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# Ukraine's 10-point peace plan and the Kyiv Security Compact – An assessment



Authors:

Andriy TYUSHKA and Tracey GERMAN

European Parliament coordinator:

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In-Depth Analysis

# Ukraine's 10-point peace plan and the Kyiv Security Compact – An assessment

## ABSTRACT

With the aim of bringing Russia's war of aggression to an end and developing a sustainable post-war peace, Ukraine has advanced its vision of peace (as encompassed in President Zelenskyy's 'peace formula') and the paths that lead to this (as outlined in Ukraine's 10-point peace plan). Other actors, including China, Indonesia and the collective African Peace Initiative Mission, have advanced their own peace proposals. This in-depth analysis (IDA) scrutinises the different proposals that have been put forward and their visions for the post-war future of Ukraine and the European security order. It concentrates on the following questions: what are the varying assumptions about the preconditions for peace *versus* ceasefire? Do the 'peace' proposals in question draw a distinction between ceasefire and peace? There is an important difference between war termination, conflict resolution and peacebuilding – how is this dealt with by the various proposals? Finally, the IDA seeks to assess how feasible the peace proposals are in light of two baseline scenarios for the war's future course – a stalemate (long war of attrition) and Ukraine's victory. It concludes that the question of how to sustain Ukraine's independence and security is central to any discussion of finding an end to the war and a long-term peace, underscoring the centrality of an unambiguous political settlement supported by acceptable, effective guarantors.

## LEAD AUTHOR

- Andriy TYUSHKA, Senior Research Fellow, European Neighbourhood Policy Chair, College of Europe (Natolin Campus)

## CO-AUTHOR

- Tracey GERMAN, Professor of Conflict and Security, Department of Defence Studies, King's College London

## PROJECT COORDINATOR (CONTRACTOR)

- Katarzyna LUBIANIEC, Ecorys Poland

## PEER REVIEWER

- Marc BERENSON, King's College London

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## CONTACTS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Coordination: Oliver KRENTZ, Policy Department for External Relations

Editorial assistant: Inge BRYS

Feedback is welcome. Please write to [oliver.krentz@europarl.europa.eu](mailto:oliver.krentz@europarl.europa.eu)

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## Executive summary

Russia's war against Ukraine shows little sign of ending. The war poses an existential threat to Ukrainian sovereignty and statehood, as well as a fundamental challenge to both the European security order and the rules-based international order. There have been a number of proposals put forward by different actors on how to bring the war to an end, as well as to ensure lasting and sustainable peace, ranging from Ukraine's 10-point 'peace plan' to China's proposal for a political settlement, as well as the recent African peacemaking mission to Moscow. However, not every proposal is concerned with conditioning lasting peace: some clearly prioritise a short-term ceasefire arrangement, rather than conflict resolution and war termination, per se. All three of the alternative peace proposals examined in this IDA failed because they were self-serving, and were developed with the principal aim of assisting the state proposing the plan to achieve their own objectives, rather than the termination of war and subsequent development of an enduring, sustainable peace. It is imperative to avoid the pursuit of peace at any cost: Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty are non-negotiable and must be central to any proposal for war termination and peacebuilding. The core principles of the rules-based liberal international order, including justice, must not be compromised.

It is important to distinguish between finding an end to fighting on the battlefield and the establishment of sustainable peace in Ukraine. The question of how to sustain Ukraine's independence and security is central to any discussion on finding an end to the war and achieving long-term peace, underscoring the centrality of an unambiguous political settlement supported by acceptable, effective guarantors. Security guarantees are a necessary precondition for both war termination and peacebuilding, as well as peaceful post-conflict coexistence. Any conflict resolution paradigm needs to include a broader (temporal, spatial and agential) perspective in order to prevent yet another short-term settlement (a 'Minsk 3') or the 'freezing' of a war that has been ongoing since 2014. The centrality of an unambiguous political settlement, supported by acceptable, effective guarantors, must therefore be embedded in a feasible peace plan. Furthermore, Ukraine's security relationship with the US, NATO and the EU must include post-war confidence-building measures and possible discussions on Europe's long-term security architecture.

## Introduction

Twenty months after Moscow launched its full-scale invasion, Russia's war against Ukraine shows little sign of ending. The war poses an existential threat to Ukrainian sovereignty and statehood, as well as a fundamental challenge to both the European security order and the rules-based international order. There have been a number of proposals put forward by different actors on how to bring the war to an end, as well as to ensure lasting and sustainable peace, ranging from Ukraine's 10-point 'peace plan' to China's proposal for a political settlement, as well as the recent African peacemaking mission to Moscow. However, wars tend to be much more difficult to stop than they are to start, and the outcome of this war remains uncertain. As both sides continue to call for a decisive victory, there appears to be little common ground or the trust vital for negotiations to begin.

It is important to distinguish between finding an end to fighting on the battlefield and the establishment of sustainable peace. The question of how to sustain Ukraine's independence and security is central to any discussion of finding an end to the war and achieving long-term peace, underscoring the centrality of an unambiguous political settlement supported by acceptable, effective guarantors.

The critical distinction between war termination and the development of a sustainable, enduring peace is central to this IDA, which **has two key lines of inquiry: how to end the war and what needs to be done once the war has ended**. What needs to be done to bring an end to the war? And, once this has been achieved, what are the vital next steps? These two lines of inquiry shape the IDA's evaluation of the different proposals for finding an end to the conflict and their visions for the post-war future of Ukraine. What are the varying assumptions about the preconditions for peace? How does each proposal deal with the separate, but related, issues of war termination and peacebuilding?

This IDA analyses the content of the various proposals and the broader discussion about a possible peace process and a future security architecture for Ukraine, and assesses the extent to which they are practically implementable in the current and post-war contexts. The key research questions are:

- What is the 10-point peace plan and Kyiv Security Compact? What is the relation between them?
- What other proposals have been advanced for bringing the war to an end, and by which actors? What are the different interests and motivations of the actors engaged in the search for an end to the war?
- How do these initiatives propose to ensure Ukraine's future security and stability? How do they envisage the development of a sustainable, long-term peace? How do they deal with issues such as reconciliation, transitional justice, refugees and displaced people?

This IDA uses qualitative contextual political research, based predominantly on primary source analysis, as well as theoretical and empirical insights on war and peace.<sup>1</sup> These include official texts containing proposals for war termination and a peaceful resolution of the Russian–Ukrainian conflict (see Appendices 1 to 5). This IDA also draws on other official texts (such as international agreements) and institutional interpretative discourses of the key issues in question, such as published interviews with Ukrainian, European, US American and Russian elites, first-authored op-eds, speeches and statements. Recognising the importance of theory-infused scenario analysis<sup>2</sup>, two (of at least three) possible conflict development trends are considered: Ukraine's victory and conflict protraction.

<sup>1</sup> Geller, D. S., & Singer, J. D. (1998). *Nations at War: A Scientific Study of International Conflict*. Cambridge University Press; Vasquez, J. A. (2009). *The War Puzzle Revisited*. Cambridge University Press; Gledhill, J., & Bright, J. (2019). 'Studying peace and studying conflict: Complementary or competing projects?', *Journal of Global Security Studies*, 4(2), pp. 259-266.

<sup>2</sup> Junio, T. J., & Mahnken, T. G. (2013). 'Conceiving of future war: The promise of scenario analysis for international relations'. *International Studies Review*, 15(3), 374-395; Sus, M., & Hadeed, M. (2020). 'Theory-infused and policy-relevant: On the usefulness of scenario analysis for international relations'. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 41(3), pp. 432-455.



This IDA firstly examines the literature on war termination, conflict resolution and sustainable peacebuilding, setting out the key differences between them and identifying the principal obstacles to each. It then sets out the details of Ukraine's 10-point peace plan and the Kyiv Security Compact, examining the connection between them, before assessing the feasibility of the two proposals, as well as their likely effectiveness, under two key scenarios – Ukraine's victory, or a protracted war of attrition. What are their strengths and weaknesses? Do they differentiate between war termination and peacebuilding? How do they propose to end the war? And how do they envisage the development of sustainable, long-term peace? The third chapter analyses proposals that have been advanced by other global actors, including China, Indonesia and the group of African states, and how these have been received by Ukraine and the wider international community. Finally, it presents key conclusions regarding the different proposals, how they envisage ending the war, and how they propose to build a sustainable, enduring peace, before finally offering recommendations.

# 1 How wars do – and do not – end: Theoretical and empirical insights

Russia's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 followed eight years of war in eastern Ukraine and a number of failed peacemaking efforts by international actors, including the Minsk 1 and 2 ceasefire agreements and the initiatives of the so-called 'Normandy Four' group (consisting of Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia).<sup>3</sup> A growing number of scholarly and policy-analytical accounts suggest that the Russia-imposed 'non-peace', that is, engagement in counter-peace measures (including direct armed standoffs with Ukrainian forces as well as proxy warfare), was the principal reason for the failure of Ukrainian and international peace efforts.<sup>4</sup> Thus, the various proposals put forward by different actors since 2022 must be understood as a continuation of long-running efforts to resolve this persistent and multi-layered conflict and build enduring, sustainable peace in Ukraine and further afield in the region (see Figure 1).

**Figure 1: Ukrainian, allied and alternative peace initiatives**



Source: Author's own work

The extensive literature on the challenges of ending wars and building enduring peace makes it clear that wars rarely end well; the conditions for war termination are multifaceted, meaning that it is a prolonged and difficult process. Edwards argues that as war is 'complex, chaotic and dialectical in nature', it is logical that peace is likely to be similar.<sup>5</sup> However, war and peace are not necessarily the polar opposite of each other: stopping fighting is not synonymous with resolving conflict and building sustainable peace that puts a permanent end to violence. Mac Ginty identified a situation of 'no war, no peace', in which direct

<sup>3</sup> PA-X: Peace Agreements Database, 'Ukrainian Revolution and War in Donbas (2014– )', <https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/conflict/65/Ukrainian+Revolution+and+War+in+Donbas+%282014+-+%29>; See also for data on the short-lived 'ceasefire' regimes in Donbas in 2018-2022: International Crisis Group, 'Conflict in Ukraine's Donbas: a Visual Explainer', <https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/conflict-ukraines-donbas-visual-explainer>.

<sup>4</sup> Hosaka, S. (2019) 'Putin the 'Peacemaker'? — Russian Reflexive Control During the 2014 August Invasion of Ukraine', *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 32:3, 324-346; von Essen, H., & Umland, A. (2022). Russlands diktiert Nicht-Frieden im Donbas 2014–2022: Warum die Minsker Abkommen von Anbeginn zum Scheitern verurteilt waren. *Sirius-Zeitschrift für Strategische Analysen*, 6(3), 282-292.

<sup>5</sup> Edwards, A. (2017). *'Strategy in War and Peace: A Critical Introduction'*. Edinburgh University Press.

physical violence has been reduced or ceased, but there has been no sustained conflict transformation process where causes of conflict were satisfactorily addressed.<sup>6</sup>

Wars that end with outright victory or defeat (and where durable peace is maintained) are uncommon; much more common are partial victories, wars that peter out and then re-emerge sporadically, or wars that end following prolonged periods of dialogue, negotiation and faltering implementation of peace agreements. Some form of negotiated dialogue is likely to be required to bring a lasting end to violence. There are a number of conflicts across the post-Soviet space, involving Russia in one way or another, that have remained unresolved since the disintegration of the USSR in 1991, including conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Tskhinvali region) in Georgia and Transnistria in Moldova.<sup>7</sup> They are generally referred to as frozen conflicts, but this label is misleading, as they are far from static, demonstrated by the five-day war between Russia and Georgia in 2008 and the resumption of war over Nagorno-Karabakh in 2022.

## 1.1 Defining the end of war

It is pertinent to clarify definitions at the outset and distinguish between the various terms associated with the process of bringing wars to an end. A **ceasefire** is typically a negotiated agreement to cease hostilities, but it does not end a war, only pauses it. **War termination** involves the formal end of fighting, typically involving an **armistice**. However, this does not necessarily mean the end of conflict: although it may lead to it, war termination is not synonymous with resolution of the underlying issues in a conflict. War can be ended by negotiations on several levels, from partial agreements like ceasefires, to comprehensive peace treaties. The termination of war may be long-term or, if war reoccurs, short-term. War termination is also not necessarily the same as war-ending in any permanent sense. Ramsbotham et al. are clear that the end of a war is not a precise moment in time, but rather it is a process: 'violent conflict is over when a new political dispensation prevails, or the parties become reconciled, or a new conflict eclipses the first.'<sup>8</sup>

Part of the problem lies in the ambiguity of modern victory and how to judge success in the aftermath of war. Mandel splits victory into two distinct phases: military outcomes on the battlefield, 'war-winning'; and the subsequent effort to win the peace through reconstruction and reconciliation, 'peace-winning'.<sup>9</sup> If security, good governance and order are not firmly established in countries after hostilities have ceased, it is possible to lose what was won on the battlefield. Research done at beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century found that almost half of the international wars since World War II have been followed by renewed fighting between at least one pair of belligerents.<sup>10</sup>

For war to end, the underlying drivers of a conflict must be addressed to the extent that all parties are content to renounce violence. This is where peacebuilding and conflict resolution are critical.

**Peacebuilding** seeks to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into war by strengthening national conflict management capacities at all levels, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development.<sup>11</sup> It

<sup>6</sup> Mac Ginty, R. (2006). *'No War, No Peace: The Rejuvenation of Stalled Peace Processes and Peace Accords'*. Palgrave Macmillan, p. 44.

<sup>7</sup> Violence that had erupted between Azerbaijani troops and Armenian secessionists in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1988 led to full-scale war between the two from 1992–1994; Georgia fought two separatist conflicts on its territory, the first in South Ossetia, 1991–1992, then in Abkhazia 1992–1993; and the Transnistrian conflict in Moldova was fought in 1992. Thus, the early 1990s saw the beginning of a number of conflicts across the EaP region, several of which remain unresolved today.

<sup>8</sup> Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T., & Miall, H. (2005). *'Contemporary Conflict Resolution'*. Polity Press, p. 161.

<sup>9</sup> Mandel, R. (2006). *'The Meaning of Military Victory'*. Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., p. 13.

<sup>10</sup> Fortna, V. P. (2004). *'Peace Time: Ceasefire Agreements and the Durability of Peace'*. Princeton University Press, p. 1.

<sup>11</sup> Associated, but different, concepts include peacemaking and peace enforcement. Peacemaking generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement. Peace enforcement: involves the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. It requires the explicit authorisation of the Security Council. Peacemaking involves stopping an ongoing conflict, whereas peacebuilding happens before

is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace through a range of activities and actors. Although many of peacebuilding's aims overlap with those of peacemaking, peacekeeping and conflict resolution, it is a distinct idea. Peacebuilding requires long-term international support beyond short-term interventions. After the end of the Cold War, international actors, such as the United Nations and the European Union, became active supporters of negotiated methods of war termination. Over the last three decades, peacebuilding policies have expanded to include democratisation, state building, and fundamental institutional reforms, reflecting the notion of liberal peace.

Research suggests that it is difficult to measure the success of peacebuilding; divergent concepts of what peacebuilding is have meant that there is not yet a generally accepted measure for 'success'.<sup>12</sup> Peace is more than the absence of war. Using lessons from war termination and subsequent peacebuilding efforts in Latin America, Kurtenbach has identified three elements that constitute the core of peacebuilding, which is characterised as a long-term endeavour: the reduction of violence in all its different forms; democratic participation beyond elections; and institutions capable of transforming conflict in a non-violent and constructive way under the rule of law.<sup>13</sup>

A 2015 report by the United Nations (UN) on the challenges of sustaining peace asserted that peacebuilding is too often left as an 'afterthought', describing it as 'under-prioritised, under-resourced and undertaken only after the guns fall silent'.<sup>14</sup> The report emphasised that the success of peacebuilding depends upon 'national ownership', and cannot be imposed from outside: the UN and other international actors can facilitate and enable, but must not seek to impose peace.

**Conflict resolution** is defined as a situation where 'the conflicting parties enter into an agreement that solves their central incompatibilities, accept each other's continued existence as parties, and cease all violent action against each other'.<sup>15</sup> War termination and conflict resolution are interdependent: once a war is brought to an end, resolution of the underlying causes of conflict is imperative to prevent any recurrence of violence. However, conflict resolution is not synonymous with peace. While there is considerable overlap between the two, as most understandings of peace are based on the absence or ending of war, conflict resolution is more than the absence of war. Peace agreements are considered to be an integral part of conflict resolution (as is reconstruction), but tend to be insufficient on their own to establish lasting peace. Conflict resolution also differs from peacebuilding, as it does not include some components of the latter, such as state building and socio-economic development.

### Obstacles to bringing wars to an end

The conditions for ending war are multifaceted. Cochrane observes that they usually involve some combination of the following:

- Outright military victory or defeat;

a conflict starts or once it ends. Peacekeeping prevents the resumption of fighting following a conflict; it does not address the underlying causes of violence or work to create societal change, as peacebuilding does. Peacekeeping also differs from peacebuilding in that it only occurs after conflict ends, not before it begins. For further information, see: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/terminology>.

<sup>12</sup> Call, C. T., & Cousens, E. M. (2007). 'Ending Wars and Building Peace'. *Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series*, International Peace Academy. Available at: [https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/cwc\\_working\\_paper\\_ending\\_wars\\_ccec.pdf](https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/cwc_working_paper_ending_wars_ccec.pdf), pp. 4–5.

<sup>13</sup> Kurtenbach, S. (2022). From Ending War to Building Peace: Lessons from Latin America. *GIGA Focus, Latin America*, No. 1.

<sup>14</sup> United Nations. (2015). 'The Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture', p. 7.

<sup>15</sup> Wallensteen, P. (2012). 'Understanding Conflict Resolution'. SAGE Publications, p. 8.

- Mutually hurting stalemate;
- Apposite moment for dialogue and belief that is a way out of violence;
- Change in external context, such as levels of international support;
- Sufficient leadership from protagonists;
- Inclusive process of dialogue and negotiation;
- Emergence of third parties capable of facilitating dialogue;
- Political settlement acceptable to majority of population;
- Facilitation of reconstruction and reconciliation after end of physical violence.<sup>16</sup>

Zartman defined the notion of a 'mutually hurting stalemate' as a situation when those directly involved in war come to the conclusion that there is a stalemate and they are unable to anticipate victory, combined with a belief that the status quo is hurting them. He observed that parties resolve their conflict only 'when they are ready to do so – when alternative, usually unilateral means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked, and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament.'<sup>17</sup>

There is a further important distinction to be made between the end of a war and the end of desire for war. To facilitate the latter, reconstruction and reconciliation strategies are vital. Reconciliation is a long-term process, necessary for society to deal with the past and move forwards into a post-conflict environment. As it deals with difficult, complex issues, it may be impossible for the process to take place in the short-term. Finally, reconciliation cannot be applied from outside.


Patterson has set out a series of important questions that need to be considered during the war termination and peacebuilding processes to ensure that the end of war brings stability and security: What caused the war and can these causes be addressed? How was the war fought? Are there legitimate claims for justice due to the conduct of the war? And how will settlement and implementation create a just and durable peace?<sup>18</sup> He argues that in order for wars to end well, the imperatives of security must be balanced with considerations of justice, while also seeking to resolve the fundamental causes of a war.<sup>19</sup> He proposed a framework based on three concepts of Just War thinking – order, justice and conciliation (see Figure 1 below) – with the aim of building secure and enduring peace, rather than merely an interlude in fighting. Order takes primacy over conciliation and justice, as it provides the foundation for enduring peace. Patterson points to the example of Iraq 2003, when the US-led coalition won the war but lost the peace because order did not take primacy. Nevertheless, conciliation is also critical: the search for stability will be short-lived if not accompanied by sustainable peace based on conciliation and justice.

<sup>16</sup> Cochrane, F. (2008). 'Ending Wars'. Polity Press, pp. 33-34.

<sup>17</sup> Zartman, W. (2001). 'The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments'. *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, 1(1), p. 8.

<sup>18</sup> Patterson, E. D. (2012). *Ending Wars Well: Order, Justice and Conciliation in Contemporary Post-Conflict*. Yale University Press, p. 3.

<sup>19</sup> Patterson, pp. 16-17.

**Figure 2: Framework for building a secure and enduring peace**<sup>20</sup>

Source: Author's own work

Order is most likely to occur at the end of war when one side wins an absolute victory with the other side convincingly defeated. According to Reiter's wide-ranging survey of wars over the course of a century, absolute war outcomes very significantly decrease the likelihood that war will reoccur between two states. However, absolute war outcomes are also rare, and have occurred in roughly 25% of interstate wars.<sup>21</sup>

Reiter notes that belligerents may press for absolute victory if they have fears about the credibility of an adversary's commitment to war-ending agreements, even in the face of battlefield setbacks.<sup>22</sup> The conventional wisdom is that setbacks on the battlefield should encourage negotiation and concessions, while combat success should encourage an increase in demands for the end of a war. However, Reiter's research suggests this is not the case, and the more that an actor fears its adversary will violate war-ending commitments, the more likely they will be to pursue absolute victory on the battlefield, even in the face of setbacks.

Thus, the issue of trust is fundamental to both war termination and subsequent peacebuilding efforts: doubts over the trustworthiness of an adversary shape an actor's thinking over when and how to end a war. Without trust, negotiations cannot begin. There also needs to be convergence in terms of the outcome of a war: according to Slantchev's principle of convergence, a bargaining space is created once expectations about potential outcomes have become sufficiently convergent enough, and violent conflict can be brought to an end.<sup>23</sup> As Reiter states, war ends 'when disagreement is reduced sufficiently such that bargaining space between the two sides opens, and the war-ending settlement reflects the new understanding the two sides have about the true balance of power between them'.<sup>24</sup>

The final potential obstacle is whether there is actually peace to be made. What is the cost of peace to the warring parties? In some cases, peace may be considered too costly for a state. War is ultimately a human, social activity conducted by actors in pursuit of specific political objectives – it is rare that violence is an

<sup>20</sup> Patterson, p. 17.

<sup>21</sup> Reiter, D. (2009). *'How Wars End'*. Princeton University Press, p. 35. He identified three outcomes that could constitute absolute victory: annihilation, occupation/annexation, or regime change.

<sup>22</sup> Reiter, p. 6.

<sup>23</sup> Slantchev, B. L. (2003). 'The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations', *The American Political Science Review*, 97(5), p. 621.

<sup>24</sup> Reiter, p. 36.

end in itself. Those engaged in it have to want it to end, and be ready to consider alternatives to violence in pursuit of their political objectives: cost-benefit analysis will occur, and may or may not lead to conditions where dialogue can commence. War termination efforts are unlikely to occur if an actor believes that they can win the war and achieve political aims through military means.

## 1.2 Russian aggression against Ukraine: Profiling the war

Russia's aggression against Ukraine has become a war with both 'too many nicknames' and a 'no-name war'.<sup>25</sup> Peacemaking efforts in 2014–2021 failed, to a considerable extent, because the Russian (c)over war of aggression was misdiagnosed as a 'domestic issue' or a case of 'separatism' in Ukraine (instead of acknowledging Russia's central role), a 'Ukraine crisis' (instead of seeing it as a regional security crisis), or a hybrid 'non-war'. It is vital to consider the nature of continuing Russian aggression – in terms of its real causes, aims and conflict classification – prior to any reflection on what war termination and peace ought (not to) be. As discussed above, there are significant differences between crisis management, conflict resolution and war termination.

Studies into the **causes** – rather than pretexts – of Russian belligerence in Ukraine attribute a wide range of logic and behaviour to Russia's political elites (principally the Kremlin and Putin), from great power aspirations to domestic-authoritarianism, or even hallucinations.<sup>26</sup> This myriad of analytical explanations, as well as evidence from official Russian discourse and/or policy practices, suggest that, whichever the key driver(s), this act of Russia's evolving (c)over aggression is *multi-causal* and, thus, *multi-purposive*, with complex overlaps between them.<sup>27</sup>

Russian official discourse on the war's **goals** keeps evolving, albeit in an inconsistent and inconclusive manner.<sup>28</sup> Kimmage and Lipman sum up the dynamic nature of the Russian war causes and aims:

'[Putin] has never articulated a set of persuasive objectives: his stated goals have shifted over time. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has at various points aimed to halt an invented genocide, to 'de-Nazify' a country that was not fascist, to liberate Ukraine's allegedly Russian nature, and to demilitarise the country – even though it posed no real threat to Russia.'<sup>29</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Tyushka, A. (2023). 'In '(Ukraine) crisis' we trust? On (un)intentional knowledge distortion and the exigency of terminological clarity in academic and political discourses on Russia's war against Ukraine'. *Journal of International Relations and Development (JIRD)*, forthcoming.

<sup>26</sup> For example, Krickovic, A. (2022). 'Revisionism Revisited: Developing a Typology for Classifying Russia and Other Revisionist Powers'. *International Politics*, 59(4), pp. 616-639; Mearsheimer, J. J. (2022). 'The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine War'. *Horizons*, 21, pp. 12-27; Fagergren, E. (2022). 'Russia's Gambit to Redefine the Current World Order'. *Connections*, 21(3), pp. 29-46; Steele, B. J. (2017). 'Hallucination and Intervention'. *Global Discourse*, 7(2-3), pp. 201-218; Tsygankov, A. (2015). 'Vladimir Putin's Last Stand: The Sources of Russia's Ukraine Policy'. *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 31(4), pp. 279-303; Herd, G. P. (2022). 'Understanding Russian Strategic Behavior: Imperial Strategic Culture and Putin's Operational Code'. Routledge; Götz, E., & Staun, J. (2022). 'Why Russia Attacked Ukraine: Strategic Culture and Radicalized Narratives'. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 43(3), pp. 482-497; Snyder, T. (2022). 'We Should Say It. Russia Is Fascist'. *The New York Times*. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/19/opinion/russia-fascism-ukraine-putin.html>; Bykva (2022). 'The Russian 'Schizofascism' Phenomenon'. Available at: <https://bykva.com/eng/bukvy/the-russian-schizofascism-phenomenon/>; Person, R., & McFaul, M. (2022). 'What Putin Fears Most', *Journal of Democracy*, 33(2), pp. 18-27.

<sup>27</sup> Sherr, James, and Igor Gretskiy (2023). Sherr, J., & Gretskiy, I. (2023). 'Why Russia Went to War: A Post-Crimea Assessment of Russian Beliefs and Policy', International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) *Analysis* (January 2023); D'Anieri, P. (2019). 'Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War'. Cambridge University Press.

<sup>28</sup> Tyshchenko, Y. (2023, April 18). '50 відтінків брехні: як і чому змінюється зміст російської пропаганди. Українська правда'. <https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2023/04/18/7398318/>; RBC. (2023, June 13). 'Путин заявил, что цели спецоперации меняются в соответствии с ситуацией'. РБК. <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/13/06/2023/648875e79a79475dcb5985f5>.

<sup>29</sup> Kimmage, M., & Lipman, M. (2023). 'Wartime Putinism: What the Disaster in Ukraine Has Done to the Kremlin—and to Russia'. *Foreign Affairs*. Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/wartime-putinism>.

Russian official discourse therefore has little to offer in terms of credible and convincing explanation of the war's key causes, the strategic aims currently pursued, and potentially acceptable end-states. This makes it difficult to fully assess the prospects of war termination under conditions other than a decisive victory for Russia.

Finally, **determining an applicable conflict paradigm – that is, crisis, conflict or war** – is of utmost importance for the necessary war termination and peacemaking efforts. The *complexity* of the Russian war against Ukraine is neatly captured by Mälksoo:

'Russia's 2022 full-fledged invasion of Ukraine is many things at once: a war of aggression; an attempt at yet another territorial conquest after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the eight-year-long struggle for Donbas; a parading of an ontologically anxious state whose leadership appears obsessed with being a great power through consolidating the idea of a *Russkii Mir* by ruthless violence and lies outperforming George Orwell's dystopic imagination. Most importantly, it is an imperial war in the world of nation-states, underpinned by Russia's open denial of Ukraine's political sovereignty and the Ukrainians' right to exist as an independent nation. The incompatible logics of sovereignty (Ukraine's) and imperialism (Russia's) are at the loggerheads in this conflict.'<sup>30</sup>

Russia's evolving (c)overt aggression against Ukraine has become a regional and (since 2022) manifestly *global contest*<sup>31</sup>, with the stakes too high to allow for a compromise solution on either the Russian, Ukrainian or Western sides. As a *world order revisionist war*, Russia's all-out armed struggle in Ukraine and its political and economic warfare across the Euro-Atlantic liberal-democratic space *radically limits the options for war termination, conflict resolution and the establishment of sustainable peace*, not least as any non-decisive outcome of this war inherently means its protraction, while a decisive outcome can either lead to next-level escalation, or profound chaos and reordering of the international system.

### 1.3 How could the Russia-Ukraine war end?

As discussed above, how a war ends depends on a number of factors, including the parties involved, the causes of war, and how it is fought. Who fights is particularly critical, as wars between non-major powers differ from those fought against a major power or between major powers. This is amplified by the structure and network of alliances or aligned partnerships. Thus, the type of war fought (be it a small, limited, major, or total/world and nuclear war), who is fighting, and how it is fought shape the prospects for war termination.<sup>32</sup> White notes that wars between major powers are a rare but 'unusually important category', as they are fought over fundamental questions of international order and thus are 'generally both the biggest, most destructive, and the most consequential' wars.<sup>33</sup>

Russia's war against Ukraine is fought between a nuclear-armed major power and a non-nuclear country which is not part of an alliance with a nuclear deterrent. However, it has some *important elements* of a war between major powers, even if – so far – Ukraine has only been receiving indirect support from Western powers (including the US and NATO). There is, however, clear value-alignment and world order positioning, with one party (Russia, aligned with other illiberal and revisionist powers) representing a diametrically opposed view to the other party (Ukraine, aligned with most of the liberal-democratic world). Therefore,

<sup>30</sup> Mälksoo, M. (2022). 'The Postcolonial Moment in Russia's War Against Ukraine'. *Journal of Genocide Research*, DOI: 10.1080/14623528.2022.2074947

<sup>31</sup> Ozawa, M. (2023). 'Total, global, hybrid war'. In M. Ozawa (Ed.), 'War changes everything: Russia after Ukraine' (pp. 5-17). Rome: NATO Defence College (NDC Research Paper no.28 – February 2023).

<sup>32</sup> Johnson, R. (2023). 'A Typology of Wars and How They End'. In R. Iron & D. Kingsbury (Eds.), *How Wars End: Theory and Practice* (pp. 28-44). London and New York: Routledge.

<sup>33</sup> White, H. (2023). 'How Major-Power Wars End'. In R. Iron & D. Kingsbury (Eds.), *How Wars End: Theory and Practice* (pp. 171-185). London and New York: Routledge.



this war can be characterised as a *strategic contest* that is consequential for the international system and global order.

History shows that hegemonic wars *between great powers* are fought 'to a decisive, indeed absolute, military conclusion, and result in the destruction of the political systems of the defeated countries'.<sup>34</sup> Generally, however, large-scale, high-stakes wars come to an end either when *one* of the sides collapses, or when the costs and risks of continuing the war increase so dramatically that a compromise becomes acceptable for *both* sides.<sup>35</sup>

There are three plausible options for the end of the Russia-Ukraine war: the defeat of Russia, a long war of attrition (a 'forever' war), or escalation into a major war between America (and its NATO allies) and Russia.<sup>36</sup> If Russia faces defeat in a conventional war, it could resort to the use of nuclear weapons, although much depends upon the Russian leaders' personal assessment of the situation, the risks attached to such a decision, and also the challenges associated with implementing such a decision (both in terms of a decision-implementing chain of actions and the capacity of Russian nuclear forces).

A compromise, especially in the situation of a stalemate, appears highly unlikely for both sides. For Putin, the war is a war for his legacy, his regime and his personal survival, whereas for Ukraine this is an existential war whose cost (human, material and other) is too high to allow for any compromise with an untrustworthy Russia. As Zartman notes, '[i]n normal conflict conditions, a stalemate would bring up the conditions of ripeness and provide for a shared search for mutually enticing [negotiation] opportunit[ies] acceptable to both sides... However, the cost already exacted on Ukraine is so high as to outrank any question of compromise.'<sup>37</sup>

Ukraine's victory, however defined and whenever achieved, is therefore the preferred outcome for an overwhelming majority of the world's states. Support for Ukraine in this is clearly shown in the patterns of individual-country voting for war-related resolutions in the UN General Assembly. In addition, diplomatic support in various multilateral formats<sup>38</sup> is wide-ranging. However, even though all options are possible, there are signs that a long war of attrition is being planned for, at least on Russia's side. The Kremlin and the Russian elites are bracing for a long war, not least as continuation of the war correlates with their rule, security and personal safety.<sup>39</sup>

In the wake of Finland's accession to NATO (and Sweden's imminent membership), Russia announced the reform of its Western Military District (WMD), with separate Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts, as per the presidential decree of 8 October 2023.<sup>40</sup> Russian President V. Putin hinted in December 2022 that his so-called 'special military operation' may take 'a long time'.<sup>41</sup> The 70% increase in the 2024 military budget

<sup>34</sup> As evidenced by the three most recent strategic contests, WWI, WWII and the Cold War. See: White, p. 173.

<sup>35</sup> White, p.171.

<sup>36</sup> White, p. 175.

<sup>37</sup> Zartman, W. (2023). 'Negotiations to end all wars'. In R. Iron & D. Kingsbury (Eds.), *How Wars End: Theory and Practice* (pp. 189-201). London and New York: Routledge.

<sup>38</sup> Ukraine MFA. (n.d.). 'Multilateral statements in support of Ukraine'. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine*. <https://mfa.gov.ua/en/bagatostoronni-zayavi-na-pidtrimku-ukrayini>.

<sup>39</sup> Russia's summer 2023 budget adjustments proposed a radical increase of war budget for 2024, with the Russian defence minister eyeing 2025 as the year of when the 'special military operation's' goals would arguably be achieved. See: Samorukov, M. (2023, June 13). 'Why Putin Will Never Agree to De-escalate', *Foreign Policy*. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/06/13/ukraine-counteroffensive-russia-putin-war-negotiation-ceasefire-successor/>.

<sup>40</sup> ISW (2023). Russian offensive campaign assessment. Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 08.10.2023, <https://www.understandingwar.org/background/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2023>

<sup>41</sup> Vladimir Putin, 'A Meeting with the Council on Civil Society and Human Rights, Moscow', Kremlin.ru, 7 December 2022, <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70046>

(which will comprise a third of the planned total budget),<sup>42</sup> along with the Russian defence minister's suggestion that 2025 will be the year when the 'special military operation's goals might be achieved', point towards a long war scenario. There is a notable increase in policy-analytical and scholarly accounts that consider a war of attrition an (incrementally) likely scenario, with the important caveat that potential disruptions in, or the decline of, Western military, economic and/or political support of Ukraine would only increase the likelihood of a long war.<sup>43</sup>

Ukraine's European and Western partners are cautiously optimistic that Ukraine will win the war in the longer term, although scepticism abounds about a quick victory, leading to support for the notion of a 'long war of attrition' as a likely scenario. Zelenskyy stated in his speech at the third summit of the European Political Community (EPC) in Granada (Spain) in October 2023 that Russia was considering several scenarios, including a 'particularly perilous' one – that is, to 'freeze' the war for the time being, then re-arm and adapt in order to re-launch a larger-scale offensive targeting the Black to Baltic sea area at around the year 2028.<sup>44</sup>

In November 2023, Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhnyy alluded to the war being at a critical stage, suggesting it was potentially transitioning to a long war of attrition in which positional warfare would only benefit Russia.<sup>45</sup> If this occurs, Ukraine's army will need key military technologies and the reinforcement of the air force. That being said, it should be noted that by July 2023, as the Ukrainian counter-offensive started to unwind, the country's armed forces succeeded in liberating 50% of the territories that Russia had occupied after 24 February 2022. Ukraine's counter-offensive operation continues and expands, including to the Crimean peninsula and the adjacent Black Sea waters, and includes drone strikes behind enemy lines.<sup>46</sup>

It seems likely that by mid-2024, it will be clearer which of these two baseline scenarios – that is, a protracted war of attrition (a 'long war') or a decisive (absolute) military and political victory for Ukraine – will be dominant.

## 2 Ukraine's 10-point peace plan and the Kyiv Security Compact

Calls and proposals for 'peace in Ukraine' have multiplied since February 2022, with some European and non-Western countries sporadically emphasising the urgency of ceasefire and peace negotiations – sometimes at the expense of Ukrainian sovereignty, territorial integrity or international justice. Kyiv's determination not to concede these key principles has prompted some international leaders (as well as the

<sup>42</sup> Vitkine, B. (2023). 'Russia plans to increase its military budget by 70% in 2024', *Le Monde*, 26.09.2023, [https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/09/26/russia-plans-to-increase-its-military-budget-by-70-in-2024\\_6139811\\_4.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/09/26/russia-plans-to-increase-its-military-budget-by-70-in-2024_6139811_4.html)

<sup>43</sup> Daadler, I.H., & Goldgeier, J. (2023). 'The Long War in Ukraine: The West Needs to Plan for a Protracted Conflict with Russia'. *Foreign Affairs*, 09.01.2023; Schwartz, P. (2023). 'A War of Attrition: Assessing the Impact of Equipment Shortages on Russian Military Operations in Ukraine' (CSIS Report, July 2023); Charap, S., and Priebe, M. (2023). 'Avoiding a Long War: U.S. Policy and the Trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict'. *RAND Perspective*, PEA2510 (January 2023); Bugayova, N. (2023). 'Reframing the US policy debate on a 'long war' in Ukraine', *Institute for the Study of War*, 27.04.2023, <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/reframing-us-policy-debate-long-war-ukraine>

<sup>44</sup> Zelenskyy, V. (2023, October 5). 'Участь Володимира Зеленського в інавгураційній сесії 3-го саміту Європейської політичної спільноти'. *Official YouTube Channel*, Office of the President of Ukraine. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SoF764Mxv>.

<sup>45</sup> *The Economist* (2023). Ukraine's commander-in-chief on the breakthrough he needs to beat Russia. *The Economist*, 01.11.2023, <https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/11/01/ukraines-commander-in-chief-on-the-breakthrough-he-needs-to-beat-russia>; Zaluzhnyy, Valeriy (2023). *Modern Positional Warfare and How to Win It*. *The Economist*, 01.11.2023, [https://infographics.economist.com/2023/ExternalContent/ZALUZHNYI\\_FULL\\_VERSION.pdf](https://infographics.economist.com/2023/ExternalContent/ZALUZHNYI_FULL_VERSION.pdf)

<sup>46</sup> Eckel, M. (2023). 'Breakthrough. Bridgehead. Salient. Glimmers of Progress, And Hope, in Ukraine's Advances'. *RFE/RL*, 06.09.2023, <https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-counteroffensive-hope-advances-breakthroughs/32581270.html>

Kremlin) to accuse Ukraine of not being ‘peace-minded’ and having an ‘interest’ in protracting the war instead. In his address to the UN General Assembly in September 2022, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy underlined that Ukraine is interested in peace – not on Russian terms, or just ‘any kind of peace’, but rather just and lasting peace. He outlined five elements of what became known as Zelenskyy’s ‘peace formula’<sup>47</sup> (see Appendix 1), and stated that ‘Ukraine wants peace. Europe wants peace. The world wants peace. And we have seen who is the only one who wants war’.<sup>48</sup> This was the first in a series of steps and initiatives undertaken on Ukraine’s path to peace.

## 2.1 Ukraine’s path to peace: President Zelenskyy’s 5-element peace formula, 10-point peace plan and ‘global peace summit’ preparations

Ukraine’s ‘peace formula’, as announced by President Zelenskyy in September 2022 and developed further on<sup>49</sup> (see also Appendix 1 and Table 1 below), consists of a concise set of strategic ideas (setting the framework for an end to Russian aggression), a more nuanced operational plan (outlining ten specific paths to peace and their sequence), and a number of implementing initiatives (see Table 1), including:

- President Zelenskyy’s five-element ‘peace formula’, proposed during the 77th session of the UN General Assembly on 22 September 2022 (see Appendix 1);
- Zelenskyy’s ‘10-point peace plan’ outlined at the G20 summit in Bali on 15 November 2022 (see Appendix 2);
- Ukraine’s ‘Peace Formula Philosophy’ non-paper published by the Office of the President of Ukraine on 8 August 2023;
- Preparatory meetings for a ‘Global Peace Summit’ (aka milestone ‘Path to Peace Summits’) so far held in Copenhagen (24 June 2023), Jeddah (5–6 August 2023), and Istanbul (October 2023, TBC);
- The ‘Global Peace Summit’ itself, provisionally scheduled for late 2023.

**Table 1: Ukraine’s (strategic and operational) peace formula**

Components	Date and venue of presentation	Key elements
<b>President Zelenskyy’s five-element peace formula</b>	President of Ukraine, Speech at the 77 <sup>th</sup> Session of UN GA, 22 September 2022	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Punishment for aggression</li> <li>2) Protection of life</li> <li>3) Restoration of security and territorial integrity</li> <li>4) Security guarantees</li> <li>5) Determination to defend oneself<sup>50</sup></li> </ol>
<b>President Zelenskyy’s 10-step peace plan</b>	President of Ukraine, Speech at the G20 summit, 15.11.2022 & ‘Ukraine’s Peace Formula Philosophy’ non-paper, 8 August 2023	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Radiation and nuclear safety</li> <li>2) Food security</li> <li>3) Energy security</li> <li>4) Release of all prisoners and deportees</li> <li>5) Implementation of the UN Charter and restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the world order</li> <li>6) Withdrawal of Russian troops and cessation of hostilities</li> <li>7) Justice</li> </ol>

<sup>47</sup> President of Ukraine (2022, September 22). Speech by the President of Ukraine at the General Debate of the 77th session of the UN General Assembly. <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vistup-prezidenta-ukrayini-na-zagalnih-debatah-77-yi-sesiyi-77905>.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

		8) Immediate protection of environment [in the face of] ecocide 9) Prevention of escalation 10) Confirmation of the end of the war <sup>51</sup>
<b>Global Peace Summit</b>	'Path to peace' summits, varied cities/countries	A series of Global Peace Summit-preparatory meetings aimed to discuss the details and help better implement the 10-point peace plan, so far held in: Copenhagen (June 2023), Jeddah (August 2023); and Istanbul (October 2023, TBC)
	'Global Peace Summit' itself; format, venue and date TBD	Originally scheduled to take place in late 2023 (tentatively, postponement to spring 2024 is currently under consideration)

Source: Author's own

As mentioned above, the first component of Ukraine's peace formula is **President Zelenskyy's five-element 'peace formula'**, presented in late 2022 as a strategic framework for punishing aggression and restoring Ukraine's security, as well as ensuring peace and security after the war, while preserving Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. It called for greater civilian protection and defence support for Ukraine – what Zelenskyy described as a 'formula that punishes crime, protects life, restores security and territorial integrity, guarantees security, and provides determination.'<sup>52</sup> It pursues five overarching goals, as follows:

Firstly, *punishment for aggression*

As Zelenskyy explicitly stated, the underlying rationale of the proposed peace formula is punishment for the crime of aggression, so that justice is served to Ukraine and its people, and (more importantly) any future aggression against Ukraine or elsewhere is prevented:

'A crime has been committed against Ukraine, and we demand just punishment.

The crime was committed against our state borders. The crime was committed against the lives of our people. The crime was committed against the dignity of our women and men. The crime was committed against the values that make you and me a community of the UN.

And Ukraine demands punishment for trying to steal our territory. Punishment for the murders of thousands of people. Punishment for tortures and humiliations of women and men. Punishment for the catastrophic turbulence that Russia provoked with its illegal war and not only for us, Ukrainians, but for the whole world. For every nation that is represented in this Hall of the UN General Assembly. [...]

This is the formula of crime and punishment, which is already well known to Russia. And this is the formula of justice and law and order that Russia has yet to learn. As well as any other potential aggressors. What is not in our formula? Neutrality.'<sup>53</sup>

Thus, the definition of justice and just peace includes *no* restrictions upon Ukrainian sovereignty, such as the Russian-demanded *neutrality* of Ukraine<sup>54</sup> (that is, preventing Ukraine's accession into NATO).

<sup>51</sup> President of Ukraine. (2022, November 15). 'Ukraine has always been a leader in peacemaking efforts; if Russia wants to end this war, let it prove it with actions'. *Speech by the President of Ukraine at the G20 Summit*. <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-zavzhdi-bula-liderom-mirotvorchih-zusil-yaksho-rosi-79141>.

<sup>52</sup> President of Ukraine. (2022, September 22). *Speech by the President of Ukraine at the General Debate of the 77th session of the UN General Assembly*. <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vistup-prezidenta-ukrayini-na-zagalnih-debatah-77-yi-sesiyi-77905>.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Popular prior to Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the idea of a 'neutral' Ukraine has lost its political and scholarly appeal, becoming politically unfeasible and undesirable as a solution to the war.

The demand for punishment of Russia's aggression constitutes *the* key item in Ukraine's peace formula. It is overarching and comprehensive, with legal (special tribunals and cases filed with ICJ, JCC, ITLOS, etc.), financial, socio-economic (economic sanctions ranging from travel bans and asset freezes, to blocking of trade interactions), and justice-restorative dimensions (international and international-institutional isolation of Russia, confiscation of Russian assets abroad and reparations for war crimes, as foreseen by the to-be-established 'international compensation mechanism'):

'Punishment for the crime of aggression. Punishment for violation of borders and territorial integrity. Punishment that must be in place until the internationally recognised border is restored. Until the aggression stops. And until the damages and losses for the war are fully compensated.'<sup>55</sup>

On 14 November 2022, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/ES-11/5 calling for Russian reparations for damage caused to Ukraine.<sup>56</sup> In addition to Russia, the following countries voted against the resolution: Bahamas, Belarus, Central African Republic, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iran, Mali, Nicaragua, North Korea, Syria and Zimbabwe.

Second, *protection of life*.

As Zelenskyy unequivocally stated, for Ukraine this is 'a war for life'. Hence the increasingly intensive calls for international support for Ukraine's defence effort, including military aid aimed at the physical and social protection of a 'nation's life'.<sup>57</sup>

Third, *restoration of security and territorial integrity*

Russia has not only undermined the regional and international security order, but also threatens national and international security in a variety of ways, including the freedom and safety of maritime navigation (maritime security), food safety, energy safety, (nuclear and chemical) radiation safety, environmental safety, and safety from weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). This means that rather than viewing Russian activity within the territorial confines of a bilateral conflict, it is considered a global threat. Hence Ukraine's calls for the international community to 'finally recognise Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism', both legally and politically.<sup>58</sup> Targeting domain-specific international wrongdoings of Russia also seems to be a more feasible step-by-step approach to restoring Ukraine's security (and wider regional/international security) than a 'grand bargain' on Russia's return within the current rules-based international order.

The restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity, in line with its 1991 internationally recognised borders, is not only a matter of justice or defending Ukraine's own sovereignty and statehood – it is a matter of principle and an issue with global resonance and implications, as Zelenskyy has stressed: 'When one country tries to steal the territory of another, it puts all world nations under attack'.<sup>59</sup> Needless to say that success or failure in ensuring the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity will have regional and global consequences. Ukraine's territorial integrity and security is innately connected to the global: 'Global

<sup>55</sup> President of Ukraine. (2022, September 22). Speech by the President of Ukraine at the General Debate of the 77th session of the UN General Assembly. <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vistup-prezidenta-ukrayini-na-zagalnih-debatah-77-yi-sesiyi-77905>.

<sup>56</sup> The resolution was adopted by a substantial majority, with 94 of the assembly's 193 members voting in favour, 14 voting against and 73 abstaining. UN General Assembly (2022, 14 November). United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/ES-11/5: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3994481?ln=en>.

<sup>57</sup> President of Ukraine. (2022, September 22). Speech by the President of Ukraine at the General Debate of the 77th session of the UN General Assembly. <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vistup-prezidenta-ukrayini-na-zagalnih-debatah-77-yi-sesiyi-77905>.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

security cannot be restored without restoring the territorial integrity of the nation which suffered the armed aggression'.<sup>60</sup>

Calls for Ukraine to compromise in terms of its sovereignty and territorial integrity in pursuit of peace have been persistent, but the Ukrainian leadership has made its position clear: 'Don't even think about it!'<sup>61</sup> The US leadership has described Russian demands for recognition of 'new territorial realities' (i.e. Moscow's occupation of Ukrainian territories) as 'inadmissible'. In June 2023, Polish President Andrzej Duda suggested that those countries who advance talks of Ukrainian compromise should exchange parts of their own territories with Russia instead.

The idea of Ukraine's potential territorial compromise in the name of future peace (negotiations) meets strong rejection among Ukraine's population: according to a February 2023 survey, 87% of Ukrainians consider any territorial compromises in Russia's favour inadmissible, whereas only 9% maintain this might be necessary to eventually reach a peaceful settlement with the aggressor state.<sup>62</sup> The Czech foreign minister J. Lipavsky has noted that there is more certainty than uncertainty, as Russia 'will not trade lands for peace' anyway.<sup>63</sup> Conceding territory would only embolden Russia in future and will not bring about lasting peace in Ukraine or the region more broadly.

Fourth, *security guarantees*.

Advocating for every nation's 'right to security guarantees', Zelenskyy alluded to the work in progress on concrete proposals for 'legally binding multilateral and bilateral treaties' that would enable an 'upgrade of the security architecture for Ukraine, and for Europe and the world', and that 'would not allow any more aggression' against Ukraine and/or Europe'.<sup>64</sup> This is a direct link to the so-called 'Kyiv Security Compact' – a set of recommendations developed under the auspices of the Head of Ukraine's Presidential Office Andrii Yermak and the former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, discussed below.

Finally, fifth, *determination to defend oneself*.

The final element cuts across the other four elements and relates to both Ukraine's determination to defend itself now and in the future, the necessary resolve of Ukraine's partners to substantially *and* sustainably support Ukraine in this struggle, as well as the international community's united front against rule breakers, such as Russia:

'This is our determination to fight. This is the determination of the partners to help us, and also themselves. And this is the determination of the world to unite around the one who fights against armed aggression and to call to order the one who threatens all.'<sup>65</sup>

Effectively, the aforementioned five key elements of Ukraine's peace formula embody five preconditions for peace, which reflect Patterson's framework for a secure and enduring peace based on order, justice and conciliation. The peace formula calls for the punishment of Russian aggression (justice), alongside the

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Kuleba, D. (2023, October 9). 'Голова МЗС Дмитро Кулеба: про завислі \$6 млрд від США, список реформ для України, зернову кризу, перемовини з РФ і шлях в ЄС'. *Forbes*. <https://forbes.ua/war-in-ukraine/intervyu-z-golovoyu-mzs-dmitrom-kuleboyu-06102023-16522>.

<sup>62</sup> KIIS. (2023, February 23). 'Динаміка готовності до територіальних поступок для якнайшвидшого завершення війни: результати телефонного опитування, проведеного 14-22 лютого 2023 року'. *Київський міжнародний інститут соціології (КМІС) – Соціологічне опитування*. <https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1192&page=1>.

<sup>63</sup> Lipavsky, J. (2023, August 21). 'Russia Won't Trade Land for Peace in Ukraine'. *European Pravda*. <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/articles/2023/08/21/7167895/>.

<sup>64</sup> President of Ukraine. (2022, September 22). Speech by the President of Ukraine at the General Debate of the 77th session of the UN General Assembly. <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vistup-prezidenta-ukrayini-na-zagalnih-debatah-77-yi-sesiyi-77905>.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

establishment of order and security guarantees, with the aim of ensuring Ukraine's future security and stability.

On 15 November 2022, Zelenskyy announced his **10-step path to peace** (the '**10-point peace plan**') at the Group of Twenty (G20) meeting in Bali, Indonesia (see Table 1 above).<sup>66</sup> The plan deals with both the short-term conditions for war termination and the longer-term issues of reconciliation and ending the desire for war. It calls for:

- 1) Radiation and nuclear safety focusing on restoring security around Russian-occupied Ukraine's nuclear power plant (NPP) in Zaporizhzhia (Europe's largest), including the power plant's demilitarisation (withdrawal of Russian troops), transfer of control of the NPP to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and restoring its connection to Ukrainian electricity networks; IAEA monitoring of Ukraine's four active NPPs and the laid-up Chornobyl NPP; an end to Russian radiation and nuclear blackmail;
- 2) Food security, in particular protecting and securing – through a UN/Türkiye-mediated, sustainable 'Black Sea Grain Deal' – Ukraine's seaborne grain exports, including to the world's poor(est) nations (a 'Grain from Ukraine' initiative);
- 3) Energy security, focusing on price caps on Russian energy resources and assisting Ukraine in the restoration of its destroyed energy infrastructure; the protection of energy infrastructure amidst continued Russian strikes on civilian infrastructure; hence Ukraine's request for air defence systems;
- 4) Release of all prisoners and deportees according to the 'all for all' principle, including POWs and children who have been illegally deported to Russia;<sup>67</sup>
- 5) Unconditional and non-negotiable restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity, as well as restoration of the international rules-based order, in accordance with the UN Charter that Russia blatantly violated;
- 6) Withdrawal of all Russian troops and the cessation of hostilities, with the subsequent restoration of Ukraine's 1991 state borders with Russia;
- 7) Justice, including the establishment of a special tribunal to prosecute Russia's crime of aggression and other war crimes, and a special international mechanism for Russian war reparations to Ukraine (in particular, confiscation of Russian assets abroad);
- 8) Immediate protection of the environment and the prevention of a looming ecocide (massive destruction of Ukraine's flora and fauna, millions of hectares of forest burned, and thousands of hectares of land contaminated with harmful substances – as well as, more recently – vast areas of land lost due to the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP) Dam in June 2023), with a focus on demining and restoring water treatment facilities;<sup>68</sup>

<sup>66</sup> President of Ukraine. (2022, November 15), 'Ukraine has always been a leader in peacemaking efforts; if Russia wants to end this war, let it prove it with actions'. *Speech by the President of Ukraine at the G20 Summit*: <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-zavzhdi-bula-liderom-mirotvorchih-zusil-yaksho-rosi-79141>.

<sup>67</sup> As of February 2023, Ukraine estimated that some 16 200 Ukrainian children had been deported to Russia. Russia claims it has 'protected', i.e. illegally deported, over 700 000 minors from Ukraine. See: <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-children-taken-ukraine/32527298.html>.

<sup>68</sup> Ukraine has proposed the establishment of a platform to assess the costs of war-inflicted environmental damage. In July 2022, Ukraine's Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources launched, with EU-funded project support, *EcoZagroza* ('EcoDanger') – a website tool to monitor, in real-time, the environmental toll of the war since 24 February 2022. As of 10 October 2023, 2 534 reports were recorded of military actions with a direct environmental effect. *EcoZagroza* estimates that Russia's invasion has inflicted roughly EUR 54.67 billion (UAH 2.1 billion) in environmental damage. See: <https://ecozagroza.gov.ua/en>.

- 9) Prevention of an escalation of conflict and building a (more) sustainable European security architecture including (more) credible – legally binding – security guarantees for Ukraine. Here, Ukraine calls not only for cumulative efforts to prevent further escalation by Russia, but also to provide it with legally binding security guarantees (outlined in the 'Kyiv Security Compact') that would ensure the non-escalation of the conflict before Ukraine eventually joins NATO;
- 10) Confirmation of the war's end, including in writing. Ukraine invites other international actors who would like to be 'co-creators' of peace, and support Ukraine's peace plan in general, to facilitate the conclusion of a document (treaty/agreement) confirming the end of Russian aggression.

On 8 August 2023, the Office of the President of Ukraine published **Ukraine's 'Peace Formula Philosophy'**, which had been presented and discussed days earlier at the meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.<sup>69</sup> This 'non-paper' updates the rationalisations behind each of the above peace plan's ten points, and includes numerous references to the February 2023 UN General Assembly Resolution that, by and large, supported Ukraine's rationale for peace. Importantly, it adds more specifics to the tenth point (confirmation of the end of the war), emphasising that '[t]he end of the war would be confirmed at a peace conference to be held with participation of the widest possible range of states, taking part in the implementation of the Peace Formula and making with this contribution to the achievement of comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine'.<sup>70</sup> Furthermore, the document stipulates that '[a] comprehensive legally binding international agreement is to be signed by the parties with the participation of guarantor states'.<sup>71</sup> By and large, however, Ukraine's 5-point peace formula and the 10-point peace plan remained unchanged at their core, and have been presented to the international community at distinct established fora and special gatherings, including among G7, G20 and the Global South countries.

In December 2022, President Zelenskyy urged G7 leaders to support his idea of a '**Global Peace Summit**' which would either take the entire 10-point peace plan on board, or focus on a number of specific points. He also envisaged summit-preparatory meetings, labelled 'Path to Peace' summits (discussed in a greater detail in section 2.3, below). These aim to popularise the formula and garner international support in order to better facilitate its implementability, thereby accounting for the dynamic situation on the battlefield and in the Russian war-related international context.

Ukraine's efforts to popularise the formula extend beyond 'big events' diplomacy to cover frequent meetings of the President's Office representatives with members of the international diplomatic corps in Kyiv (six meetings had been held by mid-August 2023 by the Head of the Office Andriy Yermak alone), as well as a series of meetings and presentations by the Foreign Ministry abroad.

During an extraordinary meeting with Ukraine's ambassadors on 2 August 2023, President Zelenskyy charted five key foreign-policy priorities to be furthered:

- Implementation of the peace formula;
- Military aid for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia;
- Ukraine's integration into the EU and NATO;
- Provision of guarantees for Ukraine's security, economic recovery and development;

<sup>69</sup> President of Ukraine. (2023, July 21). Ukraine's Peace Formula Philosophy. Office of the President of Ukraine. [https://www.president.gov.ua/storage/j-files-storage/01/19/53/32af8d644e6cae41791548fc82ae2d8e\\_1691483767.pdf](https://www.president.gov.ua/storage/j-files-storage/01/19/53/32af8d644e6cae41791548fc82ae2d8e_1691483767.pdf).

<sup>70</sup> Ibid. p. 7.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.



- Protection of the rights of Ukrainians abroad.<sup>72</sup>

Ukraine’s ‘peace formula’ innately draws on the key principles of the UN Charter and international law, encompassing a general (Ukrainian) vision of war termination and restoration of just and democratic peace. It also envisages a number of specific steps towards establishing comprehensive and lasting peace. However, peacebuilding and conflict resolution are long-term endeavours; they cannot take place without the establishment of security and order. These ten steps, or points, essentially condition the ceasefire and war termination aspects, touching only tangentially upon the uncertain dimensions of a post-war settlement, conflict resolution, and building sustainable peace. As the latter point is a matter of co-creation with Ukraine’s partners, neighbours and Russia, and is dependent upon how and when the war ends, multiple options and configurations appear possible, and are discussed below.

## 2.2 War termination and post-war security guarantees: The Kyiv Security Compact and the G7 Security Guarantees

Ukraine’s ‘peace formula’, outlined above, seeks to set the conditions for the cessation of hostilities and ending of the war. However, the risks of a ‘false peace’ are high, and fraught with severe consequences if Ukraine (and its partners) do not ensure that there are safety valves against renewed escalation by Russia (in case of a prolonged war) or revanchist aggression. There is little trust that Moscow will stick to any ceasefire or war termination agreement (based on its behaviour since 1991), demonstrating Reiter’s ‘commitment credibility’ issue: war termination involves more than one party and, in the absence of absolute victory for Ukraine, an untrustworthy adversary such as Russia is likely to undermine any progress towards a negotiated settlement. The 10-point peace plan alludes to the need to prevent any escalation, in particular through ‘security guarantees’, and to formally confirm the end of the war with an international agreement between the parties and guarantor countries. In this way, both functional and strategic links are created between the war-ending peace formula, on the one hand, and war-to-peace and post-war security guarantees, on the other. Third countries (both regional and global security stakeholders) will play a crucial role.

In late 2022, Ukraine set out its vision, wishes and ways to guarantee security while transitioning from the war’s end to peacebuilding, including its strategic objective of acceding to NATO – the so-called ‘Kyiv Security Compact’ (KSC). At NATO’s 2023 summit in Vilnius, the Group of Seven (G7) states adopted a Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine, which echoed some of the KSC’s propositions (see Table 2 for details).

**Table 2: Ukraine and allies’ war termination and post-war sustainable peacebuilding initiatives**

War termination initiatives and post-war peace and security guarantees	Date and venue of presentation	Key elements
<b>Kyiv Security Compact</b>	Frmr. NATO SG, A. Fogh Rasmussen, and Head of Ukraine President’s Office, A. Yermak 13 September 2022	<i>Outlines the key rationale, scope and potential shape of long-term (and interim) security guarantees before Ukraine becomes a NATO member, structured around three key pillars:</i> Security guarantees – commitments by a core group of guarantors regarding Ukraine’s self-defence capabilities and capacities to deter an attack;

<sup>72</sup> Nakonechna, Y. (2023, August 2), DW. Зеленський зібрав послів на нараду: дав п’ять завдань.: <https://www.dw.com/uk/zelenuskij-zibrav-posliv-ukraini-na-naradu-ozvuciv-pat-zavdan/a-66422906>.

		Security guarantees – how they would work in case of an attack/legal considerations and mechanisms; International sanctions. <sup>73</sup>
<b>G7 Security Guarantees</b>	The G7 Joint Declaration at the NATO's 2023 Vilnius summit, 12 July 2023 and adjoining countries' declarations	<p><i>A multilateral framework guiding future bilateral security commitments and arrangements to be negotiated and formalised between Ukraine and each G7 member to:</i></p> <p>Ensure Ukraine's sustainable defence force and capacity to deter Russian aggression in the future via:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Security assistance and modern military equipment;</li> <li>• Support to further develop Ukraine's defence industrial base;</li> <li>• Training and training exercises for Ukrainian forces;</li> <li>• Intelligence sharing and cooperation;</li> <li>• Support for cyber defence, security, and resilience initiatives, including to address threats.</li> </ul> <p>Strengthen Ukraine's economic stability and resilience, including through reconstruction and recovery efforts;</p> <p>Provide technical and financial support for Ukraine's immediate needs stemming from Russia's war, as well as to enable Ukraine to continue implementing effective reform agenda.<sup>74</sup></p>
<b>Ukraine's accession to NATO</b>	TBD	TBD

Source: Author's own work

The KSC constitutes victory-bound contingency planning: it seeks to help advance Ukraine's victory more quickly and effectively, and ensure its security both before and after the war is won. The KSC is driven by the trauma of the 1994 'Budapest Memorandum', which included security assurances from the UK, US and Russia in exchange for Ukraine relinquishing its nuclear weapons arsenal. However, these assurances did not help Ukraine deter Russian covert aggression in 2014, nor its invasion in February 2022. Consequently, Ukraine's leadership seeks credible security guarantees, including legally binding commitments for 'guarantor states'. This was emphasised by the Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, Andriy Yermak, in December 2022 on the 28<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the signing of the Budapest Memorandum:

<sup>73</sup> Rasmussen, A. F., & Yermak, A. (2022, September 13). 'The Kyiv Security Compact – International Security Guarantees for Ukraine: Recommendations'. *The Office of the President of Ukraine*. [https://www.president.gov.ua/storage/j-files-storage/01/15/89/41fd0ec2d72259a561313370cee1be6e\\_1663050954.pdf](https://www.president.gov.ua/storage/j-files-storage/01/15/89/41fd0ec2d72259a561313370cee1be6e_1663050954.pdf).

<sup>74</sup> U.S. Department of State. (2023, July 12). Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine. <https://www.state.gov/joint-declaration-of-support-for-ukraine>.

‘Ukraine gave up the third nuclear arsenal in the world for supposed security guarantees. But they turned out to be worthless, as one of the guarantors was actually a terrorist. Never again. No more Budapest Memorandums.’<sup>75</sup>

Thus, Ukraine’s approach towards peace and post-war security is fundamentally underpinned by a Budapest Memorandum-antithetical logic.

The idea of partnership-based security commitments, or ‘compacts’, has been on agenda for a while, both for Ukraine, and for other countries of the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood that are facing a growingly assertive and revisionist Russia – particularly since the annexation of Crimea in 2014.<sup>76</sup> Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 dramatically changed the security environment, necessitating additional parameters for any feasible security arrangement: allied and legally binding commitments. The KSC, a set of recommendations on future ‘international security guarantees for Ukraine’, was set out in September 2022 by the Co-chairs of the Working Group on International Security Guarantees for Ukraine, Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Andriy Yermak<sup>77</sup> (see Appendix 4 and Table 2, above). They envisage ‘a multi-tiered approach to guarantees’, whereby a ‘core group of allies will provide cast-iron commitments to support Ukraine’s armed forces, and a broader group will provide non-military guarantees, built around sanctions’.<sup>78</sup>

Structurally, the KSC security guarantee proposals revolve around three core pillars:

1. The concept and tentative content of security guarantees;
2. A set of plausible mechanisms of implementation;
3. A specific mechanism for devising and implementing international sanctions (see Appendix 4 and Table 2, above).

First and foremost, the rationale and scope of ‘security guarantees’ essentially entails a strategic framework for partnership-based – non-alliance – commitments, to be undertaken vis-à-vis Ukraine by both NATO member states and third countries (commonly referred to as ‘a core group of guarantors’<sup>79</sup>), with the aim of credibly enhancing Ukraine’s ‘self-defence capabilities and capacities to deter an attack’.<sup>80</sup> There is no expectation of mutual defence commitments akin to Article V of the Washington Treaty (nor the more flexible Article 42.7 of the Treaty of the European Union), although Ukraine will benefit from both in the future if it joins NATO and the EU. The KSC-proposed security guarantees are thus interim, and arguably ‘iron-clad’<sup>81</sup>, mechanisms for ensuring Ukraine’s security and sovereignty (including its sovereign right to choose its future development path and alliances – that is, integration into the EU and NATO). The security guarantees are meant to work as safeguards against any external infringements (whether from Russia, Ukraine’s own partners, or other powerful international players) upon Ukraine’s sovereignty, including by

<sup>75</sup> Yermak, A. (2022, December 5), Twitter post on Budapest memorandum at 28: <https://twitter.com/AndriyYermak/status/1599725192821243904>.

<sup>76</sup> German, T., & Tyushka, A. (2022). ‘Security Challenges at the EU’s Eastern Border: Which Role for CSDP?’ (DG EXPO In-Depth Analysis, PE 653.653, January 2022). Brussels: European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO\\_IDA\(2022\)653653](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_IDA(2022)653653), pp. 32-33.

<sup>77</sup> Rasmussen, A. F., & Yermak, A. (2022, September 13). ‘The Kyiv Security Compact – International Security Guarantees for Ukraine: Recommendations’. *The Office of the President of Ukraine*. [https://www.president.gov.ua/storage/j-files-storage/01/15/89/41fd0ec2d72259a561313370cee1be6e\\_1663050954.pdf](https://www.president.gov.ua/storage/j-files-storage/01/15/89/41fd0ec2d72259a561313370cee1be6e_1663050954.pdf).

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> As proposed in the KSC recommendations of September 2022, ‘a core group of guarantors’ (mentioned in the document interchangeably as well as ‘partners’ and ‘allies’) could consist of predominantly – but not exclusively – NATO countries, including the US, UK, Canada, Poland, Italy, Germany, France, Australia, Türkiye, and Nordic, Baltic and Central European countries. An ‘extended format of guarantors’ – beyond the core group – could furthermore include countries formed within the varied coalitions of the willing, akin to the currently active ca.50 countries-strong Ukraine Defence Contact Group, also known as the ‘Rammstein Format’. See Rasmussen and Yermak, pp. 3-5.

<sup>80</sup> Rasmussen and Yermak, p. 4.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

way of imposing any specific status, such as neutrality. Importantly, the KSC-based guarantees themselves should not be offered 'in exchange for [this] specific status' either.<sup>82</sup> The scope of such commitments would extend from partners' sustained investment in Ukraine's defence industrial base, extensive weapons transfers and intelligence support from allies, to providing aid to build and maintain extensive, well-trained armed forces that help Ukraine both effectively 'deter and – if needed – defend against another armed attack or acts of aggression'.<sup>83</sup>

Secondly, 'plausible mechanisms' of such security guarantees activation and implementation would have to be based on legally and politically binding (multilateral and bilateral) commitments, composed of permanent efforts to enhance Ukraine's self-defence capacity (and deterrence potential) and scalable (extended) measures to adapt and reflect the level of threat posed.<sup>84</sup> Importantly, all such guarantees should 'explicitly commit guarantors to Ukraine's self-defence' within its 'internationally recognised borders'. The same territorial scope applies for extended guarantees provision in case of an armed attack on Ukraine. The 'extended guarantee commitments by guarantors' might cover a broad spectrum of available and appropriate measures drawing on 'all elements of their national and collective power'.

According to the KSC proposal, intended security guarantee mechanisms should include:

- (a) A permanent mechanism for monitoring threats and security challenges, including the established practices of collecting, exchanging, processing and analysing intelligence;
- (b) A joint threat assessment structure, thanks to which extended security guarantees could be offered without unnecessary delays waiting for a third-party (such as the UN Security Council or UN General Assembly) to confirm 'an armed attack or an act of aggression';
- (c) An agreed decision-making process involving 'collective consultations followed by individual contributions' – all within an expedient time frame: supposedly 24 hours for holding collective consultations, and 72 hours for forming coalitions of the willing and deciding on the scope and specifics of extended guarantees.<sup>85</sup>

Importantly, none of these security guarantees should be regarded as pre-empting any other forms and formats for ensuring Ukraine's defence and deterrence.

Thirdly, an arranged international sanctions mechanism should flank the set of security guarantees as an additional layer of double deterrence, (i.e. deterrence by denial and punishment). To ensure their effectiveness, the guarantors of Ukraine's security should implement these sanctions in close coordination with other international bodies and organisations (such as the EU and G7), and invite like-minded countries (such as Switzerland, Norway, Singapore, South Korea and Australia) to join.

Notably, while foreseeing sanctions as a tool in deterring future aggression, the KSC suggests using the existing sanctions regime as a means of bringing the ongoing war to an end, preventing its renewal or a broader escalation, and thus building (more) sustainable peace. In this regard, it is recommended that the guarantors of Ukraine's security not only refrain from lifting the current sanctions, but also agree upon measures to seize the assets of the aggressor country (i.e. Russia's sovereign funds and reserves) and its citizens, as well as legal entities on the sanctions list. Sanctions are only recommended to be lifted, or

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>83</sup> According to the document Ukraine will require – from international guarantors – resources to further build and maintain 'significant' armed forces, a massive training and joint manoeuvre programme of Ukrainian forces and partners from EU and NATO countries on Ukrainian territory, advanced and comprehensive defence systems, other technology transfers and arms exports, enhanced intelligence-sharing, cyber defence and security cooperation, cooperation on countering hybrid threats, access to EU's capability funding (including the European Peace Facility and European Defence Fund) and other financial aid and direct (defence industry) investments, as well assistance in the form of reconstruction funds. See Rasmussen and Yermak, p. 5.

<sup>84</sup> Rasmussen and Yermak, p. 6.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.* pp.6-7.

temporarily suspended, in two cases: when Russia '(a) stops its aggression against Ukraine, (b) guarantees it will not attack Ukraine in the future, and (c) compensates Ukraine for the damages caused during the invasion'; or as part of a negotiated peace settlement coordinated with Ukraine.<sup>86</sup> To ensure the sustainability of a negotiated peace settlement, the KSC recommends a 'snapback' provision on the re-imposition of sanctions (at least at the level of the full set of sanctions as of 1 September 2022<sup>87</sup>) in the event of new 'armed attack' or an 'act of aggression'. If incorporated in a security guarantee agreement, such a provision should be designed to enable the immediate and almost 'automatic' re-imposition of a set of sanctions in a configuration which is yet to be confirmed.

The **G7 'Security Guarantees'**, as stated in the Joint Declaration adopted by the G7 states at NATO's 2023 Vilnius summit<sup>88</sup>, can be seen as the next step towards developing a multilateral wartime security framework for Ukraine, short of NATO's allied defence commitments (but more extensive than the unbinding Budapest Memorandum). Even though the link between the G7 Joint Declaration and the KSC has not been explicitly stated by the G7 countries, Andrii Yermak suggests that the G7 Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine 'contains elements of the Kyiv Security Compact'<sup>89</sup>.

In particular, the G7 Security Guarantees pledge presents a general (multilateral) framework guiding future individual (bilateral) security commitments and arrangements still to be negotiated and **formalised** between Ukraine and each G7 country, chiefly aiming to

- Sustain Ukraine's sustainable defence and deterrence capacity vis-à-vis Russia;
- Strengthen Ukraine's economic stability and resilience;
- Provide technical and financial support for Ukraine's immediate war needs and ongoing reforms.<sup>90</sup>

Russia's negative reaction to this development and condemnation of the G7 Security Guarantees as 'very dangerous' is a good indicator that, to an extent, the proposed security framework is more prominent and promising than the Budapest Memorandum had been.

It should be noted that, while G7 members are the primary guarantors under the above-proposed framework, the instrument is flexible and open for participation from other states. By late August 2023, 25 countries, including Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Spain, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, and Sweden, had joined the G7's 'Security Guarantees' Declaration. The Declaration was originally signed by the G7 countries – Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, the US – and the EU as a 'non-enumerated' member. In early August 2023, Ukraine launched discussions on bilateral security guarantees with the US and the UK, respectively. In mid-August, Ukrainian–Swedish talks on security guarantees were initiated.

The KSC should not be viewed in isolation. It is a series of documents, and is complemented by the G7 Security Guarantees framework. The Compact is expected to inform future bilateral security arrangements, or compacts, between Ukraine and G7 members, including the EU. In other words, sequels are to be expected. Finally, while both the KSC and the G7 Security Guarantees provide for short- to mid-term

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>87</sup> This requirement may have expediently evolved in the meantime given that a year has passed since the KSC was first presented in September 2022, and the EU is already eyeing its 12th package of sanctions against Russia.

<sup>88</sup> U.S. Department of State. (2023, July 12). Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine. <https://www.state.gov/joint-declaration-of-support-for-ukraine>.

<sup>89</sup> Yermak, A. (2023, July 21). 'Ukraine should receive reliable security guarantees and unite the whole world around Volodymyr Zelensky's Peace Formula'. *Andriy Yermak at Aspen Security Forum*. <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-maye-otrimati-nadijni-garantiyi-bezpeki-j-obyednati-84461>.

<sup>90</sup> U.S. Department of State. (2023, July 12). Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine. <https://www.state.gov/joint-declaration-of-support-for-ukraine>.

security guarantees necessary to end the war, only NATO accession – as a logical and strategic step forward – is expected to bring about long(er)-term security and peace in Ukraine and further afield in Europe.

Thus, NATO membership offers the most credible, long-term security guarantee for Ukraine.<sup>91</sup> Accession should be initiated before the war ends: any other promise of NATO membership, especially one that explicitly sets the end of the war as a precondition, would incentivise Russia to prolong the war for as long as possible. More and more voices in academia and policymaking worlds argue that Ukraine's EU and NATO membership cannot be made contingent on war termination, particularly if Ukraine's membership in both organisations is conceived of as the only feasible and sustainable security guarantee.<sup>92</sup> Security, order and conciliation are all essential for a durable, sustainable peace.<sup>93</sup>

## 2.3 Feasibility and potential effectiveness assessment

Assessing the feasibility of the aforementioned peace proposals, as well as bilateral and multilateral measures, such as the KSC and G7 Security Guarantees, is an inherently challenging task, as both the initiatives themselves and the situation on the battlefield are dynamic. Nevertheless, their potential effects and limitations can be assessed against what theory holds and the empirical evidence suggests – particularly as regards the core parameters of their conduciveness to armistice, war termination, conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The analysis below suggests that due to the complex and encompassing nature of Russian aggression against Ukraine (and the liberal international order), none of the proffered Ukrainian and Ukraine-aligned multilateral initiatives would sufficiently and fully provide conclusive and sustainable settlements for all four interlocking dimensions of war termination and peacebuilding. At the same time, the alternative peace proposals advanced by China, Indonesia and the African group of states fall even shorter of providing a credible basis for conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Furthermore, their intentionality and implementability raise legitimate questions (see Table 3).<sup>94</sup> As discussed in Chapter 1, security, the establishment of order and conciliation are critical elements of long-term peacebuilding. These alternative peace proposals fail to adequately address these issues. The feasibility of existing peace proposals varies, as indicated in Table 3 below, with Ukraine's path to peace being arguably the least 'porous' of those analysed in this study.<sup>95</sup>

<sup>91</sup> This is also a position of one of the staunchest opponents of the idea pre-24 February 2022, Henry Kissinger, who, in his recent – revisited – take on the Russia-Ukraine war and the urge to prevent WWII, suggests that Ukraine's NATO accession is the only feasible security guarantee now. See: Kissinger, H. (2023). Henry Kissinger explains how to avoid world war three. *The Economist*, 17.05.2023, <https://www.economist.com/briefing/2023/05/17/henry-kissinger-explains-how-to-avoid-world-war-three>

<sup>92</sup> Wesslau, Fredrik (2023). Securing Ukraine: NATO, Security Guarantees, and Weapons. *SCEEUS Report*, 8 (16.06.2023); Heinemann-Grüder, A. (2023). Wie enden Kriege? Einsichten für den Ukrainekrieg. *Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik*, 16(3), 227-239.

<sup>93</sup> Patterson, 2021, op. cit.

<sup>94</sup> Düben, B. A., & Wang-Kaeding, H. (2023). Don't let a good crisis go to waste: China's response to the Russia-Ukraine war. *International Politics*, 1-31, DOI: 10.1057/s41311-023-00502-3; Lin, Bonny (2023). Can China Thread the Needle on Ukraine? Beijing Struggles to Balance Its Ties to Russia and Europe. *Foreign Affairs*, 17.05.2023, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/can-china-thread-needle-ukraine>; Hoppe, S. (2022). Chinas Reaktion auf Russlands Krieg gegen die Ukraine. *Strategische Zurückhaltung mit Moskauer Schlagseite. Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik*, 15(2-3), 125-137; Sebastian, L. C., & Marzuki, K. (2023). Let sleeping bears lie: an analysis of the factors behind Indonesia's response to the Russo-Ukrainian war and its implications for the Indo-Pacific region. *International Politics*, 1-27, DOI: 10.1057/s41311-023-00478-0; Dharmaputra, R. (2023). Non-Western responses to Russia's war in Ukraine: Learning from Indonesia. *Journal of Regional Security*, 51-60, DOI: 10.5937/jrs18-41779; Bartosiewicz, M. (2023). Grain comes first: the African peace initiative for Ukraine. *OSW Centre for Eastern Studies*, 21.06.2023, <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2023-06-21/grain-comes-first-african-peace-initiative-ukraine>; Staeger, Ueli (2023). The War in Ukraine, the African Union, and African Agency. *African Affairs*, DOI: 10.1093/afraf/adad026.

<sup>95</sup> Blank (white) areas in Table 3 connote such 'pores', or blind spots, in the peace initiatives under scrutiny, whereas the shaded (grey) areas denote the initiative's assessed potential in addressing the issues of ceasefire, war termination, conflict resolution and/or (sustainable) peacebuilding, respectively. The 'TBC' markers refer to yet unknown potential of two instruments that are currently under construction – the final amount, scope and shape of to-be-concluded bilateral security commitments under the Kyiv Security Compact as well as the overall scope (agenda, international support) and success of the envisaged Global Peace Summit.

**Table 3: Comparing ‘porous’ peace plans**

Peace proposals	Interlocking war/peace dimensions			
	Ceasefire	War termination	Conflict resolution	(Sustainable) Peacebuilding
<b>Key path to peace</b>				
Ukraine’s 5-element peace formula				
Ukraine’s 10-step peace plan				
The Kyiv Security Compact			TBC	
The G7 Security Guarantees for Ukraine				
Ukraine Formula’s Global Peace Summit	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC
Ukraine’s NATO accession				
<b>Alternative paths</b>				
China’s 12-point ‘political settlement’ proposal				
African Peace Initiative Mission’s 10-point peace proposal				
Indonesian government’s 5-point peace proposal				

Source: Author’s own.

The Ukrainian proposal has also remained a nationally sustained and internationally embedded endeavour (as discussed below and set out in Figure 1) – unlike alternative proposals that comprise one-off initiatives, lacking both credible international support and Ukraine’s endorsement.

The biggest gap between the various initiatives lies in their approach to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Wars fought for limited goals are easier to end. It takes much more time and sustained effort to end wars such as Russia’s multi-layered war against Ukraine. With one of the parties (Russia) remaining able and determined to continue its war effort, war termination and conflict resolution efforts remain unfeasible. Without profound change in Russia (both political and socio-economic), any peace initiative will inherently suffer from challenges of feasibility and sustainability.<sup>96</sup> Persistent calls for compromise (effectively meaning that Ukraine accepts territorial losses) as a necessary way to end war are impractical, as there is little expectation that Russian ambitions will stop at those parts of Ukraine that it has already annexed. Such calls also lack any theoretical grounding: none of the major international relations theories can justify an end to the Russia-Ukraine war that includes ‘even a partial Russian occupation’.<sup>97</sup>

Moreover, it is important to consider broader structural factors, such as external military support for Russia (with illiberal allies, including Iran and North Korea, helping it to sustain the fight), the constellation of interests and positions of other global players like China, whose (re)positioning in the war is of a key importance, alongside the sustainability of Western unity and capacity to act against the backdrop of elections in the US and the EU. Finally, there is no clear vision or strategy for how to end this war; all of the options, including Ukrainian victory, regional escalation or Russian victory, instil fear and uncertainty among the allies and partners of both Ukraine and Russia. There is growing support for a war of attrition or protracted/frozen conflict as a collective approach to *escalation management*. The lack of attention to these aforementioned factors in the various proposals for peace inhibit war termination, conflict resolution and sustainable peacebuilding.

<sup>96</sup> Bob Deen, Niels Drost and Milou Carsten (2023) ‘After Putin, the deluge? Foresight on the possible futures of the Russian Federation’. Clingendael Report, October 2023; Umland, A. (2023). Innenpolitische Hindernisse für einen russisch-ukrainischen Waffenstillstand. Zeitschrift für Außen-und Sicherheitspolitik, 16(3), 241-250.

<sup>97</sup> Anghel, Veronica (2023). International Relations Theory and the Weak Justification for Calls for an Early Peace in the Russia-Ukraine War. Paper presented at the European University Institute’s seminar, Florence, 24.10.2023.

### 2.3.1 Obstacles to war termination

Effectively, Ukraine's 5-element peace formula and its 10-point peace plan resemble a victory-based war termination and, to a lesser extent, conflict resolution proposal. They legitimately preclude Russian participation in deliberations on ceasefire and war termination conditions. On the other hand, the KSC and the G7 Security Guarantees plan for a contingency other than Ukraine's immediate and decisive victory, and may be tangentially conducive to both war termination (whether in the wake of Ukraine's victory, or a negotiated settlement following a stalemate), conflict resolution, and (to an extent) peacebuilding – at least as far as prevention (through deterrence by denial) of renewed Russian aggression.

Although it is part of Ukraine's peace formula, the Global Peace Summit should be considered separately – and later on, as the initiative fully materialises. As a Ukraine-driven broad international intergovernmental forum for discussion and action geared towards bringing an end to Russia's war and restoring peace in Ukraine and the region, the Global Peace Summit is under construction – and thus, it is a relatively flexible undertaking, which (pending the world leaders' will and agreement) may mitigate against currently porous peace proposals.

The difficulty in assessing the feasibility of **Ukraine's 5-point peace formula and its 10-point peace plan** lies in the fact that there is no universal or proven 'formula', or indeed any 'template' to compare them with. Nevertheless, Zelenskyy's peace formula is based on the key principles of the UN Charter and international law, and thus should not be rejected by the international community, including those few who manifest tacit or vocal support for Russia. Ukraine's diplomatic efforts to promote the idea and mobilise the international community have already borne some promising results – in spite of Russia's predictable push-back.

As it stands, Ukraine's peace formula (consisting of several strategic and operational components) targets, *to an extent*, all relevant dimensions: from the cessation of hostilities (ceasefire), to war termination modalities and post-war peacebuilding. Andrii Yermak has emphasised that the 10-point peace plan, in particular, is 'not just about how to end this war in Ukraine', but also 'about [how to deal with] the major crises that are the consequences of this war', including 'food security, nuclear security, the environment, and very important humanitarian issues'.<sup>98</sup> Russian aggression is vivid proof that the current world order's safety valves – international law and institutions – failed. Ukraine's peace formula offers a chance to elaborate on novel multilateral mechanisms to ensure the non-repetition of history.

Russia has rejected Ukraine's peace proposal and Zelenskyy's 10-point peace plan, advancing its own ultimatums on 27 December 2022, demanding Ukraine surrender a fifth of its territory under Russian military and political occupation.<sup>99</sup> At the UN General Assembly meeting on 23 September 2023, Russian foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov vehemently dismissed Ukraine's peace plan as 'completely not feasible', just

<sup>98</sup> Yermak, A. (2023, July 21). 'Ukraine should receive reliable security guarantees and unite the whole world around Volodymyr Zelenskyy's Peace Formula'. *Andriy Yermak at Aspen Security Forum*. <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-maye-otrimati-nadijni-garantiyi-bezpeki-j-obyednati-84461>.

<sup>99</sup> Russia has not been seeking peace but – persistently and uncompromisingly – pursuing its aggressive objectives since the conflict's outbreak in 2014: over 30 agreed ceasefires were breached – by Russia first – sometimes even a few hours after the announcement of an armistice in Ukraine's Donbas areas; since 2019 (when V. Zelenskyy was elected as the President of Ukraine) and up until Moscow started its all-out military assault on 24 February 2022, Ukraine and allies have made 88 attempts to engage Russia in dialogue and dissuade it from further aggression.



as he negated the possibility of any ceasefire in Ukraine until negotiations began on Russian terms.<sup>100</sup> Alternative Russian visions of ending the war are by and large absent.<sup>101</sup>

### 2.3.2 Ukrainian peace activism

Ukraine has been active in promoting its vision of ending war and building peace, as encompassed in President Zelenskyy's 5-element formula and his 10-point peace plan, including among G7, G20 and the Global South countries, and, more generally, in the UN General Assembly.

On the eve of the anniversary of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution A/ES-11/L.7, calling for an end to the war in Ukraine and demanding Russia's immediate withdrawal from the country along with the building of a 'comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine'.<sup>102</sup> This nonbinding, and largely symbolic, resolution was passed with the overwhelming approval of 141 members of the 193-nation UN body (including Brazil, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and UAE), 32 abstentions (among them China, India, South Africa, Iran and Pakistan), and only seven countries voting against (Belarus, Syria, Nicaragua, Mali, Eritrea and North Korea, alongside Russia)<sup>103</sup> (see Appendix 6). Importantly, two amendments proposed by Belarus were rejected (one aimed to further dilute – discursively – Russian responsibility for and role in the conduct of hostilities in Ukraine, and the other one called upon UN member states to refrain from sending weapons to the zone of conflict). Manifest and growing multilateral support for Ukraine's way forward in ending Russian aggression is another feasibility-enhancing element of Ukraine's peace plan.

Initially, Ukraine planned to hold a 'Path to Peace' summit in February 2023, eventually holding the summit-preparatory meetings first in Copenhagen (Denmark) on 24 June 2023 and, two months later, in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) on 5–6 August 2023. The third Path to Peace summit was initially planned to be held in September 2023 in Kyiv, but was postponed, with Istanbul (Türkiye) being a potential host. Notably, attendance at the meetings has increased: in Copenhagen, 15 countries took part in the meeting,<sup>104</sup> including those that remained neutral on the Russian invasion (such as Brazil, India and South Africa). In Jeddah, 42 countries<sup>105</sup> joined the initiative at the level of national security advisors, including – for the first time – China. Over 70 countries were initially expected to participate in the next round of discussions. The third preparatory meeting took place on Malta in late October 2023. It focused on five of Ukraine's 10-point peace plan, particularly issues of nuclear, food and energy security, the return of PoWs and illegally deported Ukrainians, as well as the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity.<sup>106</sup> Representatives from 66 countries took part, up from 46 who participated in the Jeddah meeting. China did not participate,

<sup>100</sup> Notably, there is *no* clear and conclusively formulated *Russian 'peace plan'* available – only a fracture of publicly voiced ultimatums and mantras (such as the unnegotiable recognition of a 'new status quo', that is Russian occupation of Ukraine's territories, Ukraine's 'neutrality' and non-accession to both NATO and the EU, etc.), and rejections of other proposals – save, to an extent, the Chinese peace plan (at the mid-March 2023 meeting with Xi Jinping, Putin explicitly declared willingness to take China's peace proposal as a 'basis'). In turn, and in addition to Ukraine's leadership, a growing number of European leaders (including from Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Germany) explicitly reject a possibility of peace negotiations based on Russia's/Putin's conditions.

<sup>101</sup> Stanovaya, T. (2022, November 18). 'Russia's Missing Peacemakers: Why the Country's Elites Are Struggling to Break With Putin'. *Foreign Affairs*. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/russias-missing-peacemakers>.

<sup>102</sup> UN General Assembly (2023). Resolution A/ES-11/L.7 from 16.02.2023, adopted at the UNGA's 11th emergency special session – 'Principles of the Charter of the United Nations underlying a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine', <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N23/048/58/PDF/N2304858.pdf>

<sup>103</sup> UN News (2023) UN General Assembly calls for immediate end to war in Ukraine. UN News, 23.02.2023, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/02/1133847>

<sup>104</sup> Alongside Ukraine, the meeting attended the representatives (political and national security advisors) of Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, India, Italy, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Türkiye, the UK, the US and the EU. See: <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/u-kopengageni-andrij-yermak-proviv-nizku-zustrichej-iz-radni-83789>

<sup>105</sup> 'У Дждиді відбулися міжнародні консультації щодо ключових принципів миру для України', Office of the President of Ukraine, 06.08.2023, <https://www.president.gov.ua/news/u-dzhiddi-vidbulisya-mizhnarodni-konsultaciyi-shodo-klyuchov-84737>.

<sup>106</sup> Президент провів нараду щодо підсумків третьої зустрічі радників із національної безпеки щодо імплементації Формули миру'. Офіційне інтернет-представництво Президента України, 01.11.2023, <https://www.president.gov.ua/news/prezident-proviv-naradu-shodo-pidsumkiv-tretoy-zustrichi-ra-86737>

arguably because of a conflicting schedule, although both Armenia and Vatican were present for the first time. The growth in international attendance at the Malta meeting is more significant, given the backdrop of the war between Israel and Hamas.

The participation of Global South countries (including Brazil, India, China and South Africa) in the current and future preparatory works of the Global Peace Summit is highly significant. Importantly, these 'Path to Peace' summits provide the opportunity to discuss third countries' contributions to implementing specific items from the 10-point peace formula. At the meeting in Jeddah, Ukraine extended the offer to the summit participants to take the lead and responsibility for ensuring the implementation of individual peace plan propositions. Five of the points were given closer consideration during the Malta meeting.

War-terminating and peacebuilding security arrangements, as envisaged by the **KSC** and the **G7 Security Guarantees** framework, ought to reinforce some of the peace plan elements, as well as help close their gaps. **Ukraine's future NATO membership** serves as the ultimate peace and security guarantee (see Table 3, above).

### 2.3.3 Feasibility of the Kyiv Security Compact: Ensuring security and order

Before any feasibility assessment of the KSC is made, it is necessary to recognise that it is 'the result of work that has no precedents in recent history'<sup>107</sup>, and thus is a genuinely experimental undertaking, with no tested formula for success or failure. When assessing the feasibility of the KSC, it is important to stress that it is a 'wartime compact', rather than a post-war peace and security guarantee.<sup>108</sup> It is an instrument to help Ukraine resist Russian aggression, regain its full sovereignty and, possibly, territorial integrity in the long-run, as well as prepare the ground for war-terminating negotiations and settlement after the war ends with a Russian defeat. Moreover, the KSC is a series of documents, with the September 2022 draft 'recommendations' version being just the first. The expectation has been that security guarantees will eventually be codified in a 'joint strategic partnership' document named the KSC, co-signed by a core group of partners that would act as enablers of Ukraine's self-defence.<sup>109</sup> Prevention and punishment of any future aggression by Russia after this war ends fundamentally underwrite the rationale and shape of KSC propositions, including the innovative proposal for a 'snapback sanctions' clause.

Taken together, the KSC and G7 Security Guarantees Declaration provide a feasible framework for designing mid- to long-term security commitments between Ukraine and the signatory states. With a focus on 'arming Ukraine to the teeth' (i.e. providing for military aid, weapons transfers, training for Ukrainian forces and intelligence sharing, as well as other efforts to help boost Ukraine's defence and deterrence position vis-à-vis Russia), both security 'compacts' face the challenge of being translated into specific legal and political commitments. If successful, these will encompass a major leap forward – and a move away from politically (non-)binding Budapest Memorandum 'assurances'.

Ciaramella argues that a credible security arrangement for Ukraine needs to be based on the following five principles:

- (1) Strong political and legal codification that ensures the arrangement will endure regardless of electoral cycles and leadership changes in the United States and Europe;

<sup>107</sup> Yermak, A., and Rasmussen, A. Fogh (2022). Yermak and Rasmussen present recommendations for security guarantees in Kyiv. *Rasmussen Global*, 13.09.2022 [accessed on 06.12.2022, webpage no longer available], <https://rasmussenglobal.com/anders-fogh-rasmussen-and-andriy-yermak-to-co-chair-international-working-group-on-security-guarantees-for-ukraine/>

<sup>108</sup> Ciaramella, Eric, 'Envisioning a Long-Term Security Arrangement for Ukraine', *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – Working Paper*, June 2023, pp. 7-8.

<sup>109</sup> Rasmussen & Yermak, p. 4.

- (2) A predictable, multi-year pipeline for military supplies that enables Ukraine to plan and sustain a future force structure capable of deterring Russian aggression;
- (3) Support for Ukraine's defence industry, as well as targeted defence industrial investments in the United States and Europe, to prepare for a long war and an extended period of Ukrainian military reconstitution;
- (4) Mechanisms for political consultations, information sharing, and coordination to ensure that Ukraine's military needs are met in a timely fashion;
- (5) Clear linkage to Ukraine's EU accession process and post-war reconstruction.<sup>110</sup>

Finally, the KSC and the G7 Security Guarantees should *not* be seen as an *alternative* to Ukraine's NATO accession. Effectively, these have both been designed as a *transitory* mechanism on Ukraine's road to NATO membership. Andrii Yermak has emphasised that a KSC-based agreement (or set of agreements) on security guarantees for Ukraine is 'not a substitute for joining NATO', but instead 'a means of ensuring security until it happens'.<sup>111</sup> In other words, KSC and G7 Security Guarantees are part of Ukraine's NATO membership path – not a detour.

Ultimately, for the effective implementation of both Ukraine's peace formula and the international security guarantees (based on the KSC and the G7 security commitments), there must be a clear vision for Ukraine after the war, and a strong commitment to that vision, primarily from NATO and EU Member States.

### 2.3.4 Justice and conciliation: Building enduring peace

Seen in broader theoretical and empirical context, a triad of core normative dimensions – that is, **justice, legitimacy and sincerity** – loom large for the feasibility and sustainability of the Ukrainian proposals, which are inherently a victory plan: a plan that advances Ukraine's victory *and* appears feasibly implementable in the case of Ukraine's victory. Ukraine's leadership has on a number of occasions underlined that it does not seek just to *end* this war – but, more importantly, to end it in a *just* way. The first element of Zelenskyy's five-point peace formula identifies Russian accountability for aggression and other war crimes as a precondition for conflict resolution and peace. In the view of Ukraine, a just peace should not include any territorial or other related compromises. Zelenskyy has stated that 'Ukraine should not be asked to conclude compromises with its conscience, sovereignty, territory and independence. We respect the rules and we are people of our word'.<sup>112</sup>

Zelenskyy's words underline the paucity of trust between Kyiv and Moscow, which links to the notion of sincerity, which needs to be duly considered when thinking of alternatives to Ukraine's proposals. Zelenskyy has accused Russia of lacking genuine commitment to the pursuit of a negotiated settlement, asserting that 'when Russia talks about negotiations, it only wants to slow down its retreat'. The general distrust of the Russian leadership and its violations of commitments (including legally binding treaties and norms) make a ceasefire neither possible nor conducive to conflict resolution or peace: the risk – and the likelihood – is too high that Russia will use *any* armistice as a ruse to re-arm and re-group.

The same optics of sincerity versus vested interests should be applied to the reading of alternative/non-Ukrainian and, generally, already advanced and future non-Western peace plans. As the dangers of a false peace are too risky and consequential,<sup>113</sup> alternative peace plans should only be developed multilaterally and insofar as they do not contradict or distort Ukraine's own peace philosophy and action plan. Arguably,

<sup>110</sup> Ciaramella, E. (2023, June). 'Envisioning a Long-Term Security Arrangement for Ukraine'. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – Working Paper*, pp. 7-8.

<sup>111</sup> Rasmussen & Yermak.

<sup>112</sup> President of Ukraine. (2022, November 15). 'Ukraine has always been a leader in peacemaking efforts; if Russia wants to end this war, let it prove it with actions'. [Speech by the President of Ukraine at the G20 Summit](#).

<sup>113</sup> Timothy Ash, Annette Bohr, Kateryna Busol, Keir Giles, John Lough, Orysia Lutsevych, James Nixey, James Sherr, Simon Smith and Kataryna Wolczuk (2023). How to end Russia's war on Ukraine: Safeguarding Europe's future, and the dangers of a false peace. *Chatham House Report*, June 2023.

'benign' intentions and expressed formulations should be critically considered against the logic of vested interests and consequences. Peace-mongering in such a complex and multi-stakeholder war is nearly as consequential as Putin regime's war-mongering has been for the past two decades.

Peace negotiations are also undermined by the lack of convergence in the interests of the parties, meaning there is no overlapping bargaining space: Ukraine is determined to regain its entire territory or, in the worst case, strengthen its negotiating position through considerable battlefield gains. In turn, Russia is counting on Ukraine's inability to considerably advance and return its lands, the protraction of the war – and with it, the loss of Western military, political and financial aid to Ukraine – forcing Ukraine into peace negotiations on the Kremlin's terms.

In addition to the above-discussed normative rationale of war termination and peacebuilding in post-war Ukraine, there is an immense political challenge: how to reach a war-terminating **agreement with Russia** and devise an overall **post-war settlement**, especially in conditions of no clear victory on either side, or a protracted war of attrition.

Vasquez posits that 'after any war, a peace settlement resolves the outstanding issues between the parties, typically with the defeated acceding to the position of the victor'.<sup>114</sup> A war-concluding agreement usually formalises a new constellation. It is clear, however, that any peace agreement with Russia following the end of this war<sup>115</sup> (and especially if it ends with a Russian defeat) will not be sustainable or enforceable; it will essentially entail an agonistic peace agreement. Such an agreement inevitably creates space for 'contestation, plurality, and dissensus post-accord', and thus stands in stark contrast to a peace agreement built on a liberal logic of finding 'rational, win-win solutions to conflict that meet the needs of all parties and transcend incompatibilities'.<sup>116</sup> The nature of Russia's aggression against Ukraine, entrenched in Moscow's larger conflict with the liberal-democratic West, makes it impossible for an agreement to provide for a 'win-win' solution. An even bigger problem includes the retention (on Russia's side) of an antagonistic view of both Ukraine and the West: in this case, the risk of escalation and re-emergence of a larger war (of revenge) will be much higher.


The big(ger) problem would be to establish a relational peace<sup>117</sup>, rather than situational peace (effectively, ceasefire) within the strategic triangle Russia-Ukraine-US/West. Devoid of a peaceful relationship, any post-war peace agreement will suffer from unsustainability. A genuine peace, whether based on a concluded peace agreement, or yet another iteration of an informal 'cold peace' is problematic and rather unlikely for a myriad of reasons, with the war's high stakes and distrust among the parties meaning a 'hybrid peace' might emerge (see Figure 3 below).

<sup>114</sup> Vasquez, J. A. (2009). *The War Puzzle Revisited*. Cambridge University Press, p. 288.

<sup>115</sup> Should the war end during Putin's presidency – a highly unlikely development indeed – there will be additional legal and political obstacles towards concluding an agreement with Russia: the deep distrust towards the Russian leader and the legislative preclusion, on Ukraine's side, to conclude any formal agreements with him; moreover, the ICC's arrest warrant and overall international isolation do not necessarily make the current Russian president a most legitimate and credible interlocutor for such a serious and future-fraught security arrangement.

<sup>116</sup> Strömbom, L., Bramsen, I., & Stein, A. L. (2022). 'Agonistic peace agreements? Analytical tools and dilemmas'. *Review of International Studies*, 48(4), p. 689.

<sup>117</sup> Söderström et al. advance a relational view of peace, within which they define '*relational peace*' as 'a peaceful relationship [that] entails deliberation, non-domination, and cooperation between the actors in the dyad; the actors involved recognise and trust each other and believe that the relationship is either one between legitimate fellows or one between friends'. See: Söderström, J., Åkebo, M., & Jarstad, A. K. (2021). 'Friends, fellows, and foes: A new framework for studying relational peace'. *International Studies Review*, 23(3), pp. 484-508.

**Figure 3: Possible war outcomes and war/peace dynamics**

Source: Tyushka (2023a)<sup>118</sup>

Finally, and in light of the above, the **sustainability of post-war peace** is both a difficult and premature question to consider at the moment. It is difficult because of the anticipated risks of fragile peace deals with Russia, and the question of whether peace will last is one to be answered after the war ends. Given that a war-concluding agreement with Russia will likely be an agonistic peace agreement, a 'final' (and potentially broader/multilateral) agreement would be needed for initial post-war/post-accord stabilisation. There is strong moral and theoretical support for the idea that Ukraine's security relationship with the US and the EU 'must not be negotiated with Moscow'<sup>119</sup>, leaving room for post-war confidence-building measures and possible discussions on Europe's long-term security architecture. In that regard, Ukraine's peace formula can serve as a basis and chance to backdate and formalise the never-pronounced peace after the Cold War tacitly ended.

### 3 Other peace proposals

There have been a number of initiatives to broker a ceasefire and build peace in Ukraine since Russia's invasion in February 2022. Türkiye played a central role early on in the war, hosting the first high-level (and ultimately unsuccessful) contact between Russia and Ukraine at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in March 2022, when Ukraine's Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba met with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov. Talks resumed in Istanbul at the end of March 2022, but were again unsuccessful. There have been consistent calls for a ceasefire and dialogue from a range of countries, including the US, China and India. In February 2023, China set out its 12-point proposal for a political settlement (against the backdrop of cautious support for Ukraine's peace formula). This was followed by the African Peace Initiative Mission to Ukraine and Russia in June 2023, and a proposal from Indonesia's Defence Minister (see Table 4 below).

<sup>118</sup> Tyushka, A. 'Putin's War and Schrödinger's Dove: On the (im)possible triangulation of Russia's revisionist war in Ukraine and hybrid peace in Europe', Paper presented at the European University Institute's EITW Programme Workshop 'European security architectures and their implications: the past, present and future', Florence, 12-13 October 2023,

<sup>119</sup> Ciaramella, E. (2023, June). 'Envisioning a Long-Term Security Arrangement for Ukraine'. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – Working Paper, p. 18.

**Table 4: Alternative peace proposals/initiatives**

Alternative peace proposals	Date and venue of presentation	Key elements
<b>China 12-point 'political settlement' proposal</b>	PRC Foreign Ministry, 24 February 2023	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Respecting the sovereignty of all countries;</li> <li>2) Abandoning the Cold War mentality;</li> <li>3) Ceasing hostilities;</li> <li>4) Resuming peace talks;</li> <li>5) Resolving the humanitarian crisis;</li> <li>6) Protecting civilians and prisoners of war (POWs);</li> <li>7) Keeping nuclear power plants safe;</li> <li>8) Reducing strategic risks;</li> <li>9) Facilitating grain exports;</li> <li>10) Stopping unilateral sanctions;</li> <li>11) Keeping industrial and supply chains stable;</li> <li>12) Promoting post-conflict reconstruction</li> </ol> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>(FM PRC 2023<sup>120</sup>)</i></p>
<b>African Peace Initiative Mission's 10-point peace proposal</b>	Delegation of African leaders (South Africa [leading], Egypt, Senegal, Congo-Brazzaville, Comoros, Zambia and Uganda), 16 to 17 June 2023, no formal text available.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Mutual respect;</li> <li>2) Dialogue and direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine;</li> <li>3) Conflict de-escalation;</li> <li>4) Sovereignty and respect for UN Charter;</li> <li>5) Security guarantees;</li> <li>6) Opening of supply chains of food, fertiliser and fuel through the Black Sea;</li> <li>7) Humanitarian assistance to victims of the war;</li> <li>8) Release of prisoners and children abducted during the war;</li> <li>9) Post-war reconstruction;</li> <li>10) Imperative engagement of African states in conflict resolution efforts.</li> </ol> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>(Source: Singh and Reva 2023<sup>121</sup>)</i></p>

<sup>120</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 'China's Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis', 24.02.2023, [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/zxxx\\_662805/202302/t20230224\\_11030713.html](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202302/t20230224_11030713.html).

<sup>121</sup> Singh, P., & Reva, D. (2023, June 23). African peace mission: one step forward, one step back? Institute for Security Studies. <https://issafrica.org/amp/iss-today/african-peace-mission-one-step-forward-one-step-back>.

<b>Indonesian Government (Defence Minister's) 5-point peace proposal</b>	Proposed by Indonesian Minister of Defence Prabowo Subianto at the 20th International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Shangri-La Dialogue (Singapore), 3 June 2023  Contested by Indonesia's President Joko Widodo ('Jokowi'), 6 June 2023	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Immediate ceasefire;</li> <li>2) Withdrawal of forces and establishment of a demilitarised zone (in eastern Ukraine);</li> <li>3) Deployment of a UN monitoring and observer mission;</li> <li>4) Urgent and direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine;</li> <li>5) Holding a UN-sponsored referendum in eastern Ukraine to determine its future status;</li> </ol> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>(Subianto 2023<sup>122</sup>)</i></p>
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Source: Author's own.

### 3.1 China's 12-point 'political settlement' proposal

China has sought to present itself as a neutral mediator, abstaining from three UN General Assembly votes condemning Russia's actions, while calling for restraint and dialogue. However, its position has been characterised as one of 'pro-Russian neutrality': neither condemning nor explicitly backing Moscow. Beijing's attempts to position itself as an impartial mediator are undermined by the Joint Declaration of a 'no limits' partnership that the two states issued in early February 2022, along with the political, diplomatic and economic support that China has provided to Russia.<sup>123</sup>

At the end of February 2023, the Chinese government set out their proposal for a peaceful settlement of the war in a 12-point plan (see Table 4 above, and also Appendix 3 for detail). Nearly half of the proposal (five points) is focused on measures to moderate conduct during the war, such as the protection of civilians, security for nuclear power plants, a rejection of the use of nuclear weapons, and the importance of the Black Sea Grain Initiative. There is little attention given to building sustainable peace or addressing the underlying causes of the war.

The proposal makes no mention of the withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine or the return of Ukrainian territory that has been illegally annexed by Russia, instead calling for the 'sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all countries to be upheld'. Furthermore, it does not directly reference Russia's invasion and echoes Russian lines about the 'expansion of military blocs' threatening national and regional security. Finally, there is no mention of security guarantees for Ukraine.

President Zelenskyy gave a guarded welcome to the Chinese peace proposal but stressed that there could only be a 'fair peace' that involved the withdrawal of all Russian troops from occupied Ukrainian territory.<sup>124</sup> Speaking at the Russia–China summit in March 2023, Putin was careful not to endorse China's peace plan,

<sup>122</sup> Subianto, P. (2023, June 3). Speech by the Minister of Defence of Indonesia Gen. (ret.) Prabowo Subianto at the 20th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue (Asia Security Summit). Retrieved from: <https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library--content--migration/files/shangri-la-dialogue/2023/provisional-transcripts/p-3/general-ret-d-prabowo-subianto-minister-of-defense-indonesia--as-delivered.pdf>. Also available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8fJ5R6wXmVw>.

<sup>123</sup> For example, at a summit in March 2023, Putin and Xi signed several trade and security cooperation agreements, committing to strengthening the two countries' 'comprehensive partnership'.

<sup>124</sup> The Guardian. (2023, February 25). 'Zelenskyy open to China's peace plan but rejects compromise with 'sick' Putin': <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/24/zelenskyy-open-to-chinas-peace-plan-but-rejects-compromise-with-sick-putin>.

but did say that many of the plan's provisions were 'consonant with Russian approaches' and could be used as a basis for a peace settlement but only 'when the West and Kiev are ready for it'.<sup>125</sup>

Some countries did welcome the proposal, including Brazil, whose former president Lula da Silva suggested the creation of a 'G20 for peace', a group of neutral countries that could play a mediating role in the conflict.<sup>126</sup> India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi said his government was prepared to contribute to any peace process, while South Africa's Minister for International Relations, Naledi Pandor, praised China's attempts to find a diplomatic solution to the war.<sup>127</sup> Hungary expressed its support for China's diplomatic efforts, stating that the Chinese plan could be 'the basis for discussions on how to achieve peace'.<sup>128</sup>

Ultimately, the principal stumbling block to China's efforts to promote a peaceful resolution of the war is the fact that it is not considered to be a neutral/disinterested party: its wide-ranging support for Russia and talk of 'friendship without limits' means that it does not have the trust of Kyiv to act in Ukraine's interest.

### 3.2 African Peace Initiative Mission's 10-point peace proposal

In June 2023, the Senegal President Macky Sall and South African President Cyril Ramaphosa led a high-level, pan-African delegation from Uganda, Zambia, the Comoros, and Congo-Brazzaville to Kyiv and St Petersburg in an effort to convince Ukraine and Russia to begin negotiations. The delegation put forward a 10-point peace proposal (see Table 4 above) that stressed the importance of territorial sovereignty, de-escalation and security guarantees for all parties. While the initiative references security guarantees, it does not specifically refer to Ukraine, stating instead that they are essential for 'all countries in the world', which is problematic. Unlike the Chinese proposal, however, the African proposal makes specific reference to the necessity of prioritising post-war reconstruction.

President Zelenskyy rejected calls for a ceasefire and reiterated that no peace process was possible without the withdrawal of all Russian troops from occupied Ukrainian territory. Putin responded to the African initiative by stating that 'new territorial realities' must be considered for negotiations to proceed.<sup>129</sup> He also rejected a number of points in the proposal, reiterating his position that Ukraine and its Western allies started the conflict long before the Russian invasion in 2022, and stating that Moscow was 'open to constructive dialogue with anyone who wants to establish peace on the principles of fairness and acknowledgement of the legitimate interests of the parties'.<sup>130</sup>

Although the peace initiative did not succeed in getting the two parties to the negotiating table, it was significant as a demonstration of the level of concern in the Global South about the wider consequences of the war, particularly rising food prices.

African leaders continued to press Putin to seek a negotiated end to the war at the Second Russia–Africa Summit, held in July 2023. They urged him to renew the Black Sea Grain Initiative, stating that they had a

<sup>125</sup> President of Russia. (2023, March 21). Press statements by President of Russia and President of China. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70750>.

<sup>126</sup> Agencia Brasil. (2023, January 31). 'Lula suggests group of nations to negotiate peace for Ukraine, Russia'. <https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/internacional/noticia/2023-01/lula-suggests-group-nations-negotiate-peace-ukraine-russia>.

<sup>127</sup> India Today. (2023, March 2). 'India prepared to contribute to peace process'. <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india-prepared-to-contribute-to-peace-process-pm-modi-on-ukraine-war-2341727-2023-03-02>; CGTN Africa. (2023, March). 'South African Foreign Minister hails China's peace plan'. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i1\\_deyhleEw](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i1_deyhleEw).

<sup>128</sup> Although it is a member of NATO and the EU, Hungary has stated its intention of remaining neutral. However, as an EU Member State, it is obliged to support EU sanctions against Russia. See: Politico. (2023, February 27). Orbán backs China's Ukraine peace plan: <https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-hungary-ukraine-china-peace-plan-russia-invasion/>.

<sup>129</sup> Singh, P., & Reva, D. (2023, June 23). 'African peace mission: one step forward, one step back?', Institute for Security Studies. <https://issafrica.org/amp/iss-today/african-peace-mission-one-step-forward-one-step-back>.

<sup>130</sup> President of Russia. (2023, June 17). Meetings with Heads of Delegations of African states. <http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/keywords/82/events/71451>.



right to call for peace as the ongoing conflict ‘negatively affects’ them. Putin responded by repeating his assertion that the West was to blame, and said that rising global food prices were a consequence of Western policy mistakes that predated the war in Ukraine.<sup>131</sup>

### 3.3 Indonesian defence minister’s 5-point peace proposal

In June 2023, Indonesian Minister of Defence, Prabowo Subianto set out what was misunderstood as an Indonesian government peace plan at the Shangri-La Dialogue summit.<sup>132</sup> Key components of the plan included a ceasefire, the creation of a demilitarised zone, stationing UN-mandated peacekeeping forces, and conducting a UN-organised referendum in contested territories (see Table 4 above for details). However, like the earlier Chinese peace plan, Subianto’s proposal failed to name Russia as the aggressor. The Indonesian Defence Minister also referred to ‘disputed territories’ and proposed freezing the war, leaving the door open for Russia to resume hostilities in the future. This proposal followed a visit by Indonesian President Joko Widodo to Moscow and Kyiv in 2022, where he offered to mediate between the two countries. At the time, Widodo was the chairman of the G20 group of major economies.

Ukrainian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Oleg Nikolenko condemned the plan, reiterating Kyiv’s position that Russia should withdraw its troops from Ukraine. He emphasised that any proposal for a ceasefire would merely provide Russia with an opportunity to re-group and reinforce, and said that there were no disputed territories, only territory occupied by Russia.<sup>133</sup>

All three of these alternative peace proposals failed because they were self-serving, and were developed with the principal aim of assisting the state proposing the plan to achieve their own objectives, rather than the termination of war and subsequent development of enduring, sustainable peace. China was seeking to present itself as an effective mediator, capable of bringing the two parties to the table, in contrast to the US and wider West. The African proposal was driven by a desire to alleviate the wider impacts of the war on countries across the Global South, in particular rising food prices and scarcity. The Indonesian Defence Minister’s proposal was even narrower in its self-serving stance, believed to be part of early positioning ahead of the 2024 presidential elections.

Neither the Chinese or African peace proposals include any reference to the withdrawal of Russian forces, nor do they mention the return of occupied Ukrainian territory. This undermines Zelenskyy’s clear statement that a just peace should not necessitate any territorial or other compromise: ‘Ukraine should not be asked to conclude compromises with its conscience, sovereignty, territory and independence.’<sup>134</sup> While the Indonesian Defence Minister’s proposal did call for the withdrawal of troops, it also referred to ‘disputed territories’ rather than occupied territories and proposed freezing the war, leaving the door open for Russia to resume hostilities in future. Thus, all three proposals fail to offer any feasible solutions to Ukraine’s clearly-stated ‘red-lines’: the withdrawal of Russian forces from all of its territory and the full restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Furthermore, the Chinese and African proposals focus more on *jus in bello*, regulating the way that the war is being fought and seeking to minimise its impact, than on *jus post bellum* and the transition from war to a sustainable peace. Although Subianto’s proposal calls for the establishment of a demilitarised zone in

<sup>131</sup> Trevelyan, M., & Liffey, K. (2023, July 29). ‘African leaders tell Putin: ‘We have a right to call for peace’’. Reuters. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-tells-african-leaders-moscow-is-studying-their-ukraine-proposal-2023-07-28/>.

<sup>132</sup> It subsequently became clear that the Defence Minister had publicly presented the plan without informing President Joko Widodo or Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs: <https://www.reuters.com/world/indonesia-proposes-demilitarised-zone-un-referendum-ukraine-peace-plan-2023-06-03/>.

<sup>133</sup> Kapoor, K. (2023, June 3). ‘Indonesia proposes demilitarized zone, UN referendum for Ukraine peace plan. Reuters’. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/world/indonesia-proposes-demilitarised-zone-un-referendum-ukraine-peace-plan-2023-06-03/>.

<sup>134</sup> President of Ukraine, ‘Ukraine has always been a leader in peacemaking efforts; if Russia wants to end this war, let it prove it with actions’, Speech by the President of Ukraine at the G20 Summit, 15.11.2022, <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-zavzhdi-bula-liderom-mirotvorchih-zusil-yaksho-rosi-79141>

eastern Ukraine and the deployment of a UN mission, these are only steps towards terminating the war, rather than ways to develop enduring and effective peace between Ukraine and Russia. The history of Russian involvement in conflicts across the post-Soviet space since 1991 demonstrates that the absence of any final, legally binding agreement restoring Ukraine's full territorial integrity, accompanied by the complete withdrawal of all Russian forces, will merely 'freeze' the war, rather than establish sustainable peacebuilding and ultimately lead to conflict resolution.

## 4 Conclusions and recommendations

There are some significant obstacles to ongoing efforts to bring the war in Ukraine to an end and build enduring peace. The fundamental issue is the absence of trust between Ukraine and Russia: doubts over Moscow's trustworthiness and its commitment to genuine peace in Ukraine (based on years of Russian antagonism and coercion) make it very difficult to commence effective negotiations.

Furthermore, there is no convergence between the two about potential outcomes, thus, there is no bargaining space. In this sense, the war stands out from other dyadic territorial conflicts (as presented in Chapter 1). War termination necessarily involves more than one party; without absolute victory for one party, and in the absence of trust or the convergence of interests, progress is unlikely.

That being said, in the urgent search for peace in Ukraine, it is vital to avoid the pursuit of peace at any cost: Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty are non-negotiable and must be central to any proposal. The core principles of the rules-based liberal international order, including justice, must not be compromised. As the victim of Russia's unprovoked aggression, Ukraine is entitled to expect that its own vision of peace is pursued as a priority (as discussed in Chapter 2). The centrality of an unambiguous political settlement, supported by acceptable, effective guarantors, must, therefore, be embedded in any feasible peace plan.

When exploring 'alternative' peace proposals (such as the three analysed in Chapter 3), it is crucial to consider who they come from (in particular, the actor's relationship with Moscow), the timing of the proposal (for example, was the proposal made when the Russian offensive campaign stalled and Ukrainian counter-offensive was on the rise?) and what individual interests such peace 'advocates' might be pursuing. Further international efforts to (re)build the regional security system, accommodating Ukraine's vision of peace, may well need to complement the basic parameters of a post-war peace system. As a central part of Kyiv's formula for peace, the upcoming 2023 Global Peace Summit holds the key to filling the gaps currently identifiable in Ukraine's proposals, which are 'porous' and heavily unilateral (and, thus, fairly unsustainable) peace undertakings.

There can be no serious talk of sustainable peace order in the face of a protracted war (stalemate). This is even more important in the (unlikely) event of a Russian victory. Russia's war in Ukraine needs to be understood as part of Moscow's wider struggle against the collective West that has been fought using asymmetric means, notably political warfare. Consequently, any post-war peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia will not endure if it is not accompanied by a mutually acceptable (formal *and* informal) settlement of a peace and war governance system with Russia's other key adversary – the collective West. Such an agreement will also not endure if it sacrifices Ukraine's sovereign and legitimate interests as an independent country and a victim of Russian aggression.

In light of the preceding analysis and conclusions, a number of recommendations can be put forward for the EU and its institutions, acting in unison with Member States, as follows:

- The EU should withstand the temptation to pressure Ukraine (and Russia) towards quick peace on any condition other than Ukraine's decisive (or at least *de facto*) victory, and Russia's decisive (or at least admitted) defeat.
- The EU should beware of the false 'peacenik activism' of other (Russia-allied or -aligned) countries, or groups of countries, or Russia's own 'special 'peace' operation'; it should maintain the position in

any such international dialogue or negotiations that Russia is *the* key obstacle to peace. Moscow has been imposing non-peace on Ukraine since 2014 through its actions in Donbas. It is likely to remain a key irritant to sustainable post-war peace, unless its offensive ideology is dismantled and its offensive capacities are radically curtailed.

- Instead, and at the same time, the EU should throw its diplomatic weight behind Ukraine's peace formula as a legitimate and genuinely peace-minded undertaking, with some multilaterally remediable gaps and adjustable (to the war's course) operational logic.
- The EU should consistently and coherently communicate its resolve to pursue, together with Ukraine, a specific post-war peace constellation – that is, just, liberal-democratic and sustainable peace. EU institutional and Member States' diplomatic efforts should not compromise any of the components of such a vision of peace if a lasting peace is to emerge.
- In pursuit of just peace and with the aim of preventing any future aggression, the EU should step up its efforts to hold Russia accountable both legally (as part of the ongoing and future lawsuits at existing and to-be-created specialised courts and tribunals) and financially (as part of the serial and incremental sanctions regime, as well as the plans to seize Russian 'frozen' assets in European financial and investment institutions – an undertaking that needs to be legally settled and coordinated with other actors, such as the US and the UK). This is especially true considering that this part of Ukraine's peace formula is a daunting task for it to achieve alone.
- In support of Ukraine's victory-based peace formula, the EU should help sustain Ukraine's defence and deterrence posture enhancement through substantial and sustainable financial and technical assistance, including military aid and training programmes, intelligence sharing, economic and reconstruction support, etc. (e.g. the EUR 50 billion multi-annual special budget arrangement).
- As a signatory of the 2023 G7 Joint Declaration on Support for Ukraine, the EU should chart ways towards crafting a bilateral security commitment (within and beyond PESCO+ programme participation), possibly thereby envisioning its progressive nature (that is, transitioning to a 'mutual defence clause' under Art 42(7) TEU) as Ukraine pursues EU accession.
- At the multilateral diplomacy level, closer coordination of efforts between NATO, the US, the UK, and the G7 countries is evidently in motion, but this needs to be maintained regardless of potential uncertainties related to the electoral cycles in the countries concerned.
- In connection with the above, the EU should think of the ways to sustain its strategic autonomy and effective leadership in 'bad weather' situations – that is, if/when strong and united support of Ukraine's defence and victory effort among EU partners is endangered.
- While doing everything possible to support Ukraine's decisive victory, the EU and its Member States should brace for a long war – this will effectively communicate their resolve (and potentially make Russia reconsider its path towards a war of attrition). This will also serve as a credible signal to Ukraine that it will not be left abandoned, and to potential breakers of peace and rules-based international order that the costs of aggression will be high.
- Penultimately, and in parallel with the development of 'strategic patience' and commitment, the EU should view this major security crisis as an opportunity to boost its 'security actorness' worldwide, not least by investing considerable effort in building up its strategic deterrence posture.
- Finally, and with a view to the creation of a stable security architecture after this war, the EU should advance a clear strategic vision for Ukraine and Russia. While it remains unclear how and when the war will end, a protracted war makes the idea of a post-war European security architecture *without* and *against* Russia even more pertinent.

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## Appendices

### Appendix 1: Ukraine President Zelenskyy's 5-element 'peace formula' *in verbatim*

**Speech of the President of Ukraine  
at the General Debate of the 77th Session of the UN General Assembly, 22.09.2022  
[Excerpt]**

[...]

**Greetings to all people of the world who value peace and unity between different and equal nations!**

**I wish you all peace!**

I thank you that we are united in our striving to restore peace and to guarantee peace for any nation that has become a victim of the armed aggression.

A crime has been committed against Ukraine, and we demand just punishment.

The crime was committed against our state borders. The crime was committed against the lives of our people. The crime was committed against the dignity of our women and men.

The crime was committed against the values that make you and me a community of the UN.

And Ukraine demands punishment for trying to steal our territory. Punishment for the murders of thousands of people. Punishment for tortures and humiliations of women and men.

Punishment for the catastrophic turbulence that Russia provoked with its illegal war and not only for us, Ukrainians, but for the whole world. For every nation that is represented in this Hall of the UN General Assembly.

I am speaking on behalf of the state, which is forced to defend itself, but has the formula for peace. I am speaking to everyone who wants to hear how to achieve peace.

I will present a formula that can work not only for us, but for anyone who may find themselves in similar circumstances as we did. It is a formula that punishes crime, protects life, restores security and territorial integrity, guarantees security, and provides determination.

There are five preconditions for peace.

**Dear Mr. President of the General Assembly!**

**Dear Secretary-General of the United Nations!**

**Dear heads of states and governments!**

**Dear journalists!**

**Nations of the world!**

Ukraine wants peace. Europe wants peace. The world wants peace. And we have seen who is the only one who wants war.

There is only one Entity among all UN member states who would say now, if he could interrupt my speech, that he is happy with this war – with his war. But we will not let this Entity prevail over us, even though it is the largest state in the world.

Ukraine showed strength on the battlefield, using its right to self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. And no one will reproach us now or in the future with weakness or inability to fight for ourselves, for our independence.

We are achieving a result in this fight and we see what the end of this war will be, and what will be the guarantees of a stable peace.

The UN Charter proclaims the equality of nations – and we proved that Ukraine is equal among the equals.

The UN Charter protects the inviolability of borders – and we confirm our state borderline by expelling the occupiers outside.

The UN Charter stipulates the value of human rights, dignity and life, and we also stipulate them – with every Ukrainian city freed from Russian occupation.

We did not provoke this war. We held 88 rounds of talks in various formats to prevent this war, just from the beginning of my presidency until February 24 this year.

But Russia – instead of stopping the crime of aggression, which it started back in 2014 – turned it into a full-scale invasion. And we have no choice but to defend ourselves. We do it. We push the aggressor beyond the internationally recognised border of the Ukrainian state.

And this is the first item of our peace formula. Comprehensive item. Punishment.

Punishment for the crime of aggression. Punishment for violation of borders and territorial integrity. Punishment that must be in place until the internationally recognised border is restored. Until the aggression stops. And until the damages and losses for the war are fully compensated.

Therefore, sanctions against the aggressor are part of the peace formula. Blocking the trade and relations with the aggressor is part of the peace formula. All this is a punishment.

So long as the aggressor is a party to decision-making in the international organisations, he must be isolated from them – at least until aggression lasts. Reject the right to vote. Deprive delegation rights. Remove the right of veto – if it is a Member of the UN Security Council. In order to punish the aggressor within the institutions.

We should not turn a blind eye to propagandists who justify aggression, but apply a full package of personal restrictions against them. That is a punishment for lying.

Citizens of the aggressor state should not be allowed to enjoy tourism or shopping in the territory of those who value peace, but should be encouraged through visa restrictions to fight against the aggression of their own state. Punish for abetting the evil.

A Special Tribunal should be created to punish Russia for the crime of aggression against our state. This will become signal to all 'would-be' aggressors, that they must value peace or be brought to responsibility by the world.

We have prepared precise steps to establish such Tribunal. They will be presented to all states.

Ukraine will appeal to the UN General Assembly to support an international compensation mechanism.

We count on your support.

Russia should pay for this war with its assets. It is also a punishment. This is one of the most terrible punishments for Russian officials, who value money above everything else.

The second item of the peace formula is the protection of life. The most concrete item.

Now, while the sessions of the General Assembly continue, in the Ukrainian town of Izyum, Kharkiv region, the exhumation is under way... of bodies from a mass burial, which happened when the territory was controlled by Russian troops. The bodies of women and men, children and adults, civilians and soldiers were found there. 445 graves.

There is a family that died under the rubble of a house after a Russian airstrike – father, mother, 6- and 8-year-old girls, grandparents. There is a man who was strangled with a rope. There is a woman with broken ribs and wounds on her body. There is a man who was castrated before the murder, and this is not the first case.

Ask, please, the representatives of Russia why the Russian military are so obsessed with castration. What was done to them so that they want to do this to others?

The only thing that differs the mass burial in Izyum from what the world saw in Bucha is, in fact, the burial. The Russian army was in Izyum for a longer time, and therefore the bodies of the killed people were buried, and not scattered on the streets.

So, how can we allow the Russian army somewhere on Ukrainian soil, knowing that they are committing such mass murders everywhere? We cannot.

We must protect life. The world must protect life. Every state suffering the armed aggression needs the opportunity to protect its citizens and liberate its territory.

If it requires help with weapons or shells – they should be provided. If you need financial help for this, it should be given. If for this, it is necessary to help with the intelligence data – just do it. But what is not needed is lies.

We can return the Ukrainian flag to our entire territory. We can do it with the force of arms.

But we need time.

We tried to speed it up. We tried to implement the basic provisions of the UN Charter for Ukraine through negotiations.

But Russia is afraid of real negotiations and does not want to fulfil any fair international obligations. It lies to everyone. As it is typical for aggressors, for terrorists.

Even now, when Russia talks about negotiations, it only wants to slow down its retreat. Russia wants to spend the winter on the occupied territory of Ukraine and prepare forces to attempt a new offensive. New Buchas, new Izyums... Or at least it wants to prepare fortifications on occupied land and carry out military mobilisation at home.

We cannot agree to a delayed war. Because it will be even hotter than the war now.

For us, this is a war for life. That is why we need defence support – weapons, military equipment and shells. Offensive weapons, a long-range one is enough to liberate our land, and defensive systems, above all, air defence. And we need financial support – to keep internal stability and fulfil social obligations to our people.

Physical and social protection are two elements of any nation's life. So, the second item of our peace formula is the protection of life. By all available means – allowed by the UN Charter.

The third item of our peace formula is restoring security and territorial integrity.

Look at how many elements of global security Russia has undermined with its war – maritime safety, food safety, radiation safety, energy safety and safety from WMDs.

We are already restoring maritime safety and food security. And I thank Mr. António Guterres for his personal involvement. Algeria, Ethiopia, Egypt, Libya, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, Bangladesh, Israel,

India, Iran, Yemen, Cyprus, China, Korea, Lebanon, Türkiye, Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Netherlands, Germany, Romania and France have already received Ukrainian agricultural products.

And we have to increase the supply by sea. Both under market conditions and within the UN Food Program, for which Ukraine is always a reliable partner.

By the way, despite all the difficulties caused by the war, we decided to provide humanitarian aid to Ethiopia and Somalia, so we will send them an additional amount of our wheat.

But it is more difficult with other security elements.

On the eve of the General Assembly meeting, Russia fired missiles at the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant. The explosion hit the station buildings – windows were broken, walls were damaged. The rockets exploded only three hundred meters from the walls of the reactors!

And this is after the IAEA's clear appeal to Russia to stop any hostile activity against any nuclear facilities of Ukraine and, in particular, against the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station – the largest one in Europe, which Russia has turned into a target.

And that makes all of you a target.

Russian radiation blackmailing is something that should concern each and every one of you, because none of you will find a vaccine against radiation sickness.

The cost of living crisis continues in dozens of countries, it roots in the destabilisation of the energy market. It is necessary to remove the main factor of global price turbulence, namely: Russian energy blackmailing.

It is necessary to cap the prices at which Russia exports its energy resources. It is necessary to make Russian oil and gas – just ordinary goods again. Currently, oil and gas are Russia's energy weapons. And that is why it manipulates the markets so that electricity, gas, petrol and diesel become the privilege of few instead of being a common good available to all.

Limiting prices is safeguarding the world. This is the way to restore energy and price security.

But will the world go for it? Or will it be scared? Will it be scared of Russian threats?

It is necessary to take only one strong step, after which everything will become clear. The time has come for this.

This step will put everything in place. After the Russian missile terror. After the massacres. After Mariupol. After the burning of Ukrainian prisoners in Olenivka by the Russian military. After blocking the ports. After the strikes of Russian tanks and missiles on nuclear power plants. And after threats to use nuclear weapons, which have become the rule, not the exception, for Russian propagandists...

We must finally recognise Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism. At all levels. In all countries that confess the values of peace and protection of human life. Legally. Politically.

If you do not have a legal mechanism, you can make a political decision – in the parliaments. This is the foundation for restoring global security. If this strong step is taken, doubts will disappear – whether to take other important steps.

And what is very sensitive – is the border, the territorial integrity.

When one country tries to steal the territory of another state, it puts all world nations under attack.

Global security cannot be restored without restoring the territorial integrity of the nation which suffered the armed aggression.

So, the third item of the Ukrainian peace formula is the restoration of security and territorial integrity. The fourth item is security guarantees.

Every nation has the right to security guarantees. Not only the largest nations. Not only the most fortunate ones.

We have proposals to upgrade the security architecture for Ukraine, and for Europe and the world, which will not allow any more aggression against us. We are already presenting them to partners.

Proposals for legally binding multilateral and bilateral treaties. These are the conditions for the guarantors to act, and the timeline for their actions to bring results – results on land, at sea and in the air; in diplomacy and politics, in economy and finance, in providing weapons and intelligence. Each of you, who will receive the text of our peace formula will also see the details of what we offer as security guarantees.

I do not want to compare our offers with the guarantees of any alliances that exist on the planet now. I want to stress that it is always much better to guarantee the security of a nation, preventively, rather than to stop a war after it has already begun.

And the fifth item of the Ukrainian peace formula is determination. Something without which the other four items will not work.

This is our determination to fight. This is the determination of the partners to help us, and also themselves. And this is the determination of the world to unite around the one who fights against armed aggression and to call to order the one who threatens all.

**So, all five items of our formula:**

- punishment for aggression;
- protection of life;
- restoration of security and territorial integrity;
- security guarantees;
- and determination to defend oneself.

This is the formula of crime and punishment, which is already well known to Russia. And this is the formula of justice and law and order that Russia has yet to learn. As well as any other potential aggressors.

What is not in our formula? Neutrality.

Those who speak of neutrality, when human values and peace are under attack, mean something else. They talk about indifference – everyone for themselves. Here is what they say. They pretend to be interested in each other's problems. They take care of each other formally. They sympathise only for protocol. And that is why they pretend to protect someone, but in reality, they protect only their vested interests. This is what creates the conditions for war. This is what needs to be corrected in order to create conditions for peace.

[...]

Date: 22 September 2022

Source: President of Ukraine<sup>135</sup>

<sup>135</sup> President of Ukraine. (2022, September 22). Speech by the President of Ukraine at the General Debate of the 77th session of the UN General Assembly. <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vistup-prezidenta-ukrayini-na-zagalnih-debatah-77-yi-sesiyi-77905>.





## Appendix 2: Ukraine's 10-point peace plan *in verbatim*

### **The Speech of the President of Ukraine at the Group of Twenty (G20) Summit, 15.11.2022 [Excerpt]**

[...]

That is why I want to present our vision of the path to peace - how to actually achieve it. And not only for us, but also for all of you, your allies and partners.

In my statement in September of this year at UN General Assembly, I presented Ukraine's formula for peace. A formula of peace for the world.

[...]

So, here are the proposals of Ukraine:

#### **The first is radiation and nuclear safety.**

No one has the right to blackmail the world with a radioactive disaster. This is an axiom.

However, in front of the eyes of the whole world, Russia has turned our Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant into a radioactive bomb that can explode at any moment. Where will the radiation cloud go? Perhaps towards the territory of the EU. Maybe to Türkiye. Maybe to the Middle East. I consider as criminal even a hypothetical possibility of such a scenario!

Radiation safety must be restored. The IAEA has already provided respective recommendations, confirming all the risks that we have repeatedly raised. Therefore, Russia must immediately withdraw all its militants from the territory of the Zaporizhzhia NPP. The station must be immediately transferred to the control of the IAEA and the Ukrainian personnel. The normal connection of the station to the power grid must be restored immediately so that nothing threatens the stability of the reactors.

We proposed that IAEA missions are sent to all Ukrainian nuclear plants - four of them, 15 nuclear units in total. Plus the Chernobyl plant, which has been shut down and is under conservation. Such missions can verify that any hostile activity against Ukrainian nuclear facilities has indeed ceased.

How long does it take to implement it? Russia can begin the demilitarisation of the Zaporizhzhia NPP as early as tomorrow if it is really ready to restore the radioactive safety it violated.

The same goes for the crazy threats of nuclear weapons that Russian officials resort to. There are and cannot be any excuses for nuclear blackmail. And I thank you, dear G-19, for making this clear.

However, please use all your power to make Russia abandon nuclear threats. The basis for such efforts can be the Budapest Memorandum and respective capabilities of the signatory states.

#### **The second challenge is food security.**

Thanks to the strong participation of the UN, Türkiye and other partners, we have demonstrated how the cooperation of a few can restore food security for the many.

I believe our export grain initiative deserves an indefinite extension - no matter when the war ends.

The right to food is a fundamental right of every person in the world.

Since July, Ukraine has exported over 10 million tons of food by sea. We can increase exports by several million tons per month. Thus for this I propose to expand the grain export initiative to our other ports - in particular, to the ports of Mykolaiv and 'Olvia' in the Mykolaiv region.

I also call on all countries - and in particular your countries, dear G-19 leaders - to join our initiative to help the poorest with food.

We have already launched the initiative - 'Grain from Ukraine'. And the first vessel - Nord Vind - leaves for Ethiopia with 27 thousand tons of wheat on board. This is the amount that can feed almost 100,000

people per year. There can be many such ships from Ukraine, and therefore there will be many people in poor countries who are saved from starvation.

Ukraine can export 45 million tons of food this year. And let a significant part of it be directed to those who suffer the most.

What do we propose exactly? Each country can join with a specific contribution and become a co-creator of the victory over hunger and the food crisis.

### **The third is energy security.**

All of you can witness what the Russian terror is aimed at now. This is an attempt to turn the cold into a weapon. A weapon against millions of people.

About 40% of our energy infrastructure were destroyed by the strikes of Russian missiles and Iranian drones used by the occupiers. Every week, Russia blows up our power plants, transformers, and electricity supply lines.

A related goal of this terror is to prevent the export of our electricity to neighbouring countries, which could significantly help them stabilise the energy situation and reduce prices for consumers.

Russia is interested in the energy crisis. And we should all be interested in ending terror.

I thank all our partners who have already helped Ukraine with the supply of air defence and missile defence systems. This allows us to shoot down some of the Russian missiles and Iranian drones. But we must fully protect our sky. I ask you to increase respective assistance!

We have already proposed that a mission of UN experts is sent to the objects of critical energy infrastructure of Ukraine to assess the scope of damage and the needs for restoration, as well as to prevent their further destruction. We need to speed up the dispatch of this mission!

This will be a specific contribution of the international community to the stabilisation of the energy situation in Ukraine and Europe, and therefore in the global energy market.

However, regardless of the decisions of the world, any day Russia on its own can simply abandon strikes on Ukrainian energy generation and water and heat supply facilities. Let Russia prove by its rejection of terror that it is really interested in the restoration of peace.

We must also take a fundamental step so that energy resources are no longer used as weapons. Price restrictions on Russian energy resources should be introduced.

If Russia is trying to deprive Ukraine, Europe and all energy consumers in the world of predictability and price stability, the answer to this should be a forced limitation of export prices for Russia. So that the export price was not higher than the production cost. That is fair. If you take something away, the world has the right to take from you.

### **The fourth challenge is the release of all prisoners and deportees.**

Thousands of our people - military and civilians - are in the Russian captivity. They are subjected to brutal torture - this is mass abuse!

In addition, we know by name 11 thousand children who were forcibly deported to Russia. They are separated from their parents in full knowledge that they have families.

Apart from the children, whose data we know, there are tens of thousands of those who were forcibly deported and about whom we know only indirectly. Among them are many, whose parents were killed by Russian strikes, and now they are being held in the state that murdered them.

Add to that hundreds of thousands of deported adults, and you will see what a humanitarian catastrophe the Russian war has caused.

Add political prisoners - Ukrainian citizens who are held in Russia and in the temporarily occupied territory, in particular in Crimea.

We must release all these people!

I want to point out that we did not find support from the International Committee of the Red Cross. We do not see that they are fully fighting to gain access to the camps, where Ukrainian POWs and political

prisoners are held. Neither they are helping to find deported Ukrainians. This self-withdrawal is the self-destruction of the Red Cross as an organisation that was once respected.

We cannot wait.

Therefore, we must unite for the sake of the only realistic model of the release of prisoners - 'all for all'.

And also for the release of all children and adults who were deported to Russia.

I thank the partners for their efforts, which allowed the release of many Ukrainians and foreign citizens, who were captured by the Russians. And let your leadership and the sincere heart of other leaders, who are present now, help free other Ukrainians as well.

#### **The fifth – implementation of the UN Charter and restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity and the world order.**

Article 2 of the UN Charter defines everything very clearly. Everything that Russia violated by this war.

Therefore, we must restore the validity of international law - and without any compromises with the aggressor. Because the UN Charter cannot be applied partially, selectively or 'at will'.

Russia must reaffirm the territorial integrity of Ukraine within the framework of the relevant resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the applicable international legally binding documents.

It is not up to negotiations.

#### **The sixth challenge is withdrawal of Russian troops and cessation of hostilities.**

There is a clear understanding of how to achieve this.

Russia must withdraw all its troops and armed formations from the territory of Ukraine. Ukraine's control over all sections of our state border with Russia must be restored.

This will result in a real and complete cessation of hostilities.

Every day of delay means new deaths of Ukrainians, new threats to the world, and an insane increase in losses due to continuation of the Russian aggression – losses for everyone in the world.

#### **The seventh – justice.**

This is what stokes the greatest emotions.

Everywhere, when we liberate our land, we see one thing - Russia leaves behind torture chambers and mass burials of murdered people.

This was the case in Bucha and other cities in the north of the country after the occupation. This was the case in the Kharkiv region. The same we observe now in the Kherson region.

As of today, we have a full information about four hundred and thirty children killed by Russian strikes. Only children! And only those about whom we know everything for sure.

And how many mass graves are there in the territory that still remains under the control of Russia?

What will we see in Mariupol?

That is why the world should endorse establishment of the Special Tribunal regarding the crime of Russia's aggression against Ukraine and the creation of an international mechanism to compensate for all the damages caused by this war. Compensation at the expense of Russian assets, because it is the aggressor who must do everything to restore the justice violated by it.

We have already proposed a resolution of the UN General Assembly regarding an international compensation mechanism for damages caused by the Russian war. It is endorsed. We ask you to implement it.

We are also preparing the second resolution - on the Special Tribunal. Please join and support it. Because there is no such nation in the world that does not appreciate justice.

#### **The eighth challenge is ecocide, the need for immediate protection of environment.**

Millions of hectares of forest were burned by shelling. Almost two hundred thousand hectares of our land are contaminated with unexploded mines and shells. Dozens of coal mines are flooded, including the mine in which an underground nuclear test explosion was carried out in 1979...

This is the 'Yunkom' mine in the Donetsk region. It is located on the territory occupied by Russia. It has been flooded for several years - precisely because of the occupiers. Everyone in Moscow knows what a threat it poses not only to the rivers in the Donetsk region, but also to the Black Sea basin. Only the de-occupation of our territory can provide the conditions for the elimination of this threat.

It is impossible to accurately calculate the amount of atmospheric pollution from burned oil depots and other fires... As well as from blown up sewage facilities, burned chemical plants, innumerable burial sites of slayed animals.

Just imagine this – due to the Russian aggression, 6 million domestic animals died. 6 million! These are official numbers. At least 50,000 dolphins were killed in the Black Sea. Thousands of hectares of soil are contaminated with harmful substances - most of them are fertile soils. Were fertile soils.

During the last week's Climate Summit in Egypt, I proposed a platform to assess the environmental damage of war. We have to implement it.

We must also find common responses to all environmental threats created by the war. Without this, there will be no return to a normal, stable life, and the reverberations of the war will remain for a long time - in the explosions of mines that will take the lives of children and adults, in the pollution of water, soil and atmosphere.

I thank all the countries that are already helping us with demining. There is an urgent need for an increased number of equipment and experts for these operations.

Funds and technologies are also needed for the restoration of water treatment facilities.

This is not just a Ukrainian problem. This is a challenge for the whole world.

### **The next - the ninth – is the prevention of escalation.**

A risk that still exists and will remain until our security is properly ensured.

Ukraine is not a member of any of the alliances. And Russia was able to start this war precisely because Ukraine remained in the grey zone - between the Euro-Atlantic world and the Russian imperialism.

Now we do not have any security assurances either. So, how can we prevent repetition of Russia's such aggression against us?

We need effective security assurances. That is why we prepared a draft agreement – the Kyiv Security Compact, and have already presented it to partners.

Thus, we should hold an international conference to cement the key elements of the post-war security architecture in the Euro-Atlantic space, including guarantees for Ukraine.

The main outcome of the conference should be the signing of the KSC.

We can do it any time - even this year. And we must do it.

### **And the tenth – confirmation of the end of the war.**

When all the antiwar measures are implemented, when security and justice begin to be restored, a document confirming the end of the war should be signed by the parties.

I would like to emphasise that none of the steps above can take long. A month for one step at the most. For some steps, a couple of days are enough.

We already have a positive experience with the grain export initiative. How does it work?

There is the UN - and two other parties to the agreements: on one side Ukraine, Türkiye and the UN, and on the other side Russia, Türkiye and the UN.

Implementation of each of the points I have just presented can be worked out in a similar fashion.

States ready to take the lead in this or that decision can become parties to the arrangement.

Once again:

radiation and nuclear safety; food security; energy security; release of all prisoners and deported persons; implementation of the UN Charter and restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity and the world order; withdrawal of Russian troops and cessation of hostilities; restoration of justice; countering ecocide; preventing escalation; and finally - confirmation of the end of the war.

Date: 15 November 2022

Source: President of Ukraine<sup>136</sup>

<sup>136</sup> President of Ukraine. (2022, 15 November), 'Ukraine has always been a leader in peacemaking efforts; if Russia wants to end this war, let it prove it with actions'. *Speech by the President of Ukraine at the G20 Summit*. <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-zavzhdi-bula-liderom-mirotvorchih-zusil-yaksho-rosi-79141>

## Appendix 3: China's 12-point 'political settlement' proposal *in verbatim*

### China's Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis

**1. Respecting the sovereignty of all countries.** Universally recognised international law, including the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, must be strictly observed. The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all countries must be effectively upheld. All countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are equal members of the international community. All parties should jointly uphold the basic norms governing international relations and defend international fairness and justice. Equal and uniform application of international law should be promoted, while double standards must be rejected.

**2. Abandoning the Cold War mentality.** The security of a country should not be pursued at the expense of others. The security of a region should not be achieved by strengthening or expanding military blocs. The legitimate security interests and concerns of all countries must be taken seriously and addressed properly. There is no simple solution to a complex issue. All parties should, following the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security and bearing in mind the long-term peace and stability of the world, help forge a balanced, effective and sustainable European security architecture. All parties should oppose the pursuit of one's own security at the cost of others' security, prevent bloc confrontation, and work together for peace and stability on the Eurasian Continent.

**3. Ceasing hostilities.** Conflict and war benefit no one. All parties must stay rational and exercise restraint, avoid fanning the flames and aggravating tensions, and prevent the crisis from deteriorating further or even spiralling out of control. All parties should support Russia and Ukraine in working in the same direction and resuming direct dialogue as quickly as possible, so as to gradually deescalate the situation and ultimately reach a comprehensive ceasefire.

**4. Resuming peace talks.** Dialogue and negotiation are the only viable solution to the Ukraine crisis. All efforts conducive to the peaceful settlement of the crisis must be encouraged and supported. The international community should stay committed to the right approach of promoting talks for peace, help parties to the conflict open the door to a political settlement as soon as possible, and create conditions and platforms for the resumption of negotiation. China will continue to play a constructive role in this regard.

**5. Resolving the humanitarian crisis.** All measures conducive to easing the humanitarian crisis must be encouraged and supported. Humanitarian operations should follow the principles of neutrality and impartiality, and humanitarian issues should not be politicised. The safety of civilians must be effectively protected, and humanitarian corridors should be set up for the evacuation of civilians from conflict zones. Efforts are needed to increase humanitarian assistance to relevant areas, improve humanitarian conditions, and provide rapid, safe and unimpeded humanitarian access, with a view to preventing a humanitarian crisis on a larger scale. The UN should be supported in playing a coordinating role in channelling humanitarian aid to conflict zones.

**6. Protecting civilians and POWs.** Parties to the conflict should strictly abide by international humanitarian law, avoid attacking civilians or civilian facilities, protect women, children and other victims of the conflict, and respect the basic rights of POWs. China supports the exchange of POWs between Russia and Ukraine, and calls on all parties to create more favourable conditions for this purpose.

**7. Keeping nuclear power plants safe.** China opposes armed attacks against nuclear power plants or other peaceful nuclear facilities, and calls on all parties to comply with international law including the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) and resolutely avoid man-made nuclear accidents. China supports the IAEA in playing a constructive role in promoting the safety and security of peaceful nuclear facilities.

**8. Reducing strategic risks.** Nuclear weapons must not be used and nuclear wars must not be fought. The threat or use of nuclear weapons should be opposed. Nuclear proliferation must be prevented and nuclear crisis avoided. China opposes the research, development and use of chemical and biological weapons by any country under any circumstances.

**9. Facilitating grain exports.** All parties need to implement the Black Sea Grain Initiative signed by Russia, Türkiye, Ukraine and the UN fully and effectively in a balanced manner, and support the UN in playing an important role in this regard. The cooperation initiative on global food security proposed by China provides a feasible solution to the global food crisis.

**10. Stopping unilateral sanctions.** Unilateral sanctions and maximum pressure cannot solve the issue; they only create new problems. China opposes unilateral sanctions unauthorised by the UN Security Council. Relevant countries should stop abusing unilateral sanctions and 'long-arm jurisdiction' against other countries, so as to do their share in deescalating the Ukraine crisis and create conditions for developing countries to grow their economies and better the lives of their people.

**11. Keeping industrial and supply chains stable.** All parties should earnestly maintain the existing world economic system and oppose using the world economy as a tool or weapon for political purposes. Joint efforts are needed to mitigate the spillovers of the crisis and prevent it from disrupting international cooperation in energy, finance, food trade and transportation and undermining the global economic recovery.

**12. Promoting post-conflict reconstruction.** The international community needs to take measures to support post-conflict reconstruction in conflict zones. China stands ready to provide assistance and play a constructive role in this endeavour.

Date: 24 February 2023

Source: FM PRC<sup>137</sup>

<sup>137</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2023, 24 February). ['China's Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis'](#). FM PRC.





## Appendix 4: The Kyiv Security Compact (International Security Guarantees for Ukraine) *in verbatim*

### **The Kyiv Security Compact International Security Guarantees for Ukraine: Recommendations [Excerpt]**

[...]

#### **A. SECURITY GUARANTEES – COMMITMENTS BY A CORE GROUP OF GUARANTORS REGARDING UKRAINE’S SELF-DEFENCE CAPABILITIES AND CAPACITIES TO DETER AN ATTACK**

##### **CONCEPT AND PRINCIPLES**

Given its unique geopolitical position, the most effective security guarantees lie in Ukraine’s capacity to defend itself. To be sufficiently robust and credible, Ukraine’s self-defence must be underpinned by binding commitments from a group of international partners to mobilise the necessary military and non-military resources.

Ukraine is a European country that is now on the path to EU membership. This process will further integrate Ukraine into the European political community, improve its prospects for reconstruction and development, and strengthen the country’s institutions and security. As an EU member, it will also benefit from the EU’s mutual defence clause under Article 42.7 of the Treaty of the European Union. In the meantime, EU Member States and institutions should do their part in providing security guarantees to Ukraine through sustained arms supplies, financial aid, and with training missions, among others.

Ukraine’s aspiration to join NATO and benefit from its mutual defence arrangements is safeguarded in its Constitution. This aspiration is the sovereign decision of Ukraine. In the interim period Ukraine needs iron-clad security guarantees. These will come predominantly – though not exclusively – from NATO countries.

The guarantees must not constrain Ukraine to limit the size or strength of its armed forces. Nor should they be drawn in exchange for a specific status, such as neutrality, or put other obligations or restraints on Ukraine. With those guarantees, Ukraine will sustain its capacity to ensure its self-defence. Their aim is to strengthen Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence within its internationally recognised borders. The guarantees should also support Ukraine’s commitment to continuing democratic reforms, as specified in the European Council Conclusions of June 23-24 2022 on granting Ukraine EU candidate status. Effective security for Ukraine is closely related to a modern society that guarantees its citizens their fundamental rights.

##### **SCOPE**

The security guarantees should be codified in a joint strategic partnership document named the Kyiv Security Compact co-signed by a core group of partners that would act as enablers of Ukraine’s self-defence. This could include, but is not limited to, the US, UK, Canada, Poland, Italy, Germany, France, Australia, Turkey, and Nordic, Baltic, and Central European countries. In addition to the strategic partnership document, Ukraine and certain guarantor states may sign bilateral agreements covering specific issues related to security guarantees between Ukraine and the guarantor states.

On top of the core guarantors, various layers of countries could join in on additional or specific issues related to security guarantees. The Rammstein Format (*also known as the Ukraine Defence Contact Group*), made up of circa 50 countries, could form the basis of this broader group, which can become formalised into a coalition of the willing.

Provisions should be applied for Ukraine to both deter and – if needed – defend against another armed attack or acts of aggression. For this, Kyiv will need large defence forces, robust capabilities, and a strong, reformed defence industry. This must be underpinned by sustained investments in its defence industrial base, extensive weapons transfers and intelligence support from allies, and well-trained and exercised forces.

#### **To defend itself for the long term Ukraine will need:**

- **A high-readiness force that can effectively and forcefully respond to a territorial breach.** As stated in NATO's Madrid Summit Communiqué, Ukraine is 'vital' for the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. As such and with the support of key guarantors, Ukraine must be able to develop a robust territorial defence posture whose ultimate objective is to deter and successfully defend against acts of aggression. Ukraine needs the resources to maintain a significant force capable of withstanding the Russian Federation's armed forces and paramilitaries.
- **A massive training and joint manoeuvre programme of Ukrainian forces and partners on Ukrainian territory with international trainers and advisors.** Taking advantage of national and multinational training efforts by EU and NATO countries, Ukrainian forces will be trained at NATO standard and at the scale needed to build a robust territorial defence force and reserve force. The training activities will be supported by an extensive exercise programme both on Ukrainian soil and with Ukrainian forces on EU/NATO territory. In addition to training programmes, joint manoeuvres under the Vienna Document (144) will further strengthen the Ukrainian forces, increase military transparency, and serve regional needs.
- **Advanced defensive systems** including providing Ukraine with comprehensive defensive systems to protect key population centres and access points by deploying air and maritime missile defence, cyber capabilities, advanced radar capabilities. Those systems – so-called anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) - could incorporate a mix of home-based capabilities and foreign systems. In case of a threat of the use of force or aggression, they could be rapidly augmented by ear-marked systems provided by the key guarantors.
- **Access to EU's capability funding** to re-build Ukraine's defence industrial base on EU/NATO standards – and develop with EU Member States new defensive capabilities. As a candidate to EU membership, Ukraine could be granted privileged access to EU funding, mainly the European Defence Fund and the European Peace Facility.
- **Self-defence territorial force for all civilians aged above 18 years old.** Modelled on countries with active conscription, Ukraine will need to maintain a large enough territorial defence force, including a reserve service that can be sporadically called for active duty.

#### **To achieve this, Ukraine will need the group of international guarantors to:**

- Provide financial aid and direct investments, including through future reconstruction instruments, to support the national defence budget, as well as ensuring financial assistance (including non-repayable grants) to restore the infrastructure of Ukraine, which was destroyed or damaged by military actions.
- Allocate reconstruction funds, including non-repayable financial assistance, towards supporting and building Ukraine's new national defence industrial base.
- Offer technology transfers and arms export.
- Coordinate closely among each other to supply capabilities, military equipment, ammunition, and services.

- Establish regular training exercises to Ukrainian forces.
- Establish a cooperation program on cyber defence and security; and countering cyber threats.
- An enhanced intelligence cooperation, including frequent sharing of intelligence and establishing a regular cooperation between the intelligence services of Ukraine and guarantor states.

## **B. SECURITY GUARANTEES – HOW WOULD THEY WORK IN CASE OF ATTACK: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS AND MECHANISMS**

Security guarantees should be both permanent to help build Ukraine's self-defence capacity in the long term, and scalable to adapt and reflect the level of the threat. While they could be embedded in an eventual peace process, they should be agreed and implemented in the shortest time period.

This will demonstrate the unity of the international community with Ukraine, and the continuity and amplification of the current efforts, including under the Ramstein Format. It will also signal to Russia that the cost of aggression will continue to rise.

### **1. LEGAL SCOPE AND ASPECTS**

To avoid the pitfalls of weak guarantees, Ukraine will need:

- **Security guarantees that are legally and politically binding.** Guarantors can engage in binding commitments through a joint strategic partnership document – which would effectively be a binding pact amongst them.
- In addition to a joint document, **guarantors should make continuous and bilateral legal and political commitments to Ukraine**, both at the executive level of government and by the respective legislatures.
- Security guarantees **should explicitly commit guarantors to Ukraine's self-defence**. This means creating the parameters for a broad range of responses and not excluding any form of support to assure Ukraine's self-defence.
- **Some of those guarantees will be open-ended and ongoing:** they will include training and exercises, defence investment and cooperation, and weapons supply.
- **In case of aggression, the joint document should spell out extended guarantee commitments by guarantors** to use all elements of their national and collective power and take appropriate measures – which may include diplomatic, economic, and military means – to enable Ukraine to stop the aggression, restore its sovereignty, ensure its security, military edge, and capability to deter its enemies and defend itself by itself against any threat.
- **The territorial scope of the guarantees applies throughout Ukraine's internationally recognised borders.** At the same time, the extended guarantees are to apply if Ukraine comes under attack on its territory within internationally recognised borders.
- According to Uniting for Peace Resolution 377A(V) of the UN General Assembly, **the guarantors should seek the support of the UN**, most likely via the UN General Assembly, within the timeframe discussed below. Nonetheless, all security guarantee provisions will fall under the law on individual and collective self-defence (Article 51 of the UN Charter: (*'Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the UN...'*)).
- Finally, to achieve the overall political objective of the security guarantees, the joint strategic partnership document should strike the **right balance between specific provisions and generic commitments**. This could be done by combining the main joint document with an annex, which will lay out more specific provisions reflecting the threat assessment.

## 2. MECHANISMS – HOW SHOULD THE SECURITY GUARANTEES WORK

- **Triggers should be based on a joint threat assessment structure:** extended security guarantees should be activated through a mechanism that would require a request from Ukraine to the guarantor states, following ‘an armed attack or an act of aggression’. Rather than a confirmation from a third-party, such as the UN Security Council or General Assembly, there should be a degree of automaticity where guarantors would collectively consult with Ukraine.
- **The decision-making process should be based on the principle of collective consultations followed by individual contributions.** Upon a request from Ukraine, guarantors shall gather for collective consultations within a very short amount of time (e.g. 24 hours) and decide on amplifying the guarantees on the basis of a coalition of the willing (e.g. 72 hours).
- **The guarantees should be agreed on an open-ended basis.** Nevertheless, the guarantees should create a mechanism for guarantors to collectively meet, evaluate and review the guarantees, to keep them meaningful and relevant – and if need be, adjust them to meet the nature and level of threat.
- **Ukraine and the guarantor states should establish a permanent and ongoing mechanism to monitor threats and security challenges,** as well as inform each other about military activities, exercises, and manoeuvres. Towards that end, Ukraine and guarantors will need to have a mechanism of collecting, exchanging, processing, and analysing intelligence, including for the purpose of early detection regarding preparations for an armed aggression.

### C. INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS

International sanctions should be an additional layer of the overall set of security guarantees, in case of aggression. This could both help deter an act of aggression and also put a punitive cost on the aggressor. Sanctions would need to balance specific elements while leaving enough room to manoeuvre, to not reveal to the aggressor the full cost of any future possible attack on Ukraine.

Notwithstanding the sanctions mechanism described below, the guarantors should refrain from lifting the sanctions on Russia agreed since 2014, until Moscow: a) stops its aggression against Ukraine; b) guarantees it will not attack Ukraine in the future; c) compensates Ukraine for the damages caused during the invasion.

Any decision on lifting or temporarily suspending sanctions, as part of a negotiated peace settlement, should be taken in close coordination with Ukraine. The security guarantee agreement should contain a provision that the sanctions will be re-imposed (*snapback provisions*) in the event of new attacks or aggression. Sanctions need to be maintained until Russia is no longer a threat to Ukrainian sovereignty.

The package of sanctions shall be initiated and implemented by Ukraine's security guarantors, in close coordination with other international bodies such as the G7 and the EU. Other like-minded countries supporting sanctions (e.g., Switzerland, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, Australia, and others) should also be invited to join.

#### **The sanctions guarantors should:**

- Agree on a set of snapback sanctions that would be triggered by a well-defined event under international law, such as if Ukraine comes under ‘armed attack’ (Article 51 of the UN Charter) or an ‘act of aggression’ (UN General Assembly Resolution 3314, XXIX).
- The set of sanctions mentioned above should be at minimum the full set of sanctions as of September 1, 2022, which would be immediately re-imposed (*snapback sanctions*).

- In addition to the sanctions above, further measures and restrictions could be applied to significantly increase economic and other costs to an aggressor in case of an armed attack or act of aggression.
- Finally, measures should be agreed to allow authorities to seize the property of the aggressor, its sovereign funds and reserves, and the assets of its citizens and entities on the sanctions list. These assets could then be sold for the purpose of directing funds to repair the war damage inflicted on Ukraine.

Date: 13 September 2022

Source: Rasmussen and Yermak<sup>138</sup>

<sup>138</sup> Rasmussen, A. F., & Yermak, A. (2022, September 13). 'The Kyiv Security Compact – International Security Guarantees for Ukraine: Recommendations'. *The Office of the President of Ukraine*. [https://www.president.gov.ua/storage/j-files-storage/01/15/89/41fd0ec2d72259a561313370cee1be6e\\_1663050954.pdf](https://www.president.gov.ua/storage/j-files-storage/01/15/89/41fd0ec2d72259a561313370cee1be6e_1663050954.pdf).

## Appendix 5: The Group of Seven (G7) Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine *in verbatim*

### Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine

We, the Leaders of the Group of Seven (G7), reaffirm our unwavering commitment to the strategic objective of a free, independent, democratic, and sovereign Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders, capable of defending itself and deterring future aggression.

We affirm that the security of Ukraine is integral to the security of the Euro-Atlantic region.

We consider Russia's illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine to be a threat to international peace and security, a flagrant violation of international law, including the UN Charter, and incompatible with our security interests. We will stand with Ukraine as it defends itself against Russian aggression, for as long as it takes.

We stand united in our enduring support for Ukraine, rooted in our shared democratic values and interests, above all, respect for the UN Charter and the principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Today we are launching negotiations with Ukraine to formalise — through bilateral security commitments and arrangements aligned with this multilateral framework, in accordance with our respective legal and constitutional requirements — our enduring support to Ukraine as it defends its sovereignty and territorial integrity, rebuilds its economy, protects its citizens, and pursues integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. We will direct our teams to begin these discussions immediately.

We will each work with Ukraine on specific, bilateral, long-term security commitments and arrangements towards:

- a) Ensuring a sustainable force capable of defending Ukraine now and deterring Russian aggression in the future, through the continued provision of:
  - security assistance and modern military equipment, across land, air, and sea domains – prioritising air defence, artillery and long-range fires, armoured vehicles, and other key capabilities, such as combat air, and by promoting increased interoperability with Euro-Atlantic partners;
  - support to further develop Ukraine's defence industrial base;
  - training and training exercises for Ukrainian forces;
  - intelligence sharing and cooperation;
  - support for cyber defence, security, and resilience initiatives, including to address hybrid threats.
- b) Strengthening Ukraine's economic stability and resilience, including through reconstruction and recovery efforts, to create the conditions conducive to promoting Ukraine's economic prosperity, including its energy security.
- c) Providing technical and financial support for Ukraine's immediate needs stemming from Russia's war as well as to enable Ukraine to continue implementing the effective reform agenda that will support the good governance necessary to advance towards its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

In the event of future Russian armed attack, we intend to immediately consult with Ukraine to determine appropriate next steps. We intend, in accordance with our respective legal and constitutional requirements, to provide Ukraine with swift and sustained security assistance, modern military equipment across land, sea and air domains, and economic assistance, to impose economic

and other costs on Russia, and to consult with Ukraine on its needs as it exercises its right of self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. To this end, we will work with Ukraine on an enhanced package of security commitments and arrangements in case of future aggression to enable Ukraine to defend its territory and sovereignty.

In addition to the elements articulated above, we remain committed to supporting Ukraine by holding Russia accountable. This includes working to ensure that the costs to Russia of its aggression continue to rise, including through sanctions and export controls, as well as supporting efforts to hold to account those responsible for war crimes and other international crimes committed in and against Ukraine, including those involving attacks on critical civilian infrastructure. There must be no impunity for war crimes and other atrocities. In this context, we reiterate our commitment to holding those responsible to account, consistent with international law, including by supporting the efforts of international mechanisms, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC).

We reaffirm that, consistent with our respective legal systems, Russia's sovereign assets in our jurisdictions will remain immobilised until Russia pays for the damage it has caused to Ukraine. We recognise the need for the establishment of an international mechanism for reparation of damages, loss or injury caused by Russian aggression and express our readiness to explore options for the development of appropriate mechanisms.

For its part, Ukraine is committed to:

- a) Contributing positively to partner security and to strengthen transparency and accountability measures with regard to partner assistance;
- b) Continuing implementation of the law enforcement, judiciary, anti-corruption, corporate governance, economic, security sector, and state management reforms that underscore its commitments to democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and media freedoms, and put its economy on a sustainable path;
- c) Advancing defence reforms and modernisation including by strengthening democratic civilian control of the military and improving efficiency and transparency across Ukraine's defence institutions and industry.

The EU and its Member States stand ready to contribute to this effort and will swiftly consider the modalities of such contribution.

This effort will be taken forward while Ukraine pursues a pathway toward future membership in the Euro-Atlantic community.

Other countries that wish to contribute to this effort to ensure a free, strong, independent, and sovereign Ukraine may join this Joint Declaration at any time.

Date: 12 July 2023

Source: US Department of State<sup>139</sup>

<sup>139</sup> U.S. Department of State. (2023, July 12). Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine. <https://www.state.gov/joint-declaration-of-support-for-ukraine>.

## Appendix 6: UN General Assembly Resolution A/ES-11/L.7 – Voting Outcome

Voting Started		2/23/2023		3:38:58 PM	
<b>Item 5 - draft resolution A/ES-11/L.7</b>					
<b>Principles of the Charter of the United Nations underlying a comprehensive, just and</b>					
AFGHANISTAN	CAMEROON	FINLAND	KUWAIT	NEPAL	SAUDI ARABIA
ALBANIA	CANADA	FRANCE	KYRGYZSTAN	NETHERLANDS	SENEGAL
ALGERIA	CENTRAL AF...	GABON	LAO PDR	NEW ZEALAND	SERBIA
ANDORRA	CHAD	GAMBIA	LATVIA	NICARAGUA	SEYCHELLES
ANGOLA	CHILE	GEORGIA	LEBANON	NIGER	SIERRA LEONE
ANTIGUA-BA...	CHINA	GERMANY	LESOTHO	NIGERIA	SINGAPORE
ARGENTINA	COLOMBIA	GHANA	LIBERIA	NORTH MAC...	SLOVAKIA
ARMENIA	COMOROS	GREECE	LIBYA	NORWAY	SLOVENIA
AUSTRALIA	CONGO	GRENADA	LIECHTENSTEIN	OMAN	SOLOMON IS...
AUSTRIA	COSTA RICA	GUATEMALA	LITHUANIA	PAKISTAN	SOMALIA
AZERBAIJAN	COTE D'IVOIRE	GUINEA	LUXEMBOURG	PALAU	SOUTH AFRICA
BAHAMAS	CROATIA	GUINEA-BISS...	MADAGASCAR	PANAMA	SOUTH SUDAN
BAHRAIN	CUBA	GUYANA	MALAWI	PAPUA NEW ...	SPAIN
BANGLADESH	CYPRUS	HAITI	MALAYSIA	PARAGUAY	SRI LANKA
BARBADOS	CZECHIA	HONDURAS	MALDIVES	PERU	SUDAN
BELARUS	DEM PR OF K...	HUNGARY	MALI	PHILIPPINES	SURINAME
BELGIUM	DEM REP OF ...	ICELAND	MALTA	POLAND	SWEDEN
BELIZE	DENMARK	INDIA	MARSHALL IS...	PORTUGAL	SWITZERLAND
BENIN	DJIBOUTI	INDONESIA	MAURITANIA	QATAR	SYRIAN ARA...
BHUTAN	DOMINICA	IRAN (ISLAMI...	MAURITIUS	REP OF KOREA	TAJIKISTAN
BOLIVIA	DOMINICAN ...	IRAQ	MEXICO	REP OF MOL...	THAILAND
BOSNIA-HER...	ECUADOR	IRELAND	MICRONESIA...	ROMANIA	TIMOR-LESTE
BOTSWANA	EGYPT	ISRAEL	MONACO	RUSSIAN FED...	TOGO
BRAZIL	EL SALVADOR	ITALY	MONGOLIA	RWANDA	TONGA
BRUNEI DAR...	EQUATORIAL...	JAMAICA	MONTENEGRO	SAINT KITTS-...	TRINIDAD-TO...
BULGARIA	ERITREA	JAPAN	MOROCCO	SAINT LUCIA	TUNISIA
BURKINA FASO	ESTONIA	JORDAN	MOZAMBIQUE	SAINT VINCE...	TURKMENIST...
BURUNDI	ESWATINI	KAZAKHSTAN	MYANMAR	SAMOA	TUVALU
CABO VERDE	ETHIOPIA	KENYA	NAMIBIA	SAN MARINO	TÜRKIYE
CAMBODIA	FIJI	KIRIBATI	NAURU	SAO TOME-P...	UGANDA
<b>IN FAVOUR: 141</b>	<b>AGAINST: 7</b>	<b>ABSTENTION: 32</b>			

Source: UN News<sup>140</sup>

<sup>140</sup> UN News. (2023, February 23). 'UN General Assembly calls for immediate end to war in Ukraine'. *UN News*. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/02/1133847>.



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