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THE HALLSTEIN DOCTRINE:  
ITS EFFECT AS A  
SANCTION

THESIS

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The Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.) used the Hallstein Doctrine from 1955-1970 to prevent the worldwide recognition of the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.). By denying the existence of a separate German state and thus the de facto division of Germany, the F.R.G. sought to perpetuate the idea of one German nation and to ease reunification. In addition, the F.R.G. claimed to be the sole, legitimate representative of German interests, and hoped to prevent the G.D.R. from acting as a separate Germany in world affairs.

As a sanction, the Doctrine effectively prevented the international recognition of the G.D.R. Also, the G.D.R.'s trade with Third World nations, from whom recognition was most likely, was severely limited. Unfortunately, the Doctrine also prevented the reunification of Germany.

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## CHAPTER 1

### THE DIVISION OF GERMANY

With the final capitulation of Hitler's armies in May 1945 the Second World War in Europe came to an end and a new chapter in the history of Germany began. In June the Allied Powers, deeming that "there was no central Government or authority in Germany capable of accepting responsibility for the maintenance of order, the administration of the country and compliance with the requirements of the victorious Powers" (Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany, 1945a, p. 7), established their authority and power to act as the government for Germany. In the Potsdam Agreements, the victorious Allied powers divided up the conquered Germany into Zones of Occupation and provided for supreme authority in each Zone to rest with the Commanders-in-Chief who were appointed by, and who received instructions from, their respective governments. In addition, the Allied Control Council, composed of the Commanders-in-Chief, would exercise joint control in matters affecting Germany as a whole (Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany, 1945b, p. 13).

From this beginning, each Allied Power considered the German question in terms of its own interests, i.e. power

politics, and acted accordingly to attain its desires. Each power went about securing the area which it controlled. In the east, the Soviet Union began to establish an "antifascist democratic system" and later began to totally Sovietize its Zone. In the West, the United States and Britain began to establish capitalist, republican democracies with sound economies; the French reluctantly joined them. Once these systems began to materialize and crystallize, reunification of the Zones into a united Germany became more difficult. The U.S.S.R. would agree to reunification only if the socialist achievements within its Zone were kept intact and the future of the Socialist Party guaranteed. The Western Powers resisted these terms and were not willing to give up the economic and military potential of their Zones, along with their new governmental systems (Kupper, 1982, ch. 9, p. 265).

Disagreements soon arose over the settlement of a peace treaty with Germany which, it was hoped, would guarantee peace and security in Europe. However, before a treaty could be signed, there needed to be a government, representing the people, to sign the treaty. Each side took a differing view of the formation of this government. The U.S. and Britain disliked the idea of a strong, central government which might become controlled by militant aggressors; the Western Powers had already begun to establish local and state governments in their Zones. They hoped that a German National Council,

composed of ministers from the states (Länder), would draft a federal constitution which would ensure democracy, human rights and individual freedoms to the German people. Also, this National Council, with Allied Control Council supervision, would be responsible for the functioning of central administrative agencies, specifically to ensure Germany's administration as a single economic unit. The draft constitution would then be submitted for ratification to the German people (U.S. Department of State, 1946). The Soviets, however, pushed for a central government that would ensure payments of reparations. This government would have to be closely monitored to ensure the complete demilitarization and disarmament of Germany. And, according to the Soviets, the Ruhr should be placed under Allied supervision (Molotov, 1949, p. 63).

Disagreements also arose over boundaries and the running of the economy. The West sought to re-establish a national German entity which could stand on its own feet economically, since the British and French could not afford to pump money into her, but, which would not present a threat to the peace and stability of Europe. Hopefully, democratic institutions would become a basic part of this new Germany. The U.S.S.R. sought most of all to prevent Germany from becoming a new threat to its security and, therefore, placed great emphasis on disarmament and demilitarization. Plus, the U.S.S.R. sought to gain redress for the grievances done to it by Nazi

Germany, even if this destroyed the German economy. These divergent interests and misunderstandings of intentions pushed the Allies farther apart and pushed Germany's reunification farther away.

By the end of 1947 in the Eastern Zone, a German People's Congress For the Unity of Germany and a Just Peace (Volkskongress), consisting of over 1600 members, had been elected by the populace from a Soviet approved slate of candidates representing a variety of groups and parties, including the Western Zones (Hanrieder, 1967, p. 19). In March 1948 the Volkskongress elected a German People's Council (Volksrat) consisting of 300 members (the Council would later elect, in secret, 100 members from the Western Zones), which would act as the debating and voting body when the Volkskongress was not in session. The Volkskongress would also elect a smaller Presidium of 29, plus three Chairmen, to coordinate and run the Volksrat (Unanimous resolution passed by the Second German People's Congress, 1948; The election of the People's Council and its Presidium, 1948).

The Volksrat in April 1948 called for a national petition and plebiscite on German unity, stating that "Germany is an indivisible democratic republic" (Letter from the Presidium of the People's Council to Marshal Sokolovsky, 1948). Over 90% of the 13,124,000 votes cast in favor of the petition came from the Eastern Zone, while the population and

Allied Authorities in the West treated the petition with skepticism (Report on the result of the People's Petition, 1948).

The lack of response to the unity petition, the June 1948 currency reform by the British and Americans in the Western Zones, along with the London Conference reorganization recommendations, decisively divided Germany and brought heated protests from the Soviets and the Volksrat. The East saw these reforms as an attempt to create a separate West German state which would be integrated into the Western bloc (Manifest of the German People's Council, 1948). In addition, the Soviets and their Eastern Bloc allies believed the West's actions were "designed to consummate the division and dismemberment of Germany . . . [and to] frustrate the conclusion of the peace treaty with Germany" (U.S.S.R., Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1948, p.32).

The Western Allies did intend to create a provisional West German state with a democratic, federal government and, to this end, the June 1948 Western Foreign Ministers Conference in London directed, on July 1, 1948, the Minister-Presidents of the Länders of the Western Zones to call a constituent assembly for the purpose of drafting a federal constitution (U.S. Department of State, 1950, p. 275). The Minister-Presidents were at first reluctant to further the East-West division, but agreed to the directive if it was clear that the new State would be provisional in nature. In

September 1948 West German political experts drafted a constitution, which they preferred to call the Basic Law. The Basic Law established a parliamentary government with a lower house (Bundestag) where members were elected by the populace and where the largest party chose a Chancellor and formed the government. An upper house (Bundesrat), composed of members from the Länder governments, also was formed. A sixty-five member Parliamentary Council, which had been elected by the Länder parliaments, then approved the Basic Law on May 8, 1949. The Western military governors granted their consent on May 12th, and in August 1949 the first elections were held with the Christian Democratic Union, headed by Konrad Adenauer, gaining a majority. Finally, on September 21st the Western Occupation Powers recognized the new Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.), whose powers were restricted by the Occupation Statute (Hanrieder, 1967, pp. 17-19; Munch, 1976, pp. 130-131; U.S. Department of State, 1950, p. 279).

In the meantime, the Soviets also moved quickly to establish a new German state from their Occupation Zone. In October 1948 the Volksrat called for a draft constitution for the German Democratic Republic. This constitution was subsequently ratified by the Volksrat on March 19, 1949 and on May 30 by the newly elected Third People's Congress (Volkskongress). The Third Volkskongress had been elected from a single list of candidates picked by the Soviet

occupation authorities; one voted for or against the candidates, with no other choice provided - obviously all the candidates were for the new constitution. From the new Volkskongress a new Volksrat was elected and scheduled to meet in October 1949. Although the constitution called for new general elections, these were postponed until 1950 so that the new State could quickly be established (to offset the new F.R.G.).

On October 7, 1949, the Volksrat proclaimed itself the Provisional People's Chamber of the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.). The People's Chamber was to be the nationally elected lower house with the strongest faction electing a Minister-President to head the government, and with each parliamentary group represented by a Minister or Under Secretary of State. The upper house, or Länder Chamber, would house the representatives of the various Länder governments (Landtage) in proportion to their size. Together both houses would elect the President of the Republic (Announcement of the impending establishment of the German Democratic Republic, 1949; Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1949; Hanrieder, 1967, p. 19). On October 8, 1949 the Soviet Government recognized the new German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) and granted it the administration of the new state, a job formerly carried out by the Soviet Military Administration. The new Soviet Control Commission would ensure the fulfillment of the Potsdam

Agreements (Munch, 1976, p. 325; Statement by General Chuikov, 1949).

The Western Powers quickly denounced the G.D.R. as an artificial creation with no legal foundation in the popular will. The West saw the G.D.R. as a Soviet servant, completely controlled by the Communist Party in Moscow, and therefore unable to speak for the German people in its Zone, much less for all of Germany. There would be no recognition for the G.D.R. from the West (Childs, 1983, pp.299-300; Department of State Bulletin, 1949a, p. 634). Konrad Adenauer, the Chancellor of the F.R.G., embodied his state's dogmatic and legalistic approach to the G.D.R. in his statement before the Bundestag on 21 October 1949:

. . . there is no free will of the German people in the Soviet Zone. What is happening there now has not the support of, and is therefore not recognized as legitimate by, the population. The Federal Republic, on the other hand, is supported by the recognition and the freely expressed will of about 23 million Germans who are entitled to vote. Thus the Federal Republic is - pending the achievement of German unity - the sole legitimate political organization of the German people . . . . The Federal Republic of Germany also feels a responsibility for the fate of the 18 million Germans who live in the Soviet Zone . . . . The

Federal Republic of Germany is alone entitled to speak for the German people (Aktenstucke zur Beurteilung des Grotewohlbriefes, 1951, p. 21).

This attitude would dominate F.R.G. policy towards the G.D.R. for 20 years.

In the Petersburg Protocol of 1949 the Western Allies agreed to promote German membership in international organizations. As a consequence, the F.R.G. became a member of the Council of Europe, the European Payments Union, the World Health Organization, the International Labor Organization, the Food & Agriculture Organization, UNESCO, GATT and the World Bank. The West hoped that membership in these organizations would be a symbol of the F.R.G.'s being readmitted to the society of nations as an equal member (Bundesanzeiger, 1949, p. 1; Department of State Bulletin, 1949b, p. 822; Hanrieder, 1967, p. 54; Munch, 1976, pp. 226-229).

At the September 1950 Western Foreign Ministers meeting in New York, the Western Allies called for an end to the war state in Germany and a revision of the Occupation Statute. The October meeting of the East Bloc Foreign Ministers in Prague also urged the signing of a peace treaty which the Ministers felt should begin in an all-German Constituent Council with the East and West equally represented. In November, President of the G.D.R. Republic, Otto Grotewohl, informed Chancellor Adenauer that peace treaty negotiations

based on the Prague declaration should begin. However, Adenauer and the Bundestag disagreed with Grotewohl, since they believed that representatives to an all German Council should be popularly elected (Huber, 1951, p. 633; Report on Germany, 1949, pp. 98-99, 103-105; Whetten, 1980, p. 10).

In January 1951 the East German-Polish Accord recognized the Soviet mandated Oder-Neisse Line as the official eastern boundary of any German state. This accord, which the F.R.G. deplored, further separated the former Allies. The Soviets and East Germans made mandatory the recognition of this border before Germany could be reunified. The West felt that the Soviets did not really want to bargain on reunification since the U.S.S.R. was setting unacceptable demands.

However, in March-June 1951 the Four Power Ministers met to try and solve their problems and gain a peace treaty. The meetings proved unsuccessful as the Soviets demanded a peaceful, demilitarized and disarmed Germany, as had been called for in the Potsdam Agreements of 1945. The West, though, had already begun to discuss rearming Western Germany and possibly admitting her to a western European military alliance (Communique issued by the North Atlantic Council on the conclusion of their Brussels Meeting, 1950; Statement issued by the Foreign Ministers of the three powers occupying western Germany after their Brussels discussions, 1950). On May 26, 1951 the F.R.G. along with five other Western states signed the European Defense Community (E.D.C.) treaties and

the Allied High Commission (the three Western Powers) revised the Occupation Statute, thereby rescinding most of the Statute's restrictions and giving the F.R.G. basic control of its foreign affairs (Official Gazette of the Allied High Commission for Germany, 1951, p. 792). The G.D.R. responded by closing the border and preventing travel between the two Germanies (Whetten, 1980, p. 11).

Throughout 1952 and 1953 the Soviets pushed for an all-German government, but with equal representation from both East and West. In addition, the Soviets wanted the representatives to be chosen by each of the two governments. The Soviets envisioned an All-German Commission which would work to resolve the technical details and would negotiate the final accords for establishing an all-German government; the commission would then dissolve. The West, however, rejected the commission idea since they saw in it a way for the Soviets to manipulate a large contingent of the German delegates. Instead, the West called for a United Nations Commission for Germany to inspect the conditions for, and supervise, elections for an all-German government. The Soviets rejected the idea (Department of State Bulletin, 1952, p. 551; Whetten, 1980, p. 12).

The basic problem for the Four Power Conferences was how to unify Germany in peace and freedom while also satisfying the respective security requirements of the Western Powers, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The January 1954 Berlin

Conference centered on the discussion of the German question in relation to the problem of European Security. The conferees concluded that the two problems were intertwined and that German reunification could only be achieved if substantial progress was made towards European security and disarmament. Soviet Minister Molotov emphasized that an all-German government must be one based on peace and demilitarization, thus precluding it from becoming a part of the European Defense Community which was essentially a military bloc of European states. United States Secretary of State Dulles felt that Molotov's assertion, that the forming of a European or North Atlantic military force might lead to the creation of other alliances in Europe and thus split Europe, was a "grotesque inversion of history" (Europa-Archiv, 1954, pp. 6525-6397; U.S. Department of State, 1954, p. 15).

British Foreign Secretary Eden put forth a memorandum which outlined steps for German reunification. These included: (1) free elections throughout Germany; (2) convocation of a National Assembly resulting from these elections; (3) the drafting of a Constitution and the preparation of Peace Treaty negotiations; (4) adoption of the Constitution and the formation of an all-German government responsible for negotiating the Peace Treaty; and (5) signature and entry into force of the Peace Treaty (Chronique de Politique Etrangere, 1954, p. 257; U.S.

Department of State, 1954, p. 120). Molotov, in turn, proposed the formation of an all-German government by the Parliaments of the G.D.R. and F.R.G. which would include participation by various democratic groups. This government would then work out a draft all-German electoral law for the holding of all-German elections which would be "really democratic in nature" (Chronique de Politique Etrangere, 1954, pp. 260-267; U.S. Department of State, 1954, p. 125).

With no solutions attained, the Western delegates, on February 19, 1954 believed, since their proposals were not acceptable to the Soviets, even as a basis for discussion, that in fact the Soviet government was "not now ready to permit free all-German elections or abandon its control over Eastern Germany" (U.S. Department of State, 1954, p. 181). Chancellor Adenauer responded to the failure of the Berlin Conference with a call for a collective security treaty. He stated that Germans would not accept the permanent partition of Germany. And, he felt that the flow of refugees from the G.D.R. showed that the G.D.R. regime could not legitimately participate in any all-German functions or capacities. Finally, he proposed that any pan-European system should be based on freedom and equality and that the German problem could not be isolated from other world events (Frankfurter Allegemeine Zeitung, 24 & 26 February 1954). Here began the F.R.G. attempts to pull the German problem into the forefront

of all its foreign affairs, and thus F.R.G.'s relationship with the rest of the world.

The Soviets first responded by granting the G.D.R. sovereignty and establishing full diplomatic relations between the two nations [the Soviet High Commission became the Soviet Embassy], while also granting the G.D.R. control over its foreign affairs (Statement by the Soviet government on the relations between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, 1954; The Times, 1954; U.S. Department of State, 1960, pp. 482-3). Next, the Soviets attempted to forestall the finalization of a West European defensive alliance. They proposed, on March 31, 1954, that the U.S.S.R. and all of Europe join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to insure its defensive character and to prevent Germany from joining any hostile military alliances. On July 24, the Soviets stated that the creation of the E.D.C. was a special danger since its plans led to the revival of German militarism which would again be a threat to the security of Europe. The U.S.S.R. called for a new Four Power Conference. The British, however, stipulated that a new conference would be held only if the U.S.S.R. agreed to sign the Austrian State Treaty and agreed to the British proposal at Berlin for free elections as the first step in German reunification (U.S. Department of State, 1954, pp. 3-9). The Soviets declined.

After the failure to gain the needed ratification of the E.D.C. proposals, the Foreign Ministers of the six nations involved in the E.D.C. proposals met in Paris in October 1954 and created the Western European Union (W.E.U.), which replaced the E.D.C. The Ministers also formally ended the occupation of the F.R.G. (thereby paving the way for its entry into NATO in 1955). More importantly for this study, the Ministers of the United States, Great Britain and France declared that they regarded the government of the F.R.G. as the only freely constituted German government, and therefore, the only one entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs (U.S. Department of State, 1960, p. 614-648).

The Soviets tried to block ratification of the Paris agreements by declaring at the December 2, 1954 Moscow Conference that the East Europeans would take steps to safeguard their security against a rearmed Germany and would take these measures if the Paris agreements were ratified. On January 15th the Soviets declared the Paris Agreements to be incompatible with the reunification of Germany and promised that, if the Agreements were withdrawn, free elections would be held in Germany in 1955 (Neues Deutschland, 1954; Soviet News, 1954). The British Foreign Secretary, in a speech to the House of Commons, expressed the West's doubts by suggesting that the U.S.S.R.'s proposals were too ambiguous to assume that the Soviets were ready to

hold elections (Hansard, 1955, col. 647). The G.D.R. put forth its own terms that would make reunification possible; these included the annulment of the Paris Agreements, the removal of militarism in the F.R.G., free elections for an all-German National Assembly, a joint request for troop withdrawals, a peace treaty, consultation between the Germanies on outstanding matters and the use of the Austrian State Treaty as an example for the solution of the German problem (Neues Deutschland, 1955). On May 9, 1955, however, the Paris Agreements were ratified, the F.R.G. achieved full sovereignty and was admitted to NATO. A few days later on May 14 a Conference of East European States met in Warsaw and signed the East European Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (W.T.O.) to remain in effect for 25 years or until a general European treaty came into force. Although the G.D.R. was a signatory to this treaty and a member of the W.T.O., the G.D.R. did not become a part of the Joint Command of the armed forces until 1958 (Noble, 1958, pp. 193-8).

Although the Four Power Foreign Ministers met again at Geneva in October 1955, they were again unable to solve their differences. The West still wanted immediate all-German elections for a national government, while the Soviets pushed for an all-German Council made up of representatives from the existing German Parliaments. The U.S.S.R. felt reunification needed to be carried out step by step to bring the G.D.R. and

F.R.G. closer together and to improve cooperation. Reunification could not be brought about in the same way as before the existence of the Paris Agreements, the Soviets felt, without first taking into consideration what had taken place in the G.D.R. and F.R.G. in the fields of social and state development. The West, on the other hand, believed reunification could only be achieved through free elections which would establish the interests of the German people. Moreover, the West felt that the Soviets had consistently repudiated free elections while now adding the stipulation of abolishing NATO and WEU (U.S. Department of State, 1955, pp. 87, 95-6).

Facing the solid facts of N.A.T.O. and a rearmed West Germany by 1955, Soviet General-Secretary Khrushchev became interested in stabilizing the political status quo in the divided Germany by establishing relations with the F.R.G. By being the only major state which had diplomatic relations with both Germanies, the U.S.S.R. felt it would be in the supreme position to coordinate reunification efforts. Bonn faced a difficult decision, since the establishment of relations with the Soviet Union would underline the division of Germany and would give some recognition to the G.D.R.; however, Bonn did not want to cut off an important channel for possible reunification and hoped that bilateral talks might quicken the process (Dean, 1974, p. 20; Hanrieder, 1967, p. 172).

In September 1955 Adenauer visited Moscow and against the advice of his ministers he agreed to exchange ambassadors with Moscow under certain conditions. First, the F.R.G. sought the release of 10,000 prisoners of war. Next, the West Germans insisted upon including a particular reservation in the diplomatic agreements - the F.R.G. did not intend to recognize by implication the existing territorial status in Europe (Speier, 1966, pp. 93-95). To stress this point, Adenauer read a statement at his September 14, 1955 press conference, ". . . the establishment of diplomatic relations between the government of the F.R.G. and the government of the U.S.S.R. represents no recognition of the present status of their respective territories. The final determination of the borders of Germany is reserved for the peace treaty" (quoted in Speier, 1966, p. 95). The next day the Soviet Foreign Ministry published its own declaration: "With reference to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the German Federal Government the government of the U.S.S.R. deems it necessary to declare that the question of the German borders has been solved by the Potsdam Agreement and that the German Federal Republic exercises jurisdiction on the territory on which it has sovereignty" [Note: not Federal Republic of Germany but German Federal Republic which is equal to the German Democratic Republic] (Cited by Grewe, 1960, p. 221). In effect, the U.S.S.R. had recognized the F.R.G. without

gaining either recognition or a settlement of the Oder-Neisse boundary for the G.D.R. in return.

Later in 1955 the G.D.R. received the second major blow to its hopes for recognition - the Hallstein Doctrine. After the exchange of Soviet-F.R.G. ambassadors, the Soviets had immediately concluded an agreement with the G.D.R. which granted the G.D.R. the power to conduct its own affairs with the F.R.G. This recognition of both Germanies chastened the F.R.G. and caused it to spurn future contacts with other Eastern Bloc nations. The F.R.G. would now act to prevent other noncommunist states from adopting a two Germanies policy (Dean, 1974, p. 21; Schuster, 1963, p. 675). On December 9, 1955 F.R.G. Foreign Minister Dr. Heinrich von Brentano proclaimed that any state which took up diplomatic relations with the G.D.R. would forfeit its relations with the F.R.G. (Bulletin des Press- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, 1955, p. 1993). Adenauer in an earlier address to the Bundestag had stated the policy even more clearly: "The assumption of or maintenance of diplomatic relations with the G.D.R. by third states would be regarded as an unfriendly act" (Stenographische Bericht, 1955, pp. 5647, 5671). Brentano's statement, given at a German ambassadors conference in Bonn which had been called to consider how to prevent other states from recognizing both German states, provided the basis of the Hallstein Doctrine. The Doctrine was named after State Secretary Walter Hallstein

who was outspoken in his call for the nonrecognition of the G.D.R. (Schuster, 1963, pp. 675-77; Speier, 1966, p. 96). The F.R.G. did not want to create the impression that East Germany had a representative and legitimate government, and it wanted to prevent the legitimization of the status quo in Central Europe. The F.R.G. wanted to keep the legal, political and historic image of a unified Germany (Dulles, 1970 p. 25; Hanrieder, 1967, p. 194; Schuster, 1963, pp. 677-679). The U.S.S.R. would of course be excepted from this Doctrine.

The Hallstein Doctrine would prove a valuable weapon, especially since it would be backed by the tremendous economic potential of the F.R.G. Bonn's policy, which proved moderately successful, attempted officially to ignore the G.D.R. as much as possible and to isolate it internationally through the Doctrine (Dean, 1974, p. 19). Robert Dean in his 1974 West German Trade with the East concisely places the Doctrine within F.R.G. foreign policy, "This was the logical corollary of Bonn's raison de etat, the fundamental political-legal thesis that the F.R.G., as the sole German state based on popular will and consent, represented the only legitimate embodiment of German sovereignty" (1974, p. 19). Von Brentano in 1956 clearly stated the reasoning and importance behind the Doctrine:

The recognition of the G.D.R. means recognition  
. . . of the division of Germany into 2 states.

Reunification would then no longer be the elimination of a transitional disturbance in the organism of our all-German state; rather it would be transformed into the infinitely more difficult task of unifying two different German states

. . . . The recognition of the G.D.R. by third states would have to be regarded by the Federal Government as agreement to the unlawful splitting off of a part of the territory under German sovereignty and as interference with domestic German affairs. Legally the unity of Germany as a state has not perished . . ." (Bulletin des Press- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, 1956, p. 1167).

Subsequently, the F.R.G. turned westward to strengthen its claims. Elinor Dulles (1970) believes the F.R.G. turned away from Eastern Europe due to internal conditions, mainly the more than ten million expellees from the East who had a "natural reluctance to accept the consequences of defeat in World War II" and who hoped to recapture the past and their homes. Perhaps the F.R.G. fell "prey to unrealistic plans and demagogic pressures" (Dulles, 1970, p. 7). So, the leaders of the leading party, the Christian Democratic Union, looked to the West. Many felt reunification could only be implemented by increasing the F.R.G.'s political leverage within the Western alliance so as to ensure the legal and

moral commitment of the West to unification. In the first 15 years after the war, the F.R.G. spent its time cooperating with, and adjusting to, the West. In addition, the F.R.G. felt that a united Western alliance with a politically and economically rehabilitated Federal Republic would eventually be able to force or pressure the U.S.S.R. to settle the German problem favorably for the F.R.G. (Dulles, 1970, p. 8; Hanrieder, 1967, p. 67; Korb, 1970, pp. 1050-1051).

Each Cold War opponent ultimately wanted a united Germany on its side, but, since each could prevent this from happening, they settled for at least a slice of Germany which could be strengthened and united with their bloc to provide extra security. The G.D.R. gave the Soviet Union stability, protection and control, while the F.R.G. gave the U.S. a forward base in the heart of Europe (Hanrieder, 1967, p. 68).

The division of Germany into two parts, each on separate paths of socio-political development and intertwined with two hostile alliance systems, has been a decisive influence in shaping each Germany's foreign policy. Each has sought justifications for its existence and attitudes. The F.R.G., upon entering the Western alliance system, immersed itself in the ideas of international nonrecognition of the G.D.R. and state unity with stress on the cohesion of the nation; the F.R.G. held tightly to these beliefs until a relaxation of the Doctrine in the late 1960s and its nullification in 1972. The G.D.R. was founded on the premise that a revolutionary

change of the German social system in the direction of communism should, and must at last, take place. Until 1951, the G.D.R. kept open the hope of restoration of the German nation with a large role for the Socialist Party, but the formation of the Western Alliance in 1953-54 made clear the existence of two, separate German states. From this point, the G.D.R. worked to achieve recognition of its independence (Scheuner, 1982, ch. 2, p. 41). However, the F.R.G.'s Hallstein Doctrine would be a major roadblock which the G.D.R. could not easily overcome.

## CHAPTER 2

### DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION AND ITS USE AS A SANCTION

In order to understand clearly the significance of the Hallstein Doctrine in international affairs and to show the significance of the Doctrine as a sanction, the concept of diplomatic recognition and its use as a sanction needs to be understood. According to Fiore's International Law Codified (1918), "recognition of a state is the solemn act necessary to establish diplomatic relations between states as well as the reciprocal enjoyment and exercise of international rights" (Fiore, 1918, p. 165). Jaffe (1933) demonstrates that in the arena of international relations membership in the family of nations is dependent on the will of those already admitted.

There are two distinct groups of scholars in the field of recognition policy who differ widely in their definition of the birth of a new nation. Disciples of the Natural Law theory believe that as soon as a new state is politically constituted it can request respect of its rights by other states. Positivists, on the other hand (the more numerous and accepted group), believe that a state exists before recognition, but that it has no international

personality and that only and exclusively through recognition can a state become an International Person and subject to International Law. Most importantly, there is no superior body to impose authority in recognition cases, so states are born from reciprocal recognition (Brownlie, 1973, p. 94; Jaffe, 1933, pp. 87-90). Lauterpacht (1948) too expresses the predominant view in international law, "recognition of states is not a matter governed by law, but a question of policy . . . . Recognition is the result of a decision taken not in the execution of duty, but in pursuance of the exigencies of national interest" (Lauterpacht, 1948, p. 1).

If a new state does not accede to international law or the wishes of those states already in existence, it is not recognized, thus making nonrecognition a type of sanction which is used to compel an international personality to perform its duty. Withholding recognition is an instrument of international policy used as a political weapon (Jaffe, 1933, pp. 111-112). According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles (Onions, 1968), sanction is "the specific penalty enacted in order to secure obedience to a law." A report by a group of members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 1938 defined sanction as "an action taken by members of the international community against an infringement, actual or threatened, of the law" (Report by a Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs [hereafter Royal Institute], 1938, p.

16). From this definition, the Royal Institute established that the purpose of a sanction is preventive, with "preventive" having two connotations: (1) an action taken to prevent the commission of an illegal act or (2) after an illegal act has been committed, action taken to prevent the transgressor from achieving his objective. A sanction need not be an action taken by the entire international community (Crawford, 1979, pp. 120-122; Royal Institute, 1938, pp. 13-15).

The refusal to recognize a state is an expression of distaste or disapproval or a notice that one state will not extend the normal courtesies to another, i.e., the normal willingness to promote and stimulate customary international, social and economic intercourse. Recognition is the method to put an end to this situation (Jaffe, 1933, p. 122). Non-recognition is also a means to express disapproval of the result of what is considered to be an illegal proceeding. So, according to the Royal Institute of International Affairs (1938), an old state may refuse to recognize a new state which it considers to have been irregularly erected as a member of the international community, or to recognize a new government set up by revolutionary methods in an old state, or to recognize that, as a result of a wrongful war or some other improper action, the territorial limits of a state have been extended or diminished (Royal Institute, 1938, p. 21).

What then are the requirements for statehood, and thus recognition? Traditionally, the criteria for statehood were many and included: a defined territory, permanent population, effective government, a capacity to enter into negotiations with other states, sovereignty, and independence. Independence meant a state had a separate existence within reasonably coherent frontiers and there was an absence of subjection to authority from another state or states. Other classical criteria for statehood were: permanence of the state; the willingness and ability to obey international law; a certain degree of civilization; recognition, and a legal order (Crawford, 1979, p. 122).

Lauterpacht in 1948 examined the various tests required for the recognition of governments and found many of them to be lacking. To him, effectiveness of government was the key; legitimacy as a test was too rigid and ambiguous, for how could one effectively and impartially judge legitimacy? As a corollary of legitimacy, he dismissed the test of the method of revolutionary change, since this too depended on unclear and ethnocentric arguments. Finally, he believed that the test of the unwillingness to fulfill international obligations by a new state often led to the imposition of promises and concessions in return for recognition (Lauterpacht, 1948, pp. 101-112).

Therefore, Lauterpacht whittled these recognition criteria down to three which he believed were clear,

reasonable, definite and exhaustive. The first of these is an independent government, free of any other state, including its parent. Second, there must be effective authority, or a degree of internal stability seen in the habitual obedience of most of the population. And, finally, there must be a defined territory (Lauterpacht, 1948, pp. 26-30). According to this formula, recognition became the legal duty of a state once the state being recognized met the required conditions. Lauterpacht also found an unsatisfactory nature to the circumstances surrounding the extension of recognition to new states; individual states determined admission to the international society and this forced the recognizing states to combine two often incongruous tasks - the duty of recognition, and the achievement of specific national advantages, both of which were likely to blur their judicial detachment (Lauterpacht, 1948, pp. 32-37).

In 1963 the United States Department of State expressed its own traditional criteria for the granting of recognition. These three criteria, which developed along with American foreign policy, included some of the requirements of the traditional approach. The first requirement centered on whether the government is in de facto control of its territory and in possession of the machinery of state. Secondly, the government must have the consent of the people, without substantial resistance to its administration. And, finally, the government must indicate a willingness to comply

with its obligations under treaties and international law (Whiteman, 1963, pp. 72-3). However, Thomas Galloway in his Recognizing Foreign Governments: The Practice of the United States (1978) reveals that American recognition policy is constantly changing with the times and administrations, so that currently no exact criteria for statehood are employed for determining recognition.

Earlier, Lauterpacht, in his study of American recognition policy, found that the predominant characteristic for the first 130 years, much like that of Great Britain, was the "effectiveness of the government evidenced by an adequate expression of popular consent . . . the factual existence of a government, based on the consent of the population, irrespective of any legitimacy of origin" (Lauterpacht, 1948, p. 124; U.S. Department of State, 1902, p. 410). During his presidency, Woodrow Wilson changed American recognition policy. Recognition would be decided based on whether a new government was moral, according to American standards. Wilson sought to create a rational-moral order based on concepts of law and justice. Efforts were made to judge the motives and objectives of those who desired change. The consent of the people was the overriding concern and America often required, as a means of testing this consent, regular elections in accordance with a national constitution.<sup>1</sup> In 1930 the U.S. made a major step in abandoning the need for legitimization by constitutional methods when Secretary of

State Stimson recognized new governments in Argentina, Peru and Bolivia based on satisfactory evidence that the governments were in de facto control of their countries and there was no active resistance to their rule. Thus the U.S. abandoned legitimation and turned to the principle of effectiveness (Lauterpacht, 1948, p. 132). However, during World War II, the requirement of freely expressed consent by the people to a free form of government again became an American test of recognition. The three requirements mentioned above represent the conditions most evident throughout American history.

Therefore, it is apparent from this brief description that there are a variety of conditions used to determine the eligibility of a state for recognition. Each state determines its own requirements and its policy of recognition. Once enacted, recognition has legal consequences.

Now that recognition has been defined and the requirements for statehood, and thus recognition, examined, what does non-recognition mean to a state? Recognition is decisive for the creation of a state's international personality and the rights normally associated with this personality. Lauterpacht states, "a state may exist as a physical fact; but it is a physical fact which is of no relevance for the commencement of particular international rights and duties, until by recognition - and by nothing else

- it has been lifted into the sphere of law, until by recognition it has become a juridical fact" (Lauterpacht, 1948, p. 75).

A state deprived of recognition is deprived of the usual international prerogatives such as protection against foreign assistance to rebellious groups. The acts of its legislative, administrative and judicial organs are treated as null and void; it is often refused jurisdictional immunities and cannot appear as a plaintiff in foreign courts (Lauterpacht, 1948, p. 90). The state also does not have a position before international tribunals. Treaties, which regulate relations between states, remain in force but are inoperative, thus depriving the state of international intercourse. A state is denied access to, and the right to dispose of, property situated abroad. The state is denied protection in civil war; its right to declare war and to conclude peace is questioned. Often, diplomatic protection is denied its agents abroad (Lauterpacht, 1948, pp. 142-144).

Recognition is really a formal gesture, but a gesture whose absence can hamper a state. Citizens of a non-recognized state are denied certain facilities in their international intercourse such as a national flag, passports, consuls and other diplomatic representatives to smooth their way and protect them. An unrecognized state also faces the uncertain status of its currency and possible trouble in raising loans. New enterprises might then be discouraged by

such uncertainties (Royal Institute, 1938, p.22). According to some scholars, the importance of recognition is mostly traditional and lies in the sense of legitimacy which recognition confers. And, since states which grant or receive recognition perceive it as important, they have made it a precondition for many other actions that do have inherent significance, such as the continuance of aid or the resumption of diplomatic relations (Galloway, 1978, p. 11). The principle of non-recognition implies a measure of sanction for, and repression of, breaches of international law.

## CHAPTER 3

### ONE GERMANY OR TWO?

Did the German state still exist after World War II? This was the legal question which vexed many scholars and which would provide a legal basis for the establishment of the F.R.G. as the only state qualified to speak for the German people. Many scholars tried to say that the German state (Reich) still existed after World War II, and thus the F.R.G. had assumed responsibility as the successor of the Reich. However, this assumption was mostly politically motivated by the desire to prove that the G.D.R. was an international outlaw, and also to help maintain conditions which would make the reunification of Germany possible (Schweigler, 1980, ch. 3, p. 101). Here is a brief re-examination of the legal principles of the creation of the two German states.

With the collapse of German resistance by June 5, 1945, there was no longer an effective recognized government of Germany ( U.S. Department of State, 1986, p. 33). Therefore, the Allied Powers assumed "supreme authority with respect to Germany" in accordance with the previously agreed upon decision to split Germany into Four Zones of Occupation

(United Nations Treaty Series [UNTS], 1956, pp. 280, 298; British and Foreign State Papers [BFSP], 1953, pp. 803, 852). Since the Berlin Declaration did not expressly include the idea of annexation of Germany by the Powers, which usually would then have meant the extinction of Germany, the Allied Control Council gained recognition as the "government of Germany." This is particularly apparent in the Treaty with Spain which recited that "the powers and authority of the Government of the German Reich had been assumed by a Representation of the Allied Governments" and which repeatedly referred to the Allied Powers as acting "in the name of the Government of Germany" (BFSP, 1955, p. 1058). So Germany continued to exist as a state and the German nationality as a nationality.

In reality, the government was given over to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Four Powers, jointly for Germany as a whole and separately in their own zones (Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany, 1945a, p. 7). Each Commander acted officially as an agent of the Four Powers, but he received instructions from his own government. In so far as he exercised governmental authority, it was limited to his own zone. The Commanders were expected to act with regard to the necessities of occupation and with the interests of the German nation in mind. These powers were held to be fiduciary in nature, as cited by the Supreme Restitution Court for the U.S. Zone in 1951, "the Allied

Control Council and the Military Governments of the four zones are not organs solely of the occupying nations, but they are fiduciary holders of the German sovereign power for the people" (Court of Restitution Appeals Reports, 1951, p. 463 as cited in Mann, 1967, p. 765). Therefore, the legislation enacted by the Commanders was in fact German legislation. And, since the Commanders did not hold sovereignty over their zone and since their power was delegated to them by the Four Powers, the Commanders could not transfer their responsibilities or their rights as a whole without Four Power consent. Therefore, according to Mann (1967), Germany was a state and it remained a single, unitary state, though it was governed by five different governmental authorities.

With the breakdown of the Allied Control Commission and the walkout of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief on March 20, 1948 (U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1948, p. 19), the Western Allies created a subordinate government - the Federal Republic of Germany on September 21, 1949. Crawford (1979) feels that this was not illegal at the time, since each Occupying Power was "de jure entitled to exercise governing authority in respect of [its] zone of occupation in Germany and might therefore establish subordinate organizations to act in its behalf" (Hansard, 1966, col. 204 as cited in Crawford, 1979, p. 275). The Western Powers also put the F.R.G. under an Occupation Statute on September 21. This

Statute provided for a measure of control by an Allied High Commission consisting of High Commissioners appointed by the three Western Allies (U.S. Department of State, 1950, p. 275).

The Western Powers had already come to view the F.R.G. as having special status; the Declaration of December 19, 1950 stated that "the Three Governments consider that the Government of the Federal Republic is the only German Government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for the German people in international affairs" (UNTS, 1954, p. 308). The Three Powers extended the F.R.G.'s authority with the Tripartite Convention on Relations, May 26, 1952 and the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the F.R.G., October 23, 1954, whose statutes became effective on May 5, 1955 with establishment of NATO. These Conventions terminated the Occupation regime and stated that "the Federal Republic would have full authority of a sovereign state over its internal and external affairs". However, this power was limited, "In view of the international situation, which has so far prevented the unification of Germany and the conclusion of a peace settlement, the Three Powers retain the rights and responsibilities heretofore exercised or held by them, relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, including the reunification of Germany and a peace settlement" (UNTS, 1959, pp. 328-330).

The three Allies had no power to relinquish quadripartite control without Soviet approval, as stated earlier. However, Soviet recognition of the F.R.G. on September 13, 1955 provided the consent needed and thus ratified and validated the action taken to create the F.R.G. in 1949 (Mann, 1967, p. 769). From this action, a majority of nations then recognized the Federal Republic.

On October 7, 1949 the Soviet Union created a local government within its Eastern Zone and immediately accorded this government, the G.D.R., the function of administration which had belonged to the Soviet Military Administration. A new Soviet Control Commission was established to provide supervision for the new government (Statement by General Chuikov, 1949). On March 25, 1954 the U.S.S.R. granted the same diplomatic relations to the G.D.R. which the U.S.S.R. held with other nations, except in some areas of security (Statement by the Soviet government on the relations between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, 1954). The September 20, 1955 treaty between the U.S.S.R. and the G.D.R. accorded the G.D.R. general freedom of action in regard to its domestic and foreign policy, with the only reservations concerning the "obligations of the Soviet Union and the G.D.R. under existing international agreements relating to Germany as a whole" (UNTS, 1956, p. 201). The G.D.R. subsequently received recognition from the Socialist Bloc.

The Western Powers, however, refused recognition. And, in the Conventions mentioned above, the Western Powers had in fact made a contractual agreement whereby they agreed that only the F.R.G. was the legitimately constituted government of Germany and therefore entitled to speak for it in international affairs (Munch, 1976, pp. 246-247). In addition, the Western Powers actually agreed that, with the F.R.G., they would "co-operate to achieve, by peaceful means, their common aim of a reunified Germany" (UNTS, 1959, p. 334), an aim which would preclude the recognition of the G.D.R. According to Mann, the refusal to recognize the G.D.R. was legally based, since the creation of the G.D.R. and the transfer to it of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief's rights and powers was a breach of the U.S.S.R.'s obligations and was invalid under the arrangements of 1945, particularly since this was not agreed to by the other Powers.

In addition, the West often used the argument that in fact the G.D.R. did not really have any independence of the U.S.S.R. and therefore lacked one of the prerequisites required for recognition. Other prerequisites which the F.R.G. had cited as lacking in the G.D.R. included: (1) that there was no autochthonous people in the East since the vast majority considered themselves German, not East German; (2) that the existence of a State in the East would constitute an unlawful intervention in the affairs of the F.R.G. as representing Germany; and (3) that there could be

no State so long as the Eastern Zone had no opportunity to exercise its inherent and fundamental right of self-determination. The West therefore believed that, since the G.D.R. was not recognized, it did not exist as a State which possessed national sovereignty. The West even went so far as to state that they "do not recognize the East German regime nor the existence of a State in the Soviet Zone" (Mann, 1967, p. 771).

James Crawford (1979) sought to dispel some of the reasons used by the West, and particularly the F.R.G., for not recognizing the G.D.R. First, general non-recognition, as put forth in the International Registration of the Trade Mark Case (Lauterpacht, 1960, p. 82), was not a course supportable as the grounds for denying statehood. Secondly, he believed one cannot argue that the quadripartite agreements made independence legally impossible (Lauterpacht, 1969, p. 853), since secession from international authority was possible like secession from national authority. Third, the argument that the G.D.R. lacked effective independence of the U.S.S.R. was made hard to sustain by the continuance of the G.D.R. over a long period of time and by the lack of military opposition to secession. Lastly, the argument was made by the West that the creation of the G.D.R. was a violation of the principle of self-determination as applied to Germany as a whole by the Potsdam Agreement. However, self-determination in the Agreement was heavily qualified by

reliance on strategic considerations and coexisted with extensive quadripartite powers, even extending to the contemplated dismemberment of Germany (Crawford, 1979, pp. 276-277).

What then was the F.R.G.'s claim to be the continuation of Germany past? Besides the fact that the F.R.G. was recognized by the Western Powers and later the Soviet Union and in various treaties and memoranda of the Western Powers, why was the F.R.G. recognized as the only legitimate successor of the Reich and the only state to represent the German people? Mann (1967) provided three concepts which have foundation in international law. The first of these lay in the fact that there was only one German nationality. All Germans, including those living outside of the F.R.G., were recognized as Germans by the F.R.G., even those refugees from the Soviet Zone who had the right to take up residence in the F.R.G. (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz, 1953, p. 266). The F.R.G. had always acknowledged its duty to accept and care for Germans abroad. And, most importantly, there was never a suggestion that a German lost his German nationality as a result of the creation of the Federal Republic. If there had not been a succession of Germany (i.e. an end to Germany in 1949 and the creation of two new German states), the loss of nationality would have occurred in some instances.

The second bit of evidence of the F.R.G.'s continuation of Germany was seen in the effect of treaties concluded with

Germany before World War II. The question concerned whether a treaty to which Germany was a party before the war continued to be, or if revived, was binding on the F.R.G. The first instance when this question was raised concerned the 1905 Hague Convention on Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeal in Zurich on December 1, 1945, quickly declared that Germany was in existence and thus the Convention was in force (Lauterpacht, 1951, p. 187). The next point fell to the Swiss Federal Tribunal in 1952 which decided that the F.R.G. was not intended to be "a new West German State but rather to reorganize the existing German State to the extent permitted by the occupying States . . . . Accordingly . . . earlier treaties concluded with Germany continue to be in force in relation to the Federal Republic" (Lauterpacht, 1957, p. 31). The District Court at Rotterdam also reached the same conclusion in 1952 when it stated that the F.R.G. "was not a new State; it was the continuation of the German State which existed previously and had never ceased to exist" (Lauterpacht, 1957, p. 29; Neue Justiz, 1952, No. 327). According to Mann's research, at no time had the F.R.G. denied being bound by a pre-World War II treaty.

Third, the F.R.G.'s acceptance of the entire German foreign debt also provided evidence of its claim to be the continuance of the previous German state. Shortly after the three Western Powers granted their recognition of Germany at the New York Conference in September 1950, they presented a

request to Chancellor Adenauer that the F.R.G. acknowledge and assume pre-war German debts (Adenauer, 1965, p. 285). This was based on the traditional international law principle relating to the assumption of debt, which showed the maintenance of continuity between political regimes (Adenauer, 1965, p. 287). Adenauer replied on March 6, 1951 that the F.R.G. confirmed its liability for the pre-war external debt of the German Reich and the details of this agreement were included in the Agreement on German External Debts, February 27, 1953.

If then Germany still existed as a state, and if the F.R.G. was seen to represent it, and if the G.D.R. was not recognized as a state, then the territory controlled by the G.D.R. was still a part of Germany. Therefore, according to this theory, the purpose and meaning of the non-recognition of the G.D.R. was to show that Germany was still a single, undivided, unitary State, and it had not suffered dismemberment or loss of territory (Mann, 1967, p. 787). The G.D.R. held a different view of this scenario and had never claimed an identification with pre-World War II Germany. Instead, the East had developed the dual-State theory which resided on the premise that Germany ceased to exist in 1945 and that two new German states were born and currently existed (Crawford, 1979, p. 280; Neue Justiz, 1951, pp. 223, 468).

For the F.R.G. the existence of two Germanies and even the tacit recognition of the G.D.R. would be a blow to its very foundation (Dean, 1974, p. 19). Therefore, the F.R.G. immediately sought to discourage other states from maintaining official contacts with the G.D.R. and also to isolate the East German state and label it as a diplomatic and political fiction maintained by the socialist bloc. The form of discouragement and isolation used became known as the Hallstein Doctrine.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE HALLSTEIN DOCTRINE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC'S FOREIGN POLICY

Under Chancellor Adenauer, the Federal Republic sought to gain strength in its position vis-a-vis the Democratic Republic. The F.R.G. foreign policy, based on the Hallstein Doctrine, gave highest priority to weakening the international position of the G.D.R. Adenauer based his policy on two assumptions. First, he believed that the reunification of Germany was the responsibility of the Big Four Powers who had sought its break-up originally. And, secondly, he believed Germany must be rehabilitated politically and economically, and integrated into the West, so that it could challenge Soviet control over Eastern Germany from a position of strength. Adenauer refused to give up German territorial claims or the belief that the F.R.G. was the sole representative of German interests. For the first 15 years of its existence, the F.R.G. was tied so heavily to the West that it had no links to the East. Through the Hallstein Doctrine, Adenauer and the F.R.G. sought to isolate the G.D.R., show the G.D.R.'s liabilities to the U.S.S.R. and expose the absurdity of a divided Germany

(Adenauer, 1965; Korbel, 1970a, pp. 1050-1051; Whetten, 1980, p. 16).

To many, including Korbel (1970a), Adenauer's approach was a failure since it prevented any attempt at German reunification. Every major step the F.R.G. took led only to a deeper estrangement between the two Germanies. The Hallstein Doctrine, while very effective, seriously hampered the F.R.G.'s diplomatic maneuverability in Eastern Europe. Melvin Croan (1968) stated that "the F.R.G.'s political rationale was based not only on the claim to stand for Germany as a whole, but also the anticipation of national reunification along western democratic, constitutional lines" (p. 79). The F.R.G. held steadfastly to the idea that reunification would occur only according to its own guidelines and beliefs; the F.R.G. felt that the G.D.R. would be dismantled totally and all of Germany reunited under the Basic Law. To this end, the West repeatedly refused Eastern ideas on reunification. The East Germans and Soviets put forth such steps as: direct contacts between the two German governments, establishment of an All-German Council, preparation of a new constitution, and free elections. However, the West suspected the elections would be sabotaged and that the other ideas might imply recognition for the G.D.R. regime (Korbel, 1970a, p. 1051).

Since the Hallstein Doctrine existed only as a pronouncement of the Foreign Office and not as a

parliamentary resolution, there was a tendency to overlook its significance, especially in the years from 1955-1966. The Doctrine not only effectively limited the recognition of the G.D.R., it also clarified the German question, especially for the many new nations. Without the Doctrine, many of the new nations would have failed to appreciate this special problem. From 1957 onwards, the F.R.G. held many talks behind the scenes with representatives of nations in Africa and Asia; the F.R.G. repeated its stand that there could not be two German ambassadors in one capital.

If diplomatic recognition is used as a criteria of success, the F.R.G. has been remarkably successful in the non-aligned world in putting forth its claim to represent Germany. By 1956, the F.R.G. had established 47 embassies and 21 legations around the world, and by 1965, the F.R.G. had diplomatic relations with 97 sovereign states (Vertretungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Ausland, 1956; News from the German Embassy, 1965).

The first nation against which the F.R.G. invoked the Hallstein Doctrine was Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was the first socialist nation to which the F.R.G. sent an ambassador, and the only one with which it broke relations. On October 15, 1957, Tito had recognized the G.D.R. in the Belgrade Declaration in which Yugoslavia affirmed its belief in the permanence of the Oder-Neisse line and called for direct German negotiations. This statement was made in a joint

appearance with Polish Party leader Gomulka in Belgrade (Noble, 1960, pp. 516-520). Tito's policy surprised the world and especially the F.R.G. The F.R.G. saw this as an unfriendly act and a threat to Germany's vital interests, since the F.R.G. feared that if it acquiesced to Yugoslavia, other neutrals might try to develop a two Germanies policy. Bonn ended diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, which apparently surprised Tito (Die Welt, 1964); it would take more than 10 years for relations to be restored between the two nations. The F.R.G. would sever relations with Castro's Cuba in 1963 when the new socialist state recognized the G.D.R.

There were many in Bonn who saw the Doctrine as a hindrance to F.R.G. relations with nations of the world, especially Eastern Europe with whom the F.R.G. wanted to expand trade and relations, thus further isolating the G.D.R. In the 1961 national election, the minority swing party, the Free Democratic Party (F.D.P.), forced Adenauer to change his Foreign Minister from von Brentano to Gerhard Schroeder in hopes of obtaining better relations with Eastern Europe. The Doctrine was to be kept intact so as not to enhance the G.D.R.'s international standing. With the retirement of Adenauer in 1963, Ludwig Erhard became the new Chancellor of the F.R.G. (October 1963-December 1966). He proved more flexible than Adenauer in his Eastern policy and some progress was made, although each step still remained within

the Hallstein Doctrine. The F.R.G. offered economic incentives to Eastern Europe to gain trade missions without consular rights. So, by 1964 the F.R.G. had trade missions with Poland (March 1963), Rumania (October 1963), Hungary (November 1963) and Bulgaria (March 1964). The F.D.P. repeatedly pushed for expansion of Eastern relations, and the party's chairman, Erich Mende, even stated that the Doctrine was obsolete (Die Welt, 1966).

The U.S.S.R.'s allies who had already recognized the G.D.R. remained a key question for the Doctrine and the F.R.G. Should the F.R.G. refuse to exchange ambassadors with any of these nations in order to prevent the dual representation of Germany, or should the F.R.G. seek to establish embassies if an opportunity arose in order not to leave the field completely to the G.D.R.? Wilhelm Grewe, a key figure in the Foreign Office who had helped to create the Doctrine, strongly argued against establishing any diplomatic relations with socialist states that had relations with the G.D.R. He argued that if the F.R.G. were to establish relations with these nations, over 50 neutral and non-aligned nations would recognize the G.D.R., since the F.R.G. would have no strong argument to deter Cairo, New Delhi or Jakarta. He felt that the attempt to successfully apply a double standard of recognition based on the distinction between communist states that have recognized the G.D.R. for years

and other, neutral or non-aligned states that have not, would be simply wishful thinking (Grewe, 1960, p. 151).

Others in the government, however, wished to gain more ground after the opening of the trade missions. The idea of Geburtsfehlertheorie, or the birth defect theory, was now developed for this reason. This theory postulated that the East European states had established diplomatic relations with the G.D.R. without having any choice and before the Hallstein Doctrine was formed. Since the F.R.G. could not expect them to sever ties now, they could not be judged ex post facto and therefore, diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe were permissible. This theory would also keep the Doctrine intact for third states (Suddeutsche Zeitung, 1967). Robert Dean (1974) believed that then the emphasis shifted from the recognition of the G.D.R. to the F.R.G.'s sole right to represent Germany in the international arena (Alleinvertretungsrecht) (Dean, 1974, pp. 29-30). Many in the government feared that the Geburtsfehlertheorie and Alleinvertretungsrecht might compromise the Doctrine and so in the last years of the Erhard government little that was constructive was done with the two theories.

In the meantime, the Doctrine was applied a little less drastically to several other nations. In response to the establishment of a G.D.R. consulate-general in Colombo, economic aid to Ceylon was terminated in the spring of 1964. Military aid to Tanzania was stopped in February 1965 with

the opening of an East German consulate-general in Dar-es-Salaam (Speier, 1966, p. 98). However, there were inconsistencies in the application of the Doctrine. For example, in the case of Ceylon, 13 million Deutsche Marks (DM) worth of aid was suspended because of the establishment of a consulate-general of the G.D.R., but economic aid equalling DM350 million continued to Syria in spite of the establishment of a G.D.R. consulate-general. Tanzania's case is also illuminating. Formed by a union of Zanzibar and Tanganyika in February of 1965, Tanzania closed the G.D.R. embassy on the island of Zanzibar and opened instead a consulate-general in Dar-es-Salaam on the mainland. This did not involve recognition of the G.D.R. and in fact downgraded the G.D.R.'s representation. The F.R.G., which had full diplomatic relations with Tanganyika, however, still took affront, and when the Tanzanian President Nyerere disregarded Bonn's threat, the F.R.G. cut off military aid. Nyerere then announced that Tanzania would accept no more economic aid from the F.R.G. The F.R.G. did not cut off diplomatic relations with Tanzania (Hacker, 1965; Holzer, 1965; Ludwig, 1965, p. 84).

The F.R.G.'s relations with Arab states in 1965 revealed more problems with the Doctrine. While trying to persuade Egypt's President Nasser to cancel the visit of the G.D.R.'s Walter Ulbricht to Cairo, the F.R.G. discontinued military aid to Israel. Nasser, however, proceeded to embarrass the

F.R.G. by affirming the invitation. Ulbricht was treated like a head of state, and although Nasser maintained he had not recognized Ulbricht's regime, he had in fact recognized it de facto.

Even worse for the F.R.G., Ulbricht was expected to visit Indonesia and Latin America before the end of the year. The German cabinet was split on what action to take. Gerhard Schroeder, the Foreign Minister, four C.D.U. ministers including the Defense Minister and four or five F.D.P. cabinet members urged caution. They believed that to apply the Doctrine against Egypt, thus breaking diplomatic relations with Cairo, would forfeit the F.R.G.'s sole right of representation of Germany in the Middle East, since Nassar would surely establish ties with the G.D.R., and at least five other Arab states would follow suit. Others such as Chancellor Erhard, Franz Josef Strauss and four members of the Bavarian Christian Social Union, plus two other C.D.U. ministers, hoped for drastic action. This group received the support of Adenauer and Hallstein who urged application. The C.D.U.'s partner in government, the F.D.P., had always been critical of the Doctrine and they now believed that the Doctrine was immobilizing German foreign policy; they believed this would lead to the gradual retreat of the F.R.G. from Africa and Asia. Allied ambassadors, all of whom feared an F.R.G. break with Egypt would upset the delicate balance-

of-power in the Middle East, especially U.S. Ambassador McGhee, urged extreme caution (New York Times, 1965).

On March 7, 1965, Erhard, reversing his previous stance, compromised on a decision. He avoided breaking diplomatic relations and opted to refuse to renew aid and credit guarantees to Egypt in the future. In addition, the F.R.G. would establish diplomatic relations with Israel. Due to this recognition, ten Arab states, excluding Morocco, Tunisia and Libya, immediately broke off relations with the F.R.G. Economic and cultural relations were continued and the embassy staffs stayed at their work. On May 15 the official Cairo newspaper, Al Ahram, announced that Egypt would not establish diplomatic relations with the G.D.R. since only Algeria, Iraq and Yemen would follow her, thus causing a split in the Arab world. The F.R.G. soon expected to resume diplomatic relations with the Arabs (Speier, 1966, pp. 98-101).

According to the Hallstein Doctrine's original definition, the Federal Republic's relations with Egypt should have been severed in February 1965. But, Chancellor Erhard had left the decision to break relations to the Arabs; and, he had responded with only economic sanctions and the recognition of Israel. On March 7, the F.R.G. restated the Doctrine in new terms, "An upgrading of this despotic regime, i.e., the G.D.R., is regarded by the F.R.G. as an unfriendly act to be answered with appropriate measures in each

individual case" (Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, 1956). This statement reveals the growth in means available to the F.R.G. for upholding the Doctrine, for as Speier (1966) noted, when the Doctrine was formulated, economic means, such as technical, economic and military assistance or its punitive withdrawal, played virtually no role. Only with the creation of the Ministry for Economic Development in 1961 did economic aid become a politically usable instrument to supplement the diplomatic instrument of the Hallstein Doctrine (Speier, 1966, p. 98).

With the apparent problems in the Doctrine and the evident failure of the Adenauer policy on reunification, steps to relax the Doctrine began. The G.D.R. was not isolated within Eastern Europe; it had its own economic miracle which showed a viable system; its position was strengthened by the 1964 East German-U.S.S.R. Friendship Treaty; and it was becoming more difficult for Bonn to block diplomatic recognition. After performing poorly in the last elections, the West German Social Democratic Party (S.P.D.) decided to make major changes in the party platform which it felt would attract new voters by being more in tune with public opinion. So, in June 1966 at the Party Conference the party passed a resolution calling for a more positive role in the German problem by shifting the F.R.G.'s emphasis from reunification to the welfare of the East Germans. The party also sought a reversal of the Hallstein Doctrine, a

compromise on the Oder-Neisse border, peaceful coexistence with the G.D.R. and broader contacts between the two nations (Whetten, 1980, p. 33).

The formation of the Grand Coalition between the S.P.D. and C.D.U. began the relaxation of the Hallstein Doctrine and allowed for overtures to Eastern Europe. This new Eastern policy was based on a tacit acceptance of the necessity to come to terms with the G.D.R. Hopefully ties with Eastern Europe would help isolate the G.D.R. regime (Dean, 1974, p. 36). Georg Kiesinger, as Chancellor of the Grand Coalition government, in his opening speech in December 1966 omitted traditional F.R.G. demands for reunification, although he did not call for recognition of the G.D.R. The government proposed a broadening of relations between the two Germanies based on more freedom of travel, credits, joint economic projects, and cultural exchanges. Whetten (1980) saw these proposals as an inherent de facto recognition of the G.D.R. Thus, the Grand Coalition attempted a more flexible and constructive approach to the F.R.G.'s Eastern policy, or Ostpolitik. The government even acknowledged that reunification could only be achieved with the agreement of the U.S.S.R. and so a rapprochement was needed with the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. By announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe and thus endorsing the Geburtsfehlertheorie, the Grand Coalition brought about the nominal end of the Hallstein Doctrine.

In January 1967 Rumania became the first Warsaw Pact country to establish diplomatic relations with Bonn. One year later relations with Yugoslavia were restored. These relations forced the F.R.G. to accept a two Germanies policy and compromised the Hallstein Doctrine. The government tried to shore up its nonrecognition policy by announcing that it was "wrong to assume that, after establishing diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, the Federal Government has no longer any objections against the recognition of the G.D.R. by other states . . . in the future Bonn will consider it a highly unfriendly action if a neutral country, without being forced to do so, sends an Ambassador to East Berlin"

(Deutsche Welle, February 1, 1968 quoted in Dulles, 1970, p. 23).

The G.D.R. quickly reacted to counter the F.R.G. inroads into Eastern Europe. The Socialist Unity Party (S.E.D.) announced its own "Ulbricht Doctrine" which set preconditions on other Eastern European states before they could normalize relations with Bonn. First, the F.R.G. must have recognized the G.D.R. and, secondly, have recognized the existing borders in Eastern Europe. Lastly, the F.R.G. must have renounced its use and production of nuclear weapons (Stuttgarter Zeitung, 1966). The G.D.R. also moved to strengthen its ties with the other East European states by signing bilateral mutual defense treaties which stressed the

inviolability of the European borders, the existence of two Germanies, and mutual aid if there was military aggression.

The Hallstein Doctrine, however, had lost its original thrust and intent to force the G.D.R. into international isolation. The principle of exclusive representation was also weakened since, though Bonn might try to maintain this policy, in Belgrade and Bucharest, the German people were now represented by two German governments. By the first half of 1969, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, South Yemen and Cambodia had recognized the G.D.R. (Jacobsen, Leptin, Scheuner and Schulz, 1979, pp. 857-859; Korbelt, 1970a, p. 1058).

The greatest shift in F.R.G. foreign policy towards the East occurred from 1969-1972 under the leadership of the S.P.D. and Chancellor Willy Brandt. At the 1968 Party Conference in preparation for the 1969 elections, the S.P.D. adopted a platform which stated that the F.R.G. must respect and recognize the existing frontiers in Eastern Europe until a peace treaty could be signed. For the election campaign the SPD professed a progressive outlook which called for a "regulated coexistence" with Eastern Germany. The party proposed negotiations between the two governments, but was not willing to regard the G.D.R. as a foreign country. The F.D.P. went even further in calling for the abolition of the Hallstein Doctrine and a renunciation of the F.R.G.'s right to sole representation. Finally, the parties stated that "no German territorial claims must be allowed to stand in the way

of a peaceful order between East and West in Europe" (German International, 1969, p. 15; Germany and Eastern Europe Since 1945, 1973, pp. 34-35). The S.P.D. campaigned in 1969 basically on its Ostpolitik while the C.D.U. continued its conservative platform towards the East. The S.P.D. and F.D.P. managed to gain a 12 vote majority, and since they had campaigned for Ostpolitik, they believed they now had a mandate to seek accommodation with Eastern Europe. Thus, the Hallstein Doctrine basically ended (Whetten, 1980, p. 57). Walter Scheel first intimated, on June 17, 1969, the new view that the partition of Germany into two separate, independent states was a political reality: "The division of the nation into states is a politically accomplished fact" (Stenographische Bericht, 1969, p. 13255). Chancellor Brandt made this fact explicit in his Report on the State of the Nation speech in 1970 (Stenographische Bericht, 1969, p. 21; Stenographische Bericht, 1970, p. 840).

The Federal Republic's foreign policy had come almost full circle. The 1972 Basic Treaty between the two Germanies would finish the change. On December 21, 1972, the F.R.G. and G.D.R. signed the Basic Treaty in which they agreed:

- (1) to develop normal, good-neighbor relations on the basis of equality (Article I);
- (2) to recognize the Charter of the United Nations as basis for their conduct (Article II);
- (3) to settle their differences without threat of force (Article III);
- (4) that neither German state would represent

the other abroad (Article IV); (5) to both work for peaceful European relations, reduce their armed forces and work for complete disarmament under international inspection, while also respecting each other's independence in internal and external affairs (Article V); (6) to cooperate in economics, scientific and technical ventures, traffic, law, post and telephones, health services, culture and sport (Article VII); and (7) to exchange permanent representatives (Article VIII). They also agreed that the Basic Treaty would not interfere with any other existing treaties. Therefore, the Basic Treaty gave the G.D.R. recognition by the F.R.G. of its separate existence and established the G.D.R. in full equality with the F.R.G. (Childs, 1983, pp. 86-7). Thus ended almost twenty years of cold, civil war. The following year, 1973, brought both German states membership in the United Nations. F.R.G. recognition also brought an end to the G.D.R.'s foreign policy which, beginning with the development of the two German state theory, had concentrated on developing the G.D.R.'s image as an independent state and on achieving recognition from states outside of the Soviet bloc.

The Hallstein Doctrine, a major component of the F.R.G. policy from 1955-1970, had effectively fulfilled its task as conceived by its founders; it had prevented the recognition of the G.D.R. by most nations of the world, thus isolating the young East German nation within the Socialist bloc. However, the Doctrine had also limited the movements of the

F.R.G., and, as new nations began to see a way to exploit the F.R.G. and as the F.R.G. sought to build new markets in the East, the Doctrine had to give. While preventing the recognition of the G.D.R., the Hallstein Doctrine had also helped prevent the reunification of Germany.

## CHAPTER 5

### THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC'S FOREIGN POLICY

In his 1968 speech, G.D.R. Foreign Minister Otto Winzer put forth five principles of G.D.R. foreign policy; these reflected the G.D.R.'s position as a loyal Soviet ally and her need to establish an active foreign policy to gain recognition. The first principle stated the need for creating the most favorable international conditions for building socialism in the G.D.R.; the second wished to increase the political ideological unity of socialist states. In order to increase this unity, the third principle promised support for those struggling for liberation from capitalism and promised continued support for these movements after they had won independence, especially if they followed a non-capitalist path of development. Fourth, the G.D.R. sought to establish relations with capitalist nations but within the bounds of peaceful co-existence. And, finally, the G.D.R. sought to fight aggressive and dangerous F.R.G. imperialism and its claim to represent all Germans (Alleinvertretung) (Childs, 1983, p. 300; Merkl, 1974, pp. 90-92; Olszewski, 1978, pp. 180-182 and p. 189).

John Starrels (1980) best summed up the G.D.R.'s difficult position in the world, "dependent on Moscow's good graces in a constant search to legitimize its existence, maintain its political status quo and domestic economic stability and secure the integrity of its territory; the G.D.R. is confronted with the difficult task of satisfying the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, while simultaneously contending with the nationalism of the Federal Republic of Germany and seeking to establish and further its own national goals" (p. 72). The G.D.R. played three roles: (1) as a divided nation state in the general interstate system; (2) as a state in a socialist-oriented interstate subsystem, where the U.S.S.R. was the head; and (3) as a state directed by the S.E.D. which controlled few resources and which dealt with national liberation movements (Kuhns, 1985, p. 224).

The G.D.R. constantly struggled against its international isolation which was caused by the F.R.G. and its Hallstein Doctrine. The German Democratic Republic's foreign policy was an instrument to secure its existence and development and to gain acceptance from other states. Three decisive factors, or goals, influenced the development of G.D.R. foreign policy.

1. The G.D.R. leadership had to avoid conflicts with the leadership of the U.S.S.R.. Its geographical situation and historical experience were extremely significant for its

development politically. Situated in the heart of Europe guarding the northern invasion routes to the rest of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the G.D.R. was home to twenty Soviet divisions, and was a key factor in the defense of the U.S.S.R.<sup>2</sup> Because of its strategic position, the G.D.R. was given little leeway, had to be faithful to socialism, and was forced to recognize the ideological leadership of the Soviet Union, while also trying to placate its own people's hope for independence. Furthermore, the G.D.R. bowed to the security and power interests of the U.S.S.R.

Since in reality the G.D.R. was an artificial creation of the Soviet Union, it was dependent on Soviet policies to maintain its position. The G.D.R.-U.S.S.R. relationship was at the heart of G.D.R. legitimacy, since the U.S.S.R. provided the external factors for the development of a socialist state in Germany; and the U.S.S.R. guaranteed the G.D.R.'s existence (Krisch, 1985, p. 58; Olszewski, 1978, pp. 179-180). In 1954 the Soviets provided the G.D.R. with its sovereignty and nominal control over its foreign relations (Statement by the Soviet government on the relations between the Soviet Union and German Democratic Republic, 1954; U.S. Department of State, 1950, pp. 482-483). Henry Krisch (1985) and others (Bowers, 1979; Childs, 1983) have claimed that the G.D.R. was in fact a surrogate for the U.S.S.R. around the world.

Childs (1983), in fact, explicitly stated that the "G.D.R. relationship with the Soviet Union is the main determinant of its [the G.D.R.'s] foreign policy" (p. 308). The 1968 Constitution of the G.D.R. bound it closely to the U.S.S.R. by calling, in Article 6, for comprehensive cooperation and friendship with the Soviet Union and other socialist states (Muller-Romer, 1968). The revised constitution of 1974 went even further; Article 6, now read that the G.D.R. was "forever and irrevocably allied with the Soviet Union" (Muller-Romer, 1974, p. 53). The Friendship Treaty of 1975 even seemed to deny the G.D.R. an independent foreign policy, when in Article 9 the treaty stated, "The two sides will inform and consult each other on all important international questions and will act from a common position in the interests of both states" (Der Morgen, 1975). The G.D.R., in its struggle for recognition, was dependent on the U.S.S.R. and the policy of socialist internationalism which sought to cultivate socialist interaction.

2. The G.D.R. attempted to reduce the legitimacy gap with its own population. With the Soviets in control after the war, the S.E.D. could not claim to be the continuation of a progressive German socialist tradition. The S.E.D. itself was disliked and distrusted by the population, since the leaders, most of whom had been living in the Soviet Union for a number of years, had been installed into power by the Soviets immediately after the war. The U.S.S.R. had

continually tried to tie the G.D.R. closer to the other socialist states of Eastern Europe in an attempt to provide the G.D.R. with its own identity. An active foreign policy was the best way for the G.D.R., and particularly the S.E.D. leadership, to make a name for itself and gain its own identity.

There were three key reasons for the G.D.R. to pursue a Third World policy which was highly publicized at home. First, such a policy served to increase the public's awareness and acceptance of a national political identity and thus reinforced the G.D.R. regime's policy of delimitation from the Federal Republic. Secondly, the Third World provided a means for continuing the rivalry with the F.R.G. and it offered the G.D.R. propogandists a major opportunity to attack neocolonialism of capitalist West Germany. Finally, G.D.R. aid to selected Third World nations and to national liberation movements served to enhance the regime's prestige, which could contribute to increasing its legitimacy (Butler and Valenta, 1981, pp. 151-152).

Due to the successful application of the Hallstein Doctrine, the G.D.R. remained isolated diplomatically for years. Upon its birth in 1949, the G.D.R. had gained immediate recognition from all of the socialist states of Eastern Europe<sup>3</sup> except Yugoslavia, and recognition from the People's Republic of China and North Korea. In 1950, North Vietnam and the People's Republic of Mongolia also recognized

the G.D.R. With the exception of Yugoslavia in 1957 (which was previously discussed) and Cuba in 1963, no other state recognized the G.D.R. until 1969 (See Appendix I). And, as discussed earlier, by 1969 the F.R.G. had begun to weaken the Doctrine, and with the election victory of the S.P.D., to completely dismantle it.

Because of its lack of recognition, the G.D.R. drew even closer to the U.S.S.R. and sought to uphold the Leninist anti-imperialist principle of the struggle of the working class. The G.D.R. followed the U.S.S.R.'s lead and helped in the Soviet's Third World policy, while also seeking to gain diplomatic help. The G.D.R.'s policy was unsuccessful, as seen by the lack of recognition, until the F.R.G. softened and eliminated the Doctrine. It is ironic that though the Soviets advocated the Nonaligned Movement, the G.D.R. was often denied recognition by these countries due to the principle of nonalignment. Nonaligned nations, especially Egypt and India, felt that recognizing the G.D.R. would violate their neutrality. Even then-Soviet client states such as Ghana and Guinea refused to recognize the G.D.R. while the Doctrine remained in effect (Schneider, 1979b, ch. 5, pp. 703-4; von Plate, 1979b, ch.4, p. 681). The two Germanies competed intensely for recognition, especially from the many new states which sprang up in the 1950s and 1960s. Few developing nations were willing to become involved in the

German question and instead, waited to act until the Basic Treaty solved the German differences for them.

The G.D.R.'s first successes in gaining recognition came from two socialist states. Yugoslavia's recognition in 1957 and subsequent break with the F.R.G. was seen as a minor triumph. Relations between the two nations were not very close or important, however (End, 1973, p. 33). The next nation to recognize the G.D.R. was Fidel Castro's Cuba, which was a state also seeking to make new friends among the community of nations. Again, the F.R.G. upheld the Doctrine and broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba.

The G.D.R. saw that its best hopes for gaining recognition lay in the many new Third World nations. The Third World also offered the prospect of gaining needed raw materials, such as oil, copper and fruit. The G.D.R. hoped that alignment with the Third World might allow it to establish its own distinct national identity, and therefore, was on constant watch for chances to extend a helping hand or befriend a new nation or government.

The G.D.R. had some success in the Arab world in the early years. Due to the Federal Republic's payment of reparations to Israel in March 1953 and her extensive help in building up the Israeli army in 1956, the Arab nations sought to punish the F.R.G. by making overtures to the G.D.R. In 1953, Egypt signed a trade and payments treaty with the G.D.R. and in 1955 signed a consular agreement (von Plate,

1979b, ch. 4, p. 682). No recognition followed, however. As discussed earlier, Ulbricht's visit to Egypt in 1965 caused the F.R.G. further problems, but did not result in recognition for the G.D.R.

Also in 1965, the G.D.R. appeared to make some inroads in Black Africa. The G.D.R. had established an ambassador in the new nation of Zanzibar which already had strong ties to the People's Republic of China. However, when Zanzibar and Tanganyika, which already had established relations with the F.R.G., merged to form the new nation of Tanzania, the G.D.R.'s position was reduced to a consulate-general.<sup>4</sup> Once Tanzania later lost her military aid from the F.R.G., as mentioned earlier, the G.D.R. and China stepped in to fill the gap by providing planning, financial and banking advisors, teachers, nurses, radios, newspapers and fishing and canning equipment (Childs, 1969, p. 248; von Plate, 1979a, pp. 660-662). Again though, the G.D.R. received no recognition.

Cambodia became the first non-communist state to recognize the G.D.R. in 1969, quickly followed by Iraq. Within weeks the Sudan, Syria, South Yemen and Egypt had followed suit. (see Appendix) In sub-Saharan Africa the G.D.R. had first concentrated on Ghana, Guinea and Mali but gained nothing as these countries established relations with the F.R.G. The 1969-early 1970s brought changes in the aim of G.D.R. foreign policy to more active involvement in

African internal affairs as emphasis shifted from Ghana and Mali to Angola and Guinea-Bissau in eastern Africa, along with continued trading with the People's Republic of Congo-Brazzaville. Tanzania was out and Mozambique and Benin were added. These were all new nations which appeared to lean away from the capitalist West. 1970 brought not only the stated end to the Hallstein Doctrine, but also recognition from Congo-Brazzaville, Somalia, Algeria and the Central African Republic (Croan, 1980, p. 25; Jacobsen, et al., p. 857).

In the 1960s the G.D.R. had established contacts with organizations of national liberation, especially the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (M.P.L.A.), the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (F.R.E.L.I.M.O.) and the African Independence Party of Guinea-Bissau. Samora Machel of F.R.E.L.I.M.O. had been a guest at the VIII Parteitag (party gathering) of the S.E.D. in 1971. In addition, the G.D.R. had backed Joshua Nkomo and aided his Zimbabwe African People's Union (Z.A.P.U.) organization since 1973 in their war with the whites; unfortunately for the G.D.R., Robert Mugabe won the post civil war election and relations between Zimbabwe and East Germany cooled. Salvador Allende's victory in Chile brought recognition in 1971, only the second Latin American country to do so (Bischof, 1979, ch. 2, p. 649). Unofficial relations had been simmering with Uruguay, Brazil and Colombia since the 1950s. By 1973, the G.D.R. had gained

recognition from all of these nations plus Argentina, Peru, Costa Rica, Guyana, Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia, but relations were lost with Chile in 1973 after Pinochet's coup. The G.D.R. has been active in its help not only to leftists in Chile, but also Nicaragua and El Salvador (Childs, 1983, p. 311).

One of the most interesting episodes in G.D.R. foreign policy with Third World states concerned Iran. For years the S.E.D. had scorned the Shah in Iran and had helped the mainly pro-communist emigres of the Tudeh Party (Zabih, 1966, p. 220; von Plate, 1979b, p. 685). Quite by surprise, the G.D.R. and Iran established relations in 1972; these relations helped the G.D.R. with her energy needs, and for the Shah, they were a measure of his country's independence as well as a move against the Tudeh. Relations between the two nations were quiet with a few visits by East German specialists to Teheran (von Plate, 1979b, ch. 4, pp. 685-687). The Shah was scheduled to visit the G.D.R. in 1978 and receive an honorary degree from Humboldt University, but he was overthrown shortly before the visit. The G.D.R. quickly jumped behind the new regime and in April 1980 signed a treaty of economic cooperation and trade with Teheran. The subsequent Iran-Iraq war caused further embarrassment for the G.D.R. because of the its close relationship with Iraq.

It is clear from this brief history of G.D.R. foreign relations that the G.D.R. was unable to establish its own

identity in the world while the Hallstein Doctrine remained in effect. No non-socialist nation recognized the G.D.R. until the Doctrine began to crumble in the late 1960s, and most only extended recognition after the Doctrine had been renounced by the S.P.D. in 1970. Relations were not established with the West European industrial states until after the Basic Treaty was signed in 1972, due to these states' close relations with the Federal Republic. Switzerland became the first Western nation to grant the G.D.R. recognition on December 20, 1972, followed by Sweden, Austria and Australia. The first NATO member to extend recognition was Belgium. Early 1973 brought recognition from the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Finland, Spain, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Italy, France and Britain. The United States and Canada waited until 1974 and 1975, respectively (Appendix; Childs, 1983, p. 312; Jacobsen, et al., 1979, pp. 857-861).

The G.D.R. policy in regard to the West had four main thrusts. First, the G.D.R. hoped to gain recognition; this recognition would then hopefully weaken NATO. Third, the G.D.R. sought every opportunity to discredit West German "revanchism." Finally, by establishing strong commercial ties, the S.E.D. hoped not only to bring the G.D.R.'s political aims closer to reality, but also to modernize its industry.

The best example of the G.D.R.'s western policy can be seen in her relations with Great Britain. The British were dismayed by West German intransigence concerning the eastern borders and by Nazi scandals in the Bonn government. There were even calls between 1955-1959 by some Labor Party members for recognition of the G.D.R. The Chamber of Foreign Trade, an East German organization, was established in 1959 in London and concluded some agreements with the Federation of British Industries. Although some British businessmen, academicians, journalists and trade unionists did travel to East Germany, their numbers were small and had no effect on government policy. The building of the Berlin Wall hardened the British government policy. Even the victory by Labor in 1964 did not lead to recognition, most likely because of the need for F.R.G. help with Britain's hopeful entry into the European Community, as well as the need for NATO solidarity (Childs, 1983, p. 313).

Perhaps American relations with the G.D.R. were a prime example of the G.D.R.'s isolation. Basically, until 1974 there were no relations. Even obtaining information on Eastern Germany was difficult; an American Society for the Study of the German Democratic Republic was established in 1965, but soon fell apart. There were no books on East German-U.S. relations, only a very short chapter by Childs (1985). The U.S. government preferred to discuss its differences concerning the G.D.R. with Moscow which it felt

was the true controlling agent of G.D.R. actions. American complaints centered on the belief that the G.D.R. was the main link in heroin trade which was supplied to U.S. servicemen in the F.R.G. Also, the U.S. had long maintained that the G.D.R. was a bastion for terrorists, and that East Berlin provided an entry for these terrorists into Western Europe. Even cultural exchanges between the U.S. and the G.D.R. were minimal, with few scholars exchanged. (Gatzke, 1980, pp. 258-262; Lindemann, 1979, ch. 1, pp. 623-633). The East Germans probably have a better, though somewhat distorted, view of American life since they have access to American movies and television programs on F.R.G. television, which can be picked up in over 80 percent of the G.D.R.

3. Lastly, the G.D.R.'s foreign policy was greatly affected by its attempt to neutralize the attraction of the F.R.G. The G.D.R. had to raise its standard of living to be competitive with the West, but to do this it interacted more with the F.R.G. It was easier for the G.D.R. to trade with the F.R.G. since trade with the F.R.G. was not seen as trade with a foreign country, and the delivery routes were short and traditional. Therefore, the G.D.R. had a continual political interest in freeing itself from the economic hold of the F.R.G. by expanding its imports from other countries.

Although this chapter has shown that the Hallstein Doctrine was an effective sanction in preventing the recognition of the G.D.R., one must also explore the other

means by which the G.D.R. attempted to establish its own identity. Closely tied with her foreign policy goals were the G.D.R.'s foreign economic relations. Hans-Dieter Jacobsen (1984) examined the factors which demonstrated the political function of the foreign economic relations of the G.D.R. in helping to achieve the foreign policy goals and in helping to increase prosperity and economic growth. Structural factors revealed the G.D.R.'s dependency on foreign trade - the small size of the country and small deposits of raw materials and fuel, plus the limited size of the domestic market. The second factor was found in the state monopoly on foreign trade which limited the activity of potential trading partners. As already mentioned, ideological and political factors contained the goals of helping national liberation movements and attempting to achieve international recognition, while reducing the role of the F.R.G. The G.D.R.'s role in the Warsaw Pact defense organization as the western most member with a long border with a NATO country also was a factor in the G.D.R.'s foreign policy (Jacobsen, 1984, pp. 125-127; Schulz, 1982, ch. 2, pp. 23-24). The importance of these factors varied with time as did the relationship between economics and politics.

After the imposition of the Hallstein Doctrine, the wish to achieve recognition became all powerful, and the G.D.R. attempted to use its finances and import levels as leverage. The G.D.R. needed access to crucial raw materials, and it

needed to gain prestige as an actor on the world scene. The G.D.R.'s lack of international recognition was unacceptable for the self-preservation of a state, since international acceptance helps one gain prestige and wealth. Many western writers (Childs, 1983; Jacobsen, 1982) believed that foreign trade became the best way for the G.D.R. to promote its political interests, especially in the Third World where it could find necessary raw materials. However, this study will show that the G.D.R. did not increase its trade levels significantly with developing countries and it did not receive diplomatic recognition from most of the nations until the 1970s, after the Basic Treaty between the G.D.R. and F.R.G. was signed, and the Hallstein Doctrine disbanded.

## CHAPTER 6

### FOREIGN TRADE RELATIONS

According to Albert Hirschman's (1945) mercantilist relationship of foreign trade and power, the increase of the wealth of any country is an increase in its absolute power. National power is equal to "the power of coercion which one nation may bring to bear upon other nations" (p. 14). There are many factors in the expansion of power including foreign trade. Foreign trade has two main effects on a nation's power position. The supply effect centers on the provision of a plentiful supply of goods or by replacement of goods wanted less by goods wanted more. Foreign trade may also become a direct source of power through influence; in this effect, small nations become reliant on the large nations' markets and come to be able to do without them less. This mercantilist relationship concludes that an increase of wealth through foreign trade leads to an increase of power relative to that of other countries; since an increase of wealth is an increase of its absolute power, and, if this increase in wealth is caused by foreign trade, then, it causes a loss of wealth for other countries (Hirschman, 1945).

The F.R.G. used this power on other nations to shut off the G.D.R.; what could the G.D.R. offer them if the small nations' trade was cut off? The Federal Republic gained in wealth through a large and varied foreign trade policy (see Appendix); therefore the F.R.G.'s power with these countries also increased. Also, the F.R.G. has held a large and favorable balance of trade with the G.D.R. For West Germany, intra-German trade was a vestige of German unity and a means for aiding the East German population; also, F.R.G. industry felt that Eastern Germany was its own traditional trading preserve. East Germany's trade with West Germany was a key factor in its industrial development, especially in iron and steel consumption and capital good imports. Furthermore, with the special concessions from the West which still saw intra-German trade as domestic, the G.D.R. was able to conserve its foreign exchange and exploit the opening to the European Common Market. The G.D.R., on the other hand, had a low level of foreign trade with Third World nations, and therefore, little power, so that the G.D.R. could not force them to give diplomatic recognition. Furthermore, the effect of the Hallstein Doctrine as a sanction was enhanced when coupled with the F.R.G.'s trade power.

What were the reasons for the G.D.R.'s involvement with Third World nations? The search for recognition and competition with the F.R.G. spurred early involvement, but later trade became foremost as the G.D.R. needed oil, coal,

raw materials and some agricultural products. The G.D.R. also wanted to prove itself a reliable partner of the U.S.S.R. to show that it vigorously pursued Soviet aims in the Third World (Childs, 1983, p. 290). For the G.D.R., government agreements and trade missions constituted de facto recognition.

In addition, the G.D.R., as the socialist part of a divided Germany, had to restructure its trade; old trade patterns from before the war were no longer open or sought. Heinz Kohler (1962) examined the changed regional distribution of East German trade after World War II. He defined his categories as follows: communist countries included Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, China, Mongolia, North Korea and North Vietnam; the anti-imperialist nations were composed of all of the Americas outside the U.S. and Canada, all of Africa except for the Union of South Africa and in non-communist Asia all areas except for Formosa, Iran, Israel, Japan, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, South Korea and South Vietnam. He found that in East Germany, now the G.D.R., trade for 1936 (the last year reliable trade statistics for Germany could be found) 18 percent of the total was with future communist bloc nations (13 percent alone to Poland including the German areas beyond the Oder-Neisse line), 5 percent with "anti-imperialist" areas, 65 percent with West Germany and 13 percent with other

Western areas. In 1946 the trade volume with the communist bloc had risen to 20 percent, while that with West Germany was up to 76 percent; trade with Western Europe fell to only 4 percent.

With the consolidation of socialist power in Eastern Europe in 1948, East German trade with the communist bloc shot up to 44 percent, while West German trade fell to 43 percent and trade with Western Europe was at 14 percent. By 1951, when it was clear that the U.S.S.R. desired to integrate the G.D.R. into the Eastern bloc, the communist bloc held 76 percent of the East German trade volume, including 45 percent with the U.S.S.R., 16 percent with Poland and 7 percent with the Czechs. West Germany's share had fallen to 7 percent. Western Europe held 17 percent and trade with the anti-imperialist camp had resumed at an insignificant 1 percent. Since this time, Communist countries have held about three-quarters of the total of East German trade, with the U.S.S.R. holding by far the largest percentage, while the West has had about 20 percent (including West Germany) and the anti-imperialist areas have remained at 4-5 percent (Kohler, 1962, pp.232-236).

Why then did the G.D.R. pursue trade with Third World nations instead of Western developed countries? First, although the G.D.R. needed trade with the West to obtain technology, there were many obstacles. The main obstacle centered on the nonconvertibility of the Soviet bloc

currency. In the West, a parity of currency values (for exchange rates) was established according to each nation's purchasing power and by the value of the currency in gold. In Eastern Europe the exchange rates are set arbitrarily and independently of the actual relative buying power or price of gold. So, the East Europeans were forced to trade bilaterally. Also, the pricing system caused problems since the East Europeans have an absence of a system of accounting based on rational cost or price data. Instead, prices are determined by what is needed to fulfill economic objectives, and they are adjusted to serve internal purposes, much different from the West's supply and demand. The West was also reluctant to trade with Eastern Europe because of a fear of dumping or price undercutting. East German trade with the West was hurt by a Western embargo, multilateralism, their own import and export quotas and their commodity structure since the G.D.R. produced finished goods often considered inferior in the West or for which there was not a market (Dean, 1974, pp. 6-15).

In addition, the Eastern European nations had industrialized after the war and had become reliant on the U.S.S.R. to provide their agricultural and raw materials because they lacked capital. G.D.R. trade with the Soviet Union had increased gradually since the war and peaked in 1962. G.D.R. trade was geared to Soviet needs. Therefore, by the end of the 1940s and into the 1950s, the G.D.R. had to

pay reparations while also being burdened with unfair prices and exchange terms - as shown by the export of scarce high quality goods and the 1944 price freeze on its exports (Forster, 1957, p. 19). By 1954, the G.D.R.'s reparation payments ended and industrial product exports expanded, along with an increase in imports of food and raw material. However, even with the end of the price freeze in 1956, G.D.R. was still disadvantaged in her trade with the U.S.S.R., as export earnings were too low and import prices too high (Mendershausen, 1959, pp. 106-118; 1960, pp. 152-163). The G.D.R. tried to make early contacts with Western Europe, especially the F.R.G., but East-West economic conflict, economic discrimination by the West versus Eastern Europe through NATO embargoes, and the great price increase in raw materials after the Korean War, all helped to increase G.D.R. dependence on the U.S.S.R. Therefore, the G.D.R. looked to socialist countries for materials, and the G.D.R. attempted to obtain long-term trade and payment agreements with select non-communist states.

The G.D.R. could pay the Third World nations with machinery, equipment and manufactured goods rather than non-existent currency, something which they could not do with Western nations. And, Third World nations did not have the cash to buy necessary machines and equipment (Holzman, 1976, pp. 176-177). The G.D.R.'s action in the Third World would provide a non-Central European dimension for its influence

and provide prestige and possible recognition, both of which could be legitimizing factors (Krisch, 1985, p. 65). According to Krisch, the G.D.R. played a type of supplicant and surrogate role; it was a supplicant for diplomatic recognition and then for access to non-Soviet energy and raw materials, while also being the U.S.S.R.'s surrogate in deals with the Third World. As a junior partner of the U.S.S.R., the G.D.R. could provide assistance - economically, politically, militarily and technically - to the Third World. In addition, the G.D.R. could provide training, refuge, medical aid and education.

Foreign trade was of major importance for the political and economic development of the G.D.R. as it tried to gain international recognition in the 1950s and '60s. Foreign trade helped to raise the economic development level of the G.D.R. After 1955 and the imposition of the Hallstein Doctrine, the G.D.R. worked mainly towards gaining recognition, so that economics were subordinate to politics. In addition, the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 damaged the G.D.R.'s international reputation. Only with economic development did the G.D.R.'s foreign relationships increase; however, the G.D.R. could not be self-sufficient since it had few raw materials. Non-capitalist developing states were to provide raw materials and, by signing contractual agreements which are part of international relations between states, enhance the political status of the G.D.R. The amount of the

agreements was modest and was concentrated in only a few areas. In addition, the G.D.R.'s trade with the developing nations never amounted to more than 4-5 percent of her total trade (see Appendix). The main diplomatic success came once the G.D.R. offered development aid through credits, technical aid and some military aid. Nevertheless, these nations did not recognize the G.D.R. until 1970, when the Hallstein Doctrine was dropped (Jacobsen, 1984, pp. 144-158; also see Appendix).

The G.D.R. attempted to concentrate its trade efforts on only a few countries in different regions, in order not to spread itself too thin and also to have the highest possible effect. It especially concentrated on those developing nations on the "anti-capitalist road" or those who also hoped to gain support for their own diplomatic recognition. Egypt, India and Brazil were the G.D.R.'s main trading partners in the Third World. In 1954 the G.D.R. signed its first long-term trade agreement with India, and renewed this agreement for five more years in 1959 and again in 1964. The agreement called for the G.D.R. to export mostly metal products and chemicals; the G.D.R. also supplied machine tool licenses, motor scooters, typewriters, photo apparatus, cable products and help with steel production. In turn, the G.D.R. imported from India raw materials such as wood, cotton, jute, tea, vegetable fats, cotton and silk textiles (Lamm and Kupper,

1976, p. 178 & pp. 306-308; Muller, 1964, p. 164; Schneider, 1979a, p. 669).

The first country with which the G.D.R. established trade relations was Egypt, when in 1953 the two nations signed a trade and payments treaty. By 1955 Egypt granted the G.D.R. a consular agreement. The G.D.R. exported metal products, tool manufacturing machines, diesel motors, autos, optical products, office machines, scientific apparatus and chemical products to Egypt, while importing cotton, thread (these first two comprised nine-tenths of the G.D.R.'s imports from Egypt), fruits and vegetables (Lamm and Kupper, 1976, pp. 156-158; Muller, 1964, p. 164).

Trade with Brazil grew rapidly after the signing of a bank agreement to facilitate trade in 1958. In 1961 a G.D.R. government delegation signed a \$40 million trade agreement between the two nations, and in 1964 the G.D.R. held its first industrial exhibition in Brazil. In June 1966 the two nations signed an inter-airline agreement. The G.D.R.'s main exports to Brazil included machine tools, agricultural machines, office and printing machinery and textile industry equipment, while her imports included coffee, tobacco and wood (Jacobsen, et al., 1982, p. 781; Muller, 1964, p. 164).

The G.D.R. maintained a variety of types of trade relations with developing countries. These relations included barter agreements, scientific and technical collaboration with a tendency towards joint research, and

scientific cooperation in specific fields, especially textiles, engineering, chemicals and oil-processing. The G.D.R. has been especially helpful in the areas of water control, forestry, transport and telecommunications while receiving mainly raw materials in return (Domdey, 1971, p. 167; Kuhns, 1985, p. 227). Third World states were particularly interested in purchasing complete factories, such as printing works, sugar factories, oil extraction plants and cement works. The machine tool industry was important because of the application of the unit-construction principle, which saved the importer investment costs. The machines from the G.D.R. could be mounted in a variety of different ways quite easily and at low cost, so that they performed a variety of jobs. By combining the machines into assembly lines, they provided the opportunity for modern large-scale production.

In 1955 the G.D.R. had trade and government level agreements with only seven Third World Nations: India, Egypt, Burma, Lebanon, Sudan, Syria and Indonesia. By 1961 the G.D.R. had established trade relations with twenty-one countries, including Ceylon, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Congo, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, and Tunisia. The G.D.R. had also begun trade relations with Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela in Latin America. By 1979, seven years after the signing of the Basic Treaty,

the G.D.R. had signed trade agreements with forty-nine Third World states (Jacobsen, et al., 1979, pp. 771-983; Muller, 1964, p. 140). Most of the G.D.R.'s exports were machine tools and basic industrial goods, while exports from the Third World brought in mostly food.

In addition to its few embassies, the G.D.R. established a presence in countries around the world in the form of consulates-general, consulates, trade missions with consular rights, trade missions without consular rights, representatives of the Ministry for Foreign Trade, representatives on the basis of agreements between the state banks and through the Chamber for Foreign Trade of the G.D.R., which was established to conclude trade agreements with various countries. East German official representation did not always reveal the full extent of the G.D.R.'s influence. For example, most of the foreign correspondents were actually members of the S.E.D. party. And, the G.D.R. spread its influence through the contact between labor unions and youth organizations, and with printed materials (Speier, 1966, p. 99).

The G.D.R. continually tried to convince Third World nations that an increase in trade with the G.D.R. would help to reduce the developing nations' dependence on developed Western nations. G.D.R. officials also stressed the stabilizing effect on prices and the ability to reduce stocks which the G.D.R.'s purchases allowed. In addition, Third

World nations would be able to purchase finished goods at reasonable prices (Faulwetter, 1969, pp. 255-257).

While trade with the Third World helped to make a much greater variety of food available to the people of the G.D.R., there were problems. G.D.R. trade with the developing nations (see Appendix) remained relatively low and inconsequential. The trading figures also show wide fluctuations in trade with individual countries; these swings reflect either political changes (Egypt, Angola, Mozambique) or the G.D.R.'s interest in oil imports (Algeria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Syria). The G.D.R. kept most of its trade centered on the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe as well as the F.R.G. In fact, most of the G.D.R.'s raw materials and fuels still came from the U.S.S.R., and consumption of expensive consumer goods such as coffee or southern fruits were kept low (Schulz, 1982, p. 33). The G.D.R. was unsuccessful in using trade to gain recognition since the trade was just not there. There were also problems with unreliable partners, abrupt regime changes, corruption and a lack of understanding of the needs of the new developing countries by the G.D.R. (Childs, 1983, pp. 303-4). In addition, the G.D.R. regime had some problems at home as the citizens felt the cost of trading in the Third World was a waste of resources, especially because of corruption, tyranny and incompetence in the developing nations (Childs, 1983, p. 291).

In 1961 the amount of G.D.R. world trade dropped dramatically due to the international response to the building of the Berlin Wall. After 1973 G.D.R. trade in the Third World grew due to the need for oil. Trade with Africa increased as the G.D.R. wanted to receive copper and coal from Mozambique along with cotton, sugar, nuts, copra, wood and sisal. Exports from Ethiopian mainly consisted of coffee; Angola supplied ores, wood, oil, fish and food products (Childs, 1983, pp. 303-4). The potential influence of G.D.R. foreign policy and trade was small and far behind the F.R.G. Where it made economic contacts in the developing world, the G.D.R. often found it impossible to meet the expectations of the other party, for it was often unable either to expand trade within the relatively short period of time it had proclaimed<sup>5</sup> or to provide essential development assistance. Thus its opportunities for exerting influence through foreign policy were restricted largely to the role of the junior partner of the U.S.S.R. and its aid and development program.

The G.D.R. did have the technical skills, organization expertise and military knowledge to be an asset to the U.S.S.R. As the most aggressive East European nation, the G.D.R. became a large part of the Soviet-oriented policy of development, especially in Africa. Through aid and development programs the G.D.R. was able to establish contacts with developing nations and liberation movements.

There is a real difficulty in calculating aid given to developing countries by the Soviet Bloc nations because no figures are ever published, except for an occasional comment in the press (Vassilev, 1969, p. 61). In which case, military aid must be considered along with economic aid (Vassilev, 1969, p. 70). So, figures on aid are estimates by scholars and intelligence experts and these often vary greatly. But, it is necessary to understand the importance of the use of aid by Soviet bloc nations, especially the G.D.R.. If the G.D.R. was a surrogate for Soviet policy as stated by Burns (1979) and others, then the G.D.R. aid program was an extension of Soviet policy and careful consideration of G.D.R. activities was essential to digest the interests of the U.S.S.R., particularly in the Third World.

Vassil Vassilev (1969) stated that aid programs of the Soviet bloc were mainly for commercial consideration, but were backed by a range of political and ideological considerations which provided the material for the official doctrine (p. 9). Whether one considered the G.D.R. as a Soviet surrogate or not, G.D.R. aid to Third World nations not only helped promote socialist (and therefore Soviet) goals, but aid also provided prestige and identity to the Democratic Republic.

Krisch indicated there were three types of support the G.D.R. offered. The first consisted of general political

support, such as in the United Nations debates (obviously this was not available until the mid-1970s). Secondly, the G.D.R. provided material aid and personnel training. As already stated, it was difficult to estimate the direct aid given to favored states since this included direct grants, trade preferences, training costs, etc. Some of this type of aid was done through social organizations such as the Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (FDGB) or Free German Federation of Trade Unions which trained many Third World trade unionists (Muller, 1964, p. 285).

Finally, the G.D.R. offered military aid which included equipment, training and perhaps direct combat support. G.D.R. military aid could be broken down into five main types: (1) supplying weapons and technical equipment, (2) training the military cadre, (3) help in building armaments industry, (4) licensing local production of advanced weapons, and (5) field training the military (Krisch, 1985, p. 65). Military assistance was particularly important because: it broadened the scope of G.D.R. relations thus increasing its prestige; offered opportunities to influence liberation movements which might come to power and provide future allies; was strategic and affected the regional balance of forces; provided opportunity for pressure on the West, especially in relation to oil routes; and increased the G.D.R.'s bargaining strength in international affairs (Glass, 1980, p. 312)

The G.D.R. was particularly active in the training of personnel, both civilian and military, rather than the supplier of arms. The G.D.R. was especially adept at helping to build the administration in authoritarian regimes, as many citizens of developing countries received training in the G.D.R. (Coker, 1980, p. 236; Krisch, 1985, p. 65; Muller, 1964, p. 290). This training was particularly helpful for the former Portuguese colonies which needed trained civilians to fill the administrative gap left by the abrupt departure of the Portuguese officials. For example, in Mozambique the G.D.R. helped in the organization and running of the Ministry of Planning, while in Angola, experts from the G.D.R. ran the port of Luanda (Coker, 1980, pp. 234-235). Men from the G.D.R. acted as advisors in the areas of education, transportation, communication networks, party cadre, teacher training and medicine (Kuhns, 1985, pp. 230-231).

The G.D.R. also realized that cultural relations could often be a first step towards gaining recognition. By 1971, the G.D.R. had established cultural agreements with twelve Third World nations, including Algeria, Chile, Dahomey, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Cambodia, Congo-Brazzaville, Mali, Sudan, South Yemen and Egypt (Bundesminister fur innerdeutsche Beziehungen, 1971, p. 16). Regional friendship societies were used to coordinate cultural activities, such as the German-Arab Society (D.A.G.), which established cultural and information centers in Cairo, Alexandria,

Damascus, Baghdad and Sudan. The society also set up displays, language classes, scientific and practical lectures, movies and art exhibits, while publishing Al-Matschalla, a monthly magazine (Mallinckrodt, 1978, pp. 240-241). The G.D.R. realized, too, that if students from developing countries could obtain an education in an industrialized nation, they could rise quickly in their own country, and then they would hopefully have a favorable attitude towards the country where they received their education. Students from over 100 nations have studied in the G.D.R. at a variety of schools. The Herder Institute in Leipzig provided language training and specialized studies in its Institute for Tropical and Subtropical Agriculture. Students from the Third World also attended the German School for Film Art in Potsdam, and the Wilhelm Pieck Junior College of the Free German Youth provided youth education (Mallinckrodt, 1978, p. 242; Muller, 1964, p. 285). Kurt Seibt, president of the Solidarity Committee which worked to promote the G.D.R. in the Third World by giving support to liberation movements, stated that the G.D.R. had helped Kampuchea, Laos, Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen, Algeria, the PLO, Nicaragua and others in Latin America. They had also helped members of movements in Vietnam, Chile, Angola, South Africa, Uruguay, Ethiopia and Mozambique to go to the G.D.R. for training (Kruger, 1979, pp. 52-64). During

the 1970s over 10,000 citizens from Third World nations received an education at universities in the G.D.R..

In 1980 the International Institute for Strategic Studies reported that the G.D.R. had advisors in Algeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Nigeria and the People's Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville). In addition, they were assisting guerrillas in Zimbabwe and in Namibia (SWAPO or the Southwest Africa People's Organization). This was a major growth from the first report of G.D.R. military advisors in Brazzaville in 1973 (Childs, 1983, p. 290). Christopher Coker (1980) has gone so far as to call the East Germans in Africa the coordinators of all Warsaw Pact actions in the region, a stronger picture of the G.D.R.'s role. In fact Coker estimated in 1978 that the East Germans comprised 40 percent of all East European advisors stationed in Africa.

The G.D.R.'s most important African connections have come in the ex-Portuguese colonies where the G.D.R. had been tied to the development of liberation movements. Samora Machel, leader of the M.P.L.A. movement in Mozambique, had been a guest at the S.E.D. Party Conference in 1971; Joshua Nkomo, leader of Z.A.P.U. in Zimbabwe (not a former Portuguese colony), had received G.D.R. aid in 1973; and Agostinho Neto, head of the Popular Movement for Liberation of Angola (M.P.L.A.), was believed to be receiving G.D.R. aid by 1973 (possibly from the G.D.R. advisors stationed in the

Congo). The S.E.D. had been the first East European party to establish ties with Neto and had even published the MPLA's statutes in 1961 (Burns, 1979, p. 40; Childs, 1983, pp. 304-5; Schleicher, 1979, pp. 62-76; Zenker, 1977, pp. 93-106). Once these liberation movements had come to power, they looked to the G.D.R. for continued support and aid, which they received.

Angola utilized the G.D.R. as instructors and specialists to operate signals and electronics, to organize and maintain transportation, to operate the harbor facilities and to provide medical help (Childs, 1983, p. 290). Neto used G.D.R. advisors in supervisory positions within his government. The G.D.R. also played a key role in the establishment and training of police and internal security forces within Angola which would help the MPLA remain in power (Butler and Valenta, 1981, p. 58; Childs, 1983, p. 290; Radu, 1981, p. 43).

The G.D.R. had played a similar role in Mozambique. Here, G.D.R. experts created and ran the National Bureau for People's Security and organized a militia (Janke, 1978, p. 6). They also initially provided Machel's private bodyguard (Burns, 1979, p. 51). In exchange, the G.D.R. has one of the largest embassies on the African continent in the capital of Maputo (Burns, 1979, p. 52; Getler 1977, p. 4).

The estimate of the number of G.D.R. advisors in Africa has varied greatly. Burns estimated 5,000-10,000 on the

continent, with 2,500 in Angola and 1,500 in Mozambique, while the International Institute for Strategic Studies quoted about 2,300; Radu stated 3,000-4,500 total (Burns, 1979, p. 50; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983, p. 22; Radu, 1981, p. 307). Pond put the number at about 3,000 (Pond, 1978, p. 3).

The G.D.R. has concentrated its support and aid to the MPLA in Angola, SWAPO in Namibia, the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, Nkomo's ZAPU, Robert Mugabe's Patriotic Front (ZANU) in Zimbabwe and Machel's Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) (Glass, 1980, p. 306; Staar, 1979, pp. 121-122). The G.D.R. has provided funds for medicine, clothing and foodstuffs for liberation movements still fighting. Once in power, these movements received help in organizing their political parties and training their police. In 1978 the Research Institute for Political Science of the University of Cologne estimated the G.D.R. spent \$111 million on weapons and military equipment for Africa and another \$167 million for non-military goods (Nawrocki, 1978, p. 6). Since the G.D.R.'s GNP was so much smaller than the F.R.G., the amount of its development aid may be as big a percentage as the F.R.G.'s, however, the G.D.R. aid goes to fewer countries, mostly to those with COMECON obligations such as Cuba, Mongolia, or Vietnam.

Despite the great effort aimed at cultivating relations in the Third World, the G.D.R. did not gain recognition from

any except socialist states until the Hallstein Doctrine was dismantled. The extent of official trade exchanges and the lack of vital imports from the Third World reduced the importance of economic considerations as well. Childs (1983) pointed out several problems with G.D.R. involvement in the Third World. First, it was difficult for the S.E.D. at home to explain the amount of its assistance as many citizens felt it was a waste of resources and that it was immoral to export arms to regimes which appeared irresponsible. In addition, there was a problem of desertions by G.D.R. advisors in their remote assignments (Childs, 1983, p. 291).

The G.D.R. did use aid and assistance to develop relationships with new governments and liberation movements which became useful after the Hallstein Doctrine was dropped and the G.D.R. was recognized. These relationships then blossomed and provided the G.D.R. with close relationships with a number of Third World nations, particularly in Africa. However, these relationships only received official status after the Doctrine was dropped. Obviously, the Third World had some ties to the G.D.R., but the G.D.R.'s allure was not enough to gain it diplomatic recognition. The statistics in the Appendices clearly show the G.D.R.'s lack of trade development with the Third World; an increase in this trade was desired and there were many attempts by the G.D.R. government to increase and promote its interests<sup>6</sup>, but the payoffs were slim.

## CHAPTER 7

### CONCLUSION

Clearly, the Hallstein Doctrine was an effective diplomatic sanction upon the German Democratic Republic in the years 1955-1970, but the Doctrine did not gain the reunification of Germany. West German leaders, Adenauer in particular, wished to force the Soviet-dominated eastern half of Germany to compromise on German reunification in favor of the Western demands. The West believed that without recognition, the S.E.D. could not solidify its hold on the people and the G.D.R. could not develop its own separate identity. The Doctrine was in reality born from a sense of fear that through recognition of two, separate German states, German reunification would become passé.

The Federal Republic's existence was based on the fact that it was the sole inheritor of the German tradition. The existence of another German state would threaten the F.R.G.'s very foundation for existence and thus its identity. The Federal Republic, backed by the Western Allies, also feared Soviet influence. Since the West believed that the G.D.R. was an artificial creation which was conceived and dominated by the Soviet Union, there was no

legal basis for granting it recognition. Wishing to preserve its own foundational existence, the F.R.G. and its allies wished to force all other nations to also conclude that the G.D.R. was an artificial state unworthy of membership in the community of nations.

The Soviets, on the other hand, feared a resurgent Germany in the heart of Europe which would be dominated by the capitalist West. If a neutral united Germany was impossible, then the Soviets would settle for at least a part of Germany which they could dominate. And, with influence throughout Eastern Europe, the U.S.S.R. was able to gain recognition for the G.D.R. from at least the socialist nations.

As each nation raced to prove its worth, the F.R.G. threw up a roadblock for the East. The Hallstein Doctrine, backed by the power of the West, threatened nations which sought to recognize the G.D.R. Therefore, the Doctrine became one of the divisive symbols of the Cold War, as each nation had to choose on which side of the war it stood by how it recognized Germany. New nations were faced with political and economic problems of their own, which, to them, had a great deal more meaning and weight than had the division of Germany. German economic or military aid to a new state could be used to impress upon that state the importance of political interests which either the F.R.G. or G.D.R. considered vital. According to Speier (1966), the only

sensible criterion for judging whether or not such a "bribe" for political goals was worth the price seemed to be the political success and the value put upon that success.

For the F.R.G., the success of the Doctrine could be measured in the absence of political recognition for the G.D.R., while its failure was evident in the continued division of Germany. Despite the G.D.R.'s attempts to sway nations, particularly those in the Third World, the G.D.R. remained isolated until the F.R.G. was willing to allow recognition by non-socialist third states. The F.R.G. was backed by the Western industrialized states which did not recognize the G.D.R. until the mid-1970s, the U.S being one of the last. Furthermore, the growth in the diplomatic representation of the F.R.G. was a consequence not only of decolonization and Western economic power, but also of the Hallstein Doctrine.

Many of the new states which really looked towards neutrality might have established relations with both Germanies had it not been for the Doctrine. However, such recognition would have been a major blow to the Western policy on Germany since it would have lowered the international standing of the F.R.G. and given support to the two state theory in the non-communist world. Recognition would also have made the entry of the G.D.R. into international organizations inevitable. However, by recognizing the F.R.G., the nonaligned states aligned

themselves on the side of the West. At the 1961 Belgrade Conference of Nonaligned nations, several prominent leaders - Nehru, Sukarno and Nkrumah - in theory accepted the existence of two Germanies, but the economic weight of the F.R.G. and the West kept them from explicitly acting against Bonn. Several new states, such as Guinea and Mali, had gone through intense conflicts with the Western colonial powers which had dominated them and were tempted to move closer to the G.D.R. and the East. In still other neutral states such as Burma, Cambodia or Afghanistan, security problems stemming from geography led to a prudent respect for socialist interests so that the F.R.G. wielded less influence. Sukarno in Indonesia came close to recognizing the G.D.R. in order to gain support from the Soviets for his territorial ambitions; and, Indian leaders seemed to believe that indirect support of the Soviet two-state theory in Germany would further the cause of world peace (Speier, 1966). However, none of these nations recognized the G.D.R. before 1969 and the demise of the Doctrine in West German foreign policy.

It is interesting to note that in the late 1960s the desires of the two Germanies towards relations began to take a dramatic turn. Croan (1966) showed that once it was the F.R.G. which refused to deal with the East, except to arrange the liquidation of the G.D.R.; then it was the G.D.R. which refused to deal with the West unless its terms for the unconditional acceptance of the division of Germany,

demilitarization and transformation of the West were met - terms which amounted to the liquidation of the F.R.G. Once it was the G.D.R. which pushed for all-German contacts which the West discarded as a subversive scheme; then it was the West who proposed contacts and the East who shunned them. Where once the F.R.G. developed the Hallstein Doctrine as a barrier against the G.D.R., then it was the G.D.R. which attempted to limit the spread of F.R.G. influence in Eastern Europe by proclaiming its own Ulbricht Doctrine which forced the F.R.G. to recognize the G.D.R. before it established relations with East European nations. As the F.R.G. moved forward with its Ostpolitik, the G.D.R. grew wary and tried to push the F.R.G. all the way to establishing full relations. Croan (1969) branded the Germans as suffering from cauchemar des coalitions, or a fear of political isolation and encirclement. Therefore, the greater the success of one German state in making good internationally, the deeper the trauma of the other. He notes the panic of the West German diplomacy of the late 1950s and early 1960s and the obstinacy with which it clung to the Hallstein Doctrine in the pre-Grand Coalition period, as the G.D.R. seemed poised to make diplomatic breakthroughs in the Third World. Then again the G.D.R.'s hysteria was evident in the enunciation of its own "Hallstein Doctrine in reverse" in 1967 when it appeared the F.R.G. might break through in Eastern Europe.

Unlike the Stimson Doctrine and the U.S. policy towards Russia in the 1920s, the Hallstein Doctrine of non-recognition proved a valuable and efficient sanction. The Stimson Doctrine of the early 1930s was formulated as a means to sanction Japan for her aggressive actions in China. In the Department of State note of January 7, 1932 the U.S. "did not intend to recognize as legally valid any situation, treaty or agreement impairing the treaty rights of the U.S. in China or brought about by means contrary to the Pact of Paris" (U.S. Department of State, 1936, p. 8). Therefore the U.S. would not recognize the puppet state of Manchukuo. Here the principle of non-recognition was used as a substitute for economic pressure or military force. Without strong international support or tough economic sanctions to back the policy, Japan was able to ignore the sanction of non-recognition and continue on her conquering path in China.

United States non-recognition of the new Soviet state in 1917 resulted from American anger concerning the Russian pull out in World War I and on the stated anti-Western policy of the Bolsheviki. Bainbridge Colby, U.S. Secretary of State during Woodrow Wilson's last year, clearly stated American feelings, "At the moment when the work of creating a popular representative government based upon universal suffrage was nearing completion the Bolsheviki, although in number an inconsiderable minority of the people, by force and cunning seized the powers and the machinery of government and have

continued to use them with savage oppression to maintain themselves in power" (U.S. Department of State, 1936, pp. 465-468). Much like the case of the G.D.R., the U.S. did not feel that the Bolsheviks ruled by the consent of the people. Moreover, the Bolsheviks had stated their anticipation of the imminent collapse of all Western governments due to people's revolts. Thus, as Edward Bennett so clearly states, "to accept a government whose very existence, not to mention its declared intent to change the world, posed a threat to the political and moral structure could not be readily tolerated" (Bennett, 1970, p. 43).

The U.S.S.R. would, however, soon gain recognition from other states in Europe beginning with Germany. The reasons for recognition included the need for trade and the desire to stabilize Eastern Europe. The U.S.S.R. survived, grew and prospered without U.S. recognition (see Appendix). The U.S.S.R.'s place as a major power in the world and the U.S.'s need for counterbalance against the Japanese and Germans eventually forced American recognition in 1933.

The use of non-recognition in the case of Southern Rhodesia proved, after a long battle, to be an effective use of recognition as a sanction. On November 11, 1965, the white minority government proclaimed its independence from Great Britain in an attempt to prevent the independence of a black-led Rhodesia. However, the United Nations and its members refused to recognize the new Rhodesia as independent,

and its declaration of independence was condemned by the General Assembly and the Security Council as an illegal act (United Nations Security Council, 1966, p. 23; United Nations General Assembly, 1965; United Nations Security Council, 1965). The United Nations went even farther in invoking partial economic sanctions (1966), and later comprehensive sanctions (1968), to try and force Rhodesia into compliance with international requests. However, the noncooperation of South Africa and Portugal reduced the measure's impacts. In 1977 the Security Council adopted a mandatory arms embargo. Eventually, the decline of the economy, white disaffection in a long and bloody civil war and the cost of defensive measures brought victory for the nationalist black forces and the new state of Zimbabwe proclaimed its independence in 1980 and was admitted to the U.N.

For the G.D.R. the sanction of nonrecognition proved formidable. Until 1969 no nonsocialist state recognized the G.D.R. as a viable, independent state in the international community. Thus, in vying with the Federal Republic for diplomatic recognition, the G.D.R. had failed, but it had made a determined effort to assert its presence in the Third World, even if only below the ambassadorial level. As far as these efforts were successful, they affirm both the gradual erosion of the Doctrine and its power. Wherever the G.D.R. established a legation, a consulate-general, a consulate, a trade mission, or a lesser representation, they would like to

have had an ambassador. On the opposite side, whenever the G.D.R. managed to make its presence felt, the F.R.G. would have preferred a complete G.D.R. failure. Neither side was satisfied with the existing situation.

The G.D.R.'s support and working relationship with national liberation movements did provide it with a toehold of support in the Third World. After the Basic Treaty was signed in 1972 and most nations of the world recognized the G.D.R., many of the Third World states which had won independence established close ties with the G.D.R. The number of G.D.R. advisors and military personnel in the Third World, especially in Africa, reveal the extent of its influence, prompting some to call them the new Afrika Korps. The G.D.R.'s hard work during the time of the Doctrine paid off after its dissolution.

The Hallstein Doctrine proved a credible international sanction against the G.D.R. Try as it might, the G.D.R. was unable to establish relations with any other than socialist nations before 1969. Trade with Third World nations was limited to only 4-5 percent of her total volume. However, the Doctrine, though it prevented the acceptance of two independent Germanies, did not bring about the reunification of Germany. The Doctrine helped to strengthen the split between East and West and cement Soviet support for maintaining the post-World War II status quo in Europe.

## NOTES

1. For a good bibliography and some interesting commentary on the attitude of Wilson see Daniel M. Smith, June 1965, National Interest and American Intervention, 1917: An Historical Appraisal. The Journal of American History LII, pp. 5-24.

2. Eberhard Schulz lays much of the reasons behind the lack of a reunified Germany on the security interests of other states in Europe,

"In retrospect it is not surprising that four-power control over vanquished Germany after 1945 has proved to be so unstable and short-lived. The power struggle was indeed preordained and had to result in the division of Germany if the security of the one side or the other was not to be placed in jeopardy. Even if one assumes that objective causes need not have led to partition, it must be conceded that the subjective fears of the superpowers (and the influential politicians in the countries surrounding Germany) which derive from historical experiences, suggested such a development.." (Schulz, et al., p. 23).

3. In 1953, when the SCC became the Soviet Embassy, the East European states renamed their diplomatic missions, embassies.

4. There are several levels for officials representing a nation in official relations with another:

Ambassador = a diplomatic official of the highest rank appointed and accredited as representative in residence by one government to another.

Minister = a person authorized to represent his government in diplomatic dealings with other governments, usually ranking next below and ambassador.

Consul = an official appointed by a government to reside in a foreign city and represent his government's commercial interests and give assistance to its citizens there.

Consul general = a consular office of the highest rank.

5. For example, the Central African Republic, after it had granted the GDR recognition in 1970, broke off relations in 1971 since the GDR had not provided any worthy economic services (Lindemann, 1972, p. 1019).

APPENDIX A  
RECOGNITION OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

COUNTRY	DATE
1. U.S.S.R.	15-Oct-49
2. Bulgaria	17-Oct-49
3. Poland	18-Oct-49
4. Czechoslovakia	18-Oct-49
5. Rumania	18-Oct-49
6. Hungary	19-Oct-49
7. People's Republic of China	25-Oct-49
8. North Korea	02-Feb-50
9. Albania	02-Dec-49
10. North Vietnam	02-Feb-50
11. Monglian People's Republic	13-Oct-50
12. Yugoslavia	10-Oct-57
13. Cuba	12-Jan-63
14. Cambodia	08-May-69
15. Iraq	10-May-69
16. Sudan	03-Jun-69
17. Syria	05-Jun-69
18. Republic of South Vietnam	20-Jun-69
19. People's Republic of Yemen	10-Jul-69
20. Egypt	11-Jul-69
21. People's Republic of Congo	08-Jan-70
22. Somalia	08-Apr-70
23. Central African Republic (later named Central African Empire)	18-Apr-70 suspended 12-Aug-71 resumed 16-May-74
24. Algeria	20-May-70
25. Maldiv Islands	22-May-70
26. Sri Lanka	23-Jun-70
27. Guinea	09-Sep-70
28. Chile	16-Mar-71 withdrawn 21-Sep-73
29. Equatorial Guinea	14-Apr-71
30. Chad	06-Jun-71
31. Bangladesh	16-Jan-72
32. India	08-Oct-72
33. Pakistan	15-Nov-72
34. Iran	07-Dec-72
35. Burundi	07-Dec-72
36. Ghana	13-Dec-72
37. Tunisia	17-Dec-72
38. Zaire	18-Dec-72 suspended on 02-May-7 resumed 20-Jan-79
39. Kuwait	18-Dec-72
40. Switzerland	20-Dec-72

COUNTRY	DATE
41. Nepal	20-Dec-72
42. Lebanon	20-Dec-72
43. Indonesia	21-Dec-72
44. Sweden	21-Dec-72
45. Austria	21-Dec-72
46. Cyprus	21-Dec-72
47. Tanzania	21-Dec-72
48. North Yemen	21-Dec-72
49. Australia	22-Dec-72
50. Sierra Leone	22-Dec-72
51. Uruguay	24-Dec-72
52. Belgium	27-Dec-72
53. Peru	28-Dec-72
54. Morocco	29-Dec-72 suspended on 13-Nov-7 resumed on 05-Mar-76
55. Luxembourg	05-Jan-73
56. Netherlands	05-Jan-73
57. Uganda	05-Jan-73
58. Finland	07-Jan-73
59. Costa Rica	09-Jan-73
60. Spain	11-Jan-73 suspended on 04-Oct-7 resumed on 04-Apr-76
61. Denmark	12-Jan-73
62. Iceland	12-Jan-73
63. Gambia	15-Jan-73
64. Afghanistan	17-Jan-73
65. Norway	17-Jan-73
66. Italy	18-Jan-73
67. Mauretania	22-Jan-73
68. Ethiopia	01-Feb-73
69. Malta	06-Feb-73
70. France	09-Feb-73
71. Great Britain	09-Feb-73
72. Nigeria	10-Feb-73
73. Rwanda	14-Feb-73
74. Zambia	21-Feb-73
75. Burma	23-Feb-73
76. Colombia	23-Mar-73
77. Malaysia	04-Apr-73
78. Upper Volta	13-Apr-73
79. Guyana	18-Apr-73
80. Togo	18-Apr-73

COUNTRY	DATE
81. Mali	19-Apr-73
82. Japan	15-May-73
83. Greece	25-May-73
84. Mexico	05-Jun-73
85. Argentina	25-Jun-73
86. Liechtenstein	28-Jun-73
87. Libya	29-Jun-73
88. Cameroon	21-Jul-73
89. Ecuador	23-Jul-73
90. Venezuela	24-Jul-73
91. Singapore	10-Aug-73
92. Senegal	22-Aug-73
93. Benin	14-Sep-73
94. Bolivia	18-Sep-73
95. Philippines	21-Sep-73
96. Liberia	28-Sep-73
97. Jordan	08-Oct-73
98. Brazil	22-Oct-73
99. San Marino	26-Nov-73 consular relations
100. Madagascar	29-Nov-73
101. Fiji	11-Jan-74
102. Panama	28-Jan-74
103. Gabon	04-Apr-74
104. Guinea-Bissau	17-Apr-74
105. New Zealand	31-May-74
106. Laos	27-May-74
107. Turkey	01-Jun-74
108. Portugal	19-Jun-74
109. Thailand	03-Sep-74
110. United States	04-Sep-74
111. Mauritius	29-Oct-74
112. Niger	04-Mar-75
113. Kenya	19-May-75
114. Mozambique	25-Jun-75
115. Sao Tome and Principe	15-Jul-75
116. Canada	01-Aug-75
117. Cape Verde	05-Aug-75
118. Angola	11-Nov-75
119. Comoros	14-Feb-76
120. Lesotho	23-Mar-76

COUNTRY	DATE
121. Seychelle	03-Jul-76
122. Jamaica	21-Mar-77
123. Botswana	13-May-77
124. Djibouti	29-Jun-77
125. Surinam	03-Aug-78
126. Papua-New Guinea	01-Dec-78

Source: Jacobsen, H. A., et al. 1979.  
Drei Jahrzehnte Aussenpolitik der DDR.  
Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, pp. 857-859.

APPENDIX B  
REGIONAL STRUCTURE OF GDR FOREIGN TRADE, 1949-77

(in % of turnover)

Year	Total Foreign trade turnover (in valuta marks)	including (in%)				Western industrialized countries	Of which, inter- German trade
		USSR	other CMEA	other socialist countries	developing countries		
1949	2,702.0	37.7	27.2	0.0	0.3	34.7	.
1950	3,677.8	39.7	32.6	0.0	0.4	27.3	16.0
1951	5,545.2	45.6	27.9	2.7	1.1	22.7	.
1952	6,348.1	42.3	28.0	4.8	1.5	23.4	.
1953	8,190.1	45.7	25.4	6.4	0.7	21.7	.
1954	10,020.5	48.2	20.3	7.6	1.4	22.5	.
1955	10,389.3	38.2	25.8	8.1	2.9	25.0	10.9
1956	11,562.1	40.9	24.8	7.4	3.4	23.5	11.0
1957	14,566.4	44.6	21.9	6.8	3.9	22.8	11.3
1958	15,194.5	42.7	22.6	8.6	4.4	21.6	11.3
1959	17,466.0	44.9	23.6	7.5	3.6	20.4	11.1
1960	18,487.4	42.8	24.8	7.0	4.3	21.1	10.3
1961	19,034.6	43.8	27.1	4.1	4.8	20.2	9.2
1962	20,098.5	48.9	26.0	4.1	3.6	17.4	8.3
1963	21,182.9	48.6	25.9	4.1	3.5	18.1	8.6
1964	23,373.6	46.6	25.7	4.1	3.8	19.8	9.4
1965	24,693.2	41.1	28.3	4.4	4.5	21.7	9.5
1966	26,963.8	41.5	26.7	5.0	4.6	22.3	10.2
1967	28,286.1	42.0	27.4	4.8	4.5	21.3	9.0
1968	30,172.6	42.6	28.9	4.5	4.1	19.9	8.7
1969	34,760.8	41.1	27.5	4.1	4.2	23.1	10.0
1970	39,597.4	39.1	28.2	4.3	4.0	24.4	10.2
1971	42,240.6	38.1	29.1	4.4	4.1	24.3	10.2
1972	46,782.4	37.7	30.2	3.2	3.2	25.8	10.3
1973	53,501.7	34.6	31.3	2.8	3.4	27.9	9.2
1974	64,012.7	31.4	29.6	3.1	5.0	30.9	9.4
1975	74,393.6	35.7	30.6	3.5	4.4	25.9	8.7
1976	85,456.5	32.5	31.4	3.2	4.6	28.3	8.6
1977	91,726.3	35.4	32.5	3.5	4.9	23.7	8.5

Sources: German Democratic Republic.

Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR 1977. East Berlin. pp. 257 ff.

Statistisches Taschenbuch der DDR 1978, East Berlin, 1978, pp. 91 ff.

APPENDIX C  
SOURCES OF GDR PETROLEUM IMPORTS

COUNTRY	1975				1976				1977				1978			
	(thousands of metric tons)				(thousands of metric tons)				(thousands of metric tons)				(thousands of metric tons)			
Soviet Union	9,233.0	89.35%	15,097.0	88.82%	16,012.0	88.78%	17,007.0	89.31%	17,760.0	89.13%						
Egypt	932.0	9.02%	187.0	1.10%	180.0	1.00%	135.0	0.71%	179.0	0.90%						
Iraq		0.00%	1,454.0	8.55%	1,576.0	8.74%	1,072.0	5.63%	1,157.0	5.81%						
Syria	18.0	0.17%	240.0	1.41%	258.0	1.43%	301.0	1.58%	350.0	1.76%						
Algeria		0.00%		0.00%		0.00%	12.7	0.07%	310.6	1.56%						
Total	10,183.0		16,978.0		18,026.0		18,527.7		19,756.6							
Published																
Total*	10,334.0		16,997.0		18,036.0		19,042.0		19,925.0							
Unaccounted for in official																
GDR Statistics	151.0	1.46%	19.0	0.11%	10.0	0.06%	514.3	2.70%	168.4	0.85%						

\* The total figure for petroleum imports published. These official totals do not account for the sum of oil imports obtained when the columns indicating oil imports by country are added up.

Source: German Democratic Republic.  
Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR 1979. East Berlin.

APPENDIX D

BILATERAL COMMITMENT OF CAPITAL BY THE GDR  
TO NON-COMMUNIST DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Recipient	Amount (In Million U.S. \$)
Algeria	142.8
Burma	11.9
Cambodia	42.3
Ceylon	42.2
Egypt	91.5
Ghana	24.0
Guinea	4.1
Indonesia	11.2
Iraq	84.0
Mali	7.0
South Yemen	7.5
Sudan	20.8
Syria	83.0
Yemen	5.0
Total	577.3

Source: Lamm, Hans Siegfried and Siegfried Kupper. 1976.  
DDR und Dritte Welt. Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag.

APPENDIX E  
WEST GERMAN AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

## TOTAL AID, 1956-63

YEAR	AID (Million US \$)
1956	435
1957	544
1958	520
1959	797
1960	615
1961	829
1962	632
1963	576

Source: Federal Republic of Germany. Statistisches Bundesamt. 1964. Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Stuttgart und Mainz. P. 566.

## AID RECIPIENTS, 1950-63

LATIN AMERICA	EUROPE	AFRICA
Argentina	Cyprus	Algeria
Bolivia	Greece	Cameroon
Brazil	Iceland	Central African Rep.
Chile	Italy	Congo-Brazzaville
Columbia	Spain	Congo-Leopoldville
Dominican Republic	Turkey	Chad
Ecuador	Yugoslavia	Dahomey
El Salvador		Egypt
Guatemala	ASIA	Ethiopia
Haiti	Afghanistan	Gabon
Hondorus	Burma	Ghana
Jamaica	Cambodia	Guinea
Mexico	Ceylon	Ivory Coast
Nicaragua	Taiwan	Kenya
Paraguay	India	Liberia
Peru	Indonesia	Libya
Surinam	Iran	Madagascar
Trinidad-Tobago	Iraq	Mali
Uruguay	Jordan	Mauritania
Venezuela	South Korea	Morocco
	Laos	Niger
	Lebanon	Nigeria
	Malaysia	Nyassaland
	Nepal	Rwanda-Burundi
	Pakistan	Senegal
	Philippines	Sierra Leone
	Samoa	Somalia
	Saudi Arabia	Sudan
	Syria	Tanganyika
	Thailand	Togo
	South Vietnam	Tunisia
	Yemen	Uganda
		Upper Volta

Source: Scala International, (Deutsche Ausgabe) Sonderheft Entwicklungshilfe, Nr. 12 Dezember, 1963, pp. 22-23.

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