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Sam Lebens
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From the Publisher: Bertrand Russell and the Nature of Propositions offers the first book-length defence of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement (MRTJ). Although the theory was much maligned by Wittgenstein and ultimately rejected... more
From the Publisher:

Bertrand Russell and the Nature of Propositions offers the first book-length defence of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement (MRTJ). Although the theory was much maligned by Wittgenstein and ultimately rejected by Russell himself, Lebens shows that it provides a rich and insightful way to understand the nature of propositional content.

In Part I, Lebens charts the trajectory of Russell’s thought before he adopted the MRTJ. Part II reviews the historical story of the theory: What led Russell to deny the existence of propositions altogether? Why did the theory keep evolving throughout its short life? What role did G. F. Stout play in the evolution of the theory? What was Wittgenstein’s concern with the theory, and, if we can’t know what his concern was exactly, then what are the best contending hypotheses? And why did Russell give the theory up? In Part III, Lebens makes the case that Russell’s concerns with the theory weren’t worth its rejection. Moreover, he argues that the MRTJ does most of what we could want from an account of propositions at little philosophical cost.

This book bridges the history of early analytic philosophy with work in contemporary philosophy of language. It advances a bold reading of the theory of descriptions and offers a new understanding of the role of Stout and the representation concern in the evolution of the MRTJ. It also makes a decisive contribution to philosophy of language by demonstrating the viability of a no-proposition theory of propositions.
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Pascal's wager faces serious criticisms and is generally considered unconvincing. We argue that it can make a comeback powered by an unlikely ally: postmodernism. If one denies the existence of objective facts (e.g. about God or His... more
Pascal's wager faces serious criticisms and is generally considered unconvincing. We argue that it can make a comeback powered by an unlikely ally: postmodernism. If one denies the existence of objective facts (e.g. about God or His relation to the world), then various non-theological considerations should come to the fore when considering the rationality of religious commitment and the choice of education for one's children. In fact, we shall argue that, if one genuinely cares about one's children, thenin many Western countriesone cannot consistently be both secular and post-modernist.
In his warranted christian belief, Alvin Plantinga launches a forceful attack on apophaticism, the view that God is in some sense or other beyond description. This paper explores his attack before searching for a Plantinga-proof... more
In his warranted christian belief, Alvin Plantinga launches a forceful attack on apophaticism, the view that God is in some sense or other beyond description. This paper explores his attack before searching for a Plantinga-proof formulation of apophaticism.
Is Orthodox Judaism committed to the existence of a Torah that pre-existed the world? This paper argues that Orthodoxy is so committed unless it can find compelling philosophical or theological reasons to reject the possibility of such an... more
Is Orthodox Judaism committed to the existence of a Torah that pre-existed the world? This paper argues that Orthodoxy is so committed unless it can find compelling philosophical or theological reasons to reject the possibility of such an entity, and then to re-interpret allegorically all of the texts that speak of such a Torah. Providing an ontology of primordial texts, I argue that no compelling reason can be found to deny the existence of the primordial Torah.
What happens when you assume that the world is a dream in the mind of God, or that the world's history is a story that God is spinning? Focusing on the role that this assumption plays in the thought of Rabbi Mordechai Yosef Leiner... more
What happens when you assume that the world is a dream in the mind of God, or that the world's history is a story that God is spinning? Focusing on the role that this assumption plays in the thought of Rabbi Mordechai Yosef Leiner (1801–1854), at least as it is understood by Rabbi Herzl Hefter, I argue that this assumption generates interesting solutions to old riddles in the philosophy of religion and interesting insights into the nature of religious language.
Since the classical period, Jewish scholars have drawn on developments in philosophy to enrich our understanding of Judaism. This methodology reached its pinnacle in the medieval period with figures like Maimonides and continued into the... more
Since the classical period, Jewish scholars have drawn on developments in philosophy to enrich our understanding of Judaism. This methodology reached its pinnacle in the medieval period with figures like Maimonides and continued into the modern period with the likes of Levinas. The explosion of Anglo-American/analytic philosophy in the twentieth century means that there is now a treasure chest of material, largely unexplored by Jewish philosophy, with which to explore, analyze, and develop the Jewish tradition. This book gathers together a number of analytic philosophers and invites them to turn their training to an investigation of Jewish texts, traditions, and/or thinkers, in order to showcase what Jewish philosophy might look like in an analytic age.
ed contents—these ‘floating adjectives’—form a representational framework, allowing us to connect past experiences with present experiences. I don’t really experience the computer as something separate from the table, but this abstraction... more
ed contents—these ‘floating adjectives’—form a representational framework, allowing us to connect past experiences with present experiences. I don’t really experience the computer as something separate from the table, but this abstraction (of computer from table) allows me to join up past, present, and future experiences: I recognize the table from past experiences where there was no computer, and I recognize the computer in future experiences without the table. If we didn’t ascend to the level of relational experience, our minds simply wouldn’t be able to process the undifferentiated flux of immediate experience. We shouldn’t imagine that the world itself is anything like the world we create through our abstractions.8 On the one hand, Reality can’t be as it appears to us in our immediate experiences, because our immediate experiences are incomplete—they fail to be self-contained, since they are, of their very nature, fleeting. Apparently, no independently existent thing could fail ...
According to Steward Candlish, Russell and Moore had misunderstood F. H. Bradley's monism. According to Jonathan Schaffer, they had misunderstood monism more generally. A key thread of the creation narrative of analytic philosophy,... more
According to Steward Candlish, Russell and Moore had misunderstood F. H. Bradley's monism. According to Jonathan Schaffer, they had misunderstood monism more generally. A key thread of the creation narrative of analytic philosophy, according to which Russell and Moore successfully undermined monism to give rise to a new movement is, therefore, in doubt. In this paper, I defend the standard narrative against those who seek to revise it.
This paper argues that God, despite his perfection, can have faith in us. The paper includes exegesis of various Midrasihc texts, so as to understand the Rabbinic claim that God manifested faith in creating the world. After the exegesis,... more
This paper argues that God, despite his perfection, can have faith in us. The paper includes exegesis of various Midrasihc texts, so as to understand the Rabbinic claim that God manifested faith in creating the world. After the exegesis, the paper goes on to provide philosophical motivation for thinking that the Rabbinic claim is consistent with Perfect Being Theology, and consistent with a proper analysis of the nature of faith. Finally, the paper attempts to tie the virtue that faith can exhibit to the virtues associated with art, as it is understood by R. G. Collingwood. This association is particularly apt, given the Midrashic description of God as an artist. All of this is offered in response to Rabbi Moses Nachmanides who argued (against other important commentaries) that Abraham’s faith, in Genesis 15:6, wasn’t worthy of particular praise.
Find the published version of this paper here: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11153-016-9600-3
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Is Orthodox Judaism committed to the existence of a Torah that pre-existed the world? This paper argues that Orthodoxy is so committed unless it can find compelling philosophical or theological reasons to reject the possibility of such an... more
Is Orthodox Judaism committed to the existence of a Torah that pre-existed the world? This paper argues that Orthodoxy is so committed unless it can find compelling philosophical or theological reasons to reject the possibility of such an entity, and then to re-interpret allegorically all of the texts that speak of such a Torah. Providing an ontology of primordial texts, I argue that no compelling reason can be found to deny the existence of the primordial Torah.
Access the published version here: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11153-016-9600-3
Research Interests:
Utilising some ideas about the semantics of fiction, I try to argue that Hassidic idealism (a doctrine I try to explain) can solve the central problem with the doctrine of sefirot (a Kabbalistic doctrine that I also try to explain). The... more
Utilising some ideas about the semantics of fiction, I try to argue that Hassidic idealism (a doctrine I try to explain) can solve the central problem with the doctrine of sefirot (a Kabbalistic doctrine that I also try to explain). The structure of the solution might also be able to help Christians explain the Trinity - although, clearly, that wasn't my main agenda! Be warned: some very wacky metaphysics and theology here.
I'd be happy to hear people's feedback.
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Part of a Symposium on Yoram Hazony's book, The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture
This paper wants to know whether it would exist, or could exist, in worlds in which I didn't write it. Before we can answer this question, we first of all have to inquire as to what, exactly, this paper is. After exploring two forms of... more
This paper wants to know whether it would exist, or could exist, in worlds in which I didn't write it. Before we can answer this question, we first of all have to inquire as to what, exactly, this paper is. After exploring two forms of Platonism (pure and impure), and a theory that defines literary works in terms of events, I shall argue that the term ‘this paper’ is actually infected with ambiguity. Does this paper need me? It depends upon what you mean by ‘this paper’. I lay out the options for what you might mean, and answer the question for each of the options.
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This paper focusses on the Rabbinic suggestion that the attitude of awe, rather than any particular belief, lies at the heart of religiosity. On the basis of these Rabbinic sources, and others, the paper puts forward three theses: (1)... more
This paper focusses on the Rabbinic suggestion that the attitude of awe, rather than any particular belief, lies at the heart of religiosity. On the basis of these Rabbinic sources, and others, the paper puts forward three theses: (1) that belief is not a sufficiently absorbing epistemic attitude to bear towards the truths of religion; (2) that much of our religious knowledge isn’t mediated via belief; and (3) that make-believe is sometimes more important, in the cultivation of religiosity than is mere belief.
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In this paper I set out what I take to be the necessary and sufficient conditions for living a religious life. I concede that the criteria I lay down are too general to be considered complete, but they are complete enough to demonstrate... more
In this paper I set out what I take to be the necessary and sufficient conditions for living a religious life. I concede that the criteria I lay down are too general to be considered complete, but they are complete enough to demonstrate the sorts of values in terms of which a defence of a religious life must trade.
Research Interests:
Research Interests: