Organised Crime & Crime Prevention - what works? - Scandinavian ...
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<strong>Organised</strong> <strong>Crime</strong> &<br />
<strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> - <strong>what</strong> <strong>works</strong>?<br />
Rapport fra NSfK:s 40. forskerseminar<br />
Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Nordisk Samarbejdsråd<br />
for Kriminologi<br />
<strong>Scandinavian</strong> Research<br />
Council for Criminology
Nordisk Samarbejdsråd for Kriminologi<br />
<strong>Scandinavian</strong> Research Council for Criminology<br />
http://www.ibt.ku.dk/NSfK<br />
Retsvidenskabeligt Institut D, Københavns Universitet<br />
Sankt Peders Stræde 19, DK-1453 København K<br />
Formand: Sekretariatsleder:<br />
Flemming Balvig<br />
flemming.balvig@jur.ku.dk nina.krarup@jur.ku.dk<br />
Tel: +45-35 32 33 25 Tel: +45-35 32 33 32<br />
Fax: +45-35 32 33 34 Fax: +45-35 32 33 34<br />
Sekretærer:<br />
Rikke Gut Jesper Stecher<br />
rikke.gut@jur.ku.dk jesper.stecher@jur.ku.dk<br />
Tel: +45-35 32 33 44 Tel: +45-35 32 33 44<br />
Fax: +45-35 32 33 34 Fax: +45-35 32 33 34<br />
Kontaktsekretærer<br />
Finland: Danmark:<br />
Aarne Kinnunen Anne-Stina Sørensen<br />
Delegationen for brottsförebyggande Retsvidenskabeligt Institut D<br />
P.O. Box 1200 Københavns Universitet<br />
FIN-00101 Helsingfors Sankt Peders Stræde 19<br />
Tel: +358-9 1825 7863 DK-1453 København K<br />
+358-50 5928 703 Tel: +45-35 32 33 44<br />
Fax: +358-9 1825 7518 Fax: +45-35 32 33 34<br />
aarne.kinnunen@om.vn.fi anne-stina.sorensen@jur.ku.dk<br />
Grønland: Island:<br />
Elisæus Kreutzmann Karl Steinar Valsson<br />
Kriminalforsorgen i Grønland Löfreglan i Reykjavik<br />
Box 139 Hverfisgötu 115<br />
DK-3900 Godthåb IS-150 Reykjavik<br />
Tel: +299-24 988 Tel: +354-569 90 80<br />
Fax: +299-24 979 Fax: +354-569 90 99<br />
karlsteinar@police.is<br />
Norge: Sverige:<br />
Evy Frantzsen Helena du Rées Nordenstad<br />
Institutt for kriminologi Kriminologiska institutionen<br />
Universitetet i Oslo Stockholms Universitet<br />
P.B. 6872, St. Olavs plass, S-106 96 Stockholm<br />
N-0130 Oslo Tel: +46-8 674 70 55<br />
Tel: +47-22 85 01 19 Fax: +46-8 15 78 81<br />
Fax: +47-22 85 02 52 helena.durees@crim.su.se<br />
evy.frantzsen@jus.uio.no
Rådsmedlemmer:<br />
Flemming Balvig, Danmark (formand) Anette Storgaard, Danmark<br />
flemming.balvig@jur.ku.dk as@jura.au.dk<br />
Retsvidenskabeligt Institut D Afdeling for proces- og kriminalvidenskab, Juridisk Institut<br />
Københavns Universitet Aarhus Universitet<br />
Sankt Peders Stræde 19 Bartholins Allé 34, Bygning 340<br />
DK-1453 København K DK-8000 Århus C<br />
Tlf.: +45-35 32 33 25 Tlf.: +45-89 42 13 59<br />
Fax: +45-35 32 33 34 Fax: +45-86 19 44 63<br />
Britta Kyvsgaard, Danmark Kauko Aromaa, Finland<br />
bky@jm.dk kauko.aromaa@om.vn.fi.<br />
Justitsministeriet, Adm. Afd. Rättspolitiska forskningsinstitutet<br />
Slotsholmsgade 10 PB 1200<br />
DK-1216 København K FIN-00101 Helsingfors<br />
Tlf.: +45-33 95 41 84 Tlf.: +358-9 1825 7850<br />
Fax: +45-33 93 35 10 Fax: +358-9 1825 7865<br />
Raimo Lahti, Finland Jukka Lindstedt, Finland<br />
raimo.lahti@helsinki.fi jukka.lindstedt@om.vn.fi<br />
Juridiska fakulteten Justitieministeriet, lagberedningsavdelningen<br />
Helsingfors Universitet Södra Esplanaden 10<br />
PB 4 PB 1<br />
FIN-00014 FIN-00131 Helsingfors<br />
Tlf.: +358-9 1912 2448 Tlf.: +358-9 1825 7725<br />
Fax: +358-9 1912 3090 Fax: +358-9 1825 7737<br />
Erlendur S. Baldursson, Island Ragnheidur Bragadóttir, Island<br />
erlendur.baldursson@skima.is rb@rhi.hi.is<br />
Fangelsismálastofnun Háskóli Islands<br />
Borgartdni 7 Lagadeild, Lögberg<br />
IS-105 Reykjavík v/Sudurgata<br />
Tlf.: +354-520 5009 IS-150 Reykjavik<br />
Fax: +354-520 5019 Tlf.: +354-525 43 86<br />
Fax: +354-525 43 88<br />
Ragnheidur Hardardóttir, Island Sturla Falck, Norge<br />
ragnheidur.hardardottir@isgatt.is sturla.falck@isaf.no<br />
Rigsadvokaten Norsk institutt for forskning om oppvekst, velferd og aldring (NOVA)<br />
c/o Ragnheidur Hardardóttir Munthesgt. 29<br />
Hverfisgata 4-6 N-0260 Oslo<br />
IS-150 Reykjavik Tlf.: +47-22 54 13 13<br />
Tlf: +354-530 1600 Fax: +47-22 54 12 01<br />
Fax: + 354- 530 1606<br />
Hedda Giertsen, Norge Ellinor Houm, Norge<br />
hedda.giertsen@jus.uio.no Ila landsfengsel<br />
Institutt for kriminologi PB 1, Røa<br />
Universitetet i Oslo N-0701 Oslo<br />
PB 6872, St. Olavs Plass Tlf.: +47-67 16 11 93<br />
N-0130 Oslo Fax: +47-67 14 98 40<br />
Tlf.: +47-22 85 01 44<br />
Fax: +47-22 85 02 52<br />
Jerzy Sarnecki, Sverige Marie Torstensson, Sverige<br />
jerzy.sarnecki@crim.su.se marie.torstensson@phs.pi.se<br />
Kriminologiska Institutionen Polishögskolan, Forskningsenheten<br />
Stockholms Universitet Sörentorp<br />
S-106 96 Stockholm S-171 92 Solna<br />
Tlf.: +46-8 16 21 02 Tlf.: +46-8 401 67 46<br />
Fax: +46-8 15 78 81 Fax: +46-8 655 44 20<br />
Annika Brickman, Sverige<br />
annika.brickman@justice.ministry.se<br />
Justitiedepartementet<br />
Rosenbad 4<br />
S - 103 33 Stockholm<br />
Tlf.: +46-8 405 46 30
Fax: +46-8 405 48 95
ISBN 87-987103-0-3
Forord<br />
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Da Nordisk Samarbejdsråd for Kriminologi den 21.-24. maj afholdt dette års forskerseminar<br />
på Hotel Matinlahti i Espoo, Finland, havde nordiske kriminologer for 40. gang anledning til<br />
at præsentere deres forskning og diskutere forskellige kriminologiske temaer.<br />
Omkring 60 nordiske kriminologer mødtes med inviterede gæster fra de baltiske lande,<br />
Rusland, England og USA under hovedtemaerne "<strong>Organised</strong> <strong>Crime</strong>" og "<strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> -<br />
<strong>what</strong> <strong>works</strong>?". Aktuel og igangværende forskning fra de nordiske lande blev derudover<br />
præsenteret under temaerne: "<strong>Crime</strong> Trends", "Økonomisk kriminalitet", "Alternativ til<br />
straffsystem", "Straffsystem", "Fängelseforskning" og "<strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong>".<br />
Denne rapport består af arbejdspapirer, der blev præsenteret på seminaret. Seminarets<br />
internationale skær afspejler sig i en god del engelsksprogede papirer.<br />
Papirerne er samlet i den rækkefølge, de blev præsenteret på seminaret, sådan som det<br />
fremgår af programmet, der er optrykt først i rapporten. Oplæg fra Lawrence W. Sherman<br />
(USA) er bilagt bagest i rapporten i form af artiklen "Preventing <strong>Crime</strong>: What Works, What<br />
Doesn't, What's Promising", Research in Brief, National Institute of Justice, July 1998, som<br />
NSfK har fået tilladelse til at trykke i rapporten. Artiklen er, såvel som hele den<br />
bagvedliggende forskningsrapport, tilgængelig på internettet på adressen<br />
http://www.preventingcrime.org.<br />
Årets forskerseminar var rigt på gode oplevelser. Det gælder for det første gode faglige<br />
oplevelser. En væsentlig del af de faglige oplevelser videregiver NSfK til rapportens læsere.<br />
Men en anden væsentlig faglig del af seminaret udkommer ikke i skriftlig form. Det gælder de<br />
vigtige spørgsmål, der blev rejst og diskuteret i tilknytning til de enkelte foredrag.<br />
For det andet var seminaret rigt på oplevelser, der finder sted i et samspil med faglige og<br />
sociale elementer. Det gælder de nye personlige og faglige kontakter, der knyttes imellem<br />
forskere på tværs af de nordiske kriminologiske miljøer, samt de etablerede kontakter, der<br />
holdes vedlige. En særlig mulighed for at knytte kontakt til fjernere kriminologiske miljøer<br />
bød sig i år. Den mulighed greb mange.<br />
Forskerseminaret blev i 1998 arrangeret af de finske rådsmedlemmer og kontaktsekretær i<br />
samarbejde med rådsmedlemmer og kontaktsekretærer fra de øvrige nordiske lande samt med<br />
NSfK's danske sekretariat.<br />
Tak for en stor indsats til alle foredragsholdere og bidragsydere. Tak til de finske arrangører<br />
og til sekretariatets medhjælpere!<br />
København, november 1998<br />
Nina Löwe Krarup,<br />
Sekretariatsleder for Nordisk Samarbejdsråd for Kriminologi<br />
1
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
NSfK•s 40. forskerseminar 1998<br />
21. - 24. maj 1998 på Matinlahti konferencecenter, Espoo, Finland<br />
Torsdag 21. maj <strong>Organised</strong> <strong>Crime</strong> - Plenum<br />
Ordstyrer: Kauko Aromaa<br />
Side 5 Michael Levi (U.K.): Analysing '<strong>Organised</strong> <strong>Crime</strong>' and State<br />
Responses: Some Reflections on Murky Waters<br />
Side 20 Joi Bay (DK): Definition of <strong>Organised</strong> <strong>Crime</strong> in the European Union -<br />
A Criminological Perspective<br />
Side 35 Johan Bäckman (FIN): The inflation of crime in Russia<br />
Side 46 Anna Markina (EST): On Profiling <strong>Organised</strong> <strong>Crime</strong> in Estonia<br />
Fredag 22. maj Aktuel forskning<br />
Session I <strong>Crime</strong> Trends<br />
Ordstyrer: Britta Kyvsgaard<br />
Side 54 Maya Rusakova (RUS): <strong>Organised</strong> <strong>Crime</strong> and the Narcotics Business<br />
in<br />
St. Petersburg<br />
Side 57 Andri Ahven (EST): <strong>Crime</strong> Trends in Estonia<br />
Side 61 Ârija Lodzina (LAT): <strong>Crime</strong> Trends in Latvia<br />
Side 68 Genovaitë Babachinaitë (LIT): Comparative Survey of Criminality in<br />
Lithuania<br />
Session II Økonomisk kriminalitet<br />
Ordstyrer: Jan Georg Christophersen<br />
Side 77 Nicolay B. Johansen (N): Konflikter i næringslivet<br />
Side 85 Paul Larsson (N): Kontroll av økonomisk kriminalitet innen det<br />
internasjonale verdipapirmarkedet<br />
Side 90 Anne Alvesalo (FIN): “They are not honest criminals”<br />
Session III <strong>Crime</strong> Trends (continues)<br />
Ordstyrer: Britta Kyvsgaard<br />
Side 99 Erik Terp (GR): Den seneste kriminalitetsudvikling i Grønland<br />
Side 106 Hedda Giertsen (N): <strong>Crime</strong> trends and trends in the criminal policy in<br />
Norway<br />
Jan Andersson (S): <strong>Crime</strong> Trends in Sweden1<br />
Side 114 Kauko Aromaa (FIN): <strong>Crime</strong> Trends in Finland in the 1990´s<br />
Session IV Alternativ til straffsystem<br />
Ordstyrer: Erlendur Baldursson<br />
Side 117 Lise-Lotte Rytterbro (S): En studie av brott som blivit föremål för<br />
medling och vilka organisationer som interesserat sig för medling i<br />
Sverige<br />
Side 125 Jukka-Pekka Takala (FIN): Mediation and moral emotions II:<br />
observing<br />
mediation sessions<br />
Side 130 Erlendur Baldursson (IS) og Jón Friðrik Sigurðsson (IS): Alcohol and<br />
1 NSfK har ikke modtaget en skriftlig version af oplægget fra oplægsholderen.<br />
2
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Drug Abuse Treatment and Recidivism.<br />
Lørdag 23. maj Aktuel forskning<br />
Session V Diverse<br />
Ordstyrer: Marie Torstensson<br />
Side 139 Timo Korander (FIN): Speculations on the Finnish Police Murders<br />
Side 144 Nina Jon (N): Biseksuelle menn og hiv-forebygging<br />
Side 149 Elisabeth Næss (N): Vold er ære, kriminalitet er penger<br />
Session VI Straffsystem<br />
Ordstyrer: Joi Bay<br />
Side 153 Malcolm Davies (UK): Comparative sentencing project - Using focus<br />
group methodology<br />
Side 157 Timo Ahonen (FIN) og Tarja Kauppila (FIN): Tracing the basis of<br />
“constructive punishment”- Some answers to some unanswerable<br />
questions?<br />
Side 170 Gorm Gabrielsen (DK): The increasing number of forensic psychiatric<br />
patients in Denmark, 1980-96. Causes and perspectives<br />
Session VII <strong>Crime</strong> prevention<br />
Ordstyrer: Aarne Kinnunen<br />
Side 180 Mårten Landahl (S): <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> and Criminological Theory<br />
Side 197 Íris Böðvarsdóttir (IS) og Anna Kristín Newton (IS): Research Results<br />
of Sexual and Violent Offenders in Iceland<br />
Session VIII Fängelseforskning<br />
Ordstyrer: Anette Storgaard<br />
Marie Indahl (N): Bruk av varetekt i Norge, Sverige og Danmark<br />
19962<br />
Side 204 Ilppo Alatalo (FIN): Våld och hot om väld mot fängelsepersonalen -<br />
situationelt perspektiv<br />
Side 208 Ragnhild Sollund (N): Voldsdømte flyktninger<br />
<strong>Crime</strong> prevention - Plenum<br />
Ordstyrer: Per-Ole Träskman<br />
Lawrence W. Sherman (USA): Preventing <strong>Crime</strong> - <strong>what</strong> <strong>works</strong>?3<br />
Side 213 Karsten Ive (DK): <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> in Denmark<br />
Jan Andersson (S): <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> in Sweden4<br />
Side 217 Hannu Takala (FIN): <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> in Finland<br />
Side 221 Jan Georg Christophersen (N): Aktuelle kriminalitetsforebyggende<br />
tiltak i Norge<br />
Side 228 Karl Steinar Valsson (IS): <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> in Iceland<br />
Side 229 Bodil Karlshøj (GR) og Elisæus Kreutzmann (GR): "Grønlandskort<br />
med angivelse af byer og bygder" og "Kriminalpræventivt arbejde i<br />
2 Dette foredrag var programsat af NSfK uden forudgående tilsagn fra oplægsholderen. Det er derfor i fuld<br />
overensstemmelse med NSfK, at en skriftlig version af dette oplæg ikke foreligger.<br />
3 Oplæg fra Lawrence W. Sherman (USA) er bilagt bagest i rapporten i form af artiklen "Preventing <strong>Crime</strong>:<br />
What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising", Research in Brief, National Institute of Justice, July 1998, som<br />
NSfK har fået tilladelse til at trykke i rapporten. Artiklen er, såvel som hele den bagvedliggende<br />
forskningsrapport, tilgængelig på internettet på adressen http://www.preventingcrime.org .<br />
4 NSfK har ikke modtaget en skriftlig version af oplægget fra oplægsholderen.<br />
3
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Grønland"<br />
Søndag 24. maj Brottsprevention - Plenum<br />
Ordstyrer: Kauko Aromaa<br />
Side 232 Ingrid Sahlin (S): Inverterad prevention<br />
Side 251 Nils Christie (N): Forebyggelse<br />
Side 261 Deltagerliste<br />
Bilag Sherman, Lawrence W. et al.: "Preventing <strong>Crime</strong>: What Works, What<br />
Doesn't, What's Promising". In: Research in Brief, National Institute of<br />
Justice, July 1998.<br />
4
Michael Levi, Professor of Criminology<br />
University of Wales, Cardiff<br />
50 Park Place, CF1 3AT, Wales, UK<br />
e-mail: Levi@cardiff.ac.uk<br />
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Analysing ‘<strong>Organised</strong> <strong>Crime</strong>’ and State Responses:<br />
Some Reflections on Murky Waters<br />
The author is grateful to the <strong>Scandinavian</strong> Research Council for Criminology for the grant<br />
that made attendance at the Criminology conference possible.<br />
General Introduction<br />
It has become commonplace to observe that the term ‘organised crime’ is frequently used but<br />
difficult to define, shifting as it does between discourses about activities – as in the term<br />
‘crime’ – and discourses about evil associations, as refracted through the common usage of<br />
the term ‘Mafia’, which has long since lost its purely Italian origin and can be prefixed by a<br />
nationality such as Russian, Colombian, or Chechen. (Interestingly, the Chinese are typically<br />
described as ‘Triads’ and the Japanese as ‘Yakuza’, demonstrating the equal symbolic<br />
efficacy but cultural differentness from Europe and America.) <strong>Organised</strong> crime is generally<br />
applied to describe a group of people who act together on a long-term basis to commit crimes<br />
for gain though, as A.K. Cohen (1977) observed, it is important to separate out the distinction<br />
between structures of association and structures of activity. Maltz (1976) gave readers a list<br />
of ‘organised crime’ distinguishing features, including four essential characteristics:<br />
violence, corruption, continuity, and variety in types of crime engaged in. As observed by<br />
Alice in Wonderland, ‘I can make things mean <strong>what</strong>ever I want them to mean: the questions<br />
is who’s master – that’s all’, this list is tenable, it has the disadvantage that intelligent people<br />
who reduce police interest in them by not using violence and who specialise in one form of<br />
crime thereby cannot be termed ‘organised criminals’. It might make sense to distinguish<br />
professional criminals from organised ones, but the above seems to be a rather strange result,<br />
and one that is re-inforced by the binary nature of the ‘organised’/‘not organised’ dichotomy.<br />
For there may be nothing at all disorganised about professional criminals: they may find it<br />
simply convenient to side-step the moral panic surrounding organised crime, as well as the<br />
predatory and often ill-disciplined attentions of psychopathic gangsters.<br />
The notion of organised crime as a continuing criminal enterprise is embodied in the<br />
popularly accepted (in Europe) definition employed by the German Federal police, the<br />
BundesKriminalAmt:<br />
<strong>Organised</strong> crime is the planned violation of the law for profit or to acquire power,<br />
which offences are each, or together, of a major significance, and are carried out by<br />
more than two participants who co-operate within a division of labour for a long or<br />
undetermined time span using<br />
a. commercial or commercial-like structures, or<br />
b. violence or other means of intimidation, or<br />
c. influence on politics, media, public administration, justice and the legitimate<br />
economy.<br />
5
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
This BKA definition provides a baseline to determine whether a criminal group ranks as<br />
‘organised crime’, but ‘major importance’ is undefined, perhaps on the assumption that, to<br />
quote one senior British officer’s analogy with organised crime, ‘if it quacks like a duck,<br />
walks like a duck and shits like a duck, it probably is a duck’: an approach to definition that<br />
satisfied the British Parliamentary Home Affairs Committee (1995). ‘<strong>Organised</strong> crime’ can<br />
mean anything from the Camorra to three very menacing burglars and a window cleaning<br />
business who differentiate by having one as look-out, another as burglar and a third as<br />
money-launderer, and who sue every newspaper who suggests that their business is<br />
disreputable!<br />
The term ‘organised crime’ has an emotional kick which makes it easier to get resources and<br />
powers in circumstances that are quite vague in their ambit, and sociologists of crime control<br />
ought to study this labelling process in its own right. Despite the European Convention on<br />
Human Rights and variations in constitutional and data protections, there is a move<br />
throughout Europe to enhance police powers, to improve liaison between and within national<br />
police forces, and to harmonise and review the implementation of money-laundering<br />
legislation as measures against ‘it’. Even British politicians, who historically have rejected<br />
the continental model of centralised forces – anything that Napoleon in particular or the<br />
French in general liked is ipso facto undesirable! – were more than willing to set up the<br />
National Criminal Intelligence Service and, in 1998, the National <strong>Crime</strong> Squad, described by<br />
the media (but denied by the Home Secretary) as being a ‘British FBI’. These are assisted by<br />
the Security Services (MI5) and the Secret Intelligence Services (MI6), which seek a ‘social<br />
defence’ role after the collapse of the Soviet Union: the latter was publicly praised by the UK<br />
Foreign Secretary in April 1998 for its contribution to the fight against organised crime<br />
(though, not surprisingly, no details were released). There may be those who see this as a<br />
sinister conspiracy by those wishing to establish a ‘police State’, but one should note that the<br />
developments of centralised police units are resented and resisted by most regional Chief<br />
Constables, who are concerned lest this expansion be at the expense of their own budgets and<br />
prestige.<br />
In the wider European arena, there has been a flurry of activity in the European Union and the<br />
Council of Europe, accelerating since the 1996 EU Dublin Summit (itself stimulated by the<br />
Irish government’s response to the high-profile contract killing of crime journalist Veronica<br />
Guerin): high level multi-disciplinary groups have sought areas of co-operation, implemented<br />
a High-Level Action Plan and finally got Europol off the ground by 1999. The EU and the<br />
Council of Europe are training EU applicant countries and others in anti-laundering<br />
implementation: EU legislation concerned with organised crime and some machinery for<br />
putting it into effect is required to be in place before accession to the EU. EU-wide measures<br />
to criminalise membership of criminal organisations – influenced by the Italian legislation but<br />
harder to apply in less regimented settings – and tough action against criminal offshore<br />
finance centres are under contemplation in 1998.<br />
It is not only the EU and Council of Europe that have been active in outreach programmes.<br />
The model mechanism for anti-laundering policies remains the Financial Action Task Force<br />
(started only in 1989 by the G-7 – now G-8, including Russia - élite industrial countries), with<br />
its system of ‘peer review’ by other countries – a concern with implementation as well as the<br />
passing of legislation which was novel at the beginning of the 1990s. The UN has also<br />
become involved increasingly in this arena, especially in the drugs issue but later on all-crime<br />
anti-laundering measures, as the boundaries between proceeds of different types of crime<br />
become increasingly blurred. The arrival in the top UN Drug Control and <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong><br />
6
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
post of Pino Arlacchi, a sociologist-turned-politician Mafia expert, placed organised crime at<br />
the top of the 1998 UN criminological agenda, with a rapidly devised draft UN Convention<br />
on the subject. This great political confluence has led to international pressure to harmonise<br />
the fight against organised crime, even if people do not always have a clear understanding of<br />
<strong>what</strong> ‘it’ is.<br />
However, the nature of ‘organised crime’ remains deeply contested terrain, at least in<br />
academic circles and in those countries who are more worried about loss of independence and<br />
civil liberties than they are about subservience to organised crime. The role of intelligence<br />
agencies - regarding which the CIA is the best documented - in covert military operations<br />
overseas, especially in support of anti-Communist military regimes or guerrilla movements,<br />
makes ‘State-<strong>Organised</strong> <strong>Crime</strong>’ often a more appropriate term1.<br />
By contrast, the term ‘organised crime’ tends to focus us downwards towards the threat posed<br />
by some (usually alien) group of low-lifes, and one can see this in the work of the journalist<br />
Claire Sterling (1991, 1994), who appeared merely to reflect the ideological perspectives of<br />
US enforcement agencies. However, a note of caution. To explain the bureaucratic and<br />
ideological functions of the term ‘organised crime’ does not by itself demonstrate that the<br />
term is inappropriate, nor does it tell us anything about whether or not there are any long-term<br />
groups of criminals who commit serious offences or even begin to constitute the State. The<br />
epistemological difficulties are <strong>what</strong> sort of evidence one uses to account for the structuring<br />
of criminal behaviour; the range of criminal behaviours that come under the umbrella of any<br />
group of criminals; how far up the political chain one reaches in one’s delineation of who<br />
are organised criminals (in Colombia and Mexico, for example); and how valid is the<br />
‘evidence’ upon which one relies2.<br />
The nature of organised crime and ‘its’ markets<br />
It must first be re-emphasised that our construction of how crimes are organised depends on<br />
our knowledge, and <strong>what</strong> counts as ‘knowledge’ rather than ideological ‘spin’ is at some<br />
times less problematic than at others. Take, for example, the following situation (see, further,<br />
Levi, 1998), which was discovered by accident rather than as a result of conscious police<br />
targeting. In the early 1990s, the team of Chinese who were gaily distributing their counterfeit<br />
Gold Cards on a train in the South of England were very distressed when they were spotted by<br />
an off-duty policewoman who happened to be walking past them. Had they not been<br />
detected, they probably would have committed hundreds of thousands of pounds worth of<br />
fraud, and only in retrospect – if at all - would the credit card companies have dealt with it as<br />
organised crime. Even then, the police – and researchers who were dependent on the police –<br />
might never have had the case referred to them or might never have investigated it because<br />
they were too busy (Levi and Pithouse, forthcoming).<br />
In North-western Europe, organised crime as a criminal economy is essentially a cross-border<br />
crime-trade (van Duyne, 1993, 1996). Despite the impact of modern horticulture on growing<br />
cannabis in the inclement weather of the UK, or of synthesising drugs – making importation<br />
from outside Europe or even the UK unnecessary - some element of cross-border trade is<br />
1In mid-1998, the trial of senior politicians from the Gonzalez government and senior Civil Guard officials into<br />
atrocities committed as part of the ‘war’ against the Basque ETA will reveal extensive money-laundering in<br />
support of the assassinations of those believed to be ETA supporters. This meets all of the BKA definition of<br />
organised crime, though its adherents doubtless thought that they were doing it for the legitimate State.<br />
2Without descending too far into post-modernism, it is obvious that <strong>what</strong> counts as evidence depends partly on<br />
<strong>what</strong> one wishes to believe.<br />
7
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inevitable, even if it is only the importation of seeds and precursor chemicals and, perhaps, as<br />
a stage in the laundering of proceeds of crime.<br />
The Italian (or rather, American-Italian) model has embedded itself in popular culture,<br />
mediated through Hollywood. Yet rather than being line-managerial, along the Cressey<br />
(1969)/Godfather model, most social scientists regard organised crime as less total in its<br />
ambit and as a manifestation of more general patron/client relationships. Thus, because of<br />
their reputation for violence and discipline, Mafiosi and other ‘gangsters’ play a key role in<br />
criminal dispute-settlement in the US and Italy. Indeed, Reuter (1983 and subsequently) has<br />
suggested that the principal function of the Mafia is in contract enforcement, and that one<br />
should separate out the people and groups involved in the commission of crime from those<br />
involved in dispute settlement (for which role high information is required). Similarly<br />
Gambetta (1994), in his book on the Sicilian Mafia, has suggested that the role of Mafia<br />
comes into play because of the absence of trust in underworld relationships (though the<br />
absence of trust does not by itself produces ‘Mafias’, for example in Russia).<br />
Nowadays, there is hardly an Italian name in the FBI ‘most wanted’ list of targets. Cuban<br />
refugees, Colombians and, increasingly, Mexicans have come to dominate the distribution of<br />
narcotics in the Southern states, and other ethnic groups - Puerto-Rican, Japanese, and<br />
Chinese (particularly Fukinese) - as well as white motor-cycle gangs, also are involved in<br />
organised crime in the US. In the future, such groups will make less use than previously of<br />
Italian/American Mafia dispute resolution services. Street-level criminals are normally<br />
independent of major crime syndicates. As Block and Chambliss (1981) suggest, rather than<br />
being viewed as an alien group of outsiders coming in and perverting society, organised crime<br />
in America is best viewed as a set of shifting coalitions between groups of gangsters,<br />
businesspeople, politicians, and union leaders, normally local or regional in scope. Many of<br />
these people have legitimate jobs and sources of income. Similar observations would apply in<br />
some Third World countries such as Mexico (Geopolitical Drug Dispatch, 1998), where a<br />
small élite dominate the economy and political system and share favours out among<br />
themselves. Similarly, the privatisation of the economy has extended their opportunities in<br />
many former Communist countries, as well as providing easy avenues for money-laundering<br />
where the authorities are not too inquisitive about the source of the funds.<br />
Among advanced industrial nations, the closest similarities to this ‘political coalition’<br />
organisational model occur in Australia, where extensive narcotics, cargo theft, and labour<br />
racketeering rings have been discovered, and in Japan, where gangs such as Yakuza specialise<br />
in vice and extortion, including extortion by fear of embarrassment on the part of large<br />
corporations at their Annual General Meetings. Both of these illustrations, however, also<br />
suggest that the coalition – in which campaign funds also play an important role – is not<br />
entirely by consent: businesspeople would rather not pay the blackmail if they felt they had<br />
any realistic alternative. In Britain, by contrast, organised crime groups have not developed<br />
in this way, partly because of a more conservative social and political system, but principally<br />
because the supply and consumption of alcohol, the opiates, gambling, and prostitution<br />
remain legal but partly regulated. This reduces the profitability of supplying them criminally.<br />
A host of ethnic groups are important in the supply of drugs to and via Britain. But except<br />
for narcotics importers and wholesalers, cargo thieves who work at airports, and local vice,<br />
protection, and pornography syndicates, British organised criminals tend to be relatively<br />
short-term groups drawn together for specific projects such as fraud and armed robbery, from<br />
a pool of long-term professional criminals on a within-force or regional basis (see McIntosh,<br />
1975 and Mack and Kerner, 1975, for some early discussions along these lines).<br />
8
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Instead of such uncreative comparisons with the US, it may be better to look at organised<br />
crime in Europe from its own set of economic and social landscapes in which organised crime<br />
trade takes place. As van Duyne (1996) observes, Europe has a large diversity of economies,<br />
extensive economic regulations, many loosely controlled borders to cross, and relatively small<br />
jurisdictions. This means that the largest illegal profits for European crime-entrepreneurs are<br />
to be gained in the drug market and in the area of organised business crime. If the normal<br />
(licit) business nucleus in Southern Italy, Turkey or Pakistan is the (extended) family (Ianni<br />
and Reuss-Ianni, 1972), in Northern Europe such socio-economic family units are much rarer<br />
and social bonds more restricted, for example to people bound by loyalties of place, though<br />
the very fracturing of the social fabric that has led to so much concern about social exclusion<br />
also paradoxically may inhibit criminal solidarity. The exceptions are the crime-enterprises<br />
of minorities in Europe whose businesses are family matters, which should not be equated<br />
with impersonal ‘syndicates’ (Ianni, 1974).<br />
No profits can be made if potential customers are not aware of the existence of the unlawful<br />
service, and this generally means that in the long run, the police will come to know about it<br />
too. To ensure freedom from the law, the criminals must therefore subvert the police and/or<br />
the courts, and this is a major reason for concern about the impact of organised crime.<br />
(Though in reality, it is a side-effect of the prohibition of goods and services in popular<br />
demand.) In the Italian case - though it is always difficult to know who controls whom - there<br />
are grounds for supposing that the State itself has in some sense been in league with organised<br />
crime groups: as the trial of former Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti for Mafia offences, the<br />
jailing (in absentia) of former PM Bettino Craxi for similar offences, and the conviction in<br />
1998 of recent PM Silvio Berlusconi for tax evasion and bribery might suggest. But arguably,<br />
<strong>what</strong>ever the patron-client relationships and the peculiar Italian ‘professional politicians’ that<br />
permeate Italian society (della Porta and Pizzorno, 1996), few of these things could be done<br />
without the active complicity of US foreign policy, which consistently has been more<br />
concerned about defeating communism than about organised crime. It seems entirely<br />
plausible that without the collapse of Communism, the US would have continued to support<br />
the traditional Christian Democrat/Mafia coalition in Italy, and the tangentopoli scandal<br />
might never have developed in the way that it did (see Nelken, 1996 and della Porta and<br />
Pizzorno, 1996).<br />
<strong>Organised</strong> crime in Britain<br />
Perceptive crime correspondent for The Guardian newspaper Duncan Campbell (1990, p.1)<br />
starts one of his books on the changing face of professional crime by pointing to the shift in<br />
25 years of two of the Great Train Robbers "from teams of organised criminals in overalls<br />
grabbing large bundles of Bank of England notes to quiet, besuited drug-dealers selling white<br />
powders from Latin America" . However, in principle, this could just as easily be a function<br />
of their age: they were simply too old to go around threatening people with shotguns.<br />
According to Campbell, the age of the gangster/family firm was replaced by the age of the<br />
robber, as cash in transit became the strange object of desire, and, allegedly with some<br />
assistance from the Metropolitan Police, robbers were relatively free from arrest. However,<br />
the advent of informants – in the UK, ‘supergrasses’, in Italy, pentiti - and reduction in<br />
corruption ended this in the early 1970s. As the Age of the Robber ended, the Age of the<br />
Dealer began. Yet though there is much in this as a general trend, we should not be seduced<br />
by this periodisation. There were twice as many robberies in the mid-1990s as in the mid-<br />
1980s, and considerably more than during the Age of the Robber. Although one might expect<br />
that the Age of the Fraudster represents the apotheosis of British organised crime,<br />
9
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representing high profits and relatively low police interest and sentences, there appear to be<br />
cultural and skill barriers to entry into many areas of fraud, which have stopped this<br />
transformation. Several armed robbers turned to long-firm (bankruptcy) frauds, credit card<br />
fraud, social security fraud, and even to fraud against the European Union - either alongside<br />
or subsequent to drug dealing - but this move into the moderately upmarket areas of fraud has<br />
hardly dented those other types of crime.<br />
The haphazard development of criminological research on serious offenders for gain in<br />
different parts of Europe means that our understanding of the way in which criminals organise<br />
themselves is very patchy. There is always a tendency to counterpoint North European forms<br />
of criminal organisation against the ‘crime corporation’-like structures supposedly existing in<br />
North America and Southern Italy. British and German work from the 1970s was obsessed by<br />
distancing North European crime from American organised crime (Mack and Kerner, 1975),<br />
implying that if crime is not syndicated (and supported by widespread police corruption), it<br />
cannot be ‘organised’. McIntosh (1975) more usefully distinguishes methods of organising<br />
crime in terms of the technological and policing barriers the particular crime confronts:<br />
where prevention precautions are high, organisation shifts from routinised craft groups -<br />
pickpockets, and even safecrackers - to looser, perhaps even one-off, alliances between<br />
project criminals. But this does not tell us about the conditions under which these modes will<br />
change or be prevented.<br />
My interview-based study of bankruptcy fraudsters found substantial variations in the<br />
organisation of that form of crime during the 1960s and 1970s, but since the sixteenth<br />
century, fraudsters in particular have found cross-border crime attractive because it creates<br />
problems of legal jurisdiction, investigative cost, and practical interest by police, prosecutors,<br />
and even creditors themselves (Levi, 1981). European Union harmonisation does not itself<br />
make any difference to this, except (1) in providing new pretexts or ‘storylines’ for fraudsters<br />
to use to get credit or investment, and (2) inasmuch as it changes the structures of control, e.g.<br />
reducing customs paperwork makes VAT evasion easier, or the UK’s ratification of the<br />
European Convention on Mutual Assistance makes co-operation and conviction easier (see<br />
Passas and Nelken, 1993).<br />
The lack of a research base on patterns of criminal relationships in most European countries -<br />
including, regrettably, the UK - means that we have little information about how domestic<br />
criminals meet and decide <strong>what</strong> to do, let alone how and to <strong>what</strong> effect/lack of effect Eurocriminals<br />
meet. Major offenders do not advertise their services in the media, and apart from<br />
common holidays in Spain, marinas, and casinos, such contacts - mediated no doubt by<br />
language difficulties which British criminals may experience in more acute form than most -<br />
may often be tentative, hedged around with the problem of negotiating trust in an ambience in<br />
which betrayal (perhaps by an undercover agent, especially an American or British one) can<br />
have very serious consequence not just for freedom but for retention of proceeds of crime.<br />
Most plausible is the notion that Euro-criminals are either crime entrepreneurs who already<br />
exploit international trade for the purposes of fraud and/or smuggling, or money-launderers<br />
who put their clients in touch with each other. Beyond that, in the area of serious crime for<br />
gain, there is only speculation or the ‘annual reports’ compiled for the EU and the Council of<br />
Europe, largely on the basis of official police and intelligence sources. More recently,<br />
Ruggiero (1996) has argued that both corporate and organised crime can be understood as<br />
variations on the same theme.<br />
10
The Control of <strong>Organised</strong> <strong>Crime</strong> in the UK<br />
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
There are two dimensions of shifts in approach to the control of organised crime in the UK.<br />
The first is substantive legislation, relating especially to money-laundering and proceeds of<br />
crime legislation (see Gold and Levi, 1994; Levi and Osofsky, 1995). Essentially, the<br />
unpopularity of bankers and of drugs traffickers has enabled the State to regulate certain areas<br />
of activity that otherwise might have been very difficult, and in this sense, the demonology of<br />
‘organised crime’ has been very ‘useful’. The second includes (i) the more commonly<br />
understood area of ‘policing powers’, including the powers not only of the police but also of<br />
the Security Services and corporate crime investigation bodies such as the Department of<br />
Trade and Industry and the Serious Fraud Office; and (ii) the real resources devoted to<br />
controlling ‘organised crime’. There is no space to discuss these in detail here, but despite<br />
some inhibiting effect from the European Court of Human Rights, the exchange of<br />
intelligence internationally and the depth of proactive surveillance – with the UK at the<br />
permissive extreme and Germany, because of its federal structure and data protection laws, at<br />
the other – have transformed the potential for intelligence-led policing (and disruption) of<br />
organised crime activity.<br />
However, apart from questions of demand for illegal goods and services, one factor acting as<br />
a brake upon this European or Global Panopticon is limited resources. One of the<br />
consequences of the fear of centralised policing in Britain is that, though not quite to the same<br />
degree as in the nineteenth century, reformers have to approach their task with caution,<br />
addressing questions of ideology as well as of technical efficiency. Thus, although there has<br />
been frequent comment by detectives I have interviewed in the Metropolitan and other forces<br />
over the past twenty years to the effect that it is madness not to have a national force<br />
(particularly, as in fraud, when even routine investigations take them all over the country),<br />
this found few overt echoes at senior officer level. With the birth of ‘organised crime’ as a<br />
social problem, the time for such moves seemed propitious, and a crucial propellant was the<br />
report of the Home Affairs Committee (1995) on <strong>Organised</strong> <strong>Crime</strong>3. Cynics may suggest<br />
that the proposers of a national force (and the Security Services, who arguably may need such<br />
an entity with whom to work) have simply invented the problem, but there is a difference<br />
between opportunism and invention. One could characterise much of the debate about how<br />
much organised crime there is ‘in’ the UK - and this is a conceptually important issue, for<br />
‘affecting the UK’ might be a better way of looking at it - as being between ‘believers’ who<br />
see a risk (whether short or long term) and want to prepare our system to meet it and the<br />
‘unbelievers’, who see simply a plot to undermine their local or regional autonomy by a<br />
Southern English clique of the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), City of London<br />
Commissioner and Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioner (Special Operations), plus<br />
the Security Services. Thus, by analogy with the functional effects of Cressey (1969) in the<br />
US, the construction of ‘the nature of the problem’ is crucial to <strong>what</strong> one does about it.<br />
Though contrariwise, as with serial killings and rapes, the mode of organising knowledge has<br />
a key effect on whether one actually picks up patterns that ‘objectively are there’.<br />
The former Home Secretary Michael Howard observed (lunchtime BBC News, 2/7/1996):<br />
3Readers might like to note that unlike the US, for example, British Parliamentary Select Committees have very<br />
little independent research backing, no equivalent of Senate Counsel, and invite evidence, which they can crossexamine<br />
orally if they wish. I and Barrie Irving, the Director of the Police Foundation, were the only academic<br />
researchers who gave evidence to the Committee.<br />
11
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12<br />
‘<strong>Organised</strong> <strong>Crime</strong> is a multi-million pound industry. The new National <strong>Crime</strong> Squad<br />
will be targeting drugs traffickers and other serious professional criminals who<br />
threaten the integrity of our financial system by fraud and money-laundering. We are<br />
not establishing a British equivalent of the FBI. There will be no federal crimes.<br />
Second, no direct recruitment: police officers will continue to be seconded from their<br />
local police forces. All crimes will still be reported locally. Tripartite accountability<br />
arrangements will remain.’<br />
The Liberal Democrats had great reservations about the proposals, and Labour, at least in<br />
opposition, wanted more accountability, while agreeing that everything possible should be<br />
done about the menace of organised crime. The future of organised crime policing depends<br />
partly upon <strong>what</strong> resources the Security Services and the Secret Intelligence Services actually<br />
have available for this task (and how many ‘problems’ are caused in other areas, such as<br />
Northern Ireland); partly on the avoidance of scandals of corruption and improper use of<br />
power; and partly on how far any beefing up of the value of the National Criminal<br />
Intelligence Service (NCIS) can achieve legitimacy in the eyes of operational police officers,<br />
in the internecine quarrels that are as prevalent among anti-organised crime agencies as they<br />
are elsewhere in the criminal justice system and in academia. To this extent, the fears of many<br />
on the liberal left about the totalitarian dangers posed by the <strong>Organised</strong> <strong>Crime</strong>-fighting State<br />
are misconceived. On the other hand, these fights among organised crime-fighters over ‘rep’<br />
and ‘turf’ constitute a cost in terms of effectiveness for those who believe that the real enemy<br />
is the mixed set of crime entrepreneurs who are sometimes collected up under the label of<br />
‘organised crime’.<br />
Judgments about the ‘need’ for centralised police squads are greeted with suspicion as an<br />
attempt to shift resources away from local concerns (and the political expression of those<br />
local concerns) towards the London Metropolitan interests manifested in the Home Office.<br />
Yet one of the beauties of the system of police accountability in Britain is that responsibility<br />
can always be shifted when desired. Let us take as an example the proposal of the Home<br />
Affairs Committee (1995: para 124) that the Home Secretary should use his power to<br />
nominate Key Performance Indicators under the Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 to<br />
prioritise the following up on suspicious transaction reports by bankers (which Gold and Levi,<br />
1994, found to be very modestly undertaken). The response of the government was (Home<br />
Office, 1996, para 25):<br />
The government accepts that difficulties can be caused by delays in the suspicious<br />
financial transaction reporting system. However, we do not consider it appropriate to<br />
use the powers ....The Police and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1994 devolves greater<br />
responsibility to police authorities and chief constables for the control and use of the<br />
resources available, and for determining their local priorities. The Government<br />
considers that the processing of suspicious transactions is a matter for local forces to<br />
manage.<br />
Admittedly, it is difficult to envisage a formula that would permit the logical transformation<br />
of local into national issues, but there are no reasons given here other than that the Home<br />
Secretary did not consider this to be a key area. Yet at the same time, there is pressure from a<br />
London coalition to go for a tougher centralised approach that will be mandated.<br />
The National <strong>Crime</strong> Squad will be paid for by a levy upon existing police authorities, and it<br />
remains to be seen how happy they will feel about being required to give up part of their
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
resource to fund a squad over which they will have no control. What happens, for example, if<br />
the South Wales police consider that a group of travelling criminals is causing them a lot of<br />
problems: the sort of issue currently dealt with by the Regional <strong>Crime</strong> Squad or by the force<br />
itself. Will the new NCS take it on? There is always a problem about differences in seriousness<br />
perspectives between London and the regions (an issue that crops up also in uniform<br />
national prosecution criteria): how will these be played out? This is the sort of issue that is<br />
critical to many local police authority representatives and citizens who are making serious<br />
local demands on the police. But this very parochialism of perspective enables the ‘take<br />
organised crime seriously coalition’ to argue that it is vital for central authority to impose<br />
collective benefits.<br />
The role of the security services in relation to ‘organised crime’<br />
This is not the place for a discussion of the role of the security services in sustaining Pax<br />
Britannica (or, in the case of the CIA, Pax Americana), fruitful though such a review would<br />
be. Suffice it to observe that despite the fact that the collapse of the Soviet Union is unlikely<br />
to bring an end to anti-capitalist terrorism, there is a felt need to find a new role for the sort of<br />
expertise that is unlikely to have a significant niche outside multinational corporations (and<br />
therefore faces a difficult time ‘on the dole’). There is also a common feeling in some<br />
Establishment circles that most police are too parochial and frankly too dull and unsophisticated<br />
to play a major role in dealing with brighter criminals: there is a certain class and<br />
educational barrier between ‘cop culture’ (however changing in the light of teamwork and<br />
proactive policing) and ‘spook culture’. (Although the latter may be more akin to normal<br />
thought processes in government and civil service, the police - possibly responding to social<br />
legitimacy - do appear to have an extraordinary hold on Home Office ministers.)<br />
The Security Service Act 1996 inter alia gave MI5 a potentially important role in the fight<br />
against organised crime (or, in the terms of the Act, ‘serious crime’: an important piece of<br />
terminological slippage). Section 1 refers to the function of the Service to act in support of the<br />
activities of police forces and other law enforcement agencies in the prevention and detection<br />
of serious crime.<br />
In Opposition, the ‘new realist’ Labour Party - keen to be tough on crime as well as the causes<br />
of crime - acquiesced in the role and the greater part of the Bill. However, stimulated by<br />
criticism in the Observer and Guardian newspapers that these important constitutional<br />
changes had been passed with only the most cursory debate in the House of Commons (and<br />
with very modest debate in the House of Lords’ Second Reading), some objection was made<br />
by Labour peers in the Committee Stage in the House of Lords to the breadth of definition of<br />
‘serious crime’ in <strong>what</strong> is now Section 2, in the context of the basis on which warrants to<br />
enter and seize property and interception warrants were to be granted. In sub-section 4,<br />
conduct is serious crime if it constitutes (or, if it took place in the United Kingdom, would<br />
constitute) one or more offences, and either -<br />
(a) it involves the use of violence, results in substantial financial gain or is<br />
conduct by a large number of persons in pursuit of a common purpose; or [my<br />
italics]<br />
(b) the offence or one of the offences is an offence for which a person who has<br />
attained the age of twenty-one and has no previous convictions could be<br />
expected to be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of three years or more.<br />
13
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There was no suggestion in the wording that the violence has to be serious: it could be<br />
common assault. The response of the (then) Minister Baroness Blatch is illuminating<br />
(Hansard, 10 June 1996 HL cols. 1497-1539):<br />
14<br />
<strong>Crime</strong> does not always come in neat packages clearly labelled "serious" or "not<br />
serious". That is particularly true of the kind of work the Security Service will be<br />
doing. With its particular skills and experience, the service will be most effective<br />
gathering intelligence and infiltrating organised crime groups, who may extend<br />
tentacles into a wide range of activities. The very nature of the work means that the<br />
service will not always know <strong>what</strong> it is dealing with, particularly in the exploratory<br />
stages. Inevitably, some leads will be turn out to be blind alleys and criminal<br />
organisations may find novel forms of criminal activity which were on the margins of<br />
a rigidly defined serious crime. There is a need for a degree of flexibility...and<br />
common sense in determining <strong>what</strong> lies within the function, without transgressing on<br />
inappropriate areas of inquiry.<br />
....a rigid definition of serious crime...would hamper the service’s effectiveness and<br />
create endless opportunities for unscrupulous defence lawyers to challenge the<br />
legitimacy of the Security Service’s involvement on technical grounds. It is much<br />
better that the Security Service should initially have a degree of freedom to develop<br />
investigations but, at the point when the service wishes to employ intrusive<br />
investigative techniques...it should be required to demonstrate that it is involved in<br />
combating serious crime as one of the controls over the issue of warrants....<br />
That is not to say that the Security Service will end up dealing with trivial cases.<br />
Indeed, ministers have given repeated assurances that, in practice, the service is to be<br />
tasked with the investigation of organised crime, as it is commonly understood [my<br />
italics]. This means that the service’s principal targets under its new function will be<br />
drug traffickers, money launderers and racketeers.<br />
In other words, trust us! Objections to English legislation are made more difficult by the<br />
practice of amending complex sets of prior legislation, making it hard to formulate changes<br />
clearly in ways that can be followed by others. Nevertheless, as the first female Commander<br />
in the Metropolitan Police, (now) Baroness Hilton, replied:<br />
It is a very slippery slope down the path of non-accountability and potential injustice,<br />
not only to the public and the police but also the security services....This amendment<br />
is an important restraint on <strong>what</strong> could be an extremely dangerous situation and a<br />
constitutional impropriety.<br />
Baroness Blatch sought to reassure by stating that the Security Service will not in any event<br />
act independently of the police. It will be tasked by the police, or the work will be done in<br />
support of the police or the other agencies mentioned in the course of the debates.<br />
She added that this Bill conferred no new powers on the Security Service: merely its use of<br />
existing powers in a new area! This is verbal conjuring of a high order. As Labour peer Lord<br />
McIntosh observed:
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
We want an assurance that when it acts in support of the activities of police forces - in<br />
other words, in dealing with the criminal law in this country - it does not have powers<br />
that the police do not have.<br />
As for co-ordination of the police and the Security Services, the head of the NCIS will<br />
decide <strong>what</strong> should be done about operations where there is a conflict between<br />
keeping informants safe and making arrests.<br />
Further conflict arose on the issue of warrants by the Executive. One of the Law Lords,<br />
Browne-Wilkinson, observed that the Bill proposed a major constitutional shift towards the<br />
Executive in dealing not with espionage but with ordinary police duties ‘to invade the privacy<br />
of the Englishman’s home’. Minister Baroness Blatch responded that the Bill was merely an<br />
extension of existing powers. But as Lord McIntosh noted:<br />
We land up with the worst of all possible worlds on warrants. We land up with an<br />
extension of powers for the Security Service, not because they are new powers but<br />
because they are applied for the first time to the people of this country. We land up<br />
with inconsistent powers as between police and Security Service in pursuit of the same<br />
objective. We have a different trigger for the exercise of these powers...not an<br />
extension of the judicial trigger...but an extension of the trigger of the executive<br />
power.... There is no provision...for adequate accountability and scrutiny....<br />
The predictable response to this was that the Security services have a security tribunal and<br />
commissioner and that warrants ‘will be secured on the basis of meeting the serious crime test<br />
set out in detail in Clause 2’ (which test is very easy to satisfy).<br />
Despite the attempts of authors from Sutherland (1983, originally 1939) to Ruggiero (1996) to<br />
argue that ‘white-collar crime is organised crime’, the UK enforcement agencies have been<br />
far more reluctant than their US counterparts to treat white-collar and organised crime as<br />
related phenomena, to be dealt with by policing methods such as ‘Sting operations’ : this is<br />
due partly to legal but mainly to cultural differences (Levi, 1995). Differences between the<br />
‘performance indicators’ of police and customs, as well as bureaucratic rivalries, inhibit cooperation.<br />
The grafting on - or not - of the security services who are used to disruption and<br />
other extra-criminal justice tactics are likely to prove intriguing: such methods are seldom<br />
susceptible to review by the courts, especially when the suspect party does not know that<br />
there has been some intervention such as loss of potential business contract.<br />
The new financial policing: measures against money-laundering and asset forfeiture<br />
The other major plank of anti-organised crime activity involves greater scrutiny of persons<br />
and – to a lesser extent – transactions entering the global financial system. The regulation of<br />
financial institutions for other than financial prudential purposes embodies an intriguing<br />
political paradox. On the one hand, those interested in the political anatomy of Britain take it<br />
for granted that it is ‘finance capital’ that dominates the political economic landscape. On the<br />
other, we have first, bankers, and then a large range of other financial media in most advanced<br />
and many Third World and former Communist countries being compelled to accept a fairly<br />
open-ended set of commitments to co-operate in an increasingly active process of searching<br />
out and reporting those seeking to launder the suspected proceeds of crime (or to require them<br />
to report large quantities of cash and wire transfers, in those systems such as the USA and<br />
Australia that have routine cash reporting requirements).<br />
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Is this designed to favour the large, established financial institution against the marginal one?<br />
Perhaps, but though the international and local prohibitions against laundering shift from<br />
de-authorisation following the controversial exercise of ‘supervisory discretion’ to criminal<br />
law mandates the entitlement to anathematise and incapacitate the BCCIs of this world, and to<br />
put at risk marginal private banks which encourage a ‘no questions asked’ approach to ‘serve’<br />
well-heeled clients to the advantage of large firms - I do not find it plausible that this is<br />
simply a mainstream hegemony-sustaining exercise. For, one may ask, why did such large<br />
institutions not clamour for anti-laundering legislation to be initiated, and even if these<br />
‘financial sweatshops’ benefited from laundering, did the large institutions themselves not<br />
benefit significantly from a morally neutral (or wilfully blind) attitude to the origins of<br />
money? And does the legislation not require them to spend large amounts of money enforcing<br />
banking systems that they would not do for their own financial benefit? Surely the regulatory<br />
(and lawyer-dominated) bureaucratic empires that have been created as a result were not so<br />
powerful that they could overcome the sales and marketing-oriented dominant groups within<br />
the financial services industry? Why concede at all such a slippery-slope principle as that it is<br />
the business of bankers to look at the moral origins of money, even in the face of a law-andorder<br />
onslaught whose uncontainability itself shows the limitations of an explanatory<br />
approach to social control based around economic interests? These are questions that any<br />
political economy approach to accounting for anti-laundering legislation ought to face.<br />
Some of the findings of Gold and Levi (1994) will doubtless disappoint those ‘law and order<br />
fanatics’ who had hoped that the diminution of banking secrecy would magically unlock the<br />
secrets of ‘organised criminals’, whether these be drugs traffickers, sophisticated fraudsters,<br />
or terrorists. Paradoxically, the same findings might reassure those who feared that such<br />
changes would simply make it easy for the police to catch large numbers of merely petty<br />
offenders: this has not happened either to any significant degree, when compared with street<br />
policing operations and with arrests and compoundings - i.e. financial penalties without<br />
prosecution - by customs officers at sea and airports.<br />
These observations about the modest effect to date on drugs trafficking and other serious<br />
crime arrests of these fast-growing exceptions to the principle of customer confidentiality<br />
should be placed in the context of the difficulties that are experienced by investigators of any<br />
set of major offenders. Given these more general difficulties - in identifying who ‘the<br />
criminals’ are, in keeping surveillance, and in developing & making use of informants - any<br />
‘untainted’ and unself-interested source of information is important, particularly when the<br />
information is ‘proactive’ (i.e. it arrives - at least in principle - before the police have gleaned<br />
the news that a crime has been committed or that the person whose transactions are reported<br />
upon is a suspected offender). Another important dimension is that - given the relative<br />
impermeability of Afro-Caribbean and Asian drug subcultures to undercover surveillance by<br />
almost entirely white police forces - using (except for BCCI and several other Asian-run<br />
banks that have been closed down by the Bank of England, mainly white-employing)<br />
financial institutions as information sources goes some way to breaking through some of the<br />
data-gathering barriers. (Though in the case of Asians - whether Indo-Pak or Chinese- there<br />
are well established underground banking mechanisms that also are relatively immune from<br />
surveillance by the police and, probably just as relevantly, from surveillance by the tax<br />
authorities.)<br />
So how do we theorise these developments in <strong>what</strong> I would like to term ‘the new policing’?<br />
At one level of explanation, we can produce interesting but fairly prosaic analyses of the ways<br />
in which disillusionment with the ability of conventional methods of reactive and patrol<br />
16
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policing to cope with major criminal markets and ‘crime entrepreneurs’ has prompted the<br />
search for more structured and ‘cost-effective’ approaches to policing. The Audit<br />
Commission’s pressure for proactive ‘offender targeting’ has led to ‘intelligence-led policing’<br />
becoming a dominant theme in British policing. In theory, suspicious transaction reporting by<br />
bankers offers the possibility of doing so in a less prejudiced way than by use of police discretion,<br />
via dispassionate computer-modelled neural network analysis. But in practice, we are<br />
down to the same criteria of suspiciousness - of out-of-context behaviour - that the police use,<br />
only operated this time by bankers.<br />
The trend, at least in rhetoric, has been to aim to use financial institutions’ proactive reports<br />
to generate information to<br />
(a) pick out individuals who may be involved in crime who were not previously<br />
suspected. (Of course, these could include political dissidents, but I do not believe<br />
that this is a core objective.)<br />
(b) provide greater substantiation of the activity trail of ‘known offenders’ in ways<br />
that would be too expensive and time consuming to collect via traditional police<br />
means.<br />
But in practice, the police resources devoted to this have been very modest in Britain, even in<br />
Northern Ireland which is the traditional experimenting ground for social control measures: if<br />
one investigator can get through six routine enquiries a day, this makes around 30 a week,<br />
perhaps 1,200 a year (out of national UK total of currently about 17,000 annually), without<br />
doing anything other than check to see if the person is already ‘known to the authorities’. In<br />
the UK, NCIS are completely overwhelmed by this reactive processing, and local forces are<br />
similar - many do not even trawl their local intelligence databases. Elsewhere, the ‘yield’ of<br />
reports is likewise the grounds for concern.<br />
It is important to appreciate that regulatory as well as criminal law mechanisms are used to<br />
control laundering, but there are practical and political/legal problems. What, for example,<br />
does the Bank of England intend to do if a particular bank, building society or - newly<br />
regulated - bureau de change does not report any suspicions one year? In the real world, are<br />
the cops going to show any more interest than in the past in prosecuting bankers and lawyers<br />
who have acted as intermediaries in major trafficking or fraud cases? Monitoring compliance<br />
with anti-laundering procedures provides a constant justification for inspection of Third<br />
World and other governments’ financial systems, but it also does lead to mutual pressure to<br />
raise standards of commercial integrity, at least in relation to wilful blindness in accepting<br />
funds that could only have come from crime.<br />
Concluding remarks<br />
Gradually (and see Sutton, 1998, for a valuable analysis of this in relation to stolen property<br />
markets), criminologists have begun to see ‘the causes of crime’ as including an analysis of<br />
how crime is organised socially and technically. This fuses the neglected traditions of<br />
gang/subculture theory with situational opportunity theory, especially in its improved recent<br />
formulations (Clarke, 1997; Clarke and Homel, 1997) in showing how the forms of crime are<br />
shaped by the motivational and cultural environments in which they occur, which facilitate<br />
and/or inhibit the development of highly organised crime, whether or not accompanied by<br />
offender versatility. To understand how this is possible, we need to examine crime as a<br />
business process, requiring funding, technical skills, distribution mechanisms, and moneyhandling<br />
facilities. The larger the criminal business, the more likely all these elements will be<br />
17
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required, with the special business problem that <strong>what</strong> they are doing is illegal and, if caught<br />
and convicted, they – and their bankers or lawyers - could all go to jail for very long times as<br />
‘organised criminals’. In short, we are not arguing that no-one forms international groupings<br />
that commit very serious social harms: though not all of them are labelled ‘organised<br />
criminals’ (Ruggiero, 1996), there obviously are such groups and net<strong>works</strong>. However, for all<br />
but those who simply want to develop a moral panic to get more powers and resources, <strong>what</strong><br />
is important (for crime control as well as academia) is to appreciate the subtlety, complexity<br />
and depth of field of the organisation of crime.<br />
References<br />
Block, A. and W. Chambliss: Organizing <strong>Crime</strong>. Elsevier, New York 1981.<br />
Campbell, D.: That was Business, This is Personal. Secker and Warburg, London 1990.<br />
Clarke, R.: ‘Introduction’. In: R. Clarke (ed.): Situational <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong>: Successful<br />
Case Studies. Harrow and Heston, New York 1997.<br />
Clarke, R. and Homel, R.: ‘A revised classification of situational crime prevention<br />
techniques’.<br />
In: S. Lab (ed.): <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> at a Cross-roads, Cincinnati: Anderson.<br />
Cressey, D.R.: Theft of the nation; the structure and operations of organised crime in<br />
America. Harper & Row, New York 1969.<br />
Cohen, A.K.: ‘The concept of criminal organisation’. In: British Journal of Criminology,<br />
17-1977, pp. 97-111.<br />
della Porta, D. and Pizzorno, A.: ‘The business politicians: Reflections from a study of<br />
political corruption’. In: Levi, M. and D. Nelken (eds.): ‘The Corruption of Politics<br />
and the Politics of Corruption’: Journal of Law and Society, 23-1996, pp. 73-94.<br />
Dorn, N., K. Murji, and N. South: Traffickers. Routledge, London 1992.<br />
van Duyne , P.: ‘<strong>Organised</strong> <strong>Crime</strong> and Business-<strong>Crime</strong> Enterprises in the Netherlands’. In:<br />
<strong>Crime</strong>, Law and Social Change, 19-1993, pp. 103-142.<br />
van Duyne, P.: ‘The Phantom and Threat of <strong>Organised</strong> <strong>Crime</strong>’. In: <strong>Crime</strong>, Law and Social<br />
Change, 24-1996, pp. 341-377.<br />
Gambetta, D. The Sicilian Mafia, Harvard UP, Cambridge, Mass 1994.<br />
Gold, M. and M. Levi: Money-laundering in the UK: an appraisal of suspicion-based<br />
reporting. The Police Foundation, London 1994.<br />
Home Affairs Committee: <strong>Organised</strong> <strong>Crime</strong>, HMSO, London 1995.<br />
Home Office: Response to the Report of the Home Affairs Select Committee on <strong>Organised</strong><br />
<strong>Crime</strong>, HMSO, London 1996.<br />
Ianni, F.A. and E. Reuss-Ianni: A Family Business; Kinship and social control in organised<br />
crime. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1972,<br />
Ianni, F.A.: ‘Authority, power and respect: the interplay of control systems in an organised<br />
crime "family"’. In: Rottenberg, S. (ed.): The economics of crime and punishment.<br />
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington D.C. 1974.<br />
Levi, M.: The Phantom Capitalists: the Organisation and Control of Long-Firm Fraud,<br />
Gower, Aldershot 1981.<br />
Levi, M.: ‘Covert policing and the investigation of 'organized fraud': the English experience<br />
in international context’. In: C. Fijnaut and G. Marx (eds.), Police Surveillance in<br />
Comparative Perspective. Kluwer, The Hague 1995.<br />
Levi, M.: ‘Organising plastic fraud: enterprise criminals and the side-stepping of fraud<br />
prevention’. In: M. Levi (ed.) Special Issue of the Howard 37-4-1998, pp.423-438.<br />
Journal of Criminal Justice, November 1997.<br />
Levi, M. and Osofsky, L.: Investigating, seizing and confiscating the proceeds of crime,<br />
Police Research Group Paper 61. Home Office, London 1995.<br />
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Levi, M. and Pithouse, A. (forthcoming): White-Collar <strong>Crime</strong> and its Victims: the Media and<br />
Social Construction of Business Fraud. Clarendon Press, Oxford.<br />
McIntosh, M.: The Organisation of <strong>Crime</strong>. Macmillan, London 1975<br />
Mack, J. and H. Kerner: The <strong>Crime</strong> Industry. Saxon House, Lexington 1975.<br />
Maltz, M.: ‘On Defining <strong>Organised</strong> <strong>Crime</strong>: The Development of a Definition and a<br />
Typology’. In: <strong>Crime</strong> and Delinquency, 22-1976, pp. 338-346.<br />
Nelken, D. : ‘The judges and political corruption in Italy’. In: Levi, M. and D.Nelken (eds.),<br />
‘The Corruption of Politics and the Politics of Corruption’: Special Issue of Journal<br />
of Law and Society, 23-1996, pp. 95-112.<br />
Passas, N. and D. Nelken: ‘The thin line between legitimate and criminal enterprises: subsidy<br />
frauds in the European Community’. In: <strong>Crime</strong>, Law and Social Change, 3-1993, pp.<br />
223-244.<br />
Reuter, P.: Disorganized crime: Illegal markets and the Mafia. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.<br />
1983.<br />
Ruggiero, V.: <strong>Organised</strong> and Corporate <strong>Crime</strong> in Europe. Dartmouth, Aldershot 1996.<br />
Sterling, C.: The Mafia. Grafton, London 1991.<br />
Sterling, C.: <strong>Crime</strong> without Frontiers. Warner, London 1994.<br />
Sutton, M.: Handling Stolen Goods and Theft: a Market Reduction Approach, Home Office<br />
Research Study 178. Home Office, London 1998.<br />
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Joi Bay, Research Fellow<br />
Institute of Legal Science, D, University of Copenhagen<br />
Sankt Peders Stræde 19, DK-1453 København K<br />
e-mail: joi.bay@jur.ku.dk<br />
20<br />
Definitions of Organized <strong>Crime</strong> in the European Union<br />
A Criminological Perspective<br />
The Harmonization of Concepts<br />
Throughout the 1990’s organized crime has been a strong motivation for and driving force<br />
behind the constant effort to expand cooperation in the legal and law-enforcement aspects of<br />
the European Union. Thus, organized crime has been cited repeatedly as a justification for<br />
decisions and agreements on police and legal cooperation.<br />
“<strong>Organised</strong> crime is increasingly becoming a threat to society as we know it and want to<br />
preserve it. Criminal behaviour is no longer the domain of individuals alone, but also of<br />
organisations that pervade the various structures of civil society, and indeed society as a<br />
whole. <strong>Crime</strong> is increasingly being organised across national borders, also taking<br />
advantage of the free movement of goods, capital, services and persons” (Action plan,<br />
1997: preamble).<br />
As indicated, the principles of the Union Treaty concerning an open market for capital, goods,<br />
services, and labor force have been the main source of the expectation that criminals would<br />
utilize these new possibilities for trans-border activities. It is feared that organized criminal<br />
net<strong>works</strong> will not only benefit from free movement within the Union, but also abuse<br />
differences in national laws. Thus, criminal organizations could be viewed as capitalist<br />
enterprises that wish to organize on the international level, establish illegal activities,<br />
transport illegal goods and illegal earnings from one country to another, and establish bases in<br />
or move to the country in which the illegal sector suffers the least—economic and punitive—<br />
consequences (Adamoli et al., 1998: 107)1<br />
To date a number of EU member states—including the <strong>Scandinavian</strong> countries─have had no<br />
national definitions of organized crime•neither penal definitions nor legal classification<br />
systems that include organized crime. Of course, this absence of definitions reflects the fact<br />
that these countries have not had or only seldom have had criminality of a magnitude and<br />
character that would necessitate concepts of organized crime or criminal organizations. By<br />
virtue of ever-increasing EU cooperation in the legal field, however, the concept of organized<br />
crime has not only been introduced into the debate over criminal policy in recent years, but it<br />
will also be imported into the criminal law and legal administration of these countries. In<br />
countries where organized crime is more an abstract concept than a concrete experience•such<br />
as the <strong>Scandinavian</strong> countries•import of organized crime as a concept is coincident with the<br />
implementation of organized crime as a phenomenon, where organized crime is constructed<br />
1 Even though it is correct in principle that an open market for goods, services, and work force provides<br />
betteropportunities for criminals to move around, it is doubtful that organized crime has the ability to operate in<br />
accordance with such cost-benefit pronciples, thereby freeing itself from its local, national, or ethnic base.
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
as a social and criminal problem (see Bay, 1998). Consequently, it is important not only to<br />
evaluate these efforts toward harmonization from a penal perspective, but also to assess how<br />
these EU initiatives will affect the comprehension of organized crime in the national debate<br />
over legal policy and in the scientific discourse.<br />
This paper will discuss three key EU definitions•definitions that have been developed and<br />
used in recent years by the European Parliament, the European Council, and the so-called K4<br />
Committee, which is a coordinating committee in the legal area comprising high-ranking<br />
officials and which is appointed in accordance with Article K.4 of the Union Treaty (Treaty,<br />
1992).<br />
Organized <strong>Crime</strong> as the Driving Force behind EU Cooperation in the Legal Area<br />
As mentioned above, organized crime is serving as a generator to intensify police and legal<br />
cooperation and harmonization within the EU and, thus, to establish the future European<br />
Police Office (Europol).<br />
The initiative for establishing Europol was taken in 1991 when Germany proposed setting up<br />
a central European police unit in order to intensify the joint struggle against drug crimes and<br />
other organized crime. To accelerate the establishment of a joint police unit, however, a<br />
Europol predecessor was established: the Europol Drugs Unit (EDU), whose initial task was<br />
to exchange police information on narcotics and money laundering. The EDU’s mandate was<br />
later expanded to include the exchange of information and intelligence on certain forms of<br />
illegal, organized activities that include two or more member states and to assist police and<br />
other authorities in the battle against organized crime (Article 2 in Joint Action, 1995). The<br />
types of crime initially covered by the EDU agreement include the illegal drug trafficking,<br />
illicit trafficking in nuclear substances, illegal immigrant smuggling, and illegal trading in<br />
stolen motor vehicles; but this list has since been expanded to include trading in human<br />
beings (so-called white-slave traffic) (Joint Action, 1996b: article 1). The focus of the<br />
Europol Drugs Unit on organized crime was later emphasized in the decision that this police<br />
unit would gather information concerning expertise on combatting international organized<br />
crime (Joint Action, 1996a).<br />
Organized crime also plays a central role in the Europol convention. In its statement of<br />
purpose, Europol’s field of activity is defined as: “terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and<br />
other serious forms of international crime where there are factual indications that an<br />
organized criminal structure is involved” (Europol Convention, 1995: article 1). Thus,<br />
organized crime is a prerequisite for the operation of Europol, but the Europol convention<br />
does not define organized crime in greater detail.<br />
The convention on extradition between member states of the European Union (Convention,<br />
1996) is also grounded in the effort against organized crime. In accordance with this<br />
convention, criminals shall be extradited when a “conspiracy or an association” is involved<br />
whose purpose it is to commit various types of crimes, including “drug trafficking and other<br />
forms of organized crime” (Article 3, Paragraph 1), but neither of the terms ‘conspiracy’ or<br />
‘an association to commit offenses’ or ‘organized crime’ is defined in greater detail.<br />
However, participation in a criminal organization is defined as follows:<br />
“(...) the behaviour of any person which contributes to the commission by a group of persons<br />
acting with a common purpose of one or more offenses in the field of terrorism as in Articles<br />
1 and 2 of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, drug<br />
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22<br />
trafficking and other forms of organized crime or other acts of violence against the life,<br />
physical integrity or liberty of a person, or creating a collective danger for persons, punishable<br />
by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least 12 months,<br />
even where that person does not take part in the actual execution of the offense or offenses<br />
concerned; such contribution shall be intentional and made having knowledge either of the<br />
purpose and the general criminal activity of the group or of the intention of the group to<br />
commit the offense or offenses concerned” (Convention, 1996: article 3, paragraph 4).<br />
In this and similar documents concerning police and legal cooperation within the EU, it is<br />
always an explicit assumption that the overall goal is to combat “international organized<br />
crime,” which is a standard formula that is often repeated in the preambles to legal documents<br />
in this area. But the language is inconsistent. Sometimes reference is made to “international<br />
crime,” in other cases it is “organized crime” or “transnational crimes”. Even though these<br />
terms are not synonymous, they are used as such, without being defined in greater detail. It is<br />
assumed that their meaning is known and there is an implicit assumption that the concrete<br />
forms of criminality that the EDU and Europol are to be involved in, such as the smuggling of<br />
drugs, automobiles, people, and radioactive materials, are by their very nature organized or<br />
international.<br />
That these terms alone figure in the preambles of EU documents clearly indicates their<br />
function. They are nonbinding and imprecise designations that primarily serve ideological<br />
and justificatory functions.<br />
The Political Definition of Organized <strong>Crime</strong><br />
A first attempt at a more precise and binding definition comes from the European Parliament.<br />
The European Parliament has been working for a long time to place organized crime on the<br />
EU agenda. It was, in particular, those countries that have long and extensive experience with<br />
serious organized crime that took the initiative in this area. Most of the numerous documents<br />
on criminality that the European Parliament has approved contain direct references to the<br />
danger represented by organized crime. The parliament’s Resolution on Criminal Activities in<br />
Europe points to organized crime as the most serious crime problem in Europe and it states<br />
that “organized crime, with its strong destabilizing and corrupting influence, is a political,<br />
social and cultural problem which undermines public institutions and democracy itself”<br />
(European Parliament’s resolution, 1994: preamble). In close accord with this concern, the<br />
European Parliament defines organized crime as follows:<br />
“(The European Parliament) defines organized crime as an organized criminal association<br />
operating at international level, the activities of which range form actual criminal offenses<br />
to the direct or indirect control of economic activities, public <strong>works</strong> concessions, licenses,<br />
contracts and services” (European Parliament’s resolution, 1994: article 1)<br />
Thus, this definition is based on three primary qualifications—the type of organization, the<br />
geographic field of operation, and the extent of the criminal activities, whereby particular<br />
emphasis is placed on corruption of the business sector and, consequently, those elements of<br />
organized crime that threaten the principles of societies based on market economy. However,<br />
this broad, politically oriented definition of organized crime has had neither practical nor<br />
legislative significance and the parliament itself later abandoned the use of this definition<br />
(e.g. in Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs, 1997).
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As the desire to expand Union-wide cooperation in the battle against organized crime has<br />
been operationalized by central officials and judicial authorities, the understanding of<br />
organized crime has become more concrete, but at the same time it has also been diluted, so<br />
that the fundamental and salient features of organized crime as underscored in the European<br />
Parliament’s definition have been obliterated.<br />
The Police Definition of Organized <strong>Crime</strong><br />
In the early 1990’s the Drugs and Organized <strong>Crime</strong> Group began issuing annual joint EU<br />
situation reports on the extent and directions of international organized crime. The EU reports<br />
were and are based on national reports, but these were not standardized until 1994 when an ad<br />
hoc Working Group on International Organized <strong>Crime</strong> developed a proposal for the<br />
systematic reporting of national organized crime (Appendix 2 to K.4-udvalget, 1993). The K4<br />
Committee used this to produce a number of instructions on how the annual national reports<br />
should be made: <strong>what</strong> subjects the reports should cover (Appendix B to K.4-udvalget, 1995)<br />
and a list of characteristic features of organized crime (Appendix C), i.e. operative directions<br />
indicating how organized crime can be identified, classified, and distinguished from other<br />
forms of crime.<br />
Based on these criteria, the national police forces have prepared annual reports on organized<br />
crime in their country during the past year and these reports have been combined to form<br />
annual situational reports on organized crime in the European Union (Arbejdsgruppen<br />
vedrørende Narkotika og Organiseret Kriminalitet, 1995a; Arbejdsgruppen vedrørende<br />
Narkotika og Organiseret Kriminalitet, 1995b; Arbejdsgruppen vedrørende Narkotika og<br />
Organiseret Kriminalitet, 1996; Arbejdsgruppen vedrørende Narkotika og Organiseret<br />
Kriminalitet, 1997).<br />
The K.4 Committee’s list of features of organized crime includes eleven characteristics:<br />
“At least six of the following characteristics shall be present, three of which shall be nos. 1, 5,<br />
and 11 below, for a crime or criminal group to be characterized as organized crime:<br />
1. Collaboration of more than two people;<br />
2. each with own appointed tasks;<br />
3. for a prolonged or indefinite period of time;<br />
4. using some form of discipline and control<br />
5. suspected of the commission of serious criminal offences;<br />
6. operating on an international level;<br />
7. using violence or other means suitable for intimidation;<br />
8. using commercial or business-like structures<br />
9. engaged in money laundering<br />
10.exerting influence on politics, on the media, public administration, judicial<br />
authorities, or the economy;<br />
11.determined by the pursuit of profit and/or power.” (Appendix C of K.4-<br />
udvalget, 1995).2<br />
2. The official English version of the eleven criteria was not available. Consequently this quotation is based on<br />
an unofficial translation from the Danish version.<br />
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According to this list of features, organized crime can be both a crime and a criminal<br />
organization, as indicated in the introduction to the eleven characteristics. This dual nature is<br />
important because it opens up the possibility that a series of criminal acts in itself can be<br />
characterized as organized criminality, even if there is no actual organization involved. This<br />
means that ad hoc cooperation in crimes, such as bank robberies or smuggling expeditions,<br />
can be characterized as organized crime if the other required criteria are met.<br />
1. Collaboration of more than two people. The first condition for the presence of organized<br />
crime is the existence of a (rudimentary) organization, assumed here to mean more than two<br />
persons, i.e. a group of persons. However, this introductory and obligatory characteristic<br />
contains no requirement of an organization in the traditional sense: with a division of labor<br />
among various functions, with formalized relations among participants, or with a ranking of<br />
the participants. Thus, cooperation can include all forms of social organization from the<br />
loosest and most temporary form of cooperation to the most traditional forms of hierarchic<br />
and continuous organizations.<br />
This primary condition of cooperation among a group of persons is an important criterion<br />
for distinguishing between a specific and a common sense form of organized crime. While in<br />
everyday speech we may speak of a planned and continuous form of criminality that is carried<br />
out by individuals, such as repeated, unlawful smuggling of foreign women for prostitution,<br />
as crime that is (well) organized; it is clear here that such criminality can be designated as<br />
organized crime only under certain conditions. Thus, it is not sufficient for crime to be<br />
organized. It must be committed within (as opposed to by) an organization—understood here<br />
to be cooperation by a group of more than two persons.<br />
The wording of the first criterion for classification as organized crime is in close accord<br />
with criminological research on this type of criminality. This research shows that organized<br />
crime is not necessarily committed by or within bureaucratic structures, but it is carried out<br />
just as frequently in loosely structured net<strong>works</strong> (Potter, 1994).<br />
2. Each with own appointed tasks. Division of labor is the expression normally used in<br />
organizational sociology to indicate “predetermined tasks” and it is customary to view an<br />
organization with a division of labor as more advanced or developed than an organization<br />
without a division of labor. After all, the division of labor indicates that the tasks the<br />
organization undertakes are so varied and specialized that the individual tasks must be<br />
divided among persons with various qualifications, functions, or rankings. In this context, the<br />
division of labor should be understood in a broad sense, meaning that a hierarchical system<br />
within an organization can also be seen as a kind of division of labor. This hierarchical form<br />
of the division of labor means there is a power structure and a built-in inequality within the<br />
organization.<br />
Both the functional and the hierarchical division of labor are well known in the<br />
international literature on criminal organizations, but there is hardly agreement among<br />
researchers, however, as to <strong>what</strong> form of power structure is characteristic of organized crime.<br />
Abadinsky maintains that organized criminal groups have a vertical power structure with<br />
three or more permanent levels and that authority is linked to ranking and that this is true<br />
regardless of which person assumes a position (Abadinsky, 1994: 6). Kenney & Finckenauer<br />
also stress the structural aspects. Organized criminals have a well structured hierarchy with<br />
leaders and subordinates, but also a number of “hangers-on” and people who are loosely<br />
connected to the organization (Kenney & Finckenauer, 1995: 4). Maltz, on the other hand,<br />
asserts that even though a well-defined (albeit informal) hierarchy maintained by force is<br />
usually in place, a definition of organized crime cannot be based on a particular form of<br />
structure, since these structures can be rather volatile (Maltz, 1985: 28).<br />
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3. For a prolonged or indefinite period of time. This characteristic entails an expectation that<br />
the criminal organization comprises a stable structure that is permanent or at least is not ad<br />
hoc in nature. As with the second criterion, the purpose is to qualify the organized aspects.<br />
We are not dealing here with temporary or spontaneous working forms, but more permanent<br />
formations.<br />
Both Abadinsky and Kenny & Finckenauer assume in their definitions of organized crime<br />
that the organized groups comprise a stable and continuous conspiracy, meaning there is an<br />
organization that can exist independently of its actual members—when leaders die or are<br />
imprisoned the organization does not collapse because they are replaced by others.<br />
Continuity is not crucial for Maltz. He stresses that there are both noncontinuous and<br />
continuous forms of organized crime. The noncontinuous forms are situational ad hoc groups<br />
that appear in order to profit from individual situations. For stable criminal organizations,<br />
however, it is their continuous activity, such as narcotics distribution, extortion, or illegal<br />
gambling that is the cohesive element (Maltz, 1985: 28).<br />
4. Using some form of discipline and control. This characteristic of organized crime describes<br />
internal social control within the criminal organization. However, it is difficult to imagine<br />
any form of social organization without “some form of discipline and control.” A “particular<br />
form of discipline or control” would have been more meaningful, since without question it is<br />
a means of maintaining an organization and protecting the organization against legal<br />
measures that is meant.<br />
Abadinsky maintains that, like legitimate organizations, an organized criminal group has<br />
rules and regulations that its members are expected to follow (Abadinsky, 1994: 8), and<br />
Kenney & Finckenauer point out that membership, initiation rites, rules and regulations,<br />
activities, and leadership in an organized criminal group comprise the formal aspects of<br />
internal social control. These rules and rituals are surrounded by an oath of secrecy that, if<br />
broken, results in expulsion or death (Kenney & Finckenauer, 1995: 6). Maltz points out,<br />
however, that the use of force as an internal disciplinary means within criminal organizations<br />
has been on the decline and that the oath of secrecy mentioned above has been far from total,<br />
since there are numerous examples of members who have witnessed against their<br />
organization. Maltz also stresses that discipline in an organization in which most members<br />
are armed and ready to use their weapons must be based on a high degree of acceptance on<br />
the part of its members. Although there must, of course be some form of internal social<br />
control before a group of individuals can be called an organization, it is not—for Maltz—a<br />
decisive factor in the definition of organized crime (Maltz, 1985: 29).<br />
5. Suspected of the commission of serious criminal offences. The fifth characteristic, which is<br />
one of the three obligatory ones, contains three significant elements. First of all, it is<br />
sufficient if there is suspicion of illegal activity, i.e. the lowest degree of crime assumption by<br />
police. Moreover, it is not specified as to how such suspicion is grounded, but since these<br />
criteria are based on international police cooperation, it may be assumed that the usual<br />
requirements in provisions regarding suspicion must be met: the suspicion must have a certain<br />
strength, the suspicion must be directed against a certain action, the suspicion must be<br />
directed against a certain person (or perhaps an organization in this case), the suspicion must<br />
be directed against an action that has been committed (Koch, 1980: 89). The latter condition<br />
is dubious, however, since “commission” may vaguely refer to either a criminal act already<br />
committed or the assumption of future criminality.<br />
Secondly, there are some (unspecified) requirements on the seriousness of the crime. It<br />
may be assumed, however, that there is a concept of proportionality built into these criteria.<br />
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Being registered and reported for organized crime is a form of police surveillance that can<br />
have serious consequences for those implicated, so it is assumed here that the criminal<br />
offences must be commensurate with the form of power exercised. The guidelines for national<br />
reporting of organized crime mention the following forms of serious crime: drugs, fraud,<br />
counterfeiting, armed robbery, kidnapping, extortion, theft and fencing of automobiles, hitand-run<br />
robbery, art theft, illegal arms trafficking, traffic in human beings, prostitution, child<br />
pornography, environmental crimes, illegal gaming systems, and money laundering<br />
(Appendix B of K4-udvalget, 1995).<br />
Thirdly, it is assumed that crimes, i.e. punishable offences, are involved, which is an<br />
obvious premise. More importantly, the plural form is used, so that there must be a series of<br />
serious crimes and, thus, more than one individual act.<br />
6. Operating on an international level . The nature of trans-border crime is indicated by this<br />
characteristic, which is an extension of the organizational characteristics under points 1-4.<br />
The fact that an organization operates transnationally is an indication of the organization’s<br />
qualifications, scope, and professionalism, since it may normally be expected that<br />
international operations raise greater demands than national ones.<br />
A characteristic such as trans-border activity is not typically included in scientifically<br />
formulated criteria for organized crime. <strong>Crime</strong> on the national level can be just as organized<br />
as international crime. It is included in the EU’s list of the features of organized crime<br />
because this list was compiled as a result of international cooperation: if trans-border crime, it<br />
is legitimate for it to be dealt with by EU police cooperation.<br />
7. Using violence or other means suitable for intimidation. There is general agreement that<br />
one feature common to all types of organized crime is the willingness to use or to threaten the<br />
use of force, both against other criminals and against clients who cannot repay their debt.<br />
Concerning the background for the use of physical force, Maltz writes that the conflicts that<br />
arise, of necessity, within an organization and between said organization and its clients or<br />
business contacts that, in the legal world, would be settled (as a rule) in the courts, must be<br />
solved by other means in illegal business operations (Maltz, 1985: 27).<br />
The EU’s language is noteworthy in that the motive behind the use of violence and<br />
similar means - intimidation - is of key importance. It is not a prerequisite, however, that<br />
intimidation has actually occurred or that anyone has felt intimidated, but only that the means<br />
that are used can have an intimidating effect. Presumably, in this context violent behavior<br />
includes both violence and the threat of violence. Other means capable of intimidation may<br />
include economic methods and symbolic forms of violation.<br />
8. Using commercial or business-like structures. Organized crime is - or can be - a mix of<br />
legal and illegal enterprises. Initially legal enterprises can develop more and more illegal<br />
aspects, while the opposite occurs when organized crime invests its profits in legal businesses<br />
or gains joint ownership of legitimate businesses. There can also be other reasons for<br />
organized crime to be involved in legitimate businesses. They can be used to launder the<br />
proceeds of crime and legitimate businesses can also serve as a good front.<br />
The wording of item 8 of the EU criteria is also very broad and unspecified on this score.<br />
When it refers to commercial or business structures, this presumably does not necessarily<br />
refer to businesses in the legal sense.<br />
9. Engaged in money laundering. Integrating the proceeds of crime into the legal financial<br />
system is inextricably linked to all forms of property crime, particularly on the grand scale,<br />
such as is the case with certain forms of organized crime. The money laundering criterion is a<br />
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direct extension of the above-mentioned characteristic concerning the use of commercial or<br />
business-like structures - one can hardly imagine money laundering without the use of such<br />
legal structures.<br />
10. Exerting influence on politics, on the media, public administration, judicial authorities, or<br />
the economy. Corruption in the form of bribery, attempted bribery of public officials and<br />
politicians, or the use (or threatened use) of force toward persons involved in the judicial<br />
system is an important feature of organized crime in the criminological literature. To some<br />
criminologists it is the most important criterion (Cressey, 1969: 319). Corruption enables<br />
organized crime to achieve a certain form of immunity against being reported to the police,<br />
investigated, arrested, charged, and tried and bribery can be an attempt to gain a competitive<br />
advantage, for example in obtaining orders (Maltz, 1985: 25).<br />
However, instead of the well-defined term corruption the EU criteria uses a broader<br />
term—the exercise of influence. The crucial difference between these two terms is that<br />
corruption is of necessity an illegal form of influence or attempted influence, while the<br />
language that was chosen also includes legal forms of influence, which raises a number of<br />
questions. Can legal political activity or lobbying be the “exercise of influence at the political<br />
level?” Is participation in the political or cultural publicity “influence on the media?” Is the<br />
use of attorneys, for example, to defend one’s interests the “exercise of influence on public<br />
administration or justice authorities?” Are business activities the “exercise of influence on<br />
socioeconomic conditions?”<br />
This characteristic can be interpreted quite broadly and comprehensively, so that<br />
practically any form of participation in society can be included, but it can also be interpreted<br />
narrowly, so that the “exercise of influence” is identical to corruption, i.e. either bribery or the<br />
use of power as a means of influencing public officials.<br />
11. Determined by the pursuit of profit and/or power. Criminological research often stresses<br />
the nonideological nature of organized crime. The objectives of organized crime are power<br />
and profit—not political or ideological goals. Thus, this feature distinguishes those in<br />
organized crime from political extremists groups that may be organized in the same manner<br />
and commit the same types of crime, but are driven by political motivation (Abadinsky, 1994:<br />
6; Kenney & Finckenauer, 1995: 3). Since this criterion is one of the three obligatory ones in<br />
the EU list of characteristics, politically motivated crimes in the form of terrorism are not<br />
normally classified as organized crime.<br />
The Legal Definition of Organized <strong>Crime</strong><br />
The joint legal definition of organized crime is a result of the action plan for combating<br />
organized crime that was approved at a Council meeting in April 1997 (Action plan, 1997).<br />
The action plan was developed by a so-called High Level Group comprising representatives<br />
of the prosecutory authorities of the member states. This plan of action consists of 15<br />
political guidelines and 30 specific recommendations, as well as a timetable and<br />
implementation plan for each of the recommendations. The desire for a joint legal<br />
comprehension of organized crime and joint criminalization of participation in criminal<br />
organizations has a high priority in the action plan. It is the first of the political guidelines:<br />
“The Council is requested rapidly to adopt a joint action aiming at making it an offense under<br />
the laws of each Member State for a person, present in its territory, to participate in a<br />
criminal organization, irrespective of the location in the Union where the organization is<br />
concentrated or is carrying out its criminal activity” (Action plan, 1997: 4)<br />
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Otherwise, the action plan is a mixture of far-reaching program declarations and short-term<br />
recommendations. The main goal of the action plan is to make the fight against organized<br />
crime at the European and international levels more effective and this overall goal is used as<br />
an argument for expanding EU cooperation in the legal area. It is proposed, for example, that<br />
Europol’s authority be extended beyond the present convention (Article 6, Paragraph f) and<br />
the Europol be given operational power (Political Guideline No. 10). It is proposed to relax<br />
the requirements of double criminality in connection with mutual legal assistance and<br />
extradition between EU countries (Political Guideline No. 4) and there are several proposals<br />
concerning how judicial authorities can coordinate their actions to combat organized crime:<br />
establishing a network for legal cooperation at the European level, appointing<br />
interdisciplinary groups, and developing cooperation among judicial authorities and tax<br />
authorities (Political Guidelines Nos. 7, 8, 9, and 12).<br />
The specific instructions for action are divided into a number of general conditions, proposals<br />
for preventing organized crime, recommendations for new legal instruments, ideas for<br />
practical cooperation among police, judicial authorities, and customs authorities for<br />
combatting organized crime, proposals for expanding Europol’s mandate and tasks, and<br />
finally suggested measures to prevent money laundering. With certain exceptions, the action<br />
plan advocates implementing all 30 recommendations by the end of 1998, which indicates,<br />
first of all, the high priority the action plan places on the effort against organized crime and,<br />
secondly, the intensity of the expanded legal cooperation within the EU.<br />
On the basis of this action plan, the Council for Legal and Internal Affairs approved a joint<br />
action on making it a criminal offence to participate in criminal organizations (Joint Action,<br />
1998).3 The joint action sets forth joint definitions for criminal organizations and requires<br />
that all member states criminalize membership in such organizations. The object of this joint<br />
action is to introduce a common strategy regarding participation in the activities of criminal<br />
organizations: more uniformity in legal proceedings against such participation and easier<br />
extradition of persons accused of participation in criminal organizations to member states<br />
demanding such extradition.<br />
A criminal organization is defined as:<br />
“Within the meaning of this Joint Action, a criminal organization shall mean a lasting,<br />
structured association of more than two persons, acting in concert with a view to<br />
committing crimes or other offences which are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a<br />
detention order of a maximum of at least four years or a more serious penalty, whether<br />
such crimes or offences are an end in themselves or a means of obtaining material benefits<br />
and, if necessary, of improperly influencing the operation of public authorities. The crimes<br />
or other offences referred to in the first paragraph include those mentioned in Article 2 of<br />
the Europol Convention and in the Annex thereto and carry a sentence at least equivalent<br />
to that provided for in the first paragraph” (Joint Action, 1998: article 1).<br />
The crimes referred to in Article 2 of the Europol convention include illegal drug trafficking,<br />
illegal trade in nuclear and radioactive materials, organized illegal immigration (smuggling of<br />
3. At the meeting of the Council for Legal and Internal Affairs on 19 March 1998, agreement was reached on the<br />
formulation of this joint action. It will be given final approval at the meeting on 28-29 May 1998.<br />
28
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humans), trade in human beings, illegal trade in stolen motor vehicles, and terrorist<br />
activities.4<br />
4. Article 2 of the Europol Convention states:<br />
•1. The objective of Europol shall be, within the framework of cooperation between the Member States pursuant<br />
to Article K.1(9) of the Treaty on European Union, to improve, by means of the measures referred to in this<br />
Convention, the effectiveness and cooperation of the competent authorities in the Member States in preventing<br />
and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of international crime where there are<br />
factual indications that an organized criminal structure is involved and two or more Member States are affected<br />
by the forms of crime in question in such a way as to require a common approach by the Member States owing to<br />
the scale, significance and consequences of the offenses concerned.<br />
In order to achieve progressively the objective mentioned in paragraph 1, Europol shall initially act to prevent<br />
and combat unlawful drug trafficking, trafficking in nuclear and radioactive substances, illegal immigrant<br />
smuggling, trade in human beings and motor vehicle crime.<br />
Within two years at the latest following the entry into force of this Convention, Europol shall also deal with<br />
crimes committed or likely to be committed in the course of terrorist activities against life, limb, personal<br />
freedom or property. The Council, acting unanimously in accordance with the procedure laid down in Title VI of<br />
the Treaty on European Union, may decide to instruct Europol to deal with such terrorist activities before that<br />
period has expired.<br />
The Council, acting unanimously in accordance with the procedure laid down in Title VI of the Treaty on<br />
European Union, may decide to instruct Europol to deal with other forms of crime listed in the Annex to this<br />
Convention or specific manifestations thereof. Before acting, the Council shall instruct the Management Board to<br />
prepare its decision and in particular to set out the budgetary and staffing implications for Europol.<br />
Europol•s competence as regards a form of crime or specific manifestations thereof shall cover both:<br />
1) illegal money-laundering activities in connection with these forms of crime or specific manifestations thereof;<br />
2) related criminal offenses.<br />
The following shall be regarded as related and shall be taken into account in accordance with the procedures set<br />
out in Articles 8 and 10:<br />
- criminal offenses committed in order to procure the means for perpetrating acts within the sphere of competence<br />
of Europol;<br />
- criminal offenses committed in order to facilitate or carry out acts within the sphere of competence of Europol;<br />
- criminal offenses committed to ensure the impunity of acts within the sphere of competence of Europol.<br />
(Europol Convention, 1995).<br />
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The above-mentioned appendix to the Europol convention contains a long list of crimes, the<br />
most important of which are murder and aggravated assault, racism and xenophobia,<br />
kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking, organized robbery, embezzlement and other<br />
crimes against property, forgery of money and documents, and illegal trafficking in arms,<br />
human organs, endangered plant and animal species, and hormonal substances. Moreover,<br />
Europol’s jurisdiction also includes money laundering and other punishable actions<br />
originating in the above-mentioned forms of crime.5<br />
The Joint Action against participation in criminal organizations, defines participation in a<br />
criminal organization in two different ways (Article 2, Paragraphs 1 and 2), and the individual<br />
member states can choose whether they wish to criminalize participation in criminal organizations<br />
in accordance with one or both definitions:<br />
1. “Conduct by any person who, with intent and with knowledge of either the aim and general<br />
criminal activity of the organization or the intention of the organized group to commit the<br />
offenses in question, actively takes part in:<br />
30<br />
− the criminal organization’s activities referred to in Article 1, even where that<br />
person does not take part in the actual execution of the offenses concerned<br />
and, subject to the general principles of the criminal law of the Member State<br />
concerned, even where the offenses concerned are not actually committed,<br />
− the organization’s other activities in the further knowledge that his<br />
participation will contribute to the achievement of the organization’s criminal<br />
activities as referred to in Article<br />
2. Conduct by any person consisting in an agreement with one or more persons that an<br />
activity should be pursued which, if carried out, would amount to the commission of such<br />
5. List of other serious forms of international crime which Europol could deal with in addition to those<br />
already provided for in Article 2(2) in compliance with Europol´s objective as set out in Article 2(1).<br />
Against life, limb or personal freedom:<br />
- murder, grievous bodily injury<br />
- illicit trade in human organs and tissue<br />
- kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking<br />
- racism and xenophobia<br />
Against property or public goods including fraud:<br />
- organized robbery<br />
- illicit trafficking in cultural goods, including antiquities and <strong>works</strong> of art<br />
- swindling and fraud<br />
- racketeering and extortion<br />
- counterfeiting and product piracy<br />
- forgery of administrative documents and trafficking therein<br />
- forgery of money and means of payment<br />
- computer crime<br />
- corruption<br />
Illegal trading and harm to the environment:<br />
- illicit trafficking in arms, ammunition and explosives<br />
- illicit trafficking in endangered animal species<br />
- illicit trafficking in endangered plant species and varieties<br />
- environmental crime<br />
- illicit trafficking in hormonal substances and other growth promoters. (Europol Convention, 1995)
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
crimes or offenses as referred to in Article 1, even if that person does not take part in the<br />
actual execution of the activity” (Joint Action, 1998: article 2).<br />
This definition is intended to reconcile three different legal traditions: the continental<br />
tradition according to which it is possible and desirable to punish participation in the<br />
activities of a criminal organization, the Anglo-American tradition which views a conspiracy<br />
as punishable and according to which an agreement between two or more persons is sufficient<br />
for indictment, and the <strong>Scandinavian</strong> tradition of far-reaching regulations on participation and<br />
attempt, which are general in nature and not specifically directed against criminal<br />
organizations or criminal conspiracies (Rådet for Den Europæiske Union -<br />
Generalsekretariatet, 1997). Depending on how this joint definition and the obligation to<br />
make it a criminal offence to particiapate in a criminal organization is implementet in national<br />
legislation, this way of criminalizing membership of an organization will be a crucial<br />
departure from legal traditions in Scandinavia.<br />
But the definition of illegal participation in a criminal organization also expresses an<br />
attempt to include the participation of - for example - an attorney or abookkeeper, in the<br />
activities of an organization, when those involved act intentional and with the understanding<br />
that their participation helps promote the criminal organization.<br />
Why Organized <strong>Crime</strong> as a Joint Concept?<br />
In both of these EU definitions emphasis is placed on the organizational aspects of organized<br />
crime. This becomes clear when, in its Joint Action, the Council for Legal and Internal<br />
Affairs first defines a criminal organization and then defines how participation in such an<br />
organization is to be viewed. It is also clear in the way the various features of organized<br />
crime are balanced. In the Council’s legal definition the organizational aspects and<br />
seriousness of the criminal action are obligatory elements and in the K4 Committee’s eleven<br />
characteristics the organizational attributes, together with the seriousness of the crimes and<br />
the motives, are also obligatory.<br />
When the emphasis is placed on organizational relationships and on the seriousness of the<br />
crime, the result is definitions or categorizations that are unable to distinguish between<br />
organized crime and other forms of collective criminality that are organized, such as gang<br />
crime, white collar crime, and organizational crime. Thus, there are no attempts to identify<br />
distinctive features of organized crime. Instead of defining organized crime as an<br />
independent and distinctive form of crime, organized crime becomes a catch-all term for a<br />
number of serious crimes that already have other designations.<br />
This conceptualization of organized crime as an overriding category which, in principle,<br />
can include all forms of collective crimes and organizations, results in a heterogeneous<br />
classification system. The category of organized crime comes to encompass motorcycle clubs<br />
such as the Hell’s Angels and the Bandidos, but also corporate embezzlers and organized<br />
fraud against EU funds. Such a broad classification system tends to be devoid of specific<br />
meaning or, in any event, of comprehension. Instead, the term organized crime is reduced to<br />
an evaluation of the seriousness and organizational features of certain types of crime.<br />
Organized crime as a concept is inappropriate and should actually be avoided, since it<br />
contains the linguistic possibility of several meanings. First of all, it is difficult to define and<br />
delineate organized crime from other types of crime such as professional crime, criminal<br />
subcultures, career crime, gang crime, criminal net<strong>works</strong>, criminal conspiracies,<br />
organizational crime, corporate crime, and white collar crime (Bay, 1995). Secondly, it is<br />
difficult to distinguish between crime that is organized and organized crime, i.e. between a<br />
common sense meaning of organized crime and a narrower legal or criminological meaning.<br />
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To avoid confusion of organized crime per se and crime in a broader sense, various<br />
researchers have developed methods for distinguishing them. Donald Cressey places<br />
organized crime in quotation marks when he speaks of it in the popular sense, but omits the<br />
quotation marks when he uses the term in its scientific sense (Cressey, 1969). Michael Maltz<br />
distinguishes between organized crime (general meaning) and organized crime (specific<br />
meaning) (Maltz, 1985). Joseph Albini has proposed using the term syndicated crime for the<br />
specific form of organized crime (Albini, 1971). None of these proposals have caught on,<br />
however.<br />
If one wishes to use the term organized crime, he must isolate the distinctive features of such<br />
crime that will distinguish it from other forms of collective crime. Such a definition would<br />
focus on the power aspect of organized crime. The conclusive feature which distinguishes<br />
organized crime from all other forms of collective crime and makes organized crime a serious<br />
social problem is that organized crime comprises an economic and physical power factor that<br />
can place itself above customary laws and legal principles, either by the use of corruption or<br />
by threatening the authorities’ monopoly on the exercise of power. Thus, it can form a<br />
parallel power and authority that appropriates the official authorities’ tools of power and<br />
monopoly position in the areas of legal proceedings, the physical exercise of force, and<br />
taxation.<br />
It is these community-threatening traits that comprise the distinctive feature of organized<br />
crime and that actually make the case for the concept of organized crime: the establishment of<br />
a parallel social power structure with special rights and means of force, as well as the<br />
corruption of the judicial system and other authorities by means of economic or violent force.<br />
It is in these traits of organized crime—i.e. the methods used to commit and conceal criminal<br />
activity—that a descriptive and analytical definition should concentrate on.<br />
Why has the EU chosen to use such a broad and imprecise definition of organized crime? It is<br />
primarily for political reasons. By raising a number of broad criteria for organized crime, this<br />
type of crime is made to appear more extensive and serious than it would if more precise and<br />
limited criteria were used. And since organized crime has been defined previously in only a<br />
few member states and since, in general, it is difficult to define organized crime, it has been<br />
possible to define the scope of the joint concepts more freely than it would have been for<br />
criminal forms that had already been defined specifically.<br />
Presumably, the previously existing definitions have also helped dilute the criteria.<br />
Countries such as Italy, France, Portugal, and Germany already had national, penal definitions<br />
and, moreover, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom had operational definitions used by<br />
the national police authorities.6 Since the joint criteria were supposed to be based on—and, to<br />
a certain extent, to integrate previously existing national definitions and classifications, it was<br />
probably necessary to reach compromises that stand in the way of a more optimal form of<br />
classification and definition.<br />
A third reason is that this way of understanding organized crime has achieved<br />
international acceptance—presumably by virtue of United States’ influence on international<br />
police work, on legal cooperation, and particularly on the myth making of crimes. By using<br />
the concept of organized crime and linking the efforts against organized crime to the police<br />
and penal authorities within the EU, it is possible to tie into the popular, mass media-based<br />
myths of the Mafia, criminal syndicates, and an underworld that is an illegal copy of the<br />
law-abiding world (Bay, 1992).<br />
6 The national definitions and classifications of organized crime are indicated in (Statewatch, 1994);<br />
(Arbejdsgruppen vedrørende Narkotika og Organiseret Kriminalitet, 1995) and (Adamoli et al., 1998).<br />
32
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Notes<br />
Part of this paper - in Danish - will later be published in (Bay, 1998).<br />
References<br />
Abadinsky, H.: Organized <strong>Crime</strong>. Nelson-Hall, Chicago, IL 1994 (4 Edition).<br />
Action plan no 97/C 251/01 adopted on 28.4.1997. Action plan to combat organized crime.<br />
Official Journal, 1997, C 251, 1.<br />
Adamoli, S., Di Nicola, A., Savona, E.U. and Zoffi, P.: <strong>Organised</strong> <strong>Crime</strong> Around the World.<br />
HEUNI, Helsinki 1998.<br />
Albini, J.L.: The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend. Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York,<br />
NY 1971.<br />
Arbejdsgruppen vedrørende Narkotika og Organiseret Kriminalitet (1995a), Situationsrapport<br />
om organiseret kriminalitet i Den Europæiske Union i 1993, Bryssel, EU. 10166/4/94<br />
ENFOPOL 144 REV 4. 27.2.1995.<br />
Arbejdsgruppen vedrørende Narkotika og Organiseret Kriminalitet (1995b), Situationsrapport<br />
om organiseret kriminalitet i Den Europæiske Union i 1994, Bryssel, EU. 10506/1/95<br />
ENFOPOL 108 REV 1.<br />
Arbejdsgruppen vedrørende Narkotika og Organiseret Kriminalitet (1996), Situationsrapport<br />
om organiseret kriminalitet i Den Europæiske Union i 1995, Bryssel, EU. 10555/96<br />
ENFOPOL 155.<br />
Arbejdsgruppen vedrørende Narkotika og Organiseret Kriminalitet (1997), Situationsrapport<br />
om organiseret kriminalitet i Den Europæiske Union i 1996, Bryssel, EU. 12447/1/97<br />
ENFOPOL 219 REV 1. 1.12.1997.<br />
Bay, J.: ‘Myter og virkelighed omkring rocker-kriminalitet’. In: Lov & Ret, 2-1992, pp. 17-<br />
21.<br />
Bay, J.: ‘Organiseret kriminalitet - definitioner og begreber i amerikansk forskning’. In:<br />
Kriminalistisk Instituts Årbog 1994. Balvig, F. (ed.). Kriminalistisk Institut,<br />
København 1995.<br />
Bay, J.: ‘Da organiseret kriminalitet blev indført til Danmark’. In: Nordisk Tidsskrift for<br />
Kriminologi. (Forthcoming) 1998.<br />
Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs (1996) Report on the draft Joint Action on<br />
making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal organization in the Member<br />
States of the European Union, Strassburg, European Parlimant. A4-0349/97.<br />
5.11.1997.<br />
Convention (1996), Convention relating to extradition between the Member States of the<br />
European Union. Official journal, 1996, C 313, 11ff.<br />
Cressey, D.: Theft of the Nation: The Structure and Operations of Organized <strong>Crime</strong> in<br />
America. Harper & Row, New York, NY 1969,<br />
European Parliament's resolution no A3-0033/94 adopted on 11.2.1994. Resolution on<br />
criminal activities in Europe. Official Journal, 1994, C 61, 235.<br />
Europol Convention nr 95/C 316/01 adopted on 26/07/1995. Convention based on article K.3<br />
of the treaty on European Union, on the establishemnt of a European Police Office<br />
(Europol Convention). Official Journal, 1995, C 316, 1-33.<br />
Joint Action no 95/73/JHA: adopted on 10.3.1995. Joint Action Concerning the Europol<br />
Drugs Unit. Official Journal, 1995, L 62, 1.<br />
Joint Action no 96/747/RIA adopted on 29.11.1996. Joint Action concerning the creation and<br />
maintenance of a directory of specialized competences, skills and expertise in the fight<br />
against international organized crime. Official Journal, 1996, L 342, 2f.<br />
33
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Joint Action no 96/748/RIA adopted on 16.12.1996. Joint Action extending the mandate given<br />
to the Europol Drugs Unit. Official Journal, 1996, L 342, 4.<br />
Joint Action (1998), ‘Joint Action on making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal<br />
organization in the member states of the European Union’, 2075th Council meeting -<br />
Justice and Home Affairs, Brussels, 19 March 1998, Annex.<br />
K.4-udvalget (1995), Udarbejdelse af en fælles ordning for indsamling og systematisk analyse<br />
af efterretninger om international organiseret kriminalitet, Bruxelles, Den Europæiske<br />
Union: Rådet. 12247/1/94. 28.2.1995.<br />
K.4-udvalget, D.E.U. (1993), Rapport til Rådet fra Ad hoc-gruppen vedrørende International<br />
Organiseret Kriminalitet, Bruxelles, K.4-udvalget. 9908/2/93 - CRIMORG 1.<br />
22.11.1993.<br />
Kenney, D.J. and Finckenauer, J.O.: Organized <strong>Crime</strong> in America. Wadsworth, Belmont, CA<br />
1995 (1. Edition).<br />
Koch, H.: (1980), ‘Politiovervågning og -indgreb - nye mål og midler’. In: Koch, H. and<br />
Lorentzen, H. (eds.): Politiselektion - Politiprævention: en rapport om kvalitative<br />
ændringer i 1980'ernes politi. Nordisk Samarbejdsråd for Kriminologi,Oslo 1980.<br />
Maltz, M.D.: ‘Toward Defining Organized <strong>Crime</strong>’. In: Alexander, H.E. and Caiden, G.E.<br />
(eds.): The Politics and Economics of Organized <strong>Crime</strong>. Lexington Books, Lesington,<br />
MA 1985.<br />
Potter, G.W.: Criminal Organizations: Vice, Racketeering, and Politics in an American City.<br />
Waveland Press, Prospect Heights, IL 1994.<br />
Rådet for Den Europæiske Union - Generalsekretariatet (1997), Presssemeddelse: 2055.<br />
samling i Rådet, Retlige og Indre Anliggender den 4. og 5. december 1997, Bruxelles.<br />
12888/97 (Presse 375).<br />
Statewatch (1994), ‘Europol: Defining Organized <strong>Crime</strong>’, Statewatch, 4 (July-August) , 4, 12.<br />
Treaty no 192M adopted on 07.02.1992. Treaty on European Union. Offical Journal, 1992, C<br />
191, 1.<br />
34
Johan Bäckman, Researcher<br />
National Research Institute of Legal Policy<br />
PB 1200, FIN-00101 Helsinki<br />
e-mail: johan.backman@om.vn.fi<br />
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
The inflation of crime in Russia<br />
Ladies and gentlemen, dear participants of this conference.<br />
The production of a new threat is one of the fundamental principles guiding the new European<br />
security agenda. The menaces of the Cold War seem to haunt Europe, this time in the form of<br />
so-called “organized crime” seen to be proliferating mainly from the countries of the former<br />
East block. As a new external enemy, East European crime - especially the “Russian Mafia” -<br />
serves in the creation of a common identity, as well as arousing calls for the implementation<br />
of centralized police bodies.<br />
Over the last five years I have studied the influence of the Russian crime situation on Finland.<br />
My work has consisted of field work in Finland, Russia and Estonia. I have collected a store<br />
of thematic interviews and other materials in connection with law enforcement officials,<br />
liaison officers and other specialists. In the following, my intention is to depict the hypothesis<br />
I have been working on to explain the impact of Russian crime on Finland, as well as to make<br />
the crime situation in Russia more understandable.<br />
The title of my presentation is “The Inflation of <strong>Crime</strong> in Russia”.<br />
The starting point for constructing the hypothesis is a paradox. Briefly, if the Russian crime<br />
situation is as alarming as various sources claim, the growing interaction between Finland and<br />
Russia should result in serious criminal consequences for Finland. However, this simple logic<br />
has not held true so far. In the following, I shall briefly attempt to illustrate the empirical<br />
aspects of this paradox.<br />
Most of the information concerning crime in Russia paints a very black picture of the present<br />
situation. According to question polls, one Russian in three actually believes that “the mafia”<br />
governs the Russian Federation. Both foreign and domestic sources often claim that semilegal<br />
and mafia-type organizations control a crucial part of the Russian state, society and<br />
markets. Some students of the Russian markets insist that it is quite natural for all Russian and<br />
foreign businesses to pay protection fees to extortion-orientated mafia-organisations, known<br />
as “roofs” (kryshi) in local parlance. Certain Russian law enforcement officials claim that<br />
most of the money flowing out of Russia is in fact being laundered by organized crime. The<br />
Russian law enforcement agencies are plagued by inefficiency, low or delayed wages, and<br />
corruption; the Ministry of the Interior annually fires approximately 30,000 employees for<br />
abuses of office. In such circumstances it is hardly surprising, that the phenomenon described<br />
as “organized crime” has been defined as the principal public enemy of the Russian state and<br />
society. Especially as the number of exposed criminal groups has multiplied from<br />
approximately 800 in 1990 to over 8,200 in 1995.<br />
The situation in the city of St. Petersburg, which lies only a few hundred kilometers from the<br />
35
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Finnish border, seems to be the most alarming. From 1990 to 1995 the murder rate grew from<br />
5,8 to 20 per 100,000 inhabitants. And when one looks at the statistics concerning causes of<br />
death, one may observe that only 60-70 percent of actual murders were ever registered! The<br />
law enforcement officials of St. Petersburg estimate that there are up to 200 leaders of<br />
“organized crime”, and up to 15,000 participants in “criminal organizations” living in the city.<br />
Annually the authorities expose over 500 “criminal organizations” and around 2,000 crimes<br />
and dozens of murders committed in the context of “organized crime”. At the same time, the<br />
Finnish law enforcement officials do not even know how to register such categories.<br />
Confiscations from the criminal groups of St. Petersburg include firearms, narcotics,<br />
explosives and hard currency worth hundreds of thousands of U.S. dollars, and the numbers<br />
are increasing.<br />
Several Russian law enforcement officials, criminologists from the Ministry of the Interior,<br />
academics and reporters share the view that Russia is in a state of criminal chaos,<br />
contaminated and infested with the phenomena that they describe as “organized crime”.<br />
Meanwhile, the interaction between Finland and Russia has grown considerably in the 1990´s.<br />
The flow of people, goods and capital has increased over the 1,300 kilometer border that<br />
Finland, alone in the European Union, shares with the Russian Federation. In St. Petersburg<br />
and its surroundings, only a few hundred kilometres from Helsinki, there are more people<br />
than in the whole of Finland. The number of visits paid by Russian visitors to Finland has<br />
skyrocketed up to one million people annually, which is an exceptional figure for a country of<br />
five million. On their shopping sprees in Finland, the Russian tourists annually spend approximately<br />
600,000 U.S. dollars. Annually over 300,000 Russian automobiles cross the border<br />
and hit the Finnish roads. The volume of Finnish-Russian trade has grown considerably over<br />
the past few years, exceeding the massive Soviet-Finnish clearing trade. A majority of the<br />
75,000 foreigners living in Finland originate from the former Soviet Union, and their number<br />
is expected to double over the next 10-15 years. Over 20,000 people living in Finland report<br />
that they speak Russian as their mother tongue.<br />
This economic, cultural and social interaction between Russia and Finland has reached levels<br />
unknown in the history of the two countries.<br />
Knowing the dangerous dimensions of crime in Russia, one may well ask about the criminal<br />
consequences of the interaction between Finland and Russia. What kind of evidence does the<br />
Finnish law enforcement have about crime originating in Russia? What kind of quantitative<br />
and qualitative changes has the Finnish crime situation undergone? How is “Russian crime”<br />
discussed in Finland? How is Finnish law enforcement reacting to crime originating in<br />
Russia? What kind of security agenda has been established for combating this crime?<br />
Rather paradoxically, the evidence produced by Finnish law enforcement does not reveal any<br />
considerable quantitative growth or qualitative change, which could be attributed to Russian<br />
influences, in the Finnish crime situation.<br />
In spite of the annual volume of one million visitors from Russia, the statistics of crime and<br />
conviction show that annually only about one percent of suspects and convicts are citizens of<br />
Russia. The majority of the crimes committed by Russians are traffic offences and petty<br />
larcenies, which applies to the general population equally. For instance, in 1996 only three<br />
Russians and four Swedes were suspected of murder in Finland, while the number of Finnish<br />
suspects was over 500.<br />
36
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
If the Russians are just about visible in the crime figures with their one percent, they are even<br />
less visible in the prison statistics. On the average, slightly more than three percent of those<br />
incarcerated in Finnish prisons are foreigners. Out of 3,200 prisoners, only six individuals are<br />
citizens of Russia. The Russians committing crimes in Finland are less likely to get a prison<br />
sentence than Finns in general.<br />
This situation may be compared to Sweden in the early 1970´s, when more than 1,000 Finns<br />
were annually sent to Swedish prisons for serious crimes, such as assaults and homicides. The<br />
growth of professional crime in the Finnish emigrant community was far more serious than in<br />
the case of Russians in Finland today. The prominence of the criminal element in the Finnish<br />
emigrant community was probably a major reason for the persistent discrimination against the<br />
Finnish-speaking minority in Sweden. In the most drastic instances, this has resulted in some<br />
Finns being treated as deviants because of their inability to learn to speak Swedish with a<br />
proper accent.<br />
The image of Finland being infiltrated by Russian mafia-style criminal activity certainly lacks<br />
evidence, though of course we have to define <strong>what</strong> we mean by mafia-activity. The Finnish<br />
police has not uncovered a single case of organized extortion of protection fees from Finnish<br />
businesses, corruption of public officials initiated by Russian business circles, or<br />
assassinations attributable to Russians. A few cases of Finnish-Russian economic crime and<br />
drug-trafficking have been exposed and investigated by the police, but these include incidents<br />
of Finnish businessmen cheating Russians, Finnish citizens associating with Russian drug<br />
organizations, and Finnish and Russian businessmen jointly misleading the customs and tax<br />
officials of the Russian Federation.<br />
Even the statistics concerning suspected money laundering - compiled by the Financial<br />
Supervision Authority of the Bank of Finland - offer no evidence of serious Russia-related<br />
problems. Only three percent of the inflow of suspected laundered money originated from<br />
Russia in 1997, and over the past four years Russia´s share has been 10 percent of the average<br />
volume. Nevertheless, the National Bureau of Investigation reports that a fifth of the investigated<br />
cases of money-laundering are in some way connected with Russia, but this may have<br />
something to do with the fact that most Finnish businesses have Russian contacts of some<br />
kind.<br />
The dramatic increase in the number of Russian motorists traversing the roads of Finland has<br />
not resulted in the expected massacre: in 1997 over 700 individuals died in the Finnish traffic,<br />
but only nine deaths were attributable to Russian drivers. With the dismal reputation of<br />
Russian drivers and vehicles, one would expect some depressing side-effects to an invasion of<br />
the Finnish roads by hundreds of thousands of Russians. The Finnish traffic police believe<br />
that the publicity concerning the dangers of Russian traffic has increased safety on the roads,<br />
as people drive more slowly and carefully in the presence of a Russian car, especially a truck.<br />
As you can see, although the facts of the Russian crime situation are alarming, the evidence of<br />
its wide-spread consequences in Finland is extremely hard to find.<br />
There are two simple and logical answers to this paradox. First, some may claim that Russian<br />
criminals are able to operate in Finland without fear of being detected, because Finnish law<br />
enforcement lacks the professional skills for uncovering qualitatively new and dangerous<br />
crime phenomena originating abroad. The second hypothesis for explaining this paradox<br />
37
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
forces us to investigate the crime situation in Russia, and the control mechanisms that shape<br />
it, more critically.<br />
The first explanation, blaming the inadequacies of law enforcement, has its advocates. They<br />
tend to emphasize the qualitatively specific nature of most of the crime originating in Russia,<br />
which makes it hidden, and thus difficult to expose by using conventional methods of law<br />
enforcement. According to this school of thought, the Russian criminal organizations create<br />
various contacts in Finland, but operate on a purely legitimate basis at first, switching to<br />
criminal operations once they are well-acquainted with the environment and have established<br />
contacts with Finnish bulvans. Those emphasizing the hidden nature of Russian crime seem to<br />
share a common prejudice: they are certain that Russian criminality is much more<br />
professional, intelligent and experienced that Finnish criminality.<br />
One is reminded of the conclusions drawn by the criminologist Otto Pollak in the 1960´s.<br />
According to Pollak, the criminality of women is of minor statistical significance, because<br />
women are cunning and treacherous, and thus less prone to being exposed by officials than<br />
men. Pollak believed that there are differences in the criminality of men and women, and as<br />
women tend to commit crimes in their homes, their crimes often go unreported and uninvestigated.<br />
Women are able to cover their crimes by using their feminine role: they may kill under<br />
the guise of providing shelter and comfort, or manipulate passion in order to betray and<br />
deceive. In addition, Pollak was of the opinion that women are punished less severely than<br />
male criminals, as the justice system tends to treat women more softly.<br />
Why is it, that many Finns imagine Russian criminality to be more hidden, and latent, than<br />
our domestic criminality? It does seem, that the Finnish public consciousness tends to view<br />
Russians much as Otto Pollak viewed women.<br />
The crime originating in Russia has one very odd dimension. Several of my informants in the<br />
Finnish and Swedish police forces - and also from other countries where Soviet emigrants<br />
have formed prominent communities - have claimed that crime originating in Russia often has<br />
a Jewish predomination.<br />
One leading Swedish expert of Swedish-Russian economic crime told me that the majority of<br />
the Russian-speaking economic criminals operating in Sweden are Jews, and that their ethnic<br />
characteristics make them naturally adept at economic crime. Several experts of Finnish law<br />
enforcement have told me that the country most infested with Russian crime is Israel, which<br />
has received the largest community of Russian Jewish emigrants.<br />
A very slight rhetorical tendency to blame the Jews runs through some of my research<br />
material. As some of the exposed criminals really are of Jewish descent, the information<br />
collected by the police may acquire dodgy elements of ethnic stereotyping. According to a<br />
Finnish policeperson, the leader of the biggest Russian-speaking drug organization exposed in<br />
Finland was indeed a Jew; a citizen of Israel, who only spoke Russian. According to my<br />
source, the man´s ethnic character facilitated his criminal career.<br />
At the same time, my informants in St. Petersburg law enforcement did not refer to Jews at all<br />
when discussing the principles of ethnic organization in the context of “organized crime”.<br />
They emphasized the role played by people of Caucasian origin, while stressing that most<br />
criminal organisations are not ethnically homogenous. Anti-semitic sentiments may be<br />
widespread in Russian society, but not among the police.<br />
38
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
However, going all the way to Canada, according to the Criminal Intelligenence Service of<br />
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police a particularly infamous criminal group of Russianspeakers<br />
in Ontario - tagged “Caucasians” - consisted purely of Jews. The Ontario criminal<br />
intelligence reported that the Jewish group was widely known as “The Beast”. It was also<br />
reported that the Jewish background of the group enabled the members to travel more easily<br />
in and out of the former Soviet Union. According to the Ontario police, Jews are present in<br />
the most powerful “Russian” criminal group as well.<br />
Why are Finnish, Swedish and Canadian law enforcers blaming Jews for the growth of<br />
Russian-speaking criminality on their soil, while the Russian officials make no such claims?<br />
Statistics do testify to the fact that Jews have been one of the most predominant nationality in<br />
emigrating from the former Soviet Union. With the collapse of the Soviet regime, over three<br />
million ethnic Russians returned to Russia, but at least one million ethnic Jews emigrated to<br />
Israel from the former Soviet Union. The statistics of the Israeli immigration ministry clearly<br />
show that the majority of the Soviet-Jewish emigrants have managed to find work as<br />
academics, researchers, physicians and teachers. The fact that Jews emigrate from Russia,<br />
while Slavic emigrants return to Russia, goes some of the way to explain the paradox above.<br />
The following hypthesis may be constructed: While the criminal activities prolifirate in<br />
Russia, most of the individuals emigrating to Finland and Sweden in fact represent the minor<br />
nationalities, among them Jews and Ingerian Finns, instead of actual Russians. While the<br />
police information indicates that many of the most serious criminals are in fact of Jewish<br />
descent, this becomes more understandable when one views the proportion of Jews among the<br />
emigrant population. This is one possible explanation why there is no evidence of Finland<br />
being infiltrated by criminality originating in Russia: The bulk of Jewish and other minority<br />
nationalities are more orientated to intellectual professions, and thus less prone to criminality.<br />
In addition, the minority nationalities have a long experience of harassment and intimidation<br />
by both Soviet and Russian officials, and thus may wish to keep out of trouble.<br />
On the other hand, blaming Jews for Russian-speaking crime has darker historical precedents.<br />
In addition to traditional Christendom and Nazi-Germany, recent history provides many<br />
examples of political campaigning when Jews have been associated with criminality. In the<br />
political rhetorics of several countries, communists, Jews and Russians have often formed a<br />
homogenous national security threat. For instance, in the United States of the 1950´s Senator<br />
Joseph R. McCarthy launched an anti-communist campaign, in the name of national security,<br />
which contained xenophobic and anti-semitic accents, aimed at prominent Jews as well, the<br />
majority of whom were of Eastern European origin. The scholar Daniel Goldhagen (1996) has<br />
illustrated the ways in which the labelling of Jews and their businesses as criminal and<br />
dangerous facilitated the persecution and eventual genocide of Jews by Nationalist Socialist<br />
Germany.<br />
Contemporary history-writing tends to isolate anti-semitism as a historical phenomenon, alien<br />
to our time, but my in my research I found the old prejudices alive and kicking. The<br />
association of dishonesty and crookedness with Russian-speakers, often defined as Jews, may<br />
well facilitate developments familiar from the beginning of the century. Uncertainty about the<br />
influence of the Russian markets on Europe may well contribute to scapegoating the Jews for<br />
economic and social instability, once again. The Swedish example of processing information<br />
concerning actual criminals of Jewish descent is evidence of this worrying trend.<br />
39
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
The racist hate crimes committed against Russian-speakers in Finland is another alarming<br />
phenomenon. In the ealy 1990´s the Finnish media engaged in a spectacular campaign of<br />
xenophobic, even racist, scaremongering against the Russian-speaking minority and Russian<br />
tourists. After the Soviet Union collapsed and the borders were opened, there were actual<br />
cases of Russian-speakers practicing efficient shoplifting and prostitution; the media pounced<br />
on these few instances and blew everything out of proportion. The popular image of Russian<br />
speakers as “thieves and prostitutes” was created very quickly, and this resulted in the<br />
creation of a culture of hate crimes. The assaults and attempted murders against Russianspeakers<br />
have not been committed by young fanatics or skinheads, but by ordinary, “mature”<br />
individuals. The typical stimulus has been the act of speaking Russian in a public space. The<br />
following examples registered by the Finnish police in 1996 and 1997 illustrate the nature of<br />
these hate crimes.<br />
- A 55-year-old Finnish male pensioner heard a woman speaking Russian in the centre of<br />
Helsinki after midnight. Suddenly he loudly called her “a whore” and struck her in the face<br />
- A 49-year-old Finnish Lutheran priest heard two young boys speaking Russian at the<br />
Helsinkin railway station. The priest said that “Russians are shit” and hit one of the boys on<br />
the head with a plastic bag full of glass bottles.<br />
- In the provincial town of Jaala, a 25-year-old Finnish woman wildly opened fire with a<br />
shotgun at a motel accommodating Russian tourists. Later she explained to the police that she<br />
had been overcome by “holy wrath” against the Russians, whom she considered to be<br />
prostitutes.<br />
- In Helsinki, a middle-aged Finnish man believed he had been robbed by a Russian the night<br />
before, and decided to kill the first Russian in sight. When he heard three men talking to each<br />
other in Russian on the street, he went to buy a Mora-knife and stabbed one of the men.<br />
In addition to the violent hate crimes above, Russian-speakers are under a constant barrage of<br />
public verbal abuse, with the words “whore”, “thief” and “mafia” being bandied about by the<br />
Finnish citizens. It is hardly surprising, that the over 20,000 Russian-speakers resident in<br />
Finland tend to avoid speaking Russian in public places.<br />
When two Finnish policemen were murdered in the centre of Helsinki in 1997, public opinion<br />
was instantly convinced that the murderer was Russian, because the man had spoken English,<br />
and because newspaper reports claimed that the man had carried his bag “in a Russian<br />
manner”. All those concerned about Finnish-Russian relations breathed a sigh of relief, when<br />
the murderer turned out to be a Dane.<br />
The activities instigated by the public hysteria about Russian criminality are a deeper cause of<br />
worry for the police than Russian criminality itself. Besides the hate crimes, the Finnish<br />
public is working up a demand for illegal or semi-legal goods and services, such as smuggled<br />
alcohol, cigarettes, drugs, sexual services and stolen goods. Similar public demand is<br />
promoting such supply in Northern Norway as well. The following example sheds some light<br />
on this problem.<br />
In 1997, investigative journalists revealed the existence of a couple of small brothels<br />
operating in Eastern Finland. There were claims that the “Russian Mafia” is entering the<br />
40
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
country via the brothels. The public called for a quick investigation, prosecution and<br />
sentences, but the publicity had quite the opposite effect. Hundreds of men from all over<br />
Finland flocked to one of the brothels, which closed down because of the attention. However,<br />
another brothel operated during the investigation, continued to operate after the prosecution<br />
and was doing well after the sentences. The fact that individual prostitution is not illegal, and<br />
the fact that evidence of procuring is difficult to produce, fade into insignificance where the<br />
wide demand for prostitution is concerned.<br />
The moralistic crusade initiated by the press, resulting in minor riots and assaults on the<br />
Russian-speaking population, may yet cause more work for the police than the actual<br />
suspected crimes. On the other hand, the more responsible segments of the Finnish media<br />
have reacted to the negative developments, trying to remind the public that being a Russianspeaker<br />
does not justify being branded as “a thief” or “a prostitute”.<br />
Accordingly, we should question the necessity of categorizing crime in terms of nationality,<br />
ethnicity or citizenship when dealing with “Russian crime”, as such categorizations tend to<br />
produce xenophobic and racist sentiments among the public.<br />
In preventing criminality resulting from the opening of the borders during the 1990´s, Finnish<br />
law enforcement has developed a sort of a security agenda for conceptualising the phenomena<br />
and for focusing the preventive measures. This agenda, based upon experience, claims that<br />
qualitatively the Russian-speaking criminality has brought practically nothing new to the<br />
Finnish crime scene, except for the new possibilities that have opened up for Finnish<br />
criminals. Cases resembling organized crime have included the illegal trade in alcohol and<br />
tobacco and prostitution, as well as more severe cases of organized automobile thefts,<br />
international drug-trafficking, procuring and economic crime over the Finnish-Russian<br />
border. Although such cases receive wide public attention, they are not numerous in<br />
comparison with Finnish domestic crimes.<br />
Individuals of different citizenships and ethnic backgrounds have usually collaborated in such<br />
crimes, without emphasis on nationality of ethnicity. Finnish citizens have worked together<br />
with Estonians and Russians, Finnish citizens of Russian or Estonian origin, or with the<br />
Ingerian Finns who hold Russian passports but have residence permits in Finland because of<br />
their ethnic background. In addition, the criminals of different nationalities operate in<br />
different territories.<br />
Finnish professional criminals are known by the police to control parts of the Estonian drug<br />
trade together with their Estonian and Russian counterparts, and dodgy Finnish businessmen<br />
are known to operate in both North-West Russia and the territory of Finland, operating<br />
together with the Russians by cheating each other and evading taxes in both countries. Some<br />
Finnish businesses are cheating the Russian tax officials by systematic double-billing, but<br />
Finnish officials have not been willing to report their names to the Russian officials, since the<br />
crimes have not been committed on Finnish territory. Moreover, as some have said, cheating<br />
Russian tax officials is beneficial for the Finnish national economy.<br />
All this undermines the significance of citizenship-based or geographically defined statistical<br />
measurements of crime, and its reliability when investigating the crime phenomena in<br />
question. In general, one should speak of internationalizing net<strong>works</strong> of Finnish, Russian and<br />
Estonian criminals, who communicate by speaking English, Finnish or Russian.<br />
41
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
The police generally agree that in the framework of ordinary crime prevention and its<br />
development, the crime originating in Russia can be successfully prevented, which means that<br />
there is no need for a special unit for combating crime originating in Russia. Instead, the<br />
police are calling for developing and strengthening cooperation with Russian law enforcement<br />
in the framework of developing the implementation of the intergovernmental crime<br />
prevention agreement, and developing the activities of the liaison officers working in Russia.<br />
The liaison officials begun their work on Russian territory in 1991, and the crime prevention<br />
agreement was ratified in 1993. However, the establishment of positions for liaison officers<br />
and signing crime prevention cooperation agreements is not enough. Effective<br />
implementation calls for the development of long-lasting personal ties between the officials of<br />
the two countries. Such development needs time. With such extensive, long term crime<br />
prevention between Finland and Russia, the possibilities of Russian crime influencing Finland<br />
remain minute.<br />
The problem remains, that not all countries are open to such development. Some countries<br />
will not develop cooperation, because their officials and politicians view their Russian<br />
counterparts as being immoral, criminal and corrupt. They suspect Russian officials of being<br />
in thrall to organized crime, of extorting bribes, or working as spies, or deceiving their<br />
Western counterparts in other ways. This is especially true of some Estonian officials. The<br />
Estonian member of parliamemt Ando Leps has written that “organized crime” of Estonia is<br />
purely a Russian import, and that the activities of the “Russian mafia” are actually directed<br />
and approved by “corrupt chauvinist officials in Russian bodies of power”, who want to keep<br />
Estonia in the Russian sphere of influence at any cost. Such sentiments are obviously a<br />
hindrance to cooperation.<br />
What are the problems ecnountered by Finnish law enforcement officials when cooperating<br />
with their Russian colleagues? In my interviews I tried to cover every possible aspect of the<br />
cooperation between Finnish and Russian law enforcement officials, trying to find the<br />
problems related with inefficiency on the Russian side, as well as more general problems of<br />
cooperation. None of the present or former Finnish liaison officers were able to report a single<br />
case of suspected abuse of office on the Russian side. On the whole, the Finnish liaison<br />
officers praised the efficiency of the Russians, thus debunking several old myths about the<br />
Russians. The problems tended to be mutual; red tape and language problems.<br />
The reluctance of some countries to take part in such cooperation may simply result in the<br />
actual growth of Russia-related crime problems in such countries. We may well ask why<br />
some of the leading criminal figures of St. Petersburg have been well represented in Sweden,<br />
but not in Finland. It is possible that “organised crime” originating in Russia may enter<br />
Finland in the future, but this time from the West.<br />
In addition to the problems prevented in the framework of the ordinary crime prevention<br />
agenda, the Finnish Security Police has also defined the actual national security threats caused<br />
by crime originating in Russia. The central focus of the Security Police is on economic security,<br />
and the security of “the structure of society”, as defined by the police. By “the structure<br />
of the society” the officials of the Finnish Security Police mean mainly the members of the<br />
political, economic and administrative elites of Finland. The fact that the members of the<br />
ruling elite often have complex connections of an economic nature to various instances or<br />
among themselves, is a cause of worry for the police, as such connections may be used by<br />
criminals in influencing and corrupting political, adminstrative or economic decision-making.<br />
42
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
This is a major concern of the police, as such relations are generally unhealthy and pose a<br />
threat to national security, as Russian professional criminals, as well as instances representing<br />
non-criminal interests, may easily utilise the inadequacies of the “structure of society”. The<br />
informants from the Security Police also said that such connections of economic nature<br />
among the ruling elites of Finland closely resemble the equivalent situation in Russia, which<br />
adds to the paradoxical nature of the situation.<br />
I will now come back to the paradox mentioned in the beginning. Why is it that the explosive<br />
growth of crime in Russia, and the qualitative and quantitative changes, along with the<br />
growing interaction between Finland and Russia, have not affected the Finnish crime situation<br />
to a greater extent? Here we encounter the phenomenon of cultural differences in policing,<br />
especially differences in the control mechanisms that shape crime. What is evident, is that the<br />
control mechanisms of Russia produce a much higher crime rate than the equivalent system in<br />
Finland. <strong>Crime</strong> rates are higher in Russia, and the crimes are qualitatively more serious.<br />
Understanding the paradox calls for a critical evaluation of the Russian crime situation, and<br />
this includes a study of the control mechanisms that produce crime, as well as moral codes in<br />
general.<br />
Many distinguished scholars, such as Louise I. Shelley (1996) and Peter H. Solomon (1996),<br />
have shown how the Soviet Union did succeed in the creation of a monolithic police state,<br />
authorizing the police to intervene in most aspects of the lives of the citizens. All elements<br />
that contradicted the state interests were considered criminal, especially profit-making and<br />
private business were condemned as seriously damaging to society.<br />
When the regime collapsed, the function of policing faced various changes, which resulted in<br />
changes in the production of crime. However, the main hypothesis is not the fact that the<br />
crime control, in the context of producing crime, changed more than the actual crime<br />
situation, but that the mechanisms of crime control and crime production remained relatively<br />
constant. This resulted in the inflation of crime, and the relative growth in the production of<br />
crime, compared to the actual crime situation.<br />
Several factors may be isolated when studying the sources of the inflation of crime in<br />
contemporary Russia. I shall now briefly explain how the function of policing accordingly<br />
changed the practices of crime registration, the implementation of the theory of criminal law,<br />
the general anti-market sentiments, the growth of private policing, and the undefined sphere<br />
of emerging relations between the public and private spheres. All these contributed to the<br />
inflation of crime.<br />
The crime rate increased not only because of actual crime, but with the change in the position<br />
and function of the police. My informants revealed how the police under the old regime<br />
attempted to minimize the amount of registered crime because of administrational, political<br />
and practical reasons, but after the changes they begun to register as many crimes as possible,<br />
also for various reasons. The result was a growth in crime, or a growth in the production of<br />
crime by crime control, which resulted in the inflation of crime.<br />
One important factor is the theory of Russian criminal law. According to the theoretical<br />
principles, all phenomena that run counter to the interests of the state are defined as “socially<br />
dangerous”, and all socially dangerous phenomena are defined as crime by the crime control<br />
system. The system of crime control does not attempt to integrate the deviant elements, but<br />
<strong>works</strong> to isolate elements that oppose state interests, and eventually to eliminate them. Backed<br />
43
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
by the theory of criminal law, and motivated by a resistance to change, Russian law enforcement<br />
has succeeded in implementing exceptional measures, and in producing more crime.<br />
This is reflected in legal reforms and their implementation, presidential decrees, and the<br />
establishment of new law enforcement agencies which reveal considerable growth in the<br />
production of crime. In comparison to the European Union, for instance, the Russian<br />
Federation has been highly effective in defining the phenomena described as “organized<br />
crime” as the principal enemy of state and society, and also in the context of producing<br />
“organized crime”.<br />
The Russian moral codes that condemn private enterprise and profiteering are also<br />
contributing to the inflation of crime. As business and profit-making was criminalized<br />
speculation, and punished as such, during the eight decades of Soviet rule, it is hardly<br />
surprising that the majority of the people have negative attitudes towards private business and<br />
its players, condemning them as criminal. Profit-making is causing social tension because of<br />
the drastically increasing social inequality. This is naturally considered a threat to state<br />
interests, and in effect criminal. Ironically, the crime-orientated interpretations of Russian<br />
capitalism that are being offered to the world consciousness draw their inspiration from the<br />
dregs of Soviet moral codes. The vulgar leftist background of some Western social scientists,<br />
especially in Scandinavia, <strong>works</strong> to bolster such interpretations.<br />
One of the factors promoting the inflation of crime is the emergence of private security<br />
policing in Russia. Such activities are often seen as a form of criminal extortion, but more<br />
critical evaluation of such sentiments speak for the inflation of crime. Private security<br />
companies are the principal cause of the collapse of monolithic state control, thus constituting<br />
the principal threat to the state agencies. Producing an image of criminal threats in the<br />
emerging markets is ultimately in the best interests of the private security businesses themselves,<br />
as such images increase the demand for security services. This also <strong>works</strong> to promote<br />
the inflation of crime.<br />
The concept of corruption has also fallen victim to inflation. The newly established relations<br />
between private businesses and state officials have become an object of inflated discussion, as<br />
the old moral codes condemn the dabblings of state officials in commercial affairs as<br />
criminal. In Finland such revelations are a part of everyday life. In addition, corruption<br />
scandals are extensively utilized in the solving of political conflicts of interest.<br />
Even prostitution has become inflated. Several of my informants said that prostitution is<br />
proliferating in Russia at an alarming rate, but when asked <strong>what</strong> they meant by prostitution,<br />
they included in the concept all immoral practices made possible by the market economy,<br />
such as the housewife institution or cohabiting adolescents. Of course there are huge numbers<br />
of actual prostitutes as well, but categorising all housewifes in the same group does seem<br />
inflated.<br />
The word “mafia” is also used very liberally by many Russians. Mafia often refers to all<br />
possible aspects of contemporary society which contradict the past.<br />
The ultimate result of the inflation of crime is, that as the legistlators and enforcers react to<br />
such public concerns, the autocratic model of policing becomes predominant.<br />
Ladies and gentlemen.<br />
44
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
The impact of Russia´s crime situation on the crime situation in Finland clearly shows that<br />
there is a cultural division between the two national traditions that produce crime and<br />
criminals. In accordance with my hypothesis, the crime-infested image of Russia being<br />
produced for our consciousness is fundamentally a product of Russian societal processes that<br />
promote inflated arguments about the crime situation. The mechanisms of crime control work<br />
to result in the inflation of crime. The information produced in Russia tends to become<br />
inflated, especially when projected onto the Finnish, or European forum.<br />
Although understanding the differences in systems of crime control, the new European<br />
security agenda is prone to exploiting this process of inflation. Thus it may be turned into an<br />
inflation of security, and help in the construction of a common threat, and in the forging of a<br />
common identity. This would naturally promote the creation of a central system of control in<br />
Europe.<br />
However, in the Russian Federation the centralized control systems for combating “organized<br />
crime” are highly developed and severe, and the inflation of crime has resulted in discussion<br />
about actual human rights violations. In addition, nationalistic, xenophobic and anti-semitic<br />
tendencies are being nurtured by the inflation of crime.<br />
Ultimately it depends on European political conjectures, especially economic policy, how and<br />
where the societal processes producing inflatory crime concepts are being utilized.<br />
Thank you for your attention.<br />
45
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Anna Markina, Lecturer<br />
Department of Criminology and Sociology of Deviant Behaviour<br />
National Defence and Public Service Academy<br />
61 Kase tee, 00020 Tallinn, Estland<br />
e-mail: anna@endpsa.ee<br />
46<br />
On Profiling <strong>Organised</strong> <strong>Crime</strong> in Estonia<br />
Introduction<br />
One and a half year ago I prepared my first paper on organised crime that was presented here,<br />
in Espoo. The data sources I then used were interviews with law enforcement officials,<br />
mainly the members of the Estonian <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> Committee. Since, I have concentrated<br />
my research on organised crime problems. I have tried to collect information on organised<br />
crime from any official data source. Besides the interviews with law enforcement officials, I<br />
have used memos issued by the Estonian Criminal Police, the responses to the organised<br />
crime surveys from the Europol. Finally, I have composed my own very short questionnaire.<br />
In this paper I will give the overview of the sources and try to compose the whole picture of<br />
organised crime as it is seen by the Estonian Law Enforcement agencies.<br />
I am completely aware that the data from the police or prosecution are not the only sources<br />
for information about organised crime. Interviewing criminals and mass media analysis are<br />
the other possibilities.<br />
What is profiled?<br />
First of all, we should agree on <strong>what</strong> is profiled when one is talking about 'organised crime'. It<br />
is necessary to start with the clarification of the terms used. Although starting every paper<br />
with the definition of organised crime seems to be boring, the definition of the phenomenon<br />
could not be omitted since it varies from country to country and even from expert to expert.<br />
The notion 'organised crime' is not mentioned in the Estonian Criminal Code or any other<br />
legal act in Estonia. The only appropriate definition is given in paragraph 196'1 in the<br />
Estonian Criminal Code in which 'criminal alliance' is defined as: "a stable group of three or<br />
more persons with division of labour, associated for the purpose of committing offences of<br />
the first and second degree".<br />
The expression 'criminal group' (which is not the same as a group of criminals) is often used<br />
synonymously for the 'criminal alliance'. When talking about organised crime, Estonian<br />
experts as a rule talk about criminal groups. In this way, the definition of organised crime how<br />
Estonian policemen use it could be roughly re-formulated as "<strong>Organised</strong> crime is a sum of<br />
criminal groups". Therefore, following this definition, one should describe all the groups in<br />
order to describe organised crime in Estonia. From a criminological point of view the<br />
phenomenon of organised crime and criminal groups are not the same. A simple description<br />
of the organised crime groups does not take into account societal consequences of organised<br />
crime.<br />
It is worth to mention that in fact, criminal alliance, in turn, is treated as a number of<br />
criminals acting together. Often the number of groups per 100,000 population measures the
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
extent of organised crime in a region and the number of members in it estimates the group.1<br />
Although I use data about the number of groups and the size of groups in this paper, I ask the<br />
reader to be critical. This simplification is probably unavoidable and even necessary while it<br />
is one of the possibilities to describe somehow this complex latent phenomenon. The usage of<br />
numeric data gives us some estimation of the number of professional criminals rather than<br />
describes organised crime.<br />
<strong>Organised</strong> crime story<br />
The conclusions below are made on the basis of more than 10 interviews and talks with highranking<br />
law enforcement officials from the Estonian Police Board and the Estonian Security<br />
Police during 1996-1997, and several memos written by the departments to the Ministry of<br />
Interior.<br />
Short history<br />
The emergence of organised crime in Estonia could be dated to the eighties, when the first<br />
criminals, who could be considered organised, came to Estonia. Some law enforcement<br />
officials suggest that the rise of organised crime started in the very beginning of the 1980s.<br />
The preparation work for the 1980 Olympic Games caused one of the biggest waves of<br />
migration into Estonia during the years of the Soviet occupation. Along with construction<br />
workers, a number of criminals came to Estonia. Ordinary people as well as criminals were<br />
attracted to the Baltic States by proximity to the West, higher living standards and a more<br />
liberal regime compared to the other parts of the Soviet Union. The activities of these newly<br />
arrived criminals included fraud, pickpocketing, and illegal money exchange.<br />
The majority of experts, however, suggest that the first organised crime groups appeared in<br />
Estonia during the subsequent period of perestroika that opened up new opportunities for<br />
business. The first organised criminal association formed and acting on the territory of<br />
Estonia was a group of sportsmen operating a protection racket. The first outside criminal<br />
group came to Estonia from the Russian part of the Soviet Union in the end of the 1980s. The<br />
activity of newcomers was mainly gambling on the streets, a new phenomenon in Estonia. At<br />
the end of the 80s there were already several organised groups of criminals in Estonia that<br />
were mainly engaged in illegal gambling and racketeering.<br />
Although some economic reforms started earlier, the re-establishing of Estonian<br />
independence in 1991 could be considered as the crucial point of transition from socialism to<br />
a market-oriented economy. Of various kinds of entrepreneurial activities, trade in nonferrous<br />
metals, either legal or illegal, became most popular in Estonia. Metals were exported<br />
mostly from Russia to the West. During that period, often referred to as the Estonian ‘Metal<br />
Age’, several organised crime groups made their initial capital. To estimate the scope of the<br />
trade and the profit made, it should be mentioned that in 1993 Estonia became one of the topten<br />
exporters in non-ferrous metals in the world. To the extent that enormous profits were<br />
involved, the battle between organised crime groups about the spheres of interest became<br />
extremely violent. Homicide statistics show considerable growth in 1992-1994. The money<br />
that organised crime groups gained from the metal export trade was eventually invested into<br />
both legal and illegal business.<br />
1 See, for example: ‘<strong>Organised</strong> <strong>Crime</strong> in the Baltic Region. Collected Articles’, Criminological Research Centre.<br />
Riga, November 1997, p. 235.<br />
47<br />
Kommentar [FL1]: (Можно<br />
провести паралель с<br />
экономикой. Число занятых в<br />
данной организации(компании)<br />
также как и число предприятий в<br />
регионе может как-то описать<br />
экономическое положение, но<br />
ничего не скажет о том,<br />
преуспевает ли предприятие, не<br />
даст возможность ничего сказать<br />
об экономике данного региона.)
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Since 1994 Estonia and Russia passed several laws to regulate the metal export trade: Russia<br />
introduced 100 percent taxation, and Estonia declared a state monopoly on metal exports.<br />
Also the border between the two states became stricter. The metal trade was no longer so<br />
profitable. <strong>Organised</strong> crime groups moved their money into new business areas: economic<br />
crimes, tax evasion, and smuggling, mainly in drugs. As one Estonian law official expressed<br />
it, “organised criminals started to move towards a purely Western type of thinking.”2 At that<br />
time also Estonian-speaking criminal groups and authorities appeared.<br />
The current activities of criminal groups<br />
The formative stage of Estonian organised crime is by now more or less completed.<br />
According to the police, the main reason for this is the end of the inflow of criminal groups<br />
from the outside, usually from Russia. This is, on the one hand, due to improved police work<br />
and stricter border regime, and, on the other hand, the desire of local criminal groups not to<br />
allow new competitors into Estonia. Although at the earlier stages some of the groups have<br />
been led by groups from Russia, these relations have recently weakened considerably.3 It is<br />
possible to recognise this trend by looking at the names of the groups. If in the late 1980s and<br />
early 1990s the groups were named according to the origins of their leaders (for example,<br />
Krasnodar, Perm, Solekamsk, etc.), today groups are usually called by the names of their<br />
leaders living in Estonia. The structure and nature of relations between criminal organisations<br />
from Russia and Estonia has changed. Russian groups communicate no longer directly with<br />
particular Estonian groups, but through the recognised Estonian leaders. The relations of<br />
subordination and control between groups are thus replaced by economic links.<br />
Police reports identify about 10-20 organised crime groups operating in Estonia today. It<br />
should be mentioned that organised crime groups in Estonia are “divided” by the police into<br />
Russian groups and Estonian ones. Taking into account the changes in relations between the<br />
Russian and Estonian underworld, the term "Russian" refers to the Estonian criminal groups<br />
mainly composed of criminals whose ethnic background is Russian, Ukrainian, etc. The<br />
activities of “Russians” and “Estonians” are different. Russian gangs’ traditional activities are<br />
racket, theft of auto vehicles, violent crimes. Estonian criminal groups are engaged in<br />
economic crimes, tax evasion, and smuggling. This division is not only according to the<br />
ethnic composition of the groups. To some extent this is a differentiation between "old" and<br />
"new" crime. Violent crimes, theft, racketeering, illegal gambling and prostitution are types of<br />
crimes that are already familiar to the police, and there are traditions and skills to detect and<br />
combat them. In contrast, corruption, money laundering, tax fraud, and transnational criminal<br />
links are relatively new phenomenons. The Estonian police lacks necessary skills, equipment,<br />
legislation, and even knowledge about these types of crimes.<br />
Exploiting its geographical position, the traditionally strong links between Estonian organised<br />
crime and criminal groups from Russia, and new links with criminal groups from the Western<br />
countries, Estonia became a transit point for illegal goods, especially drugs and alcohol. The<br />
main partners in drug smuggling are groups in Russia, Finland and Sweden. The role of<br />
organised crime groups from Russia was already discussed. However, criminal organisations<br />
from Sweden and Finland are performing on the Estonian stage as well. Estonian police has<br />
solved a case in which smuggling of illicit drugs through Estonia to Sweden was organised by<br />
Swedish criminals. It is also a recent trend that not only transit of narcotics to Finland but also<br />
2 Anvelt Andres, Interview conducted in Tallinn 23.09.1997.<br />
3 Estonian Police Board, Information on <strong>Organised</strong> <strong>Crime</strong> , in manuscript (in Estonian, 1997).<br />
48
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
production of drugs in Estonia is organised by Finnish criminals. The next links in the chain<br />
include drug transportation to Finland, and money laundering in Estonia.4<br />
To sum up, in the situation when official statistics on criminal groups does not exist, the<br />
narratives from the law enforcement officials give an opportunity to follow the dynamics of<br />
groups and their activities. The generalised approach, where not separate groups but criminal<br />
activities are discussed, gives the possibility to differentiate several stages in the development<br />
of organised crime. The following stages could be distinguished:<br />
1. Formational stage "Racket and gambling"<br />
2. The stage of collecting initial capital, so called "Metal Age"<br />
3. The division of spheres of interest, "Bloody Autumn"<br />
4. Drug trade and smuggling, "Western crimes"<br />
While expert interviews are the best to describe the qualitative changes in organised crime,<br />
they do not provide the base for an estimation of the extent of organised crime and does not<br />
allow any comparison between countries. If a quantitative estimation or comparison is the<br />
goal, more formal data are usually needed. In that case criminal statistics and surveys could<br />
help.<br />
Questionnaire<br />
All the questionnaires on organised crime I have seen describe organised crime groups<br />
according to some common criteria, in order to create a basis for systematic analysis. In the<br />
explanatory notes to the questionnaire on criminal organisations active in the Netherlands it is<br />
said, that this form of profiling criminal groups "makes it possible to typify the known<br />
criminal groupings in a short time on the basis of a number of essential characteristics"5. The<br />
Expert Group on <strong>Organised</strong> <strong>Crime</strong> of the Council of Europe has developed a set of criteria<br />
through which organised crime could be defined. These criteria (1 through 4 are mandatory,<br />
the other optional) include:<br />
1. Collaboration of three or more people;<br />
2. For a prolonged or indefinite period of time;<br />
3. Suspected or convicted of committing serious criminal offences;<br />
4. With the objective of pursuing profit and/or power;<br />
5. Having a specific task or role for each participant;<br />
6. Using some form of internal discipline and control;<br />
7. Using violence or other means suitable for intimidation;<br />
8. Exerting influence on politics, the media, public administration, law<br />
enforcement, the administration of justice or the economy by corruption or<br />
any other means;<br />
9. Using commercial or business-like structures;<br />
10. Engaging in money laundering;<br />
11. Operating on an international level6<br />
4 Anvelt, Op.Cit.<br />
5 A contribution of the Netherlands Delegation to the World Ministerial Conference on <strong>Organised</strong> Transnational<br />
<strong>Crime</strong>, Naples 21-23 November 1994, p. 63.<br />
6 Criteria are listed in: Sabrina Adamoli, Andrea Di Nicola, Ernesto U. Savona, and Paola Zoffi. "<strong>Organised</strong><br />
<strong>Crime</strong> Around the World", HEUNI Publication Series No. 31, Helsinki 1998, p. 9.<br />
49
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
These criteria were included into a short questionnaire distributed to the Estonian Police<br />
Board and Security Police in April 1998. At the moment I have responses from the Security<br />
Police, but am still waiting for responses from the Police Board. The Security Police reported<br />
data about 9 criminal groups. Each group satisfies all criteria listed above.7 For details I also<br />
used information from the PC-CO questionnaire completed by Security Police and the Police<br />
department.<br />
In addition to the information obtained from the interviews, it could be said that two thirds of<br />
the reported groups are associated either with the Estonian capital Tallinn or its<br />
neighbourhood. However, groups are operating on a regional, a national (Estonian), as well as<br />
an international level (mostly in Russia). International links usually include Russia. One of<br />
the groups co-operates with group(s) from Scandinavia, and the Chechens' group has<br />
relationships with their compatriots in other countries. The groups also have relationships<br />
with each other.<br />
The groups reported in the survey have been operated on a long-term basis. The "oldest" for<br />
10, the "youngest" for at least 4 years.<br />
According to the survey results each groups contains at least 10 members. It is quite possible<br />
that due to the specifics of their tasks the Security Police are not dealing with smaller groups.<br />
The biggest group reported incorporates more than 100 members. The size of four groups<br />
could be estimated as 10 to 20 individuals; another 4 groups are bigger, with 30 to 50<br />
members. The Security Police notify that groups with more than 10 members have a<br />
hierarchical structure with a "leader", and "inspectors" on specific types of crime. On the<br />
lower level there are small groups of 3-4 persons, one of whom is "responsible".<br />
The questionnaire contained questions about the ethnic composition of the groups. Two of<br />
nine groups are ethnically homogeneous. Those are Estonians and Chechens. The other<br />
groups have members of different ethnic origins. The Security Police estimates the proportion<br />
of non-Estonians in criminals to be 75%.<br />
7 When looking through the report made on the basis of the questionnaire, Security Police commented these data.<br />
They added that there are more than 9 criminal groups in Estonia. 3 of 9 groups do not exist any more thanks to<br />
the Security Police effort.<br />
50
Table 1. Criminal activities groups are involved in.<br />
Criminal activity The number of<br />
groups involved<br />
in<br />
Extortion 9<br />
Fraud 8<br />
Kidnapping 6<br />
Robbery 5<br />
Housebreaking 5<br />
Vehicle theft 5<br />
Narcotics 5<br />
Armed robbery 4<br />
Homicide 2<br />
Prostitution 2<br />
Illegal gambling schemes 1<br />
Counterfeiting 1<br />
Other types of crime 6<br />
Source: Questionnaire<br />
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Table 1 gives the overview of the types of criminal activities that the groups are involved in.<br />
All groups practise extortion and almost all of them are involved in fraud. Quite remarkable is<br />
the fact that no group was involved in illegal trade in firearms, although this option was listed.<br />
The results of the questionnaire also showed that all the groups are believed to be involved in<br />
money laundering. Money laundering, however, is not criminalised in Estonia yet.<br />
Statistical data<br />
There is no statistics on how many persons were accused on organising or belonging to a<br />
criminal alliance (§ 196'1). From the interviews with experts and the questionnaire we could,<br />
however, conclude <strong>what</strong> types of crime could be the reflection of organised criminal<br />
activities. Extortion, as we have seen before, is a type of criminal activity that all the groups<br />
are involved in. The data on registered cases of extortion should reflect the scope of this<br />
activity, if we could trust criminal statistics at all.<br />
The idea is to examine the rate of the types of crime most common for criminal groups. The<br />
other possibility is to look at the number of persons under prosecution for cleared offences<br />
together with some other characteristics of offences available from crime statistics. There are<br />
two parameters I would like to look at. Firstly, if the criminal offence was committed in a<br />
group or not, and, secondly, the ethnic background of the offender.<br />
51
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Table 2. The number of registered offences and persons convicted in Estonia 1995-1997<br />
1995 1996 1997<br />
Extortion<br />
registered offences 195 169 194<br />
persons convicted 151 137 138<br />
- in group 124 111 112<br />
Estonians (%)<br />
Fraud<br />
- 33% 37%<br />
registered offences 869 890 1863<br />
persons convicted 136 187 210<br />
- in group 73 119 108<br />
Estonians (%)<br />
Narcotics<br />
71% 72%<br />
registered offences 51 115 114<br />
persons convicted - 74 85<br />
- in group - 21 24<br />
Estonians (%)<br />
Economic crimes<br />
- 19% 28%<br />
registered offences 186 196 504<br />
persons convicted 74 82 167<br />
- in group 11 11 26<br />
Estonians (%) - 83% 91%<br />
Source: Statistical Bureau of Estonian Police Board<br />
The data on persons who have committed crimes in co-operation with others is interesting<br />
because it is the only possibility to reflect activities of criminal group members. The<br />
limitation in this case is, of course, that it is impossible to distinguish between groups of<br />
criminals and criminal groups. Data presented in table 2 show that the number of registered<br />
cases of extortion, the activity that all the criminal groupings are involved in, remains more or<br />
less stable over the last three years. Data on narcotics and economic crimes shows<br />
considerable growth.<br />
The data on fraud should be commented separately. The number of registered fraud has<br />
increased by 109% from 890 in 1996 to 1863 in 1997. Without taking into account data on<br />
persons convicted, the situation could be alarming. The increase in the number of persons<br />
convicted of this type of crime is not so dramatic (increase by 12%). Fraud is the type of<br />
crime that has a rather high clearance rate: according to the Police Board data 68% of<br />
recorded frauds were cleared in 1997. Putting together data on recorded cases and convicted<br />
persons we could say that the same number of criminals commit more frauds. From the<br />
interviews I have learned, that in 1997 a group of criminals involved in numerous frauds was<br />
caught, and each fraud was convicted (and recorded) separately.<br />
<strong>Organised</strong> crime often has an ethnic dimension. In one interview with an expert, organised<br />
crime was defined as ‘the number of crimes committed by non-Estonians’. From the<br />
questionnaire we have learned that there are no homogeneous Russian groups and that 75% of<br />
criminal group members are non-Estonians. It gave me the idea to look at the ethnic<br />
background of the persons under prosecution. Again, there are the same limitations as in the<br />
case of offences committed by groups. The percentage of convicted individuals, who have an<br />
52
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Estonian background, is growing in all types of crime. The explanation could be quite simple:<br />
the proportion of Estonians in the population is growing as well. As we can see, the<br />
involvement of Estonians is higher in economic types of crime. These numbers support the<br />
information obtained from the interviews with policemen.<br />
To sum up, the numerical data on recorded crimes does not provide enough information to<br />
make any conclusion about the extent of organised crime in Estonia. It could be used,<br />
however in combination with the information gained from the interviews with law<br />
enforcement officials to illustrate some trends. On the other hand, interview data could and<br />
should be used to interpret crime statistics.<br />
Conclusions<br />
In the presented paper three sources of information about organised crime were analysed:<br />
interviews with police officials, questionnaire data and crime statistics.<br />
The most informative source has with no doubts been the interviews with officials. This is the<br />
best source for data about the groups, about the history of organised crime and the trends.<br />
Only interviews could clarify the usage of terms by the police. This, in turn, can help to avoid<br />
some misunderstandings.<br />
The questionnaires help when there is a need for quantitative information and there is no<br />
official statistics available. Questionnaire could, probably, help to follow the changes in the<br />
activities of organised crime groups in one particular country. I would, however, be critical to<br />
use these data for comparisons between countries. The questionnaire is also useful to make<br />
information gained from the interviews more concrete because it does not allow<br />
generalisations.<br />
<strong>Crime</strong> statistics in the way it exists in Estonia now could be used to illustrate the data on<br />
organised crime group activities that was collected from the other sources.<br />
53
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Maya Rusakova and Yakov Kostjukovski<br />
Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Science Deviantology Center<br />
7 th Krasnoarmeiskaya 25/14<br />
198052 St. Petersburg, Russia<br />
e-mail: inso@ego.spb.su<br />
54<br />
<strong>Organised</strong> <strong>Crime</strong> and the Narcotics Business in St.Petersburg 1<br />
The use of illegal drugs and the role of organised crime in the narcotics market are difficult to<br />
investigate because these remain hidden to a very high degree. Empirical research employing<br />
techniques such as participant observation and interviews of drug users, offenders, and other<br />
informants with first-hand knowledge of the subject, allows you to get into the very center of<br />
events, to see the underworld from the inside with “aboriginal eyes”.<br />
<strong>Organised</strong> crime constantly expands its sphere of influence. “Money-making” remains the<br />
priority, but it is accompanied with others: crime organisations are interested in access to state<br />
structures, and in influencing economy and policy. Thus, quantitative change of crime<br />
succesfully passes to qualitative change. In today´s talk about the criminal elements being on<br />
the way to “capture” authority, “capture” does not mean “war”. It is rather a matter of fusion,<br />
criminal structures having abundant experience of cooperation with business, political parties<br />
and other central elements of society.<br />
Today´s business world is strongly coordinated with organised crime. This is not a matter of a<br />
criminal takeover. <strong>Crime</strong> organisations have for a long time been successfully involved in the<br />
privatization process, and in banking operations, credits, and the mortgage business. The<br />
criminal organisations become a kind of hybrids of the criminal-business enterprise. Many of<br />
them are capable not only of taking a bank “under their wing” but they have also been able to<br />
open their own bank. Thus “obshak” (criminal organisation money) is turned into money that<br />
can be invested and turned into productive capital. This structure can be more effective than<br />
the state because crime organisations have access to a coercion apparatus that is more likely<br />
to produce results than state operations.<br />
In comparison with 1993-1994, the situation in the criminal world is rather quiet. There are<br />
serious reasons to believe that it is “a quiet before thunder”. Year by year, St.Petersburg<br />
receives more criminal money from Moscow. St.Petersburg is one of the largest business<br />
centers of the country. With seaport, airport, railway stations, its location close to the border<br />
(“window to Europe”), the city is extremely attractive for contrabandists, swindlers in the art<br />
business, antique swindlers and other professional criminals. According to expert opinion,<br />
Moscow is not only the political but also the criminal capital of Russia. Moscow money<br />
introduces managers, owners and their interests into St.Petersburg. The conflict in this field is<br />
inevitable.<br />
<strong>Organised</strong> crime as business means supply of goods and services, which are illegal but have a<br />
large demand. Narcotics trade is one of the most profitable of such activities. Police arrest the<br />
weakest and less organised narcotics dealers (often with the help of information obtained<br />
1 Edited by Kauko Aromaa.
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
from their rivals), thus effecting a kind of selection: those who are better organised stay<br />
immune to control. The laws prohibiting the use, buying, possession and production of drugs<br />
contribute to the same result.<br />
Presently, there are no less than 500,000 drug users in St.Petersburg, and their number is<br />
increasing. This is corroborated by research carried out in the Center of Deviantology and<br />
elsewhere. The drugs market is changing because of the influence of many factors: the<br />
political and economical situation in the countrym, legislation, production opportunities,<br />
police action, and fashion.<br />
Leningrad (St.Petersburg) has always been one of the centers of synthetic drug production.<br />
According to this indicator, it is presently the leading center in the country.<br />
Barbiturates, amphetamines, PCP, LSD, MDMA, DOP and their modifications differ very<br />
much from each other according to how complicated and expensive they are to produce. At<br />
the moment, all necessary opportunities for producing synthetic drugs are available: there is<br />
practically no control over the necessary chemical components, most of the highly qualified<br />
chemists are unemployed, and nearly all existing chemical laboratories are not in operation<br />
and are bankrupt. There is no doubt that widespread narcotics production has already begun,<br />
intended also for Western European markets.<br />
The phenomenon of a “new youth culture” has become popular among young people, linked<br />
to a youth subculture around discotheques. This can explain the increasing number of<br />
narcotics users with a rather high social status, and with a financial position much higher than<br />
average. Drugs being fashionable is a very important feature of the present situation. It is not<br />
only that certain kind of drugs are fashionable, but drug use as such has become a matter of<br />
prestige.<br />
Despite the fashionability of synthetic drugs, opiates and cannabis are the principal drugs in<br />
St.Petersburg. This market is very stable, because of the very well functioning channels of<br />
distribution.<br />
Representatives of organised crime penetrate the legal economy because they must invest<br />
large sums of money obtained by illegal narcotics sales into legal business. All over the<br />
world, this is the way legal and illegal businesses cooperate and become integrated.<br />
Of course, Russia is no exception. The result of such integration is the consolidation of legal<br />
and illegal business in a kind of economic symbiosis. First: large sums of money accumulated<br />
in the narcotics business allow organised crime to penetrate high levels of the economic,<br />
political and information sectors, and to invest money into the financial sector. This naturally<br />
leads to the consequence that whole branches of the legal economy are in the hands of<br />
organised crime. Second: the influence of organised crime turns legal sources of money into a<br />
kind of “holes” for money transition into criminal spheres and for criminal purposes.<br />
The narcotics business makes use of different mechanisms such as fixing prices, expanding<br />
the market e.g. by multi-level marketing (the main advantage of which is that it induces<br />
clients to find new clients), by promoting a broad selection of drugs and inventing new<br />
preparates. Narcotics money is invested in all branches of the legal economy. These are in<br />
great need of capital, and for example state securities produced by most governments are very<br />
convenient to turn such money into legal capital.<br />
55
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
St. Petersburg, being one of the largest cities in Europe, provides a large market for drugs and<br />
is not unimportant in the framework of Russia or of Europe, either.<br />
<strong>Organised</strong> crime in St.Petersburg, as elsewhere in Russia, is not just business without<br />
influence on legislation and policy. If laws are unrealistic, “legislation” of an illegal character<br />
will define a line of behaviour and norms, on which society lives. Policies of prohibition and<br />
punishment never bring good results.<br />
56
Andri Ahven, Expert for the Estonian Police Board<br />
Information and Comunications Department<br />
Police Board<br />
Pagari 1, EE-0100 Tallin<br />
e-mail: andri@sisemin.gov.ee<br />
e-mail: andri.ahven@mail.ee<br />
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
<strong>Crime</strong> Trends in Estonia<br />
General overview<br />
The number of police-recorded crimes has increased during the late 1980s and early 1990s in<br />
all the Baltic countries. Since 1992, the crime rate has stayed at a relatively high level, mainly<br />
due to a large number of property crimes.<br />
In Estonia, 280 crimes per 10 000 inhabitants were recorded by the police in 1997, which is<br />
the highest level since 1992. The respective figure was 147 in Latvia and 205 in Lithuania.<br />
(These figures are not entirely comparable due to differences in criminal law and registration<br />
practice. In the case of Latvia, the decrease in 1994 is to some extent explained by changes in<br />
the criminal law.)<br />
Figure 1. Total number of police recorded offences against the Criminal Code<br />
Per 10 000 of population<br />
300<br />
250<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
0<br />
Estonia<br />
Lithuania<br />
Latvia<br />
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997<br />
In Estonia, 82% of the crimes recorded by the police in 1997 were crimes against property,<br />
10% were cases of hooliganism, 3% were crimes against persons (homicide, assault, rape,<br />
etc). The other types of crime were less represented. Domestic burglaries constituted 16% and<br />
thefts from cars 15% of all recorded crimes. According to the police the most common stolen<br />
objects were audio and video systems, clothes, jewellery and car parts.<br />
57
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
The rate of violent crime is significant in the north-eastern part of Estonia (especially in<br />
Narva). The rate of property and economic crime is highest in Tallinn.<br />
According to the survey of the Estonian Institute for Market Research, 26% of the<br />
respondents or members of their family suffered because of crimes against property and<br />
against persons in 1997. The most common crimes according to the survey are as follows (%<br />
victimised during the last 12 months):<br />
58<br />
theft from a car - 9%<br />
theft from a garden or field - 8%<br />
pickpocketing - 6%<br />
theft from an apartment (domestic burglary) - 5%<br />
theft from a premise or summerhouse - 5%<br />
crime against person - 5%<br />
Homicide<br />
The homicide rate has increased in all of the Baltic countries during the years 1989-1994, but<br />
has decreased substantially during the last three years. The same trend appeared in Russia,<br />
where the rate has been even higher than in Estonia. During the same period no remarkable<br />
changes occured in the Central European countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary), and<br />
their homicide rate has remained at a low level in comparison to Russia and the Baltic<br />
countries.<br />
Table 1. Homicide rate per 100 000 inhabitants *<br />
Estonia Latvia Lithuania Poland Czech<br />
Republic<br />
Russia<br />
1988 6,0 … … … … …<br />
1989 7,9 … … … … …<br />
1990 11,0 9,2 7,5 1,9 2,1 14,3<br />
1991 10,8 11,4 9,0 2,5 2,5 15,3<br />
1992 19,3 16,1 10,5 2,6 2,4 22,9<br />
1993 25,6 24,7 12,5 2,9 1,4 30,4<br />
1994 28,1 23,0 13,4 3,0 … …<br />
1995 22,1 18,2 11,7 … … …<br />
1996 19,8 15,4 9,3 … … …<br />
* According to the data on causes of death<br />
Drug-related crimes<br />
The number of registered drug-related crimes has increased in all of the Baltic countries<br />
during the 1990s. It should be noticed that the number of registered drug-related crimes is<br />
substantially influenced by police capability and activity. The level of drug-related crime is<br />
probably much higher than the official statistics show, especially in Estonia.
Figure 2.<br />
Police-registered drug-related crimes<br />
Per 100 000 inhabitants<br />
18<br />
16<br />
14<br />
12<br />
10<br />
8<br />
6<br />
4<br />
2<br />
0<br />
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997<br />
Estonia<br />
Latvia<br />
Lithuania<br />
Citizenship of offenders<br />
According to police data on known offenders, Estonian citizens have been more active in the<br />
area of economic crimes, and non-Estonian citizens (mainly immigrants) in commiting drugrelated<br />
crimes and violent crimes (homicides, rapes, robberies). In 1997, the non-Estonian<br />
citizens’ criminal activity (known offenders per 10 000 of population) was 1,4 times higher<br />
than the Estonian citizens’ (2,2 times in cases of ‘first degree crimes’ such as homicide,<br />
assaults etc).<br />
Victimisation of foreign citizens<br />
According to the police data, the most common crimes against foreign citizens have been<br />
property crimes (theft of cash, documents, valuables, etc). The number of violent crimes has<br />
been small (see table 2).<br />
The number of registered offences against foreign citizens has been relatively small and stable<br />
during the last years, although the number of tourists (especially from Finland and Sweden)<br />
has increased substantially at the same time. For example, only three serious violent crimes<br />
and one serious robbery against Finnish citizens were registered in 1997, although more than<br />
2,5 million Finnish citizens visited Estonia in 1997.<br />
59
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Table 2. Police registered crimes against foreign citizens in Estonia, 1997 *<br />
Finland Sweden Denmark Germany Latvia Lithuani<br />
a<br />
Serious violent crimes 3 1 - - - 1<br />
- intentional homicide 1 - - - - 1<br />
- assault 1 1 - - - -<br />
- rape 1 - - - - -<br />
Robbery ** 1 - - 1 2 -<br />
Public theft *** 97 10 2 5 2 1<br />
Theft 353 66 11 14 24 9<br />
Other 34 12 3 5 7 1<br />
TOTAL 488 90 16 25 35 12<br />
* Including data about foreign citizens living in Estonia<br />
** With the use of serious violence or threat<br />
*** With the use of minor violence or threat<br />
Sources:<br />
Official statistics of the Estonian National Police Board;<br />
Surveys of the Estonian Institute for Market Research (Eesti Konjunktuuriinstituut)(EKI-<br />
TEST,1994-1997);<br />
Data on causes of death of the Statistical Office of Estonia.<br />
60
Arija Lodzina, Researcher<br />
Criminology Research Centre<br />
Meistaru 10, 1050 Riga, Latvia<br />
e-mail: an-vilks@com.latnet.lv<br />
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
<strong>Crime</strong> Trends in Latvia<br />
The level of crime in Latvia has increased very rapidly in the period of 1991-92. There are<br />
several reasons for that: one is the short term improvement of crime registration. Another is<br />
that the regained freedom and democracy was understood as an allowance of arbitrary<br />
behaviour and disorder in law. Since 1993, however, the level of crime has considerably<br />
decreased (table 1). In fact, during the last 5 years crime has decreased by 40.4%. Now there<br />
is a period of stability.<br />
The crime rate per 100 000 inhabitants is rather different in the three Baltic states (table 1).<br />
To continue with the positive trends, we should mention the improving clearance rate<br />
(detection rate). In 1997, 51.4% of crime was cleared. This is the best clearance rate since<br />
1990 in Latvia and better than that of our neighbours - Lithuania and Estonia - 42.8% and<br />
31.7% respectively.<br />
As concerns the traditional types of crime, let’s draw our attention to the structure of crime<br />
(table 2). The proportion of serious crimes is especially high - it makes up half of all the<br />
crimes (51%).<br />
The level of intentional homicides has decreased by 40% since 1993 (table 3). However, if we<br />
sum the high number of intentional homicides with the number of bodily injuries with lethal<br />
outcomes - 176 cases (1997), the picture is not satisfying. Particular concern is caused by the<br />
increase of some forms of violent crime: intentional serious bodily injuries, aggravated<br />
injuries and aggravated injuries leading to death. The decrease of registered serious crimes<br />
mostly happened due to the fall in robberies. There was also a decrease in large scale thefts<br />
and rapes. At the same time, the number of thefts from cars and trading places increased.<br />
The number of juvenile crimes rose in 1997. In that year juveniles accounted for 19.2% of all<br />
crimes committed. It actually is a threatening problem, if we consider the age of young<br />
perpetrators (15 - 23 years).<br />
Characteristically, in the latest period, crime trends show not only quantitative, but also<br />
qualitative changes. New forms of crime are developing in the sphere of finance and<br />
economics; electronic communication systems experience different kinds of criminal<br />
manipulations, so does the public opinion - making use of absence of stable values and ideals,<br />
new non-traditional religious movements and sects gain ground, posing threat to human lives<br />
and the integrity of society.<br />
Special attention should be paid to economic crimes. Police statistics show that a great part of<br />
registered economic crime (41.6%), reflects cases of money counterfeiting. As concerns the<br />
return of damage, law enforcement agencies show extremely poor performance - only 3.5% of<br />
losses get returned. None of three Baltic States possess an effective system to face economic<br />
61
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
crime which is the especially dangerous for our states given our geo-political, social and<br />
economic situation.<br />
One of the indicators of economic crime is so-called ``shadow`` economy. The data of the<br />
Ministry of Finance prove that 30-32% of Latvia’s GDP has been generated exactly in this<br />
``hidden`` sphere of economic activities. One form of the ``shadow`` economy is smuggling.<br />
Authorities estimate that smuggling of different kinds of commodities is considerable and<br />
amounts to : 50% of all meat products, 60% of precious metals, and about one third of alcohol<br />
sold in Latvia. The smuggling of food products is destroying local producers. At the same<br />
time, in 1997, only 19 persons were convicted for smuggling, 12 of them - conditionally.<br />
This is evidence that the efficiency of measures against smuggling is very low. Smuggling is<br />
favoured by following conditions:<br />
• high taxes (income, VAT);<br />
• inadequacies in legal regulations;<br />
• insufficient training and activity, as well as poor co-ordination of work in law enforcement<br />
institutions.<br />
Illegal operations with privatisation certificates (like ``vouchers`` in Russia) is another type of<br />
economic crime, causing significant damage to the state, and this significance still hasn’t been<br />
assessed. Damage by illegal operations in the process of privatisation are not estimable today.<br />
Unsolved are issues related to organised crime - illegal prostitution services and racketeering.<br />
Due to lack of time, not all matters related to organised crime are discussed, for example drug<br />
and arms trafficking.<br />
The latest feature in the Latvian crime situation in the last 10 years is the appearance of<br />
crimes with use of explosives. The average number of crimes is around 60 cases per year<br />
(1995 - 67; 1996 - 60; 1997 - 64) and more than half of them have been committed in Riga.<br />
Speaking about the latest explosions in Latvia, it must be said that the State has not<br />
recognised the commission of any terrorist acts, since the concept of terrorism is not defined<br />
in Latvia (except for highjacking of aircraft). Therefore, amendments to the Criminal law and<br />
the Criminal Procedural law are needed.<br />
The number of crimes related to the use of guns is rather unstable (table 4).<br />
The distribution of offenders (table 5) suggests that the level of recidivism is remarkably high<br />
(41.2%), as is the share of crimes committed in groups (41.0%) and crimes committed under<br />
the influence of alcohol (46.4%).<br />
The level of recidivism is also high among convicted persons (23.8%), as is the tendency to<br />
commit crime in groups (44.7%) (table 6).<br />
Contrary to police statistics, victimization survey data from 1996 show no essential difference<br />
in crime levels in the 3 Baltic States (table 7). Similarity is also observed in the reporting rate<br />
to the police (table 8). Noticeable discrepancy appears in respect to the corruption level,<br />
which is three times lower in Estonia than in Latvia (table 9).<br />
62
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
One of the achievements of this year is that the new Criminal Law has been finally passed by<br />
the Parliament. However, it has not been announced by the President, meaning that it is not<br />
yet in force. The President may be unwilling to sign it because the new Criminal Law retains<br />
the death penalty which the President wants to be abolished. The discussion of death penalty<br />
in the Parliament will be continued and the Paliament may implement changes in the Criminal<br />
Law in favour of abolishing the death penalty if the 6th protocol of the European Convention<br />
on Human Rights is ratified.<br />
The beginning of 1998 gives no reason for optimism. There have been cases of extremely<br />
horrifying murders and aggravated bodily injuries, many of which have been associated with<br />
alcohol. However, some negative social circumstances effect the crime level, but this is<br />
beyond the influence of the police. Here the main concern is over the crimes committed under<br />
the influence of alcohol or narcotic substances. Surveys and press publications claim that<br />
there is a high level of violence against children, especially sexual abuse of children. There is<br />
also a rapid increase of drug abuse, particularly among the youth.<br />
There is a need for co-ordinated efforts of police, social workers, and the medical<br />
establishment. The attitude and involvement of society as a whole has to be considered as<br />
well.<br />
Table 1. <strong>Crime</strong> level in Latvia as compared to criminality in Estonia and Lithuania<br />
Indicators 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997<br />
Registered crime<br />
Latvia 34 686 41 929 61 871 52 835 40 983 39 141 38 205 36 865<br />
Estonia 23 807 31 748 41 254 37 163 35 739 39 570 35 411 40 972<br />
Lithuania 37 056 44 984 56 615 60 378 58 634 60 819 68 053 75 816<br />
<strong>Crime</strong> rate per<br />
10 000 population<br />
Latvia 129 158 235 204 161 156 152 148.7<br />
Estonia 150 206 267 245 236 265 240 280.2<br />
Lithuania 99 120 151 161 158 164 183 204.5<br />
63
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Table 2. The distribution of crime (Total/percent distribution by type of crime)<br />
64<br />
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997<br />
Recorded crime 61 871 52 835 40 983 39141 38205 36865<br />
Of which:<br />
Violent crime Total 21 611 31 801 23 520 20 244 19 640 18 791<br />
% 34.9 60.2 57.4 51.7 51.4 51.0<br />
Economic crime Total 1 169 899 860 1 137 1 287 1 749<br />
% 1.9 1.7 2.1 2.9 3.4 4.7<br />
Drug-related crime Total 83 219 278 271 361 428<br />
% 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.2<br />
Property crime Total 51 639 41 211 28 813 26 281 23 368 21 892<br />
% 83.5 78.0 70.3 67.1 61.2 59.4<br />
Homicide* Total 293 429 375 281 256 259<br />
% 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7<br />
* Including attempts<br />
Table 3. Homicide by selected country<br />
Year Total Per 100 000<br />
population<br />
Latvia* 1997 259 10.5<br />
Denmark** 1993 71 2.0<br />
Estonia 1997 247 16.7<br />
Russia* 1994 32 286 21.8<br />
Lithuania 1997 391 10.5<br />
Norway*** 1993 47 1.6<br />
Finland** 1993 129 3.7<br />
Ukraine*** 1994 4 571 8.8<br />
Sweden** 1993 173 3.0<br />
* Including attempts<br />
** Calculated per population aged 15-67<br />
*** Calculated per population aged 14-67
Table 4. Distribution of gun crime<br />
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
1995 1996 1997<br />
Total number of gun crimes 435 508 344<br />
of which:<br />
gun homicides 66 51 39<br />
gun assults 246 348 206<br />
Illegal possession of guns 536 626 591<br />
Confiscated guns 203 260 267<br />
Table 5. Offenders: percentage distribution by selected characteristics<br />
As percentage of the total<br />
number of offenders:<br />
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997<br />
juveniles 19.4 18.9 15.6 13.7 12.6 15.2 15.8 16.0<br />
no study nor work 65.6 63.8<br />
with a previous crime<br />
record<br />
33.0 35.1 34.6 40.4 40.4 40.1 39.5 41.2<br />
members of a criminal<br />
group<br />
36.6 41.3 49.6 52.3 46.0 44.7 43.7 41.0<br />
under the influence of<br />
alcohol<br />
39.2 41.9 45.4 50.3 52.8 47.6 47.2 46.4<br />
narcotic drug<br />
intoxication<br />
0.57 0.51<br />
Table 6. Number of convicted persons in 1997<br />
Total<br />
of wich:<br />
12 772<br />
with previous<br />
conviction<br />
3037 23.8%<br />
crime convicted in<br />
group<br />
5703 44.7%<br />
65
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Table 7. Percentage victimised by the different types of events in the course of the past<br />
year<br />
66<br />
Finland** Estonia** Latvia Lithuania<br />
1992 1995 1996 1997<br />
theft of car 0.7 1.6 1.8 1.0<br />
- car owners only 0.8 2.7 4.3<br />
theft from car 3.0 7.0 4.5 10.4<br />
- car owners only 3.6 11.5 10.5<br />
car vandalism 5.6 5.2 3.6 7.3<br />
- car owners only 6.8 8.6 8.5<br />
theft of motorcycle 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3<br />
theft of bicycle 4.9 4.7 2.5 7.1<br />
burglary with entry 0.6 4.2 2.6 7.6<br />
attemted burglary 0.6 3.9 5.3 5.5<br />
robbery 1.0 3.4 2.6 3.3<br />
personal theft<br />
pickpocketing<br />
4.7 8.2 12.7 13.2<br />
sexual incidents* 3.7 1.3 0.7 0.9<br />
assault/threat 4.1 5.5 2.6 4.8<br />
* women only<br />
** Kauko Aromaa, Andri Ahven. Victims of <strong>Crime</strong> in a Time of Change: Estonia 1993 and 1995<br />
Table 8. Percentage of crime reported to the police in the past five years<br />
Estonia Latvia Lithuania<br />
Car theft 88 92 89<br />
Theft from car 31 37 45<br />
Car vandalism 22 35 23<br />
Theft of motorcycle 100 63 25<br />
Theft of bicycle 25 29 42<br />
Burglary 69 71 58<br />
Attempted burglary 30 23 37<br />
Robbery 26 31 44<br />
Personal theft 19 16 23<br />
Sexual incidents* 12 7 24<br />
Assault/threat 20 20 30
Table 9. Function of the person who demanded the bribe<br />
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Estonia Latvia Lithuania<br />
1995 1996 1997<br />
Government official 0.9 4.6 2.7<br />
Customs officer 0.9 3.5 2.7<br />
Police officer 0.7 1.3 3.5<br />
Inspector 1.3 2.0 0.5<br />
Other 0.5 1.1 1.4<br />
Total (of all respondents) 4.3 12.5 10.9<br />
Table 10. Capital punishment imposed<br />
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997<br />
6 5 6 5 9 5 4 4 - - 4 - -<br />
67
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
GenovaitëBabachinaitë, Head of the Department of Criminology<br />
Lithuanian Law Academy<br />
Ateities 20, 2057 Vilnius, Lithuania<br />
68<br />
Comparative Survey of Criminality in Lithuania<br />
This paper compares the main indicators of criminality in Lithuania with that of the other<br />
countries - primarily the Baltic states. The neighbouring Baltic states, Latvia and Estonia,<br />
began their independent social development from the same social conditions as Lithuania, but<br />
in a slightly different time. All three states are yet in a transitional period, so the comparison<br />
of their criminality is especially important during all the period of independent development.<br />
But before this it is important to discuss shortly the main crime indicators at the time when<br />
the three countries were still incorporated into Soviet Union, but beginning their moves<br />
towards independence.<br />
Table 1. Criminality in the Baltic Republics during 1985-1989<br />
Year<br />
1985<br />
1986<br />
1987<br />
1988<br />
1989<br />
Registered crimes<br />
Lithuania<br />
21 363<br />
20 628<br />
20 037<br />
21 337<br />
31 238<br />
Latvia<br />
25 303<br />
22 307<br />
21 502<br />
22 991<br />
29 676<br />
Estonia<br />
14 828<br />
12 500<br />
11 465<br />
12 167<br />
19 141<br />
<strong>Crime</strong> rate per 10 000 inhabitants<br />
Lithuania<br />
59,8<br />
57,5<br />
55,9<br />
58,7<br />
84,9<br />
Latvia<br />
97,6<br />
85,3<br />
81,4<br />
86,2<br />
110,6<br />
Estonia<br />
96,9<br />
81,1<br />
73,7<br />
77,4<br />
121,1<br />
The period of revival in the Baltic countries began in 1988. Gorbachiov’s “perestroyka”<br />
began earlier. Limited private economic activity was then allowed, but on the basis of<br />
socialistic economy in essence. All of these and other (unmentioned here) social - economic<br />
changes have influenced on criminality in the Baltic states, which was already especially<br />
striking in statistical accounts by 1989. This is shown in table 1 where the data of registered<br />
criminality is presented. During the five years before restoring independence, as indicated in<br />
table 1, the crime level in Lithuania was constantly smaller than in the other Baltic republics.<br />
In 1985 it was 1,7 times smaller than in Latvia and Estonia, whose crime levels were<br />
approximately equal in 1985. In 1988 the crime level in Lithuania was 1,5 times smaller than<br />
in Latvia and 1,3 times smaller than in Estonia, so the gap in crime levels decreased not in<br />
Lithuania’s favour.<br />
In 1989, criminality in the Baltic republics increased significantly: in Lithuania the number of<br />
registered crimes increased by 9901, in Latvia - by 6685, and in Estonia - by 6974. So, in total<br />
numbers, the greatest increase of registered crimes was in Lithuania. According to the
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
comparative indicators (rate per 10.000 inhabitants) the situation is a little bit different: the<br />
crime level in Lithuania increased almost 1,5 times, in Latvia almost 1,3 times, in Estonia<br />
almost 1,6 times. Thus, the largest percentage increase in crime rates in 1989 was in Estonia;<br />
in Lithuania. Lithaunia had the second largest increase. Yet despite differences in rates of<br />
increase, Estonia had the highest crime rate in 1989 (121,1), followed by Latvia (110,6) and<br />
Lithuania (84,9).<br />
Thus, it seems that before the restoration of independence the level of criminality was<br />
smallest in Lithuania as compared with the other Baltic republics (Latvia and Estonia).<br />
Now it is urgent to examine the situation after Lithuania had restored its independence.<br />
Table 2. Criminality in the Baltic States during 1990-1996<br />
Year<br />
1990<br />
1991<br />
1992<br />
1993<br />
1994<br />
1995<br />
1996<br />
Registered crimes<br />
Lithuania<br />
37 056<br />
44 984<br />
56 615<br />
60 378<br />
58 634<br />
60 819<br />
68 053<br />
Latvia<br />
34 686<br />
41 929<br />
61 871<br />
52 835<br />
40 983<br />
39 141<br />
38 205<br />
Estonia<br />
23 807<br />
31 748<br />
41 254<br />
37 163<br />
35 739<br />
39 570<br />
35 411<br />
<strong>Crime</strong> rate per 10 000 inhabitants<br />
Lithuania<br />
99<br />
120<br />
151<br />
162<br />
158<br />
Latvia<br />
129<br />
151<br />
235<br />
204<br />
161<br />
Estonia<br />
During the period of Lithuania’s independence (1990-1996 as shown in table 2), the total<br />
number of registered crimes (as compared with 1989) increased in Lithuania by 2,2 times, in<br />
Latvia by 1,3 times, in Estonia by 1,9 times. Thus, the rate of growth in the total number of<br />
registered crimes was greatest in Lithuania and smallest in Latvia.<br />
The number of registered crimes in Lithuania increased by 2,2 times, in Latvia by 1,4 times,<br />
in Estonia by 2 times. So, we can state that the crime development in Lithuania during the<br />
period of independence was very similar to that in Estonia. In Latvia the rate of growth in<br />
criminality was significantly smaller than in Lithuania and Estonia.<br />
In 1996 the crime rate in Lithuania per 10.000 was 183, in Latvia 152,2, in Estonia 240. In<br />
Lithuania the rates of crime growth during the period of independence were the greatest, but<br />
the crime level during all this time still remained significantly - by one-third - smaller than in<br />
Estonia, but became by one-fifth greater than in Latvia.<br />
164<br />
183<br />
155<br />
152<br />
150<br />
206<br />
267<br />
245<br />
236<br />
265<br />
240<br />
69
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Comparing the former period (1985-1989) with the present, the crime rate remained the<br />
highest in Estonia (240); the second highest in Lithuania (183) and the third highest in Latvia<br />
(152). In other words, the criminality in Lithuania has exceeded that of Latvia, and criminality<br />
in Estonia has remained the greatest.<br />
During the period of independence, the state of registration and accountance of crime<br />
indicators (which during the Soviet period was identical in all Baltic Republics) has changed<br />
considerably. The Baltic countries have at different times decriminalised deeds, which during<br />
the Soviet period were criminalized, and have at different times and in various ways<br />
criminalized "new deeds" that appeared while developing market economy (for instance<br />
commercial crimes). Therefore it is difficult to compare the crime structure of these states on<br />
the whole. It is only possible to compare only some indicators of registration of traditional<br />
crimes during the latest five years - 1992-1996.<br />
Table 3. <strong>Crime</strong>s of hooliganism in the Baltic States during 1992-1996<br />
State<br />
total numbers<br />
Lithuania<br />
Latvia<br />
Estonia<br />
70<br />
Year<br />
1992<br />
1424<br />
1282<br />
779<br />
as a percent of all crimes<br />
Lithuania<br />
Latvia<br />
Estonia<br />
2,5<br />
2,1<br />
1,9<br />
1993<br />
1444<br />
1193<br />
795<br />
2,4<br />
2,2<br />
2,1<br />
1994<br />
1699<br />
1319<br />
881<br />
2,9<br />
3,2<br />
1995<br />
2565<br />
1406<br />
1215<br />
4,2<br />
3,6<br />
1996<br />
3003<br />
1311<br />
1155<br />
We can see in table 3 that the registered hooliganism crimes in the Baltic countries were<br />
constantly increasing during the five year period. The total registered number of hooliganism<br />
crimes in Lithuania increased more than 2 times, in Latvia remained almost stable (there were<br />
registered 29 crimes more), and increased by 1,5 times in Estonia.<br />
<strong>Crime</strong>s of hooliganism make up only a small part of registered criminality in the Baltic<br />
countries: from 1,9-2,5 per cent in 1992 to 3,3-4,4 per cent in 1996. In all three Baltic<br />
countries hooliganism as a proportion of all crime increased by 1,7 times during the last five<br />
years.<br />
2,5<br />
3,0<br />
4,4<br />
3,4<br />
3,3
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Thus, a complex evaluation of the data about the status of hooliganism crimes in the Baltic<br />
states suggests, that the volume and rates of growth of hooliganism crimes are the greatest in<br />
Lithuania, followed by Estonia, and then Latvia.<br />
Indicators of the spreading of theft, one more traditional type of crime, are presented in table<br />
4.<br />
Table 4. Thefts in the Baltic States during 1992-1996<br />
Year<br />
Registered thefts<br />
Lithuania Latvia Estonia<br />
total as a percent total as a percent total as a percent<br />
number of all crimes number of all crimes number of all crimes<br />
1992 42 708 75,4 48 190 77,9 33 309 80,7<br />
1993 43 375 71,8 39 356 74,5 27 339 73,6<br />
1994 40 252 68,6 27 211 66,4 24 719 69,2<br />
1995 41 619 68,4 24 628 63,0 28 165 71,2<br />
1996 44 600 65,5 23 368 61,2 24 764 69,9<br />
Thefts made up the greatest part of criminality in general in the Baltic states in 1992 (75,4%<br />
in Lithuania, 77,9% in in Latvia, 80,7% in Estonia). The smallest proportion of thefts was in<br />
1996 (65,5% in Lithuania, 61,2% in Latvia, 69,9% in Estonia). As we see, in Lithuania and<br />
Estonia theft as a proportion of all crime decreased during the five years by approximately 10<br />
per cent, and in Latvia by 16,7 per cent.<br />
Thus, thefts constantly make up the greatest part of registered criminality in the Baltic states:<br />
in 1992 in Lithuania - 3/4 in Latvia - more than 3/4 and in Estonia - 4/5; in 1996 in Lithuania<br />
- 2/3, in Latvia - less than 2/3, in Estonia - more than 2/3.<br />
In general, theft as a proportion of all crimes and its dynamics during 1992-1996 was similar<br />
in all of the Baltic countries.<br />
But by total numbers of thefts and their dynamics the Baltic states differ very much. During<br />
the above mentioned period, the greatest number of thefts was registered in Lithuania in 1996,<br />
where there were 1892 crimes more than in 1992 but only 1225 more crimes than in 1993. So,<br />
the number of thefts in Lithuania during the period mentioned above has not increased much<br />
(by 4,4 per cent).<br />
In Latvia during 1992-1996 the greatest number of thefts was registered in 1992 and the<br />
smallest in 1996 (a difference of 24822 crimes, or 51,5% smaller).<br />
In Estonia during 1992-1996 the greatest number of registered thefts was in 1992; smallest in<br />
1994 and 1996 (accordingly by 8590 crimes or 25,8 per cent and 8545 crimes or 25,6 per cent<br />
smaller).<br />
This analysis shows that the most unfavourable situation and dynamics of thefts during the<br />
1992-1996 period among Baltic states was in Lithuania: the total number did not increase<br />
71
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
much in Lithuania (by 4,4 per cent) and in the other two Baltic states it has significantly<br />
decreased (in Estonia by one-fourth and in Latvia by half).<br />
The most widespreaded types of theft in all of the Baltic countries are thefts from dwellings<br />
and thefts of vehicles.<br />
Table 5. Thefts from Dwellings in Baltic States during 1992-1996<br />
Registered thefts from dwellings<br />
Year Lithuania Latvia Estonia<br />
total as a percent total as a percent total as a percent<br />
number of all thefts number of all thefts number of all thefts<br />
1992 6 610 15,5 9 845 20,4 7 980 23,9<br />
1993 6 964 16,0 9 075 23,0 7 137 26,1<br />
1994 7 414 18,4 6 257 23,0 6 878 27,8<br />
1995 6 344 15,2 5 083 20,6 8 175 29,0<br />
1996 8 631 19,3 5 068 21,6 6 864 27,7<br />
Thefts from dwellings now make up about 1/5 of the general number of registered crimes in<br />
Lithuania and Latvia and more than 1/4 in Estonia.<br />
The number of registered thefts in the Baltic countries has changed differently. During 1992-<br />
1996 the total number of registered thefts has increased by 2021 crime or 30,6 per cent in<br />
Lithuania. In Latvia this number during the aforesaid period decreased by 4777 crimes or 48,5<br />
per cent. And in Estonia it decreased by 1116 crimes or 14 per cent.<br />
Evaluating the indicators presented, it is possible to state that the state and dynamics of thefts<br />
from dwellings is the most unfavourable in Lithuania; in Estonia thefts from dwellings<br />
decreased by 1/7 and in Latvia almost by one-half during 1992-1996.<br />
Table 6. Thefts of Vehicles in the Baltic States during 1992-1996<br />
Year<br />
Registered thefts of vehicles<br />
Lithuania Latvia Estonia<br />
total as a percent of total as a percent of total as a percent of<br />
number all thefts number all thefts number all thefts<br />
1992 2 000 4,7 - - 1 735 5,2<br />
1993 2 879 6,6 4 265 10,8 1 262 4,6<br />
1994 6 344 15,8 4 266 15,7 1 094 4,4<br />
1995 6 738 16,2 2 774 11,3 801 2,8<br />
1996 6 267 14,0 2 215 9,5 666 2,7<br />
The situation and dynamics of thefts of vehicles during 1992-1996 are especially<br />
unfavourable in Lithuania. Auto theft as a proportion of the general number of registered<br />
thefts increased by 3 times. In Estonia, on the contrary, the proportion made up by thefts of<br />
vehicles decreased by 2 times. In Latvia great fluctuations in the proportion of thefts of<br />
72
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
vehicles do not allow an exact (strict) conclusion, however it is possible to assert that auto<br />
theft as a proportion of all thefts remained relatively stable during the period in question.<br />
The number of registered thefts of vehicles in Lithuania increased by more than 3 times<br />
during 1992-1996. At the same time in Latvia this indicator decreased by almost 2 times and<br />
in Estonia by 2,6 times.<br />
It is possible to affirm that such an especially unfavourable state and dynamic of thefts of<br />
vehicles in Lithuania is determined by its geographical position (as a transit state) which is<br />
rather different from the other two Baltic states•, and that it is not a result of Lithuania•s<br />
inability to set its affairs in order. It is possible to maintain also that for Lithuania this specific<br />
position costs much.<br />
One more traditional and widespread type of crime is robbery. We see the data about<br />
robberies in table seven.<br />
Table 7. Robberies in the Baltic States during 1992-1996<br />
Year<br />
Registered robberies<br />
Lithuania Latvia Estonia<br />
total as a percent of total as a percent of total as a percent of<br />
number all crimes number all crimes number all crimes<br />
1992 488 0,9 807 1,3 480 1,2<br />
1993 737 1,2 1 177 2,2 612 1,6<br />
1994 4 217 7,2 1 142 2,8 786 2,2<br />
1995 2 837 4,7 905 2,3 694 1,7<br />
1996 3 481 5,1 1 031 2,7 577 1,6<br />
In the dynamics of robberies in the Baltic states during 1992-1996 we notice that the first two<br />
years coincide with a period during which the of reorganization of law enforcement agencies<br />
and state institutions as a whole was still under intensive creation, and when the latentiveness<br />
(the "dark figures") of robberies could be greater. So the state in all Baltic states during the<br />
years 1992-1993 is analogous. But during the three later years of the explored period we<br />
observe a stable indicator of the proportion of robberies: in Lithuania the proportion of<br />
robberies as compared to general criminality is approximately twice that in Latvia and three<br />
times greater than in Estonia.<br />
The number of robberies in Lithuania during the three later years is slightly decreasing, in<br />
Latvia remains roughly stable, and in Estonia is also some<strong>what</strong> decreasing. Therefore it is<br />
possible to ascertain that the state and dynamics of robberies in the Baltic states is similar.<br />
Besides traditional property crimes, whose states and changes in the Baltic countries are<br />
presented earlier, it is very important to compare traditional violent crimes against person in<br />
the Baltic states: murders, severe bodily injuries, rapes.<br />
Table 8. Premeditated Murders (with attempts) in the Baltic States during 1992-1996<br />
73
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Registered premeditated murders (with attempts)<br />
Year<br />
Lithuania Latvia Estonia<br />
1992 303 293 223<br />
1993 480 429 328<br />
1994 523 375 365<br />
1995 502 281 304<br />
1996 405 256 268<br />
Premeditated murders make up an insignificant part in the criminality of the Baltic states, but<br />
they are the most serious violent crimes against persons. During 1992-1995 in the Baltic<br />
states the situation of registered murders (with attempts) was different. In Lithuania the total<br />
number of these crimes had increased by 1,5 times, in Estonia by 1,4 times and in Latvia the<br />
annual fluctuations of this number do not show any clear tendency. During the last year 1996<br />
the number of murders was smaller in all the Baltic states than during the earlier year 1995: in<br />
Lithuania by 97 crimes, in Latvia by 25 and Estonia by 36 crimes. Could this mean the<br />
beginning of a tendency towards a decrease of premeditated murders? The statistical data of<br />
next several years will show.<br />
Table 9. Rapes (with attempts) in the Baltic States during 1992-1996<br />
Year Registered rapes (with attempts)<br />
Lithuania Latvia Estonia<br />
1992 191 124 72<br />
1993 196 130 104<br />
1994 165 129 124<br />
1995 200 158 102<br />
1996 168 130 94<br />
In table 9 we see the state and changes of one more serious traditional violent crime against<br />
the person • rape. During the examined period of 1992-1996 the number of registered rapes<br />
(with attempts) in Latvia was stable, in Lithuania there was a slight tendency towards<br />
reduction and in Estonia was a similar slight tendency towards growth. But in essence the<br />
situation of these crimes in the Baltic states was similar and in Lithuania the spreading of<br />
these crimes was the smallest.<br />
Table 10. Intentional Serious Bodily Injuries in the Baltic States during 1992-1996<br />
74
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Year Registered intentional serious bodily injuries<br />
Lithuania Latvia Estonia<br />
1992 346 571 223<br />
1993 344 725 220<br />
1994 353 714 248<br />
1995 299 597 223<br />
1996 351 467 229<br />
The state of registered intentional serious bodily injuries in all the Baltic states is stable. Only<br />
in Latvia during 1993-1994 was there a markedly greater number of serious bodily injuries<br />
than were registered during the other three years.<br />
Beyond doubt, the intensiveness of the spreading of these crimes is the smallest in Lithuania.<br />
In general, serious violent crimes in the Baltic countries make up about 2 per cent of the<br />
overall number of registered crimes.<br />
The crime situation in every country is also reliably characterized by the level of clearance<br />
rates in the Baltic states, which are illustrated in the following table.<br />
Table 11. Percent of crimes closed in the Baltic States during 1992-1996<br />
Year Closed crimes (percent)<br />
Lithuania Latvia Estonia<br />
1992 35 26 18<br />
1993 37 28 25<br />
1994 41 31 27<br />
1995 40 35 29<br />
1996 41 44 33<br />
As shown in table 11, during the investigated period of 1992-1996, the highest clearence rate<br />
in all years was in Lithuania. In the beginning of the period almost twice as many crimes were<br />
closed in Lithuania than in Estonia and one • third more than in Latvia.<br />
Generally, indicators of crime closure were constantly improving in all the Baltic countries,<br />
but even now they are not high: in Lithuania in 1996, 41 per cent of the registered crimes<br />
were closed, in Latvia 44 per cent, and in Estonia almost 10 per cent less • only 33 per cent.<br />
Conclusions<br />
1. Before the restoration of independence crime level in Lithuania was constantly smaller. In<br />
1988 the crime level in Lithuania was 1,5 times smaller then in Latvia and 1,3 times<br />
smaller than in Estonia.<br />
2. According to the indicators in 1989 the highest crime level per 10.000 inhabitants was in<br />
Estonia (121,1); in the second place was Latvia (110,6); in the third place Lithuania (84,9).<br />
3. During the period of independence changes in criminality in Lithuania were very similar to<br />
changes in Estonia (criminality in Lithuania until the year 1996 inclusive increased 2,2<br />
75
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
times, in Estonia • 2 times). In Latvia the rate of crime growth (1,4 times) was<br />
significantly smaller than in Lithuania and Estonia.<br />
4. In 1996 the crime level per 10.000 inhabitants in Lithuania was 183, in Latvia 152, and in<br />
Estonia 240. In Lithuania the rates of crime growth during the period of independence<br />
were the greatest, but the crime level during all this time, nevertheless, remained<br />
considerably, by one-third, smaller than in Estonia, but became by one-fifth bigger than in<br />
Latvia.<br />
5. The most unfavourable state and dynamics of thefts in 1992-1996 among the Baltic states<br />
was in Lithuania: the total number in Lithuania increased a little (4,4 per cent) and in the<br />
two other Baltic states it decreased considerably (in Estonia by one-fourth and in Latvia by<br />
half).<br />
6. Premeditated murders make up a small part of the criminality in the Baltic states. In<br />
Lithuania during 1992-1995 the total number of these crimes increased by 1,5 times, in<br />
Estonia by 1,4 times and in Latvia annual fluctuations of this number do not show any<br />
clear tendency. In 1996 in all Baltic countries the number of premeditated murders<br />
decreased: in Lithuania by 97 crimes, in Latvia by 25, in Estonia by 36.<br />
7. In all three Baltic states indicators of crime closure were constantly improving, but even<br />
now they are not high. In Lithuania during 1996, 41 per cent of registered crimes were<br />
closed, in Latvia 44 per cent, in Estonia only 33 per cent.<br />
References<br />
G.Babachinait : Kriminologiniai nusikalstamumo raidos Lietuvoje periodizacijos aspektai.<br />
Lietuvos teis s tradicijos. Justitia, Vilnius, 1997 pp. 45-54.<br />
Nusikalstamumas ir teis saugos institucij veikla: Criminality and the Law Enforcement<br />
Activity. Department of the Statistics to the Government of the Republic of Lithuania,<br />
Vilnius, 1997, p. 50.<br />
76
Nicolay Borchgrevink Johansen, Cand. polit<br />
Privat adresse: Falsnesgt. 16 A<br />
N-0556 Oslo<br />
e-mail: n.b.johansen@jus.uio.no<br />
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Konflikter i næringslivet.1<br />
En grossist for bensinforhandlere klaget til Prisrådet på at Swix Sport ikke ville selge dem<br />
skismøring. Prisrådet behandlet klagen, grep inn og forbød Swix å nekte forretningsforbindelse<br />
med bensingrossisten.<br />
Hvorfor i all verden skulle noen ønske å nekte noen å selge varene deres? I følge vanlig<br />
økonomisk tankegang skulle en leverandør være interessert i å spre varene sine mest mulig.<br />
I utgangspunktet vil man selge maksimalt av sitt produkt, det er jo dette som gir inntekt og<br />
profitt! Videre skulle man tro en produsent, feks Swix, ønsket mest mulig konkurranse blant<br />
videreforhandlerne, slik at prisen ble minimal, og flere forbrukere fikk råd til å kjøpe varen.<br />
Dette er grunner som skaper forventning om at produsenter og leverandører vil selge til så<br />
mange videreforhandlere som mulig.<br />
Den klagende grossisten hevdet bla a at salg av skismøring utenfor faghandelen vil føre til økt<br />
priskonkurranse, og viste til et brev der Swix avslørte at de ville beskytte sport- og fritidsforhandlernes<br />
tilgang på den “betydelige bruttofortjeneste disse representerer” (Pristidende nr.<br />
6/1992, s 61). De mente således at det gjorde seg gjeldende “almene hensyn” som tilsa at<br />
nektelsen burde forbys. Økt konkurranse ville føre til lavere priser og mer effektiv utnyttelse<br />
av samfunnets ressurser. I tillegg hevdet bensinstasjongrossisten at nektelsen var “urimelig”<br />
for dem, da de i god tro hadde regnet med leveranse og bla a satt av plass til Swix' produkter i<br />
katalogen sin.<br />
“Almene hensyn” og “urimelighet” utgjorde de to inngrepskriteriene Prisrådet opererte med.2<br />
Kriteriene må ses i sammenheng med henholdsvis Prisdirektoratets og Konkurransetilsynets<br />
hovedgeskjeftigelse, rettledet som de var/er av prisloven og konkurranseloven. Formålet har<br />
helt siden 1953, mer eller mindre tydelig formulert, vært å bidra til optimal utnyttelse av<br />
ressurser. Det altoverveiende virkemiddel i så måte har vært konkurranse. Hindringer for<br />
konkurranse skal fjernes, og der det ikke konkurreres fra før, skal det legges til rette for dette.<br />
I tråd med denne mål-middel filosofien, som er blitt mer og mer sentral i den “vestlige<br />
verden” etter den andre verdenskrig, slås det fast i alle tidligere studier av Prisrådets praksis<br />
at inngrep er forbeholdt markeder uten “virksom -” eller “effektiv konkurranse”3 (Bachke<br />
1977, Jensen 1991). Konkurranse har således i praksis nesten fungert som et inngrepskriterie.<br />
Bensingrossisten hevdet at både almene hensyn og urimelighet gjorde seg gjeldende, i tillegg<br />
til antydninger om at det ikke forekom effektiv konkurranse i markedet. Swix mente på sin<br />
side at bensinstasjoner ikke kunne tilby den service skismøring krever at betjeningen kan gi.<br />
De hevdet dessuten at deres valg av distribusjonssystem utgjorde den beste utnyttelse av<br />
1 Næringsliv = “erhvervsliv”.<br />
2 Med omleggingen til konkurranseloven i 1994 ble “urimelighetskriteriet” fjernet. Men også av andre grunner,<br />
som vil fremgå, skal vi i det følgende konsentrere oppmerksomheten om “almene hensyn”.<br />
3 Uttrykk ofte brukt i behandlingen av disse sakene.<br />
77
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
ressurssene. De skulle i så måte ha fulgt en fast distribusjonspolitikk på dette helt siden 1947.<br />
Prisrådet vurderte det imidlertid slik at denne nektelsen både skadet konkurransen i markedet<br />
for skismøring og var urimelig for den klagende grossisten, og foretok inngrep. Swix ble<br />
dermed i praksis pålagt å levere skismøring til grossisten for bensinstasjoner.<br />
Det er først og fremst på to måter at næringsdrivendes interesser kan komme i konflikt med<br />
“almene” interesser (hensyn). For det første kan en bedrift ønske å profilere seg på en bestemt<br />
måte, gjerne som noe eksklusivt, og dermed forsøke å unngå at produktet assosieres med noe<br />
“billig”, feks forretninger kjent for lave priser. Kanskje ønsker man i denne forretningen ikke<br />
at produktet skal være billig, nettopp av samme grunner. Det kan også tenkes ressursmessige<br />
hensyn: I noen tilfeller er transport så kostbart at det å levere til mange vil fordyre distribusjonskostnadene<br />
i urimelig grad. I andre tilfeller kan man ønske å belønne avtagere som<br />
markedsfører produktet. Ofte finner man situasjoner der en bedrift (butikk) står for markedsføringen<br />
av et produkt, mens andre bedrifter ikke tar del i disse kostnadene, men likevel<br />
høster fortjeneste ved å ha produktet i sitt sortiment. Felles for disse tilfellene er at<br />
incitamentet til nektelsen kommer fra leverandøren. Så lenge leverandøren kan godtgjøre at<br />
utvelgelsen av videreforhandlere foretas etter “objektive kriterier” på konsekvent vis, blir<br />
dette akseptert av Konkurransetilsynet, slik det også ble av Prisrådet.<br />
For det andre kan nektelsen skyldes at leverandøren eller klagerens rivaler prøver å eliminere<br />
priskonkurransen. I mange tilfeller er det den nektedes konkurrenter som legger press på<br />
leverandøren for at vedkommende ikke skal levere til klageren. De kan med trusler om å<br />
skifte leverandør presse leverandøren til å nekte å forhandle med den som klager. Grunnen til<br />
å presse leverandøren på dette punktet kan være at klagerens konkurrenter er fornøyd med<br />
inntjeningen i markedet, og ser profitten truet av klagerens lave priser. Denne typer grunner<br />
til å nekte forretningsforbindelse er grunnleggende sett av horisontal karakter, og det finnes<br />
flere eksempler på at leverandører er interessert i å få vedtak mot seg, for derigjennom å få et<br />
“alibi” for å stå i mot presset fra klagerens konkurrenter. Men dette er langtfra alltid tilfelle. I<br />
mange tilfeller ser det ut til at såvel leverandøren som vedkommendes faste forhandlere<br />
motarbeider “effektiv konkurranse” i markedene, slik tilfelle etter all sannsynlighet var i<br />
markedet for skismøring.<br />
I tillegg til den sakstypen som ble presentert i det foregående, finner man eksempler på helt<br />
andre nektelser. Det kan være saker der klageren er forbruker (konflikten vil da ikke være<br />
mellom næringsdrivende), klager på offentlige reguleringer (som distriktspolitiske hensyn<br />
eller beskyttelse av spesielle markeder slik som bokmarkedet), klager innen markeder der<br />
andre myndigheter gir konsesjoner (eksempelvis media) eller at nektelsen dreier seg om så<br />
små beløp at myndighetene ikke finner å bruke tid på dem. Videre finnes det saker der<br />
klageren oppfører seg kverulantisk etter hverdagslige kriterier, der nektelse skyldes<br />
personlige motsetningsforhold, tilfeller der en leverandør har sett seg lei på manglene betaling<br />
fra klagerens side og nekter videre forbindelse, eller rett og slett oppsigelse/ingen fornyelse av<br />
kontrakt.<br />
Leveringsnektelser kan innklages til konkurransetilsynet og behandles etter<br />
konkurranselovens §3-10. Dette lovverket er imidlertid ganske nytt. Fra 1954 til 1994 gjaldt<br />
en annen lov, den såkalte “prisloven”. Også her fantes en hjemmel for å gripe inn overfor<br />
forretningsnektelser (§23). Det rettslige grunnlaget er ikke helt likt i de to lovverkene, og<br />
dette kompliserer mitt prosjekt her i dag. Jeg har foretatt en liten studie av saker behandlet<br />
etter inngrepsparagrafene i to lovene, men for å gjøre dette skikkelig, måtte jeg presentert det<br />
rettslige grunnlaget. Det er det ikke plass til. Her skal jeg nøye meg med å slå fast at denne<br />
78
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
type saker tidligere ble behandlet av et domstollignende organ, Prisrådet. Etter 1.1.1994<br />
avgjøres klager etter konkurranseloven §3-10 av forvaltningen. Mesteparten av mitt materiale<br />
skriver seg fra tiden under prislovens regime, så i dagens anledning skal vi tilsidesette<br />
forskjellene i regime og det rettslige grunnlaget. Jeg skal forsøke å kommentere utviklingen<br />
av forretningsnektelser behandlet i henholdsvis Prisdirektoratet og Konkurransetilsynet i<br />
perioden 1954-1997.4<br />
Utviklingen av antallet saker og inngrep.<br />
Etter dette forsøket på å sette leveringsnektelser i et større perspektiv, skal vi nå se nærmere<br />
på antallet behandlede saker i Prisrådet og hva slags skjebne disse har fått.<br />
Antall saker behandlet i Prisrådet 1954 - 1997.5<br />
35<br />
30<br />
25<br />
20<br />
15<br />
10<br />
5<br />
0<br />
54 57 60 63 66 69 72 75 78 81 84 87 90 93 96<br />
Kanskje det mest bemerkelsesverdige ved denne figuren er det lave antallet saker. Tar vi i<br />
betraktning antallet firmaer som finnes i Norge, og forestiller oss hvor mange relasjoner disse<br />
inngår med hverandre vertikalt, er det åpenbart at det må oppstå mange konflikter. Det er<br />
derfor oppsiktsvekkende at bare ca 20 saker i snitt havner i et offentlig konfliktløsningsorgan.<br />
Det andre som slår en er kanskje at antallet saker er såpass stabilt. Når vi opererer med så små<br />
tall som her, skulle man vel forvente at variasjonsbredden ble større? Her opplever vi så små<br />
tall at tilfeldighetenes uimotståelige utjevningskraft ikke får fult spillerom, likevel ser vi ikke<br />
større svingninger enn fra 8 til 34, og det som ekstreme ytterpunkter. Og ser vi nøye på<br />
figuren kan man ytterligere få det inntrykk at saksmengden har stabilisert seg i den siste<br />
halvdelen av 40-årsperioden. (Vi skal merke oss at 1994 er utelatt, det var det året den nye<br />
lovgivningen ble satt i kraft, og Konkurransetilsynet er innrømmet en liten<br />
innkjøringsperiode).<br />
4 Med det nye lovverket skiftet Prisdirektoratet navn til Konkurransetilsynet.<br />
5 Kilde for 1983-1993: Prisdirektoratets årsrapporter publisert i Pristidende. 1977-1982 er basert på<br />
oppsummeringer av Prisdirektoratets virksomhet i de årlige stortingsmeldingene med retningslinjer (St.meld. 53<br />
(1977-78) s. 17, St.meld. 64 (1978-79) s. 17, St.meld. 44 (1979-80) s. 17, St.meld. 69 (1980-81) s. 19, St.meld.<br />
58 (1981-82) s. 14, St.meld. 59 (1982-83) s. 20-21, St.meld. 43 (1983-84) s. 11). Disse oversiktene er basert på<br />
årganger som ikke helt følger kalenderåret; fra 1/11 til 31/10 året etter. Dette medfører at det blir en liten<br />
overlapp, noen saker blir talt med to ganger, de som ble avgjort i november og desember 1976, mens det<br />
tilsvarende blir en glipp for de sakene som ble avgjort i november og desember 1982. Dette skulle likevel ikke ha<br />
betydning for hovedinntrykket, skulle tallene for de enkelte år bli mye forskjellig med “årsskifte” 1. november<br />
skal dette jevne seg ut. 1954-1976 er basert på Bachke 1977, side 48.<br />
79
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Andel inngrep i sakene behandlet av Prisrådet 1954 - 1997.6<br />
90<br />
80<br />
70<br />
60<br />
50<br />
40<br />
30<br />
20<br />
10<br />
0<br />
80<br />
54 57 60 63 66 69 72 75 78 81 84 87 90 93 96<br />
Det er vanskelig å slå fast at det har funnet sted en jevn nedgang i andelen inngrep, men det er<br />
tydelig at Prisrådet etter en litt nølende start var svært hissige på å gripe inn overfor forretningsnektelser.<br />
Dette kommer særskilt godt til syne sammenlignet med den jevnt lave villigheten<br />
til å gripe inn man finner i prislovens siste tiår. Foruten toppårene i 83, 85 og 86 har<br />
andelen vært jevnt under gjennomsnittet (45%) i siste halvdel av prislovens regimetid. Og de<br />
siste årene sank andelen til i praksis 2-3 saker i året. Etter den nye loven trådte i kraft har det<br />
vært henholdsvis 1, 0 og 1 inngrep.<br />
Bachke (1977) kommenterer utviklingen tom 1975, og forbauses av det han forstår som en<br />
stadig mer forståelsesfull holdning overfor forretningsnektelser. Dette baserer han på en<br />
overgang fra at flertallet av klager blir tatt til følge, til at mindre enn halvparten blir denne<br />
skjebne til del. Hans skjønn, om enn mer kvalifisert, er likefullt ikke mindre skjønnsmessig<br />
enn mitt skjønn. I ettertid synes det litt merkelig at nettopp dette skulle utgjøre en<br />
grenseverdi, i dag opererer vi jo med 10% inngrep! Sammenlignet med den utvikling han ikke<br />
kunne vite noe om, den som kom etterpå, er praksisen langt mer “forstående” i dag enn den<br />
han karakteriserer som “forståelsesfull”. Jeg har selv studert utviklingen og vært i tvil om det<br />
finner sted noen sig-nifikant endring overhodet. Dette bla a på bakgrunn av det lave antall<br />
saker. Men når Bachke mener det finner sted en dreining i mer aksepterende retning, på<br />
grunnlag av et materiale mye mindre preget av endring enn den etterfølgende utvikling,<br />
legger jeg til grunn at en slik endring har funnet sted.<br />
Hvordan kan man forklare endringen? Det er i hovedsak to forhold som peker seg ut til å<br />
forklare at nesten ingen saker ender med inngrep, og ikke har gjort det på 10 år: Innslaget av<br />
“bagatellsaker” og utviklingen av den bestemte markedsformen “monopolistisk konkurranse”.<br />
Men før vi kommer så langt, er jeg nødt til presentere kildematerialet.<br />
Det empiriske grunnlaget.<br />
Det jeg har gjort, er å gjennomgå et sakspapirene for et utvalg av sakene i to perioder. Fra<br />
årgangene 1991,1992 og 1993 (slutten av prisrådperioden) har jeg trukket ut en tredjedel av<br />
den samlede saksmengde, og tilsvarende fra årgangene 1995, 1996 og 1997. Til sammen har<br />
dette blitt 39 saker, der jeg har gjennomgått sakspapirene fra den formelle klage til vedtak<br />
eller avslutningsbrev foreligger fra myndighetenes side. I det gamle regime gjaldt en del<br />
andre regler som har betydning for hvordan man skal telle sakene. For det første var<br />
saksbehandlingen innrettet mot Prisrådet. Sekretariatet for Prisrådet var prisrådkontoret i<br />
Prisdirektoratet. Denne forskjellen innebærer at man i det gamle regime fikk “henlagte” og<br />
6 Kildene på antall inngrep er de samme som over, prosentueringene er foretatt av meg.
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
“trukne” saker, saker som aldri kom så langt som til Prisrådbehandling. Jeg har tatt med noen<br />
slike saker også. Etter innføringen av konkurranseloven forsvant ordningen med<br />
Prisrådsbehandling. Sakene behandles nå av saksbehandlere i den såkalte<br />
“markedsavdelingen” på Konkurransetilsynet, og avgjøres rent administrativt av ledelsen i<br />
markedsavdelingen sammen med ledelsen av Konkurransetilsynet. Dermed blir forskjellen<br />
mellom saker som ble behandlet av Prisrådet samt de som ble henlagt/trukket, og saker som<br />
får endelig vedtak i dag, ikke så stor.<br />
Av de gamle sakene var det 16 som ble behandlet av Prisrådet. Disse ble trukket tilfeldig etter<br />
saksnummer utfra de tre nevnte årgangene. De 16 sakene ble supplert med 7 saker som ikke<br />
“nådde fram” til Prisrådet, saker som ble trukket eller henlagt. At de ble henlagt innebærer på<br />
ingen måte at de ble uinteressante. Til sammen består det “gamle” materialet av 23 saker. Det<br />
nye materialet består av 16 saker. Disse er trukket ut på samme måte som i det gamle materialet,<br />
og utgjør tilsvarende omtrent en tredjedel av den samlede saksmengden i perioden.<br />
Materialet gir ingen mulighet til å forklare utviklingen i hele perioden. En forklaring på<br />
nedgangen måtte ta høyde for hvorvidt sakene var sammenlignbare gjennom hele perioden.<br />
Det er feks ikke sikkert, som det antydes over, at inngrepsandelen gjenspeiler en slags<br />
holdning til å gripe inn. Det kan like gjerne være uttrykk for at sakenes karakter har endret<br />
seg. Dessuten kan det være misvisende å bare fokusere på klager som fører til inngrep. Mange<br />
saker løser seg underveis i saksbehandlingen. Enkelte av de trukne saken fra Prisråd-tiden blir<br />
forlikt underveis. Det samme finner vi i dag, og det virker som en rimelig antagelse at<br />
innslaget av slike saker har vært jevnt helt siden 1954.<br />
Bagatellsakene.<br />
Det som etterhvert ble åpenbart, var at de fleste saker aldri ble formulert skriftlig, og aldri<br />
fikk noe saksnummer. De aller aller fleste henvendelser kommer pr telefon. Kontorsjefene,<br />
som tar seg av slike henvendelser, redegjør da rutinemessig for reglementet og antyder hva<br />
som skal til for å få medhold, tar i mot adresse og sender et eksemplar av retningslinjer for<br />
behandling av klager. Det viste seg at Konkurransetilsynet mottok 1-2 slike henvendelser<br />
hver dag! Det gir, hvis vi beregner 250 arbeidsdager i året, 350-400 hundre henvendelser<br />
årlig. Minst.<br />
Dette er tall som rimer bedre med en intuitiv forståelse av omfanget av forretningsnektelser<br />
og konflikter generelt i næringslivet. Av 400 er det 5% som ender med formell klage. Og av<br />
disse er det kanskje 10% igjen som får medhold. Jeg skal ikke antyde at ansatte i<br />
Konkurransetilsynet skremmer vekk klagerne, det er det ingenting som tyder på. Antageligvis<br />
tyder omfanget av frafall fra telefon til formell klage, at det er svært få saker som er<br />
leveringsnektelser av et slikt slag at det ville medført inngrep. En grunn til å tro noe slikt<br />
finner vi blant noen sakene som fikk saksnummer. Mange av disse bærer nemlig preg av at de<br />
ikke har hatt telefonisk kontakt med Konkurransetilsynet før klagen ble sendt (eller er sendt<br />
inn på tross av at saken åpenbart ikke ville få medhold). Dette er saker som ikke faller inn<br />
under noen av inngrepskriteriene, der heller ikke klager hevder at noen av disse gjør seg<br />
gjeldende, eller der dette fremgår som utvilsomt. Jeg har kalt denne type saker for<br />
“bagatellsaker”.<br />
Ved en gjennomgang av de 39 sakene fant jeg å kunne karakterisere 21 som bagatellmessige.<br />
Godt over halvparten av sakene totalt er enten klager fra forbrukere, klager på offentlige<br />
reguleringer, faller utenfor prislovens eller konkurranselovens kompetanseområde, bærer preg<br />
av kverulantisme fra klageren, er av personlig karakter, eller bærer preg av å handle om noe<br />
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NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
helt annet (som tilfeldigvis medfører forretningsnektelse, som mislighold av kontrakter).<br />
Mange av sakene hadde rett og slett ikke noe å gjøre i Prisrådet eller Konkurransetilsynet.<br />
Dette gjaldt særlig de “nye” sakene (12 av bagatellsakene er nye, mens 9 er fra det eldre<br />
materialet).<br />
En grunn til den lave andelen inngrep er rett og slett karakteren til de sakene som kommer<br />
inn. Mange av sakene Konkurransetilsynet behandler er således slike som kunne vært<br />
avskåret i telefonen, dersom klager hadde ringt før klage ble sendt, eller forstått rekkevidden<br />
av det som fremgår av retningslinjene de fikk tilsendt. (Det er typisk at “bagatellklagene” ikke<br />
føres av jurister men lekfolk.) Når Konkurransetilsynet får så mange som opptil 400<br />
henvendelser i året, er det bare rimelig at noen av disse passerer det filteret som telefonen<br />
muliggjør.<br />
På dette grunnlaget kunne man stille det omvendte spørsmål, om hvorfor så mange saker som<br />
15-20 ble behandlet av Konkurransetilsynet og Prisrådet, og hvorfor så mange som det gjorde<br />
medførte inngrep. Konkurransetilsynet og Prisrådet kan de seneste ti år betraktes som en<br />
oppsamlingspost for mindre fornøyde næringsdrivende, som i større eller mindre grad, og mer<br />
eller mindre tilfeldig er blitt utsatt for nektelse av forretningsforbindelse.<br />
Men fortsatt står 18 saker igjen definert som “genuine” forretningsnektelser. Det er tross alt<br />
nesten halvparten av sakene. Hvorfor er det heller ikke her særlig utbredt å foreta inngrep?<br />
Monopolistisk konkurranse.<br />
Svaret kan ligge i forekomsten av markedsformen “monopolistisk konkurranse”, men denne<br />
sammenhengen er basert på mer spekulative sammenhenger enn det foregående. Selve<br />
begrepet “monopolistisk konkurranse” kan høres ut som en selvmotsigelse, konkurranse og<br />
monopol blir i økonomien betraktet som ytterpunkter og motsatser i spekteret av<br />
markedsformer. Men navnet skjemmer visst ingen, og når man snakker om monopolistisk<br />
konkurranse siktes det oftest til det vi kan kalle “merkevarekonkurranse”. I denne formen for<br />
konkurranse om forbrukernes kjøpevillighet, er fokus flyttet fra pris til egenskaper ved varen<br />
og/eller bilder av egenskaper ved varen, selv om pris ikke blir helt eliminert som<br />
konkurranseparameter. I noen markeder er varene helt homogene, som økonomene sier. Dette<br />
er en av forutsetningene i “frikonkurransemodellen”. Mel og sukker består av de samme<br />
kjemiske sammensetningene uansett hvilket firma som produserer det. Det motsatte er<br />
heterogene markeder, hvor varene ikke direkte kan erstatte hverandre. Enten besitter de<br />
forskjellige kvaliteter, som feks møbler. Men her er det en glidende overgang til mer eller<br />
mindre fiktive forskjeller produkter i mellom. Mer og mer vanlig er det at varene fremstilles<br />
som mer differensierte enn de i virkeligheten er. Vi kjenner de mest påfallende eksemplene<br />
alle sammen, for dette er de som møter oss på TV-skjermen i reklamepausene, fra<br />
superboards og alle de rom som reklamen etterhvert har invadert, inkludert private<br />
telefonsamtaler. Biler, damebind, bensin, leskedrikk, sjokolade, klær, - eksemplene på<br />
merkefokusert konkurranse kunne mangfoldiggjøres.<br />
Den økte betydningen av denne markedsformen kan illustreres med veksten i<br />
reklamebransjen. Fra 1979 til 1992 økte bruttoproduksjonsverdien nesten fem ganger, fra 1,7<br />
til nesten 8 milliarder kroner, antallet bedrifter økte 1½ gang, fra 500 til 1300 (Historisk<br />
Statistikk 1994, tabell 21.6). Denne veksten henger både sammen med at antallet arenaer<br />
reklamen utspiller seg på har økt, slik at det å markedsføre en vare med reklame er blitt<br />
dyrere, og at reklame har blitt en viktigere del av konkurransen. Tallene skal derfor ikke<br />
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brukes til å antyde at omfanget av monopolistisk konkurranse er firedoblet siden Bachke<br />
gjorde sin studie. Men at den har økt betydelig, synes opplagt.<br />
Det fremgår ikke av øvrige studier av leveringsnektelser i hvilken grad klager har rettet seg<br />
mot leverandører av merkevarer. Hverken Bachke (1977) eller Jensen (1991) tar opp dette<br />
spesielt. Det finnes således ikke noe sammenligningsgrunnlag for dagens situasjon. Men det<br />
er påfallende at i 14 av de 18 sakene som ikke er klassifisert som bagatellmessige, finner<br />
forretningsnektelsen sted i en markedsføringskanal preget av monopolistisk konkurranse.7<br />
Hvilken relevans har sammenhengen mellom manglende inngrep overfor forretningsnektelser<br />
og forekomsten av monopolistisk konkurranse? Vi så innledningsvis at Prisrådets og Konkurransetilsynets<br />
virksomhet måtte forstås i lys av lovenes formålsparagrafer, og at disse er nært<br />
knyttet til stimulering av konkurranse i næringslivet. Inngrepskriteriet “almene hensyn” er<br />
nært knyttet til dette, i tillegg til at Prisrådet (og Konkurransetilsynet?) har vært “særlig<br />
inngrepsvillige” overfor markeder der konkurransen har syntes svak. Men det finnes ingen<br />
tegn på at man har skilt mellom de forskjellige konkurranseformene “priskonkurranse”<br />
(frikonkurranse) og “merkevarekonkurranse” (monopolistisk konkurranse) i de sakene jeg har<br />
gjennomgått. Det er påfallende at et typisk merkevaremarked som klesbransjen blir<br />
kategorisert som i “virksom konkurranse”, mens empiriske studier av dette markedet (som<br />
Furseth 1994) konkluderer med at dette er en sannhet med omfattende modifikasjoner, det<br />
hevdes bla a at de dominerende kjedene ikke deltar i den lokale priskonkurransen (s 207).<br />
Til tross for konkurranseformenes forskjellige egenskaper, den ene retter seg mot pris og<br />
presser prisene ned, mens den andre først og fremst retter seg mot egenskapene til varen og<br />
fremstillingen av disse, ser det ut til at konstateringen av konkurranse uansett utløser motvilje<br />
mot å gripe inn. Når utviklingen i næringslivet går mot mer og mer produktdifferensiering<br />
(man sørger for at produktene i samme marked ikke ligner hverandre) og/eller mer og mer<br />
reklame (man sørger for at produktene i samme marked ikke ser ut som de ligner hverandre),<br />
er det klart at dette gjenspeiles i Pris/konkurransemyndighetenes virksomhet. Det blir stadig<br />
viktigere for videreforhandlere å forhandle det rette produktet, mens Prisrådet og<br />
Konkurransetilsynet opererer med et udifferensiert konkurransebegrep.<br />
Til slutt.<br />
Motstrebende har vi erkjent at det i Prisrådets virksomhet synes å finnes en gradvis dreining i<br />
retning vegring mot å gripe inn overfor forretningsnektelser i næringslivet. Det er påpekt to<br />
forhold som kan forklare dette. Andelen bagatellsaker kaster lys over den lave andelen<br />
inngrep i dag, mens utviklingen av konkurranseformer der produktenes mer eller mindre<br />
tilsynelatende forskjelligartethet kan gi forståelse også av nedgangen i inngrepstilbøyelighet.<br />
Vi skal ikke her ta stilling til om Konkurransetilsynets håndtering av monopolistisk<br />
konkurranse er av det gode eller onde. Vi nøyer oss med å antyde at utviklingen av<br />
næringslivet i retning av produktdifferensiering og reklamebasert konkurranse kan kaste lys<br />
over utviklingen av andelen inngrep i forretningsnektelser behandlet av Prisrådet og<br />
Konkurransetilsynet. Minst like viktig for denne forståelsen imidlertid omfanget av<br />
bagatellsaker, som igjen må forstås på bakgrunn av konkurransemyndighetenes saksfilter.<br />
Ikke alle bagatellsakene blir avverget i klagers første møte med Konkurransetilsynet, og<br />
tidligere Prisdirektoratet, og behandlingen av disse sakene utgjør en stor del av<br />
myndighetenes virksomhet på dette feltet.<br />
7 Basert på mitt skjønn.<br />
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Litteratur<br />
Bachke, L.B: Nektelse av forretningsforbindelse. Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 1977.<br />
Gripsrud, Geir og Arne Nygaard: Markedsføringskanaler. Cappelen akademisk forlag, 1997.<br />
Furseth, Peder Inge: Konkurranse i detaljhandelen. Arbeidsrapport nr. 9-1994. Statens<br />
institutt for forbruksforskning, Lysaker, Norge.<br />
Historisk statistikk 1994, Statistisk sentralbyrå, Oslo.<br />
Jensen, Olav Harald: Urimelig og almenskadelig forretningsnektelse. Pristidende nr. 6-1991.<br />
Johansen, Nicolay B: Avtalt spill. Hovedfagsavhandling ved institutt for kriminologi,<br />
Universitetet i Oslo, 1996.<br />
Lagmannsrettens og herreds- og byrettens forretningsstatistikk m.v. for 1997: Udatert notat<br />
fra justisdepartementet.<br />
Næringslivets Konkurranseutvalg: Informasjonshefte, udatert.<br />
Pristidende nr. 6-1992<br />
Ukens Statistikk nr. 32-1997. Statistisk sentralbyrå, Oslo.<br />
84
Paul Larsson, Forsker, dr. polit<br />
Institutt for kriminologi, Universitetet i Oslo<br />
PB 6872 - St. Olavs Plass<br />
N-0130 Oslo<br />
e-mail: paul.larsson@jus.uio.no<br />
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Kontroll av økonomisk kriminalitet innen det internasjonale<br />
verdipapirmarkedet<br />
Verdipapirmarkedet har de senere år vært rystet av flere store skandalesaker. Lovbruddene<br />
strekker seg fra det enkle til det komplekse; fra underslag (NOKA), dokumentfalsk, kursmanipulasjon<br />
(Sysdeco), megleres brudd på god forretningsskikk (NAT/ Platou) til innsidehandel.<br />
I forbindelse med disse sakene er det reist spørsmål om hvor kontrollen var når lovbruddene<br />
skjedde og hvorfor det ikke ble satt noen stopper for dem.<br />
Undersøkelsens siktemål, som avsluttes i år 2000, er å beskrive noen “cases” hvor kontrollen<br />
av ulovlige handlinger vektlegges. Det er det ytre, formaliserte kontrollapparatets funksjoner<br />
(Kredittilsynet [SEC], Børsen og ØKOKRIM) undersøkelsen retter seg mot. Utviklingen<br />
innen kontrollen er ikke entydig. På 1980 - tallet skjedde nasjonalt en sterk deregulering av<br />
finansnæringen (Larsson 1997a). Samtidig skjedde i mange vestlige land en formalisering av<br />
kontrollen innen verdipapirmarkedet (Moran 1984 og Clarke 1986). Etter økonomi- og<br />
bankkrise ved inngangen til 1990- tallet har det nasjonalt og internasjonalt skjedd en utviklingen<br />
av ulike kontrolltiltak rettet mot finansnæringen.<br />
Innsamling av data vil konsentrere seg om bruk av foreliggende materiale, supplert med<br />
intervjuer av sentrale aktører. Analysen vil fokusere på velkjente “cases”. Både norske og<br />
utenlandske saker vil beskrives slik at ulikheter i kontrollsystemer og kontrollkultur kan<br />
sammenlignes.<br />
Reguleringen av næringen er viktig av flere grunner. Verdipapirmarkedet har i dag en<br />
helt sentral plass innen økonomien. Dette marked er slik at kriminalitet og kriser ikke bare<br />
truer de nasjonale markeder, men den økonomiske orden på internasjonalt nivå. Det er flere<br />
offer for kriminaliteten innen næringen. Enkeltaksjonærer taper store pengesummer på<br />
underslag og bedrageri (eks. Noka-saken). “Markedet” eller “børsen” kan lett bli offer - de er<br />
avhengig av tillit, hvis tilliten svekkes vil omsetningen av verdipapirer lide under det (NOU<br />
1996: 2).<br />
Hensikten med undersøkelsen er å belyse sentrale spørsmål omkring reguleringen og<br />
kontrollen av verdipapirmarkedet. Eksempelvis:<br />
- Styrke og svakheter ved ulike former for kontroll.<br />
- Hvordan kan lovbrudd innen næringen bedre forebygges?<br />
- Er det realistisk at lovbrudd oppdages underveis, eller kun etter handlingen er begått?<br />
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NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
- Kontrollens kostnader og inntekter. Det vil si hvilke hinder skaper ulike kontrollformer i<br />
markedet, er det noe å tjene på økt regulering av verdipapirmarkedet eller er det utelukkende<br />
utgifter forbundet med kontrollen?1<br />
- Kan utviklingen innen kontrollen av dette markedet best beskrives som deregulering eller er<br />
det snakk om re- eller omregulering? En kan i enkelte næringer se at deler av reguleringen<br />
som setter rammer for driften fjernes, mens det ytre kontrollapparatet samtidig styrkes.<br />
Det vil være essensielt å besvare disse spørsmål for å belyse hvordan kriminalitet innen<br />
næringen bedre kan reguleres.<br />
Den strukturelle rammen. Utviklingen innen verdipapirmarkedet de seneste tiår<br />
Det har blitt spesielt viktig å kontrollere verdipapirmarkedet etter omsetningen innen<br />
markedet skjøt i været fra midten av 1980- tallet2. Før 1983 - 84 var kjøp og salg av aksjer og<br />
verdipapirer noe som gjaldt en snever elite. Det var på mange måter innsiderenes marked.<br />
Markedet fikk et nytt preg etter flere nye aktører kom inn (Clarke 1986). “Folk flest” ble<br />
oppfordret til å sette penger i ulike fonds og det ble vanlig at ulike “kasser” (pensjonskasser<br />
og lignende) handlet på Børsen. På denne måten ble markedet demokratisert. Dermed kom det<br />
inn eiere som hadde et langt mer indirekte forhold til bedriftene de investerte i. De var ikke<br />
direkte interessert i bedriften, men kun i utbyttet av papiret. Derved økte betydningen av<br />
tilliten til verdipapirmarkedet og meglerne. Dette medførte en bevegelse fra mer uformelle<br />
former for kontroll, selvkontroll og i retning av formalisering (Moran 1984). Det kom flere<br />
nye lover fra midten av 80- tallet eksempelvis Lov om verdipapirhandel og Lov om<br />
verdipapirsentralen 1985 og reguleringen av innsidehandel fra 1988.<br />
Mye av hva som skjedde i Norge har likhetstrekk med utviklingen i andre vestlige land.<br />
Den norske økonomi per 1997 er en del av den internasjonale økonomi. Kontrollen av<br />
omsetningen av verdipapirer i Norge kan derfor ikke studeres alene, den må settes i en<br />
internasjonal ramme og sammenlignes med utenlandske erfaringer. En ny hverdag i næringen<br />
medfører at gamle måter å kontrollere næringen foreldes og at nye presser seg frem.<br />
Metode / “cases”<br />
Tilgangen på data er alltid et problem når lukkede verdener skal studeres. Verdipapir- og<br />
finansmarkedet har mange ekskluderende trekk og var inntil nylig preget av å være<br />
innsidernes marked. Likevel finnes det metoder som kan benyttes, en mulighet er studier av<br />
foreliggende materiale omkring velpubliserte saker.<br />
“Ofte er det slik at kritisk journalistikk får sakene frem i lyset og fungerer som pådriver for<br />
kontrollmyndighetenes arbeide. Fra nyere tid i Norge er Hårek saken (Larsson 1997 a),<br />
1 Da VPS (lov om verdipapirsentralen) ble diskutert i stortinget kom det en rekke kritiske invendinger om<br />
kostnadene ved registreringen i forhold til de fordeler en vant med å innføre den. Man antok registreringen ville<br />
skape unødige hinder i verdipapirmarkedet og at det ville medføre stort ekstra-arbeide. Det viste seg at vinsten<br />
ved denne formen for kontroll overgikk kostnadene.<br />
2‘De senere år har vi hatt en eventyrlig utvikling når det gjelder omsetningen av aksjer og obligasjoner. I mange<br />
år lå meglernes totalomsetning av aksjer på noen hundre millioner i året, men de siste par årene har omsetningen<br />
rett og slett eksplodert. I 1983 var omsetningen på 7 milliarder kr, og i tillegg ble det foretatt kapitalutvidelser i<br />
børsnoterte selskaper for 2.7 milliarder kr. I 1984 ble denne fantastiske omsetningsrekorden slått ganske<br />
ettertrykkelig, og omsetningen ble økt til nesten 20 milliarder kr, og kapitalutvidelsen passerte 6,5 milliarder kr.'<br />
(Debatt Odelstinget Em. 30 mai - Lov om verdipapirsentral s. 992, 1985). Disse tall er ‘peanuts’ mot dagens<br />
omsetning av verdipapirer. Omsetningen av aksjer og grundfondsbevis på Oslo Børs passerte i 1993 terskelen på<br />
120 milliarder (NOU 1996: 2)<br />
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NAT /Platou (februar / mars 97) og Noka Securities (mai 97) sakene talende eksempler.<br />
Særlig Dagens Næringsliv har satt kritisk søkelys på tvilsomheter innen næringslivet som<br />
har vist seg å være store og alvorlige kompleks. De metodiske problemer med å bruke<br />
media er mange, men det som ofte har skjedd i de store skandalene er at andre,<br />
kontrollmyndigheter og gransknings grupper, også har gått inn i sakene. Det virvles derfor<br />
ofte opp et svært stort og sammensatt materiale opp som står til forskerens disposisjon.”<br />
(Larsson 1997b)<br />
Medias viktigste funksjon i slike saker er som pådriver for det formelle kontrollapparat. Det<br />
bør understrekes at mediadekningen ikke er hovedkilde, det er dokumentasjonen kontrollapparatet<br />
produserer som er av størst betydning. Det kan være dommer, sakspapirer, ulike<br />
rapporter, innberetninger eller faglitteratur. Disse kilder vil suppleres med samtaler med<br />
ansatte i ØKOKRIM, Kredittilsynet og børsen samt “spillere” på markedet.<br />
Noen saker som kan være egnet å studere i detalj er:<br />
- NAT (Norwgian Applied Technology) / Platou saken. Denne saken avdekket at<br />
fonsdmeglere ikke bare i Platou, men også andre firma forsynte seg kraftig av aksjer som<br />
deres kunder skulle hatt. Disse aksjene ble betegnet som underpriset slik at fondsmeglerne<br />
gjorde nærmest “idiotsikre” investeringer. Firmaet R.S. Platou valgte å innstille sin<br />
virksomhet etter Kredittilsynet inndro deres konsesjon. Kredittilsynets rapport om forholdene<br />
i meglerhuset understreket en rekke kritikkverdige forhold (DN 22/3 - 1997).<br />
- Noka securities /Almgren saken. Hovedforholdet i Noka kollapsen var at adm. dir. Almgren<br />
i Noka Securities investerte i Ericsson aksjer med kundenes midler for å dekke over eget tap<br />
på 23 millioner i svenske statsobligasjoner. Han spekulerte på at Ericsson aksjene skulle<br />
synke i verdi (shortsalg). Det gjorde de ikke, de steg. Almgren “spilte” bort kundenes penger<br />
og “pyntet” på regnskapene slik at tapene ikke kom frem (dokumentforfalskning). Almgren<br />
ble høsten 1997 dømt til flere års fengselsstraff for disse forhold. Totalt ble det avdekket et<br />
tap på over 150 millioners, flere tapte millionbeløp på Noka.<br />
- Peter Young / Morgan Grenfell saken. Dette komplekset er kanskje spesielt interessant fordi<br />
Young blant annet spekulerte i norske verdipairer og brøt flere børsregler i den forbindelse<br />
(som eksempelvis flaggingsplikt, det vil si rapportering om kjøp til børsen). Young var ansett<br />
å være en av de absolutt beste spekulantene før han “mistet taket”. Etterhvert kom han til å<br />
sette store summer i risikofylte investeringer.<br />
- Baringsbank / Leeson saken. Baringsskandalen er et eksempel på svikt i både bankens<br />
intern- og eksternkontroll (Larsson 1998). Ingen grep inn før den unge Nick Leeson hadde<br />
“spilt” bort ærverdige Barings banks (som ble grunnlagt på begynnelsen av 1700 tallet)<br />
reserver på børsen i Singapore i januar 1995.<br />
Fra selvregulering til formalisert ytre kontroll?<br />
Store deler av verdipapir- og finansmarkedet har inntil nylig i stor grad vært selvregulert.<br />
Selvregulering kan enten utføres av den enkelte bedrift eller av bransjeorganisasjoner (som<br />
Norges Fondsmeglerforbund). Selvregulering kan defineres på denne måten:<br />
“Self-regulation is defined broadly to include social control against corporate crime<br />
engaged in by both individual corporations and trade associations. It includes private<br />
enforcement of the law and private enforcement of corporate policies designed to prevent<br />
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corporate offences (such as accounting policies designed to prevent slush funds and bribes).”<br />
(Braithwaite og Fisse, 1987 s. 222)<br />
Denne type kontroll fungerer best i lukkede homogene kulturer hvor aktørene er av ens<br />
oppfatning når det gjelder etiske spilleregler og hvor trusselen for overtramp er utstøtelse<br />
(Clarke 1986).<br />
Børsen er en selvregulerende organisasjon3. Børsen skal føre tilsyn med at børsreglene<br />
overholdes (børslov § 1-5, se NOU 1996:2 s. 189). Det gjelder eksempelvis regler om<br />
verdisensitive opplysninger, et tilfelle var Sysdeco som ikke ga riktige opplysninger og<br />
dermed bidro til å skape en feilprising av aksjene. Det gjelder også regler om hvem som kan<br />
handle med papirer, kravet om at kunden skal være valuttainlending var et spørsmål i Peter<br />
Young saken hvor det ble handlet norske verdipapirer. Det kan også være spørsmål om brudd<br />
på meglernes egne retningslinjer. De skal ideelt sett være en “uinteressert mellommann” ikke<br />
drive egen butikk, noe som ikke var tilfelle i NAT saken. Dette forholdet kan også oppfattes<br />
som brudd på den noe runde betegnelsen god forretningsskikk (vphl §5). Børsen skal melde<br />
fra til Kredittilsynet dersom “børsen har grunn til å anta at det er handlet i strid med<br />
bestemmelsene i vphl.”<br />
I den senere tid har Børsen måttet tåle kritikk på grunn av håndteringen av flere saker.<br />
Dagens Næringsliv (3/3 - 97) kom med påstander om at børsen ikke lenger var troverdig som<br />
kontrollør. Det var for få ansatte, 6 personer, som hadde mangelfull informasjon til å kunne<br />
utføre sine oppgaver. Kontrollen burde derfor flyttes til Kredittilsynet ble det hevdet.<br />
“Kontrollstaben på børsen kan like gjerne flyttes til Kredittilsynet, som i alle tilfelle har mer<br />
troverdighet i sitt embete enn Oslo Børs.” (DN 3/3 - 97).<br />
Det er flere organer som kontrollerer ulike sider av verdipapirhandelen. Børsen og<br />
Kredittilsynet skal samarbeide i større saker, mens ØKOKRIM tar seg av de saker hvor det er<br />
snakk om å reise tiltale. Kredittilsynet utfører vanligvis stedlig tilsynsvirksomhet. Deres<br />
hovedmandat er etterhvert utvidet fra å konsentrere seg om soliditeten til bedrifter innen<br />
finanssektorens til å se til at de “virker på en hensiktsmessig og betryggende måte.” Det er en<br />
rekke handlinger som rammes av denne utvidede definisjon blant annet innsidehandel og<br />
aktivitet som truer tilliten til verdipapirmarkedet. Kredittilsynet har langt større muligheter<br />
etterforske større sakskomplekser enn børsen. Både Børsen og Kreittilsynet benytter først og<br />
fremst råd og advarsler når overtramp oppdages. Disse kontrollorganer spiller på lag med og<br />
har i stor grad sammenfallende interesser med de kontrollerte. Kontrollører og kontrollerte har<br />
ofte samme faglige og yrkesmessige bakgrunn (Løyning 1995) noe som stort sett oppfattes<br />
som en fordel, men som også kan være problematisk. Fordelen er at de vet hvordan det tenkes<br />
og gjøres i finansverdenen, mens det kan være uheldig at de skal kontrollere “gamle<br />
kjenninger”.<br />
Referanser:<br />
Braithwaite, John og Brent Fisse: “Self-Regulation and Corporate <strong>Crime</strong>”. In: Shearing og<br />
stenning (eds): Private Policing, Sage, 1987.<br />
Clarke, Michael: Regulating the City. Competition, Scandal and Reform. Open University<br />
Press, 1986.<br />
Johansen, Per Ole: “Meglernes tillitsbrudd og den uærlige lege”. I: Studier i økonomisk<br />
kriminalitet. Johansen (red). KS-serien, 1991.<br />
3 Johansen (1991) beskriver Chicagobørsens problemer med selvregulering av meglernes aktiviteter innen<br />
futures markedet.<br />
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NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Larsson, Paul: “Skattepakker til folket. Banksertifikatkomplekset 1985 - 1995”. Forskning<br />
om økonomisk kriminalitet, Rapport nr. 42, Norges forskningsråd 1997a.<br />
Larsson, Paul: “Metodiske kvaler ved studiet av økonomisk kriminalitet”. I: Rapport fra<br />
NSfKs 18. kontaktseminar og 39. Forskerseminar. Hirtshalls, Danmark1997b.<br />
Larsson, Paul: I lovens grenseland. Banksertifikatordningen 1985 - 95. Dr. avhandling,<br />
institutt for kriminologi, 1998 (kommer på forlaget Pax i 1999).<br />
Løyning, Trond: “Makt og Penger. En analyse av relasjonene mellom Kredittilsynet og<br />
banker i perioden 1986 - 1994”. I: Det nye pengesamfunnet. Rapport nr. 82, Norges<br />
forskningsråd, 1996.<br />
Moran, Michael: The Politics of Banking. The Strange Case of Competition and Credit<br />
Control, Macmillan Press, 1984.<br />
NOU 1996: 2: Verdipapirhandel<br />
Ot. debatt, 30/5: Lov om VPS, 1985.<br />
Punch, Maurice: Dirty Business. Sage, 1996.<br />
89
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Anne Kaarina Alvesalo, LL. M, Lic. Iur.<br />
Police College<br />
Post Box 13, 02151 Espoo, Finland<br />
e-mail: anne.alvesalo@krp.poliisi.mailnet.fi<br />
“They are not honest criminals“<br />
-the construction of legal practices around the policing, litigation<br />
and counterlitigation surrounding white collar crime and<br />
entrepreneurship in contemporary Finland.<br />
working paper<br />
Abstract:<br />
There is (once again) a boom in the control of white collar crime in Finland and much has<br />
happened in this field throughout the 1990´s.New laws have been passed, not only<br />
criminalizing laws, but laws that have as their aimpoint to make the control economic crime<br />
more effective. Positions for public prosecutors specialized in the field of white collar crime<br />
have been established.<br />
The whole organization of investigation of white collar crime has been reformed and new<br />
posts have been established. The police and tax-authorities have developed new ways to<br />
control white collar crime. Extensive crimes have been revealed. Also they have as one of<br />
their aimpoint to access the damages caused by white collar crime. The tax authorities<br />
arranged a massive advertising campaing against the hidden economy.<br />
All this has resulted e.g. in that the representatives and unions of enterpreneurs have reacted<br />
strongly: they are describing these control policies with words like “police-state“, “murder of<br />
justice“ “percecution“ etc. A new phenomena has aroused. The people who are prosecuted<br />
of white collar crime`s are constantly lodging complaints or pressing charges against the<br />
police and litigating for damages caused by allegedly false accusations.<br />
The interesting matter in this phenomena of policing, litigation and counterlitigation is that<br />
the police claim that the accused are litigating and lodging complaints only in order to<br />
prolong the process and to take the attention away of the crime. The enterpreneurs claim that<br />
there are political reasons for the police to control them, and that the measures used in this<br />
persecution are exaggerated and illegal. The aimpoint of the presentation is to try to<br />
understand at how and why these new control practices are constructed from different points<br />
of view, and try to connect this more generally with the phenomenon of white collar crime.<br />
1. Introduction<br />
There are two aimpoints of my presentation. Firstly, I want to give an insight to the present<br />
boom of the control of white collar crime in Finland, and to the relatively new phenomena of<br />
lodging complaints and counterlitigating in cases of white collar crime; Secondly, I will try to<br />
analyze how these new control practices and reactions against them are constructed from<br />
different points of view, and try to connect this more generally with the phenomenon of white<br />
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collar crime.1<br />
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
As everyone knows, white collar crime has been relatively neglected in the study of crime and<br />
deviance. The main focus of study - as well as that of control policy - has been on traditional<br />
street-crime.This is the case in Finland as well. Every now and then, however, it becomes<br />
fashionable to talk about white collar crime as a public problem2. In Finland there was a<br />
phase of concern in the beginning of the eighties when several big cases on white collar came<br />
to daylight and a boom of prosecuting white collar criminals emerged. A lot of the charges<br />
were dismissed, because of the complicated nature of the cases, and because of the<br />
inexperience of police and procecutors. In 1983 our President Koivisto gave critisized the<br />
public procecutors for procecuting too easily in cases of white collar crime. After that, the<br />
thereshold to prosecute white collar criminals became higher. All in all, the debate concerning<br />
stricter control faded away towards the end of the eighties.<br />
After the long period of economic growth and excessive consumption in the 1980´s, a period<br />
of depression began in Finland in the beginning of the nineties. The development of the GNP<br />
began to decline and unemployment began to increase. There was a rapid increase in the<br />
number of bankruptcy petitions.3 In 1992 there was the so-called 'Black Thursday', when<br />
several banks published simultaneously their unprofitable part-year reports and several big<br />
companies became bankrupt. During the depression, several illegal acts committed by bank<br />
directors, politicians and businessmen were revealed, and simultaneously excessive govermental<br />
monetary support was granted to banks, which have in the last few years experienced<br />
considerable problems partly because of the losses caused by dishonest businessmen and bank<br />
executives.<br />
The decision makers' attention was once again to economic crime and one of the key profit<br />
areas within the profit plan of the police in 1993-96 was to prevent economic crime. In order<br />
to achieve the objectives set in the plan, a project was launched in the chief management of<br />
the police, to draw up a concrete strategy on the measures required by the effective prevention<br />
of economic crime.<br />
In 1993 a research was funded by the ministery of interiors on the economic damages caused<br />
by white collar crime. Prior to this researchproject, there was no comprehensive statistics<br />
available of economic crime as we defined it in this research (committed in an organizational<br />
framework).4<br />
The main task was to assess the extent of the economic/white collar crime crime and the<br />
amount of losses of the cases that were sentenced. Also the problems of investigation of the<br />
police were mapped.<br />
1 At this point I have not had the possibility to systematically gather extensive data on the exact amounts of<br />
complaints or lawsuits against the police. A preliminary questionnare concerning the experiences of the police in<br />
this matter was performed to all investigators dealing with white collar crime. In addition I have discussed the<br />
matter with numerous investigators. A case study was completed on compaints made against one person in<br />
charge of inquiries, as it was seen as an interesting ‘exaggerated stereotype’ of the phenomenon.<br />
2 On the processes of defining public problems, see e.g. Gusfield: ‘The Culture of public problems’ (1981).<br />
3 The increase of banctrupsy petitions began several years earlier at the same time when the financial markets<br />
were liberalized (deregulated). Matti Viren, Velkakierre No. 13,1995. p.33.<br />
4 Laitinen-Alvesalo: Talouden Varjopuoli (The dark side of economy), (1994).<br />
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The main result of the research was that only 10 % of the damages that are known to the<br />
police/procecutor are adjudged. Furthermore only 5 % of the adjudged damages are received<br />
back from the offenders by the state or other victims. 5 The puhishments in white collar crime<br />
were very lenient. Also an estimation was presented on the total amount of damages, that is,<br />
the damages caused by the hidden white collar crime.This research had a lot of publicity, and<br />
it aroused controversial reactions. All in all, it had its role in strengthening the present “war<br />
against white collar crime“.<br />
2. The present crusade against white collar crime<br />
In the field of white collar crime much has happened throughout the 1990´s: The present<br />
goverment has in its programme “to fight white collar crime and the black economy“ and<br />
they have made a special programme6 to do so, and are politically bound to the promises of<br />
the programme. The parlament granted 100 million finnish marks to the programme. It has<br />
been emphasized that the money invested in control will be multiplied as the damages caused<br />
by this type of crime will be seized.<br />
Indeed, in the field of controlling white collar crime a lot has happened throughout the 1990´s<br />
in Finland in several branches.7 New laws have been passed, not only criminalizing laws, but<br />
laws that have as their aimpoint to make the control economic crime more effective, e.g. the<br />
law regulating banctrupcies, register of companies, debt recovery procedure, concealment<br />
regulation between authorities and bank secrecy. There are new positions for public prosecutors<br />
specialized in the field of white collar crime. A special new office has been established<br />
i.e. the banktrupcy ombudsman whose duty is to supervise banctrupcies.<br />
The whole organization of investigation of white collar crime has been reformed and the<br />
amount of investigators has multiplied during the past few years. Policemen have special<br />
courses on how to investigate white collar crime and ad hoc organs for co-operation between<br />
different authorities have been established. The police management has also constructed their<br />
own definition for white collar crime, which has been informed to all policemen who are<br />
involved in investigating them. The policemen are obligated to register all cases that fulfill<br />
the definition in a special page in the reports of offence. The aimpoint is to attain<br />
comprehensive statistics on white collar crime, and to have up to date information on the<br />
amount of property that has been seized by different police districts.<br />
The police and tax-authorities have developed new ways to control white collar crime. The<br />
key elements of the new control policy are to are attain damages and to control white collar<br />
5 Virta, Erja - Laitinen, Ahti, 1996.<br />
6 Valtioneuvoston periaatepäätös 1.2.1996 (The Goverments Desicion of priciple 1.2. 1996)<br />
7 Ministery of justice: New laws have been passed e.g. the law regulating banctrupcies, register of companies,<br />
debt recovery procedure, concealment regulation between authorities and bank secrecy. Public prosecutors<br />
offices specialized (12 ) in the field of white collar crime have been established and there is special training for<br />
all procecutors. A special new office has been established : the bantrupcy -ombudsman whose office´s duty is to<br />
supervise banctrupcies and who performs special investigations in banctrup´s estates. The Police: 20 new<br />
investigation units and new posts have been established (now 406 investigators). Policemen are trained to<br />
investigate white collar crime and special organs for co-operation between officials have been established. One<br />
of their aimpoints is to access the damages caused by white collar crime. The tax authorities financed a massive<br />
advertising campaing against the black-economy. They have developed a computerprogramme with which they<br />
try to reveal “suspicious enterprises“. Ministery of trade and industry: New laws are under construction on state<br />
subsidies, and the control of them has been made more strict.<br />
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crime - not years after they have occured - but as they are happening. This has meant that the<br />
whole culture of investigation has changed in cases of white collar crime. The new<br />
requirements have resulted in that the police are much more active in their controlmechanisms.<br />
Instead of inviting the suspected white collar criminal politely to come to<br />
answer some questions, the police arrest them for interrogation. They are using more coercive<br />
means (e.g. house search, seizure of property), they are using intelligence to reveal crimes.<br />
The co-operation of officials has become quite routinized and effective. In addition the police<br />
the tax- and some other authorities arranged a massive advertising campaing against the black<br />
economy.<br />
At the same time, some high officials have been aquitted from white collar crime. One of the<br />
most scandalous event was that the husband of a member of the supreme court was dismissed<br />
from accustations of tax evation on the basis of the “small amount of the evaded tax“. This<br />
has caused another kind of image of control: citizens are claiming that the criminal justice<br />
systems favours those in high places and the whole integrity of the supreme court has also<br />
been questioned. Furthermore, an ex-ministers (“Uffe“) compensations for civil damages<br />
related to the bank crisis were adjusted drastically by the present minister of Finance, and the<br />
damages were considered tax-deductible. When this became public knowledge, the Minister<br />
of Finance gave her resignation. These scandals have had their role in preassuring the police<br />
to get better results in the investigation of white collar crime.8<br />
All in all, white collar criminals have been forced to face similar kind of intensity of reactions<br />
of the control system as “traditional“ criminals have done for ages.<br />
3. Images of control - Images of reactions towards it<br />
Along with the new and intensified control mechanisms of white collar crime, another<br />
relatively new phenomena in the finnish legal culture has aroused. The people who are<br />
suspected of white collar crimes are constantly lodging complaints or pressing charges against<br />
the police claiming e.g. that there are grounds for disqualication or that there are procedural<br />
faults in the preliminary investigation. They have expressed that they do not trust the police.<br />
On the other hand, the police claim that in many cases the reason for the defendants´ reactions<br />
is that they are trying to prolong the process, and are trying to take the attention away from<br />
the real matter. It is quite interesting how how these legal practices are constructed from<br />
different points of view.<br />
3.1. Business world and enterpreneurs<br />
The representatives and associations of enterpreneurs have reacted strongly: they are<br />
describing the new control policies with words like “police-state“, “miscarriage of justice“<br />
“political percecution“, “unneccecary shaming“ etc. E.g. the enterpeneurs association<br />
announced heavily in the mass media that based on their research on the actions of tax<br />
authorities, they have come to the conclusion that most of the audits had been arbitary,<br />
included several kinds of illegalities, and caused unneccecary banctrupcies. An investigative<br />
journalist questioned these results, and looked into the actions of tax authorities. According to<br />
his investigation, the images given by the enterpreneurs association have not described<br />
rightfully the present reality of control, and uses words like “enterpreneurs delusion“ and<br />
“enterpreneurs media game“. According to him, the tax authorities have “stepped on some big<br />
8 Immedityly after the “Uffe“ scandal, a special group of ministers was established to think on measures against<br />
white collar crime. They gathered 50 suggestions from the field to change laws and to make control more<br />
effective.<br />
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toes“, and as a result there has been systematic attempts to make the tax authorities seem as<br />
“bad“.9 In fact an audit was made by the state´s audit unit into the actions of tax authorities<br />
(Control of control!). The result of the inspection was that the entrepreneurs claims were<br />
wrong.<br />
If a person feels that she has experienced that she has been treated in an unjust manner by the<br />
police there are three possible methods of reaction. One can press criminal charges, one can<br />
sue for civil damages or lodge a compaint.10 The general notion11 of police who are dealing<br />
with white collar crime is that the use of all posible legal mechanisms has increased in the<br />
past few years, and in particular they are used much more by white collar criminals the<br />
traditional criminals.<br />
In the case study I conducted, the accused was charged of offences agains banktrupcy law: via<br />
complicated arrangements he had made 1,5 million marks dissapear. He undertook legal<br />
actions against 20 people that were somehow connected to the case. He lodged complaints,<br />
pressed criminal charges and sued for civil damages. He claimed that the person in charge of<br />
the investigation had harrased him, caused unnneccecary suffering, comitted slander, denied<br />
him legal aid, kept him in detention too long. He had similar complaints agains the investigators<br />
in the case and the prisonguards. He also claimed that the tax auditor had acted illegally.<br />
Furthermore, he claimed that the two administrators of his estate and their lawyers had given<br />
false statements. In his opinion even the bank manager who demanded that his business<br />
should be adjudicated in banktrupcy had made himself guilty of something. The general<br />
attitude of the defendant is quite clearly, that he was extremely angry that his actions were<br />
questionned in any manner, and that he had been subjected to being treated as some kind of<br />
“criminal“.<br />
“It is clear that the police see that going bancrupt is a crime in itself...I have done<br />
nothing criminal and the police are desperatly trying to find something illegal in my actions“<br />
The more public figures often see that they are selected and subjected to control measures<br />
only because of who they are and that otherwise no attention would have been paid to similar<br />
actions. An ex-minister who was suspected of participating in land flips (the value of an estate<br />
rose from 12,5 million to 18 million in one day!) said:<br />
“I was a normal customer of the bank and the only reason my actions are condemnd<br />
is because of my name. What I did was only rearranging my financial matters, and I didn´t<br />
know anything about the internal problems of the bank...and the prices of estates change so<br />
rapidly.“12<br />
3.2. Police<br />
9 Helsingin Sanomat 23.2.1997. p.D2.<br />
10 Lodging a complaint is a pecualiarity in the Finnish legal system. There is no due form to draft it, there are no<br />
time limits and one can complain of any actions of any state authority. The supervising authority must always<br />
look into it and give a statement. The highest official of these compaints is the parlaments legal ombudsman, who<br />
has the power to give (punitive) admonitions. Originally the complaint was designed to secure the legal rights of<br />
uneducated people.<br />
11 According to the questionnare I made, 80 % of white collar crime investigators knew cases where such<br />
mechanisms had been used.<br />
12 Kauppalehti 24.9.97.<br />
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The controller´s viewpoint is quite different from that of the enterpreneurs. The whole<br />
perception of white collar offenders differs radically from that of the traditional offender.<br />
“You can not trust these white collar criminals, they are not “honest criminals“ like<br />
the traditional ones, who played by the rules and understood that it is in the nature of matters<br />
that policemen were supposed to chase criminals; that was not called persecution“. 13<br />
The way the police look at the new control mechanisms is basically that there is nothing new<br />
in them with respect to crime control in general:<br />
“White collar or street crime, all in all they are crimes that we are supposed to<br />
investigate...why should we go easier with the white collar criminal?“ and “They (white<br />
collar criminals) just cannot perceive that they get subjected to the treatment criminals are<br />
supposed to...“14<br />
The rhetorics used by the police show that the police in its turn is not used to the constant<br />
questioning of its actions. Surely, the police has always been subjected to complaints and<br />
litigation, but the measures used by white collar criminals are different and the according to<br />
the police, the legal grounds are new and more innovative and they are done for different<br />
reasons than traditionally:<br />
“They use all possible legal means against all possible parties in order to prolong the<br />
process....one cannot breathe during the investigation of white collar crimes before one has<br />
answered to numerous complaints that the accused and his legal adviser fabricate“15 ,<br />
and<br />
“... the only point of the complaints is to make the investigation more difficult...and to<br />
take away the attention away from the real matter, the crime that has been commited“ 16<br />
Also the police see that the basic nature of the reactions against control measures is reflecting<br />
the general skewed mentality of the white collar criminal:<br />
“Using all those legal measures involves the same logic as illegal business...it´s<br />
playing games with the law...twisting and bending it, and using it to get <strong>what</strong> one wants“.17<br />
The fact that quite many policemen refused to answer my question on their knowledge of<br />
cases where the accused had taken legal measures against the police gave the impression of<br />
sensitiveness in this matter:<br />
and<br />
“Yes, I know, but I dont´t want to talk about them.“<br />
“Lets let the parties involved tell about them...“18<br />
13 Comment of a white collar crime investigator (interview).<br />
14 Comment of a white collar crime investigator (interview).<br />
15 Comment of a white collar crime investigator in the questionnaire.<br />
16 Comment of several white collar crime investigators in the questionnaire<br />
17 Comment of a white collar crime investigator (interview).<br />
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There is a notion as well, that some investigators have become almost intimitated and more<br />
careful in e.g. using coercive measures in their investigation:<br />
“Some investigators use all their energy in building the case so that they can be sure<br />
that they can not be claimed to have done anything wrong....the majority of their time goes -<br />
not into investigating the crime - but into constructing a buffer against complaints“19<br />
4. Concluding remarks and questions<br />
Is the effective control of white collar crime only a political makeshift? Nils Christie has<br />
analysed “the suitable enemy“, by which he means unwanted conditions that are seen as<br />
suitable to be raised as “social problems“. According to Christie drugs are a perfect enemy.<br />
The enemy needs to be hated by the population. It ought to be seen as dangerous, often<br />
inhuman. Good enemies are those that never die. He claimes that economic crime, is “perfect,<br />
indispensible, AND completely useless if taken seriously.“ Because the good enemy must be<br />
relatievly small, it must be without great political power. He questiones the possibility of law<br />
and order campaings against white collar criminals: “Can we imagine the same rules of the<br />
game than e.g. in drugs: (Provocation, infiltration the police pretending to be businessmen,<br />
bugging of telephones, payment to informers, the complete stripping by customs officers of<br />
business executives, and intimate body searches)?”.20<br />
Is the control of white collar crime, and the consideration of it as a “problem“ permanent, or<br />
is it, once again, an acute political need that has aroused the intesnified control. According to<br />
Christie white collar crime is indispensible particularly to goverments slightly to the left.<br />
“But this enemy is a good one only when kept at a distance and on an abstract level. Clearly<br />
exposed, it might become dangerous.“21 It has been claimed that in the end of the day, there<br />
will always be more political interest is more likely to be exerted in blocking or derailing<br />
white collar crime investigations, and that police can operate effectively only to the extent<br />
that they are free from political influence.22 Is in fact control the control of white collar crime<br />
more effective than the control of it ?<br />
Christie´s analysis is quite relevant if one looks at the abovementioned trends in Finland: the<br />
elites representative´s reactions can be seen as efforts to water down their control. It is<br />
interesting how Sykes´ and Matza´s techniques of neutralazation can be found in the reactions<br />
of of white collar criminals. As Matza stated: “The criminal law, more so than any<br />
comparable system of norms, acknowledges and states the principled grounds under which an<br />
actor may claim exemption. The law contains seeds of its own neutralization“.23 Denial of<br />
responsibility, denial of injury, denial of the victim, condemnation of the condemners and<br />
appeal to higher loyalities are all beautifully present in the abovementioned rhetorics of white<br />
collar criminals.<br />
It has been suggested that in fact techniques of rationalization and neutralization can be used<br />
to explain white collar criminality, how they become lawbreakers. An Important part in the<br />
18 Comments of several white collar crime investigators in the questionnaire<br />
19 Comment of a white collar crime investigator (interview) 25.11.97. There is an interesting analogy here to<br />
journalists who have been subjected to several law suits (white collar criminals´); they too have become careful<br />
when writing about them.<br />
20 Amusingly enough, one key area of Finnish policing in 1998 is drugs.<br />
21 Christie in van Swaaningen: Abolitionism (1986), p. 42-54<br />
22 Friedrichs 1996, 272.<br />
23 Matza (1964), p. 61.<br />
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aswer is that white collar criminals adopt a vocabulary of motives: excuses, justifications,<br />
disclaimers and denials.24<br />
Foucault´s analysis on the establishment of a useful group called delinquents is pertinent here<br />
as well. He distuingishes illegalities and delinquency, where he claims the strategic<br />
opposition to exist (although the juridicial opposition is between legalities and illegalities).<br />
The fact remains that many types of harmful business behaviour have succeeded in avoiding<br />
being subject to any criminal sanctions at all.25 According to Foucault, delinquents will<br />
remain at the borderland of society, they are forced to be satisfied with weak conditions of<br />
life, becuse they are cut off from the population that could help them; they are categorized<br />
inevitably as a part of localized criminality, which isn´t atrractive; which is politically not<br />
dangerous and economically harmless.26<br />
One the other hand one must also ask, is this agressive way of reacting to (white collar) crime<br />
desirable? Aren´t the mechanisms of the the criminal justice systems as a whole legitimated<br />
through this “war against white collar criminals“. Henry and Milovanovic have suggested that<br />
conventional crime control efforts fuel the engine of crime. Control interventions take<br />
criminal activity to new levels on investment and self enclosed innovation. Public horror and<br />
outrage call for more investment in control measures that further feed the cyckle. They claim<br />
that crime is autopoetic in that it is self-sustaining through its absorption of others reactions to<br />
it.27<br />
The suitability of the criminal justice system itself in its task has surely been questioned<br />
among criminologists (abolitionism, peacemaking criminology), but this has been done<br />
mostly in relation to street crime. In fact, with respect to white collar crime, the controllers<br />
and even the critical criminologists have stood at the same side! The Finnish criminal justice<br />
system is now embracing also other than the marginalized: in its net are caught also the elite´s<br />
representatives who have expressed that the criminal justice system is unfair. Will this lead<br />
into that new mechanisms outside the criminal justice system are demanded and developed? If<br />
so, will those alternative mechanisms be implemented only in the illegalities of the elite?<br />
Why is it useful too look at the control system of white collar crime and reactions against it?<br />
White collar crime has questioned the traditional concept of crime. It reminds us constantly of<br />
the artificiality of all definions of crime28, and maybe even makes us question the<br />
onthological reality of crime on the whole.29 The control mechanisms of white collar crime<br />
are different then those of ordinary crime, and so are the reactions against control. The control<br />
of these offences is often said of being hampered of competing values and social costs which<br />
do not arise in repressing ordinary crime.30<br />
Research on white collar crime should not, however, lead to reaffirm the existing realities of<br />
the criminal justice system. What Henry and Milovanovic suggest in their proposal for a<br />
Constitutive Criminology is the development of alternative replacement discourses, which are<br />
directed toward the dual process of deconstructing prevailing structures of meanings and<br />
24 Friedrics 1996, (among others), 230.<br />
25 Nelken in Maguire et al: Oxford Handbook of Criminology (1994), p. 366.<br />
26 Foucault: Dicipline and Punish, (1980), p. 315.<br />
27 See Henry and Milovanovic: Constitutive Criminology,(1996), pp. 214-241.<br />
28 See Nelken (1994), p. 366.<br />
29 This is <strong>what</strong> the aboilitionists claim: there is no onthological reality of crime.<br />
30 See Nelken (1994), p. 360.<br />
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NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
displacing them with new meanings, words.This is in fact <strong>what</strong> Sutherland did when he<br />
introduced his ground-breaking definition of white collar crime, which has reorientated much<br />
investigation in the notion of crime.31 Looking into the control mechanisms, and reactions to<br />
control and how they are constructed from different points of view gives interesting insights<br />
into the analysis of the criminal justice system as a whole.<br />
References:<br />
Christie, Nils: ‘Suitable Enemies’. In: van Swaaningen, Rene (ed.): Abolitionism. Amsterdam<br />
1986.<br />
Foucault, Michel: Discipline and Punish. New York 1980.<br />
Friedrichs, David. O: Trusted Criminals. Belmont, Albany etc. 1996.<br />
Henry, Stuart and Dragan Milovanovic: Constitutive Criminology. London etc. 1996.<br />
Laitinen, Ahti and Anne Alvesalo: Talouden varjopuoli. Sisäasiainministeriö. Poliisin<br />
oppikirjasarja 3/94. Helsinki 1994.<br />
Matza, David: Delinquency and drift. New York 1964.<br />
Nelken, David: ‘White Collar crime’. In: Maguire et al.: Oxford handbook of Criminology.<br />
Oxford 1994. pp. 355-92.<br />
Sykes, Gresham M. and David Matza: “Techniques of Neutralization: A theory of<br />
Delinquency”. In: American Sociological Review, 22 - 1957.<br />
Taloudellisen rikollisuuuden selvittelytyöryhmän mietintö. Oikeusministeriön<br />
lainvalmisteluosaston julkaisu 6/1983. Helsinki 1983.<br />
Talousrikollisuuden ja harmaan talouden torjunta Suomessa. Talousrikostorjunnan<br />
vuosiraportti 1996. Sisäasiainministeriö. Poliisiosaston julkaisusarja. Helsinki 1997.<br />
Valtioneuvoston periaatepäätös talousrikollisuuden ja harmaan talouden torjuntaohjelmaksi<br />
1.2. 1996.<br />
Viren, Matti: ‘Pahin konkurssiaalto ohitettu - onko silti paluuta normaalitasolle?’.<br />
Velkakierre,<br />
No. 13 - 1995, pp. 32-41.<br />
Virta, Erja and Ahti Laitinen: Talousrikostuomioihin liittyvä perintä. Sisäasiainministeriö.<br />
Poliisiosaston julkaisu 4/1996, Helsinki.<br />
31 Sutherland (1940), See Henry and Milovanovic (1996), p. 106.<br />
98
Erik Terp Jensen, Politiassessor<br />
Politimesteren i Grønland<br />
Boks 1006, 3900 Nuuk, Grønland<br />
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Den seneste kriminalitetsudvikling i Grønland<br />
Generelt om politimesterembedet i Grønland<br />
Grønland er en selvstændig politikreds i rigsfællesskabet. Den er, som de øvrige 55 kredse i<br />
Danmark, underlagt Rigspolitichefen og Justitsministeriet. Kredsen er opdelt i 18 distrikter<br />
med hver sin politistation. Ved udgangen af 1997 bestod politistyrken af i alt 112 polititjenestmænd,<br />
hvoraf 22 var udsendte.<br />
Politimesteren har sit embede i Nuuk. Han er ansvarlig for den overordnede administration og<br />
anklagevirksomhed i samtlige politidistrikter samt administrationen af de 3 anstalter for domfældte.<br />
Grønland havde pr. 1. januar 1997 i alt 55.971 indbyggere (befolkningstallet i Danmark<br />
udgjorde pr. samme dato 5.2 mill. indbyggere). Heraf boede 81% eller 45.351 indbyggere i<br />
landets 17 byer og knap 17,5% eller 9.770 indbyggere i landets 59 bygder. De tre største byer<br />
er Nuuk med 13.300 indbyggere, Sisimiut med 5.364 og Ilulissat med 4.634 indbyggere.<br />
Grønlands Kriminallov<br />
Grønlands Kriminallov er væsentlig forskellig fra f.eks. den danske straffelov, idet kriminallovens<br />
hovedsigte er at føre den dømte tilbage i samfundet og ud af kriminalitet ved foranstaltninger,<br />
som normalt ikke omfatter frihedsberøvelse i traditionel forstand. Af samme<br />
grund indeholder kriminalloven ikke stafferammer, idet det forudsættes, at hver enkelt sag<br />
afgøres konkret. De normale sanktioner er bøde, betinget dom, dom til forsorg og anbringelse<br />
i anstalt. Den sidste foranstaltning indebærer i langt de fleste tilfælde alene ophold i anstalt<br />
udenfor normal arbejdstid.<br />
Udgangspunktet om, at hver enkelt sag afgøres konkret fraviges indenfor en række særlovsområder,<br />
hvor foranstaltningen - typisk bøde - udmåles ud fra mere generelle principper og<br />
dermed får karakter af en mere takstmæssig afgørelse. Dette gælder navnlig overtrædelser af<br />
lov om euforiserende stoffer, færdselsloven og arbejdsmiljøloven.<br />
I hver by findes en kredsret. Kredsdommeren er lægdomer, som under medvirken af to domsmænd<br />
behandler alle sager. Anklageren er politimand, og besidderen (forsvareren) er heller<br />
ikke jurist. Ankeinstans er Grønlands Landsret i Nuuk, der ledes af en landsdommer, som skal<br />
opfylde de i Danmark gældende betingelser for at blive dommer. I landsreten møder anklagemyndigheden<br />
ved en jurist, ligesom besidderen som udgangspunkt er jurist.<br />
Der er i 1994 nedsat en Retsvæsenkommission, som bl.a. har til opgave at revidere den<br />
grønlandske kriminal- og retsplejelov, ligesom den skal opstille de fordele og ulemper som<br />
måtte være forbundet med at Grønland hjemtager rets- og politiområdet. Kommissionens<br />
beretning forventes at foreligge ved udgangen af 1999.<br />
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Den seneste kriminalitetsudvikling i Grønland<br />
Igennem de sidste årtier har kriminalitetsbilledet i Grønland - som bekendt - været præget af<br />
en relativ høj og gennem årene næsten konstant stigende kriminalitetsfrekvens.<br />
Kriminalitetsmønsteret har været præget af et relativt set stort antal personfarlige<br />
forbrydelser, medens niveauet for berigelseskriminalitet - typisk de simple former for tyveri,<br />
bedrageri osv. - stort ser svarer til det der findes i Danmark.<br />
Baggrunden for den grønlandske kriminalitetsudvikling har så vidt ses aldrig været genstand<br />
for en egentlig videnskabelig undersøgelse.<br />
Det er imidlertid politiets vurdering at en væsentlig del af Grønlands kriminalitetsproblemer<br />
kan forklares med tilstedeværelsen af navnlig følgende kriminalitetsfremmende<br />
hovedfaktorer:<br />
omvæltningerne af økonomisk, social og kulturel art, som det grønlandske samfund har været<br />
udsat for siden 1960érne, herunder navnlig den betydelige vandring fra bygd til by, stigningen<br />
i befolkningstallet samt faldet i antallet af personer som lever af traditionel fangst og fiskeri,<br />
det høje spiritusforbrug, og befolkningens nemme adgang til våben.<br />
Antallet af anmeldelser af overtrædelser nåede sit foreløbige højdepunkt i 1986 med 6.721<br />
anmeldelser (fig. 1). I perioden fra 1986 til 1992 kunne der konstateres et år for år lille men<br />
konstant fald i anmeldelserne, idet antallet af drab (fig. 6) og specielt sædelighedsforbrydelser<br />
(fig. 9) dog fortsat steg medens antallet af anmeldelser for berigelseskriminalitet (fig. 2 og 3)<br />
som en hovedtendens faldt.<br />
Det jævne fald i kriminaliteten siden 1986 blev på ny afløst af stigninger i 1993, 1994 og<br />
1995 for så vidt angik det samlede antal af anmeldelser. Det var imidlertid alene det samlede<br />
antal anmeldelser for vold (fig. 5) og tyveri (fig. 3) som steg år for år i den nævnte periode.<br />
Over den samlede treårige periode kunne der endvidere konstateres en stigning i antallet af<br />
anmeldelser for voldtægt og forsøg herpå (fig. 8) samt berigelsesforbrydelser i øvrigt (fig. 4).<br />
Derimod faldt det samlede antal af anmeldelser vedrørende såvel drab og drabsforsøg som<br />
indbrudstyveri over den samme periode (fig. 6, fig. 7 og fig. 2).<br />
Stigningerne i 1993-95 var overraskende, da et faldende spiritusforbrug (fig. 10) samt<br />
befolkningens aldersmæssige sammensætning tilsagde et fortsat, jævnt fald i kriminaliteten.<br />
I 1996 faldt antallet af anmeldte i forhold til 1995 med 11,7%. Faldet vedrørte alle kategorier<br />
med undtagelse af drab (som steg fra 5 til 7 anmeldelser, fig. 6 ) og indbrudstyverier (som<br />
steg fra 896 til 952 anmeldelser, fig. 2).<br />
Senest er der i 1997 på ny indtrådt en svag stigning i antallet af anmeldelser på 4,2% i forhold<br />
til 1996. Ser man på det gennemsnitlige niveau fra 1990 til 1997, ligger antallet af<br />
anmeldelser for 1997 - 5.157 - ca. 2% lavere ende gennemsnittet, og fortsat væsentlig lavere<br />
end i 1986.<br />
Ser man på de faktorer, der typisk har betydning for kriminaliteten i Grønland - 1)<br />
spiritusforbruget, og 2( antallet af personer i den kriminalaktive alder, kan den - ganske vist<br />
svage kriminalitetsstigning - ikke umiddelbart forklares, idet udviklingen skulle medføre en<br />
stagnation eller i bedste fald en nedgang i kriminaliteten. Spiritusforbruget lå i 1996 på 12,6<br />
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liter pr. person over 14 år (i 1986 lå forbruget på 20 liter ren alkohol pr. person), hvilket i<br />
øvrigt svarer til spiritusforbruget i Danmark. De store fødselsårgange fra 1958 - 1986 ligger<br />
nu i alderen 29 til 40 år, således at antallet af 15-29 årige, den kriminalaktive alder, er relativt<br />
små.<br />
Det er imidlertid værd at bemærke sig, at der i forbindelse med den seneste stigning i det<br />
samlede antal anmeldelser, samtidig er sket et betydeligt fald i anmeldelserne indenfor<br />
områderne drab og drabsforsøg (fig. 6 og fig. 7), vold (fig. 5) og formueforbrydelser (tyveri<br />
og berigelsesforbrydelser i øvrigt, fig. 3 og fig. 4).<br />
Den største kriminalitetsstigning fra 1996 til 1997 er sket på områderne indbrudstyveri (fig. 2)<br />
og øvrige sædelighedsforbrydelser (fig. 9) som dækker over blodskam, kønsligt forhold til<br />
børn og blufærdighedskrænkelse.<br />
Der er fortsat ikke konstateret hårde stoffer i Grønland, ligesom der endnu ikke er afsløret<br />
tilfælde af egentlig organiseret kriminalitet i Grønland.<br />
Til det samlede billede af kriminaliteten hører udviklingen med hensyn til Kriminalforsorgens<br />
tilsynsvirksomhed og anstalternes samlede belæg. Således har tilsyn og anvendelse af<br />
anstaltsanbringelse været stødt faldende med det hidtil laveste niveau i 1997 (fig. 12) Det<br />
færre antal friheds- og tilsynsforantaltninger peger på en nedgang i antallet af grovere<br />
forbrydelser.<br />
Der er også i 1997-98 udfoldet store bestræbelser på det kriminalpræventive område. Således<br />
har politimesterembedet i flere tilfælde modtaget tilskud fra Justitsministeriets særlige<br />
kriminalpræventive pulje til brug for konkrete projekter vedrørende forebyggelse af navnlig<br />
vold og sædelighedskriminalitet.<br />
I 1997 konstateredes der for første gang bandekriminalitet i Grønland. I Nuuk blev en<br />
drengebande med medlemmer fra 15 - 19 år afsløret af politiet som bagmænd til en række<br />
røveriske overfald og indbrudstyverier. Sagerne mod de pågældende blev hovedsageligt<br />
afgjort med tilsynsdomme. Der er efterfølgende udfoldet store bestræbelser i SSPK-regi<br />
(socialvæsen, skole, politi og kriminalforsorg) på at komme dette - i Grønland - nye problem<br />
til livs. Således har Nuuk kommune eksempelvis ansat en række “miljøarbejdere”, som<br />
primært har til opgave at opsøge og tale med de unge i de miljøer, hvor de unge typisk færdes.<br />
Bestræbelserne ses tilsyneladende at have båret frugt, idet der ikke efterfølgende er afsløret<br />
lignende drengebander.<br />
Sammenfattende er det politimesterembedets vurdering, at der er grundlag for at nære håb<br />
om, at stigningerne i det samlede antal af overtrædelser af kriminalloven i 1993-95 og igen i<br />
1997 har været af tilfældig karakter, og fremfor alt, at det seneste fald i den personfarlige<br />
kriminalitet vil fortsætte.<br />
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NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Hedda Giertsen, Assistant Professor<br />
Department of Criminology, University of Oslo<br />
PB 6872, St. Olavs Plass, N-0130 Oslo<br />
e-mail: hedda.giertsen@jus.uio.no<br />
106<br />
<strong>Crime</strong> trends and trends in the criminal policy in Norway 1<br />
To talk about crime trends is also to talk about trends in criminal policy. <strong>Crime</strong> statistics tell<br />
about the number of acts which have been reported to the police, accepted by the prosecution<br />
authorities as crimes, and dealt with by courts and prison authorities.<br />
It is old knowledge that crime statistics actually give us statistics on the capacity of<br />
the different parts of the control apparatus.<br />
The latest published statistics on the police, the courts and prison activities are from<br />
1995. More recent figures can be found in other sources such as state budgets from the last<br />
years; a document called Stortingsmelding no. 27 (1997-98) written by The Ministry of Law<br />
and delivered to Stortinget (the parliament), and from information from the police reported in<br />
the media. All these kinds of sources are used in this paper.<br />
In the following I will discuss two main topics:<br />
1) The first is about figures, trends - and discussions connected to some of these figures.<br />
2) The second is about recent trends in crime politics in Norway.<br />
1) Figures<br />
I will first present some figures, which I assume is expected of me: The number of reported<br />
offences in 1995 were 400600 (SSB 95, table 1). Of these, 286000 were classified as crimes,<br />
showing an increase compared to the previous years.<br />
In Norway another category, 'crimes investigated by the police' is more often used. In 1995<br />
270000 crimes were investigated by the police (SSB 1995, t. 4). This figure represents an<br />
increase from previous years, an increase which can also be traced in the number of investigated<br />
crimes pr 1000 inhabitants from 1960 to 1995:<br />
1960: 10.8<br />
1970: 16.8<br />
1980: 29.8<br />
1990: 55.4<br />
1995: 61.6 (SSB 95, t. 4)<br />
Of the 270000 crimes in 1995:<br />
69.3 % were classified as theft;<br />
4.3 % were classified as violence against person<br />
(of these 32 were classified as murders)2 (SSB 95, t. 5)<br />
1 A some<strong>what</strong> extended version of the paper given on the 22nd. of May 1998. Many thanks to Ragnhild<br />
Hennum, Heidi Mork Lomell and Rachel Paul for all their comments and help to make this paper correct and<br />
readable.<br />
2 From 1991 to 1995 the numbers of reported murders were: 38; 50; 47; 46; 32.
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
But instead of giving rows of figures, I will concentrate on some discussions which stem from<br />
changes in figures of some kinds of reported crimes - even though these crimes do not take<br />
any dominant position among the figures. Some present of the concerns, arguments, proposals<br />
and measures will be presented.<br />
Of course I can only deal with some of the topics that have been discussed. Other<br />
discussions could also have been presented.<br />
As a general comment to the discussions, one can say: Serious concerns are expressed when<br />
reported numbers go up; and when they go down.<br />
i) concerns when numbers go up<br />
One example: The numbers on reported violence (acts classified as 'crime of violence against<br />
the person') show an increase from 8300 in 1991 to 11600 in 1995 (SSB 95, t. 5). Also in the<br />
first quarter of 1998 there has been an increase in the number of reported violent crimes compared<br />
to the same period in 1997. The highest increase in absolute numbers was found for<br />
'assaults' which increased from 2200 to 2500, an increase by 13 %; while 'wounding or<br />
inflicting bodily harm' had the highest relative increase by 26 % (N = 582), when comparing<br />
the first 3 months of 1997 and 1998 (SSB 1998).<br />
These increases in crimes of violence is one of the reasons behind a suggestion from a<br />
majority in Stortinget, urging the courts to increase the sentences in cases of violent crimes.<br />
But this idea challenges the ideal of the independent court. So in the end most of the<br />
representatives found it sufficient to give a statement as a political signal in general, while a<br />
few wanted to make a statement directed to the courts.<br />
The number of murders also cause serious concerns. In recent years there has been no<br />
increase in reported murders (see fn 2). But there are other increases to be found. In a<br />
newspaper (Dagbladet 10.3.98) the police report on murders in 1997. This year 39 persons<br />
were murdered, and of these 14 by knife. In 1994 the numbers were respectively 6 out of 27.<br />
This increase in the reported use of knives has led to a suggestion from 'The Committee to<br />
consider Laws on Weapons'3 to increase punishments in criminal cases involving weapons.<br />
In 1993 a law was passed that criminalized possession of knives 'or other sharp tools'<br />
in public places (not if the purpose was respectable), with punishments of fine up to NOK<br />
2000 or of imprisonment for up to 3 months.<br />
According to The Ministry of Law, 1002 persons have been reported to the police for<br />
possessing knives illegally in 1997. In 1997 146 persons were given ticket fines for<br />
possessing knives (Dagsavisen 10.3.98).<br />
The police are satisfied with the law which gives them an opportunity to stop and<br />
search people for knives (Dagbladet 10.3.98).<br />
In 1997, there were reported 7 cases of murders were firearms had been used.4 But even if<br />
these cases are few and less than the number of knives used in reported murders, there are<br />
concerns about firearms.<br />
This winter there have been reports in the media showing worries and concerns for<br />
young boys and men in Oslo, who according to the police and journalists, are between 20 and<br />
35 years old, belong to two conflicting groups or gangs, and are often from immigrant<br />
3 ‘Våpenlovutvalget’<br />
4 The firearms used were: shotgun (hagle) 2, revolver 0; rifle 1, pistol 4.<br />
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families. The reports say that these men 'have enough firearms' such as automatic pistols and<br />
revolvers.<br />
This discussion is also encouraged by a study by Thomas Haaland and Inger Lise Lien<br />
(1998) on groups or 'gangs' among young, mostly immigrant people in Oslo. These are<br />
conflicting groups, and serious incidents of violence have occurred between these kinds of<br />
groups before (for one such incident, see Guri Larsen 1992).<br />
This winter the police have also pointed out violence in homes and families directed towards<br />
women and children, as a major concern (Dagsavisen 4.2.98). For a long time researchers and<br />
women's organisations have considered this kind of violence as serious acts on the grounds<br />
that they often lead to serious physical harm, are repeated, may last for years, are often<br />
combined with psychological humiliation, and the victims are reluctant to go to the police.<br />
What is worth noting is that also the police place this kind of violence high up on their list of<br />
concerns.<br />
ii) concerns when the reported numbers go down<br />
The numbers of reported sexual offences went down in 1995: The numbers of rapes<br />
investigated by the police were both in 1992 and 1993: 360, in 1995: 309, which is a decrease<br />
by 14%.<br />
More seriously it was seen that the numbers of rape reported to the police decreased;<br />
and even more seriously that also the number of sanctions for rapes went down by half from<br />
75 in 1991 till 36 in 1995 (SSB 95, t. 36). The number of reactions for rapes in 1997 were<br />
even lower, by 30 cases (SSB 1997).<br />
These decreases resulted in serious concerns from several groups who were anxious that<br />
women would from now report even fewer cases of rape than before.<br />
To improve the position of women, women's organisations and a political party, SV,5 made a<br />
proposal to define as illegal 'unintentional rape', to make it possible to sentence men who<br />
today may plead not guilty, saying they did not understand the refusals and resistance from<br />
the victim, and may be believed, at least in a lower court (Dagbladet 27.1.1997)6.<br />
But this proposal has as yet not gained much support.7<br />
Last year there has been an increase in the number of rapes reported to the police: In<br />
the first 3 months of 1998 109 rapes have been reported to the police, compared to 86 reports<br />
during the first three months of 97 (SSB 1998).<br />
Also when it comes to incest and sexual abuse towards children under 14/16 years, there have<br />
been concerns that the number of cases reported to the police have declined recently. This<br />
happened after a case in Bjugn where a number of persons were reported for sexual abuse<br />
against children, but none found guilty.<br />
The numbers of incest and sexual abuse towards children under 14/16 years reported to the<br />
police, and investigated by the police have gone down from 1991 till 1995:<br />
5 SV, Sosialistisk Venstreparti; The Socialistic Left Party<br />
6 According to the report in the newspaper, the majority of the courts found that a 52 year old man committed for<br />
trial had used force when he forced the 18 year old woman to have sexual intercourse with him, but that he did<br />
not ‘understand ’ that the girl tried to avoid this from happening. At the same time the man was convicted to<br />
pay the woman NOK 40.000 as compensation for her suffering.<br />
7 Also another topic has recently occurred connected to cases of rape: A man brought to court charged with rape,<br />
has, before the penal-law-case was completed - reported the woman to the civil court on charge of libel.<br />
108
eported to the police:<br />
sexual abuse towards<br />
incest: children under 14/16 years:<br />
1991 168 607<br />
1995 111 393<br />
investigated by the police:<br />
sexual abuse towards<br />
incest: children under 14/16 years:<br />
1991 103 322<br />
1995 88 397<br />
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
In 1992 the concerns about incest led to an increase in the maximum punishment up to 21<br />
years of imprisonment for serious crimes of incest. This is the highest possible punishment in<br />
Norway (Andenæs 1994).<br />
Not only penal measures<br />
What is important to note, though not particular to rape and sexual abuse against children, is<br />
that measures have also been taken with the intention to help and cure, directed towards both<br />
the offended and the offender.<br />
This means that at the same time as 'The Norwegian society' sees these acts or<br />
happenings as crimes, suitable tasks for the police, courts and prisons, - we also see them as<br />
accidents that need to be mended or helped - beyond moral indignation and punishment.<br />
For victims there are several self-help-centres:<br />
- Women's shelters (Krisesentre) for women who have been battered or raped. Today there are<br />
such shelters in all but 66 municipalities. In 1995 4000 women and children spent in total<br />
74000 nights in the shelters (Aftenposten 24.3.97). For a discussion of immigrant women and<br />
Women's shelters, see Rachel Paul 1995; 1998).<br />
- A centre for persons who have been raped (Voldtektsmottaket), which is part of the<br />
municipal acute clinic (Legevakta).<br />
- Centres for persons who have been exposed to incest (Støttesenter for incestutsatte). The<br />
first centre started in 1986, and today there are 12 such centres. In 1995 they received 8000<br />
visits and 19000 referrals from persons who have experienced incest, recently or long ago,<br />
and from their family-members (Aftenposten 24.3.97).<br />
- There is also a centre for men who have been exposed to incest, which offers possibilities<br />
for talks in groups or with one consultant (Aftenposten 5.11.97).<br />
- Social-medical section for children and youth; Children's ward; Clinic for women/children,<br />
Aker Hospital, Oslo. (Sosialmedisinsk seksjon for barn og ungdom, Barneavdelingen,<br />
Kvinne/ Barnklinikken, Aker sykehus, Oslo). This centre started in 1986. The yearly number<br />
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of children/youth who have been referred, has varied from 20 in 1986 to 143 in 1996.8<br />
(Annual report 1996)<br />
For offenders:<br />
- The Institute for Clinical Sexology and Therapy (Institutt for klinisk sexologi og terapi)<br />
which started in 1989 and has worked with men who have committed rape (Reid J. Stene<br />
1998).<br />
One could say that there is a trend and a tendency to open up another perspective on these<br />
acts - and see them not only as crimes, but also as accidents that need to be helped and<br />
prevented.<br />
Today we see a peculiar break with this trend in a suggestion from two political<br />
parties (Arbeiderpartiet and Kristelig folkeparti),9 that prostitution should be criminalized,<br />
and not only the prostitute-customer (to criminalize the customer has been suggested before<br />
(see Høigård and Finstad 1986)).<br />
At the same time a new book has been presented with the title "Når sex blir<br />
arbeid"/"When sex becomes work", by May-Len Skilbrei (1998). The author who has talked<br />
with several women in this field, and who has also worked on "Teletorget" organizing<br />
telephone calls between men and women, finds this suggestion not a very good idea. This will<br />
not have any great impact in reducing the number of persons starting as prostitutes; it will<br />
only create more trouble and difficulties for them, as the condemnation and stigmatization<br />
will increase.<br />
And there are already alternatives to criminalization to be found in Oslo. For seven<br />
years "The Night-home" with 13 beds has offered prostitutes an asylum, and all together 500<br />
users have been registered (Thomas Haaland 1997).<br />
This tendency to see unwanted acts not only as crimes but also as accidents and problems that<br />
need to be helped, is of course the case not only when it comes to sexual offences, but also in<br />
other instances, for example violence.<br />
When it comes to violence, there are programs for offenders that start in prison, as for sexual<br />
offenders. In 1996 about 90 persons attended these "talk-groups for persons who are<br />
sentenced for violent and sexually offensive acts (St.meld. nr. 27 (1997-98)).<br />
- There are also services outside prison, such as 'Alternative to violence, Centre for men who<br />
use violence' (ATV)/(Alternativ til vold, senter for menn som slår). This centre started in<br />
1987. Today there are 18 such centres in Norway. Since the centre started and up to today<br />
between 500 and 600 persons have contacted ATV because they perceive their violent acts as<br />
a problem, and have attended courses and groups. In more than 2/3 of these cases, the men<br />
themselves have taken the initiative to contact ATV, and this contact is voluntary (Annual<br />
report 1995).<br />
When it comes to those acts that crimes we define as related to narcotics, we see the same<br />
dualism which mirrors the ambivalence of <strong>what</strong> the acts are all about: Is it a problem for law<br />
and order, or for treatment and help?<br />
In this field it seems that the persons brought to trial, sentenced and imprisoned, are<br />
more likely to be controlled than helped. But also here there have been treatment-programs in<br />
8 In the report for 1996 the Section says they are in doubt in 60% (of the 143 investigated cases) whether an<br />
offence of serious sexual abuse has taken place or not, and finds it not likely in 20% of the cases.<br />
9 The Labour Party and Christian People's Party.<br />
110
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three prisons, but reaching only a fairly small number of relevant prisoners (see St.meld. no.<br />
16 (1996-97)). Control measures dominate heavily inside the prisons.10<br />
Services for treatment are most often placed outside prison.<br />
If we should take our point of departure in the social, treatment and helping-sector, we<br />
immediately see the combination of control-help. There is nothing new in the fact that help<br />
and control are combined and mingled. On the contrary - they are like Siamese twins in the<br />
Norwegian history of poverty- and criminal-measures. But the method of this combination<br />
that the Norwegian authorities have chosen in the field of drug-use, in their Law on social<br />
measures and welfare (Lov om sosiale tjenester mv.) of 1993, is new, inventive and<br />
astonishing.<br />
Here the point of departure is that treatment for drug use should rely on voluntary<br />
participation. Forced treatment is impossible. So the solution is, according to § 6-2, that a<br />
person can be kept in an institution by force - not to be treated - but to be motivated to be<br />
treated freely. There is a limit to this: 3 months. After that you get an offer to make a contract.<br />
But then it does happen that persons under treatment sometimes drop out. So then, forced<br />
measures were invented: if a person should run away from the contract that she or he has<br />
freely agreed upon, the institution can search for her or him, and keep her for another 3 weeks<br />
by force - in order to re-motivate the run-away to continue the treatment. This may happen<br />
three times.<br />
From 1993 and till the summer 96, there have been reported all together 39 cases<br />
where force have been used according to § 6-2.<br />
Far too little! This is the view of The Ministry of Social affairs, who therefore worked out<br />
suggestions to increase the control on people using drugs, opening up possibilities for one<br />
family-member to report another to the social authorities, who may then consider use of force.<br />
Another suggestion has been to standardize and increase the use of urine-tests.<br />
This tendency to believe in force and control can be seen also in other sections of the policy<br />
on drugs, where methadone-programs for long-time drug-users are kept at a small scale and<br />
are developed slowly (see for example Nils Christie: Snegler som livreddere/Snails as lifesavers,<br />
1998).<br />
Reports in the media on the numbers of persons dying by over-doses, is most often read as an<br />
argument for more police, more control, more prison. But one could also read these numbers<br />
as an argument for more help, more methadone-programs, and not to forget, more decent<br />
treatment by the ordinary health services of persons using drugs.<br />
2) trends in the criminal policy<br />
This section of the paper is based on a document made by The Ministry of Law to the<br />
Parliament, drawing up the lines for criminal policy (Stortingsmelding nor. 27 (1997-98) "Om<br />
kriminalomsorgen").<br />
At first glance one might say that the trend in this document is two-fold:<br />
i) more control, by increasing the opportunities for the police to control people, and to<br />
increase the number of prison-places (to day the number of prison-places is 2899. According<br />
to the Ministry's plan, the number of such places in year 2000 will be 3200).<br />
10 The measures taken are: urine-tests; police raids in the early mornings, some times with dogs; strip and search<br />
of prisoners; investigating insides of the body such as rectum, stomach and vagina of women; search of prisoncells;<br />
offers to do the sentence on 'contract' (eg. Hedda Giertsen 1995).<br />
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NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
ii) At the same time there is a tendency not only to increase the number of prison-places, but<br />
also to look for alternatives to imprisonment, such as conflict resolution boards (Jane Dullum<br />
1996; Siri Kemeny 199); community-service (Paul Larsson 1994); an extended use of conditioned<br />
sentencing and imprisonment - and a proposal to open up for a pilot-project on<br />
electronic monitoring of offenders.<br />
But looking more thoroughly on these alternatives to prison, it becomes clear that these more<br />
lenient alternatives will actually lead to more control than today, as they will be linked up to a<br />
compulsory program (obligatorisk tilsynsprogram); and the sanctions for breaking conditions<br />
will be more efficiently inflicted, if The Ministry is heard.<br />
To realise their plan for more efficiency, The Ministry has made the following<br />
proposals: that the decision to re-imprison convicts on conditioned sentence who violate their<br />
conditions, shall be transferred from the court to administrative authorities. This would mean<br />
to re-introduce a system that was given up 8 years ago. The Ministry also proposes that prison<br />
directors shall decide whether violations of conditions for prisoners on conditioned discharge,<br />
shall lead to re-imprisonment.<br />
As another measure The Ministry suggests an introduction of a new "short-timeprison"<br />
for seven days - which may be prolonged(!). In these cases the prison-authorities of<br />
the Ministry shall be in charge.<br />
Some trends and tendencies can be read out of this document: First and most strikingly one<br />
sees a prioritization of efficiency at the cost of legal protection.<br />
One can also see a tendency to increase the total volume of control,<br />
and to blur the difference between serving sentences in prison and under probation;<br />
between the role of the prison-ward and the probation officer, so that the tasks of a probationofficer<br />
will be more and more like those of a ward.<br />
Another trend can also be discerned more clearly today: By use of programs, projects,<br />
'sentencing plans', it seems to me that prison-authorities more and more speak of prisons and<br />
sentencing not only in administrative and bureaucratic terms, but also as a place for socialtechnical<br />
measures, for repairing the 'criminals'. The treatment-arguments from the 60s and<br />
70s are here again, but now wrapped up in a more modern, administrative, efficient-like<br />
language. The prison-programs boil down to a question of finding the right tool, whether it be<br />
'scared straight' or 'conceptual skills'. This efficiency-perspective we also see in the politics of<br />
differentiation, which was introduced at the end of the 1980s, claiming that the programs and<br />
measures for prisoners shall not be evenly spread to all, but to 'those who take responsibility<br />
for their own rehabilitation'. The treatment should be efficient (see Stortingsmelding no. 23<br />
(1991-92) "Om bekjempelse av kriminaliteten" and St. prp. nr. 1. The Ministry of Law (the<br />
state budget) for the years later 1992).<br />
Again, just as in the 60s and 1970s, this 'repairing-the-criminal'-perspective tries to convince<br />
us that we all have the same interests, namely to find the right healing-program; and leaves<br />
out (or at least tries to leave out) the questions on criminal-policy, values and decency.<br />
Literature:<br />
Andenæs, Johs.: Straffen som problem. Spartacus. 1994/1997<br />
Christie, Nils: Snegler som livreddere. Aftenposten 24.1.97<br />
<strong>Crime</strong> Statistics 1995 (SSB 95) / Kriminalstatistikk 1995. Statistisk sentralbyrå 1997.<br />
Dullum, Jane med bidrag fra Nils Christie: Konfliktrådene. Institutt for kriminologi. 1996.<br />
Giertsen, Hedda: Fengselsvesenets skjulte verdimønstre. I: Lov og rett 1995.<br />
112
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Høigård, Cecilie and Liv Finstad: Bakgater. Pax 1986/Backstreets 1992.<br />
Haaland, Thomas and Inger-Lise Lien: Vold og gjengatferd: en pilotstudie av et<br />
ungdomsmiljø. Nibr-rapport: Ungdom mot vold 1998. Norsk institutt for by- og<br />
regionforskning. 1998.<br />
Haaland, Thomas: Et varmt hjem i en kald hverdag. Prosjekt rapport nr. 11/1997. Norsk<br />
Institutt for by- og region forskning. 1997.<br />
Kemeny, Siri: Nærbilder av saker meglet i konfliktråd. Institutt for kriminologi, 1998.<br />
Larsen, Guri: Brødre. Æreskamp og hjemløshet blant innvandringens ungdom. Pax 1992<br />
Larsson, Paul: Samfunnstjenesten sett fra innsiden. Nordisk tidsskrift for kriminalvidenskab.<br />
nr. 3/1994<br />
Paul, Rachel: Immigrant Women and Shelters for Battered Women. I: Ideologi og empiri i<br />
kriminologien. Rapport fra NSfKs 37. forskerseminar, Arild, Sverige 1995.<br />
Paul, Rachel: Shelters for battered Women and the needs forImmigrant Women. Tema/Nord<br />
Migration. Nordic Council of Ministry. 1998:507. 1998<br />
Skilbrei, May-Len: Når sex blir arbeid. Pax. 1998<br />
Stene, Reid J.: Straff og behandling av sedelighetsdømte i et lokalt prosjekt. En kriminologisk<br />
evaluering av "Tverr etatlig samarbeid for behandling av sedelighetsdømte i Vest-<br />
Agder". Institutt for kriminologi, Universitetet i Oslo. 1998.<br />
Stortingsmelding nr. 23. Om bekjempelse av kriminaliteten (1991- 92).<br />
Stortingsmelding nr. 27. Om kriminalomsorgen (1997-98).<br />
Ukens statistikk nr. 18 1998.(SSB 98). Statistisk sentralbyrå 1998.<br />
Ukens statistikk nr. 44 1997.(SSB 97). Statistisk sentralbyrå 1997.<br />
Årsrapport 1995/Report for 1995. Alternative to violence (ATV).<br />
Årsrapport 1996/Report for 1996.Sosialmedisinsk seksjon for barn og ungdom,<br />
barneavdelingen, Kvinne/Barnklinikken, Aker sykehus, Oslo.<br />
113
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Kauko Aromaa, Research Director<br />
National Research Institute of Legal Policy<br />
PB 1200, FIN-00014 University of Helsinki<br />
e-mail: kauko.aromaa@om.vn.fi<br />
114<br />
<strong>Crime</strong> trends in Finland in the 1990’s<br />
For Finland, the early 1990s were a period a severe economic recession, followed by a<br />
reorganisation process of economic structures that is still continuing. The EU membership has<br />
supported this process. The next phase of the restructuring process is the present, exceptionally<br />
rapid migration wave, resulting in a situation where there are only a few growth centers,<br />
with vast emptying backlands. Parallel to this regional polarisation development, there is<br />
another process of social polarisation that is connected with a very high unemployment and a<br />
tendency to weaken the well-developed Finnish social welfare system. The high<br />
unemployment rate is an indication of a new problem of a large relative surplus population<br />
that Finland has to deal with by its own economy, lacking today any obvious target area to<br />
which the surplus population could migrate for better employment opportunities. In this<br />
respect, the situation is very different from the previous period of high migration (in the<br />
1960s), when Sweden was able to absorb hundreds of thousands of Finnish immigrants. In the<br />
long run, the surplus population may begin to develop sub-, slum and countercultures that will<br />
produce crime problems hitherto almost unknown in Finland.<br />
One of the largest qualitative crime changes has to do with the expansion of the narcotics<br />
market to cover the whole country. The relatively negative future expectations as well as the<br />
easy availability of narcotic substances are almost sufficient explanations to this process. The<br />
availability of narcotics has improved as the supply has grown due to the massivity and ease<br />
of international mobility, and because the relative saturation of the central European markets<br />
has made even the rather small Finnish markets increasingly interesting. A great deal of<br />
property crimes are made to finance substance abuse - in this way, the growth of narcotics<br />
offences is connected with certain property crimes (often such offences as car crimes, house<br />
and other burglaries, and shoplifting are mentioned in this context).<br />
In the 1990s, also a growth of homicides has continued. This trend is created through fourfive<br />
different factors:<br />
• the growth of alcohol consumption that, with the present consumption<br />
pattern, furthers both acute alcohol-related violence and homicides that occur<br />
between marginalized males;<br />
• the urbanisation of Finland is followed by a growth in homicides as the<br />
homicide rates in the large cities is some<strong>what</strong> higher than in other parts of the<br />
country;<br />
• The "greying" of the population means that the large after-war birth cohorts<br />
have matured to the worst "homicide age";<br />
• a professionalisation and toughening in the underworld, in part as the<br />
narcotics market grows stronger, brings forth homicides that are related to the<br />
power struggle, competition, and rule enforcement within this sector.
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
The recorded number of assault offences has after the mid-1990s started to increase and this<br />
increase may continue. This statistical development does not, however, reflect general<br />
violence rates as measured by victimisation surveys. These are rather on a downward track.<br />
Recorded theft offences have been on a rather stable level in the 1990s. Also here, population<br />
surveys rather indicate a downward than an upward trend, at least as far as private persons are<br />
concerned.<br />
Other crime changes of the 1990s, at least if we look for characteristics that are new, are<br />
primarily the fact that the role of foreigners - as perpetrators as well as victims - is gaining in<br />
importance, parallel to the fact that immigrants from many directions, also from the East, are<br />
becoming more common.<br />
The public crime debate takes up a multiplicity of topics, from pedophilia and rapes to economic<br />
crimes. All this has quite little to do with large crime categories and their changes. An<br />
increased interest in economic crime has, however, been paralleled by a clear improvement in<br />
the control of this type of offences.<br />
Above, I have repeatedly referred to "recorded crimes". The crime statistics produced as a<br />
byproduct of police activities is not unproblematic, if factual crime changes are looked for.<br />
For the same reasons, direct comparisons with other countries are on an insecure basis if these<br />
data are relied upon. Police statistics are working statistics of the police force, and depict the<br />
development in field only in a secondary sense.<br />
An important improvement in this regard are the so-called victimisation surveys. In these,<br />
representative population samples are asked about their crime experiences and, i.a., reporting<br />
crimes to the police. The results are clear: surveys often provide a different picture of the<br />
development than the one derived from police sources. In the case of Finland, a long-term<br />
trend of an increasing reporting activity is found to have taken place. In an international<br />
comparison, the Finnish crime rates are rather low, a fact that is not easy to believe if<br />
recorded crime is compared. This discrepancy indicates that crime statistics in Finland are<br />
more advanced and more comprehensive than in many other counmtries. -Another trend that<br />
is revealed by victimisation surveys is a continuing increase in the fear of or concern for<br />
crime, as well as of a growing popularity of measures taken to avoid victimisation.<br />
Police have not been dealt with abov (with the exception of reportign behaviour). Essential<br />
tendencies have been the professionalisation of the police and a tendency to complement<br />
traditional reactive policing with proactive programs (this is likely to increase recorded<br />
crime). Most recently, crime prevention and community policing have been adopted in their<br />
official task descriptions. Thus, also the earlier centralization tendencies of policing are about<br />
to be reconsidered. Parallel to these developments, a comprehensive automatization of the<br />
police information systems has resulted in an increasingly comprehensive recording of crimes<br />
- a phenomenon that has an independent growth influence on recorded crime.<br />
Police resources in Finland are not very large. Of these, a considerable proportion is spent on<br />
various supportive activities, automatic data processing representing the new growth industry<br />
among these. Also, police resources have been cut to achieve savings in public expenditure.<br />
Such changes may have a visible effect on recorded crime cleared through the own activities<br />
of the police - some of the recent stagnation in recorded crime may be attributed to these<br />
circumstances.<br />
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With systematic long-term efforts, the Finnish prisoner rate has been brought down to a<br />
<strong>Scandinavian</strong> average. It has been demonstrated that this policy and the general development<br />
of crime cannot be directly connected.<br />
116
Lise-Lotte Rytterbro, Doktorand<br />
Kriminologiska institutionen, Stockholms Universitet,<br />
S-10691 Stockholm<br />
e-mail: lise-lotte.rytterbro@crim.su.se<br />
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
En studie av brott som blivit föremål för medling och vilka<br />
organisationer som intresserat sig för medling i Sverige<br />
Det finns idag uppskattningsvis ett 20-tal verksamheter i Sverige som arbetar med medling<br />
mellan brottsoffer och gärningsman. En del medlingsverksamheter har varit mer eller mindre<br />
aktiva sedan slutet av 1980-talet, men de flesta är nystartade. I stort sett alla verksamheter har<br />
en särskild målgrupp gärningsmän, nämligen ungdomar. Medling bedrivs vanligen i<br />
projektform som inte iscensatts på initiativ av någon statlig instans. Medling i samband med<br />
brott är och har varit under rättsligt utredande men är inte reglerat i lag. I riksdagen har man<br />
vid flera tillfällen debatterat medling, varvid samtliga partier uttalat sig positivt i frågan. Ett<br />
intensifierat intresse har också kommit till uttryck på annat sätt.1 Medling mellan brottsoffer<br />
och gärningsman kan kort sagt sägas befinnas i en etableringsprocess under 1990-talet. Syftet<br />
med denna undersökning är ett led i att beskriva och analysera medling i Sverige.<br />
Idéerna bakom medling omfattar flera olika kriminalpolitiska områden: brottsofferdiskursen,<br />
åtgärder mot ungdomsbrottslighet, alternativa reaktioner på brott i allmänhet samt civilrätt<br />
(förlikning) (jmf Zila 1988; Järvinen 1993). Det finns flera aspekter av medling, t ex vilka<br />
parter som deltar, medlarens uppgift och kompetens och medlingens juridiska hemvist. Mot<br />
bakgrund av att medling befinner sig i en etableringsprocess omfattar undersökningen vilka<br />
grupper och organisationer som är intresserade av medling i Sverige. Studien visar också<br />
vilka typer av brott som hitintills behandlats inom några av de medlingsverksamheter som<br />
redan finns.<br />
Metod och material<br />
Den första delen omfattar aktörer som deltagit på fyra möten om medling. Initiativtagare till<br />
mötena har varit Brottsofferjourernas riksförbund (1 möte) respektive Skyddsförbundet2 (1<br />
möte) samt Riksgruppen för medling3, som står för två möten. Samtliga möten ägde rum i<br />
Stockholm. Ett möte ägde rum 1996, och tre möten 1997. Antal deltagare på mötena varierar<br />
från ett 30-tal till runt 130 personer. De två förstnämnda mötena bar titlarna "Medling - ett<br />
möte med möjligheter" respektive "Medling som alternativ påföljd". De två mötena i<br />
Riksgruppens regi kallades för "Medlarträffen" respektive "Medlingsdagen". Ytterligare<br />
några möten har anordnats under den tid som studien sammanställts (nov. 1997 - mars 1998).<br />
I studien av intressegrupper utgörs materialet av deltagarlistor med namn och oftast nämnd<br />
1 En utredning om medling lades fram av Riksåklagarämbetet 1996 och frågan ska ytterligare utredas och<br />
utvärderas under 1998. Det har vidare inrättats en särskilt kurs i medling vid Göteborgs universitet (som dock<br />
inte primärt är inriktat på brott, men väl på att konflikter är parternas egendom som experter inte ska ta över).<br />
En svensk bok om medling vid brott har nyligen givits ut (Nehlin m fl 1998). Även de möten under 1996-97<br />
som ingår i denna undersökning är uttryck för ett ökat intresse.<br />
2 Svenska skyddsförbundet är ett samlande organ för alla skyddsföreningar, ibland kallade skyddsvärn,<br />
fångvårds eller understödsförening. Förbundet avger bland annat yttranden i frågor av betydelse för<br />
kriminalvårdens frivård. (Svenska skyddsförbundet 1996:2). Fortsättningsvis används i studien omväxlande<br />
skyddsvärn och skyddsförbund<br />
3 Riksgruppen för medling kallas numera för "Föreningen för medling i Sverige".<br />
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NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
organisationstillhörighet. En del personer har deltagit på flera av mötena, vilket inte framgår i<br />
resultatredovisningen, eftersom varje mötesdeltagande person ingår. Vid klassificeringar av<br />
personernas organisationstillhörighet har listornas uppgifter använts. Ibland kan en person<br />
presenteras som tillhörande socialtjänsten och vid ett annat möte presenteras samma person<br />
som representerade en medlingsverksamhet. Detta behöver inte innebära att personen i fråga<br />
tidigare eller senare har varit eller är medlare, utan på vad personerna i fråga angett vara sin<br />
organisation eller på nedtecknaren. Detta gäller särskilt klassificeringen av representanter för<br />
medling, men i några fall andra aktörer.<br />
Den andra delen redogör för de brottstyper som blivit aktuella för medling vid sex<br />
medlingsverksamheter i landet. Materialet baseras på medlingsverksamheternas egna<br />
uppgifter och i ett fall på en utvärdering gjord av en utomstående. Urvalet av<br />
medlingsverksamheter baseras först och främst på att det finns eller kan åstadkommas en<br />
någorlunda god skriftlig redovisning av brottstyper och att man medlat åtminstone ett tiotal<br />
fall. Många medlingsverksamheter har i olika former redovisat sina brottstyper, t ex använder<br />
en verksamhet ett statistikprogram. Andra har efter fråga från mig antecknat brottstyperna.<br />
Några medlingsverksamheter anger de brott som aktualiserats för medling, men sedan inte<br />
blivit föremål för medling (ett fåtal fall). Det framgår dock inte vilka brottstyper som inte<br />
blivit föremål för medling, varför samtliga brottstyper som aktualiserats för medling ingår i<br />
undersökningen.4 Brotten har blivit föremål för medling under cirka en fyraårsperiod, från<br />
februari 1994 till december 1997. Vissa verksamheter redovisar brott för några månader,<br />
andra har uppgifter för upp till två år. Antalet brottstyper varierar från några få fall inom en<br />
medlingsverksamhet till närmare hundra vid en annan verksamhet.<br />
I studien kommer vissa resultat jämföras med uppgifter från förlikningsprojekten i Finland<br />
och konfliktråden i Norge. Båda dessa länder har en mer etablerad medling jämfört med<br />
Sverige. Även jämförelser med Tyskland kommer att göras. Uppgifterna från Tyskland härrör<br />
dock från slutet av 1980-talet och rör endast en medlingsverksamhet, medan de nordiska<br />
länderna omfattar flera medlingsverksamheter under 1990-talet. Enligt den studie som<br />
uppgifterna om det tyska medlingsprojektet är hämtade ifrån, fanns i Tyskland under 1980talet<br />
flera olika medlingsprojekt och generellt verkar situationen likna den situation som<br />
medling har i Sverige under 1990-talets andra hälft, det vill säga att flera projekt finns, men<br />
att medling inte riktigt etablerats. Det är främst uppgifter om medlare inom Norges, Finlands<br />
och i någon mån Tysklands verksamheter som används vid jämförelsen av de svenska<br />
organisationsrepresentant-erna. Jämförbarheten är därför något skev. Brottstyperna medger en<br />
något bättre jämförbarhet. Antalet ärenden som medlats i Finland är dock högre och i Norge<br />
mycket högre än antalet brottstyper i denna studie varför jämförelserna ska tolkas med<br />
försiktighet.<br />
Aktörer på möten om medling<br />
Följande avsnitt redovisar vilka aktörer som deltagit på fyra möten om medling vid fyra olika<br />
tillfällen 1996-97. Mötena ägde rum i Stockholm. Ett möte anordnadres av Skyddsförbundet<br />
med titeln "Medling som alternativ påföljd". Det andra mötet anordnades av<br />
Brottsofferjourernas riksförbund på den internationella brottsofferdagen och bar titeln<br />
"Medling - ett möte med möjligheter". De två andra mötena anordnades av vad som i studien<br />
kallas för "Riksgruppen". Denna grupp utgörs av personer som är intresserade av medling<br />
4 En medlingsverksamhet anger som skäl till att medling ej blev av att gärningsmännen redan betalt böter och<br />
därför inte velat delta.<br />
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NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
varav några har startat med medling och många vill starta med medling. Mötena hade titlarna<br />
"Medlarträffen" respektive "Medlingsdagen".<br />
Figur 1<br />
Aktörer på möten om medling. Fördelning efter möteskategori. Antal.5 (N=288)<br />
5 Antalet aktörrepresentanter kommer framdeles att variera beroende på vilken kategori som analyseras.<br />
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NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Figur 2<br />
Aktörer på möten om medling. Fördelning efter aktörskategori. Antal. (N=289)<br />
Brott som blivit föremål för medling<br />
Nedan redovisas vilka brottstyper som blivit föremål för medling inom sex<br />
medlingsverksamheter i Sverige. Inledningsvis anges brottstypernas fördelning inom varje<br />
medlingsverksamhet samt inbördes fördelning av de olika brottstyperna. Därefter redovisas en<br />
jämförelse av brottstyper mellan Sverige, Norge, Finland och Tyskland.<br />
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NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Tabell 1<br />
Brottstyper som blivit föremål för medling. Fördelning efter medlingsverksamhet (N=356)<br />
Medlingsverksamheter I - VI Brott totalt<br />
I II III IIII V VI Antal Procent<br />
___________________________________________________________________________<br />
Snatteri 7 3 10 4 17 55 96 27<br />
Skadegörelse/Klotter 18 12 22 19 - 10 81 23<br />
Stöld* 18 7 20 18 - 9 72 20<br />
Inbrott 11 5 9 2 - 8 35 10<br />
Misshandel** - 11 14 3 - 5 33 9<br />
Rån*** - 5 11 6 - - 22 8<br />
Hot / Hot mot - 1 7 - - 8 3<br />
tjänsteman m.m****<br />
Övrigt***** 2 1 1 - - 3 7 2<br />
Mordbrand 2 - - - - - 2 1<br />
___________________________________________________________________________<br />
Summa 58 45 94 52 17 90 356 (100)<br />
Verksamheternas redovisade tidsperiod (ungefärliga uppgifter): I = C:a 1 år (1994);<br />
II = 15 månader (1996-97); III = 2 år (1995-97); IIII = 20 månader (1995-96); V = 3 månader<br />
(1997); VI = C:a 1 år (1996/97)<br />
* Inkluderar försök till stöld, bilstöld och försök till bilstöld; tillgrepp av fortskaffningsmedel<br />
och försök till tillgrepp av fortskaffningsmedel.<br />
** Inkluderar försök till misshandel, vållande till kroppsskada samt grov misshandel<br />
*** Inkluderar försök till rån samt väskryckning<br />
**** Inkluderar våld mot tjänsteman samt olaga tvång<br />
***** I kategorin övrigt återfinns häleri (2), övergrepp i rättssak (1) samt förolämpning (1).<br />
Övriga tre (3) brott redovisas i verksamhet VI som "övriga brott".<br />
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Tabell 2<br />
Jämförelse mellan Norge, Finland, Tyskland och Sverige av brott som blivit föremål för<br />
medling. Procent.<br />
Norge* Finland** Tyskland*** Sverige****<br />
1994-95 1990 1985-87 1994-97<br />
________________________________________________________________________<br />
Snatteri/ Stöld 51 21 31 47<br />
Skadegörelse/Klotter 21 30 17 23<br />
Våld /Misshandel 5 27 29 9<br />
Övriga 23 22 23 21<br />
________________________________________________________________________<br />
N=4 387) (N=732) (N=204) (N=356)<br />
* Avser genomsnittet av samtliga Norges konfliktråd, utom konfliktråd som hade färre än 30<br />
ärenden. Detta gäller dock ej våld/misshandel (där ingår alla konfliktråd). Källa: Evaluering<br />
av konfliktrådsordningen (1996:85-86), figur 17 och tabell 10.<br />
**Omfattar nio förlikningprojekt. Källa: Lappi-Seppälä 1996:399, tabell 9.<br />
*** Omfattar ett medlingsprojekt. Stöld/snatteri motsvaras i uppgiften från Tyskland av<br />
"simple theft". Källa: Trenczek 1990:116, tabell 1.<br />
**** Omfattar sex medlingsprojekt.<br />
Sammanfattning<br />
Resultatet visar att socialtjänsten är den organisation som tycks vara mest intresserad av<br />
medling, drygt 30 procent utgörs av representanter från socialtjänsten. I relation till övriga<br />
aktörer är socialtjänsten också väl representerad på samtliga fyra möten och har en stor<br />
spridning över landet. Polisen utgör, liksom representanter för brottsofferorganisationer,<br />
ungefär 20 procent. Föreningar inom Svenska skyddsförbundet liksom brottsofferjourer som<br />
vardera stod för två av mötena i studien, finns representerade på samtliga möten. Endast ett<br />
fåtal av representanter från dessa organisationer deltog på de möten som inte initierats av dem<br />
själva. Bland övriga aktörsgrupper finns representanter för kommunal verksamhet, t ex<br />
bostadsförmedling, jurister, forskare, representanter från kyrkan och brottsförebyggande<br />
organisationer. Att det framförallt är socialtjänsten som intresserat sig för medling i Sverige<br />
är i linje med vilken bakgrund medlare har i Finland och Norge samt organiseringen av<br />
medling i Finland. I Finland, där medlare arbetar frivilligt är verksamheten vanligtvis en<br />
permanent del av socialtjänstens verksamhetsområde och de flesta medlare kommer från det<br />
sociala arbetsområdet (Iivari 1992:137). Dullum & Christie (1996:132) poängterar den<br />
relativt stora andel personer i konfliktråden som arbetar med barn och ungdom (framförallt<br />
socionomer och lärare).I Tyskland omnämns socialarbetare och övervakare som medlare,<br />
vilka har medling som en del av sina andra arbetsuppgifter (Trenczek 1990:114). I de finska<br />
förlikningsbyråerna är en klar majoritet av medlarna kvinnor (Stenberg 1994:17). I Norge är<br />
däremot männen något överrepresenterade bland medlare i konfliktråden, 57 procent.<br />
(Evaluering av konfliktrådsordningen 1996:55; Dullum & Christie 1996:132). (Uppgifter om<br />
medlares kön i Tyskland saknas.)<br />
De brott som är vanliga inom medlingsverksamheterna i Sverige är stöld/snatteri (47 procent)<br />
och skadegörelse/klotter (23 procent). Dessa brott utgör tillsammans 70 procent av de totalt<br />
356 brottstyperna som ingår i studien.<br />
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NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Trots det stora antalet medlingsfall i Norges konfliktråd jämfört med det relativt få brotten<br />
inom Sveriges medlingsverksamheter är likheterna slående mellan länderna avseende brottstypernas<br />
fördelning. Samtidigt ska Sveriges något högre andel misshandelsbrott jämfört med<br />
Norge poängteras, eller i varje fall inte förringas. Finland och Tyskland har en relativt stor<br />
andel misshandelsfall. Skadegörelse (vandalism) tycks dock vara den vanligaste enskilda<br />
brottstypen inom Finlands medlingsverksamhet, enligt flera undersökningar (Marnell<br />
1992:14; Järvinen 1993:112; Iivari 1992:138). Däremot visar statistik från en<br />
medlingsverksamhet (Helsingfors förlikningsbyrå) att endast ett fall av snatteri har medlats av<br />
totalt 204 ärenden (Marnell 1992:14). Även om Tyskland endast bidrar med brottstyper från<br />
en medlingsverksamhet i tabell 2, tycks snatteri/stöld och skadegörelsebrott vara vanliga<br />
brottstyper. I den tyska studien finns även en del uppgifter om två andra verksamheter, vilka i<br />
stort sett uppvisar liknande resultat (Trenczek 1990:113-118). Ett gemensamt drag för<br />
samtliga fyra länder är den anmärkningsvärt stora andelen skadegörelsebrott. Den utgör<br />
ungefär 20 procent i Norge, Tyskland och Sverige och 30 procent i Finland.<br />
Referenser:<br />
Dullum, Jane & Nils Christie: Konfliktrådene. Institutt for kriminologi, Universitetet i Oslo,<br />
Oslo 1996.<br />
Evaluering av konfliktrådsordningen. Sluttrapport: Agenda utredning og utvikling. Sandvika<br />
1996.<br />
Iivari, Juha: The process of mediation in Finland. A special reference to the question "How to<br />
get cases for mediation". In: Messmer, Hans & Otto, H U (eds) Restorative justice on<br />
trial. 1992<br />
Järvinen, Saja: ‘Mediation off offences in Finland. mediation in practice and an assasment of<br />
mediation as an alternative to the criminal justice system’. I: Nordisk samarbetsråd for<br />
kriminologi. Rapport fra 35. forskerseminariar i Vanajanlinna, Finland. 1993.<br />
Marnell, Gunnar: ‘Påföljdsalternativ i med och motvind’. I: Tidskrift för kriminalvård. (År<br />
och nummer saknas).<br />
Nehlin, Christina m.fl.: Medling vid brott. Stockholm 1998.<br />
Stenberg, Carl-Olof: ‘Förlikning’. I: Tidskrift för kriminalvård, nr 4-1994.<br />
Svenska skyddsförbundet: Medling som alternativ brottspåföljd. Dokumentation från en<br />
temadag anordnad av Svenska skyddsförbundet den 31 maj 1996.<br />
Trenczek, Thomas: ‘A Revieiw and assessment of Victim-offender reconciliation<br />
programming in West Germany’. In: Galaway, Burt & Hudson, Joe (ed.) Criminal<br />
justice, estitution, and reconciliation. Willow tree press, inc. N.Y. 1990.<br />
Zila, Josef: 'Förlikning mellan brottsoffer och gärningsman'. I: Brottsoffer. Brå-utredning<br />
1988:1. Allmänna förlaget, Stockholm 1988.<br />
Källmaterial mötesdeltagare:<br />
Deltagarlista 1: Deltagare vid Svenska skyddsförbundets temadag 960531. I: Svenska<br />
skyddsförbundet (1996). Medling som alternativ brottspåföljd. Dokumentation från<br />
en<br />
temadag anordnad av Svenska skyddsförbundet den 31 maj 1996. Stencil.<br />
Deltagarlista 2: Deltagarförteckning. Medling - ett möte med möjligheter 21 februari 1997.<br />
Stencil<br />
Deltaglista 3:Anmälda till medlingsdagen 29 maj 1997<br />
Deltaglista 4:Anmälningar till medlarträffen<br />
123
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Källmaterial brottstyper:<br />
Helsingborgs förlikningsbyrå. Statistik för 1991. I: Tidskrift för kriminalvård. sid. 14 f., (År<br />
och nummer saknas).<br />
Lappi-Seppälä, Tapio: 'Finland'. In: Reparation in criminal law, Volume 1-1996. Albin, Eser<br />
& Susanne Walther (eds). Freiburg.<br />
Evaluering av konfliktrådsordningen. Sluttrapport: Agenda utredning og utvikling. Sandvika<br />
1996.<br />
Dullum, Jane & Nils Christie: Konfliktrådene. Institutt for kriminologi. Universitetet i Oslo<br />
1996.<br />
Trenczek, Thomas: ‘A Revieiw and assessment of Victim-offender reconciliation<br />
programming in West Germany i Galaway’, Burt & Hudson, Joe (ed.) Criminal<br />
justice, restitution, and reconciliation. Willow tree press, inc. N.Y 1990.<br />
Forsén-Lindell, L. & Gaal, H: Samverkanprojektet Revansch i Västerås, en begränsad<br />
utvärdering. Polishögskolan. Specialarbete. Stockholm 1995.<br />
Slutrapport från medlingsprojektet i Uppsala 950401-970331. Christina Nehlin<br />
Socialförvaltningen, Uppsala. Bilaga 1.<br />
Sundberg, Roger: Medling. Offer - ung gärningsman skall mötas. En utvärdering av ett<br />
medlingsprojekt i Lund. Sid 7. 1996.<br />
Trollhättans kommun: Statistiska uppgifter från Trollkraft i Trollhättan.<br />
Statistik över projektets medlingsverksamhet Handslaget. Hudiksvall.<br />
Västerås kommun, PRO/Aros<br />
Datalista<br />
124
Jukka-Pekka Takala, Researcher<br />
National Research Institute of Legal Policy<br />
POB 1200, FIN-00101, University of Helsinki<br />
e-mail: Jukka-Pekka.Takala@om.vn.fi<br />
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Mediation and moral emotions II: observing mediation sessions<br />
1. Introduction<br />
This paper is the second one describing the findings of a study on mediation or victimoffender<br />
reconciliation in Finland. The first one was presented a year ago. The present paper<br />
will concentrate on the observations of mediation sessions and discuss their meaning for the<br />
position of mediation.<br />
The Finnish mediation system gets most of its clients from the police and the prosecutor and<br />
deals with them before their cases are sent to the court. Although it is permissible and even<br />
commendable to retrieve cases from the community at large, without the intervention of the<br />
authorities, few cases appear this way. This is an agency-based system, using one vocabulary.<br />
Some of the basic elements of the Finnish mediation system were given in the paper a year<br />
ago, and a more comprehensive charting of the system is being prepared in NRILP by Ida<br />
Mielityinen.<br />
Observation of mediation and court sessions<br />
In our contacts with the mediation agencies and mediators we expressed a wish to observe<br />
and possibly audiotape mediation sessions. Some mediators disliked the idea; one person held<br />
that the presence of outside observers would jeopardize the whole idea of mediation; another<br />
could allow an observer in some cases but rejected the idea of tape-recording. However, most<br />
mediators were willing to let us in if the parties would agree.<br />
The observed cases were ones that mediators suggested to us either directly or through the<br />
mediation agency. There were no particular attempts to make the selection of sessions<br />
representative. Because of this self-selection, it is likely that the observed sessions were<br />
chaired by mediators who were more experienced than the average. After having witnessed<br />
several sessions dealing with vandalism in which the victims had been corporate entities we<br />
expressed one wish: to see sessions with individual persons as victims.<br />
The processing of eight cases were observed in nine mediation sessions. Three of the<br />
mediation sessions were tape-recorded; of others, extensive notes were made. In addition,<br />
mostly after the mediation sessions, a few parties to mediation were briefly interviewed.<br />
The types of crimes the observed sessions dealt with include examples of the most important<br />
crime categories in Finnish mediation. Four cases dealt with assaults; a man had kicked his<br />
ex-girlfriend in her apartment; another man had kicked his girlfriend in the head in a public<br />
park; a man had hit another one in a bar and the victim’s teeth had broken; the fourth assault<br />
by two teenagers against two other teenagers involved also the robbing of a small amount of<br />
money and other property. Two sessions dealt with vandalism; a group of schoolboys had<br />
painted graffiti; a man is his twenties had broken an expensive shop window at a shopping<br />
mall. One case involved the theft of the wallet from a pupil at a school and use of the stolen<br />
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library card to get CD’s from the library. In the final case a man suspected that his neighbors’<br />
children intentionally made noise that prevented his sleeping; he had threatened the neighbors<br />
in various ways and the neighbors had filed a complaint.<br />
Finally, four criminal court sessions were observed and notes written of them. They dealt with<br />
assault (the verdict was aggravated assault), theft, and drug offenses.<br />
2. Observations on the sessions<br />
The setting of the mediation and court sessions.<br />
The contexts of the mediation and court sessions differ in many respects. The court sessions<br />
are held during business hours, addressing is formal (‘Vous’), the ‘script’ of the session is<br />
relatively rigid. The mediation sessions are often held in the evening, others are addressed on<br />
the first-name basis, the flow of discussion is relatively free. In the criminal court, the events<br />
are discussed based on the pre-trial investigation minutes made by the police; in mediation,<br />
the parties describe the events in their own words. In court, a direct exchange of words<br />
between the defendant and the victim is rare; in mediation, it is common. In court, a<br />
considerable part of the words spoken are addressed to no person but for the benefit of the<br />
court record; in mediation, there all discussion is addressed directly to other persons present.<br />
In court, the verdict is handed down by the judge--the defendant and the victim seem passive<br />
recipients of the decision; in mediation, the offender symbolically assumes responsibility of<br />
the matter, makes an apology and is forgiven by the victim.<br />
Emotionally charged settlements in mediation<br />
All the observed mediation cases lead to a settlement, seven during the observed session, the<br />
eighth one later. Two of the cases were such that it seems improbable that they would have<br />
reached as reasonable a settlement in any other way, either if they had been left alone or had<br />
been processed by the official legal system.<br />
One of these was the case of a ex-couple, who had separated shortly after a child had been<br />
born a few months before the incident. The assault, a kick severe enough to leave bruises that<br />
a doctor could verify (no sick leave ordered), had taken place because of differences over the<br />
ownership of some electronic equipment. The mediation session was over an hour of very<br />
intensive and deeply emotional discussion over the relationship of the couple - very<br />
constructive discussion in the end. It appeared that for the woman, the session was a means to<br />
force the man to discuss these matters. The man seemed to be terribly hurt because the<br />
woman had reported the incident to the police in the first place. But an agreement was<br />
reached: asking and giving forgiveness.<br />
Mediation seemed like a sensible way of dealing with the matter. The man probably would<br />
not have talked to the woman without some form of coercion. A court might have ordered<br />
fines but would probably have made the couple fall even further apart. A marriage counselor<br />
might have helped if they would have been able to go there - but on the other hand the<br />
relationship did not seem to involve any particularly serious problems that would require<br />
special professional attendance.<br />
The other clear solution involved a man and his neighbors, a family. The man who worked at<br />
a night shift had had problems sleeping during the day because of noise from the radiators. He<br />
suspected - he was convinced - that this neighboring family, or their kids, deliberately tapped<br />
the radiators. He had asked them to stop and had issued all sorts of threats, that of killing<br />
included. Insults had been exchanged between the neighbors. The man was really furious, so<br />
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furious he asked to meet the mediators without the other party because he was afraid he might<br />
not be able to control himself if they were present.<br />
After meeting with both parties in long, tedious discussions in which all sorts of solutions,<br />
including the moving away of one or the other of the parties, were discussed, the mediators<br />
noticed that there was a chance to show the angry man that the family had not caused the<br />
irritating sound. They had been out of town during a weekend during which he had suffered<br />
from the noise. This did not happen in the observed session, it was later told by the mediators<br />
that when the man heard this, he burst into tears. Pretty soon the parties were together drafting<br />
a letter to the house managers for them to investigate <strong>what</strong> caused the irritating noise.<br />
Compensations for pain and suffering<br />
The preceding two cases were, it seemed, actually solved through mediation. They were also<br />
very emotional in tone. Some of the other sessions were more matter-of-factual. There was,<br />
however, in one of them an interesting stage that illustrates the limits and possibilities of<br />
mediation - and the power of moral emotions.<br />
It was an assault and robbery case, involving young school kids. Two drunk young men had<br />
assaulted two other young boys in the street and taken some cigarettes and money from them.<br />
Apart from the four youngsters there were four parents present in the session - two for the two<br />
victims and two for the two offenders. The victims had been scared a lot and one of them had<br />
got some painful bruises, but there were no medical expenses nor any permanent damage. The<br />
property taken was only worth a 100 marks (USD 18). The mediators are usually discouraged<br />
to suggest or accept any monetary compensations for pain or suffering that are bigger than the<br />
very restrictive guidelines for compensation in traffic accidents require or allow. Under those<br />
terms, you must be quite badly hurt to get any money for pain and suffering. The settlement<br />
was taking shape with the standard apology and only the 100 marks compensation for the lost<br />
property. The father of one of the victims felt this was clearly inadequate, considering the<br />
seriousness of the offense: “I mean an assault and robbery”. A lengthy discussion of the<br />
principles of compensation followed. The father grudgingly said he accepted the principles,<br />
but yet he seemed emotionally dissatisfied, as if there remained a deficit in the balance sheet<br />
of moral emotions. Finally one of the mediators suggested an additional agreement outside<br />
the official written settlement: the offenders would do one afternoon of clean-up work at the<br />
yard of the family of one of the victims. This seemed to satisfy the distressed father. This to<br />
me shows that the guidelines regarding compensation of damages may restrict the playing out<br />
of people’s moral negotiations. It also shows the power of moral emotions.<br />
Young people spoke little<br />
Two mediation sessions in which some parents of the young parties were present were taped<br />
and transcribed word by word. The young protagonists turned out to speak very little. In the<br />
first session, there were four young offenders, their mothers (4), a representative of the victim<br />
(a corporate entity), and two mediators. The four young defendants used only one-fifth of the<br />
turns of talking and only four per cent of the words spoken in the session. In the other session,<br />
there was one young offender, his father, the mother of one individual victim and an adult<br />
representative of a corporate victim, plus a mediator. The young defendant used one-third of<br />
the turns of speech and one-tenth of the words spoken in the session. There were on average<br />
only four or five words in one speaking turn by a youngster in both sessions. They were<br />
mostly short replies to questions by adults.<br />
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The observation may not be representative, but even a few findings like this go against some<br />
of the most simple portrayals of mediation. However, even if the observation were<br />
representative, it does not mean that mediation would be a worse alternative than a regular<br />
court; these mediation sessions still endow the quiet youngsters with a larger role in their<br />
affairs than common court proceedings so. The observations do support the statements by<br />
some of the interviewees who said that youngsters are often reluctant to talk much while their<br />
parents are present and who sometimes ask the parents to wait for a while in another room<br />
while the matter is discussed between the young protagonists.<br />
An emotionally satisfying settlement is not always reached.<br />
In addition to those mediation sessions that clearly achieved something emotionally<br />
important, there were sessions that were less satisfying. For example, one of the assault cases<br />
observed was such that the two male parties, who were old pals or at least acquaintances, had<br />
already reached an agreement between themselves and did not want to discuss the whys and<br />
wherefores of their fight. The matter came up in mediation only because the offender could<br />
not afford to pay the dentist to fix the victim’s teeth that his fist had damaged. It seemed that<br />
the municipal social welfare agency had set it as a condition for a voucher to the dentist that<br />
the men participate in a mediation session. So, even if a nominal agreement was reached -<br />
inculing apology and forgiveness plus a plan for the offender to repay the municipality the<br />
dentist’s bill - there was not an equally satisfying emotional and substantial settlement as in<br />
the most successful of the observed cases. A similar sense of incompleteness remained in<br />
some other sessions as well.<br />
3. Conclusion<br />
There is more variation to the sessions than the ideal-typical depictions of mediation would<br />
suggest. There were different types of sessions:<br />
- those that work just as depicted in the documents of the mediation movement: the victim and<br />
the offender genuinely meet and resolve their conflict facilitated by the mediators and the<br />
situation;<br />
- those whose participants do not want to discuss the matters in front of other persons - these<br />
tend to turn into moralizing events - their function is to remind the offender of the<br />
blameworthiness of his/her deed;<br />
- those in which the participants are reserved about their emotions but do accomplish<br />
something about the practical matters of compensation.<br />
While the chances for open discussion and an adequate dealing with moral emotions are<br />
better in mediation than they are in the regular court session, often the functions of the<br />
mediation sessions seem to be elsewhere - and closer to the traditional functions of courts: to<br />
symbolize, to mark in a ritualistic way the importance of some societal norms, a warning,<br />
perhaps.<br />
However, the observations made in this research suggest that mediation indeed does often<br />
offer a suitable form for the participants’ moral emotions to be expressed and played out.<br />
A judicial conflict, even that between the offender and the victim of a crime, often has<br />
properties that are similar to the well-known game of Prisoners’ dilemma. Often the result<br />
would serve better both parties if they agreed to compromise. However, against every single<br />
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move of the opposite party, a tough, uncompromising position seems the best bet. For a<br />
person to be ready to choose a conciliatory move he often has to have quick feedback that the<br />
other party is going to cooperate. An important element in these “games” is the emotional<br />
tone of the interchange. In a mediation session, these conciliatory moves seem to easier to<br />
initiate than in a more formalistic and adversarial court proceedings.<br />
4. References<br />
Takala, Jukka-Pekka: “Mediation and moral emotions: the mediators’ views”. In: Fängsler:<br />
administration, behandling og evaluering. <strong>Scandinavian</strong> Research Council for<br />
Criminology, Reykjavik, Iceland 1997, pp. 263-74. (A more comprehensive report is<br />
published in Finnish: Takala, Jukka-Pekka. 1998).<br />
Moraalitunteet rikosten sovittelussa [Moral Emotions in Victim-Offender Mediation].<br />
Oikeuspoliittisen tutkimuslaitoksen julkaisuja 151. Helsinki. (Parts of the English<br />
summary of that report is used in the present paper).<br />
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Erlendur S. Baldursson, Head of Department<br />
Prison and Probation Administration<br />
Borgartún 7, IS- 105 Reykjavik<br />
e-mail: erlendur.baldursson@skima.is<br />
and<br />
Jón Friðrik Sigurðsson, Psychologist<br />
Prison and Probation Administration<br />
Borgartún 7, IS- 105 Reykjavik<br />
e-mail: jonfridrik@skima.is<br />
130<br />
Alcohol and Drug Abuse Treatment and Recidivism.<br />
An attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of substance abuse<br />
treatment as an alternative to imprisonment among Icelandic<br />
prison inmates.<br />
Introduction<br />
Treatment of criminal offenders for alcohol and drug abuse has a long history behind it, both<br />
in prisons and outside prisons. In the years following 1970 the optimism relating to the<br />
feasibility of such treatment programmes provided for offenders receded considerably<br />
following the publication by an American scientist of the conclusions drawn by him<br />
concerning the possibilities for such treatment (Martinson, 1974). His conclusions indicated<br />
rather meagre success in the rehabilitation of offenders. His message was that for this purpose<br />
“nothing <strong>works</strong>”. Later investigations have nevertheless indicated the opposite; namely that<br />
rehabilitation is indeed successful in some cases, and is frequently manifested by a reduction<br />
in the rate of return to prison (McMurran and Hollin, 1993). The success of treatment is<br />
however very difficult to measure, and study results are often misleading. Grevholm and<br />
Külhorn (1997) compiled a survey of the results of eleven Nordic studies of the results of<br />
treatment programmes carried out in 1980-1995, and found that none of them fulfilled the<br />
methodological standards applicable to such studies. Martinson’s conclusion of no success<br />
and speculations relating to the links between drug abuse and crime, in addition to varied<br />
opinions concerning the appropriateness of offering drug treatment in prison, have had the<br />
effect that views relating to drug treatment of offenders have fluctuated considerably in the<br />
past two decades (Peters, 1993).<br />
The objective in treating criminal offenders for alcohol and drug abuse can be described as<br />
twofold. One is to improve their health and their life in general, and the other is to reduce the<br />
likelihood of their return to prison. Notwithstanding the fact that the link between alcohol or<br />
substance abuse and crime is by no means always evident, such abuse and crime often go<br />
hand in hand, and many offenders are of the opinion that their crimes are a direct consequence<br />
of their drug abuse. Many studies have been conducted outside Iceland for the purpose of<br />
investigating these links. It has repeatedly been revealed that abuse of drugs is common<br />
among offenders (Baldwin, 1991), and also that abuse of alcohol is frequently linked to<br />
violent crimes (Gudjonsson and Petursson, 1990; Cookson, 1992; Thomas and McMurran,<br />
1993), whereas abuse of other drugs tends to be linked to property crimes (Junger-Tas, 1991,
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Egg, 1992). A recent study of young English criminal offenders (Kirby, 1993) showed that<br />
93% of those asked said they had been abusing drugs regularly, and that they committed<br />
crime in order to finance their drug purchases.<br />
According to the studies conducted by Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson (1994, 1996) of alcohol<br />
and drug abuse by Icelandic prisoners prior to the service of their sentences, three out of<br />
every four participants reported having been under the influence of some intoxicating<br />
substance when committing the crime for which they were sentenced, and of these, 64% said<br />
that they had been under the influence of alcohol and 33% under the influence of illicit drugs<br />
(Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson, 1994). The prisoners were asked various questions concerning<br />
their drug abuse before they were incarcerated. A sizeable proportion seemed to have<br />
considerable alcohol or other drug problems. Seventeen per cent said that they had been using<br />
alcohol or some illicit drugs on a daily basis for the six months prior to imprisonment, and<br />
almost one-fourth (23%) said that they had at some time used drugs by injection. Almost one<br />
third considered themselves to have a drug problem, and 57% said that they had received<br />
treatment for alcohol or drug abuse at some time (Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson, 1995, 1996).<br />
An excerpt of Sigurdsson’s and Gudjonsson’s writings on alcohol and drug abuse by<br />
Icelandic prisoners was published in the Annual Report of the Prison and Probation<br />
Administration for 1993.<br />
Since 1990, the Prison and Probation Administration (hereafter abbreviated PPA) has offered<br />
prisoners the option of completing the last six weeks of their imprisonment by taking part in a<br />
treatment programme for alcohol and drug abuse with SAA (Samtök áhugamanna um<br />
áfengisvandamálið), a government-supported private organisation that offers treatment to<br />
alcohol and drug abusers. This is a traditional six week programme based on the medical<br />
model of alcoholism (Minnesota Model) and the twelve AA (Alcoholic Anonymous) steps.<br />
This is done in accordance with the Prisons and Imprisonment Act, No. 48/1988, which<br />
provides for the possibility of housing a sentenced person in a hospital or other institution for<br />
treatment, if this is considered feasible on account of health, age or other (unspecified)<br />
reasons. Until 1990 this provision was usually only applied in cases of physical illness where<br />
hospitalisation was required, as no medical treatment wards have ever been operative in<br />
Icelandic prisons. This treatment option is one of three alternatives of imprisonment in<br />
Iceland, the others being community service, which was legalised in 1995, and transfer to a<br />
half-way house in Reykjavik run by the Prison Aid Association, which also started in 1995.<br />
Most prisoners applying for completion of a prison sentence by treatment for alcohol and<br />
drug abuse do so at their own initiative, but this also happens frequently as a result of a<br />
recommendation or at the instigation of others, in particular family members or persons<br />
employed within the prison system. The applications are examined by the PPA, which grants<br />
such permissions in consultation with the chief physician at SAA on the basis of the<br />
prisoner’s conduct or performance when serving his sentence and any other indications as to<br />
whether his desire is expressed in earnest. In 1990-1996 a total of 120 prisoners were afforded<br />
the opportunity of completing their sentences by taking part in such a programme. Most<br />
prisoners permitted to complete their sentences in this manner have been sentenced to fairly<br />
long prison terms, which most often are terminated by conditional release on probation. By<br />
offering this option, the idea is to provide for the prisoners a better preparation for life outside<br />
prison. Before the treatment starts a written agreement is entered into between the prisoner<br />
and the PPA, specifying the conditions accepted by the prisoner. He undertakes to obey<br />
certain rules and orders issued by both the PPA and SAA. If the conditions set are violated, or<br />
if the prisoner wants to terminate the treatment, he is brought to prison again, where he<br />
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completes his sentence. If a prisoner leaves the SAA treatment facilities without the<br />
knowledge or approval of the PPA, this is regarded as a breakout from prison, which may be<br />
subject to disciplinary sanctions under the Prisons and Imprisonment Act.<br />
The objective of the present study is to assess <strong>what</strong> results may have been obtained from<br />
offering to prisoners the option of completing their sentences by participating in a six-week<br />
alcohol and drug abuse treatment programme at SAA. This is done by investigating whether<br />
there is any difference in the rate of recidivism among those who completed this programme<br />
and those who failed to do so. It was assumed that persons in the former group were less<br />
likely to return to prison, and that those who did return would do so later than the others. In<br />
making this comparison, use was only made of information concerning those who completed<br />
their treatment programme not later than four years ago, i.e. those who took part in such a<br />
programme in 1990-1993, so as to obtain a reliable picture of their return rate. Another<br />
purpose was to investigate the criminal records of the prisoners and compare it to the<br />
available information on the criminal records and return rates of Icelandic prisoners in<br />
general. An assessment of the efficiency of the treatment was not included, as the available<br />
information does not permit this. The study was in part carried out with the financial support<br />
of the Alcohol and Drug Abuse <strong>Prevention</strong> Fund (Forvarnararsjóður).<br />
The rates of return to prison among Icelandic prisoners have been the subject of some study<br />
programmes. Gudjonsson (1982) investigated how more than 70 boys who had been<br />
accommodated at Breiðavík in Iceland, a home for behaviourally disturbed children, had<br />
fared after they left that facility, and found that approximately 73% had committed a criminal<br />
act three or more years after they had left. Soon after, another study of the return rates to<br />
Icelandic prisons was conducted by Kristmundsson (1985), who found that more than one half<br />
(55%) of prisoners who had completed their sentences in 1979 and 1980 had served a prison<br />
sentence previously, and that 59% of them had returned to prison by 1984. Recently<br />
Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson (1997) investigated the criminal records of almost 500 Icelandic<br />
prisoners who had served their sentences in the period 1991-1995. Among the results was that<br />
40% of the prisoners had served prison sentences previously. An excerpt of their article on the<br />
criminal records of Icelandic prisoners was published in the PPA’s Annual Report for 1996.<br />
The investigations of Kristmundsson (1985) and Sigurdsson and Gudjonssson (1997) indicate<br />
that recidivism in Iceland showed a marked reduction in the period 1980-1985. It must be<br />
noted, however, that different studies show different return rates. A lower rate is shown if a<br />
study relates to all persons coming to prison for the service of a sentence, but a study of all<br />
persons staying in prison at a particular point in time shows a higher rate. In the latter case a<br />
higher return rate may be expected, because the study group then includes a higher proportion<br />
of habitual offenders. A cross-section of the present Icelandic prison population reveals that<br />
approximately 50% of Icelandic prisoners have served a sentence previously.<br />
Method<br />
A study of recidivism rates and criminal records of 48 prisoners who were permitted to<br />
complete their prison sentences by a six week alcohol and drug abuse treatment programme at<br />
SAA in 1990-1993 included 44 men (92%) and 4 women (8%). Figure 1 shows the age<br />
distribution of the prisoners. Their average age at the time the treatment programme was<br />
initiated was 30.1 years (SD=8.0). The youngest prisoner was 18 years old, and the oldest was<br />
54 years old.<br />
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The study included a comparison of those who completed the full six week programme at<br />
SAA and those who failed to do so, i.e. those who terminated their participation at their own<br />
request and those who were dismissed as a result of some disciplinary violation during the<br />
programme.<br />
Results<br />
Table 1 shows the number of prisoners, for each year separately, who completed the entire<br />
programme, and of those who did not. Of the 48 prisoners given the opportunity of<br />
completing their prison sentences by participation in a six week alcohol and drug abuse<br />
programme at SAA, 34 prisoners completed the programme (71%), but 14 (29%) ceased their<br />
participation before its completion, 8 at their own request, and 6 because of disciplinary<br />
violations during the programme. Those completing the programme were 32 men (73%) and 2<br />
women (50%). No comparison was made between males and females, as the female sample<br />
was very small. Female prisoners are only between 5 and 6 per cent of those who at any<br />
particular time serve prison sentences in Iceland.<br />
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Table 1. The number of prisoners who completed a treatment programme and those who<br />
failed to do so in 1990 to 1996, both years included.<br />
Treatment completed Treatment not completed<br />
Year Number (%) Number (%) Total<br />
1990 11 (85%) 2 (15%) 13<br />
1991 9 (60%) 6 (40%) 15<br />
1992 8 (62%) 5 (38%) 13<br />
1993 6 (86%) 1 (14%) 7<br />
Total 34 (71%) 14 (29%) 48<br />
Table 2 shows the types of offence for which a sentence was being served at the time the<br />
treatment programme commenced. As shown there, more than half of the number of prisoners<br />
were serving a sentence for property offences, which is consistent with the causes for<br />
imprisonment in Iceland in recent years (refer to the Annual Reports of the PPA). It is<br />
noteworthy that almost one third (29%) of the prisoners to whom the study related were<br />
serving a sentence for violent or sexual offences, while according to the PPA’s Annual Report<br />
for 1996, only 16% of Icelandic prisoners served sentences on account of such offences in<br />
1996.<br />
Table 2. The types of offence for which the prisoners were serving sentences when the<br />
opportunity of participation in the treatment programme was offered them.<br />
Treatment completed Treatment not Total undergoing<br />
completed<br />
treatment<br />
Type of offence Number (%) Number (%) Number (%)<br />
Property offences 17 (65%) 9 (35%) 26 (54%)<br />
Serious<br />
violations<br />
traffic 7 (88%) 1 (12%) 8 (17%)<br />
Sexual offences 6 (67%) 3 (33%) 9 (19%)<br />
Violent offences* 4 (80%) 1 (20%) 5 (10%)<br />
Total 34 (71%) 14 (29%) 48 (100%)<br />
* Two individuals serving sentences for homicide or attempted homicide are included in this<br />
category.<br />
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Figure 2 shows the differences in rates of recidivism during the study period, i.e. to the end of<br />
1997, by year of treatment.<br />
Table 4 shows the average numbers, standard deviations and t-tests for those who completed<br />
the treatment programmes and those who failed to do so in 1990-1993. No significant<br />
difference was demonstrated among the two groups as regards the variables studied. The<br />
mean ages of prisoners participating in the treatment programmes proved to be the same, as<br />
was the case with the average duration of the sentence or sentences they were serving at the<br />
time of commencing treatment. Almost one third (29%) of the prisoners in question were<br />
serving their first prison sentence at the time of commencing treatment.<br />
Table 4. Means, standard deviations and t-tests for prisoners completing treatment (N=34),<br />
and those who did not (N=14) in the years 1990 to 1993, as regards to the variables studied.<br />
Treatment completed Treatment<br />
completed<br />
not<br />
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t-test<br />
Age during treatment 30.1 years (8.6) 30.1 years (6.5) -0.01<br />
Duration of sentence(s) 19.8 months (28.8) 19.1 months. 0.08<br />
terminated<br />
programme<br />
by treatment<br />
(12.2)<br />
Age when first imprisoned 24.3 years (6.3) 23.1 years (4.4) 0.53<br />
Number of unconditional 5.4 sentences (4.8) 6.6 sentences (5.3) -0.72<br />
sentences at time of<br />
commencement of treatment<br />
Number of prison terms served 3.1 terms (2.3)<br />
earlier<br />
4.1 terms (2.7) -1.24<br />
Of the 48 prisoners undergoing a treatment programme in 1990-1993 a total of 30 (63%)<br />
returned to prison during the period. No significant difference was found between those who<br />
completed the entire treatment programme and those who failed to do so; however, a higher<br />
proportion of the latter group returned to prison, i.e. 86% instead of 53%. Neither was such<br />
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difference found as regards the time elapsed from participation in a treatment programme to<br />
commencement of the next prison term, between those who completed the programme and<br />
those who did not. Nevertheless, the prisoners completing the programme returned later to<br />
prison than the others. The former returned to prison in 19.5 months on the average, while the<br />
latter returned after a period averaging 14 months. Eleven of the returning prisoners were<br />
granted a second opportunity to complete their sentences by a treatment programme, and one<br />
prisoner was granted a third opportunity in the period coming under the study.<br />
Discussion<br />
Since 1990, a total of 120 prisoners have been afforded the opportunity of completing their<br />
prison sentences by participation in an alcohol and drug abuse treatment programme offered<br />
by SAA. In order to make it possible to discern any differences in the return rates to prison of<br />
those who completed the entire six week programme and those who failed to do so, the<br />
decision was taken to extend the study to at least four years from the termination of<br />
participation, in order to obtain a realistic picture of the return rates. In 1990-1993, forty-eight<br />
prisoners were afforded this option. Of these, slightly less than three fourths completed the<br />
treatment programme, but slightly more than one fourth terminated their participation at their<br />
own request or as a result of various disciplinary offences in the course of the programme. No<br />
statistically significant difference was found between the two groups, in spite of a<br />
considerable proportional difference. This may be due to the small number of individuals<br />
providing the sample. Further research is needed, and returns to prison of offenders who<br />
undergo a treatment programme while serving a sentence will continue to be monitored.<br />
It is however noteworthy that the return rate of both groups (63%) was rather high, and<br />
considerably higher than the return rate of the prisoners studied by Sigurdsson and<br />
Gudjonsson (1997), which showed that four out of every ten individuals admitted to Icelandic<br />
prisons for serving a sentence over a period of four years had served a prison term earlier. A<br />
recent study of Norwegian offenders who completed their prison sentences by an alcohol or<br />
drug abuse treatment programme, conducted by Ødegård and Amundsen (1998), revealed a<br />
higher rate of recidivism (90%) than that of those who did not participate in a programme of<br />
this kind (81%). One explanation for the high recidivism rate of the Icelandic prisoners<br />
undergoing such a programme is without doubt linked to their criminal records, as their<br />
records were both longer and graver than those of the prisoners studied by Sigurdsson and<br />
Gudjonsson. The prisoners in the present study were, on the average, approximately four<br />
years younger than the prisoners they studied, who averaged 27 years (SD=8.7) when they<br />
served their first prison sentence. The members of the present study sample had also served<br />
more terms in prison and had received more unconditional sentences than the members of<br />
their sample, who had previously been sentenced by an average of 5.1 (SD=5.2)<br />
unconditional sentences and had served an average of 2.8 (SD=2.9) prison terms.<br />
Another explanation of this high return rate can undoubtedly be traced to the alcohol and drug<br />
problems of the sample members, as this was the reason why they applied for a completion of<br />
their sentences by drug abuse treatment in the first place. It may be assumed that their drug<br />
abuse problems are proportionally greater than those of other prisoners, who did not lodge<br />
such applications. One deficiency of this study is the fact that no information was available on<br />
the prisoners’ use or consumption of alcohol or illicit drugs, nor the nature of their problems,<br />
at the time they applied for participation in the treatment programme. The only dependable<br />
information on alcohol and drug use by Icelandic prisoners is to be found in the studies of<br />
Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson (1994, 1995 and 1996). Their study (1995) of 340 Icelandic<br />
prisoners concluded that 13% were regarded as seriously dependent on the abuse of drugs,<br />
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i.e., that they reported to have used drugs at least on a weekly basis for the six months<br />
preceding imprisonment and had, in addition, used drugs by injection some time. It has also<br />
been brought to light that a very large proportion of Icelandic prisoners seem to have taken<br />
part in an alcohol and drug use treatment programme at the time they commence the service<br />
of a sentence. According to the Annual Report of the PPA for 1993, 45% of the sample<br />
members of Sigurdsson’s and Gudjonsson’s study said they had completed at least one such<br />
programme, and of these approximately one half said that they had undergone such treatment<br />
at least twice.<br />
When making this comparison, it is necessary to bear in mind that the studies of Sigurdsson<br />
and Gudjonsson included all individuals admitted to prison for the service of a prison term<br />
during a particular period, and their conclusions, therefore, relate to the course taken by the<br />
average prisoner. The present study, on the other hand, investigates the course taken by only<br />
those prisoners who were allowed participation in an alcohol or drug abuse treatment<br />
programme. It may be assumed that the members if this group have, on the whole, greater<br />
alcohol and drug use problems, and they may have a longer criminal record than the average<br />
prisoner.<br />
As regards recidivism, the results of the present study indicate that a prisoner’s completion or<br />
non-completion of a treatment programme does not matter much. Nevertheless it must be<br />
noted that the sample is rather small and it is questionable whether any firm conclusions can<br />
be drawn. The study may be regarded as the beginning of an investigation of the treatment<br />
and rehabilitation possibilities available for Icelandic prisoners, and it will be interesting to<br />
see <strong>what</strong> return rates are shown by prisoners completing their sentences by a treatment<br />
programme in a few years. The reader should also be reminded that the study is limited to the<br />
information available at the PPA. No information was available on earlier treatment<br />
programmes afforded the prisoners in question, nor their performance during any such<br />
treatment, and it would be incautious to draw any conclusions on the treatment results<br />
obtained for the members of the study sample.<br />
In spite of the high return rate of the prisoners afforded treatment there are at least two<br />
weighty arguments in favour of continuing to offer prisoners the opportunity of concluding<br />
their sentences by taking part in a treatment programme. Firstly, treatment for the abuse of<br />
alcohol or illicit drugs must remain a valid option for prisoners contending with such<br />
problems, if only from the viewpoint of health care alone. In this respect, the reaction is the<br />
same as in cases of other health problems, i.e.; attempts are made to make general health care<br />
available for prisoners while they serve their terms. Secondly, a treatment programme outside<br />
prison is a positive option, both for a prisoner and for society at large. A constructive<br />
treatment environment is likely to have better influences a prisoner’s well being and health<br />
than his incarceration in prison.<br />
References<br />
Ársskýrsla Fangelsismálastofnunar fyrir árið 1993. (Annual Report of the Prison and<br />
Probation Administration for 1993) Fangelsismálastofnun ríkisins (The Prison and<br />
Probation Administration). Reykjavík 1994.<br />
Ársskýrsla Fangelsismálastofnunar fyrir árið 1996. (Annual Report of the Prison and<br />
Probation Administration for 1996) Fangelsismálastofnun ríkisins (The Prison and<br />
Probation Administration). Reykjavík 1997.<br />
Baldwin, S.: Alcohol Education and Young Offenders. Medium and Short Term Effectiveness<br />
of Education Programs. Springer-Verlag, New York 1991.<br />
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Cookson, H.M.: ‘Alcohol use and offence type in young offenders’. In: British Journal of<br />
Criminology, 32-1992, pp. 352-360.<br />
Egg, R.: Motivation for therapy by judicial pressure? The treatment of drug addicted<br />
offenders. A lecture at the Third European Conference of Law and Psychology,<br />
Oxford, September 1992.<br />
Gudjonsson, G.H.: ‘Delinquent boys in Reykjavik: A follow-up study of boys sent to an<br />
institution’. In: Abnormal offenders, Delinquency, and the Criminal Justice System,<br />
J. Gunn and D.P. Farrington (eds.). Chichester: John Wiley. 1982, pp. 203-212.<br />
Gudjonsson, G.H. and H. Petursson: ‘Homicide in the Nordic Countries’. In: Acta Psychiatr.<br />
Scand., 82-1990, pp. 49-50.<br />
Grevholm, E. and E. Kühlhorn: ‘Behandlingseffekter inom rättsväsendet – en meta-analys av<br />
modern nordisk empirisk forskning’. I: Nordisk Tidskrift for Kriminalvidenskab,<br />
20-1997, pp. 170-181.<br />
Sigurdsson, J.F. and G.H. Gudjonsson: ‘Alcohol and drug intoxication during police<br />
interrogation and the reasons why suspects confess to the police’. In: Addiction, 89-<br />
1994, pp. 985-977.<br />
Sigurdsson, J.F. and G.H. Gudjonsson: ‘Personality characteristics of drug-dependent<br />
offenders’. In: Nordic Journal of Psychiatry, 49-1995, pp.33-38.<br />
Sigurdsson, J.F. and G.H. Gudjonsson: ‘Illicit drug use among Icelandic prisoners prior to<br />
their imprisonment’. In: Criminal Behaviour and Mental Health, 6-1996, pp. 98-104.<br />
Sigurdsson, J.F. and G.H. Gudjonsson: ‘The criminal history of ‘false confessors’ and other<br />
prison inmates’. In: The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry, 8-1997, pp. 447-455.<br />
Junger-Tas, J: Nature and Evolution of Criminality of Young Adults. Tenth Criminological<br />
Colloquium. Theme: Young adult offenders and crime policy. Strasbourg: Council of<br />
Europe 1991.<br />
Kirby, T.: ‘Drugs at heart of crime wave among young’. The Independent, Tuesday 13 May<br />
1993, p. 3.<br />
Martinson, R.: ‘What <strong>works</strong>? Questions and answers about prison reform’. In: The Public<br />
Interest, 35-1974, pp. 22-54.<br />
McMurran, M. and C.R. Hollin: Young Offenders and Alcohol Related <strong>Crime</strong>. A<br />
Practitioner’s Guidebook. Chichester: John Wiley. 1993.<br />
Kristmundsson, O.H.: Ólögleg ávana- og fíkniefni á Íslandi [Illicit Drugs of Habituation and<br />
Dependence in Iceland]. The Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs. Reykjavík<br />
1985.<br />
Peters, R.H.: ‘Drug treatment in jails and detention settings’. In: J.A. Inciardi (Ed.) Drug<br />
Treatment and Criminal Justice. Sage Publications, California 1993.<br />
Thomas, G. og M. McMurran: ‘Alcohol-Related Offending in Male Special Hospital<br />
Patients’. In: Medicine, Science and the Law, 33-1993, pp. 29-32.<br />
Ødegård, E. og A. Amundsen,: ‘§ 12-soning – om effekten av å implantere behandling<br />
innenfor en straffekontekst’. I: Nordisk Alkohol- & Narkotikatidskrift,15-1998, pp. 21-<br />
33.<br />
138
Timo Korander, Researcher<br />
Police College<br />
PAKK, PB 13, FIN-02151 Espoo<br />
e-mail: timo.korander@krp.poliisi.mailnet.fi<br />
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Speculations on the Finnish Police Murders<br />
Two policemen are shot in the centre of Helsinki. The press, tv and radio - the media - follow<br />
closely and in real time (cf. the Persian Gulf war) both the events and public reactions. It is<br />
said that never before have similar reactions been seen. Why do the police murders become<br />
such a great sensation? 1 What matters might be behind the “police murder sensation”?<br />
The dreaded model constructed by Hollywood came true<br />
You had already seen it in the movies, but only in the movies! Irrational, ruthless and<br />
unexplainable violence leaves you powerless. The emotional reaction is remarkable, and this<br />
feeling and event is symbolised by the image of the method of killing emerging on the<br />
memory’s retina: in the night in the dark street executed human bodies lying on their knees<br />
and stomachs, cowardly and cruelly shot to the back (neck). When talking about the police<br />
murders this image rose and will rise to people’s eyes. The whole narrative of the story is not<br />
insignificant.<br />
A real time crime movie<br />
The event has the elements of a thriller: a shocking and dramatic beginning (the way, time<br />
and place of killing) cannot leave people with emotions cold. 2 A nation-wide, extremely<br />
exciting, unique police operation begins, a chase, where after the first moments the hope of<br />
victory of the good is lost - after two days it seems impossible to catch the villain. And then:<br />
catharsis! The guilty one has been identified and finally apprehended. The good (the police),<br />
on whom has been attacked, acts like a victorious hero until the end (the police killer is not<br />
even battered when he is apprehended). The evil confesses, repents his acts and get his<br />
1. Before I discuss alternative explanations, I will answer a couple of concrete questions concerning my current<br />
research project: I’ve been just about two years with police officers as a participant observationist. In the<br />
morning of the event I was leaving for Spain to attend a conference in Oniati. It crossed my mind that I could<br />
have been patrolling with the shot policemen in the night of the murders (e.g. I felt a pain in my chest). Anyway,<br />
it was not very probable, because those men did not belong to those units I was driving with. However, I knew<br />
them both by sight and I had worked with their co-workers. With those, who knew them, I have talked about<br />
their feelings. However, these reasonings have nothing to do with the matters that I want discuss with the<br />
seminar attendants next. I want to talk about, <strong>what</strong> lay behind the “police murder phenomena”, things connected<br />
with it and the consequences of it. Nevertheless, it should be said that perhaps discussing this subject is some<br />
kind of “debriefing” or therapy for me. This may explain the sarcastic rhetoric of my paper. Let us say that it is<br />
some kind of “reflective sociology” (or social psychology). Nothing is sacred to the sociologists.<br />
2. To start speculations... What is the function of the morning news, especially from radio? You (or “normal<br />
people”) start a new day by listening is the world same place as last night, as it was before you went to sleep. Is<br />
everything out there OK? Is weather OK, is there revolution, riot or strikes, problems in traffic, anything<br />
abnormal? People are in sensitive condition when they wake up in home, aren’t they? Now everything wasn’t the<br />
same compared yesterday. The morning time concerning news is not insignificant. This kind of extreme (ultra)<br />
violence doesn’t fit to context of mornings. So it was “bad sun rising”, a morning shock, which turned daily<br />
rhythm of matters up side down: (might felt: “Don’t give me slaughters at my breakfast, please!”) The accurate<br />
time and place for violence is at night time: after nine o’clock news is the time of the entertainment of violence,<br />
enjoyment of action and violence, the acceptable time for Hollywood production.<br />
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punishment. The sorrow of the relatives bothers the minds of the public (audience). However,<br />
a cultural channel is based on this emotional impact:<br />
The global village and collective reaction models<br />
The global media has its role. The public reaction, the bringing of flowers, sympathy and<br />
condolences, has been tried to be explained by the model of “collective sorrow”, reminding<br />
the one felt by Princess Diana’s death. The background of collective sorrow is speculated to<br />
lie on the deep Finnish economical regression and mental depression. 3 Nothing more about<br />
the innocent, distressed white figure of the princess loved by the public, but more about other<br />
fairy tale characters: combat between good and evil.<br />
The (gendered) combat between good and evil<br />
The story is as taken from a fairy tale, the classic combat between good and evil. It was easy<br />
to identify oneself with the defender of (social) good (who could have been also somebody<br />
else than a policeman(?), but the knights of the crown are more classic). 4 The manner of<br />
killing and <strong>what</strong> had happened did not leave uncertain the division between good and evil as<br />
was the case in the hostage drama in Mikkeli and other episodes where the police had been<br />
surrounding its resistants. 5 If the incident had not been so evident, if the police had used<br />
firearms or forced the victim to act somehow, it would not have been so easy for the media to<br />
take its side:<br />
Media’s (public’s) bad conscience of earlier critique of Finnish police’s use of firearms<br />
The police has been one-sidedly critisized almost only negatively in shooting incidents. The<br />
police have during the latest years shot to death some of its armed resistants. Relatively<br />
loudly has been demanded stricter control and limitations to police’s use of firearms. Now the<br />
situation turned upside down. The policemen had been cruelly shot. 6 Behind the scene the<br />
media had to ask itself, if it was wrong, if it even was partially to blame. It was asked, if the<br />
Finnish police’s use of arms was too soft. This affected the journalistic discourse. Would the<br />
human lives of the “civil servants” been saved, if they had acted like their American<br />
colleagues:<br />
Discourse of the human faced civil servants<br />
The police is there for us. The policemen had stayed up so that we could sleep. In one night<br />
this faceless control institution, the police, got a face.<br />
3.<br />
The event was neither too near nor too far: the 100 000 Finnish users of antidepressants and also other<br />
depressed people got an opportunity to cry.<br />
4.<br />
Also the masculine stereotypes, young men as heroes, supporter the classicism of the story. Stereotypically the<br />
victimisation of a male can be accepted more easily, if he is (masculinilly) shot, especially, if he dies heroically.<br />
And yet: <strong>what</strong> about, if the other victim would have been a policewoman? Would the gender have been the issue<br />
of the “cause”? Now it was pondered, if the older policeman’s poor knowledge of languages had partially caused<br />
the event. Furthermore the critical sociologists have their archetypes of good and evil, and on the other hand, of<br />
different societies. Very revealing is an curiosity that my colleague told me. When I and Anne Alvesalo were in<br />
Oniati, she told our foreign colleagues that the policemen had been killed in a manner of an execution (we had<br />
earlier discussed the Finnish events with them). They found it very interesting “that in Finland the police killers<br />
are executed without delay”. Criminologists have stereotypes of countries (Finland as a “barbarian”) and<br />
institutions: the police seems to be suitable enemy for critical sociologists/criminologists.<br />
5.<br />
In Mikkeli there was a hostage situation, where bad police managering resulted to death of hostages.<br />
6.<br />
From the college psychology, from the cognitive dissonance theory can be drawn the psychological<br />
interpretation of one standpoint at a time: the three different components of attitude have to be in balance:<br />
emotion, knowledge and behaviour. Now the behaviour in the event and the emotion it produced was so strong<br />
that the rational aspect was defeated as contradictory. It felt contradictory to talk about police’s use of firearms<br />
based on common knowledge.<br />
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A reminder of humanity in the society: a policeman is a human being, too<br />
The dead constables’ faces were soon published. A policeman, too, is vulnerable and he has a<br />
family. Relatives grieved for them, their children and wife as well. People were really hurt,<br />
the murded ones and all those who grieved for him. 7 The policemen, these family members<br />
had stayed up for the security of the Finnish nation.<br />
Social construction of patriotism and a threat upon our haven<br />
The great story called Finland, Finnishness and patriotism, was reflected on the defenders of<br />
the society and social peace. The presumed public reaction produced a “social demand” for<br />
the social construction of the departed (killed) heroes. A tabloid even wrote, that in Finland<br />
after the war only president Urho Kekkonen got a more impressive funeral. And, in addition,<br />
it was again proven that Finland is no longer a safe haven, a peaceful village and a consensual<br />
welfare state.<br />
Fragmented postmodern society and urban horror scenario<br />
Collective emotional outbursts (of social nausea, sickness) seldom find their way out in the<br />
postmodern, fragmented society. When you find one, behind it lies a bigger constructive,<br />
collective feeling, feeling of insecurity: the fear of indifference due to the decayed social<br />
relationships in a modern urban society. And indifference (Niemel et al. 1997) in social<br />
relationships is (regarded as) the cause of violence and crime.<br />
The archeexample of the fear of crime<br />
At its worst the fear of crime is the fear of a stranger - of an outside, indefinite, unknown,<br />
unexpected and violent stranger - the fear of an attack on an honest and innocent people (both<br />
persons and nation). 8<br />
“Chasing a foreigner” and the connotations of the method<br />
Some evening papers tried to provoke (moral) panic (cf. earlier elements of moral panic in<br />
Finland caused by the fear of eastern mafia and drug expansion) telling about the chase of a<br />
violent and ruthless foreign robber. The suspect had spoken English, and there was a violent<br />
robbery of money in connection with the act. The method was similar <strong>what</strong> is known as<br />
“eastern mafia” and (western) “drug gangsters” use. The police did not express any public<br />
opinion on the nationality of the criminal, but a certain connotation was seen in the special<br />
attack on boats departing from Helsinki for Estonia. In the radio Estonia officially regretted<br />
the suspicions on Estonian citizens. It was said there was “antiracistly fortunate in a<br />
misfortune”: “Luckily the criminal was not black!” It was a good, suitable enemy against<br />
whom everybody (as one nation) could fight:<br />
7. Only the hardened criminals and critical sociologists avoided the touch of evil? As a matter of curiosity a<br />
postgraduate. sociologist, a colleague of mine said, that the whole case “pissed him off, the tabloids were load of<br />
shit...”.<br />
8. As a matter of curiosity, a relative of mine told that their 5 year old son was were scared of this killer later.<br />
They are living near to prison, and he almost could sleep at night at all, because he was so afraid, while have<br />
heard talks and news of this killer - even though parents tried to avoid him to hear or see anything. “Aren’t him<br />
in that prison, aren’t him coming to our house.” They have to lie that he is not there! How the most sensitive<br />
persons, children reacted tells about extensiveness of this sensation, as there is a Finnish expression “you hear<br />
the truth form children’s mouths”: A police killer is “a post-modern bogeyman, a witch, monster of fairy tails”.<br />
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The characteristics of the suitable enemy<br />
Some of the characteristics of a suitable enemy were found (Christie & Bruun 1986): nobody<br />
defends the victims (the suspect) or the defence is very weak, that is to say that there are very<br />
few opponent opinions or there are none. (The act was so cruel that there was no room for<br />
defence, and it would have been disgracing the “departed heroes”, if someone had dared to<br />
criticise the action of the police or analyse them control-critically.) 9 The attacker (the police)<br />
gets the honour; the weak groups pay the main part of the consequences of the war (foreigners<br />
as suspects) and the majority’s way of life was hardly disturbed, more dangerous and<br />
important matters got no attention, that is to say that the centralised power and the great<br />
majority were left in peace; and also one of the characteristics of an ideal problem is the fact<br />
that it can explain other undesirable things (e.g. the cancelling of prison leaves or the<br />
necessary existence of the prison institution):<br />
Social demand for harder control and criminal policy<br />
In Finland the Minister of Justice had started the conversation of tightening the too liberal<br />
criminal policy (see e.g. Suomen Kuvalehti). The liberal “understanding” criminal policy of<br />
the seventies had come to its end. 10 The “common people” are thought to support the harder<br />
line without reserve 11 (it can be proven by gallup surveys!): It is believed that people are<br />
afraid of the prison leaves. The hero hardly soiled himself with these demands:<br />
Moderate police? - “Statesman’s funeral”<br />
For a long time the tight budget of the police had been a constant concern of the media and<br />
the subject was brought up again, as expected, by some parliament members. Representatives<br />
of the police union expressed their opinion on this question in electronic media. The police<br />
acted moderately, and as a matter of fact, in this way they got the “public” sympathy: The<br />
police did not make the mistake of trying to get more money before “the bodies were cold”. 12<br />
And most significantly they did not have to do it for themselves: media let representatives of<br />
the public tell their opinion several times, for example about 80-years old woman insisted on<br />
more powers for the police in nine o’clock news. But the Police made a great pr-happening<br />
(Durkheimian functions: funeral have several functions including as a rite, it functions as a<br />
symbol of community’s social existence) organising a “Statesman’s funeral” with funeral<br />
procession passing the central police station, where police chiefs were saluting: 20 000 people<br />
were present, and funerals were televised. So the church had their share too, the church used<br />
death, funeral as rehabilitation of religious rites, to rehabilitate of religion and church<br />
9. There was a contradictory element concerning villain - and this is the only place I will mention anything about<br />
the person, Christiansen himself. People were confused by the thoroughly contradictory personality of the<br />
suspect: how was it possible that (as a policeman said: “the dream son in law”) a well-behaved, pleasant and<br />
handsome <strong>Scandinavian</strong> (one of us) could commit such a crime.<br />
10. Also Helsingin Sanomat expressed its opinion in its editorial 28th October 1997: “The support of the citizens<br />
helped the police significantly” on this matter: “<strong>Scandinavian</strong> liberal prison policy had - once again - sad<br />
consequences. Christensen is not the first major criminal, who has amazingly easily got a leave from the prison.<br />
He is also not the first, who murders someone.”<br />
11. There were also opponent opinions. For instance, the Councillor of the Court of Appeal, Jukka Kemppinen<br />
analysed the incident and the grief it caused and said that this sorrow could also have a connecting and healing<br />
power (“Common grief, a turn to the better” ). He wrote in Helsingin Sanomat 8th October 1997:<br />
“Opportunism is flourishing. When people are terrified of crimes, more severe penalties are demanded and<br />
people are silent about the fact that this kind of practice turns the crimes even more serious and causes more<br />
suffering and costs.”<br />
12. I know from my fieldwork experience that the internal conversations in the police was quite different. The<br />
chief of the National Bureau of Investigation expressed his opinion very objectively in Helsingin Sanomat 31st<br />
October 1997. But you can find purposeful rhetoric in his statement (see footnote 13).<br />
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institution in godless postmodern era (Look at the photo of mass procession!). Neither did the<br />
media blow it.<br />
Still moderate Finnish media?<br />
Also the media acted in a moderate Finnish way, and let the relatives mourn in peace. And it<br />
did not try to raise moral panic and turn sorrow into hatred. The sorrow was kept on the<br />
surface, the hatred was suppressed. No doubt, the English media would have acted the other<br />
way round.<br />
The place of the murders, ground of historical values, the old centre of Helsinki<br />
Lastly, it is possible to speculate that the public reactions may not have been so positive and<br />
extensive, if the incident had occurred in a “normal context of evil or crime”, for instance in<br />
sub-urban Kontula or in Lahti in Liipola, and not in the centre of historic and upper-classic<br />
Helsinki, the metaphoric heart of the (patriotic) nation. This place was easy to find and bring<br />
condolences from all over Finland (vs. the sub-urb of Kontula), too.<br />
Police-public relations<br />
The good police-public relations have been used as an explanation model for the “public<br />
reaction”. It is believed that there is fair play even with the robbers in a small village like<br />
Finland. But does these good relations have a lot of value as an explanation model in this<br />
story?<br />
Consequences?<br />
At last, did this episode give anything new to the Finnish criminal policy? Did it leave only a<br />
social demand for harder control and criminal policy? Did it leave an admiration for our<br />
police and a concern of its too tight budget, lenient use of firearms, changes in strategies and<br />
tactics, wider powers etc.? 13<br />
13. The tight budget of the police is often seen (by the police) as a crucial problem of the social order: the chief of<br />
the National Bureau of Investigation wrote in Helsingin Sanomat 31st. October 1997: “Open borders change the<br />
police work. The peaceful development of a democratic society is secured by providing sufficient assets for the<br />
authorities.” His article deals only with the police.<br />
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Nina Jon, Forsker<br />
Institutt for kriminologi, Universitetet i Oslo<br />
PB 6872, St. Olavs Plass<br />
e-mail: nina.jon@jus.uio.no<br />
144<br />
Biseksuelle menn og hiv-forebygging 1<br />
Som et ledd i prosjektet "Mann nittiseks", et prosjekt om menn og menns seksualitet i regi av<br />
Statens helsetilsyn i Norge ble det opprettet en telefonlinje som henvente seg til menn som<br />
har sex med kvinner - og med menn. 76 menn ringte inn til denne telefonen og disse mennene<br />
ble intervjuet med utgangspunkt i et standarisert spørreskjema. Dette matrialet ble jeg bedt<br />
om å analysere. Jeg kom inn i undersøkelsen på et tidspunkt hvor alle intervjuer var<br />
gjennomført, slik at jeg ikke deltok i utformingen av spørreskjemaet, og heller ikke hadde<br />
anledning til å snakke med intervjuerne underveis i prosessen. Min jobb har således vært å<br />
gjøre skjemaene tilgjengelig for statistisk databehandling, og bearbeide materialet.<br />
I tillegg til dette matrialet gjennomførte jeg et gruppe intervju med fem biseksuelle menn,<br />
som ble rekruttert gjennom min oppdragsgiver. Gjennom intervjuet søkte jeg primært å få<br />
utdypet de temaene som ikke ble særlig godt besvart gjennom telefonintervjuene.<br />
De biseksuelle mennene ser ut til å ha et høyt kunnskapsnivå om hiv og smitteveier. De vet at<br />
menn som har sex med menn er en spesielt utsatt gruppe, og de vet at kondombruk ved<br />
analsex beskytter. I all hovedsak bruker de innringende mennene betegnelser om sin egen<br />
seksualitet som innlemmer at de også har sex med menn. Mennene er altså fullt klar over at<br />
hiv er noe som også angår dem, og har ikke utdefinert seg selv fra risikogruppen.<br />
Forholdet til kondombruk og hva dette kan innebære for seksuallivet har endret seg sterkt fra<br />
hiv-epidemiens tidlige fase, hvor det å trekke frem kondomet ofte ble en kobling mellom sex<br />
og død. Som en sterk kontrast til dette er uttalelsen til en av mine informanter, når vi snakker<br />
om å glippe, og jeg spør de som sier at de alltid er helt konsekvente om det ikke hender at de<br />
ikke har kondom tilgjengelig, at kåtheten kan ta overhånd, og man gjør ting man angrer på<br />
siden. Og jeg sammenligner det med heterofile kvinner som glipper i sin bestrebelse på å<br />
beskytte seg mot graviditet. Da sier Svein:<br />
"Ja, men det er liksom én ting. Noe helt annet er det å ha en pikk i ræva og føle at det er det<br />
samme som å ha en pistol i nakken! Sånn ville jeg føle det å ha analsex uten kondom."<br />
Der hvor kondomet tidligere ble koblet til død, er det her mangelen på kondom som nå sterkt<br />
kobles til døden.<br />
Dette gjenspeiles også i flertallets seksualpraksis: 84% av innringerne har ikke hatt risikosex<br />
definert som analsex uten kondom, enten ved at de ikke har hatt analsex eller at de<br />
konsekvent har brukt kondom ved analsex siste år.<br />
1 Innledningen bygger på rapporten Biseksuelle menn - seksuell praksis og hiv-forebygging (Jon 1998)
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
For en liten gruppe av de biseksuelle mennene virker det derimot som om de ikke har tatt<br />
trusselen om hiv-smitte helt på alvor. 16% oppgir at de aldri bruker kondom ved analsex.<br />
Noen av dem ser likevel ut til å ta noen forhåndsregler i form av at de bare har sex med en<br />
fast elsker, eller ved at de bare har sex med menn de kjenner godt. Nesten halvparten av dem<br />
tar imidlertid ingen forhåndsregler overhodet. En av disse er en gutt på 22 år, som har hatt sex<br />
med fem kvinner og åtte menn siste år. Han har hatt ubeskyttet analsex med fire av mennene.<br />
Sexpartnerne har han truffet enten via kontaktannonser eller på straighte utesteder. Han<br />
betrakter seg selv som tilhørende en risikogruppe fordi "Jeg er gutt og aldri bruker kondom".<br />
Han har ikke testet seg for hiv.<br />
Det ser altså ut til at det finnes en liten gruppe menn som har sex med menn, som det<br />
forebyggende arbeidet ikke har nådd. Ingen av disse mennene fremstår som uvitende om hiv<br />
og smittemåter. De har kunnskap om hiv, men kunnskapen har ikke truffet i slik grad at de<br />
helt har tatt den inn over seg.<br />
Men som sagt: det store flertallet av innringerne unngår enten analsex med menn eller de<br />
oppgir konsekvent å bruke kondom i den grad de har analsex. Å bruke kondom for å beskytte<br />
seg og partneren mot hiv-smitte ser ut til langt på vei å være etablert som norm i sexmøtet<br />
mellom menn. Men i hvilken grad innringerne beskytter de seg selv og sine kvinnelige<br />
partnere med bruk av kondom? Så og si alle de innringende mennene hatt sex med minst én<br />
kvinne siste år. Dette gjaldt 72 av de 78 innringerne.<br />
Over halvparten av disse mennene, 42 personer, hadde aldri brukt kondom ved et vaginalt<br />
samleie med en kvinne. 11 menn hadde ikke vært konsekvente m.h.t. kondombruk, hvilket<br />
betyr at de har brukt kondom med noen kvinner, men ikke med alle kvinner de har hatt sex<br />
med siste år. 19 av mennene, eller ca. 1/4 av de som hadde vaginalt samleie med en kvinne,<br />
hadde alltid brukt kondom.<br />
Når det gjelder sex med kvinner er disse mennene ikke i samme grad opptatt av den<br />
beskyttelsen kondomet gir mot hiv-smitte, som når det gjelder sex med menn. Det er kun 1/4<br />
som konsekvent bruker kondom når de har sex med kvinner. De innringende mennene<br />
beskytter altså sine kvinnelige partnere i liten grad mot en eventuell hiv-smitte.<br />
De aller fleste, 88%, av dem som aldri har brukt kondom ved vaginale samleier lever i et fast<br />
parforhold med en kvinne. At man i faste forhold ikke bruker kondom er ikke så uvanlig.<br />
Seksualvaneundersøkelsen fra Statens Institutt for Folkehelse (1993:24) viser at bare 12% av<br />
gifte/samboende oppga å ha brukt kondom ved siste samleie i 1992. I faste forhold vil en stort<br />
sett være opptatt av å beskytte seg mot svangerskap i den grad man bruker prevensjon. Mange<br />
vil da velge andre former for prevensjon enn kondom, som p-piller, spiral etc. I et slikt<br />
forhold, hvor en sikrer seg mot uønskete svangerskap, kan bruk av kondom bli et tydelig<br />
signal om at man ikke stoler på partneren, eller at partneren ikke bør stole på en selv i forhold<br />
til seksuelt overførbare sykdommer.<br />
Ved selv å være risikoutsatte for hiv gjennom å ha sex med menn, vil disse mennenes<br />
kvinnelige partnere også trekkes inn i en risikosone. Og når mennene i tillegg i liten grad er<br />
åpne for sine kvinnelige partnere om at de også har sex med menn, vil jo kvinnene forbli helt<br />
uvitende om dette, slik at de ikke selv vil kunne ta kontroll over forhåndsregler i forhold til<br />
hiv-smitte.<br />
I samtalen med de fem biseksuelle mennene snakket vi også om det å bruke kondom sammen<br />
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med kvinner. Jeg spurte om de koblet dette med sikker sex og kondombruk til det å ha sex<br />
med menn, eller om det også var noe de tenkte på når de hadde sex med kvinner. Thomas<br />
svarte da:<br />
"Jeg har aldri jukset med en mann, men jeg har jukset med kvinner - det har jeg gjort. Jeg har<br />
ikke vært like konsekvent der, jeg har hatt samleie med kvinner uten å bruke kondom."<br />
Svein bryter inn og sier:<br />
"Ja det har jeg stadig, jeg. Men jeg har bare hatt det i forhold til kvinner så det bekymrer meg<br />
ikke i det hele tatt!"<br />
Kjetil følger opp dette:<br />
"Det bekymrer i hvertfall meg, for jeg fikk både herpes, sopp og clamydia av ei jeg var<br />
sammen med for 10 år siden. Og herpesen hadde jeg i fem år, og da blir du rimelig inaktiv<br />
seksuelt altså. Jeg var dritsjuk i den perioden."<br />
Den første assosiasjonen disse informantene har til det å ha ubeskyttet sex med en kvinne er<br />
altså hvorvidt en kvinne kan komme til å smitte dem. Kjetils tidligere erfaring når det gjelder<br />
kjønnsykdommer har vært så smertelig at han tar forhåndsregler også i forhold til kvinner.<br />
Men det er de tradisjonelle kjønnsykdommene han primært har i tankene når det gjelder<br />
kvinner. Kunnskapen om hiv og risikogrupper er stor nok til at de ikke anser det som særlig<br />
sannsynlig at en kvinne skal smitte dem med hiv.<br />
Anders sier:<br />
"Det er veldig mye større sjanse for at jeg vil ha sex med en kvinne enn med en mann uten<br />
kondom. Jeg tenker sånn rent instinktivt at det å ha sex med kvinner det er noe helt annet enn<br />
å ha sex med en mann. For med menn må man beskytte seg, altså. Men jeg tenker ikke sånn<br />
med kvinner. I forhold til kvinner tenker jeg på graviditet og kjønnsykdommer. Ikke hiv."<br />
Hiv hører tydeligvis inn i en mannssfære - og knyttes ikke til kvinner. Nettopp ved at deres<br />
umiddelbare tanker går i retning av risiko for selv å bli utsatt for hiv, forsterkes koblingen<br />
mellom hiv og mannssfæren. Bruk av kondom knyttes primært til ønske om å beskytte seg<br />
selv. Men at de selv kan representere en smittefare over for sine kvinnelige partnere er de<br />
mindre opptatte av. Først på direkte spørsmål fra meg dreies samtalen over til hvilke tanker de<br />
har om at de selv kan representere en risiko for kvinnene de har sex med. Anders gir tydelig<br />
uttrykk for at dette spørsmålet er noe han ikke har tenkt noe særlig på:<br />
"Jeg tenker lite på at jeg kan smitte henne. Det er sikkert helt feil, men det har jeg altså tenkt<br />
svært lite på. Helt sånn naturlig, av meg selv, tenker jeg bare på hiv og menn. Hvis jeg setter<br />
meg ned og tenker på det vil jeg kanskje tenke annerledes. Men jeg har ikke tenkt på det<br />
altså."<br />
Svein derimot gir uttrykk for en klar holdning:<br />
"Jeg tenker som så at jeg er så sikker i min utførelse av sex med menn, at jeg ikke vil påføre<br />
henne noe. Derfor er ikke min kvinnelige partner i nærheten av noe risiko."<br />
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Ved konsekvent å praktisere safe-sex mener Svein at han eliminerer problemstillingen, og<br />
dermed isolerer han hiv-risikoen utelukkende til et forhold mellom seg selv og sine mannlige<br />
sexpartnere. Samtidig forteller han litt senere om episoder hvor han selv nettopp har tenkt at<br />
han utsetter sine kvinnelige partnere for risiko:<br />
"Tidligere var jeg mer usikker på hvorvidt det var greit å suge eller ikke. Og da har det vært<br />
anledninger i perioden fra jeg testet meg og i de 8 ukene frem til testen gir resultater, hvor jeg<br />
har knullet damer uten kondom. Og hvor jeg på en måte har hatt en slags dårlig samvittighet.<br />
Og det har også skjedd en gang hvor jeg var klønete nok til å bruke vaselin og kondomen<br />
sprakk. Jeg fikk helt panikk, og var kjemperedd for å ha fått det. Da også i den perioden før<br />
testsvaret knulla jeg en dame uten kondom. Jeg ga blaffen, og tenkte at dette her er litt dumt<br />
liksom, inni meg. Det har jeg opplevd noen ganger."<br />
Selv om man er streng i praksisen med aldri å ha analsex uten kondom, kan man havne i<br />
risikosituasjoner. Så lenge man har analsex med menn vil det alltid være et moment av risiko i<br />
form av kondomsprekker. Og i et fast parforhold med en kvinne man ikke er åpen for, vil man<br />
fort kunne komme i vanskelige dilemmaer. Et annet moralsk dilemma er forholdet til det å<br />
suge uten kondom. I en brosjyre om sikrere sex fra Helseutvalget for homofile står det: "Noen<br />
mener at smittefaren er såpass liten at man velger å ta risikoen ved å suge eller bli sugd uten<br />
kondom. Det mangler sikker viten om smittefaren ved suging, og du må selv sette dine<br />
grenser." I og med at man ikke spurte innringerne om kondombruk i forhold til suging, har jeg<br />
desverre ikke noe data på de innringende mennenes praksis på dette feltet. Men erfaringer fra<br />
undersøkelser med homofile utvalg, tyder på at det er relativt utbredt at mennene velger å<br />
suge uten kondom. Her kommer de biseksuelle mennene opp i et moralsk dilemma som de<br />
bør ta inn over seg. For én ting er selv å velge å ta en risiko ut fra begrunnelsen at risikoen<br />
anses som liten. Noe helt annet er det å ta - selv en liten risiko - på vegne av en uinformert<br />
kvinnelig partner.<br />
I det hiv-forebyggende budskapet til menn som har sex med menn har ansvar overfor<br />
partneren blitt kommunisert. Helseutvalget for homofile anbefaler f.eks.: "Ha alltid sex som<br />
om du selv og enhver partner er hiv-positiv" (min utheving). I brosjyren "Sikrere sex for<br />
menn som har sex med menn" kommer det også gjentatte anbefalinger som setter fokus på at<br />
man skal beskytte partneren - ikke bare seg selv. Men i brosjyren er hovedbudskapet rettet<br />
mot hvordan man selv kan unngå å bli smittet. I allefall tror jeg at dette blir det vesentlige<br />
man leser ut av budskapet. Budskapet til menn som har sex med menn er i hovedsak laget av<br />
og for homofile menn. Også for homofile er det viktig å ta inn over seg ansvaret også for den<br />
andre - ikke bare seg selv. Likevel vil ansvar for partneren være mindre sentralt når man kan<br />
anta at også partneren på eget selvstendig grunnlag sørger for å beskytte seg selv.<br />
Derigjennom blir orienteringen mot seg selv som mulig smittekilde tonet ned, til fordel for en<br />
sterk orientering mot egenbeskyttelse. De biseksuelle mennene forholder seg i hovedsak til<br />
dette budskapet rettet mot menn som har sex med menn. Gjennom dette deles deres seksualliv<br />
inn i to adskilte verdener. På den ene side deres sex med kvinner som ikke handler om hiv.<br />
Og på den annen side deres sex med menn - som de opplever som sterkt knyttet til hiv, og<br />
beskyttelse av seg selv mot smitte. Dette tror jeg er med på å forklare hvorfor de biseksuelle<br />
mennene jeg har snakket med fremstår som så selvsentrerte som de tross alt gjør når vi tok<br />
opp temaet kvinner og kondombruk.<br />
Det forebyggende arbeidet bør således legge et sterkere fokus på å bevisstgjøre menn som har<br />
sex med begge kjønn om at de selv kan medføre en forhøyet risiko for sine kvinnelige<br />
seksualpartnere. Bevisstgjøringen bør settes direkte inn på å bryte koblingen om at hiv<br />
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utelukkende hører inn i en mannssfære. Samtidig støter det forebyggende arbeidet her på den<br />
begrensning at bruk av kondom ikke vil være et reelt alternativ for disse mennene i godt<br />
etablerte heterofile forhold. Å insistere på å bruke kondom i et heterofilt forhold, hvor det<br />
sentrale element i beskyttelse vil være beskyttelse mot graviditet, vil nok for disse mennene<br />
fremstå som en umulighet. Ved å insistere på å bruke kondom vil jo disse mennene tydelig<br />
kommunisere noe som det er viktig for dem å holde skjult. For de biseksuelle mennene vil<br />
nok et forebyggende budskap i retning av å insistere på kondombruk eller åpenhet ikke være<br />
et budskap man kan rette seg inn etter.<br />
Referanser<br />
Jon, Nina: Biseksuelle menn - seksuell praksis og hiv-forebygging, Stensilserie nr. 89,<br />
Institutt for kriminologi, Universitetet i Oslo, 1998<br />
Statens institutt for folkehelse: Rapport fra seksualvaneundersøkelsene i 1987 og 1992,<br />
Oslo, 1993<br />
148
Elisabeth Næss, Forsker<br />
Institutt for kriminologi, Universitetet i Oslo<br />
PB 6872, St. Olavs plass, N - 0130 Oslo<br />
e-mail:elisabeth.naess@jus.uio.no<br />
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Vold er ære, kriminalitet er penger 1<br />
Siktemålet er å studere to Oslogjenger - en gjeng med flerkulturell bakgrunn, altså barn av<br />
innvandrere og en gjeng med ungdom født av norske foreldre - for deretter å sammenligne<br />
kultur- og kriminalitetsmønsterne i de ulike gjengene.<br />
I denne innledningen vil jeg gi noen korte utdrag fra det første studiet; om den såkalte<br />
innvandergjengen.<br />
Gjengen består av marokanske og pakistanske gutter i alderen 14 - 19 år, de fleste 17 og 18.<br />
Som gruppe kan de være fysisk utagerende, og til dels ganske kriminelt aktive også. Men de<br />
viser også varme sider som samhold, hengivenhet og lojalitet. Jeg har dybdeintervjuet en del<br />
av kjernen i gjengen, samt foretatt en rekke oppfølgingsintervjuer. Intervjuene har ført til en<br />
foreløpig rapport, med tittel: “Vold er ære, kriminalitet er penger”.<br />
Denne våren er det blitt skrevet en rekke artikler i norske aviser om “voldsgjengene” i Oslo.<br />
Særlig tre gjenger er beskrevet, som alle består av gutter i alderen 15 - 25 år, med<br />
innvandrerbakgrunn. Dette har vært interessant lesning. Mange av opplysningene som<br />
framkommer kjenner jeg igjen fra guttenes beskrivelser. At det er et tøft miljø er det ikke tvil<br />
om, men journalistene gjengir ungdommene på den måten guttene selv ønsker å framstå, som<br />
enda tøffere og kulere enn det de er. Men det er også slik at en del av beskrivelsene og<br />
tilsynelatende faktaopplysninger slett ikke passer med ungdommenes opplevelse av<br />
virkeligheten.<br />
De er i et miljø hvor de fleste kjenner til hverandre, de vet hvem som “hører til” hvor. Og<br />
hvem som gjør hva. De har en imponerende oversikt over hva som rører seg i miljøet. Dette<br />
gjennom en kontinuerlig oppdatering i det de hele tiden er i bevegelse. Gjengene har ikke en<br />
slik fast struktur man kan få inntrykk av i mediene. De bruker ikke selv betegnelsene ledere<br />
og medlemmer, men gir uttrykk for at å være med i en gjeng som har et navn, er av betydning.<br />
Det er viktig å ha et rykte:<br />
“Man må vise at man er noe liksom, at man er kuul, gæærn for å si det rett ut. Når en person<br />
er gæærn får man bra rykte, av andre liksom: “han der er farlig, ikke bråk med han”. Skjønner<br />
du? Altså blant ungdommer, så er det viktigste å være sterkest på en måte. Å være farligst,<br />
ikke sant, hvis han er skikkelig gæærn, eller folka tror at han er gæærn, fordi han gjør mye<br />
rart, da får han bra rykte, da er det sånn at ingen tør å bråke med den personen.”<br />
Et “godt rykte” både innad i gjengen og overfor annen ungdom får man gjennom å tørre og<br />
tåle å delta i slåsskamper. Slåssing er en sentral del av det å være med i en gjeng. Gjennom<br />
1Innledning til NSfK seminar, Finland, 21. - 24. mai -98. Prosjektet er finansiert av KRÅD, Veileder: Professor<br />
Per Ole Johansen, Institutt for kriminologi, Oslo<br />
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NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
slåsskamper viser ungdommene styrke. Først og fremst dreier det seg om å stå samlet som<br />
gjeng og slåss mot andre. Mye av gjengens liv sentrerer mot dette. Men gjennom slåssing<br />
befestes også posisjoner innad i gjengen. De sterkeste har gjerne en høyere posisjon. Et<br />
“godt” rykte har en som tør å slåss, som ikke er redd for hverken å gi eller få juling. Når<br />
ungdommen snakker om å være “gæærn” henviser det til at man er tøff, ikke redd for noe og<br />
istand til å tøye grensene; gå utover normer og regler i samfunnet forøvrig. Flere av guttene<br />
ga i første omgang uttrykk for at de ikke fryktet noe som helst. Det viktigste er å ikke vise at<br />
man er redd. Det går an å være det, men det er noe de ikke engang viser overfor de nærmeste<br />
kameratene. Et godt rykte er å være usårbar. Redselen må de skjule godt. En forteller:<br />
“Jeg er ikke redd for noe, det er bare sånn jeg er. Jeg er ikke sånn at hvis noen sier til meg at<br />
sånn og sånn kan jeg ikke gjøre, så gjør jeg ikke det. Jeg lar ingen bestemme over meg. Jeg<br />
hører ikke på de som prøver å skremme meg. Det er noen som er sånn ikke sant, som blir født<br />
sånn, som er oppvokst sånn, som ikke hører på de andre hvis de prøver å skremme deg. Det er<br />
noen som bare går mot de som er svakere enn dem. De gjengene som går mot de som er<br />
svakere enn dem, dem går ikke mot de som er like store eller like for dem, de er feiginger og<br />
de ser på de små som drittunger. For eksempel jeg, ikke sant, når jeg går mot en stor, da er jeg<br />
liksom redd inni meg, men jeg viser det ikke, for jeg tør å gjøre det.”<br />
Å slåss er å vise at de duger til noe. De viser at de er sterke, og at de mener alvor når de sier;<br />
“ikke kødd med oss, for da får du deg en på tryne”. Og det er noe de kan, noe de behersker,<br />
både det å vise at det ligger alvor bak ordene, og det å snakke sammen gjennom å slåss. De<br />
synes det er på sin plass å vise sinne; vise at de ikke tar imot spydigheter eller forsøk på<br />
nedverdigelser. Det handler om å være i et fellesskap, hvor ungdommene snakker samme<br />
språk. Guttene i gjengen har innbyrdes forståelse av hva som betyr noe. En sier:<br />
“Det å være i gjeng er at vi hjelper hverandre, ikke sant,. Skjønner? Når du er alene, hvis du<br />
har noen problemer med andre ungdommer, hvis noen av de andre gutta kommer og banker<br />
deg greier du ikke å slåss alene, en mot fem går ikke, ikke sant.”<br />
Slåssing er en form for utfoldelse. Hvor grensene er utydelige, men alle vet at de er der.<br />
Guttene viser fram sin maskulinitet, sitt “macho”. De slåss for moro skyld, og de slåss på død<br />
og liv. De slåss for å opprettholde sitt rykte om at de er tøffe og “farlige”. Slåssinga brukes<br />
som fritidssyssel for å kompensere for kjedsomhet. Og som underholdning med fart og<br />
spenning. Slåssinga har en mening, den gir ungdommene en følelse av “å være noe”, en skal<br />
ikke kødde med dem, de vil ikke la seg “tråkke på”, og gjennom det får de en identitet.<br />
Slåssinga kan i seg selv sees som en egenverdi. Den betyr noe for ungdommene, som ikke er<br />
knyttet til de andre lovbruddene de begår. Det er en egen dynamikk i slåsskampene. Som er<br />
uavhengig av om det er ulovlig eller lovlig, akseptert eller uakseptert. De eksisterer i<br />
ungdommenes liv som noe normbundet. Første og viktigste bud er “Å stille opp for vennene”,<br />
- som betyr: å være med på slåsskamp når det trengs. Ungdommene bruker slåssing som<br />
bekreftelser på hverandre:<br />
“Jeg stiller alltid opp for vennene mine. Det er den viktigste regelen kan du si. Og om jeg<br />
ringer fordi jeg har kommet i bråk, og jeg har stilt opp for de tidligere, så kommer de om jeg<br />
trenger det.”<br />
Kampene varer over tid, og går i bølger fram og tilbake:<br />
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NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
“..da er det sånn at etter den dagen vi har begynt å slåss, så kan det vare lenge, da skjer det<br />
neste dag også”<br />
“En slåsskamp kan ta lang tid. Det varer i alt fra en uke til cirka seks, syv måneder.”<br />
“Ja, da har vi ikke noe annet å gjøre, når det er slåsskamp, da er vi i slåsskamp 24 timer i<br />
døgnet, da jakter du på folk (ler litt) alle har sin egen måte ikke sant”<br />
Gjengens deltagere er innblandet i mye slåssing, men noen av dem er til stadighet i kontakt<br />
med politiet for andre lovbrudd. Å begå lovbrudd kan sees som en av gjengens gjøremål, men<br />
dette er “opplegg” som færre er med på av gangen.<br />
I forhold til gjengen med sin kjerne bestående av rundt tyve gutter kan lovbruddene sees som<br />
mer improviserte opplegg hvor to til fem ungdom går sammen om et lovbrudd. Disse<br />
alliansene kan variere fra gang til gang. Lovbruddene er også en del av gjengens identitet,<br />
ved at de tør å gå ut over grenser, samt at det er en måte å skaffe seg “inntekt” på. Det er en<br />
del av det “å være modig og ikke redd for noe”. MEN lovbruddene styrker ikke gjengens<br />
samhold på samme måte som slåsskampene gjør. Slåssinga betraktes ikke av ungdommene<br />
som lovbrudd. Lovbrudd defineres av ungdommene selv som “kriminalitet”, og de kaller det<br />
også “de kriminelle tingene” eller “de gærne tingene” de driver med. Hvilke lovbrudd er det<br />
snakk om?<br />
“Brekk”, innbrudd, hærverk, ran, slår ned annen ungdom, trikser med mobiltelefoner, tyverier<br />
i butikker på dagtid og robber spilleautomater. Kjøp og salg, bruk og misbruk av rusmidler<br />
spiller ofte en rolle når ungdommene snakker om lovbrudd. Lovbruddene varierer svært med<br />
hensyn til alvorlighetsgrad.<br />
Utgangspunktet for dette prosjektet dreier seg blant annet om gjengens funksjon i forhold til<br />
de lovbrudd som begås. Handler det om enkeltstående lovbrudd som ungdommene begår hver<br />
for seg eller er gjengen samlet en pådriver til at lovbrudd blir begått? Hvordan lovbruddene<br />
planlegges ble for meg et spørsmål jeg så som sentralt å finne ut av. På hvilken måte<br />
planlegger de sine ulovlige affærer? Planlegger de i det hele tatt? Jeg fikk forskjellige svar,<br />
som kan tolkes dithen at hvordan lovbruddene planlegges er avhengig av hvor lenge de har<br />
vært i gjengen, og hvilke lovbrudd gjengen begår. En av guttene forteller:<br />
“I begynnelsen lagde vi mange planer. Vi snakka og snakka om hva vi skulle gjøre og<br />
hvordan vi skulle gjøre det. Vi brukte mye tid på å finne ut hva som var lurt.”<br />
“Lure ting” kan være å bryte seg inn i butikker hvor det er alarm:<br />
“Vi fant ut hvordan vi kunne nøytralisere følere for eksempel. Det var ganske moro. For<br />
eksempel prøvde vi ut hvordan vi kunne stoppe strålene med glass og spray, sånn hårspray<br />
som damene bruker på håret vet du. “<br />
Men så forandrer det seg etterhvert, de blir tatt av politiet, det blir innbyrdes krangling i<br />
gjengen, om utbytte, og om hvem som er til å stole på og ikke kommer til å tyste.<br />
Jo “bedre” de blir, jo mer de spesialiserer seg, jo mer utfordring blir det å finne opp mer<br />
avanserte metoder.<br />
“Ja, ja, da blir det mer og mer utfordring, mer og mer penger, vet du bare på en maskin kan<br />
det ligge femogtjue tusen, og da si vi er tre stykker, hvem er det som ikke er med på det? Så<br />
er det en som er hjernen, så er det resten som dekker maskinen..... ingen har lyst til å bli tatt,<br />
så det er jo ikke noe å tenke på da egentlig. Men det er noen som gir faan mer enn andre ikke<br />
sant, så du må sjekke selv, men hvis en blir nervøs så blir resten nervøse”<br />
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De begår lovbrudd i felleskap, men det er en som er “hjernen” bak. Utvelgelsen er også<br />
planlagt, selv om det kan virke tilfeldig hvem man tar med.<br />
Både slåsskampene og vinningskriminaliteten skjer på måter og i sammenhenger hvor<br />
gjengen og miljøet fungerer som et referansepunkt eller i allefall et utgangspunkt. Men her<br />
stopper også likhetene. Fordi:<br />
Slåssinga og voldshandlingene er i utpreget grad et kollektivt gruppefenomen. Det er en<br />
æressak å stille opp, og det forventes av en. I kampens hete er det den kollektive ære som står<br />
på spill, og den gjensidige lojalitet som bevises. Gjengmedlemmene lever med og lever seg<br />
inn i slåsskampene på en ganske annen og intens måte enn i de vinningskriminelle<br />
lovbruddene. Et medlem kan i perioder trappe ned og forholde seg ganske “straight” og<br />
lovlydig når det gjelder vinningskriminalitet, men backer han ut fra et slagsmål er hans dager<br />
talte, iallefall som gjengmedlem.<br />
Vinningskriminaliteten skjer i samarbeid med en eller flere andre gjengmedlemmer, og til<br />
tider også i samarbeid med personer som sympatiserer med gjengen. Disse lovbruddene<br />
handler om penger, ikke om ære. Gjengen og miljøer fungerer som et kriminelt ressurs- og<br />
kompetansesenter i den forstand at man finner seg “crimepartners” som kan variere fra gang<br />
til gang. Gjengen har ingen normer MOT å begå vinningskriminelle handlinger, men det<br />
forventes ikke på samme måten som at det forventes at en stiller opp i voldelige<br />
konfrontasjoner. Og det er heller ikke gruppen som kollektiv med den kollektive ære som<br />
investering og risikofaktor det dreier seg om, når medlemmene vurderer hvordan de skal gå<br />
fram i vinningskriminelle sammenhenger.<br />
Det er en forutsetning at men stiller opp for venner, alltid “hjelper til” - og aldri skygger unna<br />
en slåsskamp - men det er ingen forutsetning at de er med på annen kriminalitet, - selv om det<br />
styrker imagen om å være kul og tøff og TØR å begå kriminelle handlinger også. Men det kan<br />
være slitsomt, så jeg avslutter med et sitat om å være kul og tøff:<br />
“Det er vanskelig å være ungdom egentlig, nå for tida, i hvertfall jeg, jeg synes det er ganske<br />
vanskelig. Jeg tror egentlig at alle ungdommer, dem driver med ting dem ikke vil gjøre<br />
egentlig, når jeg først tenker meg om, fordi, etter det jeg har opplevd, så er det liksom, alt det<br />
jeg har gjort, man blir ganske fort lei av det ikke sant, det kommer en tid da man ikke orker<br />
mer, det er ganske vanskelig å komme seg ut av det, fordi hvis man ikke er med på en ting, så<br />
er man ikke kuul og tøff og og farlig lenger, og hvis man er med, så er man kuul og tøff.”<br />
152
Malcolm Davies, Professor<br />
Criminal Justice Centre, Thames Valley University<br />
Bond Street, London W5 5AA, England<br />
e-mail: malcolm.davies@tvu.ac.uk<br />
NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Comparative sentencing project - Using focus group methodology<br />
A comparative sentencing project (CSP) funded by the <strong>Scandinavian</strong> Research Council for<br />
Criminology is to look at sentencing policy and practice in four European jurisdictions<br />
(England, Finland, Lithuania and Norway) to examine the factors affecting the sentencing<br />
choice between custody or community sanctions.<br />
This study of comparative judicial cultures asks judges in the four countries to respond<br />
to scenarios of five different examples of burglary in terms of the type of sentence they would<br />
consider giving, how much choice they have, <strong>what</strong> sentencing objectives they have in mind<br />
and <strong>what</strong> other information they would need to give a precise sentence in an individual case.<br />
The aim of the research is firstly, to identify sentencing decisions that lie on the<br />
custodial/non-custodial borderline - referred to as the cusp. Secondly, to clarify the penal<br />
objectives and to identify the aggravating and mitigating factors that judges have in mind<br />
when sentencing this category of crime. Thirdly, to discuss the degree of confidence that<br />
judges have in the existing sentences for this category of offence. Fourthly, to identify the<br />
factors that would increase the judges’ confidence in the use of community sentences,<br />
including innovations or additional requirements that might be proposed to enhance the<br />
credibility of community sentences.<br />
For the purpose of the research we first had to identify a type of crime that would be<br />
suitable for cross-cultural comparisons and that would also generate borderline (cusp)<br />
sentencing issue in terms of whether judges should use prison or a community or other<br />
penalty.<br />
We chose the offence of burglary (housebreaking or cambriolage) for two reasons. It<br />
is a type of crime that is reasonably demarcated and relatively more narrowly defined than<br />
some crimes such as assault and theft, and is thus more readily understood and therefore<br />
helpful when making cross cultural comparisons. Furthermore it is an offence that in each of<br />
the jurisdictions has a possibility of being considered sufficiently serious to warrant custody<br />
in some circumstances and community penalties in others.<br />
We will use focus groups to ask judges to consider the five scenarios. The scenarios<br />
would vary e.g. value of th stolen goods, how organised was the crime, and a variety of<br />
offender types, from first time offenders to persistent offenders. Thus we will focus on the<br />
variables of culpability and recidivism and give examples to seek judges’ responses on the<br />
appropriateness of penalties for each scenario and to clarify the purpose of sentencing as<br />
identified by reference to sentencing objectives of retribution, denunciation, rehabilitation,<br />
deterrence, restitution or incapacitation. We will seek clarification as to the list of factors that<br />
the judges look at to determine the seriousness of a particular case. The policy relevance of<br />
the research will be pursued by asking the judges if changes to the existing method of<br />
implementing community sentences, or whether legislative reforms providing new elements<br />
to community sentences would increase their willingness to use community sentences with<br />
offenders convicted of burglary.<br />
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Focus groups<br />
A focus group is an in-depth group discussion on a pre-defined and limited topic by a small<br />
group of between five to eight panellists under the guidance of a moderator. The responses of<br />
the panellists are recorded as data for content analysis. It is a qualitative methodology and its<br />
success depends on the quality of the answers to the questions raised in the focus group<br />
discussions to provide an insight into the topic under investigation. The panel discussions<br />
normally last between one and a half and two hours.<br />
It is useful both as a method of inquiry and consultation for it can be used to probe<br />
assumptions and meanings, examine key players’ assessment of the credibility of reforms and<br />
the implications of changes in practice. Focus groups in this field work best when a very<br />
specific and limited topic is explored in-depth. They offer a systematic but unstructured way<br />
of looking at a topic in detail. The discussions held in a focus group panel are not as wide<br />
ranging as an academic seminar. In contrast to the questionnaire the responses in a focus<br />
group are not confined to pre-determined response categories and can be expressed in the<br />
respondents’ own words. This approach gives much richer material for content analysis but<br />
as a consequence it creates more problems for the analysis of responses and limits the extent<br />
to which generalisations can be made.<br />
In a previous study using focus groups to examine views about the use of community<br />
sentences (Davies 1993) we asked panellists to give us feedback through the use of follow-up<br />
evaluation questionnaires about their experience of the focus group. In California and<br />
England there was a considerable degree of support for the method. In response to the<br />
question ‘Did you find the focus group a useful way of expressing your view?’ California<br />
criminal justice officials commented as follows:<br />
A judge wrote, ‘Rarely is there any type of forum to explore these issues with other agencies<br />
that are in a position to influence change.’ A sheriff wrote,’ There are limited opportunities<br />
available for expressing views that have a state-wide implications.’ A public defender wrote,<br />
‘All who were there have direct knowledge of the problems and work with it everyday, so we<br />
could speak with first hand information and share our own concerns with each other.’ A<br />
superior court judge wrote, ‘There was a good interplay of ideas.’ (Davies 1993 p.105)<br />
The response of magistrates in England (lay judges) following focus group panels to<br />
examine attitudes towards community sentences were, as in California, overwhelmingly<br />
positive. Comments from the evaluation questionnaire in England included the following<br />
comments:<br />
‘It focused my ideas. It was beneficial to hear the other views of magistrates I do not<br />
normally sit with.’<br />
‘It was good to explain views and then discuss the implementation of realistic ideas.’<br />
‘An opportunity to discuss matters of concern with fellow magistrates. We see little of each<br />
other normally.’<br />
‘Possibly the only opportunity to hear and express views I’ve been given so far.’<br />
‘One gets an inside version of how your fellow magistrates approach justice and penalties for<br />
wrong doing.’<br />
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‘It is difficult to find the time when on the Bench to discuss fully the whole subject.’ (Davies<br />
1996 pp. 32-37)<br />
The comments regarding the usefulness of focus groups expressed above would suggest that<br />
they provide the panellists with a positive experience in that it offered them the opportunity to<br />
express their own views and hear the views of others. For the researcher the focus groups<br />
provided the chance to clarify the formal and the informal rules used by decision makers, as<br />
well as the opportunity to probe the tacit or underlying assumptions that decision makers hold<br />
about their role. The moderator can seek to determine the significance of meaning attached to<br />
different types of information received by decision makers. By providing stimuli material to<br />
a panel of peers with similar knowledge and status, it is possible to clarify meanings and<br />
ambiguities and to check whether one panellist’s comments correspond to <strong>what</strong> others say in<br />
the group. The interactionist nature of the discussion helps to promote greater insight as the<br />
moderator and other members of the panel can probe, challenge, and comment on the<br />
statements made during the discussions.<br />
Burglary scenarios<br />
In our comparative sentencing project we are asking professional and lay judges to give their<br />
views as to the likely sentence that a burglar described in five different scenarios would be<br />
given. Two of the five burglary scenarios are presented below. These two represent our most<br />
extreme cases in terms of seriousness. We would expect judges in all jurisdictions, even in<br />
Lithuania, to be able to consider a non-custodial sentence in Case 1. In Case 2, a more<br />
serious scenario with the offender having previous convictions, a Finnish judge would be<br />
likely to consider imprisonment. The three other scenarios provide less extreme examples<br />
where judges would have to exercise discretion to make decisions about borderline cases<br />
where either prison or community sanctions might be a possibility. We remind the judge that<br />
this is not a sentencing exercise where we would expect them to have a great deal more<br />
information, but is an exercise to see firstly in general terms <strong>what</strong> type of sentence they think<br />
is most likely, and secondly, to ask <strong>what</strong> further information would they need or request<br />
before they would make a decision in a real case.<br />
In the scenarios we present brief facts about the offence, the offender and the victim<br />
and in all the scenarios the defendants are male aged 24 and plead guilty. The scenarios<br />
exclude those where violence is used or weapons are involved.<br />
Case 1<br />
Offence<br />
Is a burglary of a flat during hours of daylight, when residents were at work. Access was<br />
gained through an open window, with no damage to property. The offence was opportunistic<br />
and the items stolen were foodstuffs for the defendant’s own consumption. The offence was<br />
discovered as a result of information from an informer, and the defendant admitted guilt to<br />
police when first interviewed and pleaded guilty in court at the first opportunity.<br />
Offender<br />
Defendant is of previous good character and has been unemployed for over one year. He has<br />
two children and a sick wife and he suffers from epilepsy.<br />
Victim<br />
Working couple who were in their mid-20s who did not realize initially that they had been<br />
victims of a burglary.<br />
Case 2<br />
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Offence<br />
Involves the burglary of house at 2 a.m. (at night), when residents were asleep upstairs.<br />
Associate of defendant had visited house previously to assess possibility of entry and<br />
belongings, posing as salesman. Entry gained by forcing outer door - some damage. An<br />
untidy search was carried out by the defendant though the residents were not disturbed.<br />
Jewelry worth £1000 and of sentimental value taken and not recovered<br />
Offender<br />
Defendant has three previous convictions for burglary, the latest being for dwelling house<br />
burglary for which he was given a custodial sentence and released from prison two months<br />
prior to the commission of this offence. For one of the previous convictions he was given<br />
community service but he did not successfully complete it.<br />
Victim<br />
Retired couple who were in their late-60s. The wife was semi-invalid.<br />
A covering letter is sent to the panelists in advance with details of the<br />
scenarios, a list of questions to be discussed, an explanation of the purpose of the study and<br />
the reasons why the session needs to be tape recorded. The success of the research depends<br />
on a number of factors but two are crucial. The first is to get the participation of respondents<br />
who are able to give an insight into the issues raised. The second is the quality of the<br />
discussions on the transcript that will provide the basis for the analysis.<br />
The other collaborators on this project are Paul Larsson [Department of<br />
Criminology, University of Oslo, Norway], Arnoldas Matijosius [Constitutional Court of the<br />
Republic of Lithuania and the Faculty of Law, Vilnius University], and Jukka-Pekka Takala<br />
[National Research Institute of Legal Policy, Helsinki, Finland].<br />
References<br />
Davies M: Punishing Criminals: Developing Community-Based Intermediate Sanctions.<br />
Greenwood Press, Connecticut 1993.<br />
Davies M, J-P Takala and J. Tyrer Penological Esperanto and Sentencing Parochialism: A<br />
Comparative study of the Search for Non-Prison Punishments. Dartmouth, Aldershot<br />
1996.<br />
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Timo Ahonen, LL.M., Assistant in sociology of law and jurisprudence<br />
Faculty of law, University of Turku<br />
Calonia 341<br />
FIN-20014 Åbo<br />
e-mail: timaho@utu.fi<br />
and<br />
Tarja Elisa Kauppila, M.A.Soc.Ss., Researcher, Ph. D. Student<br />
Department of Social Sciences, University of Kuopio<br />
P.O.B. 1627<br />
FIN-70211 Kuopio<br />
e-mail: kauppila@messi.uku.fi<br />
Part I:<br />
Tracing the basis of “constructive punishment”<br />
- Some answers to some unanswerable questions?<br />
About the General Principles of Sentencing in the Finnish Criminal System<br />
- something we need to know to be able to understand the idea of<br />
"constructive punishment"<br />
Timo Ahonen<br />
Faculty of law, University of Turku, Finland<br />
Few words of introduction<br />
In this paper I will briefly examine few of the questions we should be considering when<br />
discussing the concept of “constructive punishment”. I will bring up only few - but important<br />
- topics of the general principles of sentencing and try reflect them on the some<strong>what</strong><br />
undefinet concept of “constructive punishment”.<br />
Accordig to the analytical pluralist conception, the application of punishment is guided by<br />
several differing basic values and goals (Lappi-Seppälä 1987, 661). How to use these basic<br />
values and goals, or wich ones should be stressed in a specific situation, depens on the<br />
situation in hand and on the surrounding society and it´s values and goals. A penal (or<br />
criminal) law ideology can be described as the basic conception of crime and/or punishment<br />
(Jareborg 1992, 103). 1 This basic conception more or less guides person`s ideas and opinions<br />
about crime and punishment in general. At least for a criminal law scientis it is important - or<br />
essential - to recognize <strong>what</strong> is the penal law ideology she or he uses in his or hers work.<br />
Discussions and debates about different theories of punishment and crime have been ongoing<br />
for at least the last 250 years. This short paper will not solve any of the questions raised in<br />
1 Jareborg continues: “And obviously, anyone`s views on crime and punishment depent to a large extent on his<br />
views of the relation - if any - between God and Man, the relation between Man and nature, the optimal<br />
organization of society, causal mechanis, and the status of different types of persons.” (Jareborg 1992, 103)<br />
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that discussion - nor does it try to do so. This paper serves mostly as a exercise for the author<br />
in directing his thoughts from the law and penal code to criminal. Because that is <strong>what</strong><br />
criminal law is finally all about; the person on the reciving end.<br />
These joint papers by Ahonen and Kauppila are the result of a lingering e-mail discussion and<br />
article and paper excange which started last year after NSfKs 39. forskerseminar in Hirtshals,<br />
Denmark. The authors hope that more than just a result this paper could be a startingpoint to a<br />
long and productive cooperation between a social scientist and a criminal law scientist. We<br />
hope that our example of cooperation across scientific borderlines will encourage others to do<br />
the same.<br />
Purpose and limits of punishment?<br />
In the modern capitalist society the aim, the goal of the criminal sanctions system is in the<br />
prevention of crime and the increase in equitable distribution of well-being. It has been said<br />
that the purpose of the whole system of punishment lies in the prevention of behavior that<br />
violates the vital interests of society and its members (Lappi-Seppälä 1987, 661-661, 666).1 2<br />
Criminal provisions may be used only to protect interests which are vital to the community.<br />
What are these interests that need to be protected? 3 According to Nuutila, in modern goalrational<br />
criminal justice the list of interests (Rechtsgüter) can be derived either directly or<br />
indirectly from the constitution and human rights. The interests to be protected by the<br />
criminal law would then be defined not in the minds of criminal law scholars and<br />
criminologist but also in the political discussions in Parliament and the international human<br />
rights conventions (Nuutila 1996, 308). The most important decisions on the use of<br />
punishment should be made by Parliament (also Lappi-Seppälä 1987, 658). This thinking<br />
gives penal sanctions the democratic backround they need in order to be efficient and<br />
acceptable in the long run.<br />
The aim of the modern neoclassical penal system in preventing crime is mainly general<br />
prevention. The effect of penal system in general prevention is assumed to be reached through<br />
the moral creating and enforcing effect in punishment rather than through fear, deterrence<br />
(Lappi-Seppälä 1992, 6). 4 General prevention theory assumes that the disapproval expressed<br />
in punishment affects the values and moral views of individuals. This is supposed to lead to<br />
the internalization of the norms of criminal law and the values they reflect. People refrain<br />
from illegal behaviour, not because it is followed by unpleasant punishment, but because the<br />
behaviour itself is regarded as morally blameworthy (Lappi-Seppälä 1992, 7). 5 The effect of<br />
punishment on the strengthening of morals also requires that the sysytem is not made overly<br />
2 Page numbers used here are from the English summary of Lappi-Seppälä´s dissertation.<br />
3 Overview of the principles governing criminal provisions, see Lahti, R. (1992). “Die Gesamtreform de<br />
finnischen Strafgesetzes: Zielsetzung und Strand der Reforbarbeit bis 1992: insbesondere im Blick auf die erste<br />
Phase der Gesamtreform”, in Lahti, L.-Nuotio, K (eds.): Criminal Law Theory in Transition. Helsinki.<br />
4 However Lappi-Seppälä states that: “In concrete decisions, the level of punishment should not appear to the<br />
court to be means for seeking general prevention: it should instead be seen as means for the court to establish the<br />
blameworthiness of the offence in question in relation to other acts” (Lappi-Seppälä 1987, 667).<br />
5 Finnish and <strong>Scandinavian</strong> textbook definitions of general prevention emphasize the norm-strengthening impact<br />
of a properly working criminal system (Anttila & Törnudd 1992, 13). Deterrence can bee seen as a component of<br />
general prevention but not necessarily a major component (Anttila & Törnudd 1983, 156-159).<br />
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techinical and complicated (Lappi-Seppälä 1987, 658). The expediency of a criminal justice<br />
system is measured through its general prevention (Lahti 1985, 259).<br />
These two starting points - protection of the vital intrest of the community and general<br />
prevention - are also closely connected to each other. It could be presumed that if the “vital<br />
intrest of the society” are protected by criminal sanctions the “morals and values” of the<br />
members of the society would be in harmony with the punishments for violating these values.<br />
Its a nice circle. Of course, here lies at least two kinds of questions (a) how do we define these<br />
vital intrests of the society, and - <strong>what</strong> is more important - who does this definding and (b)<br />
how do we deal with those individuals who do not share those same “morals and values” as<br />
the majority of the population? Part of the answer to the first question could be found in the<br />
basic human rights and international conventions. The second part of the first question could<br />
be answered by refering to democracy and its power and legitimacy. The second question has<br />
been answered dozens of times by hundrets of theorist, but it still remains open. Behind these<br />
complex questions lurke countless number of more questions.<br />
Purpose of imprisonment?<br />
Even if it is relatively “easy “ to form reasons to justify punishment as such, it is not as easy<br />
to justify imprisonment as a form of punishment. The history of law and comparative law<br />
indicates that there is no direct correlation between the systems of sanctions and the level of<br />
crime; harder punishment do not necessarily degrease criminality and vise versa (Lappi-<br />
Seppälä 1987, 665). The hardest sanction in Finnish penal code is lifetime of imprisonment<br />
(for murder). The Criminal Law Commitee of 1972 particulary emhasized the heavy social<br />
costs of imprisonment and thought the use of it should be minimized (Anttila &Törnudd<br />
1992, 13). On the other hand, total abolition of prison sentences seems hardly possible.<br />
The emhasis on general prevention as one of the main principles of the Finnish criminal<br />
system easily leads easily to the conclusion that our reform ideology rejects totally individual<br />
prevention. This is not altogether true (Anttila &Törnudd 1992, 14). Special prevention just<br />
requires extensive discretion (Lappi-Seppälä 1987, 658). The role of the individual prevention<br />
in penal institutions, and the role of imprisonment in our criminal sanctions system, has been<br />
characterized by the following excellent words:<br />
“To keep people in prison in order to cure them of their criminality is inhumane<br />
and irrational, as systematic research can not give any basis for hoping that the<br />
average offender will be less crime-prone after release. The period of time spent<br />
in prison should, nevertheless, be utilized positively as far as possible - and if<br />
there are certain categories of offences who can benefit from treatment, we should<br />
of course offer them this opportunity”<br />
(Anttila &Törnudd 1980, 48).<br />
The less the sanction affects the rights of an individual - less harm it brings to the offender -<br />
the smaller the risk of recidivism, and recidivism - in my opinion - is always a sign of a failed<br />
criminal sanctions system. Keeping that in mind we can say that in the present system, the<br />
risk of recidivism can be best lessened by avoiding the use of unconditional sentences of<br />
imprisonment.<br />
When sentencing recidivist the penal system in fact follows <strong>what</strong> could be called commonsense<br />
policy of incapasitation. The selective incapacitation explicitly accepted only as a guide<br />
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in the choise of sanction for the most serious type of violent crime is used on recidivist<br />
(Lappi-Seppälä 1987, 668. See also Jareborg 1992, 108-110). 6 This might well be in harmony<br />
with the general prevention idea, but vital intrest of the society are nowhere to bee seen. 7<br />
Efficient, just and humane criminal justice...<br />
The following movements or tendencies can be discerned in Finnish crimal policy since the<br />
1960´s;<br />
a) critisism of so called treatment ideology<br />
b) emphasis on cost-bemefit thinking<br />
c) so-called neo-classicim in criminal law<br />
d) pragmatic reform work by utilizing modified ideas of the above-mentioned movements<br />
(Lahti 1990, 57).<br />
The important difference between Finland and the other countries is that the treatment<br />
ideology never established itself as the main reform ideology. Finland more or less jumped<br />
over the treatment stage in the historical developement of penal reform ideologies and went<br />
directly towards a more modern ideology, emphasizing rationality in the form of general<br />
prevention and classic principles of justice, rather than mechanism of e.g. deterrence or<br />
individual prevention (Anttila & Törnudd 1992, 12-13).<br />
From the mid 70´s the Finnish criminal justice system has been reformed in a “neo-classical<br />
spirit”. The emhasis has been, as mentioned - instead of individualization and rehabilitation -<br />
on legal security and the principles of proportionality, predictability and equality. A general<br />
preventive oriented sentencing system emhasizes fairness and justness of sanctions and in<br />
sentensing the central values are proportionality, predictability and equality (Lappi-Seppälä<br />
1992, 7-8). 8<br />
Efficient criminal justice shall be used for the prevention of unacceptable bahavior only to the<br />
extent proved necessary in a cost-effiency comparison of criminal policy measures (Lahti<br />
1985, 259). In other words; criminal provision must bring about more advantages than<br />
disadvantages to the society as a whole. The advantages beeing, of course, the preventive<br />
effects from the point of view of the protected intrest, and the disadvantages (a) suffering of<br />
the victim, (b) financial disadvantages to the state and (c) restriction of the liberties of<br />
individuals (see Nuutila 1996, 311-312).<br />
6 According to ch. 6:2 n. 4 of the Penal Code of Finland the following is a ground for increasing the punishment:<br />
“the criminal history of the offender, if the relation between it and the new offence on the basis of the<br />
similarity between the offenses or otherwise shows that the offender is apparently heedless of the prohibitions<br />
and commands of law”.<br />
7 Here I can not go in detail to discuss the culpability of the reoffender; agreement on whether repeated crime<br />
signifies increased culpability has not been reached. In my opinion recidivism does not necessarely make the<br />
offender more culpable.<br />
8 These ideas are also expressed in the basic norm of sentencing (Penal Code ch 6:1): ‘When meting out a<br />
punishment, all the relevant grounds increasing and decreasing the punishment and the uniformness of<br />
sentencing practice shall be taken into consideration. The punishment shall be meted out so that it is in just<br />
proportion to the damage and danger caused by the offence and to the culpability of the offender manifest in<br />
the offence .’<br />
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The justice of a criminal justice system is evaluated by the principles of equality, fairness and<br />
predictability (Lahti 1985, 259). Equality requires similar punishments for similar cases<br />
(Lappi-Seppälä 1987, 665). The principle of justice can bee seen as containing two demands<br />
that are in state of internal tension; formal (generalized) justice and (individualized) in casu<br />
justice. The former emhasizes predictability an the latter stresses that cases should be dealt<br />
with on an individual basis (Lappi-Seppälä 1987, 665). Predictability is in connection with<br />
legalistic nulla poena sine lege -principle.<br />
Humaneness contains the idea of the criminal justice system beeing determined so that it is in<br />
harmony with the principles of human dignity, integrity, freedom of the individual and other<br />
human rights (Lahti 1985, 259, Nuutila 1996).<br />
One way of justifying the criminal justice system is justification on utilitarian grounds. It can<br />
also be said that the justification of the application of punishment is tied to the benefits that<br />
particular system offers to the society and to the fairness of the laws maintained through the<br />
threat of using that punishment (Lappi-Seppälä 1987, 661). However, it is clear that the<br />
structure and operation of the penal system can not be determinated only on the bases of its<br />
utility. The penal system must be both goal-rational (utility) and value-rational (justice,<br />
humaneness) (Lahti 1990, 57). The answer to a successfull penal system is of course to<br />
balance these interest.<br />
This brings us close to the question of the principle of proportionality. This principle states<br />
that there should be a just relation between the offence in question and the punishment.<br />
However, this principle does not state anything specific about the criteria of how this relation<br />
should be determined or <strong>what</strong> are the standards used in anchoring these quantates together;<br />
there is no way of measuring <strong>what</strong> is the “right” punishment for any given crime. In general,<br />
the literature relies on the general sense of justice (Lappi-Seppälä 1987, 665).9<br />
...and “constructive punishment”<br />
So <strong>what</strong> could constructive punishment be in the light of the few general principles of<br />
sentencing discussed above? Is there a definition for a constructive punisment? Can<br />
punishment be - or should punishment ever be constructive - is punishment not something<br />
you just bring on to yourself by acting against societies intrest? Should the punishment be<br />
constructive for the offender or for the surrounding society. Or both?<br />
Constructive punishment in the eyes of the criminal sanctions system could be defined as a<br />
punishment which while protecting (only) the vital intrests of the society builds general<br />
prevention without endangering the human rights of the offender during or after the<br />
punishment. In this definition the punishment could be constructive for both the offender and<br />
the society.<br />
Can imprisonment be constructive punishment? In my opinion there has to be special<br />
conditions for the prison sentence before it can be constructive in any way. This leads us<br />
back to Anttila`s and Törnudd´s sentence: “The period of time spent in prison should,<br />
9 Lappi-Seppälä sees three justifications for this: a) if the public opinion were to be ignored, the confidence<br />
placed in the system would disappear, b) the ideal of democracy in itself requires that the sense of justice, as the<br />
will of the people, be adopted as a criterion in decisionmaking, and c) the feeling that criminal recive the<br />
punishment they “deserve” has a value of its own (Lappi-Seppälä 1987, p. 665).<br />
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nevertheless, be utilized positively as far as possible - and if there are certain categories of<br />
offences who can benefit from treatment, we should of course offer them this opportunity”. If<br />
imprisonment is the only possible sentence in a given situation the time spent in prison should<br />
at least be utilized positively. Only then we can find a seed of constructiviness also in<br />
imprisonment.<br />
Part II:<br />
Insecurity and Life Control Among the Finnish Male Prisoners<br />
- Things we need to know in order to be able to act constructively<br />
Tarja Kauppila<br />
Department of Social Sciences<br />
University of Kuopio, Finland<br />
162<br />
“In the final analysis, human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did<br />
not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in<br />
violence, a dissident who was not silenced. Human security is not a concern with<br />
weapons - it is a concern with human life and dignity.” (Human Development<br />
Report 1994, 22.)<br />
The thoughts presented here are mostly based on a study of insecurity and life control among<br />
the Finnish male prisoners, and are intended as an introductional view of some preliminary<br />
results from this. The study is one part of a broad population research project on security, insecurity<br />
and coping by the Department of Social Sciences at the University of Kuopio. The<br />
basic idea was to look for further information about the prisoners' welfare problems and<br />
sollutions to them. It is obvious that this information is needed in order to be able to act<br />
constructively: to help people out of their problems and to develop our systems according to<br />
both their needs/aims and the aims of the society. The main questions here were: how<br />
security, as a value, takes its place in the prisoners' systems of value; whether or not there is<br />
insecurity among the Finnish male inmates, which parts of human life are potentially the ones<br />
most affected by insecurity, and <strong>what</strong> would be the the most common ways of life control<br />
among inmates. These questions were considered among the 259 prisoners who were interviewed<br />
using a structured question form at the end of 1993. Some of their answers are<br />
compared here with answers from civilian Finnish men who participated in the population<br />
research of insecurity and coping. It is expected that the study will be completed by the end of<br />
1998.<br />
Tracing problems of welfare<br />
One theoretic starting point of the study was security related to the concept of welfare:<br />
citizens' welfare, social security and life control are important but also demanding aims of<br />
social policy (cf. Riihinen 1979, Niemelä 1991, Raitasalo 1995; Niemelä 1997, 18). From the<br />
point of view of social policy and social work, it is important to know if people are suffering<br />
from problems related to welfare, and how common or accumulated these possible problems<br />
are among them. The findings of prisoners' values will point out <strong>what</strong> they prefer in their<br />
lives. If they seem to have some problems with the issues which are linked with these<br />
particular values, these problems might also be the ones - if any - that these people mostly<br />
prefer to get help for. In addition, if they seem to have problems with something they do not<br />
consider as so important for them, it might be very useful to try to find out why this is so, and
NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
<strong>what</strong> this means from the point of view of social policy and social work - also from the point<br />
of criminal policy and correctional treatment of prisoners.<br />
Traditionally security can be defined as a central need, value and right within human life<br />
(Niemelä 1991, 8-11) - infact as an important part of well-being regardless of whether you are<br />
in prison or not. According to Riihinen (1979, 820) security cannot be placed in the hierarchies<br />
of needs, but instead it is more like a dimension or a variable which goes through all<br />
categories of needs. With this in mind, security was here defined as (sufficient) well-being<br />
and (sufficient) certainty of its continuation in the central areas of human life - e.g. health,<br />
human relationships, work, etc. - which are closely linked with basic human needs. Insecurity<br />
is defined "negatively" here: as a lack of security (to some degree) and/or as the uncertainty<br />
of the continuation of well-being (to some degree). Insecurity can be experienced in a<br />
situation where one's own means of dealing with <strong>what</strong> happens in life are not enough. Life<br />
can never be perfectly secure, but how we are able to deal with insecurity is important, and<br />
whether we have or have not enough motivation, abilities, force, rescourses and so on, for life<br />
control. (cf. Kaufmann 1970, 24-27; Suhonen & Suhonen, 1973, 2-7, 10-14; Riihinen 1979,<br />
819-820; Niemelä 1991, 8-15; Niemelä et al. 1994, 15-17; Lahikainen & Kraav & Kirmanen<br />
& Maijala 1995, 52; Väisänen 1995, 34-37; Järvikoski 1996, 44-45, Niemelä & co. 1997, 13-<br />
25.)<br />
Prisoners often seem to be influenced by physical, psychic and social forces of different<br />
kinds. According to the earlier reports in Finland, prisoners have many kinds of problems<br />
with health, both mental and physical, despite the fact that their age structure is relatively<br />
young (Joukamaa 1991). They are a group of people, mostly men, who have serious problems<br />
with alcohol and drugs, and their death rates have grown in the 1980's (Kääriäinen 1996, 171-<br />
172). They have economical problems (Mellais 1991, Kuivajärvi 1992), and their educational<br />
level is low compared with the average educational level of the rest of the population (Karvonen<br />
& Mohell 1990, 35-38). Their lives seem to more to resemble eventful paths from<br />
adventures to stages of marginalization (Kääriäinen 1994) rather than fast ways to great<br />
success. Some of the prisoners have the problems described above, but actually we do not know<br />
how common or accumulated these problems are among prisoners and whether the<br />
problems cause them insecurity or not. Furthermore, we do not know if these problems bother<br />
them and if they want to get away from them or not. Infact we do know that there are many<br />
strategies used by some of the prisoners to find ways out of the stage of marginalization (e.g.<br />
Kuure 1996), but it is unclear just how commonly used they are. It has been said that if<br />
prisoners try to live without crime they should be able to change their ways of thinking and<br />
behaving, which often may be dominated by the social meaning structures of prison which do<br />
not work outside of it (Ulvinen 1996). What do the Finnish male prisoners think about their<br />
ways of life control?<br />
Participants and methods<br />
The 259 prisoners who participated in the study (81% of the original sample of 320 prisoners),<br />
were interviewed using a comprehensive questionnaire. The questionnaire was based<br />
on the one used in the population reseach project mentioned above (Niemelä ed. 1991).<br />
Prisoners' answers about security as a value are compared with the answers of the 239 civilian<br />
Finnish men who participated in the population study of insecurity and coping in the years<br />
1991-1992. The questions about values were the same in both studies, prisoners' and civilians'<br />
and they were developed from the basis of the study of values made by Rokeach (1973).<br />
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NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
The prisoners' sample consisted of Finnish male prisoners from the provinces of Häme<br />
(f=130), Kuopio (f=84) and Vaasa (f=45) wh were serving their sentences in six closed<br />
institutions (provincial or central prisons). The youngest of the prisoners was 19 years old,<br />
and the oldest was 73 years old (mean=33.4 years, standard deviation 9.1 years). As there<br />
were only five prisoners over the age of 55 years, 54 was taken as a boarder line in both<br />
samples to make the groups more comparable. Therefore 17% of the prisoners were of an age<br />
between 18 and 24 years; 45% at an age between 25 and 34 years; 28% at an age between 35<br />
and 44 years; and 10% at an age between 45 and 54 years. The Prisoners' principal crimes<br />
were: robbery 10%, another crime against property 29%, violent crime 35%, drunken driving/traffic<br />
offence 18% and another crime 9% of the prisoners.<br />
The first sample of civilian men consisted of 239 men from the Province of Kuopio. A sample<br />
was taken from the broad research group, 3 266 people by using the criterion created according<br />
to certain variables (sex, age, marital status, basic training and socio-economical status)<br />
and their frequency among the sample of prisoners. The first sample of civilians was created<br />
according to the prisoners' numbers above: 17% (f=40) of the civilian participants were from<br />
18 to 24 years; 45% (f=108) from 25 to 34 years; 28% (f=68) from 35 to 44 years; and 10%<br />
(f=23) from 45 to 54 years. The second sample consisted of 2 019 men who took part into the<br />
population research project in 1991-1995. Their age varied from 18 to 54 years (18-24 years<br />
16%, 25-34 years 25%, 35-44 years 30% and 45-54 years 30%).<br />
About security and insecurity in the prisoners' life<br />
The prisoners were asked the question, "What things are included in a secure life?". Almost<br />
all of the participants, 91%, replied that human relationships are included in it. About half of<br />
the prisoners mentioned family or especially a spouse and children. Every fifth prisoner<br />
interviewed mentioned friends. Two-thirds of the prisoners said that sufficient livelihood, and<br />
half said that a residence are elements of a secure life. Also, half of the prisoners mentioned<br />
that health is a part of security. Thirty-nine per cent of the prisoners mentioned work, and<br />
about every fifth mentioned freedom. All of these things seem to be quite closely linked with<br />
our basic needs (cf. Doyal & Cough 1991). So, <strong>what</strong> does insecurity mean for them? Thirty<br />
per cent of prisoners answered that it means problems with your human relationships. Thirty<br />
per cent said that insecurity includes some health problems. Every fourth mentioned economical<br />
problems. Other examples include problems with residence (23% of the participants),<br />
uncertainty about one's future (22%), sense of fear (19%) and problems related to work -<br />
mostly the lack of it, unemployment (15%), were mentioned. It may be argued that many of<br />
these things can arise from problems in satisfying our basic needs. (See Kauppila 1997a.)<br />
One very important aspect of this study was to try to find out <strong>what</strong> is important in life for<br />
these people. According to the findings of the research, the central values releated to security,<br />
family security and own security, are highly valued - infact among the "top ten" in both of the<br />
research groups, prisoners' and civilians' (N=239). This supports the very idea of both this<br />
study and the broad population reseach project. Family security is important for 92% of<br />
prisoners and for 97% of civilians; own security is important for 88% of prisoners and for<br />
93% of civilians. The beginning of the value ranking list is fairly similar in both groups: freedom,<br />
health and true friendship or companionship come first. The greatest differences<br />
between the groups were in the importance of work, national security, unpolluted nature, and<br />
social respect. In general, all of these things seem clearly to be more important for the<br />
civilians than the prisoners. It seems that people prefer the things that are some way closely<br />
linked with their daily life. (See Kauppila 1997b.)<br />
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NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
What are the most common sources of insecurity among prisoners? Almost all of the<br />
prisoners said that the decrease in freedom, that people cannot decide about their own life, is a<br />
source of insecurity. In addition many things related to "environmental insecurity" - such as<br />
contamination of the nature, destruction of life, ozone depletion and the Greenhouse Effect -<br />
were among the ten most common causes of insecurity. These things were realtively highly<br />
rated among the civilian men too. There were also some social problems; peoples' disregard<br />
and violent crimes, as well as the reduction of social and health services, cutting unemployment<br />
benefits and amount of expences, that were very common sources of insecurity among<br />
prisoners. For example, in all, 57% of prisoners had been unemployed before being sent to<br />
prison. Infact all of the ten factors mentioned here caused more, and most of them much more,<br />
insecurity to the prisoners than to the civilians. The biggest differences were in the following<br />
factors: "bureaucracy", "amount of expences" and "people cannot decide about their own<br />
life". Do these differences tell us something about the differences in the living conditions<br />
and/or in the ways of living among these two groups of people?<br />
Table 1. The ten most common causes of insecurity among the prisoners as compared with<br />
the figures among the civilian men (%)<br />
___________________________________________________________________________<br />
Male prisoners Civilian men<br />
(N=259) (N=2019)<br />
[causes me great insecurity]<br />
Causes of insecurity:<br />
__________________________________________________________________________<br />
1. People cannot decide about their own life 93 [65] 54<br />
2. Contamination of nature 93 [54] 82<br />
3. Destruction of life 91 [60] 70<br />
4. Peoples' disregard for one and another 85 [47] 63<br />
5. Bureaucracy 83 [54] 34<br />
6. Violent crimes 83 [49] 62<br />
7. Reduction of social and health services 83 [42] 60<br />
8. Ozone depletion and the Greenhouse<br />
Effect 83 [41] 55<br />
9. Amount of expences 81 [48] 39<br />
10. Cuts in unemployment benefits 80 [51] 58<br />
___________________________________________________________________________<br />
In all there were 65 factors which caused insecurity for at least every second prisoner, and 22<br />
factors that caused insecurity for at least three out of four prisoners. Nineteen factors of these<br />
65 caused inseurity especially for at least 50% of the civilian, 18-54-year-old men, who took<br />
part into the population research project (N=2 019). There were only 24 things that caused<br />
insecurity for at least every second person of the civilian sample - both men and women - who<br />
took part into the population research project in 1991-1995 (N=6 784; see Niemelä & co.<br />
1997, 79). There were only two things among these 65 that caused more insecurity for the<br />
civilians than for the prisoners: "unemployment or losing one's job", which caused insecurity<br />
for 70% of civilian men; and "the situation in the former Soviet Union", which caused<br />
insecurity for 75% of civilian men. Among the prisoners the corresponding figures were 58%<br />
and 66%.<br />
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One aspect of life control and the future in the prisoners' eyes<br />
What we think about our - or any other quarters' - possibility to influence our own future can<br />
be seen as a part of our life control, a part of manageability in life (e.g. Järvikoski 1996, 45;<br />
Pietilä 1994, 21). Therefore the prisoners were asked how much they think that certain<br />
quarters, including themselves, have an influence on their future. Almost all of them - 98% -<br />
answered that oneself at least has a little influence on one's life, and 86% of<br />
Table 2. The quarters having influence on the prisoners´ own future (%)<br />
Quarters having influence on the prisoners´<br />
own future:<br />
166<br />
Not at all A little Great Sum N<br />
Prisoner himself 2 12 86 100 259<br />
Friends and companions (in civilian life)<br />
Family<br />
Coincidence<br />
Social situation in Finland<br />
World situation<br />
Authorities (in civilian life)<br />
God<br />
Relatives<br />
Beforehand ordained fate<br />
Fellow prisoners<br />
Prison personnel<br />
Neighbours (in civilian life)<br />
19<br />
25<br />
25<br />
29<br />
35<br />
38<br />
51<br />
53<br />
51<br />
63<br />
68<br />
69<br />
prisoners said that one has great influence on one's own future. Friends and family come next<br />
on this list. The influence of coincidence was also relatively highly ranked among the<br />
prisoners, and according to them, has more impact on their future than, for example, some<br />
authorities in civilian life. It is interesting to see that neighbours, persons that live next to you<br />
in civilian life; and prison personnel, persons that you cannot avoid meeting in prison, were<br />
not ranked highly.<br />
Some steps on the way to conclusions<br />
According to the preliminary findings of the research, security as a concept is closely linked<br />
to basic or central human needs. A secure life seemed to be consist of many social aspects,<br />
like human relationships, work and love. However, sufficient livelihood, residence and health<br />
also play a central role. Insecurity as a concept seems to imply problems with the satisfaction<br />
of human needs or some kind of uncertainty of the continuation of well-being. This result is<br />
also supported by the earlier studies among civilian people (e.g. Väisänen 1995, Niemelä<br />
1997). The prisoners' ideas of a secure life were in general more similar, i. e. with the same<br />
contents, as compared with their thoughts of insecurity. The aspects of insecurity varied a lot,<br />
and perhaps they more often stemmed from the basis of the participant's personal life<br />
experiences. Security is more like an ideal situation, an idea of a good life - insecurity reflects<br />
something about the reality people are living with and the problems they meet while trying to<br />
56<br />
35<br />
54<br />
42<br />
44<br />
44<br />
27<br />
37<br />
30<br />
34<br />
23<br />
27<br />
25<br />
40<br />
21<br />
29<br />
21<br />
18<br />
22<br />
10<br />
19<br />
3<br />
9<br />
4<br />
100<br />
100<br />
100<br />
100<br />
100<br />
100<br />
100<br />
100<br />
100<br />
100<br />
100<br />
100<br />
258<br />
255<br />
258<br />
258<br />
258<br />
255<br />
255<br />
258<br />
257<br />
259<br />
256<br />
258
NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
manage. Information on both of these is needed if our aim is to act constructively: ideals give<br />
us the aims to struggle for and reality shows us the obstacles we should to be able to remove.<br />
The central values linked to security, like family security and own security, are highly valued<br />
among prisoners and civilians. The prisoners seem to think that the things which are nearer<br />
them or their family, like freedom, health, family security and love, are more important than<br />
those linked with phenomena far removed from their daily life, such as world peace, national<br />
security - or even work - may be. Perhaps the differences here are also linked with the<br />
differences in their life conditions: certain values are more important to people partly because<br />
they might have more to lose if those particular things are or should be threatened.<br />
Traditionally work forms the most significant part of the daily activities in Finnish prisons.<br />
What is the effect on these activities if prisoners generally do not greatly appreciate work -<br />
i.e. the traditional forms of work that are available for them in real life in and outside prison?<br />
What does this mean from the point of view of managing in civilian life? However 39% of the<br />
prisoners said that work is included in a secure life. And there were many other more highly<br />
valued things among them. Perhaps we should think about, how to link the things they<br />
appreciate more with the constructive elements of activities like work; e.g. earning a living<br />
(even partly), having something meaningful to do and finding one's place in society without<br />
committing crimes. What could be the new legal and more constructive ways of selfrealization<br />
during the sentence, the ways that could continue of be useful after release?<br />
It can easily be seen within the answers of the prisoners that their autonomy has been<br />
threatened and limited during their life: for example decreasing freedom and bureaucracy are<br />
among the ten most common causes of insecurity. The threat of marginalization causes them<br />
insecurity in the form of peoples' disregard for one and another, reduction of social and health<br />
services, amount of living expences and cutting unemployment benefits. In comparison with<br />
the samples of civilian men it becomes prominent that in general prisoners feel much<br />
insecurity and to a greater degree in Finnish society. Instead of locking many doors of<br />
survival we should be able to open some more. Our right to take their freedom should<br />
increase our reponsibilty and duties to try to help them to keep their freedom after release.<br />
For the most part it is an extremely good thing to trust oneself in getting out of troubles. But<br />
trusting mostly only in oneself is not such a good thing. If one succeeds, there is only oneself<br />
to thank for it, but if one does not succeed, who is to blaim? Many of the prisoners underline<br />
that "everyone is the master of their own fortune". As a social worker in a Finnish prison I<br />
have met many "lonely riders" who have lost their lands, horses and <strong>what</strong>ever still remains of<br />
their self-respect in this way. Among the prisoners' it seems to be quite general to trust<br />
friends, companions and family too - the "unofficial" people near them - and less general to<br />
believe in professionals, authorities and prison personnel. But <strong>what</strong> if there are not so many<br />
friends or family members available or they already have quite a lot of problems of their own?<br />
It is a great challenge for both prisoners and people trying to help them to build a confidential<br />
and functional relationship. But who do you trust and <strong>what</strong> do you do if you really mostly<br />
believe that coincidence has such a great influence on your future anyway?<br />
It is obvious that the Cognitive Skills Training Program, other programs or any other means<br />
are needed to support peoples' control over their personal life - perhaps also in prison rather<br />
than just outside it. But it is worth remembering that everything in life is not just in our own<br />
hands. Life control is never only a question of individuals. There are always some meaningful<br />
others; community, society and so on, even coincidences, to be somehow taken into account.<br />
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NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Nowadays it seems to be impossible to manage totally alone, and it is to be hoped that we do<br />
not expect anyone to do so - whether having gone through some supportive programs or not.<br />
Instead we could consider, whether there is anything we have not tried yet, or have not tried<br />
enough, to be able to meet those problems constructively. Anyway it can be said that constructive<br />
solutions require willingness, abilities and rescourses to cooperate - from everyone<br />
involved.<br />
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julkaisuja E. Yhteiskuntatie teet 14. Kuopio 1994.<br />
Niemelä, P. & Kainulainen, S. & Laitinen, H. & Pääkkönen, J. & Rusanen, T. & Ryynänen,<br />
Widgrén, E. & Vornanen, R. & Väisänen, R. & Ylinen, S. Suomalainen turvatto<br />
muus. Inhimillisen turvattomuuden yleisyys, perusulottuvuudet ja tyypittely - haastattelu<br />
tutkimus 1990-luvun Suomessa. Sosiaali- ja terveysturvan keskusliitto, Sosiaaliturvan<br />
kirjalli<br />
suus. Hakapaino Oy, Helsinki 1997.<br />
Nuutila, A-M: "The Reform of Fundamental Rights and the Criminal Justice System in<br />
Finland". In: Acta Juridica Hungarica. 1996:37, no 3-4. Akademiai Kiado.303-<br />
314. Budapest 1996.<br />
Raitasalo, R.: Elämänhallinta sosiaalipolitiikan tavoitteena. Kansaneläkelaitos,<br />
Sosiaali-ja terveysturvan tutkimuksia 1. Kelan omatarvepaino, Helsinki 1995.<br />
Riihinen, O.: "Henkinen turvallisuus - haaste tulevaisuuden sosiaalipolitiikalle".<br />
Sosiaaliturvalehti no. 18, pp. 819-827. 1979.<br />
Rokeach, M.: The Nature of Human Values. The Free Press, New York 1973.<br />
Suhonen, P. & Suhonen, L.: Turvattomia suomalaisia. Tutkimus turvattomuuden<br />
kokemisesta.Rauhan ja konfliktintutkimuslaitos. Tutkimuksia n:o 4, 1973. Tampere 1973.<br />
Ulvinen, V-M.: Vankilaelämän kasvatukselliset alueet vankeinhoidon tavoitteiden<br />
kehyksessä -estettyjä kuvia? Acta Universitatis Ouluensis E Scientiae Rerum Socialium 22.<br />
Oulu: Oulun Yliopistopaino. 1996.<br />
Väisänen, R.: Työelämän turvattomuus, sen syyt ja hallintakeinot. Tutkimus ydinkeski-<br />
ikäisistä (45-54) työntekijöistä Kuopion läänissä. Kuopion yliopiston julkaisuja E.<br />
Yhteiskuntatieteet 28. Kuopio 1995.<br />
169
NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Gorm Gabrielsen, Lecturer<br />
Department of Management Science and Statistics, Copenhagen Business School<br />
Julius Thomsens Plads 10<br />
DK-1925 Frederiksberg C<br />
e-mail: stgg@cbs.dk<br />
and<br />
Peter Kramp, Head of Clinic of Forensic Psychiatry,<br />
Ministry of Justice<br />
Slotsholmsgade 10<br />
DK-1216 København K<br />
170<br />
The increasing number of forensic psychiatric<br />
patients in Denmark, 1980-96<br />
Causes and perspectives<br />
The number of forensic patients in Denmark has increased dramatically during the last 15<br />
years from 300 in 1980 to about 1000 today. In this presentation we shall try to explain why<br />
forensic psychiatry has become an exploding business.<br />
Section 16 of the Danish penal code states, that “Persons who at the time of the act, were<br />
irresponsible owing to mental illness or similar conditions or a pronounced mental deficiency,<br />
are not punishable”. The term “mental illness” is equivalent to the psychiatric term<br />
“psychosis”. Section 68 establishes, that measures other than punishment can be used against<br />
psychotic offenders, namely 1: placement in a psychiatric hospital, which means, that the<br />
offender cannot be discharged before a new court order. 2: Psychiatric treatment, where the<br />
offender is admitted to a psychiatric hospital or department, and it is then for the psychiatrist<br />
to discharge and if necessary - together with the probation office - readmit the patient. 3:<br />
Outpatient treatment. Section 69 of the penal code establishes, that psychiatric treatment<br />
sanctions can be used instead of punishment to non-psychotic but otherwise mentally<br />
abnormal offenders.<br />
Denmark, a small country with about 5 millions inhabitants, is administratively divided into<br />
15 counties. Each county is responsible for the total health-service to the inhabitants of the<br />
county including the forensic patients. All forensic patients are thus treated within the<br />
ordinary psychiatric treatment-system. In principal the forensic patients are looked upon as all<br />
other psychiatric patients. Some counties have special wards for some of these patients, but in<br />
several counties they are treated at ordinary wards together with non-criminal patients. The<br />
forensic patients are not registered in any special way by the counties, and consequently the<br />
authorities responsible for the treatment, do no know the numbers - perhaps do not want to<br />
know the numbers . However, almost all the forensic patients with a sanction of “psychiatric<br />
treatment” and “outpatient treatment” are under supervision by the Department of Prison and<br />
Probation too, Kramp and Gabrielsen, 1994. Patients with a “placement order”, who cannot<br />
be discharged, of course do not need a probation officer.The Department of Prison and
NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Probation has offices in every county, and with some minor unimportant exceptions, is the<br />
area served by the local office identical with the county. Each office reports monthly to the<br />
Department the number and type of clients under supervision - those with suspect sentences,<br />
prisoners released on parole, forensic patients and so on. In this way it is possible to count the<br />
number of forensic patients in each county month by month, i.e. the monthly prevalence of<br />
forensic patients in each county. This registration has taken place since 1977, and for the<br />
present analysis the material from 1980 is used to follow the development in prevalence of<br />
forensic patients. Patients with a placement order, most of them suffer from schizophrenia and<br />
have committed serious violent crime are not under supervision and therefore are not included<br />
in the present material. The number, however, is limited, around 80,(Lund,1997), which<br />
means that our figures are minimum figures covering a least 90% of the total number of<br />
forensic patients.<br />
In 1994 we looked at the development of the prevalence of forensic patients, figure 1, Kramp<br />
and Gabrielsen, 1994.<br />
The dotted line is the number of patients increasing from about 300 in 1980 to about 700 in<br />
1993. The smooth line is the statistical model showing an annual growth rate on 6.83%.From<br />
1980 until 1993, the growth exhibited an almost perfect exponential growth. Such a curve is a<br />
rarity within the social sciences; one expect exponential growth within biology or physics but<br />
never within the social sciences. This is due to the fact, that developments in social sciences<br />
are affected by feed back mechanisms. Nevertheless, to find an exponential growth curve in<br />
this case might be because the forensic patients form a rather small fraction of patients within<br />
the mental health care system, and thereby has not been noticed until now.<br />
Three years later in 1996 we repeated the study, Kramp and Gabrielsen,1996. We extrapolated<br />
the model with an annual growth rate on 6.83%, figure 2, and we inspected how reality - the<br />
number of patients - fitted the model, figure 3. As it appears from the figure the model fits<br />
almost perfect - the growth rate still seems to be 6.83%. It can be added that the prevalence of<br />
forensic patients is still growing - at the end of April 1998 the number has increased to 1068.<br />
One can add this last point to figure 3 and see that the model still fits.<br />
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Thus, the latest numbers of forensic patients still exhibit exponential growth and thereby<br />
support the hypothesis that some kind of mechanism generates this increase. It should be<br />
noted that the same trend has been seen in many other countries.<br />
In the following we shall discuss some possible answers to this increase in the prevalence of<br />
forensic patients.<br />
Figure 4 again shows the number of forensic patients and furthermore the crime rate per year<br />
in thousands (the counts of bicycle theft and shop lifting has been removed from the crime<br />
rate). From the figure it is seen that the increasing number of forensic patients by no means<br />
can be explained by the increasing crime rate. The number of offenses reported to the police<br />
has remained almost unchanged the last 10 years, the annual number being about 400000,<br />
however, the prevalence of forensic patients has doubled.<br />
For many years one has discussed “the criminalization of the mentally ill”, however, the<br />
opposite the “psychiatrization of the criminals” has also been put forward as an explanation -<br />
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that the penal system transfers more and more criminals, first of all the most troublesome, to<br />
the psychiatric system. Some years ago we investigated this hypothesis, Kramp,1993. Table 1<br />
shows the total number of forensic patients in 1987 and in 1991. As mentioned '16<br />
encompasses the psychotics, § 69 the non-psychotics. As already seen there is an increasing<br />
number of forensic cases - from 1987 to 1991, the number has increased by 26%. However, if<br />
one divides the patients into two groups, the psychotics and the non-psychotics, it is seen that<br />
there is a decrease in the number of forensic patients who do not suffer from psychoses, while<br />
the psychotics increase dramatically. If there should be any support of the “psychiatrization of<br />
the criminals” one should expect an increasing number of non-psychotics i.e. §69-patients,<br />
however, this has not happened, on the contrary - they are decreasing.<br />
Table 1. Forensic patients in 1987 and 1991<br />
Total<br />
§16<br />
1987<br />
521<br />
335<br />
§69<br />
186<br />
§16: Psychotic when committing the crime<br />
§69: The non-psychotics<br />
1991<br />
658<br />
538<br />
120<br />
Difference<br />
137 / 26%<br />
203 / 61%<br />
-66 / -35%<br />
The material consists only of the number of cases, and does not allow any diagnostic<br />
classification. However, there are various Danish studies about forensic patients including the<br />
diagnoses of the patients, Table 2 shows uniformly that the majority of the forensic patients<br />
were psychotics and around 50% suffered from schizophrenia. An unpublished cross-sectionstudy<br />
carried out by Jens Lund in Crhus from November 1997 shows a fraction of<br />
schizophrenia among §16-patients between 65% and 70%. In conclusion in Denmark at least,<br />
there has been no “psychiatrization of the criminals”, for sure the opposite - “criminalization<br />
of the mentally ill”, first and foremost the schizoprenics.<br />
Table 2. Forensic Patients in Denmark<br />
Forensic Patients, 01.01.70 - 31.12.78, Copenhagen County<br />
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n=103; psychotic; 73, of this 42 Schizophrenic; non-psychotic: 30<br />
Kofoed-Nielsen, H. and Odgaard, K: Kriminalpsykiatrisk Undersøgelse. Ufl 1983, 145, 1241 - 1245<br />
Forensic Patients < 30 years, 01.01.78 - 31.12.87, Copenhagen City<br />
n=87; psychotic; 71, of this 57 Schizophrenic; non-psychotic: 16<br />
Jørgensen, Eva F. m.fl.: Unge med behandlingsdom i København. Ufl 1993, 155, 3006-3009<br />
Forensic Patients, 01.06.87, whole country<br />
n=573; psychotic; 459, of this 282 Schizophrenic; non-psychotic: 114<br />
Lund, J.; Retspsykiatriske patienter. Ufl 1988, 150, 1209-1212<br />
Forensic Patients, 01.03.91, KAS Nordvang, dept. R<br />
n=38; psychotic; 32, of this 25 Schizophrenic; non-psychotic: 6<br />
Hasle, N-J and L.E. Eplov: Retspsykiatriske patienter - diagnose, kriminalitet og sanktion. Ufl 1994, 156, 4683 -<br />
4689<br />
Forensic Patients, 03.1.92, whole country<br />
n=690; psychotic; 521, of this 335 Schizophrenic; non-psychotic: 169<br />
Kramp, P.: Registerundersrgelsen, unpublished.<br />
Another explanation of the increasing prevalence of forensic patients could be that the<br />
duration of the sanctions stately increase. If so the constant input of new forensic patients,<br />
would cause an increasing prevalence, because the patients remain longer and longer in the<br />
system.<br />
In Denmark sentence to psychiatric treatment is time unlimited; the sanction is abolished by a<br />
court order. It has been argued that the prosecution for various reasons do not bring these<br />
cases for the court whereby the patients remain longer and longer in the system. There does<br />
not exist data which allows an examination of this possibility for the period 1980 to 1987, but<br />
from 1987 the monthly intake and discharge of patients for each county is known. Figure 5<br />
shows the yearly intake for the whole country for the years 1989 to 1995 and correspondingly<br />
figure 6 shows the yearly discharge of forensic patients for the same years. The intake rate, or<br />
the incident rate, is estimated to 4.3% per year and the discharge rate to 4.3% per year. These<br />
two rates being equal supports the hypothesis that the duration of sanctions has been stabled<br />
during the considered years. The average duration of a sanction can be estimated to around 4<br />
years, so the considered period is in the shortest to cash up any change in duration time. On<br />
the other hand the pictures give no support to any hypothesis of an increasing duration time of<br />
sanctions.<br />
Recently it has been argued by Olsen and Ravn ,1998, that this argument does not hold.<br />
However, the arguments of Olsen and Ravn are in the authors point of view incorrect. As this<br />
discussion is very technical it is omitted from the present paper and interested can look it up<br />
in Gabrielsen,1998. In conclusion there is no support for the hypothesis that an increasing<br />
number of forensic patients can be explained by an increasing duration time of the sanctions.<br />
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Finally, the reduction in the number of psychiatric beds could be a possible explanation of the<br />
increasing criminality among the mentally ill. As mentioned earlier it is possible to collect<br />
monthly data on the number of forensic patients in each county from 1980 until 1997.<br />
Furthermore, it is possible to collect data on the number of disposable psychiatric beds in each<br />
county. Also it is possible to obtain the number of occupied beds, i.e. the number of consumed<br />
beds. These numbers are received from The Institute of Psychiatric Demography in Aarhus.<br />
During the period 1980 to 1997 a dramatic change has taken place in the mental health care<br />
system. Back in the 1980 we still had the large mental hospitals, whose patients were not only<br />
from the local county, but also from the neighbour-counties. During two decades the mental<br />
health care system has been reorganized into community mental health care and social support<br />
to psychiatric patients. In Denmark a substantial part of this reorganization has consisted in a<br />
transfer of resources from the large mental hospitals into community mental health care. The<br />
reorganization implied or included a close down of psychiatric beds in the order of 55%.<br />
However, a reorganization of a naturally grown system adapted to the increasing need of<br />
mental health care into a “from above” planned system of local community health care, does<br />
not take place without expenses. The needs from the real world seldomly fits into the planed<br />
needs. Thus, a radical reorganization should be expected to be reflected within different areas<br />
of the mental health care.<br />
However, the speed of the reorganization of the mental health care system differed between<br />
the counties. This gives us an opportunity to consider the reorganization as a quasi<br />
experimental setting, in which the counties are the experimental units and “the speed of<br />
reorganization” is the intervention and the growth rate of forensic patients is the outcome.<br />
It should noted that from 1980 until today which is the study period, there has been no<br />
changes <strong>what</strong> so ever concerning the Danish registration of mentally abnormal offenders;<br />
there has been no changes in diagnostic criteria used by forensic psychiatrists; no changes in<br />
how the prosecution administrates the rules of mental abnormal criminals and no changes in<br />
other part of the system dealing with forensic patients. The fact, that the whole system has<br />
remained unchanged in our study period, is of course very important, because new legislation<br />
or other changes could influence the number of patients. Furthermore, the Penal code is the<br />
same for the whole country covering all 15 counties, and as previously mentioned, the<br />
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Department of Prison and Probation which cover the whole country, registers nearly all the<br />
forensic psychiatric patients. On the other hand the counties have a high degree of autonomy<br />
concerning allocation of resources. There might be a high degree of dissimilarity between the<br />
counties concerning resources allocated to the large mental hospitals versus the local<br />
community mental health care and thereby a high degree of dissimilarity in the speed with<br />
which the single county reorganizes the mental health care system from large mental hospitals<br />
into local community mental health care.<br />
Figure 7 shows for county 15 the number of disposable beds, the number of used or consumed<br />
beds and the number of forensic patients for the years 1980 to 1997. This is typical curves for<br />
a county - a decreasing number of psychiatric beds and a decreasing number of consumed<br />
beds - but around 1990 the number of consumed bed stops to decrease and in several counties<br />
one even sees a slight increase - in spite of the decrease in disposable beds. When the number<br />
of consumed beds crosses the number of disposable beds, overcrowding occurs. And we have<br />
had overcrowding at nearly all psychiatric wards in Denmark the latest years.<br />
Figure 8 shows for the whole country the number of disposable beds and the number of<br />
consumed beds. In the beginning of 1990 the decrease in the number of consumed beds fades<br />
out and from 1992, there has been an increasing overcrowding in the mental hospitals; today<br />
in average around 10%.<br />
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In order to prove the postulate, that the decreasing number of psychiatric beds is the cause of<br />
the increasing number of forensic patients we have disaggregated the number of forensic<br />
patients and the number of consumed beds to the level of counties. Figure 9 shows for another<br />
county, Aarhus county, the number of disposable beds, the number of consumed beds and the<br />
number of forensic patients. It is seen that the number of consumed beds is not decreasing<br />
with the same (negative) growth rate as in county 15 and similarly the number of forensic<br />
patients are not increasing with the same growth rate in the two counties.<br />
For the statistical analysis therefore, two growth rates for each county are calculated - the<br />
(negative) growth rate of consumed beds and the growth rates of the prevalence of forensic<br />
patients from 1980 until today. In figure 10 the growth rates of forensic patients are plotted<br />
against the (negative) growth rates of consumed beds. Furthermore, an estimated line is<br />
added, the slope of this line being significantly different from zero , p=0.05. This means, that -<br />
in a county - when the number of consumed beds decreases rapidly, the number of forensic<br />
psychiatric patients increases rapidly.<br />
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Without going into details concerning the statistical analysis it can be mentioned that the<br />
analysis is carried out as a multi level analysis so that the hypothesis of the slope of the<br />
regression line being zero is tested against the between-county variation.<br />
Conclusion<br />
In Denmark the number of forensic patients has tripled in the period 1980-1997 - from 300 to<br />
1000. The reason for this very serious development cannot be found in changes of the<br />
registration of mental abnormal offenders, or changes in clinical practise or changes in the<br />
administration of the rules, or changes in the crime rate. The main reason seems to be the<br />
reorganization of the mental health care from mental hospitals into local community health<br />
care and thereby the closure of 4000 psychiatric beds. This study does not tell anything about<br />
whether the reorganization of the mental health care system has been of any benefit for some<br />
of the patients to the mental health care system. It tells that a reorganization of a natural<br />
grown system adapted to the increasing need of mental health care into a “from above”<br />
planned system of local community health care does not take place without expenses. This<br />
study shows that the most serious ill, the schizophrenics, seems to be some of the loosers in<br />
this reorganization.<br />
References<br />
Gabrielsen,G.: Increasing number of forensic psychiatric patients. A comment. To appear.<br />
1998.<br />
178
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Kramp,P.: ‘Psykotiske lovovertrædere: Kriminalitetsudvikling og behandlingsstruktur.’ I:<br />
Månedsskrift for praktisk lægegerning, 71-1993, s. 17-23.<br />
Kramp,P. & G. Gabrielsen: ‘Tilsynsklienter idømt psykiatriske særforanstaltninger’. I:<br />
Nordisk Tidsskrift for Kriminalvidnskab, 81-1994, s. 4.<br />
Kramp,P. & G. Gabrielsen, (1994): ‘Antallet af psykiske syge kriminelle fordoblet på ti år’. I:<br />
Nyt fra kriminalforsorgen. Nr. 5-1996.<br />
Lund,J.: Personal communication,1997.<br />
Olsen,J. & L. Ravn: ‘Mere statistik om psykisk syge tilsynsklienter’. I: Kriminalistisk årbog<br />
1997. Københavns Universitet, 1998.<br />
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Mårten Landahl, BSocSs (Criminology)<br />
Henriksdalsringen 1<br />
S-131 32 Nacka<br />
e-mail: info@crimiknowledge.a.se<br />
180<br />
<strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> and Criminological Theory<br />
Introduction<br />
Over the last two hundred years, numerous theories has been presented as the only, or at least<br />
the principal, explanation of crime and/or criminality. Although these theories pinpointing<br />
one or a few factors are scientifically important, their use for the practitioner interested in the<br />
prevention and control of crime is some<strong>what</strong> limited. For the practitioner (eg administrators<br />
and CP-coordinators) these theories have little to offer since most individual theories reflects<br />
only a fraction of the everyday reality faced by the practitioner, so (if even the experts can’t<br />
agree about <strong>what</strong> the problem is, or on <strong>what</strong> to do about it) why bother with theory?<br />
Yet a theoretically founded strategy for intervention is of crucial importance, since there is no<br />
other way to develop consistent and efficient techniques to reduce criminal victimization.<br />
The crime prevention practitioner needs a conceptual framework in which important key<br />
elements of disparate theories can be brought together and integrated in a model to facilitate<br />
the understanding of crime and the planning of crime prevention initiatives and to improve<br />
the understanding of;<br />
a) Where (in the causal chain from societal and individual background factors, to<br />
the criminal opportunity that) a specific crime prevention initiative is directed?<br />
b) Is the proposed initiative proximal or distant to the criminogenic situation.<br />
c) If it is reasonable to assume that the plan will work, and<br />
d) How changes in Society will affect the type, number and distribution of<br />
criminal events.<br />
In this paper I will outline such a model. I have attempted to integrate <strong>what</strong> I consider to be<br />
key concepts of interesting theories of crime and criminality. I have worked backwards, from<br />
the criminal event, through the situation in which it occurred, more and less proximal<br />
background factors and on to the composition and structure of society. The model is however<br />
presented in the traditional fashion beginning with theories of society and human nature and<br />
ending with the decision-making of individual offenders (figures 1-6).<br />
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate how one (of several possible) such integrations can be<br />
construed. I will also briefly discuss the implications of the model for crime prevention.<br />
1. A multi-level model<br />
The model can be divided into four “level boxes” preceding the actual (criminal)event (figure<br />
1). These boxes are overlapping since levels on the makro-micro scale are some<strong>what</strong> floating.<br />
The contents of each of the “level boxes” is presented as mutually exclusive concepts, one<br />
figure (2-5) for each of the four “level boxes”, and as the complete model (figure 6).
NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Figure 1 A Multi-level Model<br />
Structural base<br />
The Socialization<br />
process<br />
Motivational and<br />
situational drives<br />
The Decisionmaking<br />
process<br />
Event<br />
1.1.1 Societal organization<br />
The basic assumption of the model is that macro-level societal factors such as economic and<br />
political system, religious life and degree of Industrialization and urbanization, predetermine<br />
three important aspects influencing human behavior. First; underlying societal factors<br />
strongly influence biological and social characteristics of the population such as the age<br />
structure, the number and survival rate of children and the social desirability of having<br />
children of a certain sex. It also determines the parenting and child raising practices and<br />
associated features. Second; the degree of Communitarism of neighborhoods, of extended<br />
families and between individuals and institutions. Third; the type and kind of media coverage<br />
of different events are given as well as <strong>what</strong> type and kind of individuals are exposed to<br />
coverage of particular news and views.<br />
1.1.2 Population Characteristics<br />
Most people will agree that societal organization determinates, to a great extent, the<br />
characteristics of the population. Not only in the society as a whole (eg number of children<br />
and age structure) but that it also, through segregation, affects the characteristics of the people<br />
that will live in the individual communities.<br />
Tradition, religion, social service and pension benefits, and degree of labor-intensive<br />
agriculture plays interrelated and important roles in explaining eg. birth frequency,<br />
educational structure and other important differences in population character. In countries like<br />
India and China, the social desirability of children of a certain (eg. male) sex combined with<br />
modern methods of fetus diagnosis, leads to a decrease in the birth rate of the less desired sex<br />
which affects the population characteristics of those societies.<br />
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Figure 2 Structural Base of the Model<br />
1.1.3 Communitarism<br />
”The more weakened the groups to which (the individual) belongs, the less he depends on<br />
them, the more he consequently depends only on himself and recognizes no other rules of<br />
conduct than <strong>what</strong> are founded on his private interest.” (Durkheim: Suicide, quoted in Hirschi<br />
1974 p.16). In modern society, the concept of group must include the social structures of the<br />
area of residence.<br />
”Communitarism is a condition of societies. In communitarian societies individuals are<br />
densely enmeshed in interdependencies which have the special qualities of mutual help and<br />
trust. The interdependencies have symbolic significance in the culture or group loyalties<br />
which take precedence over individual interests. The interdependencies also have symbolic<br />
significance as attachments which invoke personal obligation to others in a community of<br />
concern, rather than simply interdependencies of convenience as between a bank and a small<br />
depositor.” (Braithwaite 1984 p.100) Braithwaite describes Communitarism as a condition of<br />
societies, which seems to be rather static in a given society and differ only between societies.<br />
In this model, however, the degree of Communitarism differs not only between societies but<br />
also between communities. Communities are seen as subject to variations caused by<br />
differences in government presence and policies in different neighborhoods (eg social service<br />
and policing practices). With this adaption the concept of Communitarism is included in the<br />
model.<br />
The level of communitarism influences, and is influenced by, individual social learning<br />
processes, and the population characteristics of a community .<br />
1.1.4 Media influence<br />
The influence of media (such as papyrus rolls, television or internet) can be understood in<br />
terms of the faith or credibility placed in a specific type, agent or publisher by consumers, the<br />
differential exposure to news and views in individuals and communities, and the social<br />
importance of singular media events which is closely linked to the total measure of media<br />
supply potential. For reasons of simplicity I will restrict the examples to the medium<br />
television. The same basic assumptions can be transposed to any kind of media.<br />
When the media supply potential is virtually unlimited (as in cable TV) the relative credibility<br />
(of television in general, as well as of eg a television news anchor) is diminished due to<br />
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competing and non coherent priorities attributed to different news and views , or in other<br />
words, differences in casting policy. A recent study of the <strong>Crime</strong> content in the three major<br />
Swedish television news programs shows that one network showed more than 3 times the<br />
amount of crime news reaching the viewers of the program showing the least crime (3.1, 4,1<br />
and 9,4 % of total news air time respectively) (Johnson 1995).<br />
The number of people exposed to a particular media is dependent on a combination of media<br />
supply potential and personal or peer or primary group preferences. The social importance of<br />
media reflects the degree in which media output is a focal concern in everyday life. In<br />
Sweden, with two television channels in the early 1980s yesterdays TV was a natural subject<br />
for discussion, eg. around the coffe-table at work, which gave broadcast consumption a social<br />
value. Today, a massive increase in media supply potential has diminished the social<br />
importance of watching television since only a minority is likely to have seen the same<br />
programs, there is no common ground for discussion. At the same time as credibility and<br />
social importance, and exposure to particular television channels is diminishing, exposure (in<br />
daily viewed minutes per capita) to television in general has increased 33.6 % from 104<br />
minutes in the fiscal year 1982/83 when two channels were operating, parallel with a massive<br />
increase in radio and television media supply potential to 139 minutes in 1994 when 60 %<br />
have cable. (figures from Westrell, personal com.)<br />
Figure 3 The Socialization Process<br />
1.2.1 The Social Learning process<br />
In its basic form Social Learning Theory stipulated that all behavior is learned and that<br />
learning of social behaviors occurs through face-to-face interaction. Hence, the impact of the<br />
composition of the neighborhood (population characteristics) is obvious. The neighborhood<br />
level of Communitarism is of crucial importance to the socialization process. Consider, as an<br />
example, life in a small town with a butcher, a grocer, small shops where you stay and chat<br />
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for a while, and a limited number of people. Most people in such a town will know each<br />
other, at least by appearance, and will react to harmful behaviors exercised by others thus<br />
rendering a high level of informal social control. In such a community it is more likely that<br />
damages to the socialization process caused by deprived or outright dreadful home<br />
circumstances and/or parenting practice will be reduced trough the social network, than in the<br />
impersonalized social and shopping environments of our great cities. The social learning<br />
process affects, and is affected by, the level of communitarism in the community.<br />
We now expand the concept of social learning process to include observational learning, and<br />
media influence. The point of departure is the fact that most behavior is learned by<br />
observation, often in absence of external reinforcements. ”Humans have evolved an advanced<br />
capacity for observational learning that enables them to expand their knowledge and skills on<br />
the basis of information conveyed by modeling influences, indeed, virtually all learning<br />
phenomena resulting from direct experience can occur vicariously by observing people’s<br />
behavior and its consequences for them.” (Bandura 1989, quoted in Hjelle & Ziegler 1992<br />
p.337).<br />
A long-lasting prejudice in theories of the behavioral sciences is that significant others (those<br />
from which behaviors, attitudes and motivations are most likely to be learned) are exclusively<br />
to be found among family and friends. As any parent knows, this is not true. In the ’Canadian<br />
Peer Study’ schoolchildren were asked to write the names of their friends. As the pupils<br />
behavior was monitored, the study showed that the pupils were much more likely to model<br />
their behaviors after persons they unilaterally rated as friends, than after persons who they<br />
rated and were rated by as friends (McCord, personal com.). It is obvious that a one-sided<br />
friendship (from A to B) must be much stronger to last for any duration of time, than a<br />
reciprocal one. Thus, idols are indeed significant others. This is well known among the<br />
market/advertisement psychologist’s and can be expressed thus;(role)”Models who appear<br />
high in competence, who are alleged experts, or who are celebrities or superstars are likely to<br />
command greater attention than models lack these attributes. Advertisers of everything from<br />
footwear to feminine products capitalize on this idea, utilizing television personalities,<br />
athletic superstars, and financial wizards to hawk their products. Other variables that are<br />
especially important at this stage are the observer’s own, preexisting capabilities and<br />
motives.”/.../”Essentially, any set of characteristics that causes a model to be perceived as<br />
intrinsically rewarding for prolonged periods of time increases the probability of more careful<br />
attention to the model, and, consequently, the probability of modeling.” (Hjelle & Ziegler<br />
1992 p.345).<br />
In 1986 Bandura showed that when our attention is directed to a model, positive incentives do<br />
not enhance observational learning. ”This is supported by research showing that children who<br />
watched a model on television in a room darkened to minimize distractions later displayed the<br />
same amount of imitative learning regardless of whether they were told in advance that such<br />
imitations would be rewarded or were given no prior incentives to learn the modeled<br />
performances.”(Hjelle & Ziegler 1992 p.347).<br />
Key factors in determining media impact on the individual social learning process are; apart<br />
from that individual’s social circumstances, the exposure to different media content, the<br />
degree of credibility he or she attributes to it, and the social importance of the received<br />
information content in the contemporary culture. A Massive media supply potential tends to<br />
increase exposure to favored types of media content, while, at the same time diminishing its<br />
credibility and social importance in particular beyond the immediate group of peers.<br />
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The characteristics of the population and the degree of communitarianism, in combination<br />
with the media influence causes differences in the statistical distribution of outcomes of the<br />
social learning process.<br />
Conscience, aspirations and lifestyle preferences is one important result of the social learning<br />
process.<br />
1.2.2 Conscience<br />
In this model, conscience is defined as a set of internalized values in which the individual<br />
truly believes. To their nature they can be pro-social, asocial or anti-social, or anything in<br />
between. The question we pass on to the Propensity box is, as Hirschi put it; ”Why does a<br />
man violate the rules in which he believes?” It is not ”Why do men differ in their beliefs<br />
about <strong>what</strong> constitutes good and desirable conduct ” (1974 p.23).<br />
If a criminal event occurs while the offender exercises <strong>what</strong> he or she truly believes to be<br />
good and desirable conduct, the cause is either a cultural conflict (as between a totalitarian<br />
regime and dissidents, or between incompatible majority and minority cultures) due to<br />
different outcomes of the social learning process, or differences in the perception or<br />
interpretation of reality caused by mental illness.<br />
Conscience is regarded as a direct result, determined by the social learning process, with no<br />
interference other than those stemming from biological differences in the capacity or<br />
functioning of the nervous system.<br />
1.2.3 Strain<br />
Strain can be defined as the discrepancy between an individuals goals and desires in life and<br />
his or her perceived prospects of reaching these goals in a lawful manner.<br />
Since the mid 1800s when books of fiction begun to be increasingly available to members of<br />
the middle and lower classes, and in particular with the television revolution during the last<br />
generation, images and models of carefree life, as well as deviant lifestyles, has become<br />
available to the general public like in no other time in history. This causes a general raise of<br />
aspirations in the population, some more realistic, some less. It also displays criminal role<br />
models and rationalizations for criminal conduct, thus suggesting alternative lifestyle and<br />
(criminal)career opportunities. There is no such things as ’universal success goals’, but<br />
individual success goals tend to move in one general direction.<br />
”The increased stress on achievement norms inflate the expectations and aspirations of the<br />
lower-class adolescent. At the same time, it limits the career opportunities available to him,<br />
demanding levels of education which he experiences special disadvantages in attaining. In<br />
addition, he finds that the career possibilities for which he is qualified have become<br />
excessively competitive, so that discriminatory criteria are covertly applied. Under such<br />
conditions he is inclined to locate the source of his troubles in the social system rather than in<br />
his own shortcomings. His sense of injustice encourages him to withdraw sentiments<br />
attributing legitimacy to the dominant social order and to search for a more efficient means to<br />
achieve his aspirations.”(Cloward & Ohlin 1960 p.1121),<br />
When individual success goals are not met, there are two possible alternatives. Either failure<br />
is attributed to oneself, and goals modified to become more realistic or eg education<br />
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improved, or the failure is attributed to society (or to discrimination) which results in the<br />
individual questioning the legitimacy of system thereby reducing his sentiment.<br />
”The democratic ideology of equality of opportunity creates constant pressure for formal<br />
criteria of evaluation that are universalistic rather than particularistic, achieved rather than<br />
ascribed-that is, for a structure of opportunities that are available to all on an open<br />
competitive basis rather than the proprietory right of a select group and that are achieved by<br />
one’s own effort rather than acquired by the mere fact of birth into a particular race, religion,<br />
social class or family.”(ibid p.119). ”Yet there are often significant discrepancies between the<br />
criteria which should and those which do control social evaluations. Even in a democratic<br />
society, for example, where the dominant ideology stresses criteria based on social equality,<br />
talent, skill, knowledge, and achivement, many competitive selections and judgments take<br />
account of such nonuniversalistic criteria as race, religion, family prestige, wealth, social<br />
class, and personal friendship.”(ibid p.115)<br />
The level of strain a person perceives has effects on his choice of routine activities and<br />
lifestyle as well as on his long-term crime potential or Propensity.<br />
1.3.1 Propensity<br />
The individual’s propensity to make criminal choices is a combination of the degree of selfcontrol<br />
that the individual is able to exercise, and, his or her readiness to utilize<br />
rationalization techniques for self-justification of criminal behavior.<br />
Individual propensity is the grand total of a persons conscience and the strain under which he<br />
or she lives. An individuals propensity to commit crimes does change over time, but is<br />
relatively stable in relation to others of the same age cohort.<br />
Gottfredson & Hirschi (1990) ascribe stable individual differences in criminal behavior to<br />
self-control (p.87). They mention six elements of self-control, of which four are either<br />
irrelevant or subcomponents to the two remaining, that low self-control facilitates immediate<br />
and simple gratification of needs and desires.<br />
Rationalization techniques are self-justifications for breaking the rules that;”is based on <strong>what</strong><br />
is essentially an unrecognized extension of defenses to crimes, in the form of justifications for<br />
deviance that are seen as valid by the delinquent but not by the legal system or society at<br />
large.”(Sykes & Matza 1957 p.666)<br />
Rationalization precedes deviant behavior, thus making it possible. A person with a low level<br />
of self-control and a high readiness to apply neutralization techniques will have a very high<br />
propensity to make criminal choices. However, we should note that this box of the model<br />
presupposes that;”If the deviant is committed to a value system different from that of<br />
conventional society, there is, within the context of the theory, (this box) nothing to explain.”<br />
(Hirschi 1974 p.23).<br />
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Figure 4 Motivational and Situational Drives<br />
1.3.2 Routine Activities versus Lifestyle<br />
Routine activity is influenced by the level of strain, and in part by the propensity to pursue<br />
immediate satisfaction of desires, which is closely linked to the propensity to make criminal<br />
choices. The level of self-control (or ability to delay or divert gratification) plays an impotent<br />
part in explaining <strong>what</strong> kind of lifestyle, as well as <strong>what</strong> kind of activities a person, regardless<br />
of lifestyle, is likely to carry out.<br />
Routine activity is defined as any activity repeated with some regularity. Driving a car is a<br />
routine activity, being involved in a car crash is not. Usual routine activities are working,<br />
commuting, sleeping, watching television, dining out, etcetera. The reason for including <strong>what</strong><br />
some would label a ’non-activity’, sleeping in the concept is it being the best example of the<br />
observation that;”The assumption, widely shared, is that a person can be simply too busy<br />
doing conventional things to find time to engage in deviant behavior.”(Hirschi 1974 p.22)<br />
In contrast, lifestyle is a set of personal preferences that effect the qualitative content of<br />
routine activities, home furnishing style etcetera. Going to a bar, or to the cinema is a routine<br />
activity, as opposed to the the choice of <strong>what</strong> to wear, choice of bar/film to see, or who to go<br />
with, and individual interaction pattern on the selected location(s) which are expressions of<br />
lifestyle. An individual involved in a lifestyle that also attracts crime-prone individuals is<br />
more exposed to crime opportunities than other individuals, and therefore more likely to<br />
commit crimes as well as to be victimized by others.<br />
Routine activity and lifestyle strongly influence the creation of situations in which the<br />
individual finds herself/himself.<br />
1.3.3 Situation<br />
The lifestyle and routine activities of the individual has a strong impact on the situations in<br />
which the individual finds himself. This model’s concept of situation has been strongly<br />
influenced by Ekblom (1994).<br />
A situation consists of a) a place, b) the presence or absence of at least one potential offender<br />
and a crime target (object or person), and c) of modulators.<br />
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The environment of a place consists of two main components, the logistic (physical)<br />
environment that facilitates or obstructs the perpetrator’s ability to commit a crime or<br />
modulator’s ability to alter the event, and factors in the (psychological/emotional)<br />
environment that affect the motivation of perpetrator or modulators.<br />
The crime target is described in terms of its desirability and/or provocability. If the target can<br />
defend itself (eg by hitting back or in case of a car, by being equipped with an alarm) that<br />
aspect of the target is considered to be a modulator. Modulators are persons or objects that<br />
influence the environment, the target or the potential perpetrator in a way affecting the<br />
probability of a criminal event.<br />
Particulars of the situation influences motivation, the perceived level of frictions and<br />
temptations, and, the perceived risk of punishment and/or detection.<br />
1.3.4 Motivation<br />
Motivation is the result of interaction between the baseline propensity, the cognitive cues in a<br />
particular situation, and the wood-bee offenders present mood, presence or absence of<br />
intoxication and other short-term conditions affecting the current perceptual and emotional<br />
state of the individual.<br />
The current motivational state, or short-term crime potential, is an important factor<br />
influencing the individual’s perception and interpretation of the frictions and temptations of<br />
life.<br />
1.4.1 Frictions and Temptations<br />
The perception of frictions and temptations is closely linked to the current motivational state<br />
and to the particulars of a situation.<br />
Frictions are situations causing feelings of wrath or anger towards a person or an object such<br />
as symbols for something the person dislikes (eg election posters or symbols for a ’hostile’<br />
football team). A temptation can be defined as a potential crime target that is attractive to the<br />
potential perpetrator.<br />
Changes in emotional and cognitive states caused by sudden bursts of desire or anger affect<br />
the perception of risk and thus the decision-making process.<br />
1.4.2 Perceptions of Risk and Deterrence<br />
The individual’s perception of the risk for detection and/or severity of punishment is<br />
determined by the particulars of the situation and his/her present perception of frictions and<br />
temptations caused by the recent emotional and cognitive state combined with <strong>what</strong> Stafford<br />
& Warr conceptualize as experiences of punishment and punishment avoidance. (Stafford &<br />
Warr 1993). Such experiences can be personal (direct) or indirect, that is, through the<br />
experiences of friends, by reputation or of others about whom the decision-maker has some<br />
knowledge. The experiences are not only about punishment, but also about successful<br />
strategies to avoid detection and/or punishment.<br />
The individual’s perception of risk is an important part of the decision-making process.<br />
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Figure 5 The decision-Making Process<br />
1.4.3 Decision-Making and the Concept of a Limited Rational Choice<br />
The model stipulates that perceived risk of punishment and detection combined with<br />
perceived levels of temptations and frictions are powerful influences in the decision-making<br />
process.<br />
Criminals as decision-makers is not an uncontroversial subject in the field of Criminology. Is<br />
it reasonable to assume that,”For example, an individual contemplating breaking into a<br />
warehouse will estimate the probability that he or she will be apprehended (e.g., as .25), the<br />
possible gains and punishments to be achieved, and the levels of satisfaction that will be<br />
gained from the break-in if he or she is not apprehended (e.g., the utility of gaining $500) or is<br />
apprehended (e.g., the utility of gaining $500 and receiving a $700 fine)/.../To continue our<br />
example, the individual would make the following calculation:<br />
EU=.75 u(x° + $500) + .25 u(x° - $700), (9.1)<br />
where u is a function that converts dollars into levels of satisfaction, and x° is the individual’s<br />
initial wealth. The individual will commit the criminal act if his or her expected utility, as<br />
calculated above, is higher by doing so than by not doing so. (example from Lattimore &<br />
Witte 1986 who don’t believe so either)<br />
This level of elaboration is, in view of our knowledge of crimes and criminals, unbelievable,<br />
yet the ”assumption that rewards and punishments influence our choices between different<br />
courses of action underlies much economic, sociological, psychological, and legal thinking<br />
about human action. ”(Cornish & Clarke 1986 p.V). The notion of a reasoning criminal, who<br />
employs the same sorts of cognitive strategies when contemplating offending as he and the<br />
rest of us utilize in other respects, ought not to be strange.<br />
The solution to the problem is the introduction of a concept of limited rational choice.<br />
”Rationality is not about meaning, but about instrumental achivement.” (Niggli 1994 p.85).<br />
”From this it follows that applying RCT does not inevitably require a view of (individual)<br />
offenders as thoughtful and intellectually sophisticated,...”(ibid p.84).<br />
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When making choices people do not, generally, use all the information available to them.<br />
People tend to use information that is consistent with <strong>what</strong> they believe (cognitive dissonance<br />
theory), easy accessible and readily available.<br />
I believe Niggli sums up the limited rational choice concept quite well as he writes;”Given<br />
the individual level and the ’limited’ character of rational calculus, concrete, short-term<br />
factors should be more important in utility calculations than abstract, general factors. For the<br />
rationally acting individual therefore the severity of sanctions is meaningless if there is only a<br />
small risk of detection or capture, since the severity of sanctions does not really address the<br />
individual but rather applies to the general societal level. (Ibid p.91f)<br />
The result of the limited rational choice process is the decision to commit a criminal act, or to<br />
choose another course of action.<br />
Figure 6 A Model Framework of Integrated Key Concepts of Criminological Theories<br />
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2. Offender Awareness Space and <strong>Crime</strong> Occurrence<br />
To commit a criminal act is a source of stress for the offender. There is (also in situations<br />
favorable to criminal outcomes) always an element of uncertainty (<strong>what</strong> if the public<br />
interferes, the police show up etcetera). Offenders will commit most of their crimes in areas<br />
that are well known to them in order to limit the risks and increase their personal safety (it’s<br />
always good to know <strong>what</strong>’s behind the next corner). The physical as well as psychological<br />
qualities of the area is important for the offenders feeling of security and control.<br />
The areas about which most knowledge is available are those in which the potential offender<br />
spends most of his time, eg the present or former area of residence, work, shopping and<br />
entertainment areas which are visited often. These areas are called the Activity Space of the<br />
individual. (fig a)<br />
Figure from Brantingham & Brantingham 1984 p 353<br />
The concept of Awareness Space includes the individual’s Activity Space and an area around<br />
and between the everyday Activity Space, which is well known to the individual and the area<br />
that is seen from the transit links (roads, buses) that are used for transportation between the<br />
areas of activity (fig b) (Brantingham & Brantingham 1984).<br />
The offender is likely to commit his crimes within his Awareness Space, but not too close to<br />
his home or other places where he might be recognized and subjected to formal or informal<br />
sanctions. The area should be well known to the offender, but he/she should not be easily<br />
identified.<br />
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Further, for a criminal event to occur the awareness space of the individual and criminal<br />
opportunities that are attractive to the potential offender must coincide at such a time and<br />
place where the offender is present (Brantingham & Brantingham 1984).<br />
192<br />
Figure from Brantingham & Brantingham 1984 p 362<br />
This means that crimes are most likely to occur in such places that has a sufficient number of<br />
potential crime targets, that is not crowded or well-kept, and that are within the awareness<br />
space of the potential offender, but not in his/her own block due to lack of anonymity.<br />
3.1 Implications for <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> Strategy<br />
“The criminal event is usually taken to be a single episode. However, in reality, it is far more<br />
like a dynamic process. There are two ways in which this aspect can be captured.. First, the<br />
possibility that the offender, the target and the environment repeatedly combine to produce a<br />
succession of similar events, as with domestic disputes or racial harassment, should be<br />
allowed for. Second, even <strong>what</strong> for legal or administrative purposes may be regarded as a<br />
single event may have quite a complex structure. Cornish (1993) uses the concept of ‘scripts’<br />
to describe the linked sequence of scenes through which a would-be offender has to navigate<br />
in order to successfully conclude the crime. Scripts are a kind of logistical map of the offense.<br />
For example ‘ringing’ (changing the identity of stolen motor vehicles to facilitate disposal)<br />
involves several stages, some of which may be crimes themselves: target selection> > theft><br />
concealment> disguise> marketing> conversion or disposal. The pursuit of such specificity<br />
within the criminal event is useful in getting closer to causal mechanisms and opening up<br />
points of intervention. In many respects (as in the example) the script is peculiar to the type of<br />
crime, and cannot be used in classification of prevention. However, it is possible to identify
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more or less ‘universal’ scripts which describe the common scenes through which most<br />
offenders have to pass in order to reach their goal.” (Ekblom 1994 p 197f)<br />
Figure from Ekblom 1994 p 200<br />
“There is, of course, an alternative set of scripts. Criminal events may end up as aborted or<br />
failed attempts; if completed they may lead on to discovery, detection, arrest, trial and<br />
punishment or treatment. These additional events may involve formal legal processes or their<br />
informal equivalents ranging from official cautioning to private acts of revenge.” (Ekblom<br />
1994 p 198)<br />
3.2 <strong>Crime</strong> intervention and <strong>Crime</strong> prevention implementation<br />
If the causes of crime are many, multi-level and diverse (as the conceptual framework<br />
implies) how can crime prevention possibly work?<br />
We do know that some victims are repeatedly victimized and that a small number of criminals<br />
commit a significant portion of all crimes. We also know (or can quite easily find out) where<br />
in place and time crimes cluster. We can also generate knowledge of the processes and<br />
circumstances surrounding the outbreak of criminal events on such hotspots, and analyze<br />
these incidents using the proximal circumstances model proposed by Ekblom, or a similar<br />
one, then take appropriate action in order to reduce the probability of criminal choices on<br />
high-risk locations and times.<br />
The absolute minimum requirements when planning and performing CP intervention projects,<br />
are (or ought to be) to;<br />
a) have identified and defined the particular problem to be prevented<br />
b) have gathered information about and analyzed the problem<br />
c) have a clear idea of <strong>what</strong> to do about it<br />
d) formulate an action plan<br />
e) to critically consider the plan. Is it likely to deliver the desired result?<br />
f) to make sure it is implemented properly, and to;<br />
g) evaluate the program and make adjustments when necessary<br />
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3.2.1 How can we know if a prevention plan will work?<br />
Criminal events are concentrated in time and place. Some potential crime targets are<br />
disproportionally victimized. A relatively small group of offender commit a significant<br />
number of criminal acts.<br />
Preventive efforts directed with these statements in mind are based on reality, and has thus a<br />
greater chance of success than any proposal ignoring the above facts. The next step is to<br />
consider the policy theory and the method of implementation. We know <strong>what</strong> behavior we<br />
wish to prevent, where and when it typically occurs etcetera.<br />
The closer to the potential criminal event the preventing efforts are directed, and the shorter<br />
the chain of implementation, the better are the chances of successful intervention, other things<br />
being equal.<br />
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Figure from Ekblom 1994 p 212<br />
When we consider the possible occurrence of criminal events as part of a sequence of<br />
interrelated circumstances, and also consider the process of implementing crime prevention<br />
initiatives as acts taken with the ultimate aim of influencing the decision-making processes of<br />
would-be offenders, it leads us to two conclusions.<br />
First, that preventive intervention that occurs early in the causal chain leading towards<br />
potential criminal events (eg Societal reforms, programs for troubled youth, social programs)<br />
will affect a large number of people and will, if they are effective, lead to long-term reduction<br />
of people’s propensity to make criminal choices and thus to a reduction of the crime level.<br />
Second, that preventive strategies working directly in proximity of the (possible) criminal<br />
event has a direct effect on the outcomes of situations that might lead to a criminal event. The<br />
places where, and the times when, criminal events are likely to occur are often well known to
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members of the public, police officers and researchers. A direct and immediate reduction of<br />
the quantity of crimes will be the result of successful intervention on such places.<br />
4. Conclusions<br />
Since little of crime is carefully planned, and many criminal events are triggered by frictions<br />
or temptations, there is little or no reason to assume that displacement effects will occur when<br />
(non-trafficing)crime is prevented on some locations.<br />
It is possible to influence human behavior. Since criminal events cluster, any changes in the<br />
logistic, physical, emotional or social environment of hotspots and/or hot targets will have<br />
some kind of effect on the choices made by those present in the situation, including the<br />
would-be offender. The ultimate goal of situational crime prevention efforts is to change the<br />
cognitive cues of hotspots and/or hot targets, in a way affecting the potential offenders. By<br />
affecting individual’s perception and ability to rationalize in, a situation, it affects his/her<br />
evaluation of the situation as a ‘good’ opportunity to commit a crime, and a criminal choice<br />
is thus made less likely.<br />
The early (social) intervention strategies work towards background factors far from the<br />
concrete situation and often have long and complicated chains of implementation. The social<br />
crime prevention strategies are difficult to implement and it is difficult to measure their<br />
effects. If, however, the chosen social crime prevention strategies are effective, a long-term<br />
decreases in the future level of criminality will occur and, thus lead to a reduction of the<br />
future crime level.<br />
The situational crime prevention strategies offers immediate and measurable reductions in the<br />
number of criminal events on selected locations. If hotspots (as opposed to well-off low-crime<br />
residential districts) are chosen for effective crime prevention efforts, the overall crime level<br />
will be reduced.<br />
Personal Communication<br />
Felson, Marcus: Tuesday seminar 1991-02-26. Dpt of Sociology, University of Stockholm.<br />
McCord, Joan: Lectures Spring term 1994. Dpt of Criminology, University of Stockholm.<br />
Wentrell, Claes: Media Mätning i Skandinavien MMS AB (Media measurment in Scandinavia<br />
Ltd) 1996-01-12 Phone conversation.<br />
Litterature sources<br />
Braithwaite, J: <strong>Crime</strong>, Shame and reintegration. U press, Cambridge 1989.<br />
Brantingham, P & P. Brantingham: Patterns in <strong>Crime</strong>. Macmillian Publ Co, N.Y. 1984.<br />
Cloward, R.A. & L.E. Ohlin: Delinquency and Opportunity. Free Press, New York 1960.<br />
Cornish,D B & Clarke, R V (Eds): The Reasoniong Criminal. Springer, New York 1986.<br />
Ekblom, P: ‘Proximal Circumstances: A Mechanism-Based Classification for <strong>Crime</strong><br />
<strong>Prevention</strong>’. In: <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> Studies vol. 2-1994, Criminal Justice Press.<br />
Gottfredson, M.R. & T. Hirschi: A General Theory of <strong>Crime</strong>. Stanford U press, 1990.<br />
Hagan, J: Modern Criminology; <strong>Crime</strong>, Criminal Behavior, and its Control. McGraw-Hill,<br />
Singapore 1988 (2 nd . printing).<br />
Hirschi, T: Causes of Delinquency. U of California press, 1974 (3 rd . Printing)<br />
Hjelle, L.A. & D.J. Ziegler: Personality Theories. McGraw-Hill, Singapore 1992 (3 rd . ed.)<br />
Johnson, Michael: Brott som nyheter- En kavntitativ studie av brottsinnehållet i tre svenska<br />
TV-nyhetsprogram under 1991 (transl. <strong>Crime</strong> as News- A Quantitative study of the<br />
<strong>Crime</strong> content of three Swedish TV-News programs during 1991). Bachelor’s thesis,<br />
195
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dptm of Criminology, U of Stockholm 1995.<br />
Kornhauser, R.R.: Social Sources of Delinquency- An Appraisal of Analytic Models. U of<br />
Chicago 1984.<br />
Lattimore, P & Witte, A.: Models of Decision Making Under Uncertainty: The Criminal<br />
Choice. In: Cornish & Clarke (Eds) 1986.<br />
Niggli, M.A.: ‘Rational Choice Theory and <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong>’. In: Studies on <strong>Crime</strong> and<br />
<strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> vol. 3-1994. National Council for <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong>, Sweden 1994.<br />
Stafford, M C & M. Warr: ‘A Reconceptualisation of General and Specific Deterrance’.<br />
Journ o Res in <strong>Crime</strong> and Delinquency vol. 10, Nr. 2-1993.<br />
Sykes, G M & D. Matza: ‘Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency’ Amer.<br />
Sociological Review vol 22-1957, pp 664-670.<br />
Wikström, P-O H: ‘Self-Control, Temptations, Friction and Punishment’. In: Wikström,<br />
Clarke & McCord (Eds) Propensity and Opportunity; National Council for <strong>Crime</strong><br />
<strong>Prevention</strong>, Sweden 5-1995.<br />
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NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Anna Kristín Newton, under graduate student, dep. of psychology, University of Iceland<br />
Private adress: Grjótagötu 12<br />
IS-101 Reykjavik<br />
e-mail: alans@vortex.is<br />
and<br />
Íris Böðvarsdóttir, under graduate student, dep. of psychology, University of Iceland<br />
Private adress: Smárahlið 14g<br />
IS-603 Akureyri<br />
e-mail: iris@ak.is<br />
Research Results of Sexual and Violent Offenders in Iceland<br />
This paper is part of a BA thesis at the Department of Psychology, University of Iceland. The purpose<br />
of the study was to explore various crime patterns in sexual and violent offenders in Iceland.<br />
Violent and sexual crimes were studied as these are considered to cause significant mental and bodily<br />
harm in victims (Kendall and Hammen, 1995).<br />
When questioned about the type of crime most feared, the general public frequently identify violent<br />
and sexual crimes, while the physical damage and the mental anguish of being a victim are identified<br />
as the main aspects of the crime most feared. Those who have been a victim of any type of<br />
crime more often than not fear that they will be attacked again (Viogt, Thornton, Barrile and Seaman,<br />
1994).<br />
According to Pollock and Rosenblat approximately 40% of the American public are afraid of becoming<br />
a victim of a serious crime, where serious crimes include murder, violent assaults and sexual<br />
offences (Beirne and Messerschmitt, 1995).<br />
Of the various factors that have been associated with criminal behaviour, alcohol is probably one of<br />
the main ones and the most frequently mentioned. Therefore in this study the connection between<br />
alcohol and crime has been considered closely. This was done by studying how many offenders<br />
were intoxicated when the crime took place. Consideration was also given to the time of day at<br />
which the crime was committed. This was done on the basis that most crimes are committed at times<br />
when people are more likely than not to have been drinking. We were also interested in the<br />
relationship between the offender and the victim, specifically if the offender and victim knew each<br />
other before the crime took place.<br />
When considering crime in general and how it comes about, situational factors are nearly always<br />
mentioned, that is the situation has to be right so that the offender has the chance to commit the<br />
crime. With this in mind we thought that by looking at some of the situational factors that are present<br />
when the crime took place we might get a clearer picture of how the crime came about.<br />
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The Icelandic judicial system classifies violent and sexual crimes as serious and therefore<br />
offenders often receive long sentences. According to Icelandic law it is possible to sentence<br />
offenders to serve 16 years for violent crimes and up to 12 years for sexual crimes (Icelandic<br />
Penal Code, 1995). Although the crime rates in Iceland is considerably lower than in other<br />
European countries, crime is a problem. Ideally we would like to see crime rates decline but<br />
for that to happen society will have to change the way it deals with crime. <strong>Crime</strong> prevention is<br />
a very difficult area to deal with but at the end of this paper we have put forward a few of our<br />
own ideas regarding crime prevention in Iceland. It should be made clear that these ideas<br />
have not in any way been tried or tested in Iceland. They are the authors• suggestions and<br />
hypothesis based on the information and results obtained during the course of the study.<br />
Method<br />
Subjects<br />
The subjects consisted of 106 criminal offenders who had served a prison sentence for their<br />
crimes in Iceland during the years 1991-1995. The age of the offenders ranged from 16-75<br />
years and the average age of the offender when the crime was committed was 28.9 years. The<br />
subjects were classified into three groups depending on the type of crime they had committed<br />
according to Icelandic law.<br />
The categories were:<br />
198<br />
Violent Offenders (N = 43)<br />
Sexual Offenders (N = 37)<br />
Child Abusers (N = 26)<br />
Instruments<br />
A checklist was designed by the authors with the help of our supervisors Dr. Jón Friðrik<br />
Sigurðsson and Dr. Gísli Guðjónsson.The checklist was compiled of twenty items about the<br />
crime, the offender and the victim. The items were chosen with regards to the hypothesis that<br />
were put forth by the researchers.<br />
Procedure<br />
All of the data in the study was collected through careful examination of court transcripts,<br />
where the offenders and victims statements were used as the primary source. Each transcript<br />
was read at least twice and information pertaining to the checklist was filled out. If for some<br />
reason the information in the transcripts was not satisfactory with regards to the checklist then<br />
they were left blank and filed as missing values. After the checklists had been filled out they<br />
were checked again against the transcripts to ensure that the information collected was as<br />
reliable as possible. All the data was collected and tested at the Prison and Probation<br />
Administration in Reykjavik<br />
Results<br />
Figure 1 indicates for each type of offence, the number of offenders that were intoxicated and<br />
those that were not intoxicated when the crime was committed.
NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Figure 1. Number of offenders who were and were not under the influence of alcohol when<br />
the crime was committed.<br />
As can be seen in figure 1 most of the violent (92%) and sexual offenders (70%) had been<br />
drinking before they committed the crime where as most of the child abusers (86%) were<br />
sober when the crime was committed.<br />
Figure 2 indicates the time of day at which the crime occurred. The term variable means that<br />
the same victim, the child, was abused on more than one occasion by the same offender.<br />
Figure 2. What time of day the crime took place.<br />
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As could be expected most of the violent and sexual crimes took place during the night,<br />
between 1 • 8 am. It is not evident however from figure 2 that most of these crimes took<br />
place on Friday or Saturday night.<br />
The relationship between the offender and victim, with regards to whether they knew each<br />
other before the crime was committed can be seen in table 1.<br />
Table 1. The relationship between victims and offenders.<br />
Offender<br />
Spouse<br />
Relative<br />
Friend<br />
Step-parent<br />
Acquaintance<br />
Stranger<br />
Unknown<br />
Total<br />
200<br />
Violent Offences<br />
N (%) N<br />
5<br />
0<br />
1<br />
0<br />
14<br />
20<br />
3<br />
43<br />
12<br />
0<br />
2<br />
0<br />
33<br />
46<br />
7<br />
100%<br />
Sexual Offences against<br />
Adults<br />
4<br />
4<br />
2<br />
1<br />
15<br />
9<br />
2<br />
37<br />
(%)<br />
11<br />
11<br />
5<br />
3<br />
40<br />
24<br />
6<br />
100%<br />
Child Abuse<br />
N<br />
0<br />
7<br />
3<br />
7<br />
6<br />
3<br />
0<br />
26<br />
(%)<br />
0<br />
27<br />
12<br />
27<br />
23<br />
11<br />
0<br />
100%<br />
Almost 80% of all violent crimes in this study were committed by strangers or acquaintances.<br />
The term acquaintance in this study was used to indicate a situation where the victim and the<br />
offender knew of each other rather than actually knew each other. This proves to be<br />
complicated in a small society such as Iceland as people are likely to recognise a number of<br />
persons without having any personal contact with them. This should be kept in mind when<br />
considering the percentage of sexual crimes committed against adults. About 40% of the<br />
sexual crimes were committed by acquaintances. In 25% of the sexual crime cases the victim<br />
knew their offender personally. In the child abuse cases the offence was usually committed<br />
by a person that the child knew well, as might be expected. This is probably because to<br />
commit a sexual crime against a child the offender in most cases needs to gain its trust. The<br />
fact that many child offenders commit more than once offence against a single victim makes<br />
this point clear.<br />
In table 2 it can be seen where most of the crimes took place.
NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Table 2. Location of crime<br />
Place of crime<br />
Victims home<br />
Offenders home<br />
Hotel<br />
Public place<br />
Violent<br />
offences<br />
13<br />
5<br />
0<br />
4<br />
%<br />
30<br />
12<br />
0<br />
9<br />
Sexual offences<br />
against adults<br />
13<br />
12<br />
4<br />
%<br />
35<br />
32<br />
11<br />
Child abuse<br />
Outdoors<br />
21 49<br />
6<br />
16 3 12<br />
Total 43 100% 37 100% 25 100%<br />
Most of the sexual crimes against adults and the child abuse cases took place in the victims or<br />
offenders home, this is a different pattern tothat seen with violent crimes in Iceland, where<br />
most of the violent offences took place outdoors.<br />
Discussion<br />
Similarities in crime types<br />
When we look at the information as a whole we can see that different crime patterns emerge<br />
depending on the type of crime that has been committed. Most violent crimes take place at<br />
weekends during the night, the offenders have usually been drinking before the crime took<br />
place. The offender and victim in these cases seldom know each other well. A similar pattern<br />
arises with regards to sexual crimes that are committed against adults. The offender is more<br />
often than not drunk whilst engaging in the criminal offence and it usually takes place at<br />
night. In over half the sexual crime cases the offender and the victim do not know each other<br />
personally. There is however a difference in the location of the crime, most sexual crimes<br />
(both against adults and children) take place either in the victims or the offenders home.<br />
When we look at the information gathered on child abuse the criminal pattern changes<br />
some<strong>what</strong>. The offender and the victim usually know each other quite well and the offender<br />
is in most cases sober when the criminal act takes place. There seems to be quite a large<br />
difference between those offenders who commit violent or sexual crimes against adults and<br />
those who commit sexual offences against children. This is a point that we think has not been<br />
emphasised enough when crime prevention is being discussed.<br />
Differences in crime types<br />
Often when people talk about crime prevention they speak as though the same method will<br />
prevent all types of crime. From our research results we conclude that different prevention<br />
methods needs to be employed according to the type of crime that is to be prevented.<br />
Preventing crime is not an easy task but the work has to start somewhere, thus we have come<br />
up with a number of ideas that we believe justify further investigation, it should be made clear<br />
that these are only suggestions and that they have not been tested in any manner.<br />
2<br />
6<br />
8<br />
13<br />
1<br />
0<br />
%<br />
32<br />
52<br />
4<br />
0<br />
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Violent crime preventio<br />
Many people believe that aggression is a natural human instinct. What is more difficult for<br />
people to agree on is how aggression influences behaviour and why some of us are more<br />
aggressive than others. As of yet it is difficult to prove how large a part aggression plays in<br />
violent behaviour. However, we believe that aggression should be looked upon as a health<br />
problem rather than a criminal one. By accepting aggression as a contributing factor to<br />
violent behaviour and dealing with it as we deal with other health and medical problems we<br />
maybe able to assist people who have problems controlling their aggression. This we think is<br />
a better solution in the long run as young adults could seek help before they commit a<br />
criminal offence. For this to happen it is necessary to make treatment readily available to<br />
those who recognise that they need it. It is also important that those people who seek this<br />
kind of help need not be ashamed to do so, it has to be socially accepted. The connection<br />
between alcohol and violence seems to be quite strong and we suggest that people who have<br />
problems controlling their aggression be made aware of this. In such cases it may be<br />
beneficial for the subject to reduce their alcohol intake.<br />
Sexual crime prevention<br />
Sexual crime prevention we think has to start at an early age. In the icelandic rape victim<br />
report from 1995 there is an increase in reported rapes (compared to the years 1990-1994)<br />
where the offender is between 16-20 years old. We believe that changes should be made with<br />
regards to sexual education in Iceland. Sex education should not only focus on the physical<br />
act of reproduction (as seems to have been the case for many years) but also on the moral and<br />
psychological aspects of sex. This can be done by various methods, for example role playing.<br />
Teenagers could be given certain projects where they try to imagine themselves as victims or<br />
offenders of a sexual crime. These exercises might help to increase awareness in teenagers of<br />
how certain situations can lead to criminal acts taking place. Hopefully it will also deter them<br />
from committing similar acts themselves in future. Alcohol plays a part in sexual crime as<br />
most of the offenders and victims are under the influence of alcohol when the crime takes<br />
place. Therefore we recommend as before that people be made aware of this factor and that<br />
help be made readily available to those who think they need to control their drinking. We<br />
would also like to see some kind of help be made available to those who have committed<br />
sexual offences so that they may be less likely to commit another similar act.<br />
<strong>Crime</strong> prevention • child abuse<br />
Child abuse is arguably one of the most difficult crimes to prevent. It is very unlikely that a<br />
person who is thinking of abusing a child seeks help, as child molestation is a very taboo<br />
subject in almost every society. Our research leads us to believe that a more profitable area of<br />
study may be to inform and study potential victims of child abuse rather than potential<br />
offenders. As the victims of child abuse are sometimes very young, it is necessary to start<br />
working with them from a young age. It is probably not viable to work with children younger<br />
than two or three years of age.<br />
Most children in iceland start play-school around this age and this would more than likely be<br />
the best place to start the prevention programme. The idea is to encourage family role playing<br />
at the play-schools which is supervised by the play-school workers. What the children are<br />
supposed to learn is how they can connect and communicate with their family members. This<br />
idea stems from the fact that in iceland most parents work a full day and therefore are unable<br />
to spend a lot of time with their children. We think that it is very important that families<br />
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NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
members feel comfortable with each other and can trust and tell each other things. This idea<br />
can not work if it is a one sided project. The other family members have to be aware of <strong>what</strong><br />
the child is learning at play-school and they need encouragement from their family. In many<br />
cases we think it would be just as beneficial for the parents and other adults around the family<br />
to participate in this programme, it might teach everyone something about relationships and<br />
communication.<br />
Child abuse • sex education<br />
Sex education for young children is something we feel should be taught. We believe that<br />
most children over the age of six know vaguely <strong>what</strong> sex is and that it has some kind of<br />
forbidden element. What they do not know is <strong>what</strong> a normal or abnormal sexual relationship<br />
consists of. This should be explained to them in a way that they can understand. By<br />
explaining this we hope that if someone tries to violate the child the child has more of a<br />
chance of stopping it before anything happens as the adult is unable to gain their trust. The<br />
main point here is that the child has learnt that the adults behaviour is wrong and will tell<br />
someone about it, rather than keep the secret.<br />
We do feel as before that child abusers need professional help to change their behaviour, this<br />
kind of help should be readily available to them. Our prevention ideas focus more or less on<br />
children and teenagers who in most cases are still at school. Therefore it should be possible<br />
to try out some of them without too much trouble or cost. Hopefully these ideas will become<br />
reality sooner rather than later.<br />
References / sources<br />
Beirne, P. and Messerschmidt, J.: Criminology 2 nd edition. Harcourt Brace and<br />
Company, USA 1995<br />
Blackburn, R.: The psychology of criminal conduct: Theory research and practice.<br />
John Wiley & Sons, Chichester 1993.<br />
Ministry of Justice: Icelandic Penal Code. Oddi, Reykjavík 1995.<br />
Kendall, P.C. and Hammen, C.: Abnormal Psychology. Houghton Mifflin<br />
Company, Boston 1995.<br />
Voigt, L., Thornton, E., Barrile, L. and Seaman, J.M.: Criminology and Justice. McGraw Hill,<br />
New York 1994.<br />
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NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Ilppo Alatalo, Planerare<br />
Justitieministeriet, PB 319<br />
FIN-00181 Helsingfors<br />
e-mail: ilppo.alatalo@om.vn.fi<br />
204<br />
Våld och hot om våld mot fängelsepersonalen<br />
- situationelt perspectiv<br />
Jag har undersökt våld och hot om våld mot fängelsepersonalen på basis av anmälningar som<br />
fängelserna gjorde till fångvårdsavdelningen under perioden 1993-1996<br />
(“anmälningsmaterial”) och material från en förfrågan riktad till fängelserna 1995<br />
(“enkätmaterial”). Båda material utgår från våld och våldshot upplevda av personalen, rentav<br />
så att den ursprungliga avsikten med registreringen av fallen var att påvisa det förkastliga i<br />
fångens handlande.<br />
Jag har främst koncentrerat mig på de våldsrelaterade situationernas karaktär och innehåll.<br />
Kvantitativt visar resultaten endast en allmänna tendens, visserligen samma allmänna<br />
förhållande mellan dold kriminalitet och upplevt våld, som är bekant från offerundersökningarna.<br />
Anmälningsmaterialet omfattar i regel fall som upplevts som allvarliga och som lett till<br />
rättsliga åtgärder. Gärningsmannen har i dessa fall vanligen åtalats för våldsamt motstånd mot<br />
en tjänsteman. Anmälningsmaterialet inbegriper 74 fall under fyra års tid. Kvalitativt är<br />
anmälningarna ojämna. I allmänhet ingår person- och straffuppgifter, förhörsprotokoll och<br />
andra referat av händelserna. Uppgifterna om objektet inskränks i allmänhet till namn och<br />
arbetsuppgift. Tid, plats och huvudsakligt förlopp ur personalsynpunkt framgår i allmänhet<br />
relativt väl. Fångsynpunkten är däremot bristfällig, ofta är gärningsmännen synnerligen<br />
fåordiga vid förhören.<br />
Enkätmaterialet innehåller uppgifter om i princip samtliga registrerade fall av våld eller<br />
våldshot mot personalen. Det handlar om ca 150 fall. Merparten har åtgärdats genom<br />
disciplinförfarande inom anstalten eller tillrättavisning av gärningsmannen. Här har vi att göra<br />
med ett ännu brokigare material. Anstalternas praktik vid registreringen har varierat olovligt<br />
mycket, så uppenbarligen också satsningen på svaren. Både bakgrundsinformation och<br />
fallbeskrivning påvisar brister. Men i flesta fall är det trots allt möjligt att skapa sig en bild av<br />
händelseförloppet.<br />
(Här kan det nämnas att instruktionerna till anstalterna angående anmälning av exceptionella<br />
fall har nu i vår förnyats och man håller på att utarbeta en blankett för uppföljning av våld och<br />
våldshot mot personalen.)<br />
Kompletterande källor är dessutom diskussioner med anställda i olika uppgifter i anstalterna<br />
och fångvårdsavdelningen samt mina tidigare intervjuer med fångar om fängelselivet.<br />
Om gärningsmännen<br />
Fångar med våldsamt beteende mot personalen är yngre och har en längre strafftid än<br />
genomsnittet. Deras medelålder var i anmälningsmaterialet 27,5 år, medianen 25, medelåldern
NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
för samtliga fångar var 35. I jämförelse med de intagna under en slumpmässigt vald dag var<br />
den bekanta strafftiden (ca 3,5 år) vid tidpunkten för gärningen ett år längre än genomsnittet.<br />
Antalet anstaltsvistelser varierade vanligen mellan två och fyra. Brottsbakgrunden<br />
dominerades av brott och brottsförsök mot liv och våldsbrott. Långa förteckningar på diverse<br />
smärre brottmål var också typiska. Notiser om tidigare våldsamt motstånd mot en tjänsteman<br />
var relativt vanliga. Resultaten i enkätmaterialet var analoga.<br />
Uppgifter om hälsotillstånd har jag inte haft till mitt förfogande. På basis av andra<br />
hänvisningar i materialet verkar det rimligt att dra slutsatsen att också psykiskt labila personer<br />
ingår i gruppen.<br />
Gärningsmannen handlar nästan alltid ensam, det finns bara några få fall när två eller tre<br />
fångar samarbetar. I anmälningsmaterialet gjorde sig drygt tio procent av gärningsmännen<br />
skyldiga till handlingen mer än en gång, antalet är analogt i enkätmaterialet.<br />
Om objekten<br />
Den överlägset största delen av objekten tillhörde övervakningspersonalen. Och också när så<br />
inte var fallet, var väktarna tvungna att ingripa när situationen reddes upp. Primärobjektet av<br />
vanligen en person. I händelseförloppets olika skeden, från start till lugnande, deltog i<br />
anmälningsmaterialet i medeltal fyra personalmedlemmar, i enkätmaterialet tre.<br />
Allmänt om fallen<br />
I flesta fall startade händelseförloppet i anstaltens boendeavdelning. Händelserna följer<br />
samma rytm som fängelserutinen i allmänhet. Händelserna avlöser varandra från väckningen<br />
och öppningen av cellerna till stängningsdags, natten är en tyst period. Det finns preliminärt<br />
sett inga skillnader mellan veckodagar eller årstider.<br />
Fallen i anmälningsmaterialet är kvalitativt sett allvarligare, typfallet omfattar förutom<br />
verbala hotelser även motstånd, spjärnande emot och slagförsök. Resultatet var relativt ofta<br />
småtörnar. Förstahjälp av läkare behövdes några gånger. God tur bidrog delvis till att<br />
allvarligare följder kunde undvikas. Våra data om gärningsmännens domar inför rätta är<br />
bristfälliga, de tycks variera mellan några dagsböter och fängelsestraff på tre-fyra månader.<br />
Typfallet i enkätmaterialet är verbal hotelse. Hotelserna riktades både mot bestämda personer<br />
och generellt mot de närvarande i situationen. Innehållet i hotelserna varierade från<br />
administrativ förtret till avlivning antingen i fängelset eller i sinom tid i friheten genom<br />
gärningsmannens eller hans kumpaners försorg. Den typiska påföljden var vistelse på från två<br />
till fyra dagar i fängelsets specialavdelning. I anmärkningsvärt många fall ansåg man en<br />
tillrättavisning vara den lämpliga påföljden.<br />
Merparten av fallen handlade inte om vapen. Skjutvapen ingick i tre fall, i två av dem tog man<br />
gisslan i samband med rymning. Under undersökningsperioden sköt man aldrig mot<br />
personalen. (Följande år hade vi att göra med en rymning under vilken man bl.a. sköt med<br />
kpist genom en tillkallad väktares vindruta.)<br />
Om situationerna<br />
Typiska situationer med våldsamt beteende är<br />
- i samband med granskning, antingen av person eller cell<br />
- när man avlägsnar ett antaget otillåtet föremål/ämne från en fånge<br />
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206<br />
- när man internerar en fånge på grund av berusning eller någon annan orsak<br />
- när man, i synnerhet i samband med internering, avlägsnar och granskar en<br />
fånges kläder och byter till annan utrustning<br />
- när konflikter mellan fångar vänds mot personalen<br />
- när obehagliga beslut (t.ex. straff eller förflyttningar mot en fånges vilja)<br />
tillkännages<br />
- när man klandrar en fånge som brutit reglerna, förbjuder någonting eller ger<br />
order om hur en fånge skall handla i en viss situation.<br />
S.C. Lights artikel Assault on Prison Officers: Interactional Themes, som grundar sig på<br />
rapportering av exceptionella händelser (New York State Department of Correctional<br />
Service), nämner som den mest allmänna orsaken “Unexplained”. I nästan 26 procent av<br />
fallen hade orsaken till incidenten förblivit oförklarlig för objektet. I mitt material begränsas<br />
analoga fall till några enstaka. Men de vanligaste identifierade orsakerna i nämnda artikel<br />
påminner i övrigt i hög grad om orsakerna i det finska materialet.<br />
Om verkande faktorer i situationerna<br />
Fängelsekulturen, i vilken dels fångkulturen och dels övervakningspersonalens kultur ingår,<br />
innehåller ett motsatsförhållande mellan de två sistnämnda (den innehåller naturligtvis också<br />
många förmedlande och dämpande element). Om man granskar situationerna med hjälp av en<br />
indelningsmodell från Luckenbils (1977) eller Felsons (1984) analyser, där modellens nästa<br />
skede alltid representerar en längre framskriden eskaleringsfas, kan man i flera situationer<br />
uppenbarligen konstatera att utgångskonstellationen är från början spänd. Trotset och<br />
konflikten mellan rollerna är kontinuerlig.<br />
Luckenbil:<br />
1. Offret trotsar gärningsmannen.<br />
2. Gärningsmannen tolkar detta som en personlig utmaning.<br />
3. Gärningsmannen framför en motutmaning eller inleder redan ett fysiskt angrepp.<br />
4. Offret tillmötesgår inte gärningsmannen eller går till motattack.<br />
5. Det uppstår ett slagsmål som grundar sig på ett gemensamt outtalat avtal.<br />
6. Efterspel.<br />
Felson:<br />
I. En verbal (eller symbolisk) konflikt<br />
- angrepp mot motpartens identitet<br />
- försök att påverka motpartens beteende<br />
- misslyckande<br />
II. Hotelser, medlings- och väjningsförsök (som kan göras både av deltagarna i konflikten och<br />
av utomstående; de kan också förekomma under den första fasen)<br />
- medlings- och förlikningsförsök<br />
- sporrande och uppviglande<br />
III. Fysiskt angrepp<br />
I en dylik situation och kulturmiljö blir den mest obetydliga frågan lätt en prestigefråga, och<br />
när så skett tryter den egna referensgruppens positiva lösningsmodeller för att behålla<br />
ansiktet. Väktaren glömmer att han representerar systemet och fungerar som en kränkt<br />
individ, fången å sin sida strävar efter rationaliteter bestämda av fångkulturen på ett sätt som<br />
för en utomstående verkar vansinnigt. Dessutom kan motstånd åtminstone för ögonblicket ge<br />
fången känslan av att han själv bestämmer över vad han gör, en liten bit autonomi. Också för
NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
vaktpersonalen kan konfliktsituationer utvecklas till höjdpunkter i ett annars (lyckligtvis)<br />
rutinmässigt arbete och stöda en eftersträvansvärd professionell image.<br />
I mitt material var fångars våld eller hot om våld mot personalen i traditionell mening<br />
rationell verksamhet endast i samband med några rymningar. I dessa fall var våldet ett på<br />
förhand medvetet valt medel i syfte att nå ett bestämt mål. Då kan man tala om instrumentellt<br />
våld.<br />
Till slut några observationer om vaktpersonalens sätt att handla. En stor del av de individuella<br />
reaktionerna återspeglas antagligen inte i materialet på grund av rådande rapporteringspraktik.<br />
Likaså inverkar rapporternas ursprungliga syfte - dvs. att påvisa det berättigade i personalens<br />
verksamhet och det förkastliga i fångens handlande - säkert på hur man antecknar fallen. Men<br />
man kan ändå särskilja två verksamhetsinriktningar. Den första betonar professionalism. Man<br />
har gått in för att lugna fången, kraftåtgärderna är genomtänkta och motiverade. Den andra<br />
förhåller sig på ett eller annat sätt personligt till händelserna: “Det var jag som skulle gripa<br />
honom, jag är ju ingen boxboll”.<br />
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Ragnhild Sollund, Forsker<br />
Institutt for kriminologi, Universitetet i Oslo<br />
PB 6872, St. Olavs plass, N-0130 Oslo<br />
e-mail: ragnhild.sollund@jus.uio.no<br />
208<br />
Voldsdømte flyktninger<br />
Bakgrunnen for prosjektet<br />
Prosjektet jeg arbeider med handler om voldsdømte flyktninger i Norge, det vil si menn<br />
mellom 15-35 år, dømt for forbrytelser mot liv, legeme og helbred, herunder drap, grove ran<br />
og voldtekt.<br />
Jeg holder på med datainnhentingen til prosjektet nå, og disse er følgelig ikke ferdig<br />
analysert. Jeg vil derfor måtte forholde meg til resultatene av prosjektet som de fremstår i dag.<br />
Bakgrunnen for prosjektet er at flere flyktninger enn det man er klar over har vært ofre for<br />
tortur, mange lider av traumer som følge av det, og som følge av krigshandlinger i form av<br />
post traumatisk stressyndrom.<br />
Mottakssystemet i Norge er i liten grad utviklet med tanke på å avdekke psykiske lidelser.<br />
Ved psykososialt senter for flyktninger er det lange køer.<br />
Når flyktningen kommer til Norge kan det i første omgang ta lang tid før søknaden om<br />
oppholdstillatelse er ferdig behandlet. I denne tiden bor flyktningene i asylmottak, ofte blir de<br />
sendt fra sted til sted. I svært mange tilfelle får flyktningene først avslag, dermed blir<br />
søknadsbehandlingstiden ytterligere forlenget ved at de anker. Denne tiden er preget av<br />
usikkerhet i forhold til fremtiden og i forhold til situasjonen for familie som er igjen i<br />
hjemlandet. Ofte må flyktningene gå i dekning mens anken behandles for å unngå utvisning.<br />
Når vedtak om opphold er gjort opplever mange å bli sosialt isolert på grunn av manglende<br />
språkkunnskaper og og grunn av manglende arbeidslivstilknytning. Flyktninger har større<br />
problemer enn nordmenn med å få innpass på arbeidsmarkedet på grunn av diskriminering, på<br />
grunn av manglende kompetanse eller fordi utdanningen ikke blir godkjent i Norge.<br />
En viktig problemstilling ved prosjektet er å avdekke hvorvidt manglende oppfølging fra<br />
mottaks- og hjelpeapparatet for flyktninger, i kombinasjon med livssituasjonen og de<br />
problemer de som flyktninger møter i Norge, kan utløse voldslovbrudd. Prosjektet er<br />
finansiert av Justisdepartementet i Norge med ni månedsverk.<br />
Metode<br />
Datainnhentingen gjennomføres i tre trinn. Det første var en karlegging av hvor mange<br />
innsatte som sitter i norske fengsler som har opphold på humanitært grunnlag eller politisk<br />
asyl, og som er dømt for alvorlige voldslovbrudd. 1Via fengselsstyret sendte jeg brev til alle<br />
fengselsanstaltene i Norge, vedlagt skjemaer til utfylling for opplysninger vedrørende alder,<br />
grunnlag for oppholdstillatelse, type lovbrudd, alder ved lovbrudd og dom.<br />
1Vold og voldtektsforsøk (strf.lovens § 192), Forbrtytelse mot liv, legeme og helbred (Strf.lovens §§ 127, 228-<br />
233, 237, 238,242,243,267,268).
NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
De utfylte skjemaene jeg fikk i retur viste at det pr. februar 1998 satt 22 flyktninger i norske<br />
fengsler. 2Disse satt i seks anstalter, alderen varierte mellom 24 og 37 år. Dommene de soner<br />
er fra 60 dager til 21 år. Ti var dømt for drap. Seks hadde sikringsdommer.<br />
Grunnen til at jeg valgte en aldersbegrensning fra 15-35 år, var at menn i den alderen kanskje<br />
i mindre grad enn eldre menn er utenfor en etablert familiesituasjon, og derfor i større grad<br />
enn eldre og yngre vil kunne ha en løs sosial tilknytning og havne i situasjoner hvor<br />
voldsanvendelse kan oppstå. En grunn til at aldersgrensen oppad ble satt til 35, var også at<br />
innvandrerungdom som er skyldig i voldslovbrudd er et gjennomgangstema i massemedia.<br />
Jeg ønsket derfor å se i hvilken grad dette var tilfellet i forhold til flyktningegruppen.<br />
I midlertid synes det ut fra datainnhentingen ved Ila landsfengsel som om aldersbegrensingen<br />
oppad heller skulle vært satt til 40 år, da den livssituasjonen flyktningene befant seg i forut<br />
for lovbruddet heller kan relateres til andre sider ved livssituasjonen enn alder.<br />
Den totale fangebefolkningen utgjorde pr. januar 1998; 2591 innsatte. Av disse var det altså<br />
med forbehold kun 22 i alderen 15-35, med flyktningebakgrunn og som var dømt for<br />
voldslovbrudd.<br />
Neste trinn i datainnhentingen var intervjuer. Jeg sendte forespørsel om intervju til de ni<br />
innsatte ved Ila landsfengsel og sikringsanstalt via sosialkonsulentene i fengselet. Av disse<br />
har en sagt nei til å delta i prosjektet, syv har sagt ja og en har etter purring via<br />
sosialkonsulent bortfalt da han ikke har gitt positiv tilbakemelding. Av disse har jeg foreløpig<br />
intervjuet seks personer.<br />
I tillegg har jeg intervjuet de to sosialkonsulentene ved Ila, fordi det gjennom samtaler med<br />
dem kom frem at de kunne ha informasjon som ville kunne supplere intervjuene med de<br />
innsatte. F.eks. var det gjennom dem det kom frem at det sitter flere innsatte på Ila som er litt<br />
eldre enn 35, og som ellers svarer til utvalgskriteriene.<br />
Hvert intervju varte mellom to og tre timer. Ett intervju ble gjennomført med tolk fra<br />
Tolketjenesten i Oslo. Jeg brukte en intervjuguide i intervjuene hvis hensikt først og fremst<br />
var å strukturere samtalene rundt forskjellige temaer.<br />
På slutten av intervjuet ba jeg informanten om samtykke til å gå inn i domspapirene deres.<br />
Før intervjuene visste jeg ikke hva hver enkelt informant var dømt for. Dette var bevisst.<br />
Lovbruddene de er dømt for er til dels grusomme. For å unngå at mine fordommer og min<br />
antipati kom i vegen for en fruktbar samtale, valgte jeg å ikke gå inn i saken før etter at<br />
intervjuet var gjennomført. De fikk selv fortelle meg sin versjon av det de hadde gjort, uten at<br />
mitt inntrykk av det var farget av forhåndkunnskap.<br />
Tredje trinn i datainnhentingen er en analyse av domspapirene i forhold til intervjuet.<br />
Samtidig som jeg ønsket informantenes versjon og forståelse av handlingen de er dømt for,<br />
ønsket jeg også å se denne i relasjon til domstolens vurdering.<br />
2Det hefter noe usikkerhet ved disse tallene, da Ullersom ikke hadde sikre opplysninger om grunnlaget for<br />
oppholdstillatelse. Pr. 13.7. 89, er dette fortsatt ikke klarlagt, da Utlendingsdireltoratet må gå gjennom<br />
saksmappene til de aktuelle innsatte.<br />
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Etiske perspektiver<br />
Det er etiske perspektiver knyttet til denne type forskning. Det første jeg vil ta opp handler<br />
om dette prosjektets tema. Ved å sette fokus på denne type problematikk kan jeg, avhengig av<br />
funnene jeg gjør, risikere å nøre opp under fordommer som eksisterer i forhold til<br />
flyktningegruppen. Det ligger et stort ansvar i å formidle resultatene av denne type prosjekter<br />
slik at man unngår å gi innvandrerfiendtlige politiske grupperinger flere argumenter til sin<br />
propaganda.<br />
Det er etiske problemstilling knyttet til denne type forskning generelt. Samfunnsforskning<br />
kan, kanskje særlig av hensyn til informantene, ikke rettferdiggjøres av erkjennelse for<br />
erkjennelsens egen skyld. Dette vil imidlertidig avhenge av i hvilken grad de utforskede<br />
involveres i prosjektet. Jo mindre informantene involveres, jo mindre må en kunne anta at<br />
omkostningene ved å bli utforsket vil være. Kanskje vil forskerens ansvar for informantene<br />
reduseres i takt med dette. Ut fra et slikt perspektiv kan en kanskje hevde at forskere i så stor<br />
grad som mulig bør unngå forskningsprosjekter som involverer direkte kontakt med<br />
informantene. En kontakt som antakeligvis vil kunne oppleves som mer belastende jo mer<br />
utsatt gruppen en ønsker kunnskap om er. Ved at man går inn og intervjuer mennesker som er<br />
i en vanskelig livssituasjon kan man risikere å påføre dem ytterligere belastninger. De kan bli<br />
tvunget til å gå inn i temaer de ellers unngår fordi det er for smertefullt. Men hvis en ikke kan<br />
mennesker i en vanskelig livssituasjon vil forskeren stå overfor metodiske problemer. I et<br />
prosjekt som dette, må en f.eks. kunne anta at det vil være vanskelig å utføre prosjektet og<br />
finne svar på problemstillingene uten at noen informanter vil involveres direkte. En annen<br />
innvending vil vil være om den utforskede gruppen vil komme bedre ut av det, ved at de ikke<br />
gjøres til gjenstand for forskning. Kanskje vil den langsiktige totale gevinst ved å forske på en<br />
sårbar, utsatt gruppe være større enn summen av belastningene for de enkelte som blir direkte<br />
involvert. Denne diskusjonen kan kanskje delvis parallellføres til diskusjonen rundt<br />
almenprevensjon, selv om en tross alt må kunne anta at belastningene ved å straffes vil være<br />
større enn belastningen ved å gjøres til forskningsobjekt. Er det riktig å straffe én, for å unngå<br />
at andre begår lovbrudd? Er det riktig å forske på en for å få vite noe om andre, og ikke minst<br />
er det i det hele tatt mulig?<br />
Selv om jeg har innhentet samtykke fra informantene, kan det stilles spørsmål ved hvor reellt<br />
dette samtykke er. Kanskje har ikke informantene forstått hva det handler om, og sier ja fordi<br />
de tror de må. Kanskje sier informantene ja fordi livssituasjonen deres i fengselet er så<br />
tyngende at ethvert avbrekk vil være positivt. Selv om de dermed også kan sies å hente noe<br />
positivt ut av det, kan en kanskje også hevde at forskeren utnytter den vanskelige<br />
livssituasjonen informantene befinner seg i. Kanskje er det nettopp de tap informantene<br />
utsettes for i fengsel gjennom krenkelsesprosessen, som fravær av sosial kontakt med det<br />
annet kjønn, fravær av selvbestemmelsesrett mm. som letter forskerens innpass. Ikke minst vil<br />
intervjuet i seg selv kunne være opprivende og få konsekvenser for informanten, som han<br />
ikke selv overskuer i det han samtykker til intervju. Dette kan være forsterkning av psykiske<br />
problemer, skyldfølelse mm. ved at han ikke får anledning til å legge det han har gjort bak<br />
seg, men må gjennom det en gang til. Det er noe skjevt og urettferdig, ja nærmest<br />
parasittaktig ved forskerens gjerning, når hun som jeg i dette tilfellet går inn i et fengsel,<br />
grafser og rører opp i menneskers vonde erfaringer, for deretter å bli låst ut døren. Så kan jeg<br />
som forsker fordype meg i det som nå er blitt data, mens informantene sitter igjen med sine<br />
ødelagte liv. De kan ikke gå, mine data er deres liv.<br />
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Kanskje vil det likevel også kunne være positivt for den enkelte å bli utforsket. I dette<br />
prosjektet vil kanskje fordelene for informantene også i noen grad oppveie belastningene,<br />
fordi forskeren kanskje også kan tilføre informanten noe positivt. Informanten kan ha behov<br />
for å snakke om og gi sin egen versjon av det som hendte. Kanskje kan det å bli hørt, det å ha<br />
betydning og være viktig for et formål også ha en positiv verdi.<br />
I dette prosjektet er jeg nøye med å understreke at informantens deltakelse i prosjektet ikke<br />
vil kunne påvirke soningsforhold, utvisningsvedtak o.l. ,men at deres deltakelse på sikt<br />
kanskje vil kunne føre til at flyktninger får en lettere mottaks- og livssituasjon i Norge. Flere<br />
av informantene ga uttrykk for at dette var viktig for dem.<br />
Dette synliggjør også forskerens ansvar i forhold til informantene. Det er viktig at dette ikke<br />
bare blir tomme ord som ga meg innpass, de må også forplikte. Kanskje er det også positivt<br />
for informanten med et avbrekk i en rutinefyllt hverdag. Det å møte en utenfor<br />
fengselssystemet kan også være en positiv erfaring. Selv om det kan være en belastning å<br />
være forskningsobjekt, vil det sannsynligvis være snakk om grader av belastning, etter grader<br />
av involvering. De som i minst grad er involvert, vil kanskje i mindre grad oppleve det som<br />
en belastning å delta. Selv om deltakelse i prosjektet var avhengig av samtykke, vet jeg ikke<br />
om det kan ha blitt opplevd som belastende å motta forespørselen. Kanskje kan bare det å<br />
motta introduksjonsbrevet som jo anslår et tema og kategoriserer informanten, i seg selv<br />
oppleves som en belastning.<br />
Foreløpige resultater<br />
Intervjuene viser noen felles trekk. Av de seks informantene jeg har intervjuet på Ila<br />
landsfengsel er det fire som har sikringsdommer for drap og voldtekt. To er kun idømt<br />
fengselsstraff. Fire lider av psykiske problemer. Videre er det vanskelig å se at opplevelsene<br />
til de to som er idømt kun fengselsstraff fra hjemlandet ikke skulle ha betydning for<br />
handlingen de har begått i Norge, selv om dette ikke er gjort til noe poeng av dommerne ved<br />
straffeutmålingen. (Den ene er dømt til 21 års fengsel).<br />
Dette gjaldt f.eks. en palestiner som var oppvokst i flyktningeleiren Shatilla i Beirut. Faren<br />
hans var blitt drept i krigshandlinger, selv hadde han vært geriljasoldat siden han var 15-16 år,<br />
og han hadde også vært med på direkte væpnede konfrontasjoner. Han var ettersøkt i Libanon<br />
og Syria og har i Norge opphold på humanitært grunnlag. Her soner 7 års fengsel for drap.<br />
Foranledningen for drapet var at to menn kom hjem til ham, truet, trakasserte og slo ham i<br />
flere timer. Han forsøkte gjentagne ganger å rømme, men ble hver gang holdt tilbake og slått.<br />
Til slutt grep han en brødkniv, og forsøkte å true seg ut. I basketaket som da oppstod i det<br />
inntrengerene forsøkte å hindre ham i å rømme, ble den ene drept. Informanten hevdet i<br />
intervjuet med meg, og også i politiavhøret, at han hadde vært livredd og at han ikke hadde<br />
ønsket å drepe noen. Dommeren på sin side fastslo at provokasjonen fra inntrengerne ikke<br />
stod i forhold til handlingen og idømte ham 6 år av almenpreventive hensyn, en straff som ble<br />
skjerpet til syv år med samme begrunnelse.<br />
Jeg ser at forskerens rolle tydeliggjøres gjennom denne type prosjekt. Mens dommeren må<br />
forholde seg til jussen og dens begrensninger, har jeg som forsker mulighet for å trekke<br />
mange flere perspektiver inn i fortolkningen av handlingen. I dette tilfellet synes jeg så langt<br />
at det er vanskelig å se at ikke de erfaringene informanten hadde fra sin oppvekst skulle ha<br />
betydning i en situasjon hvor han blir truet på livet og mishandlet.<br />
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Noe som også går igjen er at flere hadde oppsøkt hjelpeapparatet for å få hjelp, men hadde<br />
opplevd å bli avvist, eller de opplevde at de ikke fikk den hjelpen de hadde behov for. Dette<br />
kunne f.eks. skyldes at problemene deres ble bagatellisert.<br />
Et gjennomgående trekk er at livssituasjonen for informantene forut for lovbruddet er preget<br />
av manglende sosial tilhørighet, sykdom og desperasjon. Sykdommen har utviklet seg i løpet<br />
av oppholdet i Norge, situasjonen tilspisser seg og kulminerer i handlingen.<br />
Jeg finner i halvparten av intervjuene, og delvis også i det fjerde tilfellet, store sprik mellom<br />
informantenes versjon av handlingen de er dømt for, og domstolens. Noen benekter at de har<br />
gjort det de er dømt for og hevder seg uskyldig dømt. Andre bagatelliserer handlingen, og<br />
særlig gjelder det for dem som er dømt for voldtekt.<br />
Sikringsordningen er blitt sterkt kritisert. Likevel mener informantene i dette prosjektet som<br />
er idømt sikring at deres livssituasjon pr. i dag er bedre enn situasjonen de var i som<br />
kulminerte i voldshandlingen.<br />
Ut fra de datene jeg foreløpig har samlet inn, kan det se ut til at det norske samfunnet er nødt<br />
til å påta seg et større ansvar for de flyktningene som får komme. Det er ikke tilstrekkelig å gi<br />
dem opphold, hvis de ikke får den psykososiale oppfølginghen de har behov for. Ikke minst<br />
gjelder dette for overføringsflyktningene. Hvis man går inn i leire og tar ut flyktinger, må man<br />
anta at de opplevelsene de har bak seg gjør at de har behov for mer enn mat, bolig og<br />
oppholdstillatelse. En av mine informanter sier det slik:<br />
“Det hadde vært fint om vi bare kunne blitt møtt med litt større velvilje!”<br />
En annen sier:<br />
“Når vi ikke kan få noe hjelp, hadde det vært bedre om vi aldri hadde kommet hit.”<br />
Jeg vil understreke at prosjektet ikke er ferdig og at jeg i liten grad har analysert datene.<br />
Derfor er dette foreløpige resultater, og muligens vil den endelige rapporten fra prosjektet gi<br />
et annet bilde. Da vil også relevant litteratur komme med.<br />
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Karsten Ive, Head of Secretariat<br />
<strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> Council<br />
Odensegade 5, 2. Sal, DK-2100 Copenhagen Ø<br />
<strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> in Denmark<br />
In 1971 it was decided to establish the <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> Council (Det Kriminalpræventive<br />
Råd) with the task of working within the frames of existing legislatures, for the prevention of<br />
crime. The background for establishing the council was a drastic rise in crime up through the<br />
1960s. At the same time a reform of the decentralised structures in the administration took<br />
place, in result of which several small municipalities were put together into large municipal<br />
units. Consequently there was a loss of social control, and an increased need to develop<br />
advice regarding method and co-ordination of crime prevention.<br />
Right from the beginning it was agreed that crime prevention should be based on broad social<br />
insight, knowledge and practical experience. For this reason the Council was structured as an<br />
assembly consisting of a number of nationwide private organisations and societies and public<br />
units of administration, which together constitute the Council´s highest authority “The<br />
Plenum”. Today more than 40 organisations and units of administration have a seat in the<br />
Council. An executive committee, at present 8 people, appointed by “The Plenum” makes<br />
ongoing decisions about general and principle questions, and about financial matters.<br />
The member organisations have appointed representatives who take part in specialised<br />
working groups, at present 5, which each concern themselves with strategic subjects within<br />
crime prevention:<br />
− The technical Security measures Committee, which <strong>works</strong> with advice as regards technical<br />
protection against crime.<br />
− The Strategy Committee, whose task it is to develop broad counselling to the citizens<br />
concerning behaviour and routines that can reduce the risk of falling victim to crime.<br />
− The <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> Information Committee, which is concerned with the role of crime<br />
prevetions in schools, institutions and clubs.<br />
− The Committee for <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> in Local Planning, which concerns itself with town<br />
and housing related strategies for well-being, sense of security and joint responsibility as<br />
crime prevention factors.<br />
− The SSP Committee (The committee for co-operation between Schools, Social services<br />
and the Police), whose task it is to develop patterns for the organisation of crime<br />
prevention in the municipalities and local communities.<br />
Once anually the committees hold a debate on a specific theme, as a result of which the<br />
executive committee together with the chairmen of the 5 specialist committees lay down the<br />
fundamental work themes for the Council´s work. The themes pointed out express fields with<br />
a special public need for crime penvention development.<br />
The Council’s work is co-ordinated by a secretariat put at its disposal by the National<br />
Commissioner of the Police. The staff has legal, police, social and educational training.<br />
Moreover, a nationwide network of contact persons has been built up in the secretariat. This<br />
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gives the possibility of quick, informal and direct co-operation in the daily work between the<br />
Council and the local participants in crime prevention.<br />
The <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> Council may, by virtue of its structure, be regarded as a large<br />
“reporting system”. The member organisations report to the sepcialised groups about new<br />
knowledge, collected experience, trends in the present time etc. The reports are worked up in<br />
the committees and communicated to the users through the secretariat and the organisations.<br />
All in all, the fundamental idea in the Council’s communication and advice is that the<br />
recipient:<br />
214<br />
- either learns to protect himself against crime,<br />
- or learns to say no to crime as an acceptable form of behavior,<br />
- or is enabled to make a contribution to crime prevention in his local area.<br />
The Council’s interest and target groups are politicians on national and local level, authorities<br />
and organisations, employees in the police, schools and social work etc. and the ordinary<br />
citizens, young as old.<br />
<strong>Crime</strong> prevention as such is performed locally in the municipalities and local communities<br />
and is based on local needs and conditions.<br />
The <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> Council is, seen from a local point of view, the place that passes on<br />
specialist assistance, inspiration and the material to implement and develop the local work<br />
further. The secretariat today gives considerable advisory support to local activities. A<br />
recurrent theme - not only in the Council’s organisation, but also in the Council’s<br />
recommendations and advice - is that the <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> effort must take place in broad,<br />
interdisciplinary co-operation, and that the citizens involved must be active participants in the<br />
work, not just passive recipients of a public benefit. Most of the Danish municipalities have<br />
today, on recommendation from the Council, set up local SSP committees, whose<br />
fundamental idea is an expression of interdisciplinary work that transcends traditional barries.<br />
<strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> in the Nordic Context - “The Nordic Model”<br />
The Nordic countries’ historical, cultural and lingustic affinity constitutes a platform for<br />
extensive and inspiring co-operation within various areas. In keeping with the Nordic<br />
tradition, the Nordic crime prevention organisations also co-operate - Det Kriminalpræventive<br />
Råd (DKR) in Denmark, Det kriminalitetsforebyggende råd (KRÅD) in Norway, the crime<br />
preventing delegation in Finland, Brottsförebyggande rådet (BRÅ) in Sweden and the<br />
Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs in Iceland. Iceland has established a board for<br />
drug and alcohol prevention in 1997.<br />
The Nordic countries are characterised by having comparatively large public sectors and<br />
generally well developed welfare systems. Public expenditure on social welfare for children,<br />
old people, the socially or physically disabled, is comparatively high. Although the<br />
improvement in welfare has been an end in itself and not a means to prevent crime, it is no<br />
exaggeration to claim that social crime prevention has had and has high priority in the daily<br />
social work and school work in the Nordic countries.<br />
The Nordic crime prevention organisations are national organisations, whose task it is to<br />
further the work within cirme prevention, frist and foremost locally. It is also their task to
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follow and analyse the development in crime and to further the development of knowledge<br />
and methods within this area.<br />
The joint Nordic platform has had the consequence that work in the crime prevention<br />
organisations, in the main, shows great similarity, although the order of priority of the tasks<br />
can vary as can the methods employed. Thus, there is an fundamentally shared model for<br />
crime prevention work in the five Nordic countries: “The Nordic Model”.<br />
The Nordic Model may be described from the point of view of the function of crime<br />
prevention, as regards the judicial system, the sociopolitical area, child and youth<br />
development and crime occurrence. The Nordic Model is characterised by a strong affiliation<br />
to areas outside the judicial system, and the balance made between social and situational<br />
crime prevention.<br />
With regard to the judicial system the Nordic crime policy is infeuenced by the view that<br />
criminal law system can have only a minor effect on the prevention of crime. The role of the<br />
judicial system is primarily that of creating basic standards and preventing crime in general<br />
terms. In many countries outside the Nordic countries crime prevention, on the one hand, is<br />
equated with stricter punishment, and other controlling and repressive measures on the other<br />
hand.<br />
With regard to social policy, it is an end in itself to avoid marginalisation, to support vocal<br />
vulnerable people and to ensure that everyone has equal opportunities for education and for<br />
making a livelihood. Neither is a means of preventing crime. Outside the Nordic countries<br />
there are many examples of crime prevention measures that co-incide with <strong>what</strong> in the Nordic<br />
countries constitutes ordinary social work and is regarded as a citizen´s right.<br />
The main sociopolitical goal with regard to children and young people is that they have as<br />
good conditions for growing up as possible and as good a life as possible. This type of social<br />
prevention can have a general influence or contribute to finding children and young people<br />
who are in danger of developing in an undesirably way and thus prevent crime and other antisocial<br />
behavor.<br />
As regards the type of crime prevention which is intended to decrease the occurence of crime,<br />
situational prevention, it is possibly not remarkable in the Nordic Model <strong>what</strong> is done, as<br />
much as how it is done. The measures taken are the same as are to a larger or smaller extent<br />
used in other countries. But a Nordic characteristic is that we value informal social<br />
supervision. As in the case with the social care intended for children and youths, it is a<br />
specifically Nordic trait to involve the citizens themselves in participating actively and<br />
directly in the crime preventive work.<br />
The Nordic Model for crime prevention is also marked by the effort to base crime preventive<br />
measures on concrete knowledge. As far as possible, crime prevention is based on national<br />
and international research and other knowledge. Research can also contribute to assessing the<br />
effectiveness of crime preventions measures. It is the task of research to systemise and<br />
compare the information available. It is also the task of research to develop new knowledge.<br />
The Nordic Model for crime prevention is remarkable in its efforts that prevention is to be<br />
effected on the citizens’ terms and in their best interest. Finally the Nordic Model is marked<br />
by the fact that people’s sense of security has a prominent place. The Nordic Model is in itself<br />
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an important instrument to creating and upholding an open and secure community for<br />
everyone.<br />
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Hannu Takala, Executive Secretary<br />
National Council for <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong><br />
PB 1200, FIN-00101 Helsinki<br />
e-mail: hannu.takala@om.vn.fi<br />
<strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> in Finland<br />
Jan Andersson used 18 minutes to describe crime prevention in Sweden. I had some 40<br />
seconds to do the same for Finland, if the time is shared in proportion to those resources the<br />
crime prevention councils have in Sweden and Finland. I could do it showing following<br />
transparent which contains the most important information on the young and tiny crime<br />
prevention council we have in Finland.<br />
Figure 1<br />
National Council for <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong>, Finland<br />
Set up on 1989<br />
Permanent committee under the Ministry of Justice<br />
Expertise<br />
Planning<br />
Co-operation<br />
Focused on situational crime prevention<br />
Chairperson, vice chairperson and 11 members from<br />
the Ministry of Justice<br />
the police<br />
The Ministry of Social Affairs<br />
criminological research<br />
municipalities<br />
insurance<br />
trade<br />
appointed by the Government for a 3-year term<br />
3 persons working in the secretariat, extra resources on project base<br />
Current major project: preparing the national program for crime prevention<br />
In Finland the National Council for <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> was set up nine years ago. Nordic<br />
examples and a recommendation from the Council of Europe had a strong influence on the<br />
decision to set up a special body for crime prevention. In a way, crime prevention was<br />
imported to Finland - without a national need to strengthen fight against crime.<br />
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I can prove the lacking demand for new measures to prevent crime in Finland, a Finnish<br />
peculiarity, by using figures made by Tapio Lappi-Seppälä for other purposes. He uses them<br />
to prove that the increase of criminality in Finland is not a consequence of the crime policy<br />
which has decreased the number of prisoners.<br />
Figure 2<br />
Criminality has increased almost identically in four Nordic countries as the left picture shows<br />
(penal code offences; the level differences are mainly due to statistical systems). The picture<br />
on the right side shows that Finland is an exception: in Denmark, Norway and Sweden the<br />
number of prisoners has been almost constant, in Finland it has gone drastically down. Now,<br />
my question is: In which kind of society that kind of decrease in prison numbers as we have<br />
had in Finland is possible?<br />
My answer is: It is possible only in a society where criminality is not a major political<br />
question. Both the demand for harsh repressive measures and the possibilities to market the<br />
alternative crime prevention are based on the public concern on crime problems. In Finland<br />
crime issues have not been high on the political agenda. The Finns have lived too well with<br />
the existing criminality. That is the reason why our council has remained so diminutive.<br />
Time is changing. There are clear signs that the public concern on crime problems is<br />
increasing. I’m not unreservedly happy.<br />
The council was not planned to serve as a body with co-ordinating power in crime policy. The<br />
reason, I think, is that in Finland we traditionally don’t have an illusion of unrealistic<br />
consensus in criminal policy issues. Conflicting views on crime problems have been relatively<br />
open in our country, partly because the police belongs not to the Ministry of Justice, but the<br />
Ministry of Interior. At the same time there is a strong need for a forum for co-operation in<br />
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crime prevention. - Luckily conflicts in criminal policy issues haven’t got in Finland such<br />
kind of party political character we can find in several other countries.<br />
The mandate of the Finnish crime prevention council is limited. The statutory provision states<br />
that special attention should be paid to the possibilities to reduce crime by influencing<br />
conditions that cause crime. Our main focus is thus the s.c. situational crime prevention.<br />
The background for this limited mandate is officially that in the field of the situational crime<br />
prevention there was earlier no special planning body and therefore there was need to<br />
strengthen planning in this crime prevention strategy. There are other explanations, too. In the<br />
Finnish criminology a long tradition, longer and stronger than in other countries, has been to<br />
use the opportunity structure as the main explanation for the variations in crime. I refer<br />
especially to the work Patrik Törnudd has done in the Finnish criminology. The third<br />
explanation is that the mandate was very much written in Strasbourg, where I met frequently<br />
ex-director of the Swedish crime prevention council, Bo Svensson. According to him other<br />
approaches of crime prevention mainly lack the documented evidence of success.<br />
I’m proud of the work the Finnish council has done in the situational strategy in spite of it’s<br />
young age and minimal working resources. For example our study on situational prevention<br />
of economic crime is internationally the first comprehensive study in this field, as far as I<br />
know. Our report on bank robberies is a Finnish success story in crime prevention.<br />
The council is not a research unit, but planning unit. Borderline between planning and<br />
research is often vague because all good planning is based on research. However in principle<br />
there is a clear division of tasks and on the other side a tight co-operation between council<br />
and the criminological unit of the Research Institute of Legal Policy. The council <strong>works</strong><br />
physically and intellectually, but not administratively in the same environment. The situation<br />
has shown to be fruitful for both parts, not only for us. The council believes that it has a right<br />
to articulate crime prevention interests in the Finnish criminological research and therefore<br />
we subscribe research and provide financial support for it.<br />
The main task for our council under last one and half year has been drafting the national<br />
crime prevention program for Finland. The example we have used in our work is Swedish.<br />
That illustrates the value of the Nordic co-operation in crime prevention: in our countries it is<br />
not necessary to do the whole work every time right from the beginning, but we can often use<br />
the work already done in the other Nordic countries.<br />
Our council proposed to the Government that Finland should prepare a similar kind of crime<br />
prevention program Sweden have. The Government responded with enthusiasm and gave the<br />
council the drafting duty.<br />
Now the council’s work is almost done. The draft contains - not suprisingly - a lot of similar<br />
ideas as the Swedish program. But it is not a copy.<br />
In Finland we have been in that lucky situation that by beginning our work later than Sweden<br />
we have been able to “Sherman check” our proposals. At leats our proposals try to follow<br />
more close the ideal of evidence-based crime prevention than the Swedish program.<br />
That leads to the main point of my presentation:<br />
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While drafting the program and trying to use all information we have on effects of preventive<br />
measures, it was painful to notice how little we know. Perhaps we understand the criminal<br />
behavior relatively well. That’s good. But we have really limited knowledge of <strong>what</strong> <strong>works</strong>.<br />
The scientific base of the car traffic safety planning is essentially stronger: in traffic safety<br />
planning there is lot of evidence <strong>what</strong> <strong>works</strong> and this knowledge is well documented. I like to<br />
use car traffic safety as a comparison. The task of crime prevention is to prevent damages<br />
caused by crime analogically to the task of traffic safety planning to prevent damages caused<br />
by traffic accidents.<br />
In crime prevention there is an overflow of weak and unrealiable information, badly done<br />
evaluations, descriptions of enthuasiastic initiatives without any evidence of effects and, in<br />
the worst case, abused research. To manage this overflow of information has become more<br />
and more demanding task for us who try to take care honestly our duties in crime prevention<br />
and even keep the critical mind alive.<br />
<strong>Crime</strong> prevention has challenged criminology. It has done that in a new and more<br />
thoroughgoing way than traditional competing criminological theories of causes of<br />
criminality challeged each other. And, I will lastly point out, I’m not at all harnessing<br />
criminology to serve policy making only. The challenge comes from the pure scientific<br />
interests: it calls for development of criminological theories and methods.<br />
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Jan Georg Christophersen, Rådgiver<br />
Det Kriminalitetsforebyggende Råd<br />
PB 8005 dep., N-0030 Oslo<br />
Aktuelle kriminalitetsforebyggende tiltak i Norge<br />
Det kriminalitetsforebyggende råd (KRÅD) har et omfattende mandat. I dette ligger rådets<br />
overordnede mål. Samtidig sier mandatet noe om hvilke oppgaver rådet skal løse og hvordan<br />
de skal løses. Fordi mandatet er meget omfattende og ressursene relativt beskjedene, er det til<br />
enhver tid nødvendig å prioritere enkelte oppgaver framfor andre. Det er dette som er tilfelle<br />
i inneværende periode hvor hovedsatsingsområder er barn og unge. Men i tillegg til<br />
hovedfokus har rådet en lang rekke aktuelle prosjekt hvor siktemålet er forebygging av<br />
lovbrudd.<br />
1. Skolen som hovedtema<br />
Innledning<br />
Det kriminalitetsforebyggende råd (KRÅD) har for inneværende periode 1996 -1999 prioritert<br />
arbeid rettet mot barn og unge. Forebygging av lovbrudd blant barn og unge er et viktig tema,<br />
som også skolen gjennomgående vurderer som viktig. Når skolen ikke i særlig grad tar opp<br />
emner innefor feltet, skyldes det at det er læreplanen som styrer - og skal styre - skoles<br />
innhold. Dersom et emne har status som fag, vil det sikres bred og grundig behandling i<br />
skolen. Det er imidlertid mange prisverdige tiltak som ønsker innpass i skolen. Forebygging<br />
av lovbrudd må derfor stille i kø sammen med mange andre tema som ønsker seg en plass på<br />
skolens fagplan. Fagene i skolen er sterkt fastlagt, og rådet har ingen mulighet til å få inn et<br />
nytt fag. Rådets valg har derfor vært å lage et “tverrfaglig fag”. Ved å ta delemner fra seks av<br />
de sentrale fagene i skolen, har rådet satt sammen en plan for arbeidet med forebygging av<br />
lovbrudd. For hvert trinn fra 1. til 10. klasse angir planen emner av forebyggende karakter<br />
tilpasset alderstrinnet. Alle tema er laget på grunnlag av emner som allerede har plass i den<br />
nye læreplanen av 1997 (L97).<br />
Prosjektet handler om “god oppvekst og forebygging i skolen” som har fått navnet LEV VEL.<br />
Dette er betegnelsen på undervisningsmateriell til hjelp i det forebyggende arbeidet i skolen.<br />
Drivkraften i rådets arbeid med prosjektet er preget av omsorg for barn og unge, og et ønske<br />
om å bidra til å øke ungdommenes livskvalitet.<br />
Rådets håp er at skolens ledelse vil komme til at materiellet er et godt hjelpemiddel til å sette<br />
innsatsen på dette området i system. Undervisningsmateriellet er gratis og ble sendt ut til alle<br />
landets 3330 skoler i august 1997.<br />
Målet for skolesatsingen<br />
Kriminalitetsforebyggende arbeid i denne sammenheng handler om å hjelpe barn og unge til å<br />
utvikle en sunn personlighet. Hele skolemiljøet, hjemmene, fritid og nærmiljø er aktører som<br />
til sammen utgjør barns og unges oppvekstmiljø, og alle har viktige funksjoner i det<br />
forebyggende arbeidet. Skal de ulike aktørene dra i samme retning og utfylle hverandre, vil<br />
det være av stor verdi å ha kjennskap til hverandre og samordne arbeidet.<br />
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Rådet har erfaring for at skolene er reservert i forhold til emnet kriminalitet før tilfeller av<br />
lovbrudd er et faktum. Navn på materiellet tar blant annet av den grunn, utgangspunkt i å<br />
reflekterer både at rådet ønsker et bredt siktemål som tar vare på flere sider av elevenes<br />
utvikling, og som tar hensyn til skoles ønsker. Derfor fokuserer materiellet på det positive,<br />
ikke det problemorienterte. Rådets forslag til mål for skolens forebyggende virksomhet har<br />
fått følgende utforming:<br />
222<br />
- Gi elevene kunnskap om etiske spørsmål, prinsipper og vurderinger, samt hjelpe<br />
elevene til gjøre gode etiske valg.<br />
- Bidra til gode oppvekstforhold. Det gjelder elevenes oppvekstmiljø på skolen, i<br />
hjemmet og i fritiden, samt elevenes personlige vekst og utvikling.<br />
- Gi elevene kunnskaper om hva lovbrudd er og hvilke konsekvenser det kan få for<br />
utøver og offer, samt påvirke holdninger og atferd slik at elevene unngår å begå<br />
lovbrudd.<br />
Plan for det forebyggende arbeidet<br />
Forskning omkring barn og unges kriminalitet i Norge viser at det fra 1960 har vært<br />
total nedgang i den registrerte kriminalitet for aldersgruppen inntil 15 år. Det er kriminaliteten<br />
for gruppen over 15 år som har økt. Men tallene viser også at færre unge begår lovbrudd, med<br />
de lovbrudd de står for, er flere og mer omfattende (Clausen 1995). Dette kan indikere at det<br />
forebyggende arbeidet som allerede er gjort, til en viss grad har virket. Det foreligger i dag<br />
mye forskningsbasert kunnskap om barn og unges kriminelle atferd og hva som er årsakene til<br />
den. Spørsmålene blir derfor: Kan skolen bidra til å bryte noe av det skadelige mønster som<br />
enkelte havner i, og ikke minst hvordan kan skolen være med på å hindre at et slikt mønster<br />
utvikler seg?<br />
Det er kjent at flertallet av dem som har en kriminell løpebane, begynner denne i ung alder.<br />
Videre er det slik at den som for alvor har begynt med lovbrudd, ofte forblir i det kriminelle<br />
miljøet. Derfor må det forebyggende arbeidet begynne før den kriminelle løpebane starter.<br />
Hovedoppgaven blir slik rådet ser det å fokusere på hva som hjelper barn og unge til å leve et<br />
meningsfylt liv. Viktige stikkord i denne utviklingen blir identitet, egenverd, mestringsevne,<br />
grensesetting, utvikling av empati, sosial kompetanse, gruppetilhørighet, spenning og<br />
utfordring.<br />
Utvalget av stoff gjenspeiler målet om at gode oppvekstmiljø er den beste forebyggingen for<br />
normalelever på grunnskolenivå. Det er progresjon i vektleggingen fra småskolens vekt på<br />
positivt læremiljø fram til ungdomsskolens større vektlegging av problemområder.<br />
Med utgangspunkt i L 97 foreslår rådet i sin plan tre emner for hvert klassetrinn, og de fleste<br />
av disse er allerede godt kjent i skolen. Valget av emner ivaretar både variasjon og progresjon<br />
og gjenspeiler at det beste lovbruddsforebyggende tiltak er et godt oppvekstmiljø. Mange<br />
skoler har i dag undervisningsplaner innen sentrale holdningsskapende områder som<br />
rusmidler, trafikk og mobbing. Arbeidet med disse, eller lignende tema, kan lett integreres i<br />
rådets plan for forebygging. Skolen får på denne måten en helhetsplan for det forebyggende<br />
arbeidet.<br />
Den nye læreplanen for grunnskolen vektlegger tema- og prosjektarbeid. Dette vil være en<br />
egnet metode i rådets type arbeid fordi egendeltakelse og egenansvar står sentralt i et hvert<br />
prosjektarbeid. Rådets materiale er bygget opp for blant annet å kunne brukes i slik<br />
undervisning.<br />
Undervisningsmateriellet
NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Det er en rekke aktører på skolesektoren når det gjelder det kriminalitetsforebyggende<br />
arbeidet. Mange oppfatter det som om det foregår en konkurranse om å nå fram med sitt<br />
budskap. Alle har sine spesifikke behov for informasjon og praktiske ideer når det gjelder<br />
stoff og metode. Derfor vil aktørene ha behov for ulike hjelpemidler. Samtidig er det<br />
avgjørende at materiellet og aktiviteten til hver enkelt aktør er koordinert til en helhet. En<br />
komplett undervisningspakke i kriminalitetsforebyggende arbeid bør slik rådet ser det,<br />
inneholder en rekke elementer som blant annet tar for seg temaene mobbing, vold, rus,<br />
kriminalitet og rasisme. Det er utviklet egene undervisningspakker for småskoletrinnet,<br />
mellomtrinnet og ungdomstrinnet, som inneholder lærerveiledning, hefter og annet variert<br />
undervisningsmateriell tilpasset aldersgruppene. Materiellet kan brukes i den daglige<br />
undervisningen eller til tema- og prosjektarbeid. Som en del av skolepakken er det utarbeidet<br />
en egen plan for kriminalitetsforebyggende arbeid i skolen. Videre er det i samarbeid med<br />
Foreldreutvalget i grunnskolen laget et eget foreldrehefte med forslag til plan og emner for<br />
forebyggende tema i foreldreregi. Utvikling av pakken til nye områder, for eksempel<br />
videregående opplæring blir for tiden vurdert. LEV VEL er et samarbeidsprosjekt mellom:<br />
Det kriminalitetsforebyggende råd, Justisdepartementet, Kirke- utdannings- og<br />
forskningsdepartementet, Barne- og familjedepartementet, Sosial- og helsedepartementet,<br />
Kommunal- og regionaldepartementet, Regjeringens handlingsplan mot vold i bildemediene<br />
og grunnskolene.<br />
Evaluering av LEV VEL<br />
Evalueringen skal skje over 3 år. Møreforskning i Volda fikk i oppdrag å gjennomføre denne.<br />
Første trinn av evalueringen er avsluttet og gir oss data om hvordan LEV VEL ble mottatt og<br />
brukt i skolen. De to neste trinn av evalueringen vil bli gjennomført i 1998 og 1999.<br />
Svarprosenten på første del av undersøkelsen var 65 %. Det ser ut som LEV VEL er blitt godt<br />
mottatt av skolene, og mange har lagt konkrete planer for bruken av pakken. Svarene fordeler<br />
seg med 37 % fra barneskoler, 40 % fra ungdomsskoler og 21 % fra kombinerte barne- og<br />
ungdomsskoler. Dette er ganske likt det utvalget som fikk tilsendt spørreskjemaet. Svarene fra<br />
byskolene utgjør 60 % og fra landsskoler 40 %. Utvalget som spørreskjema var sendt ut til,<br />
var 73 % byskoler og 28 % landsskoler. Landsskolene svarer med andre ord svært bra på<br />
spørreskjemaet, med en svarprosent på 94. Fordelingen av responsen fra byskolene gir ca 1/3<br />
på hver av de tre typer skoler: sentrumsskoler, skoler ved bysentre og skoler som ligger<br />
utenfor bydelssentrum. Blant landsskolene ligger 42 % ved kommunesentrer, 38 % ved<br />
bygdesentrene, og 20 % ved skoler i utkantstrøk. Svarene fra by og land stemmer godt med<br />
det utvalget det ble sendt til. Fordelingen av svarene fra små skoler 23 %, fra mellomstore<br />
skoler 34 % og fra store skoler 43 %. Svarprosenten fra disse skolene stemmer også bra med<br />
utvalget som spørreskjemaet ble sendt til.<br />
Ved halvparten av skolene fikk det pedagogiske personalet forhåndsinformasjon om LEV<br />
VEL-pakken. De fleste fikk informasjonen om skolepakken på et lærermøte. Det var 87 % av<br />
respondentene som svarte at skolen hadde mottatt pakken, og 13 % svarte at de ikke hadde<br />
mottatt den. Det ble gitt informasjon om LEV VEL-pakken i både kollektive og individuelle<br />
fora., flertallet av skolene i kollektive fora. De fleste som mottok pakken, hadde altså<br />
behandlet den. Dette viser at skolene har stor interesse for LEV VEL-pakken. Det finnes en<br />
sammenheng mellom de skolene som ikke forhåndsinformerte personalet om LEV VELpakken<br />
våren 1997, og de skolene som ikke mottok skolepakken. Det kan indikere at enkelte<br />
skoler har administrative problemer. Skolene får tilsendt mange undervisningsopplegg<br />
gjennom året. Dette representerer i mange tilfeller et administrativt problem og et<br />
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kapasitetsproblem for skolene. Det finnes ingen sterke indikasjoner på at enkelte geografiske<br />
områder faller dårligere ut når det gjelder mottak av pakken.<br />
Undersøkelsen viser at 87 % vurdere pakken som svært nyttig. Dette bekreftes når 82 % skal<br />
bruke hele pakken eller deler av den. De fleste planla å bruke LEV VEL-pakken høsten 1997.<br />
Det var bare 3 % av de resterende skolene som hadde konkrete planer om å bruke pakken<br />
neste skoleår. Blant skolene som mottok LEV VEL-pakken, svarte 75 % at de kom til å bruke<br />
den i undervisningen. Det va16 % av de skolene som mottok pakken, som svarte at de ikke<br />
ønsket å bruke den. Det finnes ingen indikasjoner på at klassetrinn eller skolestørrelse har<br />
innvirkning på bruken av skolepakken. I materialet kommer det fram at uavhengig av<br />
klassetrinn eller størrelse vil om lag 80 % av skolene bruke skolepakken helt eller delvis.<br />
Det ser ut til at LEV VEL passer godt inn i skolenes nye årsplaner. Av respondentene svarte<br />
80 % at skolepakken enten passer “svært godt” eller “godt” inn i skolenes årsplaner.<br />
Det faglige innholdet vurderes som “veldig godt” eller “tilfredsstillende” av 62 % av skolene.<br />
Mange skoler hadde ikke gjort seg opp noen mening om dette ennå da pakken nylig var<br />
mottatt. Av de temaene som skolene pekte ut, var mobbing, rusmiddel, etikk og verdi og<br />
sosialiseringsprosesser de viktigste. Tallene viser at mange skoler er opptatt av<br />
allmenngyldige kategorier.<br />
De fleste skoler 97 % synes å være opptatt av kriminalitetsforebyggende arbeid. Det kommer<br />
også fram at skolene har egne handlingsplaner for forebyggende arbeid.<br />
Det er 85 % av skolene som mener at de har risikoelever. Disse skolene har som oftest et<br />
faglig opplegg for slike elever. Om lag 40 % mener at LEV VEL-pakken er nyttig for denne<br />
gruppen. Det er en jevn fordeling av yrkesgruppene innen skoleverket som arbeider med<br />
denne type elever. Om lag havparten av skilene har en koordinator ved skolen som er<br />
ansvarlig for arbeidet på feltet.<br />
Halvparten av skolene har registrert kriminalitet ved skolen. Tyveri og skadeverk er mest<br />
utbredt. Resultatet viser også at alvorlig mobbing, registrert som kriminalitet, representerer et<br />
mindre omfang. Skolene vurderer imidlertid mobbing generelt som et viktig tema i LEV<br />
VEL-pakken.<br />
De fleste skoler samarbeider med et eller flere eksterne organ. Samarbeidet med politi er mest<br />
vanlig. Det er 61 % av skolene som holder foreldremøter med forebyggende tema minst en<br />
gang i året.<br />
2. Strategier på kommunalt plan<br />
Både forskning og erfaring viser at det er klare sammenhenger mellom samfunnsstruktur og<br />
samfunnsutvikling, oppvekstmiljø og kriminalitetsutvikling. Forebygging av lovbrudd bør<br />
derfor rette seg både mot enkeltindivider og mot ulike samfunnsinstitusjoner og myndigheter<br />
lokal og sentralt. Derfor er arbeid i forhold til lokale miljø en viktig del av det<br />
kriminalitetsforebyggende arbeidet. Det krever blant annet samarbeid innad og på tvers av<br />
offentlige og private sektorer i kommunene. Rådet gjennomføret i perioden 1990-1993 et<br />
prosjekt kalt “Samordning av lokale kriminalitetsforebyggende tiltak” (SLT) i sju kommuner.<br />
Verdifull erfaring som ble vunnet gjennom prosjektet, er videreformidlet på flere måter. Rådet<br />
har siden den gang videreført arbeidet med å finne fram til tverretatlig samarbeidsformer i<br />
kommunene med tanke på forebygging av lovbrudd. Blant annet har rådet fått utviklet en<br />
“sjekkliste” for kommunalplanlegging hvor hensynet til plan- og bygningsloven når det<br />
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gjelder utforming av områder for bolig, næring og tjenesteyting ligger til grunn. Erfaringene<br />
fra SLT-prosjektet benyttes for å utvikle informasjonsmateriell for tverretatlig kommunalt<br />
samarbeid. Medvirkning på kommunale konferanser, informasjonsmøter og konsulentbistand<br />
er andre måter hvor kunnskapen om prosjektet formidles.<br />
Videre bistår rådet i arbeidet med å skolere sivilarbeidere i voldsforebyggende arbeid i<br />
kommunene. Det kriminalitetsforebyggende råd har videre sagt seg villig til å finansiere en<br />
evaluering av det arbeid som drives ved Siviltjenesteadministrasjonen - Hustad om “Vold og<br />
konfliktforebyggende tiltak blant ungdom” (VOKT). Evalueringen planlegges i disse dager og<br />
vil være igang fra januar 1999.<br />
Det kriminalitetsforebyggende råds “Nabohjelpsprosjekt” bør også nevnes i denne<br />
sammenheng. “Aksjon nabohjelp” ble startet i 1985 på initiativ fra Det<br />
kriminalitetsforebyggende råd, Justisdepartementet og Norges forsikringsforbund. I 1991<br />
inviterte Det kriminalitetsforebyggende råd landets politikamre til å finne prøveområder for<br />
“Prosjekt Nabohjelps-område”. Prosjektet er avslutte fra rådets side, men naboer har mange<br />
steder fortsatt nabohjelpen i samarbeid med politiet og kommunen. Rådets målsetting med<br />
prosjektet har vært at de som bor i området selv tar ansvar for utviklingen i nabolaget, prøver<br />
å skape bedre kontakt mellom naboene for å få ned frykt og kriminalitet. Rådet oppfordrer<br />
hvem som helst til å starte slike prosjekt. Det kan være boligbyggelag, borettslag,<br />
velforeninger eller privatpersoner. 50-100 husstander er ofte nok. Det<br />
kriminalitetsforebyggende råd har fortsatt å yte konsulentbistand og skriftlig materiell om<br />
nabohjelp og hvordan man kan ha nytte av det.<br />
3. Økonomisk kriminalitet<br />
En gang i året inviterer Det kriminalitetsforebyggende råd til konferanse om et tema knyttet<br />
til økonomisk kriminalitet. Målgruppen er næringslivet, offentlige etater, departement, politi,<br />
påtalemyndighet, rettsvesen og forskningsmiljø. Økokrimkonferanse gir anledning til å<br />
diskutere spørsmål som har sammenheng med bedriftenes lovbrudd. Det kan være nye<br />
problemstillinger eller “gamle” eller kanskje tidløse. Konferansen gir de som arbeider med<br />
forskning og utredning muligheter til å møte de som i praksis skal utøve kontroll. Det er med<br />
andre ord en kontaktkonferanse hvor mulighetene ligger godt til rette for å styrke nettverk og<br />
bygge nye relasjoner.<br />
Bedriftskriminalitet er et område man ikke “blir ferdig med”. Nye former for lovbrudd<br />
oppstår, andre metoder tas i bruk for å forebygge, perspektivene utvikles, tidligere<br />
arbeidsformer må revideres. Det kriminalitetsforebyggende råd ønsker gjennom de årlige<br />
konferansene å belyse ved foredrag og diskusjon det arbeids som gjøres i<br />
forskningsinstitusjoner og i kontrollorganene. Bekjempelse av bedriftenes kriminalitet har<br />
gjennom lang tid vært et satsingsområde for myndighetene. Hovedhensikten er å oppnå<br />
avskrekking og holdningsskapende effekt gjennom økt oppdagelsesriskiko og<br />
straffeforfølgning, samt å frata gjerningspersonen det økonomiske utbyttet.<br />
Kriminalitetsforebygging vil i tiden som kommer kreve stadig mer av helhetsløsninger.<br />
Bedriftslovbrudd må gis et ansikt slik at flest mulig bli klar over virkningene; nemlig at denne<br />
type overtredelser har flere offer enn noen annen form for lovbrudd - det rammer oss alle. Økt<br />
synlighet og bedre innsyn er slik rådet ser det måter å angripe problemet på.<br />
4. Forskning<br />
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Det kriminalietsforebyggende råd er avhengig av forskningsbasert kunnskap for å<br />
videreutvikle sin virksomhet. En rekke forskningsinstitusjoner har en vitenskapelig<br />
innfallsvinkel som er relevant for de forskjellige aspektene av rådets virksomhet. Det har<br />
derfor i inneværende periode vært tatt initiativ til forskningsprosjekt som kan belyse barn og<br />
unges kriminalitet, kriminalitetens årsaker, utvikling og effekten av tiltak. Mer konkret kan<br />
det nevnes at rådet har latt utarbeide en forskningsrapport med oversikt over og en vurdering<br />
av norske og nordiske forskningsprosjekter om kriminalitetsforebygging. Det<br />
kriminalitetsforebyggende råd har deltatt i finansieringen av et forskningsprosjekt om<br />
helerivirksomhet. Rådet har initiert et forskningsprosjekt som vil bli avsluttes i 1998 om<br />
gjengkulturens betydning for ungdomskriminaliteten. Videre evalueres skolepakken LEV<br />
VEL.<br />
5. Informasjon<br />
Informasjon er ett av rådets viktigste virkemidler som har en overgrepene funksjon for rådets<br />
satsningsområder. Rådet sørger for informasjon om kriminalitetsutviklingen og<br />
kriminalitetsforebyggende strategier og tiltak overfor virksomheter og publikum. En annen<br />
viktig oppgave er å gjøre rådet kjent som kompetansemiljø med kontaktnett til fagmiljøer som<br />
arbeider med kriminalitetsforebygging.<br />
Informasjonen fra rådet går til ulike målgrupper. De informasjonskanalene som anvendes er<br />
tradisjonelle massemedier, men moderne teknologi som Internett vil bli tatt i bruk i nær<br />
framtid. Informasjonen utformes som forskningsrapporter og populariserte utgaver av disse,<br />
bibliografier, brosjyremateriell rettet mot særskilte områder i samfunnet og<br />
konferanserapporter. Videre er møtedeltakelse og foredrag en måte som benyttes for å få ut<br />
informasjon.<br />
Rådet deler årlig ut en kriminalitetsforebyggende pris på NOK 50 000,-. En brosjyre om<br />
butikktyver og svinn er distribuert . Det har vært arrangert en konferanse med tema “Når det<br />
lovlige blir umoralsk” og en konferanserapport er distribuert.<br />
6. Internasjonalt samarbeid<br />
Internasjonalt samarbeid på det kriminalitetsforebyggende området tvinger seg fram som<br />
følge av en generell internasjonalisering. På nordisk nivå har det lenge vært et godt uformelt<br />
samarbeid. Et nordisk arbeidsutvalg har utvekslet informasjon om lokale strategier. Det<br />
kriminalitetsforebyggende råds intensjon med dette arbeidet er å innhente og gi informasjon.<br />
Rådet ser det som viktig å styrke samarbeidet mellom de nordiske rådene ved årlige møter og<br />
systematisk utveksling av kunnskap og erfaringer. Som eksempel på et konkret resultat av<br />
dette arbeidet kan nevnes engelsk oversettelse av dokumentet “The Nordic Model” hvor<br />
målgruppen er internasjonale organisasjoner.<br />
7. Avslutning<br />
Det kriminalpolitiske klimaet har i de senere årene blitt kjøligere. Krav på sterkere<br />
virkemidler og lov og orden framsettes på mange hold og har fått sterkere gjennomslag enn på<br />
lenge. Økte forholdsregler som samfunnets setter i verk for å bekjempe forbryterondet, ses av<br />
mange som den eneste rette veien å gå i bekjempelse av kriminaliteten i samfunnet. Det<br />
kriminalitetsforebyggende råd vurderer kontinuerlig de muligheter og begrensninger som<br />
ligger i det forebyggende arbeidet. Rådet er fullt på det rene med at kriminalitetsforebyggende<br />
tiltak bare er ett av flere virkemidler som samfunnet bør sette inn for effektivt å løse<br />
samfunnets problem.<br />
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Referanser<br />
Clausen, Stein-Erik: Barne- og ungdomskriminalitet i Norge, 1980-1992. Norsk Institutt for<br />
by- og regionforskning (NIBR), Rapport 1996:4, Os, lo1996.<br />
Nolet, Ronald og Elrid Digernes: Evaluering av skolepakken LEV VEL: en kartlegging av<br />
bruken av indervisningsmaterialet LEV VEL i grunnskolen i Norge 1997, 1998.<br />
227
NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Karl Steinar Valsson, Superintendent<br />
Reykjavik Police<br />
Hverfisgötu 115, IS-150 Reykjavik<br />
e-mail: karlsteinar@police.is<br />
228<br />
<strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> in Iceland<br />
In contrast to the other Nordic countries, in Iceland there is no central organisation whose task<br />
is to prevent crime. Recently the Minestry of Health has establish a separate committee,<br />
Icelands´s Council for the prevention of the use of drugs. Still there is a willing to put forward<br />
a proposal for a Committee covering all forms of crime prevention.<br />
In 1988 a separate department was established under the Chief of Police in Reykjavík. The<br />
main intention was that the department was to take care of public relation and crime<br />
prevention work. Since then this deparment has increased in size and judies. Currently 11<br />
officers and one sociologist are working for the department. The ideology behind the job is<br />
community policing in a broad perspective. The department has put forward many different<br />
programs in schools, for parents and others in different fields of crime prevention.<br />
The focus on crime prevention has for a long time often been on particular types of crime, but<br />
not all known criminal activities. In my piont of view there is a need of change here, having<br />
the officers looking at the preventional part of all crimes they are handling. What I have in<br />
mind is that an officer takes into consideration when he is investigating a case how that<br />
particular activity could be prevented. By doing this we would have much more active work<br />
in this field and hopefully better results.<br />
In Iceland there are also many other groups and agencies that work in the field of crime<br />
prevention. Most of them focus on the narcodic field but some having broader view. The City<br />
of Reykjavík is participating with the ECAD organisation (European Cities of Drugs) on a<br />
project to fight against drug use in Iceland.
NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Bodil Karlsh j Poulsen, Kontorchef<br />
Direktoratet for Sundhed og Forskning, Hjemmestyret på Gr nland<br />
Boks 1160, Grønland-3900 Nuuk<br />
e-mail: bkp@sundhed.hotel.gh.gl<br />
og<br />
Elisæus Kreutzmann, Kriminalforsorgsleder<br />
Kriminalforsorgen i Grønland<br />
Boks 139, Grønland-3900 Godthåb<br />
Gr nlandskort med angivelse af byer og bygder<br />
af Bodil Karlshøj Poulsen<br />
Bodil Karlsh j Poulsen, kontorchef i Direktoratet for Sundhed og Forskning, hvor jeg er<br />
leder af det centrale forebyggelseskontor PAARISA (•lad os passe p hverandre•).<br />
Jeg vil kort fort lle lidt om m lsætningerne for det forebyggende arbejde, s tte nogle tal p<br />
vore problemfelter og fort lle, hvorledes vi har organiseret forebyggelsen.<br />
Gr nland har tilsluttet sig Ottawa Chartret om sundhedsfremme. Det betyder, at vi har<br />
forpligtiget os til:<br />
- at styrke indsatsen i lokalsamfundet,<br />
- at udvikle de personlige f rdigheder,<br />
- at skabe st ttende milj er,<br />
- at udvikle en sundhedsfremmende politik.<br />
Landsstyrets har opsat en r kke m ls tninger for det forebyggende arbejde.<br />
• Misbrug af hash, tobak og alkohol skal v re v sentligt formidsket inden rtusindskiftet.<br />
Hash/cannabis er totalforbudt i Gr nland. Det er indtil videre det eneste narkotika i landet og<br />
m siges at v re s rdeles udbredt. 75% af de 17- rige drenge angav ved en unders gelse i<br />
1994 at have pr vet at ryge hash. Blandt de voksne oplyste ca 20% at have r get hash mere<br />
end n gang.<br />
Tobak: 80% af befolkningen er rygere.<br />
Alkohol: vores st rste •fjende•. Alkoholforbruget er g et drastisk ned fra godt 22 l ren<br />
alkohol pr voksen indbygger i 1980'erne til 12,6 l i dag.<br />
Der gennemf res i 1998 ved NAD i samarbejde med Gr nlands Hjemmestyre, Politi og<br />
Kriminalforsorg en unders gelse af befolkningens brug af og holdninger til alkohol og hash.<br />
* Borgernes egenomsorg og lokal sundhedsfremme skal styrkes.<br />
* Bygdernes sundhedsforhold skal forbedres.<br />
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Der udgives et sundhedsblad •PAARISA-avisen•, med generelt sundhedsoplysende indhold.<br />
Derudover udgives en r kke pjecer og information gennem radio og TV. Et af de forhold, der<br />
fordyrer og vanskeligg r information, er, at alt materiale skal udgives p to sprog:<br />
gr nlandsk og dansk.<br />
* Omsorgen for uf dte, sp de og sm b rn samt deres m dre skal h jnes.<br />
* Antallet af u nskede graviditeter skal nedbringes.<br />
Antal aborter er lig med antal f dsler. Is r en del voksne kvinder benytter sig af abort som<br />
pr vention.<br />
• Det nuv rende niveau for k nssygdomme skal reduceres. HIV-smittespredningen skal<br />
begr nses mest muligt, og omsorgen for HIV-smittede og AIDS-syge skal forbedres.<br />
HIV spredes fortrinsvist gennem heteroseksuelle forhold. Der er ingen spr jtenarkomaner i<br />
Gr nland. Gennemsnitsalderen for smittede ligger omkring 49 r. Der arbejdes intensivt p<br />
oplysningskampagne over for de unge og voskne for at f stoppet smittespredningen.<br />
* Antallet af ulykker herunder brandulykker skal nedbringes.<br />
* Tiltagene til forebyggelse af det uforholdsm ssigt store antal selvmord is r blandt<br />
unge skal intensiveres.<br />
Vi oplever omkring 50 selvmord om ret, hvilket er en meget h j rate i et land med 55000<br />
indbyggere. Der gennemf res kurser for ressourcepersoner og er udgivet en pjece som<br />
opfordrer til at tale om problemet.<br />
Vi tror p , at forebyggelse skal ske lokalt. Der bliver i disse r ansat en forebyggelseskonsulent<br />
i hver kommune. Det lokale netv rk best r af samarbejde mellem sundhedsv sen,<br />
skoler, politi, kriminalforsorg og kommunernes socialforvaltninger. Dette samarbejde n rer<br />
vi stor tiltro til. Vi tror p , at et godt helbred og sikring af arbejde til alle er den bedste<br />
kriminalpr ventive indsats, vi kan yde og l gger derfor vore kr fter i at sikre alle sundhed<br />
og arbejde.<br />
230<br />
Kriminalpræventivt arbejde i Grønland<br />
af Elisæus Kreutzmann<br />
I tilslutning til Bodil Karlshøj Poulsens indlæg, kan jeg supplerende fortælle lidt om SSPK’s<br />
tilblivelse i Grønland.<br />
Under et landsdækkende socialchefmøde i 1986 var der nogen fra Hjemmestyret og Nuuk<br />
kommune, der efterlyste en mere fremadrettet og mere forebyggende indsats frem for, at vi<br />
hele tiden lavede lappeløsninger.<br />
På baggrund heraf tog Nuuk kommune initiativ til at starte SSP-arbejdet. Der blev sendt en<br />
delegation afsted til Danmark, hvor kriminalforsorgen deltog. Derfor kom det til at hedde<br />
SSPK.
NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
I 1988 startede SSPK officielt i Nuuk kommune, og har siden udviklet sig meget. I dag har vi<br />
et særskilt sekretariat under socialforvaltningen, hvor der er ansat 3 medarbejdere, ligesom<br />
man nu har fået ansat 7 miljømedarbejdere.<br />
Der har været gennemført mange projekter i løbet af årene, og dem kan man læse om i<br />
brochurer m.m.<br />
Resten af Grønland blev herefter inspireret i alle former for forebyggelse. Det er meget<br />
forskelligt fra kommune til kommune, ligesom andre interesseorganisationer også kører en<br />
anden form for forebyggelse.<br />
Den grønlandske Retsvæsenskommission har i sit arbejde drøftet kriminalitetsforebyggende<br />
arbejde, og har således indhentet oplysninger fra forskellige kommuner.<br />
Herefter har kommissionen lavet et forslag om, hvorledes et landsdækkende kriminalpræventivt<br />
arbejde eventuelt kunne se ud.<br />
Kommissionen udgiver sin betænkning i år 2000.<br />
231
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Ingrid Sahlin, dr. fil.<br />
Brottsförebyggande rådet<br />
Boks 6494, S-11382 Stockholm<br />
e-mail: ingrid.sahlin@brottsforebygganderadet.se<br />
232<br />
Inverterad prevention<br />
Inledning<br />
Syftet att förebygga brott är så att säga positivt per definition och brottsprevention fungerar<br />
som ett slags argument för verksamheter som kanske både bedrivs och avvecklas främst av<br />
andra skäl och med andra konsekvenser. Det verkar finnas politiska "konjunkturer" inte bara<br />
för hur viktigt det är att förebygga brott, utan också för hur det skall ske. Metoder glöms bort,<br />
lyfts fram, döps om, läggs ned eller återupptas relativt oberoende av deras effekter på<br />
brottsligheten, och det är oklart om forskningen är orsak till eller verkan av denna<br />
förändringsprocess.<br />
När jag i slutet av 1995 började arbeta på BRÅ pågick diskussioner om ett nationellt<br />
brottsförebyggande program, som antogs 1996 (Allas vårt ansvar, Ds 1996:59), då också en<br />
kommitté för brottsförebyggande arbete bildades för att genomföra det på lokal nivå. Jag fick<br />
intrycket att brottsförebyggande arbete hade en helt annan innebörd än det haft fem år tidigare,<br />
då jag för BRÅ:s räkning studerat 1980-talets lokalt förebyggande ungdomsprojekt i<br />
samverkan (Sahlin 1992). Bland annat skildes brottsprevention ut från andra former av<br />
prevention (av t.ex. missbruk och psykisk ohälsa) på ett sätt som jag inte kände igen, andra<br />
aktörer och verksamheter dominerade i projekten och tidsperspektivet framstod som starkt<br />
förkortat: gränsen mellan att förebygga och omedelbart förhindra brott föreföll utsuddad.<br />
Begreppsapparaten var också förändrad. Grovt uttryckt verkade "brottsprevention" i mitten på<br />
1990-talet framför allt associeras med situationell prevention i polisens regi och "tidiga<br />
åtgärder" med speciella behandlingsprogram för "diagnosbarn" (barn med DAMP, ADHD<br />
e.d.), medan föräldrars uppfostran av och uppsikt över sina barn kallades "social brottsprevention".<br />
Det område jag själv studerat – projekt som försökte engagera, sysselsätta och/eller<br />
kontrollera ungdomsgrupper i frivilliga aktiviteter – nämndes knappast längre, och inte heller<br />
strukturella insatser för bättre uppväxtvillkor.<br />
Denna eventuella betydelseglidning sammanföll med en allmän nedrustning av generell<br />
socialpolitik och offentliga verksamheter för barn och ungdom, t.ex. fritidshem och fritidsgårdar,<br />
som en gång motiverats bland annat just med sin (brotts-)förebyggande funktion. Att<br />
detta pågick samtidigt som regeringen och olika statliga och kommunala myndigheter verkade<br />
betona behovet av brottsprevention mer än någonsin framstod för mig som en paradox.<br />
Avvecklingen av "brottsförebyggande" verksamheter rymdes helt enkelt inte i<br />
brottspreventionens diskurs.<br />
Det är denna paradoxala situation, dess bakgrund och konsekvenser som är temat för mitt<br />
paper. Efter en skissartad redovisning av det senaste decenniets förändringar i<br />
brottspreventionens inriktning och begreppsapparat samt dess förhållande till kriminologisk<br />
forskning kommer jag att koncentrera mig på vad jag kallat inverterad brottsprevention. Det<br />
handlar alltså om svårigheter att synliggöra, konceptualisera och beforska åtgärder och beslut
NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
som åtminstone hypotetiskt kan öka brottsligheten.1<br />
De förändrade förutsättningarna<br />
Oavsett hur man benämner och bedömer den, torde det inte råda någon oenighet om att det<br />
svenska samhället, liksom de flesta andra välfärdsstater undergått en genomgripande förändring<br />
under det senaste decenniet. Detta systemskifte har bland annat inneburit ökade<br />
inkomstklyftor, nedskärningar i olika trygghets- och bidragssystem (SOU 1995:104, s. 57ff.),<br />
skärpt bostadssegregation (SOU 1996:156, s. 28) och en minskad offentlig sektor, dvs.<br />
billigare skolor, sjukvård, barn- och äldreomsorg etc. Även socialtjänsten har sparat, vilket<br />
bland annat lett till att det blivit svårare att få bistånd och att bidragsnivåerna sänkts.<br />
Samtidigt som arbetslösheten under 1990-talet varit mycket hög bland ungdomar har deras<br />
möjligheter till arbetslöshetsersättning minskat (SOU 1996:111, s. 267ff.). Barnomsorg och<br />
fritidshem har blivit dyrare (SOU 1997:61, s. 80) och personaltätheten har minskat (ibid., s.<br />
76 ff.); många fritidshem har lagts ned och resurser för barn med särskilda behov har minskat.<br />
I skolorna har klasstorleken ökat och specialundervisningen minskat, liksom<br />
elevvårdsresurser och antalet lärarledda timmar/elev (Skolverket 1996).<br />
Brottspreventionen<br />
Samtidigt har brottspreventionens inriktning förändrats. Några dimensioner, enligt vilka man<br />
kan klassificera brottsförebyggande verksamhet, är dess mål – vari problemdefinitionen ingår<br />
– aktörer och objekt, framtidshorisonter, grad av selektivitet/ generalitet och metoder. Även<br />
om jag inte haft möjlighet att mer ingående studera förändringar i det brottsförebyggande<br />
arbetet (vilket dessutom är svårt att göra av skäl som snart framgår) vill jag tentativt hävda att<br />
det förändrats med avseende på de flesta av dessa faktorer.<br />
Många forskare har diskuterat preventionens utveckling i termer av kontrasterande preventionsmodeller<br />
(t.ex. Balvig 1979-80, DeWild 1980), och trots att de ovan nämnda<br />
dimensionerna är relativt oberoende av varandra menar jag att de kan användas för att<br />
konstruera idealtyper av brottsprevention, och jag föreslår här följande fyra modeller:<br />
1 De resonemang jag kommer att presentera baseras på delar (framför allt kapitel 5) av ett manuskript, "Brottsprevention<br />
– en utredning av ett begrepp och dess begränsningar" (Sahlin 1998), som syftade till att bringa reda i<br />
hur "brottsprevention" förhåller sig till "tidiga åtgärder mot brott", undersöka hur man analyserat och klassificerat<br />
olika former av brottsprevention och utveckla redskap för en historisk studie av brottspreventionens idémässiga<br />
och praktiska utveckling. Rapporten, som också tog upp etiska aspekter på brottsförebyggande arbete, skrevs<br />
inom ramen för det nyligen nedlagda projektet Tidiga åtgärder vid Brottsförebyggande rådet.<br />
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234<br />
Överordnade värden<br />
individens utvecklingsamhällets ordning<br />
_____________________________________________________________________<br />
individers 1 2<br />
beteenden socialisation kontroll<br />
Föränd- 1980-tal 1990-tal<br />
rings- ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––-----------------------<br />
objekt<br />
3 4<br />
förutsättningar för strukturer / miljö organisation / lagstiftning<br />
beteendepåverkan 1960-70-tal 1990-tal<br />
Figur 1. En typologi av preventionsmodeller efter värden och förändringsobjekt.<br />
De två modellerna i det översta fältet, nämligen 1) socialisation (uppfostran, stimulans<br />
och/eller utbildning av barn; lång framtidshorisont) och 2) kontroll (bevakning [av potentiella<br />
brottsobjekt och platser] / övervakning [av individer, särskilt ungdomar] / kontroll via<br />
information och repression; kort framtidshorisont.) är båda orienterade direkt mot individer<br />
för att påverka deras beteende på lång respektive kort sikt. Man kan också tänka sig ett<br />
mellanläge, "distraktion", som omfattar försök att engagera ungdomar i drogfria aktiviteter för<br />
att hålla dem borta från frestelser och kriminogena miljöer.<br />
De övriga två modellerna syftar till att skapa bättre förutsättningar för ett förändrat beteende,<br />
dvs. de är indirekta och inriktade på 3) strukturer / miljö (att skapa "goda uppväxtvillkor",<br />
jämlika levnadsförhållanden, välfungerande bostadsområden och skolor m.m. för att skapa<br />
förutsättningar för barns och ungdomars positiva utveckling) eller 4) organisation /<br />
lagstiftning (att öka effektiviteten hos myndigheter och deras instrument för brottsprevention).<br />
Modellerna skiljer sig åt beträffande samhälls- och människosyn: Medan (1) och framför allt<br />
(3) bygger på en ganska optimistisk syn på individens möjligheter att utvecklas i en ickekriminell<br />
riktning, givet att hon erbjuds goda förutsättningar, implicerar framför allt (2) att<br />
brott begås om man inte riskerar att bli upptäckt, dvs. ett kontrollteoretiskt perspektiv. Den<br />
andra och fjärde modellen sätter i praktiken samhällets ordning som mål och preventionen är<br />
därmed ofta mer snävt inriktad på brott, än i de två övriga.2<br />
Enligt min uppfattning dominerades 1960- och 1970-talets utbyggnad av välfärdsstaten av en<br />
föreställning om att förbättrade strukturer och bättre uppväxtmiljöer för (alla) barn och<br />
ungdomar indirekt förebyggde brott (3). Att "förbättra uppväxtförhållandena" hörde enligt<br />
Socialtjänstpropositionen "till de bästa förebyggande insatser som kan göras" (prop.<br />
1979/80:1, s. 251). Mer konkret förordades en socialpolitik som sörjde för att barnfamiljer<br />
hade en god ekonomi och att socialbidrag beviljades även till sådant som lekredskap och<br />
2 Jag är medveten om att denna indelning inte är exklusiv och att det finns många gränsfall och gråzoner, men<br />
jag menar ändå att den fungerar hjälpligt för att sammanfatta den svenska brottspreventionens utidshistoria.
NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
sportutrustning. Dessutom hade "förskole- och fritidshemsverksamheten, den sociala hemhjälpen,<br />
föräldrautbildningen och fritidsverksamheten /.../ givetvis också en klart förebyggande<br />
karaktär" (ibid, s. 253), liksom kommunernas fritids- och kulturverksamhet:<br />
allt<br />
“Kommunernas förebyggande arbete för barn och ungdom är enligt min mening en av<br />
de viktigaste uppgifterna som kommunerna har. Denna är emellertid inte bara<br />
socialtjänstens uppgift. Som socialutredningen också pekat på har det i kommunerna<br />
vuxit fram en omfattande förebyggande barn- och ungdomsverksamhet, där framför<br />
fritids- och kulturnämnderna tillsammans med de sociala organen har deltagit i<br />
uppbyggnadsarbetet.” (ibid, s. 254).<br />
1980-talets brottsprevention karaktäriserades mer av åtgärder som innebar och syftade till<br />
socialisation – och i viss mån distraktion – av ungdomar genom att öka deras delaktighet i<br />
"vuxensamhället" och deras medansvar för den "lokala miljön" (1). Men målet med denna<br />
delaktighet växlade mellan att tillerkänna ungdomar inflytande över samhället å ena sidan,<br />
och att anpassa och inlemma dem i samhället, så som det redan var strukturerat och<br />
organiserat, å andra sidan. Den senare varianten, som alltså var mer orienterad mot "uppfostran"<br />
vann successivt mark i slutet av 1980-talet. Under hela 1980-talet förekom också rikligt<br />
med förebyggande ungdomsprojekt som mest syftade till distraktion, såsom drogfria danser<br />
och olika fritidsaktiviteter i föreningsregi (Sahlin 1992). Mot slutet av decenniet växte nya<br />
former av brottsprevention fram, mer inriktade på övervakning och direkt kontroll, om än<br />
ännu främst genom informella aktörer, t.ex. föräldravandringar (2) (ibid.).3<br />
Med hänvisning till bl.a. det svenska Nationella brottsförebyggande programmets (Allas vårt<br />
ansvar, Ds 1996:59) tonvikt vid situationell prevention och kontroll av ungdomar och den<br />
positiva uppmärksamhet New York-polisens nolltoleransstrategi rönt i landet hävdar jag att<br />
tonvikten vid ett "försvar" av samhällets ordning genom ökad kontroll av platser och individer<br />
(2) accentuerats mer under 1990-talet, samtidigt som åtgärderna blivit mer kortsiktiga, så att<br />
social kontroll förväntas förhindra så att säga själva genomförandet av avvikande handlingar.<br />
I Sverige pågår f.n. försöksverksamhet med "nolltolerans" efter New-York-polisens modell i<br />
bl.a. Eskilstuna (Wikström, Dolmén & Fermefors 1997) och Stockholm. Enligt förespråkare<br />
för modellen (t.ex. Wilson & Kelling 1982, 1989; Kelling & Coles 1996) bör (lokal-<br />
)samhällets intressen ha företräde framför individernas frihet och rättigheter och ordningen<br />
upprätthållas genom kontroll och ingripanden, som förväntas ge omedelbara resultat i form av<br />
minskad brottslighet.<br />
Därutöver förefaller 1990-talets brottsprevention i Sverige kännetecknas av omstruktureringar<br />
av myndigheternas organisation och lagändringar för att samordna och/eller effektivisera<br />
myndigheternas kontroll, något som bl.a. märks i polisens inriktning på s.k. problemorienterat<br />
arbete, närpolisorganisationen och inrättandet av lokala brottsförebyggande råd och annan<br />
formaliserad myndighetssamverkan mot brott (4).<br />
3 Ett tragikomiskt exempel är ett bostadsområde i Malmö, som varit föremål för en rad förebyggande projekt<br />
under 1980-talet vilka omfattade allt från upprustning av utemiljön, uppbyggnad av ett lokalt föreningsliv samt<br />
aktiviteter och samlingslokaler för såväl vuxna som ungdomar i områdets centrum. Det senaste ungdomsprojektet<br />
avbröts dock i början av 1990-talet, varefter närpolisen flyttade in i den nedlagda Folkets husföreningens lokaler.<br />
235
NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Däremot är det mitt intryck att möjligheten att förebygga brott genom att förändra samhällets<br />
strukturer och institutioner för att förbättra individernas uppväxtvillkor och välfärd (3)<br />
praktiskt taget glömts bort under 1990-talet.<br />
Brottspreventionsforskningen<br />
Analysen av brottsprevention förändras med – och förändrar – dess inriktning. En vanlig<br />
indelning, hämtad från framför allt psykiatrisk och medicinsk prevention, var förr primär,<br />
sekundär och tertiär prevention. De särskiljs inte bara genom sitt avstånd till den tänkta<br />
tidpunkt, då problemet förväntas komma till uttryck i faktiska avvikelser, utan också genom<br />
målgruppens bredd. Primär prevention har alltså den bredaste målgruppen och den längsta<br />
framtidshorisonten, sekundär prevention är inriktad på riskgrupper och tertiär prevention<br />
handlar om att förebygga återfall i t.ex. brott för små grupper av identifierade personer.<br />
Men denna klassifikation är inte längre så lätt att applicera på åtgärder som syftar till att<br />
förebygga brott, nu är det vanligare att dessa klumpas ihop i "social prevention" som<br />
kontrasteras mot situationell prevention. Det senare innebär ofta att man har en bred och<br />
ospecificerad målgrupp medan framtidsperspektivet är extremt kort, det kan t.ex. handla om<br />
att förhindra skadegörelse genom att sätta in bevakning som ökar upptäcktsrisken eller<br />
stängsel som försvårar genomförande av brott. Begreppet "tidiga insatser" implicerar<br />
visserligen ett långt framtidsperspektiv, men ofta avses identifierade barn i riskzonen för en<br />
negativ utveckling, t.ex. barn med DAMP, och specifika professionella insatser för dessa, dvs.<br />
egentligen sekundär prevention. Det är svårt att idag hitta exempel på primär<br />
brottspreventioni myndigheternas förslag och rekommendationer.<br />
Brottspreventionens teori och praktik är relativt oberoende av teorier om brottslighetens<br />
orsaker. Under den långa uppbyggnaden av välfärdsstaten och utbyggnaden av den offentliga<br />
sektorn framstod de möjligen som nära lierade, men det senaste decenniet har samhällsförändringarna<br />
antagit en annan karaktär och riktning, och övergripande politiska beslut<br />
har ofta inneburit att institutioner, som tillkommit för att förebygga olika slags problem och<br />
förbättra uppväxtförhållanden för barn och ungdom, avvecklats, begränsats eller fått sänkta<br />
anslag. Klyftan mellan brottsprevention och teorier om brottsligheten i en sådan period av<br />
nedskärningar har ökat men samtidigt osynliggjorts. Brottsprevention associeras idag ofta till<br />
kortsiktiga polisinsatser och tekniskt brottsskydd, och det finns en risk att de pågående<br />
förändringarna inom social omsorg och service varken studeras eller utvärderas med avseende<br />
på sina effekter för den framtida brottsligheten. En förklaring till denna divergens är att<br />
forskning om brottsprevention i hög och kanske växande grad är knuten till regeringens behov<br />
av underlag för och utvärderingar av sina egna brottspreventiva åtgärder. Forskning om<br />
brottsförebyggande åtgärder är med andra ord beroende av vilka brottsförebyggande åtgärder<br />
som faktiskt sätts in – och det avgörs i sin tur av politiska, ekonomiska och<br />
legitimitetsrelaterade faktorer.<br />
Ju mer forskning om brottsprevention knyts till utvärderingar av brottsförebyggande projekt<br />
(som inte initierats som forskningsprojekt), desto mer kan man anta att denna forskning<br />
orienteras mot det som är politiskt relevant och gångbart nog att bli föremål för<br />
försöksverksamheter.<br />
Syfte kontra effekter<br />
Enligt t.ex. Wikström m.fl. (1994, s. 20; 1995, s. 13) är brottsprevention åtgärder som minskar<br />
indviders benägenhet att begå brott eller tillfällena till brott. Samtidigt definieras begreppet<br />
236
NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
som åtgärder som "syftar till att påverka de kriminogena faktorerna, dvs. de faktorer som<br />
främjar eller hämmar människors brottsliga beteenden" (min kursivering; Wikström m.fl.<br />
1994, s. 20).<br />
Men syfte och effekter är inte samma sak. Allt går inte som man tänkt sig, och effekter uppstår<br />
även utan avsikt. Det innebär att förhållanden och verksamheter som redan etablerats av<br />
andra skäl kan komma att benämnas som förebyggande – och vice versa, sådant som tidigare<br />
betraktats som förebyggande, förlorar denna beteckning. Härav följer också att det kan finnas<br />
"faktiskt" brottsförebyggande verksamheter som ännu inte, eller inte längre, uppmärksammats<br />
som sådana.<br />
En verksamhet kan ursprungligen ha tillkommit med (helt eller delvis) brottsförebyggande<br />
syfte, men sedan ha permanentats pga. andra funktioner – och vice versa, som när straff i<br />
efterhand tillskrivs individualpreventiva effekter.4 Om man alltså skiljer mellan vad som<br />
tillkommit i uttalat brottsförebyggande syfte (vilket ofta gäller projekt idag) och vad som de<br />
facto har brottsförebyggande effekter, oavsett syfte och huvudfunktion, så kan det visa sig att<br />
det handlar om olika insatser eller verksamheter. Daghem betecknas som offentlig omsorg<br />
och service, deras huvudsyfte är att ge barn tillsyn och stimulans och underlätta förvärvsarbete<br />
hos föräldrarna. Ändå kan de ha brottsförebyggande effekter (se t.ex. Balvig 1979-80).<br />
"Är behandling utan resultat behandling?" frågar Bergmark och Oskarsson (1994, s. 60) i en<br />
artikel om alkoholvård, och svarar själva att eftersom så få verksamheter har säkra resultat<br />
kan detta inte vara ett nödvändigt kriterium på behandling. En verkningslös samtalsterapi<br />
måste ändå, som aktivitet, beskrivas som terapi. <strong>Prevention</strong>sbegreppet används visserligen<br />
sällan som ensam beteckning på en aktivitet som sådan, men i likhet med<br />
behandlingsbegreppet förutsätter det inte att företeelsen i fråga är framgångsrik.<br />
Ett syfte kan vara primärt eller sidoordnat. Sveri (1962) kallar bättre bostadsplanering, organiserad<br />
fritidsverksamhet, höjd levnadsstandard och liknande insatser som "inte direkt syftar till<br />
att minska brottsligheten men som man antar (åtminstone på längre sikt) skall ha sådan<br />
effekt" för "indirekt förebyggande åtgärder", till skillnad från de "direkt förebyggande",<br />
såsom "mer intensiv polisbevakning, kontroll med ungdomens alkoholvanor, inrättande av<br />
ungdomsgårdar i områden med hög kriminalitetsfrekvens", vilka alltså vidtas i<br />
brottspreventivt syfte (Sveri 1962, s. 36).<br />
En verksamhets beteckning svarar ofta mot dess öppna syfte och varierar därmed med<br />
politiska och ideologiska konjunkturer ("tidsanda"), maktförhållanden och finansieringsmöjligheter.<br />
I tider med mycket pengar och engagemang för brottspreventiva ändamål kan<br />
verksamheter (projekt och reguljära) som betecknas som brottsförebyggande antas öka. Men<br />
det är för den skull inte säkert att omfattningen av verksamheter med brottsförebyggande<br />
effekter är större i sådana perioder. Dels kan man komma att använda beteckningen för<br />
verksamheter som hittills bedrivits med andra syften och som kanske saknar<br />
brottsförebyggande effekter, dels kan verksamheter som faktiskt förebygger brott samtidigt<br />
avvecklas av andra skäl.<br />
4 Att "orsaken till någontings uppkomst och den slutliga nyttan, den faktiska användningen av detta något och<br />
inordnandet av det i ett system av ändamål" är helt olika saker, betonade redan Nietzsche ([1887] 1994), eftersom<br />
det "förhandenvarande, något som redan kommit till stånd, alltid på nytt tas i bruk för nya ändamål av en eller<br />
annan överlägsen makt, tas i beslag och utnyttjas för nya syften" (ibid., s. 84 f).<br />
237
NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
I ett samhälle eller i en tidsperiod där värdet av "lag och ordning" betonas finns det ofta ett<br />
stort intresse för brottsbekämpning,5 samtidigt som det finns ett ideologiskt motstånd mot<br />
vissa verksamheter, oavsett deras eventuella brottsförebyggande verkan. Insatser för att förbättra<br />
barns utvecklingsmöjligheter (t.ex. förskola) är exempelvis, enligt Farrington (1995, s.<br />
346) svåra att "sälja" till politiker som brottsprevention, eftersom det tar tid innan man ser<br />
resultaten av dem. En satsning på situationella faktorer kan däremot ge både snabba och<br />
mätbara resultat, och passar därmed bättre i "projektformen" (se även Gilling 1994, s. 243).<br />
Såväl syften och beteckningar som funktioner och effekter avseende en verksamhet kan<br />
förändras över tid – och i olika takt. Vid någon given tidpunkt eller ur någon synvinkel kan de<br />
stämma överens, men vanligen överlappar de inte varandra helt. Det kan t.ex. finnas element i<br />
skolundervisningen som betecknas som brottsförebyggande tills det står klart att de inte har<br />
någon sådan verkan, eller tills de av andra skäl avvecklas. Samma verksamhet kan alltså i en<br />
tid betecknas som brottsförebyggande, och i en annan som något helt annat, t.ex. straff,<br />
omsorg, service, utbildning, kultur eller fritidssysselsättning – medan andra inslag kan minska<br />
brottsligheten utan att någonsin kallas brottsförebyggande, eftersom de har ett annat<br />
huvudsyfte som inte ifrågasätts.<br />
Även om en "åtgärds"- och "syftesorienterad" definition av brottsprevention kan te sig<br />
naturlig för organisationer och myndigheter som planerar att förebygga brott, är den mindre<br />
lämplig när man vill veta vad som på sikt minskar brottsligheten, oavsett vem som ansvarar<br />
för verksamheten – och oavsett om den alls kan kallas verksamhet – eller när man vill värdera<br />
olika företeelser ur brottsförebyggandesynpunkt.<br />
238<br />
Betecknas som brottsförebyggande / brottsföreb. syfte<br />
ja nej<br />
------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------<br />
1 2<br />
positiva (lyckat) (preventiv sidoeffekt)<br />
Effekter på ------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------<br />
brottsligheten 3 4<br />
inga (misslyckat) (irrelevant)<br />
------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------<br />
5 6<br />
negativa (kontrafinalt) (brottsstimulerande)<br />
Figur 2. Förhållandet mellan brottsförebyggande syften och effekter på brottslighet.<br />
5 Enligt en opinionsundersökning av SCB på uppdrag av BRÅ och Kommittén för brottsförebyggande arbete<br />
1996 var över hälften av befolkningen beredd att betala mer skatt för att öka resurserna för att "upprätthålla lag<br />
och ordning" (Ahlberg & Håkansson 1997), ett mål som också de flesta politiska partierna i Sverige lyft fram<br />
under det senaste året.
NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Mitt intryck är att det mesta som skrivs om att förebygga brott handlar om fälten 1 och 3, dvs.<br />
om verksamheter som betecknas som brottsförebyggande för att de finansieras som sådana<br />
och har det öppna syftet. I praktiken bedrivs de ofta som projekt, och kunskapen om deras<br />
resultat samlas in genom utvärderingar som i första hand förväntas svara på om projektet varit<br />
framgångsrikt (1) eller misslyckats, dvs. inte minskat brottsligheten (3). Negativa effekter på<br />
brottsligheten av verksamheter som syftar till att förebygga brott beskrivs inom forskning,<br />
som behandlar t.ex. stämplingseffekter, polisens egen brottslighet, återfall efter straff och<br />
behandling och sådant som Gary Marx (1981) kallat "den sociala kontrollens ironi" (5). Däremot<br />
tror jag att mindre intresse generellt har ägnats fält nr 2, även om sannolika "förebyggande"<br />
effekter var ett viktigt inslag i retoriken under den offentliga sektorns utbyggnad. I USA<br />
har förskoleverksamhet bedrivits i projektform med brottsförebyggande syfte och givit goda<br />
utvärderingsresultat (se t.ex. Weikart 1990; Ziegler, Taussig & Black 1992), men pga projektformen<br />
hamnar det i ruta 1 i ovanstående modell.<br />
Det sjätte fältet omfattar både åtgärder och förhållanden. "Brottsstimulerande" förhållanden<br />
utgör naturligtvis en stor del av den traditionella kriminologins empiriska fält, Eftersom<br />
verksamheter och åtgärder formas av en rad andra faktorer än dem som är relevanta för<br />
problemets lösning (Blumer 1971; Sahlin-Andersson 1996) finns ingen självklar<br />
korrespondens mellan (6) och brottspreventiva åtgärder för att förändra dessa förhållanden.<br />
Ett gränsfall mellan de två nedersta fälten (5 och 6) är när en institution som normalt anses ha<br />
en brottspreventiv funktion, om än inte ett sådant huvudsyfte, beskrivs som "kriminogen", så<br />
har t.ex. Walgrave (1982) kallat den traditionella grundskolan i Europa. Analyser av<br />
"brottsstimulerande" åtgärder, slutligen, får man söka efter i allsidiga utärderingar av olika<br />
slags projekt, reformer och politiska och ekonomiska beslut, där oönskade och oväntade<br />
konsekvenser i form av ökad brottslighet konstaterats (jfr Staulcup & Royers 1983, s. 40).<br />
Att upphöra att förebygga: undersökningsproblem<br />
Utbyggnaden av barnomsorg och kommunalt organiserad fritidsverksamhet för skolungdomar<br />
under 1980-talet hade i likhet med de flesta fritids- och kulturprojekt för ungdomar ett öppet<br />
förebyggande syfte – även om det inte bara var brott som skulle förebyggas. Men när sådana<br />
verksamheter begränsas eller avvecklas på grund av minskade resurser är syftet varken att<br />
"sluta förebygga" eller att försämra barns och ungdomars uppväxtförhållanden, än mindre att<br />
öka brottsligheten. Ändå kan effekterna av nedskärningarna hypotetiskt vara<br />
"brottsstimulerande". Frågan är då hur man skulle kunna undersöka om sådana effekter<br />
uppstår.<br />
Preliminärt kan fyra olika slags problem urskiljas, nämligen brist på begrepp; bristande<br />
kunskap om verksamheternas brottspreventiva effekter (och i så fall genom vilka mekanismer<br />
och i vilket tidsperspektiv de förebygger brott); nedskärningarnas karaktär; samt praktiska,<br />
politiska och vetenskapliga hinder för utvärderingar av "negativa" insatser som avvecklingar<br />
och nedskärningar, eftersom sådant sker med andra syften.<br />
Begreppsapparaten<br />
Det första problemet handlar om att finna ett språk för att beskriva åtgärder och beslut med<br />
negativa effekter på brottsutvecklingen (dvs. fält 6 i figur 1).<br />
"Förebygga" kan översättas med att förhindra att något icke önskvärt uppstår. Det förutsätter<br />
alltså dels att utvecklingen (om man inte gör något) värderas negativt, dels en föreställning<br />
om att den går att påverka i en önskad riktning. Därmed innebär förebyggande arbete också<br />
239
NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
en avsikt att intervenera i en utveckling för att förbättra den; vilket för övrigt bidrar till att vi<br />
"glömmer" verksamheter och förhållanden som kontinuerligt motverkar en negativ<br />
utveckling.<br />
Om man alltså utgår från syftet, saknas motsatsord till "brottsförebyggande", eftersom det<br />
som skall förhindras per definition är oönskat och inte eftersträvansvärt. Beträffande de flesta<br />
erkända samhällsproblem kan man tänka sig att det någonstans finns ett intresse av att de ökar<br />
(exempelvis kanske hälsokost- och läkemedelsindustrin får en större marknad om ohälsan<br />
ökar), men det gäller sannolikt inte brottsligheten; knappast någon kan vilja underlätta eller<br />
stimulera brottslighet som sådan.6 Individer, grupper och organisationer kan mycket väl vilja<br />
begå brott, men de har inte målet att stimulera brottslighet i allmänhet. Ingen skulle öppet<br />
beskriva sina åtgärder som "brottsfrämjande", och det är alltså nästan lika svårt att föreställa<br />
sig ett dolt sådant syfte.<br />
Det saknas dessutom begrepp för avsikten att lägga ned eller reducera en verksamhet som<br />
haft som mål att förebygga brott eller andra problem eller faktiskt fungerat så. Huruvida<br />
verksamheter med brottspreventiva syften läggs ned har inte mycket med deras framgång eller<br />
misslyckanden att göra, eftersom sådana beslut inte motiveras med att man vill sluta förebygga,<br />
utan med t.ex. ekonomiska skäl. Att upphöra med en verksamhet som förebygger brott<br />
innebär logiskt sett att vidta en åtgärd dom främjar brottslighet, men denna konsekvens<br />
kommer på sin höjd att nämnas som en negativ sidoeffekt av ett beslut som har andra syften<br />
och antas få övervägande positiva effekter – eller som anses vara oundvikligt.<br />
Om man däremot utgår från effekten (att faktiskt påverka en utveckling) skulle motsatsen till<br />
att förebygga ett problem kunna kallas "främja". Ett begrepp som "brottsfrämjande" eller<br />
"brottsstimulerande" kan förekomma i en extern kritik av en verksamhet (t.ex. kurser i hembränning,<br />
vapenförsäljning), ett beslut (t.ex. liberaliserad alkohol- och narkotikalagstiftning)<br />
eller en åtgärd (t.ex. en indragning av en tullstation), oavsett syftet. Men om tillsyn och aktiviteter<br />
för barn och ungdomar förhindrar brott borde t.ex. daghem, fritidshem och fritidsgårdar<br />
ha brottsförebyggande effekter och en nedskärning av sådan verksamhet analogt ha en<br />
potentiellt brottsstimulerande verkan.<br />
Effekternas karaktär<br />
Nästa problem är att avgöra vad i de aktuella institutionerna och verksamheterna som har<br />
eventuella brottspreventiva effekter. Om offentliga verksamheter för barn och ungdom faktiskt<br />
förebygger brott, är det ett rimligt antagande (om än inte självklart) att nedskärningar<br />
medför risk för att brottsligheten ökar. Men det förefaller vara relativt ont om utvärderingar<br />
av just brottspreventiva effekter av generella insatser som omsorg, hälsovård och skola. För<br />
att avgöra hur en avveckling eller reducering av sådan verksamhet påverkar brottsligheten bör<br />
man dessutom helst veta vilka faktorer och mekanismer i dessa insatser som har en<br />
förebyggande effekt.<br />
Barnomsorg<br />
I länder som saknar allmän förskola och offentlig barntillsyn har förskola för underprivilegierade<br />
barn, respektive barn med beteendestörningar, visat sig förebygga brottslighet i<br />
ungdomsåren. Ett av de mest kända projekten är Perry Preschool i USA. Svarta 3-4-åriga<br />
pojkar med låg intelligenskvot från fattiga familjer slumpades ut för deltagande i en tvåårig<br />
6 Det hindrar inte att det finns politiska och ekonomiska intressen i en ökad rädsla för brott (se Christie<br />
1993) .<br />
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NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
förskola med kognitivt orienterad utbildning. Kontrollgruppen var från samma bostadsområde<br />
och bestod av "tvillingar" som även matchades med avseende på trångboddhet, inkomst och<br />
huruvida de hade ensamstående föräldrar. Till projektet hörde emellertid också att lärarna<br />
gjorde täta hembesök och hade månatliga smågruppsmöten med föräldrarna. Vid nitton års<br />
ålder var medlemmarna i projektgruppen bättre på alla tester, presterade högre, hade mer<br />
sällan socialbidrag och oftare arbete och högre utbildning än kontrollgruppen. De hade också<br />
mer sällan gripits av polisen och i så fall för mindre allvarliga brott (Weikart 1989).<br />
Förklaringen var enligt dem som bedrev forskningsprojektet en positiv snöbollseffekt av att<br />
barnen kom bättre rustade till grundskolan, medan en utomstående forskare (Seitz 1990) i<br />
stället har hävdat att den verksamma delen i projektet var lärarnas kontakt med föräldrarna,<br />
som därmed utvecklades och engagerade sig mer i barnen (Ziegler, Taussig & Black 1990, s.<br />
1000).<br />
Ett antal liknande projekt7 har också visat sig ge positiva effekter på kriminaliteten, trots att<br />
detta inte var den primära uttalade avsikten. Däremot tvistar forskarna om vad i projekten som<br />
är det verksamma elementet – pedagogiken, barntillsynen, föräldrautbildningen eller stödet<br />
till föräldrarna. Ziegler, Taussig & Black (1990, s. 1003 f.) menar att det är just kombinationen<br />
av flera samtidiga stödformer som är effektiv, medan däremot Weikart, som<br />
tillhörde forskarlaget i Perry Preschool-projektet, framhävt den speciella Piaget-inspirerade<br />
pedagogiken och dess "barn-initierade lärande", som ger en stimulerande "känsla av makt i<br />
förhållande till vuxna" (Weikart 1989, s. 294).<br />
Förutom att effekten av barnomsorgen som sådan inte helt kan skiljas från de övriga inslagen,<br />
som stöd och utbildning till föräldrarna, är ett tolkningsproblem att man inte vet huruvida<br />
barnen klarade sig bättre på grund av att deras relativa utgångsläge i skolan förbättrades.<br />
Paradoxalt nog är just den begränsning av insatsen som gjorde det möjligt att använda sig av<br />
kontrollgrupper och därmed ge säkra svar om förskolans positiva effekter, ett hinder för<br />
generalisering till ett samhälle där alla barn erbjuds förskola. Vidare är de offentliga<br />
skyddsnäten mot fattigdom avsevärt bättre i de nordiska länderna än i USA, och här finns inte<br />
heller samma grad av etnisk segregation och diskriminering. Det är också möjligt att projekten<br />
innebar barnomsorg av särskilt hög kvalitet. Trots dessa reservationer är resultaten så<br />
entydiga att de ger ett mycket starkt stöd för att barnomsorg har en kraftigt<br />
brottsförebyggande effekt.<br />
Barnomsorg genom daghem är också en mer eller mindre nödvändig förutsättning för en rad<br />
av de preventiva program som handlar om pedagogisk inlärning av social kompetens och<br />
problemlösningsförmåga, vilket visat sig förebygga skolmisslyckanden, social<br />
missanpassning och kriminalitet (Bloom 1996). Men för detta fordras också tillräckliga<br />
resurser för att ge barnen något mer än ren tillsyn. Det förefaller som om nedskärningarna<br />
inom barnomsorgen i Sverige, eftersom de skett i en period av hög arbetslöshet och mindre<br />
barnkullar, inte minskat behovstäckningen utan i stället tagit sig uttryck i en lägre<br />
personalkvot, större barngrupper och mindre extraresurser för barn med "särskilda behov".8<br />
7 T.ex. Syracuse University Family Development Research Program , Yale Child Welfare Research Program,<br />
Houston Parent-Child Development Center, som alla bedrivits i USA och inriktats på en kombination av tillsyn,<br />
föräldrastöd och föräldrautbildning och som haft en kontrollgrupp av barn som inte fått del av verksamheten (se<br />
Ziegler, Taussig & Black 1990).<br />
8 Det genomsnittliga antalet barn per årsarbetare ökade med 60 % i storstadskommunerna 1992-95, och i hela<br />
landet ökade det genomsnittliga antalet barn per grupp från 13,8 till 16,7 mellan 1990 och 1995 (SOU 1997:61, s.<br />
78).<br />
241
NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Fritidshem<br />
Under 1970- och 1980-talen byggdes fritidshemsverksamhet för barn i låg- och mellanstadiet<br />
ut i Sverige och 1987 beslutades att sådan verksamhet skulle bedrivas enligt ett pedagogiskt<br />
program. År 1993 fastslogs kommunens skyldighet att anordna omsorg för barn upp till och<br />
med 12 år. Samtidigt har den statliga detaljregleringen minskat i och med att statsbidragen<br />
skurits ned (Socialstyrelsen 1996, s. 18 ff.).<br />
Skolbarnomsorg (i form av fritidshem eller dagbarnvårdare) kan ses som en utvidgning av<br />
samhällets formella kontroll av barn och ungdomar, vad avser både vilken tid av dygnet och i<br />
vilka åldrar som barn står under vuxen personals formella uppsikt (Svensson 1981, Petersson<br />
1995). Även om det funnits ett klart brottspreventivt syfte med verksamheten är det oklart om<br />
det uppnåtts. Ur jämlikhetssynpunkt har det funnits flera brister, bl.a. har fritidshemmen<br />
ansetts låsa barnen vid segregerade miljöer, och besvärliga barn har tenderat att uteslutas från<br />
de organiserade aktiviteterna inom fritidshemmens ram (Svensson 1981, s. 157 ff.). Besvärliga<br />
barn har dessutom ofta varit de som först faller ifrån öppna aktiviteter, samtidigt som<br />
de mest organiserade barnen, som redan är föreningsaktiva, är de som främst deltar i<br />
eftermiddagsverksamheterna (ibid., s. 160 f.). De höga avgifterna har sannolikt också<br />
inneburit att låginkomsttagare inte kunnat utnyttja omsorgsformen i den grad de kanske<br />
önskat. Vidare visade en undersökning av Socialstyrelsen att barn med psykosociala problem,<br />
åtminstone jämfört med barn med fysiska eller medicinska funktionshinder, i mindre<br />
utsträckning hade plats inom skolbarnomsorgen och mindre tillgång till stödresurser om de<br />
fanns där (Socialstyrelsen 1996, s. 89).<br />
För dem som ser brottspreventionen ur ett kontrollperspektiv borde det emellertid upplevas<br />
som problematiskt att fritidshemmen minskat sin täckningsgrad och övergått från "inskriven"<br />
till öppen verksamhet, varigenom många barn i grundskolan är utan vuxentillsyn under<br />
eftermiddagarna.<br />
Fritidsgårdar<br />
Ett försök att utvärdera fritidgsårdarnas "samhällsnytta" gjordes av Persson (1981) på basis av<br />
uppgifter från Malmö kommun 1977-78. Han utvecklade en modell för mätning av<br />
kommunala fritidsgårdars och föreningars förebyggande effekter på ungdomsbrottslighet och<br />
skadegörelse och prövade den på 40 olika delområden i kommunen, omfattande 70 procent av<br />
ungdomarna.9 Antalet ungdomsbrott10 och antalet polisanmälda skadegörelser i förhållande<br />
till antalet ungdomar 7-18 år inom området mättes, liksom "onormala underhållskostnader"<br />
hos det allmännyttiga bostadsföretaget MKB (Persson 1981, s. 58 ff.). Siffrorna relaterades<br />
till andelen ungdomar som regelbundet besökte komunala fritidsgårdar, respektive var<br />
medlemmar i föreningar.<br />
Andelen ungdomar i åldern 8-15 år som hade s.k. gårdskort, vilket berättigade till besök på<br />
fritidsgårdarna under kvällstid, varierade mellan 0 och 32 procent i de olika delområdena,<br />
medan andelen som var medlemmar i någon förening varierade mellan 40 och 79 procent<br />
(ibid., s. 59 f.). Båda dessa faktorer hade ytligt sett samband med den lokala<br />
ungdomsbrottsligheten och skadegörelsen. Den statistiska bearbetningen (multipel regression)<br />
visade emellertid att sambandet mellan föreningsmedlemskap och ungdomsbrottslighet helt<br />
kunde förklaras av skillnader i "sociala indikatorer" i bostadsområdena, såsom andelen soci-<br />
9 Områden med mindre än 12 % ungdomar uteslöts ur undersökningen.<br />
10 Som ungdomsbrott räknades 11 typer av brott, framför allt olika former av stöld, tillgrepp och skadegörelse,<br />
där enligt nationell statistik minst 41 % av de misstänkta är under 18 år (Persson 1981, s. 59).<br />
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alhjälpstagare och utländska medborgare, hushållens medianinkomst och in- och utflyttning<br />
till områdena (ibid., s. 60).<br />
Däremot visade den statistiska analysen att ju högre andel ungdomar som besökte fritidsgårdar,<br />
allt annat lika, desto lägre var ungdomsbrottsligheten och skadegörelsen i bostadsområdet<br />
(ibid., s. 66 ff.). En jämförande studie mellan två miljonprogramsområden gav å<br />
andra sidan inget stöd för att den lokala ungdomsbrottsligheten kunde minskas genom att<br />
öppna en fritidsgård i området. En möjlig tolkning av skillnaderna i resultaten är att den<br />
brottsförebyggande effekten för individerna bostadsområdet äts upp av att de brott som<br />
besökarna ändå begår förläggs till trakten omkring fritidsgården, i stället för exempelvis till<br />
stadens centrum eller andra stadsdelar.<br />
Resonemanget pekar på att en möjlig motsättning mellan lokala och genrella mål för<br />
brottspreventionen: Det kan eventuellt löna sig ur brottsskyddsynpunkt för ett enskilt<br />
bostadsområde att inte ha någon fritidsgård – förutsatt att grannområdet har det – medan<br />
däremot en allmän nedläggning av fritidsgårdar av utvärderingen att döma skulle öka<br />
brottsligheten i kommunen.11<br />
Skola<br />
Skolans existens är inte ifrågasatt, inte heller dess väsentliga funktion inom brottspreventionen.<br />
Däremot råder delade meningar om hur den bäst uppfyller denna roll. I det<br />
nationella brottsförebyggande programmet och t.e.x. Stockholms lokala brottsförebyggande<br />
program (Brottsförebyggande centrum 1997, s. 29), rekommenderas program mot skolk och<br />
mobbning, information till föräldrar och samverkan med polis och socialtjänst. Men enligt<br />
Engel & Hurrelmann (1989, s. 183) är skolor visserligen den mest effektiva preventiva<br />
institutionen – men bara så länge de koncentrerar sig på sin huvuduppgift, dvs att förmedla<br />
meningsfull kunskap till sina elever. Skolorna bör därför undvika att bli involverade i en<br />
social kontroll för andra myndigheters räkning. Liknande slutsatser drar Walgrave (1982).<br />
Enligt Skolverkets publikation Bilden av skolan 1996 har resursinsatsen per elev i<br />
grundskolan sjunkit sedan 1990, vilket framför allt tar sig uttryck i en kraftig minskning av<br />
antalet lärartimmar per elev. Skolklasserna har blivit större och specialundervisningen, mätt i<br />
antal timmar per elev, reducerades med en tredjedel 1990-1996. Kostnaderna för elevvård har<br />
ökat, vilket dock främst beror på höjda lokalhyror (Skolverket 1996, s. 69);<br />
elevvårdspersonalen minskade "avsevärt" i "utsatta" storstadsområden 1993-96 enligt<br />
Storstadskommittén, och särskilt elever som var utagerande eller hade koncentrationssvårigheter<br />
eller läs- och skrivsvårigheter fick minskat stöd (SOU 1997:61, s. 101 f.),<br />
samtidigt som allt färre elever uppgav att "de kan få hjälp då de behöver det" (Skolverket<br />
1996, s. 30).<br />
Elever i sjunde och nionde klass som vantrivs i skolan och känner sig ogillade av lärare<br />
involveras enligt Engel & Hurremann (1989) oftare i asociala och brottsliga aktiviteter. Att<br />
döma av en enkät till till 934 mellanstadiebarn från ett innerstads- respektive ett förortsområde<br />
i Stockholm gäller detta även i yngre åldrar.12 De 37 elever som "mycket ofta"<br />
11 På samma sätt finns en möjlighet att framgångsrikt lokalt brottsförebyggande arbete kan leda till generellt<br />
ökad brottslighet genom överflyttningseffekter och genom en allmänt minskad tillgång på platser och<br />
verksamheter för ungdomar.<br />
12 Enkäten utformades och undersökningen genomfördes av Johanna Graf och Susanna Ruben med finansiering<br />
av Skolförvaltningen i Stockholm och Socialstyrelsen. Huvudresultqten har publicerats av Socialstyrelsen (1996)<br />
i rapporten Mellanstadiebarnen – vart tar de vägen på sin fritid? Jag har fått tillgång till datafiler genom Johanna<br />
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kände olust inför skolan jämfördes med de 386 barn, som "aldrig" gjorde det. Barnen i den<br />
förra gruppen hade fler dagliga eftermiddagsaktiviteter och idrottade mer och gick något mer<br />
ofta på fritidshem men deras förhållande till kamrater och vuxna var betydligt sämre. De<br />
tyckte inte att vuxna lyssnade på dem och kände sig väldigt ofta ogillade av fritidspersonal<br />
och lärare, fick sällan beröm, kände olust inför raster, hade ofta ont i magen och huvudet och<br />
var ledsna och missnöjda med sig själva. De hade ofta blivit mobbade och själva mobbat och<br />
trodde inte att deras kamrater tyckte om dem. Och de hade skolkat, snattat, rökt och druckit<br />
mer än de barn som trivdes i skolan och åkte dessutom oftare in till city utan vuxnas sällskap.<br />
De statistiska resultaten visar inte vad som föregått vad i denna otillfredsställande tillvaro<br />
men kan ge en antydan om att för ett litet antal barn är en upplevelse av att inte vara omtyckt i<br />
skolan ett fundamentalt problem, för vilket fritidsaktiviteter och fritidshem inte kan<br />
kompensera.<br />
Tidsaspekter<br />
Det tredje undersökningsproblemet rör tidshorisonten. För att empiriskt undersöka eventuella<br />
"brottsstimulerande effekter" av inskränkningar i offentlig omsorg och service för barn måste<br />
man för det första ha en uppfattning om huruvida de brottsförebyggande effekterna är omedelbara<br />
och/eller långsiktiga. Om den verksamma mekanismen är t.ex. just tillsyn för<br />
stunden, dvs. kontroll och distraktion, skulle en eventuell negativ effekt av nedskärningar<br />
snabbt visa sig genom att fler brott begicks av de åldersgrupper som fått försämrad tillsyn.<br />
Om effekten däremot är långsiktig och beror på att verksamheterna ger social träning och<br />
trygghet som minskar barnens framtida "benägenhet" att begå brott, eller på att de innebär<br />
tidig upptäckt av och möjlighet till individuella insatser för barn i riskzon, och/eller på att de<br />
kontinuerligt motverkar skador från en olämplig hemmiljö, står man inför samma problem<br />
som vid utvärdering av många "sociala" insatser med brottsförebyggande syfte, nämligen<br />
svårigheten att kontrollera betydelsen av andra orsaksfaktorer.13<br />
Nedskärningarnas karaktär<br />
Det fjärde problemet är svårigheten att avgöra vad nedskärningarna i praktiken innebär för de<br />
verksamheter och individer och grupper som drabbas.<br />
Variationer i brottsnivån kan betraktas som ett resultat av å ena sidan brottsstimulerande, å<br />
andra sidan brottsförebyggande insatser och förhållanden. Därmed blir de också föremål för<br />
rivaliserande förklaringar. En ökad brottslighet härleds av somliga till ökad utslagning och<br />
ungdomsarbetslöshet, av andra till bristande kontroll eller till för höga eller för låga straff. En<br />
väsentlig fråga är därför i vilken riktning olika slags förhållanden och insatser av relevans för<br />
brottsligheten förändras. Nedläggning av reguljära fritidsutbud för ungdomar kan bytas ut mot<br />
föreningsdrivna fritidsprojekt eller polisledda föräldravandringar; minskning av skolpersonalen<br />
kan kompenseras av mer behandlingsresurser, strängare disciplin eller stängda butiker i<br />
skolans närhet. Kompositionen av insatser, verksamheter och förhållanden av betydelse för<br />
brottsligheten är inte bara en följd av samhällsklimatet, utan kan också förstärka takten och<br />
tendenserna i en klimatförändring på ett sätt som kanske inte någon avsett, men som i sin tur<br />
kan ha en självständig inverkan på brottslighetens utveckling.<br />
Graf och utfört några beräkningar på materialet.<br />
13 Se t.ex. Fauske (1987), som för en diskussion om svårigheterna att direkt koppla brottslighetens faktiska<br />
utveckling till dess ors aker.<br />
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Nedskärningar inom omsorg och service kan medföra lägre täckningsgrad, mindre personaltäthet,<br />
större barn-, elev- eller ungdomsgrupper, kortare öppettider, ändrade åldersgränser,<br />
hårdare platskonkurrens och/eller fler avvisningar och avstängningar, och sårbarheten<br />
för olika sådana förändringar kan variera mellan olika individer, grupper och åldrar.<br />
En utvärdering av nedskärningars eventuella brottsstimulerande effekter förutsätter alltså en<br />
uppfattning inte bara om vilka grupper, brott eller situationer som påverkas av offentliga<br />
insatser, utan också vilka som faktiskt drabbas när resurserna för service, omsorg och tillsyn<br />
minskas. Jämfört med 1980 hade antalet barn per anställd inom barnomsorgen 1996 ökat med<br />
i genomsnitt 30 procent (Arbetet Nyheterna 961105). Nedskärningarna inom barnomsorgen<br />
var i början av 1990-talet "exceptionellt stora" i storstädernas mest "utsatta stadsdelar" (SOU<br />
1997:61, s. 76). I genomsnitt ökade andelen barn per årsarbetare med 60 procent i<br />
storstäderna 1992-95 och i landet som helhet ökade barngrupperna från i genomsnitt 13,8 till<br />
16,7 barn mellan 1990 och 1995 (ibid., s. 78).<br />
Enligt en mindre, kvalitativ studie av nedskärningarnas effekter på förskolor i Malmö har de<br />
större barngrupperna medfört en hårdare styrning av barnens aktiviteter och mindre utrymme<br />
för såväl fri lek som kontakt med enskilda barn (Johansson 1996). Nya budgetmodeller med<br />
s.k. resultatenheter bidrog vidare till å ena sidan en tendens hos personalen att definiera allt<br />
fler barn som i behov av "särskilt stöd"14, å andra sidan en benägenhet hos kommunen att<br />
reservera beteckningen för fysiskt handikappade barn (ibid.).<br />
Sparbeting och begränsningar av verksamheterna kan även resultera i generellt höjda egenavgifter<br />
eller ändrade avgiftssystem. Det kan exempelvis leda till att bara föräldrar med goda<br />
inkomster har råd med barnomsorg,15 eller att tillsynstiden begränsas trots oförändrat behov,<br />
eller att insatsen subventioneras men blir behovsprövad, så att bara barn med "särskilda<br />
behov" eller i "riskzon" får del av den. I de två första fallen kan man å andra sidan anta att<br />
många barn "i riskzon" inte alls, eller inte i tillräcklig grad, får del av servicen.<br />
Men även i det fall då insatser behovsprövas kan problem uppstå för barn i "riskzon". Om<br />
barnens umgänge med "dåliga kamrater" har negativ betydelse kan behovsprövningen<br />
innebära att de positiva effekterna av omsorgen motverkas, eftersom hela barngruppen då har<br />
problem eller hög risk för problem. Sannolikheten att det finns resursstarka familjer som kan<br />
upprätthålla kvalitetskrav minskar samtidigt. Barnomsorgen har under de senaste decennierna<br />
"sprängt fattigdomsskalet" (Sunesson 1990, s. 53), vilket lett till att den till skillnad från<br />
behovsprövat bistånd upphört att vara stigmatiserande. Om service och omsorg på nytt begränsas<br />
till "utsatta grupper" kan man omvänt befara att de byggs in i ett "fattigdomsskal"<br />
med åtföljande negativa konsekvenser för de berörda. Det är å andra sidan också möjligt att<br />
behovsprövning kan ge "högriskbarn" relativa fördelar och därmed kompensation för<br />
eventuella övriga tillkortakommanden och resursbrister jämfört med andra barn (jfr t.ex.<br />
syftet med stödundervisning), vilket kan ge positiva effekter för dem som fortfarande får del<br />
av den aktuella insatsen (se Farrington 1995, s. 346).<br />
Det finns vidare anledning att undersöka hur nedskärningarna drabbar de barn som inte<br />
identifierats som individer med särskilda behov, men som ändå kännetecknas av några<br />
14 I stadsdelen Rosengård i Malmö bedömdes 70 procent av barnen vara i behov av "särskilt stöd", framför allt<br />
pga. språkförsvåringar eller språkförseningar (SOU 1997:61, s. 81).<br />
15 Drygt 57 % av de mest utsatta – dvs. de fattigaste – stadsdelarna inom landets storstadsområden höjde taxorna<br />
under 1995 (SOU 1997:61, s. 80). Enligt ett tidningsreferat av en utgiven LO-rapport (Barnomsorg,<br />
förvärvsarbete och jämställdhet, Nelander 1996) har egenavgifternas andel av totalkostnaderna för barnomsorg<br />
fördubblats sedan 1980 (Arbetet Nyheterna 961105).<br />
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förhållanden, som brukar räknas som riskfaktorer, såsom att ha fattiga, ensamstående eller<br />
arbetslösa föräldrar. I mer än var tredje kommun måste barnen år 1996 lämna den kommunala<br />
barnomsorgen om en förälder är arbetslös, vilket under 1994 gällde 40 procent av LOhushållen.<br />
Tillsammans med avgiftshöjningar bidrar detta till att många barn till<br />
låginkomsttagare i praktiken utestängs från barnomsorg (Arbetet Nyheterna 961105).<br />
Designproblem<br />
Det femte problemet gäller möjligheten att göra en "inverterad utvärdering". Inom socialpolitik<br />
är det ovanligt svårt att genomföra forskning med en experimentliknande design,<br />
vilken fordrar att insatser sätts in lokalt och avgränsat i ett område eller för en grupp,<br />
samtidigt som en kontrollgrupp med i övrigt likartade förhållanden och förutsättningar inte får<br />
del av den. Nedskärningar inom skola och omsorg sker inte i ett vakuum, utan i en miljö där<br />
andra förändringar pågår samtidigt. För att undersöka deras eventuella effekter på<br />
brottsligheten måste man därför också studera andra förhållanden och orsaker som har<br />
betydelse för brottsutvecklingen, liksom vad som görs för att kompensera för negativa<br />
konsekvenser.<br />
För det första; vad gäller mätning av omedelbara effekter finns ingen given överensstämmelse<br />
mellan var barn bor, går i skolan, respektive deltar i eventuella fritidsaktiviteter å ena sidan,<br />
och var de begår brott, vandaliserar, stör eller slåss å andra sidan. Vad gäller långsiktiga<br />
effekter, får man räkna med att barnen och deras familjer flyttar och byter skolor och<br />
naturligtvis exponeras för en rad andra åtgärder och "orsaksfaktorer", som i sin tur förändras<br />
under årens lopp.<br />
För det andra; myndigheter är skyldiga att behandla kommunbefolkningen rättvist, och i varje<br />
enskilt fall motverka negativa effekter av ett ojämnt utbud. Om exempelvis en kommundel<br />
har och en annan saknar skolbarnomsorg, kan man förvänta att barn från den förra, om de<br />
anses vara i särskilt behov av det, ändå får plats på fritidshemmet eller omsorg i någon<br />
alternativ form. Med andra ord kommer selektiva insatser att tas i anspråk i varierande<br />
utsträckning för att kompensera förlusten av generella insatser, vilket försvårar mätningar av<br />
effekter.<br />
För det tredje; det går givetvis inte att förbjuda vare sig allmänheten, organisationer eller<br />
kommunala förvaltningar att utveckla alternativa verksamheter för att direkt kompensera för<br />
brister i det kommunala utbudet, t.ex. i form av privata, lokala arrangemang för barntillsyn,<br />
som kanske inte alltid är offentligt kända.<br />
För det fjärde; en kommun eller kommundel kan inte hållas "projektfri". I såväl ett "experimentområde"<br />
som i kontrollområdet kan man förvänta sig ett antal större eller mindre<br />
satsningar på verksamheter av annan karaktär, som har möjliga brottsförebyggande effekter.<br />
Det är t.ex. rimligt att anta att information om eventuell ökad brottslighet i ett område eller<br />
inom en åldersgrupp bemöts med lokala brottsförebyggande projekt, som syftar till att<br />
motverka den negativa utvecklingen. Därmed ökas också konkurrensen mellan olika förklaringar<br />
till de förändringar som följer därefter (eller uteblir).<br />
I dessa fyra avseenden är mätproblemen likartade dem man möter vid utvärdering av projekt<br />
med brottsförebyggande syften. Men beträffande nedskärningar tillkommer även andra<br />
svårigheter. Reducering eller avveckling inom socialpolitik och omsorg är sällan av "försökskaraktär"<br />
utan resultat av mer eller mindre definitiva beslut, som dessutom ofta presenteras<br />
som oundvikliga, och därför i princip irreversibla. Att förändringarna genomförs utan<br />
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externa anslag och i syfte att spara pengar gör det ännu svårare att motivera beslutsfattarna att<br />
utvärdera effekterna, i synnerhet som uppmärksamheten på eventuella oönskade konsekvenser<br />
av verksamhetsförändringen i form av ökad brottslighet definitivt inte underlättar beslutets<br />
genomförande. Jämfört med en vanlig utvärdering kan man därför vänta sig mindre hjälp och<br />
intresse från involverade aktörer och beslutsfattare med mätningar och kartläggningar, mindre<br />
anslag till utvärderingar, och samtidigt – förhoppningsvis – mer ansträngningar från dessa<br />
aktörers sida att motverka de eventuella effekter som undersökningen efter hand kan komma<br />
att antyda.<br />
Som komplement till sådana mätningar av "oönskade effekter" av nedskärningar måste man<br />
därför antagligen använda olika mått som enligt annan forskning visat sig fungera som "prediktorer"<br />
för brottslighet och annat "asocialt" beteende, t.ex. kamratrelationer, hälsa och skoltrivsel,<br />
som kan avläsas omedelbart. Sådana indikatorer har dessutom ett allmänt inresse,<br />
utöver vad de kan förutsäga om brottslighetens utveckling.<br />
Sammanfattning<br />
Brottspreventionen – och forskningen om den – präglas av interaktionen mellan sociala,<br />
politiska och forskningsmässiga förändringsprocesser.<br />
Det pågår, för det första, en reell förändring av samhällsstrukturen i termer av ökad ojämlikhet,<br />
ökad arbetslöshet, kvalitetsförsämringar inom skola och barnomsorg samt ökad etnisk<br />
och socioekonomisk segregation. Till skillnad från tidigare (avsiktliga) strukturförändringar<br />
motiveras den inte primärt av önskan att skapa ett bättre samhälle, inklusive förebygga sociala<br />
problem och orättvisor, utan av argumentet att den är ekonomiskt nödvändig eller oundviklig.<br />
För det andra har brottspreventionens inriktning förändrats, från att ha varit till stor del<br />
inbakad i en allmän prevention av sociala problem genom strukturella insatser och miljöförbättrande<br />
åtgärder, över en inriktning på att socialisera den unga generationen till<br />
samhällslojala medborgare, till insatser som mer specifikt är inriktade på att förebygga brott<br />
genom ökad kontroll av individer och platser. Denna inriktning implicerar ett kontrollteoretiskt<br />
perspektiv på brottslighet, vilket mycket riktigt fått ökat utrymme i den svenska<br />
brottspreventionsdiskursen, som också lagt ökad tonvikt vid situationell prevention och i<br />
någon mån vid möjligheterna att tidigt upptäcka barn med hög risk för framtida kriminalitet.<br />
Förutom dessa förändringsprocesser finns en historiskt betingad brist på begrepp, kunskap<br />
och praktiska och politiska möjligheter att bedriva forskning om "inverterad prevention", dvs.<br />
sociala förändringar och politiska åtgärder med potentiellt negativa effekter på brottsligheten.<br />
Konskevenser för brottsligheten av avveckling och nedskärning av verksamheter som tidigare<br />
ansetts brottsförebyggande osynliggörs eftersom diskursen om brottsprevention framför allt<br />
uppehåller sig vid åtgärder som har ett brottsförebyggande syfte, och inte vid verksamheter<br />
med brottsförebyggande effekter. Vi saknar därför begrepp för att beskriva beslut och åtgärder<br />
som kan resultera i ökad brottslighet, såsom när man upphör med eller reducerar<br />
verksamheter med brottspreventiva effekter. Även om sådana beslut aldrig syftar till att öka<br />
brottsligheten, utan t.ex. till att spara, kan de i realiteten ha "brottsfrämjande" effekter.<br />
Om man skulle vilja undersöka "brottsfrämjande effekter" av nedskärningar i den sociala<br />
omsorgen och servicen för barn och ungdomar uppstår flera problem. Ett av dessa är att det<br />
ofta inte är utrett vilka mekanismer i generellt tillgängliga verksamheter som har<br />
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brottsförebyggande effekter och i vilket tidsperspektiv de fungerar. Ett annat är att nedskärningarna<br />
konkret kan ta sig många olika uttryck och drabba olika grupper i olika<br />
kommuner.<br />
Slutligen finns det ett antal problem förknippade med undersökningsdesignen. I likhet med<br />
situationen vid andra utvärderingar av brottsförebyggande åtgärder är det svårt att hålla andra<br />
orsaksfaktorer "konstanta" vid mätning av långsiktiga effekter och man kan (lyckligtvis) inte<br />
undvika kompensatoriska motåtgärder för drabbade grupper. För "inverterade utvärderingar"<br />
tillkommer problemet att beslutsfattarna sannolikt inte är motiverade att bidra till<br />
undersökningar av eventuella negativa effekter av deras besparingsbeslut, eller att genomföra<br />
avvecklingar etappvis eller som försöksverksamheter.<br />
Någon omfattande utvärdering av hur nedskärningar av offentlig omsorg och utbildning<br />
ökade inkomstklyftor och andra förändringar av barns och ungdomars uppväxtvillkor påverkar<br />
brottslighetens utveckling kanske aldrig kommer att kunna genomföras. Men det bör inte<br />
hindra oss från att diskutera risken för sådana konsekvenser, eller från att vidga perspektivet<br />
på vad brottsprevention kan vara utöver de åtgärder som i en given tid står högst på<br />
statsmakternas dagordning.<br />
Referenser<br />
Ahlberg, Jan & Marianne Håkansson: Svenska folket om brott och brottsförebyggande<br />
åtgärder. En opinionsundersökning. Brottsförebyggande rådet, Stockholm 1997.<br />
Arbetet Nyheterna, ‘De utestängs från dagis’ (961105).<br />
Balvig, Flemming: ‘Samfundsplanlægning og kriminalitetsforebyggene tiltag.’ I: Nordisk<br />
Tidsskrift for Kriminalvidenskab, årg. 67, nr 1- 1979-80, s. 96-111.<br />
Bergmark, Anders & Lars Oscarsson: ‘Om behandlingsbegreppet inom alkoholvården.’ I:<br />
Behandling av alkoholproblem. En kunskapsöversikt. Centrum för utvärdering av socialt<br />
arbete. Liber, s. 58-79. Stockholm 1994.<br />
Bloom, Martin: ‘Primary <strong>Prevention</strong> Practices’. In: Issues in Childrens' and Families' Lives,<br />
Vol. 5-1996. Sage, Thousand Oaks, London, New Dehli.<br />
Blumer, Herbert: ‘Social Problems as Collective Behaviour.’ In: Social Problems, Vol. 18-<br />
1971, pp. 298-306.<br />
Brottsförebyggande centrum: Manualen. Handbok för lokalt brottsförebyggande arbete.<br />
Stadsledningskontoret, Stockholm 1997.<br />
Christie, Nils: Krminalitetskontroll som industri. Mot GULAG, vestlig type?<br />
Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 1993.<br />
DeWild, Dale W.: ‘Toward a Clarification of Primary <strong>Prevention</strong>.’ In: Community Mental<br />
Health Journal, Vol. 16, No. 4-1981, pp. 306-316.<br />
Ds 1996:59, Allas vårt ansvar. Ett nationellt brottsförebyggande program..<br />
Engel, Uwe & Klaus Hurrelmann: ‘Delinquent Behavior in Adolescence: Potential and<br />
Constraints of Preventive Strategies in School Settings.’ In: Albrecht, Peter-Alexis & Otto<br />
Backes (eds.) (1989), <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> and Intervention. Legal and Ethical Problems.<br />
Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, pp. 167-184, New York 1989.<br />
Farrington, David P: ‘Key Issues in the Integration of Motivational and Opportunity-reducing<br />
<strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> Strategies.’ In: Wikström, Per-Olof H., Ronald V. Clarke, & Joan<br />
McCord: Integrating <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> Strategies: Propensity and Opportunity. BRÅrapport<br />
1995:5, s. 333-357. Brottsförebyggande rådet, Stockholm.<br />
Fauske, Halvor: ‘Vad ska vi göra med den ökade kriminaliteten?’ I: Andersson, Dick & Owe<br />
Larsson (red.), Va' säjer dom? – ungdomsforskarna. Socialstyrelsen, Stockholm 1987.<br />
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Gilling, Daniel: ‘Multi-Agency <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> in Britan: The Problem of Combining<br />
Situational and Social Strategies.’ In: Clarke, Ronald V. (ed.): <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> Studies,<br />
Vol. 3-1994, pp. 231-247. Willow Tree Press, Inc, New York.<br />
Johansson, Maria: Besparingar inom barnomsorgen – en undersökning av vilka konsekvenser<br />
besparingar fått på två förskolor i Malmö. C-uppsats. Sociologiska institutionen, Lunds<br />
universitet, 1996.<br />
Kelling, George L. & Catherine M. Coles: Fixing Broken Windows. Restoring Order and<br />
Reducing <strong>Crime</strong>s in Our Communities. The Free Press, New York m.fl. 1996.<br />
Marx, Gary: ‘Ironies of Social Control: Authorities as Contributors to Deviance Through<br />
Escalation, Nonenforcement and Covert Facilitation.’ In: Social Problems, Vol. 28, No. 3-<br />
1981, pp. 221-246.<br />
Nietzsche, Friedrich [1887]: Om Moralens härstamning. Prisma Magnum, 1994.<br />
Persson, Ulf: Samhällsnyttan av fritidsgård. En samhällsekonomisk utvärdering av<br />
kommunala investeringar i fritidsgårdar. R13:1981, Statens råd för byggnadsforskning,<br />
Stockholm 1981.<br />
Petersson, Kenneth: ‘Viljan att förekomma – om unga i den svenska profylaxens<br />
ordningsprojekt.’ I: Dahlgren, Lars & Hultqvist, Kenneth (red.), Seendet och seendets<br />
villkor. En bok om barns och ungdomars välfärd. HLS, s. 161-208, Stockholm 1995.<br />
Proposition 1979/80:1, Omsorger om barn och ungdom.<br />
Sahlin, Ingrid : Ungdsomsprojekt: Retorik och praktik. BRÅ-pm 1992:1. Brottsförebyggande<br />
rådet, Stockholm 1992.<br />
Sahlin, Ingrid: Brottsprevention. En utredning av ett begrepp och dess begränsningar.<br />
Otryckt manuskript. Brottsförebyggande rådet, 1998.<br />
Sahlin-Andersson, Kerstin ‘I styrbarhetens utmarker.’ I: Sahlin, Ingrid (red.) Projektets<br />
paradoxer. Studentlitteratur. s. 118-143, Lund 1996.<br />
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1996.<br />
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1995.<br />
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1962, s. 31-43.<br />
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Delinquency: The role of institutions in a changing society. Collected Studies in<br />
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stadskärnan. En utvärdering av Eskilstunaprojektet. Problemgruppen, Forskningsenheten<br />
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Safety.’ In: Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 249, No 3-1982, pp. 29-38.<br />
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8-1992, pp. 997-1006.<br />
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Nils Christie, Professor<br />
Institutt for kriminologi, Universitetet i Oslo<br />
St. Olavs plass, N-0130 Oslo 1<br />
e-mail: nils.christie@jus.uio.no<br />
Forebyggelse1<br />
1. Innledning.<br />
Historien om Hans Brinkers er velkjent i Holland, og kanskje blant oss også, om jeg minner<br />
om den. Det var storm i Holland, bølgene rullet tungt mot dikene. I tillegg var det høyvann, ja<br />
ikke bare høyvann, men springflo. Hans var ute ved dikene. Han fikk øye på et lite hull hvor<br />
vannet stod inn i en stråle. Jord og grus ble revet med, snart ville det bli et digert hull, dikene<br />
ville revne og land stå under vann. Resolutt satte han knytteneven inn i hullet. Lekkasjen<br />
stoppet. Men ingen så ham, så slik måtte han bli stående natten til ende. Men han nådde sitt<br />
mål. Hans lille knytteneve forebygget at vannet skulle sluke hele området. Men vi ser ham for<br />
oss, der ute ved dikene. Utenfor er havet, stort, tungt, og farlig. Ruvende over ham. Akkurat<br />
som kriminaliteten som truer der ute. Også et hav som presser på, en mørk mengde, noe<br />
farlig, noe vi må beskytte oss imot.<br />
Her er vi ved noen av de første vanskeligheter med forebyggelsesbegrepet. Fore-bygge, altså<br />
bygge opp foran noe. Siden det skal bygges beskyttelse mot noe, må jo dette noe være<br />
uønsket. På dansk griper man til latin og taler om det kriminal-pre-ventive råd, altså noe som<br />
går foran hendelsen. At hendelsen er uønsket, blir ytterligere understreket ved at det er<br />
"kriminalitet" som det skal bygges opp foran, eller pre-venteres. Kriminalitetsforebyggelse er<br />
David mot Goliat. Jeg vil være med på Goliats side.<br />
Men dette går for fort. La oss stoppe opp og se på noen sentrale kriminalitetsforebyggende<br />
virksomheter. Men det er ikke lett å avgrense begrepet. Som Hedda Giertsen (1994) sier om<br />
forebyggelsesbegrepet, - "altfor bredt og altfor smalt". Alt kan kalles forebyggelse, når det<br />
passer dem som bruker ordet, det er "et magisk begrep som samler nasjonen og åpner<br />
pengesekken" (s. 296). Berl Kutchinsky (1990) omtaler fire grunnformer av forebyggelse; for<br />
det første ved å skape fysiske eller elektroniske barrierer, for det annet ved å skape indre<br />
barrierer hos menneskene, for det tredje ved å redusere behovene, og så som det fjerde å<br />
skape legale alternativ. Jeg velger en litt annen inndeling i tre hovedtyper: Den første går på<br />
fysisk utestenging fra eget territorium av de truende farer. Den annen går på påvirkning av<br />
individer, hindre at mennesker utvikler seg i en slik retning at de kan komme til å utgjøre en<br />
trussel. Den tredje kriminalpreventive mulighet ligger i å endre de grunnleggende<br />
forutsetninger for at uønsket atferd skal finne sted.<br />
Det blir bare noen hovedtrekk ved den kriminalitetsforebyggende virksomhet jeg her samler<br />
meg om. Noe av det jeg tar opp er allerede påpekt av de forskjellige kriminalpolitiske råd i<br />
Norden, eller i drøftelser i regi av disse råd2. Dette blir et essay - altså et forsøk - for å få fram<br />
1 Noe bearbeidet foredrag holdt på forskerseminar arrangert av Nordisk Samarbeidsråd for Kriminologi, Finland<br />
1998. Takk til konferansedeltakerne for innspill etter foredraget, og til Louk Hulsmann, Heidi Mork Lomell,<br />
Hedda Giertsen og Nina Jon for momenter og referanser på forhånd.<br />
2Et særlig interessant eksempel på parallelle resonnement til mine egne finner jeg i Hannu Takalas (1997)<br />
analyse av "Urban Criminality and built Environment"<br />
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en helhet som kanskje kan motvirke i det minste min egen tendens til slapp godtakelse av<br />
tiltak som ser ut til å ha en selvinnlysende nytteverdi.<br />
2. Utestenging.<br />
Utestengingen kan illustreres ved å tenke seg noen enkle sirkler. Innerst har vi det private,<br />
barrikadert bakom en rekke murer. Her er vi vant til å tenke på huset eller leiligheten. Men så<br />
kom jeg til å se meg om, der jeg satt i stuen og skrev. Soveværelsedøren var lukket. Den<br />
innerste sirkel i det moderne liv er rommet, - a room for oneself. Da jeg i en fjern fortid skulle<br />
ha bygget utedo på en sommerhytte, spurte snekkeren om vi ville ha en enseters eller toseters,<br />
- d.v.s. to hull ved siden av hverandre. Jeg angrer stadig på at jeg grepet av moderniteten ba<br />
om bare ett hull. I vår ikke fjerne fortid fantes en felles seng for de fleste, og så et bord i<br />
sentrum for de fleste aktiviteter, fødselsøyeblikket var et offentlig anliggende, dødsøyeblikket<br />
likeså. Symbolet på den moderne husholdning er nøkkelen på innsiden av baderomsdøren.<br />
Soveromsdøren trenger ingen nøkkel, ingen går inn der uten å høre til eller være spesielt<br />
invitert.<br />
Den innerste beskyttende ring slås om den enkelte, til nød om de to, eller blant<br />
småbarnfamilier muligens rundt dem alle. Men så kommer en kraftig ring. Denne gang rundt<br />
huset eller leiligheten, the apartment, appartemente, ja nettopp, det adskilte. Jeg har vært<br />
invitert hjem til folk med to låser og dessuten jernbeslag i kryss over inngangsdøren. Folk<br />
som bor i småhus har lås på vinduer, lydalarm og direkte linje til politistasjon eller privat<br />
vaktselskap. Om de flytter fra sine småhus, sine små fort i skogen, angis grunnen av og til å<br />
være at de vil inn i en boligblokk hvor de er bedre beskyttet ved at det bare er en dør inn i<br />
leiligheten, og så i tillegg en permanent dør ut av blokken. Til ytterdøren er det callingsystem,<br />
kanskje også fjernsyn så man kan se hvem som ber om å bli sluppet inn. Finn Carling3 har<br />
skrevet en novelle hvor en søster i nød ikke ble sluppet inn fordi fjernesynsbildet av den<br />
nødstedte utenfor døren var for uklart. Men boligblokken kan jo også sikres på andre måter.<br />
Den latinske tradisjon er portnerkonen. Mange steder er hun nå videreutviklet, først ved å bli<br />
en hann, deretter ved at hannen blir bevæpnet, deretter ved at han flyttes ut i et lite vakttårn<br />
utenfor porten, men da knyttet sammen med et høyt nettinggjerde eller en mur som går<br />
utenfor og rundt hele boligblokken, deretter ved at denne ytre mur eller gjerde får piggtråd på<br />
topp, eller som jeg også har sett, at det på toppen av muren plasseres et elektrisk gjerde.<br />
Lyskastere på mur eller gjerde står selvfølgelig på natten igjennom, samtidig som<br />
fjernsynskameraer knyttet til skjermer inne i vakttårnet hele tiden gir et skarpt bilde av hva<br />
som skjer rundt hele boligblokken. Så om huset kan vi sette en tydelig sirkel. Den avspeiler<br />
bare hva mange steder allerede er satt der i praksis.<br />
Og vi kan sette nye ringer. Vi kan i tråd med råd fra ledende teoretikere og praktikere på<br />
kriminalitetsforebygging også sette en ring rundt hele bolig-kvartalet. Kvartalet, eller hele<br />
nabolaget bør lages så man ser hvem som er hvem, eller kanskje heller; hvem som ikke er<br />
hvem, hvem som ikke er en av dem som hører til. Oversiktlige gater, ingen krinkelkroker hvor<br />
ukjente kan skjule seg, kantsten mot fortauet som markerer at gresset innenfor er privat<br />
eiendom. Ytterligere en mulighet ligger i å gi det offentlige rom status som privat. Når<br />
handdlegater og hele kvartaler blir privat, blir kontrollen enklere. Som Bottoms og Wiles<br />
(1996) peker på, gjør denne konverteringen det mulig å holde uønskede personer borte. Den<br />
edrue omstreifer eller boms kan ikke nektes å gå på Kungsgatan eller Strøget eller<br />
Esplanaden, men om handlegaten blir halvprivat, har han ingen selvfølgelig rett til adgang.<br />
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Men andre løsninger er også mulig. Representative kvartaler kan avskjermes ved at det, som i<br />
Los Angeles, legges motorveier mellom dem og nærliggende slumstrøk. Eller på enklere vis:<br />
Benkene på buss-holdeplassene lages så korte at ingen fristes til å legge seg ned på dem.<br />
Andre offentlige benker - om man da drister seg til å ha slike - kan lages så de også bare<br />
egner seg for korttidssitting. På Hovedbanegården i København har man fjernet alle benker i<br />
den store hallen, og i tillegg innført forbud mot at noen setter seg ned på gulvet. Da bilene<br />
kom til New York ble det sett på som et stort hygienisk fremskritt. Byen måtte bygges om.<br />
Bilene tok livsgrunnlaget fra grisene. Gatene ble asfaltert og grisehusene mer verdt som<br />
leiegårdsgrunn. Hestemøkken forsvant også. Før måtte man gå i sjøstøvler på Fifth Avenue.<br />
Og fremskrittene fortsetter, nå under kriminologers lederskap i kampen mot de istykkerslåtte<br />
vindusruter - the theory of the broken windows - og i kampen mot dem som underlig nok ser<br />
ut til helst å ville leve hvor vinduene er knust.<br />
Kampen for å skape det kriminalitetsfrie rom, har to mulige ytterpunkter. Det ene er å stenge<br />
de uønskede totalt ute, hvilket i praksis betyr inne i et fengsel. Det andre er å sperre seg selv<br />
inne. Den første løsning avspeiles i hva som foregår i New York akkurat nå. Det er å ta<br />
kriminalitetsforebyggelsestanken til sitt ytterpunkt. Det er lettere å stanse en bekk enn en elv,<br />
lettere å stanse en elv enn en flod, mer effektivt å arrestere en som sniker på trikken enn en<br />
som i andre sammenhenger sikkert både skyter og bedrar, mer effektivt å stoppe en tagger enn<br />
den ransmann han snart vil bli, og under enhver omstendighet et gode å arrestere folk som<br />
drikker og senere urinerer på gaten. Man kunne, som Hannu Takala sier i APROPÅ (1997,<br />
s.41-42) satset på offentlige urinaler framfor politi, men da ble man jo ikke kvitt de uønskede.<br />
Utfra gartnerstatens tankegang, jeg anvender her Zygmunt Baumans begrep (1997) om at<br />
statens sentrale oppgave er å få fjernet ugresset, er selvfølgelig innesperring langt mer egnet<br />
enn hva som bare ville være en vedlikeholdelse ved urinaler, en vedlikeholdelse som gjorde<br />
det mulig for de uønskede å forbli i gatene. USA har snart et fangetall på 2 millioner, mens<br />
Russland har 1,3 millioner. Jeg har redegjort for dette i en artikkel om Straffens geografi,<br />
(Christie 1997). Intet tyder på at veksten vil stoppe opp. For meg står denne utvikling som<br />
prevesjonstankens ytterpunkt.<br />
Det annet ytterpunkt i bestrebelsene på å skape det kriminalitetsfrie rom er beskrevet av<br />
Flemming Balvig (1995). Konkret gjelder det et område i utkanten av Sacramento,<br />
hovedstaten i California, men samme løsning finnes også andre steder, i og utenfor USA.<br />
Istedenfor å stenge de uønskede ute fra nabolaget, stenger man seg selv inne. Man setter ikke<br />
bare en mur rundt leiegården, men om hele nabolaget, og så slipper vaktene i porten bare inn<br />
folk med gyldig pass eller andre håndfaste bevis på at man har rett til å få komme. Flemming<br />
Balvig fikk ikke lov, ved første forsøk, og det forstår jeg godt etter å ha lest hva han senere<br />
skrev. Men Sacramentoløsningen er selvfølgelig i full harmoni med hva statsdannelser alle<br />
steder foretar seg. De rike i Sacramento forebygger kriminalitet ved å slå en ring om seg. På<br />
samme vis slår stater, særlig de rike stater, ringer om seg og forsøker å holde sine fremmede<br />
ute. Og akkurat nå, i Europa, slår de aller rikeste stater seg sammen for å holde hele<br />
samlingen av fremmede ute fra sine territorier. Demningene skyves lenger ut mot havet. Nye<br />
land som skal være med, må love å bygge like sikre demninger, samt å hjelpe hverandre med<br />
å holde det uønskede borte innen dikene. Hvis kriminologer ønsket å være ide-imperialister,<br />
kunne vi jo si at det var vi som fant på hele Schengen-avtalen! Tanken om kriminalitetsforebygging,<br />
er den seierende tanke, de seirendes tanke. Thomas Mathiesen (1997, 1998 A) har i<br />
sin stedige kritikk av Schengen tatt opp et helt sentralt tema.<br />
Med dette er vi ferdige med sirklene. Men ikke helt. Vi må tilbake til den innerste sirkel.<br />
Badeværelset er låst, soveværelset er hellig. Kun fantasien setter grenser for hva her kan skje.<br />
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Kanskje blir noen slått bakom døren, eller seksuelt krenket. Eller ikke gitt tilstrekkelig stell og<br />
omsorg. Derfor er det her en motgående bevegelse i gang. Utestengingen av de vanlige fører<br />
til statskontrollørenes innmarsj. Det er helt naturlig. Privatiseringen, eller som romerne så det,<br />
de-priveringen, fører til at det er vanskelig å etablere likevekt i makt i de lukkede rom. Det<br />
reises derfor krav om at systemene må kunne tvangsåpnes for å hjelpe svake parter. Politiet<br />
blir den funksjonelle ekvivalent til storfamilie, til de gammeldagse "inneboende", eller til<br />
vaktsomme naboer. Kvinnen blir anmelder, i England fengslet om hun ikke opprettholder<br />
anmeldelsen, og mannen blir som voldsmann eller sedelighetsforbryter å regne. Fortsatte<br />
lovbrudd kan mest effektivt forebygges ved at mannen får varig opphold i lukket institusjon<br />
samt oppslag i nabolaget om hvem han er og hvor han bor om han noengang løslates, i mindre<br />
ekstreme tilfelle ved at han får forbud mot å nærme seg nabolaget. En annen variant, om<br />
saken ennå ikke er blitt en sak for statskontrollører, er at kvinnen flykter til krisesenter, og<br />
deretter til et godt avlåst bosted helt for seg selv. For kvinner uten annet sosialt nettverk enn<br />
familien betyr dette en sosial død. Rachel Paul ved Institutt for Kriminologi i Oslo er i gang<br />
med en studie av indiske og pakistanske alternativer til denne løsning.<br />
Det går en linje gjennom hva som hittil er beskrevet. Ord som faller i tankene er slike som<br />
utstøting, utskillelse, frasortering, apartheid. Man slår en ring om seg og sitt og får de<br />
fremmede, det farlige, bort fra sin nærhet. Interneringen er den naturlige konsekvens av denne<br />
type kriminalitetsforebygging. Visse typer internering har dessuten et dobbelt formål. Jeg<br />
tenker på almenprevensjonen. Det er interessant å registrere hvorledes de forskjellige<br />
kriminalitetsforebyggende råd i Norden ikke legger seg tett opp til almenprevensjonen, ikke<br />
agiterer for denne, ikke gjør noen hovedsak ut av at de vil ha mer straff.<br />
Almenprevensjonstilhengerne agiterte jo for forebyggelse lenge før vi fikk noen råd for slik<br />
virksomhet. Almenprevensjonen er en krystallisering av viktige sider av forebyggelsestanken.<br />
Man piner den ene for at andre ikke skal gjøre som den pinte gjorde. Dette er<br />
kriminalitetsforebygging i første potens. Hvorfor står ikke dette som punkt nummer en på<br />
rådenes virksomhetsplaner? Jeg skal komme tilbake til spørsmålet. Men først til den annen<br />
type prevensjonstanke. Det er;<br />
3. Tanken om den skjeve sjel.<br />
På ny en innlysende tanke, denne gang i pakt med Bibelens ord. La de små barn komme til<br />
oss, så skal vi rette opp feilvaren og de vil vokse opp til å bli verdifulle borgere i landet. Eller,<br />
om de er litt eldre, la oss ved barnevernets eller behandlingsprofesjonenes hjelp rette opp<br />
defektene de allerede måtte være blitt påført. Eller, om de atpå til allerede har snublet i<br />
straffelovens bestemmelser, la oss sette inn med omfattende tiltak for å føre dem tilbake til<br />
kretsen av lovlydige borgere.<br />
Bokhyllelengden må trolig angis i kilometer når det gjelder omfanget av litteraturen om disse<br />
bestrebelser. Mye er gladmeldinger i rapporter fra behandlere. Per og Kari fikk det bedre etter<br />
ett eller annet tiltak, kriminalitetstruet ungdom er tauet inn, oppholdet på Solgløtt betød et<br />
avgjørende vendepunkt.<br />
Men innimellom gladmeldingene kommer jo også en og annen dystrere tone. Helt tilbake til<br />
Cambridge-Sommerville-studien kommer det små utrop om at det ikke alltid går så bra.<br />
Cambridge-Sommerville, - det var det elegante og gigantiske eksperiment hvor man ga<br />
halvparten av all kriminalitetstruet ungdom den maksimale psykoterapeutiske og praktiske<br />
hjelp, og den annen halvpart ingenting. Og så gikk det best med denne annen halvpart<br />
(McCord 19).<br />
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Sikker er ikke saken. Man kan visst ikke lenger ut fra de best kontrollerte studiene bastant<br />
konkludere at intet virker, nothing <strong>works</strong> (Martinson 1974). Noe ser ut til å virke. Litt. Men<br />
det må samtidig kunne sies at de skjeve sjelers oppretting neppe kan være kongeveien i<br />
kriminalitetsforebyggelsens tjeneste. Dette henger sammen med to forhold.<br />
For det første; vi vet ikke hvem som har de største behov for innsats, hvilke barn trenger<br />
ekstra innsats og hvilke klarer seg på egen hånd uansett handicaps. Løvetannbarna kalles de i<br />
Norge, slike planter som mot alle odds bryter seg opp gjennom asfalten. Blant de eldre, blant<br />
slike hvor man ønsker å forebygge gjentagelse av alvorlig kriminalitet, er forholdet helt det<br />
samme. Vår evne til forutsigelse av farlighet er ikke til stede, og vil ikke bli det så lenge<br />
mennesker er mennesker, og derved med evne og vilje til valg, -kfr. her f.eks. Mathiesen<br />
(1998 B) og for psykiatriske pasienter Rund (1997).<br />
Det annet forhold som vanskeliggjør forebyggelsen, ligger i at den hånd som hjelper, også<br />
brenner. Kriminalitetsforebyggelse er kriminalitetspåminnende. La oss bruke ungdom som<br />
eksempel. Vi vet at de fleste ungdommer som får problem med f.eks. stoffbruk, også er<br />
innehavere av en rekke andre problem. De vil regelmessig ha flere tidligere sår i sjelen, de er<br />
fattigere enn de fleste, de har mindre av et vanlig nettverk rundt seg, de har færre til å liste og<br />
lirke dem inn i arbeidslivet, de har nitten områder hvor de trenger hjelp. Og så velger man ut<br />
område nummer tretten, kaller dem narkomane og hekter dem inn i tiltak rettet mot denne<br />
tilstand. Det er ikke vanskelig å forstå at så skjer. En god del av problemene denne<br />
ungdommen sliter med er felles for mange. Det ville kreve omfattende samfunnsendringer å<br />
gjøre noe med dem. Narkomani er både bedre avgrenset og mer forskrekkende. Det er mye<br />
lettere å få penger til et "narkosenter" enn til et "ungdom må få det bra-senter". Det er lettere å<br />
få penger til det Kyvsgaard (1990) kaller sekundærforebygging eller enda lettere til<br />
tertiærforebygging, enn til primærforebygging rettet mot alle barn og unge. Det er ganske<br />
enkelt penger i kriminaliteten. Kan man love nedgang i kriminaliteten, eller en av dens<br />
avarter, er det store muligheter for å få finansiert tiltak som også ut fra andre hensyn kan være<br />
meget fornuftige. Mange narkokollektiv gjør et fint arbeid, også med alt det andre som plager<br />
folkene der, som vennemangel og skrøpelige selvbilder. Men narko står det over døren eller<br />
på himmelen over husene. Og narko står det brent inn på pannen til dem som går derfra.<br />
Med innsikt om disse forhold er det naturlig å gå et skritt videre og drøfte hva vi kunne kalle;<br />
4. Kriminalitetsforebyggingens ikke-tema.<br />
Vi vet jo hva det er. Det er helheten. Fengslene er fylt med fattigfolk, noen litt skjevere enn<br />
andre. Velstående skjeve kommer annet sted hen. Det er jo helt klart, for alle som vil se, at<br />
den nåværende samfunnsutvikling vil forsterke de handlingene som tradisjonelt sees som<br />
kriminalitetsproblem. Vi ser konturene av det endimensjonale samfunn stige fram, det<br />
samfunn hvor inntekt og konsum står overdøvende sentralt i bestemmelsen av et menneskes<br />
samfunnsposisjon og hvor det å falle ut på disse områder derfor kan bli sett på som meget<br />
farlig. Av og til er samfunn organisert på måter som gir belønning på mange livsområder;<br />
håndverksdyktighet, lærdhet, snillhet og saktmodighet, evner til å fortelle historier så noen<br />
gidder høre. Ofte gir slike samfunn til og med løfter om lønn i neste liv. Vårt er et samfunn<br />
med en enklere målstruktur. Vanskeligere, men gjevere, å bli vinner. Kanskje også med større<br />
angst for at noen uberettiget skal ta fra en det man har vunnet. En klok mann i Norge (Aarnes<br />
1998) sa det forleden slik i et intervju:<br />
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Jeg kaller det økonomisk vold når rike mennesker bygger seg hytte til 20 millioner i bygdesamfunn. Når de som<br />
bor der ikke er like rike, skapes det forbilder og målsetninger blant lokalbefolkningen som ikke er knyttet til<br />
dypere kulturelle verdier, sier han.<br />
Han mener at den generelle elitekulturen som råder i samfunnet bygger på falsk status. Han nevner blant annet<br />
eliteidretten og skjønnhetsidealene i samfunnet som eksempler på slik elitetenking.<br />
-Elitekulturen skaper skam blant de som mener at de ikke kan matche idealene sine. Det er en stor<br />
kulturoppgave å avsløre de falske forbildene, mener Aarnes.<br />
Ingrid Sahlin (1997) har en uttalelse om endringer i sosiale forutsetninger for barns gode liv.<br />
Hun sier i et intervju:<br />
Förut ansågs till exempel att trygga uppväxtvillkor var av yttersta vikt för barn och ungdomar. - Dette<br />
betraktelsessätt har i grunden förändrats i samband med att all social verksamhet har skurits ned och tvingats in i<br />
ett lönsamhetstänkande. När de reguljära samhällsverksamheterna försvagades innebär det egentligen motsatsen<br />
till brottsf örebyggande insatser. Men detta taler ingen om, eftersom det inte finns en vokabulär för en sådan<br />
inverterad brottsprevention.."<br />
Man kan si om den kriminalitetsforebyggende virksomhet at den er samfunnsbevarende. Det<br />
er det jo ikke noe galt i. Men man kan også velge en litt annen formulering. Man kan si den er<br />
samfunnsforsterkende. Den gjør oss til mer av hva vi allerede er på forhånd. For å belyse<br />
dette, må jeg gå tilbake til mitt første punkt om den kriminalitetsforebyggende territoriale<br />
virksomhet. Til apartheid.<br />
5. Apartheid<br />
Nylig var jeg en tur i Brasil og nød det gode liv på stranden i Rio, og det ikke fullt så gode i<br />
den sydende heksegryte som Sao Paulo representerer. Det er visst 12 millioner innbyggere<br />
der. Men jeg oppdaget jo at blant dem jeg traff, i mine kretser, der hadde man enkelte felles<br />
erfaringer. Første gang jeg hørte om dem, forstod jeg ikke symbolikken. Jeg biler bestandig<br />
med Air-conditioning på, sa en kvinne i Rio. Senere sa en annen i Sao Paulo; jeg stopper aldri<br />
for rødt lys om natten, og som oftest heller ikke om dagen. En tredje observasjon fra Sao<br />
Paulo; der fantes meget få småunger og litt eldre som solgte saft og pusset bilvinduer slik som<br />
det ellers yrer av i andre Latin-Amerikanske storbyer. Forklaringen på alt dette lå i angsten<br />
for kriminalitet. Bilvinduer måtte aldri åpnes og biler aldri stoppes fordi mengden av ranere er<br />
såvidt stor. Derved er også salgs og service-mulighetene stengt for ungdommen. En som<br />
intervjuet meg for et juridisk tidsskrift, en heldagsaktivist for fangers rettigheter, nevnte litt<br />
tilfeldig at hun nå var ranet åtte ganger. En kollega var også ofte ranet, sist av en kvinne som<br />
holdt et barberblad mot halsen hennes. Offeret hadde ikke air-conditioning og vinduet var<br />
åpent. Men da brast det for henne. Hun hadde forelest, var trett og sliten og svett og på vei<br />
hjem for å fore sultne unger. Nå fikk det være nok med raning, sa hun oppgitt til raneren, og<br />
satte bilen i gir. Kvinnen med barberbladet trakk forskrekket armen tilbake og gikk<br />
hoderystende oppover fortauet. Hun var uforskyldt kommet ut for et offer uten folkeskikk.<br />
Selv dro jeg til politiarresten. Den lå vegg i vegg med et hotell på 7-8 etasjer. Enerom og<br />
dobbeltrom. I arresten delte 70 mann ett rom. Dante ville ikke trodd sine øyne.<br />
I disse byer forebygges ved lukkede bilvinduer, elektriske gjerder, vakter med gevær og<br />
ubeskrivelige fengselsforhold. Man holder på det man har, med de midler som finnes. Litt<br />
utenfor betongkolossene, oppe i åsene, skimter man favellaene, fattigfolks selvbyggede<br />
nabolag.<br />
Brasil er ikke Norden, men vi blir kanskje litt mer Brasil hver gang vi installerer enda en lås.<br />
En gang i året iverksettes en gigantisk innsamlingsaksjon i Norge for et eller annet utmerket<br />
formål. Aviser, radio og fjernsyn pisker opp giverentusiasmen og tusener av bøssebærere går<br />
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fra dør til dør med bønn om penger. Sist ble noen veteraner blant bøssebærerne intervjuet. Det<br />
var tyngre nå, sa de. Ikke fordi folk gav mindre om man oppnådde å komme i kontakt med<br />
dem, men fordi man ikke kom i kontakt. Det var så vanskelig å komme inn i husene.<br />
Ytterdørene mot gaten var stengt. Man kunne ringe på, men ble ikke sluppet inn hvis ikke<br />
folk kjente deg. Man har jo ansvar for naboene, og kan ikke uten videre slippe ukjente tiggere<br />
inn i oppgangen.<br />
Et vanlig spørsmål blant forskere av kriminalitetsforebyggelsens virkninger, er om<br />
kriminaliteten bare forskyver seg. Om man forebygger effektivt i nabolag A, flytter da den<br />
uønskede virksomheten seg til nabolag B? Vanligvis finner man, at det gjør den ikke. Men det<br />
er jo ikke dette som er hovedproblemet. Problemet ligger i at nabolag B etter en tid også vil<br />
sikre seg, og det vil også C og D og E og F og de fleste andre, og så vokser den langsomt<br />
fram, den segregerte byen. Ti år etter at kriminalitetsforebyggerne har gitt sine råd er byene<br />
gått enda noen skritt mot de befestede boligblokker, eller de befestede nabolag, festningsverk<br />
som øker avstanden mennesker i mellom, gjør dem ytterligere ukjente for hverandre, og øker<br />
hva som kanskje etter hvert blir den berettigede angsten for det fremmede. Forskning om<br />
kriminalitetsforebygging, burde etter mitt skjønn dreies i retning av en analyse av de totale<br />
samfunnsmessige konsekvenser av virksomheten, og også av de interesser som står bak<br />
denne, fra interessene i de statlige råd, og over til interessene innen den private industri.<br />
Her vil jeg et øyeblikk få dreie tanken tilbake til den klassiske kriminalforebyggende<br />
virksomhet, straff. Spesielt straff som almenprevensjon. De kriminalitetsforebyggende råd er<br />
som nevnt ikke opptatt av denne type virksomhet. Tvert om virker det som om man vil legge<br />
avstand til pinen, den tilsiktede lidelsespåføring. Kriminalitetsforebygging er noe godt, bare<br />
godt. Men derved mister man forbindelsen til en verdifull side ved den gammeldagse<br />
europeiske strafferetten; bevisstheten om at tiltak også har skadelige virkninger som må<br />
holdes i sjakk. Kriminalpreventive tiltak kan bære med seg omkostninger langt utover de lett<br />
synlige i lønn til vakter og regning for elektronikk. Kanskje man burde nekte butikker å<br />
ansette private vakter, så ble de nødt til å ansette personale i steden. Kanskje man av samme<br />
grunn burde pålegge alle som transporterte mer enn X antall personer i vogn eller vognsett å<br />
ha en levende konduktør til stede så angsten kunne begrenses der folk nå sitter alene og titter<br />
på hverandre ved nattestider. Men straks den er ytret, ser vi hvor naiv denne tanke er. For ikke<br />
engang innen strafferettsinstitusjonen råder lenger de gamle ideer om forholdsmessighet.<br />
William Bratton, sjefen for zero-tolerance aksjonen i New York, startet det hele som sjef for<br />
tunnelbanepolitiet. I en ulidelig selvgratulerende tone beskrives fremgangsmåten (Bratton og<br />
Knobler, 1998). Trikkesnikere ble arrestert, belagt med håndjern, stillet opp i lange rekker på<br />
perrongen, nye trikker passerte, flere havnet i håndjernsgjengen, og etter en passelig lang tids<br />
offentlig fremvisning ble trikkesnikerne i samlet rekke marsjert opp til et provisorisk<br />
rettslokale oppe på hovedgaten. Blant de arresterte fant man enkelte ettersøkt for andre<br />
forhold. Disse ble umiddelbart fengslet. De andre ble bøtlagt. Om de ikke betalte bøtene innen<br />
korte frister, ble de oppsøkt på bostedet, gjerne klokken fire om morgenen med kraftig<br />
dundring på ytterdøren. En konduktør på hvert togsett kunne ikke gjort samme jobben.<br />
Konduktører i undergrunnsbanen ville bare fått folk til å betale. I Bratton-utgaven får man<br />
kontroll med underklassen. Samtidig spredte det seg stolthet i politikorpset.<br />
6. En farlig tanke i en farlig tid<br />
Kanskje man kunne si at forebyggelsestanken er en spesielt farlig tanke i vår tid. Det skyldes<br />
to forhold.<br />
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Den er i vår tid først og fremst farlig fordi rettsapparatet også er preget av moderniteten. Vi<br />
ser i alle moderne industrisamfunn en økende tendens til hva Simon (1996) kaller "Governing<br />
through crime". Det endimensjonale samfunn styrer i større grad enn noen gang gjennom<br />
strafferettsapparatet. Velferdssystem går ned, nulltoleransen går opp. Det er ikke snakk om<br />
gjengjeldelse mot de gateurinerende. Det er snakk om grunner for å bli kvitt dem, nøyaktig<br />
som vi tidligere i både Finland og Norge og Sverige brukte inntak av alkohol på offentlig<br />
plass som grunn til å internere fattigfolk. Bottom og Wiles (1996) peker i en viktig artikkel på<br />
hvordan den gammeldagse, ineffektive stat var laget slik med vilje. Langsommeligheten,<br />
oppsplittingen av funksjoner, rettssikkerhetsgarantier, forholdsmessighetsbetraktninger,<br />
dommeres uavhengighet hadde beskyttelsesformål. Som de sier (s.33):<br />
All this was intended to prevent abuse, and the capture of the State by vested interests. One consequence of these<br />
institutional arrangements was deliberately to create inefficiencies in the State's arrangements, but this was seen<br />
as an acceptable and indeed necessary price to pay for greater gains elsewhere. An important result of late<br />
modernity is that the pre-eminence of the nation-state is eroded ...and its overriding power declines.<br />
Simultaneously, late modernity, with its information-driven concerns, highlights the system inefficiencies which<br />
were historically built into the operation of the State.<br />
Forebyggelsestanken er også av en annen grunn spesielt farlig i vår tid. Den er spesielt farlig<br />
fordi kriminaliteten er spesielt nyttig. Vår er en tid hvor det politiske systemet har gitt fra seg<br />
styringen av det sentrale virksomhetsråde i våre endimensjonale samfunn. Det politiske<br />
systemet har gitt fra seg styringen av sentrale deler av det økonomiske liv. Det er ikke<br />
konsesjonslover, arbeidstidsbestemmelser, fordelingspolitikk, skattenivå, støtteordninger til<br />
utsatt industri eller kontroll av importert svinekjøtt som står på dagsordenen. Alt dette<br />
avgjøres utenfor. Tukler vi med fordelingspolitikken eller skattlegging av bedriftene, flytter<br />
de, tukler vi med handelsbetingelsene, får vi nei fra EØS, vil vi kvitte oss med landminene,<br />
får vi nei fra USA. Da er det greiere med kriminaliteten. Her er en arena hvor det kan vises<br />
handlekraft, en av de få gjenværende, viktigere jo færre andre arenaer som er tilbake.<br />
Hovedlinjene i kriminalitetsforebyggingen er i nydelig overensstemmelse med den generelle<br />
samfunnspolitikk. Apartheid, og så stell av noen skjeve sjeler. Men ikke noen tukling med de<br />
grunnleggende forhold. Den kriminalpreventive virksomhet er nyttig som en generell pådriver<br />
for angst. Man skaper en todeling, og bygger opp en mur imellom. Innenfor er det gode liv,<br />
våre liv. Der ute er de onde liv, farene som truer. Prevensjonstanken oppmuntrer til<br />
eksternalisering, utskillelse, adskillelse. Vi kan ikke så lett ha et kriminalitetsforebyggende<br />
råd til forebyggelse av oss selv, eller deler av oss selv. Eller, for å se det på safunnsnivå, det<br />
er heller ikke så lett å tenke seg en kriminalitetsforebyggende virksomhet som sier at<br />
kriminaliteten, den er jo en del av samfunnskroppen, en del av ordninger som vi i sum er<br />
glade for og slett ikke kunne tenke oss å være foruten. Eller enda et perspektiv, ett jeg selv<br />
arbeider med for tiden; Ved å bygge en mur mot det farlige, sperre det ute, befester man<br />
selvfølgelig forestillingene om at det der ute er noe farlig, noe man skal støte bort. Og ved<br />
attpå til å kalle det kriminalitetsforebyggelse, festner man ytterligere den merkverdige tanke<br />
at kriminalitet finnes. Det gjør den. Og det gjør den ikke. Men for mange formål, hvorav<br />
behovet for å forstå er det ene, kan det vise seg fruktbart å ta det standpunkt å si at<br />
kriminalitet ikke finnes. Handlinger finnes. Under gitte betingelser vil vi gi handlingene den<br />
mening at de er uønskede. Og under ytterligere gitte betingelser vil vi gi de uønskede<br />
handlinger den mening å være kriminelle. Men de kunne jo også vært sett på som helt<br />
annerledes om de ble betraktet innen helsesektoren, innen familiesektoren, innen<br />
vekkelsespredikantenes rekker eller på sirkus for den saks skyld. Handlinger er ikke, de blir.<br />
Og vekten som legges på kriminalitetsforebygging hjelper dem til å bli kriminelle. Gitt den<br />
mening, festner strafferettsvesenet sitt grep om handlingen.<br />
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Vi er midt oppe i en fornyet kriminaliseringsbølge, inn i soveværelset, ut i parkene for å<br />
praktisere lærdommen fra New York, eller inn i skolene hvor lærere oppfordres til å anmelde<br />
elever til politiet, - før var de ramp, nå blir de kriminelle for samme type handling. Om<br />
bevaring av det sivile samfunn sees som et viktig mål, bør organisasjoner for forebyggelse av<br />
kriminalitet sees på med mistanke, og deres iverksatte tiltak vurderes i et langtidsperspektiv.<br />
Litteratur<br />
Balvig, Flemming: Kriminalitet og social kontrol, København 1995.<br />
Bauman, Zygmunt: Moderniteten og holokaust. Oslo 1997. Originalutgave 1989.<br />
Bottoms, Anthony E. and Paul Wiles: ‘Understanding <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Prevention</strong> in Late Modern<br />
Societies’. In: Preventing <strong>Crime</strong> and Disorder. Targeting Strategies and<br />
Responsibilities. Bennett, Trevor (ed.). Cambridge 1996.<br />
Bratton, W. med Peter Knobler: Turnauround. N.Y. 1998.<br />
Carling, Finn: Fiendene, 1974.<br />
Christie, Nils: ‘Straffens geografi.’ I: Nordisk tidsskrift for kriminalvidenskab, 84, nr.2-1997.<br />
Giertsen, Hedda: "Forebyggelse av kriminalitet". Altfor bredt og altfor smalt. I: Nordisk<br />
Tidsskrift for Kriminalvidenskab, 1994, s.295-313.<br />
Jon, Nina: ‘Forebygging av kriminalitet’. Kap 24, s. 400-407. I: Kriminologi.. Red: Finstad,<br />
Liv og Cecilie Høigård, Oslo 1997.<br />
Kyvsgaard, Britta: ‘Men det er da noget, der virker’. I: Forebyggelsens veje og vildveje.<br />
Kriminalistisk Instituts Stencilserie nr. 58. Red: Kyvsgaard, Britta, Annika Snare og<br />
Preben Wilhjelm, København. 1990.<br />
Kutchinsky, Berl: ‘Kriminalitet og fire slags forebyggelse’. I:"Forebyggelsens veje og<br />
vildveje." Kriminalistisk Instituts Stencilserie nr. 58. Red: Britta Kyvsgaard, Annika<br />
Snare og Preben Wilhjelm, København. 1990.<br />
Martinson, R.: ‘What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison Reform’. In: The Public<br />
Interest, l974, 34, pp. 22-54.<br />
Mathiesen, Thomas: Schengen, Politisamarbeid, overvåking og rettssikkerhet i Europa, Oslo<br />
1997.<br />
Mathiesen, Thomas: ‘Mot et integrert overvåkingssystem i Europa.’ I: Ret og skønsomhed i en<br />
overgangstid. Festskrift til Agnete Weis Bentzon. Blume, Peter og Kirsten<br />
Ketscher (red.). København 1998 A.<br />
Mathiesen, Thomas: ‘Selective Incapacitation Revisited’. Under trykking i Law and Human<br />
Behavior, August 1998 B.<br />
McCord, William, Joan McCord og Irving Kenneth Zola: ‘Origins of <strong>Crime</strong>’. A new<br />
evaluation of the Cambridge-Sommerville Youth Study. N.Y. 1995.<br />
Rund, Bjørn Rishovd: ‘Kan voldsutøvelse hos psykiatriske pasienter forutses?.’ I: Vold og<br />
psykiatri - om forståelse og behandling. Krøvel, Bernt, Bjørn Rishovd Run og<br />
Elisabet Rør (Red.) Oslo 1997.<br />
Sahlin, Ingrid. ‘Brottsförebyggande har etiska risker’. Intervju med henne i BRÅ 1997, nr 5-<br />
6,<br />
s.30-34.<br />
Simon, Jonathan: Governing through crime. Manuskriptutkast 1996.<br />
Takala, Hannu: ‘Ordning i stadsmiljön inte bara en polisfråga’. I: Apropå, 1997, nr. 5-6, s.<br />
41-42.<br />
Takala, Hannu: Urban criminality and built environment. CPTED in Finland. Foredrag på<br />
EU-Conference on crime prevention towards a European level, 11-14 May 1997,<br />
Noordwijk the Netherlands.<br />
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Aarnes, Asbjørn. Intervju i Universitas, 11 mars 1998, s. 8-9.<br />
260
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Dorthe Bundgaard<br />
Viktoriagade 19B, 4.th.<br />
DK-1655 København V.<br />
tlf: +45 - 31315707<br />
Gorm Gabrielsen<br />
Department of Management Science and<br />
Statistics, Copenhagen Buisness School<br />
Julius Thomsens Plads 10<br />
DK-1925 Frederiksberg C<br />
tlf: +45 - 38153512<br />
fax: +45 - 38153500<br />
e-mail: stgg@cbs.dk<br />
Rikke Gut<br />
Retsvidenskabeligt institut D, Kbh. Uni.<br />
Sankt Peders stræde 19<br />
DK-1453 København K<br />
tlf: +45 - 35323344<br />
fax: +45 - 35323334<br />
e-mail: rikke.gut@jur.ku.dk<br />
Bettina Høyer Olsen<br />
Vordingborggade 6D, lejl. 3<br />
DK-2100 København Ø<br />
tlf: +45 - 35380304<br />
Karsten Ive<br />
Det Kriminalpreventive Råd<br />
Odensegade 5, 2.sal<br />
DK-2100 København Ø<br />
tlf: +45 - 35432300<br />
Annette Bitsch Jensen<br />
Gammeltoftsgade 14, 2 th.<br />
DK-1355 København K<br />
tlf: +45 - 33935939<br />
Sussie Jørgensen<br />
Magnoliavej 31<br />
DK-8260 Viby J.<br />
e-mail: sj891370@stud.jura.aau.dk<br />
tlf: +45 - 86140892<br />
Britta Kyvsgaard<br />
Justitsministeriet, Adm. Afd.<br />
Slotsholmsgade 10<br />
DK-1216 København K<br />
tlf: +45 - 33954184<br />
fax: +45 - 33933510<br />
e-mail: bky@jm.dk<br />
Nina Löwe Krarup<br />
Retsvidenskabeligt Institut D, Kbh. Uni.<br />
Sankt Peders stræde 19<br />
DK-1453 København K<br />
tlf: +45 - 35323332<br />
fax: +45 - 35323334<br />
e-mail: nina.krarup@jur.ku.dk<br />
Anna Malmborg<br />
Eksjögatan 15-17<br />
S-554 54 Jönköping<br />
tlf: +46- (0)-36 121295<br />
e-mail: lars.lindquist@brikettenergi.se<br />
Jesper Stecher<br />
Retsvidenskabeligt Institut D, Kbh. Uni.<br />
Sankt Peders stræde 19<br />
DK-1453 København K<br />
tlf: +45 - 35323344<br />
fax: +45 - 35323334<br />
e-mail: jesper.stecher@jur.ku.dk<br />
Anette Storgaard<br />
Afd. for proces-og kriminalvidenskab<br />
Århus Universitet<br />
DK-8000 Århus<br />
tlf: +45 - 89421359<br />
fax: +45 - 86194463<br />
e-mail: as@jura.au.dk<br />
261
NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Anne-Stina Sørensen<br />
Det retsvidenskabelige institut D, Kbh.<br />
Uni.<br />
Sankt Peders Stræde 19<br />
DK-1453København K<br />
tlf: +45 - 35323344<br />
fax: +45 - 35323334<br />
e-mail: anne-stina.sorensen@jur.ku.dk<br />
Estland<br />
Andri Ahven<br />
Information and Communications<br />
Department<br />
Police Board<br />
Pagari 1, EE-0100 Tallinn<br />
tlf: +372 - 5091627<br />
fax: +372 - 6123310<br />
e-mail: andri@sisemin.gov.ee<br />
e-mail: andri.ahven@mail.ee<br />
Anna Markina<br />
Department of Criminology and Sociology<br />
of Deviant Behavior. National Defence and<br />
Public Service Academy<br />
61 Kase tee<br />
EST-00020 Talinn<br />
tlf: +372 - 6265487<br />
fax: +372 - 6265343<br />
e-mail: anna@endpsa.ee<br />
Finland<br />
Timo Ahonen<br />
Faculty of law, University of Turku<br />
Calonia 341<br />
FIN-20014 Åbo<br />
tlf: +358 - 2 3335071<br />
fax: +358 - 2 3336570<br />
e-mail: timaho@utu.fi<br />
Ilppo Alatalo<br />
Justitieministeriet, PB 319<br />
FIN-00181 Helsingfors<br />
tlf: +358 - 9 16088505<br />
fax: +358 - 9 16088538<br />
e-mail: ilppo.alatalo@om.vn.fi<br />
262<br />
Anne Kaarina Alvesalo<br />
Polishögskolan/Poliisiopisto<br />
P.B. 13, FIN-02151 Espoo<br />
tlf: +358 - 9 83883439<br />
fax: +358 - 9 83883500<br />
e-mail:<br />
anne.alvesalo@krp.poliisi.mailnet.fi<br />
Kauko Aromaa<br />
Rättspolitiska forskningsintitutet<br />
PB 1200, FIN-00101 Helsingfors Uni.<br />
tlf: +358 - 9 18257850<br />
fax: +358 - 9 18257865<br />
e-mail: kauko.aromaa@om.vn.fi<br />
Eero Backman<br />
Universitet i Åbo<br />
Calonia 344<br />
FIN: 20014 Åbo<br />
tlf: +358 - 2 3335539<br />
e-mail: eeveba@utu.fi<br />
Johan Bäckman<br />
Rättspolitiska forskningsinstitutet<br />
PB 1200, FIN: 00101 Helsingfors<br />
tlf: +358 - 9 1825 7875<br />
fax: +358 - 9 825 7866<br />
e-mail: johan.backman@om.vn.fi<br />
Matti Joutsen<br />
Helsingfors kriminalpolitiska institut<br />
PB 161, FIN-00131 Helsingfors<br />
tlf: +358 - 9 18257881<br />
fax: +358 - 9 18257890<br />
e-mail: matti.joutsen@om.vn.fi<br />
Tarja Elisa Kauppila<br />
Department of Social Sciences<br />
University of Kuopio<br />
P.O.B. 1627, FIN-70211 Kuopio<br />
tlf: +358 - 17 162653<br />
fax: +358 - 017 162673<br />
e-mail: kauppila@messi.uku.fi<br />
Aarne Kinnunen<br />
Delegation för brottsförebyggande<br />
PB 1200, FIN-00100 Helsingfors<br />
tlf: +358 - 9 18257863<br />
fax: +358 - 9 18257865<br />
e-mail: aarne.kinnunen@om.vn.fi
NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Timo Korander<br />
Polishögskolan/Poliisiopisto<br />
PAKK, P.B. 13, FIN-02151 Espoo<br />
tlf: +358 - 9 83883440<br />
fax: +358 - 9 83883500<br />
e-mail:<br />
timo.korander@krp.poliisi.mailnet.fi<br />
Raimo Lahti<br />
Inst. för straff- och processrätt<br />
PB 4, Regeringsgatan 11<br />
FIN-00014 Helsingfors Universitet<br />
tlf: +358 - 9 19122448<br />
fax: +358 - 9 19123090<br />
e-mail: raimo.lahti@helsinki.fi<br />
Hannu Takala<br />
Justitieministeriet<br />
PB 1200, FIN-00101 Helsingfors<br />
tlf: +358 - 9 18257860<br />
fax: +358 - 9 18257865<br />
e-mail: hannu.takala@om.vn.fi<br />
Jukka-Pekka Takala<br />
Rättspolitiska forskningsinstitutet<br />
PB 1200, FIN-00101 Helsingfors<br />
tlf: +358 - 9 18257874<br />
fax: +358 - 9 18257866<br />
e-mail: jukka-pekka.takala@om.vn.fi<br />
Kari Tolonen<br />
Helsingfors Universitet, PB 4<br />
FIN-00014<br />
tlf: +358 - 9 7084744<br />
kari.tolonen@helsinki.fi<br />
Grønland<br />
Bodil Karlshøj Poulsen<br />
Grønlands Hjemmestyre, PAARISA<br />
Box 1160, GR-3900 Nuuk<br />
tlf: +299 - 23000-4550<br />
fax: +299 - 20977<br />
e-mail: bkp@sundhed.hotel.gh.gl<br />
Elisæus Kreutzmann<br />
Kriminalforsorgen i Grønland<br />
Box 139, GR-3900 Godthåb<br />
tlf: +299 - 24988<br />
fax: +299 - 24979<br />
Søren Søndergård Hansen<br />
Postboks 40, GR-3900 Nuuk<br />
tlf: +299 - 324200<br />
fax: +299 - 323975<br />
Erik Terp Jensen<br />
Politimesteren i Grønland<br />
Box 1006, GR-3900 Nuuk<br />
tlf: +299 - 321448<br />
fax: +299 -24194<br />
Island<br />
Sigrún Ágústsdóttir<br />
Fangelsismálastofnun<br />
Borgartúni 7<br />
IS-150 Reykjavik<br />
fax: +354 - 5205019<br />
Hallgrímur Ásgeirsson<br />
Ánalandi 6, jarðhëð<br />
IS-108 Reykjavik<br />
Erlendur S. Baldursson,<br />
Fangelsismálastofnun, Borgartúni 7<br />
IS-105 Reykjavik,<br />
tlf: +354 - 520 5009<br />
fax: +354 - 520 5019<br />
e-mail: erlendur.baldursson@skima.is<br />
Ìris Böðvarsdóttir<br />
Smárahlíð 14g<br />
IS-603 Akureyri<br />
e-mail: iris@ak.is<br />
Anna Kristín Newton<br />
Grjótagötu 12<br />
IS-101 Reykjavik<br />
e-mail: alans@vortex.is<br />
Jón Friðrik Sigurðsson<br />
Fangelsismálastofnun, Borgartúni 7<br />
IS-150 Reykjavik<br />
fax: +354 5205019<br />
e-mail: jonfridrik@skima.is<br />
Margrét Sæmundsdóttir<br />
263
NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
Fangelsismálastofnun, Borgartúni 7<br />
IS-150 Reykjavik<br />
fax: +354 -520 5019<br />
Karl Steinar Valsson,<br />
Reykjavik Police<br />
Hverfisgötu 115<br />
IS-105 Reykjavik,<br />
tlf: +354 - 569 9080<br />
fax: +354 - 569 9099<br />
e-mail: karlsteinar@police.is<br />
Letland<br />
Arija Lodzina<br />
Criminology Research Centre<br />
Meistaru 10<br />
LV-1050 Riga<br />
tlf: +371 - 7216781<br />
fax: +371 - 7216781<br />
e-mail: an-vilks@com.latnet.lv<br />
Lithauen<br />
Genovaite Babachinaite<br />
Lithuanian Law Academy<br />
Ateities 20<br />
Lithauen-2057 Vilius<br />
tlf: +370 - 2 779424<br />
fax: +370 - 2 724444<br />
Norge<br />
Nils Christie<br />
Institutt for kriminologi, Uni. i Oslo<br />
PB 6872, St. Olavs plass<br />
N-0130 Oslo 1<br />
tlf: +47 - 22850122<br />
fax: +47 - 22850252<br />
e-mail: nils.christie@jus.uio.no<br />
Jan Georg Christophersen<br />
Det Kriminalitetsforebyggende Råd<br />
PB 8005 dep.<br />
N-0030 Oslo<br />
tlf: +47 - 22245593<br />
fax: +47 - 22242728<br />
Evy Frantzsen<br />
Institutt for kriminologi, Uni. i Oslo<br />
264<br />
P.B. 6872, St. Olavs Plass<br />
N-0130 Oslo<br />
tlf: +47 - 22850119<br />
fax: +47 -22850252<br />
e-mail: evy.frantzsen@jus.uio.no<br />
Hedda Giertsen<br />
Institutt for kriminologi, Uni. i Oslo<br />
PB 6872, St. Olavs plass<br />
N-0130 Oslo<br />
tlf:. +47 - 22850144<br />
fax: +47 - 22850252<br />
e-mail: hedda.giertsen@jus.uio.no<br />
Arnt Even Hustad<br />
Statistiske sentralbyrå<br />
PB. 8131 Dep.<br />
N-0033 Oslo<br />
tlf: +47 - 22864500<br />
Marie Indahl<br />
Institut for kriminologi, Uni. i Oslo<br />
PB 6872, St. Olavs plass<br />
N-0130 Oslo<br />
tlf: +47 - 22850125<br />
fax: +47 - 22850252<br />
e-mail: marie.indahl@jus.uio.no<br />
Nicolay B. Johansen<br />
Falsensgt. 16 A<br />
N-0556 Oslo<br />
tlf: +47 - 22378431<br />
e-mail: n.b.johansen@jus.uio.no<br />
Nina Jon<br />
Institut for Kriminologi, Uni. i Oslo<br />
PB 6872, St. Olavs plass<br />
N-0130 Oslo<br />
tlf: +47 - 22850117<br />
fax: +47 - 22850252<br />
e-mail: nina.jon@jus.uio.no<br />
Ellen S. Kittelsbye<br />
Kriminalpolitisentralen (Kripos),<br />
PB 8163 Dep.<br />
N-0034 Oslo<br />
tlf: +47 - 22073109<br />
fax: +47 - 22048084<br />
Paul Larsson<br />
Institutt for kriminologi, Uni. i Oslo<br />
PB 6872 - St. Olavs Plass
NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
N-0130 Oslo<br />
tlf: +47 - 22850142<br />
fax: +47 - 22850252<br />
e-mail: paul.larsson@jus.uio.no<br />
Elisabeth Næss<br />
Institut for Kriminologi, Uni. i Oslo<br />
PB 6872, St. Olavs plass<br />
N-0130 Oslo<br />
tlf: +47 - 22850136<br />
fax: +47 - 22850252<br />
e-mail: elisabeth.naess@jus.uio.no<br />
Ragnhild Sollund<br />
Institut for Kriminologi, Uni. i Oslo<br />
PB 6872, St. Olavs plass<br />
N-0130 Oslo<br />
tlf: +47 - 22850128<br />
fax: +47 - 22850252<br />
e-mail: ragnhild.sollund@jus.uio.no<br />
Rusland<br />
Maya Rusakova<br />
Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy<br />
of Science Deviantology Center<br />
198052 St. Petersburg<br />
7 th Krasnoarmeiskaya 25/14<br />
tlf: +812 - 3160571<br />
fax: +812 - 3162929<br />
e-mail: inso@ego.spb.su<br />
Sverige<br />
Jan Andersson<br />
Brottsförebyggande rådet<br />
Box 6494<br />
S-113 82 Stockholm<br />
tlf: + 46 - 084018700<br />
fax: +46 - 08328364<br />
jan.andersson@brottsforebygganderadet.se<br />
Erik Grevholm<br />
Kommittén för brottsförebyggande arbete<br />
(KBA), Regeringsgatan 30-32<br />
S-103 33 Stockholm<br />
Mårten Landahl<br />
Henriksdalsringen 1<br />
S-131 32 Nacka<br />
tlf: +46 - 08-6152121<br />
e-mail: info@crimknowledge.a.se<br />
Sten Levander<br />
Universitetssjukhuset MAS<br />
S-205 02 Malmø<br />
tlf: +46 - 40331000<br />
Lise-Lotte Rytterbro<br />
Kriminologiska institutionen, Stockh. univ.<br />
S-106 91 Stockholm<br />
tlf: +46 - 8 6747059<br />
fax: +46 - 8 157881<br />
e-mail: lise-lotte.rytterbro@crim.su.se<br />
Ingrid Sahlin<br />
Sociologiska institutionen, Boks 114<br />
S-221 00 Lund<br />
tlf: +46 - 46 2224748<br />
fax: +46 - 46 2224794<br />
e-mail: ingrid.sahlin@soc.lu.se<br />
samt:<br />
Brottsförebyggande rådet<br />
Boks 6494<br />
S-11382 Stockholm<br />
e-mail:<br />
ingrid.sahlin@brottsforebygganderadet.se<br />
Eva Stenborre<br />
Lillekárr Sódra 202<br />
425 31 Hisings Kárra<br />
Roger Sundberg<br />
Sociologiska institutionen, Boks 114<br />
Lunds Universitet<br />
S-221 00 Lund<br />
e-mail: roger.sundberg@soc.lu.se<br />
Marie Torstensson<br />
Polishögskolan - Forskningsenheten<br />
Sörentorp<br />
S-171 92 Solna<br />
tlf: +46 - 8 4016746<br />
fax: +46 - 8 6554420<br />
e-mail: marie.torstensson@phs.pi.se<br />
Per Ole Träskman<br />
Juridikum, Lunds Universitet<br />
Boks 207<br />
S-221 00 Lund<br />
tlf: +46 - 46 2221090<br />
265
NSfK´s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998<br />
fax: +46 - 46 2224444<br />
e-mail: per-ole.traskman@jur.lu.se<br />
United Kingdom<br />
Malcolm Davies<br />
Criminal Justice Centre,<br />
Thames Valley University<br />
Bond Street, London W5 5AA, England<br />
tlf: 0181-231-2226<br />
e-mail: malcolm.davies@tvu.ac.uk<br />
Michael Levi<br />
University of Wales, Cardiff<br />
50 Park Place, Cardiff CF 1 3 AT<br />
tlf: +44 - 1222 874376<br />
fax: +44 - 1222 874435<br />
e-mail: levi@cardiff.ac.uk<br />
USA<br />
Lawrence W. Sherman<br />
Department of Criminology and Criminal<br />
Justice<br />
University of Maryland<br />
2220 Letrak Hall, College Park<br />
Maryland 20742-823<br />
tlf: +1-301 - 405 4705<br />
fax: +1-301 405 4733<br />
266