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ACTION REPORT

WOW JIMA

FEBRUARY, 1945

(4)

Handwritten notes:
21 Mar
23 Mar
25 Mar
26 Mar
28 Mar
30 Mar
31 Mar
3/Sept

JUN 21 1965

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DECLASSIFIED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

ORIGINATOR'S ROUGH DRAFT

From: CTF 12

Address: TF 32, TF 54

my CP Plan Alet-45

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COMMANDER TASK FORCE FIFTY-TWO AMPHIBIOUS SUPPORT FORCE

COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP ONE

ACS 22

4 MAR 1945 NR

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OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP ONE

File: Al6-3(2)

Fleet Post Office

Serial: 0013

San Francisco, California

JUN 21 1965



7 March 1945

JUN 1965

From: Commander Amphibious Group ONE.
To: Distribution.

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Subject: Report of Operations of Task Force 2 in the LWC JEMA Campaign from 10 February to 0600(K) 19 February - Deletions in.

Reference: (a) CTF 52 Secret File Al6-3(2), serial 009 of 22 February 1945.

1. Upon receipt of this letter, all Commands designated as holders of the subject report will delete the code words appearing in the following pages:

- A-26, in entry for 0757
- A-27, in entry for 0856
- A-28, in entry for 1056
- A-30, in entry for 1421
- A-32, in entry for 1720 and 1817
- A-34, in entry for 0641
- A-44, in entry for 1825
- D-9, subparagraph (f), second line.

W.H.P. BLANDY.

Distribution:

Same as for Subject Report, reference (a).

L.D. Reedy
L.D. REEDY,
Flag Secretary.

21 MAR 1945

NR

OM 1134

JUN 21 1965

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File: A16-3(2)
Serial: 009

22 February 1945.
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS,
EXPIRES AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

From: Commander Task Force 52 (Amphibious Support Force),
(Rear Admiral W.H.P. Blandy, USN, Commander
Amphibious Group ONE, U. S.S. ESTES, Flagship).
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander Task Force 51 (Commander Joint
Expeditionary Force and Commander Amphibious
Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
(2) Commander FIFTH Fleet.
(3) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and
Pacific Ocean Areas.

Subject: Operations of Task Force 52 in the IWO JIMA Campaign
from 10 February to 0600(K) 19 February, at which
time CTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to Plan;
Report of.

Enclosures: (A) Chronology of Operations.
(B) Comments on Intelligence.
(C) Comments on Ships' Gunfire Support.
(D) Report on Support Aircraft Operations.
(E) Comments on UDT Operations.
(F) Comments on Minesweeping.
(G) Comments on Battle Damage.
(H) Comments on Medical Facilities and Casualties.
(I) Comments on Weather.
(J) Comments on Communications.

1. The function of this command during subject period
was to exercise general supervision over, and coordinate, all acti-
vities at the objective prior to the arrival of the landing and
assault elements of the Joint Expeditionary Force on DOG Day (19
February). The forces participating in these pre-landing activities
of Task Force 52 were:

- (a) The Gunfire and Covering Force, Task Force 54, under command
of Rear Admiral B.J. Rodgers, USN (Commander Amphibious Group
ELEVEN), consisting of 6 OBB, 4 CA, 1 CL, 15 DD, 1 DM, and
1 AVD.
- (b) The Support Carrier Group, Task Group 52.2 under command of
Rear Admiral C.T. Durgin, USN (Commander Escort Carriers, U.S.
Pacific Fleet), consisting of 8 CVE, 5 DD and 9 DE.

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- (c) The Mine Group, Task Group 52.3, under command of Rear Admiral A. Sharp, USN (Commander Minecraft, U.S. Pacific Fleet), consisting of seven Sweep Units comprising 43 minecraft plus 8 LCP(R)'s rigged for shallow water minesweeping.
- (d) The Underwater Demolition Group; Task Group 52.4, under command of Captain B.H. Hanlon, USN (Commander Underwater Demolition Teams, U.S. Pacific Fleet), consisting of 6 APD's carrying UDT's Nos. 12, 13, 14, 15.
- (e) Gunboat Support Units One and Two, Task Units 52.5.1 and 52.5.2, under command of Commander M.J. Malanaphy, USN (Commander LCI Flotilla Three), consisting of 1 LCI(L) and 12 LCI(G)'s.
- (f) Land-based heavy bombers of the Strategic Air Force, Pacific Ocean Areas, Task Force 93, delivered air strikes under the control of Commander Air Support Control Unit, Task Group 52.10, Captain E.C. Parker, USN, embarked in the flagship of Commander Task Force 52, when weather permitted.

2. The mission of forces under this command was to effect the maximum possible destruction of enemy forces and defenses of IWO JIMA by aircraft and surface ship bombardment, minesweeping, and underwater demolition, during the period D -3 to D -1, inclusive, in order to facilitate its capture.

3. Intensive planning by this command for this campaign commenced on 15 October at PEARL HARBOR. It was greatly facilitated by the presence in this location, during the early period of the planning stage, of Commander FIFTH Fleet (Admiral R.A. Spruance, USN.), Commander Joint Expeditionary Force (CTF 51, Vice Admiral R.K. Turner, USN, Commander Amphibious Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet), Commander Attack Force (CTF 53, Rear Admiral H.W. Hill, USN, Commander Amphibious Group TWO), Commander Expeditionary Troops (CTF 56, Lieutenant General H.M. Smith, USMC), Commander Landing Force (CTG 56.1, Major General H. Schmidt, USMC), CTG 52.3 and CTG 52.4. Joint conferences were held and members of the staff of this command worked continuously with the staffs of the above commands.

4. CTF 52 issued his Operation Plan No. A101-45, on 1 January, 1945, and sailed for ULITHI on 12 January in his flagship, ESTES, accompanied by NEVADA and IDAHO, the transport ADMIRAL COONTZ,

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and screening ships, in accordance with CTF 52 Movement Order No. A102-45, and arrived ULITHI on 23 January (East Longitude Date). Gunnery and other training exercises were held enroute. Intensive drills for the Staff and Air Support Control Unit were conducted, in the form of battle problems covering each period of the operation at IWO JIMA.

5. Prior to departure from PEARL HARBOR, it had been expected that ships and commanders of TF 54, TG 52.2, TG 52.4, and Gunboat Support Units One and Two would be assembled at ULITHI by 24-27 January, and that the period from their arrival to 10 February, the date of departure, could be devoted to intensive briefing and conferences, training, and rehearsals, as well as logistic replenishment. While CTF 52 was enroute ULITHI it became apparent that delay in releasing certain ships then engaged in operations against LUZON, as well as damage sustained by these ships, would not only prevent their assembly at ULITHI, but would prevent their participation in operations at IWO JIMA, and that extensive changes to existing plans, particularly the ships' gunfire support plan, would be necessary. Furthermore, it developed that Vice Admiral J.B. Olendorf, USN (Commander Battleship Squadron ONE), would not command TF 54. Commander FIFTH Fleet's Operation Plan 13-44 originally provided that heavy ships of TF 54 would consist of CALIFORNIA, NEVADA, MISSISSIPPI, NEW MEXICO, WEST VIRGINIA, COLORADO, TEXAS, LOUISVILLE, PORTLAND, INDIANAPOLIS, TUSCALOOSA, CHESTER, PENSACOLA and SALT LAKE CITY. When it became apparent that participation of many of these ships would not be possible, CTF 51 revised his plan to include, for the period D -3 to D -1, NORTH CAROLINA, WASHINGTON, TENNESSEE, IDAHO, NEVADA, NEW YORK, TEXAS, ARKANSAS, CHESTER, PENSACOLA, SALT LAKE CITY, and TUSCALOOSA. He reprinted the intricate and detailed schedules of ships' gunfire on this basis, and advance copies were delivered to CTF 52 on 28 January by Rear Admiral Rodgers, who flew out from PEARL HARBOR to become CTF 54 in place of Vice Admiral Olendorf. By the time these changed plans arrived, however, Commander FIFTH Fleet had indicated that NORTH CAROLINA, and WASHINGTON would not be available until DOG Day, but that VICKSBURG would join TF 54 at SAIPAN. As CTF 51 was now at sea, and there was not time for him to issue further changes upon his arrival at ENIWETOK, CTF 52 at once prepared pen and ink changes to the Ships Gunfire Support Plan Annex of CTF 51 OpPlan No. A25-44 to cover these changes in task organization, informed CTF 51 that copies of these changes would reach him at ENIWETOK on 6 February, and that meanwhile fire support ships present at ULITHI would be briefed in accordance therewith.

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CTF 51 approved the proposed changes. Advance copies of Change No. 3 to his OpPlan, covering the latest changes in task organization, were received on 6 February and delivered to ships of TF 51 present at ULITHI, forthwith, as well as to such ships of TF 58 as might be called upon for fire support duties. In the meanwhile communications training of fire support ships and support aircraft, and two rehearsals of UDT operations, the second including actual fire support, were conducted. Conferences were held with CTG 52.2, CTG 52.3, CTG 52.4, and on 8 February there was a general conference and briefing attended by Commanding Officers of all ships present of TF 52, TF 54, possible fire support ships of TF 58, and many of the higher echelons of these commands. The Staff Gunnery Officer and Intelligence Officer had in the interim briefed gunnery officers and top and air spotters of fire support ships. Ships of the Support Carrier Group and carriers of TF 58 were also briefed. Emphasis was placed upon the necessity for confining the preliminary bombardment to deliberate destructive fire against installations which would threaten planes, ships, and the actual landing. In view of the great number of defense installations, time and ammunition did not permit fire at targets of lower priority. This subject is treated more fully in enclosures (C) and (D). Three additional CVE's were assigned to TG 52.2 prior to departure of ships of TF's 52 and 54 on 10 February.

6. Passage from ULITHI to SAIPAN was uneventful. February 12 and 13 were devoted to a rehearsal of DOG Day operations on each day, delivery of plans and orders to NEW YORK, TENNESSEE, VICKSBURG, TERRY and MULLANY which joined at SAIPAN, and fueling screening vessels. A party was sent aboard to brief the NEW YORK. It was possible to bring gunnery officers and spotters of TENNESSEE and VICKSBURG on board ESTES for briefing which included demonstration of specific enemy installations in areas of responsibility of these ships by means of photographs. Passage from SAIPAN to IWO JIMA, in accordance with CTF 52 Movement Order No. A105-45, was uneventful.

7. The general plan of operations at IWO JIMA for 16 February consisted, briefly, of sweeping adjacent waters to within approximately 6000 yards of the shore, gunfire at long (above 12000 yards) and medium (from 6000 to 12000 yards) ranges with air spot for destruction of defenses and silencing of enemy batteries, air strikes by support carrier aircraft and land-based heavy bombers of TF 93, examination of beaches from the air by special hydrographic observers, aircraft photo missions in late morning and afternoon, installation of a navigational light on HIGASHI IWA, a small rocky

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islet about 3000 yards to the eastward of IWO JIMA, and early morning and late afternoon fighter sweeps against CHICHI JIMA to destroy planes and ships or boats which might interfere with the operation. Fire support ships were to follow minesweeping units in towards the island and then work in their assigned sectors inside a screen of destroyers and APD's which enclosed the island area. APD's were to conduct visual reconnaissance of beaches, but not to approach closer than 3000 yards. This plan was followed, except that low ceiling and intermittent showers prevented the photo mission, the morning strike against CHICHI JIMA, the strike of land-based bombers, and severely handicapped the spotting planes. CTF 52, in order to prevent waste of ammunition, directed ships to fire only when efficient air spot was available. It was not possible to follow the planned firing schedules, and instead each ship fired in its assigned area of responsibility whenever weather permitted. Two enemy luggers were discovered early in the morning by support aircraft about 30 miles west of SURIBACHI MOUNTAIN. They were attacked and left burning and in a sinking condition, with crews abandoning ship. In the early afternoon a PENSACOLA spotting plane reported shooting down a Zeke which had apparently taken off from IWO JIMA. Three Betty's were strafed and probably destroyed on the ground. A battery which opened fire on minesweepers from northern flank of eastern beach was quickly silenced by fire support ships. None of our ships was hit. One fighter plane and pilot became lost in thick weather and did not return. One plane was an operational loss. One fighter plane was shot down by enemy AA but the pilot was recovered uninjured. One NEW YORK spotting plane was damaged on catapulting, and sank after personnel were removed. Results of minesweeping were negative, but one old mine adrift was sighted and sunk. Excellent reports were received from the air hydrographic observer indicating that beaches and surf conditions would permit landings by any type of landing craft. He could see no evidence of underwater defenses. Lack of photographs and the paucity of observed results by ships and aircraft prevented accurate assessment of damage to enemy installations. It was estimated, however, that the comparatively small amount of firing permitted by the intermittent thick weather had inflicted little damage on major defenses. Pilots reported enemy heavy AA gunfire not particularly intense or effective, and fire of Automatic AA intense but generally inaccurate.

8. At sunset all ships commenced night deployment away from the island, except for four destroyers which were designated to remain and provide harassing fire and illumination, interdict the

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use and repair of airfields, and prevent escape or reinforcement of the garrison. CTF 52 in ESTES, screened by 4 AM's, after following the fire support units away from the island during dusk, returned to the vicinity of the island to supervise night operations.

9. Operations planned for 17 February consisted in general of morning and evening fighter sweeps against CHICHI JIMA; close range destructive fire against eastern beach defenses during which minesweeping up to about 150 yards from the eastern shore would be covered by the heavy ships; UDT reconnaissance of eastern beaches in the late morning closely supported by heavy ships, 7 destroyers and 7 LCI(G)'s; strikes by land-based bombers at 1330; close range destructive fire on western beaches; minesweeping off western beaches and UDT reconnaissance of these beaches supported as in the morning; minesweeping to within about 2000 yards of the northern and northeastern shore; hydrographic observation of beach conditions from the air, photo missions, and night operations at the objective as on 16 February. At 0124(K) ComDesDiv 111 in NEWCOMB, with HALLIGAN, was directed to proceed to point (Lat 26°-00 N, Long 141°-50' E) and to act as radar pickets and provide life guard services for air strikes against CHICHI JIMA. At 0641(K) HALLIGAN was attacked by three Betty's when 24 miles, bearing 355°, from SURIBACHI MOUNTAIN. She drove off the attackers, shooting down one Betty. Fire support ships arrived on station and commenced the scheduled bombardment promptly at 0700(K). Mine Unit Two, in company with Gunboat Support Units One and Two, arrived at 0700(K). Gunboat support units reported to CTG 52.4 and Sweep Units 5 and 6 to CTG 52.3. A special air strike group of 12 VF's departed for CHICHI JIMA at 0735(K). The first support air strike group reported on station at 0715(K). During the day many air strikes were launched against the objective through meager to intense heavy and light anti-aircraft fire. Photographic missions were completed, but the morning verticals were poor, preventing accurate damage assessment. The fire support ships were ordered to close the eastern beaches at 0803(K) for close destructive bombardment. Under cover of this fire, and supported by two destroyers, Sweep Units 5 and 6 proceeded with operations along the eastern shore. APD's with UDT's embarked, destroyers and LCI(G)'s began assembling off the eastern beaches about 0930 for execution of the UDT reconnaissance. At 0938 the PENSACOLA, off the northeastern shore, was observed to be under fire by apparently quite heavy caliber guns as some splashes appeared to be almost as high as her foremast. She sustained extensive damage and many casualties. A plane was set on fire. The ship continued

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to fire as she withdrew to extinguish the fires and repair damage. She continued to carry out her mission, ceasing fire from time to time while casualties were being operated on and given blood transfusions. CTG 52.3 requested additional support for Sweep Unit 4 working off the northeastern shore, and VICKSBURG was ordered to provide it. By 1048(K) all units were in position to commence the UDT reconnaissance set for 1100(K). The last of the minesweepers was completing the sweep off the eastern beaches, these small ships having gallantly passed close along the eastern shore in precise formation, firing as they went, without deviation from their prescribed tracks although under occasional enemy fire. The UDT reconnaissance commenced exactly on schedule. As the LCI(G)'s moved in toward the beach, enemy fire began to concentrate on them. By 1105(K), when they reached a point 1000 yards off shore, enemy fire was intense from both medium and minor caliber weapons on the flanks and minor caliber along the beaches. The personnel of these little gunboats displayed magnificent courage as they returned fire with everything they had and refused to move out until they were forced to do so by materiel and personnel casualties. Even then, after undergoing terrific punishment, some returned to their stations amid a hail of fire, until again heavily hit. Relief LCI(G)'s replaced damaged ships without hesitation. Between 1100(K) and 1145(K) all twelve of the LCI(G)'s were hit. LCI 474 ultimately capsized after the crew had been removed, and was ordered sunk. Intensive fire from destroyers and fire support ships, and a smoke screen laid by white phosphorus projectiles, were used to cover this operation. Fire support ships took on board casualties from the LCI(G)'s as they withdrew, and CTG 52.3 in TERROR most promptly and efficiently initiated emergency repairs for serious hull damage, as well as assisting in care of the wounded. At 1121(K) LEUTZE was hit, the Commanding Officer receiving serious injuries, requiring his later transfer to ESTES, but no extensive damage was sustained by the ship. By 1220(K) all swimmers of the UDT's but one had been recovered, and the APD's and supporting destroyers moved out of the area. The reconnaissance had been accomplished. It disclosed no underwater or beach obstructions and no minefields, though one J13 "reef mine" was reported in 8 feet of water off the north flank of Red 2 Beach. Beach and surf conditions were found to be good for landing.

10. Early in the afternoon heavy fire support ships were ordered to close the western beaches and commence destructive short-range fire. At 1354(K) three squadrons of land-based bombers of

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Task Force 93 commenced bombing runs on the objective. The first squadron encountered little large caliber AA fire, but this fire increased in intensity and accuracy as the second and third squadrons commenced their runs. It was learned later that one plane received major damage, and a few others minor damage, but that all were able to return to base. The bombing was conducted from about 5000 feet altitude, and appeared to be most precise. Under cover of close-in fire support ships with two destroyers in direct support, Sweep Units 5 and 6 swept the area close to the western beaches, without drawing more than sporadic fire from the island. UDT reconnaissance of the western beaches was commenced at 1615(K). The support was modified in that no LCI(G)'s were used and the destroyers were ordered to close from 3000 yards to 2000 yards. A smoke screen by aircraft was ordered but the smoke planes had difficulty in complying, as the screen was not laid until 20 minutes after the order, and was not placed where ordered. The operation was partially screened by white phosphorus projectiles laid on the northern and southern flanks, and behind the beaches. The UDT's accomplished the reconnaissance successfully. One mine was found and a delay charge placed to destroy it. Minefields or underwater obstacles were determined to be non-existent, and beaches and surf conditions were found to be suitable for landing.

11. At 1734(K), HOWARD reported rescuing 3 men from a crashed TBF. Night deployment commenced about 1830(K). EDWARDS, TWIGGS and STEMBEL were designated to remain at the objective to execute night harassing fire, interdiction of airfields, prevent escape or reinforcement of the garrison, and to maintain careful surveillance of the beaches to ensure that the enemy did no work on them. MULLANY, APD's of TG 52.4 and Sweep Unit 4 remained with ESTES in the vicinity of the objective, as did the Gunboat Support Units One and Two. Shortly after dark TWIGGS shot down one enemy plane near the island. At 2321(K) WATERS and BULL were despatched with beach charts and personnel from the UDT's for distribution and dissemination of information on the beach reconnaissances to CTF 51, CTF 53, and designated elements of the Attack Force. Strikes on CHICHI JIMA resulted in damage to about 18 small craft and an ammunition barge blown up. At HAHA JIMA about 15 small and 1 medium sized craft were damaged. It was estimated, and examination of the afternoon photographs confirmed, that the greater part of major known defensive installations still remained undamaged. However, heavily casemated batteries at the northern base of SURIBACHI (already on map) and on the right flank of the eastern beaches

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(3 of the 4 guns not on map) had been definitely located. Orders were issued changing schedules of fire for 18 February to provide for heavy concentration of destructive fire from short range on the blockhouses, pill boxes etc., of the eastern beach area, and defenses behind it and on each flank. For knocking out the heavy flanking batteries a cross fire by IDAHO and TENNESSEE was directed. It was felt that unless this was done, the success of the landing itself would be seriously jeopardized, even though it was realized that guns and mortars in other areas would probably give trouble after the landing. Fire support ships were advised of the entire situation, and directed to make every effort to obtain the greatest possible effect from each remaining round of ammunition and minute of time.

12. At 0308(K) on 18 February MULLANY was sent to rendezvous with LUNGA POINT with photographs for delivery by plane that morning to CTF 51 and various elements of the Attack Force. Minesweeping commenced on schedule. Fire support ships were on station at 0700(K) and off the eastern beaches delivered almost continuous fire from 0700(K) to 1830(K) at ranges of from 1800 to 3000 yards from the shore. Other ships fired at targets in other areas throughout the same period. TEXAS, assisted by two destroyers, also covered uncompleted minesweeping operations off the northern shore. During the afternoon a TEXAS spotting plane recovered a downed pilot, uninjured, from 135 miles at sea. He had been sighted by a B29 of the 21st Bomber Command.

13. Night deployments were commenced at sunset, except that 5 destroyers were assigned to usual night operations at the objective, with special instructions to ensure that no work by the enemy was accomplished on the beaches. By late afternoon all minesweeping necessary to permit a successful landing, and its support and the ensuing unloading, had been accomplished. No mines were found. Reports from firing ships and examination of photographs showed that the principal defensive installations on and behind the eastern beaches, and on their flanks, had been either destroyed or heavily damaged. Among these were included the casemated batteries on the northern and southern flanks of the beaches, which were estimated to have fired on the LCI(G)'s with such telling effect on 17 February. Fragments recovered from LCI(G)'s indicated that the heaviest of these guns were about 150mm in caliber. During the evening CTF 52 informed CTF 51 that although weather had prevented expending the full ammunition allowance, and that more installations could be found and destroyed with an additional day of bombardment,

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he believed a successful landing could be made on 19 February if necessary. At 2130(K) BLESSMAN was bombed and disabled by a low flying plane. GILMER proceeded to her assistance, and ARDENT was sent to take her in tow. At 2255(K) GAMBLE was hit and disabled under similar circumstances. HAMILTON and CHANDLER stood by, and HAMILTON took GAMBLE in tow. CTF 51 was requested to send salvage ships to rendezvous with these disabled ships as soon as possible. ESTES and CHESTER each proceeding independently, were in collision at 0600(K) on 19 February. Damage to ESTES was slight and operating efficiency not impaired. CHESTER was able to complete her fire support mission but was then ordered to SAIPAN for repairs as one propellor was bent and the deck buckled so that turret three was not in operating condition. At 0600(K) CTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to plan, and ComPhibGroup ONE became CTG 51.19.

14. This operation clearly demonstrated that previous high altitude bombings and long range bombardment of IWO JIMA directed only into "target areas" achieved negligible damage to the very numerous defenses of the island, which were stout, comparatively small, and well dispersed. Photographic interpretation shows, on the contrary, that the defenses were substantially increased in number during December, January, and early February. The bombardment by this force on 16 and 17 February also had less than the desired effect, due to interference by weather, to the need for giving way to minesweeping and UDT operations, and by lack of thorough familiarity with the actual important targets, as distinguished from a mark on a map, or a photograph. It was not until after fire support ships their spotting planes and the support aircraft had worked at the objective for two days, had become familiar with the location and appearance of the defenses, and had accurately attacked them with close range gunfire and low altitude air strikes, that substantial results were achieved. This experience emphasizes once again the need for ample time as well as ample ships, aircraft and ammunition, for preliminary reduction of defenses of a strongly defended position. At the same time it is realized that certain defenses will never be destroyed or even discovered until after the troops land.

15. It is worthy of note that the defenders did not employ heavy guns against minesweepers even when they worked close to the shore. Perhaps this was because the Japanese knew there were no minefields to defend and considered that damage to minesweepers would not compensate for disclosure of batteries to the

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fire support ships. When, however, the LCI(G)'s approached the beach in support of the UDT's, it was logical for the Japanese to assume that being landing craft, they were being employed to carry and land troops. The Japanese therefore opened up with everything they had to defeat the supposed landing. It is therefore considered that LCI(G)'s or craft of that general type should not be used to support UDT's working in the vicinity of strongly defended positions, unless the major defenses are assuredly destroyed beforehand, or unless sufficient ammunition is available to permit the same heavy smothering fire as is used in conjunction with an actual landing.

16. The large Staff of an Amphibious Group Commander was needed to achieve coordination of the many and mutually conflicting activities at the objective during the pre-landing period. The trained teams which are accustomed to working as a well knit unit in controlling naval gunfire and support aircraft so that each of these weapons will effectively supplement the other are considered to be a necessity, as are the ample communications, photographic, photo interpretation, map reproduction and housing facilities, and working spaces, of an AGC. For this operation the Staff was augmented by four assistants in the Gunnery Section, and one assistant and two photo interpreters in the Intelligence Section. The services of these additional officers were fully employed and a similar arrangement is strongly recommended for future operations of this type. Familiarity with the problems confronting the Amphibious Force, and the presence of the Naval Gunfire Officer of the Staff of the 5th Amphibious Corps, were of material assistance in modifying plans and methods of attacking defensive installations to suit new developments of the situation as they arose. It is believed that factors discussed above will assume added importance in future pre-landing operations of larger scope and greater complexity.

17. In the interest of expediting this report, comments on Naval Gunfire Support, Support Aircraft Operations, Minesweeping, and UDT Operations are being forwarded herewith prior to receipt of reports from the Task Force and Task Group Commanders who immediately directed these activities. These comments have therefore been prepared from the information at hand on the date of this report. Additional comments will be submitted by endorsement upon the reports of the Commanders of these operations.

W.H.P. BLANDY.

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		ComTransRon 16	(1)
ComTHIRDPhib	(1)	ComTransRon 101	(1)
ComSEVENTHPhib	(1)	ComLSTFlot 13	(1)
ComPhibsPac	(5)	ComLSTFlot 21	(1)
ComASCUPhibsPac	(2)	ComLSMFlot 5	(1)
AdComPhibsPac	(2)		
ComPhibGrpTWO	(2)	Com1stCarTaskForPac	(1)
ComPhibGrpTHREE	(2)	Com2ndCarTaskForPac	(1)
ComPhibGrpFOUR	(2)		
ComPhibGrpFIVE	(2)	ComBatRon 1	(1)
ComPhibGrpSIX	(2)	ComBatRon 2	(1)
ComPhibGrpSEVEN	(2)	ComBatDiv 2	(1)
ComPhibGrpEIGHT	(2)	ComBatDiv 3	(1)
ComPhibGrpNINE	(2)	ComBatDiv 4	(1)
ComPhibGrpELEVEN	(5)	ComBatDiv 5	(1)
ComPhibGrpTWELVE	(2)	ComBatDiv 6	(1)
ComPhibGrpTHIRTEEN	(2)		
ComPhibGrpFOURTEEN	(2)	ComCruDiv 4	(1)

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Subject: Operations of Task Force 52 in the IWO JIMA Campaign from 10 February to 0800(K) 19 February, at which time CTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to Plan; Report of.

ComCruDiv 5	(1)	RICHARD P. LEARY (DD 664)	(1)
ComCruDiv 6	(1)	HALL (DD 583)	(1)
ComCruDiv 13	(1)	HALLIGAN (DD 584)	(1)
ComCruDiv 14	(1)	TERRY (DD 513)	(1)
ComCruDiv 17	(1)	PAUL HAMILTON (DD 590)	(1)
ComCruDiv 19	(1)	STEMBEL (DD 644)	(1)
		JOHN D. HENLEY (DD 553)	(1)
ComDesDiv 11	(1)	CAPPS (DD 550)	(1)
ComDesDiv 91	(1)	BRYANT (DD 665)	(1)
ComDesDiv 101	(1)	TWIGGS (DD 591)	(1)
ComDesDiv 111	(1)	LEUTZE (DD 481)	(1)
ComDesDiv 112	(1)	MULLANY (DD 528)	(1)
		H.A. WILEY (DM 29)	(1)
ComCortDiv 63	(1)	WILLIAMSON (AVD 2)	(1)
ComCortDiv 72	(1)		
		ComEsCarForPac	(2)
ARKANSAS (BB 33)	(1)	ComCarDiv 25	(1)
NEW YORK (BB 34)	(1)	ComCarDiv 26	(1)
TEXAS (BB 35)	(1)	MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)	(1)
NEVADA (BB 36)	(1)	SARGENT BAY (CVE 83)	(1)
IDAHO (BB 42)	(1)	WAKE ISLAND (CVE 65)	(1)
TENNESSEE (BB 43)	(1)	LUNGA POINT (CVE 94)	(1)
WEST VIRGINIA (BB 48)	(1)	ANZIO (CVE 57)	(1)
NORTH CAROLINA (BB 55)	(1)	NATOMA BAY (CVE 62)	(1)
WASHINGTON (BB 56)	(1)	STEAMER BAY (CVE 87)	(1)
PENSACOLA (CA 24)	(1)	DALY (DD 519)	(1)
SALT LAKE CITY (CA 25)	(1)	RALPH TALBOT (DD 390)	(1)
CHESTER (CA 27)	(1)	GRADY (DE 445)	(1)
INDIANAPOLIS (CA 35)	(1)	RICHARD S. BULL (DE 402)	(1)
TUSCALOOSA (CA 37)	(1)	HUTCHINS (DD 476)	(1)
SAN FRANCISCO (CA 38)	(1)	HELM (DD 388)	(1)
BOSTON (CA 69)	(1)	BAGLEY (DD 386)	(1)
PITTSBURG (CA 72)	(1)	RICHARD M. ROWELL (DE 403)	(1)
SANTA FE (CL 60)	(1)	O'FLAHERTY (DE 340)	(1)
PASADENA (CL 65)	(1)	LAWRENCE C. TAYLOR (DE 415)	(1)
BILOXI (CL 80)	(1)	MELVIN R. NAWMAN (DE 416)	(1)
VICKSBURG (CL 86)	(1)	OLIVER MITCHELL (DE 417)	(1)
ASTORIA (CL 90)	(1)	TABBERER (DE 418)	(1)
		ROBERT F. KELLER (DE 419)	(1)
NEWCOMB (DD 586)	(1)		
BENNION (DD 662)	(1)	CominPac	(3)
HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS (DD663)	(1)	CominRon 2	(1)

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Subject: Operations of Task Force 52 in the TWO JMA Campaigns from 10 February to 0600(K) 19 February, at which time CTF 51 assumed title CTF 52 according to Plan; Report of.

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CominDiv 10	(1)	SC 1054	(1)
CominDiv 35	(1)		
CominDiv 36	(1)	ComUDT'sPac	(1)
TERROR (CM 5)	(1)	GILMER (APD 11)	(1)
HOPKINS (DMS 13)	(1)	WATERS (APD 8)	(1)
DORSEY (DMS 1)	(1)	BULL (APD 78)	(1)
HOWARD (DMS 7)	(1)	BLESSMAN (APD 48)	(1)
HOGAN (DMS 6)	(1)	BARR (APD 39)	(1)
BREESE (DM 18)	(1)	BATES (APD 47)	(1)
SKIRMISH (AM 303)	(1)	UDT 12 (in APD 47)	(1)
SIGNET (AM 302)	(1)	UDT 13 (in APD 39)	(1)
STAUNCH (AM 307)	(1)	UDT 14 (in APD 78)	(1)
SCURRY (AM 304)	(1)	UDT 15 (in APD 48)	(1)
SPECTACLE (AM 305)	(1)		
SPECTOR (AM 306)	(1)	ComLCIFlot 3	(1)
TRACY (DM 19)	(1)	ComLCIGroup 8	(1)
SERENE (AM 300)	(1)	LCI(L) 627	(1)
SHELTER (AM 301)	(1)	LCI(G) 450	(1)
STRATEGY (AM 308)	(1)	LCI(G) 466	(1)
STRENGTH (AM 309)	(1)	LCI(G) 469	(1)
SUCCESS (AM 310)	(1)	LCI(G) 471	(1)
REBEL (AM 284)	(1)	LCI(G) 473	(1)
PC 809	(1)	LCI(G) 346	(1)
CHAMPION (AM 314)	(1)	LCI(G) 348	(1)
ARDENT (AM 340)	(1)	LCI(G) 438	(1)
DEFENSE (AM 317)	(1)	LCI(G) 441	(1)
DEVASTATOR (AM 318)	(1)	LCI(G) 449	(1)
GAMBLE (DM 15)	(1)	LCI(G) 457	(1)
YMS 323	(1)		
YMS 362	(1)	ESTES (AGC 12)	(3)
YMS 374	(1)	ComASCU,PhibGrpONE	(3)
YMS 401	(1)	CominPac,Rep,PhibGrpONE	(1)
YMS 411	(1)		
YMS 478	(1)	CNO	(5)
LINDSEY (DM 32)	(1)	CNO (ONI)	(3)
SC 775	(1)	ARMY & NAVY STAFF COLLEGE	(1)
SC 1027	(1)	C & Gs SCHOOL, LEAVENWORTH	(1)
YMS 193	(1)	NAVAL WAR COLLEGE	(1)
YMS 235	(1)	COMDT. MARINE CORPS	(1)
YMS 345	(1)	COMDT. MARINE CORPS SCHOOLS	(1)
YMS 361	(1)	ComPhibTraLant	(1)
YMS 407	(1)	ComPhibTraPac	(1)
YMS 475	(1)	PhibTraBase,Ft.Pierce,Fla.	(1)

L. D. Reedy
 L. D. REEDY,
 Lieutenant, USNR.,
 Flag Secretary.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS
IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

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CHRONOLOGY OF OPERATIONS

10 January 1945

- 0750(VW) TG 52.11 commenced sortie from PEARL HARBOR for movement to ULITHI in accordance with ComPhibGroupONE Movement Order A102-45. Task Organization: CTG 52.11, Rear Admiral BLANDY, OTC; ESTES (AGC 12), Flagship; Battleships TEXAS and NEVADA; Transport Unit ADMIRAL COONTZ; Screen, TransDiv 101, WATERS, BATES, BARR, GILMER and WILLIAMSON.
- 0945(VW) CTG 52.11 assumed tactical command.
- 0958 Set course 225° T.; standard speed 13 knots.
- 1017 Commenced antiaircraft practice.
- 1200 Noon Position: 20°-42.7' N.; 158°-14.6' W.
- 1305 Ceased present exercises.
- 1425 Conducted exercise repelling aircraft attack.
- 1559 Ceased present exercises.
- 1800 Changed local time to plus 10 Zone time.
- 2000(W) Position: 19°-54.5' N.; 159°-45.3' W.

11 January 1945

- 0600(W) Conducted Exercise 2(c), USF-10A, BATES target.
- 0800 Position: 19°-34.5' N.; 162°-31.4' W.
- 0900 Exercised at flag hoist drill.
- 0955 Secured from flag hoist drill.
- 1027 Commenced tactical exercises.
- 1132 Secured from tactical exercises.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

11 January 1945 (continued)

1200(W) Noon Position: 19°-33.2' N.; 163°-20.6' W.
1355 Commenced exercises.
1413 Ceased present exercises.
1700 Set clocks back one half hour to plus 10½ time.
1745(WX) Transferred appendicitis case from GILMER to ESTES.
2000 Position: 19°-24.2' N.; 164°-58.1' W.
2015 Commenced tactical exercises.
2044 Secured from tactical exercises.

12 January 1945

0600(WX) Conducted Exercise 2(C), USF-10A, BARR target.
0800 Position: 19°-01.9' N.; 167°-35' W.
0927 Commenced tactical exercises.
1100 Secured from tactical exercises.
1200 Noon Position: 18°-48.5' N.; 168°-29.9' W.
1301 NEVADA launched two planes. NEVADA conducted Exercise 4(B), USF-10A for NEVADA and TEXAS.
1436 Commenced tactical exercises.
1458 Completed tactical exercises.
1509 NEVADA proceeded independently to recover planes.
1545 NEVADA rejoined formation.
1700 Changed local time to plus 11 time.
2000(X) Position: 18°-29.2' N.; 170°-09.7' W.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE TWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

13 January 1945

0600(X) Conducted Exercise 2(C), USF-10A, BATES target.
0800 Position: 18°-01.9' N.; 173°-04.7' W.
0900 NEVADA and TEXAS, screened by WATERS, GILMER and WILLIAMSON, left formation for tactical exercises.
1000 Commenced tactical exercises.
1026 Ceased present exercises.
1130 NEVADA, TEXAS and screen rejoined formation.
1200 Noon Position: 17°-49.4' N.; 173°-57.1' W.
1402 Streamed paravanes.
1539 Recovered paravanes.
1700 Changed local time to Zone plus 11½ time.
2000(XY) Position: 17°-27.1' N.; 175°-39.8' W.
2009 Tactical exercises - Sound Contact drill.
2024 Ceased present exercises.

14 January 1945

0738(XY) WILLIAMSON came alongside ESTES to fuel.
0800 Position: 16°-57.5' N.; 178°-28.6' W.
1012 WILLIAMSON cast off from ESTES.
1059 GILMER alongside ESTES to fuel.
1200 Noon Position: 17°-16.7' N.; 179°-03.6' W.
1210 GILMER cast off from ESTES.
1223 BARR alongside NEVADA to fuel.
1355 BARR cast off from NEVADA.

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14 January 1945 (Continued)

1400(XY) WATERS alongside TEXAS to fuel.
1600 BATES alongside NEVADA to fuel.
1702 WATERS cast off from TEXAS.
1736 BATES cast off from NEVADA.
1748 Crossed 180th meridian.
2000 Position: 17°-24' N.; 179°-30' E.

15 January 1945

0521(XY) WATERS reported only one engine in operation due to condenser casualty.
0600 Conducted exercise 2(C), USF-10A, BATES target.
0628 ESTES had engineering casualty and left formation.
0640 ESTES in position; resumed guide.
0800 Position: 16°-02.9' N.; 176°-46.4' E.
0919 Commenced tactical exercises.
1037 Ceased tactical exercises.
1200 Noon Position: 15°-37' N.; 175°-53' E.
1400 Flag hoist drill, TEXAS leading.
1518 Conducted exercise 13(A) and 13(B), USF-10A.
1555 Ceased present exercises.
1700 Changed local time to Zone plus 12 time.
2000(Y) Position: 14°-52.5' N.; 174°-06.7' E.
2400 Changed local time to Zone minus 12 time.

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

17 January 1945 (East Longitude Date)

0800(M) Position: 14°-04.4' N.; 171°-12.6' E.

0911 Commenced tactical exercises.

1050 Ceased present exercises.

1100 Commenced radar reporting drill.

1149 Ceased present exercises.

1200 Noon Position: 13°-51.8' N.; 170°-20' E.

1345 BATES reported sound gear out.

1400 Flag hoist drill.

1502 Secured from flag hoist drill.

2000 Position: 13°-18.8' N.; 168°-28.1' E.
Commenced tactical exercises (Sound Contact drill).

2040 Ceased tactical exercises.

2212 TEXAS had steering casualty.

2215 TEXAS regained steering control.

18 January 1945

0800(M) Position: 12°-20.9' N.; 165°-42.6' E.

0830 TEXAS launched two planes.

0919 Conducted exercise 4(D), USF-10A.

1041 TEXAS left formation to recover planes.

1200 Noon Position: 12°-04.1' N.; 164°-52.9' E.

1210 TEXAS resumed station.

1419 GILMER alongside NEVADA to fuel.

1545 GILMER cast off from NEVADA.

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18 January 1945 (Continued)

- 1700(M) Changed local time to minus $11\frac{1}{2}$ zone time.
2000(LM) Position: $11^{\circ}-12.9'$ N.; $163^{\circ}-47.5'$ E.
2015 Commenced tactical exercise (Sound Contact drill).
2033 Ceased tactical exercises.

19 January 1945

- 0755(LM) BATES alongside NEVADA to fuel.
0800 Position: $10^{\circ}-47.4'$ N.; $160^{\circ}-53.9'$ E.
0902 BATES cast off from NEVADA.
0922 WILLIAMSON alongside ESTES to fuel.
1116 WILLIAMSON cast off from ESTES.
1137 WATERS alongside TEXAS to fuel.
1200 Noon Position: $10^{\circ}-48.5'$ N.; $160^{\circ}-13'$ E.
1338 WATERS completed fueling.
1415 BARR alongside NEVADA for fuel.
1520 BARR cast off from NEVADA.
1600 Commenced flag hoist drill.
1700 Secured from flag hoist drill. Changed local time to minus 11 zone time.
2000(L) Position: $10^{\circ}-38.6'$ N.; $158^{\circ}-29.4'$ E.

20 January 1945

- 0800(L) Position: $10^{\circ}-27.8'$ N.; $155^{\circ}-46.4'$ E.
0910 Streamed paravanes.
1108 Recovered paravanes.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

20 January 1945 (Continued)

1125(L) WATERS reported condenser casualty repaired.
1200 Noon Position: 10°-20.8' N.; 155°-00.8' E.
1305 Flag hoist drill, WILLIAMSON conducting.
2000 Position: 10°-15.7' N.; 153°-11.2' E.

21 January 1945

0800(L) Position: 10°-22' N.; 150°-30.9' E.
1200 Noon Position: 10°-24.7' N.; 149°-38.6' E.
1300 Commenced flag hoist drill.
1400 Secured from flag hoist drill.
1700 Changed local time to zone minus 10½ time.
2000(KL) Position: 10°-17' N.; 147°-47' E.

22 January 1945

0800(KL) Position: 10°-01.4' N.; 145°-06.1' E.
1000 Flag hoist drill.
1100 Secured from flag hoist drill.
1200 Noon Position: 09°-59.7' N.; 144°-16.3' E.
1233 Issued Entry Order A104-45 for ULITHI by despatch.
1245 Commander KAUFFMAN transferred to ESTES from GILMER.
1700 Changed local time to minus 10 zone time.
2000(K) Position: 10°-00.8' N.; 142°-38.1' E.

23 January 1945

0650(K) Sighted FAIS Island, ULITHI, bearing 200°, distance about 14 miles.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

23 January 1945 (Continued)

0800(K) Position: 10°-02.1' N.; 140°-24.6' E.
0848 Commenced tactical exercises.
0935 Ceased tactical exercises.
1042 Commenced anti-aircraft firing on sleeves. Tow planes from ULITHI.
1100 Ceased firing; ceased present exercises. Sighted TG 51.1 approaching MUGAI Channel from the south.
1100 Executed Entrance Order No. A104-45.
1159 ESTES passed Beacon "A", MAGEJANG Island abeam to port. Entering ULITHI Lagoon.
1223 ESTES anchored in Berth 101, ULITHI. Rear Admiral KILAND, ComPhibGrp 7 in PRAIRIE. TF 52 ships present ULITHI: OLIVER MITCHELL, MAKIN ISLAND, LUNGA POINT, BISMARCK SEA, BAGLEY, HELM, O'FLAHERTY, R.M. ROWELL, MANILA BAY, RALPH TALBOT, R.S. BULL, SAGINAW BAY, PATTERSON, J. BUTLER, EDMUNDS, BLESSMAN, WAKE ISLAND, BULL.

TF 54 ship present: EVANS.

Arrivals, 23 January: TF 51: ComTransRon 11 in FREMONT, with KNOX, O'HARA, LEEDSTOWN, HARRY LEE, CALLAWAY, FELAND, FAYETTE, FUNSTON, PRES. JACKSON, BOLIVAR, DOYEN, PRES. ADAMS, CAPE JOHNSON, ALMAACK, WARRICK, LIBRA, HERCULES, JUPITER, SWEARER, RIDDLE. TF 52: CTF 52 in ESTES, with GILMER, WATERS, BATES, BARR. TF 54: NEVADA, TEXAS, WILLIMSON.

24 January 1945

0800(K) ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI.
1030 Granted GILMER availability for repairs until 1800, 26 January.
1438 Granted WATERS availability at anchor until 1800, 27 January for repairs main steam line.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

24 January 1945 (Continued)

1438(K) Arrivals: TF 54: HALL, HALLIGAN, PAUL HAMILTON, TWIGGS.

25 January 1945

0800(K) ESTES anchored in Berth 101, ULITHI.

0908 ComFIFTHFleet in INDIANAPOLIS arrived ULITHI.

1035 Requested ComTransRon 11 to assign 2 LCVP each temporarily to TEXAS and NEVADA.

1550 Granted WATERS 6 days tender availability to repair casualty to forced draft blower.

1711 Requested ComTransRon 11 to furnish 1 boat to PhibPac Secret Mail Officer.

2045 Requested AtComULITHI confirm approval UDT rehearsal on 3 and 6 February vicinity FAIS and LOSIEP Islands.

Departures: MANILA BAY.

26 January 1945

0800(K) ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI.

1010 EVANS assigned temporarily to control of ComFIFTHFleet.

1659 CinCPac OpPlan 11-44 and ComFIFTHFleet OpPlan 13-44 declared fully effective 1400 26 January.

2138 Granted WILLIAMSON permission to exercise with tame submarine 27 January.

Arrivals: TF 51: BUSH, BOYD, TF 54: ComCruDiv 5 in CHESTER, PENSACOLA, SALT LAKE CITY, TUSCALOOSA, STEMBEL, BRYANT, BENNION, LEUTZE.

Departures: TF 51: BUSH, BOYD.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

27 January 1945

- 0242(K) ComEsCarPacFor reported for duty with MAKIN ISLAND, LUNGA POINT, BISMARCK SEA, WAKE ISLAND, RALPH TALBOT, BAGLEY, HELM, R.S. BULL, R.M. ROWELL and O'FLAHERTY.
- 0800 ESTES at anchor Berth 101, ULITHI. Rear Admiral COOLEY, ComBatDiv 6 came aboard for conference on plans for bombardment of IWO JIMA.
- 0900 Fighter director exercises.
- 1136 DesDiv 101 less HARADEN ordered report CTF 54 for duty.
- 2013 Received report that Rear Admiral RODGERS, CTF 54, had reported aboard NEVADA.
- 2200 Fighter director communication drills.

Arrivals: TF 51: O'NEIL, STERN, S.S. MILES. TF 52: ComLCIFlot 3 in LCI(L) 627 and LCI(G)'s 450, 466, 471, 473, 469, 346, 474, 348, 438, 441, 449, 457, RUDYERD BAY, SARGENT BAY.

28 January 1945

- 0002(K) Received approval of AtComULITHI on UDT rehearsal area.
- 0900 Rear Admiral RODGERS, CTF 54, came aboard for conference on IWO JIMA plans.
- 1325 Requested repair services LCI(G) 466 gyro and electrical steering gear casualty; requested repair LCI(G) 627 fire and bilge pump.
- 1330 Commander Air Support Control Unit reported aboard INDIAN-APOLIS for conference General LeMAY regarding land-based bomber plans for IWO JIMA operation.
- 1400 Preliminary conference Force Gunnery Officer on ESTES with all Gunnery Officers of TF 54 ships present.
- 1525 Directed ComTransDiv 101 to furnish ComLCIFlot 3 with 2 boats daily for use of LCI Group 8.

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28 January 1945 (Continued)

- 2015(K) Rear Admiral RODGERS (ComPhibGrpELEVEN) assumed command of TF 54.
- 2050 Ordered TEXAS, NEVADA and WILLIAMSON to report to CTF 54 for duty.
- Arrivals: TF 52: GRADY. TF 54: NEWCOMB, H.L. EDWARDS, LEARY.

29 January 1945

- 0022(K) ComFIFTHFleet ordered DesDiv 111 to report to CTF 54 for duty.
- 0800 ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI.
- 1028 ComFIFTHFleet directed BUSH report to CTG 51.1 for duty and BENNION, BRYANT and STEMBEL to report to CTF 54 for duty.
- 1330 Communication drill to test calibration transmitters and receivers for VOF spotting; TEXAS, NEVADA, TUSCALOOSA and ESTES. NOTE: These drills throughout used prepared traffic to resemble Hunter-Killer action. Frequencies tested 4340, 4720, 4580, 4450, 5015, 4795, 3845 and 3905.
- 1600 Secured from Communication drills.
- 1617 Advised ComFIFTHFleet that services EVANS could be spared if relief furnished prior departure SAIPAN.
- 1700 Assigned firing berth, ULITHI, as follows: TF 54 destroyers, Berth D; CTG 52.2, Berth E; CTF 54 for BB's and CA's, Berth F to 6 February; to CominPac, Berth F on 7, 8, 9 February.
- 1710 Directed substitution LEUTZE for EVANS in all plans for UDT support - Appendix V, Annex (H) CTF 51 OpPlan A25-44 and Rehearsal OpOrder A103-45.
- 1805 Assigned Hydrographic Observers, Lt.(jg) THOMPSON and Ens. MURPHY to CTG 52.2.
- Arrivals: TF 52: ANZIO, L.C. TYALOR, R.F. KELLER.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT ON OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

30 January 1945

0047(K) CTG 52.2 assigned PATTERSON, BAGLEY, O'FLAHERTY, ROWELL and R.S. BULL to screen for UDT rehearsal.

0735 Requested ComServRon 10 to drydock LCI(G) 450 to repack stern tubes, rudder post and propeller check.

0800 ESTES at anchor Berth 101, ULITHI.

0900 Communication drills; CHESTER, PENSACOLA, SALT LAKE CITY, ESTES.

1130 Secured from Communication drills.

1330 Communication drills, LEUTZE, BENNION and NEWCOMB.

1400 DesDiv Commanders reported aboard for preliminary conference.

1600 Secured from communication drills.

1817 Informed ComDesDivs 96, 101, 111 and 112 of desired ammunition loading of destroyers.

2015 Requested CTF 54 to direct BOYD report to CTG 51.1 for duty.

31 January 1945

0800(K) ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI.

0900 Communication drills, H.L. EDWARDS, HALL, HALLIGAN.

0918 ComFIFTHFleet requested CTF 94 to advise status repairs DAVID W. TAYLOR.

1030 Requested CTG 51.1 to advise whether firing berth desired by that group.

1120 Directed CTG 52.4 to provide CAPPS, LEUTZE, J. D. HENLEY, TWIGGS, HALL and BRYANT each one SCR-610.

1130 Secured from communication drills.

1330 Communication drills, TWIGGS, STEMBEL, BRYANT.

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

31 January 1945 (Continued)

1600(K) Secured from communication drills.

1 February 1945

0800(K) ESTES at anchor Berth 101, ULITHI. ComCruDiv 5 reported with CruDiv 5 to CTF 54 for duty.

1200 CTF 52 received orders from ComFIFTHFleet to coordinate sortie TF 51, TF 52 and TF 54 on 10 February.

Arrivals: TF 54: CAPPS, TAYLOR, HENLEY.

Departures: TF 52: ANZIO, L.C. TAYLOR, R.F. KELLER.

2 February 1945

0000(K) ComFIFTHFleet requested CincPOA to authorize Rear Admiral RODGERS to command Task Force to which assigned regardless of relative rank other officers in same Force or Group. (This was approved).

0800 ESTES at anchor Berth 101, ULITHI.

0900 Conference in ESTES for UDT Rehearsals. Present: Com UDTsPac; CO's, UDT's 12, 13, 14, 15; ComTransDiv 101, CO's GILMER, WATERS, BATES, BARR, BULL, BLESSMAN; CO's HALL, D. W. TAYLOR, BRYANT, J. D. HENLEY, EVANS, CAPPS, TWIGGS; CO's Gunboat Support Units 1 and 2; CO's 10 LCI(G)'s.

1200 Requested ComFIFTHFleet authorize WAKE ISLAND and 2 screening vessels sortie 7 February for launching planes and conducting communication drill.

1410 Requested ComFIFTHFleet designate replacement destroyer for D.W. TAYLOR.

1419 Requested CTF 54 to designate destroyer to accompany Gunboat Support Units 1 and 2.

2042 DesDiv 111 reported to CTF 54 for duty.

3 February 1945

0800(K) ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI.

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3 February 1945 (Continued)

- 0800(K) TG 52.11 commenced sortie for UDT rehearsals in PAU-LOSIEP Area in Accordance ComPhibGrpONE Rehearsal OpOrder No. A103-45 and ComUDTsPac Rehearsal OpOrder No. A2-45. ROGER-WILLIAM Hour 1100(K); ROGER-EASY Hour 1500(K).
- 0900 Briefed photographic pilots aboard LUNGA POINT.
- 0930 Rear Admiral BLANDY attended CinCPac conference in INDIANAPOLIS.
- 1035 ComFIFTHFleet requested information on delivery air support charts for air and gunnery target folders. (Advised delivered to Officer Messenger Center, ULITHI, on 1 February for distribution).
- 1658 Port Director, ULITHI requested destination, SOA and route TU 52.5.1., TU 52.5.2, BAGLEY, PATTERSON, O'FLAHERTY, R.M. ROWELL, R.S. BULL. (Advised UDT rehearsal according to plan approved by AtComULITHI and copies supplied).
- 1835 ComFIFTHFleet directed all Task Force and Task Group Commanders to inform Port Director, ULITHI, of orders for sortie, entrance, etc., ULITHI.
- 1849 Requested CTG 51.1 issue orders OZARK, S.S. MILES and WESSON proceed GUAM, arriving 7 February.
- 2355 Requested ComServRon 10 to dock LCI(G)'s 450 and 489 for propellor repairs.

Arrivals: TF 52: CTG 52.3 in TERROR with LINDSEY.

4 February 1945

- 0200(K) ComFIFTHFleet directed STANLEY, HOWARTH and HALFORD report to CTG 52.3.
- 0800 ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI.
- 0900 Critique in ESTES on UDT Rehearsal. Attendance same as conference 2 February.
- 0908 Directed order of sortie 10 February, TG 52.2 and 51.17 at 1300(K); TG 52.19 at 1430(K), ESTES first ship.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

4 February 1945 (Continued)

- 0930(K) Held conference on ESTES with CominPac and representatives on plans for IWO JIMA.
- 1300 Assumed radio guard ComPhibGrp7 who departed for LEYTE.
- 1330 Communication drills, PAUL HAMILTON, R.P. LEARY, J.D. HENLEY.
- 1430 Directed CTG 52.2 issue orders sortie WAKE ISLAND.
- 1600 Secured from communication drills.
- 1601 Advised ARKANSAS and IDAHO frequencies for aircraft radio drills 7 February.
- 1702 Advised ships TF 54 and TG 52.2 instructions for drill 7 February delivered to Officer Messenger Center.
- 1911 CTG 52.3 ordered RIDDLE report to OZARK for duty.
- 2328 ComFIFTHFleet ordered BREESE report CTG 52.3 for duty.

5 February 1945

- 0800(K) ESTES at anchor Berth 101, ULITHI. ComTransRon 11 advised no firing berths desired.
- 0900 Force Gunnery Officer briefed all gunnery officers of ships of TF 54 present, CO's of TG 52.5 ships, VOF spotters from WAKE ISLAND and Marine Corps spotters with TF 54. Communication drills; INDIANAPOLIS, NORTH CAROLINA, WASHINGTON.
- 1130 Secured from communication drills.
- 1401 ComFIFTHFleet directed CTF 52 to address two weather reports daily to him and CTF 51 after commencement of bombardment.
- 1437 Requested ComServRon 10 release one SCR 608 to Cominpac.
- Departures: TF 51: OZARK, WESSON, S.S. MILES, BELLEGROVE ASHLAND, RIDDLE.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT ON OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

6 February 1945

- 0052(K) Advised ComFIFTH Fleet that radio teletype to beach burned out.
- 0800 ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI. TG 52.11 commenced sortie for second UDT rehearsal PAU-LOSSIEP Area in accordance ComPhibGrp ONE Rehearsal OpOrder A103-45 and ComUDTsPac Rehearsal Operation Order A2-45. Actual gunfire used. ROGER-WILLIAM Hour 1100(K); ROGER-EASY Hour 1500(K).
- 1043 CTF 54 designated HENLEY to accompany LCI Group 8 on 9 February.
- 1328 CTG 51.1 requested permission proceed on duty assigned. Permission granted.
- Arrivals: TF 52: HOPKINS, DORSEY, HOGAN, HOWARD, BREESE.
- Departures: CTG 51.1 with ships assigned.

7 February 1945

- 0800(K) ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI. WAKE ISLAND, GRADY, R.E. BULL sortie to conduct communication exercises with spotting planes. Sent despatch to CTF 51 recommending LEUTZE and HAMILTON be substituted in UDT support in place EVANS and TAYLOR.
- 0900 Force Gunnery Officer briefed gunnery officers of IDAHO and ARKANSAS on board ESTES. Held conference with ComUDTsPac on future operations during the morning.
- 0930 Communication drills with planes from WAKE ISLAND - Ships: TEXAS NEVADA, TUSCALOOSA, CHESTER, PENSACOLA, SALT LAKE CITY, NORTH CAROLINA, WASHINGTON, INDIANAPOLIS, BRYANT, BENNION, STEMBEL, ESTES. The LEUTZE, NEWCOMB, H.L. EDWARDS, R.P. LEARY, HALL, ARKANSAS, HALLIGAN, TWIGGS, PAUL HAMILTON, J. D. HENLEY, IDAHO, NEW YORK and CAPPS listened only.
- 1022 CTG 52.3 directed HOGAN and LINDSEY to report for duty to Port Director, ULITHI as escorts.
- 1100 Secured from communication drills.
- 1200 ComUDTsPac reported Lt.Cdr. McLAUGHLIN, CO, BULL, admitted to SOLACE with diagnosis combat fatigue.

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

7 February 1945 (Continued)

- 1330(K) Communication drills - same as morning.
- 1412 Requested CTU 94.10.1 to provide aircraft towing services TF 52 and 54 departing 10 February.
- 1600 Secured from communication drills.
- 1700 Issued orders to ComLCIFlot 3 to proceed on 7 February to SAIPAN - TG 52.16 assigned.
- Arrivals: TF 54: ARKANSAS, IDAHO.
- Departures: TF 51: LST 42, 121, 224, and HOGAN, LINDSEY.

8 February 1945

- 0800(K) ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI.
- 0830 Conference in ESTES - Plans and briefing for IWO JIMA Operation. Attendance: CTF 54; CTG 52.2; CTG 52.3; CTG 52.4; Commanders Fire Support Units 1, 2, 3, and 4; Commanders Support Carrier Units 1, 2, and 3; ComDesDivs 11, 12, 91, 101, 111; ComCortDivs 63 and 72; Commanders Gunboat Support Units 1 and 2; Commanding Officers all ships present of TF 52 and TF 54. Also ComBatDiv 6, ComCruDivs 13 and 17 and Commanding Officers Fire Support Ships of TF 58.
- 1358 ComFIFTHFleet ordered PCE 851 to report to CTF 52 for movement to SAIPAN.
- 1430 CTG 52.3 in TERROR with GUNSTON HALL, DORSEY, HOWARD, HOPKINS BREESE, HALFORD, PRINGLE, STANLEY and HOWARTH departed for SAIPAN.
- 1600 Requested ComFwdArea to assign 2 AO's to rendezvous with CTF 54 at 1700 12 February at Lat. 14°-58' N.; Long. 145°-34' E. and 2 AO's rendezvous CTG 52.2 at 0630 12 February Lat. 14°-33' N.; Long. 146°-00' E.
- 1615 Accepted offer ComCruDiv 5 for transfer of Aerologist to ESTES for forthcoming operation.

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8 February 1945 (Continued)

1657(K) Ordered Lt. FERGUSON to assume temporary command of BULL, pending arrival new commanding officer.

2355 Directed PCE 851 to report to ComLCIFlot 3 for movement to SAIPAN.

Departures: TF 51: HALFORD, PRINGLE, STANLEY, HOWARTH.
TF 52: CTG 52.3 in TERROR with GUNSTON HALL, HOPKINS, DORSEY, HOWARD, and BREESE.

9 February 1945

0800(K) ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI. CTF 52 sent out speed-letter Serial 007, outlining antiaircraft firing for 10 February. TG 52.16, ComLCIFlot 3 with LCI Group 8, HENLEY and PCE 851 departed for SAIPAN.

0900 During day briefed ships' spotters and plane spotters from BB's, CA's and CL's aboard ESTES.

1150 Requested CTG 52.2 to forward latest task organization his group.

1330 Communication drills, IDAHO, ARKANSAS, CAPPS.

1430 SALT LAKE CITY reported to CTF 54 for duty.

1437 Directed Movement Unit BAKER to remain 8 miles astern of Movement Unit ABLE upon completion AA firing 10 February.

1600 Secured from communication drills.

Departures: TG 52.16, ComLCIFlot 3 with LCI Group 8, HENLEY and PCE 851 for SAIPAN.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

10 February 1945

- 0800(K) ESTES at anchor in Berth 101, ULITHI. TF 58 commenced sortie.
- 0900 Continued briefing ships' spotters and plane spotters from BB's, CA's and CL's during morning aboard ESTES.
- 1200 Sent despatch to CTF 51 outlining plans for delivery operation orders to TENNESSEE, VICKSBURG, NEW YORK, WILEY, HUTCHINS, TERRY and DALY. Also gave plans for briefing the above ships. Made radar guard assignments for TG 52.19.
- 1340 TG 52.19 commencing sortie. ESTES underway in accordance with Sortie Plan, Annex (A) to ComPhibGrpONE Movement Order No. A105-45.
- 1400 Directed screening vessels not to participate in firing against drone.
- 1415 Directed TUSCALOOSA to control drone runs for anti-aircraft firing. ESTES passed Beacon "A", MANGEJANG Island, abeam to starboard.
- 1533(K) CTG 52.19 assumed tactical command Movement Unit ABLE.
- 1602 Commenced scheduled exercises. Drone anti-aircraft firing.
- 1623 Received report NEWCOMB had gyro compass casualty, would join later.
- 1659 Informed CTG 52.9.2 that no drone available for him, as this group shot it down.
- 1700 Ceased drone anti-aircraft firing. Commenced anti-aircraft firing at towed sleeve.
- 1800 Ceased anti-aircraft firing.
- 1809 HELM delivered mail to ESTES.
- 1810 Formed cruising disposition 6SI. Informed CTG 52.2 and CTG 52.9.1 of cruising orders for night.
- 2000 Position: 10°-38.9' N.; 140°-38.9' E.
- 2010 Informed by BATES that sound gear inoperative.

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11 February 1945

0738(K) CHESTER reported steering casualty.

0739 CHESTER reported steering casualty repaired.

0800 Position: 12°-00.2' N.; 142°-53.3' E.

0806 Ordered Movement Unit BAKER to join formation.

0904 Formed cruising disposition 3V1.

0949 Commenced tactical exercises.

1023 Secured from tactical exercises.

1200 Noon Position: 12°-27.5' N.; 143°-29.5' E.

1252 Approved CTG 52.2 proposal to send two TEM's to SAIPAN.

1611 Directed Movement Unit BAKER take station 16080 at 1645(K).

1645 Movement Unit BAKER leaving disposition.

1709 Formed cruising disposition 6S1.

1812 WATERS requested 12 hours availability SAIPAN repair steam leak main feed pump.

1818 Informed CTU 54.1.3 that ESTES will follow Fire Support Unit 3 during approach in morning.

1827 Directed CTU 54.9.13 to direct APD's of Movement Unit ABIE to proceed on duty assigned at 0500.

1830 Executed Primary Approach Plan, SAIPAN, Annex (B) to ComPhibGrp-ONE Movement Order A105-45.

2000 Position: 13°-50.7' N.; 144°-24.6' E.

2212 STEMBEL reported surface contact dead ahead, 3000 yards.

2217 Emergency turn 6 executed.

2231 Emergency 6 turn. Surface contact identified as PC 1339.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

12 February 1945

- 0500 APD's released to proceed as directed by CTG 52.4 to report to CTF 53.
- 0553 Fire Support Units 2 and 3 ordered to proceed independently.
- 0600 Fire Support Units 1 and 4 ordered to proceed independently.
- 0710 Received information from CTF 51 that AUBURN, ELDORADO, TG 53.5, TG 52.4, TF 54 only would engage in first rehearsal.
- 0735 CTF 51 ordered MULLANY to replace D.W. TAYLOR.
- 0815 Requested berth assignment at SAIPAN, for ESTES, TENNESSEE, VICKSBURG.
- 0855 Requested 12 hours availability and berth for WATERS from CTF 51.
- 0930 CTF 51 took control air support and naval gunfire.
- 0931 ComDesRon 24 in DALY with HUTCHINS reported for duty. Ordered to report to CTG 52.2.
- 0937 Informed that BLESSMAN required new sonar projector head (none available).
- 0945 Transferred Lt.Col. WELLER and assistants to NEW YORK to brief for forthcoming operations.
- 1036 Second H Hour announced for 1230(K).
- 1040 WATERS availability granted.
- 1145 TENNESSEE requested permission remain anchor Berth L-40.
- 1150(K) CTF 51 directed primary plan for rehearsal 13 February.
- 1155 Directed CTF 54 to send one screening vessel each from Movement Group ABLE and BAKER to ESTES to receive mail at 1500.
- 1505 Requested ComServRon 10 to provide sonar projector head to BLESSMAN. (None available).
- 1605 CTF 51 directed CTF 53 to control gunfire and air support 13 February until H plus 30 when CTF 52 would assume control.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

12 February 1945 (continued)

- 1611 ESTES anchored Berth L-56 SAIPAN.
- 1637 Directed CTG 52.3 to send one minesweeper to close ESTES at 1800.
- 1801 CTF 51 directed CTG 52.3 to substitute YMS 426 vice YMS 411 and YMS 288 vice SC 775.
- 2123 Granted authority TENNESSEE remain at anchor until 0600 14 February.

13 February 1945

- 0620(K) ESTES underway independently enroute rehearsal area off TINIAN.
- 0651 TENNESSEE reported completing fueling.
- 0737 Transferred officer messenger mail to TWIGGS.
- 0756 CTF 53 confirmed H Hour at 0915.
- 0805 Requested CTF 54 issue movement orders to NEW YORK.
- 0952 Directed CTG 52.2 and CTU 52.5.1 to report logistic status vessels their groups.
- 1012 Directed ComLCIFlot 3 to report to CTG 52.3 with ICI Group 8 for movement when released by CTF 53.
- 1115 Received report ICI(G) 346 was holed by LVT and in harbor for repairs.
- 1237 MULLANY designated to replace D.W. TAYLOR night harassment D-3 night.
- 1239 Requested CTF 51 replace R.M. ROWELL due to casualty sound gear.
- 1240 CTF 53 signalled exercises completed.
- 1250 CTF 54 directed WILEY and BENNION to accompany NEW YORK to IWO JIMA.
- 1338 CTF 51 directed WESSON replace R.E. ROWELL in TG 52.2.

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13 February 1945 (continued)

- 1522(K) Directed ESTES, TENNESSEE, VICKSBURG to get underway in order named at 0610(K) 14 February.
- 1531 ESTES anchored in Berth L-56, SAIPAN.
- 1640 Ordered TENNESSEE and VICKSBURG to send gunnery officers and others to ESTES for briefing.
- 1935 Informed CTF 51 that logistics were completed.

14 February 1945

- 0612(K) CTF 51 directed that accurate records be kept for submission of all units Amphibious Support Force and Gunfire and Covering Force participating in forthcoming operation. (This was passed on to CTF 54 for information and action).
- 0612 ESTES underway standing out of harbor to rendezvous with TF 54.
- 0619 VICKSBURG and TENNESSEE underway; standing out.
- 0640 JOHN D. HENLEY, RICHARD P. LEARY and TWIGGS reported as screen.
- 0645 Formed column, ESTES, TENNESSEE, VICKSBURG, distance 850 yards.
- 0800 Position: 15°-15' N.; 145°-22' E.
- 0923 CTF 52 assumed tactical command TG 52.19. Formed cruising disposition 3V2.
- 1040 TENNESSEE reported all repairs to turbine completed.
- 1103 Directed screening vessels to include station number when reporting sound contacts.
- 1200 Noon Position: 15°-50.3' N.; 144°-42.4' E.
- 1300 HENLEY and BRYANT closed ESTES to receive mail and deliver to heavy ships.
- 1534 Directed CTG 52.4 to make deliveries charts accordance Annex (M), CTF 51 OpPlan 125-44, including Western beaches. Directed him to detail additional APD to accompany WATERS.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

14 February 1945 (continued)

1621(K) PAUL HAMILTON reported No. 3 main feed pump casualty. Estimated completion repairs morning 16 February.

2000 Position: 17°-28.6' N.; 143°-51.2' E.

15 February 1945

0800(K) Position: 20°-03.8' N.; 142°-43.3' E.

1020 Requested CTG 52.2 make fighter sweeps CHICHI JIMA on afternoon of D-3 and D-2 and morning and afternoon of D-1.

1100 CTG 52.2 reported that destroyer was sent to pick up high voltage transformer.

1200 Noon Position: 20°-55.3' N.; 142°-34.2' E.
Informed CTU 54.9.1 that after Movement Unit BAKER proceeded as previously directed he would become OTC of Movement Unit ABLE.

1252 Passed ComPhibsPac serial 0073 dated 11 February to CTG 52.4 for information and action.

1510 LEARY reported sound contact, distance 1500 yards; bearing 010°.

1517 LEARY reported contact probably fish (but much later after all ships had cleared vicinity, reported it as probable submarine).

1519 Emergency turn 9 executed.

1524 Increased speed to 15 knots.

1530 Emergency 6 turn executed.

1552 3 Turn executed bringing disposition back to original base course.

1710 Directed CTG 52.4 to limit speed of APD's to 20 knots and not to approach closer than 3000 yards to beach nor interfere with bombardment of IWO JIMA, during D-3 inspection of beaches.

1750 Directed Movement Unit BAKER to proceed independently.

1759 Movement Unit ABLE formed cruising disposition 6S3. Rear Admiral FISCHLER in TEXAS OTC.

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

15 February 1945 (continued)

1800(K) Received visual from LEARY reporting only 4 echoes obtained on sound contact slight up doppler, no hydrophone effect. (Despatch sent to CTU 52.3.19 and TFC5thFlt informing them of contact).

2000 Position: 22°-21.5' N.; 142°-00.5' E.

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16 February 1945

- 0000(K) Advance Movement Group approaching IWO JIMA in two dispositions, proceeding independently. Steaming on base course 331° at 14.5 knots CTF 52 in ESTES.
- 0230 TERRY detached to rendezvous with Minesweeping Unit 4.
- 0233 Contact made with Mine Unit 1, bearing 359°, range 36,900 yards.
- 0345 Contact made on MINAMI IWO JIMA, bearing 050°, range about 54,200 yards.
- 0452 Contact made with NEW YORK, bearing 081°, range 26,300 yards.
- 0625 SALT LAKE CITY launched spotting plane.
- 0630 BREESE directed to join Sweep Unit 4.
- 0643 Special fighter sweep on way to CHICHI JIMA to neutralize airfield and shipping.
- 0644 CTG 52.3 informed CTF 52 that Sweep Unit 1 was in Area 1 and Sweep Unit 3 in Area 13.
- 0700 STEMBEL detached to rendezvous with Minesweeping Unit 2.
- 0707 NEVADA commenced scheduled fires.
- 0714 Hydrographic plane on station.
- 0718 All fire support ships directed to fire at long and medium ranges only when efficient air spot is practicable.
- 0725 Air Coordinator and Strike Group ABLE on station.
- 0755 NEW YORK commenced scheduled fires.
- 0755 WILLIAMSON standing by NEW YORK #2 plane.
- 0757 2 Enemy merchant ships reported by an ASP plane 31 miles west of Hobrooke,
- 0758 SALT LAKE CITY directed to pick up downed plane.
- 0802 Informed that both Sweep Units 2 and 4 are 15 minutes behind schedule.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

16 February 1945 (continued)

- 0804(K) Merchant ships identified as of 500 tons or smaller.
- 0811 First pass completed in Area 1; results negative.
- 0815 Two enemy vessels under air attack.
- 0825 Air Support informed that 1 vessel was dead in water and that attack was continuing.
- 0830 WILLIAMSON recovered pilot and radioman from NEW YORK plane, which was beyond salvage.
- 0835 Strike Group ABLE ordered to return to base.
Hydrographic plane ordered to return to base; message drop cancelled.
- 0837 SALT LAKE CITY made report on status of NEW YORK plane.
- 0838 WILLIAMSON instructed to return personnel of downed plane to NEW YORK.
- 0840 SALT LAKE CITY returning to station.
- 0840 Strike Group BAKER orbiting base.
- 0843 Attack on two enemy vessels completed, both targets burning.
- 0850 All ammunition from 4 VF planes expended on two enemy vessels. 8 to 10 men were observed abandoning ship, getting into whale boat.
- 0853 TWIGGS requested instructions on what to do about survivors of sunken ships.
- 0856 All ships warned of floating mine sighted bearing 122°, distance 10 miles from Hebecks.
- 0857 Special CHICHI JIMA strike unable to accomplish mission due to weather.
- 0902 8 VOF on station.
- 0905 Fire support ships reported inside sweeping track in Area 1.
- 0908 Twin engined plane reported taking off island.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

16 February 1945 (continued)

- 0909(K) Flash RED; Control GREEN.
- 0913 Second lap of Area 1 completed; results negative.
- 0915 Screen Commander instructed to order ships to capture any boat from burning vessels and prevent their landing on IWO JIMA.
- 0917 Sweep Unit 3 in Area 13 and Unit 4 in Area 5 reported 30 minutes behind schedule. Unit 2 in Area 2 reported 20 minutes behind schedule. Results negative in all areas.
- 0927 Flash BLUE; Control GREEN.
- 0930 CHESTER, PENSACOLA, VICKSBURG each report 2 operational aircraft.
- 0936 Flash RED; Control GREEN.
- 0940 Firing ships were asked if they were using air spot and all replied in the affirmative.
- 0953 NEW YORK, TENNESSEE, SALT LAKE CITY each reported 2 planes operational.
- 1008 Sweep Unit 4 under fire from beach in Area 5.
- 1009 Because of weather, photo plane did not take photographs.
- 1013 PC 800 reported sinking 1 Type 93 Model 3 floater mine at 0930.
- 1027 CHESTER firing to cover sweepers.
- 1041 All ships directed not to fire faster than scheduled rates. They were informed it was not necessary to maintain scheduled rates under unfavorable weather conditions.
- 1050 Sweep Unit 3 completed Area 2 on schedule; results negative.
- 1055 WILEY in Station A-17 made a sound contact and attacked. Contact lost, and unable to be regained.
- 1056 CominPac reported shoal, bearing 203°, distance 5 miles from ~~Hutchins~~ had been clearance swept; results negative.
- 1118 Area 2 completed on schedule.

16 February 1945 (continued)

- 1125(K) Flash WHITE; Control GREEN.
- 1126 WILEY regained contact; not submarine. Did not make attack.
- 1140 CTG 52.3 was directed not to permit Unit 4 closer to beach until visibility permitted proper fire support.
- 1142 CTF 52 informed ships that at night while remaining at objective ESTES would keep NX12 beacon turned on pulsating. Other ships similarly equipped were authorized to use same method as aid in local identification.
- 1145 WILEY contact evaluated non-submarine.
- 1210 Area 1 completed, results negative.
- 1215 CAP strafing enemy whale boat.
- 1230 Sweep Unit 4 ordered to complete Area 5.
- 1240 CTG 52.3 requested to order Sweep Unit 1 to report to Commander Screen.
- 1240 UDT operations scheduled for night of 16-17 February cancelled. (Landing few men to investigate oil drums spaced along beach.)
- 1242 36 friendly heavy bombers approaching objective.
- 1243 All APD's less BAR assigned to CTF 54 for night deployment. CTF 54 requested to fuel them as practicable, WATERS first.
- 1245 Area 4 completed; results negative.
- 1301 Commander Screen directed to form Screen AB when Sweep Unit 1 reports for duty and to release APD's to CTG 52.4.
- 1320 TRACY investigated and recovered object reported as mine by ESTES. Object proved to be gun breach cover.
- 1323 36 heavy bombers orbiting waiting for break in weather.
- 1345 CAP returns to base.
- 1350 Sweep Unit 3 will complete northern half Area 13; available for screen at 1500.

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN.

16 February 1945 (continued)

1355(K) CTF 54 informed fire support units to commence fueling APD's at 1600.

1400 3 APD's relieved by ships of TU 52.3.1; others to relieve in 15 minutes.

1401 BARR to be in position at 1500 for inspection of beaches.

1402 Sweep Unit 3 directed to report to Commander Screen upon completion of northern half of Area 13.

1410 Weather report sent to CTF 51.

1413 NEVADA to fuel BULL and IDAHO to fuel BLESSMAN beginning at 1600.

1415 OS2U plane from PENSACOLA shot down one Zeke.

1421 CAS reported bogie 7 ~~M-locks~~ 100.

1425 Flash RED; Control YELLOW.

1430 PENSACOLA directed to fuel WATERS and GILMER.

1437 Screen AB formed.

1445 CTG 52.3 reported fuel conditions to TG 52.3 satisfactory, except HOWARD, which will be fueled from TERROR on 17th.

1447 Flash BLUE; Control YELLOW.

1453 CTG 52.4 instructed to commence inspection of beaches.

1512 Sweep Unit 1 completed Area 3 between 300 and 500 fathom curve; results negative.

1512 CAP launched.

1515 Sweep Unit 3 has completed northern half Area 13; results negative.

1517 SALT LAKE CITY reported small boat moving south in Area 149.

1520 Flash WHITE; Control GREEN.

1521 Area 5 to be completed at 1630; Area 6 at 1645.

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN.

16 February 1945 (continued)

- 1530(K) SERENE, SHELTER, HALL reporting to Commander Screen for duty.
- 1533 CAP on station.
- 1534 CTU 52.3 directed to sink small boat moving south.
- 1544 CTU 52.3.5 reported he could see no small boat.
- 1605 CTU 52.3.5 requested to direct BREESE to sink buoys at Pts. J-M and K while gear was being recovered.
- 1613 TERRY reported mission completed.
- 1622 All ships which could effectively fire in assigned areas were directed to carry out fire without regard to time schedule, but to keep within ammunition allowance.
- 1628 Area 5 completed. Area east and west of HIGASHI Rock for 1000 yards not swept.
- 1631 LEARY reported sound contact; investigating.
- 1635 PENSACOLA directed not to fire on small boat which she reported as minesweepers were in this area.
- 1636 LEARY reported she had lost sound contact.
- 1640 Flash BLUE; Control GREEN. (Bogies on radar screen).
- 1642 LEARY continuing to regain contact.
- 1643 Night deployment assignments made. Sweep Unit 4 to report to ESTES at 1800 for screening duties.
- 1644 MULLANY, HAMILTON, STEMBEL, and LEARY directed to remain at objective for night operations.
- 1645 BLESSMAN and BULL directed to report to CTF 54 on completion exercises.
- 1647 Flash WHITE; Control GREEN. (Bogies proved friendly)
- 1652 BATES reported to CTF 54 for duty; exercise completed.

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

16 February 1945 (continued)

- 1705(K) CTF 52 informed ships present that antiaircraft fire control would be governed by provisions of Appendix XIII, Annex (I) CTF 51 OpPlan A25-44.
- 1708 TU 52.3.1 ordered to proceed to Area 14 at 1800.
- 1712 CTG 52.3 reported that day's assigned sweep areas had been completed with negative results, except for one rusty Mark 93 Model 3 mine, which had been sunk by gunfire.
- 1716 ARKANSAS reported she was being fired on.
- 1720 TU 52.3.5 reported to CTF 52 for duty.
- 1720 VF crashed 3 miles from ~~Hobbs~~, bearing 300°.
- 1727 MULLANY directed to rescue pilot of downed plane.
- 1728 ARKANSAS estimated that 3" guns had fired at her.
- 1735 HOPKINS reported having rescued downed pilot from LUNGA POINT.
- 1740 Target ASP ordered to return to base.
- 1753 Ships ceased firing.
- 1800 ESTES, proceeding astern of TENNESSEE, underway. Minesweepers astern of ESTES.
- 1800 HOPKINS reported that rescued pilot was named STEVENSON.
- 1805 BARR reported her mission successfully completed.
- 1817 DEFENSE fouled sweeps on underwater object bearing 212°, distance 6100 yards from ~~Hobbs~~. CTG 52.3 suggested further investigation on 17th.
- 1821 CTF 52 informed CTU 54.1.3 that he and Sweep Unit 4 would follow group for a short time and then return to objective.
- 1832 MULLANY reported mission successfully completed.
- 1933 SCURRY retrieving gear by hand; will take another hour to complete. CTG 52.3 suggested joining ESTES group.

~~SECRET~~
ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN.

16 February 1945 (continued)

2000(K) Position: 24°-58.7' N.; 141°-05.5' E.

2045 SCURRY reported to screen of ESTES for assignment. She was assigned position 330, 2000 yards. ESTES course 118°, speed 8 knots.

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

17 February 1945

- 0000(K) TF's 52 and 54 engaged in night deployment, after bombarding, minesweeping and air operations at IWO JIMA on D -3 Day. ESTES in company with four minecraft at 8 knots, circling IWO JIMA at 5 to 8 miles distance to maintain general observation of DD night operations.
- 0040 Bombardment instructions for 17th sent out to TG 54.1.
- 0100 Report of minesweeping accomplished sent out to TF 52 and TF 54.
- 0124 NEWCOMB and HALLIGAN directed to proceed to Lat. 26° N.; Long. 141°-50' E. at 0600 to operate as radar pickets and perform Air-Sea Rescue Services for TG 52.2 planes striking CHICHI and HANA JIMAS.
- 0243 ARDENT reported sound contact bearing 320°, distance 1500 yards.
- 0245 ARDENT reported she was going to attack, unless ordered otherwise.
- 0257 ARDENT reported contact lost in wake of other vessels.
- 0420 CTU 52.3.2 directed to leave formation and proceed and rendezvous with Sweep Units 6, 7 and 8.
- 0548 TEXAS, ARKANSAS and TUSCALOOSA directed to launch planes at discretion.
- 0635 Carriers launched CAP.
- 0635 Flash WHITE; Control GREEN.
- 0640 SALT LAKE CITY launched planes.
- 0641 HALLIGAN reported under attack by 3 Betty's, bearing 355°, distance 48000 from ~~Ketrels~~.
- 0643 HALLIGAN downed one Betty, and received no damages.
- 0645 Flash BLUE; Control GREEN.
- 0648 CAP on station.
- 0650 HALLIGAN reports screen cleared; planes last seen bearing 260°.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTG 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

17 February 1945 (Continued)

0656(K) Flash RED; Control GREEN.

0700 Ships commence bombardment.
Flash RED; Control YELLOW.
CTG 52.4 asked for his recommendation for R-E Hour.

0707 Flash BLUE; Control GREEN.

0708 CTG 52.4 recommends 1100 as R-E Hour.

0715 Strike ABLE on station.

0720 Mine Unit 2 and Gunboat Support Units One and Two arrived IWO JIMA.

0725 Special strike 12 VF on way to CHICHI JIMA.

0730 CHESTER and PENSACOLA report 2 operational aircraft; VICKSBURG reports 0.

0734 CTU 52.3.5 released from screening ESTES; to carry out day's assignment.

0735 Target ASP on station.

0735 CTG 52.3 requested to direct 2 ships in addition to 4 AM's required from Sweep Unit 2 to report to ComDesRon 46 for duty.

0750 Informed that TRACY and LINDSEY had already been ordered to report for screening assignment.

0752 Informed all APD's except BARR and BATES fueled to capacity on 16th.

0758 TU 52.3.7 and 52.3.8 receiving considerable fire from GREEN Beach.

0800 Sweep Units 6 and 7 commencing scheduled operations in Area 9.

0801 TU 52.3.7 and 52.3.8 ordered to move to seaward.

0803 SALT LAKE CITY, NEW YORK, IDAHO, TENNESSEE and CHESTER directed to move into lower limit of Range Band BAKER.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTG 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

17 February 1945 (Continued)

- 0810(K) Hydrographic plane over IWO JIMA.
- 0811 CTG 52.3 directed to commence operations; fire support ships closing in.
- 0818 CTG 52.3 commences operations. Requests 2 destroyers for close support.
- 0821 R-E Hour confirmed as 1100(K).
- 0824 Informed by CTG 52.3 that YMS would require closer fire support.
- 0825 CTG 52.3 directed to conduct further investigation of object upon which DEFENSE fouled her gear on 16th.
- 0830 CTU 54.1.1 ordered to direct TENNESSEE, IDAHO and NEVADA to close for accurate destructive bombardment; also to move NEW YORK, CHESTER and SALT LAKE CITY in to effective range.
- 0831 Photo plane and fighter escort on station.
- 0834 CTG 52.3 resuming operation.
- 0837 CTU 54.1.1 told that TENNESSEE, IDAHO and NEVADA were to move inside 3000 yards and as near 2000 as practicable.
- 0840 Requested CTG 52.3 to advise completion time of Area 9.
- 0855 ESTES closed to within $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 miles from beach.
- 0855 CTF 54 directed NEW YORK with 2 DD's as screen deploy night of D -2 following Movement Unit ABLE and to have NEW YORK in firing position at 0600 daily.
- 0858 CTG 52.3 advised he expected to complete Area 9 about 1100.
- 0902 Photo plane commenced operations at 5000 feet over target.
- 0920 ComDesRon 46 directed to assign 2 of first destroyers arriving for UDT support to support Sweep Units 5 and 6 in Area 9.
- 0933 CTG 52.3 was informed that fire support was being provided by battleships and that when destroyers are available they will supplement.
- 0935 LCI(G)'s forming up preparatory to closing eastern beaches in support of scheduled UDT operations.

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

17 February 1945 (Continued)

- 0938(K) PENSACOLA hit by fire from IWO JIMA.
- 0948 CTG 52.3 informed CTF 52 that YMS received heavy fire from IWO JIMA.
- 1009 CTG 52.4 was asked which APD had been detailed to accompany WATERS to rendezvous with Attack Force.
- 1010 BRYANT and LEUTZE sent to support TU 52.3.7 and 52.3.8.
- 1010 Weather report sent to CTF 51.
- 1014 CTG 52.3 reports that battery which hit PENSACOLA will interfere with Sweep Unit 4 in Area 8. Additional close in fire support requested.
- 1015 CHICHI JIMA strike on way home; many small craft there destroyed.
- 1016 ComDesRon 46 requested that BRYANT and LEUTZE be released from supporting minesweepers to take station for UDT operation.
- 1018 CTG 52.3 informed that unless minesweeping was expedited the UDT reconnaissance would be delayed.
- 1021 LCI(G)'s moving toward beach supported by TWIGGS and CAPPS.
- 1035 MULLANY designated to deliver photographs to LUNGA POINT. Ensign STEVENSON, who had been downed on 16th, will be returned from HOPKINS via MULLANY to LUNGA POINT.
- 1037 CTG 52.3 reported Area 14 completed; results negative.
- 1038 APD's standing in toward beach with UDT teams, preparatory to launching LCP(R)'s.
- 1039 LEUTZE and BRYANT directed to support both minesweepers and UDT's.
- 1045 LCI(G)'s have taken station to support UDT operation and are firing into the beach. Enemy returning fire.
- 1048 APD Units take station to commence UDT operation.
- 1052 CTG 52.3 reports Area 9 completed; results negative.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE NEW IRON CANYON

17 February 1945 (Continued)

- 1053(K) TENNESSEE directed not to fire time fused shells over UDT boats.
- 1055 TENNESSEE reports being hit at 0848; 4 men injured, no damage to ship.
- 1055 VICKSBURG moving around to support sweepers in Area 8.
- 1100 ROGER EASY Hour.
- 1101 LCI(G) 449 has been hit.
- 1112 LCI 450 standing out of operating area; she is afire.
- 1113 Smoke being furnished by white phosphorous shells.
- 1117 CTG 52.4 requested air strike in Area 183 and 184, whence fire is believed coming.
- 1121 LEUTZE reports being hit; Captain injured, Executive Officer in command, minor material damage.
- 1125 Air strike being sent in to support UDT's
- 1130 CTG 52.4 was asked if operations were progressing satisfactorily and he replied that UDT's were receiving heavy fire from right flank.
- 1133 YMS 362 fouled sweep gear on shoal Lat. 1410-19' E.; 240-44' N.
- 1137 CTG 52.4 requested smokers. He was directed to use W.P. projectiles.
- 1141 CTG 52.4 requested increased rate of fire on all known targets, and this was ordered.
- 1145 LCI(G) 474 observed to be hit; listing heavily; believed to be sinking.
- 1151 LCI 474 reports that crew has abandoned ship; all aboard CAPPS.
- 1156 CTG 52.4 was requested to provide information on nature of opposition from beach itself.
- 1200 CTG 52.4 believed opposition was from mortar fire.

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17 February 1945 (Continued)

- 1204(K) CTG 52.4 requested smokers again.
- 1218 CTU 52.5.1 informed that CTF 52 would take 21 or more bed cases after UDT operation completed.
- 1224 CTU 52.5.1 was asked how many LCI's would be available for afternoon's operations and he replied that only one would be available.
- 1225 WILLIAMSON going alongside LCI 449 which is reported out of control and sinking.
- 1234 CTU 54.9.1 asked if he should hold up firing schedule or continue from south of bearing 070°.
- 1238 CTG 52.3 requested instructions for Sweep Units 6 and 7 which are ready to commence in Area 10 on schedule.
- 1241 CTG 52.4 was requested for his recommendation for use of smoke during afternoon's exercises and his recommendation for R-W Hour.
- 1241 CTG 52.3 requested permission for Sweep Unit 4 to remain in Area 8, estimated time of completion 1500.
- 1241 TENNESSEE reported she had 40 critical cases from LCI's aboard.
- 1242 LEUTZE reported that Commanding Officer required Xray and surgery and she was told to close ESTES to transfer casualties.
- 1245 WILLIAMSON reported her rescue party aboard LCI 449 and that TERROR was alongside and standing by. WILLIAMSON available to continue servicing planes.
- 1251 CTG 52.3 was requested to verify reported obstruction.
- 1254 CTG 52.4 desired smoke for afternoon's operations.
- 1254 CTG 52.3 reported LCI alongside with 60% casualties aboard.
- 1310 B-24's contacted on way to IWO JIMA.
- 1313 CTU 52.3.6 directed to commence scheduled operation. LINDSEY and GAMBLE underway to assist.

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ENCLOSURE (A) to CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

17 February 1945 (Continued)

- 1314(K) TWIGGS requested NEW YORK to take casualties she had aboard from LCI's.
- 1315 CTU 52.3.6 reported to CTG 52.3 that fire support was negative at this time.
- 1316 PENSACOLA requested cancellation of her firing schedule for the afternoon while doctor operated on casualties.
- 1325 WILLIAMSON reported to TERROR that she had possible sound contact on port bow, range 800 yards.
- 1325 CTG 52.3 directed to continue sweeping Area 8. Heavy fire support units ordered to close beach. CTG 52.3 to commence operations as soon as they arrive.
- CTU 52.5.1 and 52.5.2 informed LCI(G)'s not required for afternoon's operation.
- 1327 CTG 52.3 directed to commence operation in Area 10 as soon as heavy ships are seen to close the beach.
- 1327 CTG 52.4 informed that no LCI's are available for afternoon's operation and that the use of airplane smoke screens, WP shells from destroyers and close support by both DD's and heavy ships is contemplated.
- 1330 CTG 52.4 reported on morning's operation: 12 LCI's hit; all swimmers but one recovered. He recommended that DD's close to 2000 yards and that smoke planes be available for immediate use, on call.
- 1333 WILLIAMSON reported to TERROR that contact was mushy; no contact now.
- 1337 VICKSBURG directed to cover minesweepers in Area 8 and to carry out schedule as far as possible.
- 1337 Sweep Unit 3 being fired on by 40mm. in Area 7. Ordered to move out until fire support arrives.
- 1339 Photo plane mission successfully accomplished.
- 1350 Smoke planes report on station.

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17 February 1945 (Continued)

- 1354(K) B-24's bombing IWO JIMA.
- 1358 LEUTZE reports damage sustained in morning's hit.
- 1400 CTU 54.9.1 directed to observe operations in Area 10 and inform CTF 52 if airplane smoke needed for their protection. Ships are to close in to 2000 yards from shore.
- 1400 HAMILTON and HENLEY designated to support YMS in Area 10, commencing now.
- 1402 MULLANY instructed to rendezvous at 0600 18th at Pt. RANSOM to deliver photographs to LUNGA POINT.
- 1406 ARKANSAS and TUSCALOOSA directed to close in to within 2000 yards of shore.
- 1409 ComCruDiv 5 to take charge of CHESTER and VICKSBURG in supporting minesweepers in Area 7 and 8.
- 1410 HOPKINS directed to transfer Ens. STEVENSON to MULLANY for transfer to LUNGA POINT.
- 1415 Received report of damage to PENSACOLA.
- 1424 Informed that CTU 52.5.1 was putting a few officers and men aboard LCI 449.
- 1425 All ships requested to keep sharp lookout for one missing UDT swimmer.
- 1428 Commanding Officer of LEUTZE and 3 injured men transferred to ESTES.
- 1444 CTG 52.4 was informed that CTF 52 was still awaiting his recommendation for R-W Hour and designation of APD to accompany WATERS.
- 1448 CTG 52.4 was ordered to direct WATERS to close ESTES prior to leaving on assigned mission, to receive material for delivery to Tractor Group ABLE.
- 1455 CTF 54 requested 6 AM's for night deployment, as Movement Unit BAKER screen was reduced to four DD's.

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ENCLOSURE (A) CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

17 February 1945 (Continued)

- 1455(K) ESTES proceeding to west coast of IWO JIMA.
- 1458 CTG 52.4 recommended R-W Hour as 1615 provided all DD's are available. He could not designate an APD to return with WATERS until need for demolition determined.
- 1504 Flash RED; Control GREEN. (Bogey on radar screen.)
- 1507 Ordered CTF 54 to sink LCI(G) 474, which had capsized and was a menace to navigation. (Later informed by CTF 54 that LCI(G) 474 was sunk by 40mm. fire from CAPPS at 1329(K), $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles, 091° from SURIBACHI in about 100 fathoms of water.)
- 1507 Issued following orders for UDT operation: 5" AAC and 5"/51 fire will be as follows: TENNESSEE move into Sector 3, cover southern flank; ARKANSAS cover Purple 1, Brown 1 and 2; TEXAS, White 1 and 2 and Orange 2. TUSCALOOSA Orange 1 and southern flank. Carry out fire on schedule relative R-W Hour.
- 1509 VICKSBURG asked CTU 52.3.4 if ships had been fired upon during last sweep.
- 1510 CTU 52.11.1 notified his task unit that R-W Hour was 1615 and that destroyers would close from 3000 to 2000 yards offshore as no LCI's are available.
- 1511 ASP plane damaged 4 luggers on KITA IO JIMA with rockets and machine gun fire.
- 1514 Flash WHITE; Control GREEN. (Bogey identified as friendly.)
- 1514 Sweep Unit 4 moved out of Area 8 into Area 3. Area 8 75% completed from seaward.
- 1515 ARKANSAS requested permission to move out to about 3000 yards in order to fire over minesweepers with main battery. Permission was granted.
- 1517 CTU 52.3.4 reported to VICKSBURG that ships had been fired on from a battery in Area 251 FKLM.
- 1525 CTG 52.4 requested that HENLEY and HAMILTON be returned to support UDT's.

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ENCLOSURE (A) CTG 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

17 February 1945 (Continued)

- 1528 LINDSEY requested PAUL HAMILTON to neutralize Area 146 LMN as sweepers drew fire from that area.
- 1553 CTG 52.3 directed to designate one AM to take LCI 441 in tow.
- 1554 CTG 52.4 requested smokers for line 233R to 198G.
- 1557 ComDesRon 46 ordered to direct HENLEY and HAMILTON take position for UDT support.
- 1559 CTG 52.4 made additional request for smoke; on line 147B to 131X.
- 1600 CTG 52.4 reported no obstacles and only one mine in morning's mission.
- 1602 CTU 52.5.1 requested ship be assigned to repair underwater damage in 3 LCI's to make them seaworthy.
- 1603 APD's launching UDT teams.
- 1605 CTG 52.3 submitted report on damage to LCI 449.
- 1605 Enemy returning fire of DD's supporting UDT operation.
- 1606 Western beaches being strafed in support of UDT operation.
- 1615 ROGER WILLIAM Hour.
- 1621 MULLANY directed to remain in screening station until released by ComDesRon 46 and then to close ESTES.
- 1624 Smoke being laid on western beaches in support of UDT operation. Not laid where ordered.
- 1650 CTG 52.4 requested smoke from planes and WP from destroyers on line between 233R and 198G.
- 1655 Minesweepers fired on from Area 233.
- 1710 Sent following message to CTU 52.5.1: "Greatly admire magnificent courage your valiant personnel. When circumstances permit report condition each LCI and casualties. LCI 474 which capsized has been sunk. Am directing one AM designated by CTG 52.3 to take LCI 441 now alongside NEVADA in tow and remain objective pending further orders."

UNCLASSIFIED17 February 1945 (Continued)

- 1712(K) Reported to CTF 94 that B-29 reported survivor 214 miles bearing 089° from IWO JIMA at 1300 17th. Sending search to drop survival kit first light 18th.
- 1715 CTG 52.3 reported on condition of LCI 469 and 457.
- 1720 CTF 54 directed to use every opportunity to fuel DD's from heavy ships.
- 1734 HOWARD reported picking up crew of TBF.
- 1738 Night deployment postponed until 1830.
- 1739 CTU 52.5.1 requested to close ESTES and come aboard for brief conference.
- 1742 CHAMPION reported picking up three men from PETROF BAY.
- 1800 MULLANY directed to remain vicinity of ESTES and assist in screening. Photographs will not be ready for transfer until 0300, 18th.
- 1800 Sweep Unit 4 directed to report to ESTES as screen; Sweep Unit 1 to report to CTF 54 for screening assignments.
- 1805 SALT LAKE CITY granted permission to join CTU 54.9.1.
- 1806 CTG 52.3 reported on day's sweeping assignments: All areas completed, except inboard 25% of Area 8; results negative.
- 1810 LCI 471 reported to ESTES for repairs.
- 1813 All aircraft of support group, ASP and one section CAP returned to base.
- 1815 CTG 52.4 directed to report type of mine found in first operation.
- 1817 UDT operations completed. Ships ordered to cease supporting fires.
- 1818 EDWARDS, TWIGGS, STEMBEL directed to remain objective for night operations.
- 1825 SALT LAKE CITY directed to proceed and recover disabled landing plane, bearing 272°, 3 miles ~~west~~ west.

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17 February 1945 (Continued)

- 1828(K) Flash WHITE; Control YELLOW.
- 1830 TU 52.5.1 and 52.5.2 directed to remain vicinity objective overnight.
- 1836 CTG 52.3 reported Area 3 completed; results negative.
- 1838 CTG 52.4 reported on mine found in morning's operation. No evidence of minefield; mine found in 8 feet of water.
- 1850 LCI 471 alongside ESTES for repairs.
- 1855 Flash BLUE; Control YELLOW. (Bogey on radar screen.)
- 1859 CTU 54.9.1 granted permission to proceed as previously directed upon completion of firing.
- 1910 CTG 52.3 directed to be prepared to clear side of TERROR for maneuvering, in view of bogey situation.
- 1920 CTG 52.4 considered no further UDT operations necessary.
- 1933 Received report on mincraft and LCI casualties.
- 1934 CAPFS directed to contact CTU 52.5.1 in morning in regard to transfer of LCI(G) personnel.
- 1938 Flash RED; Control YELLOW.
- 1945 LCI 471 away from alongside ESTES.
- 2000 Position Report: 24°-38.5' N.; 141°-26.6' E.
- 2020 Issued instructions to ships to keep bright lookout for hostile planes.
- 2030 Flash WHITE; Control YELLOW. (Radar screen clear.)
- 2034 CTU 52.3.5 directed to join ESTES group.
- 2100 CTG 52.4 to CTF 52: Transfer completed. Expect you will detach WATERS and BULL.
- 2112 WATERS and BULL sent on assigned mission.

ENCLOSURE (A) CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

17 February 1945 (Continued)

- 2135(K) CTF 54 dispatched casualty report his force.
- 2158 MULLANY directed to take charge of screen around ESTES.
- 2225 CTU 52.3.5 reported having three men aboard from PETROFF BAY and requested instructions as to disposition of them.
- 2231 WATERS and BULL proceeding on duty assigned.
- 2252 Dispatch sent to fire support ships assigning targets for 18th.
- 2317 MULLANY direct to proceed to rendezvous with LUNGA POINT at 0600 18th. Transfer photographs and Ens. STEVENSON and return to objective.
- 2340 CTU 52.3.5 told that orders would be issued in morning regarding transfer of PETROFF BAY personnel.

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

18 February 1945

- 0000(K) TF 52 and TF 54 operating in accordance with CTF 52 Operation Plan No. A101-45 in vicinity of IWO JIMA.
- 0058 CTG 52.2 was ordered to direct LUNGA POINT to comply with CTF 51 OpPlan 25-44 in delivering photographs to be received from MULLANY.
- 0308 MULLANY was directed to close ESTES.
- 0351 MULLANY was directed to proceed on duty assigned having received from ESTES photographs and aviator for delivery to LUNGA POINT.
- 0625 Flash BLUE; Control YELLOW. (Bogey on radar screen.)
- 0635 Flash WHITE; Control YELLOW. (Bogey identified as friendly.)
- 0645 Flash WHITE; Control GREEN.
- 0650 CAP on station.
- 0656 Flash BLUE; Control GREEN. (Bogey on radar screen.)
- 0658 Special air strike by 12 VF underway for CHICHI JIMA.
- 0659 Air coordinator on station.
- 0700 Fire Support Ships commenced firing.
- 0705 TRACY and TU 52.3.5 directed to report to CTG 52.3
- 0715 PENSACOLA reported she had jettisoned damaged plane and had made temporary repairs on shell holes underwater forward.
- 0716 Flash RED; Control GREEN
- 0717 ASP now on station.
- 0720 Air Support Group of 8 VF and 8 VT on station.
- 0725 CTG 52.3 was directed to suspend sweeping operations in Areas 7, 8 and 10 until further instructions were received; to continue in Area 13.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

18 February 1945

- 0739(K) CTU 52.3.6 was asked by CTF 52 if he observed nature of drums on beaches during sweeping operations yesterday.
- 0743 Special strike on CHICHI JIMA cancelled due to weather.
- 0747 Flash BLUE; Control GREEN.
- 0758 CTG 52.3 was directed to further investigate underwater obstruction reported bearing 212° distance 6100 yards from SURIBACHI.
- 0806 PENSACOLA reported she would cease fire as her scheduled fire for period was completed, and she had surgical work to do on casualties. Permission granted.
- 0808 Flash WHITE; Control Green. (No unidentified planes on radar screen.)
- 0815 CTF 54 recommended LEUTZE screen NEW YORK enroute SAIPAN and be granted availability at SAIPAN for repairs.
- 0820 CTU 52.3.6 advised CTF 52 he had been unable to identify drums on beaches.
- 0841 Flash RED; Control GREEN. (Bogey on radar screen.)
- 0855 Flash WHITE; Control GREEN.
- 0856 Air Coordinator reports sighting bogey, believed to be an Irving.
- 0903 Directed CTF 54 to supply information on present fuel situation of DD's.
- 0905 PC 800 reported definite sound contact, bearing 145°, distance 8 miles from SURIBACHI.
- 0904 CTF 54 directed major ships to rig to fuel one DD each and to accomplish fueling when this could be done without interfering with scheduled bombardment.
- 0914 Directed CTG 52.4 to supply information on present fuel situation of APD's.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

18 February 1945

- 0921(K) Flash BLUE; Control GREEN.
- 0923 Flash WHITE; Control GREEN.
- 0928 PC 800 reported having lost contact which was evaluated as non-sub. CAPPS investigated area without obtaining contact and resumed station.
- 0950 BREESE reported sound contact in Patrol Area C6 and now attacking.
- 0958 CTU 52.3.6 stated no drums observed on eastern beaches.
- 1007 BREESE completed second attack in Area C6 and sighted unidentified slick.
- 1015 CTF 52.3 ordered PC 800 to investigate possible shoal reported as bearing 212°, distance 6100 yards from SURIBACHI.
- 1027 ComDesRon 46 was asked if he had double screen stationed.
- 1029 ComDesRon 46 was asked to make recommendations when Hunter-Killer operations deemed advisable.
- 1029 ICI 471 was asked if she required assistance to insure seaworthiness.
- 1031 NEW YORK reported she was unable to deliver more than 27000 gallons of fuel an hour as she was not equipped with modern pumps.
- 1035 GILMER was ordered to proceed to ESTES for fuel; WILLIAMSON, BATES and BARR to follow.
- 1051 MULLANY reported that in passing photographs to LUNGA POINT, supporting lines slacked, dropping containers into sea. All were recovered and delivered, believed in good condition.
- 1056 CTU 52.3.6 reported that mounds resembling little volcanoes were observed on eastern beaches and fired upon with no apparent damage to them.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

18 February 1945

- 1058(K) TWIGGS reported that plane that attacked her may have used leaky NAN beacon X-12 as point of aim. Her beacon had been satisfactory until yesterday and was found after attack to be damaged from own gunfire during day.
- 1100 ComDesRon 46 reported double screen in effect.
- 1100 CTF 54 reported all DD's have about 60% fuel aboard.
- 1109 STRENGTH proceeding to investigate a sound contact reported by DEFENSE.
- 1121 CTG 52.4 reported swimmers within ten yards of waterline on all beaches except ORANGE, 25 to 60 yards; PURPLE, 50 yards; BLUE, 30 to 80 yards.
- 1124 ComDesRon 46 was directed to supply information on status of BREESE sound contact.
- 1125 IDAHO and TENNESSEE were informed their mission not completed until direct hits obtained on all casemated guns located at northern base of SURIBACHI and on north flank of eastern beaches.
- 1125 CTG 52.3 was directed to prepare to execute D -1 minesweeping schedule in Area 7 and 8, including remainder of Area 8 uncompleted yesterday; no further work contemplated at present in Areas 9 and 10. Directed to retire immediately if heavy fire received.
- 1125 CTU 54.1.3 was directed to recommend support for sweeping assignments in Areas 7 and 8.
- 1128 ComDesRon 46 reported BREESE lost sound contact at 1036; operation "observant" being carried out.
- 1130 HALL reported #3 main feed pump casualty; to be repaired midnight tonight.
- 1131 LEUTZE was directed to report to NEW YORK prior 1800 for screening duty. To obtain emergency repairs at SAIPAN and return IWO JIMA.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

18 February 1945

- 1150(K) Commander Screen was directed to reassign units for covering screening stations C 18 to C 20.
- 1151 CTU 94.11.1 was informed that 2 VT with survival kits had been sent to search for downed personnel reported by B-29's yesterday.
- 1205 STRENGTH reported sound contact worked by her and DEFENSE evaluated as non-sub.
- 1211 ComDesRon 46 reported BREESE and MULLANY completed operation "observant" without further contact. They are returning to screening stations.
- 1212 LCI 477 reported she was in no immediate danger, but could not proceed in rough sea above six knots without shipping water through above water holes in hull.
- 1223 CTU 52.5.1 was directed to make recommendations as to which LCI's should return to base, with reason therefor, so that Movement Orders might be issued.
- 1236 CHESTER reported plane in water bearing 115°, 5½ miles from Mount SURIBACHI.
- 1250 BISMARCK SEA reported hydrographic conditions at IWO JIMA to TF 51.
- 1315 TEXAS VOS picked up survivor bearing 090°, 135 miles from SURIBACHI and is bringing him back. (Survivor was located by VT's searching for survivor reported yesterday by B-29's.
- 1322 12 VF on way to CHICHI JIMA for special strike.
- 1353 CTU 52.5.1 reported LCI's 441 and 473 require towing; 441 has inoperative machinery and 473 has engine room flooded. LCI's 438, 449, 457, 466 and 471 require extensive repairs to hull and armament; 450 and 469 can be operated after above water hull damage is repaired; 346, 348 and 627 operative.
- 1358 NEW YORK was directed to transfer Marine spotter to VICKSBURG prior departure.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

18 February 1945

- 1401(K) TEXAS was ordered to cover minesweeping operations in Areas 7 and 8.
- 1405 LEUTZE reports TBF crashed at 1400, several hundred yards off northern tip of island.
- 1415 HALL and BRYANT were directed to rescue survivors in rubber raft bearing 005°, distance 3 to 4 miles from Mount SURIBACHI.
- 1415 Directed CTF 54 to submit his opinion as to whether defenses of IWO JIMA had been sufficiently reduced to justify scheduled operations on 19th.
- 1415 VICKSBURG reported HAMILTON was within one mile and was picking up survivors, from plane crash off north side of island.
- 1418 B-24 strike cancelled on account of weather.
- 1430 CTU 54.1.3 requested CTG 52.3 for special instructions for covering minesweeping. CTG 52.3 replied that operations will commence in Areas 7 and 8 as soon as fire support arrives; sweepers now ready.
- 1440 HALL and BRYANT were directed to report to CTG 52.3 to assist in covering minesweeping in Areas 7 and 8.
- 1440 CTG 52.3 was directed to proceed with operations in Areas 7 and 8.
- 1446 Sweep Unit 2 now in northwest corner Area 8; will sweep east.
- 1503 CTG 52.3 was informed that smoke planes would be on station during minesweeping operations. Informed him CTF 52 did not wish to use smoke unless enemy fire is heavy, as it would interfere with bombardment.
- 1506 LINDSEY was directed by CTG 52.3 to cover unit commencing sweep in Area 7.
- 1510 WILLIAMSON was directed to proceed to two Kingfishers out of gas bearing 125°, 5 miles from SURIBACHI.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

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- 1510(K) BRYANT likewise covering unit sweeping Area 7.
- 1515 LEUTZE requested permission to close ESTES prior to reporting to NEW YORK to transfer effects of Commanding Officer. Permission granted.
- 1525 BATES was directed to come alongside ESTES for fuel.
- 1530 CTF 54 was informed by ComDesRon 46 that if destroyers did not fuel, they would require reballasting.
- 1554 PC 800 reported she had conducted investigation for reported shoal, with negative results.
- 1547 WILLIAMSON reported two spotting planes in water have gas; boat standing by to assist as necessary.
- 1600 BARR directed to repair light on HIGASHI Rock.
- 1600 Issued orders to LCI's to remain near objective tonight. Recommended to CTF 51 that LCI(G) 346 and 348 be used as Press boats; others not to take part in assault tomorrow.
- 1605 Ordered NEW YORK to use all 14" and as much 5"/51 HC as profitable; firing need not terminate at 1800.
- 1610 CTU 94.11.1 was informed that one survivor from a CVE in rubber boat was rescued in position 135 miles, bearing 090° from IWO JIMA at noon today. CTF 52 sent TEXAS a "Well done" for VOS pilot and crew who made this rescue.
- 1611 LINDSEY reported she would make next sweep with CTU 52.3.4.
- 1622 Ens. VALPEY of NATOMA BAY, survivor, brought aboard ESTES, condition good.
- 1630 Special strike on CHICHI JIMA returning to base.
- 1632 Sweep for moored mines in Area 8 completed; results negative.
- 1649 CTU 54.1.4 reported several large caliber shells falling in his vicinity.

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18 February 1945

- 1650(K) Sweeping of Area 8 inside 100 fathom ~~curve~~ completed for magnetic mines. Sweepers to make one pass in Area 7, unless otherwise directed. CTG 52.3 considers minesweeping to date sufficient until island is taken.
- 1658 LEUTZE directed to close ESTES prior to former's departure.
- 1700 Minesweeping in southern half Area 13 completed; results negative.
- 1708 IDAHO reported splashes in her vicinity; believed to be overs from other side of island.
- 1713 SALT LAKE CITY reported overs to be **ricochets**. Fragments from last hit SALT LAKE CITY, no damage to ship.
- 1714 Permission granted to LINDSEY to fire salvos at three anti-aircraft batteries she discovered.
- 1715 Issued orders to NEW YORK to depart IWO JIMA screened by LEUTZE at about 1830.
- 1718 TU 52.3.4 was directed to clear area and recover minesweeping gear.
- 1735 CTG 52.3 submitted fueling requirements of his group.
- 1743 LEUTZE reported to NEW YORK for screening duty.
- 1749 SALT LAKE CITY reported ammunition allowance for day expended.
- 1750 UDT 13 completed repairing light on HIGASHI Rock.
- 1752 Informed CTU 94.11.1 that survivor rescued at noon today was not the one reported by B-29's on 17th.
- 1800 BATES alongside ESTES to fuel.
- 1800 CTG 52.3 directed DM 18 and DM 15 report to CTF 54 for night deployment.

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18 February 1945

- 1812(K) CTG 52.3 reported sweeping 1500 yards inside 100 fathom curve completed in Area 7; results negative. Sweep Unit 3 recovering gear.
- 1815 TENNESSEE was granted permission to leave station to pick up damaged plane.
- 1817 CAP and ASP returned to base.
- 1822 CTU 54.9.2 requested CTG 52.3 to provide six escorts for night deployment.
- 1825 Orders for night deployment issued. Sweep Unit 4 to report to ESTES as screen.
- 1837 CTU 52.3.5 reported to ESTES for screening duty.
- 1848 TWIGGS was directed to screen ESTES until arrival of Sweep Unit 4.
- 1850 STEMBEL, TWIGGS, LEARY, HALL and HENLEY designated to remain at objective for night operations.
- 1852 Informed CTF 54 that Sweep Unit 1 and 4 APD's have been ordered to report to him for screening purposes during night deployment.
- 2000 BATES completed fueling from ESTES.
- 2002 ComDesDiv 101 in HALL was placed in charge of night operations and directed to ensure that enemy did not work on beaches during the night.
- 2030 Flash BLUE; Control YELLOW. (Bogey on radar screen.)
- 2035 Flash WHITE; Control YELLOW. (Screen clear.)
- 2130 BLESSMAN reported to CTG 52.4 that she had been hit and was on fire. (No details given.)
- 2135 Flash BLUE; Control YELLOW. (Bogey on radar screen.)
- 2200 Flash WHITE; Control WHITE. (Screen clear.)

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- 2223(K) CTF 54 reported GAMBLE hit by plane amidships. Two destroyers standing by.
- 2250 CTF 52 informed CTF 51 he believed landing could be accomplished on schedule.
- 2255 BLESSMAN requested CTG 52.4 to close and put water on boat deck fire.
- 2255 GAMBLE reported to CTG 52.3 via HAMILTON that she had been hit by bomb from low flying twin engine bomber. DORSEY standing by to take GAMBLE in tow.
- 2259 BLESSMAN reported to CTG 52.4 she was losing control. (Presumably of fire.)
- 2303 CTU 52.5.2 reported shell fragments recovered from LCI 457 identified as about 6". He believed that spherical buoys moored offshore were used for mortar and artillery range purposes. Other fire encountered was 37mm and .30 cal.
- 2315 CTF 52 asked CTG 52.4 if he was in contact with BLESSMAN, and whether he needed assistance.
- 2334 CTG 52.4 replied he required medical assistance and a ship to take BLESSMAN in tow. Position: 19 miles, bearing 345° from SURIBACHI.
- 2340 CTU 52.5.1 reported his ships noted buoys offshore during UDT operation, presumably for ranging purposes by the enemy.
- 2346 CTU 52.3.5 was ordered to send an AM to take BLESSMAN in tow.
- 2356 CTF 52 informed CTG 52.4 that ARDENT was being sent to take BLESSMAN in tow, and directed CTG 52.4 to bring casualties to ESTES after ARDENT had taken BLESSMAN in tow.

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- 0205(K) CTF 52 informed CTF 51 that HAMILTON with GAMBLE in tow and ARDENT with BLESSMAN in tow were proceeding to a designated point near IWO JIMA where they arrive at dawn,

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- 0205(K) and that both GAMBLE and BLESSMAN had been damaged by bombing. Recommend that salvage ships be sent to them as soon as possible.
- 0519 Radar contact made with approaching main body of Joint Expeditionary Force.
- 0559 ComPhibGrpONE reported to CTF 51 for duty as CTG 51.19.

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ENCLOSURE (B) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS
IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

COMMENTS ON INTELLIGENCE

1. PLANNING

(a) Assembly of intelligence material for Staff planning began about 1 November. Photographs were of high order and other available target information reflected the work done by higher echelons particularly by JICPOA and ComPhibsPac Intelligence Section. Very close liaison was maintained with the latter, and Group ONE intelligence personnel participated in the design and production of much of the detailed intelligence material. Bombardment, navigation, anchorage, and other basic maps and charts were available well in advance.

(b) Group ONE designed (with the assistance from Air Pac) and supervised production of a new type air-target folder reported as highly satisfactory to air and air-ground liaison personnel. These consisted of gridded vertical contact prints (scale of 1/5,000) of each 1,000-yard square with a line intelligence map containing defense installations of the identical area facing each companion photo and printed on the reverse of the preceding sheet.

(c) A detailed photographic plan was prepared by the section as a result of conferences with representatives of FMFPac, 5th PhibCorps, PhibsPac, and PhibGrpTWO and was included as a part of the PhibsPac Air Plan. It was detailed as to coverage and distribution and provided for a final interpretation of late photographs to be made at GUAM by Interpron TWO and representatives of the units involved in the IWO JIMA Operation.

(d) In view of the limited time available for reduction of defenses, ComPhibGrpONE directed that the photographic interpretation section be increased, since accurate, rapid, and continuous damage assessment would be essential to accomplish the maximum results. Accordingly, arrangements were made for the temporary services of two photo interpreters, one from Fleet Marines Force, Pacific, and one from PhotoRon TWO at GUAM making a total of five photo interpreters attached to the Staff. Results accomplished, despite poor photographic weather, justified the increase.

(e) To further accurate damage assessment, the section set up and operated a target information center in Joint Operations, where ships' and planes' reports on naval gunfire and air missions were recorded on cards, previously set up for each primary target, and given

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a serial number to facilitate reports by firing ships. A Kardex system was installed so that information would be instantly available for use by the force Gunnery Section and CASCU personnel. As available, photo-intelligence of damage to installations was to be added and a final evaluation of results made.

(f) In view of the absence of ships to be assigned ComPhibGrpONE for the bombardment it was decided that distribution of PhibsPac intelligence material could best be made by ComPhibGrpONE at ULITHI. Accordingly, on leaving PEARL HARBOR, this material was taken aboard and subsequently distributed at the staging point.

(g) RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) Wherever possible, PhibsPac and Group Intelligence Sections should be together during the planning phase, at least until material to be produced is decided on and responsibility therefor assigned. Where separation is unavoidable it is recommended that reasonably frequent conferences by representatives be held.

(2) The accurate location of defensive installations on early maps is extremely important and more care should be taken in order that relocation of the same targets need not be made on later maps. Joint participation by naval and ground forces in the preparation of intelligence maps is most desirable.

2. STAGING

(a) Enroute to ULITHI, work was completed on special intelligence presentations for use by fire support ships. Sets of annotated enlargements of the east and west beaches, showing particularly the blockhouses, pill-boxes, and covered artillery emplacements located in this area, were produced in quantity. The obliques were tied in with the grid-maps by annotating prominent points on the former with pin-point grid coordinates. Silhouettes of the island from various angles and distances off-shore, and sets of stereo coverage of the target were also produced in sufficient quantity for distribution to the destroyers, battleships, and cruisers.

(b) Briefing consisted of meetings with intelligence officers attached to the larger ships, general briefing of ships gunnery officers, and a photographic briefing of ships' air and top spotters, during which photographs of areas of responsibility were studied. Sufficient time was not available to make this last program fully effective, but some value was derived. Much more can be done in this re-

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ENCLOSURE (B) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

gard by breaking the sessions up into smaller units.

(c) Together with the air-support intelligence officer, personnel aboard the carrier designated to take most of the D -3 to D Day photographs were briefed, and a photographer from ComPhibsPac put aboard to assist in the photographic program. Results are covered in detail in the CASCU comments (Enclosure (D), herein).

(d) Considering the number of changes in the makeup of TF 54 and TF 52, distribution of intelligence material was accomplished satisfactorily. The fact that this material was aboard the flagship undoubtedly was responsible, as addressees of packages made up in advance could be changed to meet a very fluid situation. CTF 52 also had on hand a supply of spare copies of such material and was thus able to take care of new-comers on the spot. The officer detailed from the staff of ComPhibsPac was very helpful in meeting a difficult distribution situation.

(e) RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) So far as the gunfire and covering force is concerned, every effort should be made to produce special intelligence which will be of aid on the firing program. To accomplish this, fire support ships should make suggestions and submit any ideas regarding material which would be useful as well as indicating those things which are of no particular use to them.

(2) It is recommended that future photographic plans have in mind fire support requirements, and photographs be obtained which will, so far as possible, enable firing ships to thoroughly know their areas of responsibility.

(3) Battleships, cruisers, and destroyers should be equipped with several pairs of stereo viewers. At present most of these ships have none on board.

(4) Intelligence officers aboard fire support ships should become "field fortification experts" and should be in a position to thoroughly brief personnel aboard; and should, where possible, maintain very close liaison with the Intelligence Section of Commander Amphibious Support Force.

(5) Photographic plane should carry a hand camera of sufficient focal length to take large scale photographs, in the event a camera of small focal length is installed to meet special conditions which may fail to materialize.

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(6) If ships assigned to the support force are scattered when the principal distribution is to be made, it is recommended that material be packaged by type, and distribution accomplished by Commander Support Force at the staging area; providing of course, sufficient time for study still exists. In any event, a supply of 150 copies of all basic material should be given Commander Amphibious Support Force for distribution to newly assigned ships or those who have not received their material.

(7) It is recommended that officer personnel, aboard major fire support units, be given information regarding their particular assignments as early as considerations of security will permit, in order that they may be thoroughly familiar with them in time to participate intelligently in conferences.

3. BOMBARDMENT

(a) The Target Information Center, Joint Operations, proved very useful. Improvements in the system and a longer bombardment period will, it is believed, make it even more valuable. Reports of destruction or damage to targets by firing ships showed a conscientious attempt to get precise information to Commander Amphibious Support Force. With good weather, reports would have undoubtedly been more accurate, but as it was, especially on D -3 and D -2, direct observation and photographic confirmation of damage was very difficult. Mechanics of the system are far from perfect, but if a current record of reported results and photo intelligence is valuable this system is a step in the right direction.

(b) The system of serially numbering individual targets was, from this Command's standpoint, workable. It has its limitations and defects, especially where large areas are involved. Fire support ships are in the best position to comment on its usefulness. Some confusion was probably caused by the relocation of targets in the last intelligence map (cf planning, recommendations par. (b)). Some form of short cut in reporting results is, however, desirable and reports received from ships were extremely valuable in determining results accomplished.

(c) As noted elsewhere in these comments, photographic interpretation of results was handicapped by poor photos, brought on, in turn, by unsatisfactory weather conditions. As a result, accurate damage assessment was limited to those photos taken on D -1 between 0900 and 1500. As firing continued on that day until 1830, a large amount of accurate fire was delivered after 1500, unquestionably with excellent results. Even so, photographs did disclose the lack of definite

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destruction on D -3 and D -2, and the highly satisfactory results accomplished by close range fire on D -1. Reports of hits on first two days were not confirmed in many instances by photographs but the D -1 reports tallied very closely with photographs of the installations. Given the proper pictures and a longer period in which to make the **evaluated information** on damage available, it is believed that photographic interpretation will be a valuable ally to controlled, precise gunfire. It is, however, recognized that photo-interpretation too, has its limitations and in the present action undoubtedly much more was accomplished by the pre-landing bombardment than was disclosed by photography.

(d) Camouflage of installations at IWO JIMA was of a high order. It is considered that photo interpreters did excellent work in locating defenses, in spite of this. Ships and planes undoubtedly had considerable difficulty in distinguishing many targets from surrounding terrain, even though they knew where to look.

(e) The damage assessment map was delivered according to plan along with the required photographs. The original map was limited by the limitations restricting photography but a later one was printed and distributed in quantity to CTF 51 and 5th Amphibious Corps on D Day morning. This was probably too late to be useful, especially to the troops. Again, more time will permit more information earlier.

(f) The usual situation plots were maintained by the section, viz on the flag bridge and in the War Command Room. An excellent plot has been developed using a relief model on a table, covered with a sheet of clear plastic. Target areas, fire support ship responsibility areas, front lines, etc can be drawn and easily changed on the plastic, while the relief model, if well made, is far more realistic than a map.

4. SUMMARY OF MATERIAL PROCESSED BY PHOTOGRAPHIC LABORATORY AND MAP REPRODUCTION UNIT, USS ESTES, PERIOD OF DECEMBER 10 TO FEBRUARY 18 INCLUSIVE

(a) Photographic Laboratory:

(1) Total prints all sizes.....	57,836
(2) Total negatives processed.....	1,104
(3) Sonne rolls printed (200 ft. each)	102
(4) Rolls aerial films processed.....	29

(b) Map Reproduction:

(1) No. sheets off-set press.....	18,450
(2) Negatives.....	86
(3) Plates.....	81

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COMMENTS ON SHIPS' GUNFIRE SUPPORT

1. General Plan

(a) Each heavy ship was assigned an area of responsibility, all of which taken together, covered the entire island. Bombardment by destroyers for purposes of destruction was not planned, nor was secondary battery fire from heavy ships contemplated except for counterbattery and UDT cover. The plan provided on D -3 for bombardment at long and medium ranges, not less than 6000 yards offshore. For this day firing periods were arranged with the view toward having the minimum number of ships firing at one time and with the intent of having each ship fire for about six hours. For D -2 the plan provided for heavy, close range destructive bombardment of the defenses from Suribachi to Higashi from the eastward until about 1030. During this period ships assigned to the western areas were to conduct bombardment from longer ranges necessitated by safety requirements during the close bombardment from the east. At about 1030 major calibre fire from the ships working from Suribachi to the East Boat Basin was to stop as the ships withdrew sufficiently to permit ships engaging in support of the UDT's reconnaissance to take station. From this time until about 1230 the heavy ships on the east, as well as the close supporting destroyers, were to be primarily concerned with the support of UDT's. Upon completion of the UDT operation on the eastern beaches the ships assigned to the western areas from Suribachi to Hiraiwa Bay were to close and commence heavy short range bombardment while the ships assigned to the eastern beaches were to withdraw to positions clear of this fire and continue their own bombardment at longer ranges. The heavy bombardment from the west was to continue until 1430, at which time the heavy ships were to have withdrawn, permitting vessels engaged in the western UDT reconnaissance to take their stations. From about this time until the completion of the UDT operation the western bombardment was to be largely limited to 5" fire in support of these operations. Fires in the sectors to the northward were scheduled to allow each ship therein about six hours firing time. Safety considerations, both with regard to minesweeping and ricochets did not permit scheduling these vessels to approach very close to their targets. The schedule for D -1 Day contemplated a repetition of the D -2 schedule if further UDT operations (demolitions) were to take place and an extension of the close range firing periods if such operations were not to be carried out.

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(b) The plan required deliberate destructive fire at specific individual targets, and the assigned target priorities emphasized fire on defenses and installations which could most severely threaten our ships, our aircraft, the ship-to-shore movement, the landing, and operations immediately following the landing. The total number of defense installations was too great to attempt more than this in view of the limited time and ammunition available before D Day. Great emphasis on the priority principles was made not only in the plan but during the briefing, with the design of concentrating destructive fire on pillboxes, blockhouses, covered gun emplacements, etc., in the landing areas and around Suribachi and on the high ground immediately to the northward of the landing areas. Ships were specifically directed not to expend their efforts on destruction of installations in the northern parts of the island which would not threaten ships or aircraft, the landing or the early stages of subsequent operations: for example, pillboxes on the northern slopes. The fire of the ships having areas from #2 Airfield and to the northward was directed largely at coastal defense and antiaircraft guns. Continually, in briefing and during the operation, stress was laid on the importance of closing to short ranges to obtain maximum observation and destruction of pinpoint targets which presented the probability of being hit with a flat trajectory. As an aid in recognition of targets and familiarization with the areas, ships assigned to the beach areas were provided with large low oblique photographs covering their particular areas.

2. D minus 3 Day. On D -3 weather conditions until mid-afternoon were very unfavorable, with low ceiling, rain and mist. Observation from the ships and spotting planes was frequently impossible. Ships adhered to their instructions and fired only when visibility permitted reasonable observation. Prearranged schedules of fire were finally abandoned and ships were ordered to fire only when conditions permitted accurate fire and effective air spot. As a result of these unfavorable conditions, only about half the bombardment contemplated on this day was accomplished.

3. D minus 2 Day. During D -2 more effective fire was possible as visibility conditions were excellent. However, ships were not as prompt as desired in closing the range. The necessity for frequent movement to permit the deployment of units supporting UDT operations and the necessity of keeping major calibre impacts away from the beaches while swimmers were close inshore, limited the volume of effective fire. The ammunition expenditures for this day, however, approximated those originally scheduled. The D -2 schedule was adhered to as originally planned, except that the UDT operations

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were longer than intended, which further reduced the amount of short range bombardment. At the end of the D -2 bombardment it was apparent from reports of firing and from photographs that relatively little destruction had been accomplished due to the conditions described above, and that only by concentration on the preferred (eastern) landing beaches could adequate preparation for a landing be effected.

4. D minus 1 Day. Since no UDT operations were found necessary on D -1 a rearrangement of fire schedules was practicable. NEW YORK was assigned an eastern beach area; TEXAS was assigned coastal defense and other batteries northeast of Motoyama; VICKSBURG was assigned the area around the northeast portion of Airfield #2, which had previously been NEW YORK's responsibility. These ships were directed to close the range early and to fire as continuously as it was profitable to do so. Ammunition allowances were authorized to the extent of all bombardment ammunition on board, less the quantity scheduled for D Day fires and a reserve prescribed for one battleship. ARKANSAS was assigned the former TEXAS area in addition to her own. She and TUSCALOOSA were directed to conduct firing as practicable from as close range as would be permitted by the inevitable overs and ricochets from ships off the eastern beaches. This rearrangement of stations achieved a concentration of 4 battleships, 1 heavy cruiser, and later 1 light cruiser on the defenses on and behind the eastern beaches, and on the flanks thereof. Fire from the ships on the east was deliberate and almost continuous. In general, it was delivered from very short ranges, even as low as 1800 yards. So far as could be determined from the firing reports, and observation from the flagship, ships carried out conscientiously their directives to get the utmost value from each projectile. In the forenoon TENNESSEE fired southwesterly and IDAHO northerly, primarily at the heavy casemated batteries flanking the east beach. In the afternoon they were directed to exchange stations so as to be able to reach additional targets in their areas from favorable directions. In the afternoon TEXAS was directed to give close support to the minesweepers operating off the northern shores. Ammunition expenditures, except for NEW YORK, which completed her part in the bombardment and departed the area with only 19 rounds of 14" HC remaining, fell short of the authorized expenditures by an average of 90 rounds per ship. It is doubted that in view of conditions as described above, much value could have resulted from ships expending this additional ammunition simply for the purpose of getting rid of it. Instead, it was probably of considerable value for call fires.

5. (a) Ships' reports indicated a thorough appreciation of the target priorities and conscientious compliance with their directives as to method of firing. Reports were made frequently and in considerable detail.

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(b) At the end of D -1 it was considered from all data available that the principal defense installations in and adjacent to the eastern beach areas were either destroyed or heavily damaged and that while more could be accomplished if another day could be allowed, the preparation was sufficient to permit a landing.

6. Support of Underwater Demolition Teams

(a) The plan for support of the Underwater Demolition Teams provided that each operation would take place after a prolonged period of heavy bombardment of the beach and flank areas; that 30 minutes prior to the departure of the UDT boats from the line of LCI(G)'s, 5" fire would be laid along the beaches and on the flanks; that this fire would initially be from the heavy ships and later from the destroyers; that the LCI(G)'s proceeding from stations 2000 yards offshore would lead the boats as far 1000 yards offshore, covering them with 40mm fire while the boats went in further to put over the swimmers. The plan included provision for communication between boats, the LCI(G)'s and destroyers. All of this close support was under the command of CTG 52.4 (Com UDT'sPhibsPac); the deep support was under the command of CTF 52.

(b) The ineffectiveness of the bombardments on D -3 Day and the limited amount of close bombardment prior to the UDT operations on D -2 undoubtedly contributed to the heavy fire drawn by the close support ships during the first UDT operation. The factors contributing to this have already been noted above.

(c) The support of the UDT operation on the eastern beaches was carried out according to plan. Heavy fire was drawn from Suribachi and, to an even greater extent, from the high ground on the north flank of the eastern beaches. This fire was extremely damaging to the LCI(G)'s and inflicted minor damage on LEUTZE. The fire is believed to have come from deeply emplaced weapons sited for the specific purpose of attacking landing craft and it may have been controlled to some extent with the aid of marker buoys noted offshore by LCI(G) personnel. During the course of the operation CTG 52.4 requested smoke along the entire eastern beach area. Smoke planes not being available at the moment, a smoke screen was laid by TENNESSEE, NEVADA and IDAHO using 5" WP projectiles. The screen was continued for the remainder of the operation. For the western UDT operation so few LCI(G)'s were in condition to provide support that it was determined not to employ them. The same destroyers were used as for the eastern beaches but they were sent in to 2000 yards from the shoreline. To obtain additional 5" fire, TENNESSEE was moved to the west and the beach areas for 5" heavy

ship fire reassigned. Otherwise the western operation was carried out according to plan. During the western operation, smoke was again requested by CTG 52.4. The smoke planes evidently had difficulty in getting their smoke started. As a result their screen was late and laid in the wrong place and WP projectiles had to be used again. In this case, of the heavy ships engaged in 5" support, only TENNESSEE was equipped to deliver WP fire. The remainder of the screen was provided by NEVADA and IDAHO firing at about 7000 yards over Mount Suribachi, controlling their fire with air spot. No damage to our ships was experienced during the western UDT operation although some enemy fire was received.

(d) While the damage and casualties to the LCI(G)'s were unexpectedly severe, the fire which they drew focused additional attention to the threat existing on the northern flank of the eastern beaches, and in particular disclosed three heavy guns in well camouflaged concrete casemates, not previously discovered from the photographs. These guns were definitely put out of action on D -1 Day, and were not heard from again. Had the fire of these and other weapons in this area not been drawn on D -2, very heavy losses might have resulted during the landing.

7. Analysis of Bombardment

(a) During the operation. All priority A (weapons threatening aircraft, ship and UDT operations) and priority B (installations threatening the ship-to-shore movement and landing) targets were assigned serial numbers to permit more specific reference in reports and orders and for brevity in communications. Ships reported in detail on the bombardment of each assigned target. A sample of the reports is attached hereto. Continuous record of results was maintained on a card index as reports were received. These reports were checked against photographic interpretations to evaluate the progress of the bombardment. The reports were made on the Naval Gunfire Overload Circuit which was kept very busy handling them throughout the day and for several hours thereafter.

(b) The following tabulation presents in statistical form for certain types of target a comparison of the reported results and photographic interpretation.

ENCLOSURE (C) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

I. Targets on and near beaches:-

TYPE TARGET	REPORTED BY SHIPS				DAM-:::PHOTO INTERPRETATION		
	FIRED ON	DIRECT HITS	DESTROYED	AGED	DESTROYED	DAMAGED	
Blockhouse	14	5	7	1	9	5	
Pillboxes	37	16	12	3	20	2	
Covered Em- placements	8	1	3	2	4	2	
DP Gun	1	0	0	0	1	0	
Heavy AA MG:	3	0	1	0	1	0	

II. Targets in Northern High Ground Areas:-

Pillboxes	3	0	3	0	0	0	
Covered Em- placements	2	0	1	0	0	0	
DP Guns	21	1	2	9	2	1	
Heavy AA MG:	60	8	20	1	1	0	

Several points must be borne in mind in considering these figures. The study does not summarize the entire bombardment. The targets listed in Table I were generally subject to direct observation for the firing ships and had little natural cover, whereas the targets listed in Table II were subject only to air observation and indirect fire. Many had some natural cover. The targets in Table I in general, presented larger areas than those in Table II. Differences exist, of course, in the manner in which ships formulate their opinions as to their results. It is considered that in the case of targets in Table I, reports were based upon good observed evidence, and that in Table II, reports were largely based upon conclusions drawn from the volume of fire and the placement of MPI. The photographs on which the assessments above were made were taken prior to 1500 on D -1. Firing, however, continued until about 1830.

ENCLOSURE (C) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE TWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

The photographs of the beach areas were somewhat superior to those of the higher ground. In some cases, fragment effect of consequence to installations and personnel may not have shown on the photographs.

All of the foregoing is based upon information available to the Task Force Commander by the end of D -1 and indicates that with methodical bombardment, good observation, and photography, plus analysis, a reasonably sound assessment of target damage can be made prior to the landing.

8. Ammunition Expenditures; D -3 through D -1 (as reported in daily dispatches)

HIGH CAPACITY						
SHIP	D-3	D-2	D-1	TOTAL ROUNDS	TONS	
TENNESSEE	127	251	434	812		
IDAHO	71	207	378	656		
NEVADA	120	112	227	459		
NEW YORK	204	251	567	1022		
TEXAS	274	242	195	711	2334. (14")	
ARKANSAS	143	436	454	1033	382. (12")	
TUSCALOOSA	45	418	341	804		
CHESTER	275	212	281	708		
SALT LAKE CITY	210	347	543	1100		
PENSACOLA	203	227	355	785	450. (8")	
VICKSBURG	248	221	1382	1851	97. (6")	
				10001	3263. Tons	

ARMOR PIERCING		
SHIP	NUMBER ROUNDS	TONS
NEVADA	12	
NEW YORK	19	
IDAHO	8	
TUSCALOOSA	27	32 tons
5" AAC, HC, Common	14491	399 tons
		3694 Tons

USES OF 5" AAC, HC AND COMMON

Direct Support of Minesweepers	906 rounds
Night Harassment	1533 rounds
UDT Support	7272 rounds
Counterbattery and Misc. targets	4780 rounds
	<u>14,491 rounds</u>
White Phosphorus	1091 rounds
Star Shell (Night Harassment)	187 rounds
	<u>15,768 rounds</u>

3", 40mm and 20mm not reported.

9. Recommendations

(a) That pre-landing day bombardments of major amphibious objectives continue to be directed by an Amphibious Group Commander embarked in an AGC.

(b) That pre-landing day bombardments be scheduled to extend over not less than three days, which is considered the minimum time necessary for efficient firing of the bombardment allowance at point targets. If there are to be incidental operations, including frequent movements interfering with gunfire, or if the fixed defenses are unusually strong and numerous the bombardment period should be extended accordingly.

(c) That bombardment ships be assigned areas of responsibility, to be changed only as essential during the operation. This will permit their personnel to become thoroughly familiar with the terrain and defenses they are attacking.

(d) That bombardment plans include carefully considered target priority instructions, provisions for continuous reporting of results, provisions for frequent photographic flights and photo interpretation of results, and dissemination of the Commander's evaluation of the results to the firing ships, and for the ready reassignment of targets.

(e) That each bombardment ship be provided with all practicable detailed intelligence of latest date available before the operation. This material should include large scale low obliques and stereo pairs, with suitable annotations. Each ship should be provided with at least two stereo viewers.

(f) That each bombardment ship designate an officer with

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such assistants and facilities as necessary working in or in close conjunction with the ship's gunnery department, to make a detailed analysis of the target areas prior to bombardment, to receive all available information concerning the results of firing, and to prepare reports of such results for rapid transmission to the command having overall control of gunfire.

(g) That future gunfire plans contain ammunition loading instructions for all Fire Support Ships and those which may be called upon to serve as such.

(h) That future gunfire plans contain, in addition to present plans NEGAT and VICTOR for the control of Naval Gunfire during air strikes, a plan for placing 5 to 10 minutes of 5" fire over the antiaircraft batteries in each ship's area of responsibility just prior to an air strike.

(i) That LCI(G)'s be not employed in close support of UDT operations in heavily fortified areas until considerable reduction of the defenses has taken place.

APPENDIX (I)

SAMPLES OF FIRING REPORTS SUBMITTED

1. 42 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 200P X 90 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 200Y AND U X 28 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 182I X DIRECT HIT TARGET 404 X NEAR HIT TARGET 306 X 26 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 183C D AND E X DIRECT HITS TARGET 428 AND 437 X 138 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 183L X NEAR HITS IN AREA X 57 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 182U X DIRECT HIT TARGET 378 X NEAR HIT TARGET 416 413 AND 414 X 49 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 182X X 6 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 183W X DIRECT HIT TARGET 452 X 7 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 183N X 9 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 182M X 18 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 166H X 18 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 183A X 8 ROUNDS TARGET AREA 201U X

2. TARGET 112 44 ROUNDS X 6 DIRECT HITS X BELIEVED COMPLETELY DESTROYED X CLOSED SOUTH ENTRANCE TO BLOCKHOUSE X SHRAPNEL MAY HAVE ENTERED ENTRANCE X TARGET 138 33 ROUNDS X COMPLETELY DESTROYED X BELIEVED TO BE PILLBOX CONTAINING ANTI-TANK GUN X PERSONNEL FLED AND WERE STRAFED BY 40MM X TARGET 176 6 ROUNDS X 3 DIRECT HITS X DESTROYED X BLOCKHOUSE IN 148Q 17 ROUNDS X COMPLETELY DESTROYED X PERSONNEL FLED AND WERE STRAFED X TARGET 161 11 ROUNDS X PARTIALLY DESTROYED X BLOWN OPEN ON SOUTH SIDE X 119A 14 ROUNDS X 4 DIRECT HITS X COMPLETELY DEMOLISHED X 148L 28 ROUNDS X BIRD REPORTED SEVERAL CLOSED ARTILLERY EMPLACEMENTS X SEVERAL DIRECT HITS X PARTIALLY DESTROYED ENTRANCE X 148U TARGET 144 X PROBABLY COMPLETELY DESTROYED X 12 ROUNDS X TARGET BELIEVED TO BE 117 OR COVERED ARTILLERY EMPLACEMENT IN 148Q COMPLETELY DESTROYED X 1490 BLOCKHOUSE ON BEACH COMPLETELY DESTROYED X 4 ROUNDS X

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REPORT ON SUPPORT AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS

1. GENERAL COMMENTS

(a) Advance Commander Air Support Control Units reported to Commander Amphibious Support Force (CTF 52) aboard U.S.S. ESTES (AGC 12) on 6 January 1945, with unit attached.

(b) Primary function of this unit at IWO JIMA was the control and direction of all aircraft activities in support of the Pre-D-Day bombardment. This function included a variety of operations. First, it complemented and supported the ships of the Gunfire and Covering Force in destroying targets on the Island. Second, it provided air protection for units engaged in minesweeping and underwater demolition operations. Third, it included routine tasks, such as air defense against enemy aircraft and submarines. Lastly it included special missions such as photographic, hydrographic and smoke.

(c) Preliminary bombardment of the objective was begun at daylight on 16 February (D -3 Day) and control of all aircraft activities in the vicinity was assumed by Advance Commander Air Support Control Unit under CTF 52. This control was maintained until 0600(K) 19 February (DOG Day) when Commander Air Support Control Unit under CTF 51, arrived and assumed control. At this time CTF 52 became CTG 51.19 and Commander Air Support Control Unit for this task group remained active in a standby status monitoring all circuits.

2. TRAINING PHASE

(a) CTF 52 sortied from PEARL HARBOR enroute to ULITHI on 10 January 1945. Prior to leaving, preparations were made for training exercises. Parallel drill circuits were placed in Joint Operations and the Inner Office for four nets. This set-up provided receiving and transmitting outlets for inter-communication between four control officers operating in Joint Operations and four in the office. Positions were prepared for eight radiomen (two to each net) for copying all transmissions.

(b) Training exercises were started the second day after sailing with the primary purpose of familiarizing personnel with voice calls and the type of missions to be used in the Operation. However, no operational maps or material

other than voice calls, were given general distribution during the training phase.

(c) After the first training exercise, remaining time enroute to ULITHI was spent participating in ships' battle problems. The purpose of these problems was to simulate battle conditions and to give the various departments opportunity to coordinate their activities.

(d) During the period at ULITHI, and enroute to SAIPAN, Air Support held daily drills over its parallel hook-up. A separate group of radiomen were also given drills each afternoon in the use of sound-power phones connecting Joint Operation, Flag Shelter, Flag Bridge, Flag Plot and CIC.

(e) During the two days of rehearsal off TINIAN a thorough test of operating equipment was obtained. Minor discrepancies were noted and final corrective action was taken.

(f) Upon arrival at the objective both personnel and material were in an excellent state of readiness.

D -3 Day

3. OPERATION

(a) On arrival at the objective all positions were manned by 0500. All circuits were tested and found ready for use. At the break of dawn it was found that the skies were heavily overcast, with weather in general very unsatisfactory for flying. Except for short periods, low ceilings, poor visibility and rain continued until later afternoon.

(b) Sorties for the day totalled 158 but due to weather only 6 support missions were executed. However, some good results were obtained. In a morning strike, airfield No. 2 was strafed and attacked with rockets by F. In this strike 3 twin-engined planes were destroyed, and one probably destroyed, on the air strip. In another mission fighters attacked two luggers discovered by an ASP plane about 35 miles from the objective. After a strafing attack both luggers were left burning and in sinking condition.

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(c) In the forenoon the weather cleared sufficiently for an attack against emplacements on SURIBACHI Mountain. The latter was again struck in late afternoon and a fighter sweep of Airfield No. 2 was executed just prior to dark.

(d) The afternoon Army Air Force heavy bomber strike arrived on station slightly ahead of schedule. The ceiling was too low for bombing but as the weather was expected to improve, the Army bombers were kept on station for one hour, the maximum that their fuel would allow. The weather did not improve and the strike was returned to base.

(e) Detail of sorties, missions and targets attacked are included in the appendices.

D -2 Day

(f) Weather was excellent for flying. 226 sorties were flown, excluding ASP and CAP sorties. Twenty-five missions were executed including one smoker, two hydrographic and three photographic missions. Support missions concentrated on dual purpose guns and automatic antiaircraft around the airfields, and on both beach areas in protection of UDT operations.

(g) In two strike groups, 8 VF carried Napalm fire bombs and used them against targets, with only a fair degree of success. Four of the bombs used did not release on first attempt and several failed to ignite after drop. Somewhat similar experiences on D -1 lead to the conclusion that the answer to effective use of Napalm by plane drop has not been obtained. It is recommended that training in CVE groups with Napalm be continued with emphasis on improvement of equipment used, methods of release, and tactics to follow in making low altitude drops.

(h) The smoke mission in support of UDT's operating off the western beaches was poorly executed. Four planes carried smoke tanks. Although three made releases, only one was satisfactory.

(i) Support missions against antiaircraft and DP guns were well executed. Results were in general obscure but the Air Coordinator reported in most instances that areas were given a thorough going-over. One direct hit on a pillbox on

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the south eastern beaches resulted in a heavy explosion and fire. Strafing planes destroyed a total of ten trucks near East Boat Basin.

(j) Light antiaircraft was intense throughout the day. Heavy antiaircraft was intense only during the strike on the southern part of the island by 42 Army Liberators. This strike was effective in that the majority of the bombs, dropped from 5000 feet, hit in the target area. There were however, some premature bursts at about 2000 feet. Photographs showed no known installations hit by these bombs, but the fragments may have caused some damage and casualties.

D -1 Day

(k) Weather was only partially good for flying. Throughout most of the day the sky was overcast with low hanging clouds. Most strikes were made thru breaks in cloud formations. By 1330 when the Army land-based bombing group arrived, a layer of low clouds with ceiling at 2000 feet held up the strike. The strike eventually was cancelled and the formation was returned to base.

(l) Sorties flown totalled 28 excluding TCAP and TASP. Missions totalled 27, of which 21 were of the direct support type. Support missions were concentrated largely against positions flanking the landing beaches. The SURIBACHI Mountain area was repeatedly attacked by both fighters and bombers, a total of six missions hitting the northeastern slopes where heavy antiaircraft and dual purpose guns were grouped. On the flank of the beaches the wooded, camouflaged area overlooking the East Boat Basin was struck repeatedly with Napalm, rockets and bombs.

(m) Results for the day are difficult to assess. It is, however, believed that support aircraft functioned better than on the preceding two days. Pilots appeared more familiar with their targets and attacked more deliberately. The Air Coordinators made several observation flights which resulted in pin-pointing of certain targets, and a consequent increase in effectiveness. Concentration attacks on targets, relatively few in number but studded with numerous installations, conceivably weakened the areas commanding the landing beaches.

(n) By early afternoon reports from the SURIBACHI area showed that antiaircraft had slackened appreciably. Light anti-aircraft was again intense in other areas. One Support Group of 8 VF and 8 VT reported after a strike that practically all torpedo planes had received hits, with four badly shot up. Only one of these planes, however, failed to reach base. All personnel from the crashed plane were rescued.

4. PHOTOGRAPHIC STRIKES

(a) Bad visibility prevented the completion of any photographic missions on D -3. On the following day three missions were run and drops on the ESTES successfully made. Low obliques of the landing beaches and SURIBACHI area were excellent. Verticals were unsatisfactory for damage assessment as a 6 inch focal length camera was used in the expectation that a low ceiling would require low altitude flights. However, the ceiling lifted and photographs were taken at 5000 to 6000 feet resulting in a scale of 1:12,000 instead of 1:5000 as called for in the plan.

(b) All deliveries of film were accomplished successfully and promptly.

(c) On D -1, three missions were successfully made. Proper focal length of lens was used and all pictures, verticals and obliques, were uniformly good. One photographic plane received hits in the wing but was able to return to base safely.

5. CHICHI JIMA AND HAHA JIMA STRIKES

(a) Morning and afternoon strikes against CHICHI JIMA and HAHA JIMA were scheduled by Commander Support Carrier Group (CTG 52.2) for all three days preceding the landing. At least two of these strikes were not completed because of bad weather. Available to this command on incomplete reports are the following results on D -2 Day.

(b) At CHICHI JIMA 12-15 operational single engine and twin-engine planes were found on the morning strike. These planes were strafed. One Betty is reported as probably destroyed, one Topsy probably damaged. The afternoon strike strafed three enemy planes on the ground, none of which flamed.

(c) 15-18 small craft were observed in the cove north

of SUSAKI Airfield.

(d) The afternoon strike reported that one 75 foot ammunition barge exploded and three small craft flamed after strafing.

(e) At HAHA JIMA various small craft were strafed in the coves. No damage is reported.

6. AIR DEFENSE

(a) Enroute from ULITHI via SAIPA N to IWO JIMA TG 52.2 furnished an eight plane Combat Air Patrol for control by U.S.S. ESTES (AGC 12) in the Movement Group area. Tracking and communications practice was obtained but no enemy planes were encountered.

(b) At the objective area an eight plane CAP was furnished by TG 52.2 to U.S.S. ESTES (AGC 12) for Fighter direction control from approximately 0620 to 1815 each day from D -3 Day to D -1 Day, inclusive. Primary Fighter Direction was delegated alternately to DD's BENNION, STEMBEL and BRYANT.

(c) No enemy planes were intercepted. It is believed that only two enemy planes appeared in the area during daylight. One, a Zeke apparently from IWO JIMA, was shot down by an OS2U from U.S.S. PENSACOLA early in the morning of D -3 Day. (No other planes are believed to have landed on or taken off from IWO JIMA.) The other, reported as an Irving, was sighted and chased by the Air Coordinator on the morning of D -1. CAP was vectored but bogey apparently saw the TBM chasing him and escaped at top speed low on the water.

(d) No night CAP was available during this three day period. The following enemy planes are regarded as the total of authentic enemy planes during darkness:

(1) At 0640(K) on D -2 the picket HALLIGAN, one of two DD's stationed 80 miles north of IWO JIMA, was attacked by three twin-engine planes receiving no damage and destroying one by antiaircraft.

(2) At 1957(K) on D -2 the TWIGGS shot down a bogey first reported by the picket 80 miles north and later tracked into the objective area.

(3) About 2130(K) on D -1, one or two planes flying at about 100 feet altitude successfully bombed GAMBLE (DM) and BLESSMAN (APD). Radar reports on this plane were practically nil although there were a few weak and quickly fading contacts. Use of radar not indicated. BLESSMAN believed enemy homed visually on wake, as ship was making 22 knots while attempting to join a movement group, and wake was phosphorescent. At 0615(K) DOG Day Force Fighter Direction in U.S.S. ELDORADO relieved Force Fighter Director Officer in U.S.S. ESTES (AGC 12).

7. COMMUNICATIONS: Fighter Direction and Inter Fighter Director nets were generally satisfactory. Further comments have been made in the communications report. Use of authenticators was nil.

8. WEATHER: On D -3 and D -1 Days weather was poor for flying and particularly poor for visibility. Practically solid cover existed from lower levels of 100 to 7000 feet up to undetermined top level. CAP was kept at or below mattress on D -2 Day. Flying weather and visibility were good.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) That position of CVE's and nearby CV's be obtained by ECM hourly.

(b) That definite information be obtained from CVE's and from U.S.S. ESTES on desirability and feasibility of operating the U.S.S. ESTES YE/YG.

(c) That CVE's, particularly on first day of operation, brief pilots more thoroughly on location of base to which they are to report.

(d) That CVE's and CV's check outgoing planes carefully for IFF and pancake them if they are not showing IFF.

(e) That CVE's be briefed on new CentComTWO VHF channel designations, e.g. "Uncle" for SAD primary and "William" for Fighter Director Primary.

(f) That pilots flying one type of mission be thoroughly briefed on channels in use by planes on other missions, so that if, for example, an Anti-Sub Patrol Plane sees a bogey

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and later sees the CAP searching for it he may pass information to them that he is not the bogey and that the bogey is flying such and such a course.

(g) That ASP plane radio equipment be checked carefully.

10. ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS

General Comments

(a) The Air Plan called for target ASP planes to use a specialized voice call. This had two purposes in view, (1) to identify its patrol sector and (2) to differentiate it from local ASP planes, who were using a simple plane call plus the carrier call. For example, 1 Able Sabre for TASP meant that this plane, from carrier whose voice call was Sabre, was assigned from flight Able and had sector 1 to patrol. During the operation many TASP planes did not use this specialized call, thus creating confusion and resulting in unnecessary transmissions.

(b) Difficulty was encountered in planes coming up on wrong frequencies and using the wrong IFF code.

(c) An overlap of 30 minutes should be set-up for relieving planes. In this way each sector has 30 minutes of two-plane search. At least this much time is needed to receive all position reports and to instruct relieving plane.

D -3 Day

(d) No contact. Planes were late in reporting on station due to bad weather. Sectors were only partially flown as weather conditions permitted. Total sorties: 20.

D -2 Day

(e) No submarine contacts reported. Plane on sector 4 was given permission to strafe 3 small luggers on the east side of KITA IO JIMA. Total sorties: 42.

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D -1 Day

(f) Two submarine contacts were reported. PC 800 reported contact bearing 145° distance 8 miles from Point H. Relief plane for Sector 4, voice call 392 Ruler, was ordered to the scene for Hunter-Killer Operations. Upon arrival at scene the contact was classified as non-sub and plane ordered to Sector 4 for patrol.

(g) The second contact was reported by U.S.S. BREESE, bearing 110° distance 20 miles from U.S.S. ESTES. 392 Ruler, the nearest plane, was again vectored to the contact. This plane worked with the destroyer for 2½ hours. All attacks were made by the destroyer and the contact was finally evaluated as non-submarine. Attack was ordered off by competent authority.

(h) Total sorties: 26 - Planes were remaining on station for three hours in contrast with 1½ hour patrols on D -2.

11. AIR SEA RESCUE OPERATIONS

(a) The chart and chronological incidents below represent Air-Sea Rescue Operations from D -3 to D -1 inclusive:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PLANE</u>	<u>CAUSE</u>	<u>LOST</u>	<u>SAVED</u>
Feb. 16	OS2U	Operational		1
Feb. 16	FM-2	Probably Operational	1	
Feb. 16	FM-2	Combat		1
Feb. 17	TBM	Combat		3
Feb. 18	FM-2	Operational		1
Feb. 18	TBM	Combat		3

February 16, 1945

Air-Sea Rescue Incident No. 1

At 0745 an OS2U from the U.S.S. NEW YORK made a forced

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landing due to engine trouble at a point 15,000 yards, bearing 198° T from Mount SURIBACHI. As a result of the forced landing the wing tip float of the plane was broken.

The destroyer HALL immediately stood-by the damaged plane and was shortly relieved by the sea-plane tender WILLIAMSON.

At 0800 the SALT LAKE CITY was directed to recover the plane. At 0835 the Flag Bridge reported that all personnel had been rescued but that the plane was lost. Names of crew unavailable.

Air-Sea Rescue Incident No. 2

One VF from the SARGENT BAY of the Target Combat Air Patrol, which arrived on station at 0930 never succeeded in joining up with his group.

After arriving in the area, he stated that he didn't know where he was but believed that he was somewhere "west of the weather front." (At this time the front was from east to west).

CIC could contact him only through the DD BENNION and the DD STEMBEL. CIC instructed him to turn on emergency IFF. He received the transmission but was apparently unable to turn on his emergency IFF.

The last course that he was known to be on, according to his own report, was 090° T.

CIC gave him a vector of 070° but received no acknowledgement. Thereafter we heard no more from him, but CTU 52.2.1 was in contact with him for a short time.

The plane failed to return to base and no further reports have been received.

Anti-Submarine patrol planes were alerted to be on the lookout for the lost plane. Name of pilot unavailable.

Air-Sea Rescue Incident No. 3

At 1715, during a strafing attack on Mount SURIBACHI, a VF from the LUNGA POINT was reported to be smoking from his

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by anti-aircraft.

At 1715, a "crash" report was heard giving his position as three miles, bearing 300° T from Mount SURIBACHI. It was reported that the pilot had climbed out of the plane and got into his rubber boat.

The DMS HOPKINS observed the crash, and immediately proceeded to the scene. Meanwhile CTF 52 despatched the DD MULLANY to effect the rescue.

At 1724, the HOPKINS was alongside the survivor, and the MULLANY's mission was cancelled.

Rescue was completed at 1730 and the LUNGA POINT notified. Pilot's name: Ensign Stevenson.

February 17, 1945

Air-Sea Rescue Incident No. 1

At 1730 a VT from the PETROF BAY, call 387 Circus, made a water landing at position reported as four miles bearing 330° T from Mount SURIBACHI. All personnel were observed to get out into life-raft. Two ships started heading for scene, the HOWARD (DMS 7) and the YMS 340. The HOWARD arrived first and picked up the three survivors. Names not available.

February 18, 1945

Air-Sea Rescue Incident No. 1

At dawn two VT's from the ANZIO were launched on a special search for a survivor reported 17 February by a B-29 at position 214 miles bearing 089° T from IWO JIMA. Both planes were equipped with droppable survival gear.

At 0815 these planes reported sighting a survivor 127 miles bearing 090° T from IWO JIMA - which distance was later changed to 135 miles. At 0940 the TEXAS launched an OS2U for rescue mission. At 1040 an ARKANSAS VOS joined up, established communications with him and they proceeded on mission.

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At 1200 the VOS's arrived at scene where VT's were still orbiting and relieved them. The TEXAS plane immediately landed and effected rescue.

The VOS's returned to base and the survivor was placed aboard the WILLIAMSON which delivered him to the ESTES.

The pilot was from the NATOMA BAY - plane call Ruler 32 - and was launched pre-dawn as a part of the first LCAP on 16 February. He never succeeded in joining up due to weather conditions and became hopelessly lost in a storm. He made a water landing seven hours later at 1330. The loss of the plane was never reported to Commander Air Support Control Unit.

Pilot was not survivor orbited by B-29. Name: Ensign D.P. Valpey. Condition: Good.

Air-Sea Rescue Incident No. 2

At 1400 a report was received of a VF forced down due to antiaircraft after a bombing run. Position: four miles due north of Mount SURIBACHI.

A VOF pilot reported that a ship was headed toward the three survivors who were in a rubber boat with dye marker showing.

At 1437 VICKSBURG reported that the PAUL HAMILTON (DD 590) was picking up survivors.

The aircraft's parent was MAKIN ISLAND - call of plane 312 Fido. Names: Lieutenant (jg) H.A. Hughs, D.A. Haas, ARM3c, D.C. Smith, AMMlc. Condition: Not reported but assumed satisfactory.

Air-Sea Rescue Incident No. 3

At 1715 the picket destroyers stationed about 80 miles northeast of IWO JIMA relayed a message from a BENNINGTON VB - call 281 Legion, stating that possibly two parachutes had gone down at a position one mile due west of the highest point of CHICHI JIMA, which would place them in Futain Harbor. There was no report of rubber boat or dye marker. No action was taken by TF 52 on this report.

12. COORDINATION OF AIR SUPPORT AND NAVAL GUNFIRE

(a) Prior to arrival at the objective, conferences were held with representatives of Staff Intelligence and Naval Gunfire with the purpose of coordinating surface bombardment with air strikes. As a result of these conferences, a list of targets was prepared; the targets being given priority ratings in accordance with their relative importance to the task given to the Amphibious Support Force. This list was divided into three groupings. One group consisted of targets which Naval Gunfire could handle most effectively. Another group was made up of those targets that could be hit better by aircraft. The last group were targets which were assigned jointly to air and gunfire. It was understood that targets in either of the first two groups might be fired upon by either gunfire or air, but that in general target assignments would follow the groupings.

(b) This arrangement worked excellently in operation. The majority of targets, attacked by aircraft of an Advance Air Support Control Unit, are of the pre-determined type. This is especially true of the first day, when there has been little opportunity for accurate target spotting. The advantage of a previously prepared list of targets which can be most effectively attacked, is obvious. It is recommended that this practice be continued.

13. COMMUNICATIONS

(a) On the whole communications were excellent. A few mechanical failures were experienced but were quickly corrected by the technicians on duty.

(b) The Air-Sea Rescue net was used effectively. Army land based planes used this net for reporting in and results were good. Considerable interference from C.W., was noticed occasionally but did not block out messages.

(c) For much of the time the HK net had C.W., and other interference. Traffic was light and incoming signals were readable. In the sole instance where HK tactics were employed, the surface vessel (BREESE DM 18) could be reached by neither this ship (on HK, GW or LAW) nor the plane assigned to work with it. Commander Air Support Control Unit, over HK, had perfect communications with the plane. The latter communicated

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with the BREESE via blinker.

(d) The ASC(HF) proved successful. Traffic was not heavy and only Commanders of CVE task group and units were on with Advance Commander Air Support Control Units. ASC(VHF) was not used but it is doubtful that it would have functioned because of 5 X 5 feed over from 37.2 mcs. used by Underwater Demolition Teams.

(e) The General Warning net was used for general alerts and traffic was very light.

(f) The local air warning net was used for communications by all anti-submarine patrol planes. Radio discipline was bad and frequently messages had to be repeated. Local carrier anti-submarine pilots should be thoroughly briefed on radio discipline and patrol plans. In several instances important transmissions from long range anti-submarine patrol planes (TASP) were cut out by local ASP. Contact with TASP planes was difficult at times; some being off frequency and others having faulty equipment.

(g) The SAD(S) (5135 kcs) was not used as planned, primarily because of plane equipment failure. In one instance the transmitter on a plane was 70 kcs. off frequency, and several planes had to come up on SAD-1 or SAD-2 for any communications. It is recommended HF radio equipment in planes be thoroughly checked before leaving the carrier.

(h) The SAD(VHF) - nets (140.02 and 140.58) using TDQ transmitters and RCK receivers were very satisfactory. However, at least one spare TDQ should be installed in each AGC, and RCK receivers are recommended for use in voice filter.

(i) General Comments

(1) C.W. caused considerable interference on all HF nets but did not completely block out any transmissions.

(2) Wave traps were used successfully to reduce feed-over on several circuits and it is recommended that they be made part of permanent installation.

(3) RAO-4 receivers were satisfactory except for

band switches and phasing controls. Structural weaknesses were the cause of most trouble.

(4) Feed-over from inter-commander Air Support Control Unit nets was nil.

14. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) Weather conditions with moderately high ceiling and fair visibility is considered of major importance to effective air operations during the bombardment phase. During this phase all pilots lack complete familiarity with the target area and some pilots lack experience in this type of work. Precision bombing and firing is mandatory in order to obtain the desired results and it is therefore necessary that all pilots be able to locate the assigned targets definitely and accurately and have sufficient ceiling to make precise firing runs. When low ceiling and reduced visibility are encountered at the objective which is defended by intense antiaircraft it is not practicable for pilots to study their targets in advance. They must then resort to a hasty procedure that is not conducive to precise bombing and destructive results.

(b) Coordination and cooperation between Naval Gunfire and Air Support Control was excellent and functioned smoothly and promptly. This degree of coordination was made possible by the fact that both Naval Gunfire and Air Support were controlled exclusively from the Joint Operations room affording continuous direct contact and mutual exchange of information with a minimum of delay. A target index prepared by Staff Intelligence was used jointly by both Air Support and Naval Gunfire and it proved to be very helpful. It is strongly recommended that Air Support and Naval Gunfire continue to be controlled from the Joint Operations Room.

(c) There were, as usual, entirely too many "Bogeys" reported which later proved to be friendly. This problem is serious at present and will increase in importance in future operations. It is therefore recommended that consideration be given to the establishment of a Filter Center afloat at the objective. A Filter Center adequately manned and equipped plus strictly enforced air discipline among friendly aircraft may well prove to be one solution to this identification problem. Such a Filter Center should be separate and distinct from the present CIC.

ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

(d) In order to assist in promptly evaluating the results of air attacks during the bombardment phase it is recommended that the Air Coordinator carry a photographer and each target be photographed immediately upon completion of the attack. These photographs can be dropped to the command ship when the Air Coordinator leaves the vicinity and prompt photographic interpretation may then be accomplished. The Air Coordinator should continue to make his own observations and report the results in addition to this photographic coverage. This photographic function should be carried out in addition to the Air Coordinator's normal duties and should not in any way interfere with the performance of those duties.



E.C. PARKER,
Captain, U.S.N.

Commander Air Support Control Unit,
Amphibious Group ONE.

APPENDIX I

SORTIES DETAIL

(1) Sorties

	<u>VF</u>	<u>VT</u>	<u>VHB</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
D -3	147	56	36	239
D -2	181	113	42	336
D -1	<u>198</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>318</u>
	526	265	102	893

(2) Sorties Detail

(A) Available Support Missions

	<u>D -3</u>	<u>D -2</u>	<u>D -1</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
VF	84	107	128	319
VT	32	62	58	152
VHB	36	42	24	102

(B) For Photos

VF	2	6	6	14
VT	1	3	3	7
SpCinCPac			1	1

(C) For Hydrographic Work

VT	3	2	3	8
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(D) For Smoke Mission

VT		4	5	
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ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

	<u>D -3</u>	<u>D -2</u>	<u>D -1</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
(E) Target CAP				
VF	61	68	64	193
(F) ASP				
VT	<u>20</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>88</u>
	239	336	318	893

ENCLOSURE (D) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

APPENDIX II

MISSIONS DETAIL

	<u>D -3</u>	<u>D -2</u>	<u>D -1</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Support (Navy)	6	18	21	45
Support (Army)		1		1
Photographic	1	3	3	7
Hydrographic	3	2	3	8
Smoke	-	<u>1</u>	-	<u>1</u>
	10	25	27	62

ENCLOSURE (E) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS
IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

COMMENTS ON UDT OPERATIONS

1. (a) The scheduled operations of the Underwater Demolition Teams prior to D Day were in brief:-

- (1) Reconnaissance of Eastern beaches on D -2 forenoon.
- (2) Reconnaissance of Western beaches on D -2 afternoon.
- (3) Demolition operations either on night of D -2/D -1 or on D -1, or both, as found necessary in reconnaissance, to remove obstacles, natural or man-made, which might be found in the approaches to the beaches. Removal of anti-boat mines. Marking channels.
- (4) Assembly and dissemination of information on the foregoing.

(b) The UDT operations, including operations of the close supporting DD's and LCI(G)'s, were under the command of CTG 52.4 (ComUDT'sPac). Only a brief summary of the operations is given here. As CTG 52.4 will cover the operations fully in his action report.

2. The reconnaissance operation on the Eastern beaches took place on D -2 with ROGER hour (the time boats containing UDT personnel and LCI(G)'s in close support commenced approaching the beach from positions 2000 yards offshore) at 1100(K). Heavy fire was directed by the enemy at these craft, probably from the high ground between the East Boat Basin and MOTOYAMA, possibly also from SURIBACHI and remaining blockhouses and pill boxes not destroyed on the slopes behind the beaches. All LCI(G)'s were hit, LCI(G) 474 so badly that she later was sunk (in 100 fathoms of water) by our gunfire. LCI(G)'s suffered many casualties. LEUTZE was damaged and her C.O. seriously wounded. No damage is known to have been received by UDT boats. At the request of CTG 52.4 smoke was laid with W.P. projectiles along the ridge from SURIBACHI to about 400 yards north of East Boat Basin. This smoke plus increased rate of neutralization fire, appeared to decrease effectiveness of enemy fire.

3. Despite the heavy fire the UDT personnel carried out successfully their mission of reconnaissance. One swimmer was not recovered, and is believed to have been hit by enemy fire. The operation was completed about 1300. The reconnaissance disclosed that there were no underwater obstacles in the beach approaches and that surf and beach conditions were suitable for landing.

ENCLOSURE (E) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATION IN THE IWO JIMA OPERATIONS

4. Damage to all the available LCI(G)'s necessitated their elimination from the support of reconnaissance of the Western beaches. ROGER hour was 1615(K). Destroyers in support closed to 2000 yards of the shoreline instead of remaining at 3000 yards. Fire was drawn, but was less intense than off the Eastern beaches, and neither damage nor casualties are known to have occurred. Again WP projectile smoke was laid by battleships. The operation was completed about 1800(K). The reconnaissance disclosed that the Western beaches were free of underwater obstacles and that beach and surf conditions were suitable for landing.

5. In view of the information obtained on reconnaissance no demolition operations were considered to be necessary and none was undertaken.

6. Recommendations regarding fire support of Underwater Demolition operations are contained in Enclosure (C). Comment and recommendations on the actual operation of the UDT's are withheld pending receipt of the report of CTG 52.4.

ENCLOSURE (F) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS
IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

COMMENTS ON MINESWEEPING
16 February 1945, (D -3)

1. Minesweeping operations were started on schedule by TU 52.3.1, consisting of the HOPKINS (DMS 13), HAMILTON (DMS 18), CHANDLER (DMS 9), DORSEY (DMS 1), HOWARD (DMS 7), and HOGAN (DMS 6) commenced sweeping Sweep Area ONE at 0600(K) for moored and acoustic mines, completing the area at 1206(K).

2. Sweep Area THIRTEEN, north of 24° 30' N., meanwhile was being swept for the same types of mines by the SERENE (AM 300), SHELTER (AM 301), and STRATEGY (AM 308) from TU 52.3.4, with PC 800 as mine disposal vessel. This unit started the sweep at 0600(K) and completed at 1500(K), with negative results. However, at 0830(K) a mine was reported on the surface which was identified as a floating Japanese Type 93 Model 3 and was sunk by gunfire from the PC 800, at ten miles 122° (T) from Mt. SURIBACHI.

3. Mark VI drill mine cases were planted as buoys to mark the inshore limits of the swept area in Sweep Area FIVE, which was swept for moored, acoustic, and magnetic mines by CHAMPION (AM 314), ARDENT (AM 340), DEFENSE (AM 317), DEVASTATOR (AM 318), TU 52.3.5, together with STRENGTH (AM 309) and SUCCESS (AM 310) from TU 52.3.4 to do the magnetic sweeping. During the sweep of the area, shore installations, particularly from target areas 166 B, E and 167 A, B, opened fire upon the unit which was returned by them and their support vessel BREESE (DM 18). The entire area was swept by 1610(K), with the exception of the area 1000 yards east and west from HIGASHI IWA, which was not swept because of the shoals there. The DEFENSE (AM 317) fouled her sweep gear on an underwater object bearing 212° (T), distance 6100 yards from Mt. SURIBACHI.

4. After the first pass was made in Sweep Area ONE, three ships of TU 52.3.1, then left the formation and commenced operations in Sweep Area FOUR for moored and acoustic mines, starting at 0712(K) and completing at 1230(K). These three ships were then joined by the rest of the vessels in TU 52.3.1 which had been completing Sweep Area ONE, and the entire unit made one pass for moored and acoustic mines in Sweep Area THREE between the 300 and 500 fathom curves, completing at 1457(K).

5. The REVEL (AM 284) from TU 52.3.4 joined as a magnetic sweeper with TU 52.3.3 comprising the SKIRMISH (AM 303), SIGNET (AM 302), STAUNCH (AM 307), SCURRY (AM 304), SPECTACLE (AM 305),

ENCLOSURE (F) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

SPECTER (AM 306), and TRACY (DM 19) in a moored, acoustic and magnetic sweep of Sweep Area TWO. This unit was the only one which completed its minesweeping schedule within the assigned time on this day, completing area TWO at 1102(K) and then executing a sweep for the same types of mines in Sweep Area SIX, finishing the latter area at 1632(K). No mines were swept in any area, and generally, the sweeping was without incident.

17 February 1945, (D -2)

6. Operations were again commenced on schedule with TU 52.3.1, consisting of the same ships as the previous day, executing a sweep for moored and acoustic mines in Sweep Area FOURTEEN, completing at 1022(K). The unit then returned for screening duty, all of the minesweeping task units being assigned to the screen upon completion of each day's sweeping assignment.

7. It had been planned for TU 52.3.6 (composed of TU 52.3.7, YMS's 288, 323, 362, 374, 401, 426, 428, and LINDSEY (DM 32) with SPECTACLE (AM 305) from TU 52.3.3) and TU 52.3.8 (YMS's 193, 235, 345, 361, 407, 475, and SC 1054 with SPECTER (AM 306) from TU 52.3.3) to make one pass for moored, acoustic and magnetic mines through Sweep Area NINE starting at 0800(K), but as the unit made their approach, they were fired upon by shore batteries and were ordered to retire by CTG 52.3. Heavy fire support units were brought up for cover, and the sweep was started at 0940(K). During the sweep, the unit was fired upon again from shore, which fire was returned by vessels of the unit and the covering heavy fire support ships. Dan buoys were laid to mark the inshore limit of the area swept, being laid at 1000 yards intervals by YMS 193 and YMS 401. The YMS 362 fouled her gear on an underwater object during the sweep. The area was completed at 1055(K) with negative results. The unit then retired to the south until time to start the sweep of Sweep Area TEN.

8. Sweep Area EIGHT, except the inshore 25% was swept by TU 52.3.5 (ARDENT (AM 340), DEFENSE (AM 317), DEVASTATOR (AM 318) and CHAMPION (AM314)), and drew fire from shore batteries from the east corner of IWO JIMA while sweeping for moored and acoustic mines in that area. The fire was returned by ships of the unit, with results unreported. Upon completion of the sweep of this area, TU 52.3.5 was scheduled to make one pass through Sweep Area THREE between the 200 and 300 fathom curves for moored and acoustic mines.

9. In Sweep Area SEVEN, TU 52.3.4, consisting of SERENE (AM 300), SHELTER (AM 301), STRATEGY (AM 308), STRENGTH (AM 309),

ENCLOSURE (F) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

SUCCESS (AM 310), REBEL (AM 284), and PC 800 drew 40mm fire from the island while executing a sweep for moored and acoustic mines. The unit returned the fire and was ordered to retire by CTG 52.3 until fire support vessels arrived.

10. TU 52.3.6, composed of the same vessels that swept in area NINE in the morning, was to commence operations in Sweep Area TEN at 1300(K), but the sweep did not start until 1430(K) when heavy fire support ships and two destroyers were ready to give covering fire. One pass was made through the area for moored, acoustic and magnetic mines, the sweepers drawing fire from the island which was returned by them and the heavy fire support ships. Some of the sweepers were seen to even be firing their .50 caliber machine guns. The area was completed at 1615(K) without any casualties.

11. TU 52.3.3 (SKIRMISH (AM 303), SIGNET (AM 302), STAUNCH (AM 307), SCURRY (AM 304)), less SPECTACLE and SPECTER which were operating with TU 52.3.6, operated with the screen during the entire day, having no sweeping assignment. As the other minesweeping task units completed their assigned sweeping schedules, they were ordered to the screen.

12. CTG 52.3 reported that all scheduled areas were completed prior to 1800(K), with the sole exception of the inshore 25% of Sweep Area EIGHT.

18 February 1945, (D -1)

13. Sweep Area THIRTEEN was completed by a sweep for moored and acoustic mines south of 24° 30' N. by TU 52.3.5, by the same vessels which had swept in Sweep Area EIGHT the previous day. The unit was to commence operations in the area at 0600(K), and the sweep was reported as being completed at 1648(K), a long operation.

14. At 1445(K), heavy fire support ships moved around on the north side of IWO JIMA to give covering fire for the completion of sweeping on that side of the island where the minesweeping vessels had encountered a considerable amount of fire on the previous day. TU 52.3.3 (SKIRMISH (AM 303), SIGNET (AM 302), STAUNCH (AM 307), SCURRY (AM 304), SPECTACLE (AM 305), SPECTER (AM 306)) swept Sweep Area SEVEN for magnetic mines, and again drew fire from the island which was returned. Meanwhile, TU 52.3.4, composed of the same ships which had swept in Sweep Area SEVEN on DOG minus TWO, was sweeping Sweep Area EIGHT for moored, acoustic and magnetic mines, making one

ENCLOSURE (F) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

pass inshore of the 100 fathom curve and then between IWO JIMA and HIGASHI IWA, completing at 1545(K). This unit also drew fire from shore installations which was returned by the unit and the heavy fire support ships which were furnishing excellent covering fire.

15. Since TU 52.3.1 (HOPKINS (DMS 13), HAMILTON (DMS 18), CHANDLER (DMS 9), DORSEY (DMS 1), HOWARD (DMS 7), HOGAN (DMS 6), BREESE (DM 18)) and TU 52.3.6 (YMS's 323, 362, 374, 401, 426, 478, 288, 407, 193, 235, 345, 361, 475 and SC 1054) had no minesweeping assignments, they were refueled and assigned to the screen. Other units were assigned to the screen as they completed the areas assigned to them.

16. CTG 52.3 visual dispatch to CTF 52 of 180644 advised that he considered the minesweeping to date sufficient until the island is taken. No mines were swept during the three days of sweeping, and no casualties were suffered by any vessel of TG 52.3 while engaged in minesweeping operations.

17. The GAMBLE (DM 15) was hit by a bomb from a low-flying twin engine bomber at 2255(K) while on screening duty and was taken in tow by the HAMILTON (DMS 18).

ENCLOSURE (G) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS
IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

COMMENTS ON BATTLE DAMAGE

1. PENSACOLA (CA 24)

Hit by enemy shore batteries at 0936K, 17 February with two shells of about 8" caliber and four shells believed to be 6" and 3.5".

Damage - Compartments A302A, 400A, A309L flooded; CIC rendered inoperative; one plane destroyed, catapult damaged; one 5" gun inoperative; sick bay flooded; degaussing cable cut.

Ship's force controlled fires and flooding, made all necessary temporary repairs.

2. LCI(G)'s 474, 441, 473, 438, 449, 457, 466, 471, 469, 450, 346, 348.

Hit by enemy shore batteries, mortar or small caliber fire on morning of 17 February while covering UDT beach reconnaissance.

Damage - LCI(G) 474 capsized as a result of underwater damage and was ordered sunk during the afternoon of 17 February. Four LCI(G)'s received temporary repairs from TERROR and one from ESTES, during night of 17 February. LCI(G)'s 441 and 473 had permanent machinery casualties requiring towing from objective. LCI(G)'s 438, 449, 457, 466, 471, required extensive repairs but were able to proceed under own power. LCI(G)'s 450 and 469 required above-water hull repairs only. LCI(G)'s 346 and 348 were fully repaired by 18 February.

3. BLESSMAN (APD 48)

Bombed at 2130 18 February.

Damage - Hit starboard side amidships over forward fireroom in troop spaces. One engine and fireroom were damaged as well as much topside equipment. Power and water pressure were lost temporarily.

GILMER (APD 11) assisted in extinguishing fires and BLESSMAN was taken in tow by ARDENT (AM 340)

ENCLOSURE (G) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

4. GAMBLE (DM 15)

Bombed about 2200, 18 February; hit by two 250 pound bombs.

Damage - Both firerooms flooded, both boilers exploded, all power lost.

HAMILTON (DMS 18) went alongside and brought hoses and flooding under control. GAMBLE was taken in tow by DORSEY (DMS 1).

5. LEUTZE (DD 481)

Hit by shell of about 3" caliber from enemy shore batteries at 1106(K), 17 February.

Damage - Forward stack, stack partition, uptake, and air casing of number one boiler holed. Additional minor topside damage. Ship remained operational.

ENCLOSURE (H) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS
IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

COMMENTS ON MEDICAL FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

1. Casualties were sustained as follows:

	<u>W.I.A.</u>	<u>M.I.A.</u>	<u>K.I.A.</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
U.S.S. PENSACOLA	98	0	17	115
LCI Group 449	20	0	17	37
457	16	0	0	16
466	18	1	4	23
469	7	0	0	7
471	6	0	11	17
473	30	0	0	30
438	2	0	0	2
441	27	0	6	33
450	6	0	0	6
U.S.S. TENNESSEE	4	0	0	4
U.S.S. LEUTZE (DD 481)	4	0	0	4
U.S.S. BLESSMAN (APD 48)	11	0	0	11
UDT Teams embarked in BLESSMAN	20	0	2	22
U.S.S. WASMUTH (DMS 15)	2	0	0	2
U.S.S. BATES	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	272	1	57	330

The U.S.S. GAMBLE (DM 15) was hit by a bomb but did not make a casualty report to this Command. The casualty report from UDT's has not yet been received.

2. Medical care was rendered and the casualties kept aboard the larger ships in which they occurred. The smaller vessels transferred their cases to any convenient ship which could take them. The U.S.S. TERROR (CM5) took fifty-eight cases from the LCI Group. The remaining cases were treated aboard NEW YORK, TENNESSEE, and ESTES (AGC 12).

3. Due to necessity for not impeding combat operations transfer to the larger ships was sometimes slow and required, in many cases, repeated handling through small boats and APD's.

4. Medical supplies and facilities were adequate in all ships. Excellent first-aid was rendered aboard the small vessels.

ENCLOSURE (H) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

5. RECOMMENDATION: That in future operations it be stressed that during the pre-invasion phase, each ship and unit must make a personnel casualty report to its Unit Commander, giving number of personnel wounded, missing and killed in action. This report to be sent daily by 1700. Unit Commanders in turn should report to the Task Force Commander, casualties aboard each ship and unit under his Command. This report to be sent not later than 1800 daily.

ENCLOSURE (I) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS
IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

COMMENTS ON WEATHER
16-18 February 1945 (D -3 to D Day)

1. As Task Force 52 approached IWO JIMA, a moderate low was centered 600 miles to the northeast, with a front extending south of the target into a new wave development, then located about 200 miles to the west. We encountered the warm front of the wave late on the night of the 15th, and at dawn had a low broken to overcast of strato-cumulus at 1000 feet, and intermittent light rain. Because of low ceiling and visibility, conditions for spotting as well as air strikes were very poor at the opening of the action on 16 February.

2. The center of the wave development apparently passed just to the north of IWO JIMA at about 0900, when the wind shifted from southwest 12 knots to northwest 10 knots. Intermittent rain and low cloud did not break until 1400, when rain stopped, lower clouds gave way to an alto-stratus, alto-cumulus overcast at 9000 feet, and visibility improved to 12 miles. Conditions for spotting, gunfire and low level air strikes were satisfactory, but the B-24 strike scheduled for the afternoon was sent back. The sea was gentle, confused.

3. By the morning of the 17th the cold front had moved 300 miles southeast of IWO JIMA, and our weather was characterized by broken alto-cumulus clouds above 10,000 feet. Unlimited ceiling and visibility prevailed throughout the day. Weather was excellent for all types of operations, with wind from the northwest, 6 knots and a slight sea from northwest.

4. The good weather was short-lived. Another wave was located, forming just east of FORMOSA. By midnight of the 17th an alto-stratus overcast had formed and the following morning dawned with 6/10 of strato-cumulus and intermittent light rain. This wave was very small and moved rapidly, its center passing south of IWO JIMA by 2000 on the 18th. The lower clouds were variable in amount and visibility averaged 6 to 10 miles. Conditions were satisfactory for close range gunfire, spotting, and low-level air strikes, but again the B-24 strikes were cancelled because of 8/10 of low strato-cumulus at 1800 feet. Ceiling was 9000 feet about 50% of the day and 1800 feet the remainder. Surface winds were light, swinging from north-northeast to east. The sea was slight from northeast.

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5. The small wave disturbance moved eastward rapidly and on D Day the ceiling and visibility were unlimited, with only scattered alto-cumulus and cumulus clouds present. Surface wind was 4 to 8 knots from northeast to southeast, and the sea was slight from the northeast. Weather conditions were excellent for all types of operations on D Day.

6. REMARKS

(a) The most valuable aids to forecasting on this operation were submarine weather reports. These reports, coming from the proper areas, were of invaluable assistance in determining the correct weather situation.

(b) The search plane "in flights" and summaries were also of value, especially in areas to the north and east where the map would have otherwise been blank.

WEATHER SUMMARIES

16 February (D -3)

The day dawned with a low overcast at 1800 feet. Light intermittent rain reduced visibility to 3 - 6 miles. This condition continued until about 1000 when lower clouds broke giving glimpses of an alto-stratus overcast at 8000 feet. Intermittent rain and generally poor but variable visibility continued until 1400. During the remainder of the day, the visibility remained above 12 miles, and ceiling at 9000 feet under a solid alto-stratus overcast. Surface wind was gentle, west to northwesterly. The sea was slight from the northwest. Low ceiling and visibility made conditions for gunfire, spotting, and air strikes very unsatisfactory during the early morning, and unsatisfactory until about 1400, when they became average.

17 February (D -2)

Broken alto-cumulus clouds at 10,000 feet persisted throughout the day, together with a few lower cumulus. Conditions for operations were good, with ceiling and visibility unlimited, and a slight sea from the north. Surface wind was gentle, north to northwest.

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ENCLOSURE (I) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

18 February (D -1)

An alto-stratus overcast at 9000 feet persisted throughout the day. However, increased strato-cumulus clouds gave a ceiling at 1500 feet during the morning until 0700, and again during midday from 1000 until 1400. Occasional light rain reduced the otherwise 12 mile visibility to 6 miles at times. Conditions for low-level air strikes, close range gunfire, and spotting were satisfactory, but high level bombing was not possible during these times. Surface wind was light, northeasterly, and sea was slight from the northeast.

ENCLOSURE (J) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS
IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

COMMENTS ON COMMUNICATIONS

1. Upon the arrival of the ESTES at PEARL HARBOR, it was necessary to install considerable additional radio equipment to fit her out for use as flagship of Amphibious Support Force. Thereafter, and until departure for staging port, intensive efforts were made to test thoroughly all equipment and to calibrate on frequencies to be used in the forthcoming operation. In particular, the week's training in company with ELDORADO and AUBURN was invaluable. The actual use of equipment on planned frequencies permitted the correction of minor difficulties in advance of the operation. It also developed data as to which transmitters and antennas could be used on particular frequencies without unacceptable feed-over on other required circuits.

2. Having in mind the necessary alterations and the fact that this is the first operation in which the ESTES has participated, it is considered that the installation rendered excellent service.

3. RADAR COUNTERMEASURES

Enemy radar signals were intercepted (first intercept) as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Freq.</u>	<u>PRF</u>	<u>Pulse Width</u>	<u>True Bearing</u>	<u>Type Radar</u>
16 Feb.	0151K	23-32N 141-14E	156	500	7	---	--
16 Feb.	0620K	24-33N 141-09E	101	500	19	350	AS
16 Feb.	2047K	24-58N 141-05E	300	500	10	135	AS
18 Feb.	0342K	24-57N 141-09E	200	500	15	160	AS
18 Feb.	2105K	24-48N 141-10E	100	750	60-65	100	AS

The above radar signals were heard at various times on the 16th, 17th, 18th, and 19th of February.

Jamming, own and enemy:

- (a) None noted by the enemy.
- (b) Following by own forces:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Type of Jamming</u>	<u>Apparent Tactics</u>	<u>Effectiveness</u>
16 Feb.	0755K	Noise	To jam 159 mc. enemy radar.	Very good.
19 Feb.	0748K	Noise	Own forces adjusting jammers.	Fair
20 Feb.	0715K	Noise	Own forces adjusting jammers.	Very good.

SECRET

ENCLOSURE (J) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Type of Jamming</u>	<u>Apparent Tactics</u>	<u>Effectiveness</u>
21 Feb.	0855K	Noise	Jamming observed from bearing of our force, possibly resulting from erroneous report of enemy radar	Fair, could still read through.

4. PUBLICATIONS

(a) At the time of departure from PEARL HARBOR of Com PhibGrp ONE, Change TWO to CentComTWO and PAC-71 had not been made effective. Some of the ships in company did not have calls assigned in the old Annex B of CentComTWO, and as a temporary expedient, spare voice calls were assigned for use during passage. While enroute, on 21 January, two dispatches were received, one promulgating the effective date of Change 2 and PAC-71 as 3 February, and the other stating that these publications were effective within Task Force 51 as of 23 January. This Movement Task Group (52.11) was a part of Task Force 51, and therefore the new publications, including voice calls and shackle code, were effective within the movement group. Upon arrival at ULITHI, it was then necessary to use the old calls and old shackle with other ships present, and at the same time use the new ones with the ships of Task Force 51. On the 24th, promulgation was made by ComFwdArea that Change 2 and PAC-71 would become effective on 3 February; on the 25th, CincPoa OpPlan 11-44 and ComFIFTHFleet OpPlan 13-44 were made effective on 26 January, the latter providing for use of new publication. Use of Change 2 and PAC-71 by ships present at ULITHI was confirmed on 26 January by visual message to all ships present by ComFIFTHFleet. On the 30th, CincPoa message was received, directing delay of effective time of shackle key list until 3 February. To avoid confusion at ULITHI, it was necessary for ComFIFTHFleet to send another all ships message that CentCom TWO Change 2 was effective locally.

(b) The difficulties in providing for every situation are recognized; and the above situation is outlined so that in the future further consideration can be given to the conditions existing at large fleet anchorages in forward areas when putting into effect new publications having general usage.

(c) Annex A to CentComTWO provides a method for referring to frequencies "in the text of despatches and elsewhere by one of the letters" followed by designating numbers and letters. This method does not seem to be universally accepted. For example,

ENCLOSURE (J) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

certain channel numbers are prescribed by ComEsCarFor for VHF radio channels, differing from "D8 POA Aircraft VHF Channel Designation" contained in the insert on page A42 of Annex A to CentComTWO (Change 2). Also, Task Force 51 Communication Digest for Control Vessels, Small Craft, Beachmasters and Shore Parties, on page 37 lists "Amphibious Task Force Frequencies listed in order of Channel Numbers", which are the channel numbers of Table B4 on page A21, Annex A, CentComTWO Change 2. However, this method does not conform to the prescribed method described on first page of Annex A. It is recommended that a table of Channel Numbers be prepared and included in a Change to CentComTWO, so that all frequencies will be given one channel number and so that there will be uniformity of designating such radio channels among all the Task Units.

5. RADIO

(a) The Radio Frequency Plan for this operation was well conceived and functioned satisfactorily for this Task Force (TF 52) during the pre-D-day period. The Communication Plan of Task Force 51 was considered sufficient, and therefore no separate additional plan was issued by CTF 52.

(b) On the whole, circuit discipline was very good. However, continued command control is essential and daily stress must be laid on the vital necessity of each operator conforming to proper radio discipline and each commanding officer exercising active control of the circuits.

(c) At one time during the few days at ULITHI, circuit discipline on the Fleet Common (34.8 mcs) became very bad. Unauthorized transmissions, particularly at night, of music, obscenity, etc., became so prevalent that it was necessary for ComFIFTHFleet to promulgate an all ships message directing the suppression of unauthorized transmissions by direct officer supervision, and that the Commanding Officer or Watch Officer must retain personal custody of the microphone where no CWO was available. This directive reduced, but did not eliminate completely, the objectionable transmissions. More active indoctrination of all radio operators (including coxswains and boat crews of small boats) is essential; they must be made to realize that the cluttering of this important warning circuit may result in failure by themselves to receive a vital warning when needed most.

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(d) Particular commendation is due to Task Units 52.5.1 and 52.5.2 consisting of LCI(L) 627 and LCI(G)'s for the consistent excellence of their communications. Without exception, they answered up promptly when called, and traffic to and from them moved accurately and expeditiously.

(e) More instruction is needed for voice operators. It is not enough for radio operators to know the Radiotelephone procedure, but all individuals (officers and enlisted men other than radiomen), who use the microphone on radio circuits, must study and practice in order that they may use correct procedure. Many do not seem to realize that correct procedure is designed for accuracy and speeding up traffic handling. Among the more common errors may be listed the following:

- Use of both Roger and Wilco.
- Use of Over and Out.
- "Go Ahead" instead of "Send your message".
- "Repeat" instead of "Say again."
- "Error Error Error" instead of "Correction."
- Failing to speak slowly and distinctly.
- Omitting time group needed later for reference.

An excellent practice, which should become doctrine, is to write the message before it is given to the operator to transmit. Likewise, all incoming messages should be written. The increasing use tactically of voice radio circuits requires adherence to standard procedure, as many voice transmissions are now of more than momentary concern and require future reference and action.

(f) Training of radio operators in a general way is essential, but not enough. To make a complicated radio plan work under the stress and strain of an operation, it is absolutely necessary that the operators obtain training in the actual use of the calls and frequencies specified for use in the operation. This creates a real problem, where training is scheduled for forward areas, and in locations where danger of intercept by the enemy is real. However, intercept by the enemy is relatively less important, because sufficient training must be made available to permit our circuits to function and produce the communications which must be used in the operation. Therefore, it is recommended that radio silence restrictions on rehearsals and training circuits be modified, so as to permit training by all personnel with the actual frequencies and calls contained in the communication plan for the operation. Obviously the training must be closely supervised, and it is suggested that provision be made to build up

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radio traffic of similar nature on the same frequencies at particular locations (such as ULITHI) before and after departure of the Fleet units.

(g) The need for a tactical voice circuit for each task group continues to be apparent. It becomes acute when several large dispositions are attempting to maneuver in the same area, and the Fleet TBS circuit becomes overcrowded. Transport groups can easily use their respective Transport Group Common Frequency (on SCR 608) if the accompanying screen is able to receive and transmit on that frequency. It is recommended that high priority be given to equipping escort type vessels with SCR 608 equipment so that they may so operate with whatever transport group they may be assigned.

(h) Japanese transmissions have been observed on a number of our frequencies. It is believed that this results simply from the fact that the Japanese use many of the same frequencies as we. Only one instance (On Haiku Fox frequency) was noted where Japanese transmissions appeared to be intentional jamming.

(i) Maintenance of radio silence at staging point in forward area was facilitated by the use of Radio Teletype to the shore (on VHF). During the period at ULITHI, there were no transmissions on any normal ship-shore frequency. Necessary operational traffic was passed to the shore radio station for point to point circuits, by means of officer messenger or VHF radio teletype. All traffic of less than OP precedence was flown from ULITHI to Radio GUAM.

(j) Reception of Fleet "foxes" was much better during this operation than in the PALAU operation. One point deserves additional study, - the increasing need for decryption of traffic not addressed to all who need to know. There were several instances when we obtained dispatches, addressed in the heading to others, whereas in the text CTF 52 was included in the addressees. In order to keep abreast of the current operation, it has been necessary to decipher more than 80 percent of the Fleet Fox transmissions, a fourth of which were of no concern to us. There seems to be an increasing tendency to expect all commands to obtain necessary information by "snooping", i.e. decipherment of all traffic to other addressees which may appear to directly concern the decrypting ship. It is recommended that the principle be adhered to, that the originator is responsible for inclusion as action or information addressees all who need to know, and that

ENCLOSURE (J) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

commands decipher only those dispatches in which they are addressed in the heading. To avoid multitudinous information addressees, it is recommended that further study be given to providing collective calls to fit the particular operation in process of planning.

6. VISUAL

(a) Visual signalling was excellent. Visual silence was observed from sunset to sunrise, during which time limited number of operational dispatches was handled by Nan equipment. In cruising dispositions, the chain of visual responsibility conformed to conventional usage and permitted effective use of Nan equipment at night, particularly for 2000 position reports. In a large fleet anchorage, such as ULITHI, the value of Nan equipment is not so great, because of distances involved and lack of knowledge of exact bearing of addressed ships. We have not found Nan equipment to be effective beyond about 6,000 yards range. It is considerably slower than daylight signalling, and should be reserved for important operational traffic, letting routine administrative traffic wait for daylight methods.

(b) An all-around visual signalling light would be a great help for flagships in a fleet anchorage or at the objective.

(c) The division of ULITHI anchorage into twenty areas of visual responsibility with assigned linking ship in each, was effective in improving visual signalling. Without this arrangement, visual signalling was almost impossible, distances between ships being at times ten or twelve miles with many ships between.

(d) Use of semaphore at short distances has been stressed, but a very small percentage of messages were handled by that method. The principal means of visual signalling was the twelve inch light, but on many occasions, both while cruising and while in objective area, it was necessary to use the twenty-four inch light to reach distant addressees.

(e) While remaining in the objective area at night, the flagship displayed its X-12 Nan beacon (pulsating) for purposes of identification. Other ships were authorized to do likewise. On the first night, the TWIGGS (DD) was attacked by an enemy plane which she shot down. The TWIGGS suggested that the attacking plane may have been aided by a leaky Nan beacon, which may have been damaged during the day by shock of gunfire.

PROCESSED

ENCLOSURE (J) TO CTF 52 REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

7. TBS

(a) The TBS on primary frequency was reserved for tactical and emergency use, and discipline on this circuit was very good. While cruising, the TBS circuit was necessarily used for radar reporting by radar guardships not equipped with VHF equipment for transmitting on 142.02 mcs. At a fleet anchorage, such as ULITHI, it is essential to use TBS at times for logistics. However, the load was lightened by directing ships having a different type common VHF frequency to use that in preference to TBS (APD's 37.2 mcs., LCI(G)'s 38.7 mcs., etc., but this band could not be used from 1000 to 1500 local time daily). These circuits were authorized for use only when visual would not suffice.

(b) TBS number 2, while at ULITHI and when directed (via TBS No. 1) while cruising, was used for MCW transmissions on secondary frequency with ships having two equipments. The use of the fleet anchorage was limited to Flag Officers, battleships and cruisers. It functioned effectively, and permitted the handling of traffic beyond the immediate area over shore station point to point circuits (ships delivering traffic on MCW TBS secondary to flagship, which relayed by VHF Radio Teletype to the shore station). This use was invaluable. It is recommended that similar use be standard practice at fleet anchorages when large numbers of ships are present at times when radio silence on lower frequencies is essential.




COMMANDER TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

PHOTOGRAPHIC SUPPLEMENT

REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

FEBRUARY 1945


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LOWER CLIFF AREA AT BASE OF MT. SURIBACHI
AS OF FEBRUARY 3, 1945
Note the many caves in this area.

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MT. SURIBACHI AND LEFT FLANK OF LANDING BEACHES
D PLUS FIVE

Naval gunfire and dynamite have caused landslides which blocked entrances to many of the caves located in the cliffs near the waterline.

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GREEN BEACH TWO AND BASE OF SURIBACHI
(3 February 1945)
Coast defense positions are circled



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GREEN BEACH TWO AND BASE OF SURIBACHI
D PLUS FIVE- (February 24, 1945)
Coast defense positions were destroyed by D-1

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
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SURIBACHI MOUNTAIN--D minus TWO
Two of the positions marked are those appearing on
photograph---page 4.


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


SURIBACHI MOUNTAIN - D PLUS 5
Note condition of gun positions at base. This
four gun battery was destroyed on D -1 by USS
TENNESSEE.

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TARGET 135
Blockhouse on Red beach two under
construction as of November 27, 1944




TARGET 135
Blockhouse completed as of January 3, 1945

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TARGET 135

This blockhouse was completely destroyed by naval gunfire



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TYPICAL BEACH BLOCKHOUSE UNDER CONSTRUCTION
Openings on either side housed 20 to 40 mm. guns.

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TARGET 119 A
Northeast firing port of blockhouse-Red beach Two

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
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TARGET 119A
CLOSEUP OF NORTHEAST FIRING PORT
Gun was probably 20 or 40 mm.

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TARGET 114A

WRECKED BLOCKHOUSE RED BEACH 2

Large quantities of reinforcing bars were used
in all concrete emplacements.

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TARGET 114A

Firing port of blockhouse--Red beach Two
NEVADA, NEW YORK, TEXAS, ARKANSAS and TUSCALOOSA
destroyed or damaged many similar instalations.

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TARGET 114
Damaged blockhouse YELLOW Beach ONE


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WRECKED BLOCKHOUSE - RED BEACH ONE
Concrete slabs used in blockhouse construction
were 24 to 48 inches thick.

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TARGET 144
BLOCKHOUSE RED BEACH ONE
Direct hit - probably by 14 inch shell

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TARGET 144
INTERIOR VIEW LOOKING THROUGH FIRING PORT
Now used by marines as communication center

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TARGET 119A

REAR ENTRANCE TO BLOCKHOUSE - RED 2

This blockhouse was in two separate parts with a tunnel connecting. Oil drums were used for spare ammunition and water.

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TYPICAL WEAPON (20 mm) USED IN BEACH BLOCKHOUSES

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REAR OF COVERED ARTILLERY POSITION - RED 2
Top part is entrance and observation post.

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
~~SECRET~~



TARGET 117A
Covered artillery position from front
overlooking RED Beach 1

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AMMUNITION STORAGE AND POSSIBLY, WHEN EMPTY,
ONE MAN PILLBOX

Note openings near the top and cover at rear,
in background. Rear of RED Beach 2.

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
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TWIN MOUNT AUTOMATIC AA - VICINITY AIRFIELD NO 1
(Personnel shelter is underneath revetment)

A heavy AA concentration existed on Iwo. Air strikes were very effective in destroying or damaging a large number of these and heavier guns.

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PERSONNEL SHELTER
(Many of these were near airfields)

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ENTRANCE TO DAMAGED PILLBOX BETWEEN BEACHES RED ONE AND TWO
Construction was of logs and concrete covered with sand.

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


BATTERY OF FOUR CASEMATED GUNS IN CLIFF AREA
(Photo--February 3, 1945)

These guns were set back from cliff and did not become visible from seaward until a portion of the cliff was shot away.

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BATTERY OF FOUR CASEMATED GUNS IN CLIFF AREA
(Photo--D plus two)


This battery, three guns of which had not been definitely located due to almost perfect camouflage, was destroyed by USS IDAHO on D minus one. These particular guns (probably 6") inflicted substantial damage to LCI (G)'s on D minus two.

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JUN 21 1965

**COMMANDER TASK FORCE
FIFTY-TWO**

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS:
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.
DOD DIR 5200.10

**OPERATION PLAN
COMPHIBGROUPONE NO. A101-45**

Classification changed to

~~Confidential~~
Authority: *C70 Operations* : _____
By: *19 Jan 55*

AMPHIBIOUS SUPPORT FORCE

REGRAD *Unclassified* : _____
BY AUT *Sec of Def Ltr. Dtd 3 May 72* : _____
BY *D.M. Williams* : _____
ON *2 Nov 76* : _____

CAUTION

Every precaution must be taken to prevent this plan from falling into enemy hands.

If capture or loss of ship is imminent, this plan will be destroyed in its entirety.

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[Redacted]

16 MAR 1965

OM 6822
PO 1724863

Instructors Reading this Document

Sign Below (File No. -----)

Name ----- Date -----

Paul
Paulson 3 Sept.

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OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER, AMPHIBIOUS GROUP ONE
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

File: AL6-3(1)
Serial: 0003

JUN 21 1965

5 January 1945.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From: Commander Amphibious Group ONE.
To : Distribution.
Subject: Operation Plan No. ALOI-45 - Forwarding of.
References: (a) PacFlt. Conf. Ltr. 1CL-45, dated 1 January 1945.
(b) ALNav. 215 of December 1944.
Enclosure: (A) Subject Plan with Alternate Schedule of Events for DOG minus ONE Day.

1. The enclosure, which is complete with Alternate Schedule of Events for DOG minus ONE Day to be used in case UDTs are not required to operate on that day, is forwarded herewith. Accordingly, delete note at bottom of Page 25 of Annex (D) which states that the Alternate Schedule of Events will be forwarded at a later date.

2. This entire operation plan will be down-graded to CONFIDENTIAL one month after the objective has been officially declared secured and then used for training purposes if desired. Copies not required for study or retention may be destroyed by burning. No report of destruction will be made.

3. The attention of all commands concerned is invited to references (a) and (b) which contain all current instructions relative to action reports and war diaries.

W.H.P. BLANDY
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander T.F. 52
Amphibious Support Force,
and ComPhibGrpONE.

Distribution

Same as for OpPlan ALOI-45.

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.
DOD DIR 5200.10

L.D. Reedy
L.D. REEDY
Lieutenant, USNR.,
Flag Secretary.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Operation Plan
ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45

ADDENDUM TO ANNEX (D)

UNCLASSIFIED

ALTERNATE SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

DOG MINUS ONE DAY

IN EVENT UDTs ARE NOT REQUIRED TO OPERATE ON THAT DAY

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
0600	CAP 1 - 8 VF	On station.
0600	Sweep Unit FOUR	Begin sweeping operations in Minesweeping Area 13.
0700	Sweep Units ONE, TWO, FIVE and SIX	Available for screening duties.
0700	Screen Commander	Establish area screen around Fire Support Units. Normally TERROR and ESTES will operate within area screen as ordered by CTG 52.3 and CTF 53 respectively.
0700	Sweep Unit THREE	Begin sweeping operations in Minesweeping Area 8.
	As occurring	Each gunfire ship reports results of firing at each target or groups of targets. CTG 52.3 reports mines encountered, areas swept, and hydrographic information.
0700	CALIFORNIA LOUISVILLE WEST VIRGINIA NEVADA TUSCALOOSA SALT LAKE CITY MISSISSIPPI NEW MEXICO COLORADO CHESTER PENSACOLA	Commence firing from F.S. Sector I. Commence firing from F.S. Sector I. Commence firing from F.S. Sector II. Commence firing from F.S. Sector III. Commence firing from F.S. Sector II. Commence firing from F.S. Sector III. Commence firing from F.S. Sector II. Commence firing from F.S. Sector VI. Commence firing from F.S. Sector III. Commence firing from F.S. Sector V. Commence firing from F.S. Sector V.
About 0700	Land based planes.	On station. Commence bombing run.
0700		Ships which remained at objective over night resume stations in screen.

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Operation Plan
ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45 (Addendum to Annex (D) - Alternate Schedule of Events).

DOG MINUS ONE DAY

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
0700	Screen Commander	Designate destroyer to deliver photographs from ESTES to carrier designated by CTG 52.2. Inform CTF 52.
0730	Land based planes	Return to base.
0730	ASP 1 - 6 VT	On station.
	CAP 2 - 8 VF	On station.
	CAP 1 - 8 VF	Return to base.
	Air Coord. 1 -	On station. Reports results of air strikes, new targets, minefields, etc., as occurring.
	1 VT (VF)	
	Strike ABLE -	
	8 VF, 8 VT	On station.
	6 VT (Smokers)	On call.
During Forenoon	Fire Support Unit Commanders.	Report numbers of operational aircraft to CTF 52 and CTF 54. CTG 52.2 makes daily logistic report.
0800	LOUISVILLE	Cease firing.
	NEVADA	Cease firing.
	TUSCALOOSA	Cease firing.
	SALT LAKE CITY	Cease firing.
	NEW MEXICO	Cease firing.
0800	PORTLAND	Commence firing from F.S. Sector I.
	TEXAS	Commence firing from F.S. Sector III.
0830	CALIFORNIA	Cease firing.
	WEST VIRGINIA	Cease firing.
	MISSISSIPPI	Cease firing.
0842	Sweep Unit THREE	Secure from operations in Minesweeping Area 8. Begin operations in Area 7.
0845	Air Spot 2 - 6 VOF	On station.
0900	Photo plane 1 - 1 VT	On station.
	CAP 3 - 8 VF	On station.
	CAP 2 - 8 VF	Return to base.
	Strike BAKER -	
	8 VF, 8 VT	On station.

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Add. (D)

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~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Operation Plan

ComPhibGrpONE No. AIOI-45 (Addendum to Annex (D) - Alternate Schedule of Events).

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DOG MINUS ONE DAY

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1030	Air Spot 2 - 6 VOF	Return to base.
1100	TEXAS	Cease firing.
About 1100	Photo plane - 1 VT	On order CTG 52.10 execute photo mission for coverage of morning operations. Deliver negatives to ESTES.
1120	Sweep Unit THREE	Complete minesweeping operations in Area 7.
1130	PORTLAND NEVADA SALT LAKE CITY	Cease firing. Cease firing. Cease firing.
1145	Air Spot 4 - 6 VOF	On station.
1200	CALIFORNIA WEST VIRGINIA MISSISSIPPI	Cease firing. Cease firing. Cease firing.
1200	Photo Plane 1 - 1 VT (VF) CAP 5 - 8 VF CAP 4 - 8 VF Strike DOG - 8 VF, 8 VT Strike CHARLIE - 8 VF, 8 VT Air Spot 3 - 6 VOF	Return to base. On station. Return to base. On station. Return to base. Return to base.
1230	LOUISVILLE TUSCALOOSA NEW MEXICO CALIFORNIA WEST VIRGINIA MISSISSIPPI PORTLAND	Cease firing. Cease firing. Cease firing and retire to range B and C. Proceed to F.S. Sector II, remaining south of grid line 66. Proceed to F.S. Sector II, remaining south of grid line 66. Proceed to F.S. Sector II, remaining south of grid line 66. Proceed to F.S. Sector II, remaining south of grid line 66.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Add. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Operation Plan

ComPhibGrp ONE No. A101-45 (Addendum to Annex (D) - Alternate Schedule of Events).

DOG MINUS ONE DAY

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<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1230	LOUISVILLE	Proceed to F.S. Sector II, remaining south of grid line 66.
	TUSCALOOSA	Proceed to F.S. Sector II, remaining south of grid line 66.
1230	NEVADA	Close to about 2000 yards and commence firing from F.S. Sector III.
	TEXAS	Close to about 2000 yards and commence firing from F.S. Sector IV.
	COLORADO	Close to about 2000 yards and commence firing from F.S. Sector III.
	PENSACOLA	Close range and remain north of line through grid positions 73-81 and 80-82. Commence firing from F.S. Sector V.
	CHESTER	Close range and remain north of line through grid positions 73-81 and 80-82. Commence firing from F.S. Sector V.
1300	Land based planes.	On station. Commence bombing run.
1300	CALIFORNIA	Commence firing from F.S. Sector II.
	WEST VIRGINIA	Commence firing from F.S. Sector II.
1315	Air Spot 5 - 6 VOF	On station.
1330	PORTLAND	Commence firing from F.S. Sector II.
	LOUISVILLE	Commence firing from F.S. Sector II.
	SALT LAKE CITY	Commence firing from F.S. Sector IV.
1330	Photo Plane 2 - 1 VT	On station.
	CAP 6 - 8 VF	On station.
	CAP 5 - 8 VF	Return to base.
	Air Coord. 3 -	
	1 VT (VF)	On station.
	Air Coord. 2 -	
	1 VT (VF)	Return to base.
	Strike EASY -	
	8 VF, 8 VT	On station.
	Strike DOG -	
	8 VF, 8 VT	Return to base.
	Air Spot 4 - 6 VOF	Return to base.

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Operation Plan
 ComPhibGrpONE No. ALOI-45 (Addendum to Annex (D) - Alternate Schedule
 of Events).

DOG MINUS ONE DAY

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1400	NEVADA TEXAS COLORADO	Cease firing. Cease firing. Cease firing.
1500	CALIFORNIA LOUISVILLE WEST VIRGINIA	Cease firing. Cease firing. Cease firing.
1500	NEVADA TUSCALOOSA TEXAS MISSISSIPPI COLORADO NEW MEXICO	Commence firing from F.S. Sector III. Commence firing from F.S. Sector II. Commence firing from F.S. Sector IV. Commence firing from F.S. Sector II. Commence firing from F.S. Sector III. Commence firing from F.S. Sector V.
1500	CAP 7 - 8 VF CAP 6 - 8 VF Strike FOX - 8 VF, 8 VT Strike EASY - 8 VF, 8 VT Air Spot 5 - 6 VOF	On station. Return to base. On station. Return to base. Return to base.
1512	Sweep Unit FOUR	Complete operations in Minesweeping Area 13. Report to Screen Commander on order CTF 52.
1530	PORTLAND	Cease firing.
1600	CHESTER PENSACOLA	Cease firing. Cease firing.
About 1600	Photo plane - 1 VT	On order CTG 52.10 execute photo mis- sion for coverage of afternoon's opera- tions. Drop photos on ESTES.
1615	Air Spot 7 - 6 VOF	On station.
1700	Photo plane 2 - 1 VT CAP 8 - 8 VF CAP 7 - 8 VF	Return to base. On station. Return to base.

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Operation Plan

ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45 (Addendum to Annex (D) - Alternate Schedule of Events).

DOG MINUS ONE DAY

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1700	Air Coor. 4 - 1 VT (VF)	On station.
	Air Coor. 3 - 1 VT (VF)	Return to base.
1700	Strike GEORGE - 8 VT, 8 VF	On station.
	Strike FOX - 8 VT, 8 VF	Return to base.
	Air Spot 6 - 6 VOF	Return to base.
1700	NEVADA	Cease firing.
	TUSCALOOSA	Cease firing.
	TEXAS	Cease firing.
	SALT LAKE CITY	Cease firing.
	MISSISSIPPI	Cease firing.
	COLORADO	Cease firing.
	NEW MEXICO	Cease firing.
1700	CTF 52	Establish night patrols as follows:
	STEMBEL	Western beaches, high ground, bivouac areas, and airfields, illumination until 0100.
	TERRY	Eastern beaches, illumination after 0100.
	TERRY	N.E. patrol.
	4 LCI(G)	As designated by CTG 52.5
		(1) Western beaches until 0100, reserve after 0100.
		(2) Reserve until 0100, western beaches after 0100.
		(3) Eastern beaches until 0100; reserve after 0100.
		(4) Reserve until 0100; eastern beaches after 0100.
1700	Screen Commander	Secure screening stations - Rendezvous for night deployment as ordered.
1700		Commence night deployment.
1730	ASP 6	Return to base.
	Air Spot 7	Return to base.

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Operation Plan

ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45 (Addendum to Annex (D) - Alternate Schedule of Events).

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DOG MINUS ONE DAY

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1745	Air Coord. 4 - 1 VT (VF) Strike GEORGE - 8 VT, 8 VF	Return to base. Return to base.
1800 (about)		Send despatch to TF 51, Info CinCPac and ComFIFTH Fleet of results of mine-sweeping, air and surface bombardment.

W.H.P. BLANDY,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander T.F. 52
Amphibious Support Force
and ComPhibGrpONE.

L.D. Reedy
L.D. REEDY
Lieutenant, USNR.,
Flag Secretary.

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OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP ONE
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

File: A4-3(1)
Serial: 00017

3 February 1945.

~~_____~~
From: Commander Amphibious Group ONE.
To : All Commands Designated as Holders of ComPhibGrpONE
OpPlan No. A101-45.

Subject: ComPhibGrpONE OpPlan No. A101-45 - Change No. 1

1. Following are changes to be effected in subject plan:

TASK ORGANIZATION

Pages 1 and 2

Insert new sheet bearing reprint of these pages. Destroy original.

Page 3

- (a) Under paragraph (e), TU 52.3.5 Sweep Unit FOUR substitute "GAMBLE" for "PREBLE".
- (b) Under paragraph (e), TU 52.3.7 Sweep Unit FIVE substitute SC "1027" for SC "1028".
- (c) Under paragraph (f), TG 52.4 Underwater Demolition Group, substitute UDT "12" for UDT "11"; substitute "Lieutenant Commander Hochuli" for "Lieutenant Commander Conger".

Page 4

Under paragraph (f), TG 52.4, Underwater Demolition Group, substitute UDT "13" for UDT "12"; substitute "Lieutenant Commander Moranz" for "Lieutenant Commander Hochuli".

Page 7

Under paragraph 3(x), following paragraph 3(x)(12), add two paragraphs to read:

- (13) CTF 52 will act as SOPA at objective from DOG minus THREE Day to 0600 DOG Day.
- (14) All ships to be prepared to tow or be towed.

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Subject: ComPhibGrpONE OpPlan No. A101-45 - Change No. 1

Annex (A)

Appendix (I) - Screening Diagram DOG minus THREE Day.

(a) Change composition of Fire Support Units as follows:

- (1) FSU-1 to read: "NEVADA, IDAHO, 4 DD DesDiv 111, 1 APD".
- (2) FSU-2 to read: "NEW YORK, TENNESSEE, SALT LAKE CITY, 4 DD DesDiv 101, 1 APD".
- (3) FSU-3 to read: "TEXAS, ARKANSAS, TUSCALOOSA, 3 DD, 1 AVD DesDiv XRAY, 3 APD".
- (4) FSU-4 to read: "CHESTER, PENSACOLA, VICKSBURG, 5 DD DesDiv 91, 1 APD".

(b) In table of "Screening Station Assignments" make following changes:

	<u>Screen ABLE</u>	<u>Screen ABLE-BAKER</u>
DesDiv 111	Delete A 17	Delete AB 17, add AB 15
DesDiv XRAY	Add A 17	Add AB 17
Sweep Unit ONE	-	Delete AB 15

Appendix (II) - Screening Diagram DOG minus TWO and DOG minus ONE Days.

(a) Change composition of Fire Support Units to read as follows:

- (1) FSU-1 to read: "NEVADA, IDAHO, 3 DD DesDiv 111".
- (2) FSU-2 to read: "NEW YORK, TENNESSEE, SALT LAKE CITY, 3 DD DesDiv 101".
- (3) FSU-3 to read: "TEXAS, ARKANSAS, TUSCALOOSA, 2 DD, 1 AVD DesDiv XRAY".
- (4) FSU-4 to read: "CHESTER, PENSACOLA, VICKSBURG, 4 DD DesDiv 91".

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Subject: ComPhibGrpONE OpPlan No. A101-45 - Change No. 1

Appendix (II) - Screening Diagram DOG minus TWO and DOG minus ONE Days.

(b) In table of "Screening Station Assignments" make the following changes:

	<u>D - 2 Day</u>		<u>D -1 Day</u>
	<u>Screen CHARLIE</u>	<u>Screen DOG</u>	<u>Screen CHARLIE</u>
DesDiv 111	Delete C 10	Delete D 7	Delete C 10
DesDiv XRAY	-	change, "1 Support" to read "2 Support"	change, "1 Support" to read "2 Support".
DesDiv 101	Delete C 11	Delete D 8	Delete C 11
		change, "1 Support" to read "2 Support".	change, "1 Support" to read "2 Support".
DesDiv 91	Add C 10 Add C 11	Add D 7 Add D 8	Add C 10 Add C 11
		change, "Close Support" to read "3 Close Support"	change, "Close Support" to read "3 Close Support"
Sweep Unit ONE	-	-	Delete C 1 Delete C 2

Annex (B)

Page (B) - 2

Paragraph 4(b), substitute "TWIGGS" for "TERRY"

Page (B) - 3

Paragraph 4(c), substitute "TWIGGS" for "TERRY"

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Subject: ComPhibGrpONE OpPlan No. A101-45 - Change No. 1

Annex (C)

Appendix (V)

Effect following changes and additions to tables already established in this Appendix.

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
131	J : 8-A	: Possible Rocket Launchers (By JICPOA)	:
132	C : 21-A	: Pillbox	: East
	D : 25-A	: Pillbox	: North
	E : 27	: Add 2 Pillboxes making a total of 3	:
	H : 31-A	: Pillbox	: Southeast
	H : 32	: Water Storage - Delete Covered Artillery Emplacement	:
	H : 32-A	: Observation Post	:
	K : 36-A	: Automatic AA	: Southwest
	L : 37-A	: Ammunition Storage	: North
	M : 39	: Delete Pillbox - Substitute Covered Artillery Emplacement	:
	M : 39-A	: Covered Artillery	: South
	M : 39-B	: Covered Artillery	: Center
	R : 48	: Delete Pillbox - Substitute Covered Artillery Emplacement	:
147	C : 67-A	: Pillbox	: South-Center

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Subject: ComPhibGrpONE OpPlan No. A101-45 - Change No. 1.

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same type)
147	D : 68	: Blockhouse	: South
	I : 73	: Delete	:
	I : 73-A	: Unidentified	:
	I : 73-B	: Automatic AA	:
	J : 74	: Pillbox	: Southeast
	N : 77	: Pillbox	: South
	N : 77-A	: 3 Automatic AA	:
	O : 78	: Delete	:
	R : 86	: Delete	:
	R : 88-A	: Blockhouse	: Southeast
	S : 89-A	: Automatic AA	:
	V : 95	: Delete Open Artillery Em- : placement - Substitute : Blockhouse	:
	W : 101	: Delete	:
	Y : 104-A	: Pillbox	: South
148	E : 109-A	: Covered Artillery	: South
	F : 110-A	: 4 Empty Dual Purpose	:
	I : 113	: Delete	:
	J : 114-A	: Blockhouse	:
	N : 119-A	: Blockhouse (Possible : Coast Defense Gun)	: West-Center

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Subject: ComPhibGrpONE OpPlan No. A101-45 - Change No. 1.

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
148	R : 134	: Pillbox	: Southeast
	R : 134-A	: Pillbox	: Southwest
	V : 150-A	: Pillbox	: Northeast
	V : 151-A	: Pillbox	: Southwest
149	F : 169	: Delete	:
	F : 170-A	: Blockhouse	: Northwest
163	N : 195-A	: Pillbox	: Southeast
	N : 195-B	: Pillbox	: South
	S : 208	: Add 2 Covered Artillery -- : making a total of 3	:
164	E : 240-A	: 4 Unidentified	:
	J : 245	: Add 1 Automatic AA making: : a total of 2	:
	Y : 266	: Destroyed	:
165	E : 273	: Possible Blockhouse	: West-Center
	E : 273-A	: 2 Possible Pillboxes	: South-Center
	F : 274	: 5 Fuel Storage Tanks : (Westernly one Destroyed)	:
	J : 278	: Pillbox	:
	W : 295	: Shelter (not confirmed)	:
	Y : 299	: Beached APD	:
166	D : 305-A	: Pillbox	:

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Subject: ComPhibGrpONE OpPlan No. A101-45 - Change No. 1.

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)	
166	G	311-A	Covered Artillery Emplacement	
	H	313	Delete	
	H	316	Add 2 beached LSMs making a total of 3.	
167	A	324	Delete	
	C	327	Unidentified	
180	E	336	Delete - Add Air Raid Shelter.	
	O	342-A	Pillbox	South
	S	343	Delete	
	T	346	Delete Add Damaged Blockhouse	
	T	347	Add 2 Pillboxes making a total of 3.	Center
	Y	349-A	Pillbox	
	181	C	354	Delete - Add Pillbox
F		357	Pillbox - Change from unidentified	
G		359-A	Blockhouse	
K		363	Delete	
T		378	2 Water Storage Tanks	
X		382	Earth Covered Structure	

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Subject: ComPhibGrpONE OpPlan No. ALO1-45 - Change No. 1.

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)	
182	I	396-A	Command Post	Southwest
	N	404	Change 6 Automatic AA to 5 Automatic AA.	
	R	410	Add 1 Automatic AA making a total of 2	
	U	416-A	Command Post	Northwest
	U	416-B	Searchlight	
	Y	425	Shelter - not confirmed	
183	D	429	All Automatic AA destroyed	
	E	433	Add 1 Automatic AA making a total of 3	
	I	438-A	Pillbox	
	I	438-B	Pillbox - not confirmed	
	J	439	2 Automatic AA empty	
	K	440	Pillbox	Center
	M	442	Possible Automatic AA	Southeast
	P	445	Pillbox	Southwest
	V	451	Add 2 Covered Artillery making a total of 3	
184	F	461-A	Possible Automatic AA	
	P	471	3 Possible Pillboxes - (Not confirmed)	
	U	476	Observation Post	

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Subject: ComPhibGrpONE OpPlan No. A101-45 - Change No. 1.

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
185	G : 487	: 4 Automatic AA (Not confirmed)	:
	O : 495	: Open Artillery	:
	P : 496	: 7 Automatic AA and 1 possible AA.	:
	P : 496-A	: Possible Bivouac Area (Also in 185 K)	:
186	A : 504	: 3 Unidentified	:
198	A : 521	: 2 Pillboxes	:
	D : 524	: Delete 1 Blockhouse making a total of 1	:
	E : 525	: Blockhouse	:
	F : 526	: Pillbox	: Southwest
	G : 527	: Blockhouse	: West
	K : 532	: Delete - add Blockhouse	:
199	B : 552	: Command Post	:
	I : 560	: 2 Automatic AA destroyed	:
	J : 561	: Ammunition Storage	:
	O : 570-A	: 1 Dual Purpose	:
	P : 576	: Delete	:
	Q : 578-A	: Open Artillery	:
200	H : 600	: Destroyed	:
	H : 601	: Destroyed	:

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 Subject: 00017

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Subject: ComPhibGrpONE OpPlan No. A101-45 - Change No. 1.

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
200	N : 608	: Earth Covered Structure	:
	X : 619	: Radio Weather Station	:
202	A : 651-A	: Open Artillery	:
	B : 652	: 2 Open Artillery	:
	B : 652-A	: Searchlight	:
	I : 659	: 2 Empty Revetments - (Possible Dual Purpose)	:
	J : 661	: Change to Possible Coast Defense Gun (Not confirmed)	:
	J : 661-A	: 9 Unidentified (Probable Automatic AA)	:
	N : 665	: 7 Automatic AA	:
	T : 671	: Pillbox	: West
	T : 671-A	: Pillbox	: Northwest
	X : 675-A	: Dual Purpose Gun	:
	X : 675-B	: Dual Purpose Gun	: In line North to South.
	X : 675-C	: Dual Purpose Gun	:
	X : 675-D	: Dual Purpose Gun	:
	Y : 676-A	: 2 Pillboxes	: Northwest
203	U : 679	: Open Artillery	:
	U : 679-A	: Crushers & Loaders	:
215	N : 682	: Delete 1 Pillbox making a total of	:

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Subject: ComPhibGrpONE OpPlan No. A101-45 - Change No. 1.

TARGET SQUARE	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
215	N : 682-A	: 3 Empty Revetments	:
	T : 690-A	: Pillbox	: East
	Y : 697-A	: Pillbox	:
216	A : 699	: Pillbox	: Center
	G : 704	: Delete - Add 6 unidenti- fied.	:
	G : 705	: Delete	:
	H : 706	: Empty Revetment	:
217	C : 727	: Delete - Add Searchlight	:
	G : 733-A	: Add 3 possible Dual Pur- pose	:
	I : 736	: 2 Automatic AA	: Southwest
	I : 736-A	: 1 Automatic AA	: Northeast
218	A : 756	: Add 1 Automatic AA making a total of 2	:
	B : 757	: 2 Possible Automatic AA	: East-Center
	H : 766-A	: Command Post	: Northwest
	Q : 776	: Empty Revetment	: Southwest
	V : 781	: Empty Revetment	: South
219	G : 793-A	: Command Post	: Southwest
	L : 802-A	: Command Post	:
	T : 811-A	: Command Post	: Southwest
	V : 813	: Automatic AA	:

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Subject: ComPhibGrpONE OpPlan No. ALO1-45 - Change No. 1.

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
219	X	: 815 : Add 1 Pillbox making a total of 2	
233	I	: 820 : Observation Post	
	S	: 829 : Possible Blockhouse	
234	J	: 844 : Radio Station	South
	S	: 853 : Unidentified	
	T	: 854 : Unidentified	
235	K	: 872-A : Rangefinder	
	L	: 873 : Command Post	Southwest
	O	: 876 : Pillbox	
	U	: 886 : Add 3 Automatic AA making a total of 8	
	U	: 886-A : 2 Empty Revetments	
	U	: 886-B : Command Post	
	V	: 887 : Delete 4 Automatic AA making a total of 1	
	Y	: 892-A : Open Artillery	
251	R	: 927 : Add 1 unidentified making a total of 2	
	R	: 927-A : Covered Artillery	

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Subject: ComPhibGrpONE OpPlan No. ALO1-45 - Change No. 1

Annex (D)

Page (D) - 5

Add new entry after "1500" under "Air Spot" to read, "1500 BARR UDT 13. Place light on Higashi-Shima".

Page (D) - 6

Last unit of 2nd "1700" delete all of entry commencing "GTG 52.2".
"Prior to dark etc - - -".

Page (D) - 10

- (a) At time "About 1030", fourth unit, substitute, "LEUTZE" for "EVANS".
- (b) At time "About 1030", sixth unit, substitute, "TWIGGS" for "TERRY".
- (c) At time "About 1030", eighth unit, change "7 LCI(G)" to read "10 LCI(G)".

Page (D) - 11

At time "About 1230" substitute, "LEUTZE" for "EVANS"; substitute "TWIGGS" for "TERRY"; change "7 LCI(G)" to read "10 LCI(G)".

Page (D) - 13

At time "About 1430" substitute, "LEUTZE" for "EVANS"; substitute "TWIGGS" for "TERRY"; change "7 LCI(G)" to read "10 LCI(G)".

Page (D) - 15

At time "About 1630" substitute, "LEUTZE" for "EVANS"; substitute "TWIGGS" for "TERRY"; change "7 LCI(G)" to read "10 LCI(G)".

Page (D) - 16

(a) At first "1700" substitute "TWIGGS" for "TERRY".

(b) Beneath third "1700", add new event to read:

"1700"	"Screen Commander"	"Assign one DD to CTF 52 for transfer of photographs".
--------	--------------------	---

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Subject: ComPhibGrpONE OpPlan No. A101-45 - Change No. 1

Addendum to Annex (D)

Page Add. (D) - 1

To top of page add as new event:

" _____ " "CTF 52" "Despatch 1 DD to rendezvous
with LUNGA POINT (CVE94) with
photographs for delivery to
CTF 51 at 1000(K) DOG minus
ONE Day".

Page Add. (D) - 3

Change time "By noon" to read "1000".

Page Add. (D) - 7

Fourth "1700" delete both entries of "TERRY" insert "TWIGGS" in each case.

Additions and Corrections to Fire Support Entries in Annex (D).

Wherever occurring in Annex (D) and addendum to Annex (D):

- (a) Substitute "TENNESSEE" for "CALIFORNIA".
Substitute "CHESTER" for "PORTLAND".
Substitute "SALT LAKE CITY" for "LOUISVILLE".
Substitute "IDAHO" for "WEST VIRGINIA".
Substitute "TEXAS" for "NEVADA".
Substitute "NEW YORK" for "TUSCALOOSA".
Substitute "TUSCALOOSA" for "TEXAS".
Substitute "NEVADA" for "MISSISSIPPI".
Substitute "ARKANSAS" for "COLORADO".
Substitute "VICKSBURG" for "CHESTER".
- (b) Correct Fire Support Sectors to agree with Appendix (I) to Annex (H) of ComPhibsPac OpPlan No. A25-44.
- (c) Delete all times and units scheduled for servicing planes.

Pages (D) - 1 to (D) - 6 - In the DOG minus THREE schedule:

- (a) Wherever occurring, substitute "STEMBEL" for "TWIGGS".
- (b) Wherever occurring, substitute "TWIGGS" in place of "STEMBEL".

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Subject: ComPhibGrpONE OpPlan No. ALO1-45 - Change No. 1

- (c) Whenever occurring, delete "SALT LAKE CITY" and "NEW MEXICO".
- (d) Page (D) - 1, after third 0700 entry, insert as new unit and event "IDAHO" "Commence firing at 0700 from Fire Support Sector I".
- (e) Page (D) - 2, at 0730 insert as new unit and event, "IDAHO" "Cease firing".

Pages (D) - 7 to (D) - 25 - In the DOG minus TWO and DOG minus ONE schedules:

- (a) Wherever occurring, substitute "PENSACOLA" for "NEW MEXICO".
- (b) Delete "SALT LAKE CITY" and "PENSACOLA" as occurring originally.
- (c) Page (D) - 8, after second 0800 entry, change "2000 yards" to read "3000 yards".
- (d) Page (D) - 8, delete fourth 0800 unit and event.
- (e) Page (D) - 12, after second 1230 entry, change "2000 yards" to read "3000 yards".
- (f) Page (D) - 16, in first 1700 entry, second unit, change "TERRY" to "TWIGGS".
- (g) Page (D) - 18, after fourth 0800 entry, delete unit and event commencing, "NEW MEXICO" "Close range as minesweeping etc".
- (h) Page (D) - 23, insert as new entry under time "1500" and as new event to read, "ROGER (WILLIAM) Hour".
- (i) Page (D) - 24 in second 1700 entry, third unit, change "TERRY" to "TWIGGS".

In the Addendum to Annex (D):

- (a) Wherever occurring substitute "PENSACOLA" for "NEW MEXICO".
- (b) Delete "SALT LAKE CITY" and "PENSACOLA" as originally occurring.

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Subject: ComPhibGrpONE OpPlan No. A101-45 - Change No. 1

Page Add. (D) - 7

In fifth 1700 entry, third unit, substitute, "TWIGGS" for
"TERRY" and in fourth unit, substitute "LEARY" for "TERRY".

W.H.P. BLANDY

L.D. Reedy
L.D. REEDY,
Lieutenant, USNR.,
Flag Secretary.

UNCLASSIFIED

File: A16-3(1)
Serial: 0001

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FIFTH Fleet,
T.F. 51 Joint Expeditionary Force,
T.F. 52 Amphibious Support Force
and ComPhibGrpONE,
U.S.S. ESTES, Flagship.

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Operation Plan
ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45

PEARL HARBOR, T.H.,
1 January 1945; 1800

TASK ORGANIZATION

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- 52 Amphibious Support Force - Rear Admiral Blancy
- (a) 52.1 Force Flagship - ESTES - Captain Mathews 1 AGC
- (b) 52.10 Air Support Control Unit - Captain Parker
- (c) 54.1 Fire Support Group - assigned by Rear Admiral Rodgers-CTF 54

54.1.1 Fire Support Unit ONE - Rear Admiral Rodgers

NEVADA (F), IDAHO 2 OBB
INDIANAPOLIS (to arrive DOG Day) 1 CA
*BILOXI 1 CL
DesDiv 111 less LEUTZE - Captain Smoot
NEWCOMB (F), BENNION (FD), HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS,
RICHARD P. LEARY 4 DD

54.1.2 Fire Support Unit TWO - Captain Christian until DOG
Day then Rear Admiral Cooley

WASHINGTON (F), NORTH CAROLINA (arrive DOG
Day) 2 BB
TENNESSEE 1 OBB
*SANTA FE 1 CL
DesDiv 101 less HARADEN - Captain Martin
HALL (F), HALLIGAN, TWIGGS, PAUL HAMILTON 4 DD

Note: From DOG minus THREE to DOG minus ONE Days,
inclusive, add SALT LAKE CITY and NEW YORK.

54.1.3 Fire Support Unit THREE - Rear Admiral Fischler

TEXAS (F), ARKANSAS 2 OBB
TUSCALOOSA, @BOSTON 2 CA
DesDiv XRAY - Commander Robbins
STEMBEL (FD), JOHN D. HENLEY, LEUTZE (F) 3 DD
WILLIAMSON 1 AVD

54.1.4 Fire Support Unit FOUR - Rear Admiral Smith

NEW YORK 1 OBB
CHESTER (F), PENSACOLA, SALT LAKE CITY,
@SAN FRANCISCO, @PITTSBURG 5 CA
VICKSBURG 1 CL

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JAN 1951

Operation Plan
ComPhibGrp ONE No. A101-45

DesDiv 91 less JOHN D. HENLEY and DAVID W. TAYLOR
plus BRYANT (FD) and 1 DD assigned by
CTF 51 and 1 DD assigned by ComFIFTHFlt -
Captain Hunter
CAPPS (F), TERRY, BRYANT, _____, _____ 5 DD

Note: From DOG minus THREE to DOG minus ONE Days,
inclusive, delete SALT LAKE CITY and NEW YORK.
VICKSBURG joins Fire Support Unit FIVE on DOG
Day.

@ - Attached from TG 58.2, reporting 0700 DOG Day.
* - Attached from TG 58.4, reporting 0700 DOG Day.

(d) 52.2 Support Carrier Group - Rear Admiral Durgin

52.2.1 Support Carrier Unit ONE - Captain Tague

SARGENT BAY (F), WAKE ISLAND 2 CVE
DesDiv 47 less BACHE, BEALE, ANTHONY, WADSWORTH,
plus RALPH TALBOTT - Captain Young
DALY (F), RALPH TALBOTT 2 DD
GRADY, RICHARD S. HULL 2 DE

52.2.2 Support Carrier Unit TWO - Rear Admiral Durgin

MAKIN ISLAND (F), LUNGA POINT, BISMARCK SEA,
*ANZIO 4 CVE
DesDiv 11 less McCALL, GRIDLEY, CRAVEN, MAURY,
plus BACHE, BAGLEY - Commander Morton
BACHE (F), HELM, BAGLEY 3 DD
RICHARD M. ROWELL, O'FLAHERTY 2 DE

* - CortDiv 72 less LERAY WILSON - Cmdr. Jackson
LAWRENCE C. TAYLOR, MELVIN R. NAWMAN,
OLIVER MITCHELL (F), TABBERER,
ROBERT F. KELLER 5 DE

* - ASW Unit temporarily attached joins at SAIPAN.
To be detached when directed by ComFIFTHFleet.

(e) 52.3 Mine Group - Rear Admiral Sharp

Group Flagship - TERROR - Commander Blakeslee

52.3.1 Sweep Unit ONE - Commander Loud

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
HOGAN (F), DORSEY, HOWARD, HOGAN 4 DMS
IRLBY 1 DM

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP ONE
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

File: A4-3(1)
Serial: 00022

UNCLASSIFIED

7 February 1945.

From: Commander Amphibious Group ONE.
To : All Commands Designated as Holders of ComPhibGrpONE
OpPlan No. A101-45.

Subject: ComPhibGrpONE OpPlan No. A101-45 - Change No. 2

1. Following are changes to be effected in subject plan:

TASK ORGANIZATION

Pages 1 and 2

Insert new sheets bearing reprints of these pages. Destroy original. Insert new page 2A.

Page 6

Paragraph 3 (x) (2), second line, change "CTF 54" to "CTF 52".

Annex (A)

Appendix 1

Under FSU-2: Change "4DD" to "3 DD".
Add "1 DM".
Change "TWIGGS" to "TERRY".

Screening Station Assignments -

Opposite DesDiv 101, under Screen ABLE, add "A17"
delete "A13"; under Screen AB, add "AB17", delete
"AB13".

Opposite DesDiv XRAY, under Screen ABLE, add "A13",
delete "A17"; under Screen "AB", add "AB13", delete
"AB17".

Appendix 2

Under FSU-2 change "3 DD" to "2 DD", add "1 DM".

Screening Station Assignments - DOG minus TWO Day.

Opposite DesDiv 101, under Screen CHARLIE, add
"C11"; under Screen DOG add "D8" and change "2
support" to "1 support".

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File: A4-3(1)
Serial: 00022

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Subject: ComPhibGrpONE OpPlan No. A101-45 - Change No. 2

DOG minus ONE Day, under Screen CHARLIE, add "C11"
and change "2 support" to "1 support".

Opposite DesDiv 91, DOG minus TWO Day, under Screen
CHARLIE, delete "C11"; under Screen DOG, delete
"D8"; change "3 support" to "4 support".

DOG minus ONE Day, under Screen CHARLIE, delete
"C11", change "3 support" to "4 support".

Opposite Sweep, Unit 2, DOG minus ONE Day, under
Screen CHARLIE add "C1" and "C2".

Note 6 -

Opposite "D -2" and "D -1" change "TERRY" to "TWIGGS".

Annex (D)

Page (D) - 1

Under "Time" column, change "0430" to "0245".

In "Event" column, opposite first "0600", change "STEMBEL" to "TERRY".

In "Event" and "Unit" columns, opposite second "0700" from bottom of
page, change "TWIGGS" to "STEMBEL". Opposite last "0700", change
"STEMBEL" to "TERRY".

Page (D) - 3

In "Unit" column, opposite time "1102", change "TWIGGS" to "STEMBEL".

Page (D) - 4

In "Unit" column, opposite time "1132", change "TWIGGS" to "STEMBEL".

Page (D) - 5

In "Unit" column, opposite time "1412", change "STEMBEL" to "TERRY".

Page (D) - 6

In "Unit" column, opposite time "1632", change "TWIGGS" to "STEMBEL".

In "Event" column, opposite "1700 night patrols", change "TWIGGS" to
"STEMBEL".

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Serial: 00022

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Subject: ComPTC Response OpPlan No. A101-45 - Change No. 2

Page (D) - 9

In "Time" column, change "0820" to "0800".

Page (D) - 10

In "Unit" column, opposite time "about 1030", change "TAYLOR" to "HAMILTON".

Page (D) - 11

In "Unit" column, opposite time "about 1230", change "TAYLOR" to "HAMILTON".

Page (D) - 13

In "Unit" column, opposite time "about 1430", change "TAYLOR" to "HAMILTON".

Page (D) - 15

In "Unit" column, opposite time "about 1630", change "TAYLOR" to "HAMILTON".

Page (D) - 20

In "Unit" column, opposite first time "1030", change "TAYLOR" to "HAMILTON".

Page (D) - 21

In "Unit" column, opposite second time "about 1230", change "TAYLOR" to "HAMILTON".

Page (D) - 23

In "Unit" column, opposite second time "1430", change "TAYLOR" to "HAMILTON".

L.D. Reedy
L.D. REEDY,
Lieutenant, USNR.,
Flag Secretary.

W.H.P. BLANDY

UNCLASSIFIED

File: AL6-3(1)

Serial: 0001

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,

FIFTH Fleet,

T.F. 51 Joint Expeditionary Force,

T.F. 52 Amphibious Support Force
and ComPhibGrp ONE,

U.S.S. ESTES, Flagship.

Operation Plan

ComPhibGrp ONE No. AL01-45

PEARL HARBOR, T.H.,

1 January 1945; 1800

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TASK ORGANIZATION

52 Amphibious Support Force - Rear Admiral Blandy

(a) 52.1 Force Flagship - ESTES - Captain Mathews 1 AGC

(b) 52.10 Air Support Control Unit - Captain Parker

(c) 54.1 Fire Support Group - assigned by Rear Admiral Rodgers-CTF 54

54.1.1 Fire Support Unit ONE - Rear Admiral Rodgers

NEVADA (F), IDAHO 2 OBB

@INDIANAPOLIS 1 CA

VICKSBURG 1 CL

DesDiv 111 less LEUTZE - Captain Smoot

NEWCOMB (F), BENNION (FD),

H.L. EDWARDS, R.P. LEARY 4 DD

Note: From DOG minus THREE Day to DOG
minus ONE Day, inclusive, delete
VICKSBURG

54.1.2 Fire Support Unit TWO - Captain Christian until DOG
Day, then Captain Mitchell

TENNESSEE 1 OBB

SALT LAKE CITY 1 CA

*SANTA FE, #PASADENA 2 CL

DesDiv 101 less H/RADEN, PAUL HAMILTON,
TWIGGS plus TERRY - Captain Martin

HALL (F), HALLIGAN, TERRY 3 DD

H.A. WILEY 1 DM

Note: From DOG minus THREE Day to DOG
minus ONE Day, inclusive, add NEW YORK

54.1.3 Fire Support Unit THREE - Rear Admiral Fischler

@WASHINGTON 1 BB

TEXAS (F), ARKANSAS 2 OBB

TUSCALOOSA, #BOSTON, #PITTSBURGH 3 CA

*BILOXI, #ASTORIA 2 CL

DesDiv XRAY - Commander Carlson

PAUL HAMILTON (F), STEMBEL (FD), J.D. HENLEY 3 DD

WILLIAMSON (until DOG Day only) 1 AVD

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Operation Order
ComPhibGrpONE No. 1101-45

54.1.4 Fire Support Unit FOUR - Rear Admiral Smith

@NORTH CAROLINA	1 BB
NEW YORK	1 OBB
CHESTER (F), PENSACOLA, #SAN FRANCISCO	3 CA
<u>DesDiv 91</u> less TERRY, EVANS, J.D. HENLEY, D.W. TAYLOR plus BRYANT, LEUTZE, TWIGGS - Captain Hunter	
CAPPS (F), BRYANT (FD), TWIGGS, LEUTZE plus 1 DD assigned by CTF 51	5 DD

Note: From DOG minus THREE to DOG minus ONE
Day, inclusive, delete NEW YORK, add
VICKSBURG

For explanation of notes below see Change No. 4 to
ComFIFTH Fleet OpPlan 13-44.

- @ - Attached from TF 58 on DOG and DOG plus ONE Day.
- * - Attached from TF 58 on DOG or DOG plus ONE Day.
- # - Attached from TF 58 on DOG Day, possibly.
- % - Attached from TF 58 on DOG plus ONE Day, possibly.

(d) 52.2 Support Carrier Group - Rear Admiral Durgin

52.2.1 Support Carrier Unit ONE - Rear Admiral Sprague

SARGENT BAY (F), WAKE ISLAND	2 CVE
DALY (F), RALPH TALBOT - Captain Young (Com- DesRon 24)	2 DD
GRADY, RICHARD S. BULL	2 DE

52.2.2 Support Carrier Unit TWO - Rear Admiral Durgin

MAKIN ISLAND (F), LUNGA POINT, BISMARCK SEA	
*ANZIO	4 CVE
HUTCHINS (F), HELM, BAGLEY - Commander Laning	3 DD
RICHARD M. ROWELL, O'FLAHERTY	2 DE

*CortDiv 72 less LORAY WILSON - Commander Jackson
LAWRENCE C. TAYLOR, MELVIN R. NAWMAN,
OLIVER MITCHELL (F), TABBEFER, R.F. KELLER 5 DE

* - ASW Unit temporarily attached, joins at SAIPAN.
To be detached when directed by ComFIFTH Fleet.

File: A16-3(1)
Serial: 0001

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Operation Plan
ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45

(e) 52.3 Mine Group - Rear Admiral Sharp

Group Flagship - TERROR - Commander Blakeslee

52.3.1 Sweep Unit ONE - Commander Loud

HOPKINS (F), DORSEY, HOWARD, HOGAN
BREESE

4 DMS
1 DM

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- 2a -

Change No. 2
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OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP ONE
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

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File: A4-3(1)
Serial: 00025

8 February 1945.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
From: Commander Amphibious Group ONE;
To : All Commands Designated as Holders of ComPhibGrpONE
OpPlan No. A101-45.

Subject: ComPhibGrpONE OpPlan No. A101-45 - Charge No. 3

1. The following changes and additions to Appendix (V), Serial Numbers of Targets, of Annex (C), Special Reports at Objective, are to be effected in tables already established in subject plan.

2. Although Change No. 2 to subject plan has been distributed, it contained no changes or additions to the Tables designating serial numbers of Targets.

W.H.P. BLANDY

L.D. Reedy
L.D. REEDY,
Lieutenant, USNR.,
Flag Secretary.

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File: A4-3(1)
Serial: 00025

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Subject: ComPhibGrpONE OpPlan No. A101-45 - Change No. 3.

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
131	J	8 B	6 Mortar Groups
	J	8 C	3 Mortar Groups
			Northeast
132	K	36 B	3 Automatic AA
	K	36 C	6 Automatic AA
	K	36 D	3 (Possibly 4) AA
	P	43 A	Unidentified (large)
	P	44 A	2 Empty Revetments
	Q	46	2 Coast Defense Guns
148	P	127 A	Blockhouse under construction:
164	E	240 B	1 AA
	E	240 C	1 Possible Blockhouse
165	H	276	Delete
	Y	299 A	Pillbox
166	A	300	2 Pillboxes
	B	302	Delete
	C	304	Delete
	G	311 B	Blockhouse under construction:
	G	311 C	Pillbox
	K	319	Delete
180	E	337	Delete
181	C	354 A	Personnel Shelter
	S	377	Unidentified
	Y	383 A	1 Automatic AA
			Southwest

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File: A-571
Serial: 0005

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Subject: ComPhibGrpONE OpPlan No. ALO1-45 - Change No. 3.

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
181	Y : 383 B	: 1 Automatic AA	: Northeast
	Y : 384	: Delete	:
182	A : 385	: Delete	: Northwest
	H : 395	: 2 Storage Trenches	:
	H : 395 A	: Searchlight	:
	I : 396	: Delete 1 AA making a total of 2:	:
	N : 404 A	: 1 Automatic AA	:
	R : 410	: Delete	:
183	B : 427	: Unidentified	:
	C : 428	: 1 Automatic AA	:
	E : 433 A	: 2 Automatic AA	:
	G : 436	: Blockhouse under construction	:
	J : 439	: Delete	:
	R : 447	: Blockhouse	:
	W : 452 A	: 2 Anti-Tank Guns	:
	W : 452 B	: 2 Anti-Tank Guns	:
	X : 453 A	: 2 Anti-Tank Guns	:
184	H : 463	: 2 Unidentified	:
	X : 479	: 2 Dual Purpose	:
	X : 479 A	: 3 Dual Purpose	:
185	G : 487 A	: 2 Unidentified	:
	P : 496 B	: 3 Automatic AA making a total of 10	:

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 Serial: 00025

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Subject: ComPhibGrpONE OpPlan No. A101-45 - Change No. 3.

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
198	M : 534	: 3 Empty Emplacements	:
200	K : 604	: 5 Automatic AA	:
	L : 605	: 5 Automatic AA	: Northeast
	L : 605 A	: 1 Automatic AA	: West-Center
	N : 608 A	: Storage	:
	N : 608 B	: 1 Automatic AA	:
	P : 611 A	: 4 Automatic AA	:
	Q : 612	: 5 Automatic AA	:
	Q : 612 A	: 2 Empty Revetments	:
	R : 613	: 3 Automatic AA	:
	X : 619	: Delete	:
	Y : 620 A	: 1 Automatic AA	:
	Y : 620 B	: Searchlight	:
201	M : 634	: Unidentified	:
	P : 637	: Delete 1 making a total of 1	:
	S : 640	: 5 large caves	:
202	S : 670	: 2 Empty Revetments	:
	S : 670 A	: 4 Automatic AA	:
	T : 671 B	: 4 Automatic AA	:
	X : 675 E	: 1 Dual Purpose	:
215	S : 688 A	: Anti-Tank Gun	:
216	B : 699 A	: 2 Storage Tr	:

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Serial: 00025

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Subject: ComPhibGrpONE OpPlan A101-45 - Change No. 3.

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
216	C : 700	: 1 Empty Revetment	:
	G : 704	: Delete 1 Unidentified making a total of 5.	:
	G : 705	: 1 Coast Defense Gun	:
	V : 720	: Shelter	:
217	G : 734 A	: 1 Dual Purpose	:
	I : 736 B	: 5 Empty Revetments	:
	N : 741	: 4 Automatic AA	:
218	A : 754 A	: 3 Automatic AA	: North
	C : 761 A	: Machine Guns	:
	H : 766 B	: 1 possible Anti-Tank Gun	:
	M : 772	: 1 Unidentified	:
	Q : 776	: Delete - Add Searchlight	:
	V : 781	: Delete	:
	V : 781 A	: Underground Storage	:
	V : 781 B	: 2 Searchlights	:
219	T : 811	: Delete	:
	V : 813	: Delete 1 Automatic AA making a total of 5.	:
	V : 813 A	: 3 Automatic AA	:
230	E : None	: Unidentified Target on HIGASHI: IWA - Not numbered	:
233	E : 818	: 1 Unidentified	:

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Serial: 00025

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Subject: ComPhibGrpONE OpPlan No. A101-45 - Change No. 3.

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
233	M	: 823 : 2 Unidentified	:
235	D	: 864 : 2 Empty Revetments	:
	F	: 866 : 12 Automatic AA	:
	J	: 870 : 6 Empty Revetments	:
	K	: 871 A : 1 Dual Purpose	:
	K	: 871 B : 4 Automatic AA	:
	Q	: 881 A : Gun Director	:
	V	: 887 A : 3 Dual Purpose	: North
	V	: 888 A : 2 Automatic AA	: Northeast
	W	: 890 A : 1 Automatic AA	:
	X	: 891 : 1 Empty Revetment	:
	Y	: 894 A : 1 Empty Revetment	:

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File: A16-3(1)
Serial: 0001

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FIFTH Fleet,
T.F. 51 Joint Expeditionary Force,
T.F. 52 Amphibious Support Force
and ComPhibGrpONE,
U.S.S. ESTES, Flagship.

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Operation Plan
ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45

PEARL HARBOR, T.H.,
1 January 1945; 1800

TASK ORGANIZATION

52 Amphibious Support Force - Rear Admiral Blandy

(a) 52.1 Force Flagship - ESTES - Captain Mathews 1 AGC

(b) 52.10 Air Support Control Unit - Captain Parker

(c) 54.1 Fire Support Group - assigned by Vice Admiral Oldendorf, CTF 54.

54.1.1 Fire Support Unit ONE - Rear Admiral Chandler

CALIFORNIA (FF) 1 OBB
LOUISVILLE (F), INDIANAPOLIS 2 CA
DesDiv 111 - Captain Smoot
LEUTZE (F), BENNION (FD), NEWCOMB,
HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, RICHARD P. LEARY. 5 DD

Note: From DOG minus THREE to DOG minus ONE
Days add PORTLAND.

54.1.2 Fire Support Unit TWO - Rear Admiral Sowell

WEST VIRGINIA (F), NEVADA 2 OBB
TUSCALOOSA 1 CA
DesDiv 101 less HARADEN - Captain Martin
HALL (F), HALLIGAN, TWIGGS, PAUL HAMILTON 4 DD

Note: From DOG minus THREE to DOG minus ONE
Days, inclusive, add MISSISSIPPI and
delete NEVADA.

54.1.3 Fire Support Unit THREE - Captain Mitchell

TEXAS (F) 1 OBB
PORTLAND, SALT LAKE CITY 2 CA
DesDiv XRAY - Commander Tagg
STEMBEL (FD), JOHN D. HENLEY 2 DD
WILLIAMSON 1 AVD

Note: From DOG minus THREE to DOG minus ONE
Days, inclusive, add COLORADO and NEVADA
and delete PORTLAND.

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File: 3(1)
Serial

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Operation Plan
ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45

54.1.4 Fire Support Unit FOUR - Rear Admiral Weyler.

NEW MEXICO (F), COLORADO, MISSISSIPPI 3 CBB
CHESTER, PENSACOLA 2 CA
DesDiv 91 less JCHN D. HENLEY plus
BRYANT (FD) - Captain Hunter
CAPPS (F), TERRY, DAVID W. TAYLOR, EVANS,
BRYANT 5 DD

Note: From DCG minus THREE to DOG minus ONE
inclusive, delete COLORADO and MISSISSIPPI.

(d) 52.2 Support Carrier Group - Rear Admiral Durgin

52.2.1 Support Carrier Unit ONE - Captain Rassieur

SARGENT BAY (F), MANILA BAY, SHIPLEY BAY 3 CVE
DesDiv 12 less MUGFORD, PATTERSON, plus
McCALL - Captain Poehlman
McCALL (F), RALPH TALBOTT 2 DD
GRADY, RICHARD S. BULL 2 DE

52.2.2 Support Carrier Unit TWO - Rear Admiral Durgin

CarDiv 26 less FANSHAW BAY, MANILA BAY plus ANZIO
MAKIN ISLAND (F), LUNGA POINT, BISMARCK SEA,
SALAMAUA, ANZIO* 5 CVE
DesDiv 11 less McCALL, GRIDLEY, CRAVEN plus
BAGLEY - Captain Long
MAURY (F), HELM, BAGLEY 3 DD
RICHARD M. ROWELL, O'FLAHERTY 2 DE
*CortDiv 72 less LERAY WILSON - Commander Jackson
LAWRENCE G. TAYLOR (F), MELVIN R. NEWMAN,
OLIVER MITCHELL, TABBERER, ROBERT F. KELLER 5 DE

* - ASW Unit temporarily attached. To be detached
when directed by ComFIFTHFleet.

(e) 52.3 Mine Group - Rear Admiral Sharp

Group Flagship - TERROR - Commander Blakeslee

52.3.1 Sweep Unit ONE - Commander Loud

HOPKENS (F), SOUTHARD, HOVEY, DORSEY, HOWARD,
HCGAN 6 DMS
BRESE 1 DM

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Serial: 0001

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Operation Plan

ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45

52.3.2 AM Group - Commander Freiberghouse

52.3.3 Sweep Unit TWO - Commander Freiberghouse

SKIRMISH (F), SIGNET, STAUNCH,
SCURRY, SPECTACLE, SPECTOR 6 AM
TRAOY 1 DM

52.3.4 Sweep Unit THREE - Lieutenant Galloway

SERENE (F), SHELTER, STRATEGY,
STRENGTH, SUCCESS, REBEL 6 AM
PC 800 1 PC

52.3.5 Sweep Unit FOUR - Lieutenant Commander Howard

CHAMPION (F), ARDENT, DEFENSE, DEVASTATOR 4 AM
PREBLE 1 DM

52.3.6 YMS Group - Lieutenant Commander Lambert

52.3.7 Sweep Unit FIVE - Lieutenant Thompson

YMS 323 (F), 362, 374, 401, 411, 478 6 YMS
LINDSEY 1 DM
SC 775, 1028 2 SC

52.3.8 Sweep Unit SIX - Lieutenant Osborne

YMS 193, 235, 345, 361, 407 (F), 475 6 YMS
SC 1054 1 SC

52.3.9 Sweep Unit SEVEN - Ensign Mitchell

4 LCP(R) initially embarked in WATERS.
equipped with Size 5/M Sweep Gear.
4 LCP(R) initially embarked in GILMER,
equipped with Size 5/M Sweep Gear.

(f) 52.4 Underwater Demolition Group - Captain Hanlon

GILMER (F), WATERS, BULL, BARR, BLESSMAN, BATES 6 APD

UDT 11 - Lieutenant Commander Conger, embarked in BATES.

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ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45.

UDT 12 - Lieutenant Commander Hochuli, embarked in BARR.
UDT 14 - Lieutenant (jg) Onderdonk, embarked in BULL.
UDT 15 - Lieutenant Brooks, embarked in BLESSMAN.
GILMER and WATERS carry extra demolitions and shallow water sweeping boats.

(g) 52.5.1 Gunboat Unit ONE - Commander Melanaphy

ICI(L) 627 (F)	1 ICI(L)
IGI(G) 450, 466, 469 (Press), 471 (Press), 473, 474	6 ICI(G)

(h) 52.5.2 Gunboat Unit TWO - Lieutenant Commander Nash

ICI(G) 346, 348, 438, 441, 449, 457 (F)	6 ICI(G)
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1. General Situation

General situation as outlined in paragraph 1 of CTF 51 OpPlan No. A25-44.

Enemy Forces

Information on enemy is contained in Intelligence Plan, Annex (B) to CTF 51 OpPlan No. A25-44.

Own Forces

This operation plan is derived from CTF 51 OpPlan No. A25-44.

2. This force, during the period DOG minus THREE to DOG Day, will effect the maximum possible destruction of enemy forces and defenses of IWO JIMA by aircraft and surface ship bombardment, minesweeping and underwater demolition, in order to facilitate its capture.

3. (a) Force Flagship operate as directed by CTF 52.

(b) Commander Air Support Control Unit direct operations of aircraft in execution of Air Support Plan, Annex (I) to CTF 51 OpPlan No. A25-44. Execute Air-Sea Rescue Plan, Appendix (VIII) to Annex (I) to CTF 51 OpPlan No. A25-44.

(c) Fire Support Group execute Ships! Gunfire Support Plan, Annex (H) to CTF 51 OpPlan No. A25-44 under direction of CTF 52. Screening vessels execute Screening Plan at Objective, Annex (A). Ships designated by CTF 52 remain at objective at night to prevent escape or reinforcement of enemy garrison, interdict airfields, execute harassing fire, illuminate beaches

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File: A16-3(1)
Serial: 0001

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Operation Plan
ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45

and prevent enemy from laying mines and obstructions in accordance with Night Operations at Objective Plan, Annex (B). Ships not designated to remain at objective deploy during darkness as directed by CTF 54.

(d) Support Carrier Group provide air cover for TF 54 enroute SAIPAN and IWO JIMA. On arrival IWO JIMA proceed to operating areas and execute Air Support Plan, Annex (I) to CTF 51 OpPlan No. A25-44. Operating areas are as listed in CTF 51 OpPlan No. A25-44. Aircraft operate at objective under direction of Commander Air Support Control Unit, CTF 52.10. Antisubmarine Warfare Unit, composed of ANZIO and CortDiv 72 less LERAY WILSON is temporarily attached for ASW employment, will be detached when directed by Commander FIFTH Fleet, and will then report to Commander FIFTH Fleet for duty.

(e) Mine Group proceed to IWO JIMA as directed by CTG 52.3. On arrival IWO JIMA execute Minesweeping, Mooring Buoy and Net Plan, Annex (L) to CTF 51 OpPlan No. A25-44. Report to CTF 52 variations in soundings dangerous to navigation. Be prepared to furnish screening vessels to TF 54 for night deployment.

(f) Underwater Demolition Group proceed IWO JIMA as part of TF 54. On arrival IWO JIMA execute Beach Reconnaissance and Underwater Demolition Plan, Annex (M) to CTF 51 OpPlan No. A25-44. Augment screen at objective in accordance with Screening Plan at Objective, Annex (A). Be prepared to provide screening vessels to TF 54 for night deployment. At 0600(K) DOG Day report to CTF 53 for duty.

(g), (h) Gunboat Support Units ONE and TWO proceed to IWO JIMA as directed by CTG 52.3. On arrival IWO JIMA DOG minus TWO Day report to CTG 52.4 for duty in support of Underwater Demolition Group operations in accordance with Ships' Gunfire Support Plan, Annex (H) to CTF 51 OpPlan No. A25-44. Ships designated by CTF 52 remain at objective at night to prevent escape or reinforcement of enemy garrison, execute harassing fire and prevent enemy from laying mines and obstructions in accordance with Night Operations at Objective Plan, Annex (B).

(x)(1) Movement to objective in accordance with Movement Plan, Annex (C) to Commander FIFTH Fleet OpPlan No. 13-44.

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Operation Plan
ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45

(2) Night movements, except for ships remaining at objective, as ordered by CTF 54.

(3) All ships maintain a bright lookout for floating mines and report any sighted to CTF 52 and nearby ships immediately. Mines may be of the moored type which have broken adrift or which have been swept and not destroyed, or the type laid by aircraft and recently observed in the PHILIPPINES operations. The visible part of these latter mines consists only of a small circular metal float, with flat upper surface.

(4) Air-Sea Rescue in accordance with Air-Sea Rescue Plan, Appendix (VIII) to Annex (I) to CTF 51 OpPlan No. A25-44. Any ship or small craft participating in the operation may at any time be called upon to participate in a rescue. Ships sighting a downed aircraft shall initiate rescue operations insofar as the assigned mission and circumstances permit, informing CTF 52 of the situation. To this end all ships be prepared to dispatch a rescue boat at an instant's notice.

(5) Make special reports in accordance with Special Reports at Objective, Annex (C). Submit Action Reports in accordance with PacFlt 101-45. Suggestions for improvement in future operations are particularly desired and should be submitted promptly. Radar contact reports shall be made in accordance with CTF 51 OpPlan No. A25-44.

(6) All combatant ships of destroyer or larger size maintain appropriate speeds of at least steerageway, except:

- a. In emergency;
- b. When refueling and rearming make it infeasible; and;
- c. When close support of Underwater Demolition Team operations permits insufficient sea room to maintain steerageway.

(7) Large gunfire ships, except when operating inside the screen around the entire area of operations, will at all times be provided with a suitable screen of vessels which are not themselves delivering fire against shore positions.

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(8) Operating areas, points, retirement and shipping routes in vicinity of IWO JIMA are as shown in Operating Areas, Annex (J) to CTF 51 OpPlan No. A25-44.

(9) DOG Day is tentatively set at 19 February 1945, Zone minus TEN (K) time, East Longitude date. DOG Day is the day on which initial landings will be made on IWO JIMA. ROGER Hour is the time when the LCP(R)s of the UDTs cross the line of LCI(G)s about 2000 yards offshore, and will be specified by dispatch for day on which Underwater Demolition Teams are to conduct beach reconnaissance and demolition work.

(10) This plan is effective on receipt for planning and training and effective for operation at 0000 Zone Zero time, 10 February 1945. It ceases to be effective at 0600 Zone minus TEN time, DOG Day.

(11) At 0600(K) DOG Day CTF 51 assumes control of Task Force 52 and also title CTF 52. Rear Admiral Blandy then assumes title CTG 51.19.

(12) Public Relations provisions in accordance with Public Relations Plan, Annex (W) to CTF 51 OpPlan No. A25-44.

4. Logistics in accordance with Logistics Plan, Annex (P) to CTF 51 OpPlan No. A25-44. All large vessels be prepared to fuel destroyers and smaller vessels.
5. (a) Communications in accordance with USF-70A; CentComTWO; Communication Plan, Annex (F) to Commander FIFTH Fleet OpPlan No. 13-44; and Communication Plan, Annex (C) to CTF 51 OpPlan No. A25-44.

(b) Use Zone Zero time in date-time groups on dispatches. At all times while west of longitude one five seven thirty East Longitude, use Zone minus TEN time as local time and use East Longitude dates. HOW Hour and other lettered hours will be expressed in Zone minus TEN (K) time, East Longitude date. When time is used in text of dispatches include the appropriate zone description letters.

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Operation Plan
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(c) Commander Amphibious Support Force and Commander Air Support Control Unit in ESTES.

W.H.P. BLANDY,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander T.F. 52
Amphibious Support Force and
ComPhibGrpONE.

Annexes:

- (A) - Screening Plan at Objective.
- (B) - Night Operations at Objective.
- (C) - Special Reports at Objective.
- (D) - Schedule of Events.

L.D. Reedy
L.D. REEDY
Lieutenant, USNR.,
Flag Secretary.

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ComPhibGrpONE No. AL6-3(1)

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Distribution

Cominch (Airmail)	(13)	Maj.Gen CHANEY AC (CTG 10.16)	(1)
CinCPac	(10)	Brig.Gen. MOORE AC (CTG 95.7)	(5)
ComFIFTHFleet	(5)	ComASCU,PhibsPac	(2)
ComGenPOA	(5)	ComPhibGrp 2	(5)
ComTHIRDFleet	(3)	ComPhibGrp 3	(1)
CinCSWPA	(1)	ComPhibGrp 4	(1)
ComSEVENTHFleet	(3)	ComPhibGrp 5	(1)
ComNorPac	(1)	ComPhibGrp 6	(1)
ComSoPac	(1)	ComPhibGrp 7	(1)
ComAirPac	(1)	ComPhibGrp 12	(1)
ComDesPac (ComCruPac)	(2)	ComPhibGrp 13	(1)
ComServPac	(2)	ComServRon 10	(4)
ComSubsPac	(2)	ComServRon 12	(2)
ComHawSeaFron	(1)	ComServRonSoPac	(1)
ComAirSoPac	(1)	ComNavBaseSAIPAN	(1)
ComBatRon 2	(2)	AtComENIWETOK	(1)
ComCarTransRonPac	(2)	ComNOBGUAM	(1)
JICPOA	(1)	AtComULITHI	(1)
ComFwdAreaCentPac (For Dist.)	(10)	IsComSAIPAN	(1)
CominPac	(5)	ComSeaPlaneBaseSAIPAN	(1)
ComPhilSeaFron	(1)	IsComGUAM	(1)
ComWesCarSubArea	(1)	IsComTINIAN	(1)
ComGenFEAF	(1)	SCOFA	(2)
ComAirFwd	(5)	ComTransRon 16	(3)
ComFairWingONE	(1)	ComTransRon 15	(3)
ComTHIRDPhib	(3)	ComLSTFlot 21	(1)
ComSEVENTHPhib	(1)	ComLSMFlot 5	(1)
ComPhibsPac	(15)	ComDesRon 63	(2)
AdComPhibsPac	(5)	ComTransRon 11	(3)
ComMarGilsArea	(1)	ComService&SalvageGrp	(1)
ComGen10thArmy	(3)	ComLSTFlot 13	(1)
ComGenAAFFOA	(3)	ComServRon 6	(2)
ComGen21stBomCom	(1)	ComLSTGrp 18	(1)
ComGenFMFPac	(3)	ESTES	(2)
ComGenAirFMFPac	(2)	ComASCUPhibGrpONE	(3)
ComGenIIIPhibCorps	(1)	ComBatRon 1	(5)
ComGenVPhibCorps	(3)	ComCruDiv 4	(2)
ComGen1stMarDiv	(1)	CALIFORNIA	(2)
ComGen2ndMarDiv	(1)	LOUISVILLE	(2)
ComGen3rdMarDiv	(3)	INDIANAPOLIS	(2)
ComGen4thMarDiv	(3)	ComDesRon 56	(1)
ComGen5thMarDiv	(3)	LEUTZE	(1)
ComGen6thMarDiv	(1)	BENNION	(1)

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ComPac Esp. Div.

Distribution

BENNION (Fighter Director)	(1)	RICHARD S. BULL	(1)
NEWCOMB	(1)	ComCarDiv 26	(2)
HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS	(1)	MAKIN ISLAND	(2)
RICHARD P. LEARY	(1)	LUNGA POINT	(2)
ComBatDiv 4	(2)	BISMARCK SEA	(2)
WEST VIRGINIA	(2)	SALAMAUA	(2)
NEVADA	(2)	ANZIO	(2)
TUSCALOOSA	(2)	ComDesRon 6	(1)
ComDesRon 51	(1)	MAURY	(1)
HALL	(1)	HELM	(1)
HALLIGAN	(1)	BAGLEY	(1)
TWIGGS	(1)	RICHARD M. ROWELL	(1)
PAUL HAMILTON	(1)	O'FLAHERTY	(1)
ComBatDiv 5	(2)	ComCortDiv 72	(1)
TEXAS	(2)	LAWRENCE C. TAYLOR	(1)
PORTLAND	(2)	MELVIN R. NEWMAN	(1)
SALT LAKE CITY	(2)	OLIVER MITCHELL	(1)
STEMBEL	(1)	TABBERER	(1)
STEMBEL (Fighter Director)	(1)	ROBERT F. KELLER	(1)
JOHN D. HENLEY	(1)	ComCarDiv 28	(2)
WILLIAMSON	(1)	ComCarDiv 25	(2)
ComBatDiv 3	(2)	SAGINAW BAY	(2)
NEW MEXICO	(2)	PETROF BAY	(2)
COLORADO	(2)	RUDYARD BAY	(2)
MISSISSIPPI	(2)	STOCKTON	(1)
ComCruDiv 5	(2)	PATTERSON	(1)
CHESTER	(2)	EDMONDS	(1)
PENSACOLA	(2)	JOHN C. BUTLER	(1)
ComDesRon 46	(1)	TERROR	(1)
CAPPS	(1)	CominRon 2	(1)
TERRY	(1)	HOPKINS	(1)
DAVID W. TAYLOR	(1)	SOUTHARD	(1)
EVANS	(1)	HOVEY	(1)
BRYANT	(1)	DORSEY	(1)
BRYANT (Fighter Director)	(1)	HOWARD	(1)
ComEsCarForPac	(3)	HOGAN	(1)
SARGENT BAY	(2)	BREESE	(1)
MANILA BAY	(2)	CominRon 12	(1)
SHIPLEY BAY	(2)	SKIRMISH	(1)
ComDesDiv 12	(1)	SIGNET	(1)
McCALL	(1)	STAUNCH	(1)
RALPH TALBOTT	(1)	SCURRY	(1)
GRADY	(1)	SPECTACLE	(1)

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Distribution

SPECTOR	(1)	Com2ndCarTaskForPac	(1)
TRACY	(1)	ComCarDiv 5	(5)
SERENE (Sweep Unit)	(1)	HORNET	(1)
SERENE	(1)	WASP	(1)
SHELTER	(1)	BENNINGTON	(1)
STRATEGY	(1)	BELLEAU WOOD	(1)
STRENGTH	(1)	ComBatDiv 8	(2)
SUCCESS	(1)	MASSACHUSETTS	(1)
REBEL	(1)	INDIANA	(1)
PC 800	(1)	ComCruDiv 14	(2)
CHAMPION 1 (Sweep Unit)	(1)	VINCENNES	(1)
CHAMPION	(1)	MIAMI	(1)
ARDENT	(1)	VICKSBURG	(1)
DEFENSE	(1)	SAN JUAN	(1)
DEVASTATOR	(1)	ComDesRon 25	(2)
PREBLE	(1)	JOHN RODGERS	(1)
ComYMSType	(2)	STEVENS	(1)
YMS 323; 362; 374; 401; 411;		HARRISON	(1)
478; 193, 235, 345, 361,		McKEE	(1)
407, 475	each (1)	MURRAY	(1)
LINDSEY	(1)	RINGGOLD	(1)
SC 775, 1028, 1054	each (1)	SCHROEDER	(1)
ComULTSPac	(2)	SIGSBEE	(1)
GILMER (Sweep Unit)	(1)	DASHIELL	(1)
WATERS (Sweep Unit)	(1)	ComDesRon 61	(2)
GILMER	(1)	DeHAVEN	(1)
WATERS	(1)	MANSFIELD	(1)
BULL	(1)	LYMAN K. SWENSON	(1)
BARR	(1)	COLLETT	(1)
BLESSMAN	(1)	MADFOX	(1)
BATES	(1)	BLUE	(1)
UDT 11 (BATES)	(1)	BRUSH	(1)
UDT 12 (BARR)	(1)	TAUSSIG	(1)
UDT 14 (BULL)	(1)	SAMUEL N. MOCRE	(1)
UDT 15 (BLESSMAN)	(1)	ComCarDiv 2	(2)
LCI(L) 627	(1)	LEXINGTON	(1)
LCI(G) 450; 466; 469; 471;		HANCOCK	(1)
473; 474; 346; 348,		SAN JACINTO	(1)
438, 441, 449, 457	each (1)	ComBatDiv 6	(2)
ComLCS(L)Flot 3	(1)	WASHINGTON	(1)
ComLCIFlot 21	(1)	NORTH CAROLINA	(1)
ComLCIFlot 16	(1)	SOUTH DAKOTA	(1)
Com1stCarTaskForPac	(3)	ComCruDiv 6	(2)

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Distribution

SAN FRANCISCO	(1)	ENGLISH	(1)
MINNEAPOLIS	(1)	CHARLES S. SPERRY	(1)
ComDesRon 52	(2)	WALDRON	(1)
OWEN	(1)	HAYNSWORTH	(1)
MILLER	(1)	WALLACE L. LIND	(1)
THE SULLIVANS	(1)	JOHN W. WEEKS	(1)
STEPHEN POTTER	(1)	HANK	(1)
TINGEY	(1)	BORIE	(1)
HICKOX	(1)	ComCarDiv 6	(2)
HUNT	(1)	TICONDEROGA	(1)
LEWIS HANCOCK	(1)	RANDOLPH	(1)
MARSHALL	(1)	CABOT	(1)
ComDesRon 53	(2)	LANGLEY	(1)
CUSHING	(1)	ComCruDiv 17	(2)
HAISEY POWELL	(1)	PASADENA	(1)
COLAHAN	(1)	SPRINGFIELD	(1)
UHLMANN	(1)	ASTORIA	(1)
BENHAM	(1)	WILKES-DARRE	(1)
YARNALL	(1)	SAN DIEGO	(1)
TWINING	(1)	ComDesRon 47	(2)
STOCKHAM	(1)	MCCORD	(1)
WEDDERBURN	(1)	TRATHEN	(1)
ComCarDiv 1	(2)	HAZELWOOD	(1)
ESSEX	(1)	HEERMANN	(1)
BUNKER HILL	(1)	HAGGARD	(1)
YORKTOWN	(1)	FRANKS	(1)
COWFENS	(1)	HAILEY	(1)
ComBatDiv 7	(2)	ComDesRon 60	(2)
IOWA	(1)	BARTON	(1)
ComBatDiv 9	(2)	WALKE	(1)
WISCONSIN	(1)	LAFFEY	(1)
MISSOURI	(1)	O'BRIEN	(1)
ComCruDiv 13	(2)	LOWRY	(1)
BIRMINGHAM	(1)	ALLEN M. SUMNER	(1)
BILLOXI	(1)	MAALE	(1)
ComDesDiv 109	(2)	INGRAHAM	(1)
PORTERFIELD	(1)	ComCarDiv 11	(2)
CALLACHAN	(1)	ENTERPRISE	(1)
CASSIN YOUNG	(1)	SARATOGA	(1)
PRESTON	(1)	ALASKA	(1)
IRWIN	(1)	BALTIMORE	(1)
ComDesRon 62	(2)	FLINT	(1)
AULT	(1)	ComDesRon 54	(2)

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Distribution

REMEY	(1)	NORMAN SCOTT	(1)
MERTZ	(1)	MONSSEN	(1)
McDERMUT	(1)	McGWAN	(1)
McNAIR	(1)	MELVIN	(1)
ComDesDiv 110	(2)	LAWS	(1)
LONGSHAW	(1)	MORRISON	(1)
PRITCHETT	(1)		

DEFERRED DISTRIBUTION

CNO	(5)	NAVAL WAR COLLEGE	(1)
ARMY & NAVY STAFF COLLEGE	(1)	MARINE CORPS SCHOOL	(1)
C & Gs SCHOOL, LEAVENWORTH	(1)	COMDT. MARINE CORPS	(1)
ComPhibTraLant	(5)	ComPhibTraPac	(20)
ANNIS	(1)	PhibTraBase, Fort Pierce, Fla.	(1)

L.D. Reedy
L.D. REEDY
Lieutenant, USNR.,
Flag Secretary.

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ANNEX (A)

SCREENING PLAN AT OBJECTIVE

1. Appendix (I), Screening Diagram DOG minus THREE Day, and Appendix (II), Screening Diagram for both DOG minus TWO and DOG minus ONE Days, have been laid out to provide a closed area screen outside all Fire Support Units. Initially there is a minimum distance of 4000 yards between screening vessels and gunfire support ships. This distance will increase as the area within the screen is swept for mines, and gunfire support ships close the target. Minesweeping areas, which are restricted for navigation until swept, are indicated on the diagrams.

2. Screening vessels will take stations indicated in Screening Diagram, Appendix (I), Screen ABLE, on arrival at objective the morning of DOG minus THREE Day. Initial sweep of Minesweeping Units ONE and THREE will clear screening stations A1, A2, A3 and A4. As minesweeping areas 1 and 2, 3 and 4 are swept, the Fire Support Units will close the objective, increasing distance from screening stations. On the afternoon of DOG minus THREE Day, Screen ABLE-BAKER will be put into effect; APDs will be released for visual observation of beaches by members of the Underwater Demolition Teams, who will remain on board the APDs.

3. Screen CHARLIE, Screening Diagram, Appendix (II), will be put into effect on arrival at objective on the mornings of DOG minus TWO and DOG minus ONE Days. Screen DOG, to be used when Underwater Demolition Teams' reconnaissance is taking place on DOG minus TWO Day, will be ordered sufficiently in advance of ROGER Hour to permit close-in fire support destroyers to take their fire support stations, and thereafter on DOG minus TWO Day the stations of Screen CHARLIE will not be occupied. On DOG minus ONE Day all stations of Screen CHARLIE will be occupied, and stations of Screen DOG will be filled by vessels of Mine Units 2, 5 and 6 and by the APDs and close-in fire support destroyers as they become available.

4. Captain Hunter is designated Screen Commander and will make station assignments. The station assignments indicated on the diagrams take into consideration the distribution of screening vessels during the approach, employment during the day and subsequent night retirement. They are not mandatory, but should be used as a guide. Division Commanders will normally be assigned a centrally located station in the groups assigned them. In his group of stations, the Division Commander shall:

(a) Coordinate movements of antisubmarine ships;

(b) During temporary absence of an outer screening vessel, with no replacement available from the inner screen, adjust movements of adjacent ships to absorb the vacant station until a new screening plan is ordered or a more permanent arrangement becomes effective.

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tive; and

(c) Keep Screen Commander advised of the situation.

In case of loss of screening vessels, the Screen Commander will still maintain one complete screen around the objective enclosing all fire support units. As additional vessels become available, due to completion of minesweeping and UDT operations, a second and interior screen closer to fire support units should be formed. He will keep CTF 54 and CTF 52 advised of assignments of vessels to screening stations.

5. So far as practicable, without delay in taking screening stations, screening vessels will, while enroute to these stations, search through the area to be enclosed by the screen to determine presence of submarines. Prior to arrival of fire support ships each morning, an antisubmarine search will also be made by aircraft of the waters to be enclosed within the screen.

6. Attention is directed to the sequence of minesweeping operations listed in Minesweeping, Mooring Buoy and Net Plan, Annex (L) to CTF 51 Operation Plan No. A25-44. Ships other than minesweepers are to remain outside the areas outlined therein (and in Appendix (I) hereto) until those areas have been swept.

7. All screening stations are 7000 yards in length. The method of patrolling stations will be prescribed by the Screen Commander.

8. In event of air attack, screening vessels be prepared to close nearest heavy ships on order of CTF 52. Since the primary purpose of this operation is to effect the maximum destruction of enemy installations, it is not desired that the main effort against the objective be stopped on a "Flash Red" unless absolutely necessary.

9. Commander Screen be prepared to designate destroyers to take part in hunter-killer operations when required.

L. D. Reedy
L. D. REEDY
Lieutenant, USNR,
Flag Secretary.

W. H. P. BLANDY
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander T.F. 52
Amphibious Support Force,
and ComPhibGrpONE.

Appendices:

(I) - Screening Diagram DOG minus THREE Day.

(II) - Screening Diagram DOG minus TWO and DOG minus ONE Days.

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ANNEX (B)

NIGHT OPERATIONS AT OBJECTIVE

1. The Amphibious Support Group, less ships designated for night harassment, will retire from the objective on completion of the day's operations on DOG minus THREE, DOG minus TWO, and DOG minus ONE Days, as directed by CTF 54.

2. The missions of the night harassing group are, in general order of importance:

- (a) To prevent reinforcement or escape of the garrison;
- (b) To prevent work on defense installations and particularly to prevent installation of mines or obstructions on the beaches.
- (c) To interdict the use of the airfields; and
- (d) In general, to prevent free movement on the island; to deprive the enemy of rest, and to foster disorganization.

3. The detailed instructions of this paragraph are given to reduce the necessity for communication and may be modified as necessary by the officer in command at the objective during the night.

(a) Four destroyers are assigned for night harassment during the night of DOG minus THREE/DOG minus TWO and three destroyers and four LCI(G)s during each of the next two nights. One half the force available should be stationed on the west side of the island and the other half to the southeast, except that one destroyer shall patrol the northeastern shores.

(b) Starshells should be devoted primarily to illuminating the beaches. About one-third of the 5" AAC should be used in the high ground around MOTOYAMA and the remainder on the landing beaches and airfields. Particular attention shall be paid to placing interdiction fire on airfields whenever bogies are in the objective area, to prevent use of these fields by enemy planes. 40mm fire should be directed at the landing beaches, the neck of land northeast of SURIBACHI Mountain and at the airfields. Fire along the beaches must be sufficient to prevent effective work by the enemy thereon. 40mm fire should be by single carefully directed shots or very short bursts. Destroyers should use Mark 37 Director control.

(c) The line of fire of ships stationed southeast of the island should be to the right of 345°, and that of ships stationed to the westward should be to the left of 080°. All ships should

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remain at least 2500 yards offshore. When it is necessary to close the shoreline or to fire outside the limits given above, warning should be given to permit other ships to avoid danger from ricochets and overs.

4. Assignments of Duties.

(LCI(G)s to be designated by CTU 52.5.1).

(a) Night of DOG minus THREE/DOG minus TWO.

SHIP	M/C	ILLUM.	40mm	DARK TO 0100	0100 TO DAYLIGHT
STEMBEL	200	-	1400	Western beaches, high ground bivouac areas and airfields.	Western beaches, high ground bivouac areas and airfields.
PAUL HAMILTON	-	35	-	N.E. Patrol	Illuminate from West.
D.W. TAYLOR	50	-	1400	Eastern beaches.	Eastern beaches.
R.P. LEARY	-	35	-	Illuminate from East.	N.E. Patrol.

(b) Night of DOG minus TWO/DOG minus ONE.

SHIP	M/C	ILLUM.	40mm	DARK TO 0100	0100 TO DAYLIGHT
STEMBEL	200	-	800	Western beaches, high bivouac areas and airfields.	Western beaches and high ground bivouac areas.
	-	35	-	Illumination.	
LCI(G)	-	-	600	Western beaches.	Reserve.
LCI(G)	-	-	600	Reserve.	Western beaches.
TERRY	50	-	800	Eastern beaches.	Eastern beaches.
	-	35	-		Illumination.
LCI(G)	-	-	600	Eastern beaches.	Reserve.
LCI(G)	-	-	600	Reserve	Eastern beaches.
H.L. EDWARDS	-	-	-	Northeast patrol.	Northeast patrol.

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(c) Night of DOG minus ONE/DOG Day.

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>AAC</u>	<u>ILLUM, 40mm</u>	<u>DARK TO 0100</u>	<u>0100 TO DAYLIGHT</u>
STEMBEL	200	-	1200 Western beaches, high ground bivouac areas and airfields.	Western beaches, high ground bivouac areas and airfields.
LCI(G)	-	35	-	Illumination.
LCI(G)	-	-	600 Western beaches.	Reserve.
LCI(G)	-	-	600 Reserve.	Western beaches.
TERRY	50	-	1200 Eastern beaches.	Eastern beaches.
LCI(G)	-	35	-	Illumination.
LCI(G)	-	-	600 Eastern beaches.	Reserve.
LCI(G)	-	-	600 Reserve	Eastern beaches.
R.P. LEARY	-	-	-	Northeast patrol. Northeast patrol.

W.H.P. BLANDY,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander Task Force 52
Amphibious Support Force
and ComPhibGrpONE.

L.D. REEDY
L.D. REEDY
Lieutenant, USNR.,
Flag Secretary.

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ANNEX (C)

SPECIAL REPORTS AT OBJECTIVE

1. The appendices to this annex list special reports to be made to CTF 52 at the objective prior to the assumption of command of TF 52 by CTF 51.
2. The primary purpose of these reports is to keep CTF 52 continuously advised of progress in reduction of defenses of IWO JIMA, so that the efforts of the force may at all times be devoted to elimination of installations which have not already been destroyed.
3. In addition to reports required herein, group and unit commanders will promptly inform CTF 52 of any condition or occurrence which will apparently require a change of plan or schedule.

W.H.P. BLANDY,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander T.F. 52
Amphibious Support Force,
and ComPhibGrpONE.

Appendices:

- (I) - Fire Support Reports.
- (II) - Air Support Reports.
- (III) - Minesweeping Reports.
- (IV) - Underwater Demolition and Beach Reconnaissance Reports.
- (V) - Serial Numbers of Targets.

L.D. Reedy
L.D. REEDY
Lieutenant, USNR.,
Flag Secretary.

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Operation Plan

ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45 (Annex (C) - Special Reports at Objective).

APPENDIX (I)

FIRE SUPPORT REPORTS

1. Ammunition Reports

Ships of Fire Support Group will make daily ammunition reports in general accordance with Appendix (VI) to Annex (H) to ComPhibsPac OpPlan No. A25-44. Ships remaining at objective for night harassment will make reports each morning. Reports on completion of individual missions need not be made unless the ammunition used has varied widely from that prescribed.

2. Aircraft Reports

Fire Support Unit Commanders will report to CTF 52, information to CTF 54, each morning the number of operational aircraft in each ship having such aircraft.

3. Firing Reports

(a) In order that the limited ammunition supply be most effectively used, and in order that CTF 51 may be fully apprised of the situation on his arrival, it is necessary that CTF 52 be informed accurately of the results of firing. Each ship must establish a procedure for rapid and continuous evaluation of the results of firing. Observations of air spotters should go further than the standard spotting terms so as to include a description of the results. In addition to recording this data, when air spotters return to their ships they should be interviewed concerning the results of firing.

(b) Report will be made to CTF 52 of the results of firing at each target, or group of targets close together, upon the completion of firing at such target or group if the ship then has adequate information on which to base such report. If it is not practicable to make soundly evaluated reports during the firing, reports shall be made as soon as practicable after the completion of a scheduled firing period. Reports of noteworthy events and the general conduct of night harassment will be made each morning by the senior Fire Support Group officer remaining at the objective overnight.

(c) Reports of results of firing must be specific but as brief as is consistent with conveying the required information. Each report should indicate:

(1) Approximate rounds fired (understood to be main battery unless smaller caliber is specified);

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(Appendix (I) - Fire Support Reports).

(2) The target fired upon, by serial number for targets so designated, otherwise by type of installation and location;

(3) Results (including damage to installations other than the designated target) as determined by best method of evaluation available to the ship. Accurate, conservative reports are desired. Strong evidence must be at hand to justify a report of destruction. Where observation is unable to determine actual hits or destruction the report should include information to assist CTF 52 in estimation of probable results.

(d) Reports should be made of all targets of importance discovered either by the ship or its airspotter.

(e) An example of the desired type of report follows:

"12 ROUNDS TARGET 19 SEVERAL NEAR HITS GUN PROBABLY DAMAGED X
TARGET 18 DESTROYED X ONE HIT ON TARGET 98 X ONE HIT ON ONE
GUN OF TARGET 96 X 8 ROUNDS TARGET 23 SEVERAL CLOSE HITS X
TARGET 24 PROBABLY HIT NO LONGER DISTINGUISHABLE X LOCATED
NEW TARGET CAMOUFLAGED BLOCKHOUSE 50 YARDS SOUTH OF TARGET 23 X"

(f) Reports from Fire Support Group required in this appendix shall be made by visual when conditions permit. When reports by visual are not practicable, they shall be made over the Naval Gunfire Overload Circuit (3905 kcs.), using plain language and, whenever possible, using target serial numbers listed in Appendix (V), rather than descriptive nomenclature. If target area numbers or grid coordinates must be used, employ shackle cipher if necessary in accordance with principles set forth in Paragraph 6, Appendix (VI) to Annex (H) of ComPhibsPac OpPlan No. A25-44.

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ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45 (Annex (C) - Special Reports at Objective).

APPENDIX (II)

AIR SUPPORT REPORTS

1. Reports from Commander Task Group 52.2 (CVE's)
 - (a) Daily logistics report as listed in Appendix (A) to Annex (I) of ComPhibsPac OpPlan No. A25-44.
2. Reports from Air Coordinator
 - (a) Report results of all strikes as soon as completed, including observed damage to specific targets.
 - (b) Report any new enemy installations discovered.
 - (c) Report destruction or damage to specific defenses by ships' gunfire, when observed.
 - (d) Report location of any observed minefields or floating mines.
3. Reports from Antisubmarine Patrol
 - (a) Report any submarine contacts and results of attack.
4. Reports from Air-Sea Rescue Officer
 - (a) Report as soon as practicable after occurrence the number of pilots forced down and the number rescued, including method of rescue.
5. Reports from Fighter Director Officer
 - (a) Report, as soon as practicable after occurrence, enemy planes encountered, destroyed, probably destroyed and damaged.

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APPENDIX (III)

MINESWEEPING REPORTS

1. The following reports will be made by CTG 52.3 to CTF 52:

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Form</u>	<u>Time</u>
Mines encountered	Dispatch	When occurring.
Area swept	Dispatch	When occurring.
Daily summary of sweeping	Disptach or overlay	On completion of day's sweeping.
Hydrographic information	Disptach	When occurring.

2. Particular attention is invited to the necessity of promptly reporting any variations from soundings indicated on charts which constitute a danger to navigation.

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APPENDIX (IV)

UNDERWATER DEMOLITION AND BEACH RECONNAISSANCE REPORTS

1. CTG 52.4 make special reports to CTF 52 as follows:
 - (a) By urgent dispatch or officer messenger, reports of results of reconnaissance of eastern and western beaches. Include surf conditions, suitability of beaches for landing of LVT's and landing craft, and effects of surf, current and height of tide upon such suitability. Make recommendations regarding demolition required with estimates of time needed to complete such missions.
 - (b) After each reconnaissance deliver undeveloped film of pictures taken during reconnaissance to CTF 52.
 - (c) Upon completion of each demolition mission, inform CTF 52 by urgent dispatch or officer messenger of results and whether or not further demolition is required to prepare the location for a successful landing. If further demolition is required, include recommendation as to when the mission should be scheduled, with an estimate of time needed.

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APPENDIX (V)

SERIAL NUMBERS OF TARGETS

1. Instructions Regarding Use of Serial Numbers

The assignment of serial numbers to major known installations is for the purpose of simplifying dispatches relating thereto. Targets should be indicated by serial number whenever practicable but location of targets may be indicated by target square or grid coordinate if necessary. To avoid possible confusion numbers corresponding to the target square numbers have been eliminated from the serial numbers. New installations will be assigned numbers only by CTF 52, and units will be advised of such assignments by dispatch. New installations will be assigned the number of a previously known target in the same 200-yard square, with the addition of a, b, c, etc., to the number. To facilitate the numbering of new targets, a number has been assigned to each 200-yard square which now contains no known installations. Serial numbers do not appear on the maps; however, where it becomes necessary to distinguish between targets of the same type in a 200-yard square a description indicating location in the square such as "Eastern", "Western", etc., will be added. The following list of target serial numbers should be kept up to date by insertion of new numbers when assigned.

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
121	D 1		
	E 2		
	J 3		
122	A 4		
131	D 5		
	E 6	Open Artillery Emplacement	
	I 7	Covered Artillery Emplacement	
	J 8	Blockhouse	
	N 9	Pill Box	
	O 10	Covered Artillery Emplacement	

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Appendix (V) - Serial Numbers of Targets)

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
131	O	11 : Open Artillery Emplacement	
	S	12	
	T	13	
	X	14	
	Y	15	
132	A	16	
	B	17 : Pill Box	
	B	18 : Searchlight	
	C	19 : Dual Purpose Gun	
	C	20 : Pill Box	North
	C	21 : Pill Box	South
	C	22 : Open Artillery Emplacement	
	C	23 : Covered Artillery Emplacement	
	D	24 : Pill Box	West
	D	25 : Pill Box	East
	E	26 : Pill Box	North
	E	27 : Pill Box	South
	F	28	
	G	29	
	H	30 : Pill Box	North
	H	31 : Pill Box	South
	H	32 : Covered Artillery Emplacement	

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Appendix (V) - Serial Numbers of Targets)

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION-(Where More Than One of Same Type
132	J	34	:
	K	35 : Covered Artillery Emplacement	East
	K	36 : Covered Artillery Emplacement	West
	L	37 : Coast Defense Gun	
	M	38 : Pill Box	North
	M	39 : Pill Box	South
	M	40 : Open Artillery Emplacement	
	N	41	
	●	42	
	P	43 : Automatic AA	West
	P	44 : Automatic AA (2)	Center
	P	45 : Automatic AA	East
	Q	46	
	R	47 : Open Artillery Emplacement	
	R	48 : Pill Box	North
	R	49 : Pill Box	South
	S	50	
	T	51	
	U	52 : Open Artillery Emplacement	
	U	53 : Unidentified (2)	
	V	54 : Pill Box	
	W	55	
	X	56	

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Appendix (V) - Serial Numbers of Targets)

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
132	Y : 57	:	:
133	A : 58	: Pill Box	:
146	Y : 59	: Covered Artillery : Emplacement	:
	Y : 60	: Pill Box	:
147	B : 61	:	:
	C : 62	: Open Artillery : Emplacement	: North
	C : 63	: Open Artillery : Emplacement	: South
	C : 64	: Block House	: North
	C : 65	: Block House	: South
	C : 66	: Pill Box	: West
	C : 67	: Pill Box	: South Center
	D : 68	:	:
	E : 69	:	:
	G : 70	:	:
	H : 71	: Covered Artillery : Emplacement	:
	H : 72	: Open Artillery : Emplacement	:
	I : 73	: Block House	:
	J : 74	:	:
	L : 75	: Open Artillery : Emplacement	:
	M : 76	: Pill Box	:
	N : 77	:	:
	O : 78	: Pill Box	:
	P : 79	:	:

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Appendix (V) - Serial Numbers of Targets)

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
147	Q : 80	: Pill Box	:
	Q : 81	: Open Artillery : Emplacement	:
	R : 82	: Open Artillery : Emplacement	:
	R : 83	: Automatic AA (3)	: North
	R : 84	: Automatic AA	: Southwest
	R : 85	: Automatic AA	: South - Center
	R : 86	: Automatic AA	: Southeast
	R : 87	: Automatic AA	: East
	R : 88	: Pill Box	:
	S : 89	: Block House	:
	S : 90	: Pill Box	: South
	S : 91	: Pill Box	: North
	T : 92	: Automatic AA	: South
	T : 93	: Automatic AA	: North
	U : 94	: Open Artillery : Emplacement	:
	V : 95	: Open Artillery : Emplacement	:
	V : 96	: Dual Purpose Guns (3)	:
	V : 97	: Pill Box	:
	W : 98	: Pill Box	: Southwest
	W : 99	: Pill Box	: South
	W : 100	: Pill Box	: Northeast
	W : 101	: Dual Purpose Gun	:
	W : 102	: Open Artillery : Emplacement	:

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TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)	
147	X	103	Pill Box	
	Y	104	Pill Box	
148	A	105		
	B	106		
	C	107		
	D	108	Automatic AA	
	E	109		
	F	110	Pill Box	
	G	111		
	H	112	Block House	
	I	113	Block House	
	J	114	Block House	
	J	115	Pill Box	
	K	116		
	L	117	Pill Box	
	M	118	Pill Box	
	N	119	Pill Box	
	O	120	Pill Box	West
	O	123	Pill Box	North
	P	124	Automatic AA	West
	P	125	Automatic AA	West - Center
	P	126	Automatic AA	South
	P	127	Pill Box	

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TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION Where More Than One of Same Type)
148	Q : 128	Covered Artillery Emplacement	
	Q : 129	Pill Box	West
	Q : 130	Pill Box	Southeast
	R : 134		
	S : 135	Block House	West
	S : 136	Block House	North
	S : 137	Pill Box	
	S : 138	Anti-Tank Gun	
	U : 139	Automatic AA	
	U : 140	Pill Box	West
	U : 141	Pill Box	South
	U : 142	Pill Box	North
	U : 143	Pill Box	Northeast
	U : 144	Block House	
	V : 145	Block House	
	V : 150	Pill Box	West
	V : 151	Pill Box	Center
149	W : 152	Open Artillery Emplacement	
	A : 153	Covered Artillery Emplacement	
	A : 154	Block House	
	A : 155	Pill Box	Southwest
	A : 156	Pill Box	North - Center
	A : 157	Pill Box	Northeast

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TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)	
149	B	158	Pill Box	North
	B	159	Pill Box	Southeast
	C	160	Pill Box	
	C	161	Block House	
	D	162		
	F	169	Covered Artillery Emplacement	
	F	170	Anti-Tank Gun	
	G	171	Pill Box	
	K	172		
163	D	173	Pill Box	Center
	D	174	Pill Box	North
	E	175	Covered Artillery Emplacement	
	H	176		
	I	177	Pill Box	West
	I	178	Pill Box	East
	J	179	Block House	
	J	187	Pill Box	Southwest
	J	188	Pill Box	North
	J	189	Pill Box	East
	M	190		
N	191	Pill Box	Northeast - Center	
N	192	Pill Box (2)	Northeast	
N	193	Pill Box	Northwest	

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TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
163	N : 194	: Anti-Tank Gun	:
	N : 195	: Covered Artillery : Emplacement	:
	O : 196	: Automatic AA	:
	O : 204	: Pill Box	:
	R : 205	: Pill Box	: East
	R : 206	: Pill Box	: Southwest
	R : 207	: Pill Box	: Center
	S : 208	: Covered Artillery : Emplacement	:
	S : 209	: Pill Box	: Southwest
	S : 210	: Pill Box	: North
	S : 211	: Automatic AA	: Center
	S : 212	: Automatic AA	: East
	T : 213	: Automatic AA	: Northwest
	T : 214	: Automatic AA	: Southwest
	V : 220	:	:
	W : 221	: Pill Box	: West
	W : 222	: Pill Box	: North
	W : 223	: Pill Box	: Center
	W : 224	: Pill Box	: Northeast
	W : 225	: Covered Artillery : Emplacement	:
	W : 226	: Open Artillery : Emplacement	:
	W : 227	: Block House	:
	X : 228	:	:

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Appendix (V) - Serial Numbers of Targets)

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
163	Y : 229		
164	A : 230	Pill Box	Center
	A : 231	Pill Box	Northeast
	B : 232		
	C : 237		
	D : 238	Automatic AA	
	E : 239	Automatic AA	West
	E : 240	Automatic AA	South
	F : 241		
	G : 242		
	H : 243		
	I : 244		
	J : 245	Automatic AA	
	J : 246	Earth Covered Shelter	
	K : 247		
	L : 248		
	M : 249	Earth Covered Shelter	West
	M : 252	Earth Covered Shelter	North
	M : 253	Earth Covered Shelter	South
	N : 254		
	O : 255		
	P : 256		
	257		

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TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)	
164	R	258		
	S	259		
	T	260		
	U	261		
	V	262		
	W	263		
	X	264	Automatic AA	Southeast
	X	265	Automatic AA	East
	Y	266	Automatic AA	Southwest
	Y	267	Automatic AA	East
165	Y	268	Open Artillery Emplacement	
	A	269	Dual Purpose Gun	
	B	270	Pill Box	
	C	271		
	D	272		
	E	273		
	F	274		
	G	275	Ammunition Storage	
	H	276	Pill Box	
	I	277	Block house	
	J	278		
	K	279		
	L	280		

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TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)	
165	M	281	Block House	
	M	282	Pill Box	
	N	283		
	O	284		
	P	285		
	Q	286	Covered Artillery Emplacement	South
	Q	287	Covered Artillery Emplacement	Northeast
	R	288	Pill Box	
	S	289	Pill Box	
	T	290	Pill Box	
	U	291	Covered Artillery Emplacement	
	U	292	Pill Box	
	V	293	Pill Box	North
	V	294	Pill Box	Northeast
	W	295		
	X	296	Block House	
	X	297	Pill Box	West
	X	298	Pill Box	Center
	Y	299		
166	A	300		
	B	301	Pill Box	
	B	302	Searchlight	
	C	303	Covered Artillery Emplacement	

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TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)	
166	C	304	Anti-Tank Gun	
	D	305	Pill Box	Center
	E	306	Pill Box	Center
	E	307	Pill Box	Northeast
	E	308	Anti-Tank Gun	
	F	309	Pill Box	
	G	310	Pill Box	Southwest
	G	311	Pill Box	North
	G	312	Beached LSM	
	H	313	Covered Artillery Emplacement	
	H	314	Block House	
	H	315	Pill Box	
	H	316	Beached LSM	
	I	317		
	J	318		
	K	319	Pill Box	West
	K	320	Pill Box	South
	K	321	Anti-Tank Gun	
	L	322	Beached LSM	
167	A	323	Possible Coast Defense Gun	West
	A	324	Possible Coast Defense Gun	East
	A	325	Open Artillery Emplacement	
	B	326		

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TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)	
167	C	327		
	D	328	Pill Box	
	E	329		
	F	330		
	I	331		
	J	332		
168	A	333		
	B	334		
180	D	335	None	
	E	336	Covered Artillery Emplacement	
	E	337	Pill Box	Northcast
	I	338		
	J	339	Anti-Tank Gun	North
	J	340	Anti-Tank Gun	South
	N	341		
	O	342	Anti-Tank Gun	
	S	343	Block House	
	S	344	Pill Box	North
	S	345	Pill Box	South
	T	346	Pill Box	West
	T	347	Pill Box	North
X	348	Pill Box		
		Open Artillery Emplacement		

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Appendix (V) - Serial Numbers of Targets)

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
181	A : 350	:	:
	B : 351	: Pill Box	:
	B : 352	: Block House	:
	C : 353	: Block House	:
	C : 354	: Unidentified Installation	:
	D : 355	:	:
	E : 356	:	:
	F : 357	: Unidentified Installation	:
	G : 358	: Pill Box	: East
	G : 359	: Pill Box	: Southeast
	H : 360	: Unidentified Installation	:
	I : 361	:	:
	J : 362	:	:
	K : 363	: Anti-Tank Gun	:
	L : 364	: 3 Covered Artillery Emplacements	:
	L : 365	: Pill Box	: Northeast
	L : 366	: Pill Box	: Southwest
	L : 367	: Pill Box	: West
	L : 368	: Pill Box	: Northwest - Center
	L : 369	: Pill Box	: North
	M : 370	:	:
	N : 371	:	:
	O : 372	:	:

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TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
181	P	373 : Pill Box	Southwest
	P	374 : Pill Box	Southwest - Center
	Q	375 :	
	R	376 :	
	S	377 :	
	T	378 :	
	U	379 : Pill Box	
	V	380 :	
	W	381 :	
	X	382 :	
	Y	383 : Dual Purpose Gun	
	Y	384 : Automatic M	
182	A	385 : Pill Box	Northwest
	A	386 : Pill Box	Center
	A	387 : Anti-Tank Gun	
	A	388 : 5 Automatic M	
	B	389 : Anti-Tank Gun	
	C	390 :	
	D	391 :	
	E	392 :	
	F	393 :	
	G	394 :	
	H	395 :	

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TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
182	I : 396	: 3 Automatic AA	:
	J : 397	: Open Artillery	:
		: Emplacement	:
	K : 398	:	:
	L : 399	: Open Artillery	:
		: Emplacement	:
	L : 400	: Covered Artillery	:
		: Emplacement	:
	L : 401	: Pill Box	:
	M : 402	: Covered Artillery	:
		: Emplacement	:
	M : 403	: Open Artillery	:
		: Emplacement	:
	N : 404	: 6 Automatic AA	:
	O : 405	:	:
	P : 406	: Automatic AA	:
	Q : 407	:	:
	R : 408	: Pill Box	: Center
	R : 409	: Pill Box	: East
	R : 410	: Automatic AA	:
	S : 411	:	:
	T : 412	:	:
	U : 413	: Dual Purpose Gun	: West
	U : 414	: Dual Purpose Gun	: South
	U : 415	: Automatic AA	: Northwest
	U : 416	: 8 Automatic AA	: East
	U : 417	: Unidentified Instal-	:
		: lation	:
	V : 418	: Ammunition Storage	:

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TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)	
182	V	419	Searchlight	
	W	420	Pill Boxes (2)	
	W	421	Unidentified Installations	
	W	422	Searchlight	
	W	423	Open Artillery Emplacement	
	X	424		
	Y	425		
183	A	426		
	B	427		
	C	428		
	D	429	4 Automatic AA	West
	D	430	Automatic AA	Center
	D	431	2 Automatic AA	North
	D	432	3 Automatic AA	East
	E	433	2 Automatic AA	
	E	434	Unidentified Installation	
	F	435		
	G	436		
	H	437		
	I	438	Covered Artillery Emplacement	
J	439	2 Automatic AA		
K	440			

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TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
183	M	442	
	N	443	
	O	444	
	P	445	
	Q	446	
	R	447	
	S	448	
	T	449	
	U	450	Pill Box
	V	451	Covered Artillery Emplacement
	W	452	Pill Box
	X	453	Anti-Tank Gun
	Y	454	
184	A	455	
	B	456	Open Artillery Emplacement
	C	457	
	D	458	
	E	459	
	F	460	Searchlight
	F	461	Open Artillery Emplacement
	G	462	
	H	463	
	I	464	

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TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
184	J	465	
	K	466	
	L	467	
	M	468	
	N	469	
	O	470	
	P	471	
	Q	472	
	R	473	
	S	474	
	T	475	
	U	476	
	V	477	
	W	478	
X	479		
Y	480		
185	A	481	
	B	482	
	C	483	
	D	484	Covered Artillery Emplacement
	E	485	
	F	486	
	G	487	

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TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
185	H	488	
	I	489	
	J	490	
	K	491	
	L	492	
	M	493	
	N	494	
	O	495	
	P	496	
	Q	497	
	R	498 : Anti-Tank Gun	
	S	499	
	T	500	
	U	501	
	V	502 : Possible Pill Box	
	W	503	
186	A	504	
	F	505	
197	E	506	
	J	507 : Pill Box	South
	J	508 : Pill Box	Southeast
	J	509 : Pill Box	Northeast
	N	510	

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Operation Plan

ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45 (Annex (C) - Special Reports at Objective -
Appendix (V) - Serial Numbers of Targets)

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)	
197	O	511	Pill Box	South
	O	512	Pill Box	North
	S	513		
	T	514	Block House	
	T	515	Pill Box	East
	T	516	Pill Box	Northeast
	X	517		
	Y	518	Pill Box	Southwest
	Y	519	Pill Box	Northwest
	Y	520	Pill Box	Southeast
	198	A	521	
B		522		
C		523		
D		524	2 Block Houses	
E		525		
F		526		
G		527		
H		528	Pill Box	East
H		529	Pill Box	Southeast
I		530		
J		531	Open Artillery Emplacement	
K		532	Pill Box	

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ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45 (Annex (C) - Special Reports at Objective -
Appendix (V) - Serial Numbers of Targets)

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
198	M	534	
	N	535	
	O	536	Pill Box
	O	537	Covered Artillery Emplacement
	P	538	
	Q	539	
	R	540	
	S	541	
	T	542	Open Artillery Emplacement
	U	543	
	V	544	Pill Box
	W	545	Block House
	W	546	Pill Box Northwest
	W	547	Pill Box South
	W	548	Pill Box North
	X	549	
	Y	550	
199	A	551	
	B	552	
	C	553	Pill Box West
	C	554	Pill Box North
	D	555	
	E	556	Covered Artillery Emplacement

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ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45 (Annex (C) - Special Reports at Objective -
Appendix (V) - Serial Numbers of Targets)

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)	
199	F	557	Covered Artillery Emplacement	
	G	558		
	H	559		
	I	560	3 Automatic AA	
	J	561		
	K	562	Pill Box	
	L	563	Open Artillery Emplacement	
	M	564	Covered Artillery Emplacement	
	N	565	3 Automatic AA	
	N	566	Pill Box	
	N	567	Open Artillery Emplacement	
	N	568	Dual Purpose Gun	
	O	569	Covered Artillery Emplacement	
	O	570	Dual Purpose Gun	Northwest
	O	571	Dual Purpose Gun	Center
	O	572	Dual Purpose Gun	North
	O	573	Dual Purpose Gun	Northeast
	P	574	Open Artillery Emplacement	West
	P	575	Open Artillery Emplacement	Southeast
	P	576	Open Artillery Emplacement	Northeast
	P	577	Covered Artillery Emplacement	
	Q	578	Pill Box	

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Operation Plan

ComPhibGrpONE No. ALOI-45 (C) (V) Special Reports at Objective -
Appendix (V) - Serial Numbers of Targets)

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)	
199	S	580	Pill Box	
	T	581	Covered Artillery Emplacement	
	U	582	Pill Boxes (2)	East
	U	583	Pill Box	Southeast
	V	584	Pill Box	Southeast
	V	585	Covered Artillery Emplacement	
	W	586	Pill Box	Southwest
	W	587	Pill Box	Center
	W	588	2 Covered Artillery Emplacements	
	X	589	Pill Box	West
	X	590	Pill Box	South
	X	591	Covered Artillery Emplacement	
	Y	592		
	200	A	593	
B		594		
C		595		
D		596		
E		597		
F		598		
G		599		
H		600	Automatic AA	South
H		601	Automatic AA	Southeast
I	602			

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ComPhibGrpONE No. 101.5 Annex (C) - Special Reports at Objective -
Appendix (V) - Serial Numbers of Targets

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)	
200	J	603		
	K	604		
	L	605		
	M	606	Automatic AA	Northwest
	M	607	Automatic AA	North
	N	608		
	O	609		
	P	610	Automatic AA (2)	Center
	P	611	Automatic AA (3)	East
	Q	612		
	R	613		
	S	614		
	T	615		
	U	616		
201	V	617		
	W	618		
	X	619		
	Y	620	4 Automatic AA	
	Y	621	1 Radar	
	A	622		
	B	623		
C	624			
D	625			

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ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45 (Annex (C) - Special Reports at Objective -
Appendix (V) - Serial Numbers of Targets)

TARGET	SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
201	E	626	Searchlight	
	F	627		
	G	628		
	H	629		
	I	630		
	J	631		
	K	632		
	L	633		
	M	634		
	N	635		
	O	636		
	P	637	2 Automatic AA	
	Q	638		
	R	639		
	S	640		
	T	641		
	U	642	Automatic AA	Center
	U	643	Automatic AA	Northeast - Center
	U	644	Automatic AA	Northeast
	U	645	Open Artillery Emplacement	
	V	646	Open Artillery Emplacement	West
	V	647	Open Artillery Emplacement	South
	W	648		

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ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45 (Annex (C) - Special Reports at Objective -
Appendix (V) - Serial Numbers of Targets)

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
201	X	649	
	Y	650	Searchlight
202	A	651	Searchlight
	B	652	
	C	653	
	D	654	
	E	655	Pill Box
	F	656	
	G	657	Anti-Tank Gun
	H	658	
	I	659	
	J	660	Pill Box
	J	661	2 Unidentified Installations
	K	662	
	L	663	
	M	664	
	N	665	
	O	666	
	P	667	
	Q	668	
	R	669	
	S	670	
	T	671	

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ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45 (Annex (C) - Special Reports at Objective -
Appendix (V) - Serial Numbers of Targets)

TARGET	SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
202	U	672		
	V	673		
	W	674		
	X	675	Ammunition Storage	
	Y	676		
203	F	677		
	P	678		
	U	679		
215	E	680		
	J	681		
	N	682	Pill Boxes (2)	
	O	683	Pill Box	
	Q	684		
	R	685		
	S	686	Covered Artillery Emplacement	
	S	687	Pill Box	Center
	S	688	Pill Box	Center
	T	689	Open Artillery Emplacement	
	T	690	Block House	
	U	691		
	V	692		
	W	693	Pill Box	East
	W	694	Open Artillery Emplacement	

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ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45 Annex (C) - Special Reports at Objective -
Appendix (V) - Serial Numbers of Targets

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
215	X	695	
	X	696	Pill Box Northwest
	Y	697	Block House
216	A	698	
	B	699	
	C	700	
	D	701	
	E	702	
	F	703	
	G	704	Open Artillery Emplacement South
	G	705	Open Artillery Emplacement Southeast
	H	706	
	I	707	
	J	708	
	K	709	
	L	710	
	M	711	Covered Artillery Emplacement
	N	712	
	O	713	
	P	714	
	Q	715	
	R	716	Covered Artillery Emplacement
S	717		

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ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45 (Annex (C) - Special Report Objective -
Appendix (V) - Serial Numbers of Targets)

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)	
216	T	718		
	U	719	Possible Covered Artillery Emplacement	
	V	720		
	W	721		
	X	722		
	Y	723	Automatic AA (7)	
	Y	724	Open Artillery Emplacement	
217	A	725		
	B	726		
	C	727	Radar (possible)	
	D	728		
	E	729		
	F	730	Automatic AA (1)	South
	F	731	Automatic AA (5)	Northwest
	F	732	Automatic AA (4)	Northeast
	G	733	Covered Artillery Emplacement	
	G	734	Open Artillery Emplacement	
	H	735	Pill Box	Northwest
	I	736		
	J	737		
K	738			
L	739	Automatic AA (9)		
M	740	Open Artillery Emplacement (2)		

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ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45 (Annex (C) - Special Reports at Objective - Appendix (V) - Serial Numbers of Targets)

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)	
217	N	741		
	O	742		
	P	743		
	Q	744		
	R	745		
	S	746		
	T	747	Earth Covered Structure	
	U	748		
	V	749		
	W	750		
	X	751	Pill Box	South
	X	752	Automatic AA	
	Y	753		
	218	A	754	Automatic AA Northwest
A		755	Automatic AA Center	
A		756	Automatic AA North	
B		757		
C		758	Automatic AA Southwest	
C		759	Automatic AA Center	
C		760	Automatic AA South-Center	
C		761	Automatic AA South	
D		762	Automatic AA (6)	
E				

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ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45 (Annex (C) - Special Reports at Objective - Appendix (V) - Serial Numbers of Targets)

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
218	F	764	
	G	765	
	H	766	Automatic AA
	I	767	
	J	768	Searchlight
	J	769	Possible Radar
	K	770	
	L	771	
	M	772	
	N	773	
	O	774	
	P	775	
	Q	776	
	R	777	
	S	778	
	T	779	
	U	780	
	V	781	
	W	782	
	X	783	
	Y	784	Earth Covered Structure
219	A	785	Coast Defense Gun Northwest
	A	786	Coast Defense Gun North

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ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45 (Annex (C) - Special Reports at Objective -
Appendix (V) - Serial Numbers of Targets)

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
219	B : 787	: Pill Box	: Southwest
	C : 788	: :	: :
	D : 789	: :	: :
	E : 790	: :	: :
	F : 791	: Automatic AA (10)	: :
	G : 792	: Covered Artillery	: :
		: Emplacement	: :
	G : 793	: Pill Box	: Center
	H : 794	: Covered Artillery	: :
		: Emplacement	: :
	I : 795	: Open Artillery	: :
		: Emplacement	: :
	J : 796	: :	: :
	K : 797	: Open Artillery	: :
		: Emplacement	: :
	L : 798	: Automatic AA	: Southwest
	L : 799	: Automatic AA	: South
	L : 800	: Automatic AA	: Center
	L : 801	: Automatic AA	: North
	L : 802	: Automatic AA	: Northeast
	M : 803	: Unidentified Instal-	: :
		: lation	: :
	N : 804	: :	: :
	O : 805	: :	: :
	P : 806	: :	: :
	Q : 807	: :	: :
	R : 808	: Pill Box	: South
	R : 809	: Pill Box	: Northeast

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ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45 (Annex (C) - Special Reports at Objective -
Appendix (V) - Serial Numbers of Targets)

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)	
219	S	810	Pill Box	East
	T	811	Anti-Tank Gun	
	U	812		
	V	813		
	W	814	Pill Box	Southeast
	X	815	Pill Box	North
	Y	816		
233	D	817		
	E	818		
	H	819		
	I	820		
	J	821		
	L	822		
	M	823		
	N	824		
	O	825		
	P	826		
	Q	827		
	R	828		
	S	829		
	T	830		
	U	831		
	W	832		

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ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45 (Annex (C) - Special Reports at Objective - Appendix (V) - Serial Numbers of Targets)

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
233	X	833	
	Y	834	
234	A	835	
	B	836	
	C	837	
	D	838	
	E	839	
	F	840	
	G	841	
	H	842	
	I	843	
	J	844	
	K	845	
	L	846	
	M	847	
	N	848	
	O	849	Ammunition Storage
	P	850	
	Q	851	
R	852		
S	853		
T	854		
U	855		

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Operation Plan

ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45 (Annex (C) - Special Reports at Objective -
Appendix (V) - Serial Numbers of Targets)

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
234	V	856	
	W	857	Open Artillery Emplacement North
	W	858	Open Artillery Emplacement East
	X	859	
	Y	860	
235	A	861	
	B	862	
	C	863	
	D	864	
	E	865	
	F	866	
	G	867	
	H	868	
	I	869	
	J	870	
	K	871	Dual Purpose Gun
	K	872	Ammunition Storage
	L	873	
	M	874	
	N	875	
	O	876	
	P	877	Dual Purpose Gun Northwest
	P	878	Dual Purpose Gun Center

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Operation Plan
ComPhibGrpONE No. A101

Ports at Objective -
Appendix (V) - Serial Numbers of Targets)

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)	
235	P	879	Dual Purpose Gun	Southeast
	P	880	Ammunition Storage	
	Q	881	Dual Purpose Gun	
	Q	882	Radar	
	R	883		
	S	884		
	T	885		
	U	886	Automatic AA (5)	South and Center
	V	887	Automatic AA (5)	West-Northwest
	V	888	Ammunition Storage	
	W	889	Searchlight	
	W	890	Radar	
	X	891		
	Y	892	Automatic AA	
	Y	893	Covered Artillery Emplacement	Center
Y	894	Covered Artillery Emplacement	East	
236	A	895		
	F	896		
	G	897		
	K	898		
	L	899		
	P	900	Pill Box	Southwest
Q	901			

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Operation Plan

ComPhibGrp ONE No. A101-45 (Annex (C) - Special Reports at Objective - Appendix (V) - Serial Numbers of Targets)

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)	
236	R	902		
	U	903	Anti-Tank Gun	
	U	904	Open Artillery Emplacement	
	V	905		
	W	906		
	X	907		
	250	I	908	
J		909		
N		910		
O		911		
S		912		
T		913		
V		914		
W		915		
X		916		
Y		917		
251	F	918		
	G	919		
	H	920		
	K	921		
	L	922		
	M	923	Pill Box	Center
	N	924		

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Operation Plan

ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45 (Annex (C) - Special Reports at Objective -
Appendix (V) - Serial Numbers of Targets)

TARGET SQUARE	SERIAL NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION (Where More Than One of Same Type)
251	P	925	
	Q	926	
	R	927	Unidentified Installation
	S	928	
	U	929	
	V	930	
	W	931	
	Y	932	

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Operation Plan
ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45

ANNEX (D)

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

DOG MINUS THREE DAY

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
0430	52.3.18	Mine Unit ONE arrive Pt. BAIL. Proceed with sweeping operations as directed by CTG 52.3.
About 0500		TERROR may join Fire Support Units TWO and THREE for approach to IWO JIMA.
0600	52.3.5	Sweep Unit FOUR plus TWIGGS proceed to Minesweeping Area FIVE.
0600	CAP 1-8 VF	On station.
0600	52.3.1	Sweep Unit ONE supported by NEWCOMB begin sweeping operations in Areas 1 and 4.
0600	52.3.4	Sweep Unit THREE begin sweeping operations in Area 13, northern half.
As occurring		Each gunfire ship report results of firing at each target or group of targets. CTG 52.3 report mines encountered, areas swept and hydrographic information.
0700	Land based planes	On station; commence bombing run.
0700	Screen Commander	Establish area screen for Fire Support units.
0700	NEVADA MISSISSIPPI TUSCALOOSA CHESTER CALIFORNIA LOUISVILLE SALT LAKE CITY PENSACOLA COLORADO	Commence firing from F.S. Sector III and IV Commence firing from F.S. Sector II Commence firing from F.S. Sector II Commence firing from F.S. Sector VI Commence firing from F.S. Sector I Commence firing from F.S. Sector I Commence firing from F.S. Sectors III & IV Commence firing from F.S. Sectors V & VI Commence firing from F.S. Sectors III & IV
0700	Sweep Unit TWO plus STEMBEL	Begin sweeping in Area 2, supported by STEMBEL.
0700	Sweep Unit FOUR plus TWIGGS	Begin sweeping in Area 5, supported by TWIGGS.

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ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45 (Annex (D) - Schedule of Events)

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
0700		Normally TERROR and ESTES will operate within area screen as ordered by CTG 52.3 and CTF 52, respectively.
0730	ASP 1 - 6 VT CAP 2 - 8 VF CAP 1 - 8 VF Air Coord. 1 VT(VF)	On station On station Return to base On station - Reports, as occurring, results of strikes, new targets, presence of minefields.
0730	Strike ABLE-8 VF, 8VT Air Spot 1 - 6 VOF 6 VT (smokers)	On station On station On call
0730	Land based planes	Return to base
Forenoon		Fire Support Unit Commanders report number of operational aircraft to CTF 54 and CTF 52. CTG 52.2 makes daily logistic report
0815	NEVADA TUSCALOOSA MISSISSIPPI CHESTER	Cease firing
0815	PORTLAND WEST VIRGINIA TEXAS NEW MEXICO	Commence firing from F.S. Sector I Commence firing from F.S. Sector II Commence firing from F.S. Sectors III & IV Commence firing from F.S. Sectors V & VI
0845	Air Spot 2 - 6 VOF	On station
0900	Photo Plane 1 - 1 VT CAP 3 - 8 VF CAP 2 - 8 VF Strike BAKER-8 VF, 8 VT Strike ABLE-8 VF, 8 VT Air Spot 1 - 6 VOF	On station On station Return to base On station Return to base Return to base
0915	CALIFORNIA LOUISVILLE SALT LAKE CITY PENSACOLA COLORADO	Cease firing
0915	NEVADA TUSCALOOSA	Commence firing from F.S. Sectors III & IV Commence firing from F.S. Sector II

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Operation Plan
ComPhibGrp ONE No. AL01-45 (Annex (D) - Schedule of Events)

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
0915	MISSISSIPPI CHESTER	Commence firing from F.S. Sector II Commence firing from F.S. Sector V
1011	Sweep Unit ONE plus NEWCOMB	Complete operations in Minesweeping Areas 1 and 4. Begin operations in Area 3
1015	PORTLAND WEST VIRGINIA TEXAS NEW MEXICO	Cease firing
1015	Air Spot 3-6 VOF	On station
1015	CALIFORNIA LOUISVILLE SALT LAKE CITY PENSACOLA COLORADO	Commence firing from F.S. Sector I Commence firing from F.S. Sector I Commence firing from F.S. Sector III Commence firing from F.S. Sector V Commence firing from F.S. Sector III
1030	CAP 4-8 VF CAP 3-8 VF Air. Coor. 2-1VT(VF) Air Coor. 1 Strike CHARLIE - 8 VF, 8 VT Strike BAKER - 8 VF, 8 VT Air Spot 2-6 VOF	On station Return to base On station Return to base On station Return to base Return to base Return to base
1036	Sweep Unit ONE plus NEWCOMB	Complete operations in Minesweeping Area 3 to 300 fathom curve. Report to Commander Screen to replace APD's and WILLIAMSON on order CTF 52.
About 1100	Photo Plane-1VT	On order of CTG 52.10 execute mission for complete morning coverage. Drop negatives on ESTES.
1102	Sweep Unit TWO plus STEMBEL	Complete operations in Minesweeping Area 2
1130	NEVADA TUSCALOCCA MISSISSIPPI CHESTER	Cease firing
1130	PORTLAND WEST VIRGINIA	Commence firing from F.S. Sector I Commence firing from F.S. Sector II

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Operation Plan
ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45 (Annex (D) - Schedule of Events)

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1130	TEXAS NEW MEXICO	Commence firing from F.S. Sector III Commence firing from F.S. Sectors V & VI
1132	Sweep Unit TWO plus STEMBEL	Begin sweeping operations in Minesweeping Area 6
1145	Air Spot 4-6 VOF	On station
1200	Photo Plane-1 VT CAP 5-8 VF CAP 4-8 VF Strike DOG-8VT, 8VF Strike CHARLIE - 8 VT, 8 VF Air Spot 3-6 VOF	Return to base On station Return to base On Station Return to base Return to base
1230	CALIFORNIA LOUISVILLE SALT LAKE CITY PENSACOLA COLORADO	Cease firing
1230	NEVADA TUSCALOOSA MISSISSIPPI CHESTER	Commence firing from F.S. Sector III & IV Commence firing from F.S. Sector II Commence firing from F.S. Sector II Commence firing from F.S. Sector V
1300	Land based aircraft	On station. Commence bombing run
1315	Air Spot 5-6 VOF	On station
1321	Sweep Unit THREE	Complete northern half of minesweeping area 13. Stand by to augment screen and to act as screen for fueling operations on order CTF 52
1330	Photo Plane 2-1VT CAP 6-8 VF CAP 5-8 VF Air Coord. 3-1VT(VF) Air Coord. 2-1VT(VF) Strike EASY-8VF, 8VT Strike DOG-8VF, 8VT Air Spot 4-6 VOF	On station On station Return to base On station Return to base On station Return to base Return to base
1345	PORTLAND WEST VIRGINIA TEXAS NEW MEXICO	Cease firing

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Operation Plan

ComPhibGrp ONE No. A101-45 (Annex (D) - Schedule of Events)

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1345	CALIFORNIA LOUISVILLE SALT LAKE CITY PENSACOLA COLORADO	Commence firing from F.S. Sector I Commence firing from F.S. Sector I Commence firing from F.S. Sectors III & IV Commence firing from F.S. Sector V Commence firing from F.S. Sectors III & IV
1412	Sweep Unit FOUR plus TWIGGS	Complete sweeping operations in Minesweeping Area 5. Stand by to augment screen and to act as screening vessels for fueling operations on order CTF 52.
1445	Air Spot 6 - 6 VOF	On station
1445	NEVADA TUSCALOOSA MISSISSIPPI CHESTER	Cease firing
1445	PORTLAND WEST VIRGINIA TEXAS NEW MEXICO	Commence firing from F.S. Sector I Commence firing from F.S. Sector II Commence firing from F.S. Sectors III & IV Commence firing from F.S. Sectors V & VI
1500	CAP 7 - 8 VF CAP 6 - 8 VF Strike FOX-8 VF, 8 VT Strike EASY-8 VF, 8VT Air Spot 5-6 VOF	On station Return to base On station Return to base Return to base
1600	NEVADA TUSCALOOSA MISSISSIPPI CHESTER	Commence firing from F.S. Sectors III & IV Commence firing from F.S. Sector II Commence firing from F.S. Sector II Commence firing from F.S. Sector V
1600	CALIFORNIA LOUISVILLE SALT LAKE CITY PENSACOLA COLORADO	Cease firing
About 1600	Photo Plane	On order CTG 52.10 execute mission for overall coverage of afternoon operations. Drop negatives on ESTES on completion of mission.
1615	Air Spot 7 - 6 VOF CAP 8 - 8-VF CAP 7 - 8 VF Air Coord. 4-1 VT(VF)	On station On station Return to base On station

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Operation Plan
ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45 (Annex (D) - Schedule of Events)

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1615	Strike GEORGE -8VF,8VT Strike FOX-8VF,8VT Air Spot 6-6 VOF	On station Return to base Return to base
1632	Sweep Unit TWO plus STEMBEL	Complete minesweeping in Minesweeping Area 6.
1700	Photo Plane 2-1VT	Return to base
1700	PORTLAND WEST VIRGINIA TEXAS NEW MEXICO NEVADA TUSCALOOSA MISSISSIPPI CHESTER CTG 52.2	Cease firing Prior to dark deliver to ESTES for interpretation all photos taken during the day
1700	Screen Commander	Secure screening stations. Commence rendezvous for night deployment as ordered by CTF 54.
1700		All Units except those ordered to remain at objective commence night deployment.
1700	Night Patrols	CTF 52 establish night patrols. STEMBEL Western beaches, high ground, bivouac areas and air fields. HAMILTON - N.E. Patrol until 0100; illuminate from west after 0100. TAYLOR - Eastern beaches. LEARY - Illuminate from east until 0100; N.E. Patrol after 0100.
1700	Air Spot 7-6 VOF	Return to base.
1730	ASP - 6 VT	Return to base.
1745	Air Coord.-1 VT(VF) Strike GEORGE-8VF,8VT	Return to base Return to base
About 1800	CTF 52	Send despatch to TF 51, info to CinCPac and Com5thFlt, on beach information and results of minesweeping and air and surface bombardment.

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Operation Plan
ComPhibGrpONE No. ALOI-45 (Annex (D) - Schedule of Events).

DOG MINUS TWO DAY

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
0600		Gunboat Support Unit ONE (52.5.1), Gunboat Support Unit TWO (52.5.2), Mine Unit TWO (52.5.19) arrive Pt. WRIT. Mine Unit TWO proceed with operations as directed by CTG 52.3. 52.5.1 and 52.5.2 operate to cover UDT operations.
0600	CAP 1 - 8 VF	On station.
0600	Sweep Unit ONE	Begin sweeping operations in minesweeping area 14.
About 0700	CTF 52	Deliver selected DOG minus THREE photos to C.O., UDTs.
0700	Screen Commander	Establish area screen around Fire Support Units. Normally TERROR and ESTES will operate within area screen as ordered by CTG 52.3 and CTF 52, respectively.
As occurring		Each gunfire ship report results of firing at each target or group of targets. CTG 52.3 report mines encountered, areas swept and hydrographic information.
0700	CALIFORNIA LOUISVILLE WEST VIRGINIA NEVADA TUSCALOOSA SALT LAKE CITY MISSISSIPPI NEW MEXICO PENSACOLA COLORADO CHESTER	Commence firing from F.S. Sector I Commence firing from F.S. Sector I Commence firing from F.S. Sector II Commence firing from F.S. Sector III Commence firing from F.S. Sector II Commence firing from F.S. Sector III Commence firing from F.S. Sector II Commence firing from F.S. Sector VI Commence firing from F.S. Sector V Commence firing from F.S. Sector III Commence firing from F.S. Sector V
About 0700	Land based planes	On station. Commence bombing run.
0700		Ships which remained at objective overnight resume stations in screen.
0700	Air Spot 1 - 6 VOF	On station.

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Operation Plan

ComPhibGrpONE No. ALO1-45 (Annex (D) - Schedule of Events).

DOG MINUS TWO DAY

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
0730	Land based planes.	Depart area.
0730	ASP 1 - 6 VT	On station.
	CAP 2 - 8 VF	On station.
	CAP 1 - 8 VF	Return to base.
	Air Coord. 1 - 1 VT (VF)	On station. Report results of air strikes, new targets, minefields, etc., as occur- ring.
	Strike ABLE - 8 VF, 8 VT	On station.
0800	CALIFORNIA LOUISVILLE WEST VIRGINIA NEVADA TUSCALOOSA SALT LAKE CITY MISSISSIPPI NEW MEXICO	Cease firing.
0800	CALIFORNIA WEST VIRGINIA MISSISSIPPI	Close range to about 2000 yards in F.S. Sectors I and II. Commence deliberate destructive fire.
0800	PORTLAND LOUISVILLE TUSCALOOSA	Close range to about 6000 yards in F.S. Sectors I and II.
0800	NEW MEXICO	Close range as minesweeping permits in F.S. Sector VI.
0800	NEVADA TEXAS SALT LAKE CITY COLORADO	Take station in F.S. Sector III south of line bearing 070° from south point of island.
0800	Sweep Unit FOUR	Begin operations in Minesweeping Area 8.
0800	CHESTER PENSACOLA	Operate in F.S. Sector V north of line through grid positions 71-84 and 78-88.
0800	SALT LAKE CITY	Commence medium range fire from F.S. Sector I.
0800	TEXAS	Commence medium range fire from F.S. Sector III.

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Operation Plan

ComPhibGrp ONE No. A101-45 (Annex (D) - Schedule of Events).

DOG MINUS TWO DAY

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
0800	PORTLAND	Commence medium range fire from F.S. Sector I.
During forenoon		Fire Support Unit Commanders report number of operating aircraft to CTF 54 and CTF 52. CTG 52.2 make daily logistic report.
0820	Sweep Unit FIVE and SIX	Begin operations in Minesweeping Area 9.
0830	NEW MEXICO	Service WEST VIRGINIA and CALIFORNIA planes.
0832	Sweep Unit ONE	Complete operations in Minesweeping Area 14.
0845	Air Spot 2 - 6 VOF	On station.
0900	PENSACOLA COLORADO CHESTER	Cease firing.
0900	Photo Plane - 1 VT CAP 3 - 8 VF CAP 2 - 8 VF Strike BAKER - 8 VF, 8 VT Strike ABLE Air Spot 1 - 6 VOF	On station. On station. Return to base. On station. Return to base. Return to base.
0900	LOUISVILLE TUSCALOOSA	Medium range fire from F.S. Sector I. Medium range fire from F.S. Sector II.
About 0930	Sweep Units FIVE and SIX	Complete operations in minesweeping area 9.
0930	NEW MEXICO PENSACOLA COLORADO	Complete servicing WEST VIRGINIA and CALIFORNIA planes. Service PORTLAND planes. Service MISSISSIPPI planes.
0930	NEVADA NEW MEXICO	Commence medium range fire from F.S. Sector III. Commence close range fire from F.S. Sector VI.

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Operation Plan

ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45- (Annex (D) - Schedule of Events).

DOG MINUS TWO-DAY

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1000	CALIFORNIA WEST VIRGINIA MISSISSIPPI PORTLAND TUSCALOOSA LOUISVILLE	Open range to facilitate UDT Operations.
1015	Air Spot 3 - 6 VOF	On station.
About 1030	HALL HENLEY BRYANT EVANS TAYLOR TERRY CAPPS 7 LCI(G) 6 APD	Arrive on station as UDT support on BLUE 2. Arrive on station as UDT support on RED 2. Arrive on station as UDT support on YELLOW 2. Arrive on station as UDT support on RED 1. Arrive on station as UDT support on BLUE 1. Arrive on station as UDT support on YELLOW 1. Arrive on station as UDT support on GREEN 1. Arrive on station as UDT support. Arrive on station as UDT support.
1030	PENSACOLA COLORADO	Complete servicing PORTLAND planes. Complete servicing MISSISSIPPI planes.
1030	CALIFORNIA WEST VIRGINIA MISSISSIPPI	Open fire with 5" for UDT support.
1030	CAP 4 - 8 VF. CAP 3 - 8 VF	On station. Return to base.
1030	Air Coord. 2 - 1 VT (VF) Air Coord. 1 - 1 VT (VF) Strike CHARLIE - 8 VF, 8 VT Strike BAKER - 8 VF, 8 VT Air Spot 2 - 6 VOF	On station. Return to base. On station. Return to base. Return to base.
1050	CALIFORNIA WEST VIRGINIA MISSISSIPPI	Cease main battery fire.
About 1100	Photo Plane - 1 VT	On order of CTG-52.10 execute photo mission for coverage morning operations. Drop negatives on ESTES on completion.

Operation Plan

ComPhibGrp ONE No. A101-45 (Annex (D) - Schedule of Events).

DOG MINUS TWO DAY

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1100	TEXAS	Cease firing.
1100	2 VT (Smokers)	Report on station.
1100		ROGER-EASY Hour.
1130	NEVADA SALT LAKE CITY PORTLAND	Cease firing.
1145	Air Spot 4	On station.
1200	Photo Plane 1 CAP 5 - 8 VF CAP 4 - 8 VF Strike DOG - 8 VF, 8 VT Strike CHARLIE - 8 VF, 8 VT	Return to base. On station. Return to base. On station. Return to base.
1230	UDTs	Complete reconnaissance of eastern beaches and withdraw.
1230	LOUISVILLE TUSCALOOSA CALIFORNIA WEST VIRGINIA MISSISSIPPI	Cease firing.
About 1230	HALL, HENLEY, BRYANT EVANS, TAYLOR, TERRY CAPPS, 7 LCI(G), 6 APD.	When directed by CTG 52.4 secure from UDT support and retire from eastern beaches.
1230	2 VT (Smokers)	Return to ship.
1230	CTG 52.4	Make report to CTF 52 of results of reconnaissance by urgent despatch or officer messenger.
1230	CALIFORNIA PORTLAND LOUISVILLE WEST VIRGINIA TUSCALOOSA MISSISSIPPI	Proceed to F.S. Sector II, remaining south of grid line 66.

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Operation Plan

ComPhibGrpCNE No. ALO1-45 (Annex (D) - Schedule of Events). *

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DCG MINUS TWC DAY</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1230	NEW MEXICO		Cease firing. Retire to range band BAKER in F.S. Sector VI.
1230	NEVADA TEXAS COLORADO		Close to about 2000 yards in F.S. Sectors III and IV and commence deliberate destructive fire.
1230	SALT LAKE CITY		Close to about 6000 yards in F.S. Sectors III and IV.
1230	CHESTER PENSACOLA.		Close range and remain north of line through grid positions 73-81 and 80-82. Commence firing from F.S. Sector V.
1300	52.3.5		Sweep Unit FOUR complete operations in Minesweeping Area 8.
1300	Land based aircraft		On station. Commence bombing run.
1300	Sweep Unit THREE		Commence sweeping operations in Minesweeping Area 7.
1300	CALIFORNIA WEST VIRGINIA		Commence medium range fire from F.S. Sector II.
1315	Air Spot 5		On station.
1318	Sweep Unit FOUR		Commence sweeping operations in Minesweeping Areas 3 inside 300 fathom curve.
1325	52.3.7 and 52.3.8		Sweep Units FIVE and SIX commence operations in Minesweeping Area 10.
1330	Photo Plane 2 - 1 VT		On station.
	CAP 6 - 8 VF		On station.
	CAP 5 - 8 VF		Return to base.
	Air Coord. 3 - 1 VT (VF)		On station.
	Air Coord. 2 - 1 VT (VF)		Return to base.
	Strike EASY - 8 VF, 8 VT		On station.
	Strike DOG - 8 VF, 8 VT		Return to base.
	Air Spot 4 - 6 VCF		Return to base.

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Operation Plan

ComPhibGrp ONE No. ALO1-45 (Annex (D) - Schedule of Events).

DOG MINUS TWO DAY

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1330	MISSISSIPPI NEW MEXICO	Service COLORADO and TEXAS planes. Service NEVADA planes.
1330	PORTLAND SALT LAKE CITY	Commence firing from F.S. Sector II. Commence firing from F.S. Sector IV.
1356	Sweep Unit FOUR	Complete sweeping inside 300 fathom curve in Minesweeping Area 3. Report to Com- mander Screen for screening duties.
1400	TUSCALOOSA LOUISVILLE	Service SALT LAKE CITY planes. Service CHESTER planes.
1400	NEVADA TEXAS COLORADO SALT LAKE CITY	Open range to facilitate UDT operations.
About 1400	Sweep Unit ONE	Return to IWO JIMA. Report to Commander Screen for screening assignment.
1430	MISSISSIPPI NEW MEXICO	Complete servicing COLORADO and TEXAS planes. Complete servicing NEVADA planes.
1430	2 VT (Smokers)	Report on station.
About 1430	HALL	Arrive on station as UDT support on ORANGE 2.
	HENLEY	Arrive on station as UDT support on BROWN 2.
	BRYANT	Arrive on station as UDT support on WHITE 1.
	EVANS	Arrive on station as UDT support on PURPLE 2.
	TAYLOR	Arrive on station as UDT support on ORANGE 1.
	TERRY	Arrive on station as UDT support on WHITE 2.
	CAPPS	Arrive on station as UDT support on BROWN 1.
	7 LCI(G)	Arrive on station as UDT support.
	6 APD	Arrive on station as UDT support.

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Operation Plan
ComPhibGrpCNE No. A101-45 (Annex (D) Schedule of Events).

DCG MINUS TWO DAY

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1430	TEXAS NEVADA COLORADO	Commence firing 5" for UDT support.
1445	Sweep Units FIVE and SIX	Complete operations in Minesweeping Area 10. Report to Commander Screen for screen- ing assignment.
1445	AIR SPCT 6	On station.
1450	NEVADA TEXAS CALIFORNIA	Cease main battery fire.
1500	WEST VIRGINIA	Cease firing.
1500	TUSCALOOSA LOUISVILLE	Complete servicing SALT LAKE CITY planes. Complete servicing CHESTER planes.
1500	LOUISVILLE TUSCALOOSA MISSISSIPPI NEW MEXICO	Commence firing from F.S. Sector II and I. Commence firing from F.S. Sector II. Commence firing from F.S. Sector II. Commence firing from F.S. Sector VI.
1500	CAP 7 - 8 VF CAP 6 - 8 VF Strike FOX - 8 VF, 8 VT Strike EASY - 8 VF, 8 VT AIR SPOT 5 - 6 VCF	On station. Return to base. On station. Return to base. Return to base.
1500		ROGER-WILLIAM Hour.
1530	PORTLAND	Cease firing.
About 1600	Photo plane - 1 VT	On order of CTG 52.10 execute photo mis- sion coverage of afternoon operations, On completion drop negatives on ESTES.
1600	COLCRADO	Cease firing main battery.
1600	CHESTER PENSACOLA	Cease firing.
1615	AIR SPOT 7 - 6 VCF	On station.

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Operation Plan

ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45 (Annex (D) - Schedule of Events).

DOG MINUS TWO DAY

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1624	Sweep Unit THREE	Complete minesweeping operations in Minesweeping Area 7.
1630	UDTs	Complete reconnaissance of western beaches and withdraw.
About 1630	HALL HENLEY BRYANT EVANS TAYLOR TERRY CAPPS 7 ICI(G) 6 APD	On order of CTG 52.4 cease close fire support of UDTs and retire from western beaches.
1700	Photo plane 2 - 1 VT (VF) CAP 8 - 8 VF CAP 7 - 8 VF Air Coord. 4 - 1 VT (VF) Air Coord. 3 - 1 VT (VF) Strike GEORGE - 8 VF, 8 VT Strike FOX - 8 VF, 8 VT AIR SPOT 6 - 6 VCF	Return to base. On station. Return to base. On station. Return to base. On station. Return to base. Return to base.
1700	SALT LAKE CITY TEXAS NEVADA COLORADO LOUISVILLE TUSCALOOSA MISSISSIPPI NEW MEXICO	Cease firing.
1700	2 VT (Smokers)	Return to ship.
1700	AIR SPOT 7	Return to base.

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Operation Plan

ComPhibGrp ONE No. A101-45 (Annex (D) - Schedule of Events).

DOG MINUS TWO DAY

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1700	STEMBEL TERRY EDWARDS 4 LCI(G) (As designated by CTG 52.5)	CTF 52 establish night patrols. Western beaches, high livouac areas and airfields. Illumination until 0100. Eastern beaches - illumination after 0100. Northeast patrol. (1) Western beaches until 0100 - Reserve after 0100. (2) Reserve until 0100 - Western beaches after 0100. (3) Eastern beaches until 0100 - Reserve after 0100. (4) Reserve until 0100 - Eastern beaches after 0100.
1700	Screen Commander	Secure screening stations and rendezvous for night deployment as ordered.
1700		Commence night deployment.
After 1700		UDT submit reports to CTF 52 by urgent despatch or Officer Messenger of results of reconnaissance and deliver undeveloped film.
1730	ASP 6 VT	Return to base.
1745	Air Coord. 4 - 1 VT (VF) Strike GEORGE - 8 VT, 8 VF	Return to base. Return to base.
About 1800		Send despatch to TF 51, info CinCPac and ComFIFTH Fleet with information and results of minesweeping, air and surface ship bombardment and beach reconnaissance.

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Operation Plan

ComPhibGrp ONE No. A101-45

(Annex (D) - Schedule of Events)

DOG MINUS ONE DAY

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
0600	CAP 1-8VF	On station.
0600	Sweep Unit FOUR	Begin sweeping operations in minesweeping area 13.
0700		Sweep Units ONE, TWO, FIVE and SIX available for screening duties.
0700	Screen Commander	Establish area screen around Fire Support Units. Normally TERROR and ESTES will operate within area screen as ordered by CTG 52.3 and CTF 52 respectively.
0700	Sweep Unit THREE	Begin sweeping operations in minesweeping area 8.
As occurring		Each gunfire ship reports results of firing at each target or groups of targets. CTG 52.3 reports mines encountered, areas swept and hydrographic information.
0700	CALIFORNIA LOUISVILLE WEST VIRGINIA NEVADA TUSCALOOSA SALT LAKE CITY MISSISSIPPI NEW MEXICO	Commence firing from FS Sector I I II III II III II VI
0700	PENSACOLA COLORADO CHESTER	Commence firing from FS Sector V III V
0700 (About)	Land Based Planes	On station. Commence bombing run.
0700		Ships which remained at objective overnight resume stations in screen.
0700		Screen Commander designate destroyer to deliver photographs from ESTES to carrier designated by CTG 52.2 - Inform CTF 52.
0730	Land Based Planes	Depart area.
0730	ASP 1-6VT CAP 2-8VF CAP 1-8VF 1VT(VF)	On station. On station. Return to base. On station.

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Operation Plan

ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45

(Annex (D))

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1030	HENLEY	Arrive on station as UDT support on beach RED 2
	BRYANT	YELLOW 2
	EVANS	RED 1
	TAYLOR	BLUE 1
	TERRY	YELLOW 1
	CAPPS	GREEN 1
	7 LCI(G)	Commence UDT fire support.
	6 APD	Commence UDT fire support.
1030	PENSACOLA	Complete servicing PORTLAND planes.
1030	COLORADO	Complete servicing MISSISSIPPI planes.
1030	CALIFORNIA WEST VIRGINIA MISSISSIPPI	Open fire with 5 inch for UDT support.
1030	CAP 4-8VF	On station.
	CAP 3-8VF	Return to base.
	AIR COOR. 2-1VT(VF)	On station.
	AIR COOR. 1-1VT(VF)	Return to base.
	Strike CHARLIE-8VF,8VT	On station.
	Strike BAKER-8VF,8VT	Return to base.
	AIR SPOT 2-6VOF	Return to base.
1050	CALIFORNIA WEST VIRGINIA MISSISSIPPI	Cease main battery fire.
1100	TEXAS	Cease medium range firing.
1100	2VT (Smokers)	Report on station.
1100		ROGER EASY hour.
1100	Photo plane-1VT (About)	On order of CTG 52.10 execute photo mission for coverage of morning operations. Deliver negatives to ESTES.
1120	Sweep Unit III	Complete operations in minesweeping area 7.
1130	NEVADA SALT LAKE CITY PORTLAND	Cease firing.

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Operation Plan

ComPhibGrpONE No. AL01-45 (Annex (D) - Schedule of Events)

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
0842	Sweep Unit III	Secure from operations in minesweeping area 8. Begin operations in area 7.
0845	AIR SPOT 2-6VOF	On station.
0900	SALT LAKE CITY COLORADO CHESTER PENSACOLA	Cease firing.
0900	Photo plane 1-1VT CAP 3-8VF CAP 2-8VF Strike BAKER-8VF,8VT Strike ABLE-8VF,8VT AIR SPOT 1-6VOF	On station. On station. Returns to base. On station. Returns to base. Returns to base.
0900	LOUISVILLE TUSCALOOSA	Commence fire from FS Sectors I and II.
0930	NEW MEXICO	Complete servicing WEST VIRGINIA and CALIFORNIA planes.
0930	PENSACOLA COLORADO	Service PORTLAND planes. Service MISSISSIPPI planes.
0930	NEVADA SALT LAKE CITY	Commence medium range firing from FS Sector III.
0930	NEW MEXICO	Commence close range firing from FS Sector VI.
1000	CALIFORNIA WEST VIRGINIA MISSISSIPPI PORTLAND TUSCALOOSA LOUISVILLE	Open range to facilitate UDT operations.
By noon	CTF 52	Deliver to CTF 51 and 53 photos taken on D-2 and D-3 of beaches and defenses - Report dangers to navigation - Provide copy of latest target map.
1015	AIR SPOT 3-6VOF	On station.
1030	HALL	Arrive on station as UDT support on beach BLUE 2.

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Operation Plan

ComPhibGrpONE No. 110145

(Annex (D) - Schedule of Events)

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1030	HENLEY BRYANT EVANS TAYLOR TERRY CAPPS 7 LCI(G) 6 APF	Arrive on station as UDT support on beach RED 2 YELLOW 2 RED 1 BLUE 1 YELLOW 1 GREEN 1 Commence UDT fire support. Commence UDT fire support.
1030	PENSACOLA	Complete servicing PORTLAND planes.
1030	COLORADO	Complete servicing MISSISSIPPI planes.
1030	CALIFORNIA WEST VIRGINIA MISSISSIPPI	Open fire with 5 inch for UDT support.
1030	CAP 4-8VF CAP 3-8VF AIR COOR. 2-1VT(VF) AIR COOR. 1-1VT(VF) Strike CHARLIE-8VF,8VT Strike BAKER-8VF,8VT AIR SPOT 2-6VOF	On station. Return to base. On station. Return to base. On station. Return to base. Return to base.
1050	CALIFORNIA WEST VIRGINIA MISSISSIPPI	Cease main battery fire.
1100	TEXAS	Cease medium range firing.
1100	2VT (Smokers)	Report on station.
1100		ROGER EASY hour.
1100 (About)	Photo plane-1VT	On order of CTG 52.10 execute photo mission for coverage of morning operations. Deliver negatives to ESTES.
1120	Sweep Unit III	Complete operations in minesweeping area 7.
1130	NEVADA SALT LAKE CITY PORTLAND	Cease firing.

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Operation Plan

ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45 (Annex (D) - Schedule of Events)

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1145	AIR SPOT 4	On station.
1200	Photo plane 1	Return to base.
	CAP 5-8VF	On station.
	CAP 4-8VF	Return to base.
	Strike DOG-8VF, 8VT	On station.
	Strike CHARLIE-8VF, 8VT	Return to base.
	AIR SPOT 3-6VOF	Return to base.
1230	LOUISVILLE TUSCALOOSA CALIFORNIA WEST VIRGINIA MISSISSIPPI	Cease firing.
1230 (About)	UDTs	Complete demolition on eastern beaches and withdraw.
1230 (About)	HALL HENLEY BRYANT EVANS TAYLOR TERRY CAPPS 7 LCI(G) 6 AFD	On order of CTG 52.4 cease fire support of UDTs and retire from eastern beaches.
After 1230		UDTs submit report to CTF 52 by urgent despatch or Officer Messenger on results of demolition work and deliver undeve- loped film.
1230	CALIFORNIA PORTLAND LOUISVILLE WEST VIRGINIA TUSCALOOSA MISSISSIPPI	Return to Fire Support Sector II remain- ing south of grid line 66.
1230	NEW MEXICO	Cease firing. Retire to range band BAKER, Fire Support Sector VI.
1230	NEVADA TEXAS COLORADO	Close to about 2000 yds. in Fire Support Sectors III and IV.

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<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1230	SALT LAKE CITY	Close to 6000 yds. in Fire Support Sectors III and IV.
1230	CHESTER PENSACOLA	Close range and remain north of line through grid positions 73 dash 81 and 80 dash 82.
1230	2VT (Smokers)	Return to base.
1230	NEVADA TEXAS COLORADO	Commence firing on western beaches.
1230	CHESTER PENSACOLA	Commence medium range fire from FS Sector V.
1300	Land Based Planes	On station. Commence bombing run.
1300	CALIFORNIA WEST VIRGINIA	Commence medium range fire from FS Sector II.
1315	AIR SPOT 5	On station
1330	Photo plane 2-1VT CAP 6-8VF CAP 5-8VF AIR COOR. 3-1VT(VF) AIR COOR. 2-1VT(VF) Strike EASY-8VF, 8VT Strike DOG-8VF, 8VT AIR SPOT 4-6VCF	On station. On station. Return to base. On station. Return to base. On station. Return to base. Return to base.
1330	MISSISSIPPI	Service COLORADO and TEXAS planes.
1330	NEW MEXICO	Service NEVADA planes.
1330	PORTLAND	Commence medium range fire from FS Sector II.
	SALT LAKE CITY	Commence medium range fire from FS Sector IV
1400	TUSCALOOSA	Service PENSACOLA planes.
1400	NEVADA TEXAS COLORADO SALT LAKE CITY	Open range to facilitate UDT operations.

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Operation Plan
ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45 (Annex (D) - Schedule of Events)

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1430	MISSISSIPPI NEW MEXICO	Complete servicing COLORADO and TEXAS planes. Complete servicing NEVADA planes.
1430	2 VT (Smokers)	Report on Station
1430	HALL HENLEY BRYANT EVANS TAYLOR TERRY CAPPS 7 LCI(G) 6 APD	Arrive on station as UDT support on ORANGE 2 BROWN 2 WHITE 1 PURPLE 2 ORANGE 1 WHITE 2 BROWN 1 UDT support. UDT support.
1430	TEXAS NEVADA COLORADO	Commence UDT Fire Support using 5 inch.
1445	AIR SPOT 6	On station.
1450	NEVADA TEXAS	Cease main battery fire.
1450	CALIFORNIA	Cease firing.
1500	WEST VIRGINIA	Cease firing.
1500	TUSCALOOSA	Complete servicing PENSACOLA planes.
1500	LOUISVILLE	Commence medium range fire from FS Sector II.
	TUSCALCOSA	Commence medium range fire from FS Sector II.
	MISSISSIPPI	Commence medium range fire from FS Sector II.
	NEW MEXICO	Commence medium range fire from FS Sector VI.
1500	CAP 7-8VF CAP 6-8VF Strike FOX-8VF, 8VT Strike EASY-8VF, 8VT AIR SPOT 5-6VOF	On station. Return to base. On station. Return to base. Return to base.

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Operation Plan

ComPhibGrpCME No. A101-45

(Annex (D) - Schedule of Events)

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1512	Sweep Unit FOUR	Complete operations in minesweeping area 13. Report to Screen Commander on order CTF 52.
1530	PORTLAND	Cease firing.
1600	COLORADO	Cease main battery fire.
1600	PENSACOLA CHESTER	Cease firing.
1600 (About)	Photo plane-1VT	On order of CTG 52.10 execute photo mission for coverage of afternoon's operations. Drop photos on ESTES.
1615	AIR SPOT 7-6VOF	On station.
1630 (About)	UDTs	UDTs complete demolition work on western beaches and withdraw.
1700	Photo Plane 2-1VT CAP 8-8VF CAP 7-8VF AIR COOR. 4-1VT(VF) AIR COOR. 3-1VT(VF) Strike GEORGE-8VF,8VT Strike FOX-8VF,8VT AIR SPOT 6-6VOF	Return to base. On station. Return to base. On station. Return to base. On station. Return to base. Return to base.
1700	CTF 52 STEMBEL TERRY LEARY 4 LCI(G) as designated by CTG 52.5	Establish Night Patrols as follows: Western beaches, high ground, bivouac areas, airfields, illumination until 0100. Eastern beaches; illumination after 0100. N.E. Patrol. (1) Western beaches until 0100; reserve after 0100. (2) Reserve until 0100; western beaches after 0100. (3) Eastern beaches until 0100; reserve after 0100. (4) Reserve until 0100; eastern beaches after 0100.
1700	SALT LAKE CITY TEXAS NEVADA COLORADO	Cease firing.

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Operation Plan
ComPhibGrpONE No. A101-45

UNCLASSIFIED
(Annex (D) - Schedule of Events)

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1700	LOUISVILLE TUSCALOOSA MISSISSIPPI NEW MEXICO	Cease firing.
1700	Screen Commander	Secure screening stations. Rendezvous for night deployment as ordered.
1700	2 VT (Smokers)	Return to base.
1700		Commence night deployments.
After 1700		UDTs submit reports to CTF 52 by urgent despatch or Officer Messenger on results of demolition work. Deliver undeveloped film.
1730	ASP 6 AIR SPOT 7	Return to base. Return to base.
1745	AIR COOR. 4-1VT(VF) Strike GEORGE, 8VT, 8VF	Return to base. Return to base.
1800 (About)		Send despatch to TF 51 INFO CINCPAC and COM5thFLEET of results of mine-sweeping, air and surface bombardment and beach reconnaissance and demolition work.

NOTE: Alternative schedule of events for D-1 day in case UDTs are not required to operate on that day will be forwarded separately.

W.H.P. BLANDY,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander T.F. 52
Amphibious Support Force
and ComPhibGrpONE.

L.D. Reedy
L.D. REEDY
Lieutenant, USNR.,
Flag Secretary.

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

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
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SCREENING STATION ASSIGNMENTS

	SCREEN ABLE	SCREEN ABLE BAKER
DES DIV III	A1, A17, A18, A19	A1, AB17, AB18, AB19
DES DIV IOI	A13, A14, A16	AB13, AB14, AB16
DES DIV XRAY	A10, A11	A11
DES DIV 91	A3, A4, A5, A6, A7	A3, A4, A5, A6, A7
APD'S	A2, A8, A9, A12, A15, A20	
SWEEP UNIT ONE		A2, A8, A9, A10, A12, AB15

NOTES

- SCREEN ABLE TO BE TAKEN ON ARRIVAL D-3 MORNING. SHIPS TAKING STATIONS BY SEARCHING AHEAD OF HEAVY SHIPS.
- IN TAKING STATION FSU-2 FOLLOW IN TRACK OF SWEEP UNIT ONE, FSU 3 FOLLOW IN TRACK OF SWEEP UNIT TWO.
- DESTROYERS WILL COVER SWEEP UNITS AS FOLLOWS:
 NEWCOMB COVER SWEEP UNIT ONE (TAKES COVERING STATION ABOUT 0700 WHEN SWEEP UNIT ARRIVES IN F.S. SECTOR I)
 STEMBEL COVER SWEEP UNIT TWO (TAKES COVERING STATION AT 0700)
 TWIGGS COVER SWEEP UNIT FOUR (PROCEED AHEAD TO JOIN SWEEP UNIT 4 AT 0600)
- SWEEP UNIT ONE ON ORDER CTF 52 RELIEVES APD'S AND WILLIAMSON AVD AFTER COMPLETION SWEEPING. NUDT'S ON APD'S MAKE VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE OF BEACHES KEEPING CLEAR OF FIRE SUPPORT SHIPS AND LINES OF FIRE. WILLIAMSON STANDING BY TO SERVICE PLANES.
- FIRE SUPPORT SHIPS SHOULD KEEP AT LEAST 5000 YDS. INSIDE SCREEN WHEN PRACTICABLE.
- FOLLOWING SHIPS REMAIN AT OBJECTIVE DURING NIGHT D-3/ D-2 FOR NIGHT HARASSING AND ILLUMINATION: LEARY: TAYLOR: HAMILTON: AND STEMBEL.
- ROMAN NUMERALS INDICATE FIRE SUPPORT SECTORS. MINE SWEEPING AREAS ARE IDENTIFIED BY ARABIC NUMERALS.


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APPENDIX I OF ANNEX (A) TO COMPHIBGRP ONE OP-PLAN A 101-44

SCREENING DIAGRAM D-3 DAY

~~TOP SECRET~~
DO NOT USE FOR NAVIGATION




APPROXIMATE SCALE IN MILES

MINAMI LO SIMA



MAP REPRODUCTION UNIT
U.S.S. ESTES AGC-12



SCREENING STATION ASSIGNMENTS


UNIT	D-2 DAY		D-1 DAY	
	SCREEN CHARLIE	SCREEN DOG	SCREEN CHARLIE	SCREEN DOG
DES. DIV. III	C6, C7, C8, C9, C10.	D3, D4, D5, D6, D7.	C6, C7, C8, C9, C10.	A S
DES. DIV. XRAY	C15, C16, C17.	D11, D12, 1 SUPPORT.	C14, C15, 1 SUPPORT.	A S S I G N E D
DES. DIV. 101	C11, C12, C13, C14.	D8, D9, D10, 1 SUPPORT.	C11, C12, C13, 1 SUPPORT.	A S S I G N E D
DES. DIV. 91	C3, C4, C5. (2 DD'S OVER.)	CLOSE SUPPORT.	CLOSE SUPPORT.	A S S I G N E D
APD'S	C1, C2, C18, C19, C20. (1 APD OVER.)	CLOSE SUPPORT.	CLOSE SUPPORT.	A S S I G N E D
SWEEP UNIT I			C1, C2, C16, C17, C18, C19, C20.	A S S I G N E D
SWEEP UNIT 2		D1, D2, D13, D14.	C3, C4, C5.	A S S I G N E D

NOTES:

- ON ARRIVAL D-2 MORNING TAKE SCREEN CHARLIE POSITIONS. POSITIONS AND TRACKS INDICATED ARE PRIMARILY FOR D-2.
- ORDERS TO TAKE SCREEN DOG POSITION WILL BE ISSUED IN TIME FOR CLOSE SUPPORTING SHIPS TO REACH POSITIONS BEFORE ROGER EASY HOUR ON D-2.
- ON D-1 MORNING SCREEN CHARLIE STATIONS ARE OCCUPIED BY NON-SUPPORTING SHIPS EXTRA SHIPS WILL BE ASSIGNED TO STATIONS IN SCREEN DOG SWEEP UNITS 2, 5, & 6 AVAILABLE.
- SHIPS ON THESE STATIONS ON D-2 DAY ARE USED IN CLOSE SUPPORT AND UNDERWATER DEMOLITION AT ROGER HOUR.
- ON D-2 & D-1 WILLIAMSON SHOULD BE RELIEVED OF SCREENING DUTIES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO SERVICE PLANES.
- FOLLOWING SHIPS REMAIN AT TARGET ON NIGHTS INDICATED FOR NIGHT ILLUMINATION & HARASSING.
D-2: LEARY, TERRY, & STEMBEL.
D-1: EDWARDS, TERRY, & STEMBEL.
- ON D-2 SWEEP UNIT I WILL RETURN BY 1400 AND WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR SCREENING DUTIES, AS WILL SWEEP UNIT 4.
- ROMAN NUMERALS INDICATE FIRE SUPPORT SECTORS.
ARABIC " " MINESWEEPING AREAS.

APPENDIX 2 OF ANNEX (A) TO COMPHIBGRP ONE
OPERATION PLAN A101-44

SCREENING DIAGRAM D-2 & D-1 DAYS



DONOT USE FOR NAVIGATION