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A WORD FROM THE VICE PRESIDENT

Dear colleagues, dear friends of ISHA, dear readers!

On behalf of the International Board and Council of the working year 2015-16, I am very proud to introduce you to the 17th edition of *Carnival*, the annual journal of the *International Students of History Organization (ISHA)*. *Carnival* was founded as a students' journal in order to collect and share the research of young scholars and students alike. The articles of each volume are thematically centered on the topics of the previously held international seminars and conferences of the *ISHA* network. The journal therefore collects some of the results presented and discussed in various *ISHA* workshops but also provides the opportunity for individuals to share their scientific passion, interests and findings in a professional online journal.

The volume at hand is the third one edited by Flavia Tudini and her team and comprises articles dealing with the main themes of *ISHA* events held in 2015-16. Let me give you a brief overview of the interesting range and diversity of topics comprised here:

Right at the beginning, you can gain an insight in a new workshop-concept introduced by *ISHA* Vienna and their former president Pia Nagl as well as *ISHA* International's Archivist Georg Gänser. Based on a "hands-on" approach, the participants of the weekend seminar in Vienna explored issues concerning the city of Vienna at the end of the Second World War in cooperation with the *Municipal and Provincial Archives of Vienna*.

Following this, Marino Badurina asks "How revolutionary were the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe?" and takes on a promising journey of questioning established ("western") views of the events that brought the Soviet Union to an end.

Balint Fekete and Bence Bari both focus on 20th century Hungary; while the former takes a closer look at the propaganda during the so-called Horthy era, the latter leaps a little bit farther into the past and questions the development of Austro-Hungarian-European relations during the second half of the First World War.

A different time and topic is examined by Dániel Molnár who deals with military questions referred to by the title "The Merchant, the Spaniard and the Turks".

Two authors of this volume highlight issues of Memory and Remembrance: Susanne Korbel examines the *Bund jüdischer Frontsoldaten Österreich* as an example of memory politics following

the First World War and the constant rise in anti-Semitism in Austria whereas Jeremy Stöhs looks at the impact of the book “Slaughterhouse-five” on cultural remembrance.

A more mythological approach is taken up by Iliana Koulafeti and Tadeusz Mroziuk: Koulafeti investigates the story of the fairy Melusine and Mroziuk asks questions about “Political myths in publicist debate around the works of The Great Sejm in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth”.

Completing this wide range of topics Kostas Theodoridis deals with the “Return to Algiers” of Thomas Hees in the 17th century and Uula Neitola deconstructs the reputation of Tiberius as represented in works of Roman authors.

This diversity of topics in this volume not only represents the diversity of the international events held during the last term but also the diversity and uniqueness of *ISHA International* and its sections: The last year saw a lot of changes and rough or let us rather call them *interesting* times for *ISHA*. The organization grew rapidly – admitting new member and observer sections as well as enlarging its organs (council) in order to meet working challenges in the future. These winds of change helped putting *ISHA* back on a professional track – to furthermore guarantee and foster the exchange amongst students interested in history from all over the world.

VIVA ISHA!

Lisbeth Matzer

ISHA International Vice-President 2015-16

RESULTS OF RESEARCH OF THE ARCHIVE WORKSHOP IN VIENNA

Vienna at the End of the Second World War: Continuities and Discontinuities

1. Introduction

This paper is based on the results of research of the archive workshop, organized by the ISHA section of Vienna in collaboration with the Wiener Stadt- und Landesarchiv (Vienna City Archive) which took place from the 28th to the 31st of May 2015¹. The aim of the workshop was on the one hand, to provide students with an insight into the main tasks and challenges of working with archive material, and on the other, to study the history of National Socialism and its consequences. The students were required to read primary sources, to critically analyse them, and to relate them to a major topic. This enabled them to explore the possibilities and limitations of working with primary sources in terms of the information that they can provide and how they can be used for historical research. The primary sources were pre-selected and introduced to the students by Mag. Georg Gänser (ISHA Vienna, intern at Vienna City Archive). The secondary sources were chosen and provided by Georg Gänser, Pia Nagl, Christina Wieder, Ruth Goren and Clara Peterlik to make background information available. The students spent a full day at the Vienna City Archive and a day and a half at the University of Vienna to summarise their findings. After their results were submitted, they were reviewed by the members of ISHA Vienna, commented on and returned to the students. They revised their findings and re-submitted them.

We dedicated the workshop to the 70th Anniversary of the End of World War II, which is one of the defining moments in Austria's history. We asked the students to find continuities and discontinuities in the primary material produced during the years between 1943 and 1948 and to summarise their findings in a short paper. They succeeded, leading to the following conclusions: A clear continuity was found in terms of the biography of Karl Hermann Spitzzy, who is referred to as the discoverer of penicillin. Although the primary sources show that Spitzzy was involved with war crimes, the

¹ Furthermore we thank the Institut für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, the Verein Zeitgeschichte, the Fakultätsvertretung für Geisteswissenschaften (GEWI Wien) as well as the Studienrichtungsvertretung Geschichte (StrV) for their support.

physician didn't seem to have problems regarding his position after the war. In fact, he is still referred to as the discoverer of penicillin and considered to honourable figure in the Austrian public memory as shown by *Ulrike Achatz, Nicole Hanisch* and *Flora Fuchs* (2.1). A combination of continuities and discontinuities were found by *Anamarija Bašić, Nadine Dobler* and *Riina Hyökki* when they looked more closely at the representation of women on political posters before and after the end of the war (2.2). In the immediate post-war period, Vienna was governed by the Inter Allied Command, which was in close contact with the *Bürgermeisteramt* (mayors office). *Lorenzo Vincentini, Vincent Regente, Maja Lukanc* and *Tobias Eder* took a more detailed look at the communication process between them and how it developed between 1945 and 1949 (2.3). *Julia Demel, Jimena Alejandra Guardia Hernandez* and *Rok Piri* looked into the ways the Austrian bureaucracy interacted with issues of personal fate after the Second World War (2.4). Last but not least, *Victoria Buck, Alexandre Faure* and *Lorenz Reiter* focussed on sources related to the *Bürgermeisteramt*, as well as the documents produced in the early days after the end of the war (2.5).

2. Workshop results

2.1. Dealing with war crimes in Austria after 1945 – The case of Karl Hermann Spitzzy

The denazification process, as introduced by the Allied Forces, should support a discontinuity between the Nazi regime and the post-war period. In Austria however, this was not always the case. An example of this is the case of Karl Hermann Spitzzy. When Karl Hermann Spitzzy died in 2013, many laudatory accounts of his research on the pharmaceutical use of Penicillin were published. In most of these, his occupation during the 1930s and 1940s is only described as far as his serving as a doctor in military hospitals on the Russian front. They generally do not mention Spitzzy's early and staunch membership in the NSDAP (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei), nor his position as *Hauptsturmführer* in the *Waffen-SS*². Although the evidence of this was compelling, no action was taken after the war and he was never prosecuted.

After 1945, the Austrian administration and the Allied Forces distinguished three types of liability amongst the former NSDAP members. Only party members who were in command were classified

² Klee, Ernst. „Das Personenlexikon zum Dritten Reich – Wer war was vor und nach 1945“. Frankfurt am Main, 2003, S. 592, 1; [http://www.meduniwien.ac.at/homepage/news-und-topstories/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=3479&cHash=561c8abdaf](http://www.meduniwien.ac.at/homepage/news-und-topstories/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=3479&cHash=561c8abdaf); <http://wien.orf.at/news/stories/2587186>; http://www.medacad.org/vma/e/images/stories/img/Nachruf_K-H-Spitzzy.pdf; http://www.billrothhaus.at/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=367 [last accessed: 30.05.2015]

as war criminals³, who could face heavy punishments, whereas other categories were mostly only obliged to pay a fine. Other classifications were the *Belastete* (Offenders) and *Minderbelastete* (Lesser Offenders). In order to maintain the discourse of Austria as a victim of the Nazi Regime, the administration focused on the persecution of so-called *Illegale* (illegals), people who joined the NSDAP before the Anschluss (the annexation of Austria by Nazi Germany), as the party was still forbidden at that point⁴. When the administration initiated the denazification, it took a while for the process to get under way because many documents were not available or had been destroyed. They collaborated with society and in many cases considered the statements of former party members as trustworthy, although these often attempted to conceal their involvement. The former members of the NSDAP had to register themselves and could therefore decide which information they provided. These “registration lists” were public and everybody could “veto” the information⁵. This is due to the difficulties the Austrian administration faced in the process of denazification: The majority of civil servants had been party members before 1945, a purge would have led to a breakdown of the entire national administration.⁶ As a result it is likely that former sympathies and friendships had an effect on who was prosecuted.

Spitzky, having joined the NSDAP in 1934, should have been classified as an illegal member. Moreover, he had held the position of an SS-Oberscharführer and was Hauptsturmführer within the Waffen-SS.⁷ There was sufficient evidence that he was an “Illegal”, nevertheless he managed through repeated appeals, to have his process laid down in 1950. During the three years he brought up several different arguments, that he was just in a riding club or was forced to join the SS for example. Unfortunately these arguments were contradicted by administrative records which clearly prove his involvement with the Nazi regime. Nevertheless, his appeals were sufficient to have him declared free from accountability and allowed him to resume his academic career without his past ever being scrutinized again. Until his death, Spitzky was renowned for his research and publications in the fields of Medicine and Philosophy. He received many awards, including the “Wilhelm-Exner-Medal”⁸, the “Theodor-Körner-Award”⁹, the *Golden Medal of the city of Vienna* and was appointed honorary president of the *Wiener Medizinische Akademie*. This case shows that it was possible for former party members, even of high ranks, to escape persecution and resume life as a private

³ Berg, Matthew Paul. “Arbeitspflicht in Postwar Vienna: Punishing Nazis vs. Expediting Reconstruction 1945- 48.” In: Austrian History Yearbook, Vol. XXXVII, Minneapolis, 2006, 196.

⁴ Art. II §§1ff. Verbotsgesetz of 8th of Mai 1945, StGBI. Nr. 13/1945, 6th of June 1945.

⁵ Art. II §§1ff. Verbotsgesetz of 8th of Mai 1945, StGBI. Nr. 13/1945, 6th of June 1945.

⁶ Berg, 188.

⁷ WStLA, M.Abt. 119, A42 – NS-Registrierung: 9. Bez. 7736, Karl Hermann Spitzky. (1947-1950), Bk 511/49.

⁸ <http://www.wilhelmexner.at/liste.html> [last accessed: 30.05.2015]

⁹ <http://www.theodorkoernerfonds.at/index.php?id=154> [last accessed: 30.05.2015]

citizens, even to become people of public attention without their past being scrutinized. The post-war career of Karl Hermann Spitzzy shows a clear continuity between the role he had before and after the end of the Second World War. This is but one example, however it epitomises the extent to which Austrian denazification failed to put even well known party members in influential positions within the regime to trial.

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2.2. Posters as a Presentation of Women's Role in Society

This paper discusses the presentation of women in political posters during and after World War II in Austria. The analysis focuses on finding out how women were perceived in different historical contexts and how their position in society was defined. The aim is to reveal possible continuities and discontinuities concerning the role of women.

The analysis applies a comparative approach and concentrates on two posters. The first one is an election poster of the Austrian Socialist Party (SPÖ) used for the first post-war Parliamentary

elections in November 1945.¹⁰ The wartime perspective is represented by a German Red Cross (Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, DRK) recruitment poster from 1943. In addition, research literature considering the Nazi perception of women and the early post-war situation in Austrian society is used to support the interpretation of the visual sources.

2.2.1. Wartime perspective

The wartime poster¹¹ displays a woman leaning on a red wall, gazing at a group of nurses, who are performing the Nazi salute in the background. The group is situated in a white spotlight coming from the word *Sieg* ('victory') which, as a bright light, resembles the sun. Additionally, a red cross and the slogan "*und Du bist nicht dabei?*" ('and you are not participating?') written on top of it forms another focus of attention. Additional information about how to join the DRK as a nurse can be found underneath the cross. The wartime DRK logo, which includes the *Reichsadler* and a swastika, is positioned on the upper left corner on a red background.

When contemplating the poster more thoroughly, a correlation between the colours, proportions of the displayed items and the message of the written text can be noticed. At first sight, the woman in the foreground seems to be the main figure on the poster, but in fact she is turning her back towards the viewer and observing the action, which takes place in the background. Therefore, the centre of attention is actually deferred to her direction of eye, namely the uniformed nurses, where another deferral of the focus is made onwards to their direction of view – the sun-like beam of light presenting the word *Sieg*. Observing the poster thus leads the viewer from the woman to the right top corner with the so-called sun and finally to the slogan on the Red Cross.

The colours play an important role in emphasizing the distance between the woman and the nurses. Whereas the woman, well-dressed in dark colours, remains in the shadow, the nurses and the word *Sieg* are depicted in exceptionally bright light compared to the surrounding darkness. Apart from this dark-light contrast, the colour red gains an important role giving the viewer an understanding of the implicated norms applied in the Nazi ideology.

¹⁰ Austrian Parliament: <http://www.parlament.gv.at/ENGL/PERK/HIS/REP2/1945/index.shtml>. Accessed 28 Jun 2015. [last accessed: 30.05.2015]

¹¹ see Fig. 1. DRK: *Sieg. und du bist nicht dabei?* Die schönste Kriegsaufgabe für die deutsche Frau ist der Schwesterndienst im D.R.K. Waldheim-Eberle, Wien, 1943.



Poster 1: DRK: Sieg. Und du bist nicht dabei? Die schönste Kriegsaufgabe für die deutsche Frau ist der Schwesterndienst im D.R.K. Waldheim-Eberle, Wien, 1943.

In the National Socialist ideology, the role of the German woman was essentially linked to motherhood and therefore women's position in society was clearly defined. Although the Nazis were not the first to perceive women in such a way, this idea of woman as the “second sex” was an indispensable part of the National Socialist ideology.¹²

Nevertheless, motherhood was not exclusively bound to the nuclear family – it also had a broader dimension. Annemarie Tröger refers to the concept of “social motherhood”¹³, which expands the few legitimate roles for women to include, for instance, social workers, teachers or nurses. The poster represents these presumed female obligations by making the viewer feel guilty of not having taken part in the expected social behaviour. This is implied clearly through the direct, negatively formulated question which evokes guilt. Moreover, the red colour on the cheek of the woman highlights the shame and disgrace of her situation.

2.2.1. Post-war view

After World War II, the first elections took place on 25 November 1945 under difficult circumstances. After thirteen years of not voting, 94 percent of those entitled to vote made use of their democratic right. The winner of the elections, the People's Party (ÖVP), obtained 49.8% of the votes, which gave it a majority of the seats in the parliament. The results left the Communists

¹² Frevert, Ute: Frauen. in: Benz (ed.) Enzyklopädie des Nationalsozialismus. DTV, München 2007. 242.

¹³ Tröger, Annemarie: The Creation of a Female Assembly-Line Proletariat. in: Bridenthal (ed.) When Biology Became Destiny. Women in Weimar and Nazi Germany. Monthly Review Press, New York, 1984. 239.

however, considerably disappointed: as the main advocate in the resistance to Nazi oppression, it had assumed to gain more support from the voters. Nonetheless, it attained only 5.4% of the votes, which was significantly less than expected.¹⁴ The outcome of the elections was 85 seats for the ÖVP, 76 seats for the Socialists and only four seats for the Communists¹⁵.

The Socialists' campaign poster¹⁶ addresses women to help and heal by voting for the socialists. It says: "*Frauen! Helfen und heilen wollen wir wo Krieg und Vernichtung getobt!*" ("Women! We want to help and heal where war and destruction rioted!"). This message is conveyed in an interesting way. A crowd of women is depicted in the background, whereas the above cited sentences are pictured as banners in the front. Every single word is written on a different banner held by the female crowd. It seems as if the women are taking part in a rally. They are all dressed in a similar way - not wearing a real uniform, but still depicted wearing the same colours and relatively coherent clothes.

The women pictured in this poster are faceless, which perhaps makes the suggestion that every single woman in this poster is interchangeable. Every female viewer can recognize herself in this advertisement and is able to become a part of this movement. The only thing one needs to do to be part of this seemingly active, aware and united mass, is to vote for the Socialist Party (SPÖ).

At the lower end of the poster it therefore says: "*Wählt sozialistisch!*" ("Vote socialistic!"). Next to this call, the Logo of the SPÖ is attached. The Socialists came up with this logo consisting of three red arrows, after the National Socialists introduced their swastika as a symbol in the early 1920s.¹⁷ After the war, a red circle was added to the logo to embrace the arrows in a so-called "*Roten Ring der Einheit*"¹⁸ ("Red Circle of Unity"). The existing representation of unity is intensified by the visual representation of unity through the mass of women on the poster.

Looking at the colours used in this poster, they also seem to support the idea of unity. All women have the same orange skin tone and no facial characteristics, whereas their clothes are dark and slightly vary from a greyish blue to black. Only the written messages stick out – white banners with red letters on them and a white election request with a red and white SPÖ logo. The dominant lettering can also be seen as the main theme of this poster. Women are an active, strong and unified

¹⁴ Austrian Parliament: <http://www.parlament.gv.at/ENGL/PERK/HIS/REP2/1945/index.shtml> [last accessed: 28 June 2015]

¹⁵ Nohlen, Dieter; Stöver, Philip (eds.): Elections in Europe: A Data Handbook. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2010. 213.

¹⁶ see Fig. 2. SPÖ: Frauen! Helfen und heilen wollen wir wo Krieg und Vernichtung getobt!, 1945.

¹⁷ <http://www.dasrotewien.at/symbole-sozialdemokratische.html>. Accessed 29 Jun 2015.

¹⁸ *ibid.*

part of society, but still their main role and aim is to *help and heal*. They are animated to fulfil their duty by working in the social sector and become involved in other social activities.

Obviously, women were the sole target group of this election poster. This might seem rather uncommon, but makes sense if looking at the political and economic situation at that time. In the context of the Austrian elections in 1945, women suddenly represented approximately 2/3 of the eligible voters.¹⁹ This marks a change in the role of women in society and politics. Not only the election poster of the Socialist party, but also the other two relevant competing parties (KPÖ²⁰ and ÖVP²¹), addressed women directly. In other words, women were considered a significant factor in this specific situation more than ever.



Poster 2: SPÖ: *Frauen! Helfen und heilen wollen wir wo Krieg und Vernichtung getobt!*, 1945.

2.2.3 Conclusion

Despite the different political and social circumstances behind the discussed posters, certain similarities and continuities in the perception of women during and after the World War II can be detected. Nevertheless, there are certain discontinuities as well.

¹⁹ Rathkolb, Oliver: 1945. Zurück in die Zukunft. 70 Jahre Ende Zweiter Weltkrieg. Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna 2015. 32-33.

²⁰ Wienbibliothek im Rathaus, AC 10600139: KPÖ: Frauen, Mütter, Ihr seid es euren Kindern schuldig, 1945.

²¹ Rathkolb, 32-35.

Even though the comparison considered posters from two very different settings, the overall stereotypical image of womanhood has not changed. In both depictions, women are encouraged to take part in society as *helpers and healers*. This is clearly seen as their main role in society. The SPÖ election poster literally says that women should “help and heal”, whereas the DRK poster places women under pressure by shaming those who are not yet contributing to society as the stereotype dictates. The specific demands for women virtually stayed the same; the overall theme of motherhood, and the previously mentioned “social motherhood”²² were not disposed of after the war.

On the other hand, there is a tendency towards a more emancipated depiction of women in the post-war placard, as the women there are no longer looking away as mere followers or turning their faces to some imaginary and external goal. Instead, they are directly facing the viewer and therefore represented as a powerful and present part of society. In the 1945 situation they were thus seen as active subjects and significant citizens, which was quite a different view compared to the previous ideology.

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²² Tröger, Annemarie: The Creation of a Female Assembly-Line Proletariat. in: Bridenthal (ed.): *When Biology Became Destiny. Women in Weimar and Nazi Germany*. Monthly Review Press, New York, 1984. 239.

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Wienbibliothek im Rathaus, AC 10600139: KPÖ: Frauen, Mütter, Ihr seid es euren Kindern schuldig, 1945.

2.3. The Correspondence between the Allied Forces and Civil Administrations in Vienna between 1945 and 1949

The following analysis deals with the Allied occupation of Vienna and the communication between the Allied forces and the re-established civil government and administrations between 1945 and 1949. After the end of the Second World War, Austria was put under the control of the Allied forces. Vienna was divided between the four Allied powers, with the inner district being jointly administrated by the “Vienna Inter allied Commission (VIAC)”.²³ The reestablishment of the Austrian administration started on the base administrative level, the municipalities, led by the mayors and the offices connected to their position.²⁴ Vienna was no exception.

The findings are based on records from the *Wiener Stadt- und Landesarchiv*, focusing on primary sources from the *Alliierten-Verbindungsstelle* (Allied-liaison-department)²⁵ and the *Bürgermeisteramt* (mayor’s office)²⁶. Especially one source from the Allied-liaison-department – the *Protokollbuch* (register book)²⁷ – which lists all the issues the Allied forces and the mayor’s office corresponded about, gives a valuable overview. The main interest of the research was the communication between the different occupational forces and the administration of the city of Vienna, as well as what their communication was about. Based on the examined sources it was not possible to make a general statement about the communication between the four Allied forces.

²³ Beller, Steven. *A Concise History of Austria*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 250.

²⁴ Hanisch, Ernst. *Der lange Schatten des Staates: Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert*. Wien: Ueberreuter, 1994, 402.

²⁵ WStLA, MD, A9 – Alliierte-Verbindungen: 124/46, 127/46., bzw. WStLA, Kleine Bestände: Zeiträume und Ereignisse, A84 – VI/84 – Alliierte Besatzung: 4 – Vienna Interallied Command (Considerations on Wien).

²⁶ WStLA, MD, A6 – Bürgermeisteramt: 246/46 (Städtisches Brauhaus, Probleme mit Roter Armee), bzw. WStLA, MD, B7 – Alliierte Verbindungen: Bd.1 (1946 – 1949).

²⁷ WStLA, MD, B7 – Alliierte Verbindungen: Bd. 1 (1946-1949).

The *Bürgermeisteramt* – the central office of the city administration – functioned as a central office for the communication with the Allied forces. The mayor’s office received various requests, demands and complaints. It seems that the Allies directed the city authorities to execute their commands, since the Allies had a central role in the recreation of the state.

For example, one of the documents of the Allied offices shows that the mayor’s office was required to prevent food poisoning of canned food and to inform the Allies about executed measures.²⁸ Documents from the *Bundesdenkmalamt* (federal office for memorials and monuments) also show that the local Viennese authorities were not just receiving orders from the Allied forces, but that they also received requests: the *Bundesdenkmalamt*, for instance, asked them for lists of damaged art objects and applied for refunds for those objects.²⁹

The sources also show differences between the four Allied forces. The Western forces were giving commands in order to contribute to the reestablishment of a working administration and also to improve the quality of life, as one document by the British forces shows: the British organised a military Tattoo in Schönbrunn, which also functioned as a charity event for children.³⁰ On the other hand, the Soviet forces confiscated large parts of the economic resources and the sources speak of a lot of complaints by parties harmed by Soviet troops.³¹

The register book from the Allied-liaison-department displays a general overview of the correspondence between the mayor’s office, the Allied occupation forces and the Vienna-Inter-Allied-Commission (VIAC) between 1946 and 1949. The entries show that authorities had to deal with several recurring topics, mainly health issues (e.g.: sexual diseases, poisoning of rats), infrastructure issues (e.g. clearing rubble from the city, reconstruction), providing people with food and organizing the traffic.³² Between 1946 and 1949 the entries in the minute book decreased drastically:

year	entries³³
1946	373
1947	121
1948	32

²⁸ WStLA, MD, A9 – Alliierte-Verbindungen: 127/46.

²⁹ WStLA, M.Abt. 119, A29 – ÖV – Reste der Registratur: Mappe 8, MA 62: Anmeldung verschleppten Alliiertenvermögens (1946-1947); Mappe 10.

³⁰ WStLA, MD, A9 – Alliierte-Verbindungen: 124/46.

³¹ WStLA, MD, A6 – Bürgermeisteramt: 246/46 (Städtisches Brauhaus, Probleme mit Roter Armee).

³² WStLA, MD, B7 – Alliierte-Verbindungen: Bd.1 (1946-1949).

³³ WStLA, MD, B7 – Alliierte-Verbindungen: Bd.1 (1946- 1949).

1949	2
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We can only guess why the number of entries decreased to such an extent. Maybe there was no more need for communication about basic infrastructural questions or the local administration had taken over their tasks without detailed supervision of the Allied forces. Another reason might have been the increasingly problematic situation between the Allied powers. In this way the *Protokollbuch* can also be read as an indicator for the start of the Cold War.

In short, it can be said that Allied forces and the civil administration of Vienna – especially the mayor's office – mainly corresponded about issues of reconstruction, although the Western Allied forces had more interest in Austrian reconstruction than the Soviet forces. The mayor's office mainly received requests and commands from the Allied forces and delegated them, but they also had the chance to send requests regarding damage refunds to the Allied forces. Thus the civil administrations were mainly – but not only – recipients of orders.

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2.4. “Der Tod eines Menschen ruft eine Reihe von Verwaltungsakten hervor“³⁴ – The Reflection of Personal Fate within the Administrative Process of Austria in the aftermath of the Second World War

The first years in post-war Austria were a time of suffering and uncertainty as the country had to recover from the loss of millions of lives. The human tragedies left a terrible void in society, which the authorities had to deal with. In this sense, the following question arises: how was personal fate reflected in administrative processes in postwar Austria? In order to answer this question, three examples with different characteristics were compared: two files from the *Landesgericht für Zivilrechtssachen* (Regional Civil Court) and one report for the *Bürgermeisteramt* (Mayor’s office). All these sources are found in the *Wiener Stadt- und Landesarchiv* (Vienna City Archive).

The first example is the case of the family Schwarz³⁵. Hudes (Adele) Schwarz was never seen again after her deportation from Theresienstadt to Auschwitz on October 1st 1944, together with her daughter Antonie Schwarz. Heinrich Schwarz, their husband and father respectively, had been looking for them without success and asked the Civil Court to give an official declaration of death for both women. After a long process, both women were pronounced dead by May 8th 1945, the date of Germany’s surrender. However, Heinrich Schwarz found a woman who witnessed something that changed the course of the process. The woman had been in Theresienstadt with his wife and his daughter and was deported to Auschwitz after them; she arrived in Auschwitz some days later and found only Antonie alive. She told the woman that her mother was separated from the group right after their arrival in Auschwitz on October 12th 1944. The exact date of death was important for Heinrich Schwarz, because he and his wife owned real estates in Vienna, which he wanted to inherit. If mother and daughter had died on the same day, some distant relatives from abroad would have gotten shares of those real estates because of inheritance laws³⁶. After a long and complex debate, Hudes was finally pronounced dead by October 24th 1944, before Antonie’s death on May 8th 1945. The whole process took almost one year, from July 1946 until May 1947, when the verdict was brought in.

³⁴ (*The death of a human produces a series of administration files*) Magistrat der Stadt Wien. Die Verwaltung der Bundeshauptstadt Wien 1945-1947. Wien: Magistrat der Stadt Wien, 1947, 203.

³⁵ WStLA, Landesgericht f. Zivilrechtssachen, A26 - 48T-Akten: 631/46.

³⁶ WStLA, Landesgericht f. Zivilrechtssachen, A26 - 48T-Akten: 631/46.

The second example is the file of an Austrian soldier³⁷, whose mother also wanted an official declaration of death from the Regional Civil Court. Michael Geza Aumüller was on a transport ship in Norway, which was torpedoed and destroyed in August 1941. The report about the sinking ship was sent to the mother in October 1941. In April 1946 she requested a proof of her son's death, because she needed a legal document for the inheritance process. It took some time to collect the required documents. Besides, the Ministry of the Interior had to look for any records of the soldier in the Regional Civil Court. The mayor of his hometown confirmed that Aumüller was living there in 1940 and 1941 and that he held the Austrian citizenship. In September 1946 the Regional Civil Court declared officially that Michael Geza Aumüller died in August 1941, after his ship was torpedoed in Norway.

The last example is a report³⁸ from June 30th 1945 about the repatriation of concentration camp inmates, which was sent to the Mayor of Vienna. It stated that two former prisoners from Dachau and Buchenwald, Hans Hermann Weber and Alois Winkelhaus, had been searching for Austrian inmates in Linz, Munich, Eichach, Dachau, Weimar and Buchenwald. They reported that it would not be easy to bring back their countrymen from the concentration camps, since the Soviet Army did not allow anyone to get in and the US Army did not allow anyone to get out of their respective occupied areas. Therefore, the two men had to help some of their countrymen to cross the border illegally. When a food and clothing shortage occurred, a request was sent to the Red Cross in Geneva. The answer was positive. The Mayor of Vienna was asked to take over this matter, because it was his duty to help his countrymen to return home.

These three examples show that on the one hand, the agony of Austrian inmates in concentration camps did not end with the end of the war. The task of the authorities was not only to manage to repatriate them, but also to get food and dwelling for them through international organisations. These tasks were not easy at all. On the other hand, there is a clear difference in the administrative process for the death of soldiers and concentration camp victims, mainly because their death occurred in different circumstances. There is a discrepancy regarding the way authorities dealt with the matter, namely a faster process for fallen army members and a slower process for victims of the Holocaust. Files, protocols and reports from administration do not reflect individual tragedy, as oral history would. But they show that authorities had to deal with the gaps in society after the war (a wife was dead, a son was gone, surviving countrymen were unable to return, etc.). One can see, that

³⁷ WStLa, Landesgericht f. Zivilrechtssachen, A26 - 48T-Akten: 636/46.

³⁸ WStLa. MD, A6 – Bürgermeisteramt: 719/45.

personal fate went together with complicated administrative processes. These documents also show how individual tragedy was processed differently, regardless of the duration and the nature of the suffering: the cases of the murdered women, the fallen soldier and the surviving inmates had different characteristics, and therefore authorities dealt with them in a different way.

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2.5. A Glimpse at the priorities of the Viennese administration in the aftermath of World War II

This paper will be dealing with the occupation, reconstruction and development of the city of Vienna, along with its infrastructure, in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. This will be done using records from the postwar period. It is difficult to grasp a complete picture of the reconstruction process as the only data available for this paper were a few selected documents from the City Archive of Vienna. This means that few sources were available for access, and that the paper provides only a glimpse of the many projects and plans following World War II. This is not to say that the documents in this paper have no use; on the contrary, they elucidate not only the problems which the administration faced and the reconstruction projects they were focused on, but also the hierarchical structure of the administration.

The records come from the Vienna City Archive and consist mostly of letters and protocol books from the mayor's office, dated between 1945 and 1948. The protocol books contain the basic details of the correspondences between the city administration and external actors. The main correspondences that were researched for this paper were from late April until July 1945. They were primarily concerned with the reconstruction and development of Vienna. The main issues they

deal with include: the cleaning procedures of the city in the aftermath of World War II, the reconstruction of roads and public transport, the problems with the Red Army, and the treatment of Nazis.³⁹ The documents help to create a fuller picture about the kind of administrative initiatives which were taken after the war and which forces were delegating them. They all show the importance of the municipality of Vienna in the reconstruction of the city. At the same time, the documents should be treated with caution because they depict just one perspective concerning the reconstruction of Vienna after the Second World War. For example, the Soviet perspective as occupiers cannot be discussed in this paper because the original documents, or the writings of Blagodatov, were not available. The “perspective”, demands, and actions of Blagodatov and the Soviets are represented through the writings of the mayor.

The documents within the mayor’s office record the incoming and outgoing correspondences of the municipality of Vienna. It is significant that these documents concern only the municipality and not the state administration. This means that it is difficult to know how much input the state had in these reconstruction projects for the city. The most frequent correspondences appear to have been between the mayor and the district mayor, who were the main actors responsible for dealing with the reconstruction and cleaning of Vienna. It can be deduced from the documents that the municipality had a principle role in the reconstruction of the city of Vienna immediately after the war, and that there were various layers of administration: the district mayor answered to the city mayor, who answered to state secretary and general lieutenant Blagodatov. The general lieutenant appears to have acted as representative for the Soviet army in Vienna. This makes sense given that the Soviet army liberated Vienna and were the only part of the Allied Forces in Vienna for the first months around the end, and in the aftermath of, the war.

Two of the documents are correspondences between the Soviet general lieutenant (*Chef der Garnison*) Blagodatov and the municipality's administration.⁴⁰ The purpose of the correspondence from July 1945 was to question the progress concerning street cleaning. According to Vienna’s mayor Körner, Blagodatov demanded that the streets be cleaned: “[er] hat unter anderen [sic] befohlen, dass die Straßen Wiens bis zum 1. August 1945 restlos gesäubert sein müssen.” (Amongst other things, he has ordered that the streets of Vienna have to be cleaned completely until the 1st of August 1945). This demonstrates the fact that this was not seen by the mayor as a request, rather something that had to be done under all circumstances.⁴¹ This is furthermore verified

³⁹ WStLA, MD, B11 – Bürgermeisteramt: Jg. 1945-1948.

⁴⁰ WStLA, MD, A6 – Bürgermeisteramt: 1139/45; WStLA, MD, A6 – Bürgermeisteramt: 337/45.

⁴¹ The information comes from a report of Blagodatov’s demands from the mayor's perspective. Access to the original letter from Blagodatov would give further insight into the matter. Despite this drawback, the conclusion of a clear

by a correspondence from earlier that year between Blagotatov and Körner which includes the original document from the Russian general lieutenant. The correspondence began on 27th May 1945, and deals with the removal of human and animal corpses from the Danube canal. From the translation of the original Russian document, although there was no trace of Körner's response to this demand, it can be assumed that the mayor took orders directly from Blagotatov. The correspondence, then, allows at least some insight into the hierarchical structure of the Viennese administration, as the conversation between the single agencies is well documented.

Other issues which are dealt with regarding the reconstruction and development of Vienna include the question of how the Nazis were to be treated after the end of the war.⁴² In one document from 9th June 1945, the state secretary, a representative of *Das Staatsamt für Inneres* (the department of the interior/internal affairs), writes to the mayor of Vienna about the treatment of the Nazis. They were prioritised to be put to work in the reconstruction of the city before all others. Of special concern were the “*Illegalen*” (*illegals*); former members of the *Die Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* (NSDAP) from before 1938 when the Party had been outlawed. In practice, only the high ranking Nazis needed to be concerned, because the “ordinary” Nazis, that is, those who did not hold important posts, were so numerous that it was an extremely difficult policy to implement. The state secretary also wrote that basic laws should also apply to these citizens; it was forbidden to make them recognisable by painting swastikas on their clothes. Confiscation of their possessions without going through a legal process was also forbidden. The government asked the municipality directly to respect that.⁴³ This is evidence of an order from the central government which was expected to be carried out at a city level, and indicates the hierarchical structure of the government.

While some of the documents deal with the cleaning of Viennese streets and canals and the reconstruction of the city, there are other documents with a different theme that are still valid in the post-war priorities of the city administration: the Soviet occupation of the city. These documents delineate the tensions between the Viennese population and the occupying Soviets. In particular they depict several complaints from different companies about the Red Army.⁴⁴ The complaints came from individual firms to the *Amtsführenden Stadtrat für die Städtischen Unternehmungen und Betriebe* (Office Executive Councillor for the City Corporations and Establishments), stating that the Russian army had confiscated or stolen goods and machinery from the firms. Following the complaints, the executive counsellor appealed to the mayor to intervene. It is difficult to know how

hierarchical structure is valid, given the mayor's letter.

⁴² WStLA, MD, A6 – Bürgermeisteramt: 573/45.

⁴³ WStLA, MD, A6 – Bürgermeisteramt: 573/45.

⁴⁴ WStLA, MD, A6 – Bürgermeisteramt: 134/45.

the goods and materials were used and for what purpose, however the sources do indicate the attitude of the city administration towards the Soviets and that their plundering of goods was an important issue.

The documents in this paper show the importance of the municipality of Vienna in the reconstruction of the city. This topic could be further explored through the use of other archives and more documents, in order for a fuller picture about how the administration participated in the reconstruction of Austria, but also to gain insight into other perspectives about the post-war projects and priorities of the central administration. Also, it would be useful to investigate the protocol books more thoroughly in order to find more cases about what was being reconstructed following the war. What can be grasped from the sources is the main priorities which the Viennese municipality had in the aftermath of the war: these are the soviet occupation and the negative response to it, and the reconstruction and cleaning of the city.

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3. Summary

This project led us to two main conclusions: firstly, the end of the Second World War cannot be seen as a clear cut and re-start, but rather as a system of continuities and discontinuities in different areas of social, cultural and political life. The biography of Hermann Spitzky for instance shows a clear continuity in terms of his career before and after the World War. Even if we look at motifs of political posters we can find recurring elements. On the other hand, a lot of bureaucratic methods clearly follow a re-start, at least in the very beginning of the after-war period, when Vienna is governed by the Allied Command.

The second conclusion is rather a practical one: working with primary sources is a crucial element of historic research and yet it seems like it doesn't get a lot of attention in most university programmes. For many students this was an entirely new experience. We hope that we are able to

motivate to the students to continue working with archival material and we are looking forward to future events based on this sort of “practical experience”.

We are also very thankful to everyone who made this possible. Our thanks go to the City Archive of Vienna, for access to the sources, but also for the rooms and coffee. To Univ.-Prof. Mag. DDr.Oliver Rathkolb for his advice and important hints on the selection of the material and the association “Verein Zeitgeschichte”, the Austrian Students Union, especially the Studienrichtungsvertretung Geschichte (StrV) and the Fakultätsvertretung (GEWI) for their financial support. Furthermore we thank the ISHA Carnival team for giving us the chance to publish our results and last but not least all the members of the ISHA Vienna team, for organising the workshop and the participants who put a lot of time and effort into their work.

HOW REVOLUTIONARY WERE THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1989 IN EASTERN EUROPE?

MARINO BADURINA

In the text, based on the relevant literature, and testimonies about 1989, which brought a turning point for many residents of Eastern Europe behind the Iron Curtain, we are trying to answer how far the events, which we colloquially call the revolution, according to all of its manifestations, really contained (exhibited) its revolutionary elements i.e. how justified the attribution of the revolutionary character to the events really is.

INTRODUCTION

The word revolution is derived from the Latin word *revolutio* meaning “a turnaround”. It generally describes any sudden change that carries far-reaching consequences. Based on the experience of the French Revolution of 1789, the term has been generally used to describe changes initiated by violence and an armed struggle, along with necessary sacrifices. The concept of revolution can be used to describe the rapid changes in culture, the economy, technology and society. There is also a classification of scientific, political, and religious revolutions, where the distinctions between them may not be clear or well defined, but it is possible that each is mutually influential. The term that is usually opposed to revolution is the concept of evolution, which indicates a gradual and painless transition from the old condition to the new one, where there is a lower risk of old grievances and injustices under new circumstances.

What is considered to be a special feature of revolution is that it has to take place outside, or at least on the edge of the legal norms, which in and of itself suggests a revolt against the existing order of things. "Revolution" can take on a controversial meaning in some cases: if there is a clear break in the system of political decision-making, but political actors largely remain the same, and the targeted power becomes an associate in the act of non-violent expropriation of their own. Likewise, the term can become contentious if social patterns formally change, yet remain filled with practically the same content. The same can be said for a revolutionary outburst dismissed by those with the insight that “no revolution can change the past”, harking back to long-term political, cultural and economic heritage. This is precisely the case with 1989, a crucial year in recent European history. In this text, based on relevant literature and testimonies about the year 1989, which brought a turning point for many residents of Eastern Europe behind the Iron Curtain, we are trying to answer the question of how far the event, which we colloquially call the revolution,

according to all of its manifestations, contained its revolutionary elements. Specifically, the text will assess how much justice there is in the attribution of a revolutionary character to these events.

THE GENESIS OF 1989

The events which took place in a short period of time in the late 80s of the 20th century in the territory of Eastern Europe are, even today, a subject of many interpretations, and are seen from many perspectives.⁴⁵ Such multiperspectivity is understandable and even desirable, given the complexity of the relationship, the number of factors that played a role in these events, and the short space of time within which the events took place. The year 1989 cannot be properly understood if we approach it unilaterally and one-dimensionally.

The then state and the changes in Eastern Europe, French political scientist Francois Fejto described as "a revolution without revolutionaries" since the communist systems collapsed there on their own, without the desire of the Soviet Union to intervene and prevent the development of events. (History: The modern era of 1985 to 2007 and chronology, 2008: 181) Communism as a system just imploded. American political scientist T. Garton Ash called the state in which they were located in Eastern Europe "refolutions": a combination of revolution and reform. (Garton Ash, 1993: 7) By this, he means the coupling of pressure "from below", that is, from the nations, and pressure "from above". The pressure from above came from the reform-minded communist rulers, who, mostly out of necessity, but partly out of the genuine knowledge about the deterioration of their own policies, decided to accept the changes in their own backyard. In other words, one of the evaluations that can be accepted is that the respective events were uniting elements of social evolution and revolution, social continuity and discontinuity. (Kuran, 1991: 121)

It should also be noted that the coupling of the very concept of revolution to the former events at that time might be unpopular. This is because communists claimed exclusive rights to the term for decades, and called themselves "revolutionaries" as justification for their rule, which, it was claimed, would culminate in successful and complete socialist revolution, along with a better future for the citizens. In reality, the whole world at the end of the 70's into the beginning of the 80's saw the increasing erosion of the socialist system, and the idealistic projection of a large and strong economic upswing did not materialize. Instead, in time, the economies recorded a negative growth.

⁴⁵Eastern Europe is not taken as a geographical but as a political concept, and refers to all of the countries behind the so-called Iron Curtain, including those such as Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR that geographically mostly belong to Central Europe.

Socialism failed to deliver on most promises of material prosperity, social justice, and improvement in demographic terms. The death rate, contrary to expectations, did not decrease, and life expectancy during the last twenty years was decreased; especially in the USSR, Poland, and Hungary. (Hobsbawm, 2009: 401-402)

Great dreams of equality and justice were replaced by the harsh reality of the rule of a growing bureaucracy, poltroons, nepotism, and corruption. As time went on, citizens in these countries were offered the possibility of comparing their lives with those of citizens in Western countries through private channels of communication, and the semi-permeable state media. One need not be overly discerning to see that in this comparison, East Europeans turned out to be the unquestioned losers. However, the right balance was covered up, and the economic policy was reduced to a mere service, while you could not speak of any significant development under those conditions. Of course, the poor economic situation and the decline of living standards was also affected by the global economic trends; primarily the increase in oil prices. The borrowing continued, and the borrowed money was not used for the improvement of production. Instead, it was used to cover up the current costs, and for the maintenance of power and the status quo. It eventually led to numerous restrictions, which were mostly felt by citizens, and the deep structural reforms were avoided. Bearing in mind the nature of the system, this way of dealing with problems was understandable, in a way, given the fact that any radical reform that would be implemented by the communist government would be self-destructive, because tracing the cause of the problem would lead it to itself.

But the emphasis of solely economic causes for the events in 1989 may appear too reductive. By way of example, we can mention the GDR as a country heavily in debt, and as such it had to collapse. Romania could be viewed as a counterexample to this. In the Eighties, mostly on the back of the impoverished population, it managed almost entirely to pay off its foreign debt. Upheaval was nevertheless much more rapid and bloody, and the Ceausescus paid with their lives. The lesson would be: better for the country to fail than the people.

In addition to non-controversial economic causes, ideological motivations for revolution should be taken into account, such as the exhaustion of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, which resulted in a relatively quick surrender of the government's forces in most countries. It was an indicator of how, in the 21st century, the causes of future revolutions would be hidden in critical issues of morality, in addition to political, economic and social reasons. (Chirot, 1999: 38) Here, the issue of the causes

of revolution detracts from the field of dry sociometry and shifts into a sphere which is hardly measurable, and therefore less predictable. Thus, unlike other countries, the communist government in the Soviet Union was still relatively stable, and there was no immediate indication of any impending major changes. Communism ultimately survived longest only in the USSR. The citizens simply did not know life outside of this system and did not have the possibility of comparing social systems the way older people had in countries such as Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR. This state of "stability", or, rather, a state of stagnation, began to change in 1985 with the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev to the seat of power. He would gradually start to apply pressure for changes starting at the top. The Soviet Union would become a special case exactly for the reason that the pressure from below was minimal. Indeed, Gorbachev's reforms sought to overcome mass discontent and re-legitimize communism. On the other hand, for example in Poland, the pressure from below was crucial and decisive, while in Hungary the process was more complex. There, it was about the combination of pressure from above and below where, initially, the pressure from above had an even greater role. Had Gorbachev's efforts not been dedicated to reform and noninterference policies, (jokingly dubbed by Gorbachev: the "Sinatra doctrine", named after the song My Way), this whole process might have been slowed down and perhaps stopped for a while. Gorbachev sent an unequivocal message: the "respect of every sovereign right of people to choose their social system which they consider to be appropriate represents the most important prerequisite for a normal European process." (Kenney, 2007: 17) It was an indicator of the strength, not the weakness, of the Soviet Alliance and communism in general, Gorbachev believed. But this would soon start a domino effect in Eastern Europe, of course, with certain peculiarities in each country.

In some countries, such as Poland, transition to a new state was peaceful and gradual, the Communists and the opposition initially joined in a coalition, and the combination of market reforms and political authoritarianism was predicted. A partial reason for this should be sought in the fact that the opposition was not fully prepared to take complete control over the land. The communist nomenclature was too deeply embedded in all structures and it was necessary to reach a certain degree of conformity to bridge divisions in society and avert further economic decline. This question supplements a subsequent issue of lustration, which contrary to some claims, was not extensively implemented in any Eastern European country, and in some cases, such as Yugoslavia (e.g. Croatia), this was impossible due to the war. So the consequences for the losing side were not at all revolutionary, but they were in some way rewarded for their non-resistance to changes and they were provided with accommodation to new opportunities.

That is why in hindsight many would refer to 1989 as a "failed revolution", after which the clash with the past was not complete; either in Eastern Europe, or in former Soviet republics except the Baltic states which opened the archives and to a certain degree implemented lustration. (Stan, 2009: 45-60) This is logical when we look at the division of the revolutions depending on who committed them. In the case when the revolution was initiated by the army, i.e. an armed forces, it could be expected that the clash with the opponents would be harsher. However, in the case of such a conflict the new government would be absent, and in order to ensure the stability and continuity for itself, they will act in a more conciliatory manner, especially when inheriting structures largely cross-linked with personnel from the old system which are easier to gradually acquire than to go to a brutal clash with them.

EASTERN EUROPE AT A CROSSROADS

The first countries where the Communists were removed from power in a relatively peaceful and painless way were Poland and Hungary. However, there were some differences between them politically. Poland became the foremost country of reforms within the eastern Communist bloc since 1980 with the emergence of the trade union "Solidarity". The head of the union was young and charismatic Lech Wałęsa, the Gdansk shipyard worker who also became the focus of growing resistance. The country was taken over by a wave of protests with which the authorities brutally clashed. When in 1981, by the orders from Moscow, general Wojciech Jaruzelski was elected to be the prime minister, Poland introduced repressive policies, and the Government decided at all costs to put an end to trade union activity. Wałęsa was arrested and "Solidarity" forbidden, but in 1983 many members were granted political amnesty. However, a breath of freedom was felt after 1985 with the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev at the head of the Soviet Union. "Solidarity" was once again restored in 1986, and Wałęsa received the Nobel Prize for peace a few years earlier, and with this, the role and responsibility of the whole movement became even greater and more significant.⁴⁶ Now the government could no longer ignore the growing discontent and the need for changes.

An important role in the life of Poland was played by the Catholic Church, with respect to the vast majority of the Catholic population.⁴⁷ In regard to this, a special incentive occurred in 1978 when the archbishop of Krakow, Karol Wojtyła, was elected pope. His visits to Poland in the subsequent

⁴⁶ Wałęsa was given the Nobel peace prize in 1983., but since the government took away his passport, he couldn't receive it personally.

⁴⁷ According to the data of Polish government, 95% of Poles say they belong to the Roman Catholic Church <http://www.poland.gov.pl/?document=397> (14.4.2015.)

years, despite the protests and restraint of communist authorities, further mobilized Poles, and many of them strengthened the belief of their almost messianic role in the liberation of Europe from communism. (Kolakowski, 1999: 57) Accordingly, Garton Ash says that if he had to determine the exact point in time for the beginning of the end of communism in Eastern Europe, he would suggest 1979 and the first papal pilgrimage to his native Poland. (Garton Ash, 1999: 107) On that occasion, enormous pent up national energy was released in Poland, which had been repressed for decades. Therefore we can agree that the choice of Pope from Poland was a kind of litmus test; at best a catalyst for change, which brought Poland the flattering title of the pioneer in the fight for change.

In Czechoslovakia, the events of 1989 were termed "velvet revolution" because of the Communists, who, after initial reluctance at the round table and through negotiations, eventually decided to peacefully hand over power. This was in spite of the fact that many of the dissenters, led by Vaclav Havel, were initially surprised by the attempts of the Communists to keep their positions. The Communists were trying to push their concept of hybrid power, which would in reality only be a cosmetically altered communist government, before they proposed a coalition to finally agree on a complete change of system. In Estonia, the Baltic state, which was part of the Soviet Union, these events are remembered as the "singing revolution" since the people in one of the festivals used songs to express their opposition to staying in the USSR. The terms: "velvet revolution", "singing revolution", and "non-violent revolution" can be considered as oxymorons, yet they can be characterized as revolutionary because of the change from the one monologue and directive attitude of the communist elite to the realization that there is a need for public dialogue, although the pressure of the people and the newly established opposition political actors essentially directed the dialogue and narrowed the maneuvering space of the former rulers.

In the context of these events, one should not ignore the important role of the media. For example, when, during the gathering of the crowd in Berlin, in the bringing down of the Berlin Wall, West German state television announced that large cracks in the wall were even more obvious and that the wall was definitely falling. It was still not completely clear whether it would actually fall, but such news was the trigger because it motivated even more Berliners both from the east and from the west to go out onto the streets to greet each other. This momentum became irreversible. Precisely this role of the media, especially television, airing events every hour, led to the revolutions of 1989 being coined the "televised revolutions".

The speed of unfolding events was surprising for many, and it was even shocking. This was confirmed by the attitude of American policy which was cautious in the beginning. The then-Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and his reforms were seen as a possible passing phenomenon, of course with the awareness of the fact that in the Soviet Union there were powerful currents and groups that were dissatisfied with Gorbachev's moves, which would be confirmed later when Gorbachev was kidnapped and military circles in Moscow tried to perform a kind of coup d'état. Gorbachev's peacefulness and passivity irritated those who advocated a more radical solution and not relinquishing Soviet communism and the Soviet Union as a world leader of the Communist bloc. In this regard, perhaps the concerned circles were not completely unrealistic. The fact that the West and the greater part the population of Eastern Europe were surprised by bubbling changes indicates that the capacity of a counter-attack from conservative factions within the Communist government, at least in the beginning, existed.⁴⁸ However, over time, this possibility certainly decreased, as a wave of change had been unleashed, which quickly grew beyond the control of the state.

REVOLUTION OR NOT?

The specificity of the events in 1989 was reflected in the fact that they represented the opposition to Jacobin (Marxist) wishes to transform the world on the basis of some eschatological projections. There were no promises of a utopian future, except perhaps a partial "free market" utopia. Instead, proven old recipes of pluralist democracy, a parliamentary system, the rule of law were "offered". (Eisenstadt, 1999: 91-92 and Isaac, 1999: 121-159)⁴⁹ The reason for this lack of a utopian vision should be sought in the anti-communist character of these revolutions, and consequently, it was not logical that one utopia simply replace another. Therefore, although the very concept of "revolution" was usually tied to violence and violently forced changes, the case of 1989 suggests otherwise. Indeed, violence was largely absent, and there was no missionary characteristic to the revolution. When, as Eisenstadt says, Havel came to Poland, "he did not bring an army to revolutionize Poland,

⁴⁸For example, four months after the fall of the Berlin Wall the Allensbach Institute conducted a study among East Germans with a question: „A year ago did you expect such a peaceful revolution?“ Only 5 percent answered „yes“, 18 percent responded „yes, but not that fast“, but even 76 percent admitted they were completely surprised by the events. (Kuran, 1991: 121)

⁴⁹However, Tony Judt as a guideline of dissident intellectuals in Eastern Europe highlights a "myth of Europe" in which up to 1989 the belief in the West was rather diminished. The war in the former Yugoslavia will break the fame that the era of wars on the territory of Europe, thanks to the new ever more perfect post-war security system, finally completed. (Judt, 1999: 166) Today's turn of circumstances in Europe are an additional blow to the founding myth of Europe as an area of complete peace and stability.

he came as a friend of a friendly neighboring state, to speak before the Polish Sejm," (Eisenstadt, 1999: 92).

Also, it goes without saying that a superficial understanding of revolution as an act of violence could make you think that revolutions and various events involving violence lead to certain changes, but do not bring with them anything revolutionary. Therefore, the consequences of a revolution should always be taken into account: sometimes a certain time lag is required in order to ascertain whether something is a revolution or not. Hannah Arendt would say that "revolutions are the only political event that directly confronts us with the problem of starting." (Arendt, 1977: 146) However, in addition, the events of 1989 set the agenda of the problems of the past and its reevaluations. (Jedlicka, 1990: 39-40) It was necessary to correct the injustices to the past, which is clearly reflected in the verse of *The Internationale* which says "of the past let us make a clean slate". Here, therefore, it was not just about starting anew, but, if possible, establishing continuity with the old, which was interrupted by communism, which was subsequently shown only as a kind of historical interlude, almost the period between the two freedoms. With this, the old regularity was resumed, that almost every major change and aim was justified to achieve always rightful freedom as a fundamental guiding principle of political thought. However, Arendt considered that even an American representative system of government, which was the most proud of Freedom, was deficient. The main objection which she indicates to this system refers to the fact that it opens a space to the representatives of the people, not the people themselves. Parties thus become oligarchies isolated from the people, which might represent their interests, but not their views and opinions. (Arendt, 1977: 238)

In this way, if the possible revolutions in 1989 could be measured with a meter of freedom as absolute, it is clear that these events would fail the test of revolutionary. In short, the revolution would not be sufficiently revolutionary. The area of freedom is further narrowed since the masses in Eastern Europe expected rapid changes in their social, or financial, situation soon after the destruction of the monopoly of communist authorities and the transition to non-communist societies. Because of that, a relatively new and unprepared government structure was simply forced upon them, only to largely rely on precisely those former communists, which is why a significant number of them survived Communism's political death.

In fact, from this we can conclude that the true revolution was yet to come, while the events of 1989 marked only a transitional phase. However, historical experience teaches that such a transitional

phase persists the longest in the end. Eventually the discordant voices started to appear: one began to speak of "unfinished revolution" and wished for a final showdown with the structures of the past, while others wanted to take a break and start a long-term transition phase. Therefore, we could partially apply to 1989 what Francois Furet said about the French Revolution in 1789: "The Revolution thus continued to escape from those who wished to end it, for they continually bumped against either those who wished to erase altogether the Revolution or those who wished to start it up all over again."(Furet, 1990: 4)

To understand these devotees of transition we can connect it with the thoughts of Gustave Le Bon, a French psychologist who said that: "the real revolution, one that changed the destiny of the people, was generally carried out so slowly that historians can hardly mark the beginning so that word evolution would fit them better instead of the word revolution." (Le Bon, 2004: 289) We can further clarify the understanding of revolution as a specific leap in evolution. Essentially, this evolution is the evolution of discontent growing, thus preparing the ground for revolution which has to be driven from the top, at the right time, and after putting it down in the masses, it eventually reaches its crescendo. The term "transition" generally refers to the development of post-communist societies. However, there are different possible definitions. If the transition is understood as a sudden reversible twist, then it is like a revolution, and it represents revolutionary change. If, however, the transition is a process that takes place over a long period of time and gradually affects different spheres of society then this is a change of evolutionary character. (Švob- Djokic, 2000: 15) Most scholars will agree that the transition is a process which has just started with the disintegration of the socialist system. Yet surely it was more of a long-term process whereby the beginning of the transition coincided with the beginning of the decomposition of these systems.

Of course, it is difficult to achieve consensus about the exact time of determination of these processes, but the last decade before the fall of the Berlin Wall are indisputably the years when the changes took place before the eyes of those who lived in this system, and those who were watching from the west. Therefore, if we accept the extension of the transition to the period before the collapse of the system, to the 1980s, then the standpoint of those who deny the revolutionary events of 1989 makes more sense. According to Hobsbawm, the term "Eastern European revolution" may be misleading because it suggests a sudden overthrow of the regime, and it simply does not fit the facts. In fact, none of the regimes in Eastern Europe were truly overthrown. (Hobsbawm, 2009: 414) Of course, this is with the exception of, as was previously mentioned, the overthrow of Nicolae Ceausescu's government. However, today it is clear that this was more about the coup

planned by parts of the army and the intelligence services, instead of a true revolution and anger of the people who were "thirsty for the dictator's blood". Thus, the tip of the iceberg was removed, and the political, intelligence and military structures generally continued to exist. Hence the structures decided to participate in the transition. It is true that the Communist oligarchy in these systems declined as "rotten pears". That the Soviet Union would not intervene and would leave the Eastern regimes to their fate was the only relevant item. Those regimes had already lost faith in their own legitimacy. They confirmed de Tocqueville's theorem of a revolutionary situation that arises when the ruling elite loses faith in their own right to rule. (Garton Ash, 1999: 112). Therefore, the revolution failed not so much because of the activities of an attacker, but rather because of the inactivity of the attacked.

Otherwise, if there was a determination, perhaps the fall of communism could have been prevented, or at least postponed for some time, as proven by the Chinese example, when the government decided to violently suppress protests in Tianmen Square. Le Bon, in the example of rebellion in Russia in 1905, tried to confirm that power with sufficient determination could win a revolution if it decided to vigorously defend its position. In extremely difficult circumstances; losing the war against Japan and faced with pressure from all social classes, the Russian government, through concessions to the peasants who made up the vast majority of the population, managed to neutralize the enemy and remain in power for the next decade. This can lead to the conclusion that the government does not overthrow but instead commits suicide. (Le Bon, 2004: 307-308) By contrast the Soviet Union simply chased away many of its inhabitants, in the republics and in its sphere of influence. So some countries gained the independence that they did not even want, such as Belarus. However, they were told very clearly that they were on their own and that they had to worry about their recovery and future. Despite the principled attitude that the Soviet Union should be preserved as a union of sovereign republics, the decomposition of its institutions could not be stopped. Various theoretical considerations, among other things, the new concept of "planned-market economy" remained a dead letter. No one had a concrete idea of how this could be carried out in practice. This discrepancy between desire and reality, theory and practice was too obvious. Facing the reality has led to the fact that yesterday's rigid communists have finally allowed a peaceful transition, in which they decided to participate.

CONCLUSION

The fall of Eastern European regimes took place in relative peace that was disproportionate to the vast invested and smoldered energy that could have resulted in a much more dramatic outcome. Under those circumstances, that for many were amazing, there was no guarantee of the peaceful unfolding of events, and things could have gone downhill. However, such a course of events led to the creation and use of the seemingly paradoxical and oxymoronic terms including: "velvet revolution", "singing revolution" and "non-violent revolution". If we accept violence as one of the prerequisites for revolution, then it certainly was not a true revolution. The fate of those against whom the revolt was directed also does not support the assertion that the events of 1989 were a revolution, since most communist rulers were not punished, and many of them, who were probably not devout communists, were quickly co-opted into the new government structure and accepted the new social relations. On the other hand, when we look at the consequences of these events, we could conclude that they, for many people behind the Iron Curtain, meant a big change and the unfolding of new opportunities which had not previously been possible, accompanied by great hopes, and even illusions which accompanies all revolutions. Reality, however, has brought neither rapid nor expected changes. It was just one revolutionary moment, a flash of freedom replaced by a long-term and arduous evolutionary process that is commonly referred to as "transition". In the process, according to historical and environmental correctness, many experienced soberness of its ideals, and they had to accept that no changes, which involve the demolition of the old order, would necessarily mean that what is coming is better and more durable. Finally, there is no revolution that can change the past, undo the cultural, social and economic realities. Therefore, it was shown that after a disintegration, which actually represented only a transitional phase for the purpose of the new European integration, the countries of Central, Eastern Europe and Southeast Europe, contrary to optimistic expectations, will not even today be equal players. Indeed, they will be faced with a new arrogance which this time comes from the West, and will again represent a kind of periphery. However, resources and peripherals for some will prove to be bigger chance than earlier roles of outposts of the Red Empire.

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THE MERCHANT, THE SPANIARD AND THE TURKS – HOW NOT TO BUILD AN ARMY AND SIEGE A CITY?

DÁNIEL MÁRTON MOLNÁR

The year of 1552 in Hungary began with a very interesting and, in some ways, strange venture. A group of self-declared soldiers, led by a former merchant, tried to recapture the town of Szeged from the Ottomans, who had captured the town a decade earlier. Indeed, the Hungarians failed, but the way to this event and the aftermath are far more interesting than the actual battle.

Szeged is situated on the current Hungarian-Serbian border. In the late Medieval and Early modern period, the town was one of the greatest settlements in the country. It was built on the shore of river Tisza, opposite to the Maros (or Mures in Romanian) estuary. It made it a very important junction and trade centre.

Szeged was a wealthy town. Because of its perfect location, it became a centre for trade. Firstly the river Maros came from Transylvania, and the river was the main salt-trading route. Salt was like gold at that time, so Szeged quickly became an important salt-trade centre, seat of the “Sókamara”, the main salt-trading state-monopoly. Secondly there was the river Tisza, an important waterway with which wine especially was transported from the northern vineyards. Thirdly, both rivers were rich in fish, and Szeged had at least some 1500 fishermen. Fourthly, the town was just a bit south of the the main cattle-breeding area of the Great Hungarian Plain (Alföld), where hundreds of thousand horses and cows were bred, ready to be transported to other regions for food or to be used as warhorses.⁵⁰

Thanks to its suitable position and important role, Szeged had a large population: it probably was among the five greatest towns in Hungary at that time, with a population of 10.000.⁵¹ The population was diverse: numerous servants, fishermen, boat- and ferrymen, shopkeepers, and merchants. The merchants of Szeged were among the richest people in Hungary, and had a huge web of contacts. Being in a crossway, Szeged was a centre of information. Greater merchants had friends, employees or shops in other cities, such as Debrecen, Várad (today: Oradea), Kolozsvár (today: Cluj-Napoca), or Buda.⁵²

⁵⁰ More about the history of the city in Hungarian: Szeged 1983.

⁵¹ Szeged 1983: 541. About the society see pages 635-663.

⁵² Szakály 1995: 172-175.

When the Ottomans captured Szeged in 1541, the town was divided in many ways. At first, the town was divided physically: Szeged was very unique, it was not like a classic town of its time. It was more like an “Oppidum”, or Mezőváros, in Hungarian, which means “field town”.⁵³ Szeged was built up from three greater parts, each separated from the other by fields and marshes of nearly two-three kilometres. Each of these parts was semicircle-shaped, with three or four gates, and was situated on the shore of the river Tisza. Between the three parts were swampy fields, and in rainy weather, earth- and wooden bridges linked the parts of the towns together. The central part was named “Palling”, because it was circled by an earth rampart and a nearly three meters deep and more than fifteen meters wide trench filled with water. At the bank of the river Tisza, in the middle of Palling semicircle was a small medieval castle.⁵⁴

Secondly, the newborn Lutheran church and the Catholics had had a bitter conflict. Protestantism was relatively young, but these decades were the time of its rapid spread in Hungary – especially in the border regions and in the Ottoman-controlled areas. Until 1552, Szeged was a town where tensions grew between the two sides.

Thirdly, the townsmen could not decide what the better solution would be to avoid the Turkish threat and further raids. Some of them had the opinion to surrender to the Ottomans, so they would stop coming to raid and extort the city. Another group thought that if they managed to gather an army, they could stand and fight the Ottomans and maybe win. The quarrel ended with the victory of the “peace-party”, if we can say that: the town send envoy to grand vizier (*serasker*) Rüstem, and to the pasha of the just-fallen Buda, and swore loyalty to the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁵ The main leaders of the other group, who thought that resistance would be better, went to exile. The peace-party contained all the Protestants and many Catholics too, and they lived in the non-protected northern and southern parts, Alsó-Szeged (Lower Szeged, the southernmost of the three part) and Újsziget (New Island, the northernmost, opposite of the Maros estuary). The resistance-party came from the more well defended Palling, and were homogenously Roman Catholic.

One of the main characters of our story was a rich merchant, Mihály Tóth. He traded with cattle and horses, and owned one of the larger amounts of cattle at that time in the country.⁵⁶ Also, he was a

⁵³ Field towns are a unique kind of settlement in Medieval and Early modern Hungary. Field towns had none or negligible walls, nor stone-built, town-like buildings, but were huge and their inhabitants were not “townsmen”, but peasants and serfs under feudal lords and not just kings. Some of them developed into ordinary cities – Szeged was one of them.

⁵⁴ Szeged 1983: 498 and 537.

⁵⁵ Szeged 1983: 530.

⁵⁶ Szakály 1995: 175.

Catholic zealot and one of the leaders of the “resistance-party.” After the Ottomans had taken control over the town, Tóth went to exile. He had good contacts with the people of Debrecen, which was in the centre of cattle-breeding and trading. His contacts were so good, that when he went into exile to Debrecen, he quickly got a house there and became a member of the town’s magistrate.⁵⁷ So he had the web of contacts and the money to become one of the most important figures of the emigration.

His contact webs were wide; he not just had friends among influential townsmen, but also among a more recent group of society, the hajduks. Hajduks are an odd group. Until the 1990’s they were described as a poor and declassed people, guarding and herding the huge cattle herds of the plain.⁵⁸ They were described as champions of the poor and guardians of Protestantism,⁵⁹ and also as infantry which was deployed en-masse on the battlefield. Recent research shows something different however. At first, the hajduks were not poor; at that time, nearly one third or even more of them were cavalymen. Warhorses were expensive, a single serf definitely could not buy one. Also, a horseman needed at least two battle-ready horses – which meant that among the hajduks were numerous noblemen and townsmen, rich enough to have bought warhorses and try their luck as free soldiers. Another thing is that hajduks widely used firearms, especially muskets. A single musketeer was nothing at that time, and rifles were not made to guard cattle from wolves, but to use against humans. In that time the hajduks were on the way to becoming something similar to the Zaporozhian Cossacks.⁶⁰ Later they became musketeers, because the Hungarian armies constantly lacked mass infantry with firearms.

Mihály Tóth was constantly looking for an opportunity to retake the city from the Turks. The Turks however, were also aware of this and rebuilt and fortified the old castle of the town as well as strengthening the older defenses, especially the city’s palling. In the year of 1552, a fort with three or four cannons, a small castle and a huge encircled town were ready, with approximately 300 soldiers as a garrison, and several hundred other soldiers from groups passing through and adventurers.⁶¹

⁵⁷ Szakály 1995: 176-177

⁵⁸ Dankó 1969:5, Nagy 1983: 14.

⁵⁹ Their early 17th century leader, Stephan Bocskay even has a life-size statue at the „Reformator’s wall” in Geneva, along with Cromwell, William the Silent, Gaspar de Coligny and others.

⁶⁰ See Marton 2012

⁶¹ The town’s *defter* (Turkish official list about income, tax, and paid soldiers and officials of a town and region) talks about 12 gunners and 350 soldiers on payroll in 1551. Velics 1883: 70-71.

The opportunity came in the winter of 1551. That year King Ferdinand and George the Friar⁶² made an arrangement about the reunification of the country – from 1526 until the mentioned date a Pro-Habsburg and an Anti-Habsburg or Pro-Szapolyai part existed.⁶³ Ferdinand sent 7000 soldiers to Transylvania, under the command of Giovanni Battista Castaldo. The Ottomans didn't want to lose their vassal state, so they launched an attack in the autumn of 1551, led by Mehmed Sokollu.⁶⁴ They captured Lippa and besieged Temesvár (Timisoara), but they could not take the fort. Lippa was retaken very soon by the royal army,⁶⁵ and some minor victories were scored against the Ottomans, so Tóth saw it as the optimal moment. He mobilized some four or five-thousand men and moved to Temesvár (today Timisoara), in hope that his close ties with George Friar would grant some help. However, the Friar's political maneuvers made him suspicious in the eyes of the pro-Ferdinand nobility and for the soldiers of Castaldo, so he was assassinated in his quarter at Alvinc in December.

Tóth did not give up, and continued to look for somebody who would help in his plan. He described a plan to Giovanni Castaldo, who was the superior commander of the Transylvanian royal army. Tóth told him that he had made contact with his friends in Szeged and that everything was suitable for a quick raid on the town. The citizens would open the gates of the Palling after which his best soldiers would run into the town, kill the Ottoman garrison and wait until the royal army arrived to reinforce the city. His plan was risky, but had some advantages: because the castle was too small for the garrison, the whole Ottoman host slept in the city and the gates of the castle were not closed.⁶⁶ If the attack came by surprise and would be quick, success may follow. Castaldo gave his permission.

Tóth presented his plan not only to Castaldo, but also Bernardo Villela de Aldana, a Spanish tercio-commander and that time commander of the castle of Lippa. Aldana was a strange figure, and one of the most debated people of these times.⁶⁷ Aldana was only “de jure” master de campo, de facto

⁶² His name refers to him being a Pauline monk and bishop of Várad (Oradea) as well as a cardinal. He is mostly referred to as the “Friar” in contemporary texts.

⁶³ It would take up too much space to summarize the whole Hungarian history of that era. For that see: Géza Pálffy: *The Kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy in the Sixteenth Century, 2009.*

⁶⁴ Later he became Pasha of Rumelia, and even later grand vizier.

⁶⁵ From now on, royal army means the troops sent by Ferdinand to Transylvania.

⁶⁶ Szeged 1985: 536-38

⁶⁷ More about him can be found in Hungarian, including his memoirs, written around 1555-58. Bernardo de Aldana: *Expedición del maestro de campo Bernardo de Aldana...*, translated in Hungarian in 1986 by László Scholz. Important (in Hungarian): Zoltán Korpás: *Egy spanyol zsoldosvezér levelei...*, 1999.

he never had a complete tercio, because after his promotion he was sent to Hungary with only a third of the full amount of Spanish soldiers.⁶⁸ However, he was extremely skilled in artillery and fortification building, as well as in seizing fortresses – he was among the people who planned and built the fortress of Szolnok a year before, and had commanded the artillery in the recent sieges. He also took part in the successful defence of Temesvár at 1551. Sadly, he was also a man who wanted great deeds, glory, and honour, and therefore risked too much. He also overestimated himself and his soldiers' capabilities many times. He quickly accepted the plan of Tóth, and started to build up a group of some thousand soldiers from the royal army who were to become the garrison of the freshly taken town.⁶⁹

Their plan was so risky, and it was questionable that would it end in success. At first, there was no “plan B”, so if the hajduks couldn't take the town by surprise the whole plan would collapse. The “army” had no cannons at all, because moving cannons out from the endangered frontier castles was banned by Castaldo and Ferdinánd. The hajduks were incapable to conduct a proper siege since they lacked the discipline. The number of the royal detachment was also low for that and consisted of mostly cavalry – which was quite unique, because in most battles the royal army fielded the infantry and the Hungarians the cavalry.

The town was not impregnable, but if the Turks managed to dig themselves in the castle they would be a hard nut to crack for an army without artillery. And Szeged was situated in the middle of Turkish fortresses, nearly halfway between Belgrade and Buda, only Szolnok and Temesvár were Hungarian castles in the nearby, meaning that the town was encircled with Ottomans from three sides.⁷⁰ If the siege got stuck, the Ottomans could gather forces to break the siege, and an open-field battle would be risky to fight with mostly self-made irregular soldiers and officers.

The soldiers were not professionals, and their local leaders were not either. Although Aldana was skilled, he lacked experience in open-field battles as well as lacking experience as high commander, and also had no experience in fighting with so many and diverse “soldiers.” He had experience with tercios, but the most professional, best trained and disciplined and well organized unit of that time was far different from the hajduks. While the commander of a tercio gave the order and the soldiers did what was said, hajduks had low discipline, ignored orders, and broke up formations – or

⁶⁸ A tercio in general contains about 3000 soldiers, however, Aldana had 1200 soldiers in 1548, and 1400 in 1550. Korpás 1999: 7-14.

⁶⁹ Aldana 1986: 191-192

⁷⁰ See the map attached, and also Szakály 1995: 177-179.

not even assumed them.⁷¹ It was nearly clear that Aldana would be unable to lead them in battle. To make his work harder, the hajduks felt hate towards foreign soldiers and officers for ages and throughout their history.⁷²

As I mentioned above, Hungarian leaders were also inexperienced. The two main commanders were Tóth and his associate from Debrecen, Ambrus Nagy, but both of them came from the civil life. They had never been in a battle before, led an army, organized a battle-order or commanded a siege. The whole plan showed that they had no idea how a siege worked. They thought that inexperienced, undisciplined troops would be able to attack a town by surprise and its garrison. They did not order cannons from the higher command because they were so sure in their job.

The events actually showed all weaknesses of the plan. On the night of 22 of February, 1552, some thousand hajduks crossed the Tisza with approximately 600 fishing boats through the help of the town's fishermen. The supporters of Tóth managed to open the gates of the Palling, and the hajduks attacked the Turkish soldiers inside. The plan, however, collapsed quickly. Not because the Turks put up a fierce resistance, but the hajduks started looting immediately, making a large amount of noise. The Ottomans woke up, and did what everyone would do when attacked by surprise: run. They ran into the castle, together with their bey⁷³ and closed the gate.⁷⁴ Half of the garrison died, but some hundred managed to get into the castle and waited.

When the sun came up, the Palling was looted, especially the Turkish, Serbian and Jewish traders. The leaders also forgot about the castle, but turned their attention to their rivals. Prominent members of the "peace-party" and all Protestants were banished from the town by the order of Tóth, who supervised the action himself.⁷⁵ At least he sent a message to Aldana that the city had fallen, but the Turks had made it into the castle, and when his men tried to assault them they were beaten back.

When Aldana got the message of Tóth he was in Makó, at that time a village about thirty kilometres east from Szeged. He immediately sent a letter to Castaldo and András Báthory, who

⁷¹ About tercios: Parker 2004. and Leon 2009. About hajduks (in Hungarian): Takács 1908. and Nagy 1983.

⁷² Even Aldana remarks that they had a bad relationship even with the regular Hungarian soldiers. Aldana 1986: 197.

⁷³ Bey is an Ottoman-Turkish military rank, also can be governor of a "sanjak" (a medium-sized administrative district) or commander of a town or fort.

⁷⁴ The description of the battle came from Aldana 1986: 192-193. Also from contemporary Hungarian sources from the late XVIth century: Istvánffy I/2 2003:174

⁷⁵ Istvánffy I/2 2003:176

was the governor of Transylvania.⁷⁶ He asked for siege cannons. Problem was that the river Maros was frozen, so it was impossible to send some guns quickly by waterway. So there was the need to prepare the huge bronze and iron cannons for field transportation – but that type of cannon was only in Várad, and because Temesvár was so endangered it was forbidden to transport cannons from the fort. Unfortunately, Várad was two times as far away as Temesvár. So the time passed and worked for the Ottoman: the bey of Szeged immediately sent a message to the pasha of Buda, Hadim Ali.⁷⁷ Ali started to summon an army to Buda from the Ottoman fortresses of the area, and quickly moved in to break the siege.

The whole venture rushed into its doom. Aldana arrived at Szeged, where he realized the unbearable conditions: the hajduks had found the wine storages and had become drunk. Half of them were somewhere in the nearby villages, where they wanted to find minor Turkish detachments to kill or supply trains to loot. The rest of them were scattered among the three city parts, and were busy looting and drinking. Aldana tried to make a siege-trench around the castle and for this work he used the royal army, especially his 200 Spanish infantrymen as well as some of the hajduks. But without cannons it seemed impossible to attack. Aldana did not know at the time, but we know now that the transportable cannons in the Várad garrison still hadn't been made ready for transport. Soldiers in Várad only started to prepare them when the news came on the 4th of March: the army of Ali had attacked the Hungarian army, and the whole army had scattered.⁷⁸

The battle brought the crown up to date. On the morning of the 1st of March, peasants came with the report that a Turkish army was approaching the town. Aldana decided to take up the battle eastward from Szeged (where present-day Kiskundorozsma is). He left the royal infantry in the trenches to cover the army's backside from the Turkish garrison. Then he summoned the hajduks and the royal cavalry and took up positions. His plan was that he would scatter the Turks when they attacked, then would counterattack their camp. However, half of the hajduks were not present for the battle; they were still drunk or were somewhere else, hunting for Turkish troops or supply-caravans.⁷⁹

The battle began when the Turkish artillery opened fire from twelve cannons. The barrage made little damage, so the Turkish cavalry launched an attack. It was scattered by the royal heavy

⁷⁶ ÖStA HHStA UA Fasc. 62. Letter from Aldana to Castaldo at 24th of February, 1552.

⁷⁷ With use of a messenger pigeon. Istvánffy I/2 2003:176

⁷⁸ Báthory sent a letter to Castaldo that when he was ready to send the cannons from Várad, he received the message of the defeat. HHStA UA Fasc. 63. Báthory's letter to Castaldo at the 4th of march, 1552.

⁷⁹ Aldana 1986: 194 and Szakály 1995: 185.

cavalry on the flanks, as well as a detachment of Silesian heavy riders, led by Aldana himself, scattering the main infantry unit of the Turks and capturing the Turkish flag (it still can be seen in the Vienna war museum). The hajduks also managed to repel the attack of the janissaries. Then everything suddenly collapsed. Hajduks started to loot the dead Turks and also tried to catch runaway Turkish horses. Aldana tried to reorganize them, without success. Seeing the chaos at the center of the Hungarian army, Ali again ordered an attack, scattering the hajduks. Seeing that, the royal cavalry started to break ranks. The battle was lost, Aldana managed to get back to the town and retreated with the royal infantry with minimal losses. He retreated to the northern Szolnok fortress, while some parts of the army retreated along the river Maros. The Ottomans suffered casualties so high that they did not chase them. But they attacked the drunken hajduks in the town, slaughtering all of them. At the end of the day, four thousand hajduks, some dozen regular soldiers and thousands of Ottomans were dead.⁸⁰

After these events, Aldana and Tóth remained together; Aldana used Tóth as his deputy officer.⁸¹ Why did he do that? Because he realized that the leadership of Hungarian soldiers was far beyond his capabilities, but he needed to operate with them successfully. For that, he needed to find someone who had experience, and someone he could trust. Aldana had had in the past – and later on – many conflicts with other Hungarian leaders. While other, more experienced commanders among the Hungarians didn't like Aldana's ideas about the way of war, Tóth, who had little experience, was convinced about the usefulness of the cooperation with Aldana. He also thought that a next try for Szeged was only able if he cooperated with someone else who ranked highly in the royal army and had the ability to lead a siege.

However, Aldana had no energy to do something about Szeged. He was ordered by Castaldo in mid-April to go to Gyula, an important castle and to take control of it after its owner had died. Because of the death of the pro-Habsburg former owner, there was the danger that his relatives would try to give it to the Ottomans. Castaldo wanted to integrate the castle into the defence line. So Aldana was chained to Gyula because Castaldo forbid him to leave the castle.⁸² Furthermore,

⁸⁰ There are two sources about the battle from witnesses: One was sent by the commander of a cavalry unit, Reimpracht von Oppersdorf, (ÖSTA HHStA UA Fasc. 63:Oppersdorf's letter to Ferdinand at the 8th of March) and the other is from Aldana in his memoirs. Aldana 1986: 192-196. Also Istvánffy I/2 2003:177-78

⁸¹ Aldana 1986: 207.

⁸² ÖSTA HHStA UA Fasc. 63: Castaldo's letter to Ferdinánd, where he describes this decision on the 14th of April, 1952.

Aldana had a serious carriage-accident on the way to Gyula, and had suffered major injuries – on his right hand, an infested wound made him unable to take part in any action.⁸³ He only recovered in the first weeks of June and until that time, suffered from fever caused blood poisoning.⁸⁴

Soon after he partly had recovered, he summoned Tóth and his re-organized group to Gyula. Rumours had come that the Ottomans was planning a greater action against Hungary. The reason of their attack was that they wanted to avoid the unification of the two parts of the country. The situation was not good: Temesvár wasn't fully renovated, Lippa was nothing but a ruin, and Castaldo only had only 7000 soldiers defend Transylvania from an attack, which could come from three direction simultaneously: from Moldova, from Wallachia and from the south-west.⁸⁵

Aldana heard that the Ottomans would operate with at least two armies: one led by Ali, the pasha of Buda, marching towards the Trans-Danubian fortresses, while the other by vice-*serdar* Ahmed towards Temesvár, Szolnok, and perhaps Eger. Aldana got information about the attack of Ali against the Trans-Danubian Veszprém, so he ordered Tóth to gather his light cavalry and try to launch attack against Ali's supply.⁸⁶ They had some success, but due to the desertion of the defenders Veszprém fell after only a three-day long siege.⁸⁷ After minor clashes with smaller Turkish troops, Tóth returned to Gyula.

The attack of the main Turkish army led by Achmed was an even greater threat. During the first days of June the still sick and weak Aldana relocated himself to Lippa – where he found nothing but ruined walls and a badly paid and equipped garrison with extremely low morale.⁸⁸ This garrison was at least large: about two-or three thousand soldiers were stationed there. Some of them however were deserters of Temesvár, others were hajduks, Serbian irregulars, or simply armed peasants. On paper, there were many detachments of the royal army,⁸⁹ but most of them were decimated by earlier battles, or had suffered from desertion as well as illnesses caused by the swampy area.

⁸³ A personal letter of Aldana to his brother on the 1st of June, 1552. In.: Aldana 1986.: 273.

⁸⁴ See previous letter. Also Aldana 1986: 204

⁸⁵ Around the year of 1552: Szántó 1985.

⁸⁶ Aldana's letter to his brother at the 1st of June, 1552, In. Aldana 1986: 207. Also see: Szakály 1995: 187-188.

⁸⁷ Szántó 1985: 97.

⁸⁸ Aldana 1986: 183.

⁸⁹ ÖStA HHStA UA Fasc 65. A letter from Castaldo to Ferdinand at the 20th of July, 1552.

The siege of Temesvár began on the 10th of July. The castle was under the command of István Losonczy, Comes of Temes and an earlier rival of Aldana.⁹⁰ Historians in the past have blamed Aldana, that he did not try to lift the Ottoman siege of Temesvár because he hated the commander,⁹¹ but as we see, he was not able to do much. Castaldo urged him to try to attack the Turks,⁹² Later historians accused him of being a coward and asked why the attack never came. But his troops were in a bad condition and he was still sick and weak.

However, he tried once come to the aid of the defenders of the fortress: he asked Tóth, together with the relatives and friends of the commander of Temesvár, to try and slip through the Ottoman lines and carry gunpowder to the fortress. According to Aldana, the group scattered on the road. What happened was that they were ambushed by Ottoman cavalry and were overrun and killed. Tóth barely escaped with several wounds. He recovered after some weeks, but his cooperation with Aldana had ended. This was understandable since Aldana had been arrested or abandoning Lippa some days after the fall of Temesvár. In the past this attempt was not connected to Aldana, but examining his memoirs makes it likely that he provided the equipment for this venture. Their cooperation here ended, and in total, it had little or no effect on the course of the war.

Why this story is important? Because the historians argued, that cooperation between Hungarian and foreign soldiers as well as officers was generally bad, and that many times personal problems and dislikes made cooperation difficult. Here we saw that a Spanish and a Hungarian soldier could cooperate, even if this cooperation did not affect the course of the war. This is not surprising: some hundred soldiers cannot make a difference when armies of ten-thousands fight on the battlefield. Their actions against supply lines could have helped the defenders of the besieged city, but Veszprém had fallen too quickly and the army besieging Temesvár was well-prepared enough so that disturbing the supply lines had a minimal effect. Also Aldana was described as a man who could not cooperate even with his fellow Spanish comrades. But as we saw, he realized the necessity of someone who could lead the Hungarians under his command. Why did he choose Tóth? Beside Tóth's connections among the hajduks, Tóth was no rival of his: earlier on he had conflicts with other people – Hungarian and foreigner – because he feared for his offices and

⁹⁰ Earlier that year, Aldana had wanted to become the Comes of Temes and it poisoned their relationship.

⁹¹ Szántó 1985: 133.

⁹² ÖStA HHSStA UA Fasc 65. Letter from Castaldo on the 23th of July, 1552.

privileges which he had or wanted to get. Tóth did not show intentions to acquire land or a castle, but wanted to aid the royal forces in exchange of the recapture of his hometown, Szeged.

What was really difficult and shows the true problems of the era was the combined command of soldiers from different military traditions. When Aldana tried to lead the Hungarians he failed, because he possessed different knowledge, had no experience and was undignified in the eyes of the hajduks. He was not the only foreign commander of the era with these problems. There were Hungarian commanders too, who had same problems with foreign troops.

However, here we are met with the example that sometimes these different thinking people realized that they depended on each other. The short and not-so effective cooperation of Aldana and Tóth showed that the will to cooperate existed, even if the relationship of the Hungarian and foreign military personnel remains a mixed, bitter-sweet relationship for the next two centuries.

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THE BUND JÜDISCHE FRONTSOLDATEN ÖSTERREICH AS CULTURAL INSTITUTION

AN INTERACTIVE AND INTERDEPENDENT CONCEPT TO FIGHT

ANTI-SEMITISM BY MEMORY

SUSANNE KORBEL

Identity is intrinsically tied to memory and vice versa. The *Bund Jüdische Frontsoldaten Österreich*, which describes itself as a paramilitary veteran's organization, composed a counter-narrative to anti-Semitic stereotypes in Austria during the interwar period, more precisely primarily during the authoritarian, fascistic regime [Austrofaschismus] of Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss and his successor Kurt Schuschnigg. The narrative was based on memories of frontline experiences of Jewish and non-Jewish soldiers in First World War. However, appearing as cultural institution was an equal important part of those concepts of identity.

The aim of the underlying article is to examine identities in a critical way. Firstly, taking the issue of categorizations into consideration, I will illustrate how the *Bund jüdischer Frontsoldaten* attempted to include not solely combatants but also women and children into newly formed concepts of identity. I want to claim that staging of corporeity and memory acts were thereby equally important and were part of a non-determined understanding of culture. Next, I want to highlight that performing as cultural institution was one of these concepts. Overall, the article delves into the interactions of Jews and non-Jews and the impacts that these interactions caused will be described last.

For the purpose of this article, the organizations official organ of publication, the *Jüdische Front* and the *Mitteilungsblatt der Jüdischen Kulturstelle* are analyzed. (*Jüdische Front*, 1932-1938; *Mitteilungsblatt der Jüdischen Kulturstelle*, 1933-1937) In doing so, I refer to a theoretical approach that examines cultures as products of co-construction. (Biale, 1994: 41)

THE BUND JÜDISCHE FRONTSOLDATEN ÖSTERREICH⁹³

In August 1932, the *Bund jüdische Frontsoldaten Österreich* was founded following its German pendant *Reichsbund jüdischer Frontsoldaten Deutschland* to overcome the vehement daily anti-Semitism in interwar Austria:⁹⁴

⁹³It would be literally translated as *Organisation of jewish Front-line soldiers Austria*. As the term was a personal name I will use it on the following pages as *Bund jüdische Frontsoldaten*.

⁹⁴ Emanating from those groups of the Habsburg Monarchy which mostly understood themselves as ‚German‘ after World War One and the subsequent peace negotiations. As a continuing line from the end of the 19th century onward

„Die in Oesterreich von Tag zu Tag radikalere Formen annehmende antisemitische Hetze verschiedener politischer Parteien hat eine kleine Gruppe ehemaliger Frontsoldaten bewogen, eine Abwehrbewegung ins Leben zu rufen.“⁹⁵ (Jüdische Front, no.1, 1933: 5)

To attract a substantial number of campaigners, a first proclamation was published in several daily journals in Vienna in May. Motivated by the harsh anti-Semitism, 51 people answered the call. Further advertisements were published to appeal a broader audience. It attempted to commemorate the Jewish support for First World War and the fallen. As emerging paramilitary institution the *Bund jüdische Frontsoldaten* refers in this recruitments to the participation of Jews in the army of the Habsburg monarchy in World War I. In doing so, it aimed to construct a commonsense based on a shared experience to build collective memory:

„Jüdische Frontsoldaten, Kameraden! Kommt alle ohne Rücksicht auf Rang und Stand un auf politische Einstellung zu unserer ersten öffentlichen Versammlung Donnerstag, den 28. Juli 1932 [...]. Kommet und protestiert mit uns schärfstens gegen die ständigen Verleumdungen und täglichen Besudelungen jüdischen Namens und jüdischer Ehre. Kommet und protestiert mit uns schärfstens gegen die konstante Bedrohung harmloser jüdischer Passanten, gegen die untragbare Schädigung und Vernichtung jüdischer Existenzen, gegen die skandalösen Ueberfälle an den Hochschulen, [...]. Wir jüdische Frontsoldaten und Invaliden haben gemeinsam mit den nichtjüdischen Frontkameraden unsere Heimat verteidigt und beschützt. Soll nun die Judenschaft für den verlorenen Weltkrieg in dem sie ungeheure Opfer an Gut und Blut brachte, für die Weltwirtschaftskrise, unter der sie selbst am meisten leidet, für alles Elend als Sündenbock an den Pranger gestellt werden? [...] Soll das der Dank für die ungezählten jüdischen Heldenopfer sein? [...] Wir verlangen von der Regierung die selbstverständliche Respektierung staatsbürgerlicher Rechte, wir verlangen auch als die größten Steuerzahler Wiens Ruhe und Ordnung, um mitwirken zu können am Aufbau und Fortschritt Österreichs.“⁹⁶ (Drei Jahre Bund jüdischer Frontsoldaten, 1935: 18)

anti-Semitism was a constitutive element of the policies of national and liberal parties. (Rozenblit, 2004) The interwar period was dominated by an increasing anti-Semitism among all parties. (Rozenblit, 2002; Seger, Warren, 1991)

⁹⁵ Literal Translation: „Antisemitic agitation of different political parties, which adopts more and more radical forms every day, has induced a small group of former front-line soldiers to initiate a defense group.“

⁹⁶ Literal Translation: „Jewish Front-line Soldiers, Comrade! Come all of you without consideration of classes or political attitude to our first official assembly on Thursday, 28th July 1932 [...]. Join us and protest harshly against the constantly defamations and daily defilements of jewish names and jewish honor. Join us and protest against the constant threat of harmless jewish passerbies, against the unbearable injury and annihilation of jewish existence, against the

The First World War and Emperor Franz Joseph (who was denounced as „*Judenkaiser*“ in anti-Semitic agitation) were not able to repress the immanent anti-Semitism. What is more, anti-Semitism was exploited for daily political issues shortly after the end of the war. Thus, I want to emphasize that the increasing anti-Semitism and the manifestation of it were characteristics of the interwar period.⁹⁷ (Lichtblau, 2009: 40; Pauley, 1992: 73)

It should become more and more important that the Jewish support for the war would be remembered in the collective memory of Austria's interwar society. Therefore, although the organization was actually right winged and sharing Zionistic convictions, it raised the claim to achieve the whole Jewish population - however defined - in 1930s Austria. It supported the ‚corporate state‘ and became member of the *Vaterländische Front* shortly/immediately after the foundation in 1933. (*Drei Jahre Bund jüdische Frontsoldaten*, 1935: 24) As the political interests of the Jewish people were of course greatly diverse, this aim was not easy to achieve (Freidenreich, 1991) The *Bund jüdische Frontsoldaten* appeared not only as ex-servicemen (veteran) organization but also as cultural institution to attract a broader mass.

The reasons why the organization acted in this way shall be explored later. The thesis to be corroborated in the following pages claims that the *Bund jüdische Frontsoldaten Österreich* pursued the idea of an united ‚Jewish population‘ to act in opposition to anti-Semitism; thereby it elaborated different identities: the *cultural interested veteran* was one of them. Before delving into this task, I shall provide a draft of mythological approaches.

CO-CONSTRUCTION OF MEMORY/IES AND IDENTITY/IES

I want to delve into the multilayer phenomenon of identity/ies focusing especially on the interactions between Jews and non-Jews. Therefore ‚jewish history‘ should not be described as history beyond experiences of a so called ‚majority‘, that would mainly ignore the complex interactions between Jews and Non-Jews. (Hödl, 2007: 85) This approach is closely identified with

scandalous mugging on universities [...] We jewish frontline-soldiers and disabled people defended and protected together with non-jewish companions our homeland. Should now the Jewry be responsible for the World War, in which the Jewry made tremendous sacrifices on blood and good, and responsible too for the Great Depression, under which the Jewry suffer mostly from, and should be pilloried and scapegoated for all misery? [...] Should this be the honor for the uncountable jewish heroic deeds? [...] We call for naturally respect of civic rights from the government, as those who pay the highest amount of taxes we call for peace and ordinance to be able to contribute to the building up and progress of Austria.“

⁹⁷ For a theoretical approach in anti-Semitism research see Karady, 1999: 204-225 or Volkov, 2000: 13-36; for the dimensions of anti-Semitism Goldhagen, 1996:54-57.

the work of David Biale, to which I want to refer to overcome this mythological gap. He conclusively establishes a relationship between „*text and context*“ and emerged the concept of *co-construction* of relations between Jews and Non-Jews. „*This is not, therefore, a call for doing social history as opposed to intellectual history, but rather for studying the tensions and interactions between texts and contexts, between intellectual elites and the broader culture of which they are a part.*“ (Biale, 1994: 41)

„Identity/ies“ of individuals are a composition of ‚collective identity/ies‘ and ‚collective memory‘ and memory and identity intrinsically tied together. Identity is occurring in discourses which determine to specific times who is part of a group. On the one hand, identity offers the inclusion of those who are accepted without reservation by the group. On the other hand identity includes a high potential of exclusion for those who are not accepted. Collectives are particularly unveiled at their boundaries, hence the exclusive potential is even intensified. (Assmann. 2013: 34-37; Erll, 2011: 19) Stuart Hall argued that identity is something that develops over time, is never completely stable and should be seen as being subject to time and difference. (Hall, 1999; 91) Additionally, Identity/ies are subject to interactions in spaces - which are imagined and constructed themselves as well. Stephan Whitfield expressed this interdependence of frameworks and encapsulated the elusiveness of the concept as follows: „*If communities are not primordial but imagined, if tradition is not ancient but invented, then identity is, according to this fashionable view, not something with which one is born. Identity is constructed. It is mutable, subject to collective transmission and also to individual will and agency.*“ (Whitfield, 2002: 165) He draws primarily on the point that the category ‚Jews‘ should not be taken to be fixed, but moveable and imagined. The implementation of this fashionable view - as Whitefield puts it - for the ‚being Jewish‘ in the Habsburg Monarchy and interwar period should be dealt with below.

BEING JEWISH AT THE TURN OF THE 20TH CENTURY

Marsha Rozenblit developed the concept of a „tripartite identity“ for the Jews of Habsburg Austria. She emphasizes that „*[t]hey [the Jews] espoused a fervent Austrian state patriotism, and adopted the languages and cultures of one or another of the peoples of Austria if they modernized. But, they continued to regard themselves as members of the Jewish people. Hence, modernized Austrian Jews were Austrian politically; Germ, Czech or Polish culturally; and Jewish in an ethnic sense.*“ (Rozenblit, 2002: 110)

At the turn of the 19th century the categorization of ‚being Jewish‘ became part of a racist discourse which is described as modern anti-Semitism and mainly characterized by its perception

that the denunciations and stereotypes would have an essential reality behind them. (Karady, 2004: 304-335) The First World War raised hope of the Jews of the Habsburg Monarchy that anti-Semitism and anti-Semitic stereotypes could be assailed by participating in it. Even if anti-Semitism was not as harsh in the Habsburg army as in the German Empire one (there was not anything comparable to the „*Judenzählung*“⁹⁸ (*counting Jews*) in the German army in 1916), the integrative force of war was confined. The expression of loyalty and the participation in the First World War meant virtually nothing for the Jews at the end of it and anti-Semitism increased roughly in interwar Austria. Moreover, the end of the First World War offered a missing sense of belonging to the Jews. The struggle for identity and belonging in the community caught up anti-Semitism as the sole commonality. (Rozenblit, 2005: 178-180) Remembrance of the First World War in society became a controversial issue and representation in memory is unavoidable if a group pursue to be included in the collective at present and in the future. Memory of the First World War in interwar Austria is, as Gerald Lamprecht claims, not without confession: The tomb of the *unknown soldier* in Austria is in a crypt at the *Äußeres Burgtor* in Vienna. Therefore the soldier is actually unknown but not undenominational - memory was catholically connoted. (Lamprecht, 2012: 87)

The *Bund jüdischer Frontsoldaten* advocated for the preservation of the remembrance of the heroics of the Jewish soldiers. However, it has to be seen as a more complex institution: It was primarily a veterans organization but focused for example on the formation of an „*Einheitsfront*“ (united front), which was aimed to include all Austrian Jews to come up against anti-Semitism. The *Bund jüdische Frontsoldaten Österreich* elaborated different offers of identities to attract not just men and campaigners, but also women and children. Appearing as a cultural organization, the staging of corporeity and commemorations (memorial services) were thereby equally important. In the following part of the text, I pose and attempt to answer the question whether this strategy to fight anti-Semitism was successful.

Hence, the *Bund jüdische Frontsoldaten Österreich* could not solely be seen a defense strategy against anti-Semitism and was reasonably successful in doing so: The *Bund jüdische Frontsoldaten* became one of the largest Jewish organizations in the interwar period counting approximately 20.000 members in 1935. (*Drei Jahre Bund jüdische Frontsoldaten*, 1935: 20) It offered new identities for Jewish people in interwar Austria and attempted to construct a counter

⁹⁸ In 1916, the Jews in the Army were counted because of anti-Semitic denunciations saying that Jews would not really participate in the war - that they were not fighting but rather doing desk work. The findings which repudiated this were not published. For further data see Rosenthal, 2007.

narrative to the anti-Semitic denunciations. Memories on the frontline experiences of Jewish and non-Jewish soldiers were equally important as cultural aspects or corporeity.⁹⁹

It developed, for example an image of the Jewess being *strong, idealistic, faithful* [glaubenstreu] and *willing to make sacrifices* [opferbereit]. (Jüdische Front, vol.3 no.15: 5) She was primarily responsible for the *recollection* [Rückbesinnung] of Jewish tradition through which the Jewish unity should be recovered. Moreover, a separate women's organization [Frauengruppe] was already founded in autumn 1933, the tasks of which were charity and being economical. (Jüdische Front, vol.3 no.2:3) After the February Uprising 1934 they worked together with Catholic and Evangelic (women's-) organizations. (Jüdische Front, vol.3 no.3: 2) What is more, the *Frauengruppe* respectively the women represented the connection between the adult soldier and the children in the Bund jüdische Frontsoldaten. (Jüdische Front, vol.3 no.1: 2)

In the concepts of identity of the *Bund jüdische Frontsoldaten* adolescence and childhood were rigorously separated: Children were associated with ‚women‘, whereas youth was associated with soldiership and masculinity. (Jüdische Front, vol.5 no.2: 6) The male young adults were considered as the successors of the campaigners and had to be physically fit to be able to defend themselves as well as, as the Bund pointed out, the Jewish honor. (Jüdische Front, vol.3 no.2: 4) However, apart from physically fitness and discipline the mind should be shaped through lectures in Jewish culture. (Jüdische Front, vol.3 no.15: 6)

The anti-Semitic stereotype of the non-defensive and the accusation of Jewish cowardice implied facets which were attributed to the body. (Hödl, 1997: 175-177) On the one hand, the Bund jüdische Frontsoldaten attempted to overcome this stereotype through arguing with the Jewish support for the war and the prowess of the Jewish soldiers. On the other hand it constructed images of a body. Based on biblical quotes and the Maccabees, the will to combat [Kampfeswille] should be illustrated through an exercised body. (Jüdische Front, vol.4 no.3: 4) Sport became the basis for prowess. (Jüdische Front, vol.2 no.11: 2) Furthermore, the body was staged as the visible sign for the prowess and horrible stories of wounded soldiers were reported. (Jüdische Front, vol.3 no.8:2) However, this discourse also has to be considered as part of the German *Turnbewegung* that was an important issue in the national movement.

⁹⁹ The strong, faithful, idealistic and willing to make sacrifices Jewess or Palestine supporting community as well as the militant *Jungbund* were drafts of identity constructed by the Bund Jüdische Frontsoldaten (Korbel, 2014: 65-78).

We shall see below that the performance as cultural institution was one further concept of identity that the *Bund jüdische Frontsoldaten* attempted to offer to its (future) followers. I will explore the reason why the *Bund jüdische Frontsoldaten Österreich* appeared - respectively attempting to appear as cultural institution. How did a veterans' organization become a cultural institution? What was its understanding of culture like? Who was addressed by it and how did it affect the bargaining of identities in interwar Austria?

The *Jüdische Kulturstelle* (Jewish culture spot) was founded in autumn 1933 - merely one year after the foundation of the *Bund jüdische Frontsoldaten* itself. (*Jüdische Front*, 19.9.1933: 3) It was an association of the *Jüdische Kunststelle*, the *Verein zur Förderung jüdischer Musik*, the *Jüdischen Gesangsverein*, the *Verein für jüdische Geschichte und Literatur*, the *Jüdische Volksheim*, the *Volksbibliothek Zion* and the *Theatergruppe des Clubs Erez Israel*. (Impressum *Mitteilungsblatt der Jüdischen Kulturstelle*) According to its assertions, it was the only institution of its kind in Vienna. The question soon emerged whether sole presence as veterans' organization would be successful enough in fighting anti-Semitism. Culture represented a daily matter on which communality could be established and the *Bund jüdische Frontsoldaten* could gain new followers.

The *Jüdische Kulturstelle* sold cheap theater and concert tickets to their members, arranged lectures or invited them to museums. In addition, their own performing group staged 'Jewish plays' in German, Yiddish or Hebrew, as several announcements indicate. The *Kulturstelle* sought the foundation of libraries and book clubs. Moreover, Hebrew concerts were held regularly, for example, to honor the anniversary of the famous poet Chaim Nachman Bialik.

The „*Mitteilungsblatt der Jüdischen Kulturstelle*“ (newsletter of the Jewish culture institution) was first published in September 1934 and appeared monthly. In this newsletter the purpose of the *Jüdische Kulturstelle* was outlined as follows:

„*Der Inhalt unseres jüdischen Daseins wird von Menschlichem und Menschenmöglichem bestimmt. Wenn eine Anzahl Juden ähnlicher Geistesverfassung ein Streben zur Erhöhung des Menschlichen empfindet, ist der Drang zur Kultur, zur Bildung vorhanden; dann entsteht eine Stätte der Kultur und so entstand auch unsere ‚Jüdische Kulturstelle‘ (JKa) mit allen Verzweigungen.*“¹⁰⁰ (*Mitteilungsblatt der Jüdischen Kulturstelle*, 9.1934: 2)

¹⁰⁰ Literal translation: „*The content of our Jewish entity is contingent on humanity and humanly possible. If a number of Jews of similar mental state conceive quest for enhancement of humanity, exists the drive for culture, for education; in that case a place of culture arise and the same way our ‚Jewish culture institution‘ with all its ramifications arose.*“

Being Jewish and culture are associated with humanity and additionally with all kind of human possibilities - the longing for culture goes hand in hand with a longing for education. In this as nearly transcending described pursuit of culture all people were converged in the *Jüdische Kulturstelle*.

In October 1934, one year after the establishment of the *Jüdische Kulturstelle*, a new replica appeared in the *Jüdische Front*, which was titled „*Aus dem jüdischen Kulturleben*“ (out of Jewish cultural life) and aimed at the administration of the Jewish intellectual life. The *Jüdische Kulturstelle* attempted to address the „intellectual interested Jews“ with „[...] *aus der Feder berühmter und bedeutender Persönlichkeiten [stammende] Beiträge über alle Gebiete in Kunst und Wissenschaft, [...]*“.¹⁰¹ (*Jüdische Front*, vol.3 no.15: 4) It seems that the institution became well known soon after its establishment, therefore new cultural spots and a Jewish academy with 24 classes were supposed to be opened at the end of 1934. In addition, a „*Lehrgang für jüdische Wissenszweige*“ (seminar for Jewish disciplines) should have been established shortly after. Hebrew language, Jewish history, literature and art were labeled as „*all fields of Jewish knowledge*“. In these fields classes were held at the Jewish community college.

Even so, soldiership and military tradition was attempted be connected with education in all efforts. The cultural interested and well educated veteran became a popular subject in this discourse:

„*Wenn die jüdischen Soldaten und die ihnen Gleichgesinnten erkannt haben, daß die Pflege jüdischer Bildung ihre Pflicht ist, dann wird* ¹⁰²*keiner zurückstehen und jeder dem Rufe folgen: Jüdische Front! Auf zur Pflege jüdischer Bildung!*“¹⁰³ (*Jüdische Front*, 1.12.1934: 4)

The *Bund jüdische Frontsoldaten* and „his Jewish Front“ should initiate the emergence of a new Jewish community whereas the *Kulturstelle* provided a cultural program that was affordable and comprised something for everyone.

However, culture was associated with the notion ‚cultural state‘ [*Kulturstaat*]. For example, relations to non-Jews should be regulated in Austria like the relations between Jews and non-Jews were regulated in ‚cultural states‘. The discussion is correlate with the national discourse and refers as well to the term ‚*Volksgemeinschaft*‘ (ethnic community)¹⁰⁴. (*Jüdische Front*, vol.3 no.15: 4)

¹⁰¹ Literal translation: „[...] out of the feather of famous and important personalities contributions above all areas in art and science, which interest the mental Jew [...]“

¹⁰² „[...] *jeine musikalische Komödie in zwei Akten von J. Siegel, Musik von N. Sekunde* [...]“ (*Jüdische Front*, 5.11.1934: 7)

¹⁰³ Literal translation: „If the Jewish soldiers and their like-minded people have recognized, that the care of Jewish education is their duty, nobody will reserve and everyone will follow the reputation: Jewish front! Towards care of Jewish education!“

¹⁰⁴ For the term and concept ‚*Volksgemeinschaft*‘ and a critical examination see Bajohr, 2009.

Moreover, the *Jüdische Front* suggests that the preoccupation with ‚Jewish history‘ should make the Jews conscious about the connectedness through destiny.¹⁰⁵ (*Jüdische Front*, vol. 3 no. 16:5)

This issue was discussed under the term „Jüdische Volksbildung“ in the following years:

„Die jüdische Volksbildung ist so alt wie das jüdische Volk selbst; denn die Männer die das Judentum begründet, erhalten und neuerlebt haben, waren zu allen Zeiten ängstlich darauf bedacht, daß ihr Erkennen und Wissen in alle Teile des Volkes, ohne jedweden Unterschied Eingang finden.“¹⁰⁶ (*Mitteilungsblatt der jüdischen Kulturstelle*, vol.2 no.3: 1)

WHAT DOES CULTURE AND JEWISH CULTURE MEAN FOR THE BJF?

The Bund jüdische Frontsoldaten’s understanding of ‚culture‘ was highly diverse and did not distinguish ‚lowbrow‘ from ‚highbrow‘ culture. The offer of cultural activities and reviews fit in the organization’s self-understanding. In the performance as cultural institution it defined itself ultimately not through war experiences. Instead ‚being Jewish‘ was negotiated, for example, through Hebrew or even Yiddish literature and nearly stereotyped. Through the cultural recollection to Judaism unity should be achieved. A strong Jewry should come up together against the anti-Semitic denunciations and abuses of daily life.

In February 1935, a vaudeville theater was founded which staged its first performance on the 20th November 1935 on Franz-Josefs Kai 3rd, Vienna. Leopold Rosenbaum, who cooperated closely with famous Viennese cabaret artists like Oscar Teller, was its director. Since its foundation the theater directed cabarets, Jewish operettas, revues etc.¹⁰⁷ Before that, other theaters of the institution staged plays like „*Masseltow*“, which was described as musical comedy in two acts from J. Siegel and N. Sekunde or „*Die Komödiantin*“, another comedy in two acts with a prologue from Levi and music from Nelly Kossmann¹⁰⁸.

The *Jüdische Kulturstelle* pursued a zionistic conception of culture, as already mentioned. In the *Mitteilungsblatt* reviews of books dealing with Palestine were exclusively discussed. The Palestinian storybooks, „Jews and Judaism in German Letters through Tree Centuries“ were one of the most attention gaining volumes.

¹⁰⁵ „Lernen wir wieder jüdische Geschichte, nicht um trockene Daten und Tatsachen unserem Gedächtnis einzuprägen, sondern um die Schicksalsverbundenheit mit unserem Volke zu erleben und zu betonen!“ cited from *Jüdische Front*, vol. 3 no.16, pg.5.

¹⁰⁶ Literal translation: „The Jewish public/popular education is as old as the Jewish people (Volk) itself: the men who established, retained and re-experienced Judaism were at all times apprehensive concerned about that their knowing and knowledge would find its ways in all parts of the Volk.“

¹⁰⁷ The theater was closed in April 1938 after the seizure of power of the National-Socialists.

¹⁰⁸ „Lustspiel in zwei Akten und Prolog von Levi, Musik von Nelly Kossmann“ (*Jüdische Front*, 15.11.1934: 7)

Another aspect that was negotiated as cultural issue was a soccer team, founded in February 1935 by the *Bund jüdische Frontsoldaten*. (Jüdische Front, 1.3.1935, 7) Soccer fit perfectly in most of the convictions which the *Bund jüdische Frontsoldaten* aimed to propagandize upon its members. Playing soccer was interpreted as an activity to shape the body and refresh the self-esteem of the Jewish population. Additionally, soccer is naturally a game that is played in teams and hence, strengthens group dynamics. Being popular among a large number of people and an alternative to organize leisure time, it became part of the area of responsibility of the *Jüdische Kulturstelle*.

CONCLUSION

In the preceding pages I described the efficient ways the *Bund jüdische Frontsoldaten Österreich*, a paramilitarian organization in interwar Austria, especially at the time of Austrofascism, pursued its objectives, including its performance as a cultural institution. As possibly the most successful Jewish organization in the interwar period, it raised the claim to address all Jews and evolved different concepts of identity, hence.

Taking all the relevant aspects into consideration, I conclude that this performance cannot solely be seen as appearance of a cultural institution that stood on its own, but rather as one aspect of an identity concept that the *Bund jüdische Frontsoldaten* offered to the Jewish population of interwar Austria. In this process, the performance as a cultural institution addressed other people rather than the acts of memory and mourning. ‚Culture‘ - better ‚cultures‘ were a broadly discussed issue that could not be limited to a singular genre; not even in categories like theater or music at all. The *Jüdische Kulturstelle*'s, the cultural section of the *Bund jüdische Frontsoldaten*, area of responsibility included soccer and ‚popular‘ education as well. This fact implies that ‚cultures‘ were not separated in alleged ‚highbrow‘ and ‚lowbrow‘ culture.

The *Jüdische Kulturstelle* is a paradigmatic example of the range of Jewish and non-Jewish relations and interactions. I consider it really fascinating that ‚war‘ and ‚culture‘ are often seem to be contradictory but the *Bund jüdische Frontsoldaten* managed to reconcile both issues to persevere its interests and succeeded in constructing identity/ies out of this connection.

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NEWSREELS AND PROPAGANDA IN HORTHY ERA HUNGARY

BALINT FEKETE

This paper is about the semi-official Hungarian newsreel series, The Hungarian News-report (Magyar Híradó and later Magyar Világhíradó/The Hungarian World News). The series was – or should have been – shown in almost every Hungarian cinema week-by-week from the beginning of 1924 until the end of 1944. Although most of the Hungarian newsreels (various series, both silent and talkie) survived the 20th century, and moreover they are available for everyone on the internet, only a few historians dealt with them as an historical source.

This paper discusses the institutional background and the content of the most important Hungarian newsreel-series of the above mentioned period to point out the historical value and significance of this material. First, the institution that produced the films, The Hungarian Film Bureau (Magyar Filmiroda Rt./MFI) and its international connections will be shortly presented.

The content will then be analyzed by focusing on the visualization of violence, destruction and anti-Semitism during the Second World War. The main objective is to reconstruct how the editors (and thus the governments) exploited the propagandistic potential of The Hungarian World News.

INTRODUCTION

The interwar period of Hungarian history is characterised by Regent Miklós Horthy, leader of the country for two decades that provided posterity with a set of unique and intriguing sources: newsreels. Although little is known about the infrastructure behind the state-produced newsreels between 1924 and 1944, with professional historical research of the topic still to be carried out, the present paper is discussing the series of newsreels presented in the said period,¹⁰⁹ in addition to a select set of examples of Second World War era motion picture propaganda.

Hungarian newsreels of the Horthy era trace their roots back to the pre-First World War Austro-Hungarian Empire, where the *Kinoriport* series were produced privately. Following the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy, the events of the 1918-1919 period (i.e. the Hungarian People's Republic, led by Count Mihály Károlyi), including the Aster Revolution, were reported on a weekly basis by *The Evening Film (Az Est Film)* series, produced privately but in cooperation with the

¹⁰⁹ Other aspects of the movie industry are not concerned here. See more on these at Nemeskürty (1983) and Cunningham (2004). (In Chapter 10, Cunningham shortly discusses newsreels, if with a number of inaccuracies.)

government.¹¹⁰ The Károlyi administration was subsequently overthrown and the state was reorganised into the communist Republic of Councils, lasting from 21 March 1919 to 1 August 1919. The new state socialized the movie industry and established the first centralised newsreel service, *Red Report Film (Vörös Riport Film)*, to convey the government propaganda to the moviegoer audience. The series produced by this service later served as a model for Horthy's counter-revolutionary system, where filmmakers carefully preserved and studied these newsreels (Kurutz, 2001: 25-26; Perjési, 2001: 28-29; Nemeskürty, 1983: 180-186). The materials served additional purposes of the counter-revolutionary system, being used also as evidence in court trials. (Molnár, 1983: 32-33). As the new political system was being consolidated after the lost world war and the trauma of the Trianon peace treaty, István Bethlen's government introduced its own films of *The Hungarian News-report (Magyar Híradó)* semi-official series, later renamed *The Hungarian World Newsreel (Magyar Világhíradó)*. This series is discussed in more detail in the following.

The public discussion of newsreels was predominantly influenced by the experience of the World War and the desire to uncover the reasons behind the defeat, as well as to process and understand the shock of the Treaty of Trianon in the interwar era. Motion picture was seen as one of the primary motivators of the failure and collapse of the previous social structure, in addition to being a major cause of the spreading of crime (Bihari, 2008: 114-116, 168-170). Moreover, the worldwide conflict became to be regarded as a total war of propaganda, in which the losing central powers had accordingly been defeated (Sipos, 2010; Tegel, 2004: 143). Those losing the war concluded that the victorious had managed to better reach the peoples of the world through media and had had a deeper impact on the audiences, promoting their own agenda. In terms of propaganda, additionally, press and media were regarded as "almighty" (Bajomi-Lázár, 2006). The way psychologist Olivér Brachfeld put it in 1937: "In Germany, a few with insight have realised that the central powers had not lost the war on the battlefield as much as they had lost it in terms of propaganda. Be aware, these press and propaganda analysts say [...], not to let this be the case ever again and to be prepared to use the press more effectively during any possible future conflict." (Quoted in Sipos, 2010) In a similar manner, preparations started in Hungary as early as the 1920s.

THE INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND OF NEWSREELS

In the early 1920s, former military officer Miklós Kozma was tasked with (re-)organising the media and redefining the role of the state within its structure, earning the title of "Medialord" from

¹¹⁰ *The Evening (Az Est)* was one of the most widespread daily papers of the period and the company launched *The Evening Film (Az Est Film)* newsreel series as a subsidiary project in September 1918, parallel to the films of another emerging press business, the *Pest Journal (Pesti Napló)* (Lengyel, 2006: 456-460).

historian Mária Ormos.¹¹¹ His agenda included the introduction of the Hungarian News Agency (Magyar Távirati Iroda/MTI) and the establishment of the Hungarian Radio as well as the Hungarian Film Bureau (MFI) under its jurisdiction, among other institutions (Pirityi, 1996: especially 53-113). Closely affiliated with the state, this media conglomerate had been designed to assist the government, including delivering effective propaganda; as a result, the formally privately owned MTI is often considered a semi-official news agency.

As far as newsreels are concerned, it seems appropriate to first review the evolution of the MFI series, *The Hungarian News-report*, which had been defined in the MFI founding charter as “the domestic propaganda newsreel service on Hungarian matters”.¹¹² The first newsreel was premiered in 1924 “to show the Hungarian working days and holidays with the liveliness of life itself, if mute,” as said by one of the most recognised actors of the age, Ferenc Kis, in the introduction of the first dubbed newsreel a decade later.¹¹³ The numbered episodes and occasional specials of the series have henceforth been being produced for two decades, gradually improving in quality (Kurutz, 2001: 28). The Agency had had strong political support over the period and in 1926, Minister of Religion and Education Count Kuno Klebersberg declared it obligatory for movie theatres to screen the latest newsreel episodes before movies,¹¹⁴ making propaganda reach an even wider audience. The distribution of newsreels in the entire country was therefore ensured, the decree securing the production background for the series (Lajta, 2001: 110-119). Once the international stage started to open up to Hungary, the MFI managed to acquire materials from foreign (in the beginning, predominantly Italian) news agencies in the framework of exchange agreements, which were in turn edited into the episodes. Consequently, the series was renamed *The Hungarian World Newsreel* in 1928. Kozma paid close attention for the series to meet Western European quality standards and the first dubbed reels appeared as early as 1931, from episode 398 onwards. Additionally, he managed to acquire a building in downtown Budapest, further extending the reach of the MFI, being named Newsreel Theatre in 1939, where newsreels, documentaries and culture films¹¹⁵ were screened full time. To meet an increased demand, the Downtown Newsreel

¹¹¹ For more on Miklós Kozma, see Ormos, 2000. For more on film censorship see Záhonyi-Ábel, 2012; Záhonyi-Ábel, 2013.

¹¹² The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also contributed financially to the foundation (Molnár, 1972–1974: 15). Notably, the domestic series was complemented in the theatres by the weekly compilations of the German and Italian services, in addition to the newsreels of the Paramount, Fox and Pathé studios (Nemeskürty, 1983: 325).

¹¹³ MVH, 398.

¹¹⁴ The cinema owners obtained the copies for cost price. In 1933 the official responsible which paid for MFI, the National Association of Hungarian Cinematography-licencees (Magyar Mozgóképzemengedélyesek Országos Egyesülete) calculated 5700 Pengő for a newsreel episode (Morvay, 1933: 3-4). A feature film costed cca. 110000 Pengő in the 1930s (Sándor, 1997: 40-41).

¹¹⁵ Culture films were short documentaries focusing on specific topics, shown between newsreels and movies to neutralise the mood of the audience. Topics presented in an entertaining style varied on a large scale, including cities, landscapes, cultural values, etc. (Cunningham, 2004: 161; Kurutz, 2001: 32).

Theatre was opened a year later in the city (Sándor, 1997: 65-71, 85; Anonymous, 1939b: 2-3; v. d., 1940: 2-3). The network of cinemas was established in Budapest and other major cities; when “slim movies”, or theatres using 16 mm film projectors, became obliged by decree to screen newsreels in 1942, audiences of smaller towns were, or supposed to be, finally reached by the *Hungarian World Newsreel* as well. In the years of the Second World War, lack of film material, the frontline situation and, eventually, the Arrow Cross Party seizing power restricted the options of the MFI news editors, yet production did not stop until as late as December 1944. Finally, with episode 1084, the series was concluded.¹¹⁶

The dynamic nature of the observed evolution of newsreels suggests that the medium and, with it, governmental propaganda reached the vast majority of the population. “It is clear that the audience of the *Hungarian World Newsreel* is incomparably wider than that of the daily papers issued in the highest volume. Consequently, editorial work on the series demands a high sense of responsibility,” Ernő Gyimesy Kásás, journalist of the moviemakers’ chamber official magazine *Hungarian Film* wrote in 1943 (Gyimesy Kásás, 1943b: 8). While he had provided no specific data to support this statement, it still justifies the inclusion of newsreels in historical research as sources, given their significant role in the public information service and propaganda.

Whenever media is concerned in connection with historical research, an important factor to consider is the size and status of its audience. Unfortunately, this is still to be researched in terms of newsreels; yet, the number of theatres screening them and the method of their delivery provide representative complementary data. First of all, the number of cinemas and their seats should be considered.

	Hungary	Budapest	Number of copies
1914	-	108	-
1918	-	77	-
1924	-	79	1 → 4
1926	120	-	7
1928	488	87	13

¹¹⁶ The Hungarian Communist Party (MKP) was quick to seize the MFI assets, including theatres and materials, and forfeit them to the newly formed and communist-led Hungarian Film Industry Corporation (Mafirt). Abandoned by its staff, the MFI was rendered impossible to maintain and eventually got dissolved (Z. Karvalics – Andreides, 2006: 101-103). Newsreels were produced and showed until 1991, but during the Kádár era the genre had lost its significance owing to television (news) (Petrik, s. a.).

1929	530 92	-	
1933	414	77	-
1934	410	75	-
1938	517	81	19 → 24
1939	581	-	30
1943	770	-	55

Chart 1 – Number of movie theatres in Hungary and in Budapest and the number of film copies of MFI newsreels

(Castiglione, 1929: 218; Magyar Statisztikai Évkönyv, 1930: 280; Magyar Statisztikai Évkönyv, 1931: 281; Magyar Statisztikai Évkönyv, 1936: 347; Illyefalvi, 1934: 421.; Illyefalvi, 1939: 522; Castiglione, 1939a: 8; Castiglione, 1939b: 6; v. M. P., 1940: 9; Gyimesy Kásás, 1943b: 7.)

Chart 1 indicates in the 1920s, prior to the Great Depression, the number of cinemas had been gradually increasing. Following a temporary decline brought about by the economic crisis, the introduction of voiced reels and the revision of theatre licenses¹¹⁷, a total of 581 cinemas of various sizes were open throughout the country at the beginning of the Second World War. About one fifth of that amount was located in the capital and these among the largest in general. As far as the audience is concerned, 453 theatres offered 171,500 seats in 1927, which numbers increased to 530 and 180,400, respectively, by 1930; meanwhile, ticket sales dropped from 26 million to 19 million over the said years (Magyar Statisztikai Évkönyv, 1928: 240; Magyar Statisztikai Évkönyv, 1931: 281). No similar statistics on the war period are as yet available, although the tendencies observable during the First World War and the increase of cinemas suggest that an increased demand for news may have had newsreels further grow in popularity.¹¹⁸ In his 1943 article, Gyimesi Kásás estimated there had been 770 theatres in operation, including 189 in the regained territories: 40 cinemas in the Highlands (Felvidék), 15 in Transcarpathia (Kárpátalja), 40 in Northern Transylvania (Észak-Erdély) and 89 in Délvidék were incorporated into the domestic network (Gyimesi Kásás, 1943b: 7).

¹¹⁷ Only officially licensed movie theatres had been allowed to legally operate and authorities were eligible to review and revoke licenses; as a result, statistics often differentiated between licensed and operating cinemas. Revisions took place after the First World War, the recession and during the Second World War. After the Second Jewish Law was passed, the Minister of Interior could review and revoke „show licenses” issued to „non-Christians”, while Christians were forbidden to acquire licenses under their own names for the benefit of Jews (Anonymous, 1939a: 1-2).

¹¹⁸ See more on the press and radio at Sipos, 2011: 47., 77-84.

When evaluating the significance of newsreels, estimates of the size of the audience reveal little. The method of operation of the distribution system is not clear, yet it is safe to state that copies ideally took 33 weeks to travel around the cinemas of the country in the late 1920s, which time had been reduced to a “modest” 14 weeks by 1943. The latest newsreels, including their propaganda value, were therefore less than up to date by the time they had reached their final destination.¹¹⁹ During the war, lack of materials and the frontline moving through the country rendered distribution problematic, making newsreels secondary to radio and printed press.

News content and propaganda during the war

Hungarian newsreels fit into the tendency of delivering a set of topics in a standardised way, instead of detailed explanation and analysis, through “easily conceivable and superficial imagery” edited in the style of tabloids (Barbier – Bertho Lavenir, 2004: 213; Sipos, 2013: 36). During the war, the audience was shown a customary set of pieces of news in a fixed total timeframe, mostly depicting political acts (speeches, nominations, visits, etc.), sports (athletics, football, tennis, ice-skating, etc.), religion, arts, science or miscellaneous events (news from the zoo, fashion shows, etc.); however, war added another thematic layer to the episodes, especially at the time of victories. This plurality was intentional: images of the ongoing war were contextualised by the previous and following pieces of news, augmenting them with a new, propagandistic level of meaning (see an example later on in this paper). Reports on the well organised, militarily prepared, socially caring state were common, the pieces on Hungarian culture, sports and economic values supporting the picture of a country operating normally and of efforts bearing their fruits (most notably represented in the main title, where the successes of the territory revision works were illustrated). However, locations shown in the reports on heroically enduring soldiers, awarding ceremonies and taking care of the wounded were closer and closer to the borders from 1943 on, while the messages of the episodes, still edited and delivered on the usual level of quality, kept revolving around stability. The gap between reality and its representation increased gradually, undermining the perceived validity of the newsreels.¹²⁰

¹¹⁹ Cinemas were ranked on the basis of screening new movies. The best established were the premiere of first week theatres (which explains Kozma's efforts for the MFI to acquire an own cinema), followed by second and third week ones. In comparison, German newsreels needed 16 weeks to be fully distributed in the 1930s, which was reduced to a couple of weeks by the time of the Second World War by increasing the number of copies (Hoffmann, 2004: 133-134).

¹²⁰ In this respect, Hungarian newsreels resemble their German counterparts (Barbier – Bertho Lavenir, 2004: 219).


In the years during the war, more specifically the period between September 1939 and December 1944, over two thousand news pieces were screened.¹²¹ About 22% of those currently available were from foreign sources and the remaining c. 77% was produced in Hungary. Early into the period, the proportion of foreign materials, including British, French, Dutch, German, Italian, Japanese, Czech, Finnish and Swedish footage, was higher. Already before Hungary entered the war, German news pieces dominated the foreign intake, although the events of the Western front were initially depicted from the perspectives of multiple combatants. Later, the range of sources narrowed down and foreign news tended to be entirely absent for months from the second half of 1942. In the last year of the target period, only Swedish, Swiss and German materials were used, if anything at all (not even the German occupation of the country on 19 March 1944 changed that significantly).

To highlight the major tendencies in the shaping of the thematic structure of the newsreels, individual pieces of news were categorised as follows:

- Ceremony, commemoration funerals
- Social- and healthcare, charity
- Sports, recreation
- Politics
- Culture, education, science
- War, military
- Economy, modernization
- Church
- Short and interesting news

Each news item was given a single category. In addition to judging the categories subjectively, the length of the individual items was at this time disregarded, considering a 30 seconds report on a zoo event and a 3 or 4 minutes long account of the situation at the Ukrainian battlefield as equal units, not to mention items like the 27 minutes special on the 75th birthday of Regent Horthy.

¹²¹ Conserved and digitalised newsreels are available for watching at <http://filmhiradokonline.hu>. The three available episodes of the *Hungarist Newsreel* was also taken into account in the research.



The diagram shows the main tendencies of the editing of newsreels over the period in units of six months. The series was dominantly characterised by the war until the catastrophic defeat and destruction of the 2nd Hungarian Army at the River Don in January 1943, in addition to the turn in foreign policy under the Miklós Kállay administration (Romsics, 2005: 257-263). News from the front, and sometimes even the war in general, had become disregarded for an extended period before resuming reporting on the – now defensive – fighting in a heroic, idealised manner, although the locations shown were forebodingly closer to Budapest each time. Notably, sports news above all gained significantly more screen time at the expense of accounts of the war.¹²²

Examples of propaganda: violence, destruction and anti-Semitism

Following the overview of the thematic structure of newsreels, two subtopics are discussed in the following. First, the appearance of violence and destruction in the newsreels will be touched upon, followed by that of anti-Semitism. Through these topics, the propagandistic nature of the *Hungarian World Newsreel* is examined; more specifically, of interest is the way violence and destruction appear as well as the notable absence of the depiction of anti-Semitism.¹²³

¹²² Susan Sontag described the phenomenon this way: “War was and still is the most irresistible – and picturesque – news. (Along with that invaluable substitute for war, international sports.)” (Sontag, 2004: 53)

¹²³ There are some published articles based on content analysis though focusing on different topics like propaganda (Seres, 1983), representation of regent Miklós Horthy (Turbucz, 2010), the possible interpretations of news from USA (Sipos, 2013) and the usage of newsreels in teaching history (Fekete, 2014).

Violence appeared in the series exclusively in the context of the war; no reports of crime, murder, atrocities or discrimination were screened.¹²⁴ The visualisation of war aggression and fighting was delivered following two distinctive approaches: first, when reporting on “us” (the in-group), a heroic, united, well equipped and devoted army was shown shooting and bombing, yet death, destruction and demolition were never visualised, except when distant and distinctively military targets were hit (it is worth noting here that shots and explosions were almost always accompanied by their original sound, inserted into the background music track¹²⁵). The enemy remained faceless, depersonalised, except for making an appearance as ragged, unarmed prisoners of war.¹²⁶ Violence, therefore, did not seem to bring about brutal and bloody destruction in the newsreels. Civilians of the enemy state were usually being assisted onscreen, contributing to the sense of legitimacy of the war. “Our” wounded were always filmed in a safe, caring environment and after being treated, while the dead were never featured.

Attacks carried out by “them” (the out-group) were often designated as terror once the frontline reached Hungary; although the audience was not shown the fighting itself, they could witness its consequences. Members of the group were most often tagged as “Bolsheviks”, “partisans” or “Chetniks”; meanwhile, the domestic enemy, anti-war movements and other elements never appeared on the newsreels, viewers were not informed of their existence.

As far as visualising death is concerned, the deceased appeared scarcely onscreen: episodes of the *Hungarian World Newsreel* featured the dead once in 1940, two times in 1941, six times in 1942, a single time in 1943 and, after an entire year, twice in 1943, or a dozen times in total. Please note that the validity of the reports was not questioned during the research and all footage where human bodies were shown as corpses and the viewer was able to interpret them so, regardless of age, are taken into consideration.

Of particular interest is, as far as the visualisation of violence is concerned, episode. 908, published July, 1941.¹²⁷ Following the regular editing pattern of the series, a short, interesting piece of news introduces the newsreel, showing bear cubs playing in Sweden with cheerful background music. The report is directly followed by the pictures of slaughtered Ukrainian civilians, the killing attributed to GPU *agents* but without the revelation of the causes. According to the credits, the source of the footage was the *Die Deutsche Wochenschau*. In this narrative, the citizens of Lviv

¹²⁴ An instance of depicting violence in newsreels this way can be witnessed in news item “Pictures from Shanghai at War” from 1932. MVH, 417.

¹²⁵ German newsreels were edited in a similar manner (Tegel, 2004: 152). In a 1937 article, journalist and critic György Bálint focused on the sound effects of a newsreel on the Sino-Japanese War. As opposed to military displays customary in the age, most importantly organised parades and ceremonies, newsreels offered yet another layer this way (Bálint, 1981: 119). Examples from the *Hungarian World Newsreels* include: MVH, 706.; MVH, 709.

¹²⁶ See for instance: MVH, 895.; MVH, 914.; MVH, 961.; MVH, 1078.

¹²⁷ MVH, 908b.

cheer for the German troops marching in, greeting their “liberators”, just before the audience is shown civilians laying down the bodies of their murdered fellow citizens, surrounded by a crying crowd, mostly women (a unique feature of this episode in the researched period is the crying and screaming of women heard in the background). Direct shots of the corpses are shown with the camera scanning them for almost an entire minute, from several positions and in complete silence.

In this instance, the dead are not depersonalised parts of the “setting” but people with recognisable features for the viewer to feel sympathy for (Sontag, 2004: 75). Several interpretations are possible: first, the brutality of the enemy is displayed to further legitimate the recently launched campaign against the Bolsheviks. Second, it justifies military actions beyond the historical borders by depicting the occupation as liberation in the eyes of the locals (it is worth noting, regarding the meta-narrative of the news pieces, that the next report is about a successful attack on Soviet airfields, i.e. military targets, including slow motion footage; in a short period of screen time, the audience is taken from a zoo in Sweden to the Eastern Front of the war¹²⁸). Finally, the news forebodes what was to come if the Soviet system had gained influence in Hungary, an additional incentive to support the war effort.

Other examples of depicting death include *Hungarian World Newsreel* episode. 848 of May, 1940,¹²⁹ featuring the first appearance of a dead body onscreen. The footage of the German *UFA-Tonwoche* shows the advance of troops on the Western Front just before the pictures of a body lying on a bridge as well as a number of wounded people. The corpse is “faceless”, unidentified and no commentary is made, resulting in a static, dramatic imagery much like that of 19th century war photos (Sontag, 2004: 53-59).

Footage recorded by the Hungarian War Correspondent Company shows death to illustrate the ruthlessness of Soviet troops in episode. 909 of July, 1941.¹³⁰ As shown in one of the recordings of the destruction left by the *retreating* enemy, “Hungarian soldiers found the scorched remains of burnt political prisoners in the courtyard of the church reconstructed into a prison.” Once again, the images are naturalistic in style, the camera focusing on the blackened bodies for many seconds before eventually finding an almost white skull. The entire sequence features slow music in the background.

In the same month, episode. 912 borrows the *Die Deutsche Wochenschau* report on taking Smolensk.¹³¹ The dominant element is the *poverty* that greets the occupants, most disturbingly visualised by the naked bodies of four infants, covered with flies, further emphasised by the sound

¹²⁸ MVH, 908a.

¹²⁹ MVH, 848.

¹³⁰ MVH, 909.

¹³¹ MVH, 912.

of babies crying and dramatically countering the rumours of the well-being and prosperity of the locals. As usual, oral narration is kept to a minimum in the piece of news (just like in the case of German newsreels. Hoffmann, 2004: 134-135); the editors let the pictures tell the story.

Any other instance of visualising death is significantly subtler in this respect and remains content with showing a single, “faceless” body, briefly. In general, therefore, Hungarian newsreels tended to disregard the destruction of the war, including the complete lack of reporting casualties, most notably military or civil casualties of the homeland. The dead pictured could only be enemy soldiers (either “Anglo-Saxon”, see episode. 1052¹³², or “Bolshevik”) or civilians murdered by them. The Hungarian Army is never, in fact, seen *killing*, especially not (Hungarian) *civilians* or on a *mass scale*. What is more, the act of killing is *never portrayed on either side*, with the exception of a single scene in episode 967¹³³, where the crew of an armoured vehicle shoots an armed soldier on the run and he falls just as the camera turns in his direction. No recording of enemy soldiers killing Hungarian civilians was screened, either. Additionally, death remains static, i.e. the audience is not confronted with the agony of the dying; the suffering is *not seen or heard*. Newsreels never fully revealed to the viewers at home the amount of death caused by the war and the violent nature thereof; they were merely implying it by presenting memorials, cemeteries and military hospitals.

Devastation, on the other hand, was portrayed as a consequence of war, focusing on material losses and the destruction of buildings, enemy military equipment and vehicles. In terms of propaganda, however, of more importance is the visualisation of the relation between the war and culture and heritage. Newsreels tended to include reports on culture in its broader sense, as seen in the diagram above: arts, science, technology, economic progress, church, ceremonies and more. Once the frontline reached the territory of the country, “terror bombings” would be shown levelling churches, hospitals, cemeteries and the houses of (usually poor) civilians, carried out during sacred periods like the Holy Week.¹³⁴

¹³² MVH, 1052.

¹³³ MVH, 967. Note that the production of the footage seems to have taken place in Hungary, soldiers acting out the fighting in one of the military camps. This was a common method of shooting war reports in the period, the footage complemented by a few authentic recordings of the frontline (especially of the landscape or cities). See Nemeskürty, 1983. p. 553.; László Bokor mentions in his dissertation that, attempts were made, but these were wasteful (e. g. nothing interesting was filmed during an aerial recording), “un-cinematic” or unwatchable and also very dangerous (Bokor, 1970: 412-415). Naturally the producers tried to convince the audience of the contrary (Gyimesy Kásás, 1943a).

¹³⁴ The transcription of one of the oral narrations reads as follows: “*The bombers, flying high in the sky, did not damage military targets at all. Instead, their bombs fell on civilian or unoccupied areas everywhere. Among others, Lajos Zilahy, ’s [renowned contemporary writer – B. F.] house was hit. It is of almost symbolic meaning that the first Soviet attack on Budapest targeted the house of God, hitting the Városmajor church. It took heavy damage but its enormous walls withstood the explosion of the bomb and did not crumble.*” MVH, 968b. The next report is also of interest in terms of the dichotomous relation between destruction and production, as well as civilians: „*All around occupied Soviet lands, our troops join the currently ongoing harvest. Not only do they organise and supervise the work but also get their fair share of the efforts.*” MVH, 968a. The oral narration in the aforementioned episode 912 also highlights that churches had been converted into production facilities. MVH, 1051; MVH, 912.

One such example is provided by episode 1051, reporting on a demonised enemy attacking a unified Hungary.¹³⁵ The first element to convey this message is a piece of information relayed by the narrator: the time of the bombing, the *Holy Week*, an important and sacred period (the newsreel being concluded by the images of the procession on Holy Saturday); by thus linking the nation to the Western Christian civilization, the bombardment is implied to be a “barbaric” action.¹³⁶ Additionally, the attack is described as an “act of terrorism”, supported by the images of *civil targets* being destroyed (cf. the report on Lviv) and pictures of the ruins and locals clearing the streets being accompanied by appropriate tunes. While the presentation of the St. László Hospital, which was hit by a bomb, further emphasises the message, the human casualties, either civilian or military, are not mentioned, as are they not in any of the newsreel episodes. The shooting down of one of the *terror bombers* also takes an important role in the news story, the remains of the plane crashed into Lake Balaton shown in several cuts. The captured crew appears well treated, underlining the empathy of the in-group and the vulnerability of the enemy. The storyline of the episode culminates in the visualisation of rebuilding and social caretaking of the children and those losing their homes to the bombing, giving way to the feeling of unity.

Another aim of the present research had been to observe the way Jewry appeared on the news. Jews in Hungary had been subjected to discrimination in interwar Hungary, especially in the late 1930s and the 1940s, before most of the people legally determined to be Jewish were ultimately rounded up, deported and killed in 1944. The answer to the research query could be summarised shortly as follows: Jewry did not appear in the reports in any way. Audiences of the newsreel series were not introduced to the Jewish as a group, to persons of interest or to the culture between 1939 and 1944, or, in fact, even before that. The single exception is episode 1062 from 1944, reporting on the launch of the destruction campaign of Jewish literary works, as had been ordered by *vitéz Mihály Kolosváry-Borcsa* in June that year.¹³⁷ The footage shows protesters, including *Kolosváry-Borcsa* himself, destroying books in a ceremonial setting. Narration is distant and objective, providing no real explanation, leaving the report with its anti-Semitic content and reserved tone somewhat out of place in the set of pieces of news. Jewish people do not make an appearance even here, making the writers of the books face- and nameless; for all intents and purposes invisible.

¹³⁵ Transcript: “*Early into the Holy Week, Anglo-Saxon bombers attacked Hungarian territory, dropping bombs on numerous areas. The terrorist attack on Budapest mostly destroyed civilian targets. The peaceful homes of ordinary citizens were demolished by the murderous bombs. Not even the helpless patients were spared as about 30 bombs fell on the St. László Hospital in Budapest.*” MVH, 1051.

¹³⁶ In episode 915, the report on the arrival of Hungarian soldiers in Ukraine is shown as followed by masses and baptism ceremonies. While the film footage did not survive, the transcript of the narration remained. MVH, 915. In her last essay, *Regarding the Pain of Others*, Susan Sontag also mentions such occasions (SONTAG, 2004: 14–16).

¹³⁷ MVH, 1062.

Jews ultimately tended *not* to be represented in the *Hungarian World Newsreel*, as seen in the above example: merely the piles of books to be destroyed were shown for a couple of seconds. In other words, editors resorted to the tool of keeping silent about and disregarding the topic, as was the case with the opposition or losses and defeat in the war. Meanwhile, similar tendencies could be observed as regards *Actualités Mondés*, the newsreel series of occupied France, or the official German issue of reports. One of the possible explanations to this is the fear of the editorial team that anti-Semitic material might have led to anti-German and pro-Jewish reactions on the part of the audience (Bowles, 2004: 49-50, 55-56.; Tegel, 2004: 151). Nevertheless, withholding information is definitely one of the main tools of propaganda, a representative example of which being the lack of anti-Semitic content in newsreels during the Second World War.

What is more, of the three available episodes of the *Hungarist Newsreel* (*Hungarista Híradó*), only the report on the coup of 15 October 1944 concerned Jews: the carefully orchestrated footage is rich of comparisons (i.e. the urban, Jewish, café-goer, playboy, melancholic, saboteur worker versus the countryman, the “true Hungarian”, the soldier, the Hungarist, the working woman, the youth, the real worker and the peasant), featuring old stereotypes of Jews like wealth, lazy metropolitan lifestyle, greediness and foreignness.¹³⁸ The remaining two episodes of the *Hungarist Newsreel* lacks such content and the series, together with the Arrow Cross regime, eventually met a premature end.

The examples presented here show the kind of message newsreels aimed to convey to the audience, its method of delivery as well as its goals (including raising and feeding the feeling of hatred, demonising the enemy and emphasising domestic unity).¹³⁹ The question arises: what effect did the reports have on the viewers? How did the reception change as the war was beginning to come to an end and the reality of the newsreels began to drift away more and more dramatically from the everyday experience? As yet, no definite answer can be given, although Balázs Sipos published the results of a survey carried out in 1944, shedding some light on the effect of propaganda in general. According to the poll, in early March 1944, as “the »vast majority of the press« promoted »that all German allies must endure, [...] Most people answered *yes* to the question if Finland had had better quit the war as far as her own interests were concerned. To the question whether this step would have been beneficial or detrimental to the fate of Hungary, the *majority* answered it would have been *beneficial*. Evaluating the two answers together reveals that ordinary citizens *favoured ending the war* in these crucial days.«” (Sipos, 2011: 84-85).

¹³⁸

HH, 0.

¹³⁹

Propaganda during the First World War had a similar agenda (Sipos, 2010).

CONCLUSION

In interwar Hungary, newsreel production had its golden age. Through the media conglomerate of the MTI, established by Miklós Kozma and strongly supported by the state, the government had access to potentially effective tools of propaganda. While the newsreel series was but one element in this structure, its strong institutional background and the size of the moviegoer audience renders it a rewarding source to research.

As a result of constant improvements, the position of the *Hungarian World Newsreel* was well established by the time of the Second World War and the weekly episodes travelled all around the movie theatres of the country. During the years of the war, reports represented a unified, well organised, modern state without internal conflicts, discrimination, opposition or minority groups subject to persecution. Available episodes prove that the series was produced with propagandistic aims in mind, in addition to providing information and entertainment, the degree of effectiveness of which being, however, so far unknown.

NEWSREELS

HH

0. National Socialists Seize Power, In: *Hungarista Híradó*, 0. October 1944. [<http://filmhiradokonline.hu/watch.php?id=5883>] (Last download: 25 October 2014)

MVH

- 398 Introduction by Ferenc Kiss to the first voiced newsreel, In: *Magyar Világhíradó*, 398. September 1931. [<http://filmhiradokonline.hu/watch.php?id=1>] (Last download: 25 October 2014)
- 417 Pictures from Shanghai at War, In: *Magyar Világhíradó*, 417. February 1932. [<http://filmhiradokonline.hu/watch.php?id=126>] (Last download: 25 October 2014)
- 706 Northern China, In: *Magyar Világhíradó*, 706. September 1937. [<http://filmhiradokonline.hu/watch.php?id=2454>] (Last download: 25 October 2014)
- 709 Sino-Japanese War, In: *Magyar Világhíradó*, 709. September 1937. [<http://filmhiradokonline.hu/watch.php?id=2481>] (Last download: 25 October 2014)
- 848 The War in the West, In: *Magyar Világhíradó*, 848. May 1940. [<http://filmhiradokonline.hu/watch.php?id=3789>] (Last download: 25 October 2014)
- 895 Hungary Reclaims Délvidék, In: *Magyar Világhíradó*, 895. April 1941.

- [<http://filmhiradokonline.hu/watch.php?id=4189>] (Last download: 25 October 2014)
- 908a Attack on Soviet Airfields, In: *Magyar Világhíradó*, 908. July 1941. [<http://filmhiradokonline.hu/watch.php?id=4296>] (Last download: 25 October 2014)
- 908b The Horrible Deeds of the GPU in Lviv, In: *Magyar Világhíradó*, 908. July 1941. [<http://filmhiradokonline.hu/watch.php?id=4295>] (Last download: 25 October 2014)
- 909 The Destruction and Inhumanity of the Soviets in Galicia, In: *Magyar Világhíradó*, 909. July 1941. [<http://filmhiradokonline.hu/watch.php?id=4305>] (Last download: 25 October 2014)
- 912 Taking Smolensk, In: *Magyar Világhíradó*, 912. August 1941. [<http://filmhiradokonline.hu/watch.php?id=4320>] (Last download: 25 October 2014)
- 914 Hungarian Troops Advance in Ukraine, In: *Magyar Világhíradó*, 914. August 1941. [<http://filmhiradokonline.hu/watch.php?id=4333>] (Last download: 25 October 2014)
- 915 Soldiers' Camp Mass in Krivoj Rog, In: *Magyar Világhíradó*, 915. September 1941. [<http://filmhiradokonline.hu/watch.php?id=4343>] (Last download: 25 October 2014)
- 961 Capturing Russian Soldiers, In: *Magyar Világhíradó*, 961. August 1942. [<http://filmhiradokonline.hu/watch.php?id=4724>] (Last download: 25 October 2014)
- 967 Fighting at the River Don, In: *Magyar Világhíradó*, 967. September 1942. [<http://filmhiradokonline.hu/watch.php?id=4765>] (Last download: 25 October 2014)
- 968a Hungarian Soldiers Join the Harvest in Occupied Soviet Lands, In: *Magyar Világhíradó*, 968. September 1942. [<http://filmhiradokonline.hu/watch.php?id=4770>] (Last download: 25 October 2014)
- 968b Soviet Aerial Attack on Budapest and Other Hungarian Cities, In: *Magyar Világhíradó*, 968. September 1942. [<http://filmhiradokonline.hu/watch.php?id=4769>] (Last download: 25 October 2014)
- 1051 Anglo-Saxon Aerial Attack on Hungary, In: *Magyar Világhíradó*, 1051. April 1944. [<http://filmhiradokonline.hu/watch.php?id=5679>] (Last download: 25 October 2014)
- 1052 Anglo-Saxons Bombard the Capital Again, In: *Magyar Világhíradó*, 1052. April 1944. [<http://filmhiradokonline.hu/watch.php?id=5686>] (Last download: 25 October 2014)
- 1062 The Destruction of Jewish Literally Works Has Begun, In: *Magyar Világhíradó*, 1062. June 1944. [<http://filmhiradokonline.hu/watch.php?id=5748>] (Last download: 25 October 2014)

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1078 Prisoners of War Marching in Budapest, In: *Magyar Világhíradó*, 1078. November 1944.
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MELUSINE: THE FAIRY THAT FOUNDED A DYNASTY

ILIANA KOULAFETI

The present article's purpose is to examine the relationship between History and Fiction in the Middle Ages through the example of the, "The Romance of Melusine", a romantic novel written by Jean D' Arras and more specifically, how this powerful fairy founded. The dynasty of the Lusignans. In any event, no medieval history would be complete without an account of this powerful dynasty, for it is argued that the story of the "fairy of the feudal imagination" (Jacques Le Goff, 2005: 153) has much to tell us about the Middle Ages. It is to be questioned though how the author, the readers and the Lusignans themselves reacted to this tale. To what degree did the Lusignans actually think that their origins indeed did derive from Melusine's lineage? Moreover, did Jean d' Arras consider himself a novelist or a historiographer. And lastly what did the readers feel about Melusine and her reactions? These and many more questions about the beautiful fairy will be discussed from whom more than a century of kings from Armenia to Scotland are descended.

The imaginary world of medieval fiction seems to reflect the earthly world. Every culture and, consequently, every society has over time developed their own and unique folkloric culture. Because of this, the imaginary of medieval texts is nothing less than the dreams of a society, transforming reality into passionate spiritual views. As Evelyne Patlagean has said in her work "*L'histoire de l'imaginaire*," "the imaginary consists part of the space of representation, but it occupies part of the non-reproductive translation, not simply converted to spiritual images, but is also creative, poetic in the etymological sense". The imaginary manufactures myths and legends. Furthermore, it is the result of the mentality and sensitivity of a society as well as ~~from~~ the culture that infuses it, activating the imaginary through the making and the usage of stories and images. The medieval thought and word are structured by the ideology set by the imaginary in ~~his~~ its service. Through the characters, buildings, and objects it creates a world of ethos for the medieval society. The image of King Arthur is the mythical incarnation of the eminently political head of medieval societies, of the King. The utopian institution of the roundtable created knights who were exemplary heroes. It also consists of the dream of an equal world, which never found its incarnation in the highly unequal and hierarchical medieval society. The Fox and the unicorn reflect the moral life of people. Essentially, animals in medieval fiction constitute a tool of fear or enjoyment, condemnation or salvation. Additionally, the myth of Tristan and Isolde is the biggest myth of fatal love that leads to death and escapes the luminal ethics. Last but not least, there is the absence of

powerful women. Georges Dubys has characterized the earthly medieval world as a “male world”, where most of the mythical figures and creatures are male (Jacques Le Goff, 2005: 8). Despite the fact that during the Middle Ages the female absence is substantial, we must not forget that Christianity during this period imposed the presence of a powerful woman, the Holy Mary. Fairies, mermaids, warriors, witches contribute to a list of mythical powerful women, that not only exerted considerable power, but enjoyed social prestige through couples. Melusine, as a fairy of feudalism, stood for in medieval society as the concept of success and failure. Pope Joan incarnated the fears of the clergy. Valquiria kept alive the Vikings tradition slightly Christianized, bringing the Scandinavian imaginary to the medieval one and subsequently to the European imaginary.

One of the most important issues raised during the development of historiography has been whether narrative histories or historical fiction have been readily accepted in the academic world as a legitimate form of history. As Samantha Young notes (Samantha Young, 2011: 1), “to accept narrative as a precise, learned method of historical representation, we would first have to overcome the demand that historical works must present clear, documented evidence to be taken as true, and challenge the assumption that all fictions are merely stories conjured in a writer’s mind”. The relation between folklore and historiography had to go through three phases to end up in a co-operating level, where historiography had a lot to earn (earn, learn?) from fiction in texts (Peter Burke, 2004: 133).

Truth be told, fiction in texts can clearly co-operate with history. Even from the early ancient Greek period and from Latin texts there are examples that have helped History to be written; from Homer’s *Odyssea* and the *Iliada*, to the myth of Romulus and Remus and the founding of Rome. In addition, literary texts have always reflected the ethics, forms, traditions, feelings and transformations of societies, through honest and clear language. Anthropology, sociology and historiography can rely on “once upon a time” as long as the analysis of these texts goes hand in hand with a thorough observation of other sources.

And that is because history is not only about political or military conflicts; on the contrary, it is about how people of each era felt and interacted with each other, in order to make history happen. And information about these complicated issues can only be taken from cultural texts that do not aim at objectively describing situations and facts.

In any way, the folklore of a nation contains all the culture that people have created through their own recourses. A series of questions might be drawn from the study of a nation’s fairy tales compared to another’s: What is common to other countries? did the tales of a country originate there or are they borrowed and rewritten from other people?

While Jean d' Arras was writing the novel of Melusine, as part of the history of the Lusignans, he perhaps considered himself "half" historiographer, "half" novelist, if these terms may be used. The romance presents itself as historical, "as accurately as I could, according to the chronicles that I believe to be true" (Jean d' Arras, 2012: 19), Jean d' Arras notes. And because of this any medievalist reading this long poem might find prominent points about the late Middle Ages and the founding of this powerful dynasty. Even the name given by him, "Melusine", was used as an abbreviation of the phrase "Mere de Lusignans", which means mother of the Lusignans (Jacques Le Goff and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, 1973: 587-662). One can tell that Jean d'Arras considers himself a historiographer. He assures the reader that he himself believes the story he has undertaken to tell, and throughout the text he reiterates truth claims in a variety of forms. Among the most remarkable of these is the attestation that in his own day, Melusine's human footprint was still visible on the sill of a high window in the castle of Meurvent, where it was "inscribed" at the moment before her transformation into a dragon (Jean d' Arras, 2012: 4).

Through "Melusine", written around 1393 in the "calamitous fourteenth century" (Barbara W. Tuchman, 1987) Jean d' Arras provides historians with a range of information about the Middle Ages, the folklore and the traditions of medieval life. Despite the protracted upheavals caused by the Hundred Years War, the Black Plague and the widespread material dearth, feudal culture and folklore flourished.

The scene of a supernatural creature wedding a mortal has been previously found in Latin texts since the twelfth century, but it is argued that these supernatural creatures never play a powerful role in the lives of mortals. On the contrary, Arras' Melusine not only founds one of the most powerful Medieval Dynasties but also brought a new prestige to the line. Furthermore, the author portrays her having a story and a destiny of her own unconnected to that of the Lusignans, at a time where women were hardly independent and at the same time, well respected.

The story is actually about the violation of an interdiction, or the breaking of a promise (Jacques Le Goff, 2005, 147). Starting with her mother's story and repeating a pattern, Presine, Melusine's mother meets Elinas, king of Albany during a hunt in the woods. It takes place in a medieval land, a place where humans and supernatural creatures mingle. Thirsty as he was from hunting, Elinas decides to walk to a fountain and have some water. But as soon as he listens to the exotic voice of Presine singing, he forgets his desire to drink. Hidden behind bushes, he finally decides to approach her and after talking for some time he proposes marriage. Presine agrees on one condition; his promise being that he would never enter her chamber while she gave birth or bathed their children. After giving birth to three daughters – Melusine, Melior and Palestine – Elinas violates their agreement. She then has no choice but ~~taking~~ to take her daughters away and

leave the kingdom; because when the ethical code of fairies is violated they see no other way but to keep their word. She traveled to the lost island of Avalon, where she raised her daughters isolated and alone. By the age of fifteen, Melusine, being the eldest, wants to find out why they have been kept away from their father. Upon hearing of their father's broken promise, Melusine seeks revenge. Her sisters and her mustered their inherent supernatural powers, captured Elinas and locked him up, along with his riches in a mountain. Presine becomes enraged when she learns of the girls' actions, and punishes them for their disrespect towards their father. Melusine is condemned to take the form of a serpent from the waist down every Saturday. The only way to reach salvation is to find a gallant mortal and marry him with the promise that he would never see her on a Saturday, otherwise she would be condemned to live a life as a half serpent, half human until Judgment Day. Raymond of Poitou comes across Melusine in the forest of Coulombiers in Poitou in France, and asks for her hand in marriage. Just as her mother had done, she agrees under one condition; that he must never enter her chamber on a Saturday. He breaks the promise and sees her in the form of a half-woman, half-serpent. Unlike her mother, she forgives him. When during a disagreement he calls her a "serpent" in front of his court, she takes the form of a dragon, provides him with two magic rings and flies off, never to return.

Medieval fairies are to men and women the progenies of ancient Greek Moirai (destinies) – even their Latin name "fatae" indicates their relation to fatum (Jacques Le Goff, 2005: 146). Those fairies were incorporated into the Christian imaginary and were later categorized into good and evil ones. Essentially, if fairies are beneficial or crucial to people, their activity in society is usually done by mating with mortals.

According to Lorans Harf-Lanser, Melusine belongs to the pattern of fairy-mistresses that bring happiness, in contrast to Morgana for example, who leads her husband to the Other World (Jacques Le Goff, 2005: 148). The latter are known as the fairies of misery and unhappiness.

A fact worth highlighting in Melusine's character is that she combines characteristics of a mortal and a supernatural creature at the same time. In contrast to her mother, she forgives Raymondin for violating his promise, colliding in that way with the ethical code of fairies regarding the keeping of promises, as has been mentioned above. (Like Presine for example; even though she was devastated she had no other choice but to leave and never return). Melusine lusted for her mortal nature so much, that despite her disappointment, she kept supporting Raymondin and his kingdom, retaining the strength of his powerful reign. Prosperity and wealth were her actual gifts in order to be loved and gain back a way to salvation through her transformation to a mortal being.

Despite the fact that she keeps the image of positivity, happiness and fertility, she is miserable and unhappy against her will because of the betrayal that she experiences for the second time. She has

the strength to forgive Raymondin for breaking his promise, but it was impossible for her to accept his insult in front of a whole kingdom about her true nature.

Melusine unintentionally embodies both natures of good and evil. Her hybrid form, half human, half serpent, confuses not only researchers but the medieval people themselves about her true nature. Does her mortality overcome her supernatural powers? In spite of all the prosperity she offers, medieval people, sensitive and suspicious as they were, and due to her diabolical origins, saw a reflection of Eva through her that was never forgiven.

What could be argued through this research, is that Melusine cannot avoid her supernatural form because of her birth, despite her attempts to gain mortality. It can be said that from the beginning of her story, and even before her mother's punishment, she and her sisters use their powers in order to take revenge on their father. No human being would be able to trap a strong man within the depths of a mountain. Moreover, Melusine, despite her attempts to hide her true nature, uses her supernatural powers once more in order to grant Raymondin wealth and power. Furthermore, while reading the novel it can be noticed that Raymondin grows suspicious of his wife, because of the bizarre looks of their first seven children.

Through his words "Ah, most false serpent, by God, you and your deeds are nothing but phantoms, and no heir whom you have born will come to a good end. How those who were cruelly can burned come back to life, including yours on who took holy orders? You bore no child more worthy than Fromont. Now he is dead through demonic art, for all those who are mad with rage are under the power of the princes of hell; and it was in this way the Gieffroy committed the enormous, horrible, and hideous crime of burning his brother and the monks who did not deserve to die", he is continuously shows his inability to handle his wife's true nature, accuses her for their son's behavior. But in response, instead of revealing her supernatural origins, the heart-broken Melusine speaks about her identity in terms of human genealogy: "I want you to know who I am and who my father was, so that you will not reproach my children with being the sons of a bad mother or of a serpent or a fairy, for I am the daughter of King Elinas of Albanie and of Queen Presine, his wife".

In general, she retains a series of identities. Jean D'Arras presents her as self-reliant, and in that she can clearly be seen as a first symbol of feminism. Strong and powerful as she is, her husband's success relies on her. After her departure, all the wealth and strength she she had given him are lost with her. In addition, Melusine is connected to nature in a way. Her half serpent form is connected to liquid elements, while her dragon wings transform her to an empyrean fairy. She is a combination of humans and supernatural creatures in all positive and negative ways at the same time. Even though she benefitted the late medieval societies, she ends up being demonized. Lastly, she reveals that prestige and success are connected to the Devil.

Melusine combines, as said above, all characteristics of medieval society. It can be argued that she reflects the forms and situations of medieval societies in 12th and 13th century. Her myth suggests a highly ambiguous explanation of success in a feudal society. What Melusine actually offers to her husband is what the West did during the 12th and 13th centuries: forest reclamation and construction of castles and towns. Finally, in order to study the history of a society, we have to first understand its consciousness and its historical evolution and the imaginary as ~~it~~ is a collective phenomenon. (Jacques Le Goff, 2008: 14).

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“RETURN TO ALGIERS” : THOMAS HEES’ MISSIONS IN BARBARY THROUGH HIS *VERBALEN* (1683-1685)¹⁴⁰

KOSTAS THEODORIDIS

*Throughout the 17th century, hundreds of Dutch sailors were captured and sold off as slaves along the coast of North Africa by the corsairs of the cities of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli. In theory, all three were under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Sultan. In practice, they possessed a high degree of autonomy and pursued their own foreign policy, with their fleets preying on Christian shipping as late as 1830. As a counter-measure, the Dutch government had decreed that all merchant ships passing through the Straits of Gibraltar would have to carry cannons or sail in convoy with warships. When such measures proved futile, the Dutch decided to establish diplomatic relations with the corsair republics in order to conclude peace agreements and have all Dutch slaves ransomed: Thomas Hees, was one of envoys chosen for the daunting task. Hees went to North Africa on three different missions, in 1675, 1683 and 1685. His first mission has been studied through his lengthy journal. No such source survives for his second and third mission but - luckily enough - the National Archives in the Hague are in possession of his two *Verbalen* (Relations). Much like Venetian ambassadors who were expected to submit their famous *Relazione*, Dutch envoys were summoned in the Hague to appear before the assembly of the States-General and to give a testimony of their actions during their mission – the *Verbalen* (sing. *Verbaal*). These are unique sources in the sense that they are personal narratives which include the afterthoughts and post-reflections of diplomatic representatives which otherwise would have found little space in other diplomatic documents. In this paper, we will give a succinct account of Hees’ *Verbalen* and their unique characteristics. Furthermore, we will examine the two texts through the prism of New Diplomatic History by focusing on the actions of lesser actors of diplomacy such as translators, renegades or even former slaves.*

Ever since their conquest by the Ottoman armies in the first half of the 16th century, the cities of Barbary – the name that Europeans used in order to refer to the North African shore collectively (Klein 1971: 70) – had incited fear in the hearts of European sailors and merchants. Until the battle of Lepanto (1571) and the end of the large-scale galley warfare, North Africa had been at the front line of the Christian-Muslim struggle between Habsburg Spain and the Ottoman Empire in the Mediterranean basin and had provided ships, men and commanders for the Sultan’s cause¹⁴¹. After

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Spain's withdrawal from large scale naval operations, the cities of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli continued to prey on Christian shipping, seizing ships, cargoes and crews and selling them in the markets of North Africa. Estimates considering the total number of Christian slaves in Barbary during the Early Modern Period vary wildly, with one scholar putting the number to as much as one million (Davies 2003: 3-26). Operating from the northern shores of the Mediterranean, Christian navies were also taking part in this blend of piracy and holy war: the galleys of the Knights of the order of St. John of Malta, the ships of the Order of St. Stephen of Livorno and the corsairs of France captured thousands of Muslims in numerous slaving raids (Matar 2005: 111).

The Dutch started trading past the straits of Gibraltar in the last decade of the 16th century (Wätjen 1909:⁴) and capitalized on the fact that grain from the Baltic was needed urgently to feed the growing populations of the Mediterranean. Since both their ship's crews and the goods carried belonged to Christians, they were seen as legal prey by corsairs of Barbary. Thus the Dutch were forced to use the French flag when trading in the Ottoman domain: this is because the French had acquired a set of legal and commercial privileges, the so-called "Capitulations", which allowed them to trade freely in Muslim areas (van den Boogert 2004: 20-24). The States-General¹⁴² of the Dutch Republic concluded a peace treaty with the rulers of Morocco in 1610 (de Bakker 1991: 9) and shortly afterwards initiated the necessary contacts to obtain their own Capitulations from the Ottoman Porte. This was achieved when Cornelis Haga was appointed Dutch ambassador in Constantinople in 1612 (de Groot 1978: 13-58). Shortly after the acquisition of these important privileges, it became very clear that the three corsair cities were not willing to respect what had been agreed upon: preying on Dutch ships continued, while releasing their crews without compensation remained out of question¹⁴³.

It was under the instructions of Haga, that the States-General decided to send a diplomatic representative to Algiers: the man chosen for the task was Wijnant de Keyser, who was authorized to negotiate directly with the Algerian government in 1616-1617. De Keyser managed to release some Dutch slaves, but failed to procure a lasting peace agreement (van Krieken 1999: 14-17). A second mission was organized by Cornelis Pijnacker in 1626, but was again in vain. Realizing the limited effects of diplomacy, the States-General opted to employ stronger merchant convoys (Weber 1936: 145). Accordingly, the Directorate for the Levant Trade (*Directie Levantse Handel*) was

¹⁴² The States-General (Staten-Generaal) was the highest political authority in the Dutch Republic between 1581 and 1795. Each one of the seven united provinces (Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Gelderland, Friesland, Groningen and Overijssel) sent its delegates to convene in the General Assembly in the Hague.

¹⁴³ In fact, things could only get worse considering that the Dutch had also concluded the Twelve Years Truce (1609-1621) with Spain – the traditional rival of the corsairs.

instituted to regulate commerce in the Mediterranean and – along with the Admiralties – to provide revenue for the armament of warships that would accompany the Dutch *fluyt* ships through the Straits of Gibraltar until they reached Smyrna (modern Izmir). Punitive missions were also deemed necessary: Michiel de Ruyter, the most famous admiral of the Dutch Republic, was sent in the Mediterranean on two punitive expeditions (in 1662 and 1664), in order to retaliate against the corsairs. During these missions he was authorized to conduct diplomacy on his own terms, to conclude peace if that was possible and to release as many Dutch slaves as he could (de Groot 1985: 139). De Ruyter managed to conclude short lived treaties, but he was unable keep his fleet in the Mediterranean long enough to actually enforce them.

Hostilities between the Dutch Republic and the fleets of North Africa continued throughout the early 1670s. The city of Algiers in particular, was at war with England, France and the Netherlands at the same time. The attrition caused by the constant fighting, led the government of the city to consider making peace with at least one of its enemies. Therefore, in 1674 the *Dey*¹⁴⁴ of Algiers wrote to the States-General of the Dutch Republic and asked for the dispatch of an envoy to negotiate the terms of a potential peace (Coffrie 2010: 22). The Dutch government opted for a doctor residing in Amsterdam, Thomas Hees.

Few things are known with certainty about his early life. Hees was born to a wealthy family of Weesp (a city in the province of Holland) in 1634. In 1654, he started studying philosophy and then medicine at the University of Leiden. It is not clear in what capacity he participated in this mission, but we do know that Hees had accompanied Jacob Boreel during his embassy to the court of czar Alexis I in Moscow between 1664 and 1667. This seems to have been his very first contact with the world of diplomacy (Coffrie 2010: 22). His appointment as envoy to Algiers might be related to the fact that his brother, Johannes Hees - a wealthy merchant based in Amsterdam - was involved in the ransoming of Dutch slaves in Barbary and had contacts with Jewish merchant communities in the Mediterranean (Krieken 1991: 47). Some of these Jews served as semi-official diplomatic representatives of the Dutch Republic: for example, Jacob de Paz¹⁴⁵ was the representative of the Jewish community of Algiers but also acted as *commissaris* for the Dutch. He had not received the title of consul, because the States General had not yet concluded a peace agreement with Algiers and therefore the government of the city would not recognize de Paz's credentials.

It appears that Hees was first “discovered” by Dutch scholars as a diarist, rather than as a diplomat. In the course of his long stay in the city of Algiers during his first mission, he had kept a

¹⁴⁴ The highest authority of the city, head of the corsairs and the Ottoman janissaries bore the title of the “Dey”.

¹⁴⁵ De Paz had lived in Amsterdam for years and was a trading partner of Johannes Hees.

journal (*dagboek*) which covered the events pertinent to his effort of concluding peace with Algiers between 1675 and 1680. The part of the journal that covers the period of the first year of Hees' mission was published in 1950 by Herman Hardenberg (cf. Hardenberg 1950), the leading Dutch archivist of his time. The text was considered interesting not so much because of its insights in the conduct of Early Modern diplomacy, but because it recounted the stories of Christian slaves and the ordeals they had to suffer in the *bagnos* (slave prisons) of the Ottoman Empire. Interestingly enough, as the battle of Algiers was raging (1956-1957) during the Algerian War of Independence, this first part of this journal was translated and published in French (Bousquet 1957: 85-87). The French factions struggling to maintain Algeria, must have sympathized with the challenges that Hees' faced *vis-à-vis* the local, 17th century Algerian "pirates".

Hees arrived in Algiers in October 1675 and started negotiations with the Dey and members of the government. Unfortunately for him – and the Republic – the Algerians managed to postpone the settlement of a peace treaty under various pretexts, forcing Hees to stay and drag the negotiations for five long years: by 1678 he had managed to set free only half of the approximately 420 Dutch slaves (van Krieken 1999: 49). During his stay, he worked closely with Jacob de Paz for the ransoming. It soon became clear that the latter's connections, his linguistic skills and his access to the Algerian government were indispensable for Hees and no friction seems to have arisen between the two men.

Although the efforts of the Dutch envoy finally produced a peace agreement with Algiers in 1680, there were two pending problems: first, not all of the slaves had been set free and second, there was no peace with the other two corsairs cities of Barbary: Tripoli and Tunis. Hence, it was imperative to organize a new mission. Thomas Hees was appointed for the arduous task once more. There is no doubt that Hees' first mission to Algiers had been by far the most important, considering that this was the most important hub of corsair activity. However, although his second (1682-683) and third (1684) missions had no spectacular results (neither lasting effects, as it will be seen) they are worth studying in the sense that they provide insights into the peculiar nature of Early Modern cross-confessional diplomacy.

Hees' Verbalen

Not only were these two missions less spectacular in results and scope than the first one, but the problem is also one of sources: generally, the material that is available for Dutch diplomacy in North Africa in the 18th century is much larger in quantity than that available for the 17th century.

This also holds true for the archives of the *Legatie Turkije*, which contain the correspondence of the Dutch Embassy in Constantinople. This lack of documentation is unfortunate because Dutch commerce in the Mediterranean was much more dynamic in the second half of the 17th century. However, we do possess the two *Verbalen* which Hees delivered to the States General after the end of second and third missions. Klaas Heeringa has included both of these *Verbalen* to his vast compendium of sources pertaining to the Dutch Levant trade (Heeringa 1917: 513-522) - albeit not paginated.

Egodocuments of the Dutch “Golden Age” – diaries being the most representative example - were mainly intended to serve as records for posterity (Blaak 2009: 136-137). Hees’ *Verbalen* were in fact state-commissioned egodocuments and they were meant to be kept in the archives of the States-General. Future Dutch diplomats who were about to be deployed in North Africa may have found them very useful as sources of information on local conditions. In fact, it is quite possible that Hees himself might have read the *Verbalen* of his predecessors before embarking on his mission. Cornelis Pijnacker’s report of his mission in 1622-1623 was available in the archives of the States-General. Generally speaking, the decentralized nature of the Dutch state made sure that a large array of individuals would have access to official documents. The famous historian (and libertine) Lieuwe van Aitzema managed to put together a vast amount of official documents while writing his seminal *Saken van Staet en Oorlogh* (Affairs of State and War), with treaties of the States General appearing verbatim throughout its volumes (Poelhekke 1960: 406-407). As for the paper trail left behind by Hees, there are at least some indications that the documents sent by him to the Dutch government during his first and second missions were consulted by his contemporaries. In fact, some of them were even incorporated in works of historiography: In 1684 Simon de Vries wrote a history of the relations of the Dutch Republic with North Africa, which was published as a second volume to (the Dutch translation of) Pierre Dan’s *Histoire de Barbarie*. In his lengthy work, De Vries managed to include some of the letters sent by Hees to the States General, placing special emphasis on the dispatched lists of liberated slaves and their places of origin (de Vries 1684: 160-169). Let us now turn to the *Verbalen*.

The documents in question are dated 1683 and 1685 respectively. In terms of length, it is noteworthy that they are both considerably shorter than those produced by Dutch envoys who were sent to important European courts like – for example - those of France and Spain¹⁴⁶. The first *Verbaal* runs a mere 25 pages (DNA, SG, 12593.73) while the second one is somewhat longer, 29

¹⁴⁶ The Dutch embassy to the Spanish court in 1660-61 is a case in point, see Maurits Ebben, *Lodewijck Huygens' Spaans journaal : reis naar het hof van de koning van Spanje, 1660-1661*, (Zutphen 2005).

pages in total (DNA, SG, 8610). Both of their introductions are very straightforward and simple. They contain the objectives of the two missions: in that of 1683 Hees' task is to "free the remaining slaves in Algiers and then conclude peace with the governments of Tunis and Tripoli" (DNA, SG, 12593.73: 1). In the second *Verbaal*, it is again only in the first page that Hees gives information on the objectives of his mission: to present himself to the governments of Barbary and to "renew and perfectionate" the treaties of peace as well as "to free some slaves" (DNA, SG, 8610: 1).

It is noteworthy, that an important set of instructions that is present in other *Verbalen* is missing. When visiting European courts, Dutch ambassadors had to pay extreme attention not to embarrass the Republic in matters related to ceremonial or the general respect of the State. For example, delicate arrangements had to be worked out considering diplomatic precedence: as representatives of a Republic, the Dutch envoys were often instructed not to be given an inferior rank than that of Venice. The absence of relevant clauses in Hees' instructions could be due to the fact that in North Africa, issues of protocol - especially when reflecting the balances between Islamic and Christian states - only became delicate in the first half of the 18th century (Windler 2001: 91-94).

The *Verbalen* also mention nothing of the collection of the necessary sums for the release of the remaining Dutch slaves in North Africa. Most of the funds – in general between 50 to 75% of the total - collected by the States General for the release of Dutch slaves usually came from treasuries of the large cities of the maritime provinces and their surrounding villages (den Ridder 1986: 3-15). Although the Dutch Reformed church was not as active as the Catholic "Redemption Orders" in the Mediterranean, the acts of *kerkelijke liefdadigheidsinstellingen* (i.e. church charities) could sometimes contribute as much as 25% of the total sum for the redemption of individual slaves (den Ridder 1986: 17). Even the lands of the "Generality"¹⁴⁷ were considered liable to contribute, although they sent out hardly any seamen: as can be seen from a Resolution of the States-General dated April 29, 1682, Thomas Hees himself proposed to collect money from Breda, Buren, Lingen en Ijsselstein (Eeghen 1952: 72) if the *Stadholder*, William of Orange¹⁴⁸, would allow it. We can assume that the same pattern of fundraising was followed in this case.

Around 115.000 *guldens* became readily available from the collection by the cities of Holland for Hees' second mission to Algiers – the one which involved the largest number of slaves (van Krieken 1999: 52-53). That been said, slave ransoming and negotiations with the rulers of North African

¹⁴⁷ Territories of the Republic on the border with the Spanish Netherlands that were governed directly by the States General and had no provincial estates or representatives of their own in the Hague.

¹⁴⁸ This is no other than William III, who would ascend the English throne in 1688 after the "Glorious Revolution". He kept the title of Stadtholder in the Netherlands until his death.

cities were to be an intertwined process. In the initial phase of describing his actions, Hees stresses the fact that apart from his loyalty to the Dutch government, he was motivated by his deep Christian devotion and sympathy for the misery of Dutch captives in the hands of the Muslims and their “harde persecutie” (DNA, SG, 12593.73: ii) Let us now turn to the events of the missions.

Hees' second and third mission

Hees reached Algiers on the 17th of October 1682 and was received by the *Dey* of the city, Baba Hasan. Strangely enough, the consul of the Dutch Republic, Carel Alexander van Berck was not there to greet him: he had fled to Cadiz and refused to return to his post, forcing Hees to start looking for a replacement (DNA, SG, 12593.73: 5). Hees dispensed nearly 80.000 guilders for the ransoming of the remaining Dutch slaves, made presents to the government and secured promises that the treaty of peace and friendship would continue to be respected. The only reason of contention was that Baba Hasan insisted that consul Berck had to come back because of the promises that he had made for more ceremonial presents to the city of Algiers, but this was something that Hees could not guarantee (van Krieken 1992: 32-33). After settling all the ransoming issues, he left Algiers and sailed eastward.

In March 1683 Hees arrived in Tunis, to conclude peace with that city, only to find a struggle going on between two local factions that were supporting different *Deys*: ever since 1675 a power stand-off between the Muradids (who held the title of *Bey*) and the janissary militia of the city (headed by the former *Dey*) had been raging. Hees had to wait until Ali Bey had won the battle to negotiate the terms of the peace: 15.000 guilders had to be paid by the States General as a gift to the *Dey* and one thousand “vaatjes” (vases) of gunpowder had to be sent as a token gift (van Krieken 1992: 33; DNA, SG, 12593.73: 14). A truce of eight months would come into being, until the money and the presents finally arrived from the Republic. There is no mention of any ransoming of Dutch slaves at this instance. Hees left Tunis in May and reached Tripoli on the 9th of June 1683. After an audience with the *Dey* and the principal members of the government, the terms for a peace agreement were agreed. In fourteen months, the Dutch would have to send 150 “vaatjes” of gunpowder, three thousand bullets and five masts (van Krieken 1992: 33-34). From Tripoli, Hees made his way back to Livorno and then back to the Republic by land. We can safely assume that the mission of Hees had already brought some results by then. In fact, 1684 was perhaps one of the best years for Dutch diplomacy in North Africa altogether: in November of that year, the States General concluded a treaty with the Sultan of Morocco (de Bakker 1991: 91-92) thereby securing a safe passage from Gibraltar to the whole of the Mediterranean. Peace had not yet been concluded with

Tunis, but Algiers and Tripoli had ceased their corsair activity.

The third mission, was a less spectacular follow up. In February 1685, Hees was back in Algiers and this time he was properly greeted by the newly-appointed Dutch consul, Christoffel Mathias. However, the city's Dey did not really bother receiving the Dutch envoy: in one occasion he claimed that he was too busy "sending money to Mecca" (DNA, SG, 8610: 4). Hees would have to wait for an audience that would be satisfying for the Dutch. Finally, on the 17th of March, he managed to present his gifts to the Algerian government and secure promises of friendship. The atmosphere was hostile because news had just reached the city that a corsair of Algiers had captured a Dutch *fluyt* and sold the cargo (and the crew) in Tangier (van Krieken 1992: 35). Hees and consul Mathias asked for immediate compensation, but only managed to secure promises of future reparations instead. In April, Hees decided that it was time to leave and made a present of 100 "vaatjes" of gunpowder to the city of Algiers (DNA, SG, 8610: 9) and then left for Tripoli, where he arrived there later the same month.

There was not much to be done there: the only issue was the delivery of the gifts promised in his previous mission. These were finally delivered, along with Hees' excuses for the delay (DNA, SG, 8610: 15). The final destination of Hees' third mission was Tunis. Sailing westward this time, he arrived there in May. This time he was faced with total failure: the gifts promised to the city had not been delivered on time and enormous sums were demanded for the release of Dutch slaves. Hees did not pursue the matter any further and chose to begin his journey back home (van Krieken 1992: 36). As a general remark, we can conclude that the independent diplomatic mechanism set up by Hees was a product of the realization that Barbary was a unique case, which had to be dealt independently from Constantinople. There is further proof of this, confirming that Hees understood very well the environment in which he operated: During his last visit to Algiers, Hees first visited the Dey (head of the corsairs) and only afterwards went on to visit the representative of the Ottoman Porte residing in Algiers, bearing the title of "Basha" (pasha) (DNA, SG, 8610: 3). This was an effort to recognize that real power rested with the Dey but at the same time a theatrical attempt to pay lip-service to Ottoman suzerainty of North Africa.

All in all, as far as Hees could remember, everything had worked according to plan: peace had been established thanks to his actions and most of the slaves had been freed. On the 18th of August 1685, the *Oprechtse Courant* of Haarlem (by then one of Europe's most famous newspapers) was informing its readers that: "*Captain Laer arrived in Texel, having [on board] Commissaris Hees [coming] from the Coasts of Barbary with whose Corsairs he prolonged the Peace*" (Oprechte

Haerlemsche Courant, No. 34, 1685: 2). Thus was the series of Hees' missions concluded.

For all his short term successes, Hees could not have contributed to a significant altering of long established Mediterranean realities. Quite simply, the economic penetration of the “Northerners” through the straits of Gibraltar did not erase the divisions based on religion as fast as previously thought (Greene 2002: 42-50). Violence at sea and slavery would survive largely intact and so in the long run the Dutch Republic would have to come face to face with the corsair cities of North Africa again and again, until European imperialism managed to completely subdue resistance in the region in the first three decades of the 19th century. This turn of events may even have been predictable for the Dutch, considering that Algiers had now made peace with the French and the English once more: in March 1686, just a year and a half after Hees' return to the Republic, Algiers chose to unilaterally call off the peace agreement of 1680 and started preying on Dutch shipping with full force (van Krieken 1999: 56-57). It was only after 1726 that a new peace agreement was worked out. This new treaty lasted throughout the whole period until 1815, with two minor breaks in 1755 and 1793. This state of affairs can be seen as typical, considering the fact that during the 18th century relations between Europe and the Ottoman Empire were becoming more stable and systematized (de Groot 1985: 143).

RENEGADES AND FORMER SLAVES AS INSTRUMENTS OF DUTCH DIPLOMACY

In the last three decades, the field of diplomatic history - a hitherto neglected field because of its supposed affiliation with the traditional “great man theory” of history - has slowly been reshaped by significant developments, linked to the scholarly gains of the so-called “cultural turn”. New Diplomatic History, as the historiographic end-product of this change of scholarly attitudes is called, focuses on the processes of diplomacy rather than its results, employing an international (rather than national) point of view and paying special attention to historiographic questions centering around cross-cultural contact, identity and memory. Furthermore, when it comes to what is important to be studied, New Diplomatic History privileges the agency of a vast array of individuals rather than just narrating the dealings between states and their most formal agents such as ministers and ambassadors. In the case of European – North African relations in the Early Modern Period, focusing on “lesser” diplomatic actors such as – for example - translators (*drogmans*), has allowed recent scholarship to dismiss the notion of a solid Christian – Muslim divide that rendered cross-confessional diplomacy a European prerogative. Instead, this model can be replaced by a more balanced picture of a “shared diplomatic idiom and even co-production of diplomatic genres” (van Gelder and Krstić 2015: 103) as the process of mediation was carried out

by go-betweens who had mixed loyalties.

By studying the journal of Hees' first mission (1675-1680), Coffrie has noted the importance of local intermediaries such as Jews, translators and renegades (Coffrie 2010: 29-33). Thankfully, the *Verbalen* of Hees do offer insights into the same groups of "lesser actors" that proved useful for the aims of Dutch diplomacy in North Africa. We have already mentioned the circle of Jewish merchants around Jacob de Paz - by far Hees' most important connection. We will now focus on renegades, former slaves and even Muslim captains. The first category is by far the most interesting: a large number of Christians enslaved by the corsairs of North Africa chose to convert to Islam in order to regain their freedom or – when the latter scenario was impossible – receive better treatment from their masters. Some of them even joyfully embraced Islam in order to pursue an active career as corsairs, often preying against the shipping of their erstwhile homeland: such is the case of the notorious Jan Janszoon from Haarlem, who turned Muslim and changed his name to Murat Reis. Janszoon went on to become the first "President" of the so-called corsair Republic of Salé (Wilson 2003: 98).

Such was the animosity towards renegades in the 17th century Dutch Republic that the States General had decreed that if any of them made it back home, they would have two options: "return back to the fold" of Christianity or face execution (Kaplan 2006: 24). This punishment was deemed fair, since Islamic law decreed the same for those who would dare to leave the faith of the Prophet. However, thanks to a recent study, we now know that there was a large number (or at least larger than previously thought) of Dutch converts to Islam who managed to return to the Republic and gain a degree of toleration for themselves. Some renegades even managed to be recruited in the Dutch navy - especially through the Admiralty of Rotterdam - in order to fight against the corsairs of Dunkirk (van Gelder 2013: 17). According to van Gelder, these renegades had played an important role in the establishment of Dutch-Algerian relations earlier on, in the first decades of the 17th century.

Even though Hees had spent five years in Algiers, he still possessed no command of local languages and had to rely on translators and intermediaries. Looking for Dutch renegades who were fluent in his native language and had established connections with local networks of power, was part of the means Hees was more than willing to use. In his second mission, during the negotiations for the fixing of a price for the release of the Dutch slaves in Algiers (October 1682), Hees not only made use of Ali de Kuijper - a Dutch convert to Islam originally from Amsterdam - as a translator (*tolk*) but also dispatched him to the *Dey's* palace to negotiate the terms of the transaction himself.

In his Verbael Hees refers to him as an “instrument of the State” - albeit a “very malicious [...] and pernicious” one (DNA, SG, 12593.73: 7). This is because during Hees’ second mission, the two men fell out: while negotiating the price for the release of the Dutch slaves in Algiers, Ali had made underground talks with both Jacob de Paz (the old *commissaris*) and even the captain of Hees’ ship, Pieter Constant. It appears that the three men were willing to agree on a much higher price for ransoming than what was deemed reasonable and so Hees decided to take intervene and take care of the issue himself, by pressing for a lower price (DNA, SG, 12593.73: 7).

Hees did not reserve and hard feelings against De Paz for the incident. In fact, before leaving Algiers in 1682, Hees had advised one of De Paz’s factors - along with other “good friends” - to help with everything that could prove useful for the Dutch Republic (DNA, SG, 12593.73: 10). In Tunis, Hees came across another Dutch renegade from Amsterdam, a “lieutenant” (*Kaya*) now called Murat, who was authorized by the city’s government to take care of the dealings in the name of the *Dey* and the *Bey* (DNA, SG, 12593.73: 13). Apart from being useful as a speaker of the Dutch language, Murat does not seem to have played any other special role or to have been particularly favorable towards Hees.

Before leaving Tripoli, in July 1683, Hees had to find a provisional consul in order to take care of possible issues that might arise. With no need to ask for the permission of a higher authority, he decided that the right man for the job was Zacharias Cousart, a former domestic servant who had followed Hees in Algiers and possessed “good knowledge of the Turkish affairs” (DNA, SG, 12593.73: 21). During Hees’ third mission, Cousart was still at his post: he welcomed Hees in the harbor (April 1684) and was present during the Dutch envoy’s audience with the city’s government. Cousart does not seem to have taken part in the negotiations but it appears that he had managed to acquire the title of consul by the States-General (DNA, SG, 8610: 14). Thus, an erstwhile humble domestic servant managed to become a diplomatic representative of the Republic.

An even more interesting case, is that of a former slave. Dirk Hendrikz Riesselman (Rijselman?) had been captured in Tunis and lived as a slave with the name (Signor) “Andrea”. He was released without ransoming, as a sign of good will by the Dey of Tunis during Hees’ second mission. Right after his liberation, he was chosen by Hees as the right man to take up the post of providing the necessary paperwork¹⁴⁹ for the corsair ships of Tunis and to report directly to him for every problem that could arise (DNA, SG, 12593.73: 16). Hees was particularly fond of this “jongman” who had helped him during the negotiations. Thus, a former slave, was now acting as a diplomatic

¹⁴⁹ Every North African corsair ship was accorded a pass which stipulated that if the said ship was to encounter a Dutch warship in the open sea, it should be left unmolested.

representative of the Dutch Republic.

It is interesting how even certain Muslim captains were acquainted with Hees and helped him during his second mission. In 1683, Mohamed, a corsair captain from Tripoli had accompanied Hees during his voyage from Algiers to Tripoli and helped the Dutch envoy to negotiate with the city's government (DNA, SG, 12593.73: 17). For Mohamed, this mediation may have been a way to express his prestige, especially if he was involved in the politics of the corsair and janissary factions of the city. Thus, by reading the *Verbalen*, we can conclude that Hees' description of these "lesser" actors of diplomacy is rather positive and in line with his general views about Islam and the politics of North Africa.

CONCLUSION

When Thomas Hees had first sailed for Algiers in 1675, he had done so in the company of a heavily armed naval squadron, assigned for this mission by the Admiralty of Amsterdam. The outcome of his actions was hard to predict and perspectives must have looked gloomy: the Dutch Republic was still at war with all three corsair states of the North African coast. Ten years later, in 1685, Hees was sailing to Algiers aboard a single merchant ship called *De Vrede* (the Peace). By the end of this last mission, most of the Dutch slaves had already been ransomed and the States General had - at last - a sound, albeit short-lived agreement with the corsairs of Algiers.

Like other "egodocuments" of this sort, Hees' *Verbalen* largely function as a sort of defense of his actions and choices during his diplomatic missions: they convey the picture of a most able envoy, worthy of dealing with the most challenging environments but at the same time a "most humble servant" (*Uw onderdanigst*) of the Dutch Republic. Hees' lack of negative judgments about Islam and his deep appreciation of his Jewish acquaintances were already clearly discernable in the journal kept during his first mission. This image is not contradicted by the *Verbalen*, which thus constitute an immensely useful insight into the dynamics of Early Modern cross-confessional diplomacy. In this regard, of particular interest is the mediation offered by Dutch converts to Islam (renegades) and corsair captains, but also the use of the services of liberated Christian slaves. As a concluding remark, we can attest that focusing on such "lesser" actors of diplomacy is essential if we are aiming to come up with a more detailed image of Christian-Muslim relations in the Early Modern Mediterranean. By all means, this would be a complex and confusing image of co-operation across confessional lines and mixed loyalties.

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'THE BAD AND THE UGLY': AUSTRIA, HUNGARY AND *THE NEW EUROPE* (1916–1918)

BENCE LÁSZLÓ BARI

'Information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view' – if we accept this definition of 'propaganda' by the Oxford Dictionary, then we also acknowledge that it creates fiction. It is also true that this tool of power has its influence on contemporary conditions as well as historical perspectives

The perception of the Habsburg Monarchy, for example, was dominated by the key terms 'ramshackle empire' and 'prison of nations' for a long time. The source of this narrative can be located to the period that preceded the fall of the empire: the First World War (1914–1918). The stronghold of those who held similar opinions was the periodical titled *The New Europe* (1916–1920). The founder of this press organ was the Scottish historian Robert William Seton-Watson, who was heavily aided by the emigrant Czech politician and later Czechoslovak president Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk from the beginning. The main goal of this international, intellectual circle gathered around the newspaper was the reorganization of the Old Continent along national lines. This cause was propagated along with the destruction of the main obstacle in its way: the Habsburg Monarchy. (May, 1961: 51–54.)

My article will focus on the portrayal of the two main components of this state sentenced to death by the authors of *The New Europe*: the Empire of Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary. The collaborators initially agreed on labeling the inner structure of the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy as a system of dual oppression. However, serious differences can ultimately be detected between the images of the two states during the First World War.

INTRODUCTION

Hungary (Transleithenia): a chauvinistic, corrupt and imperialist state of a most vicious nature – Austria (Cisleithenia): a weak and decadent, yet positively developing country. Within the ranks of *The New Europe*, this was a common opinion in relation towards the two states – both of which were autonomous parts of the very same empire they were seeking to destroy. My work will describe the reasons behind this duality. During this process, I will make use of not only the articles published in *The New Europe*, but also other contemporary publications. By this determination, I will describe the construction of a long-lasting and largely fictional image of the Austrian and Hungarian parts of the Habsburg Empire.

'DUAL OPPRESSION': THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION

The criticism of The New Europe towards the Habsburg Monarchy went in two important directions. The first was a practical one in terms of Entente politics as it concerned the Dual Alliance of Germany and Austria–Hungary which formed the core of the Central Powers' bloc. On this association, the infamous German concept of Mitteleuropa was based – that the leading state of the Central Powers should organize an empire of 'Central Europe' from its conquests and the territories controlled by its allies. (Romsics, 2005: 177–181.)

The very first article of the British periodical – written by Masaryk – interpreted this aim as an extreme form of 'Pangermanism' and as an attempt of Germany to conquer the continents of Europe, Asia and Africa alike. (The New Europe, Vol. I, No. 1, 1916: 1., 19.) While this statement as such was an obvious exaggeration, it was undoubtedly a goal of German politics in the Great War to transform the Reich into a power equal to Russia and Great Britain. (Smith, 1986: 112.) Seton-Watson drew the conclusion from this situation that the Habsburg Empire was the key element in the process of German expansion – consequently, it had to be defeated and destroyed. (The New Europe, Vol. I, No. 1, 1916: 27.)

On the other hand, Masaryk's aforementioned article had already interpreted the moment when the Habsburg Empire was transformed into Austro–Hungarian Monarchy – the Compromise (German: Ausgleich, Hungarian: kiegyezés) of 1867 – as the transition of power from the Habsburgs to the Germans in Austria and the Magyars (ethnic Hungarians) in Hungary. (The New Europe, Vol. I, No. 1, 1916: 11.) Thus, the Dual Monarchy was born to be the 'prison of nations'. Seton-Watson later supplemented the readers with exact numbers in relation to this question: the Scottish historian pointed out that the empire inhabited by 52 million people was ruled by a German–Hungarian minority of only 18 million. (The New Europe, Vol. I, No. 11, 1916: 337.)

The problem of 'minority rule' proved to be especially important in relation to Transleithenia. The writer working under the pseudonym 'Dr. P.' made a statement truthful to the contemporary statistics that the Magyars constituted a slight majority of 54% in the historical Kingdom of Hungary. (The New Europe, Vol. VIII, No. 92, 1918: 12.) Conversely, the Romanian author Dimitru Drăghicescu claimed that the ruling nation made up only the 41% of the residents located in the „lands of the crown of saint Stephen” (Hungary and Croatia). (The New Europe, Vol. VII, No. 80, 1918: 39.)

Drăghicescu's main argument was that Magyars could only have been found in the Central Plains (the Hungarian 'Pousta') of the country, while only minor groups of them lived in the outer 'provinces' of nationalities. According to these statements, the territorial peripheries were demanded rightfully by the neighbouring and the coming-to-be states of Romania, Yugoslavia and

Czechoslovakia. A minor flaw in this argument was that the Romanian author seemed to forget about the noteworthy Szekler population in the heart of Transylvania. The slight of the Szekler question was also 'present' in the Romanian claims for the region at the Peace Conference of Versailles. (Romsics, 2005: 98.)

Nevertheless, the authors of *The New Europe* agreed that the Magyars were acting like despots towards the numerous nationalities of their country from 1867 on. The problems of the Hungarian political system were discussed by Seton-Watson in the second article of the periodical (*The Roumanians of Hungary*). The Scottish expert disproved the image of Magyar 'liberal rule' over minorities – on the contrary, he depicted the ruling elite as one which utilized the fierce assimilationist policy of 'Magyarization'. As he had travelled to Hungary before the war, the historian also presented the corrupt electoral system by his own observations. (*The New Europe*, Vol. I, No. 1, 1916: 22–26.)

In contrast, Austria was seen more positively in terms of minority policy. In Seton-Watson's view, the introduction of general suffrage (1907) made national conflicts more moderate due to the equalized possibilities in political representation. However, the conditions of Cisleithenia were not perfect either as the dominant position of the Austrian-Germans remained basically untouched and the monarch had the possibility to govern without the consent of the parliament. (*The New Europe*, Vol. I, No. 11, 1916: 337–339.)

While the Scottish historian formulated a balanced opinion on Austria, Masaryk enhanced and magnified the negative sides of the political system in his interpretation. The politician stated that the aims of the dominant nation was to Germanize the Bohemian provinces and the Slovenian territories. (*The New Europe*, Vol. I, No. 5, 1916: 154.) This policy was depicted in great detail in an article titled *The International Situation of Austria in January 1917*. As the political power was transferred to the military over Cisleithenia, franchise was restricted and censorship was introduced. The Germanization of the Bohemian lands had started along with the suppression of the minorities. (*The New Europe*, Vol. I, No. 12, 1917: 354., 357–360.)

Nonetheless, Hungary went way beyond Austria in its terror over the nationalities according to 'Dr. P'. The anonymous author declared that the Hungarian minorities were victims of an actual genocide. The government strived to control the local churches and education in order to create the Hungarian unitary state. The elite – as 'Dr. P' wrote – tried to colonize the territories inhabited by the nationalities and attempted to Magyarize the borderlands so that minorities could be separated physically from their homelands of Russia, Serbia and Romania. (*The New Europe*, Vol. VI, No. 72, 1918: 197–201.)

However, it must be stated that while Serbians, Romanians and Ruthenians were victims to various atrocities in Hungary, the Hungarian state did not want to exterminate its subject peoples. (Galántai, 1985: 322–323; Galántai, 2001: 136–140.) Accusations of this nature were not more than attempts to demonize and denigrate the enemy – similarly to the British propaganda towards Germans during the course of the Great War. (Thompson, 1999: 38.)

INTERNAL POLITICS DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR

The authors of *The New Europe* did not only observe the conditions and the national policies of the Monarchy, but were also attentive towards the internal situation of Cis- and Transleithenia. Consequently, they depicted the main figures and the most important events of Austrian and Hungarian politics on the pages of their periodical.

The Hungarian prime minister Count Stephen Tisza appeared as a dictator (*The New Europe*, Vol. I, No. 7, 1916: 200), a criminal responsible for the outbreak of the war and an invisible hand directing the inner life of the Monarchy in *The New Europe*. (*The New Europe*, Vol. I, No. 10, 1916: 315.) The author of the article *The Fall of Count Tisza* – written in May 1917, after entrainment of the prime minister by King Charles – held the opinion that the crimes and the importance of Tisza in the course of the conflict were equivalent to those of the German Emperor Wilhem II. The prime minister had inherited the corrupted country from his father, Koloman Tisza. His personality was defined by crudity, impulsiveness and fanatic chauvinism. (*The New Europe*, Vol. III, No. 33, 1917: 215.)

In terms of symbolism, the portrayal of the Austrian prime minister Count Karl von Stürgkh was equally strong – however, the focus in this case was on the weakness of the presented character and country. According to the anonymous author of *The New Europe*, the decadent nature of Cisleithenian politics took form in the person of Stürgkh. The politician did not have any program and was only a helpless puppet in the hands of the Emperor-King Francis Joseph and the Magyars. (*The New Europe*, Vol. I, No. 2, 1916: 53–54.)

Regarding the leading figures of the Hungarian opposition, Seton-Watson portrayed them in a negative tone similar to the one utilized in the case of Tisza. All oppositional figures turned out to be faithful supporters of the 'Pan-German' war aims. Even the pacifist and anti-German Mihály Károlyi was accused of trying to deceive the public opinion of the Entente Powers. Additionally, Seton-Watson proved that Károlyi was as Chauvinist as his fellow associates, advocating the policy of Magyarization. (*The New Europe*, Vol. II, No. 14, 1917: 16–21.)

In contrast to its Hungarian counterparts, the oppositional Austrian Social Democratic Party was evaluated more positively after their split with the government in 1918. The new aims of the

political force were to trigger social revolution, to reach a compromise with the Entente and the federalization of the Habsburg Monarchy – the latter of which, however, was unacceptable in the eyes of The New Europe's guard as it presupposed the integrity of the Danubian Empire. (The New Europe, Vol. VIII, No. 94, 1918: 67)

There was only one spot of light in the shadows of the Magyar policy. According to 'Dr. P.', the sociologist and politician Oszkár Jászi was in fact the future hope of Hungary. Leading the progressive National Civic Radical Party, the Hungarian scholar also issued the influential sociological periodical *Huszadik Század* (Twentieth Century), which was described as an outstanding press organ by the aforementioned author. (The New Europe, Vol. II, No. 20, 1917: 202–203). The source of the positive opinions on the side of The New Europe was probably Seton-Watson, who was exchanging letters frequently with Jászi before the war. (Jeszenszky, 1977: 749–759.) The collaborators of the periodical projected that Magyar peasantry and working-class – oppressed like the nationalities of Hungary – would be led by the Hungarian politician. (The New Europe, Vol. III, No. 34, 1917: 242.)

'HUNGARIAN FOREIGN POLITICS'

Hungary had already proven to be victorious twice over Austria in its sins. But the guard of The New Europe anathemized the former state not only for its oppressive politics towards minorities and for its corrupt political system. In his first article, Seton-Watson also stated that Magyars were as responsible for the out-break of the First World War as the Germans of Wilhelm II themselves.

In a single phrase, this is not only a German War, but also a Magyar War. Nay more, it is as much a Magyar War as it is a German War: for the Magyars have done more than any other people to create that electrical atmosphere in South-Eastern Europe which produced the fatal explosion. (The New Europe, Vol. I, No. 1, 19th October 1916: 20.)

Controversially, Masaryk denounced both of the dominant nations of Austria–Hungary as the enthusiastic supporters of German endeavours towards world power. In his opinion, Austrian-Germans aimed at the already mentioned Germanization of Cisleithenia. (The New Europe, Vol. 1, No. 5, 16th November 1916: 154.) Masaryk's judgement was especially strong in relation the Social Democratic Party of Austria as a subservient of 'Pan-Germanism'. The Magyars, in contrast, were only interested in keeping their privileged position within the power structure of the German *Neue Ordnung*. (The New Europe, Vol. I, No. 8, 1916: 247–248.)

However, the leading figure of the Czechoslovak movement was in the minority with his negative opinion on both Austrian-Germans and Magyars. Most of the co-workers of the periodical upheld the view that Hungary was more responsible than Austria in relation to both the First World War

and the failure of the Habsburg Monarchy as an experiment of various peoples living under the same roof. As one of the articles summed it up:

It is no accident that these expert writers, dealing with national problems, should find that all roads in Central Europe lead to Budapest. Some would, perhaps, say Vienna; we prefer the Magyar capital, because, but for Magyar nationalism and its veto upon toleration and race-reconciliation, the Habsburgs might have re-fashioned their strange realm by a bold and liberal policy towards the subject peoples. (The New Europe, Vol. VIII, No. 100, 1918: 195.)

According to this group, Austria was economically dependent on Hungary, the latter being heavily supported by Germany. (The New Europe, Vol. I, No. 10, 1916: 315). The Magyar elite did not hesitate to intervene in the inner life of Cisleithenia. (The New Europe, Vol. I, No. 2, 1916: 53–54.) Additionally, the dominant nation of Transleithenia was highly resistant to the idea of federalization – as it would have meant their loss power in relation to the Dual Monarchy and the territory of Hungary itself. (The New Europe, Vol. IV, No. 41, 1917: 42–43.)

The authors of The New Europe saw the Magyars not only as the ones who controlled the Austrian state, but as a nation with an imperialistic appetite towards the Balkans. The most extreme accusation stated that Hungarian politicians wanted their country to annex Serbia, Romania, Bosnia and Dalmatia on the basis of the ancient rights of the Holy Crown of Hungary. (The New Europe, Vol. III, No. 33, 31th May 1917, 218.)

This very determination was the one which made Magyars the loyal servants of Germany. While the latter would not have lost its importance in European relations even in the case of losing the war, Hungary would have only become a Great Power if the Central Powers won the war. (The New Europe, Vol. II, No. 21, 1917: 227.) Seton-Watson treated the country as an independent belligerent state which would have outlasted the weaker Austria during the course of the Great War. (The New Europe, Vol. I, No. 13, 1917: 385.)

Germany also needed the alliance of Hungary in order to keep Austria and the Habsburgs under control. (The New Europe, Vol. III, No. 28, 1917: 55.) Through its servant, the Great Power could block the planned reforms of the Habsburg Monarchy. According to the rumours received by The New Europe, Germany would have even enabled Hungary to become an autonomous state on its own. (The New Europe, Vol. II, No. 23, 1917: 313.)

The pledge of the German–Hungarian friendship was the very existence of Austria itself. Cisleithenia – controlled by the Austrian-Germans – neutralized the national movements dangerous for the the two allies as a weak buffer state and averted the attention of Pan-German imperialism from Transleithenia in a calming way for the Magyars. (The New Europe, Vol. VI, No. 74, 1918: 272–273.)

No such accusations were proclaimed concerning the Austrian part of the Monarchy – but other fondnesses were suspected. In his article on 'Pan-German literature', Masaryk stated that a group of Austrian-Germans devoted themselves to the *Alldeutsch* unity. (*The New Europe*, Vol. 1, No. 5, 16th November 1916: 154.) Later, this opinion was interpreted to be a dominant one among the ranks of the Cisleithenian dominant nation. (*The New Europe*, Vol. III, No. 33, 1917: 222–223.)

It is important to stress that the Magyar influence on the foreign policy of the Monarchy was enlarged in an absurd way by the authors of *The New Europe*. In reality, the most important issues were decided upon by the common Ministerial Council, in which the vote of the Hungarian Prime Minister was only one of many. (Fried, 2014: 7–8.) The inner life of Cisleithenia was also basically undisturbed by the will of its counterpart; the parts of the Monarchy were independent from each other by internal means.

The supposed war aims of the Hungarian state advocated by *The New Europe* have to be observed in a similar way. It is true that Count Stephen Tisza would have liked to see Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmatia as the future parts of Hungary. (Romsics, 2004: 147.) Moreover, he also contemplated on partly annexing the hostile Romania. (Palotás, 2003: 82.) However, it is important to emphasize that such vague territorial claims were not endorsed officially by the government of Hungary – simply because this would have meant an end to the balance of power within the Habsburg Empire and the Magyar dominance in terms of population over Transleithenia. The maxima of the war aims in reality were simple corrections on the Serbian and Romanian borders. (Bertényi, 2010: 221–222.) Similarly, the German alliance was not the fetish of the Magyar elite only; this was the general point of view of the imperial politics during the reign of Francis Joseph. (Herwig, 1997: 14–15.) It was the very same period when ambitious plans of expansion were produced by the military circles of Vienna. These were very similar to those of the accusations of *The New Europe* against the Magyars – for example, Conrad von Hötzendorf, the Chief of the General Staff seriously planned the annexation of Serbia, Montenegro and Albania to the Habsburg Empire. (Ibid, 10.)

CONCLUSION

All in all, the staff of the British periodical voiced their criticisms mainly against the Hungary of the First World War. Most of the authors interpreted the Danubian state almost as a 'Hungaro–Austrian Monarchy', the dominant nation of which would have planned to incorporate the Balkans within this structure. Thus, the pages of *The New Europe* echoed the sweetest delusions of contemporary Hungarian chauvinists. (Gyurgyák, 2007: 109.)

The rulers of Transleithenia were also seen as the faithful servants of Germany. It was due to their joint influence that the development of the Monarchy was stuck – and it was due to this failure that

the destruction of the Habsburg Empire became necessary. Apart from this, the imperialist Magyars appeared as the butchers and oppressors of the subject nationalities. The latter opinion was apparent in the views of the intellectuals who later composed the company of *The New Europe* (Jeszenszky, 1994: 228., 250–251.). The former, however, might have had its base in Bohemia – where similar accusations were voiced from the side of the Czech politicians in 1918.

A radical turn was implied in the case of a democratic revolution in Hungary, which would have been led by Oszkár Jászi. However, this transformation would have taken place not in the historical territories of Hungary, as the new borders of state – stated Seton-Watson – could have only equaled to the ethnic areas inhabited by Magyars. (*The New Europe*, Vol. IX, No. 109, 1918: 104.)

Nonetheless, several aspects were not taken into account. For the dominant nation, the integrity of the country was an axiom and an unshakeable taboo. Jászi himself shared this belief as well – along with the expectation that the minorities of Hungary would be assimilated to the Magyar ethnicity in time. (Gyurgyák, 2007: 181–184.)

In fact, Jászi's peculiar, atheist and radical thoughts did not mobilize the masses in contemporary Hungary. It is not by accident that the democratic revolution taking place in 1918 was not led by him but by Mihály Károlyi, who was accused so severely – and partly unrighteously – by the authors of *The New Europe*. It was true that the politician did believe in the sanctity of the historical borders of Hungary – however, he was truly a friend of the Entente. (Pölöskei, 2003: 540.)

Propaganda has always been based on extremities and generalization – thus, it has never been an efficient tool of unbiased evaluation. Due to this fact, the friendly tone of *The New Europe* in relation to the lower classes and Oszkár Jászi could not overshadow the frequent accusations of the elite labelled generally as 'Magyars'.

Austria, while also being a hostile country, was treated more mildly. Most of the authors held the opinion that the weak Cisleithenia fell victim to the power of imperial Germans and Magyars. Other authors have already pointed out that Austria's responsibility in causing the war was weaker than that of Hungary. (Bertényi, 2005: 29.)

This point of view was represented strongly by the editor of *The New Europe*, Seton-Watson himself – not just in the periodical, but in his other publications, too. The Scottish expert nurtured sympathetic feelings towards Austria since – and despite its various failures – it allowed space for nationalities to promote their political aims through the parliamentary system based on general suffrage.

Austria's besetting sin has been superficiality and apathy, coupled none the less with the growing feeling of tolerance... (Seton-Watson, 1916: 10–11.)

– wrote Seton-Watson in his *German, Slav and Magyar* from 1916. The source of this interesting evaluation can be found in the period before the First World War – as Seton-Watson was a true Austrophile until late 1914. While he demanded the reformation of internal politics before the war, he truly hoped that the Monarchy could revive itself as a joint and voluntary association of the peoples living inside its borders and that even the often-criticized Magyar elite could understand the necessity of such a renewal. (Jeszenszky, 1987: 20–21.) This point of view was only subject to change after the outbreak of the Great War, mainly due to the influence of Masaryk who argued successfully for the dismemberment of Austria–Hungary and for the creation of an independent Czechoslovak state. (Seton-Watson, 1981: 98–99.)

Nonetheless, the remnants of Austrophile feelings were still powerful. That is the reason why the otherwise widely respected Masaryk remained a minor voice in regard to his negative opinion on both sides of the Monarchy. His point of view, however, was absolutely understandable – being the leading figure of the Czechoslovak separatist movement, it would have been preposterous to expect Masaryk to admire the very state he wanted to tear apart for the cause of his own people.

The influence of *The New Europe* was significant in Great Britain in relation to the public images of Hungary and Austria. According to the memoirs of Masaryk, the propaganda of the periodical resulted in quite a few politicians and key figures of the Entente supporting the establishment of new national states of Eastern Europe. (Masaryk, 1969: 91., 126.) As the former British diplomat Harold Nicolson pointed out in his reminiscences from 1965: the enthusiasm felt for the Czechoslovak, Yugoslavian, Romanian and Polish good causes went hand-in-hand with disregarding the interests of the often-scourged, 'bad' Hungary and the 'ugly' Austria during the creation of the Versailles system in 1919/20. (Harold, 1919: 33–34.)

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REVEALING THE TYRANT: THE IMAGE OF TIBERIUS

BY ROMAN AUTHORS

UULA NEITOLA

At the beginning of the first century, the governance of the Roman Empire was in a state of transition. The Republican period ended following Octavian's defeat of Antonius and his subsequent receipt of the title of Augustus, the venerable. Augustus is the first ruler of the Roman Empire, and the concentrated power system of the Empire was his inheritance. Augustus' management and the executive bodies he altered for the new system of dictatorship, became the foundation for rulers in future. Following the death of Augustus, during the years 14-37 CE, this new stylized system of government was dominated and managed by Tiberius Julius Caesar Augustus. This article explores the historical image of Tiberius; specifically, whether this image is based on fiction or reality. The general view concerning the histories that document the reign of Tiberius is that they intentionally depict Tiberius as a stereotypical tyrant or despot or superhuman. However, current and past research has not addressed the dynamics that led to this image of Tiberius by his four Roman biographers from the beginning 1st to 3rd century CE. It is rather important to understand why histories or biographies about high-level political figures vary in tone and what the cause of this variation is. In the case of Tiberius, his image as a tyrannical despot has endured for centuries. This article examines the Roman authors responsible for this unflattering image of Tiberius; namely, Dio Cassius, Suetonius, Tacitus and Velleius Paterculus, and their motives for their depiction of Tiberius. Through research into historical imagery, we can begin to better understand the early imperial period; particularly, fiction in the literature of Roman historians.

I. Introduction

When trying to gather information about other cultures, peoples or certain individuals, one will be surrounded by different kinds of information from different sources. Depending on the nature of the source, the objectiveness of the information is colored in varying tones and shades. When trying to decipher if the information is correct or not, we can begin to understand how a particular source viewed the subject matter; this is commonly referred to as image.

Research on historical image concentrates on the study of relationships between cultures and the people in those cultures; generally, this research focuses on the image of certain important individuals. Theory regarding the research of historical image has become increasingly established through continuous development, and it seems that there are practically no limits to its possibilities.

Some scholars have claimed that one could approach all historical sources through the study of historical image, since every source is at the same time a relic as well as a reflection of the past (Alenius, Jalagin, Fält 2002, "Preface").

Traditionally, research of historical image has been employed by esteemed researchers since the 1970s in the Department of History at the University of Oulu. The research of professor Olavi Fält, professor Kari Alenius and university lecturer Seija Jalagin, whose work *Looking at the Other – Historical Study of Images in Theory and Practise* from 2002, has been the basic methodological work in my research.

Approach and hypothesis

According to Luke Pitcher, there are two generally employed ways to approach the study of ancient history. The first approach focuses on understanding the relationship between ancient historians and other relevant data about the classical world; testimony from other historians, evidence from inscriptions or other physical remains, or non-historical writings. The second approach focuses on viewing the works of ancient historians as literary productions (Pitcher 2009, "Introduction", viii.). Research concerning the use of historical imagery draws attention to what an image is like, how a particular image has been formed by our perceptions and why, what is the function of an image, how has an image evolved, and what can we discern about the authors of an image (Fält 2002, "Introduction", 9.).

The Latin term *auctor* is defined as an author, a promoter, producer, father or progenitor. The authors that were active in Rome were founders of different literature styles; as a result, their writings were undisputed. When examining Roman historiography it is important to understand the background of an author; for example, an author's social class and civil status provides substantial information concerning his literary style. Additionally, one can discern his educational experience and training by examining the texts that were produced; specifically, the text measured knowledge in literature and history. In practice, anyone from the senatorial or equestrian class had a possibility, with the help of friends or family, to spread his texts even to the most influential persons in society (Fantham 1996, 2-3.). Moreover, an author's motive is likely to vary based on the social and political circumstances that exist when he was writing. Defining the role and place of the author in the corpus of Roman literature is a common problem for researchers. It seems that a number of authors, especially historians, were motivated by the desire to be the first to discuss events and situations (Fantham 1996, 6.). History in Rome, in other words, was not often written for *bona fide*, in good faith.

History in antiquity was strongly associated with poetry and rhetoric, and it was often enjoyed as entertainment and for education. Historical events sought to make examples and provide guidelines for leaders and members of the Senate. History concentrated primarily on great individuals and exceptional military and political exploits undertaken for the good of the State; essentially, history aimed to build a collective memory. Roman authors also received popularity and increased reputation as a result of their work, regardless of their differing adherence to standards with respect to their truthfulness. Ancient conceptions of historical accuracy were different from the criteria of objectivity today. The Roman authors, therefore, tend to follow their Greek idols in accordance with the truth, which is carried out primarily by going *ad fontes*, to the sources. Above all, the Romans were proud of their traditions, and the past provided value and a foundation for their greatness (Mellor 1999, 1.).

During the imperial period of ancient Rome, history was often written by individuals who were active politically. An author could come up with invented happenings at open spots and write events with rather limited knowledge. The most valued method of ancient Roman historians, however, was to rely heavily on their personal observations rather than objectively viewing the facts or events. Roman historians continued the Greek tradition, in which the most important and prestigious method was detecting with an author's own eyes, *autopsia* (Munson 2013, "Introduction" 5 - 6.).

The storyline of a particular work is often enlivened by the confrontation of the author with powerful, memorable phrases, and moral or ironic stories. Authors also adopted the practice of including invented speeches by historical persons as a narrative to explain underlying motives and to reveal the nature of the characteristics of the speakers. Drafting speeches in the name of the persons of the past was a typical rhetorical tool, which became a narrative element to most of the prose literature during the imperial period. If a writer wanted to be understood, however, he had to share the same meanings with his audience.

Roman literature, written in the Latin language, remains an enduring legacy of the culture of ancient Rome. Some of the earliest extant works are historical epics telling of the early military history of Rome, followed by poetry, comedies, histories and tragedies. Latin literature drew heavily on the traditions of other cultures; particularly, the more matured literary tradition of Greece, and the strong influence of earlier Greek authors (Mastin 2009, "Rome"). The "Golden Age of Roman Literature" is usually considered to cover the period from about the start of the 1st Century BCE up to the mid-1st Century CE. Three of four of the more widely known ancient Roman authors that wrote a biography of Tiberius, Suetonius, Tacitus and Velleius Paterculus had their career during

this period. The fourth, Cassius Dio, produced his histories during the “Silver Age of Roman Literature” that extended into the 2nd Century CE.

The purpose of this article is to examine the constructed image of Tiberius by the Roman authors, by employing the methodology regarding research of historical imagery traditionally used. Whether this image of Tiberius is “correct” or a “wrong” one is secondary, as one cannot even aspire to “correctness” in such a matter. On the other hand, we can easily come to terms with the creator through the medium of the image itself (Fält 2002, ”Introduction”, 9). It is for this reason that the traditional methodology for conducting research on historical imagery best suits the topic of the image of Tiberius: it examines the subject as much as the object. How dominant are the authors’ personal additions, and how accurate are they according to historical reality? In this I am not concerned with how authentic the authors’ historical reality is, but rather I am concentrating on the factors that created the image and how that image was born.

II. Creating the Tyrant

Images guide the world. Whether the image appears as part of a history book, a cartoon, or movie, the affect, or impression of the image upon the audience is relevant. Images guide our behavior subconsciously. Before the actual analysis, however, a few basic facts about the image should be explored. Who does the image describe? Who does the describing? What is the perspective of the image, from the author, subject, and audience? The most important question is the latter.

During the Empire, epitome, short-term histories dealing with the highlights of the past, became more common. The authors often repeatedly apologized for the fact that many events had been excluded because of urgency. The Author was, therefore, able to conveniently ignore unpleasant or less glorious events; additionally, omission was often essential to ensure the safety of the author. Essentially, a truthful and objective review was not the primary objective in histories, but to educate and teach. Despite its strong tendency to emphasize personalized and moralistic anecdotes, Roman historiography was much more than a mere collection of exempla (Mehl 2014, 264; 270; Raaflaub 2014, 2).

The Authors

Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, known as a historian and biographer, was from an equestrian family. He was a protégé and frequent correspondent of Pliny the Younger. Suetonius began his career at the court of the Emperor Hadrian and in 121 CE, he was elevated to the office of Manager of Imperial Office. As a result of his operating at the court of Hadrian, Suetonius’ work was heavily influenced by the Emperor’s interests. To this end, it is probable that Hadrian freely gave Suetonius

the freedom to explore the imperial archives and libraries. Suetonius' *magnus opus De vita Caesarum*, *Lives of the Twelve Caesars*, has been an invaluable and often cited source for historians wishing to explore the characters of Roman rulers. *De vita Caesarum* includes biographies of the first twelve rulers of Rome following the Republican period, including Tiberius (Graves 1957, 7.). The style of Suetonius' biographies has been referred to as "the history of gossips", by Edwin Linkomies, the former professor of Roman literature in University of Helsinki, due to Suetonius' habit of including all rumors and scandals he heard about the emperors.

Publius Cornelius Tacitus, in addition to being one of the most renowned and significant ancient Roman authors, was a Roman politician and consul. His final work, *Annales*, includes annual events in Rome beginning with the succession of Tiberius and ending with the fall of Nero. During the Empire, several authors adopted a practice of stoic opposition to the emperors. Tacitus made no effort to appease or gratify the emperors in his work, but he did attempt to pursue the truth of his histories. He employed an asymmetric style and emphasized the variation of narrative. Tacitus began to publish his works following the long, terror filled reign of the Emperor Domitian. It seems that Emperor Domitian's tyrannical reign affected Tacitus' style of writing in many ways; specifically his descriptions of the emperors. The *Annales* of Tacitus is a revealing cross-section of Roman politics, and it represents a significant input of Roman historiography (Mellor 1993, 6-10).

Cassius Dio Cocceianus was a Greco-Roman historian, senator, politician and personal friend of several emperors. In 217-218 CE Emperor Macrinus made Dio the governor of Pergamon and Smyrna and later a consul. During the reign of Severus Alexander, Dio became the proconsul of African, Pannonian, and Dalmatian provinces. His extensive Roman history is written in Greek and is the 'newest' source considered for this article, in addition to its consideration as one of the most important historical sources for the study of the Roman Empire. Dio's personal relationships to individual rulers and the widely enjoyed political freedom characteristic of the time period he wrote in, naturally affected the descriptions of past monarchs (Millar 1966, 5-28).

Marcus Velleius Paterculus was a Roman soldier, senator, and historian. His history of Rome was published in 30 AD, during the reign of the emperor Tiberius. Having followed Tiberius on military campaigns, Velleius wrote significant eyewitness and contemporary descriptions of Tiberius' rise to power. Velleius wrote his work with a monarchical tone that was probably influenced by the wishes of the emperor himself. It is particularly this tone that makes Velleius distinct from other authors before and after him. His style differed in many respects from the histories written in the era following the death of Tiberius. Interestingly, Velleius enjoyed very little notice from subsequent Roman authors; for example Tacitus does not mention Velleius as a source for any of his works, which may be due to the fact that Tacitus did not appreciate the historiography of the first century

CE, because it was blatantly flattering to the emperor and described autocracy as an ideal system of government (Cowan 2011, "Introduction").

Each ancient Roman historian differs in his approach to the relative subject of Roman history; this difference is most evident in their expression and methods. This distinction is partly explained by the diverse and varied political atmosphere in the Empire during each authors' active career. Velleius was bound to a style that flattered most of the actions undertaken by the high ranking political figures of his time and their policies. Velleius certainly benefitted from the description of the political elite in a positive way; criticism could have been a fatal choice. Tacitus and Suetonius' works were published in the beginning of 2nd century CE, when the freedom of speech was wider. The years of 96-180 CE were known as the age of the Five Good Emperors, Nerva (96–98), Trajan (98–117), Hadrian (117–138), Antoninus Pius (138–161), and Marcus Aurelius (161–180), who presided over the most majestic days of the Roman Empire. For the active historians during this time period, there existed the possibility to be more critical of the history of Empire. Past emperors were not be glorified, but made as examples; a typical starting point of Roman historiography, which was to educate. English historian Edward Gibbons, in *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, states that the age of the Five Good Emperors offered an unusual contrast to the reigns of previous rulers. These Five Good Emperors were benevolent and their policy was comparatively moderate (Gibbon, 1. 49.). This time period offered an opportunity for historians to bring out criticism and unfavorable impressions in their works.

The Era of Tiberius

The reign of Tiberius Julius Caesar Augustus lasted from 14 to 37 AD and is a particularly important one for the Principate, since it was the first occasion when the powers designed for Augustus alone were exercised by somebody else. In contrast to glorious Augustus, "Tiberius emerges from the sources as an enigmatic and darkly complex figure, intelligent and cunning, but given to bouts of severe depression and dark moods that had a great impact on his political career as well as his personal relationships" (Fagan 1997, "Tiberius").

His reign abounds in contradictions. Tiberius went down into history as a tyrant, and even modern apologists have detected in his principate a centralizing tendency that was by no means to the advantage of the Senate (Levick 1999, 61). Despite his intelligence, Tiberius came under the influence of unscrupulous men who ensured that his posthumous reputation would be unfavorable. Despite his vast military experience, he oversaw the conquest of no new region for the Empire. He showed reluctance in running the state, retiring entirely from Rome and living out his last years in

isolation on the island of Capreae (Capri) in the gulf of Naples from 26 AD to his death. Despite his administrative abilities, Tiberius' reign represents, as it were, the adolescence of the Principate as an institution (Fagan 1997, "Tiberius").

A further element of the enigma of Tiberius was the fact that, despite such sentiments, his reign did not in fact mark any kind of reversion to the practices of the old Republic. On the contrary, it eventually represented a descent into tyranny, in which Tiberius came under the influence of the prefect of the Praetorian Guard, Lucius Aelius Sejanus, who persuaded Tiberius to live out a bitter and frustrated retirement in isolation. According to Tacitus, some felt that Augustus had adopted Tiberius as his successor either because there was no satisfactory alternative or so that a poor successor would shed a particularly favorable light on his own memory. Tiberius' reserved nature concealed haughtiness and arrogance, perhaps even a tendency to cruelty and perversion (Shotter 1992, 1-2). In this sense, the reign of Tiberius ended the Augustan illusion of "Restored Republic", referencing the future of the Principate, which, according to the historians, was both promising and terrifying.

III. Augustus' boots

By describing the Tiberian era as one of tyranny and despotism, the authors reveal their own attitudes and approaches to the Emperor. An image, here the image of Tiberius, is longer-lasting and more durable than an opinion or attitude. These images are simplifications of the reality that they describe. This image depicts reality, but is not in itself real by comparison with the object that it represents. It is real enough if we think of it as an object of study or as a factor influencing various decisions (Fält 2002, "Introduction", 8).

The life of Tiberius, and the subsequent image of him as passed down by the ancient historians, was intentionally crafted to demonstrate the varying interests of these different historians. Several descriptions of Tiberius in the works of Velleius Paterculus, Suetonius, Tacitus and Dio Cassius suggest that the handed down image of Tiberius reflects the authors' motives to present the ruler as a certain type from the beginning of his life; specifically, the image was affected by what the authors considered good governance. An education in politics was closely associated, and an important component of, the writing of history in ancient Rome. The authors seem to have paid very much attention to the manner in which Tiberius was chosen as heir of Augustus. Additionally, they were very concerned with the character of Tiberius prior to his succession to the title of Emperor. Character was seen as an important factor in the life of an Emperor; in order to avoid bad rulers, it was important that any example of an unfavorable nature was to be documented extensively before the start of his time as Emperor (Pitcher 2009, 96).

Velleius' work portrays a favorable position concerning Tiberius, and appears to characterize Tiberius in a promising manner. In Velleius' history, Tiberius' actions are not criticized; on the contrary, Tiberius' actions, decisions, and policies are rationalized as benefits to the entirety of the Roman Empire. Velleius even goes so far as to conclude that Tiberius was Augustus' favorite (Vell. 2.102.3; 2.103.1-2). The purpose of this conclusion derives primarily from the fact that Velleius was attempting to caress the Imperial Court with his work; creating a positive image was part of the official propaganda that had been cultivated and used frequently during the Augustan era. Its purpose was to convince the people that the Emperor's position was reserved for the most suitable person. Velleius' description represents the typical manner of describing "official" reality; actions that received a high amount of criticism were generally ignored. Since it was possible to spread different texts among the literate elite of the Roman Empire, insinuating a certain point of view was likely to benefit the author himself. The image of Tiberius created by Velleius may not have been criticized publicly, but it is probable that not everyone in Rome agreed with this positive portrayal. Velleius' history was published in 30 CE when the anti-Tiberian opposition was at its strongest. Those in opposition with the Emperor were more than likely not minimal with their spoken criticism of Tiberius. Velleius was motivated to write overwhelmingly encouraging descriptions of the emperors by his election to the post of Praetor prior to the death of Augustus (Shipley 1924, "Introduction").

Other ancient historians, however, tend to portray Tiberius as much less favorable. According to Suetonius, Tacitus, and Dio Cassius, it seems that Tiberius was not Augustus' favorite, or his first choice. Indeed, machinations regarding the path of succession were viewed suspiciously, and as happening without the knowledge of Augustus. In Tacitus' *Annales*, Tiberius refused to accept the imperial titles as an attempt to conceal his cruel and sinister character behind a humble demeanor (Tacitus, *Ann.* 1.12.1-5.). This refusal, and apparent ruse, is referred to as *recusatio imperii* (Timonen 2000, 223-227). In the *Annales*, Tacitus condemns Tiberius' rhetoric about sharing power with the senate as a bad policy that would no longer be successful. His description of Tiberius demonstrates just how pessimistic Tacitus was about the succession of emperors following Augustus. According to Tacitus, Tiberius' negative image was based on his plan to leave public life and engage in activities that he was inclined to undertake because of his evil character (Woodman 1988, 186).

According to Dio Cassius, Tiberius' rhetoric about the administrative co-operation between the Emperor and the Senate is a sign of his uncertainty and fear that he felt for his general Germanicus. Tiberius' fear for Germanicus is one of the main features that appear in the ancient descriptions of Tiberius' character; Dio describes him as intentionally flattering the people and the Senate,

something that Dio seems to think future rulers should avoid. Suetonius' recounting of Tiberius' use of *recusatio imperii* is more sinister. He describes Tiberius's rise to power as a political game in which Tiberius tried to get the Senate to beg him to accept the imperial titles (Suetonius, Tib. 24.2.). Such behavior is similarly noted in the biographies of other emperors, usually associated with genuine sincerity or as political machinations. In the case of Tiberius, his use of *recusatio imperii* was the latter and provided evidence for his reputation as a bad ruler. (Timonen 2000, 227)

Additionally, Suetonius, like Tacitus and Dio, interprets Tiberius' character as gloomy and somber; characteristics that were particularly important in antiquity in determining a person's nature. (Suetonius, Tib. 11.1). Perhaps the most important factor that allowed for such a critical point of view of the Emperor was the less hostile political climate during the time when these authors were active; Suetonius and Tacitus, especially, were publishing during a more liberal political arena. Since the life of Tiberius could certainly serve as an example of despotism to the audience, especially politicians, the histories specifically indicate the qualities that should be expected from future rulers. Although the beginning of Tiberius' reign was fairly quiet and lacking in any major political disasters or scandals, following an examination of the histories, it is apparent that they intentionally depict an image of Tiberius that remains the same from his youth until his death. The impression on the reader was that if he was capable of allowing and causing the political unrest and isolation that characterized the end of his reign, then he most certainly received preparation for such poor leadership early in his youth, long before he advanced to the throne.

What kind of character then should an emperor possess? A Greek writer, Theophrastus, provides a hint concerning the criteria by which Graeco-Roman leaders were judged. A successor to Aristotle in the Peripatetic school, Theophrastus is known for his, *Ἠθικοὶ χαρακτῆρες*, a collection of thirty short character-sketches of various types of individuals who walked the streets of Athens in the late fourth century BCE. He outlines various types of people from a moral standpoint; character types that form an invaluable picture of life in the Graeco-Roman world, such as the Coward, the Thankless Man, and the Vicious Man. In addition to Theophrastus, Roman authors emphasized basis for the different characteristics of their historical figures. As a result, it is possible to explain the deeds of a historical figure by referencing his character; the figure's character traits are essential to the image that is to be immortalized in history.

Dio Cassius, for example, expresses that Tiberius "thought it bad policy for the sovereign to reveal his thoughts; this was often the cause, he said, of great failures, whereas by the opposite course far more and greater successes were attained" (Cass. Dio, 57.1.3.). In this way, Dio attempts a logical organization of his history. For him, it was necessary to depict the unreasonable events of Tiberius' lifetime to ensure that the history would be better understood. It was crucial that the reader

understand the historical narrative and for events to be explained, because more than anything, Dio's history is a guide to politics for new senators (Potter 2004, 68-69). For this reason, most of Tiberius' actions are illuminated by the description of his character. Out of the many moral types illustrated by Theophrastus, the most prominent is Dissembling, which means that a person is attempting to appear as something he is not by saying things he does not mean and by acting contrary to his words (Thphr. Char. 1.5-6.).

Tacitus records that Tiberius' character varies based on the tenor of the times; meaning that as a civilian he pretended to be virtuous, and as long as his mother Livia Augusta was still alive, he covered his secret vice. Only following the death of his mother and towards the end of his life, did he inevitably succumb to his true nature; one of a cruel tyrant (Tacitus, Ann. 6.51.2.). Similarly, Suetonius records that Tiberius appeared to desire to share his power with the Senate, but that this desire was disingenuous and was merely a trick employed by Tiberius to flatter the senators and the people (Sueton, Tib. 25.2.). According to Theophrastus, Flattering was a dishonourable and profit-making act, and whoever employed this tactic was a sycophant ready to do anything to benefit himself (Thphr. Char. 2.1-2.).

A majority of the sources record that Tiberius shunned political, and public life, and retreated to the island of Capreae as a result of his poor character. From Capreae, Tiberius ruled the Empire in 24-37 CE, but never returned to Rome. It was probably a great surprise to the Senate, as well as the historians recording his reign, that the Emperor voluntarily abdicated his position. Tacitus, for example, provides several possible motives for Tiberius' retreat, most apparent was his desire to conceal his cruelty and sensual inclinations (Tacitus Ann. 4.57.2.). This character type, Patron of Rascals, was one that maliciously friended individuals of questionable morality, mainly criminals, because he wanted to be in the company of people that were similar to himself (Thphr. Char. 29.1-3.).

Because the histories written after the Tiberian era tend to depict the beginning of the Empire from an educational point of view, tyranny is not anything to be missed. The Emperors and their autocratic policies were depicted as possessing bad and self-serving intentions. The descriptions of the Emperors in histories are subjective and based on constructed images; a practice that is representative of propaganda that sought to disgrace political enemies. In propaganda, like in the histories, depictions of enemies, foreign nations, or political opponents reflect the deep national feelings and beliefs of the society producing it; this is particularly why these images are difficult to undo (Wunsch 2002, "Image Research and the Enemy Image: The Soviet Union in Finnish Newspapers during the Winter War", 75.). Images of the enemy are skillfully built on selective history; most recently, this is reflected in the Balkan wars of the 1990s.

Perhaps the most scathing enemy depictions are of an Archenemy. An Archenemy's background does not even need to be told or explained to the people by the historian, because the details are commonly known among the people and have most likely been handed down from previous generations but on the other hand very distant things. (Wunsch 2002, "Image Research and the Enemy Image: The Soviet Union in Finnish Newspapers during the Winter War", 75.) According to this tradition, the ancient Roman historians used the negatively charged character traits of Tiberius to depict him as an Archenemy; a, tristissimus hominum, the gloomiest of all men (Pliny the Elder, *Natural Histories* XXVIII.5.23.).

IV. A Warning Example From the Past

Research concerning the historical use of images informs us more about the creator, or examiner, of an image than it does about the subject of the image. The research concerning the motivation of ancient historians begins with the notion that people's perceptions of other people and cultures are dependent on their relative experience; experience that is influenced by time, location, personal background, education, personality, and the political circumstances and power struggles that prevail at the time their opinions were formed. This forms the hypothetical starting point for analysing historical images and sources. Thus, these historical images can be defined as the subjective conclusions of the author based on their beliefs, attitudes, knowledge, and preferences (Fält 2002, "Introduction", 10.)

In 26 CE, Tiberius retired from Rome to Villa Iovis on the island of Capreae, where he remained until the end of his life. Tiberius' reasons for his retreat from Rome, and ultimately public life, remained unclear to his contemporaries and subsequent generations. As a result, records of the Emperor's final years are full of speculation and rumor, usually ill intentioned. Retirement from politics was not unusual; members of the Roman aristocracy often withdrew to the coast of the Bay of Naples. So why was Tiberius' retirement different from them? Augustus, for example, had numerous villas on the island of Capreae. According to Tacitus, Sejanus, the chief of the Praetorian Guard, urged Tiberius to leave, increasing his own political influence (Cass. Dio, 58.3.1-2.). Conversely, Velleius reports that Sejanus was the perfect ally for the Emperor (Vell. 2.127.4.). Tiberius himself, reportedly was concerned for his reputation; he was known as cruel and sexually licentious. In Roman public life such a reputation was perhaps typical of a reclusive and timid person. In any case, this reputation already existed before he moved to Capreae (Shotter 1992, 59-61). As a result, the image of Tiberius is heavily affected by his move to Capreae.

In spite of his isolation, Tiberius was still capable of managing the affairs of the Roman Empire. Regardless of his political astuteness, according to historians, his withdrawal remained harmful to

his image. Any energy Tiberius had previously expelled to manage the Empire began to be channeled to more malevolent deeds encouraged by Sejanus. Detailed information regarding Tiberius' early years on Capreae has been lost, but after 31 CE, when Sejanus' fraud came to light, Tiberius seems to have been frustrated and disappointed. He began to mistrust anyone who had been involved with Sejanus. Tiberius' suspicions led to his malicious use of Maiestas proceedings; these proceedings resulted in multiple indictments against a number of senators which resulted in their suicides. The Maiestas proceedings decreased the esteem in which the Emperor was held so much so that after his death at the age of 78 in 37 CE the public attempted to erase his memory (Shotter 1992, 61-65). Suetonius reports that, upon his death, the people demanded "Tiberium in Tiberim!", Tiberius to Tiber (Suetonius, Tib. 75.1.).

Maiestas laws, or treason laws, tainted the administrative policy of the Tiberian era, and achieved a prominent role in many of the works of Roman historians. Legislation concerning the Empire was in its infancy during the time of Augustus and was still evolving during the reign of Tiberius. The administration of justice, from the Principate's perspective, was continued as it had during the Republic, the sovereignty of the Senate in representing the Roman people was maintained. Conversely, the "Restored Republic" was based on a system of absolute monarchy, where all the power rested with a single person, ensuring that the Emperor had sole legislative rights. German historian Theodor Mommsen, argues that the principate was actually a kind of diarchy, where power was divided between the monarch and the Senate.

The historians seem to have taken liberties with the proceedings of the Maiestas trials when they fabricated the image of Tiberius. The trials were related in the form of anecdotes, especially in Suetonius, because it is an effective way to relate events. In addition, metaphors are commonly used to create strong images. A majority of the metaphors concerning the life of Tiberius appear in the works of Suetonius; a style typical of the historian. Anecdotes, when yoked to metaphors, combine historical events; in this case, the Maiestas trials. One of the more remarkable anecdotes related by Suetonius appears in the relation of the trial of Mallonia. According to Suetonius, Mallonia refused intercourse with Tiberius; as a result, Tiberius accused her of treason. Following the trial, Mallonia cursed "the old goat was licking the does" and killed herself (Suetonius, Tib. 45.1.).

By relating this anecdote, Suetonius emphasizes the cruelty and arrogance of Tiberius' reign. The tone and word choice of the anecdote is also intentionally crafted by Suetonius; the Greek name Mallonia is not only the name of a female victim, but is a derivative of the Greek word μαλλός, which means a flock of wool. Mallonia then could be translated something like woolly. Metaphorically, a female sheep is refusing to have intercourse with an old goat (Champlin 2007,

24). "Goat" refers to the island of Capreae, which gets its name from the Latin word *caper* (masc.), *capra* (fem.), meaning goat.

Roman satirical epigrams were popular and combined politics, literature, and poetry. I think that it would not be at all impossible that a contemporary of Suetonius, perhaps a poet who specialized in epigrams, was responsible for the quote by Mallonia.

The foreboding tone of the works of Suetonius, Tacitus, and Dio, is characteristic of their desire to educate future citizens and leaders by depicting Tiberius as a stereotypical tyrant. The unfavorable features of a stereotype are often the most visible, carrying the cultural attitudes of the time in which the stereotype was produced. Theories concerning the historical image suggest that the audience paid closer attention to features of an image that reinforced previously held aspects of stereotypes, supporting the goals, attitudes, beliefs, and preferences of the audience. As a result of the prominence of the stereotype, we can discern a great deal about the creator of the image based by looking at the life experiences of its creator (McGarty, Yzerbyt, Spears 2002, "Social, cultural and cognitive factors in stereotype formation" pp. 1-15).

The permanence of images is further emphasized by the fact that we are inclined to accept messages which lend to support to existing stereotypes. Furthermore, an important feature of cultural research is that the images we form of things or people foreign to us tend to be unfavorable. (Fält 2002, "Introduction", 8). With respect to this, the image of Tiberius was destined to be that of a tyrant, *persona non grata*, in history; an image partly based on his malicious handling of the *Maiestas* trials (Rutledge 2001, 93-94).

V. Conclusions

My aim in this article has been to determine how the ancient historians described the life and character of Tiberius in their works. I have analyzed the images by comparing the sources that describe the life of Tiberius with each other and by taking into account the characteristics and the background of each source. These sources contain a variety of methods related to the creation of Tiberius' image, depending on how much the biography reflects the general trends of Roman historiography. Since Roman historiography was a continuation of political conflicts and moral discourse, the writers of history must be interpreted in the context of Roman society. The image of Tiberius was affected primarily by the author himself. It did not come as a surprise that the descriptions changed depending on the time of each author's active career and his compliance with historical tradition.

An image was formed, in particular, by history's relationship with science in antiquity. Science was prevalent and those in pursuit of Science were interested in the unchanging nature of things;

images, however, remain the same. The study of the past is of no value in itself, but is significant in so far as it remains relevant for contemporary and future sciences (Barton 1994, 9-10). Historiography was not considered a science, because it examined the fluid nature often seen in the recording of history. The study of the writing of history was held to investigate a changing historical tradition, because it was associated with beliefs and observation. Historiography in antiquity was primarily literature, but it included qualities of research, and it was important for the lessons preserved for posterity. The past was considered to be bound strictly by time, specifically interested in understanding human activities; historiography illuminated the human tradition.

The sources examined in this paper represent two Roman historiographical traditions. Tacitus distinctively writes in the annalistic tradition, a collection of events having taken place throughout a particular year. Velleius Paterculus, Suetonius and Dio Cassius, in addition to Tacitus, represent the Roman tradition of recording political history, or history organized around political events and figures. Roman historiography was principally political; it was motivated by the author's self-interest, and it was intended to influence domestic political affairs. The quest for truth in the recording of historical events was heavily influenced by an author's self-interest, creating a heavy bias in the work. The work of Velleius Paterculus in particular, is heavily marked with patriotic sentiment, which is reflected in the presentation of Tiberius. The purpose of this sentiment was to typify the imperial cult expressed in the literature of the early imperial period. The authors themselves benefitted from high social positions, which explains their motivation for portraying the Emperor so unfavorably, since this type of depiction was in the interests of their social class.

Histories and biographies concerning Tiberius are typical of Roman historiography; particularly the biographers of Roman Emperors, such as Tiberius, focus on the psychological state of their subject. Tacitus and Dio Cassius attempt to identify the events in his background that may have motivated Tiberius to act so tyrannically. By presenting the possible sources of his cruelty, they were able to strengthen their arguments that negatively characterized Tiberius' reign. To this end, the most outstanding and vague events of his life were filled with exaggeration and rhetoric.

Suetonius, on the other hand, broadly highlighted the possible ethical basis and consequences of Tiberius' misdeeds. To do this convincingly, he presents the good and bad actions of the Emperor, ultimately the bad outnumber the good and the image of Tiberius is negatively coloured. It seems that Tiberius' pessimistic and brutal image, which recurs often later in the literature, is generally derived from his biography by Suetonius. At the same time, Suetonius' description of Tiberius exposes one of the typical deficiencies of Roman historiography: research. Since Roman historiography was oriented to appease a particular audience, while being biographical in nature, the authors reviewed historical events very narrowly. The tendency to preserve individuality in writing

is apparent in the types of images we have of Tiberius, images that highlight the personal motives of the authors.

I noticed that the different sources were used a lot, but their representativeness is not seen as relevant. This means that each source was equal, and no distribution of primary or secondary sources was reported. This was typical of the Roman historians. A one-sided and uncritical approach from narrative sources produced a certain type of image for each biography. The authors did not succeed in identifying, or seeking to identify entities and major causes, which left the social and political reasons for marginal.

Tiberius' image transformed from one historian to another; often the subject was described more analytically, depending on how many years had passed since the death of the Emperor. Velleius Paterculus wrote his history during the Tiberian era, and the image it conveys is uncritical, often overlooking and omitting the more unpleasant details of this time, following in the tradition of Augustan propaganda. Suetonius and Tacitus published their works around the same time, nearly one hundred years from the death of Tiberius, but they differ in style and presentation. On the one hand, both authors describe Tiberius as a tyrant and a didactic example of a bad Emperor. Tiberius' gloomy character and unsuitability for the throne were influenced by author's aversion to tyranny. Suetonius' Tiberius is characterized as being inclined to misdeeds and cover-ups. The author is dropping anecdotes thematically throughout the biography and has taken all redundant information from his sources with no use of criticism.

The historian who most critically portrays the reign of Tiberius is Dio Cassius, who published his history nearly two hundred years after the death of Tiberius. Dio modelled his work after Thucydides, a renowned ancient Greek historian. Thucydides' influence is apparent in Dio's attempt to analyze the sources and to maintain clarity and logic in his work. Dio's Tiberius is depicted as possessing an intentional air of maliciousness. This depiction indicates Dio's greater inclination to scrutinize his sources. The sharpening of the image is part of a broader transformation that took place in Roman society from the Julio-Claudian dynasty until the end of the Severan dynasty. Changes in Roman society are reflected in the writing of Roman history in many ways; excluding the characteristically Augustan depiction by Velleius Paterculus. The works of Tacitus and Suetonius may be viewed as explaining how the aristocracy of the traditional Roman Republic survived during the Nerva-Antonine dynasty compared to the danger and degradation they endured during the reign of Tiberius.

Since the subjugation of Rome by Augustus, Roman society was seen as deteriorating, following the philosophy of Hesiodos. Since Tiberius was seen as a particularly bad Emperor, and the mere idea of a Principate was vehemently opposed, his reign has been detached from the reign of

Augustus. Despite the elements and evolution of historiography the image of Tiberius includes a negative charge. This reveals that Roman history needed various examples of Emperors, good and bad, in addition to good and bad elements of monarchy in general. The current perception of this reorganization broadly reflects the examples created by historians.

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Political myths in publicist debate around of works of The Great Sejm in The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 1788-1792.

TADEUSZ MROZIUK

INTRODUCTION. WHAT ARE A POLITICAL MYTHS?

In the article I will described political myths, that were used by polish republican authors before The Great Sejm and during his works (up to pass the Constitution of 3 May 1791). At the start of these reflections it is necessary determine, what are political myths. Roland Barthes wrote: “The essence of myth is rearrangement aspects of culture and nature, showing social, ideological and historical products etc., showing indirect social connections and connected with them moral, aesthetic and ideological values (...) as created in inself and in consequence bring to uptake of them as “good law”, “public opinion”, “norm” other “standard”.¹⁵⁰

There are a specifics images other ideas about some areas of the political systems, that have been created by ancient tradition of ancestors. Political myths contain some in self always truth that remain in according with to reality, and fallacy, that is a products of humans imagination, not existing *de facto* never in the public awareness. Political myths are as well very durable. Their changes and, the more, their correcting are very difficult, if at all possible.

Characteristic of political myths, that I presented above, concern as well a political myths in a polish republican thought. These myths were creating in The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 2. half 16th and 1. half 17th centuries, also in the twilight of renaissance`s age. A foundation for their was above all a political thought of the Ancient Greece and Republic of Rome. A first and corrected understanding of elementary political myths of polish republican thought, can find in works of Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski, Stanisław Orzechowski, Łukasz Górnicki, Andrzej Wolan. There marked a way of then political discourse and reforms, that are known as “Execution of Law” in reign of king Sigismund II August.¹⁵¹

Possible is statement, that influence of political myths, that had formed of this time, was not influencing unfavourable to function of the state to half seventeen century. Their influence was neutralizing by others institutions and mechanisms of politics systems of The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Very big role in the state was playing numerous middle-nobility, conscious of owns position, owns law and owns strength. Middle-nobility and (in part) riches townspeople were

¹⁵⁰ Quoted from: L. Stomma, *Polskie złudzenia narodowe/Polish national illusion*, Warsaw 2015, pg. 5.

¹⁵¹ See: Dorota Pietrzyk-Reeves, *Ład Rzeczypospolitej. Polska myśl polityczna XVI wieku a klasyczna tradycja republikańska*”/”Order of Rzeczypospolita. Polish political thought in 16th century and classical republican tradition”, Cracow 2012.

of the time a middle-class, a guarantor of the balance of the power and the stability of political system in The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

The all changed from half seventeen century more or less, when in The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had been broken out a civil war – The Khmelnytsky Uprising, and followed wars with neighbors. These conflicts caused a very big destruction of economy, culture, as well of depopulation and impoverishment of peoples, especially of townspeople and middle-nobility. Structure of society and political systems changed as a result of this. A middle-nobility lost a dominated position in the political system in oligarchy`s favour. I not mention about Polish and Lithuanian cities and townspeople, that they in general lost of any importance, with the exception cities of trade in Pomerania and at The Baltic Sea (Gdańsk, Toruń, Elbląg).

From this time the oligarchy were making a middle-nobility dependent on oneself. It was forming a relationships based on mutual obligations: oligarch give to nobleman a means to life, in exchange for this a middle-nobleman is active in the Sejm other in tribunal for the benefit of the oligarch. The oligarchy began as well use of political myths to justification own domination over middle-nobility and to manipulation her. In consequence of this situation the oligarchy were using political myths in a rivalry with the king. Political myths became a destruction for The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Decline of until now political systems were following so much easier, that happened a substantial reduction of political culture of The Polish-Lithuanian political class. Ideas of counterreformation were radicalizing. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was becoming a state of anarchy as result of destabilization power of the sejm and the king. In the Europe, especially at the neighbors of The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, from the turn of the seventeen and eighteen centuries more popular were becoming other tendency: enlightenment and absolutism.

At the end of seventeen century The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was satisfied with a few military success. However, the power of The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was basing more and more on the legend and memory of action of ancestors. Interior policy was following a definitive regression. It seems that all were waiting for change of situation in the policy as result of polish military successes and affiliation by The Holy League. But it`s not happened. The Polish and Lithuanian nobility – “political peoples” (7-8 % of whole society) were withdrawing into oneself. Hardly any news enlightened political ideas from Western Europe not got through to Polish and Lithuanian politician and political authors. If they ideas were appearing, their influence and popularity was big small.

Considerable influence over withdrew into oneself of polish politician thought, had as well dependence of function of The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to current events in European

diplomacy and policy that were being conducted by then powers in Europe. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was not longer a subject in international relations. She became a object in negotiations of European politics. The lost of sovereignty of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was bigger and bigger. From last years of seventeen century most important questions of polish policy were talking often and often outside of The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

REPUBLICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT OF WIELHORSKI AND WYBICKI

For 18th centuries a republican thought was being created by works of Stanisław Dunin-Karwicki, Mateusz Białłozor and Stanisław Leszczyński as authors of two different versions of treaty “A Free Voice Guaranteeing Freedom” and of course Stanisław Konarski. In 2. half of reign of the king Stanislaus August determined impact on development republican thought were exerting a works of two authors: Michał Wielhorski and Józef Wybicki. Wielhorski in 1770 had made a request for French philosopher and political publicist Gabriel Mably and later to J. J. Rousseau, that they project the government for The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Before this Wielhorski was writing a treaty, where included reforms to established in The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, that in his opinion were necessary. This original Wielhorski`s project was in a such questions innovative. However definitely Wielhorski`s treaty from 1785 “O przywróceniu dawnego rządu według pierwiastkowych Rzeczypospolitej ustaw”/”About reintroduce an old government according to earliest laws of the Rzeczpospolita” was determined in a critical dependent on Rousseau thought. It was not a coincidence, that Wielhorski used a authority of Rousseau. At that time Rousseau was in Poland very famous, his work “Contract social” was being mentioned very often in polish political discourse. In connection with cooperation with The Bar Confederation Rousseau wrote treaty “Uwagi nad rządem polskim”/”Considerations on the Government of Poland” that included (besides considerations *stricte* political) as well reforms of social structure in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This social part of Rousseau work was omitted almost completely by Wielhorski, who was interesting above all in a return to old laws, derogation of incorrectness in Polish political systems and protection of Polish nobilities, especially middle-nobles. Wielhorski used as well a few political myths. His works was appreciated on account of intellectual significance.¹⁵²

¹⁵² About collaboration Rousseau and Wielhorski and about works “Considerations on the Government of Poland” see about all J. Michalski, “Rousseau i sarmacki republikanizm”, Warsaw 1977 (English Ed.: “Rousseau and Polish Republicanism, translated by Richard Butterwick-Pawlikowski, Warsaw 2015); J. J. Głowacki, *Gastronomia polityczna kuchmistrza litewskiego: Michał Wielhorski (1731-1814) – życie i myśl ustrojowa*”/”Political gastronomy of master cook of The Grand Duchy Lithuanian: Michał Wielhorski (1731-1814) – life and political thought”, Warsaw 2014, pg.

Wielhorski was active when he had still a hope to gain by The Bar Confederation of victory over Russia and to prevent a partition. However it was not happened. After 1776 Wielhorski had retired from public life completely, but later he supported to hetman Seweryn Rzewuski and was an opponent to Constitution of 3 May 1791.¹⁵³ Differently was running a life of Józef Wybicki, who was as well Bar Confederate. Wybicki in connection with work on the Zamoyski Code wrote treaty “Myśli polityczne o wolności cywilnej”/”Political considerations about civil liberty”¹⁵⁴. He was devoted to international situation The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth after 1. partition and to proposing to general course of reform of government. Basis for Wybicki was works of Montesquieu. A bigger part of his treaty “Political considerations...” was devoted describing a creation of the Ancient Republic of Rome, his development, his success and his slowly destroy. Wybicki described very precisely reasons of these processes. He made not this without a cause. In reality as his word about Ancient Republic of Rome was devoted situation of The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It was a warning for tragic fall of the state. Montesquieu wrote not as well about Ancient Republic of Rome willing used her as model of ideal state, but exactly as warning for contemporary monarchs and nations. Wybicki used a fact, that nobility was familiarized with a such discourse. He was thinking that nobility absorbed the essence of this treaty. This opinion is all the more justified that in third part of “Political considerations...” is not doubt that Wybicki was writing about Poland. In the time of The Great Sejm Wybicki was a close adviser to Ignacy Potocki, an adherent of collaboration with Stanisław August and a defender of interests of cities.

STASZIC, KOŁŁATAJ, ADAM RZEWUSKI, SEWERYN RZEWUSKI

These two treaties were initiating two ways of development a polish republican thought in the time until The Great Sejm and I think that as well later until 1795 years. Among many authors of treaties that were congruent more or less with actually policy, were giving overall looking on touching questions and were known for public opinion were existing a four authors: Stanisław Staszic, Hugo Kołłątaj, Seweryn Rzewuski and Adam Wawrzyniec Rzewuski.¹⁵⁵ Staszic wrote two treaties: “Uwagi nad życiem Jana Zamoyskiego”/”Remarks upon the life of Jan Zamoyski”, in year 1787 and 3 years later “Przestrogi dla Polski”/”Warnings for Poland”. Kołłątaj had had his debut

300-335. Works of Mably was published in 1781 and “Considerations...” in 1782 year (with small differences towards original work).

¹⁵³ See: J. J. Głowacki, „Gastronomia polityczna...”, pg. 400-402, 458-462.

¹⁵⁴ J. Wybicki, „Myśli polityczne o wolności cywilnej”/”Political considerations about civil liberty”, wstęp (introduction) E. Rostworowski, Poznań 1984,

¹⁵⁵ Review political thought around works of The Great Sejm see A. Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, “O formie rządu czy o rząd dusz? Publicystyka polityczna Sejmu Czteroletniego”/”It’s a question of constitution of government or power over awareness of peoples? Political writings during The Great Sejm”, Warsaw 2000.

already in 1784 when wrote a small publicist work about military education. This work was in connection with activity of Kołłątaj as reformer Academy in Cracow. However his most important works he wrote in 1788-1790, in this the most popular and known by the reduced title as “Listy Anonima”/”Letters of Anonymus”. He were addressing these letters to Marshall of The Great Sejm Stanisław Małachowski. Kołłątaj gave straight to laws questions and necessaries reforms in political systems in The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. These two authors: Staszic and Kołłątaj - in my opinion - were a continuators of Wybicki`s thought.

Seweryn Rzewuski and Adam Rzewuski were meanwhile a continuators Wielhorski`s thought. Seweryn Rzewuski, as stated Zofia Zielińska, was an author a many treaties, which aim was above all: a restitution power of hetman according to model before 1764 and objection towards succession of throne. His most important treaty this is “O sukcesji tronu w Polsce”/”About succession of Throne in Poland”.¹⁵⁶ Approximate political thought presented Adam Rzewuski in his only treaty “O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”/”Consideration for republican political system in Poland”. In contrast to Field Hetman of the Crown, Adam Rzewuski in my opinion was not a represent of the oligarchy. Before The Great Sejm was a client of Seweryn Rzewuski and Grand Hetman of the Crown Franciszek Ksawery Branicki, but (differently from them) he went on active to work of The This Sejm. Repeatedly he was speaking about his works. A lot of things and opinions that Adam Rzewuski expressed in his treaty can read as standpoint of middle-nobility. Adam Rzewuski was presenting his conception comprehensive, but often he limited oneself to immaterial phrases, also *locis communes*.¹⁵⁷ Independently of this he was recognized by historiography as the most consequence political publicist of traditional republicanism¹⁵⁸ and who created as well a theoretical basis for own political thought. However at Adam Rzewuski is visible in the most extent a paradox of tradition republican thought.

ANALYZE OF FOLLOWS POLITICAL MYTHS

I distinguish follows political myths: democracy of the nobility, idea of *monarchia mixta*, political liberty, equality, constant conflict *inter libertatem ac maiestatem* also between the Sejm (nobility) and king, equality and unanimity and *liberum veto*. A lot of rules or institutions that I mentioned above were in 16th century in harmony with reality and played a big role in the political

¹⁵⁶ Z. Zielińska, “Republikanizm spod znaku buławy. Publicystyka polityczna Seweryna Rzewuskiego z lat 1788-1792”/”Republicanism by hetman. Political Works of Seweryn Rzewuski 1788-1792”, Warsaw 1988.

¹⁵⁷ See: Z. Zielińska, *ibidem*, pg. 40 i 95.

¹⁵⁸ R. Lis, Hugo Kołłątaj i Adam W. Rzewuski: wokół problemu opozycji intelektualno-politycznych w piśmiennictwie Sejmu Czteroletniego”H. Kołłątaj and Adam. W. Rzewuski: around of problems a intelectual and political opposition in the publicist writings of the Great Sejm , [in:] Horyzonty Polityki, No 1(1) z 2010, pg. 293.

system. As a result of events in 17th century that I described they lost this harmony and connection with reality. They became a political myths exactly. They were existing from this time in uncertain social awareness of nobility and were using instrumental to acquire of own political aims by others persons or political factions. An analyzing of contain of publicist writings in a certain extent should be related to others parts of treaty, where author wrote about government or social system. Without this moral and customs phrases become a *locis communis*, also vapid expression. It is necessary notice, that – as wrote Anna Grześkowiak-Krawicz - mostly (but not ever) a critic of a certain customs or bad human nature is *de facto* an attack towards a actual political opponents.

Democracy of the nobility

Myth of democracy of the nobility was being connected with traditional justification of domination of nobility over the rest of Polish society. According with this tradition a nobility was conquered in once time of the past a land that was peopled by tribes which were remaining in anarchy. Nobility dictated for this tribes own government, that was a Rzeczpospolita and system of *monarchia mixta*.¹⁵⁹ This concept was highly appreciated by conservative political publicist writings Seweryn Rzewuski and Adam Rzewuski, that opposed against to break of this monopoly.¹⁶⁰ However Adam Rzewuski noticed a civil liberty of townspeople and peasants, what became generally as declarations only. Later, in 1792, he was planning make of reforms in his estate. In his treaty Adam Rzewuski opposed strongly against the conceptions of ennoblement of the king and creation a new nobility.¹⁶¹

Domination of nobility and her monopoly on general wish was being criticized by Staszic and Kołłątaj.¹⁶² They would broad (however in a limited extent) a political liberty to townspeople, for example by pass a law on the right of townspeople to have a seat in the sejm on the same rights as the nobility.¹⁶³ It was necessary to assurance a durability of unity of the state and the society.¹⁶⁴ It was also a think similar to thought of Adam Rzewuski that in republic a base for the government

¹⁵⁹ A. F. Grabski, „Myśl historyczna polskiego oświecenia”/”Historical thought of Polish enlightenment”, Warsaw 1976, pg. 244-245.

¹⁶⁰ A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 2, pg. 89-90.

¹⁶¹ Ibidem, pg. 35-37.

¹⁶² H. Kołłątaj, „Prospekt, według którego ma być napisane i ułożone prawo Narodu Polskiego, czyli ustawa rządowa”/”The Plan, in accordance which should be written and composed the Law of Polish Nation, also The Constitution [in:], „Listy Anonima i Prawo Polityczne Narodu Polskiego”/”Letters of Anonymus and Political Law of Polish Nation”, Ed. B. Leśnodorski, H. Wereszycka, Warsaw 1955, vol. 2, pg. 381 and 385.

¹⁶³ H. Kołłątaj, „Prospekt...”, pg. 381.

¹⁶⁴ Ibidem, pg. 385. See also H. Kołłątaj, „O poprawie Szkoły Kadetów i o wskrzeszeniu milicyi obywatelskich napisany w roku 1784”/”About revision of School of Chivalry and about restitution of citizens militia, descibed in 1784”, [in:] tenże, „Listy Anonima i Prawo Polityczne Narodu Polskiego”, vol. 2, Ed. by B. Leśnodorski and H. Wereszycka, Warsaw 1954, pg. 362

is a “friendships” or “mutual trust” between citizens and peoples.¹⁶⁵ . For Kołłątaj and his advisers the genesis of domination of nobility was a sign for this that present social system was an usurpation, a lawlessness and was took by violence. However neither Staszic nor Kołłątaj never negated a priority of nobility in political and social system, especially towards peasants. Priority of nobility was being emphasized especially in a symbolic context, what can see in expression of Constitution of 3 May 1791. Old and conservative phrases were necessary to gain the support of nobility for reforms and to avoidance a comparatives with French Revolution.

Mentioned general wish was being defined by Staszic as common good that was a sign of happiness of majority part of nation. He rejected also the idea of unanimity as contradictory with law of nature and that realization lead to fatal effects. Also this common good should be an aim of law.¹⁶⁶ To general wish referred as well Adam Rzewuski, who was understanding it as law¹⁶⁷ and was setting it against wish or discretion of king.¹⁶⁸ . Adam Rzewuski had think about unanimity others than Staszic. In opinion of Rzewuski all should be pursue to gain of it. He noticed that in Polish policy is unable to make a compromise and all problems solve by used radically means. This was as a result of lack of intention to consideration of opinions of different parties, what in his opinion should be a constant element of Polish political system.¹⁶⁹ Rzewuski noticed not that in current situation of The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth only effective action this is a radically action. Standpoint of Rzewuski was correct, but was not being adapted to current events.

An element of myth of democracy of nobility was as well a belief that a direct democracy as a system in which general wish could be realized in the broadest extent. Direct democracy was being understood as the system, in which deputies to the sejm had a imperatives mandates and in which their latitude of decision was being limited by deputies instructions. Such model of mandate was being supported in the beginning by Kołłątaj (who changed the own think later) and above all by Adam Rzewuski and Seweryn Rzewuski.¹⁷⁰ They noticed in this an instrument of defense of liberty against reforms planed by King. Hetman Rzewuski – as the oligarch- was noticing in this too a guarantee owns political influences in capital city. However a true aims defined not direct. Authors appealed to rule of equality, liberty and above all rule that every nobleman have a right to take part in deciding on even the most important questions of the state.

Idea of *monarchia mixta*

¹⁶⁵ A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 1, pg. 4.; A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 2, pg. 133. Rzewuski addicted in other place that it is necessary a establish a equality of all the states in the society.

¹⁶⁶ S. Staszic, „Uwagi nad życiem Jana Zamoyskiego”, Heilsberg 1785, pg. 62-63.

¹⁶⁷ A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 2, pg. 67.

¹⁶⁸ A. W. Rzewuski, *ibidem*, pg. 64.

¹⁶⁹ A. W. Rzewuski, *ibidem*, pg. 31, 155.

¹⁷⁰ About this see: A. W. Rzewuski, *ibidem*, pg. 68-69.

Idea of *monarchia mixta* was not existing already in a originally and pure form. Such model of government was not being adapted to current social and political situation in the state and to then expectations of public opinion. To disadvantage of this idea conspired as well constant conflict *inter libertatem ac maiestatem* and domination of the oligarchy over middle-nobility. Furthermore to modeling of government of The Polish –Lithuanian Commonwealth had an influence a political conceptions of Montesquieu and Rousseau, different than these of Aristotle.

Staszic in a projected division of power of the state was referring to Montesquieu and Dunin-Karwicki. Legislature should be attended by the sejm. Deputies should be elected on two-years cadency, what was a sign that the sejm can be convoked by the king ever when he judge it necessary. Executive as well should be attended by the sejm that should be change then to ruling commissions.¹⁷¹ This concept of executive in opinion of Staszic should be finished conflict *inter libertatem ac maiestatem* that – as he demonstrated – can be as well in government proposed by Montesquieu. Judicative should be autonomous and independently of any outside influence. The king should perform a function of father of the nation, guardian of law and represent of the state in a interior and exterior policy. He should stay above everything and everyone.

Adam Rzewuski criticized a lack of clear divisions and describing of competitions of present legislature (the sejm), executive (the king and The Permanent Council, ruling commissions) and judicative.¹⁷² As a result of this was a lot of disputes and controversies. Rzewuski had a right undoubtedly, but his words in reality was an attack towards The Permanent Council and the sejm that was remaining over influence of King. Definitely – for preservation of liberty - Rzewuski presented a conception of division of power into legislative, executive, judicative and moderate power. Legislative should be attended by the sejm. Executive should be attended by the ruling commissions that should be composed of commissioners elected by the sejm. Judicative should be – just as in the conception of Staszic – autonomous.¹⁷³ Moderate power should be made by the king and by the his council. Obligation of moderate power would be a guard the balance of between third in advance mentioned powers and mind a following of own competitions by these powers.¹⁷⁴ Power of the king should be similar to the conception of Staszic, however Rzewuski forbad to establishment of succession of throne.¹⁷⁵ Rzewuski emphasized that the king must be considered as office – then he will not be have a fear of lost a power and nation will not be afraid of own

¹⁷¹ S. Staszic, op. cit., pg. 52.

¹⁷² A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 1, pg. 120.

¹⁷³ See: Adam W. Rzewuski, ibidem, pg. 126 and Adam W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 2, pg. 107, 127-128. Rzewuski emphasized it by demand a differents cities as seat for the Tribunal and for the Sejm and executive powers. (ibidem pg. 43).

¹⁷⁴ A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 1, pg. 156.

¹⁷⁵ A. W. Rzewuski, ibidem, pg. 107 (the king as guard of laws).

liberty.¹⁷⁶ The kings council Rzewuski created on the basis of presented the senate. Staszic created not a such council. This council should advise to the king and also control of his activities.¹⁷⁷

Seweryn Rzewuski was a supporter of return to government that was existing in Saxon epoch, when one of the most important centre in political system was the Senat as *status intermedius* and hetman as defender of liberty against King`s aspiration to despotism. King should be in his opinion just as in conception of others a “Father of the nation”¹⁷⁸, however in that case a completely other ideological base for political system, these word would have different meaning. Position of the king should be returned to state from the Saxon epoch, also when The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was in the biggest falling. In opinion of Seweryn Rzewuski making of regulation of power of the king would be meaningless, because Rzewuski thought that king will break their even. He addicted that it would be best if abolish a position of king.¹⁷⁹ This thing was as well in work of Adam Rzewuski, however he noticed, that existing of king in political systems is necessary, because virtues (especially a love of the homeland) does not exist in the Polish nation, especially among the oligarchy. King should be a substitute for this virtues.¹⁸⁰ Whereas in thought of Seweryn Rzewuski presence of king justified a strong position of hetman in political systems. Without of existing the king so strong position of hetman would be unjustified. Seweryn Rzewuski was as well an adversary of permanent Sejm, which in model proposed by Staszic and Kołłątaj would became a centre of influence of king.¹⁸¹ This thing was as well in work of Adam Rzewuski, however he mentioned very oft and sharply about bad influences of the oligarchy on political systems. Meanwhile Seweryn Rzewuski - apart from general phrases about equality of nobility – mentioned not about this. Seweryn Rzewuski criticized as well the senate as a centre of influence of king which in this way had a possibility of moderating of laws.¹⁸² However in his work this critic was only because win a support of middle-nobility. The senate in then form of course was not accepted for him, but Seweryn Rzewuski – because oneself aspirated to wining of power – made not an anything changes in functioning of this institution. Seweryn Rzewuski was using this concept manipulatively and he could return to idea of *monarchia mixta* - at the most-only in symbolic dimension.

Political liberty

¹⁷⁶ A. W. Rzewuski, *ibidem*, pg. 175.

¹⁷⁷ A. W. Rzewuski, *ibidem*, pg. 67 and 157-158; Adam W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 2, pg. 177.

¹⁷⁸ S. Rzewuski, „O sukcesyi tronu”, Warsaw 1789, pg. 26.

¹⁷⁹ S. Rzewuski, *ibidem*, pg. 35.

¹⁸⁰ A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 1, pg. 130-131 and 154

¹⁸¹ S. Rzewuski, „O sukcesyi...”, pg. 20.

¹⁸² *Ibidem*, p. 31, Z. Zielińska, *op. cit.*, pg. 80

Political liberty was being understood as all rights connected with existence as citizen of The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This state was generally acclaimed as republic, also liberty state. Staszic wrote that only in republic is possible civil liberty, equality and security of person and asset. These third things were being acclaimed oft and oft as basis of liberty in place of the sejm (Adam Rzewuski)¹⁸³ and judicative (Adam Rzewuski)¹⁸⁴ or *liberum veto* (Seweryn Rzewuski).¹⁸⁵

The power of king was being accepted only on account of this that a position of king was – in comparative with west Europe – not very strong. However a condition for this was a good functioning the sejm. Paradoxically the inefficient sejm was favorable for the king, what noticed already Stanisław Dunin - Karwicki. Therefore all authors were demanding above all a reform of the sejm. Position of king according to model of absolutism from West Europe and in Russia (with that Stanislaus August had a close relationships) was being regarded generally as threat for political liberty. Political system, where was functioned a such king, was being determined as “captivity”.¹⁸⁶

Therefore in publicist writings was existing an objection against establishment of succession of throne. Staszic and Seweryn Rzewuski wanted change a model of free election.¹⁸⁷ However in opinion of Staszic whatever reform of free election will not a durability and stability of The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.¹⁸⁸ Adam Rzewuski and Seweryn Rzewuski as hetman were an adherent of free election. In their opinion king that was elected in free election was owing own power to the nation, also for her preservation, he must be obedient for the nation.¹⁸⁹ However later Seweryn Rzewuski preferred an abolition of the king than establishment the succession of throne¹⁹⁰ while Adam Rzewuski support the Constitution of 3 May 1791.¹⁹¹ The most consequence adherent of succession of throne by Elector of Saxony with concluding a alliance with Prussia was Kołłątaj.¹⁹² Similar as Staszic he referring to thought of Wybicki. The succession of throne would be not an

¹⁸³ A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 2, pg. 37-38.

¹⁸⁴ Ibidem, pg. 43.

¹⁸⁵ A development of concept liberty a Polish republican thought in 18. century researched Anna Grześkowiak-Krwawicz. See: A. Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, Regina Libertas: wolność w polskiej myśli politycznej XVIII wieku, Gdańsk 2006. English Ed.: “Queen Liberty: The Concept of Freedom in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, translated by Daniel J. Sax, 2012.

¹⁸⁶ See: A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 1, pg. 79, 95-96; S. Rzewuski, „O sukcesyi...”, pg. 14-18.

¹⁸⁷ S. Rzewuski, „O sukcesyi...”, pg. 6-9, 42.

¹⁸⁸ S. Staszic, op. cit., pg. 53.

¹⁸⁹ R. Lis, Hugo Kołłątaj i Adam W. Rzewuski: wokół problemu...”, pg. 312; S. Rzewuski, „O sukcesyi...”, pg. 14. Seweryn Rzewuski addicted that succession of throne is a danger for independent of Poland that exist thanks to own weakness. S. Rzewuski, „O sukcesyi...”, pg. 37-39.

¹⁹⁰ S. Rzewuski, „O sukcesyi...”, pg. 43.

¹⁹¹ A. W. Rzewuski, *Kopia listu senatora litewskiego do przyjaciela w Warszawie mieszkającego*, [w:] J. Woliński, J. Michalski, E. Rostworowski, "Materiały do Dziejów Sejmu Czteroletniego/"Writings materials to History of the Great Sejm" vol. 1, Wrocław 1955, p. 560-562; See also "Adama Wawrzeńca Rzewuskiego kasztelana witebskiego Głos z okazji namienionej Konstytucji trzeciego Maia na Sessyi dnia 20 października 1791 roku miany; See also: J. Michalski, History of Polish dyploMACy, vol. 2, pg. 666.

¹⁹² R. Lis, Hugo Kołłątaj i Adam W. Rzewuski: wokół problemu...”; H. Kołłątaj, „Prospekt...”, pg. 383-384

element of the new government that would be republican. It explain a contradictions in a political thoughts of Kołłątaj and Staszic: remaining of *pacta conventa* as bill which determine a right and obligations of the king¹⁹³ and right of the sejm to choice the reigning dynasty. Succession of throne was only a concept for preservation the sovereignty of The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in interior and exterior relationships.¹⁹⁴ A lack connection between government and a weakness of the state noticed already Seweryn Rzewuski, what was in part true.¹⁹⁵

Adam Rzewuski in turn – similarly to Seweryn Rzewuski¹⁹⁶- was warned against „calm captivity”, also against state in which liberty order public and security public would exist seemingly, but citizens would not have in reality a possibility to participation in deciding about public matters.¹⁹⁷ He set her against a „restless liberty” and „spirit of parties”, referring *nota bene* to Montesquieu. Rzewuski noticed a necessity assurances for free existing of opposition and pluralism of political programs.¹⁹⁸ Question, which it is necessary to ask yourself, is follows: which character would have and should have this restless liberty and spirit of parties towards, even if, maintenance a rights of nobility who have not possess any land estate and a dependency a reform of political life and political system on improvement of morality of society only, without using of legal or institutional instruments. Kołłątaj was warned against a „spirit of parties”, also from model that proposed Rzewuski repeatedly.

One of remedy for preservation of political liberty was openness.¹⁹⁹ Openness was understanding as being an active in not secret and remaining open and accessible for everybody. Openness enabled to eliminate all irregularities and intrigues of oligarchy or the king, in dependent, who was an authors of phrases about openness. In a fear of influence other persons on decision of deputies in the sejm and the nobility in the nobility assemblies, his work and the votes on choice

¹⁹³ Adam Rzewuski about *pacta conventa* see: A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 2, pg. 106-108.

¹⁹⁴ See: K. Zienkowska, „Sukcesja tronu w Ustawie rządowej 3 maja 1791 roku – koncepcja władcy, czy symbol suwerenności?”/”Succession of the throne in Constitution of 3 May 1791 – conception of power or symbol of sovereignty”, [in:] „Konstytucja 3 maja. Prawo-polityka-symbol. Materiały z sesji Polskiego Towarzystwa Historycznego na Zamku Królewskim w Warszawie 6-7 maja 1791 roku”/”Constitution of 3 May 1791. Law-policy-symbol. Writings materials from session of Polish Historical Society”, Warsaw 1992, Ed. by Anna Grzeskowiak-Krwawicz, pg. 56-57.

¹⁹⁵ S. Rzewuski, „O sukcesyi...”, pg. 12.

¹⁹⁶ S. Rzewuski, „Odpis na list przyjaciela względem listu J. M. Ks. Krasińskiego, biskupa kamienieckiego”/ ”Answer the letter of friend towards the letter of Krasiński, Bishop of Kamieniec Podolski”, Warsaw 1790, pg. 14.

¹⁹⁷ A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 2, pg. 79

¹⁹⁸ A. W. Rzewuski, *ibidem*, pg. 4-6 and A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 1, pg. 35.

¹⁹⁹ For example during a election campaign (A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 2, pg. 20-22. A guarantee of honest will be as well a offices (*Ibidem*, pg. 27-28); S. Staszic, *op. cit.*, pg. 58. In advance he claimed that sluggishness is a characteristic of republic (*Ibidem*, pg. 50). Later he negated this.

offices should be secret.²⁰⁰ A possibility of realization of idea of openness restricted as well a necessity of keeping in secrecy of questions national security and defense.²⁰¹ Adam Rzewuski and Seweryn Rzewuski supported a open votes over project of bills in the sejm. Why? They worried that in secret votes the deputies would vote inconsistent with deputies instructions and in result the oligarchy lost influence on policy and in consequence the sejm will be gain this the king. The oligarchy had broad possibilities to action in the nobility assemblies than in the sejm. The king had a reverse situation.²⁰² Open votes over the bills make possible a effective control of the deputies at the nobility assemblies after the sejm. A lack of this control was equivalent to despotism of the Sejm in Warsaw. The standpoint of Adam Rzewuski was not entirely according to his others postulations, because made possible the oligarchy. Seweryn Rzewuski was an adherent of secrecy vote in the beginning own career.²⁰³ Later, when he had became a oligarchy, he changed own opinion.

Remedy for preservation of the political liberty was as well the cardinal laws. Cardinal laws or fundamental laws contained the most important rules of organization of the state and society and which were ensuring a stability of government and felling of equality in society.²⁰⁴ This idea is actual to this day – today this function perform mostly a constitution a modern meaning. About necessary establishment of cardinal laws wrote all authors. In dependent from view on the world presented by authors a cardinal laws could either attempt to moderate of reality for necessary reforms becoming a guidelines (Staszic, Kołłątaj) or preserve the rules of the old social and political system (Adam and Seweryn Rzewuski). Those first authors used a myth of old law only in order *stricte* tactical (for Wybicki)²⁰⁵, while these second authors believed in really that return to old laws before decline of mores and customs will be a effective remedy for crisis situation of The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (for Wielhorski).

A lot of passage was being devoted to reasonable and moderately using of liberty and critic of interregnum.²⁰⁶ In opinion of Adam Rzewuski - adherent of the free election – power in time of interregnum should be attended by the the senate, not by the primate.²⁰⁷ Defender of interregnum in

²⁰⁰ S. Staszic, op. cit., pg. 60; A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 2, pg. 121 – Rzewuski noticed a necessity for secrecy. See also: Ibidem, pg. 96 and 112 (openness in the legislative procedure).

²⁰¹ S. Rzewuski, „O sukcesyi...”, pg. 49.

²⁰² Z. Zielińska, op. cit., pg. 8.

²⁰³ Z. Zielińska, op. cit., pg. 16.

²⁰⁴ A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 1, pg. 111, 120. See also Z. Radwański, „Prawa kardynalne. Studium prawno-histeryczne.”/”Cardinal laws. Law-historical study”, Poznań 1952, pg. 145.

²⁰⁵ See also: H. Kołłątaj, „Prospekt...”, pg. 383-384 (tactical using of myth „old government”).

²⁰⁶ H. Kołłątaj, „Prospekt...”, pg. 385; S. Staszic, op. cit., pg. 93.

²⁰⁷ A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 2, pg. 77; It can be a sign for anticlerical attitude of Rzewuski.

present form was Seweryn Rzewuski.²⁰⁸ With a reasonable using of liberty was being connected a making for common good.²⁰⁹ Poles, in opinion of Staszic, lost these abilities and they could not used them. However, it was not only a his opinion. The sense of common good and community should be restore by establishment a citizenship education.²¹⁰ Value of man would credit only his own merits and state-oriented attitude, not antecedents, birth, having knightheads and held offices.²¹¹ Different was only a thought of Seweryn Rzewuski.²¹² For merits would be entitled a special reward.²¹³ It mentioned that it should be stopped all political divisions – especially in the moment of danger for independent of homeland: Adam Rzewuski referred to Montesquieu²¹⁴, about this wrote as well Staszic.²¹⁵ Kołłątaj – refereeing in rhetoric to The Sarmation culture - wrote that it is necessary a establishment of strict military discipline, good order and instill a feeling of danger from interior so that Poles begin a reforms.²¹⁶ Whereas hetman explained an asking for help to foreign state by danger for liberty of nobility and her rights. It follows that love of the homeland was to him a self-love and she was existing only when state come up to his expectations.²¹⁷ His attitude criticised Adam Rzewuski in the correspondence.²¹⁸ However Seweryn Rzewuski in others place of his works criticized military presence of Russia in The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It was as well an attack towards the king and his govern in cooperation with Russian ambassador Otto von Stackelberg.

All institutions in the state should be active on the basis of law and in his limits described by bills passed by the sejm – so described the all authors. Otherwise would be a despotism, as wrote Adam Rzewuski.²¹⁹ Kołłątaj considered that liberty is possible only there where exist a rules of law.²²⁰ Authors were warning against the permanent sejm that would abuse own competitions

²⁰⁸ S. Rzewuski, „O sukcesyi...”, pg. 110

²⁰⁹ S. Staszic, op. cit., pg. 95-96; H. Kołłątaj, „Prospekt...”, pg. 382 (Kołłątaj criticised a lack of ma king for common good).

²¹⁰ See: A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 1, pg. 61; A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 2, pg. 31, 84-86, 125-126, 155 (the nobility assemblies send to himself own Project of bill and deputies instructions. The Sejm send to the nobility assemblies an official reports from control of the executive. A such law institutions as above, can conside as sign of direct democracy.

²¹¹ A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 1, pg. 63-69; A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 2, pg. 176.

²¹² See letter of Rzewuski Field Hetman of Crown to deputies from Nowogród [Adam Rzewuski], Gruszczyn, 4.12.1782.

²¹³ A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 1, pg.178-179. Good understood fame and good reputation was being considered also as rewards. The most complex system of rewards created a H. Kołłątaj. His ideas appeared in works over the Constitution of 3 May 1791.

²¹⁴ A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 2, pg. 4

²¹⁵ S. Staszic, op. cit., pg. 4

²¹⁶ See: H. Kołłątaj, „O poprawie Szkoły Kadetów...”, pg. 354.

²¹⁷ Z. Zielińska, op. cit., p. 32; S. Rzewuski, „Odpis na list przyjaciela...”, pg. 8.

²¹⁸ List Adama Rzewuskiego do zięcia Heniga/Letter of Adam Rzewuski to son-in-law Henig, 24.09.1792, copy, Biblioteka im. Ks. Czartoryskich/Library of Czartoryski`s, 929, pg. 1227.

²¹⁹ A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 2, pg. 117.

²²⁰ H. Kołłątaj, „Prospekt...”, pg. 386 and tenże, „O poprawie Szkoły Kadetów...”, pg. 353.

without any restrictions and use a function of legislative and executive.²²¹ They criticized a situation in which the sejm decide an all matters, both publics and particulars. They criticized a lack of discipline among deputies at the sejm,²²² interminable arguments and losing of time.²²³ Authors noticed excess of ceremonialism over substance, what was a problem especially towards short time of work of the sejm.²²⁴ Therefore they were demanding at latest to some extent order of procedures in the sejm and establish a strict discipline among deputies.²²⁵ Conservatives authors for example Adam Rzewuski made this with resistance and not consistent, because they were considering this as impugning of the *aureae libertas*.²²⁶ Definitely as a result of realizing their proposes, the situation would not change. It is necessary noticed that warring against a anarchy as result of unlimited power of the sejm were a attack against a power of the king in reality. This is confirmed by the fact that the Rzewuski`s categorically rejected an idea of establish of free mandate of deputy or abolition a requirement of unanimity to pass of cardinal laws. A similar fear against the king had not Staszic and Kołłątaj. Seweryn Rzewuski was understanding a political liberty as possibility a doing, what would be profitable for him. He was not governed by sense of common good.²²⁷ Egoism was being criticised very sharply by others authors.

With idea of reasonable liberty was being connected a critic of the ways of security of liberty, also *liberum veto* and confederations. However they were not being perceived in this same way. *Liberum veto* in old and traditionally understanding was rejected and at the most was limited to deciding of cardinal laws. More about this I will speak later. Whereas idea of confederation, although was being criticized as well, was accepted *de facto* as, for example, protest of army against a the king as result of break by him a law (Adam Rzewuski). However, from then, old confederates should change in this that she should be regulated by law or at latest by common rule of social and political life. Staszic accepted as well idea of confederate for that same reason what Adam Rzewuski, but in his opinion should be over strict control of the sejm. Also character of these confederates would be in benefit of reform and royal, different from Adam Rzewuski. Necessarily an adherent of ideas confederate was Kołłątaj in the beginning own political career. His words reflected a program of then political part y - "Familia" of Czartoryskis. Character of his concept confederates would be similar to concept of Staszic. Later Kołłątaj changed own opinion about this

²²¹A. W. Rzewuski, *ibidem*, pg. 69, 98-99, 117. Rzewuski criticised in addition certain elements of judicative in activities of the sejm. (*ibidem*, pg. 126-136). See also: A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 1, pg. 151-152 and 157.; S. Rzewuski, „O sukcesji...” pg. 20, H. Kołłątaj, „Prospekt...”, pg. 387

²²²A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 2, pg. 14, 25-26, 28-29, 120, 139.

²²³S. Staszic, *op. cit.*, pg. 47, 61.

²²⁴S. Staszic, *op. cit.*, pg. 49; A. W. Rzewuski, *ibidem*, pg. 89, 103-105 (a new way of vote). But he preserved a tradition of reading of *pacta conventa* as a symbol that a Power of the king is from wish of nation. (*ibidem*, pg. 106)

²²⁵Adam W. Rzewuski, *ibidem*, pg. 119

²²⁶Adam W. Rzewuski, *ibidem*, pg. 81-83.

²²⁷S. Rzewuski, „Odpis na list przyjaciela...” pg. 8.

subject and he criticized strongly of this idea.²²⁸ Traditionally understanding of idea confederates assumed Seweryn Rzewuski, who just as Adam Rzewuski made possible a protest of army against a the king as result of break by him a law.²²⁹ However - different from Adam Rzewuski - Seweryn Rzewuski provided not an any common rule that would be can restrict activities of army. In addition a such confederate would be over presidency of hetman as a main defender of liberty. Whereas Adam Rzewuski – similarly as Kołłątaj²³⁰ - criticised a such unlimited and dangerous for balance of power in the political systems power of hetman, just as well of others ministers.²³¹

For Staszic it was necessary for guaranteeing of interior also political liberty assurance of exterior liberty, also sovereignty and independence of state in international relations, especially with neighbors. Without this – he wrote – political liberty will be illusory and be base on “grace of stronger”.²³² Kołłątaj addicted that decline of exterior liberty was not as a result of negligence of latest years, but latest century.²³³ Necessary to assurance of exterior liberty was a effective national defense, also efficient army. In order to achieve this indispensable were a tasks, which Staszic and Kołłątaj described in detail, and in turn to establish their – effective and orderly, in a word “decent”, “interior liberty”. It is possible to notice that both areas: government of the state and his position in the international relations, are in depending on each other in large extent. Seweryn Rzewuski noticed as well necessity of for enforcement of national defense, but he kept silent about task, also these words were a declarations without essence only.²³⁴ An element for enforcement of exterior liberty was as well a critic a influences of foreigner in The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and critic of foreign journeys.

Staszic noticed about idea of civil army and about system of military exercises for creation of awareness that all people (not only citizens) are responsible for liberty of the state. He could restore a condition of knights - a group of citizens who are also soldiers, which existed before centuries.²³⁵ However his civil army was not a levy of nobility in traditional and conservative meaning. She should be modern: be equal in extent of standard towards others state of West Europe, especially towards neighbors of The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, be good financed and employ a specialists.²³⁶ He addicted that a such army only can provide of effective security for

²²⁸ H. Kołłątaj, „Prospekt...”, pg. 383.

²²⁹ S. Rzewuski, „O sukcesyi...”, pg. 25; Z. Zielińska, op. cit., pg. 49

²³⁰ H. Kołłątaj, „Prospekt...”, pg. 382.

²³¹ A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 1, pg. 108.

²³² S. Staszic, op. cit., pg. 57.

²³³ H. Kołłątaj, „Prospekt...”, pg. 380-381. Seweryn Rzewuski came to a similar conclusion, see: S. Rzewuski, “O sukcesyi...”, pg. 44.

²³⁴ S. Rzewuski, “O sukcesyi tronu...”, pg. 13, 41.

²³⁵ S. Staszic, op. cit., pg. 117, 124. This myth was used as well by Seweryn Rzewuski, see: Z. Zielińska, op. cit., pg. 101.

²³⁶ S. Staszic, op. cit., pg. 123.

the state. *Sivis pace, para bellum* – he stated.²³⁷ Staszic was using (not only in this example) the old phraseology to push through a new conception that became in spirit of enlightenment. In turn a popularity of idea of civil army was as a result of this that in opinion of republican authors then methods of conducting of war were not legal with law of nature. These methods put as a finances and engineering above strength and bravery. They were not being enabled a liberating from “captivity” which exist in West Europe.²³⁸ However Staszic described not in such detailed extent as Kołłątaj, who proposed as well a changes in military education.²³⁹ Whereas Adam Rzewuski and Seweryn Rzewuski wrote not about significance of army for restoring of polish statehood (for example about conscription and tasks)²⁴⁰ and would be content with improvement of morality and customs of nobility. However Adam Rzewuski a few pages devoted for describing of relation between the king, The Military Commission, army and soldiers. He noticed that for fear of liberty it would be necessary mutual limiting of ambitions king and senior officers in the army. He addicted that would be very profitable for morale in the army a immediately relations between king and soldiers. He must also have an awareness of significance army in the state.²⁴¹

Conflict *inter libertatem ac majestatem*

Rivalry between the king and the sejm, in other words, between the king and the nobility or as well between the king and the nation - as this conflict was being called in then publicist writing, was a pivot of political discourse in 18th century. For so long time it made a discourse about this question only, but they pursued not to it solution. Why? Existing of this conflict was in benefit of the oligarchy who played first fiddle in political systems of The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. He guaranteed for this group of nobility existence through continuous manipulation between the king and the nobility. Solution of this conflict for long time it noticed in making to choice between a two model political systems: pure republic or pure monarchy. In time this question became more and more complicated as a result of international position of The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In addiction establishment of republic in understanding of Dunin-Karwicki was more and more really, because in government was being strengthened a central executive power that was being created by the king – The Permanent Council.

Staszic perceived conflict *Inter libertatem ac majestatem* as struggle of power and monopoly for common wish. In his opinion this struggle should be finished, because in another case

²³⁷ Ibidem, pg. 115.

²³⁸ See. About war wrote S. Staszic, ibidem, pg. 114-115, 118.

²³⁹ See: H. Kołłątaj, „O poprawie Szkoły Kadetów...”.

²⁴⁰ R. Lis, Hugo Kołłątaj i Adam W. Rzewuski: wokół problemu...”, pg. 294. Seweryn Rzewuski had declared that planed an establishment a Council of War to limite of power of hetman. (S. Rzewuski, „O sukcesyi...”, pg. 54, 58.). This words were instrumental. Rzewuski in this treaty wrote not in generally about power of hetman so that win a supporters of free election and not lost an opponents of strong power of hetman.

²⁴¹ A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 1, pg. 159, 161-162.

he will pursued to definitely decline of the state. This struggle was a reason as well of lack an efficient executive that gradually she lost a support in public opinion.²⁴² Staszic, criticized a attacks from nobility towards The Permanent Council (in The Sejm and in publicist writings), that were being addressed *de facto* to the king Stanisław August. He wrote: “As if he (polish nation – T. M.) was the most happy, itself cope nothing, but he shout abuse at The (Permanent – T. M.) Council”²⁴³

All authors knew that establish a pure republican government will a wrong solution. Staszic noticed at this direct.²⁴⁴. Authors proposed also bigger or smaller modification of this government. Staszic a position of the king considered as source of all wrong. He wrote: “Guideline for ours kings is not how make happy a humanity but how it make unhappy”.²⁴⁵ Nevertheless he proposed to establish a strong power of the king and success of throne. He argued that a state only with such position of king can stand a chance of to be held in high esteem in the Europe.²⁴⁶ However power of the king should be restricted and regulated by law. Staszic wrote: „Success of throne is not dangerous there, where king has not a power larger than being in a guardian of execution of law.”²⁴⁷ Staszic proposed to deprive as well a right to distributing of districts. King should be deprived an owns foods, that should be devoted for army. The sejm should be determined for him a regular pay. Staszic realized also a concept in according to rule telling first by Jan Zamoyski: *Rex regnet, sed non gubernat*.

Kołątaj just as Staszic and Adam Rzewuski noticed a solution of conflict *inter libertatem ac maiestatem* in depriving from the king a right to distribution of offices and districts and depriving him an influences on power of execution of law. Executive should be attended by the ruling commissions that should be created by the sejm. In opinion of Kołątaj should be established a successive throne while not elected how wanted as well Rzewuski. Successive throne would gave to the king much more strong position than present both in foreign policy and interior policy. The king would be separated from current political disputes and from a rivalry of the oligarchy`s fraction. And it would not be a separation based on virtue and good mores of political class only how as well wanted Adam Rzewuski. It should be pass a clearly division competitions into institutions of the state. Power of the king should be regulated by the law. He noticed that the king must a certain power, otherwise he will her gain by intrigues etc.²⁴⁸ The king should have a position a guard of constitution and guard of execution of law. He criticised The Permanent Council as institutions that

²⁴² S. Staszic, op. cit., pg. 71.

²⁴³ Ibidem, pg. 76.

²⁴⁴ Ibidem, pg. 58-59.

²⁴⁵ Ibidem, pg. 58.

²⁴⁶ Ibidem.

²⁴⁷ Ibidem, pg. 51.

²⁴⁸ A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 1, pg. 154; H. Kołątaj, „Prospekt...”, pg. 386.

was a danger for both liberty and. She deprived a executive from the sejm (by the fact that having the right to official interpret of law) and caused a serious reduction of authority of the king.²⁴⁹ Instead of this Council the senate should be both a guard of liberty and an adviser for the king. His competition should be identical to the king.²⁵⁰ Senators should be elected by “the nation” (also by the sejm or the nobility assemblies) and would be still a *status intermedius*. The senate as a guard of the constitution would have as well a right to moderate of legislative decision of the sejm.²⁵¹ In outline this conception was realized in Constitution of 3 May 1791.

Adam Rzewuski noticed a solution of conflict *inter libertatem ac maiestatem* above all in liquidation of the senate in present model and in precisely described of obligations and rights of central powers of the state. Rzewuski referred to concept of Areopag in the ancient Athens or Council of Efors in the ancient Sparta. The senate in his opinion should be still a council at the side of the king, but her members would be elected from now on by the king only. An obligation of a new council should be above all make a control of activities of the king and, if necessary, make a prevention.²⁵² Rzewuski addicted that council would advice as well to king.²⁵³ A new council would became probably a government in modern meaning of this word, what can prove her competitions and personal composition. Senators would be appointed by the king with exception the ministers who would be elected by the Sejm. It is worth noticed that these ministers would be however the presidents in ruling commissions and this fact in substantial degree would reinforce a central governments. Precisely this conception was being proposing by Kołłątaj in work on the Constitution of 3 May 1791. Office of the members in the senate would be a height point of his career and would be lifelong, also they would be a old peoples, what is a synonym of wisdom.²⁵⁴ Rzewuski regarded in this a guarantee of correct performing a function of senator as guardian of the liberty.²⁵⁵ Senator would hold in high esteem and would have a specially favorable in the state, but they would have forbidden take a part in a legislative (Rzewuski strongly criticised having by The Permanent Council the right to official interpret of law).²⁵⁶ They should advise the sejm in important questions. This council would be responsible to the sejm for activities of the king (Adam

²⁴⁹ H. Kołłątaj, *ibidem*, pg. 381.

²⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, pg. 386.

²⁵¹ *Ibidem*, pg. 387.

²⁵² See: A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 2, pg. 77-78.

²⁵³ *Ibidem*, pg. 73 and next.

²⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, pg. 60-61. This characteristic Seweryn Rzewuski wanted for all offices lifelong for fear of kings despotism (S. Rzewuski, “O sukcesyi...” pg. 20). Adam Rzewuski wanted her only for an office of member of the senate. Other offices should have a two years cadency. (Adam W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 2, pg. 104).

²⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, pg. 81-82.

²⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, pg. 63.

Rzewuski referred in this case to model of England).²⁵⁷ Until now senators took a part of legislative procedure and *de facto* also were not responsible against the nobility. Senators being a *status intermedius* had a conflict of interests: on the one hand they should be trusted for the king as their breadwinner, while on the other hand they must kept a their popularity among own clientele when they made a works being in a conflict with interest of the court.²⁵⁸ Besides reform of the senate Adam Rzewuski planed a limiting of competences of the king to *de facto* representative role, except for questions of public security, trade and cities. However, Rzewuski wanted keep the right of the king to distributing of offices (with exception ministers) and about districts he mentioned not. The king should have guaranteed a regular pay, the own court and respect from the sejm.²⁵⁹ Executive should be attended by the commissions dependent on the sejm.²⁶⁰

Models of political systems suggested by Seweryn Rzewuski in own publicist writings was not leading to solution of conflict *inter libertatem ac maiestatem*. Seweryn Rzewuski could restore a power of hetman and exactly he would be a person who should be hold a power of moderation between the king and the sejm.²⁶¹ He was adherent as well as weakest position the king and his council. He criticised in every aspects The Permanent Council. Anyway during his political career Rzewuski was changing oft an own opinions about various aspects of government, for example once he was a supporter a right of the king to distributing of districts, another time he was a opponent of this rights.²⁶²

Equality

Equality as political myth was being understood in two different ways: as equality in international relationships and as equality in extent of the state of nobility. It is necessary mention about else one aspects of equality - a postulated activity of the state that should lead to limited of inequality among citizens and families (Staszic, Adam Rzewuski). For example Adam Rzewuski postulated a follows proposals: ban for possibility applying for the recommendation letters and establish of regulations for procedure applying for the wardship.²⁶³ Obviously that call not question that on these proposals of authors had an influences a ideas of enlightenment. However these demands postulated by republican authors was as well an attack against in the king. Why? Because - in opinion republican authors the king was a source of inequality in the society and of existing social divisions. It was as a result of distribution of trade privileges, distribution of offices and

²⁵⁷ Ibidem, pg. 177.

²⁵⁸ Ibidem, pg. 49-53.

²⁵⁹ Ibidem, pg. 57, 59, 60-61 and Adam W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 1, pg. 106, 176.

²⁶⁰ Ibidem, pg. 176.

²⁶¹ Z. Zielińska, op. cit., pg. 20, 49, 90.

²⁶² See: Z. Zielińska, op. cit., pg. 18; S. Rzewuski, „O sukcesyi...”, pg. 31 (Rzewuski criticised there the senate.).

²⁶³ A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 1, pg. 164.

districts, awarding of orders, medals and others gifts, constant conducting of war.²⁶⁴ These accusations were having also a different meanings at each of authors. Staszic and Kołłątaj proposed to deprive the king of distributing of offices and districts in order to separated of majesty from current political disputes. They proposed this as well for king`s good and it was an element of complex plan of reform of the state.²⁶⁵ Similarly Adam Rzewuski, although his program of reform based on entirely different assumptions than those two. Whereas Seweryn Rzewuski used of this rhetoric aimed to attack against the king, depreciate of his position and destroy of his authority.

All authors as one considered that in present international relationships exist a inequality. Staszic wrote that inequality of states came into being in the time of end of equality of this peoples, who united to these states. Inequality from peoples transferred to nations. This situation was as a result of exist of absolutely monarchies that was being governed arbitrary by the tyrannical kings. In publicist writings existed a lot of examples of such states.²⁶⁶ Among that states existed not (or existed seldom) the Empire of Habsburg. I think that it was as a result of more sympathetic attitude to The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and to then her transformations than were presenting by Russia and Prussia. More positive than others was as well a history of relationships between Poland and Austrian. Staszic instead of making of critic of reign of Joseph II – who was also a tyrannical king – noted the benefits of his reforms that were as well in large extent similar to proposals of Staszic.²⁶⁷

Authors attacked a then international relationships that all decisions concerning relations between a states were dependent from discretion of then kings. In opinion of these authors a reason of this that equality in international relationships was a fiction, was basing their on good or bad wish of peoples and not on law of nations that have a source in law of nature.²⁶⁸ Absolutely monarchies were stronger than republics and they dictated to them what should do a weak and poor states. Staszic and Adam Rzewuski noticed this. However they differed as well in extent of program of postulated reforms. Rzewuski could wait for revolutions in European states that should happen not known when and establish of republics in every of them. In his opinion as a result of this revolutions would not be a wars already never and every man would be a king for oneself.²⁶⁹ In then situation of The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth a such words were nonsensical, what – it appears that noticed Staszic. If The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth wanted – he wrote- lead a

²⁶⁴ See: S. Staszic, op. cit., p. 98-99 and Adam W. Rzewuski, ibidem, pg. 167-168, 170.

²⁶⁵ S. Staszic, op. cit., pg. 83.

²⁶⁶ See for ex ample: S. Staszic, op. cit., pg. 72, S. Rzewuski, „Odpis na list przyjaciela...”, pg. 8; tenże, „O sukcesyi...”, pg. 28-30, 31.

²⁶⁷ S. Staszic, op. cit., pg. 111.

²⁶⁸ S. Staszic, op. cit., pg. 117 and pg. 120-121, where Staszic described a rules of conduct of wars.

²⁶⁹ Adam W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 1, pg. 175-176.

industrial, political and social decline and be a considerate member of European community, she must accept a present character of international relationships in the Europe. She must – Staszic continued- adapt oneself to this situation, also advance in this same ways – at least in outline- what her neighbors.²⁷⁰

Attempt at fall a domination of the oligarchy was a main aim of then publicist writings. First Staszic made an attack towards the oligarchy. In his opinion oligarchy government was the worst: were including a defects of monarchy and democracy, but were not including their advantages.²⁷¹ To creation of the oligarchy in the extreme brought a accumulation a goods and offices by a few family in the state.²⁷² Similarly wrote Kołłątaj²⁷³ and Adam Rzewuski.²⁷⁴ He criticized above all methods that were being used by the oligarchy towards nobility: manipulations, blackmail, making drunk, at last completely dependence of the nobility from her, that was taking the form of incapacitation In every aspects. Remaining in such dependence was not legal with sense of human dignity, good reputation of man and contributed to decline of political culture.²⁷⁵ This latest noticed as well Staszic. Adam Rzewuski in order to make active the nobility demanded a limitation of cadency of deputies (it can interpret as attack against the oligarchy or the king)²⁷⁶ and supported a possibility by each nobleman a project of law to considering by the nobility assemblies.²⁷⁷ As remedy for problem a dependent the nobility on the oligarchy and improvement political culture of nobility was a work for common good.²⁷⁸ She was as well the answer the towards other problems that signaled in publicist writings: very lower population in the state, backward agriculture, not develop trade, weaks cities (Staszic, Adam Rzewuski, Kołłątaj).²⁷⁹ Ethos of work was descended from townspeople`s culture.

Authors were having a differently opinions about right of nobility to participation in the nobility assemblies, especially their right to vote and right to stand for election. Staszic and Kołłątaj wanted deprive of this rights the nobility without own possession and the nobility becoming dependent on everyone or everything. They thought not this as danger for equality or

²⁷⁰ Staszic develop this subject in own treaty „Przestrogi dla Polski”.

²⁷¹ S. Staszic, op. cit., pg. 60-61.

²⁷² S. Staszic, op. cit., pg. 92.

²⁷³ H. Kołłątaj, „Prospekt...”, pg. 382.

²⁷⁴ Adam W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 1, pg. 152.

²⁷⁵ Adam W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 2, pg. 6-7, 9-10.

²⁷⁶ Ibidem, pg. 70-71.

²⁷⁷ Ibidem, pg. 30. But a decision, which projects would be in deputies instruction, should belong as present to nobility with possessions. Adam Rzewuski (differently than Seweryn Rzewuski (S. Rzewuski, “O sukcesyi...”, pg. 21) wanted deprive the nobility without possession a right to personal immunity (*neminem captivabimus nisi iure victum*). Having this right by all nobility was a base for a democracy of the nobility (Adam W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 1, pg. 121).

²⁷⁸ H. Kołłątaj, „O poprawie szkoły Kadetów...”, pg. 350.

²⁷⁹ A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 2, pg. 146-147; H. Kołłątaj, „Prospekt...”, pg. 380; tenże, „O poprawie Szkoły Kadetów...”, pg. 363; S. Staszic, op. cit., pg. 12.

liberty of nobility. Both these rules were a result of their conceptions in light of which a base for electoral rights and using from political liberty would be a having a possession. Not having of it, also not working, was losing a political liberty, but was keeping a civil liberty, in this also equal justice under law. Other else thing is such that this change *de facto* would not be a novelty: to the sejm were being elected as deputies only a nobility with possessions also having a money to pay for own mission already from long time and a lot of nobility assemblies deprived rights to vote for nobility without possession and to the sejm.

Adam Rzewuski although differed as well a civil liberty and political liberty, opposed against depriving from nobility without possession a electoral right. He noticed that it would be unjustly, because a men cannot be guilty of lost an own goods as a result of certain events. It should not be a reason to depriving them a electoral rights. It is worthy noticed that Rzewuski assumed a situation in which nobleman lost own goods as a result of events and circumstances independent from him only. Following the same reasoning lost of goods as result of (for example) wastefulness would be as well as a result of such circumstances. In this way Rzewuski protected a settled-dawn-nobility that was oft not educated and not having skills to used of political liberty. However this group of nobility was the biggest, had (mostly) a the most conservative customs and political beliefs and in this connection could be durable and stable political opposition to the power of the king. Adam Rzewuski based not as well a electoral rights on descent, because he wanted a make impossible take a part in the nobility assemblies for the oligarchy. Only own merits and had virtues give a rights to political liberty, and the oligarchy in his opinion was lacking of theirs.²⁸⁰ However this proposal was very naive and in practice unreal.²⁸¹

Seweryn Rzewuski in own works made a creation of own person as defender of equality of nobility. Seweryn Rzewuski criticized as well an excessive ambitions of the oligarchy and her scornful attitude towards middle and settled-dawn nobility. Own rhetoric directed to this last group of nobility. However his actual aim a really was not an interest of nobility or good of the state, but an attempt of support for his political conceptions – preservation of election *viritim* and restitution of power of hetman. It was above all a particularly aim. Other thing is question if these conceptions were – in opinion of Seweryn Rzewuski - in accordance with reason the state of The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Seweryn Rzewuski opposed very strong against a changes that were preparing by the Great sejm, especially against depraving a the nobility without possessions of

²⁸⁰ See: R. Lis, Hugo Kołłątaj i Adam W. Rzewuski: wokół problemu...”, pg. 300, 305, 310.

²⁸¹ A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 2, pg. 7, 17.

rights to vote. He justified a the own thoughts in the same way as Adam Rzewuski.²⁸² Realization of this change would deprive him of big part own electorate.²⁸³

Unanimity and *liberum veto*

However after socially and political transformations in 17th century this rule became a caricature, especially since using of *liberum veto*, what paralyzed a work of the sejm. Unanimity was being identified with *liberum veto*, what was not true. Long time ago unanimity was not being understood as absolutely but as consensus of opinion and was concerning *de facto* a more important questions of the state only. Aim of unanimity was a respect for possible the most presented standpoints in finally decisions. It wanted to avoid a needless conflicts between majority and minority and it wanted so that a law was executing by all people. Precedent of *liberum veto* made a possible an appealing to this rule and accusing of her non-compliance, independently of this, to which matters she was being concerned. In this way danger of using a *liberum veto* was existing as well by trivial matters and as a result of this even when was discussed about them it had to gain an absolute unanimity, so that the sejm will not be interrupted. While it was not discussed about questions truly important and which by their nature was stirring a much controversy.²⁸⁴

Liberum veto in opinions of Staszic and Kołłątaj²⁸⁵ was a reason a very big divisions in a society and a creation of the individualism, that had a character of egoism. Staszic wrote: „is a many state as citizens”²⁸⁶. *Liberum veto* established a tyranny of individual men, what noticed already Wielhorski. *Liberum veto* criticized Adam Rzewuski. In his opinion it was a biggest irregularity of polish political liberty.²⁸⁷ His standpoint was identical as Wielhorski`s. Authors who I analyze in this article, proposed establish differents majority in the sejm.

In extent of cardinal law a necessity achievement of unanimity noticed Kołłątaj (rather as consensus of opinion)²⁸⁸ and Adam Rzewuski (I think that literally)²⁸⁹, while Staszic of qualified two-thirds majority vote only.²⁹⁰ In other matters: economy, trade, civil law, criminal law all authors – including in this Seweryn Rzewuski – proposed an using a simple majority of votes. But independent of it they were also more conservative than Stanisław Konarski that was writing before 25 years ago and who demanded a majority vote in all matters, in this in case of cardinal law. Later became also a problem, if unanimity should be concern a binding deputies instructions (*de facto* it

²⁸² S. Rzewuski, „Odpis na list przyjaciela...”, pg. 16.

²⁸³ Z. Zielińska, op. cit., pg. 8.

²⁸⁴ About development a concept of *liberum veto* see W. Konopczyński, “Liberum veto”, Warsaw 1918.

²⁸⁵ H. Kołłątaj, “Prospekt...”, pg. 381.

²⁸⁶ S. Staszic, op. cit., pg. 47-49

²⁸⁷ A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 1, pg. 151-152.

²⁸⁸ In this way a unanimity was understanding by Białożor/Leszczyński or Konarski, see. Arkadiusz M. Stasiak, „Patriotyzm w myśli konfederatów barskich”/”Patriotism in thought of Bar Confederates”, Lublin 2005, pg. 36

²⁸⁹ A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 1, pg. 116.

²⁹⁰ S. Staszic, op. cit., pg. 66-67.

would be a unanimity of all nobility assemblies in the state) or deputies having a seats on the sejm when deputies instructions would not be banded. The last word of Staszic noticed a binding deputies instructions. Similarly as Adam Rzewuski, Seweryn Rzewuski and Kołłątaj defended an imperative mandate as a remedy to guarantee a stability of government and social system.²⁹¹ However Kołłątaj in time became a adherent of free mandate. He wanted an abolition of binding deputies instructions, because nobility assemblies were undermining the legislative decisions of the sejm.

Authors who defended an unanimity in understanding of Saxon epoch, was Seweryn Rzewuski. But even he limited this unanimity to cardinal law only. It was *de facto* a defend of *liberum veto*, what hetman stated very clearly and openly. He did it under the pretext of preservation of privilege of nobility against attack from the king who – in his opinion- pursued to coup d'état. Rzewuski addicted that unanimity is a guarantee of minority rights.²⁹² For Rzewuski *liberum veto* was still a “mirror of liberty”. Defend of *liberum veto* was as well an own interest of hetman Rzewuski. He could be active against the king in the sejm as thanks to this institution and thanks to deputies that was having a imperative mandate and was being his clientele. Other laws that were not important from point of view of his political interests could be pass by majority votes.

Conclusion

All authors analised by me in this article were a active participants of publicist debate before and during of The Great Sejm. Their fundamental method of rhetoric was a persuasion that often was having a emotional character. For effective persuasion they were using a political myths, that were very similar often. A task of historian is a disclosure their true meaning. Authors wanted be identified with a readers of their works, also with the nobility and (less) with the townspeople. One of basis of then publicist writings was as well an appealing to Christian morality, to citizen ethos having a traditions in Ancient Greece and Rome and an emotional calling to be active in social and political life.

Among four authors Staszic and Kołłątaj used a old republican rhetoric for popularize of reform in all areas of state activities: government, economy, trade, education. However this rhetoric was used there only, where it was necessary, and if it was possible, they used a new enlightenment rhetoric and as a result of this - as opposed to traditional republican rhetoric - their argumentation was very substantial and good justified. Their aim was to pass of new effective government and social reforms in the spirit of enlightenment. Their treaties connected a theoretical consideration

²⁹¹ A. W. Rzewuski, „O formie rządu republikańskiego myśli”, Warsaw 1790, part 2, pg. 122-123; S. Rzewuski, „O sukcesyi...”, pg. 20; Z. Zielińska, op. cit., pg. 86. Support for binding deputies instructions was being connected mostly with dislike to Warsaw as the capital city and the seat of the king.

²⁹² S. Rzewuski, „O sukcesyi...”, pg. 19-20.

with the answer the current political challenges.²⁹³ In other ways proceeded Adam Rzewuski, who could not however answer the current political challenges in way effective and fully.²⁹⁴ For Adam Rzewuski the most important aim was a reform of virtues, morality and customs. In his opinion from their repair was dependent a reform of the state, his institutions and The Polish-Lithuanian society.²⁹⁵ The aim for Adam Rzewuski was as well above all a preservation of present government and social system or, only exceptionally, a planning very limited changes that should be pass in the way of lengthy transformation. Outside of this classification was Seweryn Rzewuski who cared about only the realizing own political interests and republican values and institutions treated instrumental. Naturally, it preclude not that ideas and opinions were his own and in which he believed.

On the shape of legislative of The Great Sejm (The Constitution of 3 May 1791 and others bills) the biggest influence have undoubtedly a thought of Staszic and Kołłątaj – the second of which was a co-author of The Constitution of 3 May 1791. Thought of Adam Rzewuski was being less significant. His treaty had not a polemics, however himself Rzewuski was a popular politician. His conservative thinks were reflecting a view on the world of majority nobility, in this a nobility, who was supporting a reforms of The Great Sejm. Seweryn Rzewuski above all were creating a opposition towards reforms of The Great Sejm. He had not a influence on a content of legislative of this Sejm and he had an effect on work of this Sejm through own publicist writings²⁹⁶ and through the own clientele. However in time he was losing her what was a result of political concessions of fraction of reforms and high treason of Seweryn Rzewuski.

Summary:

In the article I described a political myths, which polish politician used during of The Great Sejm and which final to take to pass of Constitution of 3 May 1791, and another's acts of law, which were in compact connection with Constitution. I concentrate on political publicist works: democracy of the nobility, idea of *monarchia mixta*, political liberty, conflict *inter libertatem ac maiestatem*, equality, unanimity and *liberum veto*. Amongst a political publicists authors, that were analyzed by me, are: Hugo Kołłątaj, Stanisław Staszic, Seweryn Rzewuski and Adam Wawrzyniec Rzewuski. They all had different political concepts and used a different methods of persuasion. To increase persuasion they used political myths, which often were very similar. They were all

²⁹³See: R. Lis, Hugo Kołłątaj i Adam W. Rzewuski: wokół problemu...”, pg. 304.

²⁹⁴See: R. Lis, Hugo Kołłątaj i Adam W. Rzewuski: wokół problemu...”, pg. 298.

²⁹⁵See: A. Grześkowiak - Krwawicz, „O formę rządu czy rząd dusz...”, pg. 143.

²⁹⁶Z. Zielińska, op. cit., pg. 131.

republicans and differed in detail. My second goal is a comparison of presenting of these political myths by all authors in turn, to find a difference between them and describing their.

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SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT


THE IMPLICATIONS OF KURT VONNEGUT'S *SLAUGHTERHOUSE-FIVE* FOR CULTURAL REMEMBRANCE

JEREMY STÖHS

1. INTRODUCTION

For a scholar of English and History such as myself, Kurt Vonnegut's *Slaughterhouse-Five* is intriguing for a number of reasons. Not only can it be analyzed for its groundbreaking literary style of post-modernism but also for its historical and cultural significance. Moreover, I have rarely found an author who deals with an event of the Second World War in such an intriguing way as Vonnegut does. Yet, however skillfully and stirringly he might have depicted his recollections of the Allied bombing of the German city of Dresden, what has left me most unsettled is the fact that Vonnegut creates an inaccurate picture of historical events. This is owed to the fact that he relied on a single source to substantiate his accounts, namely David Irving's book, *The Destruction of Dresden*.

Irving's book was first published in 1963 and brought the bombing back into the minds of the public after it (as so many events of the war) had been marginalized in the years following the war. In the preface of his book, Irving concludes that over 135,000 people were killed in the firebombing, more than in the firebombing of Tokyo and the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima; thus constituting the deadliest aerial-attack in history. Irving describes his effort to write his book as follows:



Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse-Five or The Children's Crusade was published in 1969 and became one

I have tried to reconstruct the attack, minute by minute, throughout the fourteen hours and ten minutes of the triple blow which is estimated authoritatively to have killed more than 135,000 of the population of a city swollen to twice its peace-time size by a massive influx of refugees from the East, Allied and Russian prisoners of war, and thousands of forces labourers (Irving, Preface n.p.).

Irving has since been widely criticized for “inflating the number of dead as a means of engaging in ‘moral equivalency’” (Lipstad n.p.), adding to the notion that this attack had been not only unethical but also an act of terror and wanton murder of innocent civilians.

As *Slaughterhouse-Five* rose to global fame, being translated into many different languages, it has by now “come to occupy a fairly comfortable position in the canon of post-war literature” as an “icon of sixties pop culture” (Rigney 8). Moreover, the novel reached a much wider audience than any disciplined investigation of a historian ever could. By referring to Irving as his primary source, and writing an international bestseller, Vonnegut therefore “unwittingly helped perpetrate an untruth” (11). The novel and Irving’s book still remain influential references for many historical events and subsequently have far-reaching implications on the popular opinion on history. As Mark Spencer Mills puts it, “[Vonnegut’s] book actually becomes part of the historical archive and part of our collective national memory of the bombing of Dresden” (36). These aspects will be explored in the further course of this article.

In the first chapter, I will summarize how Vonnegut depicts the bombing of Dresden and will comment on a number of important passages from the book. Secondly, I will outline the historical background of the bombing. Thereby, I will make references to the most current publications and research on the aerial campaign and draw comparisons to David Irving’s book, *The Destruction of Dresden*. By critically reflecting on both Irving’s publication as well as Vonnegut’s decision to use it as his primary source of information, a number of questions arise, which will be discussed in the subsequent chapters. For example: In which historical and cultural context does *Slaughterhouse-Five* have to be analyzed? Why was the book, *The Destruction of Dresden* the preferred source at the time of Vonnegut’s writing? In how far might Vonnegut’s traumatic experience have had such an effect on him that it impeded a more thorough investigation regarding the bombing – or was Irving’s book in fact the most credible source? In my final chapter I will address the problem of authenticity and what implications the success of *Slaughterhouse-Five* has for the sphere of “cultural remembrance” (Rigney 6).

For my analysis I will use the two primary sources, *Slaughterhouse-Five* and *The Destruction of Dresden*, as well as secondary literature from different fields of academia, thus gaining a more holistic view on the questions at hand. I believe this to be essential when dealing with a book as complex as *Slaughterhouse-Five*. I have selected a number of articles and theses from the areas of military history, cultural studies, and literary studies to support my conclusion.

2. A NOVEL AND A HISTORIC SOURCE

There is an ongoing debate on how to differentiate between and rate various forms of written history. Ann Rigney, for example, argues that fictional work is neither historiographical, nor claims to be, and therefore has to be analyzed from a different point of view (6). Furthermore, she opines that unlike historians who operate within a disciplined academic field using “recognized methods and modes of argumentation that help produce authoritative accounts of past events” (6), writers like Vonnegut underlie a different set of rules: “[W]hile artists and writers shape views of the past too, they usually do so while often flouting the rules of evidence and pursuing goals that are not only epistemological, but aesthetic or moralistic.” (6).


Before going into detail concerning the depiction of historical events in *Slaughterhouse-Five*, I want to juxtapose Rigney’s arguments in regard to Vonnegut’s role as an author to my following analysis and concluding statements. In her assessment she extenuates the effect that “failed history” (11) has on the reader by referring to the book’s first sentence:

[E]ven if the concept of “failed history” [in other words creating and perpetuating a flawed perception of historical events] were applicable in some sense, it still fails to account for the degree and nature of the novel’s success. So rather than use Vonnegut’s inaccuracies as a prelude to dismissing him, I propose to use the (ir)relevance of numbers as a springboard for considering historical fiction as a distinctive medium in the ongoing production of collective remembrance. Vonnegut’s mistake regarding the number of victims is enough to discredit the novel as a source of historical knowledge in the traditional sense. But the novel was not received by its many fans as a work of history (even if it was perceived as being about a real event in the past). Nor was it ever intended to be taken seriously as history, as the opening lines make clear: “All this happened, more or less.” (11)

Vonnegut’s literary performance in *Slaughterhouse-Five*, unwittingly commits the error of replacing 30,000 or so victims with about 130,000 and hence eliding the very considerable distinction between these two figures [...]. But at a certain point, we may conclude from his novel that numbers say nothing at all beyond “more or less”. (24)

The phrase “so it goes” gained proverbial fame in the United States, which was suffering a cultural and political crisis of the highest magnitude when the novel was published in 1969. At the

height of the Vietnam War and a period of drastic changes within America's civil society, *Slaughterhouse-Five* struck a chord with those who felt that the United States had been moving into the wrong direction for far too long. By 1968 the coercive bombing campaign *Operation Rolling Thunder* against the Viet Kong had proven indecisive and even the most massive bombing in history at Khe Sang had only led to further repudiation among many Americans.²⁹⁷ Vonnegut's first-hand experience backed by Irving's book led to more than twenty English-language editions and over 800,000 sold copies in the U.S. alone, all within one year (8).



David Irving's book caused wide spread discussion regarding the

Already in his opening chapter Vonnegut tries to convey to the reader what magnitude the bombing must have had: "I really did go back to Dresden with Guggenheim money [...] in 1967. It looked a lot like Dayton, Ohio, more open spaces than Dayton has. There must be tons of human bone meal in the ground" (1). Shortly later, speaking in his own voice, the author tells us that "[e]ven then I was supposedly writing a book about Dresden. It wasn't a famous air raid back then in America. Not many Americans knew how much worse it had been than Hiroshima" (10). He adds other ostensible "historical facts", such as that the Nazis had produced soap and candles from the fat of the people killed in the concentration camps:

I happened to tell a University Professor at a cocktail party about the raid as I had seen it, about the book I would write. [...] And he told me about the concentration camps, and about how the Germans had made soap and candles out the fat of dead Jews and so on. All I could say was, "I know, I know, I know". (10)

When the protagonist of the story, Billy Pilgrim, is brought to a POW camp in Germany a similar scene unfolds:

²⁹⁷A number of books have been published providing in-depth analysis of the US air campaign in Southeast Asia: Francillon, René J: *Vietnam; The War In The Air*. New York: Arch Cape Press, 1987. For *Operation Rolling Thunder* see: Morrocco, John: *The Vietnam Experience, Thunder From Above, Air War, 1961-1968*. Boston: Boston Publishing Company/Boston, MA, 1984. Also see Thompson, James Clay: *Rolling Thunder, Understanding Policy and Program Failure*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980.

Only the candles and the soap were of German origin. They had a ghostly, opalescent similarity. The British had no way of knowing it, but the candles and the soap were made from the fat of rendered Jews and Gypsies and fairies and communists, and other enemies of the State. So it goes. (96)

Adding to the description of the main theme of this novel, the bombing of Dresden, Vonnegut leaves no room for doubt that he believes the strike to be the worst atrocity of the war, even if the passages are narrated through the fictional characters of *Slaughterhouse-Five*: “And Billy had seen the greatest massacre in European history, which was the fire-bombing of Dresden. So it goes” (Vonnegut 101); “Nothing happened that night. It was the next night that about one hundred and thirty thousand people in Dresden would die. So it goes” (165); ““Americans have finally heard about Dresden,’ said Rumfoord, twenty-three years after the raid. ‘A lot of them know now how much worse it was than Hiroshima [...]’” (191).

What is more, Vonnegut would also go on to claim that the Allies lacked any militarily and strategically justifiable reasons to bomb Dresden (Vonnegut qtd. in Allen 4). This assumption has been refuted by more recent historical publications. However, these insights into the strategic utility and execution of the air-raids have not yet been able to displace the public opinion that Dresden was a victim of morally abhorrent terror-bombing.

3. HISTORY STRIKES BACK

David Irving definitely has to be given credit with bringing the Dresden bombing into the consciousness of the general public as well as eliciting a discussion among scholars regarding the actual events of February 1945. As Rigney correctly points out, Vonnegut’s decision to use Irving’s



Irving soon became a questionable figure as he began voicing anti-Semitic views and

Destruction of Dresden “[was] a not unreasonable choice at the time for a non-specialist, given the paucity of other books on the subject and the considerable splash that Irving’s book had made in the media” (10). In fact, even a leading military figure like Air Marshal Sir Robert (*Deputy Air Officer Commanding* under Sir Arthur “Bombing” Harris during the Second World War) took Irving’s findings for face value when, in the foreword of the

book he notes that “135,000 people died as the result of an air attack with conventional weapons” (Saundby n.p.).

Rigney adds that by the time Vonnegut wrote his novel in 1969, Irving had not yet become a persona non grata and discredited historian for his denial of the Holocaust and anti-Semitic views. Therefore, she concludes that Vonnegut cannot be blamed for using Irving as his primary reference (11). However, in the years following Irving’s publication other historians started to express doubts regarding the author’s sources and views. Already as early as 1955 some of the German documents that Irving later used in his publications had been proven to be forged. In a letter to *The Times*, in 1966, Irving admitted having used these sources and thus having misled his readers:

The bombing of Dresden in 1945 has in recent years been adduced by some people as evidence that conventional bombing can be more devastating than nuclear attacks, and others have sought to draw false lessons from this. My own share of the blame for this is large: in my 1963 book *The Destruction of Dresden* I stated that estimates of the casualties in that city varied between 35,000 and over 200,000.

Two years ago I procured from a private east German source what purported to be extracts from the Police President's report, quoting the final death-roll as "a quarter of a million"; the other statistics it contained were accurate, but it is now obvious that the death-roll statistic was falsified, probably in 1945. (Irving, “Letter”)

Therefore, by the time Vonnegut was about to have *Slaughterhouse-Five* printed (1969) the author of his selected source had already corrected the number of deaths by a staggering 100,000.

In short, the report [from the *Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer Elbe* which was responsible for civil defense measures in Dresden] shows that the Dresden casualties were on much the same scale as in the heaviest Hamburg raids in 1943. [...] His figures are very much lower than those I quoted. The crucial passage reads: "Casualties: by 10th March, 1945, 18,375 dead, 2,212 seriously injured, and 13,918 slightly injured had been registered, with 350,000 homeless and permanently evacuated." The total death-roll, "primarily women and children," was expected to reach 25,000. (Irving, “Letter”)

Surprisingly, Irving did not make any changes to the subsequent editions of his book, although many publications in the following years would contradict both Irving’s general findings

as well as many of Vonnegut's depictions in *Slaughterhouse-Five*. In 1977, for example, Götz Bergander, a German historian, published *Dresden im Luftkrieg*, and went on to provide ample evidence that not only was Irving's death toll far too high, but also that „Irving's blood-curdling tales of phosphorous bombs and murderous sweeps by Allied fighter aircraft [were] both fantasies“ (Smith 471). Interestingly, Vonnegut also describes these attacks as if they had really occurred:

American fighter planes came in under the smoke to see if anything was moving. They saw Billy and the rest moving down there. The planes sprayed them with machine-gun bullets, but the bullets missed. Then they saw some other people moving down by the riverside and they shot at them. They hit some of them. So it goes. (180)

By the turn of the millennium, a number of scholars had collected nearly all available historical evidence concerning the bombing of Dresden. Publications such as Richard Evans' *Lying about Hitler* (2002), Frederick Taylor's *Dresden* (2005), or Tami Davis Biddle's *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945* (2004), have provided much insight into the events of February 1945.

As I have mentioned previously, different forms of literature can be analyzed from various perspectives. Historiography and the field of academic writing are based on inherently distinct features in comparison to fictional writing; even if the latter is based on historical events. While

Slaughterhouse-Five is a helpful example of how this “distinctiveness artistic writing [acts] as mediator of historical understanding” (Rigney 7), I believe that Vonnegut's book nonetheless has had far too much influence on the formation of public opinion and cultural remembrance to merely dismiss the issue of historical accountability on the ground of academic tradition. In the following



of

Regardless of the number of casualties, the utter destruction of Dresden should serve as a reminder

chapter, I will go on to point out what impact this novel has had on cultural remembrance and why Vonnegut can be criticized for not having reacted to this development.

4. PERPETUATING MYTHS

During the process of finding articles and books regarding my topic I came across a publication that is exemplary for the problem regarding historicity in fictional literature. In *Blooms Modern Critical Interpretations: Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse-Five*, published in 2009, the editor Harold Bloom includes an article by the American author, William Rodney Allan. Based on an article from 1991, Allen makes the following questionable statement:

The story of Dresden was a hard one for an American to tell for a simple reason: it was designed by the Allies to kill as many German civilians as possible, and it was staggeringly successful in achieving that aim. Because the government rebuffed his attempts shortly after the war to obtain information about the Dresden bombing, saying only that it was classified, it took Vonnegut years to realize the scale of the destruction of life on the night of February 13, 1945. What he eventually learned was that, by the most conservative estimates, 135,000 people died in the raid – far more than were killed by either of the atomic bombs the United States dropped later that year on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. (Allen 3-4)

Allen goes on to quote Vonnegut, who explained in an interview that

[w]hen we went into the war, we felt our Government was a respecter of life, careful about not injuring civilian and that sort of thing. Well, Dresden had no tactical value; it was a city of civilians. Yet the Allies bombed it until it burned and melted. And then they lied about it. All that was startling to us. (Vonnegut qtd. in Allen 4)

And finally Allen comes to the conclusion that Vonnegut did not, after all, overdramatize the bombing of Dresden (4).

Keeping in mind what has been explained previously, namely that already in 1955 the number of casualties had been called into question, and by the mid-1970s there was considerable debate regarding the allegations of terror-bombing, fighter planes strafing the civilian population, phosphor bombs and the strategic value of Dresden in general, it is inconceivable to me how a scholar in 1991 can make such blatant remarks, not to mention how such an article can be published in an anthology in 2009. The only possible explanation can be that both the accounts of *Slaughterhouse-Five* and *The Destruction of Dresden* have been so heavily imprinted in the historical memory of everybody outside the field of military history, that they remain an

omnipresent membrane of thought that cannot be penetrated by historical facts. As Taylor puts it, both books create the idea that the bombing was “the unforgivable thing that our fathers did in the name of freedom and humanity” (11).

Many scholars, of course, argue that Vonnegut is not to blame for this development as he opens his story with a disclaimer, reminding the reader that “[a]ll this happened, more or less. The war parts, anyway, are *[only] pretty much* true” (Vonnegut 1; my italics). Contrary to Rigney, who argues that the novel was never intended to be taken seriously as history (11), I would, however, agree with Mill’s hypothesis that “[i]n asserting the facticity of the war sections of the novel, Vonnegut suggest that he wants the reader to take his novel seriously, as a sincere and accurate depiction of what really happened in Dresden” (28).

Historians will always try to combat what they believe to be a blurring of facts and figures, while scholars in the field of literature and cultural studies usually will try to find answers concerning the artistic and moral elements of a piece of literature. However, despite this discrepancy, a case can be made that every scholar has to critically engage with the most current sources on the topic instead of simply parroting alleged historical ‘facts’ that a post-modernist fictional novel has put forward, regardless of whether it was written by an eye witness or not.

More importantly, Kurt Vonnegut can rightfully be criticized. It would have been an easy task to add an introduction to the later editions of his book, in which he corrects the flawed depiction of the events. This would have had little negative effect on the book’s success nor impaired the reading experience. Rather it would have prevented the emergence of a distorted picture of the bombing campaign. In how far the war-trauma had impeded further discussion or



Arguably as infamous as Vonnegut’s recollections, this picture showing

research on Vonnegut’s part is debatable – and purely speculative within this context as I have not found any source in which Vonnegut is asked, or comments on, why he never set the record straight. Even if such a source exists, the fact that it is not readily available speaks for a general disinterest in setting the record straight, given the status the novel enjoys.

5. CONCLUSION

Slaughterhouse-Five rightfully has established itself as one of the most important post-modernist novels. It addresses many important aspects in such unprecedented fashion that the author is able to render his traumatic experiences in a poignant and gripping way. His book is used in school and university classrooms to discuss moral issues, such as war and death, literary features,

e. g. narratology or literary genre, or the process of writing as a method of dealing with trauma. Most everybody working with *Slaughterhouse-Five* will read Sir Rupert Sandby's introduction, Vonnegut's description and the references to David Irving. They then might go on to write papers and discuss the varied issues regarding the book, finding articles such as the one by William Rodney Allen, and will reiterate what Vonnegut and Irving promulgated. They will find cliff notes with brief descriptions of the book – lacking any reference to sources – such as

[t]he bombing of Dresden began February 13, 1945, and lasted through April 17 — a period of two months — yet even today, it remains one of the most controversial military decisions in modern warfare. Why this premier cultural city was devastated during World War II continues to be clouded in mystery. (cliffsnotes.com)

And the ever-present and self-perpetuating statement: “The number of persons killed during the two-month bombing of Dresden is impossible to pinpoint precisely. Estimated casualties range from 35,000 up to 135,000, a disparity due in part to the chaotic nature of all wartime bombings” (cliffsnotes.com). Finally, they will submit their findings and add to the already prevalent misconceptions of the events.

Given the fact that there is no such thing as ‘historical truth,’ one could agree with Rigney that “at a certain point, we may conclude from this novel that numbers say nothing at all beyond ‘more or less.’ The message Vonnegut brings home through his naïve, understated narrative is that every collateral victim may be one too many” (24).

Ultimately however, an author such as Vonnegut also has an obligation towards greater public in not feeding them historical myths; in particular when the author enjoys so much credibility for being an eyewitness. Furthermore, we have to ask ourselves: Can following discrepancies between the narrative and the currently most detailed findings of the actual events be relegated to a position of only relative importance? 100,000 fewer people were killed than Vonnegut claims. So it goes. Dresden was by no means a city without any strategic value, only filled with civilian. So it goes. Fighter aircraft did not swoop down, and open fire on fleeing civilians in Dresden. So it goes. And there never was soap and candles made from the fat of Jews in POW camps.²⁹⁸ So it goes.

²⁹⁸ Regarding the wide-spread belief that soap and candles were made from the fat of killed Jews the German Wikipedia site dealing with *Slaughterhouse-Five* also provides following statement and a link to a the Conference of the *German Studies Association* in Washington D.C in 2004, which discussed how this urban myth still elicits wide-spread discussions:

“Nach heutigem Wissen war der Spruch zu einem Gefangenen, ihn zu Seife zu verarbeiten, vor allem ein gängiger Topos in der ordinären, nicht gleichberechtigten Kommunikation der Wachmänner bzw. -frauen mit ihren Opfern, eine aggressive Todesdrohung. Eine ähnliche, noch kürzere Drohung dieser Art war ein nach oben ausgestreckter Zeigefinger, der den aufsteigenden Rauch aus den Krematorien symbolisierte“ (Wikipedia.de).

A page would have sufficed to set the record straight, to change the general misperception of the bombing, to do away with some of the myths surrounding the war. This would not have had a detrimental effect on the message Vonnegut wanted to convey. It would, however, have spared historians, scholars, and teachers the painstaking effort of trying to insert a kernel of truth into the almost impermeable sphere of cultural remembrance in what was **not** “the greatest massacre in European history” (Vonnegut 101).

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“Die Historiker in aller Welt sind sich darin einig, dass die Liste der NS-Gräueltaten lang genug ist, dass man ihr nichts hinzuzufügen braucht, es auch nicht darf, wenn man seine Glaubwürdigkeit nicht verlieren möchte. Sie haben die Seifenlegende längst in die Fußnoten der Geschichte verbannt, aber nicht von der Tagesordnung absetzen können. Sie wird sich noch lange in der öffentlichen Meinung halten, und die Deutschen werden mit ihr leben müssen. Vermutlich noch sehr lange“ (history.ucsb.edu).

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