Jg. 4, Heft

movements

Journal for Critical Migration and Border Regime Studies

Wissensproduktionen der Migration

ISSN 2509-8322

[transcript]

Katherine Braun, Fabian Georgi, Robert Matthies, Simona Pagano, Mathias Rodatz, Maria Schwertl (Hg.)

Wissensproduktionen der Migration

movements.
Journal for Critical Migration and Border Regime Studies
Vol. 4, Issue 1/2018

Our journal is dedicated to the movements of migration as well as the attempts to control and govern them. *movements* aims at promoting interdisciplinary migration and border regime studies intervening into the knowledge field of migration in a self-reflexive fashion and critical of power relations. As a forum for critical social research, *movements* wishes to contribute to the development of an adequate understanding of the complex realities and power structures of migration and a substantiated critique of the current patterns of the government of migration. The content and strategic focus of the journal is closely related to that of the Network for Critical Migration and Border Regime Studies (kritnet). Its editorial work builds upon this relationship and the established structures of a collective knowledge production. *movements* features academic papers subjected to a collaborative peer review, but also early research reports, political, conceptual and methodological debates and interventions. The majority of its contributions are usually in German language. The journal is published in print with *transcript* as well as on our open access website (CC BY-SA 4.0): *movements-journal.org*.

Unsere Zeitschrift widmet sich in zwei Ausgaben pro Jahr den Bewegungen der Migration sowie den Versuchen, diese zu kontrollieren und zu regulieren. *movements* verfolgt das Ziel, eine interdisziplinäre Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung voranzutreiben, die selbstreflexiv und machtkritisch in das Wissensfeld der Migration interveniert. Im Sinne einer kritischen Gesellschaftsforschung will sie dazu beitragen, ein adäquates Verständnis der komplexen, machtförmingen Realitäten der Migration und eine fundierte Kritik an den gegenwärtigen Formen der Regierung von Migration zu entwickeln. Die redaktionelle Arbeit baut auf die seit Langem im *Netzwerk kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung (kritnet)* etablierten Strukturen und Erfahrungen kollektiver Wissensproduktion auf. *movements* umfasst wissenschaftliche Aufsätze, die einem kollaborativen *double blind review* unterliegen, aber auch frühe Berichte und Aufsätze aus der Forschung sowie politische, analytische und konzeptionelle Interventionen. Die Beiträge sind überwiegend in deutscher Sprache. Die Zeitschrift erscheint als Druckausgabe bei *transcript* sowie parallel dazu auf unserer open access Webseite (CC BY-SA 4.0): *movements-journal.org*.

Vol. 4, Issue 1/2018

mᵒvements

Journal for Critical Migration and Border Regime Studies

[transcript]

Herausgeber_innen der Ausgabe
Katherine Braun, Fabian Georgi, Robert Matthies, Simona Pagano, Mathias Rodatz, Maria Schwertl

Redaktion *movements*
Ilker Ataç, Katherine Braun, Fabian Georgi, Sabine Hess, Juliane Karakayali, Bernd Kasparek, Stefanie Kron, Simona Pagano, Philipp Ratfisch, Lisa Riedner, Mathias Rodatz, Maria Schwertl, Helge Schwiertz, Simon Noori, Vassilis S. Tsianos

Die Zeitschrift *movements. Journal for Critical Migration and Border Regime Studies* erscheint zweimal jährlich. Wir senden Ihnen Ihr Exemplar gerne portofrei zu (innerhalb Deutschlands). Sie können die Zeitschrift als Jahresabonnement direkt über den Verlag abonnieren. Das Abonnement beginnt mit dem aktuellen Heft und verlängert sich automatisch um jeweils ein Jahr, wenn es nicht bis zum 1. Februar eines Jahres beim Verlag gekündigt wird. Die Zusendung der abonnierten Exemplare erfolgt unmittelbar nach Erscheinen. Weitere Informationen finden Sie unter: http://www.transcript-verlag.de/movements. Selbstverständlich ist *movements* auch über jede Buchhandlung erhältlich.

Printversion erschienen im transcript Verlag 2018

ROSA LUXEMBURG STIFTUNG

Umschlagkonzept: Kordula Röckenhaus, Bielefeld
Innenlayout: Bernd Kasparek, Mathias Rodatz
Korrektorat Deutsch: Simon Noori, Ilker Ataç, Sabine Hess, Juliane Karakayali, Philipp Ratfisch, Lisa Riedner, Helge Schwiertz
Korrektorat Englisch: Matt Rees, Christina Rogers

ISSN 2509-8322 | Print-ISBN 978-3-8376-4245-2
Gedruckt auf alterungsbeständigem Papier mit chlorfrei gebleichtem Zellstoff.

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek
Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliographie; detaillierte bibliographische Daten sind im Internet abrufbar: http://dnb.d-nb.de.

Inhalt

Aufsätze

Debatte

Forschungswerkstatt

Interventionen

Interviews

Umkämpfte Wissensproduktionen der Migration

Editorial

KATHERINE BRAUN, FABIAN GEORGI, ROBERT MATTHIES, SIMONA PAGANO, MATHIAS RODATZ, MARIA SCHWERTL

In den vergangenen Jahrzehnten haben sich Akteure und Ordnungen des Wissens der Migration vervielfältigt. Nicht nur akademische und andere wissenschaftliche Perspektiven haben sich ausdifferenziert, zunehmend treten auch weitere Akteure der Wissensproduktion in Konkurrenz zu ihnen oder ergänzen sie. Ein *migration knowledge hype* mobilisiert nationale Staatsapparate, inter- und transnationale Organisationen sowie gesellschaftliche Akteure wie Beratungsfirmen, Thinktanks, Stiftungen, NGOs usw. (Casas-Cortes et al. 2014). Die Beiträge dieser Ausgabe von *movements* nehmen verschiedene Aspekte dieses ›Hypes‹ in den Blick und formulieren unterschiedliche Formen der Kritik: an bestimmten Arten der *wissenschaftlichen* Wissensproduktion, an neuen Akteuren und Praktiken staatlicher und zivilgesellschaftlicher Wissensproduktion *über* Migration sowie an Prozessen der Marginalisierung des Wissens und der Wissensproduktionen *durch* und *der* Migration. Letzteres versuchen mehrere Beiträge, indem sie Möglichkeiten und Grenzen widerständiger Wissensproduktionen ausloten.

Diese Ausgabe entstand aus einem Interesse an Wissensproduktionen als konstitutivem Bestandteil des Funktionierens von Grenzen und der Regierung der Migration. Wissensproduktion ist auch als Gegenstand einer kritischen Grenz- und Migrationsforschung nicht mehr wegzudenken. Konkreter Anlass war für uns die Frage, welche Veränderungen hegemonialer und kritischer Wissensproduktionen sich nach dem ›Sommer der Migration‹ 2015 feststellen lassen und wie diese zu analysieren sind.

Im Folgenden skizzieren wir einige Aspekte dieser Dynamiken, darunter institutionalisierte Hegemonien deutscher Migrationsforschung und grundsätzliche Kritiken der Funktionen wissenschaftlicher Wissensproduktion. Im Anschluss stellen wir die Beiträge dieser Ausgabe vor. Wie immer ist auch für diese Ausgabe von *movements* den vielen Beteiligten zu danken – zu allererst unseren Autor*innen und den ›unsichtbaren‹ Begleiter*innen ihrer Texte, die mit ihren konstruktiven Gutachten zur Wissensproduktion dieses Heftes beigetragen haben.

Wissenschaftliche Wissensproduktion nach dem ›Sommer der Migration‹

Seit der Krise des deutschen und europäischen Grenzregimes 2015/16 ist in Deutschland die Nachfrage nach Wissen über Migration massiv angestiegen. Das Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF) stellte 2016 rund 18 Millionen Euro für Forschungsprojekte zu Flucht, Migration und Integration bereit (BMBF 2016). Exemplarisch für viele Förderinstitutionen begründete es diesen Schritt mit dem Hinweis, es sei notwendig, die »Datengrundlage über Flüchtlinge in Deutschland« und die »gesellschaftlichen Folgen der Zuwanderung« (ebd.) zu verbessern. Bildungsministerin Johanna Wanka wurde mit den Worten zitiert: »Wir brauchen für dieses komplexe Themenfeld dringend weitere Expertise aus den Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften.« (Ebd.) Als Resultat dieses und zahlreicher anderer Förderprogramme hat sich die Migrations- und Fluchtforschung in Deutschland seit 2015 nicht nur quantitativ vergrößert, sondern auch qualitativ verändert.

Quantitativ ist eine Zunahme von Fördergeldern, Forschungsprojekten und -instituten zu verzeichnen. So stellt Olaf Kleist in einer Studie zur »Flucht- und Flüchtlingsforschung in Deutschland« fest, dass entsprechende Fördergelder, vor allem Drittmittel, seit 2013 deutlich angestiegen sind (Kleist 2018: 32f., 37). Insbesondere hat sich die Zahl neu begonnener Forschungsprojekte um das Fünffache erhöht, von 35 im Jahr 2013 auf 175 im Jahr 2016 (ebd.: 13f.). Auch private Stiftungen steuern substanzielle Mittel bei. Bereits 2008 schlossen sich zu diesem Zweck acht Stiftungen im *Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration* (SVR) zusammen. Besonders engagiert zeigt sich die Stiftung Mercator, Mitglied des SVR. Ihr mit fast drei Millionen Euro finanzierter, »praxisnahe[r]« *Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration* »identifiziert Herausforderungen und erarbeitet Handlungsstrategien zur europäischen Asyl- und Migrationspolitik aus primär wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Sicht« (Stiftung Mercator 2018; vgl. Kleist 2018: 31). Symptomatisch für die Hochkonjunktur des Feldes ist die Neugründung ganzer Institute mit (teils) langfristiger Förderung, darunter das im Februar 2017 etablierte *Interdisziplinäre Zentrum für Integrations- und Migrationsforschung* (InZentIM) der Universität Duisburg-Essen und das mit 6,8 Millionen Euro Bundesmitteln finanzierte *Deutsche Zentrum für Integrations- und Migrationsforschung* (DeZIM) in Berlin (BMFSFJ 2017), das die Arbeit der DeZIM-Gemeinschaft aus sieben regionalen Instituten bündeln[1] und »Politikberatung leisten« soll (BMFSFJ 2018). Schließlich kündigte das

1 | Die sieben Institute der DeZIM-Gemeinschaft sind: *Berliner Institut für empirische Integrations- und Migrationsforschung* (BIM), *Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialfor-*

BMBF im Oktober 2017 an, über 40 Millionen Euro in ein dezentrales *Institut für gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt* zu investieren (BMBF 2017; zum Hintergrund siehe Schlottmann 2017; Burchard 2017).

Die qualitativen Veränderungen, die mit dieser Entwicklung einhergehen werden, sind noch nicht absehbar. Betrachtet man ähnliche ›Schübe‹ in der Vergangenheit, wird allerdings deutlich, dass die hegemonialen sozialwissenschaftlichen Wissensproduktionen häufig ebenso konservativ auf veränderte gesellschaftliche Realitäten infolge von Migrationsprozessen reagierten, wie die gesellschaftlichen Debatten, vor deren Hintergrund sie jeweils betrieben wurden. In der Entwicklung des Mainstreams der deutschen akademischen Migrationsforschung von der sogenannten ›Gastarbeiterforschung‹ über die ›Ausländer- und Asylforschung‹ und die ›Ausländerpädagogik‹ bis hin zur ›Assimilations-‹ und ›Integrationsforschung‹ wurde beharrlich am methodologischen Nationalismus festgehalten – nicht zuletzt, weil mit dem Anspruch ›praxisnah‹ meist ›politik-‹ und ›staatsnah‹ gemeint war (bspw. Lanz 2007: 88ff.). Der Blick auf die Tatsache der Migration und der Kämpfe um Rechte und Anerkennung, die sich längst in der gesellschaftlichen (und insbesondere der städtischen) Realität der Bundesrepublik niedergeschlagen hatten, inspirierte zunächst nur im Bereich dezidiert ›kritischer‹ Arbeiten entsprechende Wissensproduktionen, oft und erzwungener Maßen außerhalb der Universitäten. Es waren migrantische Selbstorganisationen ehemaliger Gastarbeiter*innen und Unterstützer*innen, die zuerst zentrale Impulse für eine kritische Migrations- und Rassismusforschung in Deutschland setzten. Dazu zählt der Frauenkongress von 1984, in dem migrantische und Schwarze Wissenschaftler*innen und Aktivist*innen die Invisibilisierung rassistischer Verhältnisse in Bewegungen und Wissenschaft kritisierten (Arbeitsgruppe Frauenkongress 1984; Kalpaka/Rähtzel 1986; Oguntoye/Opitz/Schultz 1986; Gümen 1998). Ausschlaggebend für diese Perspektiven waren auch internationale Debatten, insbesondere die britischen, und deren Übersetzung. Der 1992 stattfindende Kongress »Rassismus und Migration in Europa« (Kalpaka/Rähtzel 1992; vgl. auch Bojadžijev et al. 2018) brachte nicht nur internationale Aktivist*innen und Wissenschaftler*innen zusammen, er war auch der Impuls für eine rassismuskritische Migrationsforschung, die unterschiedliche theoretische Bezugspunkte kombinierte (ebd.). Auch das Ziel von *kritnet* als Netzwerk kritischer Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung wie auch der Zeitschrift *movements*,

---

schung (WZB), *Zentrum für Integrations- und Migrationsforschung* (InZentIM) der Universität Duisburg-Essen, *Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung* (MZES), Universität Mannheim, *Institut für interdisziplinäre Konflikt- und Gewaltforschung* (IKG), Universität Bielefeld, *Institut für Migrationsforschung und interkulturelle Studien* (IMIS), Universität Osnabrück und das *Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung* (IAB) (BMFSFJ 2018).

für deren Entstehung aktivistische und außeruniversitäre Wissensproduktionen entscheidend waren (insbesondere die *Forschungsgesellschaft Flucht und Migration* und *Kanak Attak*[2]), bleibt es bis heute, entsprechende Wissensproduktionen und die dafür notwendigen sozialwissenschaftlichen Zugänge und Perspektiven auch an den Universitäten zu festigen – also »Bewegung in die kultur- und sozialwissenschaftliche Migrationsforschung zu bringen, die viel zu lange die Migrantinnen und Migranten selbst als Problem erforscht hat, anstatt nach den politischen, ökonomischen und rechtlichen Bedingungen zu fragen, die Migration und Grenzen als gesellschaftliche Phänomene überhaupt erst hervorbringen« (Redaktion movements 2015; vgl. Georgi/Wagner 2009; Hess/Kasparek 2010).

Mit Blick auf die seit dem ›Sommer der Migration‹ zu beobachtenden Entwicklungen im Feld der wissenschaftlichen Wissensproduktion ist festzustellen, dass die Figur des ›Flüchtlings‹ ins Zentrum politischer und wissenschaftlicher Aufmerksamkeit gerückt ist. Mit der ›Flüchtlingsforschung‹ hat sich in den 2010er-Jahren ein neues Feld etabliert, das, analog zu den oben genannten Feldern aus der Geschichte der deutschen Migrationsforschung, im direkten Zusammenhang mit aktuellen gesellschaftlichen Konflikten steht. Bemerkenswert ist, wie strategisch das neue Forschungsfeld ausgebaut wird, etwa durch die Etablierung des *Netzwerks Flüchtlingsforschung* (2013), die *Zeitschrift für Flüchtlingsforschung* (seit 2017 im Nomos Verlag) und ein Mapping des Feldes im Projekt *Flucht – Forschung – Transfer* (2016–2018, finanziert vom BMBF). Der Fokus dieser Forschungen liegt häufig auf Fragen der ›Integration und Aufnahme‹ in die deutsche Gesellschaft (vgl. Kleist 2018: 22f.). Einmal mehr, so scheint es, wendet sich die deutsche Migrationsforschung angesichts neuer Migrationsbewegungen also den ausgetretenen assimilations- und integrationstheoretischen Pfaden und damit häufig auch dem methodologischen Nationalismus zu.

Insofern können wir Kleist nur zustimmen, wenn er »eine deutliche thematische Verengung der deutschen Flucht- und Flüchtlingsforschung« feststellt (ebd.: 22). Dabei gäbe es international zahlreiche Anschlusspunkte, mit denen die Engführung auf Fragen der ›Integration‹ überschritten werden und stattdessen komplexe Fluchtursachen, die Flucht- und Asylpolitik, die politische Ökonomie von Flucht oder Räume jenseits Deutschlands und Europas in den Blick geraten könnten. Zu diesen Themen gehören etwa forcierte bzw. ›gewaltbedingte‹ Migration als Reaktion auf Krieg und Vertreibung oder auf körperliche und seelische Verletzungen durch religiöse, politische und sexuelle Verfolgung (Giles/Hyndman 2004), postkolonial geprägte

2 | Siehe die URLs www.ffm-berlin.de sowie www.kanak-attak.de.

(Bürger-)Kriege, die Bedeutung internationaler Abkommen für Praktiken der Migration (Chimni 1998; Malkki 1995) und die Konstruktionsprozesse von Flucht und der Figur des ›Flüchtlings‹ selbst (Rajaram 2002). Insbesondere in internationalen Debatten existiert längst ein hoher Grad an Reflexivität über Machtbeziehungen (Harrell-Bond 1986) und Repräsentationslogiken (Malkki 1995; Rajaram 2002; Moulin 2012) im Forschungskontext, der in deutschen Debatten zunehmend aufgegriffen wird (vgl. Braun 2017). Solchen Forschungen gelingt es, den lokalen Kontext zu überschreiten und verstärkt translokale Phänomene zu fokussieren, etwa zur humanitären Hilfe für Geflüchtete (Hyndman 2000; Fassin 2012).

Die Art und Weise, wie sich die wissenschaftliche Wissensproduktion zu Migration in Deutschland weiterentwickelt, wird nicht zuletzt davon abhängen, wie an den Universitäten auf die verstärkten Forderungen an die Migrations- und Fluchtforschung, gesellschafts- und politikrelevanter zu werden, reagiert werden wird. Solche Forderungen implizieren die Vorstellung, dass sich Migrationsprozesse politisch besser regulieren ließen, wenn man ihre Elemente (Fluchtursachen, Migrationsrouten, Integrationsprozesse) besser verstünde. Die Gefahr besteht, dass eine solche ›Anwendungsorientierung‹ der Migrationsforschung alte Traditionslinien von ›Ausländerforschung‹ bis hin zum Integrationsparadigma fortschreiben wird, insbesondere dann, wenn wissenschaftliche Politikberatung sich an die aktuellen Tendenzen einer repressiven Migrationspolitik und erstarkter nationalistischer und rassistischer Kräfte anpasst.[3] Angesichts dieser Dynamiken erscheint es uns wichtiger denn je, über die Bedingungen, Spielräume und Fallstricke kritischer Wissensproduktion zu Migration nachzudenken.

Die gesellschaftliche Funktion wissenschaftlicher Wissensproduktion

Insbesondere in der gegenwärtigen gesellschaftlichen Polarisierung erscheint es uns jedoch falsch, zu dichotom oder dualistisch über das Verhältnis von (kritischer) wissenschaftlicher Wissensproduktion auf der einen und hegemonialen Kräften, Politik und Staat auf der anderen Seite nachzudenken. Wenn man sich vergegenwärtigt, wie einige staatliche Institutionen neue Finanzmittel für die Migrationsforschung be-

3 | Sorgen vor einem ›rechten Thinktank‹ bestanden beispielsweise bei der Gründung des Instituts für gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt, bei der der Rechtskonservative Werner Patzelt von der TU Dresden maßgeblich beteiligt war (vgl. Burchard 2017).

gründen, wird dies nachvollziehbar. So verband das BMBF sein bereits erwähntes Förderprogramm nicht nur mit dem Bedarf nach einer besseren Datengrundlage und der »Vermittlung der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse in Politik und Gesellschaft« (BMBF 2016), sondern auch mit der Notwendigkeit, den ›alternativen Fakten‹ zu Flucht und Migration im Kontext des gesellschaftlichen Rechtsrucks entgegenzuwirken – und zwar indem die »Stimme der Wissenschaft« (ebd.) gestärkt werde. Ähnlich argumentierte das Bundesfamilienministerium hinsichtlich der Neugründung des DeZIM: »Falschinformationen und Mutmaßungen müssen wir Fakten entgegensetzen!« (BMFSFJ 2017) Freilich, diese Unterscheidung zwischen guter, weil ›objektiver‹ Wissenschaft und schlechter, weil ›ideologischer‹ Wissensproduktion von rechts wird nicht ausreichend qualifiziert bzw. ist insgesamt irreführend. Schließlich gilt für den Gegenstandsbereich der ›Migration‹ in besonderem Maße, dass »wissenschaftliche Tätigkeit nie politisch neutral [ist]« (Fiedler et al. 2017: 12), wie es das Editorial der *movements*-Ausgabe 3(1) formulierte. »Ob Forschende wollen oder nicht, ob es ihnen bewusst ist oder nicht, ob sie es offen zugeben und öffentlich reflektieren oder nicht – ihre soziale Stellung, ihre Finanzierung, die Funktionen und Effekte ihrer Tätigkeit haben einen zutiefst politischen Charakter« (ebd.).

Dass Wissenschaft *per se* weder emanzipatorisch noch objektiv ist, wird schon seit Langem reflektiert. Die Frage, was kritische Wissenschaft prägt und wie kritische Migrationsforschung gemacht werden kann, ist auch zentraler Gegenstand des Netzwerks *kritnet*. Dabei beziehen wir uns auf eine Vielfalt von theoretischen Ansätzen, von denen wir im Folgenden drei Perspektiven diskutieren werden. Wichtige Bezugspunkte sind hier die Vertreter*innen feministischer Erkenntnistheorien, die Frankfurter Schule und andere marxistische Perspektiven sowie Konstruktivismus, Poststrukturalismus und post- bzw. dekoloniale Kritik.

Wissenschaft wird in diesen kritischen Ansätzen als Technik verstanden, die soziale Wirklichkeit nicht nur beschreibt, sondern mitherstellt. Dabei ist vor allem in einer an Michel Foucaults Überlegungen zur Regierungskunst und zur *gouvernementalité* (Foucault 2000) anschließenden Perspektive die Verknüpfung von Wissen und Macht von zentraler Bedeutung, die den produktiven Charakter beider Aspekte in den Vordergrund rückt (vgl. dazu Foucault 1994: 250; Foucault 1976: 45). Die Ausübung von Macht setzt spezifische Wissensformen voraus und erfordert bestimmte Techniken. Sie ist eine (Regierungs-)Kunst im doppelten Sinne. Sie ist künstlich im Sinne eines Fabrizierens, eines prozesshaften Produzierens, und fragt zugleich nach der bestmöglichen Weise, die Macht auszuüben (Krasmann 2007: 280ff.; Gordon 1980). Sie ist deshalb zur Rationalisierung gezwungen und muss ihre eigenen Bedingungen reflektieren. Realität und Repräsentation sind in einer solchen Perspektive nicht entkoppelt. Dinge und Denken konstituieren einander, politische Praktiken beschreiben

und problematisieren eine Ordnung der Realität und stellen sie damit zugleich her. Ein solches machtdurchtränktes Wissen ist nicht rein, weil das Wissen sich erst in der Anwendung realisiert und praktisch wird, *episteme* und *techne* zugleich (Miller/Rose 1991; Dean 1996).

Eine kritische Reflexion von Wissensproduktion analysiert somit die gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen und die Praktiken und Technologien unter bzw. mit denen Dinge zu Objekten des Wissens gemacht werden. Indem Wissen etwa über ›den Flüchtling‹ produziert wird, wird dieser als Objekt von Kontrolle und Regierung erst hergestellt (vgl. Braun/Matthies 2017: 33ff.). Wissenschaft hat normalisierende, hierarchisierende und herrschaftsstabilisierende Effekte und Funktionen, sie ist selbst Teil der sozialen Wirklichkeit, von der sie sich ein Bild macht. Wissenschaftliches Wissen ist immer an konkrete – dynamische, konfliktuelle – Praktiken gebunden und ein zentrales Moment der Reproduktion wissenschaftlicher und politischer Praxis.

Neben Foucault'schen Ansätzen tragen auch historisch-materialistische Theorien zu einer kritischen Reflexion von Wissensproduktion bei. Wissenschaftler*innen, so formulierte Max Horkheimer es in »Traditionelle und kritische Theorie«, einem Schlüsselaufsatz der Frankfurter Schule, »sind in den gesellschaftlichen Apparat eingespannt, ihre Leistung ist ein Moment der Selbsterhaltung, der fortwährenden Reproduktion des Bestehenden, gleichviel, was sie sich selbst für einen Reim darauf machen« (Horkheimer 2003/1937: 213). Ein anderer Klassiker wissenschaftlicher Selbstkritik, den wir in der Produktion dieser *movements*-Ausgabe intensiv und kontrovers diskutiert haben, ist der Artikel »Fat-Cat Sociology« von Martin Nicolaus (1991/1968), einem Vertreter der *Radical Sociology Movement*, ursprünglich gehalten als Rede auf dem Kongress der *American Sociological Association* (ASA) im August 1968 in Boston (vgl. Fuller 1996). In seiner Rede bringt er die Verstrickung von Wissenschaft in Herrschaftsprozesse polemisch wie pointiert auf den Punkt: »The corporate rulers of this society would not be spending as much money as they do for knowledge, if knowledge did not confer power.« (Nicolaus 1991/1968: 254) Wissen übertrage Macht, deshalb werde dafür bezahlt und deshalb bestehe zwischen Erkenntnisobjekten und -subjekten eine Beziehung, die Herrschaftsverhältnisse spiegelt: »So far, sociologists have been schlepping this knowledge that confers power along a one-way chain, taking knowledge from the people, giving knowledge to the rulers.« (Ebd.) Als soziologisch ›interessant‹ gelten den Herrschenden zentral die *Bewegungen* subalterner oder unterdrückter Gruppen (ebd.: 252). Die Produktion von systemstabilisierendem Herrschaftswissen *über* diese Bewegungen sei die eigentliche Funktion sozialwissenschaftlicher Arbeit, und Soziolog*innen – und andere Sozialwissenschaftler*innen – würden von ihrer Kollaboration persönlich profitieren:

> »[T]he eyes of sociologists, with few but honorable (or honorable but few) exceptions, have been turned downward, and their palms upward. Eyes down, to study the activities of the lower classes, of the subject population – those activities which created problems for the smooth exercise of governmental power.« (Ebd.)

Auch aus Perspektive feministischer und postkolonialer Theorien werden Formen, Wirkungsweisen und Funktionen von Wissenschaft für die Aufrechterhaltung herrschender Ungleichheiten grundlegend kritisiert, und dabei das Postulat wissenschaftlicher Objektivität und Neutralität insbesondere hinsichtlich der Stabilisierung androzentrischer, rassistischer und kolonialer Herrschaftsordnungen und der Marginalisierung emanzipatorischer Praktiken hinterfragt (bspw. Said 1978; Fanon 1985; Collins 1990; Haraway 1995; Gutiérrez Rodríguez 1999; Castro Varela/Dhawan 2005). Wissenschaft trage mit diskursiven Mitteln zur Herstellung eines europäischen Selbst und eines nicht-westlichen Anderen bei (vgl. Said 1978; Spivak 1999). Damit verbunden sei die Konstruktion einer Norm, in der das Andere als Abweichung und Bedrohung diskursiv konstruiert werde. Wissenschaft wird als hegemoniales kulturelles Projekt kritisiert, das mit der Schaffung von hierarchisch organisierten Wissensordnungen und Denksystemen (Freire 1970; Gramsci 1991) einhergeht, die dann von Subjekten ›internalisiert‹ (Freire 1970) oder sogar ›epidermisiert‹ (Fanon 1985) werden.

Wissen und Macht, Wissenschaft und Herrschaft sind demnach also unaufhebbar verstrickt. Allerdings ist offensichtlich, dass wir mit einer Ausgabe zu Fragen der Wissensproduktion in der Zeitschrift *movements* den Anspruch erheben, dass es sehr wohl einen Unterschied macht, was für »einen Reim« (Horkheimer 2003/1937: 213; s.o.) wir uns auf die Verhältnisse machen – und dass wir die Institution Wissenschaft als einen Ort der Auseinandersetzung begreifen, an dem es sich für Erkenntnisse jenseits der »Reproduktion des Bestehenden« (ebd.) einzutreten lohnt. Dabei gilt es sich allerdings immer wieder an die aufgeführten, grundsätzlichen Kritiken westlicher (Sozial-)Wissenschaft zu erinnern. Auch wenn sich Macht- und Herrschaftsmechanismen ebenso wie sozialwissenschaftliche Wissensproduktionen ausdifferenziert haben und kritische Perspektiven sowie gesellschaftliche Kämpfe immer wieder integriert wurden – der Mainstream wissenschaftlicher Wissensproduktion unterscheidet sich nach wie vor nur marginal von den Hegemonien, die die Verwaltung unserer Welt aufrechterhalten. Es gilt sich vor Augen zu führen, dass sich eine kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung den Regeln der Institution Wissenschaft – und damit den Zwängen des ›gesellschaftlichen Apparats‹, der jede wissenschaftliche Wissensproduktion auf den Moment der ›Reproduktion des Bestehenden‹ zu reduzieren droht –, immer wieder neu entziehen muss. Die Frage, ob und auf welche Weise dies mög-

lich ist, gilt es zuerst im Verhältnis zwischen kritischer Migrationsforschung und den Bewegungen und Kämpfen der Migration sowie solidarischem Aktivismus zu verhandeln.

Das Spektrum der möglichen Formen einer kritischen wissenschaftlichen Wissensproduktion lässt sich dabei grob zwischen zwei Polen verorten. Auf der einen Seite stehen jene grundsätzlichen Kritiken der Triebkräfte von (akademischer) Wissensproduktion und ihrer Funktion für Macht- und Herrschaftsmechanismen, die bereits zur Sprache gekommen sind. Auf der anderen Seite stehen Perspektiven, die Hegemonien der Wissensproduktion nicht nur durch (negative) Kritik, sondern durch die Sichtbarmachung und Theoretisierung anderer, marginalisierter Formen der Wissensproduktion und entsprechender Kämpfe zu dezentrieren suchen (bspw. Escobar/Restrepo 2005). In diesem Sinne gilt es, Wissensproduktionen im Plural zu denken und sie nicht auf Fragen (der Kritik) von hegemonialen Strukturen und Diskursen zu reduzieren. Stattdessen muss (auch) die alltägliche und praktische Ko-Produktion von Wissen in den Blick genommen werden.

Insbesondere feministische Erkenntnistheoretikerinnen wie Patricia Hill Collins (1990) oder Donna Haraway schlagen deshalb vor, von ›situiertem Wissen‹ zu sprechen, das von einem bestimmten Standpunkt aus produziert wird. Der Anspruch einer neutralen und objektiven Wissenschaft sei eine ›Illusion weißer, heterosexueller Männer‹ (vgl. Haraway 1995), die davon ausgehe, man könne Objekte, Subjekte und gesellschaftliche Verhältnisse aus einer ›unmarkierten Position‹ beschreiben und wissenschaftliche Praxis jenseits von Machtverhältnissen produzieren. Mit der heuristischen Perspektive des situierten Wissens wird auch auf Erkenntnisse der politischen Kämpfe Schwarzer, migrantischer Feministinnen und des Antikolonialismus zurückgegriffen. Ausgangspunkt entsprechender Theoriebildung ist stets die Praxis als Erfahrung der Unterdrückung und damit verbundener Widerständigkeit (Anzaldúa/Moraga 1983; Collins 1990; vgl. auch Caixeta 2003; Gutiérrez Rodríguez/Steyerl 2003). Ein daran anschließender Vorschlag ist der einer ›parteilichen Forschung‹ (Freire 1970; hooks 1984; maiz 2009), die gezielt zur Verbesserung der Lebensverhältnisse der ›beforschten Subjekte‹ beiträgt, sowie einen epistemologischen Raum für marginalisiertes Wissen und Selbstrepräsentationen eröffnet. In der kritischen Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung bildet diese Form der ›parteilichen Forschung‹ einen wichtigen Strang, der durch methodologische Prozesse wissenschaftlicher Selbstreflexion begleitet wird (beispielhaft hierzu Azzarello et al. 2014; Carstensen et al. 2014; maiz 2009; Riedner 2014; Schwenken 2017) und bisher vor allem im Kontext von Forschung über prekäre Beschäftigungsverhältnisse und Migration eingesetzt wurde.

TEXTE DIESER AUSGABE

Innerhalb des oben benannten Spektrums kritischer Wissensproduktion, aufgespannt zwischen den Polen negativer Kritik und der Arbeit an und mit widerständigen Formen der Wissensproduktion, setzen die Artikel dieser Ausgabe unterschiedliche Schwerpunkte. Eine Anzahl von Texten lässt sich jeweils nahe einem der Pole verorten, andere beschäftigen sich vor allem mit Widersprüchen und Effekten hegemonialer Wissensproduktionen.

Widerständige Formen von Wissensproduktion

Zu den Texten, die sich mit Praktiken und Möglichkeiten widerständiger Formen von Wissensproduktion befassen, gehören die Beiträge von Rubia Salgado, Ursula Santa Cruz, Daniel Bendix sowie das von Sophie Hinger mit Charles Heller und Lorenzo Pezzani geführte Interview. Ihre Texte kritisieren die hegemonialen Logiken, Machtstrukturen und Episteme von Wissen über Migration, indem sie unterschiedliche Wissensformationen gegeneinander wenden. Sie versuchen gegenhegemoniale Wissensformen zu produzieren oder deren Existenz und Wirkungsweise hervorzuheben – Wissensformen, die Menschenleben schützen, die in bestehende Verhältnisse intervenieren und sie verändern.

Rubia Salgado beschreibt in ihrer Intervention als Mitglied der Vereine *maiz* und *das kollektiv – kritische bildungs-, beratungs- und kulturarbeit von und für migrant*innen* die Möglichkeiten des Erlernens von Deutsch als Zweitsprache. Nicht nur Machtasymmetrien, sondern auch Rassismen kennzeichnen den Zweitsprachenerwerb. Um so dringlicher erscheint es deswegen in der Bildungsarbeit, Räume der kritischen Reflexion und der ›gegenhegemonialen Wissensproduktion‹ zu gestalten. Im Mittelpunkt steht ein anerkennendes, wechselseitiges und gleichwertiges Beziehungsverhältnis zwischen Lehrenden und Lernenden.

Ursula Santa Cruz problematisiert in unserem Interview mit ihr die Diskussionen um geschlechtsspezifische Gewalt insbesondere in migrationspolitischen und europäischen feministischen Kontexten. Ähnlich wie wir es aus dem *black*, *chicana* und *postcolonial feminism* kennen (vgl. Mohanty 2003; Anzaldúa/Moraga 1983), kritisiert sie aus einer dekolonialen Perspektive universalisierende Vorstellungen europäischer Feministinnen, die migrantische Frauen aus dem globalen Süden ausschließlich als Opfer von Gewalt eines migrantischen Patriarchats konstruieren. Damit verbunden ist nicht nur die Konstruktion eines europäisch-feministischen Selbst, sondern auch die Invisibilisierung von familiärer Gewalt seitens europäischer Männer. Im Anschluss an dekoloniale Ansätze hebt sie die Rolle des ›Ortes der Aussage‹ (*position of*

enunciation) hervor, fragt also, aus welcher (geopolitischen) Position heraus Gewalt benannt, theoretisiert und bewertet wird und welche epistemologischen und ideologischen Frameworks damit verbunden sind: Wer bestimmt, was Gewalt ist und was nicht? Dabei geht es ihr um eine situierte Analyse von Geschlechterverhältnissen und rassistischen Gesellschaftsformationen. Ausgangspunkt ihrer Analyse sind die Erfahrungen migrantischer und sex-gender-dissidenter Menschen, die sich im Kollektiv t.i.c.t.a.c. selbst organisiert haben, um ihre alltäglichen Gewalterfahrungen zu reflektieren und gegenhegemoniale Praktiken zu entwerfen, um die migrantische Stimmenvielfalt und die Pluralität von Erfahrungen sichtbar zu machen.

Charles Heller und **Lorenzo Pezzani** diskutieren und reflektieren im Interview mit **Sophie Hinger** ihre spezifische Praxis der Wissensproduktion. Im Jahr 2011 gründeten der Wissenschaftler und Filmemacher Heller und der Architekt Pezzani das Projekt *Forensic Oceanography*, um die tödlichen Auswirkungen des militarisierten Grenzregimes und der Migrationspolitik im Mittelmeer zu untersuchen. In Zusammenarbeit mit einem breiten Netzwerk von NGOs, Aktivist*innen, Wissenschaftler*innen und Journalist*innen produzieren sie Berichte, Artikel, Karten und Videos, um die Gewalt gegen Migrant*innen an den europäischen Seegrenzen zu dokumentieren. Ihre Praxis verdichtete sich 2012 in der Online-Plattform *WatchTheMed.net*, aus der 2014 das *WatchTheMed Alarmphone* hervorging, einer Hotline für Migrant*innen in Seenot. Sophie Hinger, wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin an der Universität Osnabrück und Mitglied des *Alarmphone*, tauschte sich zwischen Juli 2017 und Februar 2018 per Skype und E-Mail mit Heller und Pezzani über die Veränderungen im Grenzregime des (zentralen) Mittelmeers und die Rolle von *activist researchers* in dieser umkämpften Arena aus.

Daniel Bendix spielt im Titel seines Artikels »Der globale Süden ist hier!« auf einen Text an, der 2017 in *movements* 3(1) erschienen ist. »Den globalen Süden mitdenken!« hatte Miriam Lang gefordert und sich damit gegen eine Tendenz in der kritischen Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung gewandt, die sich dezidiert desinteressiert an Fluchtursachen und an den Gründen für Migration zeige. Lang warf dieser Position einen Eurozentrismus vor, der sich für reale Dynamiken im globalen Süden und die Zwänge, denen Migrant*innen unterlägen, nicht interessiere. Bendix stimmt Lang zu, verweist aber darauf, dass der globale Süden in Gestalt von Refugee-Gruppen und migrantischen Organisationen bereits ›hier‹ sei. Um also den globalen Süden in kritische Forschung einzubeziehen, müsste mit diesen Akteur*innen hier im globalen Norden enger und auf Augenhöhe kooperiert und ihre Analysen, Forderungen und politischen Praktiken stärker wahrgenommen werden. In diesem Sinne fordert Bendix von sich als kritisch verstehenden Migrations- und Grenzforscher*innen, die widerständige Wissensproduktion migrantischer Aktivist*innen in Deutschland

und Europa ernst(er) zu nehmen. Dies hieße etwa, so zeigt er an zahlreichen Beispielen, stärker über den Zusammenhang von Migration und Kapitalismus, Grenzen und Imperialismus nachzudenken.

In ihrer Intervention zu Rassismuskritik und Meinungsfreiheit an den Universitäten begründen **Katharina Hoppe**, **Darja Klingenberg**, **Vanessa Eileen Thompson**, **Felix Trautmann** und **Alexander Vorbrugg**, warum sie sich für die Absage eines geplanten Vortrags des umstrittenen Vorsitzenden der Deutschen Polizeigewerkschaft (DPolG), Rainer Wendt, an der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt eingesetzt haben. Die Einladung Wendts, der vor allem durch rechtspopulistische Äußerungen in den Medien aufgefallen ist, deuten sie als Ausdruck aktueller diskursiv-politischer Verschiebungen nach rechts. Ihr Protest wurde von liberaler Seite mit Verweis auf die Meinungsfreiheit kritisiert und dabei ihre gegenüber rassistischen ›Meinungen‹ artikulierte Kritik in den Bereich derer gedrängt, die diese Freiheit gefährden. Dagegen wenden die Autor*innen ein, dass die Diskriminierungsfreiheit ein ebenso hohes Gut sei wie die Meinungsfreiheit und beide nicht gegeneinander ausgespielt werden sollten. Auch im konkreten Einzelfall sei deshalb Widerstand gegen die Einladung von Personen zu leisten, deren Äußerungen einen diskriminierenden Gehalt erwarten ließen. Nicht nur um die Frage der Toleranz gehe es, sondern auch darum, dass die Grenzen der Sagbarkeit selbst politisch ausgehandelt werden müssen.

Hegemoniale Formen von Wissensproduktion

Es ist wohl kein Zufall, dass die bisher genannten Texte, die sich mit widerständiger Wissensproduktion befassen, allesamt unter den Rubriken ›Interviews‹ und ›Interventionen‹ eingegangen sind. Im Kontrast hierzu befassen sich die Texte aus den Rubriken wissenschaftliche ›Artikel‹ (Inken Bartels, Sarah Louise Nash, Léonie Newhouse) und ›Forschungswerkstatt‹ (Ole Oeltjen) mit verschiedenen Aspekten hegemonialer bzw. herrschaftsnaher Wissensproduktion, darunter europäische und internationale *expert communities* und Konferenzen, die durch ihre Wissensproduktionen und Wissensprodukte problematische Effekte erzeugen. Gleiches gilt für den stark visuellen Mapping-Beitrag von Maribel Casas-Cortes und Sebastian Cobarrubias und für den Aufsatz von Joshua Hatton, den wir unter der neuen Rubrik ›Debatte‹ publizieren (siehe unten).

Inken Bartels konzentriert sich in ihrem Artikel auf den bislang wenig erforschten Aspekt der *Vermittlung* von Migrationswissen. Sie fragt, wie das herrschaftsnahe Wissen über Migration und ›Migrationsmanagement‹, das in internationalen Organisationen wie der IOM produziert (und vor allem von Regierungen des globalen Nordens finanziert) wird, in die migrationspolitische Praxis von Ländern des glo-

balen Südens übergeht. Auf äußerst anschauliche und erhellende Weise untersucht sie dieses Problem anhand internationaler Workshops und Konferenzen in Tunesien und Marokko, wo IGO-Vertreter*innen auf Angestellte lokaler NGOs und Staatsapparate treffen und *best practices* und *lessons learned* des Migrationsmanagements vermitteln. Mit Bezug auf Pierre Bourdieu kann Bartels jedoch zeigen, dass dieser Vermittlungsprozess nicht einseitig, nicht *top-down* ist. Stattdessen sind lokale Regimeakteure aktiv an ständig umkämpften Prozessen der Wissensvermittlung beteiligt.

Sarah Louise Nash stellt in ihrem Artikel ebenfalls internationale Organisationen ins Zentrum. Sie kritisiert, dass sich im Feld ›Migration im Kontext des Klimawandels‹ ein eigendynamischer Kreislauf aus Forschung, Klimapolitik und Wissensproduktion etabliert hat, der durch einen scheinbar unstillbaren ›Wissensdurst‹ vorangetrieben wird. Aus einer an Foucault anknüpfenden Perspektive untersucht sie die Macht-Wissen-Komplexe des Feldes und fragt, *welches* und *wessen* Wissen durch die dominierenden *epistemic communities* (Regierungen, internationale Organisationen, UNO, wissenschaftlicher Mainstream) ausgeschlossen wird. Sie identifiziert vier Grenzen, durch die das Wissen über Migration im Kontext des Klimawandels auf ›legitim Denkbares‹ beschränkt wird, darunter herrschende Problemdefinitionen und Begriffe sowie nur für Elitenakteure offene Diskussionsräume.

Léonie Newhouse wendet sich ausgehend von ihrer eigenen Forschung in Juba im Süd-Sudan gegen die ausschließliche Fokussierung europäischer Forscher*innen auf die EUropäischen Außengrenzen und grenznahe Transiträume. Newhouse adressiert damit epistemologische Fragen, also den geopolitischen Ort der Wissensproduktion, und plädiert für eine Reflexion der eigenen Forscher*innenpositionierung. Mit der Kritik an Wissensproduktionen, die Europa zum Zentrum und Ziel aller Migrationsverläufe machen, geht es nicht nur um einen bloßen Perspektivwechsel hin zu Süd-Süd-Migrationen. Eine kritische Reflexion der Konstruktion des (migrationspolitischen) Forschungsgegenstandes sei auch deshalb wichtig, weil die jüngsten Ereignisse und politischen Entwicklungen zu einem Anstieg des Interesses an Flucht und Migration geführt haben. Insbesondere beim Forschungsdesign müsse deshalb darauf geachtet werden, nicht jene auch in Diskursen staatlicher und staatsnaher Akteure dominierenden Logiken zu reproduzieren, die ausschließlich den drei Kontinenten Europa, Nordamerika und Australien als Hauptziele für Migrant*innen auf der ganzen Welt Aufmerksamkeit schenken. Sie plädiert dafür, sich über den Ort des eigenen Forschens Gedanken zu machen: Jenseits Europas zu forschen bedeute, sich der multiplen Ziele und Routen von Mobilitäten bewusst zu werden.

Ole Oeltjen betont ganz im Sinne der stärker werdenden Beschäftigung mit *migration industries*, dass nicht nur Wissenschaft und Politik, sondern auch Unternehmen Wissen über Migration produzieren und fragt, welche Perspektiven und Logiken ei-

gentlich Betreiber von Unterkünften auf Flucht einnehmen. Oeltjen zeigt, wie stark bei Unterkunftsbetreibern bzw. ihren Mitarbeiter*innen humanitaristische (Opfer-) Perspektiven vorherrschen und orientalistisches *Othering* reproduziert wird. Dies ist deshalb so frappierend, weil die Unterkunftsbetreiber*innen zunehmend reklamieren, für die Bewohner*innen der Unterkünfte, für die Geflüchteten, zu sprechen und sich (nicht nur, aber auch zu diesem Zweck) vermehrt vernetzen und zusammenschließen.

Schließlich zeigen **Maribel Casas-Cortes** und **Sebastian Cobarrubias** anhand von Karten und anderen Geo-Visualisierungen die EU-Praktiken und Perspektiven der *Remote Migration Control* auf. So können sie nachweisen, wie kartografische, visuelle Wissensproduktion die Externalisierung der EU-Grenzen unterstützt hat. Vor allem am Beispiel der ›i-Map‹, einer interaktiven Kartografie von Migrationsrouten, die unter Autoritäten in EU- und Nicht-EU-Ländern weit verbreitet ist, wird deutlich, wie ein visuelles Porträt von Migrationsbewegungen eine geteilte Expertensprache entstehen lässt und das geographisch Imaginäre einer Illegalität jenseits der Grenzen hervorbringt. Die Konsequenzen dieser kartografischen Praktiken treffen Menschen ganz konkret, sie befördern eine Logik, die Bewegung bereits beim Aufbruch und während des Transits kriminalisiert. Illegalität wird auf eine Weise konstruiert, die einen Grenzübertritt als Ziel annimmt, bevor eine Grenze tatsächlich überquert worden ist. Illegal wird jemand in dieser Logik in dem Moment, in dem er/sie entscheidet, zu migrieren. Der Beitrag weist jedoch auch auf alternative Möglichkeiten von Kartografie als Element eines widerständigen Gegenwissens hin.

Politische Ökonomie, Kritik und Gegenwissen

Eine Sonderstellung in dieser Ausgabe nimmt der Aufsatz »MARS Attacks!« von **Joshua Hatton** ein. Der Artikel analysiert die Verstrickung der britischen *migration and refugee studies* (MARS) in die restriktive Migrationspolitik der ›New‹ Labour-Regierungen von 1997 bis 2010. Hatton bezeichnet seine Analyse als ›warnendes Beispiel‹ (*cautionary tale*) für die Entwicklung der Migrations- und Fluchtforschung in Deutschland: MARS-Forscher*innen hätten den von ihnen beforschten Menschen durch die Kooperation mit zwei staatlichen Gremien heftig geschadet. Im Gegenzug, so Hatton, reproduzierten die Forscher*innen eine enge Kooperationsbeziehung mit dem britischen Staat, die sie unter den Bedingungen des Drittmittelzwangs als notwendig für ihre akademischen Karrieren und beruflichen Existenzen begriffen. Die historisch-materialistische Interpretation der Neoliberalisierung der britischen Hochschulen, mit der Hatton die geringe Autonomie und somit das Verhalten der Forscher*innen erklärt, war in der *movements*-Redaktion umstritten. Gleiches galt für seine Entscheidung, die Namen der an den staatlichen Gremien beteiligten Wissen-

schaftler*innen zu nennen sowie für seine am Ende des Artikels formulierte Einschätzung, dass innerhalb staatlicher Institutionen (inklusive der Universitäten) eine wirklich kritische Wissensproduktion zu Migration *nicht* möglich sei. Allenfalls Gegenaufklärung (*counter-surveillance*) über Akteure, Diskurse und Strukturen der Migrationskontrolle biete einen Ansatzpunkt. Wir haben Hattons Aufsatz deshalb zum Anlass genommen, die neue Rubrik ›Debatte‹ zu etablieren. In einer folgenden *movements*-Ausgabe werden Diskussionsbeiträge zu den in »MARS Attacks!« aufgeworfenen Fragen erscheinen.

Hattons Forderung nach *counter knowledge* ähnelt jedoch Vorschlägen, die in der kritischen Wissenschaft eine lange Tradition haben. Bereits 1968 erklärte Martin Nicolaus in seiner ›Fat-Cat Sociology‹-Rede Gegenaufklärung zu einer der zentralen Aufgabe einer ›radikalen‹ Sozialwissenschaft:

> »What if that machinery were reversed? What if the habits, problems, secrets, and unconscious motivations of the wealthy and powerful were daily scrutinized by a thousand systematic researchers, were hourly pried into, analyzed and cross-referenced; were tabulated and published in a hundred inexpensive mass-circulation journals and written so that even the fifteen-year-old high-school drop-out could understand them and predict the actions of his landlord to manipulate and control him?« (Nicolaus 1991/1968: 254)

Für eine sich als kritisch verstehende Migrations-, Grenz- und Fluchtforschung hieße dies, nicht Wissen ›über‹ Migrant*innen und ›Flüchtlinge‹ zu produzieren, sondern über die Akteure, Diskurse und Strukturen, die erst die Lebenshoffnungen und dann oft auch die Mobilität von Menschen beherrschen wollen. Entsprechende Vorschläge wurden in der kritischen Migrations- und Grenzforschung in den letzten Jahren immer wieder unterbreitet: Diese solle keine Migrant*innenforschung sein, keine Migrantologie (Bojadžijev/Römhild 2014), sondern entweder die Kämpfe der Migration in den Fokus nehmen (Moulier Boutang 2007) oder das Regieren selbst. Auch Charles Heller und Lorenzo Pezzani skizzieren in ihrem Interview in dieser Ausgabe eine solche Praxis. Die kritische Analyse und Reflexion von Wissensproduktionen in und zu Migrations- und Grenzregimen muss und wird also weitergehen. Als Redaktion laden wir explizit dazu ein, die zukünftig offenen Calls for Papers der *movements* zu nutzen, um weitere Beiträge zu Wissensproduktionen über Migration und ihre Regierung einzureichen.

LITERATUR

Anzaldúa, Gloria / Moraga, Cherríe (1983): This Bridge called my Back. Writings by Radical Women of Color. New York.

Arbeitsgruppe Frauenkongress (1984): Sind wir uns denn so fremd? Dokumentation des ersten Kongresses ausländischer und deutscher Frauen. 23.-25. März 1984. Frankfurt am Main.

Azzarello, Stefania / Fish, Jennifer / Günther, Sylvia / Heimeshoff, Lisa / Hobden, Clair / Kirchhoff, Maren / Schwenken, Helen / (2014): ›We want to be the protagonists of our own stories!‹ A participatory research manual on how domestic workers and researchers can jointly conduct research. Kassel.

BMBF / Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (2016): Mehr Forschung zu Flucht, Migration und Integration. Pressemitteilung 135/2016 vom 15.11.2016. URL: bmbf.de [10.06.2018].

BMBF / Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (2017): Richtlinie zum Aufbau eines ›Instituts für gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt‹. Bekanntmachung vom 23. Oktober 2017. URL: bmbf.de [10.06.2018].

BMFSFJ / Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend (2017): Auftakt für Deutsches Zentrum für Integrations- und Migrationsforschung. Aktuelle Meldung vom 28.06.2017. URL: bmfsfj.de [10.06.2018].

BMFSFJ / Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend (2018): Deutsches Zentrum für Integrations- und Migrationsforschung erhält Doppelspitze. Aktuelle Meldung vom 05.02.2018. URL: bmfsfj.de [10.06.2018].

Bojadžijev, Manuela / Römhild, Regina (2014): Was kommt nach dem »transnational turn«? Perspektiven fur eine kritische Migrationsforschung. In: Labor Migration (Hg.): Vom Rand ins Zentrum. Perspektiven einer kritischen Migrationsforschung. Berliner Blätter. Ethnographische und ethnologische Beiträge 65. Berlin. 10–24.

Bojadžijev, Manuela / Opratko, Benjamin / Liebig, Manuel (2018): Rassismusforschung in Deutschland. Prekäre Geschichte, strukturelle Probleme, neue Herausforderungen. In: Beratungsnetzwerk Hessen (Hg.): Leerstelle Rassismus. NSU und die Folgen. Schwalbach. Im Erscheinen.

Braun, Katherine (2017): Decolonial perspectives on the charitable space in the context of the current »Welcome culture« in Germany. In: Social Inclusion 5 (3). 38–48.

Braun, Katherine / Matthies, Robert (2017): Ökonomisierte Menschenrechte. Meritokratische Bürgerschaft am Beispiel des ›Genfer Wegs‹. In: movements. Journal für kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung 3 (1). 31–49. URL: movements-journal.org [10.06.2018].

Burchard, Amory (2017): Zehn Institute gegen die Entkoppelung. Der Tagesspiegel vom 15.11.2017. URL: tagesspiegel.de [10.06.2018].

Caixeta, Luzenir (2003): Anthropophagie als Antwort auf die eurozentrische Kulturhegemonie. Oder: Wie die Mehrheitsgesellschaft feministische Migrantinnen schlucken muss. In: Gutiérrez Rodríguez, Encarnación / Steyerl, Hito (Hg.) (2003): Spricht die Subalterne Deutsch? Migration und postkoloniale Kritik. Münster. 186–195.

Carstensen, Anna Lisa / Heimeshoff, Lisa-Marie / Jungehülsing, Jenny / Kirchhoff, Maren / Trzeciak, Miriam (2014): Forschende Aktivist_innen und aktivistische Forscher_innen. In: Heimeshoff, Lisa-Marie et al. (Hg.): Grenzregime II. Migration – Kontrolle – Wissen. Transnationale Perspektiven. Berlin/Hamburg. 257–268.

Casas-Cortes, Maribel / Cobarrubias, Sebastian / De Genova, Nicholas / Garelli, Glenda / Grappi, Giorgio / Heller, Charles / Hess, Sabine / Kasparek, Bernd / Mezzadra, Sandro / Neilson, Brett / Peano, Irene / Pezzani, Lorenzo / Pickles, John / Rahola, Federico / Riedner, Lisa / Scheel, Stephan / Tazzioli, Martina (2014): New Keywords: Migration and Borders. In: Cultural Studies 29 (1). 55–87.

Castro Varela, María do Mar / Dhawan, Nikita (2005): Postkoloniale Theorie. Eine kritische Einführung. Bielefeld.

Chimni, B. S. (1998): The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South. In: Journal of Refugee Studies 11 (4). 350–374.

Collins, Patricia Hill (1990): Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment. New York.

Dean, Mitchell (1996): Putting the Technological into Government. In: History of the Human Sciences 9 (3). 47–68.

Escobar, Arturo / Restrepo, Eduardo (2005): Other Anthropologies and Anthropology Otherwise. Steps to a World Anthropologies Framework. In: Critique of Anthropology 25 (2). 99–129.

Fanon, Frantz (1985): The Psychology of Oppression. New York/London.

Fassin, Didier (2012): Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present. Los Angeles/London.

Fiedler, Mathias / Georgi, Fabian / Hielscher, Lee / Ratfisch, Philipp / Riedner, Lisa / Schwab, Veit / Sontowski, Simon (2017): Umkämpfte Bewegungen nach und durch EUropa. Zur Einleitung. In: movements. Journal für kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung 3 (1). 9–19. URL: movements-journal.org [10.06.2018].

Foucault, Michel (1976): Mikrophysik der Macht. Über Strafjustiz, Psychiatrie und Medizin. Berlin.

Foucault, Michel (1994): Überwachen und Strafen. Die Geburt des Gefängnisses. Frankfurt am Main.

Foucault, Michel (2000): Die Gouvernementalität. In: Bröckling, Ulrich / Krasmann, Susanne / Lemke, Thomas (Hg.): Gouvernementalität der Gegenwart. Studien zur Ökonomisierung des Sozialen. Frankfurt am Main. 41–67.

Freire, Paulo (1970): Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York.

Fuller, Abigail (1996): Producing Radical Scholarship: The Radical Sociology Movement, 1967–1975. In: Sociological Imagination 33 (1). URL: comm-org.wisc.edu [10.06.2018].

Georgi, Fabian / Wagner, Fabian (2009): Macht Wissen Kontrolle. Bedingungen kritischer Migrationsforschung. In: Kulturrisse 1/2009. 24–27. URL: igkultur.at [10.06.2018].

Giles, Wenona / Hyndman, Jennifer (Hg.) (2004): Sites of Violence: Gender and Conflict Zones. Berkeley.

Gordon, Colin (1980): Afterword. In: Ders. (Hg.): Michel Foucault. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings. New York. 229–259.

Gramsci, Antonio (1991): Gefängnishefte. Hamburg.

Gümen, Sedef (1998): Das Soziale des Geschlechts. In: Das Argument 225: Grenzen. 187–202.

Gutiérrez Rodríguez, Encarnación (1999): Intellektuelle Migrantinnen – Subjektivitäten im Zeitalter von Globalisierung. Eine postkoloniale dekonstruktive Analyse von Biographien im Spannungsfeld von Ethnisierung und Vergeschlechtlichung. Bielefeld.

Gutiérrez Rodríguez, Encarnación / Steyerl, Hito (Hg.) (2003): Spricht die Subalterne Deutsch? Migration und postkoloniale Kritik. Münster.

Haraway, Donna (1995): Die Neuerfindung der Natur. Primaten, Cyborgs und Frauen. Frankfurt am Main/New York.

Harrell-Bond, Barbara (1986): Imposing Aid: An Emergency Assistance to Refugees. Oxford.

Hess, Sabine / Kasparek, Bernd (Hg.) (2010): Grenzregime. Diskurse, Praktiken, Institutionen in Europa. Berlin/Hamburg.

hooks, bell (1984): Feminist Theory: From Margin To Center. Cambridge.

Horkheimer, Max (2003/1937): Traditionelle und kritische Theorie. In: Ders.: Traditionelle und kritische Theorie. Fünf Aufsätze. Frankfurt am Main. 205–259.

Hyndman, Jennifer (2000): Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism. Minnesota.

Kalpaka, Annita / Räthzel, Nora (Hg.) (1986): Die Schwierigkeit, nicht rassistisch zu sein. Berlin.

Kalpaka, Annita / Räthzel, Nora (Hg.) (1992): Rassismus und Migration in Europa. Beiträge des Kongresses »Rassismus und Migration in Europa«. Hamburg.

Kleist, J. Olaf (2018): Flucht- und Flüchtlingsforschung in Deutschland: Akteure, Themen und Strukturen. Flucht: Forschung und Transfer. State-of-Research Papier 01, Februar 2018. URL: flucht-forschung-transfer.de [10.06.2018].

Krasmann, Susanne (2007): Gouvernementalität: Epistemologie, Macht und Subjektivierung. In: Schützeichel, Rainer (Hg.): Handbuch Wissenssoziologie und Wissensforschung. Konstanz. 280–298.

Lanz, Stephan (2007): Berlin aufgemischt: abendländisch, multikulturell, kosmopolitisch? Die politische Konstruktion einer Einwanderungsstadt. Berlin.

maiz (2009): Am Anfang war El Dorado. Europas Suche nach dem El Dorado und die Utopien der Migration. 15 Jahre maiz. URL: maiz.at [10.06.2018].

Malkki, Liisa (1995): Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania. Chicago.

Miller, Peter / Rose, Nikolas (1991): Governing economic life. In: Economy and Society 19 (1). 1–31.

Mohanty, Chandra Talpade (2003): Feminism without Borders. Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity. Durham.

Moulier Boutang, Yann (2007): Europa, Autonomie der Migration, Biopolitik. In: Pieper, Marianne / Atzert, Thomas / Karakayali, Serhat / Tsianos, Vassilis (Hg.): Empire und die biopolitische Wende. Die Internationale Diskussion im Anschluss an Negri und Hardt. Frankfurt am Main. 169–180.

Moulin, Carolina (2012): Ungrateful subjects? Refugee protests and the logic of gratitude. In: Nyers, Peter / Rygiel, Kim (Hg.): Citizenship, migrant activism and the politics of movement. London/New York. 54–72.

Nicolaus, Martin (1991/1968): Fat-Cat Sociology. In: Oppenheimer, Martin / Murray, Martin J. / Levine, Rhonda F. (Hg.): Radical Sociologists and the Movement: Experiences, Lessons, and Legacies. Philadelphia. 251–254. URL: nicolaus.com [10.06.2018].

Oguntoye, Katharina / Opitz, May / Schultz, Dagmar (Hg.) (1986): Farbe bekennen. Afrodeutsche Frauen auf den Spuren ihrer Geschichte. Berlin.

Rajaram, Prem Kumar (2002): Humanitarianism and Representations of the Refugee. In: Journal of Refugee Studies 15 (3). 247–264.

Redaktion movements (2015): Introducing movements. Das Journal für kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung. In: movements. Journal für kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung 1 (1). URL: movements-journal.org [10.06.2018].

Riedner, Lisa (2014): Wie intervenieren? Zur Wirkmacht akademischer Wissenspraxis und der ethnographischen Regimeanalyse. In: Heimeshoff, Lisa-Marie / Hess, Sabine / Kron, Stefanie / Schwenken, Helen / Trzeciak, Miriam (Hg.): Grenzregime II. Migration – Kontrolle – Wissen. Transnationale Perspektiven. Berlin/Hamburg. 281–300.

Said, Edward (1978): Orientalism. New York.

Schlottmann, Karin (2017): Sachsen bekommt doch kein Institut für gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt. Sächsische Zeitung vom 15.11.2017. URL: sz-online.de [10.06.2018].

Schwenken, Helen (2017): The Emergence of an ›Impossible‹ Movement: Domestic Workers Organize Globally. In: Rucht, Dieter / Gosewinkel, Dieter (Hg.): Transnational Social Movements. New York. 205–228.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (1999): A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a Critique of the vanishing present. Kalkutta.

Stiftung Mercator (2018): Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration (MEDAM). Praxisnahes Forschungsprojekt zu ökonomischen Perspektiven auf die Flüchtlingskrise. URL: stiftung-mercator.de [10.06.2018].

It is Obvious from the Map!

Disobeying the Production of Illegality beyond Borderlines

MARIBEL CASAS-CORTES, SEBASTIAN COBARRUBIAS

Abstract: This synthetic piece engages the phenomenon of border externalization from the perspective of conflicting maps. On the one hand, there are official cartographies produced by and circulating among policy makers, border authorities, security think tanks and media outlets. While these institutional maps deploy the professionalism and neutrality associated with expertise, we point how they are driven by a restrictive logic of containment towards mobility. On the other hand, we introduce another set of maps, which are just as sophisticated, yet the product of embodied, experiential and activist knowledge(s) coming from those supporting and enacting a politics of freedom of movement. This paper showcases, and reflects on, the politics of institutional maps produced by border institutions used to envision and implement ongoing practices of remote migration control. Attention is further given to examples of counter-cartographies that show how controversial, problematic and inaccurate the institutional maps for migration control are. These counter-maps enable alternative visions and practices of human mobility. Many of these maps are now part of the itinerant art collection first launched in Los Angeles and currently hosted in Zagreb: *It is Obvious from the Map!*.

Keywords: borders, maps, knowledge production, illegality, routes

Migration control increasingly takes place beyond the borders of destination countries. Migrants' journeys are traced using advanced technology and paramilitary deployments that target migrants' supposed places of origin and transit. Our work looks at those practices of remote migration control by the European Union (EU), here focusing on official maps by border and security institutions used to imagine and implement this kind of bordering at a distance. Based on a long-term, multi-sited research project (including Brussels, Vienna, London, Madrid, Rabat), this paper[1] looks at the

1 | Thanks to Sohrab Moheddi & Thomas Keenan, curators of the exhibition »It is Obvious from the Map« at the LA based art gallery REDCAT. We value their passionate interest in the EU border regime and their pursuit in making its intricacies accessible to the broader public. Also, we highly appreciate the advice we received from REDCAT's editor, Jessica Loudis, who carefully reviewed a previous version of this text several times to make it as clear as possible

cartographic planning supporting externalized EU border practices. We contend that the ›routes thinking‹ behind visual portrayals of migration flows is creating a shared expert language and a geographical imaginary of illegality beyond borders. These maps facilitate a visual logic of tracing migratory routes. Bordering practices along traveling trajectories criminalize movement at its departure and during the transit of a migrant's itinerary. Illegality is constructed in ways that target border crossing even before any border is crossed, making someone illegal at the very moment and place where s/he decides to migrate.

Our argument builds on bio-political readings of the EU border regime as a producer of distinct clusters of populations with different rights to move (i.e. Feldman 2012; De Genova 2017). We also considerably draw on ethnographic analyses of the EU's border externalization policies in North and West Africa (Andersson 2014) as well as on ethnographic research on the *International Centre for Migration Policy Development* (ICMPD) (Hess 2010). The ICMPD is the producer and distributor of the »i-Map,« which has played an influential role in visualizing the ›route‹ as an object of policy, disseminating a mapping trend for tracing migrants' journeys among border institutions. This paper suggests that illegality is cartographically configured and re-configured by ›expert‹ security actors. Such a spatial reconfiguration of borders can have concrete human consequences beyond the maps, giving rise to controversial practices of interception far away from conventional borderlines.

This article approaches the phenomenon of border externalization from the perspective of conflicting maps. On the one hand, there are official cartographies produced by, and circulating among, policy makers, border authorities, security think tanks and media outlets. While these maps deploy the professionalism and neutrality associated with expertise, we intend to highlight how they are driven by a restrictive logic of containment towards mobility. On the other hand, we will introduce another set of maps that are similarly sophisticated, but the product of embodied, experiential and activist knowledge deriving from those supporting and enacting a politics of freedom of movement. This paper showcases, and reflects on, the politics of institutional maps produced by border institutions used to envision and implement

for the exhibit. We also want to thank Ivet Ćurlin, curator and member of *What, How & for Whom/WHW* collective from Zagreb, who is showcasing these maps at the *Nova Gallery*. Finally, thanks to cartographer Tim Stallman for working with us on the visualization of the geographic thinking behind some of the key EU documents defining current migration policy. Last but not least, thanks to all of those who keep moving across borders, with or without required papers, for challenging the limited current border system and fully embracing the capacity of humanity to move, exchange and grow in diversity.

ongoing practices of remote migration control. Attention is also given to examples of counter-cartographies, which show how controversial, problematic and inaccurate those institutional maps used for migration control actually are. Furthermore, the counter-maps enable alternative visions and practices of human mobility.[2]

The maps in this article[3] are now shown to the public as part of the traveling art collection »It is Obvious from the Map,« curated by Sohrab Moheddi and Thomas Keenan. It was first launched at The Roy and Edna Disney/CalArts Theater (REDCAT), an interdisciplinary contemporary arts center for innovative visual, performing and media arts located inside the Walt Disney Concert Hall complex in downtown Los Angeles. Currently, the collection is hosted in Zagreb (see Image 1). The itinerant collection includes maps of migratory routes and borders produced by a variety of contesting actors: 1) migration policy institutions, 2) migrants and refugees on the move and 3) no-border activists (see Redcat 2017).

Genealogies of Border Externalization

Over the last five years of the ›refugee crisis,‹ the European Union has increased its bilateral agreements with non-EU countries in order to further contain flows of migration. These agreements double down on an existing EU-approach that relies on collaboration with non-EU countries in matters of border patrol, surveillance, interception and return. This transnational cooperation includes sharing data on border movements and organizing multi-country operations to intersept what are designated as ›migrants in transit.‹ FRONTEX (the ›European Border and Coast Guard Agency‹), national border guards of EU member states and international organizations such as the ICMPD provide technical means for cooperation, deployment forces, supplies, funding and training to non-EU countries.

All border practices that involve acting beyond territorial lines and in coordination with third countries are referred to as instances of »border externalization« (Migration Keywords Collective 2015). The origins of outsourcing border control – and the concurrent tendencies to evade the law and constantly extend geo-juridical boundaries their roots in the United States' interdiction of Haitian refugees in the early

2 | We have further explored this tension among politics and goals underlying maps with the concept of »combat of cartographies« in the article »Clashing Cartographies, Migrating Maps« (2017).

3 | More maps are included with the online version of this text at movements-journal.org.

Image 1. Collection »It is Obvious from the Map«

The collection was curated by Sohrab Moheddi and Thomas Keenan. It was first launched at *The Roy and Edna Disney/CalArts Theater* (RED-CAT), Los Angeles in 2017. The picture shows the collection while hosted at the *Nova Gallery* in Zagreb from November 2017 to March 2018. Ivet Ćurlin, member of *What, How & for Whom/WHW* collective curated a broad exhibition about rethinking the proliferation of borders entitled »Signs and Whispers« (see URL: whw.hr).

1980s and have since spread, especially among the EU and Australia (Gaibazzi et al. 2016; Zaiotti 2016).

For the EU, border externalization is neither new nor anecdotal. It has characterized the EU's strategy for containing migration since the 1990s. Based on a restrictive view of human mobility, current policies are inspired by a geographical imaginary of migration flows that is considered as organized in concentric circles and found in an old but influential document: »The EU Strategy Paper on Asylum and Migration« of 1998 (EU Council 1998). These circles encompass the entire globe, and they classify countries as either: 1) desirable destinations and zones of mobility, 2) as countries of transit adjacent to the EU, 3) as countries of transit further away, 4) or as sources of undesirable population flows (see Maps 1-4).

This hierarchical and racialized understanding of rights to mobility constitutes the basis for legitimizing practices of migration control outside EU territorial limits. This approach to mobility is based on designating the members of specific territories and populations as having different entitlements to move. By doing this, focus shifts from border crossings at national limits to a more ›global‹ method of migration control. It becomes necessary to pay attention to the points of origin and transit of those flows: »[a]n effective entry control concept cannot be based simply on controls at the border but must cover every step taken by a third country national from the time he begins his journey to the time he reaches his destination« (EU Council 1998: 13). This vision of migration control, based on the management of migratory journeys, was embraced in the *Global Approach to Migration and Mobility* framework in 2005 (EU Council 2005; EU Commission 2005) and reinvigorated in 2015, after the Arab Spring uprisings around the Mediterranean.

The conventional understanding of migration control is that each nation-state is in charge of its own borders at territorial lines and ports and manages visas in national embassies abroad. Yet, this approach is considered incomplete within EU migration policy circles, which believe that »efficient migration management« entails going beyond the place and time of the entry point (Interview given to Guardia Civil-Servicio de Fronteras, Madrid, 2013). Thus, it is necessary to establish transnational cooperation in order to track where the migrant is in her/his process of moving towards an assumed destination point in Europe, and to collaborate with the border authorities of other countries to intercept ›potential‹ irregular migrant flows.

Maps 1-4: Concentric Circles

Cartographic visualization of »The EU Strategy Paper on Asylum and Migration« submitted by the Austrian Presidency of the EU in 1998. Conceptualized by Maribel Casas-Cortes and Sebastian Cobarrubias, designed by Tim Stallmann and commissioned by REDCAT (2017).

Map 1. EU member states/Schengen zone: As the integration of the European Union proceeded, the twenty-odd members of the EU pooled their sovereignty together and created a zone of free movement for goods, capital and people called the Schengen zone. The zone allows you to move, work and study freely in any of its member countries. Considered one of the success stories of the EU, Schengen has come under increasing critique since the so-called financial and refugee crises.

Map 2. European Neighborhood Partnership: EU candidate countries are potential members of the EU, and must meet Schengen criteria. Transit countries which are adjacent to the Euroepan Union are offered a chance to access some markets in the EU without tariffs, and to participate in the regulatory frameworks through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

Map 3. Transit Zone: The transit zone includes many of the ENP countries (which have stronger trade links with the EU), along with other countries, which are seen from the EU as needing to policing migrants that are 'transiting' through their countries on the way to the EU. Countries of the third circle are considered to be points of transit for migrants on their way to the first circle. These countries are not offered integration into EU Markets and frameworks.

Map 4. Source Countries: The countries of the 4th circle are seen as migration »source« countries, briefly referred to in the 1998 strategy as »the Middle East, China, and black Africa«. The EU approach towards these countries includes border security as in the transit countries but is complimented by programs that encourage people to »stay in their circle«. These projects of »dissuasion« can include development projects; PR campaigns on the dangers of irregular migration as well as signing agreements to allow for rapid deportation of these countries' nationals form the EU. Countries highlighted on this map are those considered part of the »4th circle« for EU purposes. The stars indicate countries identified as top sources of illegal entries in 2016. Thus, not all countries which actually make up the top sources of undocumented migrants to the EU are treated as part of the 4th circle by EU policy.

VISUALIZATIONS OF ROUTES?

Recent border security objectives attempt to trace and manage the entirety of the journey. This is how the route has become a migration management concept and strategy. Since 2003, the ICMPD has visualized migrant routes, with the intent of managing them. The i-Map, a regularly updated online map, has become a reference point for border management from a distance.[4] The map does not trace border walls or empirically represent individual journeys; rather, it focuses on clustering flows into distinct routes that can be managed as shared itineraries with clear points of origin, transit and destination. Initially, the European Commission designated four main routes traversing the African continent: the West African/Atlantic Route, the Western Mediterranean Route, the Central Mediterranean Route, and the East African/Horn of Africa Route.

More recent maps presented on i-Map show how the representation and naming of routes evolve according to perceived transformations of migrant journeys.[5] The 2014 version (the most recent non-animated version) is a static representation of migrants' routes. Professionally designed, the cartographers chose to provide physical geographical details of the regions without emphasizing national borders, nor color-coding national territories as in regular political maps. This way, the web of lines of migrants' flows receive a prominent role looking as ›empirical‹ as the mountains. While the map conveys a sense of being strongly data driven, we contend that a specific politics of expertise is at work generating a particular vision of human flows. For instance, while there are no arrows on the lines, and thus no apparent directionality, the viewer still gets an overwhelming impression that all those flows are moving towards EUrope.[6]

The i-Map was known in every migration and border agency office in which we conducted interviews. The visual expertise and spatial vocabulary it represents has spread among EU and non-EU border officers, creating a shared way of thinking about migration. The i-Map and its »routes thinking« are now a standard image (in simplified form) in media discussions on the current asylum crisis in Europe. Other migration management agencies, such as FRONTEX (see Map 5) and the

---

4 | See parts of the initial version of i-Map called »Interactive Map on Migration« at imap-migration.org [01.01.2018].

5 | For an animation of certain routes see imap-migration.org [01.01.2018].

6 | For a further engagement with this argument see Sebastian Cobarrubias »Mapping Illegality« in *Antipode* (forthcoming).



Map 5. »Nationalities of Illegal border crossers«

Route map published in the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) Quarterly Report (Frontex 2016).

International Organization for Migration (IOM), have developed their own routes rendering them inspired by i-Map and its geographical thinking.

The conceptual cartographies that help to imagine and implement ›remote migration control‹ facilitate the coordination of real-time maps typically displayed on border guards' screens. Migration routes maps complement high-tech surveillance at border zones and are placed into a trans-continental network of border management at times integrating real-time data of suspected border crossers into the more expansive migration routes management architecture.

Maps for Imagining and Implementing Remote Migration Control

In visualizing targets as fluctuating routes, these maps do not provide a straightforward empirical representation of the exact numbers of people moving through the routes. The directionality of the routes is not accurate either as Europe is often assumed to be the sole destination without rendering intra-regional migration flows. Such routes maps – widely disseminated among border authorities and migration experts as well as by the media – produce, spread and normalize a particularly restrictive way of thinking about migration control.

Normalizing and even legitimizing the tracking and the management of movement along a migrant route gives rise to controversial border practices. For instance, Spanish border authorities have been deployed in Senegalese territorial waters and coastlands thousands of miles away from the territorial borders of Spain, where they patrol *cayucos* (fishing boats retooled for possible migration) via satellite technologies, military vessels and aircrafts.

Displacing border control practices to presumed places of origin or transit of migrants has also resulted in EU and non-EU countries conducting additional kinds of sea and land operations. Some are veritable military interventions, such as those that target sites of origin and transit in West Africa: Operation Hera attempts to stop migration along the maritime route between West Africa and the Spanish Canary Islands, and is led by FRONTEX (2006–ongoing).[7] Project Seahorse is a transnational

7 | Operation Hera is coordinated by Frontex, and its aim is to stop migration along the maritime route between West Africa and the Spanish Canary Islands. Effectively, Hera aims to intercept any vessel detected within its area of operation and to divert it back to the port of departure with the authorization and cooperation of Senegalese and Mauritanian authorities. Moreover, individuals who successfully arrive in the Canary Islands are screened and returned

police cooperation mission led by Spanish border authorities operating at the same route (2006–ongoing).

Given the ›success‹ of these operations in terms of ›apprehending migrants‹ in the Atlantic, a similar, though further developed, technological infrastructure and modus operandi for surveillance has been applied to the Mediterranean. This effort has at times been known as »Seahorse Mediterranean« and has currently been incorporated into the pan-EU border surveillance network EUROSUR. Other complementary interdiction operations are now underway, such as the markedly military EUNAVFOR Med: Operation Sophia (2015–ongoing).

Outsourcing borders is not a solo enterprise. While the EU and its member states are very invested in these policies, non-EU governments must agree to these efforts and cooperate with them in order for this approach to migration control to work. Most of the time, although EU efforts with third countries are portrayed as creating a »connected global border management community« (FRONTEX 2018) and »capacity building« (ICMPD 2018), collaboration only comes after under certain conditions: development aid, entrance to EU markets or diplomatic support.

Thus, a cross-national institutional architecture is also working in parallel to these paramilitary operations, often through diplomatic processes involving countries whose territories align themself with specific routes. For instance: for the East African Route there is the Khartoum Process (whose main participants include Germany, Italy, Eritrea and Sudan); and for the West African route, the Rabat Process (whose main participants include Spain, France, Morocco, and Senegal).

COUNTER-MAPPING? IT IS OBVIOUS FROM THE MAP

To highlight the expert-driven production of maps on irregular migration and their links to paramilitary border control operations, we describe these various tools and actors as part of a ›mapping migration matrix.‹ We contend that these maps are creating a shared language of expertise and a geographical imaginary of illegality beyond borders. These attempts to normalize controversial practices of managing human mobility are nonetheless contested by migratory movements and their own cartographic productions. These counter-cartographic productions themselves either embody, de-

---

to where they came from. The operation has been active since Spanish border authorities requested technical assistance from the EU in 2006, and, according to Frontex, it has been a success. Country flags indicate EU and non-EU governments involved in this operation via transnational patrols and bilateral agreements.

fend, or push the imagination to embrace the historically established but currently neglected Ius Migrandi or ›Right to migrate.‹[8]

These ›counter-cartographies‹ can include maps evoking and facilitating freedom of movement made and sent/texted/emailed among refugees and migrants along their journeys or sent to peers or perhaps family members to make their paths smoother. The »It is Obvious from the Map« collection is showcasing a series of maps that speak of the turbulence of migration movements trespassing those sophisticated networks of migration control.

There are drawings that challenge the accuracy of official routes maps and that point to the many alternative journeys going to or around EUrope, many of which are not visible on official maps of routes. The collection mainly focuses on the digital real-time maps created from exchange among migrants in the Mediterranean, who use the technology of mobile phones, scribble over Google maps and share specific tips on Facebook about how to cross certain borders and navigate unknown territories. With their very movement, those labeled by the i-Map as »irregular« or as »asylum seekers« within »mixed migration flows« are embodying a different notion of mobility than the one EUrope wants to regulate, name and classify. One of the phone texts accompanying a personalized Google map indicated how making it to arrive in a new country was »obvious from the map.« This became the title of the collection, which hosts a comprehensive collection of these maps collected by Djordje Balmazovic (Škart collective) in collaboration with non-EU migrants and asylum seekers. These counter-cartographies point to how those who are negated freedom of movement keep moving across borders and visually share tactics about how to do it.

Counter-cartographies of the border regime also include other kinds of mapping initiatives that try to contest the ›big brother‹ feeling conveyed by the official maps, especially the i-Map's sense of professional accuracy. The local organization of undocumented migrants of Zaragoza, after their initial furious reaction upon discovering the existence of i-Map, decided to organize a series of workshop for collaboratively drawing »Our own map of routes.« The rich reflections coming out of these workshops shifted the usual eyewitness stories coming out of so-called ›illegal‹ and ›risky‹ crossings of the border: instead of a dramatized and often self-blaming narrative, a more empowering self-portrait emerged that was able to pin down the lack of political will on the part of governments to allow people to move. Visually, the obstacles people faced while being in movement are shown by a series of icons incorporated into a map legend. Even if the actual map might be rolled up inside a closet, the final

8 | For a more extensive review of maps denouncing the EU's border regime see Bhagat/Mogel 2007.

product itself was not central, but rather the reimagining of identities and political demands that emerged through the mapping process.[9]

Another powerful example of counter-cartographies are the mapping efforts by the Forensic Oceanography project to turn »surveillance against itself« (Heller/Pezzani/Stierl 2017), that is, to map what the border control agents are doing in the Mediterranean Sea, specifically focusing on particular incidents (such as ›left-to-die-boat‹) and visualizing many occurring violations of international law. This »disobedient gaze« (Heller/Pezzani/Stierl 2017) is helpful not only in denouncing the legal and human rights abuses committed by the EU-border regime, but also in flippinging surveillance technologies around to the surveyors, thus turning the question of »who is the illegal one?« upside down.[10]

Counter-cartographies, within the context of the mapping migration matrix, refer to those graphic and collaborative efforts working for a no-borders ethics. These maps visually show the limits of the seemingly over-powering border regime as well as the obstacles the latter puts in the way of people's freedom to move, thereby empowering a politics of disobedience towards restrictive and arbitrary border politics.

LITERATURE

Andersson, Ruben (2014): Illegality, Inc.: Clandestine migration and the business of bordering Europe. Oakland.

Bhagat, Alexis / Mogel, Lize (2007): An Atlas of Radical Cartography. Los Angeles.

Casas-Cortes, Maribel / Cobarrubias, Sebastian / Heller, Charles / Pezzani, Lorenzo (2017): Clashing cartographies, migrating maps. In: ACME: Journal of Radical Geography 16 (1). 2–3.

Casas-Cortes, Maribel (2017): Politics of Disobedience: Ensuring Freedom of Movements in a B/Ordered World. In: Spheres: Journal for Digital Cultures 4. 1–6. URL: spheres-journal.org [12.06.2018].

Cobarrubias, Sebastian (forthcoming 2018): Maps of Illegality. The International Center of Migration Policy Development and the Carto-Politics of Migration Management at a Distance. In: Antipode (forthcoming).

De Genova, Nicholas (Ed.) (2018): The Borders of »Europe«: Autonomy of Migration, Tactics of Bordering. Durham.

European Commission (2005): Priority Actions for Responding to the Challenges of Migration: First follow-up to Hampton Court. COM (2005) 621, 30 November. Brussels.

9 | For a further development on this issue see Casas-Cortes et al. (2017).

10 | For a further discussion of counter-cartographies as embracing and empowering a politics of border disobedience see Casas-Cortes (2017).

European Union, the Council (1998): Strategy Paper on Immigration and Asylum, 9809/1/98, Rev. 1, CK4 27, ASIM 170.

European Union, the Council (2005): Global Approach to Migration. Priority Actions Focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean. Council doc. 15744/05, 13 December. Brussels.

Feldman, Gregory (2012): The Migration Apparatus: Security, Labor, and Policymaking in the European Union. Stanford.

FRONTEX (2016): FRAN Quarterly. Quarter 2 April–June 2016. Warsaw. URL: frontex.europa.eu [11.06.2018]

FRONTEX (2018): FRONTEX Partners: Non-EU Countries. URL: frontex.europa.eu [16.03.2018].

Gaibazzi, Paolo / Dünnwald, Stephan / Bellagamba, Alice (Eds.) (2016): EurAfrican Borders and Migration Management: Political Cultures, Contested Spaces, and Ordinary Lives. Basingstoke.

Heller, Charles / Pezzani, Lorenzo / Stierl, Maurice (2017): Disobedient Sensing and Border Struggles at the Maritime Frontier of EUrope. In: Spheres: Journal for Digital Cultures 4. 1–15. URL: spheres-journal.org [12.06.2018].

Hess, Sabine (2010): ›We are Facilitating States!‹ An Ethnographic Analysis of the International Centre for Policy Development. In: Geiger, Martin / Pecoud, Antoine (Eds.): The Politics of International Migration Management. London. 96–118.

ICMPD (2018): ICMPD: Our Work – Capacity Building. URL: icmpd.org [16.03.2018].

Migration Keywords Collective (2015): New Keywords: Migration and Borders. In: Cultural Studies 29 (1). 55–87.

Redcat (2017): It is obvious from the map. The Redcat of 25.03.2017. URL: redcat.org [01.01.2018].

What, how & for whom (2018): Signs and Whispers. URL: whw.hr [01.01.2018].

Zaiotti, Ruben (Ed.) (2016): Externalizing Migration Management: Europe, North America and the Spread of »Remote Control« Practices. London/New York.

Aufsätze

Practices and Power of Knowledge Dissemination

International Organizations in the Externalization of Migration Management in Morocco and Tunisia

INKEN BARTELS

Abstract: The production and dissemination of knowledge about migration are integral parts of the politics of international migration management. To a large extent, this knowledge is produced by International Organizations (IOs). These play also an active role in its dissemination to third countries in the context of the externalization of European migration policies. In comparison to the power and practices of knowledge production and dissemination by IOs, only few empirical studies however examine how this knowledge actually ›enters‹ the practical management of migration taking place within so-called third countries outside the EU's external borders. Against this background, this article focuses on international conferences and workshops as constitutive situations of disseminating knowledge on migration and its management to North African countries. Drawing on Bourdieu's concepts, the article analyses the contested social process of knowledge dissemination in the context of the externalization of European migration policies, and questions what is at stake for whom when knowledge about migration management is transferred to third countries.

Keywords: knowledge dissemination, migration management, International Organizations, Bourdieu, North Africa

»It is not to see migration as a problem, but to promote its management«, a staff member of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) said about her organization's interventions in Tunisia in 2015 (Interview, IOM staff, Tunisia 2015). »And there is support that we can offer« (ibid.). With ›we‹, she referred to the numerous International Organizations (IOs) that expanded their services in the country after the revolution in 2011 in order to ›support‹ state and non-state actors in their migration management. The production and dissemination of knowledge has become an integral part of this support. According to my interviewee, the objective of her work was to »integrate the question of migration into the national dynamics« of a country (ibid.). She insisted, however, that it was not »just copy and paste« (ibid.). Instead, the IOM would closely »observe the things« and if »there are certain questions where we think that it would be good to work together« and a feeling that »we should bet-

ter explore these things«, then the IOM would offer its expertise (ibid.). »If there is a need for assistance, we look how we can support their needs. We listen«, she summed up the seemingly supportive and well-meant services for the sending and transit countries which European states and the European Union (EU) have focused on to externalize their migration control policies.

In accordance with the international discourse on migration management, IOs working in the field of migration politics commonly present their services as objective and, therefore, apolitical ›international expertise‹ for state and non-state actors outside Europe. Their services are not ›imposed‹ by force, but offered to their ›partners‹. Yet, in this article, I aim to show how the diverse formats and forums of so-called mutual exchange and partnership that are organized by IOs enable them to mainstream their particular knowledge about how to manage migration into the emerging fields of migration politics in North Africa. While much of the existing literature presents the practices of knowledge dissemination as a process of governmentality, I analyze it as a dynamic and conflictual negotiation process, in which diverse actors participate and compete, with their different strategies and stakes.

I examine the IOs' practices and power of disseminating knowledge in Morocco and Tunisia. I ask how IOs are able to influence the understanding of migration and the possibilities and needs of its control within sending and transit countries, even if, traditionally, state actors in these countries have not perceived migration as their problem and its control as their responsibility. Drawing on Bourdieu's concepts of *field, habitus, capital* and *symbolic power*, I seek to reveal how IOs have been more successful in cooperating with Moroccan and Tunisian ›partners‹ than European states have been in their previous attempts to externalize border and migration controls to their ›neighborhood‹, which were based on repressive means and direct inter-state cooperation. I therefore study the dissemination of knowledge on migration management, and knowledge appropriation and rejection, as a social negotiation process between different actors in an asymmetrically structured transnational *field*. In this way, I direct particular attention to the question of why Moroccan and Tunisian actors would participate in the cooperation on international migration management as it is suggested by IOs. I argue that the *symbolic power* that IOs exercise through the dissemination of knowledge is particularly efficient in externalizing European migration policies, since it is not recognized as such by other actors in the field.

In order to empirically investigate these social negotiation processes, I focus on international conferences and workshops as constitutive situations of disseminating knowledge in sending and transit countries. My analysis is based on fieldwork which

I conducted in Morocco and Tunisia in 2014 and 2015.[1] The specific negotiations between the IOs' promotion of knowledge on migration management and the state and non-state actors' acceptance, rejection, and/or appropriation of it are reconstructed from qualitative interviews and participant observation at international workshops and conferences, which were organized by IOs in these countries. With this article, I thus seek to offer empirical insights into the contested process of knowledge dissemination in the context of the externalization of European migration policies and reveal what is at stake for whom when knowledge about migration management is transferred to sending and transit countries.

Externalization of European Migration Policies to Morocco and Tunisia

Despite long-standing attempts by European states to externalize migration policies to North Africa, Moroccan and Tunisian authorities resisted, hesitated, or simply did not implement the policies resulting from the agreements, initiatives, and partnerships concluded throughout the 1990s (see Cassarino 2010). At that time, IOs working in this field only played a minor role in these countries. Their work was tolerated, though it remained focused on small-scale projects, mainly offering direct assistance to migrants in need, or information campaigns to prevent potential migrants from emigration (see, e.g., Valluy 2007; Caillault 2012; Tazzioli 2014). In 2003 and 2004, King Mohammed VI of Morocco and Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali introduced a securitized logic of border control through laws that criminalized unauthorized emigration, and enhanced control of their external sea borders (see Belguendouz 2005; Di Bartolomeo/Fakhoury/Perrin 2010). These policies were reactions on the part of the Moroccan and Tunisian governments to European pressure. They sought to satisfy the demands of the EU and its Member States, and thus to gain financial support from Europe in other fields of international cooperation, such as development or economic integration (see El Qadim 2010). However, since both countries share a long tradition of emigration to Europe and largely profit from remittances sent

1 | The fieldwork was conducted during two visits, to Morocco from May to August 2014, and to Tunisia from January to April 2015. During this time, I conducted 25 semi-structured interviews and many more informal conversations with various actors, including IOs, state institutions, embassy representatives of donor countries, and NGOs, as well as researchers, activists, and migrants. Participant observation was done at different political, social, and cultural events, including six conferences and workshops, which were organized by IOs themselves.

home from their citizens ›residing abroad‹, they were reluctant to implement further restrictive measures to ›fight against irregular migration‹. Instead, they continued to demand the extension of legal ways of emigration to Europe. Questions of immigration and asylum, in turn, ranked low on the priorities of their governments, who did not understand themselves to be countries of transit or immigration at that time (see Di Bartolomeo/Fakhoury/Perrin 2010; De Haas 2014).

Despite increasingly security-oriented state policies, civil society actors integrated migrants' demands into their struggles for human rights in Morocco and Tunisia. In Morocco, moreover, numerous self-organized migrant associations and support structures were founded in the mid-2000s (see, e.g., Valluy 2007; Schmidt 2015). In Tunisia, in turn, the issue of migration seemed only of marginal concern in the media and public debates at that time (see Planes-Boissac 2010: 14). For NGOs specialized in migrants' rights and migrant self-organizations, the work was difficult in a context in which independent expression and political action were almost impossible (see, e.g., Boubakri 2013; Bartels 2014). Those associations that resisted the repressive conditions were well connected through transnational civil society networks. Their work, however, was not directly supported by the EU or European states.

Based on a new global policy discourse on migration management, which was proactively promoted by IOs like the IOM, the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the EU and its Member States introduced a more liberal and humanitarian approach in the mid-2000s. This so-called global and comprehensive approach to migration was meant to offer new incentives to their ›partners‹ in sending and transit countries for cooperation on migration control. Policies under this new approach attempted to turn migration into a ›triple win‹ process for the benefit of all parties involved: receiving and sending states, as well as the migrants themselves (see Kalm 2012). These policies sought to transform migration into an orderly, predictable, and manageable process under the effective control of states. Based on this technocratic understanding of migration, the main concern of migration politics was to design and implement appropriate programs, forums for cooperation and consultation, and the ›right mix‹ of incentives and control. In this context, migration researchers have observed »great confidence« (ibid.: 67) among politicians and practitioners that

> »*if* the knowledge about migration is increased by the collection and dissemination of timely and accurate data, *if* migration officials get more professional training, *if* national administrative capacity is enhanced by increased resources and expertise, and *if* interstate cooperation is pro-

> moted… *then* migration policy can be used as an effective tool« (ibid.; see also Geiger/Pécoud 2010a).

Based on this assumption, the EU and its Member States sought to disseminate their dominant knowledge on migration management in sending and transit countries outside of Europe, in order to improve their policies and effectively manage migration movements before they reached the external borders of the EU. In practice, IOs became important knowledge producers and service providers for their financially strong member states, most of them European, while implementing this knowledge and these services within more peripheral member states, such as Morocco and Tunisia (see Speer 2014). The introduction of this new approach consequently strengthened the role of IOs, and the IOM in particular, in this field (see e.g. Georgi 2010; Geiger/Pécoud 2014; Frowd 2015).

Morocco and Tunisia became important laboratories for the implementation of the EU's ›global‹ and ›comprehensive‹ policies by IOs (see Gaibazzi/Bellagamba/Dünnwald 2017). In contrast to much of the existing literature, I do not see the actors in these countries as »passive spectators in the background« (ibid.: 11), but as active shapers of developments in this field. In this article, I therefore examine the IOs' practices of knowledge dissemination not as happening »in a vacuum, but in specific historical, socio-political, economic and cultural realities« that influence their effects in a certain context (ibid.: 12). With the help of Bourdieu's concepts of *field*, *habitus*, *capital*, and *symbolic power*, I analyze the effects of knowledge dissemination not as the result of a dominant discourse or rationality, but of the struggles among multiple actors with their own stakes and strategies about relations, resources, and recognition in the transnational field of migration management.

In the following section, I review the literature on the role of IOs in the (re-)production and dissemination of knowledge on international migration management, and discuss the widespread conceptualization of their power and practices in Foucauldian terms. Extending this approach to include actors who spread and receive the dominant knowledge on migration management, I then suggest a perspective inspired by Bourdieu's concepts. Informed by this approach, I subsequently analyze the specific practices and negotiation processes of knowledge dissemination by IOs in the context of the externalization of European migration policies in Morocco and Tunisia. In conclusion, I argue that, since it is not recognized as such, IOs' knowledge dissemination is a particularly powerful and efficient mode of externalization.

Beyond Governmentality: Studying Knowledge Dissemination by IOs

While critical approaches to the knowledge production and dissemination of IOs in the field of migration politics remain marginal, the academic interest in examining the power and practices of IOs in this context has grown in recent years (among others see Andrijasevic/Walters 2010; Georgi 2010; Geiger 2012; Geiger/Pécoud 2014; Hess 2014; Scheel/Ratfisch 2014). Many authors refer to Foucault's analytics of government to conceptualize the power of knowledge within the politics of international migration management. According to them, the dominant discourse of migration management rests on knowledge that, when it becomes accepted as a truth, provides a rationality that justifies and supports the use of power. The production of knowledge provides the discursive grounds by creating a certain reality or ›problem‹, in which the exercise of power seems rational (Kalm 2010: 27f.).

IOs establish these discursive grounds by sharing definitions, categories, and normative standards among the actors involved in the governing of migration. In doing so, they spread often-unquestioned assumptions as well as particular recommendations about the possibilities and needs of its control (see Korneev 2014: 891; Speer 2014: 154). They generate data on migration movements, produce specialized knowledge and know-how about the management of this data, and organize different formats for its dissemination, such as international conferences, workshops, and trainings (see Geiger 2012: 38ff.). While IOs mostly provide services for their member states, some of them have developed their own visions on how to govern migration, and even play a significant role in the construction of the ›reality of migration‹ by identifying and framing certain ›problems of migration‹ (see Geiger/Pécoud 2014). Advancing specific issues, IOs thus take a (pro-)active part in the struggles over the directions of international migration policymaking (see Georgi 2010: 48). Their ›expert knowledge‹ serves politicians and practitioners around the globe in order to justify their choices. Since their knowledge is mostly »presented as ›factual‹, ›neutral‹ and ›objective‹« (Geiger/Pécoud 2010b: 11), it is difficult for other actors in the field to question. However, as many authors have pointed out, this apparently value-neutral and apolitical knowledge is informed by political orientations, organizational cultures, traditions, and interests (see Lavenex 2007; Boswell 2009; Geiger/Pécoud 2010b). Through these practices of knowledge (re-)production and dissemination, IOs are able to exercise a soft form of influence over the politics of international migration management, often interpreted as a form of »global governmentality« (Geiger/Pécoud 2014: 874; Hess 2014: 258) or the »international conduct of the conduct of countries« (Andrijasevic/Walters 2010: 984). This perspective

highlights how the power of soft and subtle »arts of governing« migration (Karakayali/Tsianos 2007: 7, my translation, IB) influences and structures how migration is perceived, interpreted, and dealt with in a specific context. It further directs attention to the activating modes that seek to make state and non-state actors as well as migrants themselves participate in the international management of migration according to its dominant rationality (see Geiger/Pécoud 2013).

This power to softly spread and implement the knowledge on international migration management assigns IOs an important role in the externalization of European migration policies (see, i.a., Geiger 2011, 2014). According to Geiger,

> »EU institutions in their approach to exterritorialize, or territorially ›shift out‹, prevention strategies are highly dependent on specialized intermediary actors, most notable intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). [...] On the basis of their expert knowledge and their wide portfolio of operational capacities, they provide states [...] exceptional opportunities to find practical solutions and outsource (externalize) their mobility-related measures.« (Geiger 2014: 225)

The dissemination of ›their expert knowledge‹ of migration management is one of the ›practical solutions‹ IOs offer EU and European states in order to externalize migration control towards sending and transit countries. Through these practices, IOs have managed to establish themselves as a trusted intermediary between states. Through their capacity-building programs and the organization of conferences, consultations, and trainings, they have been able to exercise a soft influence on diverse actors. However, Betts (2008) emphasizes that, despite their service orientation and dependence on European funding, IOs have their »own institutional interests« (ibid.: 15). As bureaucracies, they would not simply implement the »preferences of states«, but also follow »their own institutional strategies« (ibid.). The negotiations of these institutional interests and strategies between IOs and their member states, however, have so far received little academic attention. This holds especially true for their relations with the wide range of state and non-state actors within those countries in which they implement their projects.

To address these gaps in the literature, I examine how the knowledge produced and promoted by IOs actually ›enters‹ the practical management of migration taking place outside the EU's external borders. Drawing on concepts developed by Bourdieu, I direct attention to the actors who disseminate and receive knowledge in a certain field. The notion of a *field* refers to a social space that is defined by the (power) relations between positions and the *stakes* for which the actors compete (see Bourdieu/Wacquant 1992: 94ff.). The knowledge disseminated in Morocco and Tunisia about migration

management is thus not studied as the effect of a dominant discourse or rationality, but rather as an »object of struggles in the social world and in the sociological world which is committed to producing the truth of the social world« (Bourdieu 2004 [2001]: 115). Accordingly, this knowledge »results from struggles inside institutions and between institutions for what is to count as the legitimate truth« (Bigo 2002: 74) within a field in which different interests are at stake. Importantly, these stakes go beyond purely economic interests; they include strategies to maximize different kinds of individual and institutional resources (forms of *capital*), and to improve and expand actors' positions in the *field*. Examining these struggles in the context of the externalization of European migration policies, I investigate not only the institutions that practically disseminate knowledge about migration and its management, but also consider those who accept, appropriate, or reject it in their countries. Moreover, I open up the black box of these actors in order to reveal the unquestioned assumptions and embodied routines (their *habitus*) that make their action possible. Extending Foucauldian analyses, I bring the social actors, along with their histories and strategies, into the picture, and position their work within a field of particular material and symbolic struggles, power relations, and asymmetric positions. By asking what is at stake for the different actors involved in a certain field of struggles, this perspective helps to reveal why state and non-state actors in countries outside Europe get involved in the field of migration management. I argue that the concept of *symbolic power* is key to understand the success of the IOs' practices of knowledge dissemination as a means of externalizing migration management to sending and transit countries.

The Game of International Conferences

»It seems that they are everywhere«, a Moroccan researcher and long-standing observer of migration politics commented on the IOs' expanding activities in the country in 2014 (Conversation, researcher, Morocco 2014). »But in these dialogues in which they organize discussions between the ministries, it is where they include their vision, the content, the orientation, the philosophy«, he added more precisely, directing my attention to the importance of the numerous fora and formats of ›mutual exchange‹ that IOs organize in order to disseminate knowledge on migration management to their ›partners‹ within sending and transit countries. I dedicate this section of the article to an analysis of the social negotiation processes between the various actors who participated in such events in Morocco and Tunisia in 2014 and 2015. First, I introduce the setting of international conferences and shed light on the asymmetrical distribution of *capital* among the participants, which allows IOs and their donors to

set the discourses and rules of these events. Subsequently, I turn to the Moroccan and Tunisian state and non-state actors to examine who is accepted as a relevant *player* and what is *at stake* for those who participate in this *game*. In the third section, I open up the black box of IOs, and ask why they have become interesting partners for Moroccan and Tunisian actors to cooperate with, when they were previously reluctant to do so with European states. Finally, I show how Moroccan and Tunisian actors have learned how to *play by the rules* of this field and make use of their ›partnerships‹ with IOs.

The Practices and Power of Workshopping

While the activities of IOs were for a long time only grudgingly tolerated in Morocco, the situation changed with the King's announcement of the *New Migration Policy* in September 2013. This was part of a general democratic opening of the country in reaction to demands raised by an emboldened Moroccan civil society movement during the Arab Spring. In the following years, government authorities started to call actively for the expertise of IOs. Or, as a Moroccan researcher phrased it, when the ministries »do not know how to do something, they think that IOM can do everything. Or at least, that it has the technical know-how. So, they approach IOM«, which shows that the organization had established itself as an important actor through its work in the field in previous years (ibid.). The IOM's staff, on the other hand, was »well-informed about everything. They take everything« (ibid.), he pointed out with a mixture of respect and annoyance. As a consequence, since then, numerous conferences, workshops and roundtable discussions have been organized by the ›international experts‹ of IOs in Morocco.

During my fieldwork in Morocco in 2014, a Moroccan colleague invited me to join such a workshop, which was organized by one of the UN sub-organizations in the country. Afterwards, I added to my field notes: »While I can stick to my role as an observer, I suddenly find myself in the middle of what Bourdieu would have called the *game* of international migration management: A long, narrow conference hall with oversized, comfortable chairs and golden-framed impressionist pictures on the walls, freezing air conditioning and overstuffed PowerPoint presentations, all celebrating the *New Moroccan Migration Policy*. Thirty people, about half of them ›internationals‹, sit in two rows around a long conference table for about five hours« (Observation, UN Workshop, Morocco 2014).

Usually at the center of everyone's attention, the staff of IOs seek to deliver a professional performance. The IOs' employees take on different roles on such occasions: Most of the time, they are invited as ›international experts‹ to comment

on developments in the country under question and propose solutions based on their »home-made expertise« (Interview, IOM staff, Tunisia 2015). But they also act as moderators of seminars, workshops, working groups, or roundtables. This allows them to summarize results and highlight specific points the organization regards as important, while leaving out critical issues with reference to the sheer, omnipresent lack of time.

In contrast to the Moroccan and Tunisian actors in the field, IOs are far more adept at organizing such costly events themselves. They are comparatively well-equipped, due to their funding by the EU and European states. These material resources, or *economic capital* (see Bourdieu/Wacquant 1992: 119), permit them to set the agenda, invite speakers, and edit the publications following such events. Those events, which I observed, bore a surprising resemblance to another across countries and topics. Usually the same people, representing a small number of governmental or international institutions, meet in expensive hotels of the countries' capitals around overcrowded buffets, sharing their experiences and ›best practices‹, presenting extensive PowerPoint presentations with blinking numbers and repetitions of the keywords of international migration management, such as ›participative approaches‹, ›global partnerships‹, ›shared responsibility‹ etc. Based on their comparative advantage in *economic capital* and their recognition as international experts (see Bourdieu 1998 [1994]: 47), IOs are able to define and to implement the *rules* of such events. According to Bourdieu, the distribution of different forms of *capital* determines the actors' positions in a *field* (Bourdieu 1986). This advantage in stocks of *economic* and *symbolic capital* indicates the IOs' powerful position in the transnational field of migration management.

While the EU and its Member States do not seem to play a very prominent role at such conferences and workshops at first glance, the discourses dominating such events indicate their symbolic influence. The global policy discourse of migration management, predominantly articulated in French throughout the presentations, discussions, and publications, is usually compatible with European conventions, standards, and definitions in this field. But even beyond explicit references, the discourse barely escapes implicit assumptions of European and international migration policies, such as the prominent dichotomies of legal vs. illegal migration, voluntary vs. forced displacements, victims vs. criminals. Even when no representatives of the EU or its Member States sit at the table, they still intervene in *symbolic struggles* over the directions and developments of migration policies in Morocco or Tunisia through the knowledge that is disseminated by IOs. European states and the EU influence policymaking within these countries by financing IOs – who, as trusted intermediaries, exercise a *symbolic power* via their knowledge production and dissemination. With

Bourdieu's concepts, the knowledge production and dissemination by IOs can be described as »the power of making things with words« (Bourdieu 1992 [1987]: 153; my translation, IB) or the »power to constitute the given by stating it, to act upon the world by acting upon the representation of the world« (Bourdieu/Wacquant 1992: 148). This power is employed within the *symbolic struggles* over the imposition of meanings and representations of the social world and its legitimate order (see Bourdieu 1992 [1987]: 147f.). Accordingly, an accepted version of the truth about the social world, and thereby about how to manage migration, emerges from the struggles between actors in a certain field – rather than from a dominant discourse or rationality.

Struggles for Positions and Participation

Discussions at the conferences and workshops I attended often revolved around the same thematic issues and keywords of international migration management. For the distribution of forms of capital and positions in the field, however, it made a difference who was invited and who was not. Among government officials, for example, formal invitations to international conferences and workshops served as an important indicator of their political relevance. As I could observe in Morocco, the newly-appointed *Minister of Moroccans Residing Abroad and Migration Affairs* was usually invited to such occasions, since he had taken over the official lead on migration issues from the long-standing responsibility of the *Ministry of Interior* in 2013. Whether this symbolic change in responsibilities will lead to a practical redistribution of political power and positions in the field in the future remains to be seen. Nevertheless, through their invitations, IOs enhanced the new ministry's *social capital* by providing »a durable network of more less-institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition« (Bourdieu/Wacquant 1992: 119). In this way, IOs thus strengthened the position of the new ministry in the Moroccan field of migration politics.

In Tunisia, post-revolutionary struggles about political positions and resources were still ongoing at the time of my fieldwork in 2015. The question of which national institution would become the most relevant in the field of migration politics was still open. Different ministries, notably the *Ministry of External Affairs*, the *Ministry of the Interior* and the *Ministry of Social Affairs*, dealt with different aspects of migration. Nationally as well as internationally, they struggled for recognition and resources in order to support their different priorities. Civil society actors questioned the cooperation with European states on restrictive migration control, which had predated the revolution. In contrast to the cooperation with the EU and its Member States, IOs

were not perceived as external interventions that actualized a colonial past. The cooperation on the part of IOs and the reference to their ›international expertise‹ even seemed helpful to Tunisian actors as they sought acceptance for their vision and the legitimization of policy changes at the national level (see Korneev 2014: 900). The *social capital* as well as *cultural capital* (in the form of competences, skills, qualifications etc.; see Bourdieu/Wacquant 1992: 119) gained through interactions with IOs can be mobilized as a cultural authority in the national struggles over positions, resources, and recognition. In this way, the benefits of cooperation with IOs can be converted into other resources. In the transnational field of migration management, multiple state and non-state actors have thus interacted according to the more or less explicit *rules* and various forms of *capital* that are at stake on different levels (see Bueger/Gadinger 2008; Scheel et al. 2016).

According to Bourdieu, actors often develop unconscious *strategies* to improve or secure their positions in a field. At the workshops and conferences that I observed in post-revolutionary Tunisia, these strategies to cooperate, appropriate, or reject the dominant discourses and knowledge of IOs were also noticeable among the increasing number of civil society actors within the audience. A young and ethnically diverse audience actively engaged in the debates with representatives of the ministries and IOs, and confronted them with their concerns and demands. Indeed, Tunisian migration policies after the revolution developed in direct interaction with the few old and the many newly-founded civil society groups and migrant (self-)organizations (see Bartels 2014). In Morocco, after years of struggles by civil society actors, the *New Migration Policy* in 2013 was finally and quite surprisingly decreed by the King. While an active civil society has continued to get engaged for migrants' rights and has made itself heard throughout the country and beyond, policymaking has generally remained a very hierarchically-structured process in Morocco. At official events, there seemed to be little room for opposition forces and critical voices from below. Consequently, NGOs or migrant (self-) organizations were often missing at the roundtables and microphones, but were designated a place in the audience. The officially proclaimed participatory and inclusive consultation processes, which started in Morocco in 2013, were thus for all practical purposes turned into diplomatic exchanges between government officials and the ›internationals‹, usually White Europeans, working in the »transnational galaxy« of IOs (Pandolfi/McFalls 2010: 171). These people were said to work particularly hard towards a successful career in the ›international community‹, but often lacked the knowledge about the place and its history that they were supposed to support with their ›expertise‹.

The Habitus of International Migration Management

Usually the staff of an IO stays between three months and three years in a country, before it is replaced by a new team that is better qualified for the next project of the organization. This »migrant and deterritorialized community« of IOs' early career staff is thus always ready to move on, driven by the *illusio* that »there is still a lot to accomplish« (Pandolfi/McFalls 2010: 183). According to Bourdieu, actors are *taken in by the game* and pursue its stakes based on their emotional or corporeal investments that he called *illusio*. Participation in this game, or field, respectively, denotes a tacit acknowledgement of its rules and structures, which constitute an effective constraint on action, because they operate at the semiconscious or unconscious level. They constitute what Bourdieu defined as *doxa*, a »silent experience of the world«, that which »goes without saying« (Jackson 2008: 167; see also Bourdieu 1977 [1972]: 167f.). The self-evident beliefs and values, and the tacitly acknowledged *rules of the game*, do not dictate, but inform the participants' actions and behavior in the field (Bourdieu 1990 [1980]: 80ff.).

At the conferences in Morocco and Tunisia, I could observe how the IOs' staff played the game of international migration management very skillfully. »Their teams are well positioned at the conference: The team of the IOM is present, with three members always first to take a seat, keen and concentrated, and also excited or nervous to start working. The team of the UNHCR joins them. A representative of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) takes a seat at the table. In terms of content, a difference in their positions is hardly noticeable. They rather complete each other – in their colorful presentations full of complex charts and graphs, as well as at the lunch table. Eating salmon and drinking Diet Coke, the young professionals discuss the morning session. They complain about the contributions of some participants, notably of the Moroccan researchers. They wonder what [those researchers] might have meant with their questions about the UNHCR's mandate and motivation in Morocco. [...] It seems that the debates of the early 2000s about the role of the UNHCR in Morocco among migration researchers and activists in the country are unfamiliar to them« (Observations, UN workshop, Morocco 2014).

Often in their first job after graduation, the staffers of IOs seem highly motivated and passionate to support the country that the organization has chosen to send them to. In this respect, the staffers working for IOs in Morocco and Tunisia share a strong sense of identification with their respective organization and a rather unquestioned belief in the benefits of its mission. At the same time, however, the employees' *individual habitus* can be characterized as very career-oriented, mobile, and motivated to move on. They face the need to prove their skills and knowledge, and make personal

contacts in this field in order to leave with an excellent recommendation for their next mission. Their work thus seems to be driven as much by their embodied competition over individual stocks of *cultural* and *social capital* as by their *illusioic belief* in the benefits of international migration management. Not only collective actors, but also individual ones have thus developed *strategies* to improve or secure their positions in a field.

Bourdieu's concept of *habitus* provides analytical access to the semi-conscious orientations and *engine* of the actors involved in this game. This is generated by the sum of external structures internalized by actors, which enable them to function effectively in the field (see Bourdieu 1977 [1972]: 82). In this respect, the IOs' staff, with their competitive *habitus* and their unquestioning belief in the merits of the mission, *fits* the transnational field of migration management, which is structured by neoliberal and humanitarian logics, and by a colonial history of ›international interventions‹ in North Africa (see Bartels 2017). While Bourdieu mostly referred to the *individual habitus* of people, the habitus concept can also be applied to study collective actors, such as IOs (see Jackson 2009). The latter can be conceptualized simultaneously as collective actors within a transnational field, as well as bureaucratic fields crowded with individual actors. While individual actors compete for positions within the organizations, they »are likely to develop similar dispositions and thus similar practices« (ibid.: 107) which crystallize into a *collective habitus*. This collective habitus, in turn, dominates the organizations' outward performance and agency in the transnational field of migration management. Working on its implementation side, the staff of an IO, for example, commonly shares a neutral view of itself as being in a position that does not allow for any political decisions. Instead, the employees only follow the project guidelines, administrative rules, and terms of reference that were negotiated and decided upon in the headquarters of their organizations, donors, and governments. However, for many of my interview partners, it was important to emphasize that ›nothing is imposed‹ but originates in the demands of Moroccan and Tunisian authorities. These individual dispositions are also reflected in the organizations' self-presentation. They permit the IOs to play according to the implicit rules of the transnational field of migration management and function as acceptable ›partners‹ for Moroccan and Tunisian actors.

Cooperation, Confrontation, and Appropriation

As indicated above, in 2013, after the Moroccan king announced the *New Migration Policy*, government officials suddenly called for ›experts‹ in order to elaborate on and implement the new policies. However, civil society activists and researchers who

had already worked for a long time on these issues in the country saw themselves falling behind the expanding interventions of IOs. The knowledge of these ›local experts‹ was not recognized as valuable expertise. The Moroccan state actors instead preferred to cooperate with the ›international experts‹ of the IOs and to make use of their dominant knowledge. »Every time that there is a project, they [the IOs] take it. If there is a need expressed at the level of a ministry, they contact it and say ›we take it‹, ›we will do it for you!‹«, the Moroccan researcher quoted above complained during a coffee break at a workshop (Conversation, researcher, Mor. 2014). However, the IOs »do not have a real expertise. They just take existing bibliographies, they use your work, but they never say it« (ibid.). From the perspective of researchers and activists, the new governmental rhetoric of participation and inclusion turned for all practical purposes into an unsatisfactory process of international consultations and top-down information. These researchers and activists criticized this process, explaining that the involvement of IOs would legitimize the ›participatory‹ processes announced by the Moroccan government. The situation shows that the question of whose knowledge is valuable and who is accepted as an expert in the field is contested within the transnational field of migration management.

Furthermore, this policymaking *à la Marocaine* is illustrative of the king's *feel for the game* of international migration management. He knows how to play by its rules and to maneuver the country through the demands and challenges of its politics by taking some progressive steps forward without making too many truly democratic concessions. Rhetorically, Moroccan government officials have appropriated and eloquently replicated the international discourses spread by IOs. »Morocco stands for a global and integrated approach«, a representative of the new Moroccan migration ministry announced at one of the workshops (Observations, UN workshop, Mor. 2014). He highlighted the »shared responsibility« Morocco would in turn expect from the international community – including financial resources (ibid.). On the same occasion, he explicitly demanded the IOs' help in Morocco to »fight against irregular migration« and thanked them for their support in the development of recent law (ibid.). According to his presentation, the three new Moroccan laws on asylum, integration, and anti-trafficking would entail a chapter on cooperation with IOs. Such cooperation serves the Moroccan authorities not only within the national struggle for power and positions, but also on the international level. Through the appropriation of its dominant discourses and expert knowledge, the Moroccan authorities have been able to reemploy the *cultural capital* of international migration management in order to *convert* it into economic and social benefits in international negotiations.

Moreover, this complicity permits Moroccan authorities to avoid struggles with ›national experts‹. »They do not call for national experts, jurists, economists, etc.

They call for international experts because those organizations, they are more discreet, they are not so critical«, explained the Moroccan researcher, sharing another observation (Conversation, researcher, Morocco 2014). The representatives of IOs would act in accordance with their institutions' apolitical mandates and diplomatic practices and thus remain uncritical towards state politics (see Korneev 2014: 898f.). During the conferences and workshops that I attended, the staff of IOs did not openly criticize their member states, but took rather moderating and pacifying positions. In turn, many Moroccan and Tunisian actors – whether state or non-state – tried to win their trust and favor. During the breaks of such events, the IOs' staffers were often surrounded by crowds of participants, distributing their cards and publications from large white plastic bags.

Generally, it was not easy to find critical voices in such situations of material and symbolic knowledge dissemination. »The IOM does many things, they have published this study recently about trafficking, it is very well known«, a participant told me during lunch at a conference in Tunisia (Conversation, researcher, Tunisia 2015). From his point of view, the IOM has nothing to do with the externalization of European migration policies. »There are other associations that deal with it«, he argued and referred to Frontex as an example (ibid.). In contrast to the actors working »at the border« (ibid.), the IOM or the ICMPD are mostly perceived as scientific experts rather than as political actors within the transnational field of migration management, even though the boundaries between science and politics are practically blurred in this field. This expert position gives a »doxic aura of legitimacy, universality and naturalness« (Pouliot 2004: 13) to the IOs' discourses. This *doxic belief* in the separation between apparently neutral science and mistrusted politics thereby assists in the *misrecognition* of the *symbolic power* of IOs to spread a legitimate way of dealing with migration and their active role in the externalization of European migration policies to Morocco and Tunisia.

Conclusion

By giving workshops and organizing conferences to share ›best practices‹, ›international standards‹, and ›lessons learned‹ from other countries, as well as their own recommendations, IOs have aimed to establish the dominant assumptions and keywords of international migration management among a wide range of actors in Morocco and Tunisia. Appearing as neutral and objective experts, their staff have sought to (in-) form state and non-state actors, to support them in the development of definitions, categories, and indicators to detect the according phenomena in their own countries,

and to promote political and administrative solutions in line with the global language and dominant understanding of migration management. In this article, I analyzed the practices and power of IOs in the transnational processes of knowledge dissemination. With the help of Bourdieu's concepts, I highlighted the institutional strategies and stakes of varioius actors involved in this game and have thus shown that the dissemination of knowledge on migration management is a contested negotiation process in which its recipients play an active role.

»First, we need statistics, numbers, facts, etc. in order to develop policies, measures, etc. afterwards« was a view shared by many participants at the conferences in Morocco and Tunisia. At such occasions, it seemed that for their various implicit and explicit strategies and ambitions, many state and non-state actors in these countries had appropriated the knowledge disseminated by IOs and learned how to play by the rules of the game of international migration management. As this knowledge became »internalized by other actors as both natural and legitimate« (Jackson 2009: 111), the *symbolic power* of IOs to externalize concepts and practices of migration control has become a welcome alternative to the explicit pressure by European states. Embedded and embodied in the actors' modes of action, cognition, and beliefs, this symbolic influence often remained misrecognized as such (see Bourdieu/Wacquant 1992: 166). Drawing on the participation of politicians and administrations from sending and transit countries, this influence was particularly efficient as a form of »violence which is exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity« (ibid.: 171). The IOs' vision of international migration management is thus not imposed on other actors in the field but appears as self-evident and therefore legitimate to them. It enables Moroccan and Tunisian actors to participate in this game without appearing to be directly forced to do so by European state actors, whose interventions in the field more openly reflect the asymmetrical power relations inherited form a colonial past. The *doxic belief* in the objectivity and the neutrality of ›international expertise‹, in turn, covers the active role of IOs in the externalization and expansion of European migration policies in North Africa and their involvement in the reproduction of power relations in the field. The *symbolic power* of their interventions to integrate state and non-state actors in sending and transit countries into the international management of migration therefore remains widely misrecognized.

In this article, I have proposed to analyze the knowledge on migration management that actually enters Moroccan and Tunisian politics of migration control not as the effect of a dominant ›global‹ rationality or discourse that disciplines the practices of ›local‹ actors, but as the outcome of concrete social negotiation processes in the trans-Mediterranean field of migration management. With the help of Bourdieu's concepts, I have shown that the dissemination of knowledge by IOs in the context of

the externalization of European migration policies is not a smooth top-down process but marked by struggles and strategies among and within the various state and non-state actors involved, including those that are otherwise often conceived as its passive recipients.

LITERATURE

Andrijasevic, Rutvica / Walters, William (2010): The International Organization for Migration and the International Government of Borders. In: Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 28 (6). 977–999.

Bartels, Inken (2014): Die Neuordnung der tunesischen Migrationspolitik nach dem ›Arabischen Frühling‹. In: Berliner Debatte Initial 25 (4). 48–64.

Bartels, Inken (2017): ›We must do it gently‹. The contested implementation of the IOM's migration management in Morocco. In: Migration Studies 5 (3). 315–336.

Belguendouz, Abdelkrim (2005): Expansion et sous-traitance des logiques d'enfermement de l'Union européenne: l'exemple du Maroc. In: Cultures & Conflits 57. 155–219.

Betts, Alexander (2008): Global Migration Governance. GEG Working Paper 2008/43. URL: geg-test.nsms.ox.ac.uk [28.09.2018].

Bigo, Didier (2002): Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease. In: Alternatives 27. 63–92.

Boswell, Cristina (2009): The Political Uses of Expert Knowledge: Immigration Policy and Social Research. Cambridge.

Boubakri, Hassan (2013): Revolution and International Migration in Tunisia. MPC Research Report 2013/04. Florence.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1977 [1972]): Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1986): The Forms of Capital. In: Richardson, John G. (Ed.): Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education. Westport. 241–258.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1990 [1980]): The Logic of Practice. Stanford.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1992 [1987]): Rede und Antwort. Frankfurt am Main.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1998 [1994]): Practical Reason. On the Theory of Action. Stanford.

Bourdieu, Pierre (2004 [2001]): Science of Science and Reflexivity. Chicago.

Bourdieu, Pierre / Wacquant, Loïc (1992): An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Chicago.

Bueger, Christian / Gadinger, Frank (2008): Praktisch gedacht! Praxis-theoretischer Konstruktivismus in den Internationalen Beziehungen. In: Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 15 (2). 273–302.

Caillault, Clotilde (2012): The Implementation of Coherent Migration Management through IOM Programs in Morocco. In: IMIS-Beiträge 40. 133–156.

Cassarino, Jean-Pierre (2010): Dealing with Unbalanced Reciprocities: Cooperation on Readmission and Implications. In: Cassarino, Jean-Pierre (Ed.): Unbalanced Reciprocities: Cooperation on Readmission in the Euro-Mediterranean Area. Washington. 1–29.

De Haas, Hein (2014): Morocco: Setting the Stage for Becoming a Migration Transition Country? URL: migrationpolicy.org [28.09.2018].

Di Bartolomeo, Anna / Fakhoury, Tamirace / Perrin, Delphine (2010): CARIM – Migration Profile Tunisia. CARIM Migration Profiles. Florence.

El Qadim, Nora (2010): La politique migratoire européenne vue du Maroc: Contraintes et opportunités. In: Politique européenne 2 (31). 91–118.

Frowd, Philippe Mamadou (2015): Securing Borders in West Africa: Transnational Actors, Practices and Knowledges. PhD Dissertation. Hamilton.

Gaibazzi, Paolo / Bellagamba, Alice / Dünnwald, Stephan (2017): Introduction: An Afro-Europeanist Perspective on EurAfrican Borders. In: Gaibazzi, Paolo / Bellagamba, Alice / Dünnwald, Stephan (Eds.): EurAfrican Borders and Migration Management. Political Cultures, Contested Spaces, and Ordinary Lives. Basingstoke. 3–27.

Geiger, Martin (2011): Europäische Migrationspolitik und Raumproduktion. Internationale Regierungsorganisationen im Management von Migration in Albanien, Bosnien-Herzegowina und der Ukraine. Baden-Baden.

Geiger, Martin (2012): Weltorganisationen in der Gestaltung globaler und regionaler Migrationspolitik: Die International Organization for Migration (IOM). In: Koch, Martin (Ed.): Weltorganisationen. Wiesbaden. 129–151.

Geiger, Martin (2014): The Production of a Safe Neighborhood and the Disciplining of International Mobility. In: Walton-Roberts, Margaret / Hennebry, Jenna (Eds.): Territoriality and Migration in the E.U. Neighbourhood. Spilling Over the Wall. Dordrecht. 225–243.

Geiger, Martin / Pécoud, Antoine (Eds.) (2010a): The Politics of International Migration Management. Basingstoke.

Geiger, Martin / Pécoud, Antoine (2010b): The Politics of International Migration Management. In: Geiger, Martin / Pécoud, Antoine (Eds.): The Politics of International Migration Management. Basingstoke. 1–20.

Geiger, Martin / Pécoud, Antoine (2013): Disciplining the Transnational Mobility of People. Basingstoke.

Geiger, Martin / Pécoud, Antoine (2014): International Organizations and the Politics of Migration. In: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 40 (6). 865–887.

Georgi, Fabian (2010): For the Benefit of Some: The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and its Global Migration Management. In: Geiger, Martin / Pécoud, Antoine (Eds.): The Politics of International Migration Management. Basingstoke. 45–72.

Hess, Sabine (2014): Das Regieren der Migration als wissensbasierte Netzwerkpolitik. Eine ethnographische Policy-Analyse des International Centre for Migration Policy Development. In: Vonderau, Asta / Adam, Jens (Eds.): Formationen des Politischen. Anthropologie politischer Felder. Bielefeld. 241–273.

Jackson, Peter (2008): Pierre Bourdieu, the ›Cultural Turn‹ and the Practice of International History. In: Review of International Studies 34 (1). 155–181.

Jackson, Peter (2009): Pierre Bourdieu. In: Edkins, Jenny / Vaughan-Williams, Nick (Eds.): Critical Theorists and International Relations. London/New York. 102–113.

Kalm, Sara (2010): Liberalizing Movements? The Political Rationality of Global Migration Management. In: Geiger, Martin / Pécoud, Antoine (Eds.): The Politics of International Migration Management. Basingstoke. 21–44.

Kalm, Sara (2012): Global Migration Management, Order and Access to Mobility. In: IMIS-Beiträge 40. 49–74.

Karakayali, Serhat / Tsianos, Vassilis (2007): Movements that matter. Eine Einleitung. In: Transit Migration Forschungsgruppe (Eds.): Turbulente Ränder. Neue Perspektiven auf Migration an den Grenzen Europas. Bielefeld. 7–17.

Korneev, Oleg (2014): Exchanging Knowledge, Enhancing Capacities, Developing Mechanisms: IOM's Role in the Implementation of the EU-Russia Readmission Agreement. In: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 40 (6). 888–904.

Lavenex, Sandra (2007): The External Face of Europeanization: Third Countries and International Organizations. In: Faist, Thomas / Ette, Andreas (Eds.): The Europeanization of National Policies and Politics of Immigration. Between Autonomy and the European Union. Basingstoke. 246–264.

Pandolfi, Mariella / McFalls, Laurence (2010): Global Bureaucracy: Irresponsible but not Indifferent. In: Dal Lago, Alessandro / Palidda, Salvatore (Eds.): Conflict, Security and the Reshaping of Society. The civilization of war. London/New York. 171–185.

Planes-Boissac, Véronique (2010): Study on Migration and Asylum in Arab Countries. Copenhagen.

Pouliot, Vincent (2004): Toward a Bourdieusian Constructivism in IR: Outline of a Theory of Practice of Security Communities. Presented at the Fifth pan-European Conference, Standing Group on International Relations. The Hague.

Scheel, Stephan / Ratfisch, Philipp (2014): Refugee Protection Meets Migration Management: UNHCR as a Global Police of Populations. In: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 40 (6). 924–941.

Scheel, Stephan / Cakici, Baki / Grommé, Francisca / Ruppert, Evelyn / Takala, Ville / Ustek-Spilda, Funda (2016): Transcending Methodological Nationalism through a Transversal Method? On the Stakes and Challenges of Collaboration. ARITHMUS Working Paper Series 1. London.

Schmidt, Matthias (2015): Zwischen Moral und Skandal. Humanitarismus und Menschenrechte in der Migrations- und Grenzpolitik Marokkos. In: movements. Journal for Critical Migration and Border Regime Studies 1 (1). URL: movements-journal.org [18.01.2018].

Speer, Marc (2014): Die IOM in der Ukraine: Wissensproduzentin und Dienstleisterin von Migration Management. In: Heimeshoff, Lisa-Marie / Hess, Sabine / Kron, Stefanie / Schwenken, Helen / Trzeciak, Miriam (Eds.): Grenzregime II. Migration, Kontrolle, Wissen. Transnationale Perspektiven. Berlin/Hamburg. 152–161.

Tazzioli, Martina (2014): ›People not of our concern‹. Rejected refugees in Tunisia. In: Radical Philosophy 184. URL: radicalphilosophy.com [12.02.2018].

Valluy, Jerome (2007): Contribution à une sociologie politique du HCR: le cas des politiques européennes et du HCR au Maroc. Collection ›Etudes‹ May 2017. URL: reseau-terra.eu [12.02.2018].

Knowing Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change

The Self-Perpetuating Circle of Research, Policy, and Knowledge Production

SARAH LOUISE NASH

Abstract: A self-perpetuating circle of research, policy, and knowledge production has emerged around human mobility in the context of climate change, spurred on by a seemingly unquenchable thirst for knowledge. This article interrogates this circle, and the group of actors at its centre, through the lens of power-knowledge relations. The analysis interrogates the boundaries of the thinkable, the limits of how it is legitimate to know human mobility in the context of climate change. Four sets of boundaries feature: the presentation of the issue as a problem requiring technical solutions; the validation of particular elite spaces as sites of research, policy, and knowledge production; the admission of certain actors to these spaces; and the terms in which it is possible to talk about the issues. These boundaries are drawn around one particular knowledge created by an elite epistemic community at the expense of others that are not granted the same legitimacy. This knowledge is often employed (by its creators and by others) to make and support calls for increased migration control, as such potentially concretely effecting the lives of people on the move. This article therefore argues for breaking the self-perpetuating circle of research, policy, and knowledge production. This critique is not only important for understanding how we know human mobility in the context of climate change but for pushing the boundaries of the thinkable.

Keywords: climate change, human mobility, knowledge, power, UNFCCC

Human mobility in the context of climate change has emerged as a distinct area of research, policy, and knowledge production. It is neither a sub-set of work on human mobility, nor on climate change, but rather both areas touch on human mobility in the context of climate change, creating a distinct area of research, policy, and knowledge production in its own right. The space occupied by work on human mobility in the context of climate change therefore sits between two poles: prominent scholars from a variety of disciplines and both thematic foci have intervened in the debate; policy processes from human mobility politics (UN General Assembly 2016) as well as global climate change politics (UNFCCC 2010; 2013; 2016) have staked out an

interest; and human mobility and climate change are increasingly being constructed together as »interconnection clusters« of global risks (World Economic Forum 2016: 9).

This space has produced a great many *knowledge products*,[1] overwhelmingly as written documents, that are portrayed as imparting authoritative knowledge on human mobility in the context of climate change. In this article, knowledge production is not to be equated with research. Research is rather taken to refer to undertakings (whether conducted under the banner of academic research institutions or elsewhere) to establish and better understand the links between human mobility and climate change. There are of course significant overlaps, with many researchers also creating knowledge products. Still, these categories, though overlapping, are not synonymous.

However, research, policy, and knowledge production are inherently tied together when it comes to knowing human mobility in the context of climate change. Research is drawn into policymaking through knowledge products or is even commissioned in an effort to inform policy; policy draws on available knowledge products and supports calls for more knowledge; knowledge products draw on research, and are used to provide a rationale for further research, and are relied on heavily in policymaking. The three are mutually constitutive and unable to exist in isolation, with complex relations therefore underpinning everything that is known.

Researchers, policymakers, and producers of knowledge also sing from the same hymn sheet in terms of securing their own existence, with all of them incessantly calling for increased knowledge on human mobility in the context of climate change (McLeman 2014; Melde et al. 2017). These calls persist even though the links between human mobility and climate change have already taken on truth effects, as illustrated by the inclusion of human mobility as a central societal consequence of climate change in the latest report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which itself compiles its reports based on already existing academic literature (IPCC 2014). By continuing to include human mobility in agreed-upon documents (even if just to call for more knowledge), policymakers also tacitly recognise the legitimacy granted to the linking of mobility and climate change.

Following Benoît Mayer (2013), perhaps it is not simply *more* knowledge that should be called for, but *different* knowledge. In reviewing a series of seminal works in the literature, Mayer identified a tendency to recognise conceptual difficulties in the study of the nexus of climate change and human mobility, but a failure to reflect

1 | The term *knowledge products* has been chosen here after it was used in a private conversation I had with a staff member for a UN agency on the margins of a UNFCCC meeting to describe their written outputs related to human mobility in the context of climate change.

deeply upon and move beyond these conceptual issues. In a similar vein, Calum Nicholson (2014, 2017) has identified six problematic tendencies in the literature: First, a tendency to make very generic statements; second, an opposite tendency of making very specific statements that cannot be applied beyond a very specific context; third, arguments relying on contradictory statements; fourth, a prevalence of tautological statements covering every eventuality; fifth, conclusions with equivocal statements calling for more research; and sixth, the laundering of categories to describe people on the move. To these critiques, I add a call to interrogate the power-knowledge relations underlying the creation of knowledge. Especially given that knowledge on human mobility in the context of climate change has been subject to such critique regarding its very foundations, it is paramount to question why and for whom it is being created (see also Baldwin 2017).

In a nutshell, in order to truly understand human mobility in the context of climate change, it is necessary to backpedal and re-consider the core ontological and epistemological assumptions of the field (see Nicholson 2017). Building in particular on Andrew Baldwin's work (2017), this article therefore interrogates how we know human mobility in the context of climate change through the lens of power-knowledge relations. The following section outlines this theoretical positioning, based on Foucauldian power-knowledge theory. Section Three considers the calls from both academia and the policy world for increased knowledge in greater depth. Section Four then moves to consider the power relations that drive these calls, the self-perpetuating circle of policy, research, and knowledge production that is created and sustained, and the boundaries that are drawn around the thinkable by this circle. The concluding section then argues for breaking this circle to open up the boundaries of the thinkable, to include previously overlooked perspectives and marginalised voices.

What this article does not attempt is an in-depth analysis of the *content* of the discourse on human mobility in the context of climate change, focusing instead on some of the mechanisms by which it has emerged and is being perpetuated. This is not to say that the content of the discourse being analysed here is independent of the power-knowledge relations that this article diagnoses. Indeed, particularly given the conclusions this article draws regarding the domination of particular elite knowledge on human mobility in the context of climate change, demonstrating these links is incredibly important. However, such a critique is beyond the scope of this more targeted intervention. I do encourage this article to be read in conjunction with existing critiques of the discourse on human mobility in the context of climate change, which have drawn necessary attention to the securitised nature of the discourse on ›climate refugees‹ (Bettini 2013) and imagery often used in the discourse (Methmann/Rothe 2014), which have critiqued the neoliberal concept of resilience (Felli 2013; Bettini

2014), which have raised concerns regarding the neglect of climate justice (Bettini et al. 2017), and which have identified the discourse as being highly racialised (Baldwin 2012, 2016) as well as gender blind (Myrttinen 2017) or even reproducing clichéd narratives (Rothe 2017).

This article is part of a larger study of policymaking on climate change and human mobility between 2010 and 2015 (Nash 2017). This study was framed by Foucauldian genealogy (Foucault 1977), and traced the emergence of human mobility in the context of climate change as an area of global policymaking. This analysis drew on a document corpus of 150 documents from organisations carrying out advocacy work on human mobility in the context of climate change. Both draft and final documents from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) were also included in the corpus. This document analysis was complimented with a series of 13 semi-structured interviews conducted with individuals active in this area of policymaking in 2015 and early 2016, before and shortly after the Paris climate change negotiations. In addition, a substantial literature review of the academic literature has also fed into the analysis, as well as the author's own observations from attending a number of international conferences, where it was possible to observe the interactions between policymakers and academics.

Foucault, Knowledge and Power

> »[W]e are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth« (Foucault 1980: 93).

Power, according to Foucault, is not a resource; »it is never localised here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth« (Foucault 1980: 98) and as such, it cannot be owned by anyone and is instead imbued in all social relations. Power is also normatively neutral, not only constraining but also a productive force, »it does not only weigh on us as a force that says no, but [...] it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse« (ibid.: 109). As this quote already hints, knowledge exists in a relationship to power, with the exercise of power being mutually constitutive, historically contingent, and performative. Performativity, following Judith Butler, »that reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains« (Butler 1993: xii), provides a particularly useful avenue by which to understand the self-reinforcing power-knowledge relations at play in the discourse on human mobil-

ity in the context of climate change and performed in particular arenas such as policy negotiations. It is not only the *content* of knowledge on human mobility in the context of climate change, but the language employed to talk about the issue, the visuals used in knowledge products, the adherence to strict rules of conduct in particular settings, the institutional affiliation of the speaker and even the display of an UN agency lanyard that can cause power and knowledge to continue to reverberate.

Baldwin and Bettini have already identified the actors who do pass the threshold to be considered as legitimate to speak on human mobility in the context of climate change as constituting an epistemic community.[2] They argue that power-knowledge relations can be best observed in »the coming into being of an epistemic community of experts and researchers, bound together through a shared set of assumptions about the nature of human mobility in the context of climate change« (Baldwin/Bettini 2017: 5). They go on to argue that power-knowledge relations become visible in the boundaries that are drawn by an epistemic community around »what can and cannot be said about a specific area of knowledge, distinguishing, sometimes formally, sometimes tacitly, the parameters for legitimate speech« (ibid.: 5–6). These boundaries can also be referred to as the »boundaries of the thinkable«.

In line with an epistemological position that rejects the possibility of pursuing *objective* analysis of the real world, knowledge cannot be taken to be a singular true representation of a social phenomenon. Rather, particular knowledge may take on truth effects, where certain knowledge is privileged and taken to be particularly legitimate, giving it the impression of depicting a true, objective reality (Foucault 1980: 93). However, this should not be read as a rejection of scientific standards, and the aim is not, through rejection of *objective* analysis of the real world, to fall into a relativist quagmire. In the analysis of climate change this is particularly important, so as not to leave oneself open to being read as a climate change denier; indeed I explicitly take the stance that »climate change is a real, material circumstance with potentially dire consequences for much of the world's population, especially those already living on the fringes of capital« (Baldwin/Bettini 2017: 2). This conviction is based, largely, on my understanding of knowledge produced by scientists working on climate change. Therefore, although not necessarily *objective*, knowledge production

2 | According to Noel Castree, epistemic communities, a term coined by Peter Haas, refer to communities of professionals from various disciplines and backgrounds, which »gain their distinctiveness, and sense of self-identity, through a mixture of their value-set, ontological beliefs, questions of interest, objects/domains of concern, methods of inquiry, the criteria favoured for determining worthy ideas, knowledge or information, and their chosen genre of communication« (Castree 2014: 42).

is still linked to things that are actually happening.[3] In approaching knowledge therefore, the aim of this article is, following Donna Haraway, to »have *simultaneously* an account of radical historical contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects [...] *and* a no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a ›real‹ world, one that can be partially shared« (Haraway 1988: 579). Knowledge is approached as »situated and embodied knowledges« (ibid.: 583), »where partiality and not universality is the condition of being heard to make rational knowledge claims« (ibid.: 589).

A Never Ending Thirst for Knowledge

The thirst for knowledge in relation to human mobility in the context of climate change appears never-ending. Significant contributions to scholarship on human mobility in the context of climate change frequently dedicate space to identifying future directions for research and how their contribution could be built upon in the future. One example of this tendency is in the work of Robert McLeman, with an entire chapter of a monograph on climate change and human migration dedicated to »emergent issues in climate and migration research« (McLeman 2014). Although the area of research that is human mobility in the context of climate change has continued to develop since McLeman identified it as »very much in its infancy« (2014: 210), this has not halted continued calls for more knowledge. The recently completed MECLEP project (Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Evident for Policy), one of the

3 | Climate change is material and has impacts that are felt by societies. However, how climate change is perceived by these societies is built on complex webs of meaning. In an example used by Methmann, Rothe and Stephan, »a glacier is, in physical terms, a mass of ice with certain properties, it depends on its discursive representation whether it counts as an object of scientific inquiry, an emblem of pure nature or a witness of dangerous global warming« (Methmann/Rothe/Stephan 2013: 5). Therefore reactions to climate change, including potential changes in human mobility, cannot be explained purely by physical, material changes, but also their discursive representations. A similar statement can be made in regard to people on the move. While it is not to be disregarded that people are moving, it depends on discursive representation whether people are considered as victims of displacement due to climate change, as heroes of adaptation, or as masses of ›illegal migrants‹, with each of these representations framing people on the move in a different way, which in turns differs from if people on the move were considered as persons with individual biographies, ideas and personalities (see Andersson 2014).

largest empirical research projects to have been conducted on human mobility in the context of climate change,[4] also identified a series of ways forward, largely involving the use of new methodological innovations, to be employed by »the next generation of empirical research on migration in the context of environmental change« (Melde et al. 2017: 43).

This thirst for knowledge that was already diagnosed by Mayer (2013) typifies a field of scholarship aware of but unable to react to conceptual tensions underpinning the entire field. Thus, whilst knowledge has been created that definitely adds to the *breadth* of knowledge on human mobility in the context of climate change (for example, including case studies about new locales) the conceptual *depth* of the scholarship has not always been added to, with many studies failing to react critically to the scholarship that has come before them.

A thirst for knowledge on human mobility in the context of climate change is not limited to an academic pursuit. Policymakers have also increasingly called for more knowledge on the links between climate change and human mobility. The clearest examples are contained in the agreed-upon texts of the UNFCCC that concern human mobility, all of which call for more knowledge. The first inclusion of human mobility in an agreed-upon text at the global level (Warner 2012) in the Cancun Adaptation Framework invited Parties to undertake »measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at national, regional and international levels« (UNFCCC, 2010: 14(f)) as an aspect of climate change adaptation. In 2012, a further UNFCCC decision (UNFCCC 2013, 3/CP.18, 7(a)(vi)), this time as part of the UNFCCC's ›loss and damage‹ area of work, referenced human mobility, acknowledging work being undertaken to advance »the understanding of and expertise on loss and damage«, one aspect of which is »how impacts of climate change are affecting patterns of migration, displacement and human mobility«. Ending the period that began with Cancun in 2010, the UNFCCC's decision from the Paris climate change conference in 2015 moved beyond purely calling for more knowledge (Nash 2017). This decision created a task force »to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change« (UNFCCC 2016: 49).

---

4 | The MECLEP project, funded by the EU and implemented by the IOM with a consortium or research institutions, carried out comparative research in six countries (Dominican Republic, Haiti, Kenya, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, and Vietnam) to ascertain how migration could benefit or undermine adaptation to environmental and climate change (Melde et al. 2017).

As an explicit response to the call for more knowledge made in the Cancun Adaptation Framework, as well as in initiatives headed up by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (see also Hall 2016), the Nansen Initiative was launched in late 2012, based on pledges made by the governments of Norway and Switzerland to cooperate with other states and actors »with the aim of obtaining a better understanding« of cross-border movements in the context of disasters (Government of Norway 2011). In order to carry out its mandate, the Nansen Initiative carried out sub-regional consultations which were supplemented by newly commissioned studies where a particular knowledge gap was perceived to exist. Therefore, the Nansen Initiative both collated and created knowledge products in weighty outcome documents (The Nansen Initiative 2015).

The creation of a self-proclaimed Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility (hereafter Advisory Group) in 2013, mainly from UN agencies[5] working together with the purpose of informing the UNFCCC negotiations on issues of human mobility (UNHCR 2014: 18), created an intermediary between knowledge producers and policymaking. This group has proven to be a vital channel for providing knowledge to policymaking actors, particularly the UNFCCC, with an air that the knowledge provided in briefing documents by the Advisory Group (2014, 2015, 2017) is objective knowledge, with truth effects being created in a number of ways. First, the language used to talk about the issues corresponds to UN standards. For example, one briefing document from 2015 includes an opening section highlighting the numerous international agreements that the briefing document is in consonance with, repeating the phrase »in line with« (Advisory Group 2015: 1) reminiscent of a UN agreement. A similar pattern is used in a 2014 submission, which opens with the phrase »*Recalling* decision 3/CP.18 paragraph 7(a(vi) [...]« (Advisory Group 2014: 1). This language can be fairly impenetrable to outsiders and conforms to many of the elaborate constructs of the UN world within which the text operates. The insider status of the Advisory Group in the UNFCCC is also emphasised, with briefing documents explicitly identifying contributions that they have already made: »The Advisory Group participated to [sic] the drafting of the work programme to be adopted by the COP20 in December 2014 during, the Executive Committee first two initial meetings suggesting one of the activities on human mobility« (ibid.: 11). Second, the knowledge

5 | The Advisory Group is an informal group composed of the UNHCR, IOM, the United Nations University section on Environmental and Human Security (UNU-EHS), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Norwegian Refugee Council/Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (NRC/IDMC), Sciences Po-CERI, and Refugees International (Advisory Group, 2014).

presented to policymakers by the Advisory Group is put together in a very deliberate manner. It is highly condensed, built up around an air of consensus that depicts it as authoritative knowledge, highly polished, and presented in formats that appeal to policymakers (Nash 2017).

When one begins to deconstruct not necessarily the content, but the performativity of knowledge on human mobility in the context of climate change, the power-knowledge relations become apparent. Human mobility in the context of climate change is created as a phenomenon (a phenomenon requiring responses from the policy world) in incredibly elite and remote institutional circles. The centricity of Geneva, and the UN bubble that the city often represents for the majority of agencies involved in the Advisory Group, also introduces an additional geographical bias.

Knowledge and policy on human mobility in the context of climate change are therefore inherently linked, with knowledge being created explicitly in order to inform policymaking processes. In an academic culture where policy-relevant research is increasingly something to be revered, this is an interesting opening for academics who can feed their work directly into policy processes and avoid having their work consigned to a dusty bookshelf. In the continual fight for academic funding, work that is aligned with particularly hot policy topics also has greater chances of being funded. Tapping in to these priorities can therefore be a path for academics to keep their heads above the water in a financial sense.

An Inside Job: Knowledge Narcissism and Marginalised Knowledges

When interrogating knowledge in relation to work on human mobility in the context of climate change, it is nevertheless important to go beyond mere recognition of the links between academia and the policy world. These are not particularly hidden, and therefore uncovering them is not much of a revelation. What might be less apparent upon first glance is the self-reinforcing nature of these links and the self-perpetuating circle of policy, research, and knowledge production that has formed, driven by calls for more policy, research, and knowledge embedded in knowledge products, and the activities of an elite epistemic community who continues to legitimise the very existence of the community through the necessity of continued policy, research, and knowledge production work.

To analyse this circle, it is important to look at the epistemic community on human mobility in the context of climate change, which is pushing for inclusion of the issue in international agreements and the like. Certainly in the UNFCCC context, many

of the central figures are representatives of the various member organisations of the Advisory Group. However, in addition to being involved in influencing policymaking processes and pushing for provisions that call for more knowledge, these organisations are themselves involved in knowledge production. Therefore, the ones involved in policymaking, supporting calls for increased knowledge, and carrying out research and creating knowledge products in order to respond to these calls are all the same actors.

This not only reinforces the power of those who are already in a position to provide relevant knowledge, but also places actors involved in the policymaking process in a position to suggest particular ways in which to frame the calls for more knowledge according to their organisational strengths, institutional mandates, and priorities. This is potentially problematic for two reasons: First, the dominance of the same actors in both fields, setting the questions to be answered and providing the answers to them, is likely to lead to an echo-chamber effect, with few new perspectives being introduced into the discourse (Baldwin 2015). Second, the organisations that are heavily implicated in both knowledge production and policymaking on human mobility in the context of climate change are tied up in complex funding structures, with many relying on national governments for financial support. As others have already warned, especially given current discourses surrounding human mobility, and in particular a tendency towards increased calls for migration control, there is a risk that the starting point of striving for increased migration control could become transposed into the policymaking on human mobility in the context of climate change (Bettini 2014).

The third element of this self-perpetuating circle, research, is also not immune. There is not always a clear distinction between knowledge production by non-academic actors and academic research, with large academic research projects into human mobility in the context of climate change being carried out in conjunction with civil society organisations (CARE International and United Nations University 2012), or funded by the European Union (EU) and implemented by the IOM (Melde et al. 2017). Whilst there is no suggestion here that academic rigour is lacking in the formation of conclusions in any of these research initiatives, the involvement of policy and advocacy actors in the conceptualisation and question-setting stages of these projects should not be overlooked.

Also key to the continued rotating of this circle is a knowledge narcissism on behalf of the actors at its centre: they display self-assurance that their perspective is vital to work on human mobility in the context of climate change; they portray themselves as authoritative sources of knowledge; and they publicise their role in previous policy successes. Therefore, consideration of the creation and sustenance of this circle, and

the actors at its centre, can provide insights into how we know human mobility in the context of climate change.

In the policy-research-knowledge production circle surrounding human mobility in the context of climate change, four sets of boundaries of the thinkable have been drawn. The remainder of this section will be concerned with identifying these sets of boundaries, before some of the implications are touched on.

The first boundary of the thinkable is around human mobility in the context of climate change as a *problem* that needs to be *solved*; to once again cite Baldwin and Bettini (2017), it is »overly represented as a crisis that demands technical and expert solutions« (ibid.: 5). This particular boundary is very important for the policy element of the self-perpetuating circle identified above, as this boundary justifies the very existence of the circle. Therefore, knowledge products that sustain this idea are the ones that get filtered into policymaking spaces. Although dissident voices exist that question the suitability of policy processes as a response to human mobility in the context of climate change (see Baldwin 2017), or attempt to de-naturalise the existence of policymaking in this area (see Nash 2017), these rarely enter the circle.

The second boundary that has been drawn is around the spaces where work on human mobility and climate change should (legitimately) be carried out. For almost ten years, the premier stage for policymaking has been the UNFCCC. This setting alone is an indication of unequal power relations: the UN climate change negotiations can be impenetrable for outsiders, discussions are shrouded in jargon and abbreviations, and even once inside the negotiations as an observer, there are many closed spaces that are only accessible to UN insiders or State Parties. Therefore, power-knowledge relations are present both in the fact that only actors that have gained access to the UNFCCC are party to knowledge that is shared there, but also that in order to bring knowledge to the UNFCCC, actors need to have been deemed ›legitimate‹ and granted access.

In the research world, a geographical bias has also been observed in terms of where knowledge on human mobility in the context of climate change is produced. A study of the geographies of research in this field concluded that whilst the majority of case studies focus on the Global South, the majority are carried out by researchers based in the Global North (Guélat et al. 2016). Initiatives that focus on collating existing research (with the IPCC as a prominent example) will therefore also have this inbuilt bias. A geographical bias is therefore present not only in policymaking on human mobility in the context of climate change, but also in the production of knowledge through academic studies. This dovetails with an argument that has already been made by Baldwin (2017) that the discourse on climate change and human mobility represents a European form of power.

The third set of boundaries is somewhat more subtle and concerns what knowledge is deemed ›legitimate‹ and, in the context of the UNFCCC, admissible to the process. As an area that has been set up as demanding technical and expert solutions, knowledge has to conform to these codes in order to be deemed legitimate. For academia, this may mean publication in the correct journals or with academic publishers; in fora such as the UNFCCC, knowledge should conform to the language of the institution, and be presented in short, digestible formats. Here, the actors at the centre of the policy, research, and knowledge production circle, especially the Advisory Group, have become dominant, producing strict narratives that all members have agreed upon, and they have outlined these in very short documents, aimed at influencing policymakers (see Nash 2017). Their dominance can be equated with a gatekeeper role in the passage of knowledge into the UNFCCC.

The fourth set of boundaries are drawn around in what terms it is acceptable to talk about human mobility in the context of climate change. This refers both to the pure semantics of what terms are acceptable, but equally to the ideational components that are attached to them. The prevalence of UN actors in the discourse, as well as the desire to be policy-relevant on the part of academics, has contributed to an over-reliance on established categories of human mobility (see the dominant formulation of »displacement, migration and planned relocation« contained in the Cancun Adaptation Framework (UNFCCC 2010: 14(f)) and a fascination with distinguishing between different categories of movement based on the degree to which movement was forced or more-or-less voluntary. This leaves little room to conceptualise mobilities that fall outside of these categories, or outside of previously conceptualised types of movement, and this continues to bolster the role of UN agencies that have mandates defined around these terms.

These four sets of boundaries (which are by no means an exhaustive list) have the important implication for work on human mobility in the context of climate change that one type of elite knowledge (with particular geographical, institutional, and linguistic biases) comes to dominate. Knowledge that falls within the four sets of boundaries, and conforms to the expectations laid out therein, acquires truth effects. However, in order to open up this area of work to make knowledge production more diverse and accessible, an important question is: what voices are being excluded? What knowledges are being marginalised because of the knowledge narcissism displayed by the players at the centre of the self-perpetuating policy, research, and knowledge production circle? One startling omission is the voices of the people whose mobilities are/may be affected in the context of climate change. This is unsurprising in a discourse dominated by technical contributions and experts; however, it can nonetheless limit the perspectives represented.

Conclusion: Breaking the Cycle

This article has set out the argument that a self-perpetuating circle of research, policymaking, and knowledge production exists in relation to human mobility in the context of climate change, and argues, from the perspective of power-knowledge relations, that this circle revolves around a particular elite set of actors who promote their knowledge on human mobility in the context of climate change. A vital part of this circle has been the never-ending thirst for more knowledge, often pushed for and delivered by the same actors, and adhering to norms for knowledge production that they have already established.

The point of this argument is not simply to rock the boat, but should be read as a first step to opening up this circle to interrogation and expanding the boundaries of the thinkable. Staying within established fora such as the UNFCCC, a more open knowledge production process could heighten the transparency of policymaking processes and of academic research. It may also provide the impetus for previously marginalised voices to be included more fully. However, the real potential impact of this analysis is not within the tight confines of established policymaking processes. By casting the net more broadly, beyond the research, policy, knowledge production circle, new perspectives may come to light that would change the direction of how we think about human mobility in the context of climate change.

Literature

Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility (2014): Human mobility in the context of climate change. Recommendations from the advisory group on climate change and human mobility COP20 Lima, Peru. URL: iom.int [02.08.2017].

Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility (2015): Human mobility in the context of climate change. Recommendations from the Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility. URL: environmentalmigration.iom.int [22.02.2018].

Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility (2017): Submission from the Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility on possible activities under strategy workstreams of the five-year rolling workplan. URL: unfccc.int [02.08.2017].

Andersson, Ruben (2014): Illegality, Inc. Oakland.

Baldwin, W. Andrew (2012): Orientalising environmental citizenship: climate change, migration and the potentiality of race. In: Citizenship Studies 16 (5–6). 625–640.

Baldwin, W. Andrew (2015): Responsibility, politics and reason: A sympathetic comment on Castree. In: Dialogues on Human Geography 5 (3). 317–321.

Baldwin, W. Andrew (2016): Resilience and race, or climate change and the uninsurable migrant: Towards an anthroporacial reading of ›race‹. In: Resilience 5 (2). 129–143.

Baldwin, W. Andrew (2017): Climate change, migration, and the crisis of humanism. In: Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 8 (3).

Baldwin, W. Andrew / Bettini, Giovanni (2017): Introduction: Life adrift. In: Baldwin, W. Andrew / Bettini, Giovanni (Eds.): Life Adrift: Climate Change, Migration, Critique. London. 1–21.

Bettini, Giovanni (2013): Climate Barbarians at the Gate? A critique of apocalyptic narratives on ›climate refugees‹. In: Geoforum 45. 63–72.

Bettini, Giovanni (2014): Climate migration as an adaptation strategy: de-securitizing climate-induced migration or making the unruly governable? In: Critical Studies on Security 2 (2) 180–195.

Bettini, Giovanni / Nash, Sarah Louise / Gioli, Giovanna (2017): One step forward, two steps back? The fading contours of (in)justice in competing discourses on climate migration. In: The Geographical Journal 185 (4). 348–358.

Butler, Judith (1993): Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ›Sex‹. London.

CARE International / UNU (2012): Where the Rain Falls. URL: wheretherainfalls.org [02.08.2017].

Castree, Noel (2014): Making Sense of Nature. Abingdon.

Dean, Mitchell (2010): Governmentality. Power and rule in modern society. London.

Felli, Romain (2013): Managing Climate Insecurity by Ensuring Continuous Capital Accumulation: ›Climate Refugees‹ and ›Climate Migrants‹. In: New Political Economy 18 (3). 337–363.

Foucault, Michel (1977): Nietzsche, Genealogy, History. In: Bouchard, Donald F. (Ed.): Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews. Ithaca. 139–164.

Foucault, Michel (1980): Two Lectures. In: Gordon, Colin (Ed.): Michel Foucault. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings. 1972–1977. New York. 78–108.

Government of Norway (2011): Statement by Norway. UNHCR Ministerial Meeting of 07.12.2011. URL: norway-geneva.org [02.08.2017].

Guélat, Jérémie / Kaenzig, Raoul / Piguet, Etienne (2016): Géographie de la recherche. In: Ionesco, Dina / Mokhnacheva, Daria / Gemenne, François (Eds.): Atlas des migrations environnementales. Paris. 20–21.

Hall, Nina (2016): Displacement, Development, and Climate Change. International organizations moving beyond their mandates. Abingdon.

Haraway, Donna (1988): Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective. In: Feminist Studies 14 (3). 575–599.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014): Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge/New York.

Mayer, Benoît (2013): Constructing ›Climate Migration‹ as a Global Governance Issue: Essential Flaws in the Contemporary Literature. In: McGill International Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy 9 (1). 87–117.

McLeman, Robert (2014): Climate and Human Migration. Past Experiences, Future Challenges. Cambridge.

Melde, Susanne / Laczko, Frank / Gemenne, François (Eds.) (2017): Making mobility work for adaptation to environmental changes: Results from the MECLEP global research. Geneva.

Methmann, Chris / Rothe, Delf / Stephan, Benjamin (2013): Interpretive Approaches to Global Climate Governance. (De)constructing the greenhouse. Abingdon.

Methmann, Chris / Rothe, Delf (2014): Tracing the spectre that haunts Europe: the visual construction of climate-induced migration in the MENA region. In: Critical Studies on Security 2 (2). 162–179.

Myrttinen, Henri (2017): The Complex Ties that Bind: Gendered Agency and Expectations in Conflict and Climate Change-related Migration. In: Global Policy 8. 48–54.

Nash, Sarah Louise (2017): From Cancun to Paris: an era of policymaking on climate change and migration. In: Global Policy 9 (1). 53–63.

Nicholson, Calum T. M. (2014): Climate change and the politics of causal reasoning: the case of climate change and migration. In: The Geographical Journal 180 (2).151–160.

Nicholson, Calum T. M. (2017): ›Climate-induced migration‹: ways forward in the face of an intrinsically equivocal concept. In: Mayer, Benoît / Crépeau, François (Eds.): Research Handbook on Climate Change, Migration and the Law. Cheltenham. 49–66.

Rothe, Delf (2017): Gendering Resilience: Myths and Stereotypes in the Discourse on Climate-induced Migration. In: Global Policy 8. 40–47.

The Nansen Initiative (2015): Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change, Volume 1. Geneva.

UNFCCC (2010): The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1.

UNFCCC (2013): Report of the Conference of the Parties on its eighteenth session, held in Doha from 26 November to 8 December 2012. FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1.

UNFCCC (2016): Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first session, held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015 Addendum Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-first session. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1.

UN General Assembly (2016): Draft resolution referred to the high-level plenary meeting on addressing large movements of refugees and migrants by the General Assembly at its seventieth session: New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. New York, A/71/L.1.

UNHCR (2014): UNHCR, the environment and climate change. An overview. URL: unhcr.org [03.08.2017].

Warner, Koko (2012): Human migration and displacement in the context of adaptation to climate change: the Cancun Adaptation Framework and potential for future action. In: Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 30. 1061–1077.

World Economic Forum (2016): The Global Risks Report 2016, 11th edition. Geneva.

Other Paths, Other Destinations

Towards a Manifold Reading of Mobility across Borders

LÉONIE NEWHOUSE

Abstract: In the past years, there has been renewed scholarly interest in migrants arriving in, or on their way to, Europe. Much of this research takes the mobile migrant as its object, forwarding analyses that consider experiences of migrants, encounters on the frontlines of migration governance regimes, and the geopolitics of non-arrival policies along the routes towards Europe. While this work is crucial, it is important to critically reflect on how such analytical and methodological approaches reify contemporary migration in Africa as primarily oriented towards European destinations. In this essay, I reflect on how selection bias intrinsic in much qualitative migration research (including my own) shapes the stories we tell about migration. By reflecting on my own research with regional migrants in East Africa, I consider what can be gained by an attention to the manifold routes that channel, constrain, foreclose and open up mobility towards particular destinations.

Keywords: qualitative methodologies, African migration, Eurocentrism

In the past years, there has been renewed scholarly interest in migrants arriving in, or on their way to, Europe. Much of this research takes the mobile migrant as its object, forwarding analyses that consider experiences of migrants, encounters on the front-lines of migration governance regimes, and the geopolitics of non-arrival policies along the routes towards Europe. While this work is crucial, it is important to critically reflect on how such analytical and methodological approaches reify contemporary migration in Africa as primarily oriented towards European destinations. In this essay, I reflect on how selection bias intrinsic in much qualitative migration research (including my own) shapes the stories we tell about migration. By reflecting on my own research with regional migrants in East Africa, I consider what can be gained by an attention to the manifold pathways that channel, constrain, foreclose and open up mobility towards particular destinations.[1]

1 | There are many different ways that ›routes‹ are conceived of in scholarly literature. For some, routes describe the individual and collective trajectories of (migrant) journeys (Clifford 1997; Coutin 2005). More recently this route-based understanding has been taken up

In this paper, I want to focus primarily on scholarly knowledge production about migration, though I do so with a recognition that these are deeply inflected by a broader political discourse that sees migration as highly directional, moving from poorer less developed places towards more affluent places (see Berriane/de Haas 2012). I offer a reminder – because none of this is new – of some of the sticky methodological issues that, for the most part, are intrinsic to qualitative research on migration. Such a pause for reflection is critically important at this moment because recent events and political developments have prompted a spike in interest across the social sciences on themes related to refugees, clandestine migration and bordering policies. With this new cohort of researchers entering the field, care must be taken in research design in order to avoid reproducing powerful state logics that give undue attention to places like Europe, North America and Australia as the primary destinations for migrants around the world. Because much of this current turn concerns clandestine migration to Europe – whether undertaken in spaces of European migrant reception, on the shores of the Mediterranean, or further afield in places identified as nodes in trans-Saharan migration routes – and because my own research focus is on regional migrations in Africa, I use scholarly and policy representations of African migration as lens to highlight my concerns.

The paper is not meant as a rebuke of the vitally important and crucial work being done on modes of EU border externalization, and their impacts on migrants and societies in Africa. But rather, I want to read these studies and analyses against what I know from my own (and many others') research on the practices of mobility in Africa to question the ways in which intra-African migrations are often assimilated into framings that unduly center Europe as a destination.

METHODOLOGIES AND THE STORIES WE (CAN) TELL

It has long been recognized that research with migrants offers particular methodological challenges. Let us remember some of the reasons why: i) Migrants have different characteristics than people who do not migrate (Stark/Bloom 1985; Borjas 1987) or who migrate elsewhere (Taylor 1987), ii) Migrants can be hard to find (Massey 2004), in part because they do not always want to be found (Malkki 1995; Bloch

by policy makers and used to inform governance efforts that seek to control migration (see Casas-Cortes/Cobarrubias/Pickles 2015). I use this term to denote the particularity of mobility practices as they are shaped in relation to geopolitical and geo-economic factors, including state action.

2007; Rojas-Wiesner/de Vargas 2014; Turner 2016; Kihato 2007), and iii) migrants do not sit still (Beauchemin 2014: 929; Schapendonk 2012), which in turn requires more complex research design that can capture the processual and itinerant nature of migration. These social facts present some of the enduring obstacles to knowledge production related to migration. While some of these issues are of particular concern to those researchers working quantitatively (see Castles 2012), the question of how we as researchers can apprehend migration processes that extend across disparate locations and through time is vitally important (Silvey/Lawson 1999). And how we address these obstacles unquestionably influences the data we gather as well as what analyses it is possible to undertake and the interpretations we are able to offer (Jacobsen/Landau 2003). This remains the case even when researchers work from critical, feminist or other non-positivist theories of generalization (Silvey/Lawson 1999). It should be uncontroversial, then, to state that choices around research design shape who we talk to, the kinds of knowledge we produce, and the stories we tell. In what follows, I identify some trends in qualitative migration research design, and explore their consequences for our understanding of migration processes in Africa, Europe and across the Mediterranean.

Migration is and has long been a highly politicized topic of inquiry. As Jacobsen and Landau (2003) recognized fifteen years ago, much migration research, particularly when undertaken in times or events labeled as crises, is motivated in part by a desire to intervene in some way in the debates that swirl around a topic that is nearly always to some extent politicized. While Jacobsen and Landau focus primarily on forced migrants, the points they raise are also pertinent to understanding processes of migration that have more mixed motivations (see, for example, de Genova 2002). The politicized nature of migration generally, then, makes knowledge production about migrants and migration processes particularly fraught, as various actors including scholars, funders, functionaries, politicians and activists from across the political spectrum seek to shape discourse and policy towards particular ends (Berriane/de Haas 2012). Often the end goal of such knowledge production is to affect policy or shame states, whether this is to impose tighter restrictions (see for example the work of the Center for Immigration Studies in the US context), to push for greater rights for migrants and refugees through liberal (and libertarian) appeals to law and rights, or even to take more radical abolitionist critiques of containment (see for example Mezzadra/Neilson 2013; Loyd/Mitchelson/Burridge 2013). In such a contested social field, critical reflection about the ways in which our knowledge is produced, the underlying assumptions informing research design, how we define migrants and migration, as well as how we gain access to interlocutors is imperative if we are not to simply reproduce state logics (de Genova 2002).

One of the key points Jacobsen and Landau (2003) raise is that of how we go about selecting the people with who we speak, in their words the question of ›selection bias‹ in participant recruitment. While many readers who are committed to critical, ethnographic and or feminist approaches to knowledge production may veer away from the language of sampling, it is nevertheless worthwhile to pause for a moment and consider what qualitative research can gain from thinking rigorously about who we are (and are *not)* talking to, and how we find them. As my brief review above suggests, this is not such a simple question to answer given the challenges that migrants and mobile people pose to the standard modes of participant recruitment. To offer just one example: if we are interested in understanding the differential drivers of migration from a particular location, it would be particularly useful to generate qualitative longitudinal data – e.g., conduct long term field research – that captures the social, economic and political realities of those who migrate *and* those that stay put, a process that may extend across decades rather than the short field seasons which are the ambit of the established academic on research leave, or the field-work year of the doctoral student.

One of the most common methods of recruiting interlocutors in ethnographic and other types of qualitative research with migrants is through various modes of convenience sampling (Jacobsen/Landau 2003). This is a catch all term that includes such techniques as snowball sampling, some web-based surveys and social media methods, embedding within institutions or service organization, as well as some forms of geographical sampling – selecting people that pass through a particular location, to name just one example. What they share is the selection of participants based on those who are readily or easily available. But it should also be recognized that these ›convenient‹ modes of gaining access to migrants leave the decision about who participates to factors ›outside‹ of the research process – whether that is to key informants in the case of snowball sampling, to those with internet access and time on their hands in the case of web-surveys, to powerful institutions in the case of embedded research or to geographical processes. Given that research with migrants may be conducted in environments of legal jeopardy or contexts of social discrimination, this way of negotiating access is often critical to being able to do the research at all. It can help by offering anonymity or because it builds needed trust between the researcher and migrants (as when a researcher embeds with a migrant rights organization, for example), trust in the absence of which research would not be possible. But these techniques also demand our thought and attention to better understand, and perhaps account for, how they shape research results. As the limits and benefits of snowball recruitment (Biernacki/Waldorf 1981; Wright et al. 1992; Browne 2005), institutionally embedded ethnography (Campbell 2006; Mountz 2010; Newhouse 2015a; Jubany 2017;

Polzer Ngwato 2012) and digital methodologies (Postill/Pink 2012; Groves 2011) have been more widely discussed, I want to focus here on the final mode of convenience sampling I mentioned: where geography plays a ›deciding‹ role in the shape of selecting research participants.

Geography is a foundational and inextricable aspect of migration as a human experience, and thus it is central to scholarly treatments of the topic. More specifically, geographical containers – such as nation or city – have long shaped the study of migration (Ravenstein 1876, 1889). But it is with the emergence of intersectional feminist approaches to borderlands (Anzaldúa 1987), the rise of the concepts of transnationalism (Glick-Schiller/Basch/Blanc-Szanton 1992) and globalization (Appadurai 1996; Castles/Miller 1998) as well as the critique of methodological nationalism (Wimmer/Glick Schiller 2003) that migration scholars began, as a matter of urgency, to more seriously interrogate the underlying geographical assumptions and frames that shaped their work. This critical impulse lead to a reconsideration of some of the common sense ways of studying migration, away from *stocks* and toward *flows*. The result was a period of conceptual and methodological innovation, which sought in part to account for the geographical assumptions and limitations of migration research more explicitly (for a review of these developments see Levitt/Jaworsky 2007). This turn encompassed reworkings of qualitative research practices spanning from Marcus' (1995) evangelism for multisided ethnography, Coutin's (2005) ethnography »en route«, the emergence of the autonomy of migration approach (Bojadžijev/Karakayali 2010), to the new mobilities paradigm, drawing influences from actor-network theory (Sheller/Urry 2006). While each of these approaches differ, they share in common a distinct concern for the ways in which social life extends across space and through time. Here, space is not merely the background to a study, but fundamentally co-constitutive of the social processes and experiences which the research seeks to apprehend (see Massey 2005).

One result of this period of conceptual and methodological innovation has been an increasing tendency in recent decades in choosing to focus on specific sites or points of condensation where migration comes in to focus. Indeed, the last decade has seen a florescence of research on transit migration as well as compelling and insightful examinations of routes, way points and bottlenecks that migrants pass through, or remain stuck in, as they (attempt) transit elsewhere (see for example Schapendonk 2012; Collyer/Düvell/de Haas 2012; Hess 2012; Brachet 2012; Mountz 2011). The strength of this approach is in its ability to capture to some extent the processual nature of the journey, which had largely gone unexplored in research focused on sending and receiving contexts. Perhaps, this shift has been driven by externalization policy imperatives that have extended bordering practices outward from Europe, Australia

and North America, as de Haas has oft argued (de Haas 2008). But regardless of the origin, this route-based approach has come to be a new common-sense way to approach and understand migration. This trend has been particularly pronounced in relation to clandestine migration toward Europe.

But this approach, too, has particular limits and constraints. As scholars design research projects around particular ›flash points‹ of migration – the fences of Melilla and Ceuta (Collyer 2007), Calais (Millner 2011; Rygiel 2011) and the Chunnel (Zhang 2017), Lampedusa (Andrijasevic 2006; Dines/Montagna/Ruggiero 2015) and Lesvos (Franck 2017), Agadez and Ajdabiya (Brachet 2012), bottlenecks that might be viewed as gates to Europe – they will encounter there, primarily, those migrants who have already made the determination to head to Europe. In addition, perhaps, they might also meet a handful of discouraged migrants, ready to give up on that goal, and consider other options. But it is critical to remember that these bottlenecks and stop-over points are in themselves also a selection mechanism. Those people that find themselves in these locations, have already made substantial investments – material and imaginative – in the idea of a European arrival. They are already »en-route« to a specified destination (Coutin 2005; Andersson 2014). Otherwise, one would not find them there. So, regardless of the specific method or technique used to gather data – interviews, focus groups, participant observation or participatory methods – the data, in the form of migration narratives, trajectories and so forth, will tend to point in a particular direction: toward Europe.

This remains the case even (we might argue particularly) when the validity of results is checked through triangulation or through data saturation. Indeed, as a researcher, it becomes very powerful and persuasive to apprehend, until saturation, a certain set of co-ordinates. So powerful, in fact, that it can be difficult to hold in our heads, and in our writing, the other possibilities and other destinations, precisely because migrants to those locations do not appear to be apprehended – they are moving elsewhere. It is thus in the spirit of collegial critique, that I wish to read one recent study for what it *can't* tell us, for the gaps it has no means to bridge in order to explore the impact of letting geography decide. And in the spirit of fairness, I follow this with a discussion of what a similar critique might say to my own work.

Reading Routes Backwards and the Fantasies of ›Europe‹

To better understand the ways in which focusing on geographical ›flash points‹ of migration shapes the stories we tell about migration, I will focus on a large well-funded collaborative project that was conducted in the latter half of 2015 in the wake of Europe's so-called »long summer of migration« (Kasparek/Speer 2015). The Mediterranean Migration Research Programme (MEDMIG) was a multi-sited research program funded under an *Urgency Grant* scheme by the UK's Economic and Social Research Council in connection with the Department for International Development to the tune of one million pounds.[2] However, conditions tied to the funding stipulated i) that the research be policy relevant and ii) that data collection should be limited primarily to people on the European side of the Mediterranean (Sigoña 2017). The research design was specifically organized in an attempt to capture the diversity of irregular migration into the EU, by choosing several ›hot-spots‹ of arrival, and purposive sampling to reach various demographic groups (Crawley et al. 2015). Together, the research teams conducted 500 interviews with migrants, plus an additional 100 interviews with government and civil society actors to better understand the various meta-, meso- and micro-level factors that contributed to and shaped migrant journeys across the Mediterranean (Crawley et al. 2015).

The final report presents an empirical snap shot of the research results packed with direct quotes, maps, graphs, and tables that show the breakdown of their interview partners in terms of country of origin, gender, route and number of stops along their journey and closes with a series of policy recommendations. While the report sensitively makes an attempt to unpack the indeterminacy of migration decisions, and attends to the ways routes get constructed along the way, it nevertheless reproduces ›Europe‹ as the primary destination for migrants from the Levant, West and Central Asia, and much of Africa. Regardless of the critical stance on the part of the authors towards reifying migration towards Europe, the limitation of interviewing only those who managed to reach European shores means that routes are retrospectively constructed, both narratively and visually, as emanating from a diversity of locations but with only one single destination: Europe.

This is particularly true when considering the power of the maps they employ to frame the perception of migratory flows. As Elwood (2006: 325–7) and more recently

2 | As the images of migrants drowning in the Mediterranean splashed over TV screens, and filled the pages of newspapers across the globe, emergency funding was made available by policy-makers for scholars to help them make sense of the unfolding process.

Ciabarri (2014) and Tazzioli (2016: 5–6) argue, maps often have a particular authority and persuasive effect in political and policy debates, which *can* be used to confront and re-shape state logics, but which do not completely overcome, counter or step outside those logics. In this case, the image of multiple lines converging on Europe serves to reinforce a broader public perception of migration that is empirically more difficult to sustain. To be fair to the authors, the map does not claim to do anything more than depict the journeys of the people with whom researchers spoke; it is a descriptive representation without any claim to be representative or to form the basis of broader inferences. Yet, while it is true that more migrants arrived in Europe in 2015 than in the years previously, the *vast* majority of migrants from origination points depicted on the map did not in fact enter Europe, and may have little interest, aspiration or resources to do so. For example, in roughly the same period depicted in the map (the period running up to late 2015) Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran and Jordan were the top five refugee hosting countries in the world; Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya each hosted nearly as many displaced people as did Germany, Europe's top hosting country (UNHCR 2016); and intra-regional migration accounted for 65.6% of migration from countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Ratha/Eigen-Zucchi/Plaza 2016). Yet because of the way in which the research has been designed, none of these flows has the possibility to appear on the map or in the narratives conveyed in the text, effacing the most significant migrant trajectories in these regions.

To be clear, the research described above was well designed, rigorously executed, and produced important new knowledge about migration across the Mediterranean, which was after all its stated objective. Indeed, in the writing up of the report, the authors make the effort to complicate the simple story of linear migration routes toward Europe. Yet, even with such a critical stance, the story they are able to tell based on their data is one that puts Europe at the center. In reading the report for what it cannot tell us, the limitations that come with using geography as sampling frame become glaringly apparent.

This also highlights the ways in which political priorities and the funding streams attached to them serve to reinforce particular political (but also scholarly) narratives that frame migration as always in relation to certain kinds of destinations. The reason for this is two-fold. First, framing mobility and bordering practices around the idea of routes toward Europe, or naming the Sahara and the Atlantic and Mediterranean shore-line as »Europe's vast borderlands« (Andersson 2014) obscures long histories of mobility between African states, and re-writes contemporary migrations on the continent in narratives that center on events of European non/arrival. This turns a blind eye to the other destinations, trajectories, historical genealogies and cultural repertoires that animate cross-border migration on the continent (see

Bakewell/Jónsson 2011; McGlennen forthcoming; Maher 2017; Lydon 2009). Likewise, we know from years of research that the majority of international migrants originating in Africa remain on the continent (de Haas 2008; World Bank 2011), while new research is also beginning to show deepening migratory ties between Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Gulf (see for example Şaul/Pelican 2014, Flahaux/de Haas 2016; Chu 2015; Haugen 2012; Lan 2015; Heck 2014). All this to say that much of the migration on the African continent has no European destination. If Europe is not wholly irrelevant – as a foreclosed option, a choice not taken, or a force impacting the policing of intra-African borders – it certainly does not merit the central place it occupies in the scholarship and popular discourses which frame African mobilities.

Additionally, the construction of migrant routes after the fact from the perspective of particular destinations (in this case Europe) fails to meaningfully account for the indeterminacy of migration. This is to say that even when the open-ended, evolving nature of many migration journeys is mentioned, the narratives constructed from the vantage of points of arrival nevertheless inscribe a more linear understanding of specified routes. This backward-looking perspective ossifies trajectories that are often decided in an ad-hoc manner along the way and is ill-equipped to grasp the trajectories that just happened to lead elsewhere (see also Ciabarri 2014). In this way, the indeterminate nature of migration and mobility projects, which often have no consistently held destinations (see Landau 2012; Echeverri Zuluaga 2015), is likewise rendered more concrete and unidirectional than they are experienced. As an increasingly large body of literature on what has become known as stepwise or serial migration confirms, migrant routes and destinations are most often indeterminate, evolving and responsive to a variety of factors, from the possibilities of gaining legal status, to perceived economic opportunities, to rumors and information exchanges in chance and fleeting encounter en route (Steinberg 2015, 2016). As Binaisa and Jolivet (2016) have noted, migrants »search for life«, that is they search for places that offer some grounds on which they can build toward some future, some promise of a more stable or more prosperous situation; a territory from which they can expand their field of operations, or shore up the gains they have made along the way (Newhouse 2017b). In retrospect, trajectories that in the temporality of mobility choices are shifty and indeterminate, calcify into channels, conduits and routes.

A View from Juba

In the spirit of self-critical balance, I will now discuss my own research with migrants in Juba, South Sudan, taking up both the epistemic centering of Europe in scholarly and policy knowledge projects around migration, as well as the ways in which data-saturation produced its own blind spots. My research, conducted in the first half of 2015, focuses on regional migration circuits in Eastern Africa that complicate what is typically understood as ›crisis migration‹. In the East African neighborhood, these trajectories knit together the region, and yet often fail to appear in broader scholarly discussions (Newhouse 2017a). These are movements that flow into precarious or conflict-impacted contexts; economic migrant routes that often operate in parallel to, but distinct from, itineraries of displacement or refugee return. My interest, then, was to better understand the collective assemblages of migration journeys that play a generative role in the emergence, efflorescence and dissolution of boom-towns like Juba. And so I went to Juba to further understand the motivations, decisions and experiences of the tens of thousands of migrants from all over east and central Africa who found their way to Juba, lured to the city despite the violence and renewed conflict by a once promising economy: by the windfalls of new oil, international state building largess and a »virgin« country (Newhouse 2017b).

Yet, one day in May 2015, I found myself, quite by accident, discussing clandestine migration routes toward the Mediterranean with an official of the Ethiopian Embassy in Juba, South Sudan. I had not mentioned Europe when I had asked for an interview with the embassy.[3] I was there hoping to track down migrant numbers, numbers which are notoriously difficult to verify in any country with significant levels of un- and minimally documented migration. Did the embassy know how many Ethiopian nationals were in South Sudan, I asked. Where in the country did they concentrate? And for what kinds of issues did they seek consular support?

Instead of answering my direct question, the consular officer veered in another direction, toward what has been discussed in the academic literature as the »Euro-African borderlands« (Andersson 2014), by way of the Ethiopian government's efforts to tackle undocumented migration between itself and its western neighbor. While echoing rights-based discourses relating to migration, the consular officer spoke of the government's efforts to persuade potential migrants to remain in Ethiopia,

3 | While I had not mentioned Europe in any of my communications with the staff at the embassy, I offered my card when making my request for an audience with the consular officer which identified me as a scholar based in Germany. There is little doubt that my presence as a white, European-based scholar shaped how officials at the embassy chose to address me.

both through media campaigns exposing the »brutality of the migrant pathways« and through targeted capacity building efforts and microfinance projects. I found this performance intriguing, but also puzzling. It was clear that the embassy saw some benefit in presenting itself to me as a credible and *humane* partner in controlling migration towards Europe. And as I continued with interviews at the Embassies of Kenya, Uganda and Somalia the spectre of ›destination Europe‹ continued to surface, unbidden. My interest in migrant lives and experiences in South Sudan was understood not for itself, but rather through a lens firmly focused on the Mediterranean.

Some may say that I am reading too much into the appearance of a fantasy of ›destination Europe‹ in this interview, which might also be explained away by the accident of timing. As we drew into late spring and summer months of 2015, the so-called ›European migrant crisis‹ in the Mediterranean continued to unfold, with near weekly reports of dramatic rescues at sea, and even more tragic mass drownings (Collyer/King 2016). Additionally, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in cooperation with the European diplomatic mission were at that time putting pressure on the embassies in Juba to get a better handle on their nationals. But, I would argue instead that Juba was, just at that moment coming to be understood by experts and politicians as one of the way-points or stop-over grounds on a ›Central Mediterranean Route‹, which was also in construction. As the boats leaving the Libyan shores for Europe became ever more frequent after the fall of Qaddafi, there was a rush to gain verifiable empirical data on the irregular pathways originating in the East African Horn, with the migrant presence in Juba suddenly viewed in a new light.

This was so despite the fact that Europe, as a destination, was rarely mentioned when I was speaking with migrants themselves. The empirical ›story‹ that unfolded in the nearly one hundred formal interviews and the many more informal conversations I had with migrant entrepreneurs in the city, was one in which very few people expressed any interest in going to Europe clandestinely or for immigration purposes. This was as true of those with significant capital and expansive international networks as it was of street vendors and those building other micro-enterprises. A plurality of interlocutors was downright dismissive of the idea, preferring the risky but potentially much more lucrative prospects available to them where they were. A handful admitted to an interest in visiting Europe for reasons of trade, to source materials for import, tourism or to visit family or friends. Many more spoke of their desire to visit (but not necessarily migrate to) South Africa, Dubai, Istanbul, India and China, if they mentioned other destinations at all. As I have written previously (Newhouse 2017b), migrants continuously undertake a complex weighing out of the possibilities of all sorts of destinations, before deciding on a particular one. And these decisions are

constantly re-evaluated against prevailing political and economic conditions, shifts in visa regimes, and perceptions of opportunities on the horizon.

I recount my conversation with the consulate because for me, this interaction indexes a critical point in relation to the production of migration knowledge by drawing attention to the ways in which researchers, governments and international organizations fail to see particular places for what they are: destinations.

But is the only story to be told from Juba? It was certainly the one that emerged most compellingly from the data. Yet, as I have mentioned, even in my own research, the geographical frame – Juba – misses out on the various and complex process of migration that lead to other destinations, including Europe. Those other itineraries entered into my research only second-hand through the stories told of migrants who passed Juba fleetingly, or passed it by completely as they transited towards the Libyan shore or, to offer another example, back home to Somalia from South Africa (Newhouse 2015b). My approach, based in the tea stalls, markets and patios that shape commercial life in Juba was better poised to capture the regional nature of migration in the East African neighborhood. My interviews and observations captured something of the short-term cross-border trading circuits, including professional labor migration of the staff of international non-governmental and community-based organizations; those moving because their skills are more valued elsewhere; or those seeking to take advantage of differentials in currency values, or of labor- and trading markets less saturated by intense competition, or less constrained by political machinations. Given my location and research design, I was ill equipped to apprehend those other paths and other destinations. The muted presence of trajectories toward Europe from the vantage point of Juba, indeed, were so rare that they were overwhelmed by the preponderance of narratives that centered squarely on Juba, or that reached outward to cities like Dubai and Shenzhen. Because of this, I remained skeptical of the reality that – at least for some – Juba was, in fact, one of the staging grounds for what has come to be understood in policy circles as the ›Central Mediterranean Route‹.

Toward a Manifold Reading of Migration

In this essay, I have taken a critical look at recent migration scholarship to think through the relationship between methodology and knowledge production. I have focused on a new trend in qualitative migration research which implicitly or explicitly relies on geographical sampling to tell stories about migration, often from the perspective of migrants en-route. I traced out why this geographical approach gained traction, and pointed to some important tensions inherent in research designs which

let geography ›decide‹ who participates in the research, drawing examples from my own and others' research. In this final concluding section, I pull together the strands of my critique to argue for a manifold reading of migration which relies on sustained and critical reflection of the limits of methodologies and an openness to lateral collaborations to weave more indeterminate narratives of mobility across borders.

So, given this analysis, what happens if we take seriously the temporal and spatial unfolding of trajectories, *en media res*? Methodologically, what steps can critical qualitative researchers of migration undertake to better account for the situatedness of our research? And for the situated and manifold nature of migration itself? I have advocated here for manifold reading of migration, that is to say, a conceptualization which goes beyond an attention to stops, or stays (Crawley et al. 2015), to encompass a more fundamental questioning of what we understand as a destination in itself.

But how might we go about this? In conversations with critical migration scholars during the interstitial moments at conferences and workshops in the past few years, I have been struck by the way our data can overwhelm us, by the accretion of certainty that comes when a certain set of coordinates are repeated to us over and over again. I see reflected in others, the same sureness I feel of the migration stories I have to tell, even as these other stories diverge and contradict my own. And rather than view this as a problem for migration scholarship, I see it as a starting point of a manifold reading of migration. Because, in the multiplicity of stories, we need not find such accounts mutually exclusive, but instead we can view them as the raw material for more richly woven narratives of mobility across borders. This requires of scholars a modesty of claims, but also new ways of working in collaboration, of reading disparate work against each other to collectively give shape to new understandings, narratives and theorizations. Such a collective process of oblique or lateral comparison (see Robinson 2016), offers the possibility of constructing knowledge that more fully captures the indeterminacy and virtuosity of migration.

LITERATURE

Andersson, Ruben (2014): Hunter and Prey: Patrolling Clandestine Migration in the Euro-African Borderlands. In: Anthropological Quarterly 87 (1). 119–149.

Andrijasevic, Rutvica (2006): Lampedusa in focus: migrants caught between the Libyan desert and the deep sea. In: feminist review 82 (1). 120–125.

Anzaldúa, Gloria E. (1987): Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza. 3rd ed. San Francisco.

Appadurai, Arjun (1996): Modernity At Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Public Worlds, Vol. 1). Minneapolis.

Bakewell, Oliver / Jónsson, Gunvor (2011): Migration, mobility and the African city. In: International Migration Institute (IMI) Working Paper Series 50.

Beauchemin, Cris (2014): A Manifesto for Quantitative Multi-sited Approaches to International Migration. In: International Migration Review 48 (4). 921–938.

Berriane, Mohamed / De Haas, Hein (2012): New questions for innovative migration research. In: Berriane, Mohamed / De Haas, Hein (Eds.): African migrations research: innovative methods and methodologies. Trenton. 1–14.

Biernacki, Patrick / Waldorf, Dan (1981): Snowball Sampling: Problems and Techniques of Chain Referral Sampling. In: Sociological Methods & Research 10 (2). 141–163.

Binaisa, Naluwembe / Jolivet, Dominique (2016): ›We search for Life‹: Mobilities, infrastructure and the Congolese from Eastern DR Congo. Presented at Inhabiting the Corridors: A Workshop On Surging Resource Economies & Urban Life in East Africa, October 27–29, 2016. Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity Göttingen, Germany.

Bloch, Alice (2007): Methodological Challenges for National and Multi-sited Comparative Survey Research. In: Journal of Refugee Studies 20 (2). 230–247.

Bojadžijev, Manuela / Karakayali, Serhat (2010): Recuperating the Sideshows of Capitalism: The Autonomy of Migration Today. In: e-flux 17. URL: e-flux.com [26.01.2018].

Borjas, George J. (1987): Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants. In: American Economic Review 77 (4). 531–553.

Brachet, Julien (2012): From one Stage to the Next: Transit and Transport in (Trans) Saharan Migrations. In: Berriane, Mohamed / De Haas, Hein (Eds.): African migrations research: innovative methods and methodologies. Trenton. 91–113.

Browne, Kath (2005): Snowball Sampling: Using Social Networks to Research Non-heterosexual Women. In: International Journal of Social Research Methodology 8 (1). 47–60.

Campbell, Elizabeth H. (2006): Urban Refugees in Nairobi: Problems of Protection, Mechanisms of Survival, and Possibilities for Integration. In: Journal of Refugee Studies 19 (3). 396–413.

Casas-Cortes, Maribel / Cobarrubias, Sebastian / Pickles, John (2015): Riding Routes and Itinerant Borders: Autonomy of Migration and Border Externalization. In: Antipode 47 (4). 894–914.

Castles, Stephen (2012): Methodology and Methods: Conceptual Issues. In: Berriane, Mohamed / De Haas, Hein (Eds.): African migrations research: innovative methods and methodologies. Trenton. 16–36.

Castles, Stephen / Miller, Mark J. (1998): The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. New York.

Chu, Nellie (2015): Uncertain Encounters: African Migrant Entrepreneurs and Chinese Manufacturers. In: China Policy Institute: Analysis. URL: cpianalysis.org [26.01.2018].

Ciabarri, Luca (2014): Dynamics and Representations of Migration Corridors: The Rise and Fall of the Libya Lampedusa Route and Forms of Mobility from the Horn of Africa (2000–2009). In: ACME: an International Journal for Critical Geography 13 (2). 246–262.

Clifford, James (1997): Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century. Cambridge/Massachusetts.

Collyer, Michael (2007): In-Between Places: Trans-Saharan Transit Migrants in Morocco and the Fragmented Journey to Europe. In: Antipode 39 (4). 668–690.

Collyer, Michael / Düvell, Franck / De Haas, Hein (2012): Critical Approaches to Transit Migration. In: Population, Space and Place 18 (4). 407–414.

Collyer, Michael / King, Russell (2016): Narrating Europe's Migration and Refugee ›Crisis‹. In: Human Geography: a new radical journal 9 (2). 1–12.

Coutin, Susan Bibler (2005): Being en Route. In: American Anthropologist 107 (2). 195–206.

Crawley, Heaven / Düvell, Franck / Jones, Katharine / McMahon, Simon / Sigoña, Nanda (2015): Destination Europe. Understanding the dynamics and drivers of Mediterranean migration understanding the dynamics and drivers of Mediterranean migration in 2015. MEDMIG Final Report. URL: medmig.info [08.06.2018].

De Genova, Nicholas P. (2002): Migrant »Illegality« and Deportability in Everyday Life. In: Annual Review of Anthropology 31. 419–447.

De Haas, Hein (2008): The Myth of Invasion: the inconvenient realities of African migration to Europe. In: Third World Quarterly 29 (7). 1305–1322.

Dines, Nick / Montagna, Nicola / Ruggiero, Vincenzo (2015): Thinking Lampedusa: border construction, the spectacle of bare life and the productivity of migrants. In: Ethnic and Racial studies 38 (3). 430–445.

Echeverri Zuluaga, Jonathan (2015): Errance and elsewheres among Africans waiting to restart their journeys in Dakar, Senegal. In: Cultural Anthropology 30 (4). 589–610.

Elwood, Sarah (2006): Negotiating Knowledge Production: The everyday inclusions, exclusions, and contradictions of participatory GIS research. In: The Professional Geographer 58 (2). 197–208.

Flahaux, Maurice-Laurence / De Haas, Hein (2016): African migration: trends, patterns, drivers. In: Comparative Migration Studies 4 (1). 1–25.

Franck, Anja K. (2017): Im/Mobility and Deportability in Transit: Lesvos Island, Greece, June 2015. In: Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie 108 (6). 879–884.

Glick Schiller, Nina / Basch, Linda / Blanc-Szanton, Cristina (1992): Towards a definition of transnationalism. In: Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 645 (1). ix–xiv.

Groves, Robert M. (2011): Three Eras of Survey Research. In: Public Opinion Quarterly 75 (5). 861–871.

Haugen, Heidi Ø. (2012): Nigerians in China: A second state of immobility. In: International Migration 50 (2). 65–80.

Heck, Gerda (2014): Worshipping in the Hotel Golden Age. Transnational networks, economy, religion and migration of Congolese in Istanbul. In: Becker, Jochen / Klingan, Katrin / Lanz, Stephan / Wildner, Kathrin (Eds.): Global Prayers. Contemporary Manifestations of the Religious in the City. Zürich. 274–289.

Hess, Sabine (2012): De-naturalising transit migration. Theory and methods of an ethnographic regime analysis. In: Population, Space and Place 18 (4). 428–440.

Jacobsen, Karen / Landau, Loren B. (2003): The Dual Imperative in Refugee Research: Some Methodological and Ethical Considerations in Social Science Research on Forced Migration. In: Disasters 27. 185–206.

Jubany, Olga (2017): Screening Asylum in a Culture of Disbelief: Truths, Denials and Skeptical Borders. Cham.

Kasparek, Bernd / Speer, Marc (2015): Of hope. Hungary and the long summer of migration. URL: bordermonitoring.eu [12.06.2018].

Kihato, Caroline Wanjiku (2007): Invisible lives, inaudible voices? The social conditions of migrant women in Johannesburg. In: African identities 5 (1). 89–110.

Lan, Shanshan (2015): State regulation of undocumented African migrants in China: A multi-scalar analysis. In: Journal of Asian and African Studies 50 (3). 289–304.

Landau, Loren B. (2012): Hospitality without hosts: Mobility and communities in Africa's urban estuaries. In: Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research Seminar (19 March 2012). URL: wiser.wits.ac.za [08.06.2018].

Levitt, Peggy / Jaworsky, B. Nady (2007): Transnational Migration Studies: Past Developments and Future Trends. In: Annual Review of Sociology 33. 129–156.

Loyd, Jenna / Mitchelson, Mattew / Burridge, Andrew / Cowen, Deborah (Eds.) (2013): Beyond walls and cages: Prisons, borders, and global crisis (Vol. 14). Athens.

Lydon, Ghislaine (2009): On Trans-Saharan Trails: Islamic Law, Trade Networks, and Cross-Cultural Exchange in Nineteenth-Century Western Africa. Cambridge.

Maher, Stephanie (2017): Historicising ›Irregular‹ Migration from Senegal to Europe. In: Anti-Trafficking Review (9). 77–91.

Malkki, Liisa H. (1995): Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania. Chicago.

Marcus, George E. (1995): Ethnography in/of the world system: The emergence of multi-sited ethnography. In: Annual Review of Anthropology 24. 95–117.

Massey, Doreen (2005): For Space. London/Thousand Oaks CA.

McGlennen, Emma (forthcoming): Chapter 2: Yalla na Yalla nangu ziyaar: pilgrimage, piety, and production of elders in Working for another world: Senegalese Migrants in Morocco (unpublished doctoral dissertation). Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore.

Mezzadra, Sandro / Neilson, Brett (2013): Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor. Durham.

Millner, Naomi (2011): From »refugee« to »migrant« in Calais solidarity activism: Re-staging undocumented migration for a future politics of asylum. In: Political Geography 30 (6). 320–328.

Mountz, Alison (2010): Seeking asylum: Human smuggling and bureaucracy at the border. Minneapolis.

Mountz, Alison (2011): The Enforcement Archipelago: Detention, Haunting, and Asylum on Islands. In: Political Geography 30 (3). 118–128.

Newhouse, Léonie S. (2015a): More than Mere Survival: Violence, Humanitarian Governance, and Practical Material Politics in a Kenyan Refugee Camp. In: Environment and Planning A 47 (11). 2292–2307.

Newhouse, Léonie S. (2015b): Come tomorrow. URL: mmg.mpg.de [26.01.2018].

Newhouse, Léonie S. (2017a): Precarious Circulations of Aspirations in Juba. In: Cityscapes: The Corridor. 14–16. URL: mmg.mpg.de [12.06.2018].

Newhouse, Léonie S. (2017b): Uncertain Futures and Everyday Hedging in a Humanitarian City. In: Transaction of the Institute of British Geographers 42. 503–515.

Polzer Ngwato, Tara (2012): Collecting Data on Migrants Through Service Provider NGOs: Towards Data Use and Advocacy. In: Journal of Refugee Studies 26 (1). 144–154.

Postill, John / Pink, Sarah (2012): Social Media Ethnography: The Digital Researcher in a Messy Web. In: Media International Australia 145 (1). 123–134.
Ratha, Dilip / Eigen-Zucchi, Christian / Plaza, Sonia (2016): Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016. Washington D.C.
Ravenstein, Ernest G. (1876): The birthplaces of the people and the laws of migration. London.
Ravenstein, Ernest G. (1889): The Laws of Migration. In: Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 52 (2). 241–305.
Robinson, Jennifer (2016): Thinking cities through elsewhere: Comparative tactics for a more global urban studies. In: Progress in Human Geography 40 (1). 3–29.
Rojas-Wiesner, Martha Luz / De Vargas, Maria (2014): Strategic Invisibility as Everyday Politics for a Life with Dignity: Guatemalan Women Migrants' Experiences of Insecurity at Mexico's Southern Border. In: Truong, Thanh-Dam / Gasper, Des / Handmaker, Jeff / Bergh, Sylvia I. (Eds.): Migration, Gender and Social Justice. Perspectives on Human Insecurity. Berlin. 193–211.
Rygiel, Kim (2011): Bordering Solidarities: Migrant Activism and the Politics of Movement and Camps at Calais. In: Citizenship Studies 15 (1). 1–19.
Şaul, Mahir / Pelican, Michaela (2014): Global African Entrepreneurs: A New Research Perspective On Contemporary African Migration. In: Urban Anthropology 43 (1). 2.
Schapendonk, Joris (2012): Turbulent Trajectories: African Migrants on their Way to the European Union. In: Societies 2 (2). 27–41.
Sheller, Mimi / Urry, John (2006): The New Mobilities Paradigm. In: Environment and planning A 38 (2). 207–226.
Sigoña, Nando (2017): The Politics of Naming and Counting in the Refugee Crisis. Open Lecture, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity. March 30, 2017, Göttingen.
Silvey, Rachel / Lawson, Victoria (1999): Placing the Migrant. In: Annals of the Association of American Geographers 89 (1). 121–132.
Stark, Oded / Bloom, David E. (1985): The New Economics of Labor Migration. In: American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association 75. 173–78.
Steinberg, Jonny (2015): A man of good hope. New York.
Steinberg, Jonny (2016): The Vertiginous Power of Decisions: Working through a Paradox about Forced Migration. In: Public Culture 28 (1). 139–160.
Taylor, J. Edward (1987): Undocumented Mexico-US Migration and the Returns to Households in Rural Mexico. In: American Journal of Agricultural Economics 69 (3). 626–638.
Tazzioli, Martina (2016): Eurosur, Humanitarian Visibility and (nearly) Real-Time Mapping in the Mediterranean. In: ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies 15 (3). 561–579.
Turner, Simon (2016): Staying out of Place: The Being and Becoming of Burundian Refugees in the Camp and the City. In: Conflict and Society 2 (1). 37–51.
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2016): UNHCR statistical yearbook 2015.
Wimmer, Andreas / Glick Schiller, Nina (2003): Methodological nationalism, the social sciences, and the study of migration: An essay in historical epistemology. In: International Migration Review 37 (3). 576–610.

World Bank (2011): Global Bilateral Migration Database. URL: data.worldbank.org [03.04.2018].

Wright, Richard / Decker, Scott H. / Redfern, Allison K. / Smith, Dietrich L. (1992): A Snowball's Chance in Hell: Doing Fieldwork with Active Residential Burglars. In: Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 29 (2). 148–161.

Zhang, Chenchen (2017): Mobile Borders and Turbulent Mobilities: Mapping the Geopolitics of the Channel Tunnel. In: Geopolitics (ahead of print). 1–28.

Debatte

MARS Attacks!

A Cautionary Tale from the UK on the Relation between Migration and Refugee Studies (MARS) and Migration Control

JOSHUA HATTON

Abstract: This article makes four related arguments regarding the academic field of migration and refugee studies (MARS) in the UK and its relations of knowledge production with UK state agencies. The first, most empirical, argument is that the field's members harmed their human subjects by providing technical and symbolic assistance to two UK Home Office-managed organisations in controlling migration: the Advisory Panel on Country Information (APCI) and the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC). The second, most theoretical argument is that these MARS-UK state agency relations of production, and the harm that the field's human subjects experienced as a result, are intelligible as aspects of the neoliberalisation of the capitalist mode of production. The third and fourth arguments that are made in this article are more normative. One is that the similarities between the cases of MARS in the UK and the field in Germany warrant attention both to the latter's relations of production and to the effects that these might be having (or may have already had) on its human subjects. The other normative argument is that a ›critical‹ MARS is a structural impossibility.

Keywords: knowledge production, migration studies, refugee studies, migration control, United Kingdom

There is reason for researchers who prioritize the well-being of people categorized as migrants and refugees to be concerned about recent increases in both the rate of growth of the field of migration and refugee studies (MARS) in Germany and the availability of German state agency funding for MARS research.[1] The concern is warranted because these phenomena coincided as well in the UK between 1997 and 2010, when, under ›New‹ Labour governments, MARS academics' engagement with UK state agencies through knowledge production and exchange harmed the field's human subjects. In this essay, I describe how this happened and provide an explanation for why it occurred.

1 | This coincidence was noted by the editors of *movements* in the call for papers for this issue.

I make and support two main arguments. The first is mostly empirical and constitutes the bulk of the essay: MARS academics harmed the field's human subjects through their participation with two advisory bodies that were managed by the UK Home Office (the Advisory Panel on Country Information [APCI], and the Migration Advisory Committee [MAC]). They did so through knowledge production, thereby providing technical and symbolic assistance to ›New‹ Labour governments in prosecuting their restrictive migration control agendas. My other main argument is more theoretical: both the collaboration of MARS academics and the resulting injury are intelligible as aspects of the neoliberalization of the capitalist mode of production. As the UK state increasingly limited asylum and immigration, it also eroded UK academics' autonomy, resulting in a situation in which the field of MARS could develop only if it assisted ›New‹ Labour governments in bringing about these new migration controls.

In addition to these two primary, mostly analytical arguments, I make two secondary ones that are more normative and are discussed only at the very beginning and end of this essay. The first, which I have already mentioned, is that the structural similarities between the cases of MARS in the UK and the field in Germany warrant attention, both to the latter's relations of production and to the effects that these might be having (or may have already had) on its human subjects. The second concerns the ›critical‹ potential of MARS, and it is presented in the last few paragraphs of this essay.

In this article, I provide the evidence that is lacking in the existing scholarship claiming that MARS facilitated migration control by symbolic (legitimation, reification, etc.) and technical (i.e., provision of useful surveillance on targets of control) means. Malkki (1995), Chimni (1998, 2009), De Genova (2002), Black (2003), Peutz (2006), and Zetter (2007) have asserted that the field did so, but they provided very few (or no, in some cases) details on exactly *how* this happened.[2] I take an approach similar to that used by David Mosse (2005) in his study of an academic field that is closely related to MARS – i.e., development studies. Mosse's monograph

> »takes a close look at the relationship between the aspirations of policy and the experience of development within the long chain of organisation that links advisers and decision makers in London with tribal villagers in western India. [...] [I]t does not ask whether, but rather *how* development works« (ibid.: 2; emphasis in original).

2 | See Hatton (2011: 5–16, 19–21) for a more detailed analysis and critique of this literature. Hatton (2011) is available at the URL listed in the bibliography at the end of this article.

Below, I describe – following Mosse – a long chain of organisation that links MARS academics and their human subjects, which includes not only the researchers and the people they study, but also government officials and agencies, members and committees of Parliament, universities (and their research centres), commissioned reports, and money. I trace empirically a network linking the knowledge production with the harm.[3]

The interpretation that I offer in this essay for the network that I describe is historical materialist; my focus is on how material conditions constrain, but do not necessarily determine, human behaviour over time.[4] This approach is, of course, most closely associated with Marx and Engels, who wrote that »circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances« (Marx/Engels 1974: 59). We all *are made* and *make* as part of a mode of production, which Wolf defines as »a specific, historically occurring set of social relations through which labor is deployed to wrest energy from nature by means of tools, skills, organization, and *knowledge*« (1982: 75; emphasis added). Below, I show how MARS academics' harm of their human subjects through knowledge production took place in the context of the neoliberal transformation of the capitalist mode of production, which David Harvey (2007) describes as including attacks on workers both at the level of the state and on a global scale.

Before researching MARS academics, I *was* a MARS academic – albeit briefly. I began my DPhil in 2003 at the University of Oxford studying migrants as a member of its Centre on Migration, Policy, and Society (COMPAS), with its director as my supervisor. Before the end of my first academic term, I had changed the topic of my doctoral thesis; I switched from producing knowledge about migrants to doing so about MARS – the community of which I was a new member.[5] My membership, however, was short-lived. By the start of the 2004 academic year, I was no longer part of COMPAS and therefore was out of MARS, as well.[6] This article is based mostly on the work that I did between 2003 and 2010 for my doctoral thesis in social

---

3 | I understand my analysis to be an example of the use of Latour's (2005) actor-network-theory. See Hatton (2011: 15–19) for details.

4 | I am very ecumenical when it comes to social theory; I consider historical materialism to be *only one of many* legitimate and illuminative ways of understanding the phenomenon of MARS's harm of its human subjects. Additional interpretations of this relation that are more existentialist, on the one hand, and more structuralist, on the other, are found in Hatton (2011).

5 | See Hatton (2011: 3–5) for more details.

6 | My departure from COMPAS was involuntary. I was able to continue my degree at the university because I was a member of St. Antony's college and received funding not through COMPAS, but rather through the university's Clarendon Fund.

and cultural anthropology. I gathered information through methods that included participant observation, interviews, the analysis of official documents, and Freedom of Information Act requests.[7]

My essay is structured as follows. I begin by providing a brief history of the institutional development of MARS. Then I show how the field's boom, which began in 1997, was funded by the newly formed Labour government in order to acquire assistance from MARS in increasing restrictions on asylum and immigration. Next, I describe two Home Office-managed advisory panels (the APCI and the MAC), the ways that MARS academics participated in these organizations, and what the resulting harmful outcomes were for their human subjects. In the penultimate section, I explain how the complicity of MARS academics developed through the neoliberal capitalist transformation both of academic labour in the UK and of the mobility of labour at the global scale. In my conclusion, I discuss the similarities between the case of MARS in the UK and that of the field in Germany, and I end by offering some personal reflections on my findings.

MARS IN THE UK

I identify as MARS academics those people who are students, researchers, or faculty at universities and who also do one or more of the following: 1) produce knowledge about people objectified as migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, or about the processes in which they are the primary actors, such as migration, transnationalism, diaspora, and integration; 2) belong to research centres that specialize in this kind of production; 3) enrol in or teach on postgraduate courses based on this knowledge; 4) edit journals dedicated to these products; and 5) belong to one of a limited number of related professional associations.

MARS has emerged in the UK recently vis-à-vis other multidisciplinary or interdisciplinary academic fields of study, such as development studies.[8] Its first research centre – the Refugee Studies Programme (RSP) at the University of Oxford, which was later renamed the Refugee Studies Centre (RSC) – was established in 1982. Many subsequent additions, such as the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) at the University of Oxford in 2003, made migration an explicit focus of

7 | See Hatton (2011: 30–37) for a more detailed description of my methods.

8 | See Hatton (2011: 46–65) for a more detailed description of the growth of MARS in the UK.

their research. MARS's first journal – the *Journal of Refugee Studies* – was begun at the RSP in 1986. One of several that followed was the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* (in 1998), which has been edited by MARS academics at the University of Sussex Centre for Migration Research (SCMR). The International Association for the Study of Forced Migration – the field's first professional association – had its inaugural meeting in 1996.

The field's first degree course – the MA in Refugee Studies at the University of East London (UEL) – began in 1997. Later examples include master's and doctoral courses in Migration Studies (at the SCMR and COMPAS); Migration, Mental Health, and Social Care (at Kent); and Migration and Transnationalism (at Nottingham). In total, by the autumn of 2008, 16 centres had been established at 11 universities, five journals had been founded at three universities, four professional associations had formed, and 23 postgraduate courses had been offered at 11 universities. This institutional development is depicted below in Figure 1.[9]



Figure 1: Growth in the Number of UK MARS Centres, Courses, Journals, and Associations, 1982–2009

9 | The data upon which the graph in Figure 1 is based are presented in tabular form in Hatton (2011: 367).

As seen in Figure 1, above, MARS experienced a boom beginning in 1997. In the 14 years preceding this growth spurt, the field had established only four centres, one journal, one association, and zero courses. In the *12* years between 1997 and 2009, however, the field grew by 10 centres, four journals, three associations, and 25 courses. As I will demonstrate in the following section, this dramatic 1997-and-beyond expansion was the result of intensive and focused capital investment in the field by the state agencies of ›New‹ Labour governments.

›NEW‹ LABOUR'S FUNDING AND EXPECTATIONS OF MARS

The rapid post-1996 growth of MARS was made possible primarily by funding from UK state agencies. The injections into the field by these organizations of research funding exceeding one million pounds are listed in Table 1, below. The acronyms stand for the following: ESRC (Economic and Social Research Council), HO IRSS (Home Office Immigration Research and Statistics Service), DFID (Department for International Development), and AHRC (Arts and Humanities Research Council). The figure for the year 2000 is a conservative estimate for earnings during the six years covered by my sample. See Hatton (2011: 294) for details.

Year	State agency	Recipient(s)	Amount (£)
1997	ESRC	Transnational Communities Programme (Oxford)	3.8m
2000	HO IRSS	Various	1.2m
2003	ESRC	Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (Oxford)	3.8m
	DFID	Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty (Sussex)	2.5m
2005	AHRC	Diasporas, Migration and Identities Programme (Leeds)	5.5m
2006	DFID	Refugee Studies Centre (Oxford)	2.5m
2008	ESRC	Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (Oxford)	4.8m
		Total	24.1m

Table 1: Significant UK State Agency Funding for MARS, 1997–2008

These investments by state agencies directed by Labour governments were of vital importance to the MARS centres they funded. The centres relied heavily on external – i.e., grant and contract research – funding, the bulk of which they acquired from

UK state agencies and other governmental sources, as seen in the examples in Table 2, below.[10]

	Percentage of Total External Funding from	
MARS Centre (Years)	UK State Agencies	All Governmental Sources (including UK State Agencies)
COMPAS (2005/06-2006/07)	85	90
RRC (2003/04-2007/08)	70	77
SCMR (2003/04-2007/08)	56	84

Table 2: Percentages of Total External Funding from UK State Agency and Governmental Sources for Selected UK MARS Centres

That COMPAS, a centre with the word »Policy« in its name, acquired nearly all of its external grant income from UK state agencies and other governmental sources might be less surprising to the reader, perhaps, than the finding that the University of East London's Refugee Research Centre, an institution perceived by the field's members as being particularly pro-migrant and pro-refugee, and which a MARS master's student described to me in 2008 as having »a lefty bent«, received such a substantial portion of this type of income from such agencies. In other words, even the MARS centre that had a reputation for having the least governmental politics in the field acquired around three-quarters of its external grant income from governmental sources.

Labour government state agencies channelled large grants to the directors of MARS centres whom they knew through prior interactions. *All* of the directors of the UK state agency-funded academic centres listed in Table 1 had cooperated in one way or another with the Labour Party during either its opposition (i.e., pre-1997) or its government phase prior to the awarding of these funds. This collaboration ranged from doing contract research for the Home Office, to being a member of one of the Home Office's advisory panels, to standing for election as a Labour Party candidate.[11]

Once the Labour Party came to power in the 1997 general election, its governments proceeded to generate new and more restrictive primary legislation in the field of

Party in Government (Years)	Legislation
Conservative (1984-96)	Immigration (Carrier's Liability) Act 1987 Immigration Act 1988 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 Asylum and Immigration Act 1996
Labour (1997-2009)	Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 UK Borders Act 2007 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009

Table 3: Immigration Legislation Generated by Conservative (1984–1996) and Labour (1997–2009) Governments

migration at double the rate of the previous Conservative governments (eight in 13 years vs. four in 13 years), as seen below in Table 3.[12]

›Evidence-based policy‹ was implicit in the Labour Party's rhetoric during its 1997 general election campaign,[13] and it was also a slogan that the party used explicitly once in government to describe (and legitimize) its policy making process.[14] The Labour government turned to the fledgling academic field of MARS (and especially the directors of the field's research centres) for the ›evidence‹ – i.e., the technical and symbolic assistance that I describe below – that it needed for its increasingly restrictive ›evidence-based‹ asylum and immigration policies. In the following section, I describe how MARS academics answered the call through their knowledge pro-

10 | See Hatton (2011: 405–410) for a more detailed presentation of these data, which I acquired through Freedom of Information Act requests. RRC stands for the Refugee Research Centre at the University of East London.

11 | See Hatton (2011: 312–315, 413) for more details.

12 | See Georgi (2014) for an analysis of UK migration policy since 1997.

13 | The party's manifesto for the election famously included the following passage: »New Labour is a party of ideas and ideals but not of outdated ideology. What counts is what works« (Dale 2000: 348).

14 | See Parsons (2002), Wells (2007), and Boswell (2009) on the importance of the concept of ›evidence-based policy‹ for ›New‹ Labour.

duction and exchange activities with the Home Office's Advisory Panel on Country Information (APCI) and Migration Advisory Committee (MAC).

The Harmful Effects of MARS Academics' Cooperation with the APCI and the MAC

In this section, I show how MARS academics harmed their human subjects through relations of knowledge production and exchange with the Home Office-managed APCI and MAC. For each of these advisory bodies, beginning with the APCI, I describe the political context of its creation and activities, the involvement by MARS academics, the technical and symbolic assistance that this provided,[15] and finally, the harm that befell the field's human subjects as a result.[16]

The APCI

The creation of the APCI was mandated by the 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, and represents a concession by the Labour government to the members of parliament (MPs) and pro-refugee NGOs that opposed the inclusion in the Act of its ›Safe Country‹ (SCO) and ›Non-Suspensive Appeals‹ (NSA) provisions. These enabled the Home Office to ›certify‹ asylum claims that it rejected as being ›clearly unfounded‹, and to create and add to (with parliamentary approval) a list of countries that were ›safe‹ to be returned to by people whose claims had been refused. Additionally, the Act prohibited the appeal of asylum decisions *from within* the UK by people whose claims had been ›certified‹ as being ›clearly unfounded‹ and who were citizens of or were entitled to reside in states that were included on this list of ›safe‹ countries. Such people's presence in the UK was criminalized immediately, they were made eligible for deportation, and they could file an appeal of the rejection of their asylum claims only from outside the UK. Their appeals were ›non-suspensive‹ in the sense

15 | My findings on the usefulness to the UK Home Office of MARS academics and their research are similar to those of Boswell (2009), who found that expert knowledge on immigration had not only an instrumental function for the Home Office, but also those that were symbolic, which she terms »*legitimising*« (ibid.: 7, emphasis in original) and »*substantiating*« (ibid., emphasis in original).

16 | See Hatton (2011) for more detailed descriptions of these phenomena (ibid. 93–127 and 368–375 for the APCI, and ibid. 127–135 for the MAC).

that their deportation would not be suspended while they appealed, as it otherwise would have been.

The concerns of many of the opponents of the SCO and NSA provisions were assuaged by the creation of the APCI, because it was charged with assisting the Home Office in improving the quality of the Country Reports (CRs) that the Labour government had pledged to use when judging if a country was ›safe‹ enough to be added to the SCO/NSA list, which critics called the ›White List‹. CRs – descriptions of the human rights and security situations in particular states – were already in use by the Home Office for evaluating asylum claims and in the asylum appeals process, and they had been roundly criticized for years by pro-asylum NGOs for inaccuracies and omissions (Good 2007: 214–215; Huber/Pettitt/Williams 2010: 24–25).

The Labour government expected the APCI to help it to overcome the remaining opposition to its new additions to the ›White List‹ – resistance that is clear in the following statement made by a Liberal Democrat MP during parliamentary debate in 2003: »We are opposed in principle to the white list, and we shall divide the Committee on the matter, as we will the House [of Commons]. [...] The Government have been warned« (Hansard 2003). The Labour government's expectation of the legitimation of its SCO/NSA decisions by the APCI is clear in the following statement from the minutes of the panel's first meeting:

> »The Home Office commented that there had been some opposition to the addition of some countries to the NSA list. If the country information in relation to such countries [e.g., Country Reports] had been considered by the Panel, this may provide some reassurance that the decision to designate a particular country had been made on a sound basis« (APCI 2003: §3.8).[17]

The APCI first met in September of 2003 and held its last meeting (its thirteenth) in October of 2008.[18] MARS academics participated as the panel's unremunerated members (APCI 2008: §6.3; APCI n.d.) and as compensated commissioned researchers. By its tenth (March 2007) meeting, the panel had had 10 MARS academics as members. A chronology of the membership of these individuals during this period is shown in Table 4, below.

These 10 academics were based at six different universities, with only one academic being based at more than one university during the period of membership.

---

17 | The APCI's website is archived at The National Archives (2012).

18 | In 2009, the APCI was renamed the Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI). I discuss its continuation in a passage below, just before my conclusion.

		APCI meeting									
Member	University	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Prof. Stephen Castles (C)	Oxford	M	M	M	M	M					
Prof. Vaughan Robinson	Swansea	M	m	m	m	m					
Prof. Richard Black	Sussex	M	M	m	m	m					
Prof. Gil Loescher	Oxford		U	M	m	M	M	m	M	m	M
Dr. Khalid Koser (C)	UCL		M	M	m	m	M	M	N	N	N
Prof. Lord Bhiku Parekh	LSE, WM			m	M	M	m	m			
Dr. Alan Ingram	UCL							M	M	M	M
Dr. Chris McDowell	City								M	M	M
Prof. Roger Zetter	Oxford								M	M	M
Dr. Laura Hammond	Reading									M	M

Table 4: The MARS Academic Members of the APCI, their University Affiliations, and the Record of their Attendance for the APCI's First 10 Meetings. Key: M: Member and Attended; m: Member, but Did Not Attend; U: Member, but University Undetermined; N: Member, but Not Academic; C: Chair

Half were the directors of MARS centres at the time they joined the panel. Two (Professors Castles and Zetter) directed Oxford's RSC. The other three (Dr. McDowell and Professors Robinson and Black) did so for City University's Information Centre on Asylum and Refugees; the University of Wales, Swansea's Migration Research Unit; and the SCMR, respectively.

MARS academic panel members provided technical assistance to the Home Office and thereby harmed their human subjects by aiding the Home Office in its production of the CRs that were used in the asylum determination and appeals processes. APCI-commissioned researchers edited these CRs – sometimes multiple drafts of the same report – for accuracy, comprehensiveness, representativeness, and structure. APCI panel members identified the researchers to be awarded these contracts. Between its first and its seventh (March 2006) meetings, MARS academic panel members channelled 12 research contracts, worth slightly under £5,000 each, for CR evaluations, to

themselves (Dr. Koser and Prof. Black), their MARS centre or university colleagues, and academics at other UK universities.[19]

Many of the commissioned analyses – especially the early ones – criticized the CRs. For example, Dr. Koser and Ms. Ceri Oeppen, a MARS graduate student at the SCMR,[20] found »many examples of a lack of accuracy, representativeness and comprehensiveness« in the April 2004 CR on Afghanistan (APCI 2004a: 5). Their »Overall Assessment« that they gave several months later of the Home Office's revised CR was much more positive:

> »The October 2004 report is a significant improvement on that of April 2004. Some problems have persisted, but on the whole even these would appear to have less serious implications than previously. We have fewer reservations over the value of the current report as evidence in assessing asylum claims from Afghanistan« (APCI 2005: 6).

By the panel's seventh (March 2006) meeting, both commissioned researchers and panel members were giving the CRs very positive evaluations. For example, the minutes of this meeting included the following statement: »The Chair agreed that with the consistently good standard of COI Reports [i.e., CRs] now being produced, the issue of ›diminishing returns‹ would need to be considered by the Panel« (APCI 2006: §3.12). In other words, he judged that the panel had improved the quality of the CRs so much that the very minor problems that the CRs had at that point no longer warranted the large amount of effort that was required by the APCI to do its work.

The Home Office used the CRs, which MARS academics had helped to produce, to harm the field's human subjects by rejecting asylum claims and challenging asylum appeals. Home Office officials compared the statements made by asylum applicants with the information contained in CRs, and they rejected claims when the testimony did not match with the documents (Huber/Pettitt/Williams 2010: 24; Morgan et al. 2003). Furthermore, Home Office presenting officers used CRs to challenge the testimony of people who were appealing the rejection of their asylum claims before the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (ibid.). The reliance on and trust in the CRs by the tribunal's judges has been confirmed by both an ethnographer of the asylum process (Good 2007: 215) and the tribunal's vice president (APCI 2004b: §3.5).

MARS academics participating with the APCI provided the Home Office with not only technical assistance, but also that which was symbolic. By giving positive eval-

---

19 | See Hatton (2011: 370–373) for more details.

20 | Ms. Oeppen would go on to become a member of the APCI/IAGCI. For an analysis of the pedagogic assistance that the APCI provided to the Home Office, see Hatton (2011: 121–123).

uations of CRs, they helped Labour governments to overcome parliamentary opposition to their policies that were harmful to the field's human subjects. The positive assessments of CRs that appeared in panel-commissioned analyses and those that were given verbally during panel meetings were used by government representatives while arguing for adding countries to the ›White List‹ during parliamentary debate. An illuminative example is that of India.

The APCI met on 7 December 2004 (its fourth meeting) to discuss the evaluation that it had commissioned of the India CR. At the end of the presentation and discussion of the commissioned analysis, the panel's chair (Prof. Castles) is minuted as stating that the report was »basically sound« (APCI 2004c: §3.18) and that »the view of the meeting was that, despite some problems, the Country Report was generally a fair reflection of the country situation and source material« (ibid.: §3.21).

Two months later, on 8 February 2005, the government's immigration minister made its case in a House of Commons committee for adding India to the SCO/NSA list. In his response to the second question from an opposition (Liberal Democrat) MP during the debate, the minister told the committee that the government had made a commitment to ask the »independent« (Hansard 2005) APCI to evaluate the CRs that it used when deciding whether or not to add a country to the list, and that it had done so with India (ibid.). He stated – echoing the APCI's chair – that »the panel had a few concerns about the way in which the country report was structured, but it concluded that it was generally a fair reflection of the position in India« (ibid.). Aside from issues of »presentation«, he continued, »the independent advisory panel found that our country information on India was essentially sound« (ibid.). Moments later, the committee agreed to the addition of India to the SCO/NSA list.

The order adding India to the list took effect on 14 February 2005. By 30 September 2005, the asylum claims of 390 people who were identified as being Indian citizens (out of 470 people identified as such who had been refused) were ›certified‹ by the Home Office as being ›clearly unfounded‹ (UK Home Office 2005: 4, 13). Their presence in the UK was consequently criminalized, and they were made bureaucratically eligible for arrest, imprisonment, and deportation. Having shown how MARS academics harmed their human subjects through their participation with the APCI, I next proceed to relate how they did so, as well, by working with the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC).

The MAC

The political context of the founding of the MAC differed significantly from that of the APCI. The Labour government – especially its Home Office – was under extreme

pressure in the spring of 2006 following election losses, a scandal over the release of ›foreign nationals‹ from UK prisons, and a general increase in anti-immigrant sentiment. It responded by appointing a new home secretary, John Reid, to head the Home Office, and by introducing a new ›points-based immigration system‹ that would discriminate against so-called ›low-skilled workers‹.[21] Secretary Reid stated to a parliamentary committee in December of 2006 that, alongside the introduction of this new system, he »personally would like to see an independent Migration Advisory Committee, a committee independent of government, which indicates to government publicly advice on the most beneficial level of immigration« (Select Committee on Home Affairs 2006). He got his wish: the Home Office-managed MAC first met a year later in December of 2007 and had met 22 times by January of 2010.

MARS academics harmed their human subjects via their participation in the MAC by providing the Home Office with technical assistance in restricting immigration. This assistance took the form of research that analysed the participation of migrant workers in the UK labour market. MARS academics participated in the MAC in two ways; several were its commissioned researchers, and one was a member of the committee. The MAC commissioned seven reports on labour shortages and immigration from 13 authors, one of whom was Dr. Andrew Geddes, a MARS academic at the University of Sheffield. The committee also commissioned a study by MAC member Dr. Martin Ruhs and his COMPAS colleague, Dr. Bridget Anderson, which synthesized the findings of these reports. Two additional members of COMPAS – researcher Dr. Rutvica Andrijasevic and a graduate student[22] – assisted Dr. Ruhs and Dr. Anderson on the project (Geddes 2008: 3–4), which the centre received £37,250 to carry out (Economic and Social Research Council 2008).

Dr. Anderson and Dr. Ruhs described their commissioned study in the following way: »This paper [...] provide[s] an independent analysis and assessment of the nature and micro-level determinants of staff shortages and the employment of migrants in key sectors and occupations of the UK economy« (Anderson/Ruhs 2008: 3). The information contained within the other MAC-commissioned reports was indeed included by Dr. Anderson and Dr. Ruhs in their synthesis. For example, they cited Dr. Geddes' paper for the finding that »nearly 90 percent of agency workers employed in second stage food processing businesses were migrants« (ibid.: 18). They concluded the review's executive summary section as follows: »[A]n incremental approach that encourages employers to pursue alternatives to immigration [i.e., migrant

21 | See Georgi (2014: 120–122) for more details.

22 | I have omitted the student's name.

labour] may be more successful than a ›big-bang‹ approach that suddenly and significantly reduces access to migrants« (ibid.: 8). The overview paper was one of several others that were brought together by MARS academic Dr. Ruhs and his MAC colleagues in producing another report: »Skilled, shortage, sensible« (UK Border Agency 2008).[23] This study identified the ›skilled‹ occupations for which its authors claimed that there was a labour shortage in the UK that could »sensibly be filled by immigration from outside the European Economic Area« (ibid.: 11), and those that supposedly could not.

On 9 September 2008 the Home Office publicized the presentation of the MAC's »Skilled, shortage, sensible« report in a press release that quoted the border and immigration minister, Liam Byrne, as follows:

> »Our new Australian-style points system is flexible to meet the needs of British business while ensuring that only those we want and no more can come here to work. This tough new shortage occupation list supports that. [...] We are grateful for the work the Migration Advisory Committee has carried out. We will be pressure testing their conclusions before publishing our final list in October« (UK Home Office 2008a).

The Home Office announced the new shortage occupation list on 11 November 2008, stating in its press release: »Today's list is tighter than ever before [...]. The number of positions available to migrants has been reduced from one million to just under 800,000« (UK Home Office 2008b). As a result, as the *Daily Telegraph* then reported, »thousands of foreign GPs, midwives and care workers will continue to find it far harder to come after such jobs were excluded from the list« (Whitehead 2008).

MARS academic Dr. Ruhs of COMPAS provided symbolic assistance, as well, to the Labour government through his activities with the MAC. He was listed as a co-author on a number of MAC reports in addition to »Skilled, shortage, sensible«. In one, Dr. Ruhs and his colleagues studied the potential economic impact of removing the UK's employment restrictions on people with Bulgarian and Romanian citizenship, concluding: »**We do not recommend fully removing UK labour market restrictions on employment of A2** [i.e., Bulgarian and Romanian] **nationals**« (Migration Advisory Committee 2008: 8–9, bold in original). In a second report, Dr. Ruhs and his MAC colleagues addressed the potential labour market impacts of the abolition of the Worker Registration Scheme (WRS) – a UK policy that required people with citizenship of one of the eight new accession states of the European

---

23 | Chapter 8 of this report includes the following statement: »We draw heavily on Anderson and Ruhs (2008), which was commissioned by us« (UK Border Agency 2008: 135).

Union (A8) to apply (along with a fee) to register their employment when working for a particular employer in the UK for more than a month (Migration Advisory Committee 2009). The foreword of this report included the following: »[W]e recommend maintaining the WRS [...] because, if [it] were [...] ended, the labour inflow from the A8 countries would probably be a little larger than otherwise« (ibid.: 4).

The Home Office used these recommendations to overcome parliamentary opposition to its restrictive policies targeting migrant workers from the EU accession countries. In May of 2009, the Home Office minister for borders and immigration invoked the authority of the MAC and its findings when seeking (and ultimately receiving) approval from the House of Commons European Committee for keeping both the work permit restrictions on prospective migrants in the A2 countries and the WRS for migrant workers from the A8 states (Hansard 2009). The Minister told the Committee in his opening statement that the Government had »sought expert advice« (ibid.) from the MAC on whether or not to continue these restrictions, and the MAC had recommended that both be maintained (ibid.).

The pre-emptive nature of the Home Office minister's inclusion of MAC findings and recommendations was demonstrated by statements that were made during the subsequent debate on the matter by two MPs – one Conservative and one Liberal Democrat. Both argued against the maintenance of restrictions on the grounds that these were »an interference to the way in which businesses go about their work« and a violation of »the principle of extending freedom of movement«, respectively (ibid.). Despite this opposition from two of its members, the European Committee agreed to endorse the Home Office's restrictive policy.

Table 5, below, summarizes the evidence that I have presented in this section on the ways that MARS academics harmed their human subjects through their cooperation with the APCI and the MAC.

Having described the ways that MARS academics harmed their human subjects through their knowledge production and exchange practices with the APCI and the MAC, I now proceed with an historical materialist interpretation of these phenomena.

MARS Academics' Knowledge Practices and Harming of their Human Subjects as Aspects of Neoliberalization

Both the relations of production and exchange of MARS, and the resulting harm that befell the field's human subjects that I described above are intelligible as aspects of the neoliberalization of the capitalist mode of production. Harvey (2007) discusses

Type of Assistance Provided to the Home Office	Specific Activities of MARS Academics	Harmful Home Office Practices Assisted
Technical		
APCI	Co-produce (edit) country reports	Reject asylum applications and challenge appeals
MAC	Describe the participation of migrant workers in the UK labour market	Select occupations to restrict for work visas
Symbolic		
APCI	Give positive evaluations of Country Reports	Acquire parliamentary consent for adding countries to the SCO/NSA list
MAC	Recommend maintaining labour market restrictions on migrant workers from the A2 and A8 countries	Acquire parliamentary consent for maintaining labour market restrictions on migrant workers from the A2 and A8 countries

Table 5: Types of Assistance Provided by MARS Academics to the Home Office (HO), the Specific Activities of these MARS Academics, and the Harmful HO Practices that They Assisted

this reorganization of global capitalism that has occurred during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. »The general attack against labour« during this period, he observes, »has been two-pronged« (ibid: 168). At the scale of the state, there has been the erosion of workers' autonomy. At the global scale, there has been the restriction of workers' mobility.

The Erosion of Academic Workers' Autonomy

The position of academics at UK universities has been weakened significantly by UK state agency actions since the coming to power of the Conservatives in 1979. According to the anthropologist of education, David Mills (2008), the »political economy of the social sciences in the UK has changed profoundly since the 1980s« (ibid.: 180). Per-student funding has been cut, the security of tenure has been abolished, and audit technologies (such as the Research Assessment Exercise/Research Excellence Framework) have been introduced (Tapper 2007; Shore/Wright 2000).

An effect of these actions is that UK-based academics have been increasingly required to generate revenue through entrepreneurial activity – especially via contract research (Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Etzkowitz 2001; Lucas 2006; Allen/Imrie 2010). Research activity by academics has been largely commodified. Imrie has characterised this commercialization of academic activity as being a »scramble for cash« (Imrie 2010: 38). That MARS academics were obliged to participate in this scramble, as well, is clear in the published statements of its high-ranking figures. For example, APCI chair Castles observed that when studying forced migration from a sociological perspective, »researchers often have no choice but to seek their funding from policy bodies (like the Home Office or the European Commission)« (Castles 2003: 26).[24]

The financial dependency that I described above of MARS on governmental agencies has strongly conditioned the behaviour of its members. Again, the field's high-ranking members have stated publicly that this has been the case. For instance, a former director of Oxford's Refugee Study Centre (RSC), David Turton, wrote the following of the MARS sub-field of Refugee Studies: »Its concern to be ›relevant‹ (and, it must be admitted, its need for funding) led it to adopt policy related categories and concerns in defining its subject matter and setting its research agenda« (Turton 2003: 1).[25] Several years before becoming the director of the RSC and joining the APCI, Prof. Zetter indicated in a publication that MARS academics' financial dependency obliged them not only to make changes in their research agenda, methods, and findings,[26] but also to engage in what anthropologists call gift exchange (Mauss 1990) with their governmental patrons.

The paper that Prof. Zetter presented at the Home Office-organized ›Bridging the Information Gaps‹ conference in London in 2001 included a statement on how he saw his being asked by the Home Office to describe and evaluate their contract research relationship publicly at the event:

> »I have been passed a slightly poisoned chalice. If I am too critical of the relationship we have had with the Home Office, then we may well exclude ourselves from any future tendering!« (UK Home Office 2001: 21)

Commodity exchange – i.e., money for research (Prof. Zetter's »future tendering«) – depended on gift exchange – i.e., an unremunerated, public, and positive evaluation

---

24 | For similar statements, see Black (2001: 61), Castles (2007: 363), and Favell (2007: 265).

25 | See also Castles (2007: 363) for a similar statement about sociologists studying migration.

26 | See Castles (2007: 363) for his statement about pressure to change findings.

of his commodity exchange experience. I posit that the unremunerated participation of MARS academics with the APCI and MAC was also a gift.

This interaction bears a strong resemblance to the *kula* system of the people of the Trobriand Islands famously analysed by Malinowski (1932) and re-interpreted by Mauss (1990) in classics of anthropology and sociology, respectively, in the 1920s. Both the *kula* and the exchange that I described above involved high-status individuals (recall that half of the MARS academic members of the APCI were centre directors; another had already been made a peer in the UK Parliament House of Lords). Both were »trade [...] of a noble kind« (ibid.: 28). Furthermore, in both cases, the ostensibly voluntary was actually obligatory (ibid.: 7); in Malinowski's terms, »*Noblesse oblige*« (Malinowski 1932: 97).[27] The multimillion pound grants that Labour government agencies made to MARS centre directors who were already known to and trusted by Home Office officials were counter-gifts in their developing reciprocal relationship.[28]

Additionally, the MARS academic-Home Office *kula*-like relationship »form[ed] the framework for a whole series of other exchanges« (Mauss 1990: 27), such as the vital commodity exchange of contract research with UK state agencies, which is akin to the Trobriand *gimwali* – i.e., »commonplace exchanges« (ibid.).[29] In sum, MARS academics' structural need for funding influenced their decisions to participate in the knowledge production and exchange activities of the APCI and MAC; this interaction provided them with relatively small, short-term research contracts and the opportunities both to distribute these to their institutional colleagues and to gain the favour of state agencies with the potential to allot future contracts and grants of varying sizes and durations.

The Restriction of Mobility

According to Harvey, the »second prong« (Harvey 2007: 168) of the attack on labour under the neoliberal reorganization of capitalism has involved the restriction of work-

---

27 | See also the statement in Hatton (2011: 187) by one of Zetter's RSC colleagues, who told me that Zetter was obliged to join the APCI because he had become the director of the RSC.

28 | See Hatton (2011: 311–316) for further details.

29 | My use here of Malinowski and Mauss is, of course, somewhat ironical. By bringing these concepts from the colonial era to bear on my object of analysis, I hope to give my MARS academic readers an epistemological nudge that will encourage them to relativise their own practices and ideas.

ers' mobility (ibid.: 168–169).[30] European colonialism had extended the capitalist mode of production – and its »characteristic capital-labor relationship« (Wolf 1982: 383) – into areas previously dominated by tributary and kin-based modes (ibid.). In the neoliberal capitalist present, the »main axis of geographical differentiation at the [global] scale« is, according to Neil Smith, the »differential determination of the value of labor power, and the geographical pattern of wages thus effected« (Smith 2008: 187).

State migration controls have functioned within the post-colonial and neoliberal capitalist modes of production to help to reproduce global inequalities in labour power, and consequentially, wage differentials. By deterring and preventing people in low-wage areas from using relatively inexpensive means of transportation to access areas with higher wages, state migration controls have helped to produce the former as »areas of redundant labor supply and lower labor costs« (Wolf 1982: 382). People who have been ›kept in their place‹[31] have supplied capitalists with reserves of low-cost labour for both a) importation, and b) work with exported capital.[32]

The MARS knowledge production and exchange practices through the APCI and the MAC that I have described can be understood as the actions of members of the managerial class, whose role is to help the capitalist state to »maintain and further the strategic relationships governing the [...] deployment of social labor« (Wolf 1982: 308). »Like workers, they are exploited by capitalists (who make a profit from managerial work), yet like capitalists themselves they dominate and control workers« (Scott/Marshall 2009). In sum – and in keeping with Harvey's metaphor – the knowledge practices of MARS academics in the UK and the injury that these activities caused their human subjects can be conceptualized as an area of human activity that had been skewered by both prongs in capital's neoliberal feast on labour.

Evidence that the carving fork is still firmly stuck in and the cutting goes on is the continued activity and membership characteristics of the APCI and MAC in the present. Despite the change from a Labour to a Conservative government in 2010, both panels have remained active and have included MARS academics as par-

30 | See also De Genova (2002: 439–440).

31 | This phrase is inspired by Bakewell's clever title for his article, »Keeping Them in Their Place« (Bakewell 2008).

32 | See Castles/Kosack (1973: 480–482) and De Genova (2002: 440–441) for additional effects of migration controls that assist in reproducing the subordination of labour to capital. See also Georgi (2016) for an alternative historical materialist interpretation of migration control.

ticipants.[33] MARS academics from Oxford, Sussex, and UCL are still members of the APCI (now called the Independent Advisory Group on Country Information [IAGCI]),[34] and Oxford's COMPAS still has its representative on the MAC.[35] This trade between MARS and the UK Home Office also continues to be of a noble kind. Current APCI/IAGCI members include the co-chair of UCL's Migration Research Unit and the director of research and knowledge exchange (!) at the University of Sussex.[36] Additionally, the current chair of the MAC was formerly the head of the Economics Department at London School of Economics, and one of the committee's members directs the Migration Observatory at Oxford's COMPAS.[37] ›New‹ Labour may be a thing of the past, but the neoliberalization of capitalism and its associated relations of production among the UK Home Office, MARS academics, and their human subjects that were established during the party's time in government persist.

Conclusion

In this essay, I demonstrated that it was through their knowledge production and exchange with the UK state agencies of the APCI and the MAC that MARS academics in the UK facilitated migration control and thereby harmed the people that they studied. I also explained these phenomena as emerging in the context of neoliberal capitalism's attacks on labour via the erosion of the autonomy of academics in the UK and the increasing restriction of the international movement of workers.

I called this essay a cautionary tale in its subtitle because of the similarities that exist between the cases of MARS in the UK and in Germany in two main areas. One is that of the coincidence of increases in state agency funding for MARS and the rate of growth of the field. The UK state provided at least £24m over a 10-year

---

33 | In 2009, the APCI was renamed the Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI). At the time of writing, its chair (Dr. Laura Hammond) and four »independent members« (Dr. Ceri Oeppen, Dr. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyehare, Dr. Michael Collyer, and Dr. Patricia Daley) were MARS academics (Gov.UK: 2016). Also, at the time of writing, the MAC's chair (Prof. Alan Manning) and two (Prof. Jackline Wahba and Ms. Madeleine Sumption) of its three members were MARS academics (Gov.UK: 2018).

34 | They are Prof. Daley of Oxford, Dr. Collyer and Dr. Oeppen of Sussex, and Dr. Fiddian-Qasmiyehare of UCL.

35 | Ms. Sumption directs the Migration Observatory at COMPAS.

36 | They are Dr. Fiddian-Qasmiyehare and Dr. Collyer, respectively.

37 | They are Prof. Manning and Ms. Sumption, respectively.

period, and the German state appears to be funding MARS at a comparable rate, with millions of euros for the field in 2016 from the Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, and funding from the Deutsche Forschungsgesellschaft in 2015 for the Grundlagen der Flüchtlingsforschung at the Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS), University of Osnabrück.[38] The success of journals such as movements (2014) and the Zeitschrift für Flüchtlingsforschung (2017) mirrors that of MARS journals in the UK and is a testament to the field's growth in Germany.

A second area of similarity between the British and German cases of MARS is that of the neoliberalization of capitalism in general and in academia in particular. As it was in the UK, the autonomy of academic workers in Germany has been diminished through an increased dependency on grant money and pressure to acquire this external funding – referred to as Drittmittel in Germany – through programmes such as the Exzellenzinitiative.[39] Additionally, the increasingly restrictive immigration and asylum policies of the UK's ›New‹ Labour governments described above are paralleled by those of the German state since 2015.[40] In particular, the recent addition of Balkan countries to its list of ›safe‹ countries by the German state mirrors the UK's MARS academic-aided expansion of its ›White List‹.

These similarities merit the careful investigation of the relations of production of MARS academics in Germany and the effects that these have had, are having, or could have in the future on the field's human subjects. The prevention of damaging outcomes like those that I described above for people categorized as migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers should be the priority for researchers – especially those who have been making a living by producing knowledge about them.

Personal Reflections[41]

I used to make a living by producing knowledge about people who were in structural positions similar to those of the human subjects of MARS. It was only after I had be-

38 | See Kleist (2017) for a description of funding for MARS projects.

39 | For a critique of this program, see Exzellenzkritik (2018).

40 | See Rietig/Müller (2016) for a summary of German asylum and immigration policies.

41 | My first manuscript submission to the editors of *movements* did not include a discussion of whether or not a ›critical‹ MARS might be possible, but it was made clear to me very early on in the editing process that followed that I would be expected by the journal's audience to address the issue. I added this final, reflective section to the essay in an attempt to respond to this demand.

gun my degree at Oxford in 2003 that I did an honest accounting of my own relations of production. I had just received a fellowship worth nearly £10,000 from the university on the basis of my prior academic work, which featured both a master's thesis and a publication (Hatton 2002) in which I wrote about low-income, indigenous people in Nicaragua.[42] I realized whilst at Oxford that I had exploited these people that I had studied (and many of whom I had befriended). We had produced a commodity – i.e., knowledge – together, but my share of the profit after I exchanged it on the academic market was much greater than was theirs. While my economic opportunities had become nearly limitless with the prospect of an Oxford degree, they continued to struggle for the basic necessities of life. I am certain that MARS academics who do a similar accounting will find the same kind of imbalance in their relation to the people they study.

To those who might claim that a ›critical‹ MARS is possible, I say: Please don't fool yourselves. A field that exploits its human subjects and produces knowledge that can be used as surveillance on them is ›critical‹ only in the liberal – not the revolutionary – sense of the word.[43] The production of knowledge about ›migrants‹, ›refugees‹, and ›asylum seekers‹ by the UK-based MARS academics considered to be the most ›critical‹ about restrictive policies, such as Liza Schuster (2005), Bridget Anderson (Anderson/Ruhs/Rogaly 2012), and Matthew Gibney (2000), demonstrates MARS's deep and essential material reliance on the exploitation of its human subjects. Similarly, the purportedly ›*kritische*‹ *Grenzregimeforschung* of a MARS academic research network in Germany, Kritnet, stands not alone, but rather is tied up with *Migrationsforschung* that is also – and ostensibly – ›*kritisch*‹.[44]

Whose side are you on? If it is that of labour, and you feel that you must produce research, then avoid or abandon MARS, and provide its human subjects with useful counter-surveillance on the actors, discourses, and structures that threaten them. If, however, you are on the side of capital, then MARS is for you.

Editors' note: The online version of this article contains changes that are not contained in the printed version. The online version is to be considered authoritative.

---

42 | The awarding of the fellowship was, I think, also based on the thesis research topic that I proposed in my application: a comparative study on the adaptation and political consciousness of Mexican migrants in the USA and Algerian migrants in France.

43 | For a discussion of surveillance and MARS in the UK, see Hatton (2011: 135–156, 286–290, 411).

44 | The full name of Kritnet is *Netzwerk kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung*.

LITERATURE

Allen, Chris / Imrie, Rob (2010): The Knowledge Business. A Critical Introduction. In: Allen, Chris / Imrie, Rob (Eds.): The Knowledge Business. The Commodification of Urban and Housing Research. Burlington. 1–19.

Anderson, Bridget / Ruhs, Martin (2008): A need for migrant labour? The micro-level determinants of staff shortages and implications for a skills based immigration policy. URL: webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk [08.06.2018].

Anderson, Bridget / Ruhs, Martin / Rogaly, Ben (2012): Chasing Ghosts. Researching Illegality in Migrant Labour Markets. In: Vargas-Silva, Carlos (Ed.): Handbook of Research Methods in Migration. Cheltenham. 396–410.

APCI (2003): APCI.1.M. Minutes of 1st Meeting held on 2 September 2003 at 2.30pm at the Home Office, Room 1028, Queen Anne's Gate. URL: webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk [12.03.2018].

APCI (2004a): APCI.3.3a. Commentary on April 2004 Country Information and Policy Unit (CIPU) Report on Afghanistan. URL: webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk [12.03.2018].

APCI (2004b): APCI.2.M. Minutes of 2nd Meeting held on 2 March 2004 at 2.30pm at the Home Office, Room 1028, Queen Anne's Gate. URL: webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk [12.03.2018].

APCI (2004c): APCI.E1.M. Minutes of Extraordinary Meeting held at 2pm on 7 December 2004 at London Hilton, 22 Park Lane, London W1. URL: webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk [12.03.2018].

APCI (2005): APCI.4.1. Commentary on the October 2004 Country Information and Policy Unit (CIPU) Report on Afghanistan. URL: webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk [12.03.2018].

APCI (2006): APCI.6.M. Minutes of 6th Meeting held on 8 March 2006 at Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, London SW1 Y4L. URL: webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk [12.03.2018].

APCI (2008): APCI.11.M. Minutes of 11th Meeting held on 7 October 2008 at Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, London SW1Y 4L. URL: webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk [12.03.2018].

APCI (n.d.): Information pack for applicants. URL: apci.org.uk [06.03.2007].

Bakewell, Oliver (2008): »Keeping Them in Their Place«. The Ambivalent Relationship between Development and Migration in Africa. In: Third World Quarterly 29 (7). 1341–1358.

Black, Richard (2001): Fifty Years of Refugee Studies. From Theory to Policy. In: International Migration Review 35 (1). 57–78.

Black, Richard (2003): Breaking the Convention. Researching the ›Illegal‹ Migration of Refugees to Europe. In: Antipode 35 (1). 34–54.

Boswell, Christina (2009): The Political Uses of Expert Knowledge. Immigration Policy and Social Research. Cambridge/New York.

Castles, Stephen (2003): Towards a Sociology of Forced Migration and Social Transformation. In: Sociology 37 (1). 13–34.

Castles, Stephen (2007): Twenty-First-Century Migration as a Challenge to Sociology. In: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 33 (3). 351–371.

Castles, Stephen / Kosack, Godula (1973): Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe. Oxford.

Chimni, B. S. (1998): The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies. A View from the South. In: Journal of Refugee Studies 11 (4). 350–374.

Chimni, B. S. (2009): The Birth of a ›Discipline‹. From Refugee to Forced Migration Studies. In: Journal of Refugee Studies 22 (1). 11–29.

Dale, Iain (2000): Labour Party General Election Manifestos 1900–1997. London/New York.

De Genova, Nicholas (2002): Migrant »Illegality« and Deportability in Everyday Life. In: Annual Review of Anthropology 31. 419–447.

Economic and Social Research Council (2008): Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) Annual Report 2007–2008. ESRC Annual Report RES-573-28-5001. URL: webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk [08.06.2018].

Etzkowitz, Henry (2001): The Second Academic Revolution and the Rise of Entrepreneurial Science. In: IEEE Technology and Society Magazine 20 (2). 18–29.

Exzellenzkritik (2018): Exzellenzkritik. URL: exzellenzkritik.wordpress.com [14.03.2018].

Favell, Adrian (2007): Rebooting Migration Theory. Interdisciplinarity, Globality and Postdisciplinarity in Migration Studies. In: Brettell, Caroline / Hollifield, James (Eds.): Migration Theory. Talking Across Disciplines. 2nd ed. New York / London. 259–278.

Geddes, Andrew (2008). Staff shortages and immigration in food processing. URL: webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk [08.06.2018].

Georgi, Fabian (2014): Making Migrants Work for Britain. Gesellschaftliche Kräfteverhältnisse und ›Managed Migration‹ in Großbritannien. In: Forschungsgruppe ›Staatsprojekt Europa‹ (Eds.): Kämpfe um Migrationspolitik. Theorie, Methode und Analysen kritischer Europaforschung. Bielefeld. 113–129.

Georgi, Fabian (2016): Widersprüche im Sommer der Migration. Ansätze einer materialistischen Grenzregimeanalyse. In: Prokla 46 (2). 183–203.

Gibney, Matthew (2000): Outside the protection of the law. The situation of irregular migrants in Europe. In: Refugee Studies Centre Working Paper Series 6. URL: rsc.ox.ac.uk [16.11.2017].

Good, Anthony (2007): Anthropology and Expertise in the Asylum Courts. Abingdon.

Gov.UK (2016): Independent Advisory Group on Country Information. Gov.UK of 02.12.2016. URL: gov.uk [18.01.2018].

Gov.UK (2018): Migration Advisory Committee. URL: gov.uk [18.01.2018].

Hansard (2003): House of Commons. Draft Asylum (Designated States) (No. 2 Order) 2003. First Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation. 7 July 2003. URL: publications.parliament.uk [12.03.2018].

Hansard (2005): House of Commons. Fifth Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation. 8 February 2005. Draft Asylum (Designated States) Order 2005. URL: publications.parliament.uk [12.03.2018].

Hansard (2009): House of Commons. European Standing Committee B. 19 May 2009. URL: publications.parliament.uk [10.02.2010].

Harvey, David (2007): A Brief History of Neoliberalism. New York.

Hatton, Joshua (2002): Las Raíces Indígenas de la Peregrinación de Jesús del Rescate en Popoyuapa, Rivas. In: Revista de Historia de Nicaragua 14. 61–72.

Hatton, Joshua (2011): How and Why Did MARS Facilitate Migration Control? Understanding the Implication of Migration and Refugee Studies (MARS) with the Restriction of Human Mobility by UK State Agencies. D.Phil. Thesis. University of Oxford, St. Antony's College. URL: ora.ox.ac.uk [27.09.2017].

Huber, Stephanie / Pettitt, Jo / Williams, Elizabeth (2010): The APCI legacy. A critical assessment. Immigration Advisory Service. URL: refworld.org [27.09.2017].

Imrie, Rob (2010): The Interrelationships between Contract Research and the Knowledge Business. In: Allen, Chris / Imrie, Rob (Eds.): The Knowledge Business. The Commodification of Urban and Housing Research. Burlington. 23–39.

Kleist, J. Olaf (2017): Flucht- und Flüchtlingsforschung in Deutschland: Bestandsaufnahme und Vorschläge zur zukünftigen Gestaltung. Policy Brief 01 (Flucht: Forschung und Transfer. Flüchtlingsforschung in Deutschland). Osnabrück/Bonn. URL: fluchtforschung-transfer.de [17.10.2017].

Latour, Bruno (2005): Reassembling the Social. An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. Oxford.

Lucas, Lisa (2006): The Research Game in Academic Life. Maidenhead.

Malinowski, Bronislaw (1932): Argonauts of the Western Pacific. An Account of Native Enterprise and Adventure in the Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea. 2nd ed. London/New York.

Malkki, Liisa (1995): Refugees and Exile. From »Refugee Studies« to the National Order of Things. In: Annual Review of Anthropology 24. 495–523.

Marx, Karl / Engels, Friedrich (1974): The German Ideology. Part One, with Selections from Parts Two and Three, together with Marx's »Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy«. 2nd ed. London.

Mauss, Marcel (1990): The Gift. The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies. London.

Migration Advisory Committee (2008): The labour market impact of relaxing restrictions on employment in the UK of nationals of Bulgarian and Romanian EU member states. URL: ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk [26.10.2010].

Migration Advisory Committee (2009): Review of the UK's transitional measures for nationals of member states that acceded to the European Union in 2004. URL: ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk [24.08.2010].

Mills, David (2008): Difficult Folk? A Political History of Social Anthropology. New York.

Morgan, Beverley / Gelsthorpe, Verity / Crawley, Heaven / Jones, Gareth (2003): Country of origin information. A user and content evaluation. Home Office Research Study 271.

Mosse, David (2005): Cultivating Development. An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice. London.

Parsons, Wayne (2002): From Muddling Through to Muddling Up. Evidence Based Policy Making and the Modernisation of British Government. In: Public Policy and Administration 17 (3). 43–60.

Peutz, Nathalie (2006): Embarking on an Anthropology of Removal. In: Current Anthropology 47 (2). 217–241.

Rietig, Victoria / Müller, Andreas (2016): The new reality. Germany adapts to its role as a major migrant magnet. Migration Policy Institute of 31.08.2016. URL: migrationpolicy.org [15.08.2017].

Schuster, Liza (2005): The continuing mobility of migrants in Italy. Shifting between places and statuses. In: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31 (4). 757–774.

Scott, John / Marshall, Gordon (2009): Contradictory class location. In: Dictionary of sociology. Oxford Reference Online. URL: oxfordreference.com [13.10.2009].

Select Committee on Home Affairs (2006): Examination of Witnesses. 12 December 2006. URL: publications.parliament.uk [01.11.2017].

Shore, Cris / Wright, Susan (2000): Coercive Accountability. The Rise of Audit Culture in Higher Education. In: Strathern, Marilyn (Ed.): Audit Cultures. Anthropological Studies in Accountability, Ethics, and the Academy. New York. 57–89.

Slaughter, Sheila / Leslie, Larry (1997): Academic Capitalism. Politics, Policies, and the Entrepreneurial University. Baltimore.

Smith, Neil (2008): Uneven Development. Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space. 3rd ed. Athens.

Tapper, Ted (2007): The Governance of British Higher Education. The Struggle for Policy Control. Dordrecht.

The National Archives (2012): Advisory Panel on Country Information. 3 October 2012. URL: webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk [12.03.2018].

Turton, David (2003): Refugees, forced resettlers and »other forced migrants«. Towards a unitary study of forced migration. UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 94. URL: unhcr.org [07.07.2008].

UK Border Agency (2008): Skilled, shortage, sensible. The recommended shortage occupation lists for the UK and Scotland. URL: ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk [24.02.2010].

UK Home Office (2001): Bridging the information gaps. A conference of research on asylum and immigration in the UK. URL: webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk [08.06.2018].

UK Home Office (2005): The annual report of the certification monitor, 2004. URL: webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk [08.06.2018].

UK Home Office (2008a): Press release of 09.09.2008. URL: press.homeoffice.gov.uk [24.10.2008].

UK Home Office (2008b): Press release of 11.10.2008. URL: press.homeoffice.gov.uk [24.02.2010].

Wells, Peter (2007): New Labour and evidence based policy making. In: People, Place and Policy Online 1 (1). 22–29. URL: extra.shu.ac.uk [11.01.2018].

Whitehead, Tom (2008): Migrant workers list includes 800,000 jobs. Daily Telegraph of 11.11.2008.

Wolf, Eric (1982): Europe and the People Without History. Berkeley.

Zetter, Roger (2007): More Labels, Fewer Refugees. Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era of Globalization. In: Journal of Refugee Studies 20 (2). 172–192.

Forschungswerkstatt

Die Interessenvertretung der ›Anderen‹

Unterkunftsbetreiber als neue Akteure der Wissensproduktion über Asylsuchende

Ole Oeltjen

Abstract: Notwithstanding strong media attention, operators of asylum seekers' accommodation centers have been largely overlooked by academic debate. This article focuses on the role of these non-profit and for-profit organizations in the production of knowledge about the accommodation – and especially about the accommodated. Drawing on qualitative interviews conducted in Berlin in 2016 and 2017, the article argues that these organizations and their employees are a crucial part of reproducing a humanitarian and orientalist discourse that depicts the accommodated asylum seekers as backward and dependent. While supposedly lobbying for the interests of their occupants, they therefore participate in silencing these voices and legitimize the precarious accommodation system.

Keywords: asylum accommodation centers, humanitarian government, third sector, othering, victimization

Die Unterbringung von Asylsuchenden innerhalb Europas wurde bisher vor allem als Teil staatlicher Asylpolitiken untersucht und fokussierte somit auf die nationale Ebene. Erst kürzlich begann sich dieser Fokus zu verschieben, wobei die Auswirkungen von auf Dezentralisierung und Privatisierung ausgerichteten Verwaltungsreformen und damit auch die lokale Unterbringungspolitik in den Blick gerieten (vgl. Darling 2016: 484). Gerade für Deutschland erscheint dies sinnvoll, da die »Bereitstellung von Infrastrukturen und Wohnraum« Ländern und Kommunen obliegt (Kreichauf 2016: 207) und dies damit die Ebene ist, auf der Asyl »produziert« wird (Hinger et al. 2016). Diese neuere Literatur fasst die Unterkunft überzeugend als Verräumlichung oder »Manifestierung der gesellschaftlichen Position der Geflüchteten« (Kreichauf 2016: 216). Weitgehend unbeachtet bleiben dabei jedoch die Akteure *innerhalb* der Unterkunft. Die wenigen empirischen Studien, die nichtstaatliche Unterkunftsbetreiber im Globalen Norden bis dato zu ihrem Untersuchungsgegenstand gemacht haben, verstehen diese als neue Akteure in der Produktion eines lokalen Asylregimes (vgl. Hinger et al. 2016) und ordnen ihre zunehmende Bedeutung in einen allgemeinen Trend neoliberaler Privatisierungs- und Austeritätspolitiken ein (vgl. Darling 2016).

Die lückenhafte empirische Forschung zu Unterkünften und ihren Betreibern erstaunt, da die Betreiberorganisationen immer wieder Gegenstand öffentlicher Debatten über die »Unterbringungsindustrie« (Nowakowski 2016) sind und ihre Mitarbeiter_innen zugleich als Expert_innen für Asylpolitik an Sichtbarkeit gewinnen (vgl. bspw. Amin 2016). Mit meinem Beitrag adressiere ich diesen Mangel und lege den Fokus auf die Betreiberorganisationen als neue Akteure der Wissensproduktion. Hilfreich ist hierbei der Rückgriff auf Teile der internationalen Campforschung, welche sich ausführlicher mit der sozialen Struktur der von ihr untersuchten Camps auseinandersetzt und damit die Akteure in ihrem Inneren mitdenkt.[1] Für diesen Beitrag ziehe ich daher Ansätze zum *humanitarian government*[2] (vgl. Agier 2011; Fassin 2007; Walters 2015) heran und argumentiere, dass die Betreiberorganisationen nicht bloß die zum staatlichen Kontroll- und Ausgrenzungsregime komplementäre »hand that cares« (Agier 2011: 5) darstellen, sondern zugleich als Expert_innen für die Unterbringung und die Untergebrachten in Erscheinung treten und für die Bewohner_innen sprechen. Diese Praxis fügt sich sowohl in einen humanitaristischen (vgl. Aradau 2004; Perkowski 2016: 333) als auch in einen orientalistisch geprägten Diskurs ein (Rygiel 2012), in dem Asylsuchende zu ›Anderen‹ und Opfern ohne *agency* werden, die keine eigene Stimme haben und über die Entscheidungen getroffen werden (vgl. Aradau 2004: 276). Unter Humanitarismus (*humanitarianism*) wird dabei ein auf der Grundannahme der Gleichheit aller Menschen beruhendes Handeln verstanden, welches die Minderung akuten menschlichen Leids zum Ziel hat (vgl. Barnett 2011: 18f.;

---

1 | Hier ist beispielsweise der Sonderband des *Journal of Refugee Studies* 29 (2) zu nennen (vgl. etwa Turner 2015). Diese Literatur bezieht sich jedoch größtenteils auf Camps im Globalen Süden, welche sich insbesondere bezüglich ihrer Durchlässigkeit von den Unterkünften in Berlin unterscheiden. Das Konzept des *humanitarian government* verwende ich daher lediglich als ›Linse‹, mit der ich auf die Rolle derer blicke, die mit der ›Verwaltung‹ und ›Pflege‹ der Asylsuchenden beauftragt sind. Die grundsätzliche Übertragbarkeit der Erkenntnisse und Konzepte aus der internationalen Campforschung auf Unterkünfte im Globalen Norden bedarf jedoch einer gesonderten Diskussion, weshalb ich mich an dieser Stelle auf die Verortung dieses Beitrags in der Forschung zu letzteren beschränke.

2 | Agier definiert *humanitarian government* als »a functional solidarity [...] between the humanitarian world (the hand that cares) and the police and military ordering (the hand that strikes) [...]. It has a power of life and death in the space assigned to it, but also and above all a major role in the transformation of individual lives, of social and cultural models, in the places where it operates.« (Agier 2011: 5). Agier beschreibt eine Form der Regierung, welche sich unter dem Vorzeichen der Hilfe und der Minderung von Leid auf den Ausschluss und die Kontrolle ›unerwünschter‹ Bevölkerungsgruppen richtet.

Fassin 2007: 518; Lieser 2013: 13; Ticktin 2011: 61). Kritische Autor_innen bringen hierbei an, dass der dem Humanitarismus zugrundeliegende Fokus auf das Leid zu einem »ontological divide« zwischen Retter_innen und Opfern führe und letztere objektiviere (Zhang 2014: 254).

Der Rückgriff auf Michel Agiers Ansatz, der humanitäre Akteure als diejenigen beschreibt, die die Hilfsbedürftigen identifizieren und kategorisieren, bietet hier Vorteile. Anders als die bestehende Literatur zur Unterbringung Asylsuchender im Globalen Norden erlaubt er, das in den Lagern (re)produzierte Wissen über die Unterbringung sowie das ›Wesen‹ und die Zusammensetzung der Bewohner_innen zu fassen. Auch in den von mir untersuchten Unterkünften verwalten Akteure mit einer humanitären Selbstinterpretation Personen, die auf ihr Opfer-Sein reduziert werden. So postuliert etwa das Berliner Rote Kreuz in seiner Beschreibung der Tätigkeiten in der lokalen »Flüchtlingshilfe«:

> »Alle ehrenamtlichen Helferinnen und Helfer sowie Mitarbeiter des DRK haben bei der Versorgung der Flüchtlinge in Berlin insbesondere die Rotkreuz-Grundsätze der Menschlichkeit und der Unparteilichkeit zu beachten. [...] Jede Helferin und jeder Helfer des DRK muss sich bemühen, den Menschen nach dem Maß ihrer Not zu helfen und dabei den dringendsten Fällen Vorrang zu geben. Auf die einzelnen Fluchtgründe kommt es nicht an.« (Berliner Rotes Kreuz 2017)

Die Grundlage meiner Argumentation bilden Interviews mit neun Unterkunftsmitarbeiter_innen, welche ich in Berlin zwischen November 2016 und Juli 2017 durchgeführt habe. Diese unterstreichen, dass humanitärer Einsatz nicht notwendigerweise »naïve and poorly informed of its effects« (Agier 2011: 207) sein muss: Einige der Unterkunftsmitarbeiter_innen sind politisch aktiv und versuchen, kritisch zu intervenieren (vgl. Hess 2016). Es kann insofern nicht das Ziel sein, einzelnen Interviewten ihren guten Willen und auch ihre Leistung für einzelne Bewohner_innen abzusprechen. Dennoch positionieren die Betreiberorganisationen durch ihre Mitarbeiter_innen Asylsuchende als Objekte einer Unterbringungspolitik und tragen zum *silencing* migrantischer Stimmen bei. Deshalb geht es mir im Folgenden um die Expertenrolle der Betreiberorganisationen und ihrer Mitarbeiter_innen und deren Darstellung der Bewohner_innen. Abschließend diskutiere ich die sich hieraus ergebenden Implikationen für die Unterbringung und zeige auf, in welcher Form die Betreiber dieses Wissen zirkulieren. Anstelle eines Fazits setze ich mich abschließend mit den Grenzen der zugrundeliegenden empirischen Arbeit auseinander und arbeite Anknüpfungspunkte für weiterführende Forschungsvorhaben heraus.

Berliner Betreiberorganisationen und ihre Expertise

Berlin eignet sich für die Untersuchung von Betreiberorganisationen besonders, da das Zusammentreffen mehrerer Faktoren dazu führte, dass im Zuge des »langen Sommers der Migration« (Hess et al. 2016) noch stärker als in anderen Bundesländern auf nichtstaatliche Organisationen in der Unterbringung zurückgegriffen wurde (vgl. Herwartz 2016). So hatten die zuständigen Behörden bereits vor dem Anstieg der Asylantragszahlen Probleme mit unklaren Zuständigkeiten und zeigten sich entsprechend überfordert von der Tatsache, dass ein besonders großer Anteil der in Deutschland Asylsuchenden zunächst in Berlin eintraf.[3] Darüber hinaus erschwerte ein ohnehin angespannter Wohnungsmarkt eine zügige Unterbringung in angemessenen Wohngebäuden (vgl. Speth/Becker 2016: 17ff.).

Seit dem Sommer 2016 werden Asylsuchende bei ihrer Ankunft in Berlin an das Ankunftszentrum am ehemaligen Flughafen Tempelhof verwiesen. Dort sind die für Registrierung und Antragstellung zuständigen Behörden LAF (Landesamt für Flüchtlingsangelegenheiten) und BAMF (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge) vertreten und es werden medizinische Untersuchungen durchgeführt, Fingerabdrücke genommen sowie weitere Daten gespeichert (vgl. Berliner Senat 2017). Anschließend werden die zur Antragsbearbeitung Berlin zugewiesenen Asylsuchenden auf Not- und Gemeinschaftsunterkünfte verteilt (vgl. Landesamt für Flüchtlingsangelegenheiten 2017). Für den Betrieb sämtlicher Unterkünfte müssen nach EU-Recht europaweite Ausschreibungen stattfinden, was zu einer hohen Diversifizierung der Betreiber geführt hat. So finden sich hier neben etablierten Wohlfahrtsverbänden wie dem Deutschen Roten Kreuz auch neu gegründete gewerbliche Betreiberfirmen.[4] Mit der Hero Norge AS erhielt im Dezember 2016 zudem erstmals eine ausländische Firma den Zuschlag für den Interimsbetrieb zweier Unterkünfte (vgl. Fahrun 2017). Beide Seiten, gewerbliche und gemeinnützige Betreiberorganisationen wurden in meinen Interviews berücksichtigt. Ebenso habe ich Wert darauf gelegt, mit Personen auf ver-

3 | Während Berlin 2015 nach dem Königsteiner Schlüssel 5,04% der Asylanträge bearbeiten musste, trafen im selben Jahr 7,24% aller in Deutschland ankommenden Asylsuchenden 2015 in Berlin ein (vgl. Speth/Becker 2016:11).

4 | Gewerbliche Betreiberorganisationen sind etwa Einzelunternehmen (e.K.) und Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH). Hinzu kommen gemeinnützige Gesellschaften (gGmbH), die jedoch im Gegensatz zu den zuvor genannten keine Gewinne erwirtschaften dürfen.

schiedenen Hierarchieebenen zu sprechen (Liste der Interviews).[5] Entgegen meinen Erwartungen zeigten sich jedoch keine erkennbaren Unterschiede in den Positionierungen der Interviewpartner_innen von gewerblichen und gemeinnützigen Betreiberorganisationen. Selbst auf Nachfrage, ob denn die jeweils andere Seite sich grundsätzlich in ihrer Arbeit in der Geflüchtetenunterbringung unterscheide, wurde dies jeweils deutlich verneint. Auch ich werde daher im Weiteren nicht zwischen gewerblichen und gemeinnützigen Betreiberorganisationen trennen.[6]

Die meisten meiner Interviewpartner_innen fühlen sich ihrer Arbeit emotional sehr verbunden. Sie bringen ihre Ablehnung der Unterbringungssituation und ihre Empathie gegenüber den Bewohner_innen zum Ausdruck, indem sie insbesondere das beengte Wohnen und den daraus resultierenden Mangel an Privatsphäre kritisieren. Besonders häufig wird die Dauer der Unterbringung thematisiert:

> »Das Wichtigste ist, dass diese Unterbringung hier einfach ein definitives Ende hat. Das heißt: Ich bin drei Monate hier, das halte ich auch aus ohne Dach überm Kopf und ohne Tür. Aber alles, was darüber hinausgeht, oder diese Unwissenheit, wie lange ich hier bleiben werde, ist einfach – das bringt die Menschen um.« (B4: 64)

Als zentrale Herausforderung sehen es die Mitarbeiter_innen, mit dieser »beschissenen Situation« (B5: 45) der Bewohner_innen einen eigenen Umgang zu finden, mangelnde Erfolge zu verarbeiten und die Grenzen des eigenen Wirkens anzuerkennen. Die Aufgabe ihrer Organisation beschreiben sie neben der operativen Leitung vor allem als Bekämpfung von Not und Leid, deren Ursachen sie in den individuellen Migrationsgründen und -erfahrungen, aber auch in der mangelhaften Vorbereitung seitens der zuständigen Behörden sehen. Sie begründen das Engagement ihrer Organisation mit deren »Mission« in der Nothilfe (B5: 23) und betrachten die »Unter-

---

5 | Um ihre Anonymität zu stärken, nutze ich bei der Bezeichnung der einzelnen Interviewpartner_innen das generische Femininum. Aus der Bezeichnung »Unterkunftsleiterin« lassen sich also keine Rückschlüsse auf die geschlechtliche Identität der interviewten Person ziehen.

6 | Zugleich kann bei der kleinen Fallzahl kaum von einer Repräsentativität des Samples ausgegangen werden. Zudem zeigten sich Unterschiede beim Feldzugang: Während von den gemeinnützigen Trägern lediglich einer nicht auf E-Mails antwortete, reagierten unter den gewerblichen nur die Hälfte. Insbesondere solche, die in den letzten 18 Monaten massiver medialer und zivilgesellschaftlicher Kritik ausgesetzt waren, ließen meine Interviewanfragen unbeantwortet oder waren nicht zum Gespräch bereit. Mein Sample erlaubt jedoch den Schluss, dass Unterschiede in der Positionierung nicht allein an der Unterscheidung gemeinnützig/gewerblich festgemacht werden können.

bringung von Leuten, die in Notlage sind« (B2: 8) als »notwendig und humanitär zwingend geboten« (B6a: 27).

Trotz ihrer verbalen Solidarisierung mit den Bewohner_innen gegen die Form und Dauer der Unterbringung legitimieren die Betreiberorganisationen das Kontrollregime, dem die Unterkünfte in Form der Hausordnung und der Kontrolle durch private Sicherheitsdienste unterliegen. Hierbei beziehen sie sich vor allem auf die Grundbedingungen der Unterbringung selbst: Das Zusammenleben vieler Menschen auf engem Raum und die hohe Fluktuation seien Gründe, weshalb man aufpassen müsse, dass Drogen, Waffen und unerwünschter Besuch aus der Unterkunft ferngehalten werden. Dies machen die folgenden Zitate zweier Unterkunftsleiterinnen deutlich:

> »Wir kontrollieren halt generell für jeden, dann steigt halt auch das Sicherheitsgefühl. Und so ist das so ein bisschen immer. Es ist halt nichts Großartiges passiert, aber andere werden Ihnen erzählt haben: Da ist mal ein Messer mit drin et cetera. Man darf halt nicht vergessen, pro Unterkunft gehen da tausende von Leuten durch innerhalb von zwei Jahren. Das heißt, sie haben schon statistisch irgendjemanden, der halt eine psychische Störung hat und sich dann bewaffnet oder so etwas.« (B7: 82)

> »Wir sind ein anstrengender Betreiber für die Bewohner. [...] Wir machen wirklich regelmäßig Begehungen in den Zimmern, Hygienebegehungen, um zu gucken, dass die Lebensmittel nicht verrotten oder um auch dann präventiv da zu sein, dass keine Alkoholika oder keine Drogen oder keine Waffen in den Zimmern sind. Wir durchsuchen nichts, aber die wissen halt ganz genau, dass wir unangenehm sind. Also dass wir anstrengend sind. Und immer wieder auch in deren Privatbereich leider reingehen. Aber mir fällt nichts Besseres ein, wie man das in Griff bekommen kann. Dadurch, dass wir Eingangskontrollen haben mit Hauskarten und dadurch, dass wir die Gäste aufschreiben, versuche ich halt den Drogenhandel auszuschließen in den Häusern.« (B2: 165)[7]

7 | Hier wird die Konstitution der Unterkunft als Ausnahmeraum deutlich, in dem die Betreiberorganisationen teils willkürlich Recht setzen. So wussten andere Interviewpartner_innen, dass Zimmerkontrollen vom LAF aus grundsätzlich verboten wären. Diese wiederum nahmen allgemeine Körper- und Taschenkontrollen an den Eingängen vor, worüber eine dritte Interviewpartnerin in einer vergleichbaren Unterkunft wiederum berichtete, dass das LAF dies nicht zuließe. Ein ähnliches Bild zeigte sich bezüglich der Rechte der Bewohner_innen, wie etwa den Besuchszeiten. Hier verstießen einige Interviewpartner_innen bewusst (zum Vor- oder Nachteil der Bewohner_innen) gegen die Rahmenhausordnung des LAF.

Das Selbstverständnis der Unterkunftsmitarbeiter_innen als Expert_innen, die besser wissen, was gut für die Bewohner_innen ist, zeigt sich in diesem Zusammenhang auch in der Abgrenzung zu anderen Personen und Organisationen. So wird über besserwisserische Ehrenamtliche berichtet, denen der Blick für die Gesamtsituation fehle und die man vor ihrem eigenen Engagement schützen müsse. Die Leiterin einer Unterkunft vertritt gar den Standpunkt, niemand könne von außen das Funktionieren einer Unterkunft verstehen, auch die Leute in der Politik hätten »keine Ahnung« (Postskriptum B1).

Wissen über die Bewohner_innen

Die von mir interviewten Unterkunftsmitarbeiter_innen bezogen nicht nur zu den Umständen der Unterbringung Stellung, sondern artikulierten vor allem auch Wissen über die Asylsuchenden selbst. Hier stehen sich Äußerungen zur Diversität der Bewohner_innen und pauschale Aussagen über diese gegenüber. Es wird betont, dass es große individuelle Unterschiede gebe und es sich bei der Unterkunft um einen »Mikrokosmos« von Menschen »unterschiedlichen Alters, unterschiedlichen Geschlechts, unterschiedlicher Religion, unterschiedlicher Herkunft, unterschiedlich was-weiß-ich auch noch« handele (B6: 89).

Wie in Agiers Arbeiten zeigt sich eine Repräsentation der Bewohner_innen als Bedürftige und Opfer, zu deren Retter_innen die Interviewten in einer Ausnahmesituation avancieren:

> »Die Arbeit mit Geflüchteten in Einrichtungen ist eine psychisch sehr anstrengende Arbeit. Aber letztendlich ist die Arbeit für Geflüchtete und die Hilfe ihnen zu gewähren, ihnen den Start in Deutschland zu erleichtern, Kernmission [unserer Organisation]. [...] Geflüchtete sind Bedürftige.« (B5: 23)

> »Ich kann nicht parallel irgendwie mal eben 300, 400 Leute aufnehmen, einen neuen Mitarbeiterstamm aufbauen halt irgendwie, alle Verträge mit allen Firmen und Unternehmen und alle Katastrophen. Und die Leute waren ja damals wirklich krank. Also in dem Moment, als wir [Unterkunft A] aufgebaut haben, das war vor einem Jahr, die Leute hatten einen langen Fluchtweg hinter sich und waren wirklich krank. Und das heißt erst einmal helfe ich den Leuten, bevor ich mich dann darum kümmere, ob jetzt irgendeine Beschriftung an der Tür ist oder nicht.« (B2: 99)

Zugleich ist diese Repräsentation in sich ausdifferenziert und hierarchisiert. Mehrere Interviewte berichten etwa, dass kranke Menschen einen Anspruch auf Einzelzimmer haben oder von Umzügen in andere Unterkünfte ausgenommen werden. In meinen Interviews wird deutlich, dass im konkreten Fall die Unterkunftsleitung selbst nach freiem Ermessen entscheidet, wer ›kränker‹ ist und bspw. das letzte Einzelzimmer bekommt (B2: 163). Andersherum erklären zwei Interviewte, dass »alleinreisende Männer« zum Teil separat und besonders abgelegen untergebracht seien und es kaum externe Angebote für diese Gruppe gebe, da diese als weniger hilfsbedürftig wahrgenommen würde (B8b: 67). Die Mitarbeiter_innen der Betreiberorganisationen nehmen also einerseits die Bewohner_innen grundsätzlich als Bedürftige war, gleichzeitig sind sie es, die das Ausmaß dieser Bedürftigkeit bestimmen.

Den Darstellungen der Bewohner_innen als Bedürftige und Opfer stehen andere gegenüber, die den Bewohner_innen pauschal bestimmte Eigenschaften oder Verhaltensweisen zuschreiben. Hier fallen solche auf, die einen grundlegenden Unterschied zwischen einem jeweils mindestens implizierten ›uns‹ und ›den Anderen‹ aufmachen. Dazu gehören Aussagen wie »mein Stellvertreter spricht die Sprache« (B1: 150), die – fälschlicherweise – alle Bewohner_innen der gleichen Sprachgemeinschaft zuweist. Eine ehemalige Unterkunftsleiterin ordnet diese ebenfalls *einem* imaginären ›anderen‹ Ort zu, wenn sie äußert: »Dort sind viel mehr Raucher als bei uns in Deutschland« (B2: 128). Den Unterschied zu ›uns‹ macht eine weitere Unterkunftsleiterin auf, die feststellt, die Bewohner_innen seien »natürlich manchmal auch aufgrund ihrer Mentalitäten sehr laut« (B8a: 82). Eine andere spricht wahlweise von »den Arabern«. Sie weiß: »Die sind ja auch sehr höflich. Also Araber untereinander sagen ja auch nicht Nein« (B2: 155). Außerdem berichtet sie:

> »Die Araber sind dramatischer als wir. Also wenn ich irgendwie etwas verbiete und sage ›Nein, das geht nicht‹ oder irgendwie so halt, dann ist die Reaktion manchmal eine sehr dramatische. Also körperlich dramatisch. Mit Tränen und auf den Boden werfen und irgendwie so etwas (lacht).« (B2: 161)

Im Sprachgebrauch der Interviewten werden die Bewohner_innen häufig pauschal als ›Araber_innen‹ bezeichnet (vgl. hierzu Attia 2012: 6f.), womit bestimmte soziale Attribute wie ein ausschweifender bzw. verantwortungsloser Lebensstil (rauchen), als übertrieben wahrgenommene Emotionalität (dramatisch) oder das Festhalten an ›rückständigen‹ Geschlechterrollen verbunden werden. Gerade in Bezug auf Letzteres wird in Abgrenzung häufig ein idealisiertes Bild der Situation in Deutschland geschaffen:

> »Wir haben [den Bewohner_innen] die Grundregeln des Zusammenlebens in Deutschland erklärt. Jeder darf seine Religion ausüben. Keiner darf den anderen behindern. Geschlagen wird niemand. Noch nicht einmal die eigene Frau oder die Kinder, was man halt von zuhause kennt. Und so weiter und so fort.« (B5: 61)

Auch der Geschäftsführerin einer anderen Organisation ist es wichtig, alle Bewohner_innen zu erreichen, »[w]enn ich sage, in Deutschland ist es verboten – auch nur eben ein Klaps auf den Hinterkopf bei den Kindern ist schon grenzwertig. Und es ist verboten, die Frauen zu schlagen« (B2: 132). Diesen Aussagen ist gemein, dass sie nicht nur eine idealisierte Darstellung der deutschen Realität entwerfen, sondern sie implizieren auch, dass es ›dort‹ – an dem Ort der ›Anderen‹ – grundsätzlich anders ist. Neben dem differenzierten Bild, das vor allem auf die unterschiedlichen Bedürfnisse und Nationalitäten der Bewohner_innen eingeht, (re)konstruieren die Interviewten so immer wieder die Bewohner_innen als homogene Gruppe der ›Anderen‹ und Gegenstück zu einem imaginierten ›uns‹.

Diese Vorstellung von den Bewohner_innen hat unmittelbare Auswirkungen auf die Ausgestaltung der Unterbringung. So wird wiederholt als Argument gegen einen Bewohner_innenrat ins Feld geführt, ein solches Verfahren würde die Frauen in der Unterkunft benachteiligen (B2, B5). Eine Unterkunftsleiterin macht deutlich, für wie abwegig sie die Idee eines Rates hält:

> »Und jetzt quasi denken wir uns das, dass so ein Unterkunftsbetreiber das mit Leuten machen kann, die geflohen sind, in einer nicht so optimalen Unterkunft sind, die aus patriarchalischen und autokratischen Verhältnissen kommen? Da soll ich das machen?« (B7: 90)

Auch seien die Bewohner_innen Partizipation ohnehin nicht gewohnt und es gebe »ein unglaubliches hierarchisches Denken von sehr vielen Menschen« (B6b: 189). Einrichtungen wie ein Bewohnerrat führten unter diesen Bedingungen bloß zur Verschärfung bestehender Spannungen in der Unterkunft:

> »Die Bewohner meckern den Rat dann an, weil die nicht das durchsetzen, was die Bewohner ganz gerne bei uns durchgesetzt haben möchten. Das heißt die stehen dazwischen und die werden dann von ihren Leuten oder den anderen Leuten angepöbelt. Dann heißt es eventuell, dass wir eine Nationalität bevorzugen. Dass wir halt die Afghanen viel mehr unterstützen und nicht die Araber oder andersherum oder wie auch immer.« (B2: 132)

Kurzum werden die Bewohner_innen aufgrund ihrer ›Kultur‹ für unfähig gehalten, gemeinsame Interessen zu finden und zu artikulieren. Zugleich wird in meinen Interviews deutlich, dass das Wissen über Unterbringung und Untergebrachte nicht allein in der Unterkunft verbleibt, sondern durch die Mitarbeiter_innen der Betreiberorganisationen auch nach außen getragen wird.

ZIRKULATION VON WISSEN

Die Betreiberorganisationen sind zunehmend miteinander vernetzt. Alle von mir interviewten Unterkunftsmitarbeiter_innen beschreiben eine wachsende Kooperation und betonen den Mehrwert des Austauschs untereinander. Es gibt Betreibertreffen und -konferenzen auf Landes- und Bezirksebene, aber auch den selbstgegründeten Verband der Berliner Flüchtlingsheimbetreiber (VBFHB). Im Zentrum stehen der Austausch von Erfahrungen und die Weitergabe von Wissen. Zugleich wird deutlich, dass sich die Betreiberorganisationen als politisch verstehen und die verschiedenen Foren zur Standardentwicklung und zur Förderung eines geschlossenen Auftretens gegenüber dem LAF nutzen (B4: 50), welches als inkompetent oder überfordert wahrgenommen wird.

Mit einer Ausnahme solidarisieren sich alle Gesprächspartner_innen in den Interviews mit den Asylsuchenden und sehen ihre Aufgabe darin, diese zu unterstützen. Jedoch verstehen sie sich nicht bloß als ›Dienstleister_innen‹ oder ›Pfleger_innen‹ der Bewohner_innen, sondern explizit auch als deren politische Interessenvertretung gegenüber dem Land. Hier geht es einerseits um eine alltägliche Ebene, auf der die Betreiber über Antragstellungen oder Gespräche mit dem LAF Verbesserungen in der räumlichen Ausstattung oder im Betreuungsschlüssel zu erwirken versuchen. Andererseits sprechen mehrere Interviewte davon, gezielt politischen Druck zu erzeugen. Dazu zählt auch die Sichtbarmachung von Missständen durch gezieltes Unterlassen.[8] Andere gehen so weit, unerwünschte politische Vorgaben wie die Änderung der Rahmenhausordnung einfach nicht umzusetzen (B8b: 145). Die zuständige Abteilungsleiterin eines großen Trägers bekennt: »Wir haben auch eine Rolle einfach in der sozialpolitischen Aktion, auch im sozialpolitischen Mitgestalten« (B6a: 138). Die Betreiberorganisationen beanspruchen also für sich – trotz zumeist fehlender inter-

8 | So führt etwa eine Interviewpartnerin trotz teils eineinhalbjähriger Unterbringungsdauer als Argument gegen einen Bewohner_innenrat ins Feld, dass man gegenüber dem LAF gar nicht erst den Anschein erwecken wolle, als Notunterkunft eine Dauerlösung darzustellen (B4: 116).

ner Foren für die Bewohner_innen – deren Bedürfnisse und Wünsche zu kennen und diese adäquat gegenüber den zuständigen Behörden vertreten zu können.

Nicht nur gegenüber den Behörden stellen die Interviewten aber die Bewohner_innen dar: auch in den Medien und der Nachbarschaft der Unterkünfte tun sie dies, um Aufklärung zu betreiben und »ganz klar von diesen Generalisierungen und Verallgemeinerung wegzukommen« (B4: 108). Indem sie eine organisierte Interessenvertretung der Bewohner_innen ablehnen, zugleich jedoch selbst gegenüber Medien und Behörden für diese sprechen, tragen die Betreiberorganisationen zum *silencing* der Bewohner_innen bei. Zudem zirkulieren sie ihr Wissen über die Zusammenarbeit mit dem LAF, die Kooperation untereinander und die Öffentlichkeitsarbeit.

In den Interviews wird deutlich, dass sich die Mitarbeiter_innen der Betreiberorganisationen in dem von Agier beschriebenen humanitären Diskurs verorten: Sie verstehen sich als Helfende in der Not, deren Handeln auf der (vermeintlichen) Bedürftigkeit der Bewohner_innen beruht. Die Interviewten führen diese zwar zum Teil auf die unzureichende Asylpolitik zurück – etwa, wenn sie die Dauer und Beengtheit der Unterbringung kritisieren. Zugleich zeigt sich, dass auch sie die Bewohner_innen anhand ihrer Bedürftigkeit kategorisieren und hierbei spezifisches Wissen und damit einhergehende Machtbeziehungen (re)produziert werden. Die Unterkunft wird zum Raum der Bedürftigen, über welchen die Betreiberorganisationen bestimmen.

Verschiedene Autor_innen haben darauf hingewiesen, dass die Auslagerung staatlicher Aufgaben auch in der Migrationspolitik zum Verlust von Expertise und Sprechfähigkeit seitens der Behörden führt (vgl. Bloom 2015: 156; Darling 2016: 493). Die Bemerkungen meiner Interviewpartner_innen zur Öffentlichkeitsarbeit zeigen, dass sich die Betreiberorganisationen ihrer Wirkmächtigkeit bewusst sind und auch ein Blick in die Medienberichterstattung deutet darauf hin, dass ihnen zunehmend eine öffentliche Expert_innenrolle im Bereich der Unterbringung Asylsuchender zukommt (vgl. bspw. Amin 2016; Memarnia 2017).

AUSBLICK

Ganz offensichtlich nehmen die Betreiberorganisationen und ihre Mitarbeiter_innen eine gewichtige Funktion in der (Re)Produktion von Wissen über die Unterbringung und insbesondere über die von ihnen untergebrachten Personen ein. Sie sind Teil eines humanitaristischen Diskurses und (re)produzieren ein Bild von den Bewohner_innen als zu rettende ›Opfer‹ in einer Ausnahmesituation, aber auch als Mitglieder ›rückständiger‹ Kulturen, die ihrer Hilfe und ihres politischen Einsatzes bedürfen. Obwohl sich einige Unterkunftsmitarbeiter_innen für die Abkehr von der Massenun-

terbringung aussprechen, (re)produzieren sie dennoch ein Bild der Bewohner_innen als unmündig und bedürftig. Hiermit werden diese wiederum zu Objekten der Unterbringung, die es nach den Vorstellungen der Betreiberorganisationen zu verwalten gilt. Gerade in Bezug auf Geschlechterverhältnisse oder nationale Ressentiments wird die Unterkunft als Ort der ›Barbarei‹ (vgl. Rygiel 2012: 811) konstruiert, der gesonderter Kontrolle bedarf. Dabei entsteht ein beispielhafter Widerspruch zwischen der Darstellung der weiblichen Bewohnerinnen als uneigenständig und hilfsbedürftig und den Forderungen nach Einzelunterbringung und Selbstverantwortung für die Asylsuchenden. Zwar setzen sich die Unterkunftsmitarbeiter_innen zum Teil für eine bessere Finanzierung der Unterkünfte oder gar eine dezentrale Unterbringung in Wohnungen ein. Durch die Darstellung der Bewohner_innen als besonders kontrollbedürftige Gruppe wird die Massenunterbringung jedoch zugleich indirekt durch sie legitimiert und die Unterkünfte werden zu »out-places«, an denen »de-socialized bodies« auch im Globalen Norden verwaltet, gepflegt und überwacht werden (Agier 2011: 182).

Während mein Artikel aufzeigt, welche Diskurse durch die Unterkunftsbetreiber (re)produziert werden und was für ein Bild diese von den Bewohner_innen entwerfen, möchte ich an dieser Stelle auch auf die Beschränkungen meiner Herangehensweise hinweisen. So ist es in diesem Rahmen nicht möglich, zu untersuchen, wie und in welchem Umfang die Betreiberorganisationen den politischen und gesellschaftlichen Diskurs über die Geflüchtetenunterbringung beeinflussen. Hierzu bedürfte es eher einer diskursanalytischen Auseinandersetzung mit Medienzeugnissen. Zudem wird zwar deutlich, dass sich die Betreiberorganisationen selbst als politische Akteure verstehen, für sich die Entwicklung von Standards und ein »sozialpolitische[s] Mitgestalten« beanspruchen, jedoch lässt sich der tatsächliche Umfang ihres Einflusses auf die Politikgestaltung nicht bestimmen. Es bedarf demnach weiterer Forschung, die sich mit den Gesetzgebungsprozessen in der Unterbringungspolitik befasst und sensibel gegenüber der Rolle der Betreiberorganisationen vorgeht.

Zuletzt möchte ich darauf hinweisen, dass mein Fokus auf die Unterkunftsmitarbeiter_innen die Gefahr birgt, selbst blind gegenüber der *agency* der Bewohner_innen zu sein und diese zu objektivieren. Es ist davon auszugehen, dass die Bewohner_innen ebenfalls an der (Re-)Produktion von Wissen in der Unterkunft beteiligt sind und dieses möglicherweise irritieren oder sich zunutze machen. Hier kann die Einbeziehung der produktiven Funktion der Betreiberorganisationen Ausgangspunkt für die weitere Erforschung von Widerstand und Subjektivierung in der Unterkunft sein, wie sie etwa von Vertreter_innen der *acts of citizenship* (vgl. Isin/Nielsen 2008) oder der Autonomie der Migration (vgl. etwa Mezzadra 2004) betrieben wird.

LITERATUR

Agier, Michel (2011): Managing the Undesirables. Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government. Cambridge.

Amin, Nina (2016): »Obdachlosigkeit vermeiden ist höchste Priorität«. Interview mit Michael Elias, Tamaja GmbH. Rbb online am 22.01.2016. URL: rbb-online.de [01.11.2017].

Aradau, Claudia (2004): The Perverse Politics of Four-Letter Words. Risk and Pity in the Securitisation of Human Trafficking. In: Millennium – Journal of International Studies 33 (2). 251–277.

Attia, Iman (2012): Ausschluss, Fürsorge und Exotismus. Kulturrassismus im Umgang mit Islam und »Muslimen«. In: Bundschuh, Stephan / Jagusch, Birgit (Hg.): Islamfeindlichkeit. Aspekte, Stimmen, Gegenstrategien. Düsseldorf. 6–10.

Barnett, Michael N. (2011): The Empire of Humanity. The History of Humanitarianism. Ithaca, NY.

Berliner Rotes Kreuz (2017): Grundsätze der DRK Flüchtlingshilfe. URL: www2.drk-berlin.de [06.06.2018].

Berliner Senat (2017): Flüchtlinge in Berlin. Registrierung. URL: berlin.de [11.11.2017].

Bloom, Tendayi (2015): The Business of Migration Control. Delegating Migration Control Functions to Private Actors. In: Global Policy 6 (2). 151–157.

Darling, Jonathan (2016): Asylum in Austere Times. Instability, Privatization and Experimentation within the UK Asylum Dispersal System. In: Journal of Refugee Studies 29 (4). 483–505.

Fahrun, Joachim (2017): Ausländischer Konzern betreibt erstmals Flüchtlingsheime. Berliner Morgenpost vom 20.03.2017. URL: morgenpost.de [05.01.2018].

Fassin, Didier (2007): Humanitarianism as a Politics of Life. In: Public Culture 19 (3). 499–520.

Herwartz, Christoph (2016): Der kurze Boom der Hilfsindustrie. Zeit Online am 12.09.2016. URL: zeit.de [05.09.2017].

Hess, Sabine (2016): Die humanitäre Grenze: Zur Funktionslogik humanitaristischer Praktiken zwischen Stabilisierung und Subversion/Transgression. Vortrag auf der Fachtagung »Dimensionen des Politischen«, 25.-28. Mai 2016. Graz.

Hess, Sabine / Kasparek, Bernd / Kron, Stefanie / Rodatz, Mathias / Schwertl, Maria / Sontowski, Simon (Hg.) (2016): Der lange Sommer der Migration. Grenzregime III. Berlin.

Hinger, Sophie / Schäfer, Philipp / Pott, Andreas (2016): The Local Production of Asylum. In: Journal of Refugee Studies 29 (4). 440–463.

Isin, Engin F. / Nielsen, Greg M. (Hg.) (2008): Acts of citizenship. London/New York.

Kreichauf, René (2016): Das Flüchtlingslager – Raumtheoretische Zugänge. In: Ludwig, Joachim / Ebner von Eschenbach, Malte / Kondratjuk, Maria (Hg.): Sozialräumliche Forschungsperspektiven. Disziplinäre Ansätze, Zugänge und Handlungsfelder. Opladen. 207–222.

Landesamt für Flüchtlingsangelegenheiten (2017): Informationen für Flüchtlinge. Wohnen. URL: berlin.de [11.11.2017].

Lieser, Jürgen (2013): Was ist humanitäre Hilfe? In: Lieser, Jürgen / Dijkzeul, Dennis (Hg.): Handbuch Humanitäre Hilfe. Berlin/Heidelberg. 9–28.

Memarnia, Susanne (2017): Flucht ins landeseigene Heim. Taz.de am 19.04.2017. URL: taz.de [08.09.2017].
Mezzadra, Sandro (2004): The right to escape. In: ephemera. theory & politics in organization 4 (3). 267–275.
Nowakowski, Gerd (2016): Flüchtlinge dürfen keine Handelsware sein. Tagesspiegel.de am 16.08.2016. URL: tagesspiegel.de [08.09.2016].
Perkowski, Nina (2016): Deaths, Interventions, Humanitarianism and Human Rights in the Mediterranean »Migration Crisis«. In: Mediterranean Politics 21 (2). 331–335.
Rygiel, Kim (2012): Politicizing camps. Forging transgressive citizenships in and through transit. In: Citizenship Studies 16 (5–6). 807–825.
Speth, Rudolf / Becker, Elke (2016): Zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure und die Betreuung geflüchteter Menschen in deutschen Kommunen. In: Opusculum 92. URL: maecenata.eu [12.09.2017].
Ticktin, Miriam Iris (2011): Casualties of Care. Immigration and the Politics of Humanitarianism in France. Berkeley, CA.
Turner, Simon (2015): What Is a Refugee Camp? Explorations of the Limits and Effects of the Camp. In: Journal of Refugee Studies 29 (2). 139–148.
Walters, William (2015): Reflections on Migration and Governmentality. In: movements. Journal für kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung 1 (1). 1–25.
Zhang, Chenchen (2014): Between Postnationality and Postcoloniality. Human Rights and the Rights of Non-citizens in a »Cosmopolitan Europe«. In: Dhawan, Nikita (Hg.): Decolonizing Enlightenment. Transnational Justice, Human Rights and Democracy in a Postcolonial World. Opladen. 243–260.

Liste der Interviews

B1: November 2016, Unterkunftsleiterin.
B2: November 2016, Geschäftsführerin.
B4: Dezember 2016, Ehrenamtskoordinatorin/Pressesprecherin.
B5: Dezember 2016, Abteilungsleiterin Geflüchtetenunterkünfte/Pressesprecherin.
B6a: Juli 2017, Abteilungsleiterin Geflüchtetenunterkünfte.
B6b: Juli 2017, Unterkunftsleiterin.
B7: Juli 2017, Unterkunftsleiterin.
B8a: Juli 2017, Unterkunftsleiterin.
B8b: Juli 2017, Sozialarbeiterin.

Interventionen

Was wir wissen

Über kritische Wissensproduktion in der Bildungsarbeit als und mit Migrant*innen

RUBIA SALGADO

Abstract: Proceeding from our work in the field of adult education with migrants, we write about approaches and methods of critical knowledge production. We write about the questions that we recognize as relevant and productive in this regard as well as about the attempts to answer these questions. We ask ourselves, for instance, how we can develop approaches for the acquisition of a second language or for basic education with migrants that establish modes of speaking, negotiating and reflecting language and that have a changing effect on the reality in which they take place. We write about methods and approaches that enable us to design educational work as a space of critical or counter-hegemonic knowledge production. In this article, we share with our readers some of the knowledge we have collected, reflected and produced in all these years, because above all we see knowledge as a tool for change.

Keywords: migration, critical adult learning, knowledge, knowledge dissemination

Wir beschäftigen uns mit dem Thema der kritischen Wissensproduktion ausgehend von unserer Tätigkeit im Feld der Erwachsenenbildung mit Migrant_innen. Das ›wir‹ bezeichnet hier die Mitarbeiter_innen von *das kollektiv. kritische bildungs-, beratungs- und kulturarbeit von und für migrantinnen* in Linz/Oberösterreich, der seit November 2015 die Bildungsaktivitäten von *maiz – Autonomes Zentrum von & für Migrantinnen* weiterführt.

Wir beschäftigen uns in unserer Arbeit kontinuierlich mit der Frage, wie es möglich ist, Ansätze für den Zweitspracherwerb bzw. für die Basisbildung mit Migrant_innen zu entwickeln, die ein Sprechen und ein Verhandeln und Reflektieren von Sprache evozieren, die verändernd auf die Wirklichkeit, in der sie stattfinden, zurückwirken. Die Beschäftigung mit dieser und anderen Fragen führte uns zur Erarbeitung von Methoden, die den Erwerb der hegemonialen Sprache als eine kritische und bewusste Aneignung und der ebensolche Gebrauch der dominanten Sprache Deutsch behandelt. Wesentliche Aspekte der Methoden bestehen erstens aus der Betrachtung des Erlernens und des Lehrens von Deutsch als Zweitsprache im Kontext der Migrationsgesellschaft als einen Prozess, der unter dem Zeichen von Machtasymmetrien und

Rassismus stattfindet, und zweitens aus dem Ziel, Bildungsarbeit als einen Raum der kritischen bzw. der gegenhegemonialen Wissensproduktion zu gestalten. Ein Ziel, das gleichzeitig als Differenzierungsmerkmal der pädagogischen Handlung und der (bildungs-)politischen Positionierungen vom Verein *maiz* und auch von *das kollektiv* fungiert. Darüber hinaus betrachten wir Wissen als Werkzeug für Veränderungen und somit teilen wir hier mit den Leser_innen einiges von dem Wissen, das wir in allen diesen Jahren gesammelt, reflektiert und hergestellt haben.

Wir wissen, dass alle wissen.

Wir wissen, dass eine Frau, die nie eine Schule betreten hat, weiß.

Wir wissen, dass eine scharfe Trennungslinie zwischen subalternem und hegemonialem Wissen schwer zu zeichnen ist.

Wir wissen, dass Gayatri C. Spivak (2008) geschrieben hat, dass die subalterne Frau nicht sprechen könne und dass sie dabei meinte, dass die subalterne Frau nicht gehört würde und dass das Hören hegemonial strukturiert sei.

Wir wissen, dass die angenommene ›Authentizität‹ der Subalternen Ergebnis gesellschaftlicher Hierarchien ist.

Wir wissen, dass subalterne Gruppen ein Wissen über sich und über die Welt haben.

Wir wissen, dass das Wissen einer subalternen Frau über sich selbst aus dem Umfeld der Produktion dieses Wissens bezogen wird und dass dieses Wissen möglicherweise aus hegemonialen Erklärungssträngen entsteht.

Wir wissen, dass Antonio Gramsci über die kritische Erneuerung des Alltagsverstands geschrieben hat.

Wir wissen, dass das Wissen der Kursteilnehmer_innen nicht unbedingt / per se kritisch ist.

Wir wissen, dass unser Wissen als Lehrende nicht unbedingt / per se kritisch ist.

Wir wissen, dass gegen den Strich zu wissen und mit hegemonialen Interpretationssträngen zu brechen, eine herausfordernde Aufgabe ist.

Wir wissen, dass das Wissen der Lernenden im Rahmen kritischer Bildungsarbeit aufgewertet und anerkannt werden soll, ohne es zu romantisieren oder zu idealisieren, d.h. auch das sogenannte subalterne Wissen soll einer kritischen, reflexiven Auseinandersetzung unterzogen werden.

Wir wissen, dass wir als intellektuelle Migrant_innen in Westeuropa Gefahr laufen, als ›Ersatz-Subalterne‹ zu wirken, die unterdrückten Gruppen zum Verstummen bringen.

Wir wissen, dass es im Sinn kritischer Bildungsarbeit unausweichlich ist, von den Subalternen zu lernen, anstatt für sie zu sprechen, anstatt sich selbst sprechen zu hören.

Wir wissen, dass Wechselseitigkeit eine Säule kritischer Bildungsarbeit bildet.

Wir wissen, dass Wechselseitigkeit bedeutet, dass alle Lernenden immer auch Lehrende sind und dass alle Lehrenden immer auch Lernende sind.

Wir wissen, dass die Frage ›Was lernen wir von den Lernenden?‹ die schwierigste Frage ist, wenn wir als Antwort keine Bestätigung unseres Vorwissens haben wollen.

Ein Beispiel:

> Eine Kursteilnehmerin erzählt, dass sie einen reichen Mann, einen Direktor, geheiratet hat, und dass sie deswegen ihren Job gekündigt hat. Die Lehrende kennt die Teilnehmerin seit einigen Jahren. Sie war ihre Lehrerin in Alphabetisierungskursen, sie weiß, dass die Frau und ihre Kinder viele Jahre unter der Gewalt österreichischen Ehemänner gelebt haben. Sie hat sie durch Scheidungen und Aufenthalten im Frauenhaus begleitet, bis die Frau dann einen sicheren Job gefunden hat und mit ihren Kindern eine Genossenschaftswohnung mieten könnte. Als Reaktion auf die Neuigkeit fragte die Lehrende: »Spinnst du? Willst du deine erkämpfte unabhängige Situation aufgeben?« Daraufhin beantwortete die Lernende: »Du hast keine Ahnung! Ich arbeite seitdem ich sechs Jahre alt bin! Und du willst mir sagen, dass ich den Job nicht aufgeben soll?«

An diesem Beispiel wird deutlich, dass wir uns mit unseren eigenen Überzeugungen als Feminist_innen auseinandersetzen müssen. Denn die Selbstverständlichkeit unserer Meinung über die Relevanz der ökonomischen Selbstständigkeit als Grundstein der Emanzipation würde hier durch ihre Argumentation tief erschüttert. Sie hat dadurch expliziert, dass dieses unter westlichen Feminist_innen als allgemein gültig betrachtetes Ziel klassenspezifische Aspekte übersehen würde. Sie hat die Lehrende dadurch herausgefordert, sich selbst zu widersprechen. Sie hat ihre privilegierte Situation bloßgestellt.

Wir wissen, dass manches Wissen abgewertet wird.

Wir wissen, dass es wichtig ist, sich immer wieder zu fragen: Was gilt als Wissen? Wann? Wo? Warum?

Wir wissen, dass es wichtig ist, Anerkennungsprozesse von Wissen als Hierarchisierungs-, Legitimierungs- und Delegitimierungsvorgänge zu reflektieren.

Wir wissen, dass es wichtig ist, Wissen und Annahmen über die ›Andere/n‹ zu hinterfragen.

Wir wissen, dass problematisierendes Lernen als eine Methode zur kritischen Wissensproduktion angewendet werden kann.

Wir wissen, dass ein Problem erst ein Problem ist, wenn die Antwort auf eine bestimmte Frage nicht bekannt ist, und wenn die Beantwortung dieser Frage als notwendig für die Akteur_innen im Lernprozess erscheint.

Wir wissen, dass ein möglicher Prozess der Wissensproduktion im Rahmen kritischer Bildungsarbeit sich vom Empirischen über das Abstrakte bis hin zum reflektierten Konkreten erstreckt.

Hier ein Beispiel[1] aus der Arbeit im Feld Deutsch als Zweitsprache (DaZ).

1 | Dieses Beispiel ist eine zusammengefasste Wiedergabe der Darstellung der Methode. Siehe maiz (2014).

Der Prozess der Wissensproduktion als problematisierendes Lernen

Es geht um eine kritische Erneuerung des Alltagsverstandes[2] der Lernenden und der Lehrenden sowie um eine kritische Aneignung der dominanten Sprache und des hegemonial legitimierten Wissens.

Der Prozess der Wissensproduktion erstreckt sich vom Empirischen über das Abstrakte bis zum reflektierten Konkreten. Das Empirische und das Abstrakte bilden Momente im Prozess der Wissensproduktion, das heißt im Prozess der Herstellung des reflektierten Konkreten. Es handelt sich deshalb um einen Prozess, weil das Konkrete nicht gegeben ist (wie es oft betrachtet wird), sondern Ergebnis einer konstruierten Wirklichkeit. Das Konkrete ist historisch und ergibt sich in der Praxis.

Ein Beispiel aus der Unterrichtspraxis

In der Erarbeitung des Begriffs und Themenfeldes ›Tagesablauf‹ kann problematisierendes Lernen als eine Methode zur kritischen Wissensproduktion angewendet werden. In DaZ-Kursen kommt die Tagesgestaltung von Frauen (Pflege-, Haushalts- und Erziehungspflichten bzw. -tätigkeiten) zum Ausdruck (empirische Ebene). Ausgehend von den in den Erzählungen beschriebenen Problemsituationen (z.B. im Zusammenhang mit Überforderungen, fehlender Anerkennung, finanzieller Notlage, Konflikte in familiären und/oder beruflichen Kontexten usw.) werden Begriffe und Konzepte wie Reproduktionsarbeit, Lohn- bzw. Erwerbsarbeit, Care-Arbeit, etc. behandelt und in ihrer historischen und gesellschaftlichen Einbettung reflektiert (Ebene des Abstrakten). Die Benennung und Reflexion dieser Tätigkeiten als Arbeit seitens der Lernenden entspricht in diesem Beispiel dem Schritt zum reflektierten Konkreten, der möglicherweise Veränderungen in der Interaktion im gesellschaftlichen Umfeld der Lernenden bewirken kann.

2 | Mit dem Begriff ›Alltagsverstand‹ wird hier Bezug auf ein Konzept von Antonio Gramsci genommen. »Die spontane Philosophie enthält die Alltagssprache inclusive ihrer alltagsweltlichen Sinndimensionen ebenso wie den Alltagsverstand, den gesunden Menschenverstand, die Popularreligion und die Folklore. [...] Die spontane Philosophie ist demgemäß die epistemologische Basis von Bildung, an der sie ansetzen muss, nicht etwa um diese Alltagsphilosophie zu überwinden, sondern um sie mit neuen Erkenntnissen anzureichern.« (Armin 2006)

Der Zugang zum reflektierten Konkreten wird durch Reflexion (das Abstrakte: Analyse- oder Metaebene) vermittelt. Reflexion ist die Antwort auf identifizierte Probleme auf der Ebene des Empirischen. Die Reflexion ist radikal, rigoros/präzis und kontextualisiert. Sie geschieht ausgehend von der Identifizierung eines Problems. Gleichzeitig bildet die Reflexion eine Antwort auf das Problem.

Wir wissen, dass Erfolg keine Kategorie zur Beurteilung einer kritischen Bildungsarbeit mit Frauen aus dem verarmten Süden mit weniger oder gar keiner formalen Bildungserfahrung sein kann.

Wir wissen, dass im Rahmen öffentlicher geförderten Bildungsarbeit die Verwertungsinteressen der Wirtschaft oberste Priorität haben, auch wenn dies unter dem Deckmantel der Förderung der sozialen Kohäsion und des Umweltschutzes geschieht, wie es in der Lissabon-Strategie von 2000 oder in ihrer aktuellen neuen Auflage formuliert wird.

Wir wissen, dass Migrations- und Integrationspolitiken u.a. Folgen eines ›Wettbewerbs um die besseren Köpfe‹ sind.

Wir wissen, dass die Forderung nach der Implementierung einer selektiven Migrationspolitik, nach einer Steuerung der Migration zugunsten der österreichischen wirtschaftlichen Interessen, von einer breiten Spektrum politischer Akteur_innen gestellt wurde und wird.

Wir wissen, dass Wertevermittlung im Sinne eines Zivilisierungsprojektes, das Grundzüge einer Kolonialpädagogik trägt, nicht erst seit Dezember 2015 in Österreich stattfindet.

Wir wissen, dass es in kritischen Bildungsprozessen darum geht, so wenige Wahrheiten wie möglich zu produzieren.

Wir wissen, dass Bildung immer politisch ist. Sie kann den status quo verfestigen oder ihn hinterfragen.

Wir wissen, dass es darum geht, Normalitäten, normative Settings und Selbstverständlichkeiten zu hinterfragen.

Wir wissen, dass, um diese Arbeit zu realisieren, neben einer Pluralität von Methoden auch die Bereitschaft, sich selbst zu widersprechen, zum Experimentieren, zu Risiko und zum Scheitern notwendig sind.

LITERATUR/LESELISTE

Armin, Bernhard (2006): Bildung als Kampf um Hegemonie. Oder: Entwicklung zur Widerständigkeit im Anschluss an Gramsci. URL: bdwi.de [06.06.2018].

Castro Varela, María do Mar / Dhawan, Nikita (2005): Postkoloniale Theorie. Eine kritische Einführung. Bielefeld.

maiz (2014): [d_a_] Deutsch als Zweitsprache – Ergebnisse und Perspektiven eines partizipativen Forschungsprozesses. Reflexive und gesellschaftskritische Zugänge / [d_a_] Curriculum für die Erwachsenenbildung: Deutsch als Zweitsprache im Dissens. Linz. 218–9. URL: maiz.at [06.06.2018].

maiz (o.J.): Grundsätze der Arbeit im Bildungsbereich. URL: maiz.at [06.06.2018].

Merkens, Andreas (2006): Hegemonie und Gegen-Hegemonie als pädagogisches Verhältnis. Antonio Gramscis politische Pädagogik. In: Rosa-Luxemburg-Bildungswerk Hamburg e.V. (Hg.): Hamburger Skripte 15 - Hegemonie und Gegen-Hegemonie. Hamburg.

Rafaty, Ryan (2014): Who will educate the educators? An interview with Gayatri Spivak. In: King's Rewiew Magazine. URL: kingsreview.co.uk [06.06.2018].

Saviani, Dermeval (1980): Educação: do senso comum à consciência filosófica. São Paulo.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (2008): Can the subaltern speak? Postkolonialität und subalterne Artikulation. Wien/Berlin.

Gutiérrez Rodríguez, Encarnación (1999): Fallstricke des Feminismus. Das Denken »kritischer Differenzen« ohne geopolitische Kontextualisierung. Einige Überlegungen zur Rezeption antirassistischer und postkolonialer Kritik. In: Polylog Nr. 4. URL: them.polylog.org [06.06.2018].

Der globale Süden ist hier!

Wie Refugee-Aktivismus den Zusammenhang von Flucht und ›Entwicklung‹ aufzeigt

DANIEL BENDIX

Abstract: This article takes up Miriam Lang's call formulated in the issue 3(1) of movements that the anti-racist movement and critical migration research should include the Global South more fully in their thinking. To practice internationalist solidarity, however, there is no need to wander off into the distance. Instead, refugee activism in Germany, with its critique of global inequality and exploitative structures, offers the best starting point. At the same time, ecological movements that are critical of developments and capitalism could also benefit from a commitment to migrant struggles. Refugee activism demands the right not to have to migrate by criticizing global economic relations and referring to the role of political and military relations between the North and the South. To fill gaps in activism and academia and to face contradictions, it is necessary for the (white-)German anti-racist scene and movements such as Degrowth to engage critically with neo-colonialism and imperialism by cooperating with self-organized refugee activism.

Keywords: global South, refugee activism, development, neocolonialism, imperialism

In Ausgabe 3 (1) der *movements* argumentiert Miriam Lang (2017), dass sich antirassistische Bewegung und kritische Migrationsforschung im deutschsprachigen Raum mehr der Frage globaler Ungleichheit zuwenden sollten. Diese konzentrierten sich zu sehr auf die Kritik am europäischen Migrationsmanagement sowie auf die Forderung nach Bewegungsfreiheit. Dabei vernachlässigten sie globale Ausbeutungsstrukturen als Fluchtursachen sowie die Tatsache, dass eine Inklusion in die dominante Produktions- und Konsumweise der BRD keine emanzipatorische Perspektive sein kann, die sich global ausweiten ließe.

Langs Beitrag trifft meines Erachtens den Nagel auf den Kopf. Er erschien, als wir mitten in den Vorbereitungen für die Konferenz »Selbstbestimmt und solidarisch!« zum Zusammenhang von Migration, Entwicklung und ökologischer Krise steckten. Die Konferenz fand im Oktober 2017 in Leipzig statt, gemeinsam veranstaltet u.a. von *Afrique-Europe-Interact*, dem *Konzeptwerk Neue Ökonomie*, *Corasol*, *glokal*, *NoStress-Tour* und dem *Entwicklungspolitischen Netzwerk Sachsen*. Dort wurde genau das versucht, was Miriam Lang fordert, nämlich die »Verbindung antirassisti-

scher Kämpfe der Migration mit solchen für ein anderes, weniger entfremdetes, weniger beschleunigtes und individualisiertes Leben [...] wie die Postwachstumsbewegung oder der Ökofeminismus« (ebd.: 187).

Lang fordert, man solle »[d]en globalen Süden mitdenken!«, der »im kapitalistischen Weltsystem überall dort [ist], wo massiv Rohstoffe zum Export abgebaut werden, ohne dass ihre Verarbeitung vor Ort Mehrwert erzielt bzw. wo extrem billige Arbeitskraft vernutzt wird« (ebd.: 182). Dort fänden »derzeit, aufgrund der nach wie vor geltenden kolonialen globalen Arbeitsteilung, heftige Kämpfe im Kontext von Akkumulation durch Enteignung [...] statt« (ebd.). Langs Perspektive sollte meines Erachtens erweitert werden. Der vor 30 Jahren ermordete panafrikanische burkinische Revolutionär und Präsident Burkina Fasos, Thomas Sankara, wies darauf hin, dass man den Imperialismus in Burkina Faso nicht lange suchen müsse, da er vor einem auf dem Teller liege (zit.n. Schumann 2012). In ähnlicher Stoßrichtung möchte ich in dieser kurzen Intervention darauf hinweisen, dass antirassistische Bewegung und kritische Migrationsforschung in der BRD für internationalistische Solidarität nicht in die Ferne schweifen müssen – der globale Süden ist ganz nah.

So plädiere ich hier nicht nur wie Miriam Lang dafür, die Solidarität mit Bewegungen im geopolitischen Süden[1] zu suchen, sondern dem Aktivismus von Migrant*innen in Deutschland zuzuhören – oder noch besser, sich ihm anzuschließen. Die antirassistische Bewegung in der BRD, die weiterhin – und nach dem ›Sommer der Migration‹ nochmal stärker – vor allem weiß und/oder deutsch imaginiert wird (auch bei Miriam Lang), sollte auf die Stimmen im selbstorganisierten Refugee-Aktivismus hören, die neben Asylsystem und Grenzregime seit langem globale Ungleichheit und Ausbeutungsstrukturen thematisieren. Gleichzeitig würde ökologischen sowie entwicklungs- und kapitalismuskritischen Bewegungen eine Kooperation mit migrantischen Kämpfen und dem Refugee-Aktivismus mehr als gut tun. Wer also richtigerweise im Sinne der Autonomie der Migration die *agency* von Mi-

1 | Für mich ist Süden hier also weniger ein geographisches Konzept, sondern eine »Metapher für menschliches Leiden hervorgerufen durch Kapitalismus und Kolonialismus auf globaler Ebene, sowie für den Widerstand dieses Leiden zu überwinden bzw. zu minimieren« (Santos 2016: 18, Übers. DB). Dieser Süden »existiert auch im geographischen Norden [...] in Form ausgeschlossener, zum Schweigen gebrachter und marginalisierter Bevölkerungsgruppen wie nicht-dokumentierten Immigrant*innen« (ebd.: 19, Übers. DB). Eine solche Bevölkerungsgruppe stellen auch die Menschen dar, die sich legalisiert in der BRD aufhalten (z.B. durch laufendes Asylverfahren oder durch Duldung), aber wissen, dass ihre einzige Chance, sich der Abschiebung zu entziehen, Illegalisierung oder Heirat sind – beispielsweise, weil sie aus einem als sicher eingestuften Herkunftsland kommen.

grant*innen ernst nimmt (Benz/Schwenken 2005), sollte sie auch in ihren politischen Analysen und ihrem Aktivismus ernst nehmen – was natürlich auch heißt, sich mit diesen kritisch auseinanderzusetzen und ggf. zu widersprechen. Für beides gibt es unzählige aktuelle Beispiele, wie die erwähnte Konferenz in Leipzig deutlich gezeigt hat. Ich möchte im Folgenden nur zwei Themenfelder ansprechen, die von geflüchteten Aktivist*innen forciert werden und die sowohl für die Degrowth-Bewegung als auch für die (von Miriam Lang kritisierte) migrationspolitische deutsche Antira-Szene von Belang sind: Neokolonialismus und Imperialismus.

Neokolonialismus – ›Wir sind hier, weil ihr unsere Länder zerstört‹

Zunächst gilt mein Augenmerk der Art und Weise, wie Refugee-Aktivist*innen Neokolonialismus thematisieren. Der Aktivist und im Januar 2018 verstorbene Direktor des *Institute of Race Relations* in London, Ambalavaner Sivanandan, hat bereits in den 1980er Jahren in aller Kürze auf den Zusammenhang zwischen europäischer Kolonisierung und Migration aus den ehemaligen Kolonien nach Europa hingewiesen: ›Wir sind hier, weil ihr da wart‹ (vgl. Alexander 2015). Seit ungefähr 20 Jahren verwenden migrierte Aktivist*innen in Deutschland den Slogan in leicht abgewandelter Form: ›Wir sind hier, weil ihr unsere Länder zerstört‹. Er verweist auf globale Verknüpfungen und neokoloniale Ausbeutungsstrukturen. Damit reklamieren sie auch – in den Worten von Boniface Mabanza auf der oben genannten Konferenz – das Recht, *nicht* auswandern zu müssen (Mabanza 2017: 31:00 min).

Die Proteste von Geflüchteten seit 2012 – und die wissenschaftliche Forschung dazu – richteten sich vor allem gegen Diskriminierung und Rassismus in der Einwanderungs- und Asylpolitik der BRD und der EU (From the Struggles Collective 2015; Langa 2015; Odugbesan/Schwiertz 2018). Doch forderten Aktivist*innen immer wieder eine doppelte Perspektive ein. Erstens ist dies eine Kritik des Rassismus, den Geflüchtete in Deutschland erfahren, zweitens eine Kritik der Gründe dafür, dass Menschen fliehen oder migrieren: »Auf der einen Seite müssen wir uns den Abschiebungen, den rassistischen Behandlungen und der sozialen Ausgrenzung hier in Deutschland entgegenstellen und auf der anderen Seite haben wir eine Sehnsucht danach, die furchtbaren Probleme unserer Brüder und Schwestern, die wir zurücklassen mussten, auszudrücken und öffentlich zu machen« (Karawane für die Rechte der Flüchtlinge und MigrantInnen 2000; vgl. Osa 2015). Ein Beispiel für diese Doppelperspektive ist das Internationale Tribunal gegen die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, dass 2013 u.a. von der *Karawane für die Rechte der Flüchtlinge und MigrantInnen*

in Berlin organisiert wurde. Das Tribunal legte der deutschen Regierung zentral zur Last, »mitverantwortlich zu sein für die tägliche Generierung von Fluchtursachen« (zit.n. Afrique-Europe-Interact 2013).

Schon 1999, am Beginn der globalisierungskritischen Bewegung, kam *The VOICE* mit Hunderten von indischen Bäuer*innen zusammen, um gegen die Liberalisierung des Landwirtschaftssektors beim G7-Gipfel in Köln zu demonstrieren (Jakob 2016: 27). Die *Karawane* mobilisierte in der Vorbereitung auf den G8-Gipfel 2007 in Heiligendamm dafür, Neokolonialismus auf die Protestagenda zu setzen: »The wealth of the so-called rich countries of the North, especially the ›Group of 8‹, the Greedy 8, accrues from the massive and inhuman exploitation and colonization of our countries« (Karawane für die Rechte der Flüchtlinge und MigrantInnen 2007). Auch Bino (2016), der an der Besetzung des Oranienplatzes in Berlin beteiligt war, argumentiert in ähnliche Richtung in einer Zeitung von und für Refugees: »[I]t is well known in this post-colonial – or rather neocolonial – era that the EU and the International World Bank control and destroy African markets« (ebd.: 4). Aktivismus von Geflüchteten in der BRD verweist also regelmäßig und bereits seit langem auf ungleiche ökonomische Beziehungen zwischen der EU/dem Westen und Afrika.

In Ergänzung bzw. Abgrenzung zu klassischer Antira-Arbeit, die oftmals Nationalstaats- und Grenzregime-fixiert war, gründete sich 2009 das Netzwerk *Afrique-Europe-Interact*, um sich »an sozialen Auseinandersetzungen um gerechte bzw. selbstbestimmte Entwicklung« zu beteiligen und das »Recht auf globale Bewegungs- und Niederlassungsfreiheit« mit dem »Recht zu bleiben« zu verknüpfen (Afrique-Europe-Interact 2012). Das Netzwerk kritisiert »neokolonialen Landraub bzw. Landgrabbing« in Westafrika, d.h. den »Ausverkauf großer Wald-, Acker- und Weideflächen an global operierende Banken, Investmentfonds und Konzerne« (ebd.), als eine wichtige Fluchtursache. Landgrabbing zerstört nach *Afrique-Europe-Interact* die Lebensgrundlagen von Kleinbäuer*innen und zwingt diese, ihre Arbeit aufzugeben und oftmals verarmt in die nächste Stadt oder – wenn die nötigen Mittel da sind – noch weiter zu ziehen. Den Kampf von Kleinbäuer*innen gegen Landgrabbing zu unterstützen, indem beispielsweise involvierte Entwicklungsinstitutionen im Norden unter Druck gesetzt werden, setzt das um, was Christoph Spehr (1996) mit dem Ansatz der ›Abwicklung des Nordens‹ (ebd.: 209ff.) propagierte und was in der Degrowth-Bewegung derzeit Widerhall findet, nämlich die Kapazität des globalen Kapitals einzuschränken, sich Ressourcen aus dem Süden anzueignen.

IMPERIALISMUS – ›WAFFENEXPORT STOPPEN! FLUCHTURSACHEN BEKÄMPFEN‹

Neben Neokolonialismus wird im Refugee-Aktivismus auch immer wieder auf die Rolle von politischen und militärischen Beziehungen des Nordens mit dem Süden hingewiesen. Die derzeit populären Degrowth-Werke »Externalisierungsgesellschaft« (Lessenich 2016) und »Imperiale Lebensweise« (Brand/Wissen 2017) problematisieren globale Ungleichheit sowie Ausbeutungsmechanismen. Unterbelichtet ist allerdings die Dimension des Imperialismus im Sinne von westlichen Militärinterventionen, Waffenexporten und ›sicherheitspolitischer‹ Kooperation mit autokratischen Regimen. Im migrantischen Aktivismus spielen diese Aspekte eine ungleich größere Rolle. So versteht der sudanesische Aktivist Adam Bahar (2015) Krieg und Waffenexporte als zentrale Fluchtursache:

> »The colonization strategy [...] is implemented by means of starting wars and marketing weaponry. It is quite simple really – Germany is one of the biggest manufacturers of weapons and military equipment in the world, it makes all the sense for it to want to sell these weapons and equipment, so wars have to be waged in Africa.« (Ebd.)

Derzeit ist die BRD militärisch alleine auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent in Mali, am Horn von Afrika, in Somalia, Sudan, Südsudan und Westsahara aktiv. Deutsche Unternehmen exportieren Waffen und militärisch bzw. militärisch nutzbare Technologien in die ganze Welt. Deutschland liegt weltweit auf Platz vier der Exporteure von großen Waffen und auf Platz zwei in Bezug auf Kleinwaffen (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2015).

Um den Zusammenhang zwischen Flucht und Waffenhandel aufzuzeigen, haben selbstorganisierte Geflüchteten- und Migrant*innen-Organisationen zusammen mit Friedens- und Anti-Kriegs-Netzwerken beispielsweise 2015 die ›Bodensee Action Days: Stop weapons' export! Fight the causes of flight!‹ organisiert (Korvensyrjä/Osa 2016). Die Aktionstage sollten aufzeigen, dass Waffen und Waffentechnologie, die in der Bodenseeregion hergestellt und entwickelt werden, Menschen dazu bringen, aus ihren Heimatländern fliehen zu müssen. Die Kampagne stellte eine Verbindung her zwischen dem Reichtum der Bodenseeregion und dem Tod von Menschen sowie der Flucht vor bewaffneten Konflikten in anderen Ländern. Die Aktivist*innen verknüpften Kritik an der Waffenindustrie mit einer der Kernforderungen der Refugee-Proteste, nämlich der Abschaffung der Lagerunterbringung (in diesem Fall des Lagers in Überlingen). Unter dem Slogan »Close the lager, and close Diehl's weapon production« (Feliziani 2016) besuchten die Protestierenden die Bewohner*innen des

Lagers und wiesen darauf hin, dass die Steuereinnahmen Überlingens zu 80 Prozent von der Waffenindustrie stammen (Jakob 2016: 167). Nach einem der Organistor*innen, Rex Osa, »ist der einzige Weg tatsächliche Toleranz und Respekt zu erzeugen, der, Menschen über die Gründe für Flucht zu bilden, und insbesondere in Bezug auf Deutschlands imperiale Rolle in der Weltpolitik« (Korvensyrjä/Osa 2016: 110). Mit ähnlicher politischer Ausrichtung gab es 2017 eine von sierra-leonischen und afghanischen Migrant*innen organisierte Demonstration in Jena, die unter anderem JenOptiks Produktion von Waffentechnologie anprangerte (The VOICE 2017). Auch sudanesische und togolesische Migrant*innen haben immer wieder verlangt, sicherheitspolitische und militärische Zusammenarbeit mit den repressiven Regimen in ihren Herkunftsländern zu beenden (Refugee Protestcamp Hannover 2014; Jakob 2016: 31).

Politische Konsequenzen

An die Kritik an Neokolonialismus und Imperialismus könnte eine Bewegung, der es um Abkehr von kapitalistischen Mensch-Mensch- und Mensch-Natur-Verhältnissen im globalen Norden und damit um weniger negative Externalitäten geht, sehr gut andocken. Refugee-Aktivismus zeigt die Notwendigkeit einer anti-imperialistischen bzw. anti-kolonialen Kritik auf. Gleichzeitig verweigert sich Refugee-Aktivismus nicht den Widersprüchen, mit denen eine Politik internationaler Solidarität umgehen muss. Die Frage der Relevanz von Lohnarbeit ist ein gutes Beispiel für grundlegende Widersprüche.

Die Kritik an Lohnarbeit ist für die Degrowth-Bewegung zentral in ihrem Streben nach einem »weniger entfremdete[n], weniger beschleunigte[n] und individualisierte[n] Leben« (Lang 2017: 187). In der Refugee-Bewegung besteht tendenziell ein deutlich positiveres Verhältnis zu Lohnarbeit und die diesbezügliche Perspektive der Degrowth-Bewegung kann schwerlich an die Lebenssituation von vielen Geflüchteten andocken. Denn es ist wohl nicht übertrieben zu sagen, dass Lagerleben und Duldung maximal entfremden – und Beschleunigung würden im Asylsystem Gefangene wohl nicht als eines ihrer Hauptprobleme nennen. In der Vorbereitung zur genannten Konferenz wiesen Organisator*innen in solcher Lebenssituation immer wieder darauf hin, dass Zugang von Migrant*innen zu Lohnarbeit sehr wichtig für die Entwicklung ihrer Herkunftsländer sei. Das kollidiert in vieler Hinsicht mit der Intention, Entwicklungsideologie in Nord und Süd zu hinterfragen und könnte als Forderung, in die Externalisierungsgesellschaft integriert zu werden, verstanden werden. Die migrierten Aktivist*innen erklärten aber Folgendes: Das Geld, was sie verdienten, wür-

den sie nach Hause schicken, wo es der selbstbestimmten Entwicklung ihrer Familienangehörigen und Freund*innen bzw. der Dorfgemeinschaft oder des Stadtviertels dient. Und tatsächlich: Rücküberweisungen von Migrant*innen sind deutlich wichtiger für ›Entwicklung‹ der Herkunftsländer als offizielle ›Entwicklungshilfe‹ (World Bank Group 2016: 17). Den Menschen, die Rücküberweisungen aus dem globalen Norden erhalten, geht es in erster Linie nicht um »Massenkonsum und [...] Anhäufung materieller Güter« (Lang 2017: 186). Mit Degrowth-Projekten im Norden, die auf Selbstversorgung ausgerichtet sind, ist Migrant*innen, die daheim Gebliebene finanziell unterstützen wollen, nicht geholfen. Subsistenzermöglichende Aktivitäten mögen »sinnvolle Betätigung und Wertschätzung« (ebd.: 180) bedeuten, die medizinische Versorgung der Mutter in Kamerun oder die Kleidung für die Kinder des Bruders in Niger können sie nicht finanzieren. Und schon gar nicht Brunnen oder ähnliche Basisinfrastruktur. Degrowth-Strategien können Menschen im globalen Süden also nicht unbedingt unmittelbar helfen.

Eine Öffnung der (weiß-)deutschen antirassistischen Szene für Fragen globaler Ungleichheit, Fluchtursachen und internationaler Solidarität ist also einerseits nicht nur über die Verbindung mit der hiesigen Degrowth- oder anderen kapitalismuskritischen Bewegungen in der BRD oder im Süden möglich, sondern auch über die Öffnung und enge Kooperation mit selbstorganisiertem Refugee-Aktivismus. Andererseits sollten die Bewegungen, die sich gegen das Entwicklungsmodell des globalen Nordens wenden, sich grundlegend mit antirassistischem migrantischen Aktivismus verbünden. Denn dieser kann einige aktivistische (und akademische) Leerstellen füllen sowie auf die auszuhandelnden Widersprüche internationaler Solidarität hinweisen.

LITERATUR

Afrique-Europe-Interact (2012): A Short Description of Our Network. URL: afrique-europe-interact.net [15.11.2017].

Afrique-Europe-Interact (2013): 13.-16.06.2013 | Tribunal gegen die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. URL: afrique-europe-interact.net [06.10.2017].

Alexander, Dominic (2015): They are coming here because we were there. Counterfire vom 17.09.2015. URL: counterfire.org [27.01.2018].

Bahar, Adam (2015): Between Two Fires: A Migrant's Fight for a Place in Germany. Africa Is a Country vom 25.03.2015. URL: africasacountry.com [08.01.2018].

Benz, Martina / Schwenken, Helen (2005): Jenseits von Autonomie und Kontrolle: Migration als eigensinnige Praxis. In: Prokla 160 / 35 (3). 363–377.

Bino (2016): Bino's Perspective on Colonialism and Imperialism in Africa. In: Daily Resistance 2. URL: oplatz.net [08.01.2018].

Brand, Ulrich / Wissen, Markus (2017): Imperiale Lebensweise. Zur Ausbeutung von Mensch und Natur im globalen Kapitalismus. München.

Feliziani, Claudio (2016): Bodensee Aktionstage: Waffenexport stoppen! Fluchtursachen bekämpfen! Stop weapons' export! Fight the causes of flight! URL: vimeo.com [01.02.2017].

From the Struggles Collective (2015): Lessons from the Struggles. A Collage. In: movements. Journal für kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung 1 (1). URL: movements-journal.org [08.01.2018].

Jakob, Christian (2016): Die Bleibenden. Wie Flüchtlinge Deutschland seit 20 Jahren verändern. Berlin.

Karawane für die Rechte der Flüchtlinge und MigrantInnen (2007): We Are Here, Because You Destroy Our Countries! Solidarity against Deportation! URL: fluechtlingsrat-hamburg.de [22.03.2017].

Karawane für die Rechte der Flüchtlinge und MigrantInnen (2000): Kongress-Deklaration der »Karawane für die Rechte der Flüchtlinge und MigrantInnen«. URL: nadir.org [22.03.2017].

Korvensyrjä, Aino / Osa, Rex (2016): »We Are Here Because You Continue to Destroy Our Countries« – an Interview with Rex Osa. In: Signal. Writings on the Freedom of Movement 2. 104–110.

Lang, Miriam (2017): Den Globalen Süden mitdenken! Was Migration mit imperialer Lebensweise, Degrowth und neuem Internationalismus zu tun hat. In: movements. Journal für kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung 3 (1). 179–190. URL: movements-journal.org [08.01.2018].

Langa, Napuli (2015): About the Refugee Movement in Kreuzberg/Berlin. In: movements. Journal für kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung 1 (2). URL: movements-journal.org [08.01.2018].

Lessenich, Stephan (2016): Neben uns die Sintflut. Die Externalisierungsgesellschaft und ihr Preis. Berlin.

Mabanza, Boniface (2017): Kritische Perspektiven auf Migration, Entwicklung und ökologische Krise. Konferenz »Selbstbestimmt und solidarisch! Konferenz zu Migration, Entwicklung und ökologischer Krise«. Leipzig, 6.-8.10.2017. URL: youtu.be [08.01.2018].

Odugbesan, Abimbola / Schwiertz, Helge (2018): »We are here to stay«. Refugee Struggles in Germany between Unity and Division. In: Rosenberger, Sieglinde / Merhaut, Nina / Stern, Verena (Hg.): Comparative Analysis of Protest Movements in Refugee, Asylum and Deportation Policies. New York.

Osa, Rex (2015): »Flüchtlinge sind keine Babys«: Es braucht Solidarität und Räume statt alter Kleider. Radio Dreyeckland vom 23.10.2015. URL: rdl.de [08.01.2018].

Refugee Protestcamp Hannover (2014): Pressemitteilung vom 04.09.2014. URL: fluechtlingscamphannover.wordpress.com [08.01.2018].

Santos, Boaventura de Sousa (2016): Epistemologies of the South and the Future. In: From the European South 1. 17–29. URL: boaventuradesousasantos.pt [08.01.2018].

Schumann, Gerd (2012): La patrie ou la mort. junge Welt vom 12.10.2012. URL: ag-friedensforschung.de [06.01.2018].

Spehr, Christoph (1996): Die Ökofalle. Nachhaltigkeit und Krise. Wien.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2015): International Arms Transfers and Arms Production. URL: sipri.org [22.03.2017].

The VOICE (2017): Jena Demonstration 24.06 | Stop All Deportation | Smash the G20 Summit of Vampires and Mothers of all Bombs. URL: thevoiceforum.org [08.01.2018].
World Bank Group (2016): Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016. 3. Aufl. Washington, DC. openknowledge.worldbank.org [03.03.2018].

Worüber wir reden, wenn wir mit jemandem nicht reden wollen

Zum Spannungsverhältnis von Rassismuskritik und Meinungsfreiheit an der Universität

KATHARINA HOPPE, DARJA KLINGENBERG, VANESSA EILEEN THOMPSON, FELIX TRAUTMANN, ALEXANDER VORBRUGG

Abstract: Public discussions concerning the cancellation of a planned lecture by the controversial chairman of the German Police Trade Union (DPolG), Rainer Wendt, at the Goethe-University Frankfurt provides an example to reflect on current discursive-political shifts towards the right in Germany. We develop this reflection along three motives, namely the non-performativity of antidiscrimination proclamations, the (re)normalization of racism, and the liberal insistence on the privileged role and value of freedom of expression vis-à-vis other democratic values. We insist that debates on the relationship between antidiscrimination and freedom of expression must not privilege the latter against the former, and approach the question of who is provided access to a public scene itself as a subject of political dispute. Furthermore, we argue that such debates should be understood against the backdrop of a current swing to right-wing politics and its implications for public discourse and political argument.

Keywords: antiracist critique, freedom of expression, right-wing populism, academic discourse, German Universities

> »Die Goethe-Universität ist eine weltoffene Werkstatt der Zukunft mitten in Europa. 1914 von BürgerInnen für BürgerInnen gegründet, hat sie seit 2008 als autonome Stiftungsuniversität an diese Tradition wieder angeknüpft. Ihrer wechselvollen Geschichte kritisch verpflichtet, ist sie geleitet von den Ideen der Europäischen Aufklärung, der Demokratie und der Rechtsstaatlichkeit und wendet sich gegen Rassismus, Nationalismus und Antisemitismus. Die Goethe-Universität ist ein Ort argumentativer Auseinandersetzung; Forschung und Lehre stehen in gesellschaftlicher Verantwortung.«

Dieses Leitbild strahlt an einem Freitagabend im Januar 2018 zwei Stunden lang über einem voll besetzten, unruhigen Hörsaal. Der groß an die Wand projizierte Text

richtet sich an das Publikum einer Veranstaltung der »Frankfurter Bürgeruniversität« mit dem Titel »Diskurskultur im Zwielicht – Wie viel Meinungsfreiheit verträgt die Uni?« Die Atmosphäre ist für eine öffentliche Abendveranstaltung ungewöhnlich angespannt: Menschen mit unterschiedlichen politischen Einstellungen sitzen dicht beieinander, ein paar Burschenschaftler mit Schärpe nehmen die Mitte des Saales ein, es gibt Gerüchte, die AfD habe zu der Veranstaltung mobilisiert. Argwöhnisch blicken viele auf die Nachbarin und ihr Klatschverhalten, immer wieder kommt es zu Zwischenrufen und lautstarker Empörung. Auf dem Podium diskutieren die Universitätspräsidentin, die Leiterin des Frankfurter Forschungszentrums Globaler Islam, ein Philosoph und Toleranzexperte, ein Humangeograph und Polizeiforscher, ein Jurist sowie ein Vertreter des AStA über die Reichweite der Meinungs- und Forschungsfreiheit an der Universität und den Umgang mit populistischen Diskursen.

Anlass für die Podiumsdiskussion ist eine Auseinandersetzung, die einige Monate zuvor bundesweit durch die Medien ging. Die Leiterin des Forschungszentrums Globaler Islam, Professorin Susanne Schröter, hatte den Polizeigewerkschafter Rainer Wendt zu einem Vortrag mit dem Titel »Polizeialltag in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft« eingeladen. Der eingeladene Wendt ist kein Unbekannter: Er ist erfolgreicher Lobbyist einer Polizeiarbeit im Law-and-Order-Stil und ein beliebter Talkshowgast, der sich durch populistische Forderungen – etwa nach einem Grenzzaun um Deutschland (vgl. Tagesschau 2015) – in die öffentliche Debatte gespielt hat (vgl. Wendt 2016). Auch aufgrund seiner Befürwortung von *racial profiling*, der Mobilisierung kultur-rassistischer Freund-Feind-Schemata und essentialistischen Problematisierung einer »Machokultur junger Muslime« steht Rainer Wendt immer wieder in der Kritik von Menschenrechtsorganisationen (Peter 2016) und ist auch unter Kolleginnen bei der Polizei umstritten (vgl. etwa die von dem Polizisten Oliver von Dobrowolski initiierte Petition »Keine Bühne mehr für Rainer Wendt (DPolG) – er spricht nicht für die ganze Polizei«, Change.org 2017).

Wissenschaftler_innen und das Studierendenparlament kritisierten daher die Einladung Wendts an die Universität Frankfurt. In einem offenen Brief[1], zu dessen 60 Unterzeichnenden auch wir gehören, wurde Kritik an Wendts Positionen formuliert und seine Ausladung gefordert. Vor dem Hintergrund des gesamtgesellschaftlichen Rechtsrucks ging es uns vor allem darum, die Normalisierung rassistischer Diskurse an der Universität und über diese hinaus sichtbar zu machen; Wendt einzuladen hielten wir für einen politischen Fehler und unvereinbar mit der gesellschaftlichen Verantwortung der Wissenschaften und der Goethe-Universität.

1 | Siehe stellungnahmewendt.wordpress.com.

Um die Einladung Wendts und seine spätere Ausladung entwickelte sich eine mediale Debatte und eine Diskussion an der Hochschule, deren Dynamik uns überraschte und deren Argumentationslogik uns besorgte. Im Verlauf dieser Debatte rückten wir als Befürworter_innen einer Ausladung Wendts selbst ins Zentrum der Kritik. Uns wurden die Forderung nach Zensur, ein »Angriff auf die Meinungsfreiheit« und »linke Meinungsdiktatur« unterstellt (bspw. Baum 2017; 3-Sat Kulturzeit 2018). Die Sorge um solche Tendenzen und deren Außenwirkung dominierten auch die im Nachgang der Ausladung Wendts veranstaltete Podiumsdiskussion. Die Universität sei kein Schutzraum, »kein Kindergarten und das Präsidium keine Meinungspolizei« erklärte die Präsidentin in einem offiziellen Statement (Wolff 2017). Darin wurde betont, dass Positionen, die von der freiheitlichen demokratischen Grundordnung gedeckt seien, auch auf dem Campus offen angesprochen werden können müssten: »Ein Klima der Angst – ganz gleich von welcher Seite dieses geschürt werde – gefährde die Wissenschaftsfreiheit« (ebd.).

Auch an anderen Universitäten, in kulturellen Einrichtungen wie Theatern, Stadtbüchereien oder Ausstellungsräumen wurde zuletzt immer häufiger und heftiger darüber gestritten, welchen rechten Positionen noch und welchen gerade nicht mehr diese Bühnen des gesellschaftlichen Diskurses geboten werden sollten. Am prominentesten bleibt sicherlich die Auseinandersetzung um den rechten Antaios Verlag auf der Frankfurter Buchmesse im Herbst 2017 in Erinnerung (vgl. Bildungsstätte Anne Frank 2017; Blum/Pichl/Uhlig 2017). Aber auch die medialen und öffentlichen Angriffe gegen Genderforscher_innen sowie die Gender Studies im Allgemeinen, die ebenfalls Ausdruck einer Diskursverschiebung hin zu rassistischen, rechten und Anti-Gender-Formationen sind, werfen die Frage auf, wie mit solchen Verschiebungen umzugehen ist (vgl. Hark/Villa 2015; Sektion Frauen- und Geschlechterforschung in der DGS 2015). Parallel zu diesen Aushandlungen weitet sich der Raum des Sagbaren für rechte und rassistische Positionen schon seit einiger Zeit aus: In Talkshows und Interviews werden menschenverachtende Positionen vertreten und die Einschränkung der Grundrechte minorisierter Gruppen gefordert. Begriffe wie ›importierte Gewalt‹ oder ›kriminelle Flüchtlinge‹ sind längst im gesamtgesellschaftlichen Sprachgebrauch angekommen.

Die Frage, wie man mit rechtspopulistischen, rechten, rassistischen und/oder antisemitischen Stimmen in Foren demokratischer Öffentlichkeit umgehen soll, ist fraglos von aktueller Dringlichkeit. Sie wird von unterschiedlichen Akteur_innen mit unterschiedlichen Nuancierungen gestellt: als Frage danach, wer wo reden kann, reden soll oder reden darf; als Frage, ob, wo, wie man mit Rechten sprechen muss; was es bringt, mit Rechten zu diskutieren; wie man Rechte kritisieren oder aufklären kann;

wie man verhindert, dass Rechte reden; was passiert, wenn Rechte reden, und wer vielleicht nicht mehr spricht oder gehört wird, wenn Rechte reden.

Dass in der Auseinandersetzung um den ›Fall Wendt‹ eine starke Fokussierung auf die Frage der Meinungsfreiheit vollzogen wurde, ist dabei selbst diskussionswürdig. Prägend war darüber hinaus die Verortung der Debatte im diskursiven Feld der liberalen und aufgeklärten Hochschule, die für sich selbst die Kritik und Überwindung von Rassismus, Antisemitismus und Sexismus in Anspruch nimmt. Vor diesem Hintergrund zeichnen sich entlang der entstandenen Diskussionslinien und Konfliktdynamiken weitergehende strukturelle Probleme und gesellschaftliche Verschiebungen ab, die weit über den Frankfurter Fall hinausreichen. Deutlich wurde im konkreten Fall, wie gefährlich es ist, Meinungsfreiheit und Rassismuskritik gegeneinander auszuspielen. Die Auseinandersetzung um Wendt an der Goethe-Universität dient uns daher im Folgenden als Anlass dazu, zentrale Probleme der Verhandlung von Meinungsfreiheit und Antidiskriminierung in Zeiten zunehmenden Rechtspopulismus zu diskutieren.

Im Folgenden werden wir zunächst knapp das Geschehen rekonstruieren und zeigen, inwiefern es irreführend ist, die Ein- und Ausladung Rainer Wendts allein im Rahmen einer Debatte um Meinungsfreiheit zu diskutieren. Daraufhin werden wir drei Argumentationsfiguren aus der Diskussion um die Ausladung Wendts reflektieren. Wir problematisieren zunächst die leeren Bezugnahmen auf Diversitäts- und Antidiskriminierungsleitlinien, bevor wir zweitens die Rassismus normalisierenden Tendenzen solcher Argumentationen herausstellen. Drittens reflektieren wir die Anrufung von Meinungsfreiheit als liberale Diskursstrategie, welche Diskussionen um Fragen der Diskriminierung tendenziell verunmöglicht.

Der ›Fall Wendt‹ als Problem von Meinungsfreiheit?

Die Kritik unseres offenen Briefes an der Einladung Wendts hat tatsächlich und – für uns überraschend – zu einer Absage des Vortrags durch das Forschungszentrum Globaler Islam geführt. Die Direktorin des Zentrums begründete diesen Schritt allerdings widersprüchlich: Mal sprach sie von einer inhaltlichen Neuorientierung der Veranstaltungsreihe, dann wieder beschrieb sie ein linksradikales Bedrohungsszenario und äußerte Sicherheitsbedenken. Der Medienprofi Wendt nutzte diese Vorlage, um sich als Opfer von ›Fake News‹, Lügen und linker Stimmungsmache zu inszenieren (vgl. Baum 2017). ›Meinungsfreiheit in Gefahr‹ und eine mit Gewalt unterdrückte Meinungsvielfalt (vgl. Wendt 2018): solche Diagnosen Wendts wurden von etlichen

Zeitungen – von der *Frankfurter Neuen Presse* bis hin zur *Welt* – bereitwillig aufgenommen. Innerhalb weniger Tage wurde die Ausladung zu einem bundesweiten Politikum. Als Ort des argumentativen Austauschs und der Meinungsfreiheit habe damit auch die Goethe-Universität einen schwerwiegenden Imageschaden erlitten, so Stimmen aus Presse und Politik. Mit der Podiumsdiskussion zur »Diskurskultur im Zwielicht« antwortete die Universitätsleitung auf diese öffentlichen Vorwürfe. Auch die Verfasser_innen des offenen Briefes wurden zu dieser Diskussionsrunde eingeladen.

Von Seiten der Hochschule war die Veranstaltung als Diskussion über die Frage der Meinungsfreiheit und nicht etwa über die von Rassismus und Populismus gerahmt. Dies war ebenso wenig verhandelbar wie die Besetzung des Podiums und kennzeichnete im Nachgang auch den Fokus der medialen Berichterstattung. Eine die Meinungsfreiheit fokussierende Beschreibung des Problems verkennt jedoch, dass ein offener Brief kein Mittel der Zensur ist: Die Verantwortung für die Ein- wie auch die Ausladung des Referenten trägt die Einladende – das erklärt sie übrigens selbst in öffentlichen Stellungnahmen (vgl. Zoske 2017). Die Vereinseitigung der Debatte auf die Frage der Meinungsfreiheit spielte zudem unwillentlich den Argumentationsstrategien der Neuen Rechten und dem rechtskonservativen Lager zu. Diese disqualifizieren bereits seit den 1990er-Jahren Forderungen nach Diskriminierungsfreiheit als Zensur und Angriff auf die Meinungsfreiheit, als linke ›political correctness‹ oder ›Genderwahn‹. Vor diesem Hintergrund lässt sich die mediale Aufmerksamkeit für die Ausladung Wendts – und nicht etwa für seine Einladung – die Sorge um die Meinungsfreiheit – und nicht um die Wirkung von Wendts Aussagen – als »moral panic« (Cohen 1972; Thompson 1998) beschreiben: Die Intervention einer kleinen Gruppe durch das Schreiben eines offenen Briefes wurde von der breiteren Öffentlichkeit als Gefahr und als Bedrohung der moralischen Werte und der Ordnung der Gesellschaft aufgefasst.

Die Problemverschiebung verdeckt zuletzt, was ursprünglich der Anlass des offenen Briefes war: das Recht auf Diskriminierungsfreiheit. Es ist gerade dieser Zusammenhang, den wir als strukturelles Problem in der gegenwärtigen gesellschaftlichen Situation für besonders wichtig halten. Denn die Auseinandersetzung um legitime politische Stimmen und Diskurse, die selbst die Form eines demokratischen Streits besitzt, muss beide Dimensionen – die Meinungs- und die Diskriminierungsfreiheit – berücksichtigen, auch wenn sie durchaus in einem Spannungsverhältnis stehen können. Dies wollen wir im Folgenden näher erläutern.

UNDOING THINGS WITH WORDS: DIE NICHT-PERFORMATIVITÄT VON ANTIDISKRIMINIERUNG

In einem der ersten Publikumsbeiträge bei der Veranstaltung wurde auf die Verantwortung des Präsidiums für die Umsetzung der diskriminierungskritischen Leitlinien verwiesen. Wie kann das demokratische Grundprinzip des Schutzes minorisierter Gruppen an der Universität umgesetzt werden? Andere Beiträge aus dem Publikum problematisierten, dass Wissenschaftler_innen, die zu Migrationsgesellschaft, Rassismus oder Antisemitismus forschen, durch AfD-Aktivist_innen bedroht werden. Noch auf dem Podium war die monatelange, massive Bedrohung von Professor_innen der Frauen- und Geschlechterforschung durch Antigenderaktivist_innen angesprochen und die fehlende Solidarität der wissenschaftlichen Communities thematisiert worden. Doch obwohl sich die Beiträger_innen mehrfach auf das über der Veranstaltung leuchtende Leitbild beriefen, in dem sich die Universität gegen Antisemitismus, Rassismus und Sexismus wendet, liefen Rückfragen zur konkreten Umsetzung immer wieder ins Leere: Kritikpunkte wurden mit Floskeln abgetan, Hinweise auf Missstände wurden überhört. In der Debatte um die Ausladung Wendts tritt das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen diskriminierungskritischen Leitlinien und ihrer praktischen Implementierung deutlich hervor.

Der eklatante Widerspruch zwischen der Mobilisierung des diskriminierungskritischen Leitbilds und dem gleichzeitigen Überhören von Akteur_innen, die Antidiskriminierung einfordern, lässt sich mit Rückgriff auf Sara Ahmed (2012) als Nichtperformativität solcher Politiken beschreiben. In ihrer empirischen Studie zu Diversitäts- und Antidiskriminierungspolitiken an britischen und australischen Hochschulen argumentiert die Rassismusforscherin, dass solche Programme in der Praxis oft nicht umsetzen, was sie versprechen. Sie formulieren Ziele, deren Umsetzung zugleich verschoben und verhindert wird, anstatt Veränderungen zu gestalten. Ahmeds Argument ist nicht einfach, dass hier Diskurs und Praxis nicht übereinstimmen, sondern dass die aktuellen Diskurse zu Gleichstellung und Antidiskriminierung vor dem Hintergrund der Neoliberalisierung der Hochschule folgenlose Proklamationen produzieren, die eine wirksame Praxis systematisch verhindern (vgl. die Beiträge in Dhawan 2016). In der systematischen Aussparung von Fragen der Diskriminierungsfreiheit wiederholte die Podiumsdiskussion ebensolche leeren – nicht-performativen – Gesten.

RANDPHÄNOMENE: DIE NORMALISIERUNG VON RASSISMUS

Selbstverständlich, so wurde während der Veranstaltung mehrfach betont, würde man nicht mit einem ›wirklichen‹ Rassisten diskutieren. Rainer Wendt polarisiere zwar, ein Rassist sei er jedoch eindeutig nicht. Eine Auseinandersetzung darüber, was rassistische Positionen charakterisiert und wie sie erkannt und eingeordnet werden können, wurde jedoch verweigert oder vermieden.[2] Dies entstand zum einen durch die klare Rahmung als Diskussion über Meinungsfreiheit. Die Frage, ob eine Position rassistisch zu bewerten sei, bekam in der Debatte den Charakter einer individuellen Befindlichkeit oder ideologischen Verblendung; ganz als sei es irrelevant für die Debatte oder einfach nicht zu bestimmen, ob Wendt problematische Positionen vertrete oder nicht. Man dürfe keine Labels anheften, erklärte Schröter, dies würde ein Klima der Angst erzeugen.

Rassismus erschien in der Debatte als diffuse Anklage, die sich nicht belegen lässt. In dieser Hinsicht kann von einer Normalisierung von Rassismus durch seine Verkennung gesprochen werden. Seit Jahrzehnten verweist die deutschsprachige Rassismusforschung darauf, dass Rassismus und Rechtsextremismus nicht dasselbe sind. Rassismus ist kein Randphänomen, sondern verläuft als gesellschaftliches Verhältnis auch durch die Mitte unserer Gesellschaft (vgl. Bojadžijev/Demirović 2002; Ha/al-Samarai/Mysorekar 2007; Jäger 1992; Oguntoye/Opitz/Schultz 1986; Räthzel 2000). Er lässt sich nicht als intentionales Fehlverhalten oder falsche Meinung beschreiben und kommt in seinen alltäglichen Formen durchaus auch ohne Bezüge auf biologistische Konstruktionen von ›Rasse‹ aus. Obwohl viele in der Debatte behaupten konnten, dass Wendts Aussagen ›nicht rassistisch‹ seien, wurde die Rassismusforschung ebenso wenig einbezogen wie rassismuskritische Wissensbestände. Obwohl der Einsatz gegen Rassismus und Sexismus immer wieder betont wurde, blieb somit weitgehend unklar, um welche gesellschaftlichen Phänomene es sich dabei eigentlich handelt und wie mit diesen Diskriminierungen umgegangen werden kann.

Diese Nichtbeachtung rassismuskritischer Positionen und Expertisen trägt zur Normalisierung von Rassismus bei: Weder bei der geplanten Veranstaltung mit Wendt noch in der Medienberichterstattung oder bei besagter Podiumsdiskussion wurden etwa ausgewiesene Rassismusforscher_innen als Expert_innen eingeladen, die Befunde und Kritik zu strukturellem Rassismus systematisch hätten einbringen können. Im Gegenteil wurde ein Rassismusverständnis mobilisiert, das – seine gesellschaftliche

2 | Als ein Vertreter der Unterzeichner_innen-Gruppe einen Beleg für die rassistische Dimension in Wendts Aussagen einbringen wollte, wurde er mit der Bemerkung, dass dies nicht auf das Podium gehöre, abgebrochen.

Wirkmacht und Gewalt bagatellisierend – diesen zu einer willkürlichen Unterstellung einer politischen Gruppe herabstufte.

Liberale Phantasien: die Meinungsfreiheit auf bequeme Art verteidigen

Ein dritter Argumentationstyp, mit dem sich unser offener Brief konfrontiert sah, betonte in liberaler Manier die Verteidigung der Meinungsfreiheit. Letztere sei ein hohes, ja das höchste Gut und verbinde sich in den Universitäten mit der Wissenschaftsfreiheit. So wenig diese Freiheiten durch den offenen Brief angegriffen wurden, so notorisch war unsere Intervention doch mit dem liberalen Diktum Voltaires konfrontiert: Bei aller Meinungsverschiedenheit müsse immer noch die Möglichkeit ihrer Artikulation erhalten bleiben. Doch die liberale Verteidigung der Meinungsfreiheit ist darin nicht nur wohlfeil und bequem, sondern drängt auch die gegenüber rassistischen ›Meinungen‹ artikulierte Kritik in den Bereich derer, die diese Freiheit gefährden. Damit wird gleichsam von ›links‹ vollzogen, was wir oben bereits als neu-rechte Strategie der Diskursverschiebung formuliert haben. Eine solche Abstraktion vom konkreten Diskursverlauf führte im Fall der Frankfurter Intervention gegen Rainer Wendt schließlich auch dazu, dass seitens der liberalen Kritiker_innen der Schaden für die Meinungsfreiheit größer eingeschätzt wurde als der durch die Diskursteilnahme einer bereits hinlänglich rassistisch positionierten Person.

Damit werden die diskursiven Mittel der Rassismuskritik zum Problem erklärt. Dabei appellierte diese Kritik gerade an das universitäre Leitbild und die gesellschaftliche Verantwortung der Wissenschaften. Aus der liberalen Perspektive heraus erschien die öffentliche Ablehnung der Diskussion mit einer Person, die sich schon allerorts zu Wort gemeldet und von der man längst genug Unhaltbares gehört hat, jedoch nicht mehr als Markierung einer Grenze des universitären Streits um das bessere Argument, sondern als ›diskurspolizeiliches‹ Auftreten und als Kapitulation vor den Herausforderungen der argumentativen Auseinandersetzung. Der offene Brief sei ein diskursives und politisches ›Eigentor‹, da eine Gelegenheit ausgelassen worden wäre, die Meinungsverschiedenheit erfolgreich auszutragen. Neben der Mutlosigkeit wurde den Verfasser_innen des offenen Briefs auch ein Mangel an Toleranz, Neugier und Offenheit attestiert. Falsch sei zwar nicht die Kritik an Rassismus und Rechtspopulismus, aber der Effekt, dass sie vor aller Auseinandersetzung schon einen Ausschluss produziere, sei unbedingt zu vermeiden. Denn allein so könne die geforderte Ausladung zum Wasser auf die Mühlen der Rechten werden, die sich nun als die eigentlichen Opfer stilisieren könnten.

Gegen diese Verkehrung wenden wir ein, dass die Diskriminierungsfreiheit als ebenso hohes Gut wie die Meinungsfreiheit zu verteidigen ist und sich diese eben nicht gegeneinander ausspielen lassen. Dies erfordert es, auch im konkreten Einzelfall Widerstand gegen die Einladung von Personen zu leisten, deren Äußerungen einen diskriminierenden Gehalt erwarten lassen (vgl. Belina 2018; Pichl 2018). Hier geht es nicht nur um die Frage der Toleranz, sondern auch darum, dass die Grenzen der Sagbarkeit selbst politisch ausgehandelt werden müssen. Rassismuskritik geht dort über die liberale Toleranzforderung hinaus, wo sie den diskursiven wie sozialen Raum der Hochschulöffentlichkeit insgesamt beschädigt sieht.

Dieser Punkt lässt sich auch gegen das liberale Phantasma einwenden, jeden argumentativ geführten Streit mit illiberalen Positionen für sich entscheiden zu können. In der Gewissheit, in jeder noch so an die Schmerzgrenze der Toleranz reichenden Situation den Sieg davontragen zu können, äußert sich ein selbstgefälliges Verständnis liberaler Verteidiger_innen der Meinungsfreiheit. Dabei überrascht, dass dieses kämpferische Selbstverständnis in der Diskurspraxis selten von Liberalen eingelöst wird. Wer unbedingt mit Rechten reden will, soll sich keinen Zwang antun. Die Intervention des offenen Briefs war jedoch von der erfahrungsgesättigten Überzeugung getragen, dass dieses ›Reden‹ nicht nur nichts bringt, sondern jedes weitere Wort Schaden für die Diskursivität selbst bedeutet. Rassismuskritik interveniert schon dort, wo sie mit der wiederholten Artikulation der gleichen Ressentiments und Stereotype rechnen muss. Die liberale Verurteilung einer solchen Intervention hält sich allzu bequem aus der Frage heraus, wer und in welcher Weise eigentlich von Diskriminierungen im universitären Kontext betroffen ist. Da auch an Hochschulen weiterhin Personen durch Diskriminierung bedroht und Adressat_innen von alltagsrassistischen Angriffen werden, bleibt zu fragen, wie die Hochschulen und die Wissenschaft als diskriminierungsfrei(er)e Räume verteidigt werden können? Gute und unbequeme Antworten diesbezüglich, so unsere Überzeugung, liefert die kritische Forschung zu Rassismus und nicht die liberale Theorie der Meinungsfreiheit.

AUSBLICK: WARUM KRITIK KEINE ZENSURFORDERUNG IST

Die skizzierten Argumentationsfiguren sind innerhalb der gesamtgesellschaftlichen Diskursverschiebungen zu verorten, die mit einem Erstarken von Rassismus, Antisemitismus, Sexismus und Rechtspopulismus einhergehen. Sie verweisen auf delegitimierende Wirkungsweisen und Disqualifizierungen, mit denen sich rassismus- und antisemitismuskritische sowie feministische Wissenschaftler_innen zunehmend auseinandersetzen müssen. Daher gilt es mehr denn je, sich für diese Arten der Proble-

matisierung zu wappnen. Insbesondere vor dem Hintergrund unterschiedlicher Positionierungen und Erfahrungsbestände mit gesellschaftlichen Herrschaftsverhältnissen ist es unabdingbar, solidarische intersektionale Verknüpfungen herzustellen und zu fördern. Nur so lässt sich der rassistischen Stimmungsmache und den Effekten der beschriebenen diskursiven Strategien etwas entgegensetzen. Unsere Überlegungen legen nahe, dass weniger das Spannungsverhältnis von Meinungsfreiheit und Rassismuskritik das Problem ist, sondern vielmehr jeder Versuch, sie gegeneinander auszuspielen. Der ›Fall Wendt‹ demonstriert, wie schnell dies geschehen kann, und wie schwierig es dann wird, die Kritik an diskriminierenden Positionen wieder als ebenso wichtige Grundlage der wissenschaftlichen und politischen Diskurse einzufordern. Die Betonung der notwendigen Aushandlung von Meinungsfreiheit und Diskriminierungsfreiheit soll hierbei gerade nicht gegen den politischen Streit immunisieren; im Gegenteil: Es gilt, sich diesen Auseinandersetzungen zu stellen, die herausfordernd, riskant und schmerzhaft sein können. Auf den Vorwurf, sich dadurch der Auseinandersetzung zu entziehen, können wir nur entgegnen, dass Meinungsfreiheit auch heißt, nicht mit jedem reden zu müssen – und dennoch einiges zu deren Position zu sagen zu haben.

LITERATUR

3-Sat Kulturzeit (2018): Kampf auf dem Campus. 3sat Kulturzeit vom 23.01.2018. URL: 3sat.de [10.03.2018].

Ahmed, Sara (2012): On Being Included. Racism and Diversity in Institutional Life. Durham/London.

Baum, Carla (2017): »Das Opfer ist die Meinungsfreiheit«. Welt vom 25.10.2017. URL: welt.de [18.02.2018].

Belina, Bernd (2018): Warum Leute wie Rainer Wendt nicht an der Universität sprechen sollten. In: Kriminologisches Journal 50 (3), im Erscheinen.

Blum, Alice / Pichl, Maximilian / Uhlig, Tom David (2017): Wo das Gespräch aufhört – Reflexionen über den Umgang mit Rechten in öffentlichen Räumen. In: Bell Tower am 26.10.2017. URL: belltower.news [02.03.2018].

Bildungsstätte Anne Frank (2017): »Die nächste Buchmesse braucht eine klare Strategie gegen Rechts«. Pressemitteilung vom 15.10.2017. URL: bs-anne-frank.de [02.03.2018].

Bojadžijev, Manuela / Demirović, Alex (2002): Konjunkturen des Rassismus. Münster.

Change.org (2017): Keine Bühne mehr für Rainer Wendt (DPolG) – er spricht nicht für die ganze Polizei! Petition initiiert von Oliver von Dobrowolski. URL: change.org [26.02.2018].

Cohen, Stanley (1972): Folk Devils and Moral Panics. The Creation of the Mods and Rockers. London/New York.

Dhawan, Nikita (Hg.) (2016): Difference that Makes No Difference. The Non-Performativity of Intersectionality and Diversity. Special Issue in: Wagadu. A Journal of Transnational Women's and Gender Studies 16.

Ha, Kien Nghi / al-Samarai, Lauré / Mysorekar, Sheila (2007): Re-Visionen. Postkoloniale Perspektiven von People of Color auf Rassismus, Kulturpolitik und Widerstand in Deutschland. Münster.

Hark, Sabine / Villa, Paula-Irene (2015): Anti-Genderismus. Sexualität und Geschlecht als Schauplätze aktueller politischer Herausforderungen. Bielefeld.

Jäger, Siegfried (1992): BrandSätze. Rassismus im Alltag. Duisburg.

Oguntoye, Katharina / Opitz, May / Schultz, Dagmar (1986): Farbe Bekennen. Afrodeutsche Frauen auf den Spuren ihrer Geschichte. Berlin.

Peter, Tobias (2016): Das Prinzip Rainer Wendt – ein Kommentar. Amnesty International vom 08.12.2016. URL: amnesty-polizei.de [18.02.2018].

Pichl, Maximilian (2018): Die Blaue Gewerkschaft. In: der rechte rand 171. URL: der-rechte-rand.de [08.06.2018].

Räthzel, Nora (2000): Theorien über Rassismus. Hamburg.

Sektion Frauen- und Geschlechterforschung in der DGS (2015): Stärkung feministischer Gesellschafts- und Wissenschaftskritik. Statement der Sektion Frauen- und Geschlechterforschung in der DGS zum »Ratschlag zum Umgang mit Anti-Feminismus« am 14.02.2015. URL: frauen-undgeschlechterforschung.de [02.03.2018].

Tagesschau (2015): Wendt fordert Grenzzaun zu Österreich. Tagesschau vom 18.10.2015. URL: tagesschau.de [10.03.2018].

Thompson, Kenneth (1998): Moral Panics. New York.

Wendt, Rainer (2016): Deutschland in Gefahr. Wie ein schwacher Staat unsere Sicherheit aufs Spiel setzt. München.

Wendt, Rainer (2018): »Das wird eine seltsame Diskussion«. Interview mit Rainer Wendt. Frankfurter Neue Presse vom 17.01.2018. URL: fnp.de [18.02.2018].

Wolff, Birgitta (2017): Universitärer Diskurs zu Meinungsfreiheit findet bereits statt. Statement von Uni-Präsidentin Prof. Birgitta Wolff. Website der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt vom 03.11.2017. URL: aktuelles.uni-frankfurt.de [18.02.2018].

Zoske, Sascha (2017): »Man muss umstrittene Referenten ohne Angst einladen können«. Interview mit Susanne Schröter. FAZ vom 31.10.2017. URL: faz.net [26.02.2018].

Interviews

Violence against Migrant Women: Evidencing the Matrix of Colonial Power

An Interview with Ursula Santa Cruz

KATHERINE BRAUN, SIMONA PAGANO

Abstract: The interview with Ursula Santa Cruz contributes to the analysis of violence against immigrant women from an intersectional and decolonial perspective. Santa Cruz critically asks what lies behind gender as an explanatory category that defines certain forms of violence against migrant women and minimizes or excludes other ones. By highlighting other forms of violence that remind us of colonial history as well as the construction of non-European others, Santa Cruz shows continuities in this field, and how these affect racialized migrants who are subject to a migration control system.

Keywords: racism, intersectionality, decoloniality, feminism

Gender-based violence has evolved into one of the most dominant topics in European discourses and policies on migration and displacement. Especially since the summer of 2015, when hundreds of thousands of people crossed EU borders, and Germany ›welcomed‹ refugees, the topic of protecting refugee women (and children) has been debated. Media coverage, programmes and policies on asylum reception have started to focus on the topic of gender-based violence. Most of the political and public discussions though have not yet analysed the conditions in which this kind of violence arises, but rather tend to present very limited perspectives that reproduce stereotypes of female victimhood and marginalisation.

During the conference »Reconsidering Gender-Based Violence in the Context of Displacement and Migration« held in Göttingen in 2017, we – kritnet members Katherine Braun and Simona Pagano – first met the feminist activist and facilitator Ursula Santa Cruz. During the conference, she provided us with insights about the specific situation of migrant women, both by looking at different geopolitical locations such as Peru and Spain, and by reflecting on the epistemic premises of the debate. Based on her own experience of migration and activism, and drawing on decolonial approaches to gender-based violence, Santa Cruz fundamentally questions the common western notion of this specific form of violence.

Due to her expertise in the field, we then asked Santa Cruz to elaborate her point of view in an interview, which we conducted via email. In the interview Ursula Santa Cruz talks about her work and her perspectives on violence against migrant women, the coloniality of power and the need for intersectional feminisms.

Katherine Braun & Simona Pagano: Ursula, could you tell us about your professional biography, and how you became an activist?

Ursula Santa Cruz: I don't know if the most appropriate word to define myself is ›activist‹, but I have been engaged in different collectives and struggles that have strongly affected me in the last few years from a decolonial and anti-racist standpoint, but also as a migrant from Peru.

I am a psychologist by profession, and my interest has always been in community psychology – supporting, accompanying and facilitating processes of groups and communities in Peru, specifically in marginal urban and rural areas to which I have had links since I began with my social and activist involvement, which was during my graduate studies. In my subsequent professional activities, I have worked in the field of clinical and community care on the problems of violence against women, mental health, and the political participation of women. From my university years to the present day, ›popular education‹[1] has been, and continues to be a very important tool for my associative and professional work.

Later, in Barcelona, I spent four years working in domestic service and almost three years without papers. That's where I became involved with an NGO as a volunteer and with migrant associations. It was in these spaces that I started to conceptualise what I had done in Peru and to develop my main question, namely which position society assigns to migrants, especially to women.

---

1 | ›Popular Education‹ is a pedagogical and emancipatory program, which is based on the revolutionary ›pedagogy of the oppressed‹ of Paulo Freire (1970). It was originally applied in the rural and poor areas in Latin America by revolutionary movements and educators like the Zapatistas and the Landless Workers' Movement (MST). Also known as ›participative action research‹ it departs from the idea that emancipatory education that is supposed to transform systems cannot be based on ›depositing‹ information (›banking education‹) about oppression systems. This form of education has to be elaborated together and has to be developed from people's own experiences and knowledge. The pedagogist becomes a facilitator, who offers the tools for reflection and solutions (Freire 1970). Freire's philosophy has inspired a lot of projects like community building programs, eco-pedagogy, etc.

How did your activist and intellectual work develop? What is your relationship with the collective t.i.c.t.a.c.?

Although this intellectual process started already during my time at the university and while working with marginalized urban populations, I still remember the turning point. I was working in a rural area of Peru. I had arrived there with my psychological standardized tests that had nothing to do with the situation of the people I studied in those areas. The tests did not fit the reality I encountered there as they were shaped by the perspective of people from the capital. However, it was in these rural areas of Peru that I learned how important it is to listen, observe, and to use the framings and codes provided by the people and to leave behind the capitalist, urban, professional gaze. I learned to focus on the needs and demands of the people I was working with. I began to theorize from the vantage point of my practice at that time, to think about my own position and positionality there and to develop strategies linked to these populations. I used theatre, humour, local customs and radio. I also used the street as a space to reach out to locals.

In Barcelona, however, I started to articulate my own migratory, professional and activist experience. But I also included the experiences of other women and men I had encountered during my involvement in participatory action research projects in Peru into my reflections. My research, then, is both political and embodied: »Thinking doing and doing thinking«, as María Lugones (2008) says. I am a co-founder and member of t.i.c.t.a.c., a collective and self-managed space that was established in 2017. We – the founders of t.i.c.t.a.c. – met, or rather found ourselves assembling our expertise, after having fought our fights alone and after having been in only white feminist spaces; spaces that had left us with discomfort and with the feeling of not being represented.

Can you elaborate on your day-to-day work? What does your work with migrant women look like?

In the last year, I have worked as a community psychologist who accompanied practitioners in their work with migrant women and as a facilitator in city councils and institutions that as well work with migrant women. In my trainings, I have focused on issues related to racism, sexism, violence and intersectionality. On the one hand, I have co-developed an intersectional methodology with which we emphasize women's agency and value their experiences and their knowledge. We also try to promote and make visible other narratives that go beyond a narrow perspective on gender. This has

been a very valuable and enriching work for the participants and for us. On the other hand, I also have developed a concept for autobiographical writing workshops – in which 80% of the participants are migrant women. These workshops are a platform for analysing their lived realities, for expressing emotions, for connecting with their bodies. These processes are initiated with reference to their narratives and trajectories and eventually lead to them re-signifying their lives.

Your work has brought you to critique the predominant perspective on violence against women. Why? What is your critique?

In the European context I have found that analyses concerning violence against women exclude questions of race, sexuality, class, context and social-historical experiences of non-white and non-European women. These categories form a complex and multidimensional matrix of power that produces different kinds of violence. My aim is therefore to bring an intersectional and decolonial perspective to the debate and to include this perspective into the analysis of violence. In my work, I examine what lies beyond gender as an explanatory category, meaning the categories that define certain forms of violence against migrant women and minimize or exclude other ones. I highlight other forms of violence that echo colonial history, that come with the construction of non-European ›others‹, that show how these forms of violence still prevail today, and that show how racialised migrants – both men, women and gender dissidents – are treated and subjected to a system of migration control.

Why has this perspective been missing from the debate so far?

The visibility, definition and public agenda of work highlighting violence against women dates back to the 1960s, to the feminist movement and the women's liberation movement in Europe and the United States, which until today denounce domestic and sexual violence that women experience. In several stages across the decades, violence against women has become an issue of different international bodies and has been implemented both in national and international policies. As an outcome, violence against women is attributed to gender inequalities and is transformed into a universal category. In this way development agencies, NGOs, universities and white, middle-class western feminist of the so-called first world countries exported a particular theory of gender to all the regions of the world. Thus, this approach is embodied in laws, public policies, programs and intervention strategies.

The sex-gender system becomes a universal tool with which inequalities between men and women in all societies and contexts are analysed and through which women

are regarded as oppressed by patriarchy due to the fact of ›simply‹ being women. This discourse, that tends to equate all women and considers them as ›sisters‹, constitutes a violent act that strips away the historicity, memory and resistance of non-white, non-European women, both in the past and in the present. Other systems of oppression that cross the lives of people alongside a heteronormative patriarchal system are ignored, especially the violence produced by modernity/coloniality towards non-white, non-European bodies, towards their epistemologies, subjectivities and life systems. This perspective also invisiblizes the exposure of non-binary migrant and racialised bodies to violence. Thus, this kind of hegemonic feminism imposes its epistemologies, categories of analysis, and plans for liberation and emancipation on all women in the world. Taking the importance of enunciation into account in positioning oneself, I ask: Who does the naming? Who decides what violence is and what forms of violence are attended to? What is the position from which the violence is named?

In this Eurocentric feminist discourse on violence, how is violence against migrant women reflected upon?

The predominant discourse refers to violence within a relationship, which is exercised by a migrant man. It is argued that this is inherent to the latter's sexist and patriarchal ›culture‹, where women are oppressed. It also presumes that ›violence is naturalized and justified among them‹. Female genital mutilation and forced marriages are also considered to be forms of violence, both exercised by the families of the girls and women and socially legitimised by their communities of origin. The causes of these violent acts have a cultural component that demands an intervention by the liberal society to safeguard the integrity of such women and girls in the face of an assumed archaic patriarchy that oppresses them.

Prostitution is also defined as another form of violence. There is the assumption that all sex workers are unfree and that their bodies are turned into objects by the patriarchal capitalist system. This assumption then leads abolitionist feminists and institutions to want to save them. Trafficking in women and sexual exploitation is also included in this notion of violence, whereby international mafias are seen as responsible for facilitating the entry of women into Europe as part of sex trafficking. This type of ›gender-based‹ violence is addressed through protocols and intervention plans that leave aside the multidimensionality and complexity of oppressions that impact the lives of migrant women.

Institutions, professionals and white feminists, then, intend ›to empower‹ migrant women, to ›lead‹ them to gain autonomy, and to ›teach‹ them to be able to recognise

the violence that they live. Some examples from my field of professionals working in interventionist projects against gender violence read as follows:

> »It is so clear that he mistreats her. I tell her, but she does not see it.«
>
> »We helped her to emancipate herself, to get away from him, from her community (Morocco). She left the city, took off her veil, dressed as a Westerner. But after a while she returned to her community, put on her veil and fell in love with another Moroccan.«
>
> »They are used to violence, it seems normal to them.«[2]

This underlying narrative does not pay attention to the stories of migrant women, but rather reduces their violent experiences to something they ›know‹ and are ›used to‹. It prevents deeper insight about the prevalent forms of violence they experience and the strategies they adopt to face it. Furthermore, a generalised alarmism persists concerning the excessive representation of migrant women in statistics on intimate partner violence, which reinforces the constructed discourses and representations of a violent and problematic ›otherness‹.

What other kinds of violence are inscribed in the bodies of migrant women that stay invisible from such a perspective?

I just want to name a few. Institutional forms of violence include, for instance, racism, regulations and procedures that obstruct the renewal of residence and work permits, processes to obtain citizenship, which hence place many migrants in a situation of administrative limbo. This situation constitutes a threat because it can lead to detention in an Immigration Detention Centre (CIE) for not having documents. Another institutional form of harassment includes the regulations for family reunion. The requirements include, for instance, a minimum size apartment. If certain requirements are not met – like the size of the apartment – the family cannot be reunited; or, it happens that migrant women lose custody of their children because they are considered unable to raise and educate them according to the local standards.

On an epistemic level, we can see that women are constructed as a homogenic group of ›migrant women‹. This construction entails victimising and infantilizing these women, but it is also accompanied by symbolic racism and exoticization. In this context, their experiences are denied – their capacities, their knowledge, their

2 | Testimonies of professionals who work in interventionist projects against gender violence who gathered for a technical training.

aspirations and their needs. On the other hand, we see how their voices are appropriated by experts, including feminists and academics. With regard to their daily experiences, violence unfolds in experiences of sexual harassment at the work place and through labour exploitation. Migrant women often work in informal economies within racialised sectors. It is important to stress that racism is intertwined with sexism in these contexts. Unfortunately, this connection is mostly denied. Finally, another kind of violence can be traced that emerges with the denial of sex work as a labour option. It can be a personal decision of migrant women to make a living from sex work. Silencing their struggles for recognising sex work as work and for improving regulations, and instead striving to ›save‹ them, can also be regarded a form of violence since, after leaving sex-work they end up being employed in precarious and lower-paid jobs.

Our approach to violence considers race and class to be important categories for analysis, but it also thinks sexuality beyond heterosexuality and gender beyond the common binary system. The complex and multidimensional nature of violence demonstrates the ways in which gender, race, class and sexuality are intertwined.

From this perspective, the position of power and privilege that white European women hold in relation to racialised migrant men contradicts the supposed ›patriarchal power‹. The bodies of these men are brutally and inhumanly violated by a racist system in which their lives matter little, as can be seen from the thousands of deaths in the Mediterranean Sea.

Forced migrations for different reasons also represent a form of violence. They expel, and uproot individuals from peripheral countries – such as from former colonies – who migrate to Europe and find themselves in positions of greater vulnerability. This is not the case with Europeans who can travel around the world without losing their privileges.

You speak of the gender system as being ›perverse‹. Could you elaborate on the notion and give examples?

Directing attention to, and focusing on, the visibility of violence within intimate relationships denies or removes the weight of immigration policies or immigration law (which generate racist violence) on the lives of migrants. Migrant men experience different forms of violence, but have been constructed as savage, sexist, abusive, ignorant and drunkards within a framework that Nelson Maldonado-Torres calls the »coloniality of being« (2007). It is common to hear these adjectives when referring to Latin American, Muslim Arab and African men. These categorisations prevent migrant men from being recognized as individual beings outside such ascriptions of

machismo, sexism and homophobia. This perversity is also manifested in speeches that assert that the increase of gender violence in Spain is due to immigration.

This point of view does not recognise the violence of non-migrant men against their migrant partners. The physical and psychological violence that they exert is racist-sexist. Let me exemplify this with testimonies of two women I visited in a municipal help centre for women in Barcelona:

> »He insults me, he calls me shitty *sudaca*[3], in your country you had nothing and here you want to be a great lady [...]. I will have you deported [...] you can never take your daughter to your country. [...] and it is not only him, also his family does that [...]. I would like to go back to Ecuador.«[4]
>
> »He forced me to eat pork and to break other customs of my religion.«[5]
>
> »He told me I was not going to achieve anything. He said if, after all, you have got the papers by marrying me, what else do you want?«

These kinds of violence go hand in hand with labour exploitation and the absence of social networks. Their situation is aggravated by the racism of the police and the judiciary operators who are suspicious towards the women's accounts and their condition as victims. In these circumstances, other topics appear, creating an image of women who take advantage of European men for the purpose of obtaining papers and material security.

It is more convenient to argue that migrant women are victims of the patriarchal system of their own societies of origin than to recognise the modes of power and control which have been designed, implemented and perfected with the purpose of maintaining and perpetuating the relations of domination over migrants' bodies. In this way, as Ramón Grosfoguel (2014) asserts, it is not questioned where these oppressions are produced in the world, who is oppressed, and what mechanisms are used to exert violence. I refer to this context, then, when I speak of the gender system or rather the construction of violence as being perverse. I consider this common

---

3 | *Sudaca* is a pejorative term for South American.

4 | Testimony of an Ecuadorian woman interviewed at a municipal help service for women in Barcelona. She has been living in Spain for eleven years and has got a permanent residence permit. She is a care worker for an elderly person without a contract and works every day without the right to vacation or extra payment for 600 Euros per month. She has a five-year-old daughter with a Spanish man who is retired. She has been abused for two years.

5 | Testimony of a Moroccan woman married to a Spanish man.

notion of violence to be theoretical, Eurocentric and abstract. It is perverse because it denies the history, genocide and violence caused by Europe in this context, especially since the beginning of modernity/coloniality. Violence was done to non-white bodies of men and women, their systems of life, production, land, knowledge, spirituality, sexuality, subjectivities, aesthetics and so on. Humanity itself was stripped away from two-thirds of the world's people, establishing a distinct line between the human/non-human while allocating people of colour to the latter category.

If the common notion of violence is so deeply Eurocentric, what would a decolonial approach to violence look like?

The colonial matrix of power continues to operate nowadays on the bodies and lives of people misnamed as the ›third world‹ and on racialised migrants that are constructed as inferior, that are violated and placed in subaltern positions. Our lives have little or no value and are set in the realm of the nonhuman. Policies, laws, mechanisms and technologies of control and surveillance, repression and suspicion are exercised against us.

Argentinian decolonial feminist philosopher María Lugones, reveals the colonial influence on the construction of gender. Gender was imposed on societies and cultures that had other ways of naming, defining and organizing themselves. Race and gender are thus co-constitutive categories of the modern colonial episteme, and they can neither be thought outside of this episteme nor separately from one another.

The epistemological contributions of black, chicana and migrant feminism in the United States, afro- and decolonial feminism in Latin America and the Caribbean, have been crucial for the understanding of the subordination and exclusion of *indigenous-black-third-world-migrant-lesbian* women who have been impacted by various systems of oppression, and who have called the ethnocentric bias of hegemonic feminism into question. African-American women from the United States challenge white feminist theory, roles and spaces, for example by showing the treatment of black female slaves who did the same work as men on the plantations and were sexually abused by their masters at night. Angela Davis (1983) discusses how black women openly challenged the gender roles implicit in traditional cultural representations of marriage and heterosexual love relationships, and how blues music was a means by which they broke the silence against misogynist violence.

What effects does this analysis have on your work as a community psychologist and facilitator? Could you give some examples?

Racism is not discrimination, stereotypes or prejudices of some groups or individuals towards or against the migrant population. Racism is a structuring system of domination, protected by the institutions and their social, legal, political, police, economic, educational and cultural mechanisms that legitimise it, regulate it and put it into practice. It is this racism that we, migrant women, can recognise violating our bodies and lives.

Following Rivas (2017), violence against migrant women has to be thought of as a continuum of colonial-capitalist, racist and heteronormative domination, and as a result of the policies of the neoliberal-western world. These phenomena are mutually inclusive and are part of the modern/colonial gender matrix that operates by permeating through the whole system, identities and subjectivities, and shaping the ways of how they define themselves, define violence, and their strategies of resistance and struggle.

Violence is structural and will not be resolved with laws and policies regarding equality, intercultural education or similar programs until the underlying problem is tackled: the process of civilisation involving death and destruction originated in Europe (and was followed by the United States) since modernity. So, who exerts violence against migrant women? Their fellow migrants? Or the Spanish state, its institutions and the European Union with its racist policies?

Ursula Santa Cruz holds a bachelor's degree in Psychology from Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos (UNMSM) in Lima, Perú, and a master's degree in Gender Equality Policies from the Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona (UAB) in Barcelona, Spain. She is a feminist specialized in violence against women in transnational contexts from an intersectional and decolonial (intervention and analysis) standpoint. Working on empowering groups and following their dynamics, she develops educational and interventional methodologies. Moreover, she has participated in several research projects related to migrant women, gender, and transnational political participation. She is also an active member of the collective Centre for Transfeminist Antiracist Critical Interventions (in Spanish, Taller de Intervenciones Críticas Transfeministas Antirracistas Combativas, t.i.c.t.a.c.).

LITERATURE

Davis, Angela (1983): Women, Race and Class. New York.

Freire, Paulo (1970): Pedagogía del Oprimido. Montevideo.

Grosfoguel, Ramón (2014): Los estudios migratorios y su anclaje en el racismo sexismo epistémico. (Master oficial en migraciones internacionales). Universidad de la Coruña. URL: youtube.com [20.08.2017].

Lugones, Maria (2008): The Coloniality of Gender. In: Worlds & Knowledges Otherwise 2 (2). 1–17. URL: globalstudies.trinity.duke.edu [11.06.2018].

Maldonado-Torres, Nelson (2007): On the Coloniality of Being. Contributions to the development of a concept. In: Cultural Studies 21 (2). 240–270.

Rivas, Fabiana (2017): La Limitaciones teóricas respeto a la violencia de género contra las mujeres: aportes desde el feminismo descolonial para el análisis en mujeres de América Latina. In: Iberoamérica Social: revista red de estudios sociales VII. 129–153. URL: iberoamericasocial.com [11.06.2018].

Transformative Trajectories – The shifting Mediterranean Border Regime and the Challenges of Critical Knowledge Production

An Interview with Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pezzani

SOPHIE HINGER

Abstract: In 2011, the researcher and filmmaker Charles Heller and the architect Lorenzo Pezzani founded the Forensic Oceanography project to investigate the lethal effects of the militarized border regime and the politics of migration in the Mediterranean Sea. In collaboration with a wide network of non governmental organisations (NGOs), activist groups, researchers and journalists, they have produced various human rights reports as well as articles, maps, and videos that document and challenge the violence perpetrated against migrants at the EU's maritime borders. In 2012, they contributed to found the online mapping and monitoring platform WatchTheMed, and in 2014, the Alarmphone, a hotline for migrants in distress at sea. Pezzani and Heller are affiliated with the Centre for Research Architecture at Goldsmiths, University of London. Sophie Hinger, research fellow at the IMIS (Osnabrück) and member of the Alarmphone, communicated with them via skype and e-mail between July 2017 and February 2018. Their exchange was concerning transformations of the Euro-Mediterranean border regime with a focus on the Central Mediterranean and the role of activist-researchers in this contested arena.

Keywords: disobedient gaze, forensics, aesthetic regimes, humanitarian border, freedom of movement, genealogies of mobility and control

Sophie Hinger: We are currently at a critical juncture of the ongoing struggles over freedom of movement and more generally human rights in the European and Mediterranean border regime – with the criminalization of those who try to save lives and support people on the move, on the one hand, and renewed cooperation between European and neighbouring states to prevent people from crossing the Mediterranean Sea on the other. In order to be able to intervene critically in this contested arena, it is important to understand the broader trajectories of change and trace the genealogy of migration control.

The two of you have had a long-standing focus on the politics of migration within and at the borders of Europe, and have been concentrating especially on the Central Mediterranean since 2011. I would like to revisit the main political developments with you that shaped the border regime here since then and motivated you to do research and intervene. What brought you to look at the maritime frontier? And what brought you to look at it in a forensic way?

Charles Heller: What took us to the sea was, first of all, the deep political shifts that spread across the Mediterranean space in 2011. The political rupture of the Arab uprisings had a dramatic impact on the Euro-Mediterranean border regime. What happened in 2011 was a reopening of the Mediterranean frontier by migrants, who seized the power vacuum left by the overthrowing of the Ben Ali and Gaddafi regimes. Before that, the Mediterranean frontier had been nearly closed, due to agreements between the Gaddafi regime and European states. In the case of Tunisia, there was an extraordinary process of seizing freedom of movement – over a few weeks, crossings occurred in broad daylight to the joyful sounds of singing and drums. In Libya, as the uprising turned into a civil war that only intensified with the subsequent NATO intervention, more and more people were forced to flee. Crossings from Libya took place in particularly precarious circumstances, and several hundred deaths were recorded in just a few months over 2011. These deaths, however, were occurring in a sea which had been turned into the most surveilled maritime space on earth by the NATO-led military intervention, which had deployed more than 38 warships off the Libyan coast. The deaths were therefore occurring despite the surveillance, and with military actors possessing knowledge of migrants' distress. As the human rights NGO GISTI argued in a press release, military actors were thus guilty of failing to assist people in distress at sea, and the NGO announced it would file suit against the EU, Frontex, and NATO. This was the political context in brief: the beginning of a phase of intensified confrontation in the longstanding *mobility conflict*, which sets the desires and movements of migrants in opposition to the politics of exclusion of states, a phase which has continued to play out across the Mediterranean frontier until today, and of which we may be seeing the end with the current rollback of the border regime – we'll come back to that.

Lorenzo Pezzani: On the other hand, and this is the second crucial element that shaped our research, a new project called »Forensic Architecture« was starting to emerge at the Centre for Research Architecture, where Charles and I were conducting our PhD research. This opened up a new horizon and pushed us to think about new methods and technologies that could be used to document human rights viola-

tions.[1] The forensic approach seeks to find *evidence* of events under investigation so as to reconstruct them and prove or disprove a crime. However, if the evidence considered by the inventors of forensic science since the times of Edmond Locard were stains, fingerprints, etc., today events are potentially recorded by an infinite amount of materials and media – from phone communication to payment data, from videos shot with mobile phones to satellite images and vehicle tracking data, from sound recordings to rubble analysis (Ruffell/McKinley 2008). This forensic perspective has traditionally been the monopoly of state agencies, which have often used it to police and silence the victims of their violence by pitting the alleged objectivity of technology and science against the fallibility of human testimony. Our aim has been to somehow reverse this process and reinvent forensics as a counter-hegemonic practice that could be used by non-governmental actors to hold state and other non-state actors accountable for their crimes (Weizman 2014).

So how did these ideas about forensics become operational in the political context that you just sketched?

Charles Heller: After reading GISTI's press release, we contacted them and offered our help to document and demand accountability for the crimes of non-assistance that they, together with other groups like Migreurop and the International Federation of Human Rights, were denouncing. It was in dialogue with this NGO coalition that we decided to focus on what then became known as the »left-to-die« boat case, in which 63 migrants died after having been abandoned to drift for 14 days in NATO's maritime surveillance area. Our contribution was to reconstruct as precisely as possible what had happened to this boat by using different remote sensing means and combining them with the testimonies of the survivors. The results of our research, which we published in April 2012 (Heller/Pezzani/Situ Studio 2012), were the basis for several suits filed in the different national contexts of some of the states involved in the military operation, namely France, Italy, Spain, and Belgium.

Lorenzo Pezzani: Taking the forensic approach to the sea presented a number of challenges. In our investigation, we had to develop new methodologies to document events that had occurred in the open sea without the presence of external witnesses. We used remote sensing means that are routinely employed to police migration but we mobilized them »against the grain«, that is, not to detect unauthorized crossings,

1 | See URL: forensic-architecture.org.

but rather to document the violence of borders themselves. In this sense, we sought to exercise what we have called a »disobedient gaze« (Pezzani/Heller 2013). Moreover, in order to determine responsibilities, we spatialized the traces of this violence within the particular legal architecture of the EU's maritime frontier. The sea is far from being the empty and lawless expanse we often imagine. Instead, it is a patchwork of overlapping and conflicting jurisdictions that are exploited by states in order to produce violence and escape responsibility for it, for instance carrying out unlawful push-backs, or refraining from engaging in rescue operations. A fine-grained understanding of this political geography of the sea has thus been crucial to understanding some of the conditions that have led to deaths at sea on a structural basis. More generally, you could say that our investigation had to challenge one of the cornerstones of modern forensic science, according to which »every contact leaves a trace«. This is because modern forensics has focused on registering traces of *direct violence* – in which harm inflicted onto individuals »can be traced back to concrete persons as actors«, in John Galtung's formulation (Galtung 1969). While our report shows that traces are indeed also left in the water, what is missing is a direct physical contact between a perpetrator and a victim. One need only think of the military ship that circled around the »left-to-die« boat without providing any assistance to its passengers, but many of other forms of violence we have documented since then also share a form of violence that kills without directly touching the bodies of migrants and that operates by omission (by many), rather than by commission (by any specific actor). This distance between the (in-)action of a perpetrator and the fate of a victim, the conversion of water into a deadly weapon, is precisely what has allowed states to present migrants' deaths at sea as tragic events all the while escaping responsibility for them. In a sense, you could think of all our work of the past few years as an attempt to account for and challenge these forms of contactless violence.

Almost two years later, in March 2014, you made the film »Liquid Traces« on the basis of the 2012 report. Why did you make the film in addition to the report?

Charles Heller: We shared the desire to make our research available to the broadest possible public. That meant giving it a form other than a 100-page report. Thinking of aesthetic strategies, video seemed to allow us to provide an answer to a question that we had since the very beginning of the project and that we had not fully been able to answer through the report: how do we combine the view from the boat with the view from the sky? Satellite imagery, one of the main technological means of documentation that we used, is often criticized for reproducing, through a technologically mediated vision, a highly asymmetrical power relation in which an objectifying

analysis ends up silencing victims of violence (Parks 2009). In this video, we wanted to find a way to combine this kind of distant vision of events, which was crucial in our quest for accountability, with the lived, subjective experiences of the migrants on the boat. As we produced the video, another important dimension of the film emerged for us. Several authors have argued that, in our analyses of borders, we have to move beyond their spatial dimension, to include their temporal dimension as well, as it allows us to become attuned to how illegalised migrants' movements are accelerated and decelerated throughout their trajectories of inclusive exclusion rather than complete exclusion by the spatial limits of borders (Tsianos/Hess/Karakayali 2009; Mezzadro/Neilson 2013). However, it is very difficult to account for the temporal dimension of a border regime through static maps. The moving image instead really allowed us to give a form to the temporality of migrants' movements, and the hierarchized rhythms of the Mediterranean mobility regime. In Liquid Traces, when we saw the slow movements of the trajectory of the drifting migrants' vessel superimposed with the pulsating movement of maritime commercial traffic through the central Mediterranean – it looks like London at rush hour – it was the first time that we felt that the argument of the *differential temporalities of movement* was given an adequate visual form. So, while this was not really an aim when we set out to produce Liquid Traces, it was certainly one of the major outcomes for us.

What have been the main outcomes of your work on the »left-to-die-boat case« in legal and political terms?

Lorenzo Pezzani: From the perspective that legal scholar Robert Knox has called »principled opportunism« (Knox 2012), filing a contentious case such as this one has undoubtedly the merit of inserting »grains of sand« into the migration regime's mechanisms, blocking it temporarily, forcing it to change slightly. For instance, one might say that the echo that the »left-to-die case« – and other similar cases we documented at the time – had on the press has probably contributed in some way to stopping the practices of non-assistance that were prevalent at the time. However, strategic litigation has also clear limits. Some of these limits are practical – legal cases are notoriously slow: All of the suits that we filed in 2012 and afterwards are still ongoing. But the limits of strategic litigation are also more substantial. For better and worse, the whole edifice of criminal law is based on the principle of individual responsibility, which makes it very difficult, if not impossible, for legal arguments to address structural causes. Even if the helicopters and the military ship that refrained from rescuing the passengers of the »left-to-die« boat were identified, and their crews found guilty, it would be utterly unrealistic to think that this might challenge the foundations of the

border regime, as the responsible individuals would probably be singled out as »bad apples«. Our attempt has always been to use singular events as a prism through which we can unpack and challenge more systemic forces, bur clearly the aim of holding states accountable for the deaths of migrants at sea is very far from being achieved.

Charles Heller: In general, I think it is very difficult to say what kind of political effects an activist and/or academic piece of work has. It often depends on the way ideas, methodologies or images are appropriated by others – and that may be for the best and for the worst. In the past, I have produced some images that have been appropriated by the IOM to deter potential migrants (Heller 2014a, 2014b), but through the methodology we developed in the process of our work on the left-to-die boat and other cases, we have also contributed to migrant solidarity movements.

Lorenzo Pezzani: This is for me perhaps the most important outcome. Together with many others, we introduced not only a new methodology, a new vocabulary for documenting and contesting the violence of the border regime, but we also contributed to creating a new awareness, as more and more groups fighting for migrants' rights have started to use technologies such as vessel tracking and mapping to exercise a critical »right to look« at sea. Making these techniques available to the larger movement was precisely what spurred us to create the WatchTheMed platform in 2012, in the wake of the »left-to-die-case«.[2] Initially our idea was that this online platform would be used primarily to document other cases of human rights violations at sea. However, among the WatchTheMed founders and members were also various other activists, who had previously been involved in networks like No One Is Illegal, No Border, and Welcome2europe. They sought to seize some of the methodologies that we had developed towards a different but equally important political tradition, which is that of direct support to unauthorized mobility.

Charles Heller: Specifically, this happened after we had documented a second major case of non-assistance by Malta and Italy with the shipwreck of 11 October 2013. At that time, some members of WatchTheMed asked, »How could we prevent these cases of non-assistance and other violations of migrants' rights from occurring in the first place, instead of simply documenting them after the facts?« One of the ideas that emerged was that if Dr. Jammo, a Syrian refugee and survivor of that shipwreck on 11 October, had not only called the Italian and Maltese coast guard, but also a wide net-

2 | See URL: watchthemed.net.

work of civil society, that could have pressured the Italian and Maltese coast guards to comply with their obligations to rescue migrants; maybe the deaths could have been prevented. This impetus materialized into the Alarmphone project, which involved institutionalizing and collectivizing the practice of lending direct support to migrants in distress at sea through a phone line, which had been practiced for a number of years on an individual and informal basis by a few exceptional individuals such as Father Mussie Zerai. With the Alarmphone, this individual support was consolidated into a strong, political practice aiming to support migrants in their movements across borders and to pressure state actors into complying with their obligation to rescue migrants in distress or preventing push-backs in all parts of the Mediterranean.

Lorenzo Pezzani: We tend to think about the two activist traditions that came together in these projects – strategic litigation and direct support – simply as different tactical tools that can be mobilized for the same strategic aim: enabling the exercise of freedom of movement. I don't think that a choice between different styles of struggle needs to be made, and in any case they never exist in »pure« form. The question is rather for us what tactic is more effective in which context.

If one thinks about of the way your project began and how it has been transformed, one can only be struck that possibly the most effective way to exercise a civilian »right to look« at the maritime frontier is not through high-tech, visual means of monitoring, but relatively low-tech mobile phones, technologies based on listening. In relation to this shift, you have suggested the concept of »disobedient listening«, as distinct from the »disobedient gaze« you mentioned earlier (Heller/Pezzani/Stierl 2015). How and why did you develop these concepts and how are the two connected?

Charles Heller: Forging new concepts is a way for us to be self-reflective, to think critically about our own work, as well as to help us decipher emergent processes. Hannah Arendt wrote about the imperative to »think what we are doing« (Arendt 1958), but for us it is at least as important to *think through doing*, and *do through thinking* – thinking as a way to reorient or sharpen what you're doing. It is clear for us that any form of activism and »militant research« is a complex practice moving between resistance, compromise, and evasion. These concepts have been important for us in terms of reflecting on our practices and, in turn, have served as a political compass of sorts to navigate this complex terrain from which there is no outside. More specifically, »disobedient sensing« – the concept we have recently used to encompass both the visual and aural dimensions you mentioned – was a way to reflect on our own attempt of *détournement* of the technologies usually associated with border surveil-

lance. We realized that while state actors seek to shed light on acts of unauthorized border crossing and to obscure the violence of the border regime, a critical practice had to reverse this looking.

Lorenzo Pezzani: What is very important to keep in mind is that you're never dealing with a static field, in which conditions of (in)visibility and (in)audibility remain unchanged. Consider this: As we mentioned before, it is often states that try to make migrants visible and migrants who try to stay invisible to cross borders. At times, however, you have a complete reversal of this aesthetic relation: migrants desperately trying to become visible and audible – on the boat, for example, through satellite phone calls, through gestures of waving etc. so as to be rescued, and states, on the contrary, seeking *not* to see and *not* to listen. So this is an immanent field of struggle, and one fraught with ambivalence at all times: here, visibility and invisibility do not designate two independent and mutually exclusive realms, but rather a topological continuum. This means that there is no single practice connected once and for all to disobedient sensing, one gesture that can be replicated in all situations. Instead, these are tactical concepts that can guide constant repositioning. They allow us to ask always anew the questions of what is power seeking to make visible and to hide, and what are migrants seeking to make visible and to hide. By providing answers to such questions that are always temporary, we seek to insert ourselves into this shifting *regime of (in)visibility and (in)audibility*, to counter the practices of states and to support the practices of migrants.

For a long time, European states made great efforts to conceal what was happening on their maritime borders. In the 1990s, it was only thanks to civil society organizations like UNITED that deaths of persons trying to reach the EU were documented and thus made visible.[3] *Today it is a lot more difficult for states to hide deaths at sea. At least since the shipwreck off the island of Lampedusa on 3 October 2013, deaths at sea have been omnipresent in the European media and political discourse.*

Lorenzo Pezzani: Indeed, the public outcry caused by that shipwreck marked a moment of rupture in this respect. Manuel Barroso, the President of the European Commission at that time, travelled to Lampedusa with the Italian Prime Minister and held a speech in front of the line of coffins to mourn the victims. What is interesting, though, is that far from being an occasion for questioning the migration regime that, arguably,

3 | For the list of deaths documented by UNITED, see URL: unitedagainstracism.org.

led to those deaths in the first place, his speech urgently called for more surveillance, more controls and more militarization, i.e. some of the very mechanisms at the core of that same regime. Similarly to the way in which the spectacle of border enforcement ends up reifying and naturalizing the border and the conditions of illegality it creates (De Genova 2013), the spectacular »visibilization« of deaths was mobilized to make the very practices and policies of border control vanish from critical analysis, pushing the larger social, legal, political and economic context in which border deaths happen out of the analytical frame. In this context, denouncing migrant deaths loses part of its oppositional edge, or may even become complicit with the policies and discourse of states. We can understand this paradox through the concept of *structural violence*, which has been used to describe forms of indirect violence that are not committed by any identifiable perpetrator(s) but that are rather the outgrowth of seemingly legitimate, institutionalized practices. Structural violence does not operate by removing knowledge and keeping violence in the dark. Instead, it is made invisible by its very repetition and reproduction. In this sense, accounting or concealing violence is also an aesthetic problem – if by aesthetics we mean, with Rancière (2006), the politics of »framing and re-framing the visible and the invisible«.

Charles Heller: This focus on the deaths of migrants as a crucial justification of, rather than a challenge to, the border regime, as well as the consequent framing of security operations as acts of saving, should be understood in the context of what William Walters has characterized as the »humanitarian border«. At the same time as EU states sought to make their own responsibility for the deaths of migrants at sea invisible, they have also sought to displace it onto smugglers. EU institutions and heads of states have argued that it is they who are putting these people's lives at risk, and as such the smugglers have been the targets of increasingly militarized operations, such as the EUNAVFOR MED – Sophia operation. So this is a very tricky move, which makes a spectacle of migrant deaths and places the responsibility of smugglers front and centre, while hiding the responsibility of states, even as we all know that smuggling networks would not exist without the EU's illegalization policies, which force migrants to resort to clandestine means of crossing.

The intertwined logics and discourses of humanitarianism and securitization have certainly characterized the operations launched by European states since 2013 starting from Mare Nostrum, which was launched by the Italian government immediately after the 2013 shipwrecks. But while Mare Nostrum still had a strong search and rescue component, its successor Triton, which was launched in 2015 and operated by

Frontex, was mainly about surveillance and border control. What did these developments in the Euro-Mediterranean border regime mean for your work?

Charles Heller: Our work underwent a shift with the ending of Mare Nostrum and the lethal consequences it had – the record number of deaths that we observed at the beginning of 2015. While the »left-to-die-boat-case« and the October 2013 case sought to meticulously document and seek accountability for particular *practices* of non-assistance, what happened with the ending of Mare Nostrum was rather an overall *policy* of non-assistance that involved keeping operations far away from the areas in which migrants encounter situations of distress, and thus refraining from rescuing not one, but dozens of migrants' boats. So our report »Death by Rescue: The Lethal Consequences of the EU's Policies of Non-assistance« essentially reconstructs the conclusion of Mare Nostrum and its lethal effects, and demonstrates that EU Member States and EU institutions implemented this policy with full knowledge of its lethal consequences. To this effect, we had to complement a *forensics of cases* with a *forensics of policies*. The report relies not only on the reconstruction of the April 2015 shipwrecks – in which 1,200 people lost their lives in a week – but also on an analysis of the institutional process leading to changing policies and of the changing conditions of migration that emerged as a result of them. In particular we looked at the way mortality (which is the relationship between arrivals and deaths and is a measure of the danger of the crossing) evolved in relation to shifts in EU policy, thus seeking to reconnect the relationship that had been severed within the discourse of the humanitarian border.[4] In this sense, the »Death by Rescue« report both responded to the shift in the forms of violence operating on the maritime frontier – from practices of non-assistance to policies of non-assistance, and the new difficulties that emerged with the humanitarianization of the border that entailed a need to reconnect state policies and their lethal effects. In turn, this demanded a shift in our appropriation of methodologies. If the »forensics of cases« demanded that we seize surveillance technologies, a »forensics of policies« demanded that we appropriated statistics, a form of knowledge production that is also deeply enmeshed with governmental practices (Heller/Pécoud 2018). Foucault noted in his 1978 lecture at the Collège de France that »statistics«, which etymologically means the »knowledge of the state«, played a central role in the emergence of forms of governmentality (Foucault 1978). Statistics were collected by a state apparatus that, in return, operated upon and through this knowledge. The collection of national population statistics are

4 | See URL: deathbyrescue.org.

historically intimately related to the very emergence of the category of »migration«. Today, migration statistics play a central role in the »border spectacle« (De Genova 2013): statistics of »irregular migration« quantify a »threat« that is measured (and measurable) only when neutralized by border patrols. Through them, it is thus simultaneously the threat of illegalized migration and the securitization work of states that are made visible. Migrant illegality is thus produced as an objective »reality« that migration policies must respond to. The relationship between counting and governing migrants is evident in Frontex's »risk analysis« reports. If statistics of intercepted illegalized migrants are central to Frontex's *state-centred* risk analysis – focusing on the alleged »risk« that irregular migration »flows« constitute for the states of the EU – statistics of mortality are instead at the core of our own *migrant-centred* »counter-risk analysis«, which focuses on assessing the risks that EU policies themselves pose for the lives of migrants, with the aim of contesting this very government.

Following the April 2015 shipwrecks, several NGOs launched their own civilian rescue missions to denounce and make up for the lethal retreat of state-led rescue operations…

Lorenzo Pezzani: In fact, MOAS had already been operating rescue operations in 2014, but only for a short period. At the beginning of 2015, they were joined by several other NGOs such as Doctors without Borders (*Médecins Sans Frontières*, MSF) and Sea Watch, and many other organizations over 2016. These were and are extraordinary initiatives that have revolutionized the capacities of non-governmental civil society actors to monitor and intervene at sea, reclaiming the sea as a central space of politics and struggles (Stierl 2016). Only a few years earlier, such initiatives seemed unthinkable, because of the degree of criminalization of rescue at sea.

Charles Heller: While these new initiatives were framed as critical responses to European state policies, within the first year of their deployment they entered a relationship of relative complementarity on an operational level with European state actors: SAR NGOs operated rescues, and state actors destroyed the vessels that had been used by migrants. By the end of 2015, it seemed that somehow everybody could be satisfied: On the one hand, even if several thousand deaths were recorded, the danger of crossing had been brought down to a level close to that which prevailed during Mare Nostrum. On the other hand, state actors could be satisfied because the number of crossings had also decreased in the Central Mediterranean – which was temporarily eclipsed by unprecedented arrivals across the Aegean. So there was an operational complementarity, and a »win-win« outcome emerged from this first year

during which humanitarian action was operated by NGOs, and securitized action by states.

Only that, in 2016, the number of crossings in the Central Med and the danger of crossing increased again, which sparked a backlash against rescue NGOs…

Charles Heller: Yes. The »long summer of migration« represented the climax of migrants' capacity to overcome borders, but also sparked a violent rollback. As the EU revealed itself to be utterly incapable of managing the movements of migrants within the EU, the push towards violent containment outside of the EU grew exponentially. After the EU-Turkey deal in March 2016, which led to a drastic reduction in crossings of the Aegean, all the attention was focused on the Central Mediterranean. This led Italy and EU agencies to adopt a two-pronged strategy: criminalizing rescue NGOs, and stepping up their collaboration with the Libyan coast guard to intercept and return migrants to Libya. Since the end of 2016, Frontex and the political class in Italy have led a virulent campaign to delegitimize proactive rescue activities, now operated almost exclusively by NGO actors. They have accused the NGOs of constituting a »pull factor« – a criticism which was used against Mare Nostrum as well in the past, of cooperating with smugglers, and – ironically – also of increasing the risk for migrants. Our most recent report, »Blaming the rescuers«, seeks to subject these accusations to empirical analysis.[5] We demonstrate that these accusations are unfounded, and that without rescue NGOs, the crossing would be far more dangerous.

Lorenzo Pezzani: We are also currently supporting *Jugend Rettet*, whose vessel Iuventa was seized in August 2017 due to an accusation of colluding with smugglers. We are producing a counter-reconstruction of the events for which it was accused – demonstrating that the allegations revolve around what we call »factual lies«: the use, for example, of a photograph, a statistical graph, a vessel track, all forms of documents that have a »factuality« to them, and weaving around them a narrative of events which is so entirely and intentionally false that it amounts to a lie.[6] Importantly, this campaign of criminalization has escalated in parallel with the collaboration with the Libyan Coast Guard. On 2 August 2017, the very same day as the Iuventa was seized, Italy authorized the deployment of its warships within Libya's territorial waters to provide logistical support to the Libyan Coast Guard to prevent and intercept mi-

5 | See URL: blamingtherescuers.org.

6 | For the Iuventa Case, see URL: blamingtherescuers.org/iuventa.

grants' departures. This contributed to an expansion of interceptions operated by the Libyan Coast Guard. This is a policy of »*refoulement* by proxy«, through which Italy has attempted to operate push-backs without touching migrants, and without getting caught, which we are currently seeking to document and contest. In this sense, we have been witnessing a new wave of policies of externalization through which the EU has been seeking to bring to a close the cycle of turbulence in the border regime sparked by the Arab uprisings – which is precisely what had put the previous wave of externalized border control into crisis.

What are the chances of civil society actors to counter the recent defamation campaigns and the various measures that the EU has undertaken to make the crossing of the Mediterranean more difficult?

Lorenzo Pezzani: It is quite stunning for me to think how quickly we have gone from that incredible moment of struggle that was the »long summer of migration« to the present conjuncture, where we witness the desperate and violent attempt to reimpose externalized border control. Back in 2015, spurred by the incredible scenes of people relentlessly overcoming borders along the so-called »Balkan route«, migrant solidarity networks became mass movements for a fleeting moment and took centre stage. They were joined by a lot of people who were less political and certainly not part of existing initiatives, but who felt the need to somehow show their solidarity with migrants, for instance greeting them as they arrived at German train stations. Without wanting to romanticize this moment, I think that we do need to understand the recent wave of the criminalization of solidarity – whether on land or at sea – precisely as a reaction to the position of power that migrants and those standing in solidarity with them managed to reach at that point. We have to keep this in mind when looking at the present situation, because it is essential to hold our ground and not let the current rollback of the EU's border regime push us out. At the same time, we need to deploy every possible tool to block the new levels of violence against migrants.

Charles Heller: What is interesting in relation to both the levels of criminalization and the violent containment is that documenting violations via strategic litigation, which had maybe lost traction during the affirmative and transgressive moment of the summer of migration, has become quite important as a defensive strategy once again, and as such this is once again one of our main focuses. But after several years of research and activism, ranging across different political traditions, we also clearly see the limits of the hand-to-hand struggle with the border regime. While we are able to win some important battles and temporarily enable more freedom of movement

for migrants, there is no fundamental transformation of the border regime. There is an urgent need to rethink strategic visions that seek to combine and articulate daily struggles *and* fundamental change towards the freedom of movement.

What would it take, do you think, to move in that direction?

Lorenzo Pezzani: This is a challenging question, which lies at the heart of two interrelated strands of research we are currently exploring – one tracing genealogies of mobility and control, and the other thinking about the politics of the freedom of movement. Concerning the first strand, looking at the *longue durée* of the mobility conflict that is currently taking place in the Mediterranean is a way for us to move beyond what William Walters has called a sort of »presentism« affecting critical migration and border studies. The very trajectory of opening and closure of 2011–2018 that we have just sketched here needs to be embedded in a longer genealogy of change that would be able to account for the successive ebbs and flows of migration and control. The work of historians clearly shows that the highly uneven mobility regime which we currently observe can be traced back to European imperial expansion across the sea and the transformation of the Mediterranean into a »colonial sea« (Clancy-Smith 2010; Borutta/Gekas 2012). In turn, it will endure along with its lethal effects as long as the colonial asymmetries which gave rise to it are perpetuated, and the demands for freedom, equality and autonomy of the people of the Global South continue to reverberate through the movement of migrants. So we are interested in poly-temporal and poly-scalar analytical lenses, such as those allowed by the concept of *viapolitics* initially forged by Walters (2015) and that we are now exploring together.

Charles Heller: From this perspective, and this leads us to the second strand, the demand for the freedom of movement also appears in a different light, as we argue in a forthcoming piece we wrote with Maurice Stierl (Heller/Pezzani/Stierl 2018). If the movements of migrants are not only restricted by state policies, but also constrained by uneven global relations, and overdetermined by deep social boundaries such as race, class and gender, then the simple opening of borders would have limited and probably ambivalent effects – after all, as Etienne Balibar (2004) has often reminded his readers, the most vocal advocates for the freedom of movement have emerged from the neoliberal camp, which sees any state regulation on the mobility of people as an attempt to impose its nefarious distortion of the market. If this is the case, then the demand for fundamental transformation of migration policies towards ones that would enable more freedom of movement need to be articulated with a broad range of practices and demands on other levels (Anderson et al. 2009). These include

anti-racist, de-colonial, and feminist struggles, the environmental justice movement, struggles directed against uneven development and neoliberalism, and those based upon the forging of new alliances, such as those between migrant and non-migrant workers for better labour conditions. This complicates the struggle for freedom of movement, but it also makes struggles surrounding borders and migration a crucial node around which to weave the many entangled struggles, which together are forming an emerging agenda for radical transformation.

Charles Heller is a Research Fellow of the Centre for Research Architecture, Goldsmiths, University of London, conducting postdoctoral research supported by the Swiss National Foundation for research. Since 2011, he has been part of various collaborative projects that critically investigate the Mediterranean border. Together with several NGOs, scientists, journalists and activist groups, he has produced maps, videos, installations and human right reports that attempt to document and challenge the ongoing death of migrants at sea. His work has been used as evidence in courts of law, published across different media and academic outlets, as well as exhibited and screened internationally.

Lorenzo Pezzani is a lecturer in Forensic Architecture at Goldsmiths, University of London. Since 2011, he has been part of various collaborative projects that critically investigate the Mediterranean border. Together with several NGOs, scientists, journalists, and activist groups, he has produced maps, videos, installations and human right reports that attempt to document and challenge the ongoing death of migrants at sea. His work has been used as evidence in courts of law, published across different media and academic outlets, as well as exhibited and screened internationally.

LITERATURE

Anderson, Bridget / Sharma, Nandita / Wright, Cynthia (2009): Editorial: Why No Borders? In: Refuge 26 (2): 5–18.

Arendt, Hannah (1958): The Human Condition. Chicago.

Balibar, Etienne (2004): We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship. Princeton.

Borutta, Manuel / Gekas, Sakis (2012): A Colonial Sea: the Mediterranean. 1798–1956. In: European Review of History, Revue européenne d'histoire 19 (1). 1–13.

Clancy-Smith, Julia (2010): Mediterraneans: North Africa and Europe in an Age of Migration, c. 1800–1900. Berkeley.

De Genova, Nicholas (2013): Spectacles of migrant ›illegality‹: the scene of exclusion, the obscene of inclusion. In: Ethnic and Racial Studies 36 (7). 1180–1198.

Foucault, Michel (2007/1978): Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the Collège de France. New York.

Galtung, Johan (1969): Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. In: Journal of Peace Research 6 (3). 167–191.

Heller, Charles (2014a): Perception management – Deterring potential migrants through information campaigns. In: Global Media and Communication 10 (3). 303–318.

Heller, Charles (2014b): Image/migration. In: Hering, Tobias (Ed.): Der Standpunkt der Aufnahme – Point of View: Perspectives of Political Film and Video Work. Berlin.

Heller, Charles / Pezzani, Lorenzo / Studio, Situ (2012): Report on the »Left-To-Die Boat«. 11 April 2012.

Heller, Charles / Pezzani, Lorenzo / Stierl, Maurice (2015): Acts of Disobedient Listening. In: Moving On. One Year Alarmphone. Berlin. 22–27.

Heller, Charles / Pécoud, Antoine (2018): Counting migrants' deaths at the border: From civil society counter-statistics to (inter)governmental recuperation. IMIn Working Papers Series 2018 No. 143.

Heller, Charles / Pezzani, Lorenzo / Stierl, Maurice (forthcoming 2018): Toward a Politics of Freedom of Movement. In: Jones, Reece (Ed.): Open Borders: In Defense of Free Movement. Athens, GA.

Knox, Robert (2012): ›Strategy and Tactics‹. The Finnish Yearbook of International Law 21 (December). 193–229.

Mezzadra, Sandro / Neilson, Brett (2013): Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor. Durham.

Parks, Lisa (2009): Digging into Google Earth: An analysis of »Crisis in Darfur«. In: Geoforum 40. 535–545.

Pezzani, Lorenzo / Heller, Charles (2013): A disobedient gaze: strategic interventions in the knowledge(s) of maritime borders. In: Postcolonial Studies 16 (3). 289–298.

Rancière, Jacques (2006): The Politics of Aesthetics. London.

Ruffell, Alastair / McKinley, Jennifer (2008): Geoforensics. Chichester.

Schuppli, Susan (2013): Walk-back technology. Dusting for fingerprints and tracking digital footprints. In: Photographies 6 (1). 159–167.

Stierl, Maurice (2016): A Sea of Struggle – Activist Border Interventions in the Mediterranean Sea. In: Citizenship Studies 20 (5). 561–578.

Tsianos, Vassilis / Hess, Sabine / Karakayali, Serhat (2009): Transnational migration theory and method of an ethnographic analysis of border regimes. Working paper. Sussex.

Walters, William (2015): On the Road with Michel Foucault: Migration, Deportation and Viapolitics. In: Fuggle, Sophie / Lanci, Yari / Tazzioli, Martina (Ed.): Foucault and the History of Our Present. Houndmills. 94–110.

Weizman, Eyal (2014): Introduction: Forensis. In: Forensic Architecture (Ed.): Forensis: The Architecture of Public Truth. Berlin.

Autor_innen

Inken Bartels is a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS) in Osnabrück. She completed her PhD in Sociology at the Berlin Graduate School of Social Sciences at the Humboldt University of Berlin. Her research focuses on reconfigurations of border and migration regimes and the role of international actors in contexts of origin and transit.

Daniel Bendix arbeitet im Fachgebiet Entwicklungspolitik und Postkoloniale Studien der Universität Kassel und ist aktiv bei glokal, einem Berliner Verein für machtkritische, postkoloniale Bildungsarbeit. Er ist Autor von *Global Development and Colonial Power. German Development Policy at Home and Abroad* (Rowman & Littlefield International, 2018).

Katherine Braun ist Soziologin und als wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin im BMBF-Verbundforschungsprojekt »Willkommenskultur und Demokratie« am *Institut für Migrationsforschung und Interkulturelle Studien* (IMIS) an der Universität Osnabrück tätig. Sie forscht zu dekolonialen und feministischen Epistemologien, Migrations- und Grenzregimen, Gender und Rassismus. Außerdem ist sie aktiv im *Netzwerk kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung* und Redaktionsmitglied bei *movements. Journal für kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung*.

Maribel Casas-Cortes, affiliated with the Anthropology Department of the University of North Carolina in Charlotte, was recently awarded a Hunt Fellowship from the Anthropological Wenner-Gren Foundation. She holds a PhD in Cultural Anthropology from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Her publications include articles in journals such as *Rethinking Marxism*, *Cultural Studies* and *Anthropology Quarterly* as well as book chapters in edited volumes such as *Insurgent Encounters* (Duke University Press, 2013), and *A Handbook to Urban Anthropology* (Blackwell, 2014).

Sebastian Cobarrubias is an Assistant Professor in the Global Studies Department at the University of North Carolina in Charlotte. He holds a PhD in Human Geography from UNC-Chapel Hill, and he has published in journals such as *Antipode*, *Political Geography*, and *European and Urban Regional Studies*. He has also contributed to edited volumes including: *Estados de Contención, Estados de Detención* (Anthropos, 2017), *The Critical Handbook on Migration Geographies* (Edgar Ellen, forthcoming), and *Anthropology of Scale: Struggles and Modalities of Modern Power* (Cornell Press, forthcoming).

Fabian Georgi ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Institut für Politikwissenschaft der Philipps-Universität Marburg (Post-Doc). Er ist Geschäftsführer der Assoziation für kritische Gesellschaftsforschung (AkG), Mitglied der Forschungsgruppe *Staatsprojekt Europa* und arbeitet aus materialistischer Sicht zu Migrationspolitik und Europäischer Integration.

Joshua Hatton is a member of Texas State Employees Union – Communications Workers of America, Local 6186. He has taught at the University of Texas at Arlington and Southeast Missouri State University. His DPhil in Social and Cultural Anthropology is from the University of Oxford.

Sophie Hinger is a lecturer in Social Geography and a Ph.D. candidate at the Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS) in Osnabrück, Germany. In her doctoral research, she investigates the politics and spaces of urban asylum in Germany with a focus on the co-production of asylum between local authorities, migrants, solidarity groups and various other individual, collective and institutional actors. For several years, she has been involved in activist research and documentation of human rights violations of migrants, especially at the EU's maritime borders.

Katharina Hoppe ist wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Arbeitsbereich *Biotechnologie, Natur und Gesellschaft* am Institut für Soziologie der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main. Ihre Lehr- und Forschungsschwerpunkte umfassen die allgemeine Soziologie, feministische und politische Theorie, die Sozialtheorie, die feministische Wissenschaftskritik und das Feld der Biopolitik.

Darja Klingenberg ist wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Cornelia Goethe Centrum der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main. Ihre Lehr- und Forschungsschwerpunkte umfassen Migrationssoziologie und feministische Theorie, intersektionale Perspektiven auf soziale Ungleichheit, die Soziologie des Wohnens, Soziologie des Humors und Methoden qualitativer Sozialforschung. Sie promoviert mit einer Untersuchung

mit dem Titel: *Wohnen nach der Migration. Materialismus, Aspirationen und Melancholie russischsprachiger migrantischer Mittelschichten*.

Robert Matthies ist Politikwissenschaftler und Kriminologe und arbeitet als Redakteur bei der *taz.die tageszeitung*. Er promoviert an der Universität Hamburg zu neuen Visualisierungstechnologien und Blickregimen im Kontext von Kriminalitätskontrolle und Sicherheitspolitiken.

Sarah Louise Nash is a postdoctoral researcher in the Institute of Forest, Environmental and Natural Resource Policy in the Department of Economics and Social Sciences at the University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences in Vienna. In 2016–17 she was Mercator-IPC fellow at Istanbul Policy Centre, Sabancı University. She holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Hamburg, where she remains an associated postdoctoral researcher in the research group Climate Change and Security (CLISEC). Her research concentrates on global policymaking on the nexus between climate change and human mobility.

Léonie Newhouse is a senior research fellow at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic diversity, working in the department of Socio-Cultural Diversity. She is an expert in the relationship between conflict, migration and displacement, and has written about how these connect to complex forms of urbanization. She is trained as a human geographer with a regional interest in the Sahel, Eastern Africa and the Horn.

Ole Oeltjen ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Lehrbereich Makrosoziologie der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Er hält einen Masterabschluss in Politikwissenschaften von der Freien Universität Berlin. Seine Forschungsschwerpunkte sind Asyl- und Sozialpolitik, Citizenship Studies und kritische Sicherheitsforschung.

Simona Pagano, Kulturanthropologin, ist wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung multireligiöser und multiethnischer Gesellschaften in Göttingen. Sie arbeitet zu kritischer Migrationsforschung, Rassismus, feministischer Theorie und Intersektionalität, Camps und anderen Formen der Unterbringung. Aktuell forscht sie in einem komparativen Projekt zu institutionellen Anordnungen, die im Kontext der Aufnahme von Geflüchteten seit 2015 entstanden sind.

Mathias Rodatz arbeitet zu Geographien der Ungleichheit: Er interessiert sich für das Spannungsfeld zwischen (räumlichen) Prozessen der Marginalisierung und sozialen, kulturellen oder politischen (Gegen-)Bewegungen, die aus ihnen hervorgehen. Zu seinen Themen gehören Migration, Bürgerschaft und Rassismus in der neoliberalen Stadt sowie Nationalismus und Zugehörigkeit in der postmigrantischen Gesellschaft.

Seit 2010 ist er als wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Institut für Humangeographie der Universität Frankfurt tätig.

Rubia Salgado ist als Erwachsenenbildner_in und Autor_in in selbstorganisierten Kontexten tätig. Schwerpunkt ihrer Arbeit liegt im Feld der kritischen Bildungsarbeit in der Migrationsgesellschaft. Sie absolvierte ein Lehramtsstudium in Brasilien und ist Mitbegründerin der Selbstorganisation maiz. Seit 2015 arbeitet sie im neuen Verein das kollektiv. kritische bildungs-, beratungs- und kulturarbeit von und für migrant*innen in Linz, der seit November 2015 die Bildungsaktivitäten des Vereins maiz – Autonomes Zentrum von & für Migrantinnen weiterführt.

Maria Schwertl ist Kulturanthropologin und PostDoc am Institut für Europäische Ethnologie der LMU München. Aktuell forscht sie zu den Produzent_innen von Grenztechnologien und ihren Imaginationen von Grenze.

Felix Trautmann ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Institut für Sozialforschung an der Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt. Seine Forschung bewegt sich zwischen politischer Philosophie, Ästhetik sowie der Kultur- und Gesellschaftstheorie.

Vanessa E. Thompson ist wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Arbeitsbereich *Kultur und Migration* am Institut für Soziologie der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main. Ihre Lehr- und Forschungsschwerpunkte umfassen kritische Rassismus- und Migrationsforschung, feministische Gesellschaftstheorie und Intersektionalität, postkolonialfeministische Theorien, Black Studies, transformative Gerechtigkeit und Methoden qualitativer Sozialforschung.

Alexander Vorbrugg ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Geographischen Institut der Universität Bern, bis Februar 2018 war er wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Institut für Humangeographie der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main. Seine Arbeitsschwerpunkte liegen in der Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeographie, feministischer Geographie und Gesellschaftstheorie. Er beschäftigt sich insbesondere mit politisch-ökonomischem Wandel, Enteignung und sozialer Ungleichheit in osteuropäischen Kontexten.