Theory and Practice of Sublime Vulnerability in the Works of Friedrich Schiller

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

DISSERTATION ACCEPTANCE CERTIFICATE

The undersigned, appointed by the

Department of Germanic Languages and Literatures

have examined a dissertation entitled

Theory and Practice of Sublime Vulnerability in the Works of Friedrich Schiller.

presented by

Rebecca Stewart

candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and hereby certify that it is worthy of acceptance.

Signature _____

Typed name: Prof. John T. Hamilton

Signature N. Sütterlin
N. Sütterlin (Apr 11, 2023 15:54 PDT)

Typed name: Prof. Nicole Sütterlin

Signature _____

Typed name: Prof. Daniel Carranza

Signature Laura Anna Macor
Laura Anna Macor (Apr 12, 2023 07:51 GMT+2)

Typed name: Prof. Laura Anna Macor

Date: April 11, 2023

Theory and Practice of Sublime Vulnerability in the Works of Friedrich Schiller

A dissertation presented

by

Rebecca Stewart

to

The Department of Germanic Languages and Literatures

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the subject of

Germanic Languages and Literatures

Harvard University

Cambridge, Massachusetts

April 2023

Dissertation Advisor: John T. Hamilton Rebecca Stewart

Theory and Practice of Sublime Vulnerability in the Works of Friedrich Schiller

Abstract

Friedrich Schiller's (1759–1805) dramatic and poetic figures share the struggle to establish agency in tyrannical, chauvinistic contexts. The present dissertation applies Schiller's own aesthetic theory to close readings of his most disenfranchised literary figures to demonstrate that the Schillerian concept of the sublime is also a theory of the vulnerable. Across his oeuvre, vulnerable figures are central to Schiller's particular aesthetic program—an anthropologically informed, pragmatic commitment to portraying society's most oppressed as they face manifold systems of constraints enforced by the privileged.

In Schiller's literary worlds, as in German-speaking Europe around 1800, the most vulnerable members of society are often—though not exclusively—women. Central to Schiller's earliest articulations of his aesthetic theory is his belief in the edifying potential of "der höchste Kampf," the idea that the greater the degree one must labor to act in contradiction to one's inclination, the more evident the display of free will. This concept comes into much fuller and more mature expression in the form of Schiller's tragic theory of the sublime, which, far from being the purview of exclusively male heroes, is constructed with female and similarly disenfranchised figures in mind. The Schillerian figures treated in the present dissertation must negotiate agency amidst psychological, physical, and, above all, sexual violence. In theory and literary practice, Schiller's vulnerable figures demonstrate their unique resistance to the patriarchal paradigm of performed masculine invulnerability through the awareness and embrace

of their vulnerability. Furthermore, the dissertation demonstrates the insidious ways that the most privileged depend on the abuse of others—and how the oppressors themselves must perpetually reckon with the frailty and inessentiality of the framework that empowers them. When the vulnerable act in self-defense, the framework collapses.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments

Writing this dissertation—my first book—was a pure delight from start to finish, and I can attribute this in large part to the most incredible mentors, colleagues, friends, and family a scholar and a human could ask for. I find it important to emphasize my awareness of how rare it is to know and work with such a spectacular group of individuals. Every day I am grateful for the friendship and support of the people and institutions that I will briefly and insufficiently thank in the following paragraphs.

I owe an endless debt of gratitude to my former advisor in the German MA program at California State University, Long Beach and now colleague, Jeffrey L. High. You saw in me what I never knew I could be. Thank you for introducing me to the works and thought of Friedrich Schiller. Your classroom is a radical, revolutionary space; you taught us the meaning of *Gedankenfreiheit*. Reflecting on your pedagogy, I ask with Schiller: *Wo eine herrlichere That, je zur Glükseligkeit der Menschen von Menschen unternommen [. . .] – Wo also eine höhere Tugendhafftere That als die Bildung der Jugend?*

Thank you to my colleagues and friends, but especially Elaine Chen and Luke Beller. Frau Chen, you have been the Goethe to my Schiller for eleven years. Herr Beller, it is an honor to be a roommate of the next great expert on Schiller's aesthetics. To the regular attendees of the Saturday Reading Group: thank you for allowing me the honor of existing in your scholarly worlds. Thank you, especially, Professors Seán Allan, Carrie Collenberg-González, Johannes Endres, Friederike von Schwerin-High, Jeffrey L. High, and Regina Range for this. Thank you, Maestro James Conlon, for showing us all where the aesthetic state can be found.

Thank you Professor Peter Burgard for the early formative seminars at Harvard, where I learned to refine my writing and thinking with scholarly rigor. I am grateful to the chair of my

dissertation committee, Professor John Hamilton, for your tireless advising, practically instant and always deeply illuminating feedback, and for your enthusiastic belief in me and my project. Thank you also for encouraging me to continue to engage with and develop a robust interpretation of Schiller's concept of gender as a *moveable* quality—an idea that was first introduced to me by the scholarship of Gail K. Hart—and one that is performed with dexterity by his male and female dramatic and poetic figures alike. Thank you Professor Nicole Sütterlin, for giving me the fruitful idea of putting *Fiesko* in dialogue with the *Ästhetische Briefe* and thereby shedding light on how both texts suggest that the sustainability of a state can be measured by the relationship of the powerful to the vulnerable. I would like to furthermore thank Professor Daniel Carranza, for not only helping me reformulate developing thoughts into beautiful and articulate prose, but also for suggesting that I engage with Eve Kosofsky Sedgewick's notions of *paranoid and reparative reading*. Thank you, Professor Laura Anna Macor, for helping me understand how and why my dissertation is of interest not only to literature scholars but also to philosophers and historians of philosophy. You are in every way a role model. Thank you, Professor Christian Moser, for inviting me to participate in a constructive doctoral colloquium. To both Professors Macor and Moser, thank you for generously hosting me for the two most influential research stays of my scholarly life thus far at the Università degli studi di Verona and the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, respectively. Thank you to Professor Ritchie Robertson for your early, enthusiastic feedback on the first chapter of this dissertation. Professor Emeritus Norbert Oellers and Frau Marlies Oellers, thank you for the many evenings of captivating and heart-filling conversations about Schiller, Hölderlin, Kafka, the state of *Germanistik*, and our shared values. Thank you, Professor Oellers, for encouraging me to compare Schillerian

monarchs, which led to the completion of my fourth chapter while in Bonn. Your support has meant the world to me.

Thank you to the co-organizers of the events, workshops, and symposia where I was able to share and develop my work in progress with the benefit of your feedback. In particular, I would like to thank the co-organizers of the *Schreibwerkstatt* and the Germanic Forum in the Department of Germanic Languages and Literatures at Harvard University; the symposium "Inspiration Bonaparte? German Culture and Napoleonic Occupation" at St. Andrews University in Scotland; the international graduate student workshop "Seid einig – einig – einig!: Friedrich Schiller and Unity," co-hosted by Harvard University, CSULB, and the Johns Hopkins Philological Society; "Responsibility: The Third International Conference of SAFI" in Verona, Italy; the meetings of the research center Ricerche di Gnoseologia e Metafisica at the Università degli studi di Verona; and the interdisciplinary graduate student conference "Overwhelming Nature: Confronting Catastrophe and the Sublime in the Arts and Humanities" at the Mahindra Humanities Center at Harvard. Thank you also to the Ashford and Armstrong families for the dissertation fellowships that made any and all of this possible.

Thank you to my mother, Laurie Stewart, who has read more about Schiller and sublime vulnerability than she ever could have wanted. I do not know any other scholar who has the great fortune to have such an available and attentive helper, critic, copyeditor, and interlocutor in their mother. This dissertation would not have been possible without you. Thank you also to the rest of the Stewart family and the Fitzgerald, Gray, Hudec, and Mejia families for your support and love. Thank you, Elias Hudec and Shelby Mejia, for teaching me that *der Mensch tatsächlich nur da ganz Mensch ist, wo er spielt*.

Lastly, thank you endlessly, Glen Eric Gray, for the many walks filled with formulations and reformulations of arguments in progress, for enriching the course of my scholarly development with your own, for testing and critically engaging with the ideas that are the most important to me, and, most of all, your boundless love.

To my colleagues—my friends and my inspiration.

Introduction

Schiller's Theory of Sublime Vulnerability

FRIEDRICH SCHILLER'S PROTAGONISTS ARE OFTEN SEPARATED across two binary camps. On the one side is the beautiful soul (*schöne Seele*). For her, moral action is so practiced that it has become her inclination. She cannot be tempted to act according to inclinations that contradict the moral law because she has no desire to do so. Therefore she must not take recourse to calculated rational judgment every time she acts—she may rely on her inclination to steer her in the right direction. At the same time, she is rewarded with pleasure each time that she acts morally. This pleasure encourages her and reinforces her continued commitment to the moral law. The appearance of a beautiful soul is graceful (*anmuthig*) and the sight of grace generally produces pleasure in whomever beholds it. In criticism of the theory, the protagonists who are taken to represent the beautiful soul have been separated out from the other protagonists across a binary—reception has tended to associate her with sensuality in opposition to rationality and has coded her feminine.

On the other side of the binary is the individual who displays dignity (*Würde*). The only condition of dignity is the demonstration of rational freedom from nature. Its appearance is most obvious where an agent chooses to pursue a rational ideal despite great risk to that individual's continued survival. The sight of dignity produces a feeling in the spectator called the sublime (*das Erhabene*), and it constitutes a mixture of pleasure and pain. Pleasure because of the realization of our human capacity for rational freedom, pain because of the terrifying sight of the physical limitation of the human when confronting nature's wrath. Reception has tended to associate dignity with rationality and has coded the dignified individual as masculine.

This bifurcation of Schiller's characters across either side of a binary, however, often confuses where it intends to elucidate, arbitrarily separating out dignified heroes from graceful lovers—and, in the process, missing that the paradigm of a Schillerian hero is something more than merely rational, or merely sensual. Rather, the paradigmatic Schillerian hero is a rational-sensual being, a heroic lover. All beautiful souls have the capacity to become dignified in tragic circumstances. If the beautiful soul remains committed to her moral ideal no matter the circumstances—even on the pain of death—she demonstrates that the source of her actions is not mere pleasure seeking but rational judgment. Still, the execution of the moral action upon which she has rationally resolved requires courage. In Schiller's heroes, the source of that courage is almost always love. Strengthened by her love of another, the formerly beautiful and now dignified soul can accept the unforgiving physical consequences of her moral commitment.[1] This is not, as Paul de Man describes it, a coping mechanism, or a fantastical delusion that replaces reality.[2] Her character contains a spaciousness that eschews such strict polarities: this reality or that fantasy. Rather, she accepts reality, terrible as it is, and nevertheless she complicates the necessity of that reality by honoring her claim to autonomy despite the loss of her life. Her terrible freedom has the power to teach any observer of her own innate capacity for autonomy and that lesson is learned via the feeling of the sublime. Because the most consistent and most effective expression of the

[1] It would be remiss of me not to note that Schiller uses beauty in a narrower and in a broader sense throughout his aesthetic writings. Dignity is still considered beautiful in a broader sense, as elaborated best by Frederick Beiser: "Hence the concept of beauty in *Anmut und Würde* is equivocal: it has a specific sense where it refers to the pleasing appearance of graceful actions, and it has a general sense where it refers to any appearance of freedom in the sensible world, whether graceful or dignified." See Frederick Beiser, *Schiller as Philosopher: A Re-Examination* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 1980.

[2] Paul de Man, "Kant and Schiller," in *Aesthetic Ideology*, ed. Andrzej Warminski (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 129–162.

sublime in Schiller's literary practice is that of the moral hero who is motivated by unconditional love, the key to interpreting Schiller's tragic figures is not merely whether they demonstrate rational autonomy—indeed, many of his villains accomplish that—but rather whether they are inspired to do so out of love.

When the role of love in Schiller's literary oeuvre is taken seriously as a crucial element of his rational-moral philosophy, an important political message emerges. His works are saturated with images of tyrant figures who experience a complete lack of love. They maintain power and authority over every domain of life except that of the heart; indeed, they are excluded from any form of loving community, platonic, intimate, social, or otherwise, and they silently suffer the psychological consequences of their loss, from the figure of the lonely emperor on judgment day in his first speech delivered at the *Hohe Karlsschule zu Stuttgart* in 1779;[3] to the lonely robber captain Karl Moor in *Die Räuber* who asks in the dead of night who would take care of him in his hour of need (1781);[4] to the abusive *Präsident von Walter*, who desperately pleads for the sympathy of anyone who would bemoan a childless father as his son dies at the end of *Kabale und Liebe* (1784);[5] to the lonely tyrant who must renounce her claim to joy in "An die Freude" (1785);[6] to the monarch of the Spanish Inquisition, Philipp II, in *Don Karlos* (1787), who scandalously

[3] "So wird mancher dem der tobende Lobspruch der Menge: dem der Affterglantz seiner That von Belohnungen träumen ließ – Ha! wie so einsam, wie so hingeschauert dastehen am großem [sic!] Gericht!" Friedrich Schiller, *Schillers Werke: Nationalausgabe*, ed. Julius Petersen et al. (Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger 1943–) 20: 7. Subsequent citations as "*NA*" with volume and page number(s).

[4] "Wer mir Bürge wäre? – – Es ist alles so finster –" *NA* 3, 109.

[5] "PRÄSIDENT. (sucht mit verdrehten Augen im ganzen Krais herum) Ist hier niemand, der um einen trostlosen Vater weinte?" *NA* 5N, 190.

[6] "Ja – wer auch nur *eine* Seele / *sein* nennt auf dem Erdenrund! / Und wer's nie gekonnt, der stehle / weinend sich aus diesem Bund!" *NA* 1, 169.

cries alone in his room when he realizes that he has been betrayed by his only friend;[7] to the figurative archetype of destructive masculinity in the poetry of the 1790s;[8] to the tyrant king Dionys in the ballad "Die Bürgschaft" (1798), who, moved by a scene of friendship between his would-be assassins that is foreign, asks that they befriend him;[9] to the regicidal Queen Elisabeth I in *Maria Stuart* (1800) who concludes the tragedy in utter solitude after learning that she has been abandoned by her closest friends and advisors.[10] A monarch, an emperor, or a robber-captain with a friend is a contradiction in terms, since the love on which friendship is based is necessarily predicated on equality. Equality is a condition that sovereigns cannot allow, as its logical conclusion is the end of unchecked sovereignty.

Opposite them stand the orphaned and abandoned Amalia in *Die Räuber*; the abused Leonore in *Die Verschwörung des Fiesko zu Genua* (1783); the figurative archetype of the feminine in the poetry of the 1790s; the patient cousin Maria Stuart and her wetnurse Hanna Kennedy in *Maria Stuart*; and the virgin committed to the freedom of her beloved homeland and her maternal caretaker, the virgin Mary in *Die Jungfrau von Orleans* (1801). With the exception of those few who have successfully established themselves as powerholders in their patriarchal

---

[7] "LERMA. Der König hat geweint. / DOMINGO. Geweint! / ALLE. *zugleich, mit betretnem Erstaunen* / Der König hat geweint!" *NA* 6, 282.

[8] See chapter 1 of the present dissertation.

[9] "Und zum Könige bringt man die Wundermähr, / Der fühlt ein menschliches Rühren, / Läßt schnell vor den Thron sie führen. // Und blicket sie lange verwundert an, / Drauf spricht er: Es ist euch gelungen, / Ihr habt das Herz mit bezwungen, / Und die Treue, sie ist doch kein leerer Wahn, / So nehmet auch mich zum Genossen, an / Ich sey, gewährt mir die Bitte, / In eurem Bunde der dritte." *NA* 1, 425.

[10] "ELISABETH. *betroffen*. Nein, Schrewsbury! Ihr werdet mich jetzt nicht / Verlassen, jetzt – / [. . .] / ELISABETH. *zum Grafen Kent, der hereintritt*. / Graf Lester komme her! / KENT. Der Lord läßt sich / Entschuldigen, er ist zu Schiff nach Frankreich. / *Sie bezwingt sich und steht mit ruhiger Fassung da.* / *Der Vorhang fällt.*" *NA* 9NI, 179–180.

societies, Schiller's female figures are united by their participation in loving community with others and their unwillingness to feign invulnerability behind the veil of a sovereignty that denies the relational reality of all creatures. In societies fragmented by the binary line separating the powerful from the disenfranchised, only the disenfranchised are able to engage honestly in loving exchange with others because their love can be unconditioned by the necessity to maintain superiority over all others. When faced with tragic circumstances, a truly unconditional commitment to others often has the physical destruction of the unconditional lover as its result. Though the lover is motivated to pursue her commitment even into death, her actions continue to sympathetically resonate in the spectator, enabling her to see that she too possesses the capacity for unconditional rational freedom and is, perhaps, more inclined to cultivate her character toward morality—not out of a valorization of death, but as a loving reaction to the unjust circumstances that leave some people with no better options.

The present dissertation proposes that Schiller's theory of the sublime responds to the destructive and self-destructive binary paradigm of patriarchal society that denies our constitutive relationality as mutually vulnerable creatures. In its stead, the Schillerian sublime offers an ethical paradigm that bears witness to human vulnerability and responds to its sight with loving care. The justification for the caring response is rationally grounded but manifests itself in and is reinforced by the feeling of love for others and the desire for all to be well. Thus, Schiller's dramaturgy champions the members of society whose vulnerability has been exacerbated and capitalized upon by patriarchal tyrants by highlighting the moral-aesthetic power inherent in their moral commitments to the loving care for others. Furthermore, Schiller's theory of the sublime carries revolutionary potential by exposing the patriarchal paradigm as not divinely ordained by nature or another god—it is arbitrary and fallible. As Schiller's theory of the sublime maintains fundamental

parallels with contemporary feminist discourses on vulnerability, the present dissertation suggests that Schiller's notion of the sublime is more effectively expressed today as a theory of sublime vulnerability.

Rather than working in complete contradiction to the course of history, which forced women into positions of exacerbated vulnerability, Schiller overwhelmingly chose female figures and the image of femininity as established in common parlance around 1800 as the metaphorical model for the dramatic portrayal of sublime vulnerability. An unfortunate and likely unintended result is that subsequent generations of Schiller scholarship have evaluated Schiller's female figures according to the same binary model of patriarchal power delineations that Schiller's philosophy works against. As a result, the central role that Schiller's female figures play in demonstrating his own system of loving-rational ethics has gone relatively unnoticed, especially in discussions of his early dramas. In order to establish the early roots of Schiller's lifelong development of sublime vulnerability, it is therefore necessary to trace the roots of his theory of the sublime back to his earliest writings. Ultimately, it will be argued that Schiller's treatment of vulnerable figures exposes his society's coding of love as feminine as arbitrary and that his *Frauenbild* corresponds to his *Menschenbild*.

New ground was broken in the history of philosophy when, in the early 2000s and foremost in the context of *Auslandsgermanistik*, Jeffrey L. High and Laura Anna Macor liberated Schiller scholarship from the dogmatic periodization of Schiller's thought into pre-Kantian and post-Kantian by turning to his earliest texts in order to trace a more differentiated history of Schiller's proto-Kantian ethics. David Pugh had already argued in 1996 that Schiller's "doctrine of aesthetic

idealization" had occurred in 1790, prior to his reading of Kant.[11] While Frederick Beiser cited significant differences between Schiller's and Kant's ethical systems in 2005, he still maintained that there was a rational turn away from Schiller's earlier ethics, according to which, Beiser argued, "love is the basis of morality."[12] Jeffrey L. High was the first to demonstrate a consistency in Schiller's ethical thought from his earliest writings to his last via his oeuvre-spanning preoccupation with a philosophical-political concept of happiness:

> Diese Passagen, die deutlich machen, dass Schillers theoretische Leitprinzipien in Bezug auf die als "Glückseligkeit" definierte Bestimmung des Menschen zwischen 1779 und 1796 (und auch danach) unverändert blieben, bilden die Grundlage für die Erörterung von Schillers Verhältnis zur Revolution. Das Hauptkriterium für Schillers Beurteilung von politischen Rebellionen leitet sich aus seinem teleologischen Oberbegriff ab: Selbstbestimmung des Individuums, die zur Glückseligkeit des Ganzen führt. (Jeffrey L. High, *Schillers Rebellionskonzept und die französische Revolution* [New York: Edward Mellon Press, 2004], 17)

Laura Anna Macor agrees with Pugh that Schiller underwent a proto-Kantian ethical "turn" from a sentimental ethics to an ethics of rational judgment, but she locates the turn in 1780 during Schiller's attendance of the *Hohe Karlsschule* and during his first drafting of *Die Räuber*. Macor argues that in this development Schiller reversed the philosophy of love that he had advocated in the *Philosophische Briefe* (1786–1789/1792/1793),[13] namely that love can be selfless (i.e., universalizable) and therefore can stand as a basis for morality. Selfless love is to be contrasted with egoism.

---

[11] David Pugh, *Dialectic of Love: Platonism in Schiller's Aesthetics* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997), 22.

[12] Beiser, 44-45.

[13] Schiller likely began writing the *Philosophische Briefe* before 1781, during his time at the Hohe Karlsschule.

According to Macor's "turn" theory, Schiller began to endorse instead the idea that love and egoism are fundamentally the same, that love can lead one astray from the course of morality, and that the insufficiency of love as a grounding for morality requires that the foundation be sought in reason alone. While the present dissertation agrees and builds on High's and Macor's models of an early proto-Kantian ethics, the following section will demonstrate that the view that love alone is an insufficient grounding for morality is indeed already present in the first speech given at the Karlsschule in 1779. This will be important for establishing the image of the vulnerable as a fundamental *Denkmodell* for Schiller's sublime aesthetics from 1779 on, one that allows for reason as the basis for moral decision making and love the inspiration for acting in accordance with it throughout his entire oeuvre, and which acknowledges and explains the consistent feminine coding of Schiller's conceptualization of the sublime.

The first Karlsschule speech opens with a dramatic portrayal of the death of Socrates. In Schiller's portrayal, Socrates has been issued an ultimatum: rescind his illegal teachings or face execution by forced suicide: "Er hat den Giftbecher in der Hand – Hier Liebe zum Leben – das mächtigste Drangsgefül, das je eines Menschen Seele bestürmte; – dort zum Pfade höherer Seeligkeit ein zitternder Schein, ein eigner durch das Forschen seines Geistes einsam erschaffner Gedanke – Was wird Sokrates wählen?" (*NA* 20, 3). From this story, Schiller derives two competing objects of Socrates's love that vie for his choice: "Liebe zum Leben" and "Liebe zur Glükseeligkeit" (*NA* 20, 3). The former love has survival as its object. The latter has as its object happiness—in this case, the desire to resist a life of intellectual slavery. Of the two, "Liebe zur Glükseeligkeit" is a "höher[e] [. . .] weiterumfaßend[e] Glükseeligkeit" and furthermore a sublime feeling ("erhabenste Liebe," *NA* 20, 4). Socrates chooses "Liebe zur Glükseeligkeit," i.e., defense of his teachings and execution. This happiness that Socrates hopes to achieve is less physically

concrete than life—it is a concept derived by rational thought, "ein eigner durch das Forschen seines Geistes einsam erschaffner Gedanke" (*NA* 20, 3). Love for this idea of happiness is a rational love, or rather, a love not grounded in the physical world—indeed, it is predicated on the renunciation of the physical world—but rather it has its ground in reason: "ihr [der Liebe] ist der scharfsehende Verstand zum Führer gegeben" (*NA* 20, 3).[14]

Nevertheless, this rational love maintains a sensible component. He likens the harmonious partnership of rationality and love as the sympathetic vibration of an untouched string responding to the vibration of an adjacent string: "Durch sie [Weißheit] lebt dein [Natur] Ewiges Uhrwerk. Durch sie klingen melodisch zusammen deine tausend zitternde Saiten!" (*NA* 20, 8). This is Schiller's image of sympathy, which happens through the collaboration of sensibility with reason. In the case of sympathetic vibration, the two strings do not touch. Usually, we require a direct physical stimulus in order to feel something through our sense organs. But in the case of sympathy, when our neighbor has a feeling inside of them, though our sense organs do not receive the same exact physical conditions as those of our neighbor, our intellect still has the ability to imagine their feelings as our own and amazingly our own senses are physically stimulated. In his second medical dissertation of 1780, *Versuch über den Zusammenhang der thierischen Natur des Menschen mit seiner geistigen*, Schiller works out his theory that emotions too—that is, stimuli that come from within a human's mind (*Geist*) rather than from the physical world without—can have a real, physical effect on the body: "Die nächtliche Jaktationen derer, die von Gewissensbissen gequält werden, und die immer mit einem febrilischen Aderschlag begleitet sind, sind wahrhaftige Fieber, die der Konsens der Maschine mit der Seele veranlaßt" (*NA* 20, 61). Again, though he does not

[14] In this early speech, "Verstand" and "Weißheit" function interchangeably with what he will later call "Vernunft."

fully work out this thesis yet, Schiller points to the measurable physical effects that an emotional stimulus can have on the audience in a theater upon adopting the passions of the fictional character portrayed on stage via sympathy: "Auch die Illusion des Zuschauers, die Sympathie, mit künstlichen Leidenschaften, hat Schauer, Gichter und Ohnmachten gewirkt." (*NA* 20, 61).

In the first *Karlsschule* speech, Schiller calls rational love an inclination (*Neigung*), a concept that will become an essential buzzword in the vocabulary of Schiller's aesthetics and always indicates, though not the grounding, certainly the influence of sensibility. Rational love involves an ease in turning toward the sight of another human and caring for them because we have been intellectually and physically moved by their own feelings and made them into our own. He characterizes thus the creator of the universe as a caregiver who brought forth the world out of the darkness out of a feeling of "*Unendliche[r] Liebe*" (NA 20, 4) and gave laws out of "*Unendliche[r] Weißheit*". Through the coupling of sensation with reason, Schiller claims to have worked out the formula for virtue. In his short speech, Schiller states seven times that "Tugend ist das harmonische Band von Liebe und Weißheit!" (*NA* 20, 4). This expression will appear again with different wording sixteen years later in his treatise *Ueber Anmuth und Würde* (1793): "so kennt die schöne Seele kein süßeres Glück, als das Heilige in sich außer sich nachgeahmt oder verwirklicht zu sehen, und in der Sinnenwelt ihren unsterblichen Freund zu umarmen" (*NA* 20, 304).

Already in Schiller's first *Karlsschule* speech, loving rational virtue is couched in imagery of its practitioner's vulnerability. Beyond the example of the imprisoned Socrates, he gives the example of a sympathetic tear cried on behalf of another in a poor man's hut.[15] He commands humanity and all of nature to bow before love and reason—bowing being a gesture of trust that

[15] See *NA* 20, 5.

honors the other because it exposes and capitalizes on the doer's vulnerability. In the same section, he uses the image of reproduction, an image that draws its effectiveness again from the vulnerability it suggests: a natural gratitude toward a parental image of love for bringing a previously nonexistent *me* into being: "Beuge dich nieder blühende jauchzende Natur; beuge dich nieder o Mensch; beuge dich Seraf am Tron! Durch die Liebe seyd ihr hervorgegangen! Durch die Liebe blühet ihr, jauchzet ihr, pranget ihr! durch die Liebe! beuget euch vor der Liebe!" (*NA* 20, 7–8).

Despite the benefits that reason draws from a harmonious partnership with its "Gespielin," the second section of Schiller's speech is dedicated to a series of warnings regarding the insufficiency of love alone as a grounding for morality because love can cause delusions about the intention of a deed in both the doer and the recipient. Thus, without wisdom, love can stray from the path of morality and insidiously harm unsuspecting others. Schiller notes how humans are notoriously ill equipped to judge the source of an agent's deeds: "Wir Menschen richten bloß die Außenseite der That: wir meßen nach den Folgen allein" (*NA* 20, 7). This is how humans can so easily delude themselves and others with flattery. Flattery appears to an unwitting recipient as love, but it is merely the cloak of egoism. In its disguise, egoism manifests as a type of violence that is historically practiced by those who have intellectually set themselves off from society under the banner of inherent social or political superiority. This is accompanied by the financial or political means to make their superiority felt. Their flattery manifests as a form of violence. The violence of flattery occurs when one's physical wellbeing is elevated only in order to induce the fear of its loss. It is by nature of this type of violence that one can be victimized without even knowing it, because the offender successfully poses as a lover. However, the victimizer's true intent is not the increased happiness of their ostensible beloved, but rather the power that the victimizer extracts

via seduction. Schiller gives the examples of Julius, Augustus, and David who control the intellectual freedom of others by seducing them in order to manipulate them. In all three cases love cloaks "d[a]s in der Tiefe der Seele laurend[e] Laster[]" (*NA* 20, 5); the inner sources of the sovereigns' deeds were lust for power and immortality.

Despite insisting on the human's fallibility in judging the "innere Quelle" of a deed, Schiller undertakes a research agenda to see if the inner source of a deed is nevertheless somehow traceable: "Mich soll izt die glänzende Außenseite prangender Thaten nicht verblenden, dringen will ich und forschen in ihre innerste Quelle, nach dem festgesezten Begriff von Tugend will ich sie richten – auf dieser Waage will ich sie wägen! – –" (*NA* 20, 4). Schiller arrives at the contemplation of a "Kampf der Seele" as a location where the inner source of a deed becomes visible. Schiller's portrayal of Socrates's "höchste[m] Kampf" (*NA* 20, 4) reveals that the more heavily one is assaulted by a physical or psychological inclination (e.g., the inclination to live), the more difficult it becomes for that person to act in contradiction to inclination, ergo the greater the potential to display free will if the doer successfully overcomes her inclination and carries out her unconditioned will. Schiller portrays Socrates as someone who possesses a great love for the idea of a happier humanity through his teachings on freedom. This love inspires an idea in Socrates's mind, the idea to resolutely carry out the execution by suicide that he has rationally accepted as correct in order to defend his right to teach philosophy without suppression. Without this feeling of love to inspire Socrates to act in a way to make "die Menschen [. . .] bestmöglich glüklich" (*NA* 20, 7), Socrates may not have possessed the emotional fortitude to carry out the annihilation of his own life, even if he knew intellectually that rationality demanded it. Already here, we see the beginnings of a dramatic idea that would be very important for Schiller's

developing concept of the sublime throughout his oeuvre—the portrayal of a dignified self-contentment despite pain:

> Tod – Unsterblichkeit – Seine Lehre mächtig versiegelt! – Höchster Kampf; – höchster Verstand – erhabenste Liebe – erhabenste *Tugend*! Erhabner nichts unter hohem bestirntem Himmel vollbracht! –
>
> Was ist also das Wesen der Tugend? Nichts anders als Liebe zur Glükseeligkeit, geleitet durch den Verstand – Tugend ist das harmonische Band von Liebe und Weißheit! (*NA* 20, 4)

The defiance of the survival instinct demonstrates the human capacity for freedom; when contentment or happiness is added to the portrayal of defiance, the demonstration is even more effective, for it more clearly demonstrates intellectual freedom from outside determination. It has gone largely overlooked in the secondary literature that Schiller's use of the term *erhaben* in the highly dramatized *Mauerschau* portrayal of Socrates's death in 1779 demonstrates that he was already conceptualizing a theory of the sublime at the Karlsschule. In this short speech, he uses the term *erhaben* six times and always in reference to the capacity to act in contradiction to one's strongest egotistical impulses with dignified calm of love for another.

Edmund Burke's treatise "Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful" (1756/1757) is a clear influence on the early development of Schiller's theory of the sublime. Already in the first Karlsschule speech, Schiller's use of oxymoron seems to mirror the concept of "pain and pleasure" as thematized by Burke.[16] For example, Schiller dramatically stages Socrates's thought process as he proceeds from a painful conceptualization of death to an aestheticized conceptualization of death as blissful immortality: "Tod – Vergehen – Unsterblichkeit – Krone des Himmels – Versieglung blutige – große – mächtige Versieglung seiner *neuen* Lehre!" (*NA* 20, 4). In his most economical turn of phrase, he summarizes the essence of the sublime as

[16] Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 28–32.

"entsezliche Freyheit" (*NA* 20, 3–4). He inherits from Burke the idea that of all the events that can enflame the emotions, pain and danger by way of fear are the greatest, and he, like Burke, uses death as his chosen example to demonstrate this effect as the strongest example of a "Kampf der Seele" (*NA* 20, 6). By searching through the annals of history in order to investigate virtue and the sublime feeling it produces, Schiller cites Burke's acknowledgement of our delightful gravitation toward historical stories of violence.

What Schiller adds to Burke's treatment already in 1779 is the association of the sublime with freedom and the formative benefit that the feeling of the sublime can have in helping us to realize our own freedom. In Schiller, virtue—a quality of one's character that can prepare one to be capable of great dignity amidst suffering—shines into the human soul, grants its spectators "großen Lohn," and emits a grand "Schimmer" (*NA* 20, 8). The benefit of the contemplation of the effects of virtue is explored further in Schiller's second *Karlsschule* speech "Die Tugend in ihren Folgen betrachtet" (1780): "Wenn je etwas ist, das ein jugendliches Herz mit Liebe zur Tugend erwärmen kann, so ist es gewis die Aussicht in ihre erhabene Folgen" (*NA* 20, 30). Furthermore, where Burke repeatedly stresses that terror necessarily suspends our reasoning capacities and is useful not as an exercise of reason but as an exercise for the improvement of one's emotions, Schiller's emphasizes the combined activation of reason and love in contemplating and reaping the benefit of the sublime. Burke identifies the sublime as a delightful pull toward pain (delightful because it reminds us that we, the observers, are not suffering it) and at the same time an aversion to the sight of pain and the desire to get rid of it. In the first *Karlsschule* speech, the happiness that is associated with the sublime has another origin, namely the knowledge of something even more powerful than the escape from pain, of a "weiterumfaßende[n] Glükseligkeit" (*NA* 20, 3). For Schiller, the feeling of the sublime warrants the praise of feeling as well as that of reason: "Beuge

dich nieder! erkenn die Würde der Weißheit! Betet an vor der Weißheit. Betet an vor der Liebe und Weißheit!" (*NA* 20, 8). The feeling of the sublime, prompted by the contemplation of great virtue leads to the topic that will occupy Schiller's entire dramatic theory and practice: demonstrating the human capacity for freedom.

Schiller dedicates much of his later writing to the topic of the sublime. In "Über den Grund des Vergnügens an tragischen Gegenständen" (1791), Schiller again describes the sublime as a source of pleasure that occupies our reason and our imagination and as an experience of "Lust durch Unlust"—displeasure due to the thought of our physical limitations ("*Ohnmacht*") and pleasure due to the revelation to our consciousness of "unsere[n] *Uebermacht*" (*NA* 20, 137–138). Furthermore, he introduces a uniquely Schillerian perspective on the sublime, namely, that one can learn of one's capacity for freedom from any agent who intentionally acts in accordance with a rational judgment to the detriment of human life, the preservation of which constitutes our strongest instinct. We can disagree with these principles; we can even disagree with the agent's reasoning and still learn from her act of physical self-sacrifice out of a commitment toward a correct or incorrect rational judgment. We learn that all humans share the same capacity for rational freedom from physical necessity (*NA* 20, 141–143).

In "Ueber das Erhabene" of 1794, Schiller's exploration of the sublime stresses a new element: unveiling violence as arbitrary, as far as reason is concerned. Though physical violence is, of course, tragically very real, the knowledge of our capacity to rationally rise above the physical effects of another's attempted coercion reveals violence to be weaker than human freedom, and therefore a comparatively weak expression of human power. Schiller describes this phenomenon as the human capacity to make another's violent volition into our own, despite our

physical aversion to it. One rationally changes one's relation to a physical violence that one cannot escape by mentally taking ownership of it:

> Kann er also den physischen Kräften keine verhältnißmäßige physische Kraft mehr entgegen setzen, so bleibt ihm, um keine Gewalt zu erleiden, nichts anders übrig, als: *ein Verhältniß*, welches ihm so nachtheilig ist, *ganz und gar aufzuheben*, und eine Gewalt die er der That nach erleiden muß, *dem Begriff nach zu vernichten*. Eine Gewalt dem Begriffe nach vernichten, heißt aber nichts anders als sich derselben freywillig unterwerfen. (*NA* 21, 39)

Far from endorsing physical violence, Schiller's theory of the sublime takes practical responsibility in recognizing that violence does exist and that those without recourse to physical strength or defense are subject to face it every day. And yet, they carry within them a power still greater than the mere physical power of any oppressor (*NA* 20, 39).

In *Ueber Anmuth und Würde,* Schiller presents a theory for a more desirable existence and one that is still free. "[. . .] das Ideal vollkommener Menschheit [fodert] keinen Widerstreit, sondern Zusammenstimmung zwischen dem Sittlichen und Sinnlichen" (*NA* 20, 298). Grace (*Anmuth*), is the beautiful appearance of an individual who has so completely nurtured an inner moral character that the individual is pleasantly disposed toward morality (*NA* 20, 287). The individual who achieves this character and whose actions are judged graceful, is called a beautiful soul.[17] A beautiful soul is the prerequisite to the sublime disposition (*erhabene Gesinnung*) that manifests itself where required in the appearance of dignity.[18] Grace, in contrast with dignity, as a form of moral beauty, only appears where the moral action that is being performed by the agent (the beautiful soul) is done with ease.[19] In other words, no serious pain or suffering may be

[17] See *NA* 20, 287.

[18] See *NA* 20, 300.

[19] See *NA* 20, 294ff.

involved, because this would hinder the pleasurable ease that is a defining feature of what makes graceful moral actions appear beautiful to the observer.[20] Dignity appears when an agent refuses, through the power of reason, to succumb to physical suffering.[21] Thus, dignity is only called for in tragic situations.[22] It impresses observers because it alone allows the capacity for the theoretical triumph of reason over physical necessity to display itself manifestly.[23]

Nevertheless, a world or a situation that calls for dignity is not, of itself, a good one. Because dignity only appears in the context of suffering, it is often the hallmark of a cruel world. Because dignity appears in an individual who is suffering a tragedy, dignity can be neither mentally nor physically sustainable, not even for someone who is otherwise inclined toward moral decisions. Outside of uniquely tragic situations, the appearance of grace is in this sense preferable to dignity, because grace appears in normal life, which ought not be perpetually tragic.[24]

As the subsequent chapters will demonstrate, Schiller's dramatic oeuvre tends toward female heroes and male tyrants, though this is by no means exclusively the case. Egoism and rational love, though apparently gendered traits, are not essentially male and female, respectively,

---

[20] See *NA* 20, 287; 298.

[21] See *NA* 20, 293–294.

[22] Beiser, 114–119.

[23] See *NA* 20, 294.

[24] See Beiser, 116–117: "[T]he ideal of complete humanity requires grace because this alone develops all of our powers ([*NA* 20,] 297–8). This ideal does not exclude dignity, however, which is understood within this ideal, because dignity involves the dominance of reason over sensibility required of all virtue. In other words, Schiller continues to think that grace alone is a sufficient statement of his ideal of humanity; but by that statement he does not mean to exclude but include dignity. The need for dignity arises when the virtue involved in both grace and dignity needs to be shown in the face of tragic circumstances. What unites grace and dignity together is the simple fact of moral virtue, the power to act on the principles of reason acquired by education and habit."

in Schiller's oeuvre. For example, chapter 2 will show how Amalia stops Karl's egoistic course of *Mordbrennerey* and stage directs his turn toward a utopian rational-loving order in *Die Räuber*. Chapter 3 focuses in part on the vulnerable figure Muley Haßan, a male person of color and servant, who strives for friendship and turns into a vengeful arsonist after he realizes that he had been deluded and rejected by the man he had thought was his friend in *Die Verschwörung des Fiesko zu Genua*. The unifying principle of Schiller's tyrants is rather their feigning of invulnerability and sovereignty, rather than sex, while the unifying principle of Schiller's heroes is their vulnerability, and it is women's low position in society that causes his representation of sublime vulnerability to trend 'feminine.'

While Schiller's literary works mirror social binaries, they treat them critically, problematizing binaries in order to deconstruct them and reveal their destructive influence. The destructive effects of the patriarchal binary on those whose vulnerability is exacerbated is obvious enough—hardly a vulnerable figure survives and the tragedy in Schiller's works usually centers around the failure of a governing body, legitimate or not, to protect its most vulnerable constituents. However, Schiller also demonstrates how the patriarchal binary is destructive to those who are empowered by it. Chapter 1 shows how the figure of the 'masculine' world destroyer in Schiller's poetry excludes himself from the full experience of being a human by isolating himself from loving community. Chapter 2 explores Franz's, Karl's, and Herrmann's own individual psychological struggles with the social imperative to feign sovereignty in *Die Räuber*. Chapter 3 shows how the commitments of the patriarch Verrina and the tyrant Count Fiesko to their ideological objectives enable them to justify psychological and physical violence against the women closest to them and how this causes the men avoidable emotional turmoil. Chapter 4 focuses in part on Queen Elisabeth I's traumatic upbringing and rise to power in a patriarchal society in *Maria Stuart*, and how her

hatred of vulnerability (and, by extension, femininity) is the tragic price of her sovereignty. Chapter 5 reads Johanna's breakdown after the encounter with the English soldier Lionel in *Die Jungfrau von Orleans* as the revenge of a suppressed sensibility as she increasingly withdraws from the community of humanity and falls into religious fanaticism and exceptionalism. Through the equal treatment of the private struggles of egoists and the public struggles of the loving vulnerable, Schiller exposes that scandal that the arbiters of power are just as vulnerable as the rest, that their maintenance of power depends on their ability to maintain the illusion of invulnerability, and that their claim to divine or natural authority on the basis of their feigned invulnerability is thus fallible and frail.

Feminist reception of Schiller's works has not previously noticed that Schiller's theory of the sublime reflects an oeuvre-spanning championing of the vulnerable, nor that the logical conclusion of theories of the beautiful soul, the aesthetic state, and sublimity exposes the binary patriarchal model of invulnerable/vulnerable as untenable. This has led to a major problem in the history of Schiller reception: how does one reconcile Schiller's treatment of female figures as regents and warriors in the later dramas with his treatment of female figures in the domestic context in his poetry and early dramas? The reception that deals with this problem often fails to acknowledge how the binary patriarchal model of invulnerable/vulnerable disadvantages Schiller's male figures as well.

Helmut Fuhrmann, for example, in response to Sylvia Bovenschen's censure of Schiller's *Frauenbild*,[25] agrees with Bovenschen's argument that Schiller's position on sex and gender in his

[25] Sylvia Bovenschen cautions that Schiller only allows his dramatic heroines to conduct themselves autonomously because they are imagined and confined "vom Mann/Künstler": "als Bild entworfen, ist das Weibliche in Bildern unendlich und in komplexen Ausgestaltungen zu vervielfältigen. Oder, um die von Schiller favorisierte Musikmetaphorik aufzunehmen: der genialische Dichter kann es instrumentalisieren zu seiner Sinfonie – denn selbst sind die Frauen,

poetry and prose "ist unrettbar antiquiert,"[26] but Fuhrmann counters an all-out condemnation of Schiller on the question of gender by separating the female figures in the dramatic oeuvre (the so-called "Frauen*gestalt*[en]") from the presentation of sex and gender in the nondramatic texts (which constitute the so-called "Frauen*bild*"): "In der Regel wurde überhaupt nicht entdeckt, ein wie tiefer, nicht nur gelegentlich auftretender, sondern durchgehender Bruch, das Frauen*bild*, das der Dichter in seiner Lyrik sowie in seinen Prosaschriften, Gesprächen und Briefen entwirft, scheidet von der Frauen*gestalt*, die uns handelnd in seinen Dramen entgegentritt."[27] Fuhrmann's approach, however, has not satisfied decades of German literary scholars, who continue to claim to have located sexism in Schiller's poetry and prose and who raise complaints of misogyny in his dramatic works. For example, in 1990, Kari Lokke argued that, in his portrayal of the titular

diese Wesen ohne Selbst, nichts weiter als seine Partituren." Bovenschen, *Die imaginierte Weiblichkeit: Exemplarische Untersuchungen zu kulturgeschichtlichen und literarischen Präsentationsformen des Weiblichen*, 3rd ed. (1979; repr., Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2016), 256. See Fuhrmann on Bovenschen: "Bovenschen, die sehr eindringlich und überzeugend nachweist, mit welcher Konsequenz Schiller nicht nur in seiner Lyrik, sondern auch in seiner Prosa an einer keineswegs egalitären, vielmehr komplementären und letztlich antifeministischen Position festhält, versagt es sich freilich, ausführlicher auf das dramatische Werk einzugehen. Sie konstatiert lediglich eine eingeschränkte 'Unverträglichkeit' bestimmter, von Mayer herausgehobener Bühnenfiguren mit Schillers theoretischem Frauenbild, ohne sich auf einen Erklärungsversuch für die zugestandene Diskrepanz ernsthaft einzulassen." Fuhrmann, *Zur poetischen und philosophischen Anthropologie Schillers* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2001), 13.

[26] Fuhrmann, 11.

[27] Fuhrmann, 12. Lesley Sharpe similarly argues for reading a tension in Schiller's *Maria Stuart* between the project of classicism and the impulse to experiment with a new aesthetic, one that complicates the antiquated gender paradigm. Citing Fuhrman, Sharpe isolates Schiller's female dramatic figures as a contrast to, as she reads it, his "exemplary expressions in poetry of the essentialist view of passive/intuitive/intellectually limited femininity" and notes that it has "long been recognized that Schiller's female and dramatic figures are anything but mere incarnations of conventional bourgeois femininity." Lesley Sharpe, "Gender and Genre: Schiller's Drama and Aesthetics," in *From Goethe to Gide: Feminism, Aesthetics, and the German Literary Canon*, ed. Mary Orr and Lesley Sharpe (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2005), 36.

heroine of his 1800 *Maria Stuart*, "Schiller the tragedian transcends his own previously expressed misogynistic stereotypes which would limit woman's spiritual strengths and capacities," but ultimately "punish[es]" his "'masculine' realist" Queen Elisabeth I "for her feminism and her desire for freedom and independence."[28] In 1993, Karen Beyer made the similar remark that Schiller "bestraft" Lenore in *Die Verschwörung des Fiesko zu Genua* (1782) with death for her "Anmaßung männlicher Handlungsfähigkeit."[29] In 2005, Lesley Sharpe found "some strong reinforcements of the gender stereotypes developing in the later decades of the eighteenth century."[30] Sharpe reads in "Das Lied von der Glocke" (1799) an affirmation of the role of the traditional German housewife, "never resting, holding the family together, while the father confronts the world outside the home."[31] In "Würde der Frauen" (1796/1800) Sharpe reads "a reflection of the contemporary idealization of women as guardians of 'nature,' their harmony, repose and spontaneous, unreflective goodness contrasting with male striving for unreachable goals."[32] Based on these brief readings and a comment on his satirical poem "Die berühmte Frau" (1789), Sharpe concludes that "Schiller shared the prejudices of his day against women who tried to transcend this paradigm of passivity."[33] In 2006, Albrecht Koschorke cited "Die berühmte Frau"

---

[28] Kari Lokke, "Schiller's *Maria Stuart*: The Historical Sublime and the Aesthetics of Gender," *Monatshefte* 82, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 129 and 135, respectively.

[29] Karen Beyer, *Schön wie ein Gott und männlich wie ein Held: Zur Rolle des weiblichen Geschlechtscharakters für die Konstituierung des männlichen Aufklärungshelden in den frühen Dramen Schillers* (Stuttgart: M&P, 1993), 85.

[30] Sharpe, 34.

[31] Sharpe, 34–35.

[32] Sharpe, 35.

[33] Sharpe, 35.

as representative of a personal opposition to "die 'öffentliche' Frau, die aus dem Schatten der häuslichen Existenz heraustritt."[34] In 2011, citing his "theoretisch[e] Schriften zur Ästhetik" and his poems "Würde der Frauen," "Macht des Weibes," and "Das Lied von der Glocke, " Susanne Kord contrasted her interpretation of Schiller's concept of *Weiblichkeit* with that of his contemporaries, concluding that Schiller was comparatively conservative, even for his time: "Schon Zeitgenossen empfanden ihn als einen der restriktivsten Denker zum Thema."[35] Kord proceeds to take Mortimer's estimation of Elisabeth in *Maria Stuart* as a failed woman, because she refuses to love a man, to be representative of Schiller's own position.[36]

There is a tradition in Schiller scholarship, only briefly documented here, of finding new ways to come to old conclusions about Schiller's position on sex and gender as "unrettbar antiquiert."[37] This conclusion is the effect of an approach that contents itself with observing Schiller's use of binary imagery and ignores how Schiller's antithetical method is rather, as Laura Anna Macor puts it, a "methodische[r] Hinweis" for analyzing polarities in order to arrive at a

---

[34] Albrecht Koschorke, "Schillers *Jungfrau von Orleans* und die Geschlechterpolitik der Französischen Revolution," in *Friedrich Schiller und der Weg in die Moderne*, ed. Walter Hinderer (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2006), 252. Koschorke concludes regarding Schiller's Johanna in *Die Jungfrau von Orleans* after she reunites with her family in Reims: "Gehorsam beteuert die Tochter nun, büßen zu wollen [. . .]. [A]m Schluss der 'romantischen Tragödie' [sind] der body politic wiederhergestellt und der Familienvater in seine traditionellen Rechte wiedereingesetzt." Koschorke, 250–251.

[35] Susanne Kord, "Weibermacht und Geschlechtslosigkeit: Dramenköniginnen bei Schiller und seinen 'Epigoninnen,'" *Revista de Filología Alemana* 19 (2011): 117.

[36] Kord, 120. Kord does not mention that Mortimer, who is determined by dangerous emotion and almost rapes Maria later in the play, is an unreliable observer and therefore an unlikely representative of Schiller's own position on women and their rights.

[37] Fuhrmann, 11.

more harmonious middle ground.[38] Walter Silz, for example, is right to foreground Schiller's employment of discord in his poetic, dramatic, aesthetic, and historical work, but his characterization of Schiller's practice as evidence of an "adversative mind,"[39] a preference for "hard and insistent dichotomies,"[40] and an arbitrary tendency toward "one-sidedness and exaggeration"[41] places too heavy a focus on discord in Schiller's work. The consequence is a disproportionate inattention to the important place that harmony holds in Schiller's writings, from his early formulation of virtue as "das harmonische Band von Liebe und Weißheit!" (*NA* 20, 4) as discussed above, to his conception of the harmonious aesthetic state in *Ueber die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen*,[42] to Freiherr von Attinghausen's dying plea that the diverse occupied Swiss tribes remain "einig – einig – einig –" in *Wilhelm Tell* in 1804.[43]

This polarity-centered reading of Schiller's aesthetics has informed German literary scholarship for so long that it has become de facto historical 'truth' that Schiller's literary agenda affirms binaries of several sorts, but in particular that of gender, without the question being thoroughly addressed whether the presence of binaries in Schiller's oeuvre is indicative rather of

---

[38] Laura Anna Macor, "Die Moralphilosophie des jungen Schiller. Ein 'Kantianer ante litteram,'" in *Who Is This Schiller Now?*, ed. Jeffrey L. High, Nicholas Martin, and Norbert Oellers (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2011), 104.

[39] Silz, Walter. "Antithesis in Schiller's Poetry," *Germanic Review* 34, no. 3 (1959): 173.

[40] Silz, 172.

[41] Silz, 172.

[42] "[. . .] wo nicht die geistlose Nachahmung fremder Sitten, sondern eigne schöne Natur das Betragen lenkt, wo der Mensch durch die verwickeltsten Verhältnisse mit kühner Einfalt und ruhiger Unschuld geht, und weder nöthig hat, fremde Freyheit zu kränken, um die seinige zu behaupten, noch seine Würde wegzuwerfen, um Anmuth zu zeigen." *NA* 20, 412.

[43] *NA* 10, 239.

a problematization of binary thinking. J.B. Metzler's *Deutsche Literaturgeschichte*, for example, uses Schiller's so-called "rigid[e] Rollendefinitionen" as metonyms for the dominant late eighteenth-century European position on women's rights in general.[44] Consequently, Schiller's reception in feminist-friendly circles has become increasingly fraught. Since its first issue in 1985, only three articles that focus on Schiller have been published in the *Women in German Yearbook*, now *Feminist German Studies*, two of them articles by Hart, one of the few scholars to have paid serious attention in more recent years to questions of gender in Schiller, and the third an interview with actress Bridge Markland.[45] Schiller's dramas are rarely performed in versions that are not intensively abridged or otherwise 'updated.' Sharpe summarized the bleak situation thus: "[S]ince the 1960s in particular, younger generations have felt estranged from his high-sounding idealism and no longer read more of his works than the shrinking number still to be found in the school curriculum [. . .]."[46] When critical reception becomes dogma, it stands in the way of more nuanced and varied understandings of the role of the feminine in eighteenth-century literature. As Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick wrote of *paranoid reading*, "the very productive critical habits embodied in what Paul Ricoeur memorably called the 'hermeneutics of suspicion' [. . .] may have had an unintentionally stultifying side effect." A tradition of readings that depart from a position of paranoia regarding polarity (as opposed to harmony) has discouraged younger generations of

---

[44] Inge Stephan, "Kunstepoche" in *Deutsche Literaturgeschichte: Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*, 8th ed., Wolfgang Beutin et al. (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2013), 191.

[45] They are Gail K. Hart, "*Anmut*'s Gender: The 'Marionettentheater' and Kleist's Revision of 'Anmut und Würde,'" *Women in German Yearbook: Feminist Studies in German Literature & Culture* 10 (1995): 83–95; Hart, "Re-dressing History: Mother Nature, Mother Isabeau, the Virgin Mary, and Schiller's *Jungfrau*," *Women in German Yearbook* 14 (1999): 91–107. Britta Kallin and Bridge Markland, "In and Out of the Box: An Interview with Performance Artist Bridge Markland," *Women in German Yearbook* 30 (2014): 74–88.

[46] Sharpe, 34.

scholars—in particular women and people of color—from reinterpreting and revising authorized claims made by the *ancien régime* of *Germanistik*.

Ironically, it is the uncritical employment of the very helpful models that were created in order to help readers identify patriarchal binary thinking at the turn of the eighteenth to the nineteenth century that has led to the prolonged obfuscation of eighteenth-century counternarratives. One such model is that of the polarization of sex characteristics proposed by historian and gender studies scholar Karin Hausen in 1976[47] and endorsed by medical historian and gender studies scholar Barbara Duden in 1977.[48] Hausen and Duden argue that at the turn of the eighteenth to the nineteenth century, women underwent a social and economic demotion, i.e. a transition from a period of comparatively high social and economic currency as contractually bound comanagers of the medieval and early modern household to a modern, early capitalist social order that deemed women's work no longer important, resulting in a new type of subjugation for the now economically obsolete sex:

> In der Arbeitsaufteilung der 'alten Gesellschaft' brachte die Arbeit der Frau aber tatsächlich eine fast gleichberechtigte soziale Stellung ein, denn diese Arbeit war nicht auf das Haus und die Familie beschränkt, sondern trug unmittelbar zur Ernährung in der gemeinsamen Wirtschaft bei. [. . .] Die Frau hat keinen besonderen 'Geschlechtscharakter,' das heißt ihre Sozialisation erfordert keine besondere psychische Zurichtung. (Duden, 130–131)

but in the course of the formation of the *Bildungsbürgertum* at the end of the eighteenth century,

> Durch die relative Entwertung der gebrauchswertorientierten Arbeit der Frau gegenüber der in Geld bezahlten Tätigkeit des Mannes war auch ein Anstoß gegeben, die Arbeit der Frau neu einzuschätzen: sie konnte *idyllisch* verklärt werden. Es ist das Wesen der Idylle,

---

[47] Karin Hausen, "Die Polarisierung der 'Geschlechtscharaktere' – Eine Spiegelung der Dissoziation von Erwerbs- und Familienleben," in *Sozialgeschichte der Familie in der Neuzeit Europas*, ed. Werner Conze (Stuttgart: Klett, 1976), 363–393.

[48] Barbara Duden, "Das schöne Eigentum: Zur Herausbildung des bürgerlichen Frauenbildes an der Wende vom 18. zum 19. Jahrhundert," *Kursbuch* 47 (1977): 125–140.

> die Arbeit der Mühe zu entkleiden und sie in eine schön anzusehende liebende Zuwendung umzuinterpretieren.[49]

A similar and more far-reaching model was popularized by historian and sexologist Thomas Laqueur in 1990 and has subsequently become a mainstay in feminist philology. Laqueur's 'one-sex'/'two-sex' model proposes that, from classical antiquity until the Enlightenment, sexual differences were largely seen by medical and governing authorities as variations or involutions of the one male sex and that only in the wake of the Enlightenment did the so-called 'second' female sex come to be seen not as a degradation of the male sex but as an entirely different biological category. In her book-length refutation of Laqueur's model, scholar in classics and ancient medicine Helen King pointed out that Laqueur's own observation that "experience, in short, is reported and remembered so as to be congruent with dominant paradigms"[50] has become an unwillingly accurate self-assessment of the canonization of his model by historians. King writes:

> Instead of using them [the two stages of Laqueur's model] as conceptual, comparative tools to make similarities and differences clearer, the two stages have been reified and the alleged movement from one to the other attached to a specific period, and to other real changes in that period. Ironically, what Laqueur had written about making experience fit the 'dominant paradigms' has also happened in the reception of *Making Sex*. (Helen King, *The One-Sex Body on Trial* [London: Routledge, 2013], xi.)

For example, in her 2019 book *Sex Changes with Kleist*, Germanist and gender studies scholar Katrin Pahl dismisses Schiller's thought and writing about masculinity and femininity with

---

[49] Duden, 134. See also Julie D. Prandi, *Spirited Women Heroes: Major Female Characters in the Dramas of Goethe, Schiller and Kleist* (Berne: Peter Lang Ltd., 1983), 16–19; Ute Frevert, *Frauen-Geschichte zwischen bürgerlicher Verbesserung und Neuer Weiblichkeit* (Suhrkamp Verlag: Frankfurt am Main, 1986), 22 and 317; Inge Stephan, "'Da werden Weiber zu Hyänen . . .': Amazonen und Amazonenmythen bei Schiller und Kleist," in *Inszenierte Weiblichkeit: Codierung der Geschlechter in der Literatur des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2004), 120; Gail K. Hart, *Friedrich Schiller: Crime, Aesthetics, and the Poetics of Punishment* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2005); Kord, 115.

[50] Thomas Laqueur, *Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 99.

isolated and abrupt summative statements on the subject that stand in for more attentive analysis of the claims made. Pahl characterizes Schiller's ethical values as "insufferable"[51] and "starkly gendered,"[52] with little further explanation. In an endnote, Pahl issues the reductive assertion that "for Schiller, grace is feminine and dignity is masculine"[53] and offers a pithy interpretation of Schiller's Johanna from *Die Jungfrau von Orleans* (1801) in an offhand remark, describing her as "thoroughly roped into heteronormativity by the end."[54] These isolated remarks function to make Schiller into the foil of Heinrich von Kleist (1777–1811), with the goal of coloring Kleist as an underdog in the canon and a paradigm of progressiveness in matters of gender and sexuality. Pahl's appraisal of the organization of gender which she claims Schiller affirms and Kleist critiques is informed by Duden's and Laqueur's writings on the polarization of sex characteristics and the 'one-sex'/'two-sex' models, respectively.[55] Whether or not, when considering history more broadly, literature scholars endorse Hausen's, Duden's, and Laqueur's models, the sweeping application of these views to Schiller's work in a generalizing fashion obscures the subtle gender criticism present in his writings.

The present dissertation aims in part to resolve the decades-long problem of continuity in Schiller's thought regarding sex and gender by showing how Schiller's presentations of loving care in the face of vulnerability always constitute a marker of sublime heroism and, moreover, that

[51] Katrin Pahl, *Sex Changes with Kleist* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2019), 135.

[52] Pahl, 136.

[53] Pahl, 212.

[54] Pahl, 183. For an alternative reading of Schiller's *Die Jungfrau von Orleans*, see chapter 5 of the present dissertation.

[55] See Pahl, 192 and 3–17.

the care response that his society has coded feminine corresponds not to an affirmation of a sex-based binary but rather that his *Frauenbild* accords with his *Menschenbild* and aims at the eventual dissolution of binary thinking. The feminist philosophy of vulnerability, and in particular the recent work of Italian feminist philosophers Adriana Cavarero and Olivia Guaraldo, is helpful in shedding light on the contemporary use of Schiller's theory of sublime vulnerability and is therefore drawn upon throughout the present dissertation. The most relevant ideas are summarized below.

Adriana Cavarero, Judith Butler, and Olivia Guaraldo have, in their more recent publications, elaborated and supported a view of the human being as fundamentally vulnerable. If, according to the paradigm, all humans are seen by all other humans, including themselves, as fundamentally vulnerable rather than threatening, an ethical binary arises: kill or care? Working in the tradition of philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas, whose idea of face-to-face encounter as a simultaneously dual-natured ethical command and emotional summons to take responsibility for the people we encounter, the feminist philosophers argue that the vulnerability paradigm constitutes an alternative response to the historically dominant patriarchal paradigm that holds opportunistic violence to be the only natural and therefore immediate and inevitable response to the sight of vulnerability. Cavarero, reflecting on the dual nature of our vulnerable bodies, posits that the sight of a wound or even the idea of its possibility makes it impossible to avoid contemplating either of two possible reactions: violence or care.[56] Butler remarks that this dual aspect of vulnerability disqualifies any political approach that is predicated on *us vs. them*—though it is true that certain historical conditions make some more difficult to wound than others, the invulnerability of a certain '*us*' is merely a delusion and in no way essential to any human being.[57]

---

[56] Adriana Cavarero, *Orrorismo, ovvero della violenza sull'inerme* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2007), 42.

[57] Judith Butler, *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* (London: Verso, 2004).

Guaraldo, applying the vulnerability paradigm to the notion of genocide, highlights that there is an historical understanding that violence against minority groups is exacerbated by nature of their perceived weakness; their weakness even is seen to invite and to encourage violence. However, Guaraldo also questions the violence/care binary maintained in the feminist vulnerability paradigm itself, suggesting that the care response might be something even more fundamental to the human than the opportunistic violent response. Furthermore, she argues that we have been so conditioned by the patriarchal idea that violence is the first and most natural human response to vulnerability status that it has obscured the naturalness of care and has been, in part, responsible for its 'degradation' as a feminine-coded quality:

> Se, insomma, pensassimo cura, non-violenza, amore come dimensioni primarie? Non sarebbe possibile, in questo modo, fare a meno della sanzione etica o divina a 'non uccidere'? In questo possibile quadro teorico e immaginativo, per capirci, il 'non uccidere' non avrebbe bisogno di formularsi come un comandamento – come sostiene Lévinas – ma sarebbe una spontanea, immediata risposta alla comune vulnerabilità, una dimensione costitutiva della nostra relazionalità che è stata rimossa, dissimulata, negletta, persino derisa dall'orizzonte mitopoietico del guerriero. (Olivia Guaraldo, "La vulnerabilità come paradigma fondativo" in *Vulnerabilità*, ed. Orsetta Giolo and Baldassare Pastore [Rome: Carocci, 2018], 67–68)

By looking at the human, Guaraldo writes, as an inherently vulnerable being rather than as an inherent aggressor, one sees the unnaturalness and even scandalous nature of the myth of violence as more primordial.

Guaraldo's suggestion finds common ground in Schiller's own philosophy. As described in much greater detail in chapter 3 of the present dissertation, Schiller's portrayal of the *Barbar* (the cultivated individual, who suppresses feeling for the sake of satisfying ideological aims) and the *Wilder* (the savage individual, who suppresses reason for the sake of satisfying sensual aims) in the *Ästhetische Briefe*, reveals a more fundamental tendency in the human toward loving community than toward violence. As Schiller describes it, both the *Wilder* and the *Barbar* can

commit violence, but the *Barbar* is more fearsome because he disdains feeling and is far more likely to let violence occur out of negligence or out of a sense of moral justification. It is through culture, not through nature, Schiller warns, that the human being has learned to distance herself too far from her more natural sense of love and physical attachment: "Stolze Selbstgenügsamkeit zieht das Herz des Weltmanns zusammen, das in dem rohen Naturmenschen noch oft sympathetisch schlägt" (*NA* 20, 320).

Furthermore, as mentioned briefly above, in Schiller's poetry and dramas, noble tyrants who claim moral legitimacy for their ruthless killing of others are frequently exposed as vulnerable, bursting the delusion that their sovereignty is inherent. In Schiller's 1780 poem, "Die schlimmen Monarchen," the poetic speaker remarks in a sneering, ironic tone, that everyone ends up decomposing in the same wooden casket, be they tyrants or galley slaves, highlighting the delusional aspect of the monarch's claim to sovereign status.[58] In his ballad "Die Bürgschaft" of 1797, the violence of a supposedly untouchable tyrant is confronted with the mutual care of two friends, which moves the monarch's heart to mercy and prompts him to ask for his former enemies' friendship, exposing his own emotional vulnerability to himself and to the world around him. Already in his first *Karlsschule* speech, Schiller writes of the delusion of a tyrant's sense of justice when compared with the truth of love among the poor: "Wie leicht wird der Weltherrscher dahinflattern auf der Waage der Gerechtigkeit Gottes! überwogen unendlich weit von *Einer – Einer* mitleidigen Träne in Hütten geweint –" (*NA* 20, 5).

Guaraldo advocates for the image of maternity as one among many possible widely relatable forms of inspiration for the care response to vulnerability. The vulnerable infant fundamentally calls to mind the care response in the mother rather than one of violence. She argues

[58] See *NA* 1, 124.

further that this model can be applied to other instances of vulnerability beyond the mother/child relationship and thus vulnerability can be freed from its gendered baggage. As the chapters that follow will demonstrate, Schiller's goal for the image of the *feminine* was hardly different from Guaraldo's is for the *maternal*. He who holds himself in a privileged position over and above others commits violence against himself and against all of his fellow humans. He is a tyrant and, as such, he can never achieve inner harmony. He propels himself into a tragic cycle of loneliness—loneliness being the very condition that creates and sustains the binaries that maintain his power. Out of necessity and habit, such tyrants delude themselves into believing that their privilege is essential and that the source of their loneliness lies outside of them. Schiller, who from his earliest writings to his last maintained a strong conviction in the power of art to encourage the establishment of a more harmonious society, created a poetics that championed vulnerability as a birthright and a source of boundless dignity. This is precisely the dynamic at work in *Don Karlos*, when Philipp II commands Elisabeth de Valois, his unwilling queen, to accompany him to the grand auto-da-fé, the public execution of republican heretics from the occupied Netherlands. Elisabeth protests by revealing that the king who seemingly owns all the world has tragically lost the one thing that all humans are endowed with at their birth—their most vulnerable moment—namely, humanity: "Ich bin ein Weib – ein weiches Weib – ein Mensch –" (*NA* 6, 55).

Chapter 1

Performed *Masculinity* and *Femininity* in Schiller's Prose and Poetry

MANY OF THE NOW CANONICAL EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY treatises that critically dealt with the historical binary of masculinity and femininity were published during Schiller's writing career, which can be dated from roughly 1779 to 1805. Examples include Joachim Heinrich Campe's (1746–1818) *Väterlicher Rath für meine Tochter: Ein Gegenstück zum Theophron; der erwachsneren und weiblichen Jugend gewidmet* (1789), Olympe de Gouges's (1748–1793) *Déclaration des droits de la femme et de la citoyenne* (1791), Mary Wollstonecraft's (1759–1797) *A Vindication of the Rights of Men, in a Letter to the Right Honourable Edmund Burke; Occasioned by His Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790) and *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman: With Strictures on the Political and Moral Subjects* (1792), Theodor Gottlieb von Hippel the Elder's (1741–1796) *Über die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Weiber* (1792), and Wilhelm von Humboldt's (1767–1835) *Über den Geschlechtsunterschied und dessen Einfluß auf die organische Natur* (1795). It is therefore hardly surprising that Schiller, the so-called "great Master of the art of 'Gegensatz'"[59] would take a poetic interest in the popular, critical, and literary engagement with the polarization of masculinity and femininity. Schiller's poetic use of masculinity and femininity as poetic symbols has been a focus of heated criticism since as early as 1796 when Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829) wrote of *Männer* and *Frauen* in Schiller's "Würde der Frauen" (1796): "Männer, wie diese, müssten an Händen und Beinen gebunden werden;

[59] Silz, 171.

solchen Frauen ziemte Gängelband und Fallhut."[60] Embedded in Schlegel's interpretation is an understanding that the figurative archetypes of femininity and masculinity employed in the poem affirm the normalization of the idea of polarized gender characteristics as biologically-derived and therefore natural and praiseworthy. Schlegel's reception reflects a general trend in feminist reception of Schiller's employment of the images of masculinity and femininity in his poetry and prose writings. The present chapter, however, revives a thesis by Germanist Gail K. Hart—that Schiller's treatment of masculinity and femininity constitutes a "review and reassignment of the attributes that signal gender"[61]—and applies Hart's thesis to the most harshly criticized, and therefore most controversial, passages regarding masculinity and femininity in his poetry and prose writings across his oeuvre. Ultimately, the present chapter proposes that Schiller's poetic play with masculinity and femininity as poetic symbols is indicative of a critical problematization of the gender binary rather than its affirmation. Binary thinking itself is criticized in the poetry and prose texts, as it is incompatible with the Schillerian ideal of the harmonized *Mensch* as an individual and as a member of a human community, the stated goal of all of Schiller's moral-aesthetic texts. The trans-oeuvre approach reveals that Schiller's concept of gender shows a remarkable continuity from his earliest writings throughout the development of his literary practice. Without Schiller's early interest in binary thinking and how it arbitrarily divides people into antagonistic groups, usually with one side in power and the other side disenfranchised, Schiller's guiding dramatic principles are unthinkable. The present chapter will proceed by addressing three binaries that have been at the root of significant feminist dispute for decades: philosophical writing vs. popular

[60] Friedrich Schlegel, "Schillers Musenalmanach auf 1796" in *Friedrich Schlegel 1794–1802: Seine prosaischen Jugendschriften*, ed. J. Minor (Vienna: Verlag von Carl Konegen, 1882), 2: 4.

[61] Hart, "Re-dressing History," 104.

writing, moveable beauty (grace) vs. architectonic beauty (physical beauty), and the savage vs. the barbarian.

Philosophical Writing vs. Popular Writing

In an essay entitled "Über die nothwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schöner Formen" (1795/1800/1804) Schiller issued a seemingly damning statement regarding the cognitive limitations of women, specifically, that women are incapable of performing any rigorous philosophical analysis. Philosophical reasoning is "das Geschäft also, welches die Natur dem andern Geschlecht nicht bloß nachließ, sondern verbot" (*NA* 21, 17). However, a contradiction arises when he immediately concedes that there are "Ausnahmen" (*NA* 21, 17) to this rule. The two claims—(a) that women have a sex-specific, lesser intellectual nature and (b) that not all women have this sex-specific limitation—contain an inherent contradiction. Either nature has established essential biological distinctions between the intellectual capacities of men and women, or "Natur" here is being used in a colloquial manner to describe the inessential, social character that women and men have developed in and through culture, and that the differences between the intellectual development in men and women are attributable to nurture rather than nature. A defense of the second interpretation proceeds in the present section.

Nature is one of the most fraught terms in Schiller's works and he does not always use it in a consistent and systematic way. Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby write of Schiller's use of the word "Natur" in the *Ästhetische Briefe* that "nowhere is the confusion of Schiller's terminology more apparent—or more irritating! The senses available to him, both

secular and sacred, were many."[62] When Schiller writes to Wilhelm von Humboldt on 17 December 1795 of "der reinen menschlichen Natur" (*NA* 28, 135), therefore, it is not immediately apparent what Schiller means by the term "Natur" without a broader understanding of Schiller's general thought regarding human nature in this period of his moral-aesthetic investigations. In his letter, Schiller complains to Humboldt that, in representations of women in ancient Greek drama, one observes the characteristics most obviously associated with femininity (e.g., motherhood, daughterhood, wifehood) "und überhaupt alle dem bloßen Geschlecht anhängige Gestalten." However, the portrayals of women figures lack the quality of humanity, unconditioned by gendered idiosyncrasies: "die Selbstständigkeit der reinen menschlichen Natur sehe ich mit der Eigenthümlichkeit des Geschlechts nirgends vereinigt" (*NA* 28, 135). By differentiating between a "reinen menschlichen Natur" and the "Eigenthümlichkeit des Geschlechts," Schiller allows for the former to be something essential and universal, unconditioned by the inessential roles assigned to and performed by bodies in society. Schiller's frustration with the portrayal of women in ancient Greek drama is that they fail to help illuminate the human condition on a deeper philosophical level and are much rather props that unintentionally serve a caricaturizing function for the feminine gender. To borrow Silvia Bovenschen's terminology, the women in ancient Greek drama are merely *imaginiert*, i.e. not self-determined, but obviously made up by an external (male) source.

What, then, would constitute the ungendered pure human nature that Schiller finds lacking in tragic Greek female figures? Another text from the same period contains important context. In

[62] See the glossary entry on "Natur" in Friedrich Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man In a Series of Letters: English and German Facing*, ed. Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby, (1967; repr. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 322–326. The choice of the word *man* over *individual* as a translation of *Mensch* in the title is misleading. Schiller most often uses the word *Mensch* in contrast with the words *Mann* or *Weib* in order to refer to the really existing physical individual in all of the individual's complexities, whereas *Mann* and *Weib* are used to signify figurative archetypes for use in specific examples.

the *Ästhetische Briefe*, Schiller defines the *Mensch* as a being who is always a *Person* caught up in a *Zustand*. The *Person* is that which is permanent, universal, and essential to the human being. The *Person* is permanent in the sense that she remains constant even while the body changes (e.g., movement through space, growing, aging, etc.). All physical changes and bodily differences between people are associated with one's *Zustand*. There is only one *Person* for all the human species. Humans create limiting identities in order to categorize different phenomenal appearances from one another and their institutions and behavior mirror the many differences in the way they appear. Nevertheless, both the *Person* and their *Zustand* can be harmonized in a mutually complementary relationship within an individual.[63] The harmonious balance resembles a *Wechsel-Wirkung* between two arbitrary poles. It is up to culture to help facilitate this *Wechsel-Wirkung* by creating the conditions for a society in which an agent can explore her rational and sensual natures at once with a freedom that current social and political limitations inhibit. One venue for this is through art, which creates an unbounded spaciousness in which the otherwise conditioned human being is freer to playfully engage her rational and sensual natures, all while remaining fixed in her limited *Zustand*: "[S]o verschwindet sowohl der Zwang der Empfindung als der Zwang der Vernunft, und wir fangen an, [. . .] zugleich mit unsrer Neigung und mit unsrer Achtung zu spielen" (*NA* 20, 354). Schiller had already proposed the theater as such a space in his 1784 essay, "Was kann eine gute, stehende Schaubühne eigentlich wirken?" The theater traverses "das ganze Gebieth des menschlichen Wissens," exhaustively covers "alle Situationen des Lebens," shines its light "in alle Winkel des Herzens hinunter," unites "alle Stände und Klassen in sich," and maintains "den gebahntesten Weg zum Verstand und zum Herzen" (*NA* 20, 99). Over time, just as the systems that divide people along lines of social and political privilege fall away in the theater, they would begin

[63] See *NA* 20, 343.

to erode outside the theater while the cultivation of rational sympathy inside the imagination could not fail to influence one's daily life:

> Und dann endlich – wenn Menschen aus allen Kraisen und Zonen und Ständen, abgeworfen jede Fessel der Künstelei und der Mode, herausgerissen aus jedem Drange des Schicksals, durch *eine* allwebende Sympathie verbrüdert in *Ein* Geschlecht wieder aufgelößt, ihrer selbst und der Welt vergessen, und ihrem himmlischen Ursprung sich nähern. Jeder Einzelne genießt die Entzückungen aller, die verstärkt und verschönert aus hundert Augen auf ihn zurück fallen, und seine Brust giebt jezt nur *Einer* Empfindung Raum – es ist diese: ein *Mensch* zu seyn. (*NA* 20, 100)

The result would be not merely internally harmonious individuals but a harmonious society of *Menschen*. In other words, that which is indivisible on the arbitrary lines of classifications and privileges, the *Person*, would find itself in an increasingly less limiting *Zustand*. Society would come to gradually reflect the universal nature of the physical manifestations of *Person* that it attempts to organize. *Zustand* is erodible, malleable, subject to change, while the *Person* remains constant.

Applied to Schiller's notion of a pure human nature that he finds lacking in Greek tragic female figures, those arbitrary characteristics that condition the female human as gendered woman, e.g., her classification as mother, daughter, and wife, constitute her erodible, malleable *Zustand*. Her "rein[e] menschlich[e] Natur" is constant and shared universally with all human beings, regardless of arbitrary *Zustände*, such as gender. This is one of many examples in Schiller's oeuvre in which gender appears to be a flexible or moveable designation that is performed by *Person* in *Zuständen* and is only reified or made essential insofar as gender is constitutive of the culture in which it was born, performed, and institutionalized. Similar examples will be elucidated in the final section of the present chapter.

With this understanding of a flexible notion of gender in mind as a *Zustand*, the apparent contradiction between Schiller's uses of the word "Natur" in his letter to Humboldt and in "Über

die nothwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schöner Formen" is illuminated in its complexity. In the former, the essence of humanity as endowed by "Natur" to women as well as to men is to be understood as universal and ungendered. In the latter, the acknowledgment of "Ausnahmen" to the "Regel" of "Natur" implies that the feminine unphilosophical disposition is not fixed, universal, and essentially biological but rather an effect of culture.

Another problem however arises when one considers that Schiller wrote in "Über die nothwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schöner Formen": "die bisher erschienen Ausnahmen können den Wunsch nicht erregen, daß sie zur Regel werden möchten" (*NA* 21, 17). Why would one not wish for philosophically minded women to become the rule rather than the exception? This clause cannot make any sense outside of the context of the greater argument of "Über die nothwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schöner Formen." In this essay, Schiller is likely responding to a criticism raised against him by Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), namely, that Schiller himself suffers from philosophically weak writing. Fichte complains that Schiller relies too heavily on the metaphors and examples in his writing, which demands a dryer and more intellectually rigorous tone and logical distance from empirical examples in order to be philosophically viable (*NA* 21, 317). In his essay, which constitutes his response, Schiller issues a word of caution against the philosophical style that Fichte advocates, arguing that it is handy for working out rigorous philosophical proofs, but not for communicating them in a way that supports their practical and wider-reaching application: "Stoff ohne Form ist freylich nur ein halber Besitz, denn die herrlichsten Kenntnisse liegen in einem Kopf, der ihnen keine Gestalt zu geben weiß, wie todte Schätze vergraben." (*NA* 21, 19) Instead, he advocates for a style that melds intellectual rigor with the influence of feeling, evidently his personal stylistic goal. Schiller promotes the moral-aesthetic style as a new standard in philosophical writing. He calls its practitioner "der darstellende

Schriftsteller." Effectively illustrative writing is impossible to achieve for the writer who has not first established a philosophically rigorous understanding of the concepts that she wishes to illustrate.[64] However, someone who is able to illustratively communicate that knowledge obtained by philosophically rigorous study is able to do *more* than the one who can merely demonstrate proofs:

> Wer mir seine Kenntnisse in schulgerechter Form überliefert, der überzeugt mich zwar, daß er sie richtig faßte, und zu behaupten weiß; wer aber zugleich im Stande ist, sie in einer schönen Form mitzutheilen, der beweist nicht nur, daß er dazu gemacht ist, sie zu erweitern, er beweist auch, daß er sie in seine Natur aufgenommen und in seinen Handlungen darzustellen fähig ist. (*NA* 21, 16)

Here again one sees a usage of "Natur" that refers not to a biologically essential difference between one who thinks philosophically and one who does not but rather that philosophical thought can be practiced to the degree that it becomes almost as inherent as if it were instinctual, from nature.

In his letters to and about Sophie Mereau from the same period as "Über die nothwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schöner Formen," he describes her as a young writer on the path toward becoming *der darstellende Schriftsteller*. Schiller's advocacy for and mentorship of Mereau furthermore provides sufficient counterevidence against the notion that he held women to be biologically barred from the rational capabilities of men. For example, in a letter to Mereau of 18 June 1795, the same year as his composition of "Über die nothwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schöner Formen," Schiller praises the "Geist der Contemplation" and the "Ausdruck von Ideen"

[64] "Wenn es für die Gründlichkeit der Erkenntniß nachtheilig befunden wurde, bey dem eigentlichen Lernen, den Foderungen des Geschmacks Raum zu geben, so wird dadurch keineswegs behauptet, daß die Bildung dieses Vermögens bey dem Studirenden zu frühzeitig sey. [. . .] Sobald das erstere nur beobachtet worden ist, kann das zweite keine andere als nützliche Folgen haben kann. Gewiß muß man einer Wahrheit schon in hohem Grad mächtig seyn, um ohne Gefahr die Form verlassen zu können, in der sie gefunden wurde; man muß einen großen Verstand besitzen, um selbst in dem freyen Spiele der Imagination sein Objekt nicht zu verlieren." *NA* 21, 15.

in her poetry, which he compares to Klopstock, "dem wir alle, der eine weniger der andre mehr, nicht sowohl nachahmen als durch unsre nordisch-philosophierende Natur gedrungen folgen" (*NA* 27, 199).

Shortly after Mereau's early literary success, she expresses her plan to edit a journal, remarking in a letter to Schiller, "Da ich zunächst für mein Geschlecht zu sammeln wünsche, so soll bei aller Freiheit des Stofs, die mein Plan zuläßt, sich die Form nie allzusehr den Wißenschaftlichen nähern, sondern stets ein leichtes, gefälliges und anmuthiges Ansehen haben" (*NA* 36, 21). In dismay and fearing that this practical endeavor would result in the renunciation of Mereau's own literary development, Schiller praises her great potential and warns her of missing her opportunity to cultivate it further: "Der Fall, von dem Sie schreiben, ist das Schicksal so vieler, die ihr Talent zu einer höhern Tätigkeit bestimmte und manche vorzügliche Fähigkeit geht dadurch für das Beßte der Kunst und der Wißenschaft verloren" (*NA* 28, 139).[65] Instead, he advises her to persevere on her own good path, never giving in to the pressure of "fehlerhaften Geschmack." The following year, he continues to praise the poetry she sends him, in which he finds "sehr viel schönes in Absicht auf den Innhalt sowohl als auf den Ausdruck" (*NA* 28, 266).[66]

Schiller evidently saw great promise in his mentee and found that he had reason to believe that she would rise above the level of dilettantism and create timeless works of art—that is to say, art that, while of its time, did not take its cue foremost from the trends of the time. In the plan for a treatise on dilettantism and art drafted (and later abandoned) by Schiller and Goethe in 1798–1799, they lay out what they see as the fundamental difference between art and dilettantism: "Die Kunst giebt sich selbst Gesetze und gebietet die Zeit: der Dilettantism folgt der Neigung der Zeit"

[65] Letter to Sophie Mereau of 23 December 1795.

[66] Letter to Sophie Mereau, possibly of the middle of July 1796.

(*NA* 21, 60). This description of the derivativeness that characterizes dilettantism is reminiscent of Schiller's warning to Mereau to observe "strenge Beharrlichkeit auf dem guten Wege," and "keine Abweichung von demselben, [. . .] keine Nachgiebigkeit gegen den fehlerhaften Geschmack" (*NA* 28, 139), indicating that he saw her work as, after the proper training, destined for a higher goal.

In a letter to Goethe of 17 August 1797, Schiller performs an informal, speculative psychoanalysis of five young poets in order to come to some clarity about what hinders each on their path toward artistry. They are: Siegfried Schmid (1774–1759), Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843), Sophie Mereau, Amalie von Imhoff, and Caroline von Wolzogen. In the case of Schmidt and Hölderlin, he observes an idealistic spirit that is so at odds with the superficial environment in which they were brought up that, he speculates, they have developed an overtly subject-oriented disposition that prevents them from locating harmony between their rational principles and the material world in which they and all others operate:

> H*err* Schmidt, so wie er jetzt ist, ist freilich nur die entgegengesetzte Carricatur von der Frankfurter empirischen Welt, und so wie diese nicht Zeit hat, in sich hinein zu gehen, so kann dieser und seines gleichen gar nicht aus sich selbst herausgehen [. . .].
>
> Ich möchte wißen ob diese Schmidt, diese Richter diese Hölderlins absolut und unter allen Umständen so subjectivisch, so überspannt, so einseitig geblieben wären, ob es an etwas primitivem liegt, oder ob nur der Mangel einer aesthetischen Nahrung und Einwirkung von aussen und die Opposition der empirischen Welt in der sie leben gegen ihren idealischen Hang diese unglückliche Wirkung hervorgebracht hat. (*NA* 29, 118)

Later in the letter, he expresses his concern that Sophie Mereau is headed along the same path: "Sie hat sich bloß in einer einsamen Existenz und in einem Widerspruch mit der Welt gebildet" (*NA* 29, 119). Her poetry displays "Ernst" but no "Spiel," and therefore her poetry falls short of the aesthetic ideal in that it lacks beauty, or, as he calls it here, "Form." Amalie von Imhoff, on the other hand, "wird [. . .] ihr Lebenlang nur damit [mit der Phantasie] spielen." His description of writing resembles his description of *dem populären Schriftsteller* who aims merely to entertain in "Über die nothwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schöner Formen." In the case of Caroline von

Wolzogen, "diese hat das Gute von beiden [Mereau und Imhoff]," but her writing still lacks clarity. From this categorization of the five poetic prospects, one observes that Schiller's conception of *dem philosophischen Schriftsteller* is not necessarily bound by sex but is rather shaped by one's relationship to one's environment.

Furthermore, one can suspect from the groups of dilettantes listed in the plan for "Über den Dilettantismus" (i.e., children, women, wealthy people, the nobility) that Schiller and Goethe intended to thematize not the biological disposition of women to dilettantism but rather the social conditions that inhibit the full development of their artistic abilities (*NA* 21, 62). It is in this specific context that one should understand Schiller's controversial letter to Goethe of just under two months prior (of 30 June 1797). Here as well, Schiller is attempting to assess the value and faults of poets in whom he sees potential. Schiller fears for Hölderlin's state of mind and announces that he may have to give up on him. In Sophie Mereau, however, he witnesses great progress:

> Sie fängt darinn [in ihrem *Briefe von Amanda und Eduard*] an, sich von Fehlern frey zu machen, die ich an ihr für ganz unheilbar hielt, und wenn sie auf diesem guten Wege weiter fortgeht, so erleben wir noch was an ihr. Ich muß mich doch wirklich drüber wundern, wie unsere Weiber jetzt, auf bloß dilettantischem Wege, eine gewiße Schreibgeschicklichkeit sich zu verschaffen wißen, die der Kunst nahe kommt. (*NA* 29, 93)

The ease with which Schiller relinquished a claim to a German reworking of Pierre Corneille's (1606–1684) *Le Cid* (1636) when she expressed interest in the project for herself[67] is evidence that, in his eyes, Mereau stayed the "guten Wege." His initial concern over her idealistic and withdrawn mental state indicates a more plausible and coherent reading of his remark about exceptional women thinkers in "Über die nothwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schöner Formen," namely, that he was expressing his opposition to the idea that women perform the

[67] See *NA* 31, 122.

masculine-coded glorification of rationality at the expense of feeling. Instead, he advocates for the harmonization of both rational and sensual characteristics in all men and women.

Again in "Über die nothwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schöner Formen," Schiller cautions all the same against the dangers of too much contact with literature that is "nur Spiel" at too early an age, which, he warned, can tarnish a young mind before it has properly developed its reasoning faculty. The disastrous effects of an education lacking in substantive philosophical import is particularly hazardous to young people, who are particularly influential. Schiller did not however limit his concern to young people, but to all those who operated in circles where philosophical rigor is sparse:

> Daher der Geist der Oberflächlichkeit und Frivolität, den man sehr oft bey solchen Ständen und in solchen Zirkeln herrschen sieht, die sie sich sonst nicht mit Unrecht der höchsten Verfeinerung rühmen. Einen jungen Menschen in diese Zirkel der *Grazien* einzuführen, ehe die *Musen* ihn als mündig entlassen haben, muß ihm nothwendig verderblich werden, und es kann gar nicht fehlen, daß eben das, was dem reifen Jüngling die äußere Vollendung giebt, den unreifen zum Gecken macht. [. . .] Form ohne Stoff [. . .] ist gar nur der Schatte eines Besitzes, und alle Kunstfertigkeit im Ausdruck kann demjenigen nichts helfen, der nichts auszudrücken hat. (*NA* 21, 18–19)

He calls the writer who produces art of this type of content *den populären Schriftsteller*. Schiller's use of the exact same term, *Frivolität*, in a letter of 9 January 1796 to his patron Friedrich Christian von Augustenburg (1756–1814), coupled with his expressed desire in both the essay and the letter to counteract the pedagogical damage that frivolous literature posed on an undeveloped mind, demonstrates that his concern was not merely theoretical but serious enough to prompt his own literary resistance to the trend. In the letter, written only four months after he sent his manuscript of "Über die nothwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schöner Formen" to Cotta for publication, he writes of his hope that his literary journal *Die Horen* will supplant "den herrschenden Geist der Frivolität durch männlichere Grundsätze" (*NA* 28, 161).

It is particularly interesting, therefore, that a great number of the writers whom he commissioned to publish in *Die Horen* were women. Schiller personally approached Elisa von der Recke (1754–1833), Caroline von Wolzogen (1763–1847), Friederike Brun (1765–1835), Sophie Mereau (1770–1806), and Amalia von Imhoff (1776–1831) for commissions, and Louise Brachman (1777–1822) approached him.[68] It would follow then that those women writers whom he published in *Die Horen* write "durch männlichere Grundsätze," i.e., guided by reason.

Furthermore, Schiller advocated for the improved access to serious literature for women. In a letter to Cotta of 14 November 1794, Schiller attached an informal review of the journal *Flora: Teutschlands Töchtern geweiht von Freundinnen und Freunden des schönen Geschlechts*, edited by Christian Jakob Zahn (1765–1830) and published in the J.B. Cottaschen Buchhandlung from 1793 to 1803. After a diplomatic expression of general agreeableness to the project, Schiller criticizes the complete lack of serious intellectual content, arguing that women are capable of much more than being merely entertained: "Aber ich kann es Ihnen kaum verzeihen, daß Sie sich bisher blos auf eine angenehme Unterhaltung des schönen Geschlechts einschränken, das einer ernsthaftern Belehrung und Bildung so sehr empfänglich und würdig ist" (*NA* 27, 86). He goes on to specifically contradict the claim made in "Über die nothwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schöner Formen" women can only grasp that which appeals to her taste. In his informal review of *Flora*, in contrast, Schiller writes:

> Sie scheinen mir also auch die Meinung zu hegen, als ob Schriften, die bei der weiblichen Welt ihr Glük machen sollen, schlechterdings nur Spiel bleiben dürften; eine Verläumdung, deren ich mich nicht schuldig machen mag. Vielmehr ist es diese ungerechte Voraussezzung, welche macht, daß so viele Werke, welche von Messe zu Messe an das schöne Geschlecht gerichtet werden, gar nicht an ihre Addresse gelangen;

[68] Schiller commissioned each of these women to contribute to his magazine except for Louise Brachmann, who approached Schiller first. Janet Besserer Holmgren, *The Women Writers In Schiller's Horen: Patrons, Petticoats, and the Promotion of Weimar Classicism* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2007), 19.

> denn der edlere Theil dieses Geschlechts (und wer möchte auch für den andern sich verwenden?) will Geistesnahrung, nicht blos Belustigung. Das Frauenzimmer hegt zwar den rühmlichen Trieb, zu gefallen, aber es ist auch vermögend, etwas zu schäzzen, was ihm nicht zu gefallen strebt. (*NA* 27, 86)

Here, Schiller writes that though women nurture the drive to please, they are equipped with the capacity to esteem that which does not please them. In other words, women are able to do exactly that which nature ostensibly "forbade" them in "Über die nothwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schöner Formen." Schiller even introduces passively denounces such an opinion as "Verläumdung" and decries it as an "ungerecht" double standard that women are denied access to texts of a deeper nature. In a letter to Cotta four months later, referring to a harsh third-party review of *Flora* published in the *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* Nr. 69, Schiller felt urged to advise: "Beobachten Sie aber doch künftig eine strengere Wahl, denn mehrere Aufsätze in der Flora sind wirklich schwer zu vertheidigen" (*NA* 27, 162). By Schiller's own standards in his review of *Flora*, then, his remark that women's rational capacities are essentially lesser than those of men is "Verläumdung" and "ungerecht" and may therefore be summarized as unfortunately sloppy phrasing that is inconsistent with his other statements on the subject from the same period. In his private letter to Cotta, Schiller gave the publisher permission to print any part of his informal review of *Flora*, implying that he was committed enough to this criticism that he was willing to defend it publicly.[69]

Bewegliche vs. architektonische Schönheit

In 1998, Germanist Gail K. Hart laid the groundwork for a new way of reading Schiller's reflections on gender by associating femininity with his understanding of "Anmuth" as a

[69] See *NA* 27, 85.

"bewegliche Schönheit" (*NA* 20, 252), i.e., a type of beauty that is not inherent in the physical body of the individual who possesses it. In other words, femininity is not biologically bound. To borrow Schiller's term, femininity is not "architektonisch." For Schiller, then, gender is no different from grace, dignity, beauty, or freedom; it is constructed by society and in society—it is not congenital. Drawing on Judith Butler's theory of gender performativity,[70] Hart concludes that Schiller "did not see gender as a given, but rather as a collection of codified attributes and behaviors that could be projected onto/into a body."[71]

A survey of Schiller's use of the terms masculine and feminine supports Hart's conclusion. Schiller did not aim to challenge the lexical usage of the terms *Männlichkeit* and *Weiblichkeit*; he often employed them in conformity with their popular associations or, in Hart's words, as "collection[s] of codified attributes and behaviors." However, Schiller's creative employment of these terms reveals that he did not see gender as essentially tied to certain types of bodies. For example, in a congratulatory letter to Christian Gottfried Körner (1756–1831) and his new wife, Minna Körner (1762–1843; née Anna Maria Wilhelmine Jakobine Stock), on the day of their wedding (7 August 1785), Schiller has his fictional *Zevs* describe his daughter *Tugend* as "meine männliche Tochter," likely referring to the Latin *virtus* (virtue), derived from *vir*, "man" (*NA* 24, 16). In a *Kallias* letter to Körner of 23 February 1793, Schiller contrasts the feminine with the masculine, but he uses both sides of this contrast in a rhetorical gesture in order to contrast male figures from history and fiction with one another: Caesar (the feminine) against Cato (the masculine), Cimon (the feminine) against Phocion (the masculine), Thomas Jones (the feminine)

---

[70] See Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism And The Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990) and Butler, *Bodies That Matter: On The Discursive Limits of "Sex"* (New York: Routledge, 1993).

[71] Hart, "Re-Dressing History," 96.

against Grandison (the masculine). Here, Schiller uses the meaning of *weiblich* and *männlich* according to their general usage at the end of the eighteenth century. The feminine character indicates a tendency in the agent toward inclination and feeling at the expense of reason, where the masculine character indicates a tendency in the agent toward reason at the cost of inclination and feeling. Instead of binding either of these characters to male or female bodies, *männlich* and *weiblich* function here as bodyless symbols, which Schiller the aesthete employs to argue that a spectator derives more pleasure from the observation of a character who acts in in accordance with inclination and feeling rather than fealty to cold rationality. The latter, if completely separated from inclination has rather an alienating, "brutal" effect, and appears to be "nichts anders als das Gegentheil des *Freien*":

> Daher gefällt uns Cesar weit mehr als Cato, Cimon mehr als Phocion, Thomas Jones weit mehr als Grandison. Daher rührt es, daß uns oft bloß *affectionierte* Handlungen mehr gefallen als rein moralische, weil sie Freiwilligkeit zeigen, weil sie durch die Natur (den Affect) nicht durch die gebieterische Vernunft wider das Intereße der Natur vollbracht werden – daher mag es kommen, daß uns die milden Tugenden mehr als die heroischen, das weibliche so oft mehr als das männliche gefällt; denn der weibliche Carakter, auch der vollkommenste, kann nie anders als aus Neigung handeln. (*NA* 26, 217)

In his poem "Das weibliche Ideal" (1796), Schiller uses feminine and masculine as superlative adjectives ("dem weiblichsten Weib" and "der männlichste Mann" *NA* 1, 287), implying that femininity and masculinity are fluid qualities that can exist to varying degrees in an individual.

Schiller's prose story "Merkwürdiges Beispiel einer weiblichen Rache" (1785–1787) is a translation of Denis Diderot's (1713–1784) story of Mme de La Pommeraye in the frame novella *Jacques le fataliste et son maître*. In Schiller's liberal translation, as in Diderot's original, Mme de La Pommeraye (here, Frau von P***) is a noblewoman respected in all of Paris for her honesty and constancy. After the death of her first husband, she wishes to remain single for the rest of her life—but she is seduced by the Marquis von Arcis (here, Marquis von A***), whom she believes,

after months of insistent pursuit, is deeply committed to her. They become intimate, but, before long, the Marquis von A*** becomes bored with his hard-won mistress. Frau von P*** launches and succeeds in a plot to avenge her scorned honor and broken heart. At the end of the plot, she facilitates the marriage of the Marquis von A*** to a young woman, who—though he does not know it until the marriage has been consummated—had formerly worked as a prostitute for ten years.

Of primary interest for the present chapter are the voice of Schiller's narrator and his original title for the story. In comparison with Diderot's already empathetic narrator, Schiller's narrator seems especially sensitive to Mme de La Pommeraye's emotional suffering. In both versions, Marquis von A*** grows tired of Frau von P***, but Schiller's narrator uses the word *einfallen*, implying a sudden, overwhelming, and unprecedented impulse to be rid of his wife:

> Au bout de quelques années, le marquis commença à trouver la vie de Mme de La Pommeraye trop unie. (Denis Diderot, *Jacques le Fataliste*, ed. Yvon Belaval [Paris: Gallimard, 1973], 145)
>
> Einige Jahre waren so hingeflossen, als es dem Marquis einfiel, die Lebensart der Dame etwas einförmig zu finden. (*NA* 16, 188)

The choice of verb makes Schiller's Marquis von A*** appear even more fickle than Diderot's—as if the slightest whim prompted him to betray the initially so resistant Frau von P***, making the betrayal even more despicable. In Diderot, mortal spite tears apart Mme de La Pommeraye ("renfermant en elle-même le dépit mortel"),[72] while, in Schiller, the mortal spite tears apart her heart ("unterdrückte den tödlichen Gram, der ihr Herz zerriß").[73] At the end of the story, both narrators appeal directly to the reader to consider the motivation of Mme de La Pommeraye/Frau

[72] Diderot, 149.

[73] *NA* 16, 191.

von P*** before judging her actions. Here in particular Schiller takes much more liberty in his translation than had been his practice throughout:

> et lorsqu'elle se venge d'une perfidie, vous vous révoltez contre elle au lieu de voir que son ressentiment ne vous indigne que parce que vous êtes incapable d'en éprouver un aussi profond, ou que vous ne faites presque aucun cas de la vertu des femmes. (Diderot, 198–199)

> Aber jetzt – jetzt, da sie an einem Treulosen Rache nimmt, empören sich deine Gefühle. Nicht weil den Herz für diese Handlung zu weich ist – weil du es der Mühe nicht wert achtest, in die Tiefe ihres Kummers hinabzusteigen, weil du zu stolz bist, weibliche Tugend anzuerkennen, findest du ihre Ahndung abscheulich. (*NA* 16, 222)

Schiller's narrator intensifies the drama in adding speech-like repetition, as if the narrator were an impassioned orator ("Aber jetzt – jetzt"). Where Diderot's narrator blames the reader's likely indignation against Mme de La Pommeraye on an incapacity to feel such deep resentment—in itself a concession to the reader's superiority of character—Schiller's narrator rejects this diplomatic excuse, implying instead that the reader may indeed be capable of such an act and is therefore applying a double standard in judgment. Diderot's narrator offers an alternative explanation for the reader's indignation, introduced by the conjunction "ou," implying uncertainty about the reader's mindset. Schiller's narrator, meanwhile, makes clear accusations against the reader. Schiller's reader is inhumane, willingly deaf to empathy, apathetic to the subjective emotional work that it would take to understand the story's protagonist: "weil du es der Mühe nicht wert achtest [. . .]." In Schiller's version, the guilt of Frau von P*** has been fully transferred to the judging reader. To add insult to injury, Schiller places the blame for the reader's unjust judgment on gendered prejudice: "weil du zu stolz bist, weibliche Tugend anzuerkennen [. . .]." This accusation has two implications. First, it is the fact that this revenge is "einer weiblichen," as Schiller describes it in the title, that makes it "merkwürdig"—that a woman would value herself enough to avenge herself is a novelty. In both Diderot's and Schiller's versions, Mme de La

Pommeraye states this herself, saying that if more women valued themselves as they ought to, fewer men would take advantage of them.[74] Second, the notion of an unusual, feminine revenge (unusual because it is feminine) is at once implicitly undermined and criticized as the unreflective position of a biased reader who participates in a culture that abuses women and then abhors them for defending themselves. Further, Schiller's narrator extends this reprimand from "lecteur" to "Leser oder Leserin" (*NA* 16, 222), implicating men and women equally in the culture of prejudice that drove Frau von P*** to her revenge. As both Diderot's and Schiller's narrators conclude:

> Je n'y vois que des trahisons moins communes; et j'approuverais fort une loi qui condamnerait aux courtisanes celui qui aurait séduit et abandonné une honnête femme : l'homme commun aux femmes communes. (Diderot, 200)

> Ich sehe hier nichts als eine Verräterei, die nur weniger alltäglich ist; und willkommen sei mir das Gesetz, welches jeden gewissenlosen Buben, der eine ehrliche Frau zu Fall bringt und dann *verläßt*, zu einer Dirne verdammt – den gemeinen Mann zu gemeinen Weibern. (*NA* 16, 223)

Here, as in the prior examples, Schiller shows himself inclined to employ the contrast of femininity and masculinity as poetic descriptors that are often applied playfully, sometimes admonishingly, as fits the occasion, but always critically. Schiller's process of applying the codified set of attributes associated with masculinity and femininity and then undermining the authority of the 'code' by applying the gendered terms to members of either sex constitutes, in Butler's words, "a fluidity of identities that suggests an openness to resignification and recontextualization."[75]

One passage in particular is frequently cited evidence of Schiller's alleged gender essentialism, namely, the end of the first section on grace in his treatise on aesthetics, *Ueber Anmuth und Würde* (*NA* 20, 288–289). Though the section is so infamous, a crucial parenthetical

[74] See *NA* 16, 217.

[75] Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 138.

remark about the male body is routinely overlooked, leading scholars to frequently make the claim that Schiller's conception of *Anmuth* corresponds to biological femaleness and *Würde* to maleness.[76] Before going into why Schiller's brief speculation about the male body is so crucial for understanding his lengthier remarks on the female body, it will first be helpful to briefly recall Schiller's use of the relevant terms grace and beauty in this treatise.

Schiller distinguishes between two types of beauty in *Ueber Anmuth und Würde*. Physical beauty ("architektonische Schönheit") is a fixed quality—i.e., it is a quality that is inseparably tied to the constitution of an object in the phenomenal realm. However, beauty itself is nothing purely empirical; it is an idea. Ideas or concepts formulated by human reason and associated by reason with the phenomenal body have no actual influence on the natural constitution of the body as an object. Nevertheless, Schiller argues, despite knowing that the physical constitution of an object in nature is not the result of merit, human reason can and does delight in lending ("hinlegen") its ideas to objects as if the objects themselves had earned such esteem. This is what happens, for example, when a subject lends the idea of teleology to the constitution of a human body, "wo die Naturnothwendigkeit durch die Nothwendigkeit des sie bestimmenden teleologischen Grundes unterstützt wird," and the subject calls the otherwise merely empirical object architectonically beautiful:

> Hier allein konnte die Schönheit gegen die Technik des Baues *berechnet* werden, welches aber nicht mehr statt findet, sobald die Nothwendigkeit nur einseitig ist und die übersinnliche Ursache, welche die Erscheinung bestimmt, sich zufällig verändert. Für die architektonische Schönheit des Menschen sorgt also die Natur *allein***,** weil ihr hier, gleich in der ersten Anlage, die Vollziehung alles dessen, was der Mensch zu Erfüllung seiner Zwecke *bedarf*, einmal für immer von dem schaffenden Verstand *übergeben* wurde, und

[76] See Lokke, 124 and 127; Bovenschen, especially 248–250; Christine Lubkoll, "Moralität und Modernität: Schillers Konzept der 'schönen Seele' im Lichte der literaturhistorischen Diskussion," in *Friedrich Schiller und der Weg in die Moderne*, ed. Walter Hinderer (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2006), especially 90–95.

> sie also in diesem ihrem *organischen* Geschäfte keine Neuerung zu befürchten hat. (*NA* 20, 262)

In other words, humans decided that the nature-given body is completely sufficient for executing all human ends and, in light of this decision, humans can and do judge that they are more or less physically beautiful according to their ability to carry out their ends with their bodies.

In contrast with "architektonische Schönheit," Schiller introduces a different type of beauty, namely, "bewegliche Schönheit." This type of beauty is not at all determined by nature, but rather it is earned by free will via human reason. It is moveable ("beweglich"), because unlike, for example, beautiful hair, which remains anatomically unchanged regardless of how its owner behaves, moveable beauty can be acquired.[77] "Anmuth" is the name of this moveable beauty, and it designates the beautiful appearance of human individuals who have so thoroughly embraced the moral law that their moral actions appear completely natural to themselves and to observers. It can, by the same token, be lost by individuals whose actions become exclusively determined by, on the one hand, instinct, desire, or any other natural influence, or, on the other, reason alone. The same individual can acquire and lose the appearance of grace over a period of time.

The distinction between *architectonic beauty* (physical beauty) and *moveable beauty* (grace) must be kept in mind when reading Schiller's remarks on the sexes in *Ueber Anmuth und Würde* because it is precisely this distinction (not, in contrast, the distinction between grace and dignity) that is at work here at the conclusion of the section on grace. When Schiller remarks that the male sex might more easily tend toward beauty, he is specifically referring to physical beauty: "Man wird, im Ganzen genommen, die Anmuth mehr bey dem *weiblichen* Geschlecht (die Schönheit vielleicht mehr bey dem männlichen) finden" (*NA* 20, 288). The evidence for this is that

[77] See *NA* 20, 254.

the distinction between "architektonische Schönheit" and "Anmuth" is summarized again in the paragraph preceding the short section on the sexes. In the rare instances when Schiller's brief remarks on the sexes are addressed, scholarship has tended to insinuate that, because this remark comes only a few paragraphs before the section on dignity, Schiller is ascribing dignity to the male sex and grace to the female sex, but there is no textual evidence to support this reading. Recognizing the correct distinction at work in this passage on the sexes—that between grace and physical beauty rather than grace and dignity—is important because it invalidates readings that claim that Schiller held grace to be an essentially female biological characteristic and dignity as an essentially male biological characteristic.

As summarized above, the judgment of one human body as more beautiful than another human body (that is, it is more fit to execute the teleological function that is lent to it by human minds) and the judgment of a human action as graceful are both judgments that require the understanding to hand over ("*übergeben*," *NA* 20, 262) an idea to that object—hence the judgments of either type of beauty cannot be based exclusively on the natural properties of the object alone and therefore must not play a role here. To add to this point—that Schiller does not demand a strict assignment of grace to one sex based on anatomy—the section on the sexes is remarkably rhetorically distinct from the rest of the treatise in that it contains numerous expressions of qualification and speculation. For example, Schiller writes that one locates grace "im Ganzen genommen" more in the female sex and architectonic beauty "vielleicht" more in the male sex (*NA* 20, 288). The contribution that "die Seele" necessarily makes toward grace "kann" be more readily fulfilled by a woman than a man. "Der weibliche Charakter" tends to perform "affektionirt[e] Handlungen" that intuitively conform with reason but are "selten" based thereon (*NA* 20, 289), but this is because a woman's morality is "gewöhnlich" in harmony with her inclination and therefore

she does not need to perform a rational calculation at every moral juncture (*NA* 20, 288).[78] His use of terminology here so closely mirrors his remarks regarding the "bloß *affectionierte* Handlungen" of "de[m] weibliche[n] Charakter" used to describe Caesar, Cimon, and Thomas Jones in the *Kallias* letter of 23 February 1793 (written in the same period as *Ueber Anmuth und Würde*) that it becomes clear that Schiller does not maintain grace to be an exclusively female phenomenon. Furthermore, since *Anmuth* describes the beautiful appearance of a moral action, it is merely a quality of movements. Individuals can neither *be* inherently graceful, nor dignified, as this would contradict the principle of *Anmuth* as a "bewegliche Schönheit." They can only *appear* as such. Similarly, in *Ueber naive und sentimentalische Dichtung*, though Schiller writes that nature has indicated for "dem andern Geschlecht [. . .] in dem naiven Charakter seine höchste Vollkommenheit," in the same paragraph he associates the naive character with genius statesmen and generals:

> Ich will hier unter den Alten nur an *Epaminondas* und *Julius Cäsar*, unter den Neuern nur an *Heinrich den Vierten* von Frankreich, *Gustav Adolph* von Schweden und den Czar *Peter* den *Großen* erinnern. Der Herzog von *Marlborough, Türenne, Vendome* zeigen uns alle diesen Charakter. (*NA* 20, 425)

Taken together, these statements appear to constitute anthropological observations on how human beings tend to aestheticize different appearances in nature. While Schiller observes different trends in the behavior of female and male individuals based on a variety of factors, including anatomy

[78] See, for example, "Über das Erhabene" (1801): "Diese Sinnesart aber, welche die Moral unter dem Begriff der Resignation in die Nothwendigkeit und die Religion unter dem Begriff der Ergebung in den göttlichen Rathschluß lehret, erfodert, wenn sie ein Werk der freyen Wahl und Ueberlegung seyn soll, schon eine größere Klarheit des Denkens und eine höhere Energie des Willens, als dem Menschen im handelnden Leben eigen zu seyn pflegt. Glücklicherweise aber ist nicht bloß in seiner rationalen Natur eine moralische Anlage, welche durch den Verstand entwickelt werden kann, sondern selbst in seiner sinnlich vernünftigen, d. h. menschlichen Natur eine *aesthetische* Tendenz dazu vorhanden, welche durch gewisse sinnliche Gegenstände geweckt, und durch Läuterung seiner Gefühle zu diesem idealistischen Schwung des Gemüths kultivirt werden kann." *NA* 21, 39–40.

and the way anatomy is socially interpreted, he does not endorse the position that certain behavioral characteristics *must* categorically be ascribed to specific anatomical arrangements.

The Savage vs. the Barbarian

The theme of the opposition between *Sinnlichkeit* and *Vernunft* is abundant throughout Schiller's oeuvre, where the presence of one capacity at the expense of the other is always the harbinger of violence that threatens the totality of the human as an individual and as a member of the community of humanity. In the *Ästhetische Briefe*, Schiller employs the image of the *Wilder* and that of the *Barbar* to illustrate two ways in which an individual can behave violently towards oneself. The behavior of the *Wilder* is always prompted foremost by sensibility (or the capacity to receive the world through the physical senses and emotions). The force of sensibility holds such a heavy sway over the mind of such an individual that it overpowers reason in an oppressive, violent way. Reason is chained to the demands of the senses: "So lange der Mensch noch ein Wilder ist, seine Triebe bloß auf materielle Gegenstände gehen, und ein Egoism von der gröbern Art seine Handlungen leitet, kann die Sinnlichkeit nur durch ihre *blinde Stärke* der Moralität gefährlich seyn, und sich den Vorschriften der Vernunft bloß als eine Macht widersetzen" (*NA* 20, 23). The *Barbar*, on the other hand, is someone whose reason (or the capacity to form ideas that go beyond what we receive through the senses and emotions) has suppressed sensibility. The behavior of the *Barbar* alarms Schiller even more than that of the *Wilder*. He finds the character of the *Barbar* represented in recent historical examples of ideologically driven violence, as in the *Terreur*, an event that prompted the composition of the *Ästhetische Briefe*.[79] In the character of the *Barbar*, Schiller locates a championing of moral principles to the detriment of the existence of the living beings

[79] High, *Schillers Rebellionskonzept*.

who might practically benefit from such principles—those whom the principles are ostensibly meant to serve.[80]

This same opposition between sensibility and reason is set up in *Über naïve und sentimentalische Dichtung* through the archetypes of the *Idealist*, who suppresses sensibility, and the *Realist*, who suppresses reason. Each archetype has an extreme variant: *der Phantast* and *der gemeine Empiriker* (*NA* 20, 502–503). The *Empiriker* has completely rejected reason and amounts as such to little more than an object in space among other objects. The failure of the *Empiriker* to develop their potential, however, does not erase that potential. The fact alone that the *Empiriker* recognizes the value of existence and acts in support of that end, shows that the *Empiriker* is not just an empty object, devoid of reason: "dieser Zustand [ist] nicht ganz gehaltlos" (*NA* 20, 502). The *Phantast*, on the other hand, who has thoroughly suppressed receptivity to sense and emotion, is a violent force that views bodies as mere burdens to be overcome:

> Der Phantast verläugnet also nicht bloß den menschlichen – er verläugnet allen Charakter, er ist völlig ohne Gesetz, er ist also gar nichts und dient auch zu gar nichts. Aber eben darum, weil die Phantaserey keine Ausschweifung der Natur sondern der Freyheit ist, also aus einer an sich achtungswürdigen Anlage entspringt, die ins unendliche perfektibel ist, so führt sie auch zu einem unendlichen Fall in eine bodenlose Tiefe, und kann nur in einer völligen Zerstörung sich endigen. (*NA* 20, 503)

Regardless of the nature of the archetypes that Schiller uses to illustrate the danger of the opposition between reason and sensibility, be it the opposition between the *Barbar* and the *Wilder*, the *Idealist* and the *Realist*, or the *Empiriker* and the *Phantast*, the message is the same: individuals who are set in internal antagonism through the suppression of their complex humanity must seek to resolve this tension in order to cease the violence that their disharmony causes—both to themselves and to others.

[80] See *NA* 20, 318.

This latter threat is central. For while, on the microcosmic scale, violence against oneself by means of suppression leads to the deterioration or complete breakdown of mental health,[81] on the macrocosmic scale, this internal tension may lead to the destruction of entire societies.[82] Schiller goes to great lengths to warn against the threat of unchecked reason to society at large:

> Nun ist aber der physische Mensch *wirklich*, und der sittliche nur *problematisch.* Hebt also die Vernunft den Naturstaat auf, wie sie notwendig muss, wenn sie den ihrigen an die Stelle setzen will, so wagt sie den physischen und wirklichen Menschen an den problematischen sittlichen, so wagt sie die Existenz der Gesellschaft an ein bloß mögliches (wenn gleich moralisch notwendiges) Ideal von Gesellschaft. (*NA* 20, 314)

If reason makes too much of a claim (and if it does so too soon) on human individuals, who as humans are distinguished among the other animals by their capacity for harmony between sensual and rational drives, reason may very well undermine the individual's potential for developing humanity at all. Schiller advocates for a loftier condition, in which there is a harmony between reason and sensibility, a so-called *Wechsel-Wirkung*, where "die Wirksamkeit des einen die Wirksamkeit des andern zugleich begründet und begrenzt" (*NA* 20, 352). This state of realized harmony is referred to by Schiller as a *dritten Charakter* (*NA* 20, 315), the first two being *der natürliche Charakter* and, opposite it, *der sittliche Charakter* (*NA* 20, 315).

Der dritte Charakter can only be developed over time and in the midst of community. Reacting however to the horrors of the *Terreur*, Schiller observes a dangerous trend among intellectuals and liberal politicians to valorize ideology at the expense of human feeling. This is the hallmark of the fall into 'barbarism' rather than an ascent to harmony. One observes this trend foremost in "d[en] civilisierten Klassen":

---

[81] See, for example, Franz Moor's confrontation with his conscience and subsequent suicide in Act 5, Scene 1 of *Die Räuber* (*NA* 3, 116–127).

[82] See, for example, Schiller's depiction of the manic society in "Das Lied von der Glocke" (*NA* 2I, 236–237).

> Ich erinnere mich nicht mehr, welcher alte oder neue Philosoph die Bemerkung machte, daß das edlere in seiner Zerstörung das abscheulichere sey, aber man wird sie auch im moralischen wahr finden. [. . .] Die Aufklärung des Verstandes, deren sich die verfeinerten Stände nicht ganz mit Unrecht rühmen, zeigt im Ganzen so wenig einen veredelnden Einfluß auf die Gesinnungen, daß sie vielmehr die Verderbniß durch Maximen befestigt. (*NA* 20, 320)

The self-destruction and the destruction of others at the hands of the privileged, or of "d[en] civilisierten Klassen," who behave in accordance with ideological principles but without love for humanity and see others only as objects to be used as means toward the achievement of ideological ends, is a theme that has long been identified as a preoccupation in Schiller's dramatic oeuvre. Stephanie Barbé Hammer recognizes in particular Schiller's dramatic portrayals of discord between men and women as one of his favorite literary frameworks through which he depicts the devastating consequences that the less privileged must endure when the more privileged allow their moral principles to suppress their feelings for others: "His dramas display masculinity as a diseased mythos which seeps to the cultural surface as a series of linked symptoms: as a desire for personal freedom so strong that it becomes mania, [. . .] and as a blood-lust so overwhelming that it must mow down everything in its path."[83] The following section of this chapter will demonstrate that Hammer's observation of Schillerian warnings against destructive masculinity in his dramas is just as present in his poetry. In the following poems, femininity corresponds to the ideal of the harmonized *Mensch* who feels (often through love) and reasons. Masculinity, in contrast, corresponds to the unstable and destructive individual who is mastered either by too much sensation or too much reason.

[83] Stephanie Barbé Hammer, "Schiller, Time and Again," *The German Quarterly* 67, no. 2 (1994): 155. See also Walter Müller-Seidel: "Es ist in der Tat eine von Männern regierte Welt, in die wir blicken." Müller-Seidel, *Friedrich Schiller und die Politik: Nicht das Große, nur das Menschliche geschehe* (München: C.H. Beck, 2009), 71.

Schiller's poem, "Die berühmte Frau" (1788) satirizes the hypocrisy among the European "civilisierten Klassen" that permits men to claim moral superiority over and victimization by the women whom they fail to fully oppress. The fictional epistler writes to his friend in order to admonish him for complaining that his wife is having an affair while, as the epistler argues, he is in a far worse situation, for his wife is not unfaithful, but rather a famous writer:

> Dich schmerzt, daß sich in Deine Rechte
> ein zweyter theilt? – Beneidenswerther Mann!
> Mein Weib gehört dem ganzen menschlichen Geschlechte. (*NA* 1, 196)

Around the time of its publication, the poem was interpreted at best as a light-hearted mockery of would-be women aesthetes[84] and at worst as an all-out condemnation of women writers.[85] However, there is no substantial evidence to support the accusation that this "Epistel eines Ehemanns an einen andern" was intended to represent the perspective of the yet unmarried Schiller, or that the mockery of the titular famous woman is to be taken seriously rather than criticized. For example, the epistler laments that his wife neglects the upkeep and improvement of her looks,[86] an activity that finds uniform criticism in Schiller's prose, as in, for example, his 1785 poem "An die Parzen," in which "die schmeichlerische Toilette" is associated with vanity and falsehood (*NA* 1, 73).[87] The epistler himself becomes a figure of irony when he insists that his

[84] "Weimar und Leipzig," *Gothaische gelehrte Zeitungen* 9, 8 November 1788, 737–738.

[85] See letter from Christiane Sophia Ludwig to Schiller of 6 December 1791 (*NA* 34.1, 119–120).

[86] "Die Toilette wartet schon, / Doch halbe Blicke nur beglücken ihren Spiegel." *NA* 1, 197.

[87] In "Ueber das gegenwärtige teutsche Theater" (1782), Schiller associates idlesness with the toilette: "So lang das Schauspiel weniger Schule als Zeitvertrieb ist [. . .], so lang es mehr für die Toilette und die Schenke arbeitet: so lange mögen immer unsere Theaterschriftsteller der patriotischen Eitelkeit entsagen, Lehrer des Volks zu seyn" (*NA* 20, 81–82). Imitated "Anmuth" (such as graceful dancing) is posed as "ein würdiges Gegenstück zu derjenigen *Schönheit*, die am Putztisch aus Karmin und Bleyweiß, falschen Locken, Fausses Gorges, und Wallfischrippen

friend's wife knows "deiner *Gattinn* Titel doch zu schätzen," an openly absurd suggestion that it is more respectable to maintain an unhappy marriage as long as the wife merely feigns loyalty to the outside world. By mocking the epistler, the poem itself works as a mockery of clueless husbands, who idealize their brides before they marry and find themselves disappointed with the reality of married life after they do. According to such a reading, the fictional letter writer of "Die berühmte Frau" may be understood literally when he nostalgically calls up the memory of the wife that he dreamed up when she was still his bride: "Ein Weib, wie keines ist, und keines war" (*NA* 1, 199). The rift between his fantasy and his wife's real self make a harmonious relationship impossible. Only an imagined or completely suppressed wife could live up to the husband's tyrannical ideal.

Schiller likely began work on "Die berühmte Frau" in late May or early June 1788 and it was published in October 1788 in Georg Joachim Göschen's (1752–1828) *Pandora, oder Kalender des Luxus und der Moden für das Jahr 1789*.[88] Two months before the poem's publication, on 23 August 1788, Johann Caspar Lavater (1741–1801), a frequent target of Schiller's derision due to his pseudoscientific system of judging character from physiognomic features, wrote a soon to be infamous letter to the pro-Enlightenment writer Elisa von der Recke. Schiller's close companions, both in person and on paper, Charlotte von Lengefeld (later Charlotte von Schiller) and Caroline von Beulwitz (née Caroline von Lengefeld, later von Wolzogen), likely already knew of Lavater's angry letter to their friend von der Recke by November 1788 if not already in mid-October 1788

hervorgeht, und verhält sich ohngefähr eben so zu der wahren Anmuth, wie die *Toiletten-Schönheit* sich zu der *architektonischen* verhält" in *Ueber Anmuth und Würde*. *NA* 20, 269.

[88] See the commentary on a letter to Körner of 12 June 1788 (*NA* 25, 502).

when von der Recke was visiting Weimar.[89] How acquainted Schiller was with the contents of Lavater's and Recke's exchange before he sat down to read their letters in November 1788 is unknown.[90] However, Schiller was already by this time positively disposed to von der Recke for her bestselling book *Nachricht von des berüchtigten Cagliostro Aufenthalte in Mitau, im Jahre 1779, und von dessen dortigen magischen Operationen* (1787), a scathing exposure of the Italian magician—and Lavater's friend—Alessandro Cagliostro (1743–1795) as a conman. Von der Recke's book was a critically important source text and inspiration for Schiller's novel "Der Geisterseher," which he published in installments from 1787 to 1789. Schiller finds that von der Recke is in the right but does not conceal his distaste for the unforgiving tone of both parties, who were once friends. He holds reservations about the right of either one to pretend to be a great mind, making fun at both of them for the inordinately sentimental enthusiasm that they express in their letters: von der Recke appears as "eine Person, die immer noch Enthousastinn nur in einem andern Rocke ist" (*NA* 25, 139). His criticism of von der Recke, therefore contains a veiled criticism of Lavater, and Schiller makes fun of Lavater further when he sarcastically pities his poor, "*Kopf*, wie doch Lavater immer ist," in the wake of von der Recke's intellectually sound assault (*NA* 25, 139). Schiller's criticism of Lavater, however, is even more interesting for the present study in

[89] See the commentary on Schiller's letter to Caroline von Beulwitz and Charlotte von Lengefeld of 13/14 November 1788: "Von diesem Brief Lavaters war bei Frau von der Reckes Aufenthalt in Weimar vom 15.–17. Oktober ausführlich die Rede" (*NA* 25, 568). Further, "Aus Schillers Darstellung ist zu entnehmen, daß die Schwestern Lengefeld von Lavaters Brief an Elise von der Recke als Tatsache schon wußten. Sie kannten diese von ihrem ersten Besuch in Weimar im Dezember 1784" (*NA* 25, 568).

[90] See Schiller's letter to Caroline von Beulwitz and Charlotte von Legefeld of 13/14 November 1788: "Wieland behauptet, daß Lavater der Frau von der Recke durch seinen Brief sehr große Vortheile über sich gegeben habe. Der Brief soll ihm sehr wenig Ehre machen; Bode hat ihn und will ihn nebst der Antwort Ihnen zu verschaffen suchen. Fr*au* v. der Recke soll sich dießmal mehr zu ihrem Vortheil in Weimar ausgenommen haben. Sie blieb aber nur 2 Tage" (*NA* 25, 130).

how it resembles the criticism of the disgruntled husband in "Die berühmte Frau." Schiller highlights the nonsensical tone of Lavater's impassioned writing[91] and takes particular offense at Lavater's derisive comparison of von der Recke's status in the scholarly world to "einen *Amazonen*auftritt" (*NA* 25, 139). Schiller qualifies Lavater's assessment of von der Recke with the subjunctive: Lavater "macht ihr besonders darinn zum Vorwurf, daß sie die *Einfalt* des Herzens verloren hätte." As in "Die berühmte Frau," Schiller takes issue with a man who attempts to gain sympathy by claiming victimization at the hands of a successful female public figure. Rather than tolerate or even support von der Recke's career, as Schiller would later do when he commissioned her writing for *Die Horen*,[92] Lavater feels that he must attack her by characterizing her success not as a gain but as a loss, here a loss of feminine *Einfalt*.

In Schiller's poem "Würde der Frauen," an archetype of masculinity is portrayed as destructive and tyrannical, while an archetype of femininity is portrayed as a harmonious teacher of humanity. The poem consists of seventeen strophes, eight of which present an archetype of masculinity and nine of which present an archetype of femininity. The presentations alternate. Eight of the nine strophes that thematize femininity begin with the contradictory conjunction "aber," for the archetype of femininity functions as a corrective alternative to destructive and self-destructive masculine-coded behavior. The presentation of masculinity is not positive. He staggers from one passion to the next, he is greedy and violent, and he destroys the limit of truth, that codeword for the result of rational investigation: "Ewig aus der Wahrheit Schranken / Schweift

[91] See Schiller's letter to Caroline von Beulwitz and Charlotte von Lengefeld of 19 and 20 November 1788: "Nach vielen unverständlichen mystisch prophetischen Ermahnungen – und ziemlich harten wenigstens gegen eine Dame!! unschicklichen Tiraden ist sie wieder plözlich eine angebetete Elisa!" (*NA* 25, 139).

[92] See Holmgren, "Elisa von der Recke: 'I aspire to fulfill my duty as a human being . . .'" in *The Women Writers in Schiller's Horen*, 128–149.

des Mannes wilde Kraft" (*NA* 1, 240). He is the *Barbar* of the *Ästhetische Briefe*. With rare exceptions, the *Mann* is displayed as an unstable, unsociable being in the singular, whose restlessness and violence precludes communion with others. The *Frau*, however, usually appears in the plural, *Frauen*, for they tend toward community. Schiller describes how the women attempt to calm the man. They warn him to return to "der Gegenwart Spur" from which he has violently torn himself (*NA* 1, 240). Unlike the *Mann*, who is plagued by the craving to consume everything outside of him, the women seek their conquests in the form of knowledge and art which is gained by turning into the infinity of one's own mind, making them freer than the man, for their enrichment is not dependent on the abuse of others:

> Aber zufrieden mit stillerem Ruhme,
> Brechen die Frauen des Augenblicks Blume,
> Pflegen sie sorgsam mit liebendem Fleiß,
> Freier in ihrem gebundenen Wirken
> Reicher, als er in des Denkens Bezirken,
> Und in der Dichtung unendlichem Kreis.[93]

The *Mann*, on the other hand, is portrayed as a tyrannical ruler, whose domain is the brutal Darwinian state where only the strongest survive: "In der Männer Herrschgebiete / Gilt der Stärke stürmisch Recht" (*NA* 1, 241). His unmerciful reign is marked by human rights violations and the devastation he wreaks on others is likened to the Scythians' oppression of the Persians: "Mit dem Schwerdt beweist der Scythe, / Und der Perser wird zum Knecht" (*NA* 1, 241). Tyrants such as these are uniformly shunned in Schiller's oeuvre, from the rapist Gianettino Doria in *Die Verschwörung des Fiesko zu Genua*; to the puppet of the Spanish Inquisition, King Philipp II in *Don Karlos*; to the colonial powers of England and France in the unfinished poem "Deutsche

[93] *NA* 1, 240–241. It is worth noting here that the characterization of women as the masters of knowledge stands in direct contradiction to the characterization of the woman as an unthinking and merely feeling being in "Über die nothwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schöner Formen."

Größe" (ca. 1801), to the occupying Habsburgs in *Wilhelm Tell*; but also to the regicidal Queen Elizabeth I in *Maria Stuart* and the murderous Princess Isabeau in *Die Jungfrau von Orleans*. Hence, there is extreme irony in Friedrich Schlegel's sarcastic 1796 criticism of the men portrayed in "Würde der Frauen"—"Männer, wie diese, müssten an Händen und Beinen gebunden werden"—namely, that Schiller practices the same criticism throughout his literary practice and applies it to men and women tyrants alike.

The women appeal for men to choose love over discord and to join them in a "Tausch der Seelen," an image that recalls Julius's description of love in the *Philosophische Briefe*: "Liebe ist [. . .] gegründet auf einen augenblicklichen Tausch der Persönlichkeit, eine Verwechslung der Wesen" (*NA* 20, 119). Julius's word choice "Verwechslung," literally means "mixing up" or "mistaking" and is important here—the friend is so thoroughly uplifted by the joy of mutual love that he momentarily loses sight of his individuality, all that which separates him from his friend beyond the capacity to love. Selfless love is the type of unity that the *Frauen* advocate for in "Würde der Frauen," because it is the reminder of that which all humans share, reminding them that behind outer appearances they are the same type of being and they are equal.

The woman here does not match up with the character of the *Wilder*, the character that Schiller set opposite of the *Barbar* in the *Ästhetische Briefe*. Rather, she has already progressed beyond the natural state of the *Wilder*, where feeling suppresses reason, and approached the peaceful, harmonious middle path between feeling and reason. She has stayed the course toward "der Menschheit Vollendung" (*NA* 1, 243), the realm that Schiller refers to as *den ästhetischen Staat* in the *Ästhetische Briefe*, a realm "wo nicht die geistlose Nachahmung fremder Sitten, sondern eigne schöne Natur das Betragen lenkt, wo der Mensch [. . .] weder nöthig hat, fremde Freyheit zu kränken, um die seinige zu behaupten, noch seine Würde wegzuwerfen, um Anmuth

zu zeigen" (*NA* 20, 412). This is not to say that she is determined by inclination—rather, she has so successfully developed her moral character that she can safely trust her feelings to influence her actions without having first to prove their rationality. Only such an internal harmony, in which the drive toward rationality is satisfied, but never at the expense of physical wellbeing, can, according to Schiller, lead to the fullest development of the human individual, who behaves rationally, not in stoic fealty to the moral law but with pleasure. The appearance of such an individual is pleasing to the observer, who recognizes the *Mensch* as a beautiful being:

> Aber in kindlich unschuldiger Hülle
> Birgt sich der hohe geläuterte Wille
> In des Weibes verklärter Gestalt.
> (*NA* 1, 243)

As summarized above, Schiller gives this type of beauty a name, *Anmuth*, the moveable beauty that one can acquire through refinement (*läutern*) or lose through lack of attention. The women offer to teach the man to give up his antagonistic behavior and cultivate his own graceful character:

> Aber mit sanftüberredender Bitte
> Führen die Frauen den Zepter der Sitte,
> Löschen die Zwietracht, die tobend entglüht,
> Lehren die Kräfte, die feindlich sich hassen,
> Sich in der lieblichen Form zu umfassen,
> Und vereinen, was ewig sich flieht.
> (*NA* 1, 242)

By the last line, the meaning of the imperative with which the poem began—"Ehret die Frauen!" (*NA* 1, 240)—becomes apparent: it is an appeal to men to join women in the fight against hate and the effort to shape society into a beautiful and humane community. The alternative, i.e., the continued polarization of humanity, is portrayed as unproductive. "Wie das Haupt der Hyder / Ewig fällt und sich erneut," the patriarchal and egoistic mentality of *might makes right* leads to a zero-sum game, an act of self-reproduction, which can only lead to continued destruction of all that is outside the self and can never lead to social progress.

Wherever discord persists in Schiller's oeuvre, destruction follows. In *Die Räuber*, Franz's and Karl's vengeful opposition to one another leads to their own destruction, as does the vengeful opposition of the brothers Don Caesar and Don Manuel in *Die Braut von Messina* (1803). While Elisabeth survives *Maria Stuart* unlike Maria, she is left utterly deserted and despised; the drama's final scene suggests a reading that Maria's fate is perhaps only slightly less lucky than that of Elisabeth. In "Die Götter Griechenlandes" (1788), the Christian God's occupation of "des Aethers Reichen" leads to the total disappearance of the gods of ancient Greece (*NA* 20, 195).

A similar warning against discord is illustrated through images of a man and a woman in "Das Lied von der Glocke." In the ballad, a boy tears himself away from a girl and stumbles through the world like a careless adventurer. When the boy returns home as a young man, full of pride, he is arrested by the sight of a young woman. She returns his interest and they become lovers. A number of polarized gender characteristics are established: the boy explores the outside world; the girl remains at home; he represents "das Spröde" and "das Strenge"; she represents "d[as] Weich[e]" and "d[as] Zart[e]" (*NA* 2I, 229). The couple leaves the carefree state of youth and the lovers become adults. At this point in the poem, there is a new and markedly melancholy mood—sweet, young love and the marriage ceremony are juxtaposed with foreboding: "Ach! des Lebens schönste Feier / Endigt auch den Lebens-Mai" (*NA* 2I, 229). The carelessness of young love flees and, with it, "[d]ie Leidenschaft" (*NA* 2I, 230). What follows is a list of *musts*: "[d]ie Liebe muß bleiben," "die Frucht muß treiben," "Der Mann muß hinaus / Ins feindliche Leben, / Muß wirken und streben" (*NA* 2I, 230). This list of actions generally considered pleasurable (love, sex, exploration) is plagued by a character of strife. In the face of endless obligations, domestic life no longer seems so sweet. Productive, seemingly harmless actions (*wirken*, *streben*, *pflanzen*, *schaffen*) are mixed in with actions associated with adversity (*erlisten*, *erraffen*, *wetten*, *wagen*).

By growing up into a man who always *must*, he substitutes the autonomy of his childhood for heteronomy under society's expectations for men.

The married couple becomes mother and father. Though the man's life is now characterized by necessity and his actions are determined by external expectations, his family fills in the gap where the happiness of youthful freedom once stood ("Ein süßer Trost ist ihm geblieben, / Er zählt die Häupter seiner Lieben"; *NA* 2I, 233). The woman, this time in the form of a mother, again takes on the role of the caregiver, creator, and supporter of familial harmony. But one member of society alone is not sufficient to secure lasting peace. As the bell will instruct future generations at the end of the poem, all individuals are transient, as is everything we create as isolated individuals: "So lehre sie [die Glocke], daß nichts bestehet, / Daß alles Irdische verhallt" (*NA* 2I, 238). The early death of the mother leaves the family unit completely wrecked and the love that she nurtured dissipates with her:

> Ach! des Hauses zarte Bande
> Sind gelöst auf immerdar,
> Denn sie wohnt im Schattenlande,
> Die des Hauses Mutter war,
> Denn es fehlt ihr treues Walten,
> Ihre Sorge wacht nicht mehr,
> An verwaister Stätte schalten
> Wird die Fremde, liebeleer.
> (*NA* 2I, 234)

In the absence of connection to the love that binds humans together in relationships of mutual care, the human being claims exception from responsibility to other creatures on earth. When the bonds of love are torn asunder, nothing stops the individual from enacting violence on another. Enraptured in the delusion that rationality is sufficient at the expense of feeling, the individual loses all sight of their humanity:

> Jedoch der schrecklichste der Schreken,
> Das ist der Mensch in seinem Wahn.

Weh' denen, die dem Ewigblinden
Des Lichtes Himmelsfackel leihn!
Sie strahlt ihm nicht, sie kann nur zünden
Und äschert Städt' und Länder ein.
(*NA* 2I, 237)

In contrast to the patriarchal family that stands on unfirm ground, an alternative approach to community is presented at the end of the poem. After a destructive war that polarizes a village, those who remain gather together to commit themselves to the common goal of peace during a dedication ceremony of a new city bell.[94] In the loving community of villagers ("die liebende Gemeine"; *NA* 2I, 238), all members are tasked with common care for the wellbeing of the group. In the village community, the polarized gender roles of the family fall away. Only then is true "*Concordia*" (*NA* 2I, 238) conceivable.

Schiller sees the realm of the domestic as a canvas against which the divisive structures of privilege may be poetically cast into relief. In the poetry thematized here, Schiller addresses gender divisions and how they not only tear people apart from one another in the domestic sphere but create discord within the individuals themselves. He moreover subtly proposes the idea that these strict, destructive gender divisions are moveable and therefore mythical, like Venus's belt as described in *Ueber Anmuth und Würde*. If anything, Schiller's poetic and aesthetic oeuvre postulates that women have largely come closer to achieving inner harmony ("der Menschheit Vollendung") than men have and that men should seek to join them in cultivating their own inner harmony. The resulting implication is not that men and women must unite as separate but equal individuals but rather that each person must realize their full, harmonious selves. Only then will society at large come closer to a more inclusive and harmonious community of individuals who nevertheless maintain the right to be diverse (*mannigfaltig*):

[94] See *NA* 2I, 238–239.

> Wenn also die Vernunft in die physische Gesellschaft ihre moralische Einheit bringt, so darf sie die Mannichfaltigkeit der Natur nicht verletzen. Wenn die Natur in dem moralischen Bau der Gesellschaft ihre Mannichfaltigkeit zu behaupten strebt, so darf der moralischen Einheit dadurch kein Abbruch geschehen; gleich weit von Einförmigkeit und Verwirrung ruht die siegende Form. *Totalität* des Charakters muß also bey dem Volke gefunden werden, welches fähig und würdig seyn soll, den Staat der Noth mit dem Staat der Freyheit zu vertauschen. (*NA* 20, 318)

Why, despite all the attention given to Schiller's representation of the feminine in his dramatic, poetic, and philosophical oeuvre, has Schiller's portrayal of the construction of individuals based on discriminatory social structures such as gender polarity so rarely been interpreted by scholars as a criticism of these very divisions themselves? One explanation is, ironically, derived precisely from this scholarly attention to Schiller's use of discord as a literary theme, which often leads interpreters to conclude that Schiller actually approved of the preservation of certain types of divisions. However, Schiller places just as much focus on the importance of harmony from his earliest writings. In his first medical dissertation, *Philosophie der Physiologie* (1779), Schiller conceives of a *Mittelkraft* that spans the bridge between the warring desires of the mind and the body.[95] Over a decade later, in the *Ästhetische Briefe*, Schiller describes the realm of the aesthetic state, that of "schönen Schein[]" (*NA* 20, 411) similarly as the mediating state between reason and inclination—a state in which judgment acknowledges and honors the desire of the physical body. Schiller's idea of harmony can therefore be understood as a quality that exists in a fraught middle ground between oppositions that fight for dominance.

In his literary works, Schiller's theory of harmony manifests itself most commonly in the image of a woman whose love stands up against the threat of destructive masculinity. The fictional philosopher Julius of Schiller's *Philosophische Briefe* uses the word "harmonisch" in a musical-metaphorical way in order to describe the feeling of love: "Liebe findet nicht statt unter

[95] See *NA* 20, 13.

gleichtönenden Seelen, aber unter harmonischen" (*NA* 20, 121). Here, harmony stands in contrast to unison (two instances of the same tone sounding simultaneously) in that harmony requires two different tones sounding simultaneously. Neither note loses its individuality in harmony, but rather their individuality is essential. Love, as Julius describes it, is the feeling of forgetting (*Verwechslung*) one's distinct selfhood, while at the same time maintaining it: "Ich begehre fremde Glükseligkeit, weil ich meine eigne begehre. Begierde nach fremder Glükseligkeit nennen wir Wohlwollen, *Liebe*" (*NA* 20, 119). Love, as Julius describes it and as Schiller's women figures portray it, is not an exhaustible commodity but a feeling that can be shared infinitely and that carries with it the power to open up a space that is at once imaginative and sensually real, where even the most unlikely pairs can reconcile their social and physical differences. The failure of society to tolerate unlikely love will form the basis of all his subsequent dramas.

Chapter 2

"Das Winseln der verlaßnen Braut / Ist Schmauß für unsre Trommelhaut": The Sublime Function of Amalia's Death

IN THE PRESENT CHAPTER ON SCHILLER'S *DIE RÄUBER*, the portrayal of Amalia von Edelreich's persistent resistance against Franz Moor and her death will be read as a paradigmatic example of the Schillerian sublime at an early stage in the dramatist's literary practice. At the Moor estate, Amalia has two options for survival: resign herself to slavery in a coerced marriage with Franz or escape. However, she hesitates to leave because she maintains hope that her beloved, Karl Moor, will return to her after a long and painful absence. After Karl briefly and unexpectedly appears at the Moor estate, then deserts her anew, Amalia rushes into the nearby forest to find him and to find the Count von Moor, whom she loves as a paternal figure. In her last scene, Amalia pursues the only path available to her to demonstrate the severity of her commitment to Karl: death by his hand. Because she freely chooses to die for the sake of an idea at the expense of her physical instinct, Amalia portrays a specifically Schillerian concept of the sublime.

Sex-based discrimination and the threat of sexual assault is thematized prominently throughout the drama, exacerbating the appearance of Amalia's vulnerability. Fully financially and socially dependent on the selfish men of the Moor family, Amalia is at the very bottom of the hierarchy of privilege among the main characters. Amalia therefore displays the greatest struggle of all the drama's characters—she has no recourse to protection of the only asset she possesses, her wellbeing, which she sacrifices. Faced at the end of the drama with the choice to abandon her lifelong commitment to Karl and seek safety apart from him or to honor her commitment as a blood oath, Amalia's final act is to demand that Karl kill her. Her death is portrayed as the gruesome

metaphorical consummation of their marriage vow. Simultaneously, her death releases Karl from his blood oath to a band of robbers, thereby ending the incessant violence that has characterized the play from the first act. The event of Amalia's death therefore is the locus of three events: the embodied liberation of Amalia's mind from coercive physical bonds, a sexual and spiritual love scene, and the invalidation of discord with forgiveness and love. Amalia's death scene accordingly serves as the first example of a leitmotif in the Schillerian dramatic oeuvre: an individual's sublime choice that inspires future acts of humanity. After a brief overview of the most important moral-aesthetic principles at work in the dramatization of Amalia's story, the chapter will proceed to address the exacerbation of Amalia's vulnerability by patriarchal discontents, her harmonization of love with rationality, and a reading of her death as the sublime victory of rationality over physical overwhelm.

Schiller's Theory of Sublime Vulnerability

One of Schiller's later aesthetic texts, *Ueber Naïve und sentimentalische Dichtung* (1795–1796), curiously ends with a grave warning. An idealistic person, who has lost all sight of the worth of human life, becomes an ideological fanatic, or, in Schiller's word, *ein Phantast*, whose intellectual freedom leads: "zu einem unendlichen Fall in eine bodenlose Tiefe, und kann nur in einer völligen Zerstörung sich endigen" (*NA* 20, 503). The destruction that ensues when sentiment is entirely absent, or suppressed, in the agent, effects not only those around the agent but also the agent herself. All throughout Schiller's oeuvre one finds representations of an ideologue who has suppressed the call of nature to love one's neighbor, or at least one's family, in pursuit of a rational ideal and who must sooner or later reckon with the deleterious psychological effects of emotional repression or suppression. A late example is Queen Elisabeth I in Schiller's *Maria Stuart*, who

privately contends with outbursts of rage, fear, and paranoia as she contemplates the legally unjustifiable murder of her cousin in pursuit of her own sovereignty. The most famous example is the figure of King Philipp II in *Don Karlos*, who cries alone in his chamber when he discovers his betrayal by the only man he had believed to be his friend. In the words of Tonio Kröger, the titular protagonist of Thomas Mann's novella (1903): "Aber man begreift es so gut, daß er geweint hat, und mir tut er eigentlich mehr leid, als der Prinz und der Marquis zusammengenommen. Er ist immer so ganz allein und ohne Liebe [. . .]."[96] One of the earliest examples is the figure of Franz Moor from *Die Räuber*, who is tortured by hallucinatory nightmares after betraying his brother and father. Veiling his authorship by attributing his tragedy to the made-up English author "Krake," Schiller describes the scene in his second medical dissertation, *Versuch über den Zusammenhang der thierischen Natur des Menschen mit seiner geistigen* (1780): "Der von Freveln schwer gedrükte Moor, der sonst spizfindig genug war, die Empfindungen der Menschlichkeit durch Skeletisierung der Begriffe in nichts aufzulösen, springt eben izt bleich, athemloß, den kalten Schweiß auf seiner Stirne, aus einem schrecklichen Traum auf" (*NA* 20, 60). Socrates's and, reluctantly, Thrasymachus's conclusion that "the just man will live well, and the unjust man will live ill," then, proves to be one of the leitmotivs of Schiller's oeuvre, from his earliest to his latest writings.[97]

The reverse side of this leitmotiv is another, namely, that sentiment can support our rational judgments in their execution and is even a necessary insurance against the idealistic fall into fanaticism. For Schiller, the individual who can act on the basis of rational judgment and do so

[96] Thomas Mann, *Tonio Kröger*, ed. John Alexander Kelley (London: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., 1949), 8.

[97] Plato, *The Republic of Plato*, trans. Jowett, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1881), 34.

with pleasure has reached the highest form of humanity's development. He works out this idea most thoroughly in his aesthetic treatise, *Ueber Anmuth und Würde*.[98] The person who wills the realization of a rational ideal through action and takes pleasure in it has achieved the harmonization of sensibility with rationality and is called a beautiful soul. If the beautiful soul is taken out of her quotidian existence and forced into tragic circumstances, she will continue to act in accordance with her rational ideal, despite suffering. Schiller terms the capacity to maintain a high degree of rational autonomy despite suffering dignity. Regardless of the circumstances, love can inspire and reinforce the realization of rational ideals: "es ist der Gesetzgeber selbst, der *Gott* in uns, der mit seinem eigenen Bilde in der Sinnenwelt spielt" (*NA* 20, 303). One of the most powerful sentiments, love itself is thematized as a rational-sensual pleasure; rational because it is guided by a principal arrived at through reason, sensual because the pleasure manifests itself in physical effects.[99]

The artist, who is interested in portraying beauty, faces the problem of how to portray the highest form of human development, because such development takes place inside the mind of an agent. All that a spectator can take in via the limited senses are, however, the actions of the inspired mind, not the inner workings of the mind itself. Schiller argues, however, that the sight of dignity does reveal something about the agent's mind, not through the physical senses but through another feeling in the spectator, namely, the feeling of the sublime.[100] By witnessing the portrayal of an

[98] For example, Schiller writes, "das Ideal vollkommener Menschheit [fodert] keinen Widerstreit, sondern Zusammenstimmung zwischen dem Sittlichen und Sinnlichen [. . .]" (*NA* 20, 298.)

[99] See *NA* 20, 303–304. Schiller differentiates between rational-sensual love and intimacy or purely physical attraction, the latter of which can overlap with the former, but ultimately carries the great risk of obscuring one's reasoning faculties. See *NA* 20, 304.

[100] In *Ueber Anmuth und Würde*, Schiller only makes cursory use of his theory of the sublime, which is explicated much more thoroughly in the following essays that preceded the treatise: "Ueber den Grund des Vergnügens an tragischen Gegenständen" (1792/1802/1804), "Vom

agent acting with rational autonomy despite physical overwhelm, the spectator realizes within her own mind that she too has the same capacity for autonomy. For the purpose of portraying one moment of dignity, it is not necessary to know beyond all shadow of a doubt the exact motivation or combination of motivations for an agent's actions. In a later text on the sublime, Schiller will add that even evil characters can demonstrate commitment to rational ideals despite suffering.[101] But the character who displays both dignity and love shows something even greater, namely, virtue, the harmonization of sensuality with rationality. One must not limit oneself to Schiller's later texts to observe the dramatic theory of the sublime at work, nor his theory of how sentiment can support rationality—both are already present in his first speech delivered at the *Hohe Karlsschule* in Stuttgart in 1779, in which he portrays the death of Socrates in defense of his principals as "das harmonische Band" between love and reason, or virtue.

A further aspect of the dramaturgy of the sublime is thematized in the first *Karlsschule* speech that will be important for all of Schiller's subsequent portrayals of dignity: the humblest, most vulnerable protagonist is the most effective venue for the sublime because the protagonist who owns nothing but her life and finds the strength to sacrifice even that is clearly acting in autonomous contradistinction to her physical inclination for survival. On the contrary, the agent who acts in accordance with a rational idea but suffers no sacrifice may just as well be acting fully out of inclination and not at all out of a harmony of sensuality and rationality: "so hat sie keinen Kampf gekostet" (*NA* 20, 7). Amalia von Edelreich in Schiller's *Die Räuber* is Schiller's first dramatic figure who demonstrates the theory of sublime vulnerability.

Erhabenen" (1793), "Ueber das Pathetische" (1793/1801/1804), and "Ueber das Erhabene" (1801/1804).

[101] See "Ueber das Pathetische," (*NA* 20, 220). A brief discussion of this statement is elaborated below in the present chapter.

The Exacerbation of Amalia's Vulnerability by Patriarchal Discontents

All of the main characters perceive that they have been unjustly disadvantaged in some particular way and their reactions to their discontent constitute the plot. The tragedy is set into motion when those characters' "ineinandergedrungen[e] Realitäten"[102] (*NA* 3, 5; 1781) come into conflict. In the mid-eighteenth-century "bürgerliche[n] Verhältnisse[n]" (*NA* 3, 6; 1781) that are depicted in *Die Räuber*, humanity is split up into individualistic binaries (strong and weak, rich and poor, young and old, noble and common, legitimate and bastard, firstborn and second born, attractive and ugly, man and woman, etc.) that are perpetually at odds with one another. Those who defy existing moral norms and the law in order to improve their lot become caught in endless competitions for dominance that end fruitlessly. For example, Maximilian von Moor, the ruling count at the Moor estate, is so concerned with protecting his honor that he is willing to defy the norm of paternal care in order to preserve his good name. When his son Franz convinces him that Franz's brother Karl has pursued a scandalous life of debauchery in Leipzig, the father is pained about his endangered honor and cries out bitterly, "Mein Name! Mein ehrlicher Name!" (*NA* 3, 13; 1781)[103] moments before disowning Karl on Franz's recommendation. The count thereby puts his son's wellbeing on the line for the sake of a vague and infinitely abstractable social concept. Schiller's comment in the preface of *Die Räuber* about Franz, that vice "lößt in Franzen all die verworrenen Schauer des

[102] *NA* 3, 5; 1781. All quotations of *Die Räuber* are cited from volume 3 of the *Nationalausgabe* of Schiller's works. Because the present chapter draws on both the first, 1781 *Lesedrama* edition, *Die Räuber: Ein Schauspiel von fünf Akten*, and the second, 1782 *Neue für die Mannheimer Bühne verbesserte Auflage* entitled *Die Räuber: Ein Trauerspiel*, citations will refer to the edition being cited by its year. For most quotations, the first edition of 1781 is preferred and will be cited parenthetically, with the parallel quotation from the 1782 edition cited in a footnote. Where the editions diverge significantly, this will be indicated in a footnote. Quotations from the preface to the 1781 edition (*NA* 3, 5–8) do not have parallel passages in the second edition.

[103] *NA* 3, 140, 1782.

Gewissens in ohnmächtige Abstraktionen auf" (*NA* 3, 6), applies just as well to the count, whose preoccupation with honor subdues the fatherly voice of his conscience. In the end, the count's struggle to preserve his honor results in the loss of everything dear to him: first his son Franz, then his son Karl, with them his line, and, finally, his life.

Franz, too, sees himself as the victim of the standing moral order, foremost because it has tolerated his mistreatment, which he ascribes to his self-professed "Bürde von Häßlichkeit" (*NA* 3, 18),[104] and also because, as the second son of the count, he is obligated to forsake the inheritance that his elder brother Karl enjoys (*NA* 3, 18ff., 1781).[105] Franz mistakes society's wrongful interpretation of natural appearance, however, for wrongs inherent in nature itself and seeks to defy both through deceit and violence. The fruit of his labor will be to witness the Moor castle go up in flames before he dies pitifully. In the first, 1781 *Lesedrama* edition, Franz strangles himself with his own golden hat string; the connection between his fate and his greed is obvious.[106] In the second, 1782 edition for the stage in Mannheim, Franz is thrown into the tower and left to rot where his father had been kept.[107]

When Karl reads, through Franz's hand, that he has been disinherited, he feels that he has been cheated of the compassion and financial support that is his due after a lifetime of filial love. He vows to achieve retribution by purging society of those among the most privileged who do not live up to his moral standards:

> Da donnern sie Sanftmuth und Duldung aus ihren Wolken, und bringen dem Gott der Liebe Menschenopfer wie einem feuerarmigen Moloch – predigen Liebe des Nächsten,

---

[104] *NA* 3, 144, 1782.

[105] *NA* 3, 144ff., 1782.

[106] See *NA* 3, 126.

[107] See *NA* 3, 228.

> und fluchen den achzigjährigen Blinden von ihren Thüren hinweg; stürmen wider den Geiz und haben Peru um Goldner Spangen willen entvölkert und die Heyden wie Zugvieh vor ihre Wagen gespannt – [. . .] mein Handwerk ist Wiedervergeltung – Rache ist mein Gewerbe.[108]

By posing himself as the antidote to Moloch, the Canaanite god associated with child sacrifice; the abusers of the disabled; and the conquistadores of Peru, Karl poses himself as the hero of society's most vulnerable. The young bandit, who had fancied himself a justified Robin Hood-esque figure in act 1, realizes however by act 5 that, far from becoming the hero of the common man that he had envisioned, he had become solely a force of destruction and that his project was a despicable failure: "O eitle Kinderey – da steh ich am Rand eines entsezlichen Lebens, und erfahre nun mit Zähnklappern und Heulen, daß *zwey Menschen wie ich den ganzen Bau der sittlichen Welt zu Grund richten würden*" (*NA* 3, 135, 1781).[109]

Though he still stands on more stable ground, Herrmann, a "Bastard von einem Edelmann," is a secondary character who perhaps rivals Amalia in the exacerbation of his vulnerability. He lives in the Moor estate and seethes against the injustices that he has endured there. Though the text provides only isolated and incomplete details about Herrmann's background, when these details are put together, they suggest that Herrmann might be the Count von Moor's illegitimate son. The relevant details about Herrmann's background are mostly embedded in a dialogue between Herrmann and Franz in act 2, scene 1, in which Herrmann voices at least three distinct grievances: one against the Count von Moor, and two against Karl. First, Herrmann declares to Franz that he will never forget how the Count von Moor had insulted him, but he does not reveal what the insult is. Franz then brings up Amalia and, at the same time, shifts the direction of

[108] *NA* 3, 70–71, 1781; *NA* 3, 182, 1782; but the provocative criticism of the church is absent in the 1782 edition.

[109] This text is absent from the 1782 edition.

Herrmann's anger from the Count to Karl: "aber ich vergesse wovon ich dir sagen wollte – hast du das Fräulein von Edelreich schon vergessen, Herrmann? [. . .] Mein Bruder hat sie dir weggefischt" (*NA* 3, 40–41, 1781).[110] The first of Hermann's two problems with Karl can be gleaned from this exchange: apparently Herrmann once believed that he might marry Amalia, but then Karl stole her heart. Franz proceeds to remind Herrmann of how Karl once taunted him because of his illegitimate birth.[111] Herrmann seethes at the offense; Karl allegedly implied that Herrmann was conceived in the dirt on a farm like an animal, and that the sight of him was a source of perpetual shame for his father: "Er [Karl] sagte: man raune sich einander in's Ohr, du seyst zwischen dem Rindfleisch und Meerrettig gemacht worden, und dein Vater habe dich nie ansehen können, ohne an die Brust zu schlagen und zu seufzen: Gott sey mir Sünder gnädig!" (*NA* 3, 41, 1781).[112] This recalls a cryptic line in act 1, scene 1, in which the Count von Moor quotes the Book of Exodus, "die Sünden seiner Väter werden heimgesucht im dritten und vierten Glied – laß ihns vollenden" (*NA* 3, 12, 1781),[113] and suggests that the sinner in the insult may well be the count. In act 4, scene 5, when Herrmann clandestinely brings food to the Count von Moor, who was left there by Franz to waste away, the Count von Moor calls Herrmann "mein Rabe" (*NA* 3, 110, 1781),[114] certainly referring to the ravens who bring food to the prophet Elijah in the First Book of Kings (1 Kings 17:6), but perhaps also to the colloquial expression for a bad father, "Rabenvater," albeit here in an ironic reversal—

[110] *NA* 3, 163, 1782.

[111] This is likely another of Franz's deceits, but, whether true or false, Herrmann believes it and this is factor that partially explains his actions in the play.

[112] *NA* 3, 163,1782.

[113] *NA* 3, 139, 1782.

[114] *NA* 3, 212, 1782.

the offspring of the "Rabenvater" would be the victim of parental neglect. Then the Count von Moor asks, "Und wie gehts meinem lieben Kind, Herrmann?" (*NA* 3, 110, 1781).[115] "Kind" may refer to the count's ungrateful and murderous son Franz, but it may very well refer to Herrmann himself. It is at least suggested, then, that Hermann's first, unexplained grievance and the reason for his hatred of the Count von Moor is that Herrmann is the illegitimate child of the Count von Moor and has been, like Franz, underappreciated by his father, who only had room in his heart for his favorite, Karl. In this light, Herrmann's almost unconditional desire for revenge is more comprehensible.

However, neither the Count von Moor's aspiration to preserve his family's reputation, nor Franz's ambition to accomplish the greatness that was denied him by family and society, nor Karl's project of revenge against hypocritical power holders, nor Herrmann's efforts to punish the count and Karl for their maltreatment of him constitute greater struggles than Amalia's fight to maintain basic autonomy over her body and mind. All that is presented of Amalia's past is that she is an orphan who was raised like a daughter at the Moor estate.[116] After the Count von Moor is deposed, Amalia lacks all access to money and protection. Her formerly happy family life has mutated into a state of perpetual fear, in which she is forced to regularly defend herself against Franz's attacks on her mind and body. In contrast, Karl seems oblivious to the privileges granted him at birth. Karl enjoyed the doting encouragement of his father throughout his childhood and financial support as

[115] *NA* 3, 212, 1782.

[116] *NA* 3, 74, 1781. "Amalia [. . .] du weißt, was du unserm Hause warst; du wardst gehalten wie Moors Tochter, selbst den Tod überlebte seine Liebe zu dir; das wirst du wol niemals vergessen? –" (*NA* 3, 184–185, 1782).

a young adult,[117] and he is a student at the highly respected University of Leipzig.[118] He squanders all of this in exchange for alcohol, elaborate pranks, and a few loyal, if equally entitled friends,[119] yet he is perfectly convinced at the start of the drama that he will be able to get away with his costly debauchery with the love and acceptance of his father intact.[120] Though the letter detailing Karl's illicit activities that Franz reads to the Count von Moor is fabricated,[121] Karl's own guilt about his spending and roguery in Leipzig leaves it unclear to what extent Franz's grounds for Karl's disownment rest on fact or fiction. Spiegelberg likens him to the prodigal son of Luke 15:11–32 and implies that he was violent and drank a lot.[122] Karl's entitlement to forgiveness despite his wanton abuse of inherited privilege casts Amalia's clemency and patience into stark relief. Franz, who otherwise feels that he has been dealt a miserable hand by nature, nevertheless recognizes that his hard lot as an ugly, second-born child is still more privileged than that of any woman: "Kan ichs ihm [dem Vater] Dank wissen, daß ich ein Mann wurde? So wenig als ich ihn verklagen könnte, wenn er ein Weib aus mir gemacht hätte."[123] Because of her sex, Amalia's only reliable hope for financial security, as well as for physical, social, and political protections, is to

[117] See *NA* 3, 13–16, 1781; *NA* 3, 141–143, 1782.

[118] See *NA* 3, 46, 1781; *NA* 3, 168, 1782.

[119] See *NA* 3, 20–24, 1781; *NA* 3, 150–153, 1782.

[120] See *NA* 3, 24, 1781; *NA* 3, 153, 1782.

[121] See *NA* 3, 18, 1781; *NA* 3, 144, 1782.

[122] See *NA* 3, 22, 1781; *NA* 3, 151, 1782.

[123] *NA* 3, 19, 1781. This passage is absent from Franz's monologue in the 1782 edition, which is significantly shorter and less instigative.

become lucky and land a good marriage—the prospects of which are completely shattered when Karl recklessly abandons her.

Though, as will be discussed in the subsequent section, Amalia prophecies from early on that her life will end in tragedy, she entertains the idea at one point that there is one place on earth that could serve as an isolated refuge for her until the moment of her death, namely, the convent. In response to Franz's abuses she retorts: "Bravo! herrlich! und in Kloster und Mauren mit deinem Basilisken-Anblik auf ewig verschont, und Musse genug an Karln zu denken, zu hangen. Willkommen mit deinem Kloster! auf auf mit deinen Mauren!"[124] By the time Amalia first announces her wish to lock herself away behind walls of "die Freystatt der betrognen Liebe,"[125] however, the reader and spectator have already witnessed how, unbeknownst to Amalia, the cloister is likely no safer for her than the Moor estate; Spiegelberg's extended description of the robbers' brutal rape of the nuns at the St. Cecilia's Cloister,[126] taken together with Amalia's repeated wish

[124] *NA* 3, 75, 1781; *NA* 3, 185, 1782. The convent often represents the last refuge of abused and neglected women in eighteenth and early nineteenth-century literature. For example, Lessing's Odoardo, the father of Emilia Galotti, demands that his daughter be wrest out of the prince's predatory reach and protected behind the walls of a cloister (*Emilia Galotti*, 1772). Schiller's Beatrice is hidden away by her mother in a cloister in order to avoid the death sentence issued her by her father (*Die Braut von Messina*, 1803). When Goethe's Eugenie is forced into a choice between exile and unwanted marriage, she hopes to find refuge in a cloister (*Die natürliche Tochter*, 1803). Kleist's Josephe is sent away to a cloister upon her father's discovery of her unholy relationship with Jeronimo Rugera ("Das Erdbeben in Chili," 1807) and Kleist's Käthchen, upon forcibly abandoning all hope of marriage to her beloved Count Wetter vom Strahl, has her father lead her to a secluded cloister (*Das Käthchen von Heilbronn*, 1810).

[125] *NA* 3, 76, 1781; *NA* 3, 186, 1782.

[126] "[I]ch sage dir, ich hab aus dem Kloster mehr dann tausend Thaler Werths geschleift, und den Spaß obendrein, und meine Kerls haben ihnen ein Andenken hinterlassen, sie werden ihre neun Monathe dran zu schleppen haben." *NA* 3, 55, 1781. This provocative monologue is absent from the 1782 edition.

to become a nun, foreshadow her inescapable fate—there is no safe place for a woman like Amalia with men like Franz and Karl in the world.

Amalia's Harmonization of Love with Reason

Amalia's great affection toward Karl and the Count von Moor do not cloud her judgment throughout the play. She shows herself to be on guard from her first scene. In her biting opening lines, she condemns the elder Count von Moor and Franz for Karl's disinheritance: "schämt euch, ihr Unmenschen! schämt euch ihr Drachenseelen, ihr Schande der Menschheit!"[127] In act 2, scene 2, Amalia keenly foresees the count's later despair and eventual death, predicting, "Auf seinem Todbett wird er umsonst die welken Hände ausstrecken nach seinem Karl, und schaudernd zurückfahren, wenn er die eiskalte Hand seines Franzens faßt –"[128] a prophecy that the Count von Moor will recall almost verbatim in act 5, scene 2.[129] Franz attempts to disarm Amalia's keen foresight by mocking her and questioning her mental soundness: "Du schwärmst, meine Liebe, du bist zu bedauren."[130] After condescendingly calling Amalia his "allerliebste Träumerinn," Franz knocks upon her breast to indicate her "sanftes liebevolles Herz."[131] The demeaning "meine Liebe" and the implication that Amalia's emotional state annuls her capacity for reason is the first of

[127] *NA* 3, 33, 1781; *NA* 3, 145, 1782.

[128] *NA* 3, 33, 1781; *NA* 3, 145, 1782.

[129] "Oh ich fühl es tief was mir Amalia sagte, der Geist der Rache sprach aus ihrem Munde. Vergebens ausstreken deine sterbenden Hände wirst du nach einem Sohn, vergebens wähnen zu umfassen die warme Hand deines Karls, der nimmermehr an deinem Bette steht –" *NA* 3, 128, 1781. See also *NA* 3, 224, 1782.

[130] *NA* 3, 33, 1781; *NA* 3, 146, 1782.

[131] *NA* 3, 34, 1781; *NA* 3, 146, 1782.

Franz's sex-based microaggressions against Amalia in the play. One of the tactics Franz employs to gain dominance over Amalia is an attempt to convince her that she is insane. He schemes to convince her that she would be better off with him as her guardian than she would be waiting for Karl or attempting to make independent use of her judgement.

Here, Schiller associates the popular mid– and late eighteenth-century dominant belief that women possess weaker mental faculties than men with Franz's villainous opportunism. The 1754 entry for "Weiber-Rechte" in Johann Heinrich Zedler's *Grosses Vollständiges Universal-Lexicon Aller Wissenschafften Und Künste* documents the assignment of legal representatives for women in court, "weil sie [die Weibs-Personen] von Natur nicht eines so durch dringenden Verstandes u. von einer so festen Entschliessung, als die Manns-Personen seyn, und daher auch leichte betrogen werden können."[132] Hence, Franz's assertion that Amalia requires his male guidance would not have been merely received by a spectator or reader as socially normal, it would have been

[132] Johann Heinrich Zedler, "Weiber-Rechte," in *Grosses vollständiges Universal-Lexicon aller Wissenschafften und Künste*, vol. 54 (Halle und Leipzig: Johann Heinrich Zedler, 173ff.). In *Die Zauberflöte* (1791), Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart and Emanuel Schikaneder critically address the eighteenth-century gender debates by making Sarastro the mouthpiece of gender conservatism, the standards of which Pamina defies throughout: "Ein Mann muß eure Herzen leiten, / Denn ohne ihn pflegt jedes Weib / Aus ihrem Wirkungskreis zu schreiten." Wolfgang Amadé Mozart and Emanuel Schikaneder, *Die Zauberflöte. Eine Große Oper in Zwey Aufzügen*, Digitale Mozart-Edition (Salzburg: Internationale Stiftung Mozarteum, 2018), https://dme.mozarteum.at/DME/libretti-edition/wrkliste.php?sec=libedi&l=1. See also Johann Gottlieb Fichte, whose position in 1796 is that the woman must logically desire that the man act as her attorney regarding her rights: "Also, zufolge ihres eignen notwendigen Willens ist der Mann der Verwalter aller ihrer Rechte; sie will, daß dieselben behauptet, und ausgeübt werden, nur inwiefern *er* es will. Er ist ihr natürlicher Repräsentant im Staate, und in der ganzen Gesellschaft. [. . .] Ihre Rechte unmittelbar durch sich selbst auszuüben, kann ihr gar nicht einfallen." Fichte, *Grundlage des Naturrechts nach den Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag: 1960), 341. The obligatory "Geschlechtsvormundschaft" was not abolished in Württemberg until 1828. Ute Gerhard, ed., *Frauen in der Geschichte des Rechts: Von der Frühen Neuzeit bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1997), 474.

immediately recognized as legally justifiable. Ultimately, Franz intends to make her marry him: "Ich bin Herr. Aber ich möchte es vollends ganz seyn."[133]

Franz himself attributes his childhood disenfranchisement to a cruel mother nature who pitted himself against his brother and he views his manipulative plot as the justified outperformance of nature at her own game: what he lacks in primogeniture, he will make up for in cunning, or so he claims. Franz's hypocritical abuse of the same might-makes-right system that deprivileges him to justify natural ownership of and authority over Amalia appears doubly hypocritical in light of his own history of suffering due to nature's partiality. Schiller thereby places Franz in the position to implicitly expose the scandalous absurdity of the claim of natural dominance of men over women. Schiller critically describes Franz's modus operandi in the preface as the degenerate result of a reasoning faculty that functions unchecked; i.e., it operates at the expense of the emotions (*NA* 3, 6). Franz's capacity to infinitely abstract reality overwhelms the system of checks and balances that usually constitutes a healthy conscience. Ritchie Robertson comments on the social-critical function of Franz as a mouthpiece for Schiller's sentimentalist warning of the possible negative effects of a society built on reason alone: "The young Schiller in *Die Räuber* presented an aristocratic villain, Franz Moor, who, as a convinced materialist, regards other people, including his father and brother, as objects to be manipulated for his own advantage [. . .]. Franz, whom commentators have compared to Sade's characters, expresses Schiller's doubts about a narrow conception of enlightenment that would reduce it to rational calculation."[134] Amalia is one among the list of people whom Franz regards as an object to be manipulated. Here as

[133] *NA* 3, 74, 1781; *NA* 3, 184, 1782.

[134] Ritchie Robertson, *The Enlightenment: The Pursuit of Happiness, 1680–1790* (New York: Harper, 2021), 339.

elsewhere, the reader should instantly become skeptical when Franz insists that Amalia is as weak minded as he believes her to be. Amalia thereby functions as a standard example of the influence of sentimentalism in *Die Räuber* and its championing of rational-sensual harmony over cold rationality.

Indeed, contrary to what Schiller has Franz claim about Amalia, he makes her into the smartest and most perceptive figure in the play. In act 1, scene 3, after Franz accuses Amalia of 'Schwärmerei,' she goads him on with a series of unexpected rhetorical tricks. First, she asks, "bedauerst du deinen Bruder?" and, after a brief pause represented by a *Gedankenstrich*, she answers her own question with an accusation: "Nein Unmensch, du hassest ihn!"[135] Amalia juxtaposes her outburst of disdain with the subsequent question, "du hassest mich doch auch?" inviting a pitifully gullible Franz to fall into her rhetorical trap. He responds to her question with a desperate, if dishonest, confession of love: "Ich liebe dich wie mich selbst, Amalia." It is here that Schiller's construction of Amalia becomes particularly interesting from a gender studies perspective because of the way she gains the upper hand against Franz through gender performance. Amalia reappropriates the character of a weak, gullible woman—the essentializing character that Franz sees in her—and she uses it as a weapon against Franz in order to expose his own poor judgment. First, Amalia feigns a plea for Franz's help: "Wenn du mich liebst, kannst du mir wol eine Bitte abschlagen?"[136] Franz, believing that Amalia has suddenly been convinced, agrees to do whatever she bids of him. She commands: "Hasse mich! [. . .] Du versprichst mirs doch? – Izt geh, und laß mich!" Franz, however, does not relent. He attempts to convince Amalia that Karl handed his engagement ring to a whore. Amalia becomes increasingly upset in response

[135] *NA* 3, 34, 1781; *NA* 3, 146, 1782.

[136] *NA* 3, 34, 1781; *NA* 3, 146, 1782.

to Franz's depiction of Karl, first "*aufgebracht*," then "*heftig*," repeating, "Meinen Ring einer Meze?" in an expression of incredulousness. When Franz adds that Karl has contracted syphilis and that he has become as much of a cripple in mind as he has in body,[137] Amalia laughs: "Ha! Karl! Nun erkenn ich dich wieder! du bist noch ganz! ganz! alles war Lüge! – weist du nicht, Bösewicht, daß Karl unmöglich das werden kann?" After Franz declares that he will beg the Count von Moor to transfer Karl's misfortune to himself, Amalia embraces him. Encouraged, Franz concludes, "Mit diesen Thränen, diesen Seufzern, diesem himmlischen Unwillen – auch für mich, für mich – unsere Seelen stimmten so zusammen." Amalia then exclaims, "O nein, das thaten sie nie!" before commanding him out of her sight only a few lines later.[138] From the beginning to the end of the scene, Amalia is certain that Franz is either completely or partially a liar and that he harbors ulterior motives when he tells her lies about Karl. Herbert Stubenrach's comment in the *Nationalausgabe* that Amalia comes off as unbelievably gullible—"Amalias Leichtgläubigkeit, die – nachdem sie sich schon durch die Lüge vom verschenkten Verlobungsring hat täuschen lassen – hier ihren Höhepunkt erreicht, ist eine der psychologischen Unwahrscheinlichkeiten dieser Frauenrolle" (*NA* 3, 405)—is, therefore, misleadingly reductive, because it ignores the context of Amalia's behavior, in which her persistent incredulity encourages Franz's scheming. In this way, she leads the witness, prompting Franz to create increasingly fantastical claims about Karl until he incriminates himself.

Moreover, though Franz publicly plays the cool and composed observer of Amalia's emotions in the first act, he privately reveals that he is the emotionally unstable one: Franz stomps

[137] See *NA* 3, 35–36, 1781; *NA* 3, 147–148, 1782.

[138] *NA* 3, 36–37, 1781; *NA* 3, 148–149, 1782.

with his feet, screams, skips with joy, faints, and even hits himself in the face.[139] The same is true of the Count von Moor, who cries, buries his head in pillows, screams, rips up his face, punches himself, pulls out his hair, flails his limbs, and even dies as the result of emotional stress.[140] Peter-André Alt characterizes the affects conveyed in the stage directions of primarily Franz and the Count von Moor as an appearance of "die pathologische Symptomatik des Schwärmertums," as "die Rebellion der Affekte im Inneren des Menschen," and as a "Studie überspannter Charaktere in seelischen Ausnahmezuständen."[141] Compared to the stage directions of Franz and the Count von Moor, and to Karl's rash reaction to his disownment, compared, moreover, to the Count von Moor, who easily falls into Franz's snare and is brought within an inch of his life during the drama's first scene, Amalia's emotional state is portrayed as comparatively stable until she encounters Karl again at the end of the play, and her emotions do not impair her ability to immediately perceive Franz's culpability in the sequence of events that destroy her life and the lives of those around her.

Franz demonstrates arguably the least foresight of any character in the drama. Everyone upon whom Franz relies, betrays him. Herrmann, who is bound to Franz only by a shared hatred

---

[139] Franz's stage directions include: "*mit den Füssen stampfend*" (*NA* 3, 37, 1781; *NA* 3, 149, 1782); "*auf den Boden stampfend*" (*NA* 3, 49, 1781; *NA* 3, 171, 1782); "*hüpft frohlockend herein*" (*NA* 3, 52, 1781; Absent in the 1782 edition.); "*er sinkt unmächtig nieder*" (*NA* 3, 118, 1781; *NA* 3, 220, 1782); "*wirft sich in seinem Sessel herum in schröklichen Bewegungen*" (*NA* 3, 124, 1781; Absent in the 1782 edition.); "*Auf Brust und Stirn schlagend*" (*NA* 3, 126, 1781; *NA* 3, 223, 1782).

[140] The Count von Moor's stage directions include: "*weint bitterlich*" (*NA* 3, 13, 1781; *NA* 3, 140, 1782); "*verhüllt sein Haupt in das Kissen*" (*NA* 3, 47, 1781; *NA* 3, 169; 1782); "*Gräßlich schreyend, sich die Haare ausraufend*" (*NA* 3, 48, 1781; *NA* 3, 169, 1782); "*schreyend, sein Gesicht zerfleischend*" (*NA* 3, 48, 1781; *NA* 3, 170, 1782); "*schlägt mit geballter Faust wider Brust und Stirn*" (*NA* 3, 49, 1781; *NA* 3, 171, 1782); in the 1781 edition, "*Der alte Moor gibt seinen Geist auf*" (*NA* 3, 131) and in the 1782 edition "*Er stirbt*" (*NA* 3, 231).

[141] Peter-André Alt, "Doppelte Paratexte: Zur Funktion impliziter und expliziter Bühnenanweisungen in Schillers und Kleists Dramen," *Kleist-Jahrbuch* 2019: 78.

of Karl, and Daniel, a servant in the Moor estate, who is bound to Franz by time and familiarity, are eventually revulsed by Franz's deviousness at crucial moments in his plans. Additionally, Franz relies on his conviction (without any evidence to support it) that he will be able to successfully bend Amalia to his will. He schemes: "Amalia gibt ihre Hofnung auf ihn auf. [. . .] Amalia hat ihre Stützen verloren, und ist ein Spiel meines Willens, da kannst du leicht denken – kurz, alles geht nach Wunsch" (*NA* 3, 43). The juxtaposition of Franz's, Karl's, and the Count's delusions about how the events of their lives will proceed make Amalia appear the least delusional among the *dramatis personae*.

Amalia furthermore possesses grim foresight about the likelihood of her untimely end as early as act 2, scene 2, when she starts expressing fantasies about death:

> Ja süß, himmlisch süß ists, eingewiegt zu werden in den Schlaf des Todes von dem Gesang des Geliebten – vielleicht träumt man auch im Grabe noch fort – ein langer, ewiger, unendlicher Traum von Karln, bis man die Glocke der Auferstehung läutet – *aufspringend entzükt*. und von izt an in seinen Armen auf ewig.[142]

Her rhetoric here anticipates that of her death scene. There too, she imagines it is judgment day: "*mit fliegenden Haaren*. Die Toden schreyen sie, seyen erstanden auf seine Stimme" and gleefully anticipates an immortal eternity of togetherness with Karl: "Ewig sein! Ewig, ewig, ewig mein!"[143] The reader learns in act 2, scene 2 that she and Karl used to sing about the inevitable death of Hektor and the wretchedness of Andromache—an unusual song choice for a young and yet hopeful couple.[144] The song's stanzas alternate between the perspectives of Andromache and Hektor, presumably sung by Amalia and Karl, respectively. In their song, the twilight of the age of heroes

---

[142] *NA* 3, 45, 1781. This passage is absent from the 1782 edition.

[143] *NA* 3, 130, 1781; *NA* 3, 230, 1782.

[144] *NA* 3, 45, 1781. Schiller published the song in a volume of his poetry under the title "Abschied Andromachas und Hektors" in 1800. The song is absent from the 1782 edition.

is announced with news of Hektor's death: "Einsam liegt dein Eisen in der Halle, / Priams grosser Heldenstamm verdirbt!" (*NA* 3, 46), indicating a grim omen for Karl. Amalia sings Hektor's and Andromache's lines alone in act 2, scene 1. Amalia steps in to fill the void left by Karl's absence when she sings the final stanza, which is supposed to represent Hektor's perspective:

> Horch! der Wilde rast schon an den Mauren –
> Gürte mir das Schwerdt um, laß das Trauren,
> Hektors Liebe stirbt im Lethe nicht!
> (*NA* 3, 46)

By allowing Amalia to play both Andromache and Hektor, Schiller has Amalia imagine herself donning her own defensive sword and assume the role that the name of her Trojan counterpart implies—Andromache means, literally, "she who fights against men."[145] Amalia is, after all, the only figure in the drama shown fighting on stage with her hands and with a dagger (act 3, scene 1). When Amalia assumes Hektor's lines, she assumes a readiness to approach the river Lethe like Hektor does in the song. It becomes increasingly clear to Amalia the only context in which she can fulfill her oath of lifelong loyalty to Karl is in death.

Franz's attempts to deceive Amalia fail utterly and in act 3, scene 1 of both the 1781 and the 1782 editions, he turns to assault, threatening her with rape at dagger point. In order to escape, Amalia needs a weapon. Once again, she utilizes Franz's underestimation of her to her own advantage. First, she plays into his misguided conviction that she will, in time, have to submit herself to his will, by suddenly embracing him: "AMALIA *fällt ihm um den Hals*. Verzeih mir Franz!"[146] Then, when he is off his guard, she grabs his dagger, the same phallic weapon with which he had threatened her moments prior: "*wie er sie umarmen will, reißt sie ihm den Degen*

[145] See Nikoletta Kanavou, *The Names of Homeric Heroes* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2015).

[146] *NA* 3, 76, 1781; *NA* 3, 186, 1782.

von der Seite und tritt hastig zurück."[147] In her emasculating response to Franz, Amalia explicitly addresses Franz's gendered presumptions about her. "Siehst du Bösewicht was ich izt aus dir machen kann? – Ich bin ein Weib," she says, but she adds: "aber ein rasendes Weib – wag es einmal mit unzüchtigem Griff meinen Leib zu betasten – dieser Stahl soll deine geile Brust mitten durchrennen, und der Geist meines Oheims wird mir die Hand dazu führen. Fleuch auf der Stelle!" and she chases Franz out of the room.

Amalia operates within the confines of a world where there are clearly defined, violent repercussions for refusing to acquiesce to a powerful man's gendered expectations. When Amalia takes Franz to task for his expectations of her by affirming her femininity—"Ich bin ein Weib"—she tacitly admits her understanding that she is impinged by a socially prescribed, limited sphere of actions. As Judith Butler writes in *Bodies That Matter*, "Femininity is thus not the product of a choice, but the forcible citation of a norm, one whose complex historicity is indissociable from relations of discipline, regulation, punishment."[148] Amalia's femininity is not something she chooses, but something that was determined for her before her birth and which she now must use in order to assert herself as an individual who is separate from Franz's will. She separates herself through the simultaneous affirmation of her femininity and the subversion of it introduced by the contradiction *aber* ("aber ein rasendes Weib"). Once again, Amalia acknowledges a preset notion of what femininity is and is not—she knows that her actions here are to some degree 'other' than the norm, i.e., a *Weib* who is not *rasend*. At the same time, however, she is aware that she has made Franz into something 'other' as well: "Siehst du Bösewicht was ich izt aus dir machen kann?" She halted the "Bösewicht," in the middle of his intended rape, which he sees as his manifest privilege,

[147] *NA* 3, 76, 1781; *NA* 3, 186, 1782.

[148] Butler, *Bodies That Matter*, 232.

by wresting from him the symbol of his masculine power, the dagger, and turning it against him. With this action, the *Weib* assumes characteristics of the *Mann*, the predator, and Franz, temporarily bereft of his stolen identity, adopts the characteristics of the *Weib*, the prey. Amalia alludes to his temporary social demotion when she claims that she has made him into an obscure "was." Amalia gains power over Franz; Franz's only option is to flee: "*Sie jagt ihn davon*." When Schiller has Amalia appropriate Franz's performative masculinity, he has her, to borrow again from Butler, "mim[e] and expos[e] both the binding power of the heterosexualizing law *and its expropriability*."[149]

Through Franz, Schiller exposes the dangerous consequences of discriminatory social binaries. In the hands of an opportunist, social binaries are villainous instruments that allow the willing and powerful to objectify others, thereby imposing arbitrary, yet nevertheless devastating barriers toward autonomous self-determination. Franz, the victim of lifelong objectification, attempts to use his masculinity as a weapon in order to gain control of the social binaries that produced his own oppression (beautiful [Karl] and ugly [Franz], firstborn [Karl] and second born [Franz]). However, Schiller demonstrates through Amalia that opportunist objectification only works so long—when the objectified are underestimated and behave in ways that defy the norm, they catch the objectifier off guard while the whole imaginary framework of objectification is exposed as unsustainable and inefficacious.

Franz is not the only character who operates through taking advantage of masculine supremacy. Herrmann's masculine performativity leads him too to foolishly believe that, with

[149] Butler, Bodies That Matter, 232.

Franz's help, Amalia can be made to bend to his will: "Pfui Herrmann du bist ein Kavalier.[150] Du must den Schimpf nicht auf dir sitzen lassen. Du must das Fräulein nicht fahren lassen, nein das must du um alle Welt nicht thun, Herrmann! [. . .] Du sollst sie haben, sag ich dir, und das von meiner Hand."[151] In the scene in which Franz seduces Herrmann into his service with Amalia as bait, he manipulates Herrmann psychologically via two methods. First, Franz applauds Herrmann on the basis of his hyperbolic performative masculinity ("Ich kenne dich, du bist ein entschloßner Kerl – Soldaten Herz – Haar auf der Zunge!";[152] "Das ist der Ton eines Manns! Rache geziemt einer männlichen Brust. Du gefällst mir, Herrmann. Nimm diesen Beutel, Herrmann").[153] Second, Franz exacerbates Hermann's impulse to protect his privilege by evoking threats to his masculine self-image ("Sie gab dir einen Korb. Ich glaube gar, er warf dich die Treppen hinunter;" "Was kanst du ihm böses thun? was kann so eine Raze gegen einen Löwen? Dein Zorn versüßt ihm seinen Triumph nur. Du kannst nichts thun, als deine Zähne zusammenschlagen, und deine Wut an trocknem Brode auslassen").[154] The reader will recall that Franz's word choices here bear striking resemblance to the words he uses to threaten Amalia a few scenes later: "Knirsche nur mit den Zähnen – speye Feuer und Mord aus den Augen – mich ergözt der Grimm eines Weibes, macht dich nur schöner, begehrenswerther."[155] Moreover, Franz repeats Herrmann's name in almost every

[150] "Kavalier" constitutes a strikingly noble address. In the English Civil War, the *cavaliers* were the royalist-aristocrats who opposed the *roundheads* who supported Parliament.

[151] *NA* 3, 41, 1781; *NA* 3, 163, 1782.

[152] *NA* 3, 40, 1781; *NA* 3, 162, 1782.

[153] *NA* 3, 40, 1781; *NA* 3, 162, 1782.

[154] *NA* 3, 41, 1781; *NA* 3, 163, 1782.

[155] *NA* 3, 76; 1781; *NA* 3, 186, 1782.

sentence, clearly emphasizing the irony that the man whose name is a composite of *Herr* and *Mann* is a disenfranchised, powerless bastard, who nevertheless wishes for nothing more than to live up to his name.[156] Both of their efforts to dominate through violent masculinity fail.

Karl also struggles with the damaging effects of the social gender binary, which arguably contributes to his downfall more than any other aspect of his character. He becomes his own victim by striving to match a fictional ideal of masculinity. Early in the drama, in a pub in Leipzig, Karl and Spiegelberg talk about what it means to be masculine. For Spiegelberg, it means to fight with knives, to get away with knavery, and to waste one's money on booze:

> Weist du noch wie tausendmal du die Flasche in der Hand den alten Filzen hast aufgezogen, und gesagt: Er soll nur drauf los schaben und scharren, du wollest dir dafür die Gurgel absauffen. – Weist du noch? he? weist du noch? O du heilloser, erbärmlicher Pralhanß! das war noch männlich gesprochen, und edelmännisch, aber –[157]

Later in the same scene, Karl makes it clear that his and Spiegelberg's warped ideal of masculinity will influence the trajectory of his career as a robber—he uses the phrase "männliche Rechte" to describe the activities (*wild sengen*, *gräßlich morden*) that the robbers will programmatically

---

[156] In the span of three pages of the *Nationalausgabe*, Franz calls Herrmann by name sixteen times. Additionally, he uses the word *Herr* 2 times and the word *Mann* or one of its variants 3 times. "Ha! Deus ex machina! Herrmann!"; "Du sollst mehr haben mit nächstem – mit nächstem, Herrmann! – Ich habe dir etwas zu sagen, Herrmann."; "Mein Vater hat dich sehr beleidigt, Herrmann!"; "Das ist der Ton eines Manns! Rache geziemt einer männlichen Brust. Du gefällst mir, Herrmann. Nimm diesen Beutel Herrmann. Er sollte schwerer seyn, wenn ich erst Herr wäre."; "Wirklich, Herrmann? wünschest du wirklich, ich wäre Herr?"; "hast du das Fräulein von Edelreich schon vergessen, Herrmann?"; "Pfui Herrmann du bist ein Kavalier. [. . .] Du must das Fräulein nicht fahren lassen, nein das must du um alle Welt nicht thun, Herrmann!"; "Nicht so stürmisch, Herrmann!"; "Ueber kurz oder lang wird er ihn in allen vier Enden der Welt aufsuchen lassen, und gute Nacht, Herrmann! wenn er ihn findet"; "und ich, der ich dich zu einem wichtigen grosen Manne machen wollte, ich selbst, Herrmann, werde tiefgebückt vor seiner Thürschwelle –"; "auch dich, mein lieber Herrmann, wird er seine Geissel fühlen lassen"; Höre dann, Herrmann!"; "Die Erndte ist dein, lieber Herrmann!" Herrmann himself calls attention to his name: "Nein! so wahr ich Herrmann heisse, das sollt ihr nicht!" (*NA* 3, 40–43, 1781).

[157] *NA* 3, 22, 1781; *NA* 3, 151, 1782.

pursue: "schwöret mir Treu und Gehorsam zu bis in den Tod! – schwört mir das bey dieser männlichen Rechte" (*NA* 3, 32, 1781).[158] Karl feels that his masculinity is being tested at two points in Act 5, Scene 2, when he is distracted from his identity as the robber captain by the pull of sympathy at the sight of his dying father: "*weichmüthig aufstehend*. O – wo ist meine Mannheit? Meine Sehnen werden schlapp, der Dolch sinkt aus meinen Händen" (*NA* 3, 129, 1781).[159] Then, Amalia enters her fatal scene. She demands that Karl desert his band of robbers and return to her. He fights again to resist the pull of sympathy:

> Das ist mehr als ein Mann erduldet. Hab ich doch den Tod aus mehr denn tausend Röhren auf mich zupfeiffen gehört, und bin ihm keinen Fusbreit gewichen, soll ich izt erst lernen beben wie ein Weib? beben vor einem Weib? – Nein, ein Weib erschüttert meine Mannheit nicht – Blut, Blut! Es ist nur ein Anstos vom Weibe – Blut mus ich saufen, es wird vorübergehen. *Er will davon fliehen*.[160]

By this point, Karl has almost completed his transformation from a Spiegelbergian booze-chugging man ("die Gurgel absauffen"), to a blood-sucking monstrosity ("Blut mus ich saufen"). His self-correction of "beben wie ein Weib" (tremble *like* a woman) to "beben vor einem Weib" (tremble *before* a woman) tacitly reveals his fear of Amalia—because her femininity (her otherness) casts Karl's violent masculinity into stark relief. Viewing Amalia, Karl can no longer look away from the horrible image of the 'man' he has become. For Karl, as for Franz, the overwhelming drive toward securing and strengthening their autonomy through masculine dominance degenerates into despotism, and they come to suffer the consequences as much as their victims do. Through Franz,

---

[158] *NA* 3, 160, 1782.

[159] This passage is absent from the 1782 edition.

[160] *NA* 3, 131, 1781; *NA* 3, 231, 1782.

Karl, and Herrmann, Schiller highlights the fictitious, inapproximable, and therefore inefficacious nature of the performance of masculinity as a tool of domination.[161]

Amalia's Sublime Heroism

In act 5, scene 2, the robbers capture Amalia in the forest outside the Moor estate where she had escaped in the hope of finding Karl and the count. After she finds Karl and embraces him, despite what he has become, he is profoundly moved. The pain of his father's injury—i.e., that he disinherited Karl at a moment when Karl needed fatherly love and understanding—is washed away by Amalia's unconditional forgiveness and love: "Sie vergibt mir, sie liebt mich! Rein bin ich wie der Aether des Himmels, sie liebt mich."[162] When Karl seeks to leave with Amalia and his father, the robbers become outraged and accuse Karl of perjury: "Pfui, über den Meineid! [. . .] Mit unserem Herzblut haben wir dich zum Leibeigenen angekauft, unser bist du, und wenn der Erzengel Michael mit dem Moloch ins Handgemeng kommen sollte! – Marsch mit uns, *Opfer um Opfer! Amalia für die Bande!*"[163] When Karl decides that he has no option but to leave with the

[161] Butler writes of the inefficacious nature of heterosexual gender norms: "Insofar as heterosexual gender norms produce inapproximable ideals, heterosexuality can be said to operate through the regulated production of hyperbolic versions of 'man' and 'woman.' These are for the most part compulsory performances, ones which none of us choose, but which each of us is forced to negotiate. I write 'forced to negotiate' because the compulsory character of these norms does not always make them efficacious. Such norms are continually haunted by their own inefficacy; hence, the anxiously repeated effort to install and augment their jurisdiction." Butler, *Bodies That Matter*, 237.

[162] *NA* 3, 132, 1782. In the 1782 edition: "Noch liebt sie mich! Noch! – rein bin ich wie das Licht! Sie liebt mich mit all meinen Sünden!" (*NA* 3, 231).

[163] *NA* 3, 132–133, 1781. In the 1782 edition: "Mit unserm Herzblut haben wir dich zum Leibeignen angekauft – Unser *bist du*, und wenn der Erzengel Michael mit dem Moloch ins Handgemeng darüber kommen sollte! Marsch mit uns! Opfer um Opfer! Liebe um Treue! Ein Weib um die Bande!" (*NA* 3, 232).

robbers, Amalia demands that he take her life.[164] Karl and the robbers refuse to kill her, so she, determined to follow through on her commitment, begins to leave, announcing that she intends to commit suicide: "Nun denn, so lehre mich Dido sterben!"[165] As she leaves, a robber aims at her and Karl finally grants her wish: "Halt! Wag es – Moors Geliebte soll nur durch Moor sterben! *Er ermordet sie.*"[166] With this act, Amalia becomes the first of many characters in Schiller's dramatic oeuvre to choose a free death over a life of sadness and servitude. She concludes that she would be much happier if she were dead: "Oh um Gotteswillen, um aller Erbarmungen willen! Ich will ja nicht Liebe mehr, weis ja wohl, daß droben unsere Sterne feindlich von einander fliehen, – Tod ist meine Bitte nur."[167] Here, a semantic issue threatens to obscure Amalia's intent. By "Liebe," Amalia means rather desire, i.e., a selfish feeling that expects a reward. To make this even clearer in the 1782 edition, Schiller adds Amalia's affirmation a few moments later that it is sweet to die at the hand of one's lover; this despite his failure to hold up his end of the oath he had made to her in their youth.[168] Furthermore, Amalia's stated renunciation of all claims to requited love is necessary in order for her death to be read as rationally independent. A death that depended on the hope of reunion in the afterlife would not be as great a sacrifice because it would indicate that Amalia had carried an earthly possession into death, namely, the hope for a reward. Only the free

---

[164] See *NA* 3, 133, 1781; *NA* 3, 232, 1782.

[165] *NA* 3, 134. This line and, with it, Amalia's clear intention to commit suicide if Karl and the robbers fail to murder her, are absent from the 1782 edition.

[166] *NA* 3, 134, 1781. In the 1782 edition: "Zurück, Harpyien! *Er tritt mit Majestät darzwischen*. Wag es einer, in mein Heiligtum zu brechen! *Sie ist mein – Indem er sie mit starken Armen umfaßt*. Und nun ziehe an ihr der Himmel, die Hölle an mir – Die Liebe über den Eiden!" (*NA* 3, 233). In the second edition, Schiller makes it even more obvious that Karl's murder of Amalia is supposed to function as a horrible act of intimacy between the two lovers.

[167] *NA* 3, 133, 1781; *NA* 3, 232, 1782.

[168] See *NA* 3, 234, 1782.

and unconditioned sacrifice of the last of Amalia's earthly possessions for the sake of her intangible promise to Karl can testify to the rational autonomy of her behavior.

When Karl helps Amalia fulfill her dying wish, he occupies at once the roles of the most horrible murderer and the most devoted lover. The phallus is strongly implied when Amalia commands Karl, "zeuch dein Schwerd, und ich bin glüklich!" (*NA* 3, 133), in the 1781 edition. The sexual imagery is much more overt in the 1782 edition. There, it is evident that Karl's murder of Amalia is not simply a cold-blooded act of violence, but it is rather an incredibly complicated, gruesome, even pornographic act of love. In this second edition, Karl lays Amalia down and reveals her breasts to the robbers while they voyeuristically look on (*NA* 3, 233). Karl stands over Amalia's almost lifeless body "*mit ausgestrecktem Degen*" (*NA* 3, 234) and likens the sword's penetration of Amalia's body to a consummation of their marriage: "Eingesegnet mit dem Schwert, hab ich heimgeführt meine Braut" (*NA* 3, 234). Schiller's comment, that Karl's killing of Amalia is necessary, that this is even a beautiful aspect of his character has puzzled scholars.[169]

Furthermore, the secondary literature reveals a disproportionate scholarly ignorance to the role of Amalia's own volition in orchestrating the intimate death that she desires, given the circumstances in which she becomes suicidal.[170] Neither the term murder nor the term suicide are

---

[169] See *NA* 23, 26. John Guthrie writes, "Er [Karl] muss, wie Schiller betont, seine Amalia umbringen, um in einem positiven Licht zu erscheinen. Ob seine Tat ihn als feurigen Liebhaber zeigt, wie Schiller behauptete, erscheint zweifelhaft." Guthrie, "Karl Moors Satanische Rebellion" in *Schillers Theaterpraxis*, ed. Peter-André Alt and Stefanie Hundehege (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), 136.

[170] Stephanie Barbé Hammer characterizes Amalia as "primarily [. . .] decoration." Hammer, 166. Karen Beyer writes, "Schiller bestraft [Amalia] für diese Anmaßung männlicher Handlungsfähigkeit nicht – wie später Leonore – mit dem Tod." Beyer, 85. See also Walter Müller-Seidel: "Am Regierungssystem ist Amalia als Frau weder direkt noch indirekt beteiligt, und wenn sie überhaupt etwas ist, so ist sie es mit Bezug auf den Verlobten." Müller-Seidel, *Schiller und die Politik*, 71. Hans Schwerte's analysis constitutes an early exception to this tradition by recognizing that Karl's return to humanity is not his own idea but rather Amalia's:

satisfactory labels for Amalia's death since the text itself points toward both. Schiller has Amalia stage-manage her own death and Karl plays the role that she envisions for him. Amalia sees Karl and exclaims, "Bräutigam, Bräutigam, du rasest!" but then she qualifies her excitement with apprehension: "Warum bin ich auch so fühllos, mitten im Wonnewirbel so kalt?"[171] Amalia's emotional coldness, her uncertainty here betrays her doubt about the reality of a sustainable reunification with the robber Karl before it is even fully apparent to Amalia, Karl, and the audience that she will be dead within a few minutes. She then victoriously cries, "Ewig sein! Ewig, ewig, ewig mein!" implying the marriage of their souls beyond their earthly existence. In the second edition, Amalia's inclination toward death is even more evident. At first Karl ridicules Amalia for her untimely talk of eternal marriage: "Hahaha! hört ihr den Pulverturm knallen über dem Stuhl der Gebärerin? Seht ihr die Flammen lecken an den Wiegen der Säuglinge? Das ist Brautfackel! das ist Hochzeitmusik!" (*NA* 3, 231, 1782). However, when Amalia convinces Karl to kill her, his rhetoric suddenly adapts to hers:

> RÄUBER MOOR *stellt sich vor Amalien und bewacht sie mit ausgestrecktem Degen.* Nun ist sie mein! – Mein! – Oder die Ewigkeit ist die Grille eines Dummkopfs gewesen. Eingesegnet mit dem Schwert, hab ich heimgeführt meine Braut, vorüber an all den Zauberhunden meines Feindes *Verhängnis*. [. . .] *Zärtlich zu Amalien*. Und er muß süß gewesen sein, der Tod von Bräutigams Händen? Nicht wahr, Amalia?
>
> AMALIA. *sterbend im Blut.* Süße. *Sie streckt ihre Hand aus und stirbt*. (*NA* 3, 234, 1782)

"Freilich kommt er zu dieser Erfahrung nicht von selbst, nicht durch sich selbst, sondern erst nachdem ihm Amalia die Hilfe ihrer Liebe, die Vergebung ihrer Tränen geschenkt hat," Schwerte, "Schillers 'Räuber,'" in *Deutsche Dramen von Gryphius bis Brecht*, ed. Jost Schillemeit, vol. 2, *Interpretationen* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1965), 154. Furthermore, Schwerte sees Karl's murder of Amalia as a gruesome demonstration of one friend willing to help another: "Daher ist sein letzter Schritt nicht mehr Selbsthilfe, sondern Nächstenhilfe, furchtbar bewahrheitet durch seine letzte extreme Tat, das blutige Hinopfern der Geliebten." Schwerte, 154.

[171] *NA* 3, 130, 1781; *NA* 3, 230, 1782.

Amalia's association of marriage with death is a citation of her earlier use of the theme. For example, she attempts to comfort Karl, in disguise as the traveling Count Brand, in act 4, scene 12[172] by sharing with him her fantasy of an eternal marriage in the afterlife:

From *Die Räuber: Ein Schauspiel* (1781):

MOOR. Oh sie ist ein unglükliches Mädgen! ihre Liebe ist für einen, der verlohren ist, und wird – ewig niemals belohnt.
AMALIA. Nein, sie wird im Himmel belohnt. Sagt man nicht, es gebe eine bessere Welt, wo die Traurigen sich freuen, und die Liebenden sich wiedererkennen?
MOOR. Ja, eine Welt, wo die Schleyer hinwegfallen, und die Liebe sich schröklich wiederfindet – *Ewigkeit* heißt ihr Name – meine Amalia ist ein unglükliches Mädgen. (*NA* 3, 102)

From *Die Räuber: Ein Trauerspiel* (1782)

RÄUBER MOOR. Meine Amalia ist ein unglückliches Mädchen!
AMALIA. Unglücklich – weil sie dich von sich stieß.
RÄUBER MOOR. Unglücklich – weil sie mich *zwiefach* umarmet.
AMALIA *mit sanftem Schmerz.* O! dann gewiß unglücklich! Das liebe Mädchen! Sie sei meine Schwester! – Aber noch gibt es eine bessere Welt. –
RÄUBER MOOR. Wo die Schleier fallen, und die Liebe mit Entsetzen zurückprallt. – Ewigkeit heißt ihr Name. – Meine Amalia ist ein unglückliches Mädchen! (*NA* 3, 207)

Right before Amalia's death, she addresses the burden of her sexual lust: "O ihr Mächte des Himmels! entlastet mich dieser tödlichen Wollust, daß ich nicht unter dem Zentner vergehe!"[173] Amalia's sexual apotheosis in death comes closely on the heels of her sexual reawakening again in act 4, scene 12 (1782), when Karl reappears at the Moor estate in the disguise of Count Brand. Amalia daydreams about the times she spent alone with Karl in the garden. Her description of their intimate union is laden with imagery of spring and common metaphors for love and sex, such as spring in full bloom (*NA* 3, 203), the nightingale (*NA* 3, 203), and the plucking of

[172] Act 4, scene 4 in the 1781 edition.

[173] *NA* 3, 230, 1782; *NA* 3, 130, 1781.

roses (*NA* 3, 206). She reminisces to Count Brand about how she once lay together with Karl and kissed him in the very garden in which they sit: "hier an diesem Busch pflückte er Rosen, und pflückte die Rosen für mich – hier, hier lag er an meinem Halse – brannte sein Mund auf dem meinen –" (*NA* 3, 206). As a result of her sexual talk, they lose control of themselves in their passion: "*Räuber Moor seiner nicht mehr mächtig, berührt ihren Mund, und ihre Küsse begegnen sich. Moor hängt stürmisch an ihren Lippen, sie sinkt halb ohnmächtig auf das Kanapee*" (*NA* 3, 206). Amalia's death scene functions dramatically not merely as the site of tragedy but also as the site of sexual catharsis, where the tension left hanging at the end of act 4, scene 12 is finally, horrifically, "schröklich" (*NA* 3, 102, 1781), released.

The placement of the garden scene in close proximity to her demise was of particular importance to Schiller, which he defended against criticism in a letter to Wolfgang Heribert von Dalberg of 6 October 1781:

> Doch hat mein Rezensent den Ausgang dieser Unterhaltung anders erwartet, aber ich bin überzeugt, mit weniger Gründen, als ich ihn, so wie er izt ist, für Recht hielt. Seine Scene mit Amalien im Garten ist um einen Akt zurükgesezt worden, und meine guten Freunde sagen, daß ich im ganzen Stük keinen beßern Ort dazu hätte wählen können als diesen, keine beßere Zeit als einige Augenblike vor Moors Scene mit Amalien. (*NA* 23, 22)

Schiller received criticism from Dalberg regarding the brutality of Amalia's death, in which Dalberg complained specifically that Amalia was stabbed by Karl. He suggested that Amalia instead commit suicide or be shot. In his first and second responses to this criticism, Schiller defends Amalia's death through Karl's hand by stressing that the novelty of the scene will be particularly effective. In a letter of 6 October 1781, Schiller writes, "Eine Scene wie seine Verurtheilung im Vten Akt ist meines Wißens auf keinem Schauplaz erlebt, eben so wenig als Amaliens Aufopferung durch ihren Geliebten" (*NA* 23, 22), and in a letter of 3 November 1781, "Theatralisch mag es immerhin von der auffallendsten Wirkung seyn" (*NA* 23, 23). Moreover, as

mentioned above, Schiller explicitly argues to Dalberg in a letter of 12 December 1781 that Karl's murder of Amalia must be understood as an act of love, concluding "daß Moor seine Amalie ermorden *muß*, und daß dieses eine *positive Schönheit* seines Karakters ist, die einerseits den feurigsten Liebhaber andernseits den *Banditenführer* mit dem lebhafftesten Kolorit auszeichnet" (*NA* 23, 26). In his anonymous 1782 review of *Die Räuber*, Schiller responded to Dalberg's criticism yet again, defending Amalia's death as the only ending for Amalia that made dramatic sense within the context of her relationship to Karl: "*Nein!* – Möglich war keine *Vereinigung* mehr, unnatürlich und höchst *undramatisch* wär eine *Resignation* gewesen. Zwar vielleicht diese letzte [eine Resignation] möglich und schön auf Seiten des männlichen Räubers – aber wie äußerst widrig auf Seiten des Mädchens! Soll sie heimgehen und sich trösten über das, was sie nicht ändern kann? Dann hätte sie *nie* geliebt" (*NA* 22, 127). In this last quote, Schiller distinguishes between Karl, the "Liebhaber," and Karl, "de[r] männlich[e] Räuber" and throughout his defensive review of the tragedy, he emphasizes a violent tension between two competing sides of Karl Moor's character, the robber and the lover, by referring to him with juxtaposed epithets—here he is "de[r] fliehend[e] Geliebt[e]" (*NA* 22, 117), there a "Mordbrenner" (*NA* 22, 120), here the "Liebhaber" (*NA* 22, 128), there the "Räuber" (*NA* 22, 128). The lover Karl cannot bear to desert Amalia again and therefore feels compelled to grant her fatal request; to do otherwise would have meant abandoning her for a second time: "weil er sein Mädchen zu feurig liebt, als sie verlassen zu können, ermordet er sie" (*NA* 22, 120). The robber Moor, on the other hand, could have simply resigned himself to his new role and abandoned her anew: "Zwar vielleicht diese letzte [eine Resignation] möglich und schön auf Seiten des männlichen Räubers."

Karl Moor, therefore, would have ended the drama as merely the robber and not the lover if he had deserted Amalia rather than grant her death wish—and it is precisely this complex,

bilateral nature of Karl's character, Schiller argues, that makes the audience love him, despite his crimes: "Endlich hat der Verfasser vermittelst einer einzigen Erfindung den fürchterlichen Verbrecher mit tausend Fäden an unser Herz geknüpft: – Der Mordbrenner liebt und wird wieder geliebt" (*NA* 22, 119–120). If Amalia had relinquished her claim on Karl, she would have ended the drama not as a passionate lover, but—in an inexplicable contradiction to her character up to that point—as a resigned, docile bachelorette. For Schiller, this would have been "höchst *undramatsich*" and even "äußerst widrig." Amalia's dying as she does, in a highly eroticized death, is not merely an authorial idiosyncrasy of Schiller's youth, nor some male phantasy of eroticized violence, but has a dramatic necessity and a characterological function: it is the only possible ending for the play given Karl's bilateral character roles as robber and lover and given the preceding plot. What critics such as Dalberg have missed is the theatrical purpose of Amalia's death: to illustrate the tension immanent in Karl's character and the unconditional love of Amalia, which she teaches to him in her final moments.

The relationships that are presented in *Die Räuber* are so intense that they are destructive. Schiller writes in his anonymous review that it is precisely the most calamitous and unsustainable human relationships—precisely those that are the most thoroughly incompatible with an orderly society—that are of highest dramatic interest to an audience:

> Ich weiß nicht, wie ich es erklären soll, daß wir um so wärmer sympathisieren, je weniger wir Gehilfen darin haben; daß wir dem, den die Welt ausstößt, unsere Tränen in die Wüste nachtragen; daß wir lieber mit Crusoe auf der menschenverlassenen Insel uns einnisten, als im dringenden Gewühle der Welt mitschwimmen. [. . .] Ein Mensch, an den sich die ganze Welt knüpft, der sich wiederum an die ganze Welt klammert, ist ein Fremdling für unser Herz. – Wir lieben das Ausschließende in der Liebe und überall. (*NA* 22, 118–119)

Hence it is everything that makes Karl, Amalia, and their relationship repulsive, dysfunctional, and self-destructive that fastens the audience's sympathies to their story. Schiller writes that Karl's

destructive behavior does not come from malicious intent, but it is rather the result of Karl's disappointment in his society, one built upon a moral system that has already fallen prey to corruption and manipulation before it could realize its highest goals: "Die gräßlichsten seiner Verbrechen sind weniger die Wirkung bösartiger Leidenschaften als des zerrütteten Systems der guten" (*NA* 22, 120). Because society cannot tolerate a "Mordbrenner Hauptmann" (*NA* 3, 69), not even one with some moral principles, and because the robbers' contract with their captain prevents the Robber Moor's defection (*NA* 3, 133), the lovers Karl and Amalia must suffer. The world has no place for them and, consequently, they choose to die in rejection of the world that forbids their union. Love is portrayed as a rebellious act in Schiller's works, an act that runs up against insurmountable barriers put up by a heartless society. Amalia's love is heroic because its unconditioned nature openly defies a society that claims natural inherence of its conditions for belonging.

It is precisely the ugliness of Amalia's ultimate free choice—the choice to withdraw from a vicious society by ending her life—that makes it not merely dramatically effective but also helps prompt the feeling of the sublime in the spectator or reader. The feeling of the sublime arises specifically in response to Amalia's willful victory over her instinct to survive, which Schiller identifies as the strongest of all inclinations, the *Selbsterhaltungstrieb* (drive to preserve one's life), over a decade later in his 1793 essay "Vom Erhabenen (Zur weitern Ausführung einiger Kantischen Ideen)." Amalia demonstrates freedom of will by choosing to end her real, living self for the sake of a merely possible idea. For Amalia at the end of *Die Räuber*, happiness and death are one and the same: "zeuch dein Schwerd, und ich bin glüklich!"[174] This reference to happiness in death, is likewise a very early dramatic precursor to the issue of pleasure and pain at the center of Schiller's

[174] *NA* 3, 133, 1781. In the 1782 edition: "Zieh den Degen, und ich bin glücklich" (*NA* 3, 233).

mature theory of the sublime. If the defiance of one's strongest inclination demonstrates a free will, this demonstration is strengthened by the display of contented, even happy, resolution in the face of extreme suffering—the inner resolution of the mind has complete mastery of the involuntary appearance of the body.

In his essay "Ueber das Pathetische," Schiller asserts that the highest moral-aesthetic interest is in portrayals of freedom, regardless of whether this freedom is employed toward achieving moral good or bad. For this reason, evil characters have just as much moral-aesthetic potential in drama as good ones (*NA* 20, 220). Indeed, even portrayals of violent actions such as suicide or even homicide—actions that are generally taken to be wrong because they inflict harm on the agent or on others—can be incredibly effective moral-aesthetic tools for the dramatist because the display of the human individual's capacity to overcome the *Selbsterhaltungstrieb* alone is enough to demonstrate to an observer that every human possesses this same freedom of will, a will that can be implemented for good or for bad. The sheer force of a radically free will has the power to shake observers into the pleasurable awareness of the strength of their own freedom. Schiller offers the example of Medea, who after murdering her children for the purpose of revenge expresses motherly suffering (*NA* 20, 220). He also calls up the example of Peregrinus Proteus, who unhesitatingly immolates himself in order to prove his determination to defend his principles (*NA* 20, 215). In the case of the former, Medea, the agent enacts violence on others and realizes along with the observer, full of remorse, that the pursuit of her end has cost her a terrible sacrifice. In the case of the latter, Peregrinus Proteus, the agent enacts violence on himself and, regardless of whether he acted morally, the observer must conclude from his display of free will that any agent could likewise choose to act toward an end that stands in contradiction with even the highest inclination—the inclination toward survival. Either of these actions could, therefore, inspire the

feeling of the sublime. Moreover, the free actions of even misguided tragic figures implicitly indict a world where better options for free action have been obscured or made structurally unavailable.

In his preface to the 1781 edition of *Die Räuber*, Schiller writes that one requires immense strength of will in order to become a hero, just the same as one requires immense strength of will in order to become a villain—it is the environment in which this strength is manifested that determines whether it will be used for heroism or villainy. This is how Schiller characterizes Karl Moor: "Ein merkwürdiger wichtiger Mensch, ausgestattet mit aller Kraft, nach der Richtung, die diese bekömmt, nothwendig entweder ein Brutus oder ein Katilina zu werden. Unglükliche Konjunkturen entscheiden für das zweyte und erst am Ende einer ungeheuren Verirrung gelangt er zu dem ersten" (*NA* 3, 6). Unlucky circumstances, i.e., a misfortunate procession of events that were out of his control, shaped the trajectory of Karl's path, leading him toward villainy and destruction. Schiller foreshadows his later treatises on the sublime here as well when he uses the example of one of his favorite sublime villains, Medea, in order to ethically justify his portrayal of Karl's so gruesome crimes: "Die Medea der alten Dramatiker bleibt bei all ihren Greueln noch ein grosses staunenwürdiges Weib" (*NA* 3, 7). It is the strength of will with which Medea acts toward her end, not the act itself, that makes her a dramatically and morally interesting character, indeed even worthy of the spectator's awe, because she operates in the context of enormous emotional struggle. In Schiller's speech "Was kann eine gute stehende Schaubühne eigentlich wirken?," Medea makes an appearance among a series of criminals, including Lady Macbeth and Schiller's own Franz Moor. The criminals Schiller highlights eventually find themselves in the midst of incredible remorse, a painful reaction to the realization of the great personal cost of their crimes:

> Wenn keine Moral mehr gelehrt wird, keine Religion mehr Glauben findet, wenn kein Gesez mehr vorhanden ist, wird uns *Medea* noch anschauern, wenn sie die Treppen des

> Pallastes herunter wankt, und der Kindermord jetzt geschehen ist. Heilsame Schauer werden die Menschheit ergreifen, und in der Stille wird jeder sein gutes Gewissen preißen, wenn *Lady Makbeth*, eine schreckliche Nachtwandlerin, ihre Hände wäscht, und alle Wohlgerüche Arabiens herbeiruft, den häßlichen Mordgeruch zu vertilgen. Wer von uns sah ohne Beben zu, wen durchdrang nicht lebendige Glut zur Tugend, brennender Haß des Lasters, als, aufgeschröckt aus Träumen der Ewigkeit, von den Schrecknissen des *nahen* Gerichts umgeben, *Franz von Moor* aus dem Schlummer sprang, als er, die Donner des erwachten Gewissens zu übertäuben, Gott aus der Schöpfung läugnete, und seine gepreßte Brust, zum lezten Gebete vertrocknet, in frechen Flüchen sich Luft machte? – – Es ist nicht Uebertreibung, wenn man behauptet, daß diese auf der Schaubühne aufgestellten Gemählde mit der Moral des gemeinen Manns endlich in eines zusammen fließen, und in einzelnen Fällen seine Empfindung bestimmen. (*NA* 20, 92)

The impressions that these scenes make on their observer are so deeply emotionally disturbing that, Schiller argues, they last far longer and are more deeply effective than the commands of moral, religious, or juridical laws (*NA* 20, 93). Scenes of vice played out to extremes before a spectator's eyes furthermore reinforce the spectator's sense of the morally just via the channel of the spectator's revulsion of evil and personal desire to avoid it (*NA* 20, 92ff.). Though Schiller does not yet boast a fleshed-out theory of the sublime, he clearly refers to Edmund Burke's 1757 description of the sublime as "delightful horror"[175] when he describes the reaction to displays of strong forces of ill will as a "heilsame Schauer," a thrill that prompts observers to silently applaud their own morality amid feelings of aversion (*NA* 20, 92ff.).

Though the portrayal of one who overcomes the *Selbsterhaltungstrieb*—and, correspondingly, dies as a result—is the classic venue for the sublime because it is the strongest theater of freedom of the mind over even the strongest inclinations, the reader can glean from Schiller's affiliation of the sublime with Franz's momentary regret and Medea's despair that noble suicide is not the *only* action that can inspire the feeling of the sublime. The action must nevertheless jeopardize the agent's ability to live without suffering (mental or physical) in order to

[175] Burke, 129.

be carried out.[176] Hence, there are at least three major events in *Die Räuber* that carry the potential to inspire the feeling of the sublime, according to Schiller's theory: Franz's Lady Macbethean regretful dream scene,[177] Amalia's death wish and the fulfillment of her commitment to Karl,[178] and Karl's decision to deliver his life to a poor family so that they can collect the bounty on his head.[179] Though Franz's renunciation of heaven and hell and his suicide in the first edition of 1781 (*NA* 3, 126) might also engender a sublime feeling in the reader, this feeling is severely mitigated because of its context. Firstly, in the dialogue with Daniel just before his suicide, Franz desperately begs the god he had renounced to bestow mercy on him and to spare him from hell (*NA* 3, 126, 1781). Secondly, though he overcomes his *Selbsterhaltungstrieb* in order to strangle himself, he does so not out of bravery but strictly out of fear of a more painful death at the hands of the approaching robbers (*NA* 3, 126, 1781). Thirdly, any sublime effect that his suicide might have is instantly dispersed by the crass treatment of his corpse by the robbers who stumble over his body and find him "wie eine Kaze verrekt [. . .] maustodt" (*NA* 3, 126–127, 1781). Fourthly, and most importantly here, Franz's death scene in the 1781 edition serves as a pitiful foil to Amalia's—unlike Amalia, who dies contentedly, Franz desperately seeks mercy from God before his death; like Amalia, Franz expresses fear of the dagger and asks Daniel to stab him as a favor, but unlike Amalia, who achieves death on her terms at Karl's hands, Daniel flees, leaving Franz utterly alone at his demise; Amalia's death releases Karl from his blood-oath obligation to the robbers, placing his own life back in his hands and accordingly permitting him to use it freely and for himself for

[176] See "Ueber das Pathetische," *NA* 20, 220.

[177] *NA* 3, 116ff., 1781; *NA* 3, 219ff., 1782.

[178] *NA* 3, 133–134, 1781; *NA* 3, 232–234, 1782.

[179] *NA* 3, 135, 1781; *NA* 3, 236, 1782.

the benefit of others, where Franz's suicide seals the fate of the unfortunate robber Schweizer, who swore to Karl that he would either kill Franz or himself, and who, upon finding Franz's corpse, shoots himself in the head (*NA* 3, 127, 1781).

Furthermore, of the events listed here, Amalia's death is unique in that it stages the effect of the sublime within the action of the drama. When Amalia manages to orchestrate her death at Karl's hands, she achieves what no other character has—namely, she stops a murderer and robber in the middle of his bloody tracks. Not even the death of Karl's father before his eyes has this effect. Immediately after Amalia's death, Karl's shifts his intention to eke out a coerced existence with the robbers to the objective to regain control over what remains of his life: "Aber noch blieb mir etwas übrig, womit ich die beleidigte Geseze versöhnen, und die mißhandelte Ordnung wiederum heilen kann."[180] Karl decides that he too will freely give up his life for the sake of a principle. Furthermore, though Schiller faced criticism for the gruesomeness of Amalia's final scene, it is precisely the stark contrast of her horrific and bloody death with her metaphorical marriage consummation that further aggravates the spectator's emotional state, priming the spectator to more keenly perceive the feeling of the sublime. Schiller describes this effect in "Über die tragische Kunst" (1791), an investigation into the phenomenon of the pleasure that spectators feel when witnessing the suffering of other individuals. Schiller writes that, though the degree to which a spectator personally identifies with the suffering individual does not constitute the cause of the spectator's pleasure, that individual's character may nevertheless prime the spectator's desire to be moved if the spectator finds the character sympathetic (*NA* 20, 152). By entrenching

[180] *NA* 3, 135, 1781. In the 1782 edition: "Banditen! Wir sind quitt – Über dieser Leiche liegt meine Handschrift zerrissen – Euch schenk ich die eurige" (*NA* 3, 234).

Amalia's death in her love story, Schiller gives her death a particularly strong emotional weight, setting the stage for a deeper impact on the spectator.

Conclusion

There are comparatively few full-length treatments on Amalia's role in *Die Räuber*. When she appears in the secondary literature, it is usually in the context of an ancillary note—that is, if she is not overlooked entirely. Julius Burggraf's section on Amalia in his 1897 monography, *Schillers Frauengestalten*, points to the ambivalent criticism of Amalia since her earliest reception—according to Burggraf, she is too idle and quixotic in the first half of the drama, and too fiery, too *männlich* in the second half.[181] More recently, there has been widespread agreement in the secondary literature that Amalia is a hollow, underdeveloped character throughout, and that little to none of her dramatic action is done on her own behalf, but rather exclusively for Karl's benefit. Even Thomas Mann characterized Amalia (and Thekla) in his *Versuch über Schiller* as "ätherische Blässe" and representative of Schiller's "pueril prahlende Sinnlichkeit, eine Erotik, die sich so recht mondän und ausgepicht gebärdet."[182] In stark contrast, Hans Schwerte recognized in 1965 that Amalia is decisively influential for the events of the plot, though he did not recognize the sublime in either Amalia's or Karl's deaths, which he characterized rather as "unheroisch."[183] Nevertheless, Schwerte's repeated insistence that Amalia is an essential figure for the play, that her rhetoric and especially her singing constitute key aspects of Schiller's aim with *Die Räuber* as a dramatic poet, and that the practice of cutting her completely out of the drama, "bringt das Drama

[181] Julius Burggraf, *Schillers Frauengestalten* (Stuttgart: Verlag von Carl Krabbe, 1897), 55–57.

[182] Thomas Mann, *Versuch über Schiller* (Berlin: S. Fischer Verlag, 1955), 15.

[183] Schwerte, 150.

um seinen Sinn und zerbricht seine Handlung durch und durch," reveals again just how thoroughly contested Amalia's role has been in the history of her reception.[184] In 1976, Gerhard Kluge criticized the scholarly inattention to Amalia: "sie bleibt unbeachtet, beargwöhnt, belächelt, man billigt ihr eine teils entbehrliche, teils wichtige Rolle im dramatischen Gefüge zu, ohne daß bisher [. . .] eigentlich gesagt worden ist, worin diese bestehe."[185] Almost twenty years later, Dagmar C. Stern endeavored to ameliorate the continued scholarly neglect of Amalia, arguing that there is no reason not to consider Amalia one of the "drei ausserordentliche Menschen" highlighted by Schiller in his preface to the first edition, noting that "she [Amalia] speaks more often and has more lines than either the ruthless Spiegelberg or the Moor patriarch," those two being her competitors for the title alongside the other, more obvious two, Karl and Franz Moor.[186] Barring few exceptions, when the character of Amalia is analyzed, she is often dismissed as a completely passive victim rather than a self-determined hero.[187] Such interpretations of Amalia, which have gained particular resonance in critical twentieth- and twenty-first-century feminist readings of Schiller's oeuvre, programmatically ignore her most impressive moments of resistance and independence, such as her self-defense against rape by Franz or the lascivious 1782 version of the garden scene with the Count von Brand, in which Amalia expresses concupiscent joy in her sexual

[184] Schwerte, 151.

[185] Gerhard Kluge, "Zwischen Seelenmechanik und Gefühlspathos. Umrisse zum Verständnis der Gestalt Amalias in »Die Räuber« – Analyse der Szene I, 3" *Jahrbuch der deutschen Schillergesellschaft* 20 (1976): 185.

[186] Dagmar C. Stern, "Amalia: The Third Extraordinary Person in Schiller's *Die Räuber*," *Colloquia Germanica* 27, no. 4 (1994): 321.

[187] See, for example, Christoph E. Schweitzer, "Schiller's *Die Räuber*: Revenge, Sacrifice, and the Terrible Price of Absolute Freedom," *Goethe Yearbook* 15 (2008): 166–167. Jaimey Fisher, "Familial Politics and Political Families: Consent, Critique, and the Fraternal Social Contract in Schiller's *Die Räuber*," *Goethe Yearbook* 13 (2005): 88 and 90–92.

life with Karl. In contrast, Norbert Oellers implicitly rejects the reception of Amalia as a passive victim in a welcome remark in a 2005 article. Referring to Amalia's self-defense against Franz, Oellers writes: "Amalia wird einstweilen kein Opfer der Gewalt, weil sie sich zu wehren weiß."[188]

Amalia's role as a lover exceeds that of the mere trope of the neglected damsel because her love is consistent with a particularly philosophical concept of love that Schiller is occupied with in his moral-aesthetic writings and which he calls "uneigennüzige Liebe" in the *Philosophische Briefe*. It is a rare form of love that demands nothing of anyone else because it is autonomously generated within the subject in response to an object. Schiller describes *uneigennüzige Liebe* in a poem in the *Philosophische Briefe*, in which an individual is able to sustain eternal love for his friend, which comes from within himself, though he lives in an utterly empty universe:

> Stünd' im All der Schöpfung ich alleine,
> Seelen träumt' ich in die Felsensteine
> und umarmend küßt' ich sie.
> Meine Klagen stöhnt' ich in die Lüfte,
> freute mich, antworteten die Klüfte,
> Thor genug, der süßen Sympathie.
> (*NA* 20, 121)

Uneigennüzige Liebe is distinguished from egoism, which is contingent upon a reward: "Egoismus sä't für die Dankbarkeit, Liebe für den Undank. Liebe verschenkt, Egoismus leyht – Einerlei vor dem Tron der richtenden Wahrheit, ob auf den Genuß des nächstfolgenden Augenbliks, oder die Aussicht einer Märtyrerkrone – einerlei, ob die Zinsen in diesem Leben oder im andern fallen!" (*NA* 20, 123). This term is best understood by contextualizing its constituent parts. *Liebe* is only one half of the equation. Once again, Schiller's first *Karlsschule* speech will help clarify this concept. In it, he writes that love is not sustainable if it is not checked by reason: "Allzugroße Güte

[188] Norbert Oellers, "Friedrich Schiller. *Die Räuber: Ein Schauspiel*," in *Erstlinge*, ed. Günther Emig and Peter Staengle (Heilbronn: Kleist-Archiv Sembdner, 2004), 30.

und Leutseeligkeit ist nicht Nachahmung Gottes. Nicht Tugend. Sie ist mit Liebe, aber nicht mit Weißheit im Bund. Tugend ist das harmonische Band von Liebe und Weißheit."[189] However, Schiller warns in that same speech, reason is not sustainable if it is not combined with love: "Aber verlarvtes Laster ist greulicher im Auge des großen Kenners im Himmel; als das, so wie *Ravaillacs* Königsmord, oder *Catalina's* Mordbrennerey in seiner Schande vor dem Auge der Menschen steht. Hier war die Güte mit Weißheit aber nicht mit Liebe im bund. Tugend ist das harmonische Band von Liebe und Weißheit" (*NA* 20, 5). Reason is the capacity with which one determines whether what one is doing is universalizable and *uneigennüzig* i.e., whether it serves the greater good. Love, however, is usually what encourages rational agents to act in the first place. Love is pleasurable, so the lover is motivated to act in ways that bring the lover closer to that which inspired it. But reason helps the rational lover choose which of these objects is the most universally serving ("welche Neigung zu höherer zu weiterumfaßender Glükseligkeit leite," *NA* 20, 3).

Uneigennüzige Liebe in the *Philosophische Briefe* is a more concise formulation of this idea. It is the collaboration of the moral imperative (i.e., universality, *Un-Eigennutz*, *weiterumfaßende Glükseligkeit*), and motivating, pleasurable love. Therefore *uneigennüzige Liebe* already contains a fundamental principal of Kantian ethics *ante litteram*—it contains the concept of a universalizable moral law—and it stresses the encouraging idea that individuals, if they strive to cultivate moral characters, can achieve a state in which they are already inclined in most cases to do what is good. Julius, the fictional author of the *Philosophische Briefe* asks his addressee and beloved friend, Raphael, to contemplate an idea that is so beneficial to humanity that one would be willing to die in order to realize it. Then, Julius asks Raphael to consider an individual "mit der

[189] *NA* 20, 6. See Macor, "Die Moralphilosophie," 105–109. See also Beiser, 84. Note that Schiller does not differentiate between *Vernunft*, *Verstand*, and *Weißheit* in his first *Karlsschule* speech.

ganzen erhabenen Anlage zu der Liebe" who would find it not merely possible, but even easy to die for such a powerful idea upon considering the posthumous happiness that the realized idea would generate. Julius writes that when one exerts outstanding effort toward the realization of an idea, one's idea becomes just as real as oneself, if merely in a momentary and microcosmic way: "Die Summe aller dieser Empfindungen wird sich verwirren mit seiner Persönlichkeit, wird mit seinem *Ich* in eins zusammen fließen. Das Menschengeschlecht, das er jetzt sich denket, ist *Er* selbst" (*NA* 20, 123). Once again, Schiller the dramaturg is not expressly interested in how morality is possible, but rather what motivates humans to endeavor to act morally.

Throughout Schiller's oeuvre, the clearest motivating factor toward the realization of the moral law in the world is love and this is reflected in the character of Amalia, who casts Franz's and Karl's egoism into relief. Up until the moment of her death, Amalia distinguishes herself from Karl because she is able to make personal sacrifices that are reinforced by her love for Karl and commitment to him even though he persistently fails to uphold his end of the bargain.[190] This quality of unconditional love, therefore, that in the secondary literature is so largely brushed aside as a metonym for a patriarchal view of femininity, is revealed when considering the figure of Amalia against the context of *selfless love* in Schiller's larger oeuvre to rather function as a

[190] Christoph Gschwind sees Julius's concept of egoism represented in Amalia's lute song in Act 3, scene 1 of the 1781 edition of *Die Räuber*. Gschwind, "Liebesphilosophie und Dramenpoetik bei Schiller" in *Schillers Theaterpraxis*, ed. Peter-André Alt and Stefanie Hundehege (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2019), 237. However, Amalia's fantasizing about her just reward in the afterlife does not make her egoistic—her fantasies demonstrate no convincing allegiance to one particular religion or belief; at most she evokes metaphorical images of the nondenominational heavens and the pagan underworld. At other times she fantasizes about eternal dreaming in a lonely grave (*NA* 3, 45, 1781; this passage is absent from the 1782 edition). In the span of a dialogue with the Count von Moor, she switches between images of the vaguely Judeo-Christian inspired "himmliche Vater" to the pagan "himmlischen Hörer" (*NA* 3, 50–51, 1781; this passage is absent from the 1782 edition), and in her final lines she gives this fantasy up entirely: "Ich will ja nicht Liebe mehr, weis ja wohl, daß droben unsere Sterne feindlich von einander fliehen, – Tod ist meine Bitte nur." *NA* 3, 133, 1781 and *NA* 3, 232, 1782.

dramatic representation of morality at work in the world. In contrast to Amalia, Karl, far from making personal sacrifices, abandons his emotional and physical obligations to his orphaned, destitute betrothed, and to his elderly, sick father the moment his filial love goes unrewarded, revealing that his youthful promise of love to Amalia was a mere physical show with no philosophical commitment behind it. Laura Anna Macor reads a criticism of the similarity of the Enlightenment philosophy of love to French materialism represented in Karl's contingent, egoistic love: "Für seine Reue hatte sich Karl eine Belohnung vorgestellt; weil die Belohnung ausbleibt, wird die Reue wieder aufgehoben. Karl verkörpert eine Dementierung der Moralphilosophie der Aufklärung in eben dem Maß, in dem sein Bruder Franz es tut."[191]

The reception of Amalia as largely dramatically and philosophically uninteresting is hard to reconcile with Schiller's own evaluation of Amalia's scenes as some of the most important—e.g., he considers her garden scene with Karl "die rührendste und entsetzlichste [Szene]" (*NA* 22, 126). In rejecting Dalberg's suggestion that Amalia commit suicide, he characterizes her death as that of a hero in his anonymous review: "Sol sie sich selbst erstechen? Mir ekelt vor diesem alltäglichen Behulf der schlechten Dramatiker, die ihre Helden über Hals über Kopf abschlachten, damit dem hungrigen Zuschauer die Suppe nicht kalt werde" (*NA* 22, 127). Rather, the sublime, fatal, "schröckliche," "tragische," "zweideutige Katastrophe" (*NA* 22, 127) of Amalia's death is a love act that relieves Karl of his hated oath-bound duty to the robbers. By releasing Karl from his miserable oath, Amalia becomes a dramatic prototype for one of Schiller's most political character tropes, the *Bürge*, i.e., someone who would stand as bail for their friend. When Amalia becomes Karl's *Bürge*, she resolves the tragic tension left hanging in the wake of Karl's lonely question in

[191] Macor, "Die Moralphilosophie," 105–106.

act 4, scene 5: "Wer mir Bürge wäre?" (*NA* 3, 109, 1781).[192] To quote Schiller's Julius, love is an idea made by reason that allows a "Verwechslung der Wesen" (*NA* 20, 119), moreover: "Alle Gesiter – eine Stufe tiefer unter dem vollkommensten Geist – sind meine Mitbrüder, weil wir alle *einer* Regel gehorchen, *einem* Oberherrn huldigen" (*NA* 20, 112). When Amalia forgives Karl, her love works within him in a metamorphotic capacity. The *Mordbrenner* and monster who thirstily cries for blood when confronted with the thought of the love he abandoned ("Blut, Blut! Es ist nur ein Anstos vom Weibe – Blut mus ich saufen," *NA* 3, 131, 1781)[193] becomes human again—and ready to accept his mortality: "Was soll ich gleich einem Diebe ein Leben länger verheimlichen, das mir schon lang im Rath der himmlischen Wächter genommen ist?"[194]

Amalia's loving clemency has a transformative power. It is the same power that Ferdinand exercises at the end of *Kabale und Liebe*, when, as his final act, he extends a hand of forgiveness to his father, who is suddenly moved to accept his culpability in the deaths of his son and Luise. He steps down from his position of privilege, which up until then had held him above the law, and willingly turns himself in to the authorities (*NA* 5N, 192). The same loving clemency is present at the end of *Die Bürgschaft*—the obvious political implication of the king's request to join in the friendship of his would-be assassins is that he would no longer be able to occupy the position of the tyrant king (*NA* 1, 425). Love, therefore, often takes on the function of implicit political criticism in Schiller's oeuvre, because it requires that the parties that partake in it meet each other

[192] This line is absent in the 1782 edition.

[193] *NA* 3, 231, 1782. See also: "Ich habe keinen Vater mehr, ich habe keine Liebe mehr, und Blut und Tod soll mich vergessen lehren, daß mir jemals etwas theuer war!" *NA* 3, 32, 1781; *NA* 3, 160, 1782; "Hör auf! ich wills ein andermal hören – morgen, nächstens, oder – wenn ich Blut gesehen habe." *NA* 3, 84, 1781; *NA* 3, 193, 1782.

[194] *NA* 3, 135, 1781. In the 1782 edition: "Leise flistert mein Genius: '*Geh nicht weiter, Moor. Hier ist der Markstein des Menschen – und der Deine.*'" *NA* 3, 234.

on a basis of equality.[195] Only then can their relationship be described as true love, which unites, in contrast to egoism, which separates. Audre Lorde describes the political importance of such a love in "The Uses of the Erotic":

> The dichotomy between the spiritual and the political is also false, resulting from an incomplete attention to our erotic knowledge. For the bridge which connects them is formed by the erotic—the sensual—those physical, emotional and psychic expressions of what is deepest and strongest and richest within each of us, being shared: the passions of love, in its deepest meanings. [. . .]
>
> The erotic functions for me in several ways, and the first is in providing the power which comes from sharing deeply any pursuit with another person. The sharing of joy, whether physical, emotional, psychic, or intellectual, forms a bridge between the sharers which can be the basis for understanding much of what is not shared between them, and lessens the threat of their difference. (Audre Lorde, "Uses of the Erotic" in *The Selected Works of Audre Lorde*, ed. Roxane Gay [New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2020], 32–33)

In the first edition of *Die Räuber*, Spiegelberg sings to the robbers:

> Das Wehgeheul geschlagner Väter,
> Der bangen Mütter Klaggezetter,
> Das Winseln der verlaßnen Braut
> Ist Schmauß für unsre Trommelhaut!
> (*NA* 3, 104)

Spiegelberg's song doubles as an address by the author to his readers. According to "Ueber die tragische Kunst," it is part of human nature (i.e., human psychology; *NA* 20, 149) to be drawn to scenes of human suffering, such as battered fathers, fearful mothers, and abandoned brides, and the greater the suffering, the more pleasure can be derived from observing it:

> Es ist eine allgemeine Erscheinung in unsrer Natur, daß uns das Traurige, das Schreckliche, das Schauderhafte selbst, mit unwiderstehlichem Zauber an sich lockt, daß wir uns von Auftritten des Jammers, des Entsetzens mit gleichen Kräften weggestoßen

[195] See Hans-Jürgen Schings: "Denn den kosmologischen Modellen, positiv ('chain of love') und negativ (Atom), entsprechen im Konzept des Julius gesellschaftliche Modelle, die Geisterrepublik auf der einen, der Despotismus auf der anderen Seite. [. . .] Für Julius ist sie natürlich Erscheinungsform und Konsequenz der 'chain of love.'" Schings, "Schillers 'Räuber': Ein Experiment des Universalhasses" in *Friedrich Schiller: Kunst, Humanität und Politik in der späten Aufklärung. Ein Symposium*, ed. Wolfgang Wittkowski (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1982), 7–8.

> und wieder angezogen fühlen. Alles drängt sich voll Erwartung um den Erzähler einer Mordgeschichte; das abentheuerlichste Gespenstermährchen verschlingen wir mit Begierde und mit desto größrer, jemehr uns dabey die Haare zu Berge steigen. (*NA* 20, 148)

According to Schiller, what draws audiences so powerfully to the subject of human suffering is that it sets up an opportunity for the individual in pain to demonstrate the capacity to rationally cope with, and even overcome, physical pain. This capacity is what Schiller's heroes are made of—because those who portray this capacity also portray to their spectators the universal human freedom of the will from the coercion of necessity. This pillar of Schiller's theory of the sublime was contemporary in Schiller's oeuvre with his composition of *Die Räuber*. Julius asks in the *Philosophische Briefe*: "Wenn wir z. B. eine Handlung der Großmut, der Tapferkeit, der Klugheit bewundern, regt sich nicht ein geheimes Bewußtsein in unserm Herzen, daß wir fähig wären ein gleiches zu thun?" (*NA* 20, 117). Because the audience's enjoyment increases proportional to the degree of suffering portrayed, the audience cannot help but follow Amalia to utmost reaches of her sanity, down a rabbit hole of persecution and pain, down to her grisly end. The audience contemplates with awe how Amalia's love for Karl and her respect for personal freedom persevere over the coercion of necessity. At her horrible end, Amalia's 'femininity' is revealed to be emblematic for a Schillerian vision of humanity, and her death for the sake of loving commitment constitutes a paradigm for his subsequent sublime heroes.

Chapter 3

"Ein unempfängliches Geschlecht": Diversity and Sustainability of the State in Schiller's *Die Verschwörung des Fiesko zu Genua* and the *Ästhetische Briefe*

IN THE FOURTH OF HIS *BRIEFE ÜBER DIE ÄSTHETISCHE ERZIEHUNG DES MENSCHEN*, Schiller provides two key guidelines regarding his concept of a healthy political state:

1. A state is only sustainable so long as it is founded on the moral principles of peace, freedom, and equality.[196] The citizens must reform themselves and, by extension, the state by cultivating a character that takes pleasure in acting on these moral principles. The state on its own is merely a theory, not an empirical reality. It requires *Menschen*[197] to realize the moral principles upon which it is theoretically founded. Schiller makes the empirical claim that, if the *Menschen* of the state do not willingly and joyfully embrace the state's moral principles (supposing that the principles on which the state is grounded are perfectly

[196] Here, Schiller demonstrates the influence of John Locke (1632–1704), Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) and where he departs from them. Schiller agrees with Locke of the self-evidence of the equality of human beings in nature. He further agrees with Locke that the rational justification for "that obligation to mutual love amongst men" is self-interest: "if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man's hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire, which is undoubtedly in other men weak, being of one and the same nature"? John Locke, *The Second Treatise on Civil Government* (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1986), 9. However, the rational justification is not enough to encourage action according to Schiller. Instead, Schiller aims to argue in the *Ästhetische Briefe* that for sustainable state reform, the citizens must possess not merely a respect for the moral law but also an inclination toward it.

[197] In the eleventh letter, Schiller makes a distinction between the concept of objective humanity, which he calls *Person*, and the empirical conditions in which all things and beings exist, which he calls *Zustand*. A *Mensch* is both, i.e., a "Person, die sich in einem bestimmten Zustand befindet" (*NA* 20, 342). *Mensch* is the Schillerian term for the material appearance of humanity in the empirical world. This distinction will be discussed in further detail below.

sound), or, in other words, if the state's ideology is at odds with the inclinations of its *Menschen*, the government is untenable, and a revolution or other form of regime change will likely follow. Thus, there is a reciprocal (not just bottom-up or top-down) relation between the moral idea of the state and the individual citizens' inclinations.

2. Schiller implicitly espouses Cicero's maxim, *Salus populi suprema lex esto*. Because the state cannot be realized without *Menschen*, it is in the best interest of the state to protect the *Menschen* who constitute it. The state that fails to protect its *Menschen* is unsustainable, because it fails to protect itself, and, in some cases, it actively works toward its own destruction.

The present chapter demonstrates that Schiller already issued these same two political exhortations in dramatic rather than theoretical form in his second play, *Die Verschwörung des Fiesko zu Genua* (1782), over a decade before he penned the *Ästhetische Briefe*. A comparison of this largely overlooked drama[198] with Schiller's most famous political-theoretical text sheds light on how the health of a revolution and the sustainability of a state can be measured by the relationship of the powerful to the vulnerable. Although Schiller's political theory has been read as idealist[199] and

[198] Not much has changed in this regard since Frank Fowler wrote in 1970 that "today as in the 1780s *Fiesko* is commonly though not quite invariably regarded as a marked anti-climax after the promise of *Die Räuber*." Fowler, "Schiller's *Fiesko* Re-Examined" in *Publications of the English Goethe Society* 40, no. 1 (1970): 2.

[199] Georg Lukács, *Goethe und seine Zeit* (Bern: Francke, 1947), 109; "Mais le révolutionnaire s'était assagi, le Stürmer était devenu un humaniste, un classique et, quand la Révolution éclata, il la considéra plutôt avec méfiance. [. . .] Il se détourne, ou plus exactement il manifeste la volonté de se détourner de toute politique, de se réfugier parmi les idées pures en espérant travailler ainsi pour l'avenir." Maurice Boucher, *La Révolution de 1789 vue par les Écrivains Allemands* (Paris: Didier, 1954), 95, see also 104–105; See also Alexander Abusch, *Schiller* (Berlin: Aufbau, 1980), 175–205, esp. 192–193, 195–196, and 198; "Schiller's idealism has been accused of being hollow rhetoric [. . .]." Wolfgang Wittkowski, "Schiller: Idealistic Morality, Autonomous Art, and Political Ethics," *The European Legacy: Toward New Paradigms* 2, no. 2 (1997): 315–319, here 315.

conservative,[200] the present chapter argues that the theory champions diversity and protections for the vulnerable over moral ideology. Writing in response to Kant's ethics, Schiller's political theory urges that the law of nature has equal authority as the moral law and that this realization does not support blind fealty and enforcement of the moral law but is rather a sign that the citizen's feelings must be engaged while performing and espousing moral action. Thus, a greater harmony is established between the law of nature and the moral law. It is just as politically realistic as it is idealistic because it explicitly and repeatedly warns against the dangers of ideologies that do not tolerate diversity in the empirical realm.[201] In *Die Verschwörung des Fiesko zu Genua*, the conspirators and their supporters act for personal gain under the guise of republicanism, while the vulnerable (here women and people of color), in contrast, demonstrate genuine commitment to republican-ethical principles. Across Schiller's oeuvre, Thrasymachus's infamous argument, that "justice is the interest of the stronger" is put to the test and Socrates's judgment, that "injustice can never be more profitable than justice" is shown to be valid. In Schiller's works, whenever two sides of a polarized binary come into conflict—here powerful vs. vulnerable—there results destruction on both sides. The republican conspiracy is, as Charlotte Craig puts it, "a brilliantly conceived exercise in futility"[202] because those most prepared to embrace the moral principles of the new state are persecuted and executed, while those in the best position to orchestrate a revolution succumb to selfish temptations.

---

[200] Abusch, 192–193, 195–196, and 198.

[201] Wittkowski contends, "Schiller, for all his moral idealism, never lost sight of political realism." Wittkowski, "Schiller: Idealistic Morality," 318.

[202] See Charlotte Craig, "Fiesco's Fable: A Portrait in Political Demagoguery," in *Modern Language Notes* 86, no. 3 (1971): 399.

Schiller's first published poem, "Der Abend," already gives insight into his early conception of a healthy revolution resulting in a sustainable state.[203] In the opening description of the setting sun in Europe, the poetic speaker remarks that it is already morning "Für andre, ach! glüksel'gre Welten" (*NA* 1, 3), likely a reference to the recent US Declaration of Independence.[204] The poem was published in October 1776 by Balthasar Haug, friend of the pro-US-American Christian Friedrich Daniel Schubart, in his *Schwäbisches Magazin von gelehrten Sachen*. The speaker remarks how only "Die Niederen" perceive the true value of the glorious evening sun that sets everything ablaze, but "Für Könige, für Grosse ists geringe" (*NA* 1, 3). There is something in the air that only the common folk can understand. The wind that blows from the west, where "glüksel'gre Welten" lie, touches first one, then several, then infinite souls, a metaphor for growing support for republicanism among the disenfranchised in Europe:

> GOtt – wenn der West ein Blatt beweget,
> Wenn auf dem Blatt ein Wurm sich reget,
> Ein Leben in dem Wurme lebt,
> Und hundert Fluten in ihm strömen,
> Wo wieder junge Würmchen schwimmen,
> Wo wieder eine Seele webt.
> (*NA* 1, 5)

About four years later, around the year 1780, Schiller composed "Die schlimmen Monarchen," inspired by the antityrannical poetry of Schubart, who by then was serving the third year of his

---

[203] See Jeffrey L. High's reading of "Der Abend" in High, "Edinburgh–Williamsburg–Ludwigsburg: From Teaching Jefferson and Schiller Scottish Enlightenment Happiness to the 'American War' and *Don Karlos*" in *Patentlösung oder Zankapfel? "German Studies" für den internationalen Bereich als Alternative zur Germanistik – Beispiele aus Amerika*, ed. Peter Pabisch, (Bern: Peter Lang, 2005), 303.

[204] On Schiller's borrowing of *happiness* as a politically-coded term associated in the English-speaking realm with Scottish Enlightenment philosophy and, later, the rhetoric of the US-American War of Liberation, see High, "Edinburgh," esp. 305–313. Johann Gottfried Herder will later cast America as the dawn (*Aurora*) adored by old Europe (*Thiton*) in his *Thiton and Aurora* (1792).

ten-year prison sentence in response to outspoken approval of the US-American Revolutionary War and criticism of Duke Karl Eugen's support of Britain. The speaker, again a poet, bitterly remarks that, in the end, not even the lowliest member of society, here the "Mohr" who guards the riches buried in the tomb of a dead monarch, envies the splendor of a dead and decomposing king (*NA* 1, 124). In a sneering, ironic tone, the poet observes that everyone ends up in the same wooden casket, be they kings or galley slaves. Where in "Der Abend" the light of the sun was associated with revolutionary freedom, here monarchs are associated with night and intentional obfuscation:

> Berget immer die erhabne Schande
> Mit des *Majestätsrechts* Nachtgewande!
> Bübelt aus des Thrones Hinterhalt.
> (*NA* 1, 127)

The poem concludes with a warning about the violent revenge of the oppressed against the monarch:

> Aber zittert für des Liedes Sprache,
> Kühnlich durch den Purpur bohrt der Pfeil der Rache
> Fürstenherzen kalt.
> (*NA* 1, 127)

On 8 January 1783, months into Schiller's contemplation of a drama on Don Carlos, Infante of Spain, and eight months before the end of the US-American Revolutionary War, Schiller wrote in a letter to Henriette von Wolzogen, "Wenn Nordamerika frei wird, so ist es ausgemacht, daß ich hingehe. In meinen Adern siedet etwas – ich möchte gern in dieser holperichten Welt einige Sprünge machen, von denen man erzählen soll" (*NA* 23, 60).

In the same period in which Schiller is making these pro-revolutionary literary gestures, he has just completed his first two dramas, both of which portray failed antityrannical rebellion. Karl von Moor opens *Die Räuber* frustrated about the corruption of the state and about the power holders who cozy up to tyrants for their own personal gain: "Sie verpallisadiren sich ins Bauchfell

eines Tyrannen, hofieren der Laune seines Magens, und lassen sich klemmen von seinen Winden" (*NA* 3, 21). Referring to the figure of the first-century liberator of the Germanic tribes from Roman occupation Hermann (Arminius), Karl wishes that a new Hermann would arise to liberate modern Germany from its oppressors and introduce a republican era: "Ah! daß der Geist Herrmanns noch in der Asche glimmte! – Stelle mich vor ein Heer Kerls wie ich, und aus Deutschland soll eine Republik werden, gegen die Rom und Sparta Nonnenklöster seyn sollen" (*NA* 3, 21). Later, in act 2, scene 3, Karl makes a gruesome exhibition of his antityrannical guiding principle when he flaunts the rings of corrupt state officials whom he executed as punishment for their abuse of privileges at the expense of the common people:

> diesen Rubin zog ich einem Minister vom Finger, den ich auf der Jagd zu den Füssen seines Fürsten niederwarf. Er hatte sich aus dem Pöbelstand zu seinem ersten Günstling empor geschmeichelt, der Fall seines Nachbars war seiner Hoheit schemel – Tränen der Waisen huben ihn auf. Diesen Demant zog ich einem Finanzrath ab, der Ehrenstellen und Aemter an die Meistbiedenten verkaufte und den traurenden Patrioten von seiner Thüre sties. (*NA* 3, 70)

In a moment of despair in act 4, scene 5, Karl sings a dialogue between Brutus and Caesar in order to awaken his "schlafende[n] Genius" (*NA* 3, 107) and to inspire him with the memory of his antityrannical aspirations: "Brutus will Tyrannengut nicht erben / Wo ein Brutus lebt muß Cesar sterben" (*NA* 3, 109).

Noble as his intentions may be, Karl's Robin Hood-esque rebellion against a tyrannical societal order utterly fails to improve the conditions of his compatriots in a meaningful way. Instead, all he achieves is to amass, embolden, arm, and unleash a group of criminals onto the world, who know how to destroy but not how to build. At the end of the drama, Karl dissolves the band in disgrace before turning himself over to the state:

> O über mich Narren, der ich wähnete die Welt durch Greuel zu verschönern, und die Geseze durch Gesezlosigkeit aufrecht zu halten. Ich nannte es Rache und Recht – [. . .] aber – O eitle Kinderey – da steh ich am Rand eines entsezlichen Lebens, und erfahre nun

> mit Zähnklappern und Heulen, daß *zwey Menschen wie ich den ganzen Bau der sittlichen Welt zu Grund richten würden*. (*NA* 3, 134–135)

The project, though ideologically noble, fails because it is executed through self-destructive means. As will be discussed in more detail below, the revolt in *Die Verschwörung des Fiesko zu Genua* goes just as poorly as that in *Die Räuber* and for similar reasons. Due to the narcissism of almost all its participants and, above all, its leaders, the revolt devolves into a senseless bloodbath that consumes itself as soon as it starts. In the end, the only remaining republican in Genoa, now disillusioned, turns himself in to the head of the government against which he has just committed treason.

It appears therefore, that Schiller, for all his poetic interest in antityrannical rebellion, was skeptical of violent revolt and maintained a nuanced position on revolution since his earliest writings.[205] In his pathbreaking study of 2004, *Schillers Rebellionskonzept und die französische Revolution*, Jeffrey L. High writes, "Die Tendenz, von einer revolutionären Jugendperiode bei Schiller und somit von einer positive, erwartenden Haltung gegenüber der Französischen Revolution auszugehen, lässt Schillers differenzierte Sicht der verschiedensten Rebellionen, Verschwörungen, Aufstände und Revolutionen vor 1789 außer Acht."[206] There is an element of revolution that he appreciated—even a violent one, such as the US-American Revolutionary War—and a type of revolution that he saw as immature, narcissistic, overly ideological, and doomed to failure. It is well documented in the secondary literature that Schiller was skeptical of

[205] The present section is indebted to the extensive body of work by Jeffrey L. High on Schiller's nuanced position toward the US-American War of Independence and the French Revolution. See for example, High, "Edinburgh" and Jeffrey L. High, "Introduction: Why Is This Schiller [Still] in the United States?" in *Who Is This Schiller Now?: Essays on His Reception and Significance*, ed. Jeffrey L. High, Nicholas Martin, and Norbert Oellers (Rochester: Camden House, 2011), 1–22.

[206] High, *Schillers Rebellionskonzept*, iii.

the French Revolution, though sometimes this skepticism is simplified to a picture of Schiller as a political reactionary.[207] However, the evidence presents a much more complicated picture. As High writes: "Schiller hielt eine [. . .] Distanz in seinen unmittelbar auf die Revolution bezogenen Bemerkungen bis zum Jahre 1793 konsequent durch"[208] and that the contemporaneity of Schiller's aesthetic studies, the French Revolution, and the publication of Kant's *Kritik der Urtheilskraft* in 1790, "führte zu der These, dass der von der politischen Wirklichkeit erschütterte und unter den Einfluß Kants geratene Schiller der Welt der Politik den Rücken kehrte und zu der abstrakten Welt der Philosophie Zuflucht nahm."[209] In the introduction to his 2005 book *Schiller as Philosopher*, Frederick Beiser listed the thesis that "*Schiller's aesthetic education was a flight from the political world*" as one of the "persistent misconceptions that have marred past and present scholarship" and counters that it "fails to understand the origins and context of Schiller's political thought: the modern republican tradition of Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Rousseau and Ferguson."[210] Schiller's documented interest in the US-American Revolutionary War in the 1770s and early 1780s continued far beyond the French Revolution—as late as 10 July 1795, Schiller recommends to Johann Wilhelm von Archenholz that he author a treatment of the "amerikanischen Freyheitskrieg" but notes of the French Revolution that it is "vor der Hand noch nicht reif für die historische Kunst" (*NA* 28, 8). Schiller's poem fragment *Deutsche Grösse* refers to the imperialism of Great Britain,

---

[207] See Georg Lukács, "Zur Ästhetik Schillers" in *Georg Lukács Werke*, vol. 10, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Ästhetik* (Neuwied: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1969), 22. Wittkowski writes, "In his works after the French Revolution, Schiller's realism is seen to be much stronger." Wittkowski, "Schiller: Idealistic Morality," 318.

[208] High, *Schillers Rebellionskonzept*, v.

[209] High, *Schillers Rebellionskonzept*, v.

[210] Beiser, 11. See also "Argument and Context of the *Ästhetische Briefe*" in the same book, 123–126, 131–133, and 161–164.

implying, if not directly stating his sympathy for the American resistance against Great Britain: "Wo der Franke wo / der Britte / Mit d stolzen Siegerschritte / Herrschend sein Geschick / bestimmt?" (*NA* 2I, 431). His final drama, *Wilhelm Tell*, is, in contrast to *Die Räuber* and *Die Verschwörung des Fiesko zu Genua*, the first portrayal in his oeuvre of the successful establishment of a republic.

In the *Ästhetische Briefe*, Schiller refers to the ongoing French revolution and the shockwaves it sent across Europe in mostly positive terms when he writes:

> der Mensch ist aus seiner langen Indolenz und Selbsttäuschung aufgewacht, und mit nachdrücklicher Stimmenmehrheit fodert er die Wiederherstellung in seine unverlierbaren Rechte. Aber er fodert sie nicht bloß, jenseits und diesseits steht er auf, sich gewaltsam zu nehmen, was ihm nach seiner Meinung mit Unrecht verweigert wird. Das Gebäude des Naturstaates wankt, seine mürben Fundamente weichen, und eine *physische* Möglichkeit scheint gegeben, das Gesetz auf den Thron zu stellen, den Menschen endlich als Selbstzweck zu ehren, und wahre Freyheit zur Grundlage der politischen Verbindung zu machen. (*NA* 20, 319)

The awakening out of indolence and self-denial, the restoration of inalienable rights, the proper valuation of the law as the benchmark of government, the honoring of the individual as an end rather than a means are worthy goals in the language of the author.[211] Europe is physically capable of all of this, Schiller maintains, i.e., the physical forces are ready, the monarchies are already starting to crumble, the revolution has begun, but: "Vergebliche Hoffnung! Die *moralische* Möglichkeit fehlt, und der freygebige Augenblick findet ein unempfängliches Geschlecht" (*NA* 20, 319). What has failed to occur, according to the *Ästhetische Briefe*, is that the revolutionaries have

[211] Schiller identifies the French by name in his letter to Prince Friedrich Christian von Augustenburg of 13 July 1793. He values the philosophical goal, "Der Versuch des Französischen Volks, sich in seine heiligen Menschenrechte einzusetzen, und eine politische Freiheit zu erringen," but, he maintains, the failed outcome, "hat bloß das Unvermögen und die Unwürdigkeit desselben an den Tag gebracht, und nicht nur dieses unglückliche Volk, sondern mit ihm auch einen beträchtlichen Theil Europens, und ein ganzes Jahrhundert, in Barbarey und Knechtschaft zurückgeschleudert" (*NA* 26, 262).

not embraced the moral foundation of the revolution within themselves. The current revolution is a mere physical changing of things—it is mere destruction of old institutions and, increasingly in the wake of the *Terror*, of lives. The former feudal state was a state of order and obedience, what Schiller calls a *Naturstaat*. In the feudal system, it is not necessary that the people nurture a moral character within themselves. Indeed, it is superfluous since morality is proscribed to the people by a third party (God) via an earthly interlocutor (the King). There is no room for change and no tolerance for diversity in the feudal state ruled by God, for God is absolute and unchanging: "Alles *was* die Gottheit ist, ist sie deswegen, *weil* sie ist; sie ist folglich alles auf ewig, weil sie ewig ist" (*NA* 20, 341). A republic however is, in theory, a government of the people, where the legislators and the executors of the moral law are one and the same: "der Staat [soll] eine Organisation seyn [. . .], die durch sich selbst und für sich selbst bildet" (*NA* 20, 317). To build a sustainable republic, therefore, a foundation of morality must be first built within the hearts of the people, the true building blocks of the republic. Mere destruction of the old system opens up a power vacuum—in this case only a physical revolution has occurred. Without a people ready to assume governance of and for themselves, the vacuum remains empty and the state remains unstable. That is, until a tyrant—perhaps operating under the guise of republicanism, as does Schiller's *Fiesko*—forcibly installs himself on the empty throne, and the people, weary of the disunity of an ungoverned state, willingly submit themselves to the order of a new dictator:

> Von der Freyheit erschreckt, die in ihren ersten Versuchen sich immer als Feindinn ankündigt, wird man dort einer bequemen Knechtschaft sich in die Arme werfen, und hier von einer pedantischen *Curatel* zur Verzweiflung gebracht, in die wilde Ungebundenheit des Naturstands entspringen. Die Usurpation wird sich auf die Schwachheit der menschlichen Natur, die Insurrection auf die Würde derselben berufen, bis endlich die große Beherrscherinn aller menschlichen Dinge, die blinde Stärke, dazwischen tritt, und den vorgeblichen Streit der Principien wie einen gemeinen Faustkampf entscheidet.[212]

[212] *NA* 20, 330. Schiller's warning of the difficulty in establishing and maintaining freedom after a period of servitude is very reminiscent of Machiavelli, who argues, "for that people is nothing

Schiller makes a similar observation regarding the whole of the philosophical enlightenment project in Europe in a letter to Goethe of 17 September 1800. In comparing what he sees as the shortcomings of both the reformation and the enlightenment, he observes that in both events, one sees the "alte Unart der menschlichen Natur" on display (*NA* 30, 197). Either the revolutionary society forgets its moral-philosophical grounding and turns to embrace the dogmatic law of a new leadership, shutting out all room for free and autonomous self-development, or the opposite occurs: the destructive impulse of the revolution continues beyond what is helpful, and the people demolish until no orderly remnant of society remains. In either case, the end result is the same: "man endigt, so wie dort, die Welt aufzulösen, und sich eine brutale Herrschaft über alles anzumaaßen" (*NA* 30, 197).

According to Schiller's vision, the most sustainable state in the long term would be one where its constituents adopt the moral law as if it were their inherent nature, not as the result of a violent replacement of an old status quo with a new status quo, but rather as the result of the gradual cultivation of moral character on an individual level: "Wenn also auf das sittliche Betragen des Menschen wie auf *natürliche* Erfolge gerechnet werden soll, so muß es Natur *seyn*, und er muß schon durch seine Triebe zu einem solchen Verfahren geführt werden, als immer nur ein sittlicher Charakter zur Folge haben kann" (*NA* 20, 315). This second, freely chosen, and carefully cultivated

---

other than a brute animal that, although of a ferocious and feral nature, has always been nourished in prison and in servitude. Then, if it is left free in a field to its fate, it becomes the prey of the first one who seeks to rechain it, not being used to feed itself and not knowing places where it may have to take refuge." Niccolò Machiavelli, *Discourses on Livy*, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 101. However, where Machiavelli models his republican critique on the principle that "all men are bad, and that they always have to use the malignity of their spirit whenever they have a free opportunity for it" (Machiavelli, 65), Schiller locates also a natural tendency toward goodness in humanity (one that exists alongside a natural tendency toward selfishness) and advances furthermore the view that humans can train a second nature that is good from inclination.

moral character can only be sustainable if it does not suppress the individual's natural impulses. The moral law which serves as a regulative ideal for the self-cultivating individual therefore cannot be one that is intolerant of difference but rather must allow for difference in empirical manifestations of the individual as a physical being, an inevitability of the human's embodiedness. On a community-wide level, where many individuals have cultivated a moral character and joined together as a unit, Schiller calls this phenomenon the aesthetic state. A government that desires reform with the aim of improving its sustainability would do well to create and support the conditions of the aesthetic state because the state's laws would already be desired by the people; the laws would derive their authority from this desire: "Soviel ist gewiß: nur das Uebergewicht eines solchen Charakters bey einem Volk kann eine Staatsverwandlung nach moralischen Principien unschädlich machen, und auch nur ein solcher Charakter kann ihre Dauer verbürgen" (*NA* 20, 315).

Schiller stresses that this process of reform will take time. It is "eine Aufgabe für mehr als Ein Jahrhundert" (*NA* 20, 329). A moral character cannot be forced upon anyone—coercion contradicts Schiller's concept of a healthy community where individuals desire to live in a way that supports the wellbeing of the state. Schiller offers the analogy of a mechanic working with raw materials in order to fashion a product that corresponds with the mechanic's desire: "so trägt er kein Bedenken, ihr Gewalt anzuthun; denn die Natur, die er bearbeitet, verdient für sich selbst keine Achtung, und es liegt ihm nicht an dem Ganzen um der Theile willen, sondern an den Theilen um des Ganzen willen" (*NA* 20, 317). Schiller is writing in republican terms when he contrasts the artist with the politician, who, on the other hand, dare not enact violence against the 'parts' (i.e., the people) for the sake of the whole (i.e., the republic), for the state is nothing less than the summation of all of its parts: "Ganz anders verhält es sich mit dem pädagogischen und politischen

Künstler, der den Menschen zugleich zu seinem Material und zu seiner Aufgabe macht" (*NA* 20, 317). The politician dares not harm its material, the *Menschen*, because this would be akin to hurting his own end, *die Menschen* qua *der Staat*: "Mit einer ganz andern Achtung, als diejenige ist, die der schöne Künstler [the artist] gegen seine Materie vorgibt, muß der Staatskünstler sich der seinigen nahen und nicht bloß subjektiv, und für einen täuschenden Effekt in den Sinnen, sondern objektiv und für das innre Wesen muß er ihrer Eigenthümlichkeit und Persönlichkeit schonen" (*NA* 20, 317). Here Schiller has presented the twofold build of the *Mensch* (here *Eigentümlichkeit*, or uniqueness, and *Persönlichkeit*, or selfhood) without yet fully explaining what these concepts imply. The following section of the present chapter will briefly elucidate Schiller's conception of the bipartite *Mensch*.

Menschen conceptualize themselves as something that transcends physical matter. The *self*, i.e., that which remains 'us' and is immune to the constantly changing world, is conceived of as within 'us' forever: "*wir* sind doch immer, und was unmittelbar aus *uns* folgt, bleibt" (*NA* 20, 341). A self is a self regardless of how one's body appears, how one feels, or what one desires. This one distinguishing aspect is therefore conceived of as utterly free of all empirical conditions, including time. Schiller calls this phenomenon *Person*, also "das Bleibende." The one thing that is free from all empirical conditions is "die reine Intelligenz," or rationality. It is what sets humans apart from all other beings in the empirical world and it legislates over the *Mensch*.

At the same time, *Menschen* perceive that they also exist as matter. They exist in bodies in time and are subject to empirical wants, needs, desires, emotions, instincts, as well as physical changes. This is what Schiller calls *Zustand*: "der Mensch ist nicht blos Person überhaupt, sondern Person, die sich in einem bestimmten Zustand befindet" (*NA* 20, 342). However, each of these fundamental aspects (i.e., *Person* and *Zustand*) of the *Mensch* is loath to tolerate the other and

demands to exert its influence over the whole. The influence of *Person* expresses itself as a drive toward rationality at the expense of sensuality and is called the *Formtrieb*. The influence of *Zustand* expresses itself as a drive toward sensuality at the expense of rationality and is called the *Stofftrieb*.

Though the *Formtrieb* and *Stofftrieb* express contradictory demands and constitute a source of conflict within the *Mensch*, they also have a symbiotic relationship. Without matter, rationality is mere empty potential. Only by operating through the body can rationality express itself in the empirical realm: "Seine Persönlichkeit, für sich allein und unabhängig von allem sinnlichen Stoffe betrachtet, ist bloß die Anlage zu einer möglichen unendlichen Aeusserung; und solange er nicht anschaut und nicht empfindet, ist er noch weiter nichts als Form und leeres Vermögen" (*NA* 20, 343). On the other hand, without rationality to guide it, matter cannot move freely—it can only move according to laws proscribed by nature: "Solange er bloß empfindet, bloß begehrt und aus bloßer Begierde wirkt, ist er noch weiter nichts als *Welt*, wenn wir unter diesem Namen bloß den formlosen Inhalt der Zeit verstehen" (*NA* 20, 343).

Therefore, according to Schiller's theory, the host of rationality (i.e., the body) must be defended if rationality is to exert a real influence on the world. *Persönlichkeit* and its nonphenomenal products, i.e., its ideas, including freedom, can only be realized through a healthy physical *Zustand*. Furthermore, Schiller expresses in his epigram of the same period "Würde des Menschen" (1796) that the dignity of a human being will indeed appear in time when basic human needs are met:

> Nichts mehr davon, ich bitt euch. Zu essen gebt ihm, zu wohnen,
> Habt ihr die Blöße bedeckt, giebt sich die Würde von selbst.
> (*NA* 1, 278)

A safe body is the prerequisite of reason as a "wirkende Kraft" in the real world. As Schiller writes in *Ueber Anmuth und Würde*, the pleasing appearance of moral character, called grace, arises only in situations where moral character can be cultivated in a state of well-being, while dignity appears only in situations of tragedy. But what Schiller is alluding to here in the epigram "Würde des Menschen" is his theory that dignity can only arise out of someone who has already cultivated a moral character, whom he calls a beautiful soul.[213] Therefore, following Schiller's theory, the state must care for its citizens and support their peaceful and pleasurable living if it desires that they establish a moral character, which has already been determined the most sustainable situation for the state. The protection of the people is synonymous with the protection of the state.

The present chapter now proceeds by looking retrospectively at Schiller's second drama, *Die Verschwörung des Fiesko zu Genua* of 1782 in order to demonstrate how the fictional Genoese revolt fails the two conditions of the sustainable state presented in the *Ästhetische Briefe*. The Genoese people neither cultivate and embrace a moral character, nor do the leaders of the republic hesitate to abuse and destroy those it deems expendable due to their status as outsiders.

In Schiller's letter to Prince Augustenburg of 11 November 1793, the private draft version of what would become the fifth of the *Ästhetische Briefe*, the lower classes are so taxed by physical necessity that they have little choice but to pursue the satisfaction of their needs at the cost of their moral development: "Der zahlreichere Theil der Menschen wird durch den harten Kampf mit dem physischen Bedürfniß viel zu sehr ermüdet und abgespannt, als daß er sich zu einem neuen und innern Kampf mit Wahnbegriffen und Vorurtheilen aufraffen sollte" (*NA* 26, 298). For this reason, they willingly submit themselves to the direction of guardians who do their thinking for them: "Zufrieden, daß Er selbst nur nicht denken darf, läßt er andre gern über seine Begriffe die

[213] See *NA* 20, 300. See also chapter 2 of the present dissertation.

Vormundschaft führen" (*NA* 26, 298). Fiesko describes such people as malleable; they are easily blown about "in einem Hui der Wind des Zufalls" (*NA* 4, 44). He makes the malleability of the physically needy and mentally exhausted lower classes into his tool. In act 2, scene 8, a small mob of workers approaches Fiesko in anger over the tyrannical behavior of the Genoese government. The workers demand, "Der Staat muß eine andere Form haben" (*NA* 4, 48), and Fiesko responds with a fable. Over the course of his storytelling, Fiesko manipulatively guides the group into considering and then enthusiastically approving three different state forms, one after the other: first a republic with a direct democracy, then a republic with a parliamentary government divided into administrative cabinets, and, finally, a monarchy.[214] Within a few short moments, the workers forget that the original cause of their anger was antirepublican corruption in the government, and they leave the scene praising Fiesko as their next monarch:

> ERSTER. Und Genua solls nachmachen, und Genua hat seinen Mann schon.
> FIESKO. Ich will ihn nicht wissen. Gehet heim. Denkt auf den Löwen. *die Bürger tulmutuarisch hinaus.* Es geht erwünscht. Volk und Senat wider Doria. Volk und Senat für Fiesko – (*NA* 4, 50)

Fiesko's primary strategy is to threaten the workers with the fear of physical harm in every stage of the fable. They would be vulnerable in the republican direct democracy, Fiesko implies, because, in the case of invasion, a cowardly majority would vote against self-defense, the state would let down its weapons, and it would be occupied and destroyed.[215] In the parliamentary republic, the cabinet would divide into self-serving factions, and it would be in no one leader's interest to hold the other politicians accountable for the abuses of their offices.[216] In the monarchy, however, all of

[214] See Craig, 393–399.

[215] See *NA* 4, 49.

[216] See *NA* 4, 50.

the state's people would find unity and protection under one strong leader, "der Klauen und Hirn und nur *einen* Magen hat – und *einem* Oberhaupt huldigten alle" (*NA* 4, 50). The weakness of the worker's minds encourages Fiesko over the course of his transformation to tyranny to justify himself as a natural *Vormund*: "Daß ich der gröste Mann bin im ganzen Genua? und die kleineren Seelen sollten sich nicht unter die Große versammeln?" (*NA* 4, 67). As Beiser has shown, Schiller's theory holds some degree of provisional intervention on behalf of the government to be necessary to secure basic well-being for all: "That Schiller did not lay down an unconditional prohibition against state intervention in the economic sphere is evident from his early essay 'Die Gesetzgebung des Lykurgus und Solon,' where he praised Solon for abolishing debts in Athens and destroying the invidious extremes of wealth and poverty."[217] That Fiesko's brand of monarchical *Vormundschaft* is not what Schiller had in mind is clear enough from the stage directions for act 3, scene 2. As Fiesko considers his right to *Vormundschaft* as a self-proclaimed great man, the sun casts the city and the sea in fiery red hues (see *NA* 4, 66–67). The image of red flames foreshadows the fire that will burn in Genoa at the end of the play and the red sea foreshadows Fiesko's death in the tyrant's cloak, which Verrina describes as stained with red blood: "Wirf diesen häßlichen Purpur weg und ich bins [dein Freund]! – Der erste Fürst war ein Mörder, und führte den Purpur ein, die Fleken seiner That in dieser Blutfarbe zu versteken –" (*NA* 4, 120).

Rather than call for a powerful *Vormund* who dictates to the people how they should think, the *Ästhetische Briefe* call for an "Übergewicht" of moral character among the people so that they can think and act for themselves. Before this is possible, however, the underprivileged must enjoy a quality of life that enables them enough mental room to worry less about their material security and to begin their moral education. This, he explains in the letter to Prince Augustenburg of 11

[217] Beiser, 134.

Novemebr 1793, is the duty of the state: "Man wird daher immer finden, daß die gedrücktesten Völker auch die borniertesten sind; daher muß man das Aufklärungswerk bey einer Nation mit Verbesserung ihres physischen Zustandes beginnen" (*NA* 26, 298–299).

The well-to-do, on the other hand, are already physically well enough to become moral citizens. Egoism, however, stands in their way: "Stolze Selbstgenügsamkeit zieht das Herz des Weltmanns zusammen, das in dem rohen Naturmenschen noch oft sympathetisch schlägt, und wie aus einer brennenden Stadt sucht jeder nur sein elendes Eigenthum aus der Verwüstung zu flüchten" (*NA* 20, 320). Fiesko disdainfully describes this problem to three upstart, disgruntled republicans, who wish to gather Genoan support for a revolt against the tyrannical government: "Sie rechnen auf die Patrizier? [. . .] Weg damit. Ihr Heldenfeuer klemmt sich in Ballen levantischer Waaren, ihre Seelen flattern ängstlich um ihre ostindische Flotte" (*NA* 4, 45). According to Fiesko's logic, they too require a strong leader: "Verrina, weist du das Wörtchen unter der Fahne? – Genueser sagts ihm, es heisse *Subordinazion*! Wenn ich nicht diese Köpfe drehen kann, wie ich eben will – Versteht mich ganz. Wenn ich nicht der Souverain der Verschwörung bin, so hat sie auch ein Mitglied verloren" (*NA* 4, 76).

The egoism and fickleness of the aristocracy is a major dramaturgical theme at the beginning and end of the play.[218] The play opens at the scene of a ball at Fiesko's residence attended by the ruling family in Genoa, the Dorias, and the Genoese nobility. In the first four scenes, ball music and sounds of revelry can be heard in the background while covert conversations regarding republicanism, revolt, and assassination take place in the foreground.[219] The stark contrast between

[218] See Ursula Wertheim, *Schillers "Fiesko" und "Don Carlos." Zu Problemen des historischen Stoffes* (Berlin: Aufbau, 1967), 95.

[219] See *NA* 4, 13ff.

the gay "Tumult" of the noble partygoers and the serious political conversations suggests a vast disconnect between the concerns of the Genoese nobility and their political leaders. Nowhere is this contrast more evident than in act 1, scene 5, which foregrounds a conversation between two of the main characters, Gianettino Doria, nephew of the Doge of Genua and pretender to the seat of duke, and his confidante, a courtier named Lomellino. Gianettino and Lomellino discuss their plan to gain access to Bertha, the fifteen-year-old daughter of the republican Verrina, so that Gianettino can rape her, an event that will serve symbolically as the Dorias' rape of Genoa.[220] In the background, "*mehrere Damen und Nobili*" are carelessly celebrating (*NA* 4, 20). At the end of the play, the Genoans parade Fiesko through the city, praising him as their new duke.[221] However, upon learning that the former doge, Andreas Doria, has survived the revolt, the nobility switches loyalties from one moment to the next: "KALKAGNO *schreit.* Fiesko! Fiesko! Andreas ist zurük, halb Genua springt dem Andreas zu" (*NA* 4, 121).

The fickleness of the aristocracy is symbolized throughout by Kalkagno and Sacco, two of the sworn coconspirators. They are both opportunists who care little for republican values. Kalkagno hopes to seduce Fiesko's wife Leonore while Fiesko is out of the house and busy with political affairs. Sacco schemes that the elimination of the old government, to whom he owes money, will allow him to escape his debt. As the two rakes confess their motivations to one another and scheme to help each other achieve their ends, Kalkagno remarks sarcastically: "und am Ende, wenn Genua *bei der Gelegenheit* frei wird, läßt sich Sacco Vater des Vaterlands taufen. Wärme mir einer das verdroschene Mährgen von Redlichkeit auf, wenn der Banquerott eines Taugenichts, und die Brunst eines Wollüstlings das Glück eines Staats entscheiden" (*NA* 4, 17). Fiesko himself

[220] See *NA* 4, 20–21.

[221] See *NA* 4, 116–117.

cares little for the moral makeup of his coconspirators, so long as they do his bidding. When he learns of Kalkagno's plot, he is delighted rather than disturbed: "Doch willkommen mit dieser Schwägerschaft. Du bist ein guter Soldat" (*NA* 4, 59).

Although Fiesko's transformation into a tyrant does not become clear until act 3, there are dramaturgical hints from the beginning of the play that the Genoese would fare no better under Fiesko than they would under Gianettino. Act 1, scene 1 opens the play with Leonore's lament about Fiesko's adulterous passion for Julia, Gianettino's sister. That Fiesko's seduction of Julia is a ruse that serves his political conspiracy and not a true betrayal is not hinted at until eight scenes later. Meanwhile, the reader learns of the entire republican plot from the mouth of Leonore, making her instantly appear the most sympathetic and heroic out of the *dramatis personae* thus far presented. Fiesko, in contrast, appears to be a knave. When it is finally revealed in act 1, scene 8 that Fiesko is playing a conspiratorial role to sedate the ruling elite, the revelation comes too late to completely eliminate the impression left on reader's memory of Leonore's painful lament and of the reader's ill feelings toward Fiesko. Moreover, Fiesko's comportment toward Julia and the intimacy that she publicly demonstrates in return indicates that, at least initially, their affair might be more than show—on both ends. For example, Fiesko kisses Julia so hard on her arm at the ball at his residence, "daß noch die Spur seiner Zähne im flammrothen Flek zurükblieb" (*NA* 4, 13).

The comparison between Gianettino and Fiesko is suggested most clearly at the three moments in which Leonore mistakes Gianettino's voice for Fiesko's. The first instance occurs in act 1, scene 1, directly after Leonore's lament regarding Fiesko's apparent infidelity:

> LEONORE *aufgefahren.* Horch! War das nicht die Stimme Fieskos, die aus dem Lerme hervordrang? Kann er lachen, wenn seine Leonore im einsamen weinet? Nicht doch mein Kind! Es war Gianettino Dorias bäurische Stimme. (*NA* 4, 14)

The second instance occurs at the end of the same scene. Again, fearing Fiesko's arrival, Leonore startles, this time crying "Fiesko kommt. Flieht! Flieht!" (*NA* 4, 15), and running into a neighboring room with her chambermaids. The image of Leonore fleeing in fear from the man whom she thinks is her husband Fiesko, immediately followed by the first entrance of the villain Gianettino in Act 1, Scene 2, sets the tone for the reader's first impression of Fiesko in act 1, scene 4, in which Fiesko seduces Julia. The third instance occurs at the end of the play, when Leonore mistakes Gianettino's death throes for her husband's.[222] This mistake will fatally lead her to Gianettino's cloak, the one in which Leonore will be accidentally murdered by Fiesko, who mistakes her for Gianettino. The image of the passing cloak from rapist-tyrant to victim, whom it consumes, to Fiesko, who immediately thereafter dons the monarchical *Purpur*, symbolizes the transfer of the role of the rapist-tyrant to the former republican. Just as Bertha's rape by Gianettino symbolizes the ravishment of Genoa by the tyrant, so too does Fiesko's impalement of his wife symbolize the continued ravishment of Genoa by a new tyrant.

Schiller vaguely describes what the aesthetic state would look like in the concluding paragraph of the *Aesthetic Letters*:

> Dem Bedürfniß nach existiert er [der ästhetische Staat] in jeder feingestimmten Seele, der That nach möchte man ihn wohl nur, wie die reine Kirche und die reine Republik in einigen wenigen auserlesenen Zirkeln finden, wo nicht die geistlose Nachahmung fremder Sitten, sondern eigne schöne Natur das Betragen lenkt, wo der Mensch durch die verwickeltsten Verhältnisse mit kühner Einfalt und ruhiger Unschuld geht, und weder nöthig hat, fremde Freyheit zu kränken, um die seinige zu behaupten, noch seine Würde wegzuwerfen, um Anmuth zu zeigen. (*NA* 20, 412)

This image of peaceful autonomy that is self-elected by each individual stands in complete contrast to the behavior of Verrina, in *Die Verschwörung des Fiesko zu Genua*, who is willing to enforce his own version of freedom at the expense of others. His actions violate the second important

[222] See *NA* 4, 106.

condition of the sustainable republic: that the citizens must be protected and physically well. When Verrina takes his daughter Bertha hostage for the liberation of Genoa, curses her, and banishes her to a cellar, not a single voice approves of his cruelty toward his innocent daughter, but rather condemns him:

> *Großes Schweigen. Auf allen Gesichtern Entsezen. Verrina blikt jeden vest und durchdringend an.*
> BOURGOGNINO. Rabenvater! Was hast du gemacht? Diesen ungeheuren gräßlichen Fluch deiner armen schuldlosen Tochter? (*NA* 4, 34–35)

Verrina is mute to Bourgognino's protests: "Ich wiederrufe nicht" and the groom has no choice but to follow the wishes of the father of his bride (see *NA* 4, 35). At this moment, an eerie textual parallel is drawn between the tyrant Fiesko and the tyrant-father Verrina's common ideological logic. Verrina interprets Gianettino's rape of Bertha as a sign by fate: "Wenn ich deinen Wink verstehe, ewige Vorsicht, so willst du Genua durch meine Bertha erlösen!" (*NA* 4, 34). Fiesko will fatefully interpret his accidental murder of Leonore in strikingly similar vocabulary: "Höret Genueser – die Vorsehung, versteh ich ihren Wink, schlug mir diese Wunde nur, mein Herz für die nahe Größe zu prüfen? [. . .] *Genua erwarte mich*, sagtet ihr?" (*NA* 4, 115–116). Finally, unlike the characteristic Schillerian sublime tragic hero, who dies in the company of friends with the hope for a better future in her heart,[223] Verrina concludes the play alone, in disgrace, as the bitter relic of an already historical revolution:

> KALKAGNO *schreit.* Fiesko! Fiesko! Andreas ist zurük, halb Genua springt dem Andreas zu. Wo ist Fiesko?
> VERRINA *mit vestem Ton. Ertrunken.*

[223] See chapter 2 of the present dissertation for a discussion of metamorphic love and the chain of good deeds initiated by Amalia's sublime death at the end of *Die Räuber*. For a discussion of Schiller's concept of sublime hope in *Die Jungfrau von Orleans*, see chapter 5 of the present dissertation. For a discussion of Schillerian sublime hope in the context of a war of liberation in "An die Freude," see Rebecca Stewart, "Anti-Napoleonic Rage and the Hope for a Better Future," in *Heinrich von Kleist: Literary and Philosophical Paradigms*, ed. Jeffrey L. High, Rebecca Stewart, and Elaine Chen (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2022), 186–187.

ZENTURIONE. Antwortet die Hölle oder das Tollhaus?
VERRINA. *Ertränkt,* wenn das hübscher lautet – Ich geh zum Andreas.
Alle bleiben in starren Gruppen stehn. Der Vorhang fällt. (*NA* 4, 121)

There are, however, two characters in the play whose actions are primarily motivated by the desire to be free (their moral impulse) and their desire to exist peacefully in society among friends and loved ones (their physical impulse)—the perfect picture of the aesthetic state as described above, where harmony between morality and physicality is the state's guiding principle. These two characters are Fiesko's wife Leonore and the Black figure (sometimes referred to as "der Mohr") Muley Haßan. However, it is precisely these two would-be ideal citizens who are barred from Genoese public society for purely discriminatory reasons: Leonore because she is a woman and Muley because he is black. The following section will profile each of these figures in order to demonstrate how Schiller dramaturgically codes them as would-be ideal citizens.[224] It will be shown how both Leonore and Muley manipulate their ostracization in their striving toward love, social acceptance, and freedom.

Muley Haßan distinguishes himself from the sworn coconspirators by means of his loyalty to his personal system of ethics. In the second scene, Gianettino hires Muley to assassinate Fiesko and delivers his promissory note in advance. Muley is shocked by the ducal pretender's lack of foresight: "Das nenn' ich Kredit! Der Herr traut meiner Jaunerparole ohne Handschrift" (*NA* 4, 16). Nevertheless, Muley extends his trip in Genoa, although he has indicated that he will need to

[224] Kettner convincingly demonstrated via several discrepancies between the scenes with Muley Haßan and those without him that the role was likely greatly expanded during Schiller's revisions of the play in October 1782. See Gustav Kettner, "Der Mohr in Schillers 'Fiesko,'" *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturgeschichte* 3 (1890): 556–573. Nevertheless, Muley Haßan, a character who is based on no historical source but is rather Schiller's invention, has been received by scholarship as dramatically central to the play. In the fourth volume of the *Nationalausgabe*, the editors comment, "Der Mohr erfüllt wichtige dramaturgische Funktionen." *NA* 4, 425. Ursula Wertheim also writes of the "sehr bühnenwirksame Rolle" and "dramaturgisch äußerst wichtige Funktion." Wertheim, 94.

travel onward to Venice immediately after the assassination, honoring the promise to fulfill his commission rather than flee with Gianettino's payment. This is the first indication of a recurring character theme with Muley: honor and honesty. Muley pitifully fails his assassination attempt. When Fiesko learns how cheaply Gianettino bought his head, he angrily mocks both Muley and Gianettino by throwing another one thousand sequins at Muley. Despite his temptation, Muley cannot accept the money he has not earned: "*wirft das Geld entschlossen auf den Tisch.* Herr – das Geld hab ich nicht verdient" (*NA* 4, 27). In defending his honor against Fiesko's sarcastic remarks, Muley contrasts European infidelity to their Christian god with his criminal fidelity to the devil: "Ist [unsere Ehre] wohl feuerfester als eurer ehrlichen Leute; *sie* brechen ihre Schwüre dem lieben Herrgott; *wir* halten sie pünktlich dem Teufel" (*NA* 4, 28). Muley proceeds to describe his ethical code and plan for self-development. The reader learns along with Fiesko that there is another society running parallel to that of the Genoese. Lacking formal government, the society of criminals operates according to merit rather than blood. Muley likens his craft to the *Exercitia spiritualia* of sixteenth-century theologian Ignatius of Loyola, an historical contemporary of Fiesko, whose set of spiritual exercises were designed to help practitioners build a closer relationship to god in daily life. However, for Muley, they are not proscribed by any law-giving authority or divinity, but rather created by oneself, according to the occasion: "Sezt mich erst auf die Probe, ihr werdet einen Mann kennen lernen, der sein Exerzitium aus dem Stegreif macht" (*NA* 4, 28). The rules of criminal society are even more binding than the rules of Christian Genoese society because they are carried out by practitioners who have willfully developed their own code of ethics in defiance of the society that has rejected them.

Muley proudly illuminates the order of the criminal society that thrives beneath the Genoese Republic's surface. The ranks of criminals follow this merit-based hierarchy: First there

are the petty thieves, then the spies and henchmen, then the hooligans who kill and stir up trouble indiscriminately, and finally, the assassins. Muley reports:

> Ich bin durch diese alle [Ränge] gewandert. Mein Genie geilte frühzeitig über jedes Gehege. Gestern Abend macht ich mein Meisterstük in der Dritten, vor einer Stunde war ich – ein Stümper in der Vierten [die der Meuchelmörder]. (*NA* 4, 28)

In the criminal underground, hidden from the attention of the Genoese government, a Black pagan may work his way up the ranks by virtue of his deeds, regardless of his origin or appearance. Through Muley and the society of criminals who are loyal to the devil, Schiller comedically demonstrates an idea that he would set down in prose two years later in his speech "Was kann eine gute stehende Schaubühne eigentlich wirken?" (1784), that moral laws are only valid if they have emotional or personal import for the individual and ennoble the individual to the degree that she takes pleasure in her moral activity. Schiller shows that Muley is invested in his society by giving him stage directions that reveal his internal dedication to the lifestyle of the criminal underground. He speaks "*treuherzig*" (*NA* 4, 27), "*lebhaft*," and "*in Hize*" (*NA* 4, 28). Muley is a comedic prototype of the first condition of the aesthetic state, in so far as he has made the code of honor of his society into his own handiwork, something he does for himself and for his brethren, and something he appears to do with pleasure. It is the desire to improve his craft, i.e., to make his work into an aesthetic endeavor, one that can be made more pleasurable to him, that binds him not merely morally but also sensually to the society of criminals and their unique code of ethics. A comedic ethics and an imperfect one, no doubt, but the playful, comedic manner in which Muley performs his work is the closest representation of Schiller's vision of *Spiel* in his oeuvre. No less important, it is only a self-made ethics according to which a Black pagan in Europe may achieve some degree of freedom.

Muley's description of the meritocracy of criminals lies in close proximity to a politically important moment in the drama (act 1, scene 6), in which Gianettino appoints his confidante Lomellino to the office of procurator, completely disregarding the applications of much more qualified candidates and the senatorial election process. Later, in act 2, scenes 4–8, Gianettino's interference with the election will play an important political function: it is the catalyst for widespread demonstrations throughout the streets of Genoa, uniting workers and nobility alike under Fiesko's banner.

The proximity of the description of the illegal but functioning meritocracy of criminals to the portrayal of the dysfunctional Genoese Republic suggests that the underground and the Genoese state serve as each other's foils. The comparison reveals that the drama does not thematize two opposing societies—that of law-abiding citizens and law-transgressing criminals—but rather two parallel societies of criminals: those privileged enough to get away with publicly flaunting their own laws, and those who flaunt the public law at great personal risk but who, nevertheless, loyally uphold their underground society's private laws. As Gianettino himself describes it: "Der Teufel, der in mir stekt, kann nur in Heiligenmaske inkognito bleiben" (*NA* 4, 56). The devil is by this point a clear reference to Muley, who sarcastically refers to the devil as his chosen lord throughout the play.[225] The devil that drives Gianettino outside of the confines of the law must merely don the mask of piety to go unnoticed. Fiesko himself dons a white mask in the play's first

[225] See *NA* 4; 26, 28, 43, 51, 93, and 111.

act,[226] a European symbol of purity and honesty, while he deceives all of Genoa, yet he mocks the appearance of Muley's face, whose blackness cannot look anything but dishonest to a European[227]:

> MOHR. Herr, ich bin ein ehrlicher Mann.
> FIESKO. Häng immer diesen Schild vor dein Gesicht hinaus, das wird nicht überflüßig seyn – aber was suchst du? (*NA* 4, 26)

In the above-ground Genoa, only one thing can make the Genoese temporarily forget his appearance:

> MOHR. Was das ein Auftritt war. Wenig fehlte, der Teufel hole mich, daß ich nicht Geschmak an der Grosmut gefunden hätte. Sie wälzten sich mir wie unsinnig um den Hals, die Mädel schienen sich bald in meines Vaters Farbe vergaft zu haben, so hizig fielen sie über meine Mondsfinsterniß her. Allmächtig ist doch das Gold, war da mein Gedanke. Auch Mohren kanns bleichen.
> FIESKO. Dein Gedanke war besser, als das Mistbeet, worinn er wuchs – (*NA* 4, 43)

Muley's observation delivers insight into his desperate search for money throughout the play. Here it is suggested that Muley would gladly abandon criminality if he were able to survive as a free man in above-ground society.

There is almost nothing that Muley can do to endurably disguise the black skin that identifies him as a member of Genoa's underbelly, but Fiesko too is a criminal who however easily manages to get away with murder. In the span of two successive scenes (act 5, scenes 10–11), Fiesko has Muley hanged without trial, and he stabs his wife Leonore. Both corpses remain on stage while a "Siegesmarsch" plays and the people remove their hats and exclaim: "*Heil, Heil dem Herzog von Genua!*" (*NA* 4, 112). The former murder he disguises as justice; the latter he disguises

---

[226] See *NA* 4, 15.

[227] In the fourth volume of the *Nationalausgabe*, the editors remark how Muley Haßan helps to expose Fiesko's similarity to Gianettino: "Der Mohr [. . .] trägt zur Enthüllung von Fieskos Charakter bei, indem die Begegnungen zwischen Fiesko und dem Mohren verdeutlichen, daß sich Fiesko und Gianettino in ihrem Streben nach Macht weniger durch die Wahl ihrer Mittel unterscheiden als vielmehr durch das taktische Geschick, diese Mittel einzusetzen." *NA* 4, 425. See also Wertheim, 94.

as the work of inescapable "Vorsehung" (*NA* 4, 115–116). Only Verrina sees through his veil of deceit:

> VERRINA. Und Abreissen ist doch sonst deine schlechteste Kunst nicht [. . .]. – Aber genug. Nur im Vorbeigehen Herzog, sage mir, was verbrach denn der arme Teufel, den ihr am Jesuiterdom aufknüpftet?
> FIESKO. Die Kanaille zündete Genua an.
> VERRINA. Aber doch die Geseze lies *die* Kanaille noch ganz?
> FIESKO. Verrina brandschazt meine Freundschaft.
> VERRINA. Hinweg mit der Freundschaft. (*NA* 4, 119)

Fiesko, however, neither expects nor understands how ethics could apply to someone like Muley, whom he views as less than human. In the first act, Fiesko insults his intelligence and Muley takes offence: "Herr, einen Schurken könnt ihr mich schimpfen, aber den Dummkopf verbitt ich" (*NA* 4, 27). Fiesko uses animal vocabulary to describe Muley, including "Kanaille" (*NA* 4; 26, 72, and 119), "Bestie" (*NA* 4, 27), "Wurm" (*NA* 4, 27), and "Wolf" (*NA* 4, 29). When Muley returns Fiesko's 1,000 sequins, Fiesko calls him a "Schaafskopf von einem Jauner!" (*NA* 4, 27). But Muley, referring to his human body, insists that, despite how differently he may appear to Fiesko, he is made of the same moral stock: "Unser eins hat auch Ehre im Leibe" (*NA* 4, 28).

Muley's insistence to Fiesko that, despite his different appearance, he too is a moral-rational being, demonstrates from early on that it is important to him that he is viewed as a human. When Fiesko tasks Muley with withstanding a round and a half of public torture as part of his scheme, Muley bitterly observes that the destruction of his body does not awaken sympathy in a European aristocrat but rather entertainment: "MOHR *schüttelt den Kopf, bedenklich.* Ein Schelm ist der Teufel. Die Herrn könnten mich beim Essen behalten, und ich würde aus lauter Komödie gerädert" (*NA* 4, 51). In the course of the play, Muley begins to dream of a loftier fate than that which the society of criminals can offer him. In act 3, scene 4, Muley claims for the first time co-ownership of conspiratorial project by means of the first person plural: "*treuherzig.* Gelt, Fiesko?

Wir zwei wollen Genua zusammenschmeissen, daß man die Geseze mit dem Besen aufkehren kann" (*NA* 4, 71). At the end of the scene, when Fiesko thanks him for his work by indicating that he has earned his own personal gallows, Muley responds disappointedly with arguably the most (in)famous line from the play: "MOHR *im Abgehen.* Der Mohr hat seine Arbeit gethan, der Mohr kann gehen. *ab*." (*NA* 4, 73). Only two scenes later, Fiesko delivers his last assignment to Muley: "FIESKO *fremd und verächtlich.* Wenn das bestellt ist, will ich dich nicht länger in Genua aufhalten. *er geht, und läßt eine Goldbörse hinter sich fallen*" (*NA* 4, 77). Muley's reaction ("*stuzig*") introduces new an emotional depth for the character. Disappointed, Muley realizes that his hope for a more equitable relationship with Fiesko was mere delusion:

> MOHR *hebt den Beutel langsam von der Erde, indem er ihm stuzig nachblikt.* Stehn wir so miteinander? "*Will ich dich nicht mehr in Genua aufhalten.*" Das heißt aus dem Christlichen in mein Heidenthum verdollmetscht: *Wenn ich Herzog bin, laß ich den guten Freund an einen genuesischen Galgen hängen.* (*NA* 4, 77)

This is the point at which Muley decides to take his vigilante revenge on the society that tantalized him with the hope of acceptance and incorporation, only in order to reject him anew. Muley sets the city on fire. Fiesko recognizes that Muley's actions derive from an emotional wound: "Deine Verrätherei ging dir hin, weil sie *mich* traf" (*NA* 4, 111). The new state's first action is the murder of one of its founders. Fiesko has Muley hanged. Even Muley's final death wish is ignored—the reader learns in the final scene that Fiesko broke his promise to have him hanged "nur an keine christliche Kirche" (*NA* 4, 111) and instead has him strung up "am Jesuiterdom" (*NA* 4, 119).

Leonore is distinguished as a noble-minded heroic character from act 1, scene 1, where her lofty republican register is put in contrast to the language of her closest companions, her chambermaids, Rosa and Arabella. For example, when Leonore laments that she has been betrayed by her husband, Rosa blithely responds, "Desto besser Madonna. Einen Gemahl verlieren, heißt zehen Cicisbeo Profit machen" (*NA* 4, 13). Leonore's reproach is intended to show that such an

idea is completely foreign to her character. The clash of fickle courtly world vs. fidelity is represented simultaneously on two levels in the opening scene: textually between Leonore and the chambermaids, as well as sonically between the sounds of Leonore's weeping and the gay dance music of the ball that creates a bitter harmonic dissonance:

> LEONORE *in Tiefsinn versunken.* Daß sie darum in seinem Herzen sich wüßte? – [. . .] daß er sie liebte? – Julien! O deinen Arm her – halte mich Bella!
> *Pause. Die Musik läßt sich von neuem hören.* (*NA* 4, 14)

Like a Verdian tragic hero ante opus, Leonore finds herself utterly alone in the depths of despair while the rest of the world is emotionally, intellectually, and acoustically deaf to her weeping. Already exposed as an outcast from society due to her fidelity, Leonore transgresses a further social line—that of her proscribed gender role as a woman—by harboring a scandalous political thought:

> LEONORE *begeistert*. […] Höret Mädchen, ich vertraue euch etwas *geheimnißvoll* einen Gedanken – als ich am Altar stand neben Fiesko – seine Hand in meine Hand gelegt – hatt ich den Gedanken, *den* zu denken dem *Weibe verboten* ist: – dieser Fiesko, dessen Hand izt in der Deinigen liegt – Dein Fiesko – aber still! daß kein Mann uns belausche, wie hoch wir uns mit dem Abfall seiner Fürtreflichkeit brüsten – dieser Dein Fiesko – Weh euch! Wenn das Gefühl euch nicht höher wirft! – wird – uns *Genua von seinen Tyrannen erlösen!* (*NA* 4, 14–15)

Leonore's political scheming shocks her chambermaids specifically because of its gender transgressivity: "ARABELLA *erstaunt.* Und diese Vorstellung kam einem Frauenzimmer am Brauttag?" (*NA* 4, 15). This first presentation of Leonore's tendency toward gender transgression occurs at the same moment that the reader first learns of the republican conspiracy. This is the first of two moments in the play where Leonore's awareness of her restricted sphere of action on the basis of socially proscribed gender roles is structurally connected to the project of political liberation.

So far, in the first scene, the anticipated roles have been dramaturgically reversed – Fiesko, the ostensible hero, is off flirting at court while Leonore is talking of revolution. A rapport is

immediately established between her and the reader. While Fiesko is offstage deceiving both the reader and the Genoese (the reader has not yet learned that he is fooling Julia and the court), the reader is allowed entry into Leonore's private chamber where she divulges her dark, heroic secret. The privacy of a lady's chamber is ironically made for the reader into the seat of the conspiracy, where Leonore speaks of treason, while the public sphere—the domain of men—is a realm of smoke and mirrors. Leonore then borrows a phrase from her Schillerian female predecessor, Amalia: "Ich bin ein Weib" (*NA* 3, 76).[228] Like Amalia, Leonore understands that she is forced to operate within the limited sphere of socially prescribed feminine domesticity. Her femininity is not freely chosen but, as Judith Butler describes it, "the forcible citation of a norm, one whose complex historicity is indissociable from relations of discipline, regulation, punishment."[229] However, Leonore distinguishes her subjective self-conception from the objectifying norm via the conjunction *aber*: "Ich bin ein Weib – aber ich fühle den Adel meines Bluts" (*NA* 4, 15). She is not just 'woman' according to the norm *but* she is also a politically interested being—a trait that is socially coded *not* feminine. Besides Verrina, Leonore has the most politically charged speech in the play, in particular in act 4, scene 14, when she attempts to prevent Fiesko from degrading into a tyrant:

> Selten stiegen Engel auf den Thron. *Seltner* herunter. Wer keinen Mensch zu fürchten braucht, wird er sich eines Menschen erbarmen? Wer an jeden Wunsch einen Donnerkeil heften kann, wird er für nöthig finden, ihm ein sanftes Wörtchen zum Geleite zu geben? *sie hält inne, dann tritt sie bescheiden zu ihm und faßt seine Hand; mit feinster Bitterkeit*. *Fürsten* Fiesko? Diese *misrathenen Projekte* der wollenden und nicht könnenden Natur – *sizen* so gern zwischen Menschheit und Gottheit *nieder*; – heillose Geschöpfe. Schlechtere Schöpfer. (*NA* 4, 101)

[228] See chapter 2 of the present dissertation for a discussion of Amalia's citation and manipulation of the gender norm.

[229] Butler, *Bodies That Matter*, 232.

The second moment of congruence between her gender transgressivity and her interest in the liberation of Genoa occurs just before her death. Tired of waiting at home for Fiesko's return from the revolt, Leonore disobeys Fiesko's command ("Gehn Sie zu Bette Gräfin," *NA* 4, 99) and instead rushes out into the city, stumbles upon and equips herself with Gianettino's sword, hat, and mantle, and declares:

> Leonore hätte gezittert? den Ersten Republikaner umarmte die feigste Republikanerin? – Geh Arabella – Wenn die Männer um Länder sich messen, dürfen auch die Weiber sich fühlen. *Man fängt wieder an zu trommeln.* Ich werfe mich unter die Kämpfer. (*NA* 4, 107)

Leonore addresses here that she, as a woman, is confined to only that territory she has ownership over, her *self* ("sich"), while men, who dominate the public sphere, may seek to expand their territory beyond established political borders. The male tyrant dares to own other people; the republican desires only to own herself, to be a free individual among a community of other free individuals. According to the *Ästhetische Briefe*, that which leads one to the aesthetic state is found only in such humble conditions as Leonore's:

> Nicht da, wo der Mensch sich *troglodytisch* in Höhlen birgt, ewig einzeln ist, und die Menschheit nie *außer sich* findet, auch nicht da, wo er *nomadisch* in großen Heermassen zieht, ewig nur Zahl ist, und die Menschheit nie *in sich* findet – da allein, wo er in eigener Hütte still mit sich selbst, und sobald er heraustritt, mit dem ganzen Geschlechte spricht, wird sich ihre liebliche Knospe entfalten. (*NA* 20, 398)

When Sacco arrives and mistakes Leonore for a man ("Wer da? Doria oder Fiesko?," *NA* 4, 108), Leonore's gender-transgressive transformation into the ultimate republican hero is complete. She responds, "*begeistert*. Fiesko und Freiheit. *sie wirft sich in eine Gasse.*" She will die shortly thereafter at Fiesko's hand. The second act of the new tyrannical government is the murder of its best republican.

In her literary-critical book *Playing in the Dark* (1993), Toni Morrison is interested in the centrality of fictional black presence to understating US-American culture. Specifically, she

investigates "the ways in which a nonwhite, Africanlike (or Africanist) presence or persona was constructed in the United States" and what close studies of these nonwhite figures can reveal about the collective authors of imagined Blackness themselves.[230] Morrison's framework is helpful when applied to Fiesko and Gianettino as contenders for the role of would-be author of the history of the new Genoa; what becomes clear is how overlooked 'others' are essential to their concept of self. Because Fiesko and Gianettino are blind to the selfhood of women and black people, this enables them to mandate social 'others' to do the actual handiwork of the government, then to reinscribe their bodies from the authorial position as objects who have been merely set into motion like automatons crafted by their creator, and, finally, to adopt the accomplishments of these 'others' as their own. Like a parasite, they are then able to abandon the host 'object' while maintaining the benefit drawn from occupying the object. Finally, they may dispose of the object according to their own terms. All throughout *Fiesko* there are critical hints at how the tyrannical government requires this authorial ability to project itself onto others. Indeed, the government is in desperate need of others to function.

When Muley describes the meritocracy of the society of criminals, he describes how politicians ("die Großen") regularly work with spies from the criminal underground: "Das sind die *Spionen* und *Maschinen*. Bedeutende Herren, denen die Großen ein Ohr leihen, wo sie ihre Allwissenheit hohlen, die sich wie Blutigel in Seelen einbeissen, das Gift aus dem Herzen schliefen, und an die Behörde speien" (*NA* 4, 28). When Fiesko stokes the tumult of the demonstrating workers, he immediately calls upon Muley to help him continue the trend toward rebellion. Every instance of *Ich* however, is couched in Muley's name, the name of the one actually

[230] Toni Morrison, *Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 6.

responsible for stoking and gathering the rebels, so that the true author of the rebellion becomes auditorily obscured: "Volk und Senat für Fiesko – Haßan! Haßan! – Ich mus diesen Wind benuzen – Haßan! Haßan! – Ich mus diesen Haß verstärken! dieses Interesse anfrischen! – Heraus Haßan! Hurensohn der Hölle! Haßan! Haßan!" (*NA* 4, 50). Fiesko uses the public humiliation of his wife Leonore and also of Gianettino's sister Julia in order to render Genoa unsuspicious of his intentions by appearing fully ingratiated with the Doria family. The greater Leonore's suffering and the more public Julia's debasement, the more likely his success. Because Gianettino and Lomellino visit the whorehouses, Muley is able to extract information about the planned execution of twelve senators and usurpation of the ducal seat, the obtainment of which information actually starts the revolt. Muley also takes it upon himself to recruit an extra four hundred soldiers for the revolt and to call all of the conspirators to Fiesko's residence. Lastly, he discovers Julia's plot to poison Leonore and prevents her assassination—at least until Fiesko murders her by accident. In other words, everything that makes the revolt physically possible is Muley's doing. Fiesko will, however, rewrite Muley's saving of Leonore into the work of "Vorsicht," just as he will make Leonore's murder into the work of "Vorsehung" (who is evidently on his side): "Doch, ich vergaß dir zu danken himmlische Vorsicht, die du es nichtig machst – Nichtig durch einen ärgeren Teufel. Deine Wege sind sonderbar" (*NA* 4, 73). Long after Fiesko has dismissed Muley in disgust and without gratitude, at the moment before the revolt breaks out, he displays the order for the assassination of the twelve senators, as well as the order for Gianettino to be appointed duke. Though Fiesko takes credit for stopping the tragedy, Schiller's stage directions hint at the senators' true savior when they refer to the stolen papers that reveal the assassination attempt as "die Zettel des Mohren" (*NA* 4, 89). Muley's own self-realization as the real author of the revolt, coupled with his public

acknowledgement that he will never be allowed credit for his part prompts him to vengefully destroy what he has built:

> MOHR. Daß ihr's wißt Schurken! *Ich* war der Mann, der diese Suppe einbrokte – *Mir* gibt man keinen Löffel. Gut. Die Haz ist mir eben recht. Wir wollen eins anzünden und plündern. Die drüben baxen sich um ein Herzogthum, wir heizen die Kirchen ein, daß die erfrornen Apostel sich wärmen. *werfen sich in die umliegenden Häuser*. (*NA* 4, 109)

Through Fiesko, Schiller offers insight into "what racial ideology does to the mind, imagination, and behavior of masters."[231] It is ultimately Fiesko's blindness to the subjectivity of others that prevents his new state from being sustainable. For the politician of the sustainable aesthetic state should see the citizens not merely as his "Material" but inseparably as both "Material" *and* "Aufgabe" of the state: "und nur weil das Ganze den Theilen dient, dürfen sich die Theile dem Ganzen fügen" (*NA* 20, 317).

To what degree did Schiller really care about physical diversity in politics? As has already been touched upon here, *Eigenthümlichkeit* for Schiller stands opposite *Persönlichkeit* as the general term for all aspects of being human that do not belong strictly to the realm of the noumenal. Later in the *Ästhetische Briefe*, Schiller prefers the term *Mannichfaltigkeit* (diversity) to indicate much the same thing. It is particularly the diversity of changes undergone by the *Mensch* in the empirical world that Schiller insists is central to his concept of a healthy constitution:

> Einheit fodert zwar die Vernunft, die Natur aber Mannichfaltigkeit, und von beyden Legislationen wird der Mensch in Anspruch genommen. [. . .] [E]ine Staatsverfassung wird noch sehr unvollendet seyn, die nur durch Aufhebung der Mannichfaltigkeit Einheit zu bewirken im Stand ist. (*NA* 20, 316–317)

Appearances of diverse human bodies and of the crimes practiced against them are thematized throughout Schiller's oeuvre. In *Die Räuber* (1781), Karl Moor blames Christianity for the genocide and enslavement of the indigenous people of Peru: "[S]ie [. . .] stürmen wider den Geiz

[231] Morrison, 12.

und haben Peru um goldner Spangen willen entvölkert und die Heyden wie Zugvieh vor ihre Wagen gespannt" (*NA* 3, 70). In "Was kann eine gute, stehende Schaubühne eigentlich wirken?," Schiller condemns the slaughter of American indigenous people for the sake of European profit under the guise of Christianity: "Christus Religion war das Feldgeschrei, als man Amerika entvölkerte –" (*NA* 20, 89–90). In "Die Götter Griechenlandes" (1788), Schiller portrays the Christian God as wholly impenetrable, permanently self-sufficient, and content as such, regardless of the wellbeing of any other creature on earth:

> Freundlos, ohne Bruder, ohne Gleichen,
> [. . . . . .]
> Selig, eh sich Wesen um ihn freuten,
> selig im entvölkerten Gefild,
> sieht er in dem langen Strom der Zeiten
> ewig nur – sein eignes Bild.
> (*NA* 1, 195)

The Christian god in this case represents a moral idea that has become a dangerous platform for racial violence. The reader may also interpret Muley Haßan's healthy skepticism of Christian fidelity in the same vein: "'*Will ich dich nicht mehr in Genua aufhalten.*' Das heißt aus dem Christlichen in mein Heidenthum verdollmetscht: *Wenn ich Herzog bin, laß ich den guten Freund an einen genuesischen Galgen hängen.*" (*NA* 4, 77). Ursula Wertheim cites Muley's self-introduction to Fiesko as a "Sklave der Republik," his description as "confisziert[]" (here meaning enslaved) in the *dramatis personae*, and Schiller's historical awareness of the execution and enslavement of Native Americans by European colonists in the sixteenth century in order to argue that Muley represents "das Schicksal der Farbigen im 16. Jahrhundert."[232] Schiller offers a rare comment that specifically addresses the slavery of African indigenous people by Europeans in his letter to Prince Augustenburg of 13 July 1793, where he writes: "aber was hier zehn große

[232] Wertheim, 96–97.

Menschen aufbauten, werden dort funfzig Schwachköpffe wieder nieder*r*eissen. Man wird in andern Welttheilen den Negern die Ketten abnehmen, und in Europa den – Geistern anlegen" (*NA* 26, 264). The main argument of the letter is that philosophy can only help humanity so much at a time—where it aids genuine moral progress in one time and place, it is applied hypocritically in another context. The example of the abolition of slavery "in anderen Welttheilen" may refer to any number of early and very limited emancipation successes, for example, the Gradual Abolition Act passed by the Pennsylvania General Assembly on 1 March 1780, or those limited emancipation successes spearheaded by Georges Biassou and Jean-François Papillon in 1791 in Haiti, or the French decree of 4 April 1792 that granted political rights to all *affranchis.* The persecution of intellectuals may very well refer to the aforementioned persecution of Schubart, increasing censorship across Europe in the wake of the revolutionary era[233] or the beginnings of French occupation of neighboring countries. All of these examples demonstrate a European claim to moral-intellectual exceptionalism that is willing to annihilate natural diversity for the sake of a merely theoretical idea. In this context, the proximity of Schiller's positive remark regarding the emancipation of slaves "in anderen Welttheilen" ("Vierter Brief") to his call for harmony between natural diversity and moral idea in the political state ("Siebenter Brief") reads as subtly proemancipatory:

> Wenn also die Vernunft in die physische Gesellschaft ihre moralische Einheit bringt, so darf sie die Mannichfaltigkeit der Natur nicht verletzen. Wenn die Natur in dem moralischen Bau der Gesellschaft ihre Mannichfaltigkeit zu behaupten strebt, so darf der moralischen Einheit dadurch kein Abbruch geschehen; gleich weit von Einförmigkeit und

[233] On Schiller's "kaleidoscope of metaphors" approach to evading censorship, see Jeffrey L. High, "'Gehört allzuviel Güte, Leutseligkeit und grosse Freygebigkeit im engsten Verstande zur Tugend?': Socrates as Secular Jesus in Schiller's First Karlsschule Speech," in "Reading Schiller," ed. Laura Anna Macor, special issue, *Philosophical Readings* 5 (2013): 22–23; "Schiller, Freude, Kleist und Rache / On the German Freedom Ode," in *Heinrich von Kleist:* Style *and concept; Explorations in Literary Dissonance*, ed. Dieter Sevin and Christoph Zeller (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2013), 130–131.

> Verwirrung ruht die siegende Form. *Totalität* des Charakters muß also bey dem Volke gefunden werden, welches fähig und würdig seyn soll, den Staat der Noth mit dem Staat der Freyheit zu vertauschen. (*NA* 20, 318)

The present study has focused on how Schiller's later political-aesthetic theory has its roots in his own dramatic practice since his earliest writing. A second, perhaps more important aspect of this study is that it helps to bridge the partially artificial gap between Schiller's early *Sturm und Drang* writing and his supposed resigned flight from the political. One of the loci of philosophical conflict in this regard is whether Schiller truly champions the aesthetic over the moral state in the *Ästhetische Briefe*. If there is actually a hierarchy implied in Schiller's aesthetic theory, where the moral state stands superior to the aesthetic state, Schiller's whole aesthetic theoretical project could be read as elitist or even pessimistic, because it would demand a necessary progress toward a state that is strictly nonphenomenal, i.e., unchanging, the opposite of life-affirming. Beiser has addressed some of the problems with this dispute at length, arguing that the main point of trouble in this regard is a false attribution of Schiller's ethics as fundamentally Kantian. In his chapter "Dispute with Kant," Beiser explains how Schiller uses Kant's ethical system as a basis of philosophical departure, not reaffirmation:

> The most accurate formulation of the issue dividing Kant and Schiller is in terms of one of the oldest questions of ethics. Namely, 'What is the *summum bonum* or the highest good?' [. . .] He [Kant] maintains that the concept of the highest good is ambiguous: it can refer to either the *supreme* good—that unconditional good which is not good upon the condition of anything else—or the *perfect* good—that whole which is not part of a larger whole.
>
> Now, expressed in these terms, Schiller's central claim is that the highest good, both complete and sufficient, is the development of aesthetic character, the whole personality. If morality is an end in itself, a *supreme* good, it is still not the *perfect* good because there is something that can be added to it to make it better: namely, the development of the whole personality, the cultivation of sensibility and individuality as well as rationality. To be sure, Kant too does not think that morality alone is the perfect or self-sufficient good but only the supreme good; he maintains that the perfect good is happiness in accord with virtue. (Beiser, 188–189)

Because the problem of the primacy of sensibility in the *Ästhetische Briefe* is central to the present chapter's claim—that Schiller champions diversity in his political-theoretical writing as well as his dramatic works—the concluding section will focus specifically on this problem by closely reading and synthesizing relevant points made in the ninth, twenty-fourth, and twenty-fifth letters. Though the letters are not all adjacent to one another, they ultimately form a unity, as they all argue for the necessity of the return from the moral state to the aesthetic state.

In the twenty-fourth Letter, Schiller identifies three "Momente oder Stuffen" of development for the individual human and for the human species as a whole: "Der Mensch in seinem *physischen* Zustand erleidet bloß die Macht der Natur; er entledigt sich dieser Macht in dem *ästhetischen Zustand*, und er beherrscht sie in dem *moralischen*."[234] If one understands that progression from the *physical state* to the *aesthetic state* to the *moral state* as a movement upwards through a hierarchy of values, the *moral state* appears to be the most ideal form and the others inferior. This seemingly stands in contradiction with Schiller's championing of the aesthetic throughout the letters. Such a reading, however, overlooks important points made by Schiller that recontextualize the *physical-aesthetic-moral* model and resolve the seeming contradiction.

Neither the *aesthetic* nor the *moral state* exists in isolation from the state(s) that came before it. Schiller qualifies his presentation of the *physical state* by arguing that it is more of an aid for thinking about human development than an empirical reality: "Dieser Zustand roher Natur läßt sich freylich, so wie er hier geschildert wird, bey keinem bestimmten Volk und Zeitalter nachweisen; er ist bloß Idee, aber eine Idee mit der die Erfahrung in einzelnen Zügen aufs genaueste zusammen stimmt" (*NA* 20, 389). Even if an individual finds herself more in the *physical state* than in any other, i.e., she has not yet begun to conceive of herself as a moral being, she still

[234] *NA* 20, 388. In a footnote he also refers to them as "Perioden" and "Epochen." *NA* 20, 394.

demonstrates a rational capacity: "Auch in den rohesten Subjekten findet man unverkennbare Spuren von Vernunftfreyheit" (*NA* 20, 390). Likewise, a more ethically cultivated individual will from time to time demonstrate characteristics that appear more influenced by physical necessity rather than reason because the *physical state* is impossible to eradicate completely in the living human individual: "es [fehlt] in den gebildesten [Subjekten] nicht an Momenten, die an jenen düstern Naturstand erinnern" (*NA* 20, 390). The mere awareness of a desire to secure one's existence and health, something that all human individuals display, is already a sign of the capacity for rationality, since this positive valuation of one's human life takes something phenomenal, namely, existence and physical wellness, and ascribes something noumenal to it, namely a value.[235] Although Schiller presents the *physical-aesthetic-moral* model as a series of "Stuffen," he finds it so important to qualify this model that he reminds readers of his qualifying remarks in a footnote:

> Ich erinnere noch einmal, daß diese beyden Perioden [der physische Zustand und der ästhetische Zustand] zwar in der Idee nothwendig von einander zu trennen sind, in der Erfahrung aber sich mehr oder weniger vermischen. Auch muß man nicht denken, als ob es eine Zeit gegeben habe, wo der Mensch nur in diesem phsyischen Stande sich befunden, und eine Zeit, wo er sich ganz von demselben losgemacht hatte. (*NA* 20, 394)

While the *physical state* is at least to some degree real (humans do have needs that are strictly physical, regardless of the human's ever-present rational capacity), the *moral state* is never real in an empirical sense. As Schiller already stressed in the third letter: "Nun ist aber der physische Mensch *wirklich*, und der sittliche nur *problematisch*" (*NA* 20, 314). The idea of the *moral state* is nevertheless important because it aids humans in rationally separating out the capacity for rational thought from empirical reality—thus granting thought its own conceptual framework. Within this isolated conceptual space, morality can be rationally investigated, just as the empirical world can be investigated in the phenomenal frameworks of space and time.

---

[235] See *NA* 20, 391.

While the general progression *physical-aesthetic-moral* must conceptually follow in this order, there is an implied return from the *moral state* to the *aesthetic state*, lest the individual cease to exist. The *moral state* is unsustainable. The idea of the *moral state* is helpful for considering the gamut of possibility—in this sense it has an opening, expanding quality. But as Schiller warned in the third letter, if human beings lose sight of the merely ideal nature of the *moral state*, it can become highly disturbing to harmony and even destructive: "so wagt sie die Existenz der Gesellschaft an ein bloß mögliches (wenn gleich moralisch nothwendiges) Ideal von Gesellschaft" (*NA* 20, 314). The human individual is capable of conceptualizing rational thought as something separate from sense. Thought can be conceived of as something utterly of its own sort. But this is the opposite of life affirming since the *Mensch* cannot be merely rational and completely detached from sensibility. Schiller's sustainable alternative is to approach morality conceptually without leaving sensibility behind. This is achieved only through beauty. According to Schiller's life-affirming ethics, beauty shows the human individual that rationality can be thought *and* felt: "Sie ist also zwar Form, weil wir sie betrachten, zugleich aber ist sie Leben, weil wir sie fühlen" (*NA* 20, 396). Beauty is pleasurable rationality, which, in the *Kallias Briefe*, goes under the name of freedom.

A passage in the ninth letter is particularly relevant here. Schiller refers to Orestes's trial in *The Eumenides* and Zeus's famous teaching, delivered here by the Furies, that "It helps, at times, to suffer into truth."[236] In Aeschylus's treatment, Orestes appears as a boy who was exiled to Phocis from his native Argos. At Phocis, Orestes was raised by Strophius alongside Strophius's son, Pylades, where they formed a deep fraternal bond. In isolation from the influence of his mother, Orestes received a command from Apollo to return to Argos and murder his mother Clytemnestra

[236] Aeschylus, *The Oresteia*, trans. Robert Fagles (New York: Penguin Group, 1984), 254.

and her lover in order to have his revenge on them for assassinating Clytemnestra's husband and Orestes's father, Agamemnon. In Schiller's ninth letter, when he introduces this reference, he is writing about the power of the artist to influence culture. In this context, Clytemnestra comes to represent a tyrannical old-world order and the comfort of remaining within the confines of established culture, while the foreign heaven (Apollo) stands in allegorically for the cold law of pure reason. Orestes's matricide is a metaphor for the deposing of a tyrannical culture. Schiller's violent example recalls his repeated warnings about the dangers of ideology conceived of as separate from sensibility, for example: "Das große Bedenken also ist, daß die physische Gesellschaft *in der Zeit* keinen Augenblick aufhören darf, indem die moralische *in der Idee* sich bildet, daß, um der Würde des Menschen willen seine Existenz nicht in Gefahr gerathen darf" (*NA* 20, 314). Morality can have destructive real-world consequences. In the example, Orestes's matricide is perceived as necessary in order to rid the world of an assassin-tyrant. Just as in Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's treatment of the story in 1779 in *Iphigenia auf Tauris*, Pylades encourages Orestes to patiently endure the suffering of guilt and await the true fulfillment of the gods' wishes through his actions. At the end of the drama, this fulfillment reveals itself as nothing less but a "neue Sitte" in which the old convention of executing foreigners at Tauris is replaced with a commandment to care for wayward arrivals: "so betrete nie / Ein Mann dies Ufer, dem der schnelle Blick / Hülfreicher Liebe nicht begegnet [. . .]."[237]

The example of Orestes's matricide appears in several other theoretical works in discussions of the *dynamic sublime*. A brief discussion of these passages will explain why it is helpful for the present reading of the *Ästhetische Briefe* to understand Schiller's choice of example.

[237] Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Goethes Schriften*, vol. 3 (Leipzig: Georg Joachim Göschen, 1787), 129.

The dynamic sublime is a feeling prompted in the observer of a terrifying, tragic, and, importantly, fictional event in which a human is portrayed as facing coercive violence and, against all odds, nevertheless manages to demonstrate the possibility of the autonomy of mind. This feeling in the observer of the recognition of human rational preeminence over sensuous drives is a pleasurable feeling. The most obvious example of the demonstration of one's autonomy is the one in which the human is victorious over the most basic and powerful natural drive—the drive to live (*Selbsterhaltungstrieb*). Therefore, tragic heroes are the figures best suited to prompt the feeling of the dynamic sublime in an observer, since tragic heroes often find themselves in precisely this situation, risking their lives and sometimes voluntarily giving it up for the sake of some rational idea. However, though Schiller writes at great length about the power of the *Selbsterhaltungstrieb*, he also includes examples of tragic individuals (both heroes and villains) who kill loved ones at great personal and psychological cost to themselves. Here, one observes that Schiller's theory of tragedy is not so much interested in making judgments about the moral worth of individual deeds, but rather merely in demonstrating to a spectator the human capacity to make choices calculated by reason.

The presentation of Orestes in the *Ästhetische Briefe* is to be understood in the context of the dynamic sublime as a tragic-heroic metaphor. In "Zerstreute Betrachtungen über verschiedene ästhetische Gegenstände" (1794), Schiller describes the "schauerliche Lust" awakened in the audience member upon observing "die Medea des griechischen Trauerspiels, Clytemnestra, die ihren Gemahl ermordet, Orest der seine Mutter tödtet" (*NA* 20, 227). These practices are obviously dangerous and unsustainable in the real world, but this is precisely what makes them such perfect material for the imaginative realm of art—the tragic figures are pushed to the brink of what human reason can accomplish by pursuing personal ideals at great physical cost. The overall argument of

the ninth letter is to inspire the next generation of artists to pursue their ideal of art even when they face criticism from the established culture in which they grew up. In this way, Schiller likens the artist to the sublime hero: at the cost of the artist's personal comfort, she defies the strong pull of culture to conform. In recognition of her rational preeminence over the discomfort caused by her 'otherness,' she continues to work according to the guide of her own rationality. Schiller likens culture to a bulwark that will eventually fall due to the revolutionary work of the forward-thinking artist: "Fallen wird das Gebäude des Wahns und der Willkührlichkeit, fallen muß es, es ist schon gefallen, sobald du gewiß bist, daß es sich neigt; aber in dem innern, nicht bloß in dem äußern Menschen muß es sich neigen" (*NA* 20, 335). The conclusion to the ninth letter is a loving address to experimental artists whose work defies the conventions of their age, whom Schiller warns will have to contend with the temptation to merely appease others rather than to follow their inner compass:

> Wie verwahrt sich aber der Künstler vor den Verderbnissen seiner Zeit, die ihn von allen Seiten umfangen? Wenn er ihr Urtheil verachtet. [. . .] Der Ernst deiner Grundsätze wird sie [die Zeitgenossen] von dir scheuchen, aber im Spiele ertragen sie sie noch; ihr Geschmack ist keuscher als ihr Herz, und hier mußt du den scheuen Flüchtling ergreifen. (*NA* 20, 334–336)

If the *moral state* is, however, self-destructive and unsustainable, how should the artist seek to endure while remaining rationally autonomous? The artist must take the deconstructing ideal that she gained in the realm of thought and freedom, return with it into the conditioned existence of the society, and work not toward social destruction but social reform:

> Lebe mit deinem Jahrhundert, aber sey nicht sein Geschöpf; leiste deinen Zeitgenossen, aber was sie bedürfen, nicht was sie loben. [. . .] Wo du sie findest, umgieb sie mit edeln, mit großen, mit geistreichen Formen, schließe sie ringsum mit den Symbolen des Vortrefflichen ein, bis der Schein die Wirklichkeit und die Kunst die Natur überwindet. (*NA* 20, 335–336)

The victory of art over nature is only possible in the *aesthetic state*, where phenomenal content interacts and harmonizes with noumenal concepts. In the twenty-fifth letter, Schiller describes the choice to return out of the stillness of thought back into the conditioned world as a "Rückweg," which is accessible because all thought touches the human emotionally if she lets it: "Zwar giebt es auch von der höchsten Abstraktion einen Rückweg zur Sinnlichkeit, denn der Gedanke rührt die innre Empfindung, und die Vorstellung logischer und moralischer Einheit geht in ein Gefühl sinnlicher Uebereinstimmug über" (*NA* 20, 396). Moreover, beauty has the power to make this return to the human realm (the *aesthetic state*) unnoticeable: "In unserm Wohlgefallen an der Schönheit hingegen läßt sich keine solche Succession zwischen der Thätigkeit und dem Leiden unterscheiden, und die Reflexion zerfließt hier so vollkommen mit dem Gefühle, daß wir die Form unmittelbar zu empfinden glauben" (*NA* 20, 396).

The return from the moral state to the aesthetic state is the most important takeaway for mortals here in the world of sense. In the theater, however, the tragic heroes remain in the moral state and destruction of their own selves and of others reliably ensues. What the audience can gain from watching a Muley and a Leonore pursuing their moral ideas against all inclination is to learn that all humans possess this capacity. Schiller, the champion of such underdogs, was writing in the hope of an age when one would no longer have to learn freedom from tragedy. An age, for example, in which, as he speculated in *Ueber naive und sentimentalische Dichtung*, comedy "würde, wenn sie es erreichte, alle Tragödie überflüssig und unmöglich machen. [. . .] [I]mmer ruhig um sich und in sich zu schauen, überall mehr Zufall als Schicksal zu finden, und mehr über Ungereimtheit zu lachen als über Bosheit zu zürnen oder zu weinen" (*NA* 20, 446).

Chapter 4

"Sobald dem Britten keine Wahl mehr bleibt": Sublime Vulnerability and Performed Sovereignty in *Maria Stuart*

THE PRESENT CHAPTER WILL PUT OLIVIA GUARALDO'S notion of the violence response as "scandalosa, non normalizzata e non normalizzabile" as it relates to "vulnerabilità come paradigma fondativo" in dialogue with Schiller's 1800 *Maria Stuart: Ein Trauerspiel*. In his drama, Maria (historical: Mary), Queen of Scots, a refugee from her own unstable nation, has appeared at the coast of England, seeking the protection of her cousin, Queen Elisabeth I (historical: Elizabeth), and was subsequently taken prisoner by that same relative.[238] Emotionally wounded, seeking compassion and care, Maria is met with violence: "Ich kam herein, als eine Bittende, / [. . .] / Und so ergriff mich die Gewalt, bereitete / Mir Ketten, wo ich Schutz gehofft –" (*NA* 9NI, 43). Elisabeth, likewise the victim of familial violence has learned from the patriarchal paradigm as practiced by her father Heinrich VIII (historical: Henry) to associate femininity with vulnerability and, fearing vulnerability in herself, to meet its appearance with fear-driven eliminationist tendencies. Elisabeth surrounds herself with men, rejects traditional social markers of femininity, such as wifehood, motherhood, and weakness, and stages herself according to the patriarchal paradigm of the sovereign subject, a completely self-sufficient and invulnerable being. At the same time, however, the audience is privy to her secret emotional struggles and learns that her self-sufficiency is rather a mixture of self-delusion and intentional façade. At the drama's conclusion, it is the loving care of Maria's male and female friends, and especially the maternal care of her

[238] This chapter addresses the fictional characters Maria and Elisabeth as treated in Schiller's tragedy and not according to historical accounts. Hence, in referring to them I use the names as they appear in Schiller's drama.

chambermaid and former wetnurse Hanna Kennedy, that gives Maria the strength to face her tragic fate. Elisabeth, in contrast, stands alive, but utterly alone. Far from justifying the obsessive fear that fuels Elisabeth's desire to murder her cousin, the obviousness of Elisabeth's physical victory over the helpless Maria highlights all the more clearly the absolutely senseless and arbitrary nature of Maria's murder.

The world around Elisabeth shows her how women are routinely forced into dangerous situations that limit what little freedom they are permitted. Deprived of parental love, Elisabeth experienced a difficult childhood that she can trace back to her father's abuse of his six wives:

> TALBOT.
> Dir war das Unglück eine strenge Schule.
> Nicht seine Freudenseite kehrte *dir*
> Das Leben zu. Du sahest keinen Thron
> Von ferne, nur das Grab zu deinen Füßen.
> Zu Woodstock war's und in des Towers Nacht,
> Wo dich der gnäd'ge Vater dieses Landes
> Zur ersten Pflicht durch Trübsal auferzog.
> (*NA* 9NI, 59)

In transferring historical Elizabeth's imprisonment in the Tower by her half sister Mary Tudor to fictional Elisabeth's father, Schiller situates the source of Elisabeth's emotional turmoil more firmly as an issue of gendered politics. Elisabeth comes to connect her father's mistreatment of her and her sex to her impossible political situation, in which her illegitimate birth puts her at constant risk by her cousin Maria, whose claim to the English throne is legitimate. Privately, she laments the fate of the seemingly sovereign woman, who however in reality is completely vulnerable to the abuses of a patriarchal political system:

> So steh' ich kämpfend gegen eine Welt,
> Ein wehrlos Weib! Mit hohen Tugenden
> Muß ich die Blöße meines Rechts bedecken,
> Den Flecken meiner fürstlichen Geburt,
> Wodurch der eigne Vater mich geschändet.
> (*NA* 9NI, 143)

Mortimer too links Elisabeth's animosity toward Maria directly to the patriarchal nature of English politics:

> Dieß Land, Milady, hat in letzten Zeiten
> Der königlichen Frauen *mehr* vom Thron
> Herab aufs Blutgerüste steigen sehn.
> Die eigne Mutter der Elisabeth
> Gieng diesen Weg, und Catharina Howard,
> Auch Lady Gray war ein gekröntes Haupt.[239]

In her first scene, Elisabeth is immediately set upon by men who pressure her to marry and give birth to an heir. She laments that despite her outward rank of queen, she is seen by her people merely for her biological function as a reproductive being and not as a legislating and self-sufficient individual:

> Auch meine jungfräuliche Freiheit soll ich,
> Mein höchstes Gut, hingeben für mein Volk,
> Und der Gebieter wird mir aufgedrungen.
> Es zeigt mir dadurch an, daß ich ihm nur
> Ein Weib bin, und ich meinte doch, regiert
> Zu haben, wie ein Mann und wie ein König.
> (*NA* 9NI, 53)

While Elisabeth has learned the patriarchal paradigm of violence from her father, the audience learns it most clearly from the story of Maria. Elisabeth's male advisors draw on the history of Maria's two disastrous marriages—she allowed her second husband to murder her first—to characterize Maria as a dangerous, pathological seductress who stirs political trouble with her charms. In contrast, Maria's chambermaid and former wetnurse, Hanna Kennedy, presents a more sympathetic account. According to Hanna, Maria's first husband, Henry Stuart, Lord Darnley, began to treat his wife and his queen coldly and tyrannically quickly after they were wed: "Trotz

[239] *NA* 9NI, 30. On the patriarchal structure that underlies the monarchical government as portrayed in *Maria Stuart*, see Gert Sautermeister, "*Maria Stuart*" in *Schillers Dramen – Neue Interpretationen*, ed. Walter Hinderer, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1983), 181–188.

bot Euch der Abscheuliche – Der Euer / Geschöpf war, Euren König wollt er spielen" (*NA* 9NI, 20). Hanna further describes Maria's subsequent marriage to James Hepburn, Fourth Earl of Bothwell, who murdered Maria's first husband, as the unfortunate consequence of the influence of masculine violence against a vulnerable woman:

> Ergriffen
> Hat Euch der Wahnsinn blinder Liebesglut,
> Euch unterjocht dem furchtbaren Verführer,
> Dem unglückselgen Bothwell – Ueber Euch
> Mit übermüthgem Männerwillen herrschte
> Der Schreckliche, der euch durch Zaubertränke,
> Durch Höllenkünste das Gemüth verwirrend
> Erhitzte –
> (*NA* 9NI, 20)

Hanna's sympathetic portrayal of Maria's youth as a story of patriarchal victimization contradicts the accusation of opportunistic seduction made by Elisabeth's advisors, thereby calling into question the justness of their advocacy for Maria's execution. By representing Maria's two marriages as abusive and manipulative, the pressure applied by Elisabeth's advisors for her to quickly marry appears doubly perverse. Elisabeth's horror at the prospect appears justified and it characterizes her every action and word:

> Die Könige sind nur Sklaven ihres Standes,
> Dem eignen Herzen dürfen sie nicht folgen.
> Mein Wunsch war's immer, unvermählt zu sterben,
> Und meinen Ruhm hätt' ich darein gesetzt,
> Daß man dereinst auf meinem Grabstein läse:
> Hier ruht die jungfräuliche Königin.
> Doch meine Unterthanen wollens nicht,
> Sie denken jetzt schon fleißig an die Zeit,
> Wo ich dahin sein werde – [. . .]
> (*NA* 9NI, 52)

It is soon revealed that the pressure to marry is part of a French scheme to negotiate the release of their Catholic compatriot, Maria.[240] Overwhelmed by dispute surrounding the legitimacy of her birth, Elisabeth is now threatened to be overwhelmed by the curse of a childless death—one that would leave Protestant England weak against the claim of a Catholic successor. Elisabeth's birth and death overshadow her current existence, and the longer she fails to establish herself as a legitimate ruler in the present, the more desperate she becomes for a stability that she has never enjoyed.

The risk in trusting men persists in proving itself as Maria continues to suffer its effects in prison. Her male prison guards constantly harass her with accusations of whoredom in Scotland and of seducing and colluding with anti-Protestant assassins in England. When Mortimer declares his intention to storm Maria's prison and free her, Maria is horrified and demands that he desist, explaining how, in the past, men who have attempted to free her with violence have only made her imprisonment more miserable and her death more certain:

> Ihr macht mich zittern, Sir – doch nicht für Freude.
> Mir fliegt ein böses Ahnden durch das Herz.
> Was unternehmt ihr? Wißt ihr's? Schrecken euch
> Nicht *Babingtons*, nicht *Tichburns* blut'ge Häupter,
> Auf Londons Brücke warnend aufgesteckt,
> Nicht das Verderben der unzähligen,
> Die ihren Tod in gleichem Wagstück fanden,
> Und meine Ketten schwerer nur gemacht?
> (*NA* 9NI, 31)

In the subsequent argument with Elisabeth's advisor, Lord Burleigh, Maria defends her innocence, claiming that she never intended to incite civil war in England and was not in agreement with the conspiracy attempts: "Wann hätt' ich das gethan? Man zeige mir Die / Dokumente auf" (*NA* 9NI, 40). She protests these charges against her which are based on Babington's alleged confession

[240] See *NA* 9NI, 54–55.

before his execution and the confessions of her secretaries Kurl (historical: Gilbert Curle) and Nau (historical: Claude Nau) under torture. She furthermore denounces the English judges for denying her the right to confront her accusers in court:

> Und warum stellte man ihn [Babington] mir nicht lebend
> Vor Augen? Warum eilte man so sehr,
> Ihn aus der Welt zu fördern, eh' man ihn
> Mir, Stirne gegen Stirne, vorgeführt?
> [. . . . . .]
> Und auf das Zeugniß meiner Hausbedienten
> Verdammt man mich?
> (*NA* 9NI, 40)

Ultimately, it is Mortimer who hastens her demise most effectively when, ignoring her command to desist, he sets the plot in motion to murder her guards, storm her prison, and free her, swearing even to assassinate Elisabeth if necessary, and marry Maria. When she protests again, he attempts to force himself on her: "*(indem er heftig auf sie zugeht, mit ausgebreiteten Armen)*" and "*(Er preßt sie heftig an sich.)*."[241] When she accuses him of violence, he shows his truest colors and announces his intent to demand *quid pro quo* and that he will not hesitate to enslave her himself if he succeeds:

> MORTIMER.
> Wenn nur der Schrecken dich gewinnen kann,
> Beim Gott der Hölle! –
> MARIA.
> Laßt mich! Raset Ihr?
> MORTIMER.
> Erzittern sollst du auch vor mir!
> [. . . . . .]
> MARIA.
> O Hanna! Rette mich aus seinen Händen!
> (*NA* 9NI, 111)

[241] *NA* 9NI, 109 and 110, respectively.

It is only after Mortimer's failed kidnapping attempt[242] that Elisabeth becomes prepared to sign the death warrant. In Schiller's dramatic universe, the uncontrolled mania of men leaves utter destruction in its wake. Gert Sautermeister writes of the gendered paradigm implied by Maria's fateful encounter with Mortimer: "Die Frau als Zauberin, Hexe, Verführerin: in diesem dämonischen Bild wird sie zur Rechenschaft für das Tun und Treiben der Männer gezogen. Das Bild spiegelt die Wahrheit verkehrt wider. Denn die Männer unterwerfen sich der Frau einzig, um ihrer Herr zu werden [. . .]."[243] Like Karl Moor in *Die Räuber*, Mortimer is an example of a man so utterly driven by his emotional needs that he is willing to destroy everything, himself and the object of his desire included, in his ravenous pursuit of self(ish)-fulfillment.

The society of men around Elisabeth encourage her, on the other hand, to annihilate her feelings in pursuit of an ideological goal. Lord Burleigh, Maria's staunchest enemy, constantly issues warnings that Elisabeth must steel herself against "Weiberlist" (*NA* 9NI, 7) and "ihrer [Maria's] Tränen weibliche Gewalt" (*NA* 9NI, 44) or risk destruction. Burleigh and Amias Paulet, a knight and Maria's prison guard, are particularly disgusted by the sight of tears, which they associate with a dangerous femininity. Before Mortimer's true intentions are revealed, Paulet proudly tells Maria about Mortimer: "Wohl ist es keiner von den weichen Toren, / Die eine falsche Weiberthräne schmelzt –" (*NA* 9NI, 17). Tears are disgusting to those who claim sovereignty because they reveal human vulnerability of a body in a grotesque way, bringing that which is inside and exposing it to the conditions of the outside. One recalls the disgust of another lonely monarch, King Philipp II in *Don Karlos*, at the sight of his son's tears, the rhetorical expression of which,

[242] Mortimer's actions cannot accurately be called a liberation attempt since Maria does not want a violent deliverance from his hand and because of his threat of rape.

[243] Sautermeister, 189.

however, betrays his subconscious awareness of the perilousness of the sight of vulnerability—it can seduce even the driest eyes to sympathetically follow suit: "Vollends Thränen? / Unwürd'ger Anblick – Geh aus meinen Augen" (*NA* 6, 66). Don Karlos's response—"Sein Aug' ist trocken, ihn gebar kein Weib" (*NA* 6, 66)—connects the patriarchal fear of women to the sovereign fear of vulnerability in general.

Elisabeth, however, feels a nagging dissatisfaction about her commitment to patriarchal conditioning because it prevents her from experiencing true love, community, and friendship: "So glücklich bin *ich* nicht, daß ich dem Manne, / Der mir vor allen theuer ist, die Krone / Aufsetzen kann!" (*NA* 9NI, 85). Hateful of herself and her fate, she misplaces the blame for her unwilling abstinence and the problem of her birth entirely on Maria,[244] a victim of the same patriarchal system that will annihilate her:

> [. . .] Sie entreißt mir den Geliebten,
> Den Bräut'gam raubt sie mir! *Maria Stuart*,
> Heißt jedes Unglück, das mich niederschlägt!
> [. . . . . .]
> Der Zweifel meiner fürstlichen Geburt
> Er ist getilgt, sobald ich *dich* vertilge.
> (*NA* 9NI, 143)

In a binary society that pits men over and against women, those who wish to survive must commit to distancing themselves from that which society deems weak. Elisabeth must demonstrate her ability to rule "wie ein Mann, und wie ein König" (*NA* 9NI, 52), that is, to contrast herself as greatly as possible with "dem gemeinen Bürgerweibe" (*NA* 9NI, 53).[245] She thereby claims

---

[244] See Dorothea E. von Mücke, "Classical Tragedy and Bildungsroman," in *Virtue and the Veil of Illusion: Generic Innovation and the Pedagogical Project in Eighteenth-Century Literature* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 220–221.

[245] See Sautermeister, 181–187. See also Hansjürgen Popp, who writes, "Elisabeth ist in ihrer Selbstfindung nicht nur dadurch beeinträchtigt, daß die Entscheidung für Macht und Realpolitik die Ausbildung der moralischen Persönlichkeit verhindert, sondern auch dadurch, daß sie als

exceptional status among the female sex,[246] which, in her patriarchal world view, it is otherwise justified to oppress:

> Wohl weiß ich, daß man Gott nicht dient, wenn man
> Die Ordnung der Natur verläßt, [. . .]
> [. . . . . .]
> Doch eine Königin, die ihre Tage
> Nicht ungenützt in müßiger Beschauung
> Verbringt, die unverdrossen, unermüdet,
> Die schwerste aller Pflichten übt, *die* sollte
> Von dem Naturzweck ausgenommen seyn,
> Der Eine Hälfte des Geschlechts der Menschen
> Der andern unterwürfig macht –
> (*NA* 9NI, 52)

Referring to Hobbes's idea that it is the similarity in human vulnerability that translates into automatic hostility in the state of nature, Guaraldo notes that the genocidal mentality responds to the sight of similarity with a similarly narcissistic violent impulse: "Ciò che infatti emerge, nella mentalità genocidaria, ma non solo in quella, è una sostanziale operazione di stravolgimento della costitutiva somiglianza umana nella vulnerabilità."[247] Ironically, it is specifically that which makes Elisabeth similar to Maria—their sex and the social perception of their sex as inherently vulnerable—that makes it impossible for her not to react with violence if she wishes to maintain her patriarchal delusion of exceptional invulnerability.

Elisabeth is not the only Schillerian monarch caught in the conflict of sovereign responsibility and personal loneliness. As Norbert Oellers has noted: "Elisabeth ist in *Maria Stuart*

---

machtbewußte Politikerin sich der von männlichen Rollenklischees dominierten politischen Welt anpaßt (wohl anpassen muß)." Popp, *Lektürehilfen: Friedrich Schiller. „Maria Stuart"* (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1995), 57.

[246] Dorothea von Mücke has noted Elisabeth's "double bind as a woman and a sovereign" and that she attempts to rectify this by "act[ing] like a man [. . .]." Mücke, 217–221.

[247] Guaraldo, 62.

so einsam wie Philipp II. in *Don Karlos* [. . .]."[248] Philipp II of Schiller's *Don Karlos* is a male monarch whose reign is characterized by brutality. His first act on stage is to banish his wife's attendant from Madrid for ten years for leaving the queen unattended for a few mere moments, not only an unusually harsh punishment but also an insult to his wife's queenly authority.[249] His next is to announce a mass execution of protestants from Flanders: "Dieß Blutgericht soll ohne Beispiel sein; / mein ganzer Hof ist feierlich geladen" (*NA* 6, 55). He too yearns to feel the joy of love, but like Elisabeth, he is prevented from doing so because he must show sternness in order to maintain political authority. When King Philipp learns that Marquis Posa, the one man he trusted with friendship in all the world, has betrayed him, he cries, causing a scandal among his retinue. His lonely sadness, however, quickly turns into vengeance: he will soon thereafter murder Posa. Despite his emotional pain, Philipp is encouraged by the grand inquisitor to continue silencing the voice of love inside of him in pursuit of a higher ideological goal:

> KÖNIG.
> Ich gehe
> in Kampf mit der beleidigten Natur.
> Auch diesen Richterstuhl getrauen Sie
> Sich zu bestechen?
> GROSSINQUISITOR.
> Vor dem Glauben
> gilt keine Stimme der Natur.
> (*NA* 6, 333)

Philipp commits to the patriarch's will and delivers his wife and son to the inquisition.[250] Neither of the lonely monarchs, however, have the courage in the end to associate themselves directly with

---

[248] Norbert Oellers, "*Maria Stuart*," in *Schiller: Elend der Geschichte, Glanz der Kunst* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2006), 247.

[249] See *NA* 6, 52.

[250] See *NA* 6, 339.

the murder—both of them push the responsibility onto other actors. Philipp famously ends *Don Karlos* by handing over the responsibility of his violent act to the inquisition in one of the most chilling lines of the play: "Kardinal! Ich habe / das Meinige gethan. Thun Sie das Ihre" (*NA* 9, 339). Elisabeth signs Maria's death warrant, but then hands it to her pitiful secretary of state, Wilhelm Davison, to whom she refuses to give clear instructions regarding her intention, leaving him ultimately with the ambiguous words: "Thut, was eures Amts ist" (*NA* 9NI, 147). Both monarchs thereby turn their faces away from the ethical consequences of their emotional negligence. To come face to face with the violence for which they are ultimately responsible would immediately call its necessity into question. Both monarchs only come to the decision to annihilate their relatives after periods of absence from face-to-face encounters with them, leaving enough time for their endangered self-image to blot out the memory of the others' own pleas for care. What becomes clear is that, in Schiller's world, Elisabeth, like all Schillerian monarchs, never had a shot at happiness in the first place. The regent must stand alone, as both Elisabeth and Philipp pitifully do:

> KARLOS.
> Mir graut
> vor dem Gedanken, einsam und allein,
> auf einem *Thron* allein zu sein. –
> PHILIPP. *von diesen Worten ergriffen, steht nachdenkend und in sich gekehrt. Nach einer Pause.*
> Ich bin allein.[251]
>
> ELISABETH *(betroffen)*.
> Nein, Schrewsbury! Ihr werdet mich jetzt nicht
> Verlassen, jetzt –
> [. . . . . .]
> *(zum Grafen Kent, der hereintritt)*.
> Graf Leicester komme her!
> KENT.
> Der Lord läßt sich

[251] *NA* 6, 68.

Entschuldigen, er ist zu Schiff nach Frankreich.
(Sie bezwingt sich und steht mit ruhiger Fassung da. Der Vorhang fällt.)
(*NA* 9NI, 179–180)

Whereas friendship is predicated on equality, monarchy requires an aggressive subjectivity that wills all other beings into mere tools of the sovereign subject's will. The psychological cost of the sovereign subject paradigm is a self-obsession that becomes a paranoic deception about the source and legitimacy of her own actions. Although Elisabeth publicly claims "Die Könige sind nur Sklaven ihres Standes" (*NA* 9NI, 52) and that she condemns violence against Maria ("Doch diese Weisheit, welche Blut befiehlt, / Ich hasse sie in meiner tiefsten Seele," *NA* 9NI, 57), she ignores the warning of her advisor Georg Talbot, Lord of Shrewsbury, to proceed with extreme caution in prosecuting Maria, falsely attributing his defense of justice to an attack against herself: "Ein warmer Anwald ist Graf Shrewsbury / Für meine Feindin und des Reichs. Ich ziehe / Die Räte vor, die meine Wohlfahrt lieben" (*NA* 9NI, 58). By associating her own wellbeing so fundamentally with that of the state, there is no longer any separation between the individual selfish will of Elisabeth the human and that of the nation of England. In another example of Elisabeth's mounting self-obsession, after noticing that she cries while reading a letter from Maria's hand, Talbot interprets this as a sign of humane mercy.[252] Elisabeth's own explanation for her tears, however, reveals that they are a response to her concern with how closely tied her own fate is with Maria's, rather than a sign of compassion for her cousin[253]:

Wehmut ergreift mich und die Seele blutet,
Daß Irdisches nicht fester steht, das Schicksal
Der Menschheit, das entsetzliche, so nahe
An meinem eignen Haupt vorüberzieht.

[252] See *NA* 9NI, 66.

[253] See also von Mücke, who also interprets Elisabeth's tears as not sympathy for Maria but shock at "the recognition of her own potential weakness." Mücke, 218–220. Popp interprets this scene as Elisabeth's "erheuchelte Humanität." Popp, 44.

(*NA* 9NI, 66)

To drive this point home, in the very next scene, Elisabeth hires Mortimer to subvert the legislative process and assassinate Maria so that her death appears to be an accident and not Elisabeth's doing:

> Es muß *vollzogen* werden, Mortimer!
> Und *ich* muß die Vollziehung anbefehlen.
> Mich immer trifft der Haß der That. Ich muß
> Sie eingestehn, und kann den Schein nicht retten.
> Das ist das schlimmste!
> (*NA* 9NI, 68)

By clandestinely organizing Maria's assassination and imbuing it with legal necessity, Elisabeth again blurs the lines between her personal will and that of the nation. Elisabeth faces two choices: recognize her own vulnerability, seek community with others, and reckon with the threatened autonomy that she will inevitably face as a woman in a patriarchal state; or continue down the path of imperial exceptionalism and loneliness, permitting and profiting from patriarchal society so long as she can feign invulnerability. She chooses the latter option, subsuming the will of Britain completely into her own: "Sobald dem Britten keine Wahl mehr bleibt, / Bin ich im ächten Ehebett' geboren!" (*NA* 9NI, 144).

What can be gleaned from the similar problems of the two monarchs, Philipp II and Elisabeth I, is that the ostensibly 'feminine' trait of vulnerability is not sex bound but, in Guaraldo's words "un paradigma fondativo" to which all humans are subject. The self-denial of vulnerability is a marker of tyranny. As philosopher María del Rosario Acosta-López argues, according to the Schillerian model of healthy human development, the improvement of one's character and therefore also of one's happiness "can only be achieved through and nurtured from, an individual's relationship to others [. . .]."[254] Schiller asks in a footnote in the *Ästhetische Briefe*: "Wie können

[254] María del Rosario Acosta-López, "'Making Other People's Feelings Our Own': From the Aesthetic to the Political in Schiller's Aesthetic Letters," in *Who Is This Schiller Now?: Essays*

wir bey noch so lobenswürdigen Maximen, billig, gütig und menschlich gegen andere seyn, wenn uns das Vermögen fehlt, fremde Natur treu und wahr in uns aufzunehmen, fremde Situationen uns anzueignen, fremde Gefühle zu den unsrigen zu machen?" (*NA* 20, 350). Acosta-López links this passage to Schiller's notion of the sublime in order to demonstrate that it is only through the human's capacity for sympathy—or in other words, the ability "sich von sich selbst zu trennen"—that it is possible for the human to realize her fullest self as a being that can transcend her physical form, take a step outside of herself and connect with the heart of another human being (*NA* 20, 151). In the *Ästhetische Briefe*, the fully developed and happy human being is portrayed as someone who has managed to harmonize her emotional and physical (sensual) drive with her rational (ideological) drive. Any suppression of one drive will ultimately result in disaster. In fact, it is characterized as violence to oneself and usually results in violence directed at others. Guaraldo describes the act of viewing the human "come il feribile e *non come il feritore*" as a process that reveals "la *perversione*, lo scandalo che la definizione oggettiva e basata su evidenze empiriche chiama in causa." Applied to Schiller's monarchs, by showing how emotionally pitiful the perpetrator of violence actually is, Schiller reveals how senseless the violent "männliche Berufsethik"[255] is: the price for gaining sovereign subjecthood is the annihilation of that emotional part of oneself that requires community. Hansjürgen Popp formulates the main political problem of the drama thus: how does one become a politician, "ohne als Mensch deformiert zu werden"?[256]

---

on His Reception and Significance, ed. Jeffrey L. High, Nicholas Martin, and Norbert Oellers (Rochester: Camden House, 2011), 190.

[255] Sautermeister, 185.

[256] Popp, 43.

The tragedy emphasizes the power of Maria's vulnerability as much as it reveals the delusion of Elisabeth's invulnerability. Maria is located in her prison throughout the entirety of the play. It opens with a scene of her barren jail in Fotheringhay Castle, which had been converted to a state prison. Her room is being torn apart in a wild search for damning evidence and the little trinkets she has left are being confiscated. In scene 2, Maria enters in a veil, perhaps evoking the veil that the historical Mary wore at her execution. She carries a crucifix, affiliating her trial with the martyrdom of Jesus Christ and symbolizing her own wrongful conviction. In the first three scenes, she is insulted by Paulet and Mortimer as she attempts to gain news regarding her case. In the fourth scene, Hanna describes in detail how Maria had been victimized by her husbands. Throughout these scenes, multiple references to her youth graphically emphasize Maria's pitiable state and descriptions of her youthful sexuality voyeuristically place the image of her carnality at the forefront of the spectator's imagination. Hanna describes her as "die weicherzogne, / Die in der Wiege Königin schon war" (*NA* 9NI, 9), as a young victim of the "Wahnsinn blinder Liebesglut" (*NA* 9NI, 20), and as a lustful seduced bride whose cheeks "sonst der Sitz / Schaamhaft erröthender Bescheidenheit, / [. . .] glühten nur vom Feuer des Verlangens" (*NA* 9NI, 20–21). Rhetorically touching upon different points on Maria's body, she refers to her "Ohr," then her "Aug'," her "Wangen," "Stirne," "Herz," and "Brust." She is described throughout as an arresting beauty but also "die jammernswürdigste" of all women (*NA* 9NI, 27). These carnal references make Maria appear ultra-fleshy and extremely vulnerable, but they simultaneously evoke her generative capacity as a mother, a point of extreme conflict for Elisabeth, as the spectator soon learns.

In the famous act 3, scene 4 confrontation between the two queens, Maria evinces her vulnerability, hoping to inspire Elisabeth to mercy. She bows down before Elisabeth and asks for

her caring hand: “Laßt mich nicht schmachvoll liegen, eure Hand / Streckt aus, reicht mir die königliche Rechte, / Mich zu erheben von dem tiefen Fall” (*NA* 9NI, 97). The sovereign reacts however with aversion (“*zurücktretend*”) and a defensive display of feigned invulnerability: “Und dankend preis’ ich meines Gottes Gnade, / Der nicht gewollt, daß ich zu euren Füßen / So liegen sollte, wie ihr jetzt zu meinen.” Maria then contrasts Elisabeth’s cold and stiff exterior (“schroff und unzugänglich, wie / Die Felsenklippe”) with the liquid softness of her concealed, vulnerable interior, invoking the image of the wound via the evocation of blood: “entweihet, schändet nicht / Das Blut der Tudor, das in meinen Adern / Wie in den euren fließt” (*NA* 9NI, 98). By appealing to Elisabeth to honor “in mir euch selbst,” Maria’s draws on their relational similarity, not just as common human beings but as relatives. By implying that Elisabeth’s care for Maria’s woundable body would be at the same time a gesture of self-care, she exposes the delusion of their separateness and that Elisabeth can hide her interior vulnerability beneath a shield of inaccessibility. Maria calls upon another embodied liquid—the one that is coded feminine and therefore terrifying to a king: “Mein Alles hängt, mein Leben, mein Geschick, / An [. . .] meiner Tränen Kraft” (*NA* 9NI, 98). Elisabeth’s defensive response to Maria’s submissive prostration seems completely out of touch with the reality of the power dynamic between them: “ihr wißt, / Daß ihr mich habt ermorden lassen wollen” (*NA* 9NI, 98). Maria’s efforts prove useless. Elisabeth insists: “Gewalt nur ist die einz’ge Sicherheit” (*NA* 9NI, 100). It is only when Elisabeth begins to call Maria a whore that Maria launches a counterattack, reverting to the behavior and rhetoric of the patriarchal sovereign: “– Regierte Recht, so läget *Ihr* vor mir / Im Staube jetzt, denn *ich* bin Euer König” (*NA* 9NI, 104). The spirit of the patriarch, that which Maria had referred to as “Ein böser Geist [. . .] / Der unsre zarte Jugend schon entzweyt” (*NA* 9NI, 99)—invoking their common

abuse at the hands of men—has reappeared. The lesson: in the patriarchal system, vulnerability begets violence, and violence begets further violence.

At the end of the drama, in a show of hypervulnerability, Maria regrets her violent insult to Elisabeth and meets Elisabeth's violence with a more caring response: "Sagt ihr, / Daß ich ihr meinen Tod von ganzem Herzen / Vergebe, meine Heftigkeit von gestern / Ihr reuevoll abbitte" (*NA* 9NI, 168). She has dressed herself in white evoking the image of a virgin bride. A rosary hangs from her belt. While the placement of the rosary, dangling from her hip, signifies sexuality, the virgin mother to whom the rosary is dedicated, combined with the white dress, suggests divine forgiveness for the carnal sins of her youth. She wears a necklace on her exposed neck, signifying at once her impending beheading and claiming agency over it. Before this violence is done to her body, she has symbolically made it into her own act. Again, she carries a crucifix. She wears an *agnus dei*, the symbol of a lamb holding a victory flag, the paradoxical exemplar of strength in vulnerability in Catholic iconography. The diadem in her hair represents her claim to regal legitimacy. She expresses care for the friends who have gathered to support her in her final moments, asking how they fared during their separation. Concerned for the future welfare of her servants, she notifies them that she has secured for them "ein neues Vaterland" (*NA* 9NI, 158) in France. She then warns them to leave England as soon as possible, "dass der Britte nicht / Sein stolzes Herz an eurem Unglück weide, / Nicht *die* im Staube seh', die *mir* gedient." Again she evokes the fleshiness of her bare body, promising that in addition to the remaining riches in the room, she has gifted them "Auch was ich auf dem Todeswege trage." She reaches out her hands and asks for them to kiss her one last time, remarking on the heat of Gertrude's burning mouth against her flesh.[257] In the eighth scene, Maria requests that her heart be brought to France to be

[257] See *NA* 9NI, 159.

buried there. By referring to her nude body and allowing her hands to be wetted with the saliva of their kisses and the water of their tears, referring to the removal of her heart from her corpse, and finally offering her forgiveness and farewell to Elisabeth, Maria exacerbates the image of her physical vulnerability and casts into relief the pointlessness of violence against the weak. Her final act is to ask her steward and recently ordained priest Melvil and her former wetnurse Hanna to accompany her to the execution scaffold. Referring to Hanna, she says, "Sie trug auf ihren Armen mich ins Leben, / Sie leite mich mit sanfter Hand zum Tod" (*NA* 9NI, 169). In this final image of maternal love, Maria calls to mind the infant, the most dependent and helpless being, and through it erases the violence of her final moment by supplanting it with a scene of love.[258] As Guaraldo writes regarding the powerful image of the maternal:

> Nel materno sono infatti percepibili, al massimo grado, i tratti di una soggettività non orientata alla morte, non strutturata, nel rapporto con l'altro, al suo annientamento. Si tratta essenzialmente della più forte esemplificazione – senz'altro stereotipica – di un'attitudine verso la vulnerabilità che se ne prende cura anziché sfruttarla in senso eliminazionista. (Guaraldo, 68)

Scholarship has been historically split on whether to interpret Maria as an exemplar of the beautiful soul[259] or of dignity, the latter of which produces the feeling of the sublime in the spectator.[260] As elaborated in chapter 2, grace, as presented in Schiller's treatise *Ueber Anmuth*

---

[258] Roger H. Stephenson has also noted that in *Maria Stuart* (and *Wallenstein*), violence "elicits a response that is itself non-violent and curative." Stephenson, "The Aesthetic Theory of Weimar Classicism," in *Studies in Weimar Classicism: Writing as Symbolic Form* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2010), 139.

[259] See Matthias Luserke, "Friedrich Schiller, *Maria Stuart*" in *Friedrich Schiller: Werke und Briefe in zwölf Bänden*, ed. Otto Dann, et al. (Frankfurt a.M.: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1996), 5:536–597; Sautermeister, 180, 195–197; Gerhard Storz, *Der Dichter Friedrich Schiller* (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1959), 96–97; and Mücke, 228–229.

[260] Norbert Oellers describes Maria's death as sublime: "es ging [. . .] um die Würde, um die Erhabenheit eines in eine ausweglose Situation geratenen Menschen, der sich mit dem Tod belohnt sieht und diesen deshalb freudig annimmt, also keineswegs tragisch endet." Oellers,

und Würde is the beautiful appearance of an individual who has so completely nurtured an inner moral character that the individual is pleasantly disposed toward morality.[261] The individual who achieves this character and whose actions are judged graceful, is called a beautiful soul.[262] In tragic situations, in contrast, one can witness the sublime—the feeling induced in the spectator by a mixture of fear and wonder: fear at the sight of overwhelming violence and wonder at the human capacity for inner peace despite violence. Unlike the sublime, grace can never appear in the context of tragedy because grace is the beautiful appearance of one acting morally with pleasure and ease.[263] In other words, the sight of serious pain or suffering would prevent the appearance of grace.[264] A tragic character therefore cannot appear as a beautiful soul, because this is incompatible with her tragic situation. As Frederick Beiser writes: "In cases where great suffering or sacrifice is involved we could not expect a person to act with grace; and, indeed, we would be suspicious, indeed indignant, if they did so."[265]

Schiller identifies the beautiful soul as the "Probierstein" between someone who exercises moral freedom with pleasure and someone who is merely lucky enough that her inclinations conform with morality. This latter character has not autonomously cultivated grace and would not act in conformity with morality if the pleasurable circumstances were to be replaced with tragic

---

"*Maria Stuart*," 232. See also Wolfgang Wittkowski, "Können Frauen regieren? Schillers *Maria Stuart*. Poesie, Geschichte und der Feminismus," *Orbis Litterarum* 52 (1997): 401–406.

[261] See *NA* 20, 287.

[262] See *NA* 20, 287.

[263] See *NA* 20, 294ff.

[264] See *NA* 20, 287; 298.

[265] Beiser, 115.

ones.[266] The beautiful soul would choose to act morally even if morality posed a conflict to inclination. This person would then be said to act with dignity in the moment of tragedy. Therefore, according to Schiller's theory, if Maria functions to produce the sublime effect in the spectator, one can assume the cultivation of a beautiful soul prior to her suffering, but this cannot be demonstrated during the tragedy's action. Hansjürgen Popp[267] and Kari Lokke[268] each maintain that Maria is transfigured into a dignified hero with the potential to evoke the feeling of the sublime during her confession scene in act 5. However, this argument requires ignorance to the composure that Maria displays amidst suffering throughout the play, which is not undone by the faint hope that Maria harbors in acts 1–4 of a reconciliation with Elisabeth. The spectator's fear that is a necessary component of producing the sublime feeling is present from act 1 when the catastrophe is established. Gert Sautermeister writes: "Nun soll die Handlung nicht mehr 'rasch zum Ende eilen',[269] sondern auf Umwegen, damit das Publikum mitten in seiner Furcht vor der Katastrophe Illusionen nähren kann."[270] Maria acknowledges already in her first scene that she cannot change the physical circumstances of her death and is prepared to make her will: "ich achte mich / Gleich einer Sterbenden" (*NA* 9NI, 14). Nevertheless, she realizes in her confession scene at the end of the play that she can change the intellectual circumstances of her death:

> MELVIL.
> So hätten deine Schreiber falsch gezeugt?
> MARIA.
> Wie ich gesagt, so ists. Was jene zeugten,

[266] See *NA* 20, 294.

[267] Popp, 49–50.

[268] Lokke, "Schiller's *Maria Stuart.*"

[269] See Schiller's letter to Goethe of 11 June 1799. *NA* 57–58.

[270] Sautermeister, 176.

Das richte Gott!
MELVIL.
So steigst du, überzeugt
Von deiner Unschuld, auf das Blutgerüste?
MARIA.
Gott würdigt mich, durch diesen unverdienten Tod
Die frühe schwere Blutschuld abzubüßen.
(*NA* 9NI, 165)

Furthermore, Popp's and Lokke's essays misleadingly reduce the aesthetic category of the sublime to a death-affirming nihilism and, particularly in Lokke's essay, a political glorification of violence. Rather, the drama supports the interpretation of Maria as a dignified character as she suffers injustices throughout, though the effect of the sublime is achieved most effectively at the drama's conclusion, when no other imaginable outcome is plausible but death. The intended effect is not a glorification of death. Rather the sublime is intended to foster an intellectual progression in the mind of the spectator: to provoke fear at the inescapability of death (this happens instinctively, or, as Schiller would call it *sympathetisch*); to bear witness to the presence of unnecessary violence in the world; to demonstrate the human capacity for intellectual autonomy even in the face of violence; and to go forth into the world aware of one's intellectual freedom—aware that humans are not merely subject to fear-induced violence but that they also have the choice to stand up to violence with care. Wittkowski summarizes the goal of the sublime thus: "Es handelt sich um die Erprobung, Übung, Einübung und Verbreitung des höchsten menschlichen *Vermögens* (potentielle Fähigkeit): der Freiheit, zu wählen – und richtig oder falsch zu wählen zwischen Gut und Böse."[271] This process is to happen not in the real world—on a battlefield, for example—but in the intellectual realm of imaginative play where one feels safe from physical harm. Where the goal of

[271] Wittkowsi, "Können Frauen regieren?," 216.

the tragic poet is to provoke the feeling of the sublime in the theater, the goal of the spectator who has left the theater is to cultivate a beautiful soul, or, in other words, to be happily ethical.

Maria rewrites the purpose of her death according to her own terms, associating it with a crime of which she is answerable to no English judge but to the judge within her own soul, and for which she desires to make retribution, namely the crime of allowing her first husband and first oppressor to be murdered by her second. Even though she, according to Catholic doctrine, should consider herself absolved of her sin after performing sacraments of penance, she does not yet feel absolved in her heart. There is a provocative agency suggested in this moment—her inner moral authority trumps that of the Catholic church. Norbert Oellers, noting the switch from blank verse to rhyming couplets at the moment where she confesses her crime anew, remarks: "deshalb soll auch der Zuschauer wissen: Mord bleibt Mord, eine Beichte ändert daran nichts, das Sakrament ist auch ihr eine fragwürdige Institution, einstweilen nicht genug für die Sünderin, vielleicht nur 'Opium des Volks.'"[272] As Schiller writes of the morally cultivated individual (i.e., the individual who is prepared to act with dignity amidst suffering) in "Ueber das Erhabene": "Nichts was sie [die Natur] an ihm [dem moralisch gebildeten Mensch] ausübt, ist Gewalt, denn eh es bis zu *ihm* kommt, ist es schon *seine eigene Handlung geworden* [. . .]" (*NA* 21, 39). In Maria's case, the nature that threatens to disturb her is the natural fear of certain death. By making her inevitable fate ("den unverdienten Tod") into her autonomous self-sacrifice for a moral principle ("Die frühe schwere Blutschuld abzubüßen"), she deprives her murderer of all agency, reinterpreting her own violent murder as an act of absolution for herself and contrition for her murdered husband.

In the conclusion of *Maria Stuart*, the allegedly invulnerable sovereign subject has been ethically defeated by a community of friends who recognize the reciprocal dependence of human

[272] Oellers, "*Maria Stuart*," 236.

individuals on one another. The love that Maria experiences at the scene of her death is only possible because she has been removed from her own former exceptional status as sovereign and is forced to accept her vulnerability in prison. As Hanna makes clear in their fourth scene dialogue, the exceptional sovereign status that had corrupted Maria's youth had already threatened to separate her from the community of those who cared for her:

> [. . .] Ihr hattet
> Kein Ohr mehr für der Freundin Warnungsstimme,
> Kein Aug' für das, was wohlanständig war.
> Verlassen hatte Euch die zarte Scheu
> Der Menschen[. . . .]
> (*NA* 9NI, 20)

The real tragedy, and the one with which the play's action actually ends, is Elisabeth's complete indoctrination into the patriarchal delusion of invulnerability and thus her self-incurred sentence of loneliness. Gert Sautermeister thus labels *Maria Stuart* "u.a. auch eine Tragödie des Patriarchalismus."[273] If the individual is lonely and isolated, she becomes afraid of her own vulnerability and this manifests in violent instability and aggression toward the self and others. On a societal scale, this aggressive fear of vulnerability divides humanity into antagonistic groups—as long as the divisions are predicated on fear of vulnerability, they will remain characterized by eliminationalist violence. Powerholders maintain a fabricated exceptional status from human vulnerability, and this exception becomes the condition of their power. Such sovereigns can never achieve internal harmony because they self-disqualify from the precondition of community. Where harmonized and contented individuals do appear, they exist in caring relationships with others and do not feign invulnerability, at once opening themselves to receive and give care and exposing themselves to others' violent intentions. Feminist philosophers suggest that the violent paradigm

[273] Sautermeister, 181.

of the sovereign subject was born in a patriarchal society and therefore has hence been coded masculine, while the vulnerability paradigm is posited as a feminist ethical response. Adriana Cavarero, Judith Butler, and Olivia Guaraldo advocate for refocusing our view of human beings through the lens of our common vulnerability in order to invite and foster a new culture of mutual care. Achieved on a societal level, Cavarero and Guaraldo hope in particular that historical images of care (e.g., the maternal) will be freed of their historically feminine coding and become more accessible to everyone. Schiller's poetic[274] and dramatic portrayals of female figures reflect his awareness of and interest in the historical nature of the patriarchal culture of aggression—his works commonly demonstrate conflicts between 'masculine'-coded sovereign subjects who feign invulnerability and 'feminine'-coded vulnerable figures who advocate for love over violence. The contrasting reactions of Elisabeth and Maria to the recognition of their shared vulnerability question the patriarchal assumption that violence is the natural and proper response and suggest that this assumption is merely the gendered inheritance of powerholders in a patriarchal world. Violence begets violence: the abuse of Elisabeth's father leads to the death of not just six queens, but to the death of humanity in a seventh and to the physical death of an eighth.

Jeffrey L. High has established that Schiller's cautious attitude toward political violence takes shape already in his earliest writings, thereby laying the now outdated scholarly conviction that Schiller experienced a sudden and dramatic turn from prorevolutionary to reactionary sentiment in the late 1790s to rest.[275] High demonstrates that Schiller was aware of the nascent First French Republic's decision to grant him honorary citizenship shortly after it was announced

[274] See also chapter 1 of the present dissertation.

[275] High, *Schillers Rebellionskonzept*.

in 1792—not, as has been argued, in 1798.[276] On 15 October 1792, Schiller wrote to his friend Christian Gottfried Körner to recommend that he translate moderate revolutionary reformer and Louis XVI sympathizer Honoré Gabriel de Riqueti, comte de Mirabeau's *Travail sur l'éducation publique* (1791) into German, possibly a critical response to his offer of honorary citizenship in light of the bloody course of the French Revolution.[277] Just two months after the September Massacres of 1792 in Paris, in a letter of 6 November 1792 Schiller conveys a new topic to Körner suggested by publisher Georg Joachim Göschen: a history of the English revolutionary Oliver Cromwell for Göschen's *Kalender auf das Jahr 1794*. He expresses his desire that Körner capitalize on the timing: because of the unrest in France, he presumes that the text would inevitably be interpreted as critical of the revolution and consequently be taken seriously by the German heads of state, proving an efficacious strategy for reform advocacy in a tumultuous time (*NA* 26, 164).[278] Schiller is advocating therefore for a reform "von der Denkungsart" as he would later formulate it in his letter to Prince Friedrich Christian von Augustenburg of 13 July 1793 (*NA* 26, 264), not for a bloody dictatorship of moral and moralizing negative laws, which he feared would have the same disastrous effects in Germany as it had in France. As Schiller's *Geschichte des dreißigjährigen Kriegs* (1788) testifies, Schiller maintained a long interest in the liberation ambitions of "ein Gemüth [. . .], das von der Ahndung eines bessern Lichts schon gewonnen war" (*NA* 18, 11), but he was also quick to warn of the great cost of political violence: "ein

[276] For the entire reconstruction of this complicated history, see High, *Schillers Rebellionskonzept*, 56–64.

[277] See *NA* 26, 159–160.

[278] "Wenn Schiller auch bemerkt, dies sei eine günstige Zeit, über Cromwell zu schreiben, so bedauert er doch in der nächsten Zeile, wegen der französischen Entwicklungen sei es so weit gekommen, daß nun die prinzipiellen Reformgegner die moralische Oberhand gewonnen hatten." High, *Schillers Rebellionskonzept*, 64.

dreyßigjähriger verheerender Krieg, der [. . .] Länder entvölkerte, Aernten zertrat, Städte und Dörfer in die Asche legte" (*NA* 18, 10). Particularly concerned after the September Massacres and in light of the mounting likelihood of an unconstitutional execution of Louis XVI, Schiller planned to write a legal defense of Louis XVI and deliver it in front of the National Convention in Paris.

Schiller was not able to carry out his plan before Louis XVI was executed on 21 January 1793. In reaction to the news, Schiller wrote to Körner on 8 February 1793: "Ich kann seit 14 Tagen keine franz*ösischen* Zeitungen mehr lesen, so ekeln diese elenden Schindersknechte mich an" (*NA* 26, 183). High draws a parallel between Schiller's own exasperation at the unconstitutional execution of Louis XVI and Count Lerma's appeal to Don Karlos in act 5, scene 8:

> Seien Sie
> ein Mensch auf König Philipps Thron. Sie haben
> auch Leiden kennen lernen. Unternehmen Sie
> nichts blut'ges gegen Ihren Vater! Ja
> nichts blutiges, mein Prinz!
> (*NA* 6, 312)

High quotes Walter Müller-Seidel, who characterizes Schiller's plan as an aversion to violence committed in the name of a moral principle without full legal justification. Schiller was disturbed by the execution of the king, "nicht weil es ein König, sondern weil es eine Hinrichtung war; weil hier über Menschen im Namen der Vernunft verfügt wurde, die allem widerspricht, was in der europäischen Aufklärung über Menschenrecht und Menschenwürde gesagt worden war."[279] Schiller's first of the *Augustenburger Briefe* is dated 9 February 1793, less than a month after the execution of Louis XVI; these letters contain a damning assessment of the current age as

[279] Walter Müller-Seidel, "Verschwörungen und Rebellionen in Schillers Dramen," in *Schiller und die höfische Welt*, ed. Achim Aurnhammer, Klaus Manger, and Friedrich Strack (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1990), 437.

unprepared to make use of a wise constitution: "Denn wenn die Weisheit selbst in Person vom Olymp herabstiege, und die vollkommenste Verfassung einführte, so müßte sie ja doch Menschen die Ausführung übergeben" (*NA* 26, 264).

It is useful to keep the context of Schiller's first political engagement with unconstitutional regicide in mind while casting a concluding glance on Schiller's more well-known dramatic treatment of unconstitutional regicide in the form of *Maria Stuart*. In the drama, Maria is concerned less with dying than with the illegality of her trial. She protests her wrongful imprisonment;[280] the denial of her right to a trial by her peers;[281] the imposition of the Act for the Queen's Safety, a bill of 1585 that was drafted specifically in association with the charge against Maria of coconspiracy against Elisabeth's life and which barred her from any right to the inheritance of the English throne;[282] and the denial of her right to face her accusers at trial.[283] But perhaps even more crucial in light of Schiller's own aspirations for societal and political reform is

[280] "Ich athme / Die Luft in einem englischen Gefängniß. / [. . .] / Ich bin nicht dieses Reiches Bürgerin, / Bin eine freie Königin des Auslands." *NA* 9NI, 35.

[281] "Verordnet ist im englischen Gesetz, / Daß jeder Angeklagte durch Geschworne / Von seines Gleichen soll gerichtet werden. / Wer in der Kommittee ist meines Gleichen?" *NA* 9NI, 34. Also: "Nicht zweifl' ich dran, es sitzen neben euch / Noch edle Männer unter meinen Richtern. / Doch sie sind *Protestanten*, Eiferer / Für Englands Wohl, und sprechen über mich, / Die Königin von Schottland, die Papistin! / Es kann der Britte gegen den Schotten nicht / Gerecht seyn, ist ein uralt Wort – Drum ist / Herkömmlich seit der Väter grauen Zeit, / Daß vor Gericht kein Britte gegen den Schotten, / Kein Schotte gegen jenen zeugen darf." *NA* 9NI, 37–38.

[282] "Ich zweifle nicht, daß ein Gesetz, ausdrücklich / Auf *mich* gemacht, verfaßt, mich zu verderben, / Sich gegen mich wird brauchen lassen – Wehe / Dem armen Opfer, wenn derselbe Mund, / Der das Gesetz gab, auch das Urtheil spricht! / Könnt Ihr es leugnen, Lord, daß jene Akte / Zu meinem Untergang ersonnen ist?" *NA* 9NI, 39.

[283] "Man stelle sie mir gegenüber, lasse sie / Ihr Zeugniß mir in's Antlitz wiederholen! / Warum mir eine Gunst, ein Recht verweigern, / Das man dem Mörder nicht versagt? Ich weiß / Aus Talbots Munde, meines vor'gen Hüters, / Daß unter dieser nämlichen Regierung / Ein Reichsschluß durchgegangen, der befiehlt, / Den Kläger dem Beklagten vorzustellen." *NA* 9NI, 41.

Maria's plaidoyer that as a queen, a relative, and a human being, Elisabeth is hardly different than she, no less vulnerable than she, and that Elisabeth, in view of her relationality with all of vulnerable humanity, would be wiser to meet vulnerability with compassion. Maria pleads with her cousin:

> Denkt an den Wechsel alles Menschlichen!
> Es leben Götter, die den Hochmut rächen!
> Verehret, fürchtet sie, die schrecklichen,
> Die mich zu euren Füßen niederstürzen –
> Um dieser fremden Zeugen willen, ehrt
> In mir euch selbst[. . . .]
> (*NA* 9NI, 98)

Maria identifies Elisabeth's delusion of sovereign subjectivity as the source of their animosity. The belief in one's invulnerability and the privilege to convince others that one's invulnerability is inherent relieves the powerholder of accountability. There is nothing to prevent the law from becoming synonymous with her violent will—at least, as long as she maintains power. One perceives in *Maria Stuart* the same revulsion that Schiller expressed over the appropriation of enlightenment principles into the motors of unchecked terror and demagoguery in France—in both cases, the hand that had acted ostensibly on behalf of the vulnerable had turned itself against the very vulnerable it had sworn to protect. To reach the Schillerian goal of placing the law of common humanity upon the throne, then, it would require "mehr als ein Jahrhundert" (*NA* 26, 264).

Chapter 5

"Doch in der Öde lernt ich mich erkennen": Sublime Vulnerability in Times of Occupation; *Die Jungfrau von Orleans* and Heinrich Joseph von Collin's *Bianca della Porta*

THE 150TH ISSUE OF THE *ZEITUNG FÜR DIE ELEGANTE WELT* of the year 1801 featured a poem dedicated to Berlin actress Henriette Meyer that was contributed by a fan writing under the name Henriette F. . . .[284] The poem's first-person speaker, inspired by reports of Meyer's famous portrayal of the French liberation hero Johanna D'Arc in Schiller's new drama, *Die Jungfrau von Orleans* at the *Französisches Schauspielhaus* in Berlin, yearns to see her heroine in person. The poem portrays a character whose domestic life is no comfort to her—it is rather the barrier that keeps her under house arrest:

> Ach ich seh' den Wallern nach und weine,
> Daß mich hindern Häuslichkeit und Pflicht
> Dich zu schaun, Du hohe Götterreine,
> Schön umstrahlt von der Verklärung Licht!

As the despairing poetic speaker, presumably the author herself, wallowed inside her domestic dungeon, the actress Henriette Meyer, clad in armor and sword in hand, marched onto the German stage as Schiller's Johanna d'Arc—after opening the drama with defiance in response to her father's wish for her to marry—to lead men in a war for personal and national autonomy. Just seven months before the Leipzig premiere of *Die Jungfrau von Orleans* (11 September 1801) and

---

A previous version of the present chapter was published as "Schiller's Johanna and Collin's Bianca as Women('s) Liberators in Anti-Napoleonic Drama" in *Inspiration Bonaparte?: German Culture and Napoleonic Occupation*, ed. Seán Allan and Jeffrey L. High (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2021), 56–76.

[284] Henriette F. . . ., "An Madame Meyer als Jungfrau von Orleans," *Zeitung für die elegante Welt*, 15 December 1801, 1212.

nine months before its Berlin premiere (23 November 1801), Joseph Bonaparte (1768–1844) and Austrian foreign minister, Johann Ludwig Joseph, Count of Cobenzl (1753–1809) signed the Treaty of Lunéville (9 February 1801), reaffirming the Holy Roman Empire's cession of the left bank of the Rhine to France. Austria would not take up arms against Bonaparte again until 1805.

At the turn of the nineteenth century, few late Enlightenment writers explicitly challenged the hypocrisy of those who did not have women in mind when they argued for the protection of individual human rights.[285] Historian Ute Frevert summarizes the dominant thinking thus: "Daß Frauen in diese universal Fortschritts- und Freiheitsperspektive nicht mit einbezogen waren, fiel sehr wenigen Zeitgenossen als Widerspruch im bürgerlichen Denken auf."[286] Citing lexica alongside medical, pedagogical, psychological, and literary texts, Karin Hausen offers a history of the terms *männlich* and *weiblich* in seventeenth-, eighteenth-, and nineteenth-century thought, culminating in a summary of the dominant perspective on gender characteristics in emergent bourgeois society that bifurcates male "activity and rationalism" and female "passivity and emotionality."[287] Hausen concludes that this bifurcation developed into a polarization of gender characteristics at the turn of the century.

The present chapter complicates broad generalizations of the discourses on sex and gender in German literature during the period of Napoleonic occupations by highlighting critical undertones in two war-of-occupation dramas that unite the theme of the liberation of the state with

[285] The positions held by women's rights advocates as unambiguous as those of, for example, Theodor Gottlieb von Hippel the Elder (1741–1796), were rare, and therefore particularly bold. See Hippel, *Über die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Weiber* (Berlin: Vossische Buchhandlung, 1792).

[286] Frevert, 16.

[287] Hausen, "Die Polarisierung der 'Geschlechtscharaktere.'"

skepticism of the justness of the disparity in privileges between men and women: Schiller's *Die Jungfrau von Orleans*, and *Bianca della Porta* (1807),[288] by Austrian dramatist Heinrich Joseph von Collin (1771/1772–1811). Both dramas were written in response to the ongoing attempt by France to force its vision of revolutionary freedom on much of the rest of Europe through occupation and conquest. Schiller and Collin engage popular discourses of women's rights by portraying female leads who liberate themselves from constructed gender constraints while liberating others from foreign occupation. While neither Schiller nor Collin expressly disparaged Napoleon Bonaparte by name, both authors unmistakably and critically addressed the phenomenon of Bonaparte and were widely received as national heroes during the period of the Napoleonic wars of occupation, not only for the quality and volume of their literary work but also for their contribution to the liberation effort through portrayals of personal and national independence. The connection between criticism embedded in their fictional characters has heretofore been mostly overlooked. Furthermore, the present study demonstrates how the course of history prompted Schiller to expand his portrayal of sublime vulnerability to include the defense of the vulnerable and how this particular mode of sublime vulnerability found currency in the dramaturgy of the period directly following Schiller's death. Defense is thus treated as an expression of care and an acknowledgement of vulnerability. It is the exacerbation of Johanna's and Bianca's vulnerability that prompts them to defend themselves and those other vulnerable around her, the occupied. Importantly, their defense is justified throughout both plays in their rejection of offense. Both plays propose that defense is a last resort decision and offer hope for a future world, where vulnerability is not exacerbated by tyrants and occupiers but recognized as a universal human condition.

[288] Collin's works are cited in Heinrich Joseph von Collin, *Heinrich J. v. Collin's sämmtliche Werke*, ed. Matthäus von Collin (Vienna: Strauß, 1812–1814). Subsequent citations as "*SW*" with volume and page number(s).

Schiller's *Die Jungfrau von Orleans* and Collin's *Bianca della Porta* as Critical Responses to Bonaparte's Wars of Occupation

Though Schiller demonstrates a lifelong interest in the subject of wars of occupation as a dramatist, poet, and historian, it is particularly noteworthy that all of his completed dramas written in the final years of his lifetime feature occupation, and two prominently feature wars of liberation: *Die Jungfrau von Orleans* (set during the fifteenth-century French war of liberation against the occupying English) and *Wilhelm Tell* (based on the legendary figure Wilhelm Tell's role in the fourteenth-century rebellion of Swiss tribes against Habsburg tyranny). Recent secondary literature on Schiller's *Die Jungfrau von Orleans* provides fruitful contextualization of the play's action against the backdrop of the period of its composition, that of the occupation of the German-speaking territories, and the literary groundswell of support for the anti-Napoleonic wars of liberation. Jeffrey L. High argued in 2006 that the French occupation of Switzerland in 1798 and Napoleon's coup in 1799 "made the decision to work on an actual French liberation hero, *Die Jungfrau von Orleans* in 1800 and then a Swiss Wilhelm Tell in 1802 that much more relevant."[289] In 2009, Walter Müller-Seidel attributed the problem of the insufficient study of Schiller's opposition to Bonaparte to the fact that Schiller never mentioned the dictator by name: "Man macht es sich zu leicht, wenn man in der Schillerforschung nur deshalb über Napoleon nicht spricht, weil Schiller seinerseits über ihn nicht spricht."[290] Müller-Seidel is a proponent of prosecutorial methods of deduction when evidence is indirect, including the assessment of "Indizienbeweiss [. . .]; er schließt bloß Erschlossenes nicht aus und kann gegebenenfalls manchen unsicheren

[289] Jeffrey L. High, "Schiller, 'merely political' Revolutions, the Personal Drama of Occupation, and Wars of Liberation," in *Schiller: National Poet—Poet of Nations*, ed. Nicholas Martin (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006), 234–235.

[290] Walter Müller-Seidel, *Schiller und die Politik*, 212.

Zeugenaussagen vorzuziehen sein."[291] One such well of circumstantial evidence is the anti-Napoleonic literature upon which Schiller's own writing had a documented influence, notably the dramas and poetry of Heinrich Joseph von Collin.

In the same period in which Schiller composed his occupation dramas (and beyond Schiller's death in 1805), a period in which Schiller and Collin themselves faced the Napoleonic occupations of their home and neighboring countries, Collin worked on many dramatic projects that likewise feature the threat of occupation, if not full wars over territorial sovereignty or wars of annihilation. These include *Regulus* (1801; which staged the threat of Carthaginian domination of Rome in the third century BCE), *Coriolan* (1802; set during the Volsci siege of Rome in the early fifth century BCE), *Polyxena* (1803; set after the destruction of Troy, the slaughter of the Trojans, and the enslavement of its female survivors), *Bianca della Porta* (1807; set during the occupation of Bassano by the tyrant Ezzelino III da Romano[292]), *Die Horatier und Curiatier* (1811; in which dictator Decius Mettus of Alba Longa schemes to conquer Rome), and *Die Befreyung von Jerusalem* (1813; set as a war of liberation of the grave of Christ).[293] After his arrest by French soldiers in late 1805 and his suffering of "Mißhandlungen der Franzosen und Entbehrungen jeder Art" (*SW* 6, 390), Collin considered dramatizing the story of Mithridates VI Eupator, King of Pontus (ca. 132–163 BCE) as a would-be liberator of the world from the oppression of Rome, described here by Matthäus von Collin (1779–1824) with reference to the perils of free speech under Napoleonic occupation: "und hier mit einer Freyheit, die er sich in neuerer Geschichte nicht

[291] Müller-Seidel, *Schiller und die Politik*, 212.

[292] The name of Collin's villain is spelled with one "z."

[293] Heinrich Joseph von Collin only worked on the first act. His brother, Matthäus von Collin, composed a second act for its premiere in 1813, after Heinrich Joseph's death. See *SW* 6, 241–242.

gestatten zu können glaubte, das machtvolle Entgegenstreben eines kräftigen Gemüths gegen Roms Welttyranney zu zeichnen" (*SW* 6, 402). However, Heinrich Joseph von Collin eventually decided against the project, anticipating that his treatment of the subject would be dangerously provocative: "Es fand sich, [. . .] daß die Beziehungen zu deutlich und sonnenklar seyn würden, um gewagt werden zu können" (*SW* 6, 402).

Collin was an avid reader of Schiller's work. He praised the strictly "berechnet[e] Einheit" (*SW* 6, 86) of the content of Schiller's *Die Jungfrau von Orleans*, despite its many scenes, locations, and characters. In his biography of Heinrich Joseph, Matthäus von Collin judges with certainty that it was his brother's reading of Schiller during his youth that inspired him later in life to compose dramas of his own (*SW* 6, 300–301). Although today Collin has disappeared from the canon entirely, his literary projects that focused on the themes of occupation and liberation found wide resonance in the first decades of the nineteenth century,[294] and his work was frequently compared to Schiller's in his reception.[295]

Collin's deep resentment toward Bonaparte is also well-documented, though likewise conspicuously—prudently—inexplicit. Müller-Seidel's description of Schiller's coded animosity toward Bonaparte—"ein[e] verschwiegen[e] Gegnerschaft, um die es sich offensichtlich

[294] According to Veronica C. Richel's directory, a Collin play was given in at least one major German or Austrian theater almost every year from 1802 until 1821. Richel, ed. *The German Stage, 1767–1890: A Directory of Playwrights and Plays* (New York: Greenwood, 1988), 30.

[295] See the comparison between Schiller and Collin in two then-contemporary reviews: F. v. S., "*Regulus*, Ein Trauerspiel von Collin," *Dramaturgisches Journal für Deutschland*, 2 April 1802, 190–191; "*Bianka della Porta:* Ein Trauerspiel in 5 Aufzügen von Collin," *Morgenblatt für gebildete Stände*, 14 November 1808, 1090.

handelt"[296]—applies well to Collin. Matthäus von Collin documents his brother's choice of euphemisms for Bonaparte and his supporters:

> Seit dem Kriege vom Jahre 1805 schien es keinem Österreicher mehr zweifelhaft, daß man zur Rettung der Nationaleigenthümlichkeit, [. . .] das Leben selbst hinzugeben bereit sein müsse, und daß es auf Erden keine heiligere Pflicht gebe. [. . .]
>
> Zu diesen [Gesinnungen] gesellte sich aber nun auch ein tiefer Haß gegen die Unterdrücker der Völker aller Zeiten, welchen Geistern der Hölle wie er [Heinrich Joseph von Collin] sie nannte, er in der Geschichte nachspürte. (*SW* 6, 394)

In the summer of 1807, while preparing the print editions of his *Bianca della Porta*, Collin came as close to naming the Napoleonic Wars and the occupying troops as the source of his discontent as he ever would in a letter exchange with publisher Friederike Unger (1741–1813). Unger wrote to Collin on 19 June 1807, five days after Bonaparte's decisive victory over Russia and Prussia at the Battle of Friedland, a defeat whose subsequent Treaty of Tilsit (the Franco-Prussian treaty was signed on 9 July 1807) was devastating to Prussia and all supporters of the German movement for self-defense against occupation.[297] Unger describes her anxiety while facing the end of Prussia's resistance against Bonaparte and the reality of the long-term occupation of Berlin:

> Sie sehen – vielleicht doch mit Mitleiden, was aus uns geworden ist, was aus uns noch werden kann! [. . .] Sollen wir nun *über*menschliche Großmuth von unserm Sieger erwarten? Doch basta! sprechen ist gefahrvoll. Durch Schweigen sich niemand verräth, sagt ein Sprichwort. (Printed in Max Lederer, ed., *Heinrich Joseph von Collin und sein Kreis: Briefe und Aktenstücke* [Vienna: Universitäts Buchhandler, 1921], 63)

With the November 1805 Napoleonic occupation of Vienna, the December 1805 defeat of Austria at the Battle of Austerlitz, and the 1807 occupation of Prussia in recent memory, Collin's

---

[296] Müller-Seidel, *Schiller und die Politik*, 212

[297] See Michael V. Leggiere on the aftermath of the Treaty of Tilsit: "Prussia convulsed under the weight of imperial occupation, which would end only after Berlin paid a crippling indemnity. [. . .] The fact that Tilsit tied the withdrawal of French troops from Prussia to an indemnity—the amount of which would be determined at a later date—gave the appearance of endless French martial rule." Leggiere, "Odd Man Out," in *Napoleon and the Struggle for Germany: The Franco-Prussian War of 1813*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 25–26.

liberation hero, Bianca della Porta, poses the question "*wer* ist sicher?" (*SW* 2, 149), a question that would have been immediately understood as politically relevant to contemporary Viennese audiences. The tyrant whom Bianca calls a "schreckliche Geburt, / die weltzerstörend selber sich verschlingt" (*SW* 2, 149), would doubtless have been immediately understood as a reference to Bonaparte. As the *Zeitung für die elegante Welt* reported from Hanover in July 1809, the title of the play was altered to *Ezelino, der Sohn der Hölle*, stressing the demonic nature of the occupier.[298] Like Bonaparte, who fashioned himself as a benevolent protector and his occupation campaigns as liberation missions,[299] it is explained that—prior to the time in which the drama is set—the villain Ezelino had once mobilized his military might to unite Italy and defend it "gegen jedes Unterdrückers Joch" (*SW* 2, 164). Painfully, however, Colonel Grimaldi, Ezelino's disenchanted confidante, laments that the formerly admirable leader has become caught up "im Rausche eigener Vergötterung" (*SW* 2, 164), and is now doomed to fall as the victim of his own megalomania.

Central to the genre of German anti-Napoleonic drama featuring occupying "Geister der Hölle" is the theme of threatened sexual violence. Rape, pillaging, and other atrocities are historically common in wars of occupation and, according to historian David G. Chandler, "French armies on the march were famed for [. . .] pillage, rape, and arson."[300] In both Schiller's *Die*

---

[298] "Korrespondenz und Notizen," *Zeitung für die elegante Welt*, 7 July 1809, 1072.

[299] See Charles Esdaile: "For example, there is the famous letter sent by the Emperor to Jerome Bonaparte when he became King of Westphalia in 1807: 'It is necessary that your people should enjoy a liberty [. . .] unheard of amongst the inhabitants of Germany.'" Esdaile, *Napoleon's Wars: An International History, 1803–1815* (London: Penguin, 2007), 234–235.

[300] David G. Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon* (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 45 and 766. See also Philip G. Dwyer, "'It Still Makes Me Shudder': Memories of Massacres and Atrocities during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars," *War in History* 16, no. 4 (2009): 381–405 and Michael J. Hughes, *Forging Napoleon's Grande Armée: Motivation, Military Culture, and Masculinity in the French Army, 1800–1808* (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 197–198.

Jungfrau von Orleans and Collin's *Bianca della Porta*, the failure of the state to protect its most vulnerable members against the threat of sexual violence at a pivotal moment in the state's history centrally links the heroine's sexual autonomy to the autonomy of the state. The threat of forced marriage and rape prompts both Schiller's Johanna and Collin's Bianca to leave the sphere of dependent passivity for which they were groomed in order to defend themselves and their loved ones and to help build the state in which they wish to live—or at least die. Schiller and Collin recognized that historical wars of liberation open up a literary space of imagining what the defended state could be like after occupation has ended. Correspondingly, Johanna and Bianca push against gender norms and propose a new image of femininity, one constructed not for an age of revolution but for an age of occupation, in which the most vulnerable willingly expose themselves to injury in the sublime act of love for future humanity.

Johanna's Liberation

There is still scholarly disagreement as to whether, as the present reading maintains, Johanna's death on the battlefield is as valid as the depth of any male tragic hero, insofar as her death constitutes a sublime triumph of vulnerability over the threat of coercion, or whether Johanna's death is merely a gendered trope, according to which literary representations of warrior women must end in the woman's destruction—not because she is a valid tragic hero but because she is a woman.[301] According to Watanabe-O'Kelly, Johanna dies, "like all warrior women except Judith," and she, "of course [. . .] has triumphed only by returning obediently to the path God has mapped

[301] See, for example, Antonia Eder, "*Amadea moderna*: Von Götterliebe und Frauenkörpern in Kleists 'Amphitryon' und Schiller's 'Die Jungfrau von Orleans," *Kleist-Jahrbuch* (2019): 149–174, especially 171.

out for her."[302] Johanna's silence at Reims, her final prayer to God in the English watchtower—the same God who abandoned her—Johanna's conflation of a bizarre fertility cult version of Christian faith and a French liberation narrative, and the lack of scholarly clarity as to what, exactly, is holy about her mission—a question that she answers with all clarity, the defense of the occupied[303]—continue to fascinate and puzzle literary critics. However, the readings in secondary literature that minimize the transgressiveness of Johanna's rejection of gender norms on the basis that she is divinely inspired,[304] or because she is silent and experiences feelings of shame at Reims,[305] or because she dies,[306] do nothing to mitigate the fact that her mission is liberation from occupation, and that, as an armed woman, she poses a threat to the status quo, both text internally (in fictional fifteenth-century France) and text externally (in nineteenth-century Europe).

In only the thirty-ninth line of the play, Johanna is singled out for her nonconformity when her well-intentioned sister, Margot, advises her to meet their father Thibaut's expectation that she marry, and soon: "Erfreue unsern Vater. Nimm ein Beispiel" (*NA* 9, 168). Johanna is further criticized for her father for taking a sudden interest in local landowner Bertrand's recently acquired

---

[302] Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, "Models for Men: Heroic Maidens from Schiller to Brecht," in *Beauty or Beast? The Warrior Woman in the German Imagination from the Renaissance to the Present* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 156.

[303] "Was ist unschuldig, heilig, menschlich gut, / Wenn es der Kampf nicht ist ums Vaterland?" *NA* 9, 235.

[304] Walter Hinderer writes, "Die kritische Tendenz wird allerdings durch den Hinweis auf den göttlichen Auftrag zumindest relativiert." Hinderer, "Der Geschlechterdiskurs im 18. Jahrhundert und die Frauengestalten in Schillers Dramen" in *Friedrich Schiller und der Weg in die Moderne*, ed. Walter Hinderer (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2006), 277.

[305] See Koschorke, 250–251. See also Hinderer, "Der Geschlechterdiskurs," 278.

[306] Cf. Watanabe-O'Kelly, 156; Koschorke, 250–251; Elisabeth Krimmer, "Transcendental Soldiers: Warfare in Schiller's *Wallenstein* and *Die Jungfrau von Orleans*," *Eighteenth Century Fiction* 19, nos. 1 and 2 (2006): 119.

helmet and his reports of Orleans's impending demise: "Was kümmerts dich! Du fragst / Nach Dingen, Mädchen, die dir nicht geziemen" (*NA* 9, 177). In act 3, scene 1, officers La Hire and Dunois come into conflict over their mutual desire to marry Johanna after the war; La Hire demands that the dauphin decide to whom Johanna should belong, and Dunois retorts: "Sie hat Frankreich frei gemacht / Und selber frei muss sie ihr Herz verschenken" (*NA* 9, 238). Here, Schiller's Dunois unwittingly and succinctly reveals the allegorical relationship between Johanna's liberation of France from occupation and the liberation of female selfhood from male occupation of female bodies. However, he fails to recognize Johanna's programmatic intention, namely to give her heart to no man at all.

Johanna is quite clear that her celibacy specifically entails a rejection of men. In the fourth scene of the prologue, Johanna recalls how the God who spoke to Moses and Isaiah instructed her: "Nicht Männerliebe darf dein Herz berühren" (*NA* 9, 181). She contradicts the insistence of the archbishop, the dauphin Karl, and his court that she marry in act 3, scene 4, arguing that her vocation as "Kriegerin des höchsten Gottes" precludes marriage: "Und keinem Manne kann ich Gattinn sein" (*NA* 9, 253). Upon further pressure from the group, she chastises them, stating again that "Neigung [. . .] zu dem irdschen Mann" is incompatible with her holy mission to liberate France (*NA* 9, 254). In act 4, scene 1, after feeling the first stirrings of affection for a man after her encounter with Lionel, Johanna feels disgusted that her heart carries "eines Mannes Bild" (*NA* 9, 269).

Almost all the characters try at some point to convince Johanna to see herself as a member of her biological and socially mandated gender group, but she is focused on creating her own space in the midst of a coerced gender binary, one that repeatedly rejects her for her appearance as a weak and hypervulnerable woman: "Vor eurem Aug enthüllt er [der Himmel] seine Wunder, / Und

ihr erblickt in mir nichts als ein Weib" (*NA* 9, 254). When Montgomery desperately tries to appeal to the "Milde [ihres] zärtlichen Geschlechts" (*NA* 9, 229), she protests, claiming she is like "die körperlosen Geister" (*NA* 9, 229), insisting that she is not even human, and that her armor covers no heart. She rejects Agnes Sorel's limited view of womanhood—"O könntest du ein Weib sein und empfinden! / Leg diese Rüstung ab" (*NA* 9, 272)—since this would require Johanna to retire from the only activity that enables her to maintain some semblance of personal freedom.[307] After Johanna successfully reunites Burgundy with France, Count Dunois, bastard of Orleans, assumes, in a display of masculine hubris, that God sent Johanna to him to become his wife, despite having received no hint of romantic interest from Johanna: "Die Wunderbare [. . .], / Die eines Gottes Schickung diesem Reich / Zur Retterin bestimmt und mir zum Weibe" (*NA* 9, 237). Dunois's intention to marry Johanna sets off an extended discussion of how best to reintegrate the virgin into the realm of the domestic once she has fulfilled her usefulness to the nation and, therefore, exhausted her allocation of exceptional freedom. Bitter about the male plans for her future, Johanna voices her disgust that men cannot see past her body: "Der Männer Auge schon, das mich begehrt, / Ist mir ein Grauen und Entheiligung" (*NA* 9, 254). At the start of the subsequent scene a knight announces that the British have crossed the Marne and are prepared to meet the French, whereupon Johanna exclaims, "Schlacht und Kampf! / Jetzt ist die Seele ihrer Banden frei" (*NA* 9, 254). Johanna's zealous reaction to the announcement of war is provoked by the endless problematization of her gender nonconformity.

Accordingly, when Johanna acts to liberate France, she simultaneously acts to liberate her body and mind from a world that has already decided how she most look, think, and act. She acts

[307] See also Julie D. Prandi, "Woman Warrior as Hero: Schiller's *Jungfrau von Orleans* and Kleist's *Penthesilea*," *Monatshefte* 77 (1985): 406.

in defiance of the constrictive sphere of prescribed femininity that views femininity as a hypervulnerability that is not universal but sex specific and, by nature of its hyper-susceptibility to injury, is justifiably exploited. It is in this spirit that she hears the voice of the Virgin Mary instructing her: "Doch werd ich dich mit kriegerischen Ehren, / Vor allen Erdenfrauen dich verklären" (*NA* 9, 181). She will rise above the expectation that she, like most other women, submit to exploitation in order to make use of her own vulnerability, exposing herself to death on the battlefield in support of a higher cause.

One of Johanna's personal motivations for self-defense is clearly and repeatedly identified by Schiller as the heightened threat of rape to the female population in an occupied state.[308] Thibaut states in the prologue that the threat of assault is the primary motivation for his urgency in finding husbands for his daughters.[309] In the third scene, Bertrand, a neighboring landowner, stresses that this is no superfluous precaution—the news has circulated that the English have sworn an oath to disgrace all virgins.[310] British commander Lionel details to Talbot and Philipp how he intends to capture Johanna and facilitate her rape by British soldiers:

> Und vor des Bastards Augen, ihres Buhlen,
> Trag ich auf diesen Armen sie herüber
> Zur Lust des Heers, in das britannsche Lager.
> (*NA* 9, 224)

---

[308] See High, "Schiller, 'merely political,'" 231–232 on the real-life threat of rape faced by Schiller's family during French occupation in 1796. Schiller demonstrated an interest in women's agency over their own bodies throughout his dramatic oeuvre. For discussions of Amalia facing the threat of rape in *Die Räuber,* the rape of Bertha as a metaphor for the rape of Genoa in *Die Verschwörung des Fiesko zu Genua*, and Mortimer's threat of rape in *Maria Stuart*, see chapters 2, 3, and 4 of the present dissertation, respectively. In *Kabale und Liebe*, Lady Milford, and in *Don Karlos*, Princess Eboli are caught in quid pro quo relationships with the prince and the king, respectively. *Wilhelm Tell* opens with an attempted rape.

[309] See *NA* 9, 167.

[310] See *NA* 9, 176.

Johanna never becomes aware of Lionel's dark plans to punish her with sexual assault and demonstrates no awareness of his stated intention to rape her when she encounters him face to face and subsequently has feeling of romantic attachment to him in act 3, scene 10. The audience, however, is aware by the time of their encounter that Johanna has limited options when she faces him: either she abandons France and enters into an intimate relationship with an English officer by her own choice; or she fights him as she did the Welsh officer Montgomery; or, as she will in fact do, she walks away, thereby allowing him to live, remaining further exposed to the threat of captivity and rape.

Thibaut's fatherly concern regarding the threat of rape that faces his daughters does not, however, justify his dictating that they submit their bodies to his will and to the male partners he selects for them. Schiller's text presents Thibaut as a patriarchal foil to Johanna's gender progressive paradigm in every important consideration addressed: where Thibaut lacks insight,[311] Johanna receives inspired visions; where Thibaut lacks civic courage,[312] Johanna rejects enslavement;[313] where Thibaut is concerned with material wealth and personal wellbeing,[314] Johanna is willing to expose herself to danger in defense of others;[315] where Thibaut is cruelly

---

[311] The prologue's opening lines are an admittance of resigned ignorance on the part of Thibaut: "Wer weiß, wer morgen über uns befiehlt!" *NA* 9, 167.

[312] "Wir sind friedliche Landleute, wissen nicht / Das Schwert zu führen, noch das kriegerische Roß / Zu tummeln. – Laß uns still gehorchend harren, / Wen uns der Sieg zum König geben wird." *NA* 9, 179.

[313] "Nichts von Verträgen! Nichts von Übergabe!" *NA* 9, 177.

[314] "Kommt an die Arbeit! Kommt! Und denke jeder / Nur an das Nächste! Lassen wir die Großen, / Der Erde Fürsten um die Erde losen, / Wir können ruhig die Zerstörung schauen, / Denn sturmfest steht der Boden, den wir bauen." *NA* 9, 180.

[315] "Ihr Plätze alle meiner stillen Freuden, / Euch laß ich hinter mir auf immerdar! / Zerstreuet euch, ihr Lämmer auf der Heiden, / Ihr seid jetzt eine hirtenlose Schar, / Denn eine andre Herde

disloyal to his daughter,[316] Johanna maintains love and respect for her family throughout.[317] Thibaut's position as Johanna's foil is made particularly clear by the fact that they are the only two characters who speak in rhyming verse in the prologue, where all others speak in blank verse.[318] Where Johanna states repeatedly her intention to remain unmarried, Thibaut repeatedly reprimands her for rejecting suitors.[319] Coming from a landowner whose livelihood depends on the fertility of his land, the metaphors that Thibaut employs to describe his daughter's body as a ripening blossom ring commercial: her body has blossomed, but her love is still budding, and he waits impatiently for it to mature into golden fruit.[320] Thibaut's graphic description of his daughter's body as an unusually attractive means of production and multiplication—his likening of her body to an agricultural commodity—reveals that he sees his daughter, at least to some extent, as a possession. Any attempt made to defend her from rape is also an act of property insurance—the virgin female body is profitable—and this objectification leaves no room for considerations of Johanna's wishes for her own body.

Johanna's autonomy stands in stark contrast to the portrayals of the hotheaded British and French soldiers, whose actions seem to be driven by vain whims rather than free choice. The young

---

muß ich weiden, / Dort auf dem blutgen Felde der Gefahr, / So ist des Geistes Ruf an mich ergangen, / Mich treibt nicht eitles, irdisches Verlangen." *NA* 9, 180.

[316] "RAIMOND. Ach! Erwägt es wohl! / Stürzt Euer eigen Kind nicht ins Verderben! / THIBAUT. Lebt ihre Seele nur, ihr Leib mag sterben." *NA* 9, 281.

[317] "Ich werf ihn von mir den verhaßten Schmuck, / Der euer Herz von meinem Herzen trennt, / Und eine Hirtin will ich wieder werden. / Wie eine niedre Magd will ich euch dienen, / Und büßen will ichs mit der strengsten Buße, / Daß ich mich eitel über euch erhob!" *NA* 9, 285.

[318] See *NA* 9, 180–181.

[319] See *NA* 9, 169.

[320] See *NA* 9, 169.

Welsh soldier Montgomery admits to himself that his decision to join the occupation of France in search of glory was an "eitler Wahn" (*NA* 9, 227). Johanna's battle with Montgomery has been characterized as a "brutal[er] Gewaltakt" and as a "brutal[er] Mord," but Johanna's dialogue with the British soldier indicates that, rather than killing him in cold blood, she has given the justness of her participation in battle serious thought.[321] When Montgomery begs Johanna for mercy, she first explains to the soldier how his youth and convenient, new-found regret do not reverse the damage inflicted on the French by his belligerent delirium:

> JOHANNA.
> Unglücklicher! Und du erinnerst mich daran,
> Wie viele Mütter dieses Landes kinderlos,
> Wie viele zarte Kinder vaterlos, wie viel
> Verlobte Bräute Witwen worden sind durch euch!
> (*NA* 9, 229)

While Montgomery personally may have meant no harm, his actions have indirectly led many innocent people to endure "der Knechtschaft Schmach" (*NA* 9, 230). In light of the threat of rape presented multiple times in the prologue and first two acts, Johanna's stated intention to protect the French from British human rights violations is hardly less self-determined than Montgomery's delirium. Johanna's denunciation of Montgomery's acts constitutes a trial in which the disastrous effects of normalizing a '(rich) boys will be (rich) boys' mentality comes to light in a way that sounds particularly contemporary. Montgomery specifically appeals to his boyhood, petitioning

[321] Hinderer refers to Montgomery's death as a "brutal[er] Mord." Hinderer, 279. Krimmer refers to Johanna's actions as the "merciless slaughter of every enemy." Krimmer, 118. Watanabe-O'Kelly writes that, in this "terrifying" scene, Johanna "kills him in cold blood," and later, she "slays him." Watanabe-O'Kelly, 152–153. On this point, it is important to remember that Johanna explicitly refuses to execute Montgomery, and demands instead that he defend himself, whereupon he rushes her and she defeats him. There is a double standard inherent in the most common views on Johanna's violent actions: if male soldiers kill each other in war, that is just war, whereas if a female soldier kills a male soldier in war, it is not only murder, but brutal and unnatural murder.

Johanna to consider his wealthy father, who will happily pay a ransom for the safe release of his unfortunate son:

> Laß mir das Licht des Lebens, nimm ein Lösegeld.
> Reich an Besitztum wohnt der Vater mir daheim
> Im schönen Lande Wallis, wo die schlängelnde
> Savern' durch grüne Auen rollt den Silberstrom,
> Und funfzig Dörfer kennen seine Herrschaft an.
> Mit reichem Golde löst er den geliebten Sohn,
> Wenn er mich im Frankenlager lebend noch vernimmt.
> (*NA* 9, 228)

When this fails—his riches mean nothing to the humble shepherdess turned warrior—he appeals to Johanna's femininity.

> Furchtbar ist deine Rede, doch dein Blick ist sanft,
> Nicht schrecklich bist du in der Nähe anzuschaun,
> Es zieht das Herz mich zu der lieblichen Gestalt.
> O bei der Milde deines zärtlichen Geschlechts
> Fleh ich dich an. Erbarme meiner Jugend dich!
> (*NA* 9, 228–229)

Montgomery specifically addresses how Johanna's self-identification as the messenger of "Der Schlachten Gott" and all her proven success in the liberation effort fall away in face-to-face interactions, where her reputation cannot conceal the appearance of frail femininity from the perspective of the male gaze. Montgomery's lines here recall Johanna's chastisement of the king, the royal court, her unwanted suitor, and the archbishop in act 3, scene 4: "Vor eurem Aug enthüllt er [der Himmel] seine Wunder, / Und ihr erblickt in mir nichts als ein Weib" (*NA* 9, 254). Here, as there, Montgomery's patronizing contradiction of her chosen identity provokes her outrage. Her desperation to be seen as an autonomous being, free from the bondage associated with her gendered appearance, prompts her to swear off the designation woman:

> JOHANNA.
> Nicht mein Geschlecht beschwöre! Nenne mich nicht Weib.
> Gleichwie die körperlosen Geister, die nicht frein
> Auf irdsche Weise, schließ ich mich an kein Geschlecht

Der Menschen an, und dieser Panzer deckt kein Herz.
(*NA* 9, 229)

Writing in October 1801, Charlotte von Stein (1742–1827) offers a contemporary female perspective on the matter: "An der streitlustigen Jungfrau Stelle hätte ich Montgomery's Leben nicht so lange, als sie tut, gefristet."[322]

The encounter with Montgomery in act 2, scene 7 and her budding exceptionalist stance, according to which she has lost all connection to humanity, is the beginning of a turning point for Johanna. Scholarship generally agrees that there is a turning point in the drama and that it occurs during and after her encounter with Lionel in act 3, scenes 9–10. Feminist scholarship predominantly views the encounter with Lionel as the beginning of a transition from autonomy to a return into the patriarchal fold and sublimation into the fatherly ideal. Koschorke writes, for example: "Gehorsam beteuert die Tochter nun, büßen zu wollen [. . .]. Am Schluss der 'romantischen Tragödie' [sind] der body politic wiederhergestellt und der Familienvater in seine traditionellen Rechte wiedereingesetzt."[323] Inge Stephan concludes that by attributing her deeds to God, Johanna "stellt sich ausdrücklich in die Tradition des gängigen Frauenverständnisses ihrer Zeit."[324] The text supports, however, a much more differentiated reading than a binary approach that arbitrarily divides the drama into pre- and post-Lionel. The encounter with Lionel is indeed perhaps the dramatic climax over the course of Johanna's development, but the over-

[322] Charlotte von Stein, letter to Charlotte Schiller of 31 October 1801, in *Charlotte von Schiller und ihre Freunde*, ed. Carl Ludwig von Ulrichs, vol. 1 (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta'scher Verlag, 1862), 462.

[323] Koschorke, 250–251.

[324] Stephan, 125.

departmentalization of the drama leads to reductive readings that ignore the importance of Johanna's repeated confrontation with gender discrimination over its course.

Johanna demonstrates both a propensity for sentimental feeling and relative autonomy of mind from the beginning of the drama. This is most evident from the prologue of the drama, when Thibaut scolds Johanna for behaving in contradiction to his plans for her and Raimond intercedes on Johanna's behalf: "Laßt ihr den Willen!" (*NA* 9, 174). In scene 4 of the prologue, Johanna issues a heartfelt goodbye to the life she enjoyed at home as a shepherdess with her family and also the rational grounding for it, to defend the rights of the occupied French.[325] It is after Montgomery's gender-based denial of her legitimacy as an autonomous defender of the right to exist that she begins to lose sight of her humanity and starts becoming that terribly destructive, 'masculine-coded' creature that Schiller warns against repeatedly throughout his oeuvre: the fanatic, who constitutes an exception to humanity. The fanatic considers himself to be a completely sovereign subject, free of the need for human love and community that all other humans share. It is by nature of this exceptionalism that he is able to justify a superiority of status above other human beings. In the *Ueber naïve und sentimentalische Dichtung*, Schiller describes the fanatic as someone who has taken the idea of freedom to its most extreme conclusion, one that completely ignores the physical nature of humanity as a body with needs and desires, and that, rather than taking one's body into account and harmonizing that aspect with one's ideological goal, seeks to be free of all physical conditions by hating and harming the body:

> Der Phantast verläugnet also nicht bloß den menschlichen – er verläugnet allen Charakter, er ist völlig ohne Gesetz, er ist also gar nichts und dient auch zu gar nichts. Aber eben darum, weil die Phantaserey keine Ausschweifung der Natur sondern der Freyheit ist, also aus einer an sich achtungswürdigen Anlage entspringt, die ins unendliche perfektibel ist, so führt sie auch zu einem unendlichen Fall in eine bodenlose Tiefe, und kann nur in einer völligen Zerstörung sich endigen. (*NA* 20, 503)

[325] See *NA* 9, 180–181.

In the first speech that Schiller delivered at nineteen at the *Hohe Karlsschule* in Stuttgart, he describes the fanatic in other terms—a person who acts in accordance with reason but without any feeling of love for the dual nature of humanity as a rational and sensual being.[326] When Johanna encounters Lionel and feels the unwanted and unexpected stirrings of physical attraction for the first time, the experience completely derails her, throwing the budding exceptionalist's self-image into doubt. Johanna had hoped to abscond from her conditional reality through exceptionalism and had thus failed to recognize that every human being must reckon with physical drives and inclinations, as well as with their physical appearances and how society interprets those appearances—in her case it is foremost society's interpretation and exploitation of her as a hypervulnerable woman that she hopes to escape. It is not until after her father denounces her as a satanist due to her nonconformity and her subsequent banishment that she is able to reflect upon her lived experience "in der Öde" and reconcile her ideal with her physical constitution in the world:

> Und ich bin nicht so elend, als du glaubst.
> Ich leide Mangel, doch das ist kein Unglück
> Für meinen Stand, ich bin verbannt und flüchtig,
> Doch in der Öde lernt ich mich erkennen.
> [. . .]
> Jetzt bin ich
> Geheilt, und dieser Sturm in der Natur,
> Der ihr das Ende drohte, war mein Freund,
> Er hat die Welt gereinigt und auch mich.
> In mir ist Friede – Komme, was da will,
> Ich bin mir keiner Schwachheit mehr bewußt!
> (*NA* 9, 297–298)

What has remained unremarked in the secondary literature is that, just as before her reckoning with physical nature, while she tends toward fanaticism, she still maintains a responsibility to her

[326] For a more in depth reading of Schiller's first *Karlsschule* speech, see the introduction of the present dissertation.

rational nature and to her self-elected ideal. If Johanna were to give up on her rational goal at this crucial moment and submit to the tyrannical pull of natural attraction at the cost of her goal, her development would be considered just as much of a failure according to the Schillerian paradigm. In her period of reflection, Johanna learns that she has a responsibility to care for the one's whose liberatory cause she vowed to take up and not to deliver France into the hands of the occupier in order to submit to selfish infatuation. At the moment of her banishment, the god who had spoken to her falls silent. Johanna's mission after her banishment remains the same, but this time she has reconstructed her own identity within herself. At the same moment, she is able to regain the heart she had foresworn in the face of Montgomery and direct it toward her own goal. When she addresses Lionel again in act 5, scene 9, she has changed: "Nicht lieben kann ich dich" (*NA* 9, 305). Her heart is, however, now open to a new, more selfless love, one that ardently wishes the wellbeing of the oppressed: "Kurz ist der Schmerz und ewig ist die Freude!" (*NA* 9, 315).

While some readers acknowledge that Schiller's Johanna responds with defiant independence to relentless sex and gender-based harassment,[327] the secondary literature largely agrees that any potential to see the drama as promoting a progressive concept of gender relations is invalidated by her inferred guilt over her transgressing of familial and gender traditions and her attribution of her success to a divine source. Even though Johanna demonstrably undergoes an intellectual and physical liberation during the period of her banishment, the thesis that Johanna acts entirely heteronomously in any part of the drama is tenuous when compared with the behavior of the men with whom she shares the stage.

[327] See Francis Lamport, "Virgins, Bastards, and Saviours of the Nation: Reflections on Schiller's Historical Dramas" in *Schiller: National Poet – Poet of Nations*, ed. Nicholas Martin (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006), 165–166.

Readings that view Johanna as a holy, unreal, empty vessel merely take Johanna at her word—she refers to herself as the "Gefäß" (*NA* 9, 253) of the "göttlichen Erscheinung" (*NA* 9, 253) and later criticizes herself for not being "ein blindes Werkzeug" (*NA* 9, 270) that the divine spirit requires in order to occupy a body with its will alone. Johanna's repeated insistence that her success is the result of divine inspiration is undermined throughout the play by conflicting notions of what god actually wills. Her father, for example, also claims to perceive the voice of god condemning his daughter. The English immediately assume that the French are aligned with the devil, while the dauphin Karl thanks god for his mercy at the coronation at Reims. When, for example, Johanna makes her first appearance at the Siege of Orleans, the soldiers follow her as if in a trance, "selbst nicht wollend" (*NA* 9, 203). The archbishop realizes (albeit too late for Johanna) that France has either banished a living saint or incurred punishment for aligning itself with the devil. Moreover, while all other characters appear to have their actions blindly led by their fear of god, Johanna's strategic repetition of her divine credentials, particularly when responding to criticisms of her gender transgression, suggests that god is rather Johanna's instrument for ensuring the preservation of her own free will, and, to some degree, the will of those who would otherwise dominate her.

Furthermore, one cannot ignore the practical constraints that come with Schiller's chosen material. Schiller's play is an adaptation of the story of a famous historical figure, whose mission prominently rests, at the very least, upon the belief in a divine calling. He situates his heroine in the tradition of centuries of politically active women before her who had been admitted otherwise unthinkable political authority, in part because of their strategic claims of divine inspiration. Such

women include Hildegard von Bingen (1098–1179) and Christine de Pizan (1364–1430).[328] As much as Johanna insists that she is God's instrument, she would not be able to serve her god effectively if there were not a deeply religious population ready and willing to exceed even her superstition.

The Liberation of Bianca della Porta

Collin's well-received 1807 drama *Bianca della Porta* ran off and on at the Vienna Burgtheater for sixteen years, from 1807 to 1823. The remarkable similarity of the plot to that of *Die Jungfrau von Orleans* and the similar presentation of a confrontation between masculine-coded exceptionalism and the exploitation of feminine-coded vulnerability suggest a comparison of the two plays and a reading of Collin's dramaturgy as the legacy of Schiller's dramatic principle of sublime vulnerability—modified for the context of prolonged Napoleonic occupation. In *Bianca della Porta*, a ruthless occupying force has endangered Europe and has now come for a small city-state where the occupying general pursues a policy of sexual violence on the conquered. In response, a brave female defender leads the underdogs to unlikely liberation, becomes temporarily weakened by the pain of an impossible love but regains her former strength in time for a final fight that brings liberation to the oppressed, and, as is often required by a tragic protagonist, gives her life in an act of sublime sacrifice. Collin's play is set in the Italian city of Bassano, the site of Ezzelino III da Romano's twelfth-century conquest, and, centuries later in 1796, the site of two battles between the French army under Bonaparte's command and the Austrian Habsburg army. Ezelino is

[328] Julie Prandi's reading constitutes an exception to the broad practice of delegitimizing Schiller's image of *femininity* by delegitimizing Johanna's mission: "Johanna's theological underpinning [. . .] is invented to justify and legitimate her, rather than to emphasize the power of religion or to prove her lack of responsibility." Prandi, "Woman Warrior," 405–406.

motivated primarily by the violent fantasy of possessing Bianca della Porta, wife of Battista della Porta, Bassano's elected podesta.

Collin is demonstrably interested in the prevailing gender conventions of his time, and he references them repeatedly throughout the drama. his male figures constantly invoke the popular late eighteenth/early nineteenth-century conception of *masculinity*, documented in Schiller's poem on the genders, "Würde der Frauen,"[329] which characterizes men as brutal and destructive tyrannical figures: "Was er schuf, zerstört er wieder" (*NA* 1, 240). For example, before Battista even knows of Ezelino's covetousness toward Bianca, he rashly prepares to swear an oath to do anything to secure Bassano's freedom. Battista is unafraid of whatever news Bassano's delegate Fongorelli might bring him, for: "Was du auch bringst, du sprichst mit einem Manne" (*SW* 2, 137). Fongorelli, knowing that Ezelino has demanded Bianca's hand in exchange for Bassano's freedom, barely manages to stop Battista from making his unconditional oath before it is too late. Fongorelli thereby prudently prevents the overhasty Battista from putting himself into a position in which he would either have to deliver Bianca up to Ezelino in order to save Bassano—or commit perjury (*SW* 2, 138). Later, in act 3, scene 1, Bianca warns Battista to postpone any further military engagement with Ezelino, since the city should receive reinforcements within a day, and Ezelino's forces have been considerably weakened. She esteems her own calculated strategic restraint as "muthig" and implies that it is a great crime when haste results in unnecessary bloodshed. Battista, however, responds in a flare of scorned honor: "Nur Weiber harren, Männer fechten" (*SW* 2, 206).

[329] See Hart, "Re-dressing History," 95–95: "Schiller's poem directly addresses gender by contrasting a catalogue of feminine characteristics with their masculine counterparts, and it presents in both versions [. . .] an interesting paradox that can only be resolved if Schiller is working consciously with stereotypes. [. . .] Schiller, though certainly a man of his time, did not see gender as a given, but rather as a collection of codified attributes and behaviors that could be projected onto/into a body."

Ezelino is able to successfully taunt and enrage Battista, provoking him into a duel and killing him, ostensibly only hours before Bassano's reinforcements are due to arrive. If Battista had waited as Bianca suggested, Bassano's strengthened forces would have overwhelmingly outnumbered Ezelino's own. Instead, Bassano is suddenly left to face Ezelino without a leader and without a sufficient army.

Bianca still holds onto hope that she can achieve freedom for Bassano, and, even more importantly, that she can do so nonviolently, thereby saving those citizens of Bassano who have not yet died in battle, or from illness or starvation. Her plan is to attempt to move Ezelino's heart—she will lure him into a chapel in which he will witness her mourning next to Battista's coffin. When Ezelino enters the chapel, however, and threatens to violently wrest her away from the coffin, Fongorelli rushes off to ring the city bells, launching an attack against Ezelino's troops. In order to halt the attack and prevent further loss of life on her behalf, Bianca resorts to her final strategy—her only remaining hope for simultaneously protecting her people's welfare and her individual autonomy—and stabs herself. Her drastic action has the desired effect: Ezelino realizes that he is worthy of her hatred, is devastated, and loses the will to continue the war.

Bianca appears intermittently to undermine her individual agency, not by attributing her actions to divine will as Johanna does, but by conceding that a woman and a man achieve their highest completeness in harmonized union with one another, not separately—a mindset that is in keeping with the dominant late eighteenth-/early nineteenth-century discourses on the sexes.[330] For example, during an act 3 conversation with Battista, Bianca appears to stress that women are patient and men are courageous: "Darum vereint der Himmel die Geschlechter, / [. . .] / Zum

[330] "Mann und Frau sind nach Natur und Bestimmung auf Ergänzung angelegt und demgemäß ist es einem einzelnen Menschen unmöglich, sich zur harmonischen Persönlichkeit zu entwickeln." Hausen, 377.

schönsten Kranz der höchsten Menschlichkeit" (*SW* 2, 205). This, however, is far from her final word on the matter. Soon thereafter, she indicates that courage is not an exclusively male characteristic when she boldly criticizes Battista's old castellan Marcino, now, after, Battista's death, the new podesta, for trying to prevent her from saving Bassano by marrying Ezelino:

> Sehr schlecht beginnst du, Podesta, dein Amt,
> Wenn du dein gutes Volk verderben willst.
> O lerne Muth von einem Weibe, Mann!
> (*SW* 2, 242)

She has turned "man" into a derogatory epithet, and at the end of the play, after repeated evocations of "manliness" by male characters who act imprudently, especially in the case of Battista, the epithet here seems particularly bitter and insulting. Though in Bianca's act 3 conversation with Battista, she first endorses the concept of the complementary nature of the sexes described by Hausen, once she is pushed by sexual coercion, grief, and lofty concern for the well-being of Bassano, she unlocks her full human potential and adopts the characteristic that she had earlier assigned to men in her conversation with Battista: "Muth." In other words, contrary to the dominant late eighteenth-century position regarding the complementary natures of man and woman, Bianca, who knows "nicht bloß zu kämpfen," but also "auszuharren" (*SW* 2, 148), succeeds in individually developing a "harmonisch[e] Persönlichkeit," independently of the aid of a male partner.

Here and above, Collin portrays the psychology of a person raised to be a woman, who is torn between what is expected of her and what she feels is personally necessary as a republican. Like Johanna, who longs to escape to the tumult of the battlefield, where the expectation of her social role as a woman is less likely to impede her internalized political goals, Bianca's self-doubt is notably absent when fighting. When, for example, she glimpses Ezelino in battle, she storms directly towards him. Ezelino underestimates her strength and determination, and out of concern

for her, calls his soldiers back. Bianca uses the enemy's retreat as an opportunity to deal a fatal blow: she throws torches into their war machines while yelling insults at them. The destruction of the enemy war machines leads directly to Ezelino's defeat in the first clash with Bassano. Collin's presentation of Bianca as a war hero stands in conspicuous contrast to Battista's absent heroism—there is no evidence presented in the play that Battista has fought for Bassano with any success, and Ezelino insinuates as much: "Daß ihr im Kampf mich träfet? / Und habt bisher mich sorgsam doch vermieden" (*SW* 2, 200). By the end of the play, as she dies, Bianca, the consummate republican, cries: "Vergib, Bassano! ach, vergib!" (*SW* 2, 269). Her dying words provide the best illustration of Bianca's triumph over traditional gender roles: in contrast with Battista, her heroic foil, whose dying utterance is a cry for his beloved—"O, Bianca!" (*SW* 2, 222)—Bianca's death is free because it is not conditioned by love and despair but by a freely elected dedication to the lives and happiness of her fellow citizens.

In Schiller's *Die Jungfrau von Orleans* and Collin's *Bianca della Porta*, the portrayal of Johanna's and Bianca's struggles against gender-based harassment and sexual coercion, culminating in their tragic and preventable deaths, issued dire warnings to audiences and readers living on the brink of vast political and social upheaval about the moral hypocrisy of a system in which powerful men keep society's most vulnerable members under one's thumb, while elsewhere claiming to be the victims of occupying oppressors. In the wake of the enlightenment's revolutionary exploration of the concept of inalienable human rights, Johanna and Bianca likewise deliver revolutionary commentary on the hypocrisy of excluding women from this concept. Their stories suggest to audiences and readers in occupied and soon-to-be-occupied territories that the most vulnerable members of a society often demonstrate the potential to become that society's greatest heroes; that is to say: their ability to persist in the face of death best displays the capacity

for human freedom. The female liberation figure was perhaps so particularly resonant in anti-Napoleonic German drama because she most clearly communicated the Schillerian concept that "der Mensch ist das Wesen, welches will" (*NA* 21, 39) at the moment of the fall of the Holy Roman Empire and of the self-coronation of a new dictator.

In 1810, Collin's friend, the poet, dramatist, and historical novelist Caroline Pichler (1749–1843) authored two essays entitled "Erinnerung an einige merkwürdige Frauen" and "Über die Bildung des weiblichen Geschlechtes."[331] Both essays focus in particular on the experience of women in an era of "gewaltige[n] Schicksale[n]" and "gewaltige[n] Menschen."[332] The reader of the present chapter will recall Frevert's attention to the relative absence of women's rights discourses in the aftermath of the revolutionary period when reading Pichler's "Über die Bildung des weiblichen Geschlechtes":

> Wenn das Menschengeschlecht durch große Epochen geht, und ungeheure Revolutionen ungeheure Veränderungen hervor bringen, wenn ganz neue Maßregeln erdacht werden, die die altgewohnten Formen zerstören, dann kann auch das weibliche Geschlecht, diese vielleicht zahlreichere Hälfte der Menschheit, sich dem Einflusse derselben nicht entziehen. (Pichler, "Bildung," 159)

The occupation/liberation model for momentous epochal change has historically resulted in new institutions, laws, and customs—and an expansion of women's participation in the current destruction of "altgewohnten Formen" would, Pichler suggests, likely result in the improvement of their situation, their inclusion in "ungeheure[n] Veränderungen" and "neue[n] Maßregeln."

In "Erinnerung an einige merkwürdige Frauen," Pichler argues that recent history in fact presents a wealth of examples of women who, under the pressure of war or other threatened

---

[331] Pichler, Caroline. "Erinnerung an einige merkwürdige Frauen" and "Über die Bildung des weiblichen Geschlechtes," in *Prosaische Aufsätze: Erster Theil* (Leipzig: Anton Pichler, 1822), 103–145 and 158–170, respectively.

[332] Pichler, "Erinnerung," 137.

oppression, displayed the qualities of "weiblichen Heldenmuth[] und hoher Kraft und Treue,"[333] but, she argues—in anticipation of the 1979 challenge issued by the feminist historian Gerda Lerner to interpret "the buried and neglected female past"[334]—historians have failed to take notice of them.[335] Pichler produces a list of historical and literary women who display exemplary "Muth, Kraft und höhere[n] Geistesaufschwung;"[336] significantly for the present chapter, in many cases Pichler foregrounds these women's reactions to threats of sexual violence (often via forced marriage). Among these examples, she lists only four then-contemporary historical dramas by name: two of them are Schiller's *Die Jungfrau von Orleans* (1801) and Collin's *Bianca della Porta* (1807). In citing Schiller and Collin, Pichler identifies and encourages a recent and markedly anti-Napoleonic dramatic tradition of searching through history "mit Liebe und Lust"[337] to find and portray examples of women figures who dared to refuse physical and mental enslavement:

> Es wäre gewiß eine belohnende Arbeit, sie [Beyspiele weiblichen Heldenmuthes] hervor zu suchen, und so aus jenem Chaos von Blut, Schrecken und Grausamkeiten die einzelnen schönen Keime der Menschheit, die sich in ihm entfalteten, der Vergessenheit zu entziehen, damit, wenn einst die Nachwelt sich schaudernd von dem Gemählde unserer Tage wendet, jene sanften guten Geister ihr erscheinen, und sie wieder mit uns versöhnen mögen. (Pichler, "Erinnerung," 137)

In her brief register of heroes from more recent history, Pichler conspicuously foregrounds the actions of women whom she believes will reconcile the dawning age of freedom and peace with the period of wars of liberation from Napoleonic occupation. Her list emphasizes that the next era

---

[333] Pichler, "Erinnerung," 137.

[334] Gerda Lerner, "The Majority Finds Its Past," in *The Majority Finds Its Past: Placing Women In History* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 132.

[335] See Pichler, "Erinnerung," 104–105.

[336] Pichler, "Erinnerung," 105.

[337] Pichler, "Erinnerung," 104–105

in European history, if it is to be characterized by lasting peace, will necessarily be an era in which being vulnerable and being female will no longer be viewed as a logical justification for enslavement or destruction. This hope, she shared with her contemporaries, Schiller and Collin, and with their heroines, Johanna—

> Und die mich jetzt verworfen und verdammt,
> Sie werden ihres Wahnes inne werden,
> Und Tränen werden meinem Schicksal fließen.
> (*NA* 9, 298)

—and Bianca:

> In Idealen,
> Der bessern Zukunft blühet unser Glück;
> Was seyn *wird*, lohnet uns, und nicht, was ist!
> (*SW* 2, 149)

Conclusion

The Uses and Abuses of Sublime Vulnerability Today

THE IMAGE OF SUBLIME VULNERABILITY CAN BE CO-OPTED to fit within the patriarchal paradigm of sovereign subjectivity, rather than as an ethical alternative. Although this melding of paradigms is not consistent according to the logic of the feminist vulnerability paradigm and therefore may easily be dismissed by philosophers as illogical, the phenomenon warrants attention because it has proven to be a particularly effective strategy on the contemporary conservative political stage. The abuse of an aesthetics of sublime vulnerability by far-right politician Giorgia Meloni, who was elected as the first female prime minister of Italy in October 2022, serves as a case study.

"Io sono Giorgia. Sono una donna, sono una madre, sono italiana, sono cristiana."[338]

Each of these five independent clauses follows the same simple structure: subject (*essere*) predicate. To a teacher of a foreign language, they are reminiscent of any student's proud self-introduction after the first five minutes of a first-semester language class.

Io sono Jane.
Sono americana.
Sono studentessa.

But the language teacher and Jane's colleagues do not understand by Jane's self-introduction that these predicates are meant to reveal the full essence of her being. Nor does the persistent force of the nominative delude any listener into thinking that by describing herself as a *studentessa*, Jane intends for her experience as such to operate as the paradigm for universal *studentessa*-hood. Soon,

[338] "Una folla immensa accoglie a San Giovanni una straordinaria Giorgia Meloni! Emozionante! Evviva Noi,'" Video uploaded to the YouTube Channel of *Fratelli d'Italia*, 19 October 2019, https://youtu.be/dFZvTFZz9cA. Subsequent citations as "Meloni, 'Una folla immensa'" with time stamp. Here 17:32.

it will be her neighbor's turn to speak, and whatever of Jane's subjectivity dominated the classroom a moment ago will be swept away by that of her peer.

But when, on 19 October 2019, at a rally for Italian Pride in Piazza San Giovanni in Rome, then head of the political party *Fratelli d'Italia* (now Prime Minister of Italy) Giorgia Meloni stepped up to the podium to deliver these five independent clauses, she made her introduction into an ontological proposition. In her speech she claims defense of the traditional family model and declares that womanhood is not a mere construct, but as real as her person. Womanhood is immutable and applicable to all who call themselves women, and she is the 'real' deal. The order of clauses is important here: she is a 'real woman,' ergo she is a caregiver, ergo she is patriotic, ergo she is devout. Because of the context, every clause implies as well that she is heterosexual. To be a woman is to be a heterosexual, to be a mother is to be a heterosexual, to be an Italian is to be a heterosexual, to be a Christian is to be a heterosexual. Specifically, her speech is tailored in response to the proposal to replace the words *padre* and *madre* on Italian identity cards with gender-neutral language. "È il loro gioco. Vogliono che siamo genitore 1 e genitore 2, genere lgbt, cittadini x, dei codici, ma noi non siamo dei codici. Noi siamo persone e difenderemo la nostra identità!"[339] she cries in indignation. Those parents who do not fit the traditional nuclear family model and who desire to not be ridiculed by their government for their nontraditional identities every time they must make use of their official document, are playing roles in a world of make believe—their families are delusional fictions. They are not included in Meloni's "noi," nor in her understanding of the category "persone."

[339] Meloni, "Una folla immensa," 17:15.

Then *Giorgia* adds: "Non me lo toglierete! Non me lo toglierete!"[340] The impersonal direct object pronoun *lo* (ironically masculine) refers to everything that *Giorgia* is (*donna*, *madre*, *italiana*, *cristiana*). With this, "il loro gioco" becomes a declaration of war. The parties are clearly defined. Rhetorically, Meloni stylizes herself as a warrior. Her loud, quick speech, her brow creased in permanent indignation lend her an air of self-sufficiency and aggression. This is the politician who, later, upon inauguration as president would motion to part with more recent tradition and be called *il*—rather than *la—Presidente del Consiglio*.[341] On the other hand, there is *Giorgia*, the vulnerable. Giorgia is self-stylized as the underdog, the 'girl next door,' clad in sneakers, jeans, a tunic top, pink lipstick, and dangly earrings, the one with whom you are on a first-name basis, a mother, a good Christian woman. In the self-declaration of essence as *Giorgia*, her occupation of the nominative forces all other voices into the position of mere object against her subjectivity. In her assuming the object position in "Non me lo toglierete," she rhetorically stages the threat of her *io* being exterminated by the absent subject implied by the second-person plural verb, but without conceding a human identity to the nameless monster that attacks her.[342] The usual omission of the subject pronoun in Italian allows for *Giorgia* to nevertheless rhetorically foreground herself: Non me lo toglierete. Her appearance on the metaphorical political stage, alone, is a display of staged vulnerability with sublime overtones: a woman in the Italian political

[340] Meloni, "Una folla immensa," 17:40.

[341] Jacopo Storni, "La Crusca: Meloni andrebbe chiamata la Presidente del Consiglio. L'articolo al maschile è un ritorno al passato,"*Corriere della Sera*, 1 November 2022, https://video.corriere.it/cronaca/crusca-meloni-andrebbe-chiamata-presidente-consiglio-l-articolo-maschile-ritorno-passato/f56aaafa-59c5-11ed-943f-15ed1af1dab5.

[342] Meloni referred to progressives as "monstruos" in a speech in Spanish at a rally hosted by the Spanish far-right party Vox. "Giorgia Meloni n VIVA21: 'Todo lo que nos identifica está siendo atacado'." *VOX España*, 14 October 2021, https://youtu.be/rVasTgK66RI. Subsequent citations as "Meloni/VOX" with timestamp. Here 03:11.

sea of men, has risen to political prominence in one of Europe's oldest patriarchies. According to the Rahel Zibner at the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, "not even half of all Italian women are in the workforce."[343] Marina Lili Venturini, president of *Associazione Nazionale Donne Elettrici*, reports that the country is ranked "thirty-ninth in the world for female representation in government."[344] Referring to the long struggle for gender parity in government, Hilary Clinton commented regarding Meloni's likely election in September 2022: "Every time a woman is elected to head of state or government, that is a step forward."[345] *Giorgia*'s sublime self-dramatization implies that her very identity faces extinction.

In this regard as well, it is noteworthy that in the introduction to her memoir (entitled *Io sono Giorgia*), she characterizes her essence as pure and unchanging:

> Ho sempre pensato che la sfida più profonda di chi sceglie la strada della politica sia riuscire a lasciare un segno del proprio passaggio senza rinunciare a rimanere fedele alla propria parte più pura, solitamente quella che ti ha spinto a impegnarti in prima persona. [. . .] Voglio mettere nero su bianco chi sono oggi per rileggermi tra dieci, venti, magari trent'anni, e non poter mentire a me stessa. (Giorgia Meloni, *Io sono Giorgia: Le mie radici, le mie idee* [Milan: Rizzoli, 2021], 11)

---

[343] Rahel Zibner and Marina Lili Venturini, "Promoting gender equality in Italy—a long way to go," *Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom*, 30 May 2022, https://www.freiheit.org/spain-italy-portugal-and-mediterranean-dialogue/promoting-gender-equality-italy-long-way-go.

[344] Zibner and Venturini, "Promoting gender equality."

[345] See Hilary Clinton and Maria Latella, "Hilary Clinton a Sky TG24: Giorgia Meloni premier? 'Dovrà essere giudicata su ciò che fa,'" *sky tg24*, 2 September 2022, https://tg24.sky.it/mondo/2022/09/02/hillary-clinton-intervista-maria-latella?social=facebook_skytg24_video-link_null. Clinton was roundly criticized for this comment. See for example David Broder, "Hilary Clinton Is Wrong: Electing a Far-Right Woman Is Not a Step Forward for Women," *Jacobin* 9 February 2022, https://jacobin.com/2022/09/hillary-clinton-women-far-right-italy-giorgia-meloni-feminism. It is important to keep in mind that Clinton was not praising Meloni's politics or character (she prefaced her remark by admitting "I don't know much about her [. . .]") but rather the unusual outcome of the election itself from the point of view of gender parity in government.

Like the immutable *donna* whose essence constitutes a set of biological characteristics, *Giorgia* is not that which changes due to outside influence, but it is something "più pura." She transcends mortality and claims a permanence usually reserved for the gods, who similarly go by one name. Like Wagner's "ewige Götter," *Giorgia* represents truth and stands alone, a sole subject among objects, eternal and immutable.

Elsewhere, Meloni has labeled those who support improved federal representation of diverse genders and sexualities beyond the heterosexual norm "lobby LGBT."[346] This group includes those who do not usually receive political representation in Italy. Meloni, therefore, who self-stylizes at once as an underdog and as a strong leader on the political stage, has achieved and maintains exceptional and sovereign status by means of aggression toward other women. She has extracted herself from the group of the underrepresented by finding a common enemy with the patriarchy that has historically delegitimized women in politics—for her enemy throws a chill down the spine of every masculinist: Watch out for "la dottrina gender"![347] Your womanhood "è minacciata dall'ombra di un 'arcobaleno', diventato simbolo di un marasma culturale che dietro la retorica dell'inclusione sconfina nella negazione della semplice realtà"![348] And *per l'amore del cielo*, beware the attack on "el sentido de las raíces sagradas y cristianas" by "un ateísmo agresivo!"[349] By making herself into the only subject with a face and the others into monstrous others with terrifying names, she erases the face of the other, obscures the other's humanity, and

[346] See, for example, "Meloni in Andalusia per sostenere Vox, dal palco arringa la folla in spagnolo," *Corriere della Sera*, 13 June 2022, https://youtu.be/jMad7nLO3OM.

[347] Meloni, *Io sono Giorgia*, 30.

[348] Meloni, *Io sono Giorgia*, 258.

[349] Meloni/VOX, 04:12.

participates in the genocidal mentality described by Guaraldo as "una sostanziale operazione di stravolgimento della costitutiva somiglianza umana nella vulnerabilità."[350] That distorted and obscured vulnerability is the very sign that has the power to interrupt violence.

While Meloni argues that *Giorgia* is under attack, *il presidente* "aborr[e] le quote rosa."[351] She promises that if the left allowed women to compete with men "ad armi pari," women would prove their worth on their own without any quotas.[352] Meloni does not however take into consideration that Italians with a history of immigration and people of color, for example, experience the added difficulty of dealing with racist verbal and physical abuse.[353] The domestic space is, furthermore, not equally safe for all women, and it is significantly less safe for Italian women than for Italian men. JumaMap Services for Refugees reported in November 2021:

> Durante il lockdown, le chiamate al numero antiviolenza 1522 sono state 5.031, il 73% in più sullo stesso periodo del 2019 (dati Istat). Le vittime che hanno chiesto aiuto sono 2.013 (+59%). [. . .] Sempre secondo i dati Istat, il 45,3% delle vittime ha paura per la propria incolumità o di morire; il 72,8% non denuncia il reato subito. Nel 93,4% dei casi la violenza si consuma tra le mura domestiche, nel 64,1% si riportano anche casi di violenza assistita. Un interessante rapporto di Eige (Istituto europeo per l'uguaglianza di genere) ha poi mostrato come purtroppo il femminicidio continui a essere il più frequente

---

[350] Guaraldo, 62.

[351] Meloni, *Io sono Giorgia*, 78.

[352] Meloni, *Io sono Giorgia*, 79.

[353] *The Guardian* reported in 2019 that "the number of racially motivated attacks have [sic!] risen sharply in Italy, tripling between 2017 and 2018, when the far-right League entered government in coalition with the anti-establishment Five Star Movement. See Lorenzo Tondo, "Italy's intelligence agency warns of rise in racist attacks," *The Guardian*, 28 February 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/28/italys-intelligence-agency-warns-of-rise-in-racist-attacks. *The New York Times* reported in 2020 that "according to data from the International Organization for Migration, between 2014 and the first six months of 2017, Italy had a 600 percent increase in the number of potential sex-trafficking victims arriving in the country by sea. In 2017, the majority of those victims were black, from Nigeria." Tariro Mzezewa, "'In Italy I Kept Meeting Guys': The Black Women Who Travel for Love," *The New York Times*, 14 February 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/14/travel/italy-black-women-love.html.

> tra gli episodi di violenza sulle donne. Sono 111 gli omicidi di donne 2019. Di questi il 91% sono classificabili come femminicidi. 2.000 in totale gli orfani di crimini domestici. ("Giornata contro la violenza sulle donne," *JumaMap Services for Refugees*, 25 November 2021, https://www.jumamap.it/it/giornata-violenza-donne-femminicidi/)

The more women assume the role of caregiver, the more likely they are to forgo education and careers. As *Politico* reported of Italy in 2020: "According to new data by the national labor watchdog (INL), some 37,600 women with children submitted voluntary resignations in 2019, compared with just over 13,900 fathers, citing the difficulty of 'reconciling employment with care needs' as the main cause for their decision" and "according to the latest data from Italy's national statistics institute (Istat), women between 25 and 44 carry out about 77 percent of care work in families."[354] In 2022, Linda Laura Sabbadini, a statistician and director of new technologies at Italy's National Institute of Statistics told *The New York Times* in an interview that "Half of Italian women do not have economic independence."[355] Though abortion has been technically legal in Italy since 1978, women must go through immense hurdles in order to actually obtain one, including

> a medical examination, observe a seven-day waiting period and sustain a mandatory counseling session aimed at helping remove 'any obstacles' to carrying the pregnancy to term. [. . .] This is then compounded by the alarming number of conscientious objectors in hospitals and clinics all over the country—the national average is calculated to be around 70 percent. (Giulia Blasi, "The fight for abortion access in Italy continues" *Politico*, 2 October 2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/the-fight-for-abortion-access-in-italy-continues-giorgia-meloni)

---

[354] Greta Privitera, "Italy's problem with working women made worse by coronavirus," *Politico*, 6 July 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/05/italys-problem-with-working-women-made-worse-by-coronavirus-349561.

[355] Elisabetta Povoledo and Gaia Pianigiani, "Giorgia Meloni could Be the First Woman to Lead Italy. Not All Women Are Happy," in *The New York Times*, 23 September 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/23/world/europe/giorgia-meloni-italy-women.html.

In response to pushback against anti-abortion policies in regions with majority representation of Meloni's party, *Fratelli d'Italia*, politicians note the low total fertility rate in Italy, characterizing it as a pressing economic crisis that is only intensified by abortions. In her memoir, after defending her position that "le istituzioni sono dalla parte di chi decide di tenere un bambino,"[356] Meloni connects this position with the threat of low fertility: "Tutti si dicono d'accordo sul fatto che la denatalità in Italia sia un problema, ma se lo dico io che sono di destra, allora la mia è nostalgia per l'Opera maternità e infanzia di Benito Mussolini."[357]

However, one notices that the threat of low fertility in Italy is, for Meloni, above all a platform for racism:

> Il popolo italiano sta scomparendo. È un fatto, non un'opinione. Pensate che il 2020 (*annus horribilis*) è stato l'anno in cui abbiamo registrato il minimo storico di figli dall'Unità d'Italia. Cioè dal 1861! [. . .] Purtroppo gli italiani fanno pochi figli e non condivido l'idea sostenuta sempre più apertamente dalla sinistra, che si possa fare a meno degli italiani, rimpiazzandoli con chi è appena arrivato da altre parti del mondo. (Meloni, *Io sono Giorgia*, 170)

Here, Meloni is endorsing the great replacement conspiracy theory, popularized by French philosopher Renaud Camus, who argued in his book *Le Grand Remplacement* (2011) that European society as such was threated into nonexistence in the face of waves of migration from nonwhite peoples. Eirikur Bergmann has demonstrated how the once fringe conspiracy theory touted by the likes of Geert Wilders (Party Leader of the Partij voor de Vriheid, Netherlands), H. C. Strache (Former Party Leader of the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs), and Dries Van Langenhove (Former Party Leader of Vlaams Belang, Belgium) is now increasingly publicly affirmed by establishment politicians across Europe, including Mark Rutte (Prime Minister of the

[356] Meloni, *Io sono Giorgia*, 177.

[357] Meloni, *Io sono Giorgia*, 182.

Netherlands and Party Leader of Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie), Mette Fredriksen (Prime Minister of Denmark and Party Leader of Socialdemokratiet), Jean-Marie Le Pen (Former President of the Front National, France), Silvio Berlusconi (Party Leader of Forza Italia and Former Prime Minister of Italy), Viktor Orbán (Party Leader of Fidesz and Prime Minister of Hungary).[358] Bergmann furthermore linked the theory's popularity to the success of the Brexit referendum.[359] In particular, the great replacement disproportionately targets migrants from Muslim-Majority countries. Considering the fact that "the average Muslim woman in Europe is expected to have 2.6 children, a full child more than the average non-Muslim woman (1.6 children,"[360] it appears that Meloni's fearmongering about the economic repercussions of Italy's low fertility rate is actually ethnically motivated—it is not merely important that Italy produce more babies, but, more importantly, Italy must produce the right babies. In her memoir, Meloni associates Islam with terrorism and oppression, in contrast with Christianity:

> L'Islam non può che essere politico, con l'affermazione della Sharia, cioè del modello giuridico e sociale previsto nel Corano. Sono semplicemente due impostazioni filosofiche, prima che religiose, distinte tra loro. A me piace quella greca, romana e cristiana. E vorrei rimanesse quella prevalente in Italia e in Europa. Dovrei sentirmi una bieca xenofoba e un'intollerante per questo? (Meloni, *Io sono Giorgia*, 282)

Furthermore, for all Meloni's apparent fear of the low birth rate crisis, not all would-be parents are equally welcome to contribute to the solution. Meloni defends the recognition of legal

[358] Eirikur Bergman, "The Eurabia Conspiracy Theory," in *Europe: Continent of Conspiracies. Conspiracy Theories in and about Europe*, ed. Andreas Önnerfors and André Krowel (London, Routledge, 2021), 35–53.

[359] Bergman, 37.

[360] Conrad Hackett, "5 facts about the Muslim population in Europe," *Pew Research* Center, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/29/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-europe/.

matrimony as exclusively "l'unione solida tra un uomo e una donna"[361] and condemns homosexual parenting as "privare un bambino della madre o del padre."[362] Italy is one of the few remaining EU-member countries without legal gay marriage. The country only recognizes civil unions. Lesbian couples and single women who would be able to contribute more children to Italy's population do not have access to assisted reproduction treatments in Italy. Meloni's self-exception from the Catholic family paradigm that she wishes to enforce (Meloni and her partner are unmarried with a daughter), reveals her as a sovereign hypocrite—a "königliche[] Heuchlerin" à la Schiller's Elisabeth I.[363] Her disproportionate concern with that aspect of the Catholic family to which she does conform, namely, sexuality, is an arbitrary predatory act against a vulnerable group. Because lesbian couples cannot produce children in the same way she can, they are subject to the limitations of the state, where Meloni is not. Her motherhood is natural because it is hers—their motherhood does not exist because it is not hers. By claiming normalcy, she at once positions herself in the position of the majority and frames the other as a dangerous, 'freak' minority. According to the plot of this spectacle, this weak minority is threatening to *Giorgia* qua Italy and *il presidente* is justified in defending itself. In a worldview where the sight of human vulnerability is translated into abnormality rather than a foundational common human condition, the vulnerable must be annihilated rather than cared for because their disgusting sight is a reminder of the vulnerability of which *il presidente* feigns freedom.

With populist *us/them* politics demonstrably on the rise in Europe, the UK and the US, it is hard to not see the justified feminist desire for a refocusing of humanity as commonly vulnerable

[361] Meloni *Io sono Giorgia*, 170.

[362] Meloni *Io sono Giorgia*, 169.

[363] See Schiller's letter to Goethe of 30 July 1799. *NA* 30, 75.

beings as idealistic. Perhaps this is where Schiller's aesthetics of sublime vulnerability can be of help. Art reliably moves hearts that are otherwise unmoved by philosophical moralizing. Schiller insists that where art cannot proscribe individual moral actions, it can evoke empathy by connecting us physically to the plight of another via our sympathetic nervous reaction to the sight of human suffering. Away from the judging eyes of other moral institutions, the quiet contemplation of art allows the spectator to play in sympathy with all sorts of characters whom we might otherwise reject in the 'real' world. Through the freedom of play, the moral idea suggested by the art is able to penetrate the heart, becoming not a commandment but an inclination: "Die Poesie kann dem Menschen werden, was dem Helden die Liebe ist. Sie kann ihm weder rathen, noch mit ihm schlagen, noch sonst eine Arbeit für ihn thun; aber zum Helden kann sie ihn erziehn, zu Thaten kann sie ihn rufen, und zu allem, was er seyn soll, ihn mit Stärke ausrüsten" (*NA* 20, 229). There is a radical compassion contained in these words. Schiller shows spectators the vulnerability of all, even the most notorious oppressors such as Philip and Elisabeth, through the eyes of sympathy. He allows his spectators to realize that their hearts can beat sympathetically even for them. The realm of the aesthetic opens up a space where complexities can reside in a spacious heart. Where there is spaciousness, *us/them* politics no longer makes any sense because there is room for all.

Bibliography

Abusch, Alexander. *Schiller*. Berlin: Aufbau, 1980.

Acosta-López, María del Rosario. "'Making Other People's Feelings Our Own': From the Aesthetic to the Political in Schiller's Aesthetic Letters." In *Who Is This Schiller Now?: Essays on His Reception and Significance*, edited by Jeffrey L. High, Nicholas Martin, and Norbert Oellers, 187–202. Rochester: Camden House, 2011.

Aeschylus. *The Oresteia*. Translated by Robert Fagles. New York: Penguin Group, 1984.

Alt, Peter-André. "Doppelte Paratexte: Zur Funktion impliziter und expliziter Bühnenanweisungen in Schillers und Kleists Dramen." *Kleist-Jahrbuch* 2019: 71–89.

Alt, Peter-André. *Schiller Leben – Werk – Zeit: Eine Biographie*. 2 vols. Munich: C. H. Beck, 2000 and 2004.

Alt, Peter-André, Marcel Lepper, and Stefanie Hundehege, eds. *Perspektiven der Schiller-Forschung*. 3 vols. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017–2021.

Beiser, Frederick. *Schiller as Philosopher: A Re-Examination*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Bergman, Eirikur. "The Eurabia Conspiracy Theory." In *Europe: Continent of Conspiracies. Conspiracy Theories in and about Europe*, edited by Andreas Önnerfors and André Krowel, 35–53. London, Routledge, 2021.

Beyer, Karen. *Schön wie ein Gott und männlich wie ein Held: Zur Rolle des weiblichen Geschlechtscharakters für die Konstituierung des männlichen Aufklärungshelden in den frühen Dramen Schillers*. Stuttgart: M&P, 1993.

Boucher, Maurice. *La Révolution de 1789 vue par les Écrivains Allemands*. Paris: Didier, 1954.

Bovenschen, Sylvia. *Die imaginierte Weiblichkeit: Exemplarische Untersuchungen zu kulturgeschichtlichen und literarischen Präsentationsformen des Weiblichen*. 3rd ed. Reprint of the first edition of 1979. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2016.

Burggraf, Julius. *Schillers Frauengestalten*. Stuttgart: Verlag von Carl Krabbe, 1897.

Burke, Edmund. A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Butler, Judith. *Bodies That Matter: On The Discursive Limits of "Sex."* New York: Routledge, 1993.

Butler, Judith. *Gender Trouble: Feminism And The Subversion of Identity*. New York: Routledge, 1990.

Butler, Judith. *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence*. London: Verso, 2004.

Cavarero, Adriana. *Orrorismo, ovvero della violenza sull'inerme*. Milan: Feltrinelli, 2007.

Chandler, David G. *The Campaigns of Napoleon*. New York: Macmillan, 1966.

Collin, Heinrich Joseph von. *Heinrich J. v. Collin's sämmtliche Werke*, edited by Matthäus von Collin. Vienna: Strauß, 1812–1814.

Craig, Charlotte. "Fiesco's Fable: A Portrait in Political Demagoguery." In *Modern Language Notes* 86, no. 3 (1971): 393–399.

De Man, Paul. "Kant and Schiller." In *Aesthetic Ideology*, edited by Andrzej Warminski, 129–162. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.

Diderot, Denis. *Jacques le Fataliste et son maître*, edited by Yvon Belaval. Paris: Gallimard, 1973.

Duden, Barbara. "Das schöne Eigentum: Zur Herausbildung des bürgerlichen Frauenbildes an der Wende vom 18. zum 19. Jahrhundert." *Kursbuch* 47 (1977): 125–140.

Dwyer, Philip G. "'It Still Makes Me Shudder': Memories of Massacres and Atrocities during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars." *War in History* 16, no. 4 (2009): 381–405.

Eder, Antonia. "*Amadea moderna*: Von Götterliebe und Frauenkörpern in Kleists 'Amphitryon' und Schiller's 'Die Jungfrau von Orleans." *Kleist-Jahrbuch* (2019): 149–174.

Esdaile, Charles. *Napoleon's Wars: An International History, 1803–1815*. London: Penguin, 2007.

Falduto, Antonino and Tim Mehigan, eds. *The Palgrave Handbook on the Philosophy of Friedrich Schiller*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023.

Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. *Grundlage des Naturrechts nach den Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag: 1960.

Fisher, Jaimey. "Familial Politics and Political Families: Consent, Critique, and the Fraternal Social Contract in Schiller's *Die Räuber*." *Goethe Yearbook* 13 (2005): 75–103.

Fowler, Frank. "Schiller's *Fiesko* Re-Examined." *Publications of the English Goethe Society* 40, no. 1 (1970): 1–29.

Frevert, Ute. *Frauen-Geschichte zwischen bürgerlicher Verbesserung und Neuer Weiblichkeit*. Suhrkamp Verlag: Frankfurt am Main, 1986.

Fuhrmann, Helmut. *Zur poetischen und philosophischen Anthropologie Schillers*. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2001.

Gerhard, Ute, ed. *Frauen in der Geschichte des Rechts: Von der Frühen Neuzeit bis zur Gegenwart*. Munich: C.H. Beck, 1997.

Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von. *Goethes Schriften*. Volume 3. Leipzig: Georg Joachim Göschen, 1787.

Gschwind, Christoph. "Liebesphilosophie und Dramenpoetik bei Schiller." In *Schillers Theaterpraxis*, edited by Peter-André Alt and Stefanie Hundehege, 231–259. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2019.

Guaraldo, Olivia. "La vulnerabilità come paradigma fondativo." In *Vulnerabilità: Analisi multidisciplinare di un concetto*, edited by Orsetta Giolo and Baldassare Pastore, 57–72. Rome: Carocci editore, 2018.

Guthrie, John. "Karl Moors Satanische Rebellion." In *Schillers Theaterpraxis*, edited by Peter-André Alt and Stefanie Hundehege, 124–137. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2019.

Hammer, Stephanie Barbé. "Schiller, Time and Again." *The German Quarterly* 67, no. 2 (1994): 153–172.

Hart, Gail K. "*Anmut*'s Gender: The 'Marionettentheater' and Kleist's Revision of 'Anmut und Würde.'" *Women in German Yearbook: Feminist Studies in German Literature & Culture* 10 (1995): 83–95.

Hart, Gail K. *Friedrich Schiller: Crime, Aesthetics, and the Poetics of Punishment*. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2005.

Hart, Gail K. "Re-dressing History: Mother Nature, Mother Isabeau, the Virgin Mary, and Schiller's *Jungfrau*." *Women in German Yearbook* 14 (1999): 91–107.

Hausen, Karin. "Die Polarisierung der 'Geschlechtscharaktere' – Eine Spiegelung der Dissoziation von Erwerbs- und Familienleben." In *Sozialgeschichte der Familie in der Neuzeit Europas*, edited by Werner Conze, 363–393. Stuttgart: Klett, 1976.

High, Jeffrey L. "Edinburgh–Williamsburg–Ludwigsburg: From Teaching Jefferson and Schiller Scottish Enlightenment Happiness to the 'American War' and *Don Karlos*." In *Patentlösung oder Zankapfel? "German Studies" für den internationalen Bereich als Alternative zur Germanistik – Beispiele aus Amerika*, edited by Peter Pabisch, 281–313. Bern: Peter Lang, 2005.

High, Jeffrey L. "'Gehört allzuviel Güte, Leutseligkeit und grosse Freygebigkeit im engsten Verstande zur Tugend?': Socrates as Secular Jesus in Schiller's First Karlsschule Speech." In "Reading Schiller," edited by Laura Anna Macor. Special issue of *Philosophical Readings* 5 (2013): 7–49.

High, Jeffrey L. "Introduction: Why Is This Schiller [Still] in the United States?" In *Who Is This Schiller Now?: Essays on His Reception and Significance*, edited by Jeffrey L. High, Nicholas Martin, and Norbert Oellers, 1–22. Rochester: Camden House, 2011.

High, Jeffrey L. "Schiller, Freude, Kleist und Rache / On the German Freedom Ode." In *Heinrich von Kleist:* Style *and concept; Explorations in Literary Dissonance*, edited by Dieter Sevin and Christoph Zeller, 123–145. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2013.

High, Jeffrey L. "Schiller, 'merely political' Revolutions, the Personal Drama of Occupation, and Wars of Liberation." In *Schiller: National Poet—Poet of Nations*, edited by Nicholas Martin, 219–240. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006.

High, Jeffrey L. *Schillers Rebellionskonzept und die französische Revolution*. New York: Edward Mellon Press, 2004.

Hinderer, Walter. "Der Geschlechterdiskurs im 18. Jahrhundert und die Frauengestalten in Schillers Dramen." In *Friedrich Schiller und der Weg in die Moderne*, edited by Walter Hinderer, 261–286. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2006.

Hippel, Theodor Gottlieb von. *Über die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Weiber*. Berlin: Vossische Buchhandlung, 1792.

Holmgren, Janet Besserer. *The Women Writers In Schiller's Horen: Patrons, Petticoats, and the Promotion of Weimar Classicism*. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2007.

Hughes, Michael J. *Forging Napoleon's Grande Armée: Motivation, Military Culture, and Masculinity in the French Army, 1800–1808*. New York: New York University Press, 2012.

Kallin, Britta and Bridge Markland. "In and Out of the Box: An Interview with Performance Artist Bridge Markland." *Women in German Yearbook* 30 (2014): 74–88.

Kanavou, Nikoletta. *The Names of Homeric Heroes*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2015.

Kettner, Gustav. "Der Mohr in Schillers 'Fiesko.'" *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturgeschichte* 3 (1890): 556–573.

King, Helen. *The One-Sex Body on Trial: The Classical and Early Modern Evidence*. London: Routledge, 2013.

Kluge, Gerhard. “Zwischen Seelenmechanik und Gefühlspathos. Umrisse zum Verständnis der Gestalt Amalias in »Die Räuber« – Analyse der Szene I, 3.” *Jahrbuch der Deutschen Schillergesellschaft* 20 (1976): 184–207.

Kord, Susanne. “Weibermacht und Geschlechtslosigkeit: Dramenköniginnen bei Schiller und seinen ‘Epigoninnen.’” *Revista de Filología Alemana* 19 (2011): 115–136.

Koschorke, Albrecht. “Schillers *Jungfrau von Orleans* und die Geschlechterpolitik der Französischen Revolution.” In *Friedrich Schiller und der Weg in die Moderne*, edited by Walter Hinderer, 243–259. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2006.

Krimmer, Elisabeth. “Transcendental Soldiers: Warfare in Schiller’s *Wallenstein* and *Die Jungfrau von Orleans*.” *Eighteenth Century Fiction* 19, nos. 1 and 2 (2006): 99–121.

Lamport, Francis. “Virgins, Bastards, and Saviours of the Nation: Reflections on Schiller’s Historical Dramas.” In *Schiller: National Poet – Poet of Nations*, edited by Nicholas Martin, 159–177. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006.

Laqueur, Thomas. *Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to* Freud. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.

Lederer, Max, ed. *Heinrich Joseph von Collin und sein Kreis: Briefe und Aktenstücke*. Vienna: Universitäts Buchhandler, 1921.

Leggiere, Michael V. “Odd Man Out.” In *Napoleon and the Struggle for Germany: The Franco-Prussian War of 1813*. Vol. 1, 21–69. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Lerner, Gerda. “The Majority Finds Its Past.” In *The Majority Finds Its Past: Placing Women In History*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979.

Locke, John. *The Second Treatise on Civil Government*. Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1986.

Lokke, Kari. “Schiller’s *Maria Stuart*: The Historical Sublime and the Aesthetics of Gender.” *Monatshefte* 82, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 123–141.

Lorde, Audre. “Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power.” In *The Selected Works of Audre Lorde*, edited by Roxane Gay, 29–38. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2020.

Lubkoll, Christine. “Moralität und Modernität: Schillers Konzept der ‘schönen Seele’ im Lichte der literaturhistorischen Diskussion.” In *Friedrich Schiller und der Weg in die Moderne*, edited by Walter Hinderer. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2006.

Lukács, Georg. *Goethe und seine Zeit*. Bern: Francke, 1947.

Lukács, Georg. “Zur Ästhetik Schillers.” In *Georg Lukács Werke*. Vol. 10 of *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Ästhetik*, 11–96. Neuwied: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1969.

Luserke, Matthias. “Friedrich Schiller, *Maria Stuart*.” In *Friedrich Schiller: Werke und Briefe in zwölf Bänden*. Vol. 5, edited by Otto Dann et al., 536–597. Frankfurt a.M.: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1996.

Machiavelli, Niccolò. *Discourses on Livy*, translated by Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996.

Macor, Laura Anna. “Die Moralphilosophie des jungen Schiller. Ein ‘Kantianer ante litteram,’” in *Who Is This Schiller Now?*, edited by Jeffrey L. High, Nicholas Martin, and Norbert Oellers. Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2011.

Mann, Thomas. *Tonio Kröger*, edited by John Alexander Kelley. London: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., 1949.

Mann, Thomas. *Versuch über Schiller*. Berlin: S. Fischer Verlag, 1955.

Meloni, Giorgia. *Io sono Giorgia: Le mie radici, le mie idee*. Milan: Rizzoli, 2021.

Morrison, Toni. *Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.

Mozart, Wolfgang Amadé and Emanuel Schikaneder, *Die Zauberflöte. Eine Große Oper in Zwey Aufzügen*, Digitale Mozart-Edition. Salzburg: Internationale Stiftung Mozarteum, 2018. https://dme.mozarteum.at/DME/libretti-edition/wrkliste.php?sec=libedi&l=1.

Mücke, Dorothea E. von. “Classical Tragedy and Bildungsroman.” In *Virtue and the Veil of Illusion: Generic Innovation and the Pedagogical Project in Eighteenth-Century Literature*, 207–276. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991.

Müller-Seidel, Walter. *Friedrich Schiller und die Politik: Nicht das Große, nur das Menschliche geschehe*. München: C.H. Beck, 2009.

Müller-Seidel, Walter. “Verschwörungen und Rebellionen in Schillers Dramen.” In *Schiller und die höfische Welt*, edited by Achim Aurnhammer, Klaus Manger, and Friedrich Strack, 422–446. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1990.

Oellers, Norbert. “Friedrich Schiller. *Die Räuber: Ein Schauspiel*,” *Erstlinge*, edited by Günther Emig and Peter Staengle, 26–40. Heilbronn: Kleist-Archiv Sembdner, 2004.

Oellers, Norbert. *Friedrich Schiller: Zur Renaissance eines entrückten Klassikers*. Wiesbaden: Weimarer Verlagsgesellschaft in der Verlagshaus Römerweg GmbH, 2018.

Oellers, Norbert. *Schiller: Elend der Geschichte, Glanz der Kunst*. Stuttgart: Reclam, 2006.

Oellers, Norbert. *Schiller*. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1993.

Pahl, Katrin. *Sex Changes with Kleist*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2019.

Pichler, Caroline. *Prosaische Aufsätze*. Vol. 1. Leipzig: Anton Pichler, 1822.

Plato. *The Republic of Plato*, translated by Jowett, 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1881.

Popp, Hansjürgen. *Lektürehilfen: Friedrich Schiller. „Maria Stuart."* .Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1995.

Prandi, Julie D. *Spirited Women Heroes: Major Female Characters in the Dramas of Goethe, Schiller and* Kleist. Berne: Peter Lang Ltd., 1983.

Prandi, Julie D. "Woman Warrior as Hero: Schiller's *Jungfrau von Orleans* and Kleist's *Penthesilea*." *Monatshefte* 77 (1985): 403–414.

Pugh, David. *Dialectic of Love: Platonism in Schiller's Aesthetics*. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997.

Richel, Veronica C., ed. *The German Stage, 1767–1890: A Directory of Playwrights and Plays* New York: Greenwood, 1988.

Robertson, Ritchie. *The Enlightenment: The Pursuit of Happiness, 1680–1790*. New York: Harper, 2021.

Sautermeister, Gert. "*Maria Stuart*." In *Schillers Dramen – Neue Interpretationen*, edited by Walter Hinderer. 2nd ed, 174–216. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1983.

Schiller, Friedrich. *On the Aesthetic Education of Man In a Series of Letters: English and German Facing*, edited by Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby. 1967. Reprint. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.

Schiller, Friedrich. *Schillers Werke: Nationalausgabe*, edited by Julius Petersen, Gerhard Fricke, Julius Petersen, Hermann Schneider, Lieselotte Blumenthal, Benno von Wiese, Norbert Oellers, Siegfried Seidel, Horst Nahler, and Georg Kurscheidt. Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger 1943–.

Schings, Hans-Jürgen. "Schillers 'Räuber': Ein Experiment des Universalhasses." In *Friedrich Schiller: Kunst, Humanität und Politik in der späten Aufklärung. Ein Symposium*, edited by Wolfgang Wittkowski, 1–25. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1982.

Schlegel, Friedrich. "Schillers Musenalmanach auf 1796" in *Friedrich Schlegel 1794–1802: Seine prosaischen Jugendschriften*, edited by J. Minor. Vol. 2. Vienna: Verlag von Carl Konegen, 1882), 1–7.

Schweitzer, Christoph E. "Schiller's *Die Räuber*: Revenge, Sacrifice, and the Terrible Price of Absolute Freedom." *Goethe Yearbook* 15 (2008): 161–170.

Schwerte, Hans. “Schillers ‘Räuber.’” In *Interpretationen*, edited by Jost Schillemeit, 147–171. Vol. 2 of *Deutsche Dramen von Gryphius bis Brecht*. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1965.

Sharpe, Lesley. “Gender and Genre: Schiller’s Drama and Aesthetics.” In *From Goethe to Gide: Feminism, Aesthetics, and the German Literary Canon*, edited by Mary Orr and Lesley Sharpe, 34–48. Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2005.

Silz, Walter. “Antithesis in Schiller’s Poetry,” *Germanic Review* 34, no. 3 (1959): 165–184

Stein, Charlotte von. *Charlotte von Schiller und ihre Freunde*, edited by Carl Ludwig von Ulrichs. Vol. 1. Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta’scher Verlag, 1862.

Stephan, Inge. *Inszenierte Weiblichkeit: Codierung der Geschlechter in der Literatur des 18. Jahrhunderts*. Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2004.

Stephan, Inge. “Kunstepoche.” In *Deutsche Literaturgeschichte: Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*. 8th edition. Wolfgang Beutin, Matthias Beilein, Klaus Ehlert et al., 185–240. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2013.

Stephenson, Roger H. “The Aesthetic Theory of Weimar Classicism.” In *Studies in Weimar Classicism: Writing as Symbolic Form*, 89–154. Bern: Peter Lang, 2010.

Stern, Dagmar C. “Amalia: The Third Extraordinary Person in Schiller’s *Die Räuber*.” *Colloquia Germanica* 27, no. 4 (1994): 321–331.

Stewart, Rebecca. “Anti-Napoleonic Rage and the Hope for a Better Future.” In *Heinrich von Kleist: Literary and Philosophical Paradigms*, edited by Jeffrey L. High, Rebecca Stewart, and Elaine Chen, 163–191. Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2022.

Stewart, Rebecca. “Schiller’s Johanna and Collin’s Bianca as Women(’s) Liberators in Anti-Napoleonic Drama.” In *Inspiration Bonaparte?: German Culture and Napoleonic Occupation*, edited by Seán Allan and Jeffrey L. High., 56–76 Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2021.

Storz, Gerhard. *Der Dichter Friedrich Schiller*. Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1959.

Watanabe-O’Kelly, Helen. “Models for Men: Heroic Maidens from Schiller to Brecht.” In *Beauty or Beast? The Warrior Woman in the German Imagination from the Renaissance to the Present*, 45–182. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 1

Wertheim, Ursula. *Schillers “Fiesko” und “Don Carlos.” Zu Problemen des historischen Stoffes*. Berlin: Aufbau, 1967.

Wittkowski, Wolfgang. “Können Frauen regieren? Schillers *Maria Stuart*. Poesie, Geschichte und der Feminismus.” *Orbis Litterarum* 52 (1997): 387–409.

Wittkowski, Wolfgang. “Schiller: Idealistic Morality, Autonomous Art, and Political Ethics.” *The European Legacy: Toward New Paradigms* 2, no. 2 (1997): 315–319.

Zedler, Johann Heinrich. *Grosses vollständiges Universal-Lexicon aller Wissenschafften und Künste*. Halle und Leipzig: Johann Heinrich Zedler, 1731ff.