SYMBOL AND REALITY

IN

THE CONTEMPORARY CATHOLIC DISCUSSION ON

THE EUCHARISTIC REAL PRESENCE

by

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PREFACE

It was difficult for this writer fo find a proper title for this paper. Even now, it is still not quite accurate, for this study is not a detailed historical analysis of the step by step discussion on the Eucharistic development of the contemporary Catholic Real Presence, nor is it meant to be one long exegesis of the contributions of representative contributors to this discussion, (which sometimes became a debate). We were prevented from consistently employing such a positivistic approach for two reasons. First, the relevant literature was simply not available for our examination. For as the reader is probably aware, much of the real ferment in the recent reevaluation of the teaching on the Eucharistic Real Presence (and with it, the teaching on Transubstantiation) has been taking place in Holland. Since Dutch is a minor language, the various newspapers, journals, and books which have carried the bulk of the Dutch contributions are all (except one or two) impossible to locate in any local library. Lack of time and money prevented the writer from journeying to the rich bibliothecal preserves of Jesuit Theologates and Protestant Divinity Schools or zeroxing the relevant periodical literature through Interlibrary Loan (which is too slow anyway). In short, we could not -- with the material available -- have carried out a rigorously positivistic approach with scholarly integrity. The second reason for not using this approach threatens to make a sham out of the first reason. That is, since this

writer by temperament finds papers which are relentlessly positivistic to be a consummate bore to write, it is doubtful he would have written such a paper even if the material were available.

And yet, the fact that this paper is not consistently positivistic does not mean, therefore, that it is simply the spinning-out of one long personal theological reflection. Someday, we hope that we might be capable of such "off the top of the head" speculation, but that day is not only far off, it just may be eschatological. Rather, what we have tried to do in this paper is to take a problem -- namely, that of the relationship of symbol and reality in the Eucharistic Real Presence -- and used the contemporary discussion as our framework for examining it. The development of the contemporary discussion, therefore, is our "home base"; and it remains, we hope, strictly in the role of a servant. Certainly, we hope that the reader will obtain a fairly good feeling for the general shape and texture of the recent discussions, but we hope that this feeling will be subordinate to his growth in understanding the dimensions of symbol and reality in the Eucharistic Real Presence.

The problem briefly stated is as follows. For centuries now the church's teaching on the Eucharistic Real Presence (and with it, Transubstantiation) has been marked by a highly realistic shape. As such, there has been in the Catholic understanding of this mystery, a persistent

drift toward "thingliness" or reification. (In this drift, of course, Eucharistic theology has been suffering along with the rest of Catholic theology.) In reaction to those who are continually tempted to reduce the sacramentality of the Eucharistic Real Presence to a mere symbol, Catholic theologians have emphacized the reality of this presence with rather imbalanced zeal, failing to integrate the reality into the sacramentality of this presence: Christ is really present, yes, but he is really present sacramentally (i.e. symbolically). This imbalance was bolstered by the traditional explanation of the Eucharistic Real Presence in terms of Transubstantiation -- a scholastic explanation which is adequate if properly understood, but which has tended by reason of its use of certain metaphysical categories, to engender an understanding of this presence which is highly thingly and spatial. In these circumstances, Transubstantiation begins to be regarded as a kind of cosmological miracle.

In this paper, we have attempted to bring reality and symbol back together again in the Eucharistic Real Presence. To accomplish this, we have attempted the following: (1) A metaphysical approach to Transubstantiation following B. Welte which we feel lends itself more easily to an integration with the sacramental or symbolic dimension; (2) An outline of a general ontology of symbol based on an essay by Karl Rahner; (3) A general anthropology of symbolic activity following Rahner, Schoonenberg, and others; (4) An analogical application of this anthropology of symbol to the Eucharistic Real Presence.

We are indebted to Bernard J. Cooke, S.J. for the general approach and outline of this paper. Also, many of the conclusions arrived at in this paper found their beginning and clarification in the lectures in sacramental and Eucharistic theology given by Father Cooke during the school year 1966-67. If our notes taken from those lectures could have been published in book form, they would have certainly made their way into many of our footnotes. Our thanks are to him.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ERP Because of the frequency in this paper of the phrase "Eucharistic Real Presence" we have decided to make it easier on our typist by using this abbreviation. It always refers to the presence of Christ to the consecrated species of bread and wine, not his presence to the community, the priest, the individual believer, etc.

TR This abbreviation always means Transubstantiation". It never refers to "Transignification," Transfinalization," etc.

CHAPTER I

A Brief Historical Note

Before entering into the main discussion, a brief historical note is necessary.

A glance at the first five centuries of the Church is revealing insofar as it furnishes no attempted solution to the "problem of the ERP." The ~~simple~~ fact is that there was no consciously explicitated "problem". To be sure, the ERP was affirmed throughout this period,[1] but it did not predominate in the Church's reflection on its experience of the Eucharist. Rather, its Eucharistic theologizing always situated the statements concerning the ERP within the context of the full <u>communitarian</u> experience of Eucharistic worship. The Eucharist was regarded as the source of the life and unity of the community, as the visible sign that bishops, priests, and laity alike were members of the communion of the Church in Christ. For example, in the catechetical instructions of Cyril of Jerusalem and Ambrose the reality of the presence of Christ is stressed, but only within the context of Christ's sacramental nourishment of the whole Church.[2] A second important characteristic of this period was the Church's conviction that the reality of Christ's presence to the bread and wine was not opposed to the sacramentality of this presence. That the bread and wine truly became the body and blood of Christ without ceasing to be sensibly apprehended as "bread" and "wine" was affirmed without

apology and fear of contradiction. During this period of the Church, it was accepted that visible realities could be symbols of a deeper, sacred reality.[3] Symbol was not opposed to reality: the visible "bread" could symbolically express the bodily reality of Christ.

It is within this tradition that Augustine's statements on the sacramentum corporis and sacramentum sanguinis must be located. As a Patristic Father, his primary emphasis is upon the full communitarian experience of Christ's presence. He does not isolate the ERP from this presence-in-community: the consecrated bread and wine are the signs of Christ's true corporeal presence which when received bring about a sacramental commemoration of the Passion of Christ which in turn intensifies the continuing existence of the Church as Christ's body.[4] Only within this fuller context does he situate the actual change of the bread and wine. For this reason, Catholic theologians who hope to ferret out a dogma of TR in the writings of Augustine usually run into difficulties. For granted that there are many clear statements in Augustine affirming the ERP and the change of the bread and wine resulting from the ERP, but they are so inextricably entwined with the rich sacramental and communitarian dimensions of the Eucharist, that it becomes impossible to isolate a specific teaching on the ERP which would be equivalent to a "tract" on TR (as found in the Manual theologie).[5]

Between the sixth and eighth centuries very little creative theological work was done on the ERP. According to

Powers, however, two different emphases did begin to emerge during this period: a Eucharistic "realism" stressing the reality of the change of the bread and wine, and a Eucharistic "spiritualism" stressing the sacramental character of the Eucharist in the Augustinian sense.[6] These two emphases precipitated much controversy during the Carolingian reform between the eighth and eleventh centuries and climaxed in the person of Berengarius of Tours (d. 1088). Berangarius, reacting against a number of crudely realistic conceptions of the ERP, emphacized the symbol dimension of the sacrament to such an extent that the elements of bread and wine became only mere symbols of Christ's body and blood. Hindered by his "crude pre-nominalist theory of knowledge,"[7] Berengarius could not distinguish between appearance and reality: if bread was what was seen on the altar after the consecration, then bread it must be. Obviously, this understanding deviated from orthodoxy, and in 1059, he was forced to sign the oath of the Roman Synod -- an oath of rather excessive realism:

> I hold that faith...which this sacred synod... has presented to me to be held...namely, that the bread and wine which are placed on the altar, after consecration, are not simply the sacrament, but the true body and blood of... Jesus Christ, and that they are sensibly, not only in a sacrament, but in truth, handled and broken by the hands of the priest, torn by the teeth of the faithful, and I swear this...[8] (italics ours)

An exhaustive treatment of the speculation that followed the Berengarian oath is of course impossible within the scope of this paper. We refer the reader to the work of

S. Bonano and Hans Jorissen for detailed discussions.[9] Suffice to say that the consensus expressed contra Berengarius and all mere symbolism, helped lend a highly realistic shape to these consequent speculations. The sacramental dimension of the sacrament was not thrust completely into oblivion, but there can be no doubt that the Patristic feel for the interconnection of symbol, mystery, and reality was largely absent. The reasons offered for this shift in emphasis are many and varied, and we cannot begin to examine all of them here. Certainly, however, we must mention the entrance of Aristotle into western philosophy and theology early in the twelfth century. Aristotelian philosophy supplied theology with a conceptional scheme of metaphysical realism which was an extremely valuable tool for the theologian attempting to lend metaphysical subtlety and precision to his theological speculations.[10]

It was about this time that the term "transubstantiation" came into vogue. It soon passed into the vocabulary of Church documents and appears in the profession of faith which Lateran IV used against the Albegensians in 1215. In using the term at this time, the Church simply affirms the faith that the Church had always professed in the true change of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ. At this time, there was still a great deal of fluidity regarding the metaphysical interpretation of this term, thus it appears that in sanctioning the term, "TR", Lateran IV was not sanctioning any particular philosophical explanation.[11] Eventually, however, a way of explaining the Eucharistic change began to dominate,

and it was this explanation which can be properly termed the real "Transubstantiationslehre." However, even within this mode of philosophical explanation there was a great deal of development, and certainly no two theories were identical.[12] Later generations in the Church came to regard Aquinas' explanation[13] as definitive, but other theories which deviated slightly from Thomas continued to live on in the various "schools" and never were condemned. These Schulmeinungen, however, should not be overemphacized -- as Catholic apologists are so prone to do in order to show the great "diversity" in Catholic theology. For despite differences, Catholic theologians of the Scholastic period, of the time of the Reformation and Trent, and right up til very recently, talked basically the same language and accepted without protest, the Aristotelian natural philosophy embodied in the teaching on TR. Thus, there is a general consensus after Aquinas that Christ's gift of self in the Eucharist was per modum substantiae.[14] Properly understood, this understanding is strictly a metaphysical view and never intends that the substance of Christ is to be conceived as being present as an inner core in a spatial sense, i.e., in the accidents of bread and wine. The difficulty was -- and still is -- that this whole scheme lends itself so easily to a physicistic and spatialistic distortion.

This spatialistic tendency, however, was encouraged by a development in liturgical practice during the Middle Ages which resulted in a shift away from the communitarian

experience of the early Church to a cult of host-adoration.[15] This shift was characterized by an overemphasis on the power of the host to save men just by being-there. With this overemphasis there developed an exaggerated importance of that awesome "moment" of the consecration, of the TR; priesthood came to be defined almost exclusively in terms of the power to consecrate. Frequency of communion gave way to distant gazing at the all-powerful host and the cult of the sacrament outside of its celebration gained immense popularity. The bond between the Eucharist and the Church was loosened[16] and the Eucharistic celebration ceased to be the central source of the communitarian life. One can see how these phenomena could easily lead to a spatial and thingly conception of the ERP as a static being-contained-there, rather than as a dynamic gift of Christ in symbolic action.

Another development that encouraged a tendency towards thingliness and a loss of the symbolic dimension, was the scholastic effort -- based on Peter Lombard's Book of the Sentences -- to distinguish the sacraments of the New Law from those of the Old Law. The distinction was soon placed in the perfect efficacy of the Christian sacrament. Efficacy, however, is in proportion to the causal power, and before long the tract "De Sacramentis" found itself dealing with physical causality, moral causality, intentional causality, etc. This approach gave a bi-polar character to the study of sacrament: the integration of symbol and cause became the task of theology for seven hundred years, usually with

little success and always with a deemphasis of the notion that sacraments cause sacramentally (i.e. symbolically).[17]

The teaching on TR, therefore, gives a highly realistic shape to an understanding of the ERP, which, isolated from its communitarian dimension and discussed largely in terms of causal efficacy, gives it a strong gravitational pull towards thingliness and spatiality. It is almost inevitable under these circumstances that TR tends to become a kind of cosmological miracle. The explanation begins to focus on accounting for the accidents of the consecrated bread and wine which are somehow suspended without their natural substance, without understanding these accidents as now being supported by the body of Christ in a spatial sense. But if Christ is not present there spatially what or who supports the accidents? Given the scholastic natural philosophy which maintained that accidents always inhere in substance, one can see how the mind is inevitably driven to a sort of a spatial understanding of Christ's presence in order to account for the obvious fact that the accidents are still <u>there</u>. This speculative difficulty with the formulation of the TR combines with the popular piety of the "<u>Christ-is-there</u>" host-adoration and reenforces the drift toward thingliness. Thus, theology and liturgical practice meet and reinforce each other, resulting in the constant threat of a crudely realistic understanding of the ERP.[18]

Once again, we do not mean to say that the properly symbolical or sacramental dimension was ever completely lost

For example, when the Council of Trent reaffirmed the Church's commitment to TR, it did so in the context of a reasonably strong emphasis on the sacramental presence. For despite the fact that the Council was reacting against the mere symbolism of Zwingli and Hausenschein, the Church showed that it had not forgotten the sacramentality of the ERP. In the Decree on the Holy Eucharist we read that

> it is not contradictory to say that our Savior always sits at the right hand of the Father in heaven according to his natural way of existing and that, nevertheless, in his substance he is sacramentally present in many other places with us.[19]

The document goes on to say that the sacramental presence in the Eucharist takes place in a change at the consecration that is a

> change of the whole substance of the bread into Christ's body and the whole substance of the wine into his blood while only the species of bread and wine remain.[20]

This change, the Church "suitably and properly" (convenienter et proprie) and "most fittingly" (aptissime) calls TR and that if anyone denies this unique change "let him be anathema."[21] Thus, Trent shows more balance and restraint than today's post-Conciliar renewal-enthusiasts tend to give it credit for.

The fact remains, however, that Trent gives more emphasis to the realistic dimension than the symbolic dimension of the ERP. Like Aquinas and the rest of the Scholastics, Trent is content to ~~simply~~ reiterate that sacraments cause

sacramentality and that therefore Christ's ERP is sacramental and then leave it at that. Thus, it is the substantiality of this sacramental presence which receives the most attention, with the result that this substantiality runs parallel to the sacramentality without ever being integrated into it. In this conception, the species or accidents[22] which remain after the consecration never attain to their full symbolic function. Of course, this raises the whole question of the extent to which the Fathers at Trent, in calling the Eucharistic change, "TR", affirmed the Aristotelian-Thomistic substance - accidents philosophy that this term had by this time come to embody. Later in this paper, we will take a brief look at this problem through the eyes of some recent interpreters of Trent. Our main concern here is merely to maintain that Trent is in continuity with the Scholastic emphasis on the "realistic"rather than symbolic dimension of the ERP.

Probably of more ultimate significance for the historical shape of the Church's understanding of TR was Trent's fragmentstion of its treatment of the Eucharist into three decrees: in addition to the one discussed above (Session 13, October, 1551), there were the decrees on the Communion under Both Species and Communion of Children (Session 21, July, 1562) and the Most Holy Sacrifice of the Mass (Session 22, September, 1562). Given the circumstances (i.e. Trent was addressing itself to three specific problems: the denial of the ERP, the insistence upon communion under both species, and the denial of the sacrificial character of the Mass) and the

necessarily apologetic tone of these decrees, they are certainly not as theologically sterile as some tend to portray them. Nevertheless, this disparate treatment aggravated the separation that had been developing since the Patristic Period between the ERP and the whole context of the Eucharistic celebration. Thus, post-Tridentine theology treated the Eucharist according to the pattern of these decrees and the unfortunate separation of sacrifice and sacrament ensued. Later we will see how a separation of the symbol (i.e. the sacrament) from the symbolic action (i.e. the sacrifice) leads inevitably to the impoverishment and misunderstanding of both. In addition to this separation, Trent, by not coming up with a firm statement recommending frequent communion[23] and by lending strong support to the cult of host-adoration,[24] bolstered aberrations which had crept into the Eucharistic piety of the sixteenth century.

Thus, the Council of Trent did not root out the weaknesses which had infiltrated post-Patristic Eucharistic theology and piety. A vigorous defense of orthodoxy indeed it was, but a foundation for renewal it was not. For despite the sacramental flavor of its teaching on the ERP, Trent gave more stress to substantiality and thereby strengthened the future of a term, "TR", which embodied a metaphysics with a strong thingly drift. And by giving disparate emphasis to the various dimensions of the Eucharist, the possibility of the ERP returning to its communitarian dimension (and with this, a more richly personalistic dimension) and thereby

reawakening to its real raison d'etre, was severely weakened. The result was centuries of stagnate Eucharistic theology and piety.

Renewal in post-Tridentine Eucharistic theology and piety came very slowly. What particular phenomena inside and outside the Church precipitated this renewal is a complex question which cannot even begin to be adequately discussed here. The emphasis on the communitarian life of the Church and the "return to the Sources" movement which characterized nineteenth century German theology (particularly in the Tubingen faculty); the revival of liturgical worship among the Benedictines beginning with the work of Dom Prosper Gueranger and climaxing the studies of Odo Casel; the decrees of Pope Pius X on participation in the Eucharist and the desirability of frequent communion; the ecumenical movement; the beginnings of a genuine ecclesiology; the contemporary philosophy of sign and symbol; etc.-- all contributed to the renewal.[25] The root cause, however, undoubtedly was the fundamental human and Christian desire for the experience of authentic worship in union with Christ.

In this paper we are going to concern ourselves with one phase of this post-Tridentine renewal in Eucharistic theology: namely, the contemporary (1950 to the present) discussion on the ERP. This discussion has been taking place primarily on the Continent, especially in Holland, Belgium, France, and Germany, and is concerned mainly with a reformulation of TR which is both orthodox and acceptable to modern man.

And, as the reader can gather from the tone and emphasis of this background chapter, our main theological goal will be to put symbol and reality back together again.

CHAPTER II

One Last Burst of Thingliness

In the first chapter, we traced briefly the developing opposition between symbol and reality in Western Eucharistic theology. The Scholastic explanation of TR, depending as it did upon Aristotelian metaphysics, gave a strongly realistic shape to the ERP -- an emphasis which was confirmed and given relative permanence in the Council of Trent. And thus, the post-Tridentine theology of the Eucharistic ERP displayed a gravitational pull toward thingliness and spatiality which persisted right up to very recently. In this short chapter, we would like to give an example of the false problems that this thingly orientation can lead to.

As we mentioned earlier in this paper, TR leads to speculation on how a substance such as bread, which "supports" and "lies behind or under" the accidents can change into the substance of Christ's body without involving a disappearance of those accidents which the substance of the bread supported. Within this rather crude formulation of the problem, TR truly became a cosmological miracle. "Substance" within this scheme becomes a kind of reality which exists invisibly <u>in</u> the bread and under the accidents -- that is, as a kind of intangible buttress. This notion is thoroughly un-Thomistic ("substance" in Thomistic is never a "thing" or a "reality" but a <u>principle</u> of reality, of being), but it is humanly understandable that the strongly realistic explanation of Aquinas (and his contempories) could easily

lead to this distortion.[1] Thus, the fact remains that this was the context within which the problem was usually discussed and taught by the theologian and understood by the average Catholic.

Given this very thingly and spatial view of the whole matter, it is understandable that Catholic theologians soon found themselves tussling with modern physics. Thus, when the crude mechanism of nineteenth century physics identified the whole of reality with the strictly sensible and denied any notion of an invisible substance, Catholic theologians saw this as threat to the TR.[2] However, when twentieth century physicists became more aware of the limitations of sensible knowledge and began to speculate on at least the possibility of there being "substance," Catholic theologians then embraced them and thought that "now they are speaking our kind of language." Thus, in 1934, O'Connor could say confidently that the physicists "cannot therefore raise any objection to transubstantiation on the grounds that it does not fit in with their scheme of reality, <u>since it does</u> to a nicety"[3] (italics ours).

The logical but almost bizarre implications of this mentality can be found in the Selvaggi-Colombo debate that took place between 1949 and 1960. Because this debate (which included others who took sides) took place in Italian (which we cannot read) and Spanish (which we can read but the literature was not available), we depended upon the detailed analysis of this debate by Vollert[4] and Gutwenger.[5]

In brief summary, the respective positions of the protagonists were as follows:

1. Selvaggi -- Convinced that modern physics has something to contribute to the theological understanding of TR, Selvaggi insists that bread and wine are composed of many substances that all change while retaining their accidental properties. This is a physical change, but impossible to verify experimentally. The physical reality of the bread is therefore touched by TR. The substances of bread -- composed as they are of molecules and atoms, are all changed into Christ's body, although the appearances which sense can perceive or measure instrumentally continue to be unchanged.

2. Colombo -- Colombo does not offer any positive reply to Selvaggi's contention, but simply persists throughout the debate to flatly deny that the dogma of TR has anything to do with any scientific position or opinion. The term "TR", he insists, is primarily theological. It was drawn primarily from Tradition, not philosophy or science. The conversion of the bread and wine cannot be identifiable with any change in the physical order. He criticizes Selvaggi for making metaphysical substance and physical reality coincide.

Other theologians began to take sides in the debate -- usually against Colombo -- and their contributions at times border on the ludicrous. Following Selvaggi's "physicist" lead, Roberto Masi insists that the consecration of a single host produces many presences of Christ, as many as there are substances in the bread. Torner, also siding with Selvaggi continues the "physicist" and radically "realistic" approach by moving the discussion into the problem of the accidents and how they can exist without their "underlying" material substance. He is led to surmise that after the consecration God preternaturally supplies the sensorial impact of those substance-forces which have disappeared and thus makes it

impossible for us to discern the physical effect of TR![6]

At this point, we take leave of the muddled debates of Eucharistic physics, Italian Style. For it is apparent that when you have been led to postulate multiple TR's, God-supplied sensorial impact, and physical conversion (even though unverifiable), then sane theological discussion has been abandoned. Not that there was not some value to the debate: Selvaggi's insistence that bread was made up of several material substances was a much-needed thrust at theologians who had come to treat bread as an individual, material substance in itself,[7] and Colombo's bulwark stand against much of this physico-chemical nonsense is admirable. But these points are of minor value; the real value of this discussion was primarily as a theological catharsis of a rampant thingliness. After Selvaggi and his cohorts Catholic theology of the ERP has nowhere to go but up -- for it is difficult to conceive that Catholic theology could get any further away from the symbolic dimension of the Eucharist.

CHAPTER III

What Does Trent Say?

Before, however, Catholic theology could go up, it had to go back. This is the classic modus operandi of modern Catholic theology. In this particular case, the "return to the sources" focuses on the council of Trent and that mode of thought characterized as "Scholastic." For certainly one of the main problems implicit in the Selvaggi-Colombo debate and in the thingliness which surrounded and permeated this debate is the unquestioned acceptance of the substance-accidents natural philosophy embodied in the Scholastic teaching on TR and the assumption that this philosophy was cannonized by Trent. We are confronted, therefore, with the question of the precise status of Tridentine dogmatic statements. What are the hermeneutical principles one must follow when interpreting the canons and decrees of Trent? This question is thorny and calls for a theoretical discussion which would lead us far astray from the limited purpose of this paper. But if we cannot discuss the matter theoretically, let us at least take a look at the way in which three representative theologians concretely attempt to interpret the content and limits of the Tridentine statements on the ERP and TR. What follows is a brief summary of the efforts of E. Gutwenger, Karl Rahner, and E. Schillebeeckx.

E. Gutwenger, a German theologian, in a very detailed analysis,[1] insists that the Fathers of Trent, because of their recourse to the Council of Constance, appealed to the

natural philosophy of Aristotle. Quoting profusely from the Acta genuina ss. oecumenici Concilii Tridentini, Gutwenger shows that in using the term "species" instead of "accidents," the Fathers at Trent do not want to distance themselves from the Council of Constance, which in condemning Wyclif, used the term "accidents."[2] Thus, the Tridentine statements on the TR are ~~en~~ an affirmation of the Aristotelian-Scholastic categories of substance and accident, even though these statements always used the term "species" instead of "accidents."[3] Gutwenger grants that the Fathers of Trent did not intend to get involved with Schulmeinungen,[4] but insists that these Schulmeinungen were concerned with minor points within the basic categories of substance and accidents and that at no time did they intend that "the Eucharist should be explained through any categories but those of substance and accidents."[5] This leads him to the general conclusion that the theologian must use the Aristotelian-Scholastic conception of substance and accidents as a controlling framework when he embarks on any further speculative treatment of TR.[6]

There are two steps therefore in the process of interpreting Trent: exegsis and interpretation of that exegesis. We agree with Gutwenger's exegesis that by and large the Fathers of Trent, in affirming TR, embodied this affirmation in an explanation dependent upon the categories of Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy. But we disagree with his interpretation of this fact; namely, that therefore these philosophical categories became as infallible as the dogma affirmed through them.[7]

Around the same time as Gutwenger's article appeared, Karl Rahner published a paper which he had presented before an ecumenical audience.[8] There is little exegesis in his paper; his approach is almost wholly interpretative. He maintains that the Church, in confessing that the ERP comes about by TR, was merely using an explicit formulation that the Church had used for centuries. Thus, the dogma of TR is a logical and not an ontic explanation of the words of Christ at the Last Supper for it tells us no more than the words of Christ tell us;[9] namely, that what he gives is his body and not bread -- even though bread was once there -- and that therefore his declaration effectively changes the reality of the bread into the reality of the body of Christ. The function of this doctrine is not to explain the how of the real presence. Rather, it is only to be understood in reference to the objective reality affirmed by the words of Christ and remains valid only in terms of this reference. All metaphysical explanations following from and made explicit in theological reflection go beyond that which is given in the definition of the dogma and turns a logical explanation into an ontic one.[10] Thus, the Aristotelian-Scholastic framework within which the dogma is defined cannot be regarded as the necessary framework -- and as a matter of fact, all the opinions and controversies of the "Schools" arising out of Catholic attempts to explain the dogma in an ontic sense even up til now remain open and obscure.[11] There is a desperate need, therefore, for a new look at the problem on the ontic level. As Rahner says quite bluntly: "These school-

controversies must be purified of the sterility of the schoolroom -- and precious little has been done in the matter."[12]

Compared to Gutwenger, Rahner's approach is agressive and daring -- and just a little bit cavalier. We find ourselves in basic agreement with him, but feel that his stark demarcation between logical and ontic explanation does not do full justice to the complexities involved. There is a need here to correlate and reconcile Rahner's interpretation with the results of Gutwenger's exegesis. For the fact remains that the Council did not remove itself from Aristotelian thought-forms, and certainly there was no conscious effort to distinguish a logical from an ontic explanation, the dogma defined from the form of the definition, etc. Not that this "conscious effort" was necessary for Rahner's interpretation to be valid -- no it was not -- but a confrontation with the consciousness of the Fathers at Trent would make his interpretation more balanced and persuasive.

E. Schillebeeckx in a long article that can only be termed magisterial supplies the balance and "filling out" that Rahner's presentation lacked.

Schillebeeckx insists that it is ~~positively~~ nonsense to have expected the Fathers at Trent to divorce themselves from those categories and concepts which constituted the thought patterns of that time, namely, the Aristotelian form of thought. The Aristotelian teaching on substance and accidents was -- given some differences and variations --

the common thought of all these Council Fathers.[13] To expect them to have thought otherwise would be, for them, tantamount to refusal to reflect meaningfully on their faith. Thus, when reflecting on the datum of faith -- namely, the ERP -- they unavoidably incorporated within their understanding the Aristotelian thought-pattern.[14] Thus, what for us is an obsolete way of thought was for them a vital, living "denkkader" (thought framework). From our perspective, therefore, we can distinguish the "actually affirmed" from its "mode of expression" -- but to do such would have never occurred to the Fathers at Trent.[15] With these points in mind, Schillebeeckx carries out his own interpretation of the Tridentine affirmation of TR. In this affirmation, he recognizes three levels:

1) the level of biblical faith which simply affirms the distinct, proper "real presence" of Christ in the Eucharist.

2) the level of ontology which affirms that a real change of the bread and wine takes place.

3) the level of natural philosophy which affirms that this level this real change is "transubstantiation" thought out in Aristotelian concepts.[16]

Schillebeeckx then follows this tripartite division with a survey of the prehistory of the question in the patristic, early medieval, and early Scholastic periods[17] and concludes that the "natural philosophy "level is a mode of expression relative to a particular historical period which does not entail any mitigation of the properly ontological dimension which belongs to the very heart of the dogmatic definition. In other words, all one has to do is compare the

modes of expression common to the Patristic Period (transelementation, transmutation) with that mode of expression in vogue with the Tridentine Fathers (TR) to be convinced that all these modes have basically the same ontological focus Thus, levels 1) and 2) do not change but the explanation and mode of expression found on level 3) can and must change. That the Council Fathers were not aware of this tripartite distinction and its implications is not surprising and it is ~~simply~~ reactionary to let this fact keep us from exploring new ways of explaining the ERP and TR.

There seems to be all but a universal consensus among Catholic theologians regarding the position espoused by Rahner and filled and definitively stated by Schillebeeckx.[18] Therefore, contemporary adoption of the term "TR" by a Catholic theologian is only necessary insofar as it affirms the radical, real change of the bread and wine into the whole Christ. The Church expressed her faith for over a thousand years quite satisfactorily without this expression and the time may come when a new term could take its place. Granted, in Pope Paul's encyclical, Mysterium Fidei, the term gets a very strong endorsement, but surely this must be understood more as the expression of the Church's general confidence in her dogmatic and theological tradition rather than as an iron-clad adoption of the Aristotelian natural philosophy traditionally embodied in this terminology.

Now that we have reached the stage in our discussion where the contemporary theologian has finally sufficiently

confronted the thorny problem of reconciling a new direction in our understanding of the ERP with the statements of Trent, we can finally enter into a more positive (and, for the writer and we hope for the reader, a more interesting) area. The weaknesses and strengths of post-Patristic and Tridentine theology have been fairly well exposed and the thingliness of post-Tridentine theology has fairly well exhausted itself in the Selvaggi-Colombo debate. Thus, we now can focus in on some of the basic questions: What is the reality of the ERP? What is the ontological dimension of bread [19] that we must affirm as being changed in TR? And even more crucially, how is this ontological dimension -- a dimension which Scholastic theology affirmed with imbalanced zeal -- integrated into the sacramental or symbolic dimension? For according to Schillebeeckx, the ERP implies an <u>ontological</u> dimension precisely in the sacramental or symbolic gift of Christ through the consecrated bread and wine -- "two dimensions of one in the same undivided reality: that is the core of the dogma."[20] In the succeeding chapters, we hope to provide a basis for the integration of these two dimensions. The first step, we believe, is to firmly establish bread and wine as anthropological realities -- a step that will give us a secure basis for an analysis of the symbolic dimension.

CHAPTER IV

Bread and Wine as Anthropological Realities

Our first task will be to properly situate the ontological dimension of the *terminus a quo*: the bread *as* bread, the wine *as* wine. For it is our conviction that a persistent cause of the thingly understanding of the ERP and TR has been a too "thingly" understanding of the substantiality of bread.

One must be careful when applying the substance-accidents categories to reality. Traditionally, "substance" has been understood to mean "that which exists in itself and not in another" or "that which gives an entity its continuing unity throughout its various accidental modifications." Can one apply this notion univocally to a man, a rock, a plant, bread? Not at all -- particularly to an artificial reality such as bread. For bread is not an individual substance in the usual Aristotelian-Scholastic sense. If we apply the Aristotelian definition to bread we discover that bread is actually a conglomeration of substances, most of which exist in exactly the same state in the bread as they would outside of the bread. Granted that in breadmaking there are some chemical changes, but these affect only a portion of the mass. In the face of these facts, the Aristotelian-Scholastic understanding of the substance-bread takes some strange twists when applied to the bread and its TR. Within this scheme any element that we can distinguish in the structure of bread as a substance or as an existent unity would, in TR, cease in its

substantiality but remain according to its accidents. But this means that we could remove, let us say, starch from the consecrated bread or water from the consecrated wine without precipitating a substantial change in either; for the substance "water" had been transubstantiated along with the other substances in wine and thus to remove it from the consecrated wine would involve only a local displacement. But all would agree that Christ is present only under the appearance of bread and wine, not water or starch. It is obvious, therefore, that any discussion of TR which does not make use of rather more subtle approach to what actually constitutes the "substance" of bread risks falling right back into the "physicist" incoherence of a Selvaggi. But as we noted earlier, the Scholastic theory always seems to plunge us into thingly contradiction and distortion ~~chaos~~.[1]

It is difficult to ascertain precisely when Catholic theologians began to display (publicly) an uneasiness over the application of "substance" in the Aristotelian sense to the bread of TR. Certainly, in neo-scholastic philosophical circles, there has been for some years a heated debate on the notion of "substance".

> As a matter of fact, neo-scholasticism had a clear tendency to reserve the concept of substance to man, that is, to formally spiritual beings; things, especially artificial beings like bread and wine, could not be called substances.[2]

But the first theologian to criticize publicly the Aristotelian and scholastic explanation as it was applied to TR was, according to Schillebeeckx, A. Vanneste.[3] However, his effort[4]

really does not point to any new formulation. In his article, however, he refers to the Protestant theologian, F. J. Leenhardt, whose essay, This is My Body,[5] spurred much discussion among Catholic theologians. He is so often cited in articles and talks concerning the ERP, that this writer is tempted to see him as one of the main sources of the contemporary effort on the part of Catholic theologians to reformulate the teaching on TR. Whatever the case may be, his ideas are found in one form or the other in every Catholic contribution to the recent discussion, and thus, we will use him as a convenient starting point.

Leenhardt begins with the fact that man invests new ends and purposes into physico-chemical reality:

> It is ... a sign of man's spiritual power that he can designate things otherwise than in accordance with their raw material, their physico-chemical composition, they can be for him something other than what they are [i.e. materially].[6]

Leenhardt does not take this notion of man as an investor-of-ends and apply it to bread on a human level. Rather, he uses this notion as a stepping-stone to the spiritual power of God vis-a-vis bread on a supernatural level:

> If the substance of things is what they are as instruments in the hands of God, ordained according to His will, and the substance is the being of the things related to the end which God assigns them, then in this case faith will admit that this bread, since it is related to the special act of will of Jesus Christ and has a new end assigned to it, will no longer have the same substance.[7]

Thus, in the Eucharist, God gives bread a new end, a theologal end, which changes its substance. In other words, God gives

bread a new finality. Leenhardt does not use these terms specifically, but certainly it seems to be an adequate description of what he means here. Thus, he does not say that the bread is transfinalized into the body of Christ. His main concern is with the finality God invests in the bread, he does not discuss at all the finality of bread before God gives it a new finality. In other words, he is more concerned with the divine finalization rather than the divine transfinalization. But if pressed and asked the question: What is bread? Leenhardt undoubtedly would have said that it is a physical-chemical composition in which man has invested the end of nourishment. Thus, it is not a matter of breaking bread down into all sorts of distinct material substances in order to discover what the terminus a quo of TR is. No, the ontological dimension of bread must be sought in its relation to man, not as an individual material substance in itself or as a mass of substances. That is, bread is an anthropological reality[8] and it is in its relation to man that we look for the substance of bread.

Leenhardt did not draw out many of the specific implications in his suggestive essay. Catholic theolgians, however, have literally pounced on the ideas embodied in his essay.[9] Thus, it is within an ecumenical situation, that J. M. Bacciocchi (referring specifically to the work of Leenhardt) put forth his notions. According to Schillebeeckx, it was Bacciochi who first used the term "transfinalization".[10] Frankly, our examination of the available writings of Bacciocchi

fails to support this contention but certainly what Bacciocchi does say concerning TR could be called "transfinalization".[11] His discussion, however, following the lead of Leenhardt, considers the divine finalization of bread and only briefly discusses bread on a level of anthropological finality.

The first Catholic theologian to discuss bread as an anthropological reality with genuine philosophical subtlety was B. Welte.[12] Because of the importance of this article we will analyse it in some detail.

Welte begins his article with an assertion (which we are now somewhat familiar with) that we understand bread as bread not by its physical and chemical composition in itself (An-Sich) but from its relation-connection (Bezugzusammenhang) of meal or nourishment. That is, food is <u>really</u> food by virtue of its relation-connection to nourishment;[13] food is food in that it "exists-for" the one who is eating. The meal thus is the relation-connection that constitutes food as food; outside of this relation-connection, food simply is not food. (Welte, of course, does not mean "outside" in the chronological sense.) In a different relation-connection, such as a chemical analysis, food is no longer food but simply a conglomeration of molecules, and in this situation one cannot really speak of this combination as possessing one, unified, existing <u>An-sich</u>. Thus, the relation-connection is really determinative of being (Seinsbestimmung); it really determines that the existent is either this or that. This relation-connection is

deeply ontological and not merely an external addition of a mental kind. Regarded most fundamentally, the relation-connection and with it, the being-determination that arises out of the relation-connection, belong to the original and proper being of the thing itself.[14]

Of course, there can be various relation-connections for the same collection of molecules. Furthermore, these relation-connections can possess different relation-horizons of different bindingness (Verbindlichkeit). For example, a newspaper can be understood and used as a newspaper or as material for fuel, but these two relation-connections and the being-determinations which arise from these relation-connections are surely not equally binding or equivalent in reference to what the existent really is -- that is, a newspaper is a newspaper first and fuel second.[15] And thus, when a relation-connection changes, what an existent <u>is</u> changes -- since beyond a particular relation-connection it is "nothing". A Greek temple is something different from what it was for those Greeks who built it and worshipped in it than it is for members of a modern travel bureau. Such a change is not merely external, it concerns the being of the existent, and if we take this inner being and call it "substance" then we could speak of a kind of historical transubstantiation.[16] Relation-connections which determine being can also be instituted and thus determine in a binding manner what the existent concerned really is, and indeed, to the degree of the binding authority of the instituter himself. A piece of cloth of certain colors can be

merely decorative material. But then one day should the official authority make a law that defines this piece of colored cloth as the national colors, then this particular colored piece of cloth becomes by virtue of this being-determining-institution something quite different from what it was.[17] It is no longer "neutral stuff" but really and objectively a flag. The being of this existent has been changed not because something physical has been changed but because this existent, by virtue of an authoritative institution has been transformed into a binding relation-connection.[18] Such a change of being is deeper and more determinative than any physical-chemical change. As a matter of fact, there could be any number of variable physical-chemical "preserves" for the particular cloth and colors which go into making this flag, but these variations could comfortable remain within the relation-connection.

The applicability of Welte's analysis to bread and wine is obvious. Both are knowable and understandable as substances in their relation-connection to man's nourishment: This is the finality invested in this particular combination of physical-chemical substances. Bread, therefore, is a reality brought into existence by man's adaptation of the material world to himself. It is an artificial human object which gets its "principe actif" (Pousset) its "Sinnenheit" (Rahner), its "Sinngestalt" (Gutwenger), its "significance" (Davis), its "finalité" (Bacciocchi), "Bezugzusammenhang" (Welte), etc., <u>not</u> from its physical composition but from its relation to man.

Thus, the words of the earlier quote from Leenhardt ("it is a sign of man's spiritual power that he can designate things otherwise than in accordance with their raw material, their physical-chemical composition") begin to make sense when we apply them to anthropological realities. Once again, this is not to say that the physico-chemical composition is utterly arbitrary. Pousset puts it well when he says that the "principe actif" of bread

> is not a physical-chemical entity, nor a general idea of nourishment; rather, it is the unity itself of such an idea and such a physical-chemical entity.[19]

Thus, one cannot make a flag out of water, bread out of arsenic, or wine out of wood. Generally, however, man does have quite a great degree of flexibility regarding the physical given-ness of the world which he sets out to transform.

With this notion of bread as an anthropological reality, we are raised once and for all out the muddle of Eucharistic physics and into a much better position to understand the real change of the bread and wine in the ERP. For it is precisely here in the sacrament of the Eucharist that the anthropological relation-connection is given a new relation-connection. In this instance, however, the new finality is theologal. The bread of the Eucharist is given a meaning or end which is absolutely binding (since it is instituted by God) and determinative of the being of the bread for the believer.[20] There is therefore a change of the substance, of the existent, which is objective in the fullest sense of the word. The bread now stands to man as the body of Christ.

The bread stands to Christ as his own self-gift to man. This is what consecrated bread means, this is what it is. Transignification equals transfinalization equals transubstantiation.

Many Catholic theologians would end the discussion at this point, pleased that the traditional understanding of TR has been given a convincing new twist which makes more understandable to the "modern mind". This is a mistake which reveals the continuing Catholic stress on the ontological and realistic dimension of the ERP. But the new relation-connection given by God to the Eucharistic bread gives this bread not just a new meaning, but a new symbolic meaning. Christ's gift of himself is not only per modum substantiae but per modum sacramenti. This fact gives a whole new dimension to the problem -- a dimension further deepened and made more complex by the fact that it is God himself in Christ through the Spirit who is the meaning of the consecrated bread.

Therefore, we must move to the level of symbol -- specifically symbolic self-communication; for in the Eucharist, bread and wine become symbols of Christ's gift of self, symbols of Christ's redeeming presence. The consecrated host is not the body of Christ in its natural state, but in a sacramental state, that is "in" a symbol. Most people are afraid to apply the word "symbol" to the ERP, which indicates that our mentalities are still embued with an anti-Beregarian and ante-Zwinglian zeal for "realism"-- a zeal which has frequently caused Catholic theology to fall into a reified understanding of

sacramental activity. This is unfortunate, for a symbol need not mean something which in reality is absent, rather it can mean something which manifests a reality distinct from itself but mediated through it. A sacrament is a sign that causes that which it signifies; it is a composite of symbol and the reality symbolized. Thus, according to Gutwenger,

> the consecrated bread is the sacramental form of the appearance of Christ. Therefore, it is absolutely fitting, to see symbol and reality, sacramental form of appearance and Christ, as a unity, and to address the consecrated bread as Christ.[21]

In moving to the level of symbol, we are not negating the conclusions reached in our explication of Welte's anaylsis of the "relation-connection", but only broadening its ontological dimension to include the reality of human and divine symbolic self-communication.

CHAPTER V

Towards a General Theological Notion of Symbol

Before we move into the interpersonal symbolic communication which characterizes human self-communication and Christ's gift of himself in the Eucharist, it would be wise, we feel, to lay a general theoretical framework. This is necessary in order to show the ontological depth of symbol on a universal level and to give some consistency and precision to the terminology which we are using. For this theoretical foundation we will depend upon a long, complex, but simply beautiful essay by Karl Rahner entitled "Towards a Theology of Symbol."[1] We should warn the reader that his reasoning is very abstract and it is not made any easier by his murky German style. What follows we hope will be a clear enough summary of his position.

Rahner begins his essay by putting forward the first of several statements which serve as the basic principles for a theological ontology of symbolism:

> The existent is of itself necessarily symbolic because it necessarily "expresses" itself in order to attain its own essence.[2]

He goes on to say that in order to explain this statement it is first of all necessary to distinguish real-symbols (Real-symbol) from merely reference-symbols, or as it is more often stated, symbols from mere signs. Mere signs or reference-symbols simply point to or refer to another reality. A reference-symbol calls attention to another reality by virtue of a certain "agreement" between the two. This kind of symbol

can be either arbitrary or natural but in either case it is basically extrinsic to the reality referred to and is subject to the control and whim of the human observer. Of course, there are cases where the margins between a reference-symbol and real-symbol are fluid. Thus, there are historical instances where meaningful symbols charged with reality have degenerated into mere signs. For example, numbers were once sacred symbols, actually manifesting and participating in a deeper, richer reality, but have since become mere signs. And in the ordinary vocabulary of most people "symbol" more closely approximates what is referred to here as a mere sign. Rahner asserts that he will not concern himself in this essay with mere signs, but rather it is his intent to seek out the highest and most primordial way in which one reality can represent another and call this primordial representation a symbol: the representation that allows a reality "to be there" (da-sein).

To reach a primordial notion of symbol it is first necessary to state that every existent is in itself plural. Every existent is a unity of the many, and one moment among this plurality is or can be an <u>expression</u> of another.[3] This statement must be axiomatically applied to an ontology of finite existents, for every finite existent possesses the stigma of not being absolutely simple. But is this necessarily a stigma? Rahner says no, and for support of this contention he directs our attention to the mystery of the Trinity where in the highest simplicity there is a true and real -- if only "relative" -- distinction of Persons and consequently -- at least in this sense -- a plurality.4 And thus, if we take

as our departure, a theology of the vestiges and reflections of the inner-trinitarian plurality in the world, we can say that the plurality of finite existents is not so much a negative qualification as it is a positive consequence of the rich, "plural" fullness of the Trinitarian life.[5] And thus, the statement that "every finite existent is plural in itself" points to a plurality (assuming that God has revealed himself) that is more than a undifferentiated simplicity and identity.

To explain this unity in plurality, Rahner calls upon the "profound principle" (tiefe Grundsatz) of Thomas Aquinas: non enim plura secundum se uniuntur: one does not look to the plurals themselves for the source of their unity. In other words, the multiple moments within the unity of a plurality must have an intrinsic "agreement" among themselves. Granted, these moments must be distinct -- for this plurality is constituted precisely through this distinction -- but these moments never originally stand on their own; they must not be understood as reaching an "agreement" and union with each other through a simple juxtaposition of their independent selves.[6] On the contrary, the unity of the plurality, the "One" which is the original and fundamental ontological root of the existent, unfolds itself in a plurality. That is, if one cannot look to the plurality itself for the source and means of its intrinsic "agreement", then one must look to a deeper principle, a deeper "One", which units this plurality. The "One", therefore, is the origin from which the plurality originates, and the plurality is precisely the manner in

which the "One" discharges and discloses itself.[7]

Implicit in Rahner's discussion up to this point is the warning that this process (unity unfolding in unified plurality) is not to be understood in a crassly chronological and visual manner as if at one stage there is a "One" which in a subsequent stage splinters itself into a plurality of moments. No, its here a matter of the metaphysical priority of the "One": the "One" realizes itself as "One" precisely in its uniting plurality. Rahner refers to the Trinity as the ultimate ontological paradigm of this unity in plurality to show how this works. For here we have perfect simplicity, the perfect "One" -- it would be impossible to conceive of any higher unity -- constituting itself precisely within a real distinction of Persons. This real distinction deprives the "One" of none of its simplicity and perfection -- each Person is a "perfectio pura". Thus, this three-in-one unity is the fundamental point of departure for a theological understanding of being.[8]

Every existent therefore possesses a plurality that is in agreement with its original "One", with its source of unity, and thus this plurality is the "expression" of the original "One." Thus every existent forms that which is distinct from itself and yet one with itself in fulfilling itself. This manner of self-fulfillment of every existent follows, in its own way, more or less perfectly in accordance with the degree of the power and richness of its being (Seinsmächtigkeit).

Unity and distinction, therefore, are correlatives which increase in the same proportion.[9] At this point, Rahner, comes to an important conclusion:

> To every existent as such belongs a plurality as an inner moment of its meaningful unity. This plurality is one through the arrival -- out of the original "One" -- of an agreement distinct from the "One". As such, this agreement has the character of expression or "symbol" vis-a-vis its original "One". Thus, we have attained our original statement: the existent is in itself symbolical because it necessarily "expresses" itself.[10]

At this point Rahner launches into a detailed refinement of what we just summarized above. He relates this self-constitutive act whereby an existent expresses or "symbolizes" itself in a plurality to the metaphysics of act and potency and in turn to the degree in which an existent possesses itself in knowledge and love.

The degree to which an existent expresses or symbolizes itself is the degree to which it is in act. It is the indication of the degree of its <u>reditio complete in seipsum</u>, of the degree of its being, of the degree of its "being-with-itself."[11] This degree of actuality, of being, of "being-with-itself," in turn is the condition of the possibility of self-possession in knowledge and love. Here Rahner is dependent upon St. Thomas's principle that "in tantum est ens cognoscens et cognitum, in quantum est ens actu." In short, in expressing itself an existent realizes itself as a plurality, and in realizing itself it possesses itself in knowledge and love,

and it is this possession of self which is the content of what designated it as being.[13] Thus in constituting itself and realizing itself in a plurality every existent is itself "symbolic" for it lets itself unfold into the "Other." An existent is in itself symbolic because it is only in expressing itself that it comes to itself at all -- and therefore, the "symbol" is the way of self-knowledge and self-attainment in general.

Another facet of the Thomistic principle stated above, leads Rahner to deduce that the gnoseological dimension of symbol is not opposed to the ontological: if an existent is symbolic to the degree in which it is in act, then an existent can be known precisely insofar as it is symbolic, for "ens est cognitum et cogniscible in quantum ipsum est actu." Thus, the ontological dimension of symbol is not opposed to its gnoseological dimension, but the very condition for its possibility.[14]

In an attempt to demonstrate how his general theory of symbol further illuminates Thomistic metaphysics, Rahner then proceeds to a detailed discussion of formal causality and "resultancy." That is, he applies his theory specifically to material being. Much of this discussion we can skip, but there are a couple of very important points. First, in Thomas's understanding of formal causality, the substantial form "pours itself out" and gives itself to the prime matter, and in doing so, brings about a determinative quantity which is really

distinct from the substance. This quantity in turn is the basis for further qualitative determinations. Together, these quantitative and qualitative determinations or "accidents" give the particular spatio-temporal shape and configuration to the existent and as such, are "species."[15] These "species" are not to be understood (as they usually are) as accidental acts of an ordinary kind. Rather the species, even though distinct from the substance and properly termed "accidents," are provided by the substance in order to fulfill itself and to express itself. This necessary "flowing-out" of the substance into the species is the "resultancy," and cannot be reduced to <u>merely</u> secondary and transitive accidental acts. The species belong <u>intrinsically</u> to what is expressed and thus are the symbol -- through which the material existent possesses itself and manifests itself. Thus, on the level of material being all the elements which were worked out in a general theory of symbol are present: the formation of the symbol as the self-realization of that which is symbolized; the <u>intrinsic</u> relationship of the symbol to that which is expressed; self-realization through the formation of this expression (which itself originates from the essence).[16]

By way of summary to the Section I of his essay, Rahner puts forth the second statement (which is an inversion of the first):

> The real-symbol is the self-realization of an existent in the other which constitutes the essence.[17]

At this point, we are going to splice in a small part of Section III of Rahner's essay entitled "The Body as the Symbol of Man" because we feel it fits more logically into our summary of his theory. We will discuss section II, "Towards a Theology of Symbolic Reality" later.

We start from the contention that the body of man is the real-symbol of man. There has been a tendency in theology to view this dualistically as if there were first a body which was in turn actuated by a soul. But according to Thomas, man is not composed of a soul and body, but of a soul and prime matter. This matter is by itself a completely potential substratum of the substantial self-realization of the soul: by giving itself, the soul gives its reality to the passive possibility of the matter.[18] Thus, anything that is in act (and therefore in reality) in this matter is precisely the soul. What is called the body, therefore, is nothing but the actuality of the soul in the "otherness" of the prime matter -- an "otherness" effected by the soul itself which is therefore the soul's expression and symbol. The body, therefore is a real-symbol precisely in the sense which Rahner has been defining the term.

In section III of his essay, "Towards a Theology of Symbolic Reality", Rahner gives some concrete applications of his general theory as they apply to specific theological truths. Starting Departing from the conviction that "no theology can be completed unless it essentially is a theology of symbol,[19]

he examines the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Church, and the sacraments.

The mystery of Trinity, of course, always stood in the background of Rahner's earlier reflections. Thus, the theology of the Logos is the most exalted theology of symbol. The Logos, as the image and utterance of the Father is one with the divine act of self-knowing, and therefore is the self-possession in knowledge of the Father. The Father is and possesses himself precisely in contrasting to himself the image which is of the same essence as himself and a person who is other than himself.[20] This means that the Logos is the "symbol" of the Father precisely in the sense the term "symbol" has been understood in the earlier reflections; namely, the inner symbol which is distinct from that which is symbolized and in which the symbolized expresses itself and possesses itself.[21] Furthermore, there is an intrinsic connection and continuation of the immanent divine act of symbolizing and the activity of God *ad extra*. For it is precisely because God "must" utter himself in the Logos that he can utter himself *ad extra*. The created finite utterance is therefore a freely chosen continuation of the immanent constitution of the Trinity and occurs through the Logos.[22]

This continuation *ad extra* of the immanent symbolization of the Trinity is fully realized in Christ. Thus, if a theology of symbol is to be written, then certainly Christology should have the central chapter.[23] This chapter would require

no more than an exegesis of the words: "He who sees me, sees the Father." (John 14:9) The incarnate Word is the absolute real-symbol of the Father *ad extra*. He is not merely the presence and revelation of God in the world, but the very expressing "being-there" of who God in his free grace intends to be vis-a-vis the world, in such a way that once this divine attitude is so expressed, it remains final and unsurpassable.[24]

Rahner then develops a long somewhat rembling reflection on the incarnation[25] much of which is not germane to our discussion. His main contention, however, is important for us; namely, that an ever-active monophysitism continues to infect the consciousness of the faithful and threatens to reduce the humanity of Christ to a mere sign of the Logos rather than a full, realizing symbol. Too often the Logos seems only to be making himself audible and perceptible through a reality which is in itself extrinsic to him.[26] The assumed humanity becomes a kind of arbitrary organ of speech, substantially united to the speaker but not the speaker himself. Too often the humanity becomes a passive instrument of the revelation of the Father and not the revelation itself. But a proper understanding of the humanity of the Logos insists that the humanity is the real-symbol of the Logos in the pre-eminent sense. The Logos, as the Son of God, is *in his humanity* the revelatory symbol in which the Father utters himself to the world. The humanity of the Logos *is* the real-symbol that makes present the very reality of what it symbolizes.[27] Extrinsicism has no place in this conception.

The next step is to extend the symbolic function of the humanity of the Logos in its continuation in the Church. The Church is the enduring presence of the incarnate Word in space and time and therefore is the body of Christ, the real-symbol of the Risen Christ.[28] However, with the Church, we have a real-symbol that is a totally human reality possessing a social and existential (i.e. freely determined) dimension.[29] For the fact that the Church is a social symbol and hence of a juridically determined nature, does not mean that it is thereby merely a reference-symbol. On the contrary, its free establishment is precisely what is demanded by the very nature of this kind of symbolic reality and does not prevent it from being a real-symbol. For example, the "Yes" that two spouses speak before the legitimate authority is an external freely spoken word which does not refer merely extrinsically to the inner consent, but is the real-symbol of this inner consent without which the intended effect (permanent marriage bond) would not be realized. The word spoken and the consent expressed form a real unity: the former is the real-symbol of the latter.[30] Thus, the fact that such a reality (i.e. the inner consent) renders itself present in a freely constituted symbolism established juridically does not at all render it any less a real-symbol.

The Church, therefore, even though it is a spiritual reality, has been freely established by Christ's redemptive act along social and juridical lines which do not contradict the fact that it is the real-symbol of the redeeming presence of

the risen Christ in the world. As such, of course, the Church is not merely a social and juridical entity, but the primary sacrament of Christ (and therefore also the real-symbol of the Holy Spirit).[31]

The classic place, however, where a theology of the symbol is generally put forward is in sacramental theology. Sacraments make concrete and actualize the symbolic reality of the primary sacrament, the Church, for the life of the individual. Sacraments therefore are also symbolic realities, "sacred signs" of the redeeming presence of God. This conception is based upon the well-known axiom: Sacramenta efficiunt quod significant et significant quod efficient. If this axiom is taken seriously it refers to that relationship which exists between the symbol and the symbolized outlined earlier in the essay.[32] The function of cause and the function of symbol (i.e. the sacramental sign) are not merely connected by a de facto extrinsic degree of God, but have an intrinsic connection that is of a mutual causal relationship. The sacramental symbol makes present the redemptive presence of Christ -- precisely insofar as it is a symbol -- because it is the essential action of the Church which is the real-symbol of Christ. The grace of God renders itself effectively present in sacraments, by creating its own expression, its spatial and temporal tangibility, which is its own symbol.[33] And as seen earlier, the fact that a symbol is constituted juridically (as sacraments are in their being an action of the furidically established Church), does not prevent sacraments from being real-symbols.

To close this second section of his essay, Rahner puts forth summary statements numbers three and four:

> 3. The notion of symbol (as we have defined it in statements one and two) is an essential and key notion in all the theological treatises. Without this notion, a correct understanding of the content of the individual treatise in itself and in its relation to other treatises is impossible.[34]
>
> 4. The saving act of God in man, from the beginning of its foundation to its perfection, always occurs in such a way that God himself is the reality of salvation, because this reality is given to man and grasped by man in a symbol, a symbol which does not represent that saving reality as absent or merely promised, but really makes this reality present by exhibiting a symbol which has been formed by this reality.[35]

Thus ends our brief summary of Rahner's general theory. He goes on in his essay to apply it to a theology of the Sacred Heart. We will make use of some of the insights found in this concrete example of a real-symbol in the next chapter. Until then, let us rest content with Rahner's magnificent integration of the ontological and the symbolical. Granted, his essay is, in his own words, a "sketchy overview and rough outline"[36] and therefore, is short on concrete examples and fine distinctions. Rahner does warn us, however, -- without giving us specific example -- that his notion of "real-symbol" is analogical (because being is analogical).[37] Thus, it is obvious that he would not univocally apply his notion of real-symbol to the historical body of Christ, the risen body of Christ, the ecclesial body of Christ, and the sacramental body of Christ in the Eucharist. The original

"One" of all these self-expressing pluralities is of course the person of the Logos -- but these pluralities are distinct by virtue of their distinct modes of the presence of the Logos. But even though Rahner does not go into the precise and detailed distinction of these pluralities, his fundamental conclusion presents us with a definitive starting-point for our further reflections. That is, symbol lies at the heart of reality. Beginning with the Father who "symbolizes" himself in the Word, it extends to the humanity of the Word, in the man Jesus both in his historical and risen state. The risen Christ, then, by the power of the Spirit, so closely identifies himself with the Church that it becomes his body, his real-symbol. The body, the Church, then expresses itself symbolically through sacrament. Symbol also lies at the heart of material reality, where every existent "expresses itself" through its quantitative and qualitative species. And lastly, man is a real-symbol: man is a spirit who expresses his deepest personal reality through his real-symbol, his body.

CHAPTER VI

Human Symbolic Activity and Material Reality

In the last chapter, we presented Rahner's general theory of symbol. Before we apply it directly to the ERP and TR, we must fill it out with an anthropology of symbol. This is necessary in order to integrate the rather static metaphysical categories of Rahner into the more dynamic categories of interpersonal presence and interpersonal symbolic activity. For sacraments have as their end the deeper <u>interpersonal presence</u> of Christ (with his Spirit) to man, and in the Eucharist, this deepening is accomplished through a <u>symbolic action</u>. It is precisely this interpersonal symbolic communication which is the context within which one can reach an understanding of the way in which material realities such as bread and wine become real-symbols. And it is precisely the discussion of the ERP within this context which has accounted for the Dutch, German, Flemish, and French contribtions to the recent reformulations of the teaching on TR. All of them have started with an anthropology of symbol, and we follow their example in this chapter.

The Human Body as a Real-Symbol

We start from Rahner's contention that the body is the real-symbol of man. We learned from his essay that the body is nothing but the actuality of the soul in the "otherness" of the prime matter. The soul, as the original "One", unfolds and realizes itself in a unified plurality called

"body". The body, therefore, is distinct from the soul but ontologically united to it in a relation of the symbol to the symbolized. In applying this notion to the Sacred Heart, Rahner's next step is crucial to our discussion. He contends that the ontological unity of the body as the real-symbol of the soul extends to <u>each part</u> of the body. As this unity expresses and unfolds itself in the body, the symbolic function of the body is manifested in each part of the body:

> The symbolic function of the body is so mysteriously interconnected that the symbolic function and power of the whole body is conveyed to each part because each part contributes to the symbol of the whole.[1]

The <u>intensity</u> of the symbolic function of the parts of the body vary of course in proportion to their particular power of expression, their degree of "belonging-ness to the soul." There is a correlation, therefore, between the symbolic intensity of a part of the body and its power of expression.[2] In other words the primary ontological unity of the soul symbolizes and realizes itself in the body and in each part of the body; and it follows that the human person expresses and renders himself present in proportion to the power of expression of those parts of his body which best embody his personhood. And thus, the proper human expressions, such as word and gesture, are the most intense ways in which a human person expresses himself and makes himself present; and as such, these expressions are real-symbols.[3] This is the fundamental point of departure for an anthropology of symbol. Thus, echoes of Rahner are found also in the work of Schoonenberg and Powers:

> The body is my body, because the person is present in it with his spiritual consciousness and spiritual freedom; he developes and expresses himself in it. (Italics mine)[4]

> Human bodiliness is itself the sign of personal reality. For it is through the bodily dimension of human existence that man gives himself to his world ... thus, in the sign-acts in which man expresses his personal "interior" to the world, there is a fundamental unity in the sign (bodily action in which every part of man's body expresses his whole self) and what it "signifies" (viz. the interiority of man actualized in bodily action).[5]

This leads to the second point that human symbolic self-expression does not take place in a vacuum: the interior reality of person unfolds itself in a body which is in the world with other human persons. Encounters in the world with other persons are essential for the full realization and perfection of this unfolding of the inner person. For in order to grow personally, man must grow in knowledge and love -- a growth impossible without encountering the world and other men. A human person, therefore, must know and be known and must love and be loved. Knowledge and love communicate and unite the human person to his world and to his fellow-men; and in doing so, the person gains himself more perfectly in self-knowledge and self-love. This is the fundamental bipolarity of all personal existence (including divine persons): in giving himself to the "Other", the person gains himself. Personal knowledge and love is therefore a being present to and for another. Human symbolic self-expression thus finds its most basic finality in intensified interpersonal presence.

How this personal presence realizes itself and under

what circumstances it is most profound, is one of the dominant themes of twentieth century philosophy (in the very broad sense of the term). So pervasive is this theme that it would require tomes to trace its manifestation in academic philosophy (personalism, existentialism, phenomenology, and neo-scholasticism), in sociology (the problems of the "mass man", the "lonely crowd", the possibility of genuine human encounter and community in the "secular city"), literature (the cult of alienation), film, psychology, etc. Theologians, particularly those on the Continent, have not been immune to this preoccupation with personal presence, and for the past couple of decades many of them have been reworking traditional scholastic categories in terms of it. Their efforts have had considerable influence in giving the current theologizing about the ERP its particular flavor and orientation. Of special interest in this case has been the refinement of the distinction between personal and spatial presence. In our research for this paper, for example, we cannot recall a single theologian who did not in one way or another refer to this distinction. An excellent representative application of this distinction is that of P. Schoonenberg, a Dutch theologian who has been "right in the thick of things" during the contemporary debate on the ERP.[6] Fortunately, some of his work has been recently translated into English, and therefore was available for our examination.[7] What is of particular interest to us in Schoonenberg's work, is not so much his discussion of the ERP proper, but the anthropological prologumenon he presents before he enters into the ERP. As the reader will discover in the following summary

of his position, his conclusions tie in well with Rahner's notion of "real-symbol".

First, Schoonenberg defines local or spatial presence as occurring when "a thing, a body (also somebody insofar as he is a body, a thing) is spatially present to another body by touching it, by bordering on it."[8] The term "spatial" refers to the contactum quantitavium in space which makes a thing "be there" in space. Thus one thing or body is spatially present to another thing in each bordering on the other. There can be a kind of communication in this kind of presence: if the two objects touch each other there is a certain amount of action and reaction (both touch and are touched) which results in a mutual adhesion. Fundamentally, however, spatial presence and its consequent "communication" is really a kind of absence, for the same quantitative borderline that results in presence, brings with it absence "because the one object stops just at the point where the other begins".[9] Thus, there is a curious dialectic in spatial presence: the very quantitative extension that allows a thing to "be there", "to be at hand", vis-a-vis another thing, is also its principle of being absent and separate from that other thing. Purely spatial presence, therefore, actually "stands nearest to absence".

To be spatially present is not only a presence in space, but rather more accurately, a presence in a spatial way. For example, one can say that a loved one travels with her lover even though she may not have actually come along on the

trip. She has, therefore, a presence <u>in space</u> where her lover is, and yet she is not there <u>in a spatial way</u>.

Personal presence must be sharply distinguished from spatial presence. Personal presence is

> a communication of the person himself, a communication of those living insights which have formed his inviolable spirit ... a sharing in them, and a sharing in them which cannot be received as a giving of information or of knowledge, but a sharing which leads to an inner intuition in the understanding, and then to a connection in the will.[10]

Thus, whereas someone or something becomes spatially present simply by lessening the distance between it and something else, personal presence is a gift of the self to the other through self-revelation and dialogue. Personal presence is characterized by free self-determination: in contrast to the mutual contiguity and adhesion of spatial presence which is axiomatic and necessary, personal presence can only exist and continue when persons freely unlock themselves to each other. Thus, there can be personal presence without spatial presence: a distant lover is personally present to the beloved on the train; the anonymous person next to the beloved is only spatially present.

In most languages personal presence and spatial presence are easily confused. For example, in English we speak of a chair being close to John and we also say that John's wife is very "close" to John. Undoubtedly, this confusion arises out of the fact that despite the sharp difference

between spatial and personal presence, they exist together in a human being. Man exists in space, in his earthly life his body always has the aspect of spatial localization in which he shares the fate of all material things. But, because the person present in his body -- with his spiritual consciousness and spiritual freedom -- develops himself and expresses himself in it, "the two kinds of presence always summon each other forth."[11] Schoonenberg here is saying -- in the categories of personal and spatial presence -- exactly the same thing Rahner said -- in more metaphysical categories -- when he referred to the body as the real-symbol of the soul.

Schoonenberg does say that personal presence is to a certain degree independent of spatial encounter (as the earlier example of lover and absent beloved indicated), but generally, presence requires spatial presence in order to come into existence.

> A person who is in the distance or a person who has lived in time past could perhaps enter into our hearts, but between human beings as such spatial nearness is the normal ground in which personal presence grows up.[12]

The spatial presence of the body -- it's spatio-temporal tangibility -- is meant to be put at the service of the personal presence. In this process, the body actually becomes purified of its mere spatiality, of its "thingliness". As such, the body becomes a mediator of the person. And thus, even though personal presence requires spatial presence, it transcends it. As human persons, our whole life is engaged in the task of making our bodies more and more the embodiment and translation

of our inner person. Thus, the greater our personal growth, the more and more our body is shot through by the person, and the more it becomes a perfect symbol.

> The body becomes more and more a symbol of communion, in the full sense of the word it becomes more a body, and by that very fact, the promise or foreshadowing of man's glorified body in the age to come.[13]

Thus, spatial presence is caught up completely into the function of mediating personal presence; in itself it has no other reason to be except in its symbolic function. Its spatial contiguity, though absolutely necessary in this earthly life, is a dimension which will not be necessary in the next -- the body will have become a perfect symbol.

In short, man is in a situation in the world where he is given the choice whether to reveal and communicate himself or not. To choose to do so, involves man in the integration of his spatial presence by his personal presence. His body must literally "speak" his person. Pure intention, however, will not accomplish this. He must translate this intention into bodily action. These actions

> become personal symbols. Bodily movements become gestures, sound becomes word, hearing becomes listening, seeing becomes esteeming; all making - known or acceptance becomes a sign of revelation or of faith; an everyday symbol of human community, a manifestation and cause of personal presence.[14]

Schoonenberg's discussion is very profound and suggestive. Of particular interest is his notion that personal presence, as it is mediated through the body and its activity, gradually integrates the spatial presence of the body so

perfectly that the body becomes more and more a symbol and less "merely a thing, having merely spatial nearness."[15] And thus, in the risen life, when man will have transcended spatial and temporal categories, his body will have become a perfect symbol. That is, man will continue to mediate his personal presence through his body, but perfectly, just as Christ now does. With this eschatological view of symbolic reality, Schoonenberg's personalistic approach has run the full circle around to where it meets Rahner's more metaphysical approach. For at the conclusion of Rahner's general outline of a theology of symbol, he insists upon the eschatological role of symbol. Granted, he says, that many signs and symbols will cease to be at the eschaton, but the humanity of Christ will continue to have a symbolic function: it will mediate the immediacy of the visio beata.[16] And in union with Christ's glorified humanity, man too will continue to express and communicate themselves symbolically through their bodies. Until then, however, both Christ (through his Church and his sacraments) and men communicate themselves through real-symbols which possess spatio-temporal tangibility.

Material Reality as a Real-Symbol

During the second half of this chapter, we would like to analyse the manner in which material reality is and can become a real-symbol. We will show that a material thing only reaches its full stature as a real-symbol when it becomes an extension of the symbolic bodily communication of personal presence (as just outlined above). In reaching an understanding of how this takes place, we will then have reached the end

of our human analogy and will be prepared to enter into a more specific discussion of the ERP.

For convenience, let us take the material reality of bread. We said earlier ~~in~~ through the analysis of B. Welte, that bread is not simply a material reality, but a material <u>anthropological</u> reality by virtue of its relation-connection to man and his nourishment. Thus, the material realities which go into the composition of bread, are as it were, only "neutral stuff" before they are combined by man and invested with the meaning and finality of nourishment. Of course, strictly on the level of their physico-chemical reality, the material realities which go into bread have their own proper act and determination -- they are substances. But in terms of their becoming an anthropological reality, these substances are undetermined matter, they are in passive potency to becoming bread. What gives definition and shape to this undetermined matter is the idea or intention of man. And in the best tradition of Thomism, we can refer to this idea or intention as an "interior word."[17] The form, shape, or essence of every created reality is, according to Thomas, an interior word; because the form of anything made by an intelligent agent is ultimately traceable back to the concept or "word" of the agent.[18] In the case of bread, the agent is of course man. It is his "creative word" which gives bread its substantial form.[19] Man "pours out" the form of bread on a certain collection of neutral matter by translating his interior word or intention into the actual work of making and shaping the bread.

Following Rahner we can thus say that bread is a unified plurality which emerges from the original "One" of man's word. All the various quantitative and qualitative determinations (the "species") of this bread, therefore, constitute the self-realization and self-expression of this original word. This original word gives the meaning and the substantiality -- or better, the relation-connection -- to the species of bread. The species, therefore, are the real-symbol of the substance of bread. Bread as a material anthropological reality is a real-symbol of nourishment, constituted as such by the inner word of man.

Bread, however, can serve not only as a real-symbol of man's biological sustenance, but can also be taken up into man's personal growth and personal self-communication. For example, when one invites a friend over for dinner, the food that is served is not merely nourishment. Within the context of the mutual personal presence of friendship, this food becomes a medium of self-giving and self-communication. It "speaks" the deepest inner attitude of a friend towards a friend. There is a deeply social and human significance to food and drink which cuts across all peoples and cultures. The American invitation: "Come on, I'll by you a cup of coffee" is much more than simply a concern for anothers's biological need for caffeine. This writer can recall a scene from the Bergman film, "The Seventh Seal" in which the tortured, God-seeking knight is invited by a hospitable family of itinerant entertainers (significantly, the names of the husband and wife

were Joseph and Mary) to join them by the sea for strawberries and milk. What follows is a series of vignettes of rare and delicate beauty wherein the knight experiences -- for the first time in many years -- the meaning of human fellowship. Indeed, within this inter-personal context, one can accurately say that the love and concern of the family for the lonely knight were truly embodied in their gifts of strawberries and milk. Thus, these gifts of food and drink did not only possess their anthropological meaning as real-symbols of nourishment, nor were they merely signs of conventional hospitality, but they were also given the ontological depth of being real-symbols of personal being-for-another. Examples from everyday life could be multiplied ad infinitum. This writer, for example, came to a full awareness of this phenomenon while courting his wife-to-be. Long separation had necessitated letter-writing and as the shoebox gradually filled up with those anxiously awaited epistles, it gradually filled up in symbolic importance! Yes, indeed, the shoebox came to the point where it had become a real-symbol of her presence.

Powers hits the nail on the head when he says that man's life is involved in a "continuous 'symbolization' of his own personal reality to his world."[20] In this way, man not only grows personally, but the world itself is invested with new meaning and therefore, really "transubstantiated."

> It is only in man's functioning as a person, living and growing in self-expression and self-giving to his world, that the objective potentiality of man's world to have actual meaning becomes existentially operative.[21]

And to give symbolic meaning to a material reality by assuming it into human self-expression is to give new ontological depth to that reality: it has been given a new purpose and thus a new being. We recall here the Thomistic principle that being, truth (ie meaning), and goodness (ie purpose + finality) are convertible.

Upon closer examination, we can see that human symbolic actions which make use of material realities are really quite complex. First, there is the particular interpersonal context which calls for a symbolic act that is appropriate to the depth of self-expression and self-communication intended. The context may be such that a juridically and socially constituted symbolic action is called for, as in the "with this ring I thee wed" of the wedding ceremony. The choice of a material object is fairly broad, but there are limitations: one does not express one's love for a friend by serving him arsenic or present one's wife with dead flowers on her birthday. Then of course there is the sheer physical accomplishment of the symbolic action. However, the most fundamental element of a genuinely symbolic action which mediates personal presence is its meaning, its significance, its intelligibility. The symbolic action in its naked physical execution symbolizes nothing. The symbolic action must be given a "shape" by the person acting which is understood and accepted by the person to whom he is communicating. The action, to be a real-symbol, must embody the intent of the person acting. The inner intent, or better, the inner word of the person communicating must be "poured out" over the physical action

and the material object embodied in that action. The inner word must therefore be communicated along with the physical action as that action's "form". This inner word embodied in the action is what makes it what it is; it really gives the action (and with it, the material object) its ontological depth as a real-symbol. For this reason, personal self-communication, which always is bodily and therefore always symbolic, is fundamentally a "word."[22]

For example, the symbolic action in which a man gives a woman an engagement ring must be <u>understood</u> by the woman as a pledge of that man's gift of self, otherwise, the ring assumed into this action is not a <u>real</u>-symbol, it "speaks" nothing to the woman. The woman must understand and accept the intent or "word" which the man wants this giving of the ring to embody. This "word" alone can give the meaning and intelligibility to the bodily action and the ring assumed into this action; this "word" is the essence of this symbolic action. That this "word" be vocalized is not necessary, for there are many symbolic actions whose "word" is universally understood or stabilized or implicitly understood by long-time friends and lovers.

Thus, if a friend invites you to his home and serves you food and drink -- let's say, bread and wine -- the bread and wine within this interpersonal context are no longer simply anthropological real-symbols of nourishment but have been given an additional meaning, a new relation-connection, within the symbolic act of serving a <u>friend</u>. There is a real sense

in which the material realities of bread and wine actualize and communicate the presence of your friend to you. Your friend, therefore, is present "in" the bread. This presence is certainly not a local or spatial presence; your friend is not in the bread, but his presence is "in" the bread as the giver is "in" the gift. That is, the personal presence "in" the bread is strictly symbolical, not spatial. This does not mean that spatial presence is peripheral to the symbolic action; on the contrary, this localization of the symbol is necessary in order that the communication "take" for localized human persons. But this spatial presence has been so suffused with the personal presence offered in the spatially present food and drink, that we can say that their spatiality has been radically purified and transformed. Spatial presence in this case only exists for the personal presence and is radically subordinate to it. Its primary reason to be is as a real-symbol, not as a quantifiably extended stuff.

To the degree in which bread becomes a real-symbol of a personal presence offered, it is not bread, but the person who offers the bread. Of course, the strictly anthropological level of bread still remains operative; after all, a friend usually feeds a hungry friend. And yet, is it not true that we also frequently accept the offer of food and drink from a friend even if we do not have any biological hunger and thirst at the time? In cases such as this, and in all cases where the eating and drinking take place expressly within the context of a deepening and intensifying of personal communion, the most

fundamental meaning and being of the food and drink is not that of nourishment, but that of real-symbols of interpersonal presence. One might say that the meaning of the food as biological nourishment is caught up in and deepened by the meaning of the food as personal nourishment.

It should be emphacized also in this discussion of human symbolic activity, that there are various levels of making oneself present through real-symbols. Human interpersonal presence is fraught with many limitations and difficulties. Our bodies, for example, never adequately symbolize our person. We are always moving towards this perfect symbolization but never do we attain it (until the next life). And then there are the fundamental limitations of space and time. The spatiality of our bodies acts as a continual cause of a gravitational pull towards mere thingliness. The relentless successiveness of time limits both the range and length of our personal contacts: there are many levels of personal communication, few of which we really have the time to give the depth that we want. Then there are the numerous "language barriers". Our "words" to one another must be intelligible and meaningful or otherwise they will not adequately convey our intent to communicate. The speaker and the listener must understand one another. This is a skill, acquired by experience and hard work, any many people shirk from this task which is necessary if there is to be any personal growth. Then there is the problem of faith: one must trust in the sincerity of another's "words" embodied in his symbolic actions. Symbols can lie, and

if a person is lied to often enough, he begins to lose trust in people. In such a case, when this person finally happens upon a person who is really worthy of his trust and faith, he does not "hear" that person's symbolic actions. We could go on with more problems of interpersonal symbolic communication, but enough has been said, we feel, to convince the reader that perfectly realized symbolic activity is an eschatological reality. Our hope, therefore, is in the risen Christ in whom our bodies will be transformed into perfect real-symbols.

All the theologians who have contributed to the contemporary discussion of the ERP (and who are still contributing) take as their point of departure, in one way or another, the anthropology of symbolic action which we have just sketched above. However, since the sketch above was <u>our own</u> sketch, there would undoubtedly be some degree of disagreement in the particulars. And we freely admit that our theological wellspring is not as deep as those possessed by those Continental theologians (especially Dutch and German) who are now doing so much to deepen our understanding of the ERP and TR. Be that as it may, a recent article by L. von Hout in the German ecumenical journal, <u>Catholica</u>, indicates that the sketch which we have presented above is in basic agreement with the main contentions of the Dutch contribution.[23] For this reason, we confidently call upon von Hout's summary of C.J.M. Dupont's[24] anthropology of symbol to serve as the conclusion to this chapter. It runs as follows:

1. Man uses material reality as his own self-expression; in doing so, man takes up material reality into his own bodiliness.

2. Symbolic activity demands an accompanying word (Begleitwort) in order to interpret the bodily action.

3. Symbolic activity is creative; it causes a deeper, personal union of one with the other (mitmensch).

4. The source of symbolic activity is one person or a group of persons who have become "one" in their intention.[25]

5. Effective symbolic activity demands that the person who communicates and the one who receives, trust and believe each other.[26]

CHAPTER VII

Symbol and the Eucharistic Real Presence

In the last chapter we discovered that a material reality such as bread has or can have various degrees of ontological depth. There is first the level of its sheer physicality, the level on which bread is seen as a combination of diverse substances. There is second the level of anthropological reality: man gives a shape or meaning to a conglomeration of substances by investing it with the finality or relation-connection of human nourishment. Thirdly, there is the level of bread as a real-symbol of personal presence: man assumes the anthropological reality of nourishment into the symbolic action of giving and communicating himself to his fellow men. It is important to note that each successive does not destroy the reality of the previous level, but gives it a deeper ontological depth by giving it a new meaning. There is even a sense in which one could say that each successive level "fulfills" the preceding one. The various physico-chemical substances which go into bread sort of "come into their own" when caught up in the finality of human nourishment. And we might say that eating bread "really means something" when it occurs within the context of an intensification of interpersonal presence. This personal level sums up and deepens the other two, and as such, gives us the basic pattern of human life: man's transformation of the world is orientated first towards his physical well-being and secondly (and most fundamentally) towards his spiritual well-being.

But the meaning of man and bread goes still deeper. For God the Father has added yet a fourth level, a level which takes up all the other levels and gives them an infinite ontological depth: consecrated bread in the Eucharist has the meaning and power of the Father's gift of himself and his Son through his Spirit. At this point in our study, we truly take an analogical leap. For the "word" which the Father speaks in the symbolic action of the Eucharist, is the Word himself in his self-giving to men; our "words" through symbolic action can only in the strictest analogical sense be compared to this "Word." The new meaning and power given to bread when it is assumed into the symbolic action of Christ's self-gift in the Eucharist, makes our transignifying of bread by assuming it into our self-giving seem superficial and highly fragile. For we are sinners and the symbolic self-giving actions of sinners always remain somewhat ambiguous and tentative. Seldom do our gifts of self even border on the unreserved. Trapped in our own selfishness and fear, we tend to "hold back". We frequently retract our symbolic acts of self-giving: we refuse to shake the hand of one who has wronged us. Our being-for-others always lacks endurance and definitiveness. And thus, the human analogy is weak as we approach God's symbolic self-revelation and self-communication: our real-symbols can never mediate a personal presence which has <u>salvific</u> meaning and power,[1] which has the creative and redemptive efficacy to make us "sons in the Son."

As we learned in the last chapter, real-symbolic self-communication is essentially a "word." The "word" that the Father speaks in giving himself is perfect and endures forever, for his "word" is his Word, the Son of God as man. As man, Christ lives his life as the perfect real-symbol of the Father's intent to communicate himself to all men, as the real-symbol of the Father's intent to render himself personallypresence to men. As the perfect real-symbol, Christ's human acts carry all the meaning and power of the one of whom he is the symbol, namely, the Father. Every human act of Christ, therefore, is a real-symbol of the Father's intent to communicate himself to men. And thus, the human acts of Christ are not merely human: his acts which appear to be only human have been radically transignified (or if you will, transfinalized or transubstantiated) -- they now speak and render present the Father's gift of self.

There are several levels to Christ's life as a real-symbol. First, in giving his human life the meaning of the Father's gift of himself, Christ transforms human life in its deepest ontological roots. For since the meaning of Christ's human life <u>is</u> the Father's gift of himself in the Son, then that is precisely what human life <u>is</u>. Following the metaphysics of Welte, we can say that the Father gives human life the relation-connection of the gift of himself in the Son which determines the being of that life: the individual human life of Christ <u>is</u> Sonship, and all the other individual human lives of men, when they are united with

Christ's human life have the meaning and existence of Christ's Sonship. A second level is that Christ lives a Jewish human life. He brings to his Jewish life the meaning of his self-giving Sonship. Thus, whatever he does as Jew, particularly in his participation in the more formalized Israelitic expressions of the meaning of their faith (namely, prayer and worship which celebrate Israel as the covenant people of Jahweh) is transformed, transignified (or better, transymbolized) into the meaning of his Sonship offered to mankind. It would require a massive study to develop in greater detail the manner in which Christ transignified human life and the life and worship of Israel. However useful such a study might be, the scope of this paper requires that we restrict ourselves to the meaning of the Eucharist (in its union with the Pasch). Even with this restriction, we can only venture a few general remarks.

The real-symbolic life of Christ is summed up in his Passover from death to resurrection, for here Christ's intent to give himself to men manifests itself in a definitive manner. Christ's intent to give himself is the Father's intent. But as man, Christ is in a situation of creaturely dependence upon the Father; thus, in his human intent to give himself to men Christ is uniting his will to the will of the Father. Christ in giving himself obeys the Father, that is, he gives himself to the Father and acknowledges the Father as Father. Thus, Christ's abandonment of himself to the Father -- which he does throughout his whole life --

is ontologically one with his intent to give himself to men. This reaches its climax in Christ's death, for the abandonment of oneself to God the Father is given a stark and definite focus in death.

In his death, therefore, Christ definitively gives himself to men in his definitive gift of himself to his Father. Indeed, every action of Christ's life before his death carried this meaning, but these actions are summed up, and as it were, finalized, in his Passover. Thus, the Passover of Christ, his death and resurrection, is the real-symbolic action of the Father's self-giving to man in the Son by the power of the Spirit. There is a circularity here which we later see extended to the Church: namely, the Father's "downward" gift of himself in Christ is accomplished through the "upward" gift of Christ to his Father -- namely, through Christ's sacrificial worship.

To give himself to the Father is thus the same as giving himself to men. In giving himself to the Father, Christ offers the perfect sacrifice on the behalf of all men. This two-directional reality constitutes Christ's priestly mediation: in acknowledging his human dependence on the Father he carries the worship of men (insofar as they are united to the worship of Christ) to Father and as the real-symbol of the Father he brings divine life and redemption to men.[2] Because it is the Son of God who gives himself to the Father, his priestly offering of sacrificial worship is

infallibly accepted by the Father. That is Christ "is raised" by the Father. Thus, Christ's resurrection cannot be separated from his death, for it is precisely in giving himself in death that he is received by the Father. Understood in this way, his resurrection is his gift of himself to men.[3] This is the reason why Christ, in his resurrection, is "established in the power of the Spirit"; for in giving himself, Christ gives his Spirit.

Therefore, Christ's whole life, as it is definitively summed up in his Passover, is the real-symbol of the Father's gift of himself to men. However, as we saw earlier in our analysis of human symbolic communication, the intelligibility and meaning of an action is what makes it a real-symbol of personal presence. Throughout the course of his life, Christ supplies this intelligibility and meaning by telling us what he is doing. These interpretative words, which give "shape" to his life, may include bodily action and material things. We are thinking here, for example, of the "signs" of John's Gospel which are summed up in the great sign, Christ's Passover. In keeping with this action plus word = real-symbol manner of communicating (which we saw in the last chapter to be absolutely fundamental to all human communication), Christ accompanies his death and resurrection with a word. This word is the Last Supper. In the context of the meaning and power of the Jewish Pasch,[4] Jesus takes up the unleavened bread and cup of benediction and fulfills the promise of the meaning of the Passover by giving a new meaning to the bread

and cup by the creative power of his divine word. The meaning he gives is in the words: "This is my body, which is being given on your behalf"; "This cup is the new covenant in my blood which is being shed on your behalf." (Luke 22:19-20). With these words, the eating of this bread and the drinking of this cup no longer means a participation in the paschal sacrifice celebrating the covenant of Sinai and the exodus from Egypt. The real body of Christ, present to the real-symbols of bread and wine, is now the meaning of these actions. And it is the real body of Christ in his Passover, in his gift to his Father and gift to us, for the word of the Last Supper can only be understood in its union with Christ's death and resurrection. Otherwise, the Last Supper becomes an utterly cryptic meal and his death a naked physical action without "shape" or meaning. United by the human intent of Christ to give himself for the sake of men, his word of the Last Supper <u>is one</u> with his action on Calvary.[5] This union of word and bodily action makes his Passover from death to resurrection the real-symbol of the Father's personal presence to and consequent union with all men in his Son through the Spirit. And thus, when we, in the Eucharistic celebration, repeat the word Christ spoke at the Last Supper by speaking the words of consecration and partaking of the real-symbols of the bread and wine (which have been given "shape" and meaning by the words of consecration), we unite ourselves to the death and resurrection of Christ, for this Passover is what this eating and drinking now <u>really mean</u> and <u>really symbolize</u>. In union with the continuing intent of the risen

Christ to give himself to the Father and to all men, the Church's action of the Eucharist is the real-symbol which makes present the redemptive mystery of Christ's Passover.[6]

As the risen Lord, the bodily Christ no longer is or can be spatially present to us, but it is precisely in this state of aspatiality that the bodily Christ is freed to be personally present to all men. Christ can now pour out his Spirit from his body unfettered by the limitations of space and time. Thus, Christ's power of self-communication is fully realized in his risen life: his risen body is a perfect real-symbol.[7] However, we still remain bound by space and time. Personal presence must still be mediated through a real-symbol which is spatial and tangible. Thus, in order to facilitate his self-communication, Christ unites and identifies himself (by the power of his Spirit) with men and establishes this union with a juridical and social expression, with a tangibility and spatiality, which enables those in union with Christ in its social expression to act as his body, to act as his real-symbol. This social and tangible expression is the Church, which as the real-symbol of Christ continues the real-symbolic function of of Christ's individual risen body.[8] This is not to say that the social and juridical tangibility is primary. What is <u>primary</u> is the invisible union of Christ with his body, the Church; but this tangibility is <u>necessary</u> for us earth-bound humans. Just as the spatial presence of the human body is not primary (for in the next life the human body will be aspatial and

still very much a real-symbol) but an absolutely necessary dimension for earthly personal self-communication, so also is spatial presence absolutely necessary if the Church is to communicate its inner personal reality, Christ.

As the ecclessial body of Christ, the Church therefore is his real-symbol; and as his real-symbol, the Church can speak "words" or perform symbolic actions which carry the intent of Christ to save men (for this continues to be his intent in his risen Life).[9] In speaking the intent of Christ in union with him, the Church renders Christ present in his Passover action, for it is precisely in his death and resurrection that Christ gives himself to us. In speaking this "word" of Christ's Passover, the Church speaks <u>the</u> Word -- all other words of the Church find their meaning in relation to this Word.[10] And if what a being <u>does</u> is what it <u>is</u>, then the Church <u>is</u> this speaking, in real-symbolic actions of word and sacrament, of the Passover of Christ. However, there are degrees in the speaking of this Passover mystery. That is, there are degrees of the Church's actualization of what (or better, who) she really is. Just as in married life where there are a variety of "words" of varying intensity in which one speaks his self-identification with his partner -- the most formal and intense word that of the mutual gift of one's body in sexual intercourse -- so also in the Church: in the Eucharist the Church speaks her own reality most formally, for here Christ is fully and bodily present to the bread and wine. But to be fully present is to be present in his Pass-

over action, and thus Christ's presence to the bread and wine is a presence-for-us. And to be present-for-us is to be giving himself to the Father, and thus, the ERP is a sacrificial presence.[11]

There is a circularity here which is quite bewildering at times. To put it somewhat more simply: Christ gives himself to the Church by uniting the Church to his action of giving himself to his Father. The interpersonal presence of Christ to his Church is thus prior to and the end result of the ERP. The ERP ~~simply~~ cannot be properly understood apart from this interpersonal presence which is meant to be intensified: Here we see the danger of host adoration, the Eucharistic celebration, for when the ERP is separated from the offering and intensification of personal presence, then both the source and the end of this ERP tend to be lost sight of.[12] For there is no possible way to understand how a symbol can be a real-symbol of personal presence if the symbol is isolated from the symbolic action of the person giving himself. Christ's presence is the presence of the giver <u>in</u> the gift: isolate this "in the gift" from the "giver" and the "giving" and one is bound to fall into understanding the "in" of "in the gift" in a spatial way. Here again we can call on Schoonenberg's distinction: Christ in his self-gift through the real-symbols of the bread and wine is present <u>in space</u>, but not <u>in a spatial way</u>.

It goes without saying that the fact that in the

Eucharistic action the bread and wine are taken up in Christ's act of bodily (as a man, there's no other way Christ can communicate except bodily) self-communication, means that the bread and wine are transformed in their deepest ontological roots. They have been given a finality, a significance, a symbolic meaning, which is the central mystery of all reality: the mystery of Christ's gift of himself to his Father and to us in his Passover. Their anthropological meaning as nourishment has been given a radically new meaning as the real-symbol of the bodily gift of Christ. The anthropological level is not annihilated, however, but it now serves a new purpose as a real-symbol of Christ's redeeming and creative personal presence. Of course, to be understood as such, men must eat and drink of the consecrated bread and wine in faith: they must believe and trust in the "word" or real-symbol which Christ is speaking to them.[13] As Christ says: "Truly, truly I say to you, he who <u>believes</u> in me has eternal <u>life</u>. I am the <u>bread</u> of <u>life</u>" (John 6:47-48).

Thus, the Eucharistic <u>Real</u> Presence comes about through a change in the being of bread and wine which can be properly called a "transymbolization." Based upon the conception of "real-symbol" which we have presented in this paper, we are convinced that this term is as accurate as "TR" and incomparably richer. Unfortunately, the popular, "unrealistic" conception of symbol would probably lead to as much distortion as the term "TR" tends to engender in the average Catholic's understanding. Probably, the term "tran-

signification" would be a good compromise -- for it includes the "sign" (symbol) dimension and the "meaning" (reality) dimension. Whatever the term used, however, the crucial truth which must be accurately conveyed is that the symbols of the consecrated bread and wine express the reality of Christ's gift of himself to his Father and to us.

CHAPTER VIII

Summary and Conclusion

In this paper, we have examined the dimensions of symbol and reality in the contemporary Catholic discussion on the ERP. We began with some background to our study by briefly tracing the gradual separation of symbol and reality in post-Patristic Eucharistic theology -- a separation which was given relative permanence by the Council of Trent. Post-Tridentine theology of the ERP, therefore, was marked by an excessively realistic emphasis which gave the Catholic understanding of the ERP a strong gravitational pull towards spatiality and thingliness. This tendency culminated in some rather bizarre efforts at a "Eucharistic Physics." We then examined some recent interpretations of the Tridentine statements on the ERP and TR and discovered that we were free to seek out a new philosophical explanation. In Chapter IV, with the help of B. Welte, we outlined a philosophical approach to the real change of the bread and wine, which rescues us from an excessively realistic emphasis, by starting from the <u>anthropological reality</u> of bread and wine. In Chapter V, a summary of Rahner's general theory of symbol was presented which established the ontological depth of the real-symbol. The next chapter took as its point of departure a theological anthropology which understands the body as the real-symbol of man and proceeded to combine the insights of Welte, Rahner, Schoonenberg, etc. into an anthropology of human symbolic activity. In this chapter, we also attempted

to demonstrate the manner in which material realities, such as bread and wine, become real-symbols of personal presence when they are taken up into human self-giving. In Chapter VII, we applied the anthropology of the real-symbol by analogy to Christ's act of self-communication through his presence to the consecrated bread and wine in the Eucharistic celebration.

The main conclusion of this paper is that the Eucharistic Real Presence comes about through a change of the bread and wine which can be termed "transymbolization" -- a term which we feel has an accuracy and richness unsurpassed by any other terminology. Until, however, the realistic dimension can be reinstated into the usual understanding of symbol, the term "transignification" appears to best combine the symbolic and realistic dimension of the Eucharistic Real Presence. But whatever the terminology employed, our faith in the Eucharistic Real Presence demands that we accept the <u>symbols</u> of the consecrated bread and wine as the perfect embodiment of the <u>reality</u> of Christ's bodily gift to us.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I — A Brief Historical Note

1. This is true right from the very beginning. Cf. for example the letters of Ignatius of Antioch: e.g. To the Smyreans 7 in The Apostolic Fathers trans. by J.B. Lightfoot (New York: Macmillan, 1898) where Ignatius speaks of the Eucharist as "the flesh of our saviour Jesus Christ."

2. Cf. the Catechetical Orations of Cyril of Jerusalem 22:3 and On the Mysteries of Ambrose. Ambrose, in referring to all the sacraments, writes that Christ"feeds his Church with these sacraments, by means of which the sustenance of the soul is strengthened" and then follows with a long section discussing the unity of the Church and Christ achieved through the Eucharist. English trans. in the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers , Vol.10 (Grand Rapids:Wm.B.Eerdman's Publishing Company,1955),pp.315-25.

3. This phenomenon receives full treatment in two articles by H. Mursurillo: "Sacramental Symbolism and the Mysterion of the Early Church," Worship 39(1965),265-74; and "History and Symbol: A Study of Form in Early Christian Literature," Theological Studies 18(1957),357-86. Cf. also H. Rahner's Symbole der Kirche (Salzburg: Otto Mueller Verlag,1964).

4. Cf. Serm.272 in Patrologia Latina,[38] 1246-47 and the discussion by Joseph Powers, Eucharistic Theology (New York: Herder and Herder,1967), galley page 4. Powers' excellent book will be published soon. Herder and Herder were kind enough to furnish us a set of galley proofs. There are about 3 regular pages to every galley page.

5. This characterized the older more apologetic approach to TR and even creeps into the otherwise excellent articles in the Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique. Cf. for example, G.Barreill's article: "L'Eucharistie d'apres les Pères," Vol.15, 1, coll. 1121-1183.

6. Powers, op.cit.,p.5.

7. Ibid.,p.7. Cf. also A.J. MacDonald, Berengar and the Reform of the Sacramental Doctrine (New York: Longman's, Green, and Company,1930) and W.H. Beekenkamp, De Avondmaalsleer van Berengarius van Tours (Martinus Nijhoff,1941).

8. Quoted by Powers, op.cit.,p.7. The original latin version can be found in Patrologia Latina 150, 410. A later confession in Rome in 1079 is considerably less bizarre in its realism. Cf. Patrologia Latina 150,411, and Beekenkamp's discussion on pp.30-31.

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9. S. Bonano, The Concept of Substance and the Development of Eucharistic Theology to the Thirteenth Century (Washington: Catholic University Press,1960). Hans Jorissen, Die Entfaltung der Transsubstantionlehre bis zum Beginn der Hochscholastik (Münster:Aschendorff,1965).

10. It should be noted, however, that Aristotle's entrance did not result in his immediate dominance. At first only his logic seems to be of importance. It is only later in the middle of the 13th century that Aristotelian metaphysics really begins to assert itself. Cf. Jorissen,op.cit., pp.113-15.

11. According to Jorissen, there were at this time three competing positions offering philosophical explanations, none of which enjoyed any dominance: "Konsubstantiation, Annihilation/Substitution, and Wesenverwandlung" (p.25). The latter position eventually triumphed and came to be what we would call "transubstantiation" but "in der Auseinandersetzung mit den drei Vergegenwörtigungstheorien begegnet in unseren Texten als Bewersgrund für die Transsubstantiation und gegen die Konsubstantiation insbesondere nirwendwo ein Hinweis auf die lehramtliche Sanktionierung der Transsubstantiaslehre durch das 4. Laterankonzil"(p.62). In otherwords, theologians did not refer to Lateran IV for support of TR.

12. Cf. Jorissen, op.cit.,pp.74-95.

13. Cf. Summa Theologiae 3a, Questions 73-78.

14. Once again we do not mean to imply here that there was a consensus regarding all the details of this conception. There ~~was~~ were,however, a basic terminological agreement and a general acceptance of the substance-accidents categories. Cf. Jorissen, pp.74-95 and the review of Jorissen's book by James McCue in Theological Studies 28(1967), 150-53.

15. Cf. Josef Jungmann, The Mass of the Roman Rite (New York:Benziger, 1951) and Archdale A. King, Eucharistic Reservation in the Western Church (New York: Sheed and Ward,1964).

16. As demonstrated by Henri de Lubac in Corpus Mysticum : L'Eucharistie et l'Église au moyen âge (Paris:1949) where he notes how the term "mystical body" shifted from the Eucharist species to the Church.

17. Throughout this paper we are going to use the terms "sacrament" and "symbol" when applying them to Christian sacraments with some degree of fluidity and interchangeability. By doing so, however, we do not mean to reduce Christian sacraments (i.e. those symbolic actions of the Church called sacraments) to the same level of efficacy

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of just any symbolic- or sign-act. Those symbolic actions called Christian sacraments possess an efficacy and intensity which puts them beyond any human symbolic activity. In this paper, however, we prefer to stress the analogical continuity of human symbolic activity and Christian symbolic activity by using the term "symbol." We are confident that the context of its use will quarantee that it carries the "realistic" and efficacious connotations which we traditionally associate with the term "sacrament."

18. We readily admit that the conception of TR that we have presented here is relatively crude. But that is just the point; this kind of understanding is so easy to fall into when one is forced to fit the ERP into TR. Thus, we really cannot document this crude conception except to say that it is precisely the conception that this writer had come to after a grade-school, high-school, and college education in Catholic schools! We recall with particular vividness that on every Friday of every week of every year of grade school we had to go to Benediction after school: our guess is that there was not one of us who did not see Christ as somehow being in the host in a spatialized sense.

19. The Church Teaches (TCT),719 (St. Louis:B.Herder Book Co.,1955).

20. TCT,728.

21. TCT,728.

22. We have found no evidence to support the claim made by some Catholics(particularly in overly irenic reference to Trent) that there is any basic difference between "species" (or "appearances") and "accidents" in the Scholastic understanding. Cf. A Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy by Bernard Wuellner (Milwaukee:Bruce Publishing Company,1966),p.3,p.288. Certainly the detailed discussion by Jorissen does not support this contention at all — even during the more fluid early Scholastic period: "Sie werden zusammengefasst unter den Begriffen : forma accidentalis, accidentales proprietates, forma panis exterior, species. Das gilt nicht nur für Petrus Cantor, sondern für diese Periode der Frühscholastik." (p.95) We have never seen any evidence that this identification changed before Trent. More on this in CHAPTER III.

23. The Council only expresses a wish (optaret) that this be so. TCT,753.

24. TCT,723 and 733.

25. Cf. Powers, op.cit.,p.12.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER II -- One Last Burst of Thingliness

1. Once again we are speaking out of our own experience before beginning research on this paper — an experience which we are sure we share with 99 44/100% of adult Catholics.

2. Cf. the letters of Newman and Manning quoted in part by William O' Connor in his article,"Transubstantiation and Modern Physics," American Ecclesiastical Review 91(1934),pp.235-50 (cf.248).

3. Ibid.,pp.246-47.

4. Cyril Vollert, "The Eucharist:Controversy on Transubstantiation," Theological Studies 22(1961),391-423.

5. E. Gutwenger, "Substanz und Akzidens in der Eucharistie," Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie, 83(1961),257-306.

6. Vollert, op.cit.,p.415.

7. That is, without understanding the substantiality of bread as not only arising out of its physical unity in se , but out of its unity as it is constituted by man and the consequent relation of nourishment that it has to man. The former cannot be understood without the latter; that is, bread is an"artificial"substance. The implications of this fact will be drawn out in CHAPTER IV.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER III — What does Trent Say?

1. Gutwenger, op.cit.

2. This is a tricky point. The Council of Constance was condemning Wycliff in his own terms — should this be taken to mean that Constance therefore meant to affirm positively the substance-accidents scheme? Difficult as this is to judge, it is obvious that Constance had a basic confidence in this scheme and that Trent reflected this same confidence. But neither Constance nor Trent could have conceived the teaching in any other way but in this scheme. We do not think that Gutwenger has to call on Trent's reference to Constance to prove this point(as his frequent quotes from the proceedings of both Councils attest to). Cf. our later discussion of Schillibeeckx's position.

3. Ibid.,p.276: "Es steht ohne Zweifel fest dass das Trienter Konzil die diesbezüglichen Bestimmungen von Konstanz voll und ganz anerkannte....Im übrigen erkennt das Konzil von Trient die Berechtigung der scholastischen Auffassung von Substanz und Akzidens in Verbindung mit der Eucharistielehre an." The only reason that the term "species" was used was because it was older and felt to be more traditional, but the Fathers of Trent are also explicit in their acceptance of "accidents." See Gutwenger's full discussion with relevant quotes on p.275.

4. On page 258 in n.4, Gutwenger quotes from the Acta genuina ss. oecumenici Concilii Tridentini I (Theiner ed.),p.526: "Bituntinus respondit, synodum velle tantum damnare haereticos, qui asserunt, ut in canoe, non autem scholasticas opiniones definire..."

5. Ibid., p.276: "Nicht aber kann es bedeuten, dass die Eucharistie nicht durch die Kategorien der Substanz und des Akzidens erklärt werden darf."

6. Ibid.,p.276:"Die aristotelisch ausgerichtete Scholastik wird immer mit Recht auf ihre Substanz- und Akzidenslehre zurückgreifen, um die spekulative Bearbeitung der Transubstantiation zu meistern."

7. In fairness to Gutwenger, we note he changed his interpretative position in a recent article: "Das Geheimnis der Gegenwart Christi in der Eucharistie," Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie 88 (1966),185-97. We have concentrated on this earlier article, however, because it is so representative of a typical Catholic approach to Trent which prevailed for centuries.

8. Karl Rahner, "Die Gegenwart Christi im Sakrament des Herrenmahles," in Die Eucharistie im Verständnis der Konfessionen (Recklinghausen,

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1961),pp.330-54. An English translation can be found in Theological Investigations IV (Baltimore:Helicon Press,1966),287-306.

9. Ibid.,p.345: "Die Lehre von der Transubstantiation sagt mir inhaltlich nicht mehr, als mir die Worte Christi sagen, wenn ich sie ernst nehme."

10. Ibid.,p.346: "Tatsächlich geht die weitere theologische Deutung der dogmatischen Transsubstantiationlehre durch die Theologen und die Schulen über den sicher definierten Inhalt des Dogmas hinaus und versucht aus der logischen Erklärung der Worte Christi eine ontische zu machen."

11. Ibid.,p.350: "Die Schulstreitigkeiten zwischen den einzelnen Katholischen Versuchen einer genaueren Aussage und (ontischen) Erklärung des Dogmas bleiben zunächst einmal offen und dunkel."

12. Ibid.,p.350: "Diese Schulstreitigkeiten müssten freilich(und darin felht es weitgehend) vom Schulstaub gereingt werden."

13. E. Schillebeeckx, "Christus' tegenwoordigheid in de Eucharistie," Tijdschrift voor Theologie 5(1965),136-172. Cf. pp.156-57: "Man kan geen enkel mens vragen, dat hij, staande in een bepaald denkkader binnen de algeme evolutie van het menselijke denken, zich juist van zijn eigen denken(vlees en bloed voor hèmzelf!) zou distanciëren en vooruitlopen op de geschiedenis, op ongeveer vijf eeuen in dit geval! De aristotelische leer van substantie en accidenten was, het met onderlinge verschillen, het eigentijdse denken van àl concilievaders."

14. Ibid.,p.157.

15. For this reason, to say that Trent never intended to canonize a specific philosophical system is simply irrelevant, because they never intended not to canonize one either: the problem as we formulate it simply would have never occurred to them. Cf. also in this connection, Gutwenger,op.cit.(and notes 3 and 4 above) and Powers' discussion in op.cit.,p.11.

16. Schillebeeckx,op.cit.,p.160.

17. Ibid.,pp.161-66.

18. Cf. for example, E.Gutwenger,"Das Geheimnis der Gegenwart Christi in der Eucharistie,"Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie (ZkTH)88(1966), 185-197; Charles Davis,"The Theology of Transubstantiation," Sophia 3(1964),12-24; Edouard Pousset,"L'Eucharistie:Présence réelle et Transsubstantiation," Recherches de Science Religieuse ,54(1966), 177-221.

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19. Frequently in this paper we will simply say "bread"; but it can be taken to mean both the bread and wine.

20. Schillebeeckx, op.cit.,p.170: "Om deze reden omvat de transsubstantiatie twee dimensies: weliswaar zijnsverandering van het brood en de wijn (waarin immers door de H. Geest de gave van Christus' verheerlijkt, levendmakend lichaam reëel wordt voltrokken), echter binnen de aardse nu (door de zijnsverandering) sacramentele gestalte van brood en wijn... Twee dimensies van een en dezelfde, ongedeelde realiteit. Dat is de kern van het dogma."

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER IV — Bread and Wine as Anthropological Realities

1. St Thomas does not seem to have extricated himself from this difficulty. In Art. 6 of Question 75 in ST 3a, the objector states that the form of bread must be accident because bread is an artificial reality. Thomas's reply is somewhat cryptic and not very satisfactory: "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet arte fieri aliquid cujus forma non est accidens, sed forma substantialis: sicut arte possunt produci ranae et serpentes [cf.Exodus 7]. Talem enim formam non producit ars virtute propria, sed virtute naturalium principiorum. Et hoc modo producit formam substantialem panis, virtute ignis dicoquentis materiam ex farina et aquae confectum."

   By referring to Aaron's power to make serpents with his rod, Thomas does not solve the problem at all:given the fact that Aaron's miracles are historical(which is somewhat doubtful), one still would not call these serpents "artifacts" in the usual sense of the word. Furthermore, frogs and serpents have a substantial unity which can be accounted for by simply regarding these animals in se without continual reference to man. Of course, Thomas is correct in saying that bread-making is an exploitation of the powers of nature, but this does not make bread an individual substance in itself — in itself it still remains an accidental combination of individual physical substances. Whatever unity it possesses can only be grasped by a reference to the relation and meaning this accidental combination has for man. Thomas, in his failure to exploit this dimension of the substantiality of bread (the overall structure of his metaphysics of finality would have certainly allowed him to do so), gave the explanation of TR an ontological starting-point which has plagued Catholic theologizing on the TR right down to the present — at least it seems to be the case as we view the matter.

   Rahner, in reference to this difficulty, writes: "Für sie[the Scholastics] war das Brot(obwohl vom Menschen hergestellt)ohne reflexe Unterscheidung auch ein Naturkörper, wie diese sonst vorkommen und und als eine einzige Substanz interpretiert wurden." Cf. "Über die Dauer der Gegenwart Christi nach dem Kommunionempfang,"Schriften zur Theologie,IV (Einsiedelm:Verlagsanstalt Benziger and Co. AG,1961), p.390.

2. E. Schillebeeckx,"Transubstantiation, Transfinalization, Transfiguration," Worship 40(1966),p.327.

3. Ibid.,p.329.

4. Cf. A.Vanneste,"Bedenkingen tegen de scholastieke transsubstantiatieleer,"Collationes Gandavenes et Brageneses 2(1956),322-335.

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5. F.J.Leenhardt,"This is my Body," in Vol. I of Ecumenical Studies in Worship: entitled Essays on the Lord's Supper (London:Lutterworth Press, 1958),24-85.

6. Ibid.,p.36

7. Ibid.,p.49

8. We borrow this term from Karl Rahner: "Heute sieht man, dass Brot eine typische anthropologische Grösse ist" (cf. op.cit.[n.1 above], p.390).

9. One cannot help but suspect that Catholic theologians had been just waiting around for an excuse to bust out of the Scholastic approach — a way out that they must have been able to forsee — but they needed a catalyst "from the outside" to spur them on to some rather bold,public speculating. Leenhardt(and also Max Thurian) gave them the opportunity. Both Vanneste and Schillebeeckx refer frequently to Leenhardt.

10. Schillebeeckx in Worship, op.cit.,p.329

11. The relevant literature is La Vie Sacramentaire de l'Eglise (Paris, 1959); L'Eucharistie (Tournai:Desclée,1964);"Presence réelle et transubstantiation," Irenikon 32(1959),139-164. In the final section of the Irenikon, he writes that "la finalité du pain et du vin [is oriented] vers l'animal raisonnable et libre"(p.163) but does not use the term "transfinalization" in this connection.

12. B.Welte,"Zum Referat von L. Scheffcyzk," Aktuelle Fragen Zur Eucharistie, ed. Michael Schmaus(München,1960),190-95.

13. Ibid.,p.190: "So ist Speise Speise vom Bezugzusammenhang mit Mahl her."

14. Ibid.,p.191:"Wenn man die Sache ganz prinzipiell betrachtet, dann gehören, glaube ich, der Bezugzusammenhang und damit die Seinsbestimmungen, die aus ihm entspringen, zum anfänglichen und eigentlichen Sein der Sache selbst." It is interesting to note that Welte goes on to say that "Das Seinde ist immer und von Anfang ein Ding für..." He cites St. Thomas who said that the "res nata est animae conjungi et in anima esse"(ST I,78,1) and goes on to say that "die Sache in ihrem Sein, wie sie es aus ihrem Ursprung mit — bringt, kommt erst und nur in der Beziehung — Z.B. des Erkennens — zu sich selbst. Dieses Zu-sich-kommen im menschlichen Verstehen (in der anima) kommt nicht zum 'An-sich' der Sache hinzu, sondern es ist gerade ihr 'An-sich'... Die Beziehung,oder, wenn man will, die Intentionalität ist das Sein des Seieden selbst."

FOOTNOTES -- CHAPTER IV(con't)

15. Ibid.,p.192: "Ob z.B. eine Zeitung als Zeitung oder als Brennmaterial verwendet und also verstanden wird: diese beiden Bezugsweisen und die ihnen entspringenden Seinsbestimmungen sind gleichwertig hinsichtlich dass, was dies Seiende eigentlich ist."

16. Ibid.,p.193:"Nennt man dies Substanz, dann könnte man her von einer Art geschichtliche Transsubstantiation sprechen." Frankly, Welte's example here strikes us as not being too felicitous, for certainly the tourist appeal of a Greek temple is still in its reference back to its ancient relation-connection. A Greek temple which has been turned into a theater would be a better example.

17. Implicitly understood here is the necessity of a formal situation (parade, courthouse, memorial day of some sort) where the national colors would be recognized as such. All instituted relation-connections would require this formalized element, we would suppose, in order to be operative -- we cannot think of any that would not.

18. Ibid.,p.194: "Das Sein dieses Seienden hat sich verändert, nicht weil physikalisch etwas geändert wurde, sondern weil dies Seiende durch massgeblicke Stiftung auf neue Weise in einem verbindlichen Bezugzusammenhang übergeführt wurde."

19. Pousset,op.cit.,p.200:"Le principe actif n'est pas entité physico-chemique, ni une idée génerale de nourriture; c'est l'unité même d'une telle idée et d'une telle entité physico-chemique."

20. B.Welte,op.cit.,p.194: "Der göttlich gestiftet Bezugzusammenhang ist als göttliche schlechthin verbindlich und seinsbestimmend für die Glaubenden."

21. Gutwenger, in ZKTH 88(1966),op.cit.,p.197: "Das konsekrierte Brot ist die sakramentale Erscheinungsform Christi, weshalb es durchaus angebracht ist, Symbol und Wirklichkeit, sakramentale Erscheinungsform und Christus als Einheit zu sehen, und das konsekriete Brot als Christus anzusprechen."

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER V — Towards a General Theological Notion of Symbol

1. Karl Rahner,"Zur Theologie des Symbols,"Cor Jesu I, ed. A. Bea, H. Rahner, H.Rondet, F.Schwendiman (Rome,1959),463-505. This essay was written in order to provide a rationale for the Devotion to the Sacred Heart (Cor Jesu was compiled in response to Pius XII's encyclical:Haurietis Aquas). It is divided into three sections: (1)Towards an Ontology of Symbolic Reality in general; (2)Towards a Theology of Symbolic Reality; (3)The Body as the Symbol of Man.

   Just recently, an English translation of this essay appeared in Theological Investigations IV (Baltimore:Helicon Press,1966),pp. 221-252. The translation is by Kevin Smyth and it is only fair(but he certainly had a thankless job — to render Rahner into good and clear English is all but impossible). At times, we have made use of some of Smyth's more felicitous expressions.

2. Ibid.,p.467: "Der erste Satz, den wir als Grundprinzip einer Ontolgie des Symbols aufstellen, lautet: das Seiende ist von sich selbst her notwendig symbolisch, weil es sich notwendig 'ausdrückt', um sein eigenes Wesen zu finden."

3. Ibid.,p.468:"Ein Seiendes (d.h. jedes) in dieser Pluralität wesentlich Ausdruck eines anderen in dieser pluralen Einheit ist oder sein kann."

4. Ibid.,p.469:"Wir wissen vielmehr aus dem Geheimnis der Trinität... dass is in der höchsten Einfachheit Gottes doch eine wahre und reale (wenn auch'nur' relative) Unterschiedenheit der 'Personen' gibt und somit, wenigstens in diesem Sinn, eine Pluralität."

5. Rahner is undoubtedly referring here to the "Trinitarian structure" that creation should have through exemplary causality (particularly in view of the fact that creation is"in Christ"). In a footnote, Rahner mentions the work of C.Kaliba, Die Welt als Gleichnis des dreieinigen Gottes:Entwurf zu einer trinitarischen Ontologie (Salzburg,1952). Kaliba's work, Rahner feels, arouses misgivings,but at least he has been willing to tackle a theme which is unduly neglected in present-day theology and philosophy. We could say the same thing about the provocative book by Dorothy Sayers, The Mind of the Maker (London:Methuen and Co. LtD.,1941).

6. Ibid.,p.470: "Diese pluralen Momente aber, in der Einheit eines Seienden die wegen der Einheit des Seienden eine innere Übereinkunft unter sich haben müssen(so sehr diese Pluralität der Momente des Seienden gerade durch die Verschiedenheit dieser Momente unter sich konstituiert sein muss), können aber diese Übereinkunft nicht haben als gewissermassen einfach nebeneinanderliegende Momente, die gleichursprunglich da sind."

FOOTNOTES — CHAPTER V(con't)

7. Ibid.,p.470: "Das Eine sich entfaltet, das Plurale also aus einem ursprünglichst 'Einen' in einem Entsprungs- und Abfolgeverhältnis herkommt, die ursprünglichste Einheit, die auch die das Plurale einende Einheit bildet, sich selbst behaltend in eine Vielheit sich entlässt und 'ent-schliesst', um dadurch gerade sich selbst zu finden."

8. Ibid.,p.470:"Es gibt also eine Unterschiedenheit, die an sich eine 'perfectio pura' ist, und ide schon im ersten Ansatz eines theologischen Seinsverständnisses mitgedacht werden muss."

9. Ibid.,p.470: "Jedes Seiende bildet (natürlich je in seiner Weise, also vollkommener oder unvollkommener, dem Grad seiner Seinsmächtigkeit entsprechend) 'zu' seiner eigenen Vollendung das von ihm Unterschiedene und doch mit ihm Eine (wobei die Einheit und Verschiedenheit korrelate, im selben Masse wachsende, nicht sich gegenseitig bis zur widersprüchlichen Ausschliesslichkeit herabmindernde Grössen sind)."

10. Ibid.,p.472.

11. Ibid.,p.472: Here Rahner uses the term "Beisichsein" or literally "being-with-itself." It is very difficult term to render into English. Roughly, it means self-possession, self-awareness, self-reflective, etc. It is a term common to the neo-scholasticism of Coreth, Lotz, and Rahner. A general principle of their philosophy is that inasmuch as, to the extent that , an existent has being, to that extent ~~and to that extent~~,and to that extent alone (leaving the essence out of consideration) it is self-reflective, it is "bei-sich", because being in its pure state is of its very nature spirit and self-awareness. Since the essence is left out of consideration, Rahner is is not saying that every existent is a spirit. Kenneth Baker, in his A Synopsis of the Transcendental Philosophy of Emerich Coreth and Karl Rahner (Spokane:Gonzaga University,1965),p.70,n.1, writes that this "approach to being...is at work either explicitly or implicitly in everything he has written [referring to Rahner] in the fields of philosophy and theology." Baker's work, even though almost too terse and compact, is a good introduction to the concepts of "Beisichsein," "Selbtsvollzug," and other related notions which are indispensable to a deeper understanding of this essay on symbol. Cf. also,of course, Karl Rahner, Hörer des Wortes (München:Kösel-Pustet,1963) and Geist in Welt:Zur Metaphysik der endlichen Erkenntnis bei Thomas von Aquin (München:Kösel,1957); Emerich Coreth, Metaphysik:Eine Methodisch-Systematische Grundlegung (Innsbruck: Tyrolia,1961).

12. Ibid.,p.472: This Thomistic principle dominates Geist in Welt.

FOOTNOTES — CHAPTER V (con't)

13. Ibid.,p.472:"Da der Vollzug in Pluralität hinein und das Beisichselbersein nicht einfach disparat in einem Seienden nebeneinander liegende Grössen sein können, wenn anders das (wissende un liebende) Beisichsein nicht irgendeine, sondern die Inhaltlichkeit dessen ist, was wir mit Sein (und somit mit dessen Selbstvollzug) bezeichnen."

14. Ibid.,p.474: "Es ist erkennbar und erkannt, insofern es selbst ontisch(an sich), weil ontologisch (für sich), ist symbolisch."

15. Ibid.,p.477: "Diese Quantität (heute würden wir das Gemeinte abgesetzte konkrete Raumzeitlichkeit oder raumzeitliche Gestalt nennen) mit ihren bestimmten qualitativen (aber auf dieser Raumzeitlichkeit basierenden) weiteren Bestimmungen ist nun aber nach Thomas eindeutig aufzufassen als die 'species', die Gestalthaftigkeit, der Anblick, den der substantielle Grund sich erwirkt, um sich selbst zu vollziehen, sich so 'auszudrücken' und anzuzeigen."

16. Ibid.,p.477:"Die Bildung des Symbols als eines Selbstvollzugs des Symbolisierten selbst, die innere Zugehörigkeit des Symbols zum Ausgedrückten selbst, die Selbstverwirklichung durch die Bildung dieses wesensentspr ingenden Ausdrucks."

17. Ibid.,p.478: "Das eigentliche Symbol (Realsymbol) ist der zur Wesenskonstitution gehörende Selbstvollzug eines Seienden im anderen."

18. Ibid.,p.499:"Ist aber streng genommen der Mensch in einer eindeutig thomistischen Auffassug nicht aus einer Seele und einem Leib zusammengsetzt, sondern aus einer Seele und der materia prima, die aufzufassen ist als das von sich her gänzlich potentielle Substrat des substantiellen Selbstvollzugs der 'anima'... die ihre Wirklichkeit der passiven Möglichkeit der materia prima (sich selbst so mitteilend gibt), so dass, was in dieser Potentialität an Akt (und Wirklichkeit) ist, eben die Seele ist... dass das, was Wir Leib nennen, nichts anderes ist als die Aktualität der Seele selbst im 'Anderen' der materia prima, die selbstgewirkte Andersheit der Seele selbst, also ihr Ausdruck und ihr Symbol."

19. Ibid.,pp.478-79.

20. Ibid.,p.480.

21. Ibid.,p.480: "Das aber heisst:der Logos ist das 'Symbol'des Vaters, und zwar in eben dem Simm, den wir dem Wort gegeben haben: das innere and doch vom Symbolisierten verschiedene, von diesem selbst gesetzte Symbol, in dem der Symbolisierte sich selbst ausdrückt und sich so selbst hat."

22. Ibid.,p.481.Cf. in this connection two articles of Rahner in Theological Investigations IV: "Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise 'De Trinitate'","77-104; "Questions of Controversial Theology on Justification,"189-220(specifically the section:'Creation in Christ'.)

FOOTNOTES — CHAPTER V (con't)

23. Ibid.,p.481.

24. Ibid.,p.481: "Der menschgewordene Logos ist das absolute Symbol Gottes in der Welt, das unüberbietbar mit dem Symbolisierten erfüllt ist, also nicht nur die Anwesenheit und Offenbarung dessen in der Welt, was Gott in sich selbst ist, sondern auch das ausdrückende Da-sein dessen, was (oder besser:wer) Gott in freier Gnade der Welt gegenüber sein wollte, und zwar so, dass diese Haltung Gottes, weil so ausgedrückt, nicht mehr zurückgenommen werden konnte, sondern die endgültige und unüberbietbar ist und bleibt."

26. Ibid.,p.482: "Dann eignet dieser Menschheit dem Logos gegenüber zwar die Funktion eines Signals, einer Livree, aber nicht in voller Wahrheit die Funktion jenes Symbols, dessen Sinn wir bisher entwickelt haben. Der Logos würde sich verlautbaren, vernehmen lassen durch eine an sich ihm fremde, von aussen zufällig angenommene, in ihrer inneren Wesenheit nichts mit ihm zu tun habende Wirklichkeit."

25. In this section, Rahner repeats almost verbatim what he had written in another article: "Zur Theologie der Menschwerdung," Catholica 12(1958),1-16.

27. Ibid,p.490: "Aus dem Gesagten ergibt sich, dass der Logos als Sohn des Vaters in seiner Menschheit als solcher in aller Wahrheit das offenbarende, weil das Geoffenbarte selbst gegenwärtig setzende Symbol ist, in dem der Vater sich in diesem Sohn selbst der Welt sagt."

28. Ibid.,p.491: "Wenn wir sagen, dass die Kirche das Gegenwärtigbleiben des menschgewordenen Wortes in Raum und Zeit ist, dann sagen wir damit auch sofort, dass sie diese Symbolfunction des Logos in der Welt fortsetzt."

29. Ibid.,p.491: "Dort, wo eine Wirklichkeit, die im Symbol kundgetan werden soll, selbst eine total menschliche also auch eine gesellschaftliche und existentielle (freiheitliche) Seite hat."

30. Ibid.,p.492, n.17.

31. Ibid.,p.492: "Die Kirche ist... nicht nur eine gesellschaftliche und rechtliche verfasste Grösse, sondern zu ihrem Wesen gehört die Heilsgnade, der Heilige Geist selbst. Damit ist aber gegeben, dass dieses Symbol der Gnade Gottes wirklich enthält, was es anzeigt, dass es das Ursakrament der Gnade Gottes ist, das nicht nur bezeichnet, sondern auch besitzt, was durch Christus endgültig in die Welt gebracht worden ist."

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32. Cf. also Rahner, The Church and the Sacraments (New York: Herder and Herder, 1963), pp.34-40. For a good summary and criticism of Rahner's position, see W. Van Roo, "Karl Rahner's Kirche und Sakramente," Gregorianum (1963), 465-500.

33. Rahner, op.cit., p.494: "Die Gnade Gottes setzt sich in den Sakramenten wirksam gegenwärtig, indem sie ihren Ausdruck, ihre raumzeitlich geschichtliche Greifbarkeit, eben ihr Symbol schafft."

34. Ibid., p.496: "Der Begriff des Symbols (in der schon definierten Bedeutung: 1. und 2.) ist in allen theologischen Traktaten ein wesentlicher Schlüsselbegriff, ohne den ein richtiges Verständnis der Tematik der einzelnen Traktate in sich und im Verhältnis zu den anderen Traktaten nicht möglich ist."

35. Ibid., p.497: "Das Heilstun Gottes am Menschen vom Anfang seiner Grundlegung bis zu seiner Vollendung geschieht immer so, dass Gott selbst die Wirklichkeit des Heils so ist, dass sie gegeben und vom Menschen ergriffen wird im Symbol, das jene Wirklichkeit nicht als abwesende (und nur versprochene) vertritt, sondern diese Wirklichkeit durch das von ihr gebildete Symbol selbst (exhibitiv) anwesend sein lässt."

36. Ibid., p.497.

37. Ibid., p.478.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER VI — Human Symbolic Activity and Material Reality

1. Rahner, op.cit., p.501: "In einer geheimnisvollen Verschränkung hinsichtlich der Symbolfunktion des Leibes jeder Teil nochmals die Symbolkraft und -funktion des Ganzen in sich trägt, indem er seinen Teil zum Ganzen des Symbols beiträgt."

2. Ibid., pp.501-02.

3. Cf. Rahner's discussion of the marital "Jawort" Ibid., p.492, n.17. See also a later footnote (p.497, n.26) where he discusses man's acceptance of God's salvific action and writes that "die Annahme von Seiten des freien Geistes des Menschen ist ein ganzmenschlicher, also auch leiblicher und somit immer auch im Symbol sich wollziehender Akt." From the content of these footnotes, we deduce that Rahner would say that there is an intrinsic link between the symbolic intensity of a part of the body and the power of self-expression possessed by this part. He never comes out and explicitly states this in the body of his essay because in this essay he is concentrating on the symbolic power of a part of the human body qua part — for as the reader will recall, this essay has its primary raison d'être in Rahner's attempt to demonstrate that the heart of man is a real-symbol (the physiological heart).

4. P. Schoonenberg, "Presence and the Eucharistic Presence," Cross Currents, Winter (1967), p.48.

5. Powers, Eucharistic Theology, p.26. Powers draws from the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty: The Phenomenology of Perception (New York and London, 1962), pp.67-179. Cf. also Mary Rose Barral, Merleau-Ponty: The Role of the Body-Subject in Interpersonal Relations (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965); R.C. Kwant, The Phenomenological Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965). Merleau-Ponty appears to be the most influential figure in the contemporary Catholic theological effort to apply an anthropology of symbol to sacramental theology.

6. Schoonenberg was one of the sources for the now famous Time article (July 2, 1965, pp.68,70) which vaulted the Dutch discussions on the ERP and TR into international attention. In a recent article, "The Real Presence in Contemporary Discussion," Theology Digest, 15 (1967), p.6, Schoonenberg writes that "in 1965, Time sent its council reporter to Holland to interview Smits, Schillebeeckx, and me. The final report of these discussions was unfortunately constructed on the opposition between sign and reality, an opposition we intended to overcome." Schillebeeckx in his Worship article, op.cit., p.333, calls the Time article "completely inadequate."

FOOTNOTES -- CHAPTER VI (con't)

7. Again we refer the reader to the articles of Schoonenberg, op. cit. Powers, op.cit., p.47 has an excellent bibliography of the Dutch discussion which includes several of Schoonenberg's important articles(none of which were able to be procured by this writer).

8. Schoonenberg, Cross Currents, pp.41-2. Cf. also the excellent discussions of personal and spatial presence by E.Gutwenger, "Das Geheimnis der Gegenwart Christi in der Eucharistie," ZKTH, 88 (1966), 185-197, and Edouard Pousset, "L'Eucharistie: Présence réelle et Transsubstantiation," Recherches de Science Religieuse 54(1966), 177-221.

9. Ibid., p.42.

10. Ibid., p.44.

11. Ibid., p.48.

12. Ibid., p.50.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., p.47.

16. Rahner, op.cit., p.496: "Was von der Symbolfunktion des menschgewordenen Logos als Logos und als Mensch gesagt wurde, gilt auch für das vollendete Dasein des Menschen, für seine Eschata. Auch eine Eschatologie enthält eine Lehre vom Realsymbol, das uns die Unmittelbarkeit Gottes in der Vollendung vermittelt: das Wort, der Fleisch geworden ist." Cf. also K.Rahner, "Die ewige Bedeutung der Menschheit Christi für unser Gottesverhältnis," Schriften zur Theologie III (Einsiedeln, 1957).

15. Ibid., p.50.

17. Thomas Aquinas in Questiones Disputatae (Romae: Marietti LtD., 1953): "Hoc autem sic ab intellectur conceptum dicitur 'verbum interius' hoc enim est quod significatur per vocem." See "De Potentia Dei," Question 9, Article 5, Resp., p.236.

18. Ibid., Article 9: "Verbum vero per forma cuiuslibet creaturae: nam in his quae ab intelligento aguntur, forma effectus a conceptione intelligentis derivatur" (p.249).

19. We use the phrase "creative word" analogically. Man's word is not creative ex nihilo as is the word of God. Man is limited by the particular limitations of the matter that he is shaping.

FOOTNOTES — CHAPTER VI (con't)

20. Powers, op.cit., p.26.

21. Ibid., p.26.

22. In this section of the paper, we are taking some of the insights of Rahner's, "Wort und Eucharistie," Aktuelle Fragen zur Eucharistie ed. Michael Schmaus (München, 1960), 7-52, and simply transposing them into anthropological categories(keeping in mind, of course, the difference between the word of man and the word of God — cf. note 19 above). For example, on p. 25 Rahner writes: "Wenn wir in den Sakramenten zwischen Wort und Element, oder hylemorphistisch zwischen Form und Materie zu unterscheiden pflegen, dann darf diese in sich sinnvolle Unterscheidung nicht verdunkeln, dass beide Elemente, also das Wort und der sakramentale Gestus, an dem einen Zeichencharakter des Sakramentes und somit am Wortcharakter partizipieren. Auch der sakramentale Gestus hat Wortcharakter. Er bezeichnet etwas, er sagt etwas aus, er macht etwas offenbar, was an sich verborgen ist. Mit einem Wort: auch er ist ein Wort... Es ist also von da aus schon durchaus unbedenklich und sachlich absolut berechtigt, das ganze Sakrament unter den Begriff des wirksamen Wortes zu subsumieren." An English trans. of this remarkable article can be found in Theological Investigations IV, pp.253-286.

23. L. Von Hout, "Fragen zur Eucharistielehre in den Niederlanden," Catholica 20(1966), 179-199. We highly recommend this article as an extremely lucid discussion of the debate on the ERP among the Dutch theologians. Von Hout covers all the major figures and gives an excellent bibliography.

24. Dupont, along with Schoonenberg, Schillebeeckx, Smits, et.al. has been one of the more active participants in the Dutch discussion. Cf. von Hout, p.195f.

25. We did not discuss the symbolic activity of groups, but whatever we said of individual persons can be applied to groups; for inasmuch as the group speaks with a unity of intention, it speaks its "word" as "one body."

26. Von Hout, op.cit., p.195f.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER VII -- Symbol and the Eucharist Real Presence

1. This needs some qualification. For our actions in union with Christ can be real-symbols which carry salvific, or better,"sacramental" meaning and power. For since the existential order within which all men live has never been anything other than a supernatural or Christic order, we would conclude that every human act of genuinely personal self-communication carries salvific power and meaning; for if human personhood in this supernatural order is fully realized and specified in the human personhood of Christ, then any human real-symbolic action which renders the person present to another is Christic. However, the fact remains that apart from one's union with Christ one would never be able to give this salvific and sacramental meaning to his symbolic actions.

2. There are many titles which describe the salvific activity of Christ -- Savoiur, Redeemer, Satisfier, Messiah,etc.-- but certainly one of the most accurate and inclusive is that of "High Priest." Scheeben's discussion of the priestly function of Christ in The Mysteries of Christianity (St. Louis:B.Herder Book Co.,1946), Chapter XVI is remarkably good. A recent explanation of priesthood which has served as an indispensable guide to our presentation in this Chapter is that of Bernard Cooke, Christian Sacraments and Christian Personality (New York:Holt,Rinehart, and Winston,1965): cf. particularly Chapter VII,"Christian Priesthood."

3. Recent literature dealing with the soteriological significance of the resurrection is immense. Two important biblical studies are F.X. Durwell, The Resurrection (New York:Sheed and Ward,1960) and David Stanley, Christ's Resurrection in Pauline Soteriology Vol.13 of Analecta Biblica (Rome:Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1961.

4. Whether or not it was a paschal meal is a mater of discussion among New Testament scholars, but that it was meant to have the meaning of Jewish Passover is os clear in the Synoptics that it has never been questioned. Cf. Bernard Cooke,"Synoptic Presentation of the Eucharist as Covenant Sacrifice,"Theological Studies 21(1960), 1-44; Joseph Powers,op.cit.and his article,"Mysterium Fidei and the Theology of the Eucharist," Worship 40(1966),pp.26-8.

5. Of course it is obvious that the actions of the Last Supper and Calvary viewed chronologically and in their sheer physicality are distinct -- but this does not prevent them from being one action. These"two"actions are one because they both carry the human intent to give himself to the Father and to all men. For example, the one action of fixing a meal is composed of a number(perhaps hundreds) of smaller, distinct "actions" (boiling the water,stirring the

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ingredients, setting the table,etc.) which are one because they all embody the intention "to fix a meal." In the same way Christ's human intent to give himself to men unites the distinct "actions" of the Last Supper and Calvary.into one action.

6. An excellent discussion of the Eucharistic action as it symbolically expresses the continuing human sacrificial intent of the risen Christ can be found in B.J.Cooke, Christian Sacraments and Christian Personality, pp.125-138. Cf. also his "The Sacraments as the Continuing Acts of Christ," Readings in Sacramental Theology, ed.C.Stephen Sullivan (Englewood Cliffs,New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,Inc.,1964),31-52.

7. Schoonenberg,op.cit.,p.50.

8. As we mentioned in n.1 above, all men who genuinely communicate themselves personally,function as real-symbols of Christ and thus speak for him. In doing so we must certainly say that they act as Christ's body — but only in a very inchaotive sense. Not until they become Christians and receive the power of Christian priesthood can they speak words which are formal and unambiguous real-symbols of the redeeming presence of Christ. Only in the exercise of Christian priesthood (as it is climaxed in speaking the word of the Eucharist) does one definitively act as the body of Christ. Thus, it is Christian priesthood which constitutes the Church as the real-symbol of the bodily Christ.

9. Rahner,"Wort und Eucharistie,"p.46:"Wenn aber so, selbst unter den absoluten Selbstvollzügen der Kirche,Sakramente genannt, die Eucharistie nicht nur der höchste Fall, sondern der eigentliche Ursprung aller anderen Sakramente ist,die hinwiederum doch so sehr die Wesensaktualisation der Kirche sind, dass alle anderen Worte und Taten der Kirche eine wesentliche Dienstfunktion diesen Wesensvollzügen der Kirche gegenüber haben und nur von da her wirklich berechtigt und verständlich sind, dann kann gesagt werden, dass die Eucharistie das alle anderen Worte der Kirche begründende und tragende, Sinnmitte aller kirchlichen Wirklichkeit bildende Wort Gottes in der Kirche schlichthin ist."

10. Thus, the frequent disparity between sacrifice and sacrament is unfortunate, for it is precisely in uniting ourselves sacramentally to Christ in the eating and drinking of his body and blood that we unite ourselves to his action of sacrifice.

11. We do not question the orthodxy of host adoration -- as long as it is understood that Christ is present to the host as offered.

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However, it is so easy to forget that this presence is a presence as offered when it is separated from the action of offering (i.e. the Eucharistic celebration) that it would be well if this kind of Eucharistic piety quietly fade away (which it slowly is).

12. Of course, the "word" Christ speaks to the Church in the Eucharist he speaks through the agency of the Church. This speaking of the "word" the Church can do because she is united to Christ by faith: she believes in the "word" Christ speaks through her. Therefore, the "word" of the Eucharist that the Church speaks is not only the "word" of Christ but also is the "word" of the Church's faith. Thus, when the Church does the Eucharist she is making an act of faith in what she is doing.

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