Chronologische - Ethikseite

Literatur zu Kants Ethik 

Bibliography on Kant’s ethics 18.02.2013 

Jörg Schroth (jschrot@gwdg.de) 

Alphabetische Ordnung / alphabetical order: http://www.ethikseite.de/bib/bkant.pdf 

Chronologische Ordnung / reverse chronological order: http://www.ethikseite.de/bib/ckant.pdf 

2013 [1] Bacin, Stefano (2013): The Perfect Duty to Oneself Merely as a Moral Being (TL 6: 428–437), 

in Kant’s “Tugendlehre”. A Comprehensive Commentary, hrsg. von Andreas 

Trampota, Oliver Sensen und Jens Timmermann, Berlin, S. 245–68. 

2013 [2] Baron, Marcia (2013): Friendship, Duties Regarding Specific Conditions of Persons, and the 

Virtues of Social Intercourse (TL 6: 468–474), in Kant’s “Tugendlehre”. A Comprehensive 

Commentary, hrsg. von Andreas Trampota, Oliver Sensen und Jens 

Timmermann, Berlin, S. 365–82. 

2013 [3] Baum, Manfred (2013): Prior Concepts of the Metaphysics of Morals (MS 6: 221–228), 



2013 [4] Denis, Lara (2013): Virtue and Its Ends (TL 6: 394–398), in Kant’s “Tugendlehre”. A Comprehensive 



2013 [5] Dörflinger, Bernd (2013): Ethische Methodenlehre: Didaktik und Asketik (TL 6: 477–485), 



2013 [6] Esser, Andrea M. (2013): The Inner Court of Conscience, Moral Self-Knowledge, and the 

Proper Object of Duty (TL 6: 437–444), in Kant’s “Tugendlehre”. A Comprehensive 

Commentary, hrsg. von Andreas Trampota, Oliver Sensen und Jens Timmermann, 

Berlin, S. 269–92. 

2013 [7] Goy, Ina (2013): Virtue and Sensibility (TL 6: 399–409), in Kant’s “Tugendlehre”. A Comprehensive 



2013 [8] Hill, Jr., Thomas E. (2013): Imperfect Duties to Oneself (TL 6: 444–447), in Kant’s “Tugendlehre”. 

A Comprehensive Commentary, hrsg. von Andreas Trampota, Oliver 

Sensen und Jens Timmermann, Berlin, S. 293–308. 

2013 [9] Höwing, Thomas (2013): Das Verhältnis der Vermögen des menschlichen Gemüts zu den 

Sittengesetzen (MS 6: 211–214), in Kant’s “Tugendlehre”. A Comprehensive 

Commentary, hrsg. von Andreas Trampota, Oliver Sensen und Jens Timmermann, 

Berlin, S. 25–58. 

2013 [10] Ludwig, Bernd (2013): Die Einteilungen der Metaphysik der Sitten im Allgemeinen und die 

der Tugendlehre im Besonderen (MS 6: 218–221 und RL 6: 239–242 und TL 6: 388–

394, 410–413), in Kant’s “Tugendlehre”. A Comprehensive Commentary, hrsg. von 

Andreas Trampota, Oliver Sensen und Jens Timmermann, Berlin, S. 59–84. 

2013 [11] Ricken, Friedo (2013): Die Religionslehre als Lehre der Pflichten gegen Gott liegt außerhalb 

der Grenzen der reinen Moralphilosophie (TL 6: 486–491), in Kant’s “Tugendlehre”. 

A Comprehensive Commentary, hrsg. von Andreas Trampota, Oliver Sensen und Jens 


2013 [12] Schadow, Steffi (2012): Recht und Ethik in Kants Metaphysik der Sitten (MS 6: 218–221 und 

TL 6: 390f.), in Kant’s “Tugendlehre”. A Comprehensive Commentary, hrsg. von 

Andreas Trampota, Oliver Sensen und Jens Timmermann, Berlin, S. 85–112. 

2013 [13] Schönecker, Dieter (2013): Duties to Others from Love (TL 6: 448–461), in Kant’s “Tugendlehre”. 



2013 [14] Timmermann, Jens (2013): Duties to Oneself as Such (TL 6: 417–420), in Kant’s “Tugendlehre”. 



2013 [15] Timmons, Mark (2013): The Perfect Duty to Oneself as an Animal Being (TL 6: 421–428), 



2013 [16] Trampota, Andreas (2013): The Concept and Necessity of an End in Ethics (TL 6: 379–389), 



2013 [17] Trampota, Andreas/Sensen, Oliver/Timmermann, Jens (Hrsg.): Kant’s “Tugendlehre”. A Comprehensive 

Commentary, Berlin. 1 

1 Acknowledgements. Contents. Abbreviations. Introduction. Idee und Notwendigkeit einer Metaphysik der 

Sitten (MS 6:205 – 209, 214 – 218 und TL 6:375 – 378) , Zöller, Günter. Das Verhältnis der Vermögen des 

menschlichen Gemüts zu den Sittengesetzen (MS 6:211 – 214), Höwing, Thomas. Die Einteilungen der 

Metaphysik der Sitten im Allgemeinen und die der Tugendlehre im Besonderen (MS 6:218 – 221 und RL 

6:239 – 242 und TL 6:388 – 394, 410 – 413), Ludwig, Bernd. Recht und Ethik in Kants Metaphysik der 

Sitten (MS 6:218 –221 und TL 6:390 f.), Schadow, Steffi. Prior Concepts of the Metaphysics of Morals (MS 

6:221 – 228), Baum, Manfred. The Concept and Necessity of an End in Ethics (TL 6:379 – 389), Trampota, 

Andreas. Virtue and Its Ends (TL 6:394 – 398), Denis, Lara. Virtue and Sensibility (TL 6:399 – 409), Goy, 

Ina. Duties to Oneself as Such (TL 6:417 – 420), Timmermann, Jens. The Perfect Duty to Oneself as an 

Animal Being (TL 6:421 – 428), Timmons, Mark. The Perfect Duty to Oneself Merely as a Moral Being 

(TL 6:428 –437), Bacin, Stefano. The Inner Court of Conscience, Moral Self-Knowledge, and the Proper 

Object of Duty (TL 6:437 – 444), Esser, Andrea M. Imperfect Duties to Oneself (TL 6:444 – 447), Hill, 

Thomas. Duties to Others from Love (TL 6:448 – 461), Schönecker, Dieter. Duties to Others From Respect 

(TL 6:462 – 468), Sensen, Oliver. Friendship, Duties Regarding Specific Conditions of Persons, and the 

Virtues of Social Intercourse (TL 6:468 – 474), Baron, Marcia. Ethische Methodenlehre: Didaktik und 

Asketik (TL 6:477 – 485), Dörflinger, Bernd. Die Religionslehre als Lehre der Pflichten gegen Gott liegt 

außerhalb der Grenzen der reinen Moralphilosophie (TL 6:486 – 491), Ricken, Friedo. Notes on 

Contributors. Index of Names. Index of Subjects.

2013 [18] Zöller, Günter (2013): Idee und Notwendigkeit einer Metaphysik der Sitten (MS 6: 205–209, 

214–218 und TL 6: 375–378), in Kant’s “Tugendlehre”. A Comprehensive Commentary, 

hrsg. von Andreas Trampota, Oliver Sensen und Jens Timmermann, Berlin, S. 

11–24. 

2012 [19] Ferguson, Benjamin (2012): Kant on Duty in the Groundwork, Res Publica 18, S. 303–19. 2 

2012 [20] Forman, David (2012): Kant on Moral Freedom and Moral Slavery, Kantian Review 17, S. 1– 

32. 3 

2012 [21] Hill, Jr., Thomas E. (2012): Virtue, Rules, and Justice: Kantian Aspirations, Oxford. 4 

2012 [22] McCarty, Richard (2012): The Right to Lie. Kantian Ethics and the Inquiring Murderer, 

2 “Barbara Herman offers an interpretation of Kant’s Groundwork on which an action has moral worth if the 

primary motive for the action is the motive of duty. She offers this approach in place of Richard Henson’s 

sufficiency-based interpretation, according to which an action has moral worth when the motive of duty is 

sufficient by itself to generate the action. Noa Latham criticizes Herman’s account and argues that we 

cannot make sense of the position that an agent can hold multiple motives for action and yet be motivated 

by only one of them, concluding that we must accept a face-value interpretation of the Groundwork where 

morally worthy actions obtain only when the agent’s sole motive is the motive of duty. This paper has two 

goals, one broad and one more constrained. The broader objective is to argue that interpretations of moral 

worth, as it is presented in the Groundwork, depend on interpretations of Kant’s theory of freedom. I show 

that whether we can make sense of the inclusion of nonmoral motives in morally worthy actions depends on 

whether the ‘always causal framework’ is consistent with Kant’s theory of freedom. The narrow goal is to 

show that if we adopt an ‘always causal’ framework for moral motivation, then Herman’s position and her 

critique of the sufficiency-based approach fail. Furthermore, within this framework I will specify a criterion 

for judging whether an action is determined by the motive of duty, even in the presence of nonmoral 

motives. Thus, I argue Latham’s conclusion that we must accept a face-value interpretation is incorrect.” 

3 “Kant’s account of the freedom gained through virtue builds on the Socratic tradition. On the Socratic view, 

when morality is our end, nothing can hinder us from attaining satisfaction: we are self-sufficient and free 

since moral goodness is (as Kant says) ‘created by us, hence is in our power’. But when our end is the 

fulfilment of sensible desires, our satisfaction requires luck as well as the cooperation of others. For Kant, 

this means that happiness requires that we get other people to work for our ends; and this requires, in turn, 

that we gain control over the things other people value so as to have influence over them. If this plan for 

happiness is not subordinated to morality, then what is most valuable to us will be precisely what others 

value. This is the root of the ‘passions’ that make us evil and make us slaves whose satisfaction depends on 

others. But, significantly, this dependence is a moral slavery and hence does not signal a loss, or even 

diminishment of the kind of freedom required for moral responsibility.” 

4 General Introduction (1). I. Basic Themes. 1. Kant’s Ethical Theory: An Overview (21). 2. Kantian 

Normative Ethics (35). 3. Kantian Constructivism as Normative Ethics (71). II. Virtue. 4. Finding Value in 

Nature (95). 5. Kant on Weakness of Will (107). 6. Kantian Virtue and “Virtue Ethics” (129). 7. Kant’s 

Tugendlehre as Normative Ethics (160). III. Moral Rules and Principles. 8. The Dignity of Persons: Kant, 

Problems, and a Proposal (185). 9. Assessing Moral Rules: Utilitarian and Kantian Perspectives (203). 10. 

The Importance of Moral Rules and Principles (225). 11. Moral Construction as a Task: Sources and Limits 

(249). IV. Practical Questions. 12. Questions about Kant’s Opposition to Revolution (277). 13. Treating 

Criminals as Ends in Themselves (296). 14 Kant and Humanitarian Intervention (320). 15. Moral 

Responsibilities of Bystanders (343). References (358). Index (367).

American Philosophical Quarterly 49, S. 331–43. 

2012 [23] Moehler, Michael (2012): A Hobbesian Derivation of the Principle of Universalization, 

Philosophical Studies 158, S. 83–107. 5 

2012 [24] O’Connell, Eoin (2012): Happiness Proportioned to Virtue: Kant and the Highest Good, 

Kantian Review 17, S. 257–79. 6 

2012 [25] Piper, Adrian M. S. (2012): Kant's Self-Legislation Procedure Reconsidered, Kant Studies 

Online 2012, S. 203–77. 

2012 [26] Sargentis, Konstantinos (2012): Moral Motivation in Kant, Kant Studies Online 2012, S. 93– 

121. 

2012 [27] Schadow, Steffi (2012): Achtung für das Gesetz. Moral und Motivation bei Kant, Berlin. 7 

2012 [28] Schönecker, Dieter (2012): Once Again: What is the ‘First Proposition’ in Kant’s Groundwork 

? Some Refinements, a New Proposal, and a Reply to Henry Allison, Kantian Review 

17, S. 281–296. 8 

5 “In this article, I derive a weak version of Kant’s categorical imperative within an informal game-theoretic 

framework. More specifically, I argue that Hobbesian agents would choose what I call the weak principle of 

universalization, if they had to decide on a rule of conflict resolution in an idealized but empirically 

defensible hypothetical decision situation. The discussion clarifies (i) the rationality requirements imposed 

on agents, (ii) the empirical conditions assumed to warrant the conclusion, and (iii) the political institutions 

that are necessary to implement the derived principle. The analysis demonstrates the moral significance of 

the weak principle of universalization and its epistemic advantage over the categorical imperative.” 

6 “This paper considers two contenders for the title of highest good in Kant's theory of practical reason: 

happiness proportioned to virtue and the maximization of happiness and virtue. I defend the 

‘proportionality thesis’ against criticisms made by Andrews Reath and others, and show how it resolves a 

dualism between prudential and moral practical reasoning. By distinguishing between the highest good as a 

principle of evaluation and an object of agency, I conclude that the maximization of happiness and virtue is 

a corollary of the instantiation of the proportionality thesis.” 

7 „ Die Frage, wie das, was die Vernunft einsieht, dazu motivieren kann, dies auch zu tun, gehört zu den 

Grundfragen von Kants praktischer Philosophie. Die vorliegende Untersuchung erschließt Kants Antwort 

auf das Problem der moralischen Motivation innerhalb seiner Handlungstheorie und Moralphilosophie. 

Neben einer philosophiehistorischen und systematischen Einordnung liefert sie eine umfassende textnahe 

Analyse der kantischen Argumente, die auch werkgeschichtliche Aspekte berücksichtigt. Auf diese Weise 

entsteht ein reichhaltiges Bild der kantischen Theorie moralischer Motivation, die in Kants Konzept der 

Moralbegründung nicht nur verwurzelt ist, sondern dieses auch unterstützt. So ist die Achtung vor dem 

Gesetz als Modus zu verstehen, in dem sich der Mensch die praktische Norm zu eigen macht. Moralische 

Gründe erweisen sich nach der hier vorgeschlagenen Interpretation als unbedingte, universal gültige 

Regeln, deren praktische Bedeutung als subjektive Handlungsgrundsätze und Motive erst durch Kants 

Theorie der moralisch-rationalen Sensibilität verständlich wird. Kants Ansatz ist damit nicht nur 

werkintern von Interesse, sondern liefert darüber hinaus einen inspirierenden Beitrag zu einer modernen 

Theorie praktischer Normativität.“ 

8 “Discussing the concept of duty in Groundwork 1, Kant refers to a ‘second proposition’ and a ‘third 

proposition’, the latter being a ‘Folgerung aus beiden vorigen’. However, Kant does not identify what the 

‘first proposition’ is. In this paper, I will argue that the first proposition is this: An action from duty is an

2012 [29] Schulzke, Marcus (2012): Kant’s Categorical Imperative, the Value of Respect, and the 

Treatment of Women, Journal of Military Ethics 11, S. 26–41. 9 

2012 [30] Silber, John (2012): Kant’s Ethics. The Good, Freedom, and the Will, Berlin. 

2012 [31] Stern, Robert (2012): Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, 

Cambridge, S. 5–100 ( Part I: Kant. 1. Kant, Moral Realism, and the Argument from 

Autonomy (7). 2. The Argument from Autonomy and the Problem of Moral 

Obligation (41). 3. Kant’s Solution to the Problem of Moral Obligation (68).) 

2011 [32] Allison, Henry E. (2011): Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary, 

Oxford. 10 

2011 [33] Altman, Matthew C. (2011): Kant and Applied Ethics. The Uses and Limits of Kant’s 

Practical Philosophy, Malden, MA. 11 

2011 [34] Bambauer, Christoph (2011): Deontologie und Teleologie in der kantischen Ethik, 

action from respect for the moral law. I defend this claim against a critique put forward by Allison 

according to which ‘respect’ is a concept that is not, and could not be, introduced in paragraphs 9–13 of 

Groundwork 1. Further, I will argue that the first proposition as I understand it can also be reconstructed as 

the conclusion (‘Folgerung’) of a deductive argument proper; however, I will also discuss the option that 

‘Folgerung’ could be understood as a corollary rather than a conclusion. Finally, Allison's own 

interpretation will be criticized.” 

9 “This paper explores the relevance of Kant’s categorical imperative to military ethics and the solution it 

suggests for improving the treatment of women in the military. The second formulation of the categorical 

imperative makes universal respect for humanity a moral requirement by asserting that one must always 

treat other people as means in themselves and never as merely means to an end. This principle is a 

promising guide for military ethics and can be reconciled with the acts of violence required by war. This 

paper argues that it can also regulate soldiers’ relations to each other and that it may contribute to 

reorienting military culture in a way that overcomes the biases against female military personnel.” 

10 Contents: Acknowledgments. Note on sources and key to abbreviations and translations. Preface. Part One: 

Preliminaries. 1. The Nature of and Need for a Metaphysic of Morals: An Analysis of the Preface of GMS. 

2. Universal Practical Philosophy and Popular Moral Philosophy. Part Two: GMS 1. 3. The Good Will. 4. 

Maxims and Moral Worth Redux. 5. Kant’s Three Propositions, the Supreme Principle of Morality, and the 

Need for Moral Philosophy. Part Three: GMS 2. 6. Rational Agency and Imperatives. 7. The Universal 

Law (FUL) and the Law of Nature (FLN). 8. The Formula of Humanity (FH). 9. Autonomy, Heteronomy, 

and Constructing the Categorical Imperative. Part Four: GMS 3. 10. The Moral Law, the Categorical 

Imperative, and the Reciprocity Thesis. 11. The Presupposition of Freedom, The Circle, and the two 

Standpoints. 12. The Deduction of the Categorical Imperative and the Outermost Boundary of Practical 

Philosophy. 

11 Preface vi. Note on Sources and Key to Abbreviations viii. Introduction: Why Kant Now 1. Part I. Applying 

Kant’s Ethics 11. 1. Animal Suffering and Moral Character 13. 2. Kant’s Strategic Importance for 

Environmental Ethics 45. 3. Moral and Legal Arguments for Universal Health Care 71. 4. The Scope of 

Patient Autonomy 90. Part II. Kantian Arguments against Kant’s Conclusions 115. 5. Subjecting Ourselves 

to Capital Punishment 117. 6. Same-Sex Marriage as a Means to Mutual Respect 139. Part III. Limitations 

of Kant’s Theory 165. 7. Consent, Mail-Order Brides, and the Marriage Contract 167. 8. Individual 

Maxims and Social Justice 194. 9. The Decomposition of the Corporate Body 217. 10. Becoming a Person 

241. Conclusion: Emerging from Kant’s Long Shadow 283. Bibliography 289. Index 311.

Freiburg/München. 

2011 [35] Baron, Marcia (2011): Virtue Ethics in Relation to Kantian Ethics: An Opinionated Overview 

and Commentary, in Perfecting Virtue. New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue 

Ethics, hrsg. von Lawrence Jost und Julian Wuerth, Cambridge, S. 8–37. 

2011 [36] Denis, Lara (2011): A Kantian Conception of Human Flourishing, in Perfecting Virtue. New 

Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics, hrsg. von Lawrence Jost und Julian 

Wuerth, Cambridge, S. 164–93. 

2011 [37] Doğan, Aysel (2011): On the Priority of the Right to the Good, Kant-Studien 102, S. 316–34 12 . 

2011 [38] Galvin, Richard (2011): Rounding Up the Usual Suspects: Varieties of Kantian Constructivism 

in Ethics, Philosophical Quarterly 61, S. 16–36. 13 

2011 [39] Geiger, Ido (2011): Rational Feelings and Moral Agency, Kantian Review 16, S. 283–308. 14 

2011 [40] Greenberg, Robert (2011): On a Presumed Omission in Kant's Derivation of the Categorical 

Imperative, Kantian Review 28, S. 449–59. 15 

12 “Rawls’s view that the right is prior to the good has been criticized by various scholars from divergent 

points of view. Some contend that Rawls’s teleological/deontological distinction based on the priority of the 

right is misleading while others claim that no plausible ethical theory can determine what is right prior to 

the good. There is no consensus on how to interpret the priority of right to the good; nor is there an 

agreement on the criteria of teleological/deontological distinction. In this article, I argue that the critics' 

interpretations of the principle of the priority of right to the good as well as their conceptions of the 

teleological/deontological distinction have serious shortcomings to the extent that they ignore rich 

theoretical resources we find in Kant’s moral and political philosophy. Kant’s conception of human dignity 

and his division of the doctrine of virtue and the doctrine of right supply powerful arguments to clarify and 

sustain the idea of the priority of right to the good and the teleological/deontological division.” 

13 “Some commentators have attributed constructivism to Kant at the first-order level; others cast him as a 

meta-ethical constructivist. Among meta-ethical constructivist interpretations I distinguish between 

‘atheistic’ and ‘agnostic’ versions regarding the existence of an independent moral order. Even though 

these two versions are incompatible, each is linked with central Kantian doctrines, revealing a tension 

within Kant's own view. Moreover, among interpretations that cast Kant as rejecting substantive realism but 

embracing procedural realism, some (i.e., those that are ‘constructivist’) face charges of indeterminacy or 

relativism, while others (practical reasoning views) face ‘daunting rationalism’ objections. I close with some 

objections to interpreting Kant as a meta-ethical constructivist.” 

14 “Kant’s conception of moral agency is often charged with attributing no role to feelings. I suggest that 

respect is the effective force driving moral action. I then argue that four additional types of rational feelings 

are necessary conditions of moral agency: (1) The affective inner life of moral agents deliberating how to 

act and reflecting on their deeds is rich and complex (conscience). To act morally we must turn our affective 

moral perception towards the ends of moral action: (2) the welfare of others (love of others); and (3) our 

own moral being (self-respect). (4) Feelings shape our particular moral acts (moral feeling). I tentatively 

suggest that the diversity of moral feelings might be as great as the range of our duties.” 

15 “A new book by Stephen Engstrom repeats a criticism of Bruce Aune’s of Kant’s derivation of the 

universalizability formula of the categorical imperative. The criticism is that Kant omitted at least one 

substantive premise in the derivation of the formula: ‘Act only on that maxim through which you can at the 

same time will that it become a universal law.’ The grounds for the formula that are given in the

2011 [41] Grenberg, Jeanine (2011): Making Sense of the Relationship of Reason and Sensibility in 

Kant’s Ethics, Kantian Review 28, S. 461–72. 16 – Zu [70]. 

2011 [42] Guyer, Paul (2011): Kantian Perfectionism, in Perfecting Virtue. New Essays on Kantian 

Ethics and Virtue Ethics, hrsg. von Lawrence Jost und Julian Wuerth, Cambridge, S. 

194–214. 

2011 [43] Herman, Barbara (2011): A Mismatch of Methods, in Derek Parfit, On What Matters Volume 

2, Oxford, S. 83–115. 

2011 [44] Herman, Barbara (2011): The Difference that Ends Make, in Perfecting Virtue. New Essays on 

Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics, hrsg. von Lawrence Jost und Julian Wuerth, 

Cambridge, S. 92–115. 

2011 [45] Jost, Lawrence/Wuerth, Julian (Hrsg.) (2011): Perfecting Virtue. New Essays on Kantian 

Ethics and Virtue Ethics, Cambridge. 

2011 [46] Kontos, Pavlos (2011): Kant’s Categories of Freedom as Rules of Moral Salience, Zeitschrift 

für philosophische Forschung 65, S. 218–40. 17 

2011 [47] Mikkola, Mari (2011): Kant on Moral Agency and Women’s Nature, Kantian Review 16, S. 

89–111. 18 

2011 [48] Onof, Christian (2011): Moral Worth and Inclinations in Kantian Ethics, Kant Studies Online 

(April 2011), S. 1–46, http://www.kantstudiesonline.net. 

2011 [49] Parfit, Derek (2011): On What Matters Volume 1, Oxford, S. 177–342 (8. Possible Consent. 9. 

Merely as a Means. 10. Respect and Value. 11. Free Will and Desert. 12. Universal 

Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, however, are said to support only a weaker requirement, namely, 

that a maxim conform to a universal law. Hence, Kant omits at least one necessary substantive premise of 

the derivation. This paper attempts to show that nothing substantive is omitted from the argument. It only 

needs two principles of inference that it is assumed add nothing substantive to the premises.” 

16 “In this essay, I look at some claims Anne Margaret Baxley makes, in her recent book Kant’s Theory of 

Virtue: The Value of Autocracy, about the relationship between reason and sensibility in Kant’s theory of 

virtue. I then reflect on tensions I find in these claims as compared to the overall goal of her book: an 

account of Kant’s conception of virtue as autocracy. Ultimately, I argue that interpreters like Baxley (and 

myself) who want to welcome a more robust role for feeling in Kantian ethics must, in order to achieve our 

purposes, move beyond the general account of the limits for the role of the moral feeling of respect in the 

grounding of Kant’s ethics which Henry Allison established in his influential Kant’s Theory of Freedom.” 

17 “This paper attempts to bring to light and to justify the double task that Kant confers on the categories of 

freedom. It will be maintained that the categories of freedom do not only function as the ratio cognoscendi 

of free actions within the sensible world but they are also well appropriated to ground the concepts of the 

good and the evil as genuine rules of moral salience (according to Herman’s well-known label), that is to 

say, as rules of how to detect and appraise circumstances and deeds bestowed with moral significance.” 

18 “Some commentators have condemned Kant’s moral project from a feminist perspective based on Kant’s 

apparently dim view of women as being innately morally deficient. Here I will argue that although his 

remarks concerning women are unsettling at first glance, a more detailed and closer examination shows that 

Kant’s view of women is actually far more complex and less unsettling than that attributed to him by 

various feminist critics. My argument, then, undercuts the justification for the severe feminist critique of 

Kant’s moral project.”

Laws. 13. What If Everyone Did That? 14. Impartiality). 

2011 [50] Parfit, Derek (2011): On What Matters Volume 2, Oxford, S. 156–68 (19. On Humanity as an 

End in itself, 169–90 (20. On a Mismatch of Methods), 652–71 (Appendix F: Some of 

Kant’s Arguments for his Formula of Universal Law), 672–77 (Appendix G: Kant’s 

Claims about the Good), 678–789 (Appendix H: Autonomy and Categorical 

Imperatives), 690–718 (Kant’s Motivational Argument). 

2011 [51] Rohlf, Michael (2011): Kant’s Early Ethics, American Dialectic 1, S. 137–66. 

2011 [52] Rosenkoetter, Timothy (2011): Kant on Construction, Apriority, and the Moral Relevance of 

Universalization, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19, 1143–74. 19 

2011 [53] Sensen, Oliver (2011): Kant’s Conception of Inner Value, European Journal of Philosophy 19, 

S. 262–80. 20 

2011 [54] Smit, Houston und Timmons, Mark (2011): The Moral Significance of Gratitude in Kant’s 

Ethics, Southern Journal of Philosophy 49, S. 295–320. 

2011 [55] Sneddon, Andrew (2011): A New Kantian Response to Maxim-Fiddling, Kantian Review 16, 

S. 67–88. 21 

19 “This paper introduces a referential reading of Kant’s practical project, according to which maxims are 

made morally permissible by their correspondence to objects, though not the ontic objects of Kant’s 

theoretical project but deontic objects (what ought to be). It illustrates this model by showing how the 

content of the Formula of Universal Law might be determined by what our capacity of practical reason can 

stand in a referential relation to, rather than by facts about what kind of beings we are (viz., uncaused 

causes). This solves the neglected puzzle of why there are passages in Kant’s works suggesting robust 

analogies between mathematics and ethics, since to universalize a maxim is to test a priori whether a 

practical object with that particular content can be constructed. An apparent problem with this hypothesis is 

that the medium of practical sensibility (feeling) does not play a role analogous to the medium of theoretical 

sensibility (intuition). In response I distinguish two separate Kantian accounts of mathematical apriority. 

The thesis that maxim universalization is a species of construction, and thus a priori, turns out to be 

consistent with the account of apriority that informs Kant’s understanding of actual mathematical practice.” 

20 “This article addresses a foundational issue in Kant’s moral philosophy, the question of the relation of the 

Categorical Imperative to value. There is an important movement in current Kant scholarship that argues 

that there is a value underlying the Categorical Imperative. However, some scholars have raised doubts as to 

whether Kant has a conception of value that could ground the Categorical Imperative. In this paper I seek to 

add to these doubts by arguing, first, that value would have to be of a particular kind in order to be the 

foundation of Kant’s moral philosophy. Second, I argue that Kant does not have such a conception of value, 

and that his arguments rule out that value could ground his moral philosophy. I then outline an alternative 

reading of how Kant uses ‘inner value’. My conclusion will be that Kant does not derive the Categorical 

Imperative from an underlying value. While some of his passages could also be read as if value were 

foundational for Kant, a close look at these passages and his arguments point away from this conclusion.” 

21 “There has long been a suspicion that Kant’s test for the universalizability of maxims can be easily 

subverted: instead of risking failing the test, design your maxim for any action whatsoever in a manner 

guaranteed to pass. This is the problem of maxim-fiddling. The present discussion of this problem has two 

theses: 

1) That extant approaches to maxim-fiddling are not satisfactory;

2011 [56] Stohr, Karen (2011): Kantian Beneficence and the Problem of Obligatory Aid, Journal of 

Moral Philosophy 8, S. 45–67. 22 

2011 [57] Swanton, Christine (2011): Kant’s Impartial Virtues of Love, in Perfecting Virtue. New Essays 

on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics, hrsg. von Lawrence Jost und Julian Wuerth, 


2011 [58] Walker, Mark Thomas (2011): Kant and Morality. Recovering the Categorical Imperative, 

Basingstoke. 

2011 [59] Wike, Victoria S. (2011): Defending Kant Against Nodding’s Care Ethics Critique, Kant 

Studies Online (Januar 2011), S. 1–26, http://www.kantstudiesonline.net. 

2011 [60] Wood, Allen W. (2011): Humanity as an End in Itself, in Derek Parfit, On What Matters 

Volume 2, Oxford, S. 58–82. 

2011 [61] Wood, Allen W. (2011): Kant and Agent-Oriented Ethics, in Perfecting Virtue. New Essays on 

Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics, hrsg. von Lawrence Jost und Julian Wuerth, 


2011 [62] Wuerth, Julian (2011): Moving Beyond Kant’s Account of Agency in the Grounding, in 

Perfecting Virtue. New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics, hrsg. von 

Lawrence Jost und Julian Wuerth, Cambridge, S. 147–63. 

2010 [63] Altman, Matthew C. (2010): Kant on Sex and Marriage: The Implications for the Same-Sex 

Marriage Debate, Kant-Studien 101, S. 309–30. 23 

2010 [64] Alves, Julius (2010): Vollkommene Tugendpflichten: Zur Systematik der Pflichten in Kants 

2) That a satisfactory response to maxim-fiddling can be articulated using Kantian resources, especially the 

first two formulations of the categorical imperative. 

This approach to maxim-fiddling draws our attention to a Kantian notion of an offence against Morality 

itself that has largely been overlooked.” 

22 “Common sense tells us that in certain circumstances, helping someone is morally obligatory. That intuition 

appears incompatible with Kant's account of beneficence as a wide imperfect duty, and its implication that 

agents may exercise latitude over which beneficent actions to perform. In this paper, I offer a resolution to 

the problem from which it follows that some opportunities to help admit latitude and others do not. I argue 

that beneficence has two components: the familiar wide duty to help others achieve their ends and a narrow 

duty to avoid indifference to others as end-setters. Although we are not always required to help, we are 

always required not to be indifferent. When helping someone is the only way not to be indifferent to a 

person, helping him/her is obligatory. My account avoids certain difficulties with other proposed solutions 

and can also address an important concern about proximity.” 

23 “When examined critically, Kant’s views on sex and marriage give us the tools to defend same-sex marriage 

on moral grounds. The sexual objectification of one’s partner can only be overcome when two people take 

responsibility for one another’s overall well-being, and this commitment is enforced through legal coercion. 

Kant’s views on the unnaturalness of homosexuality do not stand up to scrutiny, and he cannot (as he often 

tries to) restrict the purpose of sex to procreation. Kant himself rules out marriage only when the partners 

cannot give themselves to one another equally – that is, if there is inequality of exchange. Because same-sex 

marriage would be between equals and would allow homosexuals to express their desire in a morally 

appropriate way, it ought to be legalized.”

Metaphysik der Sitten, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 64, S. 520–45. 24 

2010 [65] Ameriks, Karl (2010): Reality, Reason, and Religion in the Development of Kant‘s Ethics, in 

Kant’s Moral Metaphysics. God, Freedom, and Immortality, hrsg. von 

Benjamin J. Bruxvoort Lipscomb und James Krueger, Berlin, S. 23–47. 

2010 [66] Anderson-Gold, Sharon (2010): Privacy, Respect and the Virtues of Reticence in Kant, 

Kantian Review 15, S. 28–42. 

2010 [67] Bacin, Stefano (2010): The Meaning of the Critique of Practical Reason for Moral Beings: the 

Doctrine of Method of Pure Practical Reason, in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. 

A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Andrews Reath und Jens Timmermann, Cambridge, S. 

197–215. 

2010 [68] Bailey, Tom (2010): Analysing the Good Will: Kant’s Argument in the First Section of the 

Groundwork, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18, S. 635–62. 25 

24 „Diese Arbeit widmet sich einem Hauptproblem der kantischen Pflichtensystematik in der Tugendlehre: Der 

Unterscheidung von vollkommenen und unvollkommenen Pflichten und der resultierenden Spannung 

zwischen Einleitung und Elementarlehre. Während in der Einleitung in die Tugendlehre Tugendpflichten 

begrifflich nur als unvollkommene Pflichten eingeführt und abgeleitet werden, beginnt die Elementarlehre 

mit einem extensiven Abschnitt über vollkommene Pflichten, die dennoch Tugendpflichten sein sollen. 

Nach einer kurzen Betrachtung einschlägiger Vorschläge der Literatur zu diesem Problem, versucht die 

vorliegende Arbeit aus dem Konzept der Weite von Pflichten Kriterien für die Zuordnung der verschiedenen 

Tugendpflichten zu gewinnen. Im Lichte dieser Kriterien erscheint Kants Beurteilung mancher 

verhandelter Pflichten als ‚vollkommen’ gerechtfertigt. Abschließend wird gezeigt, inwiefern sie dennoch 

zu den Tugendpflichten gehören können (und deshalb in der Elementarlehre ihren Platz haben), indem 

Kants eher beiläufige Unterscheidung von Strebens- und Erhaltungspflichten in den Mittelpunkt gerückt 

wird. Unvollkommenheit einer Pflicht folgt nur aus ethischen Strebenspflichten, nicht aus gebotenen 

Maximen überhaupt. Das Ziel der Exposition aller relevanten Merkmale, die zu einer Tugendpflicht 

gehören können, lässt verstehen, warum die Einleitung nur auf Strebenspflichten zentriert ist.“ 

“This essay is concerned with one of the main problems in Kant’s system of duties in the Tugendlehre: the 

difference between perfect and imperfect duties and the resulting inconsistency between introduction and 

Elementarlehre. Even though the introduction establishes and derives duties of virtue as imperfect duties 

only, the Elementarlehre begins with a long section concerning perfect duties, which nevertheless are 

supposed to be duties of virtue. After a brief consideration of other interpreter’s views on this topic, this 

essay tries to develop criteria for the categorisation of the different duties of virtue from the concept of a 

duty’s latitude. In light of these criteria, Kant’s categorizing some of the discussed duties as perfect seems 

justifiable. Finally I will show, why they can nevertheless be ‘duties of virtue’, by emphasizing Kant’s 

distinction between duties to strive and those to conserve. Imperfection of a duty follows from duties to 

strive only, not from obligatory maxims per se. The goal of introducing all relevant characteristics, a duty of 

virtue may have, can explain, why the introduction is only concerned with duties to strive.” 

25 “This article contends that the first section of Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals provides a 

sophisticated and valid argument, and that commentators are therefore mistaken in dismissing this section 

as flawed. In particular, the article undertakes to show that in this section Kant argues from a conception of 

the goodness of a good will to two distinctive features of moral goodness, and from these features to his 

‘formula of universal law’. The article reveals the sophistication and validity of this argument by

2010 [69] Baxley, Anne Margaret (2010): The Aesthetics of Morality: Schiller’s Critique of Kantian 

Rationalism, Philosophy Compass 5, S. 1084–95. 

2010 [70] Baxley, Anne Margaret (2010): Kant‘s Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy, Cambridge. 

– Vgl. Dazu [41]. 

2010 [71] Carson, Thomas L. (2010): Lying and Deception, Oxford, S. 67–88 (“Kant and the Absolute 

Prohibition against Lying”). 

2010 [72] Deigh, John (2010): An Introduction to Ethics, Cambridge, S. 140–56 (“Kant’s way”, 

“Formalism in Ethics”, “The problem with Kant’s formalism”). 

2010 [73] Denis, Lara (2010): Humanity, Obligation, and the Good Will: An Argument against Dean’s 

Interpretation of Humanity, Kantian Review 15, S. 118–41. 

2010 [74] Denis, Lara (2010): Freedom, Primacy, and Perfect Duties to Oneself, in Kant’s Metaphysics 

of Morals. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Lara Denis, Cambridge, S. 170–91. 

2010 [75] Denis, Lara (Hrsg.) (2010): Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide, Cambridge. 

2010 [76] Engstrom, Stephen (2010): Reason, Desire, and the Will, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. A 

Critical Guide, hrsg. von Lara Denis, Cambridge, S. 28–50. 

2010 [77] Engstrom, Stephen (2010): The Triebfeder of Pure Practical Reason, in Kant’s Critique of 

Practical Reason. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Andrews Reath und Jens Timmermann, 


2010 [78] Fahmy, Melissa Seymour (2010): Kantian Practical Love, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91, 

S. 313–31. 26 

2010 [79] Flikschuh, Katrin (2010): Justice without Virtue, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical 

Guide, hrsg. von Lara Denis, Cambridge, S. 51–70. 

2010 [80] Formosa, Paul (2010): Kant on the Highest Moral-Physical Good: The Social Aspect of Kant’s 

Moral Philosophy, Kantian Review 15, S. 1–36. 

2010 [81] Gasché, Rodolphe (2010): A Material A Priori? On Max Scheler’s Critique Of Kant’s Formal 

Ethics, Philosophical Forum 41, S. 113–26. – Dazu: Kosch, Michelle (2010): Gasché 

on Scheler, Philosophical Forum 41, S. 127–30. 

2010 [82] Geiger, Ido (2010): What is the Use of the Universal Law Formula of the Categorical 

Imperative?, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18, S. 271–295. 

2010 [83] Grenberg, Jeanine (2010): What is the Enemy of Virtue?, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. A 

considering it in the light of a number of criticisms that are commonly levelled at the section. In conclusion, 

the article proposes that this interpretation of the section also has significant implications for the 

understanding of Kant’s method, his formulas and his basic conception of the ‘moral’.” 

26 “In the Doctrine of Virtue Kant stipulates that ‘Love is a matter of feeling, not of willing . . . so a duty to 

love is an absurdity.’ Nonetheless, in the same work Kant claims that we have duties of love to other human 

beings. According to Kant, the kind of love which is commanded by duty is practical love. This paper 

defends the view that the duty of practical love articulated in the Doctrine of Virtue is distinct from the duty 

of beneficence and best understood as a duty of self-transformation, which agents observe by cultivating a 

benevolent disposition and practical beneficent desires.”

Critical Guide, hrsg. von Lara Denis, Cambridge, S. 152–69. 

2010 [84] Gressis, Rob (2010): Recent Work on Kantian Maxims I: Established Approaches, Philosophy 

Compass 5, S. 216–27. 27 

2010 [85] Gressis, Rob (2010): Recent Work on Kantian Maxims II, Philosophy Compass 5, S. 228–39. 28 

2010 [86] Guyer, Paul (2010): Moral Feelings in the Metaphysics of Morals, in Kant’s Metaphysics of 

Morals. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Lara Denis, Cambridge, S. 130–51. 

2010 [87] Guyer, Paul (2010): The Obligation to be Virtuous: Kant’s Conception of the Tugendverpflichtung, 

Social Philosophy and Policy 27, S. 206–32. 29 

27 “Maxims play a crucial role in Kant’s ethical philosophy, but there is significant disagreement about what 

maxims are. In this two-part essay, I survey eight different views of Kantian maxims, presenting their 

strengths, and their weaknesses. Part I: Established Approaches, begins with Rüdiger Bubner’s view that 

Kant took maxims to be what ordinary people of today take them to be, namely pithily expressed precepts of 

morality or prudence. Next comes the position, most associated with Rüdiger Bittner and Otfried Höffe, that 

maxims are Lebensregeln, or ‘life-rules’ – quite general rules for how to conduct oneself based on equally 

general outlooks on how the world is. These first two interpretations make sense of Kant’s claim, made in 

his anthropological and pedagogical writings, that we have to learn how to act on maxims, but they become 

less plausible in light of Kant's probable view that people always act on maxims – after all, how can people 

learn how to act on something they always act on anyway? The next two views, each advanced, at different 

times, by Onora O’Neill, make better sense of the fact that people always act on maxims, for they hold that 

maxims are intentions – either specific intentions, such as ‘to open the door’, or general intentions, such as 

‘to make guests feel welcome’– and it is perfectly sensible to claim that people always act on intentions. 

However, they face the same problem as the two previous views, which is that if people always act on 

maxims, what sense does it make to say they also have to learn how to act on them? Henry Allison, the 

main representative of the fifth view, claims, on the basis of Kant's doctrine of the ‘highest maxim’, that 

maxims are principles organized hierarchically, such that an agent endorses one maxim because she 

endorses a more general maxim. Unfortunately for Allison, there is little direct textual support for his claim 

that maxims are organized hierarchically.” 

28 “Maxims play a crucial role in Kant’s ethical philosophy, but there is significant disagreement about what 

maxims are. In this two-part essay, I survey eight different views of Kantian maxims, presenting their 

strengths and their weaknesses. In Part II: New Approaches, I look at three more recent views in somewhat 

greater detail than I do the five treatments canvassed in ‘Recent Works on Kantian Maxims I: Established 

Approaches’. First, there is Richard McCarty’s Interpretation, which holds that Kant’s understanding of 

maxims can be illuminated by placing them in the context of the Wollfian tradition, according to which 

maxims are the major premises of practical syllogisms. The next subject Maria Schwartz, holds that careful 

attention to Kant’s distinction between rules and maxims, as well as Kant’s concept of happiness, allows us 

to make sense of almost all of Kant’s remarks on maxims. It may be, however, that on Schwartz’s view 

agents turn out to perform actions as opposed to thoughtlessly habitual behaviors much less often than is 

plausible. This leads to the final approach, exemplified by Jens Timmermann, which is that Kant 

understands maxims equivocally. I claim that something like Timmermann’s approach is the only way to 

make sense of all of what Kant has to say on maxims.” 

29 “In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant makes a distinction between duties of virtue and the obligation to be 

virtuous. For a number of reasons, it may seem as if the latter does not actually require any actions of us not 

already required by the former. This essay argues that Kant does succeed in describing obligations that we

2010 [88] Hernandez, Jill Graper (2010): Impermissibility and Kantian Moral Worth, Ethical Theory and 

Moral Practice 13, S. 403–19. 30 

2010 [89] Hill, Jr., Thomas E. (2010): Kant’s Tugendlehre as Normative Ethics, in Kant’s Metaphysics 

of Morals. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Lara Denis, Cambridge, S. 234–55. 

2010 [90] Hoche, Hans-Ulrich/Knoop, Michael (2010): Logical Relations Between Kant’s Categorical 

Imperative and the Two Golden Rules, Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 18, S. 483–518. 

2010 [91] Höffe, Otfried (2010): Kant’s Innate Right as a Rational Criterion for Human Rights, in Kant’s 

Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Lara Denis, Cambridge, S. 71–92. 

2010 [92] Johnson, Robert N. (2010): Duties to and Regarding to Others, in Kant’s Metaphysics of 

Morals. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Lara Denis, Cambridge, S. 192–209. 

2010 [93] Kain, Patrick (2010): Duties Regarding Animals, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical 

Guide, hrsg. von Lara Denis, Cambridge, S. 210–33. 

2010 [94] Kain, Patrick (2010): Practical Cognition, Intuition, and the Fact of Reason, in Kant’s Moral 

Metaphysics. God, Freedom, and Immortality, hrsg. von Benjamin J. Bruxvoort 

Lipscomb und James Krueger, Berlin, S. 211–30. 

2010 [95] Keller, Pierre (2010): Two Conceptions of Compatibilism in the Critical Elucidation, in Kant’s 

Critique of Practical Reason. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Andrews Reath und Jens 

Timmermann, Cambridge, S. 119–45. 

2010 [96] Kleingeld, Pauline (2010): Moral Consciousness and the ‘Fact of Reason’, in Kant’s Critique 

of Practical Reason. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Andrews Reath und Jens 


2010 [97] Klemme, Heiner F. (2010): The Origin and Aim of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, in 

Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Andrews Reath und 

Jens Timmermann, Cambridge, S. 11–30. 

2010 [98] Kuehn, Manfred (2010): Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: The History and Significance of Its 

Deferral, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Lara Denis, 


2010 [99] Lipscomb, Benjamin J. Bruxvoort/Krueger, James (Hrsg.) (2010): Kant’s Moral Metaphysics. 

God, Freedom, and Immortality, Berlin. 

have to prepare for virtuous conduct that are different from simply fulfilling specific duties of virtue, and 

that in so doing he describes an important element of the moral life.” 

30 “Samuel Kerstein argues that an asymmetry between moral worth and maxims prevents Kant from 

accepting a category of acts that are impermissible, but have moral worth. Kerstein contends that an act 

performed from the motive of duty should be considered as a candidate for moral worth, even if the action’s 

maxim turns out to be impermissible, since moral worth depends on the correct moral motivation of an act, 

rather than on the moral rightness of an act. I argue that Kant cannot consistently maintain that there are 

morally forbidden, though good, acts since one of the conditions of acting from the moral law should be that 

one has a true belief about what the moral law requires. My project, then, rejects the possibility of morally 

impermissible, worthy acts for Kant, and qualifies the conditions for moral worth Kerstein gives with an 

epistemological constraint on moral worth.”

2010 [100] Lipscomb, Benjamin (2010): Moral Imperfection and Moral Phenomenology in Kant, in 

Kant’s Moral Metaphysics. God, Freedom, and Immortality, hrsg. von 

Benjamin J. Bruxvoort Lipscomb und James Krueger, Berlin, S. 49–80. 

2010 [101] McCarty, Richard (2010): Kant’s Derivation of the Formula of Universal Law, Dialogue 49, S. 

113–33. 31 

2010 [102] Ostaric, Lara (2010): Works of Genius as Sensible Exhibitions of the Idea of the Highest Good, 

Kant-Studien 101, 22–39. 32 

2010 [103] Pallikkathayil, Japa (2010): Deriving Morality from Politics: Rethinking the Formula of 

Humanity, Ethics 121, S. 116–47. 33 

2010 [104] Palmquist, Stephen (2010): Kant’s Ethics of Grace: Perspectival Solutions to the Moral Difficulties 

with Divine Assistance, Journal of Religion 90, S. 530–53. 

2010 [105] Reath, Andrews (2010): Introduction, in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. A Critical Guide, 

hrsg. von Andrews Reath und Jens Timmermann, Cambridge, S. 1–10. 

2010 [106] Reath, Andrews (2010): Formal Principles and the Form of a Law, in Kant’s Critique of 

Practical Reason. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Andrews Reath und Jens Timmermann, 


2010 [107] Reath, Andrews/Timmermann, Jens (Hrsg.) (2010): Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. A 

Critical Guide, Cambridge. 34 

31 “Critics have charged that there are gaps in the logic of Kant’s derivation of the formula of universal law. 

Here I defend that derivation against these charges, partly by emphasizing a neglected teleological principle 

that Kant alluded to in his argument, and partly by clarifying what he meant by actions’ “conformity to 

universal law.” He meant that actions conform to universal law just when their maxims can belong to a 

unified system of principles. An analogy with objects’ conformity to universal law in nature helps show how 

Kant was correct in deriving the formula of universal law from the premises of his argument.” 

32 “In this paper I argue that, on Kant's view, the work of genius serves as a sensible exhibition of the Idea of 

the highest good. In other words, the work of genius serves as a special sign that the world is hospitable to 

our moral ends and that the realization of our moral vocation in such a world may indeed be possible. In the 

first part of the paper, I demonstrate that the purpose of the highest good is not to strengthen our motivation 

to accept the moral law as binding for us but, rather, to strengthen our motivation to persist in our already 

existent moral dispositions. In the second part, I show that the works of genius exhibit the Idea of the 

highest good and, consequently, strengthen our hope in its realization. Drawing on the results of the second 

part, the third part of the paper demonstrates that beauty, of both art and nature, symbolizes morality in a 

more substantive sense than that suggested by Henry Allison's “formalistic” interpretation. Since, on my 

view, fine art in Kant serves as a sensible representation of an undetermined conceptual content, or the Idea 

of the highest good, the fourth part of the paper addresses the vexed question of whether Kant's account of 

fine art already anticipates the cognitive role later attributed to it by the German Idealists.” 

33 “Kant’s Formula of Humanity famously forbids treating others merely as a means. It is unclear, however, 

what exactly treating someone merely as a means comes to. This essay argues against an interpretation of 

this idea advanced by Christine Korsgaard and Onora O’Neill. The essay then develops a new interpretation 

that suggests an important connection between the Formula of Humanity and Kant’s political philosophy: 

the content of many of our moral duties depends on the results of political philosophy and, indeed, on the 

results of actual political decision making.”

2010 [108] Rehbock, Theda (2010): Moral und Sprache. Ist das Verbot der Lüge sprachphilosophisch 

begründbar?, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58, S. 105–25. 35 

2010 [109] Roff, Heather M. (2010): Kantian Provisional Duties, Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 18, S. 533- 

–62. 

2010 [110] Schönecker, Dieter E. (2010): Kant über Menschenliebe als moralische Grundlage, Archiv für 

Geschichte der Philosophie 92, S. 133–75. 36 

2010 [111] Schwartz, Jeremy (2010): Do Hypothetical Imperatives Require Categorical Imperatives?, 

European Journal of Philosophy 18, S. 84–107. 37 

34 Preface vii. List of contributors viii. Translations and abbreviations x. Introduction – Andrews Reath 1. The 

origin and aim of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason – Heiner F. Klemme 11. Formal principles and the 

form of a law – Andrews Reath 31. Moral consciousness and the ‘fact of reason’ – Pauline Kleingeld 55. 

Reversal or retreat? Kant’s deductions of freedom and morality – Jens Timmermann 73. The Triebfeder of 

pure practical reason – Stephen Engstrom 90. Two conceptions of compatibilism in the Critical Elucidation 

– Pierre Keller 119. The Antinomy of Practical Reason: reason, the unconditioned and the highest good – 

Eric Watkins 145. The primacy of practical reason and the idea of a practical postulate – Marcus 

Willaschek 168. The meaning of the Critique of Practical Reason for moral beings: the Doctrine of Method 

of Pure Practical Reason – Stefano Bacin 197. Bibliography 216. Index 223. 

35 “The paper tries to defend the Augustinian and Kantian position on the moral problem of lying against the 

popular opinion that this position must be rejected as an inhuman rigorism. The first part argues that 

Augustine and Kant do not intend to condemn entirely any kind of lying in any single case, which would be 

the task of (the power of) judgment (Urteilskraft). Rather, they strive for a clarification of lying as a 

fundamental moral concept of language. Those concepts are not morally neutral, as consequentialist 

positions hold, but function rather as a kind of conceptual measure or compass for moral judgment. That 

means that single lies can be excusable or an inevitable evil. But under no circumstance do we have a right 

or even an obligation to lie. The second part shows how the moral prohibition against lying as a linguistic 

act can be argued for - as Augustine and Kant do - by reflection on the anthropological meaning of language 

for human existence. For this purpose, following the phenomenological tradition three meanings of 

language are distinguished: 1. language as object, 2. language as practice, 3. language as “Sinnhorizont” 

(conceptual structured horizon of sense).” 

36 “In the Introduction of the Tugendlehre, Kant identifies love of human beings as one of the four moral 

predispositions that make us receptive to the moral law. We claim that this love is neither benevolence nor 

the aptitude of the inclination to beneficence in general (both are also called love of human beings); rather it 

is amor complacentiae, which Kant understands as the delight in moral striving for perfection. We also 

provide a detailed analysis of Kant’s almost completely neglected theory of moral predispositions. They are 

necessary conditions to be aware of the moral law and to be motivated by it.” 

37 “Recently, the idea that every hypothetical imperative must somehow be ‘backed up’ by a prior categorical 

imperative has gained a certain influence among Kant interpreters and ethicists influenced by Kant. Since 

instrumentalism is the position that holds that hypothetical imperatives can by themselves and without the 

aid of categorical imperatives explain all valid forms of practical reasoning, the influential idea amounts to 

a rejection of instrumentalism as internally incoherent. This paper argues against this prevailing view both 

as an interpretation of Kant and as philosophical understanding of practical reason. In particular, it will be 

argued that many of the arguments that claim to show that hypothetical imperatives must be backed up by 

categorical imperatives mistakenly assume that the form of practical reasoning must itself occur as a

2010 [112] Scutt, Marie Zermatt (2010): Kant’s Moral Theology, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 

18, S. 611–33. 

2010 [113] Timmermann, Jens (2010): Reversal or Retreat? Kant’s Deductions of Freedom and Morality, 

in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Andrews Reath 

und Jens Timmermann, Cambridge, S. 73–90. 

2010 [114] Uleman, Jennifer K. (2010): An Introduction to Kant’s Moral Philosophy, Cambridge. 38 

2010 [115] Varden, Helga (2010): Kant and Lying to the Murderer at the Door . . . One More Time: 

Kant’s Legal Philosophy and Lies to Murderers and Nazis, Journal of Social 

Philosophy 41, S. 403-21. 

2010 [116] Watkins, Eric (2010): The Antinomy of Practical Reason: Reason, the Unconditioned and the 

Highest Good, in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von 

Andrews Reath und Jens Timmermann, Cambridge, S. 145–67. 

2010 [117] Wike, Victoria/Showler, Ryan L. (2010): Kant’s Concept of the Highest Good and the 

Archetype-Ectype Distinction, Journal of Value Inquiry 44, S. 521–33. 

2010 [118] Willaschek, Marcus (2010): The Primacy of Practical Reason and the Idea of a Practical 

Postulate, in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von 

Andrews Reath und Jens Timmermann, Cambridge, S. 168–96. 

2009 [119] Ameriks, Karl/Höffe, Otfried (Hrsg.) (2009): Kant’s Moral and Legal Philosophy, 

Cambridge. 39 

premise within the reasoning. An alternative to this assumption will be offered. I will conclude that while 

instrumentalism may well be false, there is no reason to believe it is incoherent.” 

38 Acknowledgements ix. 1 Introduction: the strange thing 1. The strange thing 1. The free rational will 9. 

The value of free rational will 15. The importance of the strange thing for moral philosophy 19. 2 A sketch 

of Kantian will: desire and the human subject 23. Desire, choice, will 25. Desire and the human subject 

34. 3 A sketch continued: the structure of practical reason 39. Will as practical reason: practical rules, 

laws, and principles 39. Maxims, or subjective practical principles 41. Grounds for action: the 

representation in a principle of something as good 48. Imperatives 51. Pure practical reason, or the 

possibility of a categorical imperative 56. 4 A sketch completed: freedom 63. An overview of the free 

Kantian will 63. The free Kantian will in more detail 65. Rational freedom 72. 5 Against nature: Kant’s 

argumentative strategy 75. The problem 75. Kant’s understanding of nature 79. Kant’s common- 

sense case against a natural foundation for morality 80. Kant against nature 107. 6 The categorical 

imperative: free will willing itself 111. Kant’s formalism 112. Kant’s categorical imperative: its form and 

its content 121. Free will willing itself 140. 7 What’s so good about the good Kantian will? The appeals 

of the strange thing 145. Introduction 145. The good of free rational willing 149. 8 Conclusion: Kant and 

the goodness of the good will 175. Bibliography 180. Index 187. 

39 Acknowledgments ix. Contributors xi. Works by Kant xv. Introduction – Karl Ameriks and Otfried Höffe 1. 

I Early Conceptions 27. 1 Hutcheson and Kant – Dieter Henrich 29. 2 The Theory of Obligation in Wolff, 

Baumgarten, and the Early Kant – Clemens Schwaiger 58. II Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals 

75. 3 What Is the Purpose of a Metaphysics of Morals? Some Observations on the Preface to the 

Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals – Ludwig Siep 77. 4 The Transition from Common Rational 

Moral Knowledge to Philosophical Rational Moral Knowledge in the Groundwork – Dieter Schönecker 93. 

5 Reason Practical in Its Own Right – Gerold Prauss 123. 6 Kant’s Justification of the Role of Maxims in

2009 [120] Baron, Marcia/Seymour Fahmy, Melissa (2009): Beneficence and Other Duties of Love in The 

Metaphysics of Morals, in The Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics, hrsg. von Thomas 

E. Hill, Jr., Malden, MA, S. 211–28. 

2009 Baum, Manfred (2009): Politik und Moral in Kants praktischer Philosophie, in Kant und die 

Zukunft der europäischen Aufklärung, hrsg. von Heiner Klemme, Berlin, S. 386–99. 

2009 [121] Chappell, Timothy (2009): Ethics and Experience. Life Beyond Moral Theory, Montreal, S. 

153–76. 

2009 [122] Cherkasova, Evgenia (2009): Dostoevsky and Kant. Dialogues on Ethics, Amsterdam. 

2009 [123] Cholbi, Michael (2009): The Murderer at the Door: What Kant Should Have Said, Philosophy 

and Phenomenological Research 79, S. 17–46. 40 

2009 [124] Darwall, Stephen (2009): Why Kant Needs the Second-Person Standpoint, in The Blackwell 

Guide to Kant’s Ethics, hrsg. von Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Malden, MA, S. 138–58. 

2009 [125] Dean, Richard (2009): The Formula of Humanity as an End in Itself, in The Blackwell Guide 

to Kant’s Ethics, hrsg. von Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Malden, MA, S. 83–101. 

2009 [126] Engstrom, Stephen (2009): The Form of Practical Knowledge. A Study of the Categorical 

Imperative, Cambridge, Mass. 41 

Ethics – Michael Albrecht 134. III Critique of Practical Reason 157. 7 The Form of the Maxim as the 

Determining Ground of the Will (The Critique of Practical Reason: §§4–6, 27–30) – Otfried Höffe 159. 8 

‘On the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason’ (Chapter 2 of the Analytic of Practical Reason) – 

Annemarie Pieper 179. 9 The Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason in the Second Critique (CPrR:107–121) – 

Eckart Förster 198. 10 The Postulates of Pure Practical Reason (CPrR:122–148) – Friedo Ricken 213. IV 

Legal and Political Philosophy 229. 11 On How to Acquire Something External, and Especially on the 

Right to Things (A Commentary on the Metaphysics of Morals §§10–17) – Kristian Kühl 231. 12 ‘The 

Civil Constitution in Every State Shall Be a Republican One’ – Wolfgang Kersting 246. 13 Commentary on 

Kant’s Treatment of Constitutional Right (Metaphysics of Morals II: General Remark A; §§51–52, 

Conclusion, Appendix) – Bernd Ludwig 265. 14 Refusing Sovereign Power – The Relation between 

Philosophy and Politics in the Modern Age – Volker Gerhardt 284. Bibliography 305. Index 317. 

40 “Embarrassed by the apparent rigorism Kant expresses so bluntly in ‘On a Supposed Right to Lie,’ 

numerous contemporary Kantians have attempted to show that Kant’s ethics can justify lying in specific 

circumstances, in particular, when lying to a murderer is necessary in order to prevent her from killing 

another innocent person. My aim is to improve upon these efforts and show that lying to prevent the death 

of another innocent person could be required in Kantian terms. I argue (1) that our perfect Kantian duty of 

self-preservation can require our lying to save our own lives when threatened with unjust aggression, and 

(2) that Kant’s understanding of moral duty was that duties are symmetrical, such that if one has a duty to 

perform a given action on one’s own behalf or to protect one’s own rational nature, then one also has a duty 

to perform similar acts on other’s behalf or to protect their rational nature. Thus, that the individual 

protected against aggression by means of deception is not oneself should be of no consequence from a 

Kantian perspective. Lying to the murderer is thus an extension of the Kantian requirement of self-defense.” 

41 “Immanuel Kant’s claim that the categorical imperative of morality is based in practical reason has long 

been a source of puzzlement and doubt, even for sympathetic interpreters. Kant’s own explanations, which 

mainly concern his often-criticized formula of universal law, are laconic and obscure, leading interpreters to 

dismiss them in favor of less ambitious claims involving his other famous formulas.

2009 [127] Esser, Andrea Marlen (2009): Aufklärung der Praxis. Kantischer Konstruktivismus in der 

Ethik, in Kant und die Zukunft der europäischen Aufklärung, hrsg. von Heiner 

Klemme, Berlin, S. 319–35. 

2009 [128] Fahmy, Melissa Seymour (2019): Active Sympathetic Participation: Reconsidering Kant’s 

Duty of Sympathy, Kantian Review 14, S. 31–52. 

2009 [129] Feldmeijer, Frits Reitze (2009): Trying to Understand Kant’s Ethical Views, Journal of Value 

Inquiry 43, S. 221–41. 

2009 [130] Flikschuh, Katrin (2009): Kant’s Kingdom of Ends: Metaphysical, Not Political, in Kant’s 

Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Jens 


2009 [131] Galvin, Richard (2009): The Universal Law Formulas, in The Blackwell Guide to Kant’s 

Ethics, hrsg. von Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Malden, MA, S. 52–82. 

2009 [132] Gerhardt, Volker (2009): Die Menschheit in der Person des Menschen. Zur Anthropologie der 

menschlichen Würde bei Kant, in Kant und die Zukunft der europäischen Aufklärung, 

hrsg. von Heiner Klemme, Berlin, S. 269–91. 

2009 [133] Grenberg, Jeanine M. (2009): The Phenomenological Failure of Groundwork III, Inquiry 52, S. 

335–56. 42 

In The Form of Practical Knowledge, Stephen Engstrom provides an illuminating new interpretation of the 

categorical imperative, arguing that we have exaggerated and misconceived Kant’s break with tradition: 

Kant never departs from the classical conception of practical reason as a capacity for knowledge of the 

good. His distinctive contribution is the idea that morality’s imperatives express the form of such 

knowledge. 

By developing an account of practical knowledge that situates Kant’s ethics within his broader epistemology 

and rethinks numerous topics in his moral psychology and in his account of practical reason (including 

desire, intention, choice, will, as well as pleasure, happiness, and the good), Engstrom’s work promises to 

deepen and to reshape our understanding of Kantian ethics.” (Publisher’s description) 

Preface. Note on Citations. Introduction. Part I. Willing as Practical Knowing. 1. The Will and Practical 

Judgment. 2. Fundamental Practical Judgments: The Wish for Happiness. Part II. From Presuppositions 

of Judgment to the Idea of a Categorical Imperative. 1. The Formal Presuppositions of Practical 

Judgment. 2. Constraints on Willing. Part III. Interpretation. 1. The Categorical Imperative. 2. 

Applications. 3. Conclusion. – Epilogue. Index. 

42 “Henry Allison and Paul Guyer have recently offered interpretations of Kant’s argument in Groundwork III. 

These interpretations share this premise: the argument moves from a non-moral, theoretical premise to a 

moral conclusion, and the failure of the argument is a failure to make this jump from the non-moral to the 

moral. This characterization both of the nature of the argument and its failure is flawed. Consider instead 

the possibility that in Groundwork III, Kant is struggling toward something rather different from this, not 

trying to pull the moral rabbit out of the theoretical hat, but instead seeking a proto-phenomenological 

grounding of morality: a grounding that begins from first personal felt experiences that already possess 

moral content, and proceeds to its further practica l claims via attentive reflection on these felt experiences. 

This paper brings this assumption to our reading of Groundwork III, showing that in doing so we acquire a 

deeper appreciation both of the argument, and the reasons it fails. Kant’s argument is practical throughout.

2009 [134] Guyer, Paul (2009): Ist und Soll. Von Hume bis Kant, und heute, in Kant und die Zukunft der 

europäischen Aufklärung, hrsg. von Heiner Klemme, Berlin, S. 210–31. 

2009 [135] Guyer, Paul (2009): Problems with Freedom: Kant’s Argument in Groundwork III and its 

Subsequent Emendations, in Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. A 

Critical Guide, hrsg. von Jens Timmermann, Cambridge, S. 176–202. 

2009 [136] Hill, Jr., Thomas E. (Hrsg.) (2009): The Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics, Malden, MA. 

2009 [137] Hills, Alison (2009): Happiness in the Groundwork, in Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics 

of Morals. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Jens Timmermann, Cambridge, S. 29–44. 

2009 [138] Holtman, Sarah (2009): Autonomy and the Kingdom of Ends, in The Blackwell Guide to 

Kant’s Ethics, hrsg. von Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Malden, MA, S. 102–17. 

2009 [139] Irwin, Terence (2009): The Development of Ethics. Volume III: From Kant to Rawls, Oxford, 

S. 1–172 (66. Kant: Practical Laws. 67. Kant: From Practical Laws to Morality. 68. 

Kant: Some Objections and Replies. 69. Kant: Freedom. 70. Kant: From Freedom to 

Morality. 71. Kant: Morality and the Good. 72. Kant: Meta-Ethical Questions.). 

2009 [140] Johnson, Robert N. (2009): Good Will and the Moral Worth of Acting from Duty, in The 

Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics, hrsg. von Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Malden, MA, S. 19– 

51. 

2009 [141] Johnson, Robert N. (2009): The Moral Law as Causal Law, in Kant’s Groundwork of the 

Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Jens Timmermann, Cambridge, S. 

82–101. 

2009 [142] Kain, Patrick (2009): Kant’s Defense of Human Moral Status, Journal of the History of 

Philosophy 47, S. 59–101. 43 

2009 [143] Kerstein, Samuel J. (2009): Deriving the Supreme Moral Principle from Common Moral Ideas, 

in The Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics, hrsg. von Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Malden, MA, 

S. 121–37. 

2009 [144] Kerstein, Samuel (2009): Treating Others Merely as Means, Utilitas 21, S. 163–80. 44 

And the failure of the argument is the failure of Kant’s nascent effo rts to provide a new, phenomenological 

method for the grounding of practical philosophy.” 

43 “The determination of individual moral status is a central factor in the ethical evaluation of controversial 

practices such as elective abortion, human embryo-destructive research, and the care of the severely disabled 

and those in persistent vegetative states. A review of recent work on Kant reveals the need for a careful 

examination of the content of Kant’s biological and psychological theories and their relation to his views 

about moral status. Such an examination, in conjunction with Kant’s practical-metaphysical analysis of the 

origins of freedom, reveals Kant’s principled basis for his contention that all human beings possess moral 

status.” 

44 “In the Formula of Humanity, Kant embraces the principle that it is wrong for us to treat others merely as 

means. For contemporary Kantian ethicists, this Mere Means Principle plays the role of a moral constraint: 

it limits what we may do, even in the service of promoting the overall good. But substantive interpretations 

of the principle generate implausible results in relatively ordinary cases. On one interpretation, for example, 

you treat your opponent in a tennis tournament merely as a means and thus wrongly when you try, through 

defeating him, to win first place. The article aims to develop a reconstruction of the Mere Means Principle

2009 [145] Kuehn, Manfred (2009): Ethics and Anthropology in the Development of Kant’s Moral 

Philosophy, in Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide, 

hrsg. von Jens Timmermann, Cambridge, S. 7–28. 

2009 [146] Louden, Robert B. (2009): Making the Law Visible: The Role of Examples in Kant’s Ethics, in 

Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Jens 


2009 [147] Marks, Joel (2009): Ought Implies Kant. A Reply to the Consequentialist Critique, Lanham. 

2009 [148] Moskopp, Werner (2009): Struktur und Dynamik in Kants Kritiken, Berlin, S. 169–202 („2.2 

Die Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten“), S. 203–82 („2. 3 Die Kritik der 

praktischen Vernunft“). 45 

2009 [149] Muchnik, Pablo (2009): Kant’s Theory of Evil: An Essay on the Dangers of Self-Love and the 

Aprioricity of History, Lanham. 

2009 [150] O’Hagan, Emer (2009): Moral Self-Knowledge in Kantian Ethics, Ethical Theory and Moral 

Practice 12, S. 525–37. 46 

2009 [151] Onof, Christian (2009): Reconstructing the Grounding of Kant’s Ethics: A Critical 

Assessment, Kant-Studien 100, S. 496–517. 47 

that has more plausible implications than do rival reconstructions. It sets out a sufficient condition for an 

agent’s treating another merely as a means. This condition is intended to be Kantian, but not necessarily 

one that Kant endorses.” 

45 „Ziel dieser Untersuchung ist es, den Zusammenhang der kantischen Kritiken unter Wahrung einer 

transzendental-kritischen Perspektive nachzuweisen. Dazu wird zunächst eine Paraphrasierung der 

einzelnen Kritiken entwickelt und aus einem gemeinsamen erkenntnistheoretischen Horizont heraus 

interpretiert, der anschließend jeweils mit einschlägigen Positionen der Forschungsliteratur diskutiert wird. 

Der inhaltliche Schwerpunkt der Arbeit zielt auf eine besondere Einordnung der Leistung Kants: Eine 

Differenzierung der Bereiche „Metaphysik“, „Transzendentalphilosophie“ und „transzendentale Kritik“ 

lässt Kants Standpunkt einheitlich bestimmen und zeigt unter der Berücksichtigung der Notwendigkeit für 

das menschliche Denken die grundlegenden allgemeingültigen Strukturen des menschlichen 

Erkenntnisvermögens. Diese Akzentuierung der Betrachtung hat einige Verschiebungen des heute gelehrten 

Kant-Bildes zur Folge, die bes. den Kategorischen Imperativ und die sogenannte „Ästhetik“ der Kritik der 

Urteilskraft betreffen.“ 

46 “Kant’s duty of self-knowledge demands that one know one’s heart – the quality of one’s will in relation to 

duty. Self-knowledge requires that an agent subvert feelings which fuel self-aggrandizing narratives and 

increase self-conceit; she must adopt the standpoint of the rational agent constrained by the requirements of 

reason in order to gain information about her moral constitution. This is not I argue, contra Nancy 

Sherman, in order to assess the moral goodness of her conduct. Insofar as sound moral practice requires 

moral self-knowledge and moral self-knowledge requires a theoretical commitment to a conception of the 

moral self, sound moral agency is for Kant crucially tied to theory. Kant plausibly holds that self-knowledge 

is a protection against moral confusion and self-deception. I conclude that although his account relies too 

heavily on the awareness of moral law to explain its connection to moral development, it is insightful and 

important in Kantian ethics.” 

47 “Kant’s attempts to provide a foundation for morality are examined, with particular focus upon the fact of 

reason proof in the second Critique. The reconstructions proposed by Allison and Korsgaard are analysed in

2009 [152] von der Pfordten, Dietmar (2009): On the Dignity of Man in Kant, Philosophy 84, S. 371–91. 48 

2009 [153] Rauscher, Frederick (2009): Freedom and Reason in Groundwork III, in Kant’s Groundwork of 

the Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Jens Timmermann, 


2009 [154] Rohlf, Michael (2009): Contradiction and Consent in Kant’s Ethics, Journal of Value Inquiry 

43, S. 507–20. 

2009 [155] Schneewind, J. B. (2009): Kant Against the ‘Spurious Principles of Morality’, in Kant’s 



2009 [156] Seel, Gerhard (2009): How Does Kant Justify the Universal Objective Validity of the Law of 

Right?, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17, S. 71–94. 49 

2009 [157] Sensen, Oliver (2009): Dignity and the Formula of Humanity, in Kant’s Groundwork of the 

Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Jens Timmermann, Cambridge, S. 

102–18. 

2009 [158] Skorupski, John (2009): Autonomy and Impartiality: Groundwork III, in Kant’s Groundwork 

of the Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Jens Timmermann, 

detail. Although analogous in many ways, they ultimately differ in their understanding of the relation 

between this proof and that presented in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. A synthesis of the 

two reconstructions is proposed which amounts to combining Korsgaard’s awareness of the issue of agentsituatedness, 

with Allison’s emphasis upon the pivotal role of the notion of transcendental freedom. The 

reconstructed proof relies upon a teleological assumption about human agency, and thus does not provide an 

unconditional grounding for the moral law. After a brief examination of contemporary approaches to the 

grounding of a universal morality in the broadly Kantian tradition, the paper concludes with a suggestion as 

to how the value of freedom can form the core of an adequate response to reason’s demand for such a 

ground.” 

48 “The contribution starts with the observation that Kant mentioned Human Dignity in his main works with 

great variety in emphasis. In the ‘Grundlegung’ from 1785 we find a significant treatment and again in the 

‘Tugendlehre’ from 1798 but none in the ‘Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft’ from 1788 and in the 

‘Rechtslehre’ from 1797. This needs an explanation. In the ‘Grundlegung’ human dignity is not attached to 

the second formula of the categorical imperative, the formula of self-purposefulness, as it is often assumed, 

but to the third formula of a kingdom of ends. It is there explained as self-legislation. This placement needs 

also an explanation, which is attempted by the article. In the ‘Tugendlehre’ human dignity is then explained 

as self-purposefulness. So Kant changed his understanding of human dignity from the ‘Grundlegung’ to the 

‘Tugendlehre’. But the question is: why?” 

49 “Since more than 50 years Kant scholars debate the question whether the Law of Right as introduced in the 

Metaphysics of Morals by Kant can be justified by the Categorical Imperative. On the one hand we have 

those who think that Kant’s theory of right depends from the Categorical Imperative, on the other hand we 

find a growing group of scholars who deny this. However, the debate has been flawed by confusion and 

misunderstanding of the crucial terms and principles. Therefore, my first task will be to clarify these terms 

and principles by introducing distinctions that have been neglected too often. After this I try to show a) that 

the Law of Right can in fact be justified by using the testing method the Categorical Imperative prescribes 

and b) that there is no other way to justify it. Doing this I criticize in detail the new arguments adherents of 

the independence thesis have recently put forward.”


2009 [159] Timmermann, Jens (2009): Acting from Duty: Inclination, Reason and Moral Worth, in Kant’s 



2009 [160] Timmermann, Jens (Hrsg.) (2009): Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. A 

Critical Guide, Cambridge. 

2009 [161] Torralba, José M. (2009): The Three-fold Function of the Faculty of Judgment in Kant’s 

Practical Philosophy: Typik, Moral Judgement and Conscience, in J. M. Torralba, 

Libertad, objeto práctico y acción. La facultad del juicio en la filosofía moral de 

Kant, Hildesheim, Zürich, New York, S. 423-43. 

2009 [162] Willaschek, Marcus (2009): Rationale Postulate. Über Kants These vom Primat der reinen 

praktischen Vernunft, in Kant und die Zukunft der europäischen Aufklärung, hrsg. 

von Heiner Klemme, Berlin, S. 251–68. 

2009 [163] Willaschek, Marcus (2009): Right and Coercion: Can Kant’s Conception of Right be Derived 

from his Moral Theory?, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17, S. 49– 

70. 50 

2009 [164] Wolff, Michael (2009): Warum das Faktum der Vernunft ein Faktum ist. Auflösung einiger 

Verständnisschwierigkeiten in Kants Grundlegung der Moral, Deutsche Zeitschrift für 

Philosophie 57, S. 511–49. 

2009 [165] Wood, Allen W. (2009): Duties to Oneself, Duties of Respect to Others, in The Blackwell 


2009 [166] Wyrwich, Thomas (2009): Moralische Selbst- und Welterkenntnis: Die Deduktion des 

50 “Recently, there has been some discussion about the relationship between Kant’s conception of right (the 

sphere of juridical rights and duties) and his moral theory (with the Categorical Imperative as its 

fundamental norm). In section 1, I briefly survey some recent contributions to this debate and distinguish 

between two different questions. First, does Kant’s moral theory (as developed in the Groundwork and the 

Critique of Practical Reason) imply, or validate, a Kantian conception of right (as developed in the first 

part of the Metaphysics of Morals, the Doctrine of Right)? In other words, is the Categorical Imperative 

sufficient to show that the fundamental principles of right are normatively valid? Second, does Kant’s 

conception of right presuppose his moral theory? In other words, is the Categorical Imperative necessary to 

show that the basic principles of right are normatively valid? In this paper, I will be primarily concerned 

with defending a negative answer to the first of these questions. In section 2, I will discuss Paul Guyer’s 

attempt to vindicate a positive answer to the same question. In section 3, reasons will be given why any 

attempt to derive Kant’s conception of right from the Categorical Imperative must fail because of the 

analytic connection between right and coercion.”

kategorischen Imperativs in der Kantischen Philosophie, Würzburg. 51 

2009 [167] Zweig, Arnulf (2009): Reflections on the Enduring Value of Kant’s Ethics, in The Blackwell 


2008 [168] Anderson, Elizabeth (2008): Emotions in Kant’s Later Moral Philosophy: Honour and the Phenomenology 

of Moral Value, in Kant’s Ethics of Virtue, hrsg. von Monika Betzler, 

Berlin, S. 123–45. 

2008 [169] Anderson-Gold, Sharon (2008): The Purposiveness of Nature: Kant and Environmental Ethics, 

in Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Akten des X. Internationalen Kant- 

Kongresses, Band 3: Sektionen III–IV, hrsg. von Valerio Rohden, Ricarda R. Terra, 

Guido A. de Almeida und Margit Ruffing, Berlin, S. 3–12. 

2008 [170] Baron, Marcia (2008): Virtue Ethics, Kantian Ethics, and the “One Thought Too Many” 

Objection, in Kant’s Ethics of Virtue, hrsg. von Monika Betzler, Berlin, S. 245–77. 

2008 [171] Baz, Avner (2008): Being Right, and Being in the Right, Inquiry 51, S. 627–44. 52 

2008 [172] Betzler, Monika (Hrsg.) (2008): Kant’s Ethics of Virtue, Berlin. 

2008 [173] Bobko, Aleksander (2008): The Relationship between Ethics and Religion in Kant’s 

Philosophy, in Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Akten des X. 

Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Band 3: Sektionen III–IV, hrsg. von Valerio 

Rohden, Ricarda R. Terra, Guido A. de Almeida und Margit Ruffing, Berlin, S. 53– 

62. 

2008 [174] Borges, Maria (2008): Reasons and Causes of Actions in Kant, in Recht und Frieden in der 

Philosophie Kants. Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Band 3: Sektionen 

III–IV, hrsg. von Valerio Rohden, Ricarda R. Terra, Guido A. de Almeida und Margit 

51 „Die Studie versucht zu zeigen, dass das bisherige Begründungspotential von Kants „Deduktion“ des 

kategorischen Imperativs noch nicht ausgeschöpft ist. Die von Kant im dritten Teil seiner Grundlegung 

gebrauchten Formulierungen von einer „Verstandeswelt“, die der „Sinnenwelt“ zugrunde liegt, und von 

einem „eigentlichen Selbst“ sind durchaus wörtlich zu nehmen: Die kritische Moralphilosophie zielt in 

ihrem Innersten auf eine fundamentale Wandlung der Selbst- und Welterkenntnis des fragenden Subjektes. 

Während es sowohl die theoretizistische als auch die existentialistische Interpretation des unbedingten 

Sollensanspruchs nicht vermocht haben, eine zureichende Antwort auf die Frage nach dem Grund des 

Sittengesetzes zu fi nden, zeigt eine erneute Auseinandersetzung mit Kants Argumenten, dass nur dessen 

originäre idealistische Begründung, die den reinen Willen als unbedingtes und zugleich 

wirklichkeitsbildendes Prinzip identifi ziert, dazu in der Lage ist. Die Kantische Philosophie lässt sich 

dergestalt beginnend mit der Grundlegung bis hin zu späteren Schriften wie der Kritik der Urteilskraft als 

ein Prozess der sukzessiven, anametischen Selbstaufklärung eines natürlichen Moralbewusstseins 

rekonstruieren. Ein Prozess, der in der Philosophie Fichtes seine Aufnahme und Weiterführung gefunden 

hat.“ 

52 “This paper presents a critique of a prevailing conception of the relation between moral reasoning and 

judgment on the one hand, and moral goodness on the other. I argue that moral reasoning is inescapably 

vulnerable to moral, as opposed to merely theoretical, failure. This, I argue, means that there is something 

deeply misleading in the way that Kant's moral theory, and some of its main rivals, have invited us to 

conceive of their subject matter.”

Ruffing, Berlin, S. 63–70. 

2008 [175] Braga, Antonio Frederico Saturnino (2008): Brief Comments on the Concept of Categorical 

Imperative, in Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Akten des X. 



22. 

2008 [176] Brandt, Reinhard/Esser, Andrea/Forst, Rainer/Leist, Anton (2008): Kants Ethik in der Diskussion. 

Stellungnahmen von Reinhard Brandt, Andrea Esser, Rainer Forst und 

Anton Leist, Information Philosophie 36, Nr. 2, S. 26–35. 

2008 [177] Brito, Adriano Naves de (2008): Will, Value, and the Fact of Reason, in Recht und Frieden in 

der Philosophie Kants. Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Band 3: 

Sektionen III–IV, hrsg. von Valerio Rohden, Ricarda R. Terra, Guido A. de Almeida 

und Margit Ruffing, Berlin, S. 23–32. 

2008 [178] Bustos, Keith (2008): Defending a Kantian Conception of Duties to Self and Others, Journal of 

Value Inquiry 42, S. 241–254. – Zu [811]. 

2008 [179] Callender, Lenval A. (2008): Kant’s Moral Teleology and ‘Consequentialism’, in Recht und 

Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, 

Band 3: Sektionen III–IV, hrsg. von Valerio Rohden, Ricarda R. Terra, Guido A. de 

Almeida und Margit Ruffing, Berlin, S. 33–42. 

2008 [180] Casas, Vicente Duran (2008): Immanuel Kant: Professor of Ethics, in Recht und Frieden in 

der Philosophie Kants. Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Band 3: 



2008 [181] Cecchinato, Giorgia (2008): Die praktische Urteilskraft and das Gesetz der Freiheit, in Recht 

und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, 



2008 [182] Chagas, Flávia Carvalho (2008): The Fact of Reason and the Feeling of Respect, in Recht und 




2008 [183] Christiano, Thomas (2008): Two Conceptions of the Dignity of Persons, Jahrbuch für Recht 

und Ethik 16, S. 101–27. 

2008 [184] Clohesy, William W. (2008): Kant’s Opposition to Lying from Expediency, in Recht und 



Almeida und Margit Ruffing, Berlin, S. 43–52.

2008 [185] Cummiskey, David (2008): Dignity, Contractualism and Consequentialism, Utilitas 20, S. 

383–408. 53 

2008 [186] Darwall, Stephen (2008): Kant on Respect, Dignity, and the Duty of Respect, in Kant’s Ethics 

of Virtue, hrsg. von Monika Betzler, Berlin, S. 175–99. 

2008 [187] Denis, Lara (2008): Individual and Collective Flourishing in Kant’s Philosophy, Kantian 

Review 13, S. 82–115. 

2008 [188] Denis, Lara (2008): Kant and Hume on Morality, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 

hrsg. von Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-hume-morality/. 

2008 [189] Fenner, Dagmar (2008): Ethik. Wie soll ich handeln?, Tübingen, S. 100–106 („Kants 

Verfahren logischer Universalisierung“). 

2008 [190] Ferreira, Sofia Helena Gollnick (2008): Kant’s Concept of Moral Character, in Recht und 




2008 [191] Fricke, Christel (2008): Maximen, in Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Akten des 

X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Band 3: Sektionen III–IV, hrsg. von Valerio 


36. 

2008 [192] Geiger, Ido (2008): How Do We Derive Moral Laws?, in Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie 

Kants. Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Band 3: Sektionen III–IV, hrsg. 

von Valerio Rohden, Ricarda R. Terra, Guido A. de Almeida und Margit Ruffing, 

Berlin, S. 137–47. 

2008 [193] Grünewald, Bernward (2008): Wahrhaftigkeit, Recht and Lüge, in Recht und Frieden in der 




2008 [194] Hallich, Oliver (2008): Die Rationalität der Moral. Eine sprachanalytische Grundlegung der 

Ethik, Paderborn, S. 570–83 („Kants Versuch der Kontingenzeliminierung“). 

2008 [195] Heil, Joachim (2008): Einleitung in die praktische Philosophie Kants, in Texte zur praktischen 

Philosophie: Kant. Ausgewählt und eingeleitet von Joachim Heil, London, S. XVII– 

LXVII. 

53 “Kantian respect for persons is based on the special status and dignity of humanity. There are, however, at 

least three distinct kinds of interpretation of the principle of respect for the dignity of persons: the 

contractualist conception, the substantive conception and the direct conception. Contractualist theories are 

the most common and familiar interpretation. The contractualist assumes that some form of consent or 

agreement is the crucial factor that is required by respect for persons. The substantive conceptions of 

dignity, on the other hand, treat the concept of dignity as a substantive value that justifies a deontological 

conception of respect for persons. A third conception of respect for the dignity of persons, the conception 

that I favor, focuses directly on the special value of our rational nature. According to this consequentialist 

conception, we respect the dignity of persons by promoting the flourishing of rational nature.”

2008 [196] Heubel, Friedrich/Manzeschke, Arne (2008): Kants kategorischer Imperativ als Management- 

Technik und Marketing-Strategie?, Ethik in der Medizin 20, S. 86–93. 54 

2008 [197] Hill, Jr., Thomas (2008): Kantian Virtue and ‘Virtue Ethics’, in Kant’s Ethics of Virtue, hrsg. 

von Monika Betzler, Berlin, S. 29–59. 

2008 [198] Hill, Jr., Thomas (2008): Legislating the Moral Law and Taking One’s Choices to Be Good, 

Philosophical Books 49, S. 97–106. – Zu [369]. 

2008 [199] Hill, Jr., Thomas (2008): Moral Construction as a Task: Sources and Limits, Social Philosophy 

and Policy 25 (1), S. 214–236. 

2008 [200] Hills, Alison (2008): Kantian Value Realism, Ratio 21, S. 182–200. 55 

54 „Eine der deutschen Krankenhausketten versucht, ihr Geschäftsmodell u. a. auf Elemente der Kantschen 

Moralphilosophie zu stützen. In den Dienstverträgen der führenden Manager werden Verhaltensnormen 

spezifiziert, und es wird auf den kategorischen Imperativ Bezug genommen. Frage ist, ob dies mit der 

Kantschen Ethik vereinbar ist, und ob es sich dazu eignet, moralischen Anforderungen an Krankenhäuser 

besser gerecht zu werden. Eine Analyse der einschlägigen Texte zeigt, dass Kants kategorischer Imperativ 

mit der Goldenen Regel gleichgesetzt wird, wogegen Kant sich ausdrücklich gewehrt hat. Die Goldene 

Regel wird außerdem entstellt. Dass der kategorische Imperativ nicht nur Achtungs-, sondern auch 

Fürsorgepflichten normiert, wird übersehen. Es bleibt offen, ob aus der Kantschen Ethik nicht doch 

Folgerungen für die Krankenhausorganisation zu ziehen sind, der hier kritisierte Versuch ist jedoch 

missglückt, weil – ganz abgesehen von den Anwendungsproblemen – schon die Kantschen Konzepte 

missverstanden wurden. Immerhin zeigt der Versuch, dass es im Management ein Bewusstsein für die 

Wichtigkeit moralischer Vorgaben im Krankenhaus gibt.“ 

“Problem One of the German commercial hospital chains is trying to ground their business policy on 

elements of Kantian moral philosophy. Allegedly, the categorical imperative is inserted as a norm of 

conduct into the contracts of leading officers. We discuss whether the reference to Kantian ethics is sound 

and is suited to improving the moral standards of hospitals. 

Arguments Scrutiny of the companies’ statements reveals that the categorical imperative is equated with 

the Golden Rule, which Kant explicitly rejects, and that the Golden Rule is distored. In addition, the texts 

ignore that the categorical imperative entails not only duties of respect but also duties of beneficence. 

Conclusion Kantian arguments may indeed have some impact on hospital organisation but if so they 

should be genuine. In the case at stake, they are misused. However, even this misuse indicates an intuition 

that running a hospital includes moral demands.” 

55 “Why should we be interested in Kant’s ethical theory? One reason is that we find his views about our 

moral responsibilities appealing. Anyone who thinks that we should treat other people with respect, that we 

should not use them as a mere means in ways to which they could not possibly consent, will be attracted by 

a Kantian style of ethical theory. 

But according to recent supporters of Kant, the most distinctive and important feature of his ethical theory 

is not his claims about the particular ethical duties that we owe to each other, but his views about the nature 

of value. They argue that Kant has an account of the relationship between practical reason and value, 

known as “Kantian constructivism” that is far superior to the traditional “value realist” theory, and that it is 

because of this that we should accept his theory. 

It is now standard for both supporters and critics to claim that Kant’s moral theory stands or falls with 

Kantian constructivism. But this is a mistake. In this paper, I sketch a rival Kantian theory of value, which I 

call Kantian value realism. I argue that there is textual evidence that Kant himself accepted value realism

2008 [201] Horn, Christoph (2008): The Concept of Love in Kant’s Virtue Ethics, in Kant’s Ethics of 

Virtue, hrsg. von Monika Betzler, Berlin, S. 147–73. 

2008 [202] Johnson, Robert N. (2008): Was Kant a Virtue Ethicist?, in Kant’s Ethics of Virtue, hrsg. von 

Monika Betzler, Berlin, S. 61–75. 

2008 [203] Kalderon, Mark Eli (2008): Respecting Value, European Journal of Philosophy 16, S. 341–65. 

2008 [204] Kaplan, Shawn D. (2008): Bringing the Moral Law Closer to Intuition and Feeling: An Interpretive 

Framework for Kant’s Groundwork II, in Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie 

Kants. Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Band 3: Sektionen III– 

IV, hrsg. von Valerio Rohden, Ricarda R. Terra, Guido A. de Almeida und Margit 


2008 [205] Keinert, Maurício Cardoso (2008): Critique of Practical Reason: Moral Law and Autonomy, in 

Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, 

Band 3: Sektionen III–IV, hrsg. von Valerio Rohden, Ricarda R. Terra, Guido 

A. de Almeida und Margit Ruffing, Berlin, S. 183–88. 

2008 [206] Kerstein, Samuel J. (2008): Autonomy and Practical Law, Philosophical Books 49, S. 107–13. 

– Zu [369]. 

2008 [207] Kerstein, Samuel J. (2008): Treating Oneself Merely as a Means, in Kant’s Ethics of Virtue, 

hrsg. von Monika Betzler, Berlin, S. 201–18. 

2008 [208] Kim, Halla (2008): The Unity of Pure Practical Reason: Towards a Unified Interpretation of 

the Three Formulas of Kant’s Categorical Imperative, in Recht und Frieden in der 




2008 [209] Kim, Jong-Gook (2008): Moral zum ewigen Frieden. Eine teleologische Lekture von 

praktischer Philosophie Kants, in Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Akten 

des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Band 3: Sektionen III–IV, hrsg. von Valerio 


14. 

2008 [210] Klein, Patrick (2008): Gibt es ein Moralgesetz, das für alle Menschen gültig ist? Eine Untersuchung 

zum Faktum der Vernunft bei Immanuel Kant, Würzburg 2008. 56 

rather than constructivism. Whilst my aim in this paper is to set out the theory clearly rather than to defend 

it, I will try to show that Kantian value realism is preferable to Kantian constructivism and that it is worthy 

of further study.” 

56 „Die Frage, ob wir von allen Menschen verlangen dürfen, denselben Moralstandards zu gehorchen, entscheidet 

darüber, ob es überhaupt legitim ist, globale Moralmaßstäbe, z.B. als Menschenrechte, juridisch 

fixieren und Verstöße entsprechend sanktionieren zu wollen. Der ethische Relativismus liefert gewichtige 

Argumente gegen eine affirmative Haltung dieser Frage gegenüber. 

Kant hat für die präskriptive Gültigkeit seines kategorischen Imperativs für alle Menschen durch das viel 

diskutierte Faktum-Theorem argumentiert. Die Studie sucht die Frage zu beantworten, wie dieses von Kant 

nachgerade beiläufig vorgetragene Theorem überhaupt zu verstehen ist. Dabei ist es die zentrale These des 

Autors, dass man nicht verstehen kann, was Kant mit dem Faktum der Vernunft meint, wenn man nicht

2008 [211] Klemme, Heiner F. (2008): Moralisches Sollen, Autonomie and Achtung. Kants Konzeption 

der „libertas indifferentiae” zwischen Wolff and Crusius, in Recht und Frieden in der 




2008 [212] Lee, Seung-Kee (2008): Why Are Kant’s Hypothetical and Categorical Imperatives Analytic 

and Synthetic A Priori Practical Propositions?, in Recht und Frieden in der 




2008 [213] Ludwig, Bernd (2008): Was wird in Kants Grundlegung eigentlich deduziert? Über einen 

Grund der vermeintlichen Dunkelheit des „Dritten Abschnitts“, Jahrbuch für Recht 

und Ethik 16, S. 431–63. 

2008 [214] Maliandi, Ricardo (2008): Categorical Imperative and Ethical Inflection, in Recht und Frieden 

in der Philosophie Kants. Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Band 3: 



2008 [215] Mannion, Gerard (2008): Kant and the Defeat of Egoism: Schopenhauerian Concerns and 

Some Reappraisals and Rejoinders, Kant-Studien 99, S. 220–28. 

2008 [216] Martins, Clélia Aparecida (2008): Über die moralische Selbsterkenntnis, in Recht und Frieden 




2008 [217] Merle, Jean-Christophe (2008): Freundschaft innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft. 

Freundschaft gegenüber der Menschheit bei Kant, in Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie 

Kants. Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Band 3: Sektionen III– 

IV, hrsg. von Valerio Rohden, Ricarda R. Terra, Guido A. de Almeida und Margit 


2008 [218] Meyers, C. D. (2008): The Virtue of Cold-Heartedness, Philosophical Studies 138, S. 233– 

44. 57 

weiß, was Vernunft (nach Kant) überhaupt ist. Aus diesem Grund geht der semantischen Analyse des 

Faktum-Theorems eine elaborierte Darstellung des Kantischen Vernunftbegriffs voraus. Mithilfe dieser 

Strategie kann die Bedeutung des Faktum-Theorems erfasst und das Theorem selbst auf seine Plausibilität 

hin überprüft werden. 

Trotz einiger systematischer Defizite des Theorems, zeigt die Studie, dass sowohl Kants Vernunftbegriff als 

auch das Faktum der Vernunft unserem Alltagsbewusstsein viel vertrauter ist als es auf den ersten Blick 

scheinen mag.“ 

57 “I defend a strong version of the Kantian claim that actions done solely from duty have moral worth by (1) 

considering pure cases of acting from duty, (2) showing that love and sympathy, unlike a sense of duty, can 

often lead us to do the wrong thing, (3) carefully distinguishing moral from non-moral virtues, and (4) by 

distinguishing pathological sympathy from practical sympathy. Not only is acting purely from a sense of

2008 [219] Morrisson, Iain P. D. (2008): Kant and the Role of Pleasure in Moral Action, Athens, OH. 58 

2008 [220] Moyar, Dean (2008): Practical Apperception: Self-Imputation and Moral Judgment, in Recht 

und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, 



2008 [221] Moyar, Dean (2008): Unstable Autonomy: Conscience and Judgment in Kant’s Moral 

Philosophy, Journal of Moral Philosophy 5, S. 327–60. 59 

2008 [222] Muchnik, Pablo (2008): Kant on the Sources of Evil, in Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie 

Kants. Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Band 3: Sektionen III–IV, hrsg. 

von Valerio Rohden, Ricarda R. Terra, Guido A. de Almeida und Margit Ruffing, 

Berlin, S. 291–301. 

2008 [223] Nahra, Cinara (2008): Acting from the Motive of Duty and the Incorruptible Ideal Moral 

Agent, in Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Akten des X. Internationalen 

Kant-Kongresses, Band 3: Sektionen III–IV, hrsg. von Valerio Rohden, Ricarda R. 

Terra, Guido A. de Almeida und Margit Ruffing, Berlin, S. 303–11. 

2008 [224] Nelson, William (2008): Kant’s Formula of Humanity, Mind 117, S. 85–106. 60 

duty superior to acting from love and sympathetic feelings, but the cold-heartedness found in Kant’s 

examples should be thought of as a virtue rather than a vice.” 

58 “Kant scholars since the early nineteenth century have disagreed about how to interpret his theory of moral 

motivation. Kant tells us that the feeling of respect is the incentive to moral action, but he is notoriously 

ambiguous on the question of what exactly this means. In Kant and the Role of Pleasure in Moral Action, 

Iain Morrisson offers a new view on Kant’s theory of moral action. 

In a clear, straightforward style, Morrisson responds to the ongoing interpretive stalemate by taking an 

original approach to the problem. Whereas previous commentators have attempted to understand Kant’s 

feeling of respect by studying the relevant textual evidence in isolation, Morrisson illuminates this evidence 

by determining what Kant’s more general theory of action commits him to regarding moral action. After 

looking at how Kant’s treatment of desire and feeling can be reconciled with his famous account of free 

maxim-based action, Morrisson argues that respect moves us to moral action in a way that is structurally 

parallel to the way in which nonmoral pleasure motivates nonmoral action. 

In reconstructing a unified theory of action in Kant, Morrisson integrates a number of distinct elements in 

his practical philosophy. Kant and the Role of Pleasure in Moral Action is part of a new wave of interest in 

Kant’s anthropological (that is, psychological) works.” (Publisher’s (Ohio University Press) description) 

59 “In this paper I argue that Kant’s claims about conscience in his moral writings of the 1790s reveal a 

fundamental instability in his moral philosophy. The central issue is the relationship between the moral law 

as the form of universality and the judgment of individuals about specific cases. Against Thomas Hill’s 

claim that Kant has only a limited role for conscience, I argue that conscience has a comprehensive role in 

Kantian deliberation. I unpack the claims about conscience in the Metaphysics of Morals to show that they 

describe conscience as both a basic act of self-consciousness and as an all-things-considered judgment. I 

outline the role of conscience in moral motivation, and argue that taken together Kant’s writings about 

conscience reveal a way to rethink Kant’s conception of the Fact of Reason.” 

60 “This paper is concerned with the normative content of Kant’s formula of humanity (FH). More specifically, 

does FH, as some seem to think, imply the specific and rigid prescriptions in ‘standard’ deontological 

theories? To this latter question, I argue, the answer is ‘no’. I propose reading FH largely through the

2008 [225] Nodari, Paulo César (2008): The Moral Law as Expression of the Autonomy of Reason in the 

Critique of the [!] Practical Reason, in Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. 

Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Band 3: Sektionen III–IV, hrsg. von 

Valerio Rohden, Ricarda R. Terra, Guido A. de Almeida und Margit Ruffing, Berlin, 

S. 313–22. 

2008 [226] Noordraven, Andreas (2008): Kants moralische Ontologie. Historischer Ursprung und 

systematische Bedeutung, Würzburg. 61 

2008 [227] Ortiz-Millán, Gustavo (2008): Kant on the Nature of Desires, in Recht und Frieden in der 




2008 [228] Rapic, Smail (2008): Die Grundformel des Kategorischen Imperativs, die Selbstzweck-Formel 

und das Rechtsprinzip, in Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Akten des X. 



45. 

2008 [229] Rauscher, Frederick (2008): Why Kant’s Ethics Is A Priori – and Why It Matters, in Recht und 




2008 [230] Reath, Andrews (2008): Autonomy, Taking One’s Choices to Be Good, And Practical Law: 

formula of autonomy and the formula of the kingdom of ends, where I understand FA to describe the nature 

of the capacity of humanity – a capacity for self-governance. The latter, I suggest, is akin to the capacity for 

planning and intentional action described in Michael Bratman's work. A significant part of what FH 

requires, I then propose, is that we exercise these capacities for planning in such a way that we 

accommodate and coordinate with the (permissible) plans and intentions of others. Kant himself, as do 

many commentators, emphasizes the idea that our human capacities give us a distinctive kind of value. On 

my interpretation, by contrast, what is fundamentally important is not the value of the capacities but rather 

what they make possible: distinctive ways of mistreating (using) persons, but also a distinctive kind of 

morally desirable relationship.” 

61 „Gegenstand der vorliegenden Untersuchung ist das Verhältnis von Denken und Sein in den verschiedenen 

Phasen von Kants Denkentwicklung. Gezeigt wird, dass die vom Sein ausgehende Ontologie der 

vorkritischen Periode, die in Kants transzendental-kritischer Phase vorübergehend beiseite gedrängt wird, 

im Spätwerk erneut in den Vordergrund tritt. Diese Rehabilitierung der Ontologie im Nachlass, die jedoch 

keinen Bruch mit dem transzendentalen Denken bedeutet, sondern von Kant „eine Fortsetzung der 

Transzendentalphilosophie auf höherem Niveau“ genannt wird, ist für die Interpretation seiner Ethik von 

besonderem Interesse. Die von der heutigen Forschung immer noch als Standardinterpretation 

angenommene Auslegung, nach der die transzendentalphilosophisch begründete Lehre des kategorischen 

Imperativs das Herzstück der kantischen Ethik darstellt, kann aus der Sicht des „neuen 

Transzendentalismus“ der Spätphase nicht länger überzeugen. Der ethische Formalismus weicht hier dem 

Phänomen der konkreten sittlichen Erfahrung, das im Nachlasswerk als das eigentliche Grundphänomen 

der Moral angesehen werden kann. Der spezifisch praktische Charakter von Kants Moralphilosophie 

gewinnt damit einen systematischen Stellenwert, den die Kantforschung bis heute kaum beachtet hat.“

Replies To Critics, Philosophical Books 49, S. 125–37. – Zu [198], [206], [244]. 

2008 [231] Sato, Tsutomu (2008): Chemical Affinity in Kant’s Practical Philosophy, in Recht und Frieden 




2008 [232] Schossberger, Cynthia (2008): The Kingdom of Ends and the Fourth Example in the 

Groundwork II, in Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Akten des X. 



77. 

2008 [233] Schroth, Jörg (2008): The Priority of the Right in Kant’s Ethics, in Kant’s Ethics of Virtue, 

hrsg. von Monika Betzler, Berlin, S. 77–100. 

2008 [234] Schwartz, Maria (2008): Maximen, Ratschlage der Klugheit und der verborgene Zweck, in 

Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Akten des X. Internationalen Kant- 

Kongresses, Band 3: Sektionen III–IV, hrsg. von Valerio Rohden, Ricarda R. Terra, 

Guido A. de Almeida und Margit Ruffing, Berlin, S. 379–90. 

2008 [235] Sedgwick, Sally (2008): Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: An Introduction, 

Cambridge. 

2008 [236] Sensen, Oliver (2008): Kant’s Treatment of Human Dignity in the Groundwork, in Recht und 




2008 [237] Seymour, Melissa (2008): Widening the Field for the Practice of Virtue: Kant’s Wide 

Imperfect Duties, in Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Akten des X. 



13. 

2008 [238] Steigleder, Klaus (2008): Vernunft und Universalismus am Beispiel Immanuel Kants, in 

Grundpositionen und Anwendungsprobleme der Ethik (Kolleg Praktische Philosophie 

Band 2), hrsg. von Volker Steenblock, Stuttgart, S. 55–82. 62 

2008 [239] Stolzenberg, Jürgen (2008): The Pure “I Will” Must Be Able to Accompany All of My Desires: 

The Problem of a Deduction of the Categories of Freedom in Kant’s Critique of 

Practical Reason, in Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Akten des X. Internationalen 

Kant-Kongresses, Band 3: Sektionen III–IV, hrsg. von Valerio Rohden, 

Ricarda R. Terra, Guido A. de Almeida und Margit Ruffing, Berlin, S. 415–25. 

2008 [240] Stratton-Lake, Philip (2008): Being Virtuous and the Virtues: Two Aspects of Kant’s Doctrine 

of Virtue, in Kant’s Ethics of Virtue, hrsg. von Monika Betzler, Berlin, S. 101–21. 

2008 [241] Sussman, David (2008): From Deduction to Deed: Kant’s Grounding of the Moral Law, 

62 „1. Hinführung: Zwei Kernthesen Kants und ihre Erläuterung. 2. Bedingtes und unbedingtes Sollen. 3. Die 

Begründung des moralischen Sollens. 4. Zum Gehalt moralischen Sollens. 5. Literaturhinweise“


2008 [242] Thiel, Karsten M. (2008): Über Kants vermeintlichen Rigorismus, in Recht und Frieden in der 




2008 [243] Thorndike, Oliver (2008): Ethica Deceptrix: The Significance of Baumgarten’s Notion of a 

Chimerical Ethics for the Development of Kant’s Moral Philosophy, in Recht und 




2008 [244] Timmermann, Jens (2008): Agency and Imputation: Comments on Reath, Philosophical Books 

49, S. 114–24. – Zu [369]. 

2008 [245] Timmermann, Jens (2008): Kant’s Grundlegung: a Reply to Dieter Schönecker, Kantian 

Review 13, S. 171–77. 

2008 [246] Timmermann, Jens (2008): Limiting Freedom: On the Free Choice of Ends in Kantian Moral 

Philosophy, in Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Akten des X. 



37. 

2008 [247] Torralba, José M. (2008): Kant on the Law of Nature as the Type of Moral Law: “On the Typic 

of the Faculty of Pure Practical Judgment” and the Good as the Object of Practical 

Reason, in Natural Law: Historical, Systematic and Juridical Approaches, hrsg. von 

Alejandro N. García, Mario Šilar und José M. Torralba, Cambridge, S. 195–221. 

2008 [248] Vogt, Katja (2008): Duties to Others: Demands and Limits, in Kant’s Ethics of Virtue, hrsg. 

von Monika Betzler, Berlin, S. 219–43. 

2008 [249] Weinrib, Jacob (2008): The Juridical Significance of Kant’s ‘Supposed Right to Lie’, Kantian 

Review 13, S. 141–70. 

2008 [250] Wilson, Donald (2008): Middle Theory, Manipulation, and Inner Freedom, in Recht und 




2008 [251] Wilson, Eric Entrican (2008): Kantian Autonomy and the Moral Self, Review of Metaphysics 

62, S. 355–81. 

2008 [252] Witschen, Dieter (2008): Kultivierung des Gewissens – eine Pflicht gegenüber sich selbst. 

Kantische Reflexionen, Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 55, S. 

128–41. 

2008 [253] Wood, Allen W. (2008): Kantian Ethics, Cambridge. 63 

63 Inhalt: Preface. Abbreviations. 1 Reason. 2 Moral Worth. 3 Ethical Theory. 4 The Moral Law. 5 Humanity. 

6 Autonomy. 7 Freedom. 8 Virtue. 9 Duties. 10 Conscience. 11 Social Justice. 12 Punishment. 13 Sex. 14 

Lies. 15 Consequences. Notes. Index.

2008 [254] Zobrist, Marc (2008): Kants Lehre vom höchsten Gut und die Frage moralischer Motivation, 

Kant-Studien 99, S. 285–311. 

2007 [255] Allison, Henry E. (2007): Comments on Guyer, Inquiry 50, S. 480–88. 64 – Zu [271]. 

2007 [256] Atterton, Peter (2007) A Duty to Be Charitable? A Rigoristic Reading of Kant, Kant-Studien 

98, S. 135–55. 

2007 [257] Backström, Joel (2007): The Fear of Openness. An Essay on Friendship and the Roots of 

Morality, Åbo, S. 138–53 (“Respect vs. love (Kant)”). 

2007 [258] Banham, Gary (2007): Kant’s Moral Theory, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15, 

S. 581–93. 

2007 [259] Baum, Manfred (2007): Recht und Ethik in Kants praktischer Philosophie, in Kant in der 

Gegenwart, hrsg. von Jürgen Stolzenberg, Berlin, S. 213–26. 

2007 [260] Baxley, Anne Margaret (2007): Kantian Virtue, Philosophy Compass 2, S. 396–410. 65 

64 “Guyer argues for four major theses. First, in his early, pre-critical discussions of morality, Kant advocated 

a version of rational egoism, in which freedom, understood naturalistically as a freedom from domination by 

both one’s own inclinations and from other people, rather than happiness, is the fundamental value. From 

this point of view, the function of the moral law is to prescribe rules best suited to the preservation and 

maximization of such freedom, just as on the traditional eudaemonistic account it is to prescribe rules for 

the maximization of happiness. Second, in the Groundwork, Kant abandoned this naturalistic approach and 

while retaining the same substantive thesis as his early moral philosophy, “namely that freedom is the value 

that is realized by adherence to the moral law” (Guyer 455), attempted to provide a non-naturalistic 

(transcendental) grounding for this valuation of freedom. Third, this took the form of a transcendental 

deduction, closely modeled on that of the first Critique, which was intended to demonstrate that we are in 

fact (noumenally) free and the moral law is the “causal law” of this freedom. Fourth, this deduction is a 

disaster, indeed, one of Western philosophy’s “most spectacular train wrecks” (Guyer 445). I shall discuss 

each in turn, devoting the bulk of my attention to the last.” 

65 “Kant’s most familiar and widely read works in practical reason are the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 

Morals (1785) and the Critique of Practical Reason (1788). His principal aims in these works are to 

analyze the nature and ground of morality and to justify its supreme principle (the categorical imperative). 

Nevertheless, in these texts, Kant also paints a picture of what it means to have a good will or good 

character, and it is this account of the good will and the associated theory of moral motivation that have 

been the target of many of the historical and contemporary objections to Kant’s rationalism. From the 

perspective of these foundational works in Kant's moral theory, it appears that all that is required for 

Kantian character is a firm commitment to do one’s duty from the motive of duty in the absence of 

inclination, or in the teeth of countervailing inclination. Kant’s defenders have rightly insisted that it would 

be hasty to draw any final conclusions about his considered views on character and moral psychology on the 

basis of the Groundwork and the second Critique. An adequate assessment of these kinds of charges against 

Kant, they have argued, must address his theory of virtue, as it is set out in his other important ethical texts, 

especially the Doctrine of Virtue (1797) and Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793). In his 

theory of virtue, Kant presents a detailed account of virtue as a character trait, provides lengthy discussions 

of the various virtues he sees as central for the ethical life, and maintains that there are moral feelings that 

are part of a virtuous character and serviceable for morality. For these reasons, those interested in gleaning

2007 [261] Denis, Lara (2007): Abortion and Kant’s Formula of Universal Law, Canadian Journal of 

Philosophy 37, S. 547–80. 

2007 [262] Denis, Lara (2007): Kant’s Formula of the End in Itself: Some Recent Debates, Philosophy 

Compass 2, S. 244–57. 66 

2007 [263] Flikschuh, Katrin (2007): Duty, Nature, Right: Kant’s Response to Mendelssohn in Theory and 

Practice III, Journal of Moral Philosophy 4, S. 223–41. 67 

2007 [264] Flikschuh, Katrin (2007): Kant’s Indemonstrable Postulate of Right: A Response to Paul 

Guyer, Kantian Review 12, S. 1–39. 

2007 [265] Gilly, Thomas Albert (2007): What has Kant to do with Terrorism? Part 1 – Categorical 

Imperative, The Homeland Security Review 1, S. 205–19. 

2007 [266] Giordanetti, Piero (2007): Die Realität des Ethischen „Faktum der Vernunft“ und Gefühl in 

der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Secretum-online 34 (November 2007) (Verfaßt 

1998): 68 

http://www.secretum- 

a more complete picture of Kant’s ethics await a detailed, systematic account of Kant’s views about virtue. 

This entry aims to sketch the outlines of such an account.” 

66 “Kant’s formula of the end in itself commands that one treat humanity in oneself and in others always as an 

end and never merely as a means. Interest in, and debate concerning, this formulation of the categorical 

imperative has been growing among Kantians and ethicists more generally. After an overview of this 

formulation and Kant’s argument for it, this piece outlines several areas of current debate. It then explores 

some dominant and emerging positions regarding two questions: the identity of the end in itself, and the 

relation between the end in itself and the value of other things.” 

67 “This paper offers an imminent interpretation of Kant’s political teleology in the context of his response to 

Moses Mendelssohn in Theory and Practice III concerning prospects of humankind’s moral progress. The 

paper assesses the nature of Kant’s response against his mature political philosophy in the Doctrine of 

Right. In ‘Theory and Practice III’ Kant’s response to Mendelssohn remains incomplete: whilst insisting 

that individuals have a duty to contribute towards humankind’s moral progress, Kant has no conclusive 

answer as to how individuals might act on that duty. ‘Theory and Practice III’ lacks a clear conception of the 

distinctness of political morality from the domain of virtue; Kant’s resort to teleological argumentation is 

indicative of his lack of an account of instituting Right. The latter can be found in the Doctrine of Right – 

yet Kant’s earlier teleological arguments contribute crucially to the development of his mature morality of 

Right.” 

68 „In der Forschung wird die Realität des Ethischen bei Kant fast ausschließlich hinsichtlich des Formcharakters 

des kategorischen Imperativs und des moralischen Urteils untersucht. Die Aufmerksamkeit konzentriert 

sich dabei auf einen Vergleich mit der in der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten angekündigten und 

nicht gelungenen „Deduktion“ des kategorischen Imperativs sowie auf die Einführung der Zwei-Welten- 

Lehre. Dieser weitverbreiteten Ansicht möchte ich durch folgende These entgegentreten: Kant hat die Frage 

nach der Realität des Ethischen nicht schnell und flüchtig durch die Lehre vom Faktum der Vernunft 

beantwortet, sondern hat ihr neben den Erwägungen in der „Analytik der Grundsätze“ und der „Begriffe“ 

auch die ganze Triebfederlehre und endlich die Methodenlehre gewidmet. Der Rekurs auf die Apriorität des 

Achtungsgefühls, welcher in diesen beiden Textstücken vorgenommen wird, gewährleistet den Beweis der 

objektiven Realität des moralischen Gestzes und der ihm angemessenen menschlichen Tugend. Es wird 

auch kurz auf das apriorische Gefühl der Zufriedenheit eingegangen, welches nach Kant die Möglichkeit 

der apriorischen Verbindung von Moralität und Glückseligkeit beweist.“

online.it/default.php?idnodo=8&PHPSESSID=b5b311690ea1ddabebbc148bfed0e1f5 

2007 [267] Giordanetti, Piero (2007): Zu Kants Tugendlehre, Itinera (Dezember 2007) (Verfaßt 2005) 69 

http://www.filosofia.unimi.it/itinera/mat/saggi/?ssectitle=Saggi&authorid=giordanettip&docid=tugendlehre&format=html 

bzw. 

http://www.filosofia.unimi.it/itinera/mat/saggi/giordanettip_tugendlehre.pdf 

2007 [268] Glasgow, Joshua (2007): Kant’s Conception of Humanity, Journal of the History of Philosophy 

45, S. 291–308. 70 

2007 [269] Goy, Ina (2007): Immanuel Kant über das moralische Gefühl der Achtung, Zeitschrift für 

philosophische Forschung 61, S. 337–60. 

2007 [270] Guyer, Paul (2007): Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Reader’s Guide, 

London. 71 

2007 [271] Guyer, Paul (2007): Naturalistic and Transcendental Moments in Kant’s Moral Philosophy, 

Inquiry 50, S. 444–64. 72 – Dazu: [255], [290], [303]. 

69 „Gegen soziale oder sogar politische Umdeutungen der Kantischen Tugendlehre wird eingewandt, daß sich 

Kant nicht auf die empirische Tatsache einer intersubjektiven Menschenvernunft beruft, sondern im 

Gegenteil dazu behauptet, daß die Tugendlehre bis auf die Elemente der Metaphysik zurückgehen muß. Es 

wird die These vertreten, gemäß welcher die Tugendlehre keine Anthropologie, sondern eine 

„Anthroponomie“ (VI 405–406) ist, welche ohne den Rückbezug auf die Metaphysik weder Sicherheit noch 

Reinheit und vor allem keine bewegende Kraft haben kann. Außerderm wird die Besonderheit der 

Kantischen Tugendlehre als Eleutheronomie und Anthroponomie betont, in welcher den „ästhetischen 

Vorbegriffen“ (Ziffer XII der Einleitung) eine wesentliche Rolle zukommt. Sie sind insgesamt ästhetisch 

und vorhergehende, aber natürliche Gemütsanlagen, durch Pflichtbegriffe affiziert zu werden. Das 

Bewußtsein derselben ist nicht empirischen Ursprungs, sondern kann nur auf das eines moralischen 

Gesetzes, als Wirkung desselben aufs Gemüt, folgen. In diesem Kontext wird der Nexus mit der 

apriorischen Triebfederlehre und mit der ebenfalls apriorischen Methodenlehre der Kritik der praktischen 

Vernunft ans Licht gestellt und zwar in der Absicht, die fundierende Rolle apriorischer Gefühle zu 

betonen.“ 

70 “Contemporary Kant scholarship generally takes ‘humanity’ in Kant’s ethical writings to refer to beings 

with rational capacities. However, his claims that only the good will has unqualified goodness and that 

humanity is unconditionally valuable suggests that humanity might be the good will. This problem seems to 

have infiltrated some prominent scholarship, and Richard Dean has recently argued that, in fact, humanity 

is indeed the good will. This paper defends, and tries to make sense of, the more conventional view that 

humanity and the good will are distinct.” 

71 Inhalt: Sources and Abbreviations (S. vii), 1. Context (S. 1), 2. Overview of Themes (S. 10), 3. Reading the 

Text: Preface (S. 23), 4. Reading the Text: Section I. From the Good Will to the Formula of Universal Law 

(S. 36), 5. Reading the Text: Section II. Formulating the Categorical Imperative (S. 66), 6. Reading the 

Text: Section III. The Categorical Imperative Applies to Us (S. 146), Notes (S. 172), Suggestions for 

Further Reading (S. 179), Index (S. 183). 

72 “During the 1760s and 1770s, Kant entertained a naturalistic approach to ethics based on the supposed 

psychological fact of a human love for freedom. During the critical period, especially in the Groundwork for 

the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant clearly rejected such an approach. But his attempt at a metaphysical 

foundation for ethics in section III of the Groundwork was equally clearly a failure. Kant recognized this in 

his appeal to the “fact of reason” argument in the Critique of Practical Reason, but thereby gave up on any

2007 [272] Guyer, Paul (2007): Response to Critics, Inquiry 50, S. 497–510. – Zu [255], [290], [303]. 

2007 [273] Herman, Barbara (2007): Moral Literacy, Cambridge, Mass. 

Dazu: 

Reath, Andrews (2011): Will, Obligatory Ends and the Completion of Practical Reason: 

Comments on Barbara Herman’s Moral Literacy, Kantian Review 16, S. 1–15. 73 

Engstrom, Stephen (2011): Herman on Moral Literacy, Kantian Review 16, S. 17–31. 74 

Sedgwick, Sally (2011): ‘Letting the Phenomena In’: On How Herman’s Kantianism Does and 

Does Not Answer the Empty Formalism Critique, Kantian Review 16, S. 33–47. 75 

Herman, Barbara (2011): Embracing Kant’s Formalism, Kantian Review 16, S. 49–66. 76 

2007 [274] Herman, Barbara (2007): Obligatory Ends, in dies., Moral Literacy, Cambridge, Mass., S. 

254–75. 

2007 [275] Herman, Barbara (2007): The Will and Its Objects, in dies., Moral Literacy, Cambridge, 

Mass., S. 230–53. 

2007 [276] Horn, Christoph/Mieth, Corinna/Scarano, Nico (2007): Kommentar, in Immanuel Kant: 

Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Kommentar von Christoph Horn, Corinna 

Mieth und Nico Scarano, Frankfurt a. M., S. 107–343. 

2007 [277] Illies, Christian (2007): Orientierung durch Universalisierung: Der Kategorische Imperativ als 

attempt to ground the fundamental principle of morality at all. So it is of interest to see how far we might 

now proceed along the lines of his original naturalistic approach.” 

73 “This paper discusses three inter-related themes in Barbara Herman’s Moral Literacy – the idea that, for 

Kant, the will is a ‘norm-constituted power’ whose activity is guided by its own internal norm, that the 

obligatory ends are reasonably viewed as the ends of all rational choice, and that morality ‘completes’ 

practical reason or rational agency.” 

74 “In her recent book, Barbara Herman explores a range of topics commonly associated with virtue ethics; her 

focus, however, is not so much on virtue as on normal moral competence and the basic moral capacity 

underpinning it. To explicate this competence, Herman introduces the idea of moral literacy, arguing that it 

reveals Kantian ethical thought to be better able than Humean views to account for our readiness to hold 

persons responsible even for conduct reflecting character flaws that stem from deficiencies in their 

upbringing. Examination of Herman's account raises a question, however, about how intimately moral 

literacy is related to the basic moral capacity.” 

75 “In Moral Literacy, Barbara Herman informs us that she will defend an ‘enlarged version of Kantian moral 

theory’ (Herman 2008: ix). Her ‘enlarged version’, she says, will provide a much-needed alternative to the 

common but misguided characterization of Kant’s practical philosophy as an empty formalism. I begin with 

a brief sketch of the main features of Herman’s corrective account. I endorse her claim that the enlarged 

Kantianism she defends is true to Kant’s intentions as well as successful in correcting the objections she 

outlines. I then argue that there is another version of the empty formalism worry Herman does not address. 

Not only does she not address it, but her form of Kantianism provides fuel for its fire.” 

76 “In response to critical discussions of my book, Moral Literacy, by Stephen Engstrom, Sally Sedgwick and 

Andrews Reath, I offer a defence of Kant’s formalism that is not only friendly to my claims for the moral 

theory’s sensitivity to a wide range of moral phenomena and practices at the ground level, but also 

consistent with Kant’s high rationalist ambitions.”

Test für die Moralität von Maximen, Kant-Studien 98, S. 306–28. 

2007 [278] Johnson, Robert N. (2007): Value and Autonomy in Kantian Ethics, in Oxford Studies in 

Metaethics Vol. 2, hrsg. von Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford, S. 133–48 

2007 [279] Kaufmann, Matthias (2007): Autonomie und das Faktum der Vernunft, in Kant in der Gegenwart, 

hrsg. von Jürgen Stolzenberg, Berlin, S. 227–46. 

2007 [280] Kienzle, Bertram (2007): Macht das Sittengesetz unglücklich?, in Was ist und was sein soll. 

Natur und Freiheit bei Immanuel Kant, hrsg. von Udo Kern, Berlin, S. 267–84. 

2007 [281] Klar, Samuel (2007): Moral und Politik bei Kant. Eine Untersuchung zu Kants praktischer und 

politischer Philosophie im Ausgang der „Religion innerhalb der Grenzen bloßer Vernunft“, 

Würzburg. 77 

2007 [282] Ludwig, Bernd (2007): Kant, Garve, and the Motives of Moral Action, Journal of Moral 

Philosophy 4, S. 183–93. 78 

2007 [283] Mohr, Georg (2007): Ein „Wert, der keinen Preis hat“ – Philosophiegeschichtliche Grundlagen 

der Menschenwürde bei Kant und Fichte, in Menschenwürde. Philosophische, theologische 

und juristische Analysen, hrsg. von Hans Jörg Sandkühler, Frankfurt a. M., S. 

13–39. 

2007 [284] Nortmann, Ulrich (2007): Kants Kategorischer Imperativ in der neueren Diskussion, in Logik, 

Begriffe, Prinzipien des Handelns, hrsg. von Thomas Müller und Albert Newen, 

Paderborn, S. 249–73. 

2007 [285] O’Neill, Onora (2007): Experts, Practitioners, and Practical Judgement, Journal of Moral 

Philosophy 4, S. 154–66. 79 

77 “Diese Arbeit bietet eine umfassende kritische Analyse und Interpretation der praktischen – moralischen 

wie politischen – Philosophie Kants vom systematischen Standpunkt der Religion innerhalb der Grenzen 

der bloßen Vernunft aus. Erstmalig wird der in seiner Bedeutung nach wie vor zu Unrecht unterschätzte 

Beitrag der Religionsschrift zur politischen Philosophie kritisch herausgearbeitet, im Kontext der gesamten 

praktischen Philosophie Kants gedeutet und systematisch dargestellt.“ (Klappentext) 

78 “Kant’s comments ‘against Garve’ constitute his reaction to the latter’s remarks on Cicero’s De Officiis . 

Two related criticisms of Kant’s against Garve are discussed in brief in this paper. A closer look is then 

taken at Garve’s claim that ‘Kantian morality destroys all incentives that can move human beings to act at 

all’. I argue that Kant and Garve rely on two different models of human action for their analyses of moral 

motivation; these models differ in what each takes to be salient for the explanation of human action. I show 

that Samuel Clarke’s analogy of physical explanation in the framework of Newtonianism (in his Discourse 

concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion ) usefully illuminates the difference between 

Kant and Garve in these respects.” 

79 “In Theory and Practice Kant challenges the well-worn view that practitioners do not need to rely on theory. 

He acknowledges that experts with a deep knowledge of theory may fail as practitioners both in technical 

matters, and in matters of morality and justice. However, since action-guiding theories are intended to shape 

rather than to fit the world, practitioners have no point of reference other than the theories or principles that 

they seek to enact. If theories of duty appear to offer too little guidance for action, they should look for more 

rather than fewer principles, which will enable them to guide their practical judgement with greater, if still 

incomplete, specificity.”

2007 [286] Papish, Laura (2007): The Cultivation of Sensibility in Kant’s Moral Philosophy, Kantian 

Review 12, S. 128–46. 

2007 [287] Peucker, Henning (2007): Husserl’s Critique of Kant’s Ethics, Journal of the History of 

Philosophy 45, S. 309–19. 80 

2007 [288] Pollok, Konstantin (2007): „Wenn Vernunft volle Gewalt über das Begehrungsvermögen 

hätte“ – Über die gemeinsame Wurzel der Kantischen Imperative, Kant-Studien 98, S. 

57–80. 

2007 [289] Riley, Patrick (2007): Kant against Hobbes in Theory and Practice, Journal of Moral 

Philosophy 4, S. 194–206. 81 

2007 [290] Rödl, Sebastian (2007): Comments on Guyer, Inquiry 50, S. 489–96. 82 – Zu [271]. 

2007 [291] Sedgwick, Sally (2007): The Empty Formalism of Kant’s Categorical Imperative. Hegel’s 

Critique Revisited, Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie 16, S. 5–17. 

2007 [292] Seung, T. K. (2007): Kant: A Guide for the Perplexed, London, S. 90–143 (“2. Practical 

80 “This paper introduces Husserl’s ethics by examining his critique of Kant’s ethics. It presents Husserl’s 

lectures on ethics in which he offers his own ethical theory in a historical context. The phenomenological 

ethics seeks to combine the advantages of both the traditional empiricism and rationalism. Husserl’s ethics 

takes into account that emotions play an essential role in the constitution of values and morals. 

Contrariwise, Husserl fights against relativism in ethics and praises Kant for the discovery of an absolute 

moral imperative. He considers Kant’s ethics as a rationalistic position that is too formal and that does not 

take into account that every will must be motivated by some concrete material good that is evaluated in our 

feelings or emotions.” 

81 “In the middle section of Theory and Practice, Kant speaks briefly ‘against Hobbes’; but for a fuller version 

of Kant’s anti-Hobbesianism one must turn to the three Critiques, the Groundwork, and Religion within the 

Limits of Reason Alone. It is in those works that one learns that, for Kant, Hobbes’s notion of ‘will’ as fully 

determined ‘last appetite’ destroys the freedom needed to take ‘ought’ or moral necessity as the motives for 

self-determined action; that Hobbes’s version of the social contract is thus incoherent; that Hobbes is not 

even able to show how moral ideas (i.e. ‘ought’) are conceivable through the ‘pressure’ of ‘outward objects’. 

For Kant, in short, Hobbes has no adequate notions of will, freedom, moral necessity, ideation, or even 

obligatory contract, and therefore fails in his own stated aims.” 

82 “Before and in the Groundwork, Kant argues as follows for the validity of the moral law: we want to be free. 

Following the moral law is the only way to be free. So we should follow the moral law. The first premise of 

this syllogism is treated differently before and in the Groundwork. First Kant thought it an empirical fact 

that men want to be free and want it more than anything else. Later he sought an a priori argument showing 

that we ought to want to be free and are right in thinking it good. The former justification of the moral law 

is superior. When we look to “salvage the normative core of Kantian moral philosophy” (Guyer 445), we 

should turn to it. – So far Paul Guyer. 

It is evident that Guyer fails to describe Kant’s thought in the Groundwork. It is equally clear that Kant 

never held the position Guyer claims he held before the Groundwork. (The quotations Guyer gives in 

support of his claim show this.) Therefore I shall not discuss Guyer’s interpretation of Kant. Instead I shall 

consider the philosophical merits of the position he ascribes to the pre-critical Kant, and which he 

recommends as superior. We shall see that that position makes no sense. This indirectly addresses the 

interpretive question, as it is a reason against ascribing it to Kant.”

eason (ethics, politics, and religion)”). 83 

2007 [293] Singleton, Jane (2007): Kant’s Account of Respect: A Bridge between Rationality and 

Anthropology, Kantian Review 12, S. 40–60. 

2007 [294] Slomp, Gabriella (2007): Kant against Hobbes: Reasoning and Rhetoric, Journal of Moral 

Philosophy 4, S. 207–22. 84 

2007 [295] Sommerfeld-Lethen, Caroline (2007): Motiva auxiliaria. Kants Motivationstheorie zwischen 

Aristoteles und der Moralistik, in Was ist und was sein soll. Natur und Freiheit bei 

Immanuel Kant, hrsg. von Udo Kern, Berlin, S. 287–98. 

2007 [296] Stapleford, Scott (2007): On the Contradiction in Conception Test of the Categorical 

Imperative, South African Journal of Philosophy 26, 306–18. 85 

2007 [297] Stolzenberg, Jürgen (2007): Kants Ethik und die Möglichkeit des Altruismus (Thomas Nagel), 

in Kant in der Gegenwart, hrsg. von Jürgen Stolzenberg, Berlin, S. 247–68. 

2007 [298] Surprenant, Chris W. (2007): Cultivating Virtue: Moral Progress and the Kantian State, 


2007 [299] Timmermann, Jens (2007): Simplicity and Authority: Reflections on Theory and Practice in 

Kant’s Moral Philosophy, Journal of Moral Philosophy 4, S. 167–82. 86 

83 Kant’s ethical Platonism (S. 93), The Categorical Imperative (S. 95), Formal and substantive rationality (S. 

104), The existence of the categorical imperative (S. 107), Rational autonomy and moral legislation (S. 

114), The dialectic of practical reason (S. 126), Religion of practical reason (S. 131), The immanent ideas 

(S. 135). 

84 “This paper aims to offer an analysis of ‘Against Hobbes’, the title of the second section of Kant’s essay On 

the Common Saying: That May be Correct in Theory but is of no Use in Practice. The paper suggests that 

we should take the title ‘Against Hobbes’ seriously and that Kant meant to target Hobbes as the standardbearer 

of the old regime and in particular Hobbes’s claim that the Head of state cannot act unjustly against 

his citizens. It is argued that Kant’s interpretation of Hobbes conforms to what can be regarded as the 

majority view in Hobbesian scholarship and that Kant poses a serious challenge to Hobbes, in so far as he 

removes the very foundations from Hobbes’s argument on justice, namely, a specific notion of natural law. 

Finally the paper highlights Kant’s lack of interest in engaging with possible Hobbesian counterarguments.” 

85 “The author argues against Christine Korsgaard’s influential interpretation of Kant’s contradiction in 

conception test of the categorical imperative. Korsgaard’s rejection of the ‘teleological’ interpretation is 

shown to be based on a misunderstanding of the role that teleology plays for Kant in ruling out immoral 

maxims, and her defence of the ‘practical’ interpretation is shown to be less faithful to the text than the 

competing ‘logical’ interpretation. The works of Barbara Herman and Allen Wood are also discussed and 

evaluated.” 

86 “What is the proper task of Kantian ethical theory? This paper seeks to answer this question with reference 

to Kant’s reply to Christian Garve in Section I of his 1793 essay on Theory and Practice. Kant reasserts the 

distinctness and natural authority of our consciousness of the moral law. Every mature human being is a 

moral professional – even philosophers like Garve, if only they forget about their ill-conceived ethical 

systems and listen to the voice of pure practical reason. Normative theory, Kant argues, cannot be refuted 

with reference to alleged experience. It is the proper task of the moral philosopher to emphasize this fact.

2007 [300] Timmermann, Jens (2007): Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary, 

Cambridge. 

2007 [301] Weber, Michael (2007): More on the Motive of Duty, Journal of Ethics 11, S. 65–86. 87 

2007 [302] Wendel, Hans Jürgen (2007): Vernünftige Selbstbestimmung und gutes Leben, in Was ist und 

was sein soll. Natur und Freiheit bei Immanuel Kant, hrsg. von Udo Kern, Berlin, S. 

241–64. 

2007 [303] Wood, Allen W. (2007): Comments on Guyer, Inquiry 50, S. 465–79. 88 – Zu [271]. 

2006 [304] Ameriks, Karl (2006): Kant and Motivational Externalism, in Moralische Motivation. Kant 

und die Alternativen, hrsg. von Heiner F. Klemme, Manfred Kühn und Dieter 

Schönecker, Hamburg, S. 3–22. 

2006 [305] Baron, Marcia (2006): Acting from Duty (GMS, 397–401), in Groundwork for the 

Metaphysics of Morals, hrsg. von Christoph Horn und Dieter Schönecker, Berlin, S. 

72–92. 

2006 [306] Baron, Marcia (2006): Moral Paragons and the Metaphysics of Morals, in A Companion to 

Kant, hrsg. von Graham Bird, Oxford, S. 335–49. 

2006 [307] Baron, Marcia (2006): Overdetermined Actions and Imperfect Duties, in Moralische 

The paper also discusses Kant’s attempts to clarify his moral psychology, philosophy of value and 

conception of the highest good in the course of replying to Garve’s challenge.” 

87 “A number of neo-Kantians have suggested that an act may be morally worthy even if sympathy and similar 

emotions are present, so long as they are not what in fact motivates right action-so long as duty, and duty 

alone, in fact motivates. Thus, the ideal Kantian moral agent need not be a cold and unfeeling person, as 

some critics have suggested. Two objections to this view need to be answered. First, some maintain that 

motives cannot be present without in fact motivating. Such non-motivating reasons, it is claimed, are 

incoherent. Second, if such motives are not in fact motivating, then nonetheless the moral agent’s 

performance of right action will be objectionably cold and unfeeling. While the first objection is not 

compelling, since the alternative according to which all motives in fact motivate but differ in strength 

suffers from the very same problems attributed to the neo-Kantian view, the second has force, and any 

account of moral worth must make room for motives such as sympathy actually motivating right action.” 

88 “Paul Guyer’s paper “Naturalistic and Transcendental Moments in Kant’s Moral Philosophy” raises a set of 

issues about how Kantian ethics should be understood in relation to present day “philosophical naturalism” 

that are very much in need of discussion. The paper itself is challenging, even in some respects iconoclastic, 

and provides a highly welcome provocation to raise in new ways some basic questions about what Kantian 

ethics is and what it ought to be. Guyer offers us an admirably informed and complex argument, both 

historical and philosophical, that tangles with some of the most difficult problems in Kant’s moral 

philosophy. It begins with some ambitious and controversial claims about Kant’s moral philosophy prior to 

the Groundwork of 1785. It then offers an interpretation, and also a fundamental criticism, of the 

Groundwork’s attempt to establish the moral law based on the idea of freedom of the will. And finally, it 

raises – and expresses some opinions on – the large and vexed questions of the relationship between 

transcendental philosophy and philosophical naturalism, and whether Kantian ethics can be made 

consistent with a naturalistic philosophical outlook. In these comments I will have something to say on each 

of these three topics, without pretending (any more than Guyer does) to have exhausted what might be said 

about them.”

Motivation. Kant und die Alternativen, hrsg. von Heiner F. Klemme, Manfred Kühn 

und Dieter Schönecker, Hamburg, S. 23–37. 

2006 [308] Baum, Manfred (2006): Gefühl, Begehren und Wollen in Kants praktischer Philosophie, Jahrbuch 

für Recht und Ethik 14, hrsg. von B. Sharon Byrd, Joachim Hruschka und Jan C. 

Joerden, S. 125–39. 

2006 [309] Beck, Gunnar (2006): Immanuel Kant’s Theory of Rights, Ratio Juris 19, S. 371–401. 89 

2006 [310] Bencivenga, Ermanno (2006): Ethics Vindicated: Kant’s Transcendental Legitimation of 

Moral Discourse, Oxford. 90 

2006 [311] Bernecker, Sven (2006): Kant zur moralischen Selbsterkenntnis, Kant-Studien 97, S. 163–83. 91 

2006 [312] Brandt, Reinhard (2006): Die Selbstverwirklichung des Menschen in der Kantischen 

Moralphilosophie (Ein Stenogramm), in Moralische Motivation. Kant und die 

Alternativen, hrsg. von Heiner F. Klemme, Manfred Kühn und Dieter Schönecker, 

89 “It is common for Kant’s rights-based liberalism to be contrasted with the communitarian authoritarianism 

of the later Fichte and of Hegel, and it is the concept of autonomy that is generally regarded as the 

theoretical fount of Kant’s theory of natural rights, providing the analytical link between Kant’s moral 

philosophy and his political and legal theory. The author argues that this view is erroneous: The notion of 

autonomy ultimately remains contentless and incapable of providing practical political and legal 

prescriptions without Kant’s substantive account of human nature, an account specifying both the proper 

moral ends that humans should strive for and the anthropological limits of human perfectibility. Kant’s 

theory of rights is informed by both sets of considerations. Contrary to the received view, Kant develops a 

socially sensitive account of the self in his later writings, and comes to believe that individual autonomy 

depends in large measure on the realisation of certain propitious sociocultural and political arrangements. 

For Kant, natural rights, like individual freedom, are not ahistorical, universal standards of political justice 

but the historical outcome of the long process of enlightenment. As such, what is right will depend on what 

is timely. Here Kant is much closer to Fichte and Hegel than is generally acknowledged.” 

90 “Can we regard ourselves as having free will? What is the place of values in a world of facts? What grounds 

the authority of moral injunctions, and why should we care about them? Unless we provide satisfactory 

answers to these questions, ethics has no credible status and is likely to be subsumed by psychology, history, 

or rational decision theory. According to Ermanno Bencivenga, this outcome is both common and 

regrettable. 

Bencivenga points to Immanuel Kant for the solution. Kant’s philosophy is a sustained, bold, and successful 

effort aiming at offering us the answers we need. Ethics Vindicated is a clear and thorough account of this 

effort that builds on Bencivenga’s previous interpretation of transcendental philosophy (as articulated in his 

Kant’s Copernican Revolution) and draws on the entire Kantian corpus.” 

91 „Der intentionalistischen Ethik oder Gesinnungsethik zufolge ist das, was an einer Handlung moralisch beurteilt 

wird, die Handlungsabsicht oder Intention. Der bedeutendste Vertreter des ethischen Intentionalismus, 

Immanuel Kant, spricht freilich nicht von „Absichten“ sondern von „Maximen“. Dem hier zugrundegelegten 

Verständnis zufolge sind Maximen weder Handlungsmotive noch Handlungsstrukturen, sondern 

Handlungsabsichten. Jedoch ist nicht jede beliebige Absicht eine Maxime. Eine Maxime zu haben, heißt für 

Kant, sich bewußt entschlossen zu haben, so-und-so zu handeln. Handeln nach Maximen ist regelgeleitetes 

Verhalten. Der Begriff der Maxime bezieht sich nur auf okkurente (nicht auf dispositionale) Absichten. Und 

schließlich sind Maximen solche Absichten, die nicht auf eine singulare Verwirklichung abzielen, sondern 

für einen ganzen Lebensbereich das leitende Handlungsprinzip aufstellen.“

Hamburg, S. 39–58. 

2006 [313] Byrd, B. Sharon/Hruschka, Joachim (2006): Der ursprünglich und a priori vereinigte Wille 

und seine Konsequenzen in Kants Rechtslehre, Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 14, 

hrsg. von B. Sharon Byrd, Joachim Hruschka und Jan C. Joerden, S. 141–65. 

2006 [314] Byrd, B. Sharon/Hruschka, Joachim (2006): Kant on “Why Must I Keep My Promise?”, 

Chicago-Kent Law Review 81, S. 47–74. 

2006 [315] Caswell, Mathew (2006): Kant’s Conception of the Highest Good, the Gesinnung, and the 

Theory of Radical Evil, Kant-Studien 97, S. 184–209. 92 

2006 [316] Clayton Coleman, Mary (2006): Korsgaard on Kant on the Value of Humanity, Journal of 

Value Inquiry 40, S. 475–78. – Zu [586]. 

2006 [317] Darwall, Stephen (2006): Morality and Practical Reason: A Kantian Approach, in The Oxford 

Handbook of Ethical Theory, hrsg. von David Copp, Oxford, S. 282–320. 

2006 [318] Dean, Richard (2006): The Value of Humanity in Kant's Moral Theory, Oxford. 93 

92 “Early in the Preface to Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant claims that “morality leads 

ineluctably to religion”. This thesis is hardly an innovation of the Religion. Again and again throughout the 

critical corpus, Kant argues that religious belief is ethically significant, that it makes a morally meaningful 

difference whether an agent believes or disbelieves. And yet these claims are surely among the most doubted 

of Kant’s positions – and they are often especially doubted by readers who consider themselves Kantians. 

That Kant of all people should have so cherished religion is perhaps surprising: his moral view enshrines 

the notion that moral worth arises solely form the “good will”, that is, from a will determined by the moral 

law. Kant claims to be able to deduce this law and to account for how it motivates without ever relying on 

religious propositions. Rather, he grounds morality in the conception of autonomy, in the absolutely free 

self-legislation of the moral principle. So why, after effecting this dramatic Copernican revolution in ethics, 

does Kant appear to backslide, insisting on the moral necessity of religious belief?” 

93 “The humanity formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative demands that we treat humanity as an end in 

itself. Because this principle resonates with currently influential ideals of human rights and dignity, 

contemporary readers often find it compelling, even if the rest of Kant’s moral philosophy leaves them cold. 

Moreover, some prominent specialists in Kant’s ethics recently have turned to the humanity formulation as 

the most theoretically central and promising principle of Kant’s ethics. Nevertheless, despite the intuitive 

appeal and the increasingly recognized philosophical importance of the humanity formulation, it has 

received less attention than many other, less central, aspects of Kant’s ethics. Richard Dean offers the most 

sustained and systematic examination of the humanity formulation to date. 

Dean argues that the ‘rational nature’ that must be treated as an end in itself is not a minimally rational 

nature, consisting of the power to set ends or the unrealized capacity to act morally, but instead is the more 

properly rational nature possessed by someone who gives priority to moral principles over any contrary 

impulses. This non-standard reading of the humanity formulation provides a firm theoretical foundation for 

deriving plausible approaches to particular moral issues – and, contrary to first impressions, does not 

impose moralistic demands to pass judgment on others’ character. Dean’s reading also enables progress on 

problems of interest to Kant scholars, such as reconstructing Kant’s argument for accepting the humanity 

formulation as a basic moral principle, and allows for increased understanding of the relationship between 

Kant’s ethics and supposedly Kantian ideas such as ‘respect for autonomy’.

2006 [319] Driver, Julia (2006): Ethics. The Fundamentals, Oxford, S. 80–101. 

2006 [320] Dunn, Robert (2006): Values and the Reflective Point of View. On Expressivism, Self- 

Knowledge and Agency, Aldershot, S. 107–24. 

2006 [321] Duttge, Gunnar/Löwe, Michael (2006): Das Absolute im Recht. Epilegomena zur deontologischen 

Legitimation abwägungsfreier Rechtsgehalte, Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 

14, hrsg. von B. Sharon Byrd, Joachim Hruschka und Jan C. Joerden, S. 351–84. 

2006 [322] Fröhlich, Günter (2006): Nachdenken über das Gute. Ethische Positionen bei Aristoteles, 

Cicero, Kant, Mill und Scheler, Göttingen, S. 69–102 („Kant und der Kategorische 

Imperativ“). 

2006 [323] Fulda, Hans Friedrich (2006): Notwendigkeit des Rechts unter Voraussetzung des Kategorischen 

Imperativs der Sittlichkeit, Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 14, hrsg. von B. 

Sharon Byrd, Joachim Hruschka und Jan C. Joerden, S. 167–213. 

2006 [324] Gardner, Sebastian (2006): The Primacy of Practical Reason, in A Companion to Kant, hrsg. 

von Graham Bird, Oxford, S. 259–74. 

2006 [325] Geismann, Georg (2006): Recht und Moral in der Philosophie Kants, Jahrbuch für Recht und 

Ethik 14, hrsg. von B. Sharon Byrd, Joachim Hruschka und Jan C. Joerden, S. 3–124. 

2006 [326] Gerhardt, Volker (2006): Menschheit in meiner Person. Exposé zu einer Theorie des exemplarischen 

Handelns, Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 14, hrsg. von B. Sharon Byrd, 

Joachim Hruschka und Jan C. Joerden, S. 215–24. 

2006 [327] Gilabert, Pablo (2006): Considerations on the Notion of Moral Validity in the Moral Theories 

of Kant and Habermas, Kant-Studien 97, S. 210–27. 94 

2006 [328] González Valenzuela, Juliana (2006): Kant’s Ethics and its Influence on Bioethics, in Kant 

Today – Kant aujourd'hui – Kant heute. Results of the IIP Conference/Actes des 

Entretiens de l'Institut International de Philosophie Karlsruhe/Heidelberg 2004, hrsg. 

von Hans Lenk und Reiner Wiehl, Münster, S. 127–41. 

2006 [329] Hare, John E. (2006): On Recognizing our Duties as God’s Commands, in Moralische 

Contents: I. Good Will as an End in Itself. 1 Introduction. 2 What should we treat as an end in itself? 3 The 

good will reading meshes with major ideas of Kant’s ethics. 4 The textual dispute, and arguments in favour 

of minimal readings. 5 Is the good will reading just too hard to swallow? II. The Humanity Formulation as a 

Moral Principle. 6 The argument for the humanity formula. 7 How duties follow from the categorical 

imperative. 8 Kantian value, beneficence, and consequentialism. 9 Non-human animals, humanity, and the 

kingdom of ends. 10 Would Kant say we should respect moral autonomy? 11 Autonomy as an end in itself? 

12 Some big pictures.” 

94 “In what follows I will consider Kant's and Habermas’s conceptions of moral validity in a comparative and 

critical way. First, I will reconstruct Habermas's discursive or deliberative reformulation of Kant’s moral 

theory (sec.1). And, second, I will introduce some comparative critical considerations (2). I will contend 

that, though much is gained with Habermas’s intersubjectivist reformulation of Kant’s moral philosophy, 

some problems emerge that could be treated with the help of certain Kantian insights. I will focus on Kant’s 

and Habermas’s strictly moral writings. The issue of political validity or legitimacy (i.e., of the validity of 

norms that are to be enforced by a coercive state apparatus) is of course of great importance, but I will not 

address it here.”

Motivation. Kant und die Alternativen, hrsg. von Heiner F. Klemme, Manfred Kühn 

und Dieter Schönecker, Hamburg, S. 275–85. 

2006 [330] Harzer, Regina (2006): Über die Bedeutsamkeit des Kategorischen Imperativs für die 

Rechtslehre Kants, Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 14, hrsg. von B. Sharon Byrd, 


2006 [331] Herman, Barbara (2006): Reasoning to Obligation, Inquiry 49, S. 44–61. 95 

2006 [332] Hernandez, Jill (2006): On Asymmetry in Kant’s Doctrine of Moral Worth, Florida 

Philosophical Review 6, S. 43–52. 96 

2006 [333] Hill, Jr., Thomas E. (2006): Kantian Normative Ethics, in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical 

Theory, hrsg. von David Copp, Oxford, S. 480–514. 

2006 [334] Höffe, Otfried (2006): „Gerne dien ich den Freunden, doch tue ich es leider mit Neigung ...“ – 

Überwindet Schillers Gedanke der schönen Seele Kants Gegensatz von Pflicht und 

Neigung?, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 60, S. 1–20. 97 

95 “If, as Kant says, “the will is practical reason”, we should think of willing as a mode of reasoning, and its 

activity represented in movement from evaluative premises to intention by way of a validity-securing 

principle of inference. Such a view of willing takes motive and rational choice out of empirical psychology, 

thereby eliminating grounds for many familiar objections to Kant's account of morally good action. The 

categorical imperative provides the fundamental principle of valid practical inference; however, for good 

willing, we also require correct premises. These come from specifications of the two obligatory ends – our 

own perfection and the happiness of others. Interpreting good willing as good reasoning not only fits well 

with Kant's metaphysics of free action, it also offers a sound method for reasoning to and about individual 

as well as role-dependent moral obligations.” 

96 “That an act can have moral worth even if the end of the action is not realized seems asymmetrical with 

Kant’s dual notion that acts cannot have moral worth if the maxim for action is impermissible. Recent 

scholarship contends that fixing the asymmetry will allow impermissible acts done from a morally worthy 

motive to have moral worth. I argue against the asymmetry thesis and contend that Kant cannot 

consistently maintain a class of impermissible, morally worthy action and the view that right acts respect 

the dignity of humanity.” 

97 „Der Autor untersucht in diesem Aufsatz den Versuch von Schiller, den Gegensatz von Pflicht und 

Neigung, der in der Kantischen Moralphilosophie eine große Rolle spielt durch den Begriff der „schönen 

Seele“ zu überwinden. Auf dem Konzept der schönen Seele gründet Schiller den Gedanken der wahren 

Humanität. Der Autor prüft, wie der Gegensatz von Pflicht und Neigung bei Kant aussieht um dann zu 

untersuchen, ob sich das Programm einer Verbindung der beiden durch die „schöne Seele“ von Schiller 

verwirklichen lässt. 

Der Begriff der Pflicht im Gegensatz zur Neigung bedeutet bei Kant im Gegensatz zu der Auffassung vieler 

Kritiker, keine formale Aufforderung eine Aufgabe zu erfüllen, gleich welchen Rang diese Aufgabe hat. 

Kant vertritt keinen rein funktionalen oder gar autoritären Pflichtbegriff. Pflicht ist bei Kant eine 

Beschreibung des moralisch Guten. Der Pflichtcharakter kommt deshalb zustande, weil das moralisch Gute 

aus verschiedenen Gründen, wegen sinnlichen Antrieben (den Neigungen), nicht anerkannt oder befolgt 

wird. Aus diesem Grund muss auch genauer von moralischer Pflicht gesprochen werden, um die Pflicht von 

anderen Verbindlichkeiten abzugrenzen. Eine zweite Unterscheidung innerhalb der Kantischen 

Moralphilosophie ist die Unterscheidung zwischen Legalität und Moralität. Wer nach dem moralisch

2006 [335] Horn, Christoph (2006): Kant on Ends in Nature and in Human Agency. The Teleological 

Argument (GMS, 394–396), in Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, hrsg. von 

Christoph Horn und Dieter Schönecker, Berlin, S. 45–71. 

2006 [336] Horn, Christoph/Schönecker, Dieter (Hrsg.) (2006): Groundwork for the Metaphysics of 

Morals, Berlin. 

2006 [337] Johnston, James Scott (2006): The Education of the Categorical Imperative, Studies in 

Philosophy and Education 25, S. 385–402. 98 

2006 [338] Kain, Patrick (2006): Constructivism, Intrinsic Normativity, and the Motivational Analysis 

Argument, in Moralische Motivation. Kant und die Alternativen, hrsg. von Heiner F. 

Klemme, Manfred Kühn und Dieter Schönecker, Hamburg, S. 59–78. 

2006 [339] Kain, Patrick (2006): Realism and Anti-Realism in Kant’s Second Critique, Philosophy 

Compass 1, S. 449–65. 99 

2006 [340] Kerstein, Samuel J. (2006): Deriving the Formula of Humanity (GMS, 427–437), in 

Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, hrsg. von Christoph Horn und Dieter 

Schönecker, Berlin, S. 200–221. 

2006 [341] Kerstein, Samuel J. (2006): Deriving the Formula of Universal Law, in A Companion to Kant, 

hrsg. von Graham Bird, Oxford, S. 308–21. 

2006 [342] Klemme, Heiner F. (2006): Praktische Gründe und moralische Motivation. Eine 

deontologische Perspektive, in Moralische Motivation. Kant und die Alternativen, 

hrsg. von Heiner F. Klemme, Manfred Kühn und Dieter Schönecker, Hamburg, S. 

113–53. 

2006 [343] Klemme, Heiner F./Kühn, Manfred/Schönecker, Dieter (Hrsg.) (2006): Moralische Motivation. 

Kant und die Alternativen, Hamburg. 

2006 [344] Köhl, Harald (2006): Abschied vom Unbedingten. Über den heterogenen Charakter 

moralischer Forderungen, Freiburg. 

2006 [345] Köhler, Michael (2006): The Derivation of the Moral Law (GMS, 402, 420f.), in Groundwork 

richtigen Handelt handelt zunächst nur legal, erst wenn das Motiv des Handelnden es auch ist sich nach 

dem moralischen Gesetz zu richten, dann kann man dem Menschen auch die volle Moralität zusprechen.“ 

98 “In this article, I examine anew the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant and its contributions to educational 

theory. I make four claims. First, that Kant should be read as having the Categorical Imperative develop out 

of subjective maxims. Second, that moral self-perfection is the aim of moral education. Third, that moral 

self-perfection develops by children habituating the results of their moral maxims in scenarios and cases. 

Fourth, that character and culture, Kant’s highest aims for humanity, are the ultimate beneficiaries of this 

process.” 

99 “This article surveys recent work on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, with a particular focus on his 

doctrine of the fact of reason and his doctrine of the practical postulates, assessing the implications of such 

work for the debate about realism and antirealism in Kant’s moral philosophy. Section 1 briefly surveys 

some salient considerations raised by Kant’s first Critique and Groundwork. In section 2, I survey recent 

work on the Kant’s doctrine of the fact of reason and argue that it does not support an anti-realist 

interpretation of Kant’s ethics. In section 3, I argue that recent work on Kant's doctrine of the practical 

postulates does not support an anti-realist interpretation of Kant's ethics.”

for the Metaphysics of Morals, hrsg. von Christoph Horn und Dieter 


2006 [346] Kühl, Kristian (2006): Zur Abgrenzung des Rechts von Sittlichkeit, guten Sitten und Tugend, 

Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 14, hrsg. von B. Sharon Byrd, Joachim Hruschka und 

Jan C. Joerden, S. 243–58. 

2006 [347] Lege, Joachim (2006): Abscheu, Schaudern und Empörung. Die emotionale Seite von Recht 

und Sittlichkeit bei Kant, Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 14, hrsg. von B. Sharon Byrd, 


2006 [348] Lohmar, Achim (2006): Suizid und Moral, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 60, S. 59– 

84: S. 67–79. 100 

2006 [349] Louden, Robert B. (2006): Applying Kant’s Ethics: The Role of Anthropology, in A 

Companion to Kant, hrsg. von Graham Bird, Oxford, S. 350–63. 

2006 [350] Louden, Robert B. (2006): Moralische Stärke: Tugend als eine Pflicht gegen sich selbst, in 

Moralische Motivation. Kant und die Alternativen, hrsg. von Heiner F. Klemme, 

Manfred Kühn und Dieter Schönecker, Hamburg, S. 79–95. 

2006 [351] Ludwig, Bernd (2006): Kant’s Hypothetical Imperatives (GMS, 417–419), in Groundwork for 

the Metaphysics of Morals, hrsg. von Christoph Horn und Dieter Schönecker, Berlin, 

S. 139–57. 

2006 [352] McCarty, Richard (2006): Maxims in Kant’s Practical Philosophy, Journal of the History of 

Philosophy 44, S. 65–83. 101 

2006 [353] Mahon, James (2006): Kant and Maria von Herbert: Reticence vs. Deception, Philosophy 81, 

100 „In diesem Aufsatz diskutiere ich die radikale und anspruchsvolle These, dass es intrinsisch unmoralisch 

und absolut verboten ist, sich selbst das Leben zu nehmen. Diese These verdient Interesse, insofern sie 

konstitutiv mit einer besonderen Auffassung über Wesen und Sinn der Moral verbunden ist. So behauptete 

Wittgenstein, dass alles erlaubt ist, wenn der Suizid erlaubt ist. Wie in der christlichen Tradition wird der 

Suizid damit als ein nihilistischer Akt interpretiert, welcher in Opposition zur Moral als solcher steht. 

Entsprechend gehört es dann zum Sinn der Moral selbst, dass niemand sich selbst das Leben nehmen darf. 

Zur Begründung des absoluten Verbotenseins des Suizids kann eine säkulare Ethik entweder zu zeigen 

versuchen, dass die Unverfügbarkeit des eigenen Lebens aus dem Begriff der Moral folgt; oder sie kann zu 

zeigen versuchen, dass sie aus dem Sinn der eigenen sittlichen Existenz folgt. Ich zeige im Detail, warum 

alle beide dieser von Kant beschrittenen Wege scheitern, und entwickle schließlich Konsequenzen, die sich 

aus dieser Zurückweisung für einige grundlegende Fragen der Ethik ergeben.“ 

101 “A standard interpretation of Kantian “maxims” sees them as expressing reasons for action, implying that 

we cannot act without a maxim. But recent challenges to this interpretation claim that Kant viewed acting 

on maxims as optional. Kant’s understanding of maxims derives from Christian Wolff, who regarded 

maxims as major premises of the practical syllogism. This supports the standard interpretation. Yet Kant 

also viewed commitments to maxims as essential for virtue and character development, which supports 

challenges to the standard interpretation, and raises questions about the coherence of Kant’s overall 

conception of the role of maxims in practical philosophy.”

S. 417–44. 102 

2006 [354] Mahon, James Edwin (2006): Kant and the Perfect Duty to Others Not to Lie, British Journal 

for the History of Philosophy 14, S. 653–85. 

2006 [355] Martin, Adrienne M. (2006): How to Argue for the Value of Humanity, Pacific Philosophical 

Quarterly 87, S. 96–125. 103 

2006 [356] Mayer, Verena (2006): Das Paradox des Regelfolgens in Kants Moralphilosophie, Kant- 

Studien 97, S. 343–68. 104 

2006 [357] Mieth, Corinna/Rosenthal, Jacob (2006): “Freedom must be presupposed as a property of the 

will of all rational beings” (GMS III, 2), in Groundwork for the Metaphysics of 

Morals, hrsg. von Christoph Horn und Dieter Schönecker, Berlin, S. 247–84. 

2006 [358] Moore, A. W. (2006): Maxims and Thick Ethical Concepts, Ratio 19, S. 129–47. 105 

102 “This article argues for a distinction between reticence and lying on the basis of what Kant says about 

reticence in his correspondence with Maria von Herbert and in his other ethical writings, and defends this 

distinction against the objections of Rae Langton (‘Duty and Desolation’, Philosophy 67, No. 262 (October 

1992), 481–505). Lying is necessarily deceptive, whereas reticence is not necessarily deceptive. Allowing 

another person to remain ignorant of some matter is a form of reticence that is not deceptive. This form of 

reticence may be ethically permissible.” 

103 “Significant effort has been devoted to locating a good argument for Kant’s Formula of Humanity. In this 

paper, I contrast two arguments, based on Kant’s text, for the Formula of Humanity. The first, which I call 

the ‘Valued Ends’ argument, is an influential and appealing argument developed most notably by Christine 

Korsgaard and Allen Wood. Notwithstanding the appeal and influence of this argument, it ultimately fails 

on several counts. I therefore present as an alternative the ‘Autonomy’ argument, which is largely inspired 

by the failings of the Valued Ends argument.” 

104 „Regeln im Sinne von Handlungsvorschriften setzen ihre Anwendbarkeit schon begrifflich voraus. Alle Regeln 

regeln mögliches Verhalten, seien es Verkehrsregeln, juridische Gesetze, mathematische und logische 

Verfahren, und selbst „Bedeutungspostulate“, die festlegen, wie ein Ausdruck verständlich zu verwenden 

ist. Regeln ohne irgendeinen möglichen Anwendungsspielraum sind sinnlos. Dabei werden durch Regeln 

nicht nur mögliche Anwendungen präsupponiert, sondern umgekehrt aus gegebenen Tatsachen oder 

Ereignissen Regelmäßigkeiten herausgelesen, die sich in der Regel ausdrücken. Die Regel bezeichnet in 

diesem Sinne das „Prinzip hinter den Tatsachen“, das sie diesen freilich in gewisser Weise erst andichtet. 

Zweck dieses Vorgehens ist nicht zuletzt, die mögliche Fortsetzung der Tatsachenreihe gleichzeitig zu 

bestimmen und zu begründen, jedenfalls aber eine gewisse Ordnung, Rechtfertigung und Voraussagbarkeit 

des Handelns zu gewährleisten. Regelanwendung verlangt deshalb eine komplexe geistige Kompetenz, die 

nicht nur Fähigkeiten der Abstraktion und Reflexion, sondern auch Können und Erfahrung voraussetzt.“ 

105 “I begin with Kant’s notion of a maxim and consider the role which this notion plays in Kant’s 

formulations of the fundamental categorical imperative. This raises the question of what a maxim is, and 

why there is not the same requirement for resolutions of other kinds to be universalizable. Drawing on 

Bernard Williams’ notion of a thick ethical concept, I proffer an answer to this question which is intended 

neither in a spirit of simple exegesis nor as a straightforward exercise in moral philosophy but as something 

that is poised somewhere between the two. My aim is to provide a kind of rational reconstruction of Kant. In 

the final section of the essay, I argue that this reconstruction, while it manages to salvage something 

distinctively Kantian, also does justice to the relativism involved in what J. L. Mackie calls ‘people's 

adherence to and participation in different ways of life’.”

2006 [359] Oberer, Hariolf (2006): Sittlichkeit, Ethik und Recht bei Kant, Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 


2006 [360] Parfit, Derek (2006): Kant’s Arguments for His Formula of Universal Law, in The Egalitarian 

Conscience. Essays in Honour of G. A. Cohen, hrsg. von Christine Sypnowich, 

Oxford, S. 56–69. 

2006 [361] Pawlik, Michael (2006): Kants Volk von Teufeln und sein Staat, Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 


2006 [362] von der Pfordten, Dietmar (2006): Zur Würde des Menschen bei Kant, Jahrbuch für Recht und 

Ethik 14, hrsg. von B. Sharon Byrd, Joachim Hruschka und Jan C. Joerden, S. 501– 

17. Wiederabgedruckt in Dietmar von der Pfordten, Menschenwürde, Recht und Staat 

bei Kant. Fünf Untersuchungen, Paderborn 2009, S. 9–26. 

2006 [363] Pollok, Konstantin (2006): Kant und Habermas über das principium executionis moralischer 

Handlungen, in Moralische Motivation. Kant und die Alternativen, hrsg. von Heiner 

F. Klemme, Manfred Kühn und Dieter Schönecker, Hamburg, S. 193–227. 

2006 [364] Powell, Brian K. (2006): Kant and Kantians on “the Normative Question”, Ethical Theory and 

Moral Practice 9, S. 535–44. 106 

2006 [365] Quarfood, Marcel (2006): The Circle and the Two Standpoints (GMS III, 3), in Groundwork 

for the Metaphysics of Morals, hrsg. von Christoph Horn und Dieter 


2006 [366] Rauscher, Frederick (2006): Reason as a Natural Cause, in Moralische Motivation. Kant und 

die Alternativen, hrsg. von Heiner F. Klemme, Manfred Kühn und Dieter Schönecker, 

Hamburg, S. 97–110. 

2006 [367] Reath, Andrews (2006): Agency and Universal Law, in Reath, Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s 

Moral Theory. Selected Essays, Oxford 2006, S. 196–230. 

2006 [368] Reath, Andrews (2006): Autonomy of the Will as the Foundation of Morality, in Reath, Agency 

and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory. Selected Essays, Oxford 2006, S. 121–72. 

2006 [369] Reath, Andrews (2006): Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory. Selected Essays, 

Oxford. 107 – Dazu: Book Symposion in Philosophical Books 49 (2008): [198], [206], 

[244]. 

106 “After decades of vigorous debate, many contemporary philosophers in the Kantian tradition continue to 

believe, or at least hope, that morality can be given a firm grounding by showing that rational agents cannot 

consistently reject moral requirements. In the present paper, I do not take a stand on the possibility of 

bringing out the alleged inconsistency. Instead I argue that, even if a successful argument could be given for 

this inconsistency, this would not provide an adequate answer to “the normative question” (i.e., “why should 

I be moral?”). My defense of this claim emerges from a defense of a claim about Kant, namely, that he did 

not attempt to answer the normative question in this way. After carefully articulating Kant’s answer to the 

normative question, I argue that his answer to this question contains a lesson about why we should not 

embrace the approach that is popular among many contemporary Kantians.” 

107 “Andrews Reath presents a selection of his best essays on various features of Kant’s moral psychology and 

moral theory, with particular emphasis on his conception of rational agency and his conception of 

autonomy. The opening essays explore different elements of Kant’s views about motivation, including his

2006 [370] Rivera, Faviola (2006): Kantian Ethical Duties, Kantian Review 11, S. 78–101. 

2006 [371] Röd, Wolfgang (2006): Die Philosophie der Neuzeit 3: Teil 1: Kritische Philosophie von Kant 

bis Schopenhauer (= Geschichte der Philosophie IX, 1, hrsg. von Wolfgang Röd), 

München, S. 74–92 (“[I] 4. Die Ethik [Kants]”). 

2006 [372] Santozki, Ulrike (2006): Die Bedeutung antiker Theorien für die Genese und Systematik von 

Kants Philosophie. Eine Analyse der drei Kriterien [!], Berlin, S. 149–229 („III Die 

Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten und die Kritik der praktischen Vernunft) 

2006 [373] Scarano, Nico (2006): Necessity and Apriority in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. An Interpretation 

of the Groundwork’s Preface (GMS, 387–392), in Groundwork for the Metaphysics of 


2006 [374] Schönecker, Dieter E. (2006): How is a categorical imperative possible? Kant’s deduction of 

the categorical imperative (GMS, III, 4), in Groundwork for the Metaphysics of 


2006 [375] Shaver, Robert (2006): Korsgaard on Hypothetical Imperatives, Philosophical Studies 129, S. 

335–47. 108 

2006 [376] Steigleder, Klaus (2006): The Analytic Relationship of Freedom and Morality (GMS III, 1), in 

Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, hrsg. von Christoph Horn und Dieter 


account of respect for morality as the distinctive moral motive and his view of the principle of happiness as 

a representation of the shared structure of non-moral choice. These essays stress the unity of Kant’s moral 

psychology by arguing that moral and non-moral considerations motivate in essentially the same way. 

Several of the essays develop an original approach to Kant’s conception of autonomy that emphasizes the 

political metaphors found throughout Kant’s writings on ethics. They argue that autonomy is best 

interpreted not as a psychological capacity, but as a kind of sovereignty: in claiming that moral agents have 

autonomy, Kant regards them as a kind of sovereign legislator with the power to give moral law through 

their willing. The final essays explore some of the implications of this conception of autonomy elsewhere in 

Kant’s moral thought, arguing that his Formula of Universal Law uses this conception of autonomy to 

generate substantive moral principles and exploring the connection between Kantian self-legislation and 

duties to oneself. The collection offers revised versions of several previously published essays, as well as two 

new papers, ‘Autonomy of the Will as the Foundation of Morality’ and ‘Agency and Universal Law’. It will 

be of interest to all students and scholars of Kant, and to many moral philosophers.” Contents: 1 Kant’s 

Theory of Moral Sensibility: Respect for the Moral Law and the Influence of Inclination. 2 Hedonism, 

Heteronomy, and Kant’s Principle of Happiness. 3 The Categorical Imperative and Kant’s Conception of 

Practical Rationality. 4 Legislating the Moral Law. 5 Autonomy of the Will as the Foundation of Morality. 6 

Legislating for a Realm of Ends: The Social Dimension of Autonomy. 7 Agency and Universal Law. 8 

Duties to Oneself and Self-Legislation. 9 Agency and the Imputation of Consequences in Kant’s Ethics. 

108 “I argue that rationalists need not adopt Kant’s method for determining what one has reason to do, where by 

“Kant’s method” I mean the view that normative guidance comes only from directives imposed on the agent 

by the agent’s own will. I focus on Kant’s argument for “imperatives of skill,” one sort of hypothetical 

imperative. I argue, against Korsgaard, that Kant’s argument is neither better nor significantly different 

than the sort of argument non-Kantian rationalists offer. I close by arguing that Korsgaard is wrong to think 

that her question “why should I care about performing the means to my ends?” is a serious worry.”

2006 [377] Stratton-Lake, Philip (2006): Moral Motivation in Kant, in A Companion to Kant, hrsg. von 

Graham Bird, Oxford, S. 322–34. 

2006 [378] Thorpe, Lucas (2006): The Point of Studying Ethics According to Kant, Journal of Value 

Inquiry 40, S. 461–74. 

2006 [379] Timmermann, Jens (2006): Kantian Duties to the Self, Explained and Defended, Philosophy 

81, S. 505–30. 109 

2006 [380] Timmermann, Jens (2006): Value without Regress: Kant’s ‘Formula of Humanity’ Revisited, 

European Journal of Philosophy 14, S. 69–93. 

2006 [381] Timmons, Mark (2006): The Categorical Imperative and Universalizability (GMS, 421–424), 

in Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, hrsg. von Christoph Horn und Dieter 


2006 [382] Trapp, Rainer W. (2006): Folter oder selbstverschuldete Rettungsbefragung?, Paderborn, S. 

109–21. 

2006 [383] Velleman, J. David (2006): A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics, in ders., Self to Self. 

Selected Essays, Cambridge, S. 16–44. 

2006 [384] Ward, Andrew (2006): Kant. The Three Critiques, Cambridge, S. 139–79 (“Critique of 

Practical Reason”). 

2006 [385] Willaschek, Marcus (2006): Practical Reason. A Commentary on Kant’s Groundwork of the 

Metaphysics of Morals (GMS, 412–417), in Groundwork for the Metaphysics of 


2006 [386] Witschen, Dieter (2006): Achtung und Nächstenliebe. Zu einer Unterscheidung in Kants 

„Metaphysik der Sitten“, Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 53, S. 

617–634. 

2006 [387] Wolf, Jean-Claude (2006): Unordnung in Kants Ethik und Rechtsphilosophie, Jahrbuch für 

Recht und Ethik 14, hrsg. von B. Sharon Byrd, Joachim Hruschka und Jan C. Joerden, 

S. 295–309. 

2006 [388] Wood, Allen W. (2006): Kant’s Formulations of the Moral Law, in A Companion to Kant, 

hrsg. von Graham Bird, Oxford, S. 291–307. 

2006 [389] Wood, Allen W. (2006): The Good Without Limitation (GMS, 393–394), in Groundwork for 

the Metaphysics of Morals, hrsg. von Christoph Horn und Dieter Schönecker, Berlin, 

S. 25–44. 

2006 [390] Yang, Xiaomei (2006): Categorical Imperatives, Moral Requirements, and Moral Motivation, 

109 “The present article is an attempt to clarify the Kantian conception of duties to the self and to defend them 

against common objections. Kant’s thesis that all duty rests on duties to the self is shown to follow from the 

autonomy of the human will; and the allegation that they are impossible because the agent could always 

release himself from such a duty turns out to be question-begging. There is no attempt to prove that there 

are such duties, but they are revealed to be an indispensable part of morality. Traditional attributes of moral 

commands, such as ‘categoricity’ or ‘overridingness’ make no sense in a one-sidedly other-regarding or 

social conception of morality.”

Metaphilosophy 37, S. 112–29. 110 

2006 [391] Zaczyk, Rainer (2006): Einheit des Grundes, Grund der Differenz von Moralität und Legalität, 



2006 [392] Zinkin, Melissa (2006): Respect for the Law and the Use of Dynamical Terms in Kant’s 

Theory of Moral Motivation, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 88, S. 31–53. 111 

2005 [393] Baum, Manfred (2005): Sittlichkeit und Freiheit in Kants Grundlegung, in Ethikbegründungen 

zwischen Universalismus und Relativismus, hrsg. von Kristina Engelhard und Dietmar 

H. Heidemann, Berlin, S. 183–202. 

2005 [394] Baz, Avner (2005): Moral Justification and the Idea of an Ethical Position, Philosophy 80, S. 

101–23. 112 

2005 [395] Cagle, Randy (2005): Becoming a Virtuous Agent: Kant and the Cultivation of Feelings and 

Emotions, Kant-Studien 96, S. 452–67. 113 

110 “Kant has argued that moral requirements are categorical. Kant’s claim has been challenged by some 

contemporary philosophers; this article defends Kant’s doctrine. I argue that Kant’s claim captures the 

unique feature of moral requirements. The main arguments against Kant’s claim focus on one condition that 

a categorical imperative must meet: to be independent of desires. I argue that there is another important, but 

often ignored, condition that a categorical imperative must meet, and this second condition is crucial to 

understanding why moral requirements are not hypothetical. I also argue that the claim that moral 

requirements are not categorical because they depend on desires for motivation is beside the point. The issue 

of whether moral requirements are categorical is not an issue about whether moral desires or feelings are 

necessary for moral motivation but are rather an issue about the ground of moral desires or moral feelings. 

Moral requirements are categorical because they are requirements of reason, and reason makes moral 

desires or feelings possible.” 

111 “Kant’s discussion of the feeling of respect presents a puzzle regarding both the precise nature of this 

feeling and its role in his moral theory as an incentive that motivates us to follow the moral law. If it is a 

feeling that motivates us to follow the law, this would contradict Kant’s view that moral obligation is based 

on reason alone. I argue that Kant has an account of respect as feeling that is nevertheless not separate from 

the use of reason, but is intrinsic to willing. I demonstrate this by taking literally Kant’s references to force 

in the second Critique. By referring to Kant’s pre-critical essay on Negative Magnitudes (1763), I show that 

Kant’s account of how the moral law effects in us a feeling of respect is underpinned by his view that the 

will is a kind of negative magnitude, or force. I conclude by noting some of the implications of my 

discussion for Kant's account of virtue.” 

112 “In this paper I develop a critique of Kantian ethics, and more precisely a critique of a particular conception 

of moral reasoning. The fundamental assumption that underlies the conception that I am targeting is that to 

justify (morally or otherwise) an action is (perhaps with an ‘all things being equal’ clause) to settle its value, 

in such a way that all rational participants would have to acknowledge that value. As an alternative to the 

Kantian conception, I propose a conception in which the basic unit of moral reasoning is not an action but 

rather what I call an ‘ethical position’ – where an ethical position is where, at any given moment and with 

respect to the matter at hand, you stand, and where moral reasoning consists in the articulation of ethical 

positions.” 

113 “In this paper I take up two problems that arise in connection with the Kantian duty to cultivate certain 

moral and non-moral feelings and emotions.”

2005 [396] Calder, Todd (2005): Kant and Degrees of Wrongness, Journal of Value Inquiry 39, S. 229– 

44. 

2005 [397] Denis, Lara (2005): Autonomy and the Highest Good, Kantian Review 10, S. 33–59. 

2005 [398] Forschner, Maximilian (2005): Immanuel Kant über Vernunftglaube und 

Handlungsmotivation, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 59, S. 327–44. 

2005 [399] Freydberg, Bernard (2005): Imagination in Kant’s Critique of Practial Reason, Bloomington. 

2005 [400] Graband, Claudia (2005): Das Vermögen der Freiheit: Kants Kategorien der praktischen Vernunft, 


2005 [401] Greenberg, Sean (2005): From Canon to Dialectic to Antinomy: Giving Inclinations Their 

Due, Inquiry 48, S. 232–48. 114 

2005 [402] Grenberg, Jeanine M. (2005): Kant and the Ethics of Humility. A Story of Dependence, 

Corruption and Virtue, Cambridge. 115 

2005 [403] Guyer, Paul (2005): Kant’s System of Duties, in Guyer, Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom. 

Selected Essays, Oxford, S. 243–74. 

2005 [404] Hill, Jr., Thomas E. (2005): Assessing Moral Rules: Utilitarian and Kantian Perspectives, 

Philosophical Issues 15, S. 158–178. 

2005 [405] Hills, Alison (2005): Rational Nature as the Source of Value, Kantian Review 10, S. 60–81. 

2005 [406] Joerden, Jan C. (2005): Über ein vermeintes Recht (des Staates) aus Menschenliebe zu foltern, 

in Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 13: Philosophia Practica Universalis. Festschrift für 

114 “In a recent paper, Eckart Förster challenges interpreters to explain why in the first Critique practical 

reason has a canon but no dialectic, whereas in the second Critique, there is not only a dialectic, but an 

antinomy of practical reason. In the Groundwork, Kant claims that there is a natural dialectic with respect 

to morality (4:405), a different claim from those advanced in the first and second Critiques. Förster's 

challenge may therefore be reformulated as the problem of explaining why practical reason has a canon in 

the first Critique, a dialectic in the Groundwork, and an antinomy in the second Critique. In this paper, I 

answer this challenge. I argue that these differences are due to the different aims and scope of the works, 

and in particular, the different place of the inclinations in their arguments.” 

115 “In recent years, philosophers have either ignored the virtue of humility or found it to be in need of radical 

redefinition. But humility is a central human virtue, and it is the purpose of this book to defend that claim 

from a Kantian point of view. Jeanine Grenberg argues that we can indeed speak of Aristotelian-style, but 

still deeply Kantian, virtuous character traits. She proposes moving from focus on action to focus on person, 

not leaving the former behind, but instead taking it up within a larger, more satisfying Kantian moral 

theory. Using examples from literature as well as philosophy, she shows that there is a Kantian virtue theory 

to be explored in which humility plays a central role. Her book will have a wide appeal to readers not only 

in Kant studies but also in theological ethics and moral psychology.” 

Contents: “Introduction; Part I. Kantian Virtue: 1. Dependent and corrupt rational agency; 2. Constraints on 

any possible Kantian account of virtue; 3. A Kantian account of virtue; Part II. A Kantian Response to 

Recent Accounts of Humility: 4. A Kantian response to recent accounts of humility; Part III: 5. The Kantian 

Virtue of Humility: 5. The Kantian virtue of humility; 6. Humility and self-respect; 7. The humble person; 

Part IV. The Virtues of Kantian Humility: 8. The humble pursuit of self-knowledge; 9. The humble pursuit 

of respect for persons; Conclusion.”

Joachim Hruschka zum 70. Geburtstag, hrsg. von B. Sharon Byrd und Jan C. Joerden, 

Berlin, S. 495–525. 

2005 [407] Johnson, Andrew B. (2005): Kant’s Empirical Hedonism, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86, 

S. 50–63. 116 – Zu [1027]. 

2005 [408] Kaplan, Shawn D. (2005): A Critique of the Practical Contradiction Procedure for Testing 

Maxims, Kantian Review 10, S. 112–27. 

2005 [409] Kulenkampff, Jens (2005): Kant und der „unpartheische Zuschauer“, in Jahrbuch für Recht 

und Ethik 13: Philosophia Practica Universalis. Festschrift für Joachim Hruschka 

zum 70. Geburtstag, hrsg. von B. Sharon Byrd und Jan C. Joerden, Berlin, S. 237–55. 

2005 [410] LeBar, Mark (2005): Eudaimonist Autonomy, American Philosophical Quarterly 42, S. 171– 

83. 

2005 [411] Leist, Anton (2005): Ethik der Beziehungen. Versuche über eine postkantianische Moralphilosophie, 

Berlin, S. 15–22 („Kants Ethik, verwerfen oder retten?“), 23–45 („Kantische 

und Post-Kantische Moral“). 

2005 [412] Lohmar, Achim (2005): Gibt es Pflichten gegen sich selbst?, Allgemeine Zeitschrift für 

Philosophie 30, S. 47–65: S. 55–60 („2. Kant über den Primat von Pflichten gegen 

sich selbst“). 

2005 [413] Potter, Nelson (2005): Kant on Duties to Animals, in Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 13: 

Philosophia Practica Universalis. Festschrift für Joachim Hruschka zum 70. Geburtstag, 

hrsg. von B. Sharon Byrd und Jan C. Joerden, Berlin, S. 299–311. 

2005 [414] Sala, Giovanni B. (2005): Der Formalismus in der Ethik Kants – Überlegungen zu einer alten 

Kontroverse, Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 52, S. 191–215. 

2005 [415] Saurette, Paul (2005): The Kantian Imperative: Humiliation, Common Sense, Politics, 

Toronto. 

2005 [416] Schmidt, Claudia M. (2005): The Anthropological Dimension of Kant’s Metaphysics of 

Morals, Kant-Studien 96, S. 66–84. 

2005 [417] Schroeder, Mark (2005): The Hypothetical Imperative?, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 

83, S. 357–72. 117 

2005 [418] Sommerfeld-Lethen, Caroline (2004): Wie moralisch werden? Kants moralistische Ethik, Freiburg. 

116 “According to the long orthodox interpretation of Kant’s theory of motivation, Kant recognized only two 

fundamental types of motives: moral motives and egoistic, hedonistic motives. Seeking to defend Kant 

against the ensuing charges of psychological simplism, Andrews Reath formulated a forceful and seminal 

repudiation of this interpretation in his 1989 essay “Hedonism, Heteronomy and Kant’s Principle of 

Happiness.” The current paper aims to show that Reath’s popular exegetical alternative is untenable. His 

arguments against the traditional view miss the mark, and his revisionist interpretation of Kant's theory of 

motivation cannot bear the considerable weight of the countervailing evidence.” 

117 “According to the standard view, Kant held that hypothetical imperatives are universally binding edicts 

with disjunctive objects: take-the-means-or-don’t-have-the-end. But Kant thought otherwise. He held that 

they are edicts binding only on some – those who have an end.”

2005 [419] Sussman, David (2005): Perversity of the Heart, Philosophical Review 114, S. 153–77. [Über 

das radikale Böse, on radical evil.] 

2005 [420] Taylor, Robert S. (2005): Kantian Personal Autonomy, Political Theory 33, S. 602–28. 118 

2005 [421] Timmermann, Jens (2005): Good but Not Required? – Assessing the Demands of Kantian 

Ethics, Journal of Moral Philosophy 2, S. 9–27. 119 

2005 [422] Timmermann, Jens (2005): When the Tail Wags the Dog: Animal Welfare and Indirect Duty 

in Kantian Ethics, Kantian Review 10, S. 128–49. 

2005 [423] Timmermann, Jens (2005): Why Kant Could not Have Been a Utilitarian, Utilitas 17, S. 243– 

64. 120 

118 “Jeremy Waldron has recently raised the question of whether there is anything approximating the creative 

self-authorship of personal autonomy in the writings of Immanuel Kant. After considering the possibility 

that Kantian prudential reasoning might serve as a conception of personal autonomy, I argue that the 

elements of a more suitable conception can be found in Kant’s Tugendlehre, or “Doctrine of Virtue” – 

specifically, in the imperfect duties of self-perfection and the practical love of others. This discovery is 

important for at least three reasons: first, it elucidates the relationship among the various conceptions of 

autonomy employed by personal-autonomy theorists and contemporary Kantians; second, it brings to the 

surface previously unnoticed or undernoticed features of Kant’s moral theory; and third, it provides an 

essential line of defense against certain critiques of contemporary Kantian theories, especially that of John 

Rawls.” 

119 “There seems to be a strong sentiment in pre-philosophical moral thought that actions can be morally 

valuable without at the same time being morally required. Yet Kant, who takes great pride in developing an 

ethical system firmly grounded in common moral thought, makes no provision for any such extraordinary 

acts of virtue. Rather, he supports a classification of actions as either obligatory, permissible or prohibited, 

which in the eyes of his critics makes it totally inadequate to the facts of morality. The related idea of 

uncommonly grand and noble deeds is frequently dismissed by Kant as high-flown emotional nonsense. 

Such considerations give rise to the fear that actions intuitively classed as morally commendable but not 

required must be re-classified as commands of duty by Kant, making his ethical theory as unbearably 

demanding as direct utilitarianism. The paper divides into three sections: (1) an examination of the nature 

of moral goodness from a meta-ethical angle that introduces some passages from Kant’s writings presenting 

strong theoretical evidence against the case for supererogatory action; (2) a critique of Thomas Hill’s 

suggestion that within the category of wide duty we can accommodate some of the main features of actions 

classified as supererogatory in other ethical systems; concluding that, contra Hill, there are no actions of 

wide duty that can be so characterized in any significant sense; and (3) a final discussion of the problem of 

how demanding the requirements of Kantian ethical theory really are.” 

120 “In 1993, Richard Hare argued that, contrary to received opinion, Kant could have been a utilitarian. In this 

article, I argue that Hare was wrong. Kant's theory would not have been utilitarian or consequentialist even 

if his practical recommendations coincided with utilitarian commands: Kant's theory of value is essentially 

anti-utilitarian; there is no place for rational contradiction as the source of moral imperatives in 

utilitarianism; Kant would reject the move to separate levels of moral thinking: first-order moral judgement 

makes use of the principle of morality; and, relatedly, he would resist the common utilitarian distinction 

between actions and their motives because any correct description of an action must refer to motivation. The 

article concludes with the thought that any consequentialist theory based on pre-given ends (teleology) lacks

2005 [424] Timmons, Mark (2005): The Philosophical and Practical Significance of Kant’s Universality 

Formulations of the Categorical Imperative, in Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 13: 

Philosophia Practica Universalis. Festschrift für Joachim Hruschka zum 70. 

Geburtstag, hrsg. von B. Sharon Byrd und Jan C. Joerden, Berlin, S. 313–33. 

2005 [425] Uniacke, Suzanne (2005): Responsibility and Obligation: Some Kantian Directions, 

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13, S. 461–75. 121 

2005 [426] Westphal, Kenneth R. (2005): Kant, Hegel, and Determining Our Duties, in Jahrbuch für 

Recht und Ethik 13: Philosophia Practica Universalis. Festschrift für Joachim 

Hruschka zum 70. Geburtstag, hrsg. von B. Sharon Byrd und Jan C. Joerden, Berlin, 

S. 335–54. 

2005 [427] Wood, Allen W. (2005): Kant, Oxford [Erschienen 2004], S. 129–50 (“Ethical Theory”). 

2004 [428] Ameriks, Karl (2004): Kant und das Problem der moralischen Motivation, in Kants Ethik, 

hrsg. von Karl Ameriks und Dieter Sturma, Paderborn 2004, S. 98–116. 

2004 [429] Ameriks, Karl/Sturma, Dieter (Hrsg.) (2004): Kants Ethik, Paderborn. 

2004 [430] Bartuschat, Wolfgang (2004): Kant über Grundsatz und Grundsätze in der Moral, Jahrbuch 

für Recht und Ethik, Band 12, hrsg. von B. Sharon Byrd, Joachim Hruschka und Jan 

C. Joerden, Berlin, S. 283–98. 

2004 [431] Biller-Andorno, Nikola (2004): Die Kantische Moraltheorie im Kontext der modernen 

Medizinethik, in Angewandte Ethik im Spannungsfeld von Begründung und 

Anwendung, hrsg. von Hans Friesen und Karsten Berr, Frankfurt a. M., S. 295–308. 

2004 [432] Coeckelbergh, Mark (2004): The Metaphysics of Autonomy. The Reconciliation of Ancient and 

Modern Ideals of the Person, Houndmills, S. 147–68 (“Hill’s Ideal of Autonomy”), S. 

the philosophical resources to distinguish between willing something as a means and as an end, leaving 

means only, and destroying transparency.” 

121 “This paper asks how we should conceptualize the relationship between responsibility and obligation. Its 

central concern is the relevance of considerations of obligation to the attribution of responsibility for what 

we do or bring about. The paper approaches this issue through an examination of Kant’s complex, 

challenging and instructive theory of responsibility, in which strict obligation plays a pivotal role in 

attributions of responsibility for the outcomes of our actions. Even if we do not accept Kant’s strongly 

juridical concept of responsibility, his theory provides insight into the way in which we should see the 

connection between responsibility and obligation.”

169–95 (“The Ideal of the Person in Kant’s Groundwork”). 122 

2004 [433] Düsing, Klaus (2004): Kants Ethik in der Philosophie der Gegenwart, in Warum Kant heute?, 

hrsg. von Dietmar H. Heidemann und Kristina Engelhard, Berlin, S. 231–63. 

2004 [434] Edwards, Jeffrey (2004): Universal Lawgiving and Material Determining Grounds in Kant’s 

Moral Doctrine of Ends, in Metaphysik und Kritik. Festschrift für Manfred Baum zum 

65. Geburtstag, hrsg. von Sabine Doyé, Marion Heinz und Udo Rameil, Berlin, New 

York, S. 215–35. 

2004 [435] Esser, Andrea Marlen (2004): Eine Ethik für Endliche. Kants Tugendlehre in der Gegenwart, 

Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt. 

2004 [436] Fonnesu, Luca (2004): Kants praktische Philosophie und die Verwirklichung der Moral, in 

Recht – Geschichte – Religion. Die Bedeutung Kants für die Gegenwart, hrsg. von 

Herta Nagl-Docekal und Rudolf Langthaler, Berlin, S. 49–61. 

2004 [437] Geiger, Ido (2004): Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Practical Philosophy. Moral Motivation and the 

Founding of the Modern State, Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus 2: 

Der Begriff des Staates, S. 12–49. 

2004 [438] Geismann, Georg (2004): Über Pflicht und Neigung in Kants Moralphilosophie, in Metaphysik 

und Kritik. Festschrift für Manfred Baum zum 65. Geburtstag, hrsg. von Sabine Doyé, 

Marion Heinz und Udo Rameil, Berlin, New York, S. 237–50. 

2004 [439] Graham, Gordon (2004): Eight Theories of Ethics, London, S. 98–127 (“Kantianism”). 

2004 [440] Greimann, Dirk (2004): Ist Kants Ethik ontologisch unschuldig?, Kant-Studien 95, S. 107–27. 

2004 [441] Grünewald, Bernward (2004): Form und Materie der reinen praktischen Vernunft. Über die 

Haltlosigkeit von Formalismus- und Solipsismus-Vorwürfen und das Verhältnis des 

kategorischen Imperativs zu seinen Erläuterungsformeln, in Metaphysik und Kritik. 

Festschrift für Manfred Baum zum 65. Geburtstag, hrsg. von Sabine Doyé, Marion 

Heinz und Udo Rameil, Berlin, New York, S. 183–201. 

2004 [442] Höffe, Otfried (2004): Kant über Recht und Moral, in Kants Ethik, hrsg. von Karl Ameriks und 

Dieter Sturma, Paderborn, S. 249–68. 

122 “7 Hill’s Ideal of Autonomy 7.1. Introduction 7.2. Hill’s Kantian ideal of autonomy 7.2.1. What the 

Kantian ideal of autonomy is not, according to Hill 7.2.2. What the Kantian ideal of autonomy is, according 

to Hill 7.3. Merits of Hill’s ideal: the extent to which he achieves his aims and solves the problems of the 

extended ideal of autonomy 7.4. Why Hill fails to achieve his own aims: Is Hill’s ideal Kantian? 7.5. 

Objections to Hill’s idea of choice and deliberation 7.6. Why Hill fails to solve Problem Three of the 

extended ideal 7.7. Conclusion 

8 The Ideal of the Person in Kant’s Groundwork 8.1. Introduction 8.2. The ideal person according to Kant 

8.2.1. Principles and reasons 8.2.2. Autonomy 8.2.3. Good will and the good 8.2.4. Why Kant’s ideal of 

autonomy is not morally ‘neutral’ 8.2.5. Is self-control a Kantian virtue? More on Kant’s second-best ideal 

of the person 8.3. Kant’s answer to Problem Three 8.3.1. Two contradictory positions on the relation 

between autonomy and morality 8.3.2. The Wille/Willkür distinction reconsidered: Kant’s concept of 

radical evil 8.3.3. Conclusion 8.4.Conclusion 8.4.1. Kantian autonomy and the extended ideal of autonomy 

8.4.2. General conclusion”

2004 [443] Horn, Christoph (2004): Die Menschheit als objektiver Zweck – Kants Selbstzweckformel des 

kategorischen Imperativs, in Kants Ethik, hrsg. von Karl Ameriks und Dieter Sturma, 

Paderborn 2004, S. 195–212. 

2004 [444] Howard, Jason J. (2004): Kant and Moral Imputation: Conscience and the Riddle of the Given, 

American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 78, S. 609–29. 

2004 [445] Hruschka, Joachim (2004): Auf dem Wege zum Kategorischen Imperativ, in Metaphysik und 

Kritik. Festschrift für Manfred Baum zum 65. Geburtstag, hrsg. von Sabine Doyé, 

Marion Heinz und Udo Rameil, Berlin, New York, S. 167–81. 

2004 [446] Hruschka, Joachim (2004): The Permissive Law of Practical Reason in Kant’s Metaphysics of 

Morals, Law and Philosophy 23, S. 45–72. 

2004 [447] Johnson, Robert N. (2004): Kant’s Moral Philosophy, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 

hrsg. von Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/. 

2004 [448] Kain, Patrick (2004): Self-Legislation in Kant’s Moral Philosophy, Archiv für Geschichte der 

Philosophie 86, S. 257–306. 123 

2004 [449] Kersting, Wolfgang (2004): Vernunft, Verbindlichkeit und Recht bei Kant, in Kants Ethik, 

hrsg. von Karl Ameriks und Dieter Sturma, Paderborn, S. 269–90. 

2004 [450] Kim, Jong-Gook (2004): Kants Lügenverbot in sozialethischer Perspektive, Kant-Studien 95, 

S. 226–34. 

2004 [451] Kitcher, Patricia (2004): Kant’s Argument for the Categorical Imperative, Nous 38, S. 555–84. 

2004 [452] Klimchuk, Dennis (2004): Three Accounts of Respect for Persons in Kant’s Ethics, Kantian 

Review 8, S. 38–61. 

2004 [453] Krasnoff, Larry (2004): Pythagoras Enlightened: Kant on the Effect of Moral Philosophy, 

in New Essays on the History of Autonomy. A Collection Honoring J. B. Schneewind, 

hrsg. von Natalie Brender und Larry Krasnoff, Cambridge, S. 133–53. 

2004 [454] Kulenkampff, Jens (2004): Moralisches Gefühl oder moral sense: wie berechtigt ist Kants Kritik?, 

Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik, Band 12, hrsg. von B. Sharon Byrd, Joachim 

Hruschka und Jan C. Joerden, Berlin, S. 233–51. 

2004 [455] Oberer, Hariolf (2004): Honeste vive. Zu Immanuel Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, AA 06, 

236. 20–30, in Metaphysik und Kritik. Festschrift für Manfred Baum zum 65. 

123 “Kant famously insisted that “the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will” is 

the supreme principle of morality. Recent interpreters have taken this emphasis on the self-legislation of the 

moral law as evidence that Kant endorsed a distinctively constructivist conception of morality according to 

which the moral law is a positive law, created by us. But a closer historical examination suggests otherwise. 

Kant developed his conception of legislation in the context of his opposition to theological voluntarist 

accounts of morality and his engagement with conceptions of obligation found in his Wolffian predecessors. 

In order to defend important claims about the necessity and immediacy of moral obligation, Kant drew and 

refined a distinction between the legislation and authorship of the moral law in a way that precludes 

standard theological voluntarist theories and presents an obstacle to recent constructivist interpretations. A 

correct understanding of Kant’s development and use of this distinction reveals that his conception of 

legislation leaves little room for constructivist moral anti-realism.”

Geburtstag, hrsg. von Sabine Doyé, Marion Heinz und Udo Rameil, Berlin, New 

York, S. 203–13. 

2004 [456] O’Neill, Onora (2004): Autonomy, Plurality and Public Reason, in New Essays on the History 

of Autonomy. A Collection Honoring J. B. Schneewind, hrsg. von Natalie Brender und 

Larry Krasnoff, Cambridge, S. 181–94. 

2004 [457] O’Neill, Onora (2004): Rationality as Practical Reason, in The Oxford Handbook of 

Rationality, hrsg. von Alfred R. Mele und Piers Rawling, Oxford, S. 93–109. 

2004 [458] O’Neill, Onora (2004): Self-Legislation, Autonomy and the Form of Law, in Recht – 

Geschichte – Religion. Die Bedeutung Kants für die Gegenwart, hrsg. von Herta 

Nagl-Docekal und Rudolf Langthaler, Berlin, S. 13–26. 

2004 [459] Patt, Walter (2004): Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Eine Einführung, London 2004. 

2004 [460] Reid, James (2004): Morality and Sensibility in Kant: Toward a Theory of Virtue, Kantian 

Review 8, S. 89–114. 

2004 [461] Rickless, Samuel C. (2004): From the Good Will to the Formula of Universal Law, Philosophy 

and Phenomenological Research 68, S. 554–577. 

2004 [462] Rogerson, Kenneth F. (2004): Kant on Beauty and Morality, Kant-Studien 95, S. 338–354. 

2004 [463] Römpp, Georg (2004): Die Sprache der Freiheit. Kants moralphilosophische 

Sprachauffassung, Kant-Studien 95, S. 182–203. 

2004 [464] Römpp, Georg (2006): Kants Kritik der reinen Freiheit. Eine Erörterung der Metaphysik der 

Sitten, Berlin. 124 

124 „Inhaltsübersicht. A. Einleitung – B. Die ‚Metaphysik der Sitten’ als Kritik der reinen Freiheit: Die reine 

Freiheit als individuelle Eleutheronomie – Das Factum der Vernunft und die Tat der Person – Die reine 

Freiheit und der Gegenstand der Kantischen Philosophie des Rechts – Rechts- und Tugendlehre als Kritik 

der reinen Freiheit – C. Die Freiheit im äußeren Gebrauch: Die Verbindlichkeit einer freien Handlung – Die 

Person und ihre Tat – Tatfreiheit und Maximenfreiheit – Der moralische Begriff des Rechts – Der 

rechtliche Mensch und sein vernünftiger Selbstzweck – Das Subjekt und sein Mein und Dein – D. 

Rechtsverhältnis und Rechtsgeltung: Die Person und ihr rechtlich Eigenes – Die Konstitution des Rechts in 

der Selbstdifferenzierung des Subjekts – Die ‚private’ Konstitution des Rechtsverhältnisses und die 

‚provisio’ auf den bürgerlichen Zustand – Das Prinzip des Richters und der Beginn des Rechtsverhältnisses 

– Der Staat und die Demonstration der Freiheit im Rechtsverhältnis – Wider den Kontraktualismus: der 

Rechtszustand als Konstitutionsbedingung von Personalität – E. Die Freiheit im äußeren Selbstverhältnis: 

Recht und Tugend und die Notwendigkeit einer freien Handlung – ‚Fortitudo moralis’ und Pflichtzwecke – 

Tugendpflichten und die Selbsterzeugung der Freiheit in der Welt – Der Ursprung der Tugendpflichten in 

der Basisargumentation der Kantischen Ethik – Die Tugend und die autopoietische Konstitution des 

Menschen als Subjekt – F. Freiheit und Selbstverpflichtung: Die Antinomie der Pflichten gegen sich selbst 

und die Autonomie des Selbstverhältnisses – Die Pflichten gegen sich selbst und die Selbstauffassung als 

animalisches und moralisches Wesen – Selbstverpflichtung und Freiheit in der Animalität: das Problem des 

Suizids – Selbstverpflichtung und Freiheit in der Moralität: das Problem der Lüge – Der innere Richter und 

der Beginn des Selbstverhältnisses – Das Prinzip der Verpflichtetheit und die Pflichten gegen Andere – G. 

Die Kritik der reinen Freiheit als Denken der Differenz des Bewußtseins: Die kritizistische Aufgabe und der 

Gedanke der Differenz – Die Situierung des Denkens der Differenz – Die Differenz als Differenzierung des

2004 [465] Sala, Giovanni B. (2004): Kants „Kritik der praktischen Vernunft“. Ein Kommentar, 

Darmstadt. 

2004 [466] Sensen, Oliver (2004): Kants Begriff der Menschenwürde, in Abwägende Vernunft. Praktische 

Rationalität in historischer, systematischer und religionsphilosophischer Perspektive, 

hrsg. von Franz-Josef Bormann und Christian Schröer, Berlin, S. 220–36. 

2004 [467] Stern, Robert (2004): Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’? And Did Kant Think It Does?, Utilitas 16, S. 

42–61. 125 

2004 [468] Sturma, Dieter (2004): Kants Ethik der Autonomie, in Kants Ethik, hrsg. von Karl Ameriks 

und Dieter Sturma, Paderborn 2004, S. 160–77. 

2004 [469] Trampota, Andreas (2004): Autonome Vernunft mit moralischer Sehkraft. Die 

Komplementarität von Allgemeinem und Besonderem bei Immanuel Kant, in 

Abwägende Vernunft. Praktische Rationalität in historischer, systematischer und 

religionsphilosophischer Perspektive, hrsg. von Franz-Josef Bormann und Christian 

Schröer, Berlin, S. 203–19. 

2004 [470] Velleman, J. David (2004): Willing the Law, in Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical 

Essays, hrsg. von Monika Betzler und Peter Baumann, Cambridge, S. 27–56. 

Wiederabgedruckt in Velleman, Self to Self. Selected Essays, Cambridge 2006, S. 

284–311. 

2004 [471] Werner, Micha H. (2004): Kants pflichtenethischer Rigorismus und die Diskursethik: eine 

maximenethische Deutung des Anwendungsproblems, in Perspektiven der 

Diskursethik, hrsg. von Niels Gottschalk-Mazouz, Würzburg, S. 81–110. 

2003 [472] Banham, Gary (2003): Kant’s Practical Philosophy. From Critique to Doctrine, New York. 

2003 [473] Baxley, Anne Margaret (2003): Does Kantian Virtue Amount to More than Continence?, 

Review of Metaphysics 56, S. 559–86. 

2003 [474] Birnbacher, Dieter (2003): Analytische Einführung in die Ethik, Berlin, S. 136–54 („4.3.1 

Kants Kategorischer Imperativ“). 

2003 [475] Bowman, Curtis (2003): A Deduction of Kant’s Concept of the Highest Good, Journal of 

Philosophical Research 28, S. 45–63. 

2003 [476] Brinkmann, Walter (2003): Praktische Notwendigkeit. Eine Formalisierung von Kants 

Bewußtseins – Das ‚Ich denke’ und das ‚Meine’ – Die Possessivität ‚meiner’ Vorstellungen – H. Rückblick: 

Der Status einer Kritik der reinen Freiheit: Die Architektonik des juridischen Modells der Vernunftkritik – 

Die Konstitution des ‚mein’ und die Selbstdifferenzierung des moralischen Subjekts – ‚Meine 

Vorstellungen’ im apperzeptiven Selbstverhältnis und die Konstitution von Subjektivität aus Freiheit – Die 

Kritik der reinen Vernunft aus der Perspektive der Kritik der reinen Freiheit – Zusammenfassung – 

Literatur- und Sachwortverzeichnis“ 

125 “The aim of this article is twofold. First, it is argued that while the principle of ‘ought implies can’ is 

certainly plausible in some form, it is tempting to misconstrue it, and that this has happened in the way it 

has been taken up in some of the current literature. Second, Kant's understanding of the principle is 

considered. Here it is argued that these problematic conceptions put the principle to work in a way that Kant 

does not, so that there is an important divergence here which can easily be overlooked.”

kategorischem Imperativ, Paderborn. 

2003 [477] Coble, Kelly (2003): Kant’s Dynamic Theory of Character, Kantian Review (Cardiff) 7, S. 38– 

71. 

2003 [478] Fischer, Peter (2003): Moralität und Sinn. Zur Systematik von Klugheit, Moral und 

symbolischer Erfahrung im Werk Kants, München. 126 

2003 [479] Fischer, Peter (2003): Einführung in die Ethik, München, S. 146–66 („Immanuel Kants 

Konzept der Freiheit als Autonomie“). 

2003 [480] Fleischer, Margot (2003): Schopenhauer als Kritiker der Kantischen Ethik. Eine kritische 

Dokumentation, Würzburg. 

2003 [481] Frierson, Patrick (2003): Freedom and Anthropology in Kant’s Moral Philosophy, 

Cambridge. 127 

2003 [482] Glasgow, Joshua M. (2003): Expanding the Limits of Universalization: Kant’s Duties and 

Kantian Moral Deliberation, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33, S. 23–47. 128 

2003 [483] Greimann, Dirk (2003): Kants Ableitung der Formel des kategorischen Imperativs aus seinem 

bloßen Begriff, in Philosophiegeschichte und logische Analyse, hrsg. von Uwe 

Meixner und Albert Newen, Band 6: Geschichte der Ethik, Paderborn, S. 97–111. 

2003 [484] Guyer, Paul (2003): Kant on the Theory and Practice of Autonomy, Social Philosophy and 

Policy 20/2, S. 70–98. Wiederabgedruckt in Guyer, Kant’s System of Nature and 

Freedom. Selected Essays, Oxford 2005, S. 115–45. 

2003 [485] Haardt, Alexander (2003): Normativität und Normalität in den ethischen Konzeptionen Kants 

126 „Nicht historisierend, wie es in der Kant-Exegese zumeist geschieht, sondern in systematischer Absicht 

wird Kants Moralphilosophie aus dem Kontext seines Gesamtwerkes der kritischen Periode interpretiert. So 

werden jene Themenbereiche erschlossen, die eine jede Ethik berücksichtigen muß, wenn sie als systematisch 

vollständig gelten möchte. Dadurch werden neue Sichtweise auf traditionelle Probleme der Ethik 

Kants ermöglicht und Schnittstellen zu neueren Debatten aufgewiesen. Ein Kernstück der Arbeit bilden die 

Deutungen des moralischen Sinns der ästhetischen Urteile über das Schöne und das Erhabene sowie der 

teleologischen Urteile der Natur- und Geschichtsbetrachtung. Durch eine Explikation verschiedener Erfahrungsbegriffe 

wird es möglich, den Typus des kantischen Moralisten als Lebensform zu verstehen.“ 

127 Contents: Introduction: Kant’s anthropology and Schleiermacher’s dilemma; Part I. The Problem: 1. The 

asymmetry in Kant’s conception of freedom; 2. Anthropology as an empirical science; 3. The moral 

significance of Kant’s ‘pragmatic anthropology’; 4. Moral anthropology in contemporary neokantian ethics; 

Part II. The Solution: 5. Transcendental evil, radical evil, and moral anthropology; 6. Moral influence on 

others; Epilogue. Incorporating moral anthropology and defending Kantian moral philosophy. 

128 “Conventional wisdom on Kantian ethics holds that in order to find out if one’s action is morally 

permissible, one must “interpersonally universalize” the maxim behind that action, i.e., be able to will it for 

everyone without falling into some sort of contradiction. I argue in this paper that this conventional 

wisdom must be supplemented by a requirement to “temporally universalize” one’s maxim, such that it 

hypothetically holds for all times. Doing so, I argue, allows us to better understand Kant’s arguments for 

duties to oneself in the Groundwork, and it also allows us to avoid putative problem maxims for Christine 

Korsgaard’s “practical contradiction” interpretation of the universalization procedure, namely those offered 

by Barbara Herman that contain a coordination feature (e.g., “I will play tennis at 10:00 on Sundays”).”

und Schelers, in: Phänomenologische Forschungen / Phenomenological Studies / 

Recherches Phénoménologiques, S. 5–22. 

2003 [486] Himmelmann, Beatrix (2003): Kants Begriff des Glücks, Berlin (Kant-Studien – 

Ergänzungshefte 142). 

2003 [487] Hoerster, Norbert (2003): Ethik und Interesse, Stuttgart, S. 105–21 („Kants kategorischer 

Imperativ“). 

2003 [488] Irlenborn, Bernd (2003): Die Bedeutung des Bösen für Kants praktische Philosophie. Zur 

Grundlegung der Religionsschrift, Prima Philosophia (Cuxhaven) 16, S. 407–423. 

2003 [489] Klemme, Heiner F. (2003): Einleitung, in Immanuel Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 

mit einer Einleitung, Sachanmerkungen und einer Bibliographie von Heiner Klemme, 

herausgegeben von Horst D. Brandt und Heiner F. Klemme, Hamburg, S. IX–LXIII. 

2003 [490] Leyva, Gustavo (2003): Notizen zur neueren Rezeption der kantischen Ethik in der 

angloamerikanischen Philosophie, Philosophische Rundschau 50, S. 43–61. 

2003 [491] Łukow, Paweł (2003): Maxims, Moral Responsiveness, and Judgment, Kant-Studien 94, S. 

405–425. 

2003 [492] Lumer, Christoph (2002/2003): Kantischer Externalismus und Motive zu moralischem 

Handeln, Conceptus 35, S. 263–86. 

2003 [493] Mahon, J. E. (2003): Kant on Lies, Candour and Reticence, Kantian Review 7, S. 102–33. 

2003 [494] Miller, Sarah Clark (2003): Filial Obligation, Kant’s Duty of Beneficience, and Need, in Care 

of the Aged: Biomedical Ethics Reviews, hrsg. von James M. Humber, Totowa S. 169– 

198. 

2003 [495] Millgram, Elijah (2003): Does the Categorical Imperative Give Rise to a Contradiction in the 

Will?, Philosophical Review 112, S. 525–560. Wiederabgedruckt mit einem Postscript 

in Millgram, Ethics Done Right. Practical Reasoning as a Foundation for Moral 

Theory, Cambridge 2005, S. 89–132. 

2003 [496] Moore, A. W. (2003): Noble in Reason, Infinite in Faculty. Themes and Variations in Kant’s 

Moral and Religious Philosophy, London. 

2003 [497] Nauckhoff, Josefine (2003): Incentives and Interests in Kant’s Moral Psychology, History of 

Philosophy Quarterly 20, S. 41–60. 

2003 [498] Potter, Nelson (2003): Applying the Categorical Imperative in Kant’s Rechtslehre, Jahrbuch 



2003 [499] Reath, Andrews (2003): Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785): 

Duty and Autonomy, in: The Classics of Western Philosophy: A Reader’s Guide, hrsg. 

von Jorge J. E. Gracia u.a., Malden, MA, S. 346–356. 

2003 [500] Reath, Andrews (2003): Value and Law in Kant’s Moral Theory. A Critical Review of Paul 

Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, Ethics 114, S. 127–55. 

2003 [501] Rottenberg, Elizabeth (2003): The Legacy of the Future: Kant and the Ethical Question, Kant- 

Studien 94, S. 172–197.

2003 [502] Schroth, Jörg (2003): Der voreilige Schluß auf den Nonkonsequentialismus in der Nelson- und 

Kant-Interpretation, in Philosophiegeschichte und logische Analyse, hrsg. von Uwe 

Meixner und Albert Newen, Band 6: Geschichte der Ethik, Paderborn, S. 123–50. 

2003 [503] Taylor, Christopher R. (2003): Depositum II – Konrad Cramer’s Reflections on the Logical 

Structure of a Kantian Moral Argument, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 57, 

S. 601–611. 129 – Zu [605]. Vgl. Dazu [506]. 

2003 [504] Teehan, John (2003): Kantian Ethics: After Darwin, Zygon 38, S. 49–60. 

2003 [505] Tenenbaum, Sergio (2003): Speculative Mistakes and Ordinary Temptations: Kant on 

Instrumentalist Conceptions of Practical Reason, History of Philosophy Quarterly 20, 

S. 203–223. 

2003 [506] Timmermann, Jens (2003): Depositum I – Konrad Cramers Diskussion der logischen Struktur 

eines Kantischen Beispiels für moralisches Argumentieren, Zeitschrift für 

philosophische Forschung 57, S. 589–600. 130 – Zu [605]. Vgl. dazu [503]. 

2003 [507] Timmermann, Jens (2003): Sittengesetz und Freiheit. Untersuchungen zu Immanuel Kants 

Theorie des freien Willens, Berlin, New York, S. 145–88 („Kapitel IV. Maximen“), 

189–207 („Kapitel V. Moralische Motivation: das Phänomen der Achtung“). 

2003 [508] Trampota, Andreas (2003): Autonome Vernunft oder moralische Sehkraft? Das epistemische 

Fundament der Ethik bei Immanuel Kant und Iris Murdoch, Stuttgart. 

2003 [509] Unna, Yvonne (2003): Kant’s Answers to the Casuistical Questions Concerning Self- 

Disembodiment, Kant-Studien 94, S. 454–73. 

2003 [510] Weber, Michael (2003): The Motive of Duty and the Nature of Emotions: Kantian Reflections 

on the Moral Worth, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33, S. 183–202. 

129 “Konrad Cramer, in “Reflections on the Logical Structure of a Kantian Moral Argument”, argues that the 

Universal Law Formulation (UL) of the Categorical Imperative is best understood as providing us with an 

indirect method for determining the moral permissibility of acting on our maxims. He then goes on argue, 

however, that no interpretation of UL is consistent with Kant’s epistemic claim that we can easily discover 

what morality demands of us. In response I argue that Cramer relies on an excessively demanding interpretation 

of Kant’s epistemic claim and that his indirect interpretation of UL rests on a problematic account 

how our maxims relate to the actions that we perform on their basis. I then turn to the question of the overall 

plausibility of UL, and stress the need to interpret it within the context of Kant’s overall moral system.” 

130 „Kant vertritt in der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft und im Gemeinspruch die Auffassung, daß man eine 

Leihgabe auch dann nicht einfach einbehalten darf, wenn dies gefahrlos möglich wäre. Wie Konrad Cramer 

allerdings in seinem Aufsatz zum „Depositum“ zeigt, ist es gar nicht so leicht, auf der Grundlage der Kantischen 

Ethik ein gutes Argument für diese Auffassung zu rekonstruieren. Im Ausgang von Cramers Kritik 

wird hier der Versuch unternommen, Kants Position zu stärken: Die Maxime desjenigen, der das hinterlegte 

Gut einbehält, ist die, sein Vermögen mit allen sicheren Mitteln zu vergrößern; wäre nun diese 

Maxime allgemein verbreitet, so würde es der ursprüngliche Eigentümer gar nicht wagen, sich von seinem 

Eigentum zu trennen. Es gäbe keine Deposita. Derjenige, der sich so am Gut eines andern bereichern 

möchte, untergräbt bei Allgemeinheit seiner Maxime tatsächlich die Bedingung der Möglichkeit der 

Einbehaltung des Depositums. Entscheidend wichtig für den Erfolg der Rekonstruktion ist die präzise 

Unterscheidung von „Regeln“ und „Maximen“.“

2003 [511] Werner, Micha H. (2003): Diskursethik als Maximenethik. Von der Prinzipienbegründung zur 

Handlungsorientierung, Würzbürg, S. 102–50 („‚Anwendungsprobleme’ der Ethik 

Kants“). 

2003 [512] Wittwer, Héctor (2003): Über einige Voraussetzungen und Ergebnisse der Ethik Kants, 

Philosophisches Jahrbuch 110, S. 23–45. 

2002 [513] Allison, Henry E. (2002): On the Very Idea of a Propensity to Evil, Journal of Value Inquiry 

36, S. 337–48. 

2002 [514] Ameriks, Karl (2002): “Pure Reason of Itself Alone Suffices to Determine the Will” (42–57), 

in Immanuel Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, hrsg. von Otfried Höffe, Berlin, S. 

99–114. Wiederabgedruckt in Ameriks, Interpreting Kant’s Critiques, Oxford 2003, 

S. 249–61. 

2002 [515] Baron, Marcia W. (2002): Love and Respect in the Doctrine of Virtue, in Kant’s Metaphysics 

of Morals. Interpretative Essays, hrsg. von Mark Timmons, Oxford, S. 391–408. 

2002 [516] Baron, Marcia (2002): Acting from Duty, in Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics 

of Morals, edited and translated by Allen W. Wood. With Essays by J. B. Schneewind, 

Marica Baron, Shelly Kagan, Allen W. Wood, New Haven 2002, S. 92–110. – 

Handeln aus Pflicht, in Kants Ethik, hrsg. von Karl Ameriks und Dieter Sturma, 

Paderborn 2004, S. 80–97. 

2002 [517] Brandt, Reinhard (2002): „Kritische Beleuchtung der Analytik der reinen praktischen 

Vernunft“ (89–106), in Immanuel Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, hrsg. von 

Otfried Höffe, Berlin, S. 153–72. 

2002 [518] Brewer, Talbot (2002): Maxims and Virtues, Philosophical Review 111, S. 539–72. 

2002 [519] Brewer, Talbot (2002): The Character of Temptation: Towards a More Plausible Kantian 

Moral Psychology, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83, S. 103–30. 131 

2002 [520] Byrd, B. Sharon (2002): Kant’s Theory of Contract, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. Interpretative 

Essays, hrsg. von Mark Timmons, Oxford, S. 111–32. 

2002 [521] Cicovacki, Predrag (2002): Introduction: Kant’s Practical Philosophy Today, Journal of Value 

Inquiry 36, S. 151–159. 

2002 [522] Cicovacki, Predrag (2002): The Illusory Fabric of Kant’s True Morality, Journal of Value 

Inquiry 36, S. 383–99. 

2002 [523] Deligiorgi, Katerina (2002): Universalisability, Publicity, and Communication: Kant’s 

Conception of Reason, European Journal of Philosophy 10, S. 143–159. 

131 “Kant maintained that dutiful action can have the fullest measure of moral worth even if chosen in the face 

of powerful inclinations to act immorally, and indeed that opposing inclinations only highlight the worth of 

the action. I argue that this conclusion rests on an implausibly mechanistic account of desires, and that 

many desires are constituted by tendencies to see certain features of one’s circumstances as reasons to 

perform one or another action. I try to show that inclinations to violate moral requirements sometimes 

manifest a morally objectionable half-heartedness in one’s commitment to those very requirements, and – by 

extension – to the values that undergird these requirements.”

2002 [524] Dieringer, Volker (2002): Was erkennt die praktische Vernunft? Zu Kants Begriff des Guten in 

der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Kant-Studien 93, S. 137–157. 

2002 [525] Engstrom, Stephen (2002): The Inner Freedom of Virtue, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. 

Interpretative Essays, hrsg. von Mark Timmons, Oxford, S. 289–316. 

2002 [526] Flikschuh, Katrin (2002): Kantian Desires: Freedom of Choice and Action in the Rechtslehre, 

in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. Interpretative Essays, hrsg. von Mark Timmons, 

Oxford, S. 185–208. 

2002 [527] Förster, Eckart (2002): Die Dialektik der reinen praktischen Vernunft (107–121), in Immanuel 

Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, hrsg. von Otfried Höffe, Berlin, S. 173–86. – 

The Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason in the Second Critique (CPrR: 107–21), in 

Kant’s Moral and Legal Philosophy, hrsg. von Karl Ameriks und Otfried Höffe, 

Cambridge 2009, S. 198–212. 

2002 [528] Geismann, Georg (2002): Die Formeln des kategorischen Imperativs nach H. J. Paton, N. N., 

Klaus Reich und Julius Ebbinghaus, Kant-Studien 93, S. 374–84. 

2002 [529] Gerhardt, Volker (2002): Immanuel Kant. Vernunft und Leben, Stuttgart, S. 183–239 („Was 

soll ich tun? Ethik und Recht aus dem Prinzip der Vernunft“). 

2002 [530] Grimm, Stephen R. (2002): Kant’s Argument for Radical Evil, European Journal of 


2002 [531] Guyer, Paul (2002): Ends of Reason and Ends of Nature: The Place of Teleology in Kant’s 

Ethics, Journal of Value Inquiry 36, S. 161–86. Wiederabgedruckt in Guyer, Kant’s 

System of Nature and Freedom. Selected Essays, Oxford 2005, S. 169–97. 

2002 [532] Guyer, Paul (2002): Kant’s Deductions of the Principles of Right, in Kant’s Metaphysics of 

Morals. Interpretative Essays, hrsg. von Mark Timmons, Oxford, S. 23–64. 

Wiederabgedruckt in Guyer, Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom. Selected Essays, 

Oxford 2005, S. 198–242. 

2002 [533] Haardt, Alexander (2002): Ethik. Zum Verhältnis von Moralität und Rationalität am Beispiel 

der kritischen Ethik Immanuel Kants, in Die Philosophie in ihren Disziplinen. Eine 

Einführung. Bochumer Ringvorlesung Wintersemester 1999/2000, hrsg. von Burkhard 

Mojsisch und Orrin F. Summerell, Amsterdam, S. 49–64. 

2002 [534] Haucke, Kai (2002): Moralische Pflicht und die Frage nach dem gelingenden Leben. Überlegungen 

zu Kants Glücksbegriff, Kant-Studien 93, S. 177–99. 

2002 [535] Herman, Barbara (2002): The Scope of Moral Requirement, Philosophy and Public Affairs 30, 

S. 227–56. Wiederabgedruckt in Herman, Moral Literacy, Cambridge, Mass. 2007, S. 

203–29. 

2002 [536] Hill, Jr., Thomas E. (2002): Punishment, Conscience, and Moral Worth, in Kant’s 

Metaphysics of Morals. Interpretative Essays, hrsg. von Mark Timmons, Oxford, S. 

233–54. 

2002 [537] Hill, Jr., Thomas E. (2002): Meeting Needs and Doing Favors, in ders., Human Welfare and 

Moral Worth. Kantian Perspectives, Oxford, S. 201–43. 

2002 [538] Hill, Jr., Thomas E. (2002): Personal Values and Setting Oneself Ends, in ders., Human

Welfare and Moral Worth. Kantian Perspectives, Oxford, S. 244–74. 

2002 [539] Hill, Jr., Thomas E./Zweig, Arnulf (2002): Editors’ Introduction: Some Main Themes of the 

Groundwork (S. 19–108), Analysis of Arguments (S. 109–77), in Immanuel Kant 

(1785): Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Arnulf Zweig and 

edited by Thomas E. Hill, Jr. and Arnulf Zweig, Oxford 2002. 

2002 [540] Höffe, Otfried (2002): Immanuel Kant: Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, in Klassische Werke 

der Philosophie. Von Aristoteles bis Habermas, hrsg. von Reinhard Brandt und 

Thomas Sturm, Leipzig, S. 161–91. 

2002 [541] Höffe, Otfried (2002): Einführung in die Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, in Immanuel Kant, 

Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, hrsg. von Otfried Höffe, Berlin, S. 1–23. 

2002 [542] Höffe, Otfried (2002): Die Form der Maximen als Bestimmungsgrund (§§ 4–6, 27–30), in 

Immanuel Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, hrsg. von Otfried Höffe, Berlin, S. 

63–80. – The Form of the Maxim as the Determining Ground of the Will (The 

Critique of Practical Reason: §§ 4–6, 27–30), in Kant’s Moral and Legal Philosophy, 

hrsg. von Karl Ameriks und Otfried Höffe, Cambridge 2009, S. 159–78. 

2002 [543] Höffe, Otfried (Hrsg.) (2002): Immanuel Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Berlin. 

2002 [544] Hoffmann, Thomas Sören (2002): Gewissen als praktische Apperzeption. Zur Lehre vom 

Gewissen in Kants Ethik-Vorlesungen, Kant-Studien 93, S. 424–443. 

2002 [545] Horn, Christoph (2002): Wille, Willensbestimmung, Begehrungsvermögen (§§ 1–3, 19–26), in 

Immanuel Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, hrsg. von Otfried Höffe, Berlin, S. 

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2002 [546] Johnson, Robert N. (2002): Happiness as a Natural End, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. 


2002 [547] Jokic, Aleksandar (2002): Supererogation and Moral Luck: Two Problems for Kant, One 

Solution, Journal of Value Inquiry 36, S. 221–233. 

2002 [548] Kagan, Shelly (2002): Kantianism for Consequentialists, in Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for 

the Metaphysics of Morals, edited and translated by Allen W. Wood. With Essays by 

J. B. Schneewind, Marica Baron, Shelly Kagan, Allen W. Wood, New Haven 2002, S. 

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2002 [549] Kerstein, Samuel J. (2002): Kant’s Search for the Supreme Principle of Morality, Cambridge. 

2002 [550] Kneller, Jane (2002): Aesthetic Value and the Primacy of the Practical in Kant’s Philosophy, 

Journal of Value Inquiry 36, S. 369–82. 

2002 [551] Kupperman, Joel J. (2002): A Messy Derivation of the Categorical Imperative, Philosophy 77,

S. 485–502. 132 

2002 [552] Lawrence, Joseph P. (2002): Radical Evil and Kant’s Turn to Religion, Journal of Value 

Inquiry 36, S. 319–35. 

2002 [553] Leyva, Gustavo (2002): Notizen zur neueren Rezeption der kantischen Ethik in der angloamerikanischen 

Philosophie, Philosophische Rundschau 49, S. 290–304. 

2002 [554] Ludwig, Bernd (2002): Whence Public Right? The Role of Theoretical and Practical Reasoning 

in Kant’s Doctrine of Right, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. Interpretative Essays, 

hrsg. von Mark Timmons, Oxford, S. 159–84. 

2002 [555] Makkreel, Rudolf A. (2002): Reflective Judgment and the Problem of Assessing Virtue in 

Kant, Journal of Value Inquiry 36, S. 205–20. 

2002 [556] Melnick, Arthur (2002): Kant’s Formulations of the Categorical Imperative, Kant-Studien 93, 

S. 291–308. Wiederabgedruckt in Melnick, Themes in Kant’s Metaphysics and Ethics, 

Washington, D.C. 2004, S. 229–48. 

2002 [557] Munzel, G. Felicitas (2002): “Doctrine of Method” and “Closing” (151–163), in Immanuel 

Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, hrsg. von Otfried Höffe, Berlin, S. 203–17. 

2002 [558] O’Neill, Onora (2002): Instituting Principles: Between Duty and Action, in Kant’s 


331–48. 

2002 [559] O’Neill, Onora (2002): Autonomy and the Fact of Reason in the Kritik der praktischen 

Vernunft (§§ 7–8, 30–41), in Immanuel Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, hrsg. 

von Otfried Höffe, Berlin, S. 81–97. 

2002 [560] Paley, John (2002): Virtues of Autonomy: The Kantian Ethics of Care, Nursing Philosophy: An 

International Journal for Healthcare Professionals 3, S. 133–143. 

2002 [561] Pasternack, Lawrence (2002): Intrinsic Value and Moral Overridingness in Kant’s 

Groundwork, Southwest Philosophy Review 18, S. 113–121. 

2002 [562] Pieper, Annemarie (2002): Zweites Hauptstück (57–71), in Immanuel Kant, Kritik der praktischen 

Vernunft, hrsg. von Otfried Höffe, Berlin, S. 115–33. – ‘On the Concept of an 

Object of Pure Practical Reason’ (Chapter 2 of the Analytic of Practical Reason), in 

Kant’s Moral and Legal Philosophy, hrsg. von Karl Ameriks und Otfried Höffe, 

Cambridge 2009, S. 179–97. 

2002 [563] Pogge, Thomas W. (2002): Is Kant’s Rechtslehre a ‘Comprehensive Liberalism’?, in Kant’s 


133–58. 

132 “Here are two widespread responses to Kant’s categorical imperative. On one hand, one might note the 

absence of detailed rational derivation. On the other hand, even someone who maintains some skepticism is 

likely to have a sense that (nevertheless) there is something to Kant’s central ideas. The recommended 

solution is analysis of elements of the categorical imperative. Their appeal turns out to have different 

sources. One aspect of the first formulation rests on the logic of normative utterances. But others can be 

justified only in terms of their contributions to desirable functionings of a moral order.”

2002 [564] Potter, Nelson (2002): Duties to Oneself, Motivational Internalism, and Self-Deception in 

Kant’s Ethics, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. Interpretative Essays, hrsg. von 

Mark Timmons, Oxford, S. 371–90. 

2002 [565] Powers, Thomas M. (2002): The Integrity of Body: Kantian Moral Constraints on the Physical 

Self, in Persons and Their Bodies: Rights, Responsibilities, Relationships, hrsg. von 

Mark J. Cherry, New York, S. 209–32. 

2002 [566] Prichard, H. A. (2002): Kant’s Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, in 

Prichard, Moral Writings, hrsg. von Jim MacAdam, Oxford, S. 50–76. 

2002 [567] Rachels, James (2002): The Elements of Moral Philosophy, New York, 4. Aufl., S. 130–40 

(“Kant and Respect for Persons”). 5. Auflage von Stuart Rachels, New York 2007, S. 

130–40. (Änderung gegenüber der 4. Aufl.: “additional justifications for punishment 

are noted”). 

2002 [568] Ranasinghe, Nalin (2002): Ethics for the Little Man: Kant, Eichmann, and the Banality of 

Evil, Journal of Value Inquiry 36, S. 299–317. 

2002 [569] Rauscher, Frederick (2002): Kant’s Moral Anti-Realism, Journal of the History of Philosophy 

40, S. 477–499. 

2002 [570] Reath, Andrews (2002): Self-Legislation and Duties to Oneself, in Kant’s Metaphysics of 


Wiederabgedruckt in Reath, Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory. Selected 

Essays, Oxford 2006, S. 231–49. 

2002 [571] Regan, Donald (2002): The Value of Rational Nature, Ethics 112, S. 267–91. 

2002 [572] Ricken, Friedo (2002): Die Postulate der reinen praktischen Vernunft (122–148), in Immanuel 

Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, hrsg. von Otfried Höffe, Berlin, S. 187–202. – 

The Postulates of Pure Practical Reason (CPrR: 122–148), in Kant’s Moral and Legal 

Philosophy, hrsg. von Karl Ameriks und Otfried Höffe, Cambridge 2009, S. 213–29. 

2002 [573] Scarano, Nico (2002): Moralisches Handeln. Zum dritten Hauptstück von Kants Kritik der 

praktischen Vernunft (71–89), in Immanuel Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 

hrsg. von Otfried Höffe, Berlin, S. 135–52. 

2002 [574] Schneewind, J. B. (2002): Why Study Kant’s Ethics?, in Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the 

Metaphysics of Morals, edited and translated by Allen W. Wood. With Essays by J. B. 

Schneewind, Marica Baron, Shelly Kagan, Allen W. Wood, New Haven 2002, S. 83– 

91. 

2002 [575] Schönecker, Dieter E./Wood, Allen E. (2002): Kants „Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der 

Sitten“. Ein einführender Kommentar, Paderborn. 

2002 [576] Singleton, Jane (2002): Virtue Ethics, Kantian Ethics, and Consequentialism, Journal of 

Philosophical Research, S. 537–551. 

2002 [577] Sob, Brigitte (2002): Die transzendentale Ethik Kants. Zur Problematik einer apriorischen

Moraltheorie, Frankfurt a.M., Berlin, Bern u.a. 133 

2002 [578] Staege, Roswitha (2002): Hypothetische Imperative, Kant-Studien 93, S. 42–56. 

2002 [579] Steigleder, Klaus (2002): Kant, in Handbuch Ethik, hrsg. von Marcus Düwell, Christoph 

Hübenthal und Micha H.Werner, Stuttgart, Weimar, S. 128–139. 

2002 [580] Steigleder, Klaus (2002): Kants Moralphilosophie. Die Selbstbezüglichkeit reiner praktischer 

Vernunft, Stuttgart, Weimar. 

2002 [581] Stohr, Karen E. (2002): Virtue Ethics and Kant’s Cold-Hearted Benefactor, Journal of Value 

Inquiry 36, S. 187–204. 

2002 [582] Tannenbaum, Julie (2002): Acting with Feeling from Duty, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 

5, S. 321–337. 134 

2002 [583] Timmons, Mark (2002): Moral Theory. An Introduction, Lanham, S. 151–87 (“Kant’s Moral 

Theory”). 

2002 [584] Timmons, Mark (2002): Motive and Rightness in Kant’s Ethical System, in Kant’s 


255–88. 

2002 [585] Timmons, Mark (Hrsg.) (2002): Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. Interpretative Essays, Oxford. 

2002 [586] Watkins, Eric/Fitzpatrick, William (2002): O’Neill and Korsgaard on the Construction of 

Normativity, Journal of Value Inquiry 36, S. 349–67. – Vgl. dazu [316]. 

2002 [587] Westphal, Kenneth R. (2002): A Kantian Justification of Possession, in Kant’s Metaphysics of 


2002 [588] Willaschek, Marcus (2002): Which Imperatives of Right? On the Non-Prescriptive Character 

of Juridical Laws in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. 


2002 [589] Wood, Allen W. (2002): The Final Form of Kant’s Practical Philosophy, in Kant’s 


133 „Die kantische Ethik steht im Spannungsfeld von Rationalismus und Unmittelbarkeit, welche von der Vernunft 

nicht mehr zu fassen ist. Es ist das Faszinierende an der Theorie Kants, dass Moralität als 

vernünftiges Phänomen erkannt wird, welches intersubjektive Geltung beanspruchen muss. Gleichwohl 

kommt praktische Vernunft im Begriff des Gewissens in einen rational nicht mehr einholbaren Bereich. 

Inhalt: Die kantische Freiheitstheorie – Das Problem der praktischen Vernunft – Der kategorische Imperativ 

– Das Gewissen.“ 

134 “A central claim in Kantian ethics is that an agent is properly morally motivated just in case she acts from 

duty alone. Bernard Williams, Michael Stocker, and Justin Oakley claim that certain emotionally infused 

actions, such as lending a compassionate helping hand, can only be done from compassion and not from 

duty. I argue that these critics have overlooked a distinction between an action’s manner, how an action is 

done, and its motive, the agent’s reason for acting. Through a range of examples I demonstrate how an 

emotion can determine an action’s manner without also serving as the motive. Thus, it is possible for an 

agent to act compassionately from duty alone. This distinction between the manner and the motive of an 

action not only restores a central claim in Kantian ethics but it also allows for an expanded role of emotions 

in moral action.”

1–21. 

2002 [590] Wood, Allen W. (2002): Preface and Introduction (3–16), in Immanuel Kant, Kritik der praktischen 

Vernunft, hrsg. von Otfried Höffe, Berlin, S. 25–41. 

2002 [591] Wood, Allen W. (2002): What Is Kantian Ethics?, in Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the 

Metaphysics of Morals, edited and translated by Allen W. Wood. With Essays by J. B. 

Schneewind, Marica Baron, Shelly Kagan, Allen W. Wood, New Haven 2002, S. 157– 

81. 

2002 [592] Wyller, Truls (2002): Geschichte der Ethik. Eine systematische Einführung, Paderborn, (Norwegische 

Originalausgabe: 1996), S. 151–73 („Immanuel Kant“). 

2001 [593] Ameriks, Karl (2001): Zu Kants Argumentation am Anfang des Dritten Abschnitts der Grundlegung, 

in Systematische Ethik mit Kant, hrsg. von Hans-Ulrich Baumgarten und 

Carsten Held, Freiburg, S. 24–54. 

2001 [594] Bacin, Stefano (2001): Die Lehre vom Begriff des Guten in der Kritik der praktischen 

Vernunft, in Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant- 

Kongresses, hrsg. von Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann und Ralph Schumacher, 

Berlin, New York, Bd. III, S. 131–40. 

2001 [595] Baumann, Peter (2001): Epistemologische Aspekte in Kants Moralphilosophie, in Kant und die 

Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, hrsg. von 

Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann und Ralph Schumacher, Berlin, New York, 

Bd. III, S. 3–12. 

2001 [596] Baumgarten, Hans-Ulrich (2001): Kants kritischer Begriff der Gesinnung, in Systematische 

Ethik mit Kant, hrsg. von Hans-Ulrich Baumgarten und Carsten Held, Freiburg, S. 

55–81. 

2001 [597] Baumgarten, Hans-Ulrich/Held, Carsten (Hrsg.) (2001): Systematische Ethik mit Kant, 

Freiburg. 

2001 [598] Betzler, Monika (2001): Moralische Konflikte: Versuch einer kantischen Deutung, in Kant und 

die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, hrsg. von 


Bd. III, S. 141–51. 

2001 [599] Borges, Maria de Lourdes (2001): Sympathy in Kant’s Moral Theory, in Kant und die Berliner 

Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, hrsg. von Volker 

Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann und Ralph Schumacher, Berlin, New York, Bd. III, 

S. 152–58. 

2001 [600] Brewer, Talbot (2001): Rethinking our Maxims: Perceptual Salience and Practical Judgment in 

Kantian Ethics, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4, S. 219–30. 135 

135 “Some contemporary Kantians have argued that one could not be virtuous without having internalized 

certain patterns of awareness that permit one to identify and respond reliably to moral reasons for action. I 

agree, but I argue that this insight requires unrecognized, far-reaching, and thoroughly welcome changes in 

the traditional Kantian understanding of maxims and virtues. In particular, it implies that one’s 

characteristic emotions and desires will partly determine one’s maxims, and hence the praiseworthiness of

2001 [601] Brinkmann, Walter (2001): Die Goldene Regel und der Kategorische Imperativ: Rationalität 

und praktische Notwendigkeit, in Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. 

Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, hrsg. von Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann 

und Ralph Schumacher, Berlin, New York, Bd. III, S. 13–20. 

2001 [602] Bubner, Rüdiger (2001): Another Look at Maxims, in Kant’s Legacy: Essays in Honor of 

Lewis White Beck, hrsg. von Predrag Cicovacki, Rochester, S. 245–59. 

2001 [603] Cicovacki, Predrag (2001): Zwischen gutem Willen und Kategorischem Imperativ. Die Zweideutigkeit 

der menschlichen Natur in Kants Moralphilosophie, in Systematische 


330–54. 

2001 [604] Clohesy, William W. (2001): Seeking Altruism in Kant’s Practical Philosophy, in Kant und die 



Bd. III, S. 159–65. 

2001 [605] Cramer, Konrad (2001): „Depositum“ – Zur logischen Struktur eines Kantischen Beispiels für 

moralisches Argumentieren, in Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen 

Kant-Kongresses, hrsg. von Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann und 

Ralph Schumacher, Berlin, New York, Bd. 1, S. 116–130. – Vgl. dazu [503], [506]. 

2001 [606] Cunningham, Anthony (2001): The Heart of What Matters. The Role for Literature in Moral 

Philosophy, Berkeley, S. 20–68 (“The Aim of Ethical Theory”), 158–79 (“Kant, 

Moral Conflict, and Tragedy”). 

2001 [607] Edwards, Jeffrey (2001): Material Conditions of Practical Principles in Kant’s Kritik der praktischen 

Vernunft, in Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen 

Kant-Kongresses, hrsg. von Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann und Ralph Schumacher, 


2001 [608] Enskat, Rainer (2001): Autonomie und Humanität. Wie kategorische Imperative die 

Urteilskraft orientieren, in Systematische Ethik mit Kant, hrsg. von Hans-Ulrich 

Baumgarten und Carsten Held, Freiburg, S. 82–123. 

2001 [609] Esser, Andrea (2001): Kant und moralische Konflikte, in Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. 

Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, hrsg. von Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter 

Horstmann und Ralph Schumacher, Berlin, New York, Bd. III, S. 194–201. 

2001 [610] Esser, Andrea (2008): Kant on Solving Moral Conflicts, in Kant’s Ethics of Virtue, hrsg. von 

one’s actions. I try to show this by pointing out an instability in the Kantian understanding of maxims. On 

the one hand, maxims are thought of as consciously affirmed, subjective principles of action. On the other 

hand, Kantians claim that nothing counts as an action, nor as morally assessable, unless it has a maxim. 

One cannot take both thoughts seriously without implausibly constricting the range of behavior that counts 

as action, hence as morally assessable. This difficulty can be overcome, I suggest, by jettisoning the idea 

that maxims must be consciously affirmed, and by stressing the way in which maxims are grounded in the 

pruning and shaping of one’s emotions and desires during socialization. This opens the door to a rich 

Kantian theory of virtue. It also raises questions about the scope and ground of our moral responsibility, 

which I address at the end of the paper.”

Monika Betzler, Berlin, S. 279–302. 

2001 [611] Fricke, Christel (2001): Kants Theorie des guten Willens zwischen empiristischer 

Konsenstheorie und Crusianischer Moraltheologie, in Kant und die Berliner 



S. 202–10. 

2001 [612] Friebe, Cord (2001): Der Kategorische Imperativ bei Kant und Freund, in Systematische Ethik 

mit Kant, hrsg. von Hans-Ulrich Baumgarten und Carsten Held, Freiburg, S. 192–210. 

2001 [613] Glasgow, Joshua M. (2001): Kant’s Non-Prudential Duty of Beneficence, in Kant und die Berliner 



S. 211–19. 

2001 [614] Green, Ronald M. (2001): What Does it Mean to Use Someone as “A Means Only”: Rereading 

Kant, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 11 (3), S. 247–61. 136 

2001 [615] Grenberg, Jeanine M. (2001): Feeling, Desire and Interest in Kant’s Theory of Action, Kant- 

Studien 92, S. 153–79. 

2001 [616] Guyer, Paul (2001): The Form and Matter of the Categorical Imperative, in Kant und die 


Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann und Ralph Schumacher, Berlin, Band I, S. 

131–50. Wiederabgedruckt in Guyer, Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom. Selected 

Essays, Oxford 2005, S. 146–68. 

2001 [617] Held, Carsten (2001): Kant über Willensfreiheit und Moralität, in Systematische Ethik mit 

Kant, hrsg. von Hans-Ulrich Baumgarten und Carsten Held, Freiburg, S. 124–61. 

2001 [618] Hepfer, Karl (2001): „… der Stein der Weisen“: Motivation und Maximen, in Kant und die 



Bd. III, S. 220–29. 

2001 [619] Herman, Barbara (2001): Rethinking Kant’s Hedonism, in Fact and Value: Essays on Ethics 

and Metaphysics for Judith Jarvis Thomson, Cambridge. Revidierte Version in 

Herman, Moral Literacy, Cambridge, Mass. 2007, S. 176–202. 

2001 [620] Himmelmann, Beatrix (2001): Die Lüge als Problem für Kants praktische Philosophie, in Kant 

136 “Debates about commodification in bioethics frequently appeal to Kant’s famous second formulation of the 

categorical imperative, the formula requiring us to treat the rational (human) being as “an end in itself” and 

“never as a means only.” In the course of her own treatment of commodification, Margaret Jane Radin 

observes that Kant’s application of this formula “does not generate noncontroversial particular 

consequences.” This is so, I argue, because Kant offers three different--and largely incompatible-interpretations 

of the formula. One focuses on the obligation to preserve rational willing; the second stresses 

respect for human (physical) dignity and integrity; the third views respect for others as “ends in themselves” 

as primarily involving a willingness to govern one’s conduct by a procedure of impartial co-legislation. 

Only the third of these interpretations, I conclude, offers a reasonable and coherent approach to moral 

judgment about the limits of commodification.”

und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, hrsg. 

von Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann und Ralph Schumacher, Berlin, New 

York, Bd. III, S. 230–38. 

2001 [621] Höffe, Otfried (2001): „Königliche Völker“. Zu Kants kosmopolitischer Rechts- und Friedenstheorie, 

Frankfurt a. M., S. 36–104 („Moral“). 

2001 [622] Illies, Christian (2001): Die vermeintliche Leere des Kategorischen Imperativs. Zur 

Anwendbarkeit von Kants Moralprinzip, in Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten 

des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, hrsg. von Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter 


2001 [623] Kerstein, Samuel J. (2001): Kant’s (Not so Radical?) Hedonism, in Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. 

Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, hrsg. von Volker Gerhardt, 

Rolf-Peter Horstmann und Ralph Schumacher, Berlin, New York, Bd. III, S. 247–55. 

2001 [624] Klemme, Heiner F. (2001): Perspektiven der Interpretation: Kant und das Verbot der Lüge, in 

Kant verstehen - Understanding Kant. Über die Interpretation philosophischer Texte, 

hrsg. Von D. Schönecker und Th. Zwenger, Darmstadt, S. 85–105. 

2001 [625] Klotz, Christian (2001): Gesetzesbegriffe in Kants Ethik, in Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. 

Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, hrsg. von Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter 


2001 [626] Lege, Joachim (2001): Der Kategorische Imperativ im Lichte der Jurisprudenz. Kants Grundlegung 

zur Metaphysik der Sitten und die Autonomie des Rechts, in Systematische 


262–85. 

2001 [627] Loparic, Zeljko (2001): Das Faktum der Vernunft – eine semantische Auslegung, in Kant und 

die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, hrsg. von 


Bd. III, S. 63–71. 

2001 [628] Nordenstam, Tore (2001): Kant and the Utilitarians, Ethical Perspectives 8, S. 29–36. 

2001 [629] Oliveira, Nythamar Fernandes (2001): Kant, Rawls, and the Foundations of a Theory of 

Justice, in Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant- 

Kongresses, hrsg. von Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann und Ralph Schumacher, 


2001 [630] Ott, Konrad (2001): Moralbegründungen zur Einführung, Hamburg, S. 77–93 („Die Ethik 

Immanuel Kants“). 

2001 [631] Quarfood, Marcel (2001): Kant’s Practical Deduction of Moral Obligation in Groundwork III, 

in Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, 

hrsg. von Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann und Ralph Schumacher, Berlin, 

New York, Bd. III, S. 72–79. 

2001 [632] Rohden, Valerio (2001): Ciceros formula und Kants „neue Formel“ des Moralprinzips, in Kant 



York, Bd. III, S. 305–14.

2001 [633] Römpp, Georg (2001): Die Artikulation der Autonomie – Zur systematischen Stellung der Tugendlehre 

in der kantischen Philosophie, in Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten 

des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, hrsg. von Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter 


2001 [634] Rosen, Stanley (2001): Kant über Glückseligkeit, in Systematische Ethik mit Kant, hrsg. von 

Hans-Ulrich Baumgarten und Carsten Held, Freiburg, S. 355–80. 

2001 [635] Rudolph, Enno (2001): MacIntyres Kantkritik. Zur Verteidigung des Kategorischen 

Imperativs, in Systematische Ethik mit Kant, hrsg. von Hans-Ulrich Baumgarten und 

Carsten Held, Freiburg, S. 286–97. 

2001 [636] Scarano, Nico (2001): Moralische Überzeugungen. Grundlinien einer antirealistischen 

Theorie der Moral, Paderborn, S. 116–28 („Kategorische Imperative und Handlungsrationalität“). 

2001 [637] Schönecker, Dieter E. (2001): What is the ‘First Proposition’ Regarding Duty in Kant’s 

Grundlegung?, in Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen 

Kant-Kongresses, hrsg. von Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann und Ralph Schumacher, 


2001 [638] Shibuya, Haruyoshi (2001): Kant und das Problem des Wert-Nihilismus, in Kant und die 



Bd. III, S. 327–33. 

2001 [639] Stangneth, Bettina (2001): Das „Faktum der Vernunft“. Versuch einer Ortsbestimmung, in 

Akten des 9. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Bd. 3, Berlin, S. 104–12. 

2001 [640] Steigleder, Klaus (2001): Hypothetische Imperative als reflexive Urteile, in Kant und die 



Bd. III, S. 113–21. 

2001 [641] Steigleder, Klaus (2001): Kants Konzeption der Moralphilosophie als „Metaphysik der Sitten“, 

in Interdisziplinäre Ethik. Grundlagen, Methoden, Bereiche, hrsg. von Adrian 

Holderegger und Jean-Pierre Wils, Freiburg, Wien, S. 101–123. 

2001 [642] Sverdlik, Steven (2001): Kant, Nonaccidentalness and the Availability of Moral Worth, 

Journal of Ethics 5, S. 293–313. 137 

2001 [643] Timmermann, Jens (2001): The Dutiful Lie: Kantian Approaches to Moral Dilemmas, in Kant 


137 “Contemporary Kantians who defend Kant’s view of the superiority of the sense of duty as a form of 

motivation appeal to various ideas. Some say, if only implicitly, that the sense of duty is always “available”' 

to an agent, when she has a moral obligation. Some, like Barbara Herman, say that the sense of duty 

provides a “nonaccidental” connection between an agent’s motivation and the act’s rightness. In this paper I 

show that the “availability” and “nonaccidentalness” arguments are in tension with one another. And the 

“availability” idea, although certainly supported by some passages in Kant himself, is also clearly denied in 

other passages. My conclusion is that Kantians will need to abandon either availability or nonaccidentalness 

if they wish to have a consistent set of views about the sense of duty.”


York, Bd. III, S. 345–54. 

2001 [644] Timmermann, Jens (2001): Alles halb so schlimm: Bemerkungen zu Kants ethischem 

Rigorismus, in Ethik ohne Dogmen. Aufsätze für Günther Patzig, hrsg. von Achim 

Stephan und Klaus Peter Rippe, Paderborn, S. 58–82. 

2001 [645] Weidemann, Hermann (2001): Kants Kritik am Eudämonismus und die Platonische Ethik, 


2001 [646] Wood, Allen W. (2001): Der gute Wille, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 49, S. 819–30. 

2001 [647] Wood, Allen W. (2001): Kant versus Eudaimonism, in Kant’s Legacy: Essays in Honor of 

Lewis White Beck, hrsg. von Predrag Cicovacki, Rochester, S. 261–81. 

2001 [648] Wood, Allen W. (2001): Was ist Kantische Ethik?, in Systematische Ethik mit Kant, hrsg. von 

Hans-Ulrich Baumgarten und Carsten Held, Freiburg, S. 381–408. 

2000 [649] Baumanns, Peter (2000): Kants Ethik. Die Grundlehre, Würzburg. 

2000 [650] Blackburn, Simon (2001): Being Good. A Short Introduction to Ethics, Oxford, S. 116–24 

(“The Categorical Imperative”). 

2000 [651] Bruton, Samuel V. (2000): Establishing Kant’s Formula of Humanity, Southwest Philosophy 

Review 16, S, 41–49. 

2000 [652] Denis, Lara (2000): Kant’s Conception of Duties Regarding Animals: Reconstruction and Reconsideration, 

History of Philosophy Quarterly 17, S, 405–423. 

2000 [653] Edwards, Jeffrey (2000): Egoism and Formalism in the Development of Kant’s Moral 

Philosophy, Kant-Studien 91, S. 411–32. 

2000 [654] Edwards, Jeffrey (2000): Self-Love, Anthropology, and Universal Benevolence in Kant’s Metaphysics 

of Morals, Review of Metaphysics 53, S. 887–914. 

2000 [655] Fairbanks, Sandra Jane (2000): Kantian Moral Theory and the Destruction of the Self. 

Boulder. 

2000 [656] Geismann, Georg (2000): Sittlichkeit, Religion und Geschichte in der Philosophie Kants, Jahrbuch 


Joerden, S. 437–531. 

2000 [657] Grondin, Jean (2000): Zur Phänomenologie des moralischen ‚Gesetzes’. Das kontemplative 

Motiv der Erhebung in Kants praktischer Metaphysik, Kant-Studien 91, S. 385–94. 

2000 [658] Guevara, Daniel (2000): Kant’s Theory of Moral Motivation, Boulder. 

2000 [659] Guyer, Paul (2000): Moral Worth, Virtue, and Merit, in ders., Kant on Freedom, Law, and 

Happiness, Cambridge, S. 287–329. 

2000 [660] Harbison, Warren (2000): Self-Improvement, Beneficence, and the Law of Nature Formula, 


2000 [661] Hare, John E. (2000): Kant on Recognizing Our Duties As God’s Commands, Faith and 


2000 [662] Hare, John E. (2000): Kant’s Divine Command Theory and Its Reception within Analytic

Philosophy, in Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion, hrsg. von D. Z. Phillips und 

Timothy Tessin, London, S. 263–277. 

2000 [663] Herrera, Larry (2000): Kant on the Moral Triebfeder, Kant-Studien 91, S. 395–410. 

2000 [664] Hill, Jr., Thomas E. (2000): Respect, Pluralism, and Justice. Kantian Perspectives, Oxford. 

2000 [665] Hill, Jr., Thomas E. (2000): Kantianism, in The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, hrsg. von 

Hugh LaFollette, Oxford, S. 227–46. Wiederabgedruckt als “Kantian Analysis: From 

Duty to Autonomy” in Hill, Human Welfare and Moral Worth. Kantian Perspectives, 

Oxford 2002, S. 13–36. 

2000 [666] Leist, Anton (2000): Die gute Handlung. Eine Einführung in die Ethik, Berlin, S. 245–329 

(„Ethik mit Kant“). 

2000 [667] Louden, Robert B. (2000): Kant’s Impure Ethics. From Rational Beings to Human Beings, 

Oxford. 

2000 [668] McNair, Ted (2000): Universal Necessity and Contradictions in Conception, Kant-Studien 91, 

S. 25–43. 

2000 [669] Malibabo, Balimbanga (2000): Kants Konzept einer kritischen Metaphysik der Sitten, 

Würzburg. 

2000 [670] Mariña, Jacqueline (2000): Making Sense of Kant’s Highest Good, Kant-Studien 91, S. 329– 

55. 

2000 [671] Marshall, Thomas (2006): The Ambiguity of Kant’s Concept of Happiness, Reason Papers 26, 

S. 21–28. 

2000 [672] Moggach, Douglas (2000): The Construction of Juridical Space: Kant’s Analogy of Relation in 

the Metaphysics of Morals, in The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of 

Philosophy, Vol. 7: Modern Philosophy, hrsg. von Mark D. Gedney, Bowling Green, 

S. 201–209. 

2000 [673] Neumann, Michael (2000): Did Kant Respect Persons?, Res Publica 6, S. 285–99. 138 

2000 [674] O’Neill, Onora (2000): Kant’s Justice and Kantian Justice, in dies., Bounds of Justice, Cambridge, 

S. 65–80. – Kantische Gerechtigkeit und kantianische Gerechtigkeit, in Kants 

Ethik, hrsg. von Karl Ameriks und Dieter Sturma, Paderborn 2004, S. 58–73. 

2000 [675] Pfannkuche, Walter (2000): Die Moral der Optimierung des Wohls. Begründung und 

Anwendung eines modernen Moralprinzips, Freiburg, S. 140–74. 

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138 “The illusion that Kant respects persons comes from ascribing contemporary meanings to purely technical 

terms within his second formulation of the categorical imperative, “[A]ct so that you treat humanity, 

whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only'”. When we 

realize that “humanity” means rational nature and “person” means the supersensible self (homo noumenon), 

we find that we are to respect, not human selves in all their diversity (homo phaenomenon), but rational 

selves in all their sameness, in their unvarying conformity to the universal principles of pure practical 

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139 “An examination of Kant’s account of moral worth. The debate over whether or not Kant said moral actions 

have worth only if they are carried out from duty or whether actions carried out from mixed motives can be 

good is complex and lies at the heart of Kant’s philosophy. Philip Stratton-Lake offers an account of acting 

from duty which utilizes the distinction between primary and secondary motives. He maintains that the 

moral law should not be understood as normative moral reason but as playing a transcendental role. Thus, a 

Kantian account of moral worth is one where the virtuous agent is one who is responsive to concrete 

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(2000): Rezension von David Cummiskey, Kantian Consequentialism, Kant-Studien 

91, S. 507–11. 

1996 [802] Dean, Richard (1996): What Should We Treat as an End in Itself?, Pacific Philosophical 

Quarterly 77, S. 268–88. 

1996 [803] Engstrom, Stephen (1996): Happiness and the Highest Good in Aristotle and Kant, in 

Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics. Rethinking Happiness and Duty, hrsg. von Stephen 

Engstrom und Jennifer Whiting, Cambridge, S. 102–38. 

1996 [804] Engstrom, Stephen/Whiting, Jennifer (Hrsg.) (1996): Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics. 

Rethinking Happiness and Duty, Cambridge. 

1996 [805] Guyer, Paul (1996): The Value of Agency. Review Essay of Barbara Herman, The Practice of 

Moral Judgment, Ethics 106, S. 404–23. – Zu [886]. 

1996 [806] Herman, Barbara (1996): Making Room for Character, in Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics. 

Rethinking Happiness and Duty, hrsg. von Stephen Engstrom und Jennifer 

Whiting, Cambridge, S. 36–60. Revidierte Version in Herman, Moral Literacy, 

Cambridge, Mass. 2007, S. 1–28. 

1996 [807] Hill, Jr., Thomas E. (1996): Moral Dilemmas, Gaps, and Residues: A Kantian Perspective, in 

Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory, hrsg. von H. E. Mason, Oxford, S. 167–98. 

1996 [808] Hill, Jr., Thomas E. (1996): Is a Good Will Overrated?, Midwest Studies in Philosophy Volume 

20: Moral Concepts, hrsg. von Peter French, Theodore E. Uehling und Howard 

Wettstein, Notre Dame, S. 299–317. Wiederabgedruckt in Hill, Human Welfare and 

Moral Worth. Kantian Perspectives, Oxford 2002, S. 37–60. 

1996 [809] Hiltscher, Reinhard (1996): Zur systematischen Stellung des Bösen in Kants Moralphilosophie, 

in Wahrheit und Geltung. Festschrift für Werner Flach, hrsg. von Alexander Riebel 

und Reinhard Hiltscher, Würzburg, S. 85–117. 

1996 [810] Irwin, T. H. (1996): Kant’s Criticisms of Eudaemonism, in Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics. 

Rethinking Happiness and Duty, hrsg. von Stephen Engstrom und Jennifer

Whiting, Cambridge, S. 63–101. 

1996 [811] Jeske, Diane (1996): Perfection, Happiness, and Duties to Self, American Philosophical 

Quarterly 33, S. 263–76. – Vgl. dazu [178]. 

1996 [812] Johnson, Robert N. (1996): Expressing a Good Will: Kant on the Motive of Duty, Southern 

Journal of Philosophy 34, S. 147–168. 

1996 [813] Johnson, Robert N. (1996): Kant’s Conception of Merit, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77, S. 

313–337. 

1996 [814] Korsgaard, Christine M. (1996): Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge. 

1996 [815] Korsgaard, Christine M. (1996): From Duty and for the Sake of the Noble: Kant and Aristotle 

on Morally Good Action, in Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics. Rethinking Happiness and 

Duty, hrsg. von Stephen Engstrom und Jennifer Whiting, Cambridge, S. 203–36. 

Wiederabgedruckt in Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency, Oxford 2008, S. 174– 

206. 

1996 [816] O’Neill, Onora (1996): Kant’s Virtues, in How Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues, hrsg. 

von Roger Crisp, Oxford, S. 77–97. 

1996 [817] Pauer-Studer, Herlinde (1996): Das Andere der Gerechtigkeit. Moraltheorie im Kontext der 

Geschlechterdifferenz, Berlin, S. 169–89 („Pflichten, Imperative und die Achtung für 

das moralische Gesetz: Die Moraltheorie Immanuel Kants“). 

1996 [818] Potter, Nelson (1996): Kant and the Moral Worth of Actions, Southern Journal of Philosophy 

34, S. 225–242. 

1996 [819] Schneewind, J. B. (1996): Kant and Stoic Ethics, in Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics. Rethinking 

Happiness and Duty, hrsg. von Stephen Engstrom und Jennifer Whiting, Cambridge, 

S. 285–301. 

1996 [820] Schönecker, Dieter E. (1996): Zur Analytizität der Grundlegung, Kant-Studien 87, S. 348–54. 

1996 [821] Sedgwick, Sally (1996): Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Empiricism and the Categorical 

Imperative, Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 50, S. 560–581. 

1996 [822] Seebohm, Thomas M. (1996): Kant und Mill über den Ursprung des obersten Prinzips der 

Moral, in Inmitten der Zeit. Beiträge zur europäischen Gegenwartsphilosophie. 

Festschrift für Manfred Riedel, hrsg. von Thomas Grethlein und Heinrich Leitner, 

Würzburg, S. 179–217. 

1996 [823] Sullivan, Roger J. (1996): Introduction, in Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, hrsg. 

von Mary Gregor, Cambridge, S. vii–xxvi. 

1996 [824] Whiting, Jennifer (1996): Self-Love and Authoritative Virtue: Prolegomenon to a Kantian 

Reading of Eudemian Ethics viii 3, in Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics. Rethinking 

Happiness and Duty, hrsg. von Stephen Engstrom und Jennifer Whiting, Cambridge, 

S. 162–199. 

1996 [825] Wood, Allen W. (1996): Self-Love, Self-Benevolence, and Self-Conceit, in Aristotle, Kant, and 

the Stoics. Rethinking Happiness and Duty, hrsg. von Stephen Engstrom und Jennifer 

Whiting, Cambridge, S. 141–61.

1996 [826] Wood, Allen W. (1996): General Introduction, in Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy. 

Translated and Edited by Mary J. Gregor (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of 

Immanuel Kant), Cambridge, S.xiii–xxxiii. 

1995 [827] Atwell, John (1995): Kant and the Duty to Promote Others’ Happiness, Proceedings of the 

Eighth International Kant Congress, Memphis 1995, hrsg. von Hoke Robinson, 

Milwaukee, Band 1, S. 727–34. – Dazu Stephen Engstrom: Comment: Happiness and 

Beneficence, S. 735–42. 

1995 [828] Baron, Marcia W. (1995): Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology, Ithaca. 

1995 [829] Blosser, Philip (1995): Scheler’s Critique of Kant’s Ethics, Athens, OH. 

1995 [830] Guyer, Paul (1995): The Possibility of the Categorical Imperative, Philosophical Review 104, 

S. 353–85. Wiederabgedruckt in Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, 

Cambridge 2000, S. 172–206 sowie in Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 

Morals. Critical Essays, hrsg. von Paul Guyer, Totowa 1998, S. 215–46. 

1995 [831] Holtman, Sarah (1995): Kant’s Formula of Humanity and the Pursuit of Subjective Ends, in 

Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, Memphis 1995, hrsg. von 

Hoke Robinson, Milwaukee, Band 2, S. 697–704. 

1995 [832] James, David (1995): Kant on Ideal Friendship in the “Doctrine of Virtue”, in Proceedings of 

the Eighth International Kant Congress, Memphis 1995, hrsg. von Hoke Robinson, 

Milwaukee, Band 2, S. 557–66. 

1995 [833] Johnson, Darrell (1995): Analytic and Synthetic Method and the Structure of Kant’s 

Grounding, in Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress (Memphis), 

hrsg. von Hoke Robinson, Milwaukee, Vol. 2, Part 2, S. 613–20. 

1995 [834] Klemme Heiner (1995): Beobachtungen zur Kantischen Vermittlung von Theorie und Praxis 

in der praktischen Philosophie, Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant 

Congress, Memphis 1995, hrsg. von Hoke Robinson, Milwaukee, Band 2, S. 521–32. 

1995 [835] Korsgaard, Christine M. (1995): Rawls and Kant: On the Primacy of the Practical, 

Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, Memphis 1995, hrsg. von 

Hoke Robinson, Milwaukee, Band 1, S. 1165–74. 

1995 [836] Löhrer, Guido (1995): Menschliche Würde. Wissenschaftliche Geltung und metaphorische 

Grenze der praktischen Philosophie Kants, Freiburg, München. 

1995 [837] Munzel, G. Felicitas (1995): ‘The Beautiful Is the Symbol of the Morally-Good’: Kant’s 

Philosophical Basis of Proof for the Idea of the Morally-Good, Journal of the History 

of Philosophy 33, S. 301–30. 

1995 [838] Nuyen, A. T. (1995): The Heart of the Kantian Moral Agent, American Catholic Philosophical 


1995 [839] Rauscher, Frederick (1995): Kant’s Conflation of Pure Practical Reason and Will, Proceedings 

of the Eighth International Kant Congress, Memphis 1995, hrsg. von Hoke Robinson, 

Milwaukee, Band 2, S. 579–86. 

1995 [840] Reath, Andrews (1995): Autonomy and Practical Reason: Thomas Hill’s Kantianism, 

Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 3, hrsg. von B. Sharon Byrd, Joachim Hruschka und


1995 [841] Reath, Andrews (1995): Understanding Kantian Autonomy, Proceedings of the Eighth International 

Kant Congress, Memphis 1995, hrsg. von Hoke Robinson, Milwaukee, Band 

1, S. 1185–92. 

1995 [842] Rohs, Peter (1995): Warum Kant kein Utilitarist war, in Zum moralischen Denken, hrsg. von 

Christoph Fehige und Georg Meggle, Frankfurt a. M. 1995, Bd. 2, S. 35–41. 

1995 [843] Schaller, Walter E. (1995): From the Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals: What 

Happened to Morality in Kant’s Theory of Justice?, History of Philosophy Quarterly 

12, S. 333–45. 

1995 [844] Schefczyk, Michael (1995): Moral ohne Nutzen. Eine Apologie des Kantischen Formalismus, 

St. Augustin. 

1995 [845] Seel, Martin (1995): Versuch über die Form des Glücks. Studien zur Ethik, Frankfurt a. M., S. 

20–26 („Kant: Einheit ohne Identität“). 

1995 [846] Sherline, Edward (1995): Heteronomy and Spurious Principles of Morality in Kant’s Groundwork, 

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 76, S. 32–46. 

1995 [847] Sherman, Nancy (1995): Reason and Feelings in Kantian Morality, Philosophy and 

Phenomenological Research 55, S. 369–77. 

1995 [848] Stuhlmann-Laeisz, Rainer (1995): Obligation and Prohibition: The Only Possible Outcomes of 

a Moral Decision Following Kant’s Categorical Imperative, Proceedings of the Eighth 

International Kant Congress, Memphis 1995, hrsg. von Hoke Robinson, Milwaukee, 

Band 2, S. 605–20. 

1995 [849] Sullivan, Roger J. (1995): The Influence of Kant’s Anthropology on His Moral Theory, Review 

of Metaphysics 49, S. 77–94. 

1995 [850] Terada, Toshiro (1995): ‘The Universal Principle of Right’ as the Supreme Principle of Kant’s 

Practical Philosophy, Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, 

Memphis 1995, hrsg. von Hoke Robinson, Milwaukee, Band 2, S. 541–48. 

1995 [851] Westphal, Kenneth R. (1995): How “Full” is Kant’s Categorical Imperative?, Jahrbuch für 


S. 465–509. – Zu [886] und [1035]. 

1995 [852] Wiggins, David (1995): Categorical Requirements: Kant and Hume on the Idea of Duty, in 

Virtues and Reasons. Philippa Foot and Moral Theory. Essays in Honour of Philippa 

Foot, hrsg. von Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence und Warren Quinn, Oxford, S. 

297–330. 

1995 [853] Willaschek Marcus (1995): Was sind praktische Gesetze?, Proceedings of the Eighth International 

Kant Congress, Memphis 1995, hrsg. von Hoke Robinson, Milwaukee, Band 

2, S. 533–40. 

1995 [854] Wood, Allen W. (1995): Humanity As End in Itself, in Proceedings of the Eigth International 

Kant Congress, Memphis 1995, hrsg. von Hoke Robinson, Vol. 1, Part 1, Milwaukee, 

S. 301–19. Wiederabgedruckt in Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. 

Critical Essays, hrsg. von Paul Guyer, Totowa 1998, S. 165–87.

1994 [855] Albrecht, Michael (1994): Kants Maximenethik und ihre Begründung, Kant-Studien 85, S. 

129–46. – Kant’s Justification of the Role of Maxims in Ethics, in Kant’s Moral and 

Legal Philosophy, hrsg. von Karl Ameriks und Otfried Höffe, Cambridge 2009, S. 

134–57. 

1994 [856] Donagan, Alan (1994): The Moral Theory Almost Nobody Knows: Kant’s, in Donagan, The 

Philosophical Papers of Alan Donagan Volume I: Action, Reason and Value, hrsg. 

von J. E. Malpas, Chicago, S. 144–52. 

1994 [857] Emmet, Dorothy (1994): The Role of the Unrealisable. A Study in Regulative Ideals, 

Houndmills, S. 10–29 (“Regulative Ideals: Kant”, “A Regulative Ideal in Ethics: The 

Good Will”). 

1994 [858] Gowans, Christopher W. (1994): Innocence Lost. An Examination of Inescapable Moral 

Wrongdoing, New York, Oxford, S. 184–217 (“Kantian Critiques of the Phenomenological 

Argument”). 

1994 [859] Hill, Jr., Thomas E. (1994): Kant on Responsibility for Consequences, Jahrbuch für Recht und 


Wiederabgedruckt in Hill, Respect, Pluralism, and Justice. Kantian Perspectives, 

Oxford 2000, S. 155–72. 

1994 [860] König, Peter (1994): Autonomie und Autokratie. Über Kants Metaphysik der Sitten, Berlin. 

1994 [861] McCarty, R. (1994): Motivation and Moral Choice in Kant’s Theory of Rational Agency, Kant- 

Studien 85, S. 15–31. 

1994 [862] Neiman, Susan (1994): The Unity of Reason. Rereading Kant, Oxford, S. 105–44 (“The 

Primacy of the Practical”). 

1994 [863] Pogge, Thomas W. (1994): Freudigers Grundlegung, Grazer Philosophische Studien 47, S. 

223–39. 

1994 [864] Potter, Nelson (1994): Kant on Obligation and Motivation in Law and Ethics, Jahrbuch für 


S. 95–111. 

1994 [865] Potter, Nelson (1994): Maxims in Kant’s Moral Philosophy, Philosophia 23, S. 59–90. 

1994 [866] Reath, Andrews (1994): Agency and the Imputation of Consequences in Kant’s Ethics, 


Jan C. Joerden, S. 259–81. Wiederabgedruckt in Reath, Agency and Autonomy in 

Kant’s Moral Theory. Selected Essays, Oxford 2006, S. 250–69. 

1994 [867] Reath, Andrews (1994): Legislating the Moral Law, Nous 28, S. 435–64. Wiederabgedruckt in 

Reath, Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory. Selected Essays, Oxford 2006, 

S. 92–120. 

1994 [868] Seung, T. K. (1994): Kant’s Platonic Revolution in Moral and Political Philosophy, 

Baltimore, S. 95–129 (“The Groundwork and the Second Critique: Kant’s 

Formalism”), S. 130–54 (“The Metaphysics of Morals: Kant’s Platonic Reversion”). 

1994 [869] Sullivan, Roger J. (1994): An Introduction to Kant’s Ethics, Cambridge. 

1994 [870] Timmons, Mark (1994): Evil and Imputation in Kant’s Ethics, Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik


1994 [871] Wagner, Hans (1994): Kants Konzept von hypothetischen Imperativen, Kant-Studien 85, S. 

78–84. 

1994 [872] Wichmann, Heinz (1994): Probleme der Kantischen Ethik. Überlegungen im Anschluß an Paul 

Menzers kritische Betrachtung, Kant-Studien 85, S. 303–308. 

1993 [873] Allison, Henry E. (1993): Kant’s Doctrine of Obligatory Ends, Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 1. 

Wiederabgedruckt in Allison, Idealism and Freedom. Essays on Kant’s Theoretical 

and Practical Philosophy, Cambridge 1996, S. 155–68. 140 – Vgl. dazu [897]. 

1993 [874] Baier, Annette (1993): Moralism and Cruelty: Reflections on Hume and Kant, Ethics 103, S. 

436–57. Wiederabgedruckt in Baier, Moral Prejudices. Essays on Ethics, Cambridge, 

Mass. 1995, S. 268–93. 

1993 [875] Becker, Don (1993): Kant’s Moral and Political Philosophy, in The Age of German Idealism, 

hrsg. von Robert C. Solomon und Kathleen Higgins, London, New York, S. 68–102 

(Routledge History of Philosophy vol. 6). 

1993 [876] Billington, Ray (1993): Living Philosophy. An Introduction to Moral Thought, London, S. 

109–31 (“Ends and Means I: Kant”). 

1993 [877] Brandt, Reinhard (1993): Gerechtigkeit bei Kant, Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 1, hrsg. von B. 

Sharon Byrd, Joachim Hruschka und Jan C. Joerden, S. 25–44. 141 

1993 [878] Forschner, Maximilian (1993): Über das Glück des Menschen. Aristoteles, Epikur, Stoa, 

Thomas von Aquin, Darmstadt, S. 107–50 („Moralität und Glückseligkeit in Kants 

Reflexionen“). 

1993 [879] Freudiger, Jürg (1993): Kants Begründung der praktischen Philosophie. Systematische 

Stellung, Methode und Argumentationsstruktur der „Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der 

Sitten“, Bern, Stuttgart, Wien. 

1993 [880] Gregor, Mary (1993): Kant on Obligation, Rights, and Virtue, Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 1, 

S. 69–102. 

140 “This paper analyzes Kant’s thesis in the Tugendlehre that there are certain ends (one’s own perfection and 

the happiness of others) that we are obligated to adopt. It contends that none of the three arguments which 

Kant advances in support of this thesis succeeds and that the attempted reconstruction by Nelson Potter 

likewise fails. It then maintains that the argument does work, if one brings in, as an implicit premise, 

transcendental freedom. Finally, it is argued that this late doctrine of obligatory ends marks a significant 

advance over the treatment of broad duties in the Grundlegung and can serve as a basis for defending 

Kant’s ethics against the familiar emptiness charge.” 

141 “Kant’s ethics do not include a discussion of justice as a specific virtue, and the “Metaphysical First 

Principles of the Doctrine of Right” appear to deal only with private and public law, but not with justice. In 

fact, Kant’s ethics in the three Critiques and later relevant writings is dependent on God’s iustitia 

distributiva as the highest good and the institution of the state is labelled as “public justice”. This article 

attempts to explain this connection and to provide a contribution to the topic of Kantian justice. The 

Epilogue to this article discusses a letter dated November 6, 1790, which Kant wrote in one of his official 

capacities at the University of Königsberg and which as of yet has remained unpublished.”

1993 [881] Grünewald, Bernward (1993): Zur moralphilosophischen Funktion des Prinzips vom höchsten 

Gut, in Naturzweckmäßigkeit und ästhetische Kultur. Studien zu Kants Kritik der 

Urteilskraft, hrsg. von Karl-Heinz Schwabe und Martina Thom, St. Augustin, S. 133– 

39. 

1993 [882] Guyer, Paul (1993): Kant’s Morality of Law and Morality of Freedom, in Kant and Critique. 

New Essays in in Honor of W. H. Werkmeister, hrsg. von R. M. Dancy, Dordrecht, S. 

43–89. Wiederabgedruckt in Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, 

Cambridge 2000, S. 129–71. 

1993 [883] Hare, R. M. (1993): Could Kant Have Been A Utilitarian?, in ders., Sorting Out Ethics, Oxford 

1997, S. 147–65 (revidierte Version). – Könnte Kant ein Utilitarist gewesen sein?, in 

Zum moralischen Denken, hrsg. von Christoph Fehige und Georg Meggle, Frankfurt 

a. M. 1995, Bd. 2, S. 11–34. 

1993 [884] Herman, Barbara (1993): Moral Deliberation and the Derivation of Duties, in dies., The 

Practice of Moral Judgment, Cambridge, Mass., S. 132–58. 

1993 [885] Herman, Barbara (1993): Leaving Deontology Behind, in dies., The Practice of Moral 

Judgment, Cambridge, Mass., S. 208–40. – Jenseits der Deontologie, in Kants Ethik, 

hrsg. von Karl Ameriks und Dieter Sturma, Paderborn 2004, S. 117–54. 

1993 [886] Herman, Barbara (1993): The Practice of Moral Judgment, Cambridge, Mass. – Vgl. dazu 

[805], [851]. 

1993 [887] Höfffe, Otfried (1993): Empirie und Apriori in Kants Rechtsethik, in Ethische Norm und 

empirische Hypothese, hrsg. von Lutz H. Eckensberger und Ulrich Gähde, Frankfurt 

a. M., S. 21–44. 

1993 [888] Hruschka, Joachim (1993): Kants Bearbeitung der Goldenen Regel im Kontext der vorangegangenen 

und der zeitgenössischen Diskussion, in Strafgerechtigkeit. Festschrift für 

Arthur Kaufmann zum 70. Geburtstag, hrsg. von Fritjof Haft, Winfried Hassemer, 

Ulfrid Neumann, Wolfgang Schild und Ulrich Schroth, Heidelberg, S. 129–40. 

1993 [889] Jacobson, Mogens Chrom (1993): Über das Verhältnis zwischen Immanuel Kants Rechts- und 

Moralphilosophie, Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 27, S. 72–92. 

1993 [890] Joerden, Jan C. (1993): Was leisten Kants Beispiele bei der Anwendung des Kategorischen Imperativs? 

Zugleich eine Besprechung von: Christian Schnoor, Kants Kategorischer 

Imperativ als Kriterium der Richtigkeit des Handelns, Archiv für Rechts- und 

Sozialphilosophie 79, S. 247–58. – Zu [1035]. 

1993 [891] Johnson, Mark (1993): Moral Imagination. Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics, 

Chicago, S. 65–76 (“Kant’s Metaphoric Morality”). 

1993 [892] Köhl, Harald (1993): Die Theorie des moralischen Gefühls bei Kant und Schopenhauer, in Zur 

Philosophie der Gefühle, hrsg von Hinrich Fink-Eitel und Georg Lohmann, Frankfurt 

a. M., 2. Aufl. 1994, S. 136–56. 

1993 [893] Łuków, Pawel (1993): The Fact of Reason: Kant’s Passage to Ordinary Moral Knowledge, 


1993 [894] McCarty, R. (1993): Kantian Moral Motivation and the Feeling of Respect, Journal of the


1993 [895] Mendonça, W. P. (1993): Die Person als Zweck an sich, Kant-Studien 84, S. 167–84. 

1993 [896] Miller, R. D. (1993): An Interpretation of Kant’s Moral Philosophy, Harrogate. 

1993 [897] Potter, Nelson (1993): Reply to Allison, Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 1, hrsg. von B. Sharon 

Byrd, Joachim Hruschka und Jan C. Joerden, S. 391–400. – Zu [873]. 

1993 [898] Potter, Nelson (1993): What Is Wrong with Kant’s Four Examples?, Journal of Philosophical 

Research 18, S. 213–29. 

1993 [899] Rahman, Wahidur A. N. M. (1993): Kant’s Concepts of Duty and Happiness, Indian 


1993 [900] Schaller, Walter E. (1993): Should Kantians Care about Moral Worth?, Dialogue 32, S. 25–40. 

1993 [901] Schneewind, J. B. (1993): Kant and Natural Law Ethics, Ethics 104, S. 53–74. 

1993 [902] Seung, T. K. (1993): Intuition and Construction. The Foundation of Normative Theory, New 

Haven, S. 144–74 (“Kantian Reversal”). 

1993 [903] Simmons, Lance (1993): Kant’s Highest Good: Albatross, Keystone, Achilles Heel, History of 


1993 [904] Stratton-Lake, Philip (1993): Formulating Categorical Imperatives, Kant-Studien 83, S. 317– 

40. 

1993 [905] Sytsma, Sharon (1993): The Role of “Achtung” in Kant’s Moral Theory, Auslegung 19, S. 

117–22. 

1993 [906] Thomas, Geoffrey (1993): An Introduction to Ethics. Five Central Problems of Moral 

Judgement, London, S. 80–93 (“Kant”). 

1993 [907] Tugendhat, Ernst (1993): Vorlesungen über Ethik, Frankfurt a. M., S. 98–130 („Kants Grundlegung 

zur Metaphysik der Sitten: der 1. Abschnitt“), S. 131–60 („Der 2. Abschnitt 

von Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten“). 

1993 [908] Wahidure Rahman, A. N. M. (1993): Kant’s Concepts of Duty and Happiness, Indian 

Philosophical Quarterly 20, S.85–103. 

1993 [909] Wike, Victoria (1993): Does Kant’s Ethics Require that the Moral Law Be the Sole 

Determining Ground of the Will?, Journal of Value Inquiry 27, S. 85–92. 

1992 [910] Copp, David (1992): The “Possibility” of A Categorical Imperative: Kant’s Groundwork, Part 

III, in Philosophical Perspectives, 6, Ethics, 1992, hrsg. von James E. Tomberlin, 

Atascadero, Cal., S. 261–84. 

1992 [911] Croitoru, Rodica (1992): Critic and Doctrinal in Kant’s Ethics: The Moral Purpose, in Critic 

and Doctrinal in Kant. The Third International Symposion, September 19–21, 1992, 

hrsg. von Rodica Croitoru, Bukarest, S. 89–94. 

1992 [912] Engstrom, Stephen (1992): The Concept of the Highest Good in Kant’s Moral Theory, 

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52, S. 747–80. 

1992 [913] Green, Michael K. (1992): Kant and Moral Self-Deception, Kant-Studien 83, S. 149–69.

1992 [914] Harris, Nigel G. E. (1992): Kantian Duties and Immoral Agents, Kant-Studien 83, S. 336–43. 

1992 [915] Herman, Barbara (1992): What Happens to the Consequences?, in dies., The Practice of Moral 

Judgment, Cambridge, Mass. 1993, S. 94–112. 

1992 [916] Hill Jr., Thomas E. (1992): Kantian Pluralism, Ethics 102, S. 743–62. Wiederabgedruckt in 

Hill, Respect, Pluralism, and Justice. Kantian Perspectives, Oxford 2000, S. 11–32. 

1992 [917] Hill Jr., Thomas E. (1992): A Kantian Perspective on Moral Rules, in Philosophical 

Perspectives, 6, Ethics, 1992, hrsg. von James E. Tomberlin, Atascadero, Cal., S. 

285–304. Wiederabgedruckt in Hill, Respect, Pluralism, and Justice. Kantian 

Perspectives, Oxford 2000, S. 33–55. 

1992 [918] Hill Jr., Thomas E. (1992): Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory, Ithaca. 

1992 [919] Höffe, Otfried (1992): Ethik des kategorischen Imperativs, in Geschichte der neueren Ethik, 

Band 1: Neuzeit, hrsg. von Annemarie Pieper, Tübingen, S. 124–50. 

1992 [920] James, David N. (1992): Twenty Questions: Kant’s Applied Ethics, Southern Journal of 


1992 [921] King, James (1992): The Moral Theories of Kant and Hume: Comparisons and Polemics, 

Hume Studies 18, S. 441–65. 

1992 [922] Korsgaard, Christine M. (1992): Creating the Kingdom of Ends: Reciprocity and 

Responsibility in Personal Relations, in Philosophical Perspectives, 6, Ethics, 1992, 

hrsg. von James E. Tomberlin, Atascadero, Cal., S. 305–32. Wiederabgedruckt in 

Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge 1996, S. 188–221. – Die 

Konstruktion des Reichs der Zwecke – Gegenseitigkeit und Verantwortung in 

persönlichen Beziehungen, in Kants Ethik, hrsg. von Karl Ameriks und Dieter 

Sturma, Paderborn 2004, S. 213–44. 

1992 [923] Ludwig, Ralf (1992): Kategorischer Imperativ und Metaphysik der Sitten. Die Frage nach der 

Einheitlichkeit von Kants Ethik, Frankfurt, Bern, New York, Paris. 

1992 [924] Moore, Jennifer (1992): Kant’s Ethical Community, Journal of Value Inquiry 26, S. 51–71. 

1992 [925] Nakhnikian, George (1992): Kant’s Theory of Hypothetical Imperatives, Kant-Studien 83, S. 

21–49. 

1992 [926] Oakley, Justin (1992): Morality and the Emotions, London, S. 86–121 (“Kantian Arguments 

against Emotions as Moral Motives”). 

1992 [927] Schaller, Walter E. (1992): The Relation of Moral Worth to the Good Will in Kant’s Ethics, 

Journal of Philosophical Research 17, S. 351–82. 

1992 [928] Scheffler, Samuel (1992): Human Morality, New York, Oxford, S. 61–68. 

1992 [929] Schneewind, J. B. (1992): Autonomy, Obligation, and Virtue: An Overview of Kant’s Moral 

Philosophy, in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, hrsg. von Paul Guyer, Cambridge, 

S. 309–41. 

1992 [930] Skorpen, Erling (1992): Kant’s Indirect Duty To Secure Happiness, Existentia 2, S. 255–276. 

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143 8. Der ethische Wert und seine Begründung. 9. Die allgemeine Gültigkeit des Sittengesetzes und der 

Kulturbegriff. 10. Die Einzigkeit der Handlung und die Allgemeinheit des Sittengesetzes. 11. Sittlichkeit 

und Glück. 

144 Inhalt: Einleitung (1), Der Apriorismus der theoretischen Philosophie Kants (4), Der Begriff der 

praktischen Vernunft (22), Der Apriorismus der praktischen Vernunft (37), Glückseligkeit und Sittlichkeit 

(48), Der Formalismus der Kantischen Ethik (63), Die Lehre von der Freiheit (77), Das Gefühl der Achtung 

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