrate; and whether the body be alterant or altered, evermore a perception precedeth operation; for else all bodies would be alike one to another. And sometimes this perception, in some kind of bodies, is far more subtle than sense; so that sense is a dull thing in comparison of it: we see a weatherglass will find the least difference in heat or cold, when we find it not. And this perception is sometimes at a distance, as well as upon the touch; as when the loadstone draweth iron: or flame naphtha of Babylon, a great distance off. It is therefore a subject of a very noble inquiry, to enquire of the more noble subtile perceptions; for it is another key to open nature, as well as the sense; and sometimes better. And besides, it is a principal means of natural divination; for that which in these perceptions appeareth early, in the great effects cometh long after.

Aus diesem Text ergibt sich eine Reihe von überraschenden Thesen, die man in acht Punkten zusammenfassen kann:

1. Körper jeglicher Art haben Perzeptionen
2. Nicht alle Körper verfügen über Sinne
3. Perzeptionen entscheiden darüber, was für einen Körper angenehm oder unangenehm ist, was für ihn akzeptabel oder was inakzeptabel ist, was ihm nützt

und was ihm schadet. Perzeptionen gehen damit den entsprechenden Operationen voraus. Wäre das nicht so, dann würden sich alle Körper ähneln.

4. In manchen Fällen sind diese Perzeptionen auch subtiler als die sinnliche Erfahrung, so z.B. bei der Temperaturmessung.
5. Perzeptionen können sowohl auf Distanz als auch bei Berührung wirken.
6. Perzeptionen sind ein zweiter Schlüssel zur Natur, zusätzlich zu den Sinnen.
7. Perzeptionen sind ontologisch früher als die sinnliche Erfahrung; was den Sinnen früher erscheint, kommt in Wirklichkeit später.
8. Perzeptionen organisieren die Selbstkonstitution der Dinge und begründen damit deren Individualität.

3. Perzeption bei Leibniz

In der späten Leibniz'schen Metaphysik gibt es nur drei Sorten von Entitäten. So schreibt er in einem Brief vom 30. Juni 1704 an den niederländischen Physiker und Philosophen Burcher De Volder:

Imo rem accurate considerando dicendum est nihil in rebus esse nisi substantias simplices et in his perceptionem atque appetitum.

Wenn wir die Sache genau betrachten, dann muss man sagen, dass in den Dingen nichts ist außer einfachen Substanzen und in ihnen Perzeption und Appetitus.

Was sind Perzeptionen bei Leibniz? Im §14 der Monadologie finden wir folgende ausführliche Beschreibung von Perzeption:

Der vorübergehende Zustand, der eine Vielheit in der Einheit oder in der einfachen Substanz entfaltet, ist genau das, was Perzeption genannt wird. Man muss sie von der Apperzeption und vom Bewusstsein unterscheiden, was aus dem Folgenden hervorgehen wird.

Aus dieser Definition wird klar, dass jede Perzeption sowohl repräsentiert als auch eine Einheit stiftende Kraft besitzt. Nach derselben Definition scheint die Quelle für die Einheit stiftende Kraft darin zu liegen, dass die Perzeption einer Monade inhäriert und Monaden eine natürlich Einheit schon deshalb besitzen, weil sie keine substantiellen Teile haben. Danach erhält eine Perzeption ihre Einheit stiftende Kraft aus der atomistischen Einheit der Monade, in der sie inhäriert. Eine andere mögliche Quelle für die Einheit stiftende Kraft der Perzeption bestände darin ein vereintes Ganzes aus seinen Teilen zu sein, d.h. dass nur Perzeptionen, die echte Ganze sind, über eine Einheit stiftende Kraft verfügen würden. Andererseits könnte eine mereologisch atomistische Perzeption oder eine perzeptionelle Monade sehr gut, kraft ihrer atomistischen Natur, die perzipierten Gegenstände vereinen, doch sie wäre unfähig eine Vielheit getreu wiederzugeben. Deshalb kann die vereinende plus repräsentierende Fähigkeit einer Perzeption nicht in ihrer etwaigen mereologischen Atomizität liegen, so dass nur komplexe Perzeptionen echte Perzeptionen im Sinne der Definition des §14 sind.

Eine andere wichtige Idee, die Leibniz im zweiten Teil der zitierten Passage formuliert, ist die ausdrücklich nicht-psychologische Definition des Begriffs der Perzeption. Er unterscheidet nachdrücklich Perzeptionen von typisch psychologischen Begriffen oder Entitäten wie Apperzeption und Bewusstsein.

3.1 Die Klassifikation von Perzeptionen

Perzeptionen werden von Leibniz und anderen Philosophen des 17. Jahrhunderts wie Descartes oder Spinoza nach zwei Skalen klassifiziert:

Durch die Skala von dunkel bis klar

Durch die Skala von verworren bis deutlich

Das epistemische Ideal, das es zu erreichen gilt, ist die klare und deutliche Perzeption. Nichtsdestoweniger gibt es auf Grund metaphysischer Notwendigkeit und deshalb auch metaphysischer Unvermeidbarkeit klare aber verworrene Perzeptionen. Beide Skalen müssen eher kontinuierlich oder wenigstens dicht als diskret gesehen werden.

Die erste Skala (dunkel bis klar) gründet wohl in der intensiven Natur der Perzeptionen und ist deshalb auch nicht Gegenstand mereologischer Betrachtungen. Andererseits findet eine Perzeption ihren Platz in der zweiten Skala (verworren bis deutlich) durch ihre extensive Natur. Deshalb schlagen wir vor, die verworren-deutliche Dimension auf der Basis einer mereologisch definierbaren Relation der Repräsentation aufzufassen. Um es vorläufig und ganz grob zu nehmen: die Perzeption P repräsentiert die Entität E via h , wenn h ein Teil-Ganzes Homomorphismus der Teile von E in die Teile von P ist. Je mehr der Homomorphismus h sich einem Isomorphismus nähert, desto deutlicher wird die Repräsentation von E durch P sein und desto deutlicher wird auch P selbst sein. In §16 der Monadologie schreibt Leibniz dazu:

Wir erfahren selbst eine Vielheit in einer einfachen Substanz wenn wir finden, dass der schwächste Gedanke, den wir wahrnehmen eine vielfache Wirkung in seinem Gegenstand entfaltet. Daher muss jeder, der feststellt, dass die Seele eine einfache Substanz ist, auch diese Vielheit in der Monade feststellen.

In diesem Text zeigt Leibniz, dass die Monade eine Vielheit von Perzeptionen zur selben Zeit durch direkten Zugang zur inneren Erfahrung umfasst, d.h. durch die Erfahrung der Inhalte unseres Bewusstseins. Unser Bewusstsein beruht offensichtlich auf Perzeptionen. Leibniz setzt diese Passage aus der Monadologie fort mit dem Satz: *und Mr. Bayle sollte damit keine Schwierigkeiten haben*. d.h. mit der gleichzeitigen Atomizität von Monaden in Hinsicht auf substantielle Teile und der Gegenwart einer Vielheit von Perzeptionen in einer Substanz, d.h. der Monade.

3.1.1 Intentionalität

In der gegenwärtigen Philosophie wird Intentionalität als das wichtigste Charakteristikum psychischer Akte angesehen. Obwohl Perzeptionen und Apperzeptionen eine wichtige Rolle in der Leibniz'schen Metaphysik spielen, sucht man in seinen Schriften die Wörter Intention und Intentionalität vergebens. Nichtsdestoweniger muss der Begriff der Intentionalität in seinem System präsent sein. Ein zweiter Blick zeigt, dass Leibniz im Gegensatz zu moderner Philosophie der Psychologie, in der Intentionalität vorwiegend als primitiver Begriff behandelt wird, den Rahmen aufzeigt, in der Intentionalität definiert werden

kann: eine Perzeption intendiert ihren Gegenstand via der Teil-Ganzes Homomorphie h , wie in 3.1 erklärt wurde. In anderen Worten: wir identifizieren die Relation der Intentionalität genau mit einem solchen Homomorphismus h , der die perzipierten Gegenstände auf die Teile der perzipierenden Perzeption abbildet.

3.2 Perzeptionen als Repräsentationen

Während Spinoza in einem Brief an Oldenbourg (GP I 131) den Begriff der Perzeption wie den von Existenz, Ich, dasselbe und Veränderung etc. als unauflöslich und deshalb als undefinierbar ansieht, definiert Leibniz *perceptio* als *repraesentatio variationis externae interna*. (GP VII 329)

Es ist sehr wichtig, dass für Leibniz im Gegensatz zu Spinoza die Perzeption kein primitiver Begriff ist, sondern dass er durch Repräsentation definiert werden soll, d.h. Perzeption haben keine Repräsentationen, sondern sind Repräsentationen. Diese Definition lässt die Frage nach der materialen Natur von Perzeption = Repräsentation offen. So können sowohl Körper als auch Prozesse als Perzeptionen fungieren, vorausgesetzt dass sie eine äußere Mannigfaltigkeit durch eine innere Mannigfaltigkeit repräsentieren. Doch angesichts der Einschränkung dass Perzeptionen in Monaden inhärenter sind körperliche Entitäten ausgeschlossen.

Es gibt viele Texte, in denen Leibniz explizit behauptet und implizit andeutet, dass Perzeptionen und appetitus über eine ziemlich komplexe mereologische Struktur verfügen, d.h. sie erlauben eine mereologische Analyse in beiden Richtungen. Die mereologische Struktur der Perzeptionen wird benutzt, um ihre fundamentale Funktion zu erklären, nämlich die der Repräsentation. In der berühmten Passage aus einem Brief an Arnauld aus dem Jahre 1687 kennzeichnet Leibniz die Relation der Repräsentation durch zwei Bestimmungen: sie soll (1) konstant und (2) geregelt sein. Als typisch für eine solche konstante und geregelte Relation erwähnt er Relation einer geometrischen Repräsentation, die, soweit ihr formaler Charakter reicht, all die anderen Arten von Repräsentationen einschließt, wie die durch Wahrnehmen, Fühlen und Denken.

Ein Ding repräsentiert in meinem Sinn ein anderes, wenn es eine konstante und geregelte Beziehung gibt zwischen dem, was von dem einen und dem anderen ausgesagt werden kann. In diesem Sinne drückt eine perspektivische Projektion eine geometrische Figur aus. Ausdruck ist allen Formen gemein und ist eine Gattung von der natürlichen Perzeption, animalisches Gefühl und intellektuelles Wissen Arten sind.

Wenn man den Begriff von Perzeption spricht, ist es wichtig zu beachten, dass der Leibniz'sche Begriff der Perzeption sehr weit gefächert ist: er schließt einerseits so verschiedene Dinge wie sinnliche Erfahrung und Denkkakte intelligenter Lebewesen und andererseits ein rein strukturelles Widerspiegeln durch Monaden der untersten Stufe ein. Was allgemein übersehen wird, auch von Leibnizforschern, ist die gemeinsame quasi-mathematische Struktur, die all diese verschiedenen Arten von Perzeption teilen.

Dieser weite Bereich von Perzeption ist verbunden mit drei verschiedenen Arten von Monaden: einfache Monaden, sinnenbegabte Monaden und geistige Monaden, die zusätzlich über Apperzeptionen und Bewusstsein verfügen. Die Beziehung ist kumulativ: Monaden höherer Ebene enthalten die Strukturen der Monaden unterer Ebenen. So ist das rein strukturelle Widerspiegeln allen drei Arten von Monaden gemeinsam, und es kann

deshalb auch korrekterweise Gegenstand mereologischer Analyse sein.

3.3 Teile von Perzeptionen

Was sind die Teile von Perzeptionen? Nach Leibniz müssen wir annehmen, dass jeder Teil einer Perzeption selbst wiederum eine Perzeption ist. Nichtsdestoweniger können diesen Teilen einer Perzeption Eigenschaften fehlen, die die Perzeption selbst besitzt. In einer Passage in den *Nouveaux Essais* schreibt Leibniz:

Ich möchte gerne zwischen Perzeption und Wahrnehmung unterscheiden. Die Perzeption von Licht oder Farbe z.B., die wir wahrnehmen, ist aus einer Menge von kleinen Perzeptionen zusammengesetzt, die wir nicht wahrnehmen, und ein Geräusch, das wir perzipiert haben, aber das wir nicht beachten, wird durch eine kleine Hinzufügung oder Vermehrung wahrnehmbar.

Die Leibnizsche Behauptung, dass Perzeptionen aus so genannten kleinen Perzeptionen zusammengesetzt sind, ist unzweideutig. So ist es klar, dass Perzeptionen für Leibniz eine mereologische Struktur aufweisen. In diesem Text diskutiert Leibniz wie Perzeptionen wahrgenommen werden können oder den Prozess der Wahrnehmung von Perzeptionen. Von diesem Gesichtspunkt aus sind Perzeptionen aus kleinen oder nicht wahrgenommenen oder nicht wahrnehmbaren Perzeptionen zusammengesetzt und sie offenbaren damit eine mereologische Struktur. Durch ausreichende Vermehrung, Verkettung oder Aggregation von *petites perceptions* gelangen wir endlich zu einem Zustand in dem wir fähig sind, sie wahrzunehmen und genau dieser Zustand wird Perzeption genannt. Der Unterschied zwischen *petites perceptions* und *grandes perceptions* kann offenbar nur mithilfe ihrer mereologischen Struktur erklärt werden. Unter Benützung unserer mereologischen Analyse können wir den Übergang von nicht wahrnehmbaren *petites perceptions* zu wahrnehmbaren und wahrgenommenen *grandes perceptions* durch den Übergang von homomorpher zu isomorpher Abbildung erklären.

Bereits in einem frühen Text, nämlich in den *Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis* von 1684 sieht Leibniz gewöhnliche Farb- und Geruchsperzeptionen als zusammengesetzt aus kleineren Perzeptionen als deren Teile an, nämlich aus Perzeptionen von Figuren und Bewegungen.

Darüber hinaus, wenn wir Farben und Gerüche wahrnehmen, haben wir nichts anderes als eine Perzeption von Figuren und Bewegungen, doch von Figuren und Bewegungen, die so komplex und kurzzeitig sind, dass unser Bewusstsein in seinem gegenwärtigen Zustand unfähig ist eine jede deutlich und zu beobachten und deshalb auch nicht wahrnimmt, dass seine Perzeption aus einzelnen Perzeptionen überaus kleiner Figuren und Bewegungen zusammengesetzt ist. Wenn wir also gelbes und blaues Pulver mischen und grüne Farbe perzipieren, dann nehmen wir tatsächlich nichts als gelb und blau sorgfältig gemischt auf, doch wir bemerken das nicht und nehmen dafür eine neue Natur an. (GP IV, 426)

In diesem Text sind die grundlegenden Perzeptionen offenbar Perzeptionen von Figuren und Bewegungen. Doch diese Perzeptionen werden nicht als solche wahrgenommen, sondern als Farben, Geräusche oder Gerüche. Die Einheit der Teilperzeptionen, also die Perzeption, ist in diesem Fall von anderer Art als die Teilperzeptionen selbst. Während die Teilperzeptionen in die

Kategorie der Quantität gehören ist die wahrgenommene Perzeption eine Qualität, nämlich eine Farbe und analog kann es auch ein Geräusch oder ein Geruch sein.

Wenn wir diese Analyse von Perzeptionen bei Leibniz im Auge haben, dann sehen wir mereologisch zwei Arten von Perzeption, nämlich eine homogene und eine heterogene. Im ersten Fall gehören die Perzeption und ihre Teile derselben Kategorie an und im zweiten Fall nicht. Leibniz' Theorie der Farbe stützt sich auf Quantitäten wie Figuren und Bewegungen.

4. Perzeption bei Whitehead

In einem kurzen Kommentar zu Bacons Text schreibt Whitehead

Also in the previous letter I construed perception (as used by Bacon) as meaning taking account of the essential character of the thing perceived, and I construed sense as meaning cognition. We certainly take account of things of which we have at the time no explicit cognition. We can even have a cognitive memory of the taking account, without having had a contemporaneous cognition. Also, as Bacon points out by his statement, "... for else all bodies would be alike one to another," it is evidently some element of the essential character which we take account of, namely something on which diversity is founded and not mere bare logical diversity.

Whitehead versteht in diesem Text offensichtlich Perzeption in der Bedeutung von Zurkenntnisnahme des wesentlichen Charakters des perzipierten Gegenstandes und Sinn in der Bedeutung von kognitiver Erkenntnis. Wir nehmen sicherlich Dinge zur Kenntnis, von denen wir zur selben Zeit keine explizite kognitive Erkenntnis haben. Wir können sogar ein kognitives Gedächtnis von der Zurkenntnisnahme von Dingen haben, von denen wir keine gleichzeitige kognitive Erkenntnis gehabt haben. Offenbar nehmen wir etwas vom wesentlichen Charakter eines Gegenstandes wahr, nämlich etwas, auf dem die reale Verschiedenheit beruht und nicht bloß die logische.

Whitehead nimmt im folgenden Text eine terminologische Veränderung vor. Er ersetzt das Wort 'perception' durch 'prehension', weil man unter 'perception' kognitive Erkenntnis versteht. 'Prehension' soll im Gegensatz zu 'perception' auch für nicht-kognitive Erkenntnis stehen, denn überraschenderweise kann auch kognitive Erkenntnis damit gemeint sein.

The word 'perceive' is, in our common usage, shot through and through with the notion of cognitive apprehension. So is the word 'apprehension' even with the adjective 'cognitive' omitted. I will use the word 'prehension' for uncognitive apprehension: by this I mean apprehension which may or may not be cognitive.

Doch das sind epistemische Unterscheidungen. Whitehead zitiert den Baconschen Text aus einem anderen Grunde. Prehensions haben wie die Leibniz'schen *perceptions* durchaus eine ontologische Funktion. Sie sind für die Konstitution der grundlegenden Whitehead'schen Entitäten, d.h. der actual entities, verantwortlich, indem sie das aus der Umgebung auswählen und begünstigen, was dieser Konstitution nützt und das zurückweisen und behindern, was ihr schadet.

Wenn man den Bacon'schen Text kennt, dann kann man auch seine manchmal etwas befremdliche Haltung gegenüber Leibniz verstehen. Obwohl sein System auf-

fallende Ähnlichkeiten mit dem von Leibniz zeigt, zitiert er die Leibniz'sche Konzeption der Perzeption im Sinne einer ontologischen Relation zwischen den Dingen nicht. Er war wohl der Ansicht, dass Leibniz diese Konzeption aus der Tradition übernommen hat. Er zitiert Leibniz jedoch regelmäßig, wenn es um die Widerspiegelung geht, die ja auch in seinem System eine grundlegende Rolle spielt. Diese Theorie hat er wohl als die originäre Leistung von Leibniz angesehen.

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Children's Philosophizing (and Reasoning Judgment as Its Constitutive Element) as a Source of Tolerant Consciousness Formation

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The modern stage of development educational concept is not only a problem of the Russian society, but one of the world's societies. This is the problem of the dovish interethnic conflicts. The events, connected with religious wars in the different regions of the world, barbarous and very amplitudinous facts of terrorism set up a problem of tolerant consciousness formation during the last few years. Education at every its level is one of the social institutes which are the worst fitted to a solution of such problem. That is why the theme of my research "Children's philosophizing as a source of tolerant consciousness formation" appears to be very interesting and topical in theoretical and practical meaning.

School educators in Russia discuss the necessity of tolerant lessons, of special composition of humanitarian sciences according to cultural environment in order to create tolerant comprehension of history and culture evolution. There are a few scientific interdisciplinary researches. Therefore, the investigation in this direction should be very important and useful for the theoretical researches and the practical education.

The expansion of visual culture, preferring television to book takes toll of the human and trouble the formation of imaginative thinking. For this reason philosophers and educators of America endeavor to balance influence of visual culture. Matthew Lipman solved this problem. He established The Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children in 1974 in New Jersey, USA. This institute elaborated the programme "Philosophy for Children" which involves logic and ethics elements being investigated by examples of different life situations.

The training of young people for rationality habits qualifies them for becoming intelligent citizens, associate and parent – this is the aim of the "reflective education" of Lipman that he uncovered in his book "Thinking in education". The programme of teaching philosophy at school was elaborated under the direction of Lipman. This programme received wide spreading in many countries of the world.

Lipman maintains that Philosophy for Children is a powerful tool for moral education. He regards moral education as something much broader than the simple teaching of what is "good". Genuine ethical inquiry requires critical and creative thinking, all of which, he claims, are cultivated through children's "doing" philosophy. The goal of Lipman's pedagogical thinking is reasonable judgment. He states that the greatest disappointment of traditional education has been its failure to produce people approximating the ideal of reasonableness. For Lipman, the cultivation of reasonableness is the goal of education for democracy. This entails an effort to develop higher-order thinking, which includes a combination of critical, creative and caring thinking. Reasonableness, says Lipman, cannot be reduced to pure rationality; but reasonableness is rationality tempered by self-criticism, deliberation and judgment. Furthermore, reasonableness, Lipman claims, can be internalized only by experiencing it through reasoning together in a community of inquiry.

Philosophical inquiry is characterized by a concern with important contestable concepts but also by a particular type of procedure. Philosophers join together and try to discover the meaning – to make sense of things that are puzzling, problematic or ambiguous. They create a "community of inquiry" in which they come to understand things better through the dialogue with each other. This type of philosophical dialogue uses certain agreed strategies of reasoned inquiry, examples of which are asking for evidence, striving for consistency, constructing inferences, formulating and using criteria and making predictions. The participants share a respect for each other as persons, a commitment to truth and a concern for the procedures of inquiry. This concern for procedure implies an ongoing interest in reflecting on and evaluating the quality of the reasoning and thinking in any particular inquiry.

There are three areas of critical thinking: reasoning, judgment and the ability to see the other's point of view. The first two areas reflect two major components of philosophical training. Piaget pointed out how the development of logical reasoning is largely depended upon a person's increasing sensitivity to counterexamples, i.e. to a capacity to find cases, which might falsify a conclusion derived from one's premises. The exercises in deductive reasoning and inference are meant to provide practice in precisely those capacities.

Judgment involves reasoning, plus the ability to evaluate relations, including similarity and difference, as well as relevance and appropriateness. The exercises involve hasty versus authorized generalization, analogies, metaphors and comparisons between situations and contexts. In addition to reasoning and judgment, one must add the third component, namely the ability to take another's point of view seriously and with respect. This is seen as the hallmark of the critical thinker. In fact, this ingredient is central to educating for democracy.

To these three components we must add the fourth, namely metacognitive awareness. This factor, which appears in the writings of Piaget and others, stresses the importance of being conscious of one's own cognitive processes. Furthermore, at early ages metacognitive capacities can develop – with knowledge about general strategies and personal strengths and weaknesses – enhancing performance on such tasks as inference, classification and analogy.

The standard form of a Philosophy for Children class is the reading of the text aloud, followed by the discussion. The Lipman's storybooks don't introduce philosophical concepts in philosophical language, but present them as issues that the children in the text struggle to explore. At the same time the characters model how children might talk about these things, using the thinking skills that promote effective inquiry.

The sharing of the story is an important point of departure, after which the teacher asks for the children any comments and questions that arise out of what they have

read. These are written up and the class decides together on where to start the discussion. It is important at this point that the question to be explored is one that is really concern to the children and engages their passionate interest. In contrast to the common perception of effective thinking as a matter of cold rationality, Lipman believes that thinking has an emotional dimension and develops through intense involvement with ideas. The teacher's role is not to answer questions, but to help the children to generate contestable questions that occupy their imaginations.

The discussion, which follows, takes place within the classroom community of inquiry, of which the teacher is just a member, rather than a person who can provide answers. The teacher acts as a facilitator of the discussion. However, it is not sufficient simply to allow the discussion to ramble from one point to another. A philosophical inquiry is supposed to move forward. So the teacher has the responsibility for directing the inquiry according to procedures of philosophy. This may include reminding the children of the question under discussion, assisting them to see how their perspectives are the same or different, asking for reasons, questioning assumptions, etc.

Philosophy for Children programme promote formation of child ability to express his own individuality, to persist in his own opinion. Without this capacities self-actualization and formation of tolerant consciousness are impossible.

One of the other tasks of this programme is to train a vision of human rights. Federal Constitution (USA) is one of the first documents where human rights were clearly stated. Comity of nations is based on the human rights of Federal Constitution.

All that is a condition of the relevance of perscrutation the American experiment of developing Philosophy for Children programme and it would be useful to employ this experiment in modern Russian society. Modern school in Russia is still based on the authoritarian teaching. High-school children can assimilate only that teacher said; they can't debate and reason their cases. It goes without saying that abstract thinking degrades affected by visual culture among young people. In short a man can't think about something if it firstly is not represented in a picture example (visually).

We must not only copy the experiment of American society but explore and analyze it because Russian culture has its own characteristics and traditions. Theorists of pedagogic chair of Ural State University, namely M.N. Dydina and her followers work this way. Under their guidance at the school number 13 in Ekaterinburg pupils are working at philosophy from the elementary school: they read storybooks, ask questions, hypothesize and try to answer.

Children's philosophizing is a natural and ordinary phenomenon, but very difficult to scratch it up from groovy life, to show up the moment of child's philosophical conceptualization in current everyday perception of life. In this case philosophy encourages questions so much fundamental and important so that attempts to answer them are naive. Our society needs a man who asks very simple (infant) question to make people to reconsider what they accept as an obvious.

Often philosophizing begins with wonder and doubt in ordinary and trivial phenomenon. And very often philosophy doesn't solve the problems but points out the doubt. That is why child's question is a starting point for investigation children's philosophizing. It is important to point the child active observation of environment, unorthodoxy of child thinking, its openness to ordinary side of human being.

Having begun with wonder and doubt the children's philosophizing is lasting in play. The play permits to the person to perform the part of somebody, to change masks and thus to change own functions. Because our object of exploration is child's consciousness, the special play we are interested – is the play of mind. This play is a process in which it is possible to overwhelm unidimensional comprehension of some notion. So unlike the common sense, the philosophical mind aims not at closing but at opening a problem. It asks questions that lead to the field of the new, the paradoxical and the unknown; and it discloses potential qualities of the world.

This way the tolerant consciousness is formed in the course of the process of cognition. Philosophizing, to my mind, is a method of critical cognition and it facilitates foregoing process of formation tolerant outlook. In my view, people will solve conflicts only due to collaborative asking questions, reasoning together, co-elaborating their propositions and judgments.

Explaining the Seemingly Self-Interpreting Character of a Formula

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I. The Puzzle About the Self-Interpreting Character of a Formula

In the notable discussion of rule-following, Wittgenstein (1974) sharply and rightly brings our attention to the fact that meaning is essentially normative, in the sense that the meaning of a linguistic term sets a standard of correctness and incorrectness for the application of the term. It is only because a person uses a particular term to mean a particular thing that the person's linguistic performances with regard to the application of the term can be evaluated as correct or incorrect. Take the term "add 2" as an example where it is most clear and uncontroversial that there is a uniquely correct answer for each step of application. To say that a person understands "add 2" to mean the mathematical rule *add 2*, is tantamount to saying that the person's performances, past, present, and future, are subject to the regulation of an infinite number of instances sanctioned by the *add 2* rule. Hence, the meaning of a term, by its nature, contains a normative element in it, and a person's understanding of the meaning of a term constrains the person's linguistic performance with regard to the application of the term in a certain way in each particular case.

However, a philosophical conundrum arises when we begin to ask what meaning or understanding consists in. What is it that is capable of delivering the normative force, and of bringing about the evaluative effect regarding the application of a term, such as "add 2"? One of the proposals that Wittgenstein considers is a natural suggestion that when a person understands the meaning of "add 2", the person has a verbalized formula, e.g., $f(x) = 2x + 2$, occurring in her introspective consciousness. It is this verbalized formula that guides and constrains a person's performance in each particular case when one continues a certain numerical series.

This formula proposal is *prima facie* implausible, given the fact that not all of the speakers who understand "add 2" and are capable of continuing a numerical series accordingly, have a formula in mind. Nevertheless, the formula proposal is tempting. Suppose that those who understand the term "add 2" do have a certain formula in mind. Doesn't it seem natural to them that the formula is self-interpreting, in the sense that it determines the procedure for each step that they should take in order to be correct? A formula, say $f(x) = 2x + 2$, clearly interprets itself in such a way that a certain series is specified as follows: $f(x)$ is 2 given that the value of x is 0, $f(x)$ is 4 given that the value of x is 1, $f(x) = 6$ given that the value of x is 2, and so on. Hence, this intriguing self-interpreting character of a formula *seems* sufficient to determine the rule referred to by the term "add 2", and hence *seems* sufficient to constitute a person's understanding of the term.

Wittgenstein has convincingly shown us, however, that the formula is unable to determine the rule being followed, because the signs in the formula, such as "+", can be interpreted in different ways. Any chosen interpretation would require further interpretation to fix its content. This thus leads to an infinite regress. Kripke's (1982) discussion of the counting case is illuminating in this regard. Consider the proposal that one's following the *plus* rule consists in

one's being guided by a basic counting rule or algorithm which specifies a finite set of simple procedures. For example, to add 2 and 3 one should first count out a group of two things, one at a time, and then count out a group of 3 things, also one at a time, and finally put the two groups together, and count the totality, again one at a time. Nobody would deny that this procedure of counting is a legitimate way of adding. Some of us may use this procedure to add on some occasions. However, Kripke rejects it on the ground that it leads to an infinite regress, because the set of instructions involves the term "counting", which is in need of a further interpretation to determine its meaning. As a result, a set of instructions such as the counting procedures does not *fix* the rule being followed. This result appears counter-intuitive, but it is a solid point.

The puzzle that is the main concern of this paper can be made clear: a formula seems to be self-interpreting, but is in fact insufficient to determine the rule to be followed. We may put the puzzle in another way. There appears to be no gap in our phenomenology, between a verbalized formula and its interpretation, because of the *seemingly* self-interpreting character of the formula. However, in reality, a formula is insufficient to *fix* the rule to be followed. How may this puzzle be explained? In what follows, I explain why the formula seems self-interpreting, when it is not.

II. Explaining the Puzzle

In my account, a person's understanding the term "add 2" as meaning the $f(x) = 2x + 2$ function does not consist in her having the formula in mind. Rather it consists in the person's *possessing a disposition* to perform in a certain way. Furthermore, it is by virtue of the special way in which the person perceives her disposition, that she does not feel in her phenomenology any gap, between the formula and the interpretation of the formula.

My account has two parts. The first part is to characterize a disposition in terms of a functionalist account, which is regarded by McLaughlin (1995) as the leading theory of dispositions today. Functionalism is well known as a theory of mind in which states of mind and mental properties are construed as functional states and properties. Though there are a variety of functionalist theories, the basic and common idea of a state's possessing a functional property is for the state to occupy a certain causal role, relative to other states. A mental property or state has to be analyzed not merely in terms of its input cause and output effect, but also by reference to other mental properties or states. These other mental states in the network, such as believing that P and desiring that Q are to be in turn characterized by reference to their causal relations with other states in the network.

We may equally view a disposition to follow a rule as being a functional state, which is defined by its causal role in the person's functional organization. As a result, a rule-following disposition can be viewed as a complex functional property of a person, having a potentially infinite pairing of input-stimuli and output-responses, and having interrelations with other inner dispositional or functional states.

The second part is to show, given that a rule-following disposition is functionally characterized, how its possessor comes to know about such a functional state. How does a subject gain conscious introspective access to the complex causal network that she embodies? Dennett (1978) offers a plausible functionalist account of introspection in terms of a computer model that will help illuminate this issue. Roughly put, Dennett's account is that introspection is the series of processes by which Control, a higher executive component in the brain, directs questions to the buffer memory, gets the answers after some possible editions and transformations, and sends them to the speech center, which if so commanded, publishes them in a written or verbal form or in an internal voice. The process of introspection is best described as asking questions and receiving answers, rather than a direct monitoring or tracking of one's first-order inner processes. Dennett proposes that what a person is conscious of depends on what the person can introspect, and what the person can introspect is explained as a routine by means of which he gain access to and reports on the contents of his buffer memory.

Taking the two parts together, we may now explain the seemingly self-interpreting character of a formula. In my account, a person's use of "add 2" is determined by the person's disposition to behave in a certain way. More specifically, the person is disposed to answer $f(x) = 2$ given $x = 0$, $f(x) = 4$ given $x = 1$, $f(x) = 6$ given $x = 2$, and so on. Moreover, given Dennett's account of introspection, in which the process of introspection is depicted as asking questions and receiving answers, the objects of introspection when a person exercises his dispositional power of following a rule are the numerical series that figures in the contents of the person's utterances or written sentences or inner voices such as $f(x) = 2$ given $x = 0$, $f(x) = 4$ given $x = 1$, $f(x) = 6$ given $x = 2$, and so on. These contents are exactly "rooted" in a disposition which one perceives through directly expressing them or having thoughts about them. In our introspective consciousness, therefore, the formula makes us feel that it commands us to perform in a certain way in which a certain numerical series is generated. So, phenomenologically, there seems to be no gap, between the verbalization of the formula and its interpretation.

In the Dennettian picture, we may not know exactly how we get, say, $f(x) = 4$ given $x = 2$, which is achieved by a complex first-order process that is not accessible to our introspective consciousness. In a functionalist account of cognitive processes and introspection, what we introspect is that *there* is a mechanism which produces 4 when 2 is put in. However, we cannot introspect what that mechanism is. The formula is the hypothesis we form about our own inner workings when we reflect on the output that a dispositional state gives when given input. The hypothesis is the result of our taking the interpretive stance towards the behaviors or the disposition. Therefore, Wittgenstein is right that the rule is not the mechanism. The verbal report of the introspected formula is merely the report that there is some mechanism.

What is important to note is that, in my account, a verbalized formula is a mere hypothesis that I am following a certain rule, and that hypothesis may not be correct. It might not correctly capture my disposition or behaviors. The mathematical function that I am *actually* following has to be determined by the underlying disposition that I possess. I do not interpret a formula when I follow a rule. I simply act on my disposition. The verbalized formula is the appearance that my disposition takes on to my introspective consciousness. This explains why a formula seems to be self-interpreting.

III. Conclusion

A dispositional account can nicely explain the seemingly self-interpreting character of a rule or formula, by showing why the gap, between a verbalized formula or rule and its interpretation, is not phenomenologically apparent. We never noticed that a formula fails to be self-interpreting, because we don't interpret it when exercising our linguistic competence. When we exercise our linguistic competence, we simply act on our dispositions. This account does justice to our intuition that rule-following and linguistic meaning are transparent to the speaker, and do not need interpretation. At the same time, I preserve Wittgenstein's insight that a verbalized formula or algorithm does not constitute rule-following.

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The Necessity of the Ethical or Why Murder *Must* Be Wrong

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In the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* we find Wittgenstein's first published investigation of ethics. Furthermore, together with the "Lecture on Ethics", this is the last time he makes any longer investigation into this subject, as the Nachlass reveals only a few, scattered remarks on ethical matters after 1929. I will argue that if the ethical sections of the *Tractatus* are seen in connection to the concept of showing, they then reveal a coherent and radical alternative to traditional conceptions of ethics; an alternative which sheds light on the necessity of ethics. It is a standard dilemma in moral philosophy, that on the one hand we want to make absolute claims like 'Murder is *always* wrong', while on the other we admit that there might be cases when it is possible to give *ethical* reasons to why a particular murder is not wrong, the murder of Adolf Hitler being the standard example.

As everyone is probably well aware of, the interpretation of the *Tractatus* has again become a living area of research over the last decades. This revival has primarily grown out of a need to find a better understanding of the ending of the *Tractatus* where Wittgenstein claims that the reader who really understands him does this by recognizing his sentences as nonsensical (6.54). The traditional explanation of how meaningless sentences can yield a substantial philosophical outcome has been that Wittgenstein uses the concept of *showing* to express how nonsense can point to truths about the world which cannot be stated directly, but out of the recent discussion of this claim a 'new' interpretation of the *Tractatus* has risen according to which Wittgenstein writes that his sentences are meaningless, because he means just that! This means that none of the sentences of the *Tractatus* contain any real or lasting meaning or have any inherent role of their own, but they can be used as provisional helpers in the reader's therapeutic process of overcoming metaphysical illusions.

What is interesting from my point of view is that this new interpretation poses a specific problem for anyone who wishes to work with Wittgensteinian ethics, as most of Wittgenstein's remarks on ethics are found in the *Tractatus* and thus must be just as senseless as the rest of the book. A related problem appears if you for a moment allow yourself to regress and attempt to read the *Tractatus* as having sense, for here ethics is explicitly claimed to be impossible to state. Wittgenstein writes that there are no ethical sentences, and he continues: "Es ist klar, daß sich die Ethik nicht aussprechen läßt." (6.421) This means that any reader wanting to work with Wittgenstein's utterances on ethics faces a double demand for silence: The first rises from the fact that if you want to free yourself from metaphysical illusions, you must see that the sections on ethics in the *Tractatus* are just sheer nonsense. And if you cheat and try to do this anyway a second demand for silence arises as Wittgenstein works with an idea of ethics that doesn't admit of the ethical being uttered at all.

I think the best way to handle both of these problems is to focus on what I find to be the two least convincing aspects of the new interpretation. First, even though I find it well-argued that Wittgenstein only allows for an austere concept of nonsense, I simply do not think that he is completely consistent when claiming that all of the *Tractatus* is nonsensical, both because this does not fit

well with the way in which he continued to work in many of the areas treated in the *Tractatus* and because many of his remarks seem to be straightforwardly meaningful by any standards. Secondly, when the new reading claims that Wittgenstein dismisses any concept of *showing* I think this is based on a wrong interpretation of the concept. Showing is thought to concern cases where meaningless utterances are used to refer to something *outside* language and the world, that is, attempts to use nonsense to get a grip of ineffable truths; the very thing that Wittgenstein wants to liberate us from by means of the *Tractatus*.¹ But Wittgenstein never ties the concept of showing to ineffable truths as it only occurs in connection with tautologies, contradictions or straightforwardly meaningful sentences, something which makes it possible to combine acceptance of the fact that the *Tractatus* only offers an austere concept of nonsense with a new interpretation of showing.

Wittgenstein uses showing to denote the way the *conditions* of a structure stand out in its use, for example the way in which the conditions of meaning stand out in meaningful sentences, and it is introduced in an intimate connection to saying: "Der Satz *zeigt*, wie es sich verhält, *wenn* er wahr ist. Und er *sagt*, dass es sich so verhält." (4.022) Even though logic and language are the cases where Wittgenstein primarily uses the concept of showing, it is also used in other connections to bring out the unutterability of the particular conditions within a particular area. "Wenn es ein Kausalitätsgesetz gäbe, so könnte es lauten: ‚Es gibt Naturgesetze‘. Aber freilich kann man das nicht sagen: es zeigt sich," (6.36) When we do work in the natural sciences, causality shows itself, but within the natural sciences we are not able to state the very existence of causality. In general, what shows itself is thus the conditions for a specific type of descriptions of the world, the way a specific structure manifests itself in the use of particular descriptions. (See 6.124) What is shown is not something *in* the world, but something that shapes our dealings with the world, and as such it applies to the world with necessity. This necessity does not mean that one has to regard for example logic or causality as platonic or autonomous, as these conditions can be viewed as intimately tied to the practical dimension of mastering a language. If you view logic in this way, the necessity of logic comes from its being a *practical ability*, which we have to possess in order to speak about the world.²

Following my first objection to the new reading of the *Tractatus* I can return to the sections on ethics, where it is presented as a part of the category 'das Mystische' which is characterised by its *showing* itself (6.522). This indicates that ethics, in some way or other, should also be seen as a condition for descriptions or meaning, and the analogy between logic and ethics is emphasised both by the fact that ethics, like logic, is referred to as *transcendental*, and that ethics, through the concept of the mystical, is later tied to the fact that the world *is* (6.432). In 6.41 Wittgenstein connects ethics to the meaning of the world, which makes

¹ Diamond thinks a central part of Wittgenstein's project is to make us *give up* "the attempt to represent to ourselves something in reality ... as not sayable but shown by the sentence." (Diamond 1991, 184). See also Conant 2000, 196.

² This interpretation of logic in the *Tractatus* is very close to the one given in McGinn 2001.

it possible to argue that ethics in the *Tractatus* is a condition of the description of the world seen as a meaningful whole.³ Or, to put it in another way, what Wittgenstein calls *die Ethik* is not itself a fact but rather what constitutes the possibility of relating to the world as meaningful or valuable, and thus at the same time the condition for our everyday morality or judgements about value.

As the condition for value and morality ethics must be necessary and I want to argue that this necessity shows in our attitude to particular expressions within ethics. It is thus possible to see what Bernard Williams calls the 'thin' moral concepts – like right, wrong, virtuous etc. – as pointers which reveal the structure of ethics. We are not able to give any further reasons for the fact one ought to do the *right* actions, and this is so because the concept 'right' simply shows a part of the rules of ethics; it is a defining, not a describing term. Parallel to this, whole sentences can function as a kind of tautologies by showing necessary ethical connections, as for example the sentence 'Murder is wrong'. I want to claim that according to a Tractarian view of ethics, a sentence like this has no meaning when seen isolated from any context, it describes nothing, but it shows the limit of our ethical understanding, as it is a rule which necessarily applies within morality. It is possible to claim that anyone who does not understand this sentence is unable to participate in an ethical discourse, unable to have an ethical outlook on the world. The necessary character of sentences like 'Murder is wrong' also explain why we want to hold on to them no matter what, even when we are confronted with what we ourselves agree are counterexamples. We are afraid that acting against a sentence like 'murder is wrong' would compromise its status as rule, and therefore change the very system of ethics and our entire moral outlook. I think this is what Wittgenstein is trying to express in the following quote: "Wenn das gute oder böse Wollen die Welt ändert, so kann es nur die Grenzen der Welt ändern, nicht die Tatsachen; nicht das, was durch die Sprache ausgedrückt werden kann. Kurz, die Welt muß dann dadurch überhaupt eine andere werden." (6.43)

When we treat some sentences as definitions or ethical tautologies we thus determine the ethical conditions for any dealings with value. To see this clearly is at the same time to see that the ethical must be constituted by us, it cannot be given any external justification, and we cannot cite any more fundamental reasons to justify the ethical, there is simply nothing more to say on the matter. The silence of Wittgenstein's ethics is thus a silence which shows us that we alone have the absolute responsibility for the structure of our ethical worldview, as well as for what we actually do. The Danish philosopher K.E. Løgstrup also notes the connection between silence and the radical responsibility connected with the ethical. Working within a phenomenological framework, he thinks that the very existence of life, of other people, gives rise to a one-sided ethical demand which is "silent in the rather dramatic sense that any formulation of it as an explicit demand is unavoidably a misrepresentation of it. 'What is demanded is that the demand should not be necessary.'" (Fink 2004, 6)⁴ Because the ethical in both Wittgenstein and Løgstrup is completely dependent on us, and because the demand it makes on us is absolute, it cannot be stated.

The question arising from Wittgenstein's claim that there are no ethical sentences was whether we are then forced

to employ meaningless propositions in our dealings with ethics. I think the Tractarian conception of ethics shows that the answer to the question is twofold. First, when it comes to the attempt to say the ethical, the attempt to state the very existence of the ethical structure, I believe that the answer is in the affirmative. We can demonstrate or show this existence, but we cannot say it. This also sheds light on a comment from "A Lecture on Ethics", where Wittgenstein says that the attempt "to write or talk ethics ... was to run against the boundaries of our language" (Wittgenstein 1965, 12). But if we, secondly, look at how values or moral actions unfold on the background of the ethical, these are in no way nonsensical. The existence of the ethical shows in our meaningful actions, in the meaningful conversations we have about doing this or that, in our meaningful reactions to other people's actions or to the world as such, et cetera.⁵ It is therefore important to distinguish between the general and metaphysical question of the existence of ethics and the question of how morality and value unfolds in the meaningful lives we, hopefully, all live – and philosophy is the activity which brings us an understanding of this difference.

In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein wants to show that it is an essential condition of our world that we act ethically towards it, perceive it in terms of good and evil. There is no escaping the ethical, it is given together with the way we experience the world as a form of natural or pre-conventional normativity.⁶ But it is of vital importance for Wittgenstein that the transcendental necessity of the ethical in itself says nothing about what we actually do find good or evil, or what we ought to find good and evil. Wittgenstein thinks philosophy should shed light on how our world is structured by various norms, ethical and others, but as far as ethics goes, it can say nothing about what these ought to consist of. The investigation of ethics in the *Tractatus* therefore in no way determines the content of a normative ethics.

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³ That ethics is an investigation of the meaning of life is one of the synonyms presented in the beginning of Wittgenstein's "A Lecture on Ethics".

⁴ The last line is a quote from Løgstrup: *The Ethical Demand*, p.146.

⁵ I thus disagree with Diamond's interpretation, according to which Wittgenstein says that *all* utterances connecting to morality or value are nonsensical. See Diamond 2000.

⁶ This is another point of similarity with Løgstrup, see Fink 2004 p.8.

Brentano und Aristoteles über die Ontologie der intentionalen Beziehung

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Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos war in mehrfacher Hinsicht von Aristoteles abhängig. Auch an den Stellen, wo er seine Intentionalitätstheorie bespricht, beruft er sich auf Aristoteles, und zwar oft in der Form, als ob beinahe alles, was man heute als Verdienste der Brentanoschen Intentionalitätstheorie betrachtet, im Grunde schon bei Aristoteles latent vorhanden wäre. (Vgl. z.B. Brentano 1874/1924, S. 124f.; Brentano 1982, S. 26.) Ich will indessen zeigen, dass es zwischen der Aristotelischen und Brentanoschen Ontologie der Intentionalität doch beträchtliche Unterschiede gibt. Die Aristotelische Ontologie der intentionalen Beziehung sieht auf den ersten Blick viel einfacher und eleganter aus. Es zeigt sich allerdings, dass die größere Komplexität, die Brentano in Kauf nimmt, durch gewisse theoretische Vorteile aufgewogen wird.

1. Brentano

So etwas wie die Intentionalitätstheorie Brentanos gibt es nicht. In verschiedenen Phasen seines Denkens hat Brentano sehr verschiedene Intentionalitätstheorien formuliert. Ich konzentriere mich hier auf die Theorie des immanenten Objekts, die er um 1890 vertreten hat und die am besten in den Vorlesungen zur *Deskriptiven Psychologie* (1890/91) (Brentano 1982) dokumentiert ist. Diese Theorie führt immanente Objekte als eine Art Vermittler zwischen dem Subjekt und dem äußeren Referenzobjekt der intentionalen Beziehung ein.

Der Grund, warum man solche vermittelnden Entitäten einführt, besteht darin, dass die intentionale Beziehung nicht als eine normale Relation zwischen dem Subjekt und dem Objekt betrachtet werden kann. Ein Zeichen dieser Anomalie ist das Scheitern von zwei wichtigen logischen Regeln in intentionalen Kontexten, und zwar der Regel der Existenz-Generalisierung: $Fa \supset \exists xFx$ und der Regel der Substituierbarkeit: $Fa \wedge a=b \supset Fb$.

Die intentionale Beziehung zwischen dem Subjekt und dem (äußeren) Objekt der intentionalen Beziehung ist also keine extensionale Relation, nach der Theorie Brentanos können wir aber in einer „tieferen Schicht“ jeder intentionalen Beziehung doch eine extensionale Relation finden. Jedes Subjekt a , das sich intentional auf Objekt b bezieht, stehe nämlich in einer extensionalen Relation (die ich hier als „IMM“ bezeichne) zu einem *immanenten Objekt*.

Der Mechanismus der intentionalen Beziehung besteht nach Brentano darin, dass das immanente Objekt dieselben Eigenschaften hat, die dem (potentiellen) Referenzobjekt intentional zugeschrieben werden. Denkt jemand an einen Zentauren, dann muss er, laut Brentano, in der Relation IMM zu einem immanenten Objekt stehen, das die Eigenschaft *Zentaurheit* hat. Diese Art des Habens einer Eigenschaft, die für immanente Objekte charakteristisch ist, unterscheidet sich jedoch von einer „normalen“ Exemplifizierung. Brentano sagt, dass die immanenten Objekte die für die intentionale Beziehung relevanten Eigenschaften (hier: Zentaurheit) im *uneigentlichen* Sinne haben. (Brentano 1982, S. 26f.)

Wenn es in der bewusstseinsunabhängigen Welt ein geeignetes Referenzobjekt gibt, steht natürlich das im-

manente Objekt zu ihm in einer bestimmten Relation, die ich hier die Repräsentationsrelation nenne, und als „REPR“ bezeichne.

Das uneigentliche Haben einer Eigenschaft wird im Folgenden (nach der Konvention Zaltas) durch eine Umstellung der Reihenfolge der Symbole gekennzeichnet. Wenn ein Gegenstand a in einem normalen Sinne F ist, schreibe ich „ Fa “, wenn er hingegen die Eigenschaft F im uneigentlichen Sinne hat, schreibe ich „ aF “. (Vgl. Zalta 1988, S. 16f.)

Wenn man einen intentionalen Kontext: „ a bezieht sich intentional auf b “ (bzw. „ a stellt b vor“) als „INTab“ bezeichnet, kann Brentanos Intentionalitätstheorie folgendermaßen zusammengefasst werden:

$$(BT) \quad \text{INTab} \equiv \exists x(\text{IMMax} \wedge \exists \phi[(x\phi \wedge \Box \forall y(\phi y \equiv y \text{ ist } b)] \wedge \neg \exists \psi[x\psi \wedge \Diamond \exists z(\phi z \wedge \neg \psi z)])$$

$$(BR) \quad \text{REPRab} = \text{Df. } \exists \phi(a\phi) \wedge \forall \psi(a\psi \supset \psi b)$$

Die Formel (BT) sagt uns, dass Subjekt a Objekt b genau dann vorstellt, wenn es ein in Bezug auf a immanentes Objekt (x) gibt, das im uneigentlichen Sinne eine Eigenschaft (ϕ) hat, die so ist, dass notwendigerweise jedes Objekt, das ϕ im normalen Sinne hätte, *eo ipso* b wäre; wobei ferner gilt, dass x keine Eigenschaft ψ hat, die sozusagen „über die Eigenschaft ϕ hinausgeht“, d.h. dass es möglich ist, dass ein Gegenstand ϕ aber nicht ψ ist.

Die Definition (BR) sagt uns, dass die Repräsentationsrelation zwischen zwei Gegenständen a und b genau dann besteht, wenn a eine gewisse Eigenschaft im uneigentlichen Sinne hat und alle Eigenschaften, die a im uneigentlichen Sinne hat, von b im normalen Sinne gehabt werden.

Die Bezeichnung „ y ist b “, die in den Formeln auftritt, ist bewusst zweideutig. Sie kann sowohl die Identität (wenn „ b “ ein singulärer Term ist) als auch die Prädikation (falls „ b “ ein genereller Term ist) bedeuten.

2. Aristoteles

Aristoteles hat seine einflussreiche Intentionalitätstheorie in der Abhandlung *Über die Seele* entwickelt. (Vgl. *ibid.* 424a 11–17.) Nach dieser Theorie besteht eine intentionale Beziehung darin, dass die sich intentional beziehende Seele die Form des Referenzgegenstandes aufnimmt. Die Aristotelische Form können wir dabei als eine Eigenschaft betrachten und das Aufnehmen der Form F durch den Gegenstand a bedeutet, dass a die Eigenschaft F exemplifiziert bzw. instantiiert.

Aristoteles sagt, dass die Seele, die an etwas Rotes denkt, gewissermaßen selbst rot wird, der Zusatz „gewissermaßen“ ist hier aber sehr wichtig. Die Seele wird nämlich dadurch nicht zu einer roten Sache. Das ganze ontologische Geheimnis steckt darin, dass Aristoteles *zwei Arten der Instantiierung* unterscheidet. Eine Form (Eigenschaft) F kann durch den Gegenstand a in einer normalen Weise instantiiert werden, was dazu führt, dass a F wird. Sie kann aber auch in einer anomalen Weise instantiiert werden, was zur Folge hat, dass der Gegenstand, der sie

in dieser Weise instantiiert, sich intentional auf einen Gegenstand, der F ist, bezieht. Ich will diese ungewöhnliche Instantiierungsweise „Instantiierung*“ nennen und sie symbolisch als „ $a\{F\}$ “ bezeichnen. Die Aristotelische Theorie sieht dann folgendermaßen aus:

$$(AT) \quad INTab \equiv \exists \phi [a\{\phi\} \wedge \square \forall y (\phi y \equiv y \text{ ist } b)] \wedge \neg \exists \psi [a\{\psi\} \wedge \diamond \exists z (\phi z \wedge \neg \psi z)]$$

Subjekt a bezieht sich intentional auf Gegenstand b genau dann, wenn es eine Eigenschaft ϕ gibt, die so ist, dass (i) a die Eigenschaft ϕ instantiiert*, (ii) notwendigerweise gilt, dass ein Gegenstand die Eigenschaft ϕ genau dann hat, wenn er b ist, und (iii) a keine Eigenschaft ψ instantiiert*, die „über ϕ hinausgehen würde“ in dem Sinne, dass es möglich ist, dass es einen Gegenstand gibt, der ϕ aber nicht ψ hätte.

Die Aristotelische Version der Relation REPR ist sehr einfach und deswegen relativ uninteressant. Sie besteht nämlich zwischen einer Eigenschaft ϕ und einem Gegenstand x genau dann, wenn x ϕ instantiiert:

$$(AR) \quad REPR(Fb) = Df. Fb$$

3. Ähnlichkeiten und Unterschiede zwischen Aristoteles und Brentano

Wie wir gesehen haben, weisen die Theorien von Aristoteles und Brentano tatsächlich gewisse Ähnlichkeiten auf. (i) Beide Theorien führen spezielle Entitäten ein, die den intentionalen Zugang zu den äußeren Referenzobjekten vermitteln. (ii) Beide sehen den Mechanismus der intentionalen Beziehung darin, dass dieselbe Eigenschaft, die dem äußeren Referenzobjekt zukommen muss, auch vom Subjekt der intentionalen Beziehung in einer bestimmten Weise „erreichbar“ sein muss. (iii) Beide sprechen auch von zwei Weisen des Habens einer Eigenschaft, was uns den ontologischen Mechanismus der intentionalen Beziehung erklären soll.

Es gibt aber auch beträchtliche Unterschiede. Was den Punkt (i) betrifft, so sind die vermittelnden Entitäten, die wir bei beiden Philosophen finden, sehr verschieden. Brentano führt ontologisch ziemlich komplizierte immanente Objekte ein, die die relevanten Eigenschaften im uneigentlichen Sinne haben sollen, während Aristoteles einfach „nackte“ Eigenschaften verwendet, die er in seiner Metaphysik auch zu anderen Zwecken braucht. (ii) Die Weise, in der die relevanten Eigenschaften dem Subjekt zugänglich sind, ist auch verschieden. Bei Brentano müssen sie „zuerst“ von einem immanenten Objekt im uneigentlichen Sinne gehabt werden; und „dann“ muss noch das Subjekt zu diesem Objekt in der Relation IMM stehen. Bei Aristoteles hingegen braucht die relevante Eigenschaft vom Subjekt nur schlicht und einfach instantiiert* zu sein. (iii) Dementsprechend sind auch die zwei ungewöhnlichen Sinne, in denen immanente Objekte (bei Brentano) und bewusste Subjekte (bei Aristoteles) Eigenschaften haben können, keineswegs gleichzusetzen.

Was bei diesem Vergleich herauskommt, ist der schwer abzuweisende Eindruck, dass der Vorteil der Einfachheit eindeutig bei Aristoteles liegt.

4. Ist die Theorie von Aristoteles deshalb besser?

Die Theorie von Aristoteles sieht tatsächlich viel einfacher aus. Wenn sie also dasselbe leisten könnte wie die Theo-

rie von Brentano, wäre diese Einfachheit ein starkes *prima facie* Argument für Aristoteles. Bei genauerem Hinsehen bemerkt man allerdings, dass Aristoteles mit ein paar Problemen kämpfen muss, von denen die Theorie Brentanos frei ist:

(1) Vor allem, wenn wir die Theorie Brentanos etwas genauer unter die Lupe nehmen, bemerken wir, dass die Relation zwischen dem Subjekt und dem immanenten Objekt IMM für diese Art der Intentionalitätstheorie absolut zentral ist. Das betrifft übrigens nicht nur die Theorie Brentanos, sondern die ganze Gruppe, die man *die Theorien der vermittelnden Entitäten* nennen kann. Für jede Theorie, die das Problem der Intentionalität dadurch lösen will, dass sie zusätzliche Entitäten einführt, die den intentionalen Zugang zu den Referenzobjekten vermitteln, wird die Relation zwischen dem Subjekt und der entsprechenden vermittelnden Entität zum zentralen Punkt. Die allgemeine Form einer solchen Theorie ist folgende:

$$(TVE) \quad INTab \equiv \exists x [IMMax \wedge \square \forall y (y \text{ ist } b \equiv REPRxy)]$$

Nach TVE bezieht sich ein Subjekt a intentional auf einen Gegenstand b , genau dann, wenn (i) es einen Gegenstand x gibt, zu dem das Subjekt in der Relation IMM steht, und (ii) notwendigerweise, der Gegenstand x in der Relation REPR genau zu denjenigen Gegenständen steht, die b sind.

Wenn man die Formulierung TVE betrachtet, hat man den Eindruck, dass die Relation IMM zu einer vermittelnden Entität gewissermaßen den Platz der (angeblichen) Relation INT zu der (potentiellen) Referenzentität einnimmt, und dieser Eindruck ist völlig gerechtfertigt. Die intentionale Beziehung INT besteht laut TVE genau darin, dass das Subjekt in der IMM-Relation zu einer vermittelnden Entität steht. Die Relation REPR braucht es, wie wir wissen, nicht zu geben. Diese zentrale Funktion der Relation IMM hat aber zur Folge, dass diese Relation in gewisser Hinsicht nicht weniger rätselhaft ausfällt als die ursprüngliche Pseudo-Relation.

Das Ersetzen von INT durch IMM ist natürlich nicht zwecklos. Einige Rätsel werden dadurch doch aus der Welt geschafft. Vor allem ist IMM im Gegensatz zu INT eine *logisch reguläre* Relation, die die Regeln der Existenz-Generalisierung und der Substituierbarkeit respektiert. Nichtsdestoweniger bleibt immer noch das große Rätsel, *wie* eigentlich durch das Bestehen der Relation IMM die intentionale Beziehung zustande kommt. Dass die vermittelnden Entitäten die Existenz-Bedingung und die Bedingung der epistemischen Immanenz erfüllen, erklärt uns immer noch nicht, wie es durch das Bestehen der Relation IMM zwischen dem Subjekt und einer vermittelnden Entität dazu kommt, dass das Subjekt *an etwas denkt*, dass es *etwas zum Objekt einer mentalen Beschäftigung* macht, dass es *sein eigenes „An-Sich“ transzendiert*, oder wie auch immer man das Phänomen der Intentionalität noch umschreiben mag.

Die Erklärung dieses Faktums muss in der materialen Eigenart der Relation IMM liegen, die wahrscheinlich nicht weiter zerlegt werden kann. Es scheint, dass wir es hier mit einem Phänomen zu tun haben, das sich nicht weiter analysieren lässt. In diesem Sinne kann man durch eine Definition wie TVE das Phänomen der Intentionalität eigentlich nicht wirklich definieren, wenn man unter einer wirklichen Definition eine Reduktion des definierten Phänomens auf Phänomene einer radikal anderen Art versteht. Dass das Bestehen der IMM-Relation eine intentionale Beziehung konstituiert, wurde vielmehr *vorausgesetzt*, und es scheint, dass sich diese Voraussetzung in keiner Weise umgehen lässt.

Die Theorie von Aristoteles ist natürlich auch eine Theorie der Art TVE, in der als vermittelnde Entitäten „nackte“ Eigenschaften fungieren. Das bedeutet aber, dass sie auch eine Entsprechung der Relation IMM braucht, die den ganzen ontologischen „Inhalt“ des Sichten-intentional-Beziehens übernehmen muss; und bei Aristoteles gibt es natürlich diese Entsprechung. Es ist die Relation der Instantiierung*.

Das heißt aber, dass die Aristotelische Instantiierung* in Wahrheit die ganze ontologische Komplexität und theoretische Aufgeladenheit der Relation IMM übernehmen muss. Den Eindruck, dass wir es bei dieser Relation mit einem ontologischen Nexus zu tun haben, der ontologisch ähnlich harmlos ist wie die normale Instantiierung, trägt also. In dieser Hinsicht ist die Theorie von Aristoteles nicht einfacher, sondern weniger klar artikuliert, indem sie die größten Rätsel in dem unscheinbaren Begriff der Instantiierung* versteckt.

Dieser Punkt wäre allerdings zu verbessern, indem man anstatt von Instantiierung* explizit von einem mentalen Erfassen einer Eigenschaft spricht (wie z.B. Chisholm). Eine solche „Aristotelische“ Theorie scheint im Vergleich mit Brentano noch immer sparsamer zu sein, denn sie führt keine immanenten Objekte ein, die als merkwürdige „Träger“ der repräsentierenden Eigenschaften fungieren.

(2) Diese Komplizierung der Theorie Brentanos ist allerdings nicht ganz grundlos. Betrachten wir folgende zwei Fälle:

- (A) Hans denkt an einen Kreis und (zu gleicher Zeit) an ein Dreieck.
- (B) Hans denkt an ein rundes Dreieck.

Im Rahmen der Theorie Brentanos können wir zwischen (A) und (B) leicht unterscheiden. Im Fall (A) haben wir zwei Vorstellungen, weil wir zwei verschiedene immanente Objekte haben, wovon eines die Eigenschaft *Rundsein* und das andere die Eigenschaft *Dreieckig-Sein* (im uneigentlichen Sinne) hat. Im Fall (B) haben wir nur eine Vorstellung, weil es nur ein einziges immanentes Objekt gibt, das beide Eigenschaften (im uneigentlichen Sinne) hat. Bei Aristoteles finden wir hingegen zunächst keine Methode, zwischen (A) und (B) zu unterscheiden. In beiden Fällen haben wir eine Seele, die beide Eigenschaften instantiiert*. Die ontologischen Kosten der Theorie Brentanos, die mit dem Begriff des immanenten Objekts zusammenhängen, wurden also von ihm keineswegs umsonst in Kauf genommen.

(3) Damit hängt noch ein weiteres Argument zusammen, das zugunsten der Theorie Brentanos spricht, und das man als „phänomenologisch“ bezeichnen kann. Viele Philosophen neigen dazu, in allen Fällen der intentionalen Beziehung, in denen das bewusstseinsunabhängige Referenzobjekt fehlt, dennoch ein phänomenologisch aufweisbares Ziel der Intention zu postulieren. Es wäre gewiss von Vorteil, wenn man in dieser Funktion einfach die vermittelnde Entität anstellen könnte. Das immanente Objekt Brentanos, das eine ontologische Einheit bildet, die an die Einheit der äußeren Gegenstände erinnert, kann wahrscheinlich diese Rolle viel leichter übernehmen als die Aristotelische Form, die als solche eine „nackte“ Eigenschaft (bzw. eine Konjunktion von Eigenschaften) ist.

Endnote

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Wittgenstein's Criticism of Husserl's *Synthetic A Priori Propositions*

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Wittgenstein's refusal of *synthetic a priori propositions* is well known, and constitutes, because of its structure and form, an interesting model for an analytical-style criticism of a rival theory: it is a concise, direct and plainly expressed *reductio ad absurdum* of Husserl's ideas. However, Wittgenstein's criticism is valid only provided that a *certain definition* of synthetic propositions is accepted. The aim of this paper is to show that this definition was not at all the one accepted by Husserl, and that Wittgenstein's criticism is consequently inadequate.

1. Wittgenstein's criticism

The neat criticism of the Husserlian definition lies in the conversations with some members of the Vienna Circle, recorded by Waismann and edited as *Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis* (henceforth *WWK*):

Gesetzt nun, die Aussage: 'Ein Gegenstand kann nicht rot und grün sein' wäre ein synthetisches Urteil und die Worte 'kann nicht' bedeuten die logische Unmöglichkeit. Da nun ein Satz die Negation seiner Negation ist, muss es auch den Satz geben 'Ein Gegenstand kann rot und grün sein'. Dieser Satz wäre ebenfalls synthetisch. Als synthetischer Satz hat er Sinn, und das bedeutet, die von ihm dargestellte Sachlage kann bestehen. Bedeutet also 'kann nicht' die logische Unmöglichkeit, so kommen wir zu der Konsequenz, dass das Unmögliche doch möglich ist. Hier blieb Husserl nur der Ausweg, dass er erklärt, es gäbe noch eine dritte Möglichkeit. (*WWK*, 67-68)

Husserl is explicitly mentioned in a question asked by Schlick that opens the debate. Indeed, the *locus classicus* of the definition of a synthetic a priori proposition is precisely in Husserl's *Dritte Logische Untersuchungen* (henceforth *DLU*):

Jedes reine Gesetz, das sachhaltige Begriffe in einer Weise einschließt, die eine Formalisierung dieser Begriffe *salva veritate* nicht zulässt, ist ein synthetisches Gesetz *a priori*. (*DLU*, 260)

Why does Wittgenstein criticise the acceptance of *synthetic a priori propositions*? The answer is to be found in two fundamental features of both *TLP* and later works (until the first half of the thirties): the conception of *analyticity* and the *bipolar theory of propositions*. Let me analyse the former.

2. Wittgenstein's conception of analyticity

The class of *logical truths* individuated in *TLP* coincides with the class of *tautologies*. Indeed, the latter are defined as those expressions whose truth-value is T for every combination of the constituent propositions, and that matches exactly our standard idea that a logical truth keeps the value T for every value assignment to the terms, predicates and propositions that appear in it. Since *TLP* employs only a propositional logic, tautologies are the only logical truths.

So, according to *TLP*,

[1] A proposition is a logical truth/falsehood iff it is a tautology/contradiction.

TLP 4.4661 characterises tautologies by means of something that we can reformulate in a *syntactical* way: it says that non-logical constants play no role in determining the truth-value of logical propositions they appear in. It seems that the best way for rendering the passage is to say that only the combination of logical constants (in this case, connectives) plays a role in determining the truth-value of a logical proposition. Thus, Wittgenstein's conception of logical truth is better expressed not by means of the *substitution instance* method, but by the concept of a *syntactical structure*.

Tautologies/ contradictions are the only kinds of well-formed expressions that have an *a priori* truth-value. This follows from the following passages: *TLP* 4.4661 (afore-mentioned), the fierce assertion that logical propositions do not depict any state of affairs (and hence they are not *Bilder*) in *TLP* 4.462 and *TLP* 2.225. Hence, we have

[2] A proposition is a logical truth/ falsehood iff it has an a priori truth-value.

Once we have established these points, the crucial one is still to be developed. It concerns the relationships between *logical truth* and *necessity*. From *TLP* 6.37 we have:

[3] A proposition expresses a necessary truth/ falsehood, iff it is a logical truth/ falsehood.

By [1]–[3] we have:

[4] No *synthetic proposition* expresses a logical truth since its truth-value cannot be determined in purely syntactical ways.

Therefore we have:

[5] No *synthetic proposition* has an a priori truth-value.

3. Wittgenstein's conception of a synthetic proposition

Wittgenstein's criticism thus seems to be unassailable. But the second way of justifying his rejection is helpful in showing that this is not so. The key concepts here are that of a *depictive proposition* and of the *bipolarity of propositions*. As Peter Hacker cleverly stressed (Hacker 1986), the possibility for a proposition to have two truth-values is essential to it. Indeed, propositions represent states of affairs: they say something only as far as they are *Bilder* (*TLP* 4.03). An important feature of states of affairs concerns their *ontological status*: they are *contingent* (*TLP* 1.21, 2.0271). So, a proposition expresses something that can or cannot happen and consequently it can be true or false. *TLP* 2.25 and 2.0271 warrant that there is no necessary state of affairs and no a priori true *Bild* (the same can be said for propositions). An important consequence of this set of statements is that no logical truth/falsehood can be a proposition in the Tractarian technical sense of this word: having only one truth-value, it cannot depict a state of affairs and thus it cannot be a

*Bild*¹. Consequently, it is not a *meaningful* expression (it is *sinnlos*, although it is not *unsinnig*).

Given this, we have:

- [6] A well formed formula is a depictive proposition iff it depicts a state of affairs.

Because of the contingency of states of affairs and *TLP* 2.223, 2.224, we have that it is necessary to compare a depictive proposition with the world in order to know its truth-value.

This can be regarded as a consequence of the fact that a depictive proposition varies its truth value for some assignment of meaning to its terms. The idea is that, if a proposition α containing "t" and "s" depicts, e.g. a subsisting state of affairs, by the replacement of "t" and "s" with "a" and "b", the resulting proposition β can depict a non subsisting possible state of affairs, and hence be false, contrary to what happens to tautologies. This feature of depictive propositions matches our concept of a synthetic proposition and particularly the idea that it does not keep its truth-value constant for every substitution instance.

But this implies:

- [7] A proposition is synthetic iff it is a depictive one, i.e. if it represents a state of affairs.

By [5], [7] (or equivalently from *TLP* 2.225) we have that, for Wittgenstein,

- [8] No depictive proposition has an a priori truth value.

Furthermore, since Wittgenstein shares the classical rules for negation, we have:

- [9] A proposition α is meaningful (i.e. it depicts a state of affairs) iff $\sim\alpha$ is meaningful.

Plainly, if α is meaningful, it can be true or false; consequently, its negation operates on two possible truth-values and results in two possible truth-values as well, as required by the bipolar theory in order for a proposition to be depictive.

An agreement with the equivalences in [1]–[3] comes from [6]–[8] and besides [6]–[8] strengthen the idea that logical (and hence a priori and necessary) propositions do not depict states of affairs at all.

[6], that is the idea that *synthetic propositions* have a *depictive* function, is *TLP*'s key assumption about the relationships between the notion of *synthetic* and that of *a priori*: if somebody does not share it and provides an alternative semantical account of what is required for a proposition to be synthetic, Wittgenstein's criticism does not hold. As will be seen, this is exactly what Husserl does.

4. Husserl's definition of analytic and synthetic propositions

Let me now analyse Husserl's acceptance of *synthetic a priori* propositions. First of all, his definition of analytic and synthetic a priori propositions in *DLU* matches our *substitution instance* procedure rather than our definition in terms of a *syntactical structure*:

"Analytisch notwendige Sätze [...] sind solche Sätze die sich vollständig „formalisieren“ und als Spezialfälle [...]"

der durch solche Formalisierung gültig erwachsenden formalen oder analytischen Gesetze fassen lassen." (*DLU*, 259)

This means, basically, that a proposition is analytic iff it is possible to substitute every term occurring in it keeping its truth-value constant. The same can be said about the definition of synthetic a priori laws (and hence, propositions). So, Husserl's definitions can be rendered as follows:

- [10] A proposition is analytic iff it keeps its truth-value constant under every substitution instance.
[11] A proposition is synthetic iff its truth-value varies under at least one substitution instance.

Considering that both Husserl and Wittgenstein accept the equivalences *necessary* \equiv *a priori*, *contingent* \equiv *a posteriori*, we can use Kripke-like semantics for necessity, and hence we have:

- [12] A proposition is necessarily true iff it is true in every possible world.

From [12] it does not follow that only an analytical proposition can be a necessary one. Kripke's interpretation of classes of worlds as those models which are contained in the list of the accessibility relation (Kripke 1959) is helpful in individuating the difference. Indeed we can have a proposition that is true only for *substitution instances* restricted by a certain class of terms (i.e., terms for colours and extensions), but that can become false if the substitution is not restricted to them. Nevertheless, we can say that this proposition is true in every possible world and that means: every adequate *restricted* model that a conventionally distinguished model sees, assigns T to that proposition. Leaving out Kripke's specific semantical concepts, this seems to be Husserl's idea: *synthetic a priori propositions* are *necessarily true/ false*; however, they are not true/ false under *every substitution instance*, as far as we *can* modify their truth-value by substituting, e.g. the individual constants in them with individual ones that refer to objects of another kind.

Having said this, we can define synthetic a priori propositions by means of Kripkean and Tarskian semantic tools as follows:

- [13] α is a *synthetic a priori proposition* iff 1) given a domain D, there is at least a given evaluation class such that: a) it assigns only individuals in a precise subset of D to individual terms in α as their meaning; b) given such a meaning assignment, it assigns T to α ; 2) no evaluation class restricted to the aforesaid subset of D assigns F to α .

[10], [11] and [13] entail no contradiction, if they are considered *per se*. They are contradictory iff they are embedded in *TLP*'s Picture Theory, because this theory agrees with [1]–[3]. Indeed, if we have synthetic propositions as depictions of something contingent, we obtain *synthetic = a posteriori*.

Well, no hint of a depictive function of synthetic propositions can be found in Husserl's works. The *Erste Logische Untersuchung* reveals a theory of meaning and sense dramatically different from *TLP*'s one, and the *Vierte Logische Untersuchung* tells us that Husserl's only requirement for a proposition to be meaningful is syntactical well-formedness.

¹ This statement is confirmed by *TLP* 4.462.

5. Analysing Wittgenstein's criticism

Wittgenstein's aforesaid criticism is grounded on the following points:

1. Husserl's *synthetic a priori propositions* imply, because of their being *a priori* (and then necessarily true/ false), the impossibility that their negation be true/ false.
2. *Synthetic propositions*, because of their being *depictive*, have two possible truth-values. From [8], its negation is meaningful too, i.e. what it states *can* happen.
3. From 1), the negation of a true synthetic a priori proposition states an impossibility. Being consequently necessarily false, it cannot be bipolar and hence it cannot be meaningful.

From 1) – 3) it follows:

4. If we wish to admit that a synthetic a priori proposition has a sense, we have to admit that its negation has a sense too. We would thus obtain the absurd conclusion the "what is impossible is however possible".
5. Anyway, synthetic propositions are bipolar, and hence, if Husserl defines them as "synthetic", he has to admit that they are a posteriori, thus contradicting his own assumptions.
6. Consequently, either we deny that they are bipolar and abandon the claim that they are synthetic, or we admit that they are bipolar, giving up the idea that they are *a priori*.

Clearly, 2) is the key-assumption in Wittgenstein's criticism. By refusing it, we do not have 4)–6). Furthermore, following [13] and Husserl's requirement of well-formedness, we have that both a true synthetic a priori proposition and its negation are meaningful, although the latter cannot be true; we do not have to accept the equivalence *synthetic* \equiv *depictive* \equiv *bipolar* \equiv *a posteriori*, and hence we can state the synthetic character of "a patch cannot be red and blue in the same place at the same time" without concluding that it is a posteriori².

6. Conclusion

Thus, the idea of a *synthetic a priori proposition* can seem absurd to those who define a proposition as synthetic iff it has an *a posteriori* truth-value, like Wittgenstein or the Logical Empiricists. Without this definition or *TLP's Picture Theory*, Husserl's definition of a *synthetic a priori proposition* entails no contradiction. Since Husserl shares neither [1]–[3] nor [6]–[8], he is not compelled to conclude [4]–[5]. Wittgenstein's criticism in *WWK* presupposes [1]–[3] and moreover the *bipolar theory* and so it does not hold. No problem with the equivalence *necessary* \equiv *logical truth*: Wittgenstein's conception of what is "logical" differs from Husserl's as well as his conception of what is *meaningful*: according to Wittgenstein, the field of logical truth is the field of propositions that can be completely formalised (in Tractarian terms, of propositions that are true independently of the non-logical constants occurring in them). So, logical truths coincide with formal truths. On the contrary, Husserl introduces two kinds of logical propositions: the logical-formal ones, that can be completely formalised, and the logical-material ones, that coincide with the synthetic a priori propositions and can be expressed via [13].

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² Furthermore, by rejecting Wittgenstein's theory of bipolarity, we are able to deny the conclusion of 3).

Is a Naturalistic Theory of Reference Defensible?

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A naturalistic theory of reference says that at least ultimately reference can be explicated in terms of natural states of affairs. A major objection to naturalistic approaches says that they do not avoid indeterminacy of reference. In this essay, I discuss whether this objection is justified or not and how an approach that avoids indeterminacy is to be composed.

Naturalistic approaches usually employ natural states of affairs in counterfactual relations of the kind "If stimulus **P** were not present, then **T**, a linguistic performance of the type **t**, would not be made." How do these relations determine reference? According to the way I use the term "correct" in this essay, an expression is applied correctly if its referent is present. Conversely, reference states which entity must be present if a performance is supposed to be correct. If a counterfactual conditional is interpreted as the correctness condition of a performance, then it states what the performance refers to.

According to a counterfactual approach, a performance is said to be correct if it is counterfactually evoked by a stimulus. In daylight the counterfactual relation "If there were no dog, then 'dog' would not be uttered" applies. In twilight the counterfactual relation "If there were no dog-or-cat, then 'dog' would not be uttered" applies. A counterfactual proposal has, however, the drawback that too many performances are said to be correct. "Dog" is, for example, said to be correct if it is evoked by a cat in twilight. There are two different counterfactuals, one that applies in daylight and another one that applies in twilight. In consequence, it is indeterminate whether "dog" refers to a dog or to a dog-or-cat. Since this indeterminacy allows for a disjunctive referent, it is called the disjunction problem.

There is a second version of the disjunction problem. The presence of a dog stimulates different sense organs, e.g. the eye or the ear. These stimulations of sense organs stimulate corresponding parts of the brain. Stimulations of parts of the brain give rise to "dog". The distal stimulus (i.e. the node of the chain that is the farthest away from the performance), a dog, is counterfactually related to the performance. But a disjunctive proximal stimulus (i.e. a node that is nearer to the performance), e.g. a stimulation of the eye-or-ear, is also counterfactually related to the performance. Therefore, it is indeterminate whether "dog" refers to a dog or to a stimulation of the eye-or-ear. Correspondingly, a counterfactual approach fails to call those performances incorrect that are evoked by a stimulation of the eye-or-ear even though no dog is present. In what follows, I distinguish between the "disjunction problem 1" when I speak of the former problem and the "disjunction problem 2" when I speak of the latter.

In order to avoid the disjunction problem 1 one must consider only those counterfactual relations that exist under proper conditions (here: in daylight). According to Millikan (1984) proper conditions and the corresponding counterfactual relations need to apply only in a particular period. This avoids that the introduction of proper conditions has the consequence that too few performances are said to be correct. If one neglected Millikan's point, "dog" would *not* be said to be correct in case it was applied to a dog in twilight. The relevant period is the period where a communal practice of referring with **T** to **P**

is established, i.e. the constitution period of a linguistic practice. This specification permits one to meet our intuition that a competent speaker says something that is incorrect.

A convincing solution to the disjunction problem 1 must not imply that it is arbitrary which condition and, thus, which counterfactual is relevant. In Millikan's approach, the reason why "dog" refers to a dog (and not to a dog-or-cat) is given by the fact that the relevant proper condition is identified by considering whether a counterfactual relation was based upon a causal one. In daylight the counterfactual "If there were no dog, then 'dog' would not be uttered" applied. In twilight the counterfactual "If there were no dog-or-cat, then 'dog' would not be uttered" applied. But only the former was based upon a causal relation: In daylight a dog caused "dog." In twilight a dog-or-cat did not cause "dog" because this stimulus either evoked "dog" or "cat." The counterfactual relation that applied in daylight therefore determines the reference of "dog."

Making appeal to causal relations does not *per se* rule out that reference is arbitrary. But Millikan points out that the constitution period is conceived in an evolutionary way. This means that the causal relation did not exist by mere chance. It rather helped to establish a sufficiently stable practice of referring with "dog" to a dog (i.e. of sanctioning "dog" positively and "no dog" negatively in case the respective performance was uttered in the presence of a dog). This practice had an evolutionary advantage over a practice of referring with "dog" to a dog-or-cat because the appropriate reactions to both entities differed. Running away was appropriate in the presence of a dog but not in the presence of a dog-or-cat since some dogs-or-cats (namely cats) were peaceful animals one did not have to fear.

Millikan formulates the most promising naturalistic account of reference but her approach is still not fully convincing. In some cases the consideration of reactions to stimuli does not permit one to identify conditions under which a single counterfactual holds. No matter which condition one looks at, dogs *and* very sophisticated dummies evoked "dog" such that two different counterfactual relations were based upon causal ones. Millikan, thus, does not rule out that "dog" refers to a dog-or-dummy. Moreover, the consideration of underlying causal relations does not help with the disjunction problem 2. Under certain circumstances (such as daylight) "dog" was causally related to a dog. But "dog" was also causally related to a stimulation of the eye-or-ear, no matter which circumstances prevailed.

The disjunction problem 2 can be avoided by considering the intersection of the counterfactual chains that lead from two individuals' performances *via* different proximal stimuli to one and the same entity. Davidson calls this device "triangulation." Of course, triangulation is of no help unless it is further specified since it is, to begin with, not ruled out that there are several intersections such that reference is indeterminate. One intersection is, for example, the stimulation of the eye-or-ear, the other is a dog. Triangulation avoids indeterminacy if one considers which performances of a speaker are regularly positively sanctioned on the grounds that the interpreter is ready to make a similar performance and, thus, on the grounds that

the interpreter assumes that the speaker is under the impact of a similar stimulus like she is. The referent that is picked out must be a distal stimulus because only distal stimuli are intersubjectively accessible so that they can be judged with respect to their similarity (cf. Davidson 1989, 197).

If the determination of reference presupposes sanctions, then it presupposes social, normative states of affairs. Can the social dimension Davidson introduces be reconciled with a naturalistic framework? A reductionist kind of naturalism explicates reference *exclusively* in terms of natural states of affairs. A non-reductionist kind of naturalism, in contrast, starts out from normative states of affairs that are then explicated in terms of natural states of affairs. Sanctions, as Davidson conceives them, are based upon dispositions to a particular behavior by which the interpreter punishes the speaker's deviation from the linguistic performance *she* is ready to make. To say that the interpreter is disposed to a particular behavior means that the behavior is causally linked with the speaker's deviation. Davidson's explication of reference in terms of sanctions, therefore, speaks against a non-reductionist kind of naturalism, but not against naturalism *per se*. Davidson (Davidson 1990, 203) makes it clear that he indeed defends a naturalistic position. Note that Millikan is also committed to non-reductionist naturalism because her conception of evolution is normative. A causal-counterfactual relation and the corresponding reference are selected for their evolutionary advantage. A descriptive conception of the history of linguistic practice, in contrast, holds that reference is determined by the causal-counterfactual relation that happened to exist.

Davidson claims that triangulation avoids *both* versions of the disjunction problem (cf. Davidson 1997, 129f.). How does triangulation help with the disjunction problem 1? "Dog" is regularly positively sanctioned if it is evoked by a dog in daylight. If "dog" is prompted by a dog-or-cat in twilight it is, however, sometimes negatively sanctioned because the interpreter would sometimes utter "cat" when the speaker utters "dog". In consequence, triangulation picks out the counterfactual between a dog and "dog" that applies in daylight such that "dog" refers to a dog.

Davidson's specification of triangulation is, however, unconvincing in its application to both versions of the disjunction problem since it has the consequence that speaker and interpreter are at liberty to fix reference such that reference is relative to a linguistic community. It is therefore more favorable to combine an evolutionary and a social account of reference than to adopt Davidson's thoroughly social account: The relevant counterfactual relation is identified partly by the fact that it is based upon an underlying causal one that helped to establish an evolutionary advantageous practice and partly by sanctions. The former component avoids the disjunction problem 1 in simple cases without making reference relative to a linguistic community. The latter component avoids the disjunction problem 2 although the specification of sanctions in terms of the behavior individuals exhibit makes reference relative to a linguistic community.

There are two further objections to Davidson. First, he still does not solve the disjunction problem 1 in hard cases such as the dog-dummy example. Linguistic reactions to a dog and to a dog-or-dummy alike are sometimes negatively sanctioned since the interpreter may be ready to utter "dummy" when the speaker utters "dog" unless both individuals master conditions that permit them to tell dogs and dummies apart. But such conditions cannot be determined in causal-counterfactual terms. Mastery of

such conditions therefore does not show in sanctions that are based upon the individuals' reactions to stimuli. Second, with regard to Davidson's proposed solution to the disjunction problem 2, I do not think that he is right in holding that only distal stimuli are judged with respect to their similarity. Davidson's claim implies that the way reactions to proximal stimuli are sanctioned depends upon the presence or absence of a distal stimulus. A counterexample to this view is the case where two individuals who are not familiar with the conditions under which *fata morgana* are evoked concur in claiming to see an expanse of water both when they observe a lake far away and when they observe a *fata morgana*.

How can one do better? Let us start with the dog-dummy example. "Dog" refers to a dog because only a dog is, for example, warm to the touch. This means that only a dog succeeds in particular tests. The proper condition and the corresponding counterfactual relation is identified inferentially. "The object is warm to the touch" permits one to infer "If a dog were not present, then 'dog' would not be uttered." This strategy provides simultaneously a solution to the disjunction problem 2: A condition that permits one to distinguish between a dog and a stimulation of the eye-or-ear as possible referents also consists in the entity's warmth to the touch. Some stimulations of the eye-or-ear are not based upon the presence of a dog (but result from a mere hallucination or a dream) such that the test is not always carried out successfully by the speaker or her interpreter when "dog" is prompted by such a stimulation.

This proposed solution to the disjunction problem 1 in hard cases and to the disjunction problem 2 is based upon Brandom's inferential version of triangulation (Brandom 1994). A general solution to the disjunction problem thus reads: The proper conditions under which "dog" is correct if it is counterfactually evoked by a stimulus are "Daylight prevails" ("dog" therefore does not refer to a dog-or-cat) and "The object is warm to the touch" ("dog" therefore does not refer to a dog-or-dummy or to a stimulation of the eye-or-ear). A performance *T* that is made in the presence of a stimulus *P* is correct if

- i) it stands in a causal-counterfactual relation with *P* and
- ii) the speaker endorses upon request the presence of proper conditions and an inference from proper conditions to the performance such that one can infer from the performance to the presence of the entity it refers to.¹

If one takes inferential articulation into account, then the process of mutual sanctions that determines reference cannot ultimately be described in naturalistic terms, or more precisely stated in terms of sanctions that are based upon nothing but reactions to stimuli. Sanctions as they figure in inferential triangulation state what an interpreter takes to be correct, given the inferences the *speaker* endorses (takes to be correct). Therefore sanctions have to be explicated even ultimately in terms of what is taken to be correct, i.e. in terms of normative attitudes that are considered to be basic.

Brandom's triangulation has the advantage that it is not up to the speaker and the interpreter that the proper condition is "The object is warm to the touch" such that the reference of "dog" is a dog and not a dog-or-dummy or a disjunctive proximal stimulus. There is a pragmatic

¹ More precisely, I should speak about *attribution of commitment* to a claim, not about its *endorsement*. A commitment states what a speaker would correctly endorse, given what other claims she endorses and what follows from these claims in the light of the interpreter.

advantage of picking out a particular counterfactual. It is, for example, useful to refer with "dog" to a dog and not to a dog-or-dummy, because the adequate reactions to both entities differ. If one feels disturbed by the entity's barking, the adequate reaction in the first case consists in calming the animal whereas the adequate reaction in the second case may consist in taking out the machine's storage battery. If one steps into the territory of a dog the adequate reaction consists in getting away, whereas mere stimulations of sense organs that evoke the claim "dog" (or better "I am near a dog") need not lead to any reaction at all because these stimulations need not go hand in hand with a particular way the world is. If Brandom's triangulation does not make reference relative to a particular community, then a completely social-inferential position is as convincing as the combination of an evolutionary and a social-inferential position. But even if one opts for the former position, causal-counterfactual relations matter. The process of mutual sanctions takes non-inferred answers to the world (observation reports) into account that serve as preliminary regress-stoppers. An interpreter would not usually take an observation report to be correct if her assumption that a speaker's observation report **T** is uttered (or confirmed upon request) in *all* cases where **P** is present and *only* in those cases would prove a failure.

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Is Perception Inferential?

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One of the obstacles to understanding perception is finding a middle way between equally unattractive poles of psychology and epistemology. In psychology, the extremes are (a) the holist who claims that the brain processes all perceptual input in light of background beliefs and (b) the naïve empiricist who thinks that we always perceive the world without any “infection” from background beliefs. In epistemology, the extremes are (a) the holist (either confirmation holist or coherentist) who claims that justification is a feature of the entire system of beliefs and is only derivatively a feature of individual beliefs and (b) the naïve empiricist who thinks that because we form perceptual beliefs independently of background beliefs, all perceptual beliefs must be non-inferential.

I am assuming that epistemology should be naturalized and that knowledge is a natural product of the human neurological system, is something that humans do not have to aspire to one day possess but already have in spades. From the perspective of naturalized epistemology, the psychological and epistemological debates about holism are at bottom the same. First, if the psychological holist is correct that the brain processes perceptual input in light of background beliefs, then it would follow that background beliefs play some role in justifying perceptual knowledge and that epistemological holism is true. Similarly, if the epistemological holist is correct in thinking of justification as belonging primarily to the entire system of beliefs, then for the web of beliefs to maintain its coherence while admitting new members at the fringes, new perceptual beliefs probably have to be formed in light of background beliefs. Hence, psychological holism entails and is entailed by epistemological holism. Secondly, if the naïve realist in psychology is correct in holding that the process of forming perceptual beliefs is encapsulated from background beliefs, then the justification of the perceptual beliefs is non-inferential. Similarly, if all justified perceptual beliefs have non-inferential justification, then it is likely that all perceptual beliefs are formed independently of background beliefs. Hence, psychological naïve empiricism entails and is entailed by epistemological naïve empiricism.

Why are holism and naïve empiricism unattractive in psychology and epistemology? The problem with naïve empiricism is widely understood: the mind is not a *tabula rasa* passively accepting new impressions from the world; sensory stimulation underdetermines perceptual judgments, and a person's beliefs sometimes help fill in the gap. For instance, if a person is in a wax museum, then no matter how convincing a waxen apple in a display may appear to be, the person is likely to see it not as a real apple but as a waxen apple—the contextual knowledge that she is in a wax museum will affect her perceptual beliefs (Cornwell 2002).

Some holists argue that because sensory stimulations underdetermine perceptual judgments, background beliefs always make up the difference. I doubt that anybody thinks that all background beliefs bear upon any given experience; the brain doesn't have enough resources. Rather, the holist's claim is that a subset of background beliefs is brought to bear during an experience. One argument sometimes offered in favor of holism is that the concepts a person holds constrain the types of perceptual judgments

that a person can form and that concepts are individuated in terms of their inferential or theoretical roles, so theory necessarily “contaminates” all observational judgments. The argument is tendentious, because it is far from clear that inferential role semantics is the best account of concepts. Indeed, I prefer teleosemantics (Cornwell 2002). As for the “paucity of stimulus” argument, background beliefs are not the only candidates to fill the gap between meager sensation and complex perceptual judgments. Furthermore, holism would make all perceptual beliefs theory-laden, but as Jerry Fodor has vigorously and rightly objected, one purpose of observation is to provide a theory-independent basis for constructing or choosing between theories: wishful thinking, screwy theories, and other epistemic maladies would be even more dangerous if our perceptual judgments always had to conform to those beliefs.

We are left trying to reconcile the claims that background beliefs can influence our perceptual beliefs and that many, perhaps most, of our background beliefs do not and should not influence our perceptual beliefs. There is no contradiction between these claims, so we could accommodate both simply by saying that sometimes background beliefs influence perceptual beliefs and sometimes not, but to stop here would be to avoid the obvious and difficult question that this synthesis of holism and naïve realism raises: what determines when background beliefs can intrude in the process of forming perceptual beliefs? Providing an answer to that question is one purpose of this paper, although I have enough space only to sketch but not to defend the answer.

I am presupposing a version of Jerry Fodor's faculty psychology. Fodor offers a hierarchical, tripartite cognitive model. At the lowest level of cognition are transducers, which lawfully transform stimulus energy into representations of the same (Fodor 1983, 45). The transducers are informationally encapsulated (i.e., have limited or no access to the person's beliefs) and pass on their subdoxastic representations to input systems, which also are encapsulated. The function of the input systems is to produce consciously accessible representations about the causes of the stimuli represented by the transducers' output. The input system's assumptions are internal to the input system. When performing its computations, the input system might have access to some beliefs, but not to all of them. That encapsulation from the full system of beliefs is what makes the input systems modular. The input systems' judgments are “hypotheses” (Fodor 1983, 136 n. 31) open to correction by central processors (Fodor 1990, 262). Not all modules are observational (for instance, there also are linguistic modules), so I will call those hypotheses that are the product of observational modules “observational hypotheses.” According to Fodor, hypotheses are not beliefs but have all of the attributes of a belief – propositional content, the ability to participate in inferences with other beliefs or hypotheses, etc. – except that the central processor does not have to take a hypothesis as being true, whereas to have a belief is to take it as true. For instance, in the Müller-Lyer Illusion, the visual modules produce the observational hypothesis that the lines are of unequal length, but if someone already has been apprised that it is an illusion, that person's central processor should take that hypothesis as false. This person should not

believe that the lines were unequal. Sitting atop the modules is the central processor, which is non-modular and domain-unrestricted. It can compare the input systems' outputs against each other and against the beliefs that the person has already in order to fix perceptual beliefs.

Now that we understand Fodor's architectonic, we can examine Fodor's theory of perception, which he divides into two parts: observation, which produces observational hypotheses, and perceptual belief-fixation, which produces perceptual beliefs (1990b, 248-9). Observation is the work of the input systems and is encapsulated. By contrast:

...the fixation of belief, perceptual or otherwise, is a central process (since what one believes is sensitive to what one takes to be the state of the evidence *überhaupt*, including the beliefs previously arrived at). I am supposing that input systems offer central processes hypotheses about the world, such hypotheses being responsive to the current, local distribution of proximal stimulations. The evaluation of these hypotheses in light of the rest of what one knows is... the fixation of perceptual belief. (Fodor 1983, 136 note 31)

In short, Fodor is a holist.

Building off of Kent Bach's "take-for-granted principle" (1985), I propose that the default setting for perception is non-inferential, but if the person is aware of reasons to examine the observational hypotheses, then the central processor should intervene. For instance, I might observe that the leaves of a particular tree are auburn as I walk outside on a sunny July day without making any inferences about the lighting conditions, but if I were to observe the same tree from the scarlet nighttime illumination of fireworks, the central processor should compensate for the modules' visual hypotheses. When things are Normal (i.e., conditions in which the modules were "designed" or "trained" to work) and we have no reason to suspect otherwise, we do not first have to satisfy ourselves that conditions are Normal before accepting our modules' observational hypotheses. The perceptual systems have a default setting when operating in Normal conditions for the output of the modules to be accepted as true, and this default setting works well because in Normal conditions the perceptual systems are reliable and because Normal conditions are what we usually encounter. If one is usually in conditions in which the perceptual modules are highly reliable, then it is a good cognitive design to take the observational hypotheses as true as long as one also is good at detecting when there is a substantial probability that conditions are not Normal. (Similarly, you do not have to be cautious in checking the temperature of everything you touch in order to avoid burning yourself on the stove. A default setting of thinking that things are not too hot to touch works pretty well, as long as one is in an environment in which most things do not burn you and as long as one is pretty good at recognizing which things might burn you.)

Suppose that we think of the human mind as having among its major components the modules, the central processor, the belief box, and the decision engine, which is similar to "the will." I propose that for mature thinkers we think of there being a forked pathway leading from a terminal module (i.e., a module whose output does not go to another module). The fork occurs at a switch that determines the destination of the observational hypothesis. If the switch is in the "off" position, the hypothesis goes to the central processor, leading ultimately to an inferential belief or to revisions of background beliefs. If the switch is

"on," the hypothesis goes straight to the belief box, where the belief is available for use by either the decision engine or the central processor.

The central processor and the decision engine control modules' on/off switches. The decision engine, the seat of volition, can choose to make the central processor scrutinize the output of a terminal module by turning the module's switch off. From an epistemic standpoint, this is not a bad thing, unless it distracts the central processor from more important tasks, but the decision engine could be motivated by non-epistemic concerns, so I will ignore its influence and instead examine why the central processor would turn a module's switch off. Sometimes the central processor can anticipate a situation in which the observational modules are unlikely to generate true output, so, as in the wax museum example, the central processor consciously and systematically compensates for the modules' errant output. In other cases, the modules themselves raise the alarm for the central processor to intervene. The modules can have built-in biases or expectations, as, for example, that objects are spatiotemporally continuous. Hence, if something in the field of vision were simply to disappear and not merely recede out of sight or move behind something else, the module that had been tracking the object would "notify" the central processor that there had been an anomaly, and the central processor would intervene to examine the module's output. Secondly, modules can acquire sensory frames that are similar to Hume's association of ideas. For instance, a module might through repeated exposure be "trained" to expect a certain spatial layout, and if an item were moved or missing, the module would alert the central processor to investigate further. Similarly, a module may through repeated exposure expect a grouping of properties in a given individual or substance. For instance, if I sat on my sofa and contrary to the module's expectation the sofa felt hard, my central processor would be recruited to determine whether the sofa really was hard or the module's output was mistaken. The encapsulation of the module ensures that even if the central processor determined that the sofa was not hard, the module would continue to report otherwise. In such cases, the central processor does not permit the errant observational hypotheses to enter the belief box, but the persistence of those hypotheses explains why I would say that the sofa continues to *seem* hard.

My theory avoids the empiricist Catch-22 of insisting that all knowledge comes from the senses and that the senses should not be trusted unless one first has good reasons to think that they are trustworthy. Because the perceptual modules were designed for common environments in which the modules are highly reliable, the cognitive systems are well within their epistemic rights and are adhering to their historical adaptive response patterns to treat the observational hypotheses as true unless the central processor intervenes because there are serious reasons to doubt the hypotheses. Because as a matter of good design the default position for a module's switch is set to on, there is no particular knowledge that is necessary for many non-inferential perceptual beliefs to be justified. There can be justified empirical beliefs that arise from observational modules but that do not require any prior knowledge, including knowledge about the perceptual process. One does not always have to know how the senses work, how reliable they are, under what conditions they work best, whether conditions are presently Normal, and so on in order to have perceptual knowledge. Similarly, even though certain possible states of affairs could prevent a belief from being justified, one does not

necessarily have to know that there are no defeating conditions in order for the belief to be justified. If I knowingly ingested LSD, then I ought to distrust my senses, but that does not mean that I should trust my senses only if I believe that I am not on LSD or that there are no aliens in my closet who are using gamma rays to manipulate my mind. Although some perceptual knowledge is and ought to be inferential, we often assume, and rightly so, that the world is as it appears to be.¹

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Generic Essence

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Introduction

The concept of essence is traditionally associated with questions of the form 'What is a ?', where ' a ' is a singular term. The traditional view is that there is a distinctively metaphysical construal of questions of that form, and that describing the essence or some essential features of a given object a is just giving a correct answer, be it complete or only partial, to the metaphysical question as to what a is. I will call such answers *objectual essentialist statements*.

The concept of essence is also traditionally associated with questions of the form 'What is it to F ?', where ' F ' is a predicate expression like 'be a man' or 'be wise' or 'think'. The traditional view is that there is a distinctively metaphysical construal of these questions, and that a complete or partial correct answer to the metaphysical question as to what it is to F constitutes a description of the essence or of some essential features of F -ing. I will call such answers *generic essentialist statements*.

The concepts of objectual essence and of generic essence both occupy a central place in philosophy. It is then quite legitimate to wonder how they are to be understood. In the contemporary literature about essence, however, focus has been made on the objectual notion only, and the generic notion has been neglected. The source of such a negligence may be the thought that the generic notion can be quite easily accounted for, in terms of the objectual notion or in terms of other, more familiar concepts, e.g. in modal terms.

As I will show, this is not the case. The greatest part of the paper will be devoted to the rejection of a number of more or less natural proposals. I will end up with the suggestion that the concept of generic essence is primitive and that it can be used to define several other notions of central philosophical importance, in particular that of objectual essence, that of metaphysical necessity and that of analyticity.

Grammatical Points

Before all, some points about the formulation of essentialist claims are in order.

I will take it that all objectual statements can be put in the form:

(O) It is true in virtue of what a is that p ,

and that all generic statements can be put in the form:

(G) It is true in virtue of what it is to F that p .

I will in particular assume that:

(o) a essentially Fs

is equivalent to 'it is true in virtue of what a is that a Fs ', and that:

(g) An F essentially Gs ,

understood as a form of generic statements, is equivalent to 'it is true in virtue of what it is to be an F that all Fs G '.

I shall take (O) to be the canonical form of objectual statements and (G) to be the canonical form of generic statements. But I will nevertheless feel free to use other modes of formulations for ease of expression.

Let me note here that beside the "individual" essentialist statements we met so far stand "collective" statements. An objectual statement is collective if it is a statement to the effect that some fact holds by virtue of what several objects taken together are, like e.g. 'in virtue of what number 3 and number 4 are, it is true that $3 < 4$ '. Generic statements can also be collective, to wit 'in virtue of what it is to be a man and of what it is to be a number, it is true that nothing can be both a man and a number'. For the sake of simplicity, focus will be made on individual statements, and collective statements will be left aside until the last section. Nevertheless it will be obvious how the discussion could be adapted so as to include them.

Three Accounts Rejected

In this section I present and reject three accounts of generic statements, giving in each case the version of the account for statements of type (G) and the version for statements of type (g). Focusing on (G) should be sufficient, given that any statement exhibiting the predicational form (g) can be rephrased in sentential form. But since some may find some of the three accounts to be introduced much more plausible as applied to statements in predicational form than they are as applied to statements in sentential form, I shall explicitly mention and criticize the accounts of predicational statements.

I may appear quite natural to understand (g), construed in the generic way, as:

(g₁) Necessarily, every F Gs .

(Here and below, 'necessarily' expresses metaphysical necessity.) Accordingly, one may think that the form (G) should be understood as:

(G₁) Necessarily, everything which Fs is such that p .

But both proposals are incorrect. I take it that (g) entails (g₁) and that (G) entails 'necessarily, p ' and so (G₁) as well. But I think that the converse entailments do not hold.

(Fine 1994) has forcefully argued against the standard modal accounts of objectual essence, namely the view that (o) should be understood as 'necessarily, a Fs ' or as 'necessarily, a Fs if it exists', and the view that (O) should be understood as 'necessarily, if a exists, then p '. Similar reasons can be invoked against the proposed modal accounts of generic statements.

Necessarily, every cat is either loved by Socrates or not. But we do not want to say on that account that cats are essentially either loved by Socrates or not, nor that it is true in virtue of what it is to be a cat that cats are either loved by Socrates or not. Or again, it is necessary that every object is a member of some set (its singleton set, for instance) – or so we may suppose. So necessarily, every cat belongs to some set. But pace the friends of the modal account, it does not follow that cats essentially belong to sets or that it is true in virtue of what it is to be a cat that

cats belong to sets. Finally, take any necessary proposition whatsoever. Then by the modal account, the proposition is true in virtue of what it is to whatever you like – be a man, be wise, love Jesus and so on. And of course, this is absurd.

Some may wish to analyze (g), understood in the generic way, as:

(g₂) Necessarily, every *F* essentially *G*s.

And accordingly, one may think that the form (G) should be understood as:

(G₂) Necessarily, everything which *F*s is essentially such that *p*.

The new accounts arguably escapes all the difficulties encountered by the modal ones. For instance, one may perfectly agree that as a matter of necessity, every cat belongs to some sets, and still deny that my cat Nessie is by its very nature a member of some set.

Yet they must also be rejected: (g) does not entail (g₂), and (G) does not entail (G₂) either. For instance, it is true in virtue of what it is to be a bachelor that bachelors are unmarried; but many actual men are bachelors and fail to be essentially unmarried, and presumably also fail to be essentially such that all bachelors are unmarried.

Another objection, to all accounts presented so far indeed, is that if there can be no *F* and nothing which *G*s, then they predict that an *F* is essentially however you like and that it is true in virtue of what it is to *G* that whatever you like. But intuitively, a round square is essentially round but not essentially green, and it is true in virtue of what it is to be a round square that round squares are square, but not that round squares are tasty.

In the light of the previous considerations, one might wish to invoke *properties* (or *kinds*) and claim that (g) should be understood as:

(g₃) It is true in virtue of what the property of being an *F* is that every *F* *G*s,

and (G) as:

(G₃) It is true in virtue of what the property of *F*-ing is that *p*.

The idea behind this move is quite natural. When we say that, say, men as such are essentially human, we do not really talk about individual men, be they actual or merely possible. Rather, we talk about the having of a certain feature, that of being a man, and we state what having that feature essentially involves. The proposed account of generic essence takes this fact seriously and goes one step further: it reifies features and construes generic essentialist statements as *objectual* essentialist statements about reified features (properties).

It is quite obvious that the new proposal beautifully escapes all the previous difficulties. But it still faces some difficulties. One problem, or so I think, is that generic statements do not as such commit one to properties, nor to any object whatsoever indeed. The statements 'a man is essentially human' and 'it is true in virtue of what it is to be a man that men are animals' are not ontologically committing, in particular they not commit one to properties – no more indeed than 'men are human' and 'men are animals'. An enemy of properties may very well take these statements to be meaningful, or even true. But even under the assumption that there is such a thing as the property of being a man, my view is that one should agree that the

statements under consideration do not commit one to the property. For it is surely not *absurd* to claim that these statements are true and at the same time deny that the property exists.

Another, more radical problem is that some predicate expressions cannot possibly express properties, while there are corresponding true generic statements. Consider for instance the predicate 'is a non-self-exemplifying property'. There cannot be such a thing as the property of being a non-self-exemplifying property. For if the property in question existed, it would be the case that it exemplifies itself iff it does not. Now there are arguably plenty of propositions which are true in virtue of what it is to be a non-self-exemplifying property: the proposition that every non-self-exemplifying property is non-self-exemplifying, the proposition that every non-self-exemplifying property is a property, the proposition that every non-self-exemplifying property is an abstract object.

The previous counterexamples can be used against the view that (g) entails (g₃) and the view that (G) entails (G₃). It is plausible to say, though, that both entailments hold in case the corresponding property is available. But even when there is the property, the converse entailments do not hold. It may be held that it is true in virtue of what the property of being a quantity of water is that it is an abstract object (a property, a multiply located entity, ...). But it may be denied, at the same time, that it is true in virtue of what it is to be a quantity of water that being a quantity of water is an abstract object. Some essential features of the property of being a quantity of water may fail to pertain to what it is for something to be a quantity of water.

Generic Essence, Objectual Essence, Metaphysical Necessity and Analyticity

In reaction to the problems met by the modal accounts of objectual essence, Fine (Fine 1994) suggests that the notion should be taken as primitive, and makes two important claims. The first is that instead of "viewing essence as a special case of metaphysical necessity", he says, "we should view metaphysical necessity as a special case of essence". The idea is that for a proposition to be metaphysically necessary is for it to be true in virtue of what a given object is, or in virtue of what some given objects are. (Remember the distinction between individual and collective essentialist statements introduced in the footnote in the section on the forms of essentialist statements.) The second claim is that truth in virtue of the meaning of an expression is nothing but truth in virtue of the nature of the meaning of (or concept expressed by) that expression – and similarly for truth in virtue of the meanings of several expressions taken together. On the view that analyticity is truth in virtue of the meanings of some expressions, Fine then proposes a general picture where both metaphysical necessity and analyticity are to be understood in terms of objectual essence.

Given the difficulties we met in the search for an "analysis" of generic essence, it is tempting to go the same way and take the notion to be primitive. An option one may then find attractive is to adopt the general Finean approach to essence and its relationships to metaphysical necessity and analyticity, by suitably modifying it so as to take generic essence into account. Let me here sketch one version of that option.

Let me use '*E*_{*a, b, ...*}' for 'it is true in virtue of what *a* is, what *b* is, ... that' (collectively understood), and '*T*_{*F, G, ...*}' for 'it is true in virtue of what it is to *F*, what it is to *G*, ... that'

(collectively understood). The proposal is then to reduce objectual essence, metaphysical necessity and analyticity to generic essence according to the following equivalences:

1. $\exists a, b, \dots p$ iff $\Gamma_{be\ a, be\ b, \dots} p$ – where 'to be a ' is short for 'to be identical to a ', and similarly for 'to be b ' and the rest;
2. It is necessary that p iff $\exists F \exists G \dots \Gamma_{F, G, \dots} p$;
3. It is true in virtue of the meanings of α, β, \dots that p iff $\Gamma_{M\alpha, M\beta, \dots} p$ – where ' $M\alpha$ ' is short for 'mean what α means', and similarly for ' $M\beta$ ' and the rest;
4. It is an analytic truth that p iff $\exists \alpha \exists \beta \dots$ it is true in virtue of the meanings of α, β, \dots that p .

The picture does not include Fine's own view about truth in virtue of meaning, because I think that the view is incorrect (it is presumably true in virtue of what the concept MAN is that it is a concept, an abstract object, and capable of being grasped by minds like ours; but one may well deny – and Fine would, I guess – that it is true in virtue of what the expression 'man' means that the concept Man is a concept or an abstract object).

The proposed view is, in my opinion, rather attractive. Of course, a perspicuous presentation and defense of that view is needed, but it would require much more space than is available to me here. This is something I hope to do elsewhere.

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The *Tractatus* and the Need of Non-Truth-Functional Operations

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According to the *Tractatus*

$$\begin{aligned} &aRb \\ (\exists x) : aRx \cdot xRb, \\ (\exists x) : aRx \cdot xRy \cdot yRb, \dots \end{aligned}$$

is a formal series of propositions (4.1252, 4.1273) and, as such, it must be ordered by an internal relation (4.1252) and there must be an *operation* generating each term out of the preceding one (4.1273). If we take “*aRb*” as meaning that *a* is the father of *b*, then affirming the truth of one of the members of the series is equivalent to affirming that *a* is a direct ancestor of *b*. Although convinced that “the way¹ in which Frege and Russell express general propositions like the above is false” (4.1273), Wittgenstein believed he had found a method to express it in a *Begriffsschrift*.² In order to affirm that one of the members of a formal series of propositions is true, Wittgenstein (i) finds a way of giving a non-propositional expression to a general term of the series, (ii) treats this expression as a propositional variable, on the same level as propositional functions, and (iii) allows the operator *N* to act upon it. Let us recall the way he does this.

The first step is given at 4.1273, when Wittgenstein says “we can determine the general term of a formal series by giving its first term and the general form of the operation which generates the following term out of the preceding proposition”. If we call “*O_i*” the recursive procedure used to obtain the successive terms of the series given above, then we can rewrite the series as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} &aRb \\ &O_i' aRb, \\ &O_i' O_i' aRb, \dots \end{aligned}$$

Its general term will be given by an expression in brackets –

$$[aRb, x, O_i' x]$$

– that must be taken as a propositional variable ranging over all the members of the series (5.2522). When order is irrelevant, we may use a more economical notation, adopting the convention that

$$[aRb, x, O_i' x] = (\bar{\xi})$$

and using the bar over the variable to indicate the *totality* of its values (5.501). In this case, a totality of propositions is given by a formal law of construction, and we must remember that the *Tractatus* admits of two other ways of determining a totality of propositions (5.501). By direct enumeration, we could adopt the convention that

$$[p, q, r] = (\bar{\xi})$$

Finally, we can adopt a propositional function whose values are to be taken as the values of $\bar{\xi}$:

$$[\bar{f}x] = (\bar{\xi})$$

In any case, we can always apply the operation *N* to the selected group of propositions, obtaining a new proposition as a result (“ $\sim p \cdot \sim q \cdot \sim r$ ” and “ $\sim (\exists x) \cdot \bar{f}x$ ”, respectively). It is easy to see that in the case of $[aRb, x, O_i' x]$ the proposition “ $NN(\bar{\xi})$ ” will say that at least one member of the formal series is true, i.e. that *a* is a direct ancestor of *b*, without making use of hereditary properties.

Formal series like

$$aRb, O_i' aRb, O_i' O_i' aRb, \dots$$

can be always associated with series of ascriptions of cardinal numbers in our language. The series above, for instance, may be seen as counting the number of interposed generations that separate a direct ancestor *a* from *b*. If we use “*fx*” as an abbreviation for the propositional function “*x* is a person in this room”, then the series of propositions

There is no one in this room,
There is one person in this room,
There are two people in this room, ...

could be rewritten (using the Tractarian convention for different variables) as

$$\begin{aligned} &\sim (\exists x) fx \\ (\exists x) fx : \sim (\exists x, y) fx \cdot fy \\ (\exists x, y) fx \cdot fy : \sim (\exists x, y, z) : fx \cdot fy \cdot fz, \dots \end{aligned}$$

which is clearly a formal series. Let us call “*O_{ii}*” the operation leading from one term to the next in this series. If we adopt the convention that

$$[\sim (\exists x) fx, x, O_{ii}' x] = (\bar{\xi})$$

then “ $NN(\bar{\xi})$ ” could parallel Russell’s

$$(\exists n) \cdot n = Nc' \hat{x}(fx)$$

(i.e. “there is an *n* that is the cardinal number of the class of *f*s”) without making use of any set or type theory. I say “could” because there is an important qualification to be made here: the number of possible values of “*fx*” must be infinite. If it is not, the stock of different variables for the *x*-place in “*fx*” must be finite, and the series will have to stop at some point.³ In this case,

$$[\sim (\exists x) fx, x, O_{ii}' x]$$

would be only an abbreviation for a *list* of propositions in the range of $\bar{\xi}$. The same could be said of

$$[aRb, x, O_i' x]$$

and of any other series whose propositions were making (in the everyday language way of speaking) ascriptions of number. There is no reason indeed to stop short of quantification in general. If the values of “*fx*” are a finite totality of propositions, then “ $(\exists x) fx$ ” will be merely an abbreviation

¹ i.e., by means of the so-called “hereditary properties” (cf. Frege 1964, §24).

² “Wollen wir den allgemeinen Satz: ‘b ist ein Nachfolger von a’, in der Begriffsschrift ausdrücken... etc” (4.1273).

³ Cf. Wittgenstein 1989, p. 155, but notice that in that context Wittgenstein is ruling out any propositional reference to an actual infinity.

for an ordinary logical sum. Of the three methods given in the *Tractatus* (5.501) for determining totalities of propositions, the second (propositional functions) and the third (formal laws of construction) would be superfluous; the first (direct enumeration) would be enough. As there is no *a priori* determination of logical space (i.e. of the totality of elementary propositions), it is not possible to determine *a priori* if there is a function with infinitely many possible values or not. If “ fx ” has only a finite number of values, then “ $NN(\bar{\xi})$ ” (with $(\bar{\xi}) = [\sim(\exists x)fx, x, O_i'x]$) will not parallel “ $(\exists n).n = Nc' \hat{x}(fx)$ ”. There will be, so to speak, a “last number” m to be applied to the function, and “ $NN(\bar{\xi})$ ” will be a tautology, as can easily be seen if we imagine that “ fa ” and “ fb ” are the only possible values of “ fx ”⁴. On the other hand, if there are infinitely many values for “ fx ”, then “ $NN(\bar{\xi})$ ” is not a tautology, nor is “ $N(\bar{\xi})$ ” a contradiction, since it is perfectly possible to imagine “ fx ” being satisfied by *all* the infinite arguments. Under the proposed interpretation, “ $N(\bar{\xi})$ ” would be saying that there are infinitely many persons in this room.

* * *

There is a very important characteristic of operations like O_i and O_{ii} that must be mentioned: they are *not* truth-operations. For suppose a is not the father of b (i.e. $\sim aRb$). Must he be his grandfather? Of course not, although he can be. Again, suppose it is false to deny the existence of persons in this room – obviously it will not be necessary either to affirm or to deny the existence of exactly one. In general, we can say that no series of ascriptions of number is ordered by truth-operations. But they *are* ordered by operations, all the same.

* * *

Ascriptions of cardinal numbers are always propositions that can be inserted in formal series like $[aRb, x, O_i'x]$ and $[\sim(\exists x).fx, x, O_{ii}'x]$. Numbers will not appear in these propositions, since they are substituted here by quantificational structures. From this point of view, numbers are nothing but abbreviatory devices of our languages and must disappear under analysis. Wittgenstein’s thesis is that all formal properties of numbers can be derived from the generative power of the formal series they are used to translate. Arithmetical relations among numbers can always be reduced to logical relations among propositions of a formal series. My own thesis about the *Tractatus* is that Wittgenstein uses series like $[p, x, Nx]$ to get an infinite model that can be applied to infinite series of any kind. The relevant properties of the “interesting” series, such as $[aRb, x, O_i'x]$ and $[\sim(\exists x).fx, x, O_{ii}'x]$, are already present in the “dull” ones, such as $[p, x, Nx]$, without the danger of a full stop. Let us see how this can be done.

Ω is defined in terms of N (6.01), and so in the symbol “ $\Omega'x$ ” the variable “ x ” must stand for propositions. According to 6.02, Ω^x may be taken as a new operation defined in terms of successive applications (iterations) of Ω . Therefore, if “ p ” is a proposition, “ $\Omega^x p$ ” and “ $\Omega^{y'} \Omega^{x'} p$ ” must also be propositions for any natural numbers x and y . An immediate consequence is that a proposition with the form “ $\Omega^x \Omega^y \Omega^z p$ ” may also be expressed by the forms

⁴ The three possible values of $\bar{\xi}$ would be “ $\sim fa . \sim fb$ ”, “ $fa . \sim fb . v . \sim fa . fb$ ”, and “ $fa . fb$ ”. As “ $NN\bar{\xi}$ ” would amount to a logical sum, the result would be a tautology.

“ $\Omega^x \Omega^y q$ ” (if $q = \Omega^z p$) and “ $\Omega^x r$ ” (if $r = \Omega^y \Omega^z p$). Now, if we define

$$\Omega^{y'} \Omega^{x'} p = \Omega^{x+y'} p \text{ Def.}^5$$

it will be easy to prove the equations “ $x+0=x$ ” and “ $x+(y+1)=(x+y)+1$ ”⁶, which will give us a recursive definition of numerical addition. Proofs of the basic general properties of addition can easily be obtained by induction. We can similarly obtain proofs of the equations “ $x.0=0$ ” and “ $x(y+1)=xy+x$ ” assuming the definition given at 6.241:

$$(\Omega^x)^{y'} p = \Omega^{x \cdot y'} p \text{ Def.}$$

To avoid difficulties with the use of the inverted comma in “ $(\Omega^x)^{y'} p$ ”, suffice it to extend the definition of “ $\Omega^x p$ ” to any power of the same:⁷

$$\begin{aligned} (\Omega^x)^{0'} p &= p \text{ Def.} \\ (\Omega^x)^{y'+1'} p &= \Omega^{x'} (\Omega^x)^{y'} p \end{aligned}$$

Now the proofs of “ $x.0=0$ ” and “ $x(y+1)=xy+x$ ” will run smoothly,⁸ and we will have multiplication defined for any two natural numbers.

These are technical aspects of the Tractarian conception of number. As far as technical considerations are concerned, there is no reason to say that multiplication and addition cannot be mapped in the repeated application of N to propositions. But the mapping itself will not make much sense until we are able to show how it can reflect the use we make of numbers to describe reality. At this point, the reintroduction of operations which are not truth-operations is crucial.

As already shown, there can be no *a priori* grounds to affirm that $[aRb, x, O_i'x]$ is a formal series in the same sense as $[p, x, Nx]$. The first may come to an end, and in this case O_i would lose one of the defining aspects of operations in general: the possibility of being applied to its own results. But it is exactly in propositions belonging to series like this that we are led (in everyday language) to apply numbers in the description of facts. On the other hand, a series like $[p, x, Nx]$ does not involve any use of numbers. If “ p ” says “It’s raining”, both “ $\Omega^5 p$ ” and “ $\Omega^{35} p$ ” will say “It’s not raining”. Numbers are not being used here to describe the weather, but to mark the particular place of a propositional sign in a formal series whose infinity is given *a priori*.

It is easy to see that, although defined in terms of the operation N , the series of numbers does not involve any property specifically associated with that operation. The same could be said of the definitions given for addition and multiplication. It is also easy to see that, if we define “ Ω ” as “ N ”, we will have

⁵ Wittgenstein presupposes that the reader will supplement the recursive definition of the symbol “ $\Omega^x p$ ” at 6.02 defining addition on the model of the definition given at 6.241 for multiplication.

- (i) $\Omega^{x+0'} p = \Omega^{0'} \Omega^{x'} p = \Omega^{x'} p$.
- (ii) $\Omega^{x+(y+1)'} p = \Omega^{y+1'} \Omega^{x'} p = \Omega^y \Omega^{y'} \Omega^{x'} p = \Omega^y \Omega^{x+y'} p = \Omega^{(x+y)+1'} p$.

⁷ Wittgenstein presupposes that the reader will supplement the definition given at 6.241 with a definition for the symbol “ $(\Omega^x)^{y'} p$ ” constructed on the model previously given for the symbol “ $\Omega^x p$ ”.

- ⁸ (i) $\Omega^{x \cdot 0'} p = (\Omega^x)^{0'} p = p = \Omega^{0'} p$.
- (ii) $\Omega^{x \cdot (y+1)'} p = (\Omega^x)^{y+1'} p = \Omega^{x'} \Omega^{x \cdot y'} p = \Omega^{x \cdot y + x'} p$.

$$\Omega^5 p = \Omega^{35} p$$

but the sameness of sense, in this case, does not depend on the rules laid down for the use of numbers as exponents of operations. It only holds when the operation Ω is N . On the other hand,

$$(\Omega^5)^7 p = \Omega^{35} p$$

is an equation that can be proved inside the formal system of rules. The properties of Ω mapped in this system are all (and only) those defining a quite general recursive procedure to build propositions out of propositions. If the series $[aRb, x, O_i'x]$ is infinite, a procedure of this kind will be at work here. It is obvious that in this case

$$O_i^5 aRb = O_i^{35} aRb$$

will not be true, while

will still hold. If we define the term “penteneration” as meaning the stretch between five successive generations, we can read “ $(O_i^5)^7 aRb$ ” as saying that there are 7 pentenerations between b and his direct ancestor a . It is in contexts like this that we use arithmetical equations to calculate the number of generations mediating between a and b . Wittgenstein is trying to show that this is a practical and very useful device to abbreviate a long chain of logical deductions. The same could be said of propositions like

There are 3 men and 2 women in this room.

We may use the equation “ $3+2=5$ ” as a rule of inference leading to the conclusion that there are 5 people in this room. But once more the *arithmetical* equation may be taken as a substitution rule, and the rule may be *justified* by the *logical* equivalence between two propositions:

$$O_{ii}^2 O_{ii}^3 \sim (\exists x).fx = O_{ii}^5 \sim (\exists x).fx$$

This is the Tractarian version of logicism: arithmetical equations are part of the deductive methods of logic.

Tractarian numbers are always used to *count*. This is what the identification of all ascriptions of numbers with quantifying structures amounts to. The formal series of cardinal numbers is associated, in ascriptions of number, with larger and larger groups of nested quantifiers, like

...,
 $(\exists x)...$,
 $(\exists x, y)...$, etc.

or

$\sim(\exists x)...$,
 $\sim(\exists x, y)...$. $(\exists x)...$,
 $\sim(\exists x, y, z)...$. $(\exists x, y)...$, etc.

In the final analysis, numbers would completely disappear. Ascriptions of number would be expressed by means of quantified propositions, and would not be able to accomplish any semantical task beyond the expressive power of quantifiers – to pick out objects and count them.

While writing the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein was convinced that, under analysis, measuring would appear as a special case of counting. Propositions like

This table is 3 meters long.

would be formally analogous to

There are 3 apples on the table.

Both would have the same quantificational structure. Quantifiers would be counting apples in the second proposition, and meters in the first. But this cannot be done, as he acknowledges in the article about logical form. If we take measuring as a special case of counting, we cannot express the use of *standards*. We either multiply the standards or destroy the possibility of successive applications of them. When he wrote into Ramsey’s copy of the *Tractatus* that “number is the fundamental idea of calculus and must be introduced as such”, he was aware that the elegant version of logicism he had presented in the *Tractatus* was a complete failure and had to be abandoned.

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What We Cannot Say, We Can and Must Speak About

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Introduction

At first sight, the whole sense of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, clearly enunciated in its Preface, namely 'what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence' is introduced as an ethical law. However, if we ask 'What must we be silent about?', the answer is striking because Wittgenstein claims: 'it is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.' (6.421) In this way, ethics is part of the domain about which we must be silent. Is the above remark an ethical law that annihilates ethics? This 'paradox' seems to turn into a contradiction when we come to know that the book's point is an ethical one.

The question that I shall try to answer here is: how to interpret the sense of the *Tractatus* in relation to this alleged paradox and this supposed contradiction? Other questions need also to be answered, namely: what are the limits of language?; what is the concept of ethics in the *Tractatus*?; why is ethics at odds with these limits?; what is the nature of moral and ethical judgements?; finally, was Wittgenstein a moral sceptic?

1 - The limits of what can be said

In order to reconstruct the limits of language and, in this way, to understand why ethics is at odds with these limits, one can take the remark 2.1 'we picture facts to ourselves,' as an axiom and seek analytically the conditions of a picture. One of these conditions of language is stated in 5: 'a proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions.' This condition asserts that the sense of a proposition depends on the existence of simple propositions. The truth of a proposition is determined by the calculus of its possible combinations. However, the truth of an elementary proposition is decided by comparing it with reality. Now, there are two limiting cases of truth-functions, namely the tautology whose combinations turn out to be true in all possible worlds and the contradiction, which is false in all cases.

Another condition is pointed out in 2.18: 'What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it – correctly or incorrectly – in any way at all, is logical form, i.e. the form of reality.' This identity between the logical form of the picture and of the state of affairs is one of the conditions that allows the proposition to have sense, to say something, that is to be true or false. Now, the logical form *cannot be said*; it can only be exhibited or *shown* by the picture itself.

The remark 3.14 enunciates another condition: 'what constitutes a propositional sign is that in its elements (the words) stand in a determinate relation to one another.' A proposition is a combination of simple signs and not just a bunch of words. Its elements are connected '... like the links of a chain' (2.03). The structure is the way of effectively combining the elements in the picture. The form is the possibility of their combination.

Another necessary and universal condition of a picture is asserted in 4.0312: 'the possibility of propositions is based on the principle that objects have signs as their represen-

tatives.' What is alluded to here is that the elements that constitute the propositions must *stand for* objects. In other words, the names must have reference.

These conditions of a proposition, which can only *show* themselves in actual pictures, exhibit the limits of what can be said. Any sentence, which does not fulfil them, cannot be true or false. For example, 'Round squares are green' says nothing: the 'name' has no reference; its grammatical form is correct, but not its logical form.

2 - What can only be shown

The presentation of the conditions of saying showed that what cannot be said exists, that is, that there is something that language cannot say. Actually, these conditions show up by themselves. Now, the distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown is one of main points in Wittgenstein's book. The relationships between *saying* and *showing* are the following: every proposition, that is every picture, shows its own conditions; what is shown cannot be said; one can show without saying, for example, by means of tautologies; the attempt to say what can only be shown produces pseudo-propositions.

Based upon the distinction between to say and to show, we can conceive another between to say and to speak:

- *To say*: to represent something fulfilling the conditions of sense (e.g., to construct pictures);
- *To speak*: to express something without fulfilling the conditions of sense (e.g., to construct pseudo-propositions).

This distinction is based on the sharp division that Wittgenstein made between, on the one hand, propositions *stricto sensu*, that is, those capable of being true or false and, on the other hand, all the other pseudo-propositions (e.g.: tautologies which are senseless; nonsenses including the remarks of the *Tractatus*; absurds such as 'Socrates is identical'; ethical judgements; mathematical equations etc.). It allows us to understand why Wittgenstein, despite prohibiting the possibility of *saying* something about what cannot be said, does not prohibit us from *speaking* about what cannot be said. This can be applied to logic as well as to ethics, because both belong to the domain of the mystical. This concept does not commit Wittgenstein to any doctrine in particular, that is, to any mysticism. In 6.44, the mystical is not related to *how* the world is, but to the claim *that* it exists. It is exactly this 'experience' that is supposed by logic (5.552). In the same way, in the *Lecture on Ethics* (LE) this is the ethical 'experience' *par excellence*. Therefore, both logic and ethics depend on the *factum* of the world. Nevertheless, it does not follow any positive response to the classical question of metaphysics, namely 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' Despite the fact that in his *Notebooks* there is a tension between a dogmatic and a pantheist or materialist metaphysics, the *Tractatus* shows that metaphysics as a whole tries to say more than what can be said. However, Wittgenstein does not deny that one can *speak about* the meaning of life, either by attributing to it an extra-mundane meaning or by believing that the world is composed only of facts. What these attributions of meaning to the world cannot do is to say something.

3 - The nature of *ethical* judgements

Bearing this point in mind, it is possible now to elucidate the nature of *moral* and *ethical* judgements. Both are not pictures, that is, they are not propositions. Therefore, they cannot be either true or false. They cannot say anything. But ethics, as a philosophical discipline, intends to say something. Ethics is defined by Moore as ‘the general enquiry into what is good’ (1993: 54) and this definition is accepted by Wittgenstein who analyses in this way the term ‘good’: what is valuable; what is really important; the meaning of life, what makes life worth living; the right way of living (LE: 5). Thus, ethics intends to say something about the ultimate significance of life, about the meaning of the world.

It is possible to illustrate the purpose of ethics with some *examples* of statements that are found in the *Tractatus*, which intends to say something about what can be only *spoken* about. According to Wittgenstein, one problem of ethics, namely the question of the meaning of the world, can be tackled by dissolving it, that is, by showing that it is not a real problem (6.521). One dissolves the problem of the meaning of the world either by attributing to the world an extra-mundane significance or by conceiving life as self-sufficient. Good and bad depend on whether the problem of the meaning of the world is dissolved or not. Then, the good life presupposes that the problem of the meaning of the world is solved. That is why Wittgenstein claims that the ethical or the aesthetic contemplation of the world shows the possibility of happiness: to live *sub specie aeterni*.

We might now attempt to answer the other questions presented at the beginning of this paper regarding the domain of silence. In order to do this, it is necessary to introduce another distinction:

- the logical-philosophical sense of ‘be silent’: *not saying*
- the trivial sense of ‘be silent’: *not speaking*.

We saw above that ethics aims at *saying* what can only be *spoken* about. However, when one expresses a *moral* judgement about the meaning of the world, without holding that it can be either true or false, one confines oneself to the limits of morality and should not be silent in the trivial sense. But, ethics intend to say something about the meaning of the world and here one must be silent in the logical-philosophical sense. If this is not clear yet, one can try to carry on the analysis of the question about the pretension of ethics. Wittgenstein comments on this issue as follows: ‘Ich halte es für sicher wichtig, dass man all dem Geschwätz über Ethik – ob es eine Erkenntnis gebe, ob es Werte gebe, ob sich das Gute definieren lasse etc. – ein Ende macht.’ (cf. Waismann 1984: 69). Note that these questions are some of the main concerns of the *Principia Ethica*. What Wittgenstein impugns here is the philosophical or scientific intentions of *ethics* and not those of ordinary expressions of *morality*. And amongst the main philosophical concerns, there has always been the problem of the foundations of morality. As for Wittgenstein, the attempt to establish a scientific ground of morality yields only to nonsense. That is why he rejects the *rationalist* claim that God wants the good ‘... weil es gut ist.’ In fact, good is ‘...was Gott befiehlt.’ (cf. Waismann 1984: 115). The former requires an *explanation*, which it is exactly what he is denying that is possible to give. This allows us to understand better the use that Wittgenstein makes of *schweigen* (be silent) and to see why in the LE he holds that ethics is the tendency of running against the limits of language. That is why Wittgenstein said, paraphrasing

Schopenhauer, ‘To moralize is difficult, to establish morality impossible.’

Another philosophical assumption that Wittgenstein attempts to reduce to silence is the attempt to turn ethics into a science. Examples of this can be found in Moore and Russell. Another attempt was made by logical positivism: ethics ‘gibt *Erkenntnis* und nichts anderes, ihr Ziel ist allein die Wahrheit, das heisst: jede Wissenschaft ist als solche rein theoretisch.’ (Schlick 1984: 54) Wittgenstein’s criticism is addressed precisely to this scientificism, which tends to embrace everything, including the domain of values. In this way, when he is analysing the conditions of saying he is also showing that normative and value judgements do not satisfy these requirements. It does not make sense to ask for the reference of their simple terms. It also does not make sense to ask for either the truth or falsehood of *moral* judgements. That is why Wittgenstein rejected explanations: ‘Eine Theorie gibt mir nichts.’ (cf. Waismann 1984: 117) In other words, the good lies outside the space of facts and therefore outside of the scientific domain.

Wittgenstein denies also that ethics may be a science by showing that it is impossible to establish a science of the ultimate ends of human action (cf. Rhees 1981: 114). As far as the ends of an action are concerned, one must be *silent* in the logical-philosophical sense.

4 - Beyond ethics: morality

It is clear that there is a fundamental difference between the nature of the propositions and the nature of the *moral* judgements that express values or norms. In this way, moral judgements, compared with pictures, are pseudo-propositions. Moral judgements cannot be called propositions, for they do not satisfy the conditions of saying. Thus, when we either express judgements of values or enunciate norms of actions we are *speaking*, not *saying* something.

It is possible now to see that there is no real paradox because Wittgenstein’s remark is a law that annihilates *philosophy* of morals, that is, ethics, but not morality. There is also no contradiction because morality has not been abolished. There may be a kind of ‘quietness’ in the *Tractatus*, but it is related to philosophical silence. However, it is not a quietness related to daily moral problems.

Based upon this re-interpretation of the *Tractatus*, one can introduce another distinction, namely between an immoral silence and a moral silence:

- *Immoral silence*: to be silent, in the trivial sense, about something that should be spoken about, for example, the repudiation of a lie;
- *Moral silence*: to be silent, in the logical-philosophical sense, for example, about the problem of turning ethics into a science.

The difference between an immoral and moral silence is of paramount importance. For instance, in LE Wittgenstein distinguishes two uses of the terms ‘good’ and ‘duty’, namely one relative and another absolute. If one claims that ‘Peter is not a good soccer player’, Peter can answer that he does not intend to be better. But, if one claims that ‘Peter invented a lie about another person’, he cannot just answer that he does not intend to act in a better way: Peter *ought* to behave better (LE: 5).

Concluding remark

Finally, if there is some form of scepticism in the *Tractatus*, it is directed at ethics or rather at its philosophical pretensions. Regarding ethics, one must be silent. However, this does not imply the denial of morality. Regarding morality, one cannot be silent. The conclusion that we arrive at is this: what we cannot say, we can and sometimes must speak about.¹

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Colour Space: Phenomenal or Physical?

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In the recent philosophical (and scientific) literature on colour three views on colour space can be distinguished. One can distinguish physical colour spaces, psychophysical colour spaces, and phenomenal colour space. Physical colour spaces, e.g. a reflectance function space, are determined by means of physical properties solely. Psychophysical colour spaces are constructed by means of spectrometers and adjusted to human colour judgements. The phenomenal colour space is the three-dimensional internal space in which the phenomenal colours are ordered in a brightness, hue, and saturation dimension. The brightness axis is related to the intensity of the light beam. The second dimension, hue, is the traditional colour circle, and is usually given in polar coordinates. It is the respect in which red, yellow, green, blue, etc. differ from one another. Saturation is the dimension that reflects the ratio of a fully saturated hue versus a completely unsaturated colour, i.e. a grey tone. I will analyse the latter two colour spaces, as purely physical colour spaces are unproblematic. I will argue that psychophysical colour spaces are in fact physical colour spaces, and that there is no reason to believe in the existence of a phenomenal colour space.

Colour space has a long history. The foundation of the notion of a colour space is the chromatic colour circle. In his theory of colour (1704), Newton ordered colours in a colour circle with seven primary spectrum colours. Newton's colour circle was based on the physical phenomenon of colour diffraction, and fits within the physicalistic view of colour. Colours are viewed as properties of light rays. Later on, colour circles and spaces became part of a phenomenological tradition. Goethe's influence was particularly decisive in this evolution. Goethe campaigned against Newton's physicalistic view of colour, and located colour properties and phenomena in colour experience rather than in the external physical world.

The phenomenological tradition has exercised a significant influence upon the construction of modern colour spaces and catalogues. At the end of the 19th century the effect was visible in the work of colour scientists such as Hering and Ostwald. In particular, one major influence on the construction of the CIE-colour space in the 1920's and 30's was the painter Albert Munsell. He aspired to create an ideal colour solid, in which the coordinates would represent the principal attributes of colours perceived as belonging to surfaces and in which equal distances would represent equal sense-distances. His ideas have survived in followers like Judd, Nickerson, Newhall, who have greatly determined the outlook of current colour science. The quest for the ideal phenomenal colour space has continued ever since.

The phenomenal colour space has become philosophically important largely through the work of Carnap. In *The Logical Structure of the World*, he presented a reconstruction of all experience and our global scientific knowledge of the world on the basis of a single relation of 'recollection of part similarity' between 'elementary experiences,' i.e. the total experience the (solipsistic) subject has at a singular moment in time. The colour space is a stage in this construction. A three-dimensional (hue, saturation and brightness) colour solid was part of a five-dimensional visual space. It is important to note that *The Logical*

Structure of the World marked a transition in Carnap's thought (and in the *Wiener Kreis*) from phenomenalism to physicalism. The basic constituents of the construction were the elementary experiences of a (solipsistic) subject. In the preface to the second edition, Carnap wrote that he would rather have chosen physical objects as the building blocks, as Neurath had converted him to physicalism. He soon became displeased with the reconstruction programme, and did not rework it according to physicalist principles. His presentation of colour spaces is thus only available against a phenomenalist backdrop. One can only wonder what would have become of Carnap's colour spaces in a physicalist setting.

Remarkably, the idea of internal quality spaces, of which the colour space was the prime example, was taken over by Quine. Quine did, however, slightly modify Carnap's account. He presented quality spaces, namely, in a psychological context:

[W]e must credit the child with a sort of prelinguistic quality space. We may estimate the relative distances in his quality space by observing how he learns. If we reinforce his response of 'Red' in the presence of crimson and discourage it in the presence of yellow, and then find that he makes that response to pink and not to orange, we can infer that the shades of crimson and pink used are nearer to each other, in his quality space, than the crimson and orange. Supplementary clues to spacing are available in the child's hesitation, or reaction time. (Quine, 83)

The passage clearly illustrates the issue at stake. Quine thinks that colour experiences reveal an underlying prelinguistic quality space, the structure of which psychologists would eventually record in the form of maps. This is very much in accordance with the dominant approach in colour science at the time. The idea of a (unique) internal, phenomenal, or psychological colour space is still ubiquitous in the philosophy of colour. The concept of a phenomenal colour space, or, more generally, the notion of quality space, has been further elaborated by Austen Clark in his *Sensory Qualities*. Other recent elaborate presentations of colour spaces are Thompson et al. 1992, Gärdenfors 2000, and Shepard 2001.

It is remarkably difficult to characterise the colour space in phenomenal terms. The result is that there have been many incompatible proposals for a colour space, such as an infinite cylinder, a regular cylinder, a sphere, hemisphere, a sphere octant, a decagonal colour pyramid, a tilted double pyramid, a single cone or a tilted double cone (see Kuehni 2003). Furthermore, there are irregular spaces. For example, the most famous colour catalogue, Munsell's, has a bulge in the purple area. The overabundance of colour spaces is inconvenient, but, it would seem, not an insuperable problem. One might hope that by means of further empirical research the right colour space will be pinned down. However, the plurality is in fact a symptom of a deeper problem. There is a more fundamental difficulty with the idea of a phenomenal colour space. It is hard to imagine how it could be a genuine space with metrical properties. This difficulty arises in the form of a dilemma: either it is not a space in the mathematical sense, or it is not phenomenal. There can be colour spaces in a mathematical sense, but these are

determined by external physical parameters, and not by an internal metric or topology. There can be internal colour experience, but one cannot retrieve an internal colour structure on the basis of colour experience alone.

One thus could look at colour spaces determined by physical parameters. These are the psychophysical colour spaces. One of the most interesting psychophysical colour spaces is the wavelength mixture space or receptor colour space. A normal trichromat has three types of cones in the retina namely, the Short, Medium, and Long cones, characterised by different absorption spectra. Incident light can thus be characterised and located in a metrical space, the wavelength mixture space. The latter is a three-dimensional space, with an S, an M, and an L axis, and the points in the space indicate the amount of absorbed quanta by the respective cones. A similar colour space is a more technological colour space, namely the chromaticity diagram. It is related to the CIE standard in colorimetry. The CIE system was developed (in 1931) for technological needs, e.g. the industrial production of dyes. It consists of a series of conventions that roughly model the perceptual similarities experienced by human beings. The human factor is represented in a list of parameters, so that human colour perception can be predicted by measuring samples by spectrometers and calculating tristimuli values.

Neither the wavelength mixture space nor the CIE chromaticity diagram, however, are regarded as perfectly adequate colour spaces. The ordering of colours and especially the distances between colours slightly differ from the reports of human observers. Colour scientists have tried hard to choose a basic set of spectroscopes and parameters so as to model these reports as closely as possible, but distortions in the spatial structure cannot be completely eliminated. For this reason, there is a reluctance to call them genuine colour spaces. It has always been believed that psychophysical colour spaces are only imperfect representations of the real colour space, the phenomenal colour space, in which the phenomenal experiences are ordered. However, there remains little reason to maintain this view. Instead of regarding psychophysical colour spaces as imperfect representations of the internal colour space, they should be seen as the scientific basis of previous, more intuitive orderings of colours. The phenomenal colour space should be regarded as an obsolete, superfluous posit, parasitic upon psychophysical colour spaces.

The major difficulty with the concept of an internal, phenomenal, or conceptual colour space is that its topological or metrical structure cannot be characterised. If the scientific interpretation of the quality dimensions is strictly separated from the phenomenal, then the spatial structure of the quality space can no longer be exploited. It becomes difficult to define distances, to characterise the major axes, and to compare colours which are not neighbours in the (CIE-)colour space. For topological properties the best we can get is a relation such as "Person A perceives that colour x is closer to colour y than to colour z " for colours close enough to each other, if we accept some degree of vagueness. Colour differences can also only be compared on a local scale. From a phenomenal point of view, colours that are not close in the (physical) colour space, are entirely different. This jeopardises the possibility of a global phenomenal space. Neither is it clear how to fix the origin in the (global) phenomenal space, i.e. pure grey, how to define a local metric for phenomenal colour experiences, or how to characterise the traditional axes on the basis of phenomenal characteristics alone. Is it really clear to an observer whether some gradual change in colour only occurs in one

dimension, while the values of the other dimensions remain constant? It is probable that a different observer (or the same observer at a later time) will also see changes in the other dimensions. The plurality of colour spaces is most illuminating in relation to these difficulties. An unequivocal procedure of identification and measurement of phenomenal colour experiences is simply not available.

Austen Clark proposed an appealing procedure often employed by psychologists to overcome these difficulties, namely multi-dimensional scaling. On the basis of local judgements of the kind ' x is similar to y ', or ' x is more similar to y than to z ', or 'proximities', which are numbers that represent the similarity between stimuli, and where the samples for judgement are colours, one can construct a space in which the various colours are located. However, the mathematical structure of this space must be interpreted cautiously. For while this space has only topological properties, the colour experiences are nonetheless represented in a metrical space. This can be quite misleading. In a topological space it does not make much sense to speak of three orthogonal axes. The distances between the points in the space do not really represent anything. Vector addition does not make sense. The dimension yielded by the MDS-method is unstable. One may for example obtain four or seven-dimensional spaces, instead of the traditional three-dimensional phenomenal colour space. One must then employ some statistical criterion in order to decide how many dimensions are needed. It is not clear how these dimensions should be interpreted. The spaces thus obtained are merely graphical representations, and do not necessarily reflect an internal space.

There is also a good physical explanation for why the psychophysical colour spaces do in fact describe colour experience quite well, and moreover why they do *not* describe colour experience very precisely and as a consequence have only limited application. Because there are three types of receptors in the human eye, the visual information that is processed in the brain starts from tristimuli values. From a physical point of view, there is little difference between using three types of cones or three types of spectrometers in order to reduce the dimension of the spectral power function space. In view of the physiology of perception, it is not surprising that certain distortions occur. There are distorting processes that occur already at the level of the retina and further distortions in neural transmission and processing while opponent cells enhance contrast effects. The phenomenon of colour constancy indicates an even more complex neural processing of colour information over the whole visual field. These processes involve the non-linear stretching and recombination of the initial parameters, and thus distort the initial spatial structure of the tristimulus space. For a multitude of perceptual conditions, different psychophysical colour spaces can be constructed. In these colour spaces, compensatory adjustments are made so that the structure of the colour space better conforms to what people actually see. The plurality of psychophysical colour spaces has a natural explanation, and the quest for an 'ideal psychological colour solid', i.e. a phenomenal colour space, seems ill-conceived.

In conclusion, we can permit a multitude of psychophysical colour spaces, whose metrical structures are determined by physical parameters, and therefore are real physical spaces. On the other hand, the supposition of a phenomenal, internal, mental colour space remains wholly redundant.

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On Wittgenstein on Mathematics

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1. Wittgenstein on identity

In the *Tractatus* [4] we find a criticism of identity, concluding with 5.534 "Und nun sehen wir, dass Scheinsätze wie $a = b$, ..., $\exists x . x = a$ etc. sich in einer richtigen Begriffsschrift gar nicht hinschreiben lassen."

In 5.535 he victoriously exclaims: "Damit erledigen sich auch alle Probleme, die an solche Scheinsätze geknüpft waren ... Das, was das Axiom of infinity sagen soll, würde sich in der Sprache dadurch ausdrücken, dass es unendlich viele Namen mit verschiedener Bedeutung gäbe."

This remark about the axiom of infinity is wrong. This axiom, in whatever formulation, must imply that the Frege-Russell naturals are nonempty. If we implement Wittgenstein's suggestion by a list a_0, a_1, a_2, \dots of constants and the list of statements a_i has a denotation different from that of a_j , where i is different from j , then it can be shown that in the resulting type theory (even with the axioms of reducibility and choice) the axiom of infinity cannot be derived.

Now to the several arguments by which Wittgenstein tries to prove 5.534, namely that the identity sign = (either primitive or defined (!)) cannot exist in a correct Begriffsschrift.

An first example is 5.301 "Dass die Identität keine Relation zwischen Gegenständen ist, leuchtet ein." Clearly wrong: if A is the (or a) class of objects then the identity on A is the relation $\{ \langle x, x \rangle : x \in A \}$ qua class of ordered pairs.

Suppose no relation is a class of ordered pairs, but rather every relation is a "real" or "concrete" or "individual" connection between objects, then the statement 5.301 is still wrong – since it is *not evident* that identity should not be such a "real" relation. As second example is the famous remark 5.5303 "Beiläufig gesprochen: Von zwei Dingen zu sagen, sie seien identisch ist ein Unsinn, und von Einem zu sagen es sei identisch mit sich selbst, sagt gar nichts."

Again, this is wrong. First, let two distinct things be given, e.g., the Moon and the Sun. Then *theMoon* = *theSun* is false. But from something's being false it does not follow its being nonsensical. Next, *theMoon* = *theMoon* is true. Suppose that this statement despite its truth says *nothing*, e.g., in the sense of being *uninformative* like a tautology. But this is no reason for throwing statements like $a = a$ out of the *richtige Begriffsschrift*. For identities of the form $a = a$ can play a reasonable role in deductive systems in much the same way as tautologies do, despite their lack of information.

Next come criticisms of Russell's and Ramsey's definition of identity, respectively. In *Principia Mathematica* [3] p.168 we find the following definition of identity.

$$x = y \Leftrightarrow \forall \varphi (\varphi(x) \rightarrow \varphi(y))$$

Here the exclamation mark "!" connotes that the order of the variable φ is the lowest one (say, 1).

Wittgenstein remarks on that: 5.5302 "Russells Definition von '=' genügt nicht; weil man nach ihr nicht sagen kann, dass zwei Gegenstände alle Eigenschaften ge-

meinsam haben. (Selbst wenn dieser Satz nie richtig ist, hat er doch Sinn.)"

Again we have a remark before us which is generally regarded as ingenious. First, it is unclear what it means that one can or cannot say something according to a definition. Be that as it may, one can certainly say that the Moon and the Sun have all properties in common. This sentence is almost certainly false. We can say it. Moreover, that the Moon and the Sun have all properties in common has *Sinn*, as Wittgenstein himself would concede (in parentheses). Then, what is all the fuss about? Has Wittgenstein not shown that Russell's definition is insufficient?

Ramsey in his paper *The Foundation of Mathematics* in [2] p. 181 cites Russell's definition. Since in this definition the variable φ has order 1, the question arises whether one can prove the general law of substitutivity *without using the axiom of reducibility*. Ramsey gives an inconclusive proof to the effect that one can. In [1] (1974) J. Myhill showed that one cannot prove the law of substitutivity without the axiom of reducibility.

Wittgenstein would have scored a point if he had justified his objection against Russell's definition by a rejection of the axiom of reducibility.

In the *Big Typescript* [6] pp. 375-377 we find a discussion of *Ramsey's Theorie der Identität*. Wittgenstein cites Russell's definition as Ramsey's. These three pages in [6] contain several obvious errors. Here's just one.

"Er (i.e. Ramsey) hat also mit seiner Erklärung nichts anderes erreicht, als was die zwei Definitionen $x = x =_{def} \text{Tautologie}$... $x = y =_{def} \text{Contradiktion}$ bestimmen." To be sure, Ramsey was not that stupid to give such an *Erklärung*.

Prefinally then, let me remark that identity can indeed be handled more or less the way Wittgenstein suggests, namely using identical variables for identical objects, and distinct variables for distinct objects (see 5.53 and 5.5321). See Hintikka in the J.S.L. (about 1950). However, this does not refute my criticism, the less so because Wittgenstein himself has given no hints how his own "syncategorematic" theory of identity would work.

A Final Remark on Identity. If Wittgenstein had himself believed that his "syncategorematic" theory of identity would incorporate identity in a *richtige Begriffsschrift*, then he could hardly have written that 6.2 "Die Sätze der Mathematik sind Gleichungen also Scheinsätze." However, is the sentence that there are infinitely many primes, and the like *Gleichungen* (identities, equalities)? Not even the Pythagorean theorem is an identity. Though not themselves identities, mathematical sentences may be mathematically equivalent with identities. By the way, since any two theorems of a system are equivalent in the system, and since, say, $2 + 2 = 4$ is a theorem of every nontrivial system, every theorem (of every nontrivial system) is provably equivalent with $2 + 2 = 4$. What then did Wittgenstein want to say?

2. Wittgenstein on consistency

Philosophically, and also mathematically, one could have (and in fact has) raised several doubts against Hilbert's Programme already before Gödel's 1931 paper. Hilbert's Programme is (was) the following.

- (a) Formalize some significant part of mathematics by a "calculus" (or "formal system") M .
- (b) Show by finitary means that M is consistent; that is to say that $0=1$ is not provable in M .

Hilbert's Programme was not nonsensical; on the contrary, it is always an important question whether a given formal axiom system is consistent. The real shame is that there are so few axiom systems the consistency of which can be proved by finitary means, even if we take *finitary* in a much more liberal sense than Hilbert.

Wittgenstein's remarks about consistency (*Widerspruchsfreiheit*) suggest that he (more or less) understood Hilbert's Programme. [In [6] p. 366 we read the somewhat scornful phrase: "Der Beweis der Widerspruchsfreiheit der Axiome, von dem die Mathematiker heute soviel Aufhebens machen."]

In [6] we read under the heading *Beweis der Widerspruchsfreiheit* p. 367:

"Wenn nachträglich ein Widerspruch gefunden wird, so waren vorher die Regeln noch nicht klar und eindeutig. Der Widerspruch macht also nichts, denn er ist dann durch *das Aussprechen einer Regel* [my emphasis] zu entfernen."

Let us first explain the *prima facie* meaning of this quote. *Nachträglich* seems to mean: after setting up the calculus, i.e. the system of rules. Now suppose the calculus, say, Frege's Grundgesetze GG, has been set up, and then an inconsistency is found. Does this mean that the rules of GG were not yet clear and unambiguous? No, the rules of Frege's GG were clear and unambiguous and could *by this very virtue* be instrumental in the derivation of Russell's inconsistency. The inconsistency does not matter, says Wittgenstein. For, says he, we have just to pronounce a rule, and the inconsistency will vanish. Which rule should we pronounce in the case of GG?

This is the *prima facie* meaning of the above quote. On closer scrutiny of its environment we found that it is the real meaning.

There are still worse things Wittgenstein is saying, all to be found on p. 366 of [6].

"Zwei Spielregeln aber, die einander für einen bestimmten Fall widersprechen, sind vollkommen in Ordnung, bis dieser Fall eintritt und dann erst wird es nötig, durch eine weitere Regel zwischen ihnen zu entscheiden."

This is indeed a very powerful way to prove consistency. And then

"... wenn in den Axiomen eines Systems ein Widerspruch wäre, so wäre das gar nicht so ein grosses Unglück. Nichts ist leichter, als ihn zu beseitigen." Namely either by pronouncing of a rule or using a conflict-deciding rule.

3. Wittgenstein on uncountability

The remarks about this topic are to be found in [5] pp.54-63. I restrict myself to some short remarks, although the subject deserves a longer discussion

The qualms Wittgenstein expresses about uncountability are, to some extent, also shared by other philosophers of mathematics, mostly by some of a so-called constructivist brand.

R is uncountable means: there is no injective function from R into the class of natural numbers.

Now, what can it mean to reject the uncountability of R in the just defined sense? It could mean:

- (1) One cannot prove it.
- (2) One can refute it.
- (3) The statement of uncountability is, despite the given definition, without sense.

Each of these three objection (even (2)) can be made precise and reasonably defended. Wittgenstein did nothing like that. Instead we find desultory (and sometimes derogatory) comments. For example:

p. 56 "Our suspicion ought always to be aroused when a proof proves more than its means allow it. Something of this sort might be called 'a puffed-up proof'."

p. 56 "The set ... is not denumerable" resides in its making what is a determination, formation, of a concept, look like a fact of nature." Does Wittgenstein want to say that the uncountability of R is not a fact of nature? Has Cantor claimed it to be a fact of nature? Or does Cantor's mistake consist just in claiming the uncountability of R as *true* – whereas it is only "a determination, a formation, of a concept"? Are there determinations, formations, of concepts which we should not use in statements at all?

The main problem is this. Since Wittgenstein acknowledges the diagonal procedure as correct, even as trivial, he must be asked to formulate *the very theorem* which has been proved by this proof. Perhaps Wittgenstein thinks that there is a proof which is not a proof of a theorem at all, or of a theorem that cannot be *said* but only *shown*.

4. Wittgenstein on proofs

The notion of proof presupposed by Wittgenstein is (more or less) the notion of a derivation in a calculus or formal system of rules. I do not mention this as an objection, but only as to remind the reader that there are also other notions of proof, e.g., the intuitionistic notion which does not refer to derivations in formal systems but to (mental) constructions.

Since Wittgenstein's notion of proof is (more or less) that of a derivation within a system of rules, his "theory or philosophy of proofs" deals mainly with the following two themes:

- (1) What is a rule? What is it to follow a rule?
- (2) A proof as a graphical documentation of a derivation within a system of rules.

We remark that Wittgenstein's notion of a rule is essentially ambiguous. In one sense, a rule is a logico-mathematical rule like the rule of *modus ponens* or the chain rule in calculus. Such a logico-mathematical rule is itself a mathematical entity, e.g., the modus ponens is (may be considered as) a *function* which yields the formula ψ when applied to the formulae ϕ and $\phi \rightarrow \psi$. Also, a proof as based on this notion of rule is a mathematical entity, e.g., a tree labelled by formulae and (applications of) rules.

In another sense, a rule is a conditional imperative or a conditional permission. Human actions, e.g., in playing

games or wars, can be in conformance with rules in this sense, or they can violate them.

Now, it can be shown that, on the one hand, Wittgenstein was well aware of these two notions of rule; but that, on the other hand, he constantly confuses them. It is precisely this confusion that is responsible for the vexing ingenuity of his remarks about rules. However, the confusion of rules in the mathematical sense with rules in the non-mathematical sense is very wide-spread; indeed, this confusion is the very foundation of much of what is called philosophy of language (and, for that matter, of philosophy of mathematics). Unfortunately, in this respect, almost all of us are in the same boat.

Concerning point (2), I think that Wittgenstein has many interesting things to say; he aims at a kind of psychology of writing and reproducing proofs *qua man-made* patterns; I do not say this pejoratively.

However, if we look at Wittgenstein's more logico-mathematical remarks about proofs, we will find much lack of insight. For example, he says in [6] p. 364

"Der Beweis der Beweisbarkeit eines Satzes wäre der Beweis des Satzes selbst."

This shows that he did not understand this crucial difference; which may be, ultimately, the cause of his deplorable misunderstanding of Gödel's incompleteness theorems, as amply documented in [5].

In [6] there is much material on proofs by induction (by recursion). I was unable to discover the very problem Wittgenstein had posed to himself here.

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The Wittgensteinian Idea of Analysis as a Base for Constructive Contemporary Scepticism

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The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose. (Wittgenstein 1998, §127)

1. Introduction

My point of departure will be a terminological remark. Scepticism comprises a wide range of theories and particular ideas, and in order to comment or criticize its formulations, one has to determine which and whose exactly claims one has in mind. It is not my intention to analyse particular formulations of a certain kind of scepticism here. Instead, I will invite the audience to treat scepticism in general as a positive, constructive methodological approach. This runs contrary to many present-day opinions that take scepticism to be close to philosophical nihilism or radical relativism. Scepticism, as I propose to understand it, opens up many possibilities in epistemology (to resolve old problems of obtaining *episteme* knowledge, for example) and yet does not lead to metaphysical dogmatism (which is probably even more important).

We should keep in mind that the Wittgensteinian way of writing – collecting remarks on various subjects next to each other, asking questions, carrying on a specific philosophical dialogue and refraining from conclusive answers – allows his readers to formulate different interpretations. I do not claim that *Philosophical Investigations* cannot be treated as a consistent totality of thoughts (especially when we take its first part into account), as full of arguments about important philosophical problems, or even proposals on how to solve them. Nevertheless, I think one has to be very careful while looking for complete and comprehensive theories in Wittgenstein's work. There is one advantage in the very fact that Wittgenstein is not clear about his own view, namely, the possibility of interpreting his work in various ways. It inspires and motivates other thinkers to build their own interesting philosophical options, but it also allows them to attribute different conceptions to him. So, are we able to read anything interesting and useful about analysis in Wittgenstein's books? I believe that we can find there a quite reserved and reasonable solution about doing philosophy. A solution which has been both adored and criticized in the philosophical literature. I will look a bit closer at it.

2. A few words about constructive scepticism

A constructive form of scepticism can be understood as a critical, antifundamentalist, antiessentialist philosophical approach, in which we neither claim that we are unable to achieve any kind of knowledge, nor that we should suspend all our judgements, because we will never obtain *episteme* knowledge. Wittgenstein has showed that we can give up the idea of looking for unquestionable, undeniable, timeless, invariable, language-transcendent knowledge (usually called *episteme*) and at the same time we can obtain usual reliable human knowledge about contingent facts about our world and our life. It is worth to underscore that scepticism I am talking about here is a methodological approach rather than a well formulated

philosophical theory concerning knowledge for example. It is important especially when one tries to number Wittgenstein among the sceptics. He is not a sceptic in the sense Pyrrho of Elis was. It may be said that he rejects the traditional form of scepticism not by confronting it with a dogmatic metaphysical position, but rather with a different view of knowledge or obtaining knowledge. In this case scepticism is seen as an approach which simply cannot be formulated. Its formulation does not make sense because it raises doubts where no questions can be asked (Wittgenstein 1967, § 675, 676). To summarize, it can be stated that Wittgenstein refuses to accept a certain form of scepticism by showing that the very formulation of the idea itself is wrong and even nonsensical. I call it 'refusal' because of the lack of any better notion. What Wittgenstein wants is the philosophical problems rising within scepticism to disappear. When we abandon our claims about *episteme* knowledge, as Wittgenstein does, we will be left with descriptive analysis as a proper method of philosophising. Consequently, it can be said that his attitude towards doing philosophy is sceptical.

3. The Wittgensteinian view of philosophical analysis

The specifically Wittgensteinian way of doing philosophy is truly characteristic of both periods of his work, and it is done through the analysis of language. Both in *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein formulates philosophical conclusions after a careful and detailed analysis of language. This he does for different reasons and trying to achieve different goals. What is the correct philosophical analysis according to *Philosophical Investigations*? As it is usually understood, philosophers are trying to understand different, more or less complicated matters in philosophy. They want to clear misunderstandings, which they often notice, for example, in the common-sense views of these matters. In order to do this, they are forced to define which matters exactly need to be cleared up. Wittgenstein could not agree more. We should clear misunderstandings away, but these misunderstandings do not concern facts, sensations or other phenomena, but rather the use of words and expressions in language. It is worth mentioning in passing that language is understood here as a family resemblance of language-games, as "the family of structures more or less related to one another" (Wittgenstein 1998, § 108). Such misunderstandings can be removed by 'philosophical analysis'. Wittgenstein suggests that such an analysis is nothing more but "substituting one form of expression for another", in other words, it is a process of "taking a thing apart" and it can vary from case to case (Wittgenstein 1998, § 90). For example, when we are considering such phenomena as *pain* or *the process of understanding*, in order to make them clearer, we should recollect statements which we usually make about these phenomena (Wittgenstein 1998, § 90). As Wittgenstein puts it "our investigation (...) is directed not towards phenomena, but (...) towards the 'possibilities' of phenomena" (Wittgenstein 1998, § 90). The idea of 'analysis' should not be understood here as a method which will let us reach something like "a final analysis" or "a state of complete exactness", or let us

discover (and explain) something deeply hidden in uses of words and expressions we are analysing. The real goal of our investigation is to have a clear view of anything which, according to our purpose, needs such a clarification. The answers which we will obtain from our analysis cannot “be given once for all and independently of any future experience” (Wittgenstein 1998, § 92). It seems to me that Wittgenstein does not abandon such ideas like ‘essence’, ‘necessity’, ‘facts’, ‘logic/grammar’, and ‘mental processes’ in his late philosophy. Rather, he aims to look at them from a different point of view – from the point of view of their functions in language-games. The essence is not something which “lies *beneath* the surface”, but rather “something that already lies open to view and that becomes surveyable by a rearrangement” (Wittgenstein 1998, § 92, 108, 308). What we are going to gain by this method is not the answers to the old, classical philosophical questions (like: *What is the essence of language*), but a rejection of such questions (Wittgenstein 1998, § 47). For we can always answer – after a detailed analysis of the use of certain words expressing the ideas above – that analysed ideas are in fact modal features of human experience. Experience which is always rooted in form of life and “surrounded” with language, and which we should be able to describe. So, it can be easily said that for Wittgenstein both categories: ‘analysis’ and ‘experience’ mark a natural starting point for doing philosophy in general.

Even when we treat analysis as an unsystematic and, in a sense, unfinished philosophical procedure, we are nevertheless forced to define the temporary target of making it in any particular case. First of all, we should settle what is our philosophical perspicuity which we are going to achieve through the analysis. Its form will be different in different therapies, as Wittgenstein would put it, and there will be no one standard for it (Wittgenstein 1998, § 132, 133). Secondly, if philosophy is a special kind of analysis and language (language described as a set of language games: “the whole consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven”, Wittgenstein 1998, § 7), our aims are in a wide sense cognitive. We will be trying hard to understand language which we are using in our every day life. Because our human cognitive aims are intercorrelated with praxis, it can be said that our philosophical aims are in fact pragmatic (Putnam, 1995). We are supposed to investigate the matters which are “already in plain view”, that is, human phenomena which are difficult to investigate only because their ‘being there’ is too natural for us. So natural that their essence (not traditionally understood) is hidden from us, because it is too close (Wittgenstein 1998, § 89, 92). And finally, if philosophers do not take seriously Wittgenstein’s advice to do away with all forms of *explanation* and replace it with description alone (Wittgenstein 1998, § 109, 124, 126), philosophy will become a dead area of human activity, where language does not do its job and is like an engine idling (Wittgenstein 1998, § 132). We simply have to talk about language which is a spatial and temporal phenomenon, and not about a strange kind of phantasm (Wittgenstein 1998, § 108). There is no second-order philosophy, there is only philosophy itself, entirely connected with human forms of life, which means that the Wittgensteinian call for bringing words (especially favourite philosophical terms like: ‘thought’, ‘proposition’, ‘language’, ‘logic’) back to their everyday use must be taken for granted for any reasonable philosophical enterprise (Wittgenstein 1998, § 116, 121). Let me summarize what such an enterprise is. Philosophy should bring to light misunderstandings which are the results of bewitchment by means of language which touches philosophers (Wittgenstein 1998, § 109).

Such activities like construing theories or postulating one theoretical option against another are excluded from that very aim. Wittgenstein writes a lot about truth, thought, proposition, meaning, logic, sensations, philosophy itself, etc., but he is doing that according to the demand for describing various matters, instead of explaining them. He does not try to define them, he does not try to formulate any criteria for applying them, he does not try to formulate strict nomic rules for language, for example – in a classical sense these three requirements could build a theory. Needless to say, Wittgenstein in his late philosophy is very critical about science, its theories and methodological demands.

4. Concluding remarks

I claim that scepticism understood as a methodological position based on the Wittgensteinian idea of analysis is the only position which opens the door for pluralism in philosophy – pluralism which can be easily read from Wittgensteinian antidogmatism (Wittgenstein 1998, §131).

It can be objected that I am using the term ‘scepticism’ in a strange and unauthorised way, and the Wittgensteinian position I am describing above is simply a critical and descriptive philosophical point of view, not sceptical. It is well known that historically speaking the English word ‘scepticism’ comes from the Greek word ‘skēpsis’ which can be translated as ‘doubt, investigation, consideration’. Consequently, when you call someone ‘skeptikoī’ – to use the Greek word – you refer to somebody who refuses to take any dogmatic position and claims that he is always engaged in ‘considering’ and ‘investigating’ the matters. So, generally speaking, the constructive sceptical attitude expresses critical reflection on the world and oneself and also, more importantly, on one’s own theories about this world and oneself. Such an attitude seems to be the very beginning of philosophising in general, and specifically, it fits in very well – as I was trying to show – with the Wittgensteinian idea of doing philosophy.

I do not think Wittgenstein wanted us to stop doing philosophy just because he proposed to change the way we had been doing it. Rather, he wanted philosophical problems – oddly understood as very specific – to disappear, and only simple, usual human problems – which should be solved by certain people at a certain time – to remain. Can we still call it a philosophical enterprise? I believe we can.

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Wittgenstein über Musikverstehen und die Unterbrechung der inneren Stimme

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Zum Auftakt dieses Papiers möchte ich einige kurze musikbezogene Stellen aus Wittgensteins Briefen an Rudolf Koder zum Anlass nehmen zur Behandlung von Fragen das Meinens und Verstehens von Musik sowie neue Erfahrungen betreffend.

Was seinen Musikgeschmack angeht war Wittgenstein scheinbar konservativ – fast ausschließlich schätzte er Komponisten der klassisch-romantischen Epoche der europäischen Musikgeschichte. Dass diese Vorlieben nicht notwendig mit einer konservativen Musikauffassung einhergehen, hoffe ich hier zeigen zu können.

Der Briefwechsel Wittgensteins mit Koder, 1923 aufgenommen und bis zu Wittgensteins Tod im Jahre 1951 fortgeführt, zeugt von einer engen Freundschaft, in welcher Musik eine ganz besondere Rolle spielte. In den Briefen wurde diese aber kaum fortlaufendes Thema einer Diskussion. In 23 der 70 von Wittgenstein verfassten Briefe ist von Musik die Rede, in vier davon gibt es Äußerungen zu musikästhetischen Fragen: Ich werde zwei davon als Startrampe verwenden, nämlich die Briefe 36 und 45.

Zunächst zitiere ich aus dem Brief 36 (zw. 21.01. u. 28.02.1930): „Neulich war ich in einem Konzert & hörte die Klarinetten Quintette von Mozart & Brahms skandalös aufgeführt. Sie haben besser geklungen wie wir sie miteinander spielten! Wirklich! Wir haben uns doch die größte Mühe gegeben & und sie richtig gemeint.“ (Alber 2000, 32)

Mich lässt hier die Begründung aufhorchen, die Wittgenstein für das bessere Klangergebnis der eigenen Aufführung gibt. Der erste Teil davon ist sicherlich im Hinblick auf den ernsthaften Menschen verständlich, der höchste Ansprüche an sich und andere stellte und Nachlässigkeit nicht tolerierte. Der zweite Teil berührt eine prominente Problematik Wittgensteins: das Meinens, also die Frage nach den Bedeutungen von Ausdrücken.

Ich möchte noch einen Moment bei der Hervorhebung dieses „gemeint“ verweilen. Wie wäre es, wenn Wittgenstein in dem betreffenden Satz statt des „gemeint“ das „richtig“ unterstrichen hätte? Dann hätte man es mit dem Streit um die angemessene Interpretation, um die mehr oder weniger richtigen Alternativen, ein Stück zu „meinen“ zu tun. Dieser Streit ist jedoch nicht derjenige, auf den Wittgenstein an dieser Stelle offenbar hinauswill. Ich denke, es geht ihm eher darum, ein Musikstück *überhaupt* zu meinen oder nicht zu meinen. Er behauptet, beim Musizieren mit Koder seien die Stücke „richtig gemeint“ worden, während sie bei jener kritisierten Aufführung zwar gespielt, aber eben nicht richtig *gemeint* worden seien.

Wenn also gemeinte Stücke besser klingen – worin genau liegt dann der klangliche Unterschied zwischen einem gemeinten und einem nicht gemeinten Stück? Der Brief 36 gibt darüber keine genauere Auskunft. Der übrige Briefwechsel weist aber kontinuierlich darauf hin, in welcher Richtung der Unterschied zu suchen sei: Im Brief 92 schreibt Wittgenstein begeistert vom Klavierspiel seiner Schwester Helene, die Labor „mit unglaublichem Ausdruck“ spiele (Alber 2000, 69) und im Brief 118, dass er Koder glaube, wenn dieser schreibe, seine Schwester

spiele „Mozart mit schönem Ausdruck“ (Alber 2000, 86). Diese Stellen heben den Ausdruck als qualitatives Merkmal hervor – manche Stellen werden darin auch spezifischer: Die schlechte Qualität einer Aufführung von Bruckners 7. Symphonie wird im Brief 111 unter anderem dadurch begründet, dass die brucknerspezifische „Süße“ gefehlt hätte (Alber 2000, 81f.).

Diese und weitere Stellen in Wittgensteins Briefen weisen auf die außerordentlich wichtige Rolle hin, welche dem Ausdruck für die Qualität einer Aufführung zukommt. Dies spricht dafür, dass auch die Bewertung der Klarinetten-Quintette im Brief 36 maßgeblich mit dem Ausdruck zu tun hat, dass also die kritisierte Aufführung nicht einen solchen Ausdruck aufwies, wie ihn Wittgenstein und Koder beim Spielen derselben Stücke erzielt hatten. Wenn ich diese Möglichkeit ein Stück weiterführe, dann ließe sich Wittgensteins Erklärung als Antwort auf die Frage nach dem klanglichen Unterschied von gemeinten und nicht gemeinten Stücken folgendermaßen paraphrasieren: Damals, als wir die Klarinetten-Quintette spielten, haben wir sie richtig *gemeint* und uns die größte Mühe gegeben und *deshalb* haben wir einen solchen Ausdruck hervorgebracht und die Stücke haben besser geklungen als bei der besagten „skandalösen“ Aufführung.

Wenn auch eine enge Verwobenheit von Meinens, Ausdruck und der Qualität musikalischer Aufführungen angenommen werden kann, so bleiben die näheren Verhältnisse dieser im Sinne einer Theorie des Meinens und Verstehens von Musik weitgehend unbestimmt. Deshalb, gewissermaßen um das Bild zu schärfen, wende ich mich nun folgender Stelle im Brief 45 (zw. 25.10. u. 14.11.1930) zu: „Die einzige Möglichkeit ein Musikstück kennen zu lernen ist doch die: Du spielst es & merkst dabei deutlich, daß Du die & die Stellen noch ohne Verständnis spielst. Du kannst nun entweder auf diese Stimme (in Deinem Inneren) nicht weiter hinhorchen & das Stück verständnislos wie früher spielen, oder Du horchst auf die Stimme, dann wirst Du getrieben, die betreffende Stelle wieder & wieder zu spielen & quasi zu untersuchen. Je weniger träge Du bist desto weiter wird das gehen, d.h. desto mehr Stellen werden Dir als noch nicht wirklich gefühlt aufgehen.“ (Alber 2000, 37f.)

Ohne Umschweife möchte ich der Erklärung für dieses „dabei deutlich merken, dass“ Gehör verschaffen. Wittgenstein schreibt, man vernehme eine „Stimme (in deinem Inneren)“, auf die man „weiter hinhorchen“ könne oder nicht. Es soll sich also um etwas handeln, das im Inneren beim Spielen oder Hören von Musik vernommen wird und das beachtet oder ignoriert werden kann. Diese Beschreibung lässt eine Art Zwiegespräch von Innerem und Äußerem vermuten, ein gegenseitiges Durchwirken von musikalischen Klängen und Lauten der inneren Stimme. Wenn man sich entschliesse der Stimme zu lauschen, dann nehme man die Rolle eines Folgenden ein. Dann werde man durch die Stimme „getrieben“, die betreffende noch unverständliche Stelle „wieder & wieder zu spielen & quasi zu untersuchen“. Durch die Wiederholung noch unverständlicher Stellen werde aber die innere Stimme nicht endlich zum Schweigen gebracht, sondern vielmehr ermuntert und bekomme Gesellschaft durch einen an-

wachsenden Chor von anschwellenden neuen Stimmen, welches dazu führe – davon ist Wittgenstein überzeugt – dass man sich immer besser in sich auskenne. Der Brief 45 kann helfen, einen zusätzlichen Faden zwischen den beiden Komponenten von Wittgensteins Erklärung für ein besseres Klingen der Klarinetten-Quintette in Brief 36 zu spinnen: Es wird nicht einerseits „sich die größte Mühe gegeben“ und andererseits „richtig gemeint“, was man spielt, sondern es bedeutet vielmehr auch die größte Mühe, das eigene Verständnis so zu entwickeln, dass man überhaupt in der Lage ist, ein Stück richtig zu meinen – es fordert gewissermaßen Arbeit am Sinn.

Der weitere Verlauf der Passage ist nicht mehr eindeutig musikbezogen, sondern fügt sich tendenziell in den weiteren lebenspraktischen Kontext des Briefes ein, der die Wichtigkeit des Handelns gegenüber dem Nachdenken herausstellt. Bezogen auf das Musikverstehen heißt das, den üblichen Handlungsrahmen zu unterbrechen (die bisherige Spielpraxis) und die Tätigkeit auf blinde Flecken des Verständnisses zu konzentrieren. Wittgenstein gibt hier den Ratschlag, im Praktischen weiterzugehen, also eine Sache zu tun oder zu unterlassen und dort werde man zu größerer Klarheit (über sich) gelangen. Diese pragmatische Wendung ist bekanntermaßen eine entscheidende in Wittgensteins Philosophie – mich interessiert hier die Erklärung des Impulses zu diesem Schritt im Kontext des Musikverstehens, denn diese gehört zu jenen der frühen Briefe, die aus der Perspektive wittgensteinischer Spätphilosophie problematisch erscheinen können.

Jemandem gegenüber, der die Erklärung von Handlungen durch eine „innere Stimme“ für theoretisch vertretbar hielte, fielen einem Wittgenstein-Leser wahrscheinlich drei Hauptstrategien ein, um einer solchen Erklärung kritisch zu begegnen: *Erstens* könnte man auf provokativ wortwörtliche Art und Weise nach dieser Stimme fragen – z.B. ob sie männlich oder weiblich sei, welche Tonlage, ob sie Dialekt rede oder etwaige Sprachfehler hätte... also pointiert gefragt: Können wir ein „Erlebnis der inneren Stimme“ aufweisen? *Zweitens* könnte man skeptisch nachfragen, wie der Betreffende denn wüsste, ob er jeweils der inneren Stimme richtig gefolgt sei – hier wiederholt sich das Regel- oder Deutungsparadox: Meine Entscheidung fälle ich allerdings nach Wittgenstein in Brief 45 nicht darüber *wie*, sondern *ob* ich folgen will. *Drittens* könnte man die vermeintliche Selbstverständlichkeit des Zusammenhanges zwischen jener inneren Stimme und den Handlungen befragen, zu denen sich der Betreffende getrieben fühlt. Selbst wenn mit bestimmten Handlungen das „Erlebnis einer inneren Stimme“ regelmäßig einher ginge, ist noch kein Zusammenhang aufgewiesen – genauso gut könnte es sich um eine Begleiterscheinung handeln (vgl. PU 156-178 zum „Erlebnis des Einflusses“).

Interessant ist aber die undogmatische Art, mit der in den PU 232 und 233 die Rede von der inneren Stimme behandelt wird. Hier beschreibt Wittgenstein eine Technik der Inspiration, bei der eine Art des Hinhorchens (derselbe Ausdruck wie in Brief 45), eine Rezeptivität erlernt wird – allerdings wird das Ergebnis vom Regelfolgen explizit unterschieden. Die Technik, einer inneren Stimme folgend eine Linie zu zeichnen, kann ich lehren, aber nicht der Linie so zu folgen wie ich. Dass der Schüler nicht die gleichen Ergebnisse produziert wie ich, ist konstitutiv für dieses besondere Spiel der Inspiration. Wittgenstein hat dort auch noch angemerkt, dass es sich nicht um seine persönlichen Erfahrungsberichte handle, sondern um grammatische Anmerkungen. Unbesehen eines Aufweises in der Erfahrung hat die Rede von der inneren Stimme im Spiel der Inspiration also eine sinnvolle Verwendung. Und so ließe es sich auch vorstellen, dass Wittgenstein im Brief

45 die Erklärung der inneren Stimme als Teil dieses Spiels verwendete und nicht etwa sie zur Grundlage einer Theorie des Musikverstehens zu machen beabsichtigte.

Ich möchte abschließend einer Auffassung nachgehen, nach welcher die wittgensteinschen Argumentationslinien die folgenden Möglichkeiten nicht ausschließen: 1. Dass wir Erlebnisse haben, 2. dass mit üblichen Ausdrucksverwendungen regelmäßig bestimmte Erlebnisse einher gehen und 3. dass diese eine gewisse Relevanz haben. Diese Möglichkeit ist u.a. von Klaus Puhl in „Subjekt und Körper“ beschrieben worden (Puhl 1999, 122). Er gibt dort im Rahmen der Behandlung von Wittgensteins Subjektkritik einen Kommentar zu Wittgensteins Überlegungen zu intentionalen Einstellungen in PU 337, wo es heißt: „Die Absicht ist eingebettet in der Situation, den menschlichen Gepflogenheiten und Institutionen. Gäbe es nicht die Technik des Schachspiels, so könnte ich nicht beabsichtigen, eine Schachpartie zu spielen.“ Puhl interpretiert dieses im Rahmen einer nicht-platonistischen Erläuterung von intentionalen Einstellungen, die in ein wie es bei Puhl heißt „normativ-soziales Begriffs- und Handlungsgewebe von erfolgreicher, versuchter oder vereiteter Ausführung oder Erfüllung eingebettet“ sind. Im Rahmen solcher Institutionen – so Puhl in Abgrenzung zur Position Crispin Wrights – spräche nichts gegen die Relevanz von Stimmungslagen und psychischen Begleitvorgängen für eine bestimmte Absicht. Ich kann demnach mit Wittgenstein eine Situation so beschreiben: Eine bestimmte Stimmungslage ist relevant für meine Absicht, ein bestimmtes Musikstück zu spielen und beim Spielen dieses Musikstücks habe ich regelmäßig bestimmte Erlebnisse, die wiederum für meine Absicht, das Stück zu spielen, relevant sein können.

Können dann Stimmungen oder Erlebnisse auch dafür relevant sein, etwas auf eine bestimmte Art und Weise zu tun? Ich meine dieses bejahen zu können, denn es gibt Institutionen dafür, wie man etwas tut – man denke an das überaus komplexe Feld des menschlichen Umgangs. Vielleicht ist das ob und wie hier nur ein Unterschied der Beschreibung. Wenn also die Art und Weise etwas zu tun, mit Stimmungen zusammenhängen kann, dann könnte man etwa für das Beispiel des Musizierens sagen, dass Stimmungen oder seelische Zustände dafür relevant sein können, auf bestimmte Art und Weise zu musizieren.

Das heißt natürlich nicht, dass der Ausdruck, mit dem ich ein bestimmtes Stück spiele, durch meine Erlebnisse erzeugt oder determiniert würde und ich übersetze auch nicht meine Erlebnisse in Musik. Aber mit diesem Ausdruck können regelmäßig bestimmte Stimmungen oder psychische Begleitvorgänge einher gehen und diese können auch z.B. für eine intentionale Einstellung relevant werden. Diese Möglichkeiten ergeben sich für solche Erlebnisse oder Stimmungen, welche in Institutionen eingebettet sind.

Was also die Verwobenheit von Meinen, Verstehen und Ausdruck des Stückes angeht, ergibt sich aus Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie meiner Einschätzung nach keine Notwendigkeit, die Formulierungen der frühen Briefe zu korrigieren. Auch die Rede von der inneren Stimme muss keineswegs als fehlerhafte Auffassung einer verworfenen Theorie abgelehnt werden, sondern behält ihre sinnvolle Verwendung im Rahmen einer bestimmten kulturellen Praxis des Musikverstehens.

Allerdings geht es im Brief 45 um eine andere Tätigkeit, als diejenige, die Wittgenstein im Zusammenhang mit der Technik der Inspiration in PU 232 erwähnt, nämlich das Unterbrechen einer Gewohnheit durch eine rezeptive

Einstellung. Hier hat man es nicht mit einem jener abnormen Fälle zu tun, bei denen wir innehalten, weil wir nicht wissen, wie wir fortfahren sollen. Es handelt sich vielmehr um ein Innehalten in einem Handlungsablauf, den wir weiterführen *könnten* – wir wissen, wie wir fortzufahren haben und trotzdem halten wir inne.

Dieses alles wirft vielleicht ein verändertes Licht auf Wittgensteins vermeintlichen musikalischen Konservatismus, denn mit der praktischen Ausübung dieses unterbrechenden Spiels entpuppt sich das vermeintlich gemütlich Altbekannte als noch weithin unverstanden und als fordernder Anlass der näheren Auseinandersetzung.

Ich bin der Überzeugung, – und dieses ist das Thema meiner Dissertation – dass diese und andere Facetten einer sprachphilosophisch-musikästhetischen Konfrontation besonders dort äußert fruchtbar sind, wo die neue Musik des 20. Jahrhunderts die Institutionen überschreitet, wo sie die Interpreten und Hörer einer manchmal nahezu radikalen Verständnislosigkeit und der Forderung nach einer bisweilen unabsehbaren Arbeit am Sinn aussetzt. Vielen Dank für ihre Aufmerksamkeit.

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Eingebildete Empfindungen: Wittgensteins Analyse eines philosophischen ‚Triebes‘

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1. Philosophische ‚Triebe‘

„Wenn wir philosophieren, möchten wir Gefühle hypostasieren [d.h. annehmen], wo keine sind“ (PU 598). Unter anderem diese Neigung, Bewusstseinsvorgänge anzunehmen, wo sich keine ereignen, charakterisiert Wittgenstein mit einem Vergleich:

„Wie dem Deutschen, der gut Englisch spricht, Germanismen unterlaufen, obgleich er nicht erst den deutschen Ausdruck bildet und ihn dann ins Englische übersetzt; wie er also Englisch spricht, *als übersetzte er*, ‚unbewußt‘, aus dem Deutschen, so denken wir oft, als läge unserem Denken ein Denkschema zu Grunde; als übersetzten wir aus einer primitiveren Denkweise in die unsre“ (PU 597).

Dass wir „denken als ob unserem Denken ein Denkschema zu Grunde läge“, heißt, dass wir systematisch Gedankensprünge machen, bei denen wir, ohne es zu merken, Annahmen voraussetzen, die sich als verschiedene Instanzen immer des gleichen Schemas darstellen lassen. Diese für die „primitivere Denkweise“ charakteristischen Annahmen sind typischerweise ebenso unbegründet wie die Schlussfolgerungen, zu denen sie uns führen. In der Tat (und dies ist das entscheidende Merkmal solch schwer zu kontrollierender Neigungen): Die unbemerkten Voraussetzungen können Annahmen sein, die wir, etwa wenn wir nicht philosophieren, implizit oder ausdrücklich ablehnen – wie sich beim kompetenten Englischsprecher Konstruktionen einschleichen können, von denen er weiß, dass sie deplaziert sind.

Eine solche Neigung ist die, Sätzen, die bestimmte Tätigkeitswörter enthalten, spontan Implikationen über spezifische Bewusstseinsvorgänge zuzuschreiben. Einschlägige Verben sind etwa „lesen“, „abschreiben“, „abzeichnen“, von Wittgenstein eigenwillig unter dem Oberbegriff *Lesen* zusammengefasst (PU 156a). Sie haben situationsübergreifende Anwendungsbedingungen: Für die Ausübung der entsprechenden Tätigkeiten gibt es ein charakteristisches Verhalten, das man jedoch an den Tag legen kann, ohne sie auszuüben. Ein ABC-Schütze mag so tun, als läse er den vorher auswendig gelernten Text vor: die Zeilen mit dem Finger nachfahren, etc. In solchen Fällen, so Wittgenstein, treffen wir die Unterscheidung zwischen echtem und bloß scheinbarem Lesen (etc.) durch Bezug auf Verhalten in *weiteren* Situationen. Relevant ist zum Beispiel, ob der Schüler den Text hersagen kann, ohne ins Buch zu sehen, und ob er ihm neue Texte von vergleichbarem Schwierigkeitsgrad lesen kann (vgl. 157). Doch sobald sie abstrakt über solche Tätigkeiten nachdenken, finden viele es intuitiv plausibel zu sagen, dass sich echte von bloß scheinbaren Ausübungen durch einen bewussten oder sonstig inneren Vorgang unterscheiden *müssen*:

„Wir möchten nun freilich sagen: Was im geübten Leser und im Anfänger [der bloß ‚vorgibt‘ zu lesen] vor sich geht, wenn sie das Wort aussprechen, *kann* nicht das Gleiche sein. Und wenn kein Unterschied in dem wäre, was ihnen gerade bewußt ist, so im unbewußten Arbeiten ihres Geistes; oder auch im Gehirn“ (PU 156g).

Diese Neigung ist besonders stark, wenn wir mit einer abstrakten Frage im Hinterkopf an ganz bestimmte Fälle denken: Wenn wir an den mühsam buchstabierenden Anfänger denken, der eine bewusste Anstrengung unternimmt, und uns fragen, worin *Lesen* besteht (156e). Beim Philosophieren haben wir dann die Tendenz, zunächst gedankenlos von diesen Fällen zu verallgemeinern und charakteristische Bewusstseinserebnisse auch da anzunehmen, wo keine sind – etwa im geübten Leser, der sich keine solchen Erlebnisse bewusst machen kann (165-8). Sobald wir uns dies klar machen, springen wir zu dem genauso ungerechtfertigten Schluss, dass es *unbewusste* innere Vorgänge geben muss, die echtes von scheinbarem Lesen unterscheiden – und glauben dies mit einer Festigkeit, die erstaunen könnte, da wir von solchen Vorgängen schlicht gar nichts wissen (159). Allgemein: Auf Sätze, die Verben V mit situationsübergreifenden Anwendungsbedingungen enthalten, reagieren wir unter den genannten Umständen mit Gedankensprüngen, die eine Instanz eines charakteristischen Schemas voraussetzen:

Schema I: Genau dann wenn jemand tatsächlich V-t, ereignet sich ein innerer Vorgang (bewusst oder unbewusst), durch den sich echtes von bloß scheinbarem V-en unterscheidet.

Eine mögliche Motivation hierfür ist ein Missverständnis des ‚Arbeitens unserer Sprache‘: Beim abstrakten Nachdenken können wir die relevanten Umstände jenseits der Handlungssituation aus den Augen verlieren und gedankenlos meinen, die begriffliche Unterscheidung zwischen wirklichem und bloß scheinbarem Tun, das ja äußerlich identisch sein kann, nur durch Bezug auf einen inneren Vorgang ziehen zu können. Wir meinen dann, die Regeln der Handlungszuschreibung *müssten* auf solche Vorgänge Bezug nehmen.

Falls die Neigung zu Gedankensprüngen so schwer zu kontrollieren ist wie vom eingangs zitierten Vergleich angezeigt, lässt sie sich durchaus treffend als „Trieb“ charakterisieren. Falls diesem Trieb durch ein Missverständnis wie dem jetzt skizzierten Vorschub geleistet wird, falls er etwa (zwischenzeitig) abnimmt, sobald wir uns an die Details unserer Sprachpraxis erinnern, handelt es sich um einen „Trieb, das Arbeiten unserer Sprache mißzuverstehen“: Jemand hat einen solchen Trieb genau dann, wenn er unter bestimmten Umständen

- (i) geneigt ist, von Sätzen, die bestimmte Ausdrücke enthalten, spontan zu unberechtigten Schlussfolgerungen zu springen, die aus diesen Sätzen nur zusammen mit charakteristischen Annahmen (Instanzen des immer gleichen Schemas) folgen, welche Voraussetzungen das Subjekt weder bemerkt noch akzeptiert; und wenn
- (ii) dieser Neigung von einem Missverständnis der Verwendungsregeln für die betreffenden Ausdrücke Vorschub geleistet wird.

Solche Triebe haben Folgen: Wenn wir den als Beispiel erläuterten Trieb verspüren, neigen wir dazu, unser Innenleben mit imaginären Vorgängen und Empfindungen zu bevölkern (Abschnitt 2). Und der Konflikt dieser Einbildungen mit der Wirklichkeit, oder untereinander,

kann den Eindruck von Problemen erzeugen, wo keine sind (Abschnitt 3).

2. Eingebildete Empfindungen

In seiner Untersuchung des ‚Lesens‘ (PU 156-78) untersucht Wittgenstein, wie jener verbreitete Trieb solche Einbildungen erzeugt – and zwar bei ihm selber. Er charakterisiert seine Untersuchungen als philosophische Meditation, als Selbstgespräch: „Ich schreibe beinahe immer Selbstgespräche mit mir selbst. Sachen, die ich mir unter vier Augen sage“ (CV 88). Wenn die Formulierung „Selbstgespräche mit mir selbst“ kein Pleonasmus ist, besagt sie, dass die Bemerkungen nicht bloß die Form eines Selbstgesprächs (mit einem fiktiven Protagonisten) haben, sondern wiedergeben, was der Autor sich tatsächlich selber sagte – wie der Nachsatz dann unmissverständlich feststellt. In vielen dieser Selbstgespräche setzt sich Wittgenstein mit dem auseinander, was er selber „zu sagen geneigt“ oder „versucht“ ist, mit Ideen, die ihn intuitiv anziehen, auch wenn er sie bei näherer Überlegung als Unsinn ablehnt: „Scheue Dich ja nicht davor, Unsinn zu reden! Nur muß Du auf Deinen Unsinn lauschen“ (CV 64) – um die *eigenen* Neigungen zu gedankenlosen, und daher nur allzu oft unbemerkten, Gedankensprüngen ‚hinauszuhören‘, zu entlarven und zu beseitigen. (Fischer 2004 argumentiert detailliert für diese bislang nicht ernsthaft in Betracht gezogene These.)

Zu dem ‚Unsinn‘, auf den er ‚lauscht‘, gehören verschiedene Variationen der eben erläuterten Idee, die Wittgenstein alle mit den Worten „Ich möchte sagen:“ einleitet (PU 169c2, 173b11, 174a3, 176a4): dass wir beim Lesen, Abschreiben und Kopieren charakteristische Erlebnisse oder Empfindungen haben, die echtes von scheinbarem Tun unterscheiden. Um diese Ideen als „Fiktion“ (166a2) bzw. Einbildungen (170c1) zu entlarven, die auf spontanen, aber ungerechtfertigten Gedankensprüngen beruhen, macht er eine Reihe von „Versuch[en]“ (169c7): Er führt die genannten Tätigkeiten aus (Lesen: 169, Abschreiben: 173b8-13, Abzeichnen: 175), mit der Frage im Hinterkopf, was dabei geschieht (170b1). Dann registriert er, was er danach über dabei auftretende Empfindungen spontan zu sagen geneigt ist, und prüft dessen Berechtigung, indem er sich schließlich vergegenwärtigt, woran er sich tatsächlich erinnern kann.

So möchte er etwa spontan sagen, dass er beim Abzeichnen den Einfluss der Vorlage auf seine Bewegungen empfunden hat: „Ich habe, wenn ich nachträglich an das Erlebnis denke, das Gefühl, daß das Wesentliche an ihm ein ‚Erlebnis eines Einflusses‘, einer Verbindung, ist – im Gegensatz zu irgendeiner bloßen Gleichzeitigkeit von Phänomenen“ (176a1). Doch dieser Eindruck ist nicht gerechtfertigt: „Ich kann, sozusagen, nicht glauben, daß ich bloß hingeschaut, dieses Gesicht gemacht, den Strich gezogen habe. – Aber *erinnere* ich mich denn an etwas anderes? Nein“ (175b4-5; vgl. 176a2). Eine bestimmte Formulierung löst den Gedankensprung aus: „Denn ich bin doch geführt worden“, sage ich mir. – Dann erst tritt die Idee jenes ätherischen, ungreifbaren Einflusses auf“ (175b7-8). Vorausgesetzt wird eine Instanz von Schema I:

- (1) Ich habe die Figur wirklich abgezeichnet, bin von ihr geführt worden.
- (I) Genau dann wenn jemand wirklich etwas abzeichnet, hat er eine Empfindung der Beeinflussung, durch die sich echtes Abzeichnen von bloß zufälliger Reproduktion unterscheidet.
- (2) Ich habe das Erlebnis eines Einflusses (des Geführtwerdens, vgl. 172) gehabt.

Seine vorigen ‚Versuche‘ zeitigten analoge Gedankensprünge zum *Lesen* und *Abschreiben*, in Reaktion auf andere Auslöser, die Wittgenstein identifiziert (z.B. 170a1): Er ist systematisch geneigt, von Sätzen wie (1), die Handlungsverben mit situationsübergreifenden Anwendungsbedingungen enthalten, spontan zu ungerechtfertigten Schlussfolgerungen zu springen, die bei Voraussetzung von Instanzen des Schemas I folgen – Annahmen, die er bereits abgelehnt hat (157, 159-60).

Dieser schwer zu kontrollierende Neigung wird vom bereits erläuterten Missverständnis Vorschub geleistet. So schwindet sie etwa, sobald Wittgenstein sich vergegenwärtigt, in welchen Sinne er durchaus von der Vorlage ‚geführt wurde‘: Er zog den zweiten Strich genau parallel zu ihr, nicht beliebig, und hätte durch Verweis auf die abzeichnende Vorlage begründet, warum er die zweite Figur so und nicht anders zeichnete (vgl. 177a3, 169b5-6). Derlei macht den Unterschied zwischen echtem Abzeichnen, bei dem man sich von der Vorlage führen lässt, und ihrer bloß zufälligen Reproduktion. Wittgenstein ist geneigt, Dinge wie (2) zu sagen, sobald er dies vergisst. Auch er leidet am verbreiteten ‚Trieb, das Arbeiten unserer Sprache mißzuverstehen‘, den wir eingangs spezifizierten. Jedenfalls scheint er etliche solcher Triebe in sich selber festzustellen: „Der Philosoph ist der, der in sich [!] viele Krankheiten des Verstandes heilen muß“ (CV 50).

3. Scheinprobleme

Jener Trieb erzeugt Einbildungen. Deren Konflikt mit der Wirklichkeit erzeugt den Eindruck eines Problems: Wittgenstein ist zu sagen geneigt, er habe beim Abzeichnen das ‚Erlebnis eines Einflusses‘ gehabt. „Zugleich aber möchte ich kein erlebtes Phänomen [das ich erinnere] ‚Erlebnis des Einflusses‘ nennen“ (PU 176a2). So erscheint ihm dieses Erlebnis als „ätherisch, ungreifbar“ (175b8). Wer nicht nur die Neigung dazu verspürt, sondern tatsächlich annimmt, dass ein Bewusstseinsvorgang für eine Tätigkeit wesentlich ist, sich aber bei ihrer Ausübung keines solchen Vorganges bewusst werden kann, steht vor der Aufgabe, zu erklären, wie es sein kann, dass er sich der von ihm angenommenen Vorgänge nicht bewusst zu werden vermag. Dies ist ein *Vereinbarungsproblem*: das Problem, philosophische Annahmen zu vereinbaren mit Tatsachen oder weiteren Annahmen, die man anerkennt.

Ein Problem dieser Art entwickelt Wittgenstein unmittelbar vor dem Exkurs zum ‚Lesen‘. Es betrifft das plötzliche Verstehen einer Zahlenreihe. Auch hierfür ist Verhalten charakteristisch, das mit bloß scheinbarem V-en vereinbar ist: Die Fortsetzung der Reihe kann glücklich geraten werden, etc. So unterlaufen Wittgenstein hier die charakteristischen Gedankensprünge, die er allerdings, anders als bei seinen absichtlichen ‚Versuchen‘, zunächst zwingend findet und tatsächlich mitmacht: Obwohl er ausdrücklich Verstehen mit einer Fähigkeit gleichsetzt (151b4), reagiert er auf die Frage „Was ist es, was hier [beim plötzlichen Eintritt des Verstehens] eintritt?“ (151b5) nicht etwa mit einer informativen Beschreibung der Fähigkeit, die hier laut ausdrücklicher Annahme eintritt, sondern (i) interpretiert die Frage als die nach einem Ereignis: „Was geschah da?“ (151b7), die er umgehend mit der Anführung der verschiedenen Ereignisse beantwortet, derer wir uns in dieser Situation bisweilen bewusst werden (151b8ff.). Aus der Beobachtung, dass von jedem dieser Bewusstseinsereignisse denkbar ist, dass es sich ereignet, ohne dass das Subjekt versteht (152b), schließt Wittgenstein sofort (ii), dass der seelische Vorgang des Verstehens „sich ... hinter jenen größern und uns daher ins Auge fallenden Begleiterscheinungen versteckt“, und

versucht, ihn „zu erfassen“, was nicht gelingt (153a1-2): Der Vorgang ist genau so ungreifbar, wie das Erlebnis des Einflusses beim Abzeichnen. Schritte (i) und (ii) setzen eine Instanz von Schema I voraus:

- (I₂) Wenn jemand plötzlich versteht, ereignet sich ein Bewusstseinsvorgang, der es undenkbar macht, daß er nicht versteht.

Die Schlussfolgerung, dass (3) dieser seelische Vorgang „sich versteckt“, widerspricht dann der Beobachtung, dass „ich doch sagte „Jetzt verstehe ich“, weil ich verstand“ (153a5), offensichtlich unter ähnlicher Voraussetzung interpretiert als: (4) „Ich sagte ‚Jetzt verstehe ich‘, weil ich mir eines solchen Vorgangs bewusst wurde.“ Dies ist Wittgensteins „Wirrarr“ (153a7): das Problem, die Schlussfolgerung (3) mit der ebenso wilden ‚Beobachtung‘ (4) zu vereinbaren.

Entgegen dem ersten Anschein sind Vereinbarungsprobleme wie dieses in der Philosophie durchaus verbreitet. So sprangen etwa neuere Sprachphilosophen (Davies 1987, mit den relevanten Literaturverweisen) mit analogen Gedankensprüngen (Fischer 2005, Kap.8) zu der ungerechtfertigten Annahme, dass das Verstehen neuer Sätze auf der Ableitung ihrer Wahrheitsbedingungen beruhen *müsse*, und hatten diese Annahme mit der Beobachtung zu vereinbaren, dass sich kompetente Sprecher keines solchen Ableitungsprozesses bewusst sind. Die Antwort auf dieses Problem war eine philosophische Theorie: Die Theorie stillschweigenden semantischen Wissens, die es ermöglichen sollte, Sprechern unbewusste Ableitungsprozesse zuzuschreiben – von denen die ‚Theoretiker‘ freilich nichts wussten. Ihre Theorie ist mithin weniger *science* als *fiction*. Ein anderer Defekt ist noch fundamentaler: Wo zumindest eine der zu vereinbarenden Annahmen vollkommen ungerechtfertigt ist, ist es von vornherein überflüssig zu erklären, wie dies Hirngespinnst mit ihm anscheinend widersprechenden Tatsachen vereinbart werden kann – wenn nicht gar (wie im Problem von PU 153) mit einem weiteren Hirngespinnst. Solchen *Schein*problemen gilt Wittgensteins alternativer ‚therapeutischer‘ Ansatz.

4. Wittgensteins ‚therapeutische Wende‘

Ausgangspunkt seiner ‚therapeutischen Wende‘ ist die Distanzierung von seinen philosophischen, nicht rein sprachlichen, Intuitionen (wie sie PU 112a2-3 charakterisiert): Statt sie wie andere Philosophen fraglos zu ‚honorieren‘, also mit ihnen widersprechenden Beobachtungen vereinbaren zu wollen, betrachtet er seine Neigungen, dies oder das zu sagen und spontan plausibel zu finden, zunächst bloß als das: als Neigungen oder Versuchungen. „Was wir in so einem Fall ‚zu sagen versucht sind‘, ist natürlich nicht Philosophie; sondern es ist ihr Rohmaterial. Was also ein Mathematiker, z.B., über Objektivität und Realität der mathematischen Tatsachen [oder ein Sprachphilosoph über Verstehensvorgänge] zu sagen geneigt ist, ist nicht eine Philosophie der Mathematik [oder der Sprache], sondern etwas, was Philosophie zu *behandeln* hätte“ (PU 254a4-5).

Diese Distanzierung von den eigenen Intuitionen ermöglicht ihm die Diagnose von Vereinbarungsproblemen, die in diesem Aufsatz an einem Beispiel entwickelt wurde: Was wir hier mit – im besten Falle – den Tatsachen vereinbaren wollen, sind Einbildungen, erzeugt von Trieben, das Arbeiten unserer Sprache mitzuverstehen. In gewissen Sinne gibt es hier kein Sachproblem, sondern nur ein ‚persönliches‘ Problem des Philosophen: seine

Hirngespinnst und die beunruhigende Verwirrung, die sie hervorrufen. „Die Probleme, die durch ein Mißdeuten unserer Sprachformen entstehen ... *sind* tiefe Beunruhigungen“ (PU 111, meine Hervorhebung). Diese ‚persönlichen‘ sind die „philosophischen Probleme [die] *vollkommen* verschwinden sollen“ (PU 133b2).

Diese Problemauffassung motiviert neuartige Ziele und Methoden. ‚Was Philosophie zu *behandeln* hätte‘, nämlich zu kurieren, sind jene Beunruhigungen: „Friede in den Gedanken. Das ist das ersehnte Ziel dessen, der philosophiert“ – und zumindest Wittgensteins (CV 50). Um es zu erreichen, ‚behandelt‘ er das ‚Rohmaterial‘ seiner Intuitionen ganz anders als andere Philosophen: Er arbeitet es nicht zu einer ‚Theorie‘ aus, die Widersprüche auszuräumen verspricht, sondern will sich von diesen intuitiv packenden ‚Einbildungen‘ befreien, indem er den mit einer „Krankheit des Verstandes“ (CV 50) vergleichbaren Trieb zum Missverständnis beseitigt, der sie erzeugt und so ungerechtfertigte, aber beunruhigende Fragen (wie PU 153a4-6) aufwirft: „Der Philosoph behandelt eine Frage; wie eine Krankheit“ (PU 255).

Hierzu „gibt es [verschiedene] Methoden, gleichsam verschiedene Therapien“ (PU 133d). Eine setzt Wittgenstein zur Beseitigung des Wirrarrs von PU 153 in der Untersuchung des ‚Lesens‘ ein: Durch die ‚Versuche‘, in denen er sich bewusst die Freiheit lässt, „Unsinn zu reden“ (CV 64), den er leicht durchschauen kann, verschafft er sich Einsicht in die Natur seines Denkens: wird er sich seiner systematischen Neigung zu spontanen und ungerechtfertigten Gedankensprüngen bewusst. Diese Einsicht ist ein wirksames Mittel kognitiver Therapie: Sie schwächt diese Neigung und ermöglicht es dem Subjekt, auch Annahmen, die es zunächst zwingend findet, als das Produkt ungerechtfertigter Sprünge anzuerkennen und gegenläufige Evidenz angemessen zu würdigen (Beck 1995). Dementsprechend ist die Untersuchung des ‚Lesens‘ eingeschoben zwischen der Erwähnung des Gedankensprungs, auf dem das Wirrarr beruht (in PU 154) und der Wägung der sprachlichen Tatsachen, die ihm widersprechen (in PU 179). Wittgensteins revolutionäre ‚therapeutische‘ Ziele und Methoden erschließen sich so aus der genauen Analyse seiner Probleme als dem Produkt von Trieben zum Missverständnis, die er (auch) in sich selber entdeckte.

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Identifying, Discriminating or Picking Out an Object: Some Distinctions Neglected in the Strawsonian Tradition

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In *Individuals* Peter Strawson talks about identifying, discriminating and picking out particular objects. The most general term he uses is clearly that of identifying a particular. Discriminating and picking out count as ways of identifying. In this paper, I shall argue that picking out a particular is not necessarily a way of discriminating it and generally not a way of identifying it in a strict sense. Similarly, discriminating a particular is not necessarily a way of identifying it in a strict sense. Since Strawson regards discrimination and picking out as basic ways of identification his terminology is flawed.

Strawson introduces his notion of particular identification with reference to a situation in which two people are talking about a particular. In such a situation there is a hearer's sense of identification and a speaker's sense of identification:

Very often, when two people are talking, one of them, the speaker, refers to or mentions some particular or other. Very often, the other, the hearer, knows what, or which, particular the speaker is talking about; but sometimes he does not. I shall express this alternative by saying that the hearer either is, or is not, able to *identify* the particular referred to by the speaker. [...] When a speaker uses such an expression [a proper name, some pronouns, some descriptive phrases beginning with the definite article and expressions compounded of these] to refer to a particular, I shall say that he makes an *identifying reference* to a particular. [...] [W]hen a speaker makes an identifying reference to a particular, and his hearer does, on the strength of it, identify the particular referred to, then, I shall say, the speaker not only makes an identifying reference to, but also *identifies* that particular. So we have a hearer's sense, and a speaker's sense, of 'identify'. (Strawson 1959, 16f.)

The hearer identifies a particular referred to by the speaker if he knows what or which particular the speaker is referring to. The speaker identifies a particular if his identifying reference results in a hearer's identification.

Strawson calls the notion of identification as applied to the situation of a communication "original" (Strawson 1959, 87). But he also recognises a more solitary type of identification "in the sense of distinguishing one particular from others in thought, or observation" (Strawson 1959, 87).

There is clearly a broad sense of "identify" according to which to identify a particular means no more than to talk or think about *it* rather than about some other particular. So it means in some sense to isolate the object from all other objects and to make it the focus of one's attention. However, I wish to note that there is also a more strict and precise sense of identification which seems more appropriate for philosophical discussions. According to this notion of identification, to identify means to say of two things that they are *the same*. And to say of two things that they are the same means, in fact, to refer to one and the same thing two times and to say that what is so referred to is just one single object. If we adopt this sense of identification then it makes no sense to say that someone

identifies a particular. One cannot just identify one single thing. Rather, to identify always means to identify one thing with *another* thing, to say of the two that they are the same.

We might think that Strawson uses the strict sense of identification when he speaks of hearer's identification. We might say that a hearer identifies a particular referred to by a speaker if he knows what or which particular is the one that the speaker referred to. The speaker then knows of two things that they are the same: The thing referred to by the speaker is the same as the thing that he knows in some other way (perhaps because he sees it). Strawson himself suggests that hearer-identification "involves thinking that something is *the same*: that the particular copy I see in the speaker's hand is the same particular as that to which he is referring" (Strawson 1959, 32).

However, the case is not as clear and natural as Strawson suggests. Suppose a hearer understands the reference a speaker makes with some expression. Can we not simply say that in this case the hearer knows of some particular that the speaker refers to it? If the hearer understands the speaker's reference, say, to "that tree", then he knows of that tree that the speaker is talking about it. If this is the correct characterisation of the hearer's knowledge, or at least a characterisation which suffices to describe the hearer's understanding of the speaker's reference, then the hearer does not have to identify any two things. He does not have to know an identity proposition of the form "The tree that the speaker refers to = that tree". Rather, he just knows a simple predicate-ascription of the form "That tree is referred to by the speaker". So even Strawson's case of "hearer-identification" is not necessarily a case of a strict identification.

When we consider solitary identification it becomes even less natural to construe it as a case of strict identification. Strawson suggests that such identification has the sense of "distinguishing one particular from others in thought, or observation" (Strawson 1959, 87). However, why should distinguishing one particular from others involve thinking (or knowing) of it that it is *the same* as some other particular? It seems that distinguishing one particular from others need not involve more than ascribing some predicates to it that do not apply to any other particular. So one distinguishes or discriminates – I shall use these two terms synonymously – a particular *O* from others if one knows that *O* is *P*, where "is *P*" is a predicate that applies only to *O* and not to the particulars from which one distinguishes *O*. Of course one *could* also construe the distinguishing knowledge as knowledge of an identity statement: *O* is (identical to) a particular that is *P*. (Cf. Strawson 1959, 23.) But why should one want to do this? Such a construal seems an entirely artificial and superfluous complication of the phenomenon we wish to describe: the distinguishing of a particular from others. There does not seem to be any necessity to introduce the extra element of an identity statement, except the wish to comply with an inadequate terminology.

However, it might not only be superfluous to construe the discriminating knowledge of a particular as knowledge of identity propositions. It might also be incoherent in the

context of Strawson's investigation. Strawson describes identification as necessary for understanding reference. However, if this is the function of identification, then there could be an incoherence in assuming that it involves knowledge of identity statements. For in an identity statement there are two distinct references to the same entity. In order to understand the identity statement one has to understand both references. Now, if understanding reference to a particular object requires to know some identity statement about it, then it seems that we have produced a vicious regress. In order to understand that "a" refers to a determinate particular I have to know that a is the same as b. But in order to know that a is the same as b I have to understand the reference that is made through the use of the expression "b". How can I understand this reference? Well, if the theory is right, then I can only understand it if I know some identity statement about b. This would seem to mean that I have to know that b is the same as c. And so on. The speaker says "That tree has strange leaves". Now the hearer can only understand the speaker's expression "that tree" if he knows some identity statement about it in which the particular referred to by the speaker is identified with some particular that the hearer can distinguish from all other particulars. Such an identity statement could be "The tree that the speaker refers to is that tree", where "that tree" is a tree perceived by the hearer. But how does the hearer understand his own expression "that tree"? It seems that in order to understand it he should again know some identity statement about it in which the particular that he is referring to is identified with some particular that he can distinguish from all others. It is obvious that the theory under consideration is incoherent.

Perhaps this incoherence is the reason why the tradition of philosophical thought emanating from Strawson generally uses the term "identification" in the broad sense, where it does not involve knowing of two things that they are the same. Most prominently, Gareth Evans, in his *Varieties of Reference*, talks at length about different types of identification (demonstrative identification, self-identification and recognition-based identification), but never suggests that they involve thinking of two things that they are the same. Similar to Strawson, Evans regards "identification" as necessary for understanding reference – though primarily reference of one's own thoughts, rather than that of the expressions of other speakers. Evans bases this idea on what he calls "Russell's Principle": the claim that "a subject cannot make a judgement about something unless he knows which object his judgement is about" (Evans 1982, 90). This claim, in turn, is understood as the requirement that the subject have "*discriminating knowledge*: the subject must have a capacity to distinguish the object of his judgement from all other things" (Evans 1982, 90). So here identification of an object means discriminating or distinguishing it from all other things. One can distinguish a thing from all others by finding some individuating fact about it, something that is only true of it and of no other thing. This means ascribing some predicate to it, not identifying it with some other thing.

However, there is an analogous problem to the one pointed out above. It is claimed that understanding reference to an object *O* requires knowing that *O* is *P*, where "is *P*" is a predicate that uniquely applies to *O* and to no other thing. But knowing that *O* is *P* already seems to require understanding the reference of "*O*". How can we understand what "*O*" means in "*O* is *P*", if only the predicate-ascription is what makes the reference of "*O*" intelligible?

Evans's theory is not vulnerable to this threat of incoherence because in the central cases he describes the capacity to distinguish an object from all others as a *practical capacity* to locate the object in space and time, not as some kind of propositional knowledge. For instance, I am able and disposed to think, "I am in the Institute. The computer is in front of me. So the computer is in the Institute." My understanding of the reference of "the computer" does not consist in knowledge that my computer is such-and-such. Rather, according to Evans, it consists in being disposed to think in the way just described.

How does the notion of "picking an object out" relate to the notions of "identification" and "discrimination"? Strawson equates picking out with discriminating (cf. Strawson 1959, 18). Furthermore, he seems to regard both as instances of identification (cf. Strawson 1959, 19). However, if picking an object out is an instance of identification, this must be identification in the broad sense. For picking an object out does not involve affirming that two objects are one and the same. It seems to me equally dubious to regard picking out an object as a way of discriminating it. If I put my hand into a dark box full of qualitatively identical screws and take one out, then I pick it out, but I do not distinguish it from all others. It is true that the picked screw is distinct from all others in that it is the picked one. But this is a fact that the picker does not have to be aware of in order to do the picking. If the picker notices, "This screw is the one I have picked" then he distinguishes it from all other screws. But it seems possible to do the picking without having this knowledge.

Of course, Strawson does not talk of a mechanical picking out where he uses this term. He has in mind a picking out "by sight or hearing or touch" (Strawson 1959, 18). Some might say that picking an object out by sight, for example, does involve noticing something about the object that distinguishes it from all others. In the Strawsonian tradition the claim would be that sensibly picking an object out (i.e. by sight, hearing, touch or some other sense) involves becoming aware of its location in egocentric space. I see the bird *above me*. Its location in egocentric space, in turn, is supposed to be what distinguishes the object from all others. However, it is possible to doubt these assertions. For example John Campbell denies that, in the most basic case, I see the bird *above me*. Rather, he suggests, I just see it "above" or "to the left" or "in front" etc. (cf. Campbell 1994, 119). If this idea is correct, then it is not so clear that picking an object out with our senses involves recognising something about it that distinguishes it from all others. The object can be distinguished by the fact that it is the picked one, the one that my attention focuses on. But this is not necessarily a fact that I am aware of just because I am the one who is picking the object out. It follows that picking an object out with the help of the senses has to be distinguished from discriminating an object. If picking out, in turn, should be a sufficient base for understanding reference, as Strawson suggests, then Russell's Principle, as interpreted by Evans, would be undermined.

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Zeitlichkeit und Bewusstsein bei Franz Brentano

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Schon bei seiner Aristoteles-Deutung hat Brentano mehrmals die Rolle der Zeitbestimmung bei der diskursiven Synthese betont, welche die Koordinierung der kognitiven Akte (die den verschiedenen Bereichen des Sinnlichen und des Intellektiven angehören) leitet und somit die Einheit des Bewusstseins (Volpi 1987, 65-104). In dieser Hinsicht ist es zu bemerken, dass diese Synthese vom Gemeinsinnesvermögen (oder Sinn der Sensation, dessen Begriff jenen des sekundären Bewusstseins beim späten Brentano antizipiert) geleitet wird: Der junge Brentano neigt dazu, dieses Vermögen mit der Phantasie zu identifizieren. Von der *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* an fällt der Bezug auf eine für den Gemeinsinn zuständige unabhängige Tätigkeit weg, da sich das auf die psychischen Akte richtende reflexive Bewusstsein schon in diesen impliziert ist. Wenn die Phantasie keine primäre Rolle mehr spielt, was die Entstehung und die Konstitution des zeitlichen Bewusstseins betrifft, erhält sie aber noch Relevanz bei der zeitlichen Synthese. Der Brentano der mittleren Phase bezieht sich explizit auf eine zeitliche *Modifikation*, die auf die realen Gegenstände der Wahrnehmung ausgeübt wird, sodass ihr ontologischer Status im Sinne einer fiktiven Veränderung modalisiert wird. Diese Modifikation findet zunächst auf dem fundamentalen Niveau der Vorstellung statt: Sein wirkendes Prinzip ist in der synthetischen Tätigkeit der Phantasie (oder der ursprünglichen Assoziation) zu erkennen. Dieser Begriff nimmt den späteren Begriff der Proterästhese vorweg, der aus der Zeit der Formulierung des Programms einer deskriptiven Psychologie stammt: In dieser Phase tritt die Rolle der Phantasie in den Hintergrund und wird vielmehr jene der Proterästhese hervorgehoben, und zwar dieser Art von unmittelbarem Gedächtnis, das wie ein Widerschein die gegenwärtige Empfindung begleitet und deren virtuelle Verlängerung ausmacht (Über Brentanos Theorie des Zeitbewusstseins und ihre komplexe Entwicklung vgl. Chisholm 1981, 3-16, Kraus 1976 und insbesondere Chrudzinski 1998/99, 149-161).

In einer Reihe von Vorlesungen über die Logik, die Brentano 1884-85 gehalten hat, aber wahrscheinlich schon aus 1878/79 stammen (Ms. EL 72/2), wird die Phantasie in der Abteilung über die Vorstellung behandelt. Brentano führt dazu eine vierfache Unterscheidung ein: 1) Vorstellung der äußeren Wahrnehmung, welche die physischen Phänomene als Gegenstand hat; 2) Vorstellung der äußeren Phantasie; 3) Vorstellung der inneren Wahrnehmung, welche die psychischen Phänomene bzw. Akte als Gegenstand hat; 4) Vorstellung der inneren Phantasie. Es ist hier eine zwiefache Unterscheidung zwischen den Paaren Phänomen/nicht Phänomen (bzw. Phantasma) und Inneres/Äußeres zu bemerken, die sich überschneiden. Streng genommen bleibt der Bereich des Phänomenalen innerhalb der Grenzen der aktuellen Wahrnehmung, deren Bereich nicht zu den Produkten der Phantasie gehören. Das ist aber nicht misszuverstehen: Die Phantasie unterscheidet sich von der Wahrnehmung, nicht weil ihren Produkten nichts Wirkliches entspricht (was oft auch bei der Wahrnehmung selbst geschieht), sondern weil sie sich nicht auf ein aktuelles Phänomen bezieht. Die realen Gegenstände der Wahrnehmung, die wirklich im eigentlichen Sinn sind, sind dieselben Wahrnehmungsakte, durch welche wir die äußeren physischen Phänomene fassen. Dementsprechend kommt der inneren

Phantasie ein höherer Rang im Vergleich zur äußeren zu, gemäß der Bedeutung, die Brentano schon in seinem Frühwerk dem primären Wahrnehmungsvermögen verleiht.

Für jeden Vorstellungsakt, der etwas Vergangenes oder Zukünftiges als Gegenstand hat, ist die Phantasie zuständig, welche die Wahrnehmung der Bewegung, der Ruhe, der Veränderung und der Dauer bestimmt (Über den Begriff der Imagination in Brentano siehe Rollinger 1999, 29-31). Die Grenze zwischen Wahrnehmung und Phantasie verläuft also entlang des Zeitunterschieds, der die Modifikation des Seienden in etwas Nicht-Reales einführt; das Unterscheidungskriterium besteht also nicht in der geringeren Intensität bzw. Fülle der Phantasie, wie man traditionell meint. Die Phantasie ist eine Bewegung, die der aktuellen Empfindung folgt und ein Nachbild erzeugt, das ohne sie weiter besteht und wiederholt oder erinnert werden kann (darin besteht der Mechanismus der Ideenassoziation); nach der Sinnesphysiologie scheint es vom Weiterbestehen der Sinnenreize in den Organen abzuhängen. Das Phantasiebild entsteht also dank einer Disposition, die sich durch die Wiederholung ihm ähnlicher psychischer Akte konstituiert: Man könnte sich fragen, ob eine solche Disposition imstande ist, die aktuellen Wahrnehmungen zu durchdringen. Die Phantasie kann sowohl die räumlichen als auch die zeitlichen Größen jenseits der Grenzen der aktuellen Wahrnehmung ausdehnen und immer neue Raum- und Zeitarten im Unendlichen erzeugen, auch wenn dieser Ausdehnung von empirischen Faktoren, die von der individuellen Beschaffenheit abhängen, Grenzen gesetzt werden. Das gilt nur für einzelne Spezies von Raum und Zeit (und zwar einzelne Raum- und Zeitkontinua), aber nicht für den Raum und die Zeit als solche: Die Phantasie kann nicht dem Raum eine vierte Dimension oder der Zeit eine zweite hinzufügen.

Der Schwierigkeit, das Phänomen der Zeit als solches zu beschreiben, steht die triviale Selbstverständlichkeit der Ausdrücke des gewöhnlichen Sprachgebrauchs entgegen, die sich auf die alltägliche Erfahrung der Zeit beziehen. Dieser Umstand führt Brentano dazu, Beispiele aus der sinnlichen Phantasie zu verwenden: Bei einer Melodie besteht der einzige Unterschied zwischen zwei Tönen gleicher Intensität in der Zeit. Was diesen Unterschied ausmacht, ist nicht ein „Etwas“, das zwischen den beiden Tönen steht, weil auch bei den Farbvorstellungen räumliche Lücken wahrzunehmen sind. Ebenso unangemessen ist die einzelne Zeitbestimmung als eine Mannigfaltigkeit von Zeitverhältnissen zu verstehen, die sich gegenseitig bestimmen. Die Zeitverhältnisse, wie übrigens auch die Raum-, Qualitäts- und Intensitätsverhältnisse, brauchen eine absolute Bestimmung als Grundlage. Eine Zeitbestimmtheit würde auch beim Erscheinen eines punktuellen zeitlichen Tons in der Phantasie fortbestehen, was aber in Wirklichkeit nicht geschieht, wie auch das Erscheinen eines räumlichen Punktes. Sowohl der Raum als auch die Zeit haben eine unendliche Zahl von Arten und Varianten. Brentano bezieht sich auf die traditionelle Vorstellung der Zeit, die wie bekannt von Aristoteles stammt, als eine gerade Linie, die sich in beiden Richtungen ins Unendliche ausdehnt. Die Gegenwart im engsten Sinn ist vom Punkt symbolisiert, der die Linie in den beiden Halbgeraden der Vergangenheit und der Zukunft trennt,

ohne dass er der einen oder der anderen angehört. Die von der punktuellen Gegenwart eingeführte Grenze ist also nicht als terminus intrinsecus, sondern als terminus extrinsecus zu verstehen. In diesem Sinn verstanden ist die Gegenwart nichts anderes als die reine Punktualität, im Unterschied zum Sprachgebrauch; dieser bezeichnet hingegen etwas teilweise Vergangenes und teilweise Zukünftiges als Gegenwärtiges (die gegenwärtige Stunde, der gegenwärtige Tag usw.). Dass die Zeitspezies in ihrer Gesamtheit mit einer unendlichen geraden Linie vergleichbar sind, impliziert nicht die Möglichkeit, durch die Sinnlichkeit ein unendliches Zeitkontinuum vorzustellen, wobei die Frage nach der *Vorstellbarkeit* unendlicher Größen von der Frage nach der *Existenz* solcher Größen zu unterscheiden ist. Die unendlichen Spezies des Raums und der Zeit verbinden sich miteinander, bis sie ein Kontinuum durch infinitesimale Unterschiede bilden; von einem solchen Kontinuum stellen wir uns durch die sinnliche Wahrnehmung nur eine einzelne Spezies von Räumen oder Zeiten vor. Das ist jedoch kein Argument gegen die Existenz unendlicher Spezies, weil die Phantasie ständig die Raum- und Zeitspezies erweitert, sodass diese sich immer nach einer Mannigfaltigkeit von spezifischen Bestimmtheiten bieten (Eine ausführliche Erörterung der Auffassung des Zeitbewusstseins Brentanos findet man in Rinofner-Kreidl 1995/96, 214-217 u. Rinofner-Kreidl 2000, 345 ff.).

Die Zeit hat sich also ähnlich den übrigen Elementen der sinnlichen Vorstellungen gezeigt; sie unterscheidet sich von ihnen dadurch, dass die verschiedenen Zeitspezies durch Assoziation von der Phantasie ausgearbeitet und nie in einer aktuellen Vorstellung wahrgenommen werden. Die traditionellen Theorien haben sich immer auf die erworbene Assoziation bezogen; bei der Beschreibung dieser operationellen Vorrichtung der Phantasie spricht Brentano jedoch von einer ursprünglichen Assoziation, welche in diesem Sinn dem kantischen Schematismus der Einbildungskraft ähnlich ist, wie die Relevanz der Schemen als Zeitbestimmungen beweist. Durch diese Assoziation werden die momentanen bzw. punktuellen Gedächtnisphänomene, die zuerst entstehen, in die Vergangenheit versetzt. Man muss jedoch nicht die Natur des Zeitpunkts missverstehen, indem man ihn als eine Größe begreift, die sich derart ausdehnen kann, dass wir imstande sind, eine nicht zu langsame Bewegung zu bemerken: Wir können einen solchen Punkt überhaupt nicht fassen, und ebenso weniger den räumlichen Punkt. Aufgrund der Phänomene des momentanen Gedächtnisses arbeitet die Phantasie die Vorstellungen der Zukunft aus, genauso wie sie neue Arten von Tönen, Farben und Räumen ausarbeitet, und auch jene der Gegenwart. Diese Tatsache widerlegt endgültig die irriige Ansicht, dass die Phantasie nur in der stellvertretenden Funktion der Reproduktion und der Wiederholung nach verschiedenen Kombinationsweisen dessen, was schon in der Wahrnehmung gegeben ist, besteht. Brentano hebt den produktiven Charakter der Phantasie entschieden hervor, vor allem in Bezug auf ihre Rolle bei einer ursprünglichen und nicht empirisch erworbenen zeitlichen Synthese; Brentano selbst lehnt die empirischen Auffassungen der Zeit ab, nach denen diese Synthese aus einer erworbenen Assoziation stammt.

Eine Reihe von weiteren Bemerkungen über das Phänomen der ursprünglichen Assoziation sind in einem Manuskript aus dem Jahre 1887-88 zu finden, dessen Titel *Deskriptive Psychologie* lautet (Ms. Ps 76/2). Das Phänomen der ursprünglichen Assoziation zeigt sich bei der Vorstellung einer Bewegung oder im Allgemeinen einer Sukzession, wobei die gewöhnliche Bezeichnung

„Vorstellung“ nach Brentano unpassend ist. Man hat irrtümlich versucht, das Phänomen der Sukzession auf die Nachempfindungen zurückzuführen, während es in Wahrheit aus zeitlich modifizierten Vorstellungen herzu-leiten ist, wenn auch diese den sinnlichen Vorstellungen ähnlich sind. Ist das Maß der ursprünglichen Assoziation konstant, oder verändert es sich nach der Intensität, der Qualität u.s.w.? Der Sinn der Zeit misst die Zeitabstände der Ereignisse in ihrem Aufeinanderfolgen, wie der Sehsinn die Ausdehnung und die Abstände zwischen den äußeren Gegenständen misst; trotzdem sind wir nicht in der Lage, in genauer Weise das Zeitmaß der Phänomene der ursprünglichen Wahrnehmung zu bestimmen. Man kann versuchen, die mindestmögliche wahrnehmbare Veränderung zu bestimmen, obwohl die psychologischen Untersuchungen über die Länge des Phänomens der ursprünglichen Assoziation beinahe lückenhaft sind, da es zumeist vernachlässigt oder missverstanden wurde.

Ein weiterer Unterschied kennzeichnet die Einzigartigkeit der Zeit im Vergleich zu den anderen Klassen der sinnlichen Phänomene (Ms. EL 72/2). Die Zeitbestimmungen der Vergangenheit und der Zukunft beschränken sich nicht nur darauf, die Elemente der sinnlichen Vorstellungen mitzubestimmen, sondern verändern sie wesentlich, in Analogie mit den Bestimmungen des Vorgestellten und des Möglichen. Diese Eigenschaft der Zeitbestimmungen entfaltet sich in einer besonderen Wirkung, und zwar in der Tatsache, dass das Seiende modalisiert wird, bis es seinen selben Charakter von Wirklichkeit verliert: Etwas, das in der Vergangenheit bestanden hat (oder in der Zukunft bestehen wird), etwas rein Mögliches oder Vorgestelltes ist überhaupt nichts Wirkliches bzw. Wahres. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit und die Frage nach der Wirklichkeit sind bei Brentano so innig verbunden, dass die entsprechenden Bereiche koinzidieren. Die Zeitspezies der Gegenwart bildet eine Ausnahme im Vergleich zur Vergangenheit und zur Zukunft, indem sie die Korrelaten der Wahrnehmung, auf welche sie sich bezieht, nicht verändert. Besser gesagt, führt die Gegenwart überhaupt keine weitere Bestimmung ein: Sie ist der Nullgrad der Zeitbestimmtheit bzw. der Zeitlichkeit schlechthin, da sie zur Wahrnehmung der qualitativen, intensiven und räumlichen Bestimmtheiten nichts Neues hinzufügt. Mit anderen Worten: Die Behauptung, dass eine Wahrnehmung gegenwärtig ist, dass die Gegenwart als weitere Bestimmtheit zur Wahrnehmung hinzukommt, ist ein pleonastischer Ausdruck, da es keine Wahrnehmung gibt, die nicht aktuell ist. Die von der Phantasie in Bezug auf die Wahrnehmung eingeführte Asymmetrie besteht gerade in der Zeitbestimmung: Was in der sinnlichen Phantasie vorgestellt wird, kann nur in uneigentlichem Sinn als seiend bezeichnet werden. Die Vorstellungskorrelate der Phantasie enthalten keine Töne, Farben, Intensität oder die jeweiligen Raumbestimmungen, sondern nur das, was sich aus der Zeitmodifikation ergibt. Der Jetztpunkt ist der Nullgrad der Zeitbestimmungen der Vergangenheit und der Zukunft und deswegen deren Maßeinheit, da sie in verschiedenen Abständen von ihm entfernt liegen, sodass sich relative Zeitverhältnisse aufgrund dieser absoluten Bestimmungen bilden: Alles, was ist, ist zukünftig gewesen und wird vergangen sein u.s.w.

Indem sie die realen Elemente der Wahrnehmung modifizieren, sind die Bestimmungen der Vergangenheit und der Zukunft nicht für sich selbst real, wie sich bei einer Reihe von Eigenschaften der entsprechenden Phantasievorstellungen zeigt, die nicht bei den realen Bestimmungen vorkommen. Die Zeitbestimmungen können nicht nur reale, sondern auch nichtreale Elemente modifizieren, wie bei der Möglichkeit: Wir können sinnvoll von einer

vergangenen, gegenwärtigen oder zukünftigen Unmöglichkeit sprechen, aber nicht von einer grünen oder blauen Möglichkeit. Ein weiteres charakteristisches Merkmal der durch die Zeitbestimmungen im nichtrealen Sinn modifizierten Elemente, das von anderen Weisen des Nichtrealen geteilt ist, besteht in der Tatsache, dass diese Elemente keinem selbstständigen und wirklichen Werden, Entstehen und Aufhören unterliegen: Nur der Gegenstand – d. h. das modifizierte Korrelat – wird, weil er im eigentlichen Sinn *ist*. Dieser Umstand lässt seitens Brentanos die Behauptung des Vorrangs der Bewegung als objektiver ontologischer Bestimmung vermuten, da die Zeit streng genommen nur das subjektive Maß der Bewegung ist. Der Charakter von Nichtwirklichkeit der Vergangenheit und der Zukunft reicht vollkommen dazu aus, die Unmöglichkeit einer Fernwirkung in der Zeit zu beweisen, die nur im Bereich des Realen möglich ist; das Reale kennzeichnet sich durch die primär evidente ontologische Tatsache der Bewegung. Hinsichtlich der Bewegung behauptet Brentano aufgrund der aristotelischen Bestimmung als *e)nergeia a)telh/*, dass sie nur in unvollkommener Weise ein Reales ist. Im selben Augenblick, in dem sie gegenwärtig ist, vergeht sie kontinuierlich, sodass sie nicht in ihren vergangenen oder zukünftigen Teilen real ist, sondern im einzigen Augenblick der aktuellen Gegenwart.

Wie der Ort und die Qualität, und im Unterschied zur Intensität, erfährt die Zeit kein Mehr oder Weniger: Brentano ist z. B. die Dauer von Bergson vollkommen fremd und unbegreiflich, und zwar die Unterschiede zwischen einer „längeren“ und einer „kürzeren“ Zeit. Die nach veränderlichen Abständen vom Nullpunkt der Gegenwart in der Linie der Zeit liegenden Zeitbestimmungen sind eigentlich nicht als Grad zu beschreiben, weil die von der Gegenwart überschrittene Zeitlinie kein Kontinuum ist, gemäß der Definition der Gegenwart als *terminus extrinsecus*: Eine „unmittelbar“ vergangene Vergangenheit und eine „unmittelbar“ zukünftige Zukunft sind keine infinitesimalen Variationen der Gegenwart, sondern nicht reale Modifikationen, die einen der Gattung nach vollkommen unterschiedlichen Bereich aufschließen, wo das Seiende seinen Wirklichkeitscharakter verliert. Für sich allein betrachtet sind die Zeitspezies keine Größen (was eine Ablehnung einer bloß quantitativen Auffassung der Zeitlichkeit seitens Brentanos vermuten lässt), sondern nur die Übergänge von einer Spezies zu einer anderen und die innerhalb der einzelnen Spezies bestehenden Abstände. Das ist durch die Tatsache bewiesen, dass Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft in sich unendliche Subspezies einschließen, die voneinander verschieden sind, wie die Vergangenheit und die Zukunft von der Gegenwart.

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Über die Phänomenalität intentionaler Zustände

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1. Der qualitative Gehalt als intrinsische Essenz phänomenaler Zustände

Zweifelsohne sind unsere bewußten, mentalen Zustände von einer Fülle qualitativer Eigenschaften geprägt, deren Vorkommen sich im Begriff des *Erlebnisses* ausdrücken läßt – denn das Erlebnis ist der phänomenale Zustand par excellence. So wie es keine unbewußten Erlebnisse gibt, so kann man auch nicht von unbewußten phänomenalen Zuständen sprechen, da der Begriff der Phänomenalität voraussetzt, daß eine bestimmte Eigenschaft vorliegt und das Erlebnissubjekt zugleich dieser Eigenschaft unmittelbar gewahr ist. Da diese Eigenschaften qua Teil mentaler Zustände nur Bewußtseinssubjekten zugesprochen werden können, handelt es sich hier konsequenterweise um subjektive Eigenschaften. Phänomenale Eigenschaften, welche Erlebnisse konstituieren, sind also notwendig bewußte, subjektive, phänomenale Eigenschaften – um einen anderen Ausdruck zu gebrauchen: Qualia. Diese Qualia konstituieren all diejenigen mentalen Zustände, die häufig mit der Umschreibung charakterisiert werden, es gebe ein spezifisches *Wie es ist*, in diesem Zustand zu sein. Beispiele, wie es etwa ist, den blauen Himmel zu sehen, den Duft einer Rose zu riechen oder einfach von einem Glücksgefühl übermannt zu werden, illustrieren deutlich die Existenz von Zuständen, die einen qualitativen Gehalt aufweisen, der nicht mehr und nicht weniger ist als die Summe der darin vorkommenden Qualia. Das heißt: Alle phänomenalen Zustände werden von den ihnen zugrundeliegenden qualitativen Eigenschaften konstituiert, die die Essenz dieser Zustände schlechthin sind. Eine Analyse rein phänomenaler Zustände, wie beispielsweise die Wahrnehmung eines roten Flecks, konfrontiert uns also lediglich mit folgendem Konstituenten des Bewußtseinszustandes: Ein Rot-Quale. Mit dem Begriff des Rot-Quale erfassen wir die Qualität des Wahrnehmungserlebnisses, indem der Begriff eine wesentlich subjektive und intrinsische Eigenschaft denotiert. Diese Eigenschaft ist die Essenz des erörterten Bewußtseinszustandes, da sich dessen Gehalt eben in der Erlebnisqualität erschöpft. Selbstverständlich könnte das Rot-Erlebnis von allerlei zusätzlichen Assoziationen, Handlungsimpulsen oder auch nur von emotionellen Komponenten begleitet sein, aber keiner dieser Faktoren würde sich als unabdingbar für eine korrekte Charakterisierung des Zustandes erweisen. Denn man könnte sich freilich all dieselben Assoziationen, Handlungsimpulse und begleitenden Emotionen in Zusammenhang mit einem Orange-Quale vorstellen und hätten es dennoch mit einem grundverschiedenen Erlebnis zu tun. Dies aber bedeutet, daß nur dem Quale, welches den qualitativen Gehalt des Zustandes ausmacht, eine Individuierungsfunktion zugeschrieben werden kann. Im folgenden möchte ich untersuchen, ob ein derartiges Postulat auch für andere mentale Zustände – und zwar im besonderen für *intentionale Zustände* – geltend gemacht werden kann.

2. Die Komponenten intentionaler Zustände

In der philosophischen Analyse des Bewußtseins wird immer wieder auf einen Aspekt mentaler Zustände hingewiesen, der sich als spezifisch für das Mentale erweist – dessen Intentionalität. Der Terminus „Intentionalität“ referiert auf die Gerichtetheit unseres Bewußtseins

auf ein Objekt oder einen Inhalt. Mit anderen Worten: Viele – wenn auch nicht alle – mentalen Zustände beziehen sich auf ein Etwas, sind also Bewußtseinszustände *von etwas*. Wenn ich beispielsweise denke, so denke ich an etwas, wenn ich mich sehne, so sehne ich mich nach etwas usw. Doch wie läßt sich dieses *Etwas* genauer charakterisieren? Das Objekt oder der Inhalt eines intentionalen Zustandes muß bei genauer Betrachtung in zwei Komponenten separiert werden, die zwar nicht gänzlich voneinander unabhängig sind, aber denen dennoch eine gewisse Eigenständigkeit zugeschrieben werden muß. Diese Komponenten sind einerseits der *bewußtseinsimmanente Inhalt* und andererseits ein (bewußtseins-) *transzendenter Gegenstand*. Ersterer ist subjektabhängig und kann auch ohne einen korrespondierenden transzendenten Gegenstand existieren, was impliziert, daß seine Existenz korrekterweise in der Sphäre des Mentalen zu verorten ist. Der transzendente Gegenstand hingegen existiert subjektunabhängig und dessen tatsächliches Vorkommen in der Welt erweist sich oftmals als irrelevant für die hier analysierten intentionalen Einstellungen. Um den Intentionalitätsbegriff adäquat zu erfassen, müssen meist vier Komponenten zusammengefaßt werden: Einerseits der Träger der intentionalen Einstellung (Subjekt), andererseits der Modus (beispielsweise Denken, Glauben, Hoffen etc.) und schließlich der jeweilige immanente Inhalt sowie der eventuell gegebene transzendente Gegenstand.

3. Die zentralen Thesen

Wie bereits erörtert, gibt es rein phänomenale Zustände – wie etwa das Gefühl der Melancholie oder einer (per definitionem ungerichteten) Angst –, welche zunächst keinen Inhalt besitzen, sondern vielmehr von einem reinen *Wie*, einer Qualität wesentlich bestimmt sind. Welche Rolle muß nun aber dem postulierten qualitativen Charakter intentionaler Zustände zugeschrieben werden, die doch vor allem von ihren Inhalten geprägt scheinen? Meine Analyse der Beziehung zwischen phänomenalem und intentionalem Bewußtseins gipfelt in folgenden Thesen:

1.) *Jeder* Bewußtseinszustand beinhaltet phänomenale Eigenschaften, die ihn charakterisieren.

Wenn auch die meisten Philosophen diesem Postulat in bezug auf Wahrnehmungen, Emotionen und Ähnlichem zustimmen, so wird die Phänomenalität sogenannter kognitiver Einstellungen (wie Denken, Glauben etc.) oftmals angezweifelt. Ich werde im folgenden argumentieren, daß auch derartige mentale Zustände einen qualitativen Gehalt besitzen – kurz, daß es beispielsweise auch irgendwie ist, einen bestimmten Gedanken zu denken. In meinen Erörterungen werde ich zeigen, inwiefern sich dieser postulierte qualitative Gehalt aus einer unumgänglichen Verschränkung des bewußtseinsimmanenten Inhalts mit dem phänomenalen Aspekt ergibt.

2.) *Einige* Bewußtseinszustände beinhalten intentionale Eigenschaften.

Wie bereits eingangs festgestellt, besitzen mentale Zustände, denen intentionale Eigenschaften zugesprochen werden können, notwendigerweise einen bewußtseinsimmanenten Inhalt und zumeist auch einen transzendenten Gegenstand, auf den sie gerichtet sind. Es sollte an dieser

Stelle hinzugefügt werden, daß ich mich in meinen Ausführungen bezüglich einer konstatierten einseitigen Unablösbarkeit der Intentionalität von der Phänomenalität auf die Analyse *bewußter* intentionaler Einstellung konzentriere, da es in diesen Fällen unzweifelhaft ist, daß sie aufgrund ihres Erlebt-Werdens auch notwendig einen phänomenalen Aspekt beinhalten. Die Absurdität der Vorstellung von bewußten mentalen Zuständen ohne jegliche Erlebnisqualität ist anhand der Beispiele wie Emotionen, Wahrnehmungen etc. intuitiv einsichtig – und dieselbe evidente Phänomenalität muß auf jede Form bewußter mentaler Zustände ausgeweitet werden. Folglich ist es notwendig, darzulegen, *wie* sich diese omnipräsenten Qualia in eine Analyse intentionaler Zustände eingliedern lassen.

Die Unmöglichkeit rein inhaltsbezogener Einstellungen ohne jegliche qualitative Eigenschaften ergibt sich aus der zweifachen Rolle, die die Phänomenalität in der Konstitution eines intentionalen Zustandes spielt: Einerseits ist die spezifische Form des Gerichtetseins selbst von einem Modus-individuierenden *Wie* geprägt. Andererseits birgt der bewußtseinsimmanente Inhalt, der als Voraussetzung für eine intentionale Einstellung angesehen werden muß, wesentlich einen qualitativen Aspekt in sich, der weit über assoziierte Emotionen oder Handlungsimpulse hinausgeht. Meines Erachtens wird diese Form des Inhalts von nichts weniger konstituiert als genau den Qualia des damit einhergehenden Bedeutungserlebnisses. Diese beiden weiteren Thesen können also wie folgt formuliert werden:

- 3.) Glauben, daß p, unterscheidet sich phänomenal von hoffen (oder anderen intentionalen Modi), daß p.
- 4.) Glauben, daß p unterscheidet sich phänomenal von glauben, daß q.

Im folgenden werde ich diese zwei phänomenalen Aspekte nacheinander einer eingehenden Untersuchung unterziehen:

4. Die Phänomenalität des Modus der intentionalen Einstellung

Offensichtlich ist es irgendwie, etwas zu wünschen, zu glauben oder zu hoffen. Die Phänomenalität eines Glaubenszustandes unterscheidet sich jedoch eindeutig von dem Erlebnischarakter eines Wunsches – auch wenn diese beiden Einstellungen auf denselben transzendenten Gegenstand gerichtet sein mögen. Diese Überlegung läßt uns folgern, daß es Qualia des Modus geben muß, die es dem Subjekt ermöglichen, die einzelnen Einstellungsmodi bei gleichbleibendem Inhalt dennoch voneinander zu unterscheiden. Genau dieser qualitative Aspekt des Modus verleiht dem komplexen Zustand seine Färbung und muß somit als eine essentielle Eigenschaft der jeweiligen intentionalen Einstellung angesehen werden. Meines Erachtens ist also jeder Einstellungsmodus von einer distinkten, spezifischen Phänomenalität konstituiert und dies gilt nicht nur für emotionelle Gerichtetheit (wie etwa Fürchten, Hoffen etc.), sondern auch für kognitive Einstellungen. Denn genauso wie man Hoffen und Fürchten nicht voneinander unterscheiden könnte, wenn nicht jeder dieser Zustände einen qualitativen Gehalt implizierte, der gänzlich verschieden von allen anderen Zuständen ist, ebensowenig könnte man beispielsweise das Phänomen des Verstehens als ein solches identifizieren, wenn nicht auch hierfür eine spezifische Phänomenalität ausschlaggebend wäre. Man bedenke nur den radikalen Erlebniswandel, sobald man im Fluß einer unbekanntem Sprache plötzlich ein Wort vernimmt, welches man *versteht*. Gerade anhand derartiger Fälle

zeigt sich die Veränderung des phänomenalen Aspekts, der eben vom geänderten intentionalen Modus evoziert wurde, in vollem Ausmaß.

5. Die Phänomenalität des bewußtseinsimmanenten Inhalts

Es scheint offensichtlich zu sein, daß wir direktes Wissen von dem Inhalt einer bewußten intentionalen Einstellung besitzen. Wie kann jedoch das Zustandekommen eines derartigen Wissens erklärt werden? Da ein unmittelbarer Zugang nur bewußten, eigenpsychischen Zuständen – wie sie paradigmatisch phänomenale Zustände verkörpern – zugesprochen werden kann, so muß es auch ein subjektiver Aspekt sein, der uns zu dem jeweiligen, direkt erfassbaren Inhalt führt. Mit anderen Worten: Der einzig mögliche Kandidat, der die Aufgabe einer subjektiven, phänomenalen Vermittlung eines Inhaltes darstellen könnte, ist der bereits angeführte bewußtseinsimmanente Inhalt. Dieser scheint auch tatsächlich die individuierende Rolle zu übernehmen, damit wir zu einem unmittelbaren Wissen von dem Inhalt des Geglauten, Gedachten etc. gelangen können. Wie ich demonstrieren werde, kann ein phänomenaler Zustand variieren, obwohl der transzendente Gegenstand, auf den die intentionale Einstellung gerichtet ist, derselbe bleibt. Analog dazu kann dies jedoch nicht von dem internalistisch determinierten bewußtseinsimmanenten Inhalt ausgesagt werden, da dieser eben von dem phänomenalen Aspekt konstituiert ist. Ich möchte ein Beispiel anführen, das illustriert, inwiefern der bewußtseinsimmanente Inhalt stets phänomenal und vor allem wesentlich subjektiv ist: Angenommen zwei Personen sind intentional (z.B. im Modus des Denkens) auf den Ginkgobaum im Grazer Stadtpark gerichtet. Evidenterweise kann der mit dem bewußtseinsimmanenten Inhalt verschränkte, phänomenale Gehalt beträchtlich variieren, obwohl sowohl der transzendente Gegenstand als auch der Modus der Einstellung derselbe ist. So könnte die Person A denken, daß der Ginkgobaum der Baum ist, dessen Blätter das Denken stärken sollen, während die Person B an den Ginkgobaum als denjenigen Baum denkt, unter dem sie im Sommer ein Picknick gemacht hat. Anhand dieses Beispiels wird ersichtlich, daß der qualitative Gehalt des intentionalen Zustandes sich unabhängig von externen Faktoren in der engen Sphäre des Mentalen formiert.

Variieren wir nun das Szenario und denken an zwei Personen mit dem gleichen Erlebnisgehalt, die im Modus des Wahrnehmens mit dem bewußtseinsimmanenten Inhalt des Ginkgobaums im Stadtpark konfrontiert sind. Der Unterschied soll nun darin bestehen, daß in diesem Beispiel die Person A tatsächlich den Ginkgobaum wahrnimmt, während die Person B von einem Hologramm getäuscht wird. Das heißt, wir haben es mit einem Szenario zu tun, welches aus psychologischer Hinsicht ununterscheidbar ist, jedoch bezüglich der externen Faktoren einen gewichtigen Unterschied aufweist. In psychologischer Hinsicht ist also das tatsächliche Vorkommen eines transzendenten Gegenstandes völlig irrelevant, da die beiden Personen ein qualitativ identisches Erlebnis (konstituiert von identischen Qualia) unterlaufen und deshalb deren intentionaler Zustand auch den gleichen bewußtseinsimmanenten Inhalt besitzt. Noch signifikanter wird diese Analyse, wenn man das Beispiel auf intentionale Einstellungen bezüglich nicht-existierender Gegenstände wie etwa Einhörner ausweitet. Diese Untersuchung des Hiatus zwischen bewußtseinsimmanentem Inhalt und transzendentem Gegenstand deutet auf ein zentrales Faktum hin: Für ein adäquates Erfassen eines bewußtseinsimmanenten Inhaltes *darf* nicht auf externe Faktoren rekurriert wer-

den, da man sonst der Wichtigkeit des qualitativen Gehalts des analysierten Bewußtseinszustandes nicht gerecht werden würde.

Nun wird oftmals argumentiert, daß der konstatierte Unterschied bezüglich des *Inhalts* der intentionalen Einstellung von der Tatsache erklärt werden kann, daß Denken nicht mehr als lautloses Sprechen sei und der damit verbundene quasi auditive Eindruck den qualitativen Gehalt bestimmen würde. Doch meines Erachtens beinhalten (subvokal) verbalisierte Gedanken nicht aufgrund deren phonologischer Qualität, sondern vielmehr aufgrund der Semantik der Wörter ihre konstatierte Phänomenalität. Dies kann man leicht an folgendem Beispiel erkennen: Angenommen zwei Personen A und B vernehmen denselben Satz in italienischer Sprache. Während die Person A Italienisch beherrscht und den Satz versteht, so erlebt die Person B das Gesagte nur als eine unverständliche Klangabfolge. Obwohl also der bloße Laut für beide Subjekte derselbe ist, unterscheiden sich die jeweiligen Erlebnisse in ihrer Phänomenalität grundlegend. Dies führt zu einer weiteren Überlegung: Wenn nun die Person B den ihr unverständlichen Satz in Gedanken innerlich wiederholt (verbal formuliert), so kann man dennoch nicht sagen, daß sie den Satz *denkt*. Ergo kann das innere Lautbild eines Satzes auch nicht eine hinreichende Bedingung dafür sein, zu wissen, welchen Gedanken der formulierte Satz darstellt. Andererseits divergiert die Lautgestalt von beispielsweise „weiß“ und „bianco“ eindeutig, obwohl das Vernehmen dieser Laute bei einer Person mit adäquater Sprachkenntnis dasselbe Erlebnis evozieren kann. Somit kann die phonologische Vorstellung niemals identisch mit dem Denk-Erlebnis eines Satzes sein. Weiters erkennt man die Tatsache, daß sich der spezifische qualitative Gehalt des Versteh-Erlebnisses nicht aus der reinen Wortkombination ergibt, auch in den Fällen, die sich durch zweideutige Sätze wie etwa „*Die Laster sind längst überholt*“ auf tun. Eine mögliche Interpretation wäre: (a) Diese schlechten Angewohnheiten gibt es heutzutage nicht mehr. Die andere hingegen: (b) Diese LKW hat ein Auto schon längst hinter sich gelassen. In solchen Fällen ändert sich der phänomenale Aspekt des Erlebnisses je nach Interpretations- oder Verstehensweise. Folglich ist der Verweis auf die Lautgestalt eines Satzes kein Argument gegen die inhärente Phänomenalität von Gedanken, Glaubenseinstellungen etc. Hinzu kommt, daß es auch Gedanken nicht-verbalisierter Form gibt, beispielsweise, weil ein komplexer Inhalt in kürzester Zeit gedacht wird. Dies könnte der Fall sein, wenn man die Konsequenzen einer These durchdenkt. Trotzdem hat man während eines solchen Gedankens ein Gefühl des *Wie es ist, derartiges zu denken* und dieser qualitative Aspekt kann nicht auf ein inneres Sprechen zurückgeführt werden, weil der Inhalt eben nicht vollkommen verbalisiert wurde. In solchen Fällen ist meiner Meinung nach der bewußtseinsimmanente Inhalt – die Essenz des verbalisierbaren Gedankens – als eine Art wittgensteinscher „Keim“ gegeben, der zu dessen verbaler Manifestation auswachsen kann (siehe: Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie*, Bd. II, §232). Ebenso wenig muß ein solcher Gedanke von etwaigen visuellen Vorstellungen oder Bildern begleitet werden – wie es beim Durchdenken einer Theorie selten der Fall ist. Obwohl in solchen Fällen sowohl die auditiven als auch die visuellen Begleitphänomene fehlen, muß dem Gedanken dennoch eine Erlebnisqualität zugeschrieben werden.

Nachdem also festgestellt wurde, daß sich die Phänomenalität intentionaler Einstellungen nicht auf quasi-auditive Begleiterscheinungen zurückführen läßt, so wird anhand der folgenden Argumentation ersichtlich, daß dies ebensowenig für visuelle Begleiterscheinungen gilt, die zweifelsohne manchen intentionalen Zuständen zugespro-

chen werden müssen. Wenn ich etwa denke, daß Graz die Hauptstadt der Steiermark ist, so kann dieser Gedanke von einem inneren Bild einer steirischen Landkarte begleitet werden. Allerdings kann derselbe Gedanke mit einem Bild des Landtaggebäudes oder eben mit gar keinem Bild assoziiert werden. Ich leugne also keineswegs, daß visuelle Vorstellungen zu manchen Gedanken, Wünschen, Ängsten etc. hinzukommen – ich bezweifle nur, daß es diese inneren Bilder sind, in denen sich die Erlebnisqualität des jeweiligen intentionalen Bewußtseinszustandes erschöpft. Erstens, weil die assoziierten Bilder variieren können, während der phänomenale Gehalt des Gedankens derselbe bleibt. Zweitens, weil es zahlreiche Gedanken gibt, die weder von einem inneren Sprechen, noch von inneren Bildern begleitet werden. Während also die Phänomenalität des Inhalts von visuellen u.ä. Erlebnisqualitäten umrahmt werden kann, so darf sie jedoch nicht auf diese reduziert werden. Denn der bewußtseinsimmanente Inhalt wird unter anderem von den Qualia des Zustandes bestimmt – ähnlich wie dies bei Wahrnehmungen von Ente/Hase-Kippbildern konstatiert werden kann, wo die (vom Auslöser stark divergierende) Phänomenalität erst den Inhalt der Wahrnehmung konstituiert.

6. Zusammenfassung

Meines Erachtens ist die Phänomenalität einer intentionalen Einstellung eine Komposition aus zwei Aspekten, von denen jeder für sich einen spezifischen qualitativen Gehalt in sich trägt. Verändert sich nur einer dieser Aspekte, so verändern sich auch die mit dem jeweiligen Zustand verbundenen Qualia. Die Signifikanz der Phänomenalität für eine adäquate Analyse intentionaler Einstellungen ergibt sich also aus zweierlei Gründen. Erstens: Da *nur* der phänomenale Aspekt notwendig jeder Form von Bewußtsein zugeschrieben werden muß, so sollte diesem auch der Status der fundamentalen Essenz von Bewußtsein zuerkannt werden. Dieser qualitative Aspekt konstituiert nun wiederum denjenigen Inhalt, der intentionalen Einstellungen stets gegeben sein muß und der gleichsam als die Brücke zu einem eventuellen transzendenten Objekt angesehen werden kann: der *bewußtseinsimmanente Inhalt*. Wie bereits an der möglichen Abwesenheit eines korrespondierenden transzendenten Gegenstandes offensichtlich wird, muß gefolgert werden, daß das Wesentliche einer intentionalen Einstellung eben im engen, mentalen Inhalt zu suchen ist. Hinzu kommt die epistemische Besonderheit, daß es keinerlei Gedankens höherer Ordnung bedarf, um sich dieses subjektiven Inhalts bewußt zu sein, da innerhalb der Subjektperspektive ein unmittelbares Gewahrsein des relevanten Inhalts gegeben ist. Das heißt, das Subjekt befindet sich in einer privilegierten Position bezüglich der Feststellung, worauf ein intentionaler Zustand gerichtet ist.

Das Postulat des zweiten phänomenalen Aspekts wird von dem Faktum gestützt, daß phänomenale Eigenschaften auch die einzigen Kandidaten für unmittelbar zugängliche Eigenschaften sind, die uns die *Charakterisierung* eines mentalen Zustandes ermöglichen. So ermöglichen uns auch die *Qualia des Modus* eine Phänomenalität des intentionalen Zustandes zu identifizieren, die ungeachtet des Inhalts all denselben Einstellungstypen gemeinsam ist. Meine Analyse gipfelt also in dem Ergebnis, daß betreffs intentionaler Einstellungen die wesentlichen Eigenschaften, beispielsweise, daß ein *Gedanke, daß p* erstens ein *Gedanke* (damit meine ich den *Zustand des Denkens*) und zweitens ein *Gedanke, daß p* ist, stets phänomenale Eigenschaften sein müssen.

Intentionality Denaturalized

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Introduction

de Man: "The idea of individuation, of the human subject as a privileged viewpoint, is a mere metaphor by means of which man protects himself from his insignificance by forcing his own interpretation of the world upon the entire universe."

Putnam: "The methodological solipsist is led to his transcendental observation that everyone is equally the 'I' of the construction by his praiseworthy desire to *acknowledge* others in this sense. But you *can't* acknowledge others in this sense!"

de Man: "The metaphorical substitution is aberrant but no human self could come into being without this error."

Putnam: "Which involves recognizing that the situation *really is* symmetrical, if you think they are really constructions out of *your* sense data."

de Man: "The self was at first the center of the language as its empirical referent."

Putnam: "The 'you' he addresses his higher-order remark to cannot be the *empirical* 'you' of the system."

de Man: "The self now becomes the language of the center as fiction, as metaphor of the self."

Putnam: "But if it's really true that the 'you' of the system is the only 'you' he can *understand*, then the transcendental remark is *unintelligible*."

de Man: "Faced with the truth of its nonexistence, the self would be consumed as an insect is consumed by the flame that attracts it."

Putnam: "Moral: don't be a methodological solipsist unless you are a *real* solipsist!"

(These are quotes taken from de Man 1979, 111-112, and Putnam 1983, 318-319.)

What is striking about this quote is the point where language comes in for de Man (1979). His chiasm about the self does not, however, allude to a phenomenism à la Mach ("Das Ich ist unrettbar."), nor is it merely psycho-analytical. This opaque quote is much rather a matter of how much agency is ascribed to the self in his relation to language. I assume de Man (1979) positions himself in the tradition which tends to more or less radically question the speaker as an active part of the production of language. This tradition usually shows an allergic reaction when confronted with speech "acts" and the (illocutionary) "force" of a statement. Consequently, Intentionality has to die with the author. (cf. Barthes 1977) In the first part of my paper I will explore that tradition a little in order to find out what the motivation for such a rebuttal of agency and displacement of Intentionality is. The following section will deal with the question if, and if yes how, Intentionality can be maintained as a concept when applied to the resulting lemming-speakers and what purpose this might serve. Finally, I will try to find out how consistent such a widened account of Intentionality, now essentially deprived of its genuine context, can possibly be.

1. "an entire field..."

In the intriguing controversy between Derrida (1971) and Searle (1977) Derrida rejects Austin's philosophy of language describing it as "the teleological jurisdiction of an entire field whose organizing center remains *intention*" (p. 15). According to him, this has to be contrasted with the sole reproducibility of what has already been there; the opposition to Austin's and Wittgenstein's genetic views is evident. The focus on written language makes it simple (though not entirely feasible I suppose) for Derrida to remove Intentionality from communication.

As becomes clear from the imaginary dialogue between de Man and Putnam, de Man takes language as a stand-in for the subject. That is to say, what speaks is the language, language as such; not the person. It is the language which reiterates itself and contains the genuine origin of all our utterances; i.e. utterances that "we" like to ascribe to "ourselves". If that origin really can be found only in such a broader context, one has to start talking about that "metaphor of the self" – i.e. about language – as if it was equipped with Intentionality. This is, e.g., how language becomes injurious all the way for Butler (1997). Butler therefore has to come up with some concept of Intentionality, which is ascribed to language as such; the "subjected" subjects as the "belated origin" (p. 49) of utterances only are the medium of language.

"Is a community and history of such speakers not magically invoked at the moment in which that utterance is spoken? ... a transitivity that cannot be reduced to a causal or intentional process originating in a singular subject?" (p. 49)

This consequently has to lead to a critique of Derrida (1971), who doesn't allow for any "transitivity" whatsoever, since the *force de rupture* of the sign with its context of production doesn't allow for any pragmatic accounting for contextual constituents of meaning. The point, though, is that Butler (1997) cannot maintain the general refutation of Intentionality and recurs to some third party of speech as the ultimate bearer of intentional states. I.e., if such "transitivity" is allowed for, there can be something like *higher-order Intentionality*.

The alternative – as I see it – would have to be a focus on the strategy of rational *individuals*, using language for their strategic aims. This approach has been taken by Brown&Levinson (1978). Their Politeness Theory claims that the risk of threat via language is constantly minimized by the agents. *Intentionality* becomes *intentionality*, the non-technical term.

2. Intentionality denaturalized

Putnam (1983) argues against naturalized epistemology and for the regulative function of reason, which cannot be relativized away e.g. in the kind of cultural relativism Rorty comes up with. Nevertheless, to refer to some common context, which supposedly cannot be torn apart by the skeptic, implies that there has to be some kind of "attunement" among the speakers of a language, a common "background" (cf. Searle 1983), a commemorated "natural history" (cf. Wittgenstein 1953, §25).

On the other hand, the Wittgensteinian point about justification has to be taken seriously. When explanations come to an end, there is nothing which could be taken as a rock-solid basis, a fact which could clarify the intentional content in such a way that certainty can be claimed for how to follow a rule. There is no such fact that can be associated with a rule; nor is there any such fact for a language (which boils down to the private language argument). On the other hand, when Wittgenstein (1953, §217) ends up stating “This is just what I do.”, that Faustian spirit (“...im Anfang war die Tat”) also serves the purpose of “magically invoking that community” (cf. also the notorious Augustine-beginning in Wittgenstein 1953). Where, thus, is the intentional residue? It must somehow be connected with the “elders”. The inhabitant of a Chinese Room à la Searle (1980) is not crucial any more for Intentionality; as long as language is “at work” inside the room, this is sufficient for the ascription of a mental state.

This means that the naturalization process, i.e. the refutation of any *internal* entity which could guarantee a full-fledged justification for a rule, implies a redirection of Intentionality towards the inherited practices, something like what Butler (1997, 3) calls “condensed historicity”. This is how e.g. collectivism can be ascribed Intentionality in such a way that subordinates the subject – which I would still claim is the genuine bearer of Intentionality, which subject thus becomes the “belated and fictive origin” (Butler 1997), or the “language of the center” (de Man 1979, 112), or the “metaphor of the self” (de Man 1979, 112), or whatever. And at the same time this subordination is achieved Intentionality gains a social and historical dimension. The de-Manian subject-in-isolation has to be confronted with the possible acknowledgement of others.

“What fact about me makes it the case that I meant plus rather than quus in the past when I used the ‘+’ sign – then equally, the problem would arise for my perception of the agreement of other people.” (Searle 2002, 260)

Can this seriously be called an externalism in the sense of a naturalization? The internalization of rules which are taught by the “elders” means that the subject accepts the acceptability standards of some form of life and thereby reproduces these standards. I guess this can be called one aspect of the term “reiteration” (cf. Derrida 1971 and the reduction to “permanence” in Searle 1977). This kind of “socialization” of the justification regress is represented by a sudden halt in the line of explanation – as described by Wittgenstein (1953, §217) – implying that there has to be some a priori collective (ordinary) ground for intentional states. (cf. Cavell 1969, 21: “what is normative is exactly ordinary use itself”)

Searle (2002) develops a notion of collective Intentionality, which is irreducible to first-person singular Intentionality, but at the same time restricted to the sum of individuals – there is no group *consciousness*; this notion is thus less binding metaphysically than the allegoric/anthropomorphic view purported by Butler (1997) cited above. Nevertheless, this account also has to face the threat of the critique of Putnam (1983). (cf. Searle 2002, 96) The concession Searle (2002) seems to make to methodological solipsism is “the fact that I may be mistaken in taking it that the ‘we’ in the ‘we intend’ actually refers to a we” (Searle 2002, 97). The question then is: Can one question collective Intentionality without questioning the dignity of individual intentional states? In other words, can one be a *real* solipsist without being a *methodological* solipsist anyway, i.e. what’s the use of being (called) a solipsist otherwise?

3. Where is the spade turned?

The “problem” with Intentionality – i.e. before it is extended to a (to put it metaphysically neutral) meta-subjective perspective – is, that it does not serve as a basis e.g. for certainty about the “uptake” (cf. Austin 1975, 73), i.e. understanding the force, of a speech act. But where does the unintelligibility Putnam (1983) complains about come from? The fact that the skeptic cannot point to the common standards in order to communicate his concerns shows that these common standards also determine *ex negativo* his point of view. This is what Searle (2002, 150), calls the transcendental argument about speech acts.

“social phenomena form the conditions of possibility of speech acts” (Searle 2002, 150)

Which amounts to saying: there can be no excentric position in/about language. Since it seems unavoidable to include *this* transcendental remark in the investigation of speech acts, the statement about the ‘you’ which Putnam (1983) is *only* about the empirical ‘you’. I.e., if the social predetermination of any intentional state is accepted, there is no inconsistency with the claim that the appeal of the interlocutor as mere language or metaphor of the self is acceptable.

But doesn’t that exorcize any genuine form of Intentionality? Could any kind of mental state, e.g. a belief, be formed independently of linguistic or social jurisdiction? The borderline case of mental states in animals often seems to reveal the critical dose where the social transcendence of Intentionality can fruitfully be contrasted with the contingent natural context of the individual. Is Wittgenstein (1953, §25) a chauvinist about the animal mind? Often belief ascription to animals seems more plausible than such exclusive (anthropocentric) jurisdiction suggests, although one has learned the lesson that the danger of anthropomorphism is everywhere.

When the methodological solipsist tries to make a connection with his ‘you’, isn’t his – apparently inconsistent – interpellation and appellation of community in a similar way faulty and metaphysical as some allegedly transcendental argument about the precondition of one’s own Intentionality? It takes lots of constraints with which a higher-order Intentionality (in some solid sense of Intentionality) could be established. It is too seductive to fall into allegories, thus merely projecting individual intentional states onto collectives. But even if it were the case that some genuine Intentionality as opposed to these constructs could be found in social contexts, who would be the subject of this Intentionality? This question is crucial since similar questions have been pondered in theories of functionalism – where one would expect an answer to be simpler, since Intentionality becomes a public good, so to speak – but no satisfying solution has been presented. To assume that the collective subject of an intentional state is out there implies the rejection of further questions, the Spade is turned. In the case of Intentionality, a “naturalization” must always lead it to a place where it is not at home.

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A Naturalized Approach to the Turing Test: Is DNA Computing a Way Out of the Chinese Room?

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Introduction

In the standard account, experiments are regarded as artificial devices that test scientific theories by providing reproducible observational instances. This standard account of experiments neglects their cognitive value as devices to produce beliefs in experimenters and consensus in the scientific community. In the light of a comparison between the Turing Test and Fodor's account of scientific experimentation, this paper will deal with the following points:

Firstly, I will critically explore the Turing Test (TT hereafter), especially as to its reliability for assessing intelligence. This critical analysis will be carried out in the light of a comparison between TT and the goal of scientific experiments according to Naturalized Epistemology.

Secondly, after considering briefly Searle's Chinese Room Argument (CRA hereafter), I will claim that the basis on which Artificial Intelligence has been evaluated to date, namely, the deceit of an external interrogator, has misled the attention from the creation of intelligence in machines to its mere simulation. Furthermore, the comparison between scientific experiments and TT will show Turing's unduly epistemic emphasis on assessing intelligence by the deceit of interrogators.

Finally, I will propose that a breakthrough in computer science, to wit, DNA computation, helps go a step further in the creation and assessment of intelligence upon a more realistic basis, instead of the purely epistemic and instrumentalist approach of TT. As DNA implements a specific program from which life and intelligence arises, so too may DNA computing bridge the gap between the emulation of real mental life and its concrete replication. With the aid of DNA computing, the Turing Test could be seen as an experiment in which the outcome, the intelligence of the machine, is true if and only if the machine has genuinely implemented intelligence, not just simulating it.

Part I: The basis of the Turing Test to assess intelligence

Before determining whether the Turing Test can be regarded as an experiment, it would be suitable to find out what experiments are for. Scientific experiments are supposed to be the decisive place where mind and theory make contact through the observation of experimental results. Seemingly, experiments solely provide opportunities for making observations and confirming theories.

However, Jerry Fodor (1991) proposes an alternative viewpoint to the standard picture of experimentation. According to Fodor, while some experiments may yield observable results, the gist of experimentation consists in the causal induction of a belief if and only if that belief is *true*. The causal production of a true belief and its reproducibility under experimental conditions evince high degrees of reliability as experiments put questions to nature, disposing the mind of an experimenter to a state of

judicious receptivity. Given this state, the experimenter will be convinced of *p* if and only if *p* is true.

Further, experiments play another role in science; namely, they produce conclusive data for scientific theories, which helps convince the scientific community of a theory through experimental results. General consensus stems from experimental outcomes because they appropriately back the theories held by the scientific community. Hence, if consensus is not reached with regard to an experiment, either *p* is not the case and the theory from which the prediction has been inferred is false or the causal connection has failed. In this respect, experiments need to support *ceteris paribus* conditions. As Fodor asserts,

Jones' saying that it is 13 o'clock on the 31st of February 545 BC would very likely *not* cause you to believe that it is (1991, 202).

Given Fodor's account of scientific experimentation, can TT thus be considered an experiment? And if so, does any problem stem from considering TT as a crucial test for intelligence?

Even though TT is not intended to generate beliefs about natural phenomena, it can be regarded as a sort of litmus test for assessing intelligence in any machine that emulates the mind. Indeed, TT consists of a feasible instrumental procedure, the Imitation Game¹ (Turing 1950/1952), by which we should be convinced that, if a machine successfully imitates a man, then this is *sufficient* for believing that the machine has behaved as *if* it were intelligent.

Thus, TT is intended to assess whether or not the programmed computer can deceive the interrogator by *imitating* the answers a man would reply to the questions he has been put to. The *predictions* of the Imitation Game make TT resemble an experiment as Turing asserts that

in about fifty years it will be possible to programme computers...to make them play the game so well that an average interrogator will not have more than 70 per cent chance of making the right identification after five minutes of questioning (1950, 442).

It is worth remarking that TT does not comprise a definition of intelligence. On the contrary, according to Copeland (2000), TT only provides a *sufficient condition* for any machine to be considered intelligent so long as an external interrogator cannot tell any difference in the behavior between man and computer. The sufficient condition involved in the test establishes that if something passes the test, it can be regarded as intelligent. TT, in consequence, is a mere *instrumental device* to assess intelligence by the *causation* of the belief *p*, that the machine is a man, even if *it is not true* that the machine has replicated intelligence. The latter is a major difference between TT and the current naturalized view of experimentation in science, as Fodor's account makes clear. Although in TT an interrogator is caused to believe that the

¹ Turing proposed different versions of TT between 1950 and 1952. For the sake of simplicity, I take the last version of the Imitation Game.

machine is a man because it behaved as a man would do, it does not matter whether or not the machine has *truly replicated* a man's intelligence. According to Turing,

the idea of the test is that the machine has to try and pretend to be a man, by answering questions put to it, and it will pass if the pretence is reasonably convincing (1952).

The instrumental side entangled in TT shows the stress on the epistemic point in the assessment of intelligence, rather than its *bona fide* production. In this sense, it is not surprising that TT has not produced entire consensus as to its reliability to assess intelligence. I will return to this problem in the following parts because, as I claim, the assessment of intelligence has to be carried out upon more realistic basis. This could be so, if there was a causal connection between the *real event* in which a machine replicates intelligence and the mind of an experimenter.

Part II: Searle's Chinese Room and the causal production of mental life

Like TT, Searle's (1980 and 1990) Chinese Room Argument is based on deceiving an interrogator through the imitation of linguistic understanding, one of the conditions attributed by Turing for creating intelligence in machines.

Briefly, the Chinese Room thought experiment runs as follows: John Searle, who knows no Chinese, neither written nor spoken, supposes that he is locked in a room and communicates with an external interrogator through sheets of paper. Passed through a slot, batches of Chinese symbols are given to Searle, who matches a first and a second batch by looking up the instructions of a rulebook in English. By the same procedure, he even matches a third batch with the other two batches. The matching of symbols merely occurs according to the instructions of the rulebook, which could be said to constitute the program. According to Searle, if the first batch were a script, the second a story, and the third questions about the story, while he is completely unable to understand the script, story, and questions in Chinese, he would be completely capable of answering the questions posed by an external interrogator. Accordingly, this interrogator would judge Searle as a native Chinese speaker. In this sense, Searle could pass TT, despite having no understanding whatsoever of the Chinese symbols involved. Searle concludes that any computer passing TT may count as a machine that formally correlates symbols, but since it is unable to truly understand the meaning of these symbols, it is unable to instantiate the properties attributed to a mind, such as intentionality and consciousness.

Setting aside Copeland's (2001) and other philosophers' criticisms of CRA (Preston and Bishop 2001), CRA has somehow undermined the reliability of TT for assessing intelligence. The essence of the problem seems to be that instead of providing evidence for the artificial creation of a mind, TT merely insists on the assessment of intelligence upon the deceit of an interrogator exposed to the mimicked answers of a machine *pretending* to be a man. Consequently, the lack of reliability of TT can be explained by the absence of a true causal connection between a true belief and a state of affairs, as the naturalized view of scientific experimentation requires. Differently put, TT fails to convince of its reliability because it relies on a simulated rather than replicated mind.

Part III: DNA computation and the program of life and intelligence

In order to meet current standards of scientific rigor, the creation and assessment of intelligence should involve an authentic causal connection. This means that creating a mind should comprise the replication of the same causal interaction of a mind, though reproducing these interactions does not necessarily mean to create a mind by replicating a brain, as Searle claims (1997). Rather, on the basis of DNA computation, I claim that Artificial Intelligence may instantiate a *genuine* causal connection between the mind and the environment by the program and causal interaction DNA involve.

DNA computing suggests a compelling solution to the problem of replicating a mind and, thereby, to the problems of intentionality and consciousness posed by the Chinese Room. Forthcoming robots based on DNA transistor technology (Braun et al. 2003) may self-assemble without human manipulation. If this were so, future robots would not merely simulate intelligence and mind, but potentially replicate both via the duplication of other organisms causal powers and their adaptive intelligent behavior.

How could this be so? Since DNA can be considered the encoded program of life, it is possible to assert that any machine based on DNA chips would genuinely implement the program of life and consequently, intelligence. Thus, creating life and intelligence entail implementing DNA computation in a computer. In this respect, if we had a DNA robot running programs, it would behave formally, due to the computer programs, and intelligently, due to DNA. And since there are intelligent behaviors associated with DNA (Dawkins 1976), any machine based on DNA would behave intelligently.

An approach to the Chinese Room via DNA computing represents an advantage over the Robot's Reply proposed by Fodor (1980) as to the following points:

Firstly, DNA computers would instantiate *bona fide* replicas of intelligence insofar as they would instantiate authentic causal connections between the experimenter's mind and the state of affairs. The inability of current computers to deal intentionally with the environment may be amended by DNA technology by genuinely instantiating causally enhanced interactive behavior, not simply the *as if* of current computers and robots. DNA computing would improve the reliability of TT within the scientific community as a consequence of interrogators being caused to believe that a machine is intelligent if and only if the machine can replicate the behaviour of an adaptive organism.

Secondly, given the fact that DNA acts in the microlevel structure of an organism producing its surface characteristics, the replication of robot-machines by DNA computation may potentially reproduce the same activities and processes of a living organism. In fact organisms encode and store, within each cell, all the instructions needed to build, operate, maintain, and reproduce itself and to respond to varied environmental conditions. Hence, among other processes, a DNA robot may instantiate the mapping of the environment and the mapping of itself mapping the environment, which are considered two necessary conditions for intentionality and consciousness (Damasio 1999). And, unlike current robots, a DNA based robot replica would attempt to reach *homeostasis* as an ideal condition to replicate itself and, ultimately, to stay entirely functional.

Thirdly, DNA is linked to the process of evolution by adaptive behavior to the environment. Genes naturally produce intelligence as a means to survival via inherited responses. This explains why a DNA robot would not only causally deal with the environment, as the current robot does, but also inherit a set of intelligent behaviors. The key to understand why DNA comprises intelligence may be in Martyn Amos's (1994) remarks on DNA computation.

DNA meets key requirements regarding extreme miniaturization and compression: for instance, there are 40Mb of characters in the genome of the humble fruit fly, and these are replicated in every cell of the fruit fly's body. But the real power of DNA computation lies in its massive inherent parallelism. The average test tube can hold upwards of 10^{12} strands. When an enzyme is added, to perform certain operations on the DNA, it acts on every strand simultaneously. That's a lot of computing going on at the same time.

In summary, the instrumentalist approach of the TT deters Artificial Intelligence from creating consciousness and intentionality in current computers as it comprises the simulation of a mind rather than its replication. A solution to this problem is the replication of intelligence via DNA and the program it implements, which would help engender Artificial Intelligence. Upon this basis, it would be possible to instantiate a real causal connection between TT as the litmus test of intelligence, the mind of the experimenter, and the replication of intelligence. DNA based computers and robots would be far more convincing than computers and robots simulating intelligence, such as the ones envisaged by Turing in the TT.

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Die Rolle einer multiplikativen Wahrscheinlichkeitsmethode (MPE-Methode) bei der Gestaltwahrnehmung

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1. Methode

In meinem vorjährigen Beitrag zum Wittgenstein-Symposium (Gottlob, R., 2003a) habe ich mit der MPE-Methode, (Multiplications of the probabilities of error) eine Wahrscheinlichkeitsmethode beschrieben, die sich für stumme oder auch unbewusste, größenordnungsmäßige Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnungen besonders eignet.

Wenn als $P(A)$ die Wahrscheinlichkeit von A bezeichnet wird, so ist die Fehlerwahrscheinlichkeit von A, $P(\neg A) = 1 - P(A)$, das Komplement von $P(A)$ oder auch $P(A^c)$ notiert. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass mehrere semantisch verschiedene Fehlerwahrscheinlichkeiten gleichzeitig bestehen, ist

$$P(\neg A) \times P(\neg B) \times \dots \times P(\neg N) = [1 - P(A)] \times [1 - P(B)] \times \dots \times [1 - P(N)] = P(A^c) \times P(B^c) \times \dots \times P(N^c) \quad (1)$$

Bisher konnten mehrere Wahrscheinlichkeitssysteme nur durch die Bayes-Methode vereint werden:

$$P(A|B) = P(A) \times P(B|A) / [P(A) \times P(B|A) + P(\neg A) \times P(B|\neg A)] \quad (2)$$

Für (2) sind bedingte Wahrscheinlichkeiten erforderlich und, sofern A nicht B impliziert, drei Prämissen, die multipliziert, dividiert und addiert werden müssen. Solche Rechnungen sind im Vergleich zu (1) kompliziert und daher unbewusst oder stillschweigend kaum durchführbar. Dagegen besteht (1) nur aus einfachen Multiplikationen von Komplementen.

In meinem 2003a-Beitrag wurde mehr über die MPE-Methode (1) und ihre Variante, mit der Wahrscheinlichkeitszunahmen berechnet werden können, ausgesagt. Weitere Angaben unter Gottlob 2003b. Für die heutigen Zwecke wird die einfache MPE-Methode (1) genügen.

2. Erkenntnis singulärer Fakten: „Dieser Gegenstand ist ein Apfel“

Auch hierüber habe ich bereits 2003 berichtet. Es wurde a) der optische Eindruck bewertet, b) der Tastbefund und c) der Geruch. Aus den bisherigen Erfahrungen wurden Höchstwerte für Fehlerwahrscheinlichkeiten abgeleitet. Für a) wurden 10^{-3} , für b) 10^{-3} und für c), den hochspezifischen Geruch, 10^{-4} angenommen. Die Multiplikation nach (1) ergab eine Fehlerwahrscheinlichkeit von 10^{-10} , d.h. die Gefahr, wenn wir in einen Apfel beißen wollen, zu irren, ist minimal. Diese Rechnungen werden natürlich in der Regel nicht bewusst durchgeführt, vielmehr kalkulieren wir unbewusst und größenordnungsmäßig etwa so:

„Drei geringe bis sehr geringe Fehlerwahrscheinlichkeiten kommen zusammen, ihre Multiplikation führt zu einer sehr geringen, vernachlässigbaren Fehlerwahrscheinlichkeit.“

Auch fehlt jeder Anhaltspunkt, der gegen unsere Annahme spricht.

3. Gestaltwahrnehmung: „Ich erkenne meinen Bruder“

Auch hierüber wurde 2003 kurz berichtet. Entscheidend für

die Gestaltwahrnehmung ist die Vielzahl der Merkmale, die zusammenpassen müssen. Angeführt habe ich zunächst einfache Merkmale, die ermöglichen, die Spezies Mensch zu erkennen, ähnlich wie wir den Apfel erkannt haben. Zu diesen einfachen Merkmalen kommen solche hinzu, die hochkomplex sind und von uns nicht mehr bewusst erkennbar sind. Dazu gehört etwa der Gang, das Gesicht und die Stimme. Der Ablauf des Ganges besteht aus einer Vielzahl von Einzelbewegungen, die wir bewusst nicht mehr beschreiben können, deren Verhältnis zueinander aber hochcharakteristisch ist. Nach Churchland wird ein Gesicht nach dem Augenabstand, der Nasenbreite und der Lippenform unter einer Million von Menschen sicher erkannt und bei der Stimme ermöglichen Obertöne, die wir nicht beschreiben können, einen Anrufer am Telefon nach wenigen Worten zu erkennen.

Wir fragen uns jetzt, worauf diese großen Sicherheiten beruhen. Meine Erklärung: Es ist die Multiplikation von Fehlerwahrscheinlichkeiten nach (1). Hierbei geht jedes der vielen uns unbewussten und unbeschreibbaren Details als Faktor in die Rechnung ein und jeder Faktor, der immer kleiner als 1 ist, wird oft ausreichen, die Fehlerwahrscheinlichkeit etwa um eine Dezimalstelle, manchmal um mehr, manchmal um weniger, herabzusetzen. Bei der Erkenntnis des Apfels (bevor wir in ihn hinein gebissen haben) waren nur drei Faktoren am Werk. Die Zahl der Faktoren, die zur Gestalterkenntnis beitragen, beträgt ein Vielfaches an semantischer Diversität und an möglichen Nuancen.

Nun müssen wir uns fragen, ob der Mensch überhaupt zu einer Verarbeitung einer solchen Unzahl von Kriterien fähig ist. Wieder können wir uns Churchland anvertrauen, der in seinem Buch (1995) anführt, dass der Mensch bewusst 100 Bits/Sekunde wahrnehmen kann, unbewusst aber ein Milliardenfaches! Diese gewaltige Kapazität würde aber nicht reichen, wenn es das hier befürwortete Prinzip der Multiplikation der Fehlerwahrscheinlichkeiten nicht gäbe. Hinzukommt, dass wir bei stillschweigendem und unbewusstem Rechnen nicht numerisch rechnen müssen, sondern nur größenordnungsmäßig. Siehe Tabelle 1:

Wahrscheinlichkeit	Bezeichnung	Irrtumswahrscheinlichkeit
	Sicher für alle theoret. und praktischen Zwecke	$< 10^{-80}$
	Sicher f. alle prakt. Zwecke	$10^{-80} - 10^{-10}$
	Hochgradig wahrscheinlich	$10^{-10} - 10^{-4}$
0.9999 – 0.9	Signifikant wahrscheinlich	$10^{-4} - 10^{-1}$
0.9 – 0.7	Eher wahrscheinlich	0.1 – 0.3
0.7 – 0.3	möglich	0.3 – 0.7
0.3 – 0.001	Eher unwahrscheinlich	0.7 – 0.999
0.001 – 0.000 000 1	Extrem unwahrscheinlich	0.999 – 0.999 999 9
$< 0.000 000 1$	Praktisch unmöglich	$> 0.999 999 9$

Die Tabelle 1 zeigt solche Größenordnungen von Wahrscheinlichkeitsbewertungen im Vergleich zu den entsprechenden numerischen Wahrscheinlichkeitsangaben.

4. Gestaltwahrnehmung am Beispiel eines Musikstückes

Eine große Rolle spielt die Gestaltwahrnehmung bei Kunstwerken. Werke der darstellenden Kunst oder der Musik wirken oft auf Grund unbewusster Assoziationen auf uns, hier wollen wir uns auf die Erkenntnis eines prägnanten kurzen Teiles eines Musikstückes beschränken.

Es wird kaum jemanden geben, der Beethovens 5. Symphonie einmal gehört hat und das Werk nicht nach wenigen der ersten Takte wieder erkennen könnte. Hier zunächst das Thema und die erste Durchführung zu Beginn des ersten Satzes.



Abb. 1: Die ersten Takte (Thema und erste Durchführung) von Beethovens 5. Symphonie.

Das Thema besteht aus vier Noten, die Durchführung ist um einen Ton tiefer, der letzte Ton verlängert, zusätzlich gibt es zwei Pausennoten.

Bei der Erkenntnis des Musikstückes stützen wir uns 1. auf rhythmische Wahrnehmungen, 2. auf Tonhöhen und 3. auf zusätzliche Eigenschaften. Oft genügt der Rhythmus, etwa, wenn jemand nur entsprechend auf die Tischplatte klopft, um ein Musikstück zu erkennen. Dabei unterscheiden wir nur zwischen langen, mittellangen und kurzen Noten ($>1/4$, $1/4 - 1/8$ und $<1/8$). Somit haben wir für das Thema drei Elemente (Längen von Tönen und Pausen) bei fünf Klassen, das ergibt für das Thema $3^5 = 243$ mögliche Variationen. Für das Thema + der ersten Durchführung ergeben sich zehn Klassen, somit $3^{10} = \sim 60\,000$ mögliche Variationen. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass ein Affe zufällig diese Rhythmen mit einem Stock auf den Tisch schlägt ist rund $<1/(2 \times 10^2) = <0.005$ für das Thema und $<1/(6 \times 10^5) = <0.00001$ für Thema und erste Durchführung.

Für die Tonhöhen beschränken wir uns auf die Töne und Halbtöne einer Oktave, außerdem bewerten wir Pausen als 13. Ton und kommen so zu Fehlerwahrscheinlichkeiten für das Thema von $1/13^5$ das sind $<10^{-6}$ und für Thema + erste Durchführung von $1/13^{10}$, $= <10^{-11}$.

Zu den zusätzlichen Eigenschaften zählen wir: Instrumentierung, Tonart, Stimmung Lautstärke etc. Hier beschränken wir uns auf die Angaben „eher wahrscheinlich“ mit Irrtumswahrscheinlichkeiten zwischen 0.3 und 0.1 für Thema und Thema + erste Durchführung.

Durch die Multiplikation der Mindestwerte der Irrtumswahrscheinlichkeiten gelangen wir für das Thema zu $< 5 \times 10^{-3} \times 10^{-6} \times 10^{-1} = < 5 \times 10^{-10}$ und für Thema und erste Durchführung zu $< 10^{-5} \times 10^{-11} \times 3 \times 10^{-1} = < 3 \times 10^{-17}$. Diese „gewaltig kleine“ Zahl erklärt, dass wir schon bei den ersten Tönen der 5. Symphonie Beethovens das Werk mit „Sicherheit für alle praktischen Zwecke“ (lt. Tabelle 1) erkennen können, wenn uns das Werk einmal schon bekannt geworden ist.

Im praktischen Leben werden solche Rechnungen natürlich nicht durchgeführt. Hier rechnen wir unbewusst mit dem Zusammenwirken von mehreren Fehlerwahrscheinlichkeiten, die signifikanten, hochgradigen und praktisch sicheren Wahrscheinlichkeiten entsprechen. Zusätzlich spielt eine wesentliche Rolle, dass uns Argumente, die unseren Annahmen widersprechen, fehlen.

Da bei unseren Rechnungen die Klasse (Zahl der Noten) als Exponent von Variationsrechnungen auftritt, ist auch der große Unterschied zwischen Thema allein und Thema + erste Durchführung erklärlich. Daher sind längere Melodien noch mit viel größerer Sicherheit erkennbar. Schuberts Lied „Der Lindenbaum“ besteht nach einem längeren und sehr charakteristischen Vorspiel in einer Strophe aus 58 gesungenen Noten + 5 Pausennoten. Nur für den Rhythmus (Dauer der Töne und Pausen) erhalten wir für die Variationen eine 31 stellige Zahl und für die Variationen der Tonhöhen eine 71 stellige Zahl.

Unsere Untersuchungen zeigen, dass das, was die Pioniere der Gestalttheorie, wie C. von Ehrenfels, A. Meinong, V. Benussi, S. Witasek, K. Koffka, M. Wertheimer, W. Köhler und andere in exakten Experimenten und in genialen Intuitionen erarbeitet haben, mit Hilfe der Multiplikation der Fehlerwahrscheinlichkeiten probabilistisch untermauert werden kann.

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Emotion as Perception of Bodily Changes: Are Somatic Feeling Theories' Efforts in Reunifying the Emotion Category Forlorn Hope?

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What an emotion is and what classes of emotions there are, is a central question within the emotion debate. The premise that emotions form a natural class is a presupposition found in all "unified theories of emotions". I am especially interested in the question as to whether and how the characterization of what basic emotions are determines whether a unified theory of emotions is possible. Because of the recent revival of James-Lange theories, I concentrate on these theories, which understand emotion as perception of bodily changes. Can these efforts to reunify the emotion category be successful? Paul Griffiths recently argued that emotion is a mongrel concept. Emotions do not form a natural class. Higher cognitive emotions are not "really" emotions; basic emotions are what emotions really are. This implies that no unified theory of emotions is possible. Thus, the efforts of James-Lange theories cannot be successful. I contend that this argument does not succeed because it is grounded in a questionable distinction between basic and more complex emotions.

Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Theories

The two main conflicting views concerning emotions are the cognitive and the non-cognitive theories.

Non-cognitive theories see emotions as not necessarily involving a cognitive element. The most popular accounts are feeling theories or James-Lange theories, which see emotions as *perceptions of bodily changes*. The basic idea is that emotions are special feelings caused by changes in physiological conditions relating to the automatic and motor functions. What constitutes fear is our awareness of these bodily changes:

[...] we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble because we are sorry, angry or fearful, as the case may be. (James 1884, 190)

James-Lange theories work well in case of simple emotions or emotions that are triggered by changes in the world. If you see an aggressive dog running in your direction, without any involved judgment, your direct emotional reaction is fear. A standard argument against James-Lange theory is that bodily changes or our perception of them are not necessary for having an emotion: we can have emotions without showing bodily states, like long-term emotions show.¹ How is that possible, if emotions are nothing else than bodily states? Furthermore, the intentional content of emotions seems hard to explain, as well as the rich interaction between emotions and cultural background.

Cognitive theories in contrast have problems in dealing with empirical evidence that we have emotions in the absence of judgments or even contradictory to our beliefs. In the case of phobic reactions, individuals experience an emotion even if they are convinced the emotion is

unwarranted. In addition, the claim that we have an emotion like joy only if we *believe* it has certain desired properties seems too demanding. Intuitively, a baby or animal can enjoy something without being able to have any beliefs about it. The belief that something has desirable properties seems to be a consequence of that enjoyment rather than the other way around.

Both accounts seem adequate for some emotions – the real problem seems to be finding a theory that covers all emotions.

Evolutionary Explanations: A Third Game in Town?

Besides cognitive theories and non-cognitive theories, Paul Griffiths sees a third camp – the evolutionary approaches, especially the affect program theory. Evolutionary Psychologists propose a different theory of mind – a theory where we have no general-purpose tools but specialized tools for very special purposes. Griffiths is a proponent of stronger evolutionary psychology. He claims that all emotions are the product of natural selection and basic emotions are a small group of emotions, which are modular and pan-cultural.²

Evolutionary psychologists like Griffiths regard Ekman's account as a clear example of modular systems. Ekman/Friesen (1971) distinguished six³ basic emotions based on pan cultural understanding of facial expression: anger, fear, disgust, surprise, happiness, and sadness. In several systematic experiments they showed that basic emotions correspond to distinct bodily patterns. (Ekman/Friesen/Levensen 1991) According to Ekman the basic emotions form an affect program: *complex, oriented and automatic responses* including facial expression, change in the tone of voice, endocrine system changes, changes in the level of hormones, automatic nervous system changes, subjective emotional feelings and the direction of intention.

There is at least one other subclass of what is called emotions – which Griffiths called higher cognitive emotions. For higher cognitive emotions, the affect program theory does not work, because these are not modular and culturally specific like *envy, guilt, jealousy and love*.

It should be assumed that everything that counts as an emotion must involve the activation of ancient, pan-cultural, involuntary responses. In particular, higher cognitive activity need not trigger affect program responses in order to be counted as emotional. (Griffiths 1997, 104)

² Defenders of evolutionary psychology can propose a moderate thesis regarding emotions as well as a stronger one. In contrast to the stronger view, the moderate view only states that there is a small group of basic emotions, which are modular and pan-cultural, whereas higher cognitive emotions could possibly have a different structure. What drives Griffiths' critic is that, according to James-Lange theories, complex emotions must be given less direct evolutionary explanations than basic emotions. (Griffiths 1997:104f.) But his target is an evolutionary theory concerning all emotions. There is a cost: Complex emotions with flexible output do not count as emotions.
³ Griffiths distinguishes seven basic emotions.

¹ For example being in love for years.

Griffiths does not see the necessary unity between basic and complex emotions. He accepts that (1) complex emotions may involve basic emotions as parts, (2) they depend on basic emotions for their development, and (3) they interact with basic emotions in typical ways. Nonetheless, he does not think that they can be reduced to basic emotions or be understood as elaborations of them, for being a module causes a different causal mechanism. Modules are characterized in Fodor's classical sense as being domain-specific, mandatory, their internal processes are not consciously accessible, they are informationally encapsulated, fast and automatic. Consequently, modular emotions *involve complex, coordinated and automated and fast responses, which are not voluntary, mandatory, informationally encapsulated, and opaque to consciousness.* (Sterelny/Griffiths 1999, 344) The problem is that this limits the causal roles basic emotions play and can in principle play. Complex emotions in contrast are entirely different. The aforementioned characteristics for being modular do not work for them. For this reason, Griffiths states the disunity hypothesis: It is unwarranted to treat complex emotions as necessarily involving the activation of primary emotions. The argument summarized is this:

- (1) Basic emotions are modular, complex emotions are not.
- (2) This implies different causal mechanisms.
- (3) Natural classes require the same causal mechanisms.

It follows:

- (4) Emotions do not form a natural class.

If complex emotions cannot be associated with affect programs, there is also little hope for unified theories like the somatic feeling theory either.

The Revival of James-Lange Theories: Somatic Feeling Theories of Emotion

Lately, we have witnessed a revival of James-Lange theories. Several attempts were made to reconcile the cognitive and the non-cognitive approaches. It is conceded that some aspects in the cognitive camp's position are convincing – nonetheless, the more important aspects are covered by James-Lange accounts. Two recent proponents of accounts along these lines are Antonio Damasio and Jesse Prinz. Even Griffiths (in press) admits that these kinds of theories are promising approaches to complex emotions.

Damasio's theory has some differences to the classical James-Lange-theory:

1. He does not *identify* emotions with feelings, and in consequence he is able to allow unconscious emotions. Emotions are not feelings but the *perception of changes in bodily states* – somatic changes.
2. The number of observed potential is increased: changes in hormone levels, in the internal milieu, and of facial expression, an increase in heart rate, instrumental actions⁴ are included. Somatic states include states of the respiratory, circulatory, digestive, musculoskeletal, and endocrine systems.
3. "As if"-responses in the brain are also regarded as emotions.

Damasio (1994) distinguishes primary and secondary emotions: Primary emotions are innate and pre-organized

Jamesian emotions, they are based importantly on activities in the amygdala and frontal parts of gyrus cinguli, and identified in affect programs. (Damasio 1994:186 dt.) In the case of secondary emotions there is additional activity in the cortical system. These emotions are not innate but acquired. In these cases, there is additional activity in the cognitive system, these mental states are conscious. These emotions are cognitively involved, which makes more flexibility possible. What unifies emotions in Damasio's account is that they are all basic emotions or contain basic emotions. Damasio concedes that in the classical James-Lange theory, there is an inadequate emphasis on the role evaluation plays in the induction of emotions. Instead, we should *identify emotions with sensations of bodily changes coupled with a mental evaluative process.* (1994, 139)

Jesse Prinz has a similar view, labeled the "somatic appraisal" theory. He sees emotions as representing organism-environment relationships, but they do so via changes in the body. He adopts Lazarus' (1991) definition of appraisals as evaluations of what one's relationship to the environment implies for one's well-being. His theory sees emotions representing core relational themes – that is the element from cognitive theories. But emotions are embodied, and judgments are not necessary to elicit the emotion. According to Prinz the somatic appraisal theory applies to both basic emotions and to higher cognitive emotions, suggesting these two categories comprise a coherent kind. Basic emotions are embodied appraisals, non basic emotions are blends or combinations of basic emotions and beliefs or judgments.

Damasio and Prinz both have somatic feeling theories of emotions and see emotions as a form of bodily perception. In addition, both have hybrid theories between feeling theories and somatic theories. Nonetheless there are some differences: For Prinz, cognitive elements are causes for emotions but are not components of emotions. In contrast, Damasio regards cognitive elements as *components* of emotions in the case of complex emotions. Furthermore, their characterizations of basic emotions differ: Damasio sees them as innate and modular, whereas Prinz characterizes them as innate and the class of things where biological and conceptual hints come together. Both differences seem driven by the wish to allow for immunity in the disunity thesis and Griffiths' argument. I will argue that this maneuver is not even necessary.

Somatic Feeling Theories: Vulnerable to Griffiths' Argument?

Premise (2) is essential for Griffiths' argument. For Griffiths, there are two main differences between basic and complex emotions: what triggers the emotion is completely different; in case of basic emotions, by sensory input –, and in the case of complex emotions, by input from higher brain structures. Furthermore, the output-side is different: Basic emotions are intimately connected to physiological changes and standard behavior; complex emotions are not, at least not to the same degree, connected to standard behavior.

Because input and output differ so much, basic and complex emotions are completely different. That is enough to state that both *functions* are completely different.

Remember, (1) and (2) are premises about all emotions. According to Griffiths, complex emotions can contain basic emotions but cannot be reduced to them nor can they be seen as elaborations of them because complex emotions

⁴ For example, from tremors or tears to striking out in rage.

do *not need to contain* basic emotions. Thus he introduces a distinction within complex emotions. Is the functional role different for all complex emotions? Yes, for the criterion is that complex emotions are not to the same degree connected to standard behavior.⁵

But this criterion presupposes what it intends to establish: If (1) modules are characterized by the aforementioned criteria – being affect programs, with all the above mentioned characteristics of modules, (2) basic emotions are the components of the different subclasses of enriched emotions, and (3) whenever basic emotions also contain a cognitive element or are triggered by a cognitive element, that (4) enables more flexible responses – then complex emotions per definition cannot share the criteria for basic emotions. As a result, basic emotions per definition cannot be under voluntary control or cannot be triggered by a cognitive element, complex emotions have to. Formulated more drastically: This is just to question the basic assumption of somatic feeling theories. Somatic feeling theories are not committed to the view that basic emotions are modular in Griffiths' sense.

Let me give you an example: Assume Joe has acrophobia. Standing on the top of the CN Tower on the glass floor 113 stories above the ground triggers (via sensory input) a strong emotional response: fear. This fear is not to be controlled consciously: Even if Joe knows he cannot fall down, as he is not even walking across the glass floor, he still experiences angst. He cannot calm down, is not able to breathe any more, he stares saucer-eyed at the glass floor, etc. This seems a clear example of a basic emotion. Now let us assume Joe a week before visually imagined to be in exactly this situation. He had never been to the CN Tower, and planned to travel to Toronto just to confront himself with this situation as part of his therapy. His therapist told him to imagine standing on the top of the CN Tower in advance as training. Again Joe is in fear. He breaks out in a sweat, his heart is beating, his hands are trembling and so on. This time the emotion is triggered by input from cognitive structures, the response is probably more flexible: Joe is at least able to stop imagining himself in that situation and by doing this, the fear disappears after a while. In both cases, the input and output side differ. Nonetheless, we feel forced to say that both cases we have instances of basic emotions, even instances of the same basic emotion – fear. Even what frightens Joe is identical. According to Griffiths, we have a complex emotion in the second case, thus, not “really an emotion”. Only a real emotion may be contained. But what does this mean? What distinguishes a *contained emotion* and *being an emotion* other than the flexibility of the output? Griffiths seems in need to specify more precisely “sufficiently similar sensory input and sufficiently similar output patterns” are guarantee basic emotions and, in addition, emotions of the same kind. Furthermore, these examples show that we have a mixture of criteria that does not allow a clear decision about which emotions are basic, complex but “contain basic emotions”, and complex. “No cognitive involvement” and “being affect programs” do not give us correlating classes. The mentioned criteria for subclasses of emotions do not coincide.

Summary

I argued that the thesis that modular elements must have different causal roles than any complex element containing both modular and non-modular elements takes for granted that there is no hybrid theory possible. In addition, it presupposes that the distinction between basic and more complex emotions coincides with being modular or not. This is not an indispensable part of somatic feeling theories. The disunity hypothesis is no threat for somatic feeling theories.

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⁵ If we understand Griffiths as claiming that the functional role differs only in the case of complex emotions not containing basic emotions, we are not in a better position. Then, there is a different functional role within the class of complex emotions. Griffiths' disunity hypothesis concerns a class of things that the James-Lange theory is not concerned with.

Bedeutung ohne Absicht

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1. Meinen was man sagt

Sollte ich ein Bild von der Philosophie der Sprache zeichnen und hätte nur ein grobes Malwerkzeug zur Verfügung und dürfte nur ein, zwei Striche machen, so würde der erste Strich das zentrale Motiv der Sprachphilosophie als die Analyse von Begriffen umreißen. Der zweite Strich würde diese Analyse als Theorie der Bedeutung, das heißt der Anwendungsbedingungen für Begriffe darstellen. Dürfte ich dann noch einen dritten Pinselstrich hinzufügen, würde ich die Theorie der Bedeutung als Untersuchung darüber ausmalen, ob und wie das, was Sprecher meinen, wenn sie etwas sagen, die Bedeutung dessen bestimmt, was sie sagen.

Wenn dieses grobe Bild in der Lage ist, die feinen Züge der Sprachphilosophie einigermaßen treffend wiederzugeben, dann zeichne ich mit dem, was ich an dieser Stelle vorschlagen möchte, ein anderes Bild. In diesem Bild erscheint die Theorie der Bedeutung als etwas vom Unternehmen der Begriffsanalyse deutlich Verschiedenes, und die Intentionalität als Bedeutung sprachlicher Formen erklärt sich allenfalls indirekt über die Intentionalität als Absichtlichkeit der Zustände der Sprecher beim Sprechen. Dieses Bild entspricht einer bestimmten Interpretation des Programms der Teleosemantik, so wie es von Ruth Garrett Millikan und Fred Dretske entworfen wurde (vgl. Millikan 1984, Dretske 1988). Diese Perspektive und dieses Werkzeug möchte ich im folgenden darstellen und verteidigen.

2. Eine Frage der Bedeutung

Bedeutung kann im Versuch einer möglichst allgemeinen und unkontroversen ersten Annäherung definiert werden als die Eigenschaft einer Äußerung, sich auf etwas zu beziehen. Jenseits aller Differenzen hinsichtlich der Erklärung dieser Eigenschaft wird in den meisten philosophischen Sprachgebräuchen die Bedeutung eines Satzes oder, allgemeiner, einer sprachlichen Form in der einen oder anderen Weise an die Absichten und die mentalen Repräsentationen von Sprechern geknüpft, die mit ihren Äußerungen etwas meinen.

Es ist wahr, daß ich die Absicht haben muß, etwas zu sagen und daß ich über eine Vorstellung davon verfügen muß, worüber ich etwas sagen möchte und wie es zu sagen ist, um etwas sagen zu können und damit in der Tat auch etwas zu meinen. (Andernfalls würde ich mich in einem unverständlichen und absichtslosen Gemurmel verlieren.) Aber diese Feststellung sagt noch nichts darüber aus, ob die Bedeutung dessen, was ich sage, durch das, was ich denke, schon *definiert* ist.

Es gibt, so scheint es, genau einen Fall, in dem die Beziehung zwischen einem Zeichen und seinem Gegenstand allein und genau über den Akt des Meinens (als innerem Akt des in Beziehung Setzens von verschiedenen Dingen und Ereignissen) hergestellt wird: wenn ich, mit einer Interpretation der Vorstellungen meines Gegenüber (über das, was er weiß und was er will) im Sinn, ein neues Symbol oder Zeichen erfinde, das nur im Kontext *dieser* Interpretation, ihres Senders und ihres Adressaten verstehbar ist. Im Falle sprachlicher Zeichen funktioniert dies genau deswegen nicht, weil die Beziehung zwischen

Äußerung und Gegenstand qua Öffentlichkeit der Sprache ungeachtet eines spezifischen Verwendungskontextes gewährleistet sein muß – also unabhängig von der persönlichen Beziehung zwischen zwei oder mehreren Sprechern zueinander und der Kenntnis ihrer Absichten voneinander. Zwar gilt insbesondere im Falle Gricescher Bedeutungen (Implikaturen, vgl. Grice 1989), daß der Kontext durchaus eine Rolle für die Bedeutung des Gesagten in einer konkreten Situation spielt, doch ist dies ein abgeleiteter Fall. Er funktioniert nur vor dem Hintergrund eines allgemeinen Mechanismus, der festlegt, auf welche Klasse von Gegenständen sich ein Typ von Zeichen im allgemeinen beziehen soll und wie sich eine einzelne Äußerung auf einen Gegenstand beziehen kann.

Die Mehrheit der Theorien in der philosophischen Semantik lokalisiert solch einen Mechanismus wahlweise in der kollektiven Intentionalität von Sprechern, in expliziten Konventionen, in impliziten Übereinstimmungen im Gebrauch, oder in einer Menge von öffentlich zugänglichen Regeln als Anwendungsbedingungen für sprachliche Formen. Jede dieser Erklärungen adressiert die Absichten der Sprecher. In verschiedenem Maße wird über die Rolle der Sprecherabsichten hinaus auf die Feststellung Wert gelegt, daß die Beschaffenheit der Welt letztlich darüber *entscheidet*, was sprachliche Formen bedeuten.

Die Teleosemantik spitzt den öffentlichen Charakter der Bedeutung auf folgende Weise zu: Ein individuell festgelegtes und einmalig produziertes Zeichen hat *gar keine* Bedeutung, denn Bedeutung ist eine Eigenschaft allein *reproduzierbarer* Zeichen. Sie wird ihnen weder per Definition noch per Konvention noch per kollektiver Intentionalität zugewiesen, sondern nur und genau im Zuge ihrer Reproduktion, das heißt in ihrem wiederholten Gebrauch. Die Reproduktion erfolgt aufgrund eines bestimmten Effekts oder einer Mehrzahl von solchen. Einer dieser Effekte ist das Abbilden eines Zustandes oder Ereignisses in der Umwelt der Sprecher. Die Bedeutung eines Zeichens ist sein selektierter Effekt, genau das zu tun. Dies ist eine seiner Funktionen. Die ursprüngliche Korrelation zwischen Zeichen und abgebildetem Gegenstand kann zwar, muß aber nicht unbedingt überhaupt von vorneherein intendiert sein. Entscheidend ist, *daß* diese Korrelation ein Teil der Ursache dafür wird (als eine notwendige und Teil einer hinreichenden Bedingung), daß das Zeichen fortgesetzt reproduziert wird – und zwar von verschiedenen Sprechern in verschiedenen Situationen. Ob die Reproduktionsbedingungen erfüllt sind und welche Effekte es genau sind, welche reproduktiv relevant sind, läßt sich allein historisch, das heißt auf Basis der Selektionsgeschichte von Effekten feststellen. Diese Erklärung von Funktionen als selektierten Effekten hat ihre Basis in der evolutionären Theorie der Adaptation durch natürliche Selektion.

Dies ist eine radikalisierte Version einer Gebrauchstheorie der Bedeutung, die strikt naturalistisch, strikt antirationalistisch und strikt historisch vorgeht, aber zugleich noch weiter gesteckte Ziele verfolgt. Statt um eine Beschreibung des sozialen Gebrauchs von Zeichen geht es um eine Evolutionsgeschichte der Intentionalität überhaupt – in beiden Sinnen: als Bedeutung und als Absichtlichkeit.

3. Die Bedeutung des Darwinismus

Dieses Vorgehen setzt sich einem Verdacht aus – dem Verdacht nämlich, daß es im bestenfalls naiven Glauben an die umfassende Erklärungskraft der Darwinschen Evolutionstheorie Sprache, Bedeutung und Kultur in deren große Erzählung einspannt. Eine solche Lesart der Teleosemantik ist zwar mit hinreichend bösem Willen möglich – zumal sie einige Parallelen zur Dawkinschen Theorie der Meme aufweist (vgl. Kapitel 11 von Dawkins 1976) –, doch ich möchte eine dezidiert andere Lesart vorschlagen, die sich an einer Tradition der Interpretation des Darwinismus orientiert, die keinem biologischen Determinismus anheimfällt und als deren Anwalt etwa John Deweys “The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy” (Dewey 1910) gelten kann.

Die entscheidende darwinistische Umwälzung der Wissenschaften vom Leben bestand darin, die Prozesse des Lebens nicht als durch zeitlose und unveränderliche Formprinzipien gesteuert zu begreifen, sondern als dynamisch und kontextuell gebunden. Arten und ihre Umwelten verändern sich. Zugleich machte der Darwinismus die Prinzipien dieser Veränderung einer empirischen Untersuchung zugänglich und versuchte, sie anhand von wenigen elementaren Kausalgesetzen (und nicht inhärenten teleologischen Eigenschaften und Strukturprinzipien) zu erklären, welche die Entwicklung des Lebens eingrenzen (aber nicht in seinen Formen vorab determinieren). Die Prinzipien dieser Erklärung waren Variation – als öffnendes Prinzip der Erzeugung neuer Formen auf der Ebene des organischen Reproduktionsprozesses – und natürliche Selektion – als schließendes Prinzip der differentiellen Reproduktion varianter Formen unter gegebenen Umweltbedingungen.

Die Rolle der Umweltbedingungen richtig zu verstehen, ist die Voraussetzung für ein angemessenes Verständnis des Phänomens der Evolution. Umweltbedingungen sind *lokale* Bedingungen, die für jeden Organismus und jede Population von Organismen spezifisch sind. Sie sind nicht als ihre Umgebung im allgemeinen zu verstehen, sondern als ein Bündel von selektiv relevanten Eigenschaften, sogenannten Adaptoren – zu denen auch andere Organismen gehören. Adaptoren sind Selektionsbedingungen für Funktionen. Organismen reproduzieren sich nur, wenn ihre strukturellen und ihre Verhaltenseigenschaften auf diese Adaptoren passen – und sie existieren zuallererst, weil entweder die Eigenschaften ihrer Vorfahren auf ein weitgehend identisches Bündel von Adaptoren gepaßt haben oder ihre eigenen Eigenschaften auf ein neues Bündel von Adaptoren passen. Folglich haben jeder Organismus und jede Population ihre eigene Umwelt als Menge von selektiv relevanten Eigenschaften ihrer Umgebung.

Die Entscheidungskriterien dafür, ob eine Eigenschaft eine Adaptation ist, sind, folgen wir dieser Bestimmung von Umweltbedingungen, in zweifacher Weise unterbestimmt:

1. Veränderungen in der Umwelt sind nicht antizipierbar, da sie von kontingenten und bisweilen noch nicht einmal biologischen Faktoren abhängig sind. Bisher adaptierte Eigenschaften können ihrer Adaptoren verlustig gehen und entweder als selektiv neutrale Residuen weiterbestehen und gegebenenfalls für neue Funktionen kooptiert werden oder als maladaptiv der natürlichen Selektion zum Opfer fallen.
2. Der Prozeß der natürlichen Selektion ist in keiner Weise intentional oder auch nur zielgerichtet. Unter

veränderten Umweltbedingungen haben variante Formen, deren Eigenschaften zuvor neutral oder gar unvorteilhaft waren, fortan einen reproduktiven Vorteil, weil der glückliche Umstand eintritt, daß jene Eigenschaften auf die neuen Bedingungen passen.

Aus diesem doppelten Grund lassen sich Eigenschaften als Adaptationen, ihre Effekte als Funktionen und Evolutionsprozesse als Fortschritt allenfalls in der Rückschau als solche charakterisieren, und sie lassen sich nur in Hinblick auf die Variationen identifizieren, die zur Verfügung standen, und in Hinblick auf die Umweltbedingungen, unter denen ihre Selektion stattfand. Genau diese eigentümliche Beziehung, die der Annahme eindeutiger, optimaler, endgültiger Adaptationen im Wege steht, ist der Schlüssel zu einem angemessenen Verständnis des teleosemantischen Arguments.

4. Die Evolution der Bedeutung

Zu den auf dem Wege der natürlichen Selektion adaptierten Eigenschaften von Organismen gehören in vielen Fällen Mechanismen zur Abbildung von Umweltzuständen – gegenüber sich selbst oder gegenüber anderen Mitgliedern der Population. Auf dieser Ebene bereits kann man von Funktionen des Abbildens sprechen. Solche Funktionen nun können auf der Ebene eines Verhaltens *zwischen* Individuen der Fall sein, ohne daß diese bereits über innere Repräsentationen verfügen. Um das so wundervolle wie notorische Beispiel der Bientänze zu Rate zu ziehen (vgl. Millikan 1984): Die Tänze einer Biene, die Nektar gefunden hat, haben die Funktion, die anderen Mitglieder ihres Bienenvolks zu dieser Nahrungsquelle zu dirigieren, indem sie deren räumliche Lage abbilden. Bientänze sind somit erstens öffentliche Repräsentationen, insofern sie sich zwischen verschiedenen Individuen abspielen. Zweitens erklärt sich dieses Verhalten keineswegs so, daß die tanzende Biene eine innere Abbildung von der Lage der Nahrungsquelle absichtsvoll in einen Tanz zu übersetzen versucht. Die Abbildung des Umweltzustands und die Ausrichtung des Verhaltens auf diesen sind ein und derselbe Akt.

Manche Lebewesen demgegenüber sind jedoch in der Lage, Verhaltensmuster individuell, im eigenen Verhalten zu selektieren, anstatt als Individuen einer Selektion ihrer Verhaltensmuster unterworfen zu sein. Dies zu tun ist die Funktion von inneren Abbildungen von Welt- und Eigenzuständen. Das eigene innere Verhalten – also Zustände des Nervensystems – und das äußere Verhalten werden auf diesem Wege auf einen Umweltzustand adaptiert. Abbildungsverhalten und äußeres Verhalten auf den abgebildeten Zustand hin fallen jedoch nunmehr *nicht* in eins. Jedes Individuum entwickelt auf dem Wege des Lernens einen für sich spezifischen Mechanismus, sich in der Welt zurechtzufinden gemäß den Bedingungen, unter denen es sich zurechtfinden muß. Dementsprechend erzeugen verschiedene Individuen verschieden strukturierte mentale Abbildungen der Welt. Individuelle Akte des aufeinander Beziehens und Identifizierens von Dingen und Ereignissen sind so, unabhängig vom Vorhandensein einer Sprache, möglich.

Historisch gesehen existierten Abbildungsfunktionen also, bevor Sprache in die Welt trat. Sie existierten sogar bereits, bevor Absichtlichkeit und mentale Repräsentationen in die Welt traten. Dies ist der erste Sinn, in dem Bedeutung als Abbildungsfunktion von Absicht und Sprache unabhängig ist. Für das Phänomen *sprachlicher* Bedeutungen gilt die Unabhängigkeit von Absichten

zusätzlich in einem zweiten, *systematischen* Sinn: Die Funktion der Sprache insgesamt liegt gerade in der Verschiedenheit individueller mentaler Repräsentationen begründet, die auf dem Wege eines standardisierten, reproduzierbaren Verhaltensmusters koordiniert werden. Sprachfähigkeit als solche ist in diesem Sinne eine biologische Adaptation mit genau dieser Funktion. Sie selbst hat nicht die Funktion des Abbildens, sondern des Herstellens, Rezipierens und Reproduzierens von Verhaltensmustern, die unter anderem Abbildungsfunktionen erwerben können. Die Abbildungsfunktion sprachlicher Formen im besonderen beruht auf der Reproduktion sprachlicher Formen durch verschiedene Individuen in Relation zu einer ganzen Reihe von selektiv wirksamen Umweltbedingungen als Adaptoren:

1. einem Weltzustand, auf den ihr Verhalten *gemeinsam* auszurichten für die weiteren Verhaltensmöglichkeiten der Sprecher selektiv relevant ist;
2. dem Verhalten der verschiedenen Sprecher selbst, die einander in ihrem Verhalten eine *für* ihr Verhalten selektiv relevante Umweltbedingung sind;
3. den konkreten jeweils *unterschiedlichen* inneren Repräsentationen, die Sprecher von einem bestimmten Zustand oder Ereignis in ihrer Umwelt haben.

Die fortgesetzte Reproduktion einer sprachlichen Form gelingt genau dann, wenn ihre einzelnen Token auf all diese Bedingungen passen. Eine sprachliche Form muß also erstens einen Zustand oder ein Ereignis in der Umwelt der Sprecher abbilden – aber nicht in ihren Köpfen; sie muß zweitens das *Verhalten* der Sprecher auf jenen Zustand oder jenes Ereignis *und* aufeinander ausrichten, so daß ihre Interaktionen gelingen; und drittens muß sie zumindest dabei behilflich sein, die inneren Repräsentationen der *individuellen* Sprecher, so verschieden sie auch sein mögen, auf jenen Zustand oder jenes Ereignis auszurichten.

Es ist jedoch zum einen keine Reproduktionsbedingung für eine sprachliche Form, daß ihre Selektion immer und voll und ganz intentional im Sinne von absichtsvoll geschieht. Die Sprecherabsichten erscheinen als Umweltbedingungen einer zur natürlichen Selektion teilweise analogen, weil nicht primär intentionalen Form der Selektion von Verhaltensmustern. Zum anderen ist es keine Reproduktionsbedingung für sprachliche Formen, daß die inneren Repräsentationen der Sprecher eine identische Form annehmen oder gar einander transparent werden, indem sie in der sprachlichen Form abgebildet werden. Allein die Verbindung zwischen Vorstellung und Äußerung muß nach innen stabil und nach außen anschlussfähig sein. Dies wird dadurch geleistet, daß sprachliche Formen bei den Sprechern, die sich ihrer bedienen, Akte der Identifizierung von Weltzuständen hervorrufen. Für deren Gelingen zählt allein, daß ein bestimmter Weltzustand in eine bestimmte Korrelation zu einem anderen gesetzt wird. Diese Passung ist das Kriterium für die Bedeutung, also die Abbildungsfunktion einer sprachlichen Form. Ihr Test sind die Umweltbedingungen des Sprechens, die im Rahmen des Möglichen stabil zu halten eine der Funktionen des Sprechens als solchem ist. Eine solche Theorie der Bedeutung ist darum ein historisches und empirisches, nicht ein analytisches Projekt.

Denken und Sprechen im allgemeinen und Gedanken und sprachliche Formen im besonderen treten in den feinen Graden und Schattierungen einer Evolutionsgeschichte in die Welt. Denken und Sprechen sind natürliche Beziehungen zur Umwelt mit jeweils eigenen Funktionen und mit jeweils eigenen Bedingungen der Selektion dieser Funktionen. Zugleich jedoch ist die Umwelt des Denkens und Sprechens die geteilte soziale Lebenswelt, in der beide stattfinden und in der die Äußerungen und die Gedanken von Sprechern auf je eigene Weise zu Umweltbedingungen für die Äußerung weiterer Sätze und das Anschließenden weiterer Handlungen werden. Da diese Umwelt unabsehbar veränderlich ist, sind Menschen als Lebewesen und ihre Verhaltensweisen ebensowenig wie die Bedeutungen ihrer Äußerungen im Sinne einer perfekten und endgültigen Gestaltung an ihre Umwelt angepaßt. Weder sind für jeden Menschen alle Umweltbedingungen zu jeder Zeit vollkommen klar erkennbar oder gar im eigenen Handeln determinierbar, noch sind die Handlungen und Absichten anderer Menschen in dieser Weise verfügbar, noch können sie abschließend festlegen, was eine Äußerung bedeutet.

Vielmehr sind die Quellen der Bedeutung gerade variante Formen, die einem bestimmten, individuellen Verwendungskontext entstammen und zwar vielleicht einer Absicht entspringen, aber sicher noch keine Bedeutung haben. Sie sind es genau dann, wenn sie einerseits aus Motiven beliebiger Art seitens der Sprecher reproduziert werden und sie sich andererseits an den konkreten Umweltbedingungen des Sprechens bewähren müssen. Die Beschaffenheit der Welt alleine entscheidet darüber, welche Bedeutungen sprachliche Formen erwerben. Zu dieser Welt gehören auch die undurchsichtigen, analytisch so wenig hilfreichen Absichten der Sprecher, deren Funktionen einer Theorie der Evolution des Geistes zugleich so durchsichtig sind.

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Wittgenstein on Musical Experience and Knowledge

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Most commentators grossly underrate Wittgenstein's writing on music and generally tend to dismiss this aspect of his thinking as an oddity. Fortunately, recent years have seen an upsurge of remedial interest in the relevance of Wittgenstein's texts on musical matters to the main body of his philosophical work, in particular to his philosophical psychology.

Wittgenstein sought the connection between music and psychology already quite early in his career. His experiments on music perception, conducted between 1912 and 1913 under the auspices of Charles Myers' cutting-edge laboratory for experimental psychology in Cambridge, were designed, as David Pinsent reports, "to ascertain the extent and importance of rhythm in music" (Nedo and Ranchetti 1983). Thus stated, these experiments seem to be of consequence neither to the musician nor to the philosopher. Yet one should never mistake Wittgenstein for someone who spends quality time on trivialities. Indeed much later, after his return to philosophy in Cambridge, he confessed to G.E. Moore that his experiments on rhythm did not yield answers to questions in aesthetics as he had expected at the time (Nedo and Ranchetti 1983).

What were these questions in aesthetics about, and how did Wittgenstein address them eventually? There is, I submit, a direct answer to the former query: Wittgenstein was ultimately interested in the relation of musical experiences to knowledge; that is, he pondered over the "aboutness" of music. In this paper I shall attempt to mark the path that leads to this answer in the context of Wittgenstein's later writings, thereby answering the latter query as well. The discussion, I hope, would also underscore the scholarly need to read Wittgenstein's remarks on music as part and parcel of his legitimate philosophical work.

The bulk of Wittgenstein's texts on the experience of music belongs to his later work, and it is thematically indigenous to his thinking on philosophical psychology. Wittgenstein's treatment of the topic of musical experience occurs at the intersection of three often-overlapping concerns: (a) the grammatical complexity of language games that pertain to aesthetic phenomena and to musical experience in particular; (b) the pervasive aspectuality of music; and (c) the notion of physiognomy and its implications. I shall now address these issues in this order.

In his 1938 lectures on aesthetics, while countering G.E. Moore's analysis of the beautiful, Wittgenstein stressed the enormously complicated situation in which our aesthetic expressions have a place (*LC* 2). They must be seen against the background of certain activities, and ultimately of certain ways of living (*LC* 8, 11). Our aesthetic use of words is built up on the basis of practices and language games that are logically prior. Elsewhere, Wittgenstein elaborated by saying that our aesthetic use of words presupposes familiarity with numerous other language games – in the case of music, with games that pertain to conclusions, expressions of agreement, replies etc. – and ultimately with "the whole range of our language games" (*CV* 52). Thus Wittgenstein construes our aesthetic use of words as being grammatically complex in a "vertical" sense (see Hark 1990) that is akin to our use of words in a secondary sense (*PI* II xi 216).

When we express our aesthetic experiences, we apply concepts understood as bearers of specific techniques of use on "new surroundings" (*LW* I §797), namely, the language game of expression. The manner in which we reach for the aesthetic expression as the only possible way in which to give expression to our perception, inclinations and feelings underscores the specificity of such vertically complex game moves. Furthermore, such expressions are not metaphors either; they do not refer to comparisons, which can be identified independently of their specific, vertically complex, or secondary use.

In the case of music, the specificity of our aesthetic expressions, the way they are linked to their respective musical experiences, results in the reciprocity of music and language. The musical theme is incorporated into language: "we learn a new gesture" (*CV* 52). Referring to "the way music speaks", Wittgenstein remarks: "Don't forget that even though a poem is composed in the language of information, it is not employed in the language-game of information" (*RPP* I §888). Expression presupposes information, yet it is not reducible to information. Hence the oddity of the converse case – which Wittgenstein brings up in the continuation of the passage just quoted above – of a person who thinks that the playing of a reflective Chopin piece is actually the speaking of a language, whose sense is kept secret from him.

Let us proceed to our next issue: the pervasive aspectuality of music. As a number of scholars have already observed (Hanfling 1990; Hark 1990; Mulhall 1990; Johnston 1993), there is an obvious conceptual kinship in Wittgenstein's thinking between the secondary meaning of words and aspect perception. The dawning of an aspect marks a vertical shift in the language game played. Its expression consists of a vertically complex move in a language game that can only be understood against the backdrop of the correlate move in logically prior games (*RPP* II §541), and it is criterially related to the experiences involved. The expression of aspect dawning is, in Wittgenstein's words, "a cry of recognition" (*PI* II xi 198), which is the only criterion for the existence and nature of the experience involved.

Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect perception are replete with musical instances, which are significantly broader in scope than any of the standard examples of the duck-rabbit and other ambiguous figures. Here is a selection of very instructive examples: hearing a theme as a march or as a dance (*PI* II xi 206); hearing a certain bar as an introduction or in a certain key (*RPP* I §1); experiencing a certain interpretation of a musical passage as inevitable (*RPP* I §22); playing a passage with more intense expression or with less intense expression, with stronger emphasis on rhythm and structure or with less (*RPP* I §507); playing a passage with the correct expression (*LW* I §688); hearing one thing as a variant of another (*RPP* I §508); rephrasing a variation in such a way that it could be conceived as a different variation on the same theme, hearing a theme differently in a repetition (*RPP* I §517); hearing a melody differently after becoming acquainted with the composer's style (*LW* I §774).

The most striking thing about these examples is that they encompass virtually the entire range of what is

fundamental to the perception and performance of music: the experience of musical motion through rhythm and structure, the identification and re-identification of musical materials, the fine nuances of musical expression, and the overarching considerations of performance practice, of genre and style. Thus, according to Wittgenstein, music is fundamentally and pervasively aspectual. An important corollary to this observation is this: music does not teach us about “the external world”. Music is not employed in the language game of information (*RPP I* §888).

Another piece of the puzzle is now called for. It is generally admitted that Wittgenstein’s philosophical engagement with aspect perception is indigenous to his late work, notwithstanding some reference to ambiguous figures in the *Tractatus* (*TLP* 5.5423). Granted, it is ever more striking to acknowledge that his practical engagement with the problem of aspect perception preceded even the *Tractatus*, and that it has had its origins in his thinking on music. Of course, I refer to his 1912-1913 experiments on rhythm. In these experiments, Wittgenstein was concerned with the so-called “subjective rhythm” phenomenon as he aimed at determining the conditions under which subjects heard or read into a sequence of beats a rhythm, which, in a sense, was not there. By 1912 the phenomenon has already been well documented in the annals of psychology. The standard result in experiments like those conducted by Wittgenstein was that the initial beat was perceived to be accented, and time intervals between beats within each group appeared shorter than the time interval between the final beat of one group and the initial beat of the next group (Handel 1989).

The crucial point for our present concern is this: Wittgenstein’s 1912-1913 experiments on rhythm yielded a clear-cut case of musical aspect dawning akin to an ambiguous figure like the duck-rabbit. One may hear the series of clicks as either duple or triple meter, and could switch between these alternative aspects at will. Thus it becomes eminently clear why Wittgenstein came to disavow these early excursions into experimental psychology. His original quest turned out in fact to be not merely “to ascertain the extent and importance of rhythm in music”, as Pinsent had construed it, but rather to ascertain the extent and importance of aspect perception in music. Yet, as Wittgenstein said in his 1938 lectures on aesthetics, the sort of explanation one is looking for when one is puzzled by an aesthetic impression cannot be given by means of psychological experiment (*LC* 21). Empirical data can have no bearing on grammatical inquiry.

In the remainder of this paper I would like to discuss some implications of Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the notion of physiognomy. The notion of physiognomy – the meaningful irregularity of the living body – is central both to his explication of aspect seeing (*PI* II xi 193) and to his various discussions of musical expression (*LC* 4; *PI* §536; *RPP I* §434; *CV* 52). According to Wittgenstein, enormous variability, irregularity, and unpredictability are an essential part of human physiognomy and the concepts for which human physiognomy serve as a basis (*RPP II* §§614-615, 617, 627). Two important claims are intertwined here. First, human physiognomy is fundamentally, essentially non-mechanical. It cannot be recognized or described by means of rules, and it introduces an indefiniteness, a certain insufficiency of evidence, into our physiognomic recognition that is constitutive hence not indicative of any deficiency of knowledge. Second, such indeterminate “fine shades of behavior” constitute some of our concepts, most notably our psychological concepts, which we often use in aesthetic contexts (*Z* §505).

In the case of music, Wittgenstein’s stress on the notion of physiognomy tells us that musical experience admits what he calls “imponderable evidence” (*PI* II xi 227-229). Imponderable evidence includes “subtleties of glance, of gesture, of tone” that serve as the basis of our *Menschenkenntnis*, our “knowledge of mankind” – knowledge that can be learned by some, taught by some, yet only through “experience” or “varied observation” and by exchanging “tips”. “What we regard as expression”, says Wittgenstein, “consists of incalculability” (*CV* 73). In language games such as the language game of expression, “sufficient evidence passes over into insufficient without a borderline” (*RPP II* §614), and so the kind of knowledge gained – essentially, an ability – cannot be learned via fixed rules. The concept of musical expression, like the concept of “soul”, is diametrically opposed to the concept of a mechanism (cf. *RPP I* §324) – exact, definite calculation and prediction is conceptually detrimental to what we regard as expression. Wittgenstein suggests that we try to imagine “other beings” that might recognize soulful expression in music by rules (*RPP II* §695; *Z* §157). This thought experiment is designed to show that musical expression is constituted in such a way that an encounter with a mechanical, “soulless” surrogate of expression would have a petrifying effect.

As the countless ways in which we may perform a piece of music with genuine expression invariably attest (*CV* 82), the imponderability of this kind of evidence is significantly reflected in the way we attempt to communicate our knowledge of mankind, and in the measure for the success of our justifications. Success means that we have allowed the musical gesture to insinuate itself into our lives, we have adopted it as our own, we have exerted “a reaction in which people are in touch with one another” (*RPP I* §874). Thinking of music in terms of *Menschenkenntnis* helps to dissipate the air of paralogism in Wittgenstein’s contention that music does and does not correspond to a paradigm that is apart of the music itself (*CV* 51-52). The paradigm, says Wittgenstein, is “the rhythm of our language, of our thinking and feeling”. Yet this much is already given to us; presupposed in our vertically complex games of expression. If music does point beyond itself, if there is any sense in considering its “aboutness”, this cannot be rendered according to the ordinary model of knowledge acquisition, but rather in terms of sensitivity: a kind of attunement and a matching urge to refine it. Hence, in Wittgenstein’s words, “understanding music is an avowal of the life of mankind” (*MS* 137, 20).

In a recently published correspondence between Wittgenstein and Rudolf Koder (Alber 2000), there is a passage of striking candor, written in late 1930, in which Wittgenstein offers a kind of phenomenology of musical understanding. We begin by misunderstanding the music we play, he writes, which only means that we could now listen to voices within us that may prompt us to feel our way toward understanding through practice. Wittgenstein ends this passage in these words: “listen carefully and follow what [these voices] say to you, and you will see, you will then hear more and more distinctly, and you will know more and more about yourself [Dich immer besser in Dir auskennen]”.

This passage is certainly not a polished philosophical text. Yet precisely because it is an intimate letter to a dear friend, written with obvious passion to music, it states the upshot of this paper in a clear voice.

Endnote

In this paper I use the following abbreviations for Wittgenstein's standard editions in English:

CV	<i>Culture and Value</i>
LC	Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious
LWI	<i>Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology</i> , vol. I
PI	<i>Philosophical Investigations</i>
RPP I	<i>Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology</i> , vol. I
RPP II	<i>Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology</i> , vol. II
TLP	<i>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</i>
Z	<i>Zettel</i>

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Consciousness and the Concept of Negation in Husserl's Phenomenology

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1. Introduction

In the analytic tradition, logic has been both a central field of research and a source of tools for philosophical practice. Unlike analytic philosophers, phenomenologists have usually taken a reserved attitude towards logical tools in philosophy. In Heidegger's terms one might say that a philosopher who uses formal methods is committed to calculating thought; that is, in manipulating his or her object of research by means of those tools, he or she is tied to an attitude typical of and acceptable in the sciences, but that is not the attitude that a philosopher ought to have, in a phenomenologist's view. A prime example and a starting-point of the opposition between the two traditions was the criticism that Carnap raised against Heidegger's way of using logical words like 'nothing' (Carnap 1932). In Carnap's analysis, it is the new logic developed by Frege, Russell and Whitehead that is the final court; that logic serves as an instrument by means of which we can reveal mistakes in the sentences of metaphysicians like Heidegger and also recognise the cases when natural language leads us astray. However, the new logic may not have been metaphysically as innocent as Carnap assumed (see Haaparanta 1999).

This paper does not mean to support any simplifying oppositions between analytic philosophy and phenomenology. Nor does it wish to belittle the importance of the controversies. Instead, it seeks to take a closer look at the phenomenological roots of one type of logic, namely intuitionistic logic. It studies Husserl's way of searching for the origin of negation in consciousness. Some remarks are made on the relations between Husserl's phenomenological analysis and Kant's transcendental logic. The paper seeks to pay attention to some of the various roles that logic had in the philosophical practice of early phenomenology.

2. Husserl and Intuitionists on Logic

Since the 1890s, Husserl attacked the psychologistic philosophy of logic and mathematics. In his view, the basis of logic is not in psychology, hence, logical concepts and laws and the rules of logical inference do not express the structures or functioning of the human mind. Besides the negative, antipsychologistic programme, Husserl set himself a positive task. He asked how we can justify logic. That was to search for the justification of a certain type of human activity or research. Husserl's intention was to bring logic to the path of science, and he asked how logic as science is possible. We may construe Husserl's task by saying that, in his view, the basic concepts, laws and rules used in logic are in need of justification, and that justification can and ought to be given by phenomenology.¹

There has been discussion on whether Husserl demanded radical changes in logic, such as rejecting the law of the excluded middle. Some interpreters think that Husserl did not take a clear stand on what kind of formal

system is correct (see, e.g., Mohanty 1976 and Haaparanta 1988). On this view, the research in logic that Husserl discussed assumed the correctness of classical logic, and Husserl thought that it is a phenomenologist's task to give the needed philosophical justification for that logic and for practising logic as a scientific discipline. A logical system is given a philosophical justification in phenomenology by showing that the system is what it is, because the structure and the functioning of consciousness are of a certain kind; what they are like is precisely revealed by phenomenological analysis. If, for example, the law of the excluded middle is a codification of how consciousness functions, it is justified by a phenomenological analysis of consciousness that makes that functioning explicit.

Even if Husserl's position may not be quite clear, he certainly was conservative in logic compared to L.E.J. Brouwer, who criticised logic in general, not merely classical logic.² Michael Detlefsen (1992) argues that Brouwer's intuitionistic critique of classical mathematics is primarily based on epistemological considerations. Hence, in his view, the intuitionist's chief objection does not focus on the use of particular logical laws, such as the law of the excluded middle. He shows that in Brouwer's view mathematics is constructional activity or experience which cannot grow via the logical extrapolation of its content; instead, mathematics proceeds only phenomenologically or experientially. If Detlefsen's interpretation is correct, Brouwer's view contains criticism not only against those who take logic to be the basis of mathematics but also against logic in general. Detlefsen notes that intuitionistic logic is also a problematic enterprise from the point of view of Brouwerian intuitionistic philosophy. According to Brouwer's doctrine, original mathematical knowledge is attained by immediate experience and extending it by means of logical tools does not guarantee that the content thus extended would have been reached or could be reached in the same cognitive mode as the original knowledge. For Brouwer mathematics is mental activity; contents of thought must be lived, experienced, and genuine knowledge is based on proof-experiences (Detlefsen 1992, 224). In intuitionistic logic, just as in all logic, one leaves experience behind and manipulates syntactic representations (ibid., 237).

Even if Husserl was not as radical as Brouwer in his criticism of logicians' practices, he was philosophically radical in that he took logic to be in need of justification. Some interpreters, e.g., Dieter Lohmar, have also argued that even if Husserl wrote as a philosopher, not as one who develops logical systems, he could have had good reasons to intervene in the formal sciences as a "shy revisionist" (Lohmar 2002 and Lohmar, forthcoming). Unlike Husserl, Oskar Becker and Arend Heyting, who developed intuitionistic logic, intervened in logic and were revolutionaries in the field. They wished to change logic on the basis of Husserl's and Heidegger's thought.³

¹ See Haaparanta 1988. The most central works on the philosophical foundations of logic include *Logische Untersuchungen 1900-1901*, *Formale und transzendente Logik 1929* and *Erfahrung und Urteil 1939*.

² For Brouwer's thought, see, e.g., W.P. van Stigt's contribution in Mancosu 1998, 1-22. Also see Brouwer's articles in the same volume. Cf. Detlefsen 1992.

³ See Becker 1927 and Heyting 1930a, 1930b and 1931.

3. The Phenomenological Analysis of Negation

Even if no strong claims can be made concerning Husserl's willingness to intervene in formal logic, interesting conclusions can be drawn from what he writes about negation. Oskar Becker states in his *Mathematische Existenz* (1927) that a proposition " p holds" can be denied in two ways. Becker's analysis is based on the distinctions that Husserl makes in his *Logische Untersuchungen* (Becker 1927, 497-501). The meaning-intention (*Bedeutungsintention*) of a proposition can be fulfilled (*erfüllen*) by a proof or a perception. We then say that p holds ($+p$). If not- p holds ($+(-p)$), that is the case of disappointment or frustration (*Enttäuschung*). Husserl also uses the terms "*Aufhebung*" ("annulment") and "*(partielle) Durchstreichung*" ("partial cancellation") (Husserl 1964, § 21a). If the meaning-intention is not fulfilled or the negation of the proposition proved, that is the case of non-fulfilment (*Nicht-Erfüllung*; $-(+p)$). Instead of the term "*Bedeutungsintention*", Becker also uses the term "*Erwartungsintention*". Mancosu and van Stigt give us the following examples: If we say that a book is on the table and we also perceive a book on the table, the case is that of meaning-fulfilment. If we see the table, but there is no book on it, that is the case of disappointment or cancellation. If we do not even see the table, that is the case of the non-fulfilment of the meaning-intention (Mancosu 1998, 278).

The distinctions that Husserl makes and the analysis that he gives of the origin of negation have important connections with Kant's views. In his table of categories Kant distinguishes among affirmative (*bejahende*), negative (*verneinende*) and infinite (*unendliche*) judgements and among the corresponding categories of reality (*Realität*), negation (*Negation*) and limitation (*Limitation*) (A 70/B 95; A 80/B 106). According to Kant, in transcendental logic infinite judgements must be distinguished from affirmative judgements, even if in general logic they are classified as affirmative. Kant's general logic abstracts from the content of the predicate, even when the content is negative. Transcendental logic, for its part, is interested in the content of logical affirmation and in what it adds to our knowledge. Kant gives an example: If I say "The soul is not mortal", I have warded off error. By saying "The soul is non-mortal", I make an affirmation. I locate the soul in the unlimited sphere of non-mortal beings. The infinite sphere of all that is possible is here limited in such a way that mortality is excluded, and the soul is located in the remaining part of the whole sphere. On Kant's view, that kind of judgements are infinite as far as their logical extension is concerned but limitative in respect of the content of knowledge. As infinite judgements have a special cognitive value, they cannot be overlooked in transcendental logic (A 72/B 97).

I do not intend to argue that Husserl's views of negation coincide with Kant's ideas. Still, there are interesting connections and parallelisms. In his posthumous *Erfahrung und Urteil* Husserl states that the basis of negation does not lie in a predicative judgement but its origin can already be found in prepredicative experience, hence, in the act of consciousness (Husserl 1964, § 21). A judgement, for example, "This ball is red", expresses an anticipating intention, in Husserl's view. Husserl argues that if the intention is cancelled, if there is frustration, the judgement "This ball is not red" preserves its old positing, as negation presupposes the normal, original constitution of an object. Husserl takes it to be a mistake of traditional logic that it considers a negative judgement a basic form of a judgement (ibid., § 72). On his view, theoretical judgements are not negative; instead, at one time they confirm a being-thus and at another time they confirm a being-not-thus. Husserl thus distinguishes between what could be called affirmative and infinite judgements but regards them both as confirmations. That is what matters in science and logic, and on Husserl's view that is how it must be. However, in his phenomenological study, which is transcendental, the distinction between the fulfilment of a meaning-intention and disappointment is acknowledged, and in both cases something cognitively significant happens. Instead, if a meaning-intention is not fulfilled, nothing is constructed in the cognitive process.

4. Conclusions

Intuitionistic logic is interested in the fulfilment and in the frustration of a meaning-intention. Therefore, we can say that it considers negation from the point of view of transcendental logic. One may raise the question whether Husserl wished to revise formal logic in such a way that it attends to his studies in transcendental logic. As was noted above, there is no clear answer to that question. A phenomenologist studies the origin of logical systems and logical concepts used in those systems by trying to trace them back to pure consciousness. However, the phenomenological origin of negation is not the same as the role of the concept of negation in a formal system. It is tempting to argue that on Husserl's view a formal system can, but it need not, be true to transcendental excavations. One metaphilosophical conclusion also suggests itself. That is, turning the order of things, hence analysing consciousness and its experiences by means of a formal system that has cut off all its ties to consciousness would not fulfil the requirements that a phenomenologist sets to philosophy.

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Hinges and Frames: Wittgenstein's Surrogates for Modality

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Introduction

From the many remarks the later Wittgenstein devotes to hinges, grammars and frames an implicit view of the meaning of modal concepts can be extracted.

Most of the relevant discussion in *On Certainty* and the *Philosophical Investigations* alike centres round the role of certain kinds of *propositions* in the maintenance of order in language games. Social psychologists now recognize two distinctive roles for propositions stating the rules of a practice. There is the rule as an explicit *instruction* as to what to do. Then there is the rule as a written expression of a *hypothesis* as to the norm that is immanent in the orderliness of the practice.

For example, the upshot of a research program looking into such a social phenomenon as collective remembering is a written list of rules and conventions which are intended to express the norms according to which the activity counts as remembering. While rules and conventions are the propositional expression of norms, whatever is the actual bearer of normative constraints on proper action is not always propositional.

Neither Glock (1996) nor Baker and Hacker (1985) consistently maintain the distinction between rules as instructions and rules as hypotheses. If their accounts are faithful renderings of Wittgenstein's thought then there is something similar astray in his account.

The thrust of this paper is towards a clarification of the role-derived status of the propositions that express the norms of a practice. Are hinge *propositions* hinges, and are grammatical *propositions* frames? Or, do they express the content of hinges and frames as constraints on the orderliness of practices, which are perhaps not propositional at all?

Philosophical work in clarifying the meaning of modal distinctions seems to me to have thrown up at least four schemas.

1. The Leibnizean Schema: Modal distinctions mark differences in the internal structure of propositions. Leibniz rests the distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact on whether a proposition includes finitely many or infinitely many elementary predicates.
2. The Constructionist Schema: Modal distinctions mark the role of that which these propositions express in the ordering of experience. Kant identifies synthetic a priori propositions as those expressing the role of concepts in the ordering of experience.
3. The Russellian Schema: Modal distinctions mark differences in the levels of abstraction of general features of the universe which they describe. Necessary propositions describe the most general features of the universe. Logic is the science of logical forms (Monk, 1997: 517)
4. The Wittgenstein Schema: Modal distinctions mark differences in the role of propositions in the human form of life. Necessary propositions express norms of representation, action and so on.

Many writers on these matters have written as if, according to Wittgenstein, frame and hinge propositions were not

only expressions of norms but served as the mechanisms by which norms were maintained. Here is an example:

Baker and Hacker (1985: 272), sum up Wittgenstein's views as follows:

The idea that such necessary truths [as those of mathematics, 'grammar' in Wittgenstein's sense, and so on] are nothing but norms of representation flies in the face of a venerable tradition.

I am ready to concede that Wittgenstein himself seems often to have written in such a way as to invite this interpretation. Evidently Wittgenstein would interpret some reports on how language is used as expressions of conventions of meaning (hinges), and so incontrovertible, with others were less hinge-like.

As in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, the mature Wittgenstein resists the Platonist view of necessary propositions as part of a super-physics of the abstract which differ from ordinary empirical propositions merely by describing abstract objects. Empirical propositions can be said to describe possible states of affairs, but necessary propositions cannot be said to describe necessary states of affairs. Their role is normative rather than descriptive. They function as, or are linked to, 'grammatical propositions, sentences which are typically used to express grammatical rules'. Role must be discovered by a study of the language games in which a certain proposition plays a part.

Do frames as the underlying sources of orderliness consist of grammatical propositions? Or do grammatical propositions *express* the norms that constitute the current frame? What is the relation of grammatical propositions to frame constrained practices? Are they in some way responsible for them? Are they covert instructions or are they expressions of non-propositional normative constraints?

Glock (1996: 131) lays out four key features of Wittgenstein's treatment of something like the traditional concept of necessity.

1. There are grammatical propositions that express logical relations that cannot be analyzed truth-functionally. Glock cites 'Black is darker than white'. Propositions like this express norms of representation. We do not give prior explicit or tacit assent to this *proposition* before we can say such things as 'Coal is darker than snow'. Propositions of this kind *express* norms of representation, which are immanent in certain linguistic practices.
2. Propositions express norms of representation and standards of correct use only on specific occasions and in specific contexts. Necessary propositions do not express generic norms of representation across a multitude of cases. Indexicality of the application of the norm must be taken into account.
3. Necessary propositions do not report the uses of words. Their truth is not a consequence of the way words are used, rather they express our determinations to use words in certain ways.
4. Necessary propositions are not truths, since they express norms.

However, all four features raise the question of whether the propositions are the active sources of prescriptions or express whatever has prescriptive force in propositional terms. The ambiguity to which this paper is addressed is between propositions as *instructions*, serving as norms of representation, for example in instructing someone in an unfamiliar practice, and their more common role as *expressions* of norms of representation, implicit in some pattern of practices.

Are those rules which are not explicit instructions hypotheses about hidden rules which are means by which orderliness is achieved, or do they report or express the norms that are, to a critical eye, evident in the ways that practices display orderliness? If the latter, how do we account for orderliness? Is this a just a psychological question? English grammar expresses my linguistic norms but does not constitute them. Are there hidden rules which the native speaker unconsciously follows?

Wittgenstein, like some of his commentators, slips and slides between these two roles for rules. Yet, he should be the very one to be sceptical of 'hidden rules' accounts. Here is a troublesome remark, in this context:

It may be for example that *all enquiry on our part* is set so as to exempt certain propositions from doubt, if they are ever formulated. They lie apart from the route travelled by enquiry (Wittgenstein, 1979: § 88).

Doesn't the wording suggest that there may be propositions which are *unformulated*? In the immediately preceding *On Certainty* § 87 Wittgenstein explicitly brings up the possibility of a proposition which 'simply gets assumed as a truism, never called in question, perhaps not even formulated.' Where and how could such propositions exist unformulated? Are they supposed to be efficacious in shaping discourse in the way that whatever frames might be are supposed to be efficacious?

In *Philosophical Investigations* § 91, in showing how the task of philosophers can be transformed into a therapy, Wittgenstein offers the metaphor of 'reminder' to clarify the point of formulating a grammatical proposition.

Something we know when no one asks us, but no longer know when we are supposed to give an account of it is something we need to *remind* ourselves of. (And it is obviously something which for some reason it is difficult to remind oneself).

When one is given or gives oneself a reminder one can ask 'Of what?' It is surely not propositional knowledge that we are being reminded of. The grammatical proposition reminds us of the way we should carry out some practice, say ranking shades of grey as darker or lighter.

Even in the case of the boy who has trouble with the use of the instruction 'add 2' the problem is that the propositional form of the rule is not sufficient to guarantee the orderliness of the performance of the practice. 'Knowing that' always falls short of 'knowing how'.

What is a frame?

It seems as if grammatical propositions cannot be the exclusive components of frames, however adequately they may express the content of frames. Making use of the expression/description distinction here allows one to emphasise the intimacy of the frame/grammar relation, while leaving space to raise the question of the nature of frames in general.

The same general point distinguishing rules as instructions and rules as expression of non-propositional sources of norms needs to be reiterated for frames. Sometimes we do use relatively stable sets of propositions in a frame-like way, for instance in the way the propositions in the Prayer Book shape Evensong. However, mostly we do not shape practices by using manuals.

Let us try this formulation: the modality of a proposition is a reflection of the role of the frame that it expresses in the shaping of discourse and experience. Something frame-like fixes the uses of colour words, so a proposition expressing some aspect of that frame, such as 'Nothing can be red and green all over at once (*ceteris paribus*)' has the 'necessity' modality with its various epistemic and other aspects.

The three main features of necessary propositions, cited in *On Certainty* are our trusting something as a guide (Wittgenstein 1979: § 511), taking an attitude of sureness towards it rather than claiming to know it (Wittgenstein 1979, § 511), and, thirdly, never needing to yield to pressures to abandon it or to hand it over to the empirical domain as a testable hypothesis as to matters of fact (Wittgenstein 1979, § 512).

When someone abandons a practice, say a way of measuring temperature, it is because of some pragmatic failure. The abandonment of the relevant grammatical proposition signals or expresses the change of practice, it rarely brings it about.

The explicit choice of 'sureness' rather than 'knowing' suggests to me that in the latter part of *On Certainty* Wittgenstein is suggesting that grammars do not engender practices, but record them.

Moreover, in *On Certainty*, §519 Wittgenstein argues that if we treat the expression of an empirical fact as beyond doubt, then that fact is being used as part of a frame. This emphasises the function criterion at the expense of any reversion to a formal, structural criterion for grammatical propositions and so for constituting the domain of the 'necessity' modality.

In *Philosophical Investigations* §§ 238-242¹, Wittgenstein makes clear that acceptance of a rule is no guarantee that a practice will be performed regularly or correctly. This surely implies that the rule cannot be sole source of the orderliness of the practice even in cases where rules are instructions.

What is a hinge?

The concept of 'hinge proposition' is explained in *On Certainty* §341:

That is to say [apropos of the point that other matters than mathematical propositions are not to be doubted], the *questions* that we raise and our *doubts* depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn [namely, our questions and doubts].

Wittgenstein follows this up with a disclaimer in *On Certainty* § 343:

But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced

¹ For convenience of exposition I have sometimes used *Philosophical Investigations* and *On Certainty* as condensed citations.

to rest content with assumptions. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.

The 'hinge' metaphor seems to point to the stability of those propositions that express norms of representation, adding a nuance to the metaphor of 'frame', namely that whatever the sources of the orderliness of language games might be, they cannot be in continuous flux (*On Certainty* § 344).

One cannot avoid the problem that exercised us in the preceding section. Only if someone brings a presupposition to light and expresses it in such a way that one can attend to it, the question of whether one *should* give it up and in what circumstances can be raised. We note that giving it up would be to abandon a discourse genre as meaningful. What sort of being was a presupposition before it was brought to light in propositional form? If we say 'propositional', we are back in the conundrum of the last section.

Looking more closely at Wittgenstein's treatment of 'needing to give way' in *On Certainty* §657 there are a multitude of circumstances in which one would seem to need to give way. I might suffer a delusion; I might even be forced to give way over my proper name in odd circumstances; I might come to see 'everything' differently, as did Saul in becoming Paul.

Perhaps giving up a presupposition is not coming to see it as a false proposition, but to abandon the practice for which it expresses a condition of viability. This seems to fit with what Wittgenstein says about propositions that have come from empirical investigations but are serving the 'frame/hinge' role in anatomy.

But how is it for example with anatomy (or large part of it)? Isn't what it describes, too, exempt from doubt? To which one responds 'Certainly!' (*On Certainty* §666)

In what circumstances would someone bring forth a 'hinge' as an explicit thesis? When would one start to consider the 'tidal flow' presupposition of the blood system as mistaken? Only if a cultural framework were already showing signs of disintegrating would scepticism take hold. A crack in the ceiling leads one to examine the foundations!

What is it for meaning to evaporate?

Suppose, the need arises to give up my previous assent. What is it for meaning to evaporate after the moment of dissent? I stop assenting to the proposition 'The earth is a flat plate'. From now on the question 'What is the diameter of the plate?' has neither a correct nor an incorrect answer. A certain language game cannot be played.

Offering a hinge proposition just is the expression of the intuition that a practice is orderly. It must go this way. Thus, hinge propositions inherit a modal status. We are under no obligation to pass from the form of words to the hypothesis that hinge propositions *are* the foundations that bring it about that the practice in question is orderly.²

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² An earlier version of this paper was read at the Russell-Wittgenstein Symposium, Linacre College, Oxford, November, 2002.

Kripke's Finiteness Objection to Dispositionalist Theories of Meaning

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Kripke's Wittgenstein (KW¹) challenges theories of meaning to specify which facts about a speaker could conceivably make it the case that the words and symbols he or she uses possess determinate meanings. Most current answers to this question deploy the general *dispositionalist* strategy which KW aims to refute. These answers claim that the speaker's dispositions to *apply* terms to objects in the surrounding world constitute or determine, in some way, the meanings of these terms. KW presents a battery of argumentation against the dispositionalist. One can separate (at least²) two strands in his argumentation: the *normativity* and the *finiteness* objections. Usually the normativity objection is taken to be the more powerful one. The finiteness objection is often dismissed more quickly.

In this paper I am going to claim that there are two ways of reading KW's demand for meaning-constitutive facts, and that distinguishing between the two is crucial for the proper understanding of his objections to dispositionalist theories. I will concentrate on the finiteness objection. While I think that the distinction between the two readings which I will propose has important consequences to the proper understanding of the normativity objection as well, I believe its role is even more crucial in the case of the finiteness objection. In particular, the reasoning which is generally taken to give an answer to the finiteness objection presupposes one reading of the demand for meaning-constitutive facts, while the dominant dispositionalist theories have generally preferred the other.

These dispositionalist theories are put forward as theories of *mental content* rather than meaning. I will, however, follow Kripke in framing the question as one concerning word meanings. It is generally agreed that the problems are equally severe for dispositionalism about *meaning* and for dispositionalism about *content*, whatever view one prefers about the relationships between linguistic meaning and mental content.³ The problem arises from the notion of *correctness conditions*, and clearly such conditions exist for mental contents as well as for linguistic entities.

1. A-Questions and B-Questions

When KW asks us what facts determine the meaning of predicate P, we can take him as primarily raising one of two different questions:

- (A) What facts about me make it the case that the correct application of predicate P (as I use it) is governed by intermediary entity A?
- (B) What facts about me make it the case that it is correct to apply predicate P (as I use it) in previously unencountered instance I?

In what follows, I will refer to these kinds of questions as 'A-questions' and 'B-questions'. (A) and (B) are formulated for predicates - and I will mostly be concerned with predicates below - but one could easily adapt them for other forms of expression.

Kripke's sceptic moves quickly from the one type of question to the other. Take Kripke's example of addition and quaddition. The sceptic starts out by asking what facts about me make it the case that '125' is the correct answer to the question 'What is 68+57?' (Kripke, 8). This is clearly a B-question, asking what makes it the case that this is the correct application in this previously unencountered instance. But shortly thereafter the sceptic starts to frame the question as an A-question, asking what facts about me make it the case that my usage of '+' denotes the *addition function*, and not the *quaddition* function, which returns the value '5' when the numbers to be added (or, rather, *quadded*) are larger than any I have in fact added together (Kripke, 8-9). That is, what fact about me makes it the case that it is *this function* that sets the standard for my usage of '+'?

Similar sceptical worries can be raised about any predicate, and we can always formulate the sceptic's challenge as either an A-question or a B-question. Take 'red', for example. Suppose that I have never encountered objects which are both red and square. We can imagine Kripke's sceptic asking: what facts about me make it the case that I mean *red* rather than *red and not square* by my usage of 'red'? Again, we can take this in two ways. We can either ask an A-question: what facts about me make it the case that it is *the property of being red*, rather than *the property of being red and not square*, which sets the standard of correctness for my use of 'red'? Or we can ask a B-question: what facts about me make it the case that, when I come across a red and square object O, it is correct to apply 'red' to O?

In discussions of Kripke's problem, these formulations are often run together. It is assumed, explicitly or implicitly, that any answer to a B-question must be based on an answer to an A-question. In other words, it is assumed that the correctness of any *particular* application of a predicate is to be explained by the predicate's association with an intermediary object. On this assumption, one takes answers to A-questions as primary to answers to B-questions, in an explanatory sense. I will call this assumption Meaning Platonism:

Meaning Platonism. If S means something by predicate P, something about S determines an intermediary entity A as the standard of correctness for P. When S correctly applies P to individual x, this correctness consists in the appropriate relation obtaining between A and x.

In the examples above, the intermediary has been taken to be an abstract object such as a property or a function (in which case the appropriate relation would be property exemplification, etc.). But there are other entities that might be invoked to do the same job - I am using 'Platonism' in a loose sense. For example, A could be a *set* (of entities or n-tuples; the *extension* of P), and the appropriate relation that of set membership. Unless one identifies properties and relations with such sets, these theories would differ in

¹i.e. Wittgenstein as interpreted in Kripke (1982). All page references to Kripke are to this work.

²In addition to these two arguments, some commentators also find a *justification* or an *error* objection. My view is that these objections collapse to the normativity objection (properly understood), but I will not argue for this here.

³See, for example, Miller (1998, 178-181).

various respects. But they would share a commitment to Meaning Platonism: the correct use of predicate P consists in successfully tracking the requirements of the intermediary object picked out by whatever it is that one's competence in the use of P consists in.⁴

The key issue is the question of explanatory priority: if we explain the correctness conditions of particular applications in terms of an intermediary such as a set or a property, and give A-questions the priority, we are committed to Meaning Platonism. On the other hand, we could give B-questions the priority and seek to explain the correctness conditions of particular applications directly, without relying on intermediaries. A theory which gives B-questions explanatory priority could still think of predicates as having extensions or as referring to properties – the important point is that such entities would not be given an explanatory role. Instead, one would take the primary task to be that of explaining how correctness conditions arise for the use of a predicate, in an unbounded range of particular cases, and abstract away from particular cases to get the predicate's extension.

2. The Finiteness Objection Against Dispositionalism

Especially when we frame the question as a B-question concerning a moment of time in the past, some kind of dispositionalist answer seems compelling. If you are asked: "What makes it the case that, as you used '+' yesterday, the answer you intended for '57+68?' was '125'?", it is natural to respond by relying, in one way or another, on the fact that '125' is the answer you *would* have given, had you been asked that question yesterday. This is the basis for the dispositionalist response to Kripke's sceptic.

In its crudest form, dispositionalism would claim that "to mean addition by '+' is to be disposed, when asked for any sum 'x+y' to give the sum of x and y as the answer" (Kripke, 22). It is obvious that the crude version fails - we are from time to time disposed to make errors, and the crude dispositionalist theory is unable to account for them.

The natural reaction would be to rely on *ceteris paribus* clauses to filter out errors and claim that correct application of one's terms coincides with one's dispositions to apply the term *when conditions are favourable*. Such *sophisticated* dispositionalism is Kripke's main target. As noted above, Kripke presents at least two objections to such theories. The normativity objection claims that sophisticated dispositionalism cannot account for the normativity of meaning. My focus in this paper is on the *finiteness* objection.

The finiteness objection (Kripke, 26-28) is based on the observation that the totality of my dispositions is finite, yet we take our understanding of '+' or 'red' to determine their correct application in an *infinity* of possible instances:

- (1) The facts which determine the meanings of the words I use must determine correctness conditions for their use in an infinite number of situations.
- (2) I only possess a finite number of dispositions to apply words.

therefore,

- (3) My dispositions to apply words do not suffice to determine the meanings of my words.

Most commentators seem to think that this objection is not very damaging. The following reasoning is thought to provide an answer (Blackburn 1984a; Boghossian 1989). There is no limit to the range of situations in which dispositions (mental or non-mental) could be manifested. Thus, if my total dispositional state is to determine the correct application of my symbols, its finiteness does not seem to be a crucial shortcoming: the finite state can manifest itself in an infinite range of situations. In other words, although I possess a finite number of dispositions (however they are counted), there exists an infinite number of possible *manifestations* of my dispositions, because the number of *situations* in which my dispositions could manifest themselves is infinite. I believe this response is basically correct. However, I also believe that it has not been appreciated that this response is not available to all versions of dispositionalism. More precisely, it is only available to a *non-Platonist* version of dispositionalism.

A *Platonist* dispositionalist theory would claim that my total dispositional state, here and now, determines an intermediary which in turn determines the correct use of my terms. Thus, the theory would claim that the totality of my dispositions to use 'red' bears some non-trivial relation to the property of redness, or the set of all actual and possible red things, or what have you, but not to the property of being red and not square, or the set of all red and not square things, and so on. The thrust of Kripke's finiteness objection is that such a relation cannot be specified without circularity. My dispositional state is finite while the number of possible intermediaries is infinite – we cannot rule out all of the countless deviant interpretations.

If we appeal to the fact that dispositions can be manifested in an infinity of instances, we are no longer directly attempting to specify a relation between my dispositional state and an intermediary. Rather, we are saying that there is an infinity of possible *particular* situations in which my dispositions could be manifested. But then, in order to account for errors and normativity, we already need a way of filtering out the *incorrect* particular manifestations of our dispositions. But if that is the case, we are no longer relying on an infinite set or anything of the sort to provide correctness conditions. In other words, then we are no longer committed to Meaning Platonism.

Thus, the stock answer is only available to a *non-Platonist* dispositionalist theory. This is remarkable, because the prominent dispositionalist reductions of meaning and content are, explicitly or implicitly, Meaning Platonist in character. Most clearly, Fodor's (1990) *asymmetric dependency* theory⁵ and Dretske's (1981) *causal* theory⁶ both take their task to be that of explaining how words and concepts get to have *properties* (and relations, etc.) as their referents: the correctness conditions for the use of words and concepts in particular situations are taken to follow from this relation. Thus, answers to A-questions are given explanatory priority. If I am correct in claiming that the plausible answer to the finiteness objection is only

⁴Platonist theories of meaning are in an important sense like the theories Blackburn (1984b) calls "dog-legged", with the following exception: Blackburn seems to count as dog-legged only those theories which rely on *mental* intermediaries, while I would count as Platonist theories with *any* intermediary. For the purposes of evaluating the finiteness objection, the nature of the intermediary is irrelevant.

⁵Fodor's commitment to Meaning Platonism is particularly clear in the following quotation: "To apply a term to a thing in its extension *is* to apply the term correctly; once you've said what it is that makes the tables the extension of 'table's, there is surely no *further* question about why it's *correct* to apply a 'table' to a table." (p. 135) Clearly, the A-question concerning extension is seen as prior in the explanatory sense.

⁶Dretske's commitment to Meaning Platonism is implicit: in taking a subject's (primitive) concepts to correctly apply to things which are *of the same kind* as those present during the critical learning period, he is relying on kinds as intermediaries.

available to a non-Platonist dispositionalist theory, these theories and their descendants would then face a choice: either the theories have to be reformulated as non-Platonist, or another answer to KW's finiteness objection should be offered.

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Did Wittgenstein Follow the Rules? (Or Was He Guided by Them?)

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One of the most intriguing aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy is his discussion of rules and of their role in guiding our actions. The best known series of his remarks on this topic is the so-called rule-following discussion in the *Philosophical Investigations* I, secs. 143-242. Related remarks are found elsewhere, for instance in the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* Part I, especially secs. 1-5. (Also *ibid.* Part VII, secs. 26-27.) Wittgenstein's ideas of rules have been almost universally misunderstood. Philosophers refer routinely to his "rule-following discussion", but his very phrase epitomizes a misunderstanding. In reality Wittgenstein's discussion is not about how we consciously follow a rule. His basic problem is not whether I can know what rule I am following, whether I can know whether I am following a rule correctly, or any similar skeptical or other epistemological problem. One way of seeing this is to note that following a rule typically is for Wittgenstein a primary language-game. And as I will argue in another paper (Hintikka, forthcoming), according to Wittgenstein epistemic notions such as knowledge, doubt and certainty cannot be used in primary language-games. And if so, it is according to Wittgenstein a mistake to raise any epistemological questions concerning rule following.

But if Wittgenstein's problem was not epistemological, what was it? Instead of trying to diagnose sundry misinterpretations of Wittgenstein's remarks on rules, it is more constructive to outline the correct way of reading him. One major difficulty in interpreting Wittgenstein in general is that he seldom spells out what the problems are that he is trying to solve (Hintikka 1998). In the case of rule-following we are fortunate in that Wittgenstein himself formulates the problem he is facing in so many words. In *The Blue Book* pp.12-17 he asks: What does it mean to follow a rule? How can we teach someone to follow a rule?

Wittgenstein envisages two possible answers. First, following a rule might mean simply acting in accordance with it. Then all there is to the teaching of a rule is the process of training the learner to act in a certain way. In other words, the acquisition of a rule must be thought of as a mere drill. This drill causes the learner for instance to associate a word on paper with a certain sound and with a certain meaning.

In *The Blue Book* Wittgenstein rejects this conception of rule following. He thinks that it is a merely causal story of language learning which does not involve any genuine teaching in the sense of conveying an insight to the learner. Instead, Wittgenstein says that in genuine rule-following the rule must play an actual role in the process of following it. But how is this claim to be understood?

What he says is that in genuine rule-following a rule

is itself involved in the processes of understanding, obeying, etc; "involved", however, meaning that the expression of this rule forms part of these processes. (Op.cit., pp. 12-13)

Wittgenstein further explains his view by saying that on it

The rule is *involved* in the understanding, obeying, etc. in the sense that

the symbol of the rule forms a part of the calculation.

But what does this amount to? Wittgenstein gives a number of examples. One of them is following an algebraically expressed rule of calculating in arithmetic. In such a case we can think that what happens is that the calculator literally replaces algebraic symbols by numerals and then carries out the operations. Here the symbolic expression of the rule literally forms a part of the calculation.

Another example is especially interesting. It is outlined by Wittgenstein in *The Blue Book* p. 14 and in *Philosophical Investigations* I, secs. 50-53. This example concerns the operation of color-words. Wittgenstein envisages a person who uses color words by means of a color chart. In order to identify the color of a certain object he or she compares it with different samples of the chart. After having found the one that closest matches the color, he or she reads the name associated with that sample on the chart. That name can then lead to further action, for instance to the obeying of a verbal order in which the color word in question figures importantly. Of course the role of a physical color chart can in applications be taken over by remembered color images. The purpose of this here is to illustrate how the color chart plays a role in the actual use of color. It is involved in the kind of use Wittgenstein envisages. It is literally part (an instrument) of the color language.

Thus according to the view espoused by Wittgenstein in *The Blue Book* the rule must somehow be present there whenever I follow it, because it must actually guide what I am doing, just as much as a color chart must be present when a member of Wittgenstein's imaginary tribe uses color words.

In the sense illustrated by such examples the rule must literally guide my actions when I am following it. But now a new problem arises: How can the mere symbolic expression of a rule guide my thinking and my actions? There would not be any such problem if the rule were a phenomenological entity present in my experience. But how can an inanimate physical object, for instance a symbolic formula on paper, guide my action and my thinking? As Wittgenstein puts it, "a rule, so far as it interests us, does not act at a distance." (*The Blue Book*, p. 14.) Hence Wittgenstein's actual problem about rules is not how I follow a rule but how the rule guides me when I follow it. The problem is not about rule following but about *being guided by a rule*. In other words, what his problem is, is not whether I know the rule that I am following or whether that rule is somehow underdetermined by evidence. He is even admitting situations in which an explicit symbolic expression of a rule is given to me. Wittgenstein's question is not whether that is the right rule, but how it determines my actions when I follow it. We might call this problem the guidance problem instead of the rule-following problem.

Wittgenstein's own main examples should be enough to settle this point. What does he use as his paradigmatic example of rule-following? Reading (in the sense of reading aloud). Now what is the rule that guides me in reading aloud? Clearly the alphabet. Now when I recite a poem, should I as a philosophical follower of Wittgenstein entertain skeptical doubts whether I know my alphabet? To a philosopher who thinks that I should, one can only respond: read what Wittgenstein says. What Wittgenstein is doing is not to throw skeptical aspersions on my knowledge of the alphabet, which is proverbially thought of as the most trivial part of our conceptual repertoire, but to ask: How does that knowledge guide me in my reading? Obviously I am not conscious of the alphabet when I read. Am I subconsciously reciting the alphabet when I am reading? If not, how is my being able to utter right sounds based on my knowledge of the ABCs?

In order to understand why the guidance problem was so serious for Wittgenstein, a number of observations are in order. First, why should Wittgenstein be thinking in terms of being guided by a rule as an external object in the physical world, for instance by the symbolic formulation of a rule vs. paper? Such questions can only be answered by reference to the historical and genetic context of his thinking. Now the massive change that had taken place in Wittgenstein's thinking in October 1929 is switch from the primacy of phenomenological languages to the primacy of everyday languages. After this change, what our words of our language primarily refer to are denizens of the everyday world of external objects not given to me directly in my immediate consciousness. Hence in talking about rules we presumably have to refer primarily to their codifications in external reality. But then they are not immediately present to my consciousness and the question as to how they guide my actions becomes relevant.

This does not mean that Wittgenstein had become a behaviorist who does not acknowledge the reality of the internal world. He acknowledges readily that rule-following can take place in thought. What he is maintaining is that in principle the rule-following in external reality is the primary case conceptually. In other words, what is crucial is merely that we must always be able to think of rule-following as happening in external reality. Mental rule-following then becomes an extension of the primary external use, like doing arithmetic in one's head. As Wittgenstein writes in *The Blue Book* p. 13:

As we are not interested in where the processes thinking, calculating, take place, we can for our purpose imagine the calculation being done entirely on paper. We are not concerned with the difference: internal external.

What follows from this and what prompts the guidance problem in that we do no any longer according to Wittgenstein have direct access to rules in our thinking. The remarkable thing is that in his earlier thought Wittgenstein had in fact believed in the possibility of such immediate acquaintance with rules. In MS 116 he confesses that

[e]arlier I thought at one time that grammatical rules are an explanation of what I experience on one occasion when I use the word. They are as it were consequences or expressions of the properties which I momentarily experience when I understand the word.

Did Wittgenstein have in mind the impossibility of such direct acquaintance with rules when he formulated his problems in *The Blue Book*? Or was he led to a realization

of this impossibility by reflecting on the question he posed in *The Blue Book*, pp. 12-17? There are some indications that the latter may have been the case. This is suggested by a passage similar to our quoted one (but at the same time interestingly different). This passage occurs in MS 213 ("The Big Typescript", written probably in 1933), p. 160. There the view he later in MS 116 says that he had rejected is presented as a *prima facie* tempting but fallacious consequence of his own "exposition of grammatical rules". Hence Wittgenstein is obviously thinking of views he had held shortly before putting together MS 213. Now Wittgenstein had given such an exposition shortly before the composition of MS 213 in *The Blue Book*, pp. 12-17. Hence it is likely that Wittgenstein's realization that rules are not directly accessible was prompted by his reflections on the guidance problem.

From the perspective we have reached we can also understand the entire history of Wittgenstein's subsequent thinking about rules in the middle thirties. He began by looking for an explanation for how a rule guides my actions, and ended up by admitting that no explanation is possible. All that can be said is that one is trained to act in accordance with the rule. This means that he in effect returned to the view he rejected in the *Blue Book*, viz. the view that the teaching of a rule is a drill except that he apparently no longer thinks of this process in merely causal terms. The learning process becomes part of the language in the same sense as the external manifestation of a rule according to his earlier view. When he subsequently asks whether I can know the rule I am following, he is not inquiring into my ability to grasp an entity called the rule. He is highlighting his newly acquired view that in an important sense in my actions and my experiences there is no rule consciously guiding them.

On a semantical level, this development meant a switch of priorities. Wittgenstein first evoked the idea of language-game to highlight the nature of language as a rule-governed process. Rules were the basic semantical reality. "You can't get behind the rules, because there isn't any behind" (*Philosophical Grammar* p. 244). However, after Wittgenstein's change of priorities language-games become the ground floor of semantics. One is not taught a language-game by teaching its rules. One is trained ("drilled") to play the language-game. One can understand the rules of a language-game by being trained to master the entire game. It is in this sense that we according to Wittgenstein follow a rule "blindly".

Once again a major aspect in Wittgenstein's thinking has been generally misunderstood, not just in its details but concerning the very questions he is asking. This is the case in spite of the fact that Wittgenstein's views are eminently clear from his published books and reinforced by an examination of his *Nachlass*. It is therefore a sad comment on the scholarly standards of Wittgensteinian literature that his ideas about rules have for the most part been discussed in skeptical and other epistemological terms which according to Wittgenstein's own views are little more than nonsense.

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The Epistemological Role of Consciousness for Introspective Self-Knowledge

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1. Introduction

Traditionally, consciousness has been considered a source of knowledge, or even a kind of knowledge. More recently, the link has been taken to be less close. But still, some link there is. Or so some philosophers claim. For example, Laurence Bonjour and Christopher Peacocke have put forward a view about conscious states according to which conscious states have a special epistemological role for introspection (cp. Bonjour 1999, 2001; Peacocke 1999). Conscious states, they hold, can serve as evidence, or reasons, for the self-ascription of mental states by introspection. By implication they claim that states which are not conscious do not have the same epistemic significance as conscious states. So they endorse the thesis of the epistemological role of consciousness for introspective self-knowledge (or for short, the thesis of the epistemological significance of consciousness), as I would like to call it. Even though there are differences between Bonjour's and Peacocke's position, they converge on this point. And certainly the thesis has some intuitive appeal and is interesting enough for investigation. For reasons of space, I will discuss only Bonjour's position here.

More exactly, the thesis can be put like this:

(S) The fact that a certain state is a conscious state enables its subject to be in an especially good epistemic position with respect to the question which mental state she is in, an epistemic position that is better than the one which a nonconscious state allows.

2. Bonjour's view

In recent articles, Laurence Bonjour has proposed a view about the role of conscious states which encompasses the following theses (cp. Bonjour 2001, 1999). (1.) We have to distinguish between belief as a dispositional state and occurrent belief. Only occurrent beliefs are conscious states, and they play an important role for self-knowledge. (2.) The consciousness that is essential for occurrent beliefs is two-fold: there is a consciousness of the content of the state and a consciousness of the affirmative attitude towards it. (I will ignore consciousness of the affirmative attitude in this paper.) (3.) The consciousness of the content is not a further intentional state, but is 'built into' the occurrent belief. To have an occurrent belief is to be conscious of its content (and one's acceptance of this content). (4.) Conscious experiences also have this kind of 'built-in' consciousness of their contents. (They have a nonconceptual content.) (5.) Conscious states are the reasons for the self-ascription of the corresponding beliefs and experiences. The self-ascription of a belief or experience is a higher-order state consisting of a conceptual description of the first-order state. (6.) The 'built-in' consciousness of the content is infallible. A self-ascription on the basis of such a consciousness of content is fallible, but normally justified.

Bonjour's reason for why conscious states can have this special epistemological role seems to be this: By being conscious of the content of the first-order state one is in an epistemically ideal position to judge whether a certain

conceptual description of it is correct. One does not have to be aware of anything else – any other indicator or evidence – since one is already conscious of the content itself. So if one is wondering what one is currently thinking or experiencing, one does not have to become aware of any further piece of evidence or reason. One is in a position to make the correct (meta-)judgment on the basis of being aware of the content of the first-order state. Thus, conscious states serve as reasons for the self-ascription of mental states.

There is, however, a serious problem with this view. It may be right that conscious states play this special epistemological role. But so far, no explanation has been given for why non-conscious states could not play the very same role. Compare the conscious state with the content that *p* and the corresponding non-conscious state with the same content that *p*. Of course, being in the second, non-conscious state does not bring with it an awareness of its content. But still, when a subject is in this state she is representing the content *p*. So there is still a grasp of the content, even though not a conscious grasp. Contents do not float around freely. Subjects represent contents when they are in intentional states, they stand in a certain intentional relation to the content of their states (the relation of 'representing', as I would like to call it). And even if this relation is not the relation of being conscious of, or a relation that implies such a consciousness, one cannot see why standing in this relation to the content (representing the content) is not enough for doing the epistemological job that Bonjour thinks only conscious states can do.

What is missing in Bonjour's account is a special feature which only conscious states have and which explains why conscious states are capable of bringing the subject in an especially good epistemic position with respect to their own mental states. If one is a reliabilist, or accepts a reliabilist condition as necessary for justification, one can put the complaint in this way: A process of self-ascription that starts from a conscious state as its input is supposed to be more reliable than one which starts from a non-conscious state. But why should this be so? For all Bonjour has told us, we cannot see yet why being conscious of the content improves upon the reliability of the process in comparison to 'merely' representing the content. Why is the subject not in an ideal position to judge whether a certain conceptual description is correct if the subject is 'merely' non-consciously grasping the content? So far we have not learned why consciousness of content is epistemologically relevant at all. Of course, Bonjour is not an externalist reliabilist. But the complaint is still legitimate, since merely claiming that being conscious of content allows a special epistemic position is not enough if, for all we know, being intentionally related to content can do the very same job.

An idea for an explanation can perhaps be found in Bonjour's writings. Conscious states are, Bonjour claims, 'internally available' to the subject (cp. Bonjour 1999, p. 132). This looks like an epistemically relevant feature. But it is not clear whether Bonjour wants to claim that all non-conscious states are not 'internally available'. And it is

unclear whether he takes ‘internal availability’ as the definition of consciousness. So it is unclear what the relation between being conscious and being ‘internally available’ is supposed to be. This is especially worrisome since, as Ned Block has pointed out, we have to be very careful not to confuse phenomenal consciousness – P-consciousness – with certain kinds of accessibility – A-consciousness (cp. Block 1995). In order to avoid the mistake of taking an epistemic role as the definition of consciousness and, thus, trivializing the thesis of the epistemological role of consciousness, we have to say much more about consciousness and how it relates to various forms of accessibility.

3. A representationalist proposal: availability and introspective accessibility

In the following, I would like to discuss consciousness and its relation to various forms of accessibility from a representationalist perspective. By ‘representationalism’ here I mean a view about phenomenal consciousness like Fred Dretske’s or Michael Tye’s, or any sufficiently similar view (cp. Dretske 1995, Tye 1995). Representationalists take it that phenomenally conscious states are states with a certain (general) nonconceptual representational content which, in addition, are available to the subject’s conceptual system in a certain immediate way. Let us call this special kind of access ‘availability’. The subject need not have any introspective thoughts or beliefs about its representational states, and no language need be involved, but the states have to stand ready to have a direct impact on *some* beliefs or desires. Gareth Evans introduced availability as a condition of consciousness in his *Varieties of Reference* (1982). Michael Tye characterizes it thus:

The claim that the contents relevant to phenomenal character must be poised is to be understood as requiring that these contents attach to the (fundamentally) maplike output representations of the relevant sensory modules and stand ready and in position to make a direct impact on the belief/desire system. To say that the contents stand ready in this way is not to say that they always do have such an impact. The idea is rather that they supply the inputs for certain cognitive processes whose job it is to produce beliefs (or desires) directly from the appropriate nonconceptual representations, if attention is properly focused and the appropriate concepts are possessed. (Tye 1995, p. 138)

In sum: availability for conscious states means that these states have to stand ready to make a direct impact, to serve as inputs to the belief/desire system, and to do so if attention is paid appropriately and the relevant concepts are possessed.

Given this representationalist view, a certain strategy opens up. We can accept the thesis of the epistemological significance of consciousness and provide an explanation for it. (Phenomenal) consciousness does indeed have a special epistemological significance.¹ And the following two-fold explanation for this fact can be given: conscious states are epistemically better off than nonconscious ones since they are available; and availability is a necessary condition for introspective accessibility. In this way we have not trivialized the thesis by making introspective accessibility part of the definition of consciousness.

¹ In this paper, I am only concerned with the epistemological significance of consciousness for introspection. It is of course not excluded that consciousness has epistemological import for other kinds of knowledge, especially for ordinary perceptual knowledge.

Introspective access to conscious states is (in part) explained by availability.

Two questions remain. The first question is whether availability is really necessary for introspection. The second question is what must be added onto availability in order to arrive at introspective accessibility.

Concerning the first question, an affirmative answer seems plausible. For how should one be able to introspectively come to know that one is undergoing a certain experience if that experience is not conscious (and thus available)? Our introspective access to our own propositional attitudes also seems to run through the conscious occurrent manifestations of them (essentially in the way Christopher Peacocke 1999 describes it). In this sense, availability, as it is part of phenomenal consciousness, is presupposed by introspection. If there were a kind of coming to know about one’s own mental states for which it wasn’t the case that conscious states serve as the evidence or reasons, then it would be highly questionable whether this would count as introspection.

As to the second question, things are more complicated. There are certain questions about availability as just characterized, questions that have to be addressed in the end in order to arrive at a fully spelled out theory of consciousness. (For example, what does ‘direct’ mean here? Does it merely mean that no other mental or representational state functions as a mediator? Do available states have to have a direct impact merely on beliefs and desires, or rather on occurrent propositional attitudes?) But here I only would like to focus on one particular question concerning the relation between availability and introspective access. The question is: Is it possible that a conscious state which is available is nevertheless not introspectively accessible? The situation is meant to include already certain qualifications. First, the subject is supposed to possess the relevant concepts (the first-person concept I, the concept of a mental state or of various kinds of mental states). Second, the subject is supposed to have all necessary capacities of attention. The question is then: Even if these additional conditions are fulfilled, is it still possible that a conscious state which is available is not introspectively accessible?

I submit that the answer to this question is, yes. What is still missing is a certain *mode of mind*, in this case the introspective mode of mind. A mode of mind is a way of operating, a certain way of using and employing various mental states and processes. A subject could have all the relevant concepts and attentional capacities. But in order to really introspectively self-ascribe a perceptual state, for example, the subject has to put these abilities together in a certain way, she has to make use of them in the right way. This way of integrating certain conceptual and other mental capacities is what I mean by speaking of a mode of mind.

There are other modes of mind. When making perceptual judgments like ‘There are red tomatoes on the table’ one normally is in the mode of ‘taking at face value one’s experiences’. One judges what one perceives. No distance between one’s perceptions and one’s judgments occurs. This way of transforming perceptions into corresponding judgments seems to be a very fundamental and simple mode of mind. (But note that ‘taking at face value’ is also possible vis-à-vis one’s memories.) In contrast, in the introspective mode one does not simply conceptualize and accept what one perceives. Rather, the subject has to apply her conceptualization capacities to her perceptions as if she were making a perceptual judgment. The subject

is directed towards the outer world when doing this. But at the same time, the subject is also directed upon herself. This self-direction need not be present in the form of a thought like 'Now let me see what I am perceiving'. Rather it is present in the form of a certain mode of mind, the introspective mode of mind. The result of the conceptualization of the subject's perceptions is combined with a representation of herself as having a perception of that kind. In this way the subject is performing Evans' procedure. The whole procedure takes place in a certain framework contributing to what it is like for the subject.

Besides the 'taking at face value' mode and the introspective mode, there are probably other modes of mind associated with imagining, freely associating, inferring, understanding, and so on.

I have introduced and tried to elucidate modes of mind. They are the ways our mind uses its cognitive capacities. They are not to be confused with propositional attitudes or moods or feelings. With respect to our second question the answer to be given now is: when operating in the introspective mode of mind, availability really amounts to introspective accessibility (where the additional qualifications of concept possession and attentional capacities are supposed to be fulfilled, of course). In this way, the representationalist can accept the thesis of the epistemological significance of consciousness and offer a plausible explanation. Consciousness is epistemologically important for introspection, since it contributes to introspective accessibility.

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Emotionale Akte und moralische Werte

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0. Einleitung

Non-kognitivistische Ethiker verstehen moralische Urteile als Ausdruck von Gefühlen. „Mit ihnen werden Gefühle oder Einstellungen oder, wie Hare meint, universale Präferenzen ausgedrückt“ (J.-C. Wolf / P. Schaber, 1998, 131). Daher sind moralische Urteile rein subjektiv, sie beziehen sich nicht auf moralische Tatsachen. Das Argument lässt sich kurz folgendermaßen darstellen:

1. Moralische Urteile gehen mit Gefühlen einher.
2. Gefühle sind weder wahr noch falsch

Schluß: Moralische Urteile sind weder wahr noch falsch.

Bei dieser, zugegebenermaßen verkürzten Wiedergabe des Arguments des Non-Kognitivisten, fehlt eine Zusatzprämisse. Denn auch der Kognitivist muß die Prämissen (1) und (2) nicht bestreiten. Gleichwohl kommt er zu einem anderen Schluß, nämlich zu dem, daß moralische Urteile wahr oder falsch sind. Der Non-Kognitivist hat nämlich die zusätzliche Prämisse (3), daß die in moralischen Urteilen ausgesprochenen Qualitäten gut oder schlecht mit Gefühlen identisch sind. Dies ist aber keineswegs der Fall. Ein Gefühl der Zuneigung oder Abneigung angesichts einer bestimmten Handlung ist etwas anderes als die Qualität gut oder schlecht, die der Handlung zukommen kann. Ein positives Gefühl der Zuneigung oder wie Brentano sagt, ein „lieben“, bezieht sich auf eine bestimmte, beobachtete oder erinnerte Handlung, ebenso wie ein Gefühl der Abneigung, ein „hassen“, wie Brentano sagt, sich auf eine bestimmte Handlung bezieht. Wenn mir beispielsweise berichtet wird, daß und wie Menschen in Südamerika gefoltert werden, erzeugt dies in mir ein Gefühl der Abneigung, während ich ein Gefühl der Zuneigung empfinde, wenn ich beobachte, wie eine Person einer anderen, bedürftigen Person hilft. Diese Gefühle der Zuneigung oder Abneigung sind aber nicht identisch mit den Qualitäten gut oder schlecht, die Handlungen exemplifizieren. Oder anders ausgedrückt: Der Non-Kognitivist findet das Gute nicht in dem, was gut ist, sondern in der Person, die etwas für gut befindet.

Zur Rechtfertigung meiner Auffassung, daß moralische Urteile wahr oder falsch sind, daß sich moralische Urteile auf Handlungen beziehen, die gut oder schlecht sind, und daß diese Qualitäten objektive Qualitäten sind, sind einige Bemerkungen zur Theorie der Intentionalität erforderlich. Im Folgenden möchte ich mit einer auf Brentanos Intentionalitätstheorie aufbauenden Analyse zu zeigen versuchen, daß Gefühle durchaus nicht mit dem Gefühlten identisch sind. Der Gegenstände emotionaler Akte sind, wie die Gegenstände aller anderen intentionalen Akte, Sachverhalte.

1. Emotionale Akte

Jeder intentionale Akt hat einen Inhalt und einen Gegenstand. Während der Inhalt des Aktes eine Eigenschaft des Aktes ist, gilt dies in keinem Fall vom Gegenstand des Aktes. Der Aktgegenstand oder, was dasselbe sein soll, die Intention, ist durch die intentionale Beziehung mit dem Inhalt verbunden. Im Unterschied zu den meisten Intentionalitätstheorien, wie der von Edmund Husserl und seiner

Schule, oder Theorien, die Intentionalität als Kausalrelation beschreiben, verteidige ich die Auffassung, daß es sich bei der Intentionalität um eine Relation handelt, die nicht auf ihre Relata reduzierbar ist, wie man dies z.B. bei der Teil-Ganzes Relation oder der Kausalrelation versucht. Der intentionale Gegenstand ist nicht etwas „im Bewusstsein“ oder etwas, das vom Bewusstsein produziert wird, er ist immer etwas „vor“ dem Bewusstsein, diesem gegenüber, selbst dort, wo das Bewusstsein selbst der intentionale Gegenstand eines intentionalen Aktes ist. Die Verteidigung dieser Auffassung setzt selbstverständlich eine ausgearbeitete ontologische Relationstheorie voraus, die ich hier aber nicht erläutern will (vgl. Erwin Tegtmeier, 1992)

Was ist der Gegenstand eines Aktes? Gegenstand jedes intentionalen Aktes ist ein Sachverhalt. Der Grund für diese Behauptung ist ein ontologischer. Auf den ersten Blick könnte es nämlich so scheinen, als ob wir, z.B. im Falle der Wahrnehmung, nicht Sachverhalte, sondern Dinge erfassen, als ob wir z.B. einen Computermonitor sehen, oder ein Auto hören. Wäre dem aber tatsächlich so, dann könnten unsere intentionalen Akte niemals wahr sein. Auf der Grundlage einer Korrespondenztheorie der Wahrheit, stellen Aussagen Sachverhalte dar. Nur solche Aussagen sind wahr oder falsch, Worte, mit denen wir Dinge bezeichnen, hingegen nicht. Der Gegenstand eines intentionalen Aktes, der in einer Aussage gefaßt wird, die einen Wahrheitswert hat, ist also immer ein Sachverhalt.

Es gibt genau zwei Arten emotionaler Akte, die ich mit den Worten „Zuneigung“ und „Abneigung“ bezeichnen möchte. Jeder emotionale Akt hat genau *einen* Sachverhalt, mit dem er durch den Inhalt verbunden ist.

Was ist nun der Gegenstand eines emotionalen Aktes? Ist es eine moralische Qualität oder ein Sachverhalt, der eine moralische Qualität exemplifiziert? Wenn man zur Beantwortung dieser Frage das Phänomen betrachtet, so zeigt sich folgendes: Der Gegenstand eines Gefühls ist immer ein bestimmter Sachverhalt, nämlich eine Handlung. Wir sehen beispielsweise, daß Fritz für die gehbehinderte Frau Schmitz einkaufen geht. Dieser Sachverhalt, der auch der Gegenstand der Wahrnehmung ist, diese Handlung, ist es, die ich mit einem Gefühl der Zuneigung erfasse. Es ist nicht so, daß ich dafür Zuneigung empfinde, daß es *gut* ist, daß Fritz für die gehbehinderte Frau Schmitz einkaufen geht, sondern ich mag die Handlung als solche. Dies bedeutet, daß der Wahrnehmungsakt und der emotionale Akt in diesem Beispiel denselben Gegenstand haben, nämlich den Handlungssachverhalt. Der Wahrnehmungsakt ist die Voraussetzung des emotionalen Aktes. Damit wird zugleich behauptet, daß der Gegenstand des emotionalen Aktes nicht die Qualität gut ist, die einer bestimmten Handlung zukommt, und auch nicht der Gutherheitssachverhalt, sondern die Handlung als solche.

2. Können moralische Urteile wahr oder falsch sein?

Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage sind einige Überlegungen erforderlich, durch die deutlich wird, was wir, unter der Voraussetzung der Korrespondenztheorie der Wahrheit, mit den Worten „wahr“ oder „falsch“ zum Ausdruck

bringen. Ein intentionaler Akt, z.B. ein Wahrnehmungsakt oder ein Glaubensakt ist wahr genau dann, wenn der Gegenstand, auf den sich der Akt bezieht, besteht, oder anders gesagt, wenn das Objekt des Aktes aktuell ist. Wird die zuvor genannte Handlung in dem Satz ausgedrückt „Fritz kauft für die gehbehinderte Frau Schmitz ein“, dann ist dieser Satz genau dann wahr, wenn der Sachverhalt besteht, daß Fritz für die gehbehinderte Frau Schmitz einkaufen geht.

Ein emotionaler Akt ist *nicht* wahr oder falsch. Hier stimme ich dem Non-Kognitivisten zu. Ein emotionaler Akt ist vielmehr *angemessen* oder *unangemessen*. Gleichwohl widerspreche ich dem Non-Kognitivisten, wenn er daraus folgert, daß moralische Tatsachen nicht wahr oder falsch sein können.

3. Emotionale Akte können angemessen oder unangemessen sein

Der emotionale Akt erfaßt denselben Gegenstand wie der Wahrnehmungsakt. Mit Hilfe der Wahrnehmung erfassen wir aber ausschließlich die Handlung und keine moralische Eigenschaft. Diese Handlung wird von einem bestimmten Beobachter mit einem Gefühl der Zuneigung erfaßt, und dieses Gefühl ist etwas anderes als die moralische Qualität Gut oder Gchlecht, die die Handlung besitzt. Eine Handlung ist als solche gut oder schlecht, insofern sie eine dieser beiden Eigenschaft exemplifiziert. Nur deshalb, d.h. auf Grund der moralischen Eigenschaft, die eine Handlung hat, kann ein Gefühlsakt angemessen oder unangemessen sein. Ich bezeichne ein Gefühl der Zuneigung als angemessen, wenn die intendierte Handlung gut ist und ich bezeichne das Gefühl als unangemessen, wenn die intendierte Handlung schlecht ist. Oder anders: im Allgemeinen bezeichnen wir ein Gefühl der Abneigung als angemessen, wenn die Handlung, auf die sich der emotionale Akt bezieht, schlecht ist und als unangemessen, wenn die Handlung gut ist. Doch auf welcher Grundlage urteilen wir, daß ein emotionaler Akt angemessen oder unangemessen ist, wo doch sowohl zum Gegenstand des Wahrnehmungsaktes, wie zum Gegenstand des emotionalen Aktes nicht die Qualität Gut gehört? Das Bestehen eines Guteitssachverhalts wird ja weder durch die Wahrnehmung, noch durch das Gefühl erkannt. Es ist hier zweifellos ein weiterer intentionaler Akt involviert, wenn etwas als moralisch gut oder moralisch schlecht erkannt wird.

4. Moralische Sachverhalte werden durch Glaubensakte erkannt

Die moralischen Qualitäten, die von Handlungen exemplifiziert werden, werden durch Akte des Glaubens erkannt. Der Gegenstand eines Glaubensaktes ist beispielsweise der Sachverhalt, daß es gut ist, daß Fritz für die gehbehinderte Frau Schmitz einkaufen geht. Nur Glaubensakte erfassen moralische Sachverhalte der Form α ist gut ($G\alpha$), wobei α für einen Handlungssachverhalt stehen soll und G für die einfache Eigenschaft gut. Ob das Gefühl angemessen oder unangemessen ist, das der Wahrnehmung einer Handlung folgt, kann erst aufgrund des Glaubensaktes beurteilt werden. Aufgrund eines Glaubensaktes kann ein emotionaler Akt verursacht werden. Wenn eine Person a glaubt, daß α gut ist, kann dies bei a zu einem Gefühl der Zuneigung führen, ein Gefühl, das in diesem Fall dem Sachverhalt angemessen ist.

5. Zusammenfassung

Zur Rechtfertigung meiner Auffassung, daß moralische Urteile wahr oder falsch sind, daß sie einen Wahrheitswert besitzen und nicht bloß Ausdruck von Gefühlen desjenigen sind, der solche Urteile fällt, fasse ich jetzt zusammen:

- Ein moralisches Urteil hat einen Wahrheitswert, weil ein solches Urteil einen Glaubensakt darstellt. Glaubensakte sind wahr oder falsch.
- Der emotionale Akt hat einen Gegenstand, der nicht mit dem Gefühl der Zuneigung oder Abneigung identisch ist. Gegenstand eines emotionalen Aktes ist vielmehr eine bestimmte Handlung. Es ist die *Handlung*, die ich mag, oder die ich verabscheue.
- Moralische Qualitäten werden weder durch Wahrnehmungen noch durch emotionale Akte erkannt.
- Voraussetzung eines emotionalen Aktes ist ein Wahrnehmungsakt. Wahrnehmungsakt und Gefühlsakt können denselben Gegenstand haben, nämlich eine bestimmte, moralisch relevante Handlung.
- Handlungen sind Sachverhalte, die als solche moralische Qualitäten exemplifizieren können (vgl. Hüntelmann, 2003). Ob eine Handlung moralisch relevant ist, d.h., ob sie eine moralische Eigenschaft exemplifiziert, wird allein durch einen Glaubensakt erkannt.

Der Fehler des Non-Kognitivisten besteht nach dieser Analyse darin, daß er den Gegenstand des Gefühls und das Gefühl identifiziert. Er behauptet, daß die moralischen Qualitäten Gut oder Schlecht identisch mit den Gefühlen der Zuneigung oder Abneigung sind. Ich habe zu zeigen versucht, daß die Gefühle der Zuneigung oder Abneigung sich auf Handlungen beziehen und nicht auf moralische Qualitäten. Diese werden nie für sich, sondern nur als von Handlungen exemplifiziert erkannt und zwar durch Akte des Glaubens. Deren Gegenstand sind moralische Sachverhalte, die in moralischen Urteilen dargestellt werden, die einen Wahrheitswert besitzen.

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Die autobiographischen Bemerkungen von Ludwig Wittgenstein: zwischen Repräsentation und Konstruktion. Kulturwissenschaftliche Betrachtungen zum (auto-)biographischen Schreiben

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Bereits in den 1950er Jahren war seine Biographie „Legende“ (Ingeborg Bachmann), und spätestens nach den Jubiläen, hundertster Geburtstag (1989) und 50-jähriger Todestag (2001), wurde das Bedürfnis laut, den Mythos Ludwig Wittgenstein entkräften zu wollen. Dazu sei aber „weder eine Sammlung von Erinnerungsstücken, noch ein biographisches Unternehmen im vertrauten Sinne (erlaubt), wo nach der Illusion der 'Einheit von Werk und Leben' gefahndet wird“, sondern vor allem *Beteiligte*, der Protagonist selbst, wie Zeitzeugen heranzuziehen.¹ Kann dieser Ruf nach den sogenannten Primärquellen helfen, gewissen Stilisierungen der Biographen auf die Spur zu kommen bzw. den 'wahren' Wittgenstein zu entdecken? In diesem Diskussionskontext sind Wittgensteins autobiographische Bemerkungen in Bezug auf *Selbstwahrnehmung* und *Selbstdarstellung* interessant.

Wie verlässlich ist ein Text, eine Geschichte über sich selbst oder andere? Skepsis ist stets angebracht, denn *alle* Erzählungen beinhalten bedeutsame Aufladungen, nicht Fakten, sondern ihre Bewertung durch den Erzähler. Oft gibt es *unterschiedliche* Varianten einer Erzählung, wie in David Edmonds und John Eidinow *Wittgenstein's Poker* (2001) über die einzige Begegnung zwischen Karl Popper und Wittgenstein im Moral Science Club in Cambridge im Oktober 1946, wo verschiedene Versionen nebeneinander gestellt den Entstehungsprozeß einer bzw. vieler Geschichte(n) sichtbar machen. Diese reflexive Art der Darstellung wäre bei manchen biographischen Unklarheiten zu Wittgensteins Biographie (u.a. Homosexualität, Judentum, Misogynie) angebracht. Denn: „[...] some wish to see Wittgenstein as a companion in misery, as the gay review might suggest. Personal friends might wish to see something redemptive in Wittgenstein's struggles. Biographers may wish to find unity in a life. Philosophers of various stripes may wish to see Wittgenstein as an ally, or alternately as a purveyor of mistaken views“ (Klagge 2001, xii).

Die Rekonstruktion 'biographischer Wahrheit' ist ähnlich schwierig, wenn es sich um die Bearbeitung von autobiographischem Material handelt. Das Ziel jedes autobiographischen Schreibens ist, sich Ausdruck zu verleihen, was bedeutet, inneren Erregungsprozessen nachzuspüren, fern jeder Strategie sich nach inneren, nicht äußeren Maßstäben zu richten. Das nannte Philip Lejeune den *autobiographischen Pakt* (1994), die Übereinstimmung des Autors mit dem Leser, daß das 'Ich' im Text der Autor selbst ist, und die Übereinkunft, *Wahres* zu erzählen, sowie der Darstellung Sinn und auch Bedeutung zuzuordnen. Dieser Anspruch, Realität wiederzugeben widerspricht jedoch der subjektiven Autorposition, denn jede Selbstdarstellung ist beeinflusst von Motiven und Mitteln der Darstellung. Neben sozialen und kulturellen Faktoren, die das Schreiben prägen, ist *jedes* Schreiben auch orientiert an Vorbildern und literarischen Modellen wie Roman, Brief oder Tagebuch, welche Inhalt und Formgebung prägen. Erwartet zwar der Leser von einem autobiographi-

schen Text ein besonderes Maß an 'Lebensechtheit' oder 'Wirklichkeitstreue', so sei nach Lejeune in bezug auf Lebensgeschichten besser von *Authentizität* als von Wahrheit zu sprechen, denn es gehe um die psychische Realität des Ereignisses, die zeige, wie der Mensch die objektive Realität verarbeitet habe (1994, 158).

Insbesondere nach den Erkenntnissen des *linguistic* und *narrative turn*, welche den Konstruktivismus vorbereiteten, stellt sich die Frage in der Biographieforschung der 1990er Jahre nicht mehr, ob eine Aussage wahr oder falsch ist, sondern es wird nach den *Strategien* und *Kontexten* der Darstellung gefragt, wie jede präsentierte Identität konstruiert, narrativ verfasst, kulturell, sozial und gendermäßig bedingt ist. Dabei werden die vormals selbstverständlichen Begriffe wie *authentisch* und *unmittelbar* ergänzt durch *gestalten* und *inszeniert*. Vor allem interessiert nun, welche „Verfahren den Effekt des Authentischen auslösen“.²

Der Begriff der *Authentizität* kommt in Wittgensteins Manuskripten nicht vor, aber das Streben danach spielt in Wittgensteins Werk und Leben – und vor allem in der Rezeption – eine zentrale Rolle. Bei Ludwig Wittgenstein sei es gerade dieses unbedingte Streben nach einer ethischen Dimension in Philosophie und Leben, das ihn nach James Conant (neben anderen) für die Biographieforschung so faszinierend macht – gerade weil Wittgenstein ein Philosoph sei, der in der sokratischen Tradition der antiken Philosophie stehe: „philosophy as a way of life“ (Klagge 2001, 21ff.). Diese Einheit von Leben und Lehre pointiert Rudolf Haller als „praxeologischen Fundamentalismus“ (Macho 2001, 23). Während in Teilen der Wittgensteinliteratur der letzten zwei Jahrzehnte Wittgensteins sokratisches Ideal, sein ethischer Rigorismus, im Zentrum eines neuen Verstehens stand, gibt es neue, skeptische Fragen in der Biographieforschung, ob es seitens der Biographen nicht zu sehr zu einer Übereinstimmung von Wittgensteins Selbstsicht und ihrer Außensicht kam.³ Dieser Diskussionskontext macht es notwendig, Wittgensteins autobiographische Bemerkungen als Ausdruck von *Selbstreflexion* und Akt der *Selbstdarstellung* näher zu betrachten.

Wittgensteins Reflexionen über autobiographisches Schreiben zeigen, daß er eine Autobiographie plante. Es bleibt jedoch bei fragmenthaften Bemerkungen, die sich quer durch den Nachlass ziehen. An ihnen läßt sich Wittgensteins Haltung zum Genre (Auto-)Biographie und Tagebuch wie die Problematik des Konzepts 'Authentizität' nachzeichnen.

¹ Der Infotext zur 1996 eröffneten biographischen Dokumentation in Kirchberg *Ludwig Wittgenstein – Wirklichkeit und Mythos*. Zit. n. Iven (2000, 146).

² Vgl. u.a. Lethen (1996, 209), sowie jüngste Diskussionen in den Kulturwissenschaften über den Begriff *Performanz*.

³ U.a. verweisen Terry Eagleton und Brian McGuinness, detaillierter David Stern, Richard Shusterman und Richard Freadman auf eine fehlgeleitete Rezeption.

Wittgensteins autobiographische Reflexionen

Wittgenstein schreibt im Jahr 1929 in den *Philosophischen Betrachtungen*: „Etwas in mir spricht dafür meine Biographie zu schreiben und zwar möchte ich mein Leben einmal klar ausbreiten um es klar vor mir zu haben und auch für andere. Nicht so sehr, um darüber Gericht zu halten als um jedenfalls Klarheit und Wahrheit zu schaffen“ (BEE). Doch Wittgensteins autobiographischen Bemerkungen ist die Frage nach dem Sinn und der Möglichkeit von Wahrheit wie von Aufrichtigkeit stets immanent: „Wer sich selbst nicht kennen will, der schreibt eine Art Betrug. Wer in sich selbst nicht hinuntersteigen will, weil es zu schmerzhaft ist, bleibt natürlich auch mit dem Schreiben an der Oberfläche“ (17. Feb. 1938, BEE). Wittgenstein wies dem Biographischen in bezug auf das Verstehen seiner Gedanken eine wichtige Rolle zu, wenn es in seinem Tagebuch heißt: „Die Denkbewegungen in meinem Geistes, seiner Moralbegriffe und dem Verständnis meiner Lage wiederfinden lassen“ (1999, 62). Das erhebt die *autobiographischen Bemerkungen* zu einer wichtigen Quelle. Dennoch sieht er auch die *Ambivalenz*, die dem Schreiben und dem Denken über sich selbst prinzipiell zugrunde liegt: „Die Wahrheit über sich selbst kann man in dem verschiedensten Geiste schreiben. Im anständigsten und unanständigsten.“ (1. Sept. 1929, BEE) Auch nennt er in Gesprächen mit Oets Bouwsma die Unbeständigkeit von Schreibmotiven und betont, daß jeder Text mehr Intentionen hat als die, die er zugibt. Und am 12. Dezember 1938 schreibt er in den Manuskripten: „Es ist unmöglich, wahrer über sich zu schreiben, als man ist.“ (BEE)

Inszenierungs-Modi

Wittgensteins Skepsis ist berechtigt: Denn in jeder autobiographischen Äußerung wird der Entwurf des Selbst verhandelt und kommuniziert. Auch Wittgensteins Bemerkungen entstehen im Hinblick auf einen fiktiven Selbstentwurf, sind für Adressaten gedacht, wenn nicht für eine andere Person, so doch für das gewünschte andere Ich: So will der Autor gesehen und sich verstanden wissen.

Charakteristisch für Wittgensteins autobiographische Bemerkungen ist die Thematisierung der eigenen Eitelkeit, die mit jeder Art von Schreiben unmittelbar verbunden ist, wenn er am ersten September 1929 schreibt: „In der allerersten Zeit in Berlin als ich damit anfing auf Zetteln Gedanken über mich aufzuschreiben, da war es ein Bedürfnis. [...] Später entsprang es zum Teil dem Nachahmungstrieb (ich hatte Kellers Tagebücher gelesen) zum Teil dem Bedürfnis doch etwas von mir niederzulegen. Es war also zum Großteil Eitelkeit.“ (BEE) In weiten Teilen der Forschung werden diese Stellen zumeist als Ausdruck eines gepeinigten Strebens nach Aufrichtigkeit und Anständigkeit interpretiert. Doch wenn Wittgenstein die Gefahr von eitler Egozentrik als Hintergedanken des Tagebuchs einräumt, entzieht er sich nicht zugleich diesem Vorwurf, weil er seine eigene Unzulänglichkeit vor allem als 'genre-thing', als der narzißtischen Tendenz der Gattung Tagebuch inhärent, thematisiert? Wenn die eigene Aufrichtigkeit immer wieder hinterfragt wird, signalisiert das eine reflexive Auseinandersetzung mit sich selbst – oder geschieht es nicht auch in der Hoffnung, den *autobiographischen Pakt* mit dem Leser zu stärken? Dann wäre es nur ein Mittel der Darstellung statt des persönlichen Ausdrucks.

Wittgenstein bemühte sich um Transparenz, wenn er seine Gesprächspartner als Korrektive oder Vorbilder

nennt. Hier ist die Frage der Selbstverortung und -darstellung direkt berührt. Dennoch sind diese Verweise nicht als *unmittelbares* Faktum zu sehen, sondern der Akt ihrer Vergegenwärtigung ist stets mit einer individuellen Deutung verbunden. Vorbilder zu nennen heißt Bedeutung zuzumessen und sich in dieser Tradition verstanden wissen wollend, weil es das Selbstverständnis geprägt hat. Zwei Beispiele:

Wittgensteins Tagebücher weisen zwar Charakteristiken der von ihm genannten literarischen Vorbilder Samuel Pepys und Gottfried Keller auf, doch wie Jacques Le Rider zeigt, gab es auch zahllose „Familienähnlichkeiten“ mit den Tagebüchern von diversen Vertretern der Wiener Moderne: ein Unbehagen an der Moderne, das Erleben einer Kulturkrise und einer krisenhaften eigenen Identität (2000, 19). Wittgenstein nennt zwar vielfach die Epoche Robert Schumanns als sein Kulturideal, doch er ist maßgeblich von Zeitgenossen beeinflusst, wie seiner persönlichen Lebenssituation. Das Erlebnis des Ersten Weltkrieges und der Fremde prägen seine sogenannten *Kriegstagebücher*, wie auch seine Selbstzweifel und religiöse Konversion, in Stil und Inhalt nicht nur Charakteristika seiner Person widerspiegeln, sondern zeit- und situationstypische Schreibformen.

Solche Verweise auf Vorbilder finden sich meist in Mottos, Vorworten, Titel, Widmungen und Danksagungen. Jene sind Teil des sogenannten *Paratexts* (Gerard Genette), eine Textzone, die zwischen Autor und Leser vermittelt, Teil der privaten und öffentlichen Geschichte eines Buches ist – und damit auch eine Form der Präsentation. Ein Motto kann z.B. den Text kommentieren, seine Bedeutung spezifizieren oder auf einen Autor und damit eine Denktradition verweisen.

Schreibt Wittgenstein in einem Vorwortsentwurf der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* im Jahr 1943, daß er vor 16 Jahren mit der Philosophie wieder angefangen hat und ihn eine Relektüre des *Tractatus* zu der Idee veranlasste, beide Werke gemeinsam zu veröffentlichen – wurde später oft darüber spekuliert, ob Wittgenstein in den 1920er Jahren an seiner Philosophie gearbeitet habe. Nachweise dazu wurden erst später im Koder-Nachlaß und im Hänsel-Briefwechsel entdeckt. (Pichler 1997, 45) Daß Wittgenstein der Philosophie fern war, stimmt somit nur im Hinblick auf philosophische Institutionen, nicht inhaltlich. Hier kann Wittgensteins Vorwort als Teil einer Dramatisierung gesehen werden, die dem inneren Bedürfnis nach Wendepunkten nachkommt, die dem Leben gewissermaßen Leit motive des Handelns und Erleidens einschreibt, die jeder Biographie Spannung und Dramatik gibt. Statt einem unspektakulären Prozeßcharakter bekommt *die* Begegnung und *die* Inspiration wegweisende Macht – und wird als solche oft von Biographen unreflektiert übernommen.

Bei der Bearbeitung von autobiographischem Material ist stets die *Legende*, die ein Mensch im Laufe seines Lebens aufbaut, mit zu reflektieren. Diese Selbststilisierungen sind zum Teil von den Erwartungen der Gesellschaft mitmotiviert, als das verinnerlichte Soziale, den sogenannten *Habitus* (Pierre Bourdieu). So gehört es im Feld der Kunst dazu, eine eigenwillige Individualität herauszubilden. Deshalb sind (Auto-)Biographien oft nach einem *Künstler-typus* modelliert, ob „akademisches Schulhaupt“, „revolutionärer Neuerer“, „der Künstler als Universalgenie“ oder der „Einsame und Verkannte“ (Kris 1980, 27). Daneben prägen auch öffentliche Diskurse und gesellschaftliche Kontexte den Einzelnen in seiner *Selbstwahrnehmung* und *Selbstpräsentation*. Für Wittgenstein war *ein* relevanter

Diskurs⁴ in bezug auf das Autobiographische der Geniekult in Wien um 1900, der die Nähe von Kreativität und Wahnsinn seitens der sogenannten „Ästhetik der Dekadenz“ propagierte, als Befreiungsakt von kulturellen Zwängen. Diese Idealisierung des Leidens – mit Bezug zum christlich-jüdischen Begriff des Leidens als Weg zur Läuterung der Seele (Augustinus) oder zur Erlösung (Schopenhauer) – finden sich in Wittgensteins autobiographischen Zeugnissen wieder: spezifisch in seiner Augustinus-Rezeption und seinen Gedanken zur Beichte, generell in seiner großen Leidensfähigkeit, an der Umgebungs-, an der zeitgenössischen Unkultur, an seinen Trieben, und an der Isolation, die wiederum gesucht wird, weil zugleich Quelle der schöpferischen Kraft. Er sieht sich als Randexistenz, wenn er die Angst formuliert im Wahnsinn zu enden oder im Selbstmord, und wird dort zum Prophet, wo er versucht das Unsagbare darzustellen, indem er auf den religiösen Aspekt seiner Arbeit, doch jenseits des Werkes, verweist. Auch seine formulierte Vorstellung vom kongenialen Leser scheint der Romantik und ihrer Genieästhetik verpflichtet: Dieser Geniegläubige hatte mehrere Kontexte: in unmittelbarer Wiener Nachbarschaft die Stilisierung Otto Weiningers zum modernen Genie, im Kulturleben die Verehrung von Brahms oder Mahler, im Religiösen der Asketismus eines Augustinus, Tolstoi oder Kirkegaard (Shusterman 1996, 274).

Auch bei der *Werk-Genese*, die Teil seiner Autobiographie ist, liegt der Gedanke an 'geniale' Stilisierung zumindest nahe: Wittgenstein verweigerte, sich zu veröffentlichen, unterrichtete nur ausgewählte Studenten, traf nur ausgewählte Mitglieder des Wiener Kreises, distanzierte sich von akademischen Ritualen und absentierte sich regelmäßig ins 'einsame' Abseits. Mit Erving Goffman ließe sich fragen, inwieweit Wittgenstein durch dieses „impression management“ seine soziale Identität *unbewußt* konstruierte. Stilisierungen von ‚Differenz‘ und ‚Einsamkeitstopoi‘, die sich in Beschreibungen von Freunden und Familie, später in denen der Biographien wieder finden. Zwei andere Beispiele:

Geheimschrift und Geständnisse

Wittgensteins Tagebücher vermitteln vielen Lesern „den Eindruck höchster Unmittelbarkeit und Aufrichtigkeit“, bis hin zur Assoziation mit der „Beichte eines Sterbenden“ (Guinness 1988, 332), wie seine Beichten – 1936/37 gegenüber Freunden und Familienangehörigen – oft als Konsequenz seines großen Bedürfnisses nach „Aufrichtigkeit“ gesehen werden. Verhehlt mancher auch nicht den darin liegenden Pathos (Macho 2001, 23), wird zumeist Wittgensteins Konversion zum Glauben in Folge der Erlebnisse des Ersten Weltkrieges und der Tolstoi-Lektüre zu einer Art 'Heiligenlegende' (Freadman 2002, 334) inszeniert – ohne die Stilisierungen des autobiographischen Materials formaler und inhaltlicher Natur mit in Betracht zu ziehen, oder die Rezeption formende Editionsweise.

So kann gezeigt werden, daß Wittgensteins Geheimschrift nicht als geheim gedacht war, sondern geheim *gemacht* wurde. Zuerst durch den Akt des zensierenden Verschweigens durch die Nachlasswaller, dann emotional aufgeladen durch die Publikation getitelt *Geheime Tagebücher*, Geheimnisse und ihre Geheimhaltung suggerierend – während der Code leicht lesbar ist, eine Nachlaß-Anweisungen an den Leser beinhaltet und Wittgenstein, wie er an Russell schreibt, an einer Publikation als Rekontextualisierung des *Tractatus* gelegen war (Johannessen 1994, 34).

Mythenumwoben ist auch Wittgensteins 'berühmte Beichte' aus dem Jahr 1936/37. Doch hinter dem bedeutungsstiftenden Singular verbergen sich zahlreiche *Geständnisse* an Freunde und Familie, zahllose beichteähnliche Stellen in seinem Tagebuch und als ‚Geständnisse‘ betitelte persönliche Gespräche (Pichler 1997, 56). Jene Praxis der ‚Beichte‘ wird assoziiert mit extremen Schuldgefühlen Wittgensteins sich selbst gegenüber und unterstreichen die Wahrnehmung Wittgensteins als ‚Sozialneurotiker‘ oder ‚Heiliger‘, statt jene auch als spezifische Kommunikationsform zu sehen, die den Adressaten nach Regeln des Genres ansprechen. Dieser Rhetorik war sich Wittgenstein bewußt: „Halbe Beichten gegen Mining in denen ich doch immer als ausgezeichneter Mensch zu scheinen weiss“ (Guinness, 1988, 98f.). Nach Jacques Voisine ist „die Beichte die Bestätigung einer Ordnung [...], die der Sünder übertreten hat; die Genugtuung tritt an die Stelle der Zerknirschung“ (Losego 2002, 44). Auch Wittgensteins Geständnisse scheinen nicht alleine ein Suchen nach Transformation zu sein, wie vielfach als Art Katharsis interpretiert, sondern auch eine Suche nach Bestätigung von außen, nach festen Ordnungen, ein Bemühen um das Stabilisieren von Beziehungen mit einem Gegenüber. Nannten Philip Lejeune und Gerard Genette die Wahl einer Gattung einen „Adressierungsvertrag“, denn jede Darstellung transformiert die Botschaft, ist mit Niklas Luhmann sogar zu behaupten: „The medium is the message“.

Resümee

Wie Helmut Lethen betont, liegt es jeweils in der Hand des Betrachters Dinge für authentisch zu erklären, denn „Dinge werden authentisch gemacht [...] Dinge, Haltungen und Kunstwerke werden solange als für authentisch gehalten, wie die Autorität ihrer *sozialen Inszenierung* als unproblematisch erscheint“ (1996, 228). Folglich ist dem Begriff des Authentischen der der Konstruktion bereits inhärent: Jede Erfahrung und Präsentation von Erfahrung findet stets in sozial vermittelten Strukturen statt und präsentiert sich durch Kontexte geprägte Sprache. In dieser wechselseitigen Beeinflussung zwischen Diskurs und Erfahrung ist jede Identität auch das Resultat einer permanenten ‚Performance‘.

⁴ Andere beachtenswerte Kontexte waren die Versuche im Bloomsburykreis das Genre Biographie zu erneuern; Russells Autobiographie-Entwurf, die Lektüre von Augustinus *Confessiones*, etc.. Vgl. Immler (2004).

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Who Has Got Our Group-Intentions?

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1. Groups as Agents

States can declare war, football teams can play defensive, my family can help me to push my car. It seems to be obvious: Groups can act. And they can do so intentionally. Thus there seem to be not only group-actions but also group-intentions. States may intend to defend themselves by declaring war to a neighbouring country, football teams may intend to win the championship by choosing a certain strategy, my family may intend to help me to go to work by pushing my car, and so on. My choice of examples shows that I use the term "group" quite loosely here to cover both collections of persons and collective persons, both plural persons and unified plural persons (Jansen 2004). But intentions are normally construed as mental attitudes: I can intend to do something only because I have mental attitudes. Who has got a group's intention? The group? This seems to be the natural answer. But groups do not have a mind or brain on their own. Witness on this, e.g. John Searle:

"And how could there be any group mental phenomenon except what is in the brains of the members of the group? [...] One tradition is willing to talk about group minds, the collective unconscious, and so on. I find this talk at best mysterious and at worst incoherent. [...] there cannot be a group mind or group consciousness. All consciousness is in individual minds, in individual brains." (Searle 1990; quotes from pp. 402, 404, 406)

One response to this is the attempt to reduce the group-intention in Lewis-style (Lewis 1969) to the individual I-intentions plus mutual knowledge of them:

We two do F if and only if

- (i) I do (my part of) F and you do (your part of) F and
- (ii) I know that you do (your part of) F and you know that I do (my part of) F,
- (iii) you know that I know that you do (your part of) F and I know that you know that I do (my part of) F, and so on.

There are several problems with such an account:

- (1) The analysis of mutual knowledge in terms of individual attitudes requires an infinity of conjuncts. Can such an infinitistic analysis be plausible for finite minds?
- (2) How can even an infinity of I-attitudes give rise to a we-attitude? How comes that we have feelings of group membership, of co-operations etc., if all there is are I-attitudes? (Searle 1995, 24)
- (3) All requirements for I-intentions and mutual knowledge may be fulfilled without a group-action and thus a group-intention being present (Searle 1990, 404 against Tuomela/Miller 1988). Imagine two fishermen, sitting accidentally near each other at a small lake. They both fish in this lake. They see each other and maybe even talk to each other, thus they mutually know that they fish in this lake. But they do not fish *together*.

The last two points, (2) and (3), give evidence that the existence of a complex of individual I-intentions is not sufficient for the existence of a group-intention, though it may be necessary.

2. We-Intentions and Their Properties

Because of the difficulties of the attempt to reduce group-intentions to the individuals' I-intentions, John Searle suggests to analyse group-intentions in terms of we-intentions. Every member of the football team may say "We have the intention to win the championship" and every member of my family may say "We intend to push the car". By saying this, or so Searle says, these persons express one of their we-intentions. A Searlian we-intention is, in a sense, as individualistic as the common I-intentions: it is an intention had by an individual mind; its bearer is an individual person. But, as its name indicates, a we-intention is an intention not in the first person singular, but in the first person plural. Searlian we-intentions have the following properties:

- (1) Searle builds his theory of collective intentionality upon a *methodological individualism*. He is committed to "an ontology and metaphysics based on the existence of individual human beings as the repositories of all intentionality, whether individual or collective" (Searle 1990, 407). Thus, we-intentions have *individual bearers*.
- (2) In addition, Searle embraces a *methodological solipsism*. There is no valid inference from our intentions to what is actually going on in the world. Even a brain in a vat can have any kind of intentionality, including we-intentions (Searle 1990, 407-8).
- (3) Thus, there is *no infallibility* with regard to our intentions: "[...] I could have all the intentionality I do have even if I am radically mistaken, even if the apparent presence and co-operation of other people is an illusion" (Searle 1990, 407). Don Quixote is wrong with both of "I intend to fight that giant" and "We, Quixote and Sancho, intend to fight that giant", in that there is no giant to fight against. With regard to the we-intention, Don Quixote makes the additional mistake of wrongly assuming that Sancho Pansa is also up to fight the giant. Of course, he is not. This is, however, only a modest error with regard to we-intentions. A lunatic may even hallucinate those people with which he feels connected via a we-intention: "Collective intentionality in my head can make a purported reference to other members of a collective independent of the question whether or not there actually are such members." (Searle 1990, 407) These two possibilities to err are special to we-intentions; no similar error can occur with I-intentions.
- (4) On the other hand, there is *no omniscience* about the intentions of the groups I belong to. An academic society of which I am a member may decide to merge with another society without a corresponding we-intention existing in my mind.
- (5) Searle aims at incorporating we-intentions in the wider framework of his theory of intentionality (as presented in Searle 1983). Thus he considers we-intentions as having *causal relevance* for the intended actions to come about.
- (6) If we-intentions have causal relevance, they should also have *explanatory relevance* and *predictive force* with regard to the intended actions.

- (7) Finally, we-intentions may have *moral relevance* for the evaluations of the intended actions within, say, a Kantian framework.

3. Are Group-Intentions Based on We-Intentions?

We have seen that group-intentions and we-intentions are not quite the same. But maybe group-intentions are based on our we-intentions? Is it feasible that group-intentions come about by the members having certain we-intentions?

Firstly, are we-intentions sufficient for group-intentions? Certainly, the we-intention of a single individual is not sufficient for the existence of a group-intention. This is due to the methodological solipsism in Searle's account of we-intentions. In case a person hallucinates the entire co-operating group, the group-intention is at best hallucinated. But even if the group itself is not hallucinated, the individual may still be wrong in his supposition of a collective intention: the we-intention might not be shared by other members of the group. How many members of a group have to have corresponding we-intentions for there to be a group-intention? Does the majority suffice? Do all group-members have to have the corresponding we-intentions? I will argue that not even this is enough. Even if all group-members have the corresponding we-intention the group-intention can still fail to exist. If all members of parliament dream of a debate, at the end of which all of them vote for signing a peace-contract, each of them may form the we-intention "We intend to sign the peace-contract". The respective group-intentions of the parliament or the nation do not exist: Group-intentions of nations come into existence by actual votes of members in parliament, not by votes only dreamed of.

Secondly, are we-intentions necessary for group-intentions? On the one hand, it seems to be plausible that the members have certain we-intentions if the group is to have a corresponding group-intention. If no member of my family has the we-intention "We intend to push the car", it would be highly implausible that there is a corresponding group-intention of my family. On the other hand, if ignorance of the members about group-intentions is possible, there may be members that do not have corresponding we-intentions. A state's intention may be formed by a vote in parliament. But a member of parliament who slept over the vote has had no opportunity to form his personal we-intention. Thus there may be several group-members that do not have the corresponding we-intentions. Moreover, if a state is not a democracy but a dictatorship, the nation's intention may even be formed by the will of the dictator alone. In this case there may even be no citizens with corresponding we-intentions. Nor does the dictator have to have a corresponding we-intention. His intention might be a plain I-intention like "I intend to raise taxes" instead of a we-intention like "We intend to pay more taxes". We-intentions are thus neither sufficient nor necessary for the existence of a group-intention.

4. Group-Intentions and Their Properties

I have argued that group-intentions are to be distinguished from we-intentions. To get a grip on group-intentions themselves, we should now discuss the properties of group-intentions. Now, one of the peculiarities about group-intentions is that it is so difficult to tell who is the bearer of these intentions. Another peculiarity of group-intentions is that there may be even a complete lack of corresponding I-intentions, as has been observed by Margaret Gilbert:

"[...] there could be a shared intention to do such-and-such though none of the participants personally intend to conform their behavior to the shared intention." (Gilbert 2000, 18)

Thus, such a "shared intention" is not an intention of any of the participants. Gilbert ascribes such shared intentions to what she calls "plural subjects", to groups of people. The crucial mechanism for this is Gilbert's "schema S":

For the relevant psychological predicate "X" and a group of persons, members of this group may truly say "We X" with respect to this group, if and only if the members of the group are jointly committed to X-ing as a body (generalised version of Gilbert 2000, 19).

Gilbert's analysis perfectly fits to small-scale informal groups, where group-intentions arise from mini-contracts based on communication between and agreement of all the group-members. For Gilbert, "walking together" is "a paradigmatic social phenomenon" (Gilbert 1992, title): If Ann and Bill arrange to go for a walk together, the two of them form a plural subject that goes for a walk. Ann and Bill are jointly committed to do this walking, even if both make up their mind because of, say, the long distance. Nevertheless, the joint commitment remains valid till further negotiations between Ann and Bill bring about a new group contract (Gilbert 2000, 26). Till then, being part of the plural subject brings certain deontic constraints with it:

"First, each participant has an obligation not to act contrary to the shared intention. More positively, each has an obligation to promote the fulfilment of the shared intention as well as possible. Second, corresponding to these obligations are rights or entitlements of the other parties to the appropriate performances. Third, if one participant does something contrary to the shared intention, the others have a special entitlement to rebuke that person. [...] Participants in a shared intention understand that they are not in a position to remove its constraints unilaterally." (Gilbert 2000, 17)

But not in all cases of group-intentions these deontic constraints obtain. Again, if an academic society I belong to decides to merge with another society, I am free to oppose this merging. I may publicly speak up against it, I may even go to court, or give up my membership. Mutual communication is no longer possible in large-scale systems, even in academic societies, and it is no longer mandatory in formal groups. Formal groups may have fixed procedures to establish their intentions. In democracies the majority (of members of parliament) decides, in dictatorships the dictator decides alone. Academic societies usually are constituted democratically, small companies often are constituted dictatorially: the owner decides what the company will do. In such examples, a group's intention may not be shared by individual members, and members may even have a right to oppose group-intentions.

5. Group-Intentions: Emergent System Properties

I argued in section 3 that group-intentions are not necessarily constituted by we-intentions. And section 4 led to the result that group-intentions are not in every case brought about by the "sharing" of intentions by means of joint commitments. The positive result was that there may be different procedures how groups establish what counts as their intention. We can thus modify Gilbert's schema S in order to fit to this variety of different cases:

For a group G of group-type T it might be truly said that G intends to do F, if and only if the procedure appropriate to the group-type T of G brought it about that G intends to do F.

In this new schema, the group-type plays a crucial role. If members of parliament want to bring forward a certain motion, they have to obey certain formalities, regulated in the constitution. If, however, the same members of parliament want to go for a walk, these formalities are out of place. In this case, personal communication leading to joint commitment is the appropriate procedure. Thus, Gilbert's schema S is a special case of my own suggestion.

There is a variety of procedures that may bring about group-intentions. If a group does not have such procedures, there cannot be intentions of this group. This is, e.g., the case for a large-scale informal group, like the visitors of a football match: As they form an informal group, there is no procedure they could follow to form a group-intention. And as they have so many members, they cannot form a group-intention by personal communication leading to joint commitment.

Again: Who is the bearer of group-intentions? I have argued that group-intentions are not reducible to intentions of group-members, and that group-intentions are reducible to shared I-intentions only in the special case of small-scale informal groups. Thus, group-intentions must not be attributed to the group-members. This suggests that the natural answer, maybe, was not that bad at all: Group-intentions do have to be attributed to the groups. This does not commit us to postulate that groups have a mental life of their own, independent of the mental life of individuals. On the contrary, group intentions are brought about by the mental life of individuals. They are not reducible to the intentions of the individuals, but they emerge from speech acts and other symbolic interactions of the individuals, like promising or voting. They are, however, no properties of the individual persons, but properties of the collectives, of the whole system these individuals constitute. Thus, group-intentions are emergent properties in the technical sense: They are properties of the systems, not of the constituents, they come about by interactions of the parts, but they are of a kind that cannot be attributed to individual persons, but only to systems of such.

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Truthmaking: A Cognition-Independent Internal Relation with Heterogeneous Relata

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1. The Correspondence Theory of Truth

Assume the following series of events: (a) you are standing in a room looking for a cat, (b) another person tells you "The cat is on the mat", (c) you turn around and look in the direction of the mat, (d) on this mat you see the cat, and (e) you think "True, there it is!". Often, as in this example, an everyday assertion and its confirmation are two temporally distinct events. First comes an apprehension of a speech act (b), and later comes a confirming perceptual act (d). Since *what* is perceived in the perceptual act in some way corresponds to *what* is spoken about in the speech act, the content of the perceptual act makes the assertion true; there is often (e) an immediate "perception-assertion transition" (Mulligan 1999). Situations like the assumed one abound, and they constitute strong evidence in favour of a correspondence theory of truth. And this is so, even if they are philosophically reinterpreted to fit subjective idealism, social constructivism, or solipsism. Even if it is assumed that there is no language-and perception-independent world that may or may not contain the cat and the mat, there is nonetheless some kind of correspondence between the speech act and the perceptual act that cries out for philosophical analysis. In order to save space, however, I will in what follows simply take it for granted that there is a mind-independent world structured by universals that exist in the particulars of the world. Furthermore, the analysis will be restricted to ordinary positive empirical assertions; leaving, for instance, tautologies and negative existential assertions such as "There is no phlogiston" out of account; compare (Mulligan, Simons, Smith 1984, 314-315).

The point of departure will be David Armstrong's (1997) view on the relation of truthmaking or correspondence (he regards the terms as being ontologically equivalent). My view resembles his without however being identical thereto. Nor is my view identical with any of the recent defences of the correspondence theory of truth that I know of; see the books by (Fumerton 2002) and (Newman 2002), as well as the articles by (Smith 1999), (Bac 2003), (David 2004), and (Rami 2004); and the arguments I put forward have not been evaluated by the critics (Dodd 2000) and (McGrath 2003).

2. Armstrong's Analysis and Its Reductionism

According to Armstrong, truthmaking is fundamentally an internal relation between a token proposition, the truth(-value-)bearer, and a truthmaker that is either a state of affairs or a constituent object of such an entity (1997, 116-119 and 131). The term 'token proposition', however, is mine; Armstrong himself speaks only of 'propositions' (= 'type propositions'), 'token beliefs', and 'token thoughts'. Of course, when a truthmaker makes a token proposition true, it makes, necessarily and at the same time, the corresponding type proposition true.

An internal relation is a universal that has such a nature that its relata can exist independently of one another but is such that when, in fact, the relata exist simultaneously, then the relation is necessarily instantiated. For example,

the determinate volume that is instantiated in my pen has an internal relation of 'being smaller than' to the determinate volume that is instantiated in my lamp, but, of course, this determinate volume of my pen can exist even if the determinate volume of my lamp does not exist, and vice versa. However, as soon as both the determinate pen- and lamp-volumes exist, there is necessarily also an instance of the relation 'being smaller than'. Contrast these facts with facts about the relation 'being one meter apart'. Even if both the pen-volume-instance and the lamp-volume-instance exist and are one meter apart, they are not necessarily related by the relation 'being one meter apart'. The latter relation is external to the relata at hand; it is an external relation.

Armstrong's view, applied to the cat/mat example, is in accordance with the following common sense facts:

- the cat can be on the mat even if no one is thinking or talking about the cat and the mat (a truthmaker can exist independently of any token of the type proposition it makes true);
- one may think or assert that the cat is on the mat even if the cat is not in fact on the mat (a token proposition can exist independently of whether or not there is a corresponding truthmaker);
- necessarily: if someone has the thought or makes the assertion "the cat is on the mat", and the cat is on the mat, then it is true that the cat is on the mat (necessarily: if both a token proposition and one of its truthmakers exist, then there is a relation of truthmaking between them; correspondence obtains).

Back to my introductory example. The proposition (be it type or token) that the cat is on the mat can be made true by many determinately different states of affairs, and the cat-on-the-mat can be a truthmaker for other propositions as well. It makes for example also "An animal is on the mat" true. In this sense, there is a many-many relation of correspondence between propositions and truthmakers (Armstrong 1997, 129f).

So far so good. But now I want to criticize Armstrong's reductionist accounts of internal relations and propositions, respectively. No analysis of the essence of truthmakers will be attempted.

Typical cases of internal relations are: 'being larger than', 'being heavier than', 'being warmer than', and 'being more electrically charged than'. (Relations such as 'being non-identical with', 'being instantiated by', and 'being inherent in', which may also lay claim to be internal, will here without arguments be claimed to be categorially different). According to Armstrong's analysis, when the relation 'being larger than' exists between the lengths of the individuals Peter and Paul, there is in the world nothing more than the possession by Peter and Paul of their determinate length instances. He claims that instances of internal relations are identical with the instances of their relata. I think such a view is false; my reason is the following.

As has been made abundantly clear by phenomenological philosophy and perceptual psychology, we perceive much more than things and their most conspicuous front side property instances. We often perceive also phenomena such as colour-constancy-in-colour-variation and gestalt properties, and in my opinion also internal relations. If Peter and Paul differ significantly in length and are standing beside each other, then we can perceive their length difference. The question whether this length difference is perceived directly or only indirectly as part of the fact *that* Peter and Paul differ in length is of no importance for my argument. I merely claim (first premise) that it is an empirical fact that some internal relations are in some sense perceivable. Now, whether I perceive Peter and Paul as being of equal or unequal length may affect my future actions. That is (second premise), what is perceivable can have causal effects. When these facts are combined with the principle (third premise): “If a hypothetical entity can be shown to have causal effects then it cannot be an ontological nothing”, then we get the conclusion that internal relations cannot be ontologically eliminated.

In this Peter-Paul example, the relation ‘being larger than’ exists only as *perceived*. I have so far only proved that such a perceived internal relation cannot be eliminated. However, from a realist point of view, there seems to be no reason to restrict the existence of such a relation to its existence in thoughts and perceptions. For instance, even before mankind discovered the planets Jupiter and Pluto and that Jupiter is larger than Pluto, there must have been a mind-independent instance of the internal relation ‘being larger than’ between the volume instances of these planets. In my opinion, Armstrong wrongly identifies what is an “ontological free lunch” (here, an instance of an internal relation) with the entities (here, the relata) the lunch is based on (1997, 117).

If there can be a completely mind-independent internal relation between two mind-independent relata such as the volume instances of Jupiter and Pluto, then it seems to be the case that there can be *cognition-independent* internal relations between two mind-dependent relata such as two pains. Your pain may be more intense than mine even if no one whatsoever is cognizing this relation. But what about internal relations between mind-dependent token propositions (in beliefs and assertions) and mind-independent truthmakers? Can such internal relations be cognition-independent relations? They cannot be completely mind-independent since one of their relata is now assumed to be mind-dependent.

Propositions have two features that are especially important to my argument. First, they have *aboutness* or *directedness*, i.e., they have intentionality. In this sense of ‘about’, a proposition is necessarily about something even when it is false and this something does not exist; in another sense of ‘about’, however, it is about something only when it is true. Second, if a proposition has a truth-value, then nothing can change this truth-value. This means among other things that the proposition (be it type or token) in the introductory example is about the-cat-on-the-mat at a particular place and time. The general content or meaning in “The cat is on the mat” might be called “propositional content” (Searle 1983).

Armstrong says: “Truth attaches in the first place to propositions, those propositions which have a truthmaker. But no Naturalist can be happy with a realm of propositions” (1997, 131). In saying so, however, he identifies naturalism with his own reductive brand of naturalism. All naturalists have to deny the existence of a Platonic realm

of propositions outside the spatiotemporal world, but as is argued in (Searle 1983) and (Johansson 2004) they do not have to deny the existence of non-reducible intentional states within this world. Although I am an Aristotelian, my defence here of the correspondence theory of truth does not reject the possibility that type propositions may be Platonic entities. However, my defence requires the view that the aboutness or directedness of propositions cannot possibly be reduced to something else.

What happens if one tries to take away the intentionality of propositions? Suppose, as a thought experiment, we were to imagine that the characteristic aboutness of propositions does not exist in the cat/mat example used. This would mean would mean that the propositional structure heard in the utterance “The cat is on the mat” and the seen structure the-cat-on-the-mat differ only with respect to specificity; obviously, the fact the-cat-on-the-mat lacks intentionality. That is, what is perceived is more specific than what is asserted, but the speech act is just as little about the-cat-on-the-mat as this fact is about the speech act. If propositions lack aboutness, then (i) the token proposition of the assertion “The cat is on the mat” lacks aboutness, (ii) this assertion is incapable of representing something outside itself, and (iii) it can, empirically, be neither true nor false. Our thought experiment takes away the obvious asymmetry which exists between assertive speech acts and what they are about. The mind-to-world direction of fit of assertions (Searle 1983) disappears. This is a *reductio ad absurdum*. Propositions have intentionality. Q.E.D.

3. Truthmaking as a Cognition-Independent Internal Relation with Heterogeneous Relata

Out of the analysis made, the following four conclusions can be drawn.

First, like instances of other internal relations, instances of truthmaking add to being. When they exist, they exist whether or not there is a cognizing subject who thinks or perceives the truthmaking in question. This is the fact which makes it possible for human beings to assign propositions wrong truth-values.

Second, if all propositions are mind-dependent entities, then in a world without minds there can be no truthmaking. Truthmaking is on this assumption not a mind-independent relation, but it is nonetheless a cognition-independent relation. Even though one of its relata (the token proposition) is mind-dependent, the relation itself can exist without being cognized. If, on the other hand, type propositions are mind-independent Platonic entities, then truthmaking is a completely mind-independent relation.

Third, since all truthbearers have intentionality but many truthmakers lack it, the truthmaking relation must be able to relate categorially heterogeneous relata. In this respect truthmaking differs essentially from the examples of internal relations first presented which have homogeneous relata. The latter relate only determinates that belong to one and the same determinable. For example, ‘being heavier than’ can only be a relation between instances of the weight determinable.

Fourth, if the intentionality of the truthbearer is regarded as a special kind of relation, then this relation must not be conflated with the relation of truthmaking itself. If intentionality is regarded as a relation, then truthmaking is a doubly relational affair.

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Toward a Synthesis: Munson and the Problem of “Wittgenstein’s Phenomenology”

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In 1962 relations between analytic and continental philosophy had reached a frustrating low. Esteemed philosophers on both shores of the Channel (and the Atlantic) reverted to the “silent treatment” and even childish name-calling. In his essay “Wittgenstein’s Phenomenology” Thomas Munson expresses “deep concern” about “philosophy’s continental divide,” (Munson 1962). He points to a paper written by Charles Taylor which proposed a comparison between the methods of the warring camps (linguistic analysis and phenomenology), as a means of finding a common ground on which to stand. Munson considered this a positive step, whether Taylor’s paper was “successful or no.” He was not entirely pessimistic about the possibility of an end to their feud, however. In fact he provides ground for some genuine optimism, highlighting that many thinkers on the continent had begun to budge on their reluctance to publish analytic material. It seems to me that it is in this spirit of genuine synthesis that the brave Munson offers Wittgenstein (who he notes is “not in vogue to synthesize”, and so offers no excuses for “his bold flying in the face of tradition”) as a conciliatory figure, with the stated purpose of “mediating” between the two factions (Munson 1962).

The question arises, then, of Munson’s motives. Is he offering an account of Wittgenstein as a phenomenologist based on his own deep-rooted philosophical beliefs, or is his article merely a sort of experiment; an attempt (“successful or no”) to bridge the “divide, which so “deeply concerned” him?

The latter explanation is certainly plausible. In the course of his article (which I will discuss in more detail later) he may well be guilty of “massaging” the meaning of certain philosophical terms, not least of all the term “phenomenology,” itself, in order to spark a dialogue between analytic and continental thinkers. Moreover, we can also see how Wittgenstein would have appeared to the consternated philosopher as a poster child for such a synthesis. At the time, it would have been difficult to describe Wittgenstein as either an analytic philosopher (if one buys the *Philosophical Investigations*, the very foundations of analytic philosophy are shaken, if not destroyed) or as a continental thinker in the vein of Marcel, Merleau-Ponty or Sartre. He was a philosophical no-man’s land.

While Munson may have been primarily concerned with the socio-ideological, rather than philosophical conditions of philosophy at that moment of crisis, there is something interesting and original in his re-conception of Wittgenstein as a closet phenomenologist. Admittedly, if one wants to buy Munson’s claim, one must be willing to be flexible (exactly what he was begging both sides to be) but by keeping a relatively open mind, we find that we may make for him a rather convincing argument that the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy contains elements of phenomenology. Munson may have just been playing politics, but he seems to have stumbled on to something.

And yet he seems purposefully vague on how the “mature” Wittgenstein’s new views on language constitute a “phenomenology.” After astutely identifying Wittgenstein’s core problem in both the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations* as the problem of the “relationship between “the sign and the signified,” Munson sees Wittgenstein as essentially rejecting the very basis on which the question stands. Wittgenstein asserts that there is nothing *beyond* the

signifier to look at; there is only the language. Because language no longer functions as an intermediary between us and the world, Wittgenstein concludes that we can no longer probe truth in the same way. Instead of looking for, or imposing, logical structure, we must merely describe a language-game. Any attempts at explanation, or theorizing are inherently wrought with the same misconceptions about language that held the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein captive. Munson then argues that this rejection of explanation and emphasis on description must properly “be called phenomenology”, (Munson 1962). But why does this descriptive methodology necessarily constitute a “phenomenology?”

He frustratingly declines a comparison of his conception of phenomenology to the phenomenology of Husserl, or Heidegger, which raises a very pertinent question: what exactly does Munson mean by phenomenology if he does not mean to reference Husserl nor Heidegger (arguably the two central practitioners) in his discussion? What’s the point of using the word at all, if he does not intend to relate it to any historical notions of phenomenology? Not only do we not have a clear picture of how exactly Wittgenstein’s “phenomenology” pertains to traditional phenomenology, but he has also failed in his stated purpose of trying to mediate between the two factions. Though Wittgenstein eliminates the possibility of a private language, Munson, here, seems to be providing him a “private phenomenology.”

Though Munson would perhaps protest, I think it may serve us to help him out a bit. To do this, we can, for a time, think of the method of the *Investigations* Wittgenstein *partly* in the light of the method of the Heidegger of *Being and Time*. Using this comparison we not only see how Wittgenstein compares to a traditional phenomenologist, but we also see an improvement of Munson’s argument because of it. We should perhaps first place the idea of “description” in the context of Heidegger’s phenomenological project. Heidegger explicitly defines his method as a “descriptive phenomenology”, one that treats phenomenon by “exhibiting it directly, and by demonstrating it directly,” (Heidegger 1962). For Heidegger to exhibit phenomenon directly, we must describe a “pre-phenomenological” state; a state of “average everydayness” that occurs before we analyze things abstractly. By describing how we view things in this everyday context we may be able to get back to a state of understanding that has been largely obscured by a philosophical tradition that treats objects as “present-at-hand”, or as mental constructs divorced from their “everyday” context presented to us to theorize about and analyze. For Heidegger the goal is to see the world in a state of “readiness-to-hand”; a pre-reflective state where we view objects in their “relational context” (Heidegger 1962). When we view Heidegger like this the comparison to Wittgenstein becomes much clearer. Wittgenstein, too, asks us to think of language as its “use” in everydayness. He too, believes that nothing is concealed and “everything lies open to view” and that we must break free from the old conception of language as signifier, in order to do the proper purpose of philosophy: describe (Wittgenstein 1953). By consigning philosophy to description, we neither break the relational context for Heidegger, nor obscure the transparency that Wittgenstein believes emerges when we view language as

he has outlined. The goal of this phenomenology, it seems to me, is to restore the phenomenon as a phenomenon that "is what it is," so to speak.

I do not wish to make the irresponsible generalization that the purpose of the two books are exactly the same, but the method (which is exactly what Munson explicitly states he is concerned with) employed by both philosophers, and even the metaphors used match up wonderfully. They both ask us to think of their concern (whether it is "Being" or language) in a way that is different from the rest of philosophy, and yet completely wrapped up in how we think in our everyday relations. Munson may be correct when he asserts that his conception of Wittgenstein's phenomenology of language is not the same as Heidegger's "ontological phenomenology," (Munson 1962), but if he were attempting a real synthesis, a comparison to Heidegger may have served as a decent model.

I would even argue boldly, as a means of further clarification, that Wittgenstein performs the task of this type of phenomenology more effectively (and purely), than Heidegger when we view the latter's phenomenology of language or "meaning" (the very subject Wittgenstein applies it to, according to Munson). Heidegger mentions language briefly in Section 44 of *Being and Time*, in a passage, which has crucial importance in illustrating the essential difference between Heidegger and Wittgenstein, but to my knowledge has not received a great deal of critical attention. In this section Heidegger expounds upon the Greek notion of Truth, and how on the whole their language conveys a notion of Truth strikingly similar to the sort of pre-phenomenological understanding that we have been discussing. Heidegger immediately warns us (and conceivably himself) not to fall in to what he calls " uninhibited word mysticism" (Heidegger 1962). In other words, we must not as Wittgenstein might say allow "language to go on holiday," (Wittgenstein 1953), even, as it were, to Ancient Greece. But Heidegger seemingly forgets his taboo just a sentence later when he claims, "Nevertheless, the ultimate business of philosophy is to preserve the *force of the most elemental words*, in which Dasein expresses itself..." (Heidegger's italics). In essence, Heidegger stakes the goal of philosophy as the project of renewing the grandeur (even awe) of the Greek conception of truth precisely because it aligns with Heidegger's, and we have hopefully shown Wittgenstein's, conception of "understanding."

This is a distinct pitfall of Heidegger's system (what Rorty calls Heidegger's "reification of language" (Rorty 1993), one that foreshadows Heidegger's philosophical turn. It is this turn that causes Rorty to abandon the later Heidegger, and praise the later Wittgenstein, who, in the *PI*, resists the temptation to fall back into viewing language the way that Heidegger, the word mystic, does. No matter how "primordial" or intriguing the Greek conception of truth may be, to Wittgenstein it must necessarily remain just another means of expression in a particular language-game. Though I can understand that Heidegger would have wanted to interpret his "word mysticism" section as an explicit conception of the task of phenomenology its almost Nietzschean assertion that philosophy must capture "the force" of those "elemental words" smacks too much of the project of the later Heidegger, to be considered phenomenology, pure or otherwise. By viewing Heidegger's mistake (in a Wittgensteinian sense) we are able to create a more positive idea of what Munson sees in Wittgenstein as phenomenology.

Admittedly, there are other ways of relating Wittgenstein's and Heidegger's projects. Ross Mandel, for example, sees their shared goal not as phenomenologically linked but rather as part of a "second Kantian revolution," (Mandel 1978). He argues that they, like Kant, are more concerned

with investigating how knowledge, understanding and intentionality are possible, than with investigating the "objects of knowledge." Mandel sees their mutual "clearing away" as establishing the pre-conditions on which our ability to interact with the world are necessarily predicated. And in doing so they do same thing for the 20th century that Kant did for the 18th (Mandel 1978). Richard Rorty offers another conception, one that views the early Heidegger and late Wittgenstein in the philosophical tradition of pragmatism or at least in his version of it (Rorty 1993). For Rorty their methods are not related methodologically, but rather as a conscious choice on the part of the philosophers not to return to the tradition that got everybody (including Wittgenstein himself) so worked up in the first place. Rorty's goal here is probably best articulated by Wittgenstein himself: "to stop doing philosophy when we wish to" (Wittgenstein 1953). Once Wittgenstein and Heidegger have established their view of contingent linguistic and cultural systems entirely based on social frameworks ("forms of life") and have banished epistemology from the scope of philosophy any re-participation in traditional philosophical modes via "theory" violate their basic assumptions, (Rorty 1993). Like a red-carded footballer, they cannot re-enter the language game of philosophy, whose strict rules they have broken and destroyed.

These explanations, however, do not and (do not claim to) explain away Munson's fundamental assertion that Wittgenstein is involved in a type of phenomenology. Even if he is essentially continuing Kant's project, or trying to ease philosophy into a therapeutic role, he does so using a method very different from Kant's, or anybody else in the tradition. Perhaps we cannot yet characterize what Wittgenstein does with any philosophical jargon available to us. Perhaps we can only see his approach as one that defies definite categories. Heidegger may bear the closest resemblance methodologically to what Wittgenstein was doing, but as Rorty correctly points out, Heidegger fails to fully carry out the method to its conclusions in his later, and as I have argued earlier, writing. We may then have to accept Wittgenstein as an idiosyncratic methodologist, who at times fits these categories and at others obliterates them.

It is easy to understand why Munson, in the face of these idiosyncrasies, may have been so vague in describing Wittgenstein's phenomenology. Any attempt at concretizing exactly what Wittgenstein was doing would have probably been detrimental to his wish for dialogue and reconciliation, especially when the debate between analysts and phenomenologists raged so rancorously. Now, however, in our more enlightened times, it may do well to revisit Munson's groundbreaking effort, and flesh out his bold claims, without fear of heresy.

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Können sich Dinge ändern?

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1. Das Problem

Im Alltag scheint es uns gar nicht so problematisch zu sein anzunehmen, dass Dinge, seien es Artefakte, Lebewesen oder auch menschliche Personen, *dieselben* bleiben, obwohl sie sich *ändern*. Ich würde sogar meinen, dass es zum Kern unseres Selbstverständnisses gehört, dass dem so ist. Wir ändern uns. Wir bleiben dennoch dieselben. Warum soll es schwierig sein, das zu verstehen? – Diese Frage können wir zunächst beantworten, wenn wir uns auf ein klassisches ontologisches Prinzip berufen, das als „Leibniz’ Gesetz“ bekannt ist. Nach diesem Gesetz sind Dinge genau dann identisch, wenn sie in allen Eigenschaften übereinstimmen. Ich möchte, der Einfachheit halber, keine Erörterung darüber führen, ob in Leibniz’ Prinzip wirklich *alle Eigenschaften* gemeint sein können, oder nicht vielmehr nur alle *extensionalen* (das sind solche, deren Zukommen zu einem Ding nicht von Beobachtern abhängt) und alle *eigentlichen* Eigenschaften (das sind solche, deren Zukommen nicht schon eine Beziehung zu dem, vorab identifizierten, Ding, an dem sie vorkommen, voraussetzen; siehe Runggaldier/Kanzian 1998, u.a. 171). Gehen wir davon aus, dass nach Leibniz’ Gesetz Dinge, die nicht in allen Eigenschaften übereinstimmen, nicht identisch sein können. Wie, so können wir unser Problem nun formulieren, soll Leibniz’ Gesetz mit dem Phänomen der Änderung und der Annahme diachroner Identität zusammengehen? Ändert sich ein Ding, verliert es eine Eigenschaft und gewinnt eine andere hinzu. Nehme ich z.B. im Urlaub vier Kilos zu, verliere ich die Eigenschaft, 74 kg schwer zu sein, und „gewinne“ jene hinzu, 78 kg schwer zu sein. Ich, vor dem Urlaub, stimme nicht mehr in allen Eigenschaften mit mir, nach dem Urlaub, überein. Wie sollte ich, vor dem Urlaub, mit mir, nach dem Urlaub, identisch bleiben, ohne dass wir Leibniz’ Prinzip aufgeben?

Um die Problematik der Änderung von Dingen in den Blick zu bekommen, kann man sich bereits auf Parmenides berufen. Eines seiner Argumente gegen das Werden und Vergehen ist ein logisches, demzufolge Werden zu negieren ist, weil es widersprüchlich ist, von demselben Ding sowohl Existenz als auch Nichtexistenz anzunehmen. (Vgl. Tegtmeier 1997, 22f) Dieses Argument kann man auch auf Änderungen beziehen, die nicht das Werden und Vergehen von Dingen betreffen. Nimmt man nämlich Änderungen an, akzeptiert man folglich, dass ein und demselben Ding sowohl eine Eigenschaft F zukommt als auch die Eigenschaft F nicht zukommt. Ändere ich mich, mag ich, um beim unseligen Beispiel zu bleiben, 74 kg schwer sein und auch nicht 74 kg schwer sein. Das aber ist widersprüchlich. Wenn man Widersprüche aus der Wirklichkeit verbannen möchte (woran man gut tut), dann auch Änderungen.

2. Ein erster Lösungsansatz

Ein erster Lösungsansatz beider Probleme geht (der Sache nach) auf Aristoteles zurück. Im Buch K seiner *Metaphysik* relativiert Aristoteles das Nicht-Widerspruchsprinzip (NWP) zeitlich. (Metaphysik K, 1062a, 1f) Es besagt nunmehr, dass es nicht möglich ist, dass etwas *zu einer und derselben Zeit* sei und nicht sei, bzw., um es auf unseren Fall der Änderungen anzuwenden, dass etwas *zu*

einer und derselben Zeit eine Eigenschaft F habe und dieselbe Eigenschaft F nicht habe. Wenn ich im Urlaub zunehme, ist das unangenehm für mich, jedoch rein physisch oder vielleicht psychisch, nicht aber logisch. Nach dieser zeitlich relativierten Fassung des NWP wäre es logisch nur dann verheerend, wenn ich zu einem und demselben Zeitpunkt 74 kg auf die Waage brächte und nicht auf die Waage brächte. Das ist aber gewiss nicht der Fall.

Das hier vorausgesetzte Verständnis des Zukommens von Eigenschaften *relativ zu bestimmten Zeiten*, kann nun auch als Ansatz gesehen werden, die diachrone Identität mit Leibniz’ Prinzip zu versöhnen. Demnach wäre Leibniz’ Prinzip so zu verstehen, dass Identität genau dann vorliegt, wenn die betroffenen Dinge *zu jedem Zeitpunkt* in allen Eigenschaften übereinstimmen. Brodys Beispiel: „What is required by indiscernibility is that my table at t1 and my table at t2 have the same properties at t1 and the same properties at t2. It is not required that my table at t2 have at t2 the properties that my table at t1 had at t1.“ (Brody 1980, 21,22)

Kann aber die zeitliche Relativierung des Zukommens von Eigenschaften tatsächlich als entscheidendes Argument gegen die Kritiker von Änderungen verstanden werden? – Dagegen spricht, dass manche Autoren aus logischen Gründen vor der damit verbundenen Relativierung des NWP warnen. Nur ein zeitlich nicht-relativiertes Prinzip hätte jene Kraft, die ihm traditionell zugesprochen wird. Ich möchte hier allerdings die spezielle Diskussion des NWP ausklammern, und lediglich auf die allgemeine Schwierigkeit hinweisen, das Zukommen von Eigenschaften zu einem Ding zeitlich relativ oder indexikalisiert zu verstehen. Diese Schwierigkeit besteht m.E. darin, dass die Annahme dieser Indexikalisierung für sich genommen so vieldeutig ist, dass sie als echte Lösung des Problems der Änderungen diachron identischer Dinge zunächst nicht in Frage kommt. Bei der Darstellung dieser Schwierigkeiten kann ich mich auf David Lewis berufen.

In *On the Plurality of Worlds* unterscheidet Lewis drei verschiedene Verständnisweisen der zeitlichen Indexikalisierung des Zukommens von Eigenschaften zu einem Ding. (Vgl. Lewis 1986, 204) Fassen wir die allgemeine Formulierung der zeitlichen Indexikalisierung einer Prädikation auf als „x ist zu t F“. Wir können dies zunächst einmal so deuten, dass wir meinen „x ist-F-zu t“. Nach Lewis bedeutet diese Formulierung, dass wir das Ding x durch die Eigenschaft F in Beziehung setzen zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt t. Aus allen Eigenschaften, auch aus solchen, die wir zunächst als einstellige verstehen, werden so, ontologisch gesprochen, *Relationen*, die bestehen zwischen Dingen und Zeitpunkten. Das ist für Lewis (und nicht nur für ihn) inakzeptabel, weil dadurch das Zukommen „intrinsischer“ Eigenschaften zu Dingen geleugnet wird. Es gibt aber augenscheinlich gute Kandidaten für intrinsische Eigenschaften, das sind solche, deren Zukommen zu einem Ding von keinen dem Ding äußeren Umständen abhängt.

Eine zweite Deutung von „x ist zu t F“ nach Lewis besteht darin, intrinsische Eigenschaften zwar zuzulassen, deren Zukommen zu einem Ding aber auf einen Zeitpunkt zu beschränken. „X ist-zu-t F“ wäre eine Formulierung. Lewis selbst nimmt dieser Deutung jede Plausibilität, in

dem er sie so darlegt, dass es nach ihr keine anderen als die in der jeweiligen Prädikation angegebenen Zeiten gibt. Vom Standpunkt eines Zeitpunkts t können Dinge zu anderen Zeiten t' , t'' etc. somit auch keine Eigenschaften haben. Können Dinge zu anderen Zeiten keine Eigenschaften haben, können sie zu anderen Zeiten auch nicht existieren. Es wird so nicht nur die „endurance“ aufgegeben, sondern jeder Sinn der Rede von zeitlich irgendwie fortdauernden Dingen. Das ist bizarr, denn, so Lewis in seinem (für die Kulturnation USA bezeichnenden) Beispiel: „No man, unless it be the moment of his execution, believes he has no future; still less does anyone believe that he has no past.“ (op. cit. 204)

Die dritte Deutung ist jene, der Lewis selbst den Vorzug gibt. „X ist zu t F“ heiße, so Lewis, nichts anderes als „X-zu- t ist F“. Wovon wir Eigenschaften, die nun durchaus auch intrinsisch sein können, aussagen, ist nicht das Ding x als Ganzes. Eigenschaften sagen wir vielmehr aus von zeitlichen Ding-Teilen. Das Problem des Zukommens von unvereinbaren Eigenschaften wird auf diese Weise so gelöst, dass diese Eigenschaften nicht von einem einzigen Ding, sondern von mehreren verschiedenen Ding-Teilen, ausgesagt werden: „Kanzian-vor-dem-Urlaub ist 74 kg“, „Kanzian-nach-dem-Urlaub ist 78 kg“. Widerspruch kann so keiner entstehen, da es sich bei Kanzian-vor- bzw. Kanzian-nach-dem-Urlaub um numerisch verschiedene zeitliche Teile oder Phasen, also verschiedene Gegenstände handelt. Das gesamte Ding wird so als Summe numerisch verschiedener zeitlicher Teile verstanden. Diese Weise, in der Zeit zu sein, bezeichnet Lewis auch als „perdurance“. – Diese Lösung steht der hier vorgeschlagenen Theorie von diachron identischen Dingen entgegen. Die „endurance“ wird bei Lewis konsequenterweise explizit gelehnt. Was aber ebenfalls auf der Strecke bleibt, ist eine Deutung des Phänomens *Änderung*, um das es uns hier ja eigentlich geht. Änderungen kann es nach diesem Modell keine geben, weil es keine Dinge gibt, die *als solche* Eigenschaften wechseln. Eigenschaftswechsel ist mit dem Ende des Trägers der Eigenschaft verbunden, nicht aber mit der Änderung des Trägers. M.E. zurecht haben zahlreiche Autoren darauf hingewiesen, dass die Negierung diachron identischer Dinge im Sinne von „endurer“ auch die Negierung von Änderungen besagt.

Ich möchte mich hier nicht weiter in die Erörterung möglicher Alternativen des Verständnisses von „x ist zu t F“, also von zeitlich indexikalisierten Prädikationen, vertiefen. Worauf es mir hier ankommt ist der Hinweis, dass die zeitliche Indexikalisierung des Zukommens von Eigenschaften, für sich genommen, offen für sehr verschiedene Deutungen (mit jeweils schwerwiegenden ontologischen Implikationen) ist. Ihre Anführung allein kann somit nicht als Lösung des Problems der Änderungs-Paradoxien verstanden werden. Wenn ihre Anführung allein und für sich genommen nicht ausreicht, heißt das jedoch nicht, dass sich im Anschluss an sie bzw. im Kontext weiterführender Begründungen nicht neue Ansätze zu einer Theorie von Änderungen ergeben können. Und genau eine solche neue Theorie von Änderungen möchte ich im folgenden versuchen.

3. Eine neue Theorie der Änderung von Dingen

3.1 Lewis' erste und dritte Interpretation der allgemeinen Formel für zeitlich indexikalisierte Prädikationen sind höchst problematisch, und zwar aus ontologischen Gründen. Die erste negiert den Unterschied zwischen

Relationen und intrinsischen Eigenschaften, die dritte diachron identische Dinge, und folglich auch Änderungen. Will man die zeitliche Indexikalisierung des Zukommens von Eigenschaften zu Dingen für die Deutung von Änderungen brauchbar machen, muss man in irgendeiner Weise an Lewis' zweiter Lösung arbeiten. Dazu ist es erforderlich, die Sackgasse von Lewis' eigener Interpretation dieser Lösung zu vermeiden. Ich kann hier auf Jonathan Lowe verweisen, der genau das versucht hat. Lowe deutet „x ist-zu- t F“ so, dass durch den Zeitindikator t weder das Ding x (wie es Lösung 3 entspräche) noch die Eigenschaft F (wie es Lösung 1 besagte) modifiziert wird. Soweit kann Lowe wohl mit Lewis übereinstimmen. Modifiziert wird lediglich, und das steht auch Lewis Interpretation seiner eigenen zweiten Lösung entgegen, die *Verbindung* von x und F , und zwar dergestalt, dass diese zeitlich relativiert wird. So kann man aber Lewis', für die Plausibilität von „x ist-zu- t F“ verheerende Folgerungen vermeiden. Es ist nicht einzusehen, warum aus einer Relativierung des Zukommens einer Eigenschaft zu einem Ding auf ein bestimmte Zeit hin, folgen sollte, dass andere Zeiten „like false stories“ seien; warum vom Standpunkt einer bestimmten Zeit aus Dinge zu anderen Zeiten keine Eigenschaften haben könnten etc.

Ich möchte jetzt weder die faktisch vorliegenden Erwidernungen Lewis' gegen Lowes Deutungen weiter analysieren, noch eine eingehende Lowe-Exegese durchführen. Den Gedanken, dass man die allgemeine Formel „x ist zu t F“ als „x ist-zu- t F“ verstehen kann, also so, dass durch den Zeitindikator weder Ding noch Eigenschaft betroffen sind, möchte ich vielmehr eigenständig weiter verfolgen.

3.2 Beginnen möchte ich mit kurzen Überlegungen bezüglich des Verhältnisses von Dingen zur Zeit. Was heißt es überhaupt, dass x eben zu- t vorkommt und in der Folge zu- t Eigenschaften hat? Meines Erachtens, und dies kann ich hier nicht entfalten, haben Dinge zur Zeit bzw. zu zeitlichen Verhältnissen ein rein akzidentelles Verhältnis. Zeit bzw. zeitliche Verhältnisse gehören nicht zu jenen Instanzen, welche Dinge konstituieren. Dinge sind dreidimensional. Den akzidentellen Bezug aber der Dinge zur Zeit machen andere als dingliche Partikularien aus. Der Bezug zur Zeit wird für Dinge dadurch hergestellt, dass Dinge in andere Partikularien, sprich Ereignisse und Zustände, *eintreten*. Chisholm spricht davon, dass Ereignisse und Zustände die *Geschichte* von Dingen ausmachen, und es ist nichts anderes als die Geschichte von Dingen, die ihre Zeitlichkeit bestimmt. Dass ein Ding zu einer Zeit vorkommt, heißt demnach, dass er in ein Ereignis oder in einen Zustand eintritt, welcher ihm zeitliche Verhältnisse vermittelt.

Der Verweis insbesondere auf Zustände ist in diesem Kontext deshalb von Bedeutung, weil er auch das Verständnis dessen erleichtert, was es nach dem Gesagten bedeutet, dass ein x eben zu- t F ist. Ein Zustand ist ja nichts anderes als das F -sein von x . Lewis' zweite Deutung der zeitlichen Indexikalisierung des Zukommens von Eigenschaften zu Dingen „x ist-zu- t F“ besagt nach meiner Lesart demnach nichts anderes, als dass ein Ding x in einen Zustand $\langle x F \rangle$ eintritt. Dadurch wird notwendigerweise sein Eintritt auch in zeitliche Verhältnisse konstituiert. Jedes Eintreten eines x in ein $\langle x F \rangle$ hat somit zur Folge, dass es ein Eintreten in ein $\langle x F \rangle$ zu- t ist. Ich spreche (vom Zustand aus gesehen) auch davon, dass der Zustand das Ding *in zeitliche Verhältnisse bringt*. Im Hintergrund steht die Annahme, dass zeitliche Verhältnisse auf das Ablaufen zeitlicher Teile von nicht-dinghaften Partikularien zurückgehen.

3.3 Entscheidend aber ist es, dass wir uns durch diese Deutung nicht in jene Widersprüche verwickeln, die Gegner von Änderungen versucht haben aufzuzeigen. Nach dieser Deutung tritt ein x , dem eine Eigenschaft F zukommt, in einen Zustand $\langle x F \rangle$ ein, und folglich in zeitliche Verhältnisse t . Widersprüchlich wäre es lediglich anzunehmen, dass dasselbe x in einen Zustand $\langle x G \rangle$ eintreten könnte (wobei G und F inkompatible Eigenschaften sind), und in Folge des Eintritts in $\langle x G \rangle$ in zeitliche Verhältnisse t' , wobei gilt $t = t'$. Nicht widersprüchlich ist aber die Annahme, dass ein x in einen Zustand $\langle x F \rangle$ eintritt, und folglich in die zeitlichen Verhältnisse t und dasselbe x in einen Zustand $\langle x G \rangle$ eintritt, und folglich in die durch von t verschiedenen zeitlichen Verhältnisse t' . Und genau darin bestehen m.E. Änderungen. Es ist, einfach gesagt, nicht widersprüchlich, wenn ein und dasselbe Ding hintereinander in inkompatible Zustände eintritt, sich eben nach meinem Verständnis *ändert*. Es ist nicht widersprüchlich anzunehmen, dass die Tafel grün ist und das Grün-sein die Tafel in bestimmte zeitliche Verhältnisse bringt, weil es z.B. gestern stattgefunden hat, und wenn die Tafel blau ist und das Blau-sein die Tafel in andere zeitliche Verhältnisse bringt, weil es heute nach dem Übermalen durch den Hausmeister stattfindet.

Ebenso kann diese Analyse Leibniz' Gesetz Genüge tun. Die Forderung nach der Übereinstimmung in allen Eigenschaften als hinreichende Identitätsbedingungen könnte in der vorgeschlagenen zeitlich indexikalisierten Version von Leibniz' Gesetz beispielsweise übersetzt werden in: Wenn für ein x und für ein y gilt, dass sie in der gleichen Abfolge in die gleichen Zustände eintreten und durch das Eintreten in gleiche Zustände stets in die gleichen zeitlichen Verhältnisse gebracht werden, dann folgt daraus, dass x und y identisch sind. Im Sinne einer notwendigen Bedingung könnte man sagen, dass Dinge nur dann identisch sind, wenn sie in der gleichen Abfolge in die gleichen Zustände eintreten und durch das Eintreten in gleiche Zustände stets in die gleichen zeitlichen Verhältnisse gebracht werden.

Ich bin mir bewusst, dass hier zusätzliche Erläuterungen angebracht wären. Etwa die, dass durch meine Ausführungen weder die diachrone Identität von Dingen „bewiesen“, noch Leibniz' Gesetz gegen alle seine Gegner verteidigt werden. Es gibt aber eine Möglichkeit, und das ist mein Punkt, die diachrone Identität von Dingen sowie deren Änderung zu behaupten, ohne das NWP zu verletzen und ohne Leibniz' Prinzip aufgeben zu müssen. Und das, ohne uns in die durch Lewis aufgewiesenen Probleme der zeitlich relativierten Prädikation von Eigenschaften zu verlieren. Vorausgesetzt wird freilich, dass zeitliche Verhältnisse ausschließlich durch das Ablaufen von Zuständen und Ereignissen konstituiert werden, und es letztere sind, welche, wie ich sage, Dinge in zeitliche Verhältnisse bringen. Ich denke aber, dies ist ein geringer Preis für den Nutzen der hier vorgeschlagenen Ontologie.

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Der Inhalt innerer Repräsentationen im Licht von Peirces Zeichenbegriff

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1. Teleosemantik

Teleosemantische Theorien befassen sich auf dezidiert biologischer Grundlage mit dem Inhalt von Zeichen oder Repräsentationen. Ihr Ausgangspunkt ist ein Funktionsbegriff, der sich im Anschluss an teleologische (evolutionäre) Erklärungen in der Biologie gewinnen lässt und meist *proper function* (Millikan 1984) genannt wird. Als *eigentliche Funktion* einer Struktur, einer Eigenschaft oder eines Verhaltens soll diejenige Wirkung angesehen werden, die nach unseren evolutionären Hypothesen für die natürliche Selektion dieser Struktur, dieser Eigenschaft oder dieses Verhaltens verantwortlich ist. Mit Hilfe dieses Funktionsbegriffs ergibt sich eine *normative* Unterscheidung zwischen funktionierenden und nicht funktionierenden biologischen Einheiten, die sich allein mit Hilfe einer physiologisch-zergliedernden Beschreibung nicht gewinnen ließe.

Die grundlegende Strategie der Teleosemantik besteht darin, den Begriff der eigentlichen Funktion zur Erläuterung des ebenfalls normativen Inhalts-Begriffs (*content*) heranzuziehen (vgl. Neander 1995, 112). Wie die Identifikation einer eigentlichen Funktion zugleich die Möglichkeit eröffnet, Fehlfunktionen auszumachen, ergibt sich mit einer wie auch immer gerechtfertigten Zuordnung eines Inhalts zu einer Repräsentation oder einem Zeichen die Möglichkeit, von Fehlrepräsentationen zu sprechen, nämlich in solchen Fällen, in denen der Inhalt eines Zeichens entweder nicht existiert oder nicht so existiert, wie er repräsentiert wird. Die zentrale Frage für den teleosemantischen Ansatz lautet also: *Wie kann ein begrifflicher Bezug zwischen biologischen Normen (Funktionen) und semantischen Normen (Inhalten) hergestellt werden?* Könnte dieser Bezug ohne anspruchsvolle Zusatzannahmen hergestellt werden und könnten weiterhin auch körperinternen Zeichen (etwa neuronalen Zuständen) in nachvollziehbarer Weise Inhalte zugeordnet werden, dann läge womöglich eine Erklärung dafür in Reichweite, wie das Gehirn als biologisches Organ zu Intentionalität (und damit auch zu falschen Repräsentationen) fähig sein kann.

Man könnte das Projekt der Teleosemantik auch auf folgende Weise beschreiben: Es besteht in dem Versuch, die Fähigkeiten, die in der philosophischen Tradition unter dem Titel "Intentionalität" zusammengefasst werden, zu naturalisieren, indem aufgewiesen wird, wie bestimmte Zustände von Organismen zugleich als "biologische Kategorie" und als Zeichen aufgefasst werden können. Mir ist jedoch keine einschlägige Arbeit bekannt, die bei diesem Versuch ausdrücklich auf die/eine semiotische Tradition zurückgreift, um zunächst den Begriff des Zeichens zu klären. Bleibt dies aus, entsteht die Gefahr einer falschen Reduktion: Wo ich nur biologische Kategorien zulasse, gerät das zu erklärende Phänomen des Inhalts von sogenannten Repräsentationen aus dem Blick. Biologische Normen könnten so als semantische Normen missverstanden werden, weil deren charakteristische Eigenschaften unverstanden bleiben. Um dieser Gefahr zu entgehen ist es notwendig, festzulegen und festzuhalten, unter welchen Bedingungen von einem Zeichen gesprochen werden sollte. Dabei geht es nicht um

terminologische Entscheidungen, denn der Begriff des Zeichens (oder der Repräsentation) muss ja die ange-deutete Funktion innerhalb einer Theorie des Inhalts erfüllen können. Und ob er dazu geeignet ist, kann sich erst zeigen, wenn man ihn zunächst hinreichend klar festgelegt hat.

2. Peirces Interpretations-Bedingung

Peirces umfangreiche semiotische Forschung kann grob in zwei Phasen unterteilt werden (vgl. zu Peirces Semiotik Peirce 1931-35 und 1958, Peirce 1982ff.).

Während er sich in der ersten Phase vor allem mit der statischen Klassifikation von Zeichenarten befasste, rückt in der zweiten Phase der Begriff der Semiose oder des Zeichenprozesses in den Mittelpunkt. Gemeint ist damit der Prozess der *Interpretation* von Zeichen, d.h. ganz allgemein gesprochen der Prozess der *Inhaltszuordnung*. Wo kein solcher Prozess aufgezeigt werden kann, sollte nach Peirce auch nicht von einem Zeichen gesprochen werden. Um den Wert dieser Aussage einschätzen zu können, ist es hilfreich, analog zur Unterscheidung zwischen Sach-Ebene und Meta-Ebene zwischen einer *semiosis* Ebene, in der die zu untersuchende vermeintliche Semiose stattfindet, und einer *semiotischen* Ebene zu unterscheiden, in der wir sie untersuchen und den Zeichenbegriff dann gegebenenfalls anwenden können. *Nach Peirce sollten wir nur dort (auf der semiotischen Ebene) von Zeichen sprechen, wo es möglich ist, einerseits eine Interpretation dieses Zeichens (auf der semiosis Ebene) und andererseits auch den Inhalt dieses Zeichens nach dieser Interpretation aufzuzeigen.* Einfacher ausgedrückt: Von einem Zeichen zu sprechen setzt voraus, dass man seine Interpretation (und damit seinen Inhalt) nicht erfinden oder willkürlich festlegen muss, sondern sie in irgendeiner Weise aufzeigen kann (*Interpretations-Bedingung*, vgl. Liszka 1996, 24).

Akzeptiert man diese (hier nur grob skizzierte) Bedingung für die Anwendung des Zeichenbegriffs, stellt sich sogleich die Frage, welche Arten von Prozessen als Interpretationen (Inhaltszuordnungen) angesehen werden können. Das folgende Beispiel (aus Short 1981) führt uns dabei zurück zur Fragestellung der Teleosemantik: Ein Reh flieht vor einem Geräusch. Da es aber nicht vor dem Geräusch als solchem flieht, sondern vor einem möglichen Fressfeind, der sich im Geräusch ankündigt, kann das Geräusch als ein Zeichen (Peirce genauer: ein Index) für einen möglichen Feind angesehen werden. Es kommt häufig vor, dass das Reh vor einem Geräusch flieht, obwohl kein Fressfeind anwesend ist. In diesem Fall handelt es sich nicht um eine Fehlinterpretation, denn dem Geräusch wird korrekt der Feind als Inhalt zugeordnet, sondern um eine Fehlrepräsentation: Als Zeichen für einen Fressfeind ist das Geräusch-Zeichen fehl am Platz. Diese Auffassung steht jedoch vor zwei Schwierigkeiten:

Erstens: Woher wissen wir, dass das Geräusch für einen Fressfeind steht und nicht etwa für ein beliebiges Ereignis, das dasselbe Geräusch hervorrufen kann? In diesem Fall wäre keine Fehlrepräsentation möglich. Oder es könnte für einen bestimmten Jäger *J* stehen, der immer zur selben

Zeit durch den Wald streift. Eine mögliche Antwort darauf findet sich nicht direkt bei Peirce, sondern bei einem zeitgenössischen Interpreten (Short 1998, 53): Nach Thomas L. Short müssen wir auf die *evolutionäre Entstehungsgeschichte* des Fluchtinstinkts achten. Das heißt nichts anderes, als dass wir wie in der Teleosemantik die *eigentliche Funktion* dieses Instinkts heranziehen. In der Erklärung seiner Entstehung beziehen wir uns auf die Gefahren, die durch Flucht vermieden werden können, und auf den Selektionsvorteil, den der Fluchtinstinkt deshalb mit sich brachte. Der Bezug auf eine beliebige Geräusch-Ursache könnte den Selektionsvorteil nicht erklären. Der Jäger *J* kann in der Evolution des Fluchtinstinkts keine Rolle gespielt haben. „Fressfeind“ dagegen scheint den angemessenen Allgemeinheitsgrad zu haben. Einfacher fiel uns die Inhaltszuordnung sicherlich, wenn das Reh auf unterschiedliche Geräusch-Zeichen (für unterschiedliche Gefahren) jeweils unterschiedlich reagieren würde (vgl. Short 1998, 60), wenn wir also einen Geräusch-Code ausmachen könnten. Am Prinzip scheint sich dadurch jedoch nichts zu ändern.

Haben wir damit den Schritt von der biologischen zur semantischen Norm vollzogen, von der eigentlichen Funktion eines (Interpretations-)Verhaltens zum Inhalt eines Zeichens? Nicht ganz, denn wir stehen *zweitens* vor einer weiteren Schwierigkeit, die sich aus Peirces Interpretations-Bedingung ergibt. Danach genügt es nicht, dem Zeichen auf der semiotischen Ebene einen Inhalt zuzuordnen, die Inhaltszuordnung muss vielmehr bereits auf der semiosischen Ebene nachgewiesen werden. Das ist nur möglich, wenn die *Reaktion* des Rehs auf das Geräusch zugleich als Interpretation verstanden wird. Das heißt, wir müssen den Interpretationsbegriff äußerst weit fassen. Darum habe ich auch die neutrale Formulierung „Inhaltszuordnung“ gewählt. Peirce spricht aus eben diesem Grund von „Semiose“. Nach diesem weiten Begriff muss das Ergebnis der Interpretation (an der sich ein bestimmter Prozess als Interpretation erkennen lässt) oder der *Interpretant* (Peirce) nicht aus einem weiteren Zeichen, sondern kann auch aus der Aktualisierung einer Verhaltensweise bestehen (das gilt für den späten Peirce). Aus diesem Grund ist Peirces Zeichenbegriff für eine naturalistische Sichtweise offen.

Die Gefahr eines derart weiten Begriffs der Semiose besteht darin, dass mit der starken Betonung der Kontinuität zwischen einfachen und höherstufigen Arten der Semiose die großen Differenzen zwischen dem Verhalten des Rehs einerseits und dem menschlichen Sprachvermögen andererseits aus dem Blick geraten. Ein entscheidender Unterschied soll darum hier noch erwähnt werden: Der Interpret von Sprachzeichen muss gerade *nicht* reagieren, um zu interpretieren.

3. Das Unbestimmtheitsproblem

Ein entscheidendes Problem für die Teleosemantik ist das sogenannte Unbestimmtheitsproblem (*indeterminism problem*). Es besteht darin, nach welchen Kriterien einem vorgeblichen biologischen Zeichen ein Inhalt zugeordnet werden soll. Dass sich die Vertreter dieser Theorie hier nicht einig sind, wirft ein schlechtes Licht auf das gesamte Projekt (vgl. Neander 1995). Betrachten wir ein klassisches Beispiel (ebd.):

Frösche (*rana pipiens*) reagieren auf alles, was klein und dunkel ist und sich in einer bestimmten Geschwindigkeit bewegt, indem sie mit der Zunge danach schnappen und es gegebenenfalls hinunterschlucken. Innerhalb dieser Reaktion lokalisiert Neander das Zeichen (*representation*)

R für das Ziel, das der Frosch anvisiert, in seinem Seh-Apparat und fragt, was als der Inhalt dieses Zeichens gelten müsse. Dabei orientiert sie sich an der Wirkungskette, die für die eigentliche Funktion von *R* entscheidend ist:

Der Zustand der Sehzellen *R*

- trägt zur Gen-Reproduktion bei,
- indem er hilft, den Frosch zu ernähren,
- indem er den Frosch dazu in die Lage versetzt, Fliegen (Beute? Nahrung?) zu fangen,
- indem er kleine, dunkle, sich bewegende Objekte registriert (Neander 1995, 125).

Was soll nun als Inhalt von *R* angesehen werden: kleine Objekte, Fliegen oder gar die Gen-Reproduktion (was dann für ausnahmslos alle biologischen Zeichen gelten müsste)?

Im Lichte von Peirces Zeichenbegriff erweist sich diese Frage als falsch gestellt. Sie beruht auf der irrigen Annahme, dass die begriffliche Verbindung zwischen eigentlicher Funktion und Inhalt über das jeweils fragliche Zeichen selbst gesucht werden müsste. Was ein *R* jedoch zu einem Zeichen macht, findet sich nicht in diesem selbst oder seiner unmittelbaren kausalen Umgebung, auch nicht im *zeichenproduzierenden* Mechanismus, sondern in seiner möglichen Interpretation.

Versuchen wir in Bezug auf die Inhaltszuordnung analog zum Reh-Beispiel vorzugehen. Nehmen wir (vereinfachend) an, *R* sei ein Erregungszustand *E* in der Retina des Froschs. Dieser wird von einem neuronalen Netz, einer zentralen Mustersteuerung der Erbkoordination (*ZME*) "interpretiert", indem diese die entsprechenden Signale *S* für die Motoneuronen produziert. Analog zum Reh-Beispiel müsste nun dasjenige als Inhalt von *R* bzw. *E* angesehen werden, dessen Korrelation mit *E* die Evolutionsgeschichte von *S* erklärt. Diese Geschichte ist identisch mit der von *ZME*, denn die Produktion von *S* muss als dessen eigentliche Funktion gelten. Die Existenz von *ZME* und damit von *S* kann jedoch nicht anders erklärt werden, als wiederum mit dem Hinweis auf Fliegen oder "fliegende Nahrung". Als Inhalt von *E* hätte also "fliegende Nahrung" zu gelten. Der allgemeine Zweck der Gen-Reproduktion begründet sicherlich nicht die Entstehung von *ZME*, ebenso wenig wie die Einverleibung beliebiger dunkler Objekte.

4. Die Problematik innerer Zeichen

Der Unterschied zwischen den beiden Beispielen besteht darin, dass sich *R*, im Gegensatz zum Geräusch, das das Reh wahrnimmt, *im Inneren* des Organismus befindet. Einfacher wäre es, das relevante Zeichen nicht im Sehapparat des Froschs zu lokalisieren, sondern außen, als den optischen Aspekt der Fliege *A*. *A* wäre vom Geräusch-Zeichen des Reh-Beispiels nicht weit entfernt, denn auch dieses kann als ein Aspekt des Raubtiers aufgefasst werden, dessen Auftreten nur scheinbar speziellere Nebenbedingungen erfordert. Mit einer solchen Entscheidung wäre jedoch die Absicht unterlaufen, die die Popularität von *rana pipiens* in der Philosophie des Geistes zu begründen scheint. Der Grund dafür, dass dieses Beispiel unter anderem auch von Neander ausgewählt wird, liegt darin, dass letztlich erklärt werden soll, wie es möglich ist, dass das biologische Organ *Gehirn* zu Intentionalität (und damit auch zu falschen Repräsentationen) fähig ist. Dabei denken die Teleosemantiker an *neuronale* und damit *innere* Zustände als Zeichen.

Geht man von Peirces Zeichenbegriff aus und betrachtet man das Frosch-Beispiel nochmals in Hinsicht auf die Interpretations-Bedingung, dann erschließt sich die Problematik des gesamten Ansatzes. Kann die Aktivität von ZME als Inhaltszuordnung verstanden werden? Das wäre nach dem Gesagten nur dann möglich, wenn die (hypothetische) Evolutionsgeschichte des "Verhaltens" von ZME auf einen bestimmten Inhalt schließen ließe. Eine solche Evolutionsgeschichte liegt jedoch wenn überhaupt, dann nur als Teil der Geschichte der Spezies *rana pipiens* vor, weil es sich bei ZME eben nur um einen Teil eines Organismus handelt. Anders ausgedrückt: Die Inhaltszuordnung und damit die Möglichkeit, sinnvoll von Zeichen zu sprechen, bleibt, wie oben auch zu erkennen war, vom Verständnis der eigentlichen Funktion des untersuchten Prozesses für den gesamten Organismus und von dessen Stammesgeschichte abhängig. Wenn sogenannte *Endosemiosen*, das sind Zeichenprozesse im Inneren vielzelliger Lebewesen, zum Gegenstand semiotischer Forschung werden, dann meist unter diesem Vorbehalt und mit dem ausdrücklichen Ziel zu ermitteln, wie die Interaktion der Teile auf jeder biologischen Integrationsebene als durch Zeichenprozesse koordiniert gedacht werden kann und wie sie zum Gesamtverhalten beitragen (vgl. von Uexküll et al. 1997, 464).

Wenn also versucht werden soll, einen weiten Begriff von Interpretation oder Inhaltszuordnung konsistent zu verwenden, der zweckmäßiges Verhalten in einer biologischen Umgebung miteinschließt, dann muss es sich dabei um das Verhalten eines Organismus handeln. Kleinere biologische Einheiten scheinen als *Interpreten* wenig geeignet zu sein.

5. Fazit

Die Problematik der Inhaltszuordnung bei sogenannten inneren Repräsentationen, die sich am Frosch-Beispiel gezeigt hat, scheint mir *a fortiori* bei menschlichen Gehirnzuständen vorzuliegen. Denn dort ist es im allgemeinen nicht möglich, ein Analogon zu ZME ausfindig zu machen, dessen Aktivität in der Verarbeitung eines bestimmten "neuronalen Zeichens" liegt. Das gilt wenn nicht aus prinzipiellen Gründen dann zumindest auf dem derzeitigen Stand der Forschung. Die Interpretations-Bedingung für die Anwendung des Zeichenbegriffs ist damit nicht erfüllt. Wenn Inhaltszuordnungen vorgenommen werden, dann (mehr oder weniger offensichtlich) stets von der semiotischen Ebene aus, in Kenntnis des Verhaltens des gesamten "Organismus", dessen Beschreibung, wenn es sich um Menschen handelt, zumeist nicht mit biologischen Begriffen auskommt. Die Verbindung zwischen biologischen und semantischen Normen kann auf diesem "atomistischen" Weg darum wohl nicht hergestellt werden.

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Expressivism, Normativity, and Meaning

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1. Expressivism – the view that when we make moral judgments we do not assert facts but express our attitudes toward them – has on occasion been proposed as the correct account of all normative discourse (e.g. Gibbard 1990, Blackburn 1998a). Indeed, it would be somewhat odd if moral judgments differed from other normative judgments in this respect; the same factors that motivate the denial of appearances in the case of morality recur in other cases like aesthetics and rationality.¹ It is the very idea that there could be facts about what to think or do, facts that would be truth-makers for normative propositions and beliefs, that expressivists find peculiar. There is therefore an inherent tendency in expressivism toward encompassing all normative discourse, even if it is not always explicitly acknowledged by local expressivists. In this paper, I use arguments made in discussions about Kripkean meaning scepticism to show that global or generalized expressivism leads to incoherence. This casts doubt on more modest local expressivist accounts as well.

The argument has the following steps:

- (1) Global expressivism accounts for all normative discourse in non-factual terms.
- (2) Global expressivism presupposes a distinction between factual and non-factual discourse. (corollary of 1)
- (3) Discourse about the meaning of linguistic expressions (“meaning-talk”, for short) is a species of normative discourse.
- (4) Global expressivism accounts for meaning-talk. (from 1, 3)
- (5) Expressivism about meaning-talk is a species of non-factualism about meaning. (from 1, 4)
- (6) Non-factualism about meaning entails global non-factualism. (Wright’s semantic descent argument)
- (7) Global expressivism entails global non-factualism. (from 4, 5, 6)
- (8) Global non-factualism entails that there is no distinction between factual and non-factual discourse, since it means that all discourse is non-factual. (tautology)
- (9) Global expressivism entails that there is no distinction between factual and non-factual discourse (from 7, 8)
- (10) Global expressivism presupposes a distinction between factual and non-factual discourse and entails that there is no distinction between factual and non-factual discourse. (conjunction of 2 and 9)

So, global expressivism is incoherent. (from 10)

Premises 1 and 2 follow from the definition of expressivism. To be sure, in recent discussions, sophisticated expressivists like Simon Blackburn have argued that expressivism can allow talk of facts as long as they are understood to be different from ordinary natural facts; we

¹ Why does expressivism involve “denial of appearances”? Because on the face of it, value experience is on a par with other experience in that it presents us with properties that actions and events have independently of our reactions to them. As Sartre puts it, if my friend Pierre is in trouble, he appears with the quality “must-be-helped” (Sartre 1937/2003, 105), and it is precisely this property of his that motivates me to help him. The realist nature of value experience is reflected at least in the surface behavior of value predicates and judgments, which are typically in the declarative mood, quantify over entities or modify noun and verb phrases, as well as enter into truth-functional inferential relations with other judgments (Brink 2000, 196).

could call them “quasi-facts” or q-facts. The argument goes through all the same if we replace “non-factual” with “q-factual” throughout. Premise 3 is widely accepted, also by expressivists (e.g. Blackburn 1998a); as Wittgenstein often emphasized, when we talk about the meaning of an expression, we do not talk about how it is actually used, but about how it would be correct to use it, how it *should* be used. The only controversial primitive premise is 6, Crispin Wright’s semantic descent argument against meaning scepticism. I will first go through it in more detail and then defend it against a charge made by Blackburn.

2. As is well-known, on Saul Kripke’s (1982) interpretation of Wittgenstein no fact about a speaker, her dispositions or her environment settles whether she is following an ordinary rule for the use of an expression or a bent one that yields unpredictable results, like ‘5’ as the result of the calculation ‘57+68’. Since the meaning of an expression is nothing but a rule for its use, there is no fact of the matter about what any expression means – in other words, assertions of the type “X means y” have no truth conditions. However, Kripke argues, this is not, after all, a problem, since meaning-ascriptions have a different purpose from fact-stating. According to his “sceptical solution”, meaning-ascriptions have assertibility conditions relative to membership in a linguistic community. Claims about meaning, thus, are *non-factual*.²

Crispin Wright and Paul Boghossian have both argued that non-factualism about meaning leads to global non-factualism and thus to incoherence. Wright’s argument can be summed up as follows:

- (6a) The truth value of a statement is determined by two factors: its meaning and the state of the world in relevant respects. (platitude)
- (6b) If one truth value determining factor is non-factual, there is no fact of the matter about the truth value of the statement.
- (6c) According to meaning scepticism, the meaning factor of all statements is non-factual. (Kripke’s claim)
- (6d) Hence, non-factualism about meaning entails global non-factualism. (From a, b, and c)³

Premise 6a should be quite obvious. As Wright puts it, “An utterance of S expresses truth in a particular context if and only if what, in that context, S says is so, is so.” (Wright 1984, 768) 6b is no less so. If whether a can of soda is worth buying depends on two factors, its price and its taste, and there is no fact of the matter about its taste, there is no fact of the matter about whether it is worth buying. In the case of sodas we accept this conclusion, but with truth values the price is high. For given 6c, the result is a forced semantic descent from the metalinguistic claim

² In Kripke’s own words, “All that is needed to legitimize assertions that someone means something is that there be roughly specifiable circumstances under which they are legitimately assertible, and that the game of asserting them has a role in our lives. No supposition that ‘facts correspond’ to those assertions is needed.” (Kripke 1982, 77-78)

³ Cf. Wright 1998, 200-201. Boghossian’s formulation is even more succinct: “Since the truth-condition of any sentence S is (in part, anyway) a function of its meaning, a non-factualism about meaning will enjoy a non-factualism about truth conditions: what truth condition S possesses could hardly be a factual matter if that in virtue of which it has a particular truth-condition is not itself a factual matter.” (Boghossian 1989, 524)

that meaning ascriptions have no truth conditions to the claim that no statements have truth conditions.

Wright goes on to criticize meaning scepticism for incoherence: presumably the Kripkean sceptic wants his own conclusion to be true, not just assertible (Wright 1984, 770). The semantic descent, however, precludes this, since if no statement has truth conditions, no statement can be true. This criticism has justly been met with swallowing the pill: the Kripkean can indeed agree that his own conclusion is “merely” assertible – that is, after all, the best we can have according to him. The same goes for Wright’s further complaint that the sceptic can claim no truths about assertibility conditions; the sceptic can make do with assertibility with regard to assertibility conditions as well.⁴

3. But the expressivist cannot swallow the pill without swallowing himself. He cannot embrace global non-factualism, for that would amount to saying that there is no difference between normative discourse and other claims. Saying that “There is a cup of tea on the table” would be no less a matter of expressing attitudes than saying “Hooray for our troops!”. From the other direction, there would be no difference between, say, physical and moral facts. Stretching to cover everything, expressivism would lose its original motivation, explaining the difference between normative and non-normative talk. It could no longer claim to provide a naturalistic account of normativity and its place in human practices.

Seemingly the only way to block this problem would be to deny that non-factualism about meaning entails global non-factualism – in other words, to reject the semantic descent argument. This is Blackburn’s strategy in his response to Wright. His point of departure is that “there is no principled obstacle to metalinguistic judgement being of one kind, and judgments made with words being of a different kind” (Blackburn 1998b, 178). In other words, he argues that even if judgements about meanings of expressions are “soft” (non-factual or quasi-realist) rather than “hard” (factual in the ordinary sense), the judgments involving those expressions can still be hard. This, he claims, is because from the inside or deliberative perspective there is no problem of semantic indeterminacy or bent rules: “when I think in terms of rabbits I do not think in terms of undetached rabbit parts, and when I compute addition I do not compute quaddition.” (ibid.) When thinking and acting we do not reflect upon the contingencies underlying the semantics of our expressions; the problems caused by the softness of meaning arise only for the outsider.⁵

But is this really a solution to the problem? Blackburn does not seem to deny the principle that scepticism about meaning leads to global non-factualism, but simply say that meaning scepticism is not a problem in the first person. But how could that be? To begin with, surely the thought that [Fido is a rabbit] has the same truth condition as the sentence “Fido is a rabbit”. Its meaning is no more or no less determinate; the content of the thought does not

change when I say it out loud, whether we take linguistic or mental content to be more fundamental.⁶ So we might as well look at the public expression. And there we run into familiar Wittgensteinian and meaning externalist concerns. Perhaps I have a *feeling of certainty* when I use a word either in thought or speech that I am referring to such-and-such or following a such-and-such rule. Perhaps I *intend* to refer to a rabbit rather than rabbit parts. All this may be true. But Wittgenstein and Kripke point out that this sort of things simply do not settle what the expressions mean. I can try to say – or think – “a rabbit” and mean a weasel thereby, but that is not what it means (cf. BB, 42). I can be certain that the next step in the series is 1004, but be wrong about it (PI §187-209, §258, and *passim*). And so on. (Indexical thoughts raise complications here, but I will ignore it in the following.) This is not yet to say that thoughts and expressions do not have definite meanings or truth conditions, but rather just to say that feelings of certainty and intentions do not settle them. Blackburn’s attempt to bypass meaning scepticism in the first person case thus fails. If the meanings are soft, so are the truth conditions of the thoughts involving them, and global non-factualism with its paradoxes follows.

4. The consequence is that the expressivist has to give up his global ambition and accept that there is a species of normative discourse, namely meaning-talk, that is no less factual for that, and not just quasi-factual either. It is an open question just how we are to account for its normativity – perhaps, contrary to what Kripke argues, there is a sophisticated version of dispositional theory (such as the one developed in Pettit 1993) that can accommodate our making mistakes and other problems raised by Kripke; perhaps Wittgenstein’s own solution is not sceptical after all, as McDowell (1984) suggests. In any case, it seems that a non-factualist (or quasi-factualist) model like expressivism is ruled out.

Now, if it is possible to come up with such a factualist account of meaning discourse – and since we apparently can make claims with definite truth conditions, there do seem to be facts of the matter about the issue – then what would prevent generalizing that account to other forms of normative discourse, such as ethics? The semantic descent argument is in effect a transcendental argument to the conclusion that there have to be facts about the correct use of linguistic expressions. And if it can be a matter of fact what we should say, why could it not be a matter of fact what we should do? If there can and must be a property that could be labelled, in the spirit of Mackie’s (1977) terminology, “to-be-saidness”, why would “to-be-inferredness” in logic and “to-be-doneness” (or Sartre’s “to-be-helpedness”) in ethics be any more queer? In other words, if it is not necessary to adopt expressivism to explain one type of normative discourse, why should we think it is necessary to do so in ethics, for example? This is how the problems of global expressivism cast doubt on the entire project even in its more modest, restricted forms. It seems that once it is admitted that normativity as such does not preclude a cognitivist account of judgment in an area, what the local expressivist needs to do is find a relevant disanalogy between his favoured kind of normative judgment and meaning-judgments, so that he

⁴ Cf. Boghossian: “To be sure, a global projectivism would have to admit that it is no more than *assertible* that no sentence possesses a truth condition. But what is wrong with that? If there is an instability here, it is not a transparent one.” (Boghossian 1989, 525) Cf. Hale 1997. Boghossian goes on to develop his own argument for the incoherence of the skeptical solution (in more detail in his 1990), but it is convincingly criticized both by Wright (1992, 1998) and Blackburn (1998b).

⁵ Wright’s reply to Blackburn merely notes that we sometimes do reflect on the meanings of the expressions that feature in our judgments: “[I]n appraising the judgement that cats are vertebrates, my first move is inevitably an appreciation of the content of the very words I just used.” (Wright 1998, 202) The worry I raise in the following is different and more fundamental.

⁶ Paul Boghossian convincingly demolishes Colin McGinn’s suggestion that thought contents are exempt from sceptical problems. He sums up with the following: “On the former (Gricean) picture, one cannot threaten linguistic meaning without threatening thought content, since it is from thought that linguistic meaning is held to derive; and on the latter (Sellarsian) picture, one cannot threaten linguistic meaning without *thereby* threatening thought content, since it is from linguistic meaning that thought content is held to derive. Either way, content and meaning must stand or fall together.” (Boghossian 1989, 510)

can plausibly claim that *some* kinds of normativity require an expressivist interpretation.⁷ Perhaps such disanalogies can be found, perhaps not; the issue remains open for further investigation.

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⁷ This expressivist counterstrategy was suggested by Teemu Toppinen. One line of defense for the moral expressivist might be to claim that while linguistic normativity is always relative to a speaker's or a community's dispositions or purposes (as Pettit's (1993) response-dependent model seems to suggest), moral normativity is not so relative – if you morally should refrain from doing something, you should refrain from doing so whatever your dispositions or purposes actually are. Supposing this is the case, it still remains to be shown that cognitivism cannot account for non-relative normativity. Moreover, many theorists would deny that linguistic normativity in general is relative to individual or communal purposes, responses, or dispositions – as McDowell (1984), among others, emphasizes, our grip of the idea that predicates apply in virtue of how things are requires the possibility of the whole community going wrong.

Musik-Phänomenologie: Zur Wahrnehmung von Emotion und Bedeutung kultureller Gegenstände

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1. Husserls Begriff der Person

Im Unterschied zur Psychologie beschäftigt sich die Phänomenologie nicht mit realen Erlebnissen empirischer Subjekte, die in einem kausalen Verhältnis zu ihrer Umwelt stehen. Vielmehr ist es Husserls Grundannahme, dass weder das Denken noch andere seelische Zustände in Gestalt empirischer Gesetzesaussagen oder Kausalschemata hinreichend beschrieben werden können. So ist sein Ausgangspunkt mitunter ein wissenschaftskritischer, der sich in seiner Psychologismuskritik äußert und auf die Trennung von Geistes- und Naturwissenschaften abzielt. In Anlehnung an W. Dilthey geht Husserl davon aus, es einer neuen Psychologie bedarf,

einer allgemeinen Wissenschaft vom Geiste, die nicht „psychophysisch“, nicht naturwissenschaftlich ist. [...] Nur eine *r a d i k a l e*, auf die phänomenologischen Quellen der Konstitution der Ideen Natur, Leib, Seele und der verschiedenen Ideen von Ich und Person gerichtete Untersuchung kann hier die entscheidenden Aufschlüsse geben [...]. (Husserl 1952, 137)

1.1. Motivation und Assoziation

Intentionalität (Gerichtetsein auf etwas) ist die Grundstruktur des Bewusstseins, mittels welcher das Wesen der Erkenntnis und die Gegebenheitsweisen realer Gegenstände beschrieben werden. Meinen, Vorstellen, Erinnern, Wünschen, etc. sind qualitativ verschiedene intentionale Akte, die auf verschiedene intentionale Gegenstände gerichtet sein können. Die Phänomenologie setzt also jeden Erkenntnisgegenstand in Bezug auf das transzendente Subjekt; so wirkt der Akt der Intentionalität quasi als ‚Verbindung‘ zwischen den Dingen in der Welt und dem Bewusstsein.

Intentionalität und Motivation sind verwandte Begriffe. Das Subjekt konstituiert ein Objekt, es ist auf es gerichtet, verhält sich zu ihm. Umgekehrt reizt das Objekt das Ich auf theoretische, ästhetische, praktische Weise und wird für das Subjekt zum Thema seiner Freiheit. Intentionales Subjekt und motivierendes Objekt sind nur korrelativ ausweisbar.

Durch Assoziationen und Gewohnheiten wird eine Beziehung zwischen *früherem und späterem Bewusstsein innerhalb des Ichbewusstseins gestiftet* (Husserl 1952, 222). Während die Motivation selbst zwar im (aktuellen) Bewusstsein ist, sind ihre *Motive*, die *seelischen Gründe* meist verborgen und nur psychoanalytisch auffindbar.

Die durch Ähnlichkeit auftretende *unbewusste Erinnerung* an frühere Motivationszusammenhänge löst eine analoge Motivation aus; es besteht die Tendenz, den Bewusstseinsstrom in analoger Weise fortzusetzen. Diese *passive*, assoziative Tendenz beruht also auf dem Gesetz der Gewohnheit und dem Gesetz der Ähnlichkeit.

Indem Husserl nun die Motivationsbeziehung für den gesamten Erfahrungsbereich geltend macht, wird der Zusammenhang zwischen Motivation auf der einen und Apperzeption bzw. Konstitution auf der anderen Seite deutlich. Jede Erfahrung, jede Auffassung von Dingen und

dinglichen Zusammenhängen besteht aus einem *Motivationsgeflecht* (ebd., 224).

1.2. Der Habitus als Untergrund jeder aktuellen Wahrnehmung

Die Gesamtheit der gewohnheitsmäßigen Verhaltensweisen (der geistig passiven und aktiven), die den Untergrund der einheitlichen Person bildet, nennt Husserl den *Habitus des Subjekts*. Auf ihn ist das Subjekt in all seinen Akten bezogen, bzw. es wird von ihm getrieben.

Bei jeder Konstitution eines Gegenstandes, bei jedem intentionalen Akt wird die Person zurückverwiesen auf frühere Akte und Stellungnahmen, auf frühere Empfindungsdaten und Assoziationen. Jedes Verhalten der Person basiert auf diesem dunklen Hintergrund. So unterscheiden sich die Personen sowohl bezüglich der Eigenart ihres Verhaltens als auch bezüglich des *Sichwebens* dieses Hintergrundes.

Das personale Subjekt bildet zusammen mit dem Untergrund (*Seele als fundierender Untergrund*) die Einheit des Ich. Die Stellungnahmen des geistigen Ich sind also mit den *Vorstellungsdispositionen*, den *habituellen Eigenschaften* verflochten. Seele meint hier jedoch nicht die psychophysische Einheit, die mit der realen Natur in kausaler Beziehung steht, sondern eben die *Gesetzmäßigkeit der Bildung von Dispositionen*.

Auf diese Weise ist der Geist also mit dem sinnlich seelischen Leben verflochten. Letzteres bindet ihn auch an die objektive Natur, wodurch das Ineinandergreifen von personalistischer und naturalistischer Einstellung auf die Subjektivität wirksam wird:

so hängt das geistige Ich von der Seele und die Seele vom Leibe ab: also e[s] ist naturbedingt; aber in einem Verhältnis der Kausalität steht e[s] deswegen nicht zur Natur. Er [der Geist] hat einen Untergrund, der konditional abhängig ist, er hat als Geist eine Seele, einen Komplex von Dispositionen, die als solche durch die physische Natur bedingt und von ihr abhängig sind.

1.3. Die soziale Umwelt

Für die Person ist es konstitutiv, sich gemeinsam mit anderen Personen auf eine gemeinsame Umwelt zu beziehen. Allerdings fassen sich Personen nicht nur gegenseitig als solche auf; sie bestimmen sich gegenseitig, sind personal verbunden tätig. Selbstredend ist die interpersonale Beziehung keine kausale, sondern eine motivationale.

Sie richten sich in ihrem geistigen Tun aufeinander (das Ich auf den Anderen und umgekehrt), sie vollziehen Akte in der Absicht, von ihrem gegenüber verstanden zu werden [...] Es bilden sich so *Beziehungen des Einverständnisses*: auf die Rede folgt Antwort, auf theoretische, wertende, praktische Zumutung, die der Eine macht, folgt die gleichsam antwortende Rückwendung, die Zustimmung (das Einverstanden) oder Ablehnung (das Nicht-einverstanden) [...]. (Husserl 1952, 192f.)

Durch diese bewusstseinsmäßige Wechselbeziehung wird eine gemeinsame Umwelt hergestellt, welche physische, personale und ideale Gegenstände enthält.

Im Verstehen einer Person als empirische Einheit lassen sich nun zwei Ebenen – das Allgemeintypische und das Individualtypische – herausstreichen. Zu einer Person gehört zunächst ihr allgemein-menschliches Verhalten: einen Leib zu haben und ihm gemäß zu handeln, z.B. zu trinken, wenn ihm durstet. Auch die Eigenschaft, aus vergangenen Erfahrungen zu lernen, und die Fähigkeit, das Verhalten aufgrund dieser Erfahrungen zu ändern, gehört zum Allgemein-Menschlichen einer Person. Innerhalb dieses Allgemeintypischen bildet sich jedoch ein „Spezialcharakter“ aus, der über eine gewisse Zeit hinweg derselbe bleibt. Aber durch ihre *sich immer neu bildenden Erfahrungs-apperzeptionen* ändern sich die *Vorgegebenheiten* der Person, auf die sie sich in ihrem Verhalten (in ihren Motivationen und Stellungnahmen) bezieht. Auf diese Weise ändert und „bildet“ sich die Person durch Erfahrung.

Jede Person ist selbst Subjekt ihrer Umwelt, ist *Subjekt-Objekt*, insofern sie sich auf sich selbst und die Möglichkeiten ihres Verhaltens richten kann. Von dieser Umwelt unterscheidet Husserl die „Außenwelt“, die bloß die Objekte enthält, auf die sich eine Gemeinschaft bezieht – Kulturobjekte, Wissenschaften, Künste etc.

Umwelt, Außenwelt, Einzelsubjekt und soziale Subjektivität konstituieren die Idee der *Geisteswelt*.

Für jedes Subjekt, das in dieser Weise Glied eines sozialen Gesamtverbandes ist, konstituiert sich eine und dieselbe, obschon vom „Standpunkt“ dieses Subjekts mit einem entsprechenden (also von Subjekt zu Subjekt wechselnden) Auffassungssinn aufgefasste und gesetzte Geisteswelt: eine verbundene Vielheit von Subjekten, von Einzelgeistern und geistigen Gemeinschaften, bezogen auf eine Dingwelt, eine Welt von „Objekten“, d.i. eine Wirklichkeit, die nicht Geist, aber für den Geist ist, andererseits doch als Wirklichkeit für den Geist immerzu auch begeistete, geistig bedeutsame ist, geistigen Sinn in sich tragend und für immer neuen solchen Sinn empfänglich. (Husserl 1952, 197)

Somit gelangt man auch in personalistischer Einstellung zu einer Dingwelt als intersubjektive Natur; jedoch ist sie von der naturalistisch betrachteten Natur klar zu unterscheiden. Sie ist das *Feld wirklicher und möglicher Erfahrung*, insofern sie sich für die einzelnen Subjekte anschaulich und intersubjektiv konstituiert und geistige Bedeutung hat.

2. Die Bedeutung von *Körper, Leib* und *Geist* in der Musikwahrnehmung

Nach Husserl ist die Person also einerseits – als Körper – von Naturkausalitäten (realen Relationen) abhängig, andererseits – als Geist – durch motivationale Relationen bestimmt. Zwischen diesen Ebenen, die Husserl auch durch die Unterscheidung zwischen *naturalistischer* und *personalistischer Einstellung* charakterisiert, vermitteln der Leib und die habituellen Eigenschaften der Person, also die auf Ähnlichkeit und Gewohnheit basierenden assoziativen Relationen.

Versuchen wir nun, dies auf die Musikwahrnehmung zu übertragen, so ist es sinnvoll, eine den Bereichen *Körper, Leib, Geist* analoge Beschreibung des Wahrnehmungsprozesses vorzunehmen. Sowohl die Dimension der durch die Musik hervorgerufenen Emotionen und Bedeutungen

als auch die Musik selbst lassen sich auf diese Weise beschreiben:

Auf der körperlichen Ebene manifestieren sich Emotionen und wahrgenommene Bedeutungen z.B. in der Form eines erhöhten Hautwiderstandes, einer erhöhten Pulsfrequenz oder einer vermehrten Aktivität spezifischer Hirnregionen. Allerdings gelangen diese Aspekte in der Regel nicht zur Wahrnehmung und sind demnach für eine phänomenologische Beschreibung des Wahrnehmungsprozesses nicht von Bedeutung. Auf der Leib-Ebene empfinden wir physiologischen Veränderungen etwa als Erregung oder – im umgekehrten Fall – als Entspannung. Jedoch erleben wir diese leiblichen Empfindungen nicht isoliert von einer bestimmten Situation oder einem Objekt, das diese *motiviert* hat. So gelangt man schließlich zur Geist- und Bedeutungs-Ebene. Die auf physiologischen Reaktionen basierenden leiblichen Empfindungen werden zur erlebten Emotion, die sich beispielsweise als Angst, Freude oder Trauer herausstellt.

Natürlich vollzieht sicher dieser Prozess nicht als ein zeitliches Hintereinander und wird auch nicht stufenweise erlebt. Vielmehr bedarf es für eine solche Analyse eines reflexiven Aktes, dessen Nützlichkeit noch verdeutlicht werden wird.

Emotionen und Bedeutungen lassen sich nun wiederum in drei Bereiche unterscheiden. Einerseits in die bereits erwähnten leiblichen Empfindungen (1), andererseits in die damit assoziativ/konditional verbundenen Bedeutungen, die jedoch entweder innerhalb einer sozialen Umwelt intersubjektiv (2) oder subjektiv verschieden (3) sein können (vgl. oben *Habitus, Allgemeintypisches* vs. *Individualtypisches*).

Musik ist in naturalistischer Einstellung beschreibbar als – grob gesprochen – ein System von Frequenzen und Amplituden, das sich in der Zeit strukturiert. Natürlich nehmen wir keine physikalischen Parameter wahr, sondern Tonhöhen und Lautstärken, die in einem bestimmten Rhythmus und innerhalb einer bestimmten Zeitdauer auf bestimmte Weise zueinander in Beziehung stehen.

Nun könnte man Klangfarben, Lautstärken und Rhythmen der Leib-Ebene zuordnen, insofern sie (bzw. deren physikalische Entsprechung) physiologische Reaktionen hervorrufen, die zu leiblichen Empfindungen führen. Wir empfinden eine laute, stark akzentuierte Melodie gemeinhin als aktivierend oder anregend und meistens nicht als entspannend. Nun bleibt die ästhetische Wahrnehmung aber nicht bei diesen Empfindungen stehen. Unser gesamtes kulturelles und individuelles Wissen, unser gesamter Erfahrungsschatz beeinflusst das Wie der aktuellen Erfahrung. Es werden Bedeutungen wahrgenommen, die entweder intersubjektiv oder subjektiv verschieden sein können.

Blieben wir beim Beispiel einer lauten, stark akzentuierten Melodie. Über unseren Körper und unseren Leib assoziieren wir mit einer solchen musikalischen Gestalt vermutlich eher *Kraft* und *Dynamik*. Dies beruht auf der realen Relation, in der unser Körper mit der physikalischen Gestalt steht. Innerhalb einer sozialen Umwelt, einem Kulturkreis also oder auch einer kleineren Sozietät könnte dies nun weiter mit *Macht* oder *Gewalt* assoziiert werden. Dies kann von den verwendeten Instrumenten herrühren, die innerhalb einer Sozietät mit bestimmten Bedeutungen assoziiert werden. So werden Blechblasinstrumente oft mit kriegerischen Fanfaren in Verbindung gebracht, Holzblasinstrumente eher mit pastoralen Stimmungen. Die subjektive Wahrnehmung hingegen kann von diesen intersubjektiv

ven Assoziationen abweichen oder auch völlig verschieden davon sein, nämlich wenn die persönlichen Erfahrungen, die man mit einem musikalischen Aspekt oder einem ganzen Stück gemacht hat, die kulturellen Bedeutungen überschatten.

Auch die Musiktheorie lässt sich anhand dieses Modells beschreiben. Der Unterschied zwischen Konsonanz und Dissonanz etwa, wahrscheinlich einer der entscheidendsten Aspekte abendländischer Musik, basiert natürlich auf einer physiologischen Reaktion, insofern im Innenohr bestimmte Mechanismen ablaufen. Wir empfinden diese Klänge auf der Leib-Ebene als angenehm (Konsonanz) oder als unangenehm (Dissonanz), wobei die Bewertung selbst jeglicher physiologischer Grundlage entbehrt (zu anderen Zeiten und in anderen Kulturen war/ist dies mitunter umgekehrt). Erst eine assoziative Verknüpfung, die sich mittels Gewöhnung und Konditionierung erklären lässt, ermöglicht eine ästhetische Bewertung. Diese ist klar intersubjektiv und macht es überhaupt erst möglich, dass Musik soziale und kulturelle Bedeutung erlangt. Aber die ästhetische Bewertung von Klängen ist ferner abhängig von einem bestimmten (außer- und/oder innermusikalischen) Kontext oder der Einstellung eines konkreten Subjekts.

3. Wissenschaftskritische Implikationen

In naturalistischer Einstellung sieht man keine Personen und auch nicht die Welt, auf die sie sich in Form ihrer Umwelt beziehen. Der Naturwissenschaftler, der Psychologe sieht keine Personen und aus personalen Leistungen Sinn empfangenden Objekte – also keine Kultur-Objekte – er sieht eigentlich *keine Personen, obschon er sich mit Personen in der Einstellung des naturalistischen Psychologen zu schaffen macht* (Husserl 1952, 191).

Zwischen dem Ich, dem geistigen Subjekt und dem intentionalen, als seiend gesetzten Objekt besteht keine zwingende Kausalität, wie zwischen realem Ich bzw. Leib und realem Objekt, sondern eine Beziehung der Motivation.

Wenn der Naturwissenschaftler den Menschen betrachtet, studiert, erforscht und sein Verhalten *erklärt*, sieht und beschreibt er ihn als durch seinen Leib fundiert und in kausaler Abhängigkeit zur gesamten räumlich-zeitlichen Natur stehend. Das Ziel der Naturwissenschaft ist das Auffinden von Naturgesetzen, welche Aussagen darüber machen, was unter bestimmten Umständen auf etwas Bestimmtes folgen *mus*s. Die Naturkausalitäten sind bloß erscheinungsmäßig gegeben. Wir sehen zwar,

wie der Bohrer das Loch bohrt; aber die gesehenen Kausalitäten sind hier bloße Erscheinungen „wahrer“ Naturkausalitäten, ebenso wie das gesehene Ding bloße Erscheinung des wahren, des physikalischen Dinges ist. Die wahre Natur des Physikers ist eine methodische notwendige Substruktion des Denkens und ist nur als solche zu konstituieren, nur als „mathematische“ hat sie ihre Wahrheit. (Husserl 1952, 230)

Motivationen dagegen sind voll anschaulich gegeben. Nach Husserl wird die Person ausschließlich durch Erlebnisse motiviert und nicht durch physiologische Prozesse. Der Reiz eines Objekts rührt nicht von seinen physikalischen Eigenschaften her, von denen das Subjekt nichts zu wissen benötigt, sondern von den erfahrenen Eigenschaften. Das Subjekt erfährt das intentionale Objekt wertend, wollend, benützend oder schöpferisch umgestaltend. So handelt es sich bei meiner Umwelt nicht um die

physikalische Welt, sondern um meine thematische Welt. Jedes Objekt wird durch das subjektive Handeln zum Thema meiner Freiheit, und das Handeln selbst ist nicht mehr durch Hirn- oder Nervenprozesse erklärbar.

3.1. Anwendungsfelder von naturwissenschaftlichen und geisteswissenschaftlichen Methoden

Die erwähnte personalistische und naturalistische Einstellung spiegeln sich in den Methoden der Musikpsychologie wider. Mittels naturwissenschaftlicher Methoden, werden Reiz-Reaktions-Mechanismen untersucht, die es ermöglichen, objektive Theorien zu formulieren. Geisteswissenschaftliche Methoden zielen hingegen darauf ab, bestimmte menschliche, kulturelle Phänomene anhand ihrer motivationalen Zusammenhängen zu beschreiben. Die Unterscheidung der Bereiche der Person, des Phänomens der Emotion/Bedeutung und der Musik ist m.E. ein adäquates Modell, um Methode und Gegenstandsbereich innerhalb der Erforschung wahrgenommener musikalischer Bedeutung und Emotion aufeinander abzustimmen und Kategorienfehler zu vermeiden.

3.2. Ein Beispiel

Die musikalische Präferenz, die Frage nach dem Wohlgefallen, ist ein Bereich, der sowohl soziologisch als auch psychologisch oder historisch erforscht wird. Ich möchte nun an diesem Beispiel veranschaulichen, warum und inwiefern ein Untersuchungsmethode den Gegenstandsbereich bestimmt und gleichzeitig einschränkt.

Der Körper, der – wie bereits mehrfach erwähnt – zu seiner Umwelt in realer, kausaler Relation steht, reagiert auf einen musikalischen Stimulus mit einem bestimmten physiologischen Zustand – etwa einem bestimmten Aktivierungsniveau. Dem Modell der Homöostase (Kreitler & Kreitler 1980) zufolge wird ein mittleres Aktivierungsniveau als angenehm erlebt. In einem naturwissenschaftlichen Experiment, etwa mittels EKG oder Pulsfrequenzmessung, kann objektiv gezeigt werden, wie der menschliche Körper auf bestimmte Stimuli – als Folge eines Reiz-Reaktions-Mechanismus – reagiert. Abgesehen davon, dass diese Reaktion interindividuell oder interkulturell (aufgrund verschiedener Lebensweisen) verschieden sein kann, sagt sie noch nichts über erlebte Präferenz aus, zumal die zu verwendenden Stimuli, um Störfaktoren auszuschließen, auf möglichst wenige Aspekte beschränkt werden und daher kaum noch als musikalische gelten können.

Die assoziativen Verknüpfungen, die eine erste ästhetische Bewertung darstellen, innerhalb einer bestimmten Sozietät intersubjektiv sind und meist auf Konditionierung zurückzuführen sind, können anhand des *Semantischen Differentials* untersucht werden (Osgood et al. 1957). Das Semantische Differential ist eine Methode zur Messung der konnotativen oder affektiven Bedeutung von Objekten. Da es sich hierbei um eine Fragebogenuntersuchung mit rating-scales handelt, die statistisch ausgewertet werden, und die zur Auswahl stehenden Konnotationen sehr allgemeiner Art (angenehm vs. unangenehm, hart vs. weich) sind, kann das Ergebnis subjektive Bedeutungen nicht berücksichtigen. Es ist wichtig zu verstehen, dass diese Ergebnisse von sehr oberflächlicher Natur sind, nur innerhalb einer bestimmten Sozietät intersubjektiv sind und nicht mit – auf alle Individuen zutreffenden – objektiven Wahrheiten verwechselt werden dürfen.

Kulturelle und subjektive Bedeutungen lassen sich nur mit qualitativen Methoden untersuchen, in welchen der Forscher nicht den Anspruch erhebt, objektiver Beobach-

ter zu sein, und in denen die Personen mitsamt ihres kulturellen und persönlichen Hintergrunds in Erscheinung treten kann. Erst in dieser *personalistischen Einstellung* können die motivationalen Relationen, die dazu führen, dass Menschen eine Musik für schön befinden, herausgearbeitet werden. (vgl. Allesch 1990, 14-27)

Die Methode einer Wissenschaft – verstanden als spezifische Einstellungsweise – impliziert nicht nur deren Gegenstandsbereich als den Bereich, über den diese Wissenschaft Aussagen machen kann, sondern auch einen Subjektbegriff. Umgekehrt ist es ebenso notwendig, wenn man von einem bestimmten Subjektbegriff bzw. Gegenstandsbereich ausgeht, eine adäquate Methode anzuwenden. Da nun der Körper über den Leib mit dem Geist nicht kausal, sondern konditional verknüpft ist, können Aussagen über musikalische Präferenz, die auf der Körper-Ebene, also aufgrund naturwissenschaftlicher Methoden, getätigt werden, nicht auf die Geist-Ebene übertragen werden. M.a.W.: Studien, die keine reale Musik als Stimuli verwenden und quantitative Auswertungsmethoden anwenden, sprechen nicht über das kulturelle, geistige Phänomen Musik.

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A Dretskean Predicament of Intentionality

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I

While not making a definite distinction between the object and the content of an intentional state, Franz Brentano maintained that the object of an intentional act does not need to exist outside the mind, and thus may not be reduced to any physical entity in the world. In this way he bequeathed us the idea of intentionality as the mark of the mental. From a naturalistic point of view, however, I note that the need for the naturalization of intentionality lies in eliminating mysterious features of intentionality so understood and searching for some material or physical bases of it. This line of thought is greatly deepened when Fred Dretske suggests that there are different degrees or levels of intentionality, and that even a simple physical device, such as a thermometer, could have a certain degree of intentionality. Surprisingly, he even holds that intentionality does not need to be naturalized because the phenomena of intentionality are already prevalent in nature. To philosophers who want to regard intentionality as the mark of the mental, this must be a stunning piece of news.

Does Dretske's idea of intentionality mentioned above imply that a simple physical system has a real mind? No, it does not. What could, then, be the point of his suggestion? One answer is: To maintain that a physical device can have a certain degree of intentionality but does *not* have a mind is to separate the notion of the mark of the mental from the traditional idea of intentionality. Dretske seems to succeed in fulfilling this task. As a naturalist, I admire his idea of different levels of intentionality. However, I find in his conception of high-level intentionality a difficulty which may lead to the conclusion that some sort of intentionality is after all the mark of the mental. I call this a Dretskean predicament of intentionality. The purpose of the present paper is to pin down the difficulty. In what follows, while accounting for Dretske's idea of different levels of intentionality, I shall argue that one way to overcome the Dretskean predicament of intentionality is to avoid defining intentionality in terms of intensionality.

II

Dretske's 1980 paper "The Intentionality of Cognitive States" is a good source of understanding his fundamental ideas of intentionality. He begins the paper by remarking that, although intentional states, such as knowing, perceiving, and remembering, are not always propositional, he would first confine his consideration of intentionality to propositional attitudes whose contents are entirely true. It seems to me that in comparison with proposition-directedness, object-directedness is a more basic form of intentionality.¹ At this stage, however, we just need to note that Dretske defines the concept of an intentional state as "any state of affairs having a propositional content whose expression is non-extensional." (Dretske 1980, 282.) Using the notion of intensionality to characterize intentionality has become prevalent, especially since the American philosopher Roderick Chisholm. As we shall see later on, that is the main source of the Dretskean predicament

mentioned above. In any event it is noteworthy that with that definition of intentionality, Dretske tries to show that "intentionality, rather than being a 'mark of mental,' is a pervasive feature of *all* reality—mental and physical." (Dretske's emphasis; Dretske 1980, 285.) He makes this point clear by considering the way communication systems work.

The main function of a communicative system is to carry a piece of information. Dretske's strategy is to lay bare the aboutness of information, and then to show that it is the main source of the intentionality of our cognitive states. On his view the aboutness of information consists of three structural factors: the source of information, the receiver of information, and the information conveyed. The source of information is the world. The receiver of information obtains the very information that comes from the source of information. This is guaranteed by the nomic relation between the source and the receiver of information. So to say that the conditional probability of a piece of information is 1 is to say that the receiver obtains the information at issue without any distortion. In this way the aboutness of information is transferred from the original source of a piece of information to the receiver of the information. More important is that anything that can be a receiver and carrier of information could have an aboutness, i.e. a certain degree of intentionality. This is the first step toward proving the thesis that even a simple physical system, such as a thermometer or galvanometer, could have intentionality.

The next step is about a special feature of the intentionality of information. It is concerned with the intensional feature of the aboutness of information. When a physical system receives and carries a piece of information that something is *F*, even if '*F*' and '*G*' are extensionally equivalent, it is, in principle, possible that the physical system does not carry the information that the something is *G*. Surely the informational state of a simple physical system can be intensional. The issue is: Can the physical system really make the distinction between the information that something is *F* and the information that something is *G*, when '*F*' and '*G*' are extensionally equivalent? In other words, could a simple physical system recognize and identify the fine-grained content of a given informational state? No. Why is that so? It is, according to Dretske, because it lacks the coding system in which the fine-grained specification of information is made. This point is important. For, as we shall see shortly, Dretske bases different levels of intentionality on different sorts of coding systems that informational systems have.

III

In order to clarify Dretske's position, I now introduce an example designed to show us the need for positing different levels of intentionality. Suppose that a horse is running in the meadow. Suppose also that a zoologist, a young child who does not yet command a language, a dog, and a speed camera see the horse run. Their sense organs (or sensors) are normal, and they are seeing the horse under optimal conditions. Seeing is an intentional act, just in the sense that it is about something other than

¹ In what follows I take the philosophical terms 'intentionality,' 'aboutness,' and 'directedness' to be synonymous.

the act itself. In this respect, there are, in the above case, four intentional acts. My further questions are as follows:

First, how many objects of intentional acts are there? This question is somewhat confusing. For there are different senses of the term ‘the object of an intentional act.’ On the one hand, in the sense that each intentional act has its own object, there are four objects of intentional acts. It seems to me that this understanding of the object of an intentional act is rather nearer to the notion of the content of an intentional act. On the other hand, however, when we take the object of an intentional act to be an actual external object or state of affairs upon which an intentional state is directed, the answer would be that there is only one object or state of affairs, i.e. the running horse in the meadow, which is shared by all four intentional acts.

Second, how many contents of intentional acts are there? The current standard answer would be that there is just one intentional content, i.e. the proposition that a horse runs in the meadow. Any level-theorist of intentionality would need to contend with this claim. Surely the zoologist would see that a horse runs in the meadow. What about the child, the dog, and the speed camera? Assuming the representationalist picture of an intentional content, can we say that the content of the young child’s intentional state, who does not yet command a language, is the proposition that a horse runs in the meadow? Is the dog’s intentional state also directed upon this proposition? To say that it is so is to ascribe some high-level intentionality to the young child and the dog, which seems to be absurd. The reason that the intentionality involved in these cases must be high-level one is that the intentionality of the sort requires mastering a full-fledged language. A dilemma finally comes out: It is undeniable that both the child and the dog in the example, insofar as their sense organs properly work, must have a form of intentionality. So does the speed camera. At the same time, however, it is very hard to accept that they have some high-level intentionality. I take it that one of the motivations behind the idea that there are different degrees or levels of intentionality lies in avoiding this dilemma. And the plausible answer that can avoid that dilemma is that both the child and the dog have low-level intentionality but not high-level intentionality. In this way we legitimately postulate different levels of intentionality.

Dretske’s originality lies in his account of how different levels of intentionality are shaped and structured. According to him, there are chiefly two different ways of coding information, i.e., an analog and a digital encoding of information. In order to see what they are, let us go back to the aforementioned example, and ask the question: What could be the difference between simply seeing a running horse in the meadow and deliberately judging that a horse is running in the meadow? The Dretskean answer will be that the former is an analog representation, whereas the latter is a digital representation. Notice that when it comes to encoding a piece of information in an analog way, special means of representation, e.g. a language or a set of pertinent concepts, are not needed. In that case a representational system only requires the normal functioning of the sense organs (sensors). This is the reason why the child, the dog, and even the speed camera in the example can somehow represent the object or state of affairs in its surroundings. In contrast, according to Dretske: “Digital conversion [of an analog representation] is a process in which irrelevant pieces of information are pruned away and discarded.” (Dretske 1981, 141.) The reason why the digital conversion of information is important is that in order for a piece of information to be genuine knowledge, a definite semantic content should be added to the information, and digital conversion makes it

possible. The present point is that analog representation forms low-level intentionality, whereas digital representation constitutes high-level intentionality.

IV

By showing how a simple physical device could have and display a certain kind of intentionality, Dretske seems to succeed in reaching a radically different view of intentionality. This is not the end of the story, though. In the latter part of the 1980 paper, Dretske asks a significant question as to whether he has mentalized the physical. He did not mentalize the physical. Did he, then, discard the mental? The correct answer is no. What I want to call a Dretskean predicament of intentionality derives from these two nos. That is: Dretske, on the one hand, suggests that even a simple physical system “could occupy intentional states of the appropriate kind.” (Dretske 1980, 282.) On the other hand, however, he maintains that intentional states that simple physical systems can occupy are “not *intentional enough*.” (Dretske’s emphasis; Dretske 1980, 289.) In this respect Dretske seems to take it that high-level intentionality is intrinsically different from low-level intentionality. As we have seen, this reflects the gap between the analog and the digital encoding of information. What matters is that when we appreciate the peculiar role and function of high-level intentionality, it seems that we cannot but conclude that intentionality of the sort is, after all, the mark of the mental. Even on Dretske’s view the status of intentionality still remains a mystery, so to speak. Again: By recognizing that there are different degrees or levels of intentionality, we can successfully avoid the idea that the mark of the mental is the intentionality of the mind. As far as high-level intentionality is concerned, however, the idea of intentionality as the mark of the mental reappears. Between these two poles, where can we reach a compromise? Paying attention to the varieties and heterogeneities of the phenomena of intentionality, I think that a Dretskean level theory of intentionality could be the most promising theory that can cope with puzzles about intentionality, reference, and cognition. However, how could we face the difficulty above?

At present I cannot resolve the difficulty. One thing is certain, though. Recall that it is the notion of intentionality and its associated peculiar phenomena that drove Dretske to take high-level intentionality seriously. Many philosophers in the analytic tradition have also understood intentionality by means of intentionality. Can intentionality, then, be the only proper criterion for characterizing intentionality? I think not. Here is why: Intentionality is a feature of high-level intentionality that requires mastering a language. That is, intentionality is a product of digital representation. Consider the fact that using a language is a result of the recent development of some biological species in evolutionary processes. Intentionality could be a particularly developed form of aboutness. So understood, how can it be the defining characteristic of low-level analog intentionality? The point is this: Insofar as we adhere to the notion of intentionality to define intentionality, low-level intentionality is not low enough to be just directed at an actual external object in the environment, whereas high-level intentionality so characterized is too high. Given this point, I want to suggest that we need to discard the notion of intentionality in defining intentionality. In that way we could fill the fundamental gap between low-level intentionality and high-level intentionality. And this will help us not to conclude that *any* high-level intentionality could be the mark of the mental. The next task we need to perform would be to refine the notion of intentionality in a

new, naturalistic manner.² For now, however, suffice it to say that intensionality cannot be the defining characteristic of intentionality.

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² I maintain that we can refine the notion of different levels of intentionality without reference to the concept of intensionality. For example:
The mind is, at the low-level, directed at an object X iff the outside skin of the sensors of a cognizer reacts to the presence of an object X.
The mind is, at the high-level, directed upon an object X iff a cognizer uses a linguistic expression taken as indicating an object X.

Wittgensteins therapeutische Behandlung von Bedeutungstheorien

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In § 116 der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* (PU) schreibt Wittgenstein:

Wenn die Philosophen ein Wort gebrauchen [...] und das *Wesen* des Dinges zu erfassen trachten, muß man sich immer fragen: Wird denn dieses Wort in der Sprache, in der es seine Heimat hat, je tatsächlich so gebraucht?

Aus Stellen wie dieser haben eine Anzahl prominenter Kommentatorinnen und Kommentatoren geschlossen, daß Wittgenstein konstruktive Methoden in der Philosophie generell abgelehnt hat.¹ Folgen wir diesen Kommentaren, dann wollte Wittgenstein lediglich das Gefühl der Dringlichkeit zerstreuen, das man beim Nachdenken über philosophische Probleme empfinden kann. Seine Methode soll ausschließlich dem Zweck gedient haben, aufzuzeigen, wie wir uns beim Nachdenken in unserer eigenen verworrenen Terminologie verheddert haben. In Anlehnung an eine Bemerkung Wittgensteins bezeichnen ihre Vertreter diese Position als die therapeutische Lesart seines Werks. Damit verbinden sie die These, daß Wittgenstein nie eine philosophische Aussage um ihrer selbst willen verfochten haben soll, sondern stets, um uns die Inhaltslosigkeit philosophischer Ausdrucksformen zu demonstrieren und uns so von unserem Bedürfnis nach Philosophie zu heilen.

Wittgensteins sprachphilosophische Bemerkungen dürfen nach dieser Lesart nicht mit einer philosophischen Bedeutungstheorie verwechselt werden. Sein wirklicher Punkt war angeblich, daß das Streben nach solchen Theorien zwangsläufig zu barem Unsinn führt. Auf ungläubige Reaktionen erhält man die Antwort, daß das störrische Festhalten an philosophischen Bedeutungstheorien von der Besessenheit zeugt, die der Bedeutungsbegriff bei Philosophen weckt. Nicht zufällig sprechen Vertreter der therapeutischen Lesart deshalb gerne von einem ‚Exorzismus‘ philosophischer Probleme. Exorzismus und Therapie besagen allerdings auch als Metaphern nicht dasselbe. Wer einen Exorzismus anstrebt, möchte etwas austreiben, was dem Besessenen nicht angehört. Im Unterschied dazu sehen heutige Therapeuten im Leiden einen Teil eines komplexen psychischen bzw. physischen Systems. Weil der Patient das Symptom tatsächlich häufig als etwas Fremdes empfindet, gehört es zu den Aufgaben der Therapie, dem Patienten eine realistischere Sicht von sich und seinen Möglichkeiten zu vermitteln. *Ich werde in diesem Papier die Ansicht vertreten, daß Wittgensteins Kur uns in vergleichbarer Weise eine bestimmte Form von Bedeutungstheorie als Bestandteil eines realistischeren Bildes unserer selbst erschließen soll.*

Mein Vorschlag ist eher als Korrektur denn als schroffe Ablehnung gemeint. Die therapeutische Lesart genießt viele Vorzüge im Vergleich zu ihren traditionellen Rivalen. Zu ihren Stärken zählt, daß sie uns gegen ‚anachronistische Lesarten‘ Wittgensteins immunisiert. Gordon Baker hat diesen Ausdruck für Lesarten geprägt, die unsere aktuellen Debatten – und unsere blinden Flecke – auf Wittgensteins Position projizieren (Baker 1988, xii ff.). Ich möchte im Folgenden anhand eines Beispiels demonstrieren, wie uns die therapeutische Lesart vor einem solchen Anachronismus bewahren kann. Das Beispiel ist so

gewählt, daß es ein Licht auf Wittgensteins therapeutische Behandlung der Bedeutungstheorie wirft.

Martin Stone, ein Verfechter der therapeutischen Lesart, hat unlängst auf eine Parallele zwischen Kripkes enorm einflußreicher Wittgenstein-Interpretation und Derridas Kritik an Husserl hingewiesen (Stone 2000). Laut Kripke folgt Wittgenstein als Konsequenz aus dem Scheitern des Regel-Platonisten, daß jeder sinnvolle Ausdruck auf eine Interpretation verweist, eine These, die Stone als *Interpretivismus* bezeichnet. Diese These baut Kripke dann zu seinem berühmt-berüchtigtem skeptischen Paradox aus: Weil sich zu jeder Deutung eines Zeichens neue Deutungen finden lassen, müssen wir folgern, daß es keine Fakten über Bedeutungen gibt. Wie Derrida folgt Kripkenstein, daß diese Konsequenz unabweisbar und der Begriff der Bedeutung tief problematisch ist.

Wie Stone zeigt, unterstellt Kripke Wittgenstein, daß dieser den Interpretivismus – wie die Dekonstruktivisten – für unausweichlich hält. Damit tut Kripke etwas, wovor die Verfechter der therapeutischen Lesart hartnäckig warnen. Er schreibt Wittgenstein eine Position zu, die lediglich demonstrieren soll, wie wir uns in der Sprache verrannt haben. Stone zitiert den Anfang von § 201 PU, um zu belegen, daß Wittgenstein den Interpretivismus als Sackgasse betrachtet. Dort schreibt Wittgenstein:

Unser Paradox war dies: eine Regel könnte keine Handlungsweise bestimmen, da jede Handlungsweise mit der Regel in Übereinstimmung zu bringen sei. Die Antwort war: Ist jede mit der Regel in Übereinstimmung zu bringen, dann auch zum Widerspruch. Daher gäbe es hier weder Übereinstimmung noch Widerspruch.

Stone argumentiert überzeugend, daß die Antwort nicht etwa deshalb im Paradox selbst liegt, weil es etwas Unbekanntes enthüllt – denn ein Paradox ist lediglich offenkundig gewordener Unsinn. Es zeigt satt dessen, daß wir Bekanntes falsch verstanden haben müssen. Stones Diagnose lautet folgendermaßen. Der Fehler des Interpretivismus liegt darin, daß er die Beobachtung, daß „etwas interpretieren“ gewöhnlich bedeutet, daß wir ein Zeichen durch ein anderes ersetzen, für eine tiefe Beobachtung über die Natur von Zeichen hält. Dieser Irrtum geht darauf zurück, daß sowohl Platonisten wie Interpretivisten nach einem Weg suchen, Zeichen für sich betrachtet – abgelöst von ihrem alltäglichen Gebrauch – zu untersuchen. Der Interpretivist teilt laut Stone die Ambitionen des Platonikers, nur daß er die paradoxen Konsequenzen dieser Ambitionen für eine tiefe Einsicht hält. Wittgensteins Therapie zielt darauf ab, allen, die einen spezifisch philosophischen Gebrauch von Begriffen wie „Bedeutung“ oder „Interpretation“ anstreben, klar zu machen, daß sie im Grunde keinen sinnvollen Gebrauch solcher Ausdrücke akzeptieren *wollen!* Denn kein Versuch, Sätzen wie „Jedes Zeichen bedarf einer Interpretation“ oder „Es gibt eine Auffassung der Regel, die keine Interpretation ist“ eine Bedeutung zu geben, könnte es schaffen, gleichzeitig den Ambitionen der Bedeutungstheoretiker zu genügen und dem Dilemma von Platonismus und Interpretivismus zu entgehen.

Stones Diagnose baut darauf, daß hinter Wittgensteins Sprachphilosophie keine eigenen bedeutungstheoretischen Einstellungen stehen. Das widerspricht beispie-

¹ Ich denke bspw. an Cora Diamond, James Connant und John McDowell.

weise Boghossians Auffassung, daß sich Wittgenstein für Regeln interessiert, weil er hinter Bedeutungen eine konstitutive normative Praxis am Werk sieht (vgl. Boghossian 1989). Folgen wir Boghossians Auffassung, warnt uns Wittgensteins Erinnerung, daß Deutungen selbst Zeichen sind, die gedeutet werden müssen, nicht vor Bedeutungstheorien generell, sondern davor, die normative Dimension des Zeichengebrauchs als ein Deuten von Regeln aufzufassen. Aber nach der kargen therapeutischen Lesart steckt auch darin ein tendenzielles Mißverständnis, nämlich, Wittgenstein selbst eine *andere* Auffassung der normativen Dimension des Zeichengebrauchs zuzuschreiben. Wenn Wittgenstein im nächsten Absatz von § 201 PU schreibt:

Daß da ein Mißverständnis ist, zeigt sich schon daran, daß wir in diesem Gedankengang Deutung hinter Deutung setzen [...] Dadurch zeigen wir nämlich, daß es eine Auffassung der Regel gibt, die *nicht* eine *Deutung* ist; sondern sich von Fall zu Fall der Anwendung, in dem äußert, was wir 'der Regel folgen', und was wir 'ihr entgegenhandeln' nennen.

kommentiert das Stone erwartungsgemäß folgendermaßen:

[...] Wittgenstein takes the crucial point of the passage to be the framing of a form of words, not an instruction about how we ought to conceive of following a rule. (100)

Stones Lesart dieser Stelle kann nur im Kontext des gesamten Abschnitts beurteilt werden. In § 201 komplettiert Wittgenstein einen Gedankengang, der sich mit seiner Bemerkung in § 199 zusammenfassen läßt, daß "[e]ine Sprache verstehen heißt, eine Technik [zu] beherrschen." Denn wenn Wittgenstein in § 202 schließt, daß eben "darum" "der Regel folgen" eine Praxis sei, dann stellt er das Ergebnis von § 199 als direkte Konsequenz von § 201 dar, so als würde der Regreß der Deutungen uns gar keine andere Wahl lassen, als die Beherrschung einer Sprache als die Beherrschung einer Technik – in Kontrast zu einem Deuten von Zeichen durch andere Zeichen – zu beschreiben.

Sollten wir folgern, daß Wittgenstein auch die Formulierungen in §§ 199 und 202 als Unsinn entlarven will? Der Text liefert dafür keine Hinweise. Während Wittgenstein die Verteidigung des Platonismus seinem verwirrten Widerpart überläßt und den Interpretivismus auf ein "Mißverständnis" zurückführt, deutet er mit keinem Wort an, daß er sich davon distanzieren möchte, daß Bedeutungen durch das Beherrschen einer Technik bestimmt werden. Unter Hinzuziehung des Kontextes lautet die plausible Lesart von § 201, daß Wittgenstein tatsächlich zwei Auffassungen von Regeln unterscheidet, von denen die eine bei der Anwendung auf sprachliche Ausdrücke scheitert, während die andere den Ansatz zur richtigen Beschreibung unseres Sprachgebrauchs enthält.

In dieser Auffassung der Regel wird "von Fall zu Fall" entschieden, was als richtige Anwendung zählt. Wenn es diese Form von Regeln ist, die wir am Fall der Sprache beobachten, dann folgt allerdings, daß in der *angemessenen* Beschreibung die eigentliche Ursache des Mißverständnisses liegt, auf das Wittgenstein hinaus will. Vom Standpunkt des Therapeuten aus gesehen ist diese Folgerung allerdings gar nicht so überraschend. Ein guter Therapeut vermag seinem Patienten zu zeigen, daß die Ursache seiner Illusionen in einem verqueren Blick auf etwas liegt, das er durchaus akzeptieren könnte, wenn er nicht Erwartungen darauf projizieren würde, die Konflikte erzeugen, die er fälschlich für ein Merkmal der Phäno-

mene hält. Lassen Sie mich also fragen, unter welchen Bedingungen es akzeptabel ist, daß wir von Fall zu Fall entscheiden, was eine richtige Anwendung darstellt. Dazu müssen wir klären, was Wittgenstein unter der Beherrschung einer Technik versteht.

An verschiedenen Stellen in Wittgensteins Post-Tractatus-Texten finden sich Hinweise, die es erlauben, die Charakterisierung der Sprache als Technik etwas konkreter zu fassen:

- Der erste Schritt im Erwerb sprachlicher Ausdrücke kann nicht in einem Deuten bestehen, sondern in einem Training, das man als 'Abrichten' bezeichnen kann (PU § 198);
- zur Anwendung einer Regel kann man allerdings nicht abgerichtet werden – das erfordert eine spezifische Eigenleistung (*Braunes Buch*, 152);
- diese Eigenleistung besteht nicht im Erraten der Regel hinter dem Gebrauch (PU § 210);
- ob jemand eine Regel erworben hat, muß sich an seinem Verhalten beurteilen lassen (*Zettel* No. 101);
- dieses Verhalten muß ein Versuchen und Auswählen beinhalten (*Zettel* No. 100).

Eine Konsequenz dieser Bemerkungen ist, daß Wittgenstein die Beherrschung einer Technik mit dem entsprechenden Verhalten gleichsetzt. Hinzu kommt jedoch, daß es sich um eine spezifische Form von Verhalten handelt, die ein "Versuchen und Auswählen" beinhaltet. Das macht Sinn, wenn wir uns daran erinnern, daß Wittgenstein Regelfolgen häufig mit mechanischem, automatenhaftem Verhalten kontrastiert. Seine Beispiele führen uns vor Augen, daß es einerseits die Flexibilität des Verhaltens ist, die als Indiz für regelgeleitetes Verhalten zählt. Wenn es sich um Interaktionen zwischen mehreren Akteuren handelt, stellen wir andererseits fest, daß wir sagen möchten, daß die Akteure sozusagen 'in Koordination kreativ' sind – daß sie die Einfälle und Vorschläge ihrer Co-Akteure nachvollziehen und mit eigenen Einfällen reagieren.

Mit Hilfe des Spiel-Begriffs vermag Wittgenstein diese Beobachtungen anschaulich zusammenzufassen. Ein Spiel beherrschen heißt, technisch gesprochen, ein *diskretes kombinatorisches System* meistern. Diskrete Elemente werden unterschiedlich re-kombiniert, wobei einfache Muster in komplexeren Mustern kombiniert werden können. Im Prinzip können so unendlich viele unterschiedliche Sequenzen erzeugt werden. Viele Spiele haben zudem eine *verzweigte Struktur*. Sie stellen Aktions-Reaktions-Schemata dar, in der jede Aktion einige Reaktionen zuläßt und andere ausschließt. Das erklärt, warum Spielabläufe nicht ohne weiteres prognostiziert werden können, aber trotzdem nachvollziehbar sind. Der Vergleich mit Spielen macht somit klarer, was Techniken von anderen Formen von Verhalten abgrenzt.

Der Spiel-Vergleich ist zugleich darum erhellend, weil er andeutet, wo die Ursache des Mißverständnisses zu suchen ist. Schach oder Fußball basieren auf festen Listen von Regeln, die für die jeweilige Praxis konstitutiv sind. Eine Schach- oder Fußballspielerin muß in der Lage sein, deskriptiv äquivalente, aber abweichende Regellisten auszuschließen. Das einzige geeignete Mittel ist aber, daß man diese Regeln aufzählt, was sprachliche Kompetenz bereits voraussetzt. Der therapeutische Effekt liegt deswegen, wie ich vorschlagen möchte, darin, uns zu zeigen, daß wir im Fall von *Sprachspielen auf Regellisten verzichten können, solange wir eine Lebensform teilen*.

Der Begriff "Lebensform" wird häufig – zu Recht – damit in Verbindung gebracht, daß unser evolutionäres Erbe

zahlreiche Formen von Sozialverhalten umfaßt. Daher wird Wittgenstein manchmal so verstanden, daß er regelförmiges und regelgeleitetes Verhalten letztlich identifizieren wollte. Die Art, in der Wittgenstein den Spiel-Begriff verwendet, um das Beherrschen einer Technik von rein mechanischem Verhalten abzugrenzen, macht das allerdings unplausibel. Angeborenes Sozialverhalten kontrastiert auch für Wittgenstein mit normengeleitetem Verhalten. Angeborenes Verhalten ist hochspezialisiert, stabil, aber darum auch ungeeignet, rasch Antworten auf neue Herausforderungen zu liefern. Erst durch die Verknüpfung mit diskreten kombinatorischen Systemen kann dieses Defizit kompensiert werden, denn solche Systeme können wie eine Matrix verwendet werden, um diskrete Elemente in unserem Sozialverhalten zu diskriminieren und Kombinationsmöglichkeiten zu modellieren. Die Evolution hat uns mit einem Apparat ausgestattet, der sich ausgezeichnet dazu eignet, eine solche Matrix zu liefern. Tatsächlich verfügen wir über ein komplexes Organ zur Erzeugung und Rezeption einer vergleichsweise begrenzten Zahl von Phonemen, die als Basis einer Matrix dienen können, um mit unserem anderweitigen Verhalten verknüpft zu werden.

Die primäre Rolle von Sprachspielen dürfte somit in der Erzeugung von flexiblem und doch koordiniertem Verhalten liegen. In den meisten Situationen kommt es darum sozusagen einer bürokratischen Überregulierung gleich, die verwendete Matrix wie einen Kalkül behandeln zu wollen. Die kombinatorischen Möglichkeiten der Matrix werden hinreichend dadurch beschränkt, daß unsere Verhaltensoptionen an die Umweltbedingungen angepaßt sein müssen. Wenn wir in unserem Verhalten nach einem Kalkül suchen, finden wir nur Überschneidungen, Anknüpfungspunkte, sozusagen Stücke Wegs, die wir zusammen gegangen sind. Das kann schwindelerregend wirken, bis wir sehen, daß die Formulierung eines strengen Kalküls auf wenige Kontexte beschränkt bleiben kann.

Eine Bedeutungstheorie, die auf die Rolle der Lebensform eingeht, kann uns deswegen zu einem nüchterneren, weniger konfliktbeladenen Selbstverständnis verhelfen. Wittgensteins Absicht ist nicht, eine solche Bedeutungstheorie zu formulieren, sondern uns unsere Situation zu zeigen. Wir erwarten ein Spiel nach fixierten Regeln, aber was wir antreffen, ähnelt eher einer Freejazz-Session: Die Akteure ergreifen nacheinander die Initiative und improvisieren, und hinter den Variationen entdecken wir nur einige vage thematische Überschneidungen und den Erfindungsreichtum der Musiker. Der Sprachgebrauch kann unmöglich so chaotisch sein, möchte man protestieren.

Er ist es tatsächlich nicht, wir mißverstehen lediglich den Charakter unserer Beobachtung. Wir tendieren dazu, die Unangemessenheit des Begriffs der Regel-als-Deutung mit dem Vorliegen von Willkür oder bloßen Dispositionen zu verwechseln. Deswegen entgeht uns, daß die Offenheit des Sprachgebrauchs, die uns abschreckt, eine hart erarbeitete Enklave von Wahlmöglichkeiten in einer Einöde von naturgegebenen Übereinstimmungen darstellt. In den meisten Kontexten muß eine Interpretin I nicht mehr tun, um angemessen auf eine Äußerung p der Sprecherin S zu reagieren, als einen der Wege einschlagen, die von p aus weiterführen, sowohl im Sprechen wie im anderweitigen Handeln. In manchen Kontexten kann es allerdings tatsächlich wichtig werden, festzustellen, welche Alternativen S vorschwebten und warum sie von der Reaktion von I überrascht war. Dann gibt es Mittel, auf den geteilten Hintergrund an Routinen und Dispositionen zurückzugreifen, um die Interaktion wieder in Gang zu setzen, etwa durch Triangulation. Man erkennt allerdings einmal mehr die Rolle der Sprache in unserem Leben, wenn man diese Kontexte für die theoretisch bedeutsamsten hält.

Endnote

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On Some Metaphilosophical Implications of Quinean Naturalism

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1. The Fate of Philosophy in a Scientific Age

According to a traditional conception, philosophy is the mother of all sciences. Like most parental relationships, the one between philosophy and its offspring has also had its own problems and difficulties. With the piecemeal development of empirical and mathematical methods, early speculations on natural philosophy gradually started to mature into the various special sciences like chemistry and biology. For quite some time, it seemed that the maternal authority over the progeny remained unchallenged. However, as science started to gain more momentum and its successes became more evident, it also began to look like the more legitimate, more secure, and better justified of the two. The nature of philosophy and especially its role in relation to the scientific culture was thus problematized in a novel and an extremely acute way. Establishing and explicating a working *modus vivendi* between philosophy and science consequently became an important metaphilosophical task.

In the twentieth century, the challenge that science posed to the autonomy and authority – or even the very sustainability – of philosophy as an independent discipline became more pressing than ever. The growth of sophistication in scientific methods as well as the unprecedented rise in the amount of scientific results and findings seemed to put philosophers' claims about the world very much on the defensive. The controversial role of philosophy in the new scientific age was severely felt and acknowledged within the analytic tradition, because significant parts of it wanted to join forces with science and to affiliate themselves with the scientific world-view. To deal with the threatening proximity of science, and to avoid the appearance of obsolescence, some metaphilosophical strategies were urgently needed. Within what might be called "the scientifically oriented twentieth century analytic tradition", there were two important ways of answering the challenge of science to philosophy that are relevant for our expository purposes. The first one is the conception of pure analytic philosophy embodied in Rudolf Carnap's *logical empiricism*, and the second one is the *naturalistic* conception of philosophy formulated by Willard Van Orman Quine.

George Bealer (1996, 1) begins his article "On the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge" with two sentences that reflect the anxieties of many, and also problematize the nature and role of philosophy in relation to science most effectively:

Science can answer a multitude of questions that are beyond the reach of philosophy. Are there questions that philosophy can answer that are beyond the reach of science?

In the following, I shall try to point towards one possible solution to this problem by characterizing some implications of Quine's naturalistic position that amount to a rediscovery of metaphysics.

2. Metaphilosophical Hints from "Two Dogmas"

In his dictionary entry on metaphysics, Panayot Butchvarov (1999, 563) writes that metaphysics as the philosophi-

cal investigation of the nature, constitution, and structure of reality was rejected by positivism on the ground that its statements are cognitively meaningless since they are not empirically verifiable. He (*ibid.*) then continues by stating that more recent philosophers, such as Quine, reject metaphysics on the ground that science alone provides genuine knowledge. In both Bealer and Butchvarov, science and philosophy appear to be taken as two distinct and mutually exclusive intellectual spheres.

If one combines the presupposition of the distinctiveness of science and philosophy with a characterization of Quinean naturalism where its two central theses are taken to be that there is no first philosophy, and that science is the measure of both what there is (ontology) and how we know what there is (epistemology) (Gibson 1998, 668), then the prospects for philosophy admittedly start to look rather depressing. Since logic has developed into a formal special science of its own, and both ontology and epistemology appear to be handed over to empirical sciences like physics and psychology, little, if anything, seems to be left of the central fields of theoretical philosophy.

Indeed, many critics of Quine share a conception according to which he actually manages to destroy philosophy by seriously overemphasizing science. According to Ilkka Niiniluoto (1999, 17), the Quinean "positivist" view urges that science may be a child of philosophy, but has since grown completely independent of her mother, i.e. mature science has happily got rid of metaphysics and epistemology. Sami Pihlström (1998, xii) joins in, considering Quine an example of "extreme scientific post-philosophy", thereby also implying that Quine gives disproportional importance to science, and that his position leads to a situation where the discipline is thus in effect destroyed.

To some extent, such conceptions of Quine as the annihilator of philosophy are understandable, but they nevertheless ignore certain central features of his thought. A key element in many of the misunderstandings of Quine is the exclusive distinction that is supposed to exist between science and philosophy. Another is the failure to perceive the centrality of metaphysics to Quine's thought. One possible remedy against such misconceptions about the fate of philosophy in the hands of Quine is to look more carefully to "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" – Quine's most influential contribution to twentieth century philosophy.

In "Two Dogmas", Quine (1980, 20-46) famously abandons both the analytic-synthetic distinction and the doctrine of reductionism, which he takes to be at root identical. Quine's arguments against the two dogmas and his sketch for an empiricism without them have been thoroughly reviewed and criticized in the consequent literature (cf. e.g. Føllesdal, 2001, 217ff.). However, an important theme that is related with the rehabilitation of metaphysics is often ignored. According to Quine (*ibid.*, 20), one effect of abandoning the two dogmas is "a blurring of the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science". By blurring this sacrosanct Carnapian boundary, Quine effects a radical metaphilosophical revolution: ontological questions end up on a par with questions of natural science (*ibid.*, 45). At the

same time, the strict demarcation line between science and philosophy fades away.

For Quine (1960, 3), the philosopher and the scientist are in the same boat. His broad conception of science is related with the holistic picture painted at the end of "Two Dogmas": science is a continuum that stretches from history and engineering at one end to philosophy and pure mathematics at the other (Quine 1978, 14). Philosophy is abstract through being very general, it seeks the broad outlines of the whole system of the world, but it nevertheless is continuous with, and part of, science.

If we wish to retain something of the contrast between philosophy and science presupposed e.g. in Bealer's metaphilosophical question above, within the Quinean scenario we would be better off talking about *philosophy* on the one hand, and *the special sciences* on the other. This terminology allows philosophy to be counted among the sciences, but it also allows us to differentiate between the general viewpoint of systematic philosophy and the more specialized fields of scientific research.

3. The Ontological Relevance of Analyticity

The notion of *analyticity* played a central role in the metaphilosophical strategy that the pre-Quinean logical empiricism relied on. On the epistemological side, analyticity was used to justify the possibility of a priori knowledge without any dependence on suspect avenues like intuition (cf. Creath 1987; 1990). It was also used to characterize philosophy as a purely conceptual discipline. Philosophy was seen to deal with the formation and transformation rules that were used in the construction of linguistic frameworks which could then be utilized for various purposes. The epistemic foundation for such activity consisted in the explicit listing of the rules and definitions that one commits oneself to in adopting a certain framework.

On the ontological side, Carnap thought that with the help of the analytic-synthetic distinction, he could rid philosophy of metaphysics altogether by effecting a clear demarcation between various empirical sciences studying the world on the one hand, and the analytic disciplines that were purely linguistic or conceptual on the other. Since metaphysics was taken to be neither an empirical science nor an analytic discipline, it would have to be completely overturned (Carnap 1932), or at the very least demoted to a non-cognitive status (Carnap 1956, 205-221). The empirical sciences alone had any authority on the truth value distributions of the synthetic claims, and Carnap had a very clear conception of the philosophers' claims about the world:

... there can be no such thing as a philosophical investigation of nature, because whatever can be said about nature, that is about any events in time and space and about their connections, has to be said by the scientist on the basis of empirical investigation. There remains nothing for the philosopher to say in this field. Metaphysicians do, indeed, venture to make a lot of statements about nature, but such metaphysics is, as we have seen, not theory, but rather poetry. (Carnap 1935, 84)

Quine (1985, 37) did win a poetry contest back in high school in the 1920s, but he does not agree with Carnap on the status of metaphysics or its likeness to poetry. Quine (1980, 45-46) points to Carnap's recognition of the fact that he is able to preserve a double standard for ontological questions and scientific hypotheses only by assuming an absolute distinction between the analytic and the synthetic.

Retrospecting the "Two Dogmas" forty years after its publication, Quine (1991, 271) writes about the linkage of the two issues of analyticity and ontological commitment:

Carnap's separation of questions of existence into questions of fact and questions of framework was a separation of the synthetic and the analytic. Collapse this epistemological duality and you collapse the ontological duality.

4. The Metaphysical Turn

Some critics of Quine who fail to sympathize with the idea that there might be a respectable project in metaphysics, and who apparently think more along the lines of pure analytic philosophy, are unhappy with what Quine does to the foundations of the traditional analytic conception. P. M. S. Hacker (1998) takes Quine's wholesale repudiation of any distinction between analytic/synthetic, contingent/necessary, and a priori/a posteriori to constitute a decisive break with the earlier tradition. Hacker's worry is that the status of philosophy as an independent discipline is thereby also undermined, and that an unwelcome scientism has gained ground since Quine's *Word and Object* was published. However, it is also possible to read *Word and Object* as a major work in twentieth century analytic metaphysics, where the empirical bottom-up perspective of the beginning chapters gradually shifts towards the rationalistic top-down approach of extensionalistic regimentation and ontology.

Repatriating the once expelled metaphysical questions is made possible because within the Quinean position, analyticity no longer functions as an epistemic differentiator. Ontological issues are not seen as illusory pseudo-problems or non-cognitive external questions, when all truth is on a par, and the holistic web of belief covers everything from the most casual observation sentences to the truths of logic and the deepest metaphysical assumptions. Once holism and gradualism are accepted, abstract ontological issues slip back into the sphere of science and philosophy (cf. Quine 1969, 97-98; 1976, 203-211).

Michael J. Loux and Dean W. Zimmerman (2003, 2) refer to Quine and Peter F. Strawson as two philosophers who were especially influential in the rehabilitation of metaphysics, and also point out that they both had their roots in the anti-metaphysical traditions of logical positivism and the ordinary language movement they helped to undermine. This conception is a more adequate representation of Quine's significance within the twentieth century analytic tradition, and it also helps us to formulate an answer to the challenge that science poses to philosophy (cf. Koskinen 2004).

If we suppose that philosophy is a part of science, then we may quite justifiably wish to ask, as Michael Friedman (1999, 10) does in the context of logical positivism: "But what then is the peculiar task of philosophy, and how in general, does it relate to the special sciences?" Perhaps surprisingly, as a result of the metaphysical turn, we could let Aristotle answer on Quine's behalf:

There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature. Now this is not the same as any of the so-called special sciences; for none of these others treats universally of being as being. (*Metaphysics*, IV, 20-25, transl. by W.D. Ross)

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Subjectivist vs. Objectivist Theories of Goodness and the Possibility of a Combined Strategy

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Introduction

One might say that a conflict between subjectivist and objectivist theories lies at the core of the debate about understanding goodness. So the first question is what exactly is meant by a subjectivist and an objectivist account of goodness. After that, the question arises which side should be favoured, given their respective arguments. However, if both sides are compelling in some ways and show weaknesses in some others, a combined strategy, if possible, seems to be attractive.

In my paper I will mention some main features of both subjectivist and objectivist theories first and then point out that neither a subjectivist nor an objectivist theory can be spelled out without implicitly leading to positions of the other. At this point, a quick look at some useful distinctions in goodness can help to clarify the debate and to sketch the possibility of a combined and thus more convincing strategy.

1. A subjectivist account of goodness

A subjectivist account connects value with human interests and desires. This is best known as *informed desire account*. A thing or state of affairs is good because it is able to fulfil a *given desire* of a specific person. Thus goodness is also an individualistic quality. The desires are meant to be *given* because we have, in a subjectivist account, no direct rational influence on *what* we desire, only an indirect influence via *how* we desire. Therefore, following a Humean conception of practical rationality, as a first step we can do nothing but acknowledge the contents of our desires. Only in a second step can we, in a purely formal way, judge those contents in the light of relevant information and in their relationship to our other desires. Thus our ability to choose rationally is restricted to choosing the appropriate means to ends which are presented to us by our given desires. The standard example goes as follows. I am thirsty and I see a glass of water on the table in front of me. I assume that drinking the glass of water will satisfy my thirst. Therefore, the glass of water can be seen as good for me and I drink it. But the water is poisoned. Now, if I had known this fact, I wouldn't have desired to drink it in the first place. The desire to drink that glass of water obviously was not what I *really* wanted. Thus a thing can be good only if it is able to fulfil one of the *informed desires* of a specific person.

But our ability to develop informed desires is limited in some ways. For example, as Peter Stemmer (see Stemmer 1998, 65ff.) has pointed out, we cannot know how it is to be a parent as long as we have no children. What we want, and also what is good for us, always faces the threat of rational deficiency. To cope with that problem within a subjectivist account, Stemmer introduces a hypothetical and *fully informed* version of a person. The hypothetical person *A+* is identical with the real person *A* in all respects but underlies no informational constraints. Thus a thing is good for person *A* if it is able to fulfil the fully informed desires of the hypothetical person *A+*.

Shifting from *actual* desires of a real person *A* to those of a *hypothetical* version *A+* now raises some serious questions. How can this still be a subjectivist account if something can be good for person *A* although she does not actually desire it? And is something indeed bad for person *A* just because *A+* would not want it although she (*A*) actually is happy with it and would never have the chance to be fully informed?

Even given that the fully informed desires of the hypothetical person *A+* are always grounded in the actual desires of the real person *A*, the so modified subjectivist account presupposes a priority of informed desires over actual desires. This priority can be understood either in the sense of a universal desire, i.e. that everyone wishes his desires may be as well-informed as possible, or in the sense of a normative claim, i.e. that everyone *should* judge goodness in the light of all available information. The assumption of a universal desire is, of course, an empirical question, but whether there is such a universal desire or not, I doubt that the second option can be left aside. And that is because we face practical questions in situations like the example with the glass of water. *Should* I drink it or not? Which course of action is better for me?

When trying to answer these questions, a subjectivist theory has no choice but to judge in the light of *all* available and relevant information and in relationship to *all* my other desires. But if this is true for the judgements about all of my desires, there seems to be no more room for the presupposition of a coherent set of desires. That is because such a set would have to consist of a range of informed desires and each of those desires, shall they be not rationally deficient, would in turn depend upon a coherent set of informed desires.

To avoid such a vicious circle it is helpful to go back to the initial practical questions. Thus, when I ask what is better for me, this cannot be meant in a subjectivist sense. I want to know *what* I should do *because* it is better for me. So the goodness of a thing cannot be the result but the beginning of my reasoning and it therefore seems to be independent of my desires. But that clearly contradicts the primary thesis of a subjectivist theory in which what is good for me is seen as dependent upon my desires.

2. An objectivist account of goodness

If this line of thought is correct so far, an objectivist account of goodness seems to be the only alternative. We value and desire things or states of affairs because they have the quality of goodness. Although this helps to understand and to answer the practical question mentioned above, it still leaves open the question *why* something is good. How can it be explained that some things are good for me and some are not?

The traditional answer is that goodness is an intrinsic and therefore non-individualistic quality. If something is good, it is good in itself and is or should therefore be valued and desired. But such a view is challenged by John Leslie Mackie's famous *argument from queerness* (see Mackie 1981, 43ff.). If objective values really existed, we

would have to have some special and so far unknown epistemological sense to recognise it, which also would motivate us by bringing about an appropriate desire.

Peter Schaber (see Schaber 1998, 163ff.) has argued that an objectivist account does not need to imply any special epistemological sense. The relation between objective goodness and informed desires is quite sufficient. Just the nature of their relation is opposed to the view of a subjectivist account. In an objectivist theory it is simply the introduction to an objective good thing which leads to the development of an informed desire. Thus we know that something is objectively good by recognising the development of a corresponding informed desire.

Even if Schaber's argument is correct, it still does not give an answer to the question *why* something is good in the first place. It just explains how we can recognise objective goodness without assuming any special epistemological sense. The best idea *why* something is objectively good seems to be its relation to some informed desire. That way Schaber also tries to comprise an individualistic note of goodness, in which something can at the same time objectively be good for you and not for me. But if the relation between objective goodness and a corresponding informed desire is crucial for the objectivist account, it seems easier to follow a subjectivist theory in explaining *why* something is good. Thus something would objectively be good for a person A if it were able to fulfil a corresponding and fully informed desire of A+. But that does not look any different from the subjectivist account, which in turn leaves open the question what things are worth valuing or doing.

3. Some useful distinctions and the possibility of a combined strategy

If my considerations are correct so far, the debate between subjectivist and objectivist theories of goodness seems to be bouncing back and forth without any chance to come up with a decent solution. So it might be helpful to draw attention to some distinctions in goodness which can clarify the debate and make room for a more complex strategy.

Christine Korsgaard has described two distinctions in goodness which should not be confused (see Korsgaard 1996b, 249ff.). The first one is between intrinsic and extrinsic goodness, and the second one is between ends or final goods and means or instrumental goods. These distinctions go along with some remarks by John Searle (see Searle 2001, 54f.), who pointed out that we need to distinguish between ontological and epistemic subjectivity and objectivity. To say that goodness is intrinsic or extrinsic is, therefore, an ontological position concerning the *source* of value. Whereas intrinsic means that the goodness of something can be found in this thing itself, extrinsic means that the goodness of a thing is dependent on some other source. The second distinction lies in the realm of epistemology and describes different ways of *how* we value things or states of affairs. We might value things for their own sake, i.e. as ends or final goods, or because of their capacities to serve for some other end, i.e. we value them as means or instrumental goods.

Given that the two distinctions are located in the different contexts of ontology and epistemology, this also means that they cannot just be equated, e.g. in the sense that extrinsic goodness is always instrumental goodness. This eventually opens up the possibility of holding a position which, on the ontological side, defends a notion of extrinsic

goodness or subjectivity and, on the epistemic side, defends a notion of objective goodness.

So what a subjectivist theory of goodness does is to presuppose that there can only be extrinsic goodness in the ontological sense. But in a next step, because of the Humean approach to rationality, this is mixed up with the epistemic context. If there is no intrinsic value, then nothing can be valued for its own sake. Therefore, only the content of our desires can function as ends to which all other things can only serve as instrumental goods. This is why a subjectivist theory depends on a coherent set of desires. But an openly posed practical question that aims at what is worthwhile doing in a given situation and therefore does not presuppose such a coherent set or an already given end cannot be answered by a subjectivist account. It even seems to be unclear if such a question can be properly understood.

An objectivist theory, on the other hand, seems to tend to an ontologically intrinsic notion of goodness and analogously mixes this up with the epistemic context. Although there might be room for instrumental goodness, the primary goal is to establish a position in which the introduction to some intrinsic good thing automatically leads to valuing it for its own sake, i.e. as a final good. But this implausibly narrows the possibilities of how we can value things and also leaves open the ontological question of how the goodness of a thing is established in the first place.

The objectivist idea of an automatic route from ontological goodness to the action of valuing now leads to a third distinction. As Mackie's *argument from queerness* suggests, such a route seems to be a kind of metaphysical magic. Thus not only the ontological and epistemic but also the normative notion of goodness should be kept separate. It is then an open question whether the ontological or epistemic goodness leads to a practical reason to value the thing in question and what kind of normative force might be included. *Ought* we value it or would it be just *advisable*? At this point a further distinction between moral and ordinary values may be helpful, but I will leave that aside here. The crucial point is that distinguishing normativity helps to clarify the practical question what one should value or what is worthwhile being valued. And that is because an answer to such a question will now have to present practical reasons. A combined strategy which covers the ontological, epistemic and normative contexts of goodness may then be understood as a rationalist account (see Korsgaard 1996a, 225ff.).

Such a rationalist theory of goodness may be drawn to an ontologically extrinsic, i.e. subjectivist, position in which goodness is seen as genuinely relative between the qualities of the thing in question and the desires of specific persons. Goodness then exists in the world only because we desire some things. The rationalist theory may then hold the position of an objectively epistemic account in the sense that we are able to desire things for their own sake, i.e. as final goods. But the core of such a theory would lie in the need to present reasons both for the epistemic goodness as well as for the normative force, including not only reasons concerning the instrumental goodness in the light of some already given end but also reasons for a possible epistemic objective goodness. These reasons may well have different success in, on the one hand, justifying the goodness of a thing and, on the other hand, actually motivating a person to value or desire it. Taking into account the idea of *informed desires* this finally leads to the thesis that everything that serves as a necessary

condition for our capacity to develop desires which are as informed as possible can be seen as epistemically objectively good. It would, therefore, be advisable for all of us to value and to desire these necessary conditions, such as, for example, the ability of critical thinking.

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Limits and Potential of Political Contractarianism

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1. Contractarianism and its systematic limits

Hobbesian contractarianism has the advantage that it only requires the benefit maximizing behaviour of individuals and some basic and universal interests as its premises. The idea is to justify norms without recurring to shared moral values: Political norms are considered legitimate in a *strong* sense, if they are advantageous for the interests of *all* individuals. Therefore, the *first* premise presupposes that all individuals want to fulfil their interests as good as possible by using their instrumental rationality. However, individuals want to pursue many different interests. Therefore, the *second* premise assumes that all individuals have certain universal basic interests even if they do not have similar common interests. If certain norms improve the fulfilment of these basic interests even a rational utility maximizer would accept such norms as justified. Thomas Hobbes analyzed that self-preservation is such a basic interest (Hobbes 1996, 141). This example leads to a classical contractarian norm: the prohibition to kill. If each individual has sufficient power to kill the other individual, it is mutually advantageous for both to establish a sanction-reinforced norm which prevents them from killing one another. This norm is rational for each individual in a society because all individuals value their basic interests higher than the constraints of the norm. Thus, the Hobbesian aim is to secure at least a peaceful coexistence between individuals. Furthermore, contractarians can argue *without* an explicit agreement because they are able to show the advantage of a norm for *each* individual by referring only to interests that all individuals have. Other examples for contractarian norms are the protection of property rights or protection of physical or mental capacity to act (e.g. Stemmer 2000, 194-197, 228-232).

This argument enables the justification of norms even if individuals do not necessarily share their common interests or agree on personal, moral or religious values. The original idea was to convince even the Hobbesian fool. In addition, it seems possible to apply this justification to plural societies as these means can legitimize norms, which are historically invariant and concern all individuals similarly. However, the reference to basic interests restricts the justification to basic norms, which enables only a narrow cooperation. The question arises whether this restriction to fundamental interests is an unnecessary limitation. To analyze this it is helpful to take a step back:

The contractarian idea is to legitimize a state if (and only if) it is advantageous according to interests of individuals. Important functions of a state, however, cannot be justified with a reference to universal interests: Even if it were possible to establish property rights it would be difficult to concretize details of an economic system. Moreover it will be very difficult to legitimize any specific activity of the state in areas of economy, education or cultural and social problems. Two aspects are relevant in this context: First it appears to be plausible that further cooperation might be somehow favorable for the citizens in a society. Secondly, at least in plural societies possible conflicts between common interests could endanger the possibility of a peaceful cooperation. Therefore, it should be analyzed in the next section whether universal contractarianism could be expanded.

2. The potential of expanded contractarianism

It is the idea of this paper that social cooperation does not have to be limited to fundamental universal interests: Cooperation is also conceivable with reference to non-universal interests, because some of them can be better pursued under legal norms. Such interests will now be referred to as *contextual interests*. These interests - e.g. life plans, moral or personal values - can be influenced by culture, yet individuals can also form or revise them on their own. They are subject to historical change, and therefore it is not possible to attribute the same set of contextual interests to all individuals. This leads to the fact that *contextual norms* can only be legitimized relatively to certain distributions of interests in society.

By referring to the Hobbesian fool, a contractarian could object that only universal norms could be justified. If states would introduce further norms, the fool could claim not to possess the relevant interests. Hence, these norms would neither be advantageous nor legitimate for him. To reject this objection it would be necessary to show that a contextual cooperation can be rational for *each* individual. However, this leads to the question how norms can be legitimized in a contractarian way, if it cannot be presupposed that all individuals do have the same relevant interests. The idea is to solve this problem in the following way:

If one assumes that classical contractarianism is able to establish a narrow set of universal fundamental rights for every citizen then it appears possible to use this as a basis for further cooperation. These fundamental rights would enable negotiations between *every* citizen which would not be possible e.g. in a slavery state or a state of nature. The motivation for these negotiations lies in the mutual advantage of cooperation beyond the benefits of fundamental rights. However, as previously mentioned it cannot be presupposed that all individuals possess the same contextual interests. Hence, all individuals must analyze and evaluate their interests on their own. Next they explicitly have to agree to contextual norms to show that these norms improve their status quo. Cooperation appears to be feasible, because individual aims need not necessarily be fulfilled in detail in order to accept certain norms. Some individuals could agree to enforceable norms that respect their main interests in order to avoid endless negotiations. For example individuals can have different interests to support a certain amount of social welfare for the poor. Some may have an interest in the stability of the society, others will think about risk minimization for themselves, whilst some may have moral reasons. Therefore, even without necessarily referring to identical interests, contextual norms might be possible and advantageous. To enable results it is also conceivable that certain individuals are motivated to accept a norm because they are compensated for possible disadvantages.

All these examples have the same structure: Cooperation is only beneficial because individuals with different aims can more or less use the same means. Thus, such deals are limited to certain distributions of interests and this seems not sufficient to show that a contextual cooperation can be rationally justified to everybody. Furthermore, the idea is to distinguish between the

advantages of a contextual norm and the advantages of the contextual cooperation as a whole. To stay within the realm of contractarianism it seems promising to develop certain metanorms which shall enable an advantageous contextual cooperation for all individuals even if not every single contextual norm improves the situation for each individual.

However, this project has to cope with important problems: If everyone has to agree to a contextual norm, anyone can demand additional benefits by threatening with his veto. Strategically acting individuals would be able to demand concessions, which may exceed the gains of cooperation. Therefore, Buchanan notes that further cooperation is only favorable under a decision rule below unanimity (Buchanan 1984, 42). In addition, the problem occurs that an improvement of the situation is not a necessary condition for an agreement. An agreement can be motivated by an improvement of the situation of an individual or by a minimization of damage for the individual. Since cooperation with contextual norms is only rational for all individuals if it improves their situation it is not sufficient to refer to an explicit agreement. Therefore only under certain conditions further cooperation appears to be rational and favorable for individuals. To fulfill this condition, the mutual advantages of contextual cooperation have to be beyond the benefits of fundamental rights. In the final part of the paper some suggestions for a framework of metanorms shall be outlined.

3. Metanorms: a convincing suggestion?

The idea is that metanorms constrain the legitimization of contextual norms to enable a mutually advantageous contextual cooperation. Therefore it is not necessary to show that each contextual norm improves the situation of each individual. What has to be shown is that metanorms are rational for all individuals because they guarantee that contextual cooperation as a whole is profitable for each individual. Thus two primary aims need to be stated more precisely:

A) Metanorms have to define basic conditions for negotiations between individuals to ensure a cooperative surplus. Three examples are outlined here to show how metanorms could reach this aim: Firstly, as contextual cooperation is mutually advantageous only with reference to contextual interests of individuals it is necessary to determine which interests in a society could profit from legal norms. Economic theories try to show that it is rational for all or many individuals if the state produces certain public goods (e.g. Buchanan 1984, 47). Examples of this include infrastructure, cultural or social politics. However, with reference to contextual interests it cannot be presupposed any more that all citizens have a similar interest in a public good. Only if there is at least a majority after negotiations a state could be legitimated to produce the appropriate public good. In order to realize this aim metanorms have to frame the negotiations. Secondly, within these negotiations the strategic behavior of individuals will cause a variation of the free rider problem: Individuals could pretend not to possess certain interests in order to receive gains from the established norm afterwards. One solution could be that such a behavior would have to be recognized by other individuals and discussed in additional negotiations. Yet whatever solution is found in detail it appears to be necessary that metanorms have to regulate such systematic problems of cooperation in a way advantageous for all. Thirdly, the fact that contextual interests possess a potential to change is another example for the need of metanorms. If the

distribution of interests in a society is changing, contextual norms have to be flexible enough to adjust. Therefore individuals must have certain possibilities to object to existing norms by emphasizing a change of interests. This flexibility has the advantage that norms can adapt to new distributions of interests. Thus the importance of the original status quo is reduced as contextual norms can be renegotiated at almost any time. Without pointing out the limits and possibilities of this aim in detail, the next aim for metanorms shall be outlined:

B) Metanorms should define certain rights of protection to ensure that *each individual is able to improve his situation*. Similarly, three examples shall be outlined to show how this aim can be reached: Firstly, metanorms have the character of a public good, since they need to be realized by states. Therefore it must be considered that states possess a relatively strong power monopoly. The link between the interests of the individuals and the government has to be secured. Therefore, it appears to be necessary from the individual perspective to define limits constraining the government by constitutional norms. Important examples include the division of power or the claim for transparent political decisions. Secondly, primary discriminations could possibly be banned by metanorms. For example, Norbert Hoerster argues that it is irrational to legitimize a society to discriminate minorities. Any individual could fall victim to such a rule if interests in society change. (Hoerster 2003, 182) Therefore, certain neutrality standards would become plausible, for example that citizens are treated equally by the law or that states remain neutral in religious questions. Such protection could be guaranteed by certain metanorms for contextual range and would be supported by fundamental civil rights within universal range. In this way certain areas of individual freedom could be protected to ensure that majorities cannot legitimize any contextual norm. Such constraints seem to be an important condition for a contextual cooperation because they reduce the expectable risk of each individual within such a cooperation. Thirdly, metanorms have to guarantee the improvement of the situation of each individual. The idea is that all individuals have contextual interests, which they could better pursue in a contextual cooperation, because they are more often within the majority than the minority. However, as contextual cooperation has no unanimity rule it is at least possible that some individuals will often or always loose. To compensate this problem of any majority decision rule certain additional rights of protection should be further developed.

The condition that each individual has to have at least more advantages by contextual cooperation than by universal cooperation alone must be fulfilled. It would be necessary to compensate individuals who are permanently disadvantaged by contextual cooperation or to restrict the activity of a state in certain areas. In the best case, compensations would diminish advantages of the others, but contextual cooperation could still be useful for most individuals in many cases. In the worst case, contextual cooperation might not be advantageous any more and therefore undesirable. Reference to empirical knowledge might show and concretize such cases. For example, Geoffrey Brennan notes an important contribution of economics, because it analyzes those aims that are within reach and which means are necessary to realize them (Brennan 1993).

Without specifying these ideas sufficiently at least a fresh perspective should have been outlined. On the one hand, it uses the means of analytical philosophy, whilst on the other hand attempting to integrate individual and

cultural values. The aim consists in convincing the fool to accept contextual norms. Therefore a legitimization of political norms even for plural societies appears to be feasible, if the interests of all individuals are considered by a decision-making process and if it can be shown that metanorms are rational for each individual.

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Horwich and the Generalization Problem

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1. Two Kinds of Linguistic Environments

Frege has pointed out that there are two kinds of linguistic environments in which the truth predicate occurs. (cf. Frege 1918, 328) Unlike Frege, Paul Horwich takes propositions to be the primary bearers of truth. (cf. Horwich 1998, 135) Given Frege's distinction and Horwich's choice we can discern linguistic environments of type 1 in which the truth predicate is concatenated with a singular term that stands for a proposition. Sentences belonging to this type of environment are single sentences of the logical form 'a is F' expressing propositions that share the same logical form. In linguistic environments of type 2 the truth predicate is nested into a quantificational phrase (containing another predicate) and concatenated with a variable. Sentences belonging to this type of environment are general sentences, either existential or universal ones. They have the logical form ' $(\exists x)(Fx \ \& \ Gx)$ ' and ' $(\forall x)(Fx \rightarrow Gx)$ ' respectively. Scott Soames remarks with respect to Frege's distinction:

Although Frege does not elaborate on the theoretical significance of this contrast, it turns out to be very significant. We can sum it up this way: Environments of type 2 are important because they provide the only reason we need a truth predicate of thoughts or propositions; environments of type 1 are important because they play a privileged role in explaining what truth consists in. (Soames 1999, 23)

In environments of type 1 the truth predicate is supposedly redundant and eliminable from any sentence without any loss of content. In environments of type 2 it is not. It is exactly in these environments that we need the truth predicate and in which it has utility. Here the truth predicate enables us to say something that we would not be in a position to say without it while employing the usual means of referential quantification. Environments of type 1 are important because they are involved in biconditionals that result from the equivalence schema (P):

(P) $\langle p \rangle$ is true iff p

by replacing the schematic letter 'p' by any declarative English sentence. However, it lies so to speak in the nature of the beast that a schematic letter is not open to referential quantification. These (P)-biconditionals are crucial for explaining what propositional truth consists in. They are (in some sense) definitional of propositional truth. What is it for the proposition that I smell the scent of violets to be true? Well, one can hardly do better than to point out that the proposition is true if and only if I smell the scent of violets. Now, let us ask: What is it for an arbitrary proposition to be true? It seems to be enough to answer that the same sort of explanation could be given in any individual case. Soames expresses the idea as follows:

Thus in order to know what truth is, it seems to be enough to know that the proposition that snow is white is true iff snow is white, that the proposition that the earth is round is true iff the earth is round, and so on for any arbitrary proposition whatsoever. (Soames 1999, p.23)

But is it really enough? Given this proposal, what do we say, for instance, about the following sentence?

All propositions of the form ' $\langle p \rangle$ is true iff p' are true.

The schema (P) does not describe any procedure that allows us to deal with this universal generalization expressing that all propositions of the form (P) are true. Since there are a vast number of highly interesting generalizations about propositions containing the truth predicate, the account presented above appears to be incomplete. There seems to be an insurmountable gulf between single sentences and generalizations. Thus even if the schema (P) plays a crucial role in explaining what the truth of a single proposition consists in, it is not able to explain what the truth of a generalization consists in. The following pages are dedicated to an investigation of this problem.

2. The Logical Side

The generalization problem has a *logical* level and a level that I would like to call *epistemic-explanatory*. Regarding the logical level of the problem the question is: Is a generalization implied or entailed by the collection of all its instances? Paul Horwich says:

Clearly, a set of premises attributing some property to each object of a certain kind does not entail that everything of that kind has the property. We would need a further premise specifying that we have a premise for every object of that kind -- and this would be tantamount to our conclusion. (Horwich 1998, Postscript, 137)

So Horwich rejects that there is a positive answer to the logical side of the generalization problem. Interesting general facts about truth cannot be derived just from the collection of their instances. An additional premise is needed; but the required premise is, in absence of a suitable alternative, equivalent to the conclusion. We cannot assume the premise because it is exactly what we want to derive.

3. The Epistemic-Explanatory Side

The problem is now formulated in terms of an explanation of our acceptance of propositions. Let us first consider how Horwich presents the difficulty for his minimalist theory about truth -- a problem that was first pointed out by Anil Gupta and Scott Soames.

Our reliance on the equivalence schema will not suffice to explain our knowledge of *general* facts about truth. Consider, for example, "All propositions of the form, $(p \rightarrow p)$, are true". No doubt our particular logical convictions together with our commitment to the equivalence schema can explain, for any single proposition, why we take it to be true that this proposition implies itself. Thus we can explain, given our logical commitment to "dogs bark \rightarrow dogs bark", why we also accept "The proposition that dogs bark \rightarrow dogs bark is true". But we have not thereby explained how the above *generalization* is reached. Thus our allegiance to the equivalence schema does not really suffice to account for *all* uses of the truth predicate. Therefore, that practice does not fix the meaning of "true", contrary to what the minimalist maintains. (Gupta, Soames) (Horwich 2001, 156f.)

Paul Horwich flatly grants this point and claims that an additional explanatory premise is needed. But he also claims that the introduction of the additional premise creates no problem as long as the premise does not concern properties of the truth predicate. (cf. Horwich 2001, 157)

Let us ask now: What explains our acceptance of a general fact or principle about truth, for instance, of the general principle that every proposition of the form ' $p \rightarrow p$ ' is true? Horwich's answer is fairly complex. First, our inclination to accept all propositions of this form entitles us to accept the corresponding schema. So, our inclination to accept all single propositions such as:

If Florence is smiling, then Florence is smiling.
If snow is white, then snow is white. ...

licenses us to accept the schema:

$p \rightarrow p$.

Since we also have the underived inclination to accept all single (P)-biconditionals, this licenses us to accept the schema (P) and to convert the schema above into:

$\langle p \rightarrow p \rangle$ is true.

In the next step we introduce the following rule:

$\langle p \rangle$ is K
All propositions are K.

This rule allows us, in general, to go from any schematic theorem ' $\langle p \rangle$ is K' to the conclusion 'All propositions are K'. (cf. Horwich 2001, 164) The rule takes as input our inclination to accept that each proposition (of a certain form) has a certain property. It yields as output our inclination to accept that all propositions (of this form) have this property. In the Postscript to his book "Truth" Paul Horwich remarks that

... it is plausible to suppose that there is a truth-preserving rule of inference that will take us from a set of premises attributing to each proposition some property, F , to the conclusion that all propositions have F . No doubt this rule is not *logically* valid, for its reliability hinges not merely on the meanings of the logical constants, but also on the nature of propositions. But it is a principle we do find plausible. We commit ourselves to it, implicitly, in moving from the disposition to accept any proposition of the form ' x is F ' (where x is a proposition) to the conclusion 'All propositions are F '. So we can suppose that this rule is what sustains the explanations of the generalizations about truth with which we are concerned. Thus we can, after all, defend the thesis that the basic theory of truth consists in some subset of the instances of the equivalence schema. (Horwich 1998, 137f.)

What are the conditions under which we can apply this truth-preserving, but not logically valid rule that licenses us to go from the acceptance of any schema to the acceptance of the corresponding universal generalization? In the following extra explanatory premise Horwich specifies two conditions that are jointly sufficient for the application of the rule:

Whenever someone can establish, for any F , that it is G , and recognizes that he can do this, then he will conclude that every F is G . (Horwich 2001, 157).

If these two conditions are satisfied, our acceptance of a schema will explain our acceptance of the corresponding generalization. As Horwich points out by way of counter-

example, the satisfaction of the first condition alone is not sufficient to explain the acceptance of the generalization. (cf. Horwich 2001, 157)

4. Polemical Remarks

One minor worry arises from the suspicion that the rule in question is ad hoc. It appears to be introduced solely for the purpose of solving the generalization problem, i.e. to bridge the gap between singular sentences and generalizations containing the truth predicate. What other purpose does the rule have?

Second, the question arises whether the inclination to accept all instances of a schema is explanatorily basic for the acceptance of the corresponding generalization, as Horwich claims. Could it not be the other way round? Is a generalization accepted because there is an inclination to accept all of its instances? Or does the inclination to accept all instances result from the acceptance of the generalization? It might well be claimed that our acceptance of the corresponding generalizations is explanatorily basic for our acceptance of the single instances. Our acceptance of the instances should then be explained on the basis of the acceptance of the generalization and not the other way round.

Third, there is a problem for the minimalist theory that comes to light in the discussion of the redundancy theory. In this context Horwich says:

Our problem is to find a single, finite proposition that has the intuitive logical power of the infinite conjunction of all these instances; and the concept of truth provides a solution. (Horwich 1998, 3)

For Horwich the truth predicate has a mere logical, but very important function. It enables us to assert generalizations in a finite way employing referential quantification, thereby not having to resort to infinitary means or to substitutional quantification. For instance, we can assert the generalization that all propositions of the form ' $p \rightarrow p$ ' are true without having to assert an infinitely long conjunction containing the truth predicate which, after repeated application of the schema (P), boils down to the infinitely long truth-free conjunction:

(Florence is smiling \rightarrow Florence is smiling), and (snow is white \rightarrow snow is white), and ...

The alternative is to introduce a universal substitutional quantification as abbreviation for this infinitely long truth-free conjunction:

$(\prod p)(p \rightarrow p)$.

To allow either for infinitary devices or for substitutional quantification is to allow for a way to do away with the truth predicate. Horwich does not allow for either. Therefore, he rejects the claim that the truth predicate can be eliminated from referential generalizations. But he also holds that the infinitely many instances of the schema ' $p \rightarrow p$ ' do not entail the corresponding generalization without further premise. The problem of eliminability might thus be seen as the flipside of the generalization problem. More importantly, Horwich is opposed to the introduction of infinitely long con-/disjunctions of instances of generalizations on grounds that they are not finitely storable. And he is also opposed to substitutional quantifiers -- which might be taken as finite abbreviations of such con-/disjunctions -- on grounds that their introduction requires an extra battery of syntactic and semantic rules. But, on the other hand,

Horwich sees no problem in the fact that the minimal theory consists in the set of infinitely many biconditionals of the form (P) that cannot all be stated in a finite way either. Horwich is also not opposed to the rule introduced above for the application of which it is sufficient to be able to establish that each of the infinitely many instances of a particular schema has a certain property. So what is Horwich's justification for rejecting infinitary devices on one occasion but to adopt them on another occasion?

Fourth, consider the following special case of the application of the rule:

<<p> is true iff p> is true

All propositions of the form '<p> is true iff p' are true.

It is a pressing question how we can exclude Liar-like sentences as replacements for 'p' in the schema (P). We need a criterion to single out the paradoxical instances, for otherwise we are in danger of ending up in contradictions. (cf. Tarski 1935, 260) But it is far from clear that there is such a criterion.

Without adoption of the rule of infinite induction minimalism is incomplete since it cannot deal with generalizations. But if the rule and the application conditions associated with it are adopted, the theory gets inflated in a certain sense. This gives rise to new questions. Where do the rule and the explanatory premise fit into the theory? What is their logical space? And finally, what is then left of the deflationist spirit of minimalism about truth?

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Understanding Linguistic Signs. A Note on Husserl and Frege

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1. Frege

Should we be satisfied with Frege's explanation of signs' remaining "identical" in spite of the diversity of their occurrences? According to the standard interpretation, his solution rests on the idea that different sequences of written or oral symbols entertain an intrinsic relation with the same objective and abstract entity: the "objective meaning", the sense. There is ample evidence that this was indeed one of Frege's tenets. For instance, in the *Grundgesetze*, after hastily – and somewhat unconvincingly – rejecting the idea that sign identity may result from an abstraction, Frege concludes that:

Im regelmässigen Gebrauche sollen gleichgestaltete Zeichen dasselbe bedeuten und werden darum in dieser Hinsicht so behandelt, als wären sie dasselbe, weil sie nur als Zeichen ihrer Bedeutung in Betracht kommen. (Frege 1903, §100).¹

In *Grundgesetze*, Frege has in mind a regimented language, arithmetic, of the type described in *Concept-script* which excludes cases of synonymy: different signs are invariably and homogeneously ascribed to different objects. This has the advantage of simplifying the problem since cases in which different (primitive) signs might have the same sense or different senses and the same object do not arise and need not be accounted for. Consistency demands that we assume that in Frege's post-*Sinn und Bedeutung* theory, the relation between the sign and its denotation be nevertheless determined by sense. In order to account for the identity of sign occurrences and the cognisability thereof, Frege thus needs to provide a satisfactory explanation of the relation between sign and sense and of the way in which recognition of a sign depends on the identification of or access to the meaning associated with it: in one form or another, one who seeks to understand what it is for a sign to "express" a sense and in general to bear semantic properties must account for the cognisability of meaning. Yet, the standard interpretation is devoid of any epistemologically plausible Fregean explanation of how we actually "grasp" (his term), that is, cognise the senses that are "bound" with the signs we use. Frege would thus appear to ignore precisely what he seeks to explain: that by virtue of which a sign is cognised or, what amounts to the same, recognised as identical throughout its occurrences.

The standard interpretation does not however entirely do justice to what Frege says in *Grundgesetze* and, indeed, little attention has been paid to the following passage:

Wenn nämlich die Zeichen nur den Zweck haben, der Verständigung der Menschen untereinander... zu dienen, *braucht beim Schreibenden nur die Absicht vorhanden zu sein*, ein dem früher gemachten ähnliches Zeichen herzustellen, *und das braucht nur soweit zu gelingen, dass der Lesende die Absicht richtig erkennt*. Wir wollen im Folgenden unter « gleichgestalteten Zeichen » solche verstehen, *welche nach der Absicht des Schrei-*

¹ "According to regular use, signs of the same figure are supposed to mean the same and, in this respect, they are treated as if they were the same because they are only ever considered as the signs of their meaning." (my translation)

benden gleichgestaltet sein sollen um dasselbe zu bezeichnen. (Frege 1903, §99; my emphasis)²

The idea according to which the recognition of the intention (*Absicht*) of the speaker (or author) plays a role in the explanation of the identity of a sign throughout its occurrences implies that talk of semantic property bearers independent of reference to an agent's linguistic behaviour or to a given communication situation is illegitimate: there are signs only where there are linguistic acts, intentional (i.e. *absichtliche*) communicative interactions: there are signs only where agents have certain (motivational) mental states. Frege's appeal to types of mental states in the course of a discussion concerning the semantic properties of signs, whilst uncharacteristic, is not philosophically unjustifiable or mistaken. His fortuitous remark obviously, although it might constitute a concern for the radical antipsychologist, rests on the hardly contestable intuition that when we use linguistic signs, oral or written, our interlocutors are typically in a position to ascribe us given mental states or episodes or, as Frege would put it "to correctly recognise our intentions". What are the implications of this remark if we attempt to turn it into a systematic parameter of Frege's philosophy of language?

2. Husserl

Among Frege's contemporaries, Husserl is the one who proposed what might be the most elaborate theory of linguistic behaviour interpretation and mental state ascription and it will be interesting to interpret Frege's remark in the light of his ideas.³ According to Husserl, in typical communication situations, linguistic signs (*intimate geben kund*) to the interlocutor (some of) the speaker's mental (i.e. intentional) state(s) and episode(s). In other words, in a communication situation, linguistic signs are like one's bodily behaviour – in a sense vast enough to include also one's facial gestures – a way to access one's mental states. In this respect, there is however an important distinction between bodily and linguistic behaviour. If, say, Pierre is endowed with adequate recognitional capacities, he can infer from Marie's nodding accompanied by an avid smiling in the presence of an appetizing hypercaloric dessert, that Marie has a certain mental state, for instance the desire to eat this dessert. But the connection between Marie's bodily behaviour and the exact content of the mental state ascribed to Marie on this occasion depends on Pierre's having been led to recognize the concomitance and to associate one's desire to eat with one's approving behaviour in the presence of a dish. Marie's bodily behaviour could as well indicate, for instance, her unrepentant gluttony or her hypoglycaemic condition or other or even none of these states of affairs: according to the *Logical Investigations*, what is inferred from a (purely) bodily behaviour is anarchic inasmuch as it

² "If, namely, signs have no other aim but to serve the understanding of humans among themselves... nothing else is required but that be present the intention of producing a sign which is identical to the one that had been made previously and this need only to succeed inasmuch as the reader correctly recognises this intention. In what follows, we understand by "signs of same figure" those which, following the intention of he who writes are supposed to be the same so as to designate the same thing." (my translation)

³ In what follows I draw on what Husserl says in Hua XIX/1, *Investigation I* and in manuscripts from 1913-14 forthcoming in Hua XX/2.

depends solely on the associative moods and the recognitional and interpretative capacities of the observer which may and will vary arbitrarily from one individual to another. But if Pierre *understands* Marie when she says "I would like to eat chocolate mousse", then Pierre will, typically, systematically infer that Marie would love to eat chocolate mousse. More generally, a systematic connection will be made by any agent A_1 endowed with the adequate *linguistic* competence (and the correlative recognitional capacities) between another agent's A_2 linguistic behaviour, the oral or written statement $\varphi(x)$, and A_2 's mental episode $\psi(x)$.

Although Husserl defined intimation for communication situations that exclude irony, sarcasm, theatre, lie, deception, etc, he assumed that his theory could be extended to such contexts as well. He moreover acknowledges that there may be use of language outside any communication situation and, in such cases, to cut it short, signs do not intimate since A_1 is missing. But what is foremost relevant here is that Husserl also claims that the condition for an agent's inferring to the mental states of a speaker on the basis of what he says is that she *understands* what it expresses.

On Husserl's view, A_2 's linguistic behaviour fulfils its communicative function only if A_1 has a mental act whose *intentional matter* is identical to the intentional matter of the mental act A_2 has, namely the one intimated by $\varphi(x)$ – where 'x' designates the intentional matter. In Husserl's theory, intentional matters are individuated on the basis of the mental act of which they are part – namely the part by virtue of which this act *intends* an object. Hence they are not identical to propositions or propositional contents but rather, according to Husserl, tokens or instances thereof. In the *Logical Investigations*, the role of species (or classes) of act matters is played by what Husserl calls objective meanings and he indeed appeals to their relation to objective meanings in order to explain the identity of different propositional attitudes' intentional matters. But in his later work on *Sign and Expression*, the explanation of what makes it possible to understand a linguistic act (i.e. to recognise the signs used by an agent) will dramatically evolve. Husserl will first come to drop the contrast between bodily and linguistic behaviour and generalise his theory of behaviour interpretation so as to make communication a special case of voluntary behaviour, that is, of "action". What is interesting about Husserl's later theory for the present purpose is the fact that the problem of meaning-recognition becomes a special case of the intimating function of certain types of actions, namely of language-supported actions. The key to the problem of sign identity is, accordingly, to understand how we come to ascribe to linguistic agents the mental states we actually ascribe them on the basis of what they *do* when they speak and, in brief, Husserl's fully-fledged solution to the problem of sign recognition runs along the following lines. Linguistic behaviour is a complex and sophisticated form of voluntary bodily movement that must be perceived as *voluntary* in order to be understood: A_2 's perceiving A_1 's linguistic behaviour as voluntary has a *motivational* effect on A_2 : A_2 's perceiving A_1 's action as voluntary engages him (*ihm zumute*) to realising a corresponding voluntary action. On Husserl's view, when I assert – questions, commands, etc. function somewhat analogously – "Alonzo is an admirable logician" I am not simply producing sounds that are meant to be *perceived* by my interlocutor but I am seeking to engage him to *do* something: I am seeking, namely, to arouse in my interlocutor a disposition to co-believe that Alonzo is an admirable logician. My interlocutor is, of course, free to judge or not to judge that Alonzo is an

admirable logician (she can doubt, deny, etc...), but in order to understand what I assert, she must at least recognise that I produce the sounds or graphic patterns in order to arouse in her this disposition. An interlocutor who would not recognize that there is a practical communication intention on the part of the speaker, that the latter demands from him the (co-)realisation of a certain sophisticated language-supported mental act would not be led to ascribe him the relevant mental states and would not understand him – although he may indeed perceive the movements of his buccal orifice, the sounds that emerge from it as well as the movement of his face and/or body.

3. Frege (once more)

According to §99 of the *Grundgesetze*, in order to recognize that two (or more) occurrences of a linguistic sign belong to the same type one must recognize that the intention (*Absicht*) of the author when he produces the first is identical to his intention when he produces the other(s): what he says or writes must "intimate", to put it in Husserlian terms, the same mental act. Producing a sign for a certain purpose is clearly a type of action but, unfortunately, one can say little about Fregean *Absichten* and their motivational effects (if they have any): contrary to Husserl, Frege was not seeking to develop a theory of communicative interactions. Nevertheless, one may take for granted that Frege's *intention (Absicht) of producing a figure that designates a certain object* is a type of mental act that might be complex and whose having implies – or is identical – with the having of an act 1) by virtue of which one is directed toward or refers to the corresponding object and 2) whose occurrence in the mind of an agent can be inferred on the basis of what an agent does when she speaks. Let $*x_1*$, $*x_2*$, etc., be sign occurrences and I_1 , I_2 , etc., Fregean intentions (*Absichten*) of producing a sign in order to designate an object, that is, two-place functors that take as arguments a sign occurrence and an object. If y is an object, then:

FI $*x_1*$ is type-identical with $*x_2*$ if and only if $I_1(*x_1*, y)$ is "identical" with $I_2(*x_2*, y)$

What explains that we *perceive* the signs $*x_1*$, $*x_2*$, etc. as "identical" is, following Frege, in addition to their being maximally physiognomically similar, the fact that we *recognize as identical* the underlying intentions of the agent who produces them. How is this possible? Saying that we can recognise that $I_1(*x_1*, y)$ and $I_2(*x_2*, y)$ are "the same" because we recognise that $*x_1*$'s relation to y is determined by the same *Sinn* as the one which determines $*x_2*$'s relation to y is *not* an option since we have no Fregean epistemic criterion for sense identity. In fact, Frege seems here to go the other way around and *Grundgesetze* rather implies a position closer to the one Husserl defends in his later work on signs: we recognise that the *Sinn* of $*x_1*$ and $*x_2*$ is "the same" because we recognize $I_1(*x_1*, y)$ and $I_2(*x_2*, y)$, as "identical". For if recognising the intention of the speaker is a (necessary and) sufficient condition for recognising the identity of sign occurrences, then, if Frege is serious about the intrinsic nature of the relation between signs and their senses, we can be insured that if we recognise two signs as identical on the basis of our recognising the intention they intimate, their *Sinn* is also identical. It is, Frege would be bound to admit, because linguistic signs *intimate* certain mental episodes or states of the speaker, because we ascribe to the speakers and indeed – if we want to go the additional Husserlian step – co-realise given mental acts in communicative contexts that we come to understand what a speaker *means*: it is only once we have established the

relevant similarity-relation between what signs – or linguistic behaviour – intimate that we can come to say that these signs have or do not have the same meaning.

That epistemological considerations should play an essential role in Frege's philosophy of language should no be surprising: language is not a system of abstract types independent of human actions and the all too ubiquitous antipsychologistic scruples can only, in this respect, be grounded on a misunderstanding of what a theory of linguistic meaning should be.

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Determinism, Randomness and Desert-Value

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What difference should a belief in determinism make to one's values? Traditionally this question has been tackled by asking whether determinism is compatible with free will or with moral responsibility. Compatibilists say that determinism would not threaten free will or moral responsibility, and hence that people's values should not be influenced by whether or not they believe in determinism. Incompatibilists say that determinism would undermine free will or moral responsibility, and hence that this should have a considerable impact on values. Many evaluative beliefs should not then be available to a person who believes in determinism.

I have two reasons for preferring to tackle my original question about values and determinism without couching it in terms of free will or moral responsibility. First, I believe that many terms and phrases playing a role in discussions of this issue are systematically ambiguous, having both compatibilist and incompatibilist meanings. Such terms include 'free', 'free will', 'responsibility', 'moral responsibility', 'can' 'could have done otherwise', 'control', 'praise', 'blame', 'deserve', 'reactive attitudes', and many terms for emotions such as 'pride', 'guilt', 'resentment', and 'indignation'. I believe there is a danger, then, that an apparent disagreement over the compatibility of determinism and moral responsibility may not be genuine but may arise because the compatibilist is using the term 'moral responsibility' in what I'm calling a compatibilist sense, and the incompatibilist is using it in an incompatibilist sense. And consequently, thought experiments in which one is invited to say whether people are morally responsible in various scenarios are unlikely to yield illuminating results. A way forward would be to define 'moral responsibility' without using other systematically ambiguous expressions. However, it is usually given some such definition as the condition required for praise and blame, or for praise and blame to be deserved, or for the reactive attitudes to make sense. The danger then remains that there could be agreement in using such a definition while a systematic ambiguity in all these terms goes undetected.

My second reason for avoiding terms such as 'free will' and 'moral responsibility' is that even if this problem of ambiguity can be overcome, a substantial interest would remain in answering the further question what values are undermined when free will or moral responsibility is undermined. My preference, therefore, is to seek those features at the outset and to argue directly that they would be undermined by determinism.

This places me in the incompatibilist camp, at least in thinking that determinism has some evaluative relevance. But I do not think that compatibilists have it all wrong—many evaluative claims would not be undermined by determinism, and I think there are useful compatibilist senses of 'free will' and 'moral responsibility'.

What evaluative claims would be undermined by determinism? My answer is that *it is all those entailing that the intrinsic goodness of a person's receiving pleasure or pain depends on the virtue or vice of the person*. I shall call these desert principles. It should be clear why the principles involve intrinsic goodness—there is no reason why determinism would undermine the view that it can be instrumentally good to receive pleasures or pains on the basis of virtue or vice.

Before arguing that desert principles would be undermined by determinism I shall offer a few clarificatory remarks about such principles:

I would like to stress that my choice of the term 'desert principles' is intended as capturing one important sense of 'desert' that I want to focus on. There are certainly other senses of 'desert', including compatibilist senses, that do not involve the notion of intrinsic goodness and are not germane to this paper. For example, we would say that someone who won a medal by undetected cheating did not deserve in this sense to win the medal. Claims involving these other senses of 'desert' would not necessarily be undermined by determinism.

For the sake of simplicity I am referring to pleasure and pain, but this can be extended to first-order goods and bads to include such things as knowledge and freedom that might be held along with pleasure as intrinsically good for the person who possesses them. It must, however, exclude such putative goods as the good of suffering for one's vicious acts that I class as second-order because they make essential reference to first-order goods and bads. The pleasure or pain received by someone may be bestowed intentionally by a person, institution, or deity, in which case it may be regarded as a reward or punishment, or it may come about unintentionally.

I am using 'virtue', 'vice' and its cognates 'virtuous' etc. as the most general evaluative terms that may apply to an action, series of actions, character trait, or agent. This is a stipulation that extends common usage considerably. The judgement of virtue and vice can be based on the goodness and badness, or rightness and wrongness, of the agent's action or actions. And it may take into consideration the agent's motives, her beliefs about the goodness and rightness of her actions, and the extent to which her actions are voluntary or constrained. We may even regard as desert principles those involving conceptions of virtue and vice that include nonmoral attributes of prudence, such as self-discipline and laziness. This has relevance to questions of tax policy, as high salaries and low tax rates may be regarded as rewards for the self-interested exercise of prudential virtues of diligence and good decision-making.

The all things considered intrinsic goodness of a person's receiving some pleasure or pain can be divided into the intrinsic goodness embodied in the pleasure or pain itself, together with what might be termed the desert-value of the person's receiving pleasure or pain at a certain level after performing an act of a given level of virtue or vice. Desert principles can be formulated in terms of all things considered goodness, or the pro tanto goodness of desert-value. Individualistic desert principles apply to a single person and typically make reference to a fitting (nonzero) level of pleasure or pain for a given instance of virtue or vice. An example is the principle that it is intrinsically good for vice to meet with a fitting level of pain. Distributional desert principles apply to distributions of pleasure and pain across a number of individuals and need not entail or be entailed by individualistic principles. They include the very popular principle that it is intrinsically better that a given fixed item of pain be received by the more vicious of two possible recipients. (The evil tyrant is intent on torturing someone.)

I turn now to a thought experiment which I think will show that determinism would undermine all desert principles. It is based on Plato's Myth of Er, but modified in a crucial way. Er

learns that after death, souls are judged and then spend a period of a thousand years in bliss or turmoil in accordance with whether their lives have been virtuous or vicious. After this they are led to choose their next life from a great variety, descriptions of which are spread out on the ground for their scrutiny. They are then caused to forget all previous experiences before beginning their new lives. Let us suppose that the lives are spelled out in glorious detail, so that this myth captures the idea that lives are fully determined before they are led. Nothing about this myth or determinism is inconsistent with there being senses of causation in which agents or their reasons can be said to cause their actions. Imagine that you are one of those souls. Now let us modify the myth and suppose that instead of choosing your next life, it is simply randomly assigned to you. And suppose you draw the life of a cunning serial killer. This would seem terrifying and unjust in its own right. But now consider how you would react to the further news that after that life is over you will be tortured in the underworld to an extent that fits the viciousness of that life. I do not think you, or anyone reflecting on the situation, will think that it would be a good thing for you to receive such torture given your current helplessness.

The thought experiment is constructed in such a way that the torture cannot have consequences for you or anyone else, so it must be intrinsically good if it is good at all. This has the advantage of eliciting intuitions about intrinsic goodness that are pure and untainted by those associated with instrumental good. The intuition that the torture would not be good holds whether it is regarded as happening unintentionally by way of some cosmic principle (as in the myth), or by way of the intention of a deity.

The intuition can be seen to generalise in holding just as readily for divinely bestowed punishments or unintentionally inflicted pains during someone's life. If what the recipient did was determined, it could not be good for a deity or cosmic principle to administer pain to a vicious individual while she is alive, if this is not done as a means to future benefits. Thus it would not be *intrinsically* good for someone to receive torture during her life, no matter how vicious her life has been if determinism is true.

Furthermore, I think this point extends to the cases of punishments and rewards administered by governments, institutions, and individual people. If determinism would undermine desert principles involving divinely bestowed punishments, why not also those involving humanly bestowed punishments? In the intuitions prompted by the thought experiment, administering punishments on the basis of past vice was seen not to be good because it would be groundless discrimination, not because of any fact about who or what was administering the punishment.

This thought experiment shows that one important desert principle would be undermined by determinism, namely that it is intrinsically good for vice to meet with a fitting level of pain. But further reflection on the scenario reveals that all desert principles would be undermined. For seeing that it is entirely a matter of luck what life you draw, it is clear that the level of virtue and vice is irrelevant to the goodness of post mortem pleasures and pains, and hence to the intrinsic goodness of pleasure and pains incurred during that life. Included among the desert principles are the seemingly more plausible distribution principles such as that it is intrinsically better to punish the vicious than the innocent. These would also be undermined, for if a fixed quantity of pleasure or pain has to be distributed at the end of people's lives, it would be as irrelevant to do so on the basis of virtue and vice as on the basis of height or beauty.

I have argued that determinism has evaluative implications in that it would preclude desert principles. But the significance

of this is greatly diminished if, as many believe, determinism is unlikely to be true because physical reality is best described by quantum theory and quantum theory is most plausibly interpreted as fundamentally probabilistic rather than deterministic. We can extend the enquiry by asking what difference it would make to one's values if one believed the world were fundamentally probabilistic, and thus involved an element of randomness, as described by quantum theory. Many have thought that full freedom and responsibility and hence an unrestricted range of evaluative principles can be preserved under quantum theory provided that the indeterminacies occur in the right place.¹ I think a slight adaptation to the thought experiment will tell against this and show that the desert principles would be undermined if the world is fundamentally probabilistic.

Imagine that when hearing of the life you have been assigned, you discover that it contains various branching points at which a coin is tossed. If it falls heads your life takes course A, while if it falls tails your life takes course B. I do not think that you or anyone reflecting on the experience of pain that follows the life will think that it would be good to punish you at the end of your life when it takes course A because a coin falls heads, while it would not be good to punish you for a life taking course A if it is entirely determined. Nor do I think you or others will say the situation is crucially underdescribed because we haven't been told when during the life the coin tosses occur.

Thus the only way the desert principles could be true would be if both determinism and probabilistic indeterminism were false and some kind of agent-causal libertarian freedom were true. Such a position encounters enormous difficulties, both a priori and a posteriori, that I cannot discuss here.

I conclude that someone who believes in determinism or probabilistic indeterminism should not believe in desert principles and should not experience emotions founded on them. Such emotions would include those instances of guilt, pride, indignation, and resentment, etc. that are based on thoughts entailing desert principles. An example would be the case of indignation defined as the emotion of pain caused by the thought that X did something wrong and it would be intrinsically good for her to be punished appropriately for it. However, such desert-based thoughts and emotions may be so deeply entrenched and natural that they may be hard in practice to cast off when one comes to believe that they are theoretically undermined. But when it comes to institutions of punishment and wealth distribution, we are able to decide calmly and unhurriedly how they are to be structured, so a theoretical belief that desert principles are undermined stands a good chance of producing an accordingly rational choice of institutions.

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¹ Numerous suggestions have been discussed by both compatibilists and incompatibilists as to what this right place might be. For example, Daniel Dennett has discussed the point at which reasons relevant to the action do or don't occur to the agent. Robert Nozick mentions, but explicitly declines to pursue, the view that locates the indeterminacy in the weighting of different reasons. And Robert Kane locates it in the amount of effort one makes in struggling to do what one considers best when there are powerful countervailing inclinations. See the essays by these three authors in O'Connor (1995). These approaches stem from Wiggins (1973).

Instincts and Consciousness in Reid

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1. Introduction

According to Reid (1994, 545) there are two mechanical principles of action in human beings, namely, instincts and habits, both of which require no attention, deliberation, or will. Moreover, Reid's term "mechanical principles of action" suggests Newton's influence on Reid, especially if one considers Reid's (1994, 550) claim that habit and instinct both operate without will, intention, and thought, and therefore may be called mechanical principles of action. Yet Newton didn't only consider mechanical forces, but other kinds of forces as well; moreover, Newton's active principles are more closely linked with will, thought, and final causes, which is indicative of Reid's animal principles of action, that is, appetite, desire, affection, and passion, and of his rational principles of action, that is, what is good for us upon the whole and what appears to be our duty.

2. Instincts

With regard to instincts Reid (1994, 545) states: "By Instinct, I mean a natural blind impulse to certain actions, without having any end in view, without deliberation, and very often without any conception of what we do." Breathing in human beings, sucking and swallowing in infants are Reid's (1994, 545) examples of instincts. Moreover, instincts are not only found in human beings, but also in animals; furthermore, in the animals which we know best and which we consider as more highly developed one finds similar or the same instincts as in human beings (Reid 1994, 545). Yet according to Tinbergen (1969) human ethology is still in its infancy. Hence it is by no means clear whether human beings share so many instincts or similar instincts with animals familiar to them and with higher developed animals, that is, with related species. Moreover, I don't see why one should share so many instincts or similar instincts with animals familiar to oneself. For whether one is familiar with another species is a contingent thing, that is, I might be familiar with an ape if I live in Kenya, but I might not be familiar with an ape if I live in Russia, whereas with regard to instincts one at least has the intuition that they hold universally and that they have developed over thousands of years.

Reid (1994, 547) classifies instincts:

Besides the instincts which appear only in infancy, and are intended to supply the want of understanding in that early period, there are many which continue through life, and which supply the defects of our intellectual powers in every period. Of these we may observe three classes. *First*, There are many things necessary to be done for our preservation, which, even when we will to do, we know not the means by which they must be done. ... A *second* case ... is, When the action must be so frequently repeated, that to intend and will it every time it is done, would occupy too much of our thought, and leave no room for other necessary employments of the mind. ... A *third* case ... is, When the action must be done so suddenly that there is no time to think and determine.

Examples for the first class are swallowing food and willing to stretch out my arm, that is, in some degree every voluntary motion of our body is done instinctively. For those

internal motions, that is, the cooperation of muscles and nerves, are neither willed nor intended by us and therefore are instinctive (Reid 1994, 547). Yet one may argue that voluntary movements like willing to stretch out my arm must be learnt. This may be more obvious in the case of walking. Human beings and also, for example, horses have to learn to walk. Hence voluntary movements may not count as instinctive. One could save Reid by postulating a learning instinct which enables humans, horses, etc. to learn to walk and by this means may call voluntary movements instinctive. Yet the ability to walk may also be due to growth or maturation, so that human beings, horses, etc. don't have to learn to walk after all. Finally, there is even the possibility that the ability to walk hinges on the combination of a learning instinct with growth and maturation, so that instincts are involved after all.

The latter position gets supported by the literature. For Tinbergen (1969) reports experimental findings which show that the ability to fly in birds can be explained by growth or maturation. That is, there is no significant difference in their first flight between birds which are prevented from making incipient flight movements before and birds which are allowed to make incipient flight movements before. Yet later on there is a significant difference with regard to flying skill depending on the birds' experience. Hence beside growth and maturation there is also learning involved in the bird's ability to fly, so that instincts might be involved in the bird's ability to fly.

If these internal motions are neither willed nor intended by us, are they also beyond our control? Although Reid doesn't say so, it seems reasonable to assume that he takes that stance. For with regard to winking, an example for Reid's third class of instinct, Reid (1994, 547) observes that it is not easy to resist the impulse of instinct. Hence instincts are to a certain extent beyond our control in Reid.

Examples for Reid's (1994, 547) second class of instincts are breathing and closing the eye-lids to preserve the luster of the eye. Examples for the third class are regaining one's balance and winking, when anything threatens our eyes (Reid 1994, 547). While nowadays breathing, swallowing, closing the eye-lids, and winking fall in the category of reflexes, regaining one's balance can be considered an acquired skill and/or due to growth or maturation. For as in the case of walking human beings don't have the ability to regain one's balance from birth onwards. Yet Tinbergen (1969) has pointed out that not all instincts, like the reproductive instinct in the male stickleback, show themselves from birth onwards. Hence Reid is wrong in assuming that all instincts either appear only in infancy or continue to show up throughout life.

Reid (1994, 548) even considers the possibility that not only our actions, but even our judgments and beliefs are sometimes guided by instinct; for as it is always evidence which determines our belief and as it takes time that we grow up to the full use of our rational faculties, we do and must believe many things without any evidence at all. Hence we also must believe instinctively. Reid (1994, 549) substantiates his conclusion by the deep impression religious beliefs make upon the mind of children and by the absurd belief in ghosts and hobgoblins which early impressed stick so fast that they baffle rational conviction.

Yet the belief in ghosts and hobgoblins mostly arises, because parents, relatives, etc. tell children that there are such things to make them obedient. With regard to religious belief something similar holds, that is, children are usually told by their parents, relatives, etc. that there is a God. Moreover, why shouldn't the children take their parents', relatives', etc. words as evidence? The only way to make sense of Reid's view here is not to consider other people's words as a kind of evidence. Yet we take other people's words as evidence. In court at a trial when a person serves as a witness, his or her words are taken as evidence; moreover, sometimes these words are taken so seriously as evidence that they even decide whether someone lives or dies. Hence Reid's conclusion that we do and must believe many things without evidence at least doesn't hold for the examples he provides.

Tinbergen (1969, 112) defines an instinct as a hierarchically organized nervous mechanism which is susceptible to certain priming, releasing and directing impulses of internal as well as of external origin, and which responds to these impulses by coordinated movements that contribute to the maintenance of the individual and the species.

Hence it is wrong to assume that there is only one type of instinctive activity, which is in accordance with Reid's view. Moreover, according to Tinbergen instinctive reactions are of varying degrees of complexity, which also seems in accordance with Reid's views. For in Reid the first three categories of instinct seem to involve instincts with lesser complexity than the other ones. Finally, that instincts contribute to our maintenance can also be found in Reid.

According to Tinbergen (1969) instinctive activities can be rigid or adaptive depending on the nervous mechanism involved. That is, the centers of the higher levels do control purposive behavior which is adaptive with regard to the mechanisms it employs to attain the end; the lower levels give rise to increasingly simple and more stereotyped movements, until at the level of the consummatory act we have an entirely rigid component, the fixed pattern, and a more or less variable component, the taxis, whose variability entirely depends on changes in the outer world. Hence instincts cannot be identified with reflexes. As Reid doesn't use the term "reflex" at all, the question whether instincts are identified with reflexes in Reid has to be negated. Yet some of the examples he provides for instincts are categorized as reflexes today, whereas some others are not. So even from that starting point instincts are not identified with reflexes in Reid, which is in accordance with Tinbergen's view. Moreover, although Reid doesn't say anything about nervous mechanisms, the instinctive activities he mentions range from very rigid, like breathing, to more adaptive ones, like proneness to imitation.

Both the whole pattern and the partial patterns comprise an instinctive activity in Tinbergen (1969). For example, reproductive behavior in the male stickleback is an instinctive activity. But its components, nest-building and fighting, are also instinctive activities. In Reid one doesn't find such a distinction, though. Finally, with regard to the internal stimuli Tinbergen (1969) tentatively identifies three different kinds: (1) hormones; (2) internal sensory stimuli; and (3) intrinsic or automatic nervous impulses generated by the central nervous system itself. While Reid doesn't know about hormones and doesn't say anything with regard to the connection between the central nervous system and instincts, an empty stomach or the sensation of hunger might be an internal sensory stimulus in Reid (1994, 545) which elicits a sucking instinct in infants.

Hence overall Reid and Tinbergen don't diverge so much with regard to their account of instincts.

According to Wakefield (1990) there are two theses that are generally thought to be essential to Freud's theory, namely, that there exist unconscious instinctual impulses which underlie psychopathology and that these instinctual impulses can be brought into conscious awareness through psychoanalysis. Yet Wakefield interprets Freud differently, that is, in Freud instincts are causal properties that govern the interaction of mental contents. So what about Reid? (1) Are instincts causal properties? As Reid (1994, 66, 74) only considers agent causation to be proper causation, whereas scientific causation is only the lax and popular way of speaking about causation in Reid, instincts are no proper causes in Reid. But as instincts are principles of action in Reid, one may advance the thesis that they are causes of action in Reid's lax and popular sense of causation. (2) Are instincts conscious in Reid? As Reid doesn't say anything about the consciousness of instincts, one has to look at what he says about consciousness in general and see what one can derive from that for the consciousness of instincts.

Reid's (1994, 222-223) explication of consciousness is: *Consciousness* is a word used ... to signify that immediate knowledge which we have of our present thoughts and purposes, and, in general, of all the present operations of our minds. ... consciousness is only of things present. To apply consciousness to things past ... is to confound consciousness with memory; ... consciousness is only of things in the mind, and not of external things. It is improper to say, I am conscious of the table which is before me. I perceive it, I see it; but do not say I am conscious of it. ... Whatever we perceive, whatever we remember, whatever we are conscious of, we have a full persuasion or conviction of its existence. ... what has no existence *at present* cannot be the object of perception or of consciousness;

As Reid doesn't say anything with regard to instincts as operations of our own minds, one cannot make a judgment whether human beings are conscious of their instincts in Reid. Yet instincts can become actualized, that is, existent, at present, so that instincts could become the object of consciousness. Nevertheless breathing, swallowing food, closing the eyelids, and winking are not in the mind, whereas consciousness is only of things in the mind in Reid. Hence instincts are not conscious in Reid after all.

One could claim that human beings can reflect on their instincts, and in this way instincts can become an object of consciousness in Reid. Yet Reid (1994, 443) quite clearly distinguishes between consciousness and reflection. But insofar as consciousness is a precondition for reflection - although Reid doesn't make a claim in this regard -, instincts could become the object of consciousness in Reid after all.

According to Reid (1994, 442) the objects of consciousness are our present pains, pleasures, hopes, fears, desires, doubts, and thoughts, that is, "all the passions, and all the actions and operations of our own minds, while they are present." Furthermore, Reid (1994, 442) claims that one cannot find a proof that consciousness is not a fallacious sense. Moreover, when Reid (1994, 442) lists his first principles of contingent truths, his first principle is the existence of everything of which I am conscious. That is, when a man is conscious of pain, he is certain of its existence, when he is conscious that he doubts or believes, he is certain of the existence of those operations, etc. If one continues this list, one could also say, when a

man is conscious of an instinct, he is certain of its existence, and when a man is conscious of a habit, he is certain of its existence. Furthermore, on first sight nothing speaks against the continuation of this list. But this doesn't answer the question whether instincts or habits are conscious; it rather presupposes them to be so. Hence this is no proof for the consciousness of instincts in Reid.

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Science and Value Judgements

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In *A Companion to the Philosophy of Science* E. McMullin observes that a century ago „nearly all of those who wrote about the nature of science would have been in agreement that science ought to be ‘value-free’. (...) A century later, the maxim that scientific knowledge is ‘value-laden’ seems almost as entrenched as its opposite was earlier” (p. 550). This change has occurred when philosophers paid more attention to the experience of doing science than to analyzing textbook theories. It has then been recognized that in science the choice of experimental designs, of research methods, of theory, etc. has a character of value-judgement: „Science is *essentially* evaluative, would not be science if it could not make and thoroughly support a whole range of value-judgements. (...) Learning to be a scientist involves learning to distinguish between good theories and bad theories, between good experimental designs and bad ones. Someone who could not make such discriminations could not distinguish good science from bad science, science from nonscience; and therefore could not be a scientist” (Scriven 1994, 38-39). Values involved in such methodological judgements come to be named „epistemic” or „cognitive”. This move was relatively uncontroversial, and the effort of philosophers was concentrated on showing that for those judgements some kind of empirical basis can be secured. Yet, the question arises: do values other than cognitive – especially moral – play any role in science without threatening the objectivity and rationality of scientific enterprise? In the paper I defend a positive answer to the above question: if we are to be faithful to the experience of everyday scientific practice and not to develop “armchair philosophy” we should recognize that moral value-judgements constitute a necessary element of that practice. In order to show this, I will consider five cases when in a research procedure methodological and moral value-judgements intertwine. In the paper I use the term „science” broadly, as covering natural, social and human sciences.

1. Moral considerations in the formulation of a problem and evaluation of a solution

Scriven (1994) rightly observes that there are cases in which formulating a problem, and later evaluating a solution must take into account the moral dimension of that problem – for this dimension is part of the problem. Any formulation of a problem to be solved involves identification and conceptualization of relevant factors that make up the problem. Suppose that a scientist is to solve a problem of pest-control. Knowing – thanks to results of previous scientific research – that effects of a pesticide on farm workers, animals, rivers, drinking water etc. are serious, she must then take into account how safe must be a developed substance for “relevant beings”. And she must weight the effects desired and the effects to be minimized. And there is no one who can do that for her, as analyzing the problem is part of the scientific project. So, passing a judgement: “a developed substance should not harm people and animals” is part of problem conceptualization. The evaluation of a solution as „good” means in turn that the substance has been scientifically tested and required properties (pest-killing) were sufficiently demonstrated. But it means also that a proposed substance does not harm people, animals, and other things specified. The latter is a descriptive judgement, scientifically tested; but *that* it

should be tested is not a just methodological judgement. We have to decide what should be investigated among an infinite number of properties of a given substance: „this substance is a pesticide” is a scientific hypothesis to be tested, so the obvious candidate is the pest-killing capacity. But to take the claim „this substance is not harmful for people” as part of the hypothesis to be tested requires considerations not purely cognitive but moral. In short, sometimes judgements what should be taken into account when formulating a problem and hypotheses to be tested as possible solutions require moral considerations. In this sense a judgement what constitutes a problem and what hypotheses should be tested cannot be seen as „purely methodological”, and values governing such judgements as purely cognitive. Let us stress at that point that a judgement “there are no moral issues to be taken into account when formulating and solving the problem in hand” is also not purely methodological.

2. The moral dimension of the choice of research methods

Once a problem is specified scientists encounter a question of methods to be employed and experimental set-ups to be designed. Let us suppose that a scientist would like to investigate the impact of low temperature on a human body. He then develops a method, which contains the following step: freeze in such and such a way a statistically relevant number of human bodies to death. We could expect that it would be a reliable method, as we would experiment not with models, computer simulations but with objects about which a hypothesis is formulated. Yet, are we ready to say that this is a good scientific method but unfortunately immoral? In order to judge it as „scientifically good and reliable” we should employ it. And we employ it because we pass a judgement „it should be employed in spite of the fact that it is immoral”. We may, of course, withdraw from employing it, but then we cannot judge it as „scientifically good”. It would make no sense to say that „it is scientifically good but it should not be used in science”. In neither case a scientist passes a purely methodological judgement, for she needs to „weight” values that are not just methodological. And if the autonomy of science is to be retained, there is no one who should dictate scientists what methods should in fact be used, although we may call them into account for employing certain methods. Let us also recall that descriptions of methods as „proper” for this or that kind of investigations are part of the content of science. The fact that a reliable method was used constitutes part of the justification of a judgement that experimental data are correct, and the use of an unreliable method casts doubts on the validity of experimental results. Thus, non-cognitive values bear not only on science seen as a kind of human activity but also on science seen as knowledge unless we arbitrarily remove the methodology of a given science from that science (Lekka-Kowalik 2000/2001).

3. The relevance of moral values for hypothesis acceptance

Accepting or rejecting a hypothesis is obviously part of various scientific procedures. Since no hypothesis is

completely verified, the scientist must make a judgement to the effect that the evidence gathered is sufficient to warrant the acceptance (or the rejection) of a hypothesis under consideration. At first glance it seems that this is the point where no other but cognitive values should be taken into account. Yet, as Rudner (1953) convincingly shows, the decision regarding how strong evidence is „strong enough” depends, among other things, on the importance – in a typical moral sense – of making a mistake in accepting a hypothesis. For the hypothesis – when accepted – will be used in further research and in practice. And „how great a risk one is willing to take of being wrong in accepting and rejecting the hypothesis will depend upon how seriously in the typically ethical sense one views the consequences of making a mistake” (Rudner 1953, 2). This is why we require more evidence in order to accept a hypothesis that a certain drug does not contain a lethal quantity of toxic ingredient than we require for accepting a hypothesis that a certain plant grows only in mountain regions. The difference is explained by the fact that – if mistakenly accepted – when acting upon the first hypothesis we would cause harm in a moral sense, and in the other case we cannot see obvious morally unacceptable consequences. Again, there is no one who should dictate scientists when the evidence is “strong enough”.

4. The role of moral evaluations in judging methodological merits of research results

The belief in the dichotomy between descriptive and evaluative terms in our language cannot be longer maintained: facts and values are entangled. The fact/value dichotomy has collapsed together with others: analytic/synthetic, and observational/theoretical (Putnam 2002). We have accustomed to the fact that such terms as „rational” or „simple”, used with regard to hypotheses or methods, are at the same time descriptive and evaluative. Yet, many thinkers insist that only epistemic values are here at stake. This cannot be maintained. For our language contains not only „thick methodological concepts” such as “simple” but also the so-called „thick ethical concepts” such as “cruel” or „abase” (Putnam 2002). There are cases where a methodological evaluative judgement is implicitly dependent on a moral evaluation of facts. Suppose a historian explains a revolution in a certain country as follows: “Cruelties of the king led to the uprising”. To pass a methodological judgement “this explanation of the uprising is correct” is possible only when we judge actions of the king as “cruelties”. Methodological and moral evaluations here intertwine. There are too many of such concepts to remove them from science, unless we restrict the domain of science only to natural sciences, what seems to be rather arbitrary. Let us also note, that “thickness” of concepts is invariant with regard to negation: both “cruel” and “non-cruel” are thick concepts; and judging that the king’s actions were “non-cruel” would force the historian’s peers to reject the suggested explanation of the uprising.

5. Moral value-judgements are auxiliary hypotheses.

Intemann (2001) sketches a case where moral value-judgements are relevant for justification of scientific claims. Consider the case of grouping various symptoms and events as a disease and distinguishing them from the common blues. A justification of the claim that those events and symptoms constitute a disease called “clinical depression” appeals, among other things, to the fact that they impair the functions most essential to human well-being. Yet, determining what is essential to human well-

being involves a value-judgement that is not methodological but moral. If we did not rely on this sort of value-judgements, then cases thought to be cases of clinical depression would look gerrymandered – and it would be hard to see why we should treat them, being so different, as one disease. Let us also add that the conception of human well-being helps also to determine what should be investigated when a patient appears complaining about her health.

Let us sum up our considerations. We first hoped that science would become value-free – even if it were not so yet – and no necessity of making value-judgements would occur. For the value-freedom seemed to be a condition of the objectivity of scientific knowledge. Further research into the nature of science destroyed this hope: value-judgements are essential for science. The hope then was that the values at stake could be restricted to purely epistemic. I attempted to show that this view cannot be maintained if we take seriously everyday scientific practices: for moral and methodological values are entangled, as much as are facts and values. I tried to demonstrate this by considering various cases from scientific practice. There are at least three conclusions to be drawn from the above considerations. Two of them concern science. First, many people deny moral values in science with the fear that admitting them would diminish science’s objectivity. Yet, “for the scientist to close his eyes to the fact that scientific method *intrinsically* requires the making of value decisions, for him to push out of his consciousness the fact that he does make them, can in no way bring him closer to the ideal of objectivity” (Rudner 1953, 6). Thus, in the name of objectivity we should admit moral values into science. Secondly, learning how to make moral – and not only methodological – judgements is part of learning how to be a good scientist. So, developing an ethics of science would help doing science, although from that we must not draw the conclusion that the ethics of science should be institutionalized in ethical committees or in some other forms. The third conclusion concerns our view on value-judgements. Are they really subjective, unjustifiable, irrational, culture-dependent etc.? If so, then science is such as well. There are thinkers who draw this conclusion; some suggest that there should be – as a matter of democracy and equality – many “sciences” involving different sets of moral (and other) values. I modestly suggest to take seriously that science is objective and at the same time value-laden – and rethink our post-Humean understanding of values and value-judgements.

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Experiencing the Meaning of a Word

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The importance of this concept (of aspect-blindness) lies in the connexion between the concepts of 'seeing an aspect' and 'experiencing the meaning of a word'. For we want to ask 'what would you be missing if you did not *experience* the meaning of a word?' (PI, II, p. 182)

In the second part of his book, *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein examines the process of mental perception. The examination though unsystematically looks into a variation of terms such as: colors, emotions and pictures and tries to make sense of their linguistic basis that enables their perception. The common denominator of all these various mental terms is their *significance*. Wittgenstein examines the term *significance* in both parts of *Investigations* but in each of the part a different aspect of it is emphasized. The first part focuses on "meaning as use" while in the second part he refers to additional aspects, such as: simultaneous co-existence of several meanings in use, the relationship between the visual dimension of a word and its linguistic aspect as well as the possibility to judge and assess the process of understanding meaning.

In the above quoted motto, Wittgenstein connects among three central terms important to the understanding of meaning (all three appear for the first time in *Investigations* for the first time) and these provide the background for the discussion: aspect blindness, aspect perception and word significance experience. The use of the noun "blindness" already suggests that an element of judgment is involved; a judgment that hints to the fact that in the second part of *Investigations* it is a "closed term" that leaves no options for different interpretations.

In this discussion I am going to try and explain the connection between experience and significance, clarify the different possible interpretations as other research papers referred to it, and offer possible understanding for the term *significance* based on the expression "word significance experience".

In his book *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein suggests a new methodology to examine the connection between language and the world. In the framework of that methodology, he expresses his reservations to subordinate linguistic research to any theory whatsoever. For him, language is a collection of games and thus avoids defining the term "game" decisively. In addition, Wittgenstein examines language "in action" and focuses on how words are being used in different contexts.

First and foremost, Wittgenstein examines the words that guide his methodology, words such as: game, rule, grammar and manner of action. Further along, he focuses on words' use not as a theoretical term but as a methodological guidance meant to help us when examining the manner by which we express things using words. According to Wittgenstein, philosophy's role is to describe (not to evaluate) the way language operates:

We may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all *explanation*, and description alone must take place. And this description gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our

language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings. (Wittgenstein 2001, § 109)

Focusing on a description rather than on the explanation is in accordance with the factual reality in many instances since significance is derived from the actual use of a word:

For a *large* class of cases – though not for *all* – in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the *meaning* of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its *bearer*. (Wittgenstein 200, § 43)

This short paragraph introduces three possible ways to define *significance*: In the first stage, Wittgenstein restricts himself by saying that the examples that are brought at the end of the paragraph are not appropriate in all situations. Thus, a new category is being founded: words about which one has to discuss what type of significance suits them.

The second category includes words whose significance is an integral part of the way they are used (this is where the principle "significance equals use" derives, but one has to be aware of the fact that this is only one out of three possible options).

The third category refers to whose significance can be learned by using what is called a "the 'pointing at' definition" that is in accordance with the Augustine position described in *Investigations*, section 1.

In the first part of *Investigations*, Wittgenstein focuses on the term significance in its first two interpretations, i.e., the "the pointing at' definition" and the "definition according to a word's use". Wittgenstein criticizes Augustine that describes the "pointing at definition". According to Wittgenstein, defining the connection between objects to their name is relevant only when referring to nouns. Thus, Wittgenstein wonders how characteristics or actions (that can always be pointed at) can be described. There is also another thing that puzzles Wittgenstein: how the connection between "a name" and a "thing" can be described in other types of words.

In the second stage, Wittgenstein directs us to use: "Explanations come to an end somewhere" (Wittgenstein 2001, § 1).

In order to understand how language is being used, Wittgenstein proposes the term "game" as a metaphor. I do not intend to go into the details to the term but to jump straight to the final conclusion: Wittgenstein determines that a game's set rules characteristics cannot be defined and thus one has to focus on describing the similarities and differences among games.

Further along, Wittgenstein reaches the conclusion that such a description is not enough to enable us to understand the mental process of understanding *significance*. None of the key terms (game, rule, boundary, use, grammar) "succeeds" to describe the match between thought and reality.

This stage includes two possibility-channels: the first is to go back if possible to the "pointing at definition" as in the color category:

The agreement, the harmony, of thought and reality consists in this: if I say falsely that something is *red*, even the *red* is what it isn't. And when I want to explain the word 'red' to someone, in the sentence 'that is not red', I do it by pointing to something red. (Wittgenstein 2001, & 429)

Wittgenstein's suggestion is probably based upon William James' pragmatism whose books: *The Principles of Psychology* and *The Variety of Religious Experience* Wittgenstein quotes in *Investigations*. James discussed the issue of "mentality blindness" and suggested the following:

Where an object fails to be recognized by sight, it often happens that the patient will recognize and name it as soon as he touches it with his hand. This shows in an interesting way how numerous the associative paths are which all end by running out of the brain through the channel of speech. The hand-path is open though the eye-path be closed. (James 1981, p. 61)

Pointing and touching do not "cover" all those significance cases that entail a difficulty in describing the connection between thought and reality. Furthermore, both pointing and focusing on the use of a verb as well as on its phenomenal description prevent us from perceiving numerous other aspects of an object. A word's "use" may lend us a certain significance that word has. Had we wanted to see a number of use options or several aspects we should have done it the way Wittgenstein proposes in the second part of *Investigations* as well as in other writings. Perceiving significance through a word's use makes it vague and dim: "the picture". The word "picture" focuses on its visual aspect but at the same time connects it to two different meanings. The first one is the metaphor describing how the word is used in practice:

When someone says the word 'cube' to me, for example, I know what it means. But can the whole *use* of the word come before my mind, when I *understand* it in this way? Well, but on the other hand isn't the meaning of the word also determined by this use? And can this ways of determining meaning conflict? Can what we grasp *in a flash* accord with a use, fit or fail to fit it? And how can what is present to us in an instant, what comes before our mind in an instant, fit a *use*?

What really comes before our mind when we *understand* a word? – Isn't it something like a picture? Can't it *be* a picture?... The picture of the cube did indeed *suggest* a certain use to us, but it was possible for me to use it differently. (Wittgenstein 2001, § 139)

Wittgenstein uses the term "picture" to refer not only to concrete objects such as "a cube" or "red" but also when referring to abstract terms. The term "picture" serves both the use of abstract terms that cannot be proven and the use of empirical facts:

What am I believing in when I believe that men have souls? What am I believing in, when I believe that this substance contains two carbon rings? In both cases there is a picture in the foreground, but the sense lies far in the background; that is, the application of the picture is not easy to survey (Wittgenstein 2001, § 422).

A second visual significance is strange and extraordinary – "Meaning is a physiognomy" (Wittgenstein 2001, § 568). According to Wittgenstein, a word has "different faucets", i.e., the word studies us:

Though – one would like to say – every word has a different character in different contexts, at the same time there is *one* character it always has: a single physiog-

nomy. It looks at us.– But a face in a *painting* looks at us too. (Wittgenstein 2001, p. 155)

Further on, Wittgenstein describes the experience that takes place when a person succeeds in experiencing a word's significance through recognizing its physiognomy:

The familiar physiognomy of a word, the feeling that it has taken up its meaning into itself, that it is an actual likeness of its meaning... and how are these feelings manifested among us? – by the way we choose and value words. (Wittgenstein 2001, p. 186)

It has to be noted that these two descriptions of a picture's physiognomy contradict Wittgenstein's other saying that are repeated in *Investigations* according to which significance is not something that accompanies a word (see page 186). Thus we are facing a contradiction. On the one hand we avoid placing theories and deny the possibility that a word is accompanied by significance. On the other hand, we claim that a word has physiognomy. How can this contradiction be settled? I would like to suggest that significance actually is "word significance experience" whose experience is embedded in its physiognomy actually is what we refer to by the term "*significance*". The ability to experience a word's significance can be mental-verbal on a higher level than the ability to use a word which is only controlling a technique. The first stage of understanding a word's significance is the understanding of its grammatical function. Experiencing a word's significance functions similarly to experiencing a mental two-colored simile, or in Wittgenstein's words:

Experiencing a meaning and experiencing a mental image. 'In both cases', we should like to say, 'we are *experiencing* something, only something different. A different content is proffered – is present – to consciousness.' What is the content of the experience of imagining? The answer is a picture, or a description. And what is the content of the experience of meaning? I don't know what I am supposed to say to this. – if there is any sense in the above remark, it is that the two concepts are related like those of 'red' and 'blue'; and that is wrong. (Wittgenstein 2001, II, p. 149)

In other words, it can be said that grammatical function is similar to the two different activities. However, Is it possible that a person will be able to use words accurately and understand properly words in context but will lack the ability to "experience a word's significance"? This question is of interest to Wittgenstein and is a continuation to his motto mentioned above: What does such a person lack?

Rush Rhees, Wittgenstein's most important student, raised that question already in 1958 when he edited *The Blue and Brown Book*. The book was a preliminary studies for the *Philosophical Investigations*.

Later on, when teaching at Cambridge and referring to his students' criticism, Wittgenstein describes in length, in a positive manner the emotions that accompany a word and that lend them their significance:

A process accompanying our words which one might call the 'process of meaning them' is the modulation of the voice in which we speak the words; or one of the processes similar to this, like the play of facial expression. This accompany the spoken words... in the sense in which the tune of song accompanies its words. This tune corresponds to the 'feeling' with which we say the sentence. And I wish to point out that this feeling is the expression with which the sentence is said, or something similar to this expression. (Wittgenstein 1969, p. 35)

Wittgenstein clarifies the connection between the above quote and between significance and meaning. The use of words depends on the speaker's intentions that express his intentions through his tone that also matches his facial expression while speaking. The relationship between words and the tone in which they are uttered is similar to the relationship between lyrics and melody. This analogy is most important: If a song's quality is determined by connecting to the lyrics and to the melody, then significance is determined by connecting the words and the speaker's intentions. Significance is not determined only by words' use but also by the words that are being used, i.e. the choice of words. Specific words limit certain interpretation possibilities although they allow a number of usages. In *Investigations*, Wittgenstein includes another parallelism that connects directly to the focus of this paper. He claims that the aspect blindness is parallel to not having a musical ear: "Aspect-blindness will be *akin* to the lack of a 'musical ear'" (Part II, p. 214).

Yet, it is important to bear in mind that one can listen to music and even enjoy it without having the ability to judge it or to distinguish between its various aspects. The same can be done with language: one can use it without distinguishing among its different aspects. What, then, does a significant blind person miss? Wittgenstein who raises the question also answers it, but provides an ambiguous answer. On the one hand he points (as is quotes in this paper's motto) that distinguishing aspects is of significance and even brings different examples whose purpose is to clarify various implications of this phenomenon; on the other hand, he does not answer the question directly.

The interesting innovation in using this group of terms lies in the integration of psychology (experience, emotions) and intellect. William James paved the way to this integration when he made the connection between mental and intellectual skills and their physical-behavioral expression. Wittgenstein made a different kind of integration: He integrated the spiritual aspect to the verbal & intellectual one. In conclusion, one can say that Wittgenstein does not provide an equivocal definition to the discussed terms but offers a kind of sensitivity to the phenomena they represent. He tries to examine various levels of experiencing significance, from blindness to talent, but eventually brings back to center stage the principle of use:

There are many ways of experiencing aspects. What they have in common is the expression: 'Now I see it as *that*'... but the explanation of these *that*'s is radically different in the different cases." (Wittgenstein 1982, § 588)

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Internalist Representationalism and the Veil of Perception

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In a series of papers, Shoemaker proposes a version of internalist representationalism that aims to reconcile the possibility of inverted spectrum with the transparency of experience, and to give an essential role to qualia in experience. This view is criticized by Michael Tye, and defended by Kriegel and by Shoemaker himself. In this paper, I investigate this debate from the epistemological point of view. Tye contends that Shoemaker's view brings in a veil of perception that goes against the intuition of direct contact with the world. I intend to examine whether the defenses by Kriegel and Shoemaker are successful.

1. Shoemaker's Internalist Representationalism

According to Shoemaker, the phenomenal character of experience consists in a certain kind of representational content. This makes his position a form of representationalism. But he also thinks that it is possible for two subjects to be spectrum inverted relative to each other without anyone misrepresenting the things perceived. When Jack and Jill look at a ripe tomato, both of their experiences represent the tomato as red, yet while Jack's experience is phenomenally like ours, Jill's is phenomenally like the experience when Jack and we see green leaves. Shoemaker claims that the possibility of inverted spectrum is not in conflict with the transparency of experience. When Jack and Jill introspect, what they are directly aware of are properties of the tomato, not of their experiences.

The key is that, according to Shoemaker, experience carries two kinds of representational content. One is wide and subject-independent. When Jack and Jill represent the tomato as red, what their experiences represent is the color red of the tomato – an intrinsic and objective property of the surface of the physical object. Call it *objective redness*. In this sense, Jack's experience and Jill's share the same representational content. Call it *objective content*. The other kind of content is narrow and subject-relative. Besides objective colors, physical objects also have relational properties that produce or are disposed to produce certain qualia in individual perceivers (Shoemaker 1994, 2002). These properties are relational because what sorts of qualia are produced or are disposed to be produced depend partly on the internal nature of the subject. Since Jack and Jill are spectrum inverted, when both looking at the ripe tomato they are directly aware of different relational properties: Jack is introspectively confronted with a relational property P1 that elicits (or is disposed to elicit) Q1 (red qualia), and Jill is introspectively confronted with a different relational property P2 that elicits (or is disposed to elicit) Q2 (green qualia) (Shoemaker 1994, Kriegel 2002). Shoemaker calls these relational properties *phenomenal properties* (or *appearance properties*).

For Shoemaker, qualia are intrinsic properties of experience in virtue of which the experience has its phenomenal character. Phenomenal character is representation of phenomenal properties of objects, hence, a kind of representational content. Call it *phenomenal content* (Shoemaker 2002). On Shoemaker's account, phenomenal properties are properties of things in the environment, so the transparency of experience is respected. But

phenomenal properties are also subject-relative. Jack's and Jill's experiences have different phenomenal characters that are constitutively determined by different types of qualia, Q1 and Q2, hence contain different phenomenal content (Shoemaker 1994). The possibility of inverted spectrum is then preserved. Shoemaker thinks that internalist representationalism is the only way to embrace both the transparency of experience and the possibility of inverted spectrum, and the only way for the representationalist to do justice to the intrinsic and subjective aspect of experience.

2. Tye's Objection

According to Tye, the main consequence of Shoemaker's view is that "colors are not basically seen." (Tye 2000) What Tye means is that on Shoemaker's account colors are not *directly* seen, but only *indirectly* by seeing the related phenomenal properties. Shoemaker holds that, since Jack's and Jill's experiences have different phenomenal characters, "the properties represented by their color experiences include properties that are not colors." (Shoemaker 2002) That is, the phenomenal properties that they directly perceive are not themselves colors. Tye criticizes that this is counterintuitive. We have an ordinary intuition that, when one's experience is veridical, what one directly sees are colors of things. Yet on Shoemaker's account, what Jack immediately sees is *phenomenal red*, not the color red. Given that Jack's experience is *veridical*, why suppose that what he directly sees is *by definition* not the color red itself but something else?

Tye contends, by distinguishing between the phenomenal properties of a color and the color itself Shoemaker's view "effectively draws a veil over the colors." (Tye 2000) The result is, it is epistemically possible for the phenomenal properties to be visually perceived by a subject but the color itself is missing. Since our direct consciousness reaches only phenomenal properties, there is no epistemic guarantee that the object really has the color we take it to have or "indeed that it has any color at all." (Tye 2000) Such a cost seems too high to bear.

3. Kriegel's Defense Examined

In articulating the veil of perception objection, Tye says, "Drawing this veil is tantamount to erecting an appearance/reality distinction for the colors themselves. The coherence of such a distinction is dubious at best." (Tye 2000) Kriegel contends that the distinction does not generate real threat against internalist representationalism. He considers and refutes the following possible readings of Tye's criticism: (1) If what Tye means is that the appearance/reality distinction cannot coherently apply to colors, then he is mistaken because he himself is an objectivist about color (Tye 2000). Taking colors to be objective properties is just to acknowledge that it is possible for a viewer to be wrong about colors. (2) Tye might mean that internalist representationalism implies that we can only know the colors that things appear to have, but what colors things really have is unknowable. Kriegel's reply is that, even if it is the case that objective colors cannot be *experienced*, this by no means follows that they

cannot be *known*. One can have knowledge about objective colors by inferring from visual experience of phenomenal properties (Kriegel 2002). (3) Maybe Tye's point is that it is implausible that objective colors cannot be experienced. In reply, Kriegel says,

[T]his in itself is no embarrassment to a theory of visual experience ... That experience represents only the way things appear to be is why *thinking* is cognitively needed. ... It is only the content of *beliefs* that concern the way things really are. (Kriegel 2002)

Kriegel's view is that experience is about how things appear to us. To ascertain or to take a stance on how things really are is the task of thought, not of experience. Thus, the appearance/reality distinction is appropriate. Based on these replies, Kriegel concludes that Tye's criticism fails.

I contend that Kriegel's replies do not provide a successful defense. Consider (1). I don't think Tye's talk of the appearance/reality distinction is the best way to articulate the idea of the veil of perception. A better way, I suggest, is to use the notion of *epistemic intermediary*. I will say more about this later. What I want to call attention to here is Kriegel's remark regarding the distinction and color objectivism. He says,

If there are objective facts about colors, then any subject may get those wrong, and when she does, things will appear to her to have colors that in reality they do not have. (Kriegel 2002)

What does it mean to say that things may appear to a subject to have colors that in reality they do not have? One possibility is that for Kriegel the content of visual experience may misrepresent objective colors. Here, it is important to consider: Does the perceptual error take place at the level of experience or at the level of belief? Kriegel's remark seems to suggest the former. Recall that according to internalist representationalism experience carries both phenomenal content and objective content. The relation between them is that, Kriegel says, "experience carries, *immediately*, phenomenal content, and only *mediately*, objective content," and that "An experience carries the objective content it does only by virtue of carrying the phenomenal content it does." (Kriegel 2002) On this account, perceptual error happens when the objective content of experience misrepresents objective colors. Since phenomenal content underlies objective content, it is phenomenal content that is ultimately responsible for perceptual misrepresentation. As we shall see later, this conflicts with Kriegel's third reply.

Consider (2). Kriegel claims that even if objective colors cannot be experienced, one can still have inferential knowledge about them. But this is in fact giving up immediate knowledge about color, which violates our ordinary intuition that, when we see things veridically, we immediately know their colors without making any inference. Also, if knowledge about color can only be inferential, we will have to abandon the notion of noninferential justification.

With regard to (3), Kriegel says, "experience represents only the way things appear to be ... It is only the content of *beliefs* that concern the way things really are." (Kriegel 2002) This is problematic. First, it amounts to that the content of experience is only about phenomenal properties, not about objective properties, which goes against the view that experience carries both phenomenal content and objective content. Second, Kriegel's suggestion is that perceptual error takes place only at the level of belief or

judgment. This is explicit when he says, "to perceive the moon as appearing one inch across is not to be under an illusion. It is only when the experience is endorsed by a judgment to the effect that the moon really is one inch across that one falls into error." (Kriegel 2002) This conflicts with his first reply that the content of visual experience can get objective colors wrong. Third, if the content of experience is only about how things appear to us, and if error only happens at the level of judgment, never at the level of experience, then the content of experience would always be true. This is surely counterintuitive.

4. Shoemaker's Defense Examined

Shoemaker's defense is different. According to him, it is misleading to say that on the internalist representationalist account objective colors are not basically seen. He thinks that phenomenal color properties are just ways that the color of an object can phenomenally present itself to the subjects, and one cannot see the color of an object without seeing it phenomenally appearing to one in a certain way (Shoemaker 2000, 2002). And it is not by accident that an object possesses certain phenomenal color properties. The object has them *in virtue of* its possessing certain objective colors. Shoemaker further says, "Appearance properties must be individuated not only by the sorts of experience they produce or are disposed to produce, but also by the kind of causation involved in the production of these experiences." (Shoemaker 2002) This remark suggests that phenomenal color properties and objective colors are *causally* related. Jack perceives a ripe tomato as phenomenally red *because* the tomato is objectively red. Hence, by seeing the phenomenal redness of the tomato, Jack also sees it as objectively red. Likewise, Jill perceives the tomato as phenomenally green *because* it is objectively red. By seeing the phenomenal greenness of the tomato, Jill also sees it as objectively red. In this sense, Shoemaker contends, it is wrong to say that objective colors are not basically seen, and it is not possible that an object can have certain phenomenal color properties without having any objective color at all.

Shoemaker claims that it is by perceiving phenomenal color properties that we see objective colors. He seems to take this as a commonsensical claim, as he says, "the relation of the phenomenal property to the color is analogous to that of the facing surface of a table to the whole table." (Shoemaker 2000) I find this analogy problematic. A table is ordinarily considered as a whole, i.e., not part of another physical object. When we see the facing surface of a table, we take ourselves to be seeing the whole table. This is because seeing the facing surface of a table *is* seeing the table. But as mentioned above, the phenomenal redness that one directly perceives is by definition *not* objective redness. If so, even though phenomenal color properties and objective colors are causally related such that in veridical perception it is not possible for one to see phenomenal color properties without also seeing objective colors, it is still that objective colors are seen only indirectly.

Tye's phrase that colors are "not basically seen" might not be the best way to express this point. A better way, I suggest, is to say that since on Shoemaker's account objective colors are not directly seen, one can only know objective colors indirectly or mediately. That is, phenomenal color properties are a kind of *epistemic intermediary*. Consider the notion of perceptual error that might be implied in Shoemaker's account. There are two possibilities: (1) The subject mistakenly takes the phenomenal

content of his experience to be a *good reason to think* that the real color of the object is red. So construed, perceptual error lies at the level of belief. (2) The objective content of the subject's experience misrepresents objective colors *because* its phenomenal content misrepresents the corresponding phenomenal color properties. So construed, perceptual error is at the level of experience. More needs to be said about these possibilities. But it seems to me that both suggest that phenomenal color properties play the role of epistemic intermediary regarding our knowledge about objective colors.

If so, Shoemaker's view faces a familiar skeptical problem. Epistemically, since objective colors are not directly seen, one can *always* get real colors wrong. We need not go as far as Tye to doubt whether the object in view really has any color at all. But the following worry remains: Since we don't have direct knowledge about colors, it is epistemically possible that although things do have colors, their colors are never what we take them to have. This is counterintuitive enough. So I conclude that, like Kriegel, Shoemaker's response to Tye's criticism is unsatisfactory. Any defense of internalist representationalism has to take the epistemological relation between phenomenal content and objective content into consideration.

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Die Bedeutung des Sprachspiels für eine Neufassung biblischer Theologie: Die Sprachspiele Jesu

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Als biblischer Theologe kann man seine Augen nicht davor verschließen, dass im Vergleich zur allgemeinen Theologie (Kerr 1997; Phillips 1993, 1995), weder die klassische protestantische, noch die daraus hervorgegangene gegenwärtige katholische Exegese sich die Entwicklungen der Sprachphilosophie dieses Jahrhunderts zu Nutzen machen konnte. Und doch sind Vorstöße in dieser Richtung bereits von Ricoeur, Gadamer aber auch Derrida, in großem Stil vorgezeichnet worden.

Die eigentliche Schwierigkeit der etablierten biblischen Theologie scheint darin zu liegen, dass der Exeget, mit wenigen Ausnahmen, die Fragen der Auslegung und Anwendung biblischer Texte nicht in einem Schritt beantworten kann, oder will, und so immer erst ein objektiver Auslegungsversuch einer subjektiven Aktualisierung vorausgeht.

In diese Kluft stößt Ludwig Wittgensteins Vorschlag sich eine Sprache wie eine Lebensform vorzustellen (PI 19). Diese Einsicht markiert wiederum den Übergang zum Verständnis der Sprache im Allgemeinen und in ihren speziellen Verwendungsarten, als Spiel – dem Sprachspiel (PI 7 & 23) – das gerade in letzter Zeit als Modell in der Theologie immer mehr Bedeutung gefunden hat (Lash 1984; Cooper 1988; Stagmann 2001; Sedmak 2002). Gleichzeitig sind Sprachspiele, so Wittgenstein in PI 23, all jene formal unterscheidbaren Aktivitäten des Sprechens, die ein Teil einer Tätigkeit, oder einer Lebensform sind (Black 1978).

Ein Verständnis unterschiedlicher Sprachaktivitäten als Sprachspiele führt den Exegeten zu einer fundamentalen Neuformulierung der modernen biblischen Theologie, die ihresgleichen mit dem epochemachenden Werk Rudolf Bultmanns über die literarischen Formen in der synoptischen Tradition begonnen hat (Bultmann 1931). Die eigentliche Frage einer sprachphilosophisch orientierten biblischen Theologie ist nun nicht mehr, welche literarischen Formen sich in der Bibel finden, und wie diese zu verstehen und nachfolgend anzuwenden sind, sondern welche Sprachspiele Jesus verwendet hat (u.a. Cruickshank 1970; Thiselton 1970). Dabei kann man sich aber der bereits etablierten Formenlehre anschließen, da diese ja schon die unterscheidbaren sprachlichen Aktivitäten Jesu, wie z.B. Apophthegmata, Weisheitslogien, prophetische und apokalyptische Worte, Gesetzesworte und Gemeindeformen, Ich-Worte und Gleichnisse aufgezeigt hat (Bultmann 1931; Mason 1978).

Aufgrund dieser Überlegungen kann man sich nun auf die Suche nach den Regeln, der Grammatik und der Witze der Sprachspiele Jesu machen.

1) Sprachspiele haben hinsichtlich des Ursprungs dieses Begriffes, aus einerseits dem mathematischen Kalkül und andererseits dem tatsächlichen spielerischen Verhalten des Menschen (PI 23), konstitutive und pragmatische Regeln (Black 1978). Diese Regeln können explizit, aber auch implizit sein, wobei pragmatische Regeln in mancher Hinsicht arbiträr, aber auch teilweise konventionell festgelegt sind. Das gesamte Regelwerk eines Sprachspiels formuliert dessen Kontext der auch als Kultur eines

Sprachspiels angesehen werden kann. Der Kontext eines Sprachspiels steht in direkter Beziehung zu einem Verstehen dieses, bzw. der Menschen die sich dieses bedienen (PI 199, auch PI ii, 223.). Die Einhaltung von Regeln führt zu einer wiederholbaren Tätigkeit die eine Praxis darstellt, und aus der eine allgemeine Regelfolge abzulesen ist (PI 202). Der Erfolg oder Misserfolg eines Sprachspiels hängt somit nicht nur von der richtigen Befolgung der Regeln dessen, sondern gleichermaßen von der Beachtung der Kultur dieses ab. Somit muss ein richtiger oder falscher Gebrauch von Sprachspielen immer innerhalb der Kultur und Praxis dieser verstanden werden.

Ein besonders interessantes Beispiel hierfür ist jenes Sprachspiel Jesu, das den richtigen Gebrauch des Sabbatgebotes einer offensichtlich falschen, aber von den Pharisäern vertretenen Verwendung, gegenüberstellt (Mt 12,1-13). Der Sabbat muss immer mit Bezug auf die Liebe Gottes zu den Menschen hin, und kann niemals ohne diesen, verstanden werden (Mk 2,27) (Veerkamp 1995; Yang 1997).

2) Die Gesamtheit der Regeln eines Sprachspiels, die den Gebrauch der Sprache beschreibt, ist deren Grammatik (PI 496). Dabei verlagern sich Wittgensteins grammatische Untersuchungen von der syntaktischen Ebene der Sprache auf die Suche nach deren Tiefengrammatik (PI 664). Es ist auf dieser Ebene, wo der richtige oder falsche Gebrauch der Sprache auf deren Sinn und Unsinn stößt (PI 464). Grammatische Untersuchungen verlassen den Boden einer linguistischen Analyse der Sprache und betreten den Raum philosophischer Untersuchungen. Dort etwa zeigt es sich, dass Sätze wie „der Herr gibt alles Gute (Tobit 4,19)“ und „ein Mann gibt sein Vermögen (Mt 25,14f)“ wohl oberflächengrammatisch gleichlautend sind, doch tiefengrammatisch gänzlich verschiedene Bedeutungen und Konsequenzen haben. Die Tiefengrammatik folgt einer der Oberflächengrammatik grundsätzlich verschiedenen Logik (Locker & Sedmak 2003). Grammatische Untersuchungen stellen eine große Herausforderung dar, da diese die einem Sprachspiel implizite Regeln explizit machen (PI 142), wobei aber immer auch der Zusammenhang der Sprache mit der Lebensform, den diese darstellt, gezeigt wird.

Beispiele für Sprachspiele Jesu, für die grammatische Untersuchungen besonders zum Tragen kommen sind zweifellos die Ich-Worte des Johannesevangeliums (Joh 6,35.48; 8,12; 10,7.9; 10,11.14; 11,25; 14,6; 15,15). Die philosophischen Konsequenzen Jesus als die Auferstehung und das Leben zu verstehen (Joh 11,25), sind mit der Gesamtheit des Glaubens der Juden (Ex 3,14) und der Nachfolge und Nachahmung Jesu im Speziellen untrennbar verbunden (Wagner 1988).

3) Der für die Verwendung des Sprachspielbegriffs in der biblischen Theologie wohl am wichtigsten Aspekt ist der Witz des Sprachspiels (PI 564). Der Witz ist das, worauf es ankommt (PI 120); der eigentliche Grund warum man ein Spiel spielt. Der Witz eines Sprachspiels lässt sich nicht aus dessen expliziten Regeln ablesen, sondern ist mit der nichtregelhaften Seite des Sprachspiels verbunden und verweist auf die Interaktion der Spieler und deren soziales Handeln. Der Witz eines Spiels sind Implikaturen,

die nur im Spiel selbst zu finden sind, und somit eine Innenperspektive dessen voraussetzen (PI 142). Den Witz eines Spiels zu verstehen verlangt die Teilnahme an diesem. Man kann den Witz eines Spiels nur dann verstehen, wenn man dieses Spiel auch spielt.

Diese Einsicht ist von besonderer Tragweite für religiöse Sprache. Wie Wittgenstein bereits in Z 717 gezeigt hat, ist der von Gott Angesprochene bereits in das jeweilige Sprachspiel und dessen Lebensform eingebunden. Dieses Eingebundensein ist für Wittgenstein daran zu erkennen, dass die Lebensform des Sprachspiels die Lebensform des Angesprochenen berührt (PI 241, LC 1). Somit wird jedes verstehende Hören eines Sprachspiels Jesu zu einer gleichzeitigen Handlungsanweisung, die einer dem Sprachspiel innewohnenden Lebensform folgt.

Hierbei ist auch die Frage nach dem Entstehen von neuen Sprachspielen von großer Bedeutung. Während man zu jedem Zeitpunkt neue Regeln einführen kann, stößt die Idee der Schaffung eines Witzes auf Schwierigkeiten, wenn dieser alleine aus den Regeln hervorgehen soll. Tatsächlich entsteht der Witz, wenn ein neues Spiel gespielt wird und eine Funktion im sozialen Leben einnimmt. So wird neues Leben immer durch ein neues Sprachspiel eingeführt (PI 224), bzw. ein neues Verstehen eines bestehenden Sprachspiels zieht eine neue Lebensform nach sich. Das wiederum bedeutet, dass das Neue an einem Sprachspiel sich immer an bereits bestehenden Kontexten und Sprachspielen orientiert und neue Spiel aus bereits bestehenden hervorgehen.

Die Tragweite des Begriffes Witz zeigt sich am deutlichsten im gewiss bedeutendsten Sprachspiel Jesu, dem Gleichnis. Während man als Regel vom Gleichnis des verlorenen Schafes (Lk 15,3-6) das Gebot der Nächstenliebe klar erkennt, fordert dieses Spiel gleichzeitig dazu auf, diese mit einem gewissen Risiko zu verwirklichen. Der Witz dieses Gleichnisses ist es die Charitas durch neue und kreative Wege zu verwirklichen.

Im Gleichnis der törichten Jungfrauen lässt sich dessen Witz tatsächlich nicht aus der Oberflächengrammatik dieses Spiels ersehen. Augenscheinlich besagt die explizite Regel dieses Gleichnisses, dass man immer wachsam die Wiederkunft Jesu erwarten soll (Mt 25,13), und die implizite Regel desselben, dass man immer und überall genug Öl mit sich bringen muss. Aber worin besteht der Witz dieses Gleichnisses? Bei einer tieferen Betrachtung sieht man, dass in diesem Sprachspiel die törichten Jungfrauen der Gefahr ausgeliefert sind dem Heil verloren zu gehen, und nur ein richtiges Handeln der klugen Jungfrauen diese vor diesem Schicksal retten kann. Wenn man an diesem Spiel teilnimmt, wird man die Not, oder das Versäumnis der törichten Jungfrauen sehen, und diesen entsprechend helfen (Locker 2003). In diesem Mitspielen in diesem Gleichnis kommt der eigentliche Witz der Gleichnisse, nämlich Neues zu sehen und Neues zu hören, zum Vorschein (vgl. Mt 13,16).

Eine Beschreibung der Sprachspiele Jesu in dieser Weise schüttet nicht nur den Graben der Auslegung und Anwendung trennt zu, sondern postuliert eine fundamentale Wende von einer formgeschichtlichen, zu einer grammatischen Untersuchung biblischer Texte hin, die mit einer Unterscheidung der Sprachspiele Jesu zu beginnen hat. Eine Untersuchung der Sprachspiele Jesu bleibt aber nicht auf eine Beschreibung subjektiver Handlungstheorien auf der Basis einzelner Sprachspiele beschränkt, sondern formuliert gleichzeitig eine umfassende biblische Theolo-

gie (Bell 1975), da die Grammatik im Allgemeinen zeigt „welche Art von Gegenstand etwas ist...“ (PI 373) und somit das *Wesen* der Bibel in der Grammatik der Sprachspiele Jesu ausgesprochen wird (PI 371).

So muss, und soll einer grammatischen Untersuchung der verschiedenen Sprachspiele Jesu eine Untersuchung der Familienähnlichkeiten dieser Sprachspiele in deren grammatischer Form folgen (PI 65). Hierbei ist noch einmal Wittgensteins Unterscheidung einer Oberflächengrammatik von einer Tiefengrammatik von großer Bedeutung (PI 664). Tiefengrammatische Ähnlichkeiten der Sprachspiele Jesu geben Aufschlüsse auf das der Bibel zugrundeliegende Weltbild, und Hinweise über den Ort an dem die Sprachspiele Jesu gespielt werden (PI 669 & 667), was wiederum Klarheit über die von diesen beabsichtigte Lebensform gibt.

Dabei zeigt sich, was Wittgenstein als Weltanschauung, bzw. Weltbild bezeichnet. Eine Weltanschauung besteht aus fundamentalen Überzeugungen die einer Mythologie gleichkommen (OC 95). Diese Weltanschauung habe ich nicht weil ich mich von deren Richtigkeit überzeugt habe (OC 162), sondern es ist der überkommene Hintergrund auf welchem ich zwischen wahr und falsch unterscheidet (OC 94). Die Sätze, bzw. das Sprachspiel, das diese Weltanschauung beschreibt unterliegt nicht der empirischen Verifikation (OC 162) oder Prüfung (OC 164), sondern erklärt das Warum des Handelns (PI 217). Eine Weltanschauung wird durch Überredung weitergegeben (OC 262), wobei deren Annahme einer Bekehrung zu diesem gleichkommt.

Für ein Verstehen der Sprachspiele Jesu ist ein Verstehen der Weltanschauung die diesen zu Grunde liegt, und der daraus resultierenden allgemeinen Lebensform unverzichtbar. Jesus ruft zur Umkehr auf und verkündet die Nähe des Gottesreiches (Mk 1,15). Daraus ergeben sich handlungsspezifische Konsequenzen, die davon ausgehen, dass das Böse aus dem Himmel vertrieben ist (Lk 10,18) und dadurch das dem Guten auf Erden Entgegenstehende besiegt werden kann (Lk 10,17). Aus dieser Weltanschauung heraus lässt sich die Möglichkeit der Verwirklichung eines gottgewollten Lebens, d.h. einer neuen christlichen Lebensform ersehen. Der Mensch kann in dieser Welt trotz aller widriger Umstände genug ernten (Mk 4,1-9 par.), eine lebenswertes Leben führen (Mk 4,26-29), auch genug verdienen (Mt 20,1-16), und durch sein dem Glauben entspringendes Handeln errettet werden (Mt 25,31-46).

Zusammenfassend und abschließend bekräftigt sich die eingehende Annahme, dass der Begriff Sprachspiel im Allgemeinen, wie auch dessen Eigenschaften und Merkmale im Speziellen, eine neue Grundlage der biblischen Theologie schaffen, deren eigentlichem Ziel, der Einheit Sprache und Leben, man in dieser Vorgehensweise tatsächlich näher gekommen ist.

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“Esperanto. The Feeling of Disgust”: Wittgenstein on Planned Languages

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Wittgenstein’s views on Esperanto and other planned languages have hardly found attention thus far.¹ The issue was mostly perceived as a side-aspect of Wittgenstein’s difficult relation to the Vienna Circle. Carnap repeatedly mentions Wittgenstein’s astonishingly emotional aversion and the alleged non-organicity of Esperanto as its main reason. This seems to fit neatly to a note from 1946:

Esperanto. The feeling of disgust we get if we utter an *invented* word with invented derivative syllables. The word is cold, lacking in associations, and yet it plays at being “language”. A system of purely written signs would not disgust us so much. (*Culture and Value*, p. 52)

Again, Esperanto’s non-organicity seems to be crucial, this time described as “invented words with invented derivative syllables”, and even italicised. Although straightforward explanations for Wittgenstein’s aversion seem tempting (“it might simply be a facet of his cultural conservatism, he might have missed the embedding in a form of life”, etc.), none of them really explains the highly emotional tune of his statements. Maybe, the phenomenon deserves more attention. My paper provides some linguistic background (1), a broadened textual basis and its analysis (2), and a tentative interpretation (3).

1. The varieties of language engineering

Debates on planned languages often suffer from ignorance, *a priori* verdicts, and misleading old terms like “artificial” or “auxiliary languages” which enhance confusion. To begin with terminology, I propose to label English, German etc. as *ethno-languages*, and Esperanto, Volapük, Basic English, etc. as *planned languages*. Scientific investigation into them is called *interlinguistics*. The misleading term *auxiliary language* should be avoided altogether, whereas *artificial language* covers a much wider field, from formal logic over Neurath’s *Isotype* to computer languages.

There is a lot of deliberate language engineering in ethno-languages: think of Dante’s creation of a common Italian by selections from various dialects; the work of terminology commissions; orthography reforms; the creation or replacement of scripture systems; the choice and proclamation of a certain dialect as standard language; the creation of Ivriith on the basis of Old Hebrew. Most linguists hold that there is only a gradual difference between language engineering within ethno-languages and the creation of Esperanto and similar planned languages (Blanke 1985, 62f with further references). Hence, the dichotomy of natural/artificial has little analytical power here.

However, not all planned languages [henceforth: PLs] resemble Esperanto. There are more than 900 proposals of PLs, many of them rather dilettantic. Less than 200 were sufficiently elaborate to be called a language system, very few ever found a significant number of speakers, and only

Zamenhof’s Esperanto was a success story. The following classification can help to avoid frequent misinterpretations. Historically, there is a shift from *a priori* to *a posteriori* languages. *A priori* projects attempted to replace natural languages by something completely different. Typically, they also claimed to map a real and complete system of concepts, and the device for that was the distinction and recombination of elementary concepts. The tasks of communication and calculus were often confused. The next milestone was Schleyer’s Volapük (1879), a mixed language with *a priori* and *a posteriori* elements. Volapük attracted 40.000 speakers before it quickly died out after 1900. Esperanto opened the big era of *a posteriori* PLs developed on the basis of ethno-languages.

1. **A priori PL:** *Ars Signorum* (Dalgarno 1661), *Real Character* (Wilkins 1668), [*LogLan* (Brown 1960)]

2. **A posteriori PL:**

2.1 Modified Ethno-Languages

Latino sine flexione - type (Peano 1903; simplifies grammar, extensive vocabulary)

Basic English - type (Ogden 1930; reduces lexicon to 850 basic words, leaves grammar untouched)

2.2 Selection Languages

2.2.1 Compromise Languages *Anglo-Franca* (Henderson 1889), *Interglossa* (Hogben 1943)

2.2.2 Naturalistic PL *Occidental-Interlingue* (de Wahl 1922), *Interlingua* (Gode 1951)

2.2.3 Autonomous PL *Esperanto* (Zamenhof 1887), *Ido* (de Beaufront, Couturat 1907)

2.2.4 Integrative PL *Novial* (Jespersen 1928)

3. **Mixed a priori / a posteriori PL:** *Volapük* (Schleyer 1879)

Linguists agree on the following facts about Esperanto:

1. The vocabulary of Esperanto descends from Romance languages (75%), Germanic languages (20%) and others (5%). Due to extensive use of internationalisms, 80% of its words are recognisable for Romance speakers, 63% for Germanic speakers and 27% for Slavic speakers.

2. The basic principle in the construction of words is composition (roots, prefixes, suffixes), declension / conjugation is rudimentary. The rules allow the composition of new words. The orthography is phonematic (“WYSIWYG”).

3. Although not as exceptionless as Zamenhof hoped, Esperanto’s regular grammar makes it extremely easy to learn, especially towards lower levels of competence.

4. Esperanto equals many ethno-languages in power, it is acknowledged as a literature language by the PEN-Club and admits of scientific texts. Among approx. 2 Million speakers worldwide, about 500.000 display a high linguistic competence, some of them are native speakers.

5. Despite pessimistic prophecies, Esperanto did not split into different languages over the decades. Esperanto develops and behaves like ethno-languages: there are phenomena such as family dialects, local dialects, new idioms, borrowed vocabularies, there is a need for permanent standardization, etc.; but the overall understandability within the Esperanto community remains intact.

¹ The only paper in the field (Nyíri 1989) is defective in various points, its merits notwithstanding. Its focus is not Wittgenstein, but Esperanto, and here it transports widespread errors (e.g. that the German vocabularies in Esperanto are mostly Yiddish). Brugmann’s long-falsified 1907 thesis that Esperanto will soon dissolve into different languages is presented without criticism. State-of-the-art books like Blanke 1985 and Janton 1978 are not even mentioned.

6. Many common objections to Esperanto apply to ethno-languages as well: "Esperanto is pronounced slightly different by different native speakers", "Esperanto translations by different native speakers vary slightly", "Esperanto is Euro-/ Western-centrist", "for some people, certain sounds of Esperanto are uncommon and/or difficult to discriminate in oral conversation (s/z, ĉ/ĵ/ŝ)"; "Esperanto contains diacritic letters beyond the ASCII Code", etc.

2. Wittgenstein and the planned languages

Carnap, a practising Esperantist from his youth, dedicated a whole chapter in his autobiography to language planning and his positive practical experiences with it. He was impressed by Goethe's *Iphigenie* being given on stage during an Esperanto Congress, and by a travel to the Baltic with a Bulgarian student, where all conversation was in Esperanto. We may presume that Carnap tried to convince Wittgenstein that Esperanto actually works when they met five times in summer 1927. But in Carnap's diary we read:

20.6.27: Zum ersten Mal getroffen, bei Schlick; auch Waismann. Sehr interessanter, origineller, sympathischer Mensch. Heftig gegen Esperanto weil nicht gewachsen (das hat wohl Schlick erwähnt, daß ich Anhänger sei). Künstlernatur. Über Identität, seine Einwände gegen Ramsey.

4.7.27: Mit W. bei Schlick. Wieder über Esperanto. Dann über Intuitionismus, schließlich liest er uns Wilhelm Busch vor. (Stadler 1997, 474.)

In a letter to Schlick of 28 September 1932, when Carnap muses about Wittgenstein's antipathy towards him, he remembers these meetings:

Um seine Abneigung gegen mich zu verstehen, versuche ich mich an die Zeit zu erinnern, als ich noch mit ihm zusammenkam (Sommer 1927 oder 1928). Es zeigten sich da zuweilen sehr starke Gegensätze zwischen uns, nicht so sehr in theoretischen Ansichten, als in praktischen und gefühlsmässigen Einstellungen. Er als Künstler sah in mir einen pedantischen Rationalisten, der das Lebendige vergewaltigen will (erinnere Dich an die scharfe Ablehnung des Esperanto, das Du vorwichtigerweise mehrmals zur Sprache brachtest), und einen flachen Verächter der erhabenen Dinge [...].

Retrospectively, Carnap writes in his autobiography

that the deliberately rational and unemotional attitude of the scientist and likewise any ideas which had the flavor of "enlightenment" were repugnant to Wittgenstein. At our very first meeting with Wittgenstein, Schlick unfortunately mentioned that I was interested in the problem of an international language like Esperanto. As I had expected, Wittgenstein was definitely opposed to this idea. But I was surprised by the vehemence of his emotions. A language which had not "grown organically" seemed to him not only useless but despicable. (Fann 1967, 35.)

All these documents confirm that the lack of life and organic growth were Wittgenstein's main objection to Esperanto. Presumably, the word "organically" was used by Wittgenstein himself. Evidence for that are two early texts, a diary entry and the oft-cited paragraph *TLP* 4.002:

Die Sprache ist ein Teil unseres Organismus und nicht weniger kompliziert als dieser. (14.5.1915)

4.002 Der Mensch besitzt die Fähigkeit, Sprachen zu bauen, womit sich jeder Sinn ausdrücken läßt, ohne eine Ahnung davon zu haben, wie und was jedes Wort bedeutet. – Wie man auch spricht, ohne zu wissen, wie

die einzelnen Laute hervorgebracht werden.

Die Umgangssprache ist ein Teil des menschlichen Organismus und nicht weniger kompliziert als dieser. Es ist menschenunmöglich, die Sprachlogik aus ihr unmittelbar zu entnehmen. [...]

Die stillschweigenden Abmachungen zum Verständnis der Umgangssprache sind enorm kompliziert.

These passages remind us of a certain stream in 19th century linguistics, the so-called *Junggrammatik* school (Schleicher, Meyer, Brugmann and others). This school held that languages resemble organisms in relevant respects, they grow and age, and they reflect certain natural laws, especially those of phonetics. Dichotomies like those of natural/artificial, living/dead languages are products of this school. The *Junggrammatik* combines, among others, the evolution idea of the 19th century with Romanticist ideas of *Volksggeist* and naturalness. Both points, the organism conception of language and the primacy of spoken language, reappear in Wittgenstein, although in a *prima facie* strange coining: Wittgenstein sees all-day language as a *part* of the human organism. However, this coining shows that he made critical use of the organism metaphor.

Nevertheless, the organism metaphor is manifest, and these early texts provide an argument against certain forms of PL: if the tacit conventions needed for understanding everyday language are enormously complicated, then a PL, which must establish all those conventions artificially, is very likely to be shipwrecked. This may give a partial explanation for Wittgenstein's aversions in 1927. However, his high emotional engagement remains unexplained. Why did he regard Esperanto not only as useless, but despicable? And how much did he actually know about it?

In a note of 4 February 1949 (MS 138/p.14b, in: *Wittgenstein's Nachlass*: The Bergen Electronic Edition. Oxford University Press 2000), Wittgenstein writes:

Wer z.B. eine Kunstsprache (Esperanto, Basic English) konstruiert, wird ihre Wörter nach gewissen Gesichtspunkten auswählen, und aus diesen Gesichtspunkten könnte man dann wieder unsre Sprache betrachten. Er könnte z.B. sagen: „Ich werde nicht zwei Wörter, eins für „gehen“, eins für „schreiten“, zulassen, denn für alle wichtigen Zwecke genügt hier ein Wort.“ Und also auch: „gehen“ und „schreiten“ haben wesentlich die gleiche Bedeutung.“

Wittgenstein's overall reasoning in this passage (on the perspective of semantical considerations) is surely correct. But our point here is the parallel mentioning of Esperanto and Basic English, which is highly inappropriate in the light of our above classification. We have seen the radical differences between Basic English as an ethno-language with reduced vocabulary and Esperanto as an autonomous selection language. What Wittgenstein describes here, is probably true of Basic English, but surely not of Esperanto. There, the verbs *iri* and *paŝi* of course exist as two distinct verbs. We may take this passage as clear evidence that Wittgenstein's acquaintance with Esperanto must have been rather superficial. We may presume that Wittgenstein was considerably familiar with Basic English² via C.K. Ogden, and maybe he thought (erroneously) that Esperanto had a similarly reduced vocabulary. – With this in mind, we read the famous *CV* passage more critically:

Esperanto. Das Gefühl des Ekels, wenn wir ein *erfundenes* Wort mit erfundenen Ableitungssilben aussprechen. Das Wort ist kalt, hat keine Assoziationen und spielt

² In view of the label „Kunstsprache“ for Basic English, one might doubt even this. However, the terminology in the 1940s was much less settled than today.

doch „Sprache“. Ein bloß geschriebenes Zeichensystem würde uns nicht so anekeln.

Clearly, the invented character of Esperanto still seems to be Wittgenstein's main worry and clearly his verdict concerns the whole language (and not only the few invented parts of it, which admittedly exist). But we saw before that Esperanto is not "invented" in the same sense as Volapük was. Not only for Esperantists, but for many European speakers, especially with a Romance background, many Esperanto words are immediately understandable. This is further evidence that Wittgenstein's views about Esperanto cannot have been based on broad knowledge.

As Wittgenstein puts it, Esperanto appears as a highly artificial device with poor prospects to function. At this point we may ask how much of the Esperanto movement between the wars Wittgenstein actually perceived. In August 1924 (i.e. the year when Wittgenstein himself was involved in a sort of language engineering: he was preparing his *Wörterbuch für Volksschulen*), the 16th Esperanto World Congress took place in Vienna. The event with 3400 participants found broad public attention. The Austrian National Library keeps a valuable collection of more than 50 newspaper clippings which display a rich and rather friendly echo in the East-Austrian press. Key themes in the coverage were the actual functioning of Esperanto, its increasing introduction in China and other countries, the 60 policemen with white/green armlets who had taken voluntary Esperanto lessons and served as congress guides, and a celebrated performance of Ferdinand Raimund's *Der Verschwendter* in Esperanto in the *Bürgertheater* with prominent Viennese actors. Only a few conservative journalists brought forth well-known objections: Esperanto is not organically grown, it sounds ugly and is the road to an undesired cultural blend, it is a sort of sacrilege to translate a typical Viennese author like Raimund into such a language, etc. Some more profound articles raised the question which was the main theoretical topic of these days: whether Esperanto was bound to decay into different languages or not. It is hard to imagine that Wittgenstein, who spent the summer of 1924 partly in Vienna and partly at the Hochreit holiday house, did not, at least indirectly, notice anything of that. Nevertheless, there is no evidence for it. The debates in 1927 show that he was still not convinced of Esperanto's functioning, that his problems with Esperanto were not the main theoretical problems of his time, and that his reservations have more in common with the long shadow of the organicity thesis.

But there another important point in the 1946 passage: it is the lack of associations which is responsible for the coldness and disgusting appearance of Esperanto words. Such words just "play at being 'language'", i.e. there is something *essential* missing in Wittgenstein's view. He sometimes seems to consider an increasingly emotional, "connotationalist" account of language which is not easy to reconcile with the usual view of meaning as use. We remember that Carnap had diagnosed some emotional component in the matter already in 1932. A passage from 1936 marks a further station on the way.

Wenn wir uns fragen; worin besteht der Eindruck, den uns ein Wort macht, so denken wir zuletzt an das, was wir sehen, wenn wir das Wort anschauen. Wir nehmen an das Bild des Wortes selbst sei ziemlich nebensächlich und der Eindruck liege irgendwie hinter dem Wortbild. Und diesen Fehler machen wir immer wieder. Aber die Gestalt eines Wortes, das wir – wie alle Wörter der gewöhnlicher Sprache – unzählige male gesehen haben, macht uns einen tiefen Eindruck. Denke nur an die Schwierigkeiten, die wir empfinden wenn die Recht-

schreibung geändert wird. Solche Änderungen sind als Sakrileg empfunden worden. Freilich nur gewisse Zeichen machen uns einen tiefen Eindruck, andere nicht. Ein neu erfundenes Zeichen etwa "v" für oder kann ohne in uns etwas aufzuregen durch ein beliebiges anderes ersetzt werden. Denke daran daß das [geschriebene] gesehene] Wort uns in ähnlicher Weise vertraut ist wie das gehörte. Denke an Esperanto und wie seltsam es uns anmutet einen Ausdruck der Herzlichkeit in diese Kunstsprache übersetzt zu hören. Wir könnten ja auch nicht der Händedruck willkürlich durch ein anderes Zeichen ersetzen. Das hängt damit zusammen, daß wir uns das Gefühl der Trauer als etwas hinter den Empfindungen des Weinens, schweren Atmens etc. etc. vorstellen und diese geneigt sind als etwas Nebensächliches zu vernachlässigen. (MS 150/p.1)

In a diary entry of 8.2.1931 (*Denkbewegungen*, p.39), Wittgenstein had warned himself away from a sentimental approach to language. Nevertheless, the 1946 passage indicates that such emotional and associative aspects were becoming more and more important for him.

Be that as it may: From the linguistic standpoint, Wittgenstein's views are again misguided. There is no doubt that Esperanto words bear emotional and associative connotations, at least for the Esperanto speaker, but many of them for outsiders as well. The existence of Esperanto native speakers and poetry is one witness among many. This has simply to do with Esperanto's character as selection language, which Wittgenstein misunderstood. Wittgenstein's "feeling of disgust" is the diagnosis of an external observer with massive reservations.

3. A tentative interpretation

As there is evidence for Wittgenstein's aversion especially against Esperanto from all periods of his philosophy, we could here have a clue to another point of continuity in his work. However, there are also indications of slight shifts. It appears as if the initial idea of organicity lost influence in favour of an emotional, "connotational" account of language. But this question goes beyond the scope of this paper.

From an interlinguistic point of view, Wittgenstein's views on planned languages were clearly misguided. Why Wittgenstein made so little or no use of the many occasions to get into a deeper acquaintance, especially with Esperanto, must remain open here. However, deep-rooted emotional factors seem to have played an important role.³

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Would Wittgenstein Approve a Distinction Between Invented and Natural Language-Games?

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In their commentary on the *Philosophical Investigations*, Baker & Hacker distinguish between invented and natural language-games. This distinction is made on the basis of a conception of language-games as fundamentally invented in nature. They are taken to be devised “objects of comparison” for philosophical purposes of illuminating the features of our language both by similarity and difference between them.¹ Natural language-games are produced when this “language-game method”, as Baker & Hacker call it (Baker & Hacker, 1980, 53), is applied to “fragments of our actual linguistic practices” (Baker & Hacker, 1980, 55). They result from an extension of language-game proper to parts of our actual language. This way of differentiating between invented and natural language-games has been the dominant interpretation among Wittgenstein scholars. Stephen Hilmy makes a contrast between “hypothetical (constructed)” language-games one finds plentifully in the “Brown Book” and the “language-games *qua* loci of extant linguistic practice” (Hilmy, 1987, 69; italics original). David Stern also takes it for granted that there is a distinction between “real” and “imaginary” language-games (Stern, 1995, 20).

I take the view that both naturalness and inventedness belong together as two inseparable elements inherent in the very conception of language-games. The former element makes possible and sustains any inquiry into our language employing language-games. The latter element plays the role of an indicator that the language-games we use involve imaginarity and tentativeness and thus are open to revisions. The strategy of contrasting between two general types of language-games obscures our vision of the integrity of natural and hypothetical elements which help together to make up the idea of language-games. In other words, by dissolving these elements which are intimately merged with each other into two outwardly divergent types, the predominating exegesis covers up the significance of this fusion of both natural and hypothetical factors. A clear vision of this aspect is crucial in grasping the uniqueness of the general orientation of Wittgenstein’s thought.

To begin with, nowhere can one find Wittgenstein himself speaking of such kind of distinction. Even in the passage where the phrase “objects of comparison” appears, which is one of the basic references on which Baker & Hacker make their case, there is no hint at such a distinction.² It runs as follows,

Our clear and simple language-games are not preparatory studies for a future regimentation of language – as it were first approximations, ignoring friction and air-resistance. Rather, the language-games stand there as *objects of comparison* which will throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities. (Wittgenstein, 2001, §130; italics original; translation modified)³

¹ “Objects of comparison” is Wittgenstein’s own phrase. See Wittgenstein, 2001, §130.

² David Stern is also referring to this remark when suggesting a distinction between real and imaginary language-games (Stern, 1995, 20).

³ The German original of the first part of the second sentence whereupon I modified Anscombe’s translation is as follows: “Vielmehr stehen die Sprach-

spiele da als *Vergleichsobjekte*”. Anscombe’s translation “The language-games are rather set up as *objects of comparison*” suggests a stronger sense of artificiality to the notion of language-games than Wittgenstein’s original phrasing.

In this remark, there is not a sharp separation between language-games and our ordinary language, or in other words, between invented and natural language-games. Language-games cannot be regarded as purely conceptual tools free of any “friction and air-resistance” which are present in our mundane linguistic practice. They contain in themselves the ruggedness and fluidity of the actual human language as anyone witnesses. They do not belong to another level of conceptuality apart from our ordinary language. Rather, they stand among miscellaneous human lives and linguistic uses. What makes language-games different are no more than some of the uses put to them. The relevant shifts of uses are similar with the one in which a red board which is initially no more than a board becomes a sample when put to such a use, or the one in which a wooden rod which is primarily just a rod turns into a measuring-rod when it is used as a standard of measurement (cf. Wittgenstein, 2001, §131)

In a discussion in the early 1930’s recorded by Waismann, Wittgenstein talks about a vision of the uses of language-games. He states that the conception of language-games is a fluid one,

But this [the recognition that the concept of language is a fluid one] allows us to carry our freedom to extremes, as it were to say, if you call such and such language, then why not this other thing too? Thus we can isolate [isolieren] language games [Variant: “We can deliberately invent language-games.”]⁴ and imagine, say, that a tribe is acquainted only with such and such a game or this particular combination of language-games. (Wittgenstein, 2003, 67)

This is an important explication of what Wittgenstein intends language-games to function. As can be seen from the wording, Wittgenstein uses two verbs different in kind, i.e. “isolate” and “invent”, to describe the coming into being of language-games. The two-fold character of language-games is revealed in these two words. The methods involved in presenting language-games are at the same time a matter of isolation and a matter of invention. For one thing, there is the consideration of the actual uses of language in our everyday life. Since the phenomena of our linguistic practice are so pervasive, it might benefit inquiries into language to look closely at one particular episode at one time. Thus, the devising of language-games constitutes a pragmatic move which enable us to investigate the variegated roles of what we call language plays in the concrete episodes of the actual life. It is observations of ordinary facts of nature that make possible any such pragmatic move towards investigating our language by means of strategically isolating language-games against diffuse linguistic occurrences. As such, language-games are grounded in the actual happenings of human life. They are nurtured on the matrices of natural linguistic practice we observe everyday.

⁴ This is an original note on the same page in Wittgenstein, 2003.

For another thing, there is a character of inventedness to language-games. For the purpose of investigation, certain aspects of linguistic practice are put under focus by means of designing language-games. Some scenarios might appear to look bizarre and unnatural.⁵ One can prevent oneself from misreading them by always attempting to grasp the inventive character in relation to its root in the actual life. Language-games can be said to be a matter of invention insofar as they are used as heuristics aimed at shedding off our stagnant prejudices and taken-for-granted assumptions in regard to our language. This hypothetical character highlights their open-endedness. It plays the role of a reminder that what are used as language-games in our philosophical investigations turn on particular purposes and what is available as “our” language at the time of the invention of language-games. That is to say, what is presented in language-games as primitive and simple cannot be pinned down once and for all in a positivistic manner.

When the actual elements occupy the predominating foreground, a language-game may appear to be a life sketch. This appearance lends itself to the classification of natural, or extant language-games. When the dimension of imaginarieness comes to the fore, a language-game may be easily taken to be an invented scenario which seems to be at a remove from the actual events of the world. These appearances beguile commentators like Baker & Hacker into a typological distinction between natural and invented language-games. However, both the dimension of naturalness and imaginarieness of language-games have to be taken into consideration in their relatedness and mutual shiftiness. This means that what is regarded as natural and what is taken as imaginary can change their roles in accordance with different purposes at the time of an inquiry. Wittgenstein would in no way approve a distinction between invented and natural language-games, since this differentiation entails that language-games can be considered apart from either naturalness or inventedness.

To illustrate these points, we can take a look at how the considerations of naturalness are played out in Wittgenstein’s illustration of the language-game of the builders. The standard reading takes this language-game as an invented one (Baker & Hacker, 1980, 54; Hilmy, 1987, 92). It has been interpreted by some influential scholars as mechanistic actions of making calls and bringing the building-stones in response (Rhees, 1970; Mulhall, 2001, 52-53). Few commentators take into account Wittgenstein’s supplementary remark on this language-game which is published in *Zettel*.⁶

(On language game no.2) “You are just tacitly assuming that these people *think*; that they are like people as we know them in *that* respect; that they do not carry on that language-game merely mechanically. For if you imagined them doing that, you yourself would not call it the use of a rudimentary language.”

What am I to reply to this? Of course it is true that the life of those human beings must be like ours in many respects, and I said nothing about this similarity. But the important thing is that their language, and their thinking

too, may be rudimentary, that there is such a thing as “primitive thinking” which is to be described via primitive *behaviour*. The surroundings are not the “thinking accompaniment” of speech. (Wittgenstein, 1980, §99; italics original)

Putting aside the significance of this remark for many other exegetical issues, one can clearly see that the language-game of builders is not intended to be a purely invented episode of conduct attributed to an alien people with whom we do not even have to bother about whether they are human beings or not. Rather, a language-game like this is only conceivable on the condition that we know what it is to be human, though in a vague sense, and what a human life roughly means, among which building is one of the commonly seen activities. It is only against a background of a myriad of human lives that an episode of building is isolated, or invented as a language-game.

In section 7 of the *Investigations*, where Wittgenstein first introduces the term “language-game”, his wording is like this: “We can also think of the whole process of using words in (2) as one of those games by means of which children learn their native language. I will call these games ‘language-games’ and will sometimes speak of a primitive language as a language-game.” It is amazing that the first thing to which Wittgenstein accords the term “language-game” is not directly the building activity, but this kind of activity as a game in which children learn the native language. That children learn words by playing games is a common phenomenon in our daily life.

The pervasiveness of the elements of actual human life is manifest throughout the passages related to the language-game of builders. When Wittgenstein is talking about what he calls “ostensive teaching of words”, he states the reason for his saying that it will form an important part of the training for the children to learn the builder’s language as, “because it is so with human beings; not because it could not be imagined otherwise” (Wittgenstein, 2001, §6b). Without the consideration of the actual human lives, the imaginary wings of language-games cannot possibly spread up.

The typology of totally natural language-games as differentiating from totally invented or hypothetical language-games, in the first place, has a difficulty with explanatory consistency. In what way can the notion of language-game be applied in exactly the same sense to these two distinctive types? Baker & Hacker try to resolve this difficulty by emphasizing the first type. They introduce this type as the genuine exemplification of the use of what they call the language-game method, and explain the second type as merely an extension of this method. The second type amounts to an application of the method to “fragments of our actual linguistic practices” (Baker & Hacker, 1980, 55). If they were to hold on to a consistent explanation of language-games, then, strictly speaking, what they call natural language-games cannot be counted as language-games at all.

In the second place, this typology creates a misleading picture and thus makes it difficult for one to appreciate the vision Wittgenstein intends the use of language-games to open up. Such a picture tempts one to treat a language-game as either natural or invented, which leads to a radical opposition between “our” natural language and purely imaginary languages. The consequence of this opposition is manifest in the debate between David Cerbone’s “don’t look but think” construal of Wittgenstein’s imaginary scenarios in contention against David Bloor’s advocacy of sociological replacements of them (Cerbone,

⁵ In “Wittgenstein’s Builders”, Rhees famously argues that the language-game of the builders is too bizarre to be taken as exemplification of a real language (Rhees, 1970). I take it that this view rests upon a prior uncritical assumption as to what language is, or should be, and also upon a failure at appreciating the import of Wittgenstein’s uses of language-games.

⁶ Malcolm pays attention to this passage (Malcolm, 1993). But he merely uses it as a lead to detailed descriptions of the possible richness of the lives of the builders tribe, instead of pointing out that language-games can possibly be used and understood only when viewing them together with the many other facets of human life which remain undelineated.

1994; Bloor, 1983). In this paper, I have put relatively more stress on the side of naturalness of language-games to counter against the conceptualist strand in Baker & Hacker's work. However, the negligence of inventiveness and hence the open-endedness of language-games, which easily lead to all sorts of positivistic and relativistic interpretation of Wittgenstein's thought, must no less be avoided.

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Meinongs frühe Wahrnehmungslehre

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1. Subjektive und objektive Verbindungen

Seit seinen frühen Arbeiten weist Meinong der Psychologie die Aufgabe zu, von der inneren Erfahrung auszugehen und nach den Annahmen zu suchen, welche die Entstehung und den Verlauf der unmittelbaren Erfahrungsdaten erklären können (vgl. Meinong 1882, 167). Diese Suche muss durch die Prinzipien der Analyse und der Selbstbeobachtung geführt werden, die eine so große Rolle in der Psychologie des 19. Jahrhunderts spielten. Die Selbstbeobachtung oder innere Wahrnehmung wird als die einzige Quelle für die Beschreibung des Bewusstseinslebens betrachtet; die Beschreibung des Bewusstseinslebens soll durch Zerlegung der psychischen Tatsachen in die elementaren Inhalte erfolgen.

Die Erfahrung entsteht nach Meinong durch Verbindung von elementaren Inhalten, d.h. von Empfindungen. Die Verbindungen sind von zweifacher Art: ideale, subjektive, erzeugbare Verbindungen einerseits und reale, objektive, vorgefundene Verbindungen andererseits. Die idealen sind das Ergebnis einer psychischen Tätigkeit auf Grund gewisser Vorstellungsinhalte (vgl. Meinong 1882, 128): zu diesen sind die Relationen und jene komplexe Inhalte zu zählen, die Meinong „Kollektiv“ nennt. Der Begriff der idealen Verbindung impliziert, dass die Glieder einer Relation und die Bestandstücke eines Komplexes getrennt bleiben, und dass eine Vorstellungstätigkeit von dem einen Glied zu dem anderen Glied hinübergeht. Aus solcher Tätigkeit entsteht die Vorstellung einer Ähnlichkeit oder einer Verschiedenheit zwischen Inhalten, sowie die Vorstellung einer Gruppe, eines Paares oder eines Dinges mit mehreren Eigenschaften. Die Erfahrung ergibt sich daher als Inbegriff von elementaren, zusammenhangslosen Inhalten. „Ist die Relation das Ergebnis einer besonderen psychischen Tätigkeit, so kommt sie den Fundamenten für sich und ohne diese Tätigkeit nicht eigentlich zu; wenn man daher von den Fundamenten als gegebenen ausgeht, so muß man eine solche Relation subjektiv, ideal nennen“ (Meinong 1882, 142). Die Vorstellung von Relationen und Komplexen beruht also nach Meinong auf einem bewussten psychischen Prozess.

Die sinnliche Wahrnehmung steht aber nicht ganz unter der Herrschaft der subjektiven Tätigkeit. Meinong fragt sich, ob es objektive Faktoren gibt, die unseren Geist von einer Vorstellung zu einer anderen hinleiten können, oder ob das vereinigende Prinzip nur in unserem Geist liegt. In den Vorlesungen des Sommer Semester 1888, „Psychologie der Komplexionen“ genannt, behauptet Meinong, dass es Prinzipien gibt, die die subjektive, willkürliche Tätigkeit des „in-Beziehung-Setzen“ leiten. So Meinong: „Obwohl keinen Inhalt gibt, der sich zusammenfassender Tätigkeit für immer entzieht, so doch gibt es Gründe oder Motive der Zusammenfassung auf dem Gebiet der psychologischen Erfahrung. Bevorzugt erweisen sich da: das räumlich oder zeitlich Nahestehende; das kontinuierlich ineinander Übergehende; das Ähnliche“ (Meinong 1888). Die Relationen sind also nicht alle subjektiv, ideal. Es gibt in der Erfahrung auch Relationen, die nicht aus der psychischen Tätigkeit des Verbindens entstanden sind. Das Subjekt verhält sich diesen Relation sowie diesen Komplexen gegenüber nur wahrnehmend, das bereits Vorhandene konstatierend. In solchem Fall muss die Relation den Fundamenten wirklich zukommen, sonst könnte sie an ihnen nicht wahrgenom-

men werden (vgl. Meinong 1882, 142). Diese Relation heißt „real“ oder „objektiv“, und die daraus folgenden Komplexe „vorfindlich“. Als vorfindliche Komplexionen, bei denen das Subjekt nur rezeptiv ist, sind nach Meinong die folgenden zu nennen: die innige Verbindung zwischen Farbe und Ausdehnung, die zeitliche Bestimmtheit der psychischen und physischen Inhalte, die örtliche Bestimmtheit der physischen Inhalte, die Verbindung der verschiedenen Stellen im subjektiven Zeitkontinuum und Ortskontinuum (vgl. Meinong 1889, 208). Zu diesen Verbindungen kann das Subjekt nichts beitragen, es findet sie vor und es nimmt sie wahr wie den einfachen Inhalt Rot selbst.

Die vorfindlichen Komplexionen sind die unmittelbaren, ursprünglichen Erfahrungsdaten. Bei ihnen ist das Subjekt nicht tätig: „vorfindlich sind alle Fälle, wo es keine Produktion gibt“ (Meinong 1888). So behauptet Meinong „Jedes Mal sind aber diese Komplexionen und Relationen nicht erst durch eine reflektierende Intelligenz in die inhaltlich bestimmten Vorstellungen hineingetragen; sie sind vielmehr ein Stück Wirklichkeit, über das man sich eben nur durch die Wirklichkeit kann belehren lassen“ (Meinong 1894, 320). Meinongs Erfahrungsanalyse zeigt hier eine enge Beziehung mit den psychologischen Analysen von Carl Stumpf über die selbständigen Inhalte und Teilinhalte (vgl. Stumpf 1873), sowie mit den Analysen von Edmund Husserl über die primären Relationen und psychischen Relationen (vgl. Husserl 1891).

2. Die fundierten Inhalte

Was ändert sich in Meinongs Bild von der Erfahrung mit der Annahme der von Ehrenfels entdeckten Gestaltqualitäten? Wie verhalten sich diese neuen Vorstellungsgebilde zu beiden Arten von Verbindungen, die Meinong bestimmt hat? Damit beschäftige ich mich im Folgenden.

Unter „Gestaltqualitäten“ versteht man bekanntlich jene positiven Bewusstseinsinhalte, die keine bloße Zusammenfassung oder Summe von Elementen sind, sondern etwas diesen gegenüber Neues: z.B. eine Raumgestalt oder eine Melodie, die von der Summe der Ortbestimmtheiten und von der Summe der Töne unterscheidbar ist. In der Terminologie Meinongs werden solche Vorstellungsgebilde „fundierte Inhalte“ oder „Gegenstände höherer Ordnung“ genannt; die Elemente, an denen solche Vorstellungsgebilde gebunden sind, werden „fundierende Inhalte“ oder „Inferiora“ genannt. Diese Wendungen bedeuten, dass solche Vorstellungsgebilde nicht „neben“ den anderen, sondern „übereinander“ stehen. „Sie sind, weil auf die sie fundierenden Grundlagen als Voraussetzungen angewiesen, diesen gegenüber unselbständig; nicht-fundierte Vorstellungen können ihnen daher auch als „selbständige“ zur Seite gestellt werden, so dass fundierte und selbständige Vorstellungen im eben präzisierten Sinne eine vollständige Disjunktion ausmachen“ (Meinong 1891, 288).

Vom genetischen Standpunkt aus stellt sich nun die Frage, wie wir dazu kommen, Gestalten aufzufassen. Mit Meinongs Wörtern: Sind die fundierten Inhalte „vorfindlich“ oder „erzeugbar“, real oder ideal? Meinong betrachtet sie nicht als etwas, das schon fertig vorgegeben ist. Während für Ehrenfels die Gestaltqualität ohne eine speziell auf sie

gerichtete Tätigkeit mit der Grundlage zugleich gegeben ist, ist für Meinong der fundierte Inhalt nicht mit den fundierenden gegeben. Vorgefunden sind für ihn nur die Elemente, die Bestandstücke des Komplexes. Der fundierte Inhalt ist das Ergebnis einer besonderen psychischen Arbeit, die das Subjekt an den Gliedern des Komplexes ausübt. So Meinong: „Augenfällig wäre dann, dass beim Vergleichen das Subjekt beträchtlich mehr hinzutun muss als beim Wahrnehmen von Gestalt oder Melodie; indes dürfte auch hier den fundierenden Inhalten nicht alles zu überlassen sein“ (Meinong 1891, 296). Hier liegt der Kern der sogenannten „Vorstellungsproduktion“, die Meinong doch nie genau formuliert hat. Die Auffassung von fundierten Inhalten beansprucht eine besondere psychische Tätigkeit des Subjektes. Zur Vorstellung einer Relation muss dann das Subjekt mehr beitragen als zur Vorstellung einer Raumgestalt oder einer Melodie, weil die Elemente der Raumgestalt sowie der Melodie miteinander inniger verbunden sind als die Glieder einer Relation. In beiden Fällen ist zur Produktion der Gestaltvorstellung sowie Relationsvorstellung eine subjektive Tätigkeit nötig. Fundierte Inhalte sind also ohne weiteres als „ideal“ zu behandeln.

Diese Theorie bringt keine große Modifikation in die Wahrnehmungslehre Meinongs mit sich. Der Grund liegt offenbar darin, dass Meinong die Gestalten neben den elementaren Inhalten erhält. Er will in der Tat den Begriff des elementaren Inhalts durch den der Gestalt nicht ersetzen, sondern nur ergänzen. Dazu wird die Wahrnehmbarkeit der Bestandstücke einerseits und das Bedürfnis einer subjektiven Tätigkeit zur Gestaltvorstellung andererseits behauptet. In dieser Hinsicht unterscheidet Meinong sich von den Psychologen der Berliner Schule. Trotzdem formuliert er inzwischen eine These, die mit seiner früheren Theorie nicht im Einklang ist. Sie betrifft die Natur der fundierenden Inhalte.

In *Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung* lesen wir denn, dass *Superiora* auch „real“ sein können. Das bedeutet, es gibt auch *Superiora*, die existieren und daher wahrnehmbar sind. Als Beispiele solcher *Superiora* gibt Meinong die Verbindung von Farbe und Ortbestimmtheit, die Verbindung von Temperatur und Ortbestimmtheit, von Ton und zeitlicher Bestimmtheit, die Tonverschmelzung, das subjektive Zeitkontinuum und das subjektive Ortskontinuum und anderen an, die uns bereits als „vorgefundene Komplexionen“ bekannt sind (vgl. Meinong 1899, 395). Diese Inhalte sind nach Meinong „Sache direkter Beobachtung“. Die Produktion wird also für das Entstehen dieser fundierten Inhalte nicht vorausgesetzt. Die produzierende Tätigkeit des Subjekts ist bei den „realen *Superiora*“ ganz entbehrlich. Es stellt sich nun die Frage nach den fundierenden Inhalten der *Superiora* wie der „roten Fläche“ oder des „dauernden Tones“. Das Datum, das wir jedes Mal rezeptiv vorfinden, ist eine Farbe mit örtlicher Bestimmtheit und ein Ton mit zeitlicher Bestimmtheit. Über diese Erfahrungsdaten hinaus können wir nicht gehen. Meinong behauptet doch, dass auch unendlich kleine Teile einer einfarbigen Fläche als „Elemente“ anzusehen sind, welche in ihrer Gesamtheit eine Grundlagen für den fundierten Vorstellungsinhalt „einfarbigen Fläche“ bilden. So lautet Meinongs These: Die Kontinua sind in Wirklichkeit ungeteilte Einheiten; auch was nicht geteilt ist, kann dennoch Teile haben, d.h. es ist teilbar. Auch dem, was teilbar ist aber noch nicht geteilt worden ist, also den Kontinua, muss man Teile zuerkennen, denn „was teilbar ist, kann doch unmöglich einfach sein: was aber nicht einfach, sondern komplex ist, scheint doch wohl Teile haben zu müssen“ (Meinong 1899, 423). Die Kontinua als „reale *Superiora*“ können daher in einzelne Teilchen geteilt werden, und diese Teilchen bilden dann ihre *Inferiora*. Nur

die Schranken unserer Aufmerksamkeit setzen Meinong zufolge der praktischen Durchführung des Teilungsvorgangs Grenzen.

Daraus wird klar, warum Meinongs Wahrnehmungstheorie von den Berliner Gestaltenpsychologen für „intellektualistisch“ gehalten worden ist. Die unendlich kleinen Flächeninhalte sowie die Toneindrücke von unendlich kleiner Zeit sind offenbar gar nicht vorstellbar: sie können nicht gesehen und nicht gehört werden. Es sind begriffliche Hilfskonstruktionen, derer sich die Mathematik für bestimmte Zwecke bedient. Es sind unanschauliche, „fingerte“ Teile, mit denen die Psychologie nichts zu tun hat. Die von Meinong hier angestellte Überlegung kann also nicht in die psychologische Wissenschaft gehören, denn wo kein Teil gegeben, sondern nur denkbar ist, kann keine Rede von psychologischen Teilen sein. Wie sollen dann unanschauliche, „fingerte“ Inhalte die Grundlage für den hinzukommenden, anschaulichen Vorstellungsinhalt „rote Fläche“ oder „dauernder Ton“ abgeben? Das Kennzeichen der fundierenden Inhalte im Allgemeinen liegt eben darin, dass sie zu ihrer Vorstellung nicht auf andere Inhalte angewiesen sind, dass sie „selbständig“ sind. Die fundierenden Inhalte von „realen *Superiora*“ sind aber nicht für sich vorstellbar, sondern nur ohne einander denkbar. Wenn ein Erfahrungsdatum in sich keine unabhängig voneinander vorstellbaren Inhalte aufzuweisen hat, kann es nicht als *Superius* bezeichnet werden. Wir müssen vielmehr darunter einen vorfindlichen, unmittelbaren Erfahrungsinhalt verstehen, der besser als *Inferium* der ganzen Ordnungsreihe zu bezeichnen ist. Also erweist sich die Annahme von „realen *Superiora*“ als hinfällig.

3. Die Wahrnehmungsflüchtigkeit

Die Anerkennung von fundierten Inhalten impliziert noch eine Modifikation in Meinongs Wahrnehmungslehre. Um die Elemente neben den Gestalten zu erhalten, muss Meinong Grade in der inneren Wahrnehmung annehmen.

Er geht von der rein deskriptiven Frage aus, wie sich die fundierten Inhalte zur inneren Wahrnehmung verhalten. In seinen früheren Werken hat Meinong bereits zugegeben, dass ideale Relationen und erzeugbare Komplexionen der Introspektion schwer zugänglich sind. Der Fall der Verschiedenheit zwischen einem roten und einem blauen Papier sei hier angenommen: Die innere Wahrnehmung bestätigt ohne Schwierigkeit das Vorhandensein der Rotvorstellung und der Blauvorstellung; sie ist dennoch unfähig, neben Rot und Blau noch ein Drittes zu finden (vgl. Meinong 1899, 402). Mit der Anerkennung von fundierten Inhalten präzisiert Meinong seine Stellung. Gegen die Eventualität von Gestaltqualitäten ist nichts einzuwenden. „Versucht man freilich eine direkte Verifikation an der Empirie in der Weise, dass man sich etwa bemüht, den Inhalt der Vorstellung „Gestalt“ der Gesamtheit der sie ausmachenden Ortbestimmungen gegenüberzustellen, so ist das Ergebnis nicht sofort günstig: mir war beim Experiment zuerst zumute, als ob es evident wäre, dass die Gestalt in die Gesamtheit der Ortbestimmungen restlos aufgehen müsste“ (Meinong 1891, 286) Die Gestalt scheint in der Tat dem inneren Blick auszuweichen. Wenn ich etwa in Gedanken oder auch mit dem Auge die Konturen eines Ornamentes verfolge, so kann ich das leicht so einrichten, dass dabei keine Stelle unberührt bleibt; indem ich so gleichsam das ganze Ornament nach seiner Gestalt absuche, treffe ich aber diese an keiner einzigen Stelle an. Ich treffe vielmehr allenthalben Ortbestimmungen an, und nichts als diese.

Aus Beobachtungen solcher Art schließt die traditionelle, empiristische Psychologie auf die Nicht-Existenz von Gestaltqualitäten. Wenn die innere Wahrnehmung das Vorhandensein solcher Inhalte auf keine Weise bezeugt, sind die Gestalten oder Relationen als positive Vorstellungsgebilde nicht zu akzeptieren. Die Inhalte, die durch eine psychische Tätigkeit entstanden sind, müssen sich ganz entweder in die psychische Tätigkeit selbst oder in die Elemente auflösen, aus welchen sie bestehen. Diese ist wie bekannt die Grundauffassung der analytischen, zergliedernden Psychologie, die im 19. Jahrhundert vorherrschte.

Meinong setzt sich dieser Einstellung entgegen. Jede Psychologie, wenn sie wissenschaftlich sein will, muss eine analytische Psychologie sein – dies gibt Meinong ohne weiteres zu. Trotzdem hat sich die analytische Behandlung Meinong zufolge oft ins Unrecht gesetzt: „Gibt es aber im Psychischen Tatsächlichkeiten, die gleichsam über den Elementen oder Scheinelementen stehen, auf welche die Analyse führt, dann werden diese Tatsächlichkeiten entweder durch die Analyse zerstört oder sie bleiben mindestens, weil analytischer Behandlung in gewöhnlichen Sinne selbst nicht zugänglich, unbeachtet“ (Meinong 1899, 467). Meinong zufolge soll es Aufgabe der Psychologie sein, auch an den Tatsächlichkeiten festzuhalten, die sich vor der Analyse geltend machen. Es ist also falsch zu behaupten, dass die fundierten Inhalte innerlich nicht wahrnehmbar sind. Es handelt sich nur um einen Schein von Unwahrnehmbarkeit. So bestimmt Meinong genauer die Frage nach dem Verhältnis der Relationen und Gestalten zur inneren Wahrnehmung: „Um ihr Vorhandensein auf direktem Wege, durch Wahrnehmung also, zu wissen, fällt, solange das für theoretische Bearbeitung unerlässliche Festhalten nicht erfordert wird, durchaus nicht schwer: beim Versuch des gleichsam innerlich Fixierens versagt die innere Wahrnehmung dagegen nur zu leicht“ (Meinong 1899, 438). Gestalten und Relationen kommt also eigentlich eine „Wahrnehmungsflüchtigkeit“ zu. Sie sind wahrnehmungsflüchtig in dem Sinne, dass sie verschwinden, sobald wir versuchen, sie zu beschreiben, d.h. sie über ein gewisse Zeit aufmerksam zu betrachten.

Für Meinong stehen also die psychischen Inhalte nicht gleich starr und unveränderlich gegenüber der inneren Wahrnehmung. Die Elemente, Grundlagen oder „fundierenden Inhalte“ befinden sich in einer Vorzugsstellung, denn sie haben die Fähigkeit, sich dem Wahrnehmen und Beachten gegenüber sozusagen zu behaupten. Es gibt dann auch Inhalte, die dem inneren Wahrnehmen gegenüber eine gewisse Unbeständigkeit zeigen, d.h. die Gestalten oder die fundierten Inhalte. Mit dem Begriff der Wahrnehmungsflüchtigkeit kommt Meinong bewusst zum Bruch mit der Tradition, welche die innere Wahrnehmung als etwas Starres, Unveränderliches betrachtet. Dies ist der Preis dafür, dass er die Elemente neben den fundierten Inhalten im Bewusstseinsleben fortbestehen lässt. Mit anderen Wörtern: Er muss den Unterschied zwischen elementaren Inhalten und fundierten Inhalten nicht nur vom genetischen, sondern auch vom rein deskriptiven Standpunkt aus begründen. Daher führt er diesen Unterschied auf den zwischen einer vollen Wahrnehmung und einer Wahrnehmung gleichsam „niederer Qualität“ zurück.

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On the Reducibility of Consciousness and Intentionality

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Several philosophers (David Chalmers, Joseph Levine, Jaegwon Kim, among others) have claimed that the reduction of consciousness to, say, “pyramidal cell activity” is problematic in a way that the reduction of water to H₂O, or of temperature to kinetic energy, is not: in the former but not in the latter case we are confronted with an unbridgeable “explanatory gap”. The gap is said to result from the lack of an *a priori*, *conceptual entailment* from functional/physical truths *P* to phenomenal truths *Q*. Whereas we can explain the properties of water by *deducing* them from the behaviour of H₂O molecules, we cannot explain the properties of consciousness by *deducing* them from pyramidal cell activity. That water boils at 100° Celsius when H₂O molecules behave a certain way is said to be a “conceptual truth”; but that a particular (or any) sensory quality should be experienced when pyramidal cells behave a certain way, is not a conceptual truth at all.

The explanatory difference between the two cases is accounted for by these philosophers in terms of a “functional model” of reductive explanation inspired by the Armstrong-Lewis’s conception of “analytical functionalism”, according to which we characterize a mental/functional property in terms of its causal role, and then *identify* that property with whatever property is found to “occupy” that role. Kim, Levine, and Chalmers have embraced this “functional model of reduction” as a general model for reduction in science. This model, Kim says,

... accords well with the paradigm of reduction in science. To reduce a property, or phenomenon, we first construe it – or reconstrue it – functionally, in terms of its causal/nomic relations to other properties and phenomena. We then find properties or mechanisms, often at the microlevel, that satisfy these causal/nomic specifications and thereby fill the specified causal roles (1998, 24-25).

Any property that can be analyzed functionally can thus be identified with, or deduced from, whatever property fills its role. The reason why phenomenal properties *Q* are not conceptually implied by physical properties *P* is precisely, as Chalmers puts it, because “an implication from *P* to *Q* would require a functional analysis of consciousness, and the concept of consciousness is not a functional concept” (2002, 250). On the other hand, Chalmers (and others) also hold, the problem confronting the reducibility of consciousness does not extend to *intentional* properties, for these *can* be given a functional analysis, and so are “straightforwardly logically supervenient on the physical” (1996, p. 82).

According to Kim, the functional model for reduction should be adopted as an *alternative* to the traditional Nagelian model which, he believes, is highly problematic because of its essential dependence on bridge laws. Such bridge-laws, Kim claims, are “unexplained auxiliary premises” themselves in need of explanation, so “Nagelian reductions ... do not give us reductions that explain” (1998, 96). Furthermore, since bridge laws are supposed to be contingent, the concepts and properties they relate, Kim concludes, remain distinct, and so Nagel-reduction gets us neither conceptual nor ontological simplification.

I have argued elsewhere (Marras 2002) that these objections to the Nagel model are not justified. At any rate, they do not apply to “revamped” versions of the Nagelian model (cf. Hooker, Churchland, Beckermann, Bickle, etc.), according to which bridge-laws play no essential role in reduction. For is not essential for the reduction of one theory *T* to another theory *T** that the *actual* laws of *T* be deducible from the laws of *T**; it is only essential that an *image* or *analogue* of the *T*-laws be deducible from *T**. For example, what is essential to the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics is the derivation, from the principles of mechanics and appropriate boundary conditions, of a law *L**, $pV=2E/3$, which is the mechanical image of the Boyle-Charles law *L*, $pV=kT$, and this derivation requires no bridge laws. The bridge laws are actually *consequent* to the reduction: as Nagel himself explains in his account of the reduction of thermodynamics, the bridge law $2E/3 = kT$ is itself introduced as a *theoretical postulate suggested by a comparison of *L** with *L** (1961, 344). Naturally, once bridge laws are available, they may be used to deduce the *actual* laws of the reduced theory *T* from their images in *T** – e.g. we may use the bridge law $2E/3 = kT$ to deduce *L* from *L**. But since the bridge law was itself derived from (a “comparison” of) *L** with *L*, the deducibility of *L* from *L** and the bridge law is quite trivial – it merely serves the logical/expository function of formally exhibiting a *result* of the reduction and certifying that it has been successful, rather than the scientific/methodological function of actually *effecting* the reduction. The essential part of the reduction – the real scientific achievement – has been accomplished once the *images* of all the laws of *T* have been deduced; the deduction of the *T*-laws themselves from *T**-laws via bridge laws is, to put it bluntly, a house-keeping chore for the logician of science.

Now, it can readily be seen that this “revamped” Nagelian model and the functional model are only superficially different, the former focusing on the reduction of *theories*, the latter on the reduction of *properties*. On the functional model, for something of kind *S* to have a functional property *M* is for it to have a (first order) property *P* that “fits” *M*’s causal specification, i.e., that “fills” the causal role definitive of *M*. How is *M*’s causal role to be specified? Presumably, by articulating the set of causal/nomic relations into which *M* enters with other states *M*₁, *M*₂ ... *M*_{*n*} (including input and output states), according to some theory *T* about *S*. Thus the role of *M*_{*i*} is given by specifying *T*-properties *M*₁...*M*_{*n*}, of *S* and *T*-laws $L_1(M_1 \dots M_i \dots M_n)$, $L_2(M_1 \dots M_i \dots M_n)$, etc., displaying the way *M*_{*i*} interrelates with *M*₁... *M*_{*n*} according to theory *T* about *S*. If temperature is “functionalizable”, then a state *T* of an ideal gas *g* has the role that thermodynamics assigns to temperature just in case it obeys the pertinent laws of thermodynamics. And if pain is “functionalizable”, mental state *M* has the role of pain for *S* according to folk-psychology just in case there are folk-psychological laws according to which, under appropriate conditions, any system *S* is in *M* if *S*’s tissues are injured, if *S* will wince, believe she is in pain, seek help, etc.

Let us now ask what it is for a given property *P*_{*i*} to “fill the role” assigned to *M*_{*i*} by a theory *T* for a system *S*. We can say that *P*_{*i*} fills the *M*_{*i*}-role if it belongs to a set of (lower-level) properties *P*₁-*P*_{*n*} ascribed to *S* by a theory *T**

which nomically interrelate with one another in such a way that, under specified boundary conditions, for every law L_k ($M_1 \dots M_i \dots M_n$) of T there is a law L_k^* ($P_1 \dots P_i \dots P_n$) of T^* , such that there is a structure-preserving mapping from L_k to L_k^* . In other words, P_i occupies the M_i -role in virtue of the fact that P_i interrelates with $P_1 \dots P_n$ the way M_i interrelates with $M_1 \dots M_n$. Thus we may say that the mean kinetic energy of the molecules of an ideal gas fills the role of temperature in thermodynamics inasmuch as, corresponding to the Boyle-Charles law $pV=kT$, there is the statistical-mechanical law $pV=2E/3$ in which, given certain boundary conditions, kinetic energy relates to volume and pressure in much the same way as temperature relates to volume and pressure. And we may say that C-fiber firing fills the role of pain inasmuch as corresponding to the folk-psychological “laws” that, under appropriate conditions, tissue damage causes pain and pain causes wincing, there are neurophysiological laws to the effect that under those conditions tissue damage causes C-fiber firing and C-fiber firing causes wincing. The general idea is clear: we can say that P in T^* fills the role definitive of M in T if T^* together with appropriate boundary conditions enables the derivation of laws that are “analogues” or “images” of the T -laws in which M figures, and P occupies in T^* -laws the “position” that M occupies in T -laws.

The structural similarity between Kim’s functional reduction and (“revamped”) Nagelian reduction should now be apparent. As we have seen, in order for P_i to occupy the M_i role, there must be a law $L^*(P_1 \dots P_i \dots P_n)$ isomorphic with $L(M_1 \dots M_i \dots M_n)$. On the Nagelian account, the L -law will be a law of the theory T targeted for reduction (say, the Boyle-Charles law), and the L^* -law will be the “image” of the L -law (the mechanical counterpart of the Boyle-Charles law), derivable from the base theory T^* . On Kim’s account of functional reduction, P_i will be the basal property that fills the role of the functionalized property M_i , and P_i gets identified with M_i itself in virtue of its occupying in L^* the position that M_i occupies in L . But, recall, something analogous occurs in a Nagelian reduction: for once an image L^* is available for a given law L , then, as Nagel pointed out, we may be able to postulate biconditional bridge laws linking certain predicates of L^* with corresponding predicates of L , and these bridge laws can inductively be interpreted as expressing property identities once the intertheoretic reduction has been carried out in a sufficiently “smooth” and comprehensive way. The actual derivation of L from L^* (and, more generally, of T -laws from T^* -laws) via bridge laws has an obvious counterpart in Kim’s functional model: for given the isomorphism between L and L^* , P_i fills the M_i role only if each of the other properties $P_1 \dots P_n$ in L^* can be linked biconditionally to a corresponding M -property in L ; and so we have the equivalent of bridge laws enabling the derivation of L from L^* under Kim’s own model.

Let us now return to the issue of the reducibility of consciousness. The reason why consciousness was claimed to be irreducible was, recall, that there is no *a priori* entailment from physical properties P to phenomenal properties Q , and the reason for this was that “an implication from P to Q would require a *functional analysis* of consciousness, and the concept of consciousness is not a functional concept” (Chalmers 2002, 250).

Now, I am very much inclined to agree with Chalmers (and Levine, Kim, etc.) that the *concept* of consciousness is not a functional concept. Indeed, like Brian Loar, I am very much inclined to regard phenomenal concepts as first-person, “demonstrative”, *recognition* concepts that rigidly designate certain inner, subjective states. But unless we conflate concepts with properties, this is

consistent with supposing that the rigidly designated states are functional properties, at least in the minimal sense that, by a posteriori nomological necessity (and not by analytic definition), they causally interact with a number of other properties in certain characteristic and dependable ways sufficient to contingently pick out their kinds. So, even phenomenal properties can have certain characteristic “roles”, even though they may not be *defined* by such roles. And, as I indicated earlier, these roles may be specified by detailing the nomological generalizations that the role-playing properties normally satisfy – regularities of the form $L(M_1 \dots M_i \dots M_n)$, where M_i is the property whose role is being specified; and I see no reason to deny that for phenomenal properties, no less than for physical properties like temperature or transparency, such generalizations may well become available. That’s really all that matter – it matters not at all that they are not “analytically entailed” by the relevant phenomenal concepts; it’s enough that they be true of phenomenal properties as a matter of a posteriori necessity – say, as theoretical laws of a future, completed phenomenology. If so, phenomenal properties satisfy the first step of the so-called “functional” reduction. They also satisfy the second step if, for each of them, a lower-level, physical role-filler P_i is found, i.e., if appropriate “images” of L are forthcoming – if laws of the form $L^*(P_1 \dots P_i \dots P_n)$ are derivable, say, within a (future) neuroscientific theory T^* .

There is no question, however, of our being able to directly “deduce” L -laws from L^* -laws, or any other truths about M_i (say, pain) from truths about P_i (say, C-fiber firing) for the former and the latter sets of truths and laws are in different theoretical vocabularies and hold in conceptually distinct domains, so bridge laws are needed to mediate the deduction. Such bridge laws, recall, have the status of theoretical postulates: they are essentially contingent, empirical hypotheses inductively derived from a comparison of distinct, albeit analogous, theoretical laws. The impossibility of directly deducing the higher level from lower level truths holds not only for phenomenal properties, but for any property that is a candidate for reduction, whether we use the (“revamped”) Nagelian model of reduction or the functional model. As long as two theoretical domains are conceptually separate, there is no question of directly deducing truths in one domain from truths in the other. A *conceptual gap* remains, and it can no more be closed in the reduction of temperature to kinetic energy than in the reduction of pain to C-fiber firing. But the existence of a conceptual gap does not entail the existence of an *explanatory gap*. For we can still get explanations as a result of theoretical property-identifications, even when these are inductively based on successful theory reductions. A smooth and comprehensive reduction of phenomenology to neurology, if it ever happened, would provide inductive warrant for the identification of pain with C-fiber firing; and once that theoretical identification is in place, it can no longer be a mystery why, say, C-fiber firing should *feel* like pain: C-fiber firing *is* pain, and is it a mystery that pain should feel like pain? As Kim has put it, “identity takes away the logical space in which explanatory questions can be formulated” (1998, 98).

I believe that what holds for conscious states with respect to reduction, also holds, in all essential respects, for intentional states like beliefs and desires. I hold this for two reasons. First, unlike many philosophers, I do not hold the view that the *concept* of belief (any more than the concept of pain) is a functional concept – or, at any rate, an *entirely* functional concept – though no doubt, as a matter of a *posteriori* necessity, beliefs do interact with

other mental states and behaviour in certain characteristic ways. Rather, the concept of belief is, at least in part, essentially the concept of a state with a certain *intentional content*, and I do not suppose that the concept of intentional content is a *functional* concept. So I have no reason to think that the reduction of consciousness is problematic in a way that the reduction of intentional states (according to most participants in this debate) is not. Second, given that *property* reduction is contingent upon *theory* reduction, to insist on separating the issue of the reducibility of consciousness from the issue of the reducibility of intentional states and properties is to assume that the phenomenological theory of consciousness (“qualia theory”) is an autonomous, separable subdomain of psychology; and while this may be true in some respects, I do not believe this is true in any interesting or essential respect. I am, in other words, inclined to think that the psychological domain has a certain “seamlessness” that encompasses the domain of consciousness as well as the domain of intentionality, not only in the sense that consciousness and intentionality, as for example John Searle and Tim Crane hold, are more intimately related than generally assumed, but also in the sense that there are generalizations and principles of ascription and interpretation that cut across various strata of the psychological domain linking concepts pertaining to the propositional attitudes with concepts pertaining to “affective cognition” (the emotions) and to sensory experience (“qualia”), and that prevent the fragmentation of psychology into discrete lawful chunks, each independently available for reduction. If so, any reduction of (a theory of) consciousness – as articulated by a general and comprehensive phenomenology – would be part and parcel of a general reduction of psychology.

Let me conclude. I have not claimed that phenomenal and intentional properties can be physically reduced. Whether they can or not depends on whether a *theory* of phenomenal consciousness (perhaps a general phenomenology *cum* intentional psychology), if there ever will be one, can be reduced to physical theory; for, on the classical view that I endorse, reductive property identifications are *consequent* to theory reductions, and no-one yet knows whether a general phenomenological theory will be available, and, if available, whether it will be reducible to physical theory. My point has been that this is a strictly empirical issue, not one to be settled *a priori*, as Chalmers, Levine, Kim, and others have claimed.

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Human Soul, Human Body and Human Being

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After 1930, Wittgenstein passes through a great philosophical turbulence. And this turbulence continued till the end of his life. He started questioning his earlier views. Transcendental subject seems to have lost its hold on his thought, and we do not hear any more of the metaphysical subject or the subject that used to be the presupposition of the world's existence. Attack on the Cartesian subject for some years became his obsession. He devised very persuasive arguments against it. The Cartesian subject is undoubtedly to be rejected, but it has to be rejected with due respect. For it is not Descartes who invented the myth of the psychological self; Descartes' role was only the recording of this myth. Therefore, it is a serious issue how the simple and honest people, and not only the philosophers, were misled by their language to arrive at the myth of the psychological self.

Modern philosophy of mind is almost exclusively related to the mind body problem i.e. how meaning, rationality and conscious experience is related to, or arises from, a material world which, in itself is devoid of such characteristics. Even if the current philosophers reject Cartesian psychophysical dualism they continue to use habits of thought associated with it.

In his *Notebooks*, Wittgenstein says, "The human body... is a part of the world among others, among beasts, plants, stones etc. (*Notebooks*, 82) No special attention was paid to the human body in spite of the fact that Wittgenstein was aware of the fact that the human will successfully operates only on the human body. I can will to lift my arm but not to lift the building which I own. Only my body is subject to my will, yet bodies were not given any significance. But now Wittgenstein has a very different concept of the human body. The human body has become now "The best picture of the human soul." (*Investigations*, II, iv.) Even at the time at which Wittgenstein talked so much about the transcendental self, the transcendental self was a "deep mystery". (*Notebooks*, 80) to him. It is only in the later phase of his philosophy that he gives up the mysterious universe. Now he is occupied with the "body", something concrete, a part of the physical world, not its metaphysical limit. The body becomes a 'genuine subject' and the 'metaphysical subject' has given way, as we shall see, to a new distinction between 'the psychological subject' and 'the bodily subject'.

Before we proceed further it would be interesting to compare the views of Wittgenstein with the view of Aristotle. By saying that the human body is the best picture of the human soul Wittgenstein's view on the relation between the human soul and the human body comes very close to the view of Aristotle. Aristotle revolts against the Pythagorean-Platonic conception of the soul. The Pythagorean-Platonic view allows a soul to enter into any kind of body. The soul which is associated with the body of a man in this life may be associated with the body of a dog or a plant in other lives. Aristotle finds it absurd to think that the human soul may enter into the body of a dog or a plant. The human soul is restricted only to the human body; for it requires the *form* of the human body and this form is lacking in other animals and vegetables. As Aristotle says in *On the Souls*, "Most theories about the soul involve the following absurdity: they all join the soul to a body, or place it in a body, without adding any specification of the reason

of their union, or of the bodily conditions required for it ... they do not try to determine anything about the body which is to contain it, as it were possible as in Pythagorean myths, that any soul could be clothed upon any body – an absurd view, for each body seems to have a form and shape of its own. It is a absurd to say that the art of carpentry could embody itself in flutes; each art must use its tools, each soul its body." (McKeon 1941, 546) Not all dresses fit all kinds of beings. The dress which fits a human being is unfit for a dog or a plant. Wittgenstein's metaphor of 'the body as the best picture of the soul' can easily be substituted for Aristotle's metaphor of 'the body as the dress of the soul'.

Wittgenstein at times does not distinguish the concept of 'human body' from the concept of 'human being'. In his *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* the human soul has been pictured by the human being. As he says, "The human being is the best picture of the human soul." (281) This indifferent attitude to the distinction between the concept of a human being and the concept of a human body shows that Wittgenstein in his later work gives much importance to the concept of a human body, that this concept is equated with the concept of a human being.

For Wittgenstein's concept of soul, in his later writing, is the concept of a thinking experiencing subject. In his earlier writing he sacrificed this concept for the concept of a 'willing subject', and therefore, he failed to find it either in the world or *outside* it. Prohibiting the ascription of thoughts and experiences to a thing is prohibiting that it is (has) soul.

What leads us to say that something has experiences? We ascribe experiences to a thing by observing its behaviour. It simply makes no sense to talk about 'pain' without using 'behavioural criteria'. Pain is supposed to be an inner process. "An inner process", as Wittgenstein points out, "is in need of outward criteria." (*Investigations*, 580) On the basis of all this Wittgenstein is led to say "Only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious" (*Investigations*, 281) This implies that the living human beings are according to Wittgenstein the thinking experiencing subjects; they are the souls to which experiences are ascribed. Wittgenstein clearly makes 'human behaviour' as the paradigm for the ascription of experiences. A living being which is different from a human being could be a thinking experiencing subject, could be a soul, if its bodily behaviour resembles the bodily behaviour of the human being. So the human body is not only the paradigm for the ascription of experiences, it is also a paradigm for saying that something has a soul. As Wittgenstein says, "If one considers the behaviour of a living thing, one sees its soul." (*Investigations*, 357) Consider the variety of living beings to which Wittgenstein succeeds in ascribing experiences. "Look at a wriggling fly...pain seems able to get a foothold here." (*Investigations*, 284.) A 'wriggling fly' does not seem to be very unlike a 'crying man'. It is because we say of a man who is crying that he is in pain, that we also say of a wriggling fly that it is in pain. Wittgenstein further says, "One can imagine an animal angry, frightened, unhappy startled." (*Investigations*, II, i, p. 174) One can imagine the psychical experiences in connection with an animal because of the fact that the

behaviour of an animal resembles the behaviour of a man. But if it is possible for us to ascribe experiences to animals, it is also possible for us to say that they have souls. Can experiences be ascribed to plants? Can we say of tomatoes and cabbages that they have souls? Why not? Wittgenstein does not hesitate in allowing vegetative life to have thoughts and experiences, to have souls. As he says, "When you see trees swaying about they are talking to one another." Everything has a soul, "you compare the branches with arms." (*Lectures on Aesthetics*, 2-3) Like Plato, Wittgenstein seems to have permitted every living thing to have soul, to have thoughts and experiences. He seems to have accepted the Aristotelian restriction that the human soul is restricted only to the human body. Perhaps animals have their own variety of souls, so also the vegetable world its own.

Wittgenstein's view, however, is not as simple as that of Plato or Aristotle. What his one hand gives to the animals and plants, the other hand takes away from them, and the result is that they remain animals and plants, qualitatively different from men and women. At first step we can see Wittgenstein assimilating vegetables to the ordinary material objects. As he reacts, "But doesn't one say that a man has a consciousness, and that a tree or a stone does not?" (*Investigations*, 418) This implies that trees are not unlike stones. Up to this state we have the picture that only human beings and animals have souls. But why do we deprive the material objects and vegetables to have consciousness? Does the behaviour of a stone or a plant fail to resemble the behaviour of a man? It does. Wittgenstein refers to a chair to see whether experiences could be ascribed to it. Where do the experiences occur if they occur to a chair "In one of its parts? Or outside its body." (*Investigations*, 361) This kind of questioning is justified, for "we want to know *how* the chair is supposed to be like a human being, whether, for instances, the head is at the top of the back and so on." (*Investigations*, 361) So also if a rose is allowed to be conscious, we would like to see how its body resembles the human body. Suppose it is said, "A rose has no teeth". Is it like the raising of the question "A new born babe has no teeth"? Wittgenstein comments "One has no notion in advance where to look for teeth in a rose." (*Investigations*, II, xi, pp. 221-222) So the question of ascribing experiences to a rose does not arise. Thus, Wittgenstein has restricted Plato's souls to the animal kingdom, for men too are a species of animals (of course men suffer from the self-deception that they have something of the divine in them. Perhaps animals do not have any such suffering.)

What follows may be taken as the next step of Wittgenstein. He himself introduces difficulties for considering animals as the thinking experiencing subjects. Consider his reaction to the use of the expression 'think'. Wittgenstein remarks "we learn to say it perhaps only of human beings? We learn to assert or deny it of them. The question "Do fishes think?" does not exist among our application of language, *it is not used*." (*Philosophy of Psychology*, 201) Similar is the remark, "We don't say of a table and chair that they think; neither do we say this of a plant, a fish, and hardly of a dog; only of human beings. And not even of all human beings." (*Philosophy of Psychology*, 192) If we have been taught to assert or to deny 'thinking' to human beings, then we cannot extend its application to fishes, dogs and flies. As in his *Investigations*, Wittgenstein remarks, "If a concept refers to a character of human handwriting, it has no application to beings that do not write." (*Investigations*, II, i, p. 174) The concept of thinking refers to a human being, therefore, it has no application to those objects that are not human beings. Fishes, dogs and flies are not human beings.

The concept of thinking is tied to language, or rather, our concept of thinking is tied to our language. Fishes, dogs and flies do not use our language; hence we do not know what would it be for these animals to use our language. As Wittgenstein says, "If a lion could talk, we could not understand him." (*Investigations*, II, xi, p. 223) Therefore, we just do not know, hence do not say, what it is for an animal to think.

Wittgenstein has introduced for us a paradoxical situation concerning his views. On the one hand he has led us to think that not only animals have souls but even trees have souls. On the other hand he means to say that only human beings have souls, because in a legitimate sense we ascribe experiences only to human beings. One solution could be that Wittgenstein deprived the animals and plants only from having reason, from having thoughts. He allows them to have sensations. So his view is not very different from the view of Aristotle. Animals and plants too have souls, for they are experiencing subjects, not thinking subjects. This solution prohibits the entry of a human soul into the body of a dog or a fly. But when Wittgenstein denies thinking to animals and trees, his denial also covers the having of 'sensations' by the animals and plants. For our concept of sensation, like our concept of thinking, involves a linguistic structure. If we cannot ask the question "Do fishes think?" We can also not ask the question "Do fishes feel?" How to reconcile Wittgenstein's denial that animals are thinking experiencing subjects and his assertion that they are such subjects? The solution seems to be that when he denies thoughts and experiences to animals he denies them only in the secondary sense. According to Wittgenstein it is only in the primary sense thoughts and experiences can be ascribed only to human beings. It is only in the secondary derivative sense that animals have thoughts and experiences. But this solution would keep Wittgenstein away not only from Plato but also from Aristotle. Our ascription of experiences to animals would not be very different from our ascription of experiences to dolls and pots. So also ascription of souls to animals is in no better situation. Only human beings have experiences, and it is only in connection with human beings that we can say that they have souls. It is only in a secondary sense that we talk about a dog or a tree that it talks and feels sensations, that it possesses a soul.

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„Nicht alles, was Hund genannt wird, macht wau-wau“ – Erfahrung und Analyse als grundlegende Komponenten des Fremdsprachenunterrichts

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Eine innere Momentaufnahme aus dem Fremdsprachenunterricht: zwei sprachliche Erfahrungen – im Gegenständlichen eine russische und eine deutsche – stehen sich gegenüber.

„Гав–гав, сабака лает ьо дворе!“ –
„Wau-wau, der Hund bellt auf dem Hof!“

Hier fällt zweierlei auf: nämlich erstens, dass die lautliche Äußerung des Hundes in unterschiedlicher Weise sprachlich realisiert wird – „гав–гав“ bzw. „wau-wau“ –, und zweitens, dass jenes Lebewesen, über welches gesprochen wird, im Deutschen mit einem männlichen, im Russischen aber mit einem weiblichen Substantiv bezeichnet wird.

Es ist eine Alltagssituation im Fremdsprachenunterricht, dass Lernende und Lehrende einem Kontrast sprachlicher Erfahrungen gegenüberstehen. Diese Erfahrungen sind Gründe einer Alltagsgewissheit, innerhalb derer ein Irrtum nicht möglich ist. „Sich in der Muttersprache über die Bezeichnung gewisser Dinge nicht irren können ist einfach der gewöhnliche Fall.“ (Wittgenstein, *Über Gewissheit*, 630). Der Standard jener der Gewissheit zu Grunde liegenden Erfahrung ist auch außerhalb des zur Erfahrung Gelangten gut abgesichert, da es sich um eine solche aus der Vergangenheit handelt und von ihr auch gesagt werden kann: „es ist nicht etwa bloß *meine* Erfahrung, sondern die der Anderen von der ich Erkenntnis erhalte.“ (Wittgenstein, *Über Gewissheit*, 275).

Es ist also eine zweifach untermauerte Qualität, auf Grund derer sich ein Sprechender in der Muttersprache sicher fühlen kann.

Die Konfrontation dieser Sicherheit mit einer ebenso gesicherten, nämlich jener der Lernsprache, in welcher der Lehrende den Vorteil der Gewissheit genießt, ist eine vorrangige Herausforderung für die Beteiligten am Fremdsprachenunterricht, die in verschiedenen Gewissheiten verankerten Lernenden und Lehrende.

Aus der Analyse eben dieser Unterschiedlichkeiten in der Erfahrung und deren Gewissheitsqualitäten kann und soll sich die Art und Weise ableiten, auf welche ein Lerner in die für ihn fremde Sprache eindringen kann, was auch soviel bedeutet, dass er Vertrauen in deren Erfahrungen gewinnt.

Da die jeweilige Sprache ja auch ein Mittel ist „um sich selbst über die Sache klar zu werden“ (vgl. Wittgenstein, *Zettel*, 329), bringt ein in der Muttersprache erlerntes Wort den durch dieses besprochenen Fall in eindeutiger und unverwechselbarer Weise zur Evidenz. Das heißt, dass wir es hier mit zwei konkret in die Welt getretenen Möglichkeiten zu tun haben, eindeutig bestimmte Gegenstände „durch Zeichen vertreten zu lassen, welche die Möglichkeiten eröffnen, einen in einer bestimmten Sprache nur so zu bildenden Satz zu sprechen.“ (vgl. Wittgenstein: *Tractatus* 4.0312). Dieses „Nur so“ definiert gleichermaßen nach außen wie nach innen den „Fluss des Lebens“, in dem das Wort seine entsprechende Bedeutung erhält (vgl.

Wittgenstein, *Letzte Schriften über die Philosophie der Psychologie*, 913).

Die Beteiligten am Fremdsprachenunterricht, also Lernende und Lehrende, haben es demnach mit zwei durchaus eigenständigen „Flüssen des Lebens“ zu tun, welche unterschiedliche Fließrichtungen und Fließgeschwindigkeiten aufweisen. Diese zeigen sich einerseits in der Bildung und damit in der Geschichte eines Wortes, aber andererseits ebenso in dessen akustischem „In die Welt treten“, aber nicht weniger in dessen Symbol- und Nebenbedeutungen.

In einem russischen Märchen wird die Geschichte von einem alten Hund erzählt, welchen der Bauer nicht mehr ernähren will und daher in den einsamen Wald jagt. Der Hund trifft dort auf den Bären, dem er sein Leid klagt, worauf sich beide beraten und eine List entwerfen, welche dem Hund wieder sein Heimrecht bei der angestammten Bauernfamilie sichern soll: Der Bär wird das kleine Kind der Familie wegtragen, der Hund wird dieses wiederfinden und zu seinen Eltern zurücktragen und durch die Dankbarkeit der Eltern sein Gnadenbrot gewährleistet sehen.

Der Inhalt dieser Geschichte, also das Aufgehen des listigen Planes der beiden Tiere, funktioniert nur dadurch, dass die beiden Protagonisten im Russischen von Haus aus unterschiedlich geschlechtlich spezifiziert sind: „Hund“ – „Сабака“ – wird weiblich gedacht, „Bär“ – „Медведь“ – wie im Deutschen männlich. Der Bär übernimmt in der Geschichte daher eine männliche Rolle – das gewaltsame Rauben des Kindes, wenn auch zu einem guten Zweck –, dem weiblichen Hund kommt mit dem Wiederauffinden und Nachhausebringen des Kindes eine weiblich-mütterliche Aufgabe zu. Die Vorstellungswelt deutschsprachiger Märchen bringt den männlich gedachten Hund demgegenüber vornehmlich mit der männlichen Tätigkeit der Jagd oder mit dem ebenfalls männlich gedachten Teufel in Verbindung – man denke hier an den als Pudel in die Studierstube Einlass findenden Mephisto in Goethes „Faust I“.

Aus diesem Beispiel lässt es sich sinnvoll ableiten, dass beim Erlernen und Vermitteln einer Fremdsprache sinnvoller Weise auf die unterschiedlichen Bedingungen von Vorstellungen Rücksicht zu nehmen ist. Es geht ja darum, unterschiedliche Verbildlichungen eines Gegenstandes über den persönlich empfundenen Kontrast hinaus in eine verständnisfördernde Beziehung zu bringen, um sprachadäquate Anwendungen zu ermöglichen.

Man darf durchaus davon ausgehen, dass im zitierten Märchen ein lang und gut begründeter Schatz von Erfahrungen vorbildhaft Ausdruck gewinnt, und so sollte sich diese Erkenntnis durch analytische Überlegungen auch im Fremdsprachenunterricht zielführend niederschlagen. Ohne hier darüber Auskunft geben zu wollen, in welcher Weise die grammatikalische Beschaffenheit des russischen Wortes „Сабака“ mit der konkreten Erfahrung von einer vorrangig weiblich betonten Eigenschaft dieses Tieres zusammenhängt kann man doch davon ausgehen, dass die Vorstellungswelt der russischen Sprachgemein-

schaft und die geschlechtliche Zuordnung dieses Wortes gegenseitig bedingt sind. Aus dieser gegenseitigen Bedingtheit entsteht erst die Möglichkeit der Pointe in dem zitierten Märchen von dem Hund und dem Bären.

Unter Berücksichtigung dieser sinngebenden Besonderheiten der russischen Sprache könnte eine Empfehlung der Deutsch-Lehrenden an russische Studierende etwa folgende sein, diese Geschichte in die Lernsprache Deutsch zu übertragen und dabei dezidiert das Wort „Hündin“ für „Сабака“ zu verwenden, oder diese mit einem auch im Deutschen weiblich definierten Tier zu erzählen, etwa mit einer Katze, wobei es zumindest im Hinblick auf das Genus zu keinen Übertragungsproblemen käme, weil das russische Wort für dieses Tier, „Кошка“, auch in dieser Sprache weiblich ist, sich aber möglicherweise das Problem einer charakterlichen Unterschiedenheit zwischen Katze und Hündin und somit die Nichterfüllung des Symbolgehaltes als Übertragungshindernis herausstellen könnte.

Bedingt dadurch, dass „Сабака“ weiblich ist und ihr mütterliche Eigenschaften zugestanden werden können, wird eben dieses weibliche russische Wort durch den Gebrauch im Kontext der Handlung erklärt. Das heißt: die durch den Gebrauch des femininen Substantivs zur Evidenz gebrachte Vorstellung von der Mütterlichkeit des handelnden Wesens ist „die Erklärung, welche die Bedeutung erklärt.“ (Wittgenstein, *Philosophische Untersuchungen*, 560)

Im Falle des Wortes „Сабака“ wird mit dem Wort demnach die Bezeichnung für ein bestimmtes Tier gebraucht, andererseits aber auch die im Wort enthaltene Symbolik. Der Gebrauch des Symbols ist für die Erzählung sinngebend.

Wird von den Lernenden experimentell überprüft, ob die Symbolik des Märchens auch in der fremden Sprache mit deren Wortschatz erhalten werden kann so bedeutet dies, dass zur Erfahrung aus der Muttersprache nun auch eine solche aus der Zielsprache hinzukommt, weil die Lernenden selbst, nämlich im eigenen Denken mit dem Gelingen oder Nichtgelingen der Symbolübertragung konfrontiert werden. Dadurch haben sie eine ihnen direkt zugängliche, die Lernenden unmittelbar berührende Möglichkeit erhalten, sich in die Lernsprache einzufühlen und hineinzudenken und auszuprobieren, inwieweit sie mit ihren ursprünglich erlernten Schwimmbewegungen im nun andersgearteten „Fluss des Lebens“ zurecht kommen. Die Auseinandersetzung mit den alltäglichen Gegebenheiten zweier Sprachen und deren konkreten und symbolischen Möglichkeiten soll dann nichts weniger sein als eine gedankliche Durchdringung dieser Gegebenheiten vom eigenen Standpunkt aus. Denn das Erlernen einer anderen Sprache bedeutet auch, den Standpunkt gegenüber der Muttersprache zu hinterfragen. Der Alltagsgebrauch soll nach Rechtfertigung verlangen, das heißt, nach überlegender Analyse des Ist-Zustandes der eigenen Sprache und ihrer ursprünglichen konkreten und symbolischen Möglichkeiten. Diese gewinnen umgehend einen anderen Wert, wenn sie sich den Möglichkeiten der Lernsprache gegenübergestellt sehen. Und darin besteht nun die Herausforderung, dass nämlich die über die eigene Sprache und deren Möglichkeiten gewonnenen Kenntnisse und Erkenntnisse und das Wissen über das eigne ursprüngliche Sprachvermögen mit den Gegebenheiten der Zielsprache in Konkurrenz treten. Fruchtbar kann diese werden, wenn Lernende und Lehrende als Ziel jene Erfahrung vor Augen haben, durch welche vermittelt wird, dass durch die rechtfertigende Analyse eine Qualitätssteigerung im Hinblick auf das Verhalten in den

Lebensflüssen, aber auch in der Substanz dieser selbst festgestellt werden kann. Auch diese Erfahrung wird in die Kategorien jener gehören, welche ihre Bewährung aus der Vergangenheit herleiten und auch eine „Erfahrung der anderen“ ist. Auf ihr fußend finden sich die beiden Flüsse des Lebens im besten Fall durch einen Kanal verbunden, welcher es den Lernenden ermöglicht, beim Überwechseln seine Schwimmbewegungen sukzessive zu koordinieren – um beim Wittgenstein'schen Bilde zu bleiben. Damit ist eine ganz unverwechselbare und eigenständig erarbeitete Zugangsmöglichkeit zur neuen Sprache eröffnet, welche insofern besonders erfolversprechend ist, da sie auf der persönlichen analytisch-rechtfertigenden Möglichkeit, welche Lernende und Lehrende für einen konkreten Fall erarbeitet haben, aufbaut.

In einem speziellen Fall mag das dann heißen, dass ein bevorzugtes Interessensgebiet den Ausgangspunkt des Sprachunterrichts bildet. Da man beispielsweise davon ausgehen kann, dass ein Arzt in seiner Muttersprache kompetent über Medizin etwas aussagen kann, ist es sinnvoll, von diesem Themenkomplex ausgehend den Fremdsprachenunterricht auszubauen. Das vorhandene Wissen gibt dem Lernenden wie dem Lehrenden, der sich auf diese gegebene Wissenssituation eingestellt hat, die Möglichkeit, in ihren jeweiligen Flussbetten nach jenen Stellen zu suchen, von denen aus die Verbindung der beiden Bette ohne gefährliche Einbrüche ergraben werden kann. Dadurch erhält das Lernen auch eine sinnvolle Zielrichtung, weil der Lernende zur Überzeugung gelangen kann, dass sein bereits vorhandenes Wissen bzw. die ihm eigene Form der Lebenskompetenz auch im anderen Lebensfluss, d.h. der Zielsprache, keineswegs an Bedeutung verliert.

Diese Untermauerung der eigenen Seinsqualität durch Hinzugewinnung von etwas Neuem macht es möglich, die durch zwei Sprachen aufgebauten und bewährten Erfahrungswelten so zu nutzen, dass man sie gegebenenfalls verbindet, ohne dadurch die jeweilige Individualität zu verletzen.

Durch das Lernen und Lehren auf der beiderseitigen Grundlage analytischer Rechtfertigung wird bei den Beteiligten jene Fähigkeit gesteigert, welche gegen falsche Analogien gefeit macht und die es, wie Wittgenstein in seinem Tagbuch schreibt, möglich macht, „auf die leisen Stimmen zu horchen, die uns sagen, dass es sich hier doch nicht so verhält wie dort.“ (Wittgenstein, *Tagebücher 1930-1932/1936-1937*, S. 48)

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Questioning the Adequacy of Ordinary Language: A Glimpse at Wittgenstein, Ricoeur and Creative Metaphor

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The later Wittgenstein attempts to dispel the difficulties inherited from critiquing the language of everyday against the standard of the logically ideal by getting us to see the adequacy of ordinary language. Yet, some, such as Paul Ricoeur, have objected that in so doing Wittgenstein confines meaning to the success of using words already in a language game and thus ignores the poetic side of language which is capable of producing new meaning which was not formerly a part of the language game (Ricoeur 1977, 209, 258). What can Wittgenstein offer the poet who is restless within ordinary language and hopeful to create meaning through the intersection of different language games? Does Wittgenstein's brand of 'ordinary language philosophy', meant as a cure for Russell's and his own early logical atomism, too hastily overlook the creative power of poetic language in its drive to bring ideal logical theories of meaning to their knees? The test case for this question will be Ricoeur's notion of creative metaphor, which through an impertinent predication gives rise to an interpretation in which new meaning is produced.

To be clear Ricoeur agrees with Wittgenstein that "[i]t is only in a language that I can mean something by something," which is to say that all meaning originates from the rough ground of our ordinary, public and shared linguistic practices. To say that "bububu" means "If it doesn't rain I shall go for a walk," Wittgenstein says, shows us the grammatical difference between 'to mean' and 'to imagine' (PI §38, note). Yet, besides showing us what is required for 'meaning' isn't there something important about the fact that we say we can *imagine* a meaning? Might this imagined meaning come to have currency for us in a language game? Although Wittgenstein remarks that "to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life" it is not clear that he accepts any reciprocity between imagination, which is key to metaphorical interpretation, and a way of life (PI §19). It seems that describing our everyday linguistic activities can only reveal how we *already* live. Ricoeur, on the other hand, hopes to incorporate the possibilities of how we *might* live by emphasizing the productive side of metaphor as a dialectical intermingling of language and non-semantic reality. Metaphor as *poiesis* occurs through a negation of ordinary word usage, which leaves behind "the mere function of pointing out and showing what already exists" in order to disclose new modes of being (Ricoeur 1976, 88). Ricoeur is not concerned, as Wittgenstein is, to lead words back to their original homes; rather, he hopes to show that it is precisely through the destruction of such stagnant ordinary dwellings that space is opened up for metaphor to bring something new to language.

Just what is Ricoeur's theory of metaphor? Creative metaphor is an impertinent predication placing the literal interpretations of the terms involved against each other whose tension becomes the metaphor – the new assimilation of once logically distant words. Imagination is the ability to produce this likeness through and in spite of the initial differences (Ricoeur 1978, 146). The interest for us here is that Ricoeur's account explicitly points to the *inadequacy* of ordinary language; in fact, its failure is the condition that allows for a "new vision of reality" which the

ordinary way of speaking has failed to give us (Ricoeur 1976, 68).

For Ricoeur, metaphor displays a "surplus of meaning" that intimates its source as being which is extralinguistic. Thus, metaphor is not simply a semantic twist, but contains a referential dimension made possible through its relation to the symbolic order which mediates between metaphor, which is wholly located in language (*logos*), and reality, or Life (*bios*), which is preverbal and non-semantic (Ricoeur 1976, 59). Mediating the correspondences between *logos* and *bios*, language and our primordial lived reality, takes places through interpretation of the metaphor in a hermeneutical arch of objective explanation and subjective understanding. In the event of interpretation the reader appropriates the text in his concrete situation and opens up new ways of being (Ricoeur 1976, 92).

Ricoeur is confident that symbols, which extend outside of language, are prior to speech even though symbols can only come to thought if first expressed in language (Ricoeur 1976, 63). Ricoeur asks, "[d]oes not the fittingness, the appropriateness of certain verbal and non-verbal predicates, indicate that language not only has organized reality in a different way, but also made manifest a way of being of things, which is brought to language thanks to semantic innovation? It would seem that the enigma of metaphorical discourse is that it 'invents' in both senses of the word; what it creates, it discovers; and what it finds, it invents" (Ricoeur 1977, 239). The metaphor creates at the semantic level and discovers at the ontological level. The sense of a metaphor lies not *behind* the words, but in *front* of the words through interpretation directing the reader to the reference, moving "from what it says, to what it talks about" (Ricoeur 1976, 87-88).

Furthermore, Ricoeur holds that ordinary language obscures and even represses possible modes of being that the poet seeks to bring to language. Poetic language is unbound and liberated from the "lexical, syntactical, and stylistic constraints" of ordinary language, but it is equally bound to *what* it creates in a coextensive relation to a deeper symbolic order (Ricoeur 1976, 60). Thus, a metaphor contains a literal "is not" which coexists with an equally important metaphorical "is." With this move, Ricoeur is able to connect the unbound creative nature of metaphor on the semantic level to the dynamic nature of being itself in a referential relation through the mediating work of symbols. The deeper or more dominant the metaphor, the closer that metaphor is to the juncture of Life and Discourse, power and form, as shown in a poet, a community and, at its broadest moment, all humanity (Ricoeur 1976, 65). The poet brings Life to language and one senses that for Ricoeur there is an urgency involved; something deep beneath language awaits manifestation and calls the poet to task.

How might Wittgenstein respond to this call of the poet? In the interpretation of metaphor one risks crossing language games and creating difficulties along with potentially gaining new meaning. For example, 'my mind is an attic' is a metaphor which may get us into more trouble than reveal any symbolic truth, but there is no way to determine the matter prior to the metaphors inception.

Creative metaphor involves a risk of uttering non-sense, being misunderstood or propagating 'idle' chatter – but also of finding, as Wittgenstein might say, fertile points of view. Wittgenstein at times promotes a change in the way we live such that our philosophical illusions disappear and for this reason may seem hostile to metaphorical transference of meaning, but at other times he is quite aware of philosophy's impotence that amounts to "...trying to change the way women and me dress by talking" (*PI* §124, 133, CV 61-2).

Furthermore Wittgenstein's description of family resemblance makes metaphorical transference almost too easy. The same ability of words to be seen in a new and different light which we did not see before helps Wittgenstein dissolve metalinguistic theories, but also reveals the tendency of regions of language to cross-breed at will. Socrates has lost the battle to find the essences of our words and concepts and it is due to this failure that language can move and grow. This rough ground allows for new uses of words and is mirrored in the space invoked in Ricoeur's claim that creative metaphor brings logically distant words into proximity. Furthermore, the technique of interpreting a statement or utterance metaphorically is quite familiar to us, despite its meaning being new, and forms part of our ordinary linguistic practices. Wittgenstein and Ricoeur's positions work together here insofar as it is because we are the kind of people who thrive on family resemblances and have mastered the technique of secondary reference or metaphorical interpretation that metaphor has both the friction to create and the ability to become meaningful (*PI*, 181). "[N]ew types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten" (*PI* §23). Despite its risks to engender types of illusions, Wittgenstein is quite open to the breaking in of new meaning.

You must say something new and yet it must all be old. In fact you must confine yourself to saying old things – and all the same it must be something new! Different interpretations must correspond to different applications. A poet too has constantly to ask himself: 'but is what I am writing really true?' – and this does not necessarily mean: 'is this how it happens in reality?' Yes, you have got to assemble bits of old material. But into a *building*. (CV 40)

Here Wittgenstein balances our confinement to bits of old material – the public nature of language – with the importance of creating the new out of the old. Creative metaphor's very nature prohibits any prefigured meaning in favor of a spontaneous dawning in language – it is the deed to which we might say interpretation responds and upon which a more complex language game is built. Within language there is a wealth of potential which is in a sense waiting to be reaped or left to wilt in part due to the cultural and linguistic stage-setting, the form of life. In other passages Wittgenstein is fond of employing the metaphor that originality is a living seed; sometimes words catch on and sometimes they don't, but there is potential growth in them and thus the potential to make things be seen differently (CV 79). This is the other side of Wittgenstein, which speaks of creating buildings, not just destroying them, and echoes the productivity of *poiesis* in Ricoeur's theory of metaphor (see *PI* §118). However, for Wittgenstein, in the language game of poetry, "truth" does not necessarily correspond to "reality" – the metaphorical "is" with its ontological weight is confined to success within the language game.

Wittgenstein is open to the inventiveness of metaphor, but wary of the explanation behind it that Ricoeur gives. Creative metaphor's tensive construction shows the ordinary to be inadequate, but not through an empirical failure as such, or else, our ordinary language *would* be adequate. That is, we are utterly unable to point out that which is inexpressible in ordinary language and in need of metaphor therefore it can seem that metaphor is a less a tool for expression than a tool for creation. We might simply say that because the technique of metaphorical interpretation is quite familiar to us as a move in a language game that it displays *how* a statement is meant in a particular way to give it perlocutionary force. Thus, the metaphor's rebellion is such only in and through the language game. A good metaphor seems to stand (metaphorically) at the edge of language since as it creates it appears to inevitably reveal what we have been waiting for, what lies beyond our current linguistic frontiers – but one could say this results from being part of the concept of metaphor.

Furthermore, while the logic of correspondences between metaphors and symbols gives objective credence to a given interpretation, pointing to these connections cannot tell us anything more beyond their mere success – metaphor is a surprise which is validated afterwards. In sum, if the other to language can only be hinted at negatively and not pointed to outright, then how can Ricoeur defend the deep referential significance of metaphor against Wittgenstein's suspicion that he is simply providing seductive explanations which like philosophical confusions only have the character of depth? (*PI* §111)

The key is that even as metaphor brings us to the sublime, according to Ricoeur, its goal is not that of subliming – as in subliming the logic of our language. The metaphor lives and dies as a part of the community in which it is said – that is, it does not serve as permanent glue in the way that a word would be directly related to an object or to extralinguistic reality. Unlike Wittgenstein's opponents in the *Investigations*, because Ricoeur includes the "is not" within the "is" of metaphor he eludes charges of ontological pride and essentialism, which are hallmarks of problematic pictures of language. If nothing of such magnitude is wagered, then nothing is lost. Ricoeur does not hold that there is *one* reality out there waiting to be grasped, but that through dialectically interpreting metaphor we get a glimpse at a new reality which gives us the intimation that reality extends outside of our language. Ricoeur is not trying to say what "is" outside of language, since to say it at all would be to do so in words and so beg the question. Yet, neither is he trying to say what extralinguistic reality is 'like' as in mere simile – he wants to usher in a new view of reality co-created by language and reality. His claim that poetic discourse contains an indispensable ontological component combined with the reciprocity of an extra-linguistic reality is an attempt to describe the landscape of our normal creative and hermeneutical practices. Ricoeur's treatment of metaphor may still be mythical, but if the hope that metaphor reaches out to or intimates a reality outside of language is woven into how we live poetically, if it forms part of the vast bedrock of our poetic practices (at least in some language games, in some ways of life), and has no pretense for metalinguistic status, then wouldn't it be precisely the kind of everyday practice to which Wittgenstein would have us return?

It is fruitful to note Wittgenstein's acceptance of the everyday language game, which may include metaphorical transference, and of the process of building which can be overlooked in light of his destructive project. If we

recognize a humble view of metaphorical inventiveness as a part of the everyday, then we can put to rest Ricoeur's concerns about Wittgenstein making language games heterogeneous and likewise misguided criticisms regarding Ricoeur's optimistic view of metaphorical reference. Perhaps the way forward is best stated in the following: "[c]oncepts may alleviate mischief or they may make it worse: foster it or check it" (CV 55). While Wittgenstein may not always speak of our restlessness in language positively, we should borrow his caution such that we do not forget that all language is extraordinary and its inability to be fully captured is subject above all to wonder.

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An Appropriation, Inspired by the Early Wittgenstein, of Early Derrida on Aristotle on Time

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1. Derrida on Aristotle on Time

In his examination of Aristotle's reflections on time, Derrida identifies how a comparison with space opens up a context within which time's 'mode of Being' can 'emerge':

The relationship of points between themselves cannot be the same as that of the nows between themselves. Points do not destroy each other reciprocally. But if the present now were not annulled by the following now, it would coexist with it, which is impossible. (1968b, 54)

This argument provides us with a statement that would appear to express time's 'essence':

Not to be able to coexist with an other (the same as itself), with an other now, is not a predicate of the now, but its essence as presence. The now, presence in the act of the present, is constituted by the impossibility of coexisting with an other now, that is, with an other-the-same-as-itself. (p. 55)

The condition that coexisting temporal points be impossible is a condition of time's possibility, of its being 'what it is'.

But Derrida argues that such an 'explanation' involves us in a kind of double-think. In order to grasp the essential fact in question, we are required to think something that that essential fact dictates makes no sense:

[T]his impossibility, when barely formulated, contradicts itself, is experienced as the possibility of the impossible. This impossibility implies in its essence, in order to be what it is, that the other now, with which a now cannot coexist, is also in a certain way the same, is also a now as such, and that it coexists with that which cannot coexist with it. The impossibility of coexistence can be posited as such only on the basis of a certain coexistence, of a certain *simultaneity* of the nonsimultaneous, in which the alterity and identity of the now are maintained together in the differentiated element of a certain same. ... The impossible – the coexistence of two nows – appears only ... in a certain complicity or complication *maintaining* together several current nows which are said to be the one past and the other future. The impossible comaintenance of several present nows is impossible as the maintenance of several present nows. Time is a name for this impossible possibility. (p. 55)

The Being of time is fixed then by an 'impossible possibility', a comparison that must both fail and succeed: we borrow a sense of 'togetherness' which characterises spatial points, 'apply' it to temporal points, to 'nows', and then declare it to be 'inapplicable'.

2. A Deep Strand in Derrida's Thinking

An item of what Conant calls 'substantial nonsense' (cf. e.g. his 2000) is 'lodged' then in Aristotle's text, 'hidden, sheltered' (Derrida 1968b, 56). What I will call Derrida's 'deep' strand presents the 'enigmatic articulation' of this difference (between space and time) as resting (and thus that text too) on something for which he has coined some

of his best known terms – '*differance*', '*pharmakon*' and 'trace':

[T]he movement of *differance*, as that which produces different things, that which differentiates, is the common root of all the oppositional concepts that mark our language. (1971, 9)

Differance is the nonfull, nonsimple "origin"; it is the structured and differing origin of differences. (1968a, 141)

Derrida makes similar remarks about 'trace' and '*pharmakon*', which is 'the prior medium in which differentiation in general is produced', 'a *same* that is not the identical [but] the common element or medium of any possible dissociation' (1981, 126, 127). This movement, origin or medium is that in which space and time is 'compared' and found 'incomparable', 'the differentiated element of a certain same'; in which 'the impossibility' of the coexistence of nows is 'maintained'.

From its 'job description' alone, it follows immediately that the description of such a movement, medium, or origin – even as a movement, medium, or origin! (1968b, 66) – should present itself as a problem. Since it precedes differentiation, there is no context within which it might stand forward as thus-and-so rather than otherwise:

There is no trace *itself*, no *proper* trace. ... The trace of the trace which (is) difference above all could not appear or be named as *such*, that is, in its presence. It is the as *such* which precisely, and as such, evades us forever. (p. 66)

The sense in which the presence of such a 'thing' 'lodged', 'hidden, sheltered, but operating within' Aristotle's text undermines that text is that, though philosophy's drive to fundamentals would make this 'thing' its proper object, '*no concept of metaphysics can describe it.*' (p. 66).

3. A Shallow Strand in Derrida's Thinking

But there is, I suggest, another way of thinking, through Derrida's writings, of the 'constitution' of time's 'Being'. Derrida also picks up the precise grammatical juncture at which a certain trick takes place. Aristotle's proposals rely upon 'a word so small as to be hardly visible, and hardly visible because it appears self-evident, as discreet as that which goes without saying, a word that is self effacing, operating all the more effectively in that it evades thematic attention' (p. 56). That word is '*hama*', meaning 'together', 'all at once', 'both together', 'at the same time'. Its very 'neutrality' disguises the manner in which it is precisely in terms of frames of reference such as space and time that we may talk of 'things' co-existing, as being 'at the same time' or 'in the same place':

A now cannot coexist, as a current and present now, with another now as such. Coexistence has *meaning* only in the unity of a single, same now. This is *meaning*, sense itself, in what unites meaning to presence. One cannot even say that the coexistence of two different and equally present nows is impossible or unthinkable:

the very signification of coexistence or of presence is constituted by this limit. (pp. 54-55)

Through the 'neutrality' of the sign, '*hama*' – its being 'neither spatial nor temporal', referring us to neither points nor nows, places or phases (p. 56) – we can believe we glimpse two species of 'togetherness' that distinguish – but place within a single genus – space and time. This equivocation allows the philosopher to speak:

Aristotle ... develops his demonstration in the unnoticed self-evidence of what the locution *hama* says. He says it without saying it, lets it say itself, or rather it lets him say what he says. (p. 56)

These remarks invite a Wittgensteinian construal: as a result of being bewitched by the surface features of language, we succumb to the illusion that there *is* a context here within an ontological geography is to be worked out and a landscape to be mapped. We look unwittingly at one sphere through an analogy with another; the analogy does not carry over in certain respects and there we 'find' the ontological distinctions that characterise different spheres of Being. Space and time provide an example for Wittgenstein too.

The puzzles about time are due to the analogy between time and motion. There is an analogy, but we press it too far; we are tempted by it to talk nonsense. We say time 'flows', and then ask where to and where from, and so on. (1980, 60)

Through this crossing of frameworks, 'statements which previously had had a sense now lose it and others which had had no sense in the first way of speaking now acquire one' (1975, 267): since time flows and so do rivers, and since one can reverse the flow of a river, might the flow of time reverse?

To use a Derridian phrase, such 'shallow' analyses show 'the conditions of possibility and of impossibility' of our ontological reflections, showing how our susceptibility to certain unrecognized analogies opens up illusory 'spaces of possible possibility' parts of which we then 'close' (as 'impossible possibilities') by 'discovering' 'ontological facts'. Such a misunderstanding of our language 'lets [the ontologist] say what he says'; it provides 'the method of formulating' [*die Fragestellung*] the problems of philosophy (Wittgenstein 1961 preface), yielding 'not a determination of Being, but the very production of Being' (Derrida 1968b, 56).

4. Wittgenstein on Logical Impossibility and Ontological Types

'Seven is darker than your hat' causes us problems that 'Your coat is darker than your hat' does not. One way to characterise the difference is to say that the latter expresses a logical possibility while the former does not. One way to construe that remark is to take it as a proposal about a set of entities, saying of them that they cannot be combined to make up a state of affairs in the way suggested. Setting aside the question of why not, what looms now is a body of facts of the sort that a Russellian Theory of Types was meant to articulate; and one might well hope to find the 'impossible possibility' of simultaneous nows placed, by a theory of that sort, on the far side of the 'bounds of sense'. Yet according to the early Wittgenstein, 'all theory of types must be done away with by a theory of symbolism showing that what seem to be *different kinds of things* are symbolized by different kinds of symbols which *cannot* possibly be substituted in one

another's places' (1995, 25). How was that 'replacement' meant to work? And where does it leave 'the difference between space and time'?

Imagine a model of an accident in which we move a pepper-pot (representing the victim, Frank) across a folded napkin (representing the road) to show the point at which a car (represented by a cup) hits Frank. 'Where' might 'the illogical' be thought to be found in the model described? What might an 'illogical claim' 'made' using the elements of this model look like?

Consider first what we would say if the pepper pot were picked up and put back in the cupboard. What, one might ask, does this say about Frank? Only if we understand what the cupboard and the pepper-pot's being placed inside the cupboard are to represent, do we have any sense of what is being said about Frank and indeed that this pepper-pot is still representing Frank, instead of representing something else or nothing at all.

Suppose now that someone says 'What if *this* happens?' and places two napkins on top of each other. What is the force of our saying now 'That cannot happen'? The answer that reflection on our model suggests is not that the presented state of affairs is logically impossible but rather that our putative 'illogical combination' is a combination of signs to which a sense simply hasn't been assigned. We do not judge 'this' – referring to 'the depicted situation' – to be logically impossible; rather we wonder what 'this' – referring to this combination of signs – is meant to depict. Prior to the envisaged question, 'Is this logically possible?', is the question, 'What is this meant to represent?' Such combinations are 'dead space' within our forms of representation which, nevertheless, look superficially like 'live space'. To steer us away from 'the illogical', what we need is not an ontology but a system of signs in which those that represent roads *cannot* possibly be substituted for those that represent cups to yield something that looks like arrangements of signs that do have meaning in our systems of representation.

From this perspective, the 'impossible possibility' of simultaneous nows and the Being of time that it fixes are not 'phenomena' for which we need 'account', traced perhaps to the activity of some Derridian *différance*. Instead, their 'origin' or 'medium' is a confusion, a kind of word-play in which words play tricks *on us*; though clearly what I have offered here is no more than a sketch of how this undercutting of the need for ontology might work.

5. Appropriating Derrida

Both strands in Derrida can be seen as reconstructing the spaces within which 'Being' 'manifests itself'. In doing so, both strands show that the philosopher's thinking does not work as he believes. But they do this in two different ways: the item of 'substantial nonsense' upon which the deep strand focuses is seen by the shallow strand as 'plain nonsense' in disguise.

A more 'shallow' construal of the deep strand might still render these strands consistent with one another. The significance of Derrida's arriving at *différance*, trace, etc. could be seen as his correctly following through the confused logic of their being a basis of the imagined sort on which 'Being' 'emerges'. He could be heard as saying: 'If our philosophical thinking here is to attempt to make sense by its own lights, these are the peculiar structures that would have to be in place; but it doesn't and seeing clearly the need for such structures helps us see that'. (This, I suggest, is also a way of understanding the

'metaphysics' of the *Tractatus* (cf. McManus forthcoming)). Both strands could then be seen as restoring the construction lines, replacing the scaffolding, around philosophical thinking, to reveal its confusion. (McManus 2002 provides a fuller discussion of some of the issues the present paper raises, including that of the possibility of a 'thoroughly shallow Derrida'.)

To the card-carrying Derridian (and perhaps to Derrida himself), my paper may seem like a dreadfully unimaginative, typically utilitarian Anglo-Saxon failure to recognize what is really radical – really 'deep' – about Derrida, based on a failure to realise that there is more in Heaven and Earth than is dreamt of in my philosophy. What I see my paper as illustrating is the possibility, for those who are not quite ready to dream the dream of *differance*, of a way of learning from Derrida's readings of Aristotle, Rousseau, Husserl and others. We can look upon those readings as showing how some fundamentally important philosophical texts 'make sense' only on the basis of – are 'shallowly structured' by – particular, superficial grammatical analogies. Derrida's readings could then be seen as the skillful application, to texts on which Wittgenstein never wrote, of something not dissimilar to his radically illuminating method, a method which needs to be reapplied whenever we succumb to the forms of confusion to which we, as philosophers, are vulnerable.¹

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Der totale Skeptizismus: Eine konsequente Ausweitung des Außenweltskeptizismus

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1. T: Eine einfache Theorie über Zutreffen und Rechtfertigung

Ich werde in der Folge mittels eines skeptischen Arguments zeigen, daß es in der Erkenntnistheorie ein Problem gibt, das darin besteht, daß aus weithin akzeptierten Prämissen eine äußerst problematische Konklusion folgt. Die Prämissen bilden grundlegende Thesen über Rechtfertigung und Zutreffen von Annahmen, die Konklusion bildet ein totaler Skeptizismus. Ob diese Prämissen gültig sind oder nicht, lasse ich hier offen.

Um das Problem zu veranschaulichen, werde ich zunächst von einer einfachen Theorie über Annahmen ausgehen und zeigen, wie aus ihr ein totaler Skeptizismus folgt. Anschließend werde ich skizzieren, inwiefern dieser Skeptizismus auch aus differenzierteren Theorien über Annahmen folgt.

Unter einer Annahme wird hier eine propositionale Glaubenseinstellung verstanden. Annahmen besitzen zwei Facetten, eine subjektive und eine objektive. Wenn eine Person eine Annahme macht, dann hat sie automatisch den Eindruck, die Welt wäre ihrer Annahme entsprechend beschaffen. Diese subjektive oder psychologische Facette von Annahmen betrifft die Person, die die Annahme macht.

Wesentlich für Annahmen ist, daß sie mit der Beschaffenheit der Welt übereinstimmen können oder nicht, d.h., Annahmen können zutreffend oder unzutreffend sein. Ferner besitzen Annahmen auch eine erkenntnistheoretische Facette, d.h., Annahmen können gerechtfertigt oder ungerechtfertigt sein, wobei eine Annahme dann gerechtfertigt ist, wenn bestimmte Umstände dafür sprechen, daß sie zutrifft. Zutreffen und Rechtfertigung bilden die objektive Facette von Annahmen.

Diese beiden Facetten sind voneinander zu unterscheiden. Wenn eine Person eine Annahme macht und den Eindruck hat, daß die Welt dieser Annahme entsprechend beschaffen ist, so folgt daraus weder, daß die Annahme tatsächlich zutrifft, noch, daß sie gerechtfertigt ist.

Die folgende einfache Theorie T besteht aus einigen Grundthesen, die diese fundamentalen Ansichten über die Beschaffenheit von Annahmen widerspiegeln.

1.1. Grundthesen über Zutreffen

Für jede beliebige Annahme A_i einer Person gilt:

T1: A_i trifft genau dann zu, wenn die Welt so beschaffen ist, wie es die angenommene Theorie besagt.

T2: Entweder A_i trifft zu oder A_i trifft nicht zu.

Kommentar:

Das Zutreffen einer Annahme wird als Wahrheit in einem streng korrespondenztheoretischen Sinn verstanden.

1.2. Grundthesen über Rechtfertigung

T3: Eine Annahme ist genau dann gerechtfertigt, wenn etwas in erkenntnistheoretischer Hinsicht dafür spricht, daß diese Annahme zutrifft.

T4: Jede Annahme ist entweder gerechtfertigt oder nicht gerechtfertigt.

Daß eine Annahme nicht gerechtfertigt ist, bedeutet nur, daß nichts epistemisch dafür spricht, daß die Annahme zutrifft, und impliziert nicht die stärkere These, daß etwas dagegen spricht. Diese These ist möglich, aber nicht notwendig.

1.3. Beziehungen zwischen Zutreffen und Rechtfertigung

T beinhaltet auch eine These über die Beziehung zwischen Zutreffen und Rechtfertigung: Daß etwas in erkenntnistheoretischer Hinsicht dafür spricht, daß eine Annahme zutrifft, bedeutet, daß die Annahme unterstützt wird, oder, falls Rechtfertigung meßbar ist, daß es wahrscheinlicher ist, daß eine Annahme zutrifft, als daß ihr Gegenteil zutrifft. Ferner ist es für eine gerechtfertigte Annahme eher möglich, daß sie zutrifft, als für eine nicht gerechtfertigte Annahme. Während es für gerechtfertigte Annahmen möglich, aber unwahrscheinlich ist, daß sie nicht zutreffen, ist es für nicht gerechtfertigte Annahmen, nicht unwahrscheinlich, d.h. leicht möglich, daß sie nicht zutreffen.

Rechtfertigung wird damit möglichst weit gefaßt und umfaßt endgültige Beweise ebenso wie schwache Indizien. Rechtfertigung bedeutet daher nicht Irrtumssicherheit und impliziert nicht Zutreffen. Ferner wird Rechtfertigung in einem realistischen Sinn verstanden, d.h., die Rechtfertigung einer Annahme bezieht sich auf die Beschaffenheit der Welt. Dadurch werden pragmatische Rechtfertigungen ausgeschlossen, z.B. daß eine Annahme gerechtfertigt ist, weil sie besonders einfach oder elegant ist.

2. Konsequenzen aus T

Aus T folgt:

T5: Es gibt für jede Annahme A_i rein kombinatorisch vier mögliche Fälle:

Fall 1: A_i trifft zu und ist gerechtfertigt.

Fall 2: A_i trifft zu und ist nicht gerechtfertigt.

Fall 3: A_i trifft nicht zu und ist gerechtfertigt.

Fall 4: A_i trifft nicht zu und ist nicht gerechtfertigt.

Für jede Annahme A_i trifft genau einer der vier möglichen Fälle zu.

Aus T ergeben sich für diese vier Fälle folgende Konsequenzen: Da offensichtlich keine These von T gegen Fall 1 oder Fall 4 spricht, sind Fall 1 und Fall 4 gemäß T nicht unwahrscheinlich. T stellt fest, daß es unwahrscheinlich ist, daß eine gerechtfertigte Annahme nicht zutrifft, weshalb aus T folgt, daß Fall 3 zwar möglich, aber unwahrscheinlich ist. T berücksichtigt nicht, daß es auch Annahmen geben kann, für die nicht nur nichts spricht, sondern

gegen die auch etwas spricht, d.h. Annahmen, die nicht nur nicht gerechtfertigt, sondern auch ungerechtfertigt sind. Daher spricht auch keine These von T gegen Fall 2, weshalb der Fall 2 gemäß T nicht unwahrscheinlich ist. Aber auch wenn T dahingehend ausdifferenziert wird, daß Fall 2 unwahrscheinlich ist, ergeben sich die nachfolgenden skeptischen Konsequenzen.

2.1. Rechtfertigungstheorien

Um einfacher über Theorien über gerechtfertigte Annahmen und die Annahme dieser Theorien sprechen zu können, werden Rechtfertigungstheorien "RTs" eingeführt.

- T6: Eine Rechtfertigungstheorie RT_{Ai} ist eine Theorie, die von einer Annahme A_i besagt, daß sie gerechtfertigt ist und feststellt, warum sie gerechtfertigt ist.

Beispiel: Die Annahme, daß die Erde kugelförmig ist, ist aufgrund wissenschaftlicher Beobachtungen gerechtfertigt.

Aufgrund dieser Definition besteht eine Rechtfertigungstheorie eigentlich aus drei Theorien, die aus Gründen der Vereinfachung zu einer einzigen Theorie gebündelt werden:

1. einer Theorie, die besagt, daß ein bestimmter Umstand eine Bedingung dafür darstellt, daß A_i gerechtfertigt ist,
2. einer Theorie, die feststellt, daß dieser Umstand besteht, d.h. daß die Bedingung erfüllt ist,
3. einer Theorie, die besagt, daß A_i aufgrund von 1. und 2. gerechtfertigt ist.

RTs können selbst wieder Inhalte von Annahmen sein. Jede Durchschnittsperson, die über ein bestimmtes Reflexionsniveau verfügt, besitzt wohl ein Konzept von Rechtfertigung und nimmt RTs in irgendeiner Form an, sei es implizit oder explizit. Erkenntnistheoretiker z.B. nehmen sie explizit an.

Entscheidend ist, daß die Grundthesen von T allgemeingültig sind, weshalb die Annahmen von RTs ganz gleich zu behandeln sind wie alle anderen Annahmen auch: Wenn eine Person eine RT annimmt, so ist es möglich, daß diese Annahme zutrifft bzw. gerechtfertigt ist, aber es ist auch möglich, daß sie es nicht ist. Wenn wir von einer Annahme annehmen, daß sie aus einem bestimmten Grund gerechtfertigt ist, so ist dies als eine Annahme und nicht automatisch als Tatsache anzusehen.

Da das Zutreffen von RT_{Ai} impliziert, daß A_i gerechtfertigt ist, besteht zwischen der Annahme von A_i und der Annahme von RT_{Ai} folgende Beziehung:

- T7: Wenn RT_{Ai} zutrifft, ist es möglich, aber unwahrscheinlich, daß A_i nicht zutrifft, wenn RT_{Ai} nicht zutrifft, ist es hingegen leicht möglich, daß A_i nicht zutrifft.

Ferner gilt:

- T8: Wenn eine Person P A_i annimmt und RT_{Ai} annimmt, dann gibt es vier mögliche Fälle:

Fall 1: A_i trifft zu und RT_{Ai} trifft zu.

Fall 2: A_i trifft zu und RT_{Ai} trifft nicht zu.

Fall 3: A_i trifft nicht zu und RT_{Ai} trifft zu.

Fall 4: A_i trifft nicht zu und RT_{Ai} trifft nicht zu.

Es trifft genau einer der vier möglichen Fälle zu.

Da es unwahrscheinlich ist, daß gerechtfertigte Annahmen nicht zutreffen, ist Fall 3 möglich, aber unwahrscheinlich. Im Gegensatz dazu ist keiner der übrigen Fälle gemäß T unwahrscheinlich. Daß dies für Fall 1 gilt, bedeutet, daß es möglich ist, daß sowohl die Annahme einer Person als auch die angenommene RT zutreffen. Daß dies auch für Fall 4 gilt, bedeutet, daß es möglich ist, daß die Annahme einer Person nicht zutrifft, weil es möglich ist, daß die Person zwar annimmt, daß diese Annahme aus bestimmten Gründen gerechtfertigt ist, diese angenommene RT aber nicht zutrifft.

3. Anwendung von T auf konkrete Annahmen

Da die Thesen von T allgemeingültig sind, können sie insofern auf jede konkrete Annahme, die eine reale Person macht, angewendet werden, als von diesen Annahmen festgestellt wird, daß die Thesen von T für sie gelten.

Ich werde zunächst illustrieren, inwiefern diese Thesen auf Annahmen über die Außenwelt und Annahmen über Wahrnehmung angewendet werden können. Anschließend werde ich zeigen, warum eine Anwendung für alle Annahmen möglich ist und welche Konsequenzen sich daraus ergeben.

3.1. Anwendung von T auf Annahmen über die Außenwelt und über Wahrnehmungen

Eine Annahme über die Außenwelt ist z.B. meine Annahme, daß sich am Ort X ein Baum befindet. Wohl fast alle Durchschnittspersonen und Philosophen sind der Ansicht, daß Annahmen über die Außenwelt durch entsprechende Wahrnehmungen gerechtfertigt werden. Daher entsprechen A_i und RT_{Ai} ganz alltäglichen Annahmen:

A_i: Eine Theorie über die Außenwelt, z.B.: Am Ort X befindet sich ein Baum.

RT_{Ai}: Feststellung, daß A_i gerechtfertigt ist, weil eine entsprechende Wahrnehmung erfolgt ist.

Die Thesen von T auf derartige A_is und RT_{Ai}s anzuwenden, bedeutet festzustellen, daß es vier mögliche Fälle gibt, wobei der Fall 3 unwahrscheinlich ist, während gemäß T nichts gegen einen der übrigen drei Fälle spricht.

Fall 1: A_i trifft zu und RT_{Ai} trifft zu.

Diesem Fall entspricht der gewöhnliche Umstand einer Rechtfertigung durch funktionierende Wahrnehmung.

Fall 2: A_i trifft zu und RT_{Ai} trifft nicht zu.

Dieser Fall liegt z.B. dann vor, wenn ein Gehirn im Tank zufällig zutreffende Annahmen über seine Außenwelt macht.

Fall 3: A_i trifft nicht zu und RT_{Ai} trifft zu.

In diesem Fall liegt zwar eine Wahrnehmung vor, die eine Annahme über die Außenwelt rechtfertigt, aber diese Annahme ist dennoch nicht zutreffend. Dieser Fall ist möglich, aber unwahrscheinlich, weil Wahrnehmung als Rechtfertigung zwar Zutreffen wahrscheinlich macht, aber nicht garantiert. Situationen, in denen dieser Fall vorliegt, sind Ausnahmefälle im Rahmen einer normalerweise funktionierenden Wahrnehmung, z.B. gelegentliche Fälle von Halluzination.

Fall 4: A_i trifft nicht zu und RTA_i trifft nicht zu.

Dieser Fall ist von philosophischem Interesse, weil er eintritt, wenn das Szenario des Außenweltskeptizismus zutrifft, dem zufolge unsere Wahrnehmungen von einem bösen Dämon oder einem perfiden Wissenschaftler und nicht von der Außenwelt verursacht werden und deshalb in keiner verbindlichen Beziehung zur Außenwelt stehen. Unsere Annahme, daß Annahmen über die Außenwelt durch Wahrnehmung gerechtfertigt werden, trifft in diesen Fällen nicht zu. Dieser Fall ist gemäß T nicht unwahrscheinlich.

Der Außenweltskeptizismus kann damit als eine Anwendung der These, daß es möglich ist, daß die Annahmen einer Person nicht zutreffen, weil die von ihr angenommenen RTs nicht zutreffen, auf unsere Annahmen über die Außenwelt und deren Rechtfertigung durch Wahrnehmung angesehen werden.

4. Die Ausweitung des Skeptizismus: Der totale Skeptizismus

Die Thesen von T anzuwenden bedeutet, von konkreten Annahmen und angenommenen RTs festzustellen, daß es vier mögliche Fälle gibt. Bemerkenswert ist, daß einerseits der Fall möglich ist, daß weder die Annahme noch die angenommene RT zutrifft, und andererseits der Fall möglich ist, daß sowohl die Annahme als auch die angenommene RT zutreffen. Der ersten Möglichkeit entspricht im Fall von Annahmen über die Außenwelt und Annahmen über Wahrnehmung ein Außenweltskeptizismus.

Ein weiteres Anwendungsbeispiel sind Annahmen über mentale Einstellungen. Von ihnen wird oft angenommen, daß sie selbstrechtfertigend oder evident sind, weshalb die angenommene RT besagt, daß diese Annahmen gerechtfertigt sind, ohne daß etwas dafür getan werden muß. Aus T folgt, daß es auch möglich ist, daß Annahmen über mentale Einstellungen nicht zutreffen, wenn die von uns angenommene RT, daß diese Annahmen selbstrechtfertigend sind, nicht zutrifft. Dies mag uns unplausibel erscheinen, ändert aber nichts am Bestehen dieser Möglichkeit.

Da die Thesen von T für alle Annahmen gelten, können sie analog auf alle Annahmen und alle angenommenen RTs angewendet werden. Daher kann von jeder Annahme und jeder angenommenen RT festgestellt werden, daß es vier mögliche Fälle gibt, wobei ein möglicher Fall darin besteht, daß weder die Annahme noch die angenommene RT zutrifft, und ein anderer möglicher Fall darin besteht, daß sowohl die Annahme als auch die angenommene RT zutreffen. Wenn derart T auf alle möglichen Annahmen angewendet wird, ergibt sich ein totaler Skeptizismus, der sich durch folgende Thesen charakterisieren läßt:

- S1: Es ist für jede Annahme jeder Person möglich, daß sie nicht zutrifft.
- S2: Es ist für jede Annahme jeder Person möglich, daß sie zutrifft.

Damit ist es für jede Annahme möglich, daß sie zutrifft, und möglich, daß sie nicht zutrifft.

Da dies auch für jede angenommene RT gilt, folgt:

- S3: Es ist für jede Annahme jeder Person möglich, daß sie gerechtfertigt ist, und möglich, daß sie nicht gerechtfertigt ist.

Es ist dem totalen Skeptizismus zufolge für jede Annahme gleichermaßen möglich, daß sie zutrifft, daß sie nicht zutrifft, daß sie gerechtfertigt ist oder daß sie nicht ge-

rechtfertigt ist. Dies gilt z.B. für jede der folgenden Annahmen:

- Die Erde ist eine Kugel.
- Die Erde ist eine Schreibe.
- Die Relativitätstheorie trifft zu.
- Die Phlogistontheorie trifft zu.
- Ich denke gerade an Wien.
- Ich habe jetzt Schmerzen.

5. Hierarchien von RTs

Es gibt auch RTs für RTs, d.h. RTs höherer Ordnung. Es können induktiv für jede Annahme unendlich viele RTs bzw. unendliche Hierarchien aufeinander bezogener RTs konstruiert werden, wobei eine RT der Stufe $n+1$ von einer RT der Stufe n feststellt, warum sie gerechtfertigt ist.

Personen können grundsätzlich auch RTs höherer Ordnung annehmen. Allerdings ist dazu ein bestimmtes Reflexionsniveau notwendig. Die meisten Personen nehmen zumindest implizit RTs der ersten Stufe an, die Annahme von RTs der zweiten Stufe, z.B. erkenntnistheoretische Rechtfertigungen, warum mittels Wahrnehmung Annahmen über die Außenwelt gerechtfertigt werden, ist schon eher Spezialisten vorbehalten. Annahmen von RTs der dritten Stufe, z.B. metaphilosophische Reflexionen über erkenntnistheoretische Rechtfertigungen, sind schon innerhalb der Philosophie selten. Aber auch wenn Personen aufgrund beschränkter Ressourcen zumindest explizit nur Hierarchien von wenigen RTs annehmen, so ist die Annahme unendlicher Hierarchien theoretisch möglich.

Aus T folgt, daß es für Hierarchien, die bis RT_1 reichen, vier mögliche Fälle gibt, bis RT_2 acht mögliche Fälle, ... für unendliche Hierarchien unendlich viele mögliche Fälle. Entscheidend ist, daß gemäß T für jede Hierarchie der Fall möglich ist, daß A_i nicht zutrifft, weil alle angenommenen RTs unzutreffend sind, wie auch der Fall möglich ist, daß A_i zutrifft und alle angenommenen RTs zutreffen. Dies bedeutet, daß gleichgültig, welche Annahme P macht, wie viele RTs P annimmt und welches Reflexionsniveau P erreicht, es sowohl möglich ist, daß die Annahme nicht zutrifft, als auch möglich ist, daß die Annahme zutrifft, weshalb die Thesen des totalen Skeptizismus auch unter Berücksichtigung beliebig vieler Metaebenen gültig bleiben.

6. Der totale Skeptizismus und andere Formen des Skeptizismus

Eine weitverbreitete Version des Skeptizismus basiert auf einem Regreßargument, demzufolge eine Annahme nur gerechtfertigt sein kann, wenn unendlich viele Annahmen gerechtfertigt werden, was jedoch nicht möglich ist. Dieses Argument basiert auf zwei Prämissen: Erstens muß jede Annahme durch eine andere Annahme gerechtfertigt werden, d.h., es gibt keine evidenten Annahmen, und zweitens können nicht unendlich viele Annahmen gerechtfertigt werden. Der totale Skeptizismus ergibt sich auch dann, wenn es selbstrechtfertigende Annahmen gibt und wenn es möglich ist, unendlich viele Annahmen zu rechtfertigen. Er besagt nicht, daß es prinzipiell unmöglich ist, daß Annahmen gerechtfertigt sind, sondern stellt fest, daß es für jede Annahme möglich ist, daß sie nicht gerechtfertigt ist. Er stellt damit keine vertikale Version bekannter horizontaler Regreßargumente dar.

Häufig argumentieren Skeptiker dafür, daß es möglich ist, daß eine Annahme nicht zutrifft, weil es möglich ist,

daß eine Annahme trotz Rechtfertigung nicht zutrifft. Dieser Skeptizismus entspricht dem Fall 3, der zwar möglich, aber unwahrscheinlich ist. Im Gegensatz dazu basiert der totale Skeptizismus auf der Möglichkeit von Fall 4, d.h. darauf, daß es für jede Annahme möglich ist, daß es nicht unwahrscheinlich ist, daß sie nicht zutrifft.

7. Alternativen zu T

Der totale Skeptizismus folgt aus T, einer sehr einfachen Theorie über Zutreffen und Rechtfertigung. Er folgt jedoch auch aus komplexeren Theorien, z.B. aus einer Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie, die feststellt, daß Annahmen ein exakter Wahrscheinlichkeitswert n zukommt. In diesem Fall besagt RT1, daß A_i mit dem Wert n_1 zutrifft, RT2, daß RT1 mit dem Wert n_2 zutrifft Für jede dieser angenommenen RTs ist es möglich, daß sie nicht zutrifft, was wieder zu dem totalen Skeptizismus führt. Analoges gilt auch für andere Theorien über die strukturellen Beziehungen zwischen Zutreffen und Rechtfertigung, z.B. wenn Rechtfertigung Zutreffen impliziert.

8. Resümee

Der totale Skeptizismus ergibt sich immer dann, wenn man von der These ausgeht, daß es zutreffende und nicht zutreffende bzw. gerechtfertigte und nicht gerechtfertigte Annahmen gibt, und diese These konsequent auf alle Annahmen, insbesondere auf angenommene RTs anwendet. Entscheidend für sein Zustandekommen ist nicht die strukturelle Beziehung zwischen Rechtfertigung und Zutreffen, sondern die konsequente Gleichbehandlung aller Annahmen. Der entscheidende Schritt der Argumentation scheint darin zu bestehen, daß unsere Ansichten über Rechtfertigung als Annahmen begriffen werden, für die dieselben Gesetze gelten wie für andere Annahmen auch, und daß sie nicht automatisch als Tatsachen aufgefaßt werden.

Intrinsic Values and Human Evaluation

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1. The Concept of Intrinsic Value

Some Philosophers attribute an intrinsic value to “equality” or “nature”, but what do they mean by that? Often we are told that an intrinsic value is not an instrumental value. But what is it, then? Means to specific ends are valued instrumentally. If a train of means terminates in an end which is not, in turn, a means for something else, it is said that the train of means terminates in an “end in itself”. Since it is no means to other ends, an end in itself has no instrumental value. Happiness could be an example of such an end, but friendship, love and many other things are also possible ends in themselves. Insofar as intrinsic values are said to be non-instrumental values, we could say that an end in itself is intrinsically valuable. Thus, instead of talking about ends in themselves, one could say that happiness, friendship and love are intrinsic values.

But what do philosophers mean by attributing an intrinsic value to “equality” or “nature”? A common example for a dispute between egalitarians (who claim that equality is an intrinsic value) and anti-egalitarians (who deny that it is) is the distribution of a cake. Anti-egalitarians think that an equal distribution of a cake among a group of persons is only instrumentally valuable, for example as a means to the end of showing respect. Egalitarians ask us to distribute the cake equally even in situations in which equal distribution is no means to any other end. Thus, saying that equality is an intrinsic value is to say that equality is a moral value of its own and that an equal distribution is not merely a means to other ends. The claim that nature has an intrinsic value often hints at the same. It is to say that nature has a moral value of its own and that is not valuable merely as a means to other ends. Trees are good for building houses, but when trees are said to have an intrinsic value, it is implied that we should not value trees solely as a means to our ends. Instead, we should take moral values into consideration.

To say that something has an intrinsic value is to say that it is not merely instrumentally valuable. But why is its value called “intrinsic”? Christine Korsgaard notes that “to say that something is intrinsically good is not by definition to say that it is valued for its own sake: it is to say that it has its goodness in itself” (Korsgaard 1983, 170). Korsgaard states that it is misleading to contrast instrumental with intrinsic values. In her view, a thing that is valued instrumentally should be contrasted with a thing that is valued for its own sake or as an end; it is a distinction between final and instrumental goods. And intrinsically good things should rather be contrasted with things that derive their value from some other source. We should distinguish between intrinsically and extrinsically good things.

As we have seen, the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic values helps to clarify what those who talk about intrinsic values want to say. Nevertheless, we should also ask whether Korsgaard’s “definition” is a good means for clarification as well. Do the ones who use the concept of intrinsic value indicate that something has its goodness in itself? In order to answer this question we need to clarify Korsgaard’s statement. We need to know what it means that something has “its goodness in itself”. With reference to Moore, Korsgaard points out a possible implication:

“Since it is no part of a thing’s intrinsic nature whether anybody likes it or not, intrinsic value is quite independent of people’s desires and interests” (Korsgaard 1983, 175). So we can ask whether the term “intrinsic value” refers to values which do not depend upon desires and interests, or – more generally – which do not depend upon any evaluations.

Let us focus on the alleged intrinsic value of nature again. How is the concept of intrinsic value employed here? In environmental ethics, some authors argue for a value of nature that is independent of human evaluations, whereas others connect the intrinsic value of nature to human evaluations. Paul Taylor (1986) considers both positions. In order to do so, he distinguishes between inherent values¹ and inherent worth. Taylor points out that what he calls inherent value depends upon someone’s evaluations. In contrast to that, he reserves the term “inherent worth” for values that are independent of any evaluations.

Taylor employs the term “inherent value” as follows: sometimes we place an “inherent value” on an object or a place that we believe should be preserved, not because of its usefulness or commercial value, but simply because of its beauty, historical importance or cultural significance.

[W]hatever the basis of the inherent value placed on something may be, whether aesthetical, historical, cultural, or a matter of personal sentiment, wonder, or admiration, the inherent value of anything is relative to and dependent upon someone’s valuing it (Taylor 1986, 73).

Taylor mentions very different values here, but let me for the sake of brevity focus on aesthetic values. If nature is said to be beautiful, we attribute an aesthetic value to nature. Taylor states that the inherent value of something is relative to and dependent upon someone’s valuing it. At first, we could ask whether the beauty of nature is relative to and dependent upon someone’s evaluation. But whether or not the beauty of nature depends upon human evaluations is not what Taylor seems to be concerned with in the first place. He assumes that the beauty of nature may be the “basis” of the inherent value we place on nature. Nevertheless, we do not have to decide whether or not this basis depends upon human evaluations. Taylor simply states that *the inherent value* of nature depends upon human evaluations. But if it does, how can he say that this value is inherent?

The distinction between things that are instrumentally valuable and things that are not only instrumentally valuable could prove to be helpful again. Aesthetic values could be called inherent, since they are not instrumental. This is what Martin Seel (1996, 1997) suggests. Seel claims that the aesthetic value of nature is a not an instrumental value. He thinks that aesthetic contemplation has no instrumental value and that the object of aesthetic contemplation has no instrumental value, either. Seel believes that there is a particular attitude that is distinctive of aesthetic appreciation. This attitude is thought of as one of disinterested contemplation. It is called disinterested,

¹ Taylor’s terminology seems to go back to C. I. Lewis, who introduced the concept of “inherent value”.

because it is not focused on an item's instrumental value. If we look at a tree in a state of aesthetic contemplation, we do not, for example, focus on the diameter of the tree in order to rate its commercial value.² Seel seems to suppose that the inherent value of beautiful nature derives from the intrinsic value of aesthetic contemplation. He thinks that aesthetic contemplation is end in itself. The inherent value of beautiful nature derives its goodness from the contribution to something that is intrinsically valuable (Seel 1997, 318).

But Seel does not answer the question of *how* this value is derived. Maybe we will find an answer to this question if we consider what the alleged inherent value of nature entails. As I mentioned before, when nature is said to have an intrinsic value, this is often a statement about its moral value. It is to say that nature should be preserved regardless of its instrumental value. Seel says the same, even though he is concerned with aesthetic values. He states that it is nature's non-instrumental value that calls for its preservation (Seel 1996, 342). As opposed to other authors in environmental ethics, Seel does not demand the preservation of nature because of a moral obligation towards nature itself, but because of an obligation towards fellow human beings who do or who would contemplate nature. Thus, we could say that nature should be preserved, because it is (intrinsically) valuable for those who contemplate it. In this way it derives its value from the value of aesthetic contemplation. Seel gives further reasons for this claim. He thinks that contemplating nature is part of our good life. If nature is destroyed, it is no longer possible to contemplate nature. We should care for our own good life as well as for the good life of others. Therefore, we should preserve nature.

But if we look at this reasoning, it becomes obvious that it attributes an instrumental value to nature. Seel claims that nature should be preserved, because it is good for aesthetic contemplation, which in turn is supposed to be intrinsically valuable. But then it makes no sense to justify demanding the preservation of nature with its inherent value. In contrast to Taylor's proposal, the beauty of nature is not the basis of an inherent value placed on nature. Instead, the beauty of nature is a basis of an instrumental value placed on nature. If an inherent value is supposed to be a non-instrumental value, the predicate "inherent" turns out to be inappropriate here.

2 Values Without Evaluation

Nevertheless, we should not hesitate to apply the concept of intrinsic value to nature. In applying it, we can appeal to the definition given above and say that the intrinsic value of nature is independent of people's desires and interests. If someone says that nature has an intrinsic value and should thus be preserved, she may demand the following: nature should be preserved regardless of any human interests. For example, she could state that we should also preserve nature in places where hardly anybody travels (some places in the Antarctic, for example) or where nobody ever has the chance to appreciate or contemplate it. In order to reach a decision about what is intrinsically good, Moore advises us to consider what things are such that even if they existed by themselves "in absolute isolation", we should still judge their existence to be good (Moore⁵ 1966, 187).³ If someone demands that penguins

should be preserved, it nowadays could be more than a thought experiment. The question of whether we should preserve penguins in the Antarctic is a question that can really be asked today, and pointing to their intrinsic value is a possible answer. In answering like this, we may say that the intrinsic value does not depend upon any interests. We might even be saying that it does not depend upon any evaluations at all. Even if nobody thought that penguins are valuable, it could still be bad if they died out. Thus, to say that nature has an intrinsic value makes sense if we think that its value is independent of all evaluations.

But isn't it quite mysterious to talk about values that are independent of any evaluations? It would be rightly called mysterious if it was not understandable and if it had nothing to do with the way we talk in ordinary language. But neither is the case, and this becomes clear if we think of love. To love something often leads to judgements about its intrinsic value. In some forms of love, the lover cares selflessly about the object of her love.⁴ When someone loves something, she often thinks that it is intrinsically valuable. Its good is important to her for its own sake, and not because of its instrumental value.

As an example of such a loving person consider someone who loves old trees. If she loves old trees, she would not fell old trees, even if they were of no instrumental value to her. In addition to that, she may hold that nobody else should cut old trees down as well. If someone asks her why he should not fell old trees, she may say that they have an intrinsic value. And she would certainly deny that old trees derive their value from her love. She would claim that even if she did not love old trees and even if nobody else loved them either, they should be preserved because of their intrinsic value. Thus, if someone says that something should be preserved because of its intrinsic value, it is not mysterious to employ the term "intrinsic value" in the sense that intrinsic value is independent of human evaluations.

Maybe it is not reasonable to attribute an intrinsic value to certain things. Thus I simply want to emphasize that it seems to be part of our ordinary language to suppose that some things do not derive their value from our evaluations. It is not mysterious to say that intrinsic values are independent of any evaluations, because we are used to this manner of speaking. Nevertheless, in many cases it may be better to refrain from stating that something has an intrinsic value. If someone loves something and therefore attributes an intrinsic value to it, she may expect others to treat it as she does (preserving nature, for example). In order to formulate that expectation, she could refer to the intrinsic value of the beloved thing. But referring to its intrinsic value in a normative sense needs further reasons, and compulsory reasons for this may not be at hand. There may be means to awake in others love for something that we love or means by which we can deepen the love they feel towards it. But pointing at its intrinsic value is not sufficient and maybe even counterproductive for awakening in others the love for the beloved thing. So, in many cases, it would be better to refrain from referring to the alleged intrinsic value of the things we love.

² It is hard to see what we focus on instead. But I do not want to question or criticize the concept of aesthetic contemplation here, as I have done elsewhere (see Meyer 2003).

³ For an analysis of Moore's concept of intrinsic values see Darwall 2003.

⁴ Frankfurt calls this "active love". See Frankfurt 1999, 135.

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Nonsense, Grammar, and the Phenomenology of Acknowledgement: Wittgenstein on Moore

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Recent debate among Wittgenstein interpreters has raised a fundamental body of questions concerning the place of nonsense and of grammar within his later philosophical writings. According to a 'therapeutic' reading of Wittgenstein currently in ascendancy, nonsensicality is a failure "to make any claim at all" (Crary 2000, 6), a failure to say anything, which occurs at crucial moments in the course of philosophical dispute, a failure we learn to acknowledge and accept by following Wittgenstein's investigations. This reading, propounded by among others James Conant, has construed the thrust of some of Wittgenstein's most familiar philosophical encounters as performing a therapeutic service of exposing the philosophical nonsense that appears in the course of philosophical arguments, such as that between G. E. Moore and his skeptical opponent. If we are to believe the therapeutic reading, Wittgenstein approaches Moore's examination of philosophical skepticism with an eye to identifying the moments at which Moore's account lapses into nonsense. As the text of *On Certainty* reveals, Wittgenstein does accuse Moore of nonsensicality in some of the early portions of his discussion, though he reaches dramatically different conclusions later in the manuscript, ones claiming to have found a way for Moore to be making sense in his response to the skeptic. The contrast between Wittgenstein's references to philosophical nonsense and his subsequent attention to Moore's distinctive acknowledgement of the grammar may provide grounds for a critique of the therapeutic reading, a critique this paper examines in an initial formulation. Moore's acknowledging of grammar, though a phenomenologically complex part of his engagement with epistemology, is not ultimately nonsensical, on Wittgenstein's account.

According to the therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein, philosophical nonsense is a trait of many philosophical remarks that "do not say anything" and "do not make any claim at all" (Crary 2000, 6-7), a trait that has gone largely unnoticed in philosophy prior to Wittgenstein's investigative work. While the therapeutic reading has begun to enjoy a wider acceptance in the literature, and has stimulated a growing number of supporting exegetical accounts, this reading has been advocated perhaps most emphatically in James Conant's work on Wittgenstein. For Conant, the target of therapy is not simply a sentence such as 'I know this is a hand' considered in general throughout all of its occasions of use. The charge of 'nonsense' engages a more restricted target, on this reading, connected to the uses of a sentence within philosophical discussion. For Conant, Wittgenstein's attack is launched against nonsense sentences as they present themselves in the circumstances of philosophical argumentation.

His point is rather that it is not clear what Moore and the skeptic are doing with their words—i.e. what the context of use is supposed to be—and hence what it is that they are saying....The charge is directed here not against the sentence 'I know that that's a tree', but against a failure on the part of a speaker to provide the sentence with something to do on an occasion of speaking (Conant 1998, 242).

It is *philosophical* nonsense that Wittgenstein exposes; one sentence may appear in a variety of contexts of use, some of which enable it to make a claim, some of which leave its sense 'unclear'. As Conant sees the use of 'nonsense' in Wittgenstein's philosophy, Wittgenstein does not commit himself to the view that nonsensicality follows sentences as it were into every context of their attempted employment. For Conant, the contention of Wittgenstein's therapeutic project is rather that 'I know this is a hand', if nonsense, is nonsense at least in contexts of philosophical discussion in which we might find it to appear. Conant's version of the therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein therefore contends that if 'I know this is a hand' is nonsense for Wittgenstein, then it fails to have any sense and fails to say anything at all in at least the philosophical contexts of its use; and it is the philosophical occasions of its attempted use that exercise Wittgenstein's bent for therapy throughout the corpus of his work.

'I know this is a hand' appears to resist a therapeutic reading, however, as Wittgenstein's treatment in *On Certainty* of the broader theme of acknowledgement and our understanding of language may begin to indicate. One of the challenges Wittgenstein undertakes in his engagement with Moore's epistemological project is that of assessing, minimally, whether Moore has understood the sentences which figure centrally in its articulation. A failure to have understood one's own utterances is a hazard that can arise during the course of philosophical work such as that which Moore undertakes. Such a lack of understanding threatens the speaker of these utterances for Wittgenstein in a quite particular way.

That I am a man and not a woman can be verified (*verifiziert*), but if I were to say I was a woman, and then tried to explain the error by saying I hadn't checked the statement, the explanation would not be accepted.

The *truth* of my statements is the test of my *understanding* of these statements.

That is to say: if I make certain false statements, it becomes uncertain whether I understand them. (OC 79-81)

Here Wittgenstein expresses the position, characteristic of his later work, that some of the utterances a speaker produces may indicate a failure by this speaker to understand those utterances themselves. Since a critical remark on which Moore's discussion of epistemology turns is in the course of his argument the contention, either sensible or not, that 'I know this is a hand', Wittgenstein's worry in this case surrounds the extent to which a remark such as 'this is a hand' opens itself to the possibility of being false, and whether the talk of knowledge in such an example serves precisely to raise this possibility of error, in keeping with the character of knowledge as it is often understood in contexts of inquiry and justification. If Moore had simply not *understood* 'this is a hand', then Wittgenstein's analysis of the epistemology of Moore would come in this text to an end on the issue of his understanding of his own philosophical remarks.

Wittgenstein's discussion of Moore, however, leads him to identify an alternative conception of his talk of 'know-

edge' according to which Moore's remarks instead have a sense, that of signaling his understanding of our language. The discussion of *On Certainty* reveals that, to Wittgenstein's ear, when Moore declares 'I know this is a hand' he indicates that he understands the language sufficiently to make a range of further and distinct claims involving this expression.

Doesn't "I know that that's a hand", in Moore's sense (*Sinn*), mean (*heißt*) the same, or more or less the same, as: I can make statements like "I have a pain in this hand" or "this hand is weaker than the other" or "I once broke this hand", and countless others, in language-games where a doubt as to the existence of this hand does not come in? (OC 371)

While 'I know this is a hand' does not answer skeptical doubts in the way Moore may have supposed, this sentence does still carry a sense, and does say something, in particular about Moore's competence in a range of contexts to make statements, whether they themselves are correct or not. 'I know this is a hand', as it is used by Moore in his epistemology, speaks to Moore's understanding of the word 'hand', an understanding without which his remarks involving this term might no longer count as moves in the language games within which they may be entered. Wittgenstein considers that the expression 'I know' may serve this distinctive role more generally in our characterization of our own understanding of language; this is a role that it may occupy in a variety of the contexts in which our understanding of language can come into question.

Now might not "I know, I am not just surmising, that here is my hand" be conceived as a proposition of grammar? Hence not temporally.—

But in that case isn't it like this one: "I know, I am not just surmising, that I am seeing red"?

And isn't the consequence "So there are physical objects" like: "So there are colors"? (OC 57)

To treat 'I know this is a hand' as one of what Wittgenstein calls our grammatical propositions involves considering its context of utterance as one in which a speaker's understanding of our language can be questioned. As this passage indicates, Wittgenstein wishes at least to consider the issue of whether our understanding of language can come into question in connection with a wide array of contexts, such as in our discourse concerning either color or the physical world. In neither case, Wittgenstein suggests, do our grammatical remarks entitle us to infer the truth of the philosophical conclusions we might have wished, for in neither case do these propositions of grammar imply that we have grounds to believe as we do. Rather than implying problematically that there are physical objects, 'I know this is a hand' when used as a grammatical proposition indicates that its speaker understands the language it involves. On this point, Conant's critics have mistaken the denial of grammatical propositions for nonsense (Hacker 2003, 12-13), complicating their work by allowing sense and nonsense to stand in logical relation to one another, which *nonsense* cannot do: rather, a speaker's denial of our grammar may signal *non-understanding*. Wittgenstein's point here then is, again, that there may be cases in which questions of our knowledge do not arise in a way that calls for grounds and justification. 'I know this is a hand' may occur in contexts in which we would be wrong to think of this sentence as entangled with justifications. Rather than committing their speakers to the provision of grounds, Wittgenstein considers that there may be something else for such sentences to do.

Anyone who is unable to imagine a case in which one might say "I know that this is my hand" (and such cases are certainly rare) might say that these words were nonsense (*Unsinn*). He might of course also say "Of course I know, how could I not know?"—but then he would perhaps be taking the sentence "this is my hand" as an explanation (*Erklärung*) of the words "my hand". (OC 412)

In this passage, Wittgenstein openly shirks the option of counting 'I know this is a hand' as a piece of nonsense, in favor of considering what it might in fact say when put to use. The therapeutic view, and Conant in particular, appear to have been abandoned in this case, through Wittgenstein's discarding the nonsense response to Moore.

In closing, the therapeutic reading of the work of later Wittgenstein that has come into ascendancy over the past decade has done so to a mixed effect. This reading holds that Wittgenstein works to expose philosophical nonsense where it occurs, revealing it not to say anything, to make no claim at all (Crary 2000, 6). Conant sees this work as therapeutic due to its emphasis on "the task of eliciting such acknowledgement" (McCarthy 61) of philosophical nonsense from the speakers who generate it, as Wittgenstein distinctively conceives of this acknowledgement in his later writing. If this reading were correct, we might have expected Wittgenstein to point out with a greater degree of consistency the failure of sense that accompanies an expression such as 'I know this is a hand' into the philosophical contexts of utterance in which it may appear. Wittgenstein's actual treatment of this case, however, pursues different avenues of inquiry than the therapeutic reading anticipates, crediting Moore with a form of acknowledgement of the grammar during the course of his argument with skepticism. "Knowledge is in the end based on acknowledgement" (OC 378), as Wittgenstein sees it, and it is in these acknowledgements prior to and apart from the work of justification that our grammar is laid bare to us. Wittgenstein, however, does introduce into his account a further complication, concerning Moore's own relation to these grammatical acknowledgements, a relation that opens a question of whether the phenomenology of acknowledgement follows the same pattern for both Wittgenstein and Moore. What for Wittgenstein is a grammatical remark appears, for Moore, to be a matter more closely akin to the accurate and truthful avowal of a subjective certainty. The correctness of Moore's self-description of his certain beliefs, I would suggest, provides Wittgenstein with a basis for assigning to Moore an understanding of his own anti-skeptical remarks; however, Moore's status, in issuing these proto-grammatical remarks, does appear to operate apart from Moore's own recognition of the ultimate standing of his remarks as acknowledgements. Moore's remarks may aid the sketch of a developing picture of the fluid and evolving "river-bed of thoughts" (OC 97), a picture whose outlines Moore himself has not overtly claimed to trace. This special breed of grammatical acknowledgements therefore occupies a more complex location in our language than might first appear. By moving past the therapeutic reading, Wittgenstein interpretation may begin to consider *how* these propositions of grammar, far from withering into nonsensicality, instead continue to engage with our affirmation and denial, and continue to enable us to speak of our relation to our language as Moore and Wittgenstein appear distinctly to have done.

To conclude, the therapeutic reading does not appear to survive examination in the case of Moore's argument with skepticism. Wittgenstein denies the nonsensicality of Moore's remarks, affirming instead their acknowledgement

of a grammar that the skeptic may seek to avoid. Indeed it might seem a confusion to suggest that we in Wittgenstein's sense *acknowledge* 'I know this is a hand' as *nonsense*, unless its nonsensicality is somehow to be supposed as *open to no doubt*, as somehow prior to argument and debate, but this is precisely Conant's suggestion. The charge of 'nonsense' rather appears textually in contexts in which, as this case may help to reveal, Wittgenstein begins to search for the sense, to embark on a philosophical investigation, whose outcome leaves these initial attitudes very *much* in doubt.

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Husserl and Russell, 1911–1913

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0. Preliminary: Why Husserl and Russell from 1911–1913?

Phenomenology is usually defined as a theory of intentionality, and Husserl is considered a theorist of meaning. This explains why, when he is compared with analytic philosophers at all, this is done with respect to Frege. In particular, a parallel is drawn between Frege's distinction between sense and meaning and Husserl's distinction between *noema* and object. There is a long tradition of such studies, started by Dagfinn Føllesdal in 1969 and continued by J. N. Mohanty, Michael Dummett and Claire Ortiz Hill. The problem with this approach is that "Husserl repeatedly states loud and clear that what he is trying to do is to find the basis of our conceptual world in *immediate experience*" (Hintikka 1995, 82), whereas Frege is anything but a philosopher of immediate experience. That was what the Cambridge philosophers Moore and especially Russell were.

This explains why I am going to examine here the relatedness between Husserl and Russell. Without any doubt, the two philosophers have much in common. Indeed, what both Husserl and Russell "were in the first place trying to do was to see what the cash value of the abstract theories of physics and mathematics was in terms of what is actually given to us." (ibid., 95)

Russell's philosophy, however, is so many-faceted that we must first specify which Russell we are going to compare to Husserl here. It is, above all, not the Russell of *The Principles of Mathematics* (1903), in which he was much influenced by Peano and Frege. In this connection it might be useful to recall that Russell's philosophy became roughly Fregean only after August 1900, when he developed his Theory of Denoting. Until then, in his first drafts of the *Principles*, Russell, not unlike his friend Moore, was a strict mereologist. With the introduction of his Theory of Descriptions in 1905, however, Russell made a step towards restoring his old mereologism. (See Milkov 2003, 84f.) His new philosophical programme was best elaborated (in many cases, together with Wittgenstein) in 1911–3, and was also articulated in *Our Knowledge* (1914) and in various papers later published in *Mysticism and Logic* (1918). Unfortunately, the few attempts to compare Russell's philosophy with that of Husserl (Hill 1991) discuss the Russell of 1903–5, but not of 1911–13, or of 1899–August 1900.

By the same token, the years 1911–13 were decisive for the development of Husserl's phenomenology. In *Philosophy as a Strict Science* (1911) and in *Ideas I* (1913) he developed in full the conception of eidetic reduction and introduced the concept of *noema*.

In what follows, I shall demonstrate striking similarities between the conceptions of the two philosophers in these years. These have been divided into five sections.

1. Essences (Phenomena) / Logical Forms

(a) *Russell*. In 1911–13 Russell believed that philosophy investigates logical forms of facts and propositions – it is not interested in the logical form of language alone. The task of philosophy is to discover and *describe* the logical

form of space and time, of perception, of judgment. (Russell 1918, 85) Similarly, according to Husserl of this period, the task of philosophy is to describe phenomena, or essences. We can call the analysis of phenomena/essences eidetic intuition (*Wesensschau*).

Russell claimed further that the contemplation of the logical forms is a "direct vision of [an] abstract truth upon which the possibility of philosophical knowledge depends" (Russell 1914, 243). This is a "direct philosophical vision" of very abstract truths (ibid., 245). In *Analysis of Mind* Russell speaks of a "direct contemplation of facts" which discards language (Russell 1921, 212).

Two points are of special interest here: (i) It was precisely in connection with his theory of forms that Russell developed the conception that philosophy is nothing but *logical analysis*: we can discover logical forms only in a process of logical analysis. (ii) It was the theory of forms that called into being Russell's programme for piecemeal philosophy which was called *analytic*: "By concentrating attention upon the investigation of logical forms, it becomes possible at last for philosophy to deal with its problems piecemeal, and to obtain, as the sciences do, such partial and probably not wholly correct results as subsequent investigation can utilize even while it supplements and improves them." (Russell 1918, 85)

(b) *Husserl*. In his *Philosophy as a Strict Science* (1911) Husserl declared himself against both naturalism and relativism. On this point he was of one accord with Russell in the period from 1911–13 (and Wittgenstein from his "Notes on Logic", 1913). That Russell, the author of the manifesto "On Scientific Method in Philosophy", was against relativism, goes without saying. But he was also against naturalism: philosophy must be a discipline which lies beyond the natural sciences. (Russell 1914, 240). In a like manner, Husserl claimed that we must not discuss consciousness in terms of physics – we must not "*bething*" (*verdinglichen*) it.

Similarly to Russell's logical forms which, according to him, do not lie in Euclidean but in logical space, Husserl's essences, or phenomena, have no substantial unity, no real properties, not real parts, no causality, and experience no changes. (Husserl 1911, § 49) In this realm, there is no difference between appearance and reality. "A thing is what it is and remains identical for ever."

2. Eidetic Reduction / Logical Analysis

Parallel to Russell's notion of logical analysis mentioned above, in *Ideen I* Husserl developed the method of eidetic reduction. Eidetic reduction moves from concrete phenomena to eidetic abstraction. It is achieved in a process of "bracketing" or "suspending" the natural attitude.

The same applies to Russell's method of analysis. It starts from concrete, complex and vague data. In the process of analysis, these data are seen to be "growing at each stage more abstract, more refined, more difficult to apprehend" (Russell 1914, 245, 190), until we discover the logical form. (Incidentally, in *Philosophy as a Strict Science* Husserl often spoke of an *analysis of essences*, made by

the “phenomenological analyst”, instead of eidetic reduction.)

Husserl claimed that in order to reach phenomena, we make thought experiments in a process called *imaginative variation*. We try to imagine, for example, a thought without language, and we find out that this is impossible. In this way we examine and correct our eidetic intuition by confronting its results with reality. (see § 5)

In similar vein, Russell used thought experiments, examining with their help the strength of philosophical theories, deliberately confronting them with philosophical puzzles and paradoxes. (see Ryle 1979, 16–17) The objective was to see whether the suggested theories discovered true philosophical forms or not.

3. Examined Philosophy

Robert Sokolowski defines phenomenology as “reason’s self-discovery in the presence of intelligible objects” (Sokolowski 2000, 4); it criticizes the naivety of the pre-reflexive thinking. In this sense the phenomenological attitude is different from the natural attitude.

This definition strongly recalls Russell’s rendition of the new – analytic – philosophy as producing theses and theories which bear examination through counter-arguments. Analytic philosophy is philosophy which has been examined by reason. It is a philosophy which uses “the harmonizing meditation of reason, which tests our beliefs by their mutual compatibility, and examines, in doubtful cases, the possible sources of error on the one side and on the other.” (Russell 1918, 17) This is a procedure of “scientific restraint and balance” (*ibid.*, 20).

My point here is that the objective of this “harmonizing mediation of reason” is to eliminate the confusion of the (Husserl’s) “natural attitude”. It can do this in two alternative ways. (1) Following some a priori logical form / essences: this was the way of Husserl and Russell from 1911–13. (2) As a result of the work of something akin to “Occam’s razor”. This second point was quite clearly articulated by Gilbert Ryle, who emphasized that conceptual analyses which make up the method of the Oxford analytic philosophy are something like a phenomenology without Husserlian essences (see Ryle 1958): and – I should like to add – like Russell’s analytic philosophy without his theory of forms.

4. Taxonomy of Mental Acts

This is the only point at which we can track down Husserl’s, albeit indirect, influence on Russell.

When talking about the history of analytic philosophy, Moore’s lectures *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*, initially delivered in 1910/11, are often neglected. This is a pity. In fact, they deeply influenced the epistemological scheme which Russell advanced in *The Problems of Philosophy* (1912), *Theory of Knowledge* (1913), *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914) and “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” (1917/18). This fact is interesting for our study since Moore’s lectures, in their turn, were arguably influenced by Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* – through a book of August Messer’s, *Empfindung und Denken* (1908), which Moore reviewed for *Mind* in 1910, and which was nothing but a summary of Husserl’s book. (see Milkov 2004) In particular, Moore admired Husserl–Messer’s “attempt to classify all the kinds of elements which may occur as constituents of mental

phenomena” (Moore 1910, 395). Moreover, Moore followed Husserl in accepting that there are a variety of mental acts – supposing, judging, fearing, hoping, desiring, liking, disliking – which, in turn, are subdivisions of three great classes: cognitive acts, emotional acts, and acts of will. In *Theory of Knowledge* (1913) Russell, for his part, claimed that there are different mental acts – judging, feeling, willing and desiring. Mental acts of diverse types are cases of different cognitive relations, every one of which has its own logical form. (Russell 1984, 125 ff.)

5. Aspects and Profiles

We can make a phenomenological analysis of the immediate experience of the absolutely given by using the example of the perception of a cube. When we see a cube what is given is an aspect of the cube in which the presently visible sides are surrounded by a halo of potentially visible but actually absent sides. The other sides are also given, but as absent. Perception, therefore, involves layers of presentation, both actual and potential.

So, we perceive (1) the six sides of the cube. (2) Every one of these sides can be given in different ways. In this way we see different *aspects* of the cube. The aspects are objective. (3) One and the same aspect can be seen in different profiles (*Abschattungen*), or sketches. A profile is temporally individuated – a momentary presentation of the object. It is private.

In *Our Knowledge* Russell advances a theory of perception of the given that strongly recalls that of Husserl. According to the latter, the world is full of infinitely many perspectives / aspects. Perspectives are objective. They are mutually related. Perspectives can be perceived, or they can remain unperceived. The perceived perspectives are private.

A common-sense object, at this moment, is a system of aspects. This means that the aspects are real, whereas the thing itself can be seen as either a logical construction from the aspects, or as an entity inferred from them. So every aspect of a thing is a member of two different classes of aspects: (1) The various aspects of the *thing*; (2) The perspective of which the given *aspect* is a member. The physicist classifies aspects in the first way, the psychologist in the second.

In his *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein elaborated this theory further. According to him now, not only facts and propositions have forms; objects have forms too. More precisely, objects are concatenations of forms. However, at any specific moment, only one of the object’s forms occurs in the actual state of affairs. This means that we can never know the object as a whole but only a part of it (only one of its aspects, if we want to speak with Husserl and Russell). Different combinations of the object’s forms constitute different states of affairs. This means that the forms (aspects) of objects are nothing but possibilities of object’s occurring in states of affairs. We can paraphrase Husserl’s claim that we perceive ordinary things as one aspect of them, surrounded by a halo of their potentially visible aspects, in a Tractarian idiom by saying that we see the object in one its forms but we know that it is a concatenation of forms.

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Intentionality and (Un)Consciousness: Freud's Debt to Brentano

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Intentionality is a concept which was introduced into philosophy by Franz Brentano. In Brentano's conception there is no psychological phenomenon without intentionality. Therefore, intentionality is highlighted as an essential property of human life; it is the property that establishes our relationship with the world.

From the perspective of a philosophy of language (Searle 1982), a causal intentionality is imperative for comprehending human actions. However, Searle postulates that not all mental states would accomplish intentionality as a logical necessity. As examples, he mentions some forms of anxiety, excitement, nervous tension and panic, given that there is no answer to the question: *Why are you so anxious, excited, nervous, and frightened?*

This is precisely the unanswered question that is very often brought to psychoanalytical clinical situations. If observable facts are confronted in the context of psychoanalytic treatment, it is possible to arrive at an interpretation that differs from that of Searle. So, if intentionality is missing in the context of consciousness, psychoanalytical work can restore it in the context of unconsciousness. But it must be admitted that Searle's study is restricted to an analysis of the intentionality of ordinary situations of everyday life, and for this reason, we cannot expect any concern about the phenomena observed in the framework of psychoanalytic interest. In addition, Searle has already declared himself to be unaware of the application of his theory to such a context (John Searle, personal communication, February/2000).

Basing himself on many observable facts, in the *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, Freud (1901) describes actions in which the aims explicitly intended could not be accomplished and were substituted by others that had not been intended and were even rejected most of the time. In these cases, Freud hypothesizes the presence of an unconscious intentionality which is realizing a desire supposedly repressed or denied.

In everyday situations, where a person finds himself dislodged from a position of control over what he does or says, something paradoxical happens. In a speech-mistake event (*Fehlleistung*) the representation of the act, the reasons for executing it, the evaluation of its possible consequences and its intentionality are all missing, as well as the decision to act or not to act. Only after reflection can these elements be understood as governed by an unconscious intention, a wish struggling for a specific defined end.

Although the term "intention", associated with a conscious or unconscious qualification, appeared numerous times throughout Freud's work, the same does not hold for the term "intentionality". The latter term appeared on only two occasions (Freud 1901 and 1922). In these two passages, it can be observed that the term "intentionality" is not used in the sense in which it is normally used in philosophy, where it can be replaced by the term "intention" without leading to any misunderstanding.

According to Searle (1982), having an intention is only one variety of intentionality among several others. In this

sense, the concept of intention would be contained within that of intentionality. In his view, intention is directly related to the context of action. In addition, it becomes impossible to give meaning to an action unless intentionality is attributed to it. In view of the fact that speech acts are a type of human action, Wittgenstein, in his *Philosophical Investigations* (1953/1999), emphasizes that if we exclude intention from language, then its entire function collapses. In this sense, the intrinsic intentionality of the speaker is transferred to the words he uses, the phrases he constructs and in general to all the language games he plays.

Thus, in the accomplishment of a speech act, the speaker necessarily expresses a corresponding intention associated to what is said. In this sense, the liar just as much as the person who tells the truth maintain their commitment to telling the truth. What is evident here is the notion of an internal link involving the speech act and its intentionality. Consequently, intention is an essential element of the accomplishment of speech acts. Wittgenstein detects this condition in a precise statement that states that intention is the spirit of words (1953/1999). In this way, the link between the speech act and intentionality allows us to infer the intentionality by answering this question: What is the speaker trying to do?

Thus, the theory of action affirms the notion of the existence of an individual who exercises dominion over his actions, by means of desire and rational control. In this perspective, rationality and consciousness occupy a referentially privileged place in human action and intentionality. But, what can be said about the following declaration of the President of the House of Deputies as he is about to open the work session: *Honored Sirs! I announce the presence of so many gentlemen, and therefore declare the session "closed"?* (Freud 1901, pp.64-65).

There is no doubt that in this case the President tried to fulfill his duties and declare the session open. What could a theory of action say about this speech-mistake (considering its internal criteria of analysis)? Is it enough to consider: the Parliamentary President, in performing the procedure and pronouncing the statement, would have had an awareness of his thoughts or feelings? Does his act reflect his conscious intentionality?

It is said that the ensuing general merriment first attracted his attention, leading him to correct his mistake. This demonstrates that the president did not himself become aware of the speech-mistake. From the President's point of view, he had actually performed his intentionality and Freud would say that he had accomplished it absolutely. We should not hesitate to simply admit that he uttered those words with unconscious intention. The behavior of the speaker in this case certainly speaks against conscious intentionality, and thus excludes it.

Phenomena like this exceed the role of consciousness in the accomplishment of intentionality and should help us contemplate the boundaries of an understanding of intentionality and consciousness. Thus, if it is desirable to stay on the right track, we must, like Freud, adhere completely to Brentano's assertion that there is no psy-

chological phenomenon without intentionality, even if it is unconscious.

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Is Conceptual Analysis A Posteriori?

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I) Henderson and Horgan: abductive aposteriority

Analysis of our concepts points to important a posteriori elements in our conceptual beliefs and knowledge. Philosophical armchair thinking in particular, together with its products, philosophical analyses, is not free of a significant dose of aposteriority, which makes for a certain continuity between philosophy and most general issues in science. This is the general view I endorse. I shall not directly argue for the view, but rather discuss one prominent version of it, sometimes called “post-analytical metaphilosophy” proposed by Terry Horgan and his two collaborators, first Graham (Horgan and Graham 1991 and Graham and Horgan 1994), and most recently J. Henderson (Henderson and Horgan 2000, 2001, MS). After raising a problem for Henderson and Horgan’s recent version of the proposal (2001), and (MS), I will conclude by briefly sketching my own rather programmatic alternative.¹

The prime explanandum of the account are philosophical intuitions, and the agreed framework of the discussion is roughly the following. Philosophical questions figuring particular examples elicit particular philosophical intuitions-judgments. When for instance Berkeley challenges us in Principles, section Ten, to conceive of a body having only primary but no secondary qualities, we are supposed first to imagine or think of some such particular bodies, second, notice that we cannot do this, and somehow conclude that no such body is conceivable. Linking impossibility to inconceivability Berkeley then famously suggests that separate instantiation of primary qualities without secondary qualities is impossible. Similarly, in the Ship of Theseus thought experiment, we imagine the narrative of ship A with parts being replaced, the resulting ship B, still traveling, and the emergence of a ship C built on discarded original parts of A. Is A identical to B or C, we are asked. Next, we opt for one of them, say B, expressing the intuition that B is identical to A. Most people need not another analogous story, say of a knife, to conclude that the morals are generalisable. They somehow arrive at the general conclusion that continuity makes for identity through time. Similarly, in the Twin Earth thought experiment one first judges that XWZ is not water, and then generalizes to the view that composition is essential for stuffs. In short, one can distinguish the following steps in conceptual analysis:

First stage:

1. A particularized philosophical challenge to conceive of a state of affairs involving some property P.
2. Thought experiment implementing a P-involving particular scenario.
3. Intuition-judgment concerning P in the particularized setting.

Second stage:

4. Passage to generalization.
5. General intuition-judgment concerning P.

Horgan with his co-author Henderson (and in earlier papers Graham) goes along with the analytic tradition and

assumes that the procedure concerns the concept of P, C(P) for short (in our examples, concepts STUFF, COLOR, SHAPE, PRIMARY QUALITY, SECONDARY QUALITY, IDENTITY). He also accepts without ado a very important assumption: whatever the nature of C(P), propositions that analyze it and offer a meaning of “P” are analytic and a priori knowable. However, he is aposteriorist, i.e. considers analysis of concepts (“ideology”) to be “low grade a priori”, i.e. to a large extent a posteriori. Now where does aposteriority come from? Not from the empirical origin of C(P), since analytic judgments are a priori no matter where the concept derives from. “Second-stage processes take their start from input that are commonly a priori. Perhaps, all the agent’s judgments are deliverances of conceptual competence – but, from the epistemic point of view of one who is about to engage in reflection on them, that is yet to be determined. Accordingly, these judgments must be taken up in further reflection as *largely, and thus presumptively, a priori*.” (Henderson and Horgan, MS, 16, similar formulation in 2001, 232.) Horgan focuses upon step 4, generalization.

In the view of Horgan and his co-authors, the generalizing step, our 4, has a very complex structure. It starts from a worry about possible errors at first stage.

Commonly, there are performance errors of various kinds to be found in the first stage. Thus, it is widely recognized that, as one settles on a satisfactory general philosophical result, some of the “data points” generated in the first stage will ultimately need to be explained as erroneous. The data set for subsequent reflection is thus impure – and accordingly must be taken up as only presumptively, only defeasibly, a priori. This point about the common input to the second stage of reflection crucially affects the epistemic character of that reflection – it bestows on it an ineliminable empirical dimension. (Ibid)

The first sub-step in 4 thus “must take as a part of its project the determination of the character of the individual judgments.” The second sub-step is an attempt to weed out those judgments that are not products of competence, but performance errors. Its methodology is *inference to the best explanation*.

Such inference cannot be understood simply as an a priori move to a generalization that accounts for a pure set of high-grade a priori judgments by subsuming them under an embracing generalization. The inference cannot be understood as a kind of pure a priori codification of a pure set of high-grade a priori “data points.” For, since the inputs are not pure, the best explanation for the set of them will explain some of them as performance errors of various kinds. The empirical dimension to the investigation should then be obvious. (Ibid)

In view of Henderson and Horgan philosophical reflection must be sensitive to the issues of error, that are essentially at the level of psychology.² They speak of the impure character of the judgments on which reflection draws, and

¹ I wish to thank Terry Horgan for his unwavering help over long years, and for inspiration to discuss the a posteriori character of philosophical beliefs.

² “The best explanation of judgments pertaining to various concrete scenarios (e.g., Twin Earth scenarios, brain-in-vat scenarios, ‘Gettier cases,’ etc.) will ultimately involve empirical hypotheses about the workings and character of human semantic/conceptual competence and at the same time uncover certain conceptually grounded necessary truths.”(Ibid)

place aposteriority at that level. To summarize, we might distinguish the following:

- 4a) Raising the issue of which particular intuitions are genuine (competence product).
- 4b) Abduction or inference to the best explanation, concerning the origin of each particular intuition.
- 4c) Setting apart the dubious intuitions, that might represent competence errors.
- 4d) Generalizing from the rest, the supposedly genuine deliverances of competence.

In Horgan's view it is the inference to the best explanation that is the only source of aposteriority.

This abductive view of aposteriority is original and challenging. Unfortunately, it appears to have some serious shortcomings. The phenomenology of philosophical thought experiments seems to speak against it. Point number one. Take the three examples cited. In my own experience as well as in experience with students, *there were no immediate problematic particular intuitions elicited*. Everybody concerned just jumped from particular to general conclusion (from 3 to 5) without proposing counterexamples. People who had the recalcitrant intuition that XWZ would be water, had analogous intuitions for other stuffs. It is not only my own experience. Traditionally, the generalizing step in armchair thinking has been described as a "jump", from old Johnston's Logic to Ross and Chisholm and to contemporary authors like J.R. Brown. For the "jumpers" who have reached the intended conclusion, counterexamples come late, and with considerable effort. In short, *in many, and probably in paradigmatic cases, the whole ordeal of 4a – 4d just does not take place*. By Henderson and Horgan's standards, in all these cases the resulting insights are all *high grade a priori*.

Our point number two concerning phenomenology has to do with exceptional cases in which the thinker does generate some counterexamples to her favored intuition-type (say, Marsha judges that XWZ is not water, XUY is not gold, but XWZ cooked with Earl Grey tea leaves is tea nevertheless). The usual procedure in these cases is *content focused and content guided*, not directed towards psychological explanations. The thinker from our example, Marsha, need not ask questions like "What happens to me that I have this strange intuition about tea?". She can rely on coherence of intuitions, and offer a content-related explanation: "Oh, I guess, by tea I mean a certain kind of drink, not just kind of stuff. Any warm drink produced only from a water-like substance with help of Earl Grey just is a tea." No psychological abduction is needed. Again, the result is high-grade a priori by Henderson and Horgan's standards.

Finally, psychological abduction in hunting mistakes and accounting for them is not usually taken to preclude a priori, nor to lower its status. First the hunting. John the mathematician has been working on a very long proof, one evening even after having ingested quite a lot of whiskey. Next day he wants quickly to check his work, and decides to concentrate upon the part written in the evening, since he suspects that he has probably made most of mistakes when inebriated. Does this make the problematic part of proof less a priori? No. *In general, the empirical nature of undercutting defeaters for a belief (in contrast to overriding ones) does not turn the belief into an a posteriori one*. The same is even more obvious for accounting for mistakes. "Oh, I miscalculated since I was drunk", is a perfectly fine explanation, but it does not make a mathematical belief into an a posteriori one! Horgan might reply that in philosophy abduction is the only way to eliminate mistakes,

unlike in math. Not a good reply, since coherence and lack thereof are the most common eliminators, and (in-)coherence with other a priori beliefs does not introduce aposteriority. I conclude provisionally that counting exclusively on abduction for aposteriority in conceptual analysis is too risky. We aposteriorists should turn to alternative sources of aposteriority.

II) Alternative sources of aposteriority

Let me now propose a very brief and programmatic sketch of an alternative approach in the same naturalistic and aposterioristic spirit. Let us first distinguish a more immediate level of justification, proper for the practitioner of a given rationally grounded discipline – mathematician, logician, armchair metaphysician – and a second, more reflective level of abstract epistemological reflection.

Consider the first level first, and focus upon conceptual analysis in general (not just analysis of philosophical concepts). The first issue is the ground of legitimacy, the second immunity from empirical refutation. Take the ground of legitimacy. In contrast to Henderson and Horgan's uniform treatment of conceptual truths, one might here introduce considerations of depth. Some concepts are so blatantly empirical that most apriorists would be weary to ascribe any interestingly a priori status to propositions analyzing them. For instance, the scientific concept WATER i.e. H₂O-concept is such that it is analytic that water contains hydrogen. This makes the truth hardly a priori. Some folk concepts (say COLOR) might contain marks clearly derived from empirical research. It might be therefore maintained that their analyses are only superficially a priori, whereas their deeper justification is a posteriori. This would be a first possible source of aposteriority. Superficially a priori propositions would hardly be immune from empirical refutation. This is a second source of aposteriority (at least on the stronger and more traditional view of apriority as involving forward immunity).

Now, philosophical concepts-categories (PRIMARY QUALITY, IDENTITY, MATERIAL OBJECT) might be too general to involve such clearly empirical marks (but even this is not quite certain). A naturalist would be prone to explain people's having such concepts by their being innate and part of trans-individual tool-kit for understanding the world. This points to two additional possible sources of aposteriority for propositions that analyze them (e.g. "Continuity is necessary for identity"). First, and *prima facie* less plausibly, on the legitimacy side, one might take the deep evolutionary origin, i.e. trial-and-error derivation of such concepts and concept-analyzing propositions to constitute an a posteriori element in their justification. Although such propositions have pretty deep a priori status, they might derive from propositions that are "at bottom" empirical. This is a third candidate source of aposteriority. Next, and much more plausibly, there is no reason to assume that innate folk metaphysics (say deep beliefs about material objects) is immune to empirical refutation. This lack of immunity for even deeply a priori beliefs might be a fourth candidate source. The first level of immediate justification, by reliability, obviousness and compellingness of rational beliefs thus offers four candidate sources of aposteriority.

We now pass to the second, reflective level. Distinguish two issues: general reflective grounds of justification, and the issue of explanation. One might argue along Henderson and Horgan lines that reflective coherence, a kind of reflective equilibrium is an important source of justification. The touchy issue is at which level to place it; Henderson

and Horgan place it on the first, whereas I would prefer the second, reflective level. Now, one might argue that the proper kind of equilibrium is the wide one, involving all kinds of empirical safeguards. Then, a fifth, and perhaps less plausible source of aposteriority would be the role of positive coherence with empirical beliefs in justifying candidate rational beliefs. Such a positive coherentist support of a holistic, and thereby partly empirical nature is not out of question for philosophical claims. A more plausible role for 2nd level general coherence would be a negative one, i.e. the absence of empirical undermining. Such a negative holistic requirement does not seem unreasonable, and would involve a sixth source of aposteriority.

The seventh possible source has to do with explanation of having intuitions and explanation of their reliability: It has been argued by many, from Descartes and Kant to contemporary philosophers that having an account of possession and reliability of intuitions is necessary for their complete justification. If one accepts that explanation is part of reflective justification, we aposteriorists can then argue that since causal explanation is a posteriori, the ultimate justification for all intuitional and conceptual propositions is partly a posteriori. Thus causal explanation offers a seventh candidate source of aposteriority. Here is an overview of the whole panoply of sources.

	APOSTERIORITY	INFECTING BACKWARD LEGITIMACY	THREATENING FORWARD IMMUNITY
1ST LE VEL	INDIVIDUAL DEEP APOSTE- RIORITY	empirical origin of correct concepts (conceptual analysis in general)	from incorrect- ness
	TRANS- INDIVIDUAL (INNATE)	innate categories: evolutionary trial-and-error derivation	no reason for assuming correctness
2ND LE VEL	GENERAL COHERENCE	positive support is holistic, i.e. partly empirical	negative coherence (absence of undermining)
	EXPLANATION OF HAVING AND RELIABILITY	a) explanation is part of reflective justification b) causal explanation is a posteriori c) justification is partly a posteriori	

It has to be admitted that each of the proposed sources is just a candidate source and nothing more for the moment. Objections can be raised against each candidature, possibly more efficient than ones I have tentatively addressed to Henderson and Horgan.³ The optimistic conclusion is that the aposteriorist has more work and perhaps more hope to succeed than one would think at the first glance.

III) Conclusion

To summarize, Horgan and his co-authors rely on hypothesized psychological inference to the best explanation in service of filtering out genuine intuitions as the only source of aposteriority for analysis of concepts and for conceptual intuitions. The reliance is not to be recommended for three reasons. First, in paradigm cases the general philosophical conclusion is reached by the thought-experimenter without filtering and abduction. Second, when some filtering is done, it usually relies on non-empirical considerations of coherence of intuition-contents, rather than on psychological abduction. Third, the appeal to psychological explanation for mistakes in mathematics is not usually taken to affect apriority, so by parity of reasoning, it should not be so taken in issues about philosophical reflection.

The alternative is to concentrate upon issues neglected by Henderson and Horgan, in particular the ground of worldly reliability (or objective validity, as Kant would put it) of our intuitions. Some conceptual intuitions are grounded in obviously empirical considerations. Others, more general ones, might rely on innate concepts-categories, which are nevertheless empirically corrigible. All of them are tested on a more reflective level for coherence with the rest of our body of firm beliefs, and it is here that they might need at least a negative support, i.e. lack of undermining, by their empirical cousins. Finally, Henderson and Horgan are right about explanation, but they might have located it at too low a level. Empirical explanation of our possession of intuitions and, more importantly of their reliability, might inject a further dose of aposteriority into beliefs that were traditionally considered to be a priori.

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³ For a recent forceful defense of the view that immunity is not necessary for apriority, and that empirical recognition and explanation of our rational faculties do not threaten their apriority see Casullo 2003.

Intentionality and the Antinomy of the Liar

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1. Intentionality

What is true is true in virtue of how the world is, and is independent of our mental acts. This view is characteristic of the realism in the theory of truth (Simons 1998, 115). The realistic conception of truth has no immediate consequences for any view concerning truth-bearers, and in particular the realism in the theory of truth may be supplemented by a realistic view of truth-bearers, where truth-bearers are regarded as concrete empirical objects. It turns out that on this realistic view, truth-bearers are objects which are strictly connected with our mental acts. Our mental acts such as judging, thinking and understanding, considered either independently, or as parts of the communicative acts of uttering certain words assertively, are the most important constituents of truth-bearers in natural languages. Our consciousness by its mental (intentional) acts which point outside themselves creates true or false statements about the world. It is characteristic of the statements with verbs expressing mental acts such as: *thinks, asserts, understands, believes, wants, searches, loves, admires*, and the like that those statements cannot be used as premises in reasonings based on the rule of the existential generalization, and on the rule of substitutivity for singular terms. That is, $R(a, b)$ does not entail $\exists xR(a, x)$ if R stands for an intentional verb (for example *searches*) and b stands for a name of an intentional object (for example the golden mountain). Similarly, $S(a = b)$ and $a = b$ does not entail $S(a = a)$ if a stands for *Scott* and b stands for the *author of 'Waverley'* and S has as a part the verb *wants to know* (Simons 1992, 188). These examples suggest that the content of our mental acts sometimes may express what there is in the world, and sometimes may fail to express the truths about the world.

2. Truth-Bearers

Mental acts may be regarded either as parts of truth-bearers or as truth-bearers in themselves when they are acts of judging, thinking or understanding. But if mental acts are parts of truth-bearers then what are the primary truth-bearers themselves? To answer this question I shall refer to Simons's view expressed by him most fully in his (2003) article. Since there are no truth-bearers without a truth-bearing act, the acts of understanding are as good truth-bearers as the acts of uttering certain words assertively with understanding (2003, 46). While the truth-bearing act of understanding is private, mental linguistic act, the act of asserting is a public linguistic event. The relevant mental act characteristic of all truth-bearers meant as public events is called an act of proposing. The act of proposing may take the form of question or command as well as that of assertion (2003, 51). The primary truth-bearers which include the act of proposing and the utterance are called *propositions* and are understood as concrete events having their place and time, and their temporal and spatial parts. Simons notes that this meaning of the term 'proposition' is the oldest of uses of this term in English (2003, 48). The propositions are true or false absolutely, because as absolutely rigid, empirical objects they are not context-dependent. Context-dependence concerns expression-types whose tokens are uttered in

proposing acts. An example given below, being a generalisation of Tarski's T-schema, shows how context-dependence works in the case of a sentence-type, while the truth-predicate applied to a proposition is context-independent. I follow the formulation of Simons's article (2003, 49).

Example I: For all P, R, O, D : if P is a proposition appropriate to the utterance on day D of a token of the English sentence 'Richard is going to Oxford tomorrow' such that 'Richard' refers to the person R and 'Oxford' refers to the location O then: P is true if and only if R goes to O on the day after D .

In this example the sentence-type 'Richard is going to Oxford tomorrow' is context-dependent, what is formally expressed by the fact that its (necessary and sufficient) truth-conditions contain the variables R, O, D bounded by the universal quantifier, while the antecedent of the conditional in the example provides certain possible values of these variables. Simons notes that how the dependence works depends on features specific to the language and expression type in question (2003, 51).

3. Liar-Type Sentences

All Liar-type sentences considered in this paper are self-referential and should be carefully discerned from other self-referential sentence-types. The Liar-sentence which is used by Tarski (1933) in his antinomy of the liar, whose formulation he borrowed from Lukasiewicz, is the following sentence-type:

(1) Sentence (1) is not true.

Let us suppose now that we refer to the sentence (1) in our sentence (2) below:

(2) Sentence (1) is not true.

(1) and (2) may be regarded as two different sentence-tokens of the same sentence-type.

While (1) is self-referential, (2) is not and by the same does not by itself lead to the antinomy of the liar. In what follows I consider only those propositions in which the person P utters assertively at time T the token K of the English sentence S . I shall call the propositions of this kind *communicative acts*. The generalisation of T-schema of the previous example when applied to the sentence-type 'Sentence (1) is not true' takes now the following form:

Example II: For all C, P, K, T if C is a communicative act in which the person P utters assertively at time T the token K of the English sentence 'Sentence (1) is not true' such that 'sentence (1)' refers to the sentence (1) then: C is true if and only if (1) is not true.

If the condition that (1) is not true holds, then the communicative act C is true. Indeed: When the condition confronts the sentence (1), one can notice that the sentence (1) is not true, that is, 'Sentence (1) is not true' is not true. Let us compare this example with the next one.

Example III: For all C, P, K, T, S if C is a communicative act in which the person P utters assertively at time T the token K of the English sentence S : 'This very sentence

is not true' such that 'this very sentence' refers to the sentence *S* then: *C* is true if and only if *S* is not true.

In this case the condition that *S* is not true does not confront another token of the sentence *S*, but every token of this sentence-type, that is, the sentence-type *S* itself. The question is if this condition enables us to decide whether *S* is true or not true. In other words, what exists in the world and makes the sentence *S* true? The condition that *S* is not true, when confronts the very sentence *S*, makes an answer to this question impossible. To make more clear what I mean, I will take another example of self-referential sentence.

Example IV: For all *C, P, K, T, S'* if *C* is a communicative act in which the person *P* utters assertively at time *T* the token *K* of the English sentence *S'*: 'This very sentence contains six words' such that 'this very sentence' refers to the sentence *S'* then: *C* is true if and only if *S'* contains six words.

The condition that *S'* contains six words when confronts the sentence *S'* enables us to decide that the sentence *S'* is true. So why cannot we decide the sentence *S* of *Example III*? I need for further discussion a more concise manner of speaking: The condition which follows the words 'if and only if' will be called an object of communicative act. I do not posit a new metaphysical entity, like an incomplete object in Meinong, or a purely intentional object in Ingarden. I only use the term 'object of communicative act' as a useful shorthand. In particular I do not hold that there are in the world correlates of the objects of communicative acts, because what makes a communicative act true depends on the content of the condition in question and, with a few exceptions, is not a single object. In the case of the sentence *S* of *Example III* there is no object of communicative act which may confront the world. In consequence, the communicative act of *Example III* is not true, and also not false; it does not have a logical value, but an epistemic value: It is neither known as true, nor known as false. I refer here to Belnap's four-valued logic outlined in his (1977) paper, where the value denoted by \perp is understood in epistemic terms. There is also a strengthened form of the Liar-sentence *S'*, as in the example below.

Example V: For all *C, P, K, T, S''* if *C* is a communicative act in which the person *P* utters assertively at time *T* the token *K* of the English sentence *S''*: 'This very sentence is not true or neither true nor false' such that 'this very sentence' refers to the sentence *S''* then: *C* is true if and only if *S''* is not true or neither true nor false.

The problem with this strengthened form of the Liar-sentence is that the condition that *S''* is not true or neither true nor false, where 'not true' means 'false', when confronts the sentence *S''*, seems to suggest that intuitively *S''* is true. But does it mean that the communicative act in which *S''* has been uttered has an object? No, there is no object of communicative act in this case like in *Example IV*, in other words, there is no object which may confront the world. But if so, the communicative act in which *S''* has been uttered is neither known as true nor known as false. Now, one can imagine a communicative act in which an utterance is about the very communicative act, as in the example below.

Example VI: For all *C, P, T, K* if *C* is a communicative act in which the person *P* utters assertively at time *T* the token *K* of the English sentence 'This very communicative act is not true' such that 'this very communicative act' refers to the communicative act *C* then *C* is true if and only if *C* is not true.

The first question which we should answer now is if the communicative act *C* has its object. But in this case the object is the condition that the communicative act *C* is not true. It turns out that if the object confronts the world, that is, the communicative act *C* itself, the communicative act *C* is true, and in such a way the antinomy of the liar is restored. One may try to escape this conclusion if one assumes that the communicative act is not true only if its *world-directed* condition is not satisfied, and next to argue that in this example there is no such a condition. The problem is that in this case we are not convinced that there is no world-directed condition. It seems that the condition that *C* is not true confronts the world, that is, the communicative act *C* itself in which one asserts that the communicative act *C* is not true, and indeed *C* is not true. So in consequence we get the biconditional: '*C* is true if and only if *C* is not true' which is the conclusion of the original antinomy of the liar. Let us note that *Example VI* has its strengthened version:

Example VII: For all *C, P, K, T* if *C* is a communicative act in which the person *P* utters assertively at time *T* the token *K* of the English sentence 'This very communicative act is not true or neither true nor false' such that 'this very communicative act' refers to the communicative act *C* then *C* is true if and only if *C* is not true or neither true nor false.

What is the object of the communicative act *C* of this example? An answer to this question is easy: One may say that it is the condition that *C* is not true or neither true nor false. But if this object confronts the communicative act *C* itself, one may say that the communicative act *C* is true. In this way one may restore the strengthened form of the antinomy of the liar.

4. The Antinomy of the Liar

The antinomy of the liar in Tarski's (1933) formulation is obtained by the following reasoning:

- (1) Sentence (1) is not true (assumption)
- (2) 'Sentence (1) is not true' is true if and only if sentence (1) is not true (T-schema)
- (3) Sentence (1) = 'Sentence (1) is not true' (from (1))
- (4) Sentence (1) is true if and only if sentence (1) is not true (substitutivity for singular terms in (2)).

The major premise in this reasoning is the biconditional (2), where the T-schema is applied to the Liar-sentence (1). In our *Example II* we have a token of the sentence 'Sentence (1) is not true' uttered in a communicative act. On that account, the left side of the biconditional (2) is false, but the right side is true, because the communicative act with a token of the sentence 'Sentence (1) is not true' is true if 'Sentence (1) is not true' is not true. This makes the biconditional (2) false, and the antinomy of the liar is blocked as an unsound reasoning. In our *Example III* we have a communicative act which is neither known as true nor known as false. The biconditional (2) has now the form (2')

- (2') 'This very sentence is not true' is true if and only if this very sentence is not true.

Its left side is false, but its right side is neither known as true nor known as false, and in consequence, assuming certain reasonable rules of evaluation, (2') is neither known as true nor known as false. This blocks the antinomy of the liar as an unsound reasoning. In a similar way the antinomy is blocked in the case of the strengthened form of the Liar-sentence of *Example V*. But we

cannot avoid the antinomy of the liar where the Liar-sentence is as in *Example VI* and *VII*. Thus the switch from abstract to concrete propositions as primary truth-bearers only avoids some paradoxes and not others (Simons 2003, 53).

Endnote

My thanks go to Peter Simons for reading this paper.

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Transcendental Apperception in a Wittgensteinian Perspective

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Introduction

Ameriks (1994, 331-2) points out that in Kitcher (1990) and Powell (1990) 'the manifold ambiguity' of the 'strong apperception thesis' (SAT), 'plays a central role'. SAT holds that empirical consciousness (E) requires transcendental apperception (T) (334). According to Strawson (1966, 39, 247 ff.), this ambiguity pertains to Kant's use of personal pronouns and possessives in such a way that:

(W)e have to ask what we human beings, Kant's readers, can unambiguously understand by "us" and "we" and "our" when these expressions are so easily and loftily used to convey the doctrines of transcendental idealism.

Kitcher and Powell attempt to avoid this ambiguity focusing on the 'functional' character of apperception. Ameriks is not satisfied with these attempts. In contrast, he stipulates that:

(...) Kant himself is clear enough that he does, after all, want to say something about what the "nature" of the stuff of the self is, namely that (...) it does not constitute itself through reflection or synthesis, but rather, like everything else, it first of all exists as the non-material Ding an sich (...). (1994, 345.)

In this paper I will endorse Ameriks' criticism, though I will object to his faithfulness to Kant. Instead, I will, with reference to the 'private language argument' elaborate Powell's phenomenological approach to apperception.

This is done in section 3. Section 1. contains a description of SAT. In section 2. I outline and criticise the proposals of Kitcher and Powell.

1. Kant on the self

Kant's concern is with the possibility of experience. Kant defines experience as cognition by means of connected perceptions. For perceptions to be cognitively relevant, their connection cannot be merely associative, like in Hume. A perception in turn, is defined as an empirical consciousness (E) of a connection (apprehension) of the manifold in an empirical intuition. In §26 of the transcendental deduction of the categories Kant explains how this synthesis of the apprehension is accomplished according to the same rules, viz. the categories, which connect these perceptions in transcendental apperception (T) in order for them to become experience.

The argument for this explanation is that time and space both are the forms of intuition as well as intuitions themselves. Therefore, the apprehension of items in a spatio-temporal frame is a priori accomplished in the same way as, and governed by, the synthesis of transcendental apperception. SAT claims that (E) is necessarily accompanied by (T) in the way that is described above. Thus, the relation between these two types of conscious states is not merely logical, but rather a 'real potential relation' (Ameriks 1994, 336; cf. B132). Consequently, the self-conscious state "I think." (T) which effectively accompanies (E) is a consciousness of an identical subject of this act of synthesis in (E) (B132, B133, B135).

What has puzzled analytic philosophers in this 'real potential relation' is 'the anomalous referential structure of self-consciousness' that it entails. Since the subject of (E) is identical with the subject of (T) the 'I' cannot unambiguously be considered as an object of consciousness. (T) therefore, cannot unambiguously be considered as reflective consciousness. The conscious state (T) encompasses "only the idea of a subject of consciousness that is known only indirectly through the contents of consciousness (...)." (Sturma 1995, 201, 203.)

2. Empiricist reactions to Kant on the self

Kitcher (1990, 140) develops, in opposition with philosophers that advocate a conceptual analysis of Kant's transcendental arguments (26), a transcendental psychological interpretation of SAT, in particular of §26. She regards this 'epistemic analysis' of cognitive tasks as importantly contributory to cognitive science (205 ff.). It gives it direction (Kitcher 2000, 61).

Kitcher (1990), observes that Kant need not assume that reflective awareness is an "inseparable component of what it is to perceive, remember etc." (107, in Ameriks 1994 339). Though one can, for the reason mentioned in sect. 1., agree with this observation, Kitcher fails to explain how the relation between (T) and (E) can unambiguously be interpreted alternatively. As a consequence, it remains unclear which conception of philosophy entitles Kitcher to call this appropriation of SAT in contemporary theory of mind philosophical, notwithstanding its "striking affinities with empirical psychology" (Kitcher 1990, 26 in: Ameriks 1994, 339).

In Kitcher's interpretation, (T) is deprived of its subjective quality, since it becomes "no more than contentually interconnected systems of cognitive states" (1990, 122, in Ameriks 1994, 343.) Hence, it does not account for the transcendental claim that the relation between (T) and (E) is a real potential relation. It therefore does not satisfy as an interpretation of Kant.

In Powell's interpretation of (T) 'I' is itself not a referring expression and therefore might be taken to function as merely a logical operator, a quoting device. However, Powell (1990) is faithful to SAT's involving a 'real potential relation' between (T) and (E). For, since the transcendental subject in (T) represents perceptions as elements of a representational system (232), this interpretation presupposes that the systematic connection of these perceptions in the subject is not merely empirical, but also transcendental. At the same time, it presupposes that it is an empirical subject having these perceptions that necessarily are to be considered as elements of a perceptual system. The expression 'I', therefore, "(...) can only be used in such a way that its use carries an implicit acknowledgement of, and reference to that being who is the experiencing subject." (234) Thus, Powell's interpretation at first sight seems not vulnerable to Strawson's objection of ambiguity since it does not commit him to the view that the transcendental subject is numerically identical with the subject of empirical apperception.

However, in his interpretation, (T) is of the form: 'I think that-p', in which p is an element of a system of representations that are the content of (E). This interpretation of (T) commits him to posit a content of (T), being a 'meta-representing' of (E). Thus, the relation between (T) and (E) is projected on a model in which (T) is a second-order mental state that is transitively conscious of (E). It is (T) then, that, by being reflectively conscious of (E) as a system of representations, confers intransitive consciousness on (E), the mental state which is its object. In this model, the intransitive consciousness of (E) is taken as a relational property that is dependent on (T), rather than as such. (Cf. Zahavi 2002, 15 ff.)

In order for an element of (E) to be conscious in (T), the transcendental subject must recognise it as something that it can self-ascribe. This now it can only do, if it has a prior acquaintance with itself. This requires that it is intransitively conscious of itself. Hence, (T) "must await *either* a third-order mental state that can confer intransitive consciousness on it, in which case we are (...) confronted with a vicious infinite regress, or it must be admitted that (...) [in (T), the I] is itself already in possession of phenomenal consciousness from the very start, and that (...) would involve us in a circular explanation, presupposing that which was meant to be explained (...)". (Zahavi 2002, 16; orig. emph.) In the former case, Powell's (T) would, in contrast with Kant's claim (B132) not be original. In the latter case, his introduction of the notion of 'meta-representing' would not have the illuminative value he claims it has.

Although Powell, regards SAT, in opposition with Strawson's qualification of transcendental psychology, a 'very sophisticated phenomenology' (1990, 58), his reconstruction is nevertheless functional. Since his interpretation fails to answer the question "What is (E) like?" with an explication of its intrinsic qualities it underscores Nagel's (1974, 437) claim that functional characterisations of mental states or events do not exhaust their analysis.

For these reasons, one could endorse Ameriks's criticism of these functional reconstructions of SAT. However, the elucidatory value of his own recourse to the *Ding an sich* is limited. For this merely amounts to the adoption of transcendental idealism, which doctrine, that is the source of SAT's ambiguity, is presupposed in SAT. Moreover, one could contest that it makes sense to argue, as he does (1994, 333), that all uses of 'I' in (T) and (E) are co-referential in the sense that they refer to a numerical identical I whereas at the same time, the referent of the expression 'I' is urged to be considered as the noumenal self.

3. A Wittgensteinian perspective

SAT's ambiguity can be attributed to its belonging to an epistemology as a 'theory of getting to know' (cf. Ryle 1949, 275, 299), which, though it is claimed to be philosophical (AIX), is marked by the blend of philosophical and psychological connotations of its concepts. The functional approaches share with Kant a predilection for physical language. Given this ambiguity, Ryle's (1949, 298) question, as to the proper subject matter of the theory of knowledge is justified.

Fortunately, Ryle's dismissal of epistemology as a theory of 'getting to know' does not force one to rush to the one alternative he offers: a conceptual analysis of scientific theories. Zahavi (2002, 17) presents a phenomenological analysis of self-awareness that prevents the answer to the

question "What is (E) like?" to fall in an infinite regress, or to be viciously circular. Unlike Powell's, this analysis does not take the intransitive conscious state (E) as a relational property, but accounts for its first-personal givenness. It involves a "distinction between *intentionality*, which is characterised by a *difference* between the subject and the object of experience, and *self-consciousness*, which implies some form of *identity*." (16; orig. emph.) Thus it can answer the requirement that the identity of the I in (T) with the I in (E) "must be that of belonging to the same subject (...)", whereas it excludes that they are taken as a numerical identity (16). This provision is important, for without it, this identity, that is a necessary condition for the possibility of my calling (E) mine, would leave no room for the difference between these two types of conscious states. This difference precisely consists in the one being transitive, whereas the other is intransitive.

That the identity of the I in (T) and in (E), though it is 'some form of identity' cannot be conceived as a numerical identity, is a consequence of what Sturma calls the 'constructive displacement' of the I (B404). This, he states, does not depend on any vicious circularity but is a consequence of irreflexive relations inherent in the givenness of the empirical context. It is due to the fact—for which, as we have seen in sect. 1., Kant gives an argument in §26 of his deduction of the categories—that "consciousness of spatiotemporal objects is structured by a categorial synthesis according to the conditions of possible self-consciousness". Hence apperceptive self-referential mental acts cannot be equated with knowledge of a 'self' (1995, 201 ff.; cf. B404) as an object (B422). The identity of the representation 'I' does not concern anything of the subject whereby it is given as an object (B408). Kant claims (B157) that in (T), I am conscious of myself not as I appear to myself (cf. B429), nor as I am in myself, but only that I am. This feature of (T) can be accommodated in a phenomenological analysis insofar as it presupposes the existence of pre-linguistic and non-conceptual forms of self-awareness. Reflective self-consciousness is "derivative (...)" and always presupposes the existence of a prior unthematic, non-objectifying, prereflective self-awareness as its condition of possibility." (Zahavi 2002, 17, 18.)

Sturma connects this feature with the experiential first-person perspective of the 'private language argument'. (1995, 204). This argument is concerned with the analysis of a linguistic representation of phenomenal occurrences. As it demonstrates e.g. in §§269, 278 the redundancy of the 'transcendental' subject, as well as of the metaphysical private object (cf. §§272, 293 and 299) it allows for an unambiguous use of the first-person personal and possessive pronouns by eliminating these metaphysical entities.

Moreover, the private language argument fits well in the phenomenological project insofar as it does not take intransitive consciousness as a relational property. This has the following advantages. First, it does not take linguistic behaviour as reflective on something else but opens the way for its full-fledged analysis. Second, interpreted as an argument for the impossibility of a phenomenal language, as Hintikka (1986, 241) does, it allows for pre-linguistic forms of self-awareness. Third, since this impossibility must not be attributed to some ineffable private property of phenomenal events but can rather be interpreted as a characteristic of the grammar that is decisive for what it makes sense to say (cf. Alva Noë 1994, 20) it does not entail an ontological commitment to some private object. This is expressed by Wittgenstein's calling sensation "not a something, but not a nothing either!" (§304) Though Wittgenstein states this insight in a

rather enigmatic way, his criticism of attempts to use the objectifying grammar of a physical language to represent phenomenal events is on a par with Nagel's assessment that "physicalism is a position we cannot understand because we do not at present have any conception of how it might be true." (1974, 447.)

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Phenomenology and Language. Some Remarks on Wittgenstein's Middle Period

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1. Origins

When Wittgenstein came to Cambridge in 1929 and started doing philosophy again after about ten years, he was mainly faced with the problem of colour incompatibility. In the *Tractatus* he argued that a claim such as: "Two colours are at the same point at the same time in our visual field" (cf. Wittgenstein 1989, 6.3751) is *logically* impossible. And since elementary propositions were defined as mutually independent, it followed that he probably regarded sentences such as "A is green" and "A is red" as not being elementary expressions. The symbolism of the *Tractatus* did, however, allow a logical conjunction of such expressions containing particular colour statements about certain points in our visual field. Because such conjunctions are not "mirrored" by anything in reality, this causes an asymmetry between what can be said and what is possibly the case. In Wittgenstein's early writings, the concept of possibility was determined by the truth-functions and logical constants and therefore fully independent of *what* is said in those expressions. In one of his unpublished manuscripts, Rush Rhees remarks the following: "In *LPA* the Möglichkeiten were represented by the logical constants. And this means, I suppose, that they were represented finally by the logical constants which give (form?) the Grammatik jeder möglichen Beschreibung. In the *Bemerkungen* the 'Grammatik der Beschreibung der Tatsachen' is found or festgestellt in the Phänomenen. And these do not have the kind of systematic unity which *LPA* gives to the logical constants and the Logik/Kalkül der Wahrheitsfunktionen. [...] This Phänomenologie was part of the recognition of the diversity of Systeme, the diversity of possible grammars: and so of possibilities. It had an immense importance in connexion with the notion of 'logical possibility' and 'logical impossibility'."

So, what we can claim first, is that the symbolism of the *Tractatus* was mistaken, or at least incomplete for it could not prevent propositional conjunctions that do not have a possible equivalent in reality, or to put it in *Tractarian* terminology, that do not picture a possible state of affairs.

Secondly, Wittgenstein had to reject a central feature of his elementary propositions, i.e. their mutual logical interdependency. In January 1930, he told Moritz Schlick that in the *Tractatus* he had introduced rules for the syntactic use of logical constants without considering that those rules might have anything to do with the internal structure and connexions of sentences, e.g. in cases such as "Blue and red are in one and the same point". He now regarded such logical products as invalid. Therefore, those rules would only form part of an extensive syntax, he did not know about at the time of the *Tractatus* (cf. Wittgenstein 1993, 74). In his notes of Wittgenstein lectures between 1930 and 1933, G. E. Moore also points out that it was with regards to elementary propositions and their particular connexion with truth-functions that Wittgenstein had to change his views most: "His present view [1932] was that it was senseless to talk of a 'final' analysis, and he said that he would now treat as atomic all propositions in the expression of which neither 'and', 'or', nor 'not' occurred, nor any expression of generality." (Moore 1993, 88)

Thirdly, as the remark also shows, Wittgenstein rejected his idea of a logical analysis of propositions within a truth-functional calculus, as the one and only way to get to elementary propositions that exclusively consist of names and show when a sentence has sense or in other words, that display what it means to say something, as opposed to a combination of senseless or nonsensical signs. Part of this dismissal was due to Wittgenstein's misunderstanding of this kind of analysis as if it were like a chemical or physical one that detects hitherto hidden things and which could construct a *theory* of elementary propositions analogous to the principles of mechanics (cf. Wittgenstein 1993b, 210).

2. Transitions

Confronted with the problem of colour incompatibility in early 1929, Wittgenstein now claimed that what we need is a *purely* phenomenological theory of colours which only deals with what is really perceivable, excluding any hypothetical objects such as waves, cells etc. (cf. Wittgenstein 1991, 273). In his *Some Remarks on Logical Form* he consequently demanded "a logical analysis of actual phenomena" whereby those phenomena must be represented by numbers which therefore have to enter into elementary propositions themselves: "A simple example would be the representation of a patch P by the expression '6-9, 3-8' and of a proposition about it, e.g., P is red, by the symbol '6-9, 3-8 R', where 'R' is yet an unanalysed term ('6-9' and '3-8' stand for the continuous interval between the respective numbers)." (Wittgenstein 1929, 166)

Without going into details about Wittgenstein's idea of a numerical representation, for our purposes it is only important to point out that both his concept of logical analysis and of elementary propositions did turn away from his *Tractarian* ideas. Wittgenstein's postulated elementary connexion between colour statements in terms of numbers, he had now introduced, obviously showed the possibility to construct propositions beyond the truth-functional calculus. Rhees remarks: "The phenomenological account of colours – the representation of the grammar of colours, for instance – may be something like a complete analysis of colour propositions. But it is not the sort of thing you have in a truth-functional calculus" (Rhees, unpublished). So, if this account of colours as they are given in immediate experience is the result of an analysis, it is not the kind of operation that went with the truth-functional calculus. This means, for instance that we would not yield the result that two colours – say red and green – cannot occupy the same point in visual space by applying the analysis of "This is red" and "This is green".

Wittgenstein now spoke of primary propositions and their relation to hypotheses, a connexion that was not anymore guaranteed by any truth-functional nexus between propositions and their truth arguments or as Rhees once put it in discussion: The connexion between sense data propositions and hypotheses is not formed by truth operations, as the truth functions of elementary propositions are. They have a logical connexion with hypotheses

– but not through truth operations. And the way in which hypotheses depend upon sense datum propositions for their connexion with reality and so for their sense, is not like the way in which truth functions depend upon elementary propositions in the *Tractatus*. So it was again the internal relation which became central in Wittgenstein's new conception of a phenomenological language. During this period in 1929, he obviously thought that this connexion between language and reality was guaranteed by our immediate experience and the way in which immediate experience can be understood. The "primary language" he probably regarded as an account of sensory data which would verify or falsify hypotheses. In his *Philosophical Remarks*, he stresses this point by arguing that talking about sense data and immediate experience means to look for a non-hypothetical account (cf. Wittgenstein 1991, 283).

What Wittgenstein needed, however, to guarantee the necessary relation between language and reality was a type of proposition that would be immediately evident and he thought that propositions describing our immediate experience could fulfil this condition due to their apodictic character, a feature that, by the way, also distinguishes them from atomic propositions in the *Tractatus*.

Let us now briefly look at two criticisms that are connected with his conception of a phenomenological language:

The first is offered by Wittgenstein himself, when at one point he spoke of propositions which could be verified once and for all, and were not facets in the verification of an hypothesis, as something like surfaces which were not the surfaces of bodies (cf. Wittgenstein 1993b, 221). This would hold of any description of 'immediate experience'. If such propositions are really propositions, they do not seem to lead on to anything beyond themselves. But the figure of a mere surface does seem to suggest that he did not think they were proper propositions – although they had an important role in the verification of hypotheses. If it makes no sense to say that they might be false, then they certainly cannot be elementary propositions. Rather, they are the means whereby a proposition may be connected with reality. If they were only surfaces, they would not belong to a meaningful description. This means that what we call "the description of immediate experience" belongs to hypotheses and their verification. They are so to speak not self-contained expressions but means to connect language with reality.

Secondly, Wittgenstein's account of primary signs as signs that cannot be misunderstood might have been connected with the idea that he thought that sensory impressions *themselves* might function as symbols which means that independent of any conventions they contain a grammar that guarantees the demanded immediate evidence, a grammar of what can be imagined or thought. This kind of language would thereby exclude any nonsensical combinations of mental pictures. Phenomenological language is then characterised as a symbolism that warrants immediate understanding. It seemed that Wittgenstein did not, however, clearly distinguish between descriptions of phenomena and descriptions *by* phenomena and Rhees once told me that he might have sometimes meant the one sometimes the other, presumably due to the fact that he had still not clearly distinguished between the bearer of a name and the meaning of a name. Another quite famous critique also supports this assumption. When Frank Ramsey talks about the idea of acquaintance in connexion with Wittgenstein, he makes the following interesting remark: "Another is the argumentation about acquaintance with before leading to the conclusion that we perceive the

past. [...] It turns on a play with 'acquaintance' which means, first, capacity to symbolize and, secondly, sensory perception. Wittgenstein seems to equivocate in just the same way with his notion of 'given'." (Ramsey 1990, 7)

In one of his unpublished manuscripts, Rhees remarks the following: "The confusion comes, presumably, in treating 'das Gegebene' als *das eigentliche Zeichen* oder *das eigentliche Symbol*, a kind of limes to which we approach as we see what various equivalent 'conventional' symbols have in common: 'Das, was verunreinigt worden ist'." And: "It sometimes seems as though grammar would be what is common to all languages which say the same thing: as though such a language if it could be expressed at all, would be the expression of a grammar. But it is hard to see how there could be a grammar without *signs*. Is this the point of the suggestion about a grammar of *Vorstellungen*? Then you have the difficulty of whether this grammar could be the same if you changed all the words; how would you know which word stood for what?" This remark obviously shows one of the fundamental problems lying in the assumption that a phenomenological language could entirely do without signs and where immediate experiences could themselves work as symbols. For at least it seems that the combination of possible phenomena could not tell us how to *use* such a language i.e. form the grammar of our "secondary", ordinary language. In other words, how could immediate experience tell us whether we describe immediate experience correctly, unless there were some rules for the use of words in such descriptions? These rules would presumably be independent of any immediate experience. This criticism also points to the way, Wittgenstein eventually saw the relation between a phenomenological language and the grammar of our everyday language.

3. Consequences

In November 1929, Wittgenstein remarks that a phenomenological or primary language is not anymore what he aims at (cf. Wittgenstein MS 107, 205–206, 1991, 51) and just a few weeks later he argues that he was wrong in assuming a primary language as opposed to our ordinary "secondary" language (cf. Wittgenstein MS 108, 29). But what his idea of such a language shows is that he had to introduce a new type of proposition that were different from the *Tractarian* conception of elementary propositions and logical analysis and that shall assure the internal connexion between language and reality.

In his *Big Typescript*, Wittgenstein then headed one of the chapters "Phenomenology is grammar" and what he meant was that phenomenology could now determine the range of all possible description.

This new idea becomes best obvious in his discussion of a grammar of colours. To illuminate his approach, Wittgenstein chooses the example of a colour octahedron, which he regards as grammatical and not psychological, like in cases where we investigate say coloured after images (cf. Wittgenstein 1991, 51–52). In fact, the configuration of colours in terms of a geometrical figure helps us to depict the grammatical rules of our colour concepts, i.e. why it makes sense to talk of a reddish blue but not of a reddish green. (The octahedron is, by the way, only one way of arranging our colour concepts.) In other words, a particular geometrical arrangement does not represent any *empirical* proposition or as Rhees puts it: "We are talking about colours, of course. We are not saying that one sense datum is between two others, which would mean, 'spatially between' I suppose. To see a colour

is to see, what colour it is. And this is, where the concept comes in" (Rhees, unpublished). If colours did not have the particular configuration they have, they would not correspond to what we call "colour". This shows the erroneous assumption that another arrangement than the one given were logically possible: "We should not know what was *meant* by 'seeing red and green in the same place'. Nor can we ask whether experience agrees with the order of colours represented in the colour-octahedron, for instance. If they did not have this order they would not be what we call 'colours'" (Rhees, unpublished). What is of course important to mention in this context is the fact that within a spacial representation, some of our ordinary expressions would have a different semantics, for instance, if we say that one colour is "between" two others this is not to mean "between" as in "between two chairs", or if one colour, say R, "contains more" blue than another colour Y, this just means that R is nearer to blue than Y. But you cannot say that there is more blue in this colour than there is red in that, or that it is nearer to blue than that is to red, for we are not talking in terms of space, although the use of a geometrical figure might mislead one to think this way.

To close the circle of argumentation and give at least a clue what Wittgenstein meant by saying that phenomenology is grammar, let us shortly come back to our original problem of colour incompatibility. When Wittgenstein introduced his concept of a grammatical rule at the beginning of the 1930s, it became most clear in his claim that propositions such as "Red and green cannot be in the same visual spot", "There is no such thing as reddish green" etc. are not descriptions of our immediate experiences. They cannot be the result of our immediate experiences but rather they form our grammar of colour concepts, or, generally speaking, they rule the use of our ordinary language. To negate such propositions is not anymore to assert a contradiction. What it means instead is that it contradicts a rule that belongs to our grammar of colour concepts.

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Reference and Meaning of 'I'

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1. Introduction

According to Wittgenstein, 'The word 'I' does not designate a person' (*MS* 116, 215; 149, 4; 228, 44). In his investigations with I-thoughts, he wanted to show that 'I' is neither a name nor an expression whose logical role is to make a reference. Referring to its use he remarked: 'We don't use it because we recognize a particular person by his bodily characteristic and this creates the illusion that we use this word to refer to something bodiless, which, however, has its seat in our body' (*BB* 69). By denying the referring function Wittgenstein was resisting the idea that the self or subject is an entity bodily or ethereal. He felt that once we admit referring function to 'I', we couldn't help pursuing for its reference – an entity however elusive and mysterious.

Denying referential function to 'I', however, goes against our basic intuition regarding the use of 'I'. We want to say that 'the essence of 'I' is self-reference' (Evans 1982, 52). In sentences with 'I' as grammatical subject, the author uses 'I' for self-reference. In self-conscious thought, the subject thinks of an object that is at the same time the subject of that thought. Such a self-reference is characteristic of self-conscious thoughts and is characteristic of human beings. The use of 'I' enables us to make this unique reference.

2. Subject- Object- Uses of 'I'

Wittgenstein made a distinction between subject and object uses of 'I' to clarify the apparent referential function of 'I'. 'The word 'I', or 'any other word which denotes a subject', is used in 'two utterly different ways' as subject and as object. At object level, the word 'I' is replaceable by 'this body' but not at the subject level (*PO* 101). The former can be reduced to bodily level and can be used to describe facts whereas the latter cannot be reduced to bodily, mental or any objective level. In the object uses, 'I' is on the 'same grammatical level' with other people and at the subject level 'I' is 'without neighbours': 'But you don't mean that it happens to be alone but that its grammatical position is that of having no neighbour' (*PO* 229). By uncovering this 'neighbourless level', Wittgenstein wanted to deny the referential function of 'I', when it is used as a subject.

According to him, we can refer only to objects but not to subjects. 'If, in saying "I", I point to my own body, I model the use of the word "I" on that of the demonstrative "this person" or "he"' (*BB* 68). In subject-uses such pointing is superfluous, he argued. 'The cases of the first category involve the recognition of a particular person, ... the possibility of an error has been provided for' (*BB* 67). By implication, subject-uses do not involve recognition of a particular person, and there is no possibility of error. Possibility for reference failure is necessary for referring words, according to Wittgenstein. His conclusion, therefore, is that object uses of 'I' refer but subject uses of 'I' do not. For example, 'When I say "I am in pain", I do not point to a person who is in pain, ... I don't name any person. Just as I don't name anyone when I groan with pain' (*PI* 404). It is not used to avoid misidentification; it is rather to draw attention to myself, like raising my hand or groaning. 'To say, "I have pain" is no more a statement

about a particular person than moaning is' (*BB* 67). We cannot, however, assimilate the entire sphere of self-knowledge to this paradigm. Statements like 'I am writing this essay' and 'I increasingly realise the difficulty of the topic' do not function merely like groaning and moaning. They can figure in truth-functional operations. It is wrong to try to identify such utterances with natural expressions that are grammatically inarticulate and logically useless.

The referring function, Wittgenstein claimed, is applicable to expression E_1 , 'I have black hair' but not to E_2 , 'I have pain'. The use of 'I' in E_1 refers to my hair, an object. It is an assertion and it can be found out whether my hair is black. Finding out whether this is my pain in E_2 , however, is altogether different. I cannot find out whether I have pain; nothing would qualify as a method of finding out. Others could find it out from my behaviour. This is an awkward conclusion; others can know about my experience, which I cannot know. This is not how we use language. I have pain and I know it when I say 'I have pain'. In saying this I cannot be wrong about whom I have in mind, nor can I fail to be such a person. Thus, if 'I' were a referring expression, it would be guaranteed to refer correctly on each occasion of its use; there is no possibility for error. Therefore Wittgenstein concluded that the word 'I' is not a referring expression when used as a subject.

The claim, however, is muddled. The distinction involved here is between the natures of the objects involved – hair and pain – rather than the subject and object uses of 'I' in E_1 and E_2 . Hair is an object that can be named, described and verified for its various properties whereas pain is categorically different. The observation that there are criteria for misidentification in object cases and there are no such criteria for subject cases is also not sustainable. In the case where I have black hair and I mistakenly judge that I have red hair, I do so because I mistake the colour of my hair, not because I mistake myself for someone with red hair. Nor am I confused about whom I made the judgement. In both subject and object uses of 'I' there is no chance of my misidentifying myself in the sense of taking myself for someone else. We need to abandon the importance of Wittgenstein's distinction of subject and object uses of 'I'.

3. A Cartesian Phobia

The question remains whether 'I' refers or not. Anscombe, Malcolm, Kenny, Hacker and others argue that '*Nowhere* does 'I' have the role of designating or meaning a distinctly conceived object or subject' (Malcolm 1995, 26). It is as if they are obsessed with a Cartesian phobia: 'if 'I' is a referring expression, then Descartes was right about what the referent was' (Anscombe 1975, 58). Wittgenstein characterized his thinking on self as 'just the opposite of Descartes' emphasis on I' (*WL* 35, 63). For Descartes, in thinking, the existence of I is guaranteed beyond doubt; it is the first piece of indubitable knowledge. For Wittgenstein, however, Cartesian ego is a philosophical chimera and a root cause of much philosophical confusion. 'If "I" were a referring expression at all, it would seem to be one whose reference is guaranteed in the sense that the object an "I"-user means by it must exist so long as he is using "I", and in the sense that he cannot take the wrong object

to be the object he means by "I" (Kenny 1984, 79). Whenever the word 'I' is used, the referent I is present. Hacker prefers to characterise this super-referring function more like drawing a bull's eye around an arrow already stuck in the wall and to claim that it was a perfect shot (Hacker 1993, 223). That is a mere ceremony. 'I' does not refer, they argue, because in those cases what looks like immunity from reference-failure is in fact the absence of any reference at all.

The immunity from referential failure and misidentification, however, does not rule out the referential use of 'I' altogether. 'Immunity to error through misidentification is a straightforward consequence of demonstrative identification; ... a way in which a thought can concern (be about) an object' (Evans 1982, 218). Wittgenstein failed to *look and see* that all experiential propositions are immune from reference failure; but that does not mean that they do not refer. Similarly, though 'I' is not a name, it singularly refers to the subject.

4. 'I' Is in a Class by Itself

Ryle spoke of 'index words' that 'indicate to the hearer or reader the particular thing, episode, person or moment referred to' (Ryle 1963, 179). They are linguistic devices for referring without ascribing any properties; they 'connect immediately with reality' (PG 221). Examples are 'this', 'that', 'here', 'now', 'I', etc. They are referring expressions. We should resist the temptations 'to say that "now" is the name of an instant of time, ... "here" is the name of a place, "this" the name of a thing, and "I" the name of a man' (BB 108-109). That follows only if we hold the erroneous view that all meaningful words are names of objects. 'This' and 'that' are whatever the subject chooses to indicate, 'here' indicates the place, 'now' the time and 'I' thoughts indicate whoever produced them. They are not governed by criteria of identification. The author must have some grasp of what distinguishes the object(s) in question. For example, though I need not know where I am, and when it is, to assert correctly, 'I am here now', uses of 'here' and 'now' still require that I should refer to a place and a time. I can, of course, use 'now' to indicate the present moment or any specific period of time, and 'here' to a point or any specific area. Though it is possible to use 'here' without knowing where I am, 'now' without having a clue to when it is or 'I' in amnesia, it does not follow that these words can be used without knowledge of a referent. I must knowingly refer to something. If we want to trade on identity, different cases of 'here' are to be produced at the same place, 'now' at the same time, 'I' by the same person.

Even among the index words 'I' 'is in a class by itself' (WL 35, 21). Other index words depend on 'I': 'this' is what is in front of me, 'here' is where I am, 'now' is the moment that I am referring. 'I' is used to indicate the person who is using it. For the subject, 'there is no possibility of him using 'I' on different occasions to refer to different things' (Campbell 1995, 107). Other pronouns indicate different people at different times and referents of other index words vary according to the context. First-person present-tense assertions are directly bound up with experience so that logically there cannot be any condition the satisfaction of which is required for the experience to be of the subject. They invariably refer to the person who produced them. It is as if 'the word 'I' in the mouth of a man refers to the man who says it; it points to himself'. Wittgenstein retorts, however, 'But it was quite superfluous to point to himself. He might just as well only have raised his hand' (BB 67). This conclusion is not justified.

Think of a situation: I am in hospital and the nurse asks me: 'Do you have pain?'; I reply, 'Yes; I have pain'; and the nurse writes in her report: 'J. N. has pain'. Her statement is a true representation of my expression. The truth of it depends on the fact that 'you', 'I', and 'J. N.' have the same object as reference here. 'I' and 'you' are not extra names for J. N. nor are they alias for J. N. 'I' indicates the subject whom 'J. N.' refers to, when J. N. uses 'I' and 'you' indicates the subject whom 'J. N.' names, when J. N. is addressed. There is a logical symmetry when I say 'I am in pain', and the nurse writes, referring to me, 'He is in pain'. This allows them to stand in logical relations and to make possible the co-ordination of first-, second- and third-person perspectives. There are also asymmetries between these statements. 'I have pain' is different from 'J. N. has pain'. 'I have pain' is not ascribed on the basis of behavioural criteria, while 'J. N. has pain' is ascribed to me on the strength of my behaviour, including what I said. The nurse has reasons to ascribe the predicate to me whereas those reasons are not the reasons for myself. That does not mean to say that I have no reason to complain that 'I have pain'; 'reasons' are differently used because my having pain is a state of my being. We must 'acknowledge that there is a kind of predicate which is unambiguously and adequately ascribable both on the basis of observation of the subject of the predicate and *not* on this basis i.e., independently of observation of the subject: the second case is the case where the ascriber is also the subject' (Strawson 1959, p. 108). This distinction is applicable for the predicate as well as the subject. I ascribe certain properties to myself without criteria for identification; others only with appropriate criteria. Because there are differences in how 'I' refers from how other pronouns and index words refer, one cannot conclude that 'I' does not refer at all.

5. Conclusion

Wittgenstein himself observed that 'The word "I" does not mean the same as "L.W." even if I am L.W., nor does it mean the same as the expression 'the person who is now speaking'. But that doesn't mean that "L.W." and "I" mean different things. All it means is that these words are different instruments in our language' (BB 67). What he should have recommended was a detailed description of the various uses of 'I' and related terms that characterise human subjectivity instead of denying the referential function of 'I'. Policing of words is not included in the job description of a philosopher. It is also foolish to think that removal of a word or denial of a certain use of the word would advance philosophy. 'One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from that. But the difficulty is to remove the prejudice which stands in the way of doing this' (PI 340). As we have seen Wittgenstein himself was not free from such prejudices. He was obsessed with a Cartesian phobia. In order to resist the temptations of a Cartesian ego, he tried in vain to deny the referential function of 'I' and thereby to make it redundant. Even if we deny the referential use of 'I' and eliminate 'I' from language, we would need word(s) to describe the subjective point of view. Then we would be raising questions about the character of that word. It is our wrong perception of the use of our expressions, our asking misconceived questions and trying to answer them that gave rise to absurd theories of 'self'. One has to see that the self is neither a bodiless ego nor a merely bodily thing, but a living human being. The use of 'I' always refers to a living human being.

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PI *Philosophical Investigations*

Wittgenstein 1953 ed. G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

BB *The Blue and the Brown Books*

Wittgenstein 1958 Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

PG *Philosophical Grammar*

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WL 35 *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 1932-35: From the Notes of Alice Ambrose and Margaret Macdonald*

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Wahrnehmung und Wahrnehmungsurteil

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Seit es die Unterscheidung zwischen der Wahrnehmung und dem Wahrnehmungsurteil gibt, stellt sich die Frage nach deren Wechselverhältnis. Wahrnehmung steht für die sinnliche Erfahrung eines wahrnehmenden Subjektes, während das Wahrnehmungsurteil mit sprachlicher Struktur und begrifflicher Allgemeinheit verbunden ist. In der Philosophiegeschichte lassen sich zwei Extrempositionen nachzeichnen, die eine Antwort auf die Frage nach dem Wechselverhältnis darstellen. Innerhalb der phänomenologischen Tradition und der ihr zugrunde liegenden klassischen Urteilstheorie rückt die Sprache in eine Position der Entfremdung gegenüber dem Bereich ursprünglich-sinnlicher Erfahrung. Die extreme These besteht darin, den Zugriff des Allgemeinen auf die sinnliche Erfahrung als einen notwendigen Verlust des ursprünglich-sinnlichen Gehaltes zu verstehen. Damit tut sich zwischen der Wahrnehmung und der sprachlichen Bezugnahme eine Kluft auf, deren Überwindung eine immense Erklärungsleistung der philosophischen Theorie fordert.

Auf der anderen Seite steht eine vornehmlich analytische Position, die insbesondere auf Frege und Wittgenstein zurückgeht und die ich die extrem-logizistische Position nennen möchte, derzufolge die Wahrnehmung immer schon eingenommen von der Art des begrifflichen Zugriffs ist. Exemplarisch für diese Position ist der Ausspruch Wittgensteins: „Wie erkenne ich, daß diese Farbe Rot ist? - Eine Antwort wäre: 'Ich habe deutsch gelernt.'“ (Wittgenstein 1984, 400). Diese Position ist teilweise auch innerhalb der phänomenologischen Tradition – durch hermeneutische Ansätze (z.B. durch Gadamer) – vertreten: Der intentionale Gehalt der Wahrnehmung wird vorgängig mit dem propositionalen Gehalt identifiziert. Wahrnehmen ist immer schon ein Auffassen *als etwas*. Ein für diese Position geltend gemachtes Argument besteht darin, dass außerhalb sprachlicher Bezugnahme solche „ursprünglich-sinnlichen Gehalte“ gar nicht individuiert werden könnten.

So steht die auf der Unhintergebarkeit der Sprache beharrende Position gleichsam verkeilt mit der auf einer gewissen Evidenz gestützten Position sinnlicher Gewissheit – einer Position, die den spezifischen Gehalt der Wahrnehmung oder Erfahrung nicht schon vorgängig in der Sprache aufgehoben wissen will - als sei dieser Gehalt dem Subjekt der Wahrnehmung immer schon entzogen und in starren sprachlichen Formen veräußert. Gegen die genannten Alternativen sprechen einige elementare Intuitionen. Mit der linguistischen Wende ist unser Zugang zur Welt als sprachlich vermittelt zu verstehen, so dass die Annahme einer Kluft zwischen sinnlicher Wahrnehmung und Sprache obsolet wirkt. Gleichwohl erscheint es problematisch, den Gehalt von Wahrnehmungsurteilen auf durch die Prädikate immer schon getroffene Unterscheidungen zurückzuführen, weil damit ein zu enger Begriff von Wahrnehmung und zugleich die Sprache nicht genügend in ihrer Offenheit für noch Ausdrückendes gefasst ist.

Im Folgenden möchte ich die Urteilstheorien betrachten, welche grundlegend sind für die Beantwortung der Frage nach dem Wechselverhältnis zwischen Wahrnehmung und Wahrnehmungsurteil. Diese Urteilstheorien haben Auskunft darüber zu geben, worauf ein allgemeiner Begriff

Bezug nimmt, wenn er innerhalb eines Urteils einen einzelnen Gegenstand charakterisiert. Im Anschluss werde ich eine sich an Tugendhat anschließende Kritik formulieren, die Voraussetzungen aufdeckt, innerhalb derer eine solche Auskunft zum Problem wird und die die genannten Extrempositionen provoziert.

Die Phänomenologie teilt mit der vor allem durch Hegel und Kant geprägten Tradition eine Urteilstheorie, die den Aussagesatz als eine Synthesis zwischen Subjekt und Prädikat versteht. (Vgl. Tietz 1996.) Subjekt und Prädikat sind formal durch das Wörtchen „ist“, die Kopula, verbunden. Das Prädikat steht dabei für einen mentalen Gegenstand, für eine Wesenheit wie zum Beispiel ‚die Röte‘. So ist beispielsweise das Schloss mit der Röte verbunden. Dass etwas als rot eingeordnet werden kann, ist nur mit Rekurs auf diesen allgemeinen Begriff von Röte zu erklären. Gefragt, was die Fähigkeit ausmacht, Prädikate auf neue Beispiele anzuwenden, würde ein Mentalist antworten, dass man dafür eine Idee von diesem Identischen – der Röte – haben müsse. Der Rekurs auf mentale Gegenstände, auf Konzepte oder Vorstellungen, wie er sich in der Synthesistheorie nahelegt, kann jedoch als Antwort nicht genügen. Ein Begriff, der für einen Gegenstand steht, soll hier einen anderen, realen Gegenstand, charakterisieren. Dabei steht er selbst nicht für einen realen Gegenstand, sondern für eine mentale Entität, eine Bedeutung, die nun gleichsam aus der Luft gegriffen werden muss. Die klassische Urteilstheorie stellt den Boden dar für eine Auffassung, nach der die begriffliche Ordnung diejenige ist, welche gleichsam von außen strukturierend auf das durch die Sinne gelieferte Material zugreift.

Eine Auffassung, die die Schwierigkeiten der Synthesistheorie des Urteils zu überwinden versucht, versteht die Prädikate aus ihrer Charakterisierungsfunktion. Im Urteil wird ein Gegenstand, vertreten durch einen singulären Terminus, bestimmt durch einen Begriff, ein Prädikat. Einen Gegenstand durch ein Prädikat zu charakterisieren, heißt, ihn als Fall einer bestimmten Eigenschaft gelten zu lassen, die auch auf andere Gegenstände zutrifft, und die ihn von anderen Klassen von Gegenständen unterscheidet. Die Charakterisierungsfunktion des Prädikates besteht also im Klassifizieren und Unterscheiden. Mit Wittgenstein verstehen wir die Bedeutung eines Begriffes, wenn wir seinen Gebrauch in der Sprache kennen. Die Bedeutung des Prädikates soll dabei nicht mehr auf die Vorstellung von etwas Identischem, auf einen mentalen Gegenstand zurückgeführt werden, sondern der Verweis auf die je einzelnen Beispiele seiner Verwendung hat für die Erläuterung zu genügen, so dass umgekehrt die Bedeutung durch diese Anwendungsbeispiele dargestellt werden kann.

Doch auch hier stellt sich die Frage, was die Fähigkeit ausmacht, ein Prädikat auf verschiedene Gegenstände anzuwenden. Muss nicht doch auf so etwas wie die Vorstellung eines allen Beispielen gemeinsamen Merkmales oder das Bewusstsein einer Regel rekurriert werden, um die Anwendung des Begriffes zu erklären? Wie steht es mit der Fähigkeit, diesen Begriff auf neue Beispiele anzuwenden, die es vorher noch nicht gegeben hat? Ist eine bestimmte Idee der Röte (jener Röte, die allen roten Dingen gemeinsam ist) die Voraussetzung

dafür, einem Gegenstand das Gleiche zuschreiben zu können wie vorhin dem anderen, nämlich *dass er rot ist?* Auch wenn man die Synthesistheorie des Urteils aufgegeben und sich einer Gebrauchstheorie der Bedeutung verschrieben hat, bleibt weiterhin fraglich, ob der alleinige Verweis auf Beispiele der Anwendung genügt, um die Bedeutung der Prädikate und damit die Richtigkeit ihrer Verwendung erklären zu können. Wenn das Gleichartige, das in der Charakterisierung durch ein bestimmtes Prädikat den durch dieses klassifizierten Gegenständen zukommt, nicht in einer Idee liegt, nicht an einem abstrakten Gegenstand festgemacht werden kann, wodurch ist es sonst begründet? Liegt die Gleichartigkeit bereits in unserer Weise, wahrzunehmen, und wenn ja, wie wird sie in den Begriffen aufgenommen und welchen Einfluss hat die sprachliche Ordnung auf die Wahrnehmungsstrukturen?

Innerhalb einer Theorie, die das Urteil nicht mehr als eine Synthesis zwischen Subjekt und dem gegenständlich aufgefasstem Allgemeinen versteht, muss das Wechselverhältnis zwischen Sinnlich-Einzelnem und Sprachlich-Allgemeinem als ein Vermittlungsverhältnis gedacht werden. Hier droht aber die Tendenz, dieses Vermittlungsverhältnis so eng anzusetzen, dass die Struktur der Wahrnehmung immer schon bestimmt von sprachlichen Unterscheidungen ist. Die Fähigkeit, etwas den einzelnen Eindrücken Gemeinsames zu erfassen, wird dann als sprachliche Kompetenz und im Extrem als bloßes Ergebnis sprachlicher Prädikation verstanden. Searle drückt dieses Vermittlungsverhältnis so aus, dass die intentionalen Gehalte der Wahrnehmung mit den propositionalen Gehalten identisch sind: „all seeing is seeing that“ (Searle 1983, 40). Auch Mittelstraß vertritt eine Position, die ich der extrem-logizistischen zuordne: Neue Unterscheidungen werden immer nur als Fortsetzung und Abwandlung bestehender Unterscheidungen angewendet. (Mittelstraß 1967) Es sind dabei die Prädikate, welche eine Gliederung der Wahrnehmung nach Gleichartigkeit erst ermöglichen. Eine Wahrnehmung von Ähnlichkeiten wäre demzufolge als eine rein sprachliche Kompetenz zu werten. Tugendhats schlagender Einwand gegen eine solche Annahme lautet, dass wir sprachliche Zeichen selbst bereits als gleichartige wahrnehmen müssen, bevor sich uns sprachliche Unterscheidungen überhaupt mitteilen können. (Tugendhat 1976, 202) Diese Kritik stellt die Annahme einer rein sprachlich konstituierten Unterscheidungsfähigkeit in Frage und muss der logizistischen Position entgegengehalten werden.

Da die Problematik der geschilderten Extrempositionen auch nach einer Überwindung der Synthesistheorie des Urteils bestehen bleibt, scheint ihre Wurzel tiefer zu liegen. Es ist nicht allein die nun fehlende Möglichkeit, den Bezug auf einen mentalen Gegenstand, auf die Idee einer den einzelnen Erscheinungen gemeinsamen Eigenschaft, voranzusetzen, die die Vermittlung des Sinnlich-Einzelnem mit dem Sprachlich-Allgemeinem problematisch macht. Problematisch ist die Konstellation selbst.

Die Konstellation weist auf ein Dogma, das seit Aristoteles in philosophischen Theorien der Wahrnehmung zu finden ist. Dieses Dogma besagt, dass die Wahrnehmung sich auf das Einzelne richtet. (Aristoteles, *De Anima*, 417b) Demgegenüber steht das Allgemeine, bezeichnet durch den sprachlichen Ausdruck. Mit dem Akt der Abstraktion wird von den Besonderheiten des Einzelnen abgesehen, um den Blick auf das den verschiedenen Einzelfällen Gemeinsame, sich Wiederholende zu richten. Darin besteht die Aufgabe der Wissenschaft, als Lehre von den allgemeinen Gesetzen. Auch Locke versteht die Wahrnehmung als erste Quelle einfacher Ideen, die als noch

uninterpretiertes Material für die Verarbeitung und Verallgemeinerung durch den menschlichen Verstand dienen. Die Verallgemeinerung wird erst mit dem sprachlichen Ausdruck vollzogen. Diese Auffassung kann als Paradigma eines empiristischen Ansatzes gelten. (Kambartel 1968, 23f.)

Ist es aber tatsächlich so, dass wir radikal einzelne Sinneserfahrungen erst mithilfe der Sprache, also mithilfe unserer Begriffe nach Gesichtspunkten der Gemeinsamkeit strukturieren? Dafür soll noch einmal die prädikative Struktur des Urteils herangezogen werden. Im Urteil wird ein Prädikat einem einzelnen Gegenstand zugeschrieben. „Gegenstand“ ist im weiteren Sinne zu verstehen und kann auch ein Erlebnis, eine Situation oder ein Prozess sein. Die Einzelheit kann hier allerdings nicht *kategorial* von der Allgemeinheit unterschieden werden, sondern steht mit ihr in einem *logischen* Wechselverhältnis. Beide müssen als funktional gleichursprünglich angesehen werden. Nur auf der Ebene des Urteils kann überhaupt zwischen Einzelem und Allgemeinem unterschieden werden, indem das Allgemeine von einem einzelnen Gegenstand ausgesagt wird. Das Einzelne ist immer das Einzelne eines Allgemeinen und umgekehrt. Einzelnes und Allgemeines sind als sich ergänzende und korrelativ aufeinander bezogene Ausdrücke bereits logische Phänomene, von denen keines sinnlicher und ursprünglicher ist als das andere. (Vgl. Tugendhat 1976, 203.) Die Aufstufung des sinnlich-konkreten, noch von keinem Begriff beanspruchten Beispiels und der auf es zugreifenden begrifflichen Ordnung kann also nicht aufrechterhalten werden. Konkret kann nur ein Beispiel sein, das bereits unter dem Blickwinkel einer Allgemeinheit gesehen wird. Daraus wird deutlich, dass nicht zuerst 'nackte' Beispiele gegeben sind, die dann noch geordnet und eingeteilt werden müssten.

Solange der Wahrnehmung die Kategorie der Einzelheit zugeschrieben wird, stellt sich das Problem, wie dieses Sinnlich-Einzelnem mit dem Sprachlich-Allgemeinem vermittelt ist. Die Synthesistheorie des Urteils stellt eine Antwortstrategie dar, indem sie die Allgemeinheit des Begriffes über den Bezug auf mentale Gegenstände erklärt. Auch die logizistische Extremposition stellt eine Reaktion darauf dar, indem sie die Vermittlung selbst durch sprachliche Strukturen erläutert. Das Problem besteht für beide darin, dass in der Wahrnehmung keine Entsprechung zur Struktur sprachlicher Allgemeinheit angenommen werden kann, sondern diese ihr nur von außen auferlegt werden kann.

Es ist die Projizierung einer kategorialen Unterscheidung auf ein ursprünglich logisches Wechselverhältnis, die der Wahrnehmung den Charakter des Sinnlich-Einzelnem zuspricht. Wird diese Projektion aufgegeben, entfällt auch das Problem, auf das die extremen Positionen zu antworten versuchen, und damit auch ihre Plausibilität. Das eröffnet neue Möglichkeiten für die Wahrnehmungstheorie. Wahrnehmung kann als kategorial verschieden vom Wahrnehmungsurteil verstanden werden, ohne dass sich deshalb zwischen ursprünglich-sinnlichen Gehalten und den propositionalen Gehalten von Wahrnehmungsurteilen eine Kluft auftun muss. Es kann daran festgehalten werden, dass es in der Wahrnehmung eine vorprädikative Diskriminationsfähigkeit gibt. Die Wahrnehmung auch sprachfähiger Menschen geht zudem nicht notwendig mit einem Urteil einher. Ein weiteres unterscheidendes Merkmal ist, dass der sinnliche Gehalt einer Wahrnehmung im Gegensatz zum Gehalt einer Überzeugung unrevidierbar ist. Auch dort, wo ein Aspekt des Wahrnehmungsgehaltes zugleich der Gehalt eines Urteils ist, erschöpft sich die Wahrnehmung nicht in dem für dieses Urteil relevanten propositionalen Gehalt. Häufig wird nach

sprachlichen Ausdrücken erst noch gesucht oder gilt es, neue Erfahrungen zu beurteilen.

Gleichzeitig kann der Wahrnehmungsgehalt auch als begrifflich vermittelt verstanden werden, ohne dass die Struktur der Wahrnehmung auf sprachliche Strukturen zurückgeführt werden muss. Wir können nun von einer Wahrnehmung nach Ähnlichkeiten ausgehen, die eine natürliche Grundlage dafür darstellt, das je Gemeinsame und das je Einzelne des schon als gleichartig Wahrgenommenen begrifflich auszudrücken. Diese Wahrnehmung nach Gleichartigkeit soll dabei nicht die Allgemeinheit eines Begriffes *fundieren*; sie kann das Verfügen über solche Begriffe nicht erklären, da dafür andere Fähigkeiten vorausgesetzt werden müssen. Dazu gehört, wie Quine schreibt, das *gleichzeitige* Verfügen über die Begriffe der Identität, Einzelheit und Allgemeinheit. (Quine 1960, 102) Diese Struktur der Wahrnehmung kann aber eine weniger rätselhafte Grundlage für die Anwendung von Begriffen auf Gegenstände der Wahrnehmung darstellen. Das Allgemeine, wie es durch ein Prädikat ausgedrückt wird, stellt zwar eine neue Stufe der Interpretation jener Wahrnehmung von Gleichartigkeit dar. Die Bedeutung eines Begriffes lässt sich aber doch erklären, indem auf die je einzelnen Anwendungsfälle verwiesen wird. Die Gleichartigkeit muss nicht als ein Gegenstand des Bewusstseins oder der Theorie gegeben sein. Begriffe zwingen uns, in einem noch unbestimmten Feld von Ähnlichkeiten Trennungen zu ziehen, die Gleichartiges von Verschiedenem, Identisches von Nichtidentischem trennen; sie geben uns aber nicht erst die Fähigkeit, etwas überhaupt als gleichartig wahrnehmen zu können. Hier liegt eine Gemeinsamkeit zwischen sinnlicher Erfahrung und Begrifflichkeit, die Anknüpfungsmöglichkeiten herstellt, ohne die Souveränität beider Bereiche in Frage zu stellen.

Die Perspektive, die sich damit eröffnet, besteht darin, den Bereich der Wahrnehmung oder einer ursprünglich-sinnlichen Erfahrung als etwas fassen zu können, das sich weder in Kategorien bestimmen lässt, die den sprachlichen Ausdrucksmöglichkeiten vorausliegen und sich wesentlich von diesen unterscheiden, die somit von der Sprache niemals in adäquater Weise wiedergegeben werden können, noch aber in Kategorien, die durch sprachliche Begriffe immer schon festgelegt sind. Wenn beiden problematischen Alternativen – keinen Bereich sinnlicher Gegebenheit anzunehmen, der von der Sprache erst gegliedert wird, und zugleich der Sprache keinen solchen Vorsprung zu geben, dass die Wahrnehmung von ihr immer schon eingeholt wäre – von vornherein aus dem Weg gegangen wird, so liegt die Relevanz eines solchen Ansatzes nicht zuletzt darin, Sprache nicht als das Ergebnis einer immer schon hinter den Sprechern vollzogenen Welterschließung anzusehen, sondern ihr ein kreatives Potential zuzugestehen. Zu diesem Potential gehört auch die Offenheit und Vermittelbarkeit von sinnlichen Gehalten der Wahrnehmung.

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Some Remarks on the Editing and Publishing of *Zettel*

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1)

The German-English version of *Zettel* (hereafter Z) was published in 1967 with the number '6' on the spine. The number indicates the order of posthumous publication by Blackwell: vol. 1 is *Philosophical Investigations* (PI) published in 1953; vol. 2 *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* (RFM), in 1956; vol. 3 *The Blue and Brown Books* (BB), in 1958; vol. 4 *Notebooks 1914-1916*, in 1961; and vol. 5 *Philosophische Bemerkungen* (PB, German only), in 1964. Vol. 7 *On Certainty* (OC), in 1969 and vol. 8 *Philosophische Grammatik* (PG, German only), in 1969, followed.

2)

The order shows that these works were not published systematically. As I discussed in Oku (2002), the literary executors of Wittgenstein felt that they had to publish his *Nachlass* urgently, because, at the time of his death, he was world-famous only as the author of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Urgent publishing was successful, but it caused criticisms concerning editing: two texts (TS 227 & TS 234) were used to make up PI, as if they made a well-related whole (for a skeptical comment, see von Wright 1981); the selection principle for RFM is not clear (Oku 2002); and Rhees' editing of PG was severely criticized (Kenny 1984 and Hilmy 1987).

3)

In the last 50 years, Wittgenstein became world-famous (not as the author of TLP only), and his books long sellers. In addition to the published works, we also have the Cornell Copy and the WAB/OUP database. It is high time we assessed Z, a work which has not been evaluated appropriately. My assessment is made from three angles: a) assessment concerning the editing of Z, b) assessment concerning the historical significance of the publication of Z, and c) assessment of the value of the remarks themselves, i.e., whether the box which contained the *Zettel* remarks was a dustbox or a jewellery box.

4) Assessment concerning the editing of Z (TS 233)

The present report is the result of examining the Editors' Preface of Z and the Cornell Copy and the WAB/OUP (Oku 2005).

a) The remarks printed in Z were probably found as fragments in a box like TS 212, whose image can be seen in the WAB/OUP.

b) On behalf of the executors, Peter Geach arranged the fragments and pasted them into 2 notebooks. They are called *Zettel I* and *Zettel II*, or TS 233a and TS 233b.

c) The reason why Geach pasted them into notebooks rather than into loose-leaf folios is unclear. He pasted them leaving no space between fragments, and he cut some fragments and pasted them on two consecutive

pages of the notebooks. And he paged the notebooks. Thus, the fragments are fixed into the notebooks.

d) However, some fragments were not pasted. They were inserted into appropriate places at the time of printing. In The Cornell Copy, they were placed on the relevant pages and photographed together. Therefore, for instance, in the Cornell Copy, page 5 of *Zettel II* contains three leaves. In the WAB/OUP, these two additional fragments are photographed separately and called TS 233b-5a and TS 233-5b.

e) The WAB/OUP is more reliable than the Cornell Copy. For example, Z #648 and Z #717, which were later inserted, are not included in the Cornell Copy, however, in the WAB/OUP they are included at the end of TS 233b.

f) The exact process of printing Z, namely whether the extant two notebooks themselves were sent to the printer for typesetting or not, is unknown. However, I guess that a different typescript copy was made for printing for several reasons. Firstly, to typeset from TS 233 is terribly difficult. Secondly, for example, the remark that is now Z #354 does not occur in TS 233; this was added by the editors. Thirdly, Anscombe was translating Z into English while printing was prepared.

g) Thus, I am inclined to think, the editors had to make another copy of the typescript for printing. If the fragments had been pasted in loose leaf folios rather than in bound notebooks, much work would have been saved.

h) I do not have the slightest intention to underestimate Geach's effort. He had to retype some remarks from TS 228 and TS 232. We can confirm this through the use of different carriages and type faces and through English comments in the midst of texts, for example, "Crossed out and marked with a big ink query." (TS 233b-38.1 Z #567) and "in the margin alongside the whole of 701 and 702" (TS 233b-37.2 Z #559).

i) We find some misplacements of the fragments. A famous one is the one that concerns the "plan for the treatment of psychological concepts." The original typescript is TS 232 #63, pp. 615-616. However, the first half, p. 615, is now Z #472, and the latter half, p. 616, is now Z #483. In my opinion, such limited number of mistakes was unavoidable considering the difficult task of editing. Some amendments were made in the Suhrkamp edition of 1979.

j) However, I must add a critical comment against the executors and their representatives. Into the TS 228 and TS 232, someone wrote down directly Z section number for reference. Judging from the standard treatment of historically important textual materials, their treatment of Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* is lacking in delicacy, to say the least.

5) Assessment concerning the historical significance of publishing *Zettel*

a) First of all, let me comment on the case of TS 234 (PI Part II). TS 234 is a typescript independent from TS 227, but they were published in 1951 in one book. Though TS 234 has been lost, we can trace the roots of PI Part II. PI

Part II is made up of selections, some of which are partly revised, from TS 229, TS 232, MSS 137-138, and MS 169. These source materials have been published in a book form: *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology I* in 1980, *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology II* in 1980, *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology I* in 1981, and the Chapter 1 of *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology II* in 1992, respectively. In other words, we were able to read some selections from Wittgenstein's post-Second World War works at a very early time.

b) A similar point holds with regard to *Zettel*. According to my rough counting (Oku 2005), of 717 sections in Z, 626 sections are based on TS 228, TS 229, or TS 232. Z was published in 1967. On the other hand, TS 228 has not been published yet. In the meantime, Z has become an important source book for studying Wittgenstein's philosophy; no one can deny its historical significance.

6) Evaluation of the remarks in *Zettel*. A dustbox or a jewellery box?

a) For the assessment, firstly I would like to examine von Wright's classical article 'The Origin and Composition of the *Philosophical Investigations*' (von Wright 1981). According to him, at one stage Wittgenstein made a typescript *Bemerkungen I* (TS 228). This is a selection from his older materials, and the order of the remarks of TS 228 followed the original MSS and TSS, and their sections. Then Wittgenstein made another typescript *Bemerkungen II* (TS 230). This is a rearrangement of TS 228 according to the contents of the remarks.

b) I (Oku 2005) checked the remarks in TS 228 and traced their roots, and confirmed von Wright's description. In TS 228, remarks from MS 116 come first, then, remarks from MS 129, MS 117, MS 115, etc. Moreover, the extant copy of TS 228 contains many handwritten amendments, and these corrections are reflected in TS 230 with some further amendments.

c) However, if von Wright's description suggests a flow of texts from TS 228 via TS 230 into PI, then the suggestion is misleading. Changes in TS 230 are not reflected in PI. This is the most important suggestion in my report.

d) I compared the remarks of TS 233 (Z) taken from TS 228 with the extant copy of TS 228, and I discovered that corrections made in the two typescripts are not identical. Namely, some corrections are in the one typescript and not in the other. And even in those cases where corrections are made in both of the corresponding sections, the overall texts are generally not identical.

e) Then, I compared the sections of PI Part I taken from TS 228 with the extant copy of TS 228, and the results were similar, namely, the amendments in the extant copy of TS 228 are not reflected in PI, and some sections of TS 228 origin in PI have different amendments.

f) Then, I checked the PI passages of TS 228 origin and the Z passages of TS 228 origin, and I found that apart from few exceptions, these passages do not overlap.

g) My conclusion is this: besides the extant copy of TS 228, Wittgenstein had another copy of TS 228 and, independently of the amendments made on the extant TS 228, he made different amendments on this other copy of TS 228. Then, he cut this typescript into pieces, some of them were selected and used to make TS 227, the text for PI Part I, and most of the others were kept in a box.

h) I would like to add a comment that concerns a detail about TS 228. It is well known that PI Part I has some remarks as footnotes at the bottom of 11 pages. According to the editors, they are from the slips inserted into TS 227. All of them are of TS 228 origin. I guess that after the first selection for TS 227, Wittgenstein made another selection for his book. According to my counting, of 698 sections of TS 228, only 67 were discarded or disappeared: they are included neither in PI nor in Z.

i) Now, remarks printed in PI or Z, and those in extant TS 228 and TS 230, often have variations. This is very important for Wittgenstein studies. I would like to show a very interesting case.

j) PI #580: "An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria."

This remark was made very famous by the dispute concerning Wittgenstein's position and its relation to behaviourism. This section is from TS 228 #588. In the extant copy of TS 228, Wittgenstein added scare quotes to the phrase 'outward criteria' in handwriting, and TS 230 follows this instruction. However, in PI we do not find the scare quotes.

k) The scare quotes imply that the author has some dubious feelings for the concept or, at least, does not accept it naively. We can use this correction as one evidence that Wittgenstein is not an out-and-out behaviourist.

l) However, in TS 227 and PI, the phrase 'outward criteria' appears without scare quotes. Does this mean that Wittgenstein changed his mind again? I do not think so. In the sense I have shown elsewhere (Oku 1998), Wittgenstein was not a careful writer. Therefore, for a careful study of his philosophy, crossreferencing of his texts is very important. TS 233 (Z) contains many variants and some original texts. In this sense, the suspicion, if there is any, of *Zettel* being a "dustbox" is cleared.

7)

There remains to be discussed some other things; for instance, remarks in TS 233 which have other sources than the ones discussed in this paper; also, on a more general level, Wittgenstein's principle of selection from his first materials. I would like to talk about these on other occasions.

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Zur Theorie der Intentionalität bei France Weber

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
In diesem Beitrag soll die Theorie der Intentionalität erörtert werden, welche der slowenische Philosoph und Meinong-Schüler France Weber in seiner umfangreichen im Jahre 1928 publizierten Schrift „Problem predstavne produkcije“ („Über das Problem der Vorstellungsproduktion“) entwickelt hat. Diese Abhandlung, welche Weber selbst als die „allererste Anbahnung einer neuen und erst zu schaffenden gesamten *Aktivitätspsychologie* (nicht 'Akt-psychologie')“ (Weber 1928, 114) bezeichnet, ist wesentlicher Bestandteil des Beginns seiner „personalistischen“ Periode (etwa bis 1934), in welcher er sich vor allem mit dem Verhältnis zwischen Erlebnissen und dem Erlebnissubjekt beschäftigte, woraus seine Philosophie der Persönlichkeit entsprang. In der erwähnten Abhandlung behandelt er die so genannte „Theorie der Vorstellungsproduktion“, die von der Grazer Schule entwickelt wurde und mit einer Theorie von Gegenständen höherer Ordnung verbunden war. Wie erfassen wir solche Gegenstände, wie erfassen wir z.B. eine Melodie oder die Verschiedenheit von zwei Farben? Die Grazer Schule vertrat die Meinung, dass man derlei nicht direkt wahrnehmen kann, sondern dass derartige Gegenstände mit Hilfe der so genannten Vorstellungsproduktion erfasst werden. Weber hat diese (Grazer) Theorie der Vorstellungsproduktion in mehreren Hinsichten modifiziert. Unter Vorstellungsproduktion versteht er ein ursprüngliches Übergehen vom passiven zum entsprechenden aktiven Vorstellen. Er unterscheidet verschiedene Arten von Vorstellungsproduktion, und zwar inhaltliche, aktmäßige und intentionale Produktion, welche weiter in zahlreiche Unterarten zerfallen. Außerdem postuliert Weber eine psycho-physische und surrogative Produktion, bei welchen es sich um ein ursprüngliches Gewinnen von Empfindungen bzw. von Raum- und Zeitvorstellungen handelt. Im Folgenden wird Webers Theorie der intentionalen Vorstellungsproduktion, in welcher er sich von der Theorie der Grazer Schule signifikant entfernt hat, eingehender dargestellt.

1. Die nicht-intentionalen Erlebnisse

Im Anschluss an Meinong unterscheidet Weber bei jedem Vorstellen (was im Allgemeinen für jedes Erlebnis gilt) ein Dreifaches: Erlebnisinhalt, Akt und Gegenstand. Inhalt und Akt sind dabei etwas Psychisches, ein Teil des Vorstellens. Ihnen kommen nach Weber verschiedene Funktionen zu: Während vom Inhalt abhängt, was wir uns vorstellen, gibt der Akt Antwort auf die Frage, wie wir uns dies vorstellen; dabei unterscheidet er zwischen „echtem“ und „unechtem“ Vorstellen (in Meinong'scher Terminologie werden Ernst- und Phantasieerlebnisse einander gegenübergestellt). Nach Weber sind Inhalt und Akt des Vorstellens miteinander untrennbar verbunden; wir können sie nur mittels einer logischen Analyse getrennt behandeln, sie sind nämlich logische Komponenten des Vorstellens. Der Gegenstand andererseits ist nicht-psychischer Natur und ist vom Vorstellen unabhängig. Diese Ausführungen finden sich in Webers Frühschriften; später legt er eine völlig neue Analyse der Intentionalität vor.

In der Abhandlung von 1928 meint Weber, dass die Intentionalität des Vorstellens mit der Inhalts- bzw. Aktkomponente des Vorstellens allein nicht gegeben ist, sondern als dessen besondere reale (und nicht logische)

Komponente zu betrachten ist, welche „beide Fragen [betrifft], auf was die Vorstellung gerichtet und wie sie auf dieses was gerichtet ist. Kurz: die Intentionalität betrifft die ganze Vorstellung und kann schon deswegen nicht nur mit ihrer Inhalts- und auch nicht nur mit der Aktkomponente gegeben sein“ (Weber 1928, 78). Dass die Intentionalität des Vorstellens mit der inhaltlich-aktmäßigen Struktur nicht gleichzusetzen ist, ergibt sich im Weiteren aus der Tatsache, dass der inhaltlich-aktmäßigen Struktur des Vorstellens auf der gegenständlichen Seite kein Gegenstand als solcher entspricht. Weber meint nämlich, dass jeder Gegenstand – analog den Erlebnissen – aus zwei Komponenten besteht (siehe Weber 1928, 79, Anm. 22), und zwar aus einer Gegenstands- und einer Faktizitätskomponente. Demgemäß ist dem Inhalt auf der gegenständlichen Seite eine Gegenstandskomponente und dem Akt eine Faktizitätskomponente zugeordnet. Dies könnte man schematisch auf folgende Weise darstellen:



Daraus folgt, dass die inhaltlich-aktmäßige Struktur des Vorstellens zu keinem Gegenstand führt, sondern „nur zur Gegenstands- oder Faktizitätsseite seiner Objekte oder höchstens noch zu der ‚Summe‘ der beiden Seiten“ (Weber 1928, 80, Anm. 22). Ferner behauptet Weber, dass die inhaltlich-aktmäßige Struktur des Vorstellens einen Gegenstand nur potentiell und noch nicht aktuell präsentiert; wir können uns einen Gegenstand erst dann tatsächlich präsentieren, wenn wir darauf intentional gerichtet sind. Dazu meint er, dass Akt und Inhalt des Vorstellens von der Intentionalität des Vorstellens real abtrennbar sind, was bedeutet, dass es wohl auch nicht-intentionale Vorstellungen gibt, welche lediglich die inhaltlich-aktmäßige Struktur besitzen und auf keinen bestimmten Gegenstand hinweisen. In diesem Sinne sind derartige Vorstellungen als nicht-intentionale zu bezeichnen. Dies steht genau genommen im Gegensatz zu Brentano, welcher die Existenz von gegenstandslosen Erlebnissen nicht zulässt. Diese Ansicht verfolgt Weber auch in seinem Buch *Filozofija* (Weber 1930) weiter, in welchem er zwischen vor- und nachintentionalen nicht-intentionalen Erlebnissen unterscheidet. (Siehe Weber 1930, 213ff.; sowie Sajama & Kamppinen 1987, 119f.)

Welche Erlebnisse sind nun nach Weber nicht-intentional? Da unsere Empfindungen bereits intentionalen Charakter besitzen, meint er, dass zu solchen Erlebnissen die „primitivsten und ursprünglichen“ Vorstellungen zu zählen sind, welche er mit einfachsten Empfindungen gleichsetzt. Als Beispiel für solche Empfindungen führt Weber jene Empfindungen an, welche wir im Tiefschlaf erleben und so genannte „Organempfindungen“. Nach Weber sind derartige nicht-intentionale Empfindungen primär und gehen allen Erlebnissen entwicklungsmäßig voraus. Ein Neugeborenes z.B. kann nur potentiell empfinden; sein Empfinden ist zwar inhaltlich-aktmäßig bestimmt, jedoch ist es noch auf keinen bestimmten Gegenstand gerichtet. Dazu behauptet Weber, dass ein intentionales Erlebnis sich zu einem nicht-intentionalen wandeln kann. Es kann einen intentionalen Charakter

bekommen bzw. verlieren, wie z.B. in dem Falle, wenn ich Konturen und Farben eines Baumes sehe, jedoch noch keine Vorstellung von diesem Baum habe, bzw. wenn ich mir einen Baum noch weiter vorstellen kann, obwohl ich ihn in der Tat nicht mehr sehe. Solche Erlebnisse haben nach Weber lediglich die inhaltlich-aktmäßige Struktur, sind aber nicht-intentional. In diesem Zusammenhang spricht er vom potentiellen bzw. vegetativen Vorstellen (dieser Ausdruck ist hier als Terminus technicus gebraucht). Derartiges Vorstellen hat keinen Gegenstand, weshalb ihm auf der gegenständlichen Seite kein Gegenstand, sondern „ein (positives) Nichts“ entspricht. Nach Weber ist das Nichts als positiv zu bezeichnen, insofern auf ihm andere Gegenstandskategorien aufbauen, wie z.B. „was“, „das“ und „darum“. Das vegetative Vorstellen ist ferner seiner Natur nach ein passives Erlebnis, auf welchem intentionale Vorstellungen aufbauen und für welche es eine notwendige Grundlage bildet.

2. Über die Stufen der Intentionalität des Vorstellens

Wie wir gesehen haben, nimmt Weber neben intentionalen auch nicht-intentionale Erlebnisse an. Außerdem meint er zu dieser Zeit, dass gewisse intentionale Erlebnisse, nämlich intentionale Vorstellungen, nicht einfach vorgegeben sind, sondern durch eine besondere psychische Tätigkeit zustande kommen, welche in der Grazer Schule „Vorstellungsproduktion“ genannt wurde. In diesem Zusammenhang unterscheidet Weber vier Intentionalitätsstufen: (a) Dem nicht-intentionalen Vorstellen auf unterster Stufe folgen bzw. es sind auf ihm aufgebaut: (b) Ein Vorstellen mit präsentierender Intentionalität, (c) ein isolatives und (d) ein rationales intentionales Vorstellen. Dabei gilt, dass jedes intentionale Vorstellen höherer Stufe vom jeweiligen niedrigeren Vorstellen abhängig ist bzw. auf ihm aufbaut: Isolatives Vorstellen baut unmittelbar also auf präsentierendem intentionalem Vorstellen und rationales Vorstellen zugleich auf isolativem und präsentierendem Vorstellen auf, während präsentierendes intentionales Vorstellen auf nicht-intentionalem Vorstellen fußt. Außerdem unterscheiden sich die erwähnten Erlebnisse ihrem Charakter nach: Sie sind entweder passiv oder aktiv, genauer gesagt: Jedes Erlebnis auf niedriger Intentionalitätsstufe ist als passiv und das entsprechende Erlebnis auf höherer Stufe ist als ein aktives Erlebnis zu betrachten, wobei es sich um das Produzieren des Vorstellens handelt, welches nach Weber als „das primäre Übergehen von der Vorstellungspassivität <...> auf den Punkt der beigeordneten Vorstellungsaktivität“ (Weber 1928, 105) zu definieren ist.

Wenden wir uns nun den einzelnen Intentionalitätsstufen zu.

I. Stufe: Das präsentierende Vorstellen

Auf der untersten Stufe findet sich das, was Weber „aktuelles Präsentieren“ nennt: Ein Gegenstand wird tatsächlich präsentiert – wenn wir einen Ton hören, haben wir die Vorstellung des Tones, wenn wir eine Farbe sehen, haben wir die Vorstellung der Farbe, wenn wir eine Temperatur empfinden, haben wir die Vorstellung der Temperatur usw. Ein Gegenstand wird hierbei zwar vorgestellt, jedoch wird er nicht als etwas Eigenes, als etwas Selbständiges erfasst. Deshalb bezeichnet ihn Weber mit dem Indefinitpronomen „was“.

II. Stufe: Das isolative Vorstellen

Diese Intentionalitätsstufe lässt sich mit einem Beispiel verdeutlichen (Weber 1928, 83): Wenn wir eine Fassade eines Gebäudes, welche mit Ornamenten bemalt ist, betrachten, erleben wir hierbei verschiedenartige Vorstellungen. Zunächst ist unser Vorstellen nicht-intentional, wie das Vorstellen einzelner Linien, Schatten, Farben usw. Danach wird dieser Vorstellungsgegenstand sozusagen „gleichmäßig“ präsentiert, was heißt, dass unser Vorstellen zwar als intentional zu bezeichnen ist, jedoch dabei die Fassade (sowie ihre Details) nicht als etwas Selbständiges erfasst werden. Dies geschieht erst auf der nächsten Intentionalitätsstufe, gewissermaßen in einem Augenblick, wenn „unser Präsentieren der gesamten Fassade gewissermaßen wogend, stürmisch [wird], als wir nämlich einige ihrer Teile vorstellungsmäßig sozusagen aus der Fülle anderer loszulösen und in diesem Sinne sie als eigene, selbsteigene Phänomene zu betrachten beginnen“ (Weber 1928, 84). Unter isolativem Vorstellen ist also ein Vorstellen zu verstehen, welches uns die Gegenstände als selbständige Entitäten, die sich von ihrem Hintergrund abheben, präsentiert. Einen derartigen Gegenstand bezeichnet Weber mit dem Wort „das“.

III. Stufe: Das rationale Vorstellen

Rationales (oder auch begriffliches) Vorstellen fußt auf beiden vorangehenden Vorstellungen, nämlich auf präsentierenden und auf isolativen Vorstellungen. Nach Weber ist ein derartiges Vorstellen „begründet“ oder „motiviert“, was bedeutet, dass wir zugleich wissen können, warum wir uns einen Gegenstand auf diese Weise vorstellen. Als Beispiel dafür wird die mathematische Definition eines Kreises als „einer solchen geschlossenen Linie, welche an allen ihren Punkten von einem Punkte, welcher außerhalb ihr sich befindet, gleich entfernt ist“ (Weber 1928, 85-86) angegeben. Wenn ich also einen Kreis betrachte, habe ich folgende Vorstellungen:

a) Mein Vorstellen ist zunächst potentiell präsentierend, was bedeutet, dass es zwar inhaltlich-aktmäßige Struktur besitzt, aber noch nicht auf den Kreis selbst intentional gerichtet ist.


b) Die zweite Vorstellung ist präsentierend intentional, insofern ich mir den Kreis in der Tat vorstelle, ihn aber noch nicht als etwas Selbständiges erfassen kann.

c) Ich kann nun den Kreis als selbständige Entität erfassen, welche sich von anderen Gegenständen und vom Hintergrund abhebt – mein Vorstellen ist also isolatives zu bezeichnen.

d) Mein Vorstellen ist rational, da ich schließlich auch den Grund kenne, warum ich ihn gerade so und nicht anders vorstelle – und zwar „weil“ der Kreis so und so beschaffen ist, *‘darum’* stellen wir ihn uns so und nicht anders vor“ (Weber 1928, 86). Für rationales Vorstellen ist es charakteristisch, dass es „diese Erscheinungen nicht nur zu seinen ‘Objekten’ oder ‘Gegenständen’, sondern zugleich zu seinen ‘Gründen’ oder ‘Motiven’ hat“ (Weber 1928, 86). Deshalb bezeichnet Weber solche Gegenstände mit dem Ausdruck „darum“. Dazu meint er, dass sich die Intentionalität bei Vorstellungen sozusagen „kumuliert“ (siehe Weber 1928, 105): Die Aktivität des isolativen Vorstellens z.B. umfasst zugleich die Aktivität des präsentierenden intentionalen Vorstellens. Oder wie Weber es ausdrückt: „ein jedes erfahrungsgemäss gegebene intentionale höhere Erlebnis bereits selbst zugleich das beigeordnete niederere Erlebnis ist und nicht umgekehrt“ (Weber 1928, 96).

3. Die neue Einteilung der Erlebnisse

Aufgrund der erwähnten verschiedenen Stufen der Intentionalität legt Weber eine neue Einteilung der Erlebnisse vor, welche von der (überkommenen) Klassifikation der Erlebnisse in vier Grundklassen, d.h. in Vorstellungen, Gedanken, Gefühle und Strebungen, durchaus unabhängig ist. Nach Webers Einteilung werden die Erlebnisse zunächst in zwei Klassen geteilt, und zwar in animalische und in geistige Erlebnisse. Animalische Erlebnisse zerfallen – in Weberscher Terminologie – ferner in nicht-intentionale oder vegetative Erlebnisse und in präsentierende intentionale Erlebnisse, geistige Erlebnisse dagegen spalten sich in isolative und rationale intentionale Erlebnisse auf. Diese Einteilung lässt sich schematisch folgendermaßen darstellen:



Zwischen diesen Erlebnissen sind verschiedene Beziehungen zu konstatieren: Geistige Erlebnisse sind von vegetativen abhängig, was so viel bedeutet, dass es einerseits Subjekte gibt, die ausschließlich animalische Erlebnisse besitzen, und andererseits Subjekte mit animalischen und geistigen Erlebnissen. Ähnliche Relationen lassen sich auch innerhalb der beiden Erlebnisklassen feststellen: Präsentierende Erlebnisse sind von nicht-intentionalen abhängig und ebenso sind rationale Erlebnisse von isolativen abhängig. Nach Webers Meinung ist seine neue Einteilung der Erlebnisse die grundlegendste Klassifikation und als von der Einteilung der Erlebnisse in vier Hauptklassen völlig unabhängig aufzufassen. Dafür gibt er die folgenden Gründe an: Die Erlebnisse besitzen nach „Grazer“ Einteilung „architektonische Struktur“, wobei die Erlebnisse höherer Ordnung notwendigerweise auf jenen niedrigerer Ordnung aufgebaut sind. Dabei sind Erlebnisse niedrigerer und höherer Ordnung von einander (in Webers Worten in Žekars Übersetzung) real-numerisch verschieden, was für die Erlebnisse nach „neuer (Weberscher)“ Einteilung nicht gilt. Wie schon erwähnt, akkumuliert und umfasst damit jedes Erlebnis auf höherer Stufe alle relevanten Erlebnisse auf niedrigeren Stufen: Isolatives Vorstellen ist zugleich als präsentierend intentional wie als inhaltlich-aktmäßig zu bezeichnen. Nach Weber besteht zwischen vegetativ-animalischen und geistigen Erlebnissen ein real-funktioneller Unterschied (siehe Weber 1928, 102, Anm. 30): Vegetativ-animalische Erlebnisse sind ohne geistige Erlebnisse möglich, während geistige Erlebnisse vegetativ-animalische Erlebnisse immer voraussetzen; zwischen beiden besteht also ein real-funktioneller Unterschied. Die neue Einteilung der Erlebnisse ermöglicht nach Weber auch eine Differenzierung der Subjekte, die dann in vegetative, animalische und geistige Subjekte geschieden werden, welche ihrerseits von einander qualitativ und unüberbrückbar verschieden sind.

Die Webersche Abhandlung über Vorstellungsproduktion, welche bis zum heutigen Tage in Slowenien (weitgehend) unbemerkt geblieben ist, ist für das Verständnis der weiteren philosophischen Entwicklung Webers von Bedeutung. Darüber hinaus bietet Webers Schrift einige interessante Gedanken an jenen an, welche sich mit der Philosophie und Psychologie der „Grazer Schule“ beschäftigen.

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The Anomalous Character of Experience

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According to Davidson, only beliefs can justify other beliefs. Arguing otherwise would mean falling into the Myth of the Given, the idea that we can separate the world's contribution to our mental states from our own conceptual contribution. McDowell has objected that all Davidson is left with are causal connections with the world, which could explain, but not justify, our beliefs, and our aim at truth. If experience were just an extra-conceptual impact, it would be outside the space of reasons (of justifications). A consequence of this is that our network of beliefs lacks any external constraint. Davidson finds himself in this situation, McDowell argues, because he has not being sensitive enough to the motivations behind embracing the myth. The solution is to go all the way and to accept that experience is already inside the conceptual network. By having concepts already operating in our sensibility, and by realizing that these conceptual capacities are subject to self-criticism and modification as they belong to our more abstract cognitive universe as well, experience can also play the role that is needed to serve as justification for our beliefs. So, we concede to Davidson that beliefs cannot be justified from outside the realm of reason, but experience does not need to be outside that realm.

It should be a consequence of Davidson's rejection of 'stimulus meaning', of his application of the principle of charity "across the board", that such a principle is applied to people's interacting with their environment through action, thought *and* experience. However, when it comes to experience, he seems to limit the application of the principle to the relation between the speaker and her sensory stimulation. But, is this rejecting the notion of stimulus meaning, or rather taking it too seriously? Why cannot Davidson apply the principle of charity, not just to beliefs, but also to conceptual perceptual episodes?

This extension has an added advantage. While Davidson's use of the principle of charity can be accused of verificationism given its insistence on the understanding of interpretation in terms of translation into the interpreter's system of beliefs, a rendering of charity that accepts the rational value of experience, opens up for him the possibility of other people's experiences and placings in the world being incorporated to the interpreter's own: "When the specific character of her thinking starts to come into view for us, we are (...) coming to share with her a standpoint *within* a system of concepts, a standpoint from which we can join her in directing a shared attention at the world, without needing to break out through a boundary that encloses the system of concepts" (McDowell 1994, 35f.). Truth dwells in this communion of meanings, unlike Davidson's projectionist reading of charity, in which any matching of world-views rests on the truth-conditions of the interpreter's beliefs.

If we take Davidsonian interpretation seriously, and if we allow for the subvenient base of the mind to include the interpretee's environment (i.e., if we take seriously that meanings are not in the head), we should extend anomalous monism all the way. Davidson defends the idea that two kinds of stories can be told about the world. One of them, the interpretative one, talks about people and public objects and it is normative and anomalous. The other, the causal one, comes after, and talks about organisms, atoms, and sensory irritations. The second is

merely descriptive while the first is justificatory. The world both causes and justifies our beliefs because we can talk about the world in the vocabulary of natural science and of natural language.

Davidson is happy with keeping separate our understanding of something placed in the nomological space of the natural sciences and of something placed in the space of reasons. Is the world left out of the space of reasons? McDowell thinks that it is. However, in a restricted sense, it is not. Davidson has no doubts about accounting for interpretation against the background of a public world, one which is organized and structured in terms of the ability to use a public language shared by interpreter and interpretee. The world, inasmuch as it plays this role in Davidson's theory of interpretation, is also subject to rational description. But, why have mental states and worldly states belonging to two kinds of description while demanding experience to be restricted to only one? How can both the rational and the causal aspects of the world pass through the bottleneck of sensation which, for Davidson, resonates only to the causal ones?

The anomalousness of the mental is accompanied by an anomalousness of the world, because the world (the *public* world) is not fixed independently of the rational connections which make communication possible. Sensory impressions could therefore be described from both vocabularies: *qua* physical events they are as blind as brain states or light-waves, but *qua* mental events they are appearances, and can be part of our world-views. What I am suggesting is that, in parallel to recognizing the brain as the physical enabling condition of the mind (without identifying them in any way), we can recognize a similar role for impacts in our nerve endings as enabling conditions for experience, without establishing one-to-one identifications. The latter impacts do occur (roughly) in the skin, but experiences do not. (Brain activity occurs in the brain, thought does not.) Experiences, like thoughts, have content, and contents are aspects of states of the world, which is on both sides of the skin. Nothing goes against telling a scientific story about the causal interactions of physical features of the world with physical features of the nervous system, with the skin as a border. But nothing motivates the position which divides the self, the world, and experience in parallel with the physical story, besides faith in scientism.

Awareness seems to be an important issue here. Davidson writes:

"Emphasis on sensation or perception in epistemological matters springs from the obvious thought: sensations are what connect the world and our beliefs, and they are candidates for justifiers because we are often aware of them. The trouble (...) is that the justification seems to depend on the awareness which is just another belief." (1986, 311)

Davidson, unlike McDowell, thinks that consciousness does not extend as far as sensations. This extension of consciousness, of the conceptual, allows McDowell to say that experience can play a justificatory, and not merely causal, role. However, why should the objects of consciousness be exclusively conceptual, i.e., why cannot conscious states have contents that are not subject to the

constraint of the normative and justificatory role reserved for conceptual content? Davidson's strongest argument against conceding a justificatory role to experience is that justification depends on awareness which is another belief. But granting him that experience cannot be thought of simultaneously as something given independently of any conceptual scheme and as something that plays a rational role, i.e., granting that experiences cannot be both independent of world-views and justificatory of them, is not granting that they cannot be justificatory of them. Rejecting the first conjunct is enough to do justice to Davidson's point. One wonders what independent motivation Davidson has to ignore this incorporation of experience to the rational network, besides the unquestioned naturalism which remains in Davidson's work after his criticism of Quine's. One suggestion is to extend Davidson's anomalousness from thought and the world to experience along the following lines: sensations are only causal intermediaries between our system of beliefs and the world. They cannot play a justificatory role; our beliefs are not about them. What our beliefs are about is events and objects in the world. Nevertheless, the world can be seen under two different descriptions which cannot be nomologically linked, given that one of them is not subject to nomological, but to interpretative and rational constraints. And from such an approach events are conceptual, rational, and holistic. The world, as a whole, serves both as a cause of our beliefs, and as justification. Brute impingements on our nervous system as well as perceptions can also be accommodated in this reading: the former are captured by nomological nets (given by neurophysiology and physics) while the latter are understood within a rational network (given by psychology understood as a humanistic and interpretative enterprise).

The former role is played by the world described by the natural sciences. The latter role is played by the intersubjective world, "reached out" by triangulation, in Davidson's metaphor (cf. Davidson 1982, 326f.). According to Davidson, to arrive at the idea of a world we need to be interpreters, and objectivity emerges from the comparison of points of view. This world is rational, because we have it from our primordial interpretative (pragmatic) standpoint. This standpoint is ineliminable and prior to any theoretical enterprise. Davidson insists on the rational, anomalous and holistic character of the mental, but he leaves out the fact that the mental embraces the world, and that the world, under this description, is also rational, anomalous and holistic. This is why an extension of anomalous monism to experience yields a kind of anomalous event dualism. This second label makes explicit the most disruptive consequence for Davidson: the need to give up a token-identity theory between mental events and physical events, a need for which I have argued elsewhere (Pinedo 2004). We can retain the aspiration that our interpretative and our nomological stories should be about the same reality, by avoiding a sharp separation between rational discourse and science. But this monism only works at the holistic level. It makes no sense to apply it to particular events. This is why substance monism is not incompatible with methodological dualism/pluralism. The alternative to materialism and dualism that this suggests ultimately rests on replacing the ontological perspective for a hermeneutical, interpretative and practical one. By giving up 'mind' as the central concept in the philosophy of mind in favour of that of 'person' we can escape the temptations of materialist monism and of dualism. The difficulties that both traditional theories have should be enough to motivate such a 'personological' perspective.

From Davidson we learn that mental characteristics cannot be reduced to physical ones. He has done a lot to avoid a reification of beliefs and meanings which would stimulate this kind of reductionism. However, Davidson retains the idea that mental or rational characteristics are realized or instantiated in well-defined physical entities, such as neural states. The extension of anomalous monism (which I have argued follows from his interpretative stance) makes this "narrow" identification difficult to comprehend. It is the whole mind that comes to view when we make sense of a creature, and particular beliefs or desires are only ascribed in a tentative (indeterminate, Davidson would say) way, i.e., in a way that makes them explanatorily interesting insofar as they carry with them a world-view *and a world*. But, considering that for him there is no Given, no independent facts, or objects, or worlds, how does the world enter the world-view?

Both, the argument against Davidson's token-identity theory and the recommendation to incorporate to experience the dual aspect (causal and rational) that Davidson is happy to concede to mind and reality stem from the following thought. Davidson gives two readings of his attack on the third dogma: one of them criticizes the separation of concepts and naked sensations. The second rejects the divorce between world-views or schemes and the universe. But, while he takes the first reading too seriously, he does not take the second seriously enough. From the first he derives the idea that our sensory interface with the world can only be causal if we want to avoid something external to our concepts justifying our picture of the world. This is too radical a retreat. After all, mental states can also be physical. The common, public objects of the world which "emerge" in our interpretation and, hence, are undetached from our rational framework are surely also physical. Why are seeings and hearings and feelings refused a place in our rational understanding of people? Why cannot our interpretative net try to capture the phenomenal aspects of someone's mental life?

Finally, Davidson is not radical enough with respect to the consequences of his second reading of the dismissal of the third dogma. This is shown in his attempt to stealthily introduce identities between mental events and physical events even though there is no place in our world-view for objects to have both rational and nomological sides. Semantics and epistemology are not independent enterprises for Davidson: meaning and belief go hand in hand. However, it is not just against the experiential given or content that Davidson's criticism is directed. The dualism under criticism is the dualism "of organizing system and something waiting to be organized (...)" (Davidson 1974, 189). The supposedly given entities waiting to be organized do not need to be experiences: "As for the entities that get organized (...) we may detect two main ideas: either it is reality (the universe, the world, nature), or it is experience (the passing show, surface irritations, sensory promptings, sense-data, the given)" (*ibid.*, pp.191-2). The rejection of the third dogma is the rejection of a separation between concepts and empirical contents, and a rejection of the separation of reality from concepts. Semantics leads to epistemology and epistemology leads to metaphysics. Once he admits that ontological matters cannot be established independently of knowledge, it seems unjustified to claim that only the objects and events picked up by the rational vocabulary are subject to the model which connects them. Mental events are holistic, but this alone does not make them more dependent on the framework where they belong than physical events and objects are with respect to the scientific model that relates them. Davidson is not entitled

to a stronger form of realism towards the physical than he is towards the mental. And, finally, the identities which he infers from his argument for anomalous monism do not fit any of our conceptual devices. Davidson is defenceless against the accusation that such identities must be noumenal. However, that there cannot be noumenal objects, or events, or characteristics, or whatever, is the point that the rejection of the scheme/content dualism makes.

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Intentionale Horizonte und epistemische Perspektivität

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Husserls Erweiterung seines Intentionalitätsbegriffs zum Konzept der intentionalen Horizonte ist in der Husserl-Rezeption erstaunlich wenig Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet worden. Erläuterungen zum Horizont-Begriff beziehen sich zumeist auf die Überlegung Husserls, jede Gegenstandsbestimmung verweise auf das Potential genauere Bestimmung in weiterer Forschung. Diese Feststellung ist nicht spektakulär und scheint keiner weiteren Reflexion bedürftig. Dreyfus (1982, 18 f.) wies auf eine andere, für die KI-Forschung interessante Lesart hin: Für Husserl gelte, dass jede mentale Repräsentation irgendeines intentionalen Gegenstands mit einem Kontext oder ‚Horizont‘ von Erwartungen bzw. Vorzeichnungen des Gegenstandstyps verbunden ist, die weitere Erfahrungsdaten strukturieren. Intelligenz als kontextbestimmte und zielgerichtete Aktivität werde auf diese Weise denkbar. Dieses Konzept brachte Dreyfus mit Minskys Modell der Rahmenstruktur des Wissens in Verbindung. Ausführlich setzten sich insbesondere Smith und McIntyre (1982) mit dem Horizont-Konzept auseinander und zeigten, wie die phänomenologische ‚Philosophie des Geistes‘ für semantische Fragen fruchtbar zu machen ist. Die Horizont-Intentionalität brachten sie in Beziehung zur Semantik möglicher Welten in der Carnapschen Tradition.

Diese Interpretationen deuten ‚Horizont‘ als Kontext möglicher Gegenstandsbestimmungen. Ich argumentiere im Folgenden, dass Husserl diesen Kontext spezifischer fasst, indem er Gegenstandsbestimmungen *thematischen* Sinnrahmen bzw. *epistemischen Perspektiven* zuordnet. Damit lässt sich seine Konzeption intentionaler Horizonte als *Pendant zur Theorie epistemischer Welten* im Sinne Cassirers und Goodmans bzw. zur Theorie der Pluralität *perspektivischer Weltbeschreibungen* (Rescher 2000, 131) verstehen. Während der symboltheoretische Ansatz und analytische Erkenntnistheorie aus einer externalistischen Perspektive die kulturellen Formen des Wissens reflektieren, nimmt der phänomenologische Ansatz methodisch beim individuellen Bewusstsein seinen Ausgangspunkt. Er führt in eine Theorie personalen Wissens und eine Bedeutungstheorie, die implizites Wissen als Hintergrund für Verstehensleistungen betont.

1. Intentionale Horizonte des aktual Bewussten

Husserl hatte ‚Intentionalität‘ zunächst als geistige Bezugnahme auf Gegenstände bestimmt und dabei wie Frege Referenz unterschieden davon, in welchen Aspekten der Gegenstand mental ‚gegeben‘ ist. Diese Struktur der vermittelten, *aspektbezogenen* Bezugnahme auf einen komplexen – nämlich in vielerlei Aspekten thematisierbaren – Gegenstand begriff Husserl bereits Mitte der 1890er Jahre, d.h. noch vor seinen diesbezüglichen sprachphilosophischen Überlegungen, als Grundstruktur der Wahrnehmung: Diese ist, obgleich im Wahrnehmungsprozess nur bestimmte Teile und Aspekte des Gegenstands wahrgenommen werden, auf den ganzen Gegenstand bezogen. In diesem Kontext erkannte er, dass dieser Repräsentation des ‚ganzen Gegenstands‘ ein *Hintergrundwissen*, ein Wissen um *Typik*, zugrunde liegt. Das Phänomen, dass Menschen den Abbruch ihnen unbekannter Musikstücke bemerken, hatte ihn auf die Fährte geführt, denn in diesem Fall muss ein implizites

‚Konzept‘ von Ganzheiten einer bestimmten Art vorhanden sein (Plümacher 2004).

Wissen um Typik ist anders als die genaue Kenntnis des Gegenstands kein Wissen um Konkretes, das in weiterer Wahrnehmung erneut erfahren werden könnte, sondern Wissen um Möglichkeiten – *Varianten* – der Gegenstandserfahrung, die durch Nicht-Mögliches und auf der Basis bisheriger Erfahrung Unwahrscheinliches *begrenzt* sind. Daher betonte er, Intentionen seien *als konkrete Erlebnisse* z.B. beim Hören einer Musik „vollbestimmt“ – d.h. sie weisen bestimmte Gegenstandsaspekte deutlich auf, doch hinsichtlich dessen, was sie in Bezug auf die weitere Erfahrung des ganzen Gegenstands intendieren, existiere Unbestimmtheit. Ihr Entspreche „eine gewisse Weite möglicher Erfüllung“ in konkreter Erfahrung (Husserl 1984, 573). Dieses Hintergrundwissen ist nicht bewusst. Nur Phänomene wie Irritation, Überraschung und dgl. angesichts ‚unerwarteter‘ Erfahrungsverläufe geben Hinweise auf dessen Existenz und Erfahrung prägende Funktion.

Im ersten Band der *Ideen* wählte Husserl den Ausdruck ‚Horizont‘, um die ‚Einbettung‘ des jeweils Bewussten in ein implizites Hintergrundwissen zu bezeichnen. ‚Horizonte‘ charakterisierte er in den *Cartesischen Meditationen* als „Potentialitäten“, die expliziert werden *können* (Husserl 1963, § 19). Das Wissen um Typik des bewusst intendierten Gegenstands ist ein Element dieses Hintergrundwissens, das Erfahrungsprozesse, einschließlich der Handlungen, strukturiert. Durch Ausschluss des auf bisheriger Erfahrung Unmöglichen und sehr Unwahrscheinlichen ist Denken und Verhalten auf das in bestimmten Situationen möglicherweise und notwendig zu ‚Erwartende‘ orientiert (Husserl 1948, 34, 399; 1976, 101). Spezifizierungen ergeben sich durch Kenntnis der Merkmale und Eigentümlichkeiten bestimmter Individuen. Dreyfus‘ Vergleich zu Minskys Überlegungen zur Strukturierung des Wissens im praktischen Verhalten ist daher zuzustimmen. Erinnert sei daran, dass in den 1970er Jahren, vermittelt durch Schütz, phänomenologische Überlegungen in der Soziologie von Goffman aufgegriffen wurden, der mit *Frame Analysis* (1974) ebenfalls eine Theorie der Rahmung von Wissen und Verhalten vorstellte.

Husserls Intentionalitätskonzept war nicht nur bewusstseinstheoretisch, sondern auch semantisch orientiert. Die Bedeutung sprachlicher Ausdrücke zeigt sich und reguliert sich Husserl zufolge im sozialen Sprachgebrauch. Doch ihn beschäftigte vor allem die subjektive Seite. Hier sind Sprachzeichen mit Bedeutungsintentionen verknüpft, worunter er Konzepte verstand, die die geregelte Anwendung der Sprachzeichen in ihrem Bezug auf Gegenstände vermitteln und Erfüllungsbedingungen festlegen. Da er Konzepte als ein Wissen um Typik und als „Sinnrahmen“ möglicher Erfahrung dachte (Husserl 1948, 141), entdeckten Smith und McIntyre die Nähe dieses Konzepts zur Semantik möglicher Welten, auch zu Hintikkas Ansatz einer Semantik propositionaler Einstellungen. Letzteres ergibt sich daraus, dass Husserl spezifisch subjektive Erfahrungen resp. Überzeugungen zum Hintergrundwissen zählte.

Den Terminus ‚Horizont‘ verwandte Husserl jedoch nicht nur für Erfahrungsspielräume im genannten Sinn. Seine Rede von einem ‚zeitlichen‘ bzw. ‚räumlichen‘ Horizont, ‚mathematischen Horizonten‘, dem „Universalhorizont ‚Ge-

gegenstand““, dem ‚thematischen Horizont‘ etc. weist darauf hin, dass ‚Horizonte‘ spezifischer als ‚thematische Sinnrahmen‘ oder *epistemische Perspektiven* gedacht sind (Plümacher 2004, 220). Dies korreliert mit seiner Überlegung, dass intentionale Gegenstände nur in bestimmten Aspekten bewusst sein können. Aspektivität gehört stets zu bestimmten epistemischen Perspektiven. Denn Aspekte der Gegenstandsbetrachtung, auch die Gegenstände selbst, verschieben sich mit der Perspektive: Eine physikalische Perspektive rückt andere Gegenstandsaspekte ins Zentrum als eine biologische oder eine ästhetische, eine kommerzielle etc. In den *Ideen* befasste sich Husserl mit Denkprozessen, d.h. Verläufen bewusster Gegenstandsintentionen. Auf ‚Horizonte‘ als thematische Sinnrahmen bezieht er sich hier, weil Denkprozesse sich nicht nur assoziativ entwickeln, sondern entlang epistemischer Zusammenhänge: Sie entfalten Zusammenhänge einer Perspektive, können aber auch zu Reflexionen des Gegenstands in anderen epistemischen Perspektiven übergehen. In den *Cartesischen Meditationen* erklärt er, der gegenständliche Sinn sei niemals ein fertig Gegebenes. Er kläre sich durch die „Auslegung des Horizonts und der stetig neu geweckten Horizonte“ (Husserl 1963, § 19). Auch Ausführungen zu den so genannten ‚materialen Regionen‘ sowie Rekonstruktionen der Gründe für die kategoriale Differenzierung zwischen ‚Natur‘, ‚psychischen Wesen‘, ‚Alter Ego‘, und ‚Kultur‘ im zweiten Band der *Ideen* zeigen, dass sich Husserl mit epistemischer Perspektivität als einer unter bestimmten Prämissen stehenden Reflexion von Gegenständen befasste.

Unter dieser Voraussetzung lässt sich ‚Horizont‘ bestimmen als ‚epistemische Umgebung‘ einer bestimmten aspektischen Repräsentation eines Gegenstands in einer epistemischen Perspektive. Die ‚Umgebung‘ ist perspektivisch strukturiertes implizites Wissen; es gehören auch Vorstellungen dazu, wie vage Bestimmtes in weiterer Forschung genauer zu bestimmen wäre. Der auf epistemische Perspektiven bezogene Sinn von ‚Horizont‘ entspricht dem Begriff ‚epistemischer Welten‘ als den ‚Weisen der Weltbeschreibung‘. Husserl hat, wenn auch selten, von epistemischen „Welten“ gesprochen (Husserl 1979, 328 f.; 1976, 60; 1952, 210; 1963, § 58). Der Terminus ‚Welt‘ bleibt bei ihm vornehmlich für ‚Wirklichkeit‘ reserviert. Dies sollte jedoch nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, dass auch er die Differenz der Beschreibungsweisen der Gegenstände reflektierte.

2. Personale Wissensstrukturen

Während die meisten Erkenntnistheorien primär von einem externalistischen Standpunkt aus die Pluralität epistemischer Welten und Perspektiven reflektieren, sich also auf das öffentlich verfügbare Wissen als ‚Besitz‘ sozialer Gemeinschaften beziehen, legt die Prämisse des phänomenologischen Ansatzes, methodisch vom Individuum auszugehen, die Reflexion *personaler* Wissensstrukturen nahe. Diese unterschiedliche Perspektivität auf ‚Wissen‘ hat Folgen für thematische Schwerpunkte und Problemstellungen. Im Zentrum ersterer stehen Themen wie Theoriendynamik, Entwicklung von Techniken, Methoden und Normen in den verschiedenen wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen und anderen gesellschaftlichen Praxen, Kulturen der Förderung oder Hemmung von

Erkenntnis, Begriffe des Wissens und der Erkenntnis in verschiedenen Kulturen etc. Für die Phänomenologie verschieben sich durch ihren methodischen Individualismus Themen und Probleme. Hält sie an ihrer Prämisse fest und fragt nach der Struktur personalen Wissens, hat sie zunächst zu vergegenwärtigen, dass die Annahme, Indi-

duen könnten sich tatsächlich das gesamte öffentlich verfügbare Wissen aneignen, unrealistisch ist. Lediglich auf wenigen Wissensgebieten können Individuen Experten sein. Diese Prämisse provoziert Fragen nach der Möglichkeit der Verständigung von Experten und Laien, dem epistemischen Status des nicht selbst erworbenen Wissens, den Kriterien der Vertrauenswürdigkeit der Erkenntnisse ‚aus zweiter Hand‘, verantwortlicher Stellungnahme in Kontroversen trotz gewisser Wissenslücken etc. Da Individuen vielfältigste heterogene Wissensinformationen zu Gebieten erhalten, für die sie kein Expertenwissen ausgebildet haben, steht zu vermuten, dass nur bedingt ein Wissenszusammenhang ausgebildet werden kann. Positionen, die Rechtfertigung als Voraussetzung von ‚Wissen‘ betrachten, werden in diesem Fall nicht von einem Wissen sprechen wollen.

Husserl hat diesen Problemzusammenhang nicht thematisiert. Als Herausforderung der Phänomenologie, die er selbst nicht mehr erfüllte, betrachtete er den Nachweis, dass „die transzendente Subjektivität [...] nicht ein Chaos intentionaler Erlebnisse“ ist, kein Konglomerat diverser Kenntnisse (Husserl 1963, § 22). Heute gilt es zu prüfen, welche Vorgaben sein Ansatz für die oben formulierten Fragen liefert.

Das Konzept intentionaler Horizonte macht folgende, nicht unwichtige Vorgabe für eine Theorie personalen Wissens: Individuen bilden zahlreiche intentionale Horizonte resp. Grundlagen für epistemische Perspektiven aus. Gemeint ist damit zunächst, dass sie – insbesondere durch Schulen und Medien vermittelt – gewisse Kenntnisse über epistemische Perspektiven erwerben, zumindest zu unterscheiden wissen, welche Problemstellungen im Zentrum verschiedener Perspektiven stehen. Generalisierungen können zu einem Verständnis für die Korrelation von Fragestellungen, Prämissen und Formen der Bestimmung von Gegenständen führen. Diese Horizonte oder ‚Sinnrahmen‘ werden in individuell unterschiedlicher biographischer Erfahrung verschieden ‚gefüllt‘. Daher ist von der Individualität der Wissensprofile auszugehen. Das individuelle ‚Expertenwissen‘ mag als Kern der individuellen Wissensstruktur betrachtet werden. Dem phänomenologischen Konzept gemäß sind allerdings auch allgemeine oder vage Konzepte zu anderen Wissensbereichen in folgender Hinsicht als ‚Wissen‘ zu verstehen: Vagheit ist Husserl zufolge niemals vollständig unbestimmt. Bestimmtheit existiert zumindest in der Begrenzung des Bereichs des Unbestimmten (Husserl 1963, § 19) und dazu können bereits Vorstellungen darüber beitragen, welche Themen in einem Wissensgebiet verhandelt werden und welche in ihm nicht relevant sind. Ein Verständnis für die Unterschiedlichkeit der Problemstellungen und Methoden der Disziplinen und Theorien bietet in dieser Sicht der Dinge eine Grundlage zur Verarbeitung diverser Wissensinformationen.

Eine Theorie personalen Wissens auf phänomenologischer Basis lässt sich jedoch nicht unabhängig von ‚externalistischen‘ Wissenstheorien aufbauen. Denn die Klärung des Wissensbegriffs selbst, auch die Klärung des Begriffs ‚Perspektive‘ ist ein anderes Projekt als die Phänomenologie.

3. Epistemische Welten, epistemische Perspektiven und intentionale Horizonte

Theorien epistemischer Welten wie die Cassirers oder Goodmans trugen Argumente vor, die die Unterscheidung von ‚Welten‘ mit der Verschiedenheit der Erkenntnisgegenstände, der Erkenntnisnormen und der ontologischen

Verpflichtungen begründeten, die ‚Beschreibungssysteme‘ (Goodman 1990, 14) eröffnen. Im Blick waren und sind insbesondere die unterschiedlichen Formen der Weltbeschreibung in den verschiedenen Disziplinen der Wissenschaften und Künste. Der Begriff der epistemischen Perspektive, verstanden als spezifische Akzentuierung von Gegenständen und Gegenstandsaspekten im Kontext bestimmter Erkenntnisinteressen (Plümacher 2002), scheint einen weiteren Anwendungsbereich zu besitzen, weil er sich sowohl auf Unterschiede der Thematisierung von Welt in den Disziplinen beziehen lässt als auch auf die unterschiedlichen Akzentuierungen der Theorien innerhalb einer Wissenschaft bzw. eines anderen Tätigkeitsfelds. Reschers Überlegungen zur Differenzierung von Perspektiven (1991, 129 f.) gehen weiter ins Detail. Als Gründe zur Unterscheidung von Perspektiven führt er nicht nur deren unterschiedliche Prämissen an, sondern auch Unterschiede der mit Formen der Argumentation und Begründung verbundenen methodologischen Verpflichtung sowie Unterschiede in der Bewertung der Relevanz von Erkenntnisproblemen und Argumenten und entsprechende axiologische Verpflichtungen. Die Relation von Erkenntnisinteresse resp. Fragestellung, Aspektierung und methodologischer Verpflichtung akzentuiert auch der im Zusammenhang der Diskussion des erkenntnistheoretischen Kontextualismus verwendete Terminus ‚Erkenntnisprojekt‘ (Brendel 1999, 27; Barke 2003, 1037 ff.).

Unabhängig von den noch ausstehenden notwendigen Klärungen zum Verhältnis von ‚epistemischen Welten‘ und ‚Perspektiven‘ sowie den verschiedenen Konzepten von ‚Perspektiven‘ u.a. lässt sich Folgendes sagen: Das Projekt der Klärung, worin sich epistemische Welten, Perspektiven bzw. Projekte unterscheiden und welche Auswirkungen dies auf Weltkonstruktionen hat, unterscheidet sich von dem phänomenologischen Projekt der Bestimmung der Horizontintentionalität. Steht im Ersteren das Verhältnis von Erkenntnis und Konstruktion von Wirklichkeit im Vordergrund, wird im Zweiteren ‚Bedeutung‘ unter dem Aspekt von Explizitem und Implizitem thematisch. Als ‚explizit‘ kann das direkt Wahrgenommene, das sprachlich oder in anderen Zeichen Artikulierte gelten, dessen ‚Bedeutung‘ sich nur im Kontext eines impliziten Wissens des intentionalen Horizonts bestimmt. Die Frage, in welchem Umfang ein holistischer Zusammenhang epistemischer Beziehungen als konstitutiv für Bedeutung anzunehmen ist, wird virulent (Smith & McIntyre 1982, 273 f.). Wenn, wie Searle überzeugend gezeigt hat (1996, 186 f.), zum Verstehen von Sätzen und anderen Zeichenkomplexen ein intentionaler Hintergrund von Fähigkeiten und gesellschaftlichen Praktiken gehört, ist ‚Bedeutung‘ in Lebensformen im Sinne Wittgensteins verankert. Husserls Überlegung, dass thematische Zusammenhänge als epistemische Einheiten begriffen und von anderen unterschieden werden, ist hier ein Argument für spezifisch begrenzte Bedeutungszusammenhänge. Während in diesen Überlegungen die epistemische Funktion der Unterscheidung von thematischen Zusammenhängen resp. epistemischen Perspektiven in ihrer Bedeutung für die Konzepte ‚Bedeutung‘, ‚Verstehen‘ und ‚personale Wissensstruktur‘ im Zentrum stehen, führt die Bestimmung des Begriffs ‚epistemische Perspektive‘ in erkenntnistheoretische Projekte. Nicht nur die Beziehungen zwischen Weltbeschreibungen sind zu klären, sondern auch ein Konzept der Erkenntnis als konstruktionaler Tätigkeit des Entwerfens von Perspektiven, der Perspektiven-Unterscheidung und Integration zu neuen Perspektiven zu explizieren. Die verschiedenen Erkenntnisprojekte sollten unterschieden werden, auch wenn Ergebnisse des einen in der Perspektive des anderen aufgenommen werden können.

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Normativity and Speech Acts: On Alston on Illocutionary Rules

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1. Alston on the Normativity of Illocutionary Acts

Alston stratifies linguistic utterances into sentential acts i.e. uttering a sentence (or surrogate), illocutionary acts i.e. uttering a sentence with a certain "content" as reported by indirect speech, and perlocutionary acts i.e. producing an effect on an audience by an utterance.¹ According to Alston, normativity is the essence of illocutionary acts:

[An] utterance is made the illocutionary act it is ... not by any natural facts about the speaker - his beliefs, perlocutionary intentions, or whatever - but by a "normative" fact about the speaker - the fact that he has changed his normative position in a certain way ... (Alston 2000, 70-71).

On Alston's view this change in normative status consists in the fact that a speaker S, in uttering a certain sentence e, takes responsibility for certain conditions obtaining, i. e.:

(R1) In uttering e, S takes responsibility for C iff, in uttering e, S knowingly took on a liability to being incorrect in case of not-C (ibid, 57).

Moreover, according to Alston, such responsibility "depends on the existence of a system of rules that is in force within a community" (ibid, 58), and so he takes the following analyses of his notion of taking responsibility in terms of rule-subjection as "fundamental":

(R2) In uttering e, S takes responsibility for C iff, in uttering e, S subjects his utterance to a rule that implies that it is permissible for S to utter e only if C is the case (ibid, 60).

Although this formulation suggests that a rule to the effect that S takes responsibility for C is not identical with a rule for a permissible utterance of a sentence, all rules given by Alston are in fact of the latter kind², so Alston thinks that all illocutionary acts can be analyzed in accordance with the following scheme:

(I) S performs an illocutionary act in uttering e iff S subjects his utterance to an illocutionary rule of the form: It is permissible to utter e in literal first order communication iff C1 ... Cn.

Consider Alston's account of promises and assertions. According to Alston, an utterance of 'I will do A' is a promise iff S subjects his utterance to the following rule:

(P) It is permissible to utter 'I will do A' iff
(i) It is possible for S to do A
(ii) H would prefer S's doing A to S's not doing A
(iii) S intends to do A
(iv) In uttering 'I will do A', S places himself under an obligation to do A.

Given (P) Alston defines the promise to do A as a sentential act by which S, in uttering 'I will do A', takes responsibility for the fulfillment of the "promise-conditions" (i) to (iv). In contrast, if an utterance of 'I will do A' is an assertion, then, according to Alston, the speaker just takes responsibility for the asserted state of affairs, namely that he will do A, in virtue of subjecting his utterance to the following rule:

(A) It is permissible to utter 'I will do A' iff S will do A.

Of course, S's taking responsibility for its being the case that he will do A is not sufficient for asserting that he will do A.³ For an assertion, the uttered sentence must also "explicitly present" the proposition that S will do A, which is matter of whether the semantic constituents of the uttered sentence corresponds to elements of the proposition (ibid, 117). These two conditions are seen by Alston as sufficient for an assertion, so, in uttering e, S asserts that A iff the uttered sentence e explicitly presents the proposition A and S takes responsibility for A.

2. Are Illocutionary Acts Essentially Rule-Based?

Alston's argument for his claim that illocutionary acts are essentially rule-based rests on the following two premises:

(P1) In uttering e, S performs an illocutionary act of type I only if S, in uttering e, takes responsibility for the fulfillment of conditions C1 ... Cn,

(P2) In uttering e, S takes responsibility for the fulfillment of C1 ... Cn only if there exist a pertinent illocutionary rule to the effect that it is permissible to utter e only if C1 ... Cn are fulfilled.

No advocate of an Gricean account of illocutionary acts should deny premise (P1), although Austinians sometimes suggest that Gricean notions of "expressing" an intentional state are logically independent of such commitments.⁴ However, there are reason to doubt that (P2) is true. What does it mean to say that an illocutionary rule exist or is "in force" in a society? Since these rules are implicit rules (they could be in force in a society although none member of the is able to formulate these rules), Alston's criterion of existence for implicit rules relies on the behavior of the members of this society. His suggestion is that "a by-and-large regularity of doing A in circumstances [U] reflects the sway of a rule if and only if deviations from this regularity will generally evoke incorrectness judgments in members of the society who perceive it" (ibid, 258). With respect to illocutionary rules this criterion decomposes into the following two components:

The "Regularity" Condition: Most speakers utter a sentence e (in literal first-order communication) only if C is the case.

¹ Austin and Bach and Harnish included "locutionary" acts, Searle added "propositional" acts.

² The application of these 'illocutionary rules', is restricted to "literal, first-order communication".

³ Otherwise one would have to say that all the conditions the speaker takes responsibility for by promising to do A were asserted.

⁴ See Harnish and Plunze (2004) for further discussion.

The "Correctness" Condition: If a speaker utters *e* although *C* is not the case, this will evoke incorrectness judgments in members of the society who perceive it.

There are three problems with this proposal. First, Alston's general criterion for the existence of rules seems much too wide. For example, usually people take a flight to Prague only if they want to travel to Prague, and if someone who wants to go there boards a plane just to Paris, he or she as well as other members of the society would judge that he or she has done something incorrect. Therefore Alston's existence criterion for implicit rules is fulfilled. But obviously the action is seen as incorrect just because it is an inappropriate means for a given end, but not because a rule like, "It is permissible to enter an airplane to Prague only if the airplane goes to Prague" is violated. Hence, an action can be seen as incorrect even though there is no rule involved. The existence of a rule implies a distinction between correctness and incorrectness, but the converse does not hold. Notice that (R1) already accommodates incorrectness, so there is no reason to suppose that this notion must be explained in terms of rule subjection. Second, if one analyzes "taking responsibility" in terms of rule-subjection, because of the regularity condition it cannot be that *S*, in uttering a sentence *e*, takes responsibility for a state of affairs *C* if there is no regularity within the relevant society of doing so. However, this seems not to be true. This is shown most clearly by cases of conversational implicatures. Suppose that in a particular situation *S*, in uttering 'I will be in London' implies that he will not be able to attend a certain party. *S* thereby surely takes responsibility for its being the case that he will not be able to attend the party, although there exists no regularity to do so in uttering 'I will be in London'. Third, even if one accepts the fulfillment of the regularity and the correctness conditions as a sufficient criterion for the existence of a rule, this does not imply that obeying the rule in question transforms a sentential act into an illocutionary act. For example, since the assertion that one will do *A* necessitates that the uttered sentence explicitly presents the proposition that one will do *A*, both the fact that in most situations the uttered sentence is true and that a speaker invites legitimate criticism if this is otherwise, could also be explained by the assumption that the rule in force in the society is the following:

(A*) It is permissible to assert that one will do *A* in uttering a sentence that explicitly presents the proposition that one will do *A* iff *S* will do *A*.

So, the question is whether Alston's rule (A) constitute assertions or whether the fulfillment of the regularity and correctness condition is just the result of the "assertion rule" (A*). (In this latter case, one has to explicate the notion of taking responsibility without reference to illocutionary rules.) Now, in order to settle this question one has to show that there are cases where *S* is asserting (and takes responsibility for) something, although there is no illocutionary rule in virtue of which this is the case. In the next section we try to show that such cases exist.

3. Taking Responsibility and Explicit Performatives

According to Alston (ibid, 125), someone who utters the progressive form of an explicit performative simultaneously assert that one is performing the illocutionary act named by the performative verb as well as to perform that act. Hence, according to Alston, in uttering (1), *S* asserts both that he is asserting that he will come to London and that he will come to London.

(1) 'I am asserting that I will come to London'.

However, as far as we can see, this cannot be the case in virtue of Alston's illocutionary rules. It seems natural to assume that Alston thinks that *S*, in uttering an explicit performative, performs the act named by the performative verb by asserting that he performs this act.⁵ But in Alston's framework this is not possible. Let us suppose, first, that the sentence (1) explicitly present the proposition that *S* is asserting that he will come. Then, in order to explain within Alston's account that *S*, in uttering (1), asserts that he is asserting that he will come, one must furthermore assume that *S* subjects his utterance to the following rule:

(IR1) It is permissible to utter 'I am asserting that I will come to London' iff *S* is asserting that he will come to London.

Given (IR1) and Alston's definition of an assertion, it follows that *S*, in uttering (1), asserts that he is asserting that he will come. But to rely on this rule is blatantly circular. According to Alston's existence criterion for implicit rules, this rule exist in the relevant society only if it is fulfilled in most situations. Now, the rule (IR1) is fulfilled only if *S* actually is asserting that he will come. Hence, this rule exists only if most utterances of (1) are assertions. Therefore the rule (IR1), that is supposed to be made possible the existence of the assertion made by (1), in fact presuppose the existence of this illocutionary act type. The circularity in (IR1) should not come as a surprise. According to Alston, assertions are subject to rules to the effect that assertions should be true, which is the case if the content of the assertions are the case. In order to avoid circularity, Alston formulates his rules to the effect that *assertions* should be true, as rules to the effect that the uttered *sentences* be true. It is clear that this strategy is successful only in cases in which the meaning of the uttered sentence does not make reference to the concept of the assertion. (It is important to note that the same considerations exclude the possibility of relying on the following extension of (IR1): It is permissible to utter 'I am asserting that *P*' iff *S* is asserting that *P* and *P*.) Hence, in order to avoid circularity of explanation, the only rule available for (1) is this:

(IR2) It is permissible to utter 'I am asserting that I will come to London' iff *S* will come to London.

Given (IR2), Alston is justified in claiming that *S* asserts that he will come to London by taking responsibility for this state of affairs in virtue of *S*'s subjecting his utterance to (IR2). However, an unavoidable result of Alston's account of assertions is that *S*, in uttering (1), also asserts that he is asserting that he will come. On the one hand, the sentence (1) explicitly presents this proposition, on the other hand, *S* surely, in uttering (1), "knowingly took on a liability to being incorrect" in case he does not assert that he is asserting that he will come to London, since the uttered sentence 'I am asserting that I will come to London' is false if *S* does not assert that he is asserting that he will come to London. So, Alston is committed to the claim that an utterance of (1) is an assertion that *S* is asserting that he will come to London. But since (IR2) does not require *S* to utter (1) only if *S* is asserting that he will come to London, the utterance of (1) cannot be an assertion in virtue of (IR2), in particular, it cannot be that *S* takes responsibility for this state of affairs in virtue of this rule. So, the existence of an illocutionary rule is not necessary for taking responsibility. In contrast to what Alston wants to conclude, he was closer to the truth at the beginning: a

⁵ For an account along this line see Bach and Harnish (1979).

speaker does not take responsibility for a certain set of conditions because his sentential act is subject to an illocutionary rule requiring it, but rather S performs certain illocutionary act because he takes responsibility for those conditions being the case. The hard problem is explaining what taking such a normative stance consists in.

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Nonconceptual Content, Perception, and Value

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1. Introduction

Much of the current debate on nonconceptual personal-level content has focussed on the fineness of grain of many contents of sense perception and the examples used by both defenders and opponents of nonconceptual content have usually been drawn from the perception of colour shades or the shapes of visually presented objects (e.g. Peacocke 1992; Bermúdez 1994; McDowell 1994; Brewer 1999). I shall argue that the notion of conscious, nonconceptual content has an important explanatory rôle to play not only or even primarily in the theory of visual perception. It is equally indispensable in moral psychology and more generally in the psychology of valuation. Consider the following passage by Charles Taylor, in which he reflects on the relation between a person's episodic mental life and her linguistically articulated self-interpretation:

Thus our description of our motivations, and our attempts to formulate what we hold important, are not simple descriptions, in that their objects are not fully independent.... Our attempts to formulate what we hold important must, like *descriptions*, strive to be *faithful to something*. But what they strive to be faithful to is not an independent object ... , but rather a largely inarticulated [*sic*] sense of what is of decisive importance. An articulation of this 'object' tends to *make it into something different* from what it was before. (Taylor 1982, pp. 123-4. Emphases mine).

Taylor's thesis thus is that various 'experiences' (p. 123) with certain evaluative contents may occur prior to their fallible first-person linguistic articulation, and that any subsequent articulation is both constrained by what is presented in the experience and also 'makes it into something different'. There is an appearance of paradox in saying that psychological self-interpretation of this kind has the character of both *description* and transformation or *creation*. This appearance can be dispelled if we understand the relation between the pre-articulated occurrence of evaluative experiences of this kind and their articulation as the conceptualisation of previously nonconceptual contents. Taylor's thesis is defensible, I shall argue, if we construe the contents of those pre-articulated evaluative states as presented perceptually (or more generally, *receptively*). The argument will be neutral with respect to the issue whether the features of perceptually presented objects eliciting the relevant evaluative responses are natural ones or whether there are irreducibly evaluative properties.

2. What Is Nonconceptual Conscious Content?

What is at issue in the present context are only the contents of episodic conscious states as they are ordinarily experienced at the personal level. An experience has a *conscious* content partly by virtue of being a phenomenal consciousness of something that appears, on account of this consciousness of it, as actually or potentially being a certain way. Thus a particular visual experience is as of an apple tree in bloom on account of certain phenomenal properties instantiated or actualised through the experi-

ence. (These phenomenal properties are properties which the *object* appears as having, rather than properties of the *experience*.) I propose to call what appears as it appears in an intentional experience the *presentation*. When I am looking at an apple tree in bloom in the spring sun, my visual presentation at that moment is the tree just as it appears at the time.

It is clear that for an intentional episode to have a conscious content the occurrence of a token presentation is not sufficient. For the purposes of the present argument I shall adopt a demanding construal of intentional content according to which the attribution of such content to experiences requires not only the occurrence of token presentations, but also the actual availability of these presentations to the subject as a rational basis for her judgements and actions. They must be apt to make a contribution to the rational control of the subject's behaviour. We may call this functional dimension, borrowing an expression from Husserl, a presentation's readiness *rationally to motivate* some intentional comportment.

Throughout this paper, then, by calling a content 'conscious' I shall mean that it is both phenomenally conscious and apt to motivate judgements and actions in the sense just outlined. In the present context, an argument adequately to justify this demanding interpretation of conscious content is not needed. For the more stringent the requirements on conscious content are, the less theoretical space is left for *nonconceptual* conscious content, and the more difficult it is to make the case for it.

When is a conscious content *conceptual*? Traditionally, the sphere of the conceptual has tended to be identified with representations fully expressible by means of general words or descriptive phrases. It is an essential feature of such capacities of representing something that their actualisation does not require the presence of the referent or of a sample (where the referent is a property). In recent years, the case for rejecting such a close connection between a subject's grasp of concepts and her command of a descriptive vocabulary fully encoding these concepts has been associated especially with the work of John McDowell, emphasizing the rôle of demonstrative concepts (McDowell 1994, pp. 56-60 and pp. 170-74. Employment of a demonstrative concept is a special case of what Husserl called pre-predicative judgement. See Husserl 1973, §§ 13, 17, 47). A subject can be said to possess a concept of the perceptual property F, according to McDowell, if she has a referential and recognitional capacity regarding items which are F. She may not be competent to express, say, her grasp of the concept of a particular shade of colour by means of a general descriptive term, but may still be able to recognize the shade in different perceptual instantiations and be able to retain this grasp in memory, referring to the shade in question in either case demonstratively as 'x is coloured *thus*'. The capacity to identify and re-identify the perceptual feature is a sufficient condition for the possession of a concept of it and we can ascribe the corresponding conceptual capacity for as long as this identificatory (recognitional) ability persists.

What exactly is entailed by the claim that conceptual representations essentially involve the ability to re-cognize

or re-identify the item represented? I suggest that it implies the following requirements: (1) First, a disposition towards differential or *discriminatory responses* to the item represented. But this is clearly not sufficient. A rabbit may have highly discriminatory responses with respect to birds of prey, but it does not possess the concept *bird of prey*. (2) Secondly, an ability to think about the represented item *in its absence*. Someone who can only identify a feature when sensorily confronted with it cannot be said to be able to re-cognize it. (Hence McDowell's emphasis on memory demonstratives; see 1994, pp. 172-3). (3) Thirdly, an ability to judge different instantiations of the represented item to be instances of *the same*. Where the item is a perceptual feature, this ability will involve judgements of phenomenological similarity/sameness (cf. DeBellis 1995, pp. 60-3).

If one adopts the McDowell-Husserl line on what a conceptual (judgement-involving) content is, it might seem as if there was no theoretical space left for nonconceptual conscious contents. Instances of such contents would have to be presentations in which (1) something phenomenally appears as actually or potentially being a certain way, and which (2) are apt rationally to motivate judgements and actions. On the other hand, they would also have to be (3) such that the subject entertaining them could not reliably re-identify or recognize the relevant phenomenal features. These presentations would thus not meet the Generality Constraint (cf. Evans 1982, pp. 100-5).

3. Nonconceptual Components of Perceptual Content

It seems, however, that many perceptual representations have components which both satisfy the requirements on conscious content while failing to meet the constraints on conceptual content. I want to give two examples of this. The first comes from Mark DeBellis's analysis of musical experience in his *Music and Conceptualization* (DeBellis 1995, esp. pp. 57-79). Musical experience is quite obviously intentional. I can represent a series of sound tokens as instantiating the melody of 'Happy Birthday' and I can be right or wrong about this. According to the leading theories of musical experience we hear tonal melodies by representing pitch relations, i.e. intervals, for we can recognize a familiar tune also under transposition, when the absolute pitch locations are changed. Thus, when listening to some melody, a particular chord will be represented by me as a fifth degree or dominant, even though I may not even know what the term 'dominant' means and may only be able to refer to the item in question demonstratively as 'sounding *thus*'. Even untrained listeners, according to this theory, represent a particular chord in a tune as (say) a dominant chord. This is confirmed by the fact that such musical novices are usually able to *detect errors*. They tend to notice when a false chord has been struck in the rendition of a particular melody, even of an unfamiliar one. Furthermore, they have some awareness of the *harmonic implications of chords*. After hearing a dominant, they expect a return to the tonic; that is, they tend to express *surprise* if the tonic doesn't follow. It seems therefore clear that the requirements upon conscious intentional content are satisfied in this case. Yet, DeBellis argues plausibly that untrained listeners do not have *conceptual* representations of the chords they are hearing. For they cannot reliably distinguish same-pitch pairs from different-pitch pairs. These novices cannot re-identify a chord at different points in a tune or across different tunes. Hence they do not satisfy the conditions upon conceptual representations. Note that the point here

is not about the 'fineness of grain' of auditory perceptual representations, for such a recognitional inability may afflict some hearers also with respect to fairly coarse-grained tonal differences.

It may be objected that the novice represents the chords in question simply as 'wrong' or 'false', and that this is a conceptual capacity, since he is after all supposed to be able reliably to make such discriminations. But 'wrongness' is a manifestly resultant property. Nothing can be perceptually presented to me as *barely* wrong or false. Rather, if I am to have *perceptual* reasons for judging a chord as 'wrong', I must be representing it, however indistinctly, as having some *other* perceptual property from which the wrongness results. It is this property – call it the resultancy base – which is represented nonconceptually by the novice.

A second example of nonconceptual components of perceptual content comes from the psychology of emotions. It is well known that voluntary or 'posed' facial expressions of emotion tend to differ subtly but systematically from 'genuine', spontaneous emotional expressions. In a posed or deliberate smile, for instance, certain facial muscles in the eye and cheek areas are usually not activated which are normally involved in spontaneous smiles (Ekman and Friesen 1982). The first kind of smile also tends to begin and end more abruptly than the second (Bugenthal, 1986). Generally, posed or deliberate facial expressions are more asymmetrical than spontaneous ones. Differences like these are often registered by us in social contexts and then provide the basis for judgements such as 'that's a false smile, she is just pretending to be pleased' or 'he is merely simulating anger'. But the expressive nuances just indicated, which motivate the application of concepts such as *pretended pleasure* or *simulated anger* in such cases, are not themselves conceptually represented. That is to say, the subject usually is not able to specify the perceptible features of her interlocutor's bodily expression that motivate her judgement. Yet, in contrast to cases where information is picked up unconsciously (as in 'blindsight'), the subject here does not simply deny having non-inferential knowledge of the target features, but rather tends to avow a characteristically 'vague' or 'indistinct' awareness: '*something* about her anger seemed false, but I don't know what it was'. The interlocutor's expressive behaviour as perceived by the subject therefore interacts rationally, albeit in a characteristically limited way, with the latter's propositional attitudes, and thus qualifies as genuine conscious content.

4. Conclusion: The Possibility of Nonconceptual Evaluative Contents

Charles Taylor maintains, in the passage quoted at the beginning, that articulation of our own evaluative responses often both *describes* and *transforms* these responses. In order to bring the arguments of the previous sections to bear on his concerns, the claim clearly has to be that what he calls 'articulation' is the conceptualisation of previously nonconceptual conscious contents. In other words, analogously to untrained listeners' responses to music, or to our reactions to others' expressive behaviour, we often lack the skill to (re-)identify the perceptual features of objects or events that in fact elicit the same *evaluative* responses from us. Since many of these responses are arguably type-individuated by their intentional objects (cf. Lyons 1980), it follows that we can only conceptualise the nature of these episodic evaluative attitudes to the extent that we have identified their

intentional objects. In the absence of a developed recognitional capacity in this respect, there is only a limited and relatively crude self-comprehension. One may then perhaps say such things as that one 'likes' this or 'dislikes' that, but one is unable to articulate the specificity of one's response due to an incapacity to (re-)identify the perceptual features which are responsible, due to one's nonconceptual awareness of them, for one's response being what it is. And just as in the musical and bodily expression cases, subjects can be trained to develop more refined discriminatory abilities. This development of conceptual capacities in the evaluative case may also be called (if one wishes) *Bildung*, and amounts to an increase of self-transparency.

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Religious Experience as a Foundation for the Belief in God

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Both Richard Swinburne and William Alston take religious experience as a sort of perception. For them, a perception is a kind of awareness of something apart from oneself, which may be mediated by one of the ordinary senses or none of them (see Swinburne 1991, 247 and Alston 1991, 36). According to Swinburne, a religious experience is a conscious mental happening of something that *looks* like God being there or doing something (see Swinburne 1991, 246). For Swinburne, “appear” should be interpreted in an epistemic way, i.e. it describes what the subject is inclined to believe on the basis of his present perceptual experience. So, the crucial element in characterising an experience as religious is the way it looks (epistemically) to the subject, i.e. whether the beliefs he is inclined to form in view of that specific awareness have religious meaning for him. Perceptions have religious meaning if they appear to be an encounter with God, whose concept for Swinburne and Alston is the one traditionally accepted by natural and systematic theology (an incorporeal person who is omniscient, omnipresent, eternal, omnipotent, infinitely good and worthy of worship). In a nutshell, a religious experience is a perception that is reported by certain people as being particularly meaningful to them given a certain religious background.

Characterising religious experience clearly, postulating it as a kind of perception is not enough. The main issue here is to show that religious experiences are not hallucinations or illusions, but can have evidential value for the belief that God exists. Swinburne and Alston argue for the legitimacy and role of religious experiences in very different forms. Despite being private (only accessible to those whom God chooses to manifest Himself), Swinburne holds that reports of religious experience should be taken at their face value and can be bases of a strong *inductive argument* for the existence of God. He adopts a causal theory of perception, according to which S perceives X consciously if and only if an experience of X for S was caused by the presence of X. In addition, reports of religious experiences should be assessed on the basis of two principles of rationality in general: the principles of credulity and testimony.

According to the principle of credulity, in absence of special considerations, if it seems to a subject that *x* is present, then probably *x* is present. So, if I do not have positive reasons to doubt the beliefs I am inclined to form from the awareness of a certain object, I am *prima facie* justified in taking them as genuine. Applied to a religious experience, the principle of credulity allows to say that, unless I have good reasons not to believe the perceptual awareness of God I had, I am justified in believing that I had an authentic experience caused by a manifestation of God.

This conception reveals an internalist view of justification. For Swinburne, a subject S is justified in believing in a certain degree that *p* if and only if the data that are available to S confirm *p* in that degree and in the correct way (see Swinburne 2001, 163). In the “correct way” in this context means according to the rules of valid deductive reasoning, inductive principles as the ones expressed in the probability calculus, and principles of rationality such as the ones of credulity and testimony.

For Swinburne, if we do not accept the principle of credulity we risk to be stuck in a sceptical bog, since no empirical information could be evidence for our beliefs, and the consequences of this for human knowledge would be

disastrous. If this principle can be employed for justifying sensorial beliefs, one needs good arguments to show that it cannot be used for religious experiences as well (see Swinburne 1991, 254n.). Apart from the analogy between sense perception and religious experience, Swinburne argues that, since there is no compelling proof that God does not exist, and there is no general rebuttal against the reliability of people who report religious experiences, we can use this phenomenon as evidence in an inductive argument that strongly confirms the hypothesis that there is a God. For him, given the principle of credulity and the principle of testimony (unless we have positive grounds for rejecting what other people say, what they said they perceived probably happened), the phenomenon of religious experience tips the balance of probability in favour of theism, after considering all different arguments of natural theology (see Swinburne 1991, 291).

Swinburne's approach to the epistemology of religious experience was subject to three main types of criticisms. First, we can accept the application of the principle of credulity to sense perception while remaining sceptical as regards employing it to religious experience, since the analogy between them is very weak. Among the most important discrepancies are: God is defined as a non-spatial being who is said to appear to anyone He chooses and we cannot predict where He will show up; the agreement of many observers is not a relevant test for the authenticity of this sort of perception as it is for sense perception, and the conditions for His appearance cannot be reproduced. Second, a strong inductive argument for theism from religious experience as aimed by Swinburne faces the difficulty that there are naturalistic explanations for this phenomenon which do not postulate the existence of God. So, the most Swinburne can hope is that theism is a *possible* explanation for the occurrence of religious experience, but not an inference for the best explanation as forceful as he expects it to be. Third, the plurality of religious backgrounds puts considerable problems to the identification of the object of religious experiences as the God of traditional theism. Some mystical experiences are reported from perspectives as irreconcilable to theism as some forms of Buddhism, which refer to a perception of the Void, instead of a positive personal being. In addition, the universalistic approach Swinburne suggests in his inductive argument for theism is difficult to conciliate with the particularity of detailed background beliefs needed for identifying God in a religious experience. The most Swinburne can hope again is to hold that reports of religious experience can *possibly* refer to God, but this is too little for a strong inductive argument from religious experience.

Alston's approach follows a different path. His aim is to show that religious experience provides *prima facie* justification for the belief that there is a God the same way as any perception provides *prima facie* justification for the belief in the object that is being perceived (see Alston 1991, 3).

In contrast with Swinburne, Alston does not give an epistemic sense to “appear”. For Alston, the notion of X's appearing to a subject as so-and-so is not analysable in terms of conceptualisations or beliefs. For someone to perceive X is just for X to appear to S as so-and-so, which is independent of S's efforts, and cannot be confused with thinking, reasoning or remembering X. Alston's theory of perception is a kind of direct realism, which is not naive only

because it recognises that what X presents itself to S as may diverge from what X really is. Consequently, even not being sensorial, these phenomena can still qualify as perceptual, since sense perception is taken as only a kind of perception, although it is certainly the most important kind.

According to Alston's theory of justification, being justified in believing that *p* is having a proper ground for believing that *p* is true, which is an externalist account of justification, since these grounds are not ascertainable only on reflection by the subject. In addition, one can be justified in believing that *p* unqualifiedly (with no need of further inquiry) or *prima facie*, i.e. until it is shown that the belief in *p* is not justified. The justification of perceptual beliefs is generally only *prima facie*, since the beliefs we form from perception may prove to be wrong.

The fact that we can evaluate the degree of justification of perceptual beliefs means that forming beliefs of this kind is an activity of which people can have various degrees of command. Alston calls "doxastic practice" this activity of forming beliefs (perceptual or not). Doxastic practices are also liable to assessment as to their degree of justification, in view of their outputs (beliefs), given certain inputs or sources.

In Alston's approach, the problem of whether a perceptual belief is justified becomes the problem of whether the correspondent doxastic practice is able to generate true beliefs mostly (see Alston 1991, 100). Unfortunately, however, even for the sense perception doxastic practice, in order to check whether its outputs are mostly true, we have to count on perception itself at some point. Other doxastic practices such as deductive reasoning, testimony or memory cannot show that sense perception is a reliable mechanism of forming beliefs unless perception itself is employed. This means that, although interconnected, doxastic practices are fundamentally autonomous regarding the evaluation of their outputs. Despite this epistemic circularity, which prevents the epistemological justification of doxastic practices, we can still evaluate them practically, i.e. whether we cannot help forming beliefs that way, whether we end up *acting* on the assumption that the beliefs it forms are mostly true. This is the case with sense perception: it cannot be said reliable according to criteria furnished by other practices, but it is certainly practically justified, i.e. the best way of refuting empirical scepticism is by showing that it is practically incoherent.

Since the criteria employed in a practice cannot be used for judging the beliefs of another one, Alston proposes that we evaluate the reliability of a doxastic practice from a practical point of view, given the following characteristics: 1) whether it has a system of checking and evaluating the beliefs it forms; 2) whether its participants engage in it well before they are able to be conscious of it or reflect about it, so that it becomes entrenched and necessary for their epistemic contact with the world; 3) whether it is established and shared socially; 4) whether it generates beliefs that are consistent with other beliefs produced in the practice or with beliefs generated by more universal and entrenched practices; 5) whether it has self-support, i.e. whether it works and is helpful in practical terms.

For Alston, given the basic features of doxastic practices stated above, it is possible to classify some religions as kinds of it. Christianity, which is the example Alston elaborates, provides a conceptual background in view of which mystical perceptions are identified as well as criteria for evaluating the authenticity of mystical perception beliefs and rejecting those it considers false. It also constitutes a community where the believers engage well before they are able to reflect about it and where the principles for evalua-

tion of purported perceptions of God are socially established and shared. Moreover, the main beliefs the Christian mystical perception doxastic practice (CMP) generates are internally consistent and do not contradict other firmer and more universal practices. The "fruits of the spirit" its participants report they enjoy constitute a sign that it has significant self-support. So, we have no reason to deny that CMP has a good degree of practical justification and that the beliefs it generates, as the belief that God exists, are *prima facie* justified for those who participate in this practice.

Alston's approach to the use of religious experience as a foundation for the belief in God is not hit by the main criticisms aimed at Swinburne's proposal. First, it is not based on an analogy with sense perception, since it holds that the beliefs CMP generates should be judged according to its own criteria, as we do for any doxastic practice. Second, since (at least in a minimalist interpretation) it aims to show that the participants of CMP are *prima facie* entitled to accept the beliefs it generates, the fact that there are other explanations for reports of religious experience, which are accepted by people who do not adhere to CMP, does not constitute any problem. Third, religious pluralism is not damaging for the *prima facie* justification of CMP beliefs because, in the cases where they are incompatible, there are no common criteria for undermining one or another of those beliefs. So, the absence of a method to decide the most reliable of conflicting doxastic practices means that religious diversity is not a reason for a Christian to abandon his confidence in CMP. Fourth, it does not face the problem of identification of a mystical perception either, since the means for it are provided by each particular doxastic practice as the approach suggests.

The main problem for Alston's approach is to show what difference it makes. If people of conflicting doxastic practices that pass the reliability tests he suggests are entitled to believe their outputs, how could religious experience be helpful in the justification of theism? We seem to be lost in a hopeless relativistic situation.

Yet, Alston's proposal is helpful for the theist if it is combined with other forms of arguing for theism. Perceptions of God, given the justification provided by the doxastic practice approach, permit to assign a good degree of initial justification for theism, and this can make a big difference. This idea is better understood, however, if we put it in a probabilistic frame, which is Swinburne's method. Religious experience, instead of evidence for an argument, would be a ground for a considerable prior probability of theism from the side of the theist in the debate. If so, instead of an objective and universal value of prior probability as held by Swinburne, we should take it to be determined intersubjectively, along the lines of particular doxastic practices. This would mean that different values of prior probabilities would result. Yet, the Bayesian approach allows to say that, although prior probabilities are very important, any initial disagreement about priors can be overcome given some conditions the approach indicates. So, although Alston's treatment of religious experience has advantages over Swinburne's, it works better in the discussion about the justification of theism if this one is put in probabilistic terms.

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Phenomenology in Object Constitution

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Ordinary objects or Middle Sized Dry Goods (MSDGs) have phenomenology intrinsically built into their constitution. They belong to the category of regional ontologies whose elements are not constituents of ultimate reality. The first argument concerning object constitution addresses the question: how are objects or MSDGs built? The second argument looks at the question: how is the constitution of objects or MSDGs usually represented by metaphysicians?

1. How are objects constituted?

We believe that a distinction between ultimate ontology and regional ontologies should be made, and that so called ordinary objects belong to regional ontologies or the ontic, for short. Ultimate ontology includes the world as such, observed under high normative standards, whereas the ontic involves all of the features that we encounter in the world on an everyday basis. The difference between ultimate ontology and the ontic needs to be respected. The constitution of objects is a function of how the world is and of the power of language and thought to classify and describe the world. Now, language and thought are cognitive achievements; they have phenomenology intrinsically built into them. So, objects have phenomenology intrinsically built into them.

The question about object constitution is one of the oldest in philosophy. One would therefore expect that it would already receive an unambiguous answer, which unhappily is not the case. Quine proposed one of the best answers to this that still seems unsatisfactory: objects are whatever fills a certain region of space and time. Amie Thomasson is recently engaged into a defence of ordinary objects from the normativity-based attacks on them. None of these seems to us to provide a viable direction about how to assess the constitution of MSDGs. We take this to be a consequence of the fact that these proposals do not sufficiently respect some basic distinctions in metaphysics.

The first basic distinction in metaphysics is between ultimate ontology and regional ontologies. Ultimate ontology encompasses the world. Regional ontologies consist of features that are found *in* the world, on a daily basis, such as cats, cups and stones. It is misleading to include such stuff in ontology. Ordinary objects or MSDGs belong to the area of the ontic.

There is just one world, i.e. one spatiotemporal object, without any parts, but dynamical and rich. Distinctions between ontology and the ontic do not differentiate between different levels of real ontological and ontic strata. Rather, these distinctions are matters of normatively conditioned zooming in and out of the one and only world. It is to be expected that the regional assessment of the world will include a larger role for discriminatory power than will be the case for the world's ultimate ontological assessment.

What is the constitution of objects (MSDGs) in the regional ontology? A common mistake is either to tend towards an entirely world dependent constitution of objects, or to assess objects as being predominantly cognition dependent constructions. The first of these views is analyzed in the second section of this paper. The

second of these views is anti-realist: for it, MSDGs are predominantly or entirely constituted by language and thought. This view is represented in recent work by Hilary Putnam. We think that none of these views are right, and that objects (MSDGs) are constituted *both* as a function of how the world is and as a function of the discriminatory powers of language and thought. A cat is a congealing in the world, approached on a regional scale. A cat is not a part of the world, because the world does not have any parts; there is just the world. When we refer to the cat, we refer to the world, although in an indirect manner. The discriminative capabilities of language and thought are intrinsically involved in sorting out objects. So against predominant metaphysical views we claim that objects (MSDGs) are constituted *both* as a function of how the world is and as a function of the contribution of language and thought to the constitution of objects.

Now consider that language and thought are normative practices. They respect several constraints determining syntax and communication that are fixed by contexts. Their normativity also has the task of regional discrimination, such as assessment of particularist discriminatory compositional structure in semantics that enables productivity in both language and thought.

Cognition has phenomenology intrinsically built into it. It would be impossible to master the rich, dynamic, and structure-conditioned linguistic skills without phenomenology intrinsic to particularist patterns that provide the aforementioned structure. And similarly for the structure of thought which also has phenomenology intrinsically built into it. *"Cognitive intentional states such as occurrent thoughts, and occurrent conative intentional states such as occurrent wishes, are by their very nature phenomenal. The overall phenomenal character of such a state comprises both the phenomenology of its specific intentional content and the phenomenology of its specific attitude-type"* (Horgan and Tienson, in press). Now, as objects (MSDGs) are constituted both as a function of the world and of language and thought, they also have phenomenology intrinsically built into them. Phenomenology plays an important part in the constitution of regional ontologies. This is what we proposed to demonstrate by way of positive support for our thesis.

2. How do metaphysicians represent the constitution of objects?

The second and rather negative support for our thesis comes from taking a look at the question of how metaphysicians usually represent the constitution of objects. Often, metaphysicians start their investigation of objects by taking them to be parts of brute existent facts. So they presuppose that objects (MSDGs) exist in the ultimate sense and that they are parts of the world. Proceeding like that, metaphysicians actually appropriate normative standards that fit ultimate reality, and they apply them to objects. So objects acquire the status of language and thought independent entities in ultimate reality. Because of this, there is no cognition, and accordingly no phenomenology recognized as being intrinsically constitutive of objects.

If there is no intrinsically object constitutive phenomenology, metaphysicians cannot really deal with objects. This follows from acceptance of the former argument: objects as MSDGs are constituted not only by the world, but also by language and thought. Language and thought are cognition bound and so they have phenomenology intrinsically built into them. Now, phenomenology or qualitative conscious experience fits to particularist patterns and thus to holistic structure of a certain unique context, not to the general patterns that extend over several similar contexts. Particularist patterns are much more apt to deal with complex holistic goings-on in phenomenology enriched cognition. If metaphysicians approach objects or MSDGs by the help of general patterns, they are not capable to capture phenomenology or qualitative consciousness. So if they persist in their account of objects according to ontological general requirements, they turn out to be metaphysical zombies. They apply generalist normative standards, appropriate for ontology to the area of the ontic and therefore they end up with several normativity-based problems related to MSDGs. The result is that they either give up important areas of objects (van Inwagen 1990) or that they try to defend them in ambiguous and confusing ways (Thomasson, in press). Besides, metaphysicians are phenomenological zombies, for they do not account for any phenomenological experiences that only come through particularist patterns. Applying generalist patterns, appropriate for the ultimate ontology to the area of the ontic, metaphysicians cannot recognize objects with their intrinsically constitutive phenomenology.

The difference between generalist and particularist patterns is important. We believe that objects (MSDGs) are regional, ontic, and that they constitutively involve particularist patterns. But metaphysicians almost exclusively use general patterns. Because of not even being disposed to thematize particularist patterns metaphysicians cannot have phenomenology. Patterns that metaphysicians apply to objects are appropriate just for the world and thus to the ultimate ontology. If objects (MSDGs, being ontic or regional) are constituted by particularist patterns, they do intrinsically involve phenomenology. Applying generalist patterns will make you blind to the particularist patterns and to their intrinsic phenomenology.

We identified two separatist takes on the object constitution with which we disagree: pushing for the importance of exclusive contribution of the world, or again for the exclusive contribution of language and thought. We believe that the appropriate constitution of objects rather succeeds through combination of these factors. In what follows, we sketch the first separatist approach to the object constitution, the one that overemphasizes the importance of the world.

Often, metaphysicians start with objects as with brute existent facts. Being brute means that objects or parts are simply taken as metaphysical givens. Existent objects belong to the ultimate ontology. According to our understanding, objects do not belong to the ultimate ontology: we claim that they *ex-sist*, i.e. they appear as ontic stuff. By *ex-sistence*, we mean that there is regional ontic presence of objects *in* the world, but not as separate entities.

Existence refers to the ultimate ontological reality. But ultimate ontological reality comes with the highest normative standards. The decision to start with objects as brute facts is supported by appropriating ultimate normative standards, but not by the most basic ontological

principles such as the non-arbitrariness of composition or the impossibility of metaphysical vagueness principles.

If you treat a cat as brute metaphysical fact, and if you apply general patterns supported ultimate ontology norms to it, one consequence will be that you will not be able to recognize any constitutive role of language and thought for the cat (MSDG). Then the cat will have the status of language and thought independent reality.

But if language and thought are not recognized as constitutive for the object (MSDG) cat, then no phenomenology will be recognized as intrinsic to the constitution of the cat either. For only particularist patterns proper to language and thought may get phenomenology involved into the picture, but adopting the highest ontological normativity disallows the presence of such patterns in the object constitution.

If there is no phenomenology recognized in the constitution of objects, then actually there cannot be any objects recognized at all in this separatist metaphysical practice (separatist, because just the world is separated from the whole of the world *and* language-thought object constitution). So these metaphysicians (Thomasson, van Inwagen) that do not recognize the role of language and thought and therefore of regional normativity in the constitution of MSDGs cannot have any objects in the appropriate metaphysical sense.

Objects have phenomenology intrinsically built into their constitution. But since those metaphysicians whom we described do not leave any space for phenomenology, they are metaphysical zombies. A metaphysical zombie is somebody who does not allow phenomenology to enter into objects' constitution. Metaphysical zombies are the product of applying ultimate normative ontology standards to the area of the ontic or to the *ex-sistent*. A related issue sorts out these metaphysicians as phenomenological zombies. Phenomenological zombies do not have any qualitative experiences or what-it's-like attitudes. There is a certain feeling attached to the experience of objects (MSDGs): it feels different to recognize a cat, or a spider, or again a cup. If phenomenology is intrinsic to the constitution of objects, then these qualitative experiences are really constitutive for these objects, not just accompanying their recognition. But if there is no what-it's-like part in the object constitution, metaphysicians end up as phenomenological zombies and cannot have or recognize any objects at all. There cannot be any objects for them in regional ontology; their objects present a brute world of the ultimate ontology.

Consciousness is widely known as the hard problem. We take a look at easy problems as related to the approaches using generalist patterns. Whereas hard problems are related to *particularist* patterns, and consciousness or qualitative *phenomenology* is certainly one of these.

Our official position is that both the world *and* language-thought enter into the constitution of objects. One may remain with our position, all in putting the world into methodological parentheses, thus exercising *phenomenological epoche*. This methodological proposal does not get rid of the world. It just stresses the importance of *phenomenology* in constitution of objects (MSDGs). We think that recognizing objects as congealings *in* the world (Blob) is helped by such a proposal. *Particularist* patterns then naturally find their role in object constitution.

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Emotion, Meaning, and the Structure of Experience

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In the philosophy of mind, the related concepts of meaning, intentionality, and reference refer to representational states of the mind. Experience often appears nothing more than a complex, complicated collection of such states. The sound strategy, which philosophy and much of psychology usually follow, focuses on understanding the former, with grasping the complex whole as a distant goal.

In the present discussion, I will do the opposite. I want to start with the psychology of emotions, which focuses on meaning in a different form. In emotions, meaning and subjective experience overlap. Emotions are complex states themselves, and their study starts at a more global level of both experience and meaning. Proceeding from them, I will examine the relationships between person and world in first-person experience in general, and claim that several specific problems associated with meaning and reference of representation result from the introduction of third person, abstract viewpoints.

The strategy to proceed from global to particular has its precedents in the study of the mind. William James (1892) recommends to take the analysis of consciousness *in toto* as the starting point for psychology; Magda Arnold (1960) insists on experience as the central datum in psychology in her philosophically well informed, pioneering study of emotion.

1. Meaning in emotional experience

I want to point out that I take "experience" simply as referring to a person's awareness of what goes on at a given moment, and do not include other meanings, such as "experience" as opposite to "inexperience".

Both modern philosophy and psychology recognize emotions as complex responses that involve a flexibly organized ensemble of component processes (e.g. de Sousa 1987; Damasio 1994; Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1991). In everyday human life, emotional experience is an outstanding feature of emotional responses. Emotions are the experience of impending good or evil, to paraphrase Aristotle.

Emotions are obviously related to and have recurrently been defined as value judgments, even if mistaken ones: This line of reasoning about emotion runs from classic philosophy (Sorabji 2000) to modern cognitive theories (Roseman and Smith 2001). However, they are more than that. Value judgments may occur in "cold blood". In emotion, a person immediately and intensely experiences their *personal implications*. Grief, for example, arises in a situation in which the person incurs, imagines, or remembers an irrevocable and overwhelming loss; joy, when desires are fulfilled, love, when there is physical and spiritual unity with a desired person. In other words, emotional experience reflects what a situation *means* for the person in a highly condensed form.

Several emotion theorists have made such an interpretation of the concept of meaning central to their models of emotion (cf. Barrett and Campos 1987; Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1991). It helps to come to terms with some peculiar aspects of emotion. First, in emotion, a person does not experience and respond to "objective" attributes of a situation. For example, competitors in sports or love will respond with very different emotions to the same

objective outcome of the competition, depending on whether they are the winning or losing party. This is not a trivial observation, because the situation's objective features do play some role: It is relevant, after all, that Jones, and not James, has emerged victorious. Yet, second, the situation's objective attributes have some consequences that can only be understood by way of the idiosyncratic constitution of the person. What Jones and James idiosyncratically bring into the situation is what accounts for their different emotional experiences.

The meaning a person experiences in emotion depends on the conjunction of objective (or what is perceived as it) and personal attributes of a situation. Jones loves Jane because of her "objective" character, but *he* would refuse to love Jean, her twin-sister (or clone), although she is objectively identical to her (de Sousa 1987, discusses this problem under the header of *Alcmene's dilemma*). Musil (1978) has aptly described the fact that emotion are "simultaneously inside and outside" of the person as their "amphibian ambiguity" (see pp. 1161-1162).

In emotional meaning, subject and object, person and environment, are inextricably fused. Meaning designates the state of the relationship between them, and emotional experience is its conscious part. In characterizing this relationship, meaning has a double function. *First*, it describes its *general structure* by specifying *constitutive conditions*. A situation acquires meaning for a person if she is sensitive a) to the situation's consequences for her as a person, and b) to the available options for action in the light of these consequences. Note that the latter condition is as important as the former: emotional meaning of a situation always includes grasping what it affords to do (Frijda 1986); offhandedly, to understand "what's happening" is utterly useless without an understanding of what to do about it, as Wittgenstein (1984) understood so well. *Second*, besides defining the general form, an indefinite variety of *specific meanings* describe various forms of transient and recurrent person-environment relationships. These, extracted and stored, characterize our emotion categories: loss for grief, achievement for pride, etc. (cf. Lazarus 1991).

Emotional experience, thus, reflects the meaning of a situation for a person. "Meaning" is shorthand for a relationship between them, which characterizes both the effects of the situation and what it affords the person to do. These claims require some clarifications. *First*, in first-person (irreflexive) experience, person and environment are interdependent. Instead of resulting from some constructive mental process, cognitive or otherwise, of conjoining a priori given entities of "environment" and "person" ("self"), as some suggest (Lazarus 1991). These entities themselves, rather, are derived from the subjectively experienced relationship, if the cognitive capacities of the organism allow it. This is true irrespective of the fact that an observer may easily tell them apart, and that adult humans easily adopt such a stance towards themselves. *Second*, although emotional experience reflects meaning, it is not necessarily experience of meaning. A person may reflect on how the emotion-inducing situation affects her and her behavior, but irreflexive experience of the situation as threatening or exhilarating is nonetheless emotional or meaningful (Lambie and Marcel

2002). *Third*, conscious experience is not a necessary ingredient of the emotional response (Damasio 1999). Meaningful, emotional action may occur without awareness in both human and animal organisms. Meaning, then, is expressed in action, the manifest part of the person-environment relationship. The relationship, in this case, may be recognized by an observer, although it is not accessible to the awareness of the subject: Jones may not be aware of his fumbling around with a cigarette, but James observing him immediately recognizes it as a sign of nervous apprehension of Jane's appearance on the first date. *Finally*, meaning, as defined, sets emotions apart from value judgments. In emotion, a person does not simply recognize a situation as good, it relates to it as a good-to-be-obtained. Emotional experience constrains action in a way that mere judgment does not.

Does this phenomenological analysis of meaning in emotional experience with its strongly psychological flavor teach us anything about philosophical problems pertaining to experience, meaning, and mental representation? I think it does. I want to probe this idea with two claims (rather than arguments). The first generalizes from emotional experience to all experience, and the second draws some consequences from it.

2. Meaning and the structure of experience

Let me suggest that the analysis of meaning and person-environment relationship applies to experience in general. Experience is one way for a person to enter into a relationship with the environment; it is its conscious part. Action is another, manifest part that modifies the relationship. In one respect, I equate experience with relational meaning. If one accepts the view of experience as a relationship, it will have the structure that underlies meaning: Whatever I experience, enters into experience by way of its consequences and affordances to action. On the other hand, the equation does not hold at every given point for all experience. Meaning rarely comes ready-made: The consequences of an event may not be immediately obvious, and neither may be the action-options. Establishing relational meaning in experience and action is a process; meaning may be in the making. If it is not fully established, the relationship may be damaged or collapse. In trauma, when one is overwhelmed by consequences that deny adaptive action, behavior is muted and experience characterized by alienation, found in symptoms of depersonalization and derealization.

Again, some clarifications. *First*, to be sure, there are meaningless aspects of situations. They do not feature significantly in the relationship, and will at best remain in the background of experience. I am less sure about meaningless behaviors. Wagging one's leg in a state of high arousal may not qualify as goal-directed action, but still express relational meaning at a biological level. *Second*, experience does not need to be object-directed, or intentional, in order to reflect relational meaning. Objectless experiences, such as pleasure, pain, or moods (Searle 1983), indicate the state of the relationship very well without specifying an object (Arnold 1960, chapter 4). *Third*, in an ongoing experience, a person may engage thoughts with no obvious meaning. Writing a paper, I might suddenly think "burgundy". Although not in a direct relationship with the current situation, it derives meaning from its context: as an escapist fantasy under laborious circumstances. James and Freud both dealt with this phenomenon, though quite differently. *Finally*, what about emotion? Emotions arise when the person-environment relationship is in crisis. If experience in general reflects

meaning, emotional experience reflects meaning change, positive or negative.

3. Meaning, representation, and reference

I have carried the concept of meaning from the psychology of emotion into the phenomenology of experience. In the philosophy of the mind, meaning usually refers to the problem of mental representation. How do we account for the fact that mental states refer to anything beyond themselves? The answer, I think, depends on whether we adopt a first- or third-person viewpoint. (Most of the following discussion I owe to arguments about the ontology of intentional states and consciousness defended by Searle 1983 and 1992.)

First and foremost, the subjective mind does not represent but experiences the world. The person's subjective experience does indeed go beyond the self, as does the intentional state in the representative theory of the mind. However, meaning, the relational aspect, is a built-in feature of experience. From a first person point of view, the question of how experience relates to (or "represents") the world does not make sense. Experience is my way of relating to the world, and meaning constitutes it. The same amphibian ambiguity Musil recognizes in emotion also emerges for experience: World and subject are intrinsically intertwined.

The problem of mental representation arises as soon as I adopt a third-person viewpoint, and isolate slices of mental states from subjective experience. I can do it to myself: identify my belief "It is Friday", and ask myself how it represents the according state of the world. However, I have rather created a problem than identified it. Only by abstraction am I able to identify two different constituents, the belief and the state of the world, which do not exist independently in irreflexive experience. While for the subject the problem does not arise (experience of the world and world are one), for the observer the task of explaining the reference becomes insurmountable because of its indeterminacy.

It is important to note that representation is as little in the brain as it is in the mind. Brain cell activity of a drunken person represents his "drunkenness" as little as the activity of his liver cells "represents" the alcohol level in the blood. Nevertheless, the barfly experiences himself as drunk. Brain states *create* experience; representational properties are *ascribed* to them by observers (neuroscientists) who view brain and mind as distinct.

Representational properties, then, depend on ascription by an observer. In the case of self-observation, I may accept it as an empirical fact that my belief refers to a state in the world. In other cases, it is result of stipulation: Every child drawing a circle around two dots stipulates that this represents the face of her mother. The meaning of words depends on a similar process, if less willful on the part of the individual. However, meaning ascribed to representation ultimately blends with the relational meaning of experience. Thus, Each word is meaningful to me if I understand its consequences and the action (use) it affords. The discussion comes full circle: Words transport emotions so well, may hurt and please, because we transfer onto them relational meanings which subjective emotional experience reflects.

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Propositionaler Gehalt und soziale Normen

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Es herrscht weitgehende Einigkeit darüber, dass man die sprachliche Bedeutung von Sprechakten in zwei Aspekte unterteilen kann, nämlich einerseits die illokutionäre Kraft (z.B. Befehl, Warnung, Mitteilung), andererseits den propositionalen Gehalt. Der propositionale Gehalt eines Sprechakts besteht darin, dass er sich auf einen Sachverhalt bezieht (z.B. die Handlung, die befohlen wird, der Sachverhalt, der mitgeteilt wird). Ich möchte mich in meinem Beitrag auf den propositionalen Gehalt von Sprechakten konzentrieren. Es erscheint aufgrund der Konventionalität der natürlichen Sprache plausibel anzunehmen, dass die sprachliche Bedeutung von Sprechakten, und damit auch ihr propositionaler Gehalt, auf sozialen Normen beruht. Dieser Intuition möchte ich hier folgen und einen Vorschlag unterbreiten, wie man durch die Annahme von sozialen Normen erklären kann, dass Sprachakte bestimmte propositionale Gehalte aufweisen. Allerdings bereitet, wie sich zeigen wird, eine solche Erklärung des propositionalen Gehalts Schwierigkeiten, weil dieser Gehalt zumindest mancher Sprechakte eine gewisse Objektivität aufweist. Dieses Problem hat m.E. auch Brandom im Auge, wenn er schreibt „How does objectivity precipitate out of the social soup of norms that are whatever the community takes them to be?“ (Brandom 1994, 54) Bevor ich dieses Problem genauer beschreibe und eine Antwort darauf vorschlage, möchte ich jedoch erläutern, was ich unter einer sozialen Norm bzw. einer Konvention verstehe.

1. Soziale Normen

In einer Gesellschaft existiert dann eine soziale Norm, die besagt, dass man unter den Umständen U die Handlung H vollziehen muss, wenn die große Mehrheit ihrer Mitglieder sich gemäß dieser Norm verhält und Abweichungen von dieser Norm bestraft werden. In diesem Fall gibt es einen sozialen Druck, H zu vollziehen, wenn die Umstände U vorliegen. Man kann in diesem Fall sagen, dass es sozial korrekt bzw. inkorrekt ist, sich in gewisser Weise zu verhalten. Ein Beispiel für eine soziale Norm ist: ‚Wenn man eine Kirche betritt, muss man seinen Hut abnehmen‘. Soziale Normen besagen immer, dass man unter bestimmten Umständen U dazu sozial verpflichtet ist, eine bestimmte Handlung H auszuführen. Anders gesagt entsteht unter bestimmten Umständen ein sozialer Druck auf einen Handelnden, eine bestimmte Handlung auszuführen.

Es ist für soziale Normen weder erforderlich, dass sie von einem Souverän erlassen wurden, noch dass die Mitglieder der Gesellschaft sie formulieren können oder sich ihrer auch nur bewusst sind. Sie müssen lediglich ein implizites Wissen von den sozialen Normen haben. Es ist daher oft nicht möglich, genau anzugeben, welche Umstände für die Anwendung einer sozialen Norm vorliegen müssen, noch ist es möglich, genau anzugeben, zu welcher Handlung in diesem Fall eine Verpflichtung entsteht.

Soziale Korrektheit ist ratifikationsabhängig, d.h., wenn alle Gesellschaftsmitglieder unter den Umständen U die Handlung H ausführen würden und auch Druck auf andere Mitglieder ausüben, dies zu tun, dann folgt daraus, dass es sozial korrekt ist, sich so zu verhalten. Es ist nicht möglich, dass alle Mitglieder der Gesellschaft eine Verhaltensweise für sozial korrekt halten, die Verhaltensweise aber trotzdem nicht sozial korrekt ist. Dies zu behaupten

wäre ein Widerspruch. Was sozial korrekt ist, wird in diesem Sinne durch die Ratifikation durch die Gesellschaft festgelegt, und in diesem Sinne ist soziale Korrektheit nicht objektiv, sondern ratifikationsabhängig. Die soziale Korrektheit einer Handlung kann allerdings im Widerspruch z.B. zu ihrer moralischen Korrektheit stehen.

2. Erster Vorschlag einer Zurückführung

Ich werde meine Behandlung von propositionale Gehalten am Beispiel einer Mitteilung ‚Das Objekt O ist F durchführen. Ich gehe dabei davon aus, dass geklärt ist, welcher Einzelgegenstand durch O bezeichnet wird. Es ist dann lediglich zu klären, wie gewisse soziale Normen dazu führen, dass der Begriff F eine bestimmte Extension hat, also auf bestimmte Gegenstände zutrifft.

Folgende Zurückführung des propositionalen Gehalts von ‚Objekt O ist F auf soziale Normen scheint sich anzubieten: Nehmen wir an, dass es soziale Normen gibt, die besagen, dass man der Mitteilung ‚Objekt O ist F zustimmen muss, wenn O sich auf einen Gegenstand aus einer bestimmten Menge bezieht. Für alle Elemente e einer Menge E gelte also die folgende soziale Norm: Wenn ein Sprecher die Mitteilung ‚Objekt O ist F macht und O sich auf e bezieht, dann ist es sozial korrekt, dieser Mitteilung zuzustimmen. Durch diese sozialen Normen wird dem Begriff F eine Extension zugeordnet. Es ist sozial korrekt, den Begriff F auf bestimmte Objekte anzuwenden, während es inkorrekt ist, ihn auf andere Objekte anzuwenden.

Aus dieser Zurückführung ergibt sich als Folge, dass es nicht möglich ist, dass die große Mehrzahl der Sprecher sich bezüglich der Extension des Begriffs F irrt. Nehmen wir z.B. an, dass die große Mehrzahl der Sprecher den Begriff F auf ein bestimmtes Objekt O anwenden würde, und auch Sprecher berichtigen würde, die dies nicht tun. Dann besteht in der Gesellschaft die soziale Norm, F auf O anzuwenden. Dies wiederum bedeutet nach der obigen Zurückführung, dass O zur Extension des Begriffs gehört. Nach dieser Rekonstruktion der Extension des Begriffs F hängt es also von der Ratifikation durch die Gesellschaft ab, ob ein Gegenstand unter den Begriff fällt. Wenn die große Mehrheit der Sprecher den Begriff auf ein Objekt O anwenden würde, fällt O unter den Begriff, wenn die große Mehrheit der Sprecher dies nicht tun würde, so fällt O nicht unter den Begriff. Man kann diesen Umstand beschreiben, indem man sagt, die Extension hänge von der Anwendungspraxis oder der Ratifikation durch die Gesellschaft ab.

3. Die Objektivität des Begriffsinhalts

Diese Erklärung der Extension aufgrund von sozialen Normen kann aber zumindest nicht für alle Begriffe gelten, denn es gibt auch Begriffe, deren Extension von Anwendungspraxis der Gesellschaft unabhängig ist. Dies gilt z.B. für den Begriff ‚Gold‘, von dem ich annehmen will, dass er folgenden Begriffsinhalt aufweist: Objekte, auf die dieser Begriff zutrifft, werden nur durch Königswasser (eine Mischung aus Salz- und Salpetersäure) und durch keine andere Säure zersetzt. Ich gehe davon aus, dass die Tatsache, dass Gold sich nur in Königswasser auflöst, nicht einfach ein empirischer Satz ist, sondern dass diese

Verbindung für den Inhalt des Begriffs ‚Gold‘ konstitutiv ist. Dieses Vorgehen setzt natürlich voraus, dass man zwischen analytischen und synthetischen Sätzen unterscheiden kann. Ich werde am Schluss meines Beitrags darauf zurückkommen.

Es ist möglich, dass alle Mitglieder der Sprachgemeinschaft ‚Gold‘ auf ein bestimmtes Objekt *O* anwenden würden, obwohl *O* durch Salzsäure zersetzt würde und daher nicht unter den Begriff ‚Gold‘ fällt. Diese Möglichkeit besteht aus dem Grund, dass der Begriff ‚Gold‘ den oben genannten Begriffsinhalt hat. Aufgrund dieses Inhalts wird von Objekten, die unter diesen Begriff fallen, gefordert, dass sie eine bestimmte Eigenschaft aufweisen. Dieser Begriffsinhalt, der die Extension festlegt, ist aber von der Anwendungspraxis in der Gesellschaft unabhängig. Die Extension des Begriffs ‚Gold‘ ist daher unabhängig von der Ratifikation durch die Sprachgemeinschaft. Man kann in diesem Sinne sagen, dass der Begriffsinhalt von ‚Gold‘ eine gewisse Objektivität aufweist.

Meiner Ansicht nach gibt es sowohl Begriffe, deren Extension durch die Anwendungspraxis der Gesellschaft bestimmt wird, als auch Begriffe, deren Extension von der Anwendungspraxis unabhängig ist. Wenn durch den Inhalt eines Begriffs gefordert ist, dass die unter ihn fallenden Objekte eine bestimmte Eigenschaft aufweisen, dann ist die Extension unabhängig von der Anwendungspraxis in der Gesellschaft. Auf der anderen Seite gibt es aber auch Begriffe, deren Inhalt man sprachlich nicht weiter spezifizieren kann. Man kann für das Zutreffen eines solchen Begriffs auf ein konkretes Objekt keine weiteren Begründungen geben. Bei Meinungsverschiedenheiten kann man in solchen Fällen nur noch sagen ‚Schau doch hin!‘. Die Extension solcher Begriffe wird m.E. durch die Anwendungspraxis der Gesellschaft bestimmt.

4. Zweiter Vorschlag einer Zurückführung

Wie gesagt gehe ich in meinem Beitrag davon aus, dass sprachliche Bedeutung auf sozialen Normen über die Verwendung von Äußerungen beruht. Es hat sich nun aber gezeigt, dass die eben beschriebene Rückführung zumindest nicht für alle Begriffe gelten kann. D.h., nicht für alle Begriffe *F* trifft es zu, dass ihre Extension dadurch bestimmt wird, dass es soziale Normen gibt, die besagen, dass man der Mitteilung ‚Objekt *O* ist *F*‘ unter bestimmten Umständen zustimmen muss.

Um nun zu einem alternativen Vorschlag einer Rückführung zu kommen, muss man beachten, dass die sozialen Normen, die eben angenommen wurden, einen ganz bestimmten Aspekt der Verwendung der Äußerung ‚Objekt *O* ist *F*‘ regeln: Wenn jemand diese Äußerung getan hat, muss man ihr, je nachdem, worauf *O* sich bezieht, zustimmen oder nicht zustimmen. Ich werde nun versuchen, einen anderen Aspekt der Verwendung von ‚Objekt *O* ist *F*‘ zu finden, der durch soziale Normen geregelt wird, so dass durch diese Regelung eine bestimmte Extension für den Begriff *F* festgelegt wird, die von der Anwendungspraxis der Gesellschaft unabhängig ist.

Einen Hinweis auf einen solchen Verwendungsaspekt ergibt sich aus einer Untersuchung der illokutionären Kraft von Mitteilungen. Nach Austins Sprechakttheorie (Austin 1962) sind illokutionäre Akte ja ganz allgemein dadurch ausgezeichnet, dass sie bestimmte konventionale Folgen aufweisen. Die konventionalen Folgen von Sprechakten bestehen m.E. allgemein darin, dass durch das Vollziehen des Sprechakts für den Sprecher, den Hörer und Dritte gewisse neue Rechte und Pflichten entstehen. Das Geben

eines Befehls hat z.B. die konventionale Folge, dass der Hörer dazu verpflichtet ist, die ihm befohlene Handlung auszuführen.

Auch der Sprechakt der Mitteilung hat konventionale Folgen, die in der Entstehung neuer Rechte und Pflichten bestehen. Konkreter gesprochen schafft ein Sprecher *S* dadurch, dass er einem Adressaten *A* mitteilt, dass *p*, für sich selbst eine neue Verpflichtung. Und zwar steht er dafür gerade, dass der Sachverhalt *p* wirklich vorliegt. Diese Verpflichtung auf das Vorliegen des Sachverhalts *p* kann folgendermaßen ausbuchstabiert werden: Wenn der Sachverhalt *p* nicht besteht (wenn *S* sich also irrt) und der Adressat *A* sich bei seinen nicht-sprachlichen Handlungen auf das Vorliegen von *p* verlässt und ihm nun Schäden entstehen, weil *p* nicht vorliegt, dann ist *S* zumindest zum Teil für diesen Schaden verantwortlich, d.h. *S* ist verpflichtet, für einen Teil des Schadens aufzukommen.

Betrachten wir als Beispiel die Mitteilung ‚Objekt *O* ist aus Gold‘. Dabei gelten weiterhin die oben gemachten Annahmen über den Inhalt des Begriffs ‚Gold‘: Ein Objekt, das unter diesen Begriff fällt, wird von keiner Säure außer Königswasser zersetzt. Ein Sprecher, der die Mitteilung ‚Objekt *O* ist aus Gold‘ macht, geht die Verpflichtung ein, dass das Objekt *O* nicht zersetzt wird, wenn man es in Salzsäure legt. Nehmen wir nun an, dass der Adressat *A* sich bei seinen nicht-sprachlichen Handlungen darauf verlässt, dass *O* aus Gold ist: Er baut einen Apparat, dessen Funktionieren davon abhängt, dass *O* Salzsäure standhält. Wenn *A* nun dadurch Schäden entstehen, dass der Apparat nicht funktioniert, weil *O* durch Salzsäure zersetzt wurde, ist der Sprecher *S* für diese Schäden mit verantwortlich. Dies wiederum bedeutet, dass *S* verpflichtet ist, Schadenersatz zu leisten.

Diese Verpflichtung beruht auf der folgenden sozialen Norm: Wenn ein Sprecher *S* einem Adressaten *A* mitteilt, dass *O* aus Gold ist, und wenn *O* sich in Salzsäure auflöst, und *A* dadurch Schäden entstehen, dann ist *S* verpflichtet, für diesen Schaden aufzukommen. Das Antecedens dieser sozialen Norm verlangt u.a., dass folgender Sachverhalt besteht: Wenn *O* in Salzsäure liegt, wird *O* zersetzt. Der propositionale Gehalt der Mitteilung ‚Objekt *O* ist aus Gold‘ ergibt sich nun daraus, für das Vorliegen welches Sachverhalts der Sprecher die Verantwortung übernimmt. Nach der eben formulierten sozialen Norm ist dies das Bestehen eines Sachverhalts in Wenn-dann-Form: Wenn man Objekt *O* in irgendeine Säure außer Königswasser legt, wird es nicht zersetzt. Dies ist der propositionale Gehalt der Mitteilung, denn für das Vorliegen dieses Sachverhalts übernimmt der Sprecher die Verantwortung.

Ob ein Objekt *O* unter den Begriff ‚Gold‘ fällt, hängt davon ab, ob bezüglich *O* dieser gesetzmäßige Zusammenhang besteht. Es hängt nicht davon ab, ob die große Mehrheit der Sprecher den Begriff ‚Gold‘ auf *O* anwenden würden. Die Extension des Begriffs ‚Gold‘ erweist sich also als unabhängig von der Anwendungspraxis der Gesellschaft. Es handelt sich in diesem Sinne also um einen objektiven Begriffsinhalt. Gleichzeitig ist es aber so, dass die Extension des Begriffs letztlich dadurch bestimmt ist, welche Verwendungsweisen der Mitteilung ‚*O* ist aus Gold‘ von der Gesellschaft als sozial korrekt anerkannt werden.

5. Zur analytisch/synthetisch Unterscheidung

Abschließend möchte ich mich noch zu dem Einwand äußern, dass ich hier von einem zu stark vereinfachten Begriffssystem ausgehe. Ich nehme ja an, dass die

Eigenschaft, nur von Königswasser zersetzt zu werden, zum Inhalt des Begriffs ‚Gold‘ gehört, womit ich mich auch auf die Existenz analytischer Sätze festlege. Dass es einen scharfen Unterschied zwischen analytischen und synthetischen Sätzen gibt, wird aber vielfach angezweifelt (siehe Quine 1951). Man kann wohl zu Recht einwenden, dass unser tatsächliches Begriffssystem wesentlich komplizierter als das von mir hier angenommene ist. Man kann auch zu Recht einwenden, dass die Frage, ob ein Objekt unter einen Begriff fällt, in unserem tatsächlichen System nicht so einfach entschieden wird, wie ich es hier angenommen habe. Dies hängt meist nicht einfach von einem Wenn-dann-Verhältnis zwischen zwei Sachverhalten ab, sondern es ist normalerweise eine Vielzahl von Begriffsverhältnissen relevant, durch die die Extension eines Begriffs holistisch festgelegt wird.

Meine Antwort auf diesen Einwand ist, dass das hier vorgestellte Verfahren, den propositionalen Gehalt auf soziale Normen zurückzuführen, an solche komplexeren Begriffssysteme angepasst werden kann. Dazu muss man nur die Bedingungen, die *O* erfüllen muss, damit der Sprecher Schadenersatzpflichtig wird, entsprechend anpassen. Die soziale Norm, auf der die Extension des Begriffs *F* beruht, lautet dann: Wenn der Sprecher *S* dem Adressaten *A* mitteilt, dass das Objekt *O* unter den Begriff *F* fällt und man aufgrund holistischer Überlegungen sagen würde, dass *O* nicht unter *F* fällt und dem Adressat *A* aufgrund dessen Schäden entstehen, dann ist *S* verpflichtet, Ersatz zu leisten.

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Non-Reductive Theories of Consciousness and Phenomenology

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1. Introduction

In the growing wave of interest in consciousness in the analytic philosophy of mind, there has been an interesting movement of non-reductive theories of consciousness over the last three decades. It moves against the mainstream of the reductive analytic philosophy of consciousness and its central exponents are Thomas Nagel, John Searle and David Chalmers. Reductive theories hold that conscious phenomena can be completely explained in physical terms whereas non-reductive theories deny such a possibility. What is the nature of conscious phenomena in the light of the non-reductive theories? This question may be answered in at least three ways. First, one can describe these theories against their closest negative background, that is against the reductive theories of consciousness. Second, there are some interesting differences and tensions within the non-reductive group of theories and some of them are worth exploring in themselves. Third, the non-reductive theories can be compared with twentieth century phenomenology for there has been no more elaborated and detailed analysis of consciousness in the philosophical tradition than that offered by phenomenology.

Both phenomenological and non-reductive theories share some fundamental assumption at their starting points: they share the idea that what matters in the nature of mind is consciousness and that consciousness cannot be explained in terms of something more elementary. A closer examination of the relation between them gives some hopes for a better insight into the assumptions underlying them and perhaps into the nature of consciousness itself. But this comparison requires the scope of a book and here I can only outline it. In what follows I shall attempt to compare the two kinds of theories in respect of the scope of the described phenomena, the ways of the conceptualization of conscious phenomena and their relation to the physical phenomena. The most difficult and demanding of them is the comparison of the conceptualizations and this is what I will focus attention on.

2. The Ways of Conceptualization

The analytic approach is, perhaps unexpectedly, broader than the phenomenological approach with respect to the scope of the phenomena taken into account. One of the underlying assumptions of the phenomenological theories is that they consider conscious phenomena as appearing in the human mind only. In contrast to that, analytic theories consider these phenomena as appearing also in the minds of many other higher species. Besides, Thomas Nagel almost explicitly holds that there are many other intelligent creatures in the universe, who of course have also conscious minds. Given the myriad of species living on earth alone, it extends remarkably the scope of the examined phenomena.

The difference in the scope can partly explain the differences in the central features of the conceptualization of conscious phenomena between the theories in question. While the most important feature of consciousness in phenomenology is intentionality, in analytic theories it is 'subjectivity'. Does this constitute a fundamental differ-

ence? What is the relation between intentionality and 'subjectivity'? The idea of 'subjectivity' as the central feature of consciousness was first introduced by Nagel in his "classic" essay "What is it like to be a bat?" and has been championed since then by him as well as by Searle and Chalmers (Nagel 1974). In order to approach what Nagel means by 'subjectivity' one has to keep in mind its negative background. Nagel has introduced it in opposition to the situation on the stage of the analytic philosophy of mind set at that time among others by: Smart, Putnam, Armstrong and Dennett. Nagel did not argue that materialist theories of mind were wrong as such, he did argue, however, that they went wrong in ignoring consciousness from the very beginning. It is consciousness that matters most in the understanding of the nature of the mind and it cannot be explained in physical terms. Also, it is unjustified to use uncritically the distinction between primary and secondary qualities to explain the relation between the physical and the mental. It is impossible to give a strict definition of 'subjectivity', as it is impossible to give the definition of consciousness. In his famous formulation Nagel says that "an organism has conscious experience *at all* means basically, that there is something it is like to *be* that organism" (Nagel 1974). 'Subjectivity' means that mental states are given 'from a particular point of view' or from the 'internal point of view'. 'Point of view' along with the wide range of conscious experience are at the heart of Nagel's idea of the mind. It is precisely for this reason that minds cannot be grasped by physical methods but they are part of reality as well.

Any analytic theory of consciousness formulated after Wittgenstein has to challenge his famous position given in the argument of private language. Nagel recognizes Wittgenstein as the most important thinker of the XX century, recognizes that the rules of language must be public but he denies that mental states are strictly private. Wittgenstein made a false objectification of mental phenomena, in which he ignored their essential connection with 'a point of view' and regarded them as if they had been private physical objects. In spite of their different nature mental phenomena are also in a way objective: "I assume that the subjective ideas of experience, of action, and of the self are in some sense public or common property. That is why the problems of mind and body, free will, and personal identity are not just problems about one's own case." (Nagel 1979, 207). We do use mental terms both in the first and in the third person and what we have in mind doing so is not the behavioral aspects of their meanings alone.

John Searle's position is similar to that of Nagel's. In *The Rediscovery of the Mind* he discusses seven types of materialist theories of the mind showing that all of them have one error in common: they overlook or ignore that the mind is the conscious mind (Searle 1992). Searle's conceptualization of mental phenomena is more extensive than Nagel's. He distinguishes twelve 'structural features' of them, mentions two additional, and highlights two of them: 'subjectivity' ('subjective feeling') and intentionality. He describes 'subjectivity' in a way similar to that of Nagel and uses the concept of 'ontological subjectivity' instead of 'a particular point of view'. What is interesting in Searle's views on intentionality is its evolution towards the position of phenomenology. In his earlier work he examined the

'logic of intentionality' without referring to consciousness (Searle 1983). Now he distinguishes different forms of intentionality and claims that the 'internal intentionality of consciousness' is more elementary than that of language. But there are apparently some points in Searle's conceptualization at which the tension between phenomenological and linguistic concepts of the mind comes to surface. They are closely related to one of 'the structural features' of consciousness that is 'the aspect of familiarity'. First, this property involves categorization and it is not absolutely clear whether the categories are secondary and reflect the meanings that are present in consciousness (as they do within the framework of the phenomenological theory) or whether they are primary and are needed for the interpretation of conscious experience. Second, 'the aspect of familiarity' depends on the whole 'network of intentionality' and the latter can only function due to 'the capacities of the Background'. It is precisely at this point that the philosophy of later Wittgenstein enters into Searle's theory and he regards this philosophy as mainly concerned with the problems of 'the Background'. Among other things, 'the Background' contains contingent human practices. In the phenomenological theory of mind the meanings are grounded in the *a priori* order of 'the essences' of phenomena and 'the transcendental' sphere of subject, whereas in Searle's theory they are finally (at least partly) grounded in some contingent human practices. Some of the other differences are these: while in Searle's theory the meanings represent the world, in phenomenological theory both individual phenomena and their 'essences' present themselves directly. Both theories recognize the organizational structure of consciousness but in the phenomenological theory its central basis is the *a priori* correlation between the acts of consciousness and the realm of 'essences'. There are no more major disagreements between the rest of Searle's 'features' and phenomenological description of consciousness but, of course, both terminology and the placement of emphasis are different.

David Chalmers' approach to the problems of the mind is more empirical than that of Nagel's and Searle's but he also argues that what is most interesting and most 'mysterious' about the mind is consciousness. The problem is that some neural processes in the brain are accompanied by 'the subjective aspect' of conscious experience. Even if we identified them exactly we would not understand automatically by this why they take place at all. To understand this would mean to resolve 'the hard problem' of consciousness. In his own attempt to describe 'the subjective aspect' of consciousness, Chalmers refers to Nagel's famous phrase (Chalmers 1996).

We can now return to the questions asked at the beginning of this section. What can we say about 'subjectivity' from the perspective of phenomenological theory? 'Subjectivity' is a more general feature because it refers to both intentional and non-intentional forms of consciousness. But it is easier to discuss the qualitative differences of conscious phenomena in terms of the differences of their intentional objects. 'A *qualitative feel*' of consciousness has never appealed to the researchers of the phenomenological tradition because their central interest has been different. But it must be there because their conceptualizations always involve 'the transcendental' subject, and both intentional and non-intentional forms of consciousness are 'subjective' in this sense.

3. Towards the Subject of Consciousness

The problem of the subject of consciousness seems to be the most interesting and difficult at the same time. There are two well-known distinctions within the phenomenological theory: one between 'the transcendental ego' and the stream of consciousness and the other between the acts of consciousness and the objects towards which they are directed. Our concern here is with the former and Nagel's idea of the 'particular point of view' and the range of experiences related with it can be regarded as a more general but parallel idea. This idea is extended remarkably on the subjective side in *The View from Nowhere* devoted mainly to the nature of the human mind (Nagel 1986).

Nagel approaches the problems of the self from a few different perspectives. Within the context of personal identity, he argues that there must be 'a self as continuing subject of consciousness' and its nature cannot be explained either in terms of a substance (immaterial or material) or in terms of psychological continuity of any kind. Its nature cannot be reduced to the role of the grammatical or logical subject either. But Nagel's most original contribution to the philosophy of the self is this. What is unique for the human mind is its capacity to transcend its own subjective conditions and to develop the objective conception of the world. It is free of any particular point of view and in this sense it is 'the view from nowhere'. Still, we cannot escape our particular position within the world and because of this we are condemned to 'double vision' of the subjective and objective point of view. Although there are tensions and conflicts between them, both perspectives are valid and important. But even the most abstract objective conception of reality has to have its subject: something must be left over on the 'other side of the lenses'. The 'Objective self' is the logical subject of the objective conception of the world and it is an important aspect of the human mind. Nagel himself observes that 'the objective self' is related to Husserl's 'transcendental ego' or Wittgenstein's 'logical subject' from the *Tractatus*. For Husserl 'transcendental ego' is the ultimate source of meanings whereas Nagel's 'objective self' is the logical subject of the objective conception of reality. While 'transcendental ego' is always outside the world, Nagel attempts to place 'the objective self' within the objective conception of reality in order to close it. But this move is never completely successful. Despite these differences, the substantial role of the subject of consciousness is clear in both theories.

It is surprising that the subject of consciousness does not emerge in *The Rediscovery of the Mind*. Although Searle recognizes that there is 'a feeling of myself' or 'a characteristic sense of our own personhood' he does not put any weight on it (Searle 1992 134, 252). But again, there is an interesting evolution of Searle's ideas. In *Rationality in Action*, his last book, he argues that there must be 'an irreducible non-Humean self' as the condition for rational action (Searle 2001, 79-96). In this way 'with the greatest reluctance' he abandons the neo-Humean concept of the mind. But the subject of action is also the subject of consciousness and the question arises as to whether Searle's new position does not imply a need of some supplement to his earlier position. If he introduced such a supplement, his position would be closer to that of both Nagel and phenomenology. We may hope for such a revision as Searle's search is always in progress and knows no resting-place.

The ontological foundations of conscious experience never emerge directly ('is given') on the level of consciousness. For this reason the mind-body problem has never been a part of any phenomenological project. Of course it has come to surface many times, for example, taking the form of idealism in the case of Husserl. In contrast to that, the question about the relation between mental and non-mental phenomena is standard in the analytic philosophy of consciousness. This is the point at which the differences inside the analytic camp become more than interesting. While in Searle's 'biological naturalism' nothing is surprising in the mind-body relation, in Nagel's 'double aspect' stance there always will be some mystery in this relation.

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Facts and Values in Holistic Philosophy

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The approach of the environmental philosophy to the "is-ought question" is qualitatively different from the traditional solutions. It is perhaps best seen in the case of its environmental, holistic versions as represented by Aldo Leopold, Baird Callicot and Holmes Rolston III. As it is well-known Leopold tried to construct the so-called *land ethic*, suggesting that the sphere of ethics has continually been extended and should still be extended. According to Leopold ethics referred first to relations among individuals, then groups. Next, claimed Leopold, the time came to construct the third step in the sequence: the *land ethic* which "enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land." (Leopold, 239) Man is only a member of a biotic community which is so complex that its working could probably never be wholly understood. Then, considering the discoveries of ecology and theory of evolution, Leopold came to the conclusion, very often quoted by environmental ethicists: "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise." (Leopold, 262) In such a way a kind of ethical norm appeared (Leopold's *imperative*) formulated on the basis of the description of some ecological phenomena.

Aldo Leopold's theory of *land ethic* found its eager advocate in the person of J. Baird Callicot who, however, admitted: "Leopold has (...) committed the naturalistic fallacy; he has ventured to derive value from fact (or at least from a certain theoretical organization of facts)." (Callicot, 117) Callicot, being fully aware that the *is/ought* dichotomy seems to be environmental ethics' Achilles' heel, tried to defend Leopold, stressing the fact that the environmental philosophy remained within the new paradigm of thinking about man and the world. (Pyra 2004)

In connection with the above opinion, Callicot, analysing the problem of facts and values, referred to Hume's views on the nature of ethics. Antony Flew remarked once that Hume's ethical views "might almost seem to demand an evolutionary background." (Flew, 59) It is remarkable that such a background was definitely supplied by Darwin. Let me remind that, according to Hume, ethics overreach the sphere of pure science and appear as products of moral sentiments, like benevolence, generosity, affection, sympathy, etc., which are both natural and universal. And it is the last of the above-mentioned sentiments, sympathy, that Darwin thought to be of utmost importance, and therefore he wrote: "In however complex a manner this feeling may have originated, as it is one of high importance to all those animals which aid and defend one another, it will have been increased through natural selection; for those communities, which included the greatest number of sympathetic members, would flourish best, and rear the greatest number of offspring." (Darwin, 107) Hume insisted that the notions of good and bad were not founded on reason, they were obviously founded on sentiments. Nevertheless, one should remember, Hume attributed a very important role to reason in regard to ethics. He claimed: "reason in a strict and philosophical sense can have an influence on our conduct only after two ways: either when it excites a passion by informing us of the existence of something which is a proper object of it; or when it discovers the connection of causes and effects, so as to afford us means of exerting any passion." (Hume, 469)

Using Hume's philosophical assumptions, Callicot tried to construct an environmental ethical argument as Hume probably would do it. It includes a premise, drawn from biological sciences, and especially from ecology, and looks like this:

1. The biological sciences, including ecology, claim:
a) organic nature is systemically integrated, b) mankind is a member of an organic nature, c) therefore environmental abuse threatens human life, health, and happiness.
2. We humans have an interest in human life, health, and happiness.
3. Therefore, we ought not violate the integrity and stability of the natural environment. (Callicot, 123)

Callicot is deeply convinced that Hume, who granted to reason the role of discovering "the connection of causes and effects, so as to afford us means of exerting any passion" (Hume, 469), would accept his reasoning as "a perfectly legitimate transition from is-statements to an ought-statement. It may not be a deduction, in the strictest logical sense, but it is a cogent practical argument, according to Hume's own criteria." (Callicot, 122) As one can see, claims Callicot, Hume has tried to overcome the discrepancy between facts and values by bridging it by a premise referring to passions. Of course, the shift from *is* to *ought* is not possible within the so-called formal logic, criticised by Hume on many occasions because of its numerous limitations. (Passmore, 18-41), but it becomes possible when one introduces at least one premise of emotional character, from which then a conclusion of the sort 'ought' can be deduced. In this context it should be pointed out that Callicot suggested that he had only made clearer the possible way of a shift from facts to values, the shift elaborated in fact by Leopold, but present, rather *implicit* than *explicit*, in Leopold's *A Sand County Almanac*.

Holmes Rolston III has presented his views on the *is-ought* issue on numerous occasions. (Pyra, 2003) Like Callicot, he tries to found his reasoning on the theory of evolution and, *primo loco*, on ecological sciences. He begins his analysis with recalling the opinion of the ecologist Jan McHarg according to whom nature includes an intrinsic value system. (McHarg, 21) Rolston is fully aware that "The boundary between science and ethics is precise if we accept a pair of current (though not unargued!) philosophical categories: the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive law (...). The route from one to the other, if any, is perhaps the most intransigent issue in moral philosophy (...). No set of statements of fact by themselves entails any evaluative statement, except as some additional evaluative premise has been introduced. With careful analysis this evaluation will reappear, the ethics will separate out from the science. We shall press this logic on ecological ethics." (Rolston, 1989, 12-13) Being aware of the possible theoretical difficulties Rolston then states that the environmental sciences describe what is the case, paying particular attention to the interconnectedness of everything, whereas an ethic describes what ought to be. But what, then, with environmental ethics? - asks Rolston.

Rolston is most interested in holistic ethics, because: "It is ecological in substance, not merely in accident; it is ecological per se, not just consequentially." (Rolston 1989, 17) In this context he recalls a theory of homeostasis in the version

of Thomas B. Colwell, Jr., who writes: "The balance of Nature provides an objective normative model. It is (...) the ground of whatever other values we may develop (...) kind of ultimate value (...). It is a natural norm, not a product of human convention or supernatural authority. It says in effect to man: 'This much at least you must do, this much you must be responsible for. You must at least develop and utilize energy systems which recycle their products back into Nature' (...). Human values are founded in objectively determinable ecological relations with Nature." (Colwell, 50) If one believes Colwell, one must at least admit that the holistic ethic is somehow connected with homeostasis. I agree with Rolston when he criticises Colwell's understanding of homeostasis as "an ultimate value"; it should be rather called, I think, the precondition or background of values. One should perhaps add that in the mid-seventies Rolston was not convinced that values were inherent in nature; to such a conclusion he has come in his later works. Taking homeostasis into consideration the author of *Philosophy Gone Wild* tries to formulate a purely technical *ought*, followed by an antecedent if-option, which may next be presented as a proximate moral *ought*.

Technical ought	Ecological law	Antecedent if-option
You ought to recycle	for the value-supporting ecosystem recycles or perishes	if you wish to preserve the ground of human value
Proximate	Ecological law	Antecedent moral ought
You ought to recycle	for the value-supporting ecosystem recycles or perishes	and you ought to preserve the ground of human value

Eventually, the environmental ethic formulated above is primarily anthropological and only secondarily ecological, claims Rolston (1989, 17), because it takes care of human values first of all. Something more is needed to reformulate it in order to create primarily ecological ethics. And here Leopold's *imperative* seems to help. Here an ethic is extended from interpersonal relations directed only to man situated in the environment of which he is an inseparable part. Then the reasoning should look like this:

Proximate moral ought	Ecological law	Antecedent moral ought
You ought to recycle	for recycling preserves the ecosystem	and you ought to preserve the integrity of the ecosystem

After such a reformulation of the previous schema Rolston notices: "There, in a shift of paradigms, the values hitherto reserved for man are reallocated to man in the environment." (1989, 18) And then, concludes Rolston, "what counts as beauty and integrity is not just brought to and imposed on the ecosystem but is discovered there." (1989, 19) Therefore the next reasoning should be as follows:

Proximate moral ought	Ecological law	Antecedent moral ought	Ecosystemic evaluation
You ought to recycle	for recycling preserves the integral ecosystem	and you ought to preserve the integrity of the ecosystem	for the integral ecosystem has value

The last evaluation has entered the sphere of *metaecology* and, in addition to this, the evaluation has somehow appeared together with the ecological description of nature. Rolston does not leave anyone in doubt about this. Let us have a look at some formulations of his: "the description and evaluation to some extent arise together"; "What is ethically puzzling, and exciting, in the marriage and mutual transformation of ecological description and evaluation is that here an 'ought' is not so much derived from an 'is' as discovered simultaneously with it"; and: "For some observers at least, the sharp is/ought dichotomy is gone; the values seem to be there as soon as the facts are fully in, and both alike are properties of the system." (1989, 20) In one of his most known books, *Environmental Ethics*, he states univocally: "The way the world 'is' informs the way it 'ought' to be." (Rolston 1988, 230)

Concluding I should like to notice that Rolston in an original way tries to show how it is possible to move from facts to values. The way of doing this is, in fact, semi-logical, and is certainly not strongly grounded in formal logic. In some other works he has tried to detect values in nature, and in such a way to persuade his readers that the so-called objective scientific description always goes together with evaluations of some kind, even if the latter are included in the descriptions only *implicitly*. In one of Rolston's latest books, *Conserving Natural Value*, the *is-ought* issue does not appear at all. (Rolston, 1994) Perhaps the author has come to the conclusion that he already said everything he was able to say on the subject. Environmental philosophers show, I think, that although in strict logic we cannot pass from facts to values, it is in a great many situations rational to do so and irrational not to do so. It is my conviction that Rolston has presented quite a good example of the situation in which evaluative conclusions can be rationally drawn from factual premises.

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Inferentialismus und Erfahrung

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Robert Brandom (1994, 2000a) hat unlängst unter dem Etikett des „semantischen Inferentialismus“ eine systematische Neubegründung philosophischer Sprachbetrachtung vorgeschlagen. Im Wesentlichen zielt sein Ansatz darauf, den semantischen Grundbegriff der Referenz und damit die Idee einer den sprachlichen Ausdrücken eigenen Intentionalität zu verabschieden. Seinem Lehrer Wilfrid Sellars folgend, zieht Brandom hierzu eine funktionalistische Betrachtungsweise dessen heran, was als Bedeutung eines Ausdruckes firmieren könnte: nämlich seiner inferentiellen Rolle in Praktiken des materialen Schlussfolgerns.

Nach einer Präzisierung dieses weitreichenden Vorhabens soll eine immanente Kritik seiner Durchführung bei Brandom geleistet werden, indem das von ihm erarbeitete inferentialistische Alternativmodell auf seine Plausibilität hin geprüft wird. Hierbei ist zu zeigen, dass Brandom (wie auch Sellars) aufgrund einer – zumal weitgehend übereilten – Absage an empirische Merkmale der Begriffsverwendung nicht imstande ist, ein adäquates Modell des Sprachgebrauchs zu etablieren. Die Ausgrenzung jeglicher begrifflichen „Empirizität“ zugunsten einer strikt inferentialistischen Bestimmung des Begrifflichen zieht einige Schwierigkeiten nach sich, von denen hier vornehmlich die Rede sein soll.

1.

Der inferentialistische Ansatz lässt sich als Beantwortung der Frage, was ein Begriff sei, verstehen; sie wird dadurch beantwortet, dass das Beherrschen eines Begriffs bestimmten Fähigkeiten angeglichen wird. Brandoms (hier nicht en détail zu entfaltendes) Modell des sprachlichen Kontoführens stützt sich konsequent auf eine solche pragmatistische Auffassung, zumal es sich nicht an repräsentationalistischen Wort-Welt-Relationen oder Referenzvorstellungen bemisst, sondern die Fähigkeit rationaler Diskursteilnehmer, auf diverse Reize mit angemessenem sprachlichem Verhalten zu reagieren, in den Mittelpunkt stellt. Einen Begriff zu beherrschen komme demnach zwei Arten von Fähigkeiten gleich, die in Anlehnung an Sellars' Skizze eines semantischen Funktionalismus (Sellars 1974) einerseits die Tätigkeit des materialen Folgerns zwischen bestimmten Äußerungen sowie andererseits den Übergang zu nichtsprachlichen Anknüpfungspunkten, die perzeptorischer oder praktischer Natur sein können, umfassen sollen.

Unter materialem Schlussfolgern habe man sich dabei die Kompetenz nichtlogischen Schließens zwischen bestimmten Ausdrücken vorzustellen, wie sie durch die Folgerungs- und Inkompatibilitätsstrukturen zwischen etwa „Dies ist rot“ und „Dies ist farbig“ bzw. „Dies ist blau“ illustriert werden. Brandom erweitert nun Sellars' Argumentation, dass die Beherrschung derartiger Inferenzregeln ein essentielles Charakteristikum des Gebrauchs natürlicher Sprachen darstellt (Sellars 1953: 336), indem er den Begriff der materialen Inferenz – verstanden als von bestimmten Normen geprägte Tätigkeit – zur Fundierung einer alternativen semantischen Konzeption heranzieht. Im Kontrast zu repräsentationalistischen Referenz- und/oder Bedeutungstheorien sei die Bedeutung eines Ausdrucks in seiner inferentiellen Rolle zu suchen; seine maßgebliche

inferentielle Gliederung reiche damit für die Vorstellung einer „specifically *conceptual* contentfulness“ (Brandom 1994: 131) hin, wobei die damit umschriebene „strong inferentialist thesis“ allerdings auf einer weiten Vorstellung von inferentieller Gliederung gründe.

Mit dem Zusatz des weiten Verständnisses von inferentieller Gliederung ist zugleich die zweite Kompetenz angesprochen, die neben der materialen Folgerungstätigkeit als Voraussetzung für Brandoms Modell dient. Während materiale Inferenzen auf den innersprachlichen Bereich, d.h. auf Übergänge zwischen verbalen Äußerungen beschränkt sind, habe man überdies Wahrnehmungs- und Handlungskontexte zu berücksichtigen, die mit sprachlichen Aktivitäten in enger Beziehung stehen. Da für die vorliegende Argumentation nur die empirische Komponente des Begriffsgebrauchs ausschlaggebend ist, werden sich die weiteren Ausführungen jedoch auf die Eigenart des inferentialistischen Wahrnehmungsbegriffs beschränken. Brandom referiert hier wiederum Sellars' Ansichten, wenn er das Verfügen über empirische Begriffe (etwa „Dies ist rot“) von zwei Bedingungen abhängig macht: Einerseits habe man über verlässliche Dispositionen zu verfügen, auf bestimmte Umweltreize angemessen zu reagieren, während diese Reaktion andererseits als Bestandteil eines praktisch beherrschten inferentiellen Netzwerkes fungieren können muss. Auf diese Weise meint Brandom sowohl eine inferentialistische Rekonstruktion des Verstehens der betreffenden Begriffe zu leisten, als auch die Verbindung zur erfahrbaren Welt aufrecht zu erhalten, zumal die erwähnten Reaktionsdispositionen eine Art von „basalem Empirismus“ beinhalten würden (Brandom 2000b: 600).

Der folgende Abschnitt setzt sich mit den Schwierigkeiten auseinander, die sich angesichts der Kombination eines solchen „basalen Empirismus“ und der methodischen Absage an eine repräsentationalistische Konzeption von Sprache und Welt einstellen. Denn wenn eine funktionalistische Theorie des Gehalts von Ausdrücken nicht nur vom Begriff der Referenz, sondern auch von substantielleren empirischen Merkmalen (den traditionellen „Bedeutungen im Kopf“) gesäubert werden soll, so ist nicht mehr ersichtlich, was an empirischen Begriffen empirisch oder kognitiv relevant sein soll resp. wie sich eine Verbindung zwischen Welt und Sprachpraxis etablieren könnte, die etwas zum Gehalt letzterer beitragen könnte. Zu behandeln sind hier vornehmlich die Frage des Erwerbs und der Kritik von empirischen Begriffen sowie die Plausibilität des inferentialistischen Sprachmodells, wie es von Brandom präsentiert wird. Schließlich wird noch zu klären sein, ob die Bescheidung auf einen „basalen Empirismus“ durch zwingende Gründe motiviert ist.

2.

Für genuine Beobachtungsberichte sei es also neben der Beherrschung der jeweiligen Rolle in materialen Folgerungszusammenhängen notwendig, Sprachteilnehmer dahingehend zu konditionieren, dass sie auf bestimmte Umweltreize mit angemessenem sprachlichem Verhalten reagieren. Das konforme Vorbringen von Behauptungen wie „Dies ist rot“ wird, wie Sellars (1969) ausführt, in bestimmten Kontexten antrainiert, ohne dass man hierzu

ihrer Bedeutung in einem vorsprachlichen Sinn gewahrt sein müsste. Der Konditionierungsprozess bilde, so lässt sich mit Brandoms „starkem Inferentialismus“ ergänzen, nämlich nur die notwendige Voraussetzung für die Verankerung der Sprachpraxis in der Welt, während genuines Begriffsverständnis davon herrühre, dass sich der Sprachlernende langsam als Subjekt sprachlicher Handlungen begreift, dessen Äußerungen bestimmten (inferentiellen) Normen unterliegen.

Auffällig an dieser Konzeption ist nicht nur, dass die Beherrschung eines Begriffs mit richtigem Wortgebrauch gleichgesetzt wird, sondern auch der Umstand, wonach sich die erforderliche *empirische* Kompetenz und Wahrnehmungsgabe eines Sprachteilnehmers nicht wesentlich von der eines Messinstruments oder eines entsprechend abgerichteten Papageis unterscheidet. Letztere dürften zwar nie in den Genuss der Beherrschung inferentieller Übergänge zwischen ihren Äußerungen gelangen, teilen aber die verlässlichen Reaktionsdispositionen mit genuinen Sprachteilnehmern. Diese Beobachtung legitimiert zwar noch nicht die Folgerung, dass genuine Begriffe dem inferentialistischen Verständnis zufolge keine empirischen Aspekte beinhalten, worunter man etwa Sinnesdaten, Vorstellungsbilder, Assoziationen, Qualia o. Ä. verstehen könnte. Sellars wie auch Brandom (2000b: 608) behaupten jedoch explizit, dass Begriffe keinen kognitiven Inhalt besitzen würden, der als vorsprachliche Erfahrung oder „immediate experience of facts“ (Sellars 1963: 335) zu qualifizieren wäre. Ohne noch die Gründe für diese Zurückweisung zu diskutieren, was im letzten Abschnitt geleistet werden möge, sind zunächst die Konsequenzen einer solchen Vorgehensweise zu beachten. Die Ersetzung empirischer Komponenten eines Begriffs durch die bloße Aktivierung verlässlicher Dispositionen zu seiner verbalen Äußerung und deren inferentieller Handhabung verzerrt nämlich einige der intuitiv vorausgesetzten Aspekte des Sprachgebrauchs, da sich die Anwendungsmodalitäten eines empirischen Ausdrucks nicht ohne weiteres auf dessen kausale Veranlassung durch Umweltreize reduzieren lassen. Dieser Vorwurf möge anhand einer gedanklichen Konkretisierung von Brandoms Sprachmodell sowie einer genaueren Untersuchung dessen veranschaulicht werden, was Brandom unter der „empirischen Kritik“ von Begriffen (Brandom 1994: 225) versteht.

Zunächst sei ein vereinfachter Ausschnitt einer möglichen inferentiellen Sprachpraxis, wie sie Brandoms Modell vorsieht, betrachtet. So möge beispielsweise „jynweythek ylow“ eine empirische Äußerung darstellen, die auf bestimmte äußere Umweltreize konditioniert wird – die Unbestimmtheit dieser Formulierung reflektiert dabei das dem Inferentialismus eigentümliche Fehlen eines prälinguistischen Verständnisses der betreffenden Äußerungen. Aus ihr möge weiters der Gehalt von „orban eq trx4“ material folgen, während sie mit „lornaderek“ material inkompatibel ist. Überdies sei angenommen, dass die beiden letzteren selbst Beobachtungsberichte im inferentialistischen Sinn darstellen. Sowohl die inferentiellen Übergänge als auch die dispositionale Äußerung der eingeführten Begriffe könnten ohne weiteres von einer Sprachgemeinschaft verwendet und werdenden Mitgliedern antrainiert werden. Mit der Annahme dieses Szenarios soll nun weniger behauptet werden, dass es eine plausible mögliche Sprachpraxis darstellt, als vielmehr eine Konkretisierung von Brandoms Modell geleistet werden, die nicht vom alltäglichen Verständnis der normalen Sprache Gebrauch macht, das sie ja aus methodologischen Gründen vernachlässigen zu können beansprucht.

Betrachtet man diese fingierte Sprachpraxis, so ist zu beachten, dass sie ohne weiteres funktionieren könnte, zumal die Sprecher hinreichend auf die notwendigen Fertigkeiten konditioniert wurden und ex hypothesi auch die normativen Implikationen der Äußerung von „jynweythek ylow“ erfasst haben, nämlich den Gehalt von „orban eq trx4“, nicht aber den von „lornaderek“ material zu erzwingen. Was der Inferentialismus allerdings nicht garantieren kann, ist, dass die Sprecher auch (im alltäglichen Sinn) *verstehen*, was sie äußern. Wenn die Äußerung von „jynweythek ylow“ zwar kausal veranlasst wurde, nicht aber empirische Begleitumstände (etwa die Vorstellung möglicher Kontexte ihrer angemessenen Äußerung oder „jynweythek ylow“-spezifische Empfindungen) begrifflich umfasst, dann reicht auch eine Beherrschung der betreffenden materialen Folgerungen für deren genuines Verständnis nicht hin, da die gefolgerten („orban eq trx4“) und inkompatiblen Gehalte („lornaderek“) ebenso unverständlich erscheinen müssen wie die ursprüngliche Behauptung. Was einen auf „jynweythek ylow“-Reize konditionierten Papagei und ein entsprechendes Messinstrument von den Sprechern unterscheidet, ist bloß die Fähigkeit des inferentiellen Folgerns und Vorbringens weiterer Äußerungen sowie das Gespür für die Normen der Gesprächsführung. Damit wird zwar ein Abgrenzungskriterium etabliert, nicht aber eine plausible Rekonstruktion der Bedeutung sprachlicher Praktiken geleistet.

Zudem müssten innerhalb eines brandomschen Sprachmodells *sämtliche* materialen Folgerungsbeziehungen und Inkompatibilitäten aus der Sicht der Sprachteilnehmer vollkommen arbiträr erscheinen, wenn keine empirischen Aspekte in die involvierten Begriffe eingehen. Dies mag zwar bei einigen materialen Übergängen (etwa zwischen „Dies ist rot“ und „Dies ist farbig“ oder „Graz liegt südlich von Wien“ und „Wien liegt nördlich von Graz“) als mehr oder weniger unproblematisch empfunden werden, lässt jedoch nicht den Schluss darauf zu, dass alle Inferenzen eines solcherart „analytischen Typs“ seien. Einige materiale Inferenzen, etwa „Es regnet, deshalb werden die Straßen nass sein“ oder „Es blitzt, deshalb wird bald Donner zu hören sein“, scheinen demgegenüber durch Erfahrungstatsachen strukturiert zu sein, was sich jedoch inferentialistisch nicht erklären lässt. Wie könnten die zugrunde liegenden Tatsachen des richtigen Schließens verständlich gemacht werden, wenn nicht durch Rekurs auf Erfahrungswissen, das mit den entsprechenden Begriffen in Verbindung steht? Dass „Die Straßen werden nass sein“ aus „Es regnet“ folgt, muss dem vorgestellten Modell gemäß als genauso unhinterfragbar wie undurchsichtige semantische Regel hingenommen werden, ebenso wie der Umstand, dass „jynweythek ylow“ zwar „orban eq trx4“, nicht aber „lornaderek“ zur materialen Konsequenz hat. Dafür, dass hier empirische Begriffe zur Debatte stehen, kann aus Sellars' und Brandoms Perspektive zwar vorgebracht werden, dass sie kausal veranlasst werden. Warum sich allerdings zwischen ihnen materiale Übergänge etablieren sollten, bleibt genau so im Unklaren, wie die Frage eines Entscheidungskriteriums dafür, dass gerade „orban eq trx4“ (und nicht etwa „lornaderek“) aus „jynweythek ylow“ folgen sollte. Reduziert man das alltägliche Verstehen eines Begriffs konsequent auf dessen inferentialistisches Pendant, so fragt sich tatsächlich, warum – abgesehen davon, dass es nun einmal in dieser Form anerzogen wurde – aus „Es regnet“ gerade „Die Straßen sind nass“ und nicht etwa „Heute ist Donnerstag“ o. dgl. folgen sollte.

Die Wahl und Anwendung der getätigten Inferenzen erscheint im Rahmen des inferentialistischen Sprachmodells somit weder empirisch motiviert, noch auf em-

pirischem Weg zu rechtfertigen, was auch erhellend für Brandoms eigentümliche Vorstellung der „empirischen Kritik“ von Begriffen ist. Überraschenderweise wird die Möglichkeit eingeräumt, dass „conceptual contents can [...] be criticized, groomed and developed empirically“ (Brandom 1994: 225). Als Beleg dafür wertet Brandom ein Beispiel, das sich auf den Fall der Inkompatibilität zwischen einem Beobachtungsbericht und einer inferentiellen Konsequenz eines anderen Beobachtungsberichtes stützt. Man könnte etwa aus dem sauren Geschmack einer Substanz folgern, dass sie eine Säure ist und Lackmuspapier rot färbt, während der Lackmустest jedoch ein anderes Ergebnis erbringt (Brandom 1994: 225). Nun ist es zwar richtig, dass sich die Inkompatibilität zwischen „Diese Substanz färbt Lackmuspapier rot“ und „Diese Substanz färbt Lackmuspapier nicht rot“ dank des „basalen Empirismus“ *zutage gefördert* wird, den Sellars und Brandom mit ihrer dispositionalen Theorie der Anwendung von Begriffen zulassen. Nicht einzusehen ist jedoch, wie die potentiell nachfolgende Revision und Weiterentwicklung des Säurebegriffs *auf empirischem Weg* vollbracht werden kann. Da das einzig Empirische an einem Begriff seine kausale „Auslösung“ darstellen soll, kann kaum davon ausgegangen werden, dass die aus der Sphäre des Begrifflichen strikt ausgeklammerte Erfahrung Hilfestellungen für die neu zu definierende inferentielle Rolle eines Begriffs anbieten wird. Als „empirische“ Konsequenz, die sich im angeführten Beispiel für den Begriff der Säure ergibt, kann lediglich gelten, dass sie Lackmuspapier offenbar nicht zwingend rot färbt. Um die Möglichkeit der Weiterentwicklung von Begriffen garantieren zu können, wird man sich deshalb wohl bei anderen Quellen umsehen müssen als bei kognitiven Inhalten, die normalerweise mit einem Begriff assoziiert werden, im Rahmen des Inferentialismus jedoch gegen bloße Konformitäten des Sprachgebrauchs eingetauscht werden. Gerade Brandoms Missverständnis einer empirischen Kritik von Begriffen lässt vermuten, dass er die Konsequenzen seiner Bescheidung auf einen „basalen Empirismus“ nicht gänzlich überschaubar hat.

3.

Sollte sich eine Praxis des materialen Folgerns tatsächlich grundlegend für die alltägliche Sprache erweisen, so wird man kaum den Anteil kognitiver Aspekte des Begrifflichen an der Formierung und Strukturierung inferentieller Netzwerke vernachlässigen können, wie dies die Bescheidung auf einen basalen Empirismus nahe legt. Wie gezeigt wurde, besteht die Inadäquanz von Brandoms Sprachmodell nicht nur darin, dass es die reale Sprachpraxis offenbar anhand eines Sprachspiels vom Typ „jynweythek ylow“ konzipieren will, sondern auch kein Unterscheidungskriterium zwischen beiden angeben kann, wenn es auf das empirische Verstehen verzichten zu können meint.

Abschließend bleibt nach dem Motiv zu fragen, warum man sich im Rahmen einer Theorie über Begriffe auf einen lediglich basalen Empirismus zurückziehen sollte. Hier scheint vor allem die Vermeidung des von Sellars denunzierten „Mythos des Gegebenen“ ausschlaggebend sein –

einer empiristischen Denkhaltung, von deren epistemologischen Annahmen sich Sellars im Aufsatz „Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind“ (1963: 127-196) ausführlich distanziert. Gegen den hier im Zentrum stehenden Gedanken, dass empirische Aspekte in zumindest einige Begriffe Eingang finden müssen, führt Sellars folgendes Argument an: Um einen Begriff anwenden zu können, habe man schon über den Begriff der hierzu angemessenen Situationen zu verfügen (Sellars 1953: 336, 1963: 176). Der Rekurs auf „vorbegrifflich Gegebenes“ sei insofern illusionär, als dessen Handhabung die Fähigkeit zur Begriffsanwendung eher voraussetzt, als sie zu erklären. Wenn das Erfassen eines Begriffs der Beherrschung des korrekten Wortgebrauchs (sei es in inferentieller, sei es in responsiver Hinsicht) gleichkommt, so spielen demnach vorsprachliche kognitive Inhalte keine Rolle bei der Konstitution von Begriffen, woraus gefolgert wird, dass Erfahrungskomponenten für eine entsprechende Theorie unerheblich, wenn nicht gar irreführend seien. Hinter dieser Argumentation, die Sellars unter dem Titel „psychologischer Nominalismus“ (Sellars 1963: 160) vertritt, steht offenbar die Annahme, dass sich das Erlernen und der Gebrauch von Sprache gänzlich unabhängig von einer kognitiven Infrastruktur abspielen kann, was der „basale Empirismus“ reflektiert. Ob der Wahrnehmungsapparat und bestimmte kognitive Mechanismen tatsächlich von der Fähigkeit zur Anwendung und zum Verstehen von Begriffen separierbar ist, bleibt allerdings eine Hypothese, die nicht a priori entschieden werden kann, sondern in den kognitionswissenschaftlichen Untersuchungsbereich fällt (und dort vermutlich nicht viele Verfechter finden wird). Fest steht allerdings, dass innerhalb einer „starken inferentialistischen“ Theorie, die für das Verständnis empirischer Begriffe nur verlässliche Reaktionsdispositionen und die Fähigkeit des materialen Folgerns veranschlagt, begriffliche Normen vom Himmel fallen müssen, während empirisches Verstehen von Begriffen als unbedeutendes Beiwerk qualifiziert wird. Beides widerspricht den intuitiven Vorstellungen, die man sich gemeinhin wohl vom alltäglichen Sprachgebrauch macht.

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Wie wir Kippfiguren sehen können

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1. Kippfiguren als Gegenstand der Wahrnehmungsphysiologie

Wer kennt nicht die Kippfiguren wie den Hasen-Enten-Kopf oder die Vase von Rubin? Ein Kopf erscheint entweder als Hasen- oder als Entenkopf, je nachdem, wie man ihn sieht. Oder man sieht, wie im Falle der Rubin-vase, entweder eine weiße Vase vor schwarzem Hintergrund oder zwei sich zugewandte schwarze Gesichter vor einem weißen Hintergrund. Kippfiguren heißen deshalb so, weil das, was man sieht, plötzlich in etwas anderes Gesehenes „umkippt“. (Abb. 1. u. 2.)



Abb. 1. Hasen-Enten-Kopf



Abb. 2. Vase von Rubin

Die Gestalttheorie war eine der ersten Richtungen der experimentellen Psychologie, die sich mit der Frage beschäftigte, wie Objekte in einem Bild erkannt werden. Bedingung für die Möglichkeit, ein Objekt in einem Bild erkennen zu können, ist die Unterscheidung von Figur und Hintergrund. Figur und Grund können nicht beide zusammen und zugleich wahrgenommen werden. Der gestalttheoretischen Auffassung zufolge wird eine Figur immer als eine vor dem Hintergrund liegende „Gestalt“, als „organisierte Ganzheit“ wahrgenommen.

„Das Ganze ist mehr als die Summe seiner Teile.“ Mit dieser holistischen Grundthese hob sich die Gestalttheorie zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts gegen einen elementaristischen Strukturalismus und Reduktionismus ab. Mit den Neuro- und Kognitionswissenschaften, insbesondere mit konnektionistischen Netzwerkmodellen in der Hirnforschung und der Künstlichen Intelligenz, erfährt die Gestalttheorie heute eine Renaissance. In Rückbesinnung auf die Gestalttheorie wird Wahrnehmung als komplexer, selbstorganisierender, emergenter und holistischer Vorgang aufgefasst und „Gestalt“ als „Ganzheit“, die sich bei der Wahrnehmung spontan organisiert.

In der Tradition der Gestalttheorie steht auch die vom Physiker Hermann Haken begründete Synergetik, eine Theorie komplexer Systeme, die wörtlich so viel wie „die Lehre vom Zusammenwirken“ heißt (vgl. griech. *synergein*: zusammenwirken). Im Rahmen seiner Untersuchungen zu den neurophysiologischen Grundlagen der Wahrnehmung hat Haken ein Computermodell zur Simulation des Gestaltwechsels bei Kippfiguren entwickelt.

Seine Theorie folgt dem Paradigma einer naturalistisch-physikalistisch orientierten Neuroinformatik, die Wahrnehmungsprozesse als sensorische Informationsverarbeitungen interpretiert, in deren Verlauf durch Aktivitätsausbreitung in einem neuronalen Netz Muster entstehen, die eine dynamische Repräsentation des Rechenergebnisses darstellen. Im besagten Fall wird das Umkippen von Vase – Gesicht bzw. Gesicht – Vase als ein Phasensprung von ei-

nem stabilen Attraktor in einen anderen in einer Potentiallandschaft mathematisch beschrieben und interpretiert.

Hakens Modellvorschlag für den Gestaltwechsel, d.i. ein Algorithmus für Mustererkennung, basiert auf der entscheidenden Präsupposition, dass die Ursache des Gestaltwechsels die Ermüdung bzw. das Sinken der *Aufmerksamkeit* ist. Ein Grund dafür, dass wir Objekte erkennen und identifizieren können, ist die bei der Wahrnehmung erfolgende Selektion von Umweltreizen, die ihrerseits von der Aufmerksamkeit abhängt. Ob man z.B. einen Hasen oder eine Ente sieht, hat damit zu tun, welche Bildbereiche fixiert bzw. auf welche Bildstellen „der Blick gerichtet“ wird. Schon der Gestaltpsychologe Wolfgang Köhler sah einen Zusammenhang zwischen Gestaltwechsel und Aufmerksamkeit. Erklärt ist damit aber nicht, was „Aufmerksamkeit“ heißt.

Dass im Rahmen des synergetischen Computermodells mathematische Größen als Aufmerksamkeitsparameter bezeichnet werden, denen von *Programmiererhand* Referenzmuster – entsprechend den möglichen Bildinterpretationen (z.B. Vase und Gesicht) – zugeordnet werden, bietet allenfalls eine Interpretationshilfe für das mathematische Modell. Doch auch Haken weiß den Begriff der Aufmerksamkeit nur mit einer sehr vagen Metapher zu umschreiben: „Die Aufmerksamkeit wirkt sozusagen wie ein innerer Suchscheinwerfer, der immer wieder neue Bewußtseinsinhalte beleuchtet.“ (Haken et al. 1992, 211)

Laut neuerer neurophysiologischer Untersuchungen ist Aufmerksamkeit ein äußerst komplexes „Phänomen“, dem eine Vielzahl von „Mechanismen“ des Zentralnervensystems zugrunde liegt. Bei aller Betonung von „Komplexität“ liegt dieser Sichtweise eine sehr spezielle Auffassung von „Aufmerksamkeit“ zugrunde: Aufmerksamkeit ist „mechanischer Natur“ und daher (nur) auf der Basis mechanischer Modelle (zur selektiven Reiz- und Informationsverarbeitung) bestimmbar.

Dieses Verständnis von Aufmerksamkeit stimmt nicht mit dem alltäglichen überein. In unserem Alltag wird der Begriff der Aufmerksamkeit in einem umfassenderen, vieldeutigen Sinne verwendet. „Ist das Auffallen Schauen + Denken? Nein. Viele unserer Begriffe *kreuzen* sich hier.“ (Wittgenstein 1984, 549) Man denke z.B. an Begriffe wie „Absicht“, „Intention“, „Interesse“, „Motivation“, „Konzentration“, „Wille“ u.v.m. Als eines wird der Begriff der Aufmerksamkeit aber – im doppelten Sinne des Wortes – *nicht gebraucht*: als *mechanischer* Begriff. „Nur“ ein Sprachproblem?

2. Kippfiguren als Gegenstand der philosophischen Untersuchungen Wittgensteins

Eine Kippfigur wie den Hasen-Enten-Kopf können wir „einmal als das eine, einmal als das andere Ding *sehen*. – Wir deuten sie also, und *sehen* sie, wie wir sie *deuten*.“ (Wittgenstein 1984, 519) Um dies zu verdeutlichen unterscheidet Wittgenstein *zwei Begriffe des Sehens*: „Und ich muß zwischen dem ‚stetigen Sehen‘ eines Aspekts und dem ‚Aufleuchten‘ eines Aspekts unterscheiden.“ (Wittgenstein 1984, 520)

Im ersten Fall fällt es dem Betrachtenden gar nicht auf, dass beim Sehen des Hasen-Enten-Bildes mehrere Sicht-

weisen möglich sind. Auf die Frage, was er sieht, würde der Betrachter des Bildes antworten: „Ich sehe einen Hasen.“ Oder: „Ich sehe eine Ente.“ Der Betrachter wäre sich nicht dessen bewusst, dass es sich bei dem Bild um ein Kippbild handelt.¹ Das heißt: Für ihn wäre das Bild einfach nur *ein* Bild.

Anders *im zweiten Fall*, dem „Aufleuchten eines Aspekts“, d.i. der Moment des „Umschlagens“ des Gesehenen von einer Figur zur anderen. Nicht das ist das Problem, dass man einen Hasen-Enten-Kopf entweder als Hasen oder als Ente, aber nicht etwa als Schildkröte sehen, man also nicht alles Beliebige „in ein Bild hineinsehen“ kann, sondern das *plötzliche Bemerkten* des Aspektwechsels. Es ist ein „Seherlebnis“.²

Ebenso wenig wie man den Übergang von einem Hasen in einen Entenkopf selbst sehen kann, ist das unmittelbare „Aufleuchten“ eines Aspekts mitteilbar, aber bemerkbar und ausdrückbar. Der Ausdruck des Erlebnisses ist in solchen Fällen ein Ausruf: „Jetzt ist es ein H!“ (Wittgenstein 1984, 522) Der Ausruf ist „ein Ausdruck der Wahrnehmung und des Seherlebnisses. [...] Er verhält sich zum Erlebnis ähnlich wie der Schrei zum Schmerz.“ (Wittgenstein 1984, 524)

Für Wittgenstein ist die Frage des Aspektwechsels eine Frage der *Fähigkeit*, „etwas *als etwas* zu sehen“. Denjenigen, dem diese Fähigkeit abgeht, nennt Wittgenstein „aspektblind“. Aspektblindheit ist mit Farbenblindheit oder mit „dem Mangel des ‚musikalischen Gehörs‘“ vergleichbar. (Wittgenstein 1984, 552) Der Aspektblinde vermag zwar in dem Sinne ein Bild „einmal so und einmal so zu sehen“, dass er auf die Frage, was er sieht, sagen könnte: „Das ist ein Hase.“ Oder: „Das ist eine Ente.“ Es würde für ihn aber nicht der eine „Aspekt in den anderen überspringen“, so dass er ausriefe: „Ah, jetzt sehe ich es als ...!“ Der Aspektwechsel kann nur vom Sehenden *erlebt* werden. Er zeigt sich (uns) durch sein Staunen.

„In allen jenen Fällen kann man sagen, man erlebe einen *Vergleich*. Denn der Ausdruck des Erlebnisses ist, daß wir zu einem Vergleich geneigt sind, zu einer Paraphrase. Es ist ein Erlebnis, dessen Ausdruck ein Vergleich ist. Aber warum ein ‚Erlebnis‘? Nun, unser Ausdruck *ist* ein Erlebnisausdruck. – Weil wir sagen ‚ich sehe es als ...‘, ‚ich höre es als ...‘? Nein; obwohl diese Ausdrucksweise damit zusammenhängt. Sie ist aber *berechtigt*, weil das Sprachspiel den Ausdruck zu dem eines Erlebnisses macht.“ (Wittgenstein 1989, 70)

¹ Vgl. Wittgenstein (1989, 305): „Es läßt sich ja natürlich vorstellen, daß Einer nie einen Wechsel des Aspekts sieht“. Wittgenstein hat immer wieder die Rolle des Vorwissens für das Wahrnehmen(-können) des „Kipp-Phänomens“ betont und die Frage nach der „Verwobenheit“ von Wahrnehmungs- und Sprachfähigkeit thematisiert. Vgl. z.B. Wittgenstein (1989, 22): „Wäre es denkbar, daß jemand, der einen Hasen, aber keine Ente kennt, sagte: ‚Ich kann die Zeichnung [...] als Hasen sehen und auch noch anders, obwohl ich für den zweiten Aspekt kein Wort habe? [...] Ich würde den nicht *verstehen*, der sagte: er hätte das Bild als das eines Hasen gesehen, dies aber nicht sagen können“. Um den Hasen-Enten-Kopf einmal als das eine, einmal als das andere sehen zu können, muss man wissen, wie ein Hase bzw. eine Ente aussieht. „Bedarf es dazu nicht *dieser Begriffe*?“ (Wittgenstein 1989, 160) Bedarf es immer eines Wissens um die entsprechenden Begriffe, um eine Figur als Kippfigur sehen zu können? Etwa das Doppelkreuz einmal als weißes Kreuz vor schwarzem Hintergrund und einmal als schwarzes Kreuz vor weißem Hintergrund? „Muß man unter den Aspekten nicht rein optische von andern unterscheiden?“ (Wittgenstein 1989, 182)

² Empirische Studien belegen, dass zu den Voraussetzungen für das „Erleben des Kippbildwechsels“ ein Vorwissen und eine gewisse Voreingenommenheit zählen. So präsentierte man z.B. Probanden Kippfiguren, ohne sie von den Wahrnehmungsalternativen zu unterrichten. Das Ergebnis: Im Gegensatz zu den Erwachsenen bemerkte nur ein sehr geringer Prozentsatz der 4- bis 5-jährigen Kinder den Gestaltwechsel (92 % der Erwachsenen im Vergleich zu 8 % der Kinder). Erst nach entsprechenden Hinweisen gelang es einigen Kindern, die Doppeldeutigkeit von Kippfiguren zu entdecken, und selbst dazu benötigten sie ungewöhnlich viel Zeit (ca. 5 Minuten). Siehe Hülken 2000.

3. Kippfiguren lassen sich auf verschiedene Art und Weise betrachten

Wittgenstein geht es nicht um die Frage, wie sich der Gestaltwechsel von einem in den anderen Gehirnzustand vollzieht. Wenn wir eine Kippfigur betrachten und das „Aufleuchten“ eines Aspekts durch einen Ausruf zum Ausdruck bringen, dann sind Fragen der Art „Was geht dabei in meinem Bewußtsein vor?“ irrelevant. „Darauf kommt’s gar nicht an. Was immer vorging, war nicht mit jener Äußerung gemeint. Interessanter ist, was dabei in meinem Benehmen vorging.“ (Wittgenstein 1984, 561)

Im Gegensatz zu Wittgenstein, der das Hasen-Enten-Bild *als Beispiel gebraucht*, um auf die elementare Rolle des „Bedeutungserlebens“ aufmerksam zu machen, wenn Menschen bemerken, dass es mehr als nur eine Sicht der Dinge gibt, kommt es Neurophysiologen wie Haken gerade auf eine Klärung der Frage an: „Was passiert aber bei der Mustererkennung?“ (Haken et al. 1996, 157) Das heißt, um herauszufinden, „wie Kognition ‚funktioniert‘“, richtet Haken sein Interesse nicht wie Wittgenstein auf den alltäglichen Sprachgebrauch, sondern auf „Gehirnmodelle [insbesondere] für die Seh Wahrnehmung von Menschen“. (Haken et al. 1996, 157) Und wenn Haken behauptet, dass „unser Gehirn diese Kippfiguren“ auf eine dem synergetischen Computeralgorithmus analoge Weise „behandelt“, folgt er einer Sprechweise, die sich inzwischen in Neuroinformatik und Neurobiologie fest etabliert hat: „Ein Gehirn erkennt ..., ein visuelles System interpretiert ..., ein Netz lernt ... etc.“

Heißt das aber, dass es keinen Unterschied macht, ob es das Gehirn ist, das denkt, oder wir Menschen mit dem Gehirn, ob wir von einem Netz oder von einem Kind sagen, es lernt? „Nicht das Auge sieht, sondern der Mensch mit seinen Augen.“ „Nicht das Gehirn denkt, sondern der Mensch mit seinem Gehirn.“ „Nicht der Computer rechnet, sondern der Mensch mit dem Computer.“ Man könnte meinen, dass wir zumindest so reden müssten, um zum Ausdruck zu bringen, dass Menschen und nicht dem Gehirn, einem einzelnen Sinnesorgan oder einem Artefakt wie dem Computer die Rolle eines Handelnden und entsprechender Fähigkeiten wie Sehen und Denken, Lernen und Verstehen zuzuschreiben sind. Kinder sind ja keine Netze, die mit entsprechenden Lernalgorithmen trainiert werden könnten. Sie lernen durch Nachahmung, indem sie mit der Umwelt, zu der auch die anderen Menschen gehören, in Beziehung treten, sich an Vorbildern und Leitbildern orientieren. Deshalb meint wohl auch Wittgenstein, dass wir keine Antwort darauf geben können müssen, wie (diese oder jene) Wahrnehmung zustande kommt.

Die Fähigkeit, von seinen Sinnen Gebrauch zu machen und etwas *als etwas* zu sehen, ist eine Vorbedingung dafür, überhaupt ein Sprachspiel spielen zu können. Doch: „Was heißt es: wissen, was ein Spiel ist? Was heißt es, es wissen und es nicht sagen können?“ (Wittgenstein 1984, 282) Im Spiel wird wie in Wahrnehmung *und* Sprache ein Wissen vorausgesetzt. Es ist nicht ein Wissen um die Funktionsweise des Spiels, der Wahrnehmung oder der Sprache, sondern ein „Know-how“, d.i. ein Können, welches im Kontext einer Lebensform zu erwerben ist.

In der Praxis hat es sich längst eingebürgert, etwa vom Computer zu sagen, er rechnet, oder von einem Netz, es lernt. Alltagsbegriffe werden in die Wissenschaftssprache importiert und neu (und meist exakter) definiert. Umgekehrt wandern Begriffe (zurück) in die Alltagssprache und verlieren dabei in der Regel (wieder) ihre Bedeutungsge nauigkeit. Trotz des Wandels der Sprachen betrachten

und behandeln wir aber nach wie vor Artefakte, d.h. vom Menschen geschaffene Gegenstände, oder einzelne Organe wie das Gehirn nicht als Menschen oder als dem Menschen ähnliche Gegenstände. „Wir sagen nur vom Menschen, und was ihm ähnlich ist, es denke.“ (Wittgenstein 1984, 394)

Das Problem, um das es hier geht, ist *zum einen* die Frage, nach welchen Kriterien wir welche Eigenschaften und Fähigkeiten welchen Gegenständen zuschreiben (wollen und sollen), *zum anderen* die Frage, welche Bedeutung(en) welche Begriffe in welchen Kontexten haben. Im Sinne Wittgensteins könnte man sagen, dass sich diese Fragen nur im Hinblick auf das jeweilige Sprachspiel beantworten lassen, welches jeweils gespielt wird.

Wenn wir eine Kippfigur betrachten und das „Aufleuchten des Aspekts“ durch einen Ausruf zum Ausdruck bringen, dann spielen wir ein anderes Spiel (mit anderen Regeln und Figuren, Worten und Bildern), als wenn wir neurophysiologisch zu erklären versuchen, was während des Betrachtens einer Kippfigur „im Gehirn passiert“. Aber stimmt das auch? Spielen wir zwei *völlig* verschiedene Spiele? – Im ersten Fall ist die Kippfigur selbst der Gegenstand der Betrachtung. Ist sie es nicht auch im zweiten Fall? Ja, aber einer *anderen* Betrachtungsweise?

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Wittgenstein's Colour Blindness

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Science transforms the phenomenal world into observable and measurable data. Its putative way of knowing comprises a dynamic interplay between four key elements: Observation and experiment, hypothesis, law and theory. All sciences claim to be descriptive as they aim to make accurate, objective observations and classify the results. Observation and experiment establish the facts of science's raw data. After observation and experiment have established the facts, the scientist creates a hypothesis, a general rule that describes the facts. A hypothesis is a kind of educated guess that must be tested further. If it passes testing – that is, if it continues to describe the facts coherently – then it's promoted to scientific law. A theory makes sense of and explains a vast body of scientific knowledge, including both laws and the facts dependent on the laws. Science can thus be described as an unending process of growth and mutation according to the framework of the discourse of a given time. Scientific evolution progresses in two distinct directions: On the one hand, due to technological innovations, new knowledge systems are added to the existing corpus. Scientific disciplines, however, also undergo profound changes within themselves. Kuhn describes this not as a gradual but an abrupt process propelled by shifting paradigms. A paradigm is defined as coherent system of values and norms that shape the scientific framework by which reality is analysed. In contrast to Kuhn, Lakatos argued that several theories exist simultaneously. His umbrella unit is not a paradigm but a research programme which is characterized by a hard core of solid scientific facts. Lakatos' research programme progresses on an empirical or theoretical growth-based evolution. Finally, Feyerabend specifies that universal standards are unnecessary in judging the scientific body: *...an absence of 'objective' standards does not mean less work; it means that scientists have to check all ingredients of their trade and not only those which philosophers and establishment scientists regard as characteristically scientific. Scientists can thus no longer say: we already have the correct methods and standards of research – all we need to do is to apply them* (Feyerabend 1987, 284). Local standards determine what is real. Uniting these different approaches, the conclusion can be made that science's general aim is to develop an autonomous and coherent language by which reality becomes an approachable entity. Science's ambition is therefore to enclose as much as possible of its discursive boundaries by fitting all terms to a uniform framework. A fragment of reality, such as colour and colour blindness, is captured by the language-game of the scientific body: a conceptual network is connected to observable phenomena by which reality becomes an explanatory, predictive, descriptive or interpretative entity. Therefore, only data which are considered as valuable within such a network are admitted to the scientific corpus.

Colour and colour blindness are not reducible merely to objective and measurable data. They are, following Musselman's (2000) description, contextually situated which gives them multiple meanings: *Colour-blindness became a platform for extolling the virtues and methods of transforming idiosyncratic experience into general knowledge* (Musselman 2000, 402). Distancing oneself from the descriptive level reveals the unaltered methodological framework in the study of colour-blindness.

The contemporary gene-centric model of colour blindness associated on the one hand with the absence of either the Middle Wave (MW) or Long Wave (LW) cone pigment and with an altered or absent gene on the X-chromosome on the other hand, still owes much to John Dalton's standard framing of the topic in the eighteenth century (1794). Given the knowledge of optics and vision at the end of the eighteenth century, and the apparatus available at that time, Dalton made an extremely penetrating study of his colour vision. His research is seen today as the beginning of the construction of the model of colour blindness. Although his discovery of colour blindness was most likely accompanied by a sense of puzzlement, Dalton transformed it into a natural phenomenon to be investigated by the quantitative methods of science. In the numerous laboratory experiments, Dalton took Newton's colour spectrum as his methodological point of departure: *My observations began with the solar spectrum, or coloured image of the sun, exhibited in a dark room by means of a glass prism. I found that persons in general distinguish six kinds of colours; namely, red, orange, yellow, green, blue and purple. Newton, indeed, divides the purple into indigo and violet; but the difference between him and others is merely nominal. To me it is quite otherwise: – I see only two or at most three distinctions. These I should call yellow and blue.* (Dalton 1997, 8) As a natural phenomenon, colour blindness is considered a defect of vision: *Notwithstanding this, I was never convinced of a peculiarity in my vision, till I accidentally observed the colour of the flower of the Geranium zonale by candle-light in the Autumn of 1792. The flower was pink, but it appeared to me almost an exact sky-blue by day; in candle-light, however, it was astonishingly changed, not having then any blue in it, but being what I called red, a colour which forms a striking contrast to blue* (Dalton 1997, 8). Further, Dalton situated the cause of his defective colour vision at the individual level: *It appears therefore almost beyond a doubt, that one of the humours of my eye, and of the eyes of my fellows, is a coloured medium, probably some modification of blue. I suppose it must be the vitreous humour* (Dalton 1997, 13). Dalton's research laid the foundation for making colour blindness into a measurable defect which can be described and verified accordingly. Colour blindness is thereby reduced to a erroneous function of the eye. Relating Dalton's frame of knowledge to the above mentioned four key elements of the scientific way of knowing, we conclude that the study of colour blindness was restricted to the observational/experimental (viz. comparing coloured ribbons in day- and candle-light) and hypothetical (viz. the blue vitreous humour) level. John Dalton could not yet formulate a conclusive theory as the development of improved technologies, and in particular the notion of 'genes', gave rise to the invention of new hypotheses about the causes of colour blindness. However, these new features were merely incorporated into Dalton's theoretical framework and are thus seen merely as an extension of his analytical strategy.

In contrast with Dalton's mechanical approach of (defective) vision, colour and colour blindness are analysed by Wittgenstein from a linguistic point of view. According to Wittgenstein, the notions colour and colour blindness are constructed by the interplay between two grammar-related

spaces: On the one hand a static colour-space; on the other a dynamic and continually evolving language-space. Phenomena such as colour and colour blindness receive their meaning in the combination of these spaces.

Reflecting on colour and colour blindness, Wittgenstein takes Höfler's (1883) colour octahedron as his methodological point of departure and transposes it to a logic-grammatical level (Wittgenstein 1975, XXI-221). The application of a three-dimensional model, which gives a detailed overview of the production-process of the colour vocabulary, illustrates that Wittgenstein at first was merely interested in the outlines of this colour-space and to bring about an opening up of colour-kinships. The colour octahedron makes the grammatical rules of the colour-space surveyable: *An octahedron with pure colours at the corner-point e.g. provides a rough presentation of colour-space, and this is a grammatical representation, not a psychological one* (1975, I-1). The model as such has however no meaning. It is merely a grammar of colour on a general meta-level: *Using the octahedron as a representation gives us a bird's-eye view of the grammatical rules* (1975, I-1). Only in interaction with the life-world, notably in the possibility of making analogies with situations in actual practices, can meaning be given (Wittgenstein 1977, III-317). Despite the fact the colour octahedron gives an *Übersichtliche Darstellung* of a specific part of the colour-grammar, the model is unable to represent the deep structure of colour. According to Wittgenstein, the shine, reflection or transparency of objects can merely be described in a larger context that supersedes the logic-grammatical level: *Our colour concepts sometimes relate to substances, sometimes to surfaces, sometimes to the illumination, sometimes to transparent bodies* (1977, I-255). Besides the unchanging colour-space, Wittgenstein describes a dynamic language-space which illustrates that he was not interested in the formulation of a colour-theory, but in the logic of colour-concepts (1977, I-22). The problem, however, is that in language colour notions are not all equivalent to each other by which our understanding of colour-equality shows a state of indeterminacy. This linguistic fallacy is described by Wittgenstein as the problem of colour-accountability: *The difficulties we encounter when we reflect about the nature of colour are embedded in the indeterminateness of our concept of sameness of colour* (1977, I-56). The logic of the grammar of colour in the colour octahedron is not transferable to our everyday language. By means of the grammar in the language-space Wittgenstein refers to the structure of linguistic usage, which appears in the sentences of everyday language. So, grammar allows us to talk in an expressive and comprehensible style about the life-world. According to Wittgenstein, reality is merely thinkable within the boundaries of a linguistic framework. The analysis of his language-space illustrates that he was not interested in the formulation of a colour theory, but in clarifying the connectivity between logic and experience: *Sentences are often used on the borderline between logic and the empirical, so that their meaning changes back and forth and they count now as expressions of norms, now as expressions of experience* (1977, I-32). To express it differently: *Practices give words their meaning* (1977, III-317).

Having described the two grammar-related spaces we are able to understand Wittgenstein's interpretation of

colour and colour-blindness. Colour, on the one hand, is in Wittgenstein's linguistic approach a blurred notion which is applicable to transparent as well as opaque colours (Wittgenstein 1958, 71). As a result, these colour geometries can not be evaluated as entirely compatible. The indefiniteness of our understanding of colour equivalence is due to the absence of a recognized colour standard. The cause of this colour incompatibility is situated on the level of everyday language wherein notions of colour are not logic-consistent. Evaluating colour blindness from a linguistic perspective, an equality of structure is observed in the relation between colour blind persons and normal sighted: *Imagine that all mankind, with rare exceptions, were red-green colour-blind. Or another case: everyone was either red-green or blue-yellow colour blind* (1977, I-12). Because perceiving colours is a phenomenal activity, only a language can be employed wherein notions of colour are not equivalent: *People sometimes say (though mistakenly), "Only I can know what I see". But not: "Only I can know whether I am colour-blind". (Or again: "Only I can know whether I see or am blind: (1977, I-83). In his description of colour blindness, Wittgenstein also refers to the concept aspect-blindness: The question now arises: Could there be human beings lacking in the capacity to see something as something – and what would that be like? What sort of consequences would it have? – Would this defect be comparable to colour-blindness or to not having absolute pitch? – We will call it 'aspect-blindness' (1958, 213-214). As colour blind persons experience colours differently, aspect blind people also have another relation with images and vision. The foundation of the problem however remains the incompatibility of the grammar of everyday language. As such, there exists no structural difference between the observations of a colour blind or a normal sighted person. Both are anchored to the use of everyday language wherein the incompatibility of colour notions is a natural given: *There is, after all, no commonly accepted criterion for what colour is, unless it is one of our colours* (1977, I-15). In Wittgenstein's linguistic framework, the experience of colour blindness is but a grammatical extension adding another dimension to the grammar of the colour octahedron.*

Juxtaposing their descriptions on colour and colour blindness, we find that Dalton and Wittgenstein employ a similar physical colour space which functions as a substratum of (defective) visual perception. From this static colour space, the experience of colour blindness is transformed into an observable and measurable phenomenon. By analyzing colour and colour blindness in a laboratory context (which detaches objects from their natural environment and reconfigures new phenomena) or linguistic point of view (which relates colour blindness with the incompatibility of everyday language), Dalton and Wittgenstein create a unilateral 'Grammar of Reality' that shapes the outlook of the phenomenon. Depending on the methodological approach, colour blindness is evaluated as an aberration of the visual norm or as an enrichment of the conception of reality. The fallacy in Dalton's and Wittgenstein's way of thinking, however, is that they transfer a static colour-space from the physical to the phenomenal level. What we need, according to Heelan, is a *new grammar of reality in which the subjective and the objective are not mutually opposed* (Heelan 2002, 124).

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Wittgenstein's Directed Discontent. Clarifying the Roles of Experience and Appreciation in Skillful Coping

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1. Introduction

Starting point is the observation that in many situations in our daily lives we act adequately without deliberation. With certainty and fluency we take a chair, we immediately understand a traffic sign, and without deliberation we stop someone who, while trying to cross the street, did not notice a car coming. Often we just act, and normally this involved skillful coping is adequate. The aim of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of this omnipresent type of everyday expertise via a better understanding of the expertise in more specialised domains. I will discuss fragments from Ludwig Wittgenstein's "Lectures on Aesthetics" (1978) in which concrete situations of involved coping experts play an important role. So in this paper I use the term 'expertise' in a broad sense that comprises expertise within a specialized practice, such as that of the architect or the tailor, as well as the most habitual coping in our everyday lives, such as sitting down in a chair or cooking a soup.

More in particular, I want to clarify the roles of appreciation and lived experience in skillful coping by focussing on a concept Wittgenstein introduced in his "Lectures on Aesthetics" (LA): 'directed discontent'. As far as I know this interesting concept has been neglected in the secondary literature on Wittgenstein so far. Directed discontent describes an internal relation between the lived experience of a craftsman and the object he is appreciating or working on. I will argue that directed discontent immediately *orients* his involved coping towards improvement or rightness. This is important because it implies that this particular emotion is necessary for an adequate task fulfilment in skillful coping, a conclusion that might be relevant for the debate in cognitive science on the role of emotions in cognition (which I can not discuss here).

Finally I will argue that the phenomenon that Wittgenstein explains as directed discontent also plays a central role in Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of involved coping experts.

2. Appreciation in Involved Coping: the Case of Wittgenstein's Craftsmen

In his later work Wittgenstein pays a lot of attention to describing situations that can count as situations of (everyday) expertise. He (1953) discusses for example expertise in the field of human expressions. In LA Wittgenstein presents aesthetics as a very broad domain, which includes some practices of craftsmanship. For example, he describes involved coping of architects and tailors within their respective familiar practices.

According to Wittgenstein the central concept to be explained concerning the aesthetic practices (in his broad sense), is '*appreciation*' of objects. We could describe appreciation roughly as involved ways of selecting and coping directed at correctness of the object and showing itself in the way of acting of the appreciator. As such it can be public, without a word being uttered. Appreciation is involved and immediate and can be seen as opposed to 'judging,' which is detached and deliberating.

That he is an appreciator is not shown by the interjections he uses, but by *the way* he chooses, selects, etc. (LA, 7, my emphasis)

Appreciation is normally about *correctness* of the object for the appreciator within its context. The craftsman appreciates the object as being right or not. Because contexts are in general complex it is not possible to make explicit what appreciation consists in (LA, 7). Moreover, appreciation in a context takes place within a practice within a culture.

'This is fine' is on a level with a gesture, almost – connected with all sorts of other gestures and actions and a whole situation and a culture. (LA, 11 note 2)

Appreciation of the object by the craftsman is *normative* without being (explicitly or implicitly) rule guided. Although the tailor incorporated the rules of his practice years ago, these rules normally stay in the background while he acts in a perfectly adequate way, often without saying a word. Wittgenstein's expert tailor here and now generates a *situated* type of normativity. While the practice of tailoring could be seen as the main source of normativity in the social domain, in a concrete situation the expert is a relevant source too. Correct *is* what satisfies the (always already socialised) expert in this specific situation with all its background complexities. So in my opinion we could see the expert as a (not the!) source of normativity when he is operating within his familiar practices.

Appreciation does not need to be articulated explicitly. It primarily shows itself by being expressed in 'aesthetic reactions'.

Perhaps the most important thing in connection with aesthetics is what may be called aesthetic reactions, e.g. discontent, disgust, discomfort. (LA, 13)

It is crucial that Wittgenstein stresses the fact that these reactions of appreciation are *directed*. The relation between the craftsman's reaction and the object (in context) is an *internal relation* (and not a causal one).

We have here a kind of discomfort which you may call 'directed', e.g. if I am afraid of you, my discomfort is directed. [...] We have given, as it were, a *grammatical* explanation (in saying, the feeling is 'directed'). (LA, 14)

The dynamic attitude of the-craftsman-directed-at-the-object-in-context shows what matters to him in the situation. As we will see next, in case of directed discontent the internal relation between the object and the lived experience of the expert craftsman guides his coping in the direction of improvement.

3. Wittgenstein's Directed Discontent

The most important aesthetic reaction is '*directed discontent*' as it involves the ability to make subtle distinctions relevant to the situation.

The expression of discontent is not the same as the expression of discomfort. The expression of discontent

[by an architect correcting the design of a door] says: 'Make it higher...too low!...do something to this.' (LA, 13)

Although Wittgenstein is clear about the directedness of discontent, he does not explain very clearly the exact difference between directed discomfort and directed discontent. It seems to me that directed *discontent* crucially involves a more specific understanding of the situation. Directed discontent is related to the ability to instinctively and immediately make all kinds of subtle discriminations that make us see what should be done to improve the current situation or solve the problem.

Since expert craftsmen will normally immediately make the relevant distinctions in situations within their familiar practices, directed discontent (and not directed discomfort) seems to be their characteristic way of reacting to the situation.

The role of first person lived experience in providing a sense of normative orientation is of central importance for understanding Wittgenstein's notion of directed discontent. As the object becomes more and more right, the amount of dissatisfaction or discontent experienced seems to decrease. The lived experience of being satisfied with the object or situation under attention indicates rightness for the tailor or architect. When satisfaction or harmony is reached, a characteristic feeling might be experienced: "it fits" or "it clicks" (LA, 19).

Wittgenstein describes the involved coping of an expert tailor who has a sense for the right measures of the fabric he is cutting for this person in this situation. When things are going smoothly this expert does not need to think, speak or represent the length in centimetres, he just cuts.

But the tailor does not say: 'This is nice.' He is a good cutter. He is just contented. (LA, 13 note 2)

Wittgenstein's craftsman does not need a propositional representation of his goal since his coping is oriented immediately by the experience of directed discontent. The tailor does not deliberately control his acting by means of his personal taste, but cuts the way he cuts because he experiences it as good like this, while he would experience wider as too wide and narrower as too narrow. "This way we are contented, the other not" (LA, 13).

In sum, Wittgenstein's excellent craftsmen care about doing a good job. Directed discontent describes the craftsman's directedness at doing things right. More specifically it involves the appreciation of the object in the task-situation as incorrect. This incorrect object immediately gives rise to both an emotional perturbation (discontent) and behavioural manifestations: a competent reaction to the situation aimed at improving it, and other expressive behaviours showing discontent.

4. Extension of Directed Discontent to Other Domains of Involved Coping Experts

Although due to lack of space I can not present the full argument here, it is important to note that while Wittgenstein stresses the importance of directed discontent in aesthetic practices, the same phenomenon seems to be relevant in other situations of involved coping experts. Let me present a case of everyday expertise that clarifies what it means to know the way in familiar domains. In *Philosophical Investigations* Ixi Wittgenstein describes how we seek the right word. We consider one too strong, another too weak, continue searching, and finally find a good one

that satisfies us. Just like in the case of the craftsmen above, the *related* notions of correctness and satisfaction play an important role in orienting this type of expertise.

'What is in my mind when I say so and so?' I write a sentence. One word isn't the one I need. I find the *right* word. 'What is it I want to say? Oh yes, that is what I wanted.' The answer in these cases is the one that *satisfied* you [...] (LA, 18, my emphasis)

Directed discontent might perhaps be seen as the lived experience that draws us to the right word, as we do not just try words at random but improve step-by-step.¹ Afterwards, the word that is *accepted* as correct is characterised as the word that we were looking for all the time. Again, the relationship between the experience of content and the object, the right word for us in its context, is an internal one. The fact that in this example of everyday expertise we are directed primarily at our own inner world shows that directed discontent can function both with respect to our 'inner' and 'outer' worlds.

5. Merleau-Ponty

Hubert Dreyfus (2002) calls attention to an important theme in the early work of the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty: the (everyday) expert's tendency toward maximum grip. This concept, here abbreviated as 'maximum grip,' is similar to Wittgenstein's directed discontent in that it concerns a dynamic lived experience of orientation towards adequacy in involved skillful coping. Dreyfus cites a simple example concerning the way we find the right distance for seeing something.

For each object, as for each picture in an art gallery, there is an optimum distance from which it requires to be seen, a direction viewed from which it vouchsafes most of itself [...] We therefore tend towards the maximum of visibility, and seek a better focus as with a microscope. (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 302)

For us, as everyday experts in seeing things, no conscious representation of the right distance is needed. It is determined actively and pre-reflectively in a movement that contains a directedness at (relevant aspects of) the painting.

The directedness in involved coping is rooted in the basic pre-reflective intentionality of the body, that needs to be distinguished from explicit representational intentionality.

[A]s one acquires expertise, the acquired know-how is experienced as finer and finer discriminations of situations paired with the appropriate response to each. Maximal grip names the body's tendency to refine its responses so as to bring the current situation closer to an optimal gestalt. Thus, successful learning and action do not require propositional mental representations. (Dreyfus 2002, 367)

Involved coping is experienced as a stable flow of skillful action attuned to the changing demands of the situation. Inadequacy is experienced as disequilibrium in the system 'living body-familiar environment'. Improvement relieves an experienced tension and the realisation of maximum grip is characterised by an experience of equilibrium and a feeling of satisfaction.

Let us very briefly compare directed discontent and maximum grip. Both Dreyfus' experts and Wittgenstein's

¹ I owe this last observation to Hubert Dreyfus (personal communication).

craftsmen are characterised by their ability to make subtle distinctions. For both involved coping has an aspect of ongoing appreciation: inadequacy of the relationship between coping and situation is lived with a feeling of dissatisfaction or tension and motivates corrective reactions. Both Wittgenstein's craftsmen and Merleau-Ponty's experts normally do not have a propositional representation of their goals. In the flow of movement towards improvement, step-by-step discontent is reduced, maximum grip is approached, until finally correctness and satisfaction are reached.

Of course Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty have different philosophical backgrounds and perspectives. In the texts discussed above, however, they describe the same phenomenon with emphasis on various aspects. With respect to the normativity involved an important difference exist. What counts as maximum grip seems to depend on the concerns, interests and (limited) capacities as well as the (individual, social and biological) situation of the expert. The normativity of directed discontent is less individual in nature, being primarily determined by socialisation in existing practices.

6. Conclusion

Directed discontent describes an internal relation between the lived experience of a craftsman and the object he is appreciating or working on. It orients his involved skillful coping towards improvement and correctness. Its directedness seems to refer to both this internal relation and the fact that involved coping is directed at doing things right. Appreciation is about correctness and is primarily expressed in coping. Incorrectness is lived as an emotional perturbation (discontent), which is expressed in reactions aimed at improvement and in the way the craftsman copes.

Wittgenstein's and Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of (everyday) experts in concrete situations suggest a similar guiding role for experience in coping with a normative sensitivity. Correctness and lived experience are related because expertise implies a *concern* for correctness of relevant objects that opens the way for emotional perturbations.

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Exploding the Myth of the Given. On Phenomenology's Basic Discord with Empiricism

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In its very first step our attempt to gain knowledge about the world seems to demand a basic decision. We can either proceed from a theoretical account of how the world is constituted (or should be constituted in order to be knowable) or from our experience. The first option is characteristic of rationalism, the second one is the distinctive mark of empiricism. It is not only Kant who rightly claimed to have gone beyond this rigid alternative. Understanding modern phenomenology it is of utmost importance to see how its empirical starting-point, i.e. its commitment to primordial experiences, is combined with definitely non-empiricist methodical devices and orientations without thereby converting into or substantially approaching traditional rationalism.

„The given“ usually is meant to refer to something present which is immediately grasped by intuition. Presence, immediacy and intuition are taken to oppose symbolic or representational relations of diverse kind. Focussing on the latter is connected with some more or less vaguely announced idea of how our “direct” experiential touch on the world is subject to conceptual and methodical interpretations. Insofar as a phenomenological thinking intends to rehabilitate the intuitively given as against theoretical interpretations, it seems to strengthen the basic distinction lying beneath the opposition of empiricism and rationalism. It is a widespread view that phenomenology brings in its wake a naive concept of the intuitively given. The aim of my paper is to challenge this view. I shall argue that, despite the obvious understanding of the dictum “back to the things themselves”, it is a methodically mediated immediacy which is characteristic of a phenomenological account of the given. This will be shown with regard to Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and Heidegger's hermeneutic-phenomenological approach in *Being and Time* (BT).

Phenomenology and the Myth of the Given

What does phenomenology have in common with classical empiricism? Critically viewed, their common ground is the unquestioned presupposition that prior to all inferential knowledge there is a sphere of the immediately given which provides the epistemic underpinning of all higher-order knowledge and which, in its turn, does not stand in need of any (logical or linguistic) interpretation. It is this self-authenticating character of nonverbal episodes which is significant of the *myth of the given* (Sellars 1963, 169f). From a phenomenological point of view the idea of an immediately given functioning this way is not an inconsiderately accepted dogma. A) On the one hand, it is inevitable to acknowledge the foundational function of intuition unless we are ready to consider all our knowledge to be “groundless” in terms of referring to an infinite chain of symbolic interactions or, in special theoretical contexts, to deductive reasoning whose premises had, ever and again, to be deductively ensured. B) On the other hand, phenomenologists hesitate to straightforwardly identify the immediately given. They particularly refuse to adopt current conceptions of immediate givenness, e.g. sense data-theories. My concern is exclusively with (B). I do not question the idea of epistemic foundationalism if this

amounts to acknowledging the indispensable function of intuitional givenness with regard to all our (theoretical and practical) knowledge.

I shall defend the following theses:

(1) The phenomenologically given is a transcendental concept referring to modes of givenness of objects and processes encountered in natural experience. What is given in terms of a phenomenological approach is not given according to our usual attitude (natural experience). Reflecting on the appropriate modes of access to phenomena is the prime mark of phenomenology (this name primarily referring not to certain arguments and views but to methodical issues).

(2) How the given can be grasped is controversial among phenomenologists. The phenomenologically relevant field of intuitive givenness, for instance, is made accessible by means of a phenomenological reduction (Husserl) or a deconstruction of the history of ontology (Heidegger). Whereas the rationale of the former is the idea of *purity* in terms of a presuppositionless description of phenomena, the latter follows the ideas of *primordiality, integrity and totality* by dismantling those interpretations which conceal the original phenomena.

Reduction and Givenness (Husserl)

The basic method of Husserl's phenomenology, both in its earlier descriptive-psychological and its later transcendental form, is reflection. Transcendental phenomenology's field of investigation is the so-called “pure subjectivity”, i.e. the field of phenomenologically reduced noesis/noema-relations. The phenomenological reduction is responsible for the transcendental character of phenomenology. Thereby, “transcendental” refers to those moments and functions of consciousness which are constitutive for its ability to be related to transcendence. According to Husserl, the term “transcendence” is equivalent to “intentional immanence”: everything that is not a real part of consciousness can be named “transcendent”. The phenomenological reduction represents a specific reflective procedure. It results from asking how the access to intentional experiences has to be methodically specified in order to ensure that our descriptions of phenomena can rightly claim to be of scientific value. Husserl's idea of a philosophical science as opposed to (empirical as well as rational) positive sciences is based on the idea of a presuppositionless investigation. The phenomenological reduction demands not to admit any presupposition which cannot be shown to be part of the phenomenon. This especially refers to the *general thesis of natural attitude* which represents an existential-thesis relating to the objects one encounters as well as the experiencing subject. According to this methodical device it is evident that, when Husserl introduces his *principle of all principles* (Husserl 1976, § 24) which explicitly commits phenomenology to intuition, the intuition at issue operates within a framework of reflection.

Husserl's understanding of an intentional analysis based on intuitional evidence, in a certain sense, allows for the

intrusion of interpretational moments. The latter are due to the functional correlation of intuition and attitude. This correlation most fundamentally manifests itself when we abandon our natural attitude in favour of the phenomenological attitude (or vice versa). In course of this change of attitude, our intuition, accordingly, alters with regard to its objects and achievements. Moreover, the subject changes, too. It is only with regard to pure consciousness that we may discover a pure ego or transcendental subject. This ego is not an ontologically interpreted doubling of the empirical ego. Ontologically viewed, it is the empirical ego insofar as she considers herself under a special theoretical aspect, namely according to the question what we have to assume in terms of formal structures of consciousness if it shall be possible to take the experiencing consciousness to remain the same while every single experience occurs and disappears at certain moments. Husserl's pure ego is characterized as the persisting form or function of intentionality. Given the correlation between intuition and attitude, we cannot adhere to the idea of a neutral given which only occasionally presented itself in different attitudes while, according to its own nature, it remained independent of these changing attitudes. Apart from methodical attitudes we also have to consider *thematic attitudes* which single out particular aspects of things or particular perspectives while we keep one and the same methodical (e. g. phenomenological) attitude. What is given changes in accordance with different methodical and thematic attitudes. The given is not a self-contained stuff which could be specified without referring to certain points of view and modes of grasping. Consequently, every phenomenological description, in a specific sense, is a self-description (Rinofner-Kreidl 2003a).

From the point of view of a phenomenological attitude towards ("natural") attitudes, we are able to explain why naturalistic and personalistic attitude and, correspondingly, natural sciences and human sciences, are not of equal rank (Husserl 1952, 183f, 208-211). If phenomenology rightly is considered a higher-order-attitude (Husserl 1952, 179f), it is obvious that the object sphere of phenomenological givenness does not coincide neither with the object sphere of scientific theories nor with the practically delimited domain of interest which is constitutive of life-worldly experiences. When Husserl acknowledges reflection and intuition to be likewise indispensable for phenomenology, this is ultimately grounded in his attempt to reliably mark off phenomenology both from non-transcendental theoretical and practical approaches to interpreting experience. The phenomenological reduction defines the operational conditions under which a phenomenological understanding of sense can be realized. Consequently, although "sense", i.e. intentional relations of whatever kind, can only be grasped intuitively, a phenomenological approach is committed to a reflective method for defining its access to intentional relations (see the final comment on "so much reduction, so much givenness" in Marion 1998, 203).

Arguing that Husserl's phenomenology relies on a principle of pure intuitional givenness is true only if we tacitly take into account its methodical framework. On the other hand, attitudes cannot be arbitrarily chosen if we seriously take a phenomenological point of view. Relating to this, we have to acknowledge an original function of intuition. It is the intuitively grasped nature of the intended object which indicates the appropriate attitude to open up the inner and outer horizon of the object at issue. Corroborating this preliminary acquaintance with the "given" by means of analysing intentional relations, our intuitional evidence already works on condition that a

particular attitude has been chosen. It is only against this backdrop that we can say: *It is owing to intuitional evidence that we are able to achieve an understanding of sense.*

Destruction and Givenness (Heidegger)

Heidegger agrees to Husserl that a phenomenological investigation, on principle, has to be delimited from a positive, scientific investigation. In terms of Heidegger's thinking this means to refute any attempt to explain Being (*Sein*) by referring to particular entities (*Seiendes*). Fundamental ontology, as it is introduced in BT, is exclusively interested in the meaning of Being, i.e. in ontological issues. It, therefore, must not be confused with any positive investigation of whatever entities (e.g. anthropology or psychology). The common ground of Husserl's and Heidegger's philosophy is this "idealistic" starting-point which excludes any naturalistic (or culturalistic) attempt to consider reality in its entire scope according to one peculiar sphere of entities. However, when Husserl defines the universal sphere of pure intentionality he follows his idea of *philosophy as rigorous science*. From Heidegger's point of view this represents an undue predominance of reflection insofar as Husserl's concern with science leads him to cut the proper nature and scope of phenomenality in favour of theoretically motivated restrictions. Husserl's emphasis on the problem of how to gain access to phenomena results in a particular blindness for the real scope of primordial experiences and, correspondingly, original phenomena.

Heidegger's starting-point can be formulated as follows: What is given is not in any sense plain to the eye. It, rather, depends on our idea of philosophy and, particularly, on how the tacit presuppositions of theoretical projects are either made explicit or fall into oblivion. Ontologically and historically viewed, the idea of a presuppositionless philosophy rests on non-trivial presuppositions which cannot be discussed as long as one does not go beyond the theoretical attitude. In order to gain a comprehensive and sufficiently differentiated idea of givenness, it is necessary to distinguish several ontologically irreducible modes of being, namely *being-human* (*Dasein*), *readiness-to-hand* (*Zuhandenheit*) and *presence-at-hand* (*Vorhandenheit*), whose interrelations have to be explained in terms of ontological genesis. According to Heidegger, taking a theoretical attitude in doing philosophy is tantamount to restricting one's view of reality to the sphere of presence-at-hand.

Part of philosophy's theoretical bias is an abstract idea of the thinking subject. When Heidegger starts to elucidate the existential characteristics of being-human this goes hand in hand with a critique of modern philosophies revolving round the idea of the subject as a substantial, i.e. independent (autonomous) being. Thereto, Heidegger's critique of Descartes' project, very often, can be read as a critique of Husserl's "formal phenomenology of consciousness" (Heidegger 2001, 115), although Husserl is rarely mentioned in BT. In terms of his refutation of abstract concepts of the subject Heidegger denies that Husserl really offers any relevant description of the self as this seems to be indicated when we said that, according to Husserl, every description is a self-description. Contrary to this, Heidegger argues that phenomenological descriptions are existential constructions (Heidegger 2001, 376).

Heidegger's main concern is not any longer with the purity of phenomena but with their primordially, integrity and totality which has been lost due to the theoretical

(scientific) bias of philosophy. Consequently, laying bare the true phenomena requires to dismantle theoretically misguided interpretations. This is labelled “deconstructing the history of ontology”. This approach is responsible for the highly individual phenomenological concept of phenomenon introduced in BT which is bewildering with a view to both a vulgar and Husserlian understanding of phenomena. On first view Heidegger's etymologically guided explanation seems to be akin to Husserl's *principle of all principles*: a phenomenon is that which shows itself according to its own way of showing itself (*das was sich zeigt, so wie es sich von ihm selbst her zeigt*, Heidegger 2001, 34) However, as soon as this basic concept of phenomenon is interpreted according to the idea of destruction, a phenomenon is said to be what, first and foremost, does *not* show itself, what remains hidden compared to that which, first and foremost, shows itself, but what, by its own nature, belongs to it as its sense and ground (Heidegger 2001, 35). This profoundly radicalises an idea which can be found in Husserl's phenomenology, too, namely: what is given in terms of a phenomenological analysis has to be brought to givenness.

For Heidegger, it is, ultimately, our pre-ontological ability to understand Being which opens up the phenomena of a phenomenological investigation. Phenomenology's task is to conceptually expound what we are already acquainted with. (Being acquainted with something does not mean to have knowledge about it or to be able to conceive of it in appropriate terms.) Phenomenology has to avoid any reflective objectification of our pre-conceptual and pre-theoretical understanding of Being. This idea of hermeneutical understanding leads to an entirely different kind of interpretation as compared with Husserl (see the sharp criticism of the concept of attitude in: Heidegger 1993, 53, 78-80, 85f, 139-144, 170). So far as a philosophical investigation of life differs from life itself, Heidegger's fundamental ontology, too, is necessarily based on reflection. Heidegger's emphasis on the priority of finding the right, i.e. original way to formulate questions as against stating results, clearly indicates the fundamental role of a reflective movement which is concerned with processes of sense without describing them from a theoretically detached point of view. However, Heidegger's rather peculiar adaptation of reflection does not question the reflective character of his method (Crowell 2001, 123-151; Rinofner-Kreidl 2003b). BT argues that immediate intuition is of secondary importance compared to the ontologically prime function of understanding (Heidegger 2001, § 32). Taking into account that „understanding“ here is not restricted to grasping the contents of pure intentional relations but, instead, refers to the entire scope of our being-in-the-world, we should say: *it is owing to a fundamental pre-theoretical ability of understanding Being that we are able to make use of principles of intuition with regard to diverse objects and fields of objects. In this sense hermeneutical interpretation is prior to any kind of intuitional givenness.* If we follow Heidegger in considering intuition an objectifying act which is committed to a theoretical attitude, we even have to add: *what is intuitively given precisely resists understanding in terms of hermeneutical interpretation.*

Summary

Husserl and Heidegger both undermine the opposition of intuitional givenness and interpretation. Husserl argues that what is intuitively given already underlies a theoretical interpretation insofar as its appearance presupposes a functional correlation of intuition and attitude. Heidegger points out that intuition is secondary compared to interpretation, though the latter, since it is an existential characteristic of being-human, must not be considered a theoretical behaviour.

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Another Brentanian Thesis: “Die innere Wahrnehmung hat das Eigentümliche, dass sie nie innere Beobachtung werden kann”

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Among the various theses which Franz Brentano put forward, none has been more successful than the so-called intentionality thesis. This is indeed one of the most influential items of philosophy to emerge in recent history. There are of course other theses in Brentano's philosophy. The one under consideration here is the thesis that inner perception cannot become inner observation. Here I shall elaborate on this thesis and show how various influential philosophers have failed to appreciate it in their attempts to grapple with the issues of “introspection”, “reflection”, and the like.

While Brentano did not present many of his philosophical views in his publications, the one that concerns us here is to be found in his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. After asserting that inner perception is the source of psychological concepts, he says, “Please note, however, we said that inner *perception*, not inner *observation* is the first and indispensable source. The two are indeed distinguishable. In fact, inner perception has the peculiar characteristic that it can never become inner observation. One can observe objects that are, as usually said, perceived outwardly; in order to apprehend the phenomenon precisely, one turns one's full attention to it. In the case of objects one perceives inwardly, however, this is completely impossible. ... It is a universally valid psychological law that we never can turn our attention to the object of inner perception.” (Brentano 1874, 35 f.)

It is important to note here that the concept of inner perception does not provide Brentano with a criterion for distinguishing mental phenomena from physical ones. It will no doubt be alarming nowadays that in exploring the proposal of such a criterion Brentano asserts that the evidence of inner perception is immediate and infallible, also the only kind of perception there is in the strict and proper sense (Brentano 1874, 119). Particularly regarding the alleged infallibility of inner perception one can hardly expect applause nowadays. Yet, this need not trouble us here. The two classes of phenomena, the mental and the physical, are primarily to be distinguished, according to Brentano, first and foremost because the mental ones refer to objects intentionally and the physical ones do not (Brentano 1874, 115 ff.), not because the mental ones are infallibly given and the physical ones are not. Whether or not it turns out that the evidence of inner perception is infallible, it remains possible to examine the thesis that such perception cannot become inner observation as an independent issue.

This thesis is further explained when Brentano attempts to argue that every mental phenomenon is inwardly perceived while it is present. Among the arguments he attempts to refute in this regard is the one made from an alleged infinite regress (Brentano 1874, 159 ff.). According to this argument, there must be unperceived mental phenomena because the inner perception of one mental phenomenon would be a second mental phenomenon, the perception of this second one a third, the perception of this third a fourth, and so on into infinity. Accordingly, in order to avoid an infinite regress one must apparently concede that somewhere along the line there is an unperceived mental phenomenon.

This infinite regress can be avoided, says Brentano, if we acknowledge that the inner perception of a mental phenomenon is not an additional phenomenon (Brentano 1874, 166 ff.). On his view, there is no difference between a given mental phenomenon, whether this be a presentation, a judgment, or an act of love or hate, and the perception of this phenomenon. Here one must avoid the temptation of making outer perception and other acts of consciousness a model for inner perception. While seeing and the seen object, hearing and the heard object, remembering and the remembered object are all instances in which the act and the object can be distinguished, this is not so in the case of the perception of seeing, hearing, remembering, etc. Brentano formulates this point by speaking of the primary and secondary object of a perception. If a color, for example, is seen, the color is the primary object of the act in question. The perception of this act of seeing, however, has its object, namely seeing, as a secondary object. Since only a primary object can be an object of attention, i.e., observed, inner perception can never become inner observation.

Without a doubt Edmund Husserl is the most famous student of Brentano. Moreover, the influence of Brentano on Husserl is obvious in connection with the intentionality thesis. Yet, as regards the thesis that inner perception cannot become inner observation, Husserl plainly takes the opposite stance. In the *Logical Investigations* he embraces the argument from an infinite “regress that Brentano tried to solve by distinguishing between the primary and secondary direction of perception” (Husserl 1984, 367). Moreover, in an appendix to the *Logical Investigations* Husserl raises doubts about the distinction between inner and outer perception and states his preference for the distinction between *adequate* and *inadequate* perception. Contents of consciousness or *Erlebnisse* are particulars which can be adequately perceived, but when the perception in question is interwoven with outer perception it is no longer adequate. “In the first case the sensed content is at the same time the object of perception. The content does not indicate anything except itself. In the second case content and object become separate. The content represents what does not lie in itself or does not do so completely, but what is either completely or partially analogous to it” (Husserl 1984, 769 f.). We shall see that Schlick encounters Husserl on this point in his critical reflections on inner perception.

It is particularly of interest here what Husserl says on this topic in a letter to Johannes Daubert from the beginning of May 1904: “In memory we can live in looking at an event we have perceived before. We can, however, also look at the phenomenon itself, at the act and its moments. We can do the very same also in perception itself. While I perceive, I look at the moments of the *Erlebnis* [in this case, the act of perceiving] rather than the object and analyze them, etc. The object continues to be there as perceived, but I primarily attend to its appearing, to the act in its endurance, change, temporally fading away, etc.” (Husserl 1994, 37). This quotation can only be taken as a rejection of Brentano's thesis that mental phenomena cannot be observed while they are perceived.

Likewise, what Husserl time and again refers to as "reflection" is none other than inner observation.

While I certainly cannot show that Husserl fails in such reflection, each person can be left to consider whether he or she can achieve it. In my own case I have never done so. Moreover, if Husserl has, his results are markedly different from those of others who have allegedly engaged in inner observation. This leads me to suspect that he and these others have not really done what they claim to have done, but have only managed to convince themselves somehow that they have indeed observed their present mental states.

Apparently Husserl did not learn from his second teacher in philosophy, Carl Stumpf, to allow for inner observation of present mental phenomena, for Stumpf states plainly in his psychology lectures Husserl attended that the impossibility of observing present mental phenomena is indeed one of the disadvantages of psychology (Rollinger 1999, 286). Yet, in his posthumously published *Theory of Knowledge* he says that if it were not possible to observe mental phenomena (or, as he says, functions), "a psychology as a science, in spite of all evidence of inner perception, could not be spoken of" (Stumpf 1939/40, 346). In his attempt to explain his notion of inner observation he appeals to the thesis that the present cannot be perceived unless the immediate past is also encompassed within the object of perception. Since he maintains that the immediate past can be observed, and indeed observed much better than the more distant past, inner perception can become inner observation insofar as it can attend to the immediate past and thereby subject it to analysis, comparison, and subsumption under concepts.

By no means do I wish to underestimate the difficulties involved in the very notion of the present. There is a tendency in Brentano to regard the present as a boundary without any temporal duration at all. Since he adheres to the apparently analytic thesis that only the present can be perceived, he reaches the rather undesirable conclusion that the only objects perceivable are boundary-like or punctual (Rollinger 1999, 29 f.). Just like other students of Brentano, Stumpf found this conclusion unacceptable and was therefore compelled to regard the object of perception as a temporally extended one that includes the immediate past. While we can appreciate the difficulties that he tried to circumvent here, the thesis that it is only or at least first and foremost the present that is perceivable must not be abandoned. Such difficulties, however, would require a much lengthier treatment than is possible here.

In any case Stumpf seems to have gone wrong. It requires some temporal distance from an experience before one can observe it. While it is difficult, if not impossible, to attend to my acts of consciousness that are just past, I can do so easily when they have receded into the distant past. What is more vexing in Stumpf's attempt to defend the thesis that inner perception can become inner observation, however, is the fact that it still leaves open the question whether the *present* and not the past, however immediate, can be observed. If it cannot in the case of inner perception, Stumpf has not supported his thesis. However plausibly one can argue that perception must encompass the past within its object, one cannot overlook the fact that if this object is not to some degree or in some sense present it is not an object of perception.

What is most plausible in Stumpf's theory of inner perception is perhaps the claim that inner perception is of no scientific use unless it can become inner observation. In defense of Brentano's view this claim certainly must be

addressed. It would indeed be true, if the data of inner perception were somehow to be stated as premises for further conclusions. Yet, there is another sense in which inner perception can be of scientific use. According to Brentano, it is the source of all our psychological concepts. I have a concept of judging, for instance, because I perceive particular instances of judging, just as I have a concept of color because I perceive particular colors. It is furthermore Brentano's view, and indeed the view of all his prominent students, that it is possible to have insights on the basis of concepts alone. For instance, it is possible to see that colors must be extended simply on the basis of the concept of color. Likewise, it is possible for us to see that certain psychological theses, e.g., that a mental phenomenon always refers to an object intentionally, are true on the basis of psychological concepts. Insofar as inner perception, without becoming inner observation, provides us with concepts, it is also the source of such insights. In this sense it can be of use for descriptive psychology.

Now let us consider Moritz Schlick's views concerning inner perception in his *General Theory of Knowledge*. In this work Schlick is very much opposed to various aspects of Brentanism including the theory of inner perception. In particular he refers to Husserl in this context. In response to Husserl's conception of *adequate* perception, namely wherever the perception of a content is restricted to the content itself, which is not taken to indicate anything beyond itself, Schlick says that it makes no sense at all to speak of perception in this case. "The content is simply there, and this settles the whole matter" (Schlick 1979, 177). Throughout Schlick's discussion of inner perception he is content to say this and, apart from a mere mention in an inconsequential footnote (Schlick 1979, 447, n. 48), makes no attempt to tackle the thesis under consideration here. Schlick's strategy for dismissing inner perception altogether could of course be taken for dismissing any concept of perception at all. As one could say that a content of consciousness is there and this settles everything, one could just as well say that physical phenomena are there and this settles everything. There is no need to add the proposition that these phenomena are perceived. Yet, we know that there is a need to add this proposition. Of course we know that colors and sounds are perceived. And we know this only because we inwardly perceive our perception of them.

It is a great misfortune that the thesis under discussion here has not been given due consideration. Both Husserl and Schlick, who indeed represent the two extreme positions on the topic of inner perception, have had much influence. The consequence of this influence is that inner perception has been subject to doubt or not taken into account at all. Husserl's often rather baroque descriptions of consciousness on the basis of his alleged inner observations have not at all helped to give credibility to inner perception. Just as such efforts in the nineteenth century raised doubts, the same could be said of Husserl's efforts if his Brentanian background had not kept him anchored in experience. This is not to say that the thesis that has been discussed here has had no adherents at all besides Brentano. In Munich phenomenology, for example, it makes an appearance. In his *Phenomenology of Willing* Alexander Pfänder, the leading Munich phenomenologist, says that introspection, by which he means the same as inner observation, is better called "retrospection" (Pfänder 1900, 6). Munich phenomenology, however, has not been nearly as widely received as Husserlian phenomenology or as Schlick's orientation. It is nonetheless promising that in recent decades interest in Bren-

tano's descriptive psychology has been revitalized. Thus there is hope that his modest approach to inner perception, in contrast to the extremes of Husserl and Schlick, will indeed receive the attention it deserves.

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Externalist Versus Internalist Moral Realism

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The metaethical debate about moral realism concerns the question whether there are moral facts or not. The realist, of course, holds that there are, and that by virtue of them some moral statements are true. So the realist may also be characterized as saying that moral statements are true or false (cognitivism), and that some of them are true. Now, the question is which position in moral philosophy is actually excluded by this thesis.

Take an emotivist who claims that moral statements are in fact no statements at all, but expressions of the speaker's attitude or feelings towards certain actions or states of affairs, and are thus not capable of having a truth-value. This is certainly an anti-realist position, but we can change it slightly and say that moral claims are not *expressions* of feelings or attitudes, but *reports* of them. This certainly does not make a great difference to *ethics*. Since reports of feelings or attitudes are true or false, the emotivist can be called a realist according to the above-mentioned characterization. When Brian says "Stealing is morally wrong", his statement is true if he has unfavourable feelings towards stealing, and false, if this is not the case. But if the emotivist position can thus be construed realistically, which cannot?

At this point you may protest and say that I have presented the realist doctrine in an extremely weak way. That there are moral facts is no doubt necessary for moral realism, but, as the example shows, not sufficient. We have to say more about these facts. Here is a seemingly stronger proposal: Moral realism claims that moral statements, when construed literally, are true or false, and that some of them are literally true. If Brian says "Stealing is morally wrong", the emotivist certainly cannot claim to have construed this statement literally when she ascribes to it the same truth conditions as to "Brian has unfavourable feelings towards stealing." Or can she? The problem with the "literally" is that it is notoriously unclear what it means to construe a statement literally, and that it depends largely on your theory of statements of the kind in question. For example, many moral realists are consequentialists. Let us take a realist who is, more specifically, a rule utilitarian. According to him, "Stealing is morally wrong" means (i.e. has the same truth conditions as) "If everybody refrains from stealing, then the average utility in terms of preference satisfaction or happiness is greatly increased." Now, is *this* a literal reading of "Stealing is morally wrong"? I have no idea whether the answer is *yes* or *no*, or what could count as an argument for the one or the other, but I suspect that if the moral realist is able to maintain that his reading is a literal one, the emotivist can do so as well with respect to her reading. The realist's construal is as a *literal* construal at first glance as implausible as the emotivist's one, and if you do not consider the first impression to be relevant and bring in more theory, everybody will bring in his or her theory about morals. So, I conclude that the "literally" clause is no improvement in the characterization of moral realism.

Another quite obvious idea is to add an independence condition. Moral statements have to be true or false, i.e. moral facts have to exist independently from . . . now, from what? We have to be careful here, since we are not talking about physics or chemistry. The subject matter of ethics presupposes at least the existence of sentient beings.

There would be no moral facts if there were nobody who could be better or worse off. And certain moral facts, for example, that somebody is in certain circumstances obliged to do such-and-such, or facts that concern such phenomena as humiliation or disrespect, presuppose even the existence of intelligent beings. So, one cannot demand that moral facts be ontologically independent from the existence of humans – that might well turn out to be too strong, for human beings are the only intelligent beings we know of. Moral reality, if there is such a thing, would no doubt be much poorer, or even non-existent, if there were no human or intelligent beings. So the existence of the subject matter of ethics, moral reality, if you want, is as dependent on our existence as social reality, the subject matter of sociology. Is it perhaps independent from our recognizing it? That would be another kind of independence, namely, epistemic independence. Could stealing be morally wrong without anybody judging it so? Would injuring someone deliberately be morally wrong, even if nobody noticed that fact? I think that the answer to *some* questions of this kind may be *yes*. Progress in our moral judgements is a perfectly intelligible phenomenon that has to be explained by realists and anti-realists alike. We may very well say: "Slavery is morally wrong, but the ancient people did not realize this, not even the slaves themselves." But it seems to me very doubtful that all of the supposed moral reality could be independent of our judgements in that way. Morality is deeply entrenched in our lives, it is not some strange or far-fetched subject matter for which we could easily lack the epistemic capacities or interest. To think differently about morality in certain fundamental respects we would have to feel very differently, and a realist should not commit himself to the view that a very different emotional life of human beings would have no effect at all on the moral facts. In particular, at least on some very plausible views, somebody can be obliged to do something only if he is able to recognize that obligation, or even actually recognizes it. There are no obligations that we cannot or do not comprehend, and this, of course, excludes epistemic independence of "obligation facts".

So it seems to be quite difficult to formulate an appropriate epistemic or ontic independence condition for moral realism. All those conditions tend to be too strong to apply to a thing that is as entrenched in human life as morality is. But our task was more modest, we just wanted to exclude the emotivist from the range of realist doctrines. Couldn't this be done simply by saying that the truth conditions of (general) moral statements may not depend on subjective states of the speaker? They may depend somehow on "our" feelings (whoever "we" are), but not just on the feelings of a certain individual. A general moral statement is true or false independently of who utters it. This proposal to characterize moral realism does not distinguish between intersubjectivity and objectivity, and so the label "realism" may not be appropriate for it, it seems to be too weak to capture our intuitions concerning realism. But at least it seems to rule out emotivism, and if realism is something even stronger, all the better for it. In order to react to this proposal, the emotivist must further modify her position. She can no longer say that the statement "Stealing is morally wrong", if uttered by Brian, is true if and only if Brian has unfavourable feelings towards stealing, and if

uttered by herself, is true if and only if *she* has unfavourable feelings towards stealing. Instead she must claim that “Stealing is morally wrong” is true if and only if *she* has unfavourable feelings towards stealing, no matter who utters the statement. And she can further rigidify her use of “morally wrong” by claiming that even if she had very different feelings about it, stealing would nevertheless be morally wrong, because actually she has unfavourable feelings towards it, and that is what counts. This rigid-designation manoeuvre stems from Saul Kripke, who in *Naming and Necessity* claims that, for example, heat not only *is* molecular motion, but would even be molecular motion if we did not experience molecular motion as heat, but very differently or not at all. The characteristic feelings of warmth or heat provide our epistemic access to what heat really is, but heat would always be just this, namely, molecular motion, no matter how we experienced it. Analogously, the emotivist can give the label “morally wrong” to the descriptive properties, whatever they are, that are responsible for the unfavourable feelings that certain actions cause in her, and maintain that these actions would also be wrong if she did not feel that way towards them, simply because then they would still have those descriptive properties that *actually* cause unfavourable feelings in her.

Therefore, even an emotivist can agree that the truth conditions for moral statements do not refer to anybody’s feelings – they are merely singled out by those feelings. This, of course, is not what emotivists originally said, and you may well deny that the sketched position is still properly called “emotivist”. Also, you might have qualms about Kripke’s rigid designation, or about its application to moral terms. But the point I wanted to highlight is how surprisingly difficult it is for the moral realist to come up with a definition that is not compatible with every position in moral philosophy. A few twists and turns, and even the emotivist can claim she’s a realist. Perhaps her manoeuvres will not be successful in the end, but it should in any case be much easier to mark her position as definitely anti-realist. And not only the emotivist position, which is certainly extreme. Given these difficulties to come up with an appropriate definition of moral realism, one wonders what difference the whole debate about it can make to ethics – what was so interesting about it in the first place?

Generally speaking, the difficulties seem to me to have their source ultimately in the fact that most contemporary analytical moral realists are not willing to endow their purported moral facts with normative power, and therefore do not include such a feature in the definition of moral realism. The claim that there are moral facts which make moral statements objectively true or false, sounds, when one is confronted with it for the first time, very far-reaching. This is because one construes this claim as saying that there are, after all, objective values that make some preferences or preference orderings rational and others irrational, that endow you with reasons to adopt a certain preference ordering rather than another. There are facts that have a certain normative power – they tell you what you should value, how you should behave or what you should aim at, on pains of irrationality. For example: If it is morally wrong to injure other people (except in certain special situations), then everybody has reasons not to injure other people. A rational person will *qua rationality* not injure another person (except in certain special situations). It is precisely this kind of claim that makes moral realism interesting in the first place. There is a parallel to probabilities here. Objective probabilities are sometimes construed as entities that make certain subjective probabilities, i.e. certain degrees of belief,

rational. Every rational being that knows the objective probability of an event will, *qua rationality*, fix its subjective degrees of belief accordingly. And so will every rational being that is acquainted with a certain moral fact fix its subjective preferences accordingly. Objective probabilities yield rational degrees of belief, objective values yield rational preferences, and if they did not do that, neither the objective probabilities nor the objective values would deserve their name. So the appropriate definition of moral realism would be something along these lines: Moral realism is the view that there are facts which make certain preference orderings rational for everybody.

But this is not, in general, the view of contemporary analytical moral realism. Most of its advocates are externalists, e.g., Richard Boyd, David Brink, Frank Jackson, Peter Railton, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Nicholas Sturgeon, or, in Germany, Peter Schaber. They hold, for example, that it is a fact that injuring another person is morally wrong (except in certain special situations), but that it is a separate question under which circumstances one has a decisive reason, or a reason at all, not to injure another person. There may be someone who simply does not care for the moral facts, without being ignorant of them and without being irrational. “Morally wrong” and related notions are, as far as their reference is concerned, analyzed in purely descriptive terms, for example as “diminishing average utility”. Why anybody should care, or has good reasons, not to diminish average utility is regarded as a separate, or additional, question that does not touch the heart of moral realism. But cutting the link between moral fact and rational motivation deprives moral realism largely of its point, on the one hand, and it is, on the other hand, precisely this externalism that makes moral realism so easy to achieve. No matter how we construe our moral judgements, or our value judgements in general, about actions or states of affairs or whatever entities one could put in this place – these judgements surely do not discriminate between two of those entities that are exactly alike in their relevant descriptive properties. Almost everybody would agree that moral properties or other value properties supervene on perfectly natural or otherwise unproblematic descriptive properties. Supervenience is quite a weak relation. The emotivist, for example, who has unfavourable feelings towards a certain action, will have the same unfavourable feelings towards any other action that is descriptively relevantly similar, which she will express by saying “Actions of this kind are morally wrong.” And so we can always, no matter what we think about morals or values in general, say that the corresponding judgements are made true or false by these unproblematic descriptive facts, whichever they may be. Moral properties, or value properties in general, are thus easily found to be identical with unproblematic descriptive properties, and moral statements are found to refer to purely descriptive or even natural facts.

I think that for moral realism to be an interesting doctrine it has to stick to internalism, i.e., maintain a necessary, or at least a strong connection between moral fact and rational motivation. Such a connection – the stronger the better – lies at the very heart of moral realism, because the search for answers to questions like “Why should I take into account the interests of others and, e.g., not injure them?” is central to ethics. We should not bother whether the statement “Injuring other people is morally wrong” is true in whatever realistic sense, if that didn’t mean that everybody has reason not to injure other people. Purported moral properties or facts deserve their name only to the extent to which they show a strong connection to rational motivation. Internalist realist doctrines were

advocated by such by-now-classical authors as George Edward Moore, Max Scheler or Nicolai Hartmann, and by some contemporary writers, e.g., Jonathan Dancy or John McDowell. Most contemporary realists, of course, want to avoid the ontological obscurity and epistemic inaccessibility of the purported normative facts. Indeed, it is no easy and perhaps a hopeless task to defend successfully the existence of normative parts of reality that endow every rational being that is aware of them with certain preferences. But it seems to me that a moral realist cannot avoid this task.

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Gewalt als sozialer Gegenstand

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Das Phänomen der Gewalt ist durch eine beträchtliche Mehrdeutigkeit charakterisiert, auf die die Rechtswissenschaft aufgrund seiner strafrechtlichen Bedeutsamkeit, die hier jedoch kaum berührt wird, schon mehrmals hingewiesen hat: „Der in der Umgangssprache meist problemlos verwendete Begriff der Gewalt erweist sich bei näherem Zusehen als erschreckend unpräzise“ (Schröder 1982, 492, vgl. auch Calliess 1974, 3).

In dieser Arbeit wird das Phänomen der Gewalt auf der Basis einiger Positionen der Ontologie Adolf Reinachs behandelt. Reinach hat sich jedoch mit einer Betrachtung der Gewalt nie beschäftigt und dieser Terminus kommt in seinen Werken nur als Synonym von „Macht“ (französisch: *pouvoir*) vor. Meine These besagt, dass Gewalt – neben ihren erzeugenden Akten, die soziale Relevanz zeigen – einen besonderen Gegenstand höherer Ordnung ausmacht. Zu bestimmen, durch welche Akte Gewalt entsteht und was Gewalt ist, erscheint diesbezüglich als Hauptziel meiner Arbeit.

1. Soziale Akte

Die Gewalt ist ein Phänomen, dem ein soziales Verhalten ständig zugrunde liegt, so z.B. bezeichnet der Ausdruck „Sachgewalt“ bloß die Sachbeschädigung, und die Gewalt, die ein Subjekt gegen sich selbst richtet, ist ein Grenzfall des sozialen Verhaltens. Dieser Umstand findet seinen Grund in den sozialen Akten, durch die Gewalt entsteht. Um solche Akte näher zu definieren, wird die reinachsche, in ihren Hauptlinien hier dargestellte Theorie vorausgesetzt.

Der Autor unterscheidet zwischen spontanen und nicht spontanen Erlebnissen. Die zweiten sind als Zuständlichkeiten des Bewusstseins, wie z.B. Vorstellungen oder Gefühle, zu beschreiben. Die ersten sind punktuelle Erlebnisse, bei denen sich „das Ich als der phänomenale Urheber des Aktes erweist“ (Reinach 1989, 158). Beispiele für spontane Akte sind das Sichentschließen, das Verzeihen, Loben, Tadeln, Behaupten, Fragen, Befehlen usw. (Reinach 1989, 158). Innerhalb der spontanen Akte wird ein weiterer Unterschied zwischen internen und externen Akten getroffen. Die internen Akte sind diejenigen, die bloß im Subjekt vollzogen werden können – ein interner Akt „kann sehr wohl rein innerlich verlaufen, er kann beruhigt in sich selbst bleiben, ohne in irgendeinem Sinne eine Äußerung zu erfahren“ (Reinach 1989, 159) – während die externen ein äußeres Bezugssubjekt für ihre Realisation notwendigerweise verlangen. Behauptungen unterscheiden sich z.B. von Befehlen dadurch, dass sie sich bloß im Bewusstsein realisieren können, wobei sich Befehle ständig auf eine andere Person beziehen müssen. Innerhalb der externen Akte werden schließlich die fremdpersonalen und nicht fremdpersonalen Akte differenziert. Der Befehl ist somit ein fremdpersonaler Akt, denn er muss sich auf eine andere Person richten, er wendet sich an sie. Hingegen liegt bei Akten wie „Verzicht eines Anspruches“ oder „Widerruf eines Versprechens“ ein externer, aber kein fremdpersonaler Akt vor, da der Akt, obwohl er sich an ein fremdes Bezugssubjekt adressiert, nicht die Person, sondern die entsprechenden Ansprüche bzw. Versprechen treffen will – „Diese Akte sind zwar an fremde Personen adressiert, in ihrem Gehalt aber steckt

kein personales Moment. Während ich *stets einer Person* etwas (...) befehle, verzichte ich schlicht auf einen Anspruch (...)“ (Reinach 1989, 242). Beide Akte zeigen jedoch gemeinsam den Charakter der *Vernehmungsbedürftigkeit*¹, denn sie adressieren sich an Fremde und verlangen es somit, geäußert und vernommen zu werden. Der Befehl ist beispielsweise nur dann tatsächlich vollzogen, wenn der Befehlende weiß, dass der Adressat den Befehl zur Kenntnis nimmt, und ebenso kann ein Versprechen nur dann widerrufen werden, wenn der Versprechensempfänger den Widerrufsakt vernimmt. Der Akt „*dringt in den anderen ein*, es ist ihm die Tendenz wesentlich, von dem anderen *vernommen zu werden*“ (Reinach 1989, 159). Vernehmungsbedürftige Akte werden vom Autor *soziale Akte* genannt.

2. Gewalterzeugende Akte als soziale Akte

Die Akte, die Gewalt erzeugen, können der reinachschen Theorie gemäß als soziale Akte beschrieben werden. Sie sind spontane Akte, denn das Subjekt macht ihren „phänomenalen Urheber“ aus, und sie sind externe Akte, da sie ein äußeres Bezugssubjekt verlangen. Solche Akte richten sich nämlich *eventuell* durch die Zufügung empfindlicher Übel *gegen den Willen einer fremden Person*, um diesen einzuschränken bzw. auszuschließen (eine Auslegung, die in ihren Hauptlinien aus der Definition von Gewalt der deutschen Judikatur kommt)². Der Hinweis auf ein empfindliches Übel, mit dem hier jede direkte körperliche Einwirkung auf den Adressaten verstanden wird, ist nur eventueller Natur, da eine solche Einwirkung eine Willenseinschränkung begrifflich nicht einschließt, denn nicht alle Übel sind gegen den Willen des Adressaten gerichtet. Ebenso wenig verlangen alle Formen von Willenseinschränkung eine direkte, mechanische, körperliche Einwirkung. Alle gewaltsamen Akte zielen also auf eine Willenseinschränkung ab, die als ein psychisches Übel angesehen werden kann, aber nicht alle verursachen ein körperliches Übel. Je nachdem, ob der Akt einfach nur auf eine Beeinflussung oder vielmehr auf die Ausschaltung des Willens abzielt, spricht man in Bezug auf die entsprechenden Akte von *vis compulsiva* oder von *vis absoluta*.

Aus dieser Definition wird ferner klar, dass gewaltsame Akte fremdpersonale Akte sind, denn sie betreffen notwendigerweise *Personen* in ihrem Willen³. Deshalb besteht keine Gewalt gegen Sachen. Die fremdpersonale Richtung nennt jedoch m.E. noch keine ausreichende Bedingung für den Vollzug eines gewaltsamen Aktes. Würde sich der Akt auch nicht als vernehmungsbedürftig

¹ Nicht alle fremdpersonalen Akte sind vernehmungsbedürftig, denn z.B. ist das „Verzeihen“ ein Akt, der sich auf eine fremde Person richtet, obwohl er, um sich realisieren zu können, es nicht notwendig hat, von dem Fremden vernommen zu werden (vgl. Reinach 1989: 159).

² Im Einklang mit dieser Definition „verzichtet ein großer Teil der Lehre nunmehr explizit auf das Merkmal der körperlichen Einwirkung beim Opfer und definiert die Gewalt im wesentlichen als jeden Einsatz von Mitteln, der darauf gerichtet und geeignet ist, die Willensbildungs-, Willensentschließungs- oder Willensbetätigungsfreiheit des Opfers auszuschließen“ (Maurach-Schroeder-Maiwald 1988: 130; vgl. auch Knodel 1962: 59). Dass der Gewalt der bloße *eventuelle* Charakter der körperlichen Einwirkung bzw. des empfindlichen Übels zugeschrieben wird, bleibt jedoch bei einigen Kritikern umstritten, denn somit wird eine sog. Vergeistigung bzw. Entmaterialisierung dieses Phänomens vollzogen (vgl. u. a. Seiler 1989: 391f.).

³ Die Frage, ob auch Tiere in dieser Definition miteinbegriffen werden müssen, wird hier nicht untersucht, obwohl es mir scheint, dass sie wohl in bejahendem Sinne zu beantworten ist.

erweisen, dann hätten wir einen bloßen willenseinschränkenden, aber keinen *gewaltsam* willenseinschränkenden Akt, denn manche Akte zielen ohne Gewalt auf eine Willenseinschränkung ab. Umgekehrt können manche Akte, die keine Willenseinschränkung tatsächlich verursachen, als gewalttätig nachgewiesen werden. Ein Akt, der einen Willen gewaltsam treffen will, ist also nur dann vollzogen, wenn der Aktadressat weiß, dass sein Wille genau durch den Akt des Gewaltadressanten verletzt wird, besser, der Gewaltanwender geht nicht nur davon aus, dass der Gewaltadressat ihn als Subjekt der Akte anerkennen *kann*, sondern vielmehr *will* er von ihm anerkannt werden.

Die Gewaltsamkeit eines Aktes hängt somit mit seiner Vernehmungsbedürftigkeit eng zusammen, nicht mit seiner tatsächlichen Wirkung. Dadurch, dass sie vernehmungsbedürftig (und fremdpersonal) sind, können gewaltsame Akte als soziale Akte im Sinne Reinachs bezeichnet werden.

Schließlich muss behauptet werden, dass aufgrund der kausalen Beziehungen, die zwischen der Willenseinschränkung und dem Akt, der sie verursacht, bestehen, sie auf diesen Akt (und er auf sie) ständig verweist. Auf Seiten des Gewaltadressaten fällt deswegen das Vernommenwerden des Aktes mit dem Vernommenwerden seiner eigenen Willenseinschränkung sehr oft zusammen (besonders dann, wenn sie durch eine körperliche Einwirkung ausgeübt wird), sodass die beiden Elemente tatsächlich verflochten vorkommen können. Jedoch ist die Präsenz der Willenseinschränkung bzw. des empfindlichen Übels schlicht ein Indiz, aber noch kein Beweis für die Präsenz von gewaltsamen Akten bzw. für deren Vollzug.

3. Gewalt als sozialer Gegenstand

Dass die Ontologie Reinachs auch besondere, soziale Entitäten umfasst, wird durch die Feststellung klar, dass soziale Akte unsere Welt verändern und sie somit etwas Neues in der Welt erzeugen. Der soziale Akt des Versprechens erzeugt z.B. zwei soziale Gegenstände⁴, und zwar den Anspruch auf die Leistung des Versprechens und die Verbindlichkeit, das Versprechen zu halten. Ich glaube, dass diese theoretische Einsicht auch im Falle der Gewalt gültig ist, sodass durch die entsprechenden Akte, wenn sie erfolgreich vollzogen werden, der soziale Gegenstand „Gewalt“ erzeugt wird.

Zunächst soll die Gewalt vom eventuellen, durch den Akt verursachten Schaden differenziert werden, mit dem sie in erster Instanz identifiziert werden könnte. Mit dem allgemeinen Begriff „Schaden“ bezeichne ich die Willenseinschränkung *oder* das empfindliche, sie eventuell begleitende Übel. Schäden können nämlich durch fehlerhafte Handlungen – also unabsichtlich – im normalen sozialen Verkehr verursacht werden, ohne dass sich aber dabei Gewalt mitbeteiligt. Außerdem machen – sogar – brutale Fälle von religiösen Ritualen oder sexuellem Verhalten (vgl. Knodel 1962, 91), bei denen ein Schaden absichtlich zugefügt wird, bei dem Einverständnis des Geschädigten keine Gewaltsituation aus (hier richtet sich der Akt nicht gegen den Willen des Adressaten). Überdies kann ein Schaden doch ohne Einverständnis des Geschädigten absichtlich vorkommen, aber der Handelnde gibt gegenüber dem Geschädigten die Absicht seiner Handlung nicht kund. Wieder muss der erhebliche Unterschied betont werden, der zwischen dem bloßen Verursachen eines Schadens und demjenigen Schadenszufügen besteht, dem die Vernehmungsbedürftigkeit des

Aktes zugrunde liegt. Demgemäß sind folgende Phänomene verschieden: der Diebstahl vom Raub, die Veranlassung zur Hergabe von Vermögenswerten von der Erpressung (vgl. Schroeder 1982, 491), der Meuchelmord vom Mord sowie die spielerische von der echten Schlägerei.

Schließlich ist es durchaus möglich, dass viele Akte durch irgendein äußeres Hindernis tatsächlich keinen Schaden verursachen können (z. B. ein Schuss, der das Opfer nicht trifft). Wenn aber der Akt vernommen wird, dann kann sich der Akt gänzlich vollziehen und der dadurch entstandene Tatbestand wird als Gewalt bezeichnet. Der Schaden also, obwohl er sich in der Struktur der Gewalt immer noch in einer Weise beteiligt, die noch erwähnt wird, scheint das vom gewaltsamen Akt erzeugte, *spezifische* Produkt nicht auszumachen. Viele Akte richten nämlich Schaden an, ohne dabei Gewalt zu erzeugen.

Es muss jetzt gezeigt werden, dass die Gewalt ein Gegenstand überhaupt und spezifisch ein sozialer Gegenstand ist und wie man ihn charakterisieren kann. Für diesen Beweis mag ich wieder in der Argumentation Reinachs Unterstützung finden.

Zunächst ist es klar, dass sich Gewalt in der Zeit erstreckt. Sie kommt durch bestimmte Akte zustande und sie erlischt entweder mit dem Vollzug dieser Akte oder durch den Hinzutritt weiterer Akte. Sie kann somit kein Sachverhalt bzw. kein ideeller Gegenstand sein, da diese von einer zeitlichen Beziehung bekanntlich absehen (selbstverständlich wird in diesem Fall erneut Bezug auf Elemente der reinachschen Ontologie genommen).

Gewalt sollte also der üblichen ontologischen Dichotomie zwischen Idealität und Realität gemäß ein realer Gegenstand sein. Reale Gegenstände sind entweder physisch oder psychisch. Ist die Gewalt physisch? Vorausgesetzt, dass sie mit dem eventuellen, empfindlichen Übel nicht zusammenfällt, zeigt sie keine Eigenschaften wie „rot sein“ oder „wohlriechend“, sie ist nicht schwer oder leicht, man kann sie sogar nicht anfassen. Also Gewalt ist sicherlich kein physischer Gegenstand. Ist sie ein psychischer Gegenstand? Deutlich gegen diese These spricht die Tatsache, dass das Psychisch-Sein im Gegensatz zur Gewalt eine sehr begrenzte zeitliche Ausdehnung hat. Gewalt mit Fällen körperlicher Gewalt schlechthin zu identifizieren und somit anzunehmen, dass Gewalt nur für die begrenzte Zeit der Handlung besteht, wäre – wie schon gezeigt wurde – eine Reduktion. Ein Gewaltphänomen kann sich wohl über Jahre erstrecken, nämlich beispielsweise dann, wenn Gewalt auf die Bewegungsfreiheit des Genötigten geübt wird und als ihren Inhalt die Einsperrung einnimmt. Psychische Gegenstände zeigen keine ähnliche, zeitliche Existenz. Das Einsperrungsbeispiel zeigt ferner, dass, auch wenn der Genötigte schläft oder ohnmächtig ist, Gewalt gegen seine Bewegungsfreiheit weiter besteht. Schließlich unterscheidet sich Gewalt auch vom Sich-vergewaltigt-Fühlen, denn es ist evident, dass man sich wohl vergewaltigt fühlen kann, ohne dass dabei Gewalt wirklich besteht.

Durch das Gesagte ergibt sich, dass Gewalt kein psychischer Gegenstand ist. Sie ist also aufgrund ihrer zeitlichen Begrenztheit kein Sachverhalt und kein ideeller Gegenstand, sie muss deshalb ein realer Gegenstand sein, aber sie ist weder ein psychischer noch ein physischer Gegenstand. Sie ist ein sozialer Gegenstand.

Als sozialer Gegenstand ist Gewalt ein Gegenstand höherer Ordnung, der auf anderen Gegenständen aufbaut. Erstens muss festgestellt werden, dass Gewalt mindestens zwei Träger ständig voraussetzt, die einerseits mit dem

⁴ Mulligan bezeichnet sie auch als „confederate and successor states“ (Mulligan 1987: 44), das römische Recht spricht diesbezüglich von *incorporalia*.

Gewaltadressant, dem Subjekt der Gewaltakte, andererseits mit dem Gewaltempfänger koinzidieren. Es ist im Wesen der Gewalt begründet, dass die Träger ausschließlich *Personen* und nicht Sachen sein dürfen. Der Gewaltempfänger muss aber mit dem Gewaltadressat nicht immer koinzidieren, denn Gewalt kann auch gegen eine dritte Person (in diesem Fall also Gewaltempfänger genannt) geübt werden. Ebenso ist der Gewaltadressant üblicherweise mit dem Gewaltmandanten identisch, muss es aber nicht sein, denn soziale Akte können in modifizierter Weise durch eine Vertretung erfolgen.

Das letzte Element, das Gewalt mitkonstituiert, ist der Inhalt der Gewalt. Sowie Ansprüche (und Verbindlichkeiten) einen Inhalt wesensnotwendig besitzen (der Anspruch ist immer ein Anspruch auf etwas), so setzt die Gewalt stets einen Inhalt voraus, auf den sie aufbaut. Es wird keine Gewalt als solche geübt, sondern Gewalt verwirklicht sich immer durch einen bestimmten Inhalt. Ein solcher Inhalt entspricht einer *gegenwärtigen* Willensverletzung bzw. dem eventuellen empfindlichen Übel (oder beiden), er kann aber auch einer *zukünftigen* Wirkung entsprechen und in diesem letzten Fall nimmt die Gewalt die Form der Drohung an (die Drohung ist somit eine inhaltsbedingte Form der Gewalt).

Schließlich besteht eine letzte Eigenschaft der Gewalt in ihrer sachverhaltsanalogen Natur. Es wurde nämlich mehrmals darauf hingewiesen, dass entsprechende Akte Gewalt „erzeugen“. Eine solche Erzeugung (wie ihr Erlöschen auch) entspricht einer Grund-Folge- und keiner Ursache-Wirkung-Beziehung, die eine typische Sachverhaltsbeziehung ausmacht. Akte sind in diesem Sinne *Gründe* für das Entstehen von Gewalt, aber *Ursachen* des entsprechenden Schadens. In einer solchen Beziehung kann die Folge nur im Zusammenhang mit ihrem Grund erfasst werden, während eine Wirkung auch allein ohne Bezug auf ihre Ursache erfasst werden kann. Dementsprechend kann Gewalt – anders als der Schaden – nur in Relation mit seinen Gründen, also mit den entsprechenden Akten, erfasst werden („Wenn ich [...] den Bestand [eines durch andere Sachverhalte begründeten Sachverhaltes] neu erfassen will, so steht mir kein frei- und selbsterfassender Akt zur Verfügung. Es bleibt mir nichts anders übrig, als auf die begründenden Sachverhalte zurückzugehen und ihn aus diesen nochmals abzuleiten, genauso wie ich auf das zugrunde liegende Versprechen zurückgehen muß, um die Existenz des Anspruchs abermals festzustellen“, Reinach 1989, 157). Dem Erlöschen der Gewalt untersteht dieselbe Argumentation. Wenn der Inhalt der Gewalt durch entsprechende Akte erfüllt ist, dann ist ein Grund dafür gegeben, dass Gewalt erlischt; parallel dazu können aber neue Akte (Abwehr-, Reaktions-, Befreiungsakte ...) hinzutreten und sie machen Gründe für das Erlöschen der Gewalt aus. Hingegen lässt sich der Schaden nur aufgrund natürlicher Prozesse beheben.

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Is the Image of Colour Science Used by Cognitive Scientists and Philosophers Pathological?

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According to a consensus of psycho-physiological, neuro-physiological and philosophical doctrines, colour sensations (or qualia) are generated in a cerebral 'space' fed from photon-photoreceptor interactions (producing 'metamers') in the retina of the eye. The resulting 'space' has three dimensions: hue (or chroma), saturation (or 'purity'), and brightness (lightness, value or intensity) and (in some versions) is further structured by primitive or landmark 'colours' – usually four, or six (when white and black are added to red, yellow, green and blue). It has also been proposed that there are eleven semantic universals – labeling the previous six plus the 'intermediaries' of orange, pink, brown, purple, and grey. Versions of this consensus provide ontological, epistemological and semantic blueprints for the supposedly brute fact of the reality of colour ordained by Nature. Colour, like gold, is presumed to be a 'natural kind', picked out by 'advanced' information processing languages like our own (Berlin and Kay 1969/1991; Kay et al 1997).

In contrast I regard 'seeing colour' not as a matter of light waves impacting on eyes, producing sensations to be categorised and labeled in the 'colour space' of the brain, but as an instrument for achieving human intentions and activities, forming an interlocking network whose internal coherence relies on systematically engendering certain ways of viewing the world. This can be understood if we keep in mind contrasts between non-modern and modern societies: localised influences and resources in non-modern societies are drained away into the impersonalised relations of abstract systems, so that the very tissue of experience alters, conjoining proximity and distance in unprecedented ways, and in the case of colour enabling or constraining us to see in terms of hue, saturation and brightness. Re-characterised, these dimensions become transcendent tokens of time-space distanciations (like writing, vital to the memory controls of modern states). They become universalised commodifications regulating everyday life in time-space routinisations, and a sedimentation of the impersonal, public or 'official' language of *seeing colour* in terms of black, white, red, yellow, green, blue, brown, purple, pink, orange and gray. This is what becomes a new grammar of reality. If we insist on talking about 'colour concepts' then we must understand a particular concept as the location of activities, norms and institutions of established practice. And as with any practice of any importance, colour concepts have a history within which they come to be, are sustained and transformed, and sometimes perish as parts of the histories of those particular practices and societies. In this sense, colour concepts are more like moral or value concepts than those of the natural sciences. To abstract them from the contexts which they inform and which inform them is to risk a damaging misunderstanding. That is exactly what colour science does.

Here is an alternative conception and an all too brief overview of some incoherencies, which make otiose the relativist claim that only the practitioners of colour science are qualified to judge it. While electrochemical events are a *precondition* for seeing colour, I regard the reception of sensations in 'the colour space' as semantically labeled natural categories, kinds, or information, as a 'just so'

story: it is Wittgenstein's beetle in a box. I consider the authority of this consensus is better regarded not as the result of truth-tracking of Nature, but as the socio-historical and political outcome of various philosophical presuppositions, scientific theories, experimental practices, technological apparatus, and their recursive feedback into the lifeworld. My approach is informed by, but not the same as that of Gibson, in that I want to pursue the notion of 'social affordances' which, in relation to colour I call 'a historically inflected exosomatic organ' which takes up, uses, the affordances. This suggests that colour has become a naturalisation through science-based technologies, and through its praxes and materialisations, has become a perceptual and cultural entity that structures experience and understanding in the lifeworld. (Saunders 1992; Saunders and van Brakel 1997). Consequently I explore the historical ontology of 'colour' without assuming an underlying biological constant. In this regard I consider colour science has created a new 'reality' – most suited to performing such tasks as quality control on an assembly line, or identifying military targets. To bring this out clearly would require a counter-historiography of mainstream colour science (MCS). Instead I try to provide a moment of distanciation, a more synoptic overview, as one positive condition of understanding. In this brief paper I hope to show how the non-trivial behaviour maxims that govern colour science, are not only loaded with internal incoherencies, adhocery and the concealment of the workings which blind it to its own constraints and conditions of possibility but that despite these inadequacies, colour science enjoys an extraordinary pragmatic success, for which I suggest an explanation.

In support of the image of truth-tracking natural kinds, MCS takes a number of theses for granted.¹ 1. Colour is a perceptuolinguistic and behavioural universal, with a physical, quantifiable substratum. 2. It is exhaustively described by three independent attributes: hue, saturation, brightness. 3. There are four phenomenal unique hues: red, green, blue, yellow. 4. The unique hues are underpinned by two opponent psychophysical and/or neuronal channels: red/green, blue/yellow.²

The story runs that there are three types of photon-responding cones in the retina, each with a different photopigment, and different spectral sensitivity. The three cone types are maximally responsive to short (S), middle (M) and long (L) wavelengths of light. However individual cones are 'colour blind', preserving no details of wavelength. Only by comparing their outputs can 'information' be extracted about the activating wavelength and passed on to the next step of processing, called 'opponency'.

While the properties of the three types of cones are generally accepted, the evidence for opponency is more tendentious. The generally accepted story is of one achromatic and two chromatic channels. The first so-called brightness channel processes overall luminance. The second, red/green channel compares the outputs of the M and L cones. The third, yellow/blue channel, is claimed to compare the output of the S cones with some combination

¹ Full references can be found in Saunders and van Brakel (1997).

² Nearly all CSSts subscribe to 1, but successively fewer to 2,3,4.

of the outputs of the L and M cones. But this psychophysical model is at odds with many experimental results.³

In psychophysics many types of experiment yield evidence for something like the three channels just described. One could say that almost any quantitative colour vision experiment that depends on processes after the receptors can be interpreted in terms of the three channels, and quite often the pragmatic interpretation makes the results easier to understand. That's why most colour scientists believe in them now. Some cases seem 'quite strong evidence', some not. You have to look hard at each individual case to evaluate this. Important, of course, is to realise how much of an opponent scheme was imposed by the scientist rather than by the results. That's the first main class of problems: the individual cases are often not so convincing when you look closely. (Even the cancellation experiment, so dear to the modern advocates of opponency can be interpreted largely in terms of the cone pigments.) The second main class of problems is that there is no generally accepted quantitative formulation. The consensus is just for 'something like the three channels'. Everybody can 'model' his or her own data, often quite precisely, but no general model works. Even elementary things, like whether the LM channel takes the difference or the ratio of the L and M cone outputs, or some other function, are still undecided. This is bizarre in a field where the methods allow (are designed to produce) quantitatively very precise data. There is too a third class of problems, namely that many findings don't even fit into the general scheme.

In the physiology of monkey cells, in the optic nerve, these cells fall roughly into the three groups as far as their colour responses go, but once you get into the brain that breaks down. There are many problems with this, from anaesthetic, via variability of data with supposedly irrelevant stimulus conditions, to the so-called 'codings' particularly of spatial properties by the same cells. Add to that the fact now generally accepted that the opponent colours revealed by physiology (magenta-teal, chartreuse-violet) are nowhere near the supposed primary or unique hues, the image is very much at a loss. This is not a difference between psychophysics and physiology, because many quite persuasive opponent colour interpretations of psychophysical experiments are in terms of the physiological opponent scheme. The MacLeod-Boynton colour space for example, which is widely used, is essentially a photopigment based space, used to represent and analyse both psychophysics and physiology. So there seems to be a major conflict between the advocates of colour-names and unique-hue psychophysics versus the rest.

What cognitive science textbooks have taken up, when they regard colour science as a paradigm of information processing and modularity, is really a set of widely shared presumptions or working hypotheses rather than achievements. This is melded into the long tradition of empiricist thought on colour. I think the situation is that cognitive science wants a paradigm that appears to work, and have grossly overemphasized the extent of colour science's achievements. This is of course *ekphrasis*. Colour Science is actually very much an 'empirical' science, which has developed some 'reliable' methods but where consensus and understanding are restricted to modest sub-domains. It is surely its methods and practices, which allow it to

create an exosomatic organ. Colour science is poor at theory but adequate to discrimination applications. The bad colour science is at the level of general theory and understanding.

What experimental support is there for the assumption that colour in daily life consists of three psychologically salient components: hue, brightness and saturation? There are problems about a three dimensional spatial metrics as the proper psychological dimension of colour vision. The physical attributes of colour do not independently affect the psychological dimensions. Some say the psychological colour space has seven dimensions not three. None of the existing systems of colour classification achieves the goal of uniform perceptual intervals between any two adjacent colours. Therefore hue, brightness and saturation notwithstanding their usefulness for particular industrial-military purposes, can only claim to describe scientific colour spaces. This is what I mean by a 'floating model'.

The a priori suppositions are supported by such nostrums as 'Color vision is the ability to discriminate among different wavelengths of light ...' (Gordon and Abramov 2001, 93). Or 'the basic linguistic categories themselves have been induced by perceptual saliences common to the human race ... biology determines phenomenology and, in consequence, a piece of semantic structure' (Hardin 1988, pp. 168, 156). This account relies on photons per unit of time, unit of area and unit of solid angle, the cones in the retina, metamers, opponent processes, colour spaces and basic words which data are made to fit. But one colour scientist (D'Zamora 2003) has insightfully pinpointed a constructive possibility – there are different organisations of colour sensitive mechanisms that appear to underlie behaviour concerning colour appearance and behaviour in detection tasks. In other words 'seeing colour' and 'detecting' should not be conflated, as the entire image of colour studies has hitherto done. There are without doubt colour scientists who have founded their whole careers on not conflating them, but the image of colour science taken over by cognitive science, philosophy and related disciplines has not grasped this distinction. Here lies one of the instances that Wittgenstein diagnosed as conceptual confusion in psychology. It is this that leads to the sterile debates about mind and body and 'gaps' and whether seeing colour is the discrimination of wavelengths. A failure to address these issues is masked by collusion over ignoring them. Rather, the colour detection that colour scientists deal with has established its own norms of correctness and epistemological claims in adjacent discipline, by light of which the incoherencies have become unobtrusive, and adhocery, normal. This is what I am gesturing towards when I speak about 'pathology'. It is the totally relativistic claim that only colour scientists can properly speak about the 'truth' of colour science. It might be regarded as an example of Habermas's 'systematically distorted communication.'

³Though it could be said that there are as many psychophysical models as there are colour scientists, the account I present tends to be the one presented in textbooks and taken over by such adjacent disciplines as cognitive science, philosophy, linguistics, and anthropology.

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Evidence as a Criterion. A Criticism of Meinong and Höfler's Notion of Evidence

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1. The Problem of Evidence¹

Through the influence of logical positivism the notion of evidence has nearly been excluded from philosophy. Moritz Schlick, for example, gives a critique of the notion of evidence in his *Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre* (1918). The notion of evidence was already severely criticised, though, in Neo-Kantian circles. The Neo-Friesian philosopher Leonard Nelson, for example, criticises in his book *Über das sogenannte Erkenntnisproblem* (1908) Meinong's notion of evidence. The problem of evidence is a valid one: Either evidence is accessible to consciousness, in which case the evidence of our judgement can give no guarantee for (absolute) truth; or evidence is a guarantee for (absolute) truth, but then it cannot be accessible to consciousness. The term 'evidence' as Brentano and his pupils use it oscillates between the transcendent and the phenomenological meaning as present in the dilemma. Depending on the context it is used in either or both of the senses presented in the dilemma. Brentano explains truth in terms of evidence, where he takes evidence as accessible to consciousness, and also to exclude error. Because Brentano explains truth as evidenceability, he takes (the act of) judgement as the bearer of truth and falsity. Aiming to guarantee the objectivity of logic, Husserl (in 1900) explains evidence in terms of truth: evidence is the experience of (absolute) truth. Accordingly, Husserl takes the bearers of truth and falsity to be independent of a judging person. Both Husserl and Brentano conceive of evidence as implying absolute truth and as being accessible to consciousness. Their notions of evidence, different as each may be, do not escape from the problem of evidence.

Höfler and Meinong, in their *Logik* (1890), primarily take evidence, a characteristic of judgement, to be a psychic state (Höfler 1890, 15). The laws of logic merely give the conditions for the occurrence of such states, and are thus part of psychology (*idem*, 16, 17). Accordingly, the notion of truth, a characteristic of judgements too, is explained in terms of evidence (*idem*, 118). Their logic allows for a concept of evidence that does not involve a transcendent element, and it thus seems to escape the problem of evidence. It is accused, though, of being strongly psychological, and Meinong's later *Gegenstandstheorie* can be seen as an answer to that problem. The notion of evidence that suits Meinong's later logic is vulnerable to Nelson's criticism, though (section 2). In 1910 Höfler answers Nelson's criticism from the perspective of Meinong's *Gegenstandstheorie* (section 3). Did Höfler have a valid answer to the problem of evidence at that time? And is there a viable answer to this problem (section 4) ?

2. Nelson's Critique of Meinong's Notion of Evidence

Nelson formulates the problem of evidence as a variant of the problem of the criterion. Suppose we had a criterion by which we can distinguish a judgement that is knowledge

from one that is not. This criterion is either known or not known. If it is known, then it should be asked on the basis of what criterion can we say that we know it, and we have returned to our original problem. If it is not known, we have to make the criterion an object of knowledge. In order to determine whether our object of judgement (the criterion) is an object of knowledge, we need to apply the criterion. That is, the question whether the object of judgement is an object of knowledge must already be decided. (Nelson 1908, 92). The problem of evidence is formulated accordingly:

Either the concept of evidence entails the characteristic of truth, in which case it is impossible to decide whether a judgement is evident. Or 'evident' merely means an experience of consciousness that can psychologically be ascertained, in which case it is impossible to determine that an evident judgement is true. (Nelson 1908, 124)

Nelson's criticism concerns Meinong's position in *Über die Erfahrungsgrundlagen unseres Wissens* (1906), which essentially differs from the one in the *Logik*. A judgement is true, if the objective is a fact (Meinong 1906, 410). An objective is a state of affairs that may subsist or not. The subsisting objective is a fact. It should be noted that for Meinong a subsisting objective may involve objects that do not exist. The objectivity of logic is guaranteed by relations of obtainment between objectives, where objectives are explained independently of a judging person. Meinong does not explicitly explain evidence in terms of truth; but that order of explanation is in accordance with his logical realism and the way he uses the term 'evidence' (*idem*, 412). Meinong is confronted with the problem of evidence when he asserts that an evident judgement cannot be false (*idem*, 410), and, on the same page, that evidence is the *psychological* characteristic that distinguishes knowledge from other judgements. Nelson does not deal with Meinong's concept of *Vermutungsevidenz*. As evidence is related to the actuality of an objective, *Vermutungsevidenz* is related to the probability of an objective, according to Meinong. The problem of evidence thus extends to *Vermutungsevidenz* (cf. the term 'Evidenz der Wahrscheinlichkeit', Höfler 1890, 123).

According to Meinong, there are two presuppositions for any theory of knowledge. (1) There are true judgments; and (2) there is a criterion by which it can be determined whether our judgements are true (I have reformulated the second presupposition). (1) is shown to be true, according to Meinong, by the experience that some of our judgements are evident ('einleuchtend'), together with the thesis that it is evident that an evident judgement cannot be false. Nelson rightly criticises Meinong, because the thesis that an evident judgement cannot be false is precisely what is in question. Concerning (2), Meinong takes evidence to be the criterion of truth. He adds that evidence, being a psychological characteristic of some of our judgements, is not a perfect criterion of truth.

According to Nelson, a criterion of truth should exclude the possibility of error. Because such a criterion cannot be given, a theory of knowledge is impossible. Nelson's thesis is that all our judgements are (mediately) grounded, either by other judgements or by non-judgemental presentations

¹ The term 'evidence' as it is used in this paper refers to what pertains to the judgement, and not to the piece of evidence for a judgement.

(‘Erkenntnis’). In accordance with the Friesian tradition, Nelson has it that *a priori* immediate presentations are ultimately explained by ‘die Beschaffenheiten des Gemütes’. There is no objective foundation for knowledge; there is only a subjective origin in reason. We know the phenomenological answer to such a position: “Transzendentalpsychologie ist eben auch Psychologie”.

3. Höfler's Review of Nelson's Book

Höfler's *Erkenntnisprobleme und Erkenntnistheorie* (1910) is a 60-page review of Nelson's work on the problem of knowledge, and is a defence of Meinong's concept of evidence and his *Gegenstandstheorie* in general. A theory of knowledge, Höfler says, does not concern the psychological analysis of actual knowledge-processes. It rather concerns the understanding of the meaning of such words as ‘Erkennen’ and ‘Erkanntes’, and their *a priori* relations. This results, for example, in a thesis such as: ‘in every piece of knowledge (‘Erkenntnis’) one is able to distinguish between an act of knowing and an object of knowledge’ (Höfler 1910, 53). According to Höfler, acts of knowing are acts of evident judgements (*idem*, 22). Evidence is a property of acts of judgement, and not of non-judgemental presentations (*idem*, 25). Truth is also a characteristic of judgemental acts. As Meinong, Höfler does not explicitly explain evidence in terms of truth, but implicitly such an order of explanation is implied by Meinong's *Gegenstandstheorie*.

Against Nelson, Höfler defends the thesis that evidence is a criterion of truth (Höfler 1910, 43). Evidence, according to Höfler, is an inner, not an outer criterion of truth (*idem*, 43). The distinction between inner and outer criterion of truth is related to the distinction between primary and secondary or reflective judgement. It is not the reflective judgement that makes our primary, true judgement evident; the primary judgement must have been evident from the start. In accordance with Nelson's criticism, Höfler's term ‘evidence’ has to do double duty: in order to account for the first half of the dilemma it has to entail truth; in order to account for the second half of the dilemma, it has to be an experience of consciousness.

In accordance with the first half of the dilemma, Höfler says that a judgement that is evident, is true (*idem*, 42). Not all true judgements are judged with evidence; we may judge blindly, and hit upon the truth. Judgements in hallucinations and dreams are without evidence (‘evidenzlos’). Evidence is real insight, and not merely what seems to be so (*idem*, 38). Evidence is thus able to ground logic (‘Grundlage der Logik’, 26).

In accordance with the second half of the dilemma, Höfler says that evidence is a property of the judgement that is accessible to consciousness. Evidence is an *experience* of consciousness (*idem*, 36). The evident judgement is what is clear (‘das Klare und Deutliche’, *idem*, 26), and is opposed to psychical force, instinct and common sense. Evidence is not the same as strong conviction (‘feste Überzeugung’, *idem*, 37); it is not a subjective feeling. Evidence is a psychological-logical mark (*idem*, 55), whereas certainty (‘Gewissheit’) is a psychological mark. Evidence does not exclude error (*idem*, 36). ‘Äussere Gegenstände’, that is, physical objects, may become objects of evident judgements (*idem*, 25).

4. An Answer to the Problem of Evidence

Höfler uses the term ‘evidence’ primarily as meaning an experience of consciousness. But he does not escape Nelson's dilemma, for evidence also implies (absolute) truth in Höfler's writings. Is it possible to answer Nelson's criticism as formulated in the problem of evidence, and retain the notion of evidence?

The first question that has to be asked is: To what does evidence pertain? According to Höfler, evidence pertains to the act of judgement. Knowledge, according to Höfler, is the evident judgemental act; the object of such an act is the true and obtaining objective. In opposition to such a Meinongian theory, it is defended here that (a piece of) knowledge is to be explained not as an act of knowing. Knowledge is the *product* of an act of judging, more specifically, it is the product of an act of knowing. And it is to such judgement-products that evidence pertains. Knowledge can thus be explained as the evident judgement, which explanation is in accordance with the constructivism of Per Martin-Löf. If the judgemental act is clear and distinct, that is, if it is an act of knowing, the judgement-product is evident. A judgemental act may be immediate; examples of such immediate acts are an act of perception or an act of insight. The product of an immediate act is immediately evident, and is called *intuitive knowledge*. A judgemental act may also be an act of inference. The product of such a mediate act is mediately evident, and is called *discursive knowledge*.

In order to answer Nelson's criticism, and retain the notion of evidence, we have to choose for one side of the dilemma: evidence is a phenomenological notion, and not a transcendent notion. The notion of evidence is not related to a notion of absolute truth, but to an epistemic notion of truth. The bearers of epistemic truth or *correctness* are (potential) judgement-products. A judgement is correct, if it can be made evident. Correctness can thus be explained as *evidence-ability*. Evidence is not a criterion of correctness, but part of the explanation of correctness. There are no degrees of correctness; therefore, there are no degrees of evidence.

As a phenomenological notion, evidence should not be confused with obviousness. Often, we need time and great effort in order to see that a judgement is evident. Evidence should also be distinguished from a feeling of force, which may accompany our judgement. A feeling of force may accompany any of our prejudices. Evidence is further to be distinguished from conviction, although it is related to that notion. A judgement's being evident has an objective and a subjective side. The evident judgement is objectively certain in the sense that it is grounded (by an act of inference, insight or perception); it is subjectively certain in the sense that the judgement has to result in conviction.

One may say that clarity and distinctness of the act of judgement is a criterion of a judgement's being evident, and thus of its correctness. But this does not solve the problem of the criterion as formulated by Nelson. We have no means to determine whether our judgement is the product of an act of *real* insight. We have no means to determine whether our judgemental act is really clear and distinct, or only apparently so. Evidence does not exclude error. In this sense the problem of the criterion is a valid one. Hallucinations and judgements in our dreams can be said to be without evidence only after we have determined that there was a hallucination or a dream. Nelson is right that an absolute foundation for knowledge cannot be given, but this does not exclude a foundational theory of knowledge in which the concept of phenomenological evidence has a crucial role to play.

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Normbegründung ohne Rekurs auf Werte? Einige kritische Bemerkungen zum Projekt des Kontraktualismus

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1. Unter dem Label „kontraktualistisch“ sind heute eine Reihe von Theorien versammelt, die normativ gesehen keineswegs alle einem einheitlichen Projekt verpflichtet sind. Lassen Sie mich daher zunächst den für den Vortrag relevanten Kontraktualismus genauer eingrenzen. Ich denke, es sind generell zwei Eigenschaften, die eine Vertragstheorie charakterisieren und (die zugleich helfen, ihre Anziehungskraft erklären):

- (i) das Charakteristikum der *Freiwilligkeit der Übereinkunft*
- (ii) die Eigenschaft der *allseitigen Besserstellung*

Wer vertragliche Regelungen eingeht, tut dies freiwillig (i), und er wird nur zustimmen, wenn er sich etwas von dem Vertrag erhofft. Da dies für alle Vertragspartner gilt, sollte ein Kontrakt alle Beteiligten besser stellen (ii).

Beides sind offenbar wünschenswerte Attribute von Regelungen, die eine Gruppe von Individuen betreffen. Es lässt sich aber leicht einsehen, dass *reale* Verträge diese Eigenschaften nicht unbedingt aufweisen: Verträge können unter Zwang oder Drohung zustande kommen, und Personen können sich hinsichtlich ihrer Interessen täuschen (oder getäuscht werden). Insofern liegt der Schritt zu *hypothetischen* Abmachungen nahe: Mindestens in allen modernen Vertragstheorien wird untersucht, ob eine vernünftige Person einer Regelung (zwangfrei) zustimmen könnte oder würde, wenn sie gefragt würde.

Es sollte aber nicht übersehen werden, dass hypothetische Verträge das erste positive Attribut – freiwillige Übereinkunft – nicht aufweisen: Wenn nur gefragt wird, ob jemand einer Regelung (rationalerweise) zustimmen *könnte*, ist die faktische Zustimmung der Betroffenen irrelevant. Hypothetische Verträge scheinen nur noch den positiven Aspekt der allseitigen Besserstellung (das so genannte Paretoprinzip) zu verkörpern.

Spielt nun in allen als Vertragstheorie bezeichneten Ansätzen das herausgestellte Kriterium eine tragende Rolle? Es lässt sich leicht einsehen, dass das nicht der Fall ist: eine Reihe von Vertragstheorien führen vertragsunabhängige Wertgesichtspunkte ein und setzen sie in der Normbegründung voraus. Dies gilt insbesondere für an Locke angelehnte Vertragstheoretiker wie Nozick, Steiner oder Steinvorth und an Kant orientierte Vertragstheoretiker wie Rawls oder Scanlon.

Lassen Sie mich mit den von Locke inspirierten Ansätzen beginnen, da der Punkt hier relativ offensichtlich ist: Die Legitimität von Normen wird z.B. bei Nozick nicht aus den normativ relevanten Attributen eines Vertrages (wie Freiwilligkeit und Paretoverbesserung) hergeleitet, sondern sie bemisst sich an *Naturrechten* – und damit an bestimmten Wertvorstellungen. Die Naturrechte werden wiederum nicht durch einen Vertrag begründet, sondern davon unabhängig vorausgesetzt. Die Begründungslast liegt also auf den naturrechtlichen Prinzipien. Der Vertragsgedanke ist, wenn er überhaupt eine Rolle spielt, jedenfalls nicht tragend, also handelt es sich bei an Locke angelehnten Vertragstheorien nicht um eine wertunabhängige Normenbegründung.

Von Kant inspirierte Kontraktualisten scheinen sich näher am Vertragsgedanken zu bewegen, da sie die *Zustimmungsfähigkeit* von Regelungen und Institutionen zum Kriterium erheben. Aber die Zustimmungsfähigkeit bezieht sich hier auf bereits moralisch motivierte Akteure, und die vorausgesetzten moralischen Werte sind wiederum vom Kontraktualismus unabhängig. Im Falle von Rawls wird etwa eine Zustimmung von Akteuren eingeholt, die sich hinter einem „Schleier des Nichtwissens“ befinden. Der Schleier (und damit die Wahlsituation) ist so konstruiert, dass der „Vertrag“ ungerechte Regelungen von vornherein ausschließt. Normativ ausschlaggebend ist demnach der Wertgesichtspunkt (eines spezifischen Verständnisses) der Gerechtigkeit, auf den die Entscheidungssituation zugeschnitten ist – und die entsprechenden Wertungen werden nicht durch einen Vertrag begründet, sondern davon unabhängig vorausgesetzt. (Der zentrale Gedanke der qualifizierten Zustimmungsfähigkeit lässt sich im Übrigen auch anders als durch die Vertragsmetapher ausdrücken: Ackerman und Habermas erheben Zustimmungsfähigkeit ebenfalls zum Kriterium, aber anstelle von Verträgen illustrieren sie dies mithilfe von hypothetischen Dialogen bzw. Diskursen.) Auch an Kant orientierte Vertragstheorien liefern also keine wertunabhängige Normenbegründung, und der Vertragsgedanke spielt allenfalls eine untergeordnete Rolle.

Vertragstheorien nach Lockeschem oder Kantischem Vorbild garantieren, wie sich leicht erkennen lässt, auch keine Paretoverbesserung und weisen damit das charakteristische Attribut hypothetischer Verträge nicht auf. Wenn man möchte, kann man solche Ansätze natürlich immer noch als kontraktualistisch bezeichnen. Aber es ist wichtig, sich klar zu machen, dass der Vertrag in diesen Theorien normativ gesehen weitgehend irrelevant ist. Um die Tragfähigkeit der entsprechenden Theorien zu prüfen, müssten wir uns mit Naturrechten oder Gerechtigkeitsurteilen beschäftigen – also mit hoch kontroversen Wertvorstellungen. Ein Zwischenergebnis meiner Analyse lautet demnach: Hinsichtlich der wertunabhängigen Normbegründung interessant sind (wenn, dann) nur an Hobbes angelehnte Vertragstheorien, denen wir uns nun zuwenden wollen.

2. Von Hobbes inspirierte Vertragstheorien haben in neuerer Zeit unter anderem Buchanan, Gauthier, Stemmer und Hörster vorgelegt. Auch bei diesen Ansätzen steht die Zustimmungsfähigkeit von Normen zur Diskussion, aber das Projekt ist ambitionierter als im Falle der an Kant orientierten Vertragstheorien: Es geht darum, Normen in dem Sinne rational zu begründen, dass jeder einen Grund zu ihrer Befolgung hat, und zwar *im Lichte seiner eigenen Interessen und Präferenzen*. Insbesondere bleibt damit das wünschenswerte Attribut der allgemeinen Besserstellung erhalten, und es werden (scheinbar) keine kontroversen Wertungen vorausgesetzt. In dieser – und nur in dieser – Variante des Kontraktualismus spielt der zu Anfang skizzierte Vertragsgedanke tatsächlich eine tragende Rolle; im Folgenden werden daher ausschließlich an Hobbes orientierte Vertragstheorien als kontraktualistisch bezeichnet.

Tugendhat hat den Kontraktualismus eine Quasimoral genannt. Wir könnten auch (und vielleicht angemessener) von Moralersatz sprechen, denn es hat den Anschein, als würde der Kontraktualismus die Moral eliminieren und sie durch etwas anderes ersetzen: rationale Interessenverfolgung. Ich werde nun allerdings zu zeigen versuchen, dass dieser Schein trügt. Tatsächlich setzt auch der Kontraktualismus moralische Wertungen voraus. Wenn dies zutrifft, kommen wir an einer wertgebundenen Deutung der Theorie nicht vorbei.

Normen sollen, so die Idee des Kontraktualismus, ausschließlich auf rationale Interessenverfolgung zurückgeführt werden. Dies macht m.E. den Appeal in der Hobbeschen Tradition stehender Theoretiker wie James Buchanan aus: Gutwillig gelesen, behandeln sie moralische Werturteile so, als ob sie simple Präferenzen wären. Als einzige Legitimationsgrundlage für Institutionen, Regelungen und Normen verbleibt dann das (scheinbar) wertunabhängige Paretoprinzip, das unkontrovers zu sein scheint, da seine Einhaltung im Interesse aller Beteiligten liegt. Die Normbegründung auf diese Weise leisten zu wollen, könnte auf den ersten Blick ein sinnvolles Projekt sein. (Ob es sinnvoll ist, hängt nicht zuletzt davon ab, inwieweit wir in der Lage sind, von unseren Wertvorstellungen zurückzutreten und sie ähnlich wie Geschmacksurteile zu behandeln. Dieses Problem will ich aber im Folgenden beiseite lassen.)

Lässt sich eine Normenbegründung tatsächlich in der skizzierten Weise durchführen? Gegen diese Strategie lassen sich die folgenden drei Einwände erheben:

(i) Ein erstes Manko ist die radikale Unterbestimmtheit des Paretoprinzips, mit dem Kontraktualisten wie Buchanan operieren. Es gibt in der Regel etliche Paretoverbesserungen (zustimmungsfähige Ergebnisse), wenn von einem gegebenen Zustand ausgegangen wird, und es ist unklar, wie zwischen ihnen entschieden werden soll, wenn wir nicht mehr als das Paretoprinzip in der Hand haben.

(ii) Warum sollten wir das Paretoprinzip generell anwenden, wenn es uns nur um (rationale) Interessenverfolgung geht? Es mag zwar spezifische Bedingungen geben, unter denen es im Lichte der eigenen Interessen rational ist, anderen Personen etwas zugute kommen zu lassen, um eine Gegenleistung zu erhalten; aber es lassen sich leicht Konstellationen denken, in denen gewaltsame Lösungen von Konflikten möglich sind, die einige (machtvolle) Personen besser, andere (machtlose) Personen schlechter stellen, als sie jeweils in ihrer Ausgangsposition gestellt waren. Wenn das illegitim sein soll (wie z.B. Buchanan behauptet), dann wird die *normative* Forderung eingeführt, dass niemand durch eine Regelung schlechter gestellt werden darf. Das Paretoprinzip wird also nicht nur im Sinne einer auf Interessen basierenden Lösung von Konflikten gedeutet. Als allgemeine Norm, die unter allen Bedingungen eingehalten werden muss, ist das Paretoprinzip aber nicht wertunabhängig.

(iii) Selbst wenn der „Vertragsinhalt“ durch das Paretoprinzip hinreichend bestimmt und überzeugend begründet werden könnte, ist die (generelle) „Vertragseinhaltung“ nicht garantiert. Es mag rational sein, eine (implizite) Abmachung einzugehen – aber warum sollte ich mich unter allen Umständen daran halten? Wiederum kann es Bedingungen geben, die es im Lichte meiner eigenen Interessen geboten erscheinen lassen, meinen Beitrag zu leisten; aber das trifft nicht unter allen Konstellationen zu – insbesondere dann nicht, wenn

andere ihren Teil der „Abmachung“ bereits erfüllt haben und das Risiko gering ist, dass mein „Vertragsbruch“ entdeckt wird. Auch das Gebot der generellen Vertragseinhaltung ist also eine auf moralischen Werten beruhende Norm.

Insbesondere die beiden letzten Einwände sind für die Fragestellung des Vortrags wichtig, da sie das Projekt der wertunabhängigen kontraktualistischen Normenbegründung im Ganzen betreffen: Es zeigt sich, dass auch der strikte Kontraktualismus – entgegen dem expliziten Selbstverständnis vieler seiner Vertreter und Kritiker – auf Wertvorstellungen zurückgreift. Zu behaupten, Vertragstheorien würden ausschließlich auf rationaler Interessenverfolgung basieren, ist demnach irreführend.

3. Die im vorigen Abschnitt entwickelte Kritik macht die Notwendigkeit einer *wertbezogenen* Kontroverse um die Sonderstellung kontraktualistischer Normen deutlich. Vertragstheorien scheinen mit dem Paretoprinzip als einziger (aber nicht wertfreier!) Norm zu operieren, um den „Vertragsinhalt“ festzulegen, und sie brauchen zusätzlich eine Norm, die die „Vertragseinhaltung“ garantiert. Was spricht nun für diese Normen und die dahinter stehenden Wertungen – sind sie in besonderer Weise ausgezeichnet? Und lassen sie sich genauer spezifizieren, so dass sie ein tragfähiges Fundament für normative Theorien ergeben? Zu diesen Fragen will ich abschließend einige kurze (skeptische) Überlegungen anstellen.

Warum sind wir der Meinung, dass es geboten ist, Regelungen zu treffen, die niemanden schlechter stellen – oder gar Zustände zu realisieren, die alle Beteiligten besser stellen? Offensichtlich, weil es unfair wäre, Personen – ohne besonderen Grund – schlechter zu stellen (bzw. sie von einer möglichen Besserstellung auszuschließen). Und warum ist es nach allgemeiner Ansicht geboten, eine (im Sinne der ersten Forderung akzeptable) „Abmachung“ einzuhalten, wenn andere sich daran halten? Auch hier lautet die nahe liegende Antwort: da es unfair ist, die Abmachung auf Kosten anderer zu brechen. Was an dieser Stelle als Begründung greift, erweist sich also bei genauerem Hinsehen als *Fairnessnorm(en)*; im Hintergrund des Kontraktualismus steht, so scheint es, der Wert der Fairness. Wenn wir eine Formulierung für eine Norm suchen, die beide Forderungen – „Vertragsinhalt“ und „Vertragseinhaltung“ – umfasst, wäre folgender Vorschlag nahe liegend:

Wer Vorteile aus den Handlungen und Unterlassungen anderer Personen zieht, sollte im Gegenzug (durch Handlungen oder Unterlassungen) auch zu ihrem Wohl beitragen.

Es darf nicht übersehen werden, dass diese Formulierung ausgesprochen vage ist. (Angesichts der oben erwähnten Unterbestimmtheit des Paretoprinzips war auch nichts anderes zu erwarten.) Was genau zu einer Gegenleistung verpflichtet und worin die Gegenleistung bestehen soll, müsste spezifiziert werden. Diese Beobachtung deutet nicht zuletzt darauf hin, dass weitere (wertende) Gesichtspunkte für eine Konkretisierung der Fairnessnorm unverzichtbar sein könnten.

Immerhin haben wir mit der (elementaren) Fairness einen Wert – und eine (vage) Norm – herausstellen können, die dem Projekt des Kontraktualismus zugrunde zu liegen scheint. Aber es schließt sich die Frage an, ob dieser Wert und die daran anknüpfende Norm in besonderer Weise ausgezeichnet sind. Sie mögen einigermaßen einleuchtend sein – doch das sind andere Werte und Normen vermutlich auch. Es ist weder ersichtlich, warum

nur eine relativ minimale Interpretation von Fairness normativ relevant ist, noch warum Fairness überhaupt der einzige normativ relevante Gesichtspunkt sein sollte.

Auf den ersten Blick scheint sich die fragliche Norm dadurch auszuzeichnen, dass sie einen Bezug zur rationalen Interessenverfolgung bewahrt: der Inhalt der impliziten Abmachungen kommt mir zugute, und auch die Pflicht zur Einhaltung des „Vertrags“ ist daran gebunden, dass ich vom Handeln anderer profitiere oder profitiert habe. Aber dieser Schein trügt, wie die Analyse gezeigt hat: Akteure, die ausschließlich ihre eigenen Interessen verfolgen, werden weder unter allen Bedingungen dafür sorgen, dass niemand schlechter gestellt wird, noch werden sie generell ihren Teil zu allgemein vorteilhaften Regelungen beitragen. In Wahrheit handelt es sich um eine genuin moralische Norm.

Es lässt sich vermuten, dass der Kontraktualismus seine Attraktivität nicht zuletzt daraus gewinnt, dass er zwischen Eigeninteresse und Moral schillert. Wenn diese Vermutung zutrifft, dann sind Vertragstheorien weniger anziehend als man zunächst vermuten würde. Sie operieren mit einem Wertgesichtspunkt und einer darauf gegründeten vagen und unterbestimmten (moralischen) Norm, die nicht in ersichtlicher Weise gegenüber anderen Normen ausgezeichnet ist.

Abgesehen von der Klärung des Status kontraktualistischer Theorien hoffe ich, in diesem Vortrag deutlich gemacht zu haben, dass die Vertragsmetapher eher zur Verdunklung als zur Erhellung normativer Fragen beiträgt. Nicht nur die Heterogenität der als kontraktualistisch bezeichneten Ansätze stiftet Verwirrung; auch – und vor allem – wird in kontraktualistischen Theorien oft eher implizit auf die tatsächlich zugrunde gelegten Werte und Normen angespielt, als dass sie explizit benannt werden. Es erscheint mir sinnvoller, diese Werte und Normen sowie ihre Begründungs- und Tragfähigkeit ohne den Umweg über den Kontraktualismus zu diskutieren. Das ist ohne weiteres möglich, da sie, wie gezeigt wurde, auch unabhängig vom Vertragsgedanken formuliert werden können.

Consciousness: Central for Intentionality, but not Essential

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Wittgenstein thought that both opponents and proponents of unconscious intentionality tended to misunderstand the nature of the issue. About the psychoanalysts he said that:

... [they] were misled by their own way of expression into thinking that they had done more than discover new psychological reactions; that they had, in a sense, discovered conscious thoughts that were unconscious. (1969, 57)

Compare this with what Freud had to say about the unconscious and its relation to consciousness:

In psycho-analysis there is no choice but for us to assert that mental processes are in themselves unconscious, and to liken the perception of them by means of consciousness to the perception of the external world by means of sense-organs. (1958, 171)

Freud suggests that consciousness can be subtracted from intentional processes or states in a very simple way. In themselves, unconscious states need not be different from conscious ones (op.cit., 168). What distinguishes the latter is that they are perceived "by means of consciousness". But suppose this account fails. Suppose the consciousness of a conscious intentional state does not consist in a relation that state has, but is a feature inherent in the state itself. Then the psychoanalytic notion of the unconscious does not make sense. An unconscious thought inherently like a conscious thought would then really be, like Wittgenstein says, an unconscious conscious thought.

But many will want to hold on to the relational account. In contemporary terminology, Freud defends a higher order perception theory of consciousness, and higher order theories are still popular. The idea that consciousness is some sort of introspective access seems almost ineradicable, though I find it impossible to make sense of. Consider the visual experiences you are having right now and think the thought that you are having them. Did that thought make the perceptual experiences conscious? That seems out of the question. They were already part of your experience, your stream of consciousness before you had that thought, and that thought itself is conscious independently of whether you have another thought about it. Something does not become conscious just because it is the intentional object of an intentional state. Think of being conscious of a stone. Your consciousness does not make the stone conscious! That does not change just because the intentional object is (supposedly!) itself an intentional state.

What then, it is fair to ask, is consciousness? Very briefly: it has degrees of intensity, from the dullness of dozing to the sharpness of a sudden realization of danger, and it's the common denominator of waking and dreaming. All more specific states, from simple perceptions to complex thoughts, are comprised by these global states. A good question to ask, when you are wondering whether something is a state of consciousness, is the following: would, just in virtue of the existence of this state (not because of its causal consequences), your waking or dreaming life be different?

The upshot so far is that relational accounts of consciousness are inadequate and make the task of making unconscious intentionality intelligible appear much easier than it actually is. It is not difficult to subtract, from a conscious thought, a further thought or perception directed at that thought. But once it is recognized that consciousness

is a feature inherent in states of consciousness, the difficulty of subtracting consciousness and still keeping something recognizably mental can be appreciated.

One suggestion could be that the unconscious intentional state has the same causal role as the conscious one. But given plausible, perhaps even inevitable assumptions, that suggestion turns out to be untenable. The assumptions are that the presence of conscious states can be known and that knowledge in general is grounded in causal relations between the epistemic subject and the object of knowledge. If these assumptions are correct, an unconscious state could not have the same causal role as a conscious state because if it did, it would cause just the same cognitive reactions. The two could not be distinguished then, and the presence or absence of consciousness could therefore not be known. (Note that this argument does not only apply to knowledge of other minds, but also to knowledge of one's own mind.)

We are now in a position to start a frontal assault on the notion of unconscious intentionality à la Searle or Strawson. To make the problem vivid, let us think about how we can conceive, at various levels of spatial resolution, the spacetime occupied by a person and her environment. We could, for example, start conceptualizing the person's body at the subatomic level and then move further up, ultimately to the macroscopic level of organs, bones, muscles, vessels and so on. How can consciousness be fitted into this picture? It seems that in order to integrate consciousness, we have to shift gears in some fashion. We cannot, for example, conceive consciousness as something that we visualize in a person's head in addition to visualizing the person's brain. (We cannot even do this with visual consciousness, nor can we think of, say, auditory consciousness, as something that we hear.) To get at the reality of consciousness, we have to put ourselves into the shoes of the person, as one says, and take up her point of view. We have to imagine *being that person* (or being a bat, as Thomas Nagel invited us). So to get a grip on the reality of the person's visual consciousness, we will try to imagine what it is like to perceive her environment from her vantage point. Ditto for her experiences in other modalities and for her thought. We will represent her conscious intentionality by putting ourselves, as far as this is possible, into conscious intentional states of the same or at least similar kinds. This is representation through sameness or exemplification.

The trouble with unconscious intentionality is that it does not seem to fit into either of these pictures. We cannot represent the unconscious mind by putting ourselves into the shoes of the unconscious thinker. Only the conscious mind can be exemplified by the conscious states we put ourselves in to represent the intentionality of the other. Nor is it clear when and why one should think of some brain state as an unconscious intentional state. It looks, at least at first sight, that the nonconscious aspects of a person's existence can be exhaustively described in purely physiological terms.

Some may think that we should appeal to the notion of a language at this point, or, more generally, to the notion of a symbol. Could we not discover symbols in the brain? But naturally understood the notion of a symbol presupposes a mind operating with the symbol. So symbols could not be used as an independent criterion for the presence of unconscious intentionality. And by the arguments given

already we can also exclude the answers that the unconscious intentional state is just like the conscious state, except that there is no higher order representation registering its presence, or that it has the same causal role.

Others will feel that this whole discussion is beside the point. Why should we not give sense to the concept of unconscious intentionality by defining representational content, for example with reference to teleological notions, quite apart from any reference to consciousness? After all, that is how many accounts of intentionality in the philosophy of mind appear to proceed. But apart from specific problems with these accounts, I think they have no credible claim to be accepted as accounts of intentionality unless their relation to consciousness is clarified. Surely conscious intentionality is intentionality if anything is, and so it ought to be possible to say how we can get from conscious to unconscious intentionality. The problem can't be evaded.

Is this attack on unconscious intentionality fatal then? Psychologists and some linguists will find that hard to accept. Considerations of the following sort appear to particularly impress them. Sometimes a thought will pop into consciousness, seemingly out of the blue. Scientists, philosophers and artists report that some of their best ideas came to them in this way. Related, though less spectacular phenomena seem to occur on an everyday basis: "How do I know what I think 'till I hear what I say?" The idea that there must be lots of processes leading up to the deliverances of consciousness, so that the conscious mind is just the tip of the iceberg, is a natural one and the most powerful motivation for the notion of unconscious mentality.

But what reason do we really have to suppose that the activity leading up to conscious experience is *mental* activity? This may seem obvious. "What else could it be?" one might ask, "surely a great scientific discovery could not come about simply as a result of physiological processes!" But compare: "How could such elaborate systems as organisms have come into being except through the intervention of a designer?" We now know how organisms can evolve without the intervention of a designer, and there is no a priori proof that complex theories could not come about as a result of mere physiological processes – partly come about in this way, I should add, because there is no evidence that great ideas pop into people's minds without them having spent a lot of time thinking really hard – consciously thinking, of course – about the relevant issues. So this argument certainly is not conclusive. It could not be, because it does not address the crucial problem at all, which is not an epistemological problem. The problem is not that we do not have enough *evidence* for the claim that there are nonconscious processes leading up to conscious states. The problem is to understand what it *means* to say that these processes are intentional processes.

I suspect that in the end there is indeed no answer to this question which is both straightforward and substantial. And surely all this talk in cognitive science about a "language of thought", "unconscious calculations" and so forth sounds naïve and anthropomorphic. But yet it would be premature to conclude that the notion of unconscious intentional states is meaningless. Suppose that cognitive science postulates entities (states, processes, patterns), which are significantly similar to conscious intentional entities, including similarities with regard to their causal relations to objects external to the mind, and which lead up to conscious intentional entities or fill 'gaps' between them and so fulfill the explanatory tasks assigned to them. These postulations then, we may further assume, lead to the discovery of corresponding brain entities.

Now even in this scenario, the skeptic about unconscious intentionality could still insist that the reference to conscious intentional phenomena had a purely heuristic function. He might think of it, *Tractatus*-style, as a ladder to be thrown away when it has served its purpose of helping us to reach a better understanding of the physiological facts. In taking this position, the skeptic is not denying any obvious facts. It is not obvious that a description of the nonconscious brain could not be completely physiological. But his resistance is beginning to look a bit artificial. It would be completely natural, if indeed brain entities were found to correspond to our postulates formulated in intentionalistic vocabulary, to also use that vocabulary to refer to those entities! (Some might object to this on the ground that brain entities are physical and thus could not be designated by intentionalistic vocabulary, but this, as Searle would be the first to agree, would reveal an uncritical acceptance of the obsolete mental/physical dichotomy.)

So is the dispute perhaps a purely verbal one? Is it only that some would like to use expressions derived from intentionalistic vocabulary to designate certain phenomena, while others would prefer physiological vocabulary? This diagnosis is suggested by the part of Wittgenstein's critique which is directed at the objectors to unconscious intentionality, who, he says:

...did not see that they were not objecting to the newly discovered psychological reactions, but to the way in which they were described. (ibid.)

But this, it seems to me, we need not agree with. Wittgenstein is right to point out that both parties to the dispute tend to misunderstand the nature of the issue. But there may yet be such an issue. The issue is whether the nonconscious entities are really similar enough to conscious intentional entities in order to qualify as unconscious intentional entities. Does it make sense to treat them as part of one unified subject matter? That certainly is not a straightforward empirical question, and there may be no clear-cut method for resolving it. But that does not mean we can simply reject it as purely verbal. We sometimes have to make decisions about how to apply a term where we cannot rely on any criterion, where we cannot, so to speak, pass on responsibility to another term. In the case at hand this means that we cannot be sure to be able determine the extension of the concept of intentionality through a simple relation that intentional phenomena have to consciousness.

My suggestion then is to think of consciousness as being central to intentional phenomena, but not essential. Nothing that is not appropriately related to consciousness could be an intentional phenomenon. But I do not see how it can be determined a priori that consciousness is essential to intentionality in the sense that only occurrent conscious phenomena or dispositions to have experiences could count as intentional phenomena. We may yet feel the need, and of course many have felt it already, to extend the concept of intentionality beyond these boundaries. All philosophy can do is to try to clarify what is involved in such a step, and especially to criticize the naïve view that consciousness can be simply subtracted from intentionality, leaving everything else as it is.

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Ein dritter Weg in der Theorie sozialer Normen? Praxistheorien zwischen kausalen Erklärungen und hermeneutischem Idealismus

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In den sechziger und siebziger Jahren herrschte, angestoßen durch Peter Winchs *The Idea of a Social Science* (1958), eine rege Debatte über wittgensteinianische Philosophien der Sozialwissenschaften. Nachdem es den achtziger Jahren um diese Theorien ruhiger geworden war, erleben sie in den letzten Jahren unter dem Titel "Praxistheorie" eine Wiederbelebung und versprechen mit den Schlüsselkonzepten der Praxis bzw. der Praktiken einen dritten Weg zwischen strikt individualistischen und holistischen Sozialtheorien zu finden. Bei näherem Hinsehen stellen sich die Ansätze allerdings als ebenso heterogen heraus, wie ihre philosophischen und soziologischen Gewährsleute, die außer Wittgenstein auch Phänomenologen, Sozialphänomenologen (Schütz), Ethnomethodologen (Garfinkel) und postmoderne Autoren umfassen. Da eine Gesamtbewertung dieser Positionen auf eng begrenztem Raum nicht möglich ist, soll hier lediglich eine zentrale Divergenz diskutiert werden, welche sich in der Debatte zwischen David Bloor (1992) und Michael Lynch (1992) gezeigt hat, nämlich die zwischen Theorien, die eine kausale Erklärung von Normen und Institutionen anstreben und solchen, die eher einem hermeneutischen Idealismus verpflichtet sind. Auch wenn diese Debatte ursprünglich im Kontext der *science studies* geführt wurde, soll es im Folgenden weniger um wissenschaftliche als um soziale Normen gehen. Als soziale Normen werden dabei solche Normen verstanden, die (a) von (fast) allen Angehörigen einer Gesellschaft geteilt werden, (b) sanktionsbewehrt und (c) arbiträr sind. Sanktionen sind dabei in dem weitesten Sinne von zustimmendem oder ablehnendem Verhalten anderer gegenüber dem Verhalten eines Akteurs zu verstehen. Die Bedingung (c) soll die Diskussion der wissenschaftstheoretischen Frage nach der Notwendigkeit oder Kontingenz wissenschaftlicher Normen und Standards vermeiden. Als Beispiel sozialer Normen können daher Verkehrsregeln ebenso wie Anstandsnormen gelten, aber z.B. auch eine Institution wie das Privateigentum.

Es sei außerdem betont, dass es im gesamten Vortrag nicht um die Frage gehen wird, ob die diskutierten Deutungen Wittgensteins richtig oder falsch, angemessen oder unangemessen oder auch nur vertretbar sind, sondern nur darum, ob sie für die Theorie sozialer Normen fruchtbar sind.

1. Das starke institutionalistische Programm

Die Schärfe der Debatte zwischen Bloor und Lynch sollte nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, dass beide sich auf einem gemeinsamen Fundament bewegen, welches durch das starke institutionalistische Programm gelegt ist. Als eine schwache Institutionentheorie kann man die in der Rational-Choice-Theorie und Ökonomie verbreitete Beschreibung von Institutionen als Lösungsmechanismen für bekannte Handlungsprobleme oder als Mittel der Verringerung von Transaktionskosten verstehen. Die individuellen Präferenzen von Akteuren werden dabei als den Institutionen vorgängig aufgefasst. Das starke institutiona-

listische Programm setzt dagegen nicht bei den Präferenzen und Handlungen einzelner Akteure an, sondern vertritt die These, dass viele oder vielleicht sogar alle Typen des Handelns, auf jeden Fall aber das regelgeleitete Handeln, erst durch Institutionen konstituiert werden. Genauer lässt sich das starke institutionalistische Programm durch die folgenden Thesen kennzeichnen:

- (1) Linguistischer Idealismus: Einige Entitäten werden durch sprachliche Praktiken geschaffen, darunter fallen insbesondere Regeln, Spiele, Sprachen und Rituale.
- (2) Auf Grund des linguistischen Idealismus können sprachliche, rituelle, spielerische und ähnliche Handlungen nur im Rückgriff auf Regeln individuiert werden. Regeln sind individuellen Handlungen daher logisch vorgängig.
- (3) Selbstreferenz: Die Erschaffung von Entitäten durch linguistische Praktiken weist eine selbstbezügliche Struktur auf – bestimmte Entitäten entstehen, indem sie als solche bezeichnet oder behandelt werden.
- (4) Der Erschaffung einer Entität durch linguistische Praktiken liegt ein kollektives Behandelnd-Als zugrunde.

Das gemeinsame Fundament wird jedoch verlassen, sobald Bloor und Lynch unterschiedliche Interpretationen der Thesen (3) und (4) wählen, welche entweder auf einem kausalen Modell fußen oder aber von der hermeneutischen Annahme ausgehen, dass Institutionen sich lediglich durch das in ihnen selbst verkörperte Vokabular beschreiben lassen.

2. Bloor versus Lynch

Bloor geht von dem selbstreferentiellen Modell der Institutionen aus: Die Schließung einer Ehe besteht darin, dass die beteiligten und relevanten Akteure glauben, dass es sich um eine Eheschließung handelt, das Privateigentum besteht darin, dass die Akteure individuellen Besitz als Privateigentum behandeln und anerkennen. Die einzelnen mit einer Institution verknüpften Regeln und "Spielzüge", wie z.B. der Ringtausch, haben keine Funktion und keinen Sinn an sich selbst, der außerhalb der Institution bzw. des Spiels zu finden wäre (vgl. Bloor 1992, 272). Bis zu dieser Stelle kann man annehmen, Bloor spräche sich für eine "Hermeneutik der Lebensformen" aus, die den Sinn, welche die Akteure mit Institutionen und Regeln verbinden, zu entschlüsseln sucht – es würde sich also um ein Programm handeln, welches dem klassischen Winchs sehr ähnlich wäre. Diese Konsequenz wird jedoch vermieden, indem Bloor Kripkes skeptische Lesart von Wittgenstein rezipiert. Demnach besteht das Problem des Regelfolgens – ganz knapp gefasst – darin, zu erklären

- (1) wie eine Regel, die anhand einer endlichen Zahl von Beispielen eingeführt wurde, für eine unbeschränkte Zahl von Anwendungsfällen gelten kann;
- (2) worin die kognitive Komponente von Regeln besteht, was also Regelbefolger verstehen müssen, um einer Regel folgen zu können;

(3) worin die normative Komponente von Regeln besteht, wodurch Regelbefolger sich also "gezwungen" fühlen, einer Regel zu folgen;

(4) wieso zu glauben, der Regel R zu folgen, nicht impliziert, R tatsächlich zu folgen.

Das skeptische Argument geht von dem bekannten Szenario einer Lehrsituation aus, in der einem Schüler durch einen Lehrer die Regel "n+2" anhand von Zahlenreihen der Art "2, 4, 6, 8..." beigebracht wird. Nun sei der Schüler aber immer in der Lage, eine von der "üblichen Weise" abweichende Fortsetzung der Reihe zu bilden und diese dennoch als Fall der Anwendung einer Regel zu rationalisieren. Während die These des linguistischen Idealismus zeigen sollte, dass sich keine Gründe für Regeln jenseits eines bestimmten Spiels finden lassen, folgt aus dem skeptischen Argument, dass sich nicht einmal Gründe finden lassen, eine bestimmte Art des Verhaltens als regelgeleitet anzuerkennen und eine andere nicht. Damit sei auch das gesamte hermeneutische Vorhaben gescheitert, eine Theorie sozialer Normen und Institutionen auf der Grundlage der Rekonstruktion interner begrifflicher Beziehungen zwischen den Gehalten von Normen, welche von Akteuren interpretiert werden, zu entwickeln. An dieser Stelle tritt das Modell der kausalen Erklärung von Regelfolgen und Normentstehung auf die Bühne: Wenn sich auch keine Gründe für bestimmte Handlungen finden lassen, so doch vielleicht Ursachen? Ein entsprechendes Modell schlägt Bloor nun vor:

The argument so far may be summarised like this: in following a rule we move automatically from case to case, guided by our instinctive (but socially educated) sense of 'sameness'. Such a sense does not itself suffice to create a standard of right and wrong. It is necessary to introduce a sociological element into the account to explain normativity. Normative standards come from the consensus generated by a number of interacting rule followers, and is maintained by collectively monitoring, controlling and sanctioning their individual tendencies. Consensus makes norms objective, that is, a source of external and impersonal constraint on the individual. It gives substance to the distinction between rule followers thinking that got it right, and their really got it right. (Bloor 1997, 17)

Die unbeschränkte Anwendbarkeit einer durch eine beschränkte Anzahl von Beispielen eingeführten Regel wird also auf den Erwerb von Dispositionen zurückgeführt, welche sowohl biologischer, psychischer als auch sozialer Natur sein können. Die im Anschluss an Anscombe entwickelte These, dass zur Partizipation an eine Institution gehört, zu glauben, an ihr zu partizipieren, kann nun abgeschwächt werden zu der These, dass es genügt, wenn der Akteur weiß, dass er sich in einer geteilten Praxis mit anderen befindet, die ihn nötigenfalls mittels Sanktionen auf den "richtigen Weg" führen werden. Der empfundene Zwang, einer Regel folgen zu müssen, wird im gleichen Stil durch die Internalisierung von Sanktionen erklärt. Da für die Kategorisierung eines Verhaltens als Regelfolgen eine kollektive Sanktionspraxis benötigt wird, folgt nun auch, dass zu glauben, einer Regel zu folgen, nicht impliziert, ihr tatsächlich zu folgen.

Offen ist allerdings bislang noch, worin die treibende Kraft für diesen kausalen Prozess bestehen mag. Hier verweist Bloor auf geteilte Praktiken, welche auf gemeinsamen Interessen basieren: "The central idea is that the sociological importance of rules lies in their being shared practices sustained by interests, for example, by general interests that all group members have in coordinating their activities, and special interests such as

become invested in prior classificatory achievements and bodies of established practices, or paradigms." (Bloor 1992, 270)

Ganz anders sieht der Theorieaufbau bei Michael Lynch aus. Lynch stammt aus der von Harold Garfinkel begründeten soziologischen Schule der Ethnomethodologie, zu deren Ahnherrn mehr der Sozialphänomenologe Alfred Schütz zählt als Wittgenstein. Dennoch beansprucht auch Lynch eine Variante der Praxistheorie zu vertreten, die den Gedanken Wittgensteins besser gerecht wird als der konkurrierende Ansatz Bloors.

Bloors Diskussion des Regelfolgens basiert für Lynch auf der irreführenden Annahme einer Dichotomie zwischen einer Regel und ihren Anwendungsfällen. Gäbe man die Dichotomie dagegen auf und ersetze sie durch die Annahme, dass die "Anwendungen" der Regel ebenso zu deren Gehalt beitragen wie ihre explizite Definition, so verschwinde das Problem des Regelfolgens. Philosophische Gewährsleute für diese Position sind Baker und Hacker: "Typically explanations by examples involve using a series of examples as a *formulation of the rule*." (Baker/Hacker (1985), zit. nach Lynch 1992, 235) Ähnlich wie der Verzicht auf den Schema-Inhalt-Dualismus in der Erkenntnistheorie zur Annahme eines unmittelbaren Verhältnisses von Sprache und Welt und daher zu einem deflatorischen Wahrheitsbegriff führte, gelangt man nun zu einem deflatorischen Regelkonzept. Es hat zur Folge, dass sich nicht mehr sinnvoll von einem "Außerhalb" der Regeln sprechen lässt, welches kausal wirksam sein könnte, da mögliche Ursachen nach diesem Konzept in die Definition einer Regel eingehen und somit Gründe für das Regelfolgen werden. Aus diesen Gründen wird der Sozialtheorie die Aufgabe der Beschreibung der Praktiken und Handlungsorientierungen von Akteuren zugewiesen.

Lynchs Vorschlag beinhaltet jedoch zumindest eine Schwierigkeit. Wenn jede Anwendung einer Regel zugleich Teil ihrer Definition ist, so wird es problematisch, die Identitätskriterien einer Regel zu bestimmen. Geht man dagegen einfach davon aus, eine Regel bleibe über die Zeit identisch, so kann der kontraintuitive Fall eintreten, dass erst zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt die Regel bestimmt ist, die das Verhalten eines Akteurs zu einem früheren Zeitpunkt beschreibt.

3. Grenzen des Kausalmodells

Bislang wurden die konkurrierenden Theorien nur grob skizziert, es kommt jedoch darauf an, sie zu bewerten. Prima facie ist sicher ein Ansatz vorzuziehen, der nicht nur deskriptive, sondern auch explanatorische Ziele verfolgt.

Damit Bloors Anspruch, kausale Erklärungen zu bieten, erfüllt werden kann, müssen zwei Bedingungen erfüllt sein. Erstens müssen, den üblichen Bedingungen für deduktiv-nomologische Erklärungen entsprechend, Explanans und Explanandum unabhängig voneinander sein. Diese Bedingung ist insofern erfüllt, als die Interessen, welche Akteure zu Sanktionspraktiken motivieren, unabhängig von Regeln und Institutionen bestimmbar sind.

Zweitens muss sich zeigen lassen, wie der kausale Mechanismus zur Herausbildung von Regel, Institutionen und Regelfolgen prinzipiell aussehen könnte. Dis ist schon deshalb notwendig, um sicherstellen, dass sich einzuführende fachwissenschaftliche Erklärungen tatsächlich auf das philosophisch interessante Explanandum richten. Einen Ausgangspunkt hierzu bieten die klassischen

Arbeiten von Lewis (1969) und Ullmann-Margalit (1977) zur spieltheoretischen Erklärung von Koordinations- und Kooperationsnormen. In Koordinationsspielen mit symmetrischen oder asymmetrischen Auszahlungen kann es aufgrund von zufälligen Ereignissen oder auch Machtungleichgewichten zur "Auswahl" eines Nashgleichgewichts kommen. Akteure, die eine andere als die Gleichgewichtsstrategie wählen, werden ihre verringerte Auszahlung als Sanktion erfahren. Daher ist es in solchen Fällen möglich, von einer Konvention zu sprechen, die sich nach dem Modell Bloors erklären lässt. Etwas schwieriger stellt sich die Situation in dem bekannten Gefangenendilemma dar. Hier entsteht lediglich im Falle einer unbeschränkten Zahl von Spielrunden ein kooperatives Gleichgewicht. Wenn diese Bedingung aber annähernd erfüllt ist, lässt sich auch hier davon sprechen, dass aus den Interessen der Akteure Kooperationsnormen kausal hervorgegangen sind und durch kausale Mechanismen aufrechterhalten werden. Zu beachten ist, dass in beiden Fällen die Erklärung darauf basiert, dass die gegebenen Präferenzen von Akteuren zu Handlungsproblemen führen, für die Regeln, Normen und Institutionen eine Lösung bieten.

Sehr viel schwieriger sieht die Situation bei solchen Normen und Institutionen aus, die man üblicherweise als konstitutive Regeln beschreiben wird. Bei Spielen (im Alltagssinne), aber auch bei zahlreichen anderen sozialen Normen kann kein vorgängiges Interesse der Akteure an der Norm ausgemacht werden. Das Interesse z.B., das man daran haben kann, mit der Mode zu gehen, nämlich das, als "Hip" zu gelten, lässt sich nicht unabhängig von der Institution der Mode individuieren oder erläutern. Daher ist die Bedingung für Kausalerklärungen, dass Explanans und Explanandum unabhängig voneinander bestimmbar sein müssen, nicht erfüllt. In einer Analogie zum Argument der logischen Verknüpfung in der Handlungstheorie lässt sich hier vielleicht von einer logischen Verknüpfung von Interessen und Institutionen sprechen. Auch der Verzicht auf die Dichotomie von Regeln und Regelanwendung gewinnt hier an Bedeutung: Die Interessen von Akteuren sind nur im Rückgriff auf Institutionen individuierbar, doch zugleich entstehen, reproduzieren und verändern sich Institutionen nur aufgrund der (interessegeleiteten) Praktiken von Akteuren. Will man in solchen Fällen überhaupt Aussagen über Regeln und Regelfolgen machen, so darf man sich dem skeptischen Argument nicht anschließen. In einer gebräuchlichen hermeneutischen Wendung ausgedrückt: Es ist notwendig, in den Zirkel hinein zu gelangen und nicht aus ihm heraus.

Um die im Titel gestellte Frage aufzugreifen: Bieten Praxistheorien einen dritten Weg in der Theorie sozialer Normen? Eher bieten sie zwei Wege. Der Weg der Kausalerklärung ist im Falle von Koordinations- und Kooperationsnormen zu beschreiten und weist – trotz der Zugehörigkeit zum starken institutionalistischen Programm – eine Nähe zu individualistischen Ansätzen auf, insofern von Interessen ausgegangen wird, die den Institutionen vorgängig sind. Befasst man sich dagegen mit Praktiken, welche auf konstitutiven Regeln fußen, so ist man gezwungen, die hermeneutische Variante der Praxistheorie zu wählen. Zugleich neigt man damit dem holistischen Lager zu, da mit der These der logischen Verknüpfung von Interessen und Institutionen die These des Holismus des Mentalen auf einer gesellschaftlichen Ebene vertreten werden muss.

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Naturalizing Intentionality via Isomorphisms: A Critical Discussion of Cummins' Theory

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The recent climate in the philosophy of mind has been more friendly to theories of consciousness than it has been to theories dedicated to the naturalisation of intentionality. During the last few years there has been a remarkable dearth of new attempts to grapple with the notorious problems of earlier proposals, such as the disjunction problem or the problem of functions for single representations (as opposed to functions for cognitive mechanisms).

There is, however, an important exception to this trend, viz. Robert Cummins' theory in *Representations, targets, and attitudes* (1996). This theory takes its cue from the thought that if misrepresentation has been a major problem for all naturalist theories of mental content then a more promising theory should make room for, and explain, cognitive error. So Cummins starts his book with reflections on how a robust conception of error constrains a theory of mental content and he comes up with a distinction between representational content, i.e. the content of mental representations, and what he calls "target content", the content that attaches to so-called intenders.

1. A short sketch of Cummins' theory

An intender is a cognitive mechanism whose function is to produce representations. Since intenders have the function of generating representations each such mechanism has a certain functional description, e.g. "the current visual scene", "the object(s) in the centre of the visual field", "the last heard sentence" etc. This functional description refers to the target content of the intender, i.e. the properties that the targets of the representations produced by the intender are supposed to satisfy. The fact that a representation is tokened by some intender has itself a certain kind of content which Cummins calls "application content", i.e. the content that results from applying the tokened representation to some target. This application content is propositional. Its general form is that the target satisfies the content of the representation. On Cummins' theory propositional contents are not associated with mental sentences (Fodor, 1975, 1987, 1990) but with facts, viz. that a given representation has been tokened by a given intender.

A cognitive error occurs when the representational content doesn't match the target. The target itself is fixed on a given occasion by target content, on the one hand, and the world, on the other hand. Target-fixation is thus understood in a descriptivist way. The target of a given representation is that entity that *satisfies* target content and not, for example, an entity that elicits the production of a representation inside a given intender. Intenders are cognitive mechanisms whose job is to produce representations that are targeted at certain objects. Target content, i.e. the content that characterises what an intender is supposed to represent, is fixed by teleology, for example along the lines of an etiological theory.¹

In the following, however, I will have nothing to say about this part of Cummins' theory. Instead, I take it simply for granted. Representational content, on the other hand, is fixed by isomorphisms holding between "structures". If

you want to know what a given representations represents you have to find a structure in that representation, i.e. you have to decompose the representational vehicle into elements and relations between these elements. Since you may find more than one way of decomposing the state, object or event you will commonly find not only one but several structures. Now, the state, object or event in question represents all those things that have a structure that is isomorphic to one of the structures of the representing item. If your representation is a city map it represents among other things the intended city and every city that has the same number and arrangements of streets, assuming that you don't count the green spots and the drawings of buildings among the relevant elements. If you decompose the map in a different way, say as an arrangement of colour spots, then the map may represent every painting that has the same colours arranged in the same way. Or you might take the map as something having four sides representing desk surfaces, cupboards, walls, computer screens, sheets of paper, etc. etc.

There is a certain ambiguity as to what is supposed to be represented. It may be structures or things that have these structures. Over the next paragraphs, I want to leave it open what it is that gets represented, but eventually this question has to be addressed.

Now that we know what target content and representational content are and how they are fixed we can ask where cognitive error is to be found.

2. Misrepresentation, multiple structures, and principles of decomposition

According to Cummins' theory misrepresentation finds a natural place between target content and representational content.

(MR) A representation *r* misrepresents its target when the target doesn't have a structure that is isomorphic with a structure of the representation.

Now the question is whether this is really a "robust" notion of misrepresentation as Cummins thinks. In any case there is no problem that seems immediately as serious as the disjunction problem for causal theories of content. But there may be a problem that makes misrepresentation much less robust than initially thought. It has been noted above that there is not only one structure in a representation, i.e. in a natural state, event, or object, but many. The same goes for the targets of a representation. Which structures there are in something depends on how this thing is decomposed into elements. Now it might be the case that since there are several decompositions of both targets and representations there will always be *some* structure of the representation that is an isomorph of *some* structure of the target. If this is true then (MR) is never satisfied and there is no misrepresentation. This would be the analogue to the disjunction problem for causal theories. In any case there are lots of structures in both targets and representations and one might think that the more there are the higher the probability that an isomorphism can be found.

¹ cf. R. Millikan 1984.

In a discussion of Russell's causal theory of perception, which set forth the idea that we can only know the relations between things but not the things that stand in this relation, Max Newman showed that in order to establish an isomorphism between two domains all you need is that the elements of the domains have the same cardinal number (Newman, 1928). If this is correct and if it is possible to decompose a representation in such a way that there will be as many elements as there are in the target structure (supposing that we have a *single* such structure) then there will be isomorphism and no misrepresentation even in those cases in which the target content specifies a single structure.

The question whether misrepresentation is possible or not accordingly reduces to the question whether it is always possible to decompose a representation in such a way that there are as many elements as in the target. If there are no constraints on such a decomposition it is surely possible to decompose any object into any number of parts. So without any constraints on decomposition there will be no misrepresentation.

A possible constraint would be that the resulting parts should be *natural*. For example, you would perhaps not decompose a box that has six surfaces into a front surface, a rear surface and a surface that wraps the whole box between those two surfaces, that is, unless you have special reasons to do so. And you would not decompose a crystal into one electron and the rest of the elementary particles, but you would decompose it into its elementary particles or its atoms or layers of lattice structures. What is guiding us in such decompositions that seem to be natural is a sort of *equality principle*. Wholes are to be decomposed into parts in such a way that the parts are equal in a certain respect. A decomposition into atoms has the atoms as equal parts, a decomposition into molecules has the molecules as equal parts. Equality does not mean, however, that all the atoms or molecules or bigger structures are qualitatively the same. It only means that you take atoms, molecules, etc. as parts, regardless of their kinds.

But there is something deeper at work here than merely this equality principle. For it is not by chance that we pick the level of atoms, of molecules, etc. Why do we decompose a whole into units at these levels? Presumably because there are *laws* concerning atoms, molecules and the like. So a whole is naturally decomposed into such parts about which there are laws of nature.

When we apply this criterion to representations in computational systems then it seems that a natural decomposition of a representation is one where the parts stand in computational regularities, the analogues of laws of nature. A natural decomposition of a representation seems to be determined by how the parts of the representation are *used* computationally. If there are no computational processes that use certain parts of the representation then there will be no natural decomposition at this level, i.e. the computational level. There may still be other decompositions at some physical level but in its own domain, viz. the domain of computational systems, there would be no decomposition if there are no processes that use parts of a representation.

3. Cognitive explanations and the problem of misalignment

However, Cummins' critique of extant theories of mental content, viz. that they render cognitive explanations trivial, is most convincing with respect of conceptual role

semantics, but is less satisfactory with respect to other causal theories. If a causal connection to behaviour *B* is partly constitutive of the meaning of representation *R* then an explanation of *B* in terms of the meaning of *R* is clearly circular and in this sense trivial.

But causal theories of content which claim that only the causal relations between property instances and instances of the representation are relevant for the content of a representation do *not* render cognitive explanations trivial in the same way. For there is no circularity. According to Cummins, however, there is a different problem, viz. the problem of coordination or misalignment.² This is the problem that there is nothing that guarantees that representations of horses (|horses|) behave appropriately and that they do *not* behave as if they were representations of cows (|cows|).

Under a causal theory of content there has to be a correlation between the form and the content of a representation if explanations of behaviour referring to content are to be possible. The form of the representation determines its causal role. So if there is a correlation of form and content it is possible to explain the effects of the tokening of a representation by its content.³ On the other hand, if the correlation between form and content does *not* hold then content cannot explain anymore the effects a representation has, its form would be the only explanatory factor. The critical point for causal theories is that cognitive explanations wouldn't be credible unless the correlation of content and form holds. In order to substantiate this criticism Cummins would have to show that the correlation doesn't hold in general, i.e. that cases of misalignment are quite common. He ventures to show this by pointing out that "systems that typically reason with |cow|s as if they were |ungulate|s, or better, as if they were |cow or apparent cow|s, can be expected to get into pretty much the trouble we actually do get into." (ibid., 68)

The point is that sometimes we make errors of reasoning because we treat a representation as if it were a semantically closely related but different representation. For example, we may think that electrons have trajectories by substituting for |electron| |very small, negatively charged physical object| and inferring that since physical objects in general have trajectories electrons should have them as well.

Every such case can be considered a case of misalignment that disconfirms the correlation between form and content and puts into question the possibility of content explanations *if* content is in some way or other causally dependent on the instantiation of properties. But do content explanations fare better under the assumption that representation depends on isomorphisms? Cummins thinks that what makes the misalignment problem possible is the fact that the relation between the form of a primitive representation and the property it represents is arbitrary in the sense that, in principle, every property could be connected with every form. Moreover, the relation between form and conceptual role is equally arbitrary. So it seems to be a happy coincidence if the causal role of a representation aligns with its content. Successful explanations of behaviour in terms of content that do not suffer from the

² Fodor 1987, 81; Cummins 1996, 67 sq.

³ Such explanations are problematic, however, since the form of the representation is the causally relevant property that, together with the processing rules, determines the effects of a representation. According to Kim's supervenience argument the causal relevance of content is precluded by the form of a representation (Kim 1998). If acceptable causal explanations should mention the causally relevant properties, explanations in terms of content wouldn't be acceptable.

misalignment problem should therefore imply that the relation between form and content is *not* arbitrary and likewise for the relation between form and causal role.

Now, under the assumption that representation is based on isomorphisms the relation between form and content is not arbitrary since content is determined by form, i.e. by the structure of a representation. But, unfortunately, the same is not true of the relation between form (structure) and causal role. The causal role of a representation depends on *two* factors, viz. its form *and* the processing rules that are sensitive to this form. Since there is no necessary relationship between the form of an item and how this item is treated computationally the possibility of misalignment also exists for representations that are isomorphic with what they represent. For example, there is nothing that excludes the possibility that an isomorphic representation of a cow gets inferentially connected with the contents "is good for riding" or "likes eating oats". But if the problem of misalignment is also a problem for Cummins' theory, then this theory is in the same position concerning the status of content explanations, i.e. it has the same trouble to justify such explanations.

4. Conclusion

Cummins' basic strategy to deal with the problem of misrepresentation, viz. to distinguish between target content and representational content and to identify misrepresentation with a lack of fit between target and representation, is certainly something to be pursued and studied further. On this level of description it is left open how target content and representational content are determined. For example, it would be possible to think of target fixation in a teleofunctional way and to think of representational content in an informational/causal way. Since the second main motive for Cummins' theory, viz. that it does not trivialise cognitive explanation, is unfounded because his theory equally suffers from the problem of misalignment, we really don't have a good reason in order to prefer isomorphisms over correlations or causality. In all likelihood both isomorphisms and causal relations (which are needed for the definiteness of thought anyway) will be the ingredients of a future theory of mental representation that avoids the disjunction problem. That such a theory will in some way invoke causality or covariance is made plausible by the fact that the earliest instances of representation seem to be examples of the detection of properties where these properties have minimal complexity. Isomorphisms, on the other hand, are a good idea for organisms that are capable of dealing with or exploiting a certain level of environmental complexity. And, of course, it would be very interesting to know how causality and isomorphisms did interconnect for the first time and under which circumstances because if we knew that we would be in a better position to know how they interconnect in extant cognitive creatures.

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On Attributing Colour Perceptions

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1. Introduction

One of the main targets of Stroud's criticism in his recent book *The Quest for Reality. Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of Colour* are eliminativist theories of colour, which he regards as a version of the metaphysical project of the unmasking of colours (Stroud 2000). According to this view, no physical objects have any of the colours we see them or believe them to have. However, although this error theory describes all our colour perceptions as illusory, and all our colour beliefs as false, it cannot deny that we actually perceive colours and that we do believe that physical objects are coloured. Therefore, it has to account for these psychological facts without relying on any assumptions about the colours of things. Thus, the central question for the unmasking project is whether it is possible to acknowledge someone's perceiving a certain colour or having beliefs about the colours of things without holding that anything anywhere has any colour at all.

2. The Epistemic Conditions of Predicational Perceptions

Stroud presents the following argument to show that an interpreter, who attributes to others colour perceptions and colour beliefs, is actually bound to accept the existence of colours: Other than a realist about colours, the unmasking interpreter is not in a position to attribute perceptions of colours to others on the basis of what he believes to be the colours of the objects he sees. Instead, in attributing perceptions of colours to other people he has to rely on certain non-colour facts that he could recognize as being *correlated* with his own perceptions of patches of certain kinds.

The major problem for the unmasking interpreter lies in recognizing his own perceptions of certain kinds of patches. In order to be able to attribute perceptions with specific contents to others on the basis of what happens in his own case, he must know what happens in his own case. So he needs some conception of the kind of perception he gets from objects of a certain kind. For instance, he has to understand what a yellow patch of colour is, and to understand what he is predicating of a certain patch when he sees it as being yellow. Thus, the question is what he would be able to recognize about himself and his own perceptions. Stroud examines the following two options for defining colour predicates that are supposed to refer to properties of patches in the visual field:

(1) The unmasking interpreter might try to identify the yellow colour of the patch by definite description as that property that he sees to belong to his patch in the presence of a ripe lemon. However, according to Stroud, this specification is *not unique*, because there are too many properties to which this definite description might refer, like the elliptical shape of the patch, for instance. He argues that it is of no help to specify the property by elimination, saying only that it is that property other than its shape that he sees to belong to his elliptical patch. This negative specification is also not unique, because there are still too many properties of the patch to which the definite description might refer which are neither its shape nor the property of being yellow.

(2) Specifying the property in question by ostension or demonstration is supposed to have similar difficulties. Concentrating his attention on a yellow patch the unmasking interpreter sees in the presence of a ripe lemon and saying

„this“ or „this that I now see“ alone does not determine what he perceives or takes himself to perceive, because he could be referring to the patch, to the area surrounding the patch, or to something else. Even if he makes it clear that he means a property of the patch and explicitly says „This property“ or „This property that I see this patch to have“, it is left indeterminate which property he means, or whether he has succeeded in identifying a property at all.

According to this objection, the main problem for the unmasking interpreter is that he is not in a position to understand which specific property he is perceiving, because he knows what he is concentrating on only if he has some way of thinking of himself as concentrating on a certain property. Merely being presented with a patch that is in fact yellow is not enough to give a determinate meaning to the word „yellow“. Hence the unmasker's attempt to give an ostensive definition of the colours of patches in his visual field fails, because he lacks the required understanding of what he is concentrating on.

From these arguments Stroud draws the following two consequences: First, we have found no determinate property that the unmasking interpreter could understand himself as perceiving when a yellow patch appears to him in the presence of a ripe lemon. Therefore, he cannot attribute perceptions of that same property to others whom he knows to be related in the same way to ripe lemons. Second, even if there were any such property which he could understand himself as seeing in the presence of yellow lemons, *it could not be a colour of things*. Any property he could have in mind would be something that belongs to seen patches. So even if, in certain circumstances, he were able to attribute some perceptions to other people, and even if these perceptions were just like the perceptions he himself gets in those circumstances, the perceptions he could attribute to them would not be perceptions of the colours of things.

For these reasons, Stroud concludes that no one could abandon all beliefs about the colours of things and still understand the colour terms involved when ascribing perceptions of and beliefs about the colours of things to other people. Therefore, we cannot consistently reach the unmasking metaphysical conclusion and defend an error theory of our beliefs about the colours of things.

In a recent article, Paul Boghossian maintains that understanding predicational colour perceptions and colour beliefs does *not* require accepting the existence of the colours of things (Boghossian 2002; for a similar objection see Byrne 2002). According to him, attributing these cognitive states to other people merely requires understanding how things *look* to them. Hence, being able to understand what it means that something looks yellow to me, for instance, is sufficient for understanding what other people mean by saying that something is in fact yellow. However, this objection neglects that perceiving something as looking yellow to me is a case of *epistemic perception* that requires that the perceiver already understands the concept of being yellow (Stroud 2002). You cannot know that an object looks yellow to you unless you have the concept of yellow, because the phrase „looks yellow“ contains „yellow“ as a semantic constituent. Since it is not possible, according to Stroud, to define colour concepts in terms of features of patches in one's visual field, the only

way to give these concepts a specific meaning is to regard colours as properties of real things.

3. The Reducibility of Colour-Thoughts

Now I would like to examine an important assumption of Stroud's argument and explain why I am not convinced that for attributing predicational colour perceptions, we have to believe in the reality of the colours of things. The assumption I will focus on is his claim that the contents of our thoughts about colour are *not reducible* to any combination of non-colour ingredients (Stroud 2000, p. 147). Although some particular colours can be understood as combinations of other colours – for instance, we can think of green as a combination of yellow and blue – this is supposed not to be true of colours *in general*. Contrary to the case of thoughts about unicorns or golden mountains, there do not seem to be any properties which, while not being colours at all, could somehow be put together and, thus, convey to us the idea of colour in general. For this reason Stroud holds the view that our understanding and recognition of the colours of things cannot be built up of non-colour building blocks.

He presents several arguments to show that the concept of being yellow cannot be explained in terms of experiential concepts like „looking yellow“. He maintains that the concept of being yellow has to be regarded as conceptually more fundamental than the concept of looking yellow. This fits in with his objectivist view of colours, according to which colours are real properties which have their own causal roles. Hence, being yellow is more than just looking yellow to human perceivers under normal perceptual conditions. Therefore, it should be possible to characterize colours by features like the following:

- Colours are certain surface properties of things.
- For each colour there is a specific spectral reflectance profile.
- There are scientific laws of colour which describe the different causal roles of colours like, for instance, their effects on other colours.

Now the following question arises: If colours are characterized by features of this kind, would it be possible for us to grasp the truth-conditions of colour predicates by understanding and combining the concepts that describe these features? To answer this question, let us first consider the case of a blind person. We are able to explain the meaning of colour terms to blind persons, because they are able to understand the concepts of the features that characterize a certain colour. So we can explain the meaning of the concept of being yellow, for instance, to the blind by saying that yellow objects are characterized by a certain spectral reflectance profile and by having several specific causal effects on other colours, on our perceptual apparatus, and the like. For this reason, even blind persons who have never seen any colours, would be able to grasp the truth-conditions of colour predicates. Perhaps blind persons might not be able to *imagine* or to *see with their mind's eye* how yellow lemons would look to them. But this does not imply that they are not able to *understand* or to *grasp* what is required for an object to be yellow. Therefore, blind persons are able to attribute predicational colour perceptions to other people, because they can understand the truth-conditions of colour predicates.

Stroud also maintains that blind persons are able to know that lemons are yellow, tomatoes are red, and grass is green (Stroud 2000, p. 172f.). According to him, knowledge of the colour of a thing does not require the power of sight. Hence, the blind can understand colour terms to the extent they understand the rest of us when we speak of the colours of things.

Second, imagine a person who does not believe that she herself is seeing colours. Now, I think that if we have the conceptual resources to explain the meaning of colour predicates to a person who is *not able* to see colours, namely a blind person, it should also be possible to explain the meaning of colour terms to a person who does *not believe* that she sees colours. If we think it possible for blind persons to grasp the truth-conditions of colour predicates, I do not see why it should not also be possible to explain the meaning of colour terms to an error theorist. Why should the error theorist not be able to understand colour predicates - at least to the extent blind persons understand them? Like the blind, the error theorist has only to understand and to combine the different concepts describing the features and causal roles that characterize a certain colour. Consequently, not only the blind, but also the error theorist should be able to understand colour predicates and to attribute predicational colour perceptions to other people.

To understand colour concepts by this kind of description, the error theorist is not bound to accept the reality of colours, because he does not have to accept the assumption that the combinations of features and causal roles that are supposed to characterize the colours of things really exist. He can still deny that there are such combinations. This case is completely analogous to the case of understanding thoughts about unicorns: In order to understand thoughts with this content it is not required to accept that the combinations of properties that are supposed to characterize unicorns actually exist.

So if we do not reduce colours to their appearances, but instead maintain an objectivist view and characterize colours by their causal roles and other features, it must also be possible for us to understand colour terms by understanding and combining the concepts of these causal roles and features. For this reason, I suggest that Stroud's assumption that the contents of our thoughts about colour cannot be reduced to any combination of non-colour ingredients should be replaced by the contrary claim, namely that our understanding and recognition of the colours of things can be built up of non-colour building blocks.

Hence, we are facing the following dilemma: Either we regard „looking yellow“ as conceptually more fundamental than the concept of being yellow. Under this assumption we can accept Boghossian's and Byrne's objection that understanding how colours look to me is enough for understanding colour predicates. Or we regard the concept of being yellow as conceptually prior to „looking yellow“ and maintain an objectivist view of colour. But under this assumption not only the blind, but also the error theorist is able to understand colour predicates by understanding and combining the concepts of the features that characterize being a certain colour. For these reasons I would say that the colours of things are like unicorns and golden mountains: we can acknowledge that people believe in them without having ourselves to accept their existence.

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Fantasie. Faktizität und Fakten – Die Rolle des Imaginären in Kognitionswissenschaft und Phänomenologie

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1.

Eine ursprüngliche philosophische Methode besteht darin, Realität in Frage zu stellen. Wir fragen, *was wäre, wenn* alles nur Fiktion wäre, wenn alles nur Produkt unseres Bewusstseins, oder gar einer göttlichen Macht wäre ... Jenen Gedankenexperimenten liegt eine bestimmte Konzeption von Realität zugrunde, in der wir entweder Opfer oder Urheber von Imaginationen sind. Wir nehmen einen bestimmten Standpunkt ein, wenn wir sagen, etwas sei nicht real. Gesucht werden die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit einer objektiven, „wahren“ Realität. Der gegenwärtige philosophische Diskurs präsentiert sich diesbezüglich ambivalent: Die einen meinen, die Suche nach Realität selbst als sinnlos entlarvt zu haben. Sogenannte postmoderne Theorien beziehen sich auf eine Welt der Bilder; das Imaginäre beherrsche unsere Wirklichkeit. Die Aufspaltung des Subjektiven gehe mit einer Auflösung des Objektiven einher, was bleibt, sind Diskurse und Fiktionen, Kohärenz die im nachhinein gestiftet wird. Auf der anderen Seite die Vertreter naturalistischer Positionen. Sie sind geprägt von einem unerschütterlichen Glauben an die Naturwissenschaft, an die objektiven Fakten und Tatsachen, zu denen auch wir gehören sollen. Die Grenze ihrer Realität ist definiert über den Forschungsbereich der Naturwissenschaft. Eine andere Vorstellung von Realität und Fiktion liegt demgegenüber unserer Alltagserfahrung zugrunde. Wir suchen nicht nach einer Bestimmung von Realität, sondern setzen sie in unseren Urteilen und Meinungen stets schon voraus. Ins Zögern geraten wir erst, wenn es darum geht, mit den Fantasien und Realitätsvorstellungen anderer umzugehen.

Wie ist jenes Missverhältnis im theoretischen und alltäglichen Umgang mit Realität und Imagination zu verstehen? Gibt es einen Mittelweg zwischen dem Versuch, Fantasievorstellungen als repräsentative Tatsachen eines kognitiven Systems darzustellen, und dem postmodernen Zweifel, jemals wieder zu einer Realität zu finden? Ich vertrete die Überzeugung, dass die Phänomenologie diesen Weg gehen kann. Der hier gewählte Ansatz geht von Alltagsintuitionen aus, die phänomenologischer und kognitionswissenschaftlicher Bewusstseinstheorie gegenübergestellt werden.

2.

Wir wissen, was es heißt, Bewusstsein zu haben, wir verstehen auch andere, als in ihrem Bewusstsein lebend. Wir haben Erfahrung davon, dass unser bewusstes Erleben an unseren Körper gebunden ist, trotzdem kann ich den Schmerz einer fiktiven Person (z.B. in einem Roman) nachfühlen, ich spüre ihn sozusagen „am eigenen Leibe“. Fantasie ist eine Voraussetzung dafür, sich in andere Personen hineinzufühlen, zu verstehen. Auch erleben wir uns im Fantasieren als frei von unserem Hier. Ich kann mir vorstellen, auf einem Berggipfel in den Ostalpen zu stehen, obwohl ich gerade im Büro sitze. Der Gedanke an den Ausblick, lässt mein Herz schneller schlagen, mein Herz hier am Schreibtisch. Die Fantasie

besitzt eine Faktizität, die nicht nur bildlich ist, sondern lebendig. Versucht man sie in Begriffe, in Sprache zu fassen, so bleibt sie potentielle Fiktion. Eine Rezipientin muss sie wieder zum Leben erwecken. Imagination hat die doppelte Kraft der freien Produktion und Reproduktion von Bedeutungen. Zu Fantasieren bedeutet Zusammenhänge herzustellen und gleichzeitig in Distanz zu treten, in Differenzen zu denken. Es handelt sich aber um eine andere Distanz als die, wenn ich mich in eine theoretisch-betrachtende Perspektive begeben und vorstelle, wie mein Körper funktioniert. Ich merke, dass ich den komplizierten Funktionszusammenhang meines Gehirns nicht in mein (Er-)Leben integrieren kann. Jene theoretische Einstellung scheint somit eine zweite Realität zu schaffen, die von meiner erlebten abstrahiert.

Sich mit dem Verhältnis von Erfahrung und der Möglichkeit verschiedener Einstellungen auseinander zu setzen, heißt unter anderem, Phänomenologie zu betreiben. Während naturalistische Konzepte plausibel zu machen versuchen, wie wir jenes Wissen über unseren Körper als die eigentliche Realität unserer bewussten Existenz verstehen können, wird der Phänomenologin häufig vorgeworfen, dass sie über die Konzeption der Realität als Realität-für-jemanden, nie zu einer objektiven Welt komme. Jenes Problem stellt sich aber nur unter der nicht-phänomenologischen Voraussetzung, Realität und Bewusstsein in ein Verhältnis bringen zu wollen, statt unter Bewusstsein bereits das Verhältnis selbst zu verstehen.

Repräsentationalistische Theorien, wie sie gegenwärtig von im Umkreis der Kognitionswissenschaft tätigen Philosophen wie Thomas Metzinger oder Fred Dretske vertreten werden, gehen davon aus, dass wir Bewusstsein haben, um Informationen über die Welt zu erlangen. Die Frage, die sie zu beantworten versuchen, ist, warum wir Bewusstsein von diesen Vorgängen haben und auch von Dingen und Sachverhalten, die wir nicht aktuell wahrnehmen. Nach prinzipiellen Grenzen der Naturalisierbarkeit zu fragen, bedeutet zu untersuchen, welche Anteile unseres Selbstverständnisses naturalisierbar sind und welche nicht. Kann man z.B. sagen, die Fähigkeit zur Fantasie gehöre im Gegensatz zur Wahrnehmung zu den nicht-naturalisierbaren Phänomenen, da sie nicht mithilfe eines komplizierten Input-Output-Systems erklärbar sind? Die Bewusstseinsleistung „Fantasieren“ stellt somit einen möglichen Test für den Naturalismus dar.

3.

Welche spezielle Rolle spielt Fantasie in der Diskussion um die Naturalisierbarkeit von Bewusstsein? Mentale Repräsentation wird von Thomas Metzinger eingeführt als Vorgang durch den informationsverarbeitende Systeme, in dem Fall Menschen, interne Repräsentationen erzeugen, „Beschreibungen von Teilbereichen der Wirklichkeit“ (Metzinger 1999, 47). Es geht also um die Wirklichkeit. Die Bildung mentaler Zustände wird als Sonderfall von ansonsten unbewusst vor sich gehender Informationsverarbeitung eingeführt. (vgl. ebd., 48) Mentale Zustände weisen im Unterschied zu anderen Repräsentationen

„phänomenale Qualitäten“ (ebd.) auf. Unterschieden wird zwischen dem Prozess der Repräsentation und dem Resultat, dem Repräsentat. Der Prozess sei uns aufgrund seiner hohen Geschwindigkeit nie zugänglich, sondern stets nur das Resultat (vgl. ebd., 51). Das System, das wir sind, und die Welt, die repräsentiert wird, bleiben aufgrund der Opazität der Repräsentationen, die im einen Fall ein Selbstmodell, im anderen Fall ein Weltmodell abbilden, stets verborgen, die eigentliche „Realität“ bleibe uns verstellt. In diesem Missverständnis über die Welt und uns selbst seien wir stets gefangen. Die Fantasievorstellung, ein spezielles nicht-propositionales Format von Vorstellung, erhält ihre nur mittelbar zugängliche „Realität“ durch den Verweis auf Metarepräsentationen, die für eine andere wahrnehmungsmäßige Repräsentation steht, die wiederum auf einen Gegenstand verweist. Fantasievorstellungen entstehen also in einem komplizierten hierarchischen System von verschiedenen auf einander bezogenen Repräsentationsebenen. (vgl. ebd., 57-59)

Fred Dretske geht in seinem Modell von der Vorhandenheit „objektiver“ Information in der Natur aus. Die Informationsprozesse, in denen sich unser Denken und Handeln vollzieht, müssen als selbstgesteuerte Regelkreise begriffen werden. „*Alle mentalen Tatsachen sind repräsentationale Tatsachen*“ (Dretske 1998, 9) und werden als Teil eines allumfassenden entwicklungsmäßigen Systems begriffen. Intentionalität ist innerhalb dieses Systems ein *reales Verhältnis* und eben kein *intentionales*. Kausalketten sollen die Repräsentationen von Gegenständen, Ereignissen, Sachverhalten usw. verknüpfen. Repräsentationen werden als von der Welt „verursacht“ verstanden. Trotzdem ist Dretske der Meinung, dass seine repräsentationale Darstellung des Geistes einem phänomenologischen Intentionalitätskonzept gerecht wird. (vgl. ebd., 39f.) Was er als Struktur von Intentionalität darstellt, „die aspektbezogene Gestalt“ (ebd., 41), soll dem subjektiven Aktcharakter unserer Erfahrungen entsprechen: „Wenn ein Gegenstand repräsentiert wird, dann wird er stets unter einem Aspekt repräsentiert. Selbst wenn es keinen Gegenstand gibt, der Aspekt bleibt.“ (ebd., 42) Was aber besteht, ist nicht der Aspekt, sondern der intentionale Akt des Gerichtetseins. Edmund Husserl weist in den Ideen II auf den Unterschied zwischen intentionaler und realer Beziehung hin: „Die reale Beziehung fällt weg, wenn das Ding nicht existiert, die intentionale Beziehung bleibt bestehen.“ (Hua IV, 215) Dretske ignoriert den Aktcharakter der Intentionalität zugunsten der Inhaltlichkeit. Jene Momente sind aber nicht zu trennen.

Dretske versteht unter Wahrnehmen „kausal affiziert werden“. Kausalbeziehungen können allerdings nicht fehlen. (Vgl. Dretske 1988, 56) Innerhalb des kognitionswissenschaftlichen Modells ist es somit unmöglich, Kognition von Nicht-Kognition abzugrenzen. Es gibt kein Kriterium zur Unterscheidung von wahr oder falsch. Ohne einen Standard realistischer Erkenntnis hat es auch keinen Sinn, von Realität und Fiktion zu sprechen. Es ist nicht eine spezifisch „intrinsic Qualität“ (vgl. Dretske 1998, 43) oder ein bestimmtes „Repräsentationsformat“, was etwas zu einer Fantasievorstellung macht, sondern der Akt des Fantasierens. Der Bezug auf verschiedene Systemebenen würde reflektierende Akte einer Meta-Meta-Instanz erfordern, die es aber in einem geschlossenen Repräsentationssystem nicht geben kann. Der Repräsentationsbegriff bezieht sich auf funktionale Inhalte, die von einem Beobachterstandpunkt konstatiert werden, der im System selbst keinen Platz findet. Dass Bewusstsein sich nie im Akt des Richtens gleichzeitig auf sich selbst richten kann, interpretiert Metzinger als Informationsdefizit und spricht davon, dass die Erfahrung der Unmittelbarkeit unseres Weltbezuges nur eine Illusion sei.

Kognition wird von Kognitionswissenschaftlern als individuelle Leistung eines Organismus betrachtet. Die Rolle einer geschichtlichen Handlungs- oder Erfahrungsgemeinschaft für die Unterscheidung von Erkenntnis und Irrtum, von Imagination und Wahrnehmung wird auf die evolutionäre Entwicklung des Systems reduziert. (Vgl. Janich 1998, 377) Kognitive Systeme müssten, so Metzinger, um effektiv im Kampf ums Überleben zu sein, intern Dynamizität abbilden. „Das bedeutet: sie müssen unabhängig von der Umgebung des Systems bzw. dem Strom des Inputs aktivierbar sein.“ (Metzinger 1999, 61) Mentale Repräsentate müssten „interne Simulationen komplexer, kontrafaktischer Situationen“ (ebd., 62) ermöglichen. Fantasien gehören zu jenen mentalen Simulationen, „input-unabhängige Aktivierbarkeit“. Sie treten für Metzinger immer dann auf, „wenn die Verarbeitungskapazität des Gehirns nicht besonders stark beansprucht wird“ (ebd., 66). Es werden nun „interne Signalquellen“ (ebd., 67) in Anspruch genommen.

Jene Innen-Außen-Unterscheidung vollziehend, begibt sich Metzinger auf eine Metaebene, die er nicht innerhalb seines Modells begründen kann. Die Phänomenologin nimmt mit der Annahme der Unhintergebarkeit der Erlebnisperspektive hingegen keinen privilegierten Standpunkt bezüglich Erkenntnis ein. Phänomenologische Erkenntniskritik zu betreiben heißt nicht herauszufinden, ob ein mögliches Bewusstsein Wissen über eine hypotetisierte objektive Welt erlangen kann, sondern darum wie es, wenn es möglich ist, vor sich geht. (Vgl. Rinofner-Kreidl 2003, 11f.) Die „Welt“ ist in diesem Sinne nie „richtig“ oder „falsch“ repräsentiert, sondern paradoxerweise ist das subjektive Erfahren aus der Erste-Person-Perspektive Voraussetzung und Hindernis für jede mögliche vollständige Weltvorstellung.

4.

Metzinger und Dretske gehen davon aus, dass Fantasie ein Spezialfall von Wahrnehmung ist. Die phänomenologische Konzeption von Wahrnehmung enthält hingegen, so die hier leitende These, bereits einen imaginativen Gesichtspunkt. In der Wahrnehmung sind uns Gegenstände nur in Abschattung gegeben. Ich sehe z.B. immer nur eine Seite des Würfels, trotzdem nehme ich einen Würfel wahr. In die Wahrnehmung fließt die Vorstellung jener Aspekte des Würfels ein, die wir gerade nicht wahrnehmen. Sie werden aber nicht explizit imaginiert, sondern sind Teil des intentionalen Akts. Ich muss mir nicht zusätzlich noch alle Seiten des Würfels vorstellen, um die plastische Faktizität des Würfels wahrzunehmen. Natalie Depraz weist darauf hin, dass Passivität der Wahrnehmung und Aktivität der Imagination, entgegen Sartres Darstellung in *L'imaginaire*, keine Gegensätze bilden. Die eidetische Variation stellt einen Weg der Aufsuchung des Invarianten durch fantasiemäßige Umformung dar: „The most we can do is intend the identity of an object through its different and changing profiles. Now, in so far as perception is eidetically structured, imagination is originally required to account for the very structure of perception.“ (Depraz 1998, 43) Wahrnehmung wird als dynamischer Prozess verstanden.

Zwischen Wahrnehmung und Imagination besteht ein Verhältnis gegenseitiger Abhängigkeit. So zeigt uns die Analyse von wahrnehmungsunabhängigen Akten des Fantasierens, dass sie auch auf der Inhaltsseite an eine Vorstellung von Realität, an eine intersubjektive Erfahrungswelt, gebunden ist. Man kann den Unterschied zwischen Fiktion und Realität nicht mittels eines Korrespondenzbegriffs der Wahrheit fassen. Es macht auch

wenig Sinn, zu sagen, das Einhorn existiere nicht, weil man es nicht wahrnehmen kann. Das Einhorn ist auch Teil meiner Welt, meiner Erfahrungswelt. „Das Einhorn existiert in meiner Fantasievorstellung“ heißt, dass es in diesem Moment ein Einhorn für mich gibt, und zwar „geben“ im Sinne von Bedeutsamkeit. Im Akt des Fantasierens bin ich mir aber gleichzeitig bewusst, dass ich fantasie, das Einhorn ist stets im Modus des „als ob“ gegeben. Insofern entspricht Fantasiertes anschaulicher Vergegenwärtigung. Fantasie ist das Bewusstsein von etwas nicht Gegenwärtigem. Im Rahmen eines phänomenologischen Intentionalitätskonzepts ist Bewusstsein nicht nur stets Bewusstsein von etwas, sondern stets auch Bewusstsein dieses Erlebnisses. Das Erleben selbst ist unmittelbar gegeben. Ich muss mich nicht in einem reflexiven Akt davon überzeugen, dass meine Berggipfel-Fantasie nur eine fantasierte war. Ich bin mir im Haben der Fantasievorstellung dieses Habens bewusst. Unsere gemeinsame Lebenswelt, verbale Konventionen usw. bilden den elementaren Rahmen für kollektive Fantasien. Auch die Fantasiewelt ist keine innere Welt, kein privater Raum. Sartre fasst das Imaginäre als eine zweite Realität. Ich möchte dem widersprechen und sagen, dass sie einen wichtigen Bestandteil unserer Erfahrungswelt bildet. Wir denken und leben nicht in Tatsachen, sondern meist in dem, was gerade nicht ist. Ich glaube zu wissen, inwieweit ich meine Erfahrungen mit anderen teile und inwieweit eben nicht. Mein Fantasieren selbst kann ich niemandem zugänglich machen, die Inhalte meiner Fantasien hingegen schon. Gerade weil ich selbst verschiedenen Perspektiven und Realitätsebenen einnehmen kann, besitze ich die Fähigkeit, die Auffassungen von Fantasie und Wirklichkeit als sich aufeinander beziehend zu verstehen.

5.

Unsere Erfahrung ist stets imaginationsvermittelt, wir erfahren die Welt als bedeutsam und somit als Zusammenspiel von dem, was ist, war, sein wird und sein könnte. Husserl spricht von der „prinzipiellen Offenheit der Welt“ (Hua IV, 299). Realität und Fiktion bedingen sich wechselseitig und nicht einseitig, wie uns Naturalisten glauben lassen wollen. Wobei „Realität“, naturalistisch verstanden, physisch realisierte Kausalsysteme darstellt. Jene Realität wäre somit stets fiktional, weil wir keinen Zugang zu ihr haben. Auf der Systemebene tritt eine Verschärfung in die Gegenrichtung auf. Da stets von systematischen Zusammenhängen die Rede ist, wird überhaupt nicht mehr zwischen Repräsentation und Welt unterschieden. Die Lebenswelt ist im besten Fall eine Illusion, der wir aufgrund der hohen Verarbeitungsgeschwindigkeit unseres kognitiven Systems erliegen. Die Realität und nicht die Fiktion ist – entgegen meiner anfänglichen Vermutung – der eigentliche Test für den Naturalismus: Naturalismus fängt da an, wo die Erfahrung aufhört.

Phänomenologie ist in der Lage, jene anfangs erwähnte Einheit von Differenz und Kohärenz, die unsere erfahrungsmäßige Realität in natürlicher Einstellung kennzeichnet, zu analysieren. Die Selbstverständlichkeit, mit der wir uns auf eine gemeinsame Wirklichkeit beziehen, kann zur Verständlichkeit gebracht werden. Andererseits stehen wir vor der Herausforderung, jene Distanz, die bezüglich der naturwissenschaftlichen Fakten über unseren Körper als Funktionszusammenhang und der Erfahrung der Aufsplitterung unserer Subjektivität besteht, zumindest theoretisch rückgängig zu machen. Und zwar indem wir dort mit unserer Analyse beginnen, wo der Übergang von erfahrener Lebenswelt zu beobachteter Illusion, zu theoretisch konstituierter Auflösung stattgefunden hat. Insofern

kann man kognitionswissenschaftliche und postmoderne Ergebnisse über den Status von Realität, so verschieden sie anfangs erschienen, an einen gemeinsamen theoretischen Ausgangspunkt zurückführen. Es geht darum, jenen Einstellungswechsel von natürlicher zu theoretischer nachzuvollziehen. So ist jene „andere Realität“ nicht als zweite oder eigentliche zu postulieren, sondern als untergeordnete Ebene zu verstehen: im einen Fall als physische Voraussetzung unseres Erfahrens, im anderen Fall als Voraussetzung dafür, die *Einheit der Differenz* meiner Existenz als *jemeinige* zu verstehen. Von der Naturwissenschaft gewonnene objektive Erkenntnisse als Vorstufe zu einer endgültigen Erklärung von Subjektivität darzustellen, sowie die Einheit der Subjektivität jenseits von Differenzen zu suchen, würde dem Manne vom Lande in Kafkas Türhüterparabel entsprechen, der stets darauf wartet, Einlass in jenes Gesetz zu erhalten, das er selbst verkörpert.

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Sachverhalte bei Aristoteles und Adam Wodeham

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Aristoteles' pragma

Aristoteles, in *De Int.* 19a 33, sagt: "Die Sätze sind entsprechend wahr, wie die Dinge sind."

Wodeham [alle Zitate von Adam die dem Sentenzbuch, 1. Distinktion, 1. Frage entstammen, sind aus Perler 1990 entnommen] in seinem Sentenzenkommentar, 1. Distinktion, 1. Frage, § 58 sagt: „Das So-sein seitens des Dinges oder das Nicht-so-sein hängt nicht von einem Akt der Seele oder von einem Zeichen ab.“ (Perler 1990, 299)

In Stellen wie solchen finden wir die Sachverhalte als Wahrheitsträger. Was sind die Sachverhalte aber, und wie sind diese logisch und ontologisch konstruiert?

Aristoteles verwendet an der oben zitierten Stelle den Begriff des „Dinges“ (griech. *pragma*). Was meint er mit diesem Begriff? Meint er ein Individuum, einen Gegenstand, so dass gilt ein Etwas *a* ist ein Ding, wenn gilt $a = a$ oder meint er damit etwas anderes?

Pragmata sind bei Aristoteles die Wahrheitsträger, und nach ihnen richtet sich der Satz oder die Behauptung. (Siehe auch Modrak 2002, 20) Wenn die Dinge so sind, wie durch den Satz ausgesagt, dann ist der Satz wahr, oder umgekehrt, wenn die Dinge nicht so sind, wie der Satz von ihnen aussagt, dann ist der Satz falsch. Denn aus *De Int.* 9, 16a folgt, dass ein Satz eine Verbindung der Begriffe ist, und wenn er nicht ist, dann ist er eben kein Satz, und dass man im Satz von einer Sache sagt, dass sie ist oder nicht ist, wie durch den Satz ausgesagt.

Ich lasse zwei Aristoteles-Stellen, welche Wodeham (wie auch von Gregor von Rimini), aber auch historisch als die Hauptquelle für die Lehre der *complexae significabilia* angesehen werden, vorerst für sich sprechen:


„Auch was unter die Verneinung und Bejahung fällt, ist keine Verneinung und Bejahung. Denn die Bejahung ist eine bejahende Rede und die Verneinung eine verneinende Rede, was aber unter die Bejahung und Verneinung fällt, ist keine Rede. Doch gilt auch von ihm, daß es sich wie Bejahung und Verneinung gegenübersteht. Denn auch hier ist die Weise des Gegensatzes dieselbe: wie die Bejahung der Verneinung, etwa der Satz: er sitzt, dem anderen Satz: er sitzt nicht, gegenübersteht, so steht sich auch die durch beide Sätze bezeichnete Sache, das Sitzen dem Nichtsitzen, gegenüber.“ (*Kategorien*, 12 b 5-16)

Und weiter unten sagt der Philosoph: "Nun ist aber die Aussage gewiß nicht der Grund, daß die Sache ist. Wohl aber erscheint die Sache gleichsam als der Grund, daß die Aussage wahr ist. Denn sofern die Sache ist oder nicht ist, wird die Aussage wahr oder falsch genannt." (*Kategorien*, 14 b 14-22, vgl. auch Gaskin 1998, 42ff.)

Der Begriff des *pragma* hat ein sehr breites Bedeutungsfeld: Laut Nuchelmans (Nuchelmans 1973, 33f.) gibt es zwei Interpretationen von *pragma*: (1) *pragma* als Ding oder Gegenstand und (2) *pragma* als Sachverhalt. In den oben angeführten Stellen ist offenbar von der zweiten Bedeutung die Rede, und diese liegt im Mittelpunkt unseres Interesses. (Für weitere Erläuterungen der Bedeutungen von *pragma* vgl. Rijk 1987, besonders 36ff., aber auch Rijk 2002, 104-114.)

Ich glaube, dass man den Begriff des *pragma* an einem Beispiel gut plausibilisieren kann: Nehmen wir an, im Stadtpark von Graz mit einer Freundin spazierend, mache ich die Aussage „Im Stadtpark von Graz gibt es viele Bäume“, dann kann man meine Aussage laut der zweiten Bedeutung von *pragma* folgendermaßen illustrieren:

Meine Aussage: „Im Stadtpark von Graz gibt es jetzt viele Bäume“,



Mit diesem Dreieck will ich nur zeigen, dass die Bedeutung von *pragma* der gesamte Bereich von Individuen, Relationen, Handlungen oder Ereignissen usw. sein kann, die ausserhalb meines Geistes bestehen, also *objektive* Existenz besitzen, da das was in meinem Geiste ist, subjektiv sein muss. Die Existenz dieser Relationen, Prädikate usw. kann freilich nicht die gleiche wie die der Substanzen sein, aber sie ist eine Irgendwie-Existenz. Diese These kann man mit *Metaph.* 1030 a 17-24 wohl untermauern. (Vgl. auch Modrak 2001, 20f.) Der Sachverhalt, bzw. die *Sache (pragma)*, kann natürlich auch ohne die von mir geäußerte Aussage (ohne den Satz) für sich bestehen. Z. B., können wir sagen, (1) dass Wasser aus Wasserstoff und Sauerstoff besteht, (2) dass ein Mensch weiß ist. Diese Sachverhalte bestehen, auch ohne sie durch einen Aussagesatz geäußert zu haben, aber (1) ist notwendig, weil es gelten soll: $\forall x (x \text{ ist Wasser} \rightarrow x \text{ besteht aus Wasserstoff und Sauerstoff})$ und (2) ist kontingent, weil es nicht essentiell und notwendig für den Menschen ist, weiß zu sein. Hiermit kann die Ewigkeit und Notwendigkeit eines Sachverhaltes bestätigt werden, aber nur eingeschränkt auf solche Sachverhalte, die der Logik nicht widersprechen. Diese aber konkurrieren nicht mit Gottes Ewigkeit und Notwendigkeit, weil (die Sachverhalte) nicht wirklich (effektiv) sind wie Gott.

Wenn mein Satz „Im Stadtpark von Graz gibt es viele Bäume“ wahr ist, dann ist ein realer Sachverhalt, so wie es ein realer Sachverhalt ist, dass Wolfgang Schüssel Bundeskanzler von Österreich ist, und somit eine Tatsache. Wenn man den Satz (hiermit meine ich den Aussagesatz) mit der Aussenwelt vergleicht, dann soll es eine Eins-zu-eins-Korrelation geben, sollte der Satz den Wahrheitswert „wahr“ bekommen. Aber wenn ich *jetzt* den Satz „Waltraud Klasnic ist Bundeskanzler von Österreich“ äußere, dann habe ich einen Sachverhalt ausgesprochen, aber wenn man ihn der Aussenwelt gegenüberstellt, dann ist er *notwendig* falsch (notwendig, weil modallogisch gilt: $\phi/\neg\phi$), da die Gegenüberstellung dem Prinzip genügen muss: dass *p*, ist wahr gdw. wenn *p*, wobei „dass *p*“ den durch

den im ersten Teil enthaltenen Satz *p* ausgesprochenen Sachverhalt darstellen soll, und *p* im zweiten Teil das objektive Korrelat dieses Satzes repräsentiert. Der Satz allein, ohne etwas über den Sachverhalt auszusagen, lautet formal: „*p*“ ist wahr gdw *p*. („Objektiv“ hier kann etwas verwundern, aber ich setze voraus, dass wir mithilfe der Sprache die außersprachliche Welt eins-zu-eins abbilden können.) Diesen Schluss ziehe ich aus *De Int.* 18 b 5-9, wo vom Wahrheitsbegriff die Rede ist, und aus *De Int.* 16 a 17, wo vom Bockhirsch, der „etwas“ bedeutet, die Rede ist, jedoch nicht wahr oder falsch sein kann, aber auch aus *De Int.* 16 b 19-22, wo von Aussagewörtern gehandelt wird, die benennen oder bezeichnen, ohne zu sagen, ob das Bezeichnete ist oder nicht ist. Aber auch in der Rede von *ens secundum verum* in der *Metaph.* 1024 b 17-26 macht Aristoteles geltend, dass es das Falsche als Sache gibt, was modern gesprochen nichts anderes als ein „untatsächlicher Sachverhalt“ (vgl. Schmitz 1985, 115) ist.

Der Sachverhalt, dass es im Stadtpark von Graz viele Bäume gibt, ist also keine sprachabhängige Entität. Wäre dies der Fall, würde es vorsichtig gesprochen nicht dem Anspruch auf Ewigkeit und Notwendigkeit des Sachverhalts genügen, und wir hätten nur noch eine Kohärenztheorie der Wahrheit bei Aristoteles vertreten gefunden, aber nicht eine Korrespondenztheorie, die in der Tat von Aristoteles vertreten wird.

Adam de Wodehams *complexe significabilia*

G. Gál (Gál 1977) hat hinreichend deutlich gezeigt, dass Wodeham die Lehre von den *complexe significabilia* begründet hat, und nicht Gregor von Rimini oder gar Crathorn, und mit ihm stimmt die Mehrheit der Gelehrten überein.

Dass aber Wodehams *complexe significabile* inhaltlich (der ontologischen sowie der logischen Form nach) dem Aristotelischen *pragma* gleichzustellen ist, darin besteht noch keine einheitliche Meinung unter den Gelehrten. (Siehe Conti 2003, Femenias 1990, Gaskin 2003)

Der Theorie von den *complexe significabilia* hat nach Wodeham ihre Wurzeln in der Frage: „Hat der Wissensakt Dinge oder Zeichen, d. h. Verknüpftes im Geist, oder die durch Verknüpftes bezeichneten Dinge als unmittelbares Objekt?“ (*utrum actus sciendi habeat pro obiecto eimmediato res vel signa, id est complexum in mente vel res significatas per complexum*). (Perler 1990, 266f.)

Die Theorie Ockhams mündet darin, dass Gegenstand eines Wissens- und Zustimmungsaktes der mentale Schluss (*complexum*) eines Syllogismus ist, die Chattons dagegen darin, dass Gegenstand eines Wissens- und Zustimmungsaktes das extramentale Ding oder Individuum (*res extra*) ist.

Wodeham wurde als „Mediator“ zwischen den Kontrahenten Wilhelm Ockham und Walter Chatton dazu veranlasst, seine eigene Theorie der *complexe significabilia* als einen „mittleren Weg“ zu entwickeln.

Als den „dritten und mittleren Weg“ sieht Wodeham die Argumentation, dass der Gegenstand unseres Wissens das ist, was er das vollständige Objekt oder die Gesamtbedeutung eines Satzes nennt und was nach ihm nichts anderes ist als das *sic esse vel sic non esse sicut per propositionem denotatur* (§ 57). Dies andererseits aber bedeutet nichts anderes als den durch den Satz ausgesagten Sachverhalt, so dass die Gesamtbedeutung eines

Satzes *p* nichts anderes ist als der Sachverhalt, dass *p*. (vgl. Perler 1990, 135f.) Man darf sich nicht irreführen lassen und nicht sagen, dass Gegenstand unseres Wissens die Übereinstimmung des Satzes mit der bezeichneten Sache ist. Dies ist nur die Voraussetzung und Teilobjekt des Zustimmungsaktes für die Gesamtbedeutung eines Satzes. (Perler 1990, 93f.) Wodeham nutzt also die Vorteile beider Theorien, jener von Ockham und jener von Chatton, um seine Theorie des *complexe significabile* zu errichten. Er drückt beides in einem aus: Ein Sachverhalt hat sowohl einen propositionalen Charakter als auch einen realen Charakter. (vgl. Perler 1990, 136f. und Rijk 1987, 35, wo er schreibt: „As to the meaning of ‘pragma’, here it stands again for ‘state of affairs’ and ‘the pragma’s being’ must refer to a state of affairs actually being the case in the outside world“.)

Argumente zugunsten der These, dass das *complexe significabile* dem Aristotelischen *pragma* gleichgesetzt werden kann

Sowohl beim *pragma* als auch beim *complexe significabile* handelt es sich um etwas „Außersprachliches“, weil mittels Aussagesatz er ausgesagt wird, dass etwas der Fall ist bzw. dass die Dinge *so und so* sind. (Rijk 1987, 35, und Nuchelmans 1980, 184)

Es handelt sich, um es im Anschluss an Weidemann auszudrücken, um „eine Größe, die nicht zu den konventionellen Sprachzeichen der geschriebenen und der gesprochenen Sprache gehört, sondern auch nicht zu den natürlichen Sprachzeichen der Mentalsprache“. (Siehe Aristoteles 2002, 137)

Beide sind holistisch zu verstehen, d. h. als eine Einheit für sich, eins in der Zahl, denn anders können wir sie nicht erfassen.

In den Aristotelischen *Kategorien* 4 b 8-10 ist zu verstehen gegeben, dass *pragma* so viel wie Sachverhalt bedeutet, oder wie es de Rijk ausdrückt ‚x-being-so-and-so‘ (Rijk 1987, 33 und Rijk 2002, 107), während ein *complexe significabile* ein So-und-so-sein eines *x* bezeichnet.

Hat in *De Int.* 16 b 19-23 *pragma* die Bedeutung eines Sachverhaltes der durch einen Gedanken (*dianoia*) bezeichnet oder ausgedrückt wird, dann hat auch *complexe significabile* diese Eigenschaft, wenn *propositio* eben als Satz oder Gedanke verstanden wird, was Wodeham zugunsten Ockhams tut. (vgl. auch Rijk 2002, 114f.)

Sowohl *pragma* als auch *complexe significabilia* können durch einen *Accusativus cum infinitivo* oder durch eine nominalisierte Form bezeichnet werden. So kann z. B. in *Anal.Pr.* II 27, 70 a 32 *pragma* für „dass-alle-Weisen-gut-sind“ stehen, wie de Rijk treffend bemerkt (Rijk 1987, 37); mittels eines *complexe significabile* wird dadurch ein Sachverhalt ausgedrückt, wie auch im *pragma*-Beispiel *einai anthrōpon* = [das *complexe significabile*] *esse hominem*.

Wodeham betont mit Nachdruck, dass es sowohl falsche als auch wahre *complexe significabilia* gibt. (Wood et al. 1990, 196, 53, aber auch Trapp et al. 1981, 10, 25 ff. und passim) In *Metaph.* 1024 b 24-6 heißt es: „Auf diese Weise also heißen Sachen falsch, entweder weil sie nicht sind, oder weil die von ihnen vermittelte Vorstellung Vorstellung von etwas ist, das es nicht gibt“.

Durch Benennung dieser gemeinsamen Charakteristika glaube ich hinreichend gezeigt zu haben, dass *pragma* bei Aristoteles und *complexe significabile* bei Wodeham die gleiche ontologische und logische Struktur haben, und dass Aristoteles, obwohl er das Wort *Sachverhalt* nicht kannte, den Begriff eines solchen schon vor Adam de Wodeham besaß.¹

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Reference to Abstract Objects in a Meinongian Semantics

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As we speak about reference, we usually mean just one notion, which is mostly identical with the denotation of expressions, unless we are somehow 'mistaken' as to what we really refer to, e.g. we say "Mr Jones is coming", while it is in fact Mr Smith. But in semantics which allow for reference to abstract objects, the notion of reference is often not identical with the notion of denotation understood in the traditional way, as an existent object or a set of them.

In agreement with the simple and clear Fregean distinction, with the addition of a specifically Meinongian modification, I will propose to analyse Meinongian reference of all kinds of expressions as a two-step reference pattern. An expression primarily refers to an auxiliary abstract object (comparable to a Fregean sense), which mediates its ultimate reference to the ordinary object, if there is one (a Fregean reference). (Meinong 1915, 195-198)

Let's call these two steps *intensional reference* and *denotational reference*. The immediate intensional reference leaves us at the level of abstract 'semantic' objects, where all expressions are referential. (comp. Meinong 1960, 79) The ultimate denotational reference is identical with denotation and may provide some expressions with empty denotations (comp. Meinong 1978, 141-2). Thus, for nonexistent objects this procedure will lack its second part – there is no denotational reference – and we will say that the expression only refers to an abstract 'semantic' object (what I call 'semantic' objects are all possible objects of *intensional* reference conceived as arbitrary combinations of properties, like the objects in Meinong's *Aussersein*).

For intensional contexts, the ultimate reference of the expressions under examination will be still their denotational reference, but the intensional reference will allow to account for the difference in meaning and the resulting non-substitutivity of co-extensional expressions in such contexts. The expression 'the Morning Star' refers to an object, which happens to be identical with the object referred to by the name 'Venus'. But the reference is primarily to the object associated with the expression 'the Morning Star', with all the properties that are specifically associated with this expression. It is only in the second step of the procedure that we realise that this object is identical with the object of reference of the name 'Venus'. These two steps are in fact always present, because I'm inclined to think that even proper names are associated with senses. Yet, for ordinary denoting expressions in extensional contexts, the mediation of intensional reference can be disregarded completely and we will say that they simply refer to ordinary objects, which is the usual strategy of Meinongian logicians.

To sum up:

A. For all kinds of terms in a Meinongian semantic theory we can distinguish between:

-intensional reference – to sense-objects, abstract referents in the spectrum of semantic objects

'the Morning Star' – Morning Star
'Chimera' – Chimera

-denotational reference – to ordinary objects, denotations

'the Morning Star' – Venus
'Chimera' – the empty set

The final two-step pattern involves a characteristic Meinongian gradation of reference:

Expression – Intensional Referent – Denotational Referent
'the Morning Star' – Morning Star – Venus
'Chimera' – Chimera – the empty set

For denoting expressions intensional reference is disregarded except in intensional contexts.

B. Likewise, in the case of sentences we can distinguish between:

-intensional reference – to objectives (propositions): abstract sense entities

-denotational reference – to truth values

In intensional contexts, the intensional reference of sentences to propositions is more relevant. In ordinary extensional contexts, the denotational reference to truth values is the primary one.

The main difference from other conceptions of reference is that, instead of senses and referents, we explicitly introduce objects of reference of two kinds: objects of intensional reference and objects of denotational reference, basically assuming a non-modal one-world semantic background. This is a device to provide a uniform theoretical treatment of all traditionally nonextensional linguistic contexts, related both to the occurrence of non-denoting expressions and propositional attitude operators. Admitting the intensional reference as a legitimate referential option for some non-denoting expressions, serves to mark a peculiarly Meinongian idea that all linguistic expressions which are intelligible refer to something, if only in the abstract sphere of 'semantic' objects.

It is the feature of a Meinongian semantics, that, regardless whether it assumes a one world or a possible worlds interpretation, there is usually a single domain of objects. The objects are either all in one set, or the domain is subdivided, but not in such a way as to separate the abstract and ordinary objects, which appear side by side with each other. We can imagine someone thinking that this is wrong, or at least very strange. But this all inclusive domain of objects is not a reflection of reality, it is actually a reflection of the natural epistemic situation, when we can consider diverse epistemic options all at the same time.

No wonder that reference to abstract objects of different kinds (auxiliary, nonexistent objects, or propositions) is allowed and legitimate in Meinongian semantics. It is a sort of misunderstanding that reference to abstract objects is sometimes taken to be the same as denotation. The notion of denotation traditionally applies only to ordinary existent objects, and maybe it would be better to leave it this way, so as to avoid misunderstandings. The distinction between intensional reference and denotational reference is introduced, apart from its importance for the explanation of intensional contexts, also to differentiate between the ordinary denotation of expressions and the reference of non-denoting terms. Two notions of reference: reference to abstract objects and reference to ordinary objects, are present, although not explicitly distinguished, in all Meinongian-style semantics.

To illustrate the mechanism of reference to abstract and ordinary objects, I will present two very different Meinongian semantics, of Edward Zalta and of Jacek Pasiczek, which slightly differ in their reference patterns.

The semantics of Zalta's intensional logic takes relations, including properties, to be basic and fundamental, which means that they are not defined by means of their extensions in the actual and each possible world. Relations are considered to be undefinable and known to us by acquaintance, so their intensional differences are always preserved. Relations possess two kinds of extension, exemplification extensions consisting of ordinary individuals and encoding extensions consisting of abstract individuals. Both abstract and ordinary objects are members of Zalta's domain, and abstract objects are also called 'individuals', even though they can be represented as sets of properties or complex relational properties which they encode and exemplify. Abstract individuals are 'denoted' by non-denoting expressions and by denoting expressions in epistemic contexts. We can notice that something like a split-reference pattern is assumed in the way Zalta analyses propositional attitude contexts on the ground of his intensional logic.

(...) 'the Morning Star' has a reading on which it denotes Venus, and a reading on which it denotes the A-object that encodes all of the relevant information implied by being a Morning Star. In ordinary contexts, the properties relevantly implied are the same: being a heavenly body, disappearing in the morning, being the last heavenly body to disappear in the morning, etc. At least, these are the properties typically connected with 'the Morning Star.' The property of being an Evening Star is not typically connected, however (at least not until we discover that the two are the same). (Zalta 1988, 229)

Zalta's denotation shows a certain duality. Sometimes 'the Morning Star' denotes Venus and sometimes it denotes an abstract object – the Morning Star. He observes that the property of being an Evening Star is not typically implied by the expression 'the Morning Star', and it is not encoded by the abstract object denoted by this expression. Clearly, Zalta uses the term 'denotation' with respect to his A-objects in the same sense that I use the term 'intensional reference', as distinct from denotational reference. Nevertheless, Zalta denies that he utilizes two semantic relations.

Moreover, the formal language we shall use to preserve at least some of Frege's insights concerning senses does not utilize two semantic relations. We will get by with just the one semantic relation of denotation. The senses of the terms of English will be *denoted* by special terms of our language. (Zalta 1988, 154)

Implicitly, he has two kinds of 'denotation' in his theory, because denoting senses must certainly be distinguished from denoting ordinary objects. And perhaps the term 'denotation' is not very fortunate in this case. But due to this duality, his theory captures the typically Meinongian idea of senses as abstract objects associated with subsets of the ultimate object's properties. Nevertheless, the theory does not reflect the Meinongian gradation of reference, first to sense-correlates, next to things. What is entirely untypical for Meinongian semantics is that at the bottom of this theory of abstract objects as sense entities, Zalta is in fact an advocate of the theory of direct reference, whenever possible. He is reluctant to introduce senses into the picture, even in the form of his property-encoding A-objects (Zalta 1988, 153).

In the end, he assumes that although there are no entities that secure or mediate the reference of expressions, terms can be regarded as possessing senses, which may have explanatory value in some contexts (Zalta 1988, p.154). Still, he claims that names and also definite descriptions are rigid designators in all possible worlds, they always denote the same objects as in the actual world, even though there are sense-objects ascribed to them. These sense-objects are signified only in *de dicto* attitude contexts, and otherwise they play no role at all in determining the reference of an expression.

In general, our method of analyzing the attitudes is consistent with the results of the theory of direct reference. Every name or description of type *t* has a sense that is an A-object of type *t*. In attitude contexts, such terms signify their senses when they are in *de dicto* position. No problems are encountered when building up the intermediate proposition signified by embedded sentences containing such terms, since the sense and the denotation of the term are of same type. Given our work in Chapters 9-11, the Twain/Clemens case and the woodchuck/groundhog case do not present special puzzles. Their representations are consistent with the view that the names in question are rigid. (Zalta 1988, 223)

It is perhaps worth observing that Zalta finds sense-objects, in opposition to senses as abstract mental contents, unquestionably more useful in the theoretical representation of opaque contexts, exactly because they are perceived as objects of some sort ('intensional referents' on my distinction).

Zalta's split-reference pattern for denoting and non-denoting expressions could be represented as follows:

'the Morning Star' – Venus (denotation1): in extensional and modal contexts
 'the Morning Star' – A-object the Morning Star (denotation2): in attitude contexts
 'Chimera' – A-object Chimera (denotation2): in all contexts

Pasiczek is quite close to making an explicit distinction between two kinds of reference in his Meinongian semantics. Actually, he does not use two notions of reference, but he introduces the notions of primary and secondary interpretation. (Pasiczek 1998, p.108) The primary interpretation of a term is what he calls M-referent, and it is an individual from the basic domain of interpretation. The secondary interpretation of a term is M-meaning which is a M-object constructed as a set of sets of individuals which are the extensions of the properties ascribed to this M-object, e.g. golden mountain {set of golden things, set of mountains}.

Every name expression is correlated with a meaning represented by M-meaning. With some of those name expressions – denoting names – an M-referent is correlated, although not necessarily an individual one as in Fregean semantics. (...) M-meanings and M-referents are of the same ontological category – they are just M-objects. (...) in case of empty names: these M-meanings do not represent or mediate the reference – they are the referents *per se*. (Pasiczek 1998, 111)

When there is an existent referent, the mediation of M-meaning is disregarded and the reference is said to be directly to the M-referent. Sometimes such M-referents may be not individuals, but 'general objects' (sets of individuals), when the expression is a general one.

For some name-expressions there are no M-referents in the domain of interpretation (i.e. no denotations, or one

could say that there is no denotational reference). In such cases, the expressions refer to M-objects which are their M-meanings. According to my distinction, empty names in Pasniczek's theory possess only intensional referents.

It is an interesting issue how the two objects of primary and of secondary interpretation, namely the M-referent and the M-meaning can be identified with each other. The M-meaning is an incomplete meaning object, possessing only the properties specified, the M-referent is an ordinary individual of the domain, which is complete with an infinite number of properties. They are not identical in any strict sense. To explain this specifically Meinongian relation of identity by virtue of being implected in each other, Pasniczek uses the notion of ontic identity.

One can object that the referential identity [between M-meaning and M-referent] is not the identity of M-objects at all. However, we call this relation an ontic (or metaphysical) identity... (Pasniczek 1998, 120)

On Meinong's terms, one object may be identified with the other if its properties form a subset of the properties possessed by the other object. In this way, a general object, such as most sense-objects related to linguistic expressions, can be identified with a particular individual, even though the relation of identity does not obtain according to Leibniz's Law. Pasniczek calls this relation an ontic or metaphysical identity between the object as it is intentionally presented and the same object in reality. On this ground, it is possible for Pasniczek's theory to preserve the Meinongian gradation of reference. The primary interpretation of an expression is its ultimate referent, but the reference is mediated by the object of secondary interpretation – M-object (my intensional referent). The M-object, constructed as a set of sets of individuals, is certainly quite remote from an ordinary referent, yet, depending on the properties ascribed, it may be identified with an individual in the domain.

The two-step reference pattern for Pasniczek's M-logic:

'the Morning Star' – Morning Star (M-object: meaning) –
Venus (M-referent: an existing individual)

'Chimera' – Chimera (M-object: meaning and referent)

Generalizing the patterns of reference for the Meinongian semantics which have been presented above, we can say that the linguistic expressions refer to their denotational referents in extensional and modal contexts only. In propositional attitude contexts and in the case of non-de-

noting expressions the reference is to abstract objects which can be called their intensional referents. In the theory of Pasniczek, there is also a gradation of reference typical for Meinong's conception, because a Meinongian object constituted by a set of properties is ultimately identified with an existing individual in the basic domain.

Expression – Intensional Referent (set of properties) –
Denotational Referent (individual)

The theory of Zalta does not follow this *two-step pattern* of reference. In this theory, the reference is *split* depending on the context of interpretation.

Expression – Denotational Referent (in extensional and modal contexts)

Expression – Intensional Referent (in attitude contexts and in the case of non-denoting expressions)

The feature which is shared by both the two-step gradation pattern and the split-reference pattern is that the entity which plays the role of the *sense* of expressions in both cases, is understood as a kind of *object*. This object is the *intensional referent* of an expression whenever the expression either does not possess a denotational referent, or the context of interpretation involves a propositional attitude. Intensional referents are genuine and legitimate objects of reference, both in modal and non-modal Meinongian semantics. They may allow for a simpler and clearer treatment of a variety of semantic issues.

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Plain Phenomenology

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I will outline an approach in philosophy of mind I'll call "plain phenomenology." While it seems to me in some ways methodologically more modest than the projects of either Brentano or Husserl, much of their writings, as well as some analytic philosophy of mind, could be viewed as plain phenomenology. It is, I think, a *defensible* way of proceeding. But one may fail to recognize its acceptability, by confusing it with other targets of criticism.

What is plain phenomenology? Consider the following four claims.

- One can explain distinctions in mental phenomena via examples of what sorts of instances they do or would apply to, and what they do not or would not apply to.
- Such explanation can have significant theoretical consequences.
- One source of warrant for claims made in explaining such distinctions is that had for some *first-person* attributions of psychological features, a warrant differing in kind from that had for attributing them to someone else.
- The legitimacy of using such first-person warrant does not require that its possession be derived from third-person evidence.

In brief: one can explain theoretically important psychological distinctions partly by appeal to an underived first-person warrant. If one does this, one does plain phenomenology.

To elaborate a little on this notion, I will start by offering three illustrative cases. First consider Brentano's (1874 (1973)) discussion of *presentation* and *judgment*. He explains this distinction partly by means of broad classes of examples of modes of sensory appearance. He also considers and rejects various ways of differentiating the two, before settling on the claim that presentation, while it is essentially a presentation *of*, and *refers to* an object, is not and would never rightly be said to be true or false, or exhibit a contrast of the kind that, in the case of judgment, consists in the difference between affirming and denying something. He then uses this notion of presentation in an account of consciousness and self-knowledge—holding that our mental acts are themselves objects of presentations, and of judgments based on these—thus they are, as he would say, objects of "inner perception."

Second, consider Husserl's (1900 (1970)) efforts to distinguish different notions of *consciousness* in his fifth *Logical Investigation*. One, he tells us, pertains to whatever is part of a "stream" of consciousness. He offers examples of this, while contrasting this sense of consciousness from one in which what is conscious is whatever is the object of inner perception. He tries to explain the first notion further, as covering whatever would remain untouched by a Cartesian methodical doubt. And he distinguishes this first sense from the second, by arguing that there are mental acts conscious in the first sense one has reason to question are objects of inner perception. By doing this, he tries to identify the forms of consciousness in the first sense as comprising a field of inquiry, while distancing himself from Brentano's doctrine of inner perception, and setting the stage for an account of

knowledge based on his own views about the intentionality of perception.

Finally, consider Ned Block's (2002) attempt to distinguish what he calls *phenomenal* consciousness, from *access* and *monitoring* consciousness. Block purports to distinguish these partly by means of examples, both of cases in which they do or would apply, and of cases in which they do not or would not. So the three notions are distinguished partly through consideration of conceivable cases in which they are not coextensive. For example, we are invited to conceive of a "superblindsighters," who have in their visual systems information that is—as he puts it—"broadcast for free use in reasoning and direct rational control of action (including reporting)," even though the stimuli about which blindsighters have the information does not visually appear to them. Such information-bearing visual states as they have are thus, "access conscious"—though they would not be *phenomenally* conscious visual experiences of the relevant stimuli. Also Block invites us to conceive of animals and small children as unable to *think* about their experience—thereby lacking a kind of monitoring consciousness—while having, nonetheless, conscious visual experience of the kind superblindsighters would not have. Block argues that clarity about these distinctions is prerequisite to evaluating various approaches to explaining consciousness.

My point is not to endorse or defend any of the claims just summarized. It is, rather, to draw attention to what these philosophers are doing. They are each explaining what they mean by certain key terms. And they do this by asking us to consider types of examples where—they would agree—we have first-person warrant for thinking the terms thus meant apply, and for thinking we are conceiving of their applying (or not), in certain ways. They rely on such first-person warrant in offering their explanations, while recognizing no need to demonstrate the legitimacy of doing so by deriving possession of such warrant from evidence available to third-person observers. And they allege the acceptance of distinctions they mark in this way to have consequences salient to larger theoretical aims. Thus we can regard these philosophers as doing plain phenomenology.

In this we need not suppose they are trying either to describe the general use, or analyze the meaning of, certain English or German words they employ in marking the distinctions they want to explain. So we might distinguish plain phenomenology from ordinary language philosophy, and from conceptual analysis, as these may be conceived. Also, if we see philosophers just as plain phenomenologists, we need not say what they are doing is "a priori science." That is, we need take no responsibility for a contrast between what is knowable "independently of experience" and what is not. For their success as plain phenomenologists, it would be enough that the distinctions they want to explain can be understood once explained, and that we have a right to employ these distinctions as characterized, and that they bear on some significant issue. Of course, meeting these conditions is not trivial. Moreover, just how far one has succeeded in meeting them always remains an open question. But that does not show that the endeavor is not legitimate.

Let me expand a little on how plain phenomenology can bear on some significant theoretical issue. Brentano holds that we can apply the distinction between presentation and judgment to the case where the objects judged about and presented are themselves presentations. However, we may well worry about this. For example, in the case of a so-called outer sense, like vision or proprioception, we can distinguish variation in the object of presentation from variation in the manner in which it is presented. Can we do the same where the object allegedly presented is itself a presentation? If not, are we entitled to claim that there are not just presentations, but presentations of presentations?

Perhaps a defender of Brentano can respond adequately to this worry. The point is just that we have here an effort to explain a very broad psychological distinction that opens onto philosophical argument about a matter of theoretical substance. For how we resolve the issue just raised will determine whether we can accept Brentano's view that consciousness is inherently self-reflexive, and that first-person judgments about experience are based on perceiving one's own mental acts. These, I take it, are significant theoretical issues regarding the nature of consciousness and self-knowledge. And they do not just concern Brentano's views. For other philosophers, including some in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, offer relevantly similar views, such as the "inner sense" model of consciousness and self-knowledge proposed by Bill Lycan.

For another example, return to Block's distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness. Now, one might want to press Block for further detail about what kinds of stimuli we are to suppose discriminated, and under what conditions, in the hypothetical case of "superblindsight," so as to raise doubts that the line between phenomenal and access consciousness has been adequately drawn. Again, such concerns may well be answerable. My point now is just to illustrate how explaining a psychological distinction by appeal to classes of examples of its application, and the dialectic this initiates, can bear on substantive issues. Block argues that his distinction may lead one to conclude that being phenomenally conscious is not just a matter of its having informational content that is made available for certain kinds of information processing. And if that is so, he suggests, then the appropriate approach to phenomenal consciousness will be neurobiological rather than purely computational/functional. So how one handles this matter could have a fairly significant upshot.

You might resist Block's suggestion by pointing out that he himself claims only to explain a distinction in *concepts* of consciousness. You might argue that what allows us to distinguish the notion or concept of phenomenal consciousness from that of access consciousness reflects no difference in the *nature* of things, and that what the *property*, phenomenal consciousness, really is after all, is nothing other than the accessing or "broadcasting" of information to certain cognitive functional modules. A question we should then ask is whether one can account for the difference between the relevant concepts while regarding the phenomenal notion as just a way of picking out the property of being access conscious. But if the conversation takes this turn, that doesn't show plain phenomenology has become irrelevant. For, on the contrary, we will need to do enough of it, to get sufficiently clear about our concepts for us to address these issues.

Now one may grant that it is legitimate, and potentially theoretically significant, to draw and explain distinctions, using such evidence as is already available. But there is

an aspect of plain phenomenology not yet discussed that may seem objectionable even so, namely, the idea that we can rely on *first-person warrant underived from the third-person evidence*. This point may be highlighted by contrasting plain phenomenology with Daniel Dennett's (1991) "*heterophenomenology*." It is part of that methodological view, as I understand it, that I have no warrant for thinking I have psychological features, but what is granted me courtesy of some argument to the effect that the best explanation of the evidence available to others observing me affirms the accuracy of my self-attribution of such features in relevant circumstances. It seems that Dennett thinks we must adopt this epistemological thesis because otherwise we will have to say first-person judgment is infallible. However, while plain phenomenology does not accept Dennett's requirement that first-person warrant be derived from the third-person point of view, neither does it entail that first-person judgments about experience enjoy some kind of infallibility. From the claim that we have a distinctive type of warrant for first-person judgments it does not follow that these are completely epistemically *invulnerable*. Plain phenomenology can allow that first-person judgments about experience are not only fallible, but corrigible, dubitable, and rationally revisable.

But how, one might wonder, can this be so, if their warrant does not derive entirely from inference to the best explanation of third-person evidence? Here we should recognize that, even if third-person evidence can provide some basis to challenge first-person claims, it just does not follow that our warrant for the latter is somehow simply a by-product of the former sort of evidence. Further, it may be that, while first-person judgment about experience may face challenge from the third-person point of view, it needs to do this in a way that respects first-person authority. For perhaps the truth of a would-be correction to one's initial judgment must be recognizable in the first-person, for one to have warrant for regarding it as indeed a *correction*.

Even so, there are reasons for worrying we *shouldn't* rely on first-person warrant that remain unaddressed. One is this: it may seem that our first-person judgments are too ineliminably *variable* for us to base investigation on them. To this I would respond that the source of such variability, as well as the means for trying to reduce it, ultimately is to be found in the limitations and resources of philosophical dialogue. Where it may seem two people have reached some impasse of irreconcilable introspective convictions, underlying this is some disagreement open to philosophical discussion. Consider again the examples given earlier from Brentano and Block. If Brentano says we have presentations of our own presentations, and I say otherwise, we are not simply stuck with some brute clash of first-person convictions. We can, for example, begin to try to articulate the disanalogies (regarding distinguishable variations in appearances and objects of appearance) of the sort I've hinted at, and once these are recognized, we can try to locate what relevant points of analogy, if any, remain. And, in the case of Block, we needn't just butt heads over whether, for example, we can conceive of superblindsighters. For we can, as I've suggested, press for a more detailed picture of the case of superblindsight, and see where that leads. In such ways the reliance on first-person warrant in plain phenomenology is shaped, guided, and corrected by philosophical dialogue. The process of refining and criticizing our distinctions by addressing further questions and objections, goes hand in hand with that of considering and reconsidering our claims about what we can know with first-person warrant. If this still leaves disagreements unresolved, that is not the fault of employing a first-person perspective. Rather, it's due to

whatever it is about philosophical argument that makes it an unreliable generator of consensus.

But, one may ask, even if there's no good reason to think we *shouldn't* rely on first-person warrant to clarify important psychological distinctions, is there positive reason to think that we *should*? Here are a couple of suggestions. First: if we have reason to think we have a distinctively first-person warrant, and no reason to think we shouldn't rely on it, then that is some reason to think we should: for we should use what's epistemically available, as long as there's no compelling reason to think we shouldn't. Second, it may be that reliance on first-person warrant, whatever its hazards or frustrations, is *indispensable*, where we are concerned to explain certain distinctions. For it may be *practically* indispensable, in the sense that much of our actual knowledge of relevant phenomena is first-personal, or accepts the authority of first-person judgments. We use what we have to go on, and that is what we have to go on. But it may also be indispensable in a deeper way. Perhaps, for some class of features within psychology's domain, if we do not attribute some of these with first-person warrant, we do not understand what they are. This is plausible where the features in question are phenomenal features—features that constitute its seeming or appearing some way to someone. And so, if we do not depend on first-person warrant in our philosophical reflection about these features, we risk not understanding what features they are.

Here I have tried to identify an approach common to some analytic and phenomenological works that might further dialogue between them. If nothing else, I hope this may provoke some reflection about just what it is that we, as philosophers of mind, think we are doing.

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Bolzano on Finding Out Intentions Behind Actions

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Introduction

In paragraph 386 of his *Wissenschaftslehre* (*WL*), Bernard Bolzano presents the 28th special rule of his heuristics. The purpose of this rule is to help observers and researchers to discover intentions of given actions. Bolzano does not have an explicit theory of action, but at the beginning of the mentioned paragraph he shortly characterizes the concepts of intention (*Absicht*) and motivation. He considers intentions to be a certain kind of judgments. On the other hand, he studies intentions in a causal context. This brings his view of intentionality to a systematic connection with his theories of judgment and causality.

Bolzano distinguishes two kinds of research situations:

- (1) It is known to the researchers that a given phenomenon has been produced at will by a person (or animal) and thus has a purpose.
- (2) It is not known whether a given phenomenon has or does not have an intention behind it.

Finally, Bolzano studies five kinds of errors which can be made when the task of finding out intentions is accomplished.

Below, Bolzano's intention-finding rule is first put into its proper context in his heuristics and against the background of his theories of judgment and causality. Then his formulation of the main problem concerning intentions is studied. After that, Bolzano's advices are analysed and evaluated.

1. The context of the special rule 28

The fourth part of *WL* bears the name "Erfindungskunst" (i.e. the art of invention, or heuristics) and covers paragraphs 322-391 of this large book, which contains 718 paragraphs and is divided into five parts. In the heuristics part, Bolzano presents 13 general rules and 33 special rules, plus numerous other suggestions to facilitate researchers of various disciplines to reach their goal. That goal is said by Bolzano to be the truth. General rules are meant to be useful for any research, and this applies to most of the special rules as well.

The rules have several interconnections. They are also closely tied to the theories which have been developed in parts 1 (foundations), 2 (basic logic) and 3 (epistemology) of the book.

The first part of *WL* is *Fundamentallehre*, and it contains a proof to the effect that there are "truths in themselves" and that human beings are capable of knowing these. The second part, *Elementarlehre*, contains Bolzano's theories of concepts, of propositions, of true propositions, and of forms of logical derivation (*Schlüsse*). The third part, *Erkenntnislehre*, concerns the conditions which have to be fulfilled in order that truth be knowable for us. Heuristics thus contains the rules which have to be considered in the business of reasoning when the aim is to find the truth. Finally, the "*WL* proper", the fifth part of the book, contains the rules which have to be followed in the allocating the whole area of truth into special sciences and in the

presentation of these in specific textbooks. The book has five parts and consists of four volumes.

Those special rules which are concerned with *action* are, except for the rule of finding intentions (28), the following: that of finding suitable means to given purposes (25), of scrutinizing the judgments of others (27), of interpreting given signs (29), of finding available testimonies (30), of testing the trustworthiness of given testimonies (31), and of judging the trustworthiness of a sentence on the basis of the reputation of all those who either accept or reject it (32).

Bolzano says of rule 29 that it is a special case of the task of discovering intentions (28). Sign interpretation is thus closely connected to the explication of intentions: behind signs, there are always the intentions of those who have created them. As to rule 28, Bolzano says that it is a special case of a previous special rule 23, which is that of finding the causes of given effects.

Accordingly, intentions are a particular kind of causes – those causes which bring about actions as their effects. The intentions are had by "verständige Wesen bei ihren Unternehmungen" (*WL* 3, par. 386, p. 534); i.e., something attributable to sensible beings in their efforts. Intention (*Absicht*) or purpose (*Zweck*) is an expected effect of an action; it has determined the will of the agent to that very action, or given the motivation (*Beweggrund*) for this action. The expectation in question can be justified or is unjustified.

Moreover, Bolzano claims that every intention is only a kind of judgment. Therefore, rule 28 is also a special case of another rule, that of scrutinizing the judgments of others (27).

Because of the subsumptive relations between rules 23 and 28, on the one hand, and the rules 27 and 28, on the other hand, the theory of causality and the theory of judgments give foundations to the search for intentions. Rule 29 in turn presupposes the rule 28 (cf. above): finding an intention is essential for interpreting signs. In sum: rule 28 presupposes both rule 23 and rule 27, whereas rule 29 presupposes rule 28.

Let us now clarify the connection of the rule 28 to the theories of causality and judgment. Causes and effects are occurrences which are coordinated to each other in an analogous way as reasons and consequences. True sentences which express the existence and character of a cause can be considered as reasons, and those which maintain the existence and character of an effect, can be considered as consequences (*WL* 2, par. 168, p. 208).

Judgment is a person's stand to a sentence when he thinks or maintains that that sentence is true. It is a thought or an outward expression of a thought. It exists in the mind of the person who thinks it or presents a judgment. Cf. *WL* 1, par. 19, p. 78: "...Fürwahrhalten, oder Urtheile...Nur der gedachte oder behauptete Satz, d.h. nur der Gedanke an einen Satz, ingleichen das einen gewissen Satz enthaltende Urtheil hat Daseyn in dem Gemüthe des Wesens, das den Gedanken denkt, oder das Urtheil fällt...".

2. The problem

Bolzano raises the following questions concerning our knowledge on the phenomenal level: when are we justified to maintain that a phenomenon which we encounter has a purpose, and how is it possible for us to find out what that purpose is?

Bolzano elucidates the problem by indicating that this is mostly a difficult task, because even if we know that certain occurrences were produced by an agent's action, it is not possible to conclude that they were also anticipated by the agent let alone wanted by him. (*WL* 3, par. 386, p. 536). In other words, Bolzano distinguishes two dimensions in purposeful action: what is *expected*, and what is *intended* by an agent.

The expected and the intended do not necessarily coincide. An optimist may expect that the outcomes of his actions will correspond to his intentions; a realist counts with possible frustrations, and a pessimist even expects that the course of occurrences will deviate from that which is aimed by him. These connections between expectations and intentions do not belong to the themes of Bolzano's analysis, but one may continue the study of intentionality into this direction.

3. The procedure of finding out the intention

Let us suppose that I myself or a person whom I observe acts in a certain way which sufficiently indicates that the action has a purpose. According to Bolzano, in order to be able to say what the purpose is we must ponder on following questions: what does the acting person know? By which attention does he act? How much previous deliberation does he put into his action? Does he have an adequate knowledge of the causal connections which surround his action? Only after having answered these questions can we with a certain confidence say, which outcomes the agent has imagined his action to have – or has even in principle been able to imagine.

Even this is not enough. Not only must the agent have imagined a course of events as the effect of his action, but that course has to be such that he could want it to happen.

How to narrow down the search? Bolzano's suggestion is the following: one has to consider the set of possible outcomes and discard those which do not comply either to the duties of the agent or cannot appear favourable for him. One can then conclude that these outcomes certainly do not belong to the intentions to be found.

The real intention which brought about the decision of the agent lies in the possibilities which are left over after the above scrutiny. When we choose one of these possibilities and identify it with the agent's intention, our explanation of the action is completed. Bolzano adds to his analysis what can be called a *coherence principle*: our explanation will have a higher credibility, when the purpose which we attribute to the agent conforms to his other purposes.

4. Whether to ascribe an intention or not

We may presume that human actions and their products are intentional or have a purposeful constitution. This is a different supposition than to presume that something is done with a purpose, because our reactions to stimuli can take place without our putting a purpose behind them -

and, moreover, because sometimes we act by chance and are partly inadvertent even in our goal-oriented efforts. Theologians like Bolzano attribute purposes to gods and to the world created by God. In general, intentionality leaves its traces on the course of events. David Hume has formulated the following principle which can be followed in ascribing intentionality to given occurrences:

So far as the traces of any attributes, at present, appear, so far may we conclude these attributes to exist. (Hume 1992, ch. 11. p. 113).

According to Bolzano, when we attribute intentions to other beings, we are reasoning from our experience of their conduct that they must have a soul and be able to make observations and develop ideas, like we are. This is an argument from similarity of effects to similarity of causes, i.e. an argument on analogy. By probabilistic reasoning, we proceed first to ascription of intention and then to its identification as that very intention which it is presumed to be. Occasionally, conflicting probabilities have to be weighed against each other. Bolzano presents a beautiful example. On an uninhabited isle seamen encounter lines in the sand reminiscent of the figure which is used to illustrate Pythagoras' theorem. Have the lines been brought about by a purely causal, natural process, or have they been intentionally drawn in the sand? Both of these alternatives may be probable.

5. Errors in reasoning concerning intentions

In ascription and identification of intentions, various mistakes can be made. Bolzano mentions the following sources of error:

- a) Conclusion from us to others. We may be underestimating the significance of personal differences. Especially the impressions, ideas and wishes of another being may be different from ours.
- b) We may take something to be God's intention that in reality is not that. For instance, believers may try to justify their actions through an appeal to God's purposes.
- c) We may think that some occurrences have been purposefully produced by a person when in fact they happen coincidentally, i.e. without any preceding knowledge and will of that person.
- d) It may be that there are several purposes behind a given action, while we are satisfied only with identifying one purpose; or even if we lay our account with several purposes, we do not subsume them into a proper order in relation to each other.
- e) We are inclined to deceive ourselves in attributing intentions to our own action. We may persuade ourselves that something that we did came out unintended, while in fact it was meant by us to happen as it did. We may also be convinced that we were led by an innocent intention, while in fact a wholly other intention was leading us.

Bolzano completes his analysis of the fifth error by a Socratic remark. A person must have a firm will of learning to know himself as he really is. Here, systematic self-observation and checking of one's conduct in the light of judgments expressed by others may help one to avoid self-deception. (Cf. special rule 27: Research of the judgments of other persons, par. 385, and general rule 7: Considering the judgments of others and of the experience, par. 331).

6. Conclusion

Bolzano's heuristics is not only an amazing collection of rules. Usually in a paragraph which introduces a rule in its title, Bolzano charts the relevant area of research, gives advices for inquiry and warns of possible shortcomings in the application of the rule in question.

It is in rule 28 that Bolzano speaks of intention (*Absicht*) and intentionality. As has been indicated above, this rule has many connections to other rules and its theme is also connected to the issues concerning causality, judgment and interpretation. Bolzano studies intentionality in connection with action and motivation. Because intention is a kind of judgment and judgments are formed in the mind, Bolzano comes close to the idea that intentionality is characteristic of mental phenomena in general. It was Brentano who was to take this step in his celebrated book *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* in 1874 (*WL* appeared in 1837).

One may raise critical questions concerning intention identification. When Bolzano narrows down the search, he advices one to concentrate on those effects of an action which the agent may consider favourable, or to those which conform to the agent's duties. Bolzano even claims that one is definitely justified to exclude other possible effects. However, agents may have irrational or immoral intentions. This possibility complicates the search, but it belongs to the options of a realistic heuristics.

Also Bolzano's coherence principle raises questions. According to it, correct explanation of action gets more probable when the suggested purpose conforms to other purposes of the agent. Coherence principles are vulnerable to suspicions of circularity. However, a more drastically critical point lies in the possibility of unpredictable behaviour, which is unfortunately a feature of some agents and has to be taken into account.

Bolzano's idea of several purposes (cf. above point d)) is thought-provoking. If an action has more than one purpose, it is possible that these stay in discord. Such a conflict makes an intention complicated. Bolzano himself does not consider that possibility but is rather thinking of a subsumptive order among purposes. This suggests what has been called practical syllogisms: reasoning structures by which an agent organizes his subgoals so that they help him to reach the main goal of his action.

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Is Lewis a Conventionalist About Mereological Summation-Talk?

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From phenomenological roots, mereology, the general study of the relation of parts and wholes, has become relevant to debates in analytic metaphysics. One of the deeper mereological questions concerns the matter of summation: given a class C of mutually coexisting individuals, under what conditions does there exist an entity s such that s shares parts with all and only the entities with which any member of C shares parts? One of the most interesting answers, and one of the most popular in recent literature on the subject (featured in sources as various as (David Lewis 1986) and (Barry Smith 1996)) is: under any conditions whatsoever. Such an entity is then called *the sum*, or *fusion*, of elements of C . We may express this summation principle, *universalism*, in axiomatic form:

(S) For every nonempty class C , there is an object α such that α is the *sum* of the C s, which overlaps all and only elements of C . In symbols:

$$\exists x(Fx) \rightarrow \exists!y\forall z(y \text{ O } z \leftrightarrow \exists w(Fw \wedge w \text{ O } z))$$

(Where ' $x \text{ O } y$ ' holds by definition when x and y have a common part.)

Support for the view in unofficial contexts tends to emphasize the alleged obviousness, triviality or ontological innocence of the claim. Such remarks tend to obscure rather than clarify. Is the truth of (S) obvious in the way that the existence of the sun is obvious: apparent to anyone who has ever been outdoors? Is it trivial because it follows from other truths (be they as contentful as one likes) with which we all ought to agree? Is it ontologically innocent because the sums will in general *supervene* on their parts, in the way we may agree that mind does on brain (without thereby settling the debate between monists and dualists)?

Ought we construe support for the claim as fictionalist: a demonstration that we may speak as though it were so, while maintaining agnosticism towards its actual truth value? Lastly there is conventionalism: the position that the actual truth value of (S) is determined by the linguistic constructions and meaning rules we choose to adopt.

It seems reasonable to expect that progress towards a solution to such questions could arise from a more systematic understanding of our motivations for adopting (S). Lewis' argument is perhaps the most explicit plea for (S). Let us turn to it now:

It is a vague matter whether a given class satisfies our intuitive desiderata for composition. Each desideratum taken by itself is vague, and we get still more vagueness by trading them off against each other. To restrict composition in accordance with our intuitions would require a vague restriction. It's not on to say that somewhere we get just enough contrast with the surroundings, just enough cohesion, ...to cross a threshold and permit composition to take place, though if the candidate class had been just a little worse it would have remained sumless. But if composition obeys a vague restriction, then it must sometimes be a vague matter whether composition takes place or not. And that is impossible (Lewis 1986).

It is impossible, Lewis goes on to argue, because vagueness is located in language, not the world, and the question of whether a given class does or does not have a

mereological sum can be stated in a part of language where nothing is vague. Thus there is no room whatsoever for vagueness, which means that we must accept the sorites at face value: every class must have a sum.

We may wonder what has occurred here. We begin by allowing that our intuitive understanding of when composition takes place serves as a rough guide to when it indeed takes place. Yet we conclude that these intuitions, delineating at least some determinate cases of composition from other determinate cases of composition failure (else what is vague?), are irrelevant to when composition actually takes place. This raises the question to which we shall now turn: how exactly do we understand the relationship of our intuitions of composition to the phenomena those intuitions are supposed to track?

We need not bicker with Lewis that existence cannot be vague, and that the property (borne by a class) of having a sum is therefore a property that may not be instantiated vaguely. Let us call such a property *sharp*. Additionally, if a property is sharp in virtue of the fact that all entities bear it, or none do, then let us call it *trivially sharp*. It is clear that if some property is sharp but not trivially sharp, and there is a way to define a continuous series of cases where some cases have the property, and others do not, then there will be at least one sharp cut-off between cases that have the property, and cases that do not. Lewis' argument above is that the property of composing a sum is sharp and therefore must be trivially sharp. What premises are essential to this argument?

First of all there is the assumption that it is possible to set up the right kind of continuous series. Arguably it is not possible to guarantee this without a setting similar to Lewis' modal realism. One could seek to block his argument on the grounds that there generally is no such setting, but this would obscure the deeper problem with the argument that we wish to uncover. So let us grant that some framework is available supporting this assumption.

Second we assume that the *desiderata* we have for expecting there to be cases of composition are vague. No one has given precise, necessary and sufficient conditions for when a collection of birds forms a flock, a collection of trees an avenue, a collection of bees a swarm, and so on. We grant this descriptive assumption as well.

Third we assume that if our desiderata do not provide us explicitly with necessary and sufficient criteria for determining when composition occurs, then nothing does. The epistemic approach to vagueness is no more open to us than it is in determining precisely how many hairs one must have on one's head to count as hirsute. This assumption is necessary if we are to follow Lewis in denying that having a sum is a sharp but not nontrivially sharp property. If we deny it then we may accept that the cut-off between cases where composition occurs and where it doesn't is a sharp but nontrivial one, even though our desiderata do not yield a perfectly precise criteria for specifying where (between which arbitrarily similar cases) this cut-off lies. It is this assumption which turns out to rest on a conventionalistic attitude toward the nature of summation.

To understand what is at issue, we must first employ a framework which allows us to speak of property attributions in an ontologically neutral way. We wish to understand the distinction between (abundant) properties which do not represent any genuine joints in reality, such as the property of being either red or a handshake or prime, and (natural) properties whose instantiation does entail some addition to being, or represent some joint in reality, in the sense that something's being red entails, say, the instantiation of a certain universal, namely redness. Lewis' general framework for properties, associating them with classes, has the required neutrality. For Lewis, additionally, the distinction between abundant and natural properties is primitive (Lewis 1983) but others, such as Armstrong, Mulligan, Simons and Smith, attempt to spell it out (Armstrong 1997), (Mulligan et al. 1984).

The form of conventionalism at issue may then be defined with respect to a given property: a property is a referent only by convention just when it is neither natural, nor represents a local maxima of degree of naturalness, in the sense that it is the most natural in a neighborhood of cases we characterize by setting up a continuous series of sufficiently similar properties. Such characterization by aligning cases of sufficiently similar classes runs precisely along the lines granted earlier to Lewis. Conventionality is a function of how we use language: Let us say that a property *is* conventional when it is a referent only by convention. The definition is justified as such a property would generally become the referent for some of our talk only as the result of a conventional choice we or our interlocutors make from a homogeneous collection of candidates.

The property of topological point-sets of constituting a circle is non-conventional. We may understand and communicate the concept 'circle' without employing precise mathematical vocabulary, for example by drawing a few circles in the right setting. Such drawings will as a rule not be perfectly circular, but a potential interlocutor will generally infer that the property of genuine circularity is intended, since it is vastly more natural than any other property in the neighborhood (a neighborhood of properties specifying sets of points approximating circularity). More arguably, we might hold that redness is a non-conventional property. Here we might say that there is a redness universal, and its instantiation supervenes on more basic properties of instantiating individuals, without reducing to those relatively basic properties. If we grant Lewis' assumption that we may set up the relevant kinds of continuous series of possible cases, then there will of necessity be a sharp cut-off between genuine cases of red and cases of almost but not quite red, even if we could not have exactly specified it beforehand. We enjoy referential success to redness because there is a universal present which secures best candidate status for the associated class.

There can be no doubt that Lewis is aware of the distinction between natural and abundant properties, that he countenances it, and further that he regards it as an essential ingredient of semantics:

Among all the countless things and classes that there are, most are miscellaneous, gerrymandered, ill-demarcated. Only an elite minority are carved at the joints, so that their boundaries are established by objective sameness and difference in nature. Only these elite things and classes are eligible to serve as referents (Lewis 1984).

Lewis argues that in cases where there are natural joints in nature it is necessary that these be regarded as the most eligible candidates for reference, even when no amount of descriptive information explicitly supplied by the speaker suffices in the narrow sense to determine that reference. In the 'hirsuteness' case above there is no best candidate interpretation (where such would be a rule like: exactly 257 hairs are the minimal constraint on hirsuteness) and so we must reject the epistemicist explanation of the vagueness of that concept; here it is unproblematically located in language. In contexts where we need to treat hirsuteness as a sharp property, we choose by convention from the homogeneous class of available precisifications. But what about the vagueness inherent in our desiderata for when composition should occur? It seems that this should be an exemplary instance of a property which reflects a natural joint in reality: there is supposed to be a new *particular individual* that comes into being whenever it obtains. So if Lewis takes it as given that the present vagueness may not be epistemic, i.e. indicative that our intuitions approximate a natural joint although they fail to specify it with perfect logical rigour, then Lewis has *ex curia* ruled out the possibility that the instantiation of the having-a-sum property does not correlate with any genuine increase in being, or joint in reality.

We may now return to the initial concern we had with Lewis' argument: it begins by countenancing our intuitive desiderata as potential indicators of when classes do and do not form sums, but ends by doing violence to these desiderata, by concluding that no classes do not form sums. This move does not make sense if the project of determining when classes form sums is viewed according to the *a posteriori* scientific model, whereby we register evidence of a phenomena and try to construct the theory which best explains that evidence. The move does make sense if we view our project as the pragmatic one of deciding how to use various linguistic constructions, a pragmatic way of favoring one method of cutting the cookie-dough of reality over others. A thinker who explicitly adopts this view is Putnam, who finds unbearable our epistemic inability to decide between universalism and *nihilism*, the view that classes never form sums. Putnam responds in the spirit of the Carnap of (Carnap 1950) that which of these options we accept is a matter of which external linguistico-conceptual framework we choose to adopt, and which way we decide to use the relevant words and concepts: 'object', 'number of existing things', 'part', 'individual', etc. (Putnam 1987). The upshot of this approach is a deflation of the significance of those concepts and a consequent relativization of the facts we use them to represent. (As a consequence of these considerations, we see how Lewis' argument supports nihilism as well as it does universalism. Lewis is willing to do violence to our intuitions about where composition does not occur, preserving those about where it does. Why not rather contradict our intuitions about when composition occurs, preserving those about where it does not? It is hard to see how we might square this preference of Lewis' with his rejection of the epistemicist account of vagueness.)

Given Lewis' own criteria of naturalness for properties, his denial of the epistemicist account of vagueness in the present case must amount to a denial that the apparent increase in being evidenced when, given a class, there also exists a sum of all its elements, has any ontological or non-linguistic significance whatsoever. Whatever its metaphysical drawbacks, this view promises to diffuse seemingly contentful problems that arise in the literature on the nature of mereological sums. If the question of

whether Tibbles is identical to Tib turns out to be just a question about how to use various linguistic conventions, then it is *ipso facto* of no genuine metaphysical concern.

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Der Mensch in der roten Glasglocke. Ein Gleichnis von Ludwig Wittgenstein

Ilse Somavilla, Innsbruck, Österreich

“Die Leiden des Geistes los werden,
das heißt die Religion los werden.” (DB, 191)

“Die Auseinandersetzung mit
dem Geist, mit dem Licht, ergreift.”¹

In einem Brief-Fragment, vermutlich im Jahre 1925 an seine Schwester Hermine adressiert, schreibt Wittgenstein von einer roten Glasglocke, die er als Gleichnis für das Dasein der Menschheit bringt.

Dieser Text birgt eine Fülle von Gedanken, die sich teilweise in weiteren Schriften Wittgensteins beobachten lassen, wie auch in ähnlicher Weise bei Platon, Oswald Spengler sowie Ferdinand Ebner. Anders als in seinen Bemerkungen in philosophischen Schriften und Diskussionen geht aus diesem Schreiben Wittgensteins persönliche Einstellung zu geistigen und kulturellen Werten hervor, die einem Bekenntnis gleichkommt: zur Religion und zur Kultur, wobei die Präferenz für die Religion klar zutage tritt.

Zu betonen ist, daß Wittgenstein zur gegenwärtig häufig auftretenden Tendenz, den Kulturbegriff mit dem Religionsbegriff in eins zu setzen², eine gegensätzliche Haltung einnimmt, zwischen Kultur und Religion die große Diskrepanz sieht. Unter dem Kulturbegriff versteht er in erster Linie Kunst und Wissenschaft; Religion sieht er nicht eigentlich als Teil von Kultur, sondern als außerhalb ihrer stehend, eine Sonderstellung einnehmend. Obgleich er die Kulturen dem Bereich des Geistigen zuordnet, bedeuten sie für ihn nur eine Art Ersatz für Religion. Diese mache das wirklich Spirituelle aus.

In einer Metapher wird das religiöse Ideal – als das “reine geistige” Ideal – dementsprechend mit weißem Licht verglichen, die Ideale der verschiedenen Kulturen hingegen mit den gefärbten Lichtern, die entstehen, wenn das reine Licht durch rot gefärbtes Glas scheint. Solange eine Kulturepoche bestehe und dem Menschen etwas zu geben fähig sei, halte der Mensch diese für das Wahre, Absolute – für das Licht – nicht wissend, daß Kultur im Grunde nur ein Abglanz eines darüber stehendes Lichtes, des wirklich Geistigen, sei – nichts als ein “Traum vom Geist”, um mit Ferdinand Ebner zu sprechen, dessen Aufzeichnungen denen Wittgensteins hier sehr nahe kommen. In der ihrer selbst nicht bewußten “Icheinsamkeit” des menschlichen Bewußtseins sieht Ebner das “Es denkt”, wie es in Kants transzendentaler Ästhetik zum Ausdruck kommt – eine stets reflektierende Haltung des Betrachters gegenüber dem Ästhetischen. Der religiöse Mensch müsse sich jedoch davon befreien, d.h. aus der reflexiven Haltung des Ichs, des bloßen “Träumens vom Geist” in eine direkte Beziehung zur eigentlichen Realität des geistigen Lebens treten. Im Sinne Wittgensteins – und bezogen auf seine Metapher der Glasglocke – verhält sich die Unterscheidung zwischen getrübtetem und reinem geistigen Licht wie Ebners Unterscheidung zwischen Traum vom Geist und Realität des Geistes.

¹ Zitat aus einem Brief-Fragment Wittgensteins.

² Man denke nur an die vereinfachende Art, mit der beispielsweise Huntington in seinem Buch *Kampf der Kulturen* die Kulturen aus den Weltreligionen definiert.

Nur das Religiöse symbolisiere das, um mit Wittgenstein zu sprechen, “reine, ungetrübt Licht”, in dessen Gegenwart alle Kultur verblasse bzw. getrübt erscheine; ein Leben in Kultur und ohne Religion sei kein wirkliches Leben, sondern mache die Menschen melancholisch oder gleichgültig und oberflächlich. Der “Traum vom Geist” führt in die Irre – in die “Icheinsamkeit” – anstatt auf den richtigen Weg, der nach Ebner nur über den Dialog mit dem Du, insbesondere über den Dialog mit Gott, geht.

Solange die Menschen in jenem getrübteten Licht verharren – sich mit Kultur und Wissenschaft begnügen – bestehe kaum Verlangen nach dem reinen, absoluten Licht. Doch in Anbetracht der Tatsache, daß mit Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts die Menschheit an die Grenze der abendländischen Kultur gestoßen sei – Wittgenstein scheint offensichtlich inspiriert von Oswald Spengler – stelle sich die “Säure” ein, nämlich die Melancholie und der Humor. Im Gegensatz zu Spengler, der den Zustand, in dem sich die abendländische Kultur kurz vor ihrem Untergang befindet, als einen Zustand zivilisatorischer Dekadenz betrachtet, sieht Wittgenstein nun den Beginn einer religiösen Ära nahen. Während Spengler nämlich Kultur und Religion im Gegensatz zur Zivilisation, als Ausdruck von Mechanismus und Irreligiosität, auf einer Ebene sieht, stellt Wittgenstein die Religion eindeutig über die Kultur. – Religion, als das “reine geistige Ideal”, mit dem sich der schöpferisch Tätige auseinanderzusetzen hat, wenn er die Grenze der Kultur gefühlt hat. Dem “Strome der europäischen und amerikanischen Zivilisation”, der von Fortschritt und dem Bauen immer größerer und komplizierterer Strukturen geprägt sei, fehle jedoch der Geist des Religiösen, wie Wittgenstein im Vorwort zu den *Philosophischen Bemerkungen* beklagt. Er selbst bekennt sich als einer, der seiner Zeit fremd gegenüberstehe, wie ihm umgekehrt auch bewußt sei, daß sein Geist von jener nicht verstanden würde. Ihm ginge es um “Klarheit und Durchsichtigkeit welcher Strukturen immer”; wie sich im hier zur Diskussion stehenden Text zeigt, verbindet Wittgenstein das religiöse Ideal mit Klarheit – mittels der Metapher des reinen weißen Lichts, das die Dinge “durchsichtig” erscheinen läßt. Im selben Vorwort drückt Wittgenstein seinen Wunsch aus, daß sein Buch “zur Ehre Gottes geschrieben” sei – der Geist seines Schreibens also ein religiöser sei.

Mit seiner Metapher der Glasglocke evoziert Wittgenstein auch Analogien zu Platons Höhlengleichnis, wo die in dunkler Höhle Lebenden, die noch nie das Tageslicht geschaut haben, dieses nicht vermissen, sondern ihr Dasein und die daraus entstandene Sicht der Dinge für die wahre halten. Ebenso halten die in ihrer jeweiligen Kulturepoche sich Befindenden diese für etwas Großes und Wahres, nicht ahnend, daß es Größeres und Vollkommeres gibt.

Der Unterschied zwischen wahrer und falscher Erkenntnis bzw. zwischen Sein und Schein wird von Wittgenstein auf den Unterschied zwischen religiöser und kulturbezogener Betrachtung der Dinge übertragen: während der kulturelle Mensch die Welt durch rosa getrübtetes Licht

betrachte, erkenne der religiöse diese in reinem, klarem, ungetrübtem Licht.

Weiters symbolisiert die Metapher des menschlichen Daseins in einer Glasglocke die Zerbrechlichkeit der menschlichen Existenz sowie die Brüchigkeit der Welt. Sie macht das Prekäre und die Fragwürdigkeit kultureller Werte faßbar, im Gegensatz zur Beständigkeit des wirklich Geistigen, das in die Glasglocke nur als fernes, doch vollkommen weißes Licht hereinleuchtet. Wahre Geistigkeit wird hier dem "religiösen Ideal" gleichgesetzt und Wittgenstein läßt keinen Zweifel aufkommen, daß aus seiner Sicht dieses Ideal – als das Licht definiert – jegliche kulturellen Strömungen, überhaupt jegliche Formen menschlicher Zivilisation, überstrahlt.

Er betont vielmehr, daß das Verankertsein in einem kulturbestimmten Dasein die Sicht auf das Eigentliche trübt, da die Welt dabei gleichsam wie durch gefärbte Gläser betrachtet werde. Der kulturbezogene Mensch bleibt gefangen wie in einer Glasglocke, eingeengt, daran gehindert, in die Freiheit zu entkommen – eine Freiheit, die nur ein Leben im Geist und zugleich in Gott verspricht. Diese Freiheit ist identisch mit Wahrheit und Klarheit, da erst durch sie die Dinge richtig wahrgenommen werden – transparent geworden wie in durchsichtigem Licht.

Der Vergleich mit Spinoza liegt nahe, der von der vollkommenen, adäquaten Erkenntnis spricht – der Betrachtung "sub specie aeternitatis". Nur diese ermöglichte die wahre Sicht der Dinge und führe zu menschlicher Freiheit, die jedoch – scheinbar paradox – in der Erkenntnis der Notwendigkeit von Gottes Plänen, der logischen Notwendigkeit allen Geschehens in der Welt, liegt. Einer Notwendigkeit, die von Gott als "natura naturans" bewirkt wird und sich in der geschaffenen Welt, der "natura naturata", an unabänderlichen Naturgesetzen zeigt:

Die Mehrheit der Menschen ist jedoch von einer wahren Erkenntnis dieser Notwendigkeit wie überhaupt von einer adäquaten Betrachtung der Dinge weit entfernt und bleibt in einer inadäquaten Betrachtungsweise gefangen, die eine unvollkommene und verworrene Sicht der Dinge bedeutet. Diese ist mit dem Dasein in einer roten Glasglocke zu vergleichen, wie Wittgenstein es beschreibt. Dabei unterscheidet er zwischen drei Arten von Menschen bzw. unterschiedlichen Weisen, mit diesem Dasein umzugehen:

Die einen erkennen zwar die Begrenztheit ihrer Kultur, doch sie resignieren an der Unmöglichkeit, das Glas zu durchbrechen; sie sind demnach unfähig, sich über die Kultur zu erheben und geben sich mit ihr – dem getrübten Licht – zufrieden, ohne nach dem wahren Licht zu suchen. Ohne dieses wird der Mensch aber entweder "humoristisch" oder, wie vorhin erwähnt, "melancholisch" – Eigenschaften, die Wittgenstein dem resignierenden Menschen, dem Menschen ohne Glauben, zuschreibt. Humor und Ironie, die auch von Kierkegaard als Eigenschaften des resignierenden Menschen betrachtet werden, seien laut diesem Leidenschaften, die sich von der Leidenschaft des Glaubens wesentlich unterscheiden: sie reflektieren auf sich selbst und zeigen auf, daß das Individuum für die Wirklichkeit inkommensurabel ist (vgl. Kierkegaard, 45).

Für Wittgenstein kennzeichnen sie die unglückliche Befindlichkeit des Menschen, der an seiner Kultur und dabei an der Welt resigniert und in einen chronischen Zustand von Melancholie verfällt, der zur Verzweiflung führt. – Einen Zustand, den Wittgenstein in seinen philosophischen Gedankengängen und damit verbundenen Zweifeln an Gott selbst immer wieder an sich erfuhr.

Es ist der Zustand der Icheinsamkeit, um nochmals auf Ferdinand Ebner zurückzukommen, ein Zustand, in dem der bloß auf ästhetischen Schein gerichtete Mensch gefangen bleibt.

Neben dem resignierenden Menschen gibt es auch denjenigen, der zwar an die Grenze des Raumes stößt, diese aber nicht wahrnimmt. Er lebt weiter wie bisher, in einer oberflächlichen Weise, bar jeder Sensibilität und Reflexion. Vor allem aber ohne Leidenschaft, ohne die ein religiöser Glaube nicht möglich ist, ohne die nicht in jene Bereiche vorgedrungen werden kann, die in die Tiefe, auf den Grund gehen. Denn der "getrübte" Blick bleibt an der Oberfläche haften, wie Wittgenstein bei seinen philosophischen Untersuchungen wiederholt feststellte. Darunter ist auch eine rein wissenschaftliche Betrachtung der Dinge zu verstehen, die durch rationale Analyse eine vollständige Erklärung der Dinge anstrebt, doch in ihrer Befassung mit dem bloß Sichtbaren Wesentlichen außer auch läßt.

Um diesem näher zu kommen, müßte man – mit Wittgenstein metaphorisch gesprochen – das Glas durchbrechen. Das heißt, einen "Sprung ins Ungewisse" wagen, wie ihn Kierkegaard propagiert hat. Diese von Wittgenstein für richtig gehaltene Konsequenz ist ein Wagnis, das der Mensch auf sich zu nehmen habe – ungeachtet der Gefahr, sich dabei zu verletzen. Denn das Durchbrechen der von rotem Licht getrübten Glasglocke, um zum reinen Licht vorzudringen, ist analog dem Hinabsteigen in einen furchterregenden Abgrund, wie ihn Wittgenstein 1937 anlässlich seiner qualvollen Auseinandersetzungen mit philosophischen und religiösen Fragen schildert (vgl. DB, 200ff.). Nur durch dieses Wagnis, d.h. das Hinabsteigen in dunkle Tiefen, ist es möglich, die Wahrheit ans Licht zu holen – wie es auch nur durch das Durchbrechen der Glasglocke möglich sei, das Licht, das mit der Wahrheit identisch ist, zu schauen.

"Die Forderung ist hoch" (DB, 167), schreibt Wittgenstein. Jeden Augenblick müsse man darauf gefaßt sein, daß das Äußerste von einem verlangt wird. Bei Nichterfüllung dieser Forderung, beim Zurückschauen vor der Auseinandersetzung mit letzten Fragen, bliebe das Leben nur ein "Schein" (DB, 177), ohne Wahrheit, ohne Tiefe. Wie eben ein Leben in Kultur und Wissenschaft, doch ohne Religion, nach Ebner nur ein "Traum vom Geist" bleibt – fern vom eigentlichen Geist.

Das hohe Ethos, das Wittgenstein im Leben wie in der Arbeit vor Augen hatte, war auf jenes ungetrübte Licht gerichtet – auf vollkommene Klarheit, auf "Transparenz", die nur durch das Hinabtauchen unter die Oberfläche zu erreichen ist. Die Tiefe, das "Leuchten" müsse seine Arbeit aber "von noch einem andern Licht" (MS 157a, 68v) erhalten – womit der Bereich des Religiösen angedeutet ist.

Diese Anforderung stellt Wittgenstein an alle geistig und künstlerisch Tätigen: ohne jenes Licht würden deren Werke nicht "ergreifen", ohne Auseinandersetzung mit dem Religiösen wären sie nur mittelmäßig, Produkte "bloßer Talente" – ohne Genialität. Nur die aus den "Leiden des Geistes" hervorgegangenen Werke machen diese glaubwürdig, wahrhaft.

Die Auseinandersetzung mit dem "Licht" wirft den Künstler in eine schmerzhaft paradoxe Situation, da sie ihn stets mit dessen Schattenseite – den unweigerlichen Qualen in jedem, vom Ernst des Lebens und des Todes bewußten schöpferischen Prozeß – konfrontiert. Diese

Grenzerfahrung, das Schweben zwischen Licht und Schatten, muß in einem glaubhaften Werk durchschimmern – auf eine Art und Weise, die den Unterschied zu der aus getrübtter, rosafarbener Weltsicht entstandenen "Scheinkunst" deutlich macht.

In diesem Zusammenhang sei auf eine Tagebuchstelle Wittgensteins hingewiesen, wo er die Musik Beethovens mit Religion vergleicht – als Ausdruck von Wahrheit, ohne Beschönigung der Realität. Mit dieser Textstelle hat er ein Beispiel dafür gegeben, wie trotz offener Gegensätzlichkeit Kunst und Religion miteinander vereinbart werden können – vorausgesetzt, es handelt sich um wahre Kunst, die mit Religion nahezu identisch ist.

Beethoven ist ganz & gar Realist; ich meine, seine Musik ist ganz wahr, ich will sagen: er sieht das Leben ganz wie es ist & dann erhebt er es. Er ist ganz Religion & gar nicht religiöse Dichtung. Drum kann er in wirklichen Schmerzen trösten wenn die Andern versagen & man sich bei ihnen sagen muß: aber so ist es ja nicht. Er wiegt in keinen schönen Traum ein sondern erlöst die Welt dadurch daß er sie als Held sieht, wie sie ist.³

Musik und mit ihr alle Kunst als Ausdruck von Wahrheit wäre der Garant für die wahre Erkenntnis des Lebens, wie es auch Schopenhauer vorschwebte: In Anlehnung an Leibnizens Ausspruch "musica est exercitium arithmeticae occultum nescientis se numerare animi" [Die Musik ist eine unbewußte Übung in der Arithmetik, bei der der Geist nicht weiß, daß er zählt], wollte Schopenhauer diesen Satz parodieren, indem er folgerte: "Musica est exercitium philosophiae occultum nescientis se philosophare animi." [Die Musik ist eine unbewußte Übung in der Philosophie, bei der der Geist nicht weiß, daß er philosophiert] (Schopenhauer, WWV I, 322, 332). Wenn es gelänge, das, was die Musik in Tönen ausspricht, in Begriffen auszudrücken, so würde damit auch eine genügende Wiederholung und Erklärung der Welt selbst in Begriffen gegeben sein, also die wahre Philosophie.

In seiner Suche nach philosophischer Erkenntnis, die Wittgenstein stets mit einer Wahrheits- und Klarheitssuche – auch hinsichtlich seines persönlichen Lebens – verband, war ihm das "Höchste", was er zu erreichen wünschte, "eine Melodie zu komponieren", da er dann "sein Leben quasi zusammenfassen" und es "krystallisiert hinstellen könnte". – "Und wenn es auch nur ein kleines schäbiges Krystall wäre, aber doch eins." (DB, 9f.)

Somit scheint Wittgenstein – trotz der hier angeführten Gemeinsamkeiten mit Kierkegaard und Ferdinand Ebner – sich von diesen dahingehend zu unterscheiden, daß er, ungeachtet seines Kulturpessimismus, in der Kunst eine Möglichkeit zur richtigen Betrachtung des Lebens und der Welt erblickte. Seine Ernüchterung angesichts des geisti-

gen und kulturellen Niedergangs im Wien der Jahrhundertwende ließ in ihm nicht alle Hoffnung schwinden.

Ich habe einmal, & vielleicht mit Recht, gesagt: Aus der früheren Kultur wird ein Trümmerhaufen & am Schluß ein Aschenhaufen werden; aber es werden Geister über der Asche schweben. (VB, 25)

Doch wiederum sah er den Geist aus religiöser Sicht:

In der großstädtischen Zivilisation/Großstadt-Zivilisation kann sich der Geist nur in einen Winkel drücken. Dabei ist er aber nicht etwa atavistisch & überflüssig sondern er schwebt über der Asche der Kultur als (ewiger) Zeuge – quasi als Rächer der Gottheit/Gottes.(DB, 46)

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³ DB, S. 72. Ferdinand Ebner hatte von Beethoven eine andere Meinung. Anfangs war er von dessen Werken, insbesondere von den Symphonien, begeistert, die er als einziges kulturelles Gut der Deutschen den griechischen Tragödien gleichstellte. Später sprach er, nicht zuletzt wohl unter dem Einfluß von Josef Matthias Hauer, in abschätzigen Worten von Beethoven: dieser betäube sich in seinen Finalen am Lärm und fürchte die Stille. Nur aus dem Finale der "Eroika" meinte Ebner ein "religiös sich anmutendes Andante" zu hören (vgl. Seyr, III, 215).

Erlebter und zugeschriebener Wille

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1. Wille und Willenserlebnis

Wie verhalten sich Wille und Willenserlebnis zueinander? Diese Frage bleibt in der gegenwärtigen Diskussion, die sich mehr für die Rationalität von Wollen als für das phänomenale Bewußtsein von Wollen interessiert, einerseits erstaunlich unterbelichtet. Andererseits scheint aber eine implizite Beantwortung weit verbreitet zu sein; sonst wären die heftigen (affirmativen oder kritischen) Reaktionen auf einige rezente kognitionswissenschaftliche Forschungen kaum zu erklären, die dem bewußten Willen eine zentrale Rolle für die Handlungssteuerung verweigern. Denn in der Vorstellung vom „bewußten Willen“ bleiben aktives Willensmoment und Willenserlebnis ungeschieden; insofern wird mit der Depotenzierung des bewußten Willens der Wille als handlungssteuerndes Moment überhaupt depotenziert.

Daß man Wollen überwiegend der Bewußtseinsphäre zuordnet, verwundert nicht. In Verbindung mit Kontrolle, Rationalität, Freiheit und Autonomie gebracht, wird Wille als ein zentrales Charakteristikum dessen aufgefaßt, was individuelles Personsein ausmacht. Zugleich identifiziert man das Selbst als zentrale Steuereinheit mit phänomenalem Bewußtsein. (Entsprechend wird der Wille bei entgegengesetzter Ortung im Unbewußten tendenziell als ein der Kontrolle entzogener Trieb und als inkompatibel mit Freiheit und Autonomie aufgefaßt.)

Für die Ortung des Willens im Bewußtsein gibt es weiterhin ein erkenntnistheoretisches und methodologisches Motiv: Bewußtsein ermöglicht den Zugriff auf Wollen, Wille ist per Introspektion gegeben. Nun wurde die Idee der Introspektion seit einiger Zeit insbesondere von Seiten der analytischen Philosophie mit einer Reihe von Argumenten in Mißkredit gebracht. Für den Zugriff auf den Willen, besser: auf Vorkommnisse von Wollen, ist dann nicht phänomenales Bewußtsein leitend, sondern die Analyse des rationalen Äußerungs- und Handlungsprofils einer Person. Wollen ergibt sich aus den Motiven und den Überzeugungen von Personen (für Intentionalisten in Wittgenstein-Nachfolge wie von Wright ist das ein begrifflicher Zusammenhang, für Kausalisten wie Davidson ein kausaler) und diese wiederum sind dispositional oder funktional auf Äußerungen und Handlungen der Person bezogen. Bewußtsein kommt nur im Sinne eines Zugriffsbewußtseins, nicht aber als phänomenales Bewußtsein ins Spiel.

Stärkere Berücksichtigung von phänomenalem Bewußtsein wird nun aber nicht nur von manchen Stimmen in der Qualiadebatte gefordert, sondern – weniger thematisch – auch in der Willensdiskussion, nämlich in der (vor allem bei einigen Libertariern anzutreffenden) Annahme von spontanem, willkürfreiem, nicht durch vorhergehende mentale Ereignisse determiniertem Wollen. Wegen seiner Arationalität und Ungebundenheit an bestehendes mentales Inventar scheint solches Wollen von der funktional-analytischen Analyse nicht eingefangen werden zu können, sondern epistemologisch und methodologisch auf Introspektion angewiesen zu sein. So erstaunt es nicht, daß Anhänger (auch analytischer Provenienz) eines solchen Freiheitsbegriffs nicht nur behaupten, seine Annahme sei notwendige Voraussetzung unserer Verantwortungspraxis, sondern auch, daß wir über ein direktes Erlebnis solchen Wollens verfügen.

Ich konfrontiere die Vorstellung vom „Willen im Bewußtsein“ nun nicht erneut mit der Geschichte philosophischer Argumente gegen Introspektion im allgemeinen, sondern mit zwei prominenten, speziell auf das Willenssthema zugeschnittenen kognitionswissenschaftlichen Befunden der jüngeren Diskussion. Ich werde diese Experimente, die oftmals als Befunde gegen die Existenz personalen Willens angesehen werden, so deuten, daß sie zur Trennung von Wille und Willenserlebnis Anlaß geben. Anschließend gebe ich einige Hinweise, wie sich dennoch ein starker Willensbegriff von arationaler Willkürfreiheit und Entscheidung ohne vorhergehende zureichende Gründe aufrechterhalten und eine gewisse Art von Erster-Person-Autorität sichern läßt, somit also wichtigen Aspekten der Intuition von der Bewußtseinsgegebenheit des Willens nachgekommen werden kann.

2. Libets Experiment

In Libets Experiment (Libet 1999) werden Versuchspersonen instruiert, zu von ihnen frei zu wählenden Zeitpunkten Tasten zu betätigen und durch Ablesen der Zeigerstellung an einer uhrähnlichen Vorrichtung (mit schnellem Umlauf, um kürzere Zeitspannen zu erfassen) den Zeitpunkt zu bestimmen, an dem sie hierzu zuerst den Wunsch (*wish, urge, intention*) verspürt haben. Der ermittelte Zeitpunkt (die Reaktionszeitspanne fällt größenordnungsmäßig nicht ins Gewicht) liegt im Durchschnitt der Probanden und ihrer Versuche zirka 200 Millisekunden vor dem der Muskelaktivierung. Andererseits liegt der Zeitpunkt des Willenserlebnisses deutlich später als das Auftreten des sogenannten Bereitschaftspotentials, eines elektrischen Potentials im motorischen Kortex, das (nur) bei Körperbewegungen auftritt, die wir üblicherweise willentlich initiiert nennen. Bei vorgefaßten Plänen, die Hand bald zu bewegen, tritt dieses Potential rund 1000 Millisekunden, bei ungeplanten, spontanen willentlichen Bewegungen 500 Millisekunden vor der Muskelaktivierung auf. Für Libet ist das Auftreten des Potentials der Moment der eigentlichen Handlungsinitiierung, die also dem bewußten Willen vorangeht. Diese Deutung, wonach das Bereitschaftspotential nicht bloß eine Ursache im kausalen Weltverlauf ist, der schließlich zur Muskelaktivierung und Handlung führt, sondern für die eigentliche Handlungsinitiierung steht, macht es aus, daß Libets Herausforderung an den Willen über diejenige von einem physischen Determinismus her hinausgeht. Angreifbar ist Libets Gedankengang sicherlich (u.a.) bezüglich einer solchen direkten Charakterisierung eines neuronalen Ereignisses als „eigentlicher Handlungsinitiierung“. Wie ich meine, hat es jedoch Gewicht, daß das Bereitschaftspotential genau bei willentlichen Körperbewegungen auftritt und so im motorischen Kortex lokalisiert ist, daß es weitgehend direkt Muskelkontraktion nach sich zieht. Auf den Befund läßt sich auf folgende drei Weisen reagieren:

a) Man streitet der Erforschung psychologischer Module und neurologischer Strukturen von vornherein die Relevanz für das Verständnis unseres intentionalen Vokabulars der Alltagspraxis ab. Ich halte das für eine unangebrachte philosophische Immunisierungsstrategie.

b) Man bestreitet, daß Libets Szenario ein solches willentlicher Entscheidung ist. So sehen viele Philosophen

im willkürlichen Tastendruck alles andere als den Prototyp einer willentlichen Entscheidung und Handlung, u.a. mit dem Argument, daß die Wahl des Zeitpunktes nicht aus Gründen erfolgt. (Begründet ist nur die Absicht, überhaupt der Instruktion zu folgen und zu irgendeinem Zeitpunkt die Taste zu drücken.) – Ich teile diese Meinung nur insoweit, als die untersuchte Performanz tatsächlich bloß einen Aspekt von dem abdeckt, was wir als Phänomen willentlicher Handlungen kennen. Aber auch bei komplexeren Handlungen und Deliberationsprozessen würde für jeden Teilprozeß das gelten, was Libet für die einfache Handbewegungsabsicht ermittelt. Im Sinne einer *error theory* überhaupt willentliche Entscheidungen zu leugnen, ist ein zu hoher Preis – den zu zahlen offenbar nur die quasi-„phänomenologische“ Grundannahme der Identität von Willen und Willenserlebnis nötig.

c) Man trennt Wille und Willenserlebnis. Wille ist kein Ereignis im Bewußtsein. – Ich halte dies für die angemessene Reaktion. (Die, so sei angemerkt, nicht Bewußtseinsepiphänomenalismus impliziert; das Bewußtsein einer Gewichtung von Gründen kann sich auf den weiteren Entscheidungsprozeß auswirken.) Wenn die Trennung von Wille und Willenserleben für alltägliche Willensvorstellungen auch eine Herausforderung darstellt, weil die Vorstellungen vom Bewußtsein als aktivem, nicht nur passiv erlebendem Vermögen und die vom unmittelbar gegenwärtigen Erleben angegriffen werden, so ist es doch nicht unmöglich, sich mit ihr anzufreunden. Überhaupt: Sind unsere Intuitionen darüber, was an einem komplexen Entscheidungsprozeß phänomenal bewußt sein sollte, nicht sowieso sehr unklar? Und ist es nicht einsichtig, daß das Erleben eines Vorgangs erst eintreten kann, nachdem dieser Vorgang bereits eingesetzt hat?

3. Wegners Experiment

Veranlaßt bei Libets Experiment das zeitliche Auseinander von Handlungsinitiierung und Willenserlebnis zu philosophischer Reflexion, so bei Wegners Experiment (Wegner and Wheatley 1999, Wegner 2002) die Fallibilität des Willenserlebnisses. Bildet diese bereits je einen Grundpfeiler philosophischer Argumente gegen die zentrale Rolle von Introspektion, verspricht Wegner, mit experimentellen Befunden positiv den Mechanismus der Selbstzuschreibung von Willensphänomenen aufzuklären.

Im „I spy“-Experiment sitzt jeweils eine Versuchsperson mit einem ihr gegenüber ebenfalls als Versuchsperson ausgegebenen Mitglied des Forscherteams vor einem Bildschirm, der die Bewegungen der Computermaus wiedergibt, die sie beide zusammen steuern können, da jeder mit seinen Fingerspitzen eine der beiden Seiten der Maus berührt. Die Versuchsperson bekommt die Anweisung, ihre Mausbewegung nach einem festgelegten Intervall zu einem von ihr frei gewählten Zeitpunkt innerhalb eines Zeitfensters von zehn Sekunden zu unterbrechen und auf einer Skala von „I allowed the stop to happen“ bis „I intended to make the stop“ den Grad der Willentlichkeit der Unterbrechung zu genau diesem Zeitpunkt einzuschätzen. Während des Zeitfensters hört sie über einen Kopfhörer Worte (wie ihr gesagt wird, andere als die scheinbare zweite Versuchsperson), u.a. Namen von auf dem Bildschirm angezeigten Symbolen (wie Schwan oder Dinosaurier). Der Mitarbeiter trägt mal überhaupt nichts zum Stoppen der Bewegung bei, mal steuert er aktiv das Objekt an, dessen Name die Versuchsperson in (variiert) zeitlicher Nähe hört, und beendet dort die Bewegung. Resultate: Bei Fällen der ersten Art wirkt sich das Einspielen des Namens nicht so aus, daß die Versuchspersonen den Mauszeiger vorzugsweise in der Nähe des benannten

Objekts stoppen. Bei Fällen der zweiten Art schreiben sich die Versuchspersonen das Resultat als von ihnen selber intendiert zu, wobei der Grad zugeschriebener Willentlichkeit besonders hoch ist, wenn der Name des vom Mitarbeiter angesteuerten Objekts kurz vor dem Stoppen eingespielt wurde, und abnimmt, wenn die Zeitspanne vergrößert oder der Name nach dem Stoppen genannt wird.

Offenbar schreibt man sich ein Geschehen dann bevorzugt als willentliche Handlung zu, wenn es vom Gehalt her zu einer kurz zuvor gehaltenen Repräsentation paßt. Dann unterstellt man Kausalität zwischen beiden. (Unter bestimmten Randbedingungen, etwa daß keine andere Ursache augenfällig ist und man ein kohärent scheinendes Bild vom Geschehen zeichnet.) Wegner folgert aus diesem gewissermaßen humaneischen Resultat, wonach Willenszuschreibung auf Kausalattribution oder -unterstellung beruht, daß der Wille eine Illusion ist. Grundlage hierfür ist offenbar wieder die Identifizierung von Willen mit Willenserlebnis und die Auffassung, personaler Wille müsse, wenn es ihn gibt, irrtumsfrei im Bewußtsein erlebt werden. Was der Versuch tatsächlich zeigt, ist, daß man bezüglich der Selbstzuschreibung von Willen auf relativ einfache Weise systematische Irrtümer erzeugen kann. Illusionär ist dann eine bestimmte Vorstellung von irrtumssicherem kognitivem Zugang zum eigenen Wollen, nicht der personale Wille. Vielmehr nimmt man, wenn man in bestimmten Fällen von einer fehlerhaften Zuschreibung spricht, offenbar ja an, daß es auch richtige Zuschreibungen geben kann. Für eine allgemeine Irrtumstheorie über Willen stellt das Experiment kein Argument bereit. Wohl aber läßt es sich als Symptom für die Dringlichkeit der Fragestellung beurteilen, was manche Willensattributionen wahr und andere falsch macht und welche Gründe man für die entsprechenden Behauptungen haben kann. Wie eingangs bemerkt, scheint die Depotenzierung des Zugangs im Bewußtsein zumindest für arationales spontanes Wollen eliminierende Konsequenzen zu haben.

4. Grundzüge einer Charakterisierung von Willensvorkommnissen

Im Folgenden möchte ich zeigen, daß das nicht so sein muß. Hierfür skizziere ich zunächst einige zentrale Punkte für die Charakterisierung von Willensvorkommnissen und ihrer Zugänglichkeit (in einem durch Ideen von Wittgenstein, Kripke und Brandom geprägten Klima).

A. Für die Sicherung der „Zugänglichkeit“ zum Willen ist keine epistemisch verwertbare Definition dafür nötig, wann jemand ein bestimmtes Willensvorkommnis hat. Es muß kein Verifikationsrezept geben, welchem folgend man (bei „genügender“ Informiertheit) sicher entscheiden könnte, ob dieses Willensvorkommnis wirklich vorliegt oder nicht. Verlangt sind nur Kriterien, Anhaltspunkte, Rechtfertigungsgründe für oder gegen eine Zuschreibung.

B. Zu solchen Kriterien zählen: (i) Selbstaussagen über Willensvorkommnisse, (ii) Äußerungen und Handlungen der Person allgemein, (iii) neurophysiologische Prozesse.

(iii) Auch wenn Willensvorkommnisse nicht mit bestimmten physischen Ereignissen identisch oder auf diese reduzierbar sein sollten, können physiologische Untersuchungen Behauptungen über das Bestehen von Willensvorkommnissen zu bestimmten Zeitpunkten stützen oder schwächen.

(ii) Zur Rechtfertigung von Zuschreibungen von Willensvorkommnissen verweist man oft auf Wahlsituationen und Handlungen, in denen sich das Wollen manifestiert.

Ebenso bieten viele Äußerungen von Personen Anhaltspunkte dafür, ihnen bestimmte voluntative Einstellungen zuzuschreiben, was wir u.a. so tun, daß wir bestrebt sind, ihr voluntatives Profil möglichst kohärent zu zeichnen.

(i) Um in Erfahrung zu bringen, ob ein anderer etwas Bestimmtes will, ist einem meist geholfen, wenn man ihn direkt fragt. Behauptungen aus der ersten Person sind nicht notwendig wahr; Lüge oder Täuschung über das eigene Wollen sind möglich. Oft hat man als Zuschreibender jedoch Anhaltspunkte, die Lüge oder den Irrtum zu erkennen; beispielsweise im Falle des Wegner-Experiments durch Kenntnis des Versuchsmechanismus. Das bedeutet nicht, daß man über ein Verifikations- oder Falsifikationsrezept verfügen müßte.

C. Willensvorkommnisse sind normativ. Jemandem ein bestimmtes Wollen zuzuschreiben, heißt nicht (bloß), Wahrscheinlichkeiten dafür abzuschätzen, wie er sich verhalten wird, sondern ihm Festlegungen, Verpflichtungen zuzuschreiben, wie er sich verhalten sollte. Diese Festlegungen sind aus der Zuschreibungspraxis heraus zu explizieren, auch wenn sie sich (wie D. verdeutlicht) nicht notwendig vollständig und korrekt in faktischen Zuschreibungen manifestieren.

D. Starke realistisch-ontologische Annahmen über Unabhängigkeit der Willensvorkommnisse von der Zuschreibungspraxis werden nicht getroffen. Nichtsdestoweniger sind Aussagen über Willensvorkommnisse wahrheitsfähig. Es muß nicht (wie in Kripke 1982) vorgeschlagen) von Wahrheitsbedingungen zu Behauptbarkeitsbedingungen übergegangen werden. Wahrheitsdefiniertheit muß nicht durch substantielle Wahrheitstheorie und ontologische Festlegung der Gegenstände gesichert werden, von denen die Zuschreibungen handeln. Unsere Praxis ist so, daß wir solche Zuschreibungen als wahrheitsfähig betrachten, und sie läßt sich konsistent explizieren.

Auch wenn die Zuschreibungspraxis die Willensvorkommnisse nicht konstituiert und es möglich ist, daß alle faktischen Zuschreibungen bezüglich eines Wollens falsch sind, sind Willensvorkommnisse in einem bestimmten Sinn nicht unabhängig von der Zuschreibungspraxis. In Zusammenhang mit ihrem normativen Charakter lassen sie sich nicht nach dem ontologischen Muster natürlicher Charakteristika als etwas an einer Person auffassen, sondern existieren nur im Rahmen einer Zuschreibungspraxis. Das hindert nicht, einer einzelnen, raumzeitlich isolierten Person Wollen zuzuschreiben. Denn wir als Beobachter und Zuschreibende bilden dann mit ihr eine gemeinsame Praxis.

5. Arationales Wollen und Erste-Person-Autorität

Was ist mit dieser Skizze für das Thema der Bewußtseinsgegebenheit des Willens gewonnen?

Zum ersten gewährleistet B(i) eine gewisse Erste-Person-Autorität für die Willenszuschreibung, und das ist zumindest ein Aspekt der Vorstellung vom Ansatz im Bewußtsein. Daß unsere Praxis so ist, daß wir dem Willensinhaber selbst Autorität zusprechen, ist kein Mysterium. Die Person verfügt in der Regel selber über die meisten Informationen bezüglich ihres Einstellungs- und Handlungsprofils. Außerdem wird die Dimension des introspektiven Erlebnisses nicht gelegnet, sondern mit Hinweis auf Fallibilität relativiert und methodisch nicht als Ausgangsbasis angesetzt, sondern rückwärts über das Äußerungs- und Handlungsprofil charakterisiert. (Vgl. auch die Wahrnehmungsexplikation in (Brandom 1994).)

Zum zweiten lassen sich die Überlegungen zur Zugänglichkeit von Willensvorkommnissen direkt auf solche von arationalem, unmotiviertem, spontanem Wollen übertragen. Im Sinne von B(iii) könnte es physiologische Entsprechungen zu solchem Wollen geben. (Gegen die standardlibertarische Auffassung halte ich solches Wollen mit physischem Determinismus für kompatibel.) Ebenso ist B(ii) für solches Wollen offen: auch wenn Wollen nicht auf vorausgehenden motivationalen Einstellungen beruht, spielt es eine Rolle im motivational/rationalen Profil der Person, eben die einer bestimmten Festlegung auf künftige Äußerungen und Handlungen. – Mit Berücksichtigung solchen Wollens kann ein Wollen integriert werden, das nach überwiegender Meinung eine besondere Berücksichtigung des Bewußtsein fordert und sich einem eher „analytischen“ Zugang zu verweigern scheint.

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A. D. Smith's Phenomenological Refutation of the Argument from Illusion

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The Argument from Illusion (henceforth Afl) puts into question one of the most deeply entrenched beliefs of common sense, namely, that we are in perception immediately aware of physical objects like tables and trees. In his highly informative and stimulating book *The Problem of Perception*¹ David Smith undertakes a refutation of this argument and presents a version of direct realism which allows us to keep hold of our common sense belief. The Afl has received many criticisms, but Smith's criticism is especially interesting because it is based on "phenomenological grounds" (p. 185). Smith not only lays emphasis on many aspects which have been endorsed also by phenomenologists like Husserl and Merleau-Ponty in their investigations of perception, he commits himself also to a central claim of the classical phenomenological method: he intends to bring out central aspects of the way we experience our environment perceptually by appealing to our first person point of view. If he is right, we can finally see why the Afl must be wrong by simply paying careful enough attention to our own perceptual experiences. This latter method is of special interest here because the proponents of the Afl also tend to claim that they are doing justice to our first person perspective on perceptual phenomena. If Smith's argument succeeds, he has won a victory over these proponents in their own field.

Smith's book contains a lot of very interesting material relating to all our five senses, especially to the sense of touch, but I will here, for the sake of brevity, concentrate on vision and discuss just those aspects of his account which are of pivotal importance for his rebuttal of the Afl. After stating the Afl, I will give a short sketch of Smith's main theses and then try to show why his refutation of the Afl isn't ultimately successful.

1. The Argument from Illusion

(1) In some cases of perception, physical objects appear other than they actually are – that is, they appear to possess sensory qualities that they do not actually possess.

(2) Whenever something appears to a subject to possess a sensory quality, there is something of which the subject is aware which does possess that quality.

Therefore

(3) In some cases of perception there is something of which the subject is aware which possesses sensory qualities which the physical object the subject is purportedly perceiving does not possess.

(4) If *a* possesses a sensory quality that *b* lacks, then *a* is not identical to *b*.

Therefore

(5) In some cases of perception that of which the subject is aware is something other than the physical object the subject is purportedly perceiving.

(6) There is such continuity between those cases in which objects appear other than they actually are and

cases of veridical perception that the same analysis of perception must apply to both.

Therefore

(7) In all cases of perception that of which the subject is aware is other than the physical object the subject is purportedly perceiving.²

The object the subject is immediately aware of according to this argument is generally called a sense datum. The physical objects of our environment like tables or trees are then only mediate objects of perceptual awareness as representative realism would have it, or they are to be considered along phenomenalist lines as certain kinds of sequences of sense data. Some examples may be helpful for illustration: When I see a tilted penny, the penny appears elliptical to me, and therefore the immediate object of my awareness has to be an elliptical sense datum. A straight oar immersed in water will appear bent. Therefore, what we are immediately aware of can't be the straight oar, but must be a sense datum which is bent. Or, when a leaf blown across the street appears to you as a mouse crossing our way, what you are immediately aware of is a mouse-shaped sense datum. Finally, if one accepts the distinction between primary and secondary qualities³, one can apply the argument as follows: I am in perception immediately aware of coloured (warm etc.) objects. But the objects of my environment have only primary qualities, so the coloured (warm etc.) objects I perceive immediately must be sense data.

2. Smith's criticism of the Argument from Illusion

In his criticism Smith concentrates on the second premise of the argument which is usually considered as the central and most controversial claim of the Afl. This premise presupposes at least the two following claims:

(2.1) There are sensory qualities involved in perception.

(2.2) When we are perceiving something, we are aware of these sensory qualities (and respectively of their bearers).

Smith subscribes to the first claim but not to the second. According to him, the only thing we are aware of in perception, be it veridical or illusory, is the physical object (p. 58, p. 73). Let me briefly comment both on his support for (2.1) and his denial of (2.2). In his eyes, perception is to be distinguished strictly from conceptual states like belief, thought, or judgment (p. 37ff., chapter 3). He takes it to be obvious that there is a remarkable difference for me between my conscious state of seeing a table before me and my mere belief that a table is in front of me (p. 66). This difference is due to the fact that perception implies sensation, and sensations are the bearers of sensory qualities (p. 66). In perceptual consciousness sensory qualities are involved which are absent in the case of belief and

¹ References to page numbers without any further qualifications are made to this book.

² There can be found different versions of this argument in the literature. I follow here the reconstruction in Robinson 1994, 57-8.

³ Of course, not all adherents of the Afl will accept this distinction in this form; phenomenologists form a well-known exception.

thought. He takes sense perception to be “sensuously presentational in character” (p. 172). This support of (2.1) leads, however, to the question of how Smith can deny (2.2): If sensations or their qualities are responsible for the fact that perception from the first person point of view is different from belief or conscious thought, how can this be if we are not aware of these qualities or sensations? According to Smith they are “present in [perceptual] consciousness as intrinsic states of the experience itself” (p. 58) and this has to be distinguished from being an object of awareness. We have to “make a distinction between being present to consciousness in the way that (perceptual) sensation is, and being present – and directly present – to consciousness in the way that the immediate object of awareness is” (p. 66). The crucial question is, of course, how this distinction can be made plausible. In Smith’s own words it is “to say the least, a subtle” one (p. 66).

3. Smith’s account of perceptual consciousness

Perception does not only imply sensation according to Smith; it involves more than sensation. Sensations are not representations of objects which exist independently from the sensing subject, let alone representations of objects as independent objects. A pain or the kind of visual sensations you enjoy when you press your closed eyes don’t represent objects which exist independently from you and your body (p. 128f.). Even if one might hold that sensations have a representational or intentional content, the existence of independent objects is never part of this content. Perception, in contrast, presents the perceiver not only with independent objects; it is part of the content of perception that these objects are independent in that way. In this context, Smith gives support to the classical phenomenological claim that perception doesn’t present us only with aspects of objects (e.g. only their frontal view) but that it is also part of the content that the content itself is aspectual in that way (p. 134f.). Now, if it can be shown (1) that perception represents objects in this way and (2) that in this kind of representation no awareness of sensory qualities is in play, we can see how perception (be it veridical or illusory) can be a direct awareness of objects which can be distinguished from consciously experiencing sensory qualities.

The claim that perception can represent physical objects in a non-sensuous way (that is, without the interposition of an awareness of sensory qualities) can be made precise in different ways, however. A popular strategy which can be traced back at least to Thomas Reid takes perception to be simply a combination of sensation and belief where the belief has the role of representing the object. This would do insofar as belief is clearly a non-sensuous form of representation. But Smith refutes this account because, in the generation of perceptual content it gives sensation only a minor role either as a cause of the respective belief or as a sign for the object or its properties.⁴ In his eyes, the relation between sensation and the non-sensuous element in perception is far more intimate than the varieties of this strategy generally allow. This leads to the following two questions:

- (1) How are physical objects represented in perception as independent objects?
- (2) What is the role of sensation in this process?

⁴ In fact, Smith gives a couple of different reasons why this strategy isn’t viable (p. 74-90).

The first question Smith answers in the following way: We experience an object in perception as something which stands in a spatial relationship to us or to our sense organs. Smith calls this the “over-againstness” which these objects show in perception (p. 134). In vision there are two ways in which this over-againstness may manifest itself. Firstly, objects are just seen as distant from us ostensibly located in three-dimensional space (p. 133f.). Secondly, we can gain different perceptual perspectives on objects which are independent of us by moving our sense organs relative to them (p. 140).

Both these cases of over-againstness presuppose, at least in the case of “sensory presentational” perception⁵ like vision, a further feature, that Smith calls “phenomenological constancy” (henceforth PC) (p. 171). PC occurs when we perceive an object as remaining intrinsically unchanged and constant despite a change of our sensations. For example, when I move my eyes I have changing sensations of my environment, but the objects in my environment do not appear to change at all. Or, if an object moves towards me it will occupy a larger part of my visual field than before, but I won’t perceive it as becoming larger. It is of crucial importance here for Smith that PC is not just the result of a judgment or belief we have acquired independently of our perception; we genuinely perceive the object as remaining constant in shape or size (p. 176).

The second question finds its answer in the way that sensations come into play with PC. They play an indispensable part in the representation of the thing in question; if an object moves towards us, it looks nearer while keeping its size because of the change of our visual sensations. When we experience PC “the changing sensations always manifest to us a changing relation in which an intrinsically unchanging object comes to stand to us. Only so is such constancy intelligible at all.” (p. 172). PC is the result of both registering consciously the relational change and the intrinsic lack of change (p. 173). Although sensations alone can’t represent objects (let alone give us PC), they play an indispensable role for PC. This role is in turn indispensable for the two forms of over-againstness we encounter in sensuously presentational perception, three-dimensionality and “kinetic structuring of the sense field by self-movement” (p. 173). Nevertheless, we are in perception directly aware of the objects of our environment without the interposition of sensations or their qualities as immediate objects. But so far we seem to have found the crucial distinction between awareness of objects and the way sensational qualities figure in consciousness which allows us to do without (2.2), according to which we have to be conscious of sensory qualities in order to be aware of physical objects. And we can even hold on to (2.1) without accepting the second premise of the Afl. We may then admit that the defenders of sense data are correct when they subscribe to (2.1), but that they have underrated the complexity of perceptual content, and that they therefore see the need to treat the bearers of sensory qualities as immediate objects of perceptual awareness.

4. Problems with Smith’s account of perceptual consciousness

At first blush Smith’s strategy seems to work quite well with such examples like the tilted penny or the size of objects coming closer to us. But, as I will try to show in a moment, it gets into trouble even with cases of this kind. First,

⁵ Smith argues that our perception of the resistance of objects implies over-againstness of these objects but that it is not presentational, so that there are no sensory qualities involved (p. 153ff., p. 166ff.).

however, let's see how this account copes with other cases. Smith's refutation of the second premise of the Afl hinges essentially on PC. In cases of PC, however, we cannot speak properly of illusions; objects will look as they really are (as Smith endorses himself with respect to the tilted penny; see p. 172). But, if there is no illusion in play, the truth of the first premise of the Afl is to be denied. So it seems that Smith's refutation of the second premise works only when we suppose at the same time that the first premise is wrong as well. Then the problem arises how Smith's refutation of the Afl can work in cases of perceptual illusions where the first premise is true. Smith claims that PC is only possible if (2.2) is wrong (p. 178), so that the defender of (2.2.) has to deny a "phenomenological fact". Even if this claim were true (which is doubtful – see the end of the last paragraph), it is of no help here when we want to understand how the physical object can be the immediate object of direct perceptual awareness in the case of genuine illusions where PC is absent.

Things get even worse if you take into consideration the distinction between primary and secondary qualities (a distinction Smith himself takes to be inevitable; see p. 62ff.). This distinction implies that our perceptions of whole classes of properties are illusory: If nothing in our environment is ever red in the sense in which things appear to us red, then the red which appears in my perception of a ripe tomato has to be the property of something else, e.g. a sense datum. In this case we can't appeal to PC because the perceived object in a sense isn't coloured at all although it will always appear coloured in a certain way.⁶ And because of the fact that visual perception of shape is dependent on the perception of colour contrasts we will have to conclude that even visually perceived shape can't be a property of a physical object, so that even the cases where PC is at work seem to be threatened.

And this is not the only problem with these latter cases. Smith's account implies that the changing appearances of a constant object are due to our changing sensations with their varying sensory qualities. Especially with respect to shape properties this claim leads to difficulties. Take for example a round table seen at some distance. Even if one agrees here with Smith that it would be a mistake to describe the object of perception (the table) as elliptical (p. 182), there is something elliptical which I can trace with my finger in the air. Because, according to Smith, it can't be the form of the object of my immediate awareness it has to be the sensation. But does it make sense that we can circumscribe with our fingers features of our sensations? Is it not far more plausible to suppose that we are circumscribing here an object which is different from our act of sensing? Again, a sense datum would do the required job. Furthermore, even according to the tenets of Smith's own account, one can argue that we are immediately aware of an elliptical object which is even independent of the observer: when you walk around the round table while keeping your distance constant, your sensations of the shape will remain constant as well. But then sensations will fulfil one of Smith's criteria for objective independence of the perceiving subject, which seems absurd. Again, it is more plausible that we are directly aware of something different from our act of sensing, namely, an elliptical sense datum here fulfilling even a condition of PC.

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⁶ There is PC *within* the perception of colour; things don't change their colours when seen through tinted sunglasses, as Smith points out (p. 174f.). But this bears no relevance to the fact that according to the distinction between primary and secondary qualities our perception of the latter is illusory as a whole.

Lessons for Mary

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1. Introduction

Frank Jackson (1982) once told us the story of Mary, who is confined from birth to a black-and-white room but one day gets to see red. Jackson's interest in this story concerned the truth or falsity of physicalism. But as Michael Thau (2002) and Alex Byrne (2002) have recently pointed out, the story raises a hard and interesting question that is independent of the issue of physicalism, namely: what could Mary *learn* when she sees red? This is the question I shall discuss.

Consider the following version of Mary's release. While she has still experienced no chromatic colour, Mary is told that her thumbnail, which is behind her back, is painted red. Although Mary is told that the nail is red, it seems that she will learn something when she sees it.

But what could she learn? One might think that,

(BELIEVE-RED) when Mary is told that her nail is red, she comes to *believe* that it is red,

and

(SEE-RED) when she gets to see it, she *sees* that it is red.

But then Mary *sees* what she already *believes* to be the case. And if so, what does she *learn*?

There are three main strategies for answering this question. The first is to deny (BELIEVE-RED). Perhaps Mary doesn't really believe that her nail is red before she sees it. If so, it is obvious what she learns: she learns that her nail *is red*. The second strategy is to deny (SEE-RED). Perhaps what Mary sees is not that her nail is red, but that it is some way other than red. If so, what she learns is that her nail is *that way*. The third strategy is to accept both (BELIEVE-RED) and (SEE-RED) and identify something that Mary can learn even though they are both true.

In sections 2 and 3, I briefly discuss the first and the second strategy. In section 4, I present my own proposal, which is a version of the third strategy.

2. First strategy: Deny (BELIEVE-RED)

Perhaps one needs to have had experiences of red in order to believe of something that it is red. If so, Mary won't believe that her nail is red even if she is told so. She may believe other things, for example, that her nail has some property called 'red'. But she won't believe that it is red.

Some philosophers think this is correct (e.g. Harman 1990), but in my view there are considerable reasons to doubt that.

As philosophers like Burge (1979) and Kripke (1979) have emphasised, we quite often have beliefs about objects and properties that we have had no acquaintance with and know quite little about. In fact, we can have beliefs about objects and properties even if we are significantly *mistaken* about them. For example, I could have beliefs about arthritis even if I had no acquaintance

with this disease, knew very little about it, and were importantly mistaken about what it is.

Further, it seems – to me – that beliefs about *colour* are just like beliefs about arthritis in this regard. To illustrate this, it may be helpful to first consider some "propositional attitudes" other than belief. Thus, it seems plausible that Mary could *hope* that she will one day see red, and *doubt* that this will ever happen. And if Mary can *hope* and *doubt* that she will see red, surely she can *believe* it too.

For these briefly indicated reasons, I think the first strategy is not promising.

Before I turn to the second strategy, this is the place to make one important observation about our current puzzle. Because of Jackson's interest in physicalism, he supposed that Mary knew "all" the physical facts about colour and colour vision. I have not assumed this, and I can now make clear why. The present problem is hard insofar as it is plausible that Mary can *believe* that something is red before she has seen red. And if this section is right, Mary can believe this even if she is not an expert on colour. She may have to know a few things about red to have beliefs about it. Perhaps she needs to know that red is a visually detectable surface property. But she needn't to be an expert on red to have beliefs about it any more than I need to be an expert on arthritis to have beliefs about it.

I shall eventually consider the case where Mary in some sense knows "all" the facts about colour and colour perception. But for the time being, I will take Mary to be only as educated about these things as the average person.

3. Second strategy: Deny (SEE-RED)

Thau (2002, chapter 5) and Byrne (2002) both argue that, since Mary comes to believe that her nail is red when she is told so, and learns something when she sees it, we must conclude that she doesn't see that her nail is red. Thau embraces this conclusion "at the level of reference". According to him, the *property* that Mary sees and comes to believe that her nail has is, contrary to what we naively think, not the property red. Byrne takes the conclusion to hold only "at the level of sense". On his view, Mary sees and comes to believe a content which *refers* to the same property that her antecedent belief was about, namely redness, but which represents this property under a new *concept*.

If Mary doesn't see that her nail is red, what does she see? Thau and Byrne both argue that what Mary sees and learns cannot, in principle, be expressed by any public language predicate. The argument is this. Suppose we could introduce a public language predicate – say, 'R' – with which to express what Mary learns when she comes to see her nail. Then we could tell Mary, and thus make her believe, that her nail is R before she sees it. But at this point, our problem would repeat itself: if Mary already believes that her nail is R, how can she learn something – as she surely will – when she sees it to be R? The only way to prevent the problem from arising again is to assume that we could not introduce a predicate to express what Mary learns.

I don't think we are forced to accept this conclusion. I think it is possible that Mary learns something even if she sees what she already believes to be true. Moreover, I think that what she learns can be expressed in public – and, indeed, familiar – terms. The reason it's hard or impossible to tell her what she will learn is not that she learns something inexpressible, but that she learns so *much*.

4. Third strategy: Accept both (BELIEVE-RED) and (SEE-RED)

I shall exploit an analogy: Consider a complex, irregular, bounded, two-dimensional shape, composed of a large number of straight lines. Call this shape-type 'VERYCOMPLEX'. Now, suppose I'm told that I will see a VERYCOMPLEX figure. For the reasons mentioned in section 2 above, it seems possible that, even if I have never seen a VERYCOMPLEX and know quite little about this shape, I can believe that the figure I will see is VERYCOMPLEX. But even if I do, it is clear that I can learn any number of things when I see the figure (as VERYCOMPLEX). For example, I can learn that the longest line segment of a VERYCOMPLEX is at least three times as long as the second longest one, and that there is at least one angle between line segments that is greater than 90°.

There are two features of VERYCOMPLEXNESS that explains why I can learn something from seeing this shape even if I already believe that I will see it. The first is that VERYCOMPLEXNESS can, in a sense, be analysed in terms of its "parts" or "aspects". Thus, having a longest line segment that is more than three times as long as the second longest segment is *part* of what it is to be VERYCOMPLEX, as is having at least one angle between line segments that is greater than 90°. Second, these "parts" are *visually accessible* in this sense: one can come to know on the basis of seeing a VERYCOMPLEX that it has a longest line segment that is more than three times as long as the second longest segment. Since the shape has different "parts", I can know that a figure is verycomplex and yet not know everything about it – not even everything that is entailed by its being a VERYCOMPLEX. And since those parts are visually accessible, I can learn that a VERYCOMPLEX has them when I see one.

I suggest that this provides us with a useful model for what Mary learns when she sees her nail. This suggestion may appear outrageous, for the following reason. Unlike VERYCOMPLEX, red does not have visually accessible parts. True, philosophers of colour disagree about whether red is a simple, unanalysable quality or not. But whatever it is, red is *given to perception* as a simple and unanalysable quality. Or so we tend to think.

I suggest, however, that red – that apparently simple and unanalysable quality – has, in my sense, visually accessible parts or aspects: it is possible to learn any number of things about how red is – or about how red things are – on the basis of seeing red.

Here is a sample of the truths that, if I'm right, Mary can learn when she sees her nail (as red), even if she already believes that the nail is red:

- (a) In normal daylight, it is easy to distinguish red from black, white and grey.
- (b) As daylight fades, red becomes indistinguishable from black and grey before it becomes indistinguishable from white.
- (c) Red can (unlike black) be the colour of a light.

(d) If it's dark and clear, it is easy to detect both a white light and a red light,

(e) but if it's foggy, a red light is, all else equal, easier to detect than a white light.

Unless Mary has studied vision science, she won't know very many such truths prior to seeing her nail. But can she really learn these truths just on the basis of seeing her red nail in normal daylight? Well, to be honest, I'm not quite sure, and I don't know how to find out. But it strikes me as not too implausible that she could. It doesn't seem wildly implausible, for example, that Mary's perception of her nail should give her *some* clue about whether the nail would be easier to distinguish against a black background or a white background as daylight fades. And if it gives her *some* clue, she can come to believe it to *some* degree. And since what she then to some degree believes is *true*, this would constitute a *learning* of sorts.

The proposal is obviously somewhat speculative. All I claim for it, for now, is that it should be recognised as a live option along with other responses to our puzzle.

But even if you are sympathetic thus far, you may wonder about the case where Mary is an expert on colour and colour perception? Suppose Mary has been told about (a)-(e) and "all" other truths about red and how it looks. What could she learn in that case?

Consider VERYCOMPLEXNESS again. Suppose I haven't seen this shape, but that you tell me the relative lengths of all its line segments as well as the sizes of all the angles between them. And suppose that, by using some mnemonic technique, I can remember this whole description. Then I know, in a sense, all the facts about VERYCOMPLEXNESS; at any rate, my knowledge of VERYCOMPLEXNESS is as complete as expert Mary's knowledge of red could conceivably be. But suppose, further, that I am unable to "keep in mind" more than a few facts about VERYCOMPLEXNESS at any one time. Let's say that, at any one time, I can keep in mind at most the relative lengths of five contiguous line segments and the size of the angles between them. Then it is again clear that something new and significant happens if I get to see a VERYCOMPLEX.

Part of what is new in this case is that I *do* something that I haven't done before. Whereas before I could, at any given time, access only a few of all the facts I knew about VERYCOMPLEXNESS, I now access them (visually) *all at once*. But by *doing* this, it seems I can also come to *know* things I didn't know before. For example, I may come to know long and complicated conjunctions that were entailed by what I previously knew (e.g., that the figure has a longest line segment at least three times as long as the second longest one, *and* that there are ten contiguous line segments that are approximately the same length, *and...* – so forth.). While such propositions were entailed by what I previously knew, it was in practise beyond me to entertain them, because of their complexity. But with the aid of my new, representationally rich visual state, I can entertain them and know them to be true.

I suggest that something similar could be true of expert Mary. Even if she in a sense knew all the facts about red and how red looks, she would supposedly be incapable of keeping very many of them in mind at any one time. But when she sees red, she represents many of these things all at once, if I am right. And with the aid of this visual state, she can learn things that she was unable to figure out before. For example, she can learn long conjunctions of the things she knew, as well as other consequences of her antecedent body of knowledge.

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How Is It Possible that a Mental Representation Carries Information?

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Informational semantics faces the problem of explaining how it is possible that information is carried by mental representation (Fodor 1999). The aim of this paper is to show potential solutions to the problem. I try to define what this relation of carrying information consists in. Carrying informational content is not understood here literally as a transport of certain elements from sender to receiver, but it is understood as the power of internal states to preserve their intentional properties regardless of the circumstances in which the states are instantiated.

Intentional mental states preserve their contents regardless of the conditions in which they are tokened. Thanks to this power of carrying contents we are able to misrepresent something and to ignore given circumstances in order to plan further action. The power of carrying content by representation appears to be one of the most fundamental conditions of thinking and acting.

Informational semantics

There are several versions of informational semantics. In a nutshell, what these different versions of informational semantics have in common is the following view on the factors determining mental content:

Informational semantics: What determines the original intentional content of a mental representation is a nomological-cum-causal relation between the representation and the thing represented. (cf. Dretske 1981; Fodor 1998).

The content (meaning) of a representation is identified with the extension of this representation in informational semantics. Extension is an abstract set of elements a representation applies to. The token of the mental representation DOG means a dog thanks to the nomological relation that exists between the representation and the dog. In its crudest version, informational semantics is a view according to which a mental representation is a sign signifying its (actual or potential) cause (Fodor 1987).

It seems plausible that the representation of a dog I instantiate now, is of the same type as a representation that would appear in my mind if I looked at a dog. Despite its intuitive appeal, informational semantics faces a serious problem. It appears that the causes of an instantiation of a representation may be very different and they may have nothing in common with the content of the mental representation (that is, they may not fall under the extension of the representation). For example, the token of the mental representation DOG might be caused not only by a dog but also by a thing that looks like a dog, by a thought about barking, by a brain surgery, by drugs or by many other things.

Thesis 1. The cause of a mental representation usually does not influence the content this representation carries.

If a mental representation carried information only about properties, objects or states of affairs that caused the representation, we would be unable to remember anything, misrepresent anything or plan our action. Therefore, it is necessary to supplement the informational semantics with

an explanation of how – regardless of its causes and effects – a representation may mean certain things.

What does carrying information by representation consist in?

To make the attempt of explaining how it is possible that a mental representation carries its content, it is necessary to revise our view on representation in general. It appears that the assumption according to which a mental representation carries its content requires the rejection of a semantic criterion of individuation of representation, and replacing it with both semantic and physical criteria of individuation.

On the position of informational semantics:

Thesis 2: A mental representation carries a certain content, iff it has the same content regardless of the circumstances it appears in.

According to thesis 2, if representations of the same type appear as a consequence of influencing different causes, the representations will have the same contents. This seems to show that there are at least two factors differentiating mental representation. Let us see why it is so.

First possibility: semantic criterion of individuation. The acceptance of realism with regard to mental representation requires pointing out the factors that differentiate representational states in an integrated biological system. There is a strong temptation to accept the intuition that such differentiating factors are contents of mental representations. Let us consider this possibility.

The semantic criterion of individuation: Any two physical states of a cognitive system are representations of the same type, iff they have the same contents.

The semantic criterion of individuation is attractive because it allows for the possibility of there being the same cognitive states, but different with regard to their physical implementations. The criterion seems to be persuasive both from the perspective of everyday practice of attributing beliefs, desires and so on (we seem to attribute mental states on the basis of their contents) and from the methodological point of view (because it justifies an independent research of the mind).

However, it appears that despite all this attractiveness of the semantic criterion, this criterion cannot be reconciled with the thesis according to which a representation can carry its content. To realize this, let us apply the criterion in question to informational semantics. First, however, remember that according to informational semantics:

Thesis 2a: If representations of the same type are caused by different causes, the representations will have the same content.

Thus, taking into account both thesis 2a and the semantic criterion of individuation (the assumption according to which representations belong to the same type iff they have the same content), we have to state that:

Thesis 2b: If any two physical states of a cognitive system with the same content are caused by different causes, they will have the same content.

As it follows from thesis 2b, the acceptance of the semantic criterion of individuation and thesis 2a leads to a vicious circle. The resulting thesis 2b is a truism because, as it stands, if there are two states with the same content, these states will have the same content.

Second possibility: semantic and physical criteria of individuation. The semantic criterion of individuation was rejected because it led to a vicious circle or to the negation of the thesis according to which representations can carry their semantic contents. To find a proper way of understanding mental representation in this context, let us try to find examples of generally known entities that could be called bearers of semantic contents. The only such entities a philosopher may have an access to are non-mental representations.

Take a linguistic representation: “dog”. We assume that this representation has the power of carrying a semantic content (a power that depends on us). It means that every token of “dog” uttered or written in different circumstances means a dog. This example shows that the content is carried by tokens of a certain physical type. *If there is no structural stability, continuity or membership to a physical type, there is no chance of “carrying” anything.* Therefore, it seems that the necessary condition of carrying a content by a representation is the membership of this representation to a certain physical type. We can say that a thing preserves (carries) a certain property if and only if what guarantees its identity is different from the property.

Semantic and physical criteria of individuation: Any two physical states of a cognitive system are representations of the same type, iff they have the same content and the same physical form.

Linguistic inscriptions, for instance, can carry their representational contents thanks to belonging to the same physical type. It is extremely difficult to explain in this context what the belonging to the same physical type means. Yet, this is at least as difficult as explaining what having the same content means (the sets of elements a representation applies to are usually vague). Accepting semantic and physical criteria of individuation of representation, we can suitably reformulate thesis 2:

Thesis 2c: Any two meaningful states belonging to the same physical type and instantiated in a cognitive system will have the same content regardless of the causes that caused them.

Thus, to solve the problem of how it is possible that a mental representation carries a certain information, we should answer the following questions: “What decides that tokens of a certain physical type have certain semantic properties?” or “What combines tokens of certain physical types with their contents?” I will try to show potential answers to these questions.

How is it possible that mental representation carries information?

According to the above considerations, a mental representation is a certain physical state having a certain content (and belonging to a cognitive system). When asked how carrying information by a mental representation in a system is possible, we will answer explaining why a

token of a physical type has a particular content. Why does a particular physical state have the extension it has?

Informational semantics claims that what decides about a physical state having a particular content is a causal relation between a physical token belonging to a cognitive system and the thing represented (cf. the main thesis of informational semantics). Here is the argument. If a certain physiological state correlates causally with a natural predator of an organism which has the state, and if the state may activate the avoiding behavior, this is exactly the state that is the natural candidate for being a bearer of the information: “predator”. If there is a physiological state that does not respond to the presence of a predator and which cannot be the cause of the avoiding behavior, then by no means such a state can be a mental representation carrying the informational content: “predator”. Dretske calls this problem “*Design Problem*”: „Whether it is the deliberate creation of an engineer, the product of evolutionary development, or the outcome of individual learning, the system *S* must embody, and if it doesn’t already embody it must be supplied with, some kind of internal mechanism that is selectively sensitive to the presence or absence of condition *F*.” (Dretske 1988).

Now, we could regard the whole problem of carrying content by a mental representation as solved, but most of the time a mental representation carries its content regardless of the kind of its cause (thesis 1). Paraphrasing Dretske’s words we might say that the internal mechanism which is selectively sensitive to the presence or absence of condition *F*, may and sometimes must be activated by conditions different from *F*.

Thesis 3: The necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a representation to carry content is belonging to such a physical type which correlates causally in a system with elements falling under the representation’s extension.

Yet, there are many internal states that belong to a cognitive system and that correlate causally with many different internal and external factors. The internal states are semantically “locked” to some of these factors (Fodor 1998). Therefore, to complete the list of necessary conditions for a mental representation to carry information we should explain what “locks” representational states to certain objects (elements of extension). There are three possible explanations:

- The factors which guarantee the stability of the representational content of a certain bearer are located within the relation between a thing that represents and a thing represented.
- The factors which guarantee the stability of the representational content of a certain bearer are located within the cognitive system in which the representation is instantiated.
- The factors which guarantee the stability of the representational content of a certain bearer are located outside of a cognitive system.

The first of the above explanations was chosen by Fodor who postulated the existence of so called asymmetric causal dependency (Fodor 1987; Fodor 1990). In a nutshell, according to Fodor, the relation between a thing that represents and a thing represented, though causal, is not a *usual* causal relation. All other causal relations in which a representation is an effect, depend on it. This explanation might be applied to the solution of the problem of misrepresentation but it is futile in describing representational uses of symbols, that is, such uses that are correct but in which the symbol is caused by things that do not fall

under the extension of the symbol. Even Fodor admits that his theory faces this problem. He is ready to reject his own explanation and look for other solutions (cf. Fodor 1999).

From informational semantics' point of view, the second of the above possibilities is also difficult to accept. Notice that the only access to the relation between a representation and its object that a cognitive system has is through the representation. How, then, could a system guarantee a representation a certain extension without an independent access to causal relations resulting in the instantiations of certain cognitive states. It seems that the second option could be accepted providing that informational semantics is rejected. According to such an alternative semantics, the stability of the representational content would be guaranteed not by the relation between a representation and the object represented, but by a role that the representation plays in a system.

Taking into account the difficulties of the two solutions, we are left with the third possibility. This option claims that what makes it possible for a mental representation to carry its content regardless of the circumstances are factors that transcend the here-and-now of a cognitive system. It seems that the advocates of informational semantics are doomed to accept teleological or other accounts that invoke external factors determining the stability of representational content. Among such philosophers are those who invoke representational functions (Dretske 1988) and those who invoke benefits that an organism has thanks to the stability of the reference of cognitive states (Millikan 1984). This opens up a very broad and complex topic.

Conclusion

I have tried to show that the only promising direction for informational semantics in its attempt of explaining how it is possible that a mental representation carries its content is appealing to factors that transcend the here-and-now of a cognitive system. This is not good news for advocates of informational semantics not only because of the complexity of factors responsible for the stability of representational content, but also because of the difficulty in a naturalistic description of such factors and their role.

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Saving the Distinctions: Distinctions as the Epistemologically Significant Content of Experience

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1. Abstract

To account for a perceived distinction it is necessary to postulate a real distinction. Our process of experiencing the world is one of, mostly unconscious, interpretation of observed distinctions to provide us with a partial world-picture that is sufficient to guide action. The distinctions, themselves, are incorrigible (they do not have a truth value), directly perceived, structured, and capable of being interpreted. Interpreted experience is corrigible, representational and capable of guiding action. The two aspects are present in experience together so that it is difficult to separate them out.

2. Distinctions

Imagine that you are in a darkened room. The only thing you see is a point source of light. Suddenly, the light goes out. What happened? Perhaps, the light was extinguished. Maybe, something moved to stop the light reaching you. Then again, it is possible that you've gone blind. Working out what exactly did happen is non-trivial. One thing, however, we can be sure of – something has changed.

That this is the correct conclusion to draw is clear when we consider the alternative; if nothing has changed then why did we experience a change? To account for the observed change it is necessary to postulate a difference somewhere in our ontology, be it a distinction located internally (going blind) or one that is at least in part external (the light being extinguished or something having moved).

The claim that there is anything which is not error-prone in experience must seem quizzical, if not quixotic, given the history of epistemic scepticism and, in particular, the complexities of theoretical entanglement we have come to be aware of during the twentieth century (Quine 1960, Kuhn 1974, Hanson 1958, Feyerabend 1965, 1975). To be at all convincing the claim must be seen as minimal – observing a distinction does not suffice to specify its cause nor, indeed, does it serve to classify the elements distinguished. As such, any error that occurs can be understood as the result of an incorrect interpretation of the original distinction, i.e. we didn't go blind but merely had a barrier slid in between us and the light-source. Thus, for example, the sceptical argument based on Descartes' Deceiving Demon does not affect experience, since the error in question is that of interpreting the experience caused by the demon as an experience of a reality not shaped by a demon. As it turns out in that case, however, the experiences are actually informative of what the demon wishes us to believe and, therefore, once understood correctly, can play the role of experience that informs us about reality. Even 'the most internal' of causes, such as a theory, does not render a distinction erroneous. A perceived distinction which was merely the result of one of our theories is still informative – it is simply informative of that theory. Only assuming that the distinction had some

external cause would lead to error – the distinctions, in themselves, neither make nor entail any such claims. To put it simply, for every perceived distinction there is a real distinction – where "we may define the real as that whose characters are independent of what anybody may think them to be" (Peirce 1878). Thus, when we perceive distinctions we perceive the *real* world rather than, necessarily, the *external* world.

The minimal nature of distinctions opens up another worry. If a distinction does not specify its cause nor classify what it distinguishes, then a type of nominalism threatens. Given a number of distinctions which are independent of each other, any interpretation we should choose to apply to them is going to be, if at all, only minimally limited by those distinctions. The independent, atomised distinctions in that scenario act as particulars without any universals. To avoid that scenario, distinctions would have to interrelate. And, in fact, this is exactly what they do.

There are not only distinctions in our experience, but also distinctions between distinctions, and so on up. Thus, a light disappearing is not just an isolated distinction but is also distinct from a light changing colour. This makes for a structurally rich hierarchy of distinctions which relates all observed and remembered distinctions. Such a hierarchy still does not specify causes nor, indeed, classify: a white surface lit by red light and a red surface lit by white light may appear indistinguishable as the two differences cancel each other out – the absence of a perceived distinction does not imply the absence of difference. However, the resulting structure of distinctions is rich enough that any adequate interpretation of it is to a large degree constrained by the mere need to 'save the distinctions'.

Experience, however, has a quality which is not accounted for by distinctions. The process of interpreting is not something that takes place after we experience but, rather, something which, to a great degree, we do before we come to be aware of an experience. The result is that our conscious experience is already pre-interpreted so that, instead of seeing a set of distinctions and having to consciously interpret them, we see a chimney. That this is the case should not be surprising as the uninterpreted distinctions do not give the grounds for a particular course of action. In an evolutionary context where real-time responses are necessary for survival the process of interpretation needs to be as quick as possible and where the interpretation is largely unproblematic a trained, automated, unconscious process of interpretation is likely to be more effective. The reverse process of coming to pick out the distinctions and to successively remove the interpretations is a difficult one but one which we are capable of and which, to a degree, is used by scientists dealing with anomalous phenomena and, to a greater degree, by painters. We can experience this process by looking at a corner of a room and trying to abstract away from the walls to the planes, to the lines and to the distinctions, successively.

3. Direct and representational aspects

Our account has both a direct and a representational aspect to it. The distinctions are directly perceived features of the world. The interpreted experiences are representational in nature. In so far as it is a direct account of perception, our account does not require intermediaries such as sense data. In fact, by concentrating upon the distinctions in our experience we are free to remain agnostic about *sensa*. Nor are they needed to account for the representational aspect of experience as that merely calls for the interpretation of the distinctions.

It has been notoriously difficult to identify what it is about the world that might be directly perceived. A number of alternatives have been proposed – things, states-of-affairs, properties, propositions – all of which suffer from one of more of a number of problems caused by the tension between being directly perceivable and being a feature of the real world. The main strength of the distinctions-based account is that distinctions can clearly be both. The other strength is due from having abandoned the assumption that the directly perceived are necessarily external. At the level of the distinctions no realist assumptions are called for. It is only in our interpretation of the distinctions we perceive that we normally take up realism.

It may be felt that much the same effect could be obtained with a direct account based upon sameness or similarity. However, there exist two fundamental dissimilarities between sameness and distinction. To account for every perceived distinction it is necessary to postulate a real distinction. A perceived sameness (lack of distinction), however, may be due to two distinctions which cancel each other out as we saw in the example of the coloured cloths. Therefore, it is not necessary to postulate a real similarity when one is perceived. In addition, distinctions seem to be more fundamental in that a nontrivial similarity must be between two *different* things.

Even so, it may be felt that a distinctions-based account will suffer from the same problem as that which showed that the similarity account is not particularly advantageous. Since everything is similar to every other thing in some respect, it was necessary to specify the respect in which it was similar if one was to avoid triviality. The price was, however, that the full range of properties had to be perceived directly if similarity was to be directly perceived. This meant that any advantages of a similarity account over a full properties account were seen to be illusory. No such adaptation is necessary when it comes to distinctions. As we have seen, what is sufficient is a rich hierarchy of distinctions which makes for a non-trivial subject of interpretation. It may be that a similarity account could present a similar structure but, given the earlier considerations, this possibility need not be examined.

The representational aspect of the distinctions-based account appears through the process of interpreting the distinctions. As we've pointed out, the two always come together in experience. Alternative interpretations can have the same structure, however. The structure is directly indicative of the world outside of representation, and contains information about that world, but this information is only put into a propositional form within representations, that is, when interpreted through classifications, beliefs and theories. In this form we can reason about the information, and project it to other cases. However, these projections always go beyond the information in experience and, therefore, are fallible. So, our approach has both a direct nonpropositional aspect and an indirect representational aspect, the former being corrigible, and

the latter being fallible. We hold, then, that neither representational nor direct views of perception are correct since neither tell the complete story.

4. Content of experience

Experience, on our account, has two components, the structure of the distinctions in experience, and our interpretation of those distinctions. The former is the structure of experience. The latter classifies experience into projectible groupings, and is the basis for fallible expectations that are based in experience. The classifications are integrated into theories about the world, which link experience and give rise to the expectations. When our expectations fail, we need to revise our classifications or our beliefs. However, we do not need to revise the structure of distinctions. This structure of experience provides fixed points for the reinterpretations of experience.

The structure of experience cannot serve as the sole ground of knowledge, since it is open to multiple interpretations (see Newman 1928, Putnam 1980 for standard arguments). The problem is that abstract models can be referred to only by description, but descriptions permit alternative isomorphic interpretations as long as the interpretations have the same cardinality. Distinguishing the interpretations requires attention to the internal properties of the models. Inasmuch as we pick out actual situations in the empirical world as candidates for isomorphism with an abstract model we must refer to them ostensively (in Russell's terms, we must know them by acquaintance), so we cannot use their internal properties to pick them out, on pain of circularity (see Collier 1992, footnote 14). Consequently, the structure of experience does not pick out a unique set of propositions about the world, and it does not provide any grounds for projection to new cases. Therefore, the corrigible part of experience is not enough to ground inductive inference (Collier 1987). In order to allow inferences, we must use classifications at the very least, and typically theories and other beliefs as well.

Despite this, our given circumstances include experiences and beliefs that determine a unique, or a relatively small set of, interpretations to our experiences. Although our interpretations, over time, tend to greater integration, they typically apply within domains that are determined partly by the structure of our experience, partly by our interpretations, and partly by our beliefs about their projectibility. The expectations themselves, with the help of theories and other non-perceptual beliefs, determine the structure of experiences we think possible. Our perceptual information about the world is contained entirely within the structure of experience. Our knowledge of the world is contained entirely in the structure of the experiences we think possible. Confirmation is just conformity with this structure, while disconfirmation is disconformity. We have a reason to revise only when we encounter disconformity, or else because of difficulties with integration with our other beliefs.

Experience is composed of interpreted structured distinctions. The structure of experience is not propositional, but when interpreted to form experience itself, the result is both propositional and fallible. Perceptual knowledge of the world is contained in the structured distinctions. This structure gives the perceptual (more correctly, experiential) information we have about the world, but it does not tell us what the information means, or what we should expect. The projected structure of possible experiences contains our knowledge of the world, but we can tell what part of the

information contained in these structures is knowledge only by testing them against further experiences. This can be done only by way of our interpretations and other beliefs, which are fallible. So while the information contained in our perceptual experience is not fallible, inductive knowledge is fallible and needs justification.

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The Good and the *Ought*

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The main question I want to address concerns the relation between values and normative reasons, which I shall simply call 'reasons'. More specifically, I am mainly interested in the relation between values and reasons for action. Something's being good is often taken to be essential to one's having a reason to act. For instance, the intrinsic goodness of some experience, such as the experience of walking in the woods, is naturally seen as a reason to walk in the woods. In such a case, our reason is grounded in the values of certain things.

A stronger claim is that all reasons are grounded in values, where this can be taken to include non-moral as well as moral values. This is what Jonathan Dancy called the 'layer-cake conception': "The suggestion (...) is that instead of being based on or grounded in desires, our normative reasons are based on values. (...) At bottom there are the features that generate value; above that there is the value so generated, and above that are the reasons and requirements that are laid on us by the prospect of value; and only by that." (2000a, 29)

Thomas Scanlon has argued that we should instead go for what he calls the "buck-passing account of values" (1998). The main characteristic of this conception is that it denies that reasons, which are taken to involve normative force, are grounded in values. This is not because some reasons are not grounded in values. Rather, Scanlon's claim is that values *cannot* ground reasons.

1. Scanlon's buck-passing account

Let us first look at what Scanlon tells us about the concept of reason. Scanlon considers this concept to be both primitive and unproblematic. It is unproblematic because it would be a mistake to think that the notion of reason stands in need of a philosophical explanation. It would be a mistake to think that one ought to explain it in terms of less doubtful notions, such as that of expressed attitudes. Instead, Scanlon favours a conception that is objectivist, but not naturalist. Our judgements about our reasons to act or to think can be true or false, but they are not about the natural world. This does not mean that they are about another non-natural or platonic world. According to Scanlon, these judgements are like mathematical judgements in that they are about an independent subject matter without describing a platonic world. What is needed in order to say that reasons are an independent subject matter is simply that there are standards for arriving at correct conclusions concerning reasons (1998, 62f.).

Another important point is that the notion of reason that Scanlon has in mind is *normative*. Scanlon is very clear about this, for quite early in the book he specifies that the sense of the term "reason" he is concerned with is "the standard normative sense", which is related to the notion of justification (1998, 18). It is the kind of concept we have in mind when we ask "Why *should* one think that the volcano will erupt? What reason is there to think this?" (*ibid.*, my italics) Now, given the distinction between the evaluative and the normative I have drawn, the question is how to understand Scanlon's claim. Scanlon uses the term "normative" in a broader sense than I have, for he says that "'the good' and 'the right' are generally treated as *prima facie* distinct normative domains" (1998, 79). But it is

quite clear that he sees the concept of reason to fall on the side of the right. When he introduces the notion of reason, he compares the question of what reason there is to think something to the question of why one *should* think this thing. Thus, he would certainly subscribe to the idea that having a reason for something is to fall under a (*pro tanto*) *ought*. More precisely, the claim would be that an agent has a reason for an action or a belief if and only if he (*pro tanto*) *ought* to perform that action or to have this belief. Moreover, if Scanlon wants to avoid an account of value concepts that avoids circularity, he has to deny that the notion of reason is an evaluative one. And since it is plausible that he would agree that the choice is between the evaluative and the normative in the narrow sense I have used – and let me stress that he does not introduce a further category – there seems to be no other possibility than to claim that the notion of reason is normative in my sense or deontic.

Let us now look at Scanlon's account of values. Scanlon's starting point is the claim that to value something consists in taking oneself to have reasons for holding certain positive attitudes toward it and for acting in certain ways in regard to it (1998, 95). Admiration and respect are given as examples, but also preservation and protection. But to value something is not yet to claim that something is valuable, or that something is good. For to claim that something is valuable is to claim that "others also have reason to value it, as you do." (*ibid.*) We can take this to mean that the reasons others have are the same as the ones that we have (cf. Dancy 2000b, 162). Thus, to judge that something is valuable or good is to judge that there is a reason for holding certain positive attitudes toward it and for acting in certain ways in regard to it. This might involve the promotion of the existence of the good thing, but being a good neo-Kantian, Scanlon immediately points out that judging something to be good is not only to judge that there is a reason to promote its existence. On the contrary, Scanlon follows Elizabeth Anderson (1993) in claiming that there is a wide variety of attitudes and actions that might be considered, such as preservation, protection or respect.

The crucial point is that on this account of value, being valuable is not a property that provides reasons for action or for thought. That something is of value would not give us reason to appreciate it or to admire it; and it would give no reason to promote or to protect it. On the contrary, to say that something is valuable consists in saying that it possesses properties that are not evaluative, and which provide reasons to act and react positively toward it (1998, 96f.). These are the properties, which Scanlon tells us are often physical or psychological – a bit later on he talks about natural properties (1998, 97) – which directly give us reasons, without any evaluative intermediary. The concept of value merely indicates that these natural properties pass on the buck (or the hot potato!) of justification to actions and reactions. Hence the name of buck-passing account that Scanlon offers. Mixing metaphors, one could say that value properties are not in the race; they do not pass anything on to anything else, for the simple reason that the natural properties of things do not give them anything they could pass on; natural properties prefer to give the buck directly to our actions and reactions. Thus, reasons for action and reaction are grounded directly in the natural properties of things, without any detour through their value.

Here is a brief outline of Scanlon's account:

- (1) *x* is valuable iff *x* possesses natural properties that provide (or constitute – Scanlon uses both terms) reasons (for all) for acting and for reacting in certain ways with respect to *x*.

The ontological lesson to draw is the following. Being valuable (or good) would not be a substantial property, like being square or having a certain form. It would be a purely formal property. Here is how Scanlon puts it when he compares his account to Moore's: "to be good or valuable is to have other properties that constitute such reasons. Since the claim that some property constitutes a reason is a normative claim, this account also takes goodness and value to be non-natural properties, namely the purely formal, higher-order properties of having some lower-order properties that provide reasons of the relevant kind." (1998, 97)

But since Scanlon's concept of reason is deontic (or normative in the narrow sense), it will also be true that the concept of value or goodness has been reduced to a normative or deontic concept. To be valuable or good would be nothing else other than to have natural properties that make it the case that one ought (or maybe that one *pro tanto* ought) act or reaction in certain ways. Being valuable or good would in fact involve an *ought*: an imperative would lie in the heart of values.

2. Values wear the trousers

Scanlon presents different arguments in favour of his conception. The main one is that an explanation of reasons can dispense with value properties (1998, 97). The reasons we have are fully explained by the natural features of things. The fact that a discovery casts light on the causes of cancer gives a "complete explanation" (the expression is Scanlon's) of the reasons we have, such as the reasons to applaud it and to support further research of that kind. According to Scanlon, "These natural properties provide a complete explanation of the reasons we have for reacting in these ways to things that are good or valuable. It is not clear what further work could be done by special reason-providing properties of goodness and value, and even less clear how these properties could provide reasons." (*ibid.*)

This argument is far from obvious. It is not clear that the simple fact that a discovery casts light on the causes of cancer can provide a "complete explanation" of the reasons we have. Is it not rather because casting light on the causes of cancer is a good thing, in the sense that a better understanding of life and its pathologies is a good thing, not to mention the medical application for cancer patients that might become possible, that we don't hesitate to say that we have reasons to applaud such a discovery? It seems that if the discovery was not a good thing in itself, or would not have positive consequences, we would have no reason to applaud it. More precisely, it seems that it is *because* the discovery is a good thing that we have reasons to applaud it.

The problem of evaluating the force of this objection is that Scanlon could simply reply that he agrees that if the discovery had been no good, we would have had no reason to applaud it. For translated into his vocabulary, this means that if the discovery did not provide reasons to applaud it, we would have no reason to applaud it. Thus, what we need to show is that the values of things have a role to play in the explanation of reasons which does not reduce to the one expressed by these conditional propositions. More precisely, it has to be shown that an explanation of reasons that only takes natural properties into account has to be completed with an explanation that appeals to the values of things.

First of all, it has to be emphasized that Scanlon's conception tends to invert the order of things that is commonly admitted. We think that if a child has a reason to learn to play a music instrument, it is because this is something intrinsically good. In the same way, it is natural to think that we have a reason to refrain from doing an action because it is cowardly or cruel, and hence bad in this respect. Ordinary thinking assumes that our reasons to act and react, or at least some of them, are grounded in the value and disvalue of things. Thus, it is natural to give values a role in the explanation of reasons.

It might be thought that this observation does not go very far: ordinary thinking might just be muddled. Maybe. There are however two other problems with Scanlon's account. It is not always clear what the natural features of things are which are supposed to give us these "complete explanations" of reasons. In particular, when we use so-called thick value concepts, like *cruel*, *courageous* or *generous*, which do have a descriptive component, but no descriptive equivalent, it seems difficult to claim that the reasons for action entirely depend on the presence of natural features. That would amount to the claim that some unknown natural features provide reasons to act and react in certain ways. However, these unknown natural features can hardly be said to offer a complete explanation of the reasons we have.

The second reason why I doubt that Scanlon is right when he says that the explanation of reason can do without values is that this means that a natural, non-evaluative and non-normative property can, on its own, provide and completely explain, a reason. This seems very close to committing the naturalistic fallacy by claiming that a non-normative fact can entail a normative fact. The claim is not one of entailment, but one nonetheless wonders how it can be possible for a natural fact to provide us with reasons and to completely explain these reasons. If I tell you that I have taken an umbrella because it rains, I offer you an explanation of my action. But it could not be a complete explanation. Depending on the conception of reason that is favoured, different additional ingredients are thought necessary. In general, it is either a motivational state of the subject that is appealed to – a desire to stay dry, for instance – or an axiological fact – the value of staying dry. But by itself, the simple fact that it rains is not a sufficient explanation.

Conclusion

Where does this leave us with respect to the question we started with? It seems to me that Scanlon's attempt to reduce evaluative concepts to the concept of reason, or more generally to reduce the evaluative to the normative in the narrow sense fails. The question is what alternative conception has to be put in place instead. I shall close by noting that I agree with Jonathan Dancy (2000b) when he notes that there are many more conceptions that one would first think.

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Brentano's Revolution, Meinong's Progress and Wittgenstein's Setback

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1. Mental Representationalism and Idealism

It was Descartes who began the new way of ideas, also aptly called representationalism. That view had come a long way from the epistemological realism of Aquinas though this way had been prepared already by late Scholasticism in particular by Occam. The main point of representationalism is that as far as the physical world is concerned we are acquainted with representations only, not with things in themselves. Descartes retained Aquinas' premise that there has to be partial identity between mind and object in order for the former to know the latter. The relation of whole and part is one of partial identity and Descartes presupposed that the mind can know directly only what is part of it, what is *in* it. Naturally, mental representations are in the mind, which is impossible for physical objects. In addition to the whole-part-relation, Descartes and his disciples take into account only the causal and the similarity relation in their analysis of knowing. While they take mind and representation to be connected by the whole-part-relation, the relations of similarity and causation are discussed but finally discarded as connections between representation and physical object. Thus mind and physical object remain in principal unconnected and there is no basis for the realist view that we know the physical object as it is in itself. This was felt to be an impasse.

The empiricist analysis of Gassendi, Locke and Hume was an attempt to avoid the realism issue and to concentrate on what is given: the ideas in the mind. Locke is always vague on the relationship between ideas and objects. Sometimes he identifies ideas and qualities of physical objects and physical objects with complexes of ideas. That identification which Berkeley and Hume adopt is Kant's starting point. He claims that the physical objects we perceive are mere appearances, i.e., ideas in the mind and he does not shy away from the contention that that is in accordance with common sense and from calling his view realistic (empirical realism).

Kant pretends to be able to prove the existence of the external world by taking space and time as subjective, as forms of perceptual representation. He upholds that there is something non-mental (the thing in itself), which he assumes to be the cause of sense data in the mind. However, he takes it to be absolutely unknowable. Thus, the physical objects with which we are acquainted by perception are turned into mental objects and the thing-in-itself cannot be conceived of as physical in any customary sense, if only because it is unknowable.

Kant is not a representationalist any more since he does not consider the non-mental as an object of knowledge and since he transforms the physical objects into mental objects and thus into objects with which we are directly acquainted. Thus he holds all knowledge to be direct knowledge. In this way, he escapes from the impasse into which the representationalist theory of knowledge leads.

Kant dissolves the realism problem by turning physical into mental objects and non-mental objects into unknowables. He is convinced that he solved the problems of representationalism and overcame scepticism. However,

his solution of turning the physical into a mental object and making knowing into a purely mental production with only a loose causal connection to a non-mental „I know not what“ is absurd.

The connection between mind and physical object on which the empiricists base their analysis is causal. They understand perception as a causation of ideas by objects and their test of validity of an idea is to trace it back causally to perceptual ideas (sensations). However, since we know only the last link of the causal chain, we know nothing about that causation and therefore have no ground for inference to the physical object. Hence, Kant, who draws the final consequences from representationalism, does not admit the non-mental as an object of knowledge, although he sticks to it as the first cause of perception. He grounds the validity of knowledge wholly on the process of knowing which he takes to produce its object in the first place.

Being primarily a practical philosopher, Kant has the stomach to swallow such a subjectivist theory of knowledge. But a philosopher who strives for a tenable realism has not. Kant's so-called Copernican revolution which should rather be called Ptolemeian revolution (because it places the subject in the centre) amounts in his eyes to complete failure. Kant's theory of knowledge is clearly subjectivist (he equates objectivity with intersubjectivity), while epistemological realism is objectivist. Considering this opposition and the absurdity of the idealistic transformation of the physical into a mental object, the philosopher who strives to realism and sees that representationalism leaves mind and physical object unconnected or leads into idealism has all reason absolutely to avoid representationalism and to be on his guard against hidden representationalist premises.

2. Brentano's Revolution

In the 19th century it was Brentano who gave the movement towards objectivity, away from idealist subjectivism, a decisive momentum. He wanted to make a new start in philosophy, a new start from scratch, i.e., from phenomena not in the Kantian sense of mere appearances, but in the sense in which natural scientists use the term. First, he focuses his phenomenological research on the classification of phenomena and he finds that there is a basic difference between psychical and physical phenomena. After British empiricists and idealists who dominated philosophy had blurred and dissolved that distinction, that finding was a revolutionary step. As the essential feature of psychical phenomena Brentano notes intentionality, i.e. the directedness to an object. That was not new. It was new that intentionality is closely investigated. Before all, Brentano brings out the difference between the mental act and its object, which is also blurred by empiricism and idealism (in both views knowing and the known are more or less fused). However, Brentano's most important innovation is the discovery of the intentional relation. It makes him focus on the ontology of relations. Brentano's ontology of relations develops with respect to intentionality, especially with respect to the circumstance that mental

acts can stand in the intentional relation to non-existent objects. First, Brentano takes the view that genuine relations require the existence of all their relata and that intentionality is merely similar to a relation in contrast to relations of comparison such as 'louder'. Later, he arrives at the view that relations of comparisons are not genuine relations and that intentionality is a model relation. Yet, Brentano's relations of his second phase are one-sided. They characterise only the first relatum, while the second relatum is involved merely insofar as it is needed to describe the relational character of the first relatum. Therefore, Brentano's intentional relation is not able to connect act and object.

3. Meinong's Progress

While Husserl paves his way back to idealism by denying that there is an intentional relation (he thinks he can ground it on spatial and temporal proximity), Meinong consolidates Brentano's revolution by establishing an intentional connector, by having a two-term intentional relation. According to Meinong, relations are objects of higher order building on at least two objects. Meinong also claims that non-existent objects have ontological status. Meinong distinguishes between mental acts, their contents, and their objects and he assumes that the intentional relation holds between the content and the object of a mental act. The content of a mental act is clearly distinguished from its object. Thus it is clearly different from the representative (idea) of representationalism, which is taken to be the primary object of all mental acts.

What also helps Meinong to develop a tenable epistemological realism is his introduction of the category of objectives which is similar to that of facts. With this category he overcomes the traditional realism to which Brentano still sticks. It allows him to advocate a correspondence theory of truth without any reverting to similarity. Meinong holds that only judgmental acts are true and that they are true if and only if the respective objective to which they stand in the intentional relation obtains (*besteht*).

4. Wittgenstein's Set Back

The author of the *Tractatus* who wrote after Brentano and Meinong fell back to representationalism. His theory of knowledge is that sentences are facts, which represent other facts in virtue of being similar to them in so far as they have the same logical form. Where Locke distinguishes between idea and object, he takes ideas and properties of things to be similar and an idea to be the idea of a certain property in virtue of similarity. In contrast, Wittgenstein's representationalism could be called structural representationalism. At any rate, Wittgenstein does not understand cognition as apprehending a fact but as representing it. That may be due to his being immersed in the Kantian tradition and to his rejection of the mental, as can be gathered from *Tractatus* 5.542 and 5.5421.

Like the historical development the early representationalist Wittgenstein turns into the idealist later Wittgenstein. Admittedly, the later Wittgenstein is not an idealist in the classical sense, as was mentioned, he is even a materialist, denying or, at least, brushing aside the mental. What is idealist about the later Wittgenstein is that he rejects the cognitive relation to the object in favour of context.

Under the spell of Wittgenstein but also under the indirect idealist influence via American pragmatism, mainstream analytical philosophy is holistic and unwittingly representationalist. All mainstream analytical philosophers take representationalism for granted, although there has been criticism of it in their ranks (by Ryle, by Quine and by Davidson, typically the criticism was operationist).

Recently, an influential analytic philosopher (Hilary Putnam) finally realised the implicit representationalism (he needed a Spanish physicist for that). He reacted by jumping into some kind of direct realism which does not take up Brentano or Meinong or Moore or Russell and lacks theoretical articulation.

Meinong on the Evidence of Memory

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1. Introduction

A central thesis of Alexius Meinong's epistemology is that fallible judgements can have a *sui generis* form of immediate (i.e. non-inferential) evidence: conjectural evidence. His work on conjectural evidence makes an important contribution to theories of non-inferential justification because it challenges the view held by his teacher Brentano (and many other philosophers) that only certain and infallible judgements can be immediately justified.¹ Meinong's argument for the existence of conjectural evidence in G is based on observations about the evidence of memory judgements. I will try to reconstruct a defensible version of this Argument from the Evidence of Memory (sec. 2) by drawing on different writings from Meinong. In addition I will defend the conclusion against Brentano's criticism (sec. 2 and 3). I cannot try to argue the case convincingly here, but I hope to convince you that there is a case to be argued for.

I will start with two clarifications. Meinong focuses on what is today called 'episodic memory', remembering a thing or an episode. Meinong's views of episodic memory would merit close discussion, but all that is of interest for the purposes of this paper is an uncontroversial observation. If I remember an event, I have a memory experience. A memory experience is a mental episode with a distinctive phenomenology that represents something as something experienced or perceived before. If the thinker S is rational, has the required concepts, and has a memory experience as of A, S will be inclined to judge that A existed/took place (insofar as S is not aware of any defeaters). Meinong calls the judgements made in response to memory experiences 'memory judgements'. His central question is:

On what right, on which credentials does someone rely who makes a judgement about his past mental history on the basis of his memory?² (G, 191)

To anticipate: Brentano will hold that initially memory judgements are unjustified habitual responses to memory experiences. For Brentano, memory judgements are in need of independent evidential support; Meinong holds that we have an initial right to trust memory.

Before we can reconstruct and assess Meinong's answer, we must introduce the central notion of evidence. Meinong holds with his teacher Brentano that one has the right to judge iff the judgement is evident. According to Brentano, every evident judgement is either immediately or mediately evident. (LRU, 141) A judgement is mediately evident iff can be deduced from immediately evident judgements in immediately evident steps. A judgement that is not evident is blind. The notion of immediate evidence cannot be defined, it has to be learned from examples (LRU, 142). Paradigm examples of immediately evident judgements are judgements about present mental events and judgements whose contents are axioms like 1

= 1. (See LRU, 111; VE, 151) If we contemplate these examples, says Brentano, we learn that making an evident judgement is judging with an insight into the truth. His pupil Husserl will say that S judges with immediate evidence iff S judges with an (immediate) awareness that the judgement fits the facts (Husserl 1900, 190). The insight into the truth compels you to assent with certainty to the content judged and grounds an entitlement to certainty ("mit Fug und Recht sicher", VR, 159). Meinong will challenge this connection between immediate evidence and certainty in his discussion of the epistemology of memory.

2. The Argument from the Evidence of Memory

Here is a condensed version of the Argument from the Evidence of Memory:

Premise 1: There are evident memory judgements.

Premise 2: No evident memory judgement is immediately evident in Brentano's sense.

Premise 3: Some evident memory judgements are not mediately evident in Brentano's sense.

Conclusion: Some evident memory judgements are neither mediately nor immediately evident in Brentano's sense.

Hence, Brentano's epistemology is incomplete: the evidence of memory cannot be reduced to mediate or immediate evidence in Brentano's sense. I will now work through Meinong's reasons for affirming the premises.

Premise 1: There are Evident Memory Judgements

Meinong writes:

[T]he memory judgement is not like a blindly and thoughtlessly picked up belief one thoughtlessly clings to, it comes with an awareness of legitimation that the naïve mind rather overstretches than underrates. (G, 207)

Just think how it is for you when you have a memory experience as of an event. You are inclined to judge that the event took place, and it seems to you that you are entitled to make the judgement. You don't simply guess what happened. And we don't blame or criticise you as irresponsible when you make a memory judgement. But how can this be? *Prima facie*, there is nothing that rationally recommends making the memory judgement. Are memory judgements then immediately evident like introspective or axiomatic judgements?

Premise 2: No Evident Memory Judgement is Immediately Evident in Brentano's Sense

If a memory judgement that p were immediately evident in Brentano's sense, we would be entitled to be certain that p. (See G, 196f.) But we are not. Meinong elaborates later on this in MW: Take someone who is able to make judgements at all ("einen einigermaßen Urteilsfähigen"). He will agree that for every memory judgement he has made it is possible that he is wrong. For this reason he will

¹ The view about immediate justification held by Meinong goes back to Reid's *Essay in the Intellectual Powers of Man* (III, IV.5). Meinong never mentions Reid, but Brentano's discussions of Reid could have brought Reid's work to Meinong's attention. Burge 1993 has contributed much to the recent revival of the view.

² All translations from Brentano's and Meinong's works are mine.

neither be entitled to be certain nor take himself to have this entitlement. (See MW, 614.)

This argument also makes clear what Meinong has in mind when he speaks of the evidence of memory as evidence *for conjecture*. In elaborating his notion of conjecture Meinong appeals to the metaphor of ‘a more or less *firm* belief’ (“feste Überzeugung”). (See G, 204f.) Your belief is firm if you don’t easily abandon it in the light of reasons that speak against it; if it has a certain tenacity. The firmness of a belief cannot be equated with the Bayesian notion of degree of credence. My belief can have a high degree of credence, yet it can be flimsy: My belief that Smith is at home has a high degree of credence, yet when he does not answer the phone, I give up on my belief.³ We can rank judgements and beliefs with respect to their firmness. We can conceive of no counter-evidence that would rationally persuade us to withdraw an immediately evident judgement in the Brentanian sense. We can conceive of evidence that would rationally require the revision of my memory belief that I scratched my nose a second ago. Rational revision of this memory judgement would require more evidence and a more radical revision of what I take myself to know than the rational revision of my memory belief that I closed the gate properly two weeks ago; and so on.

Let us use the neutral term ‘acceptance’ for propositional attitudes that have the mind-to-world direction of fit. Meinong will grant other Brentanians that *strictly speaking* only acceptances with maximal firmness, i.e. certainty, qualify as judgements, although he will – *loosely speaking* – continue to refer to conjectures as ‘judgements’. (See MW, 17.) If I judge that p, I am certain that p is the case, I take myself to know. A conjecture is an acceptance with a degree of firmness lower than certainty. If I accept what memory presents to me, I am not certain: I conjecture with evidence.

Premise 3: Some Evident Memory Judgements Are not Mediatly Evident in Brentano’s Sense

If memory judgements cannot be immediately evident, are they mediatly evident, i.e. is there an independent epistemic reason (“Beweisgrund”) for the memory judgement?

Brentano answers Yes and argues that an individual memory judgement is inferentially justified on the basis of ‘experiments’: (See LRU, 161.)

- Experiment: I put the pen in a drawer. I need a pen. I make a memory judgement on the basis of which I act: I open the drawer and there is the pen.
- Inference to the best explanation: It is very unlikely that it is a mere coincidence that the memory judgement causes a successful action. Hence, it is highly probable that my memory judgement is correct.

The inferential justification of the memory judgement is momentarily:

The experiment can only be *for the moment* a ground for a reasonable belief. (LRU, 161, my emphasis.)

If we are not justified in memory judgements that inform us about the outcome of several experiments, it is difficult to justify the belief that episodic memory is reliable via induction. But let’s press on.

The outlined view that memory judgements are inferentially justified is a special case of a general view about the contents of empirical knowledge formulated by Husserl thus:

In the vast majority of cases we lack this absolute knowledge of truth [i.e. immediately evident and certain knowledge], in whose place we make use [...] of the evidence of a higher or lower degree of probability for our state of affairs, with which, if probability levels become high enough, a firm judgement is usually associated. (Husserl 1900, 13)

On the basis of this view Brentano repeatedly criticises Meinong’s assumption that there are immediately evident conjectures. Here is a representative example. Brentano has Meinong in mind when he writes:

Indeed one has even spoken about immediate conjectural evidence and ascribed it, for example, to memory. This includes in addition [to the erroneous assumption of degrees of intensity of judgement] the error that there is immediate knowledge of probability [...]. (WE, 145, my emphasis; see also WE, 68f., LRU, 158; VE, 163.)

True! If a conjecture is a judgement that a contingent state of affairs is more probable than its negation, a conjecture can be evident, but it cannot be immediately evident. Its justification depends on general principles about probability known to the believer. However, the previous discussion showed that Meinong does not hold the antecedent: If I conjecture that p, I accept that p with a degree of firmness below certainty; I do not judge with certainty that p is more probable than not p. (See especially MW, 477-479.)

But perhaps Brentano’s notion of conjecture fits memory judgements better than Meinong’s? No, we have a good reason to take Meinong’s side. Take an example. I am not required to revise my justified acceptance that p is more probable than not-p, if I find out that not-p. The judgement that ascribes a probability to a state of affairs has not been falsified in this situation. Now consider your memory conjectures. You will withdraw your memory conjecture that you had toast for breakfast this morning when you find out that you had a cereal. But a judgement that it is more likely than not that you had toast for breakfast this morning would not need to be withdrawn. Hence, memory conjectures are, in general, not judgements about the probability of a state of affairs.

This is one building block of Meinong’s criticism of Brentano’s inferential view. The other building block is Meinong’s observation that our trust in memory is not supported by a general reason:

That one accepts the authority of memory because of a *general ground* is something we are not aware of. (G, 207, my emphasis. See also EGW, 70.)

If we were entitled to an individual memory conjecture in virtue of an argument, we should be conscious of its premises. But we are not. Couldn’t one reply that it would be sufficient for entitlement if one’s belief were caused by an *implicit* general belief about probability? No, what ever an implicit belief is, it is not consciously accessible. But we are conscious of our entitlement. The mere causal story leaves that out.

³ See Wolterstorff 1996, 77f. for distinguishing firmness from credence.

Meinong's Conclusion: Some Evident Memory Judgements Are Neither Mediatly Nor Immediately Evident in Brentano's Sense.

If the premises are true, some memory acceptances are immediately evident conjectures:

The guarantee lies in the individual judgement, at least no unbiased person would look somewhere else. (G, 207)

Apart from special circumstances, we don't require a reason to trust memory. But can we be satisfied with a merely negative characterisation that we have the right to make memory judgements without a reason?

In a letter to Meinong (15. 2. 1886) Brentano suggests a negative answer:

The history of philosophy shows that man tends in these cases [problems of epistemology] to slice through the knot that he cannot unravel by the given means by assuming a special way of knowing. In this way Reid arrived at Common Sense and Kant at his synthetic apriori. You will be convinced with me that everyone has to say of himself 'nihil humani a me alienum puto' and you will not be cross with me if I provisionally (for I surely will have a more careful look) think that a similar thing has happened to you here. (PB, 23)

Brentano takes Meinong's assumption of a new form of evidence to be *ad hoc*. Unfortunately there is no reply from Meinong to Brentano. I would recommend to him to answer Brentano's objection by questioning its presupposition.

Brentano holds that logical insight and introspection give us a direct insight into the truth. Because of this immediately evident judgements in his sense are "neither in need of proof nor capable of one." (LRU, 111.) We don't need a reason, for we directly see the truth. In contrast we need a reason to accept what perception (memory, testimony) tells us. But is this asymmetry warranted? Take logical insight. It may be a fact about axiomatic judgements that they are guaranteed to be true. But this is for the right to make them irrelevant. There are illusions of axiomatic evidence. It seemed immediately evident that for every concept there is an extension, but it turned out to be necessarily false. If there are false judgements that have the features of immediately evident judgements, the rational person is either required to have an epistemic reason to make the judgement or we take him to have a basic right to trust the deliverances of logical insight until there are reasons to mistrust them. In neither case is there an epistemically relevant distinction between memory conjectures and axiomatic judgements. The former are uncertain, the latter not. But why should the degree of firmness be relevant for justification? If it is not *ad hoc* to assume a basic right to trust logical insight, it is not *ad hoc* to assume a basic right to trust memory.

This can of course only be the beginning of a defense of Meinong's view; further work has to be done in the future.⁴

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⁴ Thanks go to Johannes Brandl, Keith Hossack, David Galloway, David Papineau, Richard Samuels, and Gabriel Segal for discussion. Many thanks to the participants of the King's College departmental seminar for discussion. Special thanks to Mark Siebel for written comments and Fabrice Teroni for a very helpful discussion and suggestions.

Carnap's Notion of Explication After Wittgenstein and Strawson

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1. Two methods in philosophy

"Explication" is a technical word. Carnap means by it a procedure of "transformation of an inexact, prescientific concept, the *explicandum*, into a new exact concept, the *explicatum*" (Carnap 1950, p. 3). By "transformation" one must understand a replacement, made for certain purposes. The explicandum typically belongs to everyday language. An informal account of such an inexact concept represents the first step of the explication, for the new concept should be constructed as similar with the old one as the latter vagueness permits. The explicatum is introduced by explicit and precise rules, typically by means of formal logic, e.g. by putting it into a well-connected axiom system. But more than one exact concept may play the explicating role: exactness and explicitness are not the only features of the explicatum, which must also be fruitful for the purposes of the investigation. An explication is not properly right or wrong but rather more or less satisfactory. Furthermore, for the sake of Occam's razor, an adequate explicatum should be as simple as possible. Summarizing, the requirements that a concept should fulfil in order to be a good explicatum are four: *similarity to the explicandum*, *exactness*, *fruitfulness* and *simplicity*. The combination of two requirements can modify their scopes. Simplicity, for instance, is somehow derivative from the first three requirements. And in order to get a more fruitful explicatum, one may sometimes lose some similarity with the explicandum.

Carnap gives some examples of what is an explication. Tarski's definition of "true" is a satisfactory procedure of explication. The explicandum is the concept expressed by the term "true" as used in everyday life, in legal proceedings, in logic, in science, more or less in the sense of correct and not false, as applied to statements, reports, and so on. Tarski's definition introduces a new exact concept, within a framework of semantical concepts, which has the right features to be called a satisfactory explicatum. A different example is given by the qualitative and subjective concept of warmth, explicated by the quantitative and measurable concept of temperature, which has shown to be really fruitful in science, since it occurs in many empirical laws.

Carnap meant the notion of explication to express his conception of philosophy. Considered as such, that is, as a way, or perhaps as *the way*, of doing philosophy, explication has been strongly criticized, both implicitly and explicitly.

Peter Strawson has compared the merits of two methods of philosophical clarification: Carnapian explication, which he calls a kind of constructionism, and ordinary language philosophy. The latter is practiced by those philosophers who prefer to describe "the complex patterns of logical behaviour which the concepts of daily life exhibit" (Strawson 1963). On the one hand, there is the prescription of the model conduct of model words; on the other hand, the description of the actual conduct of actual words. One is a matter of making rules, the other a matter of noting customs. He admits that he is not "competent to discuss the extent to which theoretical scientists, in framing new concepts or refurbishing old ones, either examine minutely the behaviour of words in ordinary

language or construct axiom systems"; but readily asserts that his incompetence in this matter troubles him not at all (Strawson 1963, 504). He is right, for he is concerned with the search for *philosophical* illumination of essential concepts of non-scientific discourse. Such problems are strongly rooted in ordinary language. Sometimes it happens that by employing some ordinary concepts we feel puzzled and in need of philosophical clarification. The knot to be loosed is there, in the field of everyday concepts we are using. A careful description of the actual working of language is required. But what *philosophical* troubles would have been left then? The point concerns the *choice* of the right explicatum *for the purpose of philosophical clarification*. In order to be able to choose the exact concept that should replace the inexact one, in a case of philosophical perplexity, we must already be able to understand the source of the perplexity. Our bewilderment concerns some features of the behaviour of one or more everyday concepts. We want the new, stipulated concept not to present the source of our perplexity anymore. But then it follows that once one has found the source of the philosophical perplexity (by describing in details the logical behaviour of our daily life words), one has already achieved the philosophical task of conceptual clarification. Hence the procedure of explication, considered as a method for philosophy, is at least redundant. The main aim is already achieved at the first step of the procedure, if it is put forth with enough precision and intellectual depth: the elucidation of the prescientific, obscure, concept is a precondition of the introduction of the explicatum. The rest of the procedure, and especially the replacement of the explicandum with the explicatum, which is introduced by means of exact and (to some extent) arbitrary rules, is at least unnecessary.

Carnap replied to Strawson (see Carnap 1963). He accepted that the source of the confusion was to be found in ordinary discourse; but he interpreted such assertion differently. It is the use of inexact concepts that creates confusion. It is not a matter of looking too much at such confusion, but rather a matter of trying to go over it. Not a matter of clarifying ordinary concepts, but to *replace* them. As Richard Rorty has put it, imagine that Strawson and Carnap thought of philosophy as a sort of therapeutic practice, and of a philosophical problem as a sort of illness. While Carnap sees the philosophical problem as a cancerous tissue to be replaced with healthy tissue, the cure as a replacement, and the pathologist's report as a facultative non necessary practice, Strawson compares the philosophical problem with a neurosis, in which the cure is not complete unless the neurotic understands the sources of his neurosis.

The idea of philosophy as a therapy similar to psychoanalysis is typical of the later Wittgenstein. The right thing in philosophy is what you recognize as such. The method of the *Philosophische Untersuchungen* may be seen as an implicit criticism of Carnap's explication. Wittgenstein reminds us that philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language. A philosophical perplexity often arises from the (mis)use of an everyday word out of its "natural" context. A grammatical remark, made by putting together a perspicuous list of linguistic usages, is enough for clarification and is all one needs. For a while one might even stop philosophizing. A constructed system *à la*

Carnap is just a non necessary (but maybe useful) object of comparison.

I shall now investigate how the procedure of explication should be conceived and what results it can achieve after Wittgenstein and Strawson, if they were right (as I think they substantially were).

2. A question of taste

There is a weak sense in which the Carnapian philosopher is still free. Constructing axiom systems for philosophical purposes is, after all, a question of taste. One may like it. But there is something more than this, which is a consequence of taking seriously the analogy between a philosophical problem and a neurosis. If the awareness achieved by the “patient” is almost a necessary and sufficient condition of the “cure” of the philosophical “illness”, then the patient’s already constructed *formae mentis* may play a relevant role. The ways of thinking he prefers or is more familiar to are to be considered. And it is a fact that logic and mathematics have deeply entered our culture, and that they even represent paradigmatic cases of perspicuous linguistic systems. One may better understand something (at least sometimes) if he can put it into *formulae*.

3. Filling out gaps

A second application of explication today depends on the *nature* of *some* philosophical problems. There are cases in which we lack the criteria for applying an expression in a certain context, or in which there are gaps in the existing language. The philosopher, who feels a need of systematization, may proceed to a sort of explication. Two students of Wittgenstein at Cambridge, Georg Henrik von Wright and Max Black, have defended a similar conception of philosophy, somehow compatible both with Wittgenstein and with Carnap. Von Wright for a life has constructed logical systems for philosophical purposes. His juvenile logical works on distributive normal forms may be seen as attempts to save the notion of tautology from the negative verdict demonstrated by Alonzo Church in 1936 on the possibility of a general procedure of decision in first order logic. Von Wright’s reason seemed to be that the notion of tautology is a good explicatum of the inexact concept of logical truth. But also a large part of his later work have consisted in the study of the logic of a certain concept: alethic modal logic, deontic logic, logic of time and change, logic of preference, space, action. The concepts to be clarified are often everyday concepts. The philosopher experiences some ordinary uses as somehow in need of systematization. “Seldom ... does a philosophic investigation concern just a concept in isolation, even if only one may be in the focus of interest. This means that what the philosopher does in relation to language could, with due caution, be described as filling out gaps, or lacunas, in existing usage” (von Wright 1989, 49). He cannot do this activity “by consulting usage — since there is none to be consulted. If he can be said to consult anything at all, this would be his own intuitions about the concepts under discussion, i.e. about the rules according to which he thinks they should be employed” (*Ibidem*). Philosophy is a sort of *explication of conceptual intuitions*. The definition is close to Carnap for three reasons. Firstly, he uses the term “explication”. Secondly, he acknowledges to the philosopher some creative linguistic power, which he shows by making explicit his own intuitions (e.g. by constructing an axiom system). Third, philosophy begins when the philosopher feels some perplexity concerning ordinary

language. The definition is also Wittgensteinian, since philosophy does not interfere with current usage: the philosopher moves where there is no such a usage. In the area where he moves neither factual nor correct usage is available. That’s why he can create new linguistic rules to delineate the lacking borders of certain concepts.

Something similar has been said, less explicitly, by Black (see Black 1954). Many philosophers, he maintains, tried to define what science and scientific method are. Black would do it by means of a *persuasive* definition, a combination of descriptive and normative procedures. We need such a definition because the words to be investigated lack a clear sense. Again, here the philosopher seems to fill out gaps in ordinary conceptual fields.

4. Justifying scientific practice

The solutions 2. and 3. considered explication, following Carnap, as a *philosophical* enterprise. But in Carnap’s work there is also a complementary suggestion: explication belongs to science. Philosophy as logical syntax of language is a preliminary part of science. The explicatum belongs to the scientific vocabulary.

I shall suggest to use the notion of explication in (rationally and semantically) justifying certain novel scientific enterprises, e.g. neurosciences. Since probably scientists work in many different, non systematic and non paradigmatic ways, I do not claim that explication is the procedure that neuroscientists consciously follow. Much is probably left to imagination and contingency. But considered within an *a posteriori* description of what scientists did, explication is an antidote for conceptual confusions.

Some neuroscientists say in their books, both popular and professional, that some parts of the brain sees, remember, knows. The attribution of a psychological predicate to a part of a human being has been called by Bennett and Hacker a “mereological fallacy”. It is a logical mistake, they suggest, to ascribe to a part of a whole (e.g. the brain of a living human being) and attribute (e.g. knowledge) that logically apply only to the whole. They generalized a remark made by Wittgenstein (1953, § 281): “Only of a human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees, is blind; hears, is deaf; is conscious or unconscious”.

A possible reply is that the scientific approaches depart from the common-sense notions in several ways. The neuroscientist Simon Ullman has remarked that scientists’ notions have special technical meanings, different from ordinary ones; if often scientists say that the brain knows X, then “knows” is only a homonym of the ordinary psychological predicate (See Ullman 1991).

If a *posteriori* we describe the scientists’s work as a sort of explication, their enterprise makes more sense (e.g. the mereological fallacy disappears). They are introducing *new* concepts (e.g. the concept of knowledge*), which logically apply also to certain parts of a human being (e.g. the brain). These concepts should be simple and exact (as paradigmatically in natural sciences). They are introduced by stipulation but they are fruitful. This means that they must have explanatory value, occur into empirical laws and favour predictions. Fruitfulness justifies the dissimilarity with ordinary expressions.

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Das „fruchtbare Schweigen“: die Sprachkritik von F. Mauthner, der Sprachtranszendentalismus von L. Wittgenstein und das Interpretationsproblem in der Philosophie von K. Jaspers

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Philosophische Situation

Seit ihrem Bestehen hat sich die Philosophie mit Erkenntnisproblemen und mit ihrer Selbstklärung beschäftigt. Das gab jedem Sicherheit, der zu philosophieren begann; und der Aufbau eines neuen philosophischen Systems musste mit der sorgfältigen Auswahl der sogenannten Baumaterialien, d.h. der Wörter, Begriffe und Kategorien, beginnen.

Der Fortschritt der Philosophie in diesem Aspekt war eindeutig und in der Blütezeit der klassischen europäischen Tradition – der Philosophie Hegels, Kants – wurde die Sprache als etwas Vollkommenes dargestellt, das man nicht mehr verbessern könne. Gleichzeitig aber führte das zu einem Gebrauch einer schwer verständlichen Sprache. Der Verlust der Verständlichkeit führte zu einer Krise, die sich angesichts einer solchen philosophischen Situation in einer Sprachkritik widerspiegelte. An der Wende vom XIX. zum XX. Jahrhundert war Sprachkritik nicht mehr eine Propädeutik; sondern stellte sich als eine neue Philosophie vor.

Die Autoren des Vortrags versuchen, das Problem des "Schweigens" in der Sprachphilosophie des XX. Jahrhunderts vorzustellen. Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft sind in der Tat wissenschaftliche Disziplinen, die sich mit dem Schweigen beschäftigen, letztere z.B. in Form einer Konversationsanalyse, die Schweigen im Zusammenhang mit den Regeln und Modi des Sprecherwechsels untersucht. Aber auch andere Wissenschaften interessieren sich für das Schweigen: Die Soziologie, die Pädagogik und die Psychologie beschreiben und deuten den Verlauf und die Disfunktion kommunikativen Verhaltens als soziale Kategorie bzw. Ausdruck individueller Fehlentwicklung. Es gibt also verschiedene Arten der theoretischen Beschäftigung mit dem Schweigen, die auch je gene "Schweigeakttypen" als ihren Gegenstand konstruieren.

Die These, der hier nachgegangen werden soll, lautet: *"Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen"* (TLP). Aber wir möchten diesen berühmten Satz Wittgensteins sprachphilosophisch rekontextualisieren und im Aspekt des „fruchtbaren Schweigens“ zeigen. Dabei soll v. a. die Sprachphilosophie aus der Perspektive des Schweigens in der Philosophie von L. Wittgenstein, F. Mauthner und K. Jaspers gezeigt werden.

§ 1 Fritz Mauthner.

Kritik der Macht der Sprache

Fritz Mauthner (1849-1923), Schriftsteller und Philosoph. Während seiner erfolgreichen journalistischen Karriere trat er auch mit bedeutenden literarischen Werken hervor und begann sich mit sprachphilosophischen Problemen zu beschäftigen, auf die er sich von der Jahrhundertwende an ausschließlich konzentrierte. Als Philosoph vertrat er eine Position, die den Wert der Sprache als Mittel der Erkenntnis in Frage stellt. Mit seiner Sprachskepsis gilt er heute als Vorläufer von Wittgenstein.

Die Kritik der Sprache von Mauthner besteht darin, das Wort von seinem Sockel herunterzunehmen. Besonders

naturwissenschaftliche und philosophische Disziplinen bedürfen einer Reinigung ihrer Terminologie. Jeder Gelehrte, Philosoph und Naturforscher muss wie an eine Weltformel, an eine Moralregel oder an ein Gebet daran glauben, dass «unsere Nerven viel mehr kennen als der Umstand, der versucht, alles in Worten auszudrücken». Deswegen darf die Kritik der Sprache nicht mit der Gründung einer neuen Sprache enden. Die Sprachkritik soll vielmehr dazu auffordern, die Macht des Wortes (die Logokratie) zu beschränken, an der unsere Gesellschaft leidet.

Aber unsere sprachlichen Mittel für die Bezeichnung der Dinge sind auch nicht vollkommen. Unsere Sprache spiegelt unsere Empfindungen nicht voll und ganz wider. Das ist ein wichtiges agnostisches Argument von Mauthner. Aber es war auch ein Argument für die künstlerische Kraft der Dichtersprache, die in zwei bis drei Worten die Reinheit des Gefühls bezeichnen kann. Der Dichter spricht über das Gefühl der Liebe, ohne das Wort "Liebe" zu nennen. Diese Tatsache zeigt uns, wie Mauthner glaubt, daß die nominalistische Philosophie eine neue, aktuelle Bedeutung besitzt. «Um das Wort Aberglauben unter Kontrolle zu halten, forderte Mauthner die Denker zum Schweigen auf. Sie sollten aufhören, Fragen zu stellen, da die Antworten nur die Netze der Vielfältigkeit seien» (Mauthner 1910).

Diese Idee des furchtbaren Schweigens entwickelte Mauthner in seinem Werk «Atheismus und seine Geschichte». Er schreibt über das mystische Schweigen und versucht, eine neue negative Theologie zu begründen. «Man kann das auch Mystik nennen, erkenntniskritische Mystik nennen, erkenntniskritische, sprachliche Mystik, zum Unterschied von der dem Meister Eckhart nachgesammelten Schablone der vielzuvielen gottseligen Mystiker» (Mauthner 1910).

Die Philosophie kann für Mauthner kein System oder keine Lehre sein, sondern nur der zum Scheitern verurteilte Versuch, das Unsagbare zu sagen. Demnach müssen wir – seinem Verständnis von Philosophie folgend – zwischen zwei Aufgaben unterscheiden: a) Kritik aller Scheinbegriffe, b) Aufhebung oder „Selbstmord der Sprache"! Die eine befreit uns von dem „Schrecken über das absurde Ungeheuer der Sprache“, die andere führt uns zum entschlossenen und endgültigen Verzicht auf das Wort, zum mystischen Erlebnis: zum Schweigen (Haller 2000).

Schließlich und endlich kann man von der Sprache keine Harmonie und Folgerichtigkeit erwarten, keine Bestimmtheit der Begriffe und Kategorien, sondern nur eine Bildlichkeit und Zurücknahme, um die Vorstellung zu bewahren, oder einfach zu schweigen.

§ 2 Ludwig Wittgenstein. Sprachtranszendentalismus

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) gehört als Vertreter der sprachanalytischen Philosophie zu den einflussreichsten Philosophen des 20. Jahrhunderts. Wittgensteins Philosophie war und blieb also *Sprachkritik*. Und die wesentlichen

Bestimmungen dessen, was Philosophie als Sprachkritik zu leisten habe, bleiben im Laufe seines Schaffens unberührt.

Im *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* ist die Grundfrage die, ob und wie es in der Welt eine apriorische Ordnung gibt. Daher reflektiert Wittgenstein die Fundamente der Logik: es geht um Tatsachen, nicht um Dinge. Tatsachen haben die Form von Propositionen – aber auch wenn diese richtig sind, geben sie uns keine Gewißheit über das Empirische, die Sprache kann uns täuschen. Statt um die Grenze des 'Erkennbaren' geht es um die Möglichkeit des 'Beschreibbaren' mit den Mitteln einer logisch perfektionierten Sprache. In seiner Abbildtheorie verbindet Wittgenstein Welt und Gedanken durch Sprache. Für Wittgenstein bedeuten die Grenzen der Sprache die Grenzen der Welt. «Der Satz ist ein Bild der Wirklichkeit. Der Satz ist ein Modell der Wirklichkeit, so wie wir sie uns denken» (TLP).

Die Grenzen der Sprache sind also die Grenzen der Welt, sagt Wittgenstein. Worüber man nicht sprechen kann, ist daher nicht. Alles, was sich sagen lässt, lässt sich klar sagen. «Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen» (TLP).

Denn was Wittgenstein in dieser Konsequenz meinte, war ja, dass die Philosophie sich in Naturwissenschaft auflöst, indem sie nichts mehr sagen kann, als was die Naturwissenschaften sagen. Hat man nun ein Phänomen, über das man nichts sagen kann, dann müsste man darüber so lange schweigen, bis die Naturwissenschaften dazu Stellung nehmen können. Wittgensteins Absicht im Traktat war, dem Denken eine Grenze zu ziehen, und dies konnte entsprechend der sprachkritischen Intention nur heißen, dass das, was jenseits der Grenze liegt, nicht intensional bedeutend, sondern "Unsinn" ist (Haller 1998).

Philosophie, Religion und Mystik können keine sinnvollen Sätze aussagen. Das denkende Subjekt, das sinnvolle Sätze bildet, gehört jedoch nicht zur Welt. Es ist eine Grenze (das Auge sieht sich selbst nicht). Der Sinn der Welt muss also außerhalb der Welt liegen, denn in der Welt gibt es keinen Wert. Das „Dass“ der Welt ist das Mystische: Gegenwart und Unmittelbarkeit, gegeben in der Anschauung und dem mystischen Gefühl. Nur das „Dass“ dieses Gefühls ist aussagbar. Doch die Probleme des Lebens bleiben unberührt von dem, was sagbar ist (von der Logik). Es gibt keinen Sinn des Lebens. Man kann den Sinn des Lebens nicht aussagen und nicht; doch er zeigt sich selbst, und zwar in der Unmittelbarkeit. Das Gefühl ist, aber man kann nicht aussagen. Gott ist jenseits und abstrakt. Die Kunst sagt, aber was sie sagt, sagt sie nicht in der Kunst selbst, sondern es zeigt sich zwischen den Zeilen. Ein Kunstwerk ist das begrifflose An-Sich. Es drückt sich zwar in Worten aus, sagt aber den Begriff nicht im Wort. Das Wahre zeigt sich nicht im Begriff. Auch die Ethik ist transzendental. Es kann keine sinnvollen Sätze der Ethik geben, und die Sprache der Ethik ist das Schweigen. Ethik und Ästhetik sind eins. Die Sprache der Ästhetik ist also auch das Schweigen. Sinnvolle Sätze sind nur über das „Wie“ möglich: über die Mechanik der Welt. Doch das „Wie“ ist für das Ewige gleichgültig. Das Ewige (Gott, die Kunst) offenbart sich nicht in der Welt und ist unsagbar, liegt im Gebiet des Schweigens.

Die Konsequenz des berühmten Wittgenstein'schen Satzes ist nicht eindeutig und also nicht in einem einzigen Satz zu fassen. Die Erweiterung dieser Idee können wir sehr viel später in weiteren philosophischen Untersuchungen sehen.

§ 3 Karl Jaspers. „Stille Räume“: die Grenze der Interpretation

Zwischen der Sprachkritik Mauthners und dem Schweigen Wittgensteins scheint der von Jaspers eingeschlagene Weg ein anderer zu sein, denn er ist «der einzige Weg, des Unsagbaren gewiß zu werden – in der Mitteilung» (Jaspers 1978). In der «Vorrede zur zweiten Aufgabe» der Wissenschaft der Logik zieht Hegel die Wechselbeziehung zwischen Denken und Sprache in Betracht und geht auf die Vorzüge ein, die in dieser Hinsicht verschiedene Sprachen, die chinesische oder die deutsche, bieten können, wie die «stillen Räume des zu sich selbst gekommenen und nur in sich seienden Denkens» (Hegel, 1975). Das ist eine späte Würdigung eines Themas, das in seinem System Platz hat.

Jaspers fragt nach den „stillen Räumen“ des Denkens in den Seiten, die der Untersuchung des unlösbaren Zusammenhangs von Denken und Sprache gewidmet sind. Doch hier erhält das Schweigen offenbar eine besondere Bedeutung in seiner Philosophie der Kommunikation. In diesem Zusammenhang antwortet Jaspers auf eine gewöhnlich gestellte Frage, die dem Zweifel am unlösbaren Zusammenhang zwischen Denken und Sprache entspringt. Es ist die Frage nach der Möglichkeit eines sprachlosen Denkens, einer Bewegung des Bewußtseins, die ohne Sprache entstehen und sich erschöpfen würde (Jaspers 1990). Jaspers vorsichtige Antwort lautet: *Ein sprachloses Denken* – wenn überhaupt vorstellbar – kann als «Grenze», als «Ursprung» bzw. als «Vollendung» (Jaspers 1990) aufgefaßt werden. Wird es als Grenze aufgefaßt, kann man nicht von einem eigentlichen sprachlosen Denken reden. Die Grenze ist hier als Linie zu verstehen, welche die Sprachlichkeit von der Abbildlichkeit einerseits und von der Zeichenhaftigkeit andererseits abgrenzt. Im einen Fall ist die Sprache der unausweichliche Zielpunkt, im anderen der unausweichliche Ausgangspunkt.

Jenseits der Sprache liegt hingegen der Raum eines Schweigens, das in seiner Fülle die Sprache schon überwunden und sie sozusagen überflüssig gemacht hat. Dies ist nicht das Schweigen der Natur, sondern das Schweigen des Geistes, der durch die Sprache zur Klarheit und Vollendung gelangt ist. In diesem Raum, wo der Einklang mit dem Sein zu herrschen scheint, ist das Wort Abfall. Hier ist das Schweigen «das erfüllende, alle Sprache in sich bergende Übersprachliche des Seins selbst im erfüllenden Schweigen» (Jaspers 1990).

Das Schweigen des Seins in der Transzendenz ist die Grenze, an der die Kommunikation zerschellt, ist ihr letztes Wort (Jaspers 1935). «Die Grenze der Interpretation zieht sich dort hin, wo sich die Sprache beendet. Während der Sprachkommunikation stellt das Schweigen auch eine wichtige – wahrscheinlich – die wichtigste Bericht dar» (Jaspers 1990). Die existentielle Kommunikation, der Weg zur Einheit, ist zum Scheitern bestimmt. Die Einheit des Wahren – wenn es sie gibt – ist im Schweigen der Transzendenz, jenseits der Grenze, wo die Vielstimmigkeit der Existenzen verstummt, zugleich aber auch die Kommunikation erlischt.

Jaspers kann das von Wittgenstein im *Tractatus* empfohlene Schweigen deshalb nicht akzeptieren, weil dieses Schweigen jede Möglichkeit des Transzendierens aufhebt (Jaspers 1947). Was Jaspers in die Nähe Wittgensteins, genauer gesagt des frühen Wittgenstein rückt, ist die Weigerung, innerhalb der Philosophie auf vergegenständlichende und wissenschaftliche Weise über das zu sprechen, was in seiner Ungegenständlichkeit sich als

unsagbar erweist. Während aber Wittgenstein die Grenzen dessen festlegen will, was gegenständlich denkbar und unmittelbar sagbar ist, um mittelbar auf das Unsagbare jenseits der Grenzen hinzuweisen, betrachtet Jaspers es als die besondere Aufgabe der Philosophie, über die Grenzen hinaus zum Sein zu transzendieren, das weder gegenständlich denkbar noch unmittelbar sagbar ist, und zwar durch eine Sprache, die in sich schon den Verweis auf die Transzendenz hat und die zum Mittel einer als indirekte Mitteilung verstandenen Philosophie werden kann. Um weiter zu verdeutlichen, in welchem Sinn die Philosophie sich als solche anbieten kann, spricht Jaspers – auf Wittgenstein anspielend (Jaspers 1980) – von dem «Erklimmen einer Leiter, die nach Benutzung preisgegeben ist» (Jaspers 1947).

Jaspers Erkundung in den an die Sprache angrenzenden Räumen, in den Räumen des Schweigens, ist wohl exotischer Herkunft und stammt wahrscheinlich aus seinem Interesse für den Konfuzianismus und den Buddhismus, wo dem Schweigen – anders als in der abendländischen Tradition – ein besonderer Stellenwert zugewiesen wird. Dieser Zug seiner Reflexion verbindet ihn jedoch mit Philosophen und Dichtern seiner Zeit, von Wittgenstein bis Heidegger, von Scholem bis Celan, um nur einige zu erwähnen, die das Schweigen den Mystikern entwunden haben. Aber die Aufmerksamkeit, die Jaspers dem Schweigen widmet, weist Eigentümlichkeiten auf, die auf den Zusammenhang zurückgehen, in dem sie ihren Ursprung hat, also auf die Philosophie der Kommunikation.

Das Schweigen in der Sprachphilosophie hat eine lange Geschichte und ist von den verschiedensten Disziplinen gedeutet worden. Davon zeugt eine Vielzahl von Beispielen aus dem populären und popularisierten Sprachgebrauch, vom goldenen Schweigen bis zum bekannten Satz Wittgensteins aus dem Tractatus. Wir möchten unsere Untersuchung mit Wittgenstein revers beenden: «*Worüber man nicht schweigen kann, darüber muß man reden...*» Und wir können sicher sagen dass diese Problematik des „fruchtbaren Schweigens“ sehr aktuell und wissenschaftlich fruchtbar ist.

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Toleration as a Specific Value Experience in Ludwig Wittgenstein's Moral Philosophy

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In the context of Ludwig Wittgenstein's moral philosophy the notion of toleration has never been studied before, that's why we attempt at investigating this value category with special reference to its applicability to the current situation of our civilization.

Wittgenstein, in his Lectures on Ethics states that ethics works only as a personal prospect; therefore, experience of absolute value have entirely unique and individual. «There is only unavoidable plurality of the individual ethical worlds to which plurality of individual moral volitions corresponds» (Wittgenstein 1965). It is because of that plurality of volitions that the solution of an ethical conflict implies change in a person's attitude. Hence, moral philosophy is to deal with the general relation of a person to the world rather than a person's diverse actions.

In this perspective the notion of toleration may be conceived as a universal value category that is rooted in personal response to moral values. The clarification of the notion of toleration seems to be indispensable of an adequate consideration of this term, though it is hampered with the difficulty in expressing general definitions of this notion.

1. Introduction. Preliminary Definitions

The problem of tolerance is considered today as one of the most important global problems of contemporary civilization. The UNESCO Declaration of Principles of Tolerance (1995) affirms that «In the modern world, tolerance is more essential than ever before». Meanwhile, there is no consensus among scholars and political leaders either what tolerance actually is or what role it plays in the development of modern culture and society. Some of the current definitions have extremely broad and loose meanings and others are hardly exhaustive because of their narrowness. The existence of such a plurality of definitions raises the question of the possibility of finding a more functional, universal meaning of tolerance that would be equally applicable to the contemporary multicultural world. We might, therefore, undertake a historico-cultural critique of this notion by placing it within the context of different mentalities and cultures. Only after such an investigation would we possibly be able to work out a specific approach to the problem within the framework of contemporary cultures.

We begin by considering some of the more recent definitions of this notion. The term is effectively used in various fields such as biology, medicine, social sciences, and ethics for denoting the way a given system treats various changes which do not corrupt its totality. In other words, the system can be considered as tolerant to the changes if they do not destroy the unity of its being. Hence, tolerance, in general, is an index of the stability of the system open for exposure.

In the most general philosophical sense, tolerance may be defined as an admission of the other's being, or permission for other to be. Today this general understanding of tolerance has given way to the social and humanitarian meaning of tolerance as a basic value of

society and a fundamental virtue of ethics. It is in this sense that one can speak of the education of tolerant consciousness.

The most recent definitions of tolerance are similar to the following: «Tolerance is respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world's cultures, our forms of expression and ways of being human. It is fostered by knowledge, openness, communication and freedom of thought, consciousness and belief. Tolerance is harmony in difference. It is not only a moral duty, it is also a political and legal requirement. Tolerance, the virtue that makes peace possible, contributes to the replacement of the culture of war by a culture of peace» (Decl., 1995// UNESCO).

«To tolerate generally means to endure, suffer or put up with a person, activity, idea or organization of which or whom one does not really approved «tolerance involves some form of «acceptance» of an item to which we object» (King 1985).

«Tolerance as distinguished from toleration, respects others equally, and prides itself in no superiority to them; the virtue is therefore less misleading named respect for others. One who normally acts with respect and courtesy to those of his own group, however this may be defined, manifests this virtue only if he has both the imagination to grasp how intimately anyone feels to be a part of himself those things he shares with others of his background and the decency to adapt his behavior accordingly. A tolerant individual, one who has respect for others, when confronted by those alien to him in any of these regards, understands, instinctively or through reflection, how integral they are to them in just the same way as his own customs, language and religion are integral to himself» (Dummet 1993).

And, finally, the most recent definition:

«In accordance with the requirements of political education, tolerance is ... defined ... as a maxim for the individual and ethically motivated decision to either endure a conflict or settle it by peaceful means, based on the conviction that the other parties to the conflict enjoy principally the same rights. A conflict is always mutual negation, expressing rejection of the values and norms of the other person. Tolerance defined as a maxim, of necessity leads to a search for a comprehensive perspective, which will allow the parties to the conflict to accept each other certainties ... as equally legitimate and valid. Tolerance can thus be seen as the foundation for a democratic accord». (Tolerance 2000).

Therefore, in the contemporary world, tolerance is understood both as a value and a virtue. As a value it makes peaceful co-existence and development of cultural pluralism possible in the framework of our contemporary multicultural civilization. As a virtue it is a virtue of respect for those outside a given culture, thereby mitigating xenophobia. As such, tolerance differs from patience or indulgence. Indeed, patience is forced admission of the other's being, whereas tolerance is a conscious recogni-

tion of another's rights and freedoms irrespective of gender, ethnicity, religion, power or weakness. On the other hand, tolerance is not indulgence or indifference but an active, positive treatment of the other. In brief, tolerance is an active admission of another's existence even with the possibility of being affected by the other.

The definitions above focus on the formal meaning of tolerance by defining it as an imperative of permitting the existence of the other, or a maxim of active support of the other's existence. In these terms, tolerance is acceptance and recognition of the fact of the multicultural character of humanity in the context of globalization or an ethical norm of behavior in a multicultural democratic community. However, all these definitions express very little regarding the cultural possibilities of international, culturally tolerant relations. It is obvious that tolerance, for example, in Protestant cultures, should be founded upon a different basis than in Muslim or Orthodox cultures. Nevertheless, the search for such a basis is quite necessary for humanity's survival. This last point, so strongly stated, needs additional argumentation and raises the question of the function of tolerance within the context of contemporary life.

2. Functions of Tolerance in Contemporary Life

Human civilization is entering a new stage of existence. First of all, it is involved in the globalization of humanity, that is, the rise of a universal history of civilization. Globalization is a consequence of the Enlightenment and modernity, the child of modern Europe. The Enlightenment understood man as the universal, rational being, with the capacity to reason possessing sovereignty over passive nature. Thus, the only initial form of globalization could be an imperialism striving for the harnessing of nature and for ruling other peoples perceived as weak and undeveloped, i.e., unenlightened. The natural sciences, along with technical and technological potential, established the basis for imperialism. Industrial society, striving for permanent expansion, was therefore a product of the Enlightenment and the basis of future globalization. The industrial society was responsible for the transnational corporations, giving rise to new methods and systems of communication, thereby bringing into the world the great achievements and primary problems which exist today.

The point is that industrialism, in its global development, has caused the following phenomena: 1) a global ecological crisis, which has shown that nature is not simply a passive system to be exploited by human need; 2) new military forces, especially weapons of mass destruction; 3) new systems of communication, such as satellite communication and Internet; 4) new computer technologies have been developed to the level whereby their effectiveness is defined by the information installed and the efficiencies of their applications. The last development transformed the industrial society into an information society.

New systems of communication in our contemporary information society are not limited by national borders: One cannot confine information to national systems and one cannot enjoy the profits of import levies or duty. The Internet best represents the expansion of globalization. The cause of globalization, industrial society, with its believing in the infinite power of human reason and the universal character of human nature, gradually came to naught. Furthermore, the new information society is not techno-centric, but rather culturo-centric. It is a society of post-, or post-post-modernism. The point is that informa-

tion, having become the main productive force of society much more than technology, is dependent on the translating and receiving subjects. Human problems of hermeneutics, interpretation of information, become part and parcel of any productive process. The subject interprets the information as a member of a certain culture in which he was born and educated rather than as a person possessing some sort of transcendental, universal reason. All of these conditions predetermine the turn from universal unification and standardization of industrialism to admitting the value of specific cultures and from a merely mathematical way of treating the world to humanitarian modes of its interpretation.

One may readily observe a growing, internal contradiction and tension in the totality of these phenomena. Indeed, on the one hand, globalization of the world demands its unification and, in consequence, a universalization of consciousness. On the other hand, the cultural orientations of contemporary civilization makes such an abstract unification impossible. In other words, the historical development demands today not only the amalgamation of cultures but also their internal development. Therefore, speaking only of a global civilization hardly makes sense today; what is coming into being is really a strictly multicultural civilization. The last notion however is contradictory. If culture is the totality of means for relating the world, and of artifacts made by these means, how can one speak of a certain unity of principally different cultures, of their unification into a single, total civilization? After all, as we have already seen above, the cultural orientation of today's society excludes any possibility of reducing the cultural diversity to a certain «common to all mankind» denominator.

Thus, one of the main contradictions of the contemporary historical development may be defined as a contradiction between the universal character of global civilization coming into being and its essentially multicultural orientation. We can point to the tension between the universality of human rights and cultural specifics of different societies as one of the dimensions of this contradiction. It is well known that in many countries the very idea of human rights is rejected as «universalistic, unpluralistic and alien to them, as 'being out of line with variety of world's cultures and lifestyles. This idea is considered as an interference in their own culture...» (Kozlovsky 1997). So, we cannot avoid the search for a certain cultural «principium individuationis» of real universal values.

The only possible way to resolve these problems is to find a universal value that is a cultural symbolization of the universal. In other words, in order to take a tangible form, to become an effective tool for the regulation of human behavior, human rights, along with other universal values of global civilization, should take a cultural meaning. It goes without saying that this meaning will be quite different in the frameworks of various cultures, will be different and yet similar in its essence.

From this point of view, the value of tolerance is one of paramount importance. It becomes today not only one of the values, but a norm for treating values. It is tolerance that is the rule for the cultural symbolization of the universal. It comprises an imperative of adaptation of the universal to the individual. Thus, tolerance is the mediator, which makes the application of the universal values to nationally peculiar cultures possible. The principle of toleration, by the same token, reconciles the globalization and cultural pluralism of contemporary civilization.

The problem is that tolerance is not only the rule for treating values, it is a universal rule. Therefore, tolerance exists as a value among other universal values. As a consequence, tolerance itself has to be culturally adapted and symbolized. It is from this that the impossibility of general, universal definitions of tolerance follow. Any definition becomes merely formal and, in its essence, grasps only the function of tolerance as a rule for treating universal values.

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Warum man mit einem unsinnigen Satz nichts *meinen* kann: Erläuterungen über „das alte Missverständnis, den Begriff ‘meinen’ betreffend“

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In *Über Gewissheit* zeigt Wittgenstein, dass der Satz „Hier ist eine Hand“ in manchen Zusammenhängen einen gewöhnlichen Sinn hat. Wenn er verstanden wird, wird er in seinem gewöhnlichen Sinn verstanden. Wenn wir aber versuchen würden, G.E. Moore Kontexte zu präsentieren, in denen dieser Satz einen Sinn hat, damit sein Sinn, sein Gebrauch, ihm klar wird, würde er wahrscheinlich erwidern, dass wir uns irren, dass das, was wir beschreiben, überhaupt nicht ist, was er *meinte*. In einer solchen Antwort ist aber der Hinweis auf ein *Meinen* irreführend. Das Problem ist tatsächlich nicht, dass Moore etwas *meinte*, was er nicht hätte sagen können, sondern dass er *nichts* meint.

Wir wollen uns zuerst genau ansehen, wie Wittgenstein in *Über Gewissheit* das Argument eines Meinens verwirft, das darauf zielt, einen Satz wie den Moores als sinnvoll gelten zu lassen. Dann soll beschrieben werden, was der gewöhnliche Sinn eines Satzes ist, der ein Meinen ausdrückt, um das „Missverständnis“ klarzustellen, das einen Philosophen dazu führen kann, ein *Meinen* hinter einem Unsinn zu suchen. Das Meinen ist kein psychischer Zustand, kein vorsprachlicher Gedankeninhalt, auf das das, was gesagt wird, sich stützte.

1. Das Meinen als Argument gegen das Zusammenhangsprinzip

In *Über Gewissheit* werden Sprachspiele beschrieben, die hervorheben, inwiefern der *Sinn* eines Satzes nichts außer seinem *Gebrauch* in einem Sprachspiel ist (UG 10, 61). Da die Aussage Moores „Hier ist eine Hand“ kein Zug in einem Sprachspiel ist, sagt sie *nichts*, ist sie Unsinn (UG 10, 35, 138, 412, 461, 495). Zwar kann man sich Kontexte vorstellen, in denen diese Wortreihe einen Sinn hat (im Wald glauben mein Freund und ich, eine Hand zu sehen, die sich als ein trockener Ast erweist), und deshalb erweckt die Aussage aus dem Mund Moores den Anschein eines sinnvollen Satzes. Der Sinn ist aber nicht etwas, das *hinter* dem Satz angehängt ist und von einem Kontext zum anderen übertragen wird. Das, was jedes Mal einer Aussage ihren Gebrauch, ihren Sinn verleiht (oder nicht), ist der Zusammenhang. Darin besteht die neue Fassung des Zusammenhangsprinzips Wittgensteins: Nur im Zusammenhang der Sprache, und noch genauer, eines Sprachspiels, hat der Satz einen Sinn. (Die Sprache kann mit einer Maschine, der Satz mit einem Maschinenteil verglichen werden: vgl. BPP I, § 40.)

Die Sätze Moores könnten aber in einer Sprachlehre auftauchen. Sie wären dann keine Erfahrungssätze, aber auch kein Unsinn. Sie könnten ein Beispiel für die Anwendung einer grammatischen Regel sein. Das Lernen einer Sprache kann auf bestimmten Sprachspielen beruhen, in denen manche Sätze „leere Züge“, von dem gesamten Mechanismus abgehängte Maschinenteile sein können. Auf einen solchen Fall wird von Wittgenstein in der Bemerkung 393 angespielt: „Der Satz ‚Ich weiß, dass das ein Baum ist‘ könnte, wenn er außerhalb seines Sprachspiels gesagt wird, auch ein Zitat (aus einer deut-

schen Sprachlehre etwa) sein.“ Dieser Satz könnte etwa das Beispiel eines Ergänzungssatzes sein.

Das Problem mit den Sätzen Moores ist, dass sie außerhalb jedes Kontextes erscheinen, der ihnen einen Sinn geben würde, während Moore (oder der fiktive Gesprächspartner Wittgensteins, der die Rolle des Verteidigers Moores spielt) sich weigert, sie als Unsinn anzuerkennen. Dieser fiktive Gesprächspartner lehnt tatsächlich die mögliche Erklärung ab, die Wittgenstein vorgeschlagen hat (ein Satz könne nicht nur in Zusammenhängen, in denen er *funktioniert*, sondern auch „als Zitat aus einer Sprachlehre“ erscheinen), mit der Frage: „Aber wenn ich ihn nun *meine*, während ich ihn ausspreche?“ Der Einwand ist hier der folgende: Wenn *ich* mit meinem Satz etwas *meinte*, was immer der Kontext auch sei, wenn ich wirklich etwas im Kopf hatte, indem ich ihn aussprach (wenn ich diese Worte nicht ausgesprochen habe, weil sie schön klangen z. B.), dann sollte *dieser Satz* sicher etwas mitteilen, einen Sinn haben. Der fiktive Gesprächspartner leugnet, seine Aussage sei einem Zitat aus einer Sprachlehre vergleichbar. Sein Einwand wendet sich also genau gegen dieses „Zusammenhangsprinzip“ Wittgensteins (letzte Fassung). Diesem fiktivem Gesprächspartner nach wäre nicht (oder nicht nur) der Zusammenhang des Satzes entscheidend, um ihn als sinnvoll oder als unsinnig zu erkennen, sondern auch die *Absicht*, die zu seinem Ausdruck geführt hätte.

Dieser Einwand ist für Wittgenstein nicht annehmbar; er spricht von dem „alte[n] Missverständnis, den Begriff ‚meinen‘ betreffend“ (UG 393). Das Missverständnis besteht darin, das *Meinen*, d.h. die *Absicht, etwas zu sagen*, sowie die *Absicht* überhaupt, als einen psychischen Vorgang zu verstehen. Diese Auffassung wurde oft von Wittgenstein kritisiert (BPP I, §§ 42, 184, PU 592, PU II, xi, S. 559-560).

Dass ich etwas absichtlich tue, bedeutet nicht, dass ich irgendwann ein *Erlebnis* dieser Absicht habe. Wenn meine Bewegung jedoch unterbrochen oder verhindert wird, kann ich erklären, was meine Absicht war (BPP I, § 185). Dasselbe gilt für das Meinen. Wenn wir jemanden fragen, was er mit diesem oder jenem Ausdruck *meint*, wird nicht nach irgendeiner „geistigen Absicht“, irgendeinem vorsprachlichen Gedankeninhalt gefragt, der als Ursache und *Rechtfertigung* seiner Aussagen betrachtet werden könnte.

Wittgenstein schreibt der Philosophie vor, die Begriffe von ihrer metaphysischen auf ihren gewöhnlichen Gebrauch zurückzuführen. Wenn wir das mit dem Begriff des Meinens tun, wird Folgendes deutlich: Wenn *jemand* etwas *meint*, kann er das klar sagen; sein Satz hat einen Sinn. Dass es etwas gibt, das *gemeint* ist, bedeutet nicht, dass es einen vorsprachlichen psychischen Zustand gibt, auf den man zielen könnte, sondern dass man imstande ist, das, was gesagt wurde, zu *erläutern*.

2. Der gewöhnliche Sinn des Ausdrucks des Meinens

Was ist der gewöhnliche Gebrauch des Meinens? Um diesen Ausdruck zu erläutern, muss man zu der Frage des Sinnes eines Satzes zurückkehren. Einen Sinn haben heißt, einen Gebrauch zu haben. Der Sinn eines Satzes muss also immer *bestimmt* sein, d.h., immer *bestimmt genug für das, was man mit dem Satz machen will*. Das, was Wittgenstein im *Tractatus* schrieb, gilt noch für *Über Gewissheit*: Ein Aussagesatz ist sinnvoll genau dann, wenn er eine Tatsache beschreibt, d.h. auch, wenn er einen Wahrheitswert hat (TLP 4.023, 4.031, 4.063). Um dies anders zu sagen: Der Sinn eines Satzes ist notwendig bestimmt, d.h. genau, scharf, nicht zweideutig.

Wie Charles Travis besonders klar gezeigt hat, ist der Wahrheitswert eines Satzes von dem Zusammenhang abhängig, in dem er erscheint. Wenn Odile Hugo sagt, dass es Milch im Kühlschrank gäbe, während er einen Kaffee trinkt, den er zu bitter findet, und wenn es nur eine Pflütze Milch im Kühlschrank gibt, wird der Satz für falsch gehalten. Wenn es sich dagegen darum handelt, Hugo Vorwürfe zu machen, weil er seit drei Tagen den Kühlschrank sauber machen soll, wird derselbe Satz wahr sein (Travis 1989, S. 18-19). Der Sinn eines Satzes, also „was der Fall ist, wenn der Satz wahr ist“ (TLP 4.024), und seine Wahrheitsbedingungen werden durch den Gebrauchszusammenhang gegeben.

Der Zusammenhang und der Gebrauch sind also die einzigen Kriterien, um zu bestimmen, ob ein Satz einen Sinn (und also einen *bestimmten* Sinn) hat oder nicht. *An sich* ist kein Satz sinnvoll oder unsinnig. Der Zusammenhang entscheidet, ob er einen Sinn hat, d.h. auch, ob dieser Sinn *bestimmt* genug ist. Ich frage meine Freundin Eva, wie es ihr gehe, und sie antwortet mit dem Satz (S): „Ich bin krank.“ Wenn ich das nur gefragt habe, um mich nach ihrem Gesundheitszustand zu erkundigen, kann diese Antwort klar genug sein. Wenn ich aber Eva für den nächsten Tag zum Abendessen eingeladen habe, bin ich dazu verleitet, weiter zu fragen: „Wie *meinst* du das? Geht es dir so schlecht, dass du morgen nicht kommen kannst?“ Eva könnte etwa erwidern: „Nein, ich *meine*: Ich fühle mich nicht sehr wohl, ich habe Kopfschmerzen, aber mit Sicherheit komme ich morgen zu dir.“ (S)

Der Sinn eines Satzes ist *erläutert*, wenn es nicht nötig ist, weitere Fragen zu stellen, d.h. wenn klar ist, was derjenige, der ihn ausgesprochen oder geschrieben hat, damit *meinte*. Das, was ich *meine*, ist nichts anderes als der *Sinn* meines Satzes, und umgekehrt. Der Satz S' ist das, was mit dem Satz S *gemeint* ist. Der Satz S hatte in dem betrachteten Kontext noch keinen bestimmten Sinn. Er funktionierte noch nicht wirklich. Er war wie ein Maschinenteil, das nicht genau in die Maschine passt (nicht genau genug, damit die Maschine funktioniert), das aber passen kann, sobald es ein bisschen ‚arrangiert‘ wird. Es gibt *a priori* kein Kriterium, das sagen würde, ob der erste Teil ‚arrangiert‘ werden kann oder nicht (ob der Satz ein Unsinn oder ein „potentiell“ sinnvoller Satz ist). Nur hinterher kann von dem ersten Satz etwas gesagt werden. Wenn das Spiel des „Was-meinst-du-damit?“ zu einem Satz führt, dessen Sinn klar ist, dann ist es möglich zu sagen, dass der erste Satz „potentiell“ sinnvoll war.

Wenn jemand nach dem, was er mit einem Satz *meinte*, gefragt wird, wird eine Art *Misserfolg* der ausgesprochenen Wörter, ihre Rolle zu spielen, hervorgehoben, und es wird versucht, durch eine andere Formulierung, bessere Vertreter für diese Rolle zu finden. Dafür genügt es z. B., ein Wort durch ein genaueres (mit Bezug auf das in diesem

Augenblick gespielte Spiel) zu ersetzen – „krank“ durch „nicht sehr wohl“ –, oder bestimmte Bestandteile des Zusammenhanges, die für das Verständnis des Satzes wesentlich sind, anzuzeigen (wenn jemand Odile erstaunt ansieht, die stöhnend aufschreit, dass es Milch im Kühlschrank gibt, kann sie ihm erklären, dass Hugo seit drei Tagen den Kühlschrank sauber machen soll).

Das, was man mit einem Satz *meint*, ist das, was als Erläuterung dieses Satzes angegeben werden kann. „Wie hast du diesen Satz gemeint?“ und „Wie würdest du ihn erklären?“ sind eine und dieselbe Frage (BPP I § 184).

3. Von dem gewöhnlichen Sinn zum Unsinn

Der Ausdruck eines Meinens ist die Erläuterung des Sinnes eines Satzes. Wenn jemand *wirklich* mit seiner Rede etwas *meint*, und wenn er nicht verstanden wird, bedeutet das, dass er sich nicht klar genug ausgedrückt hat. Die Frage nach dem, was er *gemeint hat*, ist nicht unsinnig, sie mag beantwortet werden. Wenn aber ein Satz unsinnig ist, gibt es nichts zu erläutern, die Frage nach dem Meinen ist nicht triftig. Der Satz ist *in dem gespielten Spiel* nicht an der richtigen Stelle. Durch die Beschreibung des gewöhnlichen Gebrauches des Meinens wurde erläutert, warum der Einwand des fiktiven Gesprächspartners Wittgensteins in UG 393 nicht annehmbar ist. Diese Analyse soll uns auch erlauben, einen Schritt weiter zu gehen: Der Grund, warum Moores Aussagen Unsinn sind, ist, dass er damit *nichts meinte*, was immer er auch glauben mochte.

Ein Unsinn ist eine Wortreihe, die nicht allgemein *aus der Sprache*, sondern jedes Mal *aus einem bestimmten Sprachspiel* ausgeschlossen ist. In einem Text von Anscombe wird dieser Gedanke einleuchtend dargestellt: „Answers like ‚No particular reason‘, ‚I just thought I would‘, and so on are often quite intelligible; sometimes strange; and sometimes unintelligible. That is to say, if someone hunted out all the green books in his house and spread them out carefully on the roof, and gave one of the answers to the question ‚Why?‘ his words would be unintelligible unless as joking and mystification. They would be unintelligible, not because one did not know what *they* meant, but because one could not make out what the man meant by saying them here.“ (Anscombe 1963, § 18)

Die Frage nach der Verständlichkeit (also nach dem Sinn) eines Satzes stellt sich nie außerhalb irgendeines Kontextes. Derselbe Satz kann im Kontext eines Ulks verständlich sein: Ich komme nach Hause und sehe, dass das Kind, das allein dort geblieben ist – ein Kind, das unermüdlich Unfug macht –, alle grünen Bücher auf das Dach gelegt hat. Wenn ich es frage, warum es das getan hat, und wenn es mir antwortet „ohne bestimmten Grund“, oder „nur so“, ist mir seine Antwort verständlich, auch wenn sie mir nichts erklärt. Ich verstehe das witzige Kind, ich verstehe, was hier „ohne bestimmten Grund“ bedeuten kann. Aber außerhalb irgendeines Kontextes dieser Art wären dieselbe Antworten auf dieselbe Frage unverständlich. Ich würde nicht verstehen, was jemand, der wirklich *ohne Grund* so gehandelt hätte, mit diesen Worten *meinen* könnte, ich verstehe nicht, was dieser Mensch versuchen könnte, mir mitzuteilen.

Das Verhalten dieses Menschen (alle grünen Bücher auf das Dach zu legen) und die Aussagen Moores („Ich weiß, dass das ein Baum ist.“) sind beide unverständlich, *unsinnig*: *kein Zusammenhang behebt den Mangel an Gründen* für ihre Handlungen. Beide anerkennen diesen Mangel: der erste, indem er auf die Frage, warum er das

getan habe, „ohne bestimmten Grund“ antwortet, der zweite mit seiner Behauptung, er meine ja etwas (etwas, das nicht erklärt werden könne), wenn man ihn fragt, warum er das gesagt habe. Dass manche Zusammenhänge den Antworten „ohne bestimmten Grund“ und „Ich meinte etwas damit“ und dann auch den Verhaltensweisen der betreffenden Figuren *einen Sinn* geben können, ist überhaupt nicht ausgeschlossen. In den betrachteten Fällen wird aber diesen Antworten, und also diesen Verhaltensweisen, gerade *kein Sinn durch den Zusammenhang verliehen*.

4. Schluss

Der Hinweis auf ein ‚Meinen‘ ist nur eine Art, einen Satz als nicht klar genug zu erkennen und ihn zu klären. Das Meinen zielt also nicht auf irgendeinen außersprachlichen Zugang oder Vorgang, der eine Aussage rechtfertigen könnte, sondern *gehört zu unseren Sprachspielen*. Das Einzige, was einen Satz je rechtfertigt oder rechtfertigen kann, ist *sein Zusammenhang*. Wenn der Sinn eines Satzes immer von einem Meinen „abhängig“ ist, heißt das aber nur, dass das, was mit einem Satz *gemeint* ist, nichts anderes als sein Sinn ist, und umgekehrt: Der Sinn eines Satzes ist das, was mit dem Satz gemeint ist. Wenn man also behaupten kann, dass Moore mit seinen Aussagen *nichts meinte*, bedeutet das, dass weder eine genauere Formulierung noch eine Erläuterung des Zusammenhangs, in dem sie ausgesprochen wurden, deren Mangel an Bestimmtheit beheben könnte.

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Conscious Subjects

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Some have thought that we mean two quite different things with the word “conscious”. Block (1997), for example, says that the concept of consciousness is a “mongrel” concept and that our common sense understanding of it is confused. Chalmers (1996) also distinguishes between a phenomenal concept and a psychological concept of consciousness. I will sometimes use the terminology introduced in (Block, 1997) and speak of “phenomenal consciousness” in order to distinguish clearly consciousness from the related notion of accessibility, but it should be noted from the start that my understanding of it differs from his. In my view, the expression “phenomenal consciousness” is redundant. There is just one concept of consciousness, the phenomenal concept. This is why I believe that the view of consciousness I wish to argue for is simpler than most other views. The point is not merely verbal. It may lead to a more plausible picture of the relationships between consciousness and accessibility, to the presentation of which I now turn.

1. Consciousness and accessibility

I begin with a brief discussion of the concept of accessibility. I then argue that accessibility is not sufficient for consciousness. I finally try to show that consciousness and accessibility are nevertheless intimately related and that accessibility is necessary for (state) consciousness.

Roughly, a state is accessible (hereafter: an A-state) iff it is available for use in voluntary control of thought and action¹. “Voluntary” is meant to exclude mere control by “guidance” (e.g. the “guesses” people suffering from “blindsight” are capable of). Block (1997) says that being available - a simple disposition - is not enough and requires that the state be “poised” for use, which means that a system can use it directly, without further processing (e.g. retrieval). I disagree. I think that the latter requirement is ad hoc and would lead to a unnecessarily complicated cognitive architecture. Further, I see no compelling reason to abandon the wider notion of accessibility, that of a simple availability for use in voluntary control. Block’s argument is that the wider notion is imprecise. But it can be made reasonably precise. One has just to acknowledge two obvious necessary conditions for accessibility.

First, accessibility is accessibility for a system. Take cognitive systems S_1 and S_2 . A cognitive state of S_1 which can only be used by S_2 to control S_1 ’s action and reasoning (think of a science-fiction example) does not count as an A-state of S_1 . S_1 is the system *in which*, as matter of fact, the state in question can occur but, as one may say, it is not the system to which that state *belongs*. It belongs to, and is an A-state of, S_2 . This point, I take it, is obvious and does not need much discussion. There is an implicit condition of ownership for something to count as an A-state.

Second, the set of A-states for a system is the set of those states which belong, in an intuitive sense, to the system *as a whole*. The intended contrast here is with states which belong only to sub-systems. I suppose these

latter states, and in fact most cognitive states, to be inaccessible by their very nature. These are deeply inaccessible states (DI-states). It should be noted that the concept of a DI-state has wider extension than the concept of a subpersonal state, which is restricted to a certain kind of system. The concepts of accessibility and of deep inaccessibility apply to any (complete) cognitive system, not only to those for which the distinction between personal and subpersonal levels is appropriate. (As I argue in section 2, the concept of a conscious subject, a “subject of experience”, is logically prior to the concept of a person.) If one believes the distinction between personal and subpersonal states applicable to any kind of cognitive system, and not only to persons, then a DI-state is a subpersonal state.

According to the wider (and I think, correct) notion of accessibility then, apart from DI-states, every cognitive state is accessible, even those that belong to a controlling system which is momentarily or definitively impaired. Yet, this is not much. It is likely that most cognitive states and processes are deeply modular and therefore inaccessible.

As I said at the beginning, I hold the simple view that consciousness is phenomenal consciousness. Accessibility is a functional concept but, as I hope to show, consciousness is not. A conscious state has necessarily a phenomenal or qualitative character. It is what we ordinary call an “experience”. Here is a short list of examples: to feel ashamed, to hear trumpet, to imagine your father’s face, to wonder whether p or to remember suddenly that q. There is “something it is like” (Nagel, 1974) to have any of these states, they are then experiences. Is consciousness a priori (conceptually) reducible to accessibility? I don’t think so. My argument, which I state here very briefly, has three premises.

1) If an A-state which is unconscious is conceivable, then it is not a priori that an A-state is a conscious state. I won’t justify premise (1) here. Let me just say that, in my view, this conditional is straightforward and should hold on any plausible theory of the a priori.

(2) An unconscious functional duplicate of a conscious being is conceivable.² This is the crucial premise. Such an unconscious duplicate *seems* conceivable. There is no prima facie contradiction in the idea of an unconscious functional duplicate of a conscious being, and we seem to be able to imagine it. The burden of proof is then on whom wants to argue it is not conceivable, who owes us a convincing explanation of why such a thing seems conceivable while it is not. And I don’t see how such an explanation, if given, could not be ad hoc.

(3) This duplicate has A-states. One may doubt whether a wholly unconscious system is really capable of “voluntary” control. I agree that such a system would not have full-blown personal states, if it is required of a personal state that the system to which it belongs be a person. But recall first that the concept of an A-state has wider extension than that of personal state, and second that “voluntary” is not supposed to be taken in its strongest (kantian) sense. It is just intended to exclude mere

¹ I take it to be obvious that the quantification is restricted to cognitive states. Only a few panpsychists would disagree. I just suppose, and won’t argue here, that they are wrong.

² The system in question is not a «zombie», which is an unconscious physical duplicate of a conscious being.

unintelligible guidance. I am quite sure that no such doubt about premise (3) would have occurred to anyone having the relevant concept in mind.

I conclude, therefore, that consciousness is not a priori reducible to accessibility.

If the argument is sound, accessibility is not sufficient for consciousness. I will now try to show it is necessary. That conscious states sometimes are accessible is something of a truism. It is trivial that we can't have access to inaccessible states. (The notion of access here is epistemic). Since we have at least partially access to at least some of our conscious states, some conscious states are accessible. Are some conscious states inaccessible? What about deeply inaccessible states? Can they be conscious? The answer is clearly no. How could a DI-state be an experience? But I have already argued for the claim that every other cognitive state is accessible. It follows, as a matter of principle, that if a state of a system is conscious, it must be accessible. Consciousness requires accessibility. All putative counterexamples, e.g. those given by Block, 1997, can be handled easily, using the notion of low level (that is, very limited) accessibility.

2. Subjects of experiences

So far, our discussion has been focused on what Rosenthal (1992) calls "state consciousness". But, it seems to me that our basic concept of consciousness is the concept of a conscious subject ("creature consciousness"), not that of a conscious state. When I say that this concept is basic, I speak of the folk concept, that which belongs to our folk theory. It is true that philosophers have been more concerned with state consciousness. Rosenthal himself, for example, seems to think that the concept of creature consciousness is of no deep philosophical significance, for he writes: "No special puzzle exists about what it is for a creature not to be conscious; so in this case the contrast between being conscious and not being conscious is reasonably transparent."³ He gives the following answer to the question of what it is for a creature to be conscious: "To be conscious, a person or other creature must be awake and sentient." (Rosenthal 1992). But this is plainly wrong, as witnessed by the fact that an unconscious duplicate of a conscious creature, of the sort I claimed is conceivable, *is* awake and sentient (at least if "awake" and "sentient" have their ordinary meaning and mean then, respectively, "not asleep" and "capable of perception").

Contrary to what Rosenthal and others believe, it seems to me that the concept of a conscious creature or, in other words, the concept of a *subject of experience*, is the more significant one. This is plausible once one accepts the picture of the relationships between consciousness and accessibility I have argued for in section 1. If (a) consciousness requires accessibility, (b) accessibility does not require consciousness and (c) deep inaccessible states apart, every state of a cognitive system is accessible, we know that, deep modular states apart, every state of a *conscious* cognitive system is conscious. The question of what it is for a state to be conscious is then "reasonably transparent". The only interesting question becomes that of understanding what it is for a creature to be conscious.

What is then a subject of experience? If I had an answer to this question, I would have solved the famous "hard problem" of consciousness, that of explaining why

consciousness exists in the first place (in a world that is entirely physical). I have no such explanation to provide, while I don't believe the problem is intractable.⁴ My aim in what follows is much more modest than that. I will try to reinforce the claim that the question of what it is for a creature to be conscious is philosophically significant by showing that the concept of a subject of experience is logically prior to that of a person.

According to P.F. Strawson, the folk concept of a person is "the concept of a type of entity such that *both* predicates ascribing states of consciousness *and* predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation &c. are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type." (Strawson 1959). But it is plain that this is too broad. We must add at least the condition that persons be self-conscious and capable of "self-evaluation" (see Frankfurt 1971 and, for a more complete list, Dennett's "conditions of personhood", 1978). I won't develop the point here. These brief remarks are enough for present purposes.

Think again of the imaginary case of an unconscious functional duplicate of a conscious system. I add a further condition. This time, the conscious system that has been duplicated is a person, in the sense just explained (e.g. a human being). One may then ask: Is the unconscious functional duplicate of that person also a person? It seems to me that the answer is no. This shows that consciousness is necessary for personhood, and then that the concept of a conscious subject is logically prior to that of a person.

In more explicit form, my argument is the following.

(1') An *unconscious* functional duplicate of a person is conceivable. Call this unconscious duplicate "DP" (for "Duplicated Person") and the unconscious duplicate of a conscious system "DS" (for "Duplicated Subject"). I have already argued for the conceivability of DS and I won't repeat the argument here. My point is that if DS is conceivable, then DP also is. This is plain because there is nothing more to the conceivability of the latter than to the conceivability of the former.

(2') DP is not a person. This is a conceptual claim with which I think most would agree. I cannot do better than appealing to shared intuitions here. I am a person, but if some scientist were to build a machine with functional states identical to mines and I knew the machine was unconscious, I wouldn't believe the machine is a person. I wouldn't treat it as such. I wouldn't see it as an alter ego. Then, I wouldn't care much about it, e.g. I wouldn't feel empathy for it if it were to get hurt. (2') seems true on the face of it. In my view, this count as strong evidence in its favour. Further, I don't see any clear evidence against it.

Since DP is not a person but is identical with a person, except that it lacks consciousness, it follows that consciousness is necessary for being a person: one would not be a person if one were not a subject of experience. And this is a conceptual truth. That's why I claim that the concept of a subject of experience is logically prior to that of a person. I then reverse the order of priority for which P.F. Strawson has famously argued.

³ I won't discuss Rosenthal's view of state consciousness here. It will be evident for the reader that the simple view I favour is not any kind of Higher Order Thought theory.

⁴ It is less intractable, I think, if one embraces the view that creature consciousness is what matters in the first place.

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Wittgenstein's Way of Working and the Nature of Experience

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I

The *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* is the most representative text of Wittgenstein's "earlier" philosophy. It is a *sui generis* book, mainly on account of its formal structure. The sources of this work in the *Nachlass* are Tss202-204 as final versions of the *Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung*. These typescripts derive from Ms104, the so-called *Prototractatus*, which was worked out from remarks registered in Mss101-103, namely the ones edited in *Notebooks 1914-1916*. Some of those reflections were originally formulated in Ts201 and in Ms301.

From among the mentioned items the diaries hold a position of high standing. In fact, they set up as the starting place for Wittgensteinian *style* of investigation. To begin with, it is remarkable, in these manuscripts, the division between a "philosophical" part and a "private" one, the former using the recto pages in normal script and the latter the verso pages in code. It must be noted that in post-1929 writings we often find coded remarks, not only in notebooks but also in "volumes" (*Bände*), and now and then regarding "philosophical" statements. Moreover, reading throughout the texts, that is in standard and "secret" script, we can follow a parallel line of thought. Therefore, the status of Wittgenstein's cipher is problematic, much more than it seems to be. However, the most important issue in the First World War diaries concerns the quest for an appropriate *expressiveness* about the nature of proposition. What is at stake in Wittgenstein's approach to this *foundational* question is the insight that we are only able to say something *from inside*. As a matter of fact, any characterization of natural language implies the use of that *system*, *i.e.* it presupposes an *integral calculus*. Thus, the conditions of possibility *show* themselves, as Wittgenstein argues, so that whatever *description* of experience we may establish is necessarily incomplete. But this partial character of what we can grasp of reality cannot present itself as a *theory*, precisely as something *determined*; it must be *mirrored*, consequently not referred to in *language*. The following entries on the 29th of May, 1915, are elucidative:

But is *language*: the *only* language?

Why should there not be a mode of expression through which I can talk *about* language in such a way that it can appear to me in co-ordination with something else?

Suppose that music were such a mode of expression: then it is at any rate characteristic of *science* that *no* musical themes can occur in it.

I myself only write *sentences* [Sätze] down here. And why? (Ms102, 111r-112r: NB, 52e)

The *Tractatus* corresponds, exactly, to a *determination* of that perspective. By means of an unusual framework, Wittgenstein traces the limits of a *logical* systematization, displaying the sphere of what is left out. This field includes all *existential* categories that take part in any event, shaping it. For that reason, science, while devoted to factual investigations, does not shed light on the crucial, interpreted as nonsensical: what cannot be put into words, what *makes itself manifest*, what is mystical (cf. TLP, 6.522). Wittgenstein's aim is to circumscribe the task of philosophy, setting up "what can be said, *i.e.* the propo-

sitions of natural science, *i.e.* something that has nothing to do with philosophy" (TLP, 6.53). He writes afterwards:

My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless [*unsinnig*], when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)

He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly. (TLP, 6.54)

And he concludes:

Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. (TLP, 7; cf. also the "Preface")

How to avoid *nonsense* philosophizing? Obviously Wittgenstein spoke too much, but his metaphysics proves *indirectly* the insufficiency of any *theory of meaning*. In other words: the "treatise" explodes. This attempt to be so *clear as possible* in relation to the book *thesis* represents Wittgenstein's ethical view, which is outlined in the famous letter to von Ficker, probably from end of October / beginning of November 1919, submitting the text to *Der Brenner*:

[...] the point of the book is ethical. I once wanted to give a few words in the foreword which now actually are not in it, which, however, I'll write to you now because they might be a key for you: I wanted to write that my work consists of two parts: of the one which is here, and of everything which I have *not* written. And precisely this second part is the important one. For the Ethical is delimited from within, as it were, by my book; and I'm convinced that, *strictly* speaking, it can ONLY be delimited in this way. In brief, I think: All of that which *many* are *babbling* today, I have defined in my book by remaining silent about it. [...] For the time being, I'd recommend that you read the *foreword* and the *conclusion* since these express the point most directly.— [...] (LLF, 94-95)

II

After his return to Cambridge in January 1929 Wittgenstein began to write on Ms105, the first of a series of "volumes". From Mss105-107 and part of Ms108 he produced a synopsis, Ts208, which gave rise to Ts209, a revised version composed of a collection of "cuttings" (*Zettel*), published in *Philosophical Remarks*. Wittgenstein presented one of these typescripts (on the problem whether it was Ts208 or Ts209 see Pichler 1994, 53-59) to the Council of Trinity College, applying for a research fellowship in the spring of 1930. In an undated letter to Moore (March or April 1930) he describes the dictation of the synopsis as "the most loathsome work", feeling himself "wretched doing it" (CL, 241). Wittgenstein adopted this practice notwithstanding (and cf. Ms109, 51: 27.8.1930). He summarizes the remainder of Ms108 in Ts210, dictating Ts211 from Mss109-113 and the first half of Ms114. Some of the material contained in Mss110-113 had been drafted in pocket notebooks, Mss153-155. The second cutting-collection, Ts212, derives from Ts208 and Tss210-211: it is the basis for Ts213, the so-called "Big Typescript" (1933).

Wittgenstein was planning out a book, from at least the end of 1930. From the 6th of November on, he made several sketches for a foreword (cf. Ms109, 204ff). The “Foreword” to Rhees’ edition of Ts209 is an arrangement of those drafts. They constitute the genesis of a new book concept, an *extension* to the *Tractarian* achievement. A preparatory remark reads as follows:

The danger in a long foreword is that the spirit of a book has to be evident in the book itself & cannot be described. [...] (Ms109, 208: CV, 10e)

And on December 13th Wittgenstein says:

If I do not quite know how to begin a book that is because something is still unclear. For I should like to begin with the original data of philosophy, written & spoken sentences, with books as it were.

And here we encounter the difficulty of “Everything is in flux”. And perhaps that is the very point at which to begin. (Ms110, 10: CV, 11e)

If we take into consideration previous comments on the *fluxional givenness*, from December 1929 (cf. Ms107, 222ff, Ms108, 1ff), the similarities with the *Tractatus* arise. But the development of Wittgenstein’s thought requires another *medium*, susceptible to *project* our form of access in a quasi-organic way. An accurate *description* passes to fall upon the operative factors of any situation, identifying, *partially*, that background (cf. Ms110, 243: 30.6.1931). Once more, the essential point is to *express* the impossibility of a whole comprehension. This does not mean a sceptical position (then, a negative dogmatism), but a claim of finitude. Each empirical plan is a *horizontal* unit, merely allowing *intersections* in the *totalitarian* effect. The *analysability* of our point of view is *aphaeretic*, in so far as we need to *isolate* aspects, suspending (*in abstracto*) all the rest. Accordingly, Wittgenstein defends a *synoptic* model, fitting the (*in*)*determinable* nature of experience.

The “Big Typescript” plays a prominent role in that undertaking. Being divided into 19 “chapters” and 140 “sections”, each of them bearing titles, it cannot be regarded yet as a conventional book. Besides the fact that it does not contain neither introduction nor conclusion, the relation between the subjects is discontinuous. Although Wittgenstein’s “Table of Contents” indicates a thematic sequence, the *fragmentary* outcome is notorious. Nevertheless, it is a specific *fragmentation*; it works as a *synopsis*.

In the “chapter” on “Philosophy” Wittgenstein states that the “method of philosophy” is “the synoptic presentation” (*die übersichtliche Darstellung*) (Ts213, 414 [P, 9]) (on this concept see Pichler 2004, 175-198). Ambrose’s opening notes of the “Yellow Book” (Ts311: 1933-34) run as follows:

There is a truth in Schopenhauer’s view that philosophy is an organism, and that a book on philosophy, with a beginning and end, is a sort of contradiction. One difficulty with philosophy is that we lack a synoptic view. [...] (YB, 43)

The goal of the “Big Typescript” is to afford *openness*, in such a manner that every *fragment* can blend into a whole, enabling to “present synoptically” (*übersichtlich darstellen*) a maximum of grammatical connections. (Cf. Ms108, 31: 23.12.1929; Ms110, 257: 2.7.1931; cf. also e.g. Ts209, 1 [PR, 52]; Ts213, 417 [P, 11]; as well as Tss227ab, 88, §122 [PI, §122], where the first sentence is to be found in Ms142, 107, §115.) Hence, the idea of philosophy, inclusively, is presented in this way. Roughly speaking,

what Wittgenstein contends against is nothing but a philosophical methodology *theoretically* based.

Nonetheless, the “Big Typescript” did not answer Wittgenstein’s purposes entirely. He revised extensively its first part (*i.e.* the primary source for Part I of the *Philosophical Grammar*) in the typescript itself, correcting, reordering, crossing out and inserting text, using both the recto and the verso pages. This reworking proceeded in the second half of Ms114 and in the first half of Ms115, via Mss156a-b and Mss145-147, and subsequently in Ms140. In a controversial edition, which leaves out, among others, the chapters on “Philosophy” and “Phenomenology”, so unrevised as all Part II of the *Grammar*, Rhees tried to follow Wittgenstein’s puzzling editorial instructions.

In the course of 1934, while dictating the “Blue Book” (Ts309: 1933-34), Wittgenstein apparently gave up from such a revision. The “Brown Book” (Ts310: 1934-35), along with Mss148-152 and the first part of Ms157a, covering the years 1934-36, will bring a turning point. Wittgenstein’s unsuccessful attempt to revise in German the “Brown Book” in the second half of Ms115 (cf. Ms115, 292), as well as in Ms141, leads to a new reworking in Ms142 (November-December 1936): the manuscript source of the so-called “prewar version” (first half) of the *Philosophical Investigations* (corresponding to §§1-188). The typescript of that first half, Ts220, was presumably dictated in 1937.

Even retrieving remarks of the early “volumes”, Wittgenstein surpasses in Ms142/Ts220 the *static integrality* of Ts213, which results from its *division*, carrying through a *serial* organization. This (finite) *seriation* permits, on the one hand, to conceive a *multiplicity* of phenomena in flux and, on the other hand, to realize the *possibility* of *infinite deconstruction*. Defined as “a ‘dynamical’ theory of the proposition, etc.”, in spite of this, “it does not appear like a theory” but as an *evidence*, the “form of presentation” (*Form der Darstellung*) Wittgenstein has “found” shall be understood according to his notion of “idea” or “ideal”: a *prototypification* of experience. (Ms142, 99, §105; Ts220, 74, §93: Ts226, 71-72, §113; and cf. e.g. Ts233b, 16-17, §109 [from Ts239, 74] [Z, §444]; cf. in addition Ms142, 77-91; Ms157a, especially, 55v-57v.)

In Wittgenstein’s “Preface” to the “prewar version” of the *Investigations*, dated “August 1938”, linking up Ts220 with Ts221 (whose reworked cuttings, Tss222-224, have been published in Part I of the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*), the whole first half is designated as a “fragment”. And Wittgenstein stresses that “this fragment” makes clear his “method”. (Ts225, 2; cf. drafts in Ms117, 110-126, Ms159, 34r-41r; cf. also the very similar “Preface” to Tss227ab, 1-4: PI, vii-viii; and see the interpretation of Nedo, 1998, xv-xviii.) The second half was not included in further versions of the *Investigations*, whereas the first half is on its basis. Wittgenstein’s book project is a “fragment”, indeed: of his view that philosophy is a “fragment” of experience.¹

¹ In working on this paper I profited from a research stay at The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen, supported by the European Commission (5th Framework Programme, *Improving the Human Research Potential and the Socio-economic Base: Access to Research Infrastructures*).

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Meaning and Practice

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1.

If there is anything uncontroversial about the later Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, it is his view that meaning depends on linguistic practices. Many – though by no means all – commentators also agreed that he thought these practices must be not just individual but somehow social. Most – indeed, so far as I know, all – of these commentators further agree that he thought these practices must actually be communitarian, so that having a language essentially depends on meaning by one's words what members of one's community mean by them. I believe that a proper understanding of what motivates Wittgenstein's claim that meaning depends on linguistic practices does entail that these practices must be social. But I also want to suggest, more controversially, that this understanding entails that the relevant practices do not have to be communitarian but rather that they can be merely interpersonal, so that having a language essentially depends only on having had (many of) one's words, whatever one means by them, understood by others.

2.

Why does meaning depend on linguistic practices?

If it did not, Wittgenstein argues, there would be no distinction between courses of action that accord with a rule and courses of action that conflict with it (1958, #201); there would be no distinction between correct and incorrect applications of linguistic expressions. In what sense, however, must this distinction hold for there to be meaningful expressions at all? At least in this sense: there must be a distinction between saying something true and something false, between obeying an order and disobeying it, etc. In other words, the applications of linguistic expressions must be governed by standards of correctness; and these standards, like any standards, must be objective in the sense that their being fulfilled or not is not dependent simply on language users' opinion of the matter. Now it is true that we could also distinguish between correct and incorrect use of expressions by saying that correct use is use that is in accord with communal or expert use and that incorrect use is use that deviates from communal or expert use. But it is an open question whether speaking correctly in this sense is also essential to meaning, whether one could not succeed in saying anything true, or anything false, for that matter, unless one spoke like others. Indeed whether this is the case is precisely the issue that divides the communitarian camp from the interpersonal one. And presumably, if Wittgenstein did think that speaking correctly in this sense is also essential to meaning, it would be as the conclusion of an argument and not as an assumption made at the start of his inquiry into what kind of practices can deliver objective linguistic standards.

Wittgenstein's claim that objective linguistic standards and hence meaning could only be based on linguistic practices is meant to replace the claim that interpretations determine meaning, a claim which, he argues, all traditional theories of meaning are committed to. This stems from their contention that linguistic standards are provided by items that stand in complete independence of people's use of words. In the sections on rule-following, Witt-

genstein focuses on theories that postulate internal items as determinants of meaning, items such as mental pictures coming before the mind and abstract entities grasped by the mind of language users (1958, ##139-55). To mean something by a word is somehow to associate it with an item of one or the other kind. The problem, however, is that none of those items wears its meaning on its sleeves, as it were, but each of them, taken on its own, could be an instance of a variety of things. And so each could be an instance of one kind rather than another, and provide the standard for the applications of the word it is connected with, only if it were interpreted in some way or other. But this entails that it is always possible to interpret one's words in such a way that, no matter how one applies them, the application will be correct, or incorrect, as the case may be. Moreover, settling on an interpretation would be of no help, for the interpretation itself would need to be given meaning, presumably by being once again associated with some item that is on the face of it neutral.

As I said, in the sections on rule-following, Wittgenstein focuses on internal items. But the same point can be made – indeed, Wittgenstein himself makes it – about external items, that is, physical objects and events in one's environment. As Wittgenstein makes clear in his discussion of ostensive definition, external items too need to be seen under one aspect or another before they can serve as standards for the application of the words used to refer to them.

This, I take it, is one of the main lessons of Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations: whatever exactly it is that provides linguistic standards, nothing can do it in complete independence of people's use of words. Something can serve as a standard, as a determinant of meaning, only if it is used as such. This is actually a lesson well learnt by commentators on Wittgenstein. Thus David Pears writes: "The meanings of our words are not guaranteed by any independent pattern already existing in the world and waiting for language to be attached to it." (1988, 363) And Barry Stroud: Nothing could play the role of "guiding or stabilizing" words' applications "unless it meant something to the people whose actions are to be 'stabilized' or 'underpinned' by it." (2000, 231)

3.

So far we have seen why Wittgenstein maintains that meaning depends on linguistic practices. The next question is: on what kind of practices does it depend?

Let me start by noting that Wittgenstein seems to think that for there to be a distinction between correct and incorrect applications of one's words, one must also be aware of the distinction. This is suggested by his remarks in section 258 of the private language argument when he says that the would-be private speaker could not succeed in endowing the sign for her sensation with meaning because she has "no criterion of correctness", that is, no way to distinguish between what are the correct applications of her sign and what seem to her to be the correct applications. It seems to me that the suggestion here is not that she has no criterion because she has failed to establish a standard of correctness, in trying to define her sign ostensively. Rather, the suggestion seems to be that she has failed to establish such a standard because she herself cannot, in this context,

make the distinction between correct and incorrect applications. There is no standard because she is not in a position to regard anything as a standard.

Here is another passage that suggests the same conclusion. In *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, Wittgenstein argues that we would have no reason to believe that two creatures were using signs meaningfully unless we could observe, besides the regular production of signs by the creatures, actual interaction between them, e.g., “the phenomenon of a kind of instruction, of showing how and of imitation, of lucky and misfiring attempts, of reward and punishment and the like” (p. 345). What difference does the kind of interaction Wittgenstein has in mind, viz., that of a teacher instructing her pupil how to continue a series of signs, make? Surely this one: through the interaction the student is taught the distinction between doing the right thing and thinking that she is doing the right thing, and so the distinction between correct and incorrect applications of her signs. Thus Wittgenstein seems to think that we cannot say of someone that she has a language simply because we can describe her regular behaviour as rule-governed; we also need some reason to believe that the creature recognizes her rule-following behaviour as such. But why is this needed?

After all, it is easy to imagine a solitary person who regularly produces sounds or marks in response to what appear to be salient aspects of her environment. And it is easy to describe these responses as converging on particular aspects or, to put it in Wittgenstein’s terminology, as agreeing with each other, and so as being of the same kind. This may lead us to conclude that the particular aspects converged or agreed upon do provide the standards of application for the solitary person’s signs since they certainly seem to be used as such. But they might well not be so recognized by the solitary person herself.

I think, though, that these remarks belie a failure to appreciate the significance of the claim that standards are partly constituted by people’s activities, that they are the product of people’s use of words and the various kinds of items these words refer to, that is, in the first instance, objects and events in their environment. Neither side can produce standards on its own – on its own, each side is neutral among the many standards to which it may contribute. Neither people’s environment nor their words’ applications are by themselves such that these applications must latch on to one rather than another aspect of their environment. In themselves, any two or more applications may be seen as different in kind or as of the same kind in more than one respect. Similarly for any two or more items in people’s environment. It is for language users somehow to determine which applications are of the same kind, and in which respects, which is to say that it is for language users somehow to determine what are the standards that govern the applications of their words. But, if so, someone’s applications, be they solitary or social, cannot merely happen to be in agreement, linguistic standards cannot be provided by items that merely happen to be used as such. Rather, agreed upon applications must be recognized as being agreed upon, as of the same kind, in order to be of one kind or another. Thus linguistic standards must be recognized as such in order to serve as standards, which is to say that, in order to have a language, one must have a sufficiently robust concept of objectivity. For to recognize something as a standard is to recognize it as something conformity to which is independent of whether one thinks one has succeeded or not in conforming.

It is for this reason that the practices that establish linguistic standards must be social. For it is hard to see how

a solitary person could be in a position to have the requisite concept of objectivity. No matter how complex and regular we may find the connections between her productions of signs and her environment and activities in it, the fact is that whatever she counts as the same kind of objects will be, for her, the same kind, and thus whatever applications she deems to be correct will be, for her, the correct ones. The solitary person has no need to draw the line between correct and incorrect applications one way rather than another and so to settle for some rather than other linguistic standards. She “communicates” with herself no matter what she says at any given time. There is no point at which, suddenly, she has to settle on one rather than another answer to the question, “what kind?”, and so no point at which she could be in a position to distinguish between what is the same and what seems to her to be the same.

On the other hand, if a person is socially situated, then she is situated in a context that makes it possible for her to make the relevant distinction and thus for items in her environment to serve as standards governing the applications of her signs. This is so not just because she is situated in a context in which there already are linguistic practices and hence standards to which she can be introduced. Rather, it is the interaction with other people that makes it possible for her to distinguish between what seems to her the same kind of applications and what is in fact the same kind. And thus it is the interaction with other people which makes it possible for there to be linguistic standards in the first place. Interpersonal interaction puts people in a position to make the distinction because it can confront each of them with perspectives different from their own, thereby allowing them to realize that matters may be different from what they seem to be. Interpersonal communication could not succeed if it were simply up to any given language user to settle on the answer to the question, “what kind?”. Thus interpersonal communication makes it possible for language users to regard aspects of the world around them as providing objective linguistic standards.

There is, however, no reason here to believe that the social practices one must be involved in in order to have a language must be shared with others, that the standards governing the applications of an individual’s words must be those of her community. Of course, given the usual way in which someone acquires a first language, viz., through training by members of her linguistic community, what she means by her words will often be similar to what her teachers mean by them. But nothing we have seen indicates that this has to be so. The crucial part of the training lies in the acquisition of the ability objectively to distinguish between correct and incorrect applications of words, not in the learning of how the distinction is to be drawn with regard to the applications of any particular word.

If the foregoing is right, then there is good reason to believe that the linguistic practices that meaning depends on do not have to be communitarian, but that they only have to be interpersonal.

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Deflating Meinongianism

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Alexius Meinong (Meinong 1904) believed that if mental acts were characteristically intentional, then some of them would be directed towards unrels. Those who agreed with Meinong on intentionality but disagreed with him on ontology, on the other hand, typically believed that all cases apparently involving non-beings could be so paraphrased that no commitment to unrels was really involved. Terence Parsons, however, complained that “the extent to which faith in the existence of an appropriate paraphrase outruns the believer’s ability to give such a paraphrase is often quite striking.” (Parsons 1980, 36) My intent in this paper is to adapt and apply one of Putnam’s famous model-theoretic arguments (Putnam 1977, 1980, 1981, 1989) to show that such a “faith in the existence of appropriate paraphrase” is always justified. Specifically, I will do two things in what follows. First, I will show that, under the assumption that there are at least denumerably many existent objects, it is very easy to prove that, for any ideal Meinongian theory, there are infinitely many unintended deflationist interpretations of it whose domains contain only existent objects. Second, I will consider several moves possible for Meinongians to make the presumed distinction between the intended interpretation and the unintended ones, and I will argue that none of them are very plausible.

The ideal Meinongian theories that I will inveigh will be formalized theories, and, as a first approximation, one might think of the one given in Parsons’s *Nonexistent Objects* (Parsons 1980) or that in Edward Zalta’s *Abstract Objects* (Zalta 1983). Meinongians typically believe that there are mind-independent unreal objects as well as real ones and that truth consists in a determinate correspondence or reference relation between our talks or thoughts on the one hand and facts involving these objects on the other. The model-theoretic argument that I shall appeal to exploits the so-called “Upper Lowenheim-Skolem theorem” according to which a first-order theory (formulated in a countable language) has a model of any arbitrary infinite cardinality if it has an infinite model. Putnam used this theorem to show the unintelligibility of the metaphysical realism’s thesis that even an ideal theory can be false, but I shall apply it for a different purpose.

I shall assume that the reality consists of infinitely many objects, all of which are real, and I shall count every sentence of English as a real object if this assumption bothers you. Meinongians want to say that there are *more* objects than I just assumed. Call the reality that I assumed “the actualist reality” or “AR”, and call the reality that Meinongians assumed “the Meinongian reality”. Let T be any ideal Meinongian theory, formulated in a formalized first-order or second-order language L . Being ideal, T satisfies all the operational and theoretical constraints that we would like to impose upon a theory; especially, T is consistent. So, T has an infinite model (and has infinite models only) according to some familiar model-theoretical results. But then, by Upward Lowenheim-Skolem theorem, T has a model of any arbitrary infinite cardinality¹. Now, pick an infinite model $M = \langle D, \nu \rangle$ of T whose domain has the

same cardinality as *the actualist reality*. Choose any 1-1 onto mapping f from D to *the actualist reality* (there are infinitely many such mappings), and use this mapping f to define a new value assignment ν' which assigns every n -place predicate of L a set of n -tuples in *the actualist reality* in the following way: $\nu'(R^n) = \{ \langle f(d_1), \dots, f(d_n) \rangle \mid \langle d_1, \dots, d_n \rangle \in \nu(R^n) \}$ for every predicate $R^n \in L$. The result is a “correspondence” relation between predicates of L and sets of pieces of *the actualist reality* such that T comes out true in *the actualist reality*, since the new model $M' = \langle AR, \nu' \rangle$ is isomorphic to $M = \langle D, \nu \rangle$. The upshot is: for any ideal Meinongian theory, there are infinitely many deflationist interpretations of it whose domains contain only existent objects.

To be sure, Meinongians will say that *the actualist reality* AR is *not* the intended domain of their theory, and any correspondence between predicates of L and the furniture of *the actualist reality* is *not* the intended reference relation either. They will say that it is *the Meinongian reality* that is the intended domain and it is *some* (there are infinitely many such correspondence relations after all) correspondence relation defined in *the Meinongian reality* that is the intended reference relation. The problem for Meinongians, however, is to specify exactly what *that* is which makes *the actualist reality* and all correspondence relations defined in it unintended while *the Meinongian reality* and some correspondence relation defined in it intended. We have seen that operational and theoretical constraints of a theory cannot draw the distinction, and, needless to say, intention or what happen in our brains are not powerful enough to make the wanted distinction either, due to Putnam’s famous twin-earth argument. So Meinongians must come up with *something else* that singles out the right domain and the right correspondence, but the question is what exactly this something else is?

When such questions are addressed to metaphysical realists, we often get a quick reply (Brueckner 1984, Devitt and Sterelny 1999, Devitt 1983 and Hale and Wright 1997): it is the causal link between our words and the *real* reality that distinguishes. This reply may or may not provide just “more theory” to metaphysical realism, and Putnam may or may not have succeeded in rejecting it. But certainly such a reply is not available to Meinongians. Meinongians will adamantly deny that we can ever get into any causal touch with any non-existent object². And, when they deny this, they deny it with good reasons: in order for things to get into causal touch with us, they must have spatial-temporal locations – but this implies that they are all existents rather than unrels. So, if there has to be something that singles out the right domain and the right reference relation for Meinongianism, it must be something other than the causal link.

A Meinongian may appeal to the notion of explanation to characterize the intended interpretation. Thus, it might be claimed, it is *the Meinongian reality* and some reference relation defined in it that “explain” the truth-values of our ordinary fiction talks. However, if by “an explanation” we

¹ It cannot be objected that an ideal Meinongian theory is likely to be, just like Parsons’s and Zalta’s theory actually are, formulated in a second-order language and Lowenheim-Skolem theorem is not provable in such a logic. A theory formulated in a second-order language is still subject to of Henkin-style interpretations, and, when so interpreted, Lowenheim-Skolem theorem remains true.

² A typical Meinongian would say that our relations with non-existing objects are always intentional while our relations with existing ones are normally physical or causal. He would further say that our being able to be intentionally connected with non-existing objects is what makes our mental activities so special; it is the characterizing property of our mental activities.

mean the deduction of the “right”, i.e., intuited, truth-value for each sentence of our language from the given semantics, then *the actualist reality* and any reference relation defined in it also “explain” whatever Meinongians claim to be able to explain. And if we impose further pragmatic constraints, such as plausibility, preservation of past doctrine and/or simplicity, as additional requirements of a good explanation, then it is still arguable that *actualist interpretations* provide more plausible and ontologically simpler explanations than their Meinongian competitor.

There is, perhaps, another candidate for consideration. Lewis (Lewis 1983, 1984) supposes that, among all classes of things, there are “elite” ones. These “elite” classes “carve the world at its natural joints”, and their boundaries are established by objective sameness and difference in nature. Only interpretations that respect the objective joints in nature are “eligible interpretations” according to Lewis, and what makes an interpretation unintended is that it does not respect this “objective inegalitarianism of classifications”. Now, according to this idea, the aforementioned actualist interpretation *M* presumably will not carve *the actualist reality* “at the right joints”, in contrast with what the intended Meinongian interpretation does to *the Meinongian reality*, so it seems that Meinongians can appeal to an interpretation’s conformance to this natural, inegalitarian classifications to draw the desired distinction. This hope, however, cannot last long.

One reason why Meinongians should not take this way out is this. Meinongians are supposed to be generous in ontology, and, indeed, most of them are willing to posit an object for every class of properties. Positing an elite minority among all classes of things would, then, be gratuitous for their theory of properties; it would be inegalitarian to their ontology of properties. It is for this reason that most Meinongians, such as Parsons (Parson 1980) and Butchvarov (Butchvarov 1979), are very generous to both properties and objects. For most Meinongians, the following two principles

(P): Corresponding to every class of things, there is a property shared by, and only shared by, these things; and

(O): Corresponding to every class of properties, there is an object having, and only having, these properties.

look like a tempting (though inconsistent) dual (Fine 1982), and any revision of them is acceptable only with sound philosophical reasons.

Meinongians cannot appeal to “elite classes” or “natural joints” to solve the present problem for two more reasons. First, naturalness is a matter of degree, and so is an interpretation’s conformance to the natural classifications, as Lewis agreed. But since there are infinitely many unintended deflationist interpretations of Meinongian theory, some of them will likely carve *the actualist reality* as naturally as the intended Meinongian interpretation does to *the Meinongian reality*. Second, the condition of conforming to the natural classifications is too weak to single out a *unique* reference relation. We can easily prove that, if a model *M* assigns two predicates of *L* two (not necessarily disjoint) classes of the same cardinality, then the model *M'* formed by switching the assignment made by *M* to the two predicates with necessary adjustment will be such a model that (1) for every sentence of *L*, *M* and *M'* assigns the same truth value to it; and (2) *M'* carves the domain “at exactly the same joints” as *M* does³. So, if *M* is the intended model of

Meinongianism, then, *if it assigns two predicates of L equi-numbered classes*, then there is at least one *unintended eligible* model for Meinongianism. And, it seems that the condition expressed by the *italic* clause here is very easy to be satisfied: Meinongians would certainly interpret, say, both “being positive square root of 9” and “being positive square root of 4” as true only of one (though different) number. So, here again, a similar problem as our old one recurs for Meinongians⁴: what exactly is *that* that picks out a certain interpretation as intended while others unintended?

With all these considerations, I conclude that there are always infinitely many possible deflationist re-interpretations of an idealized Meinongian theory, and therefore a faith in the existence of appropriate paraphrase is justified.

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and D_G are equi-numbered. Let f be a 1-1 onto function from D to D such that (i) $f(d)$ is some member of D_G if $d \in D_F$; (ii) $f(d)$ is some member of D_F if $d \in D_G$; and (iii) $f(d) = d$ otherwise. Let M' be the model with the same domain as M , and let $v'(R^n) = \{ \langle f(d_1), \dots, f(d_n) \rangle \mid \langle d_1, \dots, d_n \rangle \in v(R^n) \}$ for every predicate $R^n \in L$. Then M and M' are isomorphic and assign the same truth value to every wff of L . Further, M and M' carve the domain at exactly the same joints.

⁴ This problem is not exactly the same one as the one we met before, however. The previous one is to find out a reference fixer which will classify actualist interpretations as unintended, while the present one is to pick out a unique Meinongian interpretation among many as *the* intended one.

³ Let $M = \langle D, v \rangle$ be a model, and let “ F^n ” and “ G^n ” be two predicates of L whose extensions $v(F^n)$ and $v(G^n)$ assigned by M are, separately, D_F and D_G , where D_F

Analytic Philosophy and Philosophical Methodology: Two Views on the Relation Between Science and Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition

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It is said that analytic philosophy was born with 'the linguistic turn' (Rorty 1967; Dummett 1993). This is a characterization according to which the aim and method of philosophy is the analysis of language. The history of the movement is often written on this model. While this conception is very useful, it may well be an invention of later historians of philosophy. Or perhaps it is a conception that developed over time and was projected back to identify the movement. There is no doubt that the early analytic philosophers (and here I mean Russell and certainly the logical positivists after him) saw themselves as introducing a new, even radically new, method for philosophy. And while they often characterized this method by reference to linguistic analysis, they also often characterized it as the application of 'scientific method' in philosophy (Russell 1929, Carnap 1996, Reichenbach 1951).

Philosophy has, since its inception, been tightly bound up with science. The philosophers of every age were developing philosophical theories and systems that fit with the scientific conceptions of their time. Descartes' metaphysics and theory of knowledge was a manifestation of his work in developing a mechanistic science. Kant's critical system was in large measure an attempt to construct a philosophy that both incorporated and grounded the Newtonian picture of the world. So why did the early analytic philosophers think of themselves as finally bringing a scientific approach to philosophy?

A part of the answer may lie in the historical context. Early analytic philosophers often conceived of their revolution of scientific philosophy in contrast with (and reaction against) other prominent trends in philosophy, especially the phenomenological tradition. Nietzsche often leveled criticisms against the 'scientism' of modern thought, insisting that genuine progress in philosophy comes from transcending the boundaries of logic and scientific categorizing. Heidegger too argued that genuine (i.e. philosophical) thinking was something quite different than scientific inquiry. The products of such philosophical work, performed in presumed isolation from any knowledge of the world acquired from the empirical science, became the object of criticism (even ridicule) for the early analysts. Their conception of their own method as scientific may have been partly due to the desire to contrast it with the view that science and philosophy are utterly independent.

But not all of the philosophers criticized by the analysts adopted a view like those mentioned. Spencer and Bergson are mentioned by Russell as examples of speculative philosophers who sought to incorporate the results of the sciences, at least as starting points for their systems. For these philosophers science and philosophy are related. But philosophy can transcend the limits of scientific inquiry. Philosophy is a method for reaching higher level generalizations, beyond those arrived at through purely empirical methods. Russell's criticism of the speculative philosophers mentioned above recognizes that they, unlike Nietzsche and Heidegger, pursue philosophy in a way connects it to science. "But there are two different ways" he writes, "in which a philosophy may seek to base itself upon science" (Russell 1929). The speculative philo-

sophy criticized aims at extending generalization beyond those given as the results of science. And that's the problem. "It is not results, but methods that can be transferred with profit from the sphere of the special sciences to the sphere of philosophy" (Russell 1929) Here is the distinctive contribution of analytic philosophy that warrants the label "scientific philosophy". It is a reconceptualization of the methods of philosophy on the model of the methods of science that marks this movement.

Russell distinction between philosophy related to scientific *results* versus philosophy related to scientific *method* is pretty clear in abstract presentation. In practice the distinction is harder to keep clear. In part this derives from the fact that the abstract point begs the question of what aspects of scientific method are employed in philosophy. Russell himself did provide some answers: philosophy amounts to logical analysis. More specifically philosophy can contribute to our understanding of some problem through an analysis and enumeration of the logical forms of statements made about the subject (Russell 1929). This conception of philosophical method was adopted in large part by some of the logical positivists. Carnap in particular argued that philosophy is precisely the analysis of the logical syntax of scientific language (Carnap 1996). Philosophy becomes the meta-theory of scientific language. Here, of course, we see the merging of the two ways of characterizing the distinctive nature of analytic philosophy – that emphasizing the analysis of language and that emphasizing scientific methods.

But the philosophy as meta-theory is not the only conception of the relation between scientific and philosophical method found in the analytic tradition. And this point also contributes to the explanation of how Russell's seemingly clear distinction between the two forms of scientific philosophy becomes blurry in practice. I will call this second conception the philosophy as hyper-theory view. By 'hyper-theory' I mean that philosophy actually contributes to the articulation of substantive scientific knowledge, albeit at an abstract and very general level far removed from the empirical observations that serve as the basis of the science. So rather than producing a theory of science (or better, a theory of the language of science) philosophy is conceived as part of the same enterprise. Quine clearly articulates this view in his image of the science philosophy continuum and in the development of his naturalized epistemology. But elements of this view can be seen in earlier phases of the development of analytic philosophy.

The distinction between the two views (meta-theory and hyper-theory) can be subtle. And I don't mean to argue that the two views are completely at odds with one another on how philosophy gets done. In both cases there is an emphasis logical analysis. But there is a significant difference between the two views with regard to how philosophy relates to science.

I am inclined to say that some seed of the philosophy as hyper-theory view can be seen in the work of Alfred North Whitehead. This may not be an entirely appropriate ob-

ervation, since Whitehead, despite his participation in the development and writing of the *Principia Mathematica*, is rarely counted among the ranks of analytic philosophers. His exclusion is no doubt warranted on the grounds that his later, explicitly philosophical work is decidedly speculative. He does, of course, have an articulated view of the relation between science and philosophy. Whitehead's philosophy is synthetic rather than analytic. Victor Lowe writes, "He brings together the characteristic ideas of diverse fields and in an imaginative construction organizes them into a unity on a different level with its own concepts; and then deduces "applications," namely, a considerable body of known propositions, and some new propositions, so as to show that this unity is not a trivial correlation, but a promising unification" (Lowe 1951). The value of the effort lies in the second stage, I suppose. Unity for its own sake is not the goal. Fruitful unity, on the other hand, can lead to progress in the fields in question.

Despite the 'synthetic' nature of the enterprise described, Whitehead's approach to philosophy does have some marks of logical analysis. After all, Whitehead, like Russell, cut his philosophical teeth on problems of mathematical logic. In particular we can see this in Whitehead's philosophy of science. Here he aims at demonstrating that the sciences, being simply the most systematic application of the 'algebraic method,' abstract from the flux experience by identifying relations and patterns in that flux (Whitehead 1951). Here I use the term 'algebraic method' in the broadest sense that includes the full (and even future) development of formal logic. For Whitehead it simply refers to "the intellectual analysis of pattern" (Whitehead 1951). Philosophy itself engages in a different but complimentary activity for Whitehead. Where science proceeds by systematic abstraction from experience to produce generalizations about nature, "The task of philosophy is to reverse this process and thus to exhibit the fusion of analysis with actuality" (Whitehead 1951). This is a distinct activity, but one that nevertheless grounds the other and clarifies its value. Philosophy seeks to lay bare the relation of scientific abstractions to the flux of experience, not in the sense of formulating correspondence rules in the context of a theory of confirmation. But rather in the context of by showing how the objects of science can be abstracted from experience and explaining how science engages in algebraic analysis of pattern.

This hyper-theory view of philosophy in its relation to science finds expressions within the normal ranks of analytic philosophers. One handy example is the work of the British biologist turned philosopher of science J. H. Woodger. While Woodger is a relatively minor player in the history of analytic philosophy of science, he is an informative illustration for our purposes because he was highly influenced by the work of Whitehead (particularly the latter's philosophy of science writings) and became entrenched in the tradition of logical positivism as well. In a fairly early effort at articulating his organicist views in the philosophy of biology, Woodger set out an account of the role of philosophy within the broader context of scientific enquiry as follows:

Different Pursuits Contributing to a Well Developed Science

(from Woodger 1931, 440)

1. empirical investigation
2. inductive generalization from 1
3. discovery of clear concepts to "embody" the inductive generalizations
4. discernment of the types of logical order used in particular fields

5. study of the logical properties of these types of order
6. theory construction
7. determination of predictions or deductive consequences from theories
8. analysis of methodological principles used in observation, generalization and theory construction
9. critical analysis of the concepts from theories
10. study of general epistemological issues (e.g. 'truth,' 'objectivity,' etc.)

Some of the tasks on this list (items 4, 5, and 8-10) are things carried out by the philosopher. The Whiteheadian character of his conception of philosophy might be indicated by his use of the phrase 'types of logical order' in item 4. This task clearly involves a kind of logical analysis, but in Whitehead's 'algebraic method' sense, rather than Russell's 'enumeration of the logical forms of statements.' More central to our purpose is Woodger's characterization of these tasks as part of the same overall process of enquiry into nature. Logical analysis is not a meta-theory of science. It is part of science itself, though a part carried out by specialists just as the experimental tasks are carried out by others specially trained in such things.

A final example of the hyper-theory view might be the American philosopher W.V. Quine. While there is no reason to think that Quine was influenced by Whitehead on this score (or any other for that matter), he does express a version of the hyper-theory view, but with a twist. Quine's famous critique of the dogma of analyticity in logical empiricism (Quine 1953) is, in effect, a critique of the meta-theory view. It critiques the distinction between object-level theory and meta-theory. On Quine's view, the propositions of the philosopher (making claims about ontology, or about epistemology) may be of a higher degree of generality than the statements put forth by the experimenter reporting her results. But this is a difference in degree, not in kind. The point it made again through Quine's image of the science-philosophy continuum. The image represents the unified nature of science and a naturalized philosophy. "There is no room for a prior philosophy" (Quine 1969). The products of philosophical analysis are not a priori, as Russell and Carnap insisted. For Quine they rest on empirical grounds in something like the same way all scientific claims do (keeping in mind Quine's holistic view of empirical justification).

This brief account of some examples of the hyper-theory view glosses over some very important differences between my exemplars (not the least of which is the centrality of experience as process in Whitehead's metaphysics). But at a minimum we can see that for the hyper-theory advocates, while the methods of philosophy include logical analysis, this method is employed within the overall field of empirical enquiry. The results of this analysis have the status of substantive claims about some aspect of the natural world and our experience of it, albeit at an extremely high level of generality. This is to be contrasted with the meta-theory view of philosophy as articulated by Russell and Carnap, according to which philosophical analysis is a theory of the language of science – a rational reconstruction after the fact – that is a priori and carries no empirical content. Admittedly the difference may appear subtle. But it is extremely important nonetheless. The hyper-theory view sees philosophy as engaged in the work of science. It is not merely offering descriptions of (or even prescriptions for) language of science. Philosophy may engage in the analysis of language, but philosophy is, after all, about the world.

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Where After All Are the Meanings? A Defense of Internalism. Searle Versus Putnam

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According to Putnam, although Oscar and Twin Oscar are in the same physical mental states (i.e., mental states interpreted in a physicalist way), Oscar points at and therefore means H₂O, whereas Twin Oscar points at and therefore means XYZ. Nothing in their heads would “tell” us the difference, that is, allow us to distinguish between these two different meanings. Therefore meanings are not in the head. Instead, we rely and depend on the world to give and assign meanings. As Putnam puts it, the world “takes over”. Searle by contrast argues that, although Oscar and his twin are in the same physical mental state, they grasp different abstract entities and their mental states have different Intentional contents. (Following Searle, “Intentionality” with capital “I” means directedness of the mind, encompassing perception, fear, desire, hope, and belief, together with what is usually meant by “intentionality”). When pointing at the water he sees in front of him, Oscar implicitly also points at himself (pointing at the water) and sets up conditions of satisfaction that refer to tokens and not mere types. It is part of his very act of *perceiving* the water that his mind sets up the condition of satisfaction that what he sees must be the stuff that *causes him* to have *that very* – here is the reflexivity! – perception. The “binding”, if I may say so, between him and the water is part of the Intentional content that we *create* by pointing and calling that stuff “water”. In this way, reality seems to be caught up into our minds. Now, is this “magic”, as Michael Devitt (1990, p. 90) claims it is?

I think there is much to be said in favor of Searle’s intuitions here. It seems to me that, on the one hand, there is more to meaning than the opponents of meanings being in the head seem to see or would be willing to accept, and on the other hand, that we should not expect too much from meanings so that they do not appear to have magical powers. To bring this out, let me begin by giving an example. Suppose you are in love with your girlfriend S (or your boyfriend P, if you wish). Now suppose someone replaces S by a copy S* and you do not notice the difference. In fact, the copy is so good that you would never find out by yourself that it is a copy. S* looks exactly like S and seems to have all the memories and habits of S. Being with S feels the same to you as being with S*. But as soon as someone told you that this is just a copy and not the real S, you would feel very odd indeed. You would ask: But where is S, my S? What happened to her? Told that she was sick, you would try to find and help her and you would turn away from S*. Told that she suddenly died you might be so sad as to turn away from S* as well. Told that she died and had wished that this copy of herself be created (or even that she created it herself) so that you can go on living with “her”, you might accept the situation because it was her gift and wish. Told that she was enjoying herself in another universe with a copy of yourself and that she knew all about this, you might accept that situation as well, whereas if she were not informed about all this you might want to get back to her and you would be very frustrated if you couldn’t.

The point of this example is that it brings out how Intentional content and conditions of satisfaction as Searle describes them are real and do very much matter to us. We are very sensitive to differences in Intentional contents

once we find out about them. Because of this it seems to me we can say we (or our acts or states of minds) *have* them, even *before* – and this is the point – we know whether they and their conditions are satisfied, met, and fulfilled. In our daily lives we tacitly assume that such conditions of satisfaction are met, that S and all our other friends and the things we are surrounded by are the same as they were yesterday. Even if we do not know for certain – there is always room for doubt – whether this is “really” S or not, we assume she is, and we become irritated if we find out that she isn’t. The fact that we *would* get very irritated if we *were* to find out that things are not as we take it for granted that they are is enough for us to say that we *have* that Intentional content (i.e., *are* in a mental state that has that content). When talking with S, we always *mean* the real one, the one we were together with yesterday and the days before that. (If we have been living with S* for several years already, things get complicated, and we have to rethink the whole situation.) The intention that this is the real S is always in our heads. Of course we also assume that the world cooperates and that we are not being tricked or make mistakes. On the spot we might not have any means to see (and be certain beyond any possible doubt) that this is S and not some substitute S*. It is in this sense that meanings are *not* in the head. But it seems to me that this is counter-intuitive, that this is not what we usually mean (and expect) when we use the word “to mean”. We mean and intend the real S, the good old S, the S where the causal chains are unbroken, even if it goes beyond our means to actually make sure and find out. We simply make this demand. We *expect* the conditions of satisfaction to be satisfied. This expectation is part of our meaning something, part of what we mean when we say: “Look! There is S”. It is based on this demand and these expectations that we can say meanings are in the head, and it seems to me that this is what counts.

Let us look at one more example. Searle writes: “The expression, ‘The murderer of Brown’, has an intension which determines as its extension the murderer of Brown... For someone who does not know who murdered Brown the extension of the expression, ‘The murderer of Brown’, is still the murderer of Brown even though he does not know who he is” (205). Suppose that the murderer was never found, that nobody knew who the murderer actually was (even the murderer himself might not know), still, there is a *general idea behind* saying “The murderer of Brown”, as there was one behind saying “Jack the Ripper”. We know there was a killing and we assume it was one person who did it. We might not have all the necessary facts in our heads to point the murderer out. But we have enough in our heads to get a *search* started. During the investigation we might make all kinds of discoveries and decisions: that it could not have been this or that person, that such and such factors would not matter whereas others would, and that the killing must have been done in this way and not in that. To do all this, we have to activate all kinds of background knowledge and particular pieces of knowledge about particular facts. These are in our heads and they help us *direct* our search. In this sense meanings are in the head. We might need to know more to point out the murderer, but we know that he must be somewhere out

there and we *have what it takes* to search for him, to begin a search and to evaluate and possibly add all kinds of new pieces of information in the process of investigation. It is based on *this* knowledge and these expectations that we mean what we say or think. Meaning is always related to the *past* (memories of past experiences and analogous cases) and the *future* (expectations and demands based on past experiences and background knowledge). Fulfillment is never guaranteed (even in cases of supposedly “direct” reference! – at least if it is to be *meaningful* reference). There is always room for doubt, discoveries, and revisions, for new theories of chemistry, new facts about S, or the actual murderer of Mr. Brown. (What a surprise, it was *him!*) Sometimes the discoveries will make us rethink what we meant, but that does not effect the general idea that meanings can be said to be in the head (especially if we focus on their Intentional aspects).

There is another aspect that might show that starting out with names, natural kinds, and reference-fixing will be getting out of bed with the wrong foot first if we want to theorize about meaning. Just think of such things as justice or love instead of water and murderers. We say, “What do you mean, she doesn’t love you?”, or, “Fair? What do you mean by ‘fair’ here?” Well, there are of course factors of socialization involved, and we do not mean these things independently of social and cultural contexts, but still, there are always conditions of satisfaction that we go by and that we can be said to have and to have set in our minds, even if we have to reflect about them (even if such reflection needs to be prompted) to become aware of them.

Now at the beginning I raised the question whether Putnam might agree that we “mean more than we know”. I believe that, in some sense, he might. If we do not know about H₂O (as different from XYZ) and if it is by means of the external world that this is what we happen to refer to and therefore can be said to “mean” (especially if, when pointing at water, we say “that stuff, whatever science will discover its inner structure to be”), then we mean more than we know. What about Searle? It seems to me that he too might subscribe to the thesis that we mean more than we know. But the difference is that for him we mean something because we ourselves have set certain conditions of satisfaction, and if we have set the condition that what we are pointing at is a sample of some liquid with an internal structure that science will discover, then that meaning, including the whole network of assumptions, memories, and expectations, is in our heads. The idea that nature cooperates is in our heads, too. Nature cannot literally “take over”, because nature does not act. Yes, we say that we listen to nature, but we also say that we ask questions. And whatever answers we get make sense only within a framework of interpretation that we have set in advance. When pointing at some stuff, what we expect and would be ready to accept (as satisfying our conditions of satisfaction) in the end depends on us. And it is those structures of expectation and acceptance that are at the heart of meaning, that is, “meaning” in the intuitive everyday sense with emphasis on its Intentional aspects. This actually comes close to what Putnam now says. He does not believe any more in Kripkean “metaphysical necessity” (as he tended to do in his paper on meaning from 1975), but has turned to “physical necessity” instead (see Putnam 1990). He now says that it is physical necessity that we can discover. But here, so it seems to me, the difference between Putnam and Searle comes out again. Putnam takes it that as long as we have not made this discovery about the watery stuff in front of us, nature must “take over” and “fix” the reference for us. Only later

might we *come round* and agree to what nature has fixed for us. Searle, on the other hand, takes it that if we already now have *what it takes* to come round, the later discovery will meet our Intentional content and can be integrated into our knowledge.

If we might (have to) modify or enlarge our knowledge, externalists would take this as counting in favor of their point of view. But it is not that modified knowledge that is part of our actual meaning, so it seems to me, but at best only our readiness for such modifications.

For Searle the background and the *potential* future discovery suffice. Not so for Putnam. For him the reference has to be *actually* fixed, and if we cannot spell this out now, nature will have to do it for us. But it seems to me that it is part of our everyday understanding of meaning that we implicitly, and more or less vaguely, simply count on potential future satisfactions and that this is enough – even more, that this is the essence of meaning. Thus we should think of meaning from the perspective of the *act* of meaning. This comes out more clearly if we look at dialogue, speech acts, and the Intentional aspects of meaning such as expectation and desire.

In setting up conditions of satisfaction we naturally count on nature to guarantee that things go as we expect. This is a result of evolution and our learning process. Our intentions are usually not frustrated. Should we then say that nature “takes over”? But what nature? Outer nature or our inner nature? Or both? I think it makes good sense to say that meaning (seen from the perspective of the act of meaning) has been absorbed into our Intentional abilities.

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Ein Beitrag zu einer Systematologie des Wissenschaftssystems

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1.

Die philosophische Wissenschaftstheorie ist nach wie vor ein Feld der Auseinandersetzungen zwischen zwei Wissenschaftskulturen: der analytisch-positivistischen Tradition einerseits, ob sie nun im Gewande des (neuerdings konstruktiven) Empirismus, des Empiriekritizismus, des klassischen, des mittleren oder des Neopositivismus auftritt. Auf der anderen Seite steht ein weitaus heterogeneres Geflecht von Theorieangeboten, die – ob nun in Form der Hermeneutik, der Phänomenologie, der Kultur-anthropologie o.a. – auf Motive wie *Verstehen*, *Intentionalität*, *Teleologie*, *Einfühlung* o.ä. verweisen. Differenzen zwischen diesen beiden Polen haben auch die neuere Wissenschaftsgeschichte geprägt, etwa im Bereich der Selbstverortung der Soziologie (Acham 1978; Hollis 1995), im Rahmen der Psychologismusdebatte (Mill 1968; Bühler 1978), in der Geschichtswissenschaft (Dray 1966; Lorenz 1997), in der Ökonomie (Hollis 1995; Sombart 2003) oder neuerdings im Bereich der Hirnforschung (Roth 1994; Newen/Vogele 2000).

Was bedeutet nun diese Pluralität der Theorieangebote? Wie ist mit den Phänomenen des Methodenmonismus bzw. des Relativismus umzugehen und welche Richtlinien lassen sich für die Wissenschaftlichkeit an sich angeben? Ist es grundsätzlich zu akzeptieren, dass unterschiedliche und sich bisweilen ausschließende Wissenschaftstheorien nebeneinander bestehen oder sind sie als sich gegenseitig ergänzende Facetten des Wissenschaftssystems zu sehen?

2.

Ich möchte im Folgenden die Aussicht auf einen Theorieansatz vorstellen, der für sich in Anspruch nimmt, die Differenzen zwischen den beiden angesprochenen Polen in einem neuen Licht erscheinen zu lassen. Wie der Titel andeutet, handelt es sich hierbei um eine Systematologie des Wissenschaftssystems. Was hierunter genau zu verstehen ist, wird an späterer Stelle angedeutet werden, zunächst möchte ich auf das Werk eines Denkers eingehen, der die hier vorliegenden Überlegungen maßgeblich geprägt hat. Die Rede ist von Franz Kröner, der in seinem 1929 erschienen Buch *Die Anarchie der philosophischen Systeme* ein Theorieangebot vorlegte, das bis zum heutigen Tage in philosophischen Kreisen nahezu unbekannt geblieben ist – zu Unrecht, wie mir scheint.

Um Krönens Werk adäquat fassen zu können, muss man den historischen Kontext berücksichtigen: Im ersten Drittel des 20. Jahrhunderts stand der Neopositivismus in seiner vollen Blüte und radikalisierte den philosophischen Diskurs mit einem an der Physik orientierten einheitswissenschaftlichen Programm. Zurecht wird darauf hingewiesen (Hegselmann 1992, S. 7ff), dass dies nicht zuletzt auf außerphilosophische Erkenntnisse aus den Bereichen der Relativitätstheorie und der mathematischen Grundlagenforschung zurückzuführen ist. Das Scheitern des mathematischen Logizismus und die nun offen zutage tretenden Differenzen zwischen der Newtonschen Mechanik und der neuen Einstein'schen Theorie erwiesen den groß angelegten Versuch Immanuel Kants, die Naturwissenschaften (transzendental-) philosophisch zu untermauern, endgültig

als misslungen, was Zweifel hinsichtlich der Selbstverortung der Philosophie als eigenständige Grundlagendisziplin aufwarf. Rigorose Sinnkriterien wurden formuliert und weiten Teilen der Philosophie aber auch der Geschichts- und Sozialwissenschaften kam aus der Sicht der Neopositivismus das Etikett der Sinnlosigkeit zu. Moritz Schlick bringt den philosophischen Geist der Zeit auf den Punkt, wenn er meint, dass „two thousand years of experience seem to teach that efforts to put an end to the chaos of [philosophical; *H.W.*] systems [...] can no longer be taken seriously“ (Schlick 1959, S. 54). Die Philosophie, so Schlick, hat es nie mit wirklichen Problemen zu tun gehabt und muss sich selbst neu definieren – bestenfalls in der Form eines Werkzeuges der Begriffsanalyse. Franz Krönens Werk fällt genau in diese Zeit und er nimmt bereits im Vorwort auf die Meinung Schlicks Bezug, wenn er meint, dass „das für die gewöhnliche Anschauung unwiderstehlichste, durchschlagendste Argument gegen Philosophie überhaupt [...] in dem Umstand [liegt], daß sie trotz einer Arbeit von zweieinhalb Jahrtausenden zu keinen ‚fixen Resultaten‘ gekommen ist [...] und dass] der eigentliche Skandal der Philosophie [...] in der Anarchie der philosophischen Systeme [besteht]“ (Kröner 1970, S. 1). Die Frage, die Kröner im folgenden beschäftigt, lautet nun folgendermaßen: Ist die Pluralität der Systeme wirklich ein Skandal oder haben wir es nicht eher mit einem Charakteristikum zu tun, das allen philosophischen Theoriekonstrukten schon auf struktureller Ebene eingeschrieben ist?

3.

Eine Wurzel für die Überlegungen Krönens ist in der Entdeckung der Nicht-Euklidischen Geometrien durch János Bolyai, Friedrich Bernhard Riemann u.a. zu sehen. Die Erkenntnis, dass geometrische Systeme, die auf das Parallelenaxiom verzichten, aus logisch-mathematischer Sicht ebenso vollständig und widerspruchsfrei konstruiert werden können, veränderte die Bedeutung des Begriffs *Axiom* in der mathematischen Grundlagenforschung nachhaltig. Axiome konnten nicht mehr als durch Evidenz abgestützt betrachtet werden, sie mussten fortan als bloße Setzungen aufgefasst werden. Diese Entwicklung beeindruckte Kröner zutiefst und so fragt er auch, „ob es gelingt, mutatis mutandis dasselbe für ein jedes mögliche philosophische System durchzuführen [...]“ (Kröner 1970, S. 73). Dieser Vergleich darf aus heutiger Sicht nicht über Gebühr strapaziert werden, denn Geometrien sind im Gegensatz zu philosophischen Theorien axiomatisierte Aussagensysteme. Dennoch wirkt diese Gegenüberstellung illustrativ, denn laut Kröner sind philosophische Systeme zumindest insofern mit jenen der Geometrie zu vergleichen, als ihre Grundlagen als Setzungen zu begreifen sind, die einiges ausschließen, um anderes adäquat in den Blick zu bekommen.

Kröner analysiert diesen Umstand unter Zuhilfenahme der Begriffe *Ektoantinomie* bzw. *Ektostasie* (Kröner 1970, S. 73 ff.). Am Anfang jeder philosophischen Theoriekonstruktion stehen gewisse Grundentscheidungen, die getroffen werden müssen, um das jeweilige System in eine bestimmte Richtung aufbauen zu können. Diese Grundoppositionen wie „Alles Seiende ist Materie“ oder „Alles Seiende ist Geist“ müssen entschieden werden, um überhaupt mit der philosophischen Einzelausgangspunkt

beginnen zu können. Doch diese Oppositionen, die Kröner als *Ektantinomien* bezeichnet, sind nicht definitiv entscheidbar, sie gleichen viel eher einer prinzipiellen Ausrichtung eines Systems. *Ektostasien* hingegen sind plurale Oppositionen, die die Art der Einstellung gegenüber bestimmten Gegenstandsbereichen bzw. der Welt als solcher definieren. Ein Theoriegebäude kann dualistisch, monistisch oder pluralistisch aufgebaut sein, aber in jedem Fall ändert dies die weitere Theoriekonstruktion maßgeblich.

Nähert man sich diesen zumeist impliziten Grund- oder Leitunterscheidungen aus systematologischer Perspektive, wird eine neue Metaebene philosophischer Problemstellungen sichtbar, die Kröner mit dem Terminus *Restprobleme* markiert (Kröner 1970, S. 191 ff.). Restprobleme entstehen, wenn jene angesprochenen Voraussetzungen und Grundunterscheidungen, die zur Problemeinengung dienen, selbst thematisiert werden. Restprobleme entstehen aber auch, wenn die jeweiligen Anschauungen, also Ektostasien, konsequent und umfassend durchgeführt werden und sich so bis an ihre eigenen Grenzen treiben.

4.

Was nun aber heißt *Systematologie*? Wir konnten bisher feststellen, dass philosophische Systeme im Rahmen der Systematologie hinsichtlich ihrer Eigenaussagen aber auch hinsichtlich ihrer untereinander bestehenden Verbindungen analysiert werden. Die Problemabscheidungen einzelner Systeme deuten immer implizit auf das hin, was durch eben diese Ausklammerungen ausgeschlossen wurde. Wir erkennen somit zwei grundlegende Charakteristika der Krönerschen Systematologie: Sie geht einerseits über den Anspruch einer bloßen Wissenschaftsgeschichtsschreibung oder Wissenschaftssoziologie weit hinaus, will aber andererseits keine weitere Einzeltheorie im Dickicht philosophischer Systeme sein, sondern „eine Legitimierung eines de facto bestehenden Zustandes“ (Kröner 1970, S. 53). Damit ist gemeint, dass Kröner die Pluralität der philosophischen Systeme als eine ebenso verständliche wie auch sinnvolle Geschichte deutet, die nicht als Defizit der Philosophie ausgelegt werden darf. Viel eher kann diese Pluralität – so Kröner – schon aus der strukturellen Beschaffenheit einzelner Theoriegebäude erklärt werden.

An dieses Ansinnen knüpfen sich zwei zentrale Fragen: Wie positioniert sich die Systematologie hinsichtlich der Unterscheidung „intern/extern“ und wie muss die spezielle Art der Theoriekonstruktion beschaffen sein, um einer möglicherweise externen Selbstverortung Rechnung zu tragen? Und: Wie geht die Systematologie mit dem Phänomen des Monismus (bzw. Absolutismus) um, ohne automatisch in einen Relativismus zu schlittern?

Zum ersten Fragenkomplex: Kröner fasst die Systematologie als standpunktjenseitige Metatheorie auf. *Standpunktjenseitig* bedeutet jedoch nicht *standpunktlos*: Jedes System verfügt über eine höchst spezielle Perspektive, die zu einer ganz bestimmten Beleuchtung von Problemen führt. Und: Kein System löst alle Probleme, sondern betont bestimmte Problemaspekte zu dem Preis, dass andere in den Hintergrund treten. Um trotz dieser zentralen Erkenntnis jene Neutralität, die ein metatheoretisches Unternehmen der angedeuteten Art fordert, erreichen zu können, muss die Systematologie einerseits Geltungsfragen hinsichtlich der analysierten Systeme unentschieden lassen. Sie kann aber andererseits auch nicht vom Standpunkt eines bestehenden Systems argumentieren, denn dann wäre jene annähernde Objektivität, die der

angedeutete Ansatz fordert, ebenfalls nicht mehr einzulösen. Stattdessen schlägt Kröner folgenden Weg vor: Die Systematologie muss vorbehaltlos jene philosophischen Systeme analysieren, die die Historie anbietet. Auf der Folie der Philosophiegeschichte soll dann gezeigt werden, dass sich dieselben Problemtypen und Lösungsstrategien durch die verschiedenen Systeme ziehen. Es geht also darum, Eigenschaften aufzuzeigen, die allen Arten von philosophischen Systemen zukommen, unabhängig davon, wie einzelne Probleme im Speziellen gelöst werden.

Wie geht Kröner nun mit den Phänomenen des Monismus und des Relativismus um? Wäre die Pluralität philosophischer Systeme als Relativismus zu begreifen, so käme der Philosophiegeschichte lediglich der Status einer zufälligen Abfolge von unzusammenhängenden Ideen zu. Dass dies jedoch nicht der Fall ist, will die Systematologie gerade zeigen: Durch die Fragen, die in Systemen gestellt werden, und auch durch jene, die nicht gestellt werden, verweisen die Systeme jeweils aufeinander und erzeugen so ein Geflecht von Relationen, das nahe legt, dass es sich nicht um ein zufälliges Nebeneinander handeln kann. Die Systematologie muss zwar zunächst voraussetzen, dass der Relativismus nicht haltbar ist, sie beweist die Richtigkeit dieser Annahme jedoch im Laufe der Analyse. Zum Monismus ist laut Kröner Folgendes zu sagen: Natürlich kann jedes System verabsolutiert werden. Doch die systemimmanente Aussage, die die Absolutheit postuliert, kann kein Bestandteil der Aussagenmenge des Systems sein. Kröner zieht auch hier einen Vergleich mit der Euklidischen Geometrie heran: Wir würden den Satz „Die Euklidische Geometrie ist die einzige Geometrie“ kaum als sechstes Axiom akzeptieren wollen, weil er eine metatheoretische Aussage über die Geometrie darstellt und keinen Satz der Geometrie selbst (Kröner 1970, S. 278 ff.). Sätze, die Absolutheit konzedieren, könnten nur auf einer Metaebene zustande kommen, doch gerade hier zeigt sich Gegenteiliges: Die Gründe, die in Systemen zum Monismus führen, können ebenso hinterfragt werden, wie vollzogene Leitunterscheidungen immer auf die Option, anders entscheiden zu können, verweisen.

5.

An der Systematologie Kröners ist sowohl die Originalität der Fragestellungen und Problemlösungsansätze als auch ihre Kompatibilität zu anderen Theoriepositionen älteren und neueren Datums bemerkenswert: In Bezug auf die Frage der Standortgebundenheit von Metatheorien liegt ein Vergleich mit Karl Mannheim nahe (Vgl. Acham 2001, S. 380 ff.). Die Forderung der radikalen Vorbehaltlosigkeit sowie die angedeutete Perspektivität von Theoriekonstrukten ähnelt in ihren Grundzügen der Husserl'schen Phänomenologie (Vgl. Rinofner-Kreidl 2004). Und zuletzt lassen sich Parallelen zur Systemtheorie Niklas Luhmanns aufzeigen, besonders was den Gedanken der systemischen Relationierung von Theorien, aber auch die generelle Art der metatheoretischen Theoriekonstruktion anlangt (Vgl. etwa: Luhmann 1999).

Gerade deshalb scheint es gewinnbringend, die Systematologie Kröners in adaptierter Form an spezielleren Bereichen – wie eben der Wissenschaftstheorie – zu erproben, denn auch hier haben wir es mit einer Ausgangssituation zu tun, die der von Kröner geschilderten sehr ähnlich ist. Wir haben anfangs darauf hingewiesen, dass im Bereich der Wissenschaftstheorie nach wie vor entgegengesetzte Theorietypen vorliegen, die mit konträren Erklärungsstrategien vorgehen. Wäre es nun möglich,

anhand einer erweiterten Systematologie diese Gegensätze aufzulösen?

Meine These lautet, dass Motive, die in der Vergangenheit anhand der Termini *Erklären* und *Verstehen*, an *Kausalität* und *Teleologie* oder an *Aristotelischer* und *Galileischer Wissenschaftsauffassung* festgemacht wurden, anhand verschiedener Strategien des Umganges mit Sinn erklärt werden können. Dies erfordert eine tragfähige Sinntheorie, die Sinn als Basismedium menschlichen Wahrnehmens, Kommunizierens und Interagierens ausweisen kann. Einige Worte hierzu: Im Anschluss an Edmund Husserls diesbezüglich relevanten Ausführungen (vor allem: Husserl 1999) wies Niklas Luhmann in vielen Publikationen Sinn als Grundmedium aller menschlichen Seinsbereiche aus (Luhmann 1971, Luhmann 1999). Sinn ist, so Luhmann, die zentrale Operationsstrategie sowohl für soziale als auch psychische Systeme. Die über weite Strecken hinweg an der Phänomenologie orientierte Sinntheorie Luhmanns besagt im Kern folgendes: Psychische und soziale Systeme finden sich ständig mit dem Grundproblem einer überkomplexen Umwelt konfrontiert. Personen können sich nicht auf alles gleichzeitig beziehen, Theorien können nicht alle Problemfelder thematisieren. Um diese Komplexität auf ein konstruktives Maß einzuschränken, müssen Unterscheidungen eingeführt werden, die Bestimmtes zu dem Preis in den Vordergrund rücken, dass anderes suspendiert wird. Das Medium Sinn gewährleistet nun, dass das, was gerade nicht aktuell ist, nicht aus dem Bezugsrahmen verschwindet, sondern als Horizont von Möglichkeiten nach wie vor reaktualisierbar bleibt. Sinn ist also jene Struktur, die zwischen Denk- bzw. Kommunikationszusammenhängen besteht. Eine Sinntheorie muss Kriterien angeben können, nach denen sich derartige Sinnzusammenhänge konstituieren.

Auf der Basis einer in dieser Form kurz angedeuteten Sinntheorie soll es möglich werden, Theorien gemäß ihrer Umgangsformen mit dem Grundmedium Sinn auf systematologischer Ebene zu vergleichen und als unterschiedliche Perspektiven der Selbstbeobachtung des Wissenschaftssystems auszuweisen. Die diesbezügliche These lautet – vereinfacht ausgedrückt –, dass es für die analytisch-positivistische Wissenschaftstheorien typisch ist, Sinnexklusion zu betreiben, also mittels ihrer Methodik Sinnverweisungen so weit wie möglich einzuschränken. Wissenschaftstheorien, die auf das *Verstehen*, *Intentionalität* o.ä. verweisen, arbeiten hingegen in die gegenläufige Richtung, denn hier wird versucht, gerade die unterschiedlichen Sinnstrukturen in den Blick zu bekommen, was eine sinnexkludierende Methodik von vornherein unbrauchbar macht.

Keine dieser beiden Strategien ist von sich aus zu favorisieren; sie haben sich auf evolutionärem Wege als funktionelle Ansätze für unterschiedliche Objektbereiche ausdifferenziert. Zu Spannungen kommt es lediglich dann, wenn sinnexkludierende Methoden auf von sich aus sinn-geladene Bereiche angewandt werden. Umgekehrt erwiesen sich auch jene Versuche, sinninkludierende Methoden

in Bereiche zu transferieren, die gerade durch eine Ausklammerung von Sinn zum Vorschein gebracht wurden, als ebenso fehlgeleitet, wie sich anhand spekulativer naturphilosophischer Ansätze leicht zeigen lässt.

Einer derart gekennzeichneten Konzeption kommt die Rolle einer „Theorie über Theorien über wissenschaftliche Erfahrungen“ zu. Die Art der Theoriekonstruktion muss diesem Umstand Rechnung tragen und in dieser Hinsicht sind die Studien Franz Kröners ein gewinnbringender Ausgangspunkt.

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Searle, Burge and Intentional Content

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1. Searle on Intentional Content

In his *Intentionality* Searle (1983) advocates a version of an internalism about mental content which embraces two claims. Firstly, the Intentional content of a given mental state is determined independently of any properties of the agent's physical and social environment, and, secondly, it suffices to determine the object of the state. Searle argues that internalism, when properly elaborated, can accommodate some "Twin Earth" examples that are traditionally treated as refuting the doctrine in question. Moreover, this view is capable of accounting for the particularity of mental and linguistic reference. Contrary to externalism, Searle points out, singular thoughts achieve their objects solely by means of their Intentional, internal satisfaction conditions.

Searle focuses on visual perception, which is commonly regarded as paradigm case of singular mental act. Some philosophers, like Tyler Burge (1977) and Kent Bach (1987), claim that the particularity of perception means that it is an irreducibly *de re* act. What they have in mind is the idea that the content of a perception-based thought contains a nonconceptual, contextual element, namely a phenomenally characterised percept. The percept designates its object by means of the agent's standing in an appropriate causal relation to the object. Therefore, Bach concludes, the Intentional content of a perception-based thought determines the intended object only in a relevant external context.

Searle's defence of his internalist account of perception rests on two ideas. The first one is that perceptual states are causally self-referential, which means that they figure in their own conditions of satisfaction and are described as being caused by their objects. According to the second idea the Intentional content of a given state determines its satisfaction conditions contextually. But contrary to externalists, the relevant context is comprised solely of internal items, such as the agent's other Intentional states (the Network) and its nonintentional, mental abilities (the Background). In short, the Intentional content of a given perceptual act determines its satisfaction conditions relatively to the agent's Network and Background.

Let's consider, following Searle, the truth conditions of a sentence "*d* sees the *F*". In order to reflect the intentional character of perception the sentence should be paraphrased as "*d* sees that the *F* is in front of *d*". This statement articulates the Intentional propositional content of *d*'s visual experience. The content determines the conditions under which the experience is satisfied. The Intentional content of *d*'s visual experience is the proposition that the *F* is in front of *d*. The conditions necessary to satisfy this are:

- (1) The *F* is in front of *d* and the fact that the *F* is in front of *d* causes this visual experience.

The above statement identifies the Intentional object of *d*'s perception by descriptive and indexical means. But what is indicated in this case is *d*'s own inner visual experience. The description, in turn, is causal, but the causation is defined from *d*'s internal point of view.

Statement (1) says nothing about the relation of the Intentional content of *d*'s present act to *d*'s Network and

Background. This dependence is crucial for the case of reidentification. The point is that *d* does not merely see something (or someone) in particular; he also sees *what* it is (or *who* he or she is). To allow for this, Searle claims, (1) is to be spelled out as follows:

- (2) The object with identical *F*-like features is before *d* and its presence and features cause this visual experience and it is identical to the object whose presence and features caused *d*'s previous visual experiences of the object *d* regards as the *F*, which in turn caused *d*'s present memories of these experiences.

The conditions so specified state, in my view, that two distinct methods of individuation determine the same object. Following Jaakko Hintikka (1975) we can call the first method perceptual and the second physical. The individuation in question is the so-called cross-world identification, since it establishes the identity between objects occurring in different possible courses of events. The frame of reference for the first method of individuation is the agent's perceptual space (more accurately, all possible worlds compatible with what the agent sees). As a result, objects so individuated are represented by descriptions referring to the agent's point of view. The frame of reference for the physical method consists of possible worlds representing what the agent remembers and believes. Corresponding to these two methods of individuation Hintikka proposes two distinct existential quantifiers: " \mathcal{F} " for speaking about objects individuated perceptually and " \mathcal{P} " for speaking about objects individuated physically. Using this notation I propose to represent the formal structure of (2) as follows:

- (3) $(\mathcal{F}x)(\mathcal{P}y)(x = y)$

Statement (3) allows for two facts. First, *d* sees something in particular. Second, *d* sees what this particular object is. In other words, the perceptual and physical methods individuate one and the same object. According to Searle's version of internalism these two methods operate on internally characterised possible worlds.

2. The Dispute Between Searle and Burge

In his "Vision and Intentional Content" Tyler Burge concedes that statement (1) sets the conditions required for *d*'s visual experience to be satisfied. He also accepts the idea that these conditions are determined by the Intentional content of *d*'s perception. What he qualifies is Searle's claim that such determination depends exclusively on *d*'s internal factors.

For Burge "a theory of Intentional content is not just a theory of satisfaction conditions", but also "a theory of mental states – mental abilities and cognitive point of view" (1991, 203). From this point of view what makes an element of the satisfaction conditions internal is the fact that it is subject to the agent's reflection and its conceptualised experience. If this is the case, Searle's internalism boils down to the claim that to be able to perceive particular objects an agent has to be able to experience or be aware of its own experiences. But there is a mismatch between this claim and Searle's naive realism, namely the

doctrine that physical objects are direct objects of our perception. Burge concludes that statement (1) ascribes to the agent more reflection and conceptual resources than it really has. Therefore Searle should either abandon his account of Intentional content or his direct realism.

In his response Searle states that Burge's objection is based on two misunderstandings. First, Burge neglects the idea that the Intentional content of a given state determines its satisfaction conditions relative to the agent's Network and Background. Second, Searle rejects the idea that an adequate account of the particularity of perception presupposes the agent's epistemic access to its experiences. In short, what determines the satisfaction conditions of a given perception is the Intentional content *strictly speaking* – namely that the *F* is in front of *d* – incorporated in the context embracing the agent's relevant experience and its Network and Background. In spite of the agent's ignorance of the elements of the context, they are internal to it. As Searle puts it, "an adequate specification of conscious Intentional contents can use concepts that are not available to the agent" (1991, 230) and "not everything which is an internal mental precondition for determining the conditions of satisfaction of an Intentional state is itself part of a content of that very Intentional state" (233).

In short, to perceive something in particular the agent has to have a relevant experience that figures in its satisfaction conditions. But it is not required that the agent is aware of this experience.

3. The General Line Behind Searle's Responses

Let me start with an observation that there are at least two possible criteria of drawing a distinction between the internal and the external. The first one is ontic: the borderline between the internal and the rest is simply our skin. In this sense all elements determining the object of a perceptual act are, according to Searle's account, internal. The second criterion is epistemic. What is internal are elements accessible to a reflection. The point is that Burge appeals to the second criterion, whereas Searle uses the first one.

The epistemic criterion is controversial. It leads either to the conclusion that some of our experiences are not inner or – given direct realism – that physical objects are internal. It is not surprising Searle does not use it.

Nevertheless my conclusion in this paragraph concerns epistemological views presupposed by Searle's account of Intentional content. In my view, there is a uniform strategy behind his responses to the objection posed by Burge and the scepticism about perceptual knowledge. The strategy resembles, at least in one crucial respect, the externalist approach to the analysis of knowledge. Let me say a word about the sceptical objection in question.

The objection starts with a statement that the necessary condition for the agent's seeing that *p* is the fact that *p* causes the agent's relevant visual experience. In short:

- (4) *d* sees that *p* → the fact that *p* causes *d*'s relevant visual experience.

Next, the sceptic claims that it is impossible for *d* to know whether the implied proposition is true. The point is that such knowledge would have to be based on further perceptions, the reliability of which would have to be examined by further perceptions, and so on. Therefore, the

sceptic conclude, since there is no neutral point of view, that perceptual knowledge is impossible.

Responding to the objection Searle points out that one can have perceptual knowledge – in short, one can see that *p* – without necessarily knowing that the very conditions for perceptual knowledge are satisfied. That means that Searle rejects an epistemic principle the sceptic tacitly assumes:

- (5) $S_d p \rightarrow K_d S_d p$

where " $S_d p$ " stands for the proposition that *d* sees that *p* and " K " is an epistemic operator for knowledge. The formula (5) is a version of the so-called KK-thesis for perceptual knowledge. The rejection of the thesis in question is motivated by some considerations concerning the nature of knowledge and justification that support the externalist account of these epistemic concepts.

The proposition that *d* knows that *d* sees that *p* implies, first, that *d* knows the elements figuring in the satisfaction conditions of his visual experience and, second, that these conditions are satisfied. In his dispute with Burge, Searle rejects the first implication, whereas in his response to the sceptical objection he abandons the second. In order to justify these steps he could appeal to the reliabilist account of justification.

Independently of whether Searle's epistemology is true or not, it has some problematic implications. Nevertheless, it does provide a sufficient basis for rejecting scepticism as well as Burge's objection. On the other hand, it seems to pose a threat to the doctrine of privileged self-knowledge.

4. Internalism and Self-Knowledge

According to the doctrine of privileged self-knowledge we can have non-empirical knowledge of our current thought contents. In other words, we are able to justify our first person content attributions *via* introspection. Some philosophers (Boghossian 1997) argue that the doctrine is incompatible with content externalism. According to the latter view the contents of our thoughts depend not only on our internal properties, but also on properties of our environment. If these two doctrines were compatible, Boghossian argues, we would be in a position to know certain external facts just by simple reflection, which is absurd. Others (Bernecker 2000) attempt to reconcile externalism with the doctrine of privileged access. Independently of whether they succeed or not, it is commonly agreed that it is externalism, not internalism, that poses a genuine or alleged threat to the doctrine of self-knowledge.

It turns out, however, that Searle's version of internalism about content can be reconciled with the doctrine of self-knowledge only with difficulty. Statement (2) lists elements determining the particular satisfaction conditions of a given perceptual act. These elements, Searle argues, do not have to be available to the agent by reflection. What determines the content of this act, therefore, are factors that the agent is usually ignorant of.

Let me consider once again the case of *d* seeing the *F*. One can say that what *d* knows by reflection is the Intentional content *strictly speaking*, namely the proposition that the *F* is in front of *d*. Does it suffice to maintain the thesis about privileged access? I am not sure. In Searle's view, what determines a particular content of a given state is the agent's Network and the state itself. Therefore, in order to maintain the thesis about privileged access, one

could acknowledge that although content-determining facts are not subject to immediate introspection, they can be known by more thorough reflection. Such a claim, nevertheless, is incompatible with the general line of Searle's defence of his account against the objections raised by Burge and the sceptic.

One solution to the problem is simply to maintain Searle's internalism and simultaneously reject the doctrine of privileged self-knowledge. But such a step puts some limits on Searle's principle of expressibility, namely the claim that whatever can be thought can be said. Furthermore, it blurs Searle's distinction between third-person and first-person accounts, namely the difference between the answers to the questions "Under what conditions does [Jones] refer to Sally, whether he knows it or not?" and "Under what conditions does he *take himself* to be seeing that Sally is in front of him?" (Searle 1983, 64).

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The Normativity of Intentionality

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1. Introduction

There are a number of provocative themes that run throughout Davidson's writings on the mind.¹ These are that the mind cannot be reductively explained in terms of the more "basic" theory of neurophysiology, that there can be no scientific regimentation of folk psychology (certainly no law-based, nomothetic, theory concerning the explanation and prediction of human thought and behavior), and that the deliverances of the most advanced physical or neurophysiological theory can neither replace nor even transform the folk psychological concepts and principles we all (implicitly) know and use. These themes are grounded in two principles underlying Davidson's account of how we understand the thoughts, drives, and actions, of our fellow neighbors: first, that to have a mind is to have a network of intentional states that is, for the most part, rationally coherent, and second, that the content of our intentional states is holistically determined – in other words, the meaning of a mental state attributed to an individual depends on the inferential role(s) it plays within the network of mental states that constitute the individual's mental life. The linchpin, Davidson declares, that ties together these two elements is "the irreducibly normative element in all attributions of attitude" (1974, 241). Thus, the reason why thought and behavior cannot be explained in terms of non-intentional, physical, vocabulary comes down to a certain "normative element" constitutive of our interpretation and attributions of the propositional attitudes. Clearly this normative element plays a pivotal role. But in spite of its significance, it is highly obscure and insufficiently understood. Indeed, there have been no serious attempts to systematically examine what, exactly, the normative element amounts to.

The aim of this paper is modest. I lay out several accounts of Davidson's attempt to characterize the "normative element," including one misleading characterization that is useful to smoke out. As we shall see, Davidson's discussion does not lend itself to just one way of cashing out the normative component of intentionality. I end the discussion with a look at how the different manifestations collectively contribute to a more comprehensive understanding.

2. The Constraining Principles

Sprinkled throughout Davidson's writings are the following principles that characterize the normative element:

- i) It is consistent with the descriptive nature of our belief reports and claims about meaning (1973, 254).
- ii) It is constitutive of thought and our intentional ascriptions, and is therefore an ineliminable component (1974, 237).
- iii) It is distinctive of thought and our intentional ascriptions (1970, 222).

Let us look at each in turn. Descriptive sentences have the logical form of fact-stating, truth-conditional, assertions, while prescriptive statements, under emotivist or expressivist analyses, have the logical form of non-assertoric endorsements, where "X is good" is analyzed as "Hurrah for X!" As Davidson maintains, and reasonably so, intentional ascriptions are like statements about the physical world in that they "are true or false in the same way" (1973, 254). Thus, "John believes that planets orbit around the sun," or "By 'sun' John means the sun," are just as declarative and truth-evaluable as, "Planets orbit around the sun."² The second constraint amounts to the claim that the normative element is a *necessary* feature of our thoughts. Thus, as the relation of determinate to determinable is an essential feature of our application of color concepts, the normative element is an essential feature of the propositional attitudes we ascribe to our neighbors. Within the work of Davidson, this means that we must interpret our fellow neighbors according to the Principle of Charity: our attributions must make our neighbor's thoughts and actions rational for the most part and her beliefs mostly true. The final constraint is that the normative element is unique to our ascriptions of the attitudes. Importantly, it is *not* a feature of physical and non-intentional ascriptions. So the claim is that "John believes that planets orbit around the sun" involves the normative element in question whereas nothing comparable is to be found in the claim, "Planets orbit around the sun."

3. What the Normative Element Is not

With these constraints in mind, let us consider several explications of this elusive "normative element." Here is one suggestion that Davidson himself considers but then rightfully rejects:

[W]hen we call an event an action, we are not, or not merely describing it, but are also judging it as good or bad, blameworthy or reasonable. (1973, 254)

On this view, the attribution of an intentional state is itself a normative remark or always accompanied by a conscious act of evaluating their contents. So on this view, we endorse or disapprove of the states we attribute ["Max believes that we should always help the poor." How noble!], or laud or criticize them for being rational or unreasonable ["Mariel has concluded that there is no highest prime number." How sensible!]. But this suggestion is precisely what the first constraint rules out. Now, we as attributors certainly judge a person's beliefs on occasion (especially among philosophers), but it overgeneralizes what is only a fragment of our practices. Most of the time we just report with complete neutrality; indeed, we can do this for those very same attributions we color with the added value judgment.

¹ Davidson's concerns lie with intentionality – beliefs and desires and other mental states that have content and are semantically evaluable – not with consciousness or the phenomenal aspects of experience.

² This is one significant point of difference between Davidson's characterization of the normativity of meaning and Kripke's and Brandom's reading of Wittgenstein's characterization (Kripke 1982; Brandom 1994).

4. What the Normative Element Is

There are four accounts that jointly compose Davidson's normative element. Let us begin with what I call the *evaluability thesis*:

Psychology, if it deals with propositional attitudes ... cannot be divorced from such questions as what constitutes a good argument or a valid inference, a rational plan, or a good reason for acting. (1974, 241)

I call this the *evaluability thesis* since the main idea is that our thoughts and actions are such that they are evaluable (as justified, valid, appropriate, and so on). This thesis does not run afoul of the first constraint for the plain reason that the normative element, under the evaluability thesis, is located in the thing that is attributed, not the attribution itself. Honoring other constraints, however, calls for emending the thesis. First, to conform to the second constraint, evaluability needs to be promoted to the status of an essential property. (Notice that evaluability would be a second-order property, for what is essential is the fact that mental states are (rationally) evaluable, not whatever first-order rational property a given state may have. In words, Max's belief that we should always help the poor may have the property of being a valid conclusion (given Max's other beliefs), but that belief does not have that first-order property essentially; rather it has the second-order property of being rationally evaluable as its essential property.) Conforming to the third constraint requires an explanation of what is so distinctive about the evaluability of the attitudes; after all, many non-intentional objects, such as table settings, clocks, and hearts and livers are also evaluable and, arguably, essentially so. The evaluability thesis, then, requires supplementation with other theses that can jointly honor the third constraint.

A different account is what I call the *use thesis*, so called because the idea is that we, as attributors, wield principles of rationality [of deductive and inductive logic, decision theory, and standards of veridical perception] in order to:

... criticize and advise others, or to modify our own beliefs and choices. (1990, 24)

Unlike the evaluability thesis, which locates the normative element in the objects of interpretation – the mental states themselves – here the normative element is located in the attributor's demonstrable use of the various epistemic norms. Such a concrete application of the norms serves to guide (for the better) the thoughts and actions of others as well as one's own self. Again, this thesis does not violate the first constraint, but like its predecessor, it needs further emending to satisfy the other two. As it stands, it does not explain how our practical use of rational principles is either constitutive of the attitudes or distinctive of them. But since it does not violate the constraints, we should not conclude that the use thesis is wrong; rather it indicates that it just cannot stand on its own.

The third account explicitly draws upon the two fundamental assumptions of Davidson's theory of the mind: first, that a mind is, for the most part, rational, and second, that the contents of our mental states are determined holistically. The rationality assumption is that we must interpret the content of a belief by placing it within a larger pattern of beliefs (desires and actions) whose contents rationally cohere with the content of the belief we wish to interpret. And the holism assumption is that a mental state derives the content that it has by playing its unique inferential role(s) within the network of the agent's total mental states. These assumptions explain the following important aspect of Davidson's normative element:

If someone believes that Tahiti is east of Honolulu, then she should believe that Honolulu is west of Tahiti. For this very reason, if we are certain she believes Honolulu is west of Tahiti, it is probably a mistake to interpret something she says as showing she also believes Tahiti is west of Honolulu. It is probably a mistake, not because it is an empirical fact that people seldom hold contradictory views, but because beliefs and other attitudes are largely identified by their logical and other relations to each other; change the relations, and you change the identity of the thought. (1990, 24)

Here, the normative element consists of the individuating role played by the norms or rationality. If it is the case that changing the inferential relations between the mental states of an individual is tantamount to changing their contents, then inferences that are *correct* to draw, the actions one rationally *ought* to perform, the beliefs that are evidentially or deductively *justified*, constitute the facts that serve as the individuation conditions for the content of an attributed thought. And as the conditions of individuation, these facts are essential to an individual's mental states and their attributed contents. Given the individual's other intentional states the content of a thought or the type of action performed is determined by its rational coherence with the totality of the agent's mental states. It is clear that this third account fully honors the second constraint. If the norms of rationality and the norms of concept application have an individuating role, then these norms clearly have a constitutive status. That it also satisfies the third constraint will be easier to see once we have the fourth account at hand.

So let us consider the final piece of the overall picture, which I call the *reflexivity thesis*:

Whatever is studied, the norms of the observer will be involved. But when what is studied is the mental, then the norms of the thing observed also enter. When thought takes thought as subject matter, the observer can only identify what he is studying by finding it rational – that is, in accord with his own standards of rationality. The astronomer and physicist are under no compulsion to find black holes or quarks to be rational entities. (1990, 25)

Here, we approach the heart of what Davidson gestures at when he talks about the normative component of the attitudes. This account satisfies the third constraint, and it is crucial to understand how. As Davidson points out, the normative element ultimately has its roots in the object of the interpreter's inquiry, which is another mind. Unlike black holes and quarks, which do not conform to norms, let alone the norms of rationality, a mind, by its very nature, has to conform to the norms of rationality. Otherwise, we are not dealing with a mind, should no or too few norms of rationality apply. Black holes and quarks certainly conform to laws – nomological principles – that support statements like "Light *ought* to bend in a black hole," but such uses of "ought" have no normative implications (see Brandom 1994, ch. 1). The mental states that make up a mind, on the other hand, are such that they bear normative relations among each other, since their very contents are individuated by the norms of rationality (which is clearly stated in the third account). And the observer of a person's mind must discern in the other's bodily movements and vocal utterances a rational pattern that is itself a pattern to which the observer (attributor, appraiser) must subscribe. Hence, insofar as the norms of rationality are reflexive – they constrain both the mental states of the interpreted mind as well as the process of interpretation engaged by the

interpreter herself – this aspect of the normative fully satisfies the third constraint.

Let us gather the four accounts together. On the view I develop of the normative element, it is not just one thing characterizable by one thesis. It involves several strands that are intricately tied together. Each of these strands are mutually supporting, so it is a mistake to try to derive a linear explanation of how they are organized. The norms of rationality that the observer uses must be the same norms that apply to the object of the observer's inquiry (the fourth account). This both supports and is supported by the fact that mental states are essentially evaluable along rational lines (the first account), and the fact that we who interpret those states must use the norms of rationality to grasp the objects of our inquiry – mental states – (the second account). These considerations again both support and are supported by the fact that the norms of rationality play an individuating role with respect to mental states and their contents (the third account).

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A Minimalist Ontology of Action

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There exists a venerable theory of action which, until relatively recently, constituted an almost unchallengeable orthodoxy. Alvin Goldman tells us that this theory “was once regarded as virtually self-evident by practically everyone” (Goldman, 68). This is the volitional theory of action; and its gist is that an event is an action if and only if it is appropriately caused by a volition or ‘act of will’. The many obscurities and inadequacies of this theory have been made clear in the twentieth century by Ludwig Wittgenstein and along similar lines by H. L. A. Hart and by Gilbert Ryle, amongst many others.

One of the most salient problems with the theory is its overcrowded ontology. First, and most obviously, the theory postulates the existence of a mysterious intentional state: volitions, which only relate to our bodily movements. We hardly ever experience such a state. Indeed, Michael Moore, the most important revivalist of the volitional theory admits that such a staple of the theory is suspicious:

to define acts like moving one’s hands in terms of duplicate mental acts of willing the movement seems an ontologically expensive way of gaining very little ground, for acting is still left unexplained. [...] And if one is willing to give a non actional account of the act of willing, why put in the extra act (i.e. of willing)? (Moore, 116).

To avoid the embarrassment of postulating mysterious acts of will, Moore suggests that volitions are nothing more than sub-types of intentions. And while this move might be seen as simplifying the ontology of action, Moore’s volitions are so different from ‘standard’ intentions that its simplifying work is negligible. After all, Moorean volitions, just like traditional volitions, can only be about bodily movements.

Alongside the well-known slogan that actions need to be caused by volitions, the volitional theory further complicates the ontology of action in ways which are not so obvious. It does so by requiring many different entities for the explanation of action. As John Austin, for example, put it:

The bodily movements which immediately follow our desires of them, are acts (properly so called). But every act is followed by *consequences*, and is also attended by *concomitants*, which are styled its *circumstances*. (Austin, 421)

The whole composed by all these elements is typically termed a ‘complex act’, or an ‘action’. Thus, the volitional theory presupposes an ontology with at least five different entities: (1) *sui generis* intentional states, (2) basic acts, (3) consequences of acts, (4) circumstances attending acts, and (5) actions.

I would like to defend a less complicated account of action. Thus, I am in principle sympathetic to the Davidsonian misgivings regarding the existence of “a class of intentional actions”, and to his extremely influential account of action tied to agency: “A person is the agent of an event if and only if there is a description of what he did that makes true a sentence that says that he did it intentionally”. Yet as Davidson himself admits: “this formulation, with its quantification over linguistic entities, cannot be considered entirely satisfactory” (Davidson, 46).

John Searle has taken Davidson’s own worry even further, as he claims that Davidson’s approach

produces such true but superficial results as that an action “can be intentional under one description, but not intentional under another” – one might as well say that a fire-engine is red under one description but not red under another. What one wants to know is: What facts are these various descriptions describing? (Searle 1984, 92)

I shall argue that Searle’s ontology of action, as I interpret it, is the best way to avoid both the overcrowded ontology of action of volitional theories and the reduction of the ontology of action to linguistic diatribes. I doubt that there is anything idiosyncratic or terribly contentious in my interpretation of Searle’s views, except, perhaps, for my insistence that his distinction between two types of intentions, which he calls “prior intentions” and “intentions-in action”, should be ignored.

As the labels suggest, of course, prior intentions are formed before acting, whereas intentions-in action are simultaneous with acting. Searle admits that while all actions involve intentions-in-action, not all have prior intentions; for the sake of simplicity I shall just discuss intentions simpliciter, (which would correspond to what Searle calls intentions-in-action). (See Zaibert 2003 and O’Shaughnessy 1991 for more on these two types of intentions). The fact that Searle himself frequently speaks of intentions simpliciter, rather than about prior intentions or intentions-in-action already supports my move, although Searle, moreover, has expressly admitted that in some contexts the distinction is not terribly important (Searle 1991). To hold fast to this distinction, in any case, might entail the sort of complicated ontology found in the volitional theory, which I wish to avoid.

The crucial first step of Searle’s method is to affirm that “an intentional action is simply the condition of satisfaction of an intention” (Searle 1984, 80). Having an intention to do X has as a condition of satisfaction that there be an *event* X in the world and that this *event* be caused by my intention to bring it about. This event could be a bodily movement, but it could be something else as well. What Searle has in mind is that the account of simple bodily movements is fundamentally the same as the account of complex act descriptions. In other words, Searle rejects the mainstay of volitional theories of actions according to which there are basic acts (mere bodily movements), and actions (complex descriptions of basic acts).

Complex intentions are those where the conditions of satisfaction include not just a bodily movement *a*, but some further components of the action, *b*, *c*, *d*, ..., which we intend to perform by way of (or by means of, or in, or by, etc.) performing *a*, *b*, *c*, ..., and the representations of both *a*, *b*, *c*, ... and the relations amongst them are included in the content of the complex intention (Searle 1984, 99).

In other words, complex acts are simply the conditions of satisfaction of complex intentions, and simple acts are the condition of satisfactions of simple intentions. Yet, Searle’s distinction between simple and complex intentions in no way depends upon metaphysical distinctions which might

In spite of these strengths, Searle's humble admission as to his inability to distinguish unintentional actions from non-actions puts him in close company with the volitional theory, for the latter seems incapable of doing just that. The beginning of wisdom is to heed the distinction between intendedness and intentionality. What Searle means is that none of these extra descriptions were part of Princip's complex intention, and thus, none of them are *intended* actions of his. But clearly they could in some cases be considered, from the normative perspective, intentional actions, in the sense that they might be considered very blameworthy. Searle is absolutely correct in that the boundaries of the complex intention constitute the boundaries of the accordion of *intended* action – this is purely a descriptive matter. Insofar as the term 'intentional' is typically (and so has been historically) used in ways which conflate both descriptive and normative aspects, however, it is not correct to say that the boundaries of the complex intention are also the boundaries of intentional action.

Imagine, for example, that aside from Princip's complex intention, which, by stipulation, only contains the events appearing in the original list, Princip was aware that by carrying out his complex intention it was practically certain that he was going to ruin Lord Grey's Summer season. This would be a case of acting with an oblique intention, in Bentham's sense, or acting knowingly, or with *dolus eventualis*, in the terms of contemporary theories of culpability, and thus it would be a case of intentional (not intended) action, almost as blameworthy as cases of direct intention.

The distinction between intentional and unintentional is, unlike the distinction between intended and unintended, a normative affair. Similarly, the distinction between unintentional actions and not-even-actions is also a normative affair. A robust ontology of action should do justice to these facts, and the best way of doing so is to supplement a parsimonious ontology of action with the unavoidable normative elements present in our assessing human action.

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Wittgenstein on the Fallacy of the Argument from Pretence

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The argument from expressions

This argument entails an account of other-ascriptions of psychological states (hereafter referred to as p-states). When we ascribe a p-state to someone, we refer to a person's expressions of feelings such as his facial expression, the look in his eyes, his tone of voice, the combination of his body movements, what he says. These expressions provide evidence for ascriptions of p-states.

Wittgenstein provides a psychological argument in favour of the claim that we acquire information on people's p-states and that this information licenses knowledge claims such as "he is happy", "he is in pain", "he is glad to see her". The argument counters the sceptic's claim that any expression of feeling can always be pretended by arguing that expressions are part of the p-state itself and, as such, are evidence for someone's being in a p-state. The argument claims that genuine bodily and linguistic expressions are natural signs of a person's p-state. Wittgenstein says:

[T]he personal experiences of an emotion must in part be strictly localized experiences; for if I frown in anger I feel the muscular tension of the frown in my forehead, and if I weep, the sensations around my eyes are obviously part, and an important part, of what I feel. (Wittgenstein 1958, 103)

Nevertheless, Wittgenstein thinks that such an account of expressions as natural signs is often underestimated, in favour of the idea that expressions are mere devices which enable the subject to externalise his p-state. Wittgenstein acknowledges that there is no sharp dividing line between natural and artificial expressions of feeling. This is confirmed by the fact that most of these expressions may successfully be feigned. In that case, what we consider to be evidence of a p-state is not a natural sign but a device for deceiving an observer.

Consider a situation in which such a device is deployed. Martin knows that on the occasion of the annual meeting of the *Aristotelian Society* he will meet his friend Robert. They used to be close friends but, owing to a quarrel they had some years ago, Martin could no longer be friendly with Robert. Nevertheless, Martin knows that openly hostile behaviour would be thought of negatively by his colleagues. So he decides to hide his feelings and to feign pleasure upon meeting Robert. Thus, when Martin meets Robert, he greets him warmly.

A person who observes the scene will be disposed to claim that Martin is glad to see Robert. What justifies this claim is the observer's having good reason for that thought. Here justification is provided by the observer's experience that criteria for someone being glad are satisfied. In this case, the satisfaction of criteria consists of the mere fact that Martin's observed behaviour fulfils a convention on how people behave when they are glad to meet someone.

This episode confirms that an expression of feeling can be feigned successfully. This casts a sceptical light on the information one gets from experiencing the satisfaction of criteria. *Criteria knowledge* is actually a type of knowledge open to defeat coming from further experience; evidence

which is not considered when the observer originally claimed, or was disposed to claim, that Martin was glad to meet Robert. This means that experiencing the satisfaction of criteria provides the observer with information; such information can be revised in the light of a new, as yet unconsidered, experience.

Imagine that after attending the meeting between the two friends, the observer acquires additional information about their previous quarrel. Furthermore, he listens to a conversation in which Martin expresses his dislike for Robert. This information defeats the observer's previous claim that Martin was glad to meet Robert, and leads him to think that – for some reason – Martin was feigning his pleasure. This means that the former claim, although perfectly justified by the satisfaction of criteria, is defeated by information provided from further experience.

The possibility of pretence seems to discredit the reliability of these claims, which are justified by the satisfaction of criteria. In particular, the possibility of pretence lends viability to the idea that knowledge of other p-states is beyond the reach of our cognitive capacities. Wittgenstein has no definitive position on this issue. While in the *Philosophical Investigations* he acknowledges there is something as a content of experience which is absolutely private and subjective (Wittgenstein 1951, § 293), in his last writings he seems less keen on this idea. He is keen to show that other-ascriptions are perfectly justified and, as such, provide information on people's p-states. This information is a kind of *criteria knowledge*, whose main feature is to be defeasible in the light of new experience.

Crispin Wright, in his discussion of this issue, considers defeasibility an essential character of assertions on other minds and past events. The idea is that assertion has a *consequential character* (Wright 1984), which licenses some expectations about possible states of affairs deriving from or related to the original act of asserting. Those expectations include any new experience or any development of a state of affairs which defeats a former assertion. This does not make the original assertion merely probable – a sort of hypothesis waiting for further confirmation – but rather the assertion still carries information provided by the experience of the satisfaction of criteria. The question here is whether an assertion such as "Martin is glad to see Robert" provides information on the observer's experience of satisfaction of criteria or, rather, about Martin's p-state. The experience of criteria being satisfied justifies the claim that Martin is glad to meet Robert, even though this claim may be subject to withdrawal in the light of further *defeating factors* such as, for instance, the observer discovering that Martin was feigning his pleasure. All of this shows that assertions about other minds are justified by the experience of the satisfaction of criteria; this experience in turn provides information which is always open to be defeated by further experience.

The argument from expressions does not provide any knock-down answer to the sceptic's claim that what one knows from the satisfaction of criteria can be nothing but a mere appearance (McDowell 1982). Nevertheless, it suggests a different account of other-ascriptions. Since we cannot establish any necessary link between one's behaviour and one's true p-states, we have to consider the

practice of making assertions on other minds as intrinsically defeasible by information coming from further experience.

The possibility of pretence seems to be one of the main *defeating factors*. But, as it will be shown by the argument from pretence, pretence-ascriptions are justified by the same kind of evidence which justifies other-ascriptions of p-states – the same p-ascriptions that the pretence is meant to defeat. As I will argue in the next section, this leaves room for a contradiction that weakens the power of the sceptic's claim.

The argument from pretence

Wittgenstein considers pretence to be a p-state. This means that the predicate 'to pretend' is ascribed on the basis of evidence provided by someone's behavior. On this premise, Wittgenstein argues that the sceptic's claim implies a contradiction. In a passage from the *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology*, Wittgenstein remarks:

Do not look at the pretending as an embarrassing appendage, as a disruption of the pattern.

One can say "He is hiding his feelings". But that means that it is not a priori they are always hidden. Or: There are two statements contradicting one another: one is that feelings are essentially hidden; the other, that someone is hiding his feelings from me.

If I can never know what he is feeling, then neither can he pretend. (Wittgenstein 1992, 35)

Wittgenstein thinks that the sceptic holds two contradictory propositions. The first can be phrased thus:

(P1) other-ascriptions of p-states can always be defeated by *defeating factors* such as pretence, illusion, deception, hiding, and the like.

(P1) corresponds to Wittgenstein's claim that feelings are essentially hidden. This enables the sceptic to say that one can never know with certainty whether a person is really in a p-state. Thus, in front of a particular person, the sceptic will be inclined to claim a proposition such as

(P2) Martin is pretending to be in a p-state.

(P2) corresponds to Wittgenstein's claim that someone is hiding his feelings from someone else. Wittgenstein envisages a contradiction between (P1) and (P2). The contradiction becomes evident as soon as one tries to say that (P2) is not simply a rephrasing of (P1) but is a *justified statement*. I will examine this suggestion in detail.

The meaning of (P1) is that every expression of feeling can be feigned. Thus there is no way of knowing with certainty people's true p-states. This is consistent with the sceptic's disposition to say that people in general, and Martin in particular, can always pretend their p-states. According to this view, (P1) says that other-ascription can always be defeated by *defeating factors* such as pretence, illusion, deception, hiding and so forth. Here one can reasonably ask on what basis the sceptic holds (P1). At first glance, (P1) is justified by the experience that other-ascriptions are normally defeasible. But this does not respect the sceptic's point of view: if one wishes to preserve the coherence of the sceptic's attitude, then one has to consider (P1) as an *a priori* proposition, namely as a proposition that the sceptic holds independently of any experience.

This is a necessary condition. Since the sceptic claims that one cannot know with certainty people's true p-states, he does not base (P1) on any information gathered from people's behaviour. This means that if the sceptic really wants to be consistent with (P1), he is compelled to take seriously the fact that any other-ascription is defeasible and hence unreliable. Because of this, justification for holding with (P1) cannot come from experience of the satisfaction of criteria. Then the sceptic must hold with (P1) *a priori*, without relying on the justificatory role of experience. It worth noting that, if we accept this view, the *a priori* justification the sceptic needs remains obscure.

What I have observed so far leaves another aspect unclear: the linguistic status of (P2). It is arguable that, if the sceptic really wants to hold with (P1), (P2) cannot be in any way asserted. This is because the act of asserting entails justification, such as the utterer having evidence that Martin is pretending his feelings. This entails that the sceptic relies on Martin's behaviour as a compound of evidence revealing his p-state. But the sceptic who really wants to hold with (P1) and acts accordingly cannot rely on anybody's behaviour since, as we have seen, expressions of p-states are essentially defeasible and unreliable. From this, it can be derived that the sceptic cannot make any justified assertion on other minds. Then the only way to hold with (P2) without countering what (P1) prescribes is to consider (P2) as a mere rephrasing of (P1). In this case, (P2) is deprived of any informative value. This paradoxical outcome has the only virtue of preserving the inner coherence of the sceptic's attitude. Nevertheless, this has the obvious consequence of depriving the sceptic's point of view of any philosophical appeal.

Wittgenstein thinks that the fallacy is revealed as soon as the sceptic leaves his isolation and tries to assert (P2) on a correct evidential basis. In this case, it seems impossible to hold with (P1) and at the same time assert (P2). A genuine assertion needs to be justified - for instance a genuine other-ascription is justified by the experience of the satisfaction of criteria. Then if (P2) is asserted, it needs to be justified. This leads to the following scenario: we have (P1) which constrains the assertion of (P2) and says that it cannot be justified by anything in the present state of affairs. If one accepts this constraint, it seems that the only way the sceptic can justify (P2) is by referring to some background reasons – reasons which are independent of the present situation and which license the assertion. For instance, the sceptic can refer to indirect evidence that people can pretend to be in p-states – for instance by providing examples of pretence.

This move leads the sceptic straight into contradiction. Pretence is indeed a p-state which one can recognise on the basis of a person's behaviour. Thus the sceptic is justified in claiming that it is possible to pretend p-states by virtue of his experience that people pretend to be in p-states. This would make (P2) a statement asserting a conclusion drawn from people's behaviour. But one has to acknowledge that the way in which the sceptic obtains justification for asserting (P2) counters (P1). This is because, in order to justifiably assert (P2), the sceptic needs to experience people's pretending to be in p-states and this presupposes that he relies on their expressions of feelings and emotions. As we have seen, such reliance is excluded by (P1).

This shows that there is no way of asserting (P2) and, at the same time, being consistent with the *a priori* proposition that expresses the sceptic's point of view. The argument shows that if one takes (P1) to be a premise

from which one derives one's epistemic standing, one cannot make any genuine assertion. This is inconsistent with the requirement that any assertion about other minds, as well as assertions about someone feigning his p-state, need to be justified by evidence drawn from experience.

Conclusions

The first argument introduces the idea that *criteria knowledge* can always be defeated by further experience. This casts a sceptical light on the reliability of other-ascriptions. The second argument shows that recognising that a *defeating factor* can occur brings with it the fact that one experiences that criteria for *defeaters* are satisfied. This means that, if the sceptic really wants to assert (P2), he needs a certain degree of justification. Here, justification is provided by the same bodily and linguistic behaviour, which licenses any other-ascription. In other words, what justifies the doubt or even the certainty that some defeating factors occur, is experience of the satisfaction of criteria. This is because *defeating factors* are recognised on the same evidential basis as those p-states that they are meant to defeat. This is consistent with the idea that a *defeater* is information gathered from people's observable states, which counters a former ascription of p-states. The occurrence of a *defeater* is within the range of the expectations licensed by the former ascription.

The fallacy Wittgenstein envisages is the contradiction between the *a priori* status of the sceptic's point of view expressed by (P1) and the *a posteriori* conditions, which justify assertions about other minds, or retractions of those assertions. From Wittgenstein's point of view, what the sceptic fails to see is that, even though other-ascriptions are *a priori* defeasible, conditions for asserting that some defeats occur are *a posteriori*, namely depending on the utterer's experience that *defeating factors* exist.

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On the Relation Between Metaphysics and Epistemology. From Husserlian Antirealism to Analytic Antimetaphysicalism and the Alternative of Epistemic Externalism

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1. Metaphysics and Epistemology

The metaphysical debate between realism and antirealism concerns the relation between the world and our knowledge of it. The relation between the world and our knowledge of the world is an issue because of the trivial fact that we have to know how the world is to know how the world is. This triviality is founded on the world being a *theoretical* concern of philosophy. And that there is a relation between the world and our knowledge of it follows from the fact that the world and our knowledge of the world are not identical while our knowledge of the world is intentionally related to the world. Yet this relation is more than the relation of intentionality since knowledge entails truth and not simply reference to something in the world.

Realism is then the rather natural position that the way the world is is independent of our knowledge of it. This position is natural in the sense that lacking any reasons to the contrary we have no motive to claim a dependence of the world on our knowledge of it. Quite on the contrary in isolation of such reasons this idea appears rather preposterous. The world may be dependent on us in that we change it but we have no evidence that our *knowledge* of the world would in any way determine the way the world is. The reverse dependence on the other hand of our knowledge on the world is an ingredient in our very concept of knowledge that it is knowledge of the world and that it is in that sense informed by the world.

Now what kind of reasons inform antirealism? What tells for a dependence of the world on our knowledge of it? It cannot be an experiential discovery that in our knowledge we incorporate aspects that do not belong to the world. For in that case we would be in the position to determine these aspects and to correspondingly change our beliefs about the world which would leave the world independent of our knowledge of it. The only reason I can imagine is that knowledge requires such dependence. Thus it has to be made out a problem for knowledge for realism. Since realism is only characterized by the world's independence of our knowledge about it the problem has to reside in this independence.

If the world is independent of our knowledge of it then the metaphysical *possibility* arises that the world is different from what we believe it to be. Thus our knowledge may be systematically false so that our knowledge would reveal to be only a claim to knowledge. The world's independence of our knowledge of it means then that the truth in knowledge is independent of our beliefs and of what makes the difference between a true belief and knowledge which latter is commonly called justification or warrant.

That truths are independent of beliefs in the sense that not all beliefs are true beliefs is obvious. Yet truth's independence of the justification or the warrant for a belief reveals an important presupposition in this argument for the problematicity of knowledge. This presupposition is

epistemic internalism. Epistemic internalism has it that we have to have reflective or introspective access to what determines whether a true belief amounts to knowledge. Since such reflective or introspective evidence for a belief may exist without this belief being true the internalist account of justification or warrant doesn't suspend the independence of truth. On the contrary position of *epistemic externalism* truth has not to be independent of justification or warrant. On an externalist account justification and warrant can be truth-conducive since they are not confined to what is reflectively or introspectively accessible. Thus on an externalist account arises the possibility that justification or warrant make it that many of our warranted or justified beliefs are true. Then truth's independence of what makes the difference between a true belief and knowledge is suspended and the problem for knowledge doesn't arise.

Yet the argument for the problematicity of knowledge has another twist which appears to block this epistemic externalist option. For according to the epistemic externalist proposal knowledge exists only if justification or warrant actually is truth-conducive. But how can we tell whether this is the case? Any reason on behalf of the truth-conducivity of justification or warrant has to depend on the truth-conducivity of justification or warrant and this is although not bluntly circular epistemically circular. Hence the possibility of truth's independence of justification or warrant still functions as a defeater for our belief in the existence of knowledge and it can only be suspended when we can *reveal* that justification or warrant actually is truth-conducive. And this epistemic externalism doesn't achieve since epistemic justification or warrant on this account is not generally reflectively or introspectively accessible.

It will not have gone unnoticed that this argument for the problematicity of knowledge under realism is a form of the sceptical challenge. For sceptical scenarios exhibit and thus depend on truth's independence of warrant or justification. The reason for the foundering of the epistemic externalist strategy against the sceptical challenge is then that the dialectical situation the sceptical argument imposes commits to epistemically internalist standards which epistemic externalism cannot comply with. And since this doesn't amount to the mere presupposition of epistemic internalism one cannot accuse the sceptical argumentation of committing a petitio. (In *Zdunek forthcoming I* investigate more thoroughly the dialectic of sceptical arguments of the Cartesian guise.) Thus realism appears to be cursed with the sceptical problem of the existence of knowledge. As to solutions to this problem for knowledge under realism I proceed to the discussion of Husserl's phenomenology and of analytic philosophy.

2. Husserl's Antirealist Solution to the Sceptical Challenge

Husserl's later philosophy is driven by the problem of knowledge in form of the sceptical challenge in the Car-

tesian guise (cf. Husserl 1982, 1986, 1987, 1990). As the source of the sceptical problem he diagnoses the conception of knowledge as aiming at a world that transcends our consciousness as the realm of our justified or warranted experiences. This diagnosis of the sceptical challenge for knowledge fits well with the systematic exposition of the problem of knowledge under realism given above. The transcendence of the world is truth's independence of justification or warrant. Consciousness as the realm of our justified or warranted experiences entails an epistemically internalist conception of justification or warrant. Thus all our knowledge about the world could be false and thus be only a claim to knowledge.

Husserl's first reaction is to restrict knowledge to what is not transcendent, that is to what belongs to consciousness, and to suspend all claims to knowledge of transcendent objects. This is his phenomenological reduction. Yet the second step is a new assessment of the conception of a transcendent world that led to the sceptical problem in the first instance. He contends this conception to be senseless. He argues that the idea of transcendence belongs to our consciousness. From hence he suggests that the transcendent world is itself constituted by consciousness and thus never transcends consciousness. This solves the sceptical problem since the allegedly transcendent has been revealed to belong to consciousness, to the realm of the epistemic, so that there is no obstacle to having knowledge of it. It follows that the world is not independent of the way we know and experience it. This amounts to antirealism. Antirealism is thus a solution to the problem of how we can have knowledge of the world which transcends the realm of the epistemic, of our argued, justified or warranted beliefs.

Kant was led in a similar way to antirealism. To Kant has to be ascribed the idea of changing the conception to reality to solve the problem of knowledge. But Kant was not so much driven by the sceptical challenge to knowledge but rather by the restricted problem of the explanation of synthetic a priori knowledge whose existence he took for granted. It has to be added that in the refutation of idealism in the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant nevertheless argues that antirealism is the only possible solution to the sceptical challenge (A 378).

3. Antimetaphysicalism in Analytic Philosophy

In *Der logische Aufbau der Welt* Carnap dismisses the metaphysical conceptions of realism, idealism and phenomenalism (by which he means the Kantian transcendental idealism resp. empirical realism, thus a form of antirealism) because these distinctions cannot be reconstructed in his constitutional system. This argument is not circular because he takes his constitutional method to be formal and its possible application to be a condition for scientific respectability. Later in his *Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology* he distinguishes between propositions about a framework for propositions and propositions within a specific framework under the heading of external and internal propositions. He argues that any epistemically decidable question has to be formulated as an internal proposition so that external propositions are not epistemically decidable but are due to practical concerns. And the conceptions of realism and (subjective) idealism belong to the realm of frameworks. Thus Carnap's solution is antimetaphysical, he denies that metaphysical distinctions have any meaning in the first instance.

The reductionism of Carnap's *Aufbau* foundered (cf. Quine 1953 [1951]). Hence his antimetaphysical strategy doesn't work. Epistemic holism was put in place of a foundationalist reconstruction of our knowledge of the world. Under a holist conception of epistemic justification, it has been argued (cf. Quine 1975), the sceptical challenge doesn't get off the ground. For within a holist conception of knowledge reasoned doubt cast on any knowledge claim depends on other knowledge. Hence one can put any knowledge claim into jeopardy but not all at once (cf. Sellars 1963 [1956], end of sect. VIII "Does Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?"). Yet the latter is what the sceptical challenge aims at.

Yet as long as realism is believed tenable this holist strategy is not successful. For the holist thesis concerns internalist evidence and only amounts to a different conception of the architecture of justification in comparison with foundationalism. According to the thesis of epistemic holism the presupposed knowledge in any reasoning may be only a knowledge claim without being true since according to realism truth is independent of our justified or warranted beliefs, however the architecture of justification is.

Now the metaphysical issue comes to the fore in the analysis of reference. And within the analysis of reference by the thesis of ontological relativity an antimetaphysical rationale is gained again. Quine rehabilitated ontology in analytic philosophy in the specific sense of the question of what there is by claiming that referential expressions in a language or theory (the variables in a canonical language) determine the ontology of the language or theory (cf. Quine 1953 [1948]). One may be inclined to connect with an ontology a realist commitment. Yet Quine undermines this realist commitment by his argument for ontological relativity (cf. Quine 1969). According to this argument there is no fact of the matter as to what a referential expression refers apart from the language or theory that commits to an ontology. The argument proceeds by the systematic exchange of the referents of referential expressions and of the extensions of predicates such that the sentences at issue remain true. Quine argues that there is no empirical difference on any such interpretation of a language or theory because the evidence for such a distinction changes as well in the same systematic manner. Now Quine doesn't conclude that the world is dependent on our knowledge and thus doesn't end with antirealism. He takes ontological relativity rather to be evidence that reference apart from a language or theory is meaningless. Thus Quine ends with antimetaphysicalism. Realism informing the sceptical rationale is blocked. There is no defeater any more to our belief in the existence of knowledge.

4. Realism Within Epistemic Externalism

If the antimetaphysical solution to the problem of knowledge within realism is to undermine metaphysical distinctions and with it the conception of realism and if the antirealist solution is to internalise the external presupposed by realism, the epistemic externalist solution is to externalise the internal by proposing that justification or warrant is not confined to consciousness, to what is reflectively or introspectively accessible, but may be constituted by relations to the world. Realism is preserved under such a conception of justification or warrant.

I yet noticed (sect. 1) that epistemic externalism cannot comply with the internalist requirements which the sceptical dialectic imposes, that epistemic externalism cannot non-circularly reveal that there actually are truth-

conducive relations. On the other hand as well the sceptical conclusion that there is no knowledge doesn't follow. And it may well be the case that we have knowledge. This depends on whether it is actually the case that our justified or warranted beliefs are truth-conducive. Epistemic externalism allows the modest position regarding the problem of knowledge posed by realism that our epistemic situation is such that we may well have knowledge, which depends on how the world is, and that we are in no position to ascertain this in a non-circular way.

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Visuelle Erfahrung und Kompetenz im künstlerischen Feld

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Die Annahme, dass Bilder eine Art "Lingua franca" seien, die eine transkulturelle Kommunikation und Weise der Welterzeugung ermöglichen könnten, wurde von der semiotischen Bildtheorie bereits in den 1960er Jahren hinterfragt. Bilder sehen und verstehen ist das Ergebnis einer *Kulturtechnik*. Wollen wir diese Einsicht besser begreifen, so müssen wir uns mit der visuellen Erfahrung bzw. mit dem Wahrnehmungs- und Verstehensakt näher befassen.

1. Untersuchung des Wahrnehmungsbegriffs

In der neueren philosophischen Forschung besteht ein Konsens darüber, dass der Wahrnehmungsakt weder ein rein produktiver noch ein rein rezeptiver Vorgang ist. Es ist hier von einem Akt und nicht bloß von einem Sinnesreiz die Rede, weil die Wahrnehmung eine Form von *sozialem Handeln* ist. Sie ist sozial, weil Bilder und Blicke, Sichtbares und Sehgewohnheiten sozial konstituiert werden. Wie jedes soziale Handeln sind das Sehen, das Beobachten und das Betrachten niemals unspezifisch und universell. Ihre Entstehung und ihre Ergebnisse hängen von unterschiedlichen Faktoren ab:

- (a) von den Produktionsbedingungen des Sichtbaren und der Konstitution des Sehfeldes,
- (b) von der medialen Form und kulturellen Vermittlungsweise des Sichtbaren und
- (c) von der Disposition und Kompetenz des Individuums. (Hier spielen Konzepte wie Leiblichkeit, Verstehenshorizont, Intentionalität und Teleoaffektivität eine wichtige Rolle.)

Bilder können verschiedene Bedeutungen transportieren und in mannigfaltigen Weisen funktionieren. Es kommt nicht von ungefähr, dass sie unterschiedlich wirken. Das Ergebnis des Wahrnehmungsaktes ist folglich kontingent, das heißt manipulierbar, instabil und kontextsensitiv. Der Wahrnehmungsakt lässt sich daher nicht auf eine bestimmte, lokalisierbare Grundlage (z.B. "soziale Klasse", "Geschlecht") oder auf einen individuellen Träger (ein „Subjekt“) zurückführen.

Wenn wir die Wahrnehmung als *interaktiven Akt* auffassen, dann müssen wir uns auch mit dem Wahrnehmungsobjekt auseinander setzen, also mit dem, was wir anschauen und was uns zugleich erblickt. Dies ist unabdingbar, weil selbst einE eingefleischteR EmpiristIn zugeben würde, dass der Wahrnehmungsakt nicht nur aus sinnlichen Reizen besteht.¹ Das bedeutet, wir sind keine passiven EmpfängerInnen eines äußeren Gegenstandes, der in uns visuell eindringt. Ebenso wenig endet der Wahrnehmungsakt mit der Identifikation des Wahrgenommenen mit einem Begriff (d.h. mit der Benennung des Bildinhaltes). Was wir wahrnehmen ist vielmehr ein *Set von Relationen*, das grundsätzlich mehrere Bedeutungsfelder generiert. Darum ist Wahrnehmung mit Deu-

tung verknüpft und da, wo Be-Deutung entsteht, ist auch ein Praxisfeld, ein praktischer Hintergrund zu finden, der dem Wahrnehmungsakt vorangeht und ihn vorstrukturiert.

Wahrnehmung als Handlung begriffen verweist weiter auf eine Disposition, nämlich die Fähigkeit, gewisse Aufgaben zu lösen und vielleicht sogar besser zu lösen als andere. Diese Potentialität impliziert nicht nur mehr Wissen, sondern auch mehr Können. Hier stoßen wir auf eine erste Vorstellung von Kompetenz: einer Kompetenz im Hinblick auf die Beherrschung einer Kulturtechnik. Sehen als kulturell generierte Fähigkeit ist stets *spezifisch* und *praxisbezogen*. Die visuelle Kompetenz einer Medien-Designerin ist eine andere als die einer Radiologin, eines Ausstellungskurators oder eines Jägers.

2. Auslegung des Kompetenzbegriffs

Überall, wo ein Kompetenzbegriff auftaucht, gibt es im Hintergrund auch einen Geltungsanspruch. Die visuelle Kompetenz einer Radiologin geht mit dem Anspruch einher, eine bestimmte Praxis zu beherrschen – nämlich die diagnostisch richtige Interpretation von Röntgenbildern. Würde man solche Geltungsansprüche als rein rhetorische Effekte und als bloße Machtambition qualifizieren, dann hieße das, die gesamte Dimension der betreffenden Praxis ausschließlich diskursiv und externalistisch zu deuten. Es bestünde in diesem Fall die Gefahr einer Verkürzung des Kompetenzbegriffs und der konkreten Praktiken. Praktisches Wissen existiert manchmal in relativer Unabhängigkeit zum diskursiven Raum, weil es unterschiedliche Aggregatsformen von Wissen gibt (siehe Wittgenstein 1977, § 78; Ryle 1969, 26ff.) – denken Sie beispielsweise an die Eleganz und Flüssigkeit der Bewegungen eines geübten Tangotänzers, an die Fingerfertigkeit einer professionellen KlavierspielerIn oder an die leibliche Intelligenz von Dick Fosbury, der Mitte der 1960er Jahre eine vollkommen neue Form des Hochspringens erfand.

Wenn es tatsächlich begründet ist, Sehen als ein Können aufzufassen und es in der Folge mit einem Kompetenzbegriff zu assoziieren, dann sollten wir folgende Frage diskutieren: Woraus besteht eine solche Kompetenz und wie wird sie ausgebildet? Es ist natürlich unmöglich im Rahmen dieses kurzen Artikels eine fertige Antwort zu präsentieren. Ich werde dennoch einige Überlegungen zur epistemologischen und soziologischen Dimension der visuellen Kompetenz formulieren.

Visuelle Kompetenz kann nur in Relation zu einer konkreten Praxis sinnvoll untersucht werden, denn es kann keine universelle, zeitlose und kulturtranszendente Kompetenz geben. Der notwendige Bezug auf eine konkrete Praxis zwingt uns zu einer klaren Einschränkung; ich werde daher von nun an ausschließlich von der Wahrnehmung im künstlerischen Feld sprechen.

KunsthistorikerInnen, Medien- und BildwissenschaftlerInnen organisieren regelmäßig Symposien über Wahrnehmungsfragen, weil ihre Probleme keinesfalls trivial sind. Der Wahrnehmungsprozess stellt eine Herausforderung dar – oder mit den Worten Merleau-Pontys (1966, 82): "Nichts ist schwerer zu wissen, als was wir eigentlich sehen." In der theoretischen Auseinandersetzung mit diesem Themenkomplex wird eine wichtige

¹ Der Empirismus neigt zur ontologischen Existenzbehauptung einer unabhängigen Welt, die sinnlich erschlossen wird, während der Idealismus für die Autonomie mentaler Prozesse argumentiert. Kritik an beiden Positionen übten mehrere PhilosophInnen des 20. Jahrhunderts, sodass es nicht notwendig ist, die Problematik nochmals auszulegen.

Präsupposition getroffen: Statische wie bewegte Bilder und in der weiteren Folge auch Kunstwerke bzw. künstlerische Leistungen sind zeichen- und bedeutungstheoretisch "dichte" Gebilde, die in einem Netz von multiplen Assoziationsketten verwoben sind (siehe Goodman 1995). Aus diesem Grund behandeln wir Kunstwerke unweigerlich als *Wissensgegenstände*.

Visuelle Kompetenz bedeutet in diesem Zusammenhang Einsicht in den Kontext, das heißt in die Entstehungs- und Rezeptionsbedingungen von Bildern. Aber sind wir alle der gleichen Meinung, was Kontext bedeutet? Es gibt gegenwärtig zwei verschiedene Positionen: Der Poststrukturalismus und große Teile der Hermeneutik betrachten kulturelle Phänomene (und damit auch visuelle Gegenstände) als eine Menge von "textuellen Zusammenhängen". Daher interpretieren sie Kontext als textuelles Gewebe bzw. als Intertextualität (siehe z.B. Ricoeur 1972, Barthes 1977). Andere, vor allem MarxistInnen und WittgensteinianerInnen, betonen die Verwebung von Gegenständen mit einer "Praxis" bzw. einer "Lebensform" (siehe z.B. Gramsci 1991, Schatzki 1996). Kontext bedeutet für sie Handlungsrahmen, das heißt eine Anzahl von strukturierten Gewohnheiten, sozialen Konventionen, Regeln und Institutionen.

Ohne die Bedeutung des Textualitätsparadigmas zu negieren, wende ich mich hier gegen eine Verabsolutierung der Textualität der Bilder sowie gegen die Interpretation der Kontextualität als Intertextualität. Ich sehe den Kontext und die Kontextanalyse eher als eine heuristische Konstruktion, die im Verlauf des Forschungsprozesses mit dem Zweck formiert wird, die Erklärung und Interpretation eines Gegenstandes zu steuern (siehe Zembylas 2001, 233-243).

Wenn wir visuelle Kompetenz im künstlerischen Feld als Einsicht in den Kontext, d.h. in die Entstehungs- und Rezeptionsbedingungen von Bildern definieren, so sind dabei folgende Merkmale zu erwähnen:

- Einsicht in die verschiedenen Visualisierungsformen und Bildfunktionen im künstlerischen Feld. Hier ist nicht bloß die Kenntnis einschlägiger Kategorien der Bildanalyse und Bildinterpretation gemeint. Vielmehr geht es um die Bewusstmachung der Wechselwirkung zwischen dem Bild (oder Objekt), dem Umfeld und der kinästhetischen Wahrnehmung. Zwischen dem Bild und dem Blick des/der Betrachters/in baut sich eine legitime differenzielle Spannung auf, die ein breites Spektrum von Akten des Verstehens und Missverstehens eröffnet. Legitim ist diese Spannung, weil durch die Zusammenkunft von Bild, Umfeld und Blick kulturell und sozial generierte Differenzen wirksam werden. Verstehen und Missverstehen sind also zentrale Kategorien, die den Begriff von visueller Kompetenz konstituieren (siehe Scholz 1998, 105-117).
- Erkennen von Präsentationstechniken, die Sichtbares und Unsichtbares – zwei Seiten der selben Medaille, denn "das Sichtbare [geht] schwanger mit dem Unsichtbaren" (Merleau-Ponty 1986, 269) – strukturieren. Dazu gehört ein Wissen über die Bedingungen der Sichtbarkeit und Sichtbarmachung, d.h. eine Einsicht in die unterschiedlichen Ausstellungstechniken (wie z.B. architektonische Merkmale, Hängetechniken, Beleuchtungsmodi) und in kuratorische Eingriffe (Ausstellungsordnung, exegetische Texte oder die Abwesenheit von solchen Texten).
- Erfassen der Sehbereitschaft der FeldteilnehmerInnen und Einsicht in die relevanten Wahrnehmungsgewohnheiten und Denkstile. (Der Begriff des Denkstils

meint ein "gerichtetes Wahrnehmen mit entsprechendem gedanklichen und sachlichen Verarbeiten des Wahrgenommenen" (Fleck 1981, 130.) Nicht nur die Gerichtetheit des Wahrnehmungsaktes wird durch den Denkstil bestimmt, sondern auch die daran anschließende Urteilskraft. Wahrnehmung ist daher ein sozialer Akt.

Wir kommen hier zu einer zentralen Schlussfolgerung: Es gibt keine Wahrnehmung im künstlerischen Feld ohne kulturelle Vermittlung. Ich möchte daher das berühmte Zitat des amerikanischen Künstlers Frank Stella "You see what you see" (Stella in Glaser 1998, 46f.) umkehren, weil es in dieser Satzaussage keine stabilen Komposita gibt: Weder das "You" (also die Identität des Subjekts), noch das "What", (das wahrgenommene Objekt), noch der Sehtakt als Prozess weisen eine Konstanz auf. Daher: "You never see what you see".

3. Die praktische Dimension der visuellen Kompetenz

Die genannten Aspekte der visuellen Kompetenz fallen in den analytischen Bereich unserer Kognition. Dennoch: Da, wo es um geschulte Wahrnehmung geht, gibt es eine epistemische Differenz, die man am besten mit den Worten des ungarischen Philosophen Michael Polanyi (1985, 14) so fassen könnte: "Wir wissen mehr als wir zu sagen wissen." Das heißt, das notwendige Wissen, welches eine visuelle Kompetenz generiert, ist breiter als das Feld des begrifflichen Wissens. Dieses Mehr-Wissen entsteht aus einem Bündel von praktischen Erfahrungen und Fähigkeiten, die sich erst im Vollzug einer Tätigkeit – im Bildherstellen oder im Bildverstehen – offenbart. Da sich dieses Wissen primär praktisch zeigt und darüber hinaus nicht immer versprachlicht werden kann, hat es keine fixierte und stabile Gestalt. Polanyi spricht folglich von "tacit knowledge", von einem stillen, nicht-artikulierten Wissen (Polanyi 1969, 138-158; vgl. auch Janik 1989, 211-224).

Sehen im künstlerischen Praxisfeld verlangt also beides: kognitive und praktische Kompetenz. Die kognitiven Aspekte weisen auf die analytische Dimension der Wahrnehmung und Rezeption künstlerischer Phänomene hin. Das praktische Wissen hingegen ist nicht immer artikulierbar und analytisch fassbar. Es ist das Ergebnis von einem Wechselspiel zwischen Erfahrung und Reflexion – einer Reflexion, die hier nicht rationalistisch aufgefasst wird. Einzelne Erfahrungen, die wir im Laufe unserer Enkulturation machen, gewinnen an Signifikanz und werden zu praxisanleitenden Beispielen. Solche Beispiele versetzen uns in die Lage, neue und komplexe visuelle Anforderungen erfolgreich zu bewältigen.

Sowohl auf der Ebene des theoretisch-systematischen wie auch auf der Ebene des praktischen Wissens ist das Soziale präsent. Konkret meine ich damit, dass die Instanzen der Präsentation und Vermittlung von Kunst (insbesondere die Ausstellungsinstitutionen und Kunstzeitschriften) den Wahrnehmungs- und Rezeptionsprozess vorstrukturieren. Raumform und Gliederung einer Ausstellung, Beleuchtung und Präsentationsform, um nur einige Aspekte zu nennen, setzen bestimmte Annahmen über den Rezeptionsprozess und über das räumlich-leibliche Verhältnis der BetrachterInnen zu den Kunstwerken durch. Bilder stehen außerdem in direkter und indirekter Verbindung zu Texten (z.B. zu impliziten oft gar nicht präsenten Prätexten wie "Bitte nicht berühren" oder "Das ist ein wichtiges Kunstwerk"). Dazu kommen auch vorhandene Texte wie z.B. der Titel, die Materialbeschriftung

tung oder exegetische Texte inner- und außerhalb des Präsentationsortes. In den Ausstellungsinstitutionen lassen sich folglich gewisse empirische Regularitäten beobachten – z.B. eine leise bedächtige Körperhaltung, methodische Betrachtung und ästhetische Bewertung der ausgestellten Gegenständen (im musealen Ausstellungsraum gibt es z.B. keine Referenz auf den monetären Wert der Werke) etc. Solche Wahrnehmungs- und Verhaltensformen – wir können auch von visuellen Praktiken sprechen – werden von großen Teilen der Kunstwelt getragen und reproduziert (siehe Zembylas 1997, 201ff.). Der Kompetenzbegriff, der im künstlerischen Feld entsteht, enthält folglich normative Komponenten, die aus der Einbettung des Wahrnehmungsaktes an ein Denk- und Praxiskollektiv erwachsen.

4. Der visuelle Akt als politischer Akt

Kunst ist nicht privat, weil sie öffentlich konstituiert wird. Ihre Perzeption löst kognitive Prozesse und kommunikative Interaktionen aus. Darüber hinaus ist Kunst Gegenstand von Tauschbeziehungen, taucht in zwischenmenschlichen und öffentlichen Debatten auf, übernimmt Symbolfunktionen (identitätsstiftende oder Distinktionsfunktionen) und kann zur Plattform und zum Transportmittel für diverse Interessen werden. Geltungsansprüche, die in der Kunstwelt erhoben werden, gehen mit konkreten Kompetenzvorstellungen einher – z.B. der Anspruch von KunstexpertInnen, sachkundige BetrachterInnen zu sein; der Anspruch von KuratorInnen, durch ihre Ausstellungs-konzeption neue Aspekte aufzudecken usw.

Kompetenz in einem Praxisfeld heißt, in der Lage zu sein, eine Tätigkeit gut oder richtig auszuführen. Kompetenz setzt ein langes Einüben und Trainieren in einem Tätigkeitsbereich voraus. Durch das Involviertsein in einem Praxiskollektiv werden die normativen Komponenten weitgehend verinnerlicht. Es entsteht eine Art Vertrautheit mit dem konkreten Praxisfeld und in der Folge eine *subjektive Gewissheit* über die Angemessenheit bzw. Richtigkeit der eigenen Sehakte und Urteile (siehe Wittgenstein 1994, §341).

Der Kompetenzbegriff enthält folglich teleologische Wertungen über den Sinn und Wert der gesamten Praxis, auf die er sich bezieht. Solche oft inartikulierten Wertungen sind, wie wir alle gut wissen, grundsätzlich umstritten. Strittig sind einerseits der epistemische Anspruch der Urteilskraft (d.h. der Anspruch auf Richtigkeit, Objektivität, Wahrheit, Korrespondenz) und andererseits der soziale Gebrauch von (ästhetischen) Urteilen. Umstritten ist weiter die Bescheinigung einer allgemeinen Handlungsfähigkeit, die Expertentum kennzeichnet. Die Zuschreibung von Kompetenz ist ein sozialer Prozess, der kollektiv ausgehandelt wird. Dabei sind institutionelle Machtmechanismen wirksam, deren Analyse spezifische Herrschaftsverhältnisse offenbaren können.

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Moral Phenomenology

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"It is clear," Wittgenstein asserts in the *Tractatus* (6.421) "that ethics cannot be put into words." Defenders of the moral antirealist position would agree on the basis that, since there are no moral facts (Ayer, 107), all moral claims are false (Mackie, 35). The only problem is that we do put ethics into words all the time, which suggests that there must be some experiences of moral value in ordinary life that are so gripping and undeniable we cannot help but to report them. If this is true, then the sense of ethics and morality are in the world and, consequently, *there are moral facts in the world*.

Moral realists of the Natural Law moral tradition (Aquinas) share a common ground with a Tractarian position: the belief that morality makes itself *manifest* in the world (Wittgenstein, 6.522). Parenthetically, these objectivist moral realists predicate the objectivity of moral judgments, although they traditionally have not taken the position that truth is settled by facts in the world. Similarly to Wittgenstein, they hold the position that the sense of moral judgments is transcendental. But one can defend a non-traditional view that there are moral facts in the world without denying the transcendental origins of the good and evil. This is possible in virtue of the transitive relation between moral facts, the world, and what is higher. If the sense of moral facts is in the world, and the sense of world is in what is higher, then the sense of moral facts in the world is part of what is higher. I shall take this latter position here, i.e., that the target of each true moral judgment is a moral fact. Nonetheless, one need not embrace the transitive relations I assume in order to accept the view that moral facts are in the world.

The fundamental starting point of Natural Law moral theory is the first principle of practical morality: *Do good, avoid evil*. Recognizing the many problems involved in defining the good—not least of which is the impossibility of defining simples (Moore, 7)—the New Natural Law scholars (Finnis, Grisez, George, Gomez-Lobo) have attempted to unravel the meaning of the term *good* by describing how the good is manifest in the world: via basic goods. We gain knowledge of basic goods from the moral value we recognize in them as intrinsic. Finnis and Grisez have taken the lead of developing catalogues of *basic goods* that serve as truth-settling conditions for the moral propositions we find in ordinary language and, thereby, in ordinary experience.

What the notion of basic goods in Natural Law moral theory suggests is that our recognition of the good in ordinary things in the world, albeit fallible, may be passed over and in fact obscured if not called forth by the evaluative mechanism involved in making of moral judgments of value. In other words, it may be the case that not only ethics *can* be put into words but, in fact, it *must* be put into words if we are not to waste our pre-empirical understandings gained in ordinary experience.

The Object of Experience

Natural Law moral theory emerges from an ontological *a priori* of morals from which all other synthetic propositions follow in a unified and systematic way. Here, I employ neither a Kantian epistemic conception of *a priori* that is an object of the will, nor a Schelerian intuitive conception of *a priori* that is a quality of the will. By ontological *a priori* I

refer to something in the world, something that has real existence and, as such, has concrete form. Only such an object of experience gives rise to what Meinong calls value-feelings, which are fundamentally existence-feelings. What is fundamental in value experience, then, is not a causal connection between an object and our feelings but, instead, a judgment that the object of value exists and is real.

Here, it is important to recognize that it is neither linguistically extravagant nor logically superfluous to assert of some thing that it exists and, in addition, that it is real. When we judge something to be good, we do not direct our judgment to the idea of goodness that exists in the mind, but to something concrete in the world that realizes the good, an action, someone's conduct, a state of affairs, or even an inanimate thing. In order to recognize something as good and thereby to judge it to be good, the target of our judgment must have an intelligible structure. From such ordinary observations, then, we draw our pre-empirical or pre-philosophical conceptions of the good. This knowledge is pre-empirical because we apprehend it without mediation from previous experience or knowledge, or from reasoning or any other sort of discursive thought, and most certainly prior to linguistic association. Accordingly, then, to assert an ontological *a priori* of morals is to affirm an existential claim about a moral fact that is intrinsically apprehensible. True moral propositions, then, merely articulate the ontological *a priori* of morals.

The Experience Itself

Some of the best examples of the experience of moral phenomena can be found in the most commonly-shared experiences from childhood: knowledge of fair play, knowledge of actions in bad faith, knowledge of someone's earnestness, the experience of love in friendship. These sorts of experiences are recognizable in their distinct nature even before one has the words to describe the phenomenon. Despite the differences in their natures, they share in common the feature of either arising value or disvalue in the flavor of the experience. This is not to say that the experiences produce correct judgments every time. In fact, it is often the case that we come to understand the true nature of an experience by being wrong. Consider the knowledge gained from being wrong in judging fair play and earnestness. Fundamentally, this is the knowledge from which we draw for the meaning intentions of words, since much if not all presented moral phenomena has obtained linguistic expression.

We indeed recognize the fundamental meaning and orientation of moral terms in ordinary language even if our knowledge or understanding of such moral terms is incomplete. An ordinary person, for example, is not paralyzed by the term *good* simply because we have not produced a definition for this term. He is sufficiently capable of grasping the subtle distinctions in meaning of the term *good* in the sentences "Joe is a good person" and "Chocolate is good." Nonetheless, the meanings of moral terms have a high risk of being contaminated by error, inadequate use, a poor command of a natural language, and false beliefs. Hence, the test of meaning intentions is only possible in their expression in moral propositions and,

perhaps even more importantly, in the confirmation or denial of their correctness by the tribunal of others whose judgments are directed at our judgments.

On this score, the moral objectivity of Natural Law facilitates the correction of false meaning intentions. This is because moral objectivism is a predicate of judgments whose truth is settled by facts in the world. Accordingly, erroneous judgments can be shown to be false. The inadequate use of terms can also be shown by demonstrating the incongruency between the meaning-intention and the term employed. Someone with a poor command of a natural language can also learn by being shown the linguistic correlates to facts in the world. And those holding false beliefs, too, can learn in this way. Such a corrective mechanism of moral knowledge is impossible in the framework of relativism or subjectivism, since these ethical positions do not accept facts in the world to be truth-settling conditions for moral propositions. And it is this failure that leads either to the wasteful destruction of perhaps correct pre-empirical moral knowledge, or to the dissemination of uncritically accepted moral beliefs.

In addition, it is important to note that not all experiences of moral value or moral disvalue are obtained directly, immediately, or fallibly. Similarly to the problem of stale scholarship that may result from profound and prolonged familiarity with a subject, we often lose the freshness in apprehending the nature of moral phenomena by filtering in experiences obtained by means of induction, adopted presuppositions, uncritical judgments, and plain apathy. Consequently, we are confronted with the problem of moral disagreement that leads some to believe that there exists no right or wrong, no good or evil. We must not fail to recognize, however, that it is in the nature of the human condition that we shall be frequently deluded by appearances. Following Meinong, we may understand false valuations as subjective since the nature of the value in these cases falls squarely on perceptions. An error in valuation, then, does not mean that value is present in the falsely-valued object in virtue of the valuation itself. Instead, this means that the appraiser has not fully grasped the nature of the target in his judgment. Conversely, all true valuations are true in virtue of their correct grasping of the moral facts.

The Articulation of the Experience

In Natural Law moral theory, moral propositions represent, in a Tractarian way, the picture of the moral fact presented to us in experience (Wittgenstein, 2.19-3). I employ the Tractarian machinery of the picture in a loose way here to illustrate the isomorphism of structures present in a moral fact in the world, in the thought directed at the moral fact, and in the moral propositional language with which we express our apprehension of the moral fact. In addition, the Tractarian picture illustrates a point that is significant for presenting the fallible nature of our moral knowledge. And this point is that moral propositions only say *how* things are and *not what* they are (Wittgenstein, 3.221). When I say, “Joe is a good person” I do not explain in what ways Joe is good, but only *how* Joe is from the perspective of my moral judgment: he’s good. Moral propositions only show the structure of the moral fact—the ontological *a priori* “good”—but not the content. This reveals the synthetic nature of moral facts since the meaning of “good” is not drawn from a definition, but from knowledge in experience. The intrinsic intelligibility of a moral fact, then, can be reconcilable with our problem of fallibility in grasping a moral fact, since we still have to put forth the effort of comprehending the content.

Let us now test this observation of the experience of value and toward this end let us employ the first principle of practical morality in Natural Law theory as an ontological *a priori* of morals: *Do good, avoid evil*. This principle does not say what is good, nor what is evil. It merely says how conduct must be carried out: doing good, avoiding evil; thus expressing the opposing relations between the good and evil. Hence, this principle expresses only the structure of conduct—that it must favor good, reject evil—but the principle does not express the content of what constitutes good or evil conduct. Consequently, we have to put some effort in grasping the meaning of good and evil in relation to particulars and, since this is not spelled out for us, we may fail sometimes and we will be successful in others. Empirically speaking from ordinary observations, we seem to access certain recognitions of the good in ordinary experience. Some have called these intuitions, others call them inclinations. Some may say that our capacity to gain moral knowledge is hardwired in our nature, others may say that we are only disposed to acquire moral knowledge. For our purposes here, any one of these descriptions works because all we want is to get to the essence of the experience itself, and not to justify the nature of the experience.

The Fitness of Natural Law in Addressing Moral Phenomena

The question now is, why Natural Law? The fitness of Natural Law moral theory lies in its capacity of addressing moral phenomena. From a single proposition—the principle of practical morality: do good, avoid evil—a unified and systematic ethical system has been drawn. The most impressive advances of Natural Law are in the form of the catalogs of basic goods despite the fact that different accounts have produced different descriptions of basic goods that result in varying numbers of basic goods. Practically speaking, it does not matter whether there are seven, nine, or twenty basic goods, or that these should contain subspecies, or that new ones should be devised for reaching a finer grained ontology of the good. The point is that Natural Law is demonstrating the richness of this foundational principle, and the complete articulation of its moral implications is a continuing project. But such a project is no different than those others engaged to draw out the theoretical principles in a discipline from one principle. Economists have attempted this, and the same has been observed for the civil law out of the foundational principle of the promise that gives rise to a claim and an obligation (Reinach). Above all, philosophy is full of first-principle propositions that are foundational to whole philosophical systems of thought whose development and full articulation still continues to this day. Wittgenstein’s Tractarian first-principle foundation is, for example, “The world is everything that is the case.”

Perhaps the strongest feature of Natural Law moral theory is that its propositions expressing the pre-empirical moral laws apprehended from the ontological *a priori* of morals are not analytic. They are, instead, synthetic. The most salient property of synthetic *a priori* propositions is that they appear obviously true (Zelaniec). Contrast, for example, the synthetic *a priori* sentence: “Everything red is colored,” with the sentence: “The Solar system has nine planets.” While the former is immediately apprehensible as obviously true, the latter demands the knowledge of what the Solar system is, what are planets, and the number of planets in the Solar system, before it is accepted (Zelaniec 18-21). More importantly, an important study dedicated to the *a posteriori* analysis of synthetic *a priori* propositions

concludes that these not only seem obviously true, but they turn out to be true (Zelaniec, 26).

Let us focus the examination on the sentence: “Do good, avoid evil” once again. The first thing we may observe is that its structure appears obviously true. First, it presents two courses of action. Second, opposites appear implicit in this sentence. We draw the notion of opposites from ordinary experience: life and death, love and hate. An ordinary adult, then, could infer from his own experience that life and love fall together in the same category that can be associated with good, and death and hate fall together in the same category that can be associated with evil. Even if the agent in question has had unfortunate experiences in romantic love, there is a sense of love that is broader than romantic love and this sense of love is experienced from the early stages of one’s ordinary life. Clearly, if the subject is suicidal to begin with, hence disposed to associate death with something good and, in addition, he was abandoned at birth, raised by wolves, and shunned by the entire world, he will not have any understanding of the broader sense of love either because it has not been part of his experience. This counterexample, however, does not destroy the findings of our present phenomenological analysis, since we have accepted fallibility as part of the framework. *A fortiori*, what our analysis shows is that the meaning of the sentence “Do good, avoid evil” appears implicit via our embodied human experience.

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