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UMI

THE FORM AND FUNCTION OF GENERAL EXTENDERS

IN ENGLISH INTERACTIVE DISCOURSE

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ABSTRACT

A set of forms, classified as adjunctive general extenders (*and so on*, *and everything*, *and stuff like that*), and disjunctive general extenders (*or anything*, *or something*, *or whatever*) are examined within a corpus of naturally-occurring English conversation to discover why users of language might employ these expressions (function) and under what circumstances (context).

A preliminary analysis focuses on the "ideational" or speaker-based, representational, function of general extenders, and the possibility that general extenders are employed to implicate categories. This involves an in-depth consideration of category types and the conceptual analysis of categories, including prototypes. An alternative possibility that general extenders function as list completers is also explored, focussing on assumptions tied to the role of social norms and expectations, particularly with regard to the construction of lists.

A subsequent analysis explores the "interpersonal" function of general extenders, i.e., the ways in which speakers use these expressions to mark their attitude toward the message expressed, or towards the hearer. Examples are offered to demonstrate how speakers employ general extenders as intensifiers, as hedges addressed to politeness strategies, as markers of invited solidarity, and in orientation to constraints on cooperative interaction.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

This is an investigation of one aspect of language that has received relatively little attention from linguists, yet is clearly an important element for the users of language. As illustrated and analyzed in the following sections, the set of linguistic elements which I shall describe as GENERAL EXTENDERS take a variety of forms, have observable contexts of occurrence, and fulfill identifiable functions. It is the goal of this investigation to present an extended analysis of those forms, contexts, and functions. I shall begin with the forms.

1.2 Forms

The phenomenon to be investigated consists of a set of forms of the type listed below, which I will call general extenders:

> and all ((of) {this/that})
>
> and (all) ({this/that}) ({kind/sort/type} of)
>> {business/crap/thing/jazz/junk/mess/nonsense/
>> shit/stuff}
>
> and {business/crap/things/junk/shit/stuff} (like that)
>
> and {business/crap/things/junk/shit/stuff} of that
>> {kind/sort/ilk/nature}
>
> and blah blah blah

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and everything (like that)

and so forth

and so on

and such

and that

and the like

and the rest

and the whole kit and caboodle

and the whole nine yards

and the whole thing

and this and that

and whatever

and whatnot

and what have you

etcetera

or anything (like that)

or {anybody/anyone} (like that)

or something (like that)

or {somebody/someone} (like that)

or somewhere (like that)

or what

or whatever

or what have you

The set of general extenders listed above contains some standard exemplars, but more novel creations are possible and not infrequent.

General extenders are a class of clause-final expressions of the form CONJ + NP which extend otherwise grammatically complete utterances; as this study will show, general extenders serve a variety of functions.

Excerpts [1]-[28] illustrate the widespread distribution of general extenders in many different genres: [1]-[3] academic writing, [4]-[5] academic meetings, [6] a novel, [7]-[8] newspaper reporting, [9]-[10] magazine reporting, [11] the lyrics of a song, [12]-[13] scripted TV shows, [14]-[15] unscripted TV shows, [16] a news radio program, [17] a federal trade commision meeting, [18] a family therapy session, [19] a mediation, [20] a courtroom deliberation, [21] a discussion in a hospital emergency room, [22] an emergency (911) phone call, [23] a telephone answering machine message, [24] an unscripted spoken narrative, [25] a stand-up comedy routine, [26] an email message, [27] a telephone conversation, and [28] a face-to-face interaction among familiars.

[1] Bilmes 1986:86
We are seeing behavior as action when we find it appropriate to inquire into the reasons for that behavior, where a reason would consist of a statement of intention, motive, desire, **and such**: ...

[2] Grace 1987:77
That is, are we to be content with principles sufficient
for all immediately practical purposes, or do we want to
require them to be sufficient absolutely (in the presence
of freaks, very exotic situations, etc.)?

[3] Schütz 1994:308
Phrases are grouped in semantic categories: e.g.,
"of trees," water, dwelling, kitchen utensils,
edibles, body parts, clothes, animals, meals,
relations, tools, colors, etc.

[4] Grimshaw:514
J: ... I would certainly be in favor of uh y'know passing
her obviously with the kinds of suggestions we'll have
for revision **and so forth**

[5] Overstreet:AM[1]
Professor X: When you started talking about category
stuff, (.) it- it ma::de me thi:nk o::f (.) uh languages I've
worked with, let's say Micronesian languages where they
ha:ve (.5) uh- u::h cl- classifier systems which are (.5)
category (.5) type things y'know you- lo::ng things, uh (.5)
rou:nd things **and so on** ...

[6] Douglas Coupland Generation X
"'What *did* you just say to Martin, Dag?' she says to me.
'He's just having *kittens* in his office---cursing your
name up and down. Did the health inspector declare this
place a Bho*pal* **or something?**'

[7] Honolulu Star-Bulletin 9/24/93
((From an article about Nolan Ryan, the pitcher))
"The Lord uniquely put those hinges together and the
elbow and the musculature **and all that kind of stuff**
to make him be able to throw the ball as hard as he did
for as long as he did," Toborg said.

[8] Baton Rouge Advocate 9/2/94
((A player talks about wearing a borrowed shoe after one of hers fell apart during a U.S. Open tennis match.))
"Once it finally molded to my foot it was fine," Garrison said. "At the beginning, it kind of felt like I was walking like a duck **or something**."

[9] <u>Vanity Fair</u> 4/94
((Interview with Ashley Hamilton))
VF: Have you ever been in therapy?
AH: For my back **and stuff**?
VF: No, like mental therapy.
AH: No, no. No mental therapy for me.

[10] <u>Omni</u> 11/83
((Interview with Noam Chomsky))
Chomsky: That's the kind of work you would hope would soon be done: to take a theory of universal grammar, fix the parameters one way or another, and then deduce from these parameters the grammar of a real human language-Japanese, Swahili, English, **or whatnot**.

[11] The Cure <u>Disintegration</u>
I never said I would stay to the end; I knew I would leave you with babies **and everything**.

[12] Beavis and Butt-Head 9/94
I don't wanna be a pa:rty pooper **or anything**, but (1.0) don't you think this cou:ch fishing thi:ng is=uh (.) I dunno (.5) kinda irresponsible?

[13] Seinfeld 1/95
Elaine: What kinda soup did he get?
Jerry: I dunno. (.) Consommé:: **or something**.

[14] Oprah Winfrey Show 10/94
Oprah: He: washed her CLO::::::thes **an' E:verything**!

[15] Crossfire 3/95
((Kinsley is talking about Cochran's mention of
Mary Anne Gerchas at the O.J. Simpson trial))
Kinsley: ... Now he made a big hoo-ha-ha about her in his
opening statement .hhh she was supposed to testify that
there were fou:r men seen at the crime scene **and so on
and so forth** ...

[16] National Public Radio 2/95
((A discussion of life in 1930s America))
Working class women had a very .hhh clear understanding
of the ways that their lives were constrained hhh. and
limited and (.) u::::m sex was one way to get things and
u:m some (.) young women said as long as they didn't take
money u:h they were not prostitutes- as long as they took
gifts, um foo::d, clo:thing, **etcetera** ...

[17] Bilmes, unpublished
J: ... but at the same time (.5) we think it's: no:t (.5)
irrelevant (nor) technical (*) picky: **or whatever**

[18] Bilmes, unpublished
C: 'Cause I ( ) all day and I don't have an adult to talk to.
You know, maybe neighbors **or something like-** and uh ...

[19] Bilmes, unpublished
T: No I can't see any reason f'r that.=It's (j's a) phone
number it's available y'know: uh: (.4) he works at Pearl
Harbor **'nd** uh (.7) **so on 'n' so forth** (.5) .hh .hh y'know°

[20] O.J. Simpson trial 3/94
((F. Lee Bailey is talking about Detective Fuhrman and the
glove he allegedly found on O.J. Simpson's property))
Bailey: It could have been concea:led UP to the ti:me (.5)
that he bolted out of the house, (.) without telling anyone
and making sure everybody else was occupied, (1.0) .hhhh
and for fiftee::n minutes (.) did something, (.5) which we::

belie:ve (.) explains the presence of the the glove, the blood an' the: (.) Br<u>o</u>nco **etcetera** ...

[21] Overstreet:ER
Nurse: He:: ha::s a minimal-looking pectis no::w, as he:'s gotten older (.) his chest, hi- and his bo::nes have y'know developed, y'know more now, y'know, and his muscles **an' stuff.**

[22] Newsweek 7/4/94
((Excerpts from 911 records appearing in article on O.J. Simpson case))
911 Operator: Is he the sportscaster **or whatever?**
Nicole: Yes. Thank you.

[23] Answering machine message   4/7/94
((Jeremy is one of Roger's students))
Roger, it's Jeremy. I heard- I heard- (*) well, I came to class but they have a (.5) bomb threat **or something.**
.hhh Wow, some guys will do <u>a</u>nything to get out of class. No. I just wanted to let you know that um I- I tried to make it today and wanted to make it but I- I wasn't ducking out **or anything** ...

[24] Guthrie 1994:59
S: <u>One</u> time. back in the <u>seventies</u>. when I was married ta <u>Jim</u>. an' there was a sugar shortage an' a-like he sold pot **'n stuff** ...

[25] Richard Pryor <u>Live in Concert</u>
People try to be m<u>a</u>cho ma::::n. That'll get you fucked up, Jack. Especially nowdays, 'cause y<u>ou</u>ng dudes that fight they don't even fight like (.) <u>o</u>lder people you know what I mean like we used to just have gang fights and you'd use your fists **an' shit**=Now they've got that Kung Fu and Karate **an' shit**=they'd like to pluck your eye out and pull your arm outta socket **an' shit.**

[26] Email message   9/27/94
Larry: This has been a wild couple of weeks. Maybe it's the conjunction of Venus and Jupiter **or something**.

[27] MO:T37
Sara: My mom's like worried I'm gonna get out there an' get involved with like the skin tra::de **or something**, I dunno.

[28] MY:F73
Maya: I mean, they got crowds that just listen to The Cure **an' stuff**.

The following general observations may be made with regard to contexts of occurrence: (1) Although general extenders are found in both written and spoken contexts, the frequency of these forms appears to be highest in informal, spoken conversation among familiars.[2] For example, in 10 hours of recorded telephone conversations and face-to-face interactions among familiars, there were a total of 158 occurrences of general extenders. On the other hand, in 10 hours of spoken interaction among nonfamiliars in formal settings (e.g., news radio interviews, political debates, academic discussions, and courtroom deliberations), there were a total of 32 occurrences of general extenders. (2) Certain forms are found primarily in informal spoken and written contexts, and talk among familiars, whereas other forms are found primarily in formal spoken and written contexts and talk among nonfamilars. For example, an examination of 10 hours of recorded telephone conversations and face-to-face interactions among familiars revealed 0 occurrences

of *etcetera*, 1 occurrence of *and so on*, 0 occurrences of *and so forth*, 12 occurrences of *and everything*, 20 occurrences of *or anything*, 4 occurrences of *and blah blah blah* (or variations thereof), and 31 occurrences of *and stuff (like that)*. In contrast, in 10 hours of conversation among nonfamiliars in formal settings, there were 9 occurrences of *etcetera*, 9 occurrences of *and so on*, 4 occurrences of *and so forth*, 0 occurrences of *and everything*, 0 occurrences of *or anything*, 0 occurrences of *and blah blah blah*, and 0 occurrences of *and stuff (like that)*. (3) Although certain forms are found to occur primarily in one of the two contexts described above, other forms are found in both. For example, an examination of the same 'informal' data set revealed 4 occurrences of *and all this/that*, 4 occurrences of *and things (like that)*, and 46 occurrences of *or something (like that)*; the 'formal' data set was found to have 5 occurrences of *and all this/that*, 1 occurrence of *and things (like that)*, and 3 occurrences of *or something (like that)*.[3]

The occurrence of general extenders has been noted in many varieties of English, including Australian (cf. Dines 1980), English (cf. Aijmer 1985; Channell 1994), Scottish (Macaulay 1991), and American (cf. Ball and Ariel 1978; Jefferson 1990), and many other languages, as well. The following are examples from Swedish [29], French [30], German [31], Japanese [32], and Dutch [33]:

[29] Aijmer 1985:389
Vi satt å prata **å så där**
We sat and talked **and that**

[30] DuBois 1993:180

Je jouais au hockey pour le collége, au hockey-salon au:
au hockey intérieur tu sais des affairs de même tu
sais, des activités parascolaires là.

I played hockey for the college, floor-hockey, inside
hockey, you know, **things like that** you know,
extracurricular activities.

[31] <u>Stern</u> 5/21/95
((Magazine interview with a professiona! swimmer))
Stern: *Gehen Sie gern zu solchen Anlässen?*
Do you like going to such occasions?
Völker: *Kommt drauf an. Manchmal ist mir das ein*
bißchen peinlich, weil ich immer noch nicht richtig
tanzen kann— Walzer und so.
It depends. Sometimes I find it embarrassing, because
I still can't dance well— waltzes **and such**.

[32] Hatch 1992:177
((apartment description))
... ++ de <u>basu-ruumu wa</u> syawaa to ANO nagasiba to
otearai ga atte AA nante iun desu ka monoire ga ne sukosi
konogurai no haba no doa to ++ hukasa ga konogurai no
monoire ga arimasu ne + ano ima iroiro ++ sono basu-
ruumu de tukau mono taoru to ka ne ato ++ otearai no
kami to ka sekken to ka sonna mono o irete irun desu
keredomo ANO yuka kara zutto ue made ++ tenzyoo made
no ookina monoire kanari hairimasu kedo ne.
... And the bathroom has a shower, a sink, and a toilet.
And what do you call it? a closet, with, I wonder how
much, about this width of a door and this much depth, we
have this closet. We put in stuff we use, towel, toilet
paper, and soap, **and things like that, that kind of**
stuff. It is from the floor to the ceiling. It's a big closet.
You can put a lot in it.[4]

[33] Have 1991:144
Patient: *En zondag kree'k eh pijn in m'n borst hier*
And Sunday night I got uh pain in my chest here
Doctor: *Mit hoesten **of zo of nou**—*
With coughing **or something or whatever**—

It should be emphasized that while general extenders are found in many different languages and contexts, this investigation will focus primarily on forms found in my corpus of American English data, which consists of informal, spoken interactions among familiars. This data base will be described in further detail in section 1.4.

1.3 Theoretical approach

The basic approach taken in this investigation fits within the tradition of descriptive linguistics. A type of construction within a natural language is observed, its various instantiations are formally identified, and an attempt is made to account for the function(s) of these forms. Diverging slightly from the perspective of narrowly focussed descriptive work, this study is also concerned with the social role potentially played by the identified construction within larger contexts of use.

Attempting to account for an aspect of language that varies with contexts of use will necessarily involve a theoretical bias that incorporates a sociocultural perspective. Such a perspective focuses on what Halliday (1970) described as the INTERPERSONAL

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function of language, emphasizing the fact that there is a great deal in language that can only be explained in terms of a speaker-hearer, interactive context. This perspective does not exclude what Halliday (1970) described as the IDEATIONAL function, that is, the speaker-based, representational, noninteractive aspect of language. However, given the longstanding preference in linguistic analysis for abstracting the 'relevant data' away from interactive contexts of use, thereby highlighting the ideational, it becomes necessary to emphasize the fact that a wider perspective on what counts as 'relevant data' will be taken in this investigation.

Many researchers who see language as a socio-cultural construct consider the interpersonal function of language to be crucial to linguistic analysis, and take face-to-face interaction as the source of many of the characteristic features of language. In the words of Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986:3):

> Conversation is the fundamental site of language use. For many people, even for whole societies, it is the only site, and it is the primary one for children acquiring language. From this perspective other areas of language use— novels, newspapers, lectures, street signs, rituals— are derivative or secondary.

Unlike those who would limit the study of language to the identification of abstract competence,[5] many writers draw attention to the fact that there is much in language which can only be accounted for in terms of a speaker-hearer situation of utterance, in which the interpersonal function involving two or more

participants has to be taken into account.   Lyons (1977:637)

expresses such a view, and emphasizes the importance of what he

calls the 'canonical situation of utterance':

> ... this involves one-one, or one-many, signalling in the
> phonic medium along the vocal-auditory channel, with all
> the participants present in the same actual situation
> able to see one another and to perceive the associated
> non-vocal paralinguistic features of their utterances,
> and each assuming the role of sender and receiver.

This perspective is also found in the work of Krauss (1987:96), who

writes:

> ... the addressee is a full participant in the formulation
> of the message— that is, the vehicle by which meaning is
> conveyed— and, indeed, may be regarded in a very real
> sense as the cause of the message. Without the addressee
> that particular message would not exist.   But the
> message, in the concrete and particular form it takes, is
> as much attributable to the existence of the addressee as
> it is to the existence of the speaker.[6]

In experimental research, Krauss and Glucksberg (1977:100-103)

have demonstrated that children must learn the use of social speech

(in addition to linguistic forms) in order to communicate

effectively.[7] The authors draw a distinction between SOCIAL and

NONSOCIAL speech, noting that nonsocial speech, which is not directed

toward another person, does not require the consideration of the

knowledge and perspective of a particular recipient in its

formulation; on the other hand, social messages, which must take

into account both the nature of the audience and the context of the conversation, are characterized by variability.

Given the existence of a long tradition of formal linguistic accounts of THE WAY LANGUAGE IS, those who see language as a socio-cultural construct have been attempting to spell out clearly some of the evidence for a view that seeks to encompass WHY language is the way it is; the goal is to identify and describe aspects of human language which crucially depend on viewing language as a social construct (i.e.,within face-to-face interaction) rather than as a biological or psychological construct (i.e.,within isolated individuals). An analysis of language which attempts to encompass WHY language is the way it is opens up the field of analysis to consider a wide range of factors, including, to name just a few: the speaker's attitude toward the hearer, the speaker's intention, the speaker's assessment of hearer's knowledge and responses, and concern for 'face.' While the inclusion of such variables may complicate the analytic process, and make an 'empirical' investigation more difficult, it is the belief of many who endorse a socio-cultural perspective on language use that these factors must be included if we are to approach an accurate account of the nature of language.

1.4 Data

Original data from recorded telephone conversations and face-to-face interactions among familiars (primarily in dyads) will be used to investigate the discourse functions performed by general extenders. All excerpts are numbered and presented in chronological order in the appendix. Where excerpts are from face-to-face interactions, an 'F' precedes the number (e.g., MY:F80); those taken from telephone conversations are preceded by a 'T' (e.g., MO:T12).

The participants include 18 individuals (11 females and 7 males), whose ages range from 23 to 64 (including five 20 year-olds, five 30 year-olds, four 40 year-olds, two 50 year-olds, and two 60 year-olds).[8] The data base, consisting of ten hours of conversation, was collected with two Panasonic Mini-Cassette Recorders (RQ-L317), two Radio Shack Ultra-Miniature Tie Clip Microphones (33-3003), and one Radio Shack Telephone Pickup Device (44-533). The portions of the recordings which contain general extenders were transcribed to include relevant cotext in the form of preceding and subsequent utterances, as well as sufficient detail for a fine-grained analysis. It is important to note that EVERY instance was transcribed; the entire set of transcriptions is presented as an appendix to this work. Since every instance which occurred within the ten hours of conversation was transcribed, this corpus of data can be used to make observations of a quantitative

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nature (although such claims will be restricted primarily to one section of this work: section 3.4).

Throughout this work, in addition to examples from my data, I will use examples from other sources to illustrate points, and to show that phenomena are not restricted to my data set. Most of these examples will be from recorded and transcribed conversations (e.g., data from other published works). However, some will be from other sources, such as newspapers, magazine articles, TV shows, and cartoons. It is worth noting that examples from newspapers and magazine articles will consist of direct quoted speech from interviews, and that ALL examples will be 'real,' rather than constructed. No substantive claims will be made purely on the basis of these 'secondary' examples.

1.4.1   Explanation of transcription symbols[9]

.   A period indicates a stopping fall in tone

,   A comma indicates continuing intonation

!   An exclamation point indicates an animated tone

?   A question mark indicates a rising tone

:   A colon indicates a lengthened segment

__   Underlining indicates stress (loudness)

CAP   Capital letters indicate extreme stress (loudness)

(.5)   Indicates the length of a pause in seconds

(( )) Double parentheses contain a description by the
       transcriptionist.

( )   Single parentheses mark transcribed material which is in
       doubt (i.e., the transcriptionist is not certain what was said).

(*)   Each asterisk between single parentheses represents
       approximately half a second of material which is in doubt.

.hh   Audible inhalation

hh   Audible exhalation

//   Indicates the point at which the next speaker begins to speak
       (in overlap). For example, in [34], Maya's utterance begins in
       the middle of Sara's 'now':

       [34] MY:F78
       1. Sara: ... I think they must have broke up or something
       'cause he's back no//w.
       2. Maya: Yeah, they must of.

=   When there is no interval between adjacent utterances, the
       two utterances are linked together with equal signs. For
       example, in turn #2 of [35], Bruce's 'Wait' is immediately
       followed by Lucy's 'Your ... ' in turn #3; Lucy's 'here' in turn #3
       is then immediately followed by Bruce's 'He ... ' in turn #4.

       [35] MO:F57
       1. Lucy: So what was I just- Oh. So Henry and I were
       talking last night an' he was saying 'I can ne:ver- (.) I::'
       Here's what he did. This is his hand motions. He goes
       2. Bruce: Wait.=

3. Lucy: ='Your intelligence level is up h<u>e::</u>re, and I am down h<u>e::</u>re.'=
4. Bruce: =He said that?

This symbol may also indicate a lack of pause within one person's turn, where a pause might be expected. For example, in [36], there is no pause between Sara's utterance of 'day' and 'y'know':

[36] MO:T42
Sara: Lemme ask you thi::s .hh this is just somethin' that dawned on me the other day=y'know in Louisiana it's kinda hard to open a bank account without a Louisiana driver's license ...

Ø   Indicates a 'zero quotative' (cf. Mathis 1992; Mathis and Yule 1994). This occurs in reported speech and marks a shift in speakers where the shift is not overtly marked by a quotative phrase, such as 'she said' or 'she's like.' For example, in [37], there is a shift in speakers in line 2, between the utterances 'Why- Why did-' and 'I'm not gonna go with Sara because .hh you're upset with-':

[37] MY:F64
Maya: ... she comes over an' she's like '(h)I- I ran over here' an' I'm like 'Why? Why did-' Ø 'I'm not gonna go with Sara because .hh you're upset with-' I'm like 'N<u>o</u>, I'm n<u>o</u>t upset with you. I'm over it. ...

1.5 Methodology

The primary aim of this study is to identify and describe a set of linguistically defined elements within interactive data. In order to achieve this, I shall call upon several analytic frameworks which linguists have appealed to since their development (beginning in the 1970s): conversation analysis, linguistic pragmatics, and politeness theory.

In section 1.5.1, I shall provide a basic description of the conversation analytic (henceforth CA) framework, and discuss how CA methods are appealed to in this work. As this discussion will show, the CA approach offers many valuable insights; however, it also imposes what may be considered unfavorable limitations on what may be included in the analysis of the data. In an effort to overcome these limitations, and provide a thorough account of how general extenders are used in interactive contexts, I shall call upon the frameworks described in sections 1.5.2 and 1.5.3: linguistic pragmatics, particularly following from Grice's (1975) Cooperative Principle, and Brown and Levinson's (1987) politeness theory.

In addition to calling upon the frameworks described in sections 1.5.1-1.5.3, this study will employ traditional formal concepts from semantics, syntax, and phonology; special attention will be given to the linguistic context (i.e., cotext) in which general extenders occur.

It is worth emphasizing that this study is devoted to the exploration of language in use, and will attempt to answer questions

related not only to how speakers express themselves (form), but also why they might choose to express themselves in the way they do (function), and under what circumstances (context).

1.5.1 Conversation analysis

> Conversation is an interactional activity exhibiting stable, orderly properties that are analyzable achievements of the conversants. Conversation analysis is a set of qualitative procedures based on detailed observation to capture the discernible features of conversational exchange. (Zimmerman 1988:406)

The CA approach to discourse was developed in the 1970s by a group of sociologists, known as ethnomethodologists, in reaction to the mainstream American approach to social science which imposed what are presumed to be objective categories onto data.[10] For the ethnomethodologist, the central objective of social science is to determine how members of a society make their behaviors what Garfinkel calls 'accountable.' Garfinkel (1967:1) specifies the meaning of the term 'accountable' as follows: 'When I speak of accountable my interests are directed to such matters as the following. I mean observable-and-reportable, i.e., available to members as situated practices of looking and telling.'[11] According to the ethnomethodologists, rather than BEGINNING with theories and categories based on assumptions about human rationality and conduct, and attempting to impose them on data, social scientists

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should look to the data in order to DISCOVER general principles of human rationality and conduct.

In an effort to develop a more rigorous approach to sociological inquiry, Sacks, the founder of CA, sought a form of sociological data which could be captured and examined repeatedly, and in detail. The data he turned to was recorded conversation. Sacks (1984:26) explains this choice as follows:

> It was not from any large interest in language or from some theoretical formulation of what should be studied that I started with tape recorded conversations, but simply because I could get [them] and I could study [them] again and again, and also, consequentially, because others could look at what I studied and make what they could, if for example, they wanted to disagree with me.

For Sacks, the examination of recorded conversation constituted an empirical approach to the analysis of one of the few 'orderly products' of society (Sacks 1984:21).

As Zimmerman (1988:409-11) notes, most CA practitioners 'consider their work to be essentially sociological in character'; their aim is to 'discover and describe the "machinery" of conversation, that is, the resources for organizing interaction that members of society draw upon to manage their everyday activity.'[12] In fact, one of the main practitioners of CA, Schegloff, suggests that the "machinery" of conversation is a primordial form of social organization (cf. Schegloff 1987).

As Levinson (1983:295) observes, the methodology of CA
is clearly derived from its sociological (i.e., ethnomethodological)
foundations:

> Out of this background comes a healthy suspicion of
> premature theorizing and *ad hoc* analytic categories: as
> far as possible the categories of analysis should be those
> that participants themselves can be shown to utilize in
> making sense of interaction; unmotivated theoretical
> constructs and unsubstantiated intuitions are all to be
> avoided. In practice this results in a strict and
> parsimonious structuralism and a theoretical
> asceticism— the emphasis is on the data and the patterns
> recurrently displayed therein.

CA emphasizes the use of NATURALLY-OCCURRING, recorded data.
Transcriptions of the data reflect details which enable the analyst
to conduct a fine-grained, or MICROANALYTIC study. For instance, a
typical transcription of a recording might contain: audible inbreaths
(.hh), audible outbreaths (hh), glottalization or self-editing markers
(-), lengthened syllables (:), syllables stressed in amplitude, pitch
and duration (underlining or capitalization), and the measurements
of micropauses of less than .2 seconds (.). Context is brought in in a
limited way, and only includes that which is demonstrably relevant
to the participants (i.e., is 'grounded' in the talk). For instance, in an
orthodox CA approach, factors such as the gender and age of the
participants are only deemed relevant to the analysis if the
participants themselves can be shown to demonstrate their
relevance (cf. Schegloff 1984). In addition to enabling the
conversation analyst to provide an empirical study of actual events,

these data serve as an 'aid to the imagination,' helping the analyst to uncover taken-for-granted and previously unnoticed details of conversational structure (cf. Sacks, 1984).

An important aspect of the conversation analytic approach concerns the interpretation of meaning. For the conversation analyst, meaning is an interactive accomplishment; it is treated as something which is NEGOTIATED and achieved by consensus, rather than existing in a speaker's head or in the words which are uttered (cf. Schegloff, 1984). In their interpretation of the data, conversation analysts may not offer interpretations which are not demonstrably relevant to the participants, or 'grounded in the talk.'[13]

For the conversation analyst, the primary context for the participants' interpretation of meaning is the SEQUENTIAL ORGANIZATION of conversation. Zimmerman (1988:409) describes this 'fundamental framework of conversation' as follows:

> The fundamental framework of conversation is sequential organization. Sequential organization encompasses the production and recognition of successive turns, for example, invitations and their subsequent acceptance or declination, or the initiation of repair by another in a next-turn when the prior speaker has not self-corrected. The course of conversational interaction is thus managed on a turn-by-turn basis, with the sequential environment providing the primary context for participants' understanding, appreciation, and use of what is being done and said in the talk (Schegloff, 1987, Schegloff and Sacks, 1973). (Zimmerman 1988:409)

In accordance with the CA approach, this study is principally based on a corpus of recorded and transcribed, naturally-occurring (English) language data, and avoids the use of constructed examples. The data are examined in order to discover how participants use general extenders, and the linguistic contexts in which they occur. In the course of the analysis, an effort is made to provide examples which display participants' interpretations (i.e., where a hearer demonstrably responds to the general extender, and the interpretation is said to be 'grounded in the talk'). In such cases, the interpretation of a general extender can be treated as something which is negotiated or achieved by consensus, rather than as having an independent existence.

There are, however, very few clear cases in my data of conversationally grounded participants' interpretations. In order to investigate those examples where no clear grounding is apparent, alternative theoretical frameworks are appealed to. In contrast to the CA framework, these frameworks, which are described in sections 1.5.2 and 1.5.3, allow for analysts' interpretations which are not 'grounded in the talk.' Unlike the CA approach, which sets out to DISCOVER general principles of human rationality and conduct, these approaches BEGIN with general assumptions about rationality and conduct, and use them to explain specific utterances. Whereas the CA approach treats meaning as something which is NEGOTIATED and achieved by consensus, these approaches treat meaning as something which is INTENDED by the speaker.

1.5.2 Linguistic pragmatics

In an effort to characterize how people use language, a philosopher named Grice (1975) identified the following set of assumptions, which, as Levinson (1983:101) notes, 'arise from basic rational considerations and may be formulated as guidelines for the efficient and effective use of language in conversation to further co-operative ends.' These 'guidelines,' as presented by Grice (1975:45), consist of a 'cooperative principle' and four 'maxims':

<u>The Cooperative Principle</u>
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange.

<u>The Maxim of Quality</u>
Try to make your contribution one that is true.
1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

<u>The Maxim of Quantity</u>
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

<u>The Maxim of Relation</u>
Be relevant.

<u>The Maxim of Manner</u>
1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
2. Avoid ambiguity.
3. Be brief. (Avoid unnecessary prolixity).
4. Be orderly.

The assumption that conversational participants are observing the cooperative principle and adhering to the maxims allows the exploitation of the maxims which results in what Grice calls conversational implicatures: meanings which are conveyed without being explicitly stated. For example, Grice offers the following example:

> A: I am out of petrol
> B. There is a garage around the corner

According to Grice, 'B would be infringing the maxim "Be relevant" unless he thinks, or thinks it possible, that the garage is open, and has petrol to sell; so he implicates that the garage is, or at least may be open, etc.'

Since the introduction of the above, several attempts have been made to modify the maxims, or to reduce their number by collapsing them. I will incorporate some observations from the work of Horn (1984), but will not explore any other versions where Grice's original insights have been radically modified (e.g., Sperber and Wilson, 1986).

Horn (1984:12) retains the maxim of Quality, noting that 'unless Quality ... obtains, the entire conversational and implicatural apparatus collapses.' Horn focuses his 'reductionist' attempt on the remaining three maxims; he suggests that the Gricean maxims of Quantity, Relation, and Manner result from two basic and competing forces, described by Zipf (1949) and Martinet (1962), which operate in the linguistic realm. These two forces are an AUDITOR'S ECONOMY,

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which is 'the need for a speaker to convey his message fully' (Horn: 1984:12); and a SPEAKER'S ECONOMY, which is a principle of least effort that makes the speaker 'restrict his output of energy, both mental and physical, to the minimum compatible with achieving his ends' (Martinet 1962:139).

In order to develop his analysis, Horn distinguishes the first component of Grice's Quantity maxim (hereafter Quantity[1]) from the second (hereafter Quantity[2]). According to Horn (1984:12), the Gricean maxim of Quantity[1] 'is essentially the same as Zipf's Auditor's Economy ... Most if not all of the remaining Gricean rules respond to the Speaker's Economy, either directly (as consequences of the least effort principle) or indirectly (through the interaction of this principle with its antithesis).' Based on this observation, Horn reduces the maxims of Quantity, Relation, and Manner to two principles: a Q-PRINCIPLE, which corresponds to the Gricean maxim of Quantity[1]; and an R-PRINCIPLE, which corresponds to the Gricean maxims of Quantity[2], Relation, and Manner.

1.5.3   Politeness

The 'face saving view' of politeness, which was proposed by Brown and Levinson (1987), has received more attention than any other model of politeness to date.[14] According to Kaspar (1994:3206), 'Its fundamental assumptions are a Weberian view ... of communication as a purposeful-rational activity, combined with Goffman's concept of face.' The following is an excerpt from Goffman's (1967:5) work, in which he defines 'face':

Every person lives in a world of social encounters, involving him either in face-to-face or mediated contact with other participants. In each of these contacts he tends to act out what is called a line—that is, a pattern of verbal and nonverbal acts by which he expresses his view of the situation and through this his evaluation of the participants, especially himself. ... The term face may be defined as the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact. Face is an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes—albeit an image that others may share, as when a person makes a good showing for his profession or religion by making a good showing for himself.

Under the face-saving view of politeness, members of society are considered to have two kinds of face: 'positive' and 'negative.' As defined by Brown and Levinson (1987:62), positive face is 'the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some others', and negative face is 'the want of every competent adult member that his actions be unimpeded by others.'[15]

While it is assumed that interlocutors generally cooperate, and assume the cooperation of others in preserving 'face', it is also assumed that interlocutors adopt a 'working hypothesis that face is always at risk.'[16] This perceived risk is offset by a measure of 'politeness.' The measure of politeness is determined by the speaker and is relative to the severity of the face threatening act (FTA) which is performed. Brown and Levinson's (1987:74) model provides the following mechanism for determining the severity of an FTA:

a) social distance between S and H (speaker and hearer)
b) the relative power of S and H
c) the absolute ranking of impositions in the particular
   culture

The classification of politeness strategies which are used to
counterbalance FTAs is quite complex. Among the options are: a
member may avoid an FTA completely, or adopt either or both of two
forms of redress: positive politeness, and/or negative politeness.
In an attempt to elucidate how interlocutors attend to and preserve
face, I shall cite some specific examples of positive and negative
politeness.

Brown and Levinson (1987:101) describe positive politeness as
follows:

> Positive politeness is redress directed to the
> addressee's positive face, his perennial desire that his
> wants (or the actions/acquisitions/values resulting from
> them) should be thought of as desirable. Redress
> consists in partially satisfying that desire by
> communicating that one's own wants (or some of them)
> are in some respects similar to the addressees' wants.

One of the mechanisms of positive politeness is 'to claim common
ground by indicating that the speaker and the hearer (S and H) both
belong to the same set of persons who share specific wants,
including goals and values' (Brown and Levinson 1987:103). An
output of this mechanism is the strategy of using in-group identity
markers. Brown and Levinson (Brown and Levinson 1987:107)
identify a number of ways in which in-group membership may be

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claimed, including: the use of 'in-group address forms, language or dialect, of jargon or slang, and of ellipsis.' An example of where this strategy might be applied is in languages with T/V systems, where a use of the 'T-form' may be used to claim solidarity with another (the term T/V is based on the French *tu* and *vous;* cf. Brown and Gilman 1960).

Negative politeness is redress directed to the hearer's negative face, which is the hearer's 'want to have his freedom of action unhindered and his attention unimpeded' (Brown and Levinson 1987:129). According to Brown and Levinson (1987:66), one way in which a speaker is in danger of impinging on the hearer and committing an FTA is by putting pressure on the hearer to accept or reject a future act by the speaker. For example, a speaker is in danger of committing an FTA whenever he or she makes an offer. One way in which a speaker can offset the risk of commiting an FTA would be to give options to the hearer.

1.6 Contribution to Linguistics

For many years the discipline of linguistics was dominated by generativist constraints on what counted as preferred areas of study (syntax, morphology, phonology) and relevant data (constructed, contextless sentences). If there was a human construct involved in this version of the field, it was an abstract creature possessing a COMPETENCE, but not, in any way deemed worthy of investigation, a capacity for taking part in social interaction via language with other

similar creatures. While research pursued within this paradigm has in many ways been successful (cf. Newmeyer 1980; Smith and Wilson 1979), during the past twenty years, its restricted perspective has gradually been shown to largely underdetermine the nature of the phenomenon called language. If linguistics is the study of language, then the actual use of language by humans in contexts to accomplish social meaning appears, to many investigators, to be worthy of the attention of linguists. Increasingly, linguists of many different specializations have been turning to conversation as the canonical situation in which language has its most obvious function in human affairs. Yet, due to the exclusion from consideration by many formal linguists of so-called PERFORMANCE data such as conversation, relatively little serious analytic work by trained LINGUISTS has been carried out on those aspects of language which only manifest themselves in conversational interaction. While anthropologists, sociologists, foreign language theorists and communication analysts have all attempted to focus on the workings of conversation, investigators in those disciplines have not focussed rigorously on the LINGUISTIC features which characterize the spoken language being used.

A number of linguists have started to reclaim the territory of conversation for the field that should have seen the area as its own from the start. The editors of Language, the journal of the Linguistic Society of America, now regularly see fit to include papers on topics like repetition in conversation, discourse markers

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like *y'know*, conversational quotatives, and many others in a similar vein. The contributions of DuBois (1987), Fox and Thompson (1990), Prince (1988), Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974), Schiffrin (1985), and Tannen (1987) among many others, have shown that there is a wealth of unanalyzed linguistic features which can only be investigated via a microanalytic approach to conversational discourse. I would like to add my own contribution to that new wave of linguistic study.

In the following pages, I will describe and offer an analysis of a category of forms that I have labelled GENERAL EXTENDERS. Due to the lack of linguistic treatment of conversation in general, no fine-grained analysis of this set of forms has ever been presented. This original work involves the study of language and will yield insights into the workings of conversation, the primary use of language in humans. More than all that, however, this study represents a simple, well-established, intellectual desire to make sense of a regularly occurring set of forms within a language. In sum, the contribution I hope to make, like many linguists before me, is to describe a regularity in language that has not been described before.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

[1] Examples labelled 'Overstreet:AM' and 'Overstreet:ER' are not part of the data set which is found in the appendix, and described in section 1.4.

[2] On a wide range of features, spoken language has been shown to differ significantly from written language (cf. Biber 1991; Brown and Yule 1983b; Halliday 1989; Horowitz and Samuels 1987; Tannen 1982). The observation that general extenders occur more frequently in spoken contexts is supported by the studies of Ball and Ariel (1978:35) and DuBois (1993:198). It should be emphasized that this study focuses on the use of spoken language (a point which will be discussed in section 1.3); no substantive claims will be made with regard to the use of general extenders in written texts.

[3] These observations are made on the basis of an examination of (1) my corpus of data consisting of informal spoken interaction among familiars, which will be described in detail in section 1.4, and (2) an examination of talk among nonfamiliars in formal spoken contexts, such as: news radio interviews (i.e., NPR's program, *All things considered*), political debates on television (i.e., the Gore versus Perot debate on *Larry King Live, Crossfire)*, political panel discussions (i.e., *This Week with David Brinkley)*, unscripted broadcasts on C-SPAN, courtroom deliberations in the absence of a jury (i.e., from the O.J. Simpson trial), academic lectures, and a dissertation defense transcript (cf. Grimshaw 1994:483-527).

[4] Thanks to Ritsuko Kikusawa for identifying the Japanese forms which correspond to the general extenders in the English translation.

[5] Perhaps the most notable is Chomsky (1957), who set out the generative agenda to describe the internal knowledge state of some ideal speaker as a basis for describing the nature of language.

[6] Both the verbal and nonverbal behavior of the hearer may influence the speaker's message formulation; cf. Goodwin (1981) and Schegloff (1988) for a discussion of the significance of nonverbal cues in conversational interaction.

[7] This relates to Hymes' (1972) notion of 'communicative competence.'

[8] I am a participant in 26 of the telephone conversations; however, I do not produce any of the general extenders in this data set. While the involvement of the analyst as an occasional participant/observer might be considered a disadvantage in some theoretical frameworks (cf. Goodwin 43-45), I believe that this was not the case in the current investigation. My involvement in this capacity, and my familiarity with the situations discussed, allowed me to have a better understanding of how relevant expressions were being used by these participants on the specific occasions recorded.

[9] Based, in part, on the notation system in Atkinson and Heritage (1984:ix-xvi).

[10] Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson are generally credited with applying the ethnomethodological approach specifically to conversation.

[11] Garfinkel's notion of accountable behavior is the source of a concept which is central to CA, namely, that of 'interactional achievement.' According to Zimmerman (1988:409), 'the notion of achievement (or alternatively, accomplishment) ... is used to refer to the outcome of methical accountable work by members of society addressed to some task or tasks.'

[12] A few examples of the elements of this "machinery" which have been described include: the construction and allocation of turns at talk (Sacks, et al. 1974); the procedures for opening and closing conversations (Schegloff 1968, 1979a; Sacks and Schegloff 1973); and the structure of preferred and dispreferred turn types (Davidson 1984; Pomerantz 1975, 1978, 1984; Wooton 1981). For a more comprehensive list see Zimmerman (1988).

[13] It should be emphasized that not all conversation analysts endorse this strict, orthodox position; cf. Bilmes (1985) for a discussion of 'conversationally grounded analyst's interpretations.'

[14] For a review of politeness as a technical term, see Kaspar (1994), and Fraser (1990).

[15] See also Scollon and Scollon (1983), who refer to positive face as a 'solidarity strategy' and negative face as a 'deference strategy.'

[16] Kaspar 1994:3206. This notion is presented in Goffman 1971:138f, where he defines this strategy as 'the diplomatic fiction of the virtual offense, or worst possible reading.'

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I shall review some of the findings of previous studies on general extenders, including the work of: Ball and Ariel (1978), Dines (1980), Aijmer (1985), Jefferson (1990), Ward and Birner (1992), DuBois (1993), Lerner (1994), and Channell (1994). Although general extenders are not the focus of studies by Romaine and Lange (1991), or Macaulay (1991), these works contain brief discussions of general extenders, which will also be covered in this review. It will be helpful to the reader to note that general extenders have been referred to variously in these works as: *tags* (Ball and Ariel 1978; Ward and Birner 1992), *set-marking tags* (Dines 1980), *utterance-final tags* (Aijmer), *generalized list completers* (Jefferson 1990; Lerner 1994), *terminal tags* (Dines 1980, Macaulay 1991), *extension particles* (DuBois 1993), and *vague category identifiers* (Channell 1994).

Rather than presenting a separate summary of each of these works, this literature review will be organized to present a summary of observations which have been made regarding (1) the form of general extenders, (2) their contexts of occurrence, (both linguistic and nonlinguistic), and (3) the function of these expressions. It is worth emphasizing that this review is essentially a presentation of claims from previous studies and that an attempt has been made to include, as excerpts, the original claims of the

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authors involved. Inclusion of these excerpts is not intended to indicate support for, or agreement with, any of the claims being made. In fact, many of these claims will be challenged by the analysis in chapters 3 and 4.

Finally, I will discuss the limitations of these studies, and discuss how the present study will aim to provide a more comprehensive and accurate account of the functions of general extenders in English interactive discourse.

2.2 Form

General extenders are typically defined as a class of clause-final expressions beginning with *and* or *or*, including the Latin expression *etcetera* (which is literally translated *and other things*). Ball and Ariel (1978:36) suggest that *blah blah blah* should also be considered a member of this class.

Aijmer (1985:372) proposes three syntactic rules (A, B, and C below) for the generation of general extenders:

$$\text{A: (and)} \quad \text{all} \quad \begin{Bmatrix} \text{that} \\ \text{this} \end{Bmatrix} \begin{Bmatrix} \text{kind} \\ \text{sort} \end{Bmatrix} \text{of} \begin{Bmatrix} \text{thing} \\ \text{stuff} \end{Bmatrix}$$

$$\text{B: (and)} \begin{Bmatrix} \text{things} \\ \text{stuff} \end{Bmatrix} \begin{Bmatrix} \text{like} \begin{Bmatrix} \text{that} \\ \text{this} \end{Bmatrix} \\ \text{of} \begin{Bmatrix} \text{that} \\ \text{this} \end{Bmatrix} \begin{Bmatrix} \text{kind} \\ \text{sort} \end{Bmatrix} \end{Bmatrix}$$

C: (or) { something / anything } { like / of } { that / this } { that / this } { kind / sort }

Aijmer (1985:373-4) also makes the following observations with regard to collocations:

> *And* cooccurs (typically) with *all* and with combinations with *every*; the Or-tag cooccurs with a *some* or *any* form and occasionally with a *wh* form. Using a logical description we can say that the And-tag contains the universal quantifier, while the Or-tag contains the existential quantifier. Other combinations are ungrammatical.

According to Aijmer, expressions such as **and something* (*and* followed by the existential quantifier), and **or all that* (*or* followed by the universal quantifier) are ungrammatical and cannot be said.[1]

Of course, not all general extenders contain either the existential or the universal quantifier. DuBois (1993:179) identifies four types of 'extension particles' (general extenders): 'those containing a universal quantifier, those containing an existential quantifier, those consisting of just a generic and a comparative, and fixed forms.' What DuBois refers to as 'generics' are forms such as *thing* or *stuff*; 'comparatives' are forms such as *like this*, and *like that* and 'fixed forms' are exemplified by *etcetera*.

With regard to the comparative forms, Channell (1994:131-132) claims that:

> ... test results and data examples both indicate that
> there is no difference in the way that the tags with *like*
> *that* and those without are understood. Similarly, *and*
> *that* is understood the same way as *and things like that.*
> Hence, it is reasonable to see the shorter tags as ellipted
> or shortened versions of the full ones.

This view differs from that of Ball and Ariel (1978:36), who claim
that *like that* is not optionally deleted. According to Ball and Ariel,
the forms *something* and *something like that* are not freely
interchangeable. The example they offer is the following:

    a. Are you crazy or something?
    b. ?? Are you crazy or something like that?

Ball and Ariel (1978), Dines (1980), Aijmer (1985), and
Channell (1994) draw attention to the fact that general extenders
contradict the generalization made by phrase structure rules for
coordination; namely, that only constituents of the same category
can be coordinated. Since general extenders are of the form CONJ +
NP, one might expect that they would be coordinated only with other
NPs. However, this is not the case. Channell (1994:132) makes the
following observations regarding the constituent types with which
general extenders are coordinated:

> ... tags can follow a number of constituent types, the
> most common being noun phrases, verb phrases, and
> embedded sentences. Prepositional phrases can be
> followed by a tag, though much less frequently than a
> noun phrase (NP) or a verb phrase (VP). When a
> prepositional phrase (PP) has a tag, it is often

functioning as an adverbial adjunct. There are very few tags with adverbs and adjectives.

Several authors present examples to demonstrate the coordination of general extenders with other-than-NP constituent types. For instance, Ball and Ariel (1978:37) offer the following example to demonstrate the coordination of *or something* with a verb. The authors ask the reader to consider 'the contrast between (a), in which a verb occurs before the tag, (b), in which an arbitrary NP has been substituted for something, and (c)':

> a. I was just sitting here with John Dean and he tells me you were going to be sued or something. (V or NP)
>
> b. ... * a witness. (V or NP)
>
> c. ... subpoenaed. (V or V)

Ball and Ariel (1978:37-8) go on to suggest that 'a possible way out' of the problem that only constituents of the same category should be coordinated 'is to treat *something* as a proform for major categories.'

A second example of a general extender which is coordinated with an other-than-NP constituent is offered by Aijmer (1985:376). According to Aijmer, the general extender *and all sorts of things* is coordinated with 'the whole of the preceding clause' in this example:

> [ə:] ‖ I think he's ‖ I think he's got (əm) - per‖suaded 'Oscar to go to the STÁTES and all ‖SÒRTS of things

Finally, Dines (1985:27-8) offers the following examples to illustrate that there are 'clear cases where the tags *and stuff like that, and things like that,* and *and that,* refer to a preceding predicate':

(a) "She could always produce her words properly an' stuff like that an' talk properly."

(b) "and she'd often be quoting grandma and things like that."

(c) "When you're going home cooking an' that, you can't be going out visiting."[2]

In fact, it is often difficult to determine exactly which part of the preceding utterance the general extender is coordinated with. Consider the following examples, which are offered by Ball and Ariel (1978:37-8) to 'illustrate some of the scope possibilites of *or something*':[3]

a. They forgot to bring the leftovers, or they didn't have time, or something. (S-scope)[4]

b. Peter Wimsey is married- yes, actually married- to that extraordinary woman who lived with a Bolshevist or something, and murdered him, or something- I forget exactly ... (VP scope)

c. ... they just think, maybe you're kooky or something (VP/AP scope)

d. It turns out she's the daughter or something of the late Benveniste. (NP scope)[5]

Ball and Ariel list two possibilities for the scope of *or something* in *c*. In fact, it seems that there may be two possiblities for the scope of the first instance of *or something* in *b* as well (i.e., it might also be coordinated with the NP *a Bolshevist*).

The above observations raise the following question: Is there any way to determine a general extender's domain of reference in such ambiguous cases? Aijmer (1985:374) suggests that the relationship between the general extender and a preceding element is achieved by prosodic as well as structural means. Channell (1994:137) makes a much stronger claim; namely, that structural ambiguities disappear in speech, where intonation makes it clear which part of the preceding utterance 'is being tagged.' Consider the following example from Channell (1994:139-140):

> But lots of big sort of important numbers that you have to ring and things, I'm sure they're made into a pattern that you can remember them by ...

According to Channell, an examination of this written example reveals that there are 'several possible scopes for the tag,' including:

NP + tag:
[big sort of important numbers   and things]
NP   [that you have to ring]
                                                            S

VP + tag: [have to [ring] and things]
                    VP   S

VP + tag: [ring and things]
VP

However, if one has access to the spoken form, and thus the prosody of this example, it becomes clear that the tag 'applies unambiguously to *ring*':

> But | lots of bîg sort of (.) important nûmbers ‖ that | that you have to rîng and thîngs ‖ and they I'm sure they're mâde into a kind of | pàttern ‖ that you can remèmber them by ‖ 6

It appears that in Channell's analysis, the relationship between the tag *and things*, and the preceding constituent *ring*, is established by the tone group boundary after *numbers* and the placement of a falling tone on *ring*.

2.3 Contexts of occurrence

Two of the existing studies on general extenders (i.e., a study of Australian English by Dines (1980), and a study of Montréal French by DuBois (1993)) are sociolinguistic studies which aim to determine the sociodemographic conditioning of general extenders (i.e., the age, gender, and/or social class of the speakers), as well as environmental constraints, which favor the occurrence of one form over another. Although it is not the focus of his study of Scottish English in Ayr, Macaulay (1991) also includes a brief sociolinguistic account of the occurrence of general extenders in his corpus of data.

All three of these studies are based on what are described as data from informal interviews.

Dines (1980) bases her findings on the occurrence of general extenders in Australian English on two sets of interviews with middle and working class women. According to Dines (1980:13) 'set marking tags' are 'socially diagnostic' in that they occur with higher frequency among the working class. Dines (1980:25) suggests that tags may be stigmatized for middle-class speakers of Australian English because they are 'vague and inexplicit'; she also claims that this is an inaccurate assumption which has diverted interest away from this topic.

Like Dines (1980), in his study of Scottish English, Macaulay (1991:169-170) reports a higher frequency of occurrence among working class speakers. Macaulay's findings are based on the analysis of 12 adult interviews conducted in 1978-1979, including six middle-class, and six lower-class interviews. Of the 361 occurrences of general extenders in his corpus of data, 95% were found to occur in the speech of lower class individuals. Macaulay notes, however, that among the participants was one, lower class male who used general extenders in an 'idiosyncratic' fashion; his speech contained 'approximately 14 tags per thousand words, compared with just over 1 per thousand in the rest of the lower-class interviews.' In fact, of the 361 instances of general extenders, 293, or 85% percent, occurred in the speech of this individual.

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DuBois' (1993) study is based on data from two corpora: the 1971 Sankoff and Cedergren corpus (Sankoff and Sankoff 1973), and the Montréal corpus of 1984 (Thibault and Vincent 1990). DuBois (1993:185) takes gender, age, social class, and the year of interview into account, and determines that:

> ... extension particle use was strongly conditioned by age, with younger speakers using the most and the rate of use per 1000 lines dropping off by 4.4 particles per 10 years of age. Women used 7.5 more particles than men. There was no class difference discernible and no difference between the 1971 and 1984 interviews.

Note that DuBois' (1993) findings with regard to class differ from those of Dines (1980) and Macaulay (1991).[7]

Several of the works on general extenders make what may be characterized as passing, or informal observations about the linguistic contexts in which these expressions occur: (1) Ball and Ariel (1978:35) say that 'it is perhaps only when the expression appears incongruous (as when embedded in a discourse of a more formal style, for example) that speakers are likely to give it any notice,' suggesting that general extenders are more appropriate in informal contexts; (2) DuBois (1993:198) claims that general extenders are more prominent in spoken than written language, and that the 'association of extension particles with the oral mode is a hint to its role in the real-time dynamic of discourse organization compared to the reflective post-hoc editing available in written mode'; and (3) Aijmer (1985:377-8) notes that the 'collocation with

you know indicates the tag and *you know* have a similar function.'
Aijmer does not state what this function is.

2.4 Function

In the earliest studies of general extenders, Ball and Ariel
(1978) and Dines (1980) claim that these expressions have a
common function, and that it is by virtue of this fact that they are
grouped together. Ball and Ariel (1978:36) suggest that the common
function is 'to suggest, without specifying, other conjuncts and
disjuncts similar in some relevant respect to the preceding.'
According to Dines (1980:22), the common function is 'to cue the
listener to interpret the preceding element as an illustrative
example of some more general case.' Dines (1980:25) refers to this
as a 'set-marking' function.

The analysis of general extenders as set-marking tags is
adopted in subsequent studies by Aijmer (1985), Ward and Birner
(1992), DuBois (1993), and Channell (1994). The following are
excerpts from these studies which further describe the set-marking
function of general extenders: (1) Aijmer (1985:374) states that ' ...
if the tag contains *and* and the set is formed by conjunction, the
speaker instructs the listener to pick out all the members of the set
on the basis of the member (or members) which has been produced as
an example ... by selecting the Or-tag the speaker signals to the
hearer to pick out one (some) member of the same set as the
preceding member'; (2) Ward and Birner (1992:209) propose that 'in

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all cases felicitous use of *and everything* requires that such instantiations exist and constitute members of a well-defined (and in principle enumerable) set'; (3) DuBois (1993:181) asserts that general extenders are 'a class of words ... serving as intermediaries between a set of elements and the concept that the speaker has just expressed. Implicit in their use is a presupposition that the listener will be able to decode them on the basis of shared knowledge'; (4) Channell (1994:122) says ' ... the whole of the expression directs the hearer to access a set, of which the given item is a member whose characteristics will enable the hearer to identify the set.'[8]

Note that the general consensus of these works is that speakers use general extenders (in combination with named items) to implicate categories, and that, based on the named items which precede the general extender, hearers are able to 'decode' general extenders to infer the speakers' intended categories.

Channell's (1994) analysis of VAGUE CATEGORY IDENTIFIERS provides the most extensive analysis of general extenders as 'set-marking tags.' In fact, very little discussion of this proposed function is offered in the other studies. A review of Channell's work will be presented in section 2.4.1.

A related, but fundamentally different analysis of general extenders is offered by Jefferson (1990). According to Jefferson, general extenders function as GENERALIZED LIST COMPLETERS. Jefferson's approach differs from the approaches of the authors mentioned

above in that it is based on a loosely defined concept of social norms. A review of Jefferson's work will be presented in section 2.4.2.

While all of the studies of general extenders propose that these expressions have a common function, many of them note that the individual forms are not interchangeable within a given context (e.g., Ball and Ariel 1978, Ward and Birner 1992, DuBois 1993). Ward and Birner (1992:207) offer the following examples in support of this claim:

a. Ms. Andrus said the check was in surprisingly good condition. "It had the stub on it **and everything**," she said. (Associated Press Newswire, 1988)

b. * Ms. Andrus said the check was in surprisingly good condition. "It had the stub on it **and stuff like that**," she said.

_____

a. Roger Boisjoly wrote letters, and some of them used pretty strong language like "catastrophic results" **and stuff like that**, and yes, I was aware of all those letters. (transcripts from the Presidential Commision on Space Shuttle Challenger accident, 3/19/86)

b. * Roger Boisjoly wrote letters, and some of them used pretty strong language like "catastrophic results" **and everything**, and yes, I was aware of all those letters.[9]

Indeed, several authors suggest that there are functions which are specific to particular forms. For example, Aijmer (1985) and Ward

and Birner (1992) claim that *and everything* serves to highlight part of an utterance; Ball and Ariel (1978) and Channell (1994) suggest that *or something* may be used as a hedge. In sections 2.4.3-2.4.5, I will review some of the claims which have been made regarding functions which are specific to particular forms.

2.4.1 Category implication

As noted above, Channell (1994) characterizes general extenders as VAGUE CATEGORY IDENTIFERS, and offers the most extensive analysis of this proposed function. Channell argues for the recognition of three types of categories to which a general extender can refer: COMMON, COVERT, and AD HOC (Channell 1994:123). According to Channell, common categories are 'named,' such as the categories *bird* or *furniture*, whereas covert and ad hoc categories are not. Channell takes the term *covert* from Cruse (1986:148), and characterizes them as 'common categories which do not have a name. That is to say, those where lexical semantics identifies a lexical gap' (Channell 1994:122). She offers an example from Cruse (1986:148): 'the class of moveable items one buys when moving into a new house.' The term *ad hoc* comes from Barsalou (1983). Ad hoc categories are described as those which 'come into existence for a person according to the demands of the moment' and are 'not lodged in memory the way common categories are.' As examples of ad hoc categories, Channell (1994:122) offers 'things that Joanna likes to do to relax' and 'ways to get back at the neighbors for the noise they make.'

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Channell's analysis of general extenders as category implicative expressions is based on 'tests carried out with native speakers of English' in order to 'back up' her 'intuitive analysis' that these expressions 'direct the hearer to access a set, of which the given item is a member whose characteristics will enable the listener to identify the set.' Her working hypothesis is that 'successful' category identification 'necessitates giving a prototypical example of an intended category' (Channell 1994:122-4). Channell (1994:124) describes her testing method as follows:

> A paper and pencil test was used to present 30 sentences containing 31 examples of tags (one item contained two different ones). These consisted of 15 examples taken from naturally-occurring conversations, and 15 constructed examples using items from Rosch's work on prototypicality within categories ... There were 39 respondents ... They were asked to list two or more items which they judged the speaker of each example "could reasonably have been thinking of when he or she said the underlined (= the italicized) part of the sentence." The respondents did not see any example answers and so were free to interpret the test as they chose. I was anxious to avoid any suggestion as to the kind of responses I expected.

Note Channell's direction to the respondents that they should 'list two or more items ... ' Built into this research method is the assumption that speakers use general extenders to implicate additional or alternate instances. This seems to conflict with Channell's expressed desire to 'avoid any suggestion as to the kind of responses' she expected. In fact, in her interpretation of the test

results, Channell (1994:125) classifies some of the responses as 'non-compliant'; in these cases, respondents 'did other things than what they were asked, such as describing the situation where somebody would say the stimulus, or describing the speaker's attitude.'

A careful consideration of this study reveals that there are many discrepancies between the methodological approach Channell advocates and her actual analytic approach. In the beginning of her book, Channell (1994:38-9) provides a rather lengthy discussion of methodology in which she emphasizes the importance of using what may be characterized as a conversation-analytic approach. Part of this discussion is presented below:

> My fundamental assumption is that the study of meaning should be an empirical study. It must involve accounting for real occurrences of talk or writing, rather than accounting for invented decontextualized sentences. ... An example sentence on a page, or a recording of an utterance, do not themselves provide information about their meanings. This indicates that meanings investigated by linguists are meanings which they have ascribed to an utterance or sentence by virtue of their knowledge of the language. Such use of intuitions does not appear very empirically valid. ... Conversation data, used in the way I am suggesting, should lead to better accounts of meaning than those which arise from accounting for invented data. ... Naturally, it is acknowledged that this type of *post hoc* analysis has problems. ... I would argue, however, that *post hoc* analysis of meanings, if it is carried out with rigorous attention to seeking justification within the structure of the conversation, is currently the only reasonable way to study meaning. In addition, using real data has certain other advantages: 1. All utterances are attested as

having been produced in a non-experimental linguistic situation ... 2. Examples drawn from real data can be seen in their real linguistic context. This avoids the uncontrolled recontextualization by the reader which is necessary with decontextualized examples and can drastically change interpretation of them. It also greatly reduces the opportunity for the analyst to introspectively invent contextual or situational details to support her argument.

In her study of general extenders as vague category identifiers, Channell sets out to BACK UP HER INTUITION as to how these expressions function, rather than setting out to DISCOVER how they function; she uses tests consisting (in part) of constructed examples, rather than examining only naturally-occurring data; the sentences she uses are isolated from their contexts of occurrence. In addition, Channell relies on informants' accounts of how they are using language. In a review of Channell's (1994) book, Ediger (1995:128) expresses some misgivings about the reliability of these informant responses:

I believe a word of caution is in order when she relies on her informants' generalizations about how vague language is used. For example, her informants suggest vague tags would not be used in writing (p.183). Since data from Channell and others (Ediger 1993) provide clear evidence to the contrary, such reported judgements should be avoided unless supported by other evidence.

In chapter three, I will investigate Channell's claim that speakers use general extenders (in combination with named exemplars) to implicate categories. Special consideration will be given to Channell's suggestion that 'successful' category

identification 'necessitates giving a prototypical example of an intended category.' I will challenge Channell's implicit assumptions that: (a) speakers have a category in mind when using a general extender; (b) a speaker's mention of a prototypical example will enable the hearer to infer the same set the speaker has in mind; and (c) hearers interpret general extenders as an instruction to access a category exemplified by the named exemplar(s). I will also consider Channell's claim that we need to recognize three types of categories to which a general extender can refer.

2.4.2   List construction

Jefferson's (1990) study of general extenders begins with the observation that 'many lists occur as three-part units.' Examples offered by Jefferson (1990:63-4) include:

> Sidney: While you've been talking tuh me, I mended,
> two nightshirts, a pillowcase? enna pair'v pants.

> Maybelle: I think if you exercise it an' work at it'n
> studied it chu do become clairvoyant.

According to Jefferson (1990:64), 'this three-partedness shows up in its barest form in the listlike "triple singles" by which people indicate muchness.' the following examples are offered as illustration:

Alice: "Well we're k-callin ar good friend Alice again and blah blah blah."

Maggie: Working working working you know how I do,

As further evidence to support her claim that lists typically occur in the form of three-part structures, Jefferson (1990:65) notes that three-partedness 'also shows up in elaborated forms involving three-part units as components of larger three-part units.' Jefferson provides the next example, separating the units with brackets:

Bitsey: Gordy is there anything fer dinner,
Gordy: Yeh. [Porkchops mashed p'tatuh'n corn] 'n [everything's cooked.] [Awl y'haftuh do is heat it up.]

Having established that 'three-partedness is an empirically observable, recurrent phenomenon which shows up in various forms,' Jefferson then moves to a second observation, namely, that 'three-partedness appears to have "programmatic relevance" for the construction of lists.' She elaborates on this observation as follows:

Two recurrent phenomena indicate the programmatic relevance of three-partedness for list construction. The first is: three-part lists can be built of less than three items. The second is: Three-partedness can be found to constitute a problem for list-makers, for which at least one methodic solution is available and deployed. (Jefferson 1990:66-7)

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With regard to the first phenomenon mentioned above, Jefferson notes that 'three-part lists are recurrently constructed by occupying a third slot with a GENERALIZED LIST COMPLETER' (i.e., general extender), as in the examples below:

> Sy: Take up [m:Metrecal er, Carnation Slender er something like that.]

> Dan: Y:know, the 'bility for a person to [pass for twenny one, and buy booze, an' that sort of thing,]

The second phenomenon referred to above is supported by these examples:

> Mr. B: It's not in the same league with [adultery, and murder, and - and - thievery,] but ...

> Jay: Samuel jus' takes things [casually en naturally en, - all that,]

Mr.B's utterance is said to demonstrate a successful search for a third item, whereas in the case of Jay's utterance, the search is terminated, and the generalized list completer is employed as a 'methodic solution to the problem of three-partedness' (Jefferson 1990:67).

According to Jefferson (1990:68), generalized list completers are not always produced as solutions to the problem of three-partedness; they may also be employed to mark a list as 'relevantly incomplete.' In other words, even if a third item were named, the list would not be exhaustively given. On the other hand, three-item

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lists are 'relatively complete'; the named items 'exhaust the array of nameables for the purposes to which this particular listing is being put.' Jefferson does not elaborate on what is meant by the terms 'relevantly incomplete' and 'relatively complete.'

Jefferson (1990:73) suggests that, given that hearers routinely monitor the projected completion of a speaker's utterance in order to determine the point at which it will be his or her turn to speak (Sacks, *et al.* 1974), we might expect a hearer to attempt to take the floor after the third list item is given. In this way, 'the relevance of three-part list construction can be found to serve as a sequential resource.'

In contrast to other studies of general extenders, Jefferson (1990:69) considers the individual forms of general extenders to be largely interchangeable:

> Such objects belong to a class which Sacks refers to as "freely-occurring" units of talk. These are units which are not constrained by, for example, specifics of reference, and which are selected from among multiple candidates.

According to Jefferson (1990:71), speakers often select a given expression by 'searching through surrounding talk ... for resources out of which to construct that requisite third member'; this is demonstrated by examples where the general extender is said to be 'accoustically [sic] consonant' with the sounds of previous list items. Consider the following:

> Ken: I go in there and [I uh put all the bottles in back and
> I uh give people change, and junk like this.]

With regard to this example, Jefferson (1990:70) notes that 'the generalized list completer "and junk like this" is initiated with a [jih] particle which is accoustically consonant with the sound of the second list item ("change"——>"junk").'[10]

Jefferson (1990:71) also draws attention to what she calls 'punlike relationships' which are exhibited in the use of general extenders:

> Punlike relationships also show up. For example, in the following fragment, a list occurs in the course of a discussion of a Thanksgiving turkey. The generalized list completer "and stuff" not only invokes an activity one does to the turkey, but is in fact one among several other items which were bought on this occasion; i.e., "stuffing" would constitute an apparently-but-not-actually array-exhausting third list item, while "and stuff" proposes the list to be "relevantly incomplete."
>
> Emma: I brought [th'pie en the whip cream en stuff,] en
> they were gonna deliver the turkey.

Although the logic of this is unclear to me, Jefferson claims that the presence of acoustic consonance and punlike relationships attest to the fact that speakers in natural conversation 'orient to' the 'programmatic relevance of three-partedness.' Jefferson clarifies the expression 'programmatic relevance' with the explanation that 'lists not only can and do occur in three parts, but *should* so occur' (Jefferson 1990:66-67). The term 'programmatic

relevance' seems to imply that three-partedness is relevant in principle to the participants, regardless of context (cf. Sacks (1992) for a discussion of the term *programmatic relevance*). In using the expression 'orient to' it appears that Jefferson is claiming that listeners are sensitive to the presence or absence of three part lists, rather than that these structures are predominant (cf. Bilmes 1988a).

Despite her attempt to clarify the meaning of 'programmatic relevance,' it is unclear exactly what kind of claim Jefferson is making; many questions are left unanswered. For example: What are the consequences of saying that participants orient to three-partedness? Does it mean that one-parted or two-parted structures are deviant, or have special implications due to their non-normative form? What would be the result(s) if one failed to 'solve' this 'problem of three-partedness'? Is this a universal, or language-specific claim? Because Jefferson is a conversation analyst whose work typically investigates patterns found in American English, I interpret her claim to be a language-specific (or culture-specific) one, which is based on a concept of social norms.[11]

Lerner (1994:22) adopts Jefferson's analysis of general extenders as generalized list completers, and addresses some of these unanswered questions:

> Why a three-part structure? I would like to suggest a systematic basis for this empirical regularity. List construction, as a situated social achievement in conversation, is shaped by the social coordination systems in conversation that organize conversational

interaction. ... Three-part list construction seems to contain features that make it consistent with the operation of turn taking and the minimization preference. Minimization can be thought of roughly as requiring list structure to be kept as short as possible while still performing the interactional work that requires listing ... I am not saying here that lists cannot be shorter than three (or longer) but that it is, in part, in the projection of a third part (e.g., in the design of the second part) that the speaker demonstrates that a list is under way.

Lerner is primarily interested in providing support for Jefferson's claim that list completion can constitute utterance completion.

In chapter three, I will give closer consideration to the claim that general extenders function as generalized list completers, and examine my corpus of naturally occurring, interactional data in an effort to determine whether a primary function of general extenders may be to address the 'programmatic relevance of three-partedness.' It is worth emphasizing that the studies of Jefferson (1990) and Lerner (1994) are concerned with the larger phenonmenon of three-partedness, and that in these studies, general extenders are viewed as just one possible solution this 'problem.' Whether or not conversational participants orient to a general 'programmatic relevance' of three-partedness is clearly beyond the scope of this study.

2.4.3 Emphasis

Two of the studies on general extenders, namely, those by Aijmer (1985), and Ward and Birner (1992), propose that certain

forms are used to emphasize or highlight part of the utterance which precedes the general extender.

Aijmer's study is based on an examination of a portion of the London-Lund Corpus of Spoken English (which is published as Svartvik and Quirk, 1980). Aijmer examined 34 of the texts in this corpus, consisting of approximately 5,000 words each. According to Aijmer (1985:382) the tag '*and everything* is functionally distinct from other And-tags.' Aijmer determines that the main function of *and everything* is to highlight the main point of an utterance, and mark it as [+remarkable]. In such cases, *everything* is stressed or bears the nucleus. The following are examples offered by Aijmer (1985:383):

((Topic: the speaker's Great-uncle))
tottering ABŎUT the 'place about ‖ ĔIGHTY ‖ all 'hobbeldy
<<CRĂCK>> and ĔVERYTHING

but I ‖ MEAN the ‖ women- the ‖ women wear VÈILS and
'everything ‖ DŎN'T they

In regard to the first example, Aijmer says 'one does not usually totter about at the age of eighty. This fact may therefore be difficult to believe and needs to be specially emphasized.' A similar interpretation is given to the general extender in the second example: 'Women do not usually wear veils. The fact that they do in this case is therefore marked as special or remarkable by means of the tag.' According to Aijmer (1985:384), *and all* serves the same function as *and everything*, but its occurrence is less frequent.

Aijmer also asserts that '*or anything* has a similar function to *and everything*, but occurs in negative environments only.' The example she offers is:

⏐ so she quite 'put him ȮFF and ⏐ now he NÈVER rings 'up or ÁNYTHING.

Ward and Birner's (1992) analysis focuses almost exclusively on the tag *and everything*. With regard to their data, Ward and Birner say only that they examined 'over 600 naturally-occurring tokens' of this particular form. The authors claim that *and everything* is different from the other forms; while it may be used to implicate additional members of an inferrable set in some cases, in other instances, it functions to indicate that a previously mentioned item represents a high value on some inferrable scale.

Using Pierrehumbert's system of pitch accent, Ward and Birner (1992:212) assert that the second function is distinguished by a $L+H^*$ pitch accent on the tag.[12] For example, given an expression such as

They cleaned it up that night. They steam-cleaned it and everything!

where *it* refers to a carpet, *and everything* is not an arbitrary member of a set of cleaning techniques; rather, it may indicate a high value on the scale such as 'degrees of thoroughness.'

An interesting claim made by Ward and Birner (1992:208-9) is that although it doesn't have to literally mean everything, *and*

everything does have to mean at least one member of the inferrable set to be true. Thus, given the utterance:

They served beer and everything at the party,

at least one other thing besides beer must have been served in order for this statement to be true.

Special attention will be given to the forms *and everything* and *or anything* in chapter four (section 4.3.1).

2.4.4 Hedges on the Maxim of Quality

Several of the existing studies of general extenders suggest that these expressions may function to modify or qualify a preceding element, or mark it as an approximation (cf. Ball and Ariel 1978:38, Dines 1980:19, Aijmer 384-5). However, little discussion is provided of this proposed function, and the examples which are given to illustrate this are primarily decontextualized fragments and constructed examples.

In their study of *or something*, Ball and Ariel (1978:38) suggest that, 'in using natural language *or*, the speaker expresses non-commitment to the truth of the individual disjuncts,' and that, it appears that, 'in a majority of cases in the data, the tags occur embedded in a clause that is already marked for non-commitment 'under *maybe*, in the antecedent of a conditional, under *think*, *guess*, etc., with modals, in interrogatives.'

Aijmer (1985:385) notes that the use of *or something (like that)* makes it possible to say something one isn't sure of and to 'be wrong about details, to use words idiosyncratically or metaphorically.' The first example below is given to illustrate this usage of *or something* to mark what precedes the general extender as an approximation; the second is offered to illustrate the usage of *or something* to indicate that the preceding utterance is not to be taken verbatim:

from an -- || aunt who'd 'gone to AMĚRICA or 'something

Royal 'Warwickshire foot and MÓUTH or 'something

With regard to the second example, Aijmer (1985:385) says 'By using the formulating "foot and mouth" (literally the name of disease affecting cattle) followed by *or something* the speaker gives a hint of what he really means at the same time as he makes a joke.'

In contrast to the findings of these authors, DuBois (1993:182) contends that the use of tags 'does not indicate that the sentence upon which it depends is incomplete or imprecise'; instead, it 'signals the end of a sentence.'

In chapter four, I will investigate the claim that certain general extenders (specifically, those beginning with *or*) may be used to express lack of commitment to the content of an utterance, or to suggest that the utterance should not be taken literally; I will analyze such uses of general extenders as hedges on the Gricean maxim of Quality.

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2.4.5 Hedges addressed to politeness strategies

Several of the existing studies of general extenders suggest that these expressions might serve to mitigate the force of an utterance (e.g., Ball and Ariel 1978:41, Aijmer 1985:384, Channell 1994:121); however, they offer little analysis of this proposed function. Aijmer 's (1985:384) discussion of this function is presented below:

> In questions *or something* functions as a "softener" mitigating the force of the speech act. If a speaker signals that the listener can choose an alternative to the one proposed, he imposes his communicative intention on the listener with less force ...

This discussion is supported by one example:

> and [?ə] you're an LSE product with <<[ə:]>> STATÌSTICS or 'something ÁRE you

As noted in section 2.4.1, Channell's (1994) analysis of general extenders considers these expressions primarily as 'vague category identifiers.' However, in her preliminary discussion, the author makes a passing observation that in certain cases, a general extender may function to mitigate the force of a request. Channell (1994:120-1) introduces the following example to illustrate that general extenders are not simply 'empty fillers' which are used to give the speaker and hearer additional time for processing; rather, they affect the meaning of utterances:

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[A is going to the shops. B asks A to buy him some bread.
Just as she leaves:]
A: So you'd like some bread?
B: Or something. Anything edible will do

In her analysis of this example, Channell (1994:121) suggests B 'is mitigating the force of his request, because he hardly knows A and does not feel sure he should request directly.' According to Channell, B is attempting to avoid 'threatening face' (in the sense of Brown and Levinson 1987).

In chapter four, I will investigate the proposal that general extenders may function as hedges addressed to politeness strategies. In my analysis, I will call on Brown and Levinson's (1987) theory of politeness.

2.4.6 The use of *like*

The use of *like* in American English has been the focus of numerous studies in recent years. Since many general extenders contain the phrase *like this/that* it would be helpful to review its various functions. Some of the topics of these studies include: the uses of *like* as a marker of new information or focus (Underhill 1980); the frequency of its usage among males and females of various ages (Blyth, *et al.* 1990); the grammaticalization of *like* to mark reported speech and thought (Romaine and Lange 1991); and an exploration of the folk linguistics of *like* (Kuiper 1994).

The most comprehensive account of the syntactic and pragmatic functions of *like* is presented in Romaine and Lange (1991:244-248). According to these authors, *like* can serve as: (1) an approximation, meaning 'having the qualities of'; e.g., *He brought along things for the picnic, food, drinks, and such-LIKE.* (2) a focussing particle; e.g., *And there were LIKE people blocking, you know?* Sometimes this focussing of like has the meaning 'for example': e.g., *He bought several beautiful presents LIKE a magnificent paperweight and jewelry.* (3) a quotative, used to evoke examples of 'what might have been said/thought or might be said/thought either on a particular or repeated occasions in the past or hypothetical instances in the future' ... or to mark the reported speech as 'one of a number of possible things similar in form and content which could have been intended.'; e.g., *When he was first a month old and stuff I used to want to sit there and just hold him and be around him. But now I'm like "Go in the other room."*

An interesting suggestion made by Romaine and Lange (1991:247) is that 'it seems plausible, that when *like* appears on its own, it is a condensed form of a phrase such as *everything like that, things like that, the like of that,* and so on.' Indeed, as my analysis of general extenders will show, many of these expressions (i.e., those which may include the phrase *like this/ that*) may function as approximating expressions, focussing expressions (i.e., intensifiers), to mark named items as examples, or to mark reported speech as one

of a number of possible things similar in form and content which could have been said.

While the function of many general extenders may be tied to the form *like*, there is a crucial difference between *like* (which occurs before named items), and general extenders (which occur after such items); namely, that general extenders contain *and* or *or*, and are often used to indicate additional or alternate instances.

2.5 Key issues for the current investigation

The existing studies of general extenders do not appear to form a consistent body of work. This impression may be attributed to the fact that they were conducted in isolation and focus on very different aspects of the phenomenon. Where the studies do overlap, the findings presented are often contradictory. These contradictory findings may be attributed, at least in part, to the fact that: (1) the analyses are based primarily on decontextualized examples; (2) sentences and sentence fragments are typically used as the unit of analysis; (3) constructed examples are used; and, (4) in some cases, the research was conducted to confirm the analysts' hypotheses about how a particular general extender is used, rather than to discover how it is actually used in a natural context.

As I hope to show, the function performed by a general extender on a given occasion is likely to be strongly determined by the speaker-hearer context of occurrence, as well as the type of utterance (e.g., invitation, offer, suggestion, assertion). It is

therefore not surprising that studies which take decontextualized sentences as the unit of analysis will tend to misinterpret and misrepresent the functions of these expressions.

In my reading of the previous studies, a number of valuable observations seem to be included in the discussion only as minor points in passing, which are given little consideration. Among these insights (which are considered relevant to the present investigation) are the following: (1) very few tags (i.e., general extenders) refer to 'traditional conceptual categories which are lexicalized by language: for example, the set of fruits, vegetables ... '; instead, most tags are more 'ephemeral.' (DuBois 1993:182); (2) the notion of *like* is a fuzzy concept, and 'the question of what things are like X can only be answered if it is known what property of X is relevant to the comparison' (Ball and Ariel 1978:39); (3) 'The employment of implicit devices [i.e., general extenders] ... is founded on the assumption of rapport.' (Dines 1980:30); and (4) the 'collocation with *you know* indicates the tag and *you know* have a similar function' (Aijmer 1985:377-8). These observations will receive closer consideration in my analysis of general extenders in chapters three and four. These and other relevant insights from previous studies will be explored in the course of chapters 3 and 4.

The questions and issues which have been noted in this survey of previous work can be roughly divided into two major groupings.

I will use Halliday's (1970) distinction between the ideational and interpersonal functions of language in order to provide general labels for those two areas.

Under the heading of ideational will be an investigation of the proposal that general extenders implicate categories. This will involve an in-depth consideration of category types and the conceptual organization of categories, including prototype analysis. The alternative view that general extenders function as list completers will also be explored, focussing on assumptions tied to the role of social norms and expectations, particularly with regard to list construction. These areas will be explored in detail in chapter 3.

Under the heading of interpersonal will be an exploration of the role of general extenders as pragmatic expressions. This will involve an analysis of how participants indicate shared knowledge and experience, and mark attitude toward the message and/or other participants, with a focus on aspects of cooperation, face, rapport, and intersubjectivity. These areas will be explored in detail in chapter 4.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

[1] No forms of the type considered ungrammatical by Aijmer occur in my data. I shall make no attempt to analyze what speakers are not observed to say, nor pursue issues involving what cannot be said.

[2] It has been suggested to me (via personal communication with Stanley Starosta, 1995) that one way to handle this would be to propose a [+PRD] predicate feature for the NP portion of the general extender. cf. Radford's (1988:155) analysis of the coordination of nonidentical constituents in the sentence *Mary was tired and in a filthy mood.* Radford cites Sag, *et al.* (1985) as proposing a [+PRD] predicate feature, and allowing two predicates to be conjoined even if they are not categorically identical.

[3] The term 'scope' is used rather loosely here by Ball and Ariel; however, the point being made is fairly transparent and does not depend on terminology.

[4] It should be noted that an embedded S is frequently analyzed under an NP node, with reported speech as a well-known case (e.g., Bicky said "It's syntax. Don't think about it, just do it," or something like that).

[5] Note that by placing the general extender directly after the constituent with which it is coordinated, rather than at the end of the utterance, the speaker limits the range of its interpretation.

[6] Channell (1994:xx) identifies the following conventions for the transcription of intonation: | represents the onset of a tone unit; ‖ represents the end of a tone unit; ' represents a stressed syllable; " represents a syllable with heavy stress; / represents a rise; \ represents a fall; ∧ represents a rise-fall; ∨ represents a fall-rise; ↑↓ represents a sudden pitch change for the beginning of the next segment; and (.) represents an untimed pause.

[7] It should be noted that an analysis of the sociodemographic conditioning of general extenders lies beyond the scope of the present study.

8 In their analyses of general extenders, several of these authors use the term *set* interchangeably with the term *category*. There are two possible interpretations for the term *set*, and hence two possible ways in which the term *category* is being used. The two interpretations for the term set may be attributed to two theories: classical set theory, and fuzzy set theory. In classical set theory, a set consists of a number of elements or members which may have no connection whatsoever, other than finding themselves in the same grouping (Allwood, *et al.* 1977:3). However, the elements (x_1, x_2, x_n) necessarily stand in a formally defined relationship (i.e., entailment) to the set-defining label (X). In this interpretation, everything is either a member (with a membership value of 1) or a nonmember (with a membership value of 0); (2) In fuzzy set theory, additional values between 0 and 1 are assigned to members to indicate degree of membership. This theory was proposed by Zadeh (1965) to extend the classical theory of sets to treat categories with gradations of membership, such as *tall men*, and *rich people*.

9 Based on the observation that individual forms are not interchangeable, Ward and Birner (1992:207) question Dines' (1980) treatment of general extenders as 'sociolinguistically conditioned realizations of a single underlying discourse function.' However, DuBois (1993:194) justifies the presentation of a 'statistical analysis of the complementarity of their distribution using variable rule analysis' based on the fact that they occupy 'the same position in discourse and have much in common functionally.'

10 It is unclear what Jefferson is referring to as a '[jih] particle.'

11 The notion of three-partedness may be based on the Western European, Christian concept of the Trinity (i.e., Father, Son, and Holy Ghost). See Scollon and Scollon (1981:33) for a discussion of three-partedness in Western narratives.

12 Pierrehumbert's (1980) system identifies six types of pitch accent in English: High, Low, and four combinations of these: L*+ H, L + H*, H*+ L, and H +L*.

CHAPTER 3
IDEATIONAL FUNCTION:
CATEGORY IMPLICATION AND LIST CONSTRUCTION

3.1 Introduction

Categorization plays a crucial role in human cognition. As Bruner, *et al.* (1956:12) note, categorization is the means by which we identify objects in the world, reduce the complexity of the environment, and reduce the necessity of constant learning; it is the means by which we divide the world into manageable chunks. In human interaction, categorization allows for economy of expression; rather than naming individual members of a category, a speaker may refer to them collectively.

In this chapter, I shall investigate the claim that speakers use general extenders (in combination with named exemplars) to implicate categories, so that hearers may infer additional or alternate members of the implicated categories. In section 3.2, a preliminary discussion will be presented to elucidate aspects of theories of categorization which will be relevant to the study at hand. It should be emphasized that the subject of categorization is a complex one, and there has been much written on this topic; this discussion is not intended to be a comprehensive account of theories of categorization, or a critical evaluation of such theories.

In section 3.3, I shall offer examples from naturally-occurring conversation which may be considered explicit evidence that speakers treat general extenders as category implicative

expressions. I will then go on to explore: the types of categories implicated by general extenders; how contextual factors may constrain the interpretation of these expressions; the types of entities with which general extenders are coordinated; and some problems with the prototype-style analysis of general extenders. In the course of this discussion, I will challenge Channell's implicit assumptions that: (a) speakers have a category in mind when using a general extender; (b) a speaker's mention of a prototypical example will enable the hearer to infer the same set the speaker has in mind; and (c) hearers interpret general extenders as an instruction to 'access' a category exemplified by the named exemplar(s).

Next, the discussion will turn to a consideration of general extenders as 'generalized list completers' (cf. Jefferson 1990). In this section, I will examine my corpus of naturally occurring, interactional data in an effort to determine whether a primary function of general extenders is to address the 'programmatic relevance of three-partedness.'

3.2 Categories

As noted in chapter 2, general extenders have been typically analyzed as category implicative expressions (cf. Ball and Ariel 1978; Dines 1980; Aijmer 1985; DuBois 1993; and Channell 1994). In previous research, the standard assumption has been that general extenders combine with a named exemplar' whose characteristics will enable the hearer to identify the set' (Channell 1994:122).

In proposing that general extenders function in this way, it would seem necessary to provide a definition of *category*. However, the only definition of *category* in the previous literature on general extenders is found in the study by Channell (1994:122), who cites the following:

> To categorize is to treat a set of things as somehow equivalent: to put them in the same pile, or call them by the same name, or respond to them in the same way. (Neisser 1987:1)

It appears from this definition that Channell is working with what may be termed a CONTEMPORARY notion of category, which considers categories to have neither clear boundaries, nor necessary and sufficient conditions for membership. This contrasts with what has been called the CLASSICAL notion of category, which considers categories to have clear boundaries, and necessary and sufficient conditions for membership (cf. Neisser 1987:viii; Lakoff 1987b:6).[1]

The contemporary notion of category may be attributed, at least in part, to the revolutionary work of Eleanor Rosch (including Rosch and Mervis 1975; Rosch, *et al.* 1976; Rosch 1977; Rosch 1978), who claimed that 'Most, if not all categories do not have clear-cut boundaries' (Rosch 1978:35), and that the classification of an object is not simply determined by a certain set of defining features.[2] In fact, according to this view, there is no single feature which every member of a category must possess. Through a series of tests, Rosch showed that categories have a 'graded structure': at the center

of each category is a 'prototype,' which exhibits the highest concentration of characteristic properties; toward the undefined edges of the category, members exhibit the fewest characteristic properties, and may barely count as members. For instance, Rosch's studies demonstrated that the prototypical, or 'best' example of a chair is the four-legged, straightbacked variety, the kind that is often found in dining rooms. Modern, single-pedestal chairs are less typical, and certain varieties, such as the beanbag, hardly count as chairs at all. This so-called 'graded structure' is now widely believed to characterize most, if not all, categories (cf. Neisser 1987:3).[3]

The 'prototype theory' view of categorization may be represented by the following illustration. In Figure 1, *a, b, c,* and *d* represent characteristic properties; a member possessing all four would be found in the shaded area, and would be a prototype (Givón 1984:14):

Prototype view of categorization

Figure 1

Among theories of categorization, Rosch's prototype theory represents what Givón calls a 'hybrid solution' between two extremist views. On the one hand, there is the 'classical,' or what he calls the 'Platonic' view, in which categories are considered to be:

> ... discrete, absolute and pristine, be they God-given, as Plato or Descartes would have it; neuro-genetically 'wired-in' as Chomsky (1966,1968) or Bickerton (1981) would have it; representing stable features of The Real World as Russell (1905,1919), Carnap (1947,1959) and other positivists would have it; or made out of atomic units of perception as the classical empiricists would have it. (Givón 1984:12-13)

Because it assumes that human categories correlate with The Real World, the classical theory of categorization may be viewed as a form of 'naïve realism.' In this view, category membership is determined by necessary and sufficient conditions, or the possession of criterial properties. This is illustrated in Figure 2, where *a* represents a criterial property, *b* is a member possessing that property, and *c* is a nonmember, which does not (Givón 1984:13):

Classical view of categorization

Figure 2

At the other extreme is a view best represented by Wittgenstein, who attempted 'to make the idea of universals, essences, ingredients, and properties as problematic as possible' (Bloor 1983:30). In addition to asserting that concepts are fuzzy-edged, or 'uncircumscribed,' Wittgenstein (1953:I,70) argues that, rather than finding a property common to all members of a category in virtue of which we group them together, an examination of our concepts will reveal 'a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail' (Wittgenstein 1953:I,66). The relationship between members of a category, as described by Wittgenstein, is represented by Figure 3:

Wittgensteinian view of categorization

Figure 3

In this view, a member *a* may share properties with *b, b* may share properties with *c,* and *c* may share properties with *d;* however, it may be the case that *a* and *d* do not share any common properties at

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all. This relationship is what Wittgenstein called one of 'family resemblances' (cf. Givón 1984:13, Bloor 1983:29-33).[4]

According to Givón (1984:14), what makes the 'hybrid solution,' also known as 'prototype theory,' a compromise position is: (1) in accordance with the 'Platonic' or 'classical' view, it provides 'empirically-verifiable postulates concerning the *clustering* of the members of natural— biological, cognitive, behavioral— categories along the categorial space, with a certain distance from the categorial mean, or prototype'; and (2) like the Wittgensteinian view, it allows for non-discrete category boundaries, and concedes that categories are rarely, if ever, defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.[5]

It follows that, if categories have neither clear boundaries nor necessary and sufficient conditions, it would be impossible to capture the entire class of items which would potentially be found in a given category. The inability to provide a semantic, or decompositional account of the members' properties does not mean, of course, that there are no restrictions on the items which might be included in a given category. As Sacks (1992, vol.1:246) points out: 'By etcetera we mean that there are others, but not ANY others' (emphasis added). Indeed, as the following discussion will show, the range of items which might be included in a category are constrained by contextual factors and background knowledge (see section 3.3.3).

These considerations are also recognized by Wittgenstein, who speaks of such factors as comprising 'language games' (Bloor 1983:29-33).

The subject of categorization is a complex one, and researchers from diverse areas such as linguistics, psychology, philosophy, and anthropology have not resolved all of their differences on this issue. However, as Neisser puts it, 'something close to a consensus appears to be emerging' (Neisser 1987:vii). It seems that many experts on categorization now accept some version of the 'prototype view,' although typicality ratings are not seen to be as stable as once was believed (Barsalou 1987:141-74; Lakoff 1987a:101-40). This is because the theories, or concepts, which are believed to determine our categories, in large part, if not exclusively, are themselves dynamic (Neisser 1987:41; and cf. Johnson-Laird 1987). In fact, a current matter of some debate in the study of concepts and categorization is the question of whether categorization is purely intellectual, and based on mental models or beliefs about the world (cf. Lakoff 1987a:101-140), or whether it also has a perceptual, or 'ecological' basis (cf. Neisser 1987:11-24; Medin and Wattenmaker 1987:25-62; Brooks 1987:175-200). This issue may never be resolved, since, as Neisser (1987:5) has suggested, 'a complete understanding of concepts and categories may be impossible without a complete understanding of the world itself'; and, as Kant held, the world-in-itself is inaccessible.

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in the author's university library.

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Figure 4

As previously noted, it lies beyond the scope of this work to give a comprehensive account of theories of categorization, or to present a critical evaluation of such theories. This preliminary discussion is presented in an effort to elucidate aspects of theories of categorization which will be relevant to the study at hand: the investigation of general extenders as category implicative expressions. For the purpose of this study, I believe it is reasonable to assume that, where general extenders are used as category implicative expressions, they implicate categories with loosely defined boundaries, and that, in employing or processing the meaning of general extenders, participants in everyday conversations are not concerned with necessary and sufficient conditions.

3.3 Category implication

Curtis

Figure 4

3.3.1 Perspicuous cases

If general extenders are to be treated, by the analyst, as possibly implicating a category of some kind, then it would be helpful to find explicit evidence in the data that speakers treat them as such. An examination of the recorded, interactional data reveals that speakers using a general extender do not typically go on to make explicit mention of what was implicated by their use of that general extender. As a result, it is difficult to provide empirical evidence to support the claim that speakers employ general extenders to implicate categories, so that hearers can infer additional or alternative members of the implicated categories. There are, however, rare, 'perspicuous cases,' in which speakers subsequently specify some of the additional or alternate things which seem to have been implied by their use of a general extender.[6] Excerpts [34]-[38] contain examples of such cases.

In [34], Sara is describing her cat's behavior on a recent visit to the vet:

[34] MO: T30
1. Sara: Y'know an' like uh (his emotional-) He was so good when I took him back to the vet to have him looked at?
2. Roger: Oh, he didn't have to be sedated?
3. Sara: No::, like, w-I mean, they just went an' sh- looked at him, she took his temperature, an' y'know stuck the thermometer up his butt, an' he didn't howl **or anything**. He didn't fi:::ght, or hiss, or scratch, or anything. He just kinda stoo:d the//re.
4. Roger: Oh
5. Sara: i was like 'Cool!' I was so::: pleased.

Sara reports that her cat was well-behaved; she says that despite the vet's prodding examination, 'he didn't howl or anything.' Sara then elaborates on what the *or anything* might have been: 'He didn't fight, or hiss, or scratch, or anything. He just kinda stood there.' The category implicated by the first use of *or anything* in [34] might be described as 'the ways in which a cat might misbehave at the vet's office.' The second use of *or anything* within this elaboration indicates that there are still further alternative ways in which the cat might have protested the examination, or misbehaved.

In [35], Sara and Maya are talking about a mutual friend's (Wendy's) mistreatment of animals, and her recent decision to have her dog put to sleep:

[35] MY:F80
1. Maya: No but you know an' an' she's like (.5) and she's just really weird with them- she doesn't- I mean I- I think she's alm//ost like-
2. Sara: It's like a completely unconscious sadistic str//eak.
3. Maya: Yeah it is. It's very sadistic. It's really mean. (.5) The whole thing is r(h)eally m(h)ean when you watch her and she's like- gets kind of absorbed with it but she's not really.=I don't think she believes that they're living at all.
4. Sara: Um//hm
5. Maya: I don't think she believes that they'll like (.) bleed **an' stuff**. I don't think she understands that (.) when she gassed her dog that the dog bloated and lost oxygen and choked to death and (.) twitched and then died you know. ...

According to Maya, Wendy doesn't grasp the fact that animals are living creatures that have a capacity for suffering. In turn #5, Maya contends that Wendy doesn't believe 'that they'll like bleed an' stuff.' She then expounds upon the expression *an' stuff*: 'I don't think she understands that when she gassed her dog that the dog bloated and lost oxygen and choked to death and twitched and then died you know.' It would appear that for Maya, bleeding, bloating, choking, twitching, and dying are members of a category of 'ways in which living creatures may suffer.'

In excerpt [36], Crystal is telling her friend Julie about some young men from Argentina she has just met:

[36] MO:T15
1. Julie: Frederico, huh?
2. Crystal: Frederico=I know! An' his brother is Juan. huh huh // huh
3. Julie: O:::h, look out!
4. Crystal: Juan is one of those light ones. He has red hair **an' everything.** L- Light hair, blue eyes, (.) white skin, Mex- um, uh Spanish, y'know.
5. Julie: Umhm
6. Crystal: An' Frederico he's- he's da::rk. He's um- he's really nice.

In turn #4, Crystal describes Juan as 'one of those light ones. He has red hair and everything.' Her further characterization indicates that at least part of *everything* includes: light hair, blue eyes, and white skin. In this example, *and everything* implicates a category of physical features that 'light' Spanish people are presumed to have.

In excerpt [37], Sara and Maya are talking about a gay friend of theirs:

[37] MY:F75
1. Sara: John's looking for a girlfriend.
2. Maya: Oh, a cover girlfriend?
3. Sara: Yeah.
4. Maya: Co//ol.
5. Sara: No. W- he's like (.) like 'You know', he's like 'Can you help me out here?' an' I huh I went 'John' ø 'I'm looking for a girlfriend' an' I was like
6. Maya: 'Why?'
7. Sara: Hey. ø 'Well just one to hang out with you know somebody just to hang out an' do stuff with **an' an' everything** you know maybe I dunno, maybe once in a while get drunk and make out with- n<u>o</u>t to have se:x, I wouldn't want to have s<u>e</u>x, y'know, just y'know, some girl to hang out with.' I'm like (.) // 'I don't know man.'
8. Maya: huh 'I: can't even do that. Whatta ya-' huh huh 'Whatta you want from me, bl<u>oo</u>d?' Oh well.
9. Sara: Heh! He's like 'Do you know anybody? who - who would be into that?' ø 'No I sure don't. Everybody I know wants sex.'
10. Maya: 'Everybody I know wants some kind of soft parts rubbed up against their soft parts. Or in their facial area **or something**.'
11. Sara: Yea//h.
12. Maya: 'Something- something in the p<u>oo</u>ntang arena.'

There are two general extenders which are elaborated upon in this excerpt: *and everything* in turn #7, and *or something* in turn #10. In turn #7, Sara reports John's description of what he wants a girlfriend for: 'Well just one to hang out with you know somebody just to hang out an' do stuff with an' an' everything you know maybe I dunno, maybe once in a while get drunk and make out with- n<u>o</u>t to have se:x, I wouldn't want to have s<u>e</u>x, y'know, just y'know, some girl

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to hang out with.' In Sara's report of John's description, the *and everything* is seen to include hanging out, getting drunk, and making out, but not having sex. In this example, the category of things referred to by the general extender *and everything* might be called 'things John wants to do with his girlfriend.'

The second example of a perspicuous case in excerpt [37] is found in turns #10 and #12. In turn #10 Maya says: 'Everybody I know wants some kind of soft parts rubbed up against their soft parts. Or in their facial area or something.' She then goes on to explicitly state a thing that might have been implicated by the expression *or something*: 'Something- something in the poontang arena.' The category referred to by Maya might be called 'the places where everybody wants some kind of soft parts rubbed up against.'

Finally, in excerpt [38], Sara and Maya are discussing old age, and the importance of being satisfied with one's life:

[38] MY:F86
1. Maya: ... unfortunately the grandma I like best is not-
dudn't feel like you know her life has been (.) any good so:
2. Sara: Well I- I- I hope that if I get to that age- if I
make it to that age and I look back and start (.) thinking
that what I've done has not been you know that I will
have the ba:lls **or the- the whatever**- the gumption //
to=
3. Maya: hnh!
4. Sara: =get up and go do something no:w (.) rather than
just sit there and go=
5. Maya: (**)
6. Sara: ='Oh well. I never did anything. I guess that's
okay.' I mean (.) you're gonna keel over and die within the
next couple of weeks then 'cause you've lost your will.
7. Maya: Ri:ght.

In turns #2 and #4, Sara subsequently specifes an alternative instance which is implicated by the general extender *or whatever*: 'Well I- I- I hope that if I get to that age- if I make it to that age and I look back and start (.) thinking that what I've done has not been you know that I will have the ba:lls or the- the whatever- the gumption to get up and go do something now ... ' In this case, the general extender might be seen to implicate a category of 'characteristics that will enable Sara to take action.'

Note that the 'perspicuous cases' presented above contain a variety of general extenders: [34] *or anything*; [35] *and stuff*; [36] *and everything*; [37] *and everything, or something*; [38] *or whatever*. Indeed, it appears that most general extenders have the capacity to function as category implicative expressions (the function of specific forms will be explored in chapter four).[7]

3.3.2 Category types

As noted in chapter 2, Channell argues for the recognition of three types of categories to which a general extender can refer: COMMON, COVERT, and AD HOC (Channell 1994:123). Common categories are lexicalized (encoded as a single lexicalized item), such as the categories *bird* or *furniture*, whereas covert and ad hoc categories are not. The following excerpts from my data set may be seen to exemplify Channell's three-way category distinction. In [39] and [40] below, a general extender is used to refer to a common category through terms which infer a category hierarchy.

[39] MO:T88
((It is Fall. Julie is in the southern U.S.; William is in Hawai`i))
1. William: Are any of the uh trees turning?
2. Julie: U:m they don't really turn much here I don't think.
3. William: They don't
4. Julie: Yeah.
5. William: Yeah. Most of 'em are evergreens around there i guess. Pine trees **an' stuff.**

Example [39] is a particularly rare example (the only such example in my data), in that the speaker, William, actually gives the superordinate term *evergreens* before naming an exemplar and implicating additional members of the category with the general extender *an' stuff*. More typical is [40], where the superordinate is not explicitly given:

[40] MO:T7
1. Julie: You takin' a nap?
2. Shirley: No::=I been (.) vacuumin' an' (1.0) washin:' (1.0) clo::thes an' dustin:' **an:' all that stuff.**

The superordinate term for the category implicated in [40] would presumably be *housework*.

Reference to a COVERT category is demonstrated in excerpt [41]. Channell (1994:123) describes covert categories as those 'without names, but for whose existence there is definite evidence.' It appears that what Channell means by this are categories which are commonly recognized, or culturally established; the example she gives is taken from Cruse (1986:148): 'the class of moveable items

one buys when moving into a new house.'[8] In [41], Rosie and Julie are discussing an upcoming camping trip to a remote area which can only be reached by boat, or by an 11-mile hike:

> [41] MO: T23
> 1. Julie: John and I are hiking out with you.
> 2. Rosie: Ya:::y
> 3. Julie: He's excited about the idea. We went an' bought shoes.
> 4. Rosie: Okay. That's //cool.
> 5. Julie: So-
> 6. Rosie: We'll get an early start, an' I was thinking if we wanted to bring in the coo::ler, we could, an' have it- Each pitch in a little bit of money an' have Jerry take it out by boat. So that we can put all the kitchen stuff in the::re, an' all the heavy stuff, an' just pack out our clo::thes an' tents an' stuff.

Rosie suggests that at the end of their stay, they could send the heavy stuff out of the campsite by boat, and carry 'the clothes and tents and stuff' out in their backpacks. The larger category to which Rosie refers with the general extender *and stuff* is: 'things that one would take on a camping trip'; she has further subdivided the category into 'heavy' items such as kitchen stuff, and 'light' items such as clothes and tents.

A third type of category proposed by Channell (1994:122-23) is called *ad hoc*; ad hoc categories are described as those which come into existence according to the demands of the moment, and are not lodged in memory (cf. Barsalou 1983). As examples, Channell offers 'things that Joanna likes to do to relax' and 'ways to get back at the neighbors for the noise they make' (Channell 1994:122). The

following excerpt is offered as an example of this from my data; in [42], Roger is needling Sara about her new work schedule, which requires her to get up at 6:30 a.m.; she rejects his suggestion that the new schedule is good for her, and cites ways in which it will do her harm:

[42] MO: T53
1. Roger: huh huh huh huh huh huh huh huh Six thirty.
Excellent. hhh.
2. Sara: Yeah.
3. Roger: Ah, you- you'll be a new person.
4. Sara: Oh no man, I'//m getting wrinkles under my eyes (my-)
5. Roger: I believe you'll probably take up religion as well hhh!
6. Sara: butt's gonna start to sag, 'n (.) **everything** from gettin' up that early
7. Roger: heh heh heh heh .hhhhh

The ad hoc category to which Sara refers in [42] might be labelled 'the ways in which Sara's body will fall apart from getting up too early.'

While excerpts [39]-[42] might be seen to support the three-way category distinction proposed by Channell, a closer consideration of this distinction reveals a significant problem with its applicability, which involves the distinction between covert and ad hoc categories. It appears that Channell interprets Cruse's term covert category to mean those which would be familiar to the majority of individuals in a given society or culture (e.g., things to take on a camping trip); and interprets ad hoc categories to be those which are less familiar,

and are created for the purpose of a current exchange (e.g., ways in which Sara's body will fall apart from getting up too early). The difficulty in distinguishing between these two category types arises when the category falls somewhere in-between these two descriptions, or overlaps them. Excerpt [43] will serve to illustrate this point.

In [43], Crystal attempts to describe to Julie the effects of taking a new illegal drug called ecstasy:

[43] MO: T12
((Crystal has just told Julie that she tried
the drug ecstasy))
1. Julie: Oh, wo:w, how was that?
2. Crystal: That was fun. It was fun.
3. Julie: I' been curious about that. John knows people
who've taken that.
4. Crystal: It's kind of like- It's just like really mild acid.
5. Julie: Oh, is that what it is?
6. Crystal: Mmhm. That's what I felt. That's what it made
me feel, y'know just the .hh colors an' the (2.0) y'know uh
the way it makes you thi:nk an' (.) **stuff.**
7. Julie: Mmh//m
8. Crystal: Except it made- it makes you really ho:t and
really thirsty-
9. Julie: Eu::w!
10. Crystal: Heh. Yeah. huh huh
11. Julie: That sounds awful!

In her description, Crystal likens ecstasy to 'really mild acid.' She then elaborates on this statement, saying 'That's what it made me feel, y'know just the colors an' the y'know uh the way it makes you think an' stuff.' The category to which Crystal refers might be called 'the effects of taking mild acid.'

Since the general extender in [43] implicates a category which is presumably unfamiliar to most speakers of English, we would not want to label 'the effects of taking really mild acid' a covert category. On the other hand, since a number of individuals outside the interaction have experimented with the drug LSD, and would consider the category to be familiar, it does not seem to fit Channell's description of an ad hoc category. In sum, it would seem that the analytic process of distinguishing between covert and ad hoc categories requires speculation concerning how many people might recognize a category.

It is worth noting that Barsalou's (1983,1987) description of ad hoc categories seems to include the types of categories which are identified by Channell (1994) as covert. Some examples of ad hoc categories offered by Barsalou (1983) include: 'things to take on a camping trip' (211), 'things to take from one's home during a fire' (214), and 'things to pack in a suitcase' (214). Indeed, it is hard to see the difference between these, and Cruse's (1986) examples of covert categories: 'the class of moveable items one buys when moving into a new house' (148), and things which can be worn (147). In fact, Barsalou allows for the possibility that, while ad hoc categories 'often appear to be created spontaneously for use in special contexts' (211), 'frequently used ad hoc categories may develop well-established category representations much like those of common categories' (214).

According to Barsalou (1983,1987), some of the important distinctions between common and ad hoc categories include: (1) the former are more familiar and central to cultural knowledge than the latter; (2) the former have well-established representations in memory, whereas the latter do not (Barsalou 1983:213); (3) the former tend to represent things in the environment, whereas the latter tend to serve people's goals (Barsalou 1983: 103-4); and (4) because the former 'reflect the correlational structure of the environment,' they form more salient groups of entities (Barsalou 1987: 103-104). The 'correlational structure of the environment' referred to in (4) is described as follows:

> ... properties of entities in the environment are not independent but, instead, form clusters of correlated properties. For example, if an entity has feathers, there is a much higher probability that it flies and builds nests, than that it swims and has gills (Barsalou 1983:214).

On the other hand, an ad hoc category, such as *things that could be used to kill a roach* may contain such diverse members as: a rubber slipper, a newspaper, or a flyswatter; its members may not appear to share correlational properties. With regard to the above observations, it is important to note that Barsalou's distinction of

category types considers only physical objects as category members. The categorization of other entity types will be discussed in section 3.3.4.

Another problem with Channell's (1994) distinction between covert and ad hoc category types, at least in the analysis of general extenders, is that there does not seem to be any motivation for this distinction. An externally imposed distinction such as this may have no relevance for the participants.

In light of the above considerations, I will consider covert and ad hoc together as one type of category, which is distinct from the common type. While it may seem reasonable to retain Barsalou's (1983) terms, *ad hoc* and *common*, for distinguishing between these category types, I will opt for the use of different terminology, since I find these terms to be misleading for use in the analysis of general extenders. The distinction of common versus ad hoc seems to imply that the former are found to occur more often than the latter, whereas, at least in my data, the converse is true: a survey of my data reveals that there are only 6 instances in which general extenders clearly appear to implicate common categories.[9] In the vast majority of instances (152), general extenders appear to implicate something other than a common category.

The terms I will use to refer to these categories are LEXICALIZED (encoded as a single lexicalized item), and NON-LEXICALIZED. This terminology draws attention to a distinction which is linguistic in nature, and is of potential relevance to the participants. For

example, where there is no name for a category, a general extender provides a way of making reference to it.[10] On the other hand, where there exists a name for a category, there exists the possibility of referring to the category by name; therefore, in using a general extender to implicate a lexicalized category, a speaker chooses that over the alternative option of simply naming the category. In such cases, it is worth considering why the speaker might do this. One reason would be to identify members of a category for a hearer who may be unfamiliar with the category, or its name. For example, in excerpt [39], it is possible that William suspects that Julie, who grew up in Hawai`i, is unfamiliar with the category of evergreens. In addition to naming the lexicalized category, he provides an example (i.e., pine trees) in an effort to illustrate the kind of tree designated by this term. Alternatively, by naming an item (or items), and using a general extender to implicate a lexicalized category, a speaker may emphasize or highlight certain members of the category. For instance, if I were going shopping for clothes, and you were to ask me what I planned to buy, I might reply 'I'm gonna buy some jeans, and stuff.' While all of the items I expected to buy might belong to the category clothing, by naming jeans, I highlight this particular member of the category. A further example of how a speaker may use a general extender to implicate a lexicali:d category in order to achieve a special effect will be presented in section 3.4.3.

3.3.3 Contextual constraints

In section 3.2.1 it was suggested that general extenders function to implicate categories with poorly defined boundaries, and that the range of items which might be included in a category are constrained by contextual factors. In this section, some empirically observable examples of constraints imposed by linguistic context, or COTEXT will be illustrated.

The interpretation of general extenders is sometimes limited by the semantic relations which hold between lexical items. For example, in [44], William's use of the general extender *and stuff* occurs within a hyponymous relationship:

> [44] MO: T88
> 1. William: Are any of the uh trees turning?
> 2. Julie: U:m they don't really turn much here I don't think.
> 3. William: They don't
> 4. Julie: Yeah.
> 5. William: Yeah most of 'em are evergreens around there I guess. Pine trees **an' stuff**.
> 6. Julie: Right. ...

Here, William names the superordinate category 'evergreens,' before giving an example of a member of the category, 'pine trees' and implicating additional members with the general extender *and stuff*. This is a rare example in my data, in that the superordinate category is both lexicalized and explicitly mentioned.

In excerpt [45], the interpretation of the general extender *and that type of thing* is constrained by what may be termed FEATURE

MERONYMY. Feature meronymy designates a peripheral type of semantic relation (a part-to-whole relationship), where the parts are actually features of a whole, rather than systemic parts (cf. Cruse 1986:175):

> [45] Jefferson 1990:66
> Heather: And they had like a concession stand like at a fair where you can buy coke and popcorn **and that type of thing.**

Here, coke and popcorn are presented as features of concession stands; the interpretation of the implicated category is constrained by Heather's mention of the place where items such as coke and popcorn are found.

Another way in which the interpretation of a general extender may be constrained is illustrated in [46]-[48]. In each of these excerpts, the speaker uses the general extender within a structure which not only expresses what something *is,* but additionally what it *is not:*

> [46] Entertainment Weekly 1994
> ((Article on Harrison Ford, who plays Jack Ryan in a new movie Clear and Present Danger))
> Although Ryan is often surrounded by explosions and gunfire, Ford says he never puts himself in any real danger. "I don't do stunts," he says. "I do running, jumping, falling down. I hit people, I get hit by people, **that kind of shit.** Stunts are done by stuntmen."

> [47] MO:T54
> 1. Sara: ... My kitty is quiet. It's not like he sits in the window and yo:wls **or anything**

[48] MO:T41
((Roger and Sara are discussing hiking in Hawai`i, where
Roger lives and Sara is about to move to))
1. Sara: So I mean that's- I really wanna get into that
'cause that's like o- o//ne of the things that really
2. Roger: This is hiking heaven.
3. Sara: Exactly. I- I- It's one of the things that really
attracted me to:: moving out there. // (**)
4. Roger: Last Sunday I hiked twelve miles.
5. Sara: Yeah, lotsa like stomping around in the woods to
be done.
6. Roger: Right.
7. Sara: An' uh, so I'm lookin' forward to tha:t=
8. Roger: =Yea://h
9. Sara: an' y'know
10. Roger: Not only that you hike to grea:t looking places
here.
11. Sara: Yea::h
12. Roger: An' at the // end of the hike you
13. Sara: heh hah hah hah Not like hiking up near like the
Lousiana State Penitentiary **or anyth//ing**
14. Roger: Na::h. No::, it's like you hike to a waterfall here,
15. Sara: hhh.
16. Roger: an' at the bottom of the waterfall there's a
pool, an' you .hh // di::ve i::n
17. Sara: (sploosh) right on in
18. Roger: kick off all your hot sweaty clothes an' dive in
n::aked! // An' you:
19. Sara: U:::h, yeah! hh. with people you don't know at all.
20. Roger: Yeah that's wha//t happens here
21. Sara: Sounds like fun.
22. Roger: Right.

As Frake (1969:36) points out, to define a category, one must know

not just what it includes, but with what it contrasts.[11]   By setting

up a contrast, the speakers in excerpts [46]-[48] identify features

which are NOT characteristic of the category (or members of the

category) implicated by the use of a general extender.[12] For example, in [46], the kinds of actions performed by Harrison Ford, such as running, jumping, falling down, and exchanging blows, are members of the category implicated by the general extender; this category is contrasted with 'stunts' which are considered to be more dangerous; the actions performed by Ford are thereby designated as a category of non-stunts which are not dangerous. In [47], Sara says: 'My kitty is quiet. It's not like he sits in the window and yowls or anything.' Here 'yowls' may be viewed as a member of a category of 'non-quiet kitty behaviors.' Finally, in [48], Sara's 'Not like hiking up near the Louisiana State Penitentiary or anything,' which is found in turn #13, is contrasted with Roger's 'you hike to grea:t looking places here.' In other words, the Louisiana State Penitentiary is a member of a category of not-great-looking places to hike.

Examples [44]-[48] illustrate how antecedent discourse may limit a hearer's interpretation of a general extender. However, the interpretation may also be constrained by the speaker's subsequent discourse. This is illustrated by excerpt [49]:

[49] MY:F80
((Maya is talking to Sara about a mutual friend of theirs, Wendy, and her sadistic treatment of animals; Wendy has just had her dog put to sleep.))
Maya: I don't think she believes that they'll like (.) bleed an' stuff. I don't think she understands that (.) when she gassed her dog that the dog bloated and lost oxygen and choked to death and (.) twitched and then died you know. I think she thinks they (.) put it in a I dunno Vegematic or something and just kind of pureed it and poured it

outside. I don't know. Or took the battery out. I don't know. It really disturbs me 'cause I'm so (1.0) picky about animals and (.5)

The point of interest in [49] is where Maya says: 'I think she thinks they (.) put it in a I dunno Vegematic or something and just kind of pureed it and poured it outside.' In this example, the phrase which follows the general extender *or something* identifies the relevant function of the named member (i.e., a Vegematic) as being something which is capable of liquifying solid material; thus, all members of the category implicated by *or something* would be capable of serving this function.

Although it appears to be relatively uncommon (there are only two examples in my data set), general extenders are sometimes further specified by a subsequent relative clause, as in [50]-[51]:

[50] MY:F64
Maya: ... My nose ru:ns and (.) my eyeballs oo:ze an' (.) **things like that that aren't real attractive.**

[51] MO:F6
Lucy: You know what um do you have a bucket **or anything I can wash the cat in?**

Excerpt [52], from another data source, contains a third example of this:

[52]   Bilmes, unpublished
Jean: ...it's better (.) if you want ninety to say one ten and come to ninety (1) just so that they can have some sense of being treated fairly (.) of being hear:d (.) or: (.) not dealing with rocks: (.) or dealing with arrogant (.)

commission attorneys **and everything else they've ever called us.**

In these 'further specified instances,' the relative clause helps to constrain the interpretation of the category implicated by the general extender by naming the category (e.g., 'things they have called us,' in [52]), or by identifying either characteristic properties of its members (e.g., 'aren't real attractive' in [50]), or their common function (e.g., 'I can wash the cat in' in [51]).

An examination of naturally-occurring, interactive data reveals that the relevant category implicated by a general extender is sometimes negotiated via the hearer's interpretation, and the speaker's subsequent acceptance of that interpretation. For example, in each of the following two excerpts, the general extender occurs in a yes/no question; in answering the question in the negative, the hearer produces an observable interpretation of what is *not* included in the category implicated by the speaker's use of a general extender:

[53] MO:T21
((Joy is inquiring about a small town in Louisiana, that Roger is familiar with))
1. Joy: An' like do you like go up there on weekends sometimes or // do they
2. Roger: .hh I have-
3. Joy: have good restaurants an' **stuff?**
4. Roger: No, no.
5. Joy: Oh
6. Roger: They don't have good restaurants. They have funky little places to eat.
7. Joy: Uh huh

[54] Newsweek 1994
((Excerpts of 911 Records appearing in article on O.J. Simpson case))
1. Nicole: Well, my ex-husband- or my husband- just broke in ... and he's ranting and raving.
2. Operator: Has he been drinking **or anything?**
3. Nicole: No, but he's crazy.
4. Operator: Did he hit you?
5. Nicole: No.

In turns #1 and #3 of excerpt [53], Joy asks Roger 'do they have good restaurants and stuff?'; Roger responds with 'No. no.' in turn #4, and then elaborates on his answer in turn #6: 'They don't have good restaurants. They have funky little places to eat.' Roger's answer reveals that his interpretation of the category implicated by the general extender in the phrase 'good restaurants and stuff' (if, in fact, a category is implicated at all) does not include 'funky little places to eat.' The fact that Joy does not reject Roger's interpretation in line #7, rather utters 'uh huh,' may be taken as evidence that she accepts it (cf. Schegloff, *et al.* 1977).

A similar phenomenon is found in excerpt [54]. In turn #2, the operator asks Nicole 'Has he been drinking or anything?'; Nicole replies 'No, but he's crazy.' Nicole's answer reveals that her interpretation of the category implicated by the general extender in the phrase 'drinking or anything' does not include 'crazy.' (Nicole's use of the logical connector *but* may indicate, however, that he was exhibiting behavior that she associates with substance abuse). The fact that the operator moves to another question in turn #4, and does not reject Nicole's interpretation, may be seen as evidence that

she accepts it. An important observation with regard to excerpts [53] and [54] is that the interpretation of general extenders is negotiated by the participants, and interactionally specified. Some further examples and a discussion of this will be presented in chapter four.

Examples [44]-[54] illustrate how empirically observable linguistic context may serve to constrain the analysis of general extenders. However, much of what limits the interpretation of these expressions cannot be located within the cotext. Instead, the interpretation of the general extender is constrained by a broader context.[13] As illustration, consider the following: On a recent trip to Albertson's grocery store in Baton Rouge, I noticed a sign posted at a service counter with two windows: The left side of the sign had an arrow pointing to the left window, and read *Money orders, Stamps, etc. ...* ; the right side of the sign had an arrow pointing to the right window, and read *Lotto*. This sign appears on the following page as Figure 5:

Albertson's grocery store sign

Figure 5

In this instance, the *etc.* referred to everything besides Lotto (lottery tickets) that you would come to the service counter for in this particular store (e.g., to buy newspapers, make inquiries, or request refunds). It is interesting to note that the category implicated by *etcetera* in this case is constrained by a kind of contiguity; the members of the category may not actually be 'similar' in any way; rather, they are grouped together as things which are handled in the same place.[14]

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It is important to note that, despite the inexplicit nature of these expressions, participants treat their interpretation as unproblematic: speakers using general extenders assume that hearers will be able to supply whatever unstated understandings are required to make recognizable sense of the speaker's talk, and hearers typically exhibit no difficulty in interpreting them. (Some empirical evidence to support this claim will be provided in chapter four). In order to proceed in the analysis of the participants' interpretation of general extenders, we must assume, as the participants do, that certain assumptions about background knowledge will be taken for granted. The following examples illustrate how assumed background knowledge may constrain the interpretation of a general extender.

The first example comes from an interview with Calvert DeForest in People Magazine (1/17/94). In reference to the picture of him as a young man in 1951 (Figure 6, top photo), DeForest said:

[55] 'This is when my hair was dark **and everything.**'

Calvert DeForest pictures

Figure 6

Here, an interpretation of the additional instances implicated by *and everything* might include all of the things that are associated with being young. On this interpretation, the ability to infer the additional instances depends on a knowledge of what goes with being young.

In [56], the speaker is telling a story about a time when she and her friends were interrogated at the Los Angeles airport about luggage containing psilocybin (i.e., 'magic') mushrooms:

[56] Anna Guthrie 1994:88
S: ... I guess (.) somebody (.) in tryin' ta decide what the hell these things are had picked up (.) some of the mushrooms an' went an' went ta smell it (.) an' he got-he had cow shit (2) he didn't pick a piece a mushroom he picked a piece a cow shit up ((laughs)) he was-he was not happy 'cuz he had cow shit all over his hands an' on his nose **an' stuff** (.) so he was (.) I mean it was real intresting. but they let us go an' gave us the suitcase...

In this instance, the hearer's interpretation of the general extender in the phrase 'he had cow shit all over his hands an' on his nose an' stuff,' would be constrained, at least in part, by the knowledge of what is involved in the action of smelling: the 'somebody' would have picked up the cow shit with one or two hands, and raised it to his nose. Based on this assumed knowledge, the hearer would most likely infer that, in addition to getting it on his hands and his nose, the 'somebody' may have gotten it on other areas of his body which are near his hands or nose (e.g., his upper lip, his forearm), or possibly dropped some, and gotten it on his shoe; the hearer would probably *not* infer that he had gotten it on his back, his ear, or the top of his head.[15]

It seems reasonable to assume, at some level, that the interpretation of just about any utterance will depend on the assumption of some type of shared knowledge. Along these lines,

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Garfinkel's (1967:38-41) 'conversation clarification experiment' showed that in two-party conversations, 'much that is being talked about is not mentioned, although each expects that the adequate sense of the matter being talked about is settled' (Garfinkel 1963:221; Heritage 1984:81). Researchers since Bartlett (1932) have proposed that 'schemata,' or pre-existing knowledge structures such as 'scripts' (dynamic event sequences) and 'frames' (fixed representations), function as familiar patterns from previous experience, and enable participants to arrive at interpretations of the unsaid (cf. Schank and Abelson 1977; Minsky 1975). This process is described by Schütz and Luckmann as follows:

> Each step of my interpretation of the world is based at any given time on a stock of previous experience: my own direct experiences, as well as such experiences as are conveyed to me by my fellow-men, above all by my parents, teachers, etc. All of these conveyed and direct experiences merge to form a unified stock of knowledge, which serves me as a reference schema for the immediate step of my interpretation of the world. All of my experiences of the life-world are brought in relation to this schema, so that the objects and events in the life-world confront me from the outset in their typical character... Every interpretation within the life-world is an interpretation within a frame of that which has already been interpreted, within a reality that is fundamentally and typically familiar. I trust that the world as it has been known by me up until now will continue to be as it is, and that consequently the stock of knowledge obtained from my fellow-men and formed from my own experiences will continue to preserve its fundamental validity.[16]

Interestingly, Schütz calls the above assumption (i.e., that the structure of the world is constant, and that the stock of knowledge one has will remain valid) the IDEALITÄT DES UND SO WEITER, or the AND SO FORTH IDEALIZATION. As Schütz notes, this term is taken from Husserl (1929/1977:41-42). The *and so forth idealization* seems to correspond with the notion that 'categorization, in essence, is a device for treating a new experience as though it were something familiar' (Frake 1969:36, cf. Bruner,*et al.* 1956).

As we will see, the assumption of shared background knowledge plays a crucial role in the function of general extenders. This will be explored further in chapter four.

3.3.4   First-, second-, and third-order entities

Most studies of categories have focussed primarily on what Lyons (1977: 443-45) calls 'first-order entities,' that is, physical objects, including: persons, animals, and things.[17]   For example, Rosch's investigation of prototypes focussed exclusively on categories comprised of first-order entities such as 'furniture' and 'birds.'   It is therefore not surprising that the most extensive study of general extenders as category implicative expressions, presented by Channell (1994), concentrates on examples of the structure [NP] + [NP], where an object NP is coordinated with a general extender. Channell aims to show that items considered to have a high degree of prototypicality serve as better examples (i.e., the hearer is more likely to infer the speaker's intended category) than those which

have a low degree of prototypicality (see section 3.3.5 for a critical discussion of this).

In fact, previous studies of general extenders make only cursory mention of examples in which general extenders are coordinated with other-than-object NP constituents, such as those in [57] and [58] below:

[57] Dines 1980:28
So she's sort of a child who swings and does somersaults **and things like that.**

[58] MO:T7
Shirley: I been (.) vacuumin' 'n' (1.0) washin': (1.0)
clo::thes 'n' dustin': **'n': all that stuff.**

The structures with which the general extenders are coordinated in [57] and [58] belong to what Lyons (1977:443) calls the class of second-order entities. These include events, processes, and states.

General extenders may also be coordinated with third-order entities (Lyons 1977:444). These are abstract entities which are outside space and time, such as propositions of the type illustrated in [59],

[59] MO:T11
Crystal: He doesn't even know where (.) my new address-
where to ch- send money to me y'know **or anything.**

which may be represented as follows: [~know (Joe, (p v q v $\propto$)], where $\propto$ represents an indeterminate number of possibilities among a category of propositions, not objects or actions.[18]

It is important to note that Lyons' (1977:443-445) distinction between first-, second- and third-order entities does not directly correspond with syntactic structures. For instance, both nouns (e.g., *peace*) and verbs (e.g., *know*) can be related to the category of 'state'; yet, each belongs to a syntactically, and morphosyntactically different class (cf. Lyons 1977:441). With regard to syntactic structure, however, an interesting consideration is the following: It may be that the coordination of second- and third-order entities which are non-NPs with a general extender (an NP) contributes to the reification of these entities, helping to 'mentally stabilize an ongoing dynamic reality' (Nelson 1983:131).[19]

The distinction between first-, second-, and third-order entities is presented to highlight a crucial difference in their ontological status, which is of some relevance to the study at hand. According to Lyons (1977:43; and cf. Strawson 1959:39ff), first-order entities are less controversial than second- and third-order entities, since it is characteristic that:

> ... they are relatively constant as to their perceptual properties; that they are located, at any point in time, in what is, psychologically at least, a three-dimensional space; and that they are publically observable.

Since second- and third-order entities are less objectively perceivable than first-order entities, categorization of such entities is necessarily based on a subjective conceptualization of these entities. Therefore, where general extenders are coordinated

with second- and third-order entities, we might expect there to be greater variation between participants' categories.

3.3.5   Problems with a prototype style-analysis

In Channell's (1994:126) words, 'successful category identification' depends upon 'giving a prototypical example of an intended category.' The following points demonstrate some of the problems with this claim:

(1) In the 'exemplar' view put forward by Channell, the assignment of a new instance to a category is determined by whether it is sufficiently SIMILAR to one or more of the category's exemplars. The notion of similarity, however, is extremely problematic; similarity which is determined in terms of matching and mismatching properties depends upon particular weights given to specific properties. Medin and Wattenmaker (1987:27) offer the following example to illustrate this point: 'a skunk and a zebra would be more similar than a horse and a zebra if the feature *striped* had sufficient weight.' In fact, studies have shown that the relative weight given to a property varies according to context. As illustration, consider the following two exchanges between Sara and Roger. In each exchange, Sara offers a sound made by her cat ('howl' in [60], and 'yowl' in [61]) as a member of a category implicated by a general extender:

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[60] MO:T30
1. Sara: Y'know an' like uh (his emotional-) He was so
good when I took him back to the v<u>e</u>t to have him l<u>oo</u>ked
at?
2. Roger: Oh, he didn't have to be sedated?
3. Sara: No::, like, w-I mean, they just went an' sh- looked
at him, she took his temperature, an' y'know stuck the
thermometer up his butt, an' he didn't howl **or anything**.
He didn't fi:::ght, or hiss, or scratch, or anything. He just
kinda stoo:d the//re.
4. Roger: Oh
5. Sara: I was like 'Cool!' I was so::: pleased.

[61] MO:T54
1. Sara: ... My kitty is quiet. It's not like he sits in the
window and y<u>o:</u>wls **or anything**
2. Roger: There is one next door does that. Have you heard
it?
3. Sara: Um yea:h, actually ...

Assuming that, for present purposes, there is no significant
difference between the terms 'howl' and 'yowl,' the above examples
may be seen to show that the relative salience of an attribute varies
according to context. Whereas 'howl' in [60] is a member of the
category of 'ways in which the cat might have misbehaved at the
vet,' 'yowl' in [61] is a member of the category of 'nonquiet cat
noises'; whereas the locally salient property of 'howl' might be
characterized as 'unpleasant,' the locally salient property of 'yowl'
is 'loud.'

(2) In analyzing prototypes as representing categories,
Channell misapplies Rosch's prototype theory.   According to Lakoff
(1987a:63), this is a widespread phenomenon; while it is true that,

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in experimental tests, subjects consistently rate some kinds of objects as better examples of a category than others, these judgements do not reflect anything direct about the nature of categorization. Indeed, while Rosch (1978:40) suggests that 'prototypes must have some place in psychological theories of representation, processing, and learning,' she goes on to say:

> Prototypes do not constitute a theory of representation of categories. Although we have suggested elsewhere that it would be reasonable in light of the basic principles of categorization, if categories were represented by prototypes that were most representative of the items in the category and least representative of the items outside the category (Rosch & Mervis 1975; Rosch 1977), such a statement remains an unspecified formula until it is made concrete by inclusion in some specific theory of representation. For example, different theories of semantic memory can contain the notion of prototypes in different fashions (Smith 1978). Prototypes can be represented either by propositional or image systems ... As with processing models, the facts about prototypes can only constrain, but do not determine, models of representation.

(3) Even if prototypes could be seen to constitute a theory of representation of categories: (a) Most, if not all, studies of prototypes have focussed on the internal structure of LEXICALIZED categories. To my knowledge, no studies have addressed the question of whether nonlexicalized categories may have prototypes, and if so, what these prototypes might be. Since general extenders are most typically used to implicate NONLEXICALIZED categories (as

noted in section 3.3.2), Channell's analysis cannot be applied in the majority of instances where general extenders are used.[20]

(b) General extenders are often coordinated with second- and third-order entities, rather than with first-order entities. Since the categorization of such second- and third-order entities would appear to rely more heavily upon subjective conceptualization, it seems reasonable to expect that variation among participants' categories would be more pronounced, and that the identification of prototypes would be problematic, if not unfeasible; (c) In addition to the point made in (b), since the meaning of general extenders is often locally determined, and interactionally specified (as discussed in section 3.3.3), it follows that there is unlikely to be a widely recognized and stable internal structure to these categories. Indeed, studies have shown that the internal structure of categories is unstable (cf. Barsalou 1987). Without a widely recognized and stable internal structure, no universal prototype can be established.

(4) While rare 'perspicuous' cases such as [34]-[38] seem to demonstrate that speakers have additional or alternate instances in mind when using a general extender to implicate a category, it is impossible to know whether speakers always have such additional or alternate instances in mind.[21] It seems that, on many occasions, general extenders are employed simply to implicate the POTENTIAL existence of alternative or alternate instances. In fact, the speaker might not be in a position to name any such instances if pressed by

the hearer. This interesting possibility will be considered in chapter four.

3.3.6 Generative categories

Although the prototype-style analysis seems basically inadequate for the study of general extenders, there are some special cases where such an analysis might be appropriately applied; namely, where general extenders are used to implicate GENERATIVE CATEGORIES. According to Lakoff (1987b:88-89), generative categories are those which are defined by central members (a special kind of prototype) and some general rules; natural numbers are the best examples of generative categories, where a category is 'defined metonymically and generatively by the single-digit numbers plus rules of arithmetic.' The following is an example of a generative category implicated by a general extender, from written academic work:

> [62] Bilmes 1986:59
> If two or more courses of action are tied for least expensive, they are compared on the second most important value dimension and, if necessary, then on a third, a fourth, **and so on.**

Note that, in place of *and so on*, the author might just as well have said *and so forth*, or *etcetera*; however, expressions such as *and stuff (like that)*, and *and all*, would seem inappropriate. This seems to suggest that *and so on*, *and so forth*, and *etcetera* comprise a

subset of general extenders which may function to implicate further members of generative categories.[22]

3.4   List construction

In this section, I will investigate Jefferson's (1990) claim that general extenders function as 'generalized list completers.'   As noted in chapter 2, Jefferson (1990), claims that speakers and hearers in natural conversation 'orient to' what she calls the 'programmatic relevance of three partedness'; in other words, participants are aware of the fact that 'lists not only can and do occur in three parts, but *should* so occur' (Jefferson 1990:66-67). Jefferson (1990:66-67) suggests that general extenders (which she calls *generalized list completers*) are employed by participants to complete three-part lists, and provide a 'methodic solution to the problem of three-partedness.'

In this section, I will examine my corpus of naturally occurring, interactional data in an effort to determine whether a primary function of general extenders is to address the 'programmatic relevance of three-partedness.'

3.4.1   General extenders as third parts

The examples in excerpts [63]-[65] would seem to support the claim that general extenders function to complete three-part lists. In each instance, a speaker names two items, and finishes a list with what Jefferson calls a *generalized list completer* (general extender).

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[63] MO:T23
((Julie and Rosie are planning a camping trip))
1. Julie: John and I are hiking out with you.
2. Rosie: Ya:::y
3. Julie: He's excited about the idea. We went an' bought
shoes.
4. Rosie: Okay. That's //cool.
5. Julie: So-
6. Rosie: We'll get an early start, an' I was thinking if we
wanted to bring in the coo::ler, we could, an' have it-
Each pitch in a little bit of money an' have Jerry take it
out by boat. So that we can put all the kitchen stuff in
the::re, an' all the heavy stuff, an' just pack out our
clo::thes an' tents **an' stuff.**

[64] MO:T40
((Sara and Roger are discussing her plans to move to
a town that he and his wife are familiar with))
1. Sara: the first (.) order of importance is to find a place
to li::ve.
2. Roger: Right. (.) Ah, yeah. We've made a list of you- for
you of like doctors a::nd connections, **an' thi//ngs**
3. Sara: Yea:::h.
4. Roger: Yea::h You'll find a place to live, and you'll find a
job. Don't worry about that.
5. Sara: Oh, no. I'm not worried about that at all.

[65] MO:F58
((Bruce and Lucy are in the kitchen preparing their
dinner))
1. Lucy: There's garlic salt an' onion powder **an' things
like (that)-**
2. Bruce: Okay.
3. Lucy: An'
4. Bruce: Ble:::ch! There's Lima beans in he:::re!
5. Lucy: I'll eat 'em.

According to Jefferson (1990), structures of the form [2 item +

general extender] are typically used where lists are 'relatively

incomplete.' In other words, even if a third item were named, the list would not be exhaustively given. (An exception to this is where the speaker uses the general extender to fill the third slot, and hold the floor, while 'searching' for the third item in a list of three; this will be illustrated with example [66]).

Indeed, it is not hard to imagine more than one item that could be added to each of the lists which appear in the above exchanges. For instance, in [63], additional, 'light' items which Rosie and Julie might take camping include sleeping bags, sheets, and towels. The possible 'things' to which Roger refers in [64] might be references of other service providers that Sara would find useful in a new town, such as hairdressers, dentists, and car mechanics. Finally, in [65], Lucy directs Bruce to the cabinet containing spices and herbs for cooking. Additional items one might expect to find in that cabinet include basil, rosemary, thyme, parsley, and oregano.

Another example which appears to demonstrate a speaker's orientation to the three-part nature of lists is found in [66]. Here, the speaker mentions two things, and after an unsuccessful search for a third, fills the slot with a general extender:

[66] MO:T39
((Sara and Roger are discussing the possibility that his landlord will let her take over his apartment when he leaves))
1. Sara: So what's the story on that apartment, has anybody come by an' looked at it?
2. Roger: No, we've had a call from the u::m (.) like the agent saying somebody is planning to come, a::n' would

that- would it be okay if they call us, an' an' an' **and so
on**= the person come an' look at it // (it's **)
3. Sara: I can't beli//eve that, man. When you've got
somebody li:ned up who's willin' to like pl<u>u</u>nk down their
money an' they don't like- Wull, nevermind.
4. Roger: Yeah.

In [66], Roger's account of what the agent said may be seen to
consist of three parts: (1) somebody is planning to come, (2) and
would it be okay if they call us, (3) and so on. As it turns out, the
general extender 'and so on' is subsequently specified by the
following phrase 'the person come and look at it.' This example from
my data would seem to support Jefferson's (1990:67) argument that
the general extender is used to fill the third slot where the speaker
is, at least temporarily, unable to produce a third item. In contrast
to lists of the structure [2 item + 'generalized list completer'],
Jefferson (1990) notes that three-item lists are complete. In this
case, Roger's replacement of the general extender 'and so on' with
the third item 'the person come by an' look at it' would indicate that
the list is 'relatively complete.'

3.4.2 Counterevidence

Although Jefferson (1990) uses similar examples to
demonstrate that participants employ general extenders in their
orientation to the 'programmatic relevance of three-partedness,' the
examples above do not provide sufficient evidence to support the
claim that participants are somehow aware that lists *should* occur
as three-part structures; these examples merely show that general

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extenders *sometimes* occur as the third item on a list. In order to critically evaluate Jefferson's (1990) claim that general extenders are employed by speakers to solve 'the problem of three-partedness,' we must consider more closely the nature of her claim.

Based on Jefferson's (1990:66-67) emphasized use of the word 'should,' it would appear that her intention is to identify participants' alleged orientation to three-partedness as a *norm*. Indeed, according to Bilmes (1986:175), 'norms are often defined in terms of an "ought."' Broadly speaking, a norm may be defined as follows:

> A norm is a rule of a certain type. A rule may prescribe the actions that constitute a certain activity (e.g., the rules of chess ...). A norm, on the other hand, regulates activities. It specifies when the activity should, may, or should not be done, or how the activity can be carried out in a socially acceptable manner. A norm is thus a regulative rule. Once again, though, a norm is only a regulative rule of a certain type. ... A norm is enforced and remedied by community members in their relations with one another. Regulations are enforced from without. (Bilmes 1986:171)

Researchers have proposed various criteria for identifying norms. One way in which norms might be identified is by statistical distributions of behavior (Bilmes 1986:172).

A quantitative analysis of 158 occurrences of general extenders from recorded telephone conversations and face-to-face interactions (i.e., all of the instances of general extenders in my data set) reveals that general extenders are used to complete three-

part lists in approximately 32 instances (see 3.4.3 for an explanation of the need to approximate the number of instances).[23] This means that, if we are to define a norm according to distributional criteria, approximately 126 examples provide counterevidence to Jefferson's claim.

Among the examples which provide counterevidence to Jefferson's claim are 8 which appear to exceed three parts.[24] These may be seen to exhibit the structure [3 item + general extender], where the general extender fills the fourth 'slot.' Examples include the following:

[67] MO: T7
((Shirley is speaking with her daughter, Julie))
1. Julie: You takin' a nap?
2. Shirley: No:::=I been (.) vacuumin' 'n (1.0) washin': (1.0) clo::thes 'n dustin': **'n: all that stuff**.
3. Julie: Umhm.

[68] MO:T37
1. Sara: ...My mom was tellin' me last night- She watched some stupid fuckin' show on .hhh (.) like Haw-w-Waikiki five O, or something, I dunno=There was some stupid ass like ne:w detective show or
2. Roger: Uh // huh
3. Sara: like horror show, or so//ap opera, **or whatever**
4. Roger: huh huh huh huh huh
5. Sara: that's s- set in fuckin' Waikiki. An' so my mom calls me this evening an' says 'I watched this show last night an' ...

[69] MY:F67
1. Maya: You know that girl? I don't know her name. I can't remember her name I don't know why. The girl that has

braids in her hair all the ti:me that used to sing for
Andy's band, and an' Margaret has the hots fo:r **an' a//ll
that stuff?**
2. Sara: O:h yeah. We- her Wendy=
3. Maya: =Wendy. That's right.

There are no clear examples of lists of the form [4(+) items +
general extender] in my corpus of data. However, this does not mean
that such structures do not occur (see, for example, [46], which
contains five items before the general extender).

By far the most common structure identified in the data,
occurring approximately 118 times, is of the form [1 item + general
extender]. Excerpts [70]-[72] are offered as examples:

[70] MO: T88
1. William: Are any of the uh trees turning?
2. Julie: U:m they don't really turn much here I don't think.
3. William: They don't
4. Julie: Yeah.
5. William: Yeah. Most of 'em are evergreens around there
I guess. Pine trees **an' stuff.**

[71] MY:F66
((Maya is describing a 'Creep Show' movie))
1. Maya: I like the one where they have the- the animal
locked in a bo:x and the- the woman (.5) what's- her name
his wife is real bitchy an' he was having fantasies of
ways to kill her?   He was like a scie//ntist **o r
something?**
2. Sara: That was in the fi̠rst o:ne I didn't see it.

[72] MY:F76
((Sara is talking about her sister's bouts wih
depression))
1. Sara: I know when my sister is depressed I can't (.)
imagine- I mean I think I get miserable an' (.) like my

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mom told me though- w- They talked with the
psychiatrist **an' all-** but she said y- uh know as
depressed as you ever get, you know she's three times
that depressed an' c<u>a</u>n't get out of it.= An' doesn't know
that there's any end to it. You know when I'm at the
b<u>o</u>ttom of the pi<u>:</u>//le I'm like
2. Maya: Right.

In fact, it has been argued that whether members of a society
obey the rules most of the time is actually beside the point; what is
of importance is that 'members orient to rules, and are capable of
recognizing whether behavior conforms to the rules,' and that
violations of rules are sanctionable (Bilmes 1986:166-167). To
illustrate the violation of a norm which is sanctionable, Bilmes
(1986:166) offers the following exchange:

A [addressing B]: Where are you going?
B: [no response]
A: The hell with you.

With regard to the above example, Bilmes notes that 'certain
activities are related by rule, in such a way that the occurrence of
one of the activities provides a 'slot' for the subsequent occurrence
of the other' (Bilmes 1986:166; cf. Sacks 1972a). Given that answers
relevantly follow questions, the fact that B does not respond to A's
question is seen as a violation of a norm; it is therefore
sanctionable.[25] (It should also be noted here that B's non-response
may be interpreted by A as a 'snub' by orientation to the norm).

For the purpose of the study at hand, one way to establish participants' orientation to the 'programmatic relevance of three-partedness' would be to look for sanctioned violations of the norm. An examination of my data does not reveal any such occurrences. Since violations of a norm are potentially interpreted by members as constituting alternative forms of behavior (e.g., no response where one is expected could be a snub), one might expect that lists of the structure [1 item + general extender] or [3(+) items + general extender] would be unrecognizable as lists, interpreted as constituting something other than a list, or held to be faulty lists. However, it is hard to imagine that a hearer would identify certain utterances containing general extenders with more (e.g., [67]) or fewer (e.g., [70]) items as being non-lists.

In sum, an examination of my corpus of naturally-occurring data does not reveal any support for Jefferson's (1990) claim that participants employ general extenders to solve a 'problem of three-partedness.'

3.4.3. The nature of lists

In this section I will explore what Jefferson (1990) may have meant by the term 'list.' It is possible that Jefferson's (1990) analysis of list construction was inspired by an observation made by Sacks (1992:475), that was subsequently explored in a study by Bilmes (1982:278), that two instances are needed to establish a pattern and an expectation, and that a third instance is required to confirm the pattern and expectation. If, in 'doing listing' with

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general extenders as third parts, we are essentially establishing a pattern and an expectation with two items, and confirming it via the general extender, then structures of the form [1 item + general extender] might be viewed as lacking the required number of items to establish the pattern and expectation.

A question raised by examples such as [70]-[72] is whether examples of the form [1 item + general extender] constitute lists at all. As was noted in chapter 2, Lerner (1994) suggests that three items are required to indicate that one is 'doing listing,' and that the function of the first two items is to establish the dimensions or range of class membership (Lerner 1994:23-24). If this is so, then it may be the case that in [70], William's explicit mention of the superordinate term 'evergreens' serves to identify the 'range of class membership,' thus eliminating the need for naming two items before the general extender. However, it should be noted that [70] is a relatively rare example; speakers do not typically name the superordinate category which is implicated by the use of a general extender (see section 3.3.2).

It may be the case that where participants are familiars, and hence close, speakers are more likely to say less and assume more. As Haiman (1983:783) notes, 'the social distance between interlocutors corresponds to the length of the message, referential content being equal.' In using general extenders as category implicative expressions, speakers may assume that hearers will be able to infer an implicated category with fewer clues. The fact that

it consists entirely of interaction among familars might help to account for the high percentage of examples of the structure [1 item + general extender] in my data. The function of general extenders in structures of the form [1 item + general extender] will receive further attention in chapter four.

Assuming that lists containing general extenders function to produce a pattern and an expectation, and subsequently confirm that expectation, one way to analyze examples of the structure [3 items + general extender] would be to view the naming of any items beyond [2 + general extender] as superfluous, or providing more instances than required. However, a consideration of the speaker's purpose in producing a list may lead to an alternative analysis. For example, in [67], it may be that Shirley's goal is to emphasize how much work she has been doing, rather than attempting to establish a pattern or expectation. Upon being asked 'You takin' a nap?' Shirley responds 'No:::=I been (.) vacuumin' 'n (1.0) washin': (1.0) clo::thes 'n dustin': 'n: all that stuff.' Note that the instances named by Shirley implicate a lexicalized category: 'housework.' This is important, for in responding to Julie's question in this manner, Shirley has chosen a longer response than if she were simply to name the category 'housework.' Shirley's utterance in turn #2 might be seen to exhibit iconicity between message content ('I have been doing a lot of work') and form (naming instances of a category and creating a longer message, rather than simply naming the lexicalized category: 'housework'). Indeed, recent research has suggested that 'language is

less arbitrary and less purely symbolic than has previously been assumed and that there is an appreciable iconic relationship between the physical form of grammatical structures and the content of messages which these structures are used to communicate' (Kirsner 1985:249; cf. Haiman 1980).

Finally, with regard to the claim that general extenders function to implicate multiple, additional list items, it is important to note that, even where general extenders occur in the structure [2 item + general extender], the general extender does not always seem to signal that multiple additional or alternate 'parts' or 'items' could have been named. As illustration, consider [73]:

> [73] MY:F78
> ((Sara and Maya are talking about a mutual
> acquaintance's appearance))
> 1. Maya: He- he always looks like (.) he has really bad
> bedhead (.5) now that he's got more hair or less hair **or**
> **something** // (He's-)
> 2. Sara: He's got like more hair.

In [73], the general extender *or something* seems to indicate that the speaker is unsure of the cause of Doug's bedhead. The function of *or something* as a marker of uncertainty will be discussed in section 4.3.3.1.

3.4.4   Problems of applicability

An attempt to implement a list-style analysis reveals problems of applicability. Note that while excerpts [63]-[65] contain clear examples of three-part lists, in instances where 'items' or

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'parts' are other than first order entities (Lyons 1977: 442), it is sometimes quite difficult to identify the 'parts.' How for instance, would one decide how many 'parts' precede the general extender in excerpts [74] and [75]?

[74] MO:T12
((Crystal is telling Julie about some guys she just met))
1. Crystal: Yeah. Um Frederico is just super- he's super mature for his age though, 'cause he's he sailed around the world s- um (.) for four yea::rs and (.) just sorta- an' had older brothers y'kno::w, and come from a really wealthy family::=had a lot of experiences **and stuff**, so he really (1.0) kinda presents himself as being older.
2. Julie: Umhm ...

[75] MO:T40
((Sara is outlining what her plans will be after moving to the city where Roger resides))
1. Sara: ...because really what I'm planning on doing is when I get out there .hhh I'm first going to focus my energy on like finding a place to li:::ve =
2. Roger: =Right=
3. Sara: =for the first couple of da::ys
4. Roger: Ri//ght
5. Sara: an' the::n I'm gonna go do::wn (.) or I might go down to a temporary place an' like do a little testing .hhh a//n'
6. Roger: Right.
7. Sara: start sendin' out my resumé, **an' stuff like that**, but, I me//an,
8. Roger: Right.
9. Sara: the first (.) order of importance is to find a place to li::ve.
10. Roger: Right. ...

In instances such as these, the identification of 'parts' is necessarily a subjective determination made by the analyst.26

3.5 Chapter summary

The most extensive studies of general extenders thus far have been conducted to confirm the analysts' hypotheses as to how these expressions are used, and have been based primarily on the examination of constructed examples and 'real' sentences isolated from their contexts of occurrence. The abstraction of the data to be analyzed away from its context of use has resulted in an overly simplistic, and even inaccurate account of how participants employ and interpret general extenders in speaker-hearer interactive contexts.

In this chapter, I examined my corpus of naturally-occurring, interactional data to investigate the claim that speakers use general extenders to implicate a category, so that hearers may infer additional or alternate members of the speaker's intended category. I found that, while there is some evidence to support the claim that speakers use general extenders to implicate additional or alternate instances of some category (section 3.3.1), it is implausible that speakers' and hearers' categories match in some objective way, or that a speaker's mention of a prototypical example will enable the hearer to infer the same set that the speaker has in mind (sections 3.3.4 and 3.3.5). I demonstrated that the interpretation of general extenders is necessarily subjective, and massively constrained by both linguistic and nonlinguistic context, as well as background knowledge (section 3.3.3).

Next, I examined my data to investigate Jefferson's (1990) claim that general extenders function to address the 'programmatic relevance of three-partedness.' I found that, although certain examples might be viewed as support for the claim that general extenders function to complete three-part lists (section 3.4.1), general extenders occurred as third parts in only 32 of 158 instances; in the overwhelming majority of cases, general extenders occur in structures of the form [1 item + general extender]. Recognizing that a quantitative analysis is just one (perhaps irrelevant) way of identifying a norm, I looked for other evidence that the participants were orienting to a norm of three-partedness (e.g., sanctioned violations); no such evidence was found (section 3.4.2). Finally, I noted some problems with the applicability of a list-style analysis (section 3.4.4). On the basis of these observations, I concluded that my data offers no supportive evidence for Jefferson's (1990:68) claim that general extenders are employed as a 'methodic solution to the problem of three-partedness.'

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

[1] The 'classical' and 'contemporary' notions of category may be compared with what Grace (1987:5-6) calls the MAPPING VIEW, and the REALITY CONSTRUCTION VIEW. The mapping view assumes that 'there is a common world out there and our languages are analogous to maps of this world,' whereas in the reality construction view 'the imperfectness of our access to knowledge of the real world assumes central importance.' They may also be compared with Lakoff's (1987b:xii-xvi) OBJECTIVIST and EXPERIENTIAL REALISM views of meaning. In the objectivist view, 'meaningful thought and reason concern merely the manipulation of abstract symbols and their correspondence to an objective reality, independent of any embodiment (except, perhaps, for limitations imposed by the organism)'; experiential realism, on the other hand, holds that 'meaningful thought and reason essentially concern the nature of the organism doing the thinking--including the nature of its body, its interactions in the environment, its social character, and so on.'

[2] Berlin (1978:9) suggests that ethnobiological classification is one area which is 'rather precisely defined,' in that 'there are fairly well agreed upon procedures for recognizing an instance of some particular plant or animal type that are less ambiguous than recognizing instances of demons, mythical beings, binary oppositions, or, for that matter, even making judgements of grammaticality.' However, those who embrace the 'contemporary' notion of category ultimately believe that the conception of 'biological species as natural kinds which are defined by common essential properties' is inaccurate, and 'will be left behind' (Lakoff 1987:9, 185-95).

[3] Similarly, in a test which involved presenting participants with pictures of containers and asking them to label them 'cup,' 'vase,' or bowl,' Labov (1973) demonstrated that the boundaries between these words are not precisely defined (as they would be if determined by necessary and sufficient conditions).

[4] According to Bloor (1983:32), Wittgenstein's approach also included a notion of focality, or 'paradigm examples'; these 'paradigm examples' seem to correspond to what Rosch calls prototypes.

[5] A point of interest with regard to the notion of category boundaries is that 'categories tend to be viewed as being separate from each other and as clear-cut as possible' (Rosch 1978:35). Whereas the 'classical' view of categories 'achieves this by means of necessary and sufficient conditions for category membership,' the 'contemporary view' achieves this sense of 'separateness and clarity of actually continuous categories by conceiving of each in terms of its clear cases, rather than its boundaries' (Rosch 1978:35-36).

[6] There are 11 such examples in my data set; see MO:T15 (x2), MO:T30, MO:T39, MO:T51, MY:F65, MY:F72, MY:F75 (x2), MY:F80, MY:F81.

[7] One form which does not appear to be used to implicate additional instances of a category is *and blah blah blah*. Special attention will be given to this form in section 4.3.3.3.

[8] cf. Berlin (1978) and Berlin, *et al.* (1968) for a discussion of covert categories and types of evidence which show that these categories are conceptually recognized. Berlin offers an example from Tzeltal, where, although there is no linguistic designation for the kingdoms as a whole, 'all names that later proved to refer to plants occur with the numeral classifier *tehk*, whereas all animal names occur with the contrasting classifier *koht'* (Berlin 1978:12).

[9] These include: MO:T7, MO:T16, MO:T52, MO:F58, MY:F67, MO:T88.

[10] Of course, this is not to say that general extenders provide the ONLY way of making reference to nonlexicalized categories. One obvious alternative would be to use a phrase to describe the category. For instance, in excerpt [8], instead of saying 'clothes, an' tents, an' stuff,' Rosie could have said 'the light things.'

[11] cf. Rosch (1978:35-36). A contrasting of categories does not presume that the boundary between the categories can be precisely defined, although it does imply that there is a boundary.

12 One way to talk about this is in terms of 'target' and 'contrast' categories. cf. Bateson (1955), who speaks of a 'proper ground' for a class, and Bilmes (1985:34-35) for a discussion of this concept.

13 cf. Brown and Yule (1983a) for a discussion of the distinction between cotext and context.

14 Lakoff (1987b:93-94) presents an interesting example of categorization based on a 'basic domain of experience' (originally from Dixon 1982): In Dyirbal, an aboriginal language of Australia, all objects are classified into one of four categories (by the use of a classifier before each noun); '... fish are in class I, since they are animate. Fishing implements (fishing spears, fishing line, etc.) are also in class 1, even though they might be expected to be in class IV, since they are neither animate nor a form of food.'

15 cf. Miller (1978) for a discussion of practical versus lexical knowledge.

16 Translation from the German: 'Jeder Schritt meiner Auslegung der Welt beruht jeweils auf einem Vorrat früherer Erfahrung: sowohl meiner eigenen unmittelbaren Erfahrungen als auch solcher Erfahrungen, die mir von meinen Mitmenschen, vor allem meinen Eltern, Lehrern usw. übermittelt wurden. All diese mitgeteilten und unmittelbaren Erfahrungen schließen sich zu einer gewissen Einheit in der Form eines Wissensvorrats zusammen, der mir als Bezugsschema für den jeweiligen Schritt meiner Weltauslegung dient. Alle meine Erfahrungen in der Lebenswelt sind auf dieses Schema bezogen, so daß mir die Gegenstände und Ereignisse in der Lebenswelt von vornherein in ihrer Typenhaftigkeit entgegentreten ... Jedes lebensweltliche Auslegen ist ein Auslegen innerhalb eines Rahmens von bereits Ausgelegtem, innerhalb einer gründsätzlich und dem Typus nach vertrauten Wirklichkeit. Ich vertraue darauf, daß die Welt, so wie sie mir bisher bekannt ist, weiter so bleiben wird und daß folglich der aus meinen eigenen Erfahrungen gebildete und der von Mitmenschen übernommene Wissensvorrat weiterhin seine grundsätzliche Gültigkeit beibehalten wird' (Schütz and Luckmann 1977:29).

[17] cf. Rosch (1978:43-45) for a discussion of preliminary studies on categorization with regard to event processes; and Jackendoff (1983:41-56) for a discussion of linguistic and nonlinguistic arguments to support the claim that 'conceptual structure must contain a rich range of ontological categories.'

[18] Of course, as noted in chapter 1, the 'scope' of a general extender is often difficult to establish. This is offered as one plausible interpretation.

[19] According to Brownowski and Bellugi (1972:70): 'What language expresses specifically is the reification by the human mind of its experience, that is, an analysis into parts (including actions and properties as well as objects) which, as concepts, can be manipulated as if they were objects.'

[20] Of course, in the instances where categories are contextually-constrained and highly novel, as opposed to culturally conventional, the named examples which precede the general extender might be considered prototypes more or less by definition.

[21] Although one might conceivably ask the speaker if he or she had anything else in mind when uttering the general extender, the speaker's account of what he or she had in mind may be an unreliable guide (cf. Bilmes 1986).

[22] Lounsbury's (1964) analysis of the word *nehcihsähA* 'maternal uncle' in Fox is an example of how members of a category may be 'generated' by a central member and some general rules.

[23] These include: MO:T12, MO:T14 (x2), MO:T18, MO:T19, MO:T23, MO:T27 (x2), MO:T29, MO:T31, MO:T32, MO:T36, MO:T39, MO:T40 (x2), MO:T45, MO:T52, MO:T53, MO:F57, MO:F58, MO:F59, MO:F61, MO:F63, MO:F64, MY:F67, MY:F71, MY:F75 (x2), MY:F78, MY:F83 (x2), MY:F85.

[24] These include: MO:T7, MO:T12, MO:T17, MO:T30, MO:T37, MO:T44, MY:F67, MY:F77.

[25] Schegloff (1968) refers to the relationship of answers to questions as 'conditional relevance.'

26 The presence of a disambiguating response by the hearer which demonstrates how the speaker's utterance was received would be one way in which the analyst could 'ground' his or her interpretation, making it more objective and empirical.

CHAPTER 4

INTERPERSONAL FUNCTION:

GENERAL EXTENDERS AS PRAGMATIC EXPRESSIONS

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, the focus of investigation was the possibility of analyzing general extenders in terms of categories. In many cases, it appears to be quite feasible to think of potential categories that may be implicated by the occurrence of a general extender. Indeed, in almost all examples cited out of context, it is possible for the analyst to propose a likely category as referent for a general extender. However, as I hope to illustrate in this chapter, within their actual contexts of occurrence, general extenders do not appear to be used with category implication as their most obvious function. When viewed in terms of their role within the interactive exchange of talk, general extenders appear to have a function that can be viewed as interpersonal and tied to the nature of the social relationships of the participants. Consequently, in this chapter, the discussion will shift from a concern with the conceptual and the categorial to an exploration of the interpersonal role of general extenders.

In section 4.2, I shall explore the role of general extenders as potentially indicating assumptions of shared knowledge and experience, particularly with regard to the marking of intersubjectivity and rapport. In section 4.3, I shall investigate the

ways in which speakers appear to use general extenders to indicate their attitude towards the message or the hearer.

4.2 Intersubjectivity

In chapter 3, consideration was given to the proposal that, in using a general extender, a speaker implicates a category, so that a hearer may infer additional or alternate members of the category the speaker has in mind. In this picture, a speaker's intended category is assumed to match the hearer's inferred category in an objective way; participants' worlds are being treated as identical at some categorial level. This, in principle, would be a very misleading perspective from which to consider interactive talk. A great deal of philosophical writing has been devoted to exploring the fact that individual mental worlds are necessarily distinct. The real focus of interest is how humans manage to create comparability of categories, or even sufficient overlap, given the assumption of non-identical worlds. This process has been described in terms of INTERSUBJECTIVITY.

Contemporary discussions of intersubjectivity focus on how participants reach similar interpretations, and ascribe this achievement to an assumption of shared knowledge, or a 'co-conception of the world.' (Schegloff 1992:1297-1298; Schiffrin 1994:387). The roots of this approach to an assumed 'co-conception of the world' can be traced back through the work of Schegloff

(1992), Garfinkel (1967), Cicourel (1974), Schütz (1932/1967), Mead (1938), Durkheim (1915), and Husserl (1929/1977).

For Husserl, a philosopher writing in the 1920s, it was important to draw a distinction between individual subjective experience and the assumed existence of a world beyond, and independent of, that individual subjectivity:[1]

> First of all, before everything else conceivable, I am. This "I am" is for me, the subject who says it, and says it in the right sense, the primitive intentional basis for my world; at the same time, I may not overlook that the "objective" world, the "world for all of us" as accepted with this sense by me, is also "my" world. "I am" is the primitive intentional basis, however, not only for "the" world, that I consider real, but also for any "ideal world" that I accept; for everything that I hold to exist— sometimes legitimately, sometimes illegitimately, etc.— including myself, my life, my believing, all this consciousness.[2]

Given that our conceptualization of the world is necessarily subjective, it seems reasonable to assume that no two individuals will share identical concepts. In fact, most analysts proceed as if it is simply not the case that separate minds have identical contents (cf. Schegloff 1992:1296-1297; cf. Garfinkel 1967). It would follow that, in principle, even if a speaker had a specific category in mind when using a general extender as a category implicative expression, the hearer's inferred category would, in many cases, not exactly match the speakers intended category. Support for this has already

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been presented in the preceding chapter, and in the work of Barsalou (1983), Frake (1969:3), and Dougherty (1981:166), on categorization.

Despite the fact that our individual conceptualizations of the world differ, social actors typically assume shared knowledge and a shared world (Husserl 1929/1977:92), and behave as if the external world is sufficiently the same for them as it is for others. This aspect of human interactive behavior has been labelled differently by different writers. In the psychological tradition, the emphasis has been on *shared*, or *mutual knowledge* (cf. Clark and Clark 1977; and the contributions in Smith 1982). In the sociological tradition, the emphasis has been on *the reciprocity of perspectives* or *intersubjectivity* (cf. Schütz 1962:10-11,14; Schütz and Luckmann 1977:59; Cicourel 1974:34; Schegloff 1992:1297). Contemporary writers in this latter tradition credit Schütz with the original articulation of these insights. Heritage (1984:77) summarizes Schütz's observations in the following way:

> Actors engaged in coordinated actions with others will assume the socially standardized and shared nature of their knowledge and will seek actively, if unconsciously, to sustain it. They will accomplish this by maintaining the 'reciprocity of perspectives' — subject only to the provision that they assume that knowledge arising from their own particular biographical circumstances will be available to others only to a limited extent, which is, partially at least, under the autonomous control of each individual.

The 'reciprocity of perspectives' described above is the procedure through which intersubjectivity is achieved (Schegloff 1992:1297).

According to Cicourel (1974:34), Schütz's reciprocity of perspectives is an 'interpretive procedure basic to all interaction,' which consists of two parts:

> The first part instructs the speaker and hearer to assume their mutual experiences of the interaction are the same even if they were to change places. The second part informs each participant to disregard personal differences in how each assigns meaning to everyday activities, thus each can attend the present scene in an identical manner for the practical matter at hand.

With regard to the study at hand, it may be said that a speaker's use of a general extender invokes an assumption of intersubjectivity; its interpretation requires the hearer to assume a reciprocity of perspectives. In using a general extender, the speaker communicates the following message to the hearer: 'Because we share the same knowledge, experience, and conceptual schemes, I do not need to be explicit; you can fill in any gaps.'[3]

4.2.1 Knowledge types

The type of knowledge required to infer what is being implicated by the use of a general extender may range from broad, cultural, or public knowledge, to private knowledge. For example, in [76], Sara and Maya are talking about a mutual friend, who is planning to move to another state. In order to infer what is implicated by the general extender *or anything like that* in [76], Sara must recognize the named items, *call me* and *write me*, as ways that members of her culture keep in touch:

[76] MY:F83
1. Maya: ... I really think as soon as she moves to
Connecticut I won't know her anymore. I'm sure she's not
gonna call me or you know write me or anything like
th//at.
2. Sara: I have a feeling she's gonna- sh- I'm not gonna
know her much anymore either ...

The category of *ways of keeping in touch* may qualify as a kind of
broad or general knowledge that the analyst, as a non-participant in
the interaction, may attribute to the participants.

Since the interpretation of an interpersonally established,
potentially private way of seeing the world would depend upon
having access to some specialized knowledge shared by the
participants, it is difficult for an analyst, as an outsider, to propose
such an interpretation of interactive data involving others.
Therefore, the following example, reconstructed from a personal
(non-recorded) conversation, will be offered to illustrate a
speaker's use of a general extender to implicate a kind of private
knowledge:

[77] ((Melvin and Sherrie are friends of Dexter and
Mary))
1. Mary: Sherrie is really unhappy with Melvin.
2. Dexter: Why?
3. Mary: Y'know, she wants whales, candlelight, **and
stuff like that.**

A stranger overhearing the exchange in [77] would likely experience
difficulty in identifying what Mary has in mind. After all, *whales*

and *candlelight* are not typically thought of as members of a category, and Mary does not elaborate on what the *stuff like that* might be. In order to determine with any certainty what Mary is referring to, the stranger would need access to the knowledge which Mary shares with Dexter. Only then might the stranger recognize what I (as the speaker) had in mind: that Sherrie wants to share certain kinds of experiences with Melvin and have him enjoy those experiences in the way that Dexter and I share and enjoy the experiences associated with the terms mentioned prior to the general extender. We could label this as a category of *romantic things*, but this label would be a massively underspecified representation of what is intersubjectively understood in this case.

While the interpretation of utterances containing some general extenders may be seen to depend upon a common, or shared experience which pre-exists the interaction (i.e, [76] and [77]), the interpretation of others may depend upon an assumption of a more abstract and subjective kind of shared knowledge. For example, in [78], Crystal is describing some of her new friends to Julie:

[78] MO:T15
1. Crystal: I been- I've sort of found some f- different kind of friends um th//at I've been hanging out with
2. Julie: That's good.
3. Crystal: Yeah. (.) So i- girlfriends, y'know, which is good for me. They stay out late, too, so I always bump into 'em. They're like (.) strippers 'n // huh huh
4. Julie: Mmhm
5. Crystal: So we'll like meet after work, an' have cocktails, an' dance, 'n just go flirt with the boys, so-
6. Julie: heh // heh

7. Crystal: We have fu::n.
8. Julie: Strippers, huh?
9. Crystal: Oh, it's funny. But they're totally ni::ce //
y'know
10. Julie: Uh huh
11. Crystal: an' this one girl you would not even know it.
She looks like she works in a grocery store **or
something**. Y'know. Just totally normal // an'
12. Julie: conservative
13. Crystal: Yeah, yeah. She just- She's young, and she
likes to travel, an' she's just having fun with it,
14. Julie: Umhm
15. Crystal: an' um they're totally cool. I- hhh. didn't
think I'd get along with 'em either=We were all thrown on
a boat together,
16. Julie: Mmhm
17. Crystal: and um ended up just having a great time.
18. Julie: Cool.

The point of interest in this excerpt is where Crystal describes one
of the strippers she has been hanging out with. Crystal says that the
girl 'looks like she works in a grocery store or something.' She then
elaborates on the expression containing the general extender with
'y'know, just totally normal.' Here, Crystal uses 'a grocery store' as
an example of a place where 'normal' people work. In implicating
'places where normal people work,' Crystal demonstrates an
expectation that Julie will recognize and share her subjective
concept of what type of person works at a grocery store.[4] Indeed,
Julie demonstrates acceptance of the concept by offering a further
characterization of the type as being 'conservative.' This
contribution is approved by Crystal, who replies 'yeah, yeah.'

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It appears that, regardless of the type of knowledge required to interpret an utterance containing a general extender, or whether the implicated concept is culturally-established (e.g., ways to keep in touch with someone) or more novel (e.g., places where 'normal' people work), the basic function of the general extender is the same. In using a general extender, the speaker conveys to the hearer an assumption of shared knowledge, and invites the hearer to supply whatever unstated understandings would be required to make sense of the utterance. By demonstrating an assumption of shared knowledge with the hearer in this manner, the speaker underscores a similarity between the participants. This may be seen to either reaffirm existing familiarity, or represent a bid to decrease social distance. In turn, by treating the speaker's utterance as unproblematic (and disregarding personal differences in how each assigns meaning to everyday activities), the hearer reciprocally underscores the participants' similarity.

4.2.2 Co-occurrence with y'know

General extenders frequently co-occur with the discourse marker y'know. In addition to occurring in many of the excerpts already cited, y'know is found to co-occur with general extenders in [79]-[81]:

[79] MO:T27
((Roger and Sara are discussing how she might take over
his apartment when he moves out))
1. Roger: I will um intimate to the people who:: r<u>e</u>nt me
this place
2. Sara: Uh huh
3. Roger: that there is someone who will y'know=like (.)
take it over, and under my recommendation as **y'know-
all that crap**, .hhhh // an' um
4. Sara: Yeah.
5. Roger: an' they will um- (.5) an' see- an' like see if I
get any feedback on their intentions about what th<u>e</u>//y
wanna do.
6. Sara: Yeah. ...

[80] MY:F83
((Maya is talking to Sara about a mutual friend who is
about to marry and move to another state, and her desire
to keep in touch with that friend))
1. Maya: ... I mean I don't approve of what she's doing (.5)
but (1.5) I'd really like to like if she's g<u>o</u>nna go through
labor and delivery and she's g<u>o</u>nna have a baby **and all
this stuff** (.5) **you know** I'd // like to be able to be
there.
2. Sara: I- I- I think she- I think she'll keep in touch with
you. Actually I do. ...

[81] MO:T10
((Crystal is telling Julie about her surprise in finding
Julie's wedding announcement in her mailbox))
Crystal: ... for some reason I just l<u>oo</u>ked in the mailbox,
I didn't even think there'd be:: anything, y'know'
Julie: Uh huh
Crystal: I just was gonna take garbage out of it **or
s(h)omething, y'(h)know**, // huh huh I didn't know wh<u>a</u>t
was in there! huh huh ...

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The co-occurrence of *y'know* with general extenders is not limited

to my data set. The following are excerpts from other data sources

which demonstrate the same phenomenon:

[82] Jefferson 1990:70
Ken: I go in there and I uh put all the bottles in back and
I uh give people change, **and junk like this.** // **Y'know.**
Roger: Last Saturday night I downed a litre bottle of
champagne...

[83] Brown and Yule 1983b:17
An elderly man reminiscing about his youth said:
There were + some very very good houses rather old-
fashioned but quite good houses + with very big rooms
and that + and these were sort of better class people +
people with maybe + minor civil servants **and things
like that you know** that had been able to afford +
dearer rents **and that** in those days **you know** ++ but
the average working-class man + the wages were very
small + the rents would run from anything from about
five shillings to + seven shillings which was about all
they could've possibly afforded in those days...

[84] Bilmes, unpublished
M: .hh Well (.) (bLloyd) I'd like y' ta- (.8) would you: be
willing t' take a minute (.) just to: (.) let us put that
down in writing?
T: No I can't see any reason f'r that.=It's (j's a) phone
number it's available y'know: uh: (.4) he works at Pearl
Harbor **'nd uh** (.7) **so on 'n' so forth** (.5) .hh .hh
y'know° I din' come in here 'n ho- hour 'nd a half 'r
whatever j'st ta j'st t' give a phone number 'n': 'n' put
something down 'n writing (.) like that //=
M: Okay (.7) wull:
T: =(y'know) (.) I come in here f'r: substantial uh (1.2) //
(reasons)

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The fact that general extenders and the discourse marker *y'know* frequently co-occur seems to support the notion that, in using a general extender, a speaker is relying on an assumption of shared knowledge or experience (cf. Aijmer 1985:378-79). According to Schiffrin, one function of *y'know* is to mark 'general consensual truths which speakers assume hearers share through their co-membership in the same culture, society, or group' (Schiffrin 1987:274). *Y'know* may also be used to seek interactional alignments by establishing shared opinion (Schiffrin 1987:279). In such cases, a hearer may affirm his or her shared knowledge or perspective with utterances such as: *yeah, umhm, uh huh, okay,* or *right.*

4.2.3 Backchannels

As noted in chapter 3, despite the inexplicit nature of general extenders, participants typically treat the interpretation of utterances containing them as unproblematic; speakers assume that hearers will be able to fill in the gaps to make recognizable sense of an utterance containing a general extender, and hearers exhibit no difficulty in interpreting them. The following excerpt contains the only example in my data of a hearer questioning a speaker's intention immediately after the speaker uses a general extender:

[85] MO:T27
1. Sara: So, but like later on, I'm gonna get together with you an' find out like how much of your stuff you wanna get rid of, an' how much of it you wanna sell to me, heh
2. Roger: O:::kay.

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3. Sara: Like are you- I me- Are you like (.) planning to do that? I mean, I don't wanna step on your toes or anything.
4. Roger: Whatcha mean?
5. Sara: Wu- // uh
6. Roger: You mean like when I leave here in August?
7. Sara: Yea:h.
8. Roger: No, no. You can ha::ve like the stuff like the bed...

The point of interest in the above exchange occurs in turns #4 and #5, where Roger asks Sara 'Whatcha mean?' and Sara responds 'wu-uh.' Utterances such as 'well' and 'uh' have been described as 'dispreference markers' or 'reluctance markers' which may indicate trouble (Pomerantz 1984:72, Davidson 1984:127, Bilmes 1988b:173). In this case, it may be that Sara is experiencing trouble with Roger's 'Whatcha mean?', which initially appears to be a request for clarification of the 'commonplace' remark 'I don't wanna step on your toes or anything.' A request for the clarification of a commonplace remark would constitute a 'breach' of Schütz's reciprocity of perspectives (the assumption that the hearer would supply whatever unstated understandings are required to make sense of the speaker's utterance). As Garfinkel has shown, conversational participants react quite strongly to requests for clarification involving such commonplace expressions. As illustration, consider the following example from Garfinkel's (1963:221-222; cf. Heritage 1984:80-82) 'breaching experiments':

Case 1: The subject was telling the experimenter, a member of the subject's car pool, about having a flat tire while going to work the previous day.

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> S: I had a flat tire.
> E: What do you mean, you had a flat tire?
> She appeared momentarily stunned. Then she answered in a hostile way: 'What do you mean? What do you mean? A flat tire is a flat tire. That is what I meant. Nothing special. What a crazy question!'

Of course, Roger's question in [85] does not result in an interactional crisis, as it does in the example from Garfinkel. This might be attributed to the fact that it is unclear what Roger is questioning (i.e., he doesn't say 'Whatcha mean, *I don't wanna step on your toes or anything?'*; in particular, he doesn't ask what she means by *or anything*). In addition, Roger's subsequent utterance in turn #6 'You mean like when I leave here in August?,' which immediately follows Sara's 'Wu-,' demonstrates that Roger is simply unsure about the time frame Sara is referring to.

Whether or not Sara perceives Roger's 'Whatcha mean?' in [85] as a breach of the reciprocity of perspectives, it seems reasonable to expect that a hearer's overt request for clarification of a general extender might be treated as such, and sanctioned by the speaker.[5] Since conversational participants do not typically question such commonplace expressions, one would need to set up experiments in order to test this hypothesis.

As is the case with the discourse marker *y'know*, general extenders may be seen to elicit displays of understanding. Indeed, hearers are often found to mark their shared knowledge with backchannels, as illustrated in [86]-[89]:

[86] MO:T7
1. Julie: You takin' a nap?
2. Sara: No:::=I been (.) vacuumin' 'n (1.0) washin': (1.0)
clo::thes 'n dustin': **'n: all that stuff.**
3. Julie: Umhm.

[87] MO:T40
1. Sara: the first (.) order of importance is to find a place
to li::ve.
2. Roger: Right. (.) Ah, yeah. We've made a list of you- for
you of like doctors a::nd connections, **an' thi//ngs**
3. Sara: Yea:::h.
4. Roger: Yea::h You'll find a place to live, and you'll find a
job. Don't worry about that.
5. Sara: Oh, no. I'm not worried about that at all.

[88] MO:T50
1. Anne: Wull that's the way- that's who I was until
2. Roger: Uh huh
3. Anne: I got a P.h.D. **or something**=
4. Roger: =Oh, okay. Right.
5. Anne: So it was u::m=
6. Roger: =Yeah, I- I know what you mean. Yeah.

[89] MY:F85
1. Maya: looking at my grandma and my grandpa: I- they're
not freaked out about dying even (.) my grandmother who
doesn't have religion is (.5) you know I mean they have
like little (.) bizarre times in their lives where they're
like kinda shaky and I think that's dealing with it but (.)
they seem to have a much better grip on the fact (.) that
they're gonna die and much more at peace with it
regardless of (.) affiliations or like intelligence **o r
any//thing.**
2. Sara: Mmhm.
3. Maya: I'm sure it's all (.) real biological but (.) hnh! ...

Again, this phenomenon is not limited to my data set. For example,

Dines (1980:30) notes that her data contained no instances of

requests for clarification by hearers; she notes instead that there was 'supportive feedback' by listeners in response to utterances containing general extenders. The following are excerpts from another data source:

[90] Svartvik and Quirk 1980:133
B: and you'll find you see you've always got some
research to do you can // always get on with some
A: (Yes)
B: slips **or something** // so you'll never
A: m
B: be in that happy position ((laughs))

[91] Svartvik and Quirk 1980:128
B: or then they (he found) last year that that five fifteen
one clashed with they some of them had phonetics **or
something**
A/C: (mhm)
B: and he said well what about half past seven

In her analysis of *y'know*, Schiffrin (1987:273) claims that once we acknowledge that the information state is verbally displayed (as it is in the examples above) 'we may also assume that the marker by which such verbal displays are SOLICITED functions not merely as a cognitive marker, but as an interactional marker' (Schiffrin 1987:273). In accordance with this description, general extenders may also be considered 'interactional markers.'

4.3 Interpersonal function

In the sections which follow, I shall examine naturally-occurring interactive data to explore how speakers use general extenders as pragmatic expressions to mark their attitude toward the message expressed, and toward the hearer: in section 4.3.1, I shall demonstrate how speakers may employ certain expressions (e.g., *or anything, and everything, or what*) as intensifiers, to emphasize or highlight a preceding part of an utterance; in section 4.3.2, I shall illustrate how a speaker's use of a general extender may be viewed as a politeness strategy; and, in section 4.3.3, I shall consider how a speaker's use of a general extender may be seen to display an orientation to one of three proposed principles of conversation: Quality (4.3.3.1), the Q-Principle (4.3.3.2), or the R-Principle (4.3.3.3).

It should be emphasized that forms which occur with higher frequency in my data set (e.g., *or anything, and everything, or something, or whatever, and stuff*) will be given more attention than those which occur with lower frequency (e.g., *and all (this/that), and shit (like that), and blah blah blah, or what*). The fact that the form *or something* occurs 43 times (which represents nearly a third of all examples), accounts for the extended analysis of this form in section 4.3.3.1.

4.3.1 General extenders as intensifiers

Previous analyses of general extenders have suggested that the form *and everything* is functionally distinct from other general extenders. As noted in chapter 2, Aijmer (1985) suggests that the function of *and everything* is to foreground or highlight the main point of an utterance, and mark it as [+remarkable]; *everything* is typically stressed. Aijmer suggests that one function of *or anything* is similar to *and everything*, the primary difference being that it occurs in negative environments. For example, *or anything* may be used to indicate that something is true, although it is hard to believe (Aijmer 1985:384). Indeed, there are examples in my data set which would seem to support the claim that *and everything* and *or anything* are used to highlight part of an utterance. Consider [92]. In this excerpt, Crystal is telling Julie about her struggle to get child support from her ex-husband:

[92] MO:T11
1. Crystal: He doesn't even know where (.) my new
address- where to ch- send money to me y'kno//w **or
anything**
2. Julie: Oh, wo:::w
3. Crystal: I kno::w, so I have to wait for it at my old
address- Meanwhile I've already had to pay re:nt, an' so
it's like he's just like expecting me to have this money:::
y'know // like
4. Julie: Mmhm
5. Crystal: to just c- come up with, like no problem-
6. Julie: Um//hm
7. Crystal: It's unbelievable!
8. Julie: Bummer.=

9. Crystal: =Su::ch a jerk. So I'm just gonna- I'm getting a lawyer an' I'm just gonna y'know they're gonna send a messenger to Australia or have one over there just serve him papers (.) t//o his face
10. Julie: Goo:d.
11. Crystal: He's gonna hafta fly back special.
12. Julie: heh heh heh // heh
13. Crystal: Yeah. I'm gonna rea:::m him for // this one.
14. Julie: huh huh huh huh huh huh // .hhh
15. Crystal: He's making me so mad=I just found out he ripped me off **an' everything**
16. Julie: He di:::d?
17. Crystal: He's been sending me um, it's supposed to be three hundred dollars, but he's been deducting seventy dollars for insurance ...

The first point of interest in excerpt [92] is found in turn #1, where Crystal says 'He doesn't even know where (.) my new address- where to ch- send money to me y'know or anything.' It appears that, in using the general extender *or anything*, Crystal marks the assertion that her ex-husband doesn't even know where to send money to her as true - although hard to believe. The adverb 'even' in this utterance strengthens this implication by providing the conventional implicature 'contrary to expectation.' Note that in turn #2, Julie responds 'Oh, wo:::w'; (although it is not clear in the transcript, the utterance of 'wo:::w' occurs after the *or anything*). This expression of surprise may be seen as a reaction to Crystal's *or anything* which marks it as hard to believe. A second point of interest in [92] is found in turn #15, where Crystal says 'I just found out he ripped me off an' everything.' In this case, Crystal's use of *and everything* seems to mark 'he ripped me off' as [+remarkable]. Once again,

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Julie's response in turn #16, 'He di::::d?' may be seen as an expression of surprise.

Further illustration of this is found in excerpt [93]. In this excerpt, Maya is telling Sara about a recent interaction she had with a mutual friend named Wendy:

[93] MY:F64
1. Maya: ... I don't know why: I always have arguments with Wendy=well, not really arguments. I- I call her (.) and I'm not perfectly happy with her and I'm not even yelling=and I'm not even arguing. I'm just like 'Okay, that's fine. I- I misunderstood you and you said you were gonna do this (.5) and I'm a little angry but that's okay and I'm gonna be over it in a minute' and I mean it. 'A- I- uh Okay, I'm a little peeved but I'll get over it.'=An' five minutes later I've forgotten it. Wendy goes into the bathroom- gets so scared sh//e takes a shi::t
2. Sara: ((burps))
3. Maya: .hhh! and then dr(h)ives to my house because she thinks she's in major trouble. I'm like (.5) 'Me not liking everything you do doesn't mea:n (.) that (.) I'm mad at you.' You know, it's like (.) she comes over an' she's like '(h)I- I ran over here' an' I'm like 'Why? Why did-' ø 'I'm not gonna go with Sara because .hh you're upset with-.' I'm like 'No, I'm not upset with you. I'm over it.=I'm completely over it.'=I said 'That pisses me off', and that got me over it.' An'=she's like (.5) 'Oh, (.5) I took a shit **and everything** 'cause I was so scared.' heh heh ø 'Wo//w, a crapper.'
4. Sara: Yea:h
5. Maya: I- I just um shake when I get nervous. I don't go and empty anything unle::ss I'm in a house that's being broken into an' then
4. Sara: huh=an' then I- //lose a:ll bowel control
5. Maya: all hell breaks loose. huh huh Yeah.

Excerpt [93] provides an especially interesting example of *and everything* functioning to mark something as [+remarkable]. What makes this example unusual is the fact that Maya, in representing both sides of the conversation, provides a response to her own utterance (represented as Wendy's speech) which contains *and everything*. In turn #3, Maya reports that Wendy said 'I took a shit and everything 'cause I was so scared'; Maya then reports her own reaction to this as 'Wow, a crapper!' The shift in speakers which occurs with 'Wow' is marked in the transcript by the zero quotative symbol which precedes it (cf. Mathis and Yule 1994). The response of 'wow' may again be seen as a reaction to an utterance containing *and everything* which marks 'I took a shit' as [+remarkable]. Since Maya's response (i.e., 'wow') displays, at some level, an interpretation of her own utterance ('I took a shit and everything'), it seems reasonable to assume that the interpretation of this utterance (i.e., [+remarkable]) matches the intended meaning ([+remarkable]).

Although I have no examples of this in my data set, the form *or nothing* is sometimes found to occur in place of *or anything*. An example of *or nothing* used to highlight part of an utterance as [+remarkable] is found in the cartoon caption in figure 7:

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in the author's university library.

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Figure 7

The Far Side

Figure 7

While examples such as [92] and [93] seem to support Aijmer's contention that *and everything* functions to highlight a preceding part of an utterance as [+remarkable], examples such as [94] (a 'perspicuous case' which appeared in chapter 3 as excerpt [36]), challenge Aijmer's (1985:383) suggestion that it is always the case that where a speaker uses *and everything*, the 'unity of the set is created ... by the speaker assigning the feature [+remarkable] to the members':

[94] MO:T15
1. Julie: Frederico, huh?
2. Crystal: Frederico=I know! An' his brother is Juan. huh huh // huh
3. Julie: O:::h, look out!
4. Crystal: Juan is one of those light ones. He has red hair **an' everything.** L- Light hair, blue eyes, (.) white skin, Mex- um, uh Spanish, y'know.
5. Julie: Umhm
6. Crystal: An' Frederico he's- he's da::rk. He's um- he's really nice.

In [94], it appears that Crystal uses *and everything* to implicate a category of physical features that 'light' Spanish people have.

In their study of the form *and everything*, Ward and Birner (1992) suggest that *and everything* can either: (1) mean all members of an inferrable category; or (2) indicate that the constituent which precedes the general extender indicates a high value on an evoked scale. (Although it is formulated differently, the second function described by Ward and Birner seems to refer to the 'highlighting' function identified by Aijmer, which has already been discussed). Ward and Birner suggest that pitch accent may play a role in distinguishing between these two functions: where the constituent *and everything* exhibits L+H* rising intonation, the second function is indicated. An example of this is found in excerpt [95] from the Oprah Winfrey Show. In this excerpt, a male audience member is telling a story about a time when he took his wife (then fianceé) out drinking, and she became ill:

[95] Oprah Winfrey Show: 2/28/94
1. Male: ... I put her in bed an' everything 'n took her
clothes an' washed 'em while she was sleepin' there and I
said I love you an' I respect you and I won't (.) do:
anything
2. Audience: Aa::::::::::::://::hhhhh!!!!
3. Oprah: That is (1.0) He: washed her CLO::::::thes **an'
E:verything!** How long you been married?
4. Male: Fourteen years. ...

In addition to exhibiting rising intonation, this instance of *and
everything* is prounounced with heavy stress on the first syllable of
every. Indeed, it may be that any type of phonological prominence
(i.e., loudness, lengthening, rising intonation) attributed to the
general extender will tend to indicate the second function described
above. In accordance with Ward and Birner's analysis, we might
analyze Oprah's use of the general extender *and everything* in the
utterance 'He: washed her CLO::::::thes an' E:VERYthing!' as indicating
that the washing of clothes represents a high value on a scale, such
as 'degrees of considerateness.'

Another way to look at the distinctive function of the forms
and everything and *or anything/or nothing* might be to view the
former as indicating a maximum extreme, and the latter as
indicating a minimum extreme. Under such an analysis, the
maximum would represent the *most,* and the minimum would
represent the *least* that could be expected in a given situation. For
example, in excerpt [96], Bruce and Lucy are making plans to pick up
a new kitten:

[96] MO:F5
1. Lucy: So: um (.) um-um-um-um, Thursday morning.
2. Bruce: Yes.
3. Lucy: I'd say at least ten o'clock, we should meet,
'cause (.) I don't wanna um:::: c- waste too much time-
I mean I don't want it to be like // (too)
4. Bruce: Do you have the cat picked out **and
everything?**
5. Lucy: Yeah. It- we're- it's the: cat we're picking up.
I mean, this // one particular cat.

In turn #3, Lucy expresses a desire not to 'waste too much time.' In
response to this, Bruce asks Lucy 'Do you have the cat picked out and
everything?' Here, *and everything* may be seen to mark 'you have the
cat picked out' as the maximum which Lucy could have done to insure
that the task of picking up the kitten would not take too much time.

Excerpt [97] is taken from a conversation in a hospital
emergency room. Karen and Lucy are employees, and are discussing a
patient who recently died there, without any friends or family at his
side:

[97] MO:F61
1. Lucy: He didn't look familiar, but I mean in his
condition::, hhh.
2. Karen: No. He was a nice- he // was a nice- patient
3. Lucy: I 'member I had a nice memory about him though.
4. Karen: Yeah. He was- he was really ni::ce. He was//n't
uh
5. Lucy: I felt so sa::d for hi::m, an' no fami//ly
6. Karen: Yea:h
7. Lucy: **or anythi::ng,** y//ea:h?
8. Karen: Yeah.
9. Lucy: So sa::d. ...

When an individual is sick in the hospital, it might be said that there is an expectancy that at least the family members of the patient (provided there are some) will visit him in the hospital. In turns #5 and #7, Lucy says 'I felt so sad for him, an' no family or anything, yeah?' Lucy's use of *or anything* in this example may be seen to mark the expectation that family would be present as minimal. Note that in this example, there is lengthening of the vowel *i*, which may play a role in designating the function of this form.

The attendance of family at a significant event in one's life is marked as minimally expected in the next example, as well.[6] In excerpt [98], Julie is telling Crystal about her recent wedding. Rather than planning a big ceremony, Julie and her husband decided to marry in court.

> [98] MO:T13
> 1. Crystal: So, but- Your parents weren't there **or anything?**
> 2. Julie: Yeah, we um, got the family to go, because part of the reason we decided to go ahead an' do it here- we wanted to just (.5) ultimately probably would liked to have just gone somewhere on the mainland an' done it just- alone. But (.5) they were gonna be really pissed, so we made it so they could come.

In turn #1, Crystal asks 'So, but- Your parents weren't there or anything?' In this example, Crystal's use of *or anything* appears to mark the attendance of Julie's parents at the wedding as something which would be minimally expected, and perhaps surprising or remarkable if it were not the case. In such cases, the general

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extender is being used to indicate the speaker's attitude (surprise, disbelief) to the information expressed immediately before the general extender.

Of course, surprise is not the only type of attitude that can be expressed by the use of this form. The speaker may wish to indicate that what he or she says could be misinterpreted; in anticipation of this, the speaker presents the potential misinterpretation, marks it as negative, and adds the general extender *or anything*.

In contemporary spoken American English, this use of *or anything* has become almost formulaic within one construction. the construction follows the pattern: <u>not X, or anything, but Y</u>. The typical interpretation invited for this formula appears to be: Y (doing or being something) could count as X (doing or being something else), and I announce that it's not, before I proceed. This pattern is present in examples [99]-[101]:

[99] MO:T50
((Anne is telling Roger about her recent trip to Ireland))
1. Anne: ... I wanna get back to Ireland. I really hhh. um:
2. Roger: Need it? (1.0)
3. Anne: Yeah, I was g- uh o:h that- some (.) y'know- some ni:ght I'll - if I c'n still remember um (.) I'll tell you some of the stuff that happened (.) // there
4. Roger: Uh huh
5. Anne: It's just spending time alo::ne, like I really- I travelled all over the country but I did it by myself // I just
6. Roger: Right
7. Anne: y'know (.) and um (.) n<u>o</u>t to try to get too mystical **or anything**, but a lot of the s- I didn't- I:: didn't t<u>a:</u>lk to anybody, // huh huh huh
8. Roger: Uh huh

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9. Anne: b- but a lot of the stuff was just (.) It's a long time since I've (.5) had a lot of experiences at a sort of non-verbal non-neocortex level ...

[100] Honolulu Star Bulletin 8/1/94
((A quote from Reggie Miller, the U.S. Dream Team II's 'biggest trash talker' on the eve of a game in Toronto))
"We don't want to cause any international incidents o r anything, but we'll get angrier in Toronto."

[101] Beavis and Butt-Head   MTV: 1/30/94
((Beavis and Butt-Head have been couch fishing, and have just hooked an elderly woman))
1. Old woman: O::h, my:::! Oh my goodness!
2. Policeman: Oh, no, not another elderly woman flying down the street! Will they n:e:ver learn?
3. Old woman: O::h my, I seem to have fallen down.
4. Butt-Head: U:::h, (1.0) sorry 'bout that. Hhhhh huh huh! (.) huh huh!
5. Beavis: Yeah! Heh heh! It won't happen again. Heh heh!
6. Old woman: Hello::? What happened to my spectacles?
7. Butt-Head: U::H, your testicles? Hhhhuh huh huh
8. Beavis: Heh heh (.) heh heh!
9. Other kid: I don't wanna be a pa:rty pooper or anything, but (1.0) don't you think this cou:ch fishing thi:ng is=uh (.) I dunno (.5) kinda irresponsible?
10. Butt-Head: Huh huh huh (.5) huh. Ye:a:h. You wanna try it? Huh huh huh (.) huh!

Because the first part of the pattern not X, or anything has become established formulaically as a way of clarifying intention, it can be so used without the second part of the formula (but Y) being articulated.   In examples [102]-[104], the speakers use the first part of the pattern to mark an attempt to clarify an intention:

[102] MO:T26

((Rosie is telling Julie about her recent encounter with an attractive young guy))

1. Rosie: ... I think that I've pretty much set him in his place, I mean in a nice way but I- you know, I mean, I'm married, so I have no intention of- I don't even know him and I think we have a long ways to go before there's ever even an issue=That's not even a- a- pa- potentia::l for anything else- any more than being friends right now.

2. Julie: Uh huh

3. Rosie: Because we don't even know each other. So:: y'//know

4. Julie: Okay

5. Rosie: all that other woo-woo stuff is just um (.) that- just that. heh heh heh Kind of- kinda blew me away, but u::h It's ni::ce an' I just made it clear that we have to keep it really sweet an' y'know (.) really innocent. And um that's the way it is.

6. Julie: Okay, Madam Wazel.

7. Rosie: I'm not tryin' to fall in love **or anything**, that's for sure.

8. Julie: heh heh heh heh // heh heh

9. Rosie: Shit! Let's complicate your life!

[103] MY:F70

((Maya is reporting on a previous interaction between her friend Tracy, and Tracy's boyfriend))

1. Maya: So he ca:lled like two hours later an' she was in bed an' she woke up an' um (.) he was like 'Tracy, Tracy' and she was like 'What? What happened? Wha- what happened? Is something wrong?'=And he wouldn't talk and she said 'You fucked someone else' and he started crying- He's like (.) 'I'm sorry- I just blah blah blah blah' an' she's like 'I can't believe- How could you do this to me? How the fuck could you do-' and just cursed at him=hung up the phone=he came home (.) an' he was so upset an' so freaked out by it and had told her immediately after it had happened and like obviousy felt real bad and wasn't tryin' to like (.) y'know see someone on the side **or anything**.=He just fucked up and felt ba:d. ...

[104] MO:T27
1. Sara: So but like later on, I'm gonna get together with you an' find out like how much of your stuff you wanna get rid of, an' how much of it you wanna sell to me, heh!
2. Roger: O:::kay.
3. Sara: Like are you- I me- Are you like (.) planning to do that? I mean, I don't wanna step on your toes or **anything**.

Although I have no examples of this in my data set, *and everything* may also occur in a similar formulaic construction: X and everything, but Y. The typical interpretation for this construction appears to be: I acknowledge X, but nevertheless assert Y. Often, Y represents the speaker's intention. Consider the following excerpt from an interview with Tom Cruise:

[105] Vanity Fair   10/94
Cruise: I was a wild kid. I'd cut school **and everything**, but it really had to do with my wanting always to push the envelope to see, Where do I stand with myself?

While Cruise acknowledges that he cut school (a behavior which is consistent with that of 'a wild kid'), he asserts that his behavior was a reflection of a noble intention; namely, it had to do with wanting to test himself, and grow as an individual.

It appears that the form *and all (that)* may also function in this way. In [106], Maya is talking about Wendy (the animal mistreater):

[106] MY:F80
Maya: And I mean (.) she is the- the caretaker of the dog
and all that but I- I'm real serious about it. If she gets
a pe:t in the next few years I'm gonna slap her ...

In this example, Maya acknowledges Wendy's rights as 'the caretaker
of the dog' she had put to sleep, but nevertheless asserts her
intention to 'slap' Wendy if she gets another pet anytime soon.

Note that in [104] and [106], the part of the utterance
preceding the general extender is prefaced by the discourse marker
I mean. According to Schiffrin (1987:296), *I mean* occurs in
explanations of intention, particularly when the speaker suspects
that the intended force of a previous utterance is 'too indirect for
appropriate uptake.'

It seems clear that the forms *and everything* and *or
anything/or nothing* are sometimes used to mark the speaker's
attitude toward part of the message, rather than to invite the hearer
to infer additional or alternate instances of some intended set.
Various descriptions have been offered to characterize the distinct
function performed by these general extenders. According to the
above descriptions, these forms may be used to: highlight something
as [+remarkable] (cf. Aijmer 1985); indicate that something
represents a high value on some scale (cf. Ward and Birner 1992);
mark something as maximally or minimally expected, or extreme; or
emphasize part of an utterance preceding a 'but' clause. An
examination of these descriptions suggests that perhaps the best

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way to describe the distinctive function of these forms is to call them INTENSIFIERS.

Another general extender which may function as an intensifier is *or what*. Consider the following examples:

[107] MO:T20
((Julie's mother, Shirley, has just received a picture
of Julie's boyfriend in the mail)).
1. Julie: Is that the best picture **or what**?
2. Shirley: Sssh! It's absolutely priceless.

[108] MO:F1
1. Lucy: Do I have the cutest cat in the world **or what**?
2. Bruce: ((breathy voice)) I love your pussy.
3. Lucy: ((breathy voice)) Thanks.

[109] MO:F1
((Lucy is talking about her obsession with Keanu Reeves))
1. Lucy: Am I psychotic **or what**?
2. Bruce: Yes.
3. Lucy: I mean if you- You kno:w me an' love me (.5)
4. Bruce: ⌈Correct.
5. Lucy: ⌊ (*) So::: (.) you can: tolerate all this=but
am I: (.5)
6. Bruce: Psychotic! No // you're just a little boy crazy

In each of these examples, *or what* is appended to a Yes/No question which contains an evaluative assessment of some kind; this construction may be represented as: X=Y, or what? The interpretation invited for this formula appears to be: I think X, don't you? By using this construction, the speaker solicits agreement from the hearer with his or her assessment that X=Y.

Indeed, in each of the above excerpts, the hearer agrees with the speaker's assessment: in [107], Shirley responds to Julie's 'Is

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that the best picture of what?' with 'Sssh! It's absolutely priceless';
in [108], Bruce responds to Lucy's 'Do I have the cutest cat in the
world or what?' with 'I love your pussy'; and, in [109], Bruce
responds to Lucy's 'Am I psychotic or what?' with 'Yes.'

It is interesting to note that, by responding in agreement in
[109], Bruce is in danger of committing a face-threatening act. In
fact, in turn #6, he withdraws his agreement, saying 'No, you're just
a little boy crazy,' indicating that he was just teasing Lucy by going
along with her negative self-evaluation.

4.3.2 Politeness

One way to look at the interpersonal function of general
extenders is in terms of politeness (cf. Brown and Levinson 1987;
and Lakoff 1973). In this section, I shall consider how a speaker's
use of a general extender may be viewed as a politeness strategy. In
section 4.3.2.1, I shall illustrate how disjunctive general extenders
may function as hedges (a strategy of negative politeness), and in
section 4.3.2.2, I shall demonstrate how the adjunctive general
extender *and stuff* may function as a marker of invited solidarity as
interactive partner (a strategy of positive politeness).

4.3.2.1 *Hedges addressed to politeness strategies*

Since any linguistic interaction is necessarily a social interaction, it would seem appropriate to look at how social concerns might influence the use of general extenders. Consider, for example, the use of *or something* in excerpt [110]:

> [110] MO:T27
> 1. Sara: Okay, lemme- lemme- lemme spell it out for you, this is what I:: would ideally like to do.
> 2. Roger: Uh huh=
> 3. Sara: =I'd like to move out there 'n take over your apartment
> 4. Roger: Right
> 5. Sara: an' all the stuff that's in it an' just b<u>u</u>y it from you, **or whatever,** an' maybe like b<u>u</u>y your truck **or something.** I dunno.
> 6. Roger: Uh huh ...

One way to look at excerpt [110] would be in terms of politeness, or *face* (as defined by Brown and Levinson 1987). Sara's utterance in turns #3 and #5, 'I'd like to move out there 'n take over your apartment an' all the stuff that's in it an' just b<u>u</u>y it from you, or whatever, an' maybe like b<u>u</u>y your truck or something,' constitutes a proposal. Since agreement to the proposal would involve compliance on the part of the hearer, and potentially impinge upon the hearer, Sara's utterance may be considered a face-threatening act.

Given that Sara's utterance is potentially a face-threatening act, it seems plausible that the general extenders *or whatever* and *or something* in [110] are functioning to express tentativeness. The modal adverb *maybe* and the succeeding utterance of 'I dunno'

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confirm this interpretation. By emphasizing that what precedes the general extender represents just one possibility, Sara expresses only a weak commitment to the proposal being made.

Excerpts [111]-[113] contain additional examples of disjunctive general extenders which function as hedges addressed to politeness strategies. In each case, a speaker is in danger of imposing his or her wants on the hearer, and thereby impeding the hearer's freedom of action and consequently threatening negative face (cf. Brown and Levinson 1987:65-6). To compensate, the speaker exhibits a face-saving act oriented to the hearer's negative face by adhering to two rules of politeness: (1) Don't impose, and (2) Give options (cf. Lakoff 1973:298).

In [111], Julie and Lucy are discussing their plans for the evening. Lucy works in town near Julie's residence, and isn't sure if she should drive home (out of town) before going out with Julie and her husband that night. Julie invites Lucy to come straight to her house after work; she suggests that before they go out, they could 'go for a walk or something':

[111] MO:T9
1. Julie: Come over an' hang out.
2. Lucy: 'kay.
3. Julie: We can always, y'know, (1.0) just ya:ck an' have dinner.
4. Lucy: Okay.
5. Julie: A//n' we could even go
6. Lucy: (But-)
7. Julie: for a walk **or somethin'** // if ya wanna go-
8. Lucy: Do I need to bring anything?

9. Julie: Um (.5) let's see, you'll be done at fi::ve, We'll
probably go for a walk an' have dinner. So::: if you're
coming at five, you could go for a walk with u::s,
10. Lucy: Okay ...

It might be argued that the general extender in [111] is used to refer
to *types of exercise.* However, as was the case in excerpt [110], the
speaker is in a position of potentially impinging upon the hearer by
imposing her wishes on the hearer. By employing the general
extender *or something,* Julie marks *a walk* as just one option, and
indicates a willingness to entertain other possibilities.

In [112], Sara and Roger are on a long-distance phone call. Sara
expresses a desire to see Roger and his wife when they arrive in the
town where Sara lives:

[112] MO:T46
1. Sara: An uh uh- I'll see ya:: (.) I- may talk to y'all
sometime next week, but if not, I'll see y'all Friday a-
probably Friday afternoon = Friday evening when y'all
get in
2. Roger: Okay.=
3. Sara: =I know y'all 'll be real tired, but (.5) hopefully
we'll like hookup **or something.** // .hhh
4. Roger: Sure.=
5. Sara: =An' uh I'll talk to you (.) la//ter
6. Roger: All right.
7. Sara: Okay.

Since the fulfillment of Sara's expressed wish would involve
compliance on Roger's part (and potentially impinge upon the hearer),
Sara's utterance, 'hopefully we'll like hookup,' is potentially face-
threatening. Once again, the general extender *or something* may be

seen to express tentativeness, and serve as a hedge addressed to politeness strategies (i.e., *Don't impose*).

Finally, in excerpt [113], Julie is asking her mother about having her mail forwarded to a new address:

> [113] MO:T48
> 1. Julie: You know those mailing address cards where you change an address?
> 2. Shirley: Yeah, you get 'em at the post office.
> 3. Julie: Yeah, I know that. Um, what was I gonna ask you (.) If I put my name on (.) saying the stuff should go to Louisiana, do you think they'll start sending your mail to Louisiana? (.5) 'Cause we have the same last name. (2.0)
> 4. Shirley: Wull no, 'cause you're gonna put your own name on it- I don't thi::nk
> 5. Julie: That's what I'm worried about.
> 6. Shirley: Wull write down at the bottom 'Please note' huh huh **or somethin'**
> 7. Julie: I don't know if it's worth it or whether I should- I probably won't get very much with you.=Maybe it's better if once an' a while you just stick it in a big envelope to me, an' I'll (.) change all the things that're coming to me, so they'll just stop coming there-
> 8. Shirley: Umhm ...

In turn #6, Shirley makes a suggestion: 'Wull write down at the bottom 'Please note huh huh or somethin'.' In terms of politeness, Shirley's suggestion that Julie take some course of action may be seen to impede Julie's freedom of action; the general extender functions as a hedge addressed to the politeness strategy 'Don't put pressure on the hearer to do (or refrain from doing) the act A' (cf. Brown and Levinson 1987:65-66). With regard to this example, it is also worth noting that Shirley begins her utterance with 'wull.' The

particle *well* typically precedes and marks dispreferreds (Levinson 1987:334). As Brown and Levinson (1987:38) note, what determines the preferred and dispreferred status of utterances lies in face considerations (cf. Atkinson and Heritage1984:268).

Indeed, it appears that general extenders commonly occur in suggestions, invitations, offers, and requests. The following examples are taken from other data sources:

[114] Davidson 1984:111
P: Oh I mean uh: you wanna go t' the store **or anything** over et the Market // Basket **or anything**?
A: hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh=Well ho//ney I-
P: Or Richard's?

[115] Davidson 1984:107
P: Wul lissid- (.) uh:: d'you wah me uh come down'n getche t'//morrow **er anything**?
A: No: de:ar.

[116] Davidson 1984:121-122
A: hh You could meet me at U.C.Be: an' I could show yih some 'a the other things on the compu:ter, (.) maybe even teach yuh how tuh program Ba:sic **er something.** .hhh (0.6)
B: Wul I don' know if I'd wanna get all that invo:lved, hh. hhh! (.hh)

[117] Atkinson and Heritage 1984:273 & 277
((S's wife has just slipped a disc))
H: And we were wondering if there's anything we can do to help
S: ┌ Well 'at's ┐
H: └ I mean ┘ can we do any shopping for her **or something like tha:t?**

(0.7)
S: Well that's most kind Heatherton .hhh At the moment
no:. because we've still got two bo:ys at home.

[118]   Schegloff: Kam tapes (unpublished)
Alan: But if you c'd just bring a:duh s'm sf'drinks w'd be
ki:nd?
(.)
Alan: // (   ),
Maryanne: Sho:re=
Alan: =or **something**, or // p'tatuh chips, peanuts **er
whatever**,
Maryanne: Sure,
Maryanne: Shore

Since in making an invitation, offer, proposal, or request, a speaker
risks rejection (cf. Davidson 1984), the speaker's face in such
contexts is also potentially threatened.   Thus, in using a general
extender to implicate additional or alternative options, and express
tentativeness, a speaker not only addresses the hearer's face
concerns, but takes a step to 'save' his or her own face.

As Levinson (1983:333, 346, 356) notes, participants tend to
avoid dispreferreds. It may be that, by using a general extender to
implicate alternative possibilities, a speaker makes an offer,
suggestion, or request, less specific and thereby increases the
likelihood of receiving a preferred response (i.e., acceptance). In the
event that the hearer does not find the stated offer, suggestion, or
request desirable, the hearer may choose to 'accept' an alternative
possibility which might have been implicated by the general
extender.

Of course, not all examples of disjunctive general extenders that function as hedges occur within utterances that are considered face-threatening (e.g., offers, suggestions, requests, and proposals). As illustration, consider [119]:

[119] MO:T5
1. Dwight: U::m my new roommate has gotten me a new email account at the U.H.
2. Julie: O:::h
3. Dwight: So um // uh
4. Julie: How'd he do that?
5. Dwight: He's got two: He's in the comp- He's in u:m engineering **or something like that**. // He works with computers
6. Julie: Oh // wo:::::w
7. Dwight: an' whatnot.

In turn #5, Dwight communicates information about his roommate: 'He's in u:m engineering or something like that.' In such cases, the use of a disjunctive general extender may serve as a hedge of another kind. This will be the focus of section 4.3.3.1.

4.3.2.2 *'And stuff' as a marker of invited solidarity*

In section 4.2, I noted that, in using a general extender to implicate additional or alternate instances, a speaker invokes an assumption of intersubjectivity, and communicates the following message to the hearer: Because we share the same knowledge, experience, and conceptual schemes, I do not need to be explicit; you can fill in any gaps. This is particularly true where speakers use ADJUNCTIVE general extenders, since the 'more' which is implicated is

typically treated as known or *given* (in the sense of Brown and Yule 1983a, cf. Chafe 1976, and Prince 1981, see section 4.3.3.2).[7]

According to Brown and Levinson (1987:117-124), one of the strategies for positive politeness is to 'presuppose, raise, or assert common ground' with the hearer, by demonstrating an assumption of shared knowledge. Since, in using a general extender to implicate additional instances, a speaker demonstrates an assumption of shared knowledge, his or her use of an adjunctive general extender may be viewed as a positive politeness strategy.

In this section, I shall focus on the use of a particular adjunctive general extender: *and stuff.* I shall demonstrate that while on some occasions, *and stuff* may be used to implicate additional instances (and underscore an assumption of shared knowledge), on other occasions, it has no apparent referential function. On such occasions, it appears that *and stuff* simply functions to mark invited solidarity as interactive partner.

Often, general extenders contain a comparative form (e.g., *like this/that; of this/that kind/sort/type*) which establishes an anaphoric relationship to the named instances which precede it. In such cases, the comparative form provides a guideline for the interpretation of the general extender, by indicating that the instances which precede it are (in some loose, and highly context-sensitive sense, as demonstrated in section 3.3.3) *similar* to the named instance (or instances) which precede the general extender.

The following excerpt contains an example of a general extender which includes *and stuff*, and a comparative:

[120] MO: T40
((Sara is outlining what her plans will be after moving to the city where Roger resides))
1. Sara: ...because really what I'm planning on doing is when I get out there .hhh I'm first going to focus my energy on like finding a place to li:::ve =
2. Roger: =Right=
3. Sara: =for the first couple of da::ys
4. Roger: Ri//ght
5. Sara: an' the::n I'm gonna go do::wn (.) or I might go down to a temporary place an' like do a little testing .hhh a//n'
6. Roger: Right.
7. Sara: start sendin' out my resumé, **an' stuff like that,** but, I me//an,
8. Roger: Right.
9. Sara: the first (.) order of importance is to find a place to li::ve.
10. Roger: Right. ...

In [120], Sara demonstrates an assumption that, because Roger shares the same knowledge, experience, and conceptual schemes, he will be able to infer what additional instances are *like* those which precede the general extender.

In many instances, however, general extenders do not contain expressions such as *like this/that*, and *of that kind/sort/type*. Nevertheless, they seem to function in the same way. The following excerpt (which appeared previously as [41]), will serve to illustrate this point:

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[121] MO:T23
1. Julie: John and I are hiking out with you.
2. Rosie: Ya:::y
3. Julie: He's excited about the idea. We went an' bought shoes.
4. Rosie: Okay. That's //cool.
5. Julie: So-
6. Rosie: We'll get an early start, an' I was thinking if we wanted to bring in the coo::ler, we could, an' have it- Each pitch in a little bit of money an' have Jerry take it out by boat. So that we can put all the kitchen stuff in the::re, an' all the heavy stuff, an' just pack out our clo::thes an' tents **an' stuff**.

Although Rosie's utterance does not contain a comparative form, it seems clear that, in using the general extender *and stuff*, Rosie is implicating additional items which are not heavy, and are similar to the named items, *clothes* and *tents*. In this case, the form *and stuff* may be considered an ellipted version of a longer form containing a comparative, such as *and stuff like that.*

Now consider [122]. In this excerpt, two friends are on a long-distance phone call. Sophie hates living in L.A. and is homesick for Hawai'i, where Julie lives. Sophie is remarking on how pleasant the people at the University in Hawai'i are:

[122] MO: T34
1. Sophie: ...'Cause I talked to the grad division yesterday an' it's so weird, y'know, I call- I call the school **an' stuff** an everybody's so nice. It's just- It almost brings tears to my eyes to talk to someone an' not have full-on gatekeeper syndrome, y'know, an' .hhh // Just
2. Julie: Mmhm.

3. Sophie: to talk to somebody no::rmal .hhh y'know, an'
you ask 'em a nice question politely, an' they're really
nice to you:: or they try to he//lp you::
4. Julie: Mmhm. Mmhm.=
5. Sophie: =an' it's like I- I just can't- I'm blown away.
Y'know it's like God, I- I- I almost forgot people are like
this!
6. Julie: Yeah.

The point of interest in this exchange is found in turn #1, where
Sophie says: 'I call the school an' stuff.' Here, it is unclear what, if
any, additional instances might be implicated by the general
extender *and stuff*. For example, contextual constraints rule out the
possibility that she may be implicating 'drop by the school,' since
Sophie is in L.A., and the University is in Hawai'i. Rather than
implicating that there are additional instances which are somehow
similar to 'I drop by school,' it seems that Sophie's use of *and stuff*
more closely resembles a particular usage of *y'know*, where it
functions as a generalized marker of invited solidarity (cf. Schiffrin
1987; and Brown and Levinson 1987).

A more transparent example of this usage of *and stuff* is found
in the excerpt below. In [123], a U.S. soldier is explaining the U.S.
military role in Haiti:

[123] Windward O`ahu News 7/95
We provided equipment to the Haitians, **and stuff**, we
provided security **and stuff**, we took care of people who
needed help **and stuff**.

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As illustrated in [123], this usage of *and stuff* is frequent, and even habitual for some speakers.[8] An examination of my data reveals 34 instances of *and stuff*, and that three speakers regularly use this expression. Below are excerpts from the speech of Crystal ([124]), Maya ([125]-[126]), and Karen ([127]-[128]):

[124] MO:T12
1. Crystal: ... Frederico is just super- he's super mature for his age though, 'cause he's he sailed around the world s- um (.) for four yea::rs and (.) just sorta- an' had older brothers, y'kno::w, and come from a really wealthy family::=had a lot of experiences **and stuff**, so he really (1.0) kinda presents himself as being older.
2. Julie: Umhm.
3. Crystal: But he's a cool guy. We're just really taking it slo:w 'cause he just got really really bu::rned 'n (.) **stuff** an' but we had some fun.
4. Julie: Um//hm.
5. Crystal: Went out sailing **an' stuff**.
6. Julie: Wull good.

[125] MY:F65
1. Maya: My d(h)ad was a bagworm.
2. Sara: Eu::w.=
3. Maya: =huh huh=
4. Sara: =Bagworm.
5. Maya: Yeah. They get in trees. He- he // uh
6. Sara: They do?
7. Maya: Yeah. They're these little (.) bugs that actually make a bag. They're mighty interesting and disgusting. That was one of his scams. He filled- he got this tanker- (.) this small tanker tru:ck and filled it with green dyed water and then went around and put and- I would take out flyers for him when I was a kid and the people would call and it said 'Insec- Insecticide' you know 'We'll spray your lawn and your trees and get rid of all your bugs for forty bucks.' So: we'd get calls ba::ck an' we'd go spray their

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tree- an' their trees and their lawn green with (.) dyed water basically, and get forty bucks an' then (.) do that for a couple days an' then (.) change our phone number. huh huh Put it under my mother's (.) maiden name **an' stuff.** So he was the 'bagworm' because he thought (.) he should (.) get that title // for offending
8. Sara: huh huh
9. Maya: so many bugs with green paint.

[126] MY:F82
((Maya is talking about Mark, who is planning to marry a friend of hers, who is pregnant))
Maya: I like Mark fi:ne and I really think that he's being (.) all right about this but I mean when I went over there last night I was like lookin' at him you know (.) knowin' that he was gonna like (.) marry her **an' stuff.** It ma- it just- it kinda grosses me out you know. His feet were- were grossin' me out. hnh! 'Cause I could see 'em and they were naked (1.0) and just like 'Gross!'

[127] MO:F61
((Emergency Room, staff lounge))
1. Karen: So (1.0) a::nyway, no I sta- I sa- I got out of here by a quarter till yesterday **an' stuff.** I didn't (1.0) see that l_ast patient.
2. Lucy: You mean quarter to four.
3. Karen: Yeah, **an' stuff** - _a_fter I took care- _a_fter I took care of the body, so. I just figured I didn't wanna leave that ha//nging till the evening shift.
4. Lucy: Now we kne::w him, didn't we?
5. Karen: Yea::h
6. Lucy: 'Cause I 'member with his na:me.
7. Karen: Yeah **an' stuff** // He was-
8. Lucy: He didn't l_oo_k familiar, but I mean in his condition::, hhh.
9. Karen: No. He was a nice- he // was a n_i_ce- patient
10. Lucy: I 'member I had a nice memory about him though.
11. Karen: Yeah. He was- he was really ni::ce. He wa//sn't uh
12. Lucy: I felt so sa::d for hi::m, an' no fami//ly

13. Karen: Yea:h
14. Lucy: or anythi::ng, y//ea:h?
15. Karen: Yeah.
16. Lucy: S//o sa::d.
17. Karen: He didn't-**an' stuff**- He didn't have any uh (.)
an' stuff- So that's why I referred it to social work ...

[128] Kuakini Emergency Room 2/94
((Karen is discussing her son's malformed chest, or
pectis))
1. Karen: Yeah, I was real conce::rned, you know, (it'd
affect 'im)
2. Sharlene: What about the organs?
3. Karen: Yeah, right, see I̲: was real conce:rned we're
gonna have a pro:blem
4. Sharlene: (*) grow, yeah.
5. Karen: But (.) **y'know 'n stuff**, as he got a little bit
o::lder **'n stuff, y'know** doctor told me (need to make
anything on it) and Justin was fi::ne and has no problem.
But as he's gotten older you can see he's (.) he's
flattening ou:t (.) **y'know, an' stuff** , an' he:'s uh, his
muscles are developing **'n 'stuff**, and I even run my hand
across his chest **y'know** and I can tell it's fla̲tter.
Y'know, so he's, yeah,
6. Lucy: Pectis, does that curl i̲:n?
7. Karen: Yeah. Pectis is in, yeah.

Of particular interest are [127] and [128]. In these excerpts, *and
stuff* is found to occur not only at the end of utterances where it is
unclear what, if any, additional instances might be implicated (e.g.,
'I got out of here by a quarter till yesterday an' stuff,' in turn #1 of
[127], and 'He didn't and stuff' in turn #17 of [127]), but after
affirmative responses (e.g., 'Yeah, an' stuff' in turns #3 and #6 of
[127]), and following a conjunction (and *y'know*) in turn #5 of [128]).
In [128], the repeated co-occurrence of *and stuff* with *y'know*

supports the notion that these forms share a common function; namely, to mark an invited solidarity as interactive partner.

Some additional support for the claim that *and stuff* may serve as a generalized marker of invited solidarity, rather than to implicate additional instances, is found in excerpt [129], where Joy is inquiring about a small town in Louisiana, that Roger is familiar with:

[129] MO: T21
1. Joy: An' like do you like go up there on weekends sometimes or // do they
2. Roger: .hh I have-
3. Joy: have good restaurants **an' stuff**?
4. Roger: No, no.
5. Joy: Oh
6. Roger: They don't have good restaurants. They have funky little places to eat.
7. Joy: Uh huh

The point of interest in [129] is Joy's question, 'Do they have good restaurants and stuff?' and Roger's response to it, 'No, no. They don't have good restaurants. They have funky little places to eat.' In this case, Roger does not interpret *and stuff* as indicating additional instances; rather, he treats restaurants as the ONLY instance referred to.

PLEASE NOTE

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Figure 8

4.3.3 The Gricean perspective

Another way to look at the interpersonal function of general extenders is in terms of the Gricean perspective. In this section, I will consider how a speaker's use of a general extender may be seen to display an orientation to one of three proposed principles of conversation: Quality (4.3.3.1), the Q-Principle (4.3.3.2), or the R-Principle (4.3.3.3). As noted in chapter 2, this reduction of Grice's (1975) original four maxims to three principles was proposed by Horn (1984).

4.3.3.1 *Quality*

Beavis and Butt-Head

Figure 8

It appears that disjunctive general extenders (most typically *or something*) are often used as a hedge on the Gricean maxim of Quality: 'try to make your contribution one that is true, specifically: do not say what you believe to be false, and do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence' (cf. Grice 1975). Maxim hedges, as defined by Brown and Levinson (1987:166), assume the maintenance of cooperation, while not strictly adhering to the requirements of the maxim. A hedge on the maxim of Quality works in the following way: a speaker may assert something which he or she thinks is potentially inaccurate (in danger of not strictly adhering to the maxim of Quality) by expressing a lack of commitment to the necessary truth of the content of the utterance, or part of the utterance (thus maintaining cooperation). By using a disjunctive general extender such as *or something* to indicate that the content of the message represents a best guess, or an approximation, a speaker can express a lack of commitment to the accuracy of an assertion.

As illustration, consider [130]. In this excerpt, the participants are Julie and Crystal, thirty-somethings who have been friends since high school. They are talking about some of their former classmates.

[130] MO:T14
1. Julie: I can't remember any ge- guys in our grade that were gay
2. Crystal: Paul Brown an' an' Fred Curry. // I- huh! I dunno, I heard Fred Curry was dressed- was like a transvestite **or something.**

3. Julie: You're kidding
4. Crystal: I- I dunno. That was a- an old rumor, I don't
even know if it was true.
5. Julie: That's funny=
6. Crystal: =Or cross-dresser // **or something**
7. Julie: Paul- Paul Brown is ga::y?
8. Crystal: No, I could see him doing that too, though. huh
huh huh! I don't know wh(h)y: ...

In turn #2, Crystal says 'I heard Fred Curry was dressed- was like a
transvestite or something.' The general extender *or something* in
this utterance may be seen to suggest alternative possibilities, and
thereby function as a hedge on the content of the message. Note that
in turn #4, Crystal explicitly states that she is not committed to
the content of the utterance with expressions such as: 'I dunno,' and
'I don't even know if it was true.' In turn #6, Crystal offers another
possibility, namely, that Fred Curry is 'a cross-dresser'; again,
Crystal follows this assertion with the hedge *or something*.

In [131], Sara is telling Roger about her friends' plans to travel
to New York and participate in a gay rights march.

[131] MO:T28
1. Sara: ... So an' uh // most of the people I know
2. Roger: Cool
3. Sara: are goin' up the:re in (.) the end of Ju::ne for this
big gay rights march i//t's
4. Roger: Uh huh
5. Sara: like the:: twenty fifth anniversary of the
Sto:newall riots = I don't know if you've ever heard of
the::m=
6. Roger: =Um//um?
7. Sara: Uh- uh- anyway, like back in the sixties there
was an apartment complex called the Stonewall
apartments an' the::y- I'm not sure exactly what happened

either, but they ended up having these huge riots there.
An' it was like for (.) gay discrimination **or something**=
Anyway, this year is the twenty fifth anniversary of it
an' uh .hhhh So anywa::y
8. Roger: You thinking of going an' marching?
9. Sara: No, no, no.

Here, Sara attempts to explain to Roger the cause of the Stonewall riots, but she isn't sure of the facts. We know this, because she explicitly says so: 'I'm not sure what happened either.' In turn #7, she marks the utterance 'an' it was like for gay discrimination' as possibly inaccurate with the general extender *or something*.

A third example of a speaker using *or something* to hedge on the maxim of Quality is found in [132]. The participants, Sara and Maya, are talking about a mutual acquaintance of theirs (Doug):

[132] MY:F78
1. Sara: He really looks a lot older than he did. I guess
2. Maya: Yeah he does.
3. Sara: travelling around London with (.) the- the
elephant Kellie Simpson would do that to you.
4. Maya: Oh, is that what he was doin'?
5. Sara: Yeah. He went to Lon//don
6. Maya: Oh ma:n=
7. Sara: =to live with he:r. I think they must have broke up
or something 'cause he's back no//w.
8. Maya: Yeah, they must of.

In turn #7, Sara speculates on the reason for Doug's return from London: 'I think they must've broke up or something.' Sara marks a lack of commitment to the accuracy of her assertion with *think* (i.e., not *know*), the epistemic modal *must've*, and the general extender *or something*.

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Finally, in [133], Maya describes a movie (Creep Show) to Sara, who hasn't seen it:

[133] MY: F66
1. Maya: I like the one where they have the- the animal locked in a bo:x and the- the woman (.5) whats- her name his wife is real bitchy an' he was having fantasies of ways to kill her? He was like a scie//ntist **o r something?**
2. Sara: That was in the first o:ne // I didn't see it
3. Maya: That was the first one- an' um (.) He would like have fantasies- He'd be talkin' then all of a sudden without any change in th- in the filming he was having a fantasy about killing her like he was talking to her an' all of a sudden an arrow goes through her head (.) and a second later he's talking to her again. It was really funny. An' he had this Tazmanian Devil **or so:mething** in a box underneath the stairwell that he'd just gotten for some experiment **or something** .hhh an' he just kinda like (slit) her in there hhh! Sat there going 'Ah hah!' She was really obnoxious though. Somebody hated (for him-) I think they show Maude **or somethi//ng**
4. Sara: Oh Go:d.

In [133], Maya attempts to recall details of the movie from memory. Her account of the film's plot and characters contains four examples of *or something*, which serve to mark the content of her utterance as possibly inaccurate.

In some cases, a disjunctive general extender (typically *or something* or *or whatever*) functions to mark an utterance, or part of an utterance, not only as potentially inaccurate, but as an approximation. This is particularly clear where numbers or amounts precede the general extender. As illustration, consider [134]-[135].

In [134], Sara is asking Roger about opening a bank account in

Hawai'i:

[134] MO: T42
1. Sara: Lemme ask you thi::s .hh   this is just somethin'
that dawned on me the other day=y'know in Louisiana it's
kinda hard to open a bank account without a Louisiana
driver's license // .hhh
2. Roger: N//o::.
3. Sara: Do you run into that sa://::me
4. Roger: That's absolutely no problem
5. Sara: Okay.
6. Roger: No, I never had any problem doi//ng that
7. Sara: Because I know when I:: first moved down here in
like (.) what? nineteen eighty six **or whatever**, um I had
to go get a Louisiana driver's license before they would
let me open a bank account.=
8. Roger: =Nope.
9. Sara: Oka//y.
10. Roger: Nope. Absolutely no problem here.

In turn #7, Sara pauses in the middle of her utterance, after

'Because I know when I first moved down here in like' and searches

for the date of her move ('what?') before naming it: 'nineteen eighty-

six.' The fact that Sara conducts a search for the date seems to

indicate that she is unsure of it, and may be seen as support for the

claim that the general extender *or whatever* is used to mark the

named date as an approximation, or a best guess. Evidence for this is

also found in the co-occurrence of the discourse marker *like*. As

noted in chapter 2, Americans tend to place *like* before the part of

an utterance they wish to qualify or put focus on; and one of the

discourse functions of *like* is to mark something as approximative

(Romaine and Lange 1991:245-248).

Excerpt [135] provides a second example of a general extender being used to mark numbers as approximate. In this excerpt, Roger is offering to leave behind some household items for Sara when she takes over his apartment.

[135] MO:T44
1. Roger: So there's an awful lot of stuff that // we'll save you money o::n
2. Sara: an' saving the expense=
3. Roger: =Right
4. Sara: Uh huh
5. Roger: The: like- like piddly stuff. Y'know like stuff that wouldn't cost you a lo::t but jus- b- jus- like // it saves two, three bu::cks, five bucks, **whatever**.
6. Sara: Yeah, y'mean:: (.5) Exactly.
7. Roger: Right.

In this example, Roger marks the amount of money which Sara might save as a small amount: 'two, three, five bucks, whatever.'

Note that there is a subtle distinction between the use of *or something* and *or whatever*. Whereas *or something* may simply mark a preceding element as an approximation, *or whatever* adds an additional implication of *it doesn't matter*, marking its accuracy as unimportant (cf. Collins 1990:353; and Longman 1988:27). This use of *whatever* is found in the following cartoon (figure 9):

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191,
Figure 9

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Figure 9

The following examples from other sources demonstrate the widespread use of disjunctive general extenders as approximating expressions:

[136] Bilmes, unpublished
T: ... I din' come in here 'n ho- hour 'nd a half **'r whatever** j'st ta j'st t' give a phone number 'n': 'n' put something down 'n writing (.) like that ...

[137] Guthrie 1994:84
S: ... every (.) spring we used ta go to <u>Dallas</u> an' visit some friends cruise down outside ya know like around <u>Houston</u> pick psilocybin mushrooms=
A=Um hmm
S: An' every year ya know pick ten pounds **er somethin'** bring 'em back. ...

[138] Craig and Tracy 1983:306
B: ... for that job he gets- I think it's three weeks or a month **or something** of vacation every year.

[139] Jefferson 1990:72
Roger: An' if he completed it within, a certain period, I think it was three hours **or something** ...

Some additional examples of general extenders which appear to mark named items as approximate are presented in [140] and [141]. In each of these examples, a speaker hedges on the accuracy of a lexical item. In excerpt [140], Ernie is conducting a name search:

[140] Jefferson 1990: p.66
Ernie: I said no I know his name is something else.
Teddy 'r Tom **'r somethin.**

In this case, it would seem that the name Ernie is searching for begins with a *T*, and is perhaps one or two syllables in length; it may or may not be one of the two names mentioned.

In [141], the point of interest is where 'B' says 'collate or something':

[141] Svartvik and Quirk 1980:136
B: that one type then there's an operation test they're interested say in well particularly seeing various adverbs and they write something like I entirely dot dot dot and the student has to complete the sentence
A: m
B: well with entirely they'll nearly all write agree with you
A: yes
B: and entirely and agree

A: m
B: go together
A: m
B: collate **or something** it's called
A: yea
B: ((laughs)) and then they in fact try another adverb

It would appear that the word 'B' intends here is *collocate*; the named item, *collate*, may be seen to approximate the correct lexical item.

Often, the general extender *or something* occurs in the environment following quoted speech or thought, as in excerpt [142], where Lucy is telling Bruce about an interaction she had with her husband:

[142] MO:F2
1. Lucy: ... Oh, and he pointed out the way I say 'listen.' He said I- You have this need to be heard or y- y'know you-
2. Bruce: ((sings:)) You have nee:::::::::d
3. Lucy: if you're not the center of attention an' y- He tr-gets ugly sometimes, and he was saying how I- I'll say 'He::::y, nobody::::'s listening to me::::::' **or something** an' I said // I don't
4. Bruce: You do: do that
5. Lucy: Yeah, I know, but a lot of the time it's just like now. I'm all 'li::ste::n:' - It's not for re:al. =
6. Bruce: =I think you do have a need to be heard. I'm gonna have to be on Henry's side on this one.

Where the general extender follows the quoted material, it appears to mark the quoted material as one of a number of possible things, similar in form and content, which could have been said. A second example of this is found in excerpt [143], from the same interaction:

[143] MO: F60
1. Lucy: ... Now he thinks it's because I talked to Malia and Malia told me like 'Leave Henry' **or something,** an' I said
2. Bruce: Did she?=
3. Lucy: =No:::. I talked, Malia listened, and she said, 'Well, those are things to think about.' She didn't tell me 'Leave Henry.'
4. Bruce: Mmhm

Note that in [143], *like* precedes the quoted material; this redundantly marks it as just one of a number of possible utterances similar in form and content, which could have been said. As Romaine and Lange (1991:247) point out, *like* may be used to 'evoke examples of what might have been said/thought or might be said/thought either on particular or repeated occasions in the past or in hypothetical instances in the future.'

Again, this phenomenon is found in data from other sources. In [144], the speaker attempts to recall a conversation:

[144]   Guthrie 1994:87
S: ... Jim asked 'em what they were doing. an'. the. um (.) DEA guy said. your friend has (.) a something culinary..unusual culinary taste. **er something like that** (1) we had no idea what the <u>hell</u> he was talking about. ...

Another environment in which disjunctive general extenders (typically *or something*) occur, is in cartoons and jokes, where it signals to the hearer that what precedes the general extender is an exaggeration, or an analogy, which should not be taken literally. In each of the following cartoons (figures 10 and 11), the speaker is

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The cartoons on pages 195 and 196,
Figures 10-11

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confronted with an unusual experience, and uses *or something* to
hedge on his or her (perhaps purposefully inaccurate)
characterization of it:

The Far Side

Figure 10

Figure 11

Examples of this from naturally-occurring data are presented in [145] and [146]:

[145] Baton Rouge Advocate 9/2/94
((U.S. Open coverage: 'Garrison sneaks to victory.' Zina Garrison talks about wearing a borrowed shoe after one of hers fell apart during a match.))
"Once it finally molded to my foot it was fine," Garrison said. "At the beginning, it kind of felt like I was walking like a duck **or something.**"

[146] MO:T52
((Sara has been driving Roger's truck))
1. Sara: Th- that truck makes the most amazing sn<u>o</u>rting noises // sometimes

2. Roger: huh huh huh
3. Sara: like when you're goin' up a hill,
4. Roger: Right.=
5. Sara: =it makes a noise exactly- it sounds exactly like
(.) I dunno like a do_::g or a ho_:rse **or something** like like
when it's when it's u::h discontent. heh heh heh It
m(h)akes the str(h)angest noise- everytime it does I just
bust out laughing.
6. Roger: huh huh huh ha::::h=okay

In each of these examples, the speaker uses *or something* to mark a
characterization as a joke, or an analogy which is not intended to be
taken literally.

Finally, it is worth noting that where disjunctive general
extenders function as a hedge on the content of an utterance, there
is frequently collocation with expressions such as: *I don't know* (e.g.,
MO:T14, MO:T27, MO:T37, MO:T47, MO:T52, MY:F65, MY:F80), *maybe*
(e.g., MO:T8, MO:T27, MO:F56, MO:F63), *probably* (e.g., MO:T19, MY:F65,
MY:F68), *I can't remember* (e.g., MY:F68), *I'm not sure* (e.g., MO:T28),
and *I think* (e.g., MY:F66, MY:F68). *Or something* is also found in
subjunctive structures (e.g., MY:F63) and interrogatives (e.g., MO:T16,
MO:T21). The co-occurrence of disjunctive general extenders with
these expressions supports the claim that, in such cases,
disjunctive general extenders function as a hedge on the content of
an utterance.

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4.3.3.2 *The Q-Principle*

As noted in chapter 1, Horn (1984:12) suggests that the Gricean maxims of Quantity, Relation, and Manner result from two basic and competing forces, described by Zipf (1949) and Martinet (1962), which operate in the linguistic realm. These two forces are an Auditor's Economy, which is 'the need for a speaker to convey his message fully' (Horn: 1984:12); and a Speaker's Economy, which is a principle of least effort that makes the speaker 'restrict his output of energy, both mental and physical, to the minimum compatible with achieving his ends' (Martinet 1962:139). According to Horn (1984:12), the Q-Principle (which corresponds to the Gricean maxim of Quantity[1]) results from the Auditor's Economy, and the R-Principle (which corresponds to the Gricean maxims of Quantity[2], Relation, and Manner) results from the Speaker's Economy.

In this section, I will consider how a speaker's use of a general extender may demonstrate an orientation to the Q-Principle. In essence, the Q-Principle is a lower-bounding constraint on the amount of what is said on a given occasion. In Horn's (1984:13) proposal, a speaker will produce his or her contribution with an awareness of the need to make the contribution sufficient to convey his or her message to the hearer. I would like to suggest that many, if not most uses of adjunctive general extenders may be interpreted in terms of a constraint on cooperative interaction such as the Q-Principle. Specifically, in using an adjunctive general extender, a speaker indicates to the hearer that he or she considers that which

precedes the general extender to be sufficient to convey his or her message. Note that on this interpretation, the Q-Principle is always in effect; the speaker's use of an adjunctive general extender is an overt marker that the speaker considers that which precedes the general extender to be sufficient to the hearer for the current purpose of the exchange.

As pointed out in section 4.1, despite the fact that our individual conceptualizations of the world differ, social actors typically assume shared knowledge and a shared world (Husserl 1929/1977:92). In using an adjunctive general extender, a speaker invokes an assumption of intersubjectivity, and communicates the following message to the hearer: Because we share the same knowledge, experience, and conceptual schemes, I do not need to be explicit; you can fill in any gaps. In other words, the 'more' which is referred to by an adjunctive general extender is marked as known or *given* (in the sense of Brown and Yule 1983a; also cf. Chafe 1976; and Prince 1981).[9]

Excerpts [147]-[148] will serve to illustrate how a speaker's use of an adjunctive general extender may be seen to demonstrate an orientation to a constraint on cooperative interaction, such as the Q-Principle. In [147], Rosie is telling Julie about a phone call she made to Tom (Rosie had been dating Tom, and Tom had recently mailed her a check to reimburse her for a trip they had taken together):

[147] MO:T32
1. Julie: Did ya talk to Tom?
2. Rosie: Yea:h.
3. Julie: Yeah?
4. Rosie: Um, finally. // Yesterday.
5. Julie: Did ya get your money?
6. Rosie: Oh, he mailed it to me last wee::k.
7. Julie: Oh, goo::d.
8. Rosie: An' he didn't ca::ll, an' didn't ca::ll,
9. Julie: Oh, okay
10. Rosie: So::: I called hi::m, an' I said 'Wull, how was your first day at work' **an' that kind of thing** an' he said he's just been really busy:: // and u:h
11. Julie: Mmm. Oka//y
12. Rosie: Which is fi:::ne, but yeah, we did get the money::
13. Julie: huh huh huh All right.
14. Rosie: So no problem the://re
15. Julie: Yeah.
16. Rosie: W- I didn't want him to think I was like (.) pining for him **or anything**.
17. Julie: Good.=
18. Rosie: =so I just hhheh said (.) th<u>a</u>nk you for the check
19. Julie: .hhh
20. Rosie: an' y'know, 'I was just sayin' hi, an' seein' how your first day on the job was' **an' that kinda thing**,=
21. Julie: =Mmhm=
22. Rosie: =kept it really light.
23. Julie: Mmhm.

Rosie explains that after waiting to hear from Tom, she finally decided to call him. In turns #10 and #20, Rosie characterizes what she said to Tom: 'I said 'Wull how was your first day of work' and that kind of thing,' and 'I was just sayin' hi and seein' how your first day on the job was' and that kind of thing.' In using the general extender *and that kind of thing*, Rosie marks the information which

precedes it as sufficient to convey her message to Julie, and treats the 'more' as known or *given*.

A second example of this is found in excerpt [148]. In [148], Anne explains the content of an email message she sent to Roger, which he is currently unable to retrieve. Anne had sent the message to congratulate Roger on his recent marriage:

[148] MO:T51
1. Roger: Oh I won't be able to read any email you've sent- we've packed the com//puter away
2. Anne: Oh, oka//y
3. Roger: I- I may be like // I'll be able to read it from Louisiana
4. Anne: That's o::h, well you've got the gist of it- You'll see it. It just sorta says that's great I'm // thrilled
5. Roger: Right.
6. Anne: um // y'know
7. Roger: Okay
8. Anne: I'm happy you're happy stay happy
9. Roger: ⌈ Right
10. Anne : ⌊ Y'know. Be happy for everybody. It's like hhh. huh huh huh Go with it **an' all that stuff** and u://m
11. Roger: Uh huh (1.0)
12. Anne: have a good one.
13. Roger: He::y! Yeah. We're havin' a good time.

Anne characterizes the message in turns #4 to #12, saying: 'It just sorta says 'That's great, I'm thrilled' um y'know 'I'm happy, you're happy, stay happy' y'know 'Be happy for everybody.' It's like hhh. huh huh huh 'Go with it' an' all that stuff an' um 'Have a good one.' Again, in using an adjunctive general extender (i.e., *an' all that stuff*), the speaker marks the preceding instances as sufficient to convey her

message, and treats the 'more' which is implicated as known, or *given*.

Note that in both [147] and [148] the speakers redundantly mark their assumption of shared knowledge with *y'know* (see section 4.2.2), and the hearers provide supportive feedback in the form of backchannels (see section 4.2.3), indicating to the speaker that they understand the message.

In fact, it may be that in some rare 'perspicuous cases' (see section 3.3.1), where a speaker goes on to explicitly state what was implicated by his or her use of an adjunctive general extender, the speaker adds the additional information in an effort to supplement what he or she subsequently considers to be an insufficient contribution (i.e., one which is less informative than required, or assumes too much). As illustration, consider the following excerpt, previously presented as [36]:

> [149] MO:T15
> 1. Julie: Frederico, huh?
> 2. Crystal: Frederico=I know! An' his brother is Juan. huh huh // huh
> 3. Julie: O:::h, look out!
> 4. Crystal: Juan is one of those light ones. He has red hair **an' everything.** L- Light hair, blue eyes, (.) white skin, Mex- um, uh Spanish, y'know.
> 5. Julie: Umhm

Note that in [149], Crystal does not receive any supportive feedback from Julie (i.e., in the form of backchannels) after her utterance of *and everything* in turn #4. Crystal subsequently elaborates on 'He

has red hair and everything,' saying 'L-Light hair, blue eyes, (.) white skin, Mex- um, uh Spanish, y'know.' A point of interest in this elaboration is Crystal's use of *y'know*. In addition to emphasizing the existence of shared knowledge with the hearer, *y'know* may also be used to check whether the hearer possesses some knowledge which is necessary for the currrent exchange (Schiffrin 1987:272). It may be that, in using *y'know* at this point, Crystal is checking to see whether she has provided enough information to convey her message to Julie. According to Schiffrin, it is crucial in such cases that the hearer 'acknowledge his/her receipt of that information either by affirming that information ... or by marking its reception with 'oh'' (Schiffrin 1987:272). In this case, Julie acknowledges receipt of the information with 'Umhm.'

4.3.3.3 *The R-Principle*

In this section, I will show how a speaker's use of an adjunctive general extender may demonstrate an orientation to the R-Principle. In essence, the R-Principle is an upper-bounding constraint on the amount and necessity of what is said on a given occasion. In Horn's (1984:13) proposal, speakers will produce their contributions with an awareness of the need to say no more than they must (at that time) and to present what they say as necessary (at that time). As I did in the previous section, I would like to suggest that some uses of adjunctive general extenders may be

interpreted in terms of a constraint on cooperative interaction, in this case, the R-Principle.

In using an adjunctive general extender in orientation to the R-Principle, a speaker indicates to the hearer that the explicit identification of the 'more' is *not necessary* at the present time. In the speaker's assessment, the expression of this information may: (a) make the contribution more informative than required (disregarding the maxim of Quantity[2]); (b) be irrelevant to the point being made by the speaker (disregarding Relevance); or (c) result in an obscure, ambiguous, or prolix utterance (disregarding Manner). In such cases, it is worth emphasizing that the actual status of the 'more' information involved need not be known or *given* (in the sense of Brown and Yule 1983a, also cf. Chafe 1976, and Prince 1981). As was the case with the Q-Principle, on this interpretation, the R-Principle is always in effect; the speaker's use of an adjunctive general extender is an overt marker that there is more, but that the explicit mention of the 'more' is *not necessary* at the present time.

Before we look at some examples of adjunctive general extenders which may be viewed as evidence of a speaker's orientation to the R-Principle, it is interesting to note that general extenders often contain nouns such as *stuff, junk, crap, shit,* and *blah.* These expressions may be used to convey negative connotations such as *worthless* and *nonsense,* and are also used to refer to *excrement* and *rubbish.* This observation may be viewed as support for the claim that, in some instances, the speaker's use of

an adjunctive general extender indicates that the 'more' which is implicated is somehow devoid of value or unimportant (to the hearer at the present time).

Perhaps the clearest example of a general extender being used implicate that the 'more' is unimportant to the hearer for current purposes is the form *(and) blah blah blah.* Consider [150]. In this example, Sara is complaining to Roger about her employer:

> [150] MO:T35
> 1. Sara: ... they don't wanna give me a paycheck today if I were to take a vacation next week they're like 'Wull, we'd hafta like- we'd hafta like mail it to you::: **an' blah blah blah.**' An' I'm like 'Hhhh! //Nevermind.'
> 2. Roger: Uh huh.

In turn #1, Sara reports something said by her employer: 'Wull, we'd hafta like- we'd hafta like mail it to you::: an' blah blah blah.' The general extender *an' blah blah blah* seems to extend the utterance, indicating that more was said, but that the content of what was said is not significant for this hearer.

This particular general extender, and variations thereof, are commonly found to occur in conjunction with reported speech that the speaker considers to be empty, stupid, or otherwise devoid of value. For example, in excerpts [151]-[152], Lucy is reporting (to her friend, Bruce) an interaction she had with her husband, Henry:

[151] MO:F57
1. Lucy: So what was I just- Oh. So Henry and I were
talking last night an' he was saying 'I can ne:ver- (.) I::'
Here's what he did. This is his hand motions. He goes
2. Bruce: Wait.=
3. Lucy: ='Your intelligence level is up he::re, and I am
down he::re.'=
4. Bruce: =He said that?=
5. Lucy: =Yes. An he goes 'I can never ho:pe to be as
intelligent as you are' This is when we're really heavily
into it.
6. Bruce: Uh huh
7. Lucy: I'm taking you to the middle of the discussion.=
8. Bruce: =Okay.
9. Lucy: .hhh He goes (.5) 'Uh- You:: and Bruce are really
intelligent, and you can talk with him **an' dadada**, and I::
can't do that.' Or something. I mean this is his excuse for
(.5) why we can't (.) I dunno be closer in terms of that
kind of relationship.
10. Bruce: Uh huh.

[152] MO:F59
1. Lucy: ...Like right no::w, the marriage is okay because
of its s:ex an'
2. Bruce: hhhm hhhm hhhm=
3. Lucy: =y'know financial (.5) whatever- minimal
support,
4. Bruce: Right.
5. Lucy: from Henry. An I I get everything I said I g- get
everything else from Bruce.
6. Bruce: Oh wo::w, I'm playin' a bigger role in this than I
thought. (3.5)
7. Lucy: An' he's like 'Wha::-' That's when the conversation
came in- 'Wull I can't do all the things he does an' I'm not
your .hhh intellectual pee::r **bluh=bluh bluh=bluh**' (.5) ø
'You're not, so go to school.' I said 'Henry, (.5) you ca::n
be.' I said 'I am a student a:::ll the time. I always wanna
learn. An' I don't think my way is the:: way.'=
8. Bruce: =Umhm ...

In each of the above excerpts, Lucy uses a variation of the form *and blah blah blah* to indicate to the hearer that more was said, but that the content of what was said is insignificant. It may be that, in Lucy's assessment, the explicit mention of the 'more' which is implicated by the adjunctive general extender would not only create an unnecessarily lengthy utterance, it may obscure the message, as well.

An interesting account of *blah* is found in the bank advertisement on the following page (see figure 12). This advertisement, which vows to leave out the *blah blah blah* describes the *blah* as 'clouds of lingo' which is 'tedious,' and 'intimidating,' and implies that such talk may 'obscure a customer's understanding.' While the bank considers the content of its message to be important, it acknowledges that recipients of its message typically find the language used to express it unclear and confusing (thereby violating the maxim of Manner, and hence the R-Principle). In essence, this bank is claiming that its new service will adhere to the R-Principle by making its language clearer.

Bank of Hawaii advertisement

Figure 12

As noted in chapter 1, it appears that certain general extenders are found primarily in informal or spoken contexts (e.g., and *blah blah blah*, *and stuff*), while others are more frequently found in formal or written contexts (e.g., *and so forth*, *and so on*). It may be that, in interactions among non-familiars, the combined forms *and so on and so forth* (or, alternatively, but less commonly found *and so forth and so on*) serve the same type of function as the form *and blah blah blah* does between familiars. As illustration, consider the following example from a mediation at a neighborhood justice center.

In [153], M is in the process of mediating a dispute between T (a tenant), and his landlord. At this point, little progress has been made toward resolving the dispute, and T is growing impatient; it appears as if T is ready to abandon the mediation process. In what is perhaps an effort to gain credit for her efforts to mediate the dispute, M proposes that the participants create a written record of that which has been discussed thus far. When M asks T if he would be willing to cooperate in the effort to put that which has been discussed in writing, T refuses M's request, characterizing the information (and the request) as trivial:

[153]   Bilmes, unpublished
M: .hh Well (.) (bLloyd) I'd like y' ta- (.8) would you: be willing t' take a minute (.) just to: (.) let us put that down in writing?
T: No I can't see any reason f'r that.=It's (j's a) phone number it's available y'know: uh: (.4) he works at Pearl Harbor 'nd uh (.7) **so on 'n' so forth** (.5) .hh .hh y'know°

I din' come in here 'n ho- hour 'nd a half 'r whatever j'st
ta j'st t' give a phone number 'n': 'n' put something down 'n
writing (.) like that //=
M: Okay (.7) wull:
T: =(y'know) (.) I come in here f'r: substantial uh (1.2) //
(reasons)

According to T, the information which M would like to put in writing
(specifically, his roommate's place of employment and work phone)
is trivial; we know this because he says 'It's (j's a) phone number'
and 'it's available.' It is clear that in T's opinion, this information
does not seem pertinent to what he assumes is the purpose of the
current exchange: the resolution of a dispute with his landlord.
While the items mentioned before the general extender are
considered to be unimportant as well, they are perhaps explicitly
mentioned as examples of what the speaker (T) considers
unimportant.

Another example of this is found in excerpt [154], from the
television show Crossfire, where the topic of discussion is the O.J.
Simpson trial:

[154] Crossfire 3/95
Kinsley: U:h Barry Tarlow I wanna ask you something
about what Joe diGenova brought up (.) briefly before the
break (.) which does not directly concern Mark Fuhrman
.hhh which is Johnny Cochran's decision today to dele:te
(.5) this woman Mary Anne Gerchas from the defense
witness list=Now he made a big hoo-ha-ha about her in
his opening statement .hhh she was supposed to testify
that there were fou:r men seen at the crime scene **and**
so on and so forth .hhh an' no:w (.) apparently she's-
he's decided she's too incredible=she was arrested a
couple of times s- si- si- since he made his opening

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statement .hhh = Isn't that an incredible setback for the
defe:nse?= Aren't they=Isn't that an- emb<u>a</u>rassing? t- to
say that you've g<u>o</u>t this witness who's gonna sa:y all
these great thi:ngs an' then never produce her?

In using the general extenders *and so on and so forth* in [154],
Kinsley's indicates that the additional things to which Mary Anne
Gerchas would testify are, at the present time, *not necessary* for the
point he is making (i.e., Kinsley wishes to focus on the fact that
Mary Anne Gerchas will not testify, rather than what she was to
testify to).

4.4 Chapter summary

In this chapter, I have attempted to illustrate that, within
their actual contexts of occurrence, general extenders appear to
have a function which is primarily interpersonal, and tied to the
nature of the social relationship of the participants.

In section 4.2, I explored the role of general extenders as
indicating assumptions of shared knowledge and experience,
particularly with regard to the marking of intersubjectivity. In
section 4.2.2, I noted that general extenders frequently co-occur
with the discourse marker *y'know*, offering support for the notion
that, in using a general extender, the speaker is relying on an
assumption of shared knowledge or experience. In section 4.2.3,
I discussed the fact that, despite the inexplicit nature of these
expressions, participants typically treat them as unproblematic.

In section 4.3, I investigated how speakers use general extenders to mark their attitude towards the message, or the hearer. In section 4.3.1, I demonstrated how certain expressions (e.g., *or anything, and everything, or what*) are employed as *intensifiers*, to emphasize or highlight a preceding part of an utterance. In section 4.3.2, I considered the use of general extenders in terms of *politeness* or *face*: In section 4.3.2.1, I illustrated how disjunctive general extenders (e.g., *or anything, or something, or whatever*) may be used as hedges (a strategy of negative politeness); and, in section 4.3.2.2, I showed how the adjunctive general extender *and stuff* may be used to signal invited solidarity as interactive partner (a strategy of positive politeness). Finally, in section 4.3.3, I demonstrated how a speaker's use of a general extender may be interpreted in terms of an orientation to one of three proposed principles of conversation: Quality (4.3.3.1), the Q-Principle (4.3.3.2), or the R-Principle (4.3.3.3).

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

[1] Many modern theorists take the social as primitive, and the self as derived from the social. On the social origins of self, there is more than one tradition, but the most prominent in the United States is probably the symbolic interactionist (cf. Cooley 1964; and Mead 1934).

[2] Translated from the German: Zuerst und allem Erdenklichen voran bin Ich. Dieses "Ich bin" ist für mich, der ich das sage und in rechtem Verstande sage, der intentionale Urgrund für meine Welt, wobei ich nicht übersehen darf, daß auch die "objektive" Welt, die "Welt für uns alle" als mir in diesem Sinn geltende "meine" Welt ist. Intentionaler Urgrund ist aber das "Ich bin"; für "die" Welt nicht nur, die ich als reale anspreche, sondern auch für die mir je geltenden "idealen Welten" und so überhaupt für alles und jedes, das ich in irgendeinem für mich verständlichen oder geltenden Sinne als seiend bewußt habe - als das bald rechtmäßig, bald unrechtmäßig ausweise, usw. - mich selbst, mein Leben, mein Meinen, all dieses Bewußthaben eingeschlossen. (Husserl 1929/1977:89-90)

[3] Garfinkel (1967) argues that all talk is incomplete. General extenders explicitly acknowledge this incompleteness. The notion that general xtenders are used to implicate 'more' will be pursued further in sections 4.3.2.2 and 4.3.3.2.

[4] A crucial difference between *y'know* and general extenders is that *y'know* sometimes functions 'to create a situation in which the speaker knows about (has meta-knowledge) knowledge which is shared with the hearer' (Schiffrin 1987:272). On the other hand, in using a general extender, a speaker typically assumes that the hearer possesses this required knowledge; general extenders are not used to create a change in the hearer's information state.

[5] I use the term 'sanctionable' in the sense of Garfinkel (1967); cf. Bilmes 1986:166, and section 3.4.2 for a discussion of this term.

[6] cf. Sacks' (1972) which identifies a normative procedure for committing suicide (something which may be considered a 'significant event' in one's life). According to Sacks, individuals who threaten to commit suicide are routinely asked (by those answering the emergency phone lines) whether they have discussed their intention to commit suicide with their family.

[7] An exception to this may be where the speaker's use of an adjunctive general extender is seen to demonstrate an orientation to the R-Principle (see section 4.3.3.3). DISJUNCTIVE general extenders are typically used to hedge on the accuracy of a named instance, or to implicate *potential* alternative instances which may be unknown to the speaker (see sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3.1).

[8] cf. McCauley (1991:169-170) who notes the 'idiosyncratic' usage of general extenders by certain speakers. It may be that, in British English, the form *an' that* functions similarly to the form *and stuff* in American English.

[9] While the use of disjunctive general extenders may also invoke an assumption of intersubjectivity and mark the alternative information as known or *given* (e.g., where they function to implicate alternative instances of a category, as demonstrated in section 3.3), it appears that disjunctive general extenders are most typically used as hedges on the Maxim of Quality (as discussed in section 4.3.3.1), or hedges addressed to politeness strategies (see section 4.3.2). In such cases, it seems reasonable to assume that, in using a disjunctive general extender, a speaker implicates the *potential* existence of alternative instances, which are perhaps unknown to the speaker.

[10] Although I have no examples of this in my data set, another form which appears to function in this manner is *etcetera, etcetera, (etcetera)*.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

5.1 General summary

For many years, the discipline of linguistics was dominated by generativist constraints on what counted as preferred areas of study (syntax, phonology, morphology) and relevant data (constructed, contextless sentences). This restricted perspective, which excludes so-called performance data such as conversation, and focuses on abstract competence, has gradually been shown to underdetermine the nature of the phenomenon called language. Increasingly, linguists of many different specializations have been turning to conversation as the canonical situation in which language has its most obvious function in human affairs. The work of these scholars has demonstrated that there is a wealth of unanalyzed linguistic features which can only be investigated via a microanalytic approach to conversational discourse. This work represents my contribution to that new wave of linguistic study.

In the preceding pages, I have described and analyzed a set of linguistic forms which I have called general extenders. General extenders are a class of clause-final expressions of the form CONJ + NP which extend otherwise grammatically complete utterances. These expressions may be divided into two basic types: adjunctive (those beginning with *and,* such as *and stuff like that, and everything*), and disjunctive (those beginning with *or,* such as *or anything, or something*).

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In chapter 1, I identified some standard exemplars of this set of forms, and illustrated their widespread distribution in many different genres. I noted that, although general extenders are found in both spoken and written contexts, the frequency of these forms appears to be greatest in informal, spoken conversation among familiars. Next, I went on to discuss the theoretical approach, data, and methodology employed in this investigation. This discussion emphasized that: (1) the analysis would be based primarily on an examination of naturally-occurring data within extended contexts; and (2) there is much in language which can only be accounted for in terms of a speaker-hearer context of occurrence.

In chapter 2, I presented a summary of previous research regarding: (1) the form of general extenders, (2) their contexts of occurrence and (3) the function of these expressions. I noted that the findings of previous studies were often contradictory, and attributed this, in part, to the fact that: (1) the analyses were based primarily on decontextualized examples; (2) sentences and sentence fragments were typically used as the unit of analysis; (3) constructed examples were used; and, (4) in some cases, the research was conducted to confirm the analysts' hypotheses about how a particular general extender is used, rather than to discover how it was actually used in a natural context.

The questions and issues which arose in this survey of previous work were roughly divided into two major groupings. Halliday's (1970) distinction between the ideational and

interpersonal functions of language was used to provide general labels for those two areas.

In chapter 3, I investigated claims involving the ideational function of language, focussing on the standard assumption that general extenders combine with named exemplars, whose characteristics enable the hearer to identify a category the speaker has in mind. This involved an in-depth consideration of category types and the conceptual organization of categories, including prototype analysis. I found that, while there is some evidence to support the claim that speakers can use general extenders in combination with named exemplars to indicate categories (section 3.3.1), it is implausible that speakers' and hearers' categories match in some objective way, or that a speaker's mention of a prototypical example will necessarily enable the hearer to infer the same set that the speaker has in mind (sections 3.3.4 and 3.3.5). I demonstrated that the interpretation of general extenders is necessarily subjective, and massively constrained by both linguistic and nonlinguistic context, as well as background knowledge (section 3.3.3).

Next, I examined my data to investigate the alternative view that general extenders function as list completers, focussing on assumptions tied to the role of social norms and expectations, particularly with regard to list construction. I found that, although certain examples might be viewed as support for the claim that general extenders function to complete three-part lists (section

3.4.1), general extenders occurred as third parts in only 32 of 158 instances. In the overwhelming majority of cases, general extenders occur in structures of the form [1 item + general extender]. I concluded that, from a linguistic perspective, the evidence from my data did not support a view of general extenders as predominantly being used to complete lists or to mark three-partedness.

In chapter 4, I explored the role of general extenders as pragmatic expressions, focussing on the interpersonal function of these forms. This involved an analysis of how participants indicate shared knowledge and experience, and mark attitude toward the message and/or other participants. The concepts of intersubjectivity and rapport (section 4.2), politeness, or *face* (section 4.3.2), and cooperation (4.3.3) were given special consideration. I found that, within their actual contexts of occurrence, general extenders appear to have a function which is primarily interpersonal, and tied to the nature of the social relationship of the participants. For example: (1) in section 4.3.1, I demonstrated how certain expressions (e.g., *or anything, and everything, or what*) are employed as *intensifiers*, to emphasize or highlight a preceding part of an utterance; (2) in section 4.3.2, I illustrated how a speaker's use of a general extender may demonstrate an orientation to politeness strategies; and (3) in section 4.3.3, I showed how a speaker's use of a general extender may be interpreted in terms of an orientation to one of three

proposed principles of conversation: Quality, the Q-Principle, or the R-Principle.

It may be the case that the priority given to finding a referential meaning for linguistic forms has been largely responsible for the category-implication analysis presented in previous works. As in many other areas of the analysis of natural language, the realization that some linguistic forms do not have a primarily referential function, but have a much more interpersonally-defined role, may lead us to do a better job as linguists (analyzing language in use) than as linguistic theorists (constraining tokens of language to fit our preferred frameworks of analysis).

5.2 Interpersonal functions of most frequently occurring forms:

As noted in chapter 2, the general consensus of previous studies has been that general extenders combine with named exemplars to implicate categories, and that based on the named exemplars, hearers are able to infer the category the speaker has in mind. Indeed, in almost all examples cited out of context, it is possible for the analyst to come up with a likely category as referent for a general extender. However, as demonstrated in chapter 4, within their actual contexts of occurrence, general extenders do not appear to be used with category implication as their most obvious function. In fact, what this investigation has shown most clearly is that, when viewed in terms of their role

within the interactive exchange of talk, general extenders appear to have a function that is primarily interpersonal, and tied to the nature of the social relationships of the participants. A summary the interpersonal functions associated with the most frequently occurring forms (in my corpus) is found on the following sections.

5.2.1   Adjunctive general extenders

(1) *and stuff (like that)*,   31   occurrences:
   (a)   Typically indicates 'more.' Generally, the 'more' is assumed to be known to the hearer (in orientation to a constraint on cooperative interaction, such as the Q-principle). In some cases, however, the 'more' can be treated as 'not necessary' at the present time (in orientation to a constraint on cooperative interaction, such as the R-principle).
   (b) Also occurs as a marker of invited solidarity with the speaker as interactional partner (a strategy of positive politeness).

(2) *and everything,* 12 occurrences:
   (a)   Typically used as an intensifier, to emphasize or highlight a previous part of an assertion or question. In this usage, it is often accompanied by increased pitch and loudness.
   (b)   May also be used to indicate 'more' which is assumed to be known to the hearer (in orientation to a constraint on cooperative interaction, such as the Q-principle).

(3) *and blah blah blah,* 4 occurrences:
   (a)   Typically indicates that more could be said. It is used to indicate that the 'more' is 'not necessary' to the hearer at the present time (in orientation to a constraint on cooperative interaction, such as the R-principle). This particular general extender, and

variations thereof, is commonly found to occur in conjunction with reported speech that the speaker considers to be of little value.

5.2.2 Disjunctive general extenders

(1) *or anything (like that),* 20 occurrences:

(a) Typically used as an intensifier, to emphasize or highlight a previous part of an assertion or question, often with accompanying increase in pitch and loudness.

(b) Also found in invitations, offers, proposals, and requests, where it is used to indicate alternative options (a strategy of negative politeness).

(2) *or something (like that),* 46 occurrences:

(a) Typically used as a hedge to mark the content of an assertion as possibly inaccurate, or approximate (in orientation to a constraint on cooperative interaction, such as the Gricean maxim of Quality). Commonly found to occur in conjunction with reported speech.

(b) Also found in invitations, offers, proposals, and requests, where it is used to indicate alternative options, and express tentativeness (a strategy of negative politeness).

(3) *or whatever,* 16 occurrences:

(a) Typically used as a hedge to mark the content of an assertion as possibly inaccurate (in orientation to a constraint on cooperative interaction, such as the Gricean maxim of Quality). Also used to convey an attitude that, from the speaker's perspective, the accuracy is unimportant.

(b) Also occurs in invitations, offers, proposals, and requests, where it is used to indicate alternative options (a strategy of negative politeness).

(4) *or what, 4 occurrences:*
    (a) Typically used as an intensifier to solicit agreement from the hearer. In such cases, it is appended to a Yes/No question which contains an evaluative assessment of some kind, and is often accompanied by an increase in pitch and loudness.

5.3 Observations with regard to methodology

The findings presented in section 5.2 were made possible by the data and methodological approach employed in this investigation. Unlike many linguistic studies which focus on competence, and abstract the object of investigation from its contexts of use, this investigation focussed on actual PERFORMANCE data.

To provide an account of the function of general extenders within their natural contexts of occurrence, I called upon three analytic frameworks: conversation analysis (CA), linguistic pragmatics, and politeness theory. In accordance with the CA approach, this study was principally based on a corpus of NATURALLY-OCCURRING language data, and avoided the use of decontextualized or constructed examples. The data were examined in order to DISCOVER how participants use general extenders, and the linguistic contexts in which they occur. In the course of the analysis, an attempt was made to provide examples which display participants' interpretations (i.e., where a hearer demonstrably responds to the general extender and the interpretation is said to be 'grounded in the talk'). There were, however, very few clear cases in my data of

conversationally grounded participants' interpretations. In order to investigate those examples where no clear grounding was apparent, I appealed to two alternative theoretical frameworks which allow for analysts' interpretations which are not 'grounded in the talk': linguistic pragmatics, particularly following from Grice's (1975) Cooperative Principle, and Brown and Levinson's (1987) politeness theory.

A final methodological note concerns my role as an occasional participant in the recorded interactions and a close acquaintance of many of the other participants who were recorded. While the involvement of the analyst as an occasional participant/observer might be considered a disadvantage in some theoretical frameworks, I believe that this was not the case in the current investigation. My involvement in this capacity, and my familiarity with the situations discussed, allowed me to have a better understanding of how relevant expressions were being used by these participants on the specific occasions recorded.

5.4 Directions for future studies

In the course of this study, a number of other possible avenues of investigation became apparent. These avenues were not pursued in the current study, due to a lack of sufficient relevant data. The pursuit of these issues will require the collection of additional spoken and written data, and perhaps the administration of

elicitation tests. Among the issues which might be explored in future studies are the following:

(1) Are general extenders found in other languages? Examples such as [29]-[33] suggest that there are comparable forms in many languages. Which forms would be considered to be general extenders? What would the range of these forms be? Are the functions discovered in this work found in other languages? Are there any additional functions which can be identified?

(2) Are general extenders a clear guide to politeness strategies? I have suggested that adjunctive general extenders demonstrate an orientation to positive politeness, and that disjunctive general extenders demonstrate an orientation to negative politeness. This proposed function may be worthy of further investigation, potentially with tests involving an elicited judgement method.

(3) Are general extenders with built-in comparative forms (e.g., *and stuff like that*, *or something like that*) actually used in a different way from their counterparts without the comparative (e.g., *and stuff*, *or something*)? In my data, it is noticeable that the longer comparative forms are much less frequent, but no obvious reason for this was apparent. A larger database of exemplars might provide some clues as to when these longer forms are preferred.

(4) Are general extenders markers of textual structure and cohesion? In some cases, particularly within written discourse, the occurrence of a general extender seems to coincide with a

conclusion to part of a discussion prior to a new direction being taken. This potential text-organizing role may be worthy of further study, possibly with an expanded database containing more written exemplars. Such an investigation would expand the analysis into Halliday's (1970) textual function of language, thereby adding to the work initiated here on the ideational and interpersonal functions.

There are no doubt many other directions in which future research with general extenders can go. I hope that I have presented a sufficiently well-documented range of observations and an adequately supported number of analytic claims that will stand the empirical test of any further explorations in this area. As long and as detailed as this investigation has been, it represents only an initial survey of the phenomenon involved. Rather than representing a conclusion, I trust that the work presented here will serve as a suitable beginning for the further investigation of this interesting facet of language.

APPENDIX: DATA

Note: Excerpts are presented in chronological order. Where excerpts are from face-to-face interaction, an 'F' precedes the number (e.g., MY:F80); those taken from telephone conversations are preceded by a 'T' (e.g., MO:T12). The designations 'MY' and 'MO' simply represent two sets of tapes, and are of no relevance to the study at hand.

MO:F1   L = Lucy; B = Bruce

((Bruce and Lucy are driving in Lucy's car))

L: Oh, we can't have the radio on.

B: D(h)<u>a</u>mn!

L: Am I psychotic **or what**?

B: Yes.

L: I mean if you- You kno:w me an' love me (.5)

B: ⌈Correct.

L: ⌊(*) (.5) So::: (.) you can: tolerate all this=but am I: (.5)

B: Psychotic! No // you're just a little boy crazy

L: But if you didn't know me

B: You're like seventee:::n- you're a fou:rteen year old girl who first discovered penilay.

L: Bu- i- (.) How lo::::ng am I gonna have to be:: like this?

B: W- I would revel in it while I could if I were you // 'cause someday you're gonna

L: But it hu::rts me:::!

B: be a bitter old woman: that doesn't // even like sex

L: But I'm married to the king of the frigid men.

B: We//ll huh huh huh

L: I'll call him Frigidaire.

B: Hmm! I // don't think so.

L: That's his new nickname. I know, I'll stop at the green light. That's a good idea.

B: It's because you're thinking about (.) frigid air.

L: It's because I'm thinking of Keanu Reeves' n<u>a</u>ked body. (3.0)

B: and his testes.

L: .hhhh! // (****)

B: Wo::::h! ((high pitch))

L: Do I have the cutest cat in the world **or what**?

B: I love your pussy. ((breathy voice))

L: Thanks. ((breathy voice))

B: huh huh huh huh huh huh

L: hhuh huh

* *

MO:F2   L = Lucy; B = Bruce

((Lucy is reporting an interaction she had wih her husband, Henry))

L: Li::ste::::::n

B: Wha::::::t?

L: Um-

B: McDoundell.=

L: =Oh, and he pointed out the way I say 'listen'. He said I- You have
   this need to be heard or y- y'know you-

B: ((sings:)) You have nee::::::::::d

L: if you're not the center of attention an' y- He tr- gets <u>u</u>gly
   sometimes, and he was saying how I- I'll say 'He::::y, nobody::::'s
   listening to me::::::' **or something** an' I said // I don't

B: You d<u>o</u>: do that

L: Yeah, I know, but a lot of the time it's just like now. I'm all
   'li::ste::n:' - It's not for re<u>:</u>al. =

B: =I think you do have a need to be heard. I'm gonna have to be on
   Henry's side on this one.=

L: = Okay, a::::nd <u>why</u> could that be? // because no-

B: Because no one listens to you.=

L: =Thank you! (2.0)

B: But see I don't believe that's true. <u>I:</u> listen to you.

L: Wu- you're the- TH<u>A</u>T'S why I'm T<u>E</u>LLING YOU:: that you're like the
   s<u>a</u>ving gr<u>a</u>ce of my life!

B: O::h, that's kind of a big burden. huh huh // huh huh

L: huh huh

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B: Can't I just be really cute instead?

L: Okay, if you insist.

* *

MO:T3   B = Bob; J = Julie

((Bob and Julie are talking about hiking))

B: I can still walk that trail but it's real hard.

J: Yeah. Yea//h

B: But-

J: .hhh It's hard for most of us. heh // heh .hhhhh

B: Well- eh- yeah. I- an' most of us have got balance where I don't. //
   heh heh heh

J: Yeah::. Still having some trouble with that (.5) equilibrium stuff?

B: Wh- yeah. It- well- just walking.

J: Mmhm

B: Y'know uh if I pay attention I can do pretty good on flat surfaces
   but as soon as the .hhh surface gets uneven **an' stuff** um (.5)
   I- it- Yeah, it gets a little tricky.

J: Hmm. Bummer.

B: Yeah. So it goes.

J: Oh we//ll.

B: But I'm here to complain about it, so so what. Mhm mhm mhm mhm
   // mhm mhm mhm mhm!

J: Yea::h.

* *

MO:T4   R =Rosie; J = Julie

R: Hello?

J: Hey!

R: Hi.

J: Sorry to boddah you

R: No, that's okay.

J: .hhh I was wondering if I could actually come by and get those
   pictures from you before we um (.) have dinner, because .hhh by

the time I mail them to John he'll be practically back otherwise // heh heh

R: Oh, sure =

J: =I thought he'd enjoy the little surprise, so:-

R: Ye:a:h

J: Um, I could like stop by where you're wo:rking, or -

R: Well, you know where it is, right?

J: I know roughly where it is, I know where you were sta:nding.

R: Ye:a:h, it's in that building on the ei:ghth floor,

J: Uh huh

R: Suite number eight five zero.

J: Eight fifty. Okay. // .hh

R: Um hm. It's Kokua Nursing. (But it) doesn't say that on our door **or anything**, but when you get off the elevator::, u:h, depending on which elevator you come up, ya hafta look around the cor//ner.

J: 'kay. What's the address of the building?

R: One three five seven.

J: One three five seven. .hhh Okay. Cool.

* *

MO:T5   L = Lucy; B = Bruce

L: So: um (.) um-um-um-um, Thursday morning.

B: Yes.

L: I'd say at least ten o'clock, we should meet, 'cause (.) I don't wanna um:::: c- waste too much time- I mean I don't want it to be like // (too)

B: Do you have the cat picked out **and everything**?

L: Yeah. It- we're- it's the: cat we're picking up. I mean, this // one particular cat.

B: What- What's it like?

L: She's rea:lly cu:::te.

B: What's she?

L: She's um like (.) two months old, an' she's basically bla:ck but she's kinda tortoise shell, I mean, she's got brown on her?

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B: Yeah, like um (.) Sable.

L: Yeah?

B: You never met Sable.

L: No.

B: Okay.

L: And the hair's kinda pokey. She's really funny. An' she's already got the most wonderful name.

B: What is it?

L: Bella.

B: Bella!

L: Yeah. Bella!

B: Bella an' Buddy.

L: Yeah. Isn't that cu:te?

B: Yeah.

* *

MO:T6   L = Lucy; B = Bruce

L: So. .hhh Anyway,

B: Buddy an' Bella. That's really cute.

L: D//id you-

B: My sister just got a brand new (Lhasa Apsa)

L: Oh, yeah?

B: It's five weeks old an' it sits // in

L: .hhhh!

B: the palm of her ha::nd.

L: .hhh! Could you die?

B: I haven't seen any pictures of it yet, but I bet it's cute

L: I bet it's r(hh)ea:::lly cute!

B: Yeah.

L: You know what um do you have a bucket **or anything** I can wash the cat in? //. hh heh

B: Uh, yeah, I do:, actually

L: Do y//ou?!

B: Uh huh

L: Make yourself a little note (.)

B: Mkay

L: to bring it- throw it in your car.

B: All right.

* *

MO:T7   S = Shirley;   J = Julie

J: You takin' a nap?

S: No:::=I been (.) vacuumin' 'n (1.0) washin': (1.0) clo::thes 'n dustin':
  'n: all that stuff.

J: Umhm. (1.0)

S: Floor was about to walk off. So I had to (.) do it.

J: heh heh heh heh

S: Take a pain pill: (.) 'n keep on goin'

J: Mm. Well, I wouldn't wanna have you over he:re, then!   heh!

* *

MO:T8   L = Lucy;   J = Julie

J: Did you know that Dad's still in horrible pain?

L: Yes. // An' you know what-

J: I feel terrible!

L: Y'know what I was thinking? Did I tell you what was my: biggest
  fear?

J: Uh-uh=

L: =That maybe he has something like some kind of (.) tumorous
  gro:wth **or something** in his- um they call it the
  retroperitoneum which is- (.) you have th- the peritoneum is a
  membrane that holds all th- your guts in, .hhh

J: Uh huh

L: an' uh, sometimes like .hhh wull behind the peritoneum is where
  your kidneys are, .hhh and (.) you could get growths or bleeds or
  things can go wrong and they call that the retroperitoneal area.
  It's just an area where (.) nothing is. = Y'know what I mean, your
  are sitting there, but around your kidneys there's nothin'.

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J: Mmhm

L: .hhh Maybe he's got a growth in that area:: (.) of some sort that's pushing on the kidney or a ureter and causing the blood. Right?

J: Mmhm.

L: A:nd now it's causing pain. (.5) Like back pain. (1.0)

J: Hmm

L: Y'know because I'm in the medical field .hhh I kinda run with this kinda thing like ((breathy voice:)) 'Oh my God!' // Of course, I could not-

J: I know, you totally run with it.

* *

MO:T9   L = Lucy; J = Julie

J: So:::::, whaddaya think? (2.0)

L: U:m: (1.0) Yo, it sounds okay. W- I'm sorry, you just told me what time to meet you and I spaced on it.

J: Okay. Your appointment's at four?

L: Yeah, an' then I think it'll go till just before five o'clock an' then I'm in town, so:-

J: So, come over. An' tell Henry to come over whenever.

L: Okay

J: Come over an' hang out.

L: 'kay.

J: We can always, y'know, (1.0) just ya:ck an' have dinner.

L: Okay.

J: A//n' we could even go

L: (But-)

J: for a walk **or somethin'** // if ya wanna go-

L: Do I need to bring anything?

J: Um (.5) let's see, you'll be done at fi::ve, We'll probably go for a walk an' have dinner. So::: if you're coming at five, you could go for a walk with u::s,

L: Okay=

J: =tell Henry to get there at (.) like (1.0) six or six thirty, if you got
   here // a little before fi//ve
L: That's good for him traffic-wise.
J: 'kay. Let's do that.

* *

MO:T10 J = Julie; C = Crystal
C: I'm all moved i:::n,
J: All right.
C: Yeah.
J: So your address is working:::, you got the ca//rd
C: My number i//sn't though. Yeah,
J: Yeah. (.) Oh
C: that was my first piece of mail!
J: O:h A//ll right.
C: Classic!
J: heh heh heh heh heh
C: Totally classic! // I wasn't
J: .hhhh .hhhh
C: even I- for some reason I just looked in the mailbox, I didn't even
   think there'd be:: anything, y'know'
J: Uh huh
C: I just was gonna take garbage out of it **or s(h)omething**,
   y'(h)know, // huh huh I didn't know what was in there! huh huh .hh
   hu::h!
J: heh heh heh

* *

MO:T11 J = Julie; C = Crystal
((C is talking about her ex-husband))
C: He doesn't even know where (.) my new address- where to ch- send
   money to me y'kno//w **or anything**
J: Oh, wo:::w

C: I kno::w, so I have to wait for it at my old address- Meanwhile I've already had to pay re:nt, an' so it's like he's just like expecting me to have this money::: y'know // like

J: Mmhm

C: to just c- come up with, like no problem-

J: Um//hm

C: It's unbelievable!

J: Bummer.=

C: =Su:ch a jerk. So I'm just gonna- I'm getting a lawyer an' I'm just gonna y'know they're gonna send a messenger to Australia or have one over there just serve him papers (.) t//o his face

J: Goo:d.

C: He's gonna hafta fly back special.

J: heh heh heh // heh

C: Yeah. I'm gonna rea:::m him for // this one.

J: huh huh huh huh huh huh // .hhh

C: He's making me so mad = I just found out he ripped me off **an' everything**

J: He di:::d?

C: He's been sending me um, it's supposed to be three hundred dollars, but he's been deducting seventy dollars for insurance

J: ⌈(S-)

C: ⌊Wull, Josh was cut off from his insurance policy way back in May, an' he's still charging me for it, an' the other thing // is that-

J: So Josh has no insurance?

C: I: have him insured under my: restaurant. That's why I told him 'Get him off your insurance'=

J: =Wull, luckily- What if you hadn't (.) been: doing that?

C: W- an' so:: then I called an' I found out that he only pa:ys a hundred forty dollars a month, or he used to pay a hundred forty a month for three:: of 'em to be on their insurance, and he was charging me:: seventy dollars.

J: O:::h

C: It shoulda been divi:ded in three::, an' that one- an' one of those thirds divided in half. And that's what I should've been paying of his insurance=I::: was paying for him a:nd Josh to be insured, basically.

J: Uo:://h!

C: Isn't that- That pisses me off man! // hhuh hhuh hhuh

J: Uo::::h!

C: And for the la::st three::: months!

J: Wo:::w

C: An' an' two of those months Josh wasn't even on the pla::n. I was paying for him and Noree::n=He's just laughing // going 'Huh huh huh'

J: What's her name? Noree::n?

C: Yea::h. // I call her Doreen.

J: .heh heh (.5) huh huh

C: But um, y'know, so here I am p- paying for this shit. I'm // just-

J: O:::h.

C: I'm livid. Absolutely livid. .hhh

* *

MO:T12   J = Julie; C = Crystal

C: An' um (1.0) he's a pretty cool guy, we just sort of- He just got-

J: Where's he from?

C: He's a- from- born in Argentina. They're Spanish.

J: Hmmm.

C: Yeah, he's kinda Doug-looking an' an' a lot like Doug, too. Y'know, just real ha:ppy, an' he's a- he's at this neat point in his life where he's just starting to work out 'n really- He doesn't even need to wo:rk, basically, these guys just have money, y'kno//w

J: How old is he?

C: He's twenny nine.

J: Mmhm. Hey, clo//ser

C: Yeah.

J: to your age.

C: Yeah, he's cool.

J: How old is Doug?

C: He's my: age.

J: Hm

C: Yeah. Um Frederico is just super- he's super mature for his age though, 'cause he's he sailed around the world s- um (.) for four yea::rs and (.) just sorta- an' had older brothers, y'kno::w, and come from a really wealthy family::=had a lot of experiences **and stuff**, so he really (1.0) kinda presents himself as being older.

J: Umhm.

C: But he's a cool guy. We're just really taking it slo:w 'cause he just got really really bu::rned **'n (.) stuff** an' but we had some fun.

J: Um//hm.

C: Went out sailing **an' stuff**.

J: Wull good.

C: Took a hit of ecstasy together. huh huh // .hhhh

J: Oh, wo:w, how was that?

C: That was fun. It was fun.

J: I' been curious about that. John knows people who've taken that.

C: It's kind of like- It's just like really mild acid.

J: Oh, is that what it is?

C: Mmhm. That's what I felt. That's what it made me feel, y'know just the .hh colors an' the (2.0) y'know uh the way it makes you thi::nk **'n (.) stuff**.

J: Mmh//m

C: Except it made- it makes you really ho::t and really thirsty-

J: Eu::w!

C: Heh. Yeah. huh huh

J: ⌈That sounds awful!

C: ⌊You get- (.) you get kinda hot, y'know In the summer I guess it's not good, huh?

J: Guess not.

MO:T13   J = Julie;   C = Crystal

J: We knew we would get married, but we didn't have a pla:n. Um, he just said 'So, when do you wanna do that?' an I said 'Anytime,' an' we just kinda said 'Okay, how 'bout now'.

C: Go::d. An' so you went out an' bought a dre::ss, (.)

J: Um actually, we just wore stuff- we went down to court an' did it an' I wore um- I had this yellow silk (.5) dress, an' I just wore that,

C: Ah

J: an' - I didn't wanna deal with all the // planning

C: Yeah

J: an' the::

C: expenses

J: Yeah. Jus- Yeah. I//t's supposed

C: Silly

J: to be fun, not a big hassle.

C: Yeah.

J: An' so (.) y'know we both just wanted it- 'cause i- for us it wasn't such a big deal, the actual (.) ceremony, we already felt married, but we wanted to be: married, so:

C: An' so you probably had tons of fun putting together that thi::ng

J: Yeah. We were just cracking up.

C: Yeah.

J: Yeah. An' (.) um::, oh, I just sent that to some of my friends who didn't even like (.) kno:w // an' they were like 'Whoa!'

C: I showed Mary today-

J: You did?

C: Yeah. She's going 'Whoa::::!'

J: heh heh heh heh

C: Yea::h.

J: Yeah, so

C: So, but- Your parents weren't there **or anything?**

J: Yeah, we um, got the family to go, because part of the reason we decided to go ahead an' do it here- we wanted to just (.5) ultimately probably would liked to have just gone somewhere on the mainland an' done it just- alone. But (.5) they were gonna be really pissed, so we made it so they could come.

C: Yeah.

* *

MO:T14 J = Julie; C = Crystal

J: I can't remember any g- guys in our grade that were gay

C: Paul Brown an' an' Fred Curry. // I- huh! I dunno, I heard Fred Curry was dressed- was like a transvestite **or something**.

J: You're kidding

C: I- I dunno. That was a- an old rumor, I don't even know if it was true.

J: That's funny=

C: =Or cross-dresser // **or something**

J: Paul- Paul Brown is ga::y?

C: No, I could see him doing that too, though. huh huh huh! I don't know wh(h)y:. //(U:::h)

J: That's weird. My sister's class has all like- all her best friends turned out to be gay

C: Oh, really:

J: Yeah. It's really bizarre // like four or five of them-

C: Oh (******)

J: all like her best friends.

C: Yea:h. Huh. Wull even Susie, y'know' back when we were buddies an' we used to ride our bikes // together **an' stuff-**

J: Mmhm

C: Everybody thought she was my boyfriend. // heh (..)

J: hah hah! I al//ways thought

C: (****)

J: Susie was gay.

C: Yeah, it kinda hit me, (.) Y'know

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J: Mmhm

C: about the last yea:://r,

J: Mmhm

C: I figured it.

J: Yeah. .hhhh

C: She had a weird family though.(1.0) Her brothers used to attack
   her 'n (1.0) grab her boobs **'n stuff,** 'n

J: O::h

C: I think her father sexually molested her (.) // as a child.

J: Wow

C: He was a stra::nge guy. Did ya ever meet him?

J: Mm-mm

C: A:h, he was weird.

J: I don't think so. Was he D<u>o</u>ctor Fishman? (2.0)

C: Yeah.

J: Then he was my eye doctor.

* *

MO:T15   J = Julie; C = Crystal

J: Freder<u>i</u>co, huh?

C: Frederico=I know! An' his brother is J<u>ua</u>n. huh huh // huh

J: O:::h, look out!

C: Juan is one of those light ones. He has red hair **an' everything.** L-
   Light hair, blue eyes, (.) white skin, Mex- um, uh Spanish, y'know.

J: Umhm

C: An' Frederico he's- he's d<u>a::</u>rk. He's um- he's really nice.

J: Look out!

C: Such a sweetheart. i know, totally. Uh Carrie Sylvester knows
   them and she already told me look out.

J: Look out for what?

C: For him.

J: Which one the l//ight-

C: For all of (.) 'em. There's like three brothers. There's another one,
   too, but // (.) he's in L.A. um

J: hhhh! .hhh W- Maybe they better look out for you:! huh huh // huh
   huh huh huh huh

C: heh heh I know. No, I'm trying really hard not to get hurt. So I'm
   playing this really, really cool.

J: Uh huh

C: I been- I've sort of found some f- different kind of friends um
   th//at I've been hanging out with

J: That's good.

C: Yeah. (.) So i- girlfriends, y'know, which is good for me. They stay
   out late, too, so I always bump into 'em. They're like (.) strippers
   'n // huh huh

J: Mmhm

C: So we'll like meet after work, an' have cocktails, an' dance, 'n just
   go flirt with the boys, so-

J: heh // heh

C: We have fu::n.

J: Strippers, huh?

C: Oh, it's funny. But they're totally ni::ce // y'know

J: Uh huh

C: an' this one girl you would not even know it. She looks like she
   works in a grocery store **or something**, y'know. Just totally
   normal // an'

J: conservative

C: Yeah, yeah. She just- She's young, and she likes to travel, an' she's
   just having fun with it,

J: Umhm

C: an' um they're totally cool. I- hhh. didn't think I'd get along with
   'em either=We were all thrown on a boat together,

J: Mmhm

C: and um ended up just having a great time.

J: Cool.

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MO:T16   D = Dwight;   J = Julie
J: Maybe I'll get to see: you before we lea:ve
D: When are you leavin'?
J: The eleventh.
D: Whoa, quick.
J: Yeah.
D: Nine day- A week an' a half.
J: Yeah. We're gonna probably go over to mom and dad's on Sunday
   night, but (.) um (.5) I don't know. We have a lotta things we have
   to do before we leave, so: // every day's gettin' full
D: (*) (.) Am I still picking up a dre:sser **or something like that?**
J: Yea:h.
D: Okay.
J: U://m
D: Lemme know when that's happening.
J: How about (.) somewhere around the ninth? (2.0)
D: The ninth. 'kay that'd be what- the weekend **or sump'n?**
J: Mm=no::. it'll be the middle of the week. The eleve- It'd probably be
   a T//uesday.
D: S- second, so the ninth would be a Tuesday.
J: Mmhm. (2.0)
D: Ok//ay, den.
J: The eighth- Well, anywhere around there, the eighth or the ninth.
D: Okay. Just gimme a call.
J: O:::ka::y
D: A::::n' I guess I'll talk to you later.
J: Okay. Thanks for callin'
D: Bye.
J: 'kay. Bye.

MO:T17 J = Julie; L = Lucy

L: I wanna go longer, bu::t, I don't know if I ca::n.

J: Mkay. Well it takes like fourty-five minutes to do the loop, so (.)
   jus' get here as q- soon as you can.

L: Bu- We're not gonna be able to then.

J: Um, wull, we'll- w-

L: Because if I don't get to you till fi:ve, that's like fo- Oh, well,
   ma:ybe. (.5)

J: Yeah.

L: W- we'll just make it, actually. We can be showering when Henry
   comes. // It's-

J: Right.

L: It's not like we're dressing up.

J: I'm thinking that, too, I don't wanna cook and hassle with that
   while we're gonna go somewhere. We'll just order something
   like- .hhh We can either get something like subsandwiches, or
   pi:zza::=

L: =or Chinese food. huh!

J: **Whatever.**

L: An' it's not like we're gonna get dressed up to go to the U.H. // so
   it's

J: Right.

L: not like we have to get all // (**)

J: Oh, it's totally cashe ((casual))

L: Yeah, like shorts **an' whatever.**

J: Right.

MO:T18   S = Billy; R = Roger

((B and R are discussing email))

R: Have you got the:: (.) the one I just sent you? Like yesterday?

B: No::.

R: O://h.

B: I don't. I just read that and eh- eh- y'know,

R: You don't reply- You don't have a little - just hit 'reply' an' heh you // send

B: Probably do::, but I don't know how tuh do it.

R: Oh, okay.

B: Y'know, just tuh like (.) pull that up an' do it = I'm- I'm sure that I y'know could probably do: it, but (.) I mean, this has not happened before. I' been gettin' to you:: (.) a lot,

R: Yea//h

B: so I'll uh (.5) y'know (.)// I-

R: Yeah. I got the- the letter from you:: I- It was weird to get a letter in the ma:il, but no e:mail.

B: Well see for a while I didn't email you because I knew you were in Iowa, //but,

R: That's true.

B: I- the last several weeks I've sent you y'know, a few things, nothing of ma:jor importance=it's just about .hhh y'know u::h file questions like y'know, are you still comin' the twelfth, do you need // me

R: Yeah

B: to meet you somewhere, **blah blah blah**. Y'know, whatever.

R: Okay. Yeah. All that.

* *

MO:T19   S = Billy;   R = Roger

B: You uh- You're still comin' the twelfth

R: Right. We fly out the eleventh and we arrive early on the twelfth=which must be a Friday.

B: Yeah.

R: Yeah.

B: Wull- So you'll be arriving he:re, New Orleans, where?

R: Uh, Baton Rouge.

B: A:ll Right. Well then uh (.) I will be there **or whatever** // at the

R: He::y, cool. Um well you want me to call you near the time, or just send you (.) the::=

B: =I'm getting y<u>ou</u>r email.

R: Oh, okay, I'll send you email. Right.

B: Y'know, an' I- I- I don't know what's happened h<u>e:</u>re, but I'll uh

R: Okay. Is everything else cool? I mean like wh//ere's

B: Yeah.

R: Pierre going? Pierre's going to Fr<u>a</u>nce or B<u>e</u>lgium, or wha//t?

B: Ye::ah, B<u>e</u>lgium an' then maybe France an' he's d<u>e</u>finitely going for the Fa::ll, but he may be going for the whole yea:r if he can get a little bit of- few more b<u>u</u>cks **or sump'n,** but u::h // y'know

R: Oh, wow.

B: He asked me if (.) I knew anybody an' I said 'Roger's back' ø 'Does he have any place yet?' ø 'I don't know' But I- I said I would email, in fact then I emailed you that day: which was ab<u>ou</u>t (.) y'know, the end of last week.

R: Uh huh. An' what's he doing, r<u>e</u>nting it? I mean, they rent it already, right? D'ya know uh what-

B: Ye:a:h. He's probably renting it or s<u>u</u>brenting it **or something** but I gave you his uh uh y'know phone number **an' all** (.) on email but you didn't get it // (an' reply)

R: huh huh huh huh Okay.

* *

MO:T20   S = Shirley; J = Julie

J: Hello?

S: My::::: goo::::dne:::://ss!

J: Hi mom, wha-, I'm in a real big hurry. What's up?

S: Wha::::t's up?! What are you hidin' behind the fig leaf, I guess!

J: Oh, you got it! // hhhh.

S: Huh huh huh huh huh huh I all but die:::d. huh huh I o//pened that an (fell off)

J: Is that the best picture **or wh<u>a</u>t?**

S: Sssh! It is <u>a</u>bsol<u>u</u>tely priceless. huh huh huh huh huh

J: I made him po::se, (**) .hhh

S: An' I teased him he couldn't find one big enough. heh!

J: Isn't it great?

S: I'm gonna put it in the album

J: Oh he's like- Don't tell him 'cause he told me 'U::h, I don't want that
in our <u>a</u>lbum.'

* *

MO:T21   J = Joy;   R = Roger

J: I did read an interesting thing on the pla:ne in // the::

R: hhh.

J: y'know the magazine the in-flight magazine that they uh did a
thing on Southern Louisiana. .hhh

R: Uh huh

J: A::nd uh, which in your opinion is the better spot, Jackson o:r Saint
Francisville?

R: O::h. (1.0) Hard choice. They have different things to offer, Sa//int
Francisville

J: Uh huh

R: is very pretty an' cutesy, and um, kinda, <u>a</u>ctually almost heading
towards yuppy now.

J: Okay.=

R: =Whereas Jackson is more um (.) more rural.

J: Uh huh

R: Yeah. But they're both really nice.=They're actually not very far
from each other.

J: Yes, eh- uh- There was a m<u>a</u>p.

R: Oh.

J: And u:::://m

R: You could live in one 'n (.) spend time in the other-

J: Umhm

R: easily.

J: Umhm

R: Like, yeah.

J: An' like do you like go up there on weekends sometimes or // do
   they
R: .hh I have-
J: have good restaurants **an' stuff?**
R: No, no.
J: Oh
R: They don't have good restaurants. They have funky little places to
   eat.
J: Uh huh
R: But I've got friends who live in (.) uh- just outside Jackson.
J: O::h.
R: Yeah.
J: O//h.
R: Yeah. Wull I actually helped 'em get the place that they live in.
J: Oh wow.
R: Yea//h.=I know the area really well.
J: An' that's like i- (.) it's a: like a cultura::l (.) treasure **or**
   something like that?
R: Saint Francisville is, yeah.
J: Oh. O//h.
R: Jackson's more funky. = There's a state prison at Jackson.
J: A:h.
R: Yeah. Saint Francisville is very cute an' pretty an' very o:ld.
J: Uh huh.
R: Like, u:h, old for (.) y'know=like the United States.
J: Yeah.
R: Yeah.

* *

MO:T22   R = Rosie; J = Julie
R: hhhh.
J: Stress, huh?
R: Um, yeah. J- Work's been really stressful, an' then y'know after I
   talked to you I've just been really stressful 'n .hhh Y'know this

gu::y that wants to go with us to Kalalau 'n he::: - I met him on
Kauai when our club went (.) with them

J: Uh huh

R: I'm semi-attracted to this person, so I look forward to seeing him:
(.) on paddles **and everything**

J: Umhm

R: An' then we went camping over the weekend (1.0) an' um Mark
didn't stay that night. He went out Saturday night an' then he left.

J: Uh-oh!

R: heh heh heh heh .hhhh So we started talking **an' everything** an'
y'know we just kinda really get along really well, 'n I dunno,
I might've messed everything up. I mean, I didn't do:::: anything,
I kissed him a couple times, but (.) it wasn't anything major,
y'know?

J: Uh huh

R: Now I'm kinda going 'We::ll' I'm freakin' out 'Well' y'know 'What am
I doing, I don't even know this person' an'

J: Is this the person you were dreaming about?

R: No::.

J: O://::h

R: No::.

J: Uddah-kine fish.

R: hhuh huh huh huh // huh huh huh huh huh

J: huh huh huh huh

* *

MO:T23   R = Rosie; J = Julie

R: So, anyway, um, (.5) I thought I might go ahead 'n make
reservations for Kalalau for=

J: =We're ready.

R: Yea:h.

J: John and I are hiking out with you.

R: Ya:::y!

J: He's excited about the idea. We went an' bought shoes.

R: Okay. That's //cool.

J: So-

R: We'll get an early start, an' I was thinking if we wanted to bring in the coo::ler, we could, an' have it- Each pitch in a little bit of money an' have Jerry take it out by boat. So that we can put all the kitchen stuff in the::re, an' all the heavy stuff, an' just pack out our clo::thes an' tents **an' stuff**. (1.5)

J: I need to (.) get us a tent. Of some so//rt.

R: Uh huh

* *

MO:T24   S = Shirley;   J = Julie

S: So, anyway, hhhh. huh Um, are you all pau with your movin' out?

J: Yep.

S: What's this uh- blue:: b- box around the corner? // Is it

J: It's empty.

S: Oh, it is?

J: Yeah.

S: I a//lmost bought one,

J: (wow)

S: an' I thought 'Well I better ask- wait till see if it was e- empty or f- **or what**- I almost bought one just like it.

J: That was the first thing I emptied. I told you a long time ago it was empty.

S: O::h. I thought maybe I'd stick some of that crap that's sittin' around you know (.) under it.

* *

MO:T25   S = Shirley;   J = Julie

S: Well, I almost got killed today:: // on my

J: Why

S: I was goin' to Waikele hhh. an' I missed the turn off, as though you get to where you're headed to Mililani **or somewhere** an' ya

can't- There's no way to get off of it, you know till you get hell an' gone

J: Mmhm

S: T- Turned around- i finally got to where- come b<u>a</u>ck around an' got back towards Honolulu, I'm goin' on the freeway, an' a big semi's behi:nd me, an' a truck in front of me started losing his construction material- // big pieces of metal

J: Oh, no!

S: If- uh, some of it flew over my car, an' it landed beh<u>i</u>nd me, so I guess that semi must've slowed up when he saw what was goin' on, an' the rest of it looked like it was comin' to my windshield but it landed right in front of my ca:r.

J: Mmmm

S: So I had to run <u>o:</u>ver it, so it was right in my lane.

J: Harsh.

S: So the good Lord must've been smilin' on me or scarin' the shit out of me, one!

J: huh huh huh

S: huh huh huh

* *

MO:T26   R = Rosie; J = Julie

J: Thanks for calling. You sure you're okay?

R: I'm fine.

J: You sound much better.

R: Oh, well, the first couple days was // like

J: heh heh

R: 'What the hell is th<u>i:</u>s?'

J: Have you seen him again?

R: Oh, yeah. I- we went out (.) a: couple of nights ago::

J: Uh huh

R: to go out an' t(h)alk = I thought that was appropriate. I- 'I think we should talk about this' huh huh huh huh

J: A:::nd=

R: =So it was good. Um, (.5) I think that I've pretty much set him in
his place, I mean in a nice way but I- you know, I mean, I'm
married, so I have no intention of- I don't even kn<u>o</u>w him and I
think we have a long ways to go before there's ever even an
issue=That's not even a- a- pa- potentia::l for anything else- any
more than being friends right now.

J: Uh huh

R: Because we don't even know each other. So:: y'//know

J: Okay

R: all that other woo-woo stuff is just um (.) that- just that. heh heh
heh Kind of- kinda blew me away, but u::h It's ni::ce an' I just made
it clear that we have to keep it really sweet an' y'know (.) really
innocent. And um that's the way it is.

J: Okay, Madam Wazel.

R: I'm not tryin' to fall in love **or anything**, that's for sure.

J: heh heh heh heh // heh heh

R: Shit! Let's complicate your life! huh huh huh huh! No, I think u:h (.)
I really don't wanna lose him as a friend, so::

J: Mmhm=

R: =I mean an' why would he- if it ca- became more than that he
wouldn't be able to come around the k<u>a</u>yak club because of B<u>o</u>b
y'know I mean, why would he wanna show his face.

J: Umhm.

R: So::, I don't wanna- I don't wanna ruin anything.

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MO:T27   S = Sara; R = Roger

R: Good.

S: So but like later on, I'm gonna get together with you an' find out
like how much of your stuff you wanna get rid of, an' how much of
it you wanna sell to me, heh!

R: O:::kay.

S: Like are you- I me- Are you like (.) planning to do that? I mean, I
don't wanna step on your toes **or anything**.

R: Whatcha mean?

S: Wu- // uh

R: You mean like when I leave here in August?

S: Yea:h.

R: No, no. You can ha::ve li//ke the stuff like the be::d

S: Okay, lemme- lemme- lemme spell it out for you, this is what I::
would ideally like to do.

R: Uh huh=

S: =I'd like to move out there 'n take over your apartment

R: Right

S: an' all the stuff that's in it an' just b<u>u</u>y it from you, **or whatever**,
an' maybe like b<u>u</u>y your truck **or something.** I dunno.

R: Uh huh huh huh // huh

S: (I mean) just because that would be the easiest way to do i//t if
you-

R: In the first instance.

S: You have stuff that wo::rks, a::nd is functional and that y<u>ou</u>:
bought, so an- an- y<u>ou</u> hafta get rid of y<u>our</u> stuff so you may as
well just sell it to me.

R: Right.

S: I mean is that like a- a- irrational line of thinking?

R: Uh, much of the stuff here that I have you can have for free.

S: A:h.

R: So y'know=like you can even minimize your initial setup costs.

S: Yeah.

R: Right. Um wh//at I just hafta-

S: Yeah that-

R: W- well, okay, I guess it could be closer to the time

S: Uh hu//h

R: I will um intimate to the people who:: r<u>e</u>nt me this place

S: Uh huh

R: that there is someone who will y'know=like (.) take it over, and
under my recommendation as y'know- **all that crap,** .hhhh // an'
um

S: Yeah.

R: an' they will um- (.5) an' see- an' like see if I get any feedback on their intentions about what th__e__//y wanna do.

S: Yeah. (.) An- an' tell 'em I only plan to be out there for about a year or two, so I mean if they are worried about me like settling myself i:n, an' also like if they're worried about that if I: get out there an' they s__e__ll the building **or something** an' they want me out, tell 'em I would agree to find another place to live=but I need to have a place to live wh__e__n I move out there, y'know?

R: Right. I thi//nk-

S: See, they could write that into the lease, y'know, 'If we sell the building, I mean, the other a- person wants you out, you hafta mo::ve', You know thirty days notice **or whatever**.

R: Well they can do that under most lease agreements anyway.

S: True.

R: So.

S: S//o.

R: You don't have to worry about that.

S: Yeah. Tell 'em I don't have wild parties an' throw people out windows **or whatever**

R: But you might be bri//nging a companion

S: Well I mi:ght. No::, no. Well (.) that- that- // that's wa:::y up in the air.

R: hhhhh. huh huh huh

S: huh I would be trying to convince that companion to come with me.

R: Probably won't- yeah. Okay.

S: (an' so-)

R: All right.

* *

MO:T28 S = Sara; R = Roger

((Sara is talking about her friend, Jackie))

S: I've heard from her (.5) She's uh she//'s (*)

R: happy in New York.

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S: Yeah. She's uh missin' everybody. She's she's(.) well um // we were livin'

R: That won't last

S: I mean, we lived together for like six months so we actually got to be like pretty good friends.

R: Right.

S: pretty close, an' so (.) we're kinda missin' each other.

R: Yea:h.

S: But 'at's okay.

R: She's in M̲anhattan.

S: Yeah, she's- she's cookin' up a storm.

R: Uh huh.

S: So an' uh // most of the people I know

R: Cool

S: are goin' up the:re in (.) the end of Ju::ne for this big gay rights march i//t's

R: Uh huh

S: like the:: twenty fifth anniversary of the Sto̲:newall riots=I don't know if you've ever heard of the::m=

R: =Um//um?

S: Uh- uh- anyway, like back in the sixties there was an apartment complex called the Stonewall apartments an' the::y- I'm not sure exactly what happened either, but they ended up having these huge riots there. An' it was like for (.) gay discrimination **or something**=Anyway, this year is the twenty fifth anniversary of it an' uh .hhhh So anywa::y

R: You thinking of going an' marching?

S: No, no, no.

R: No.

S: E- everybody I know is, an' everybody wants me: to go, but I can't really aff̲ord to go, because I'm try- trying to sa::/ve

R: Planning to go to Hawaii!

S: Yeah.

* *

MO:T29   S = Sara; R = Roger

((Sara's friends are going to NY to march in a gay rights parade))

R: You thinking of going an' marching?

S: No, no, no.

R: No.

S: E- everybody I know is, an' everybody wants me: to go, but I can't really aff<u>o</u>rd to go, because I'm try- trying to sa::*//*ve

R: Planning to go to Hawaii!

S: Yeah. I mean *//* every-

R: Tell 'em-

S: Everytime a paycheck rolls around,- Like last paycheck it's like a hundred an' somethin' dollars to take the cat to the vet an' thi*//*s

R: Oh, ri:ght.

S: this time around I had to get a new br<u>a</u>:ke job on my ca::r *//* which was

R: No::::=

S: =Well, heck, I mean the brakes are like down to absolutely nothing an' I:: have to uh- have to drive around for a few more months so *//* may as

R: Hmm.

S: well just go ahead an' have it do:ne.

R: Okay.

S: So, an' I think I'll have my <u>oi</u>l changed today, an' have the g<u>ea</u>rbox fluid changed **or whatever.** huh huh I was just like 'Damn!'

R: Wow!

S: 'I'd be better without a car!'

R: Mkay.

* *

MO:T30   S = Sara; R = Roger

S: My vet is looking into getting my kitty c<u>a</u>t past the quarantine restriction.

R: Wow!

S: Yea::h. Apparently, like (.) she thinks there might be a way that we can get him out of it. So an' if we ca::n, then I'm gonna bring him with me.

R: O::h

S: I'm gonna bring him with me. He says 'He̲llo:!'

R: By- by proving that he::: (.) cannot possibly have rabies.

S: Right.

R: All right.

S: Yea::h, like (.) I dunno. She's- she's gonna look into it for me

R: Okay.

S: I- I'll talk to her about it = I was like 'I don't think he'd survive four months in quarantine.' .hh heh heh A//n' she's like 'no-

R: It's amazing that anything (.) survives that.

S: Actually, she said he'd be fi:ne, it's probably me:: that wouldn't survive four months in quarantine. // So, um (.)

R: Uh huh.

S: Anyway, his tail is well // b- he doesn't

R: O:h, good.

S: have any hair on it // like for about

R: hhhhh. huh huh huh huh

S: an inch (.) or two, but

R: Right.

S: It's well. It healed really fast. She said he's in supe̲rb health.

R: O://h

S: An' she said he would um he would weather a quarantine just fi::::ne.

R: O:kay.

S: Y'know an' like uh (his emotional-) He was so good when I took him back to the ve̲t to have him lo̲o̲ked at?

R: Oh, he didn't have to be sedated?

S: No::, like, w-I mean, they just went an' sh- looked at him, she took his temperature, an' y'know stuck the thermometer up his butt, an' he didn't howl **or anything**. He didn't fi::::ght, or hiss, or scratch, **or anything**. He just kinda stoo:d the//re.

R: Oh

S: I was like 'Cool!' I was so::: pleased.

* *

MO:T31   S = Sophie; J = Julie

S: In the Fa:ll, um (.5) y'know Paul will continue his stuff here.=He had a chance to work at Kamehameha this summer, (.) um (.) y'know teaching- teaching uh television production?

J: Uh huh?

S: But he's gonna turn it down, um (.) bec<u>au</u>:se they're only paying him y'know the low- the minimum entry salary:: for tea//chers,

J: Yeah.

S: an' they're not gonna pa:y y'know his way over there, an' they're not gonna help him find a place to live, an' an' it's for six weeks. So he said, y'know, 'It's really not (.) worth the money that I would have to put out to get over there an' (.) y'know, find a pla::ce **or whatever** // an' y'know

J: Uh huh

S: An' of course he'd wanna come with us, too. So, (.) it doesn't- it doesn't work out. Y'know, m- financially, so he's gonna turn it down, unfortunately. If it were for l<u>o</u>nger, it would've been feasible, I think.

J: Yeah.

S: But it's only for six weeks.

* *

MO:T32   R = Rosie; J = Julie

J: Did ya talk to Tom?

R: Yea:h.

J: Yeah?

R: Um, finally. // Yesterday.

J: Did ya get your money?

R: Oh, he mailed it to me last wee::k.

J: Oh, goo::d.

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R: An' he didn't ca::ll, an' didn't ca::ll,

J: Oh, okay

R: So::: I called hi::m, an' I said 'Wull, how was your first day at work' **an' that kind of thing** an' he said he's just been really busy:: // and u:h

J: Mmm. Oka//y

R: Which is fi:::ne, but yeah, we did get the money::

J: huh huh huh All right.

R: So no problem the://re

J: Yeah.

R: W- I didn't want him to think I was like (.) pining for him **or anything**.

J: Good.=

R: =so I just hhheh said (.) tha̲nk you for the check

J: .hhh

R: an' y'know, 'I was just sayin' hi, an' seein' how your first day on the job was' **an' that kinda thing**,=

J: =Mmhm=

R: =kept it really light.

J: Mmhm.

* *

MO:T33   S = Sophie; J = Julie

S: An' I y'know, I d- just don't know how it'll (.) how it'll be:: y'know w- what's gonna happen for sure. //.hhh

J: Yeah.

S: If I can find a cheap enough place in Hawaii an' he would have to- Paul would have to find a really cheap place in Los Angeles .hhh Y'know, he only has one more year of coursework.

J: Mmm.

S: A//nd uh

J: You can't sweat it out, huh?

S: .hhh Well=

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J: =I mean I can relate to how you fee::l. But it might be even harder for you if you try to get over he:re=You've got the kids to your- y'know, by yourself an' all the financial worries on top of it=I don't know if you'll be much better off.

S: Mmhm. True, but I have two- two aunts- two y'know Paul's sisters are there. One of them doesn't work. An' she's like dy̲ing to take Katie off my hands.

J: Oh.

S: So::: you know- it's not- i- it's funny. It's almost as though I might have more support // (with)

J: Oh, I see.

S: babysitting **an' stuff** over the̲:re.

J: Mmhm

S: Um it would be sort of m- mental and emotional (.) y'know, having to cope with the long (.) waits till Paul would be able to come home or he'd have a break, and um (.5) y'know, I just don't know, I mean for a while there Katie was telling people 'I don't have a home' hhh!

J: heh hhh.

S: I'm like hhh. 'Great.'

J: 'Cause you're always moving?

S: Yeah.

* *

MO:T34   S = Sophie;   J = Julie

S: 'Cause I talked to the grad division yesterday an' it's so̲ weird, y'know, I call- I call the school **an' stuff** an everybody's so̲ nice. It's just- It almost brings tears to my eyes to talk to someone an' not have full-on gatekeeper syndrome, y'know, an' .hhh // Just=

J: Mmhm.

S: =to talk to somebody no::rmal .hhh y'know, an' you ask 'em a nice question politely, an' they're really nice to you:: or they try to he̲//lp you::

J: Mmhm. Mmhm.=

S: =an' it's like I- I just can't- I'm blown away. Y'know it's like God,
   I- I- I almost forgot people are like this!

J: Yeah.

S: Y'know // an'

J: People are way nicer here than they are in other places.

S: O::h Go:::d! Y'know, an' I mean they're telling me 'Well if you can't
   make it for registration,' 'cause they're sending me my materials,
   they said 'just call us up an' let us know an' we'll just carry it
   over for the Spring.'

J: Mm//hm

S: So that might be: that might be the best- the best solution (1.0)
   because that'll give me:: (.) more ti::me, an' it's not tha::t long to
   wait for Paul to get there. Y'know, if I were to go right after
   Christmas (.) an' go // for the Spring semester

J: Mmhm.

* *

MO:T35   S = Sara; R = Roger

((Sara is talking about troubles she's having with her employer))

S: W- you know it's like 'Fine.' Y'know, an' it's like I could do the
   same thing next Friday say, wull 'I'm gonna be on vacation next
   week, technically my last day is next Friday, y'know, why don't
   you just .hh send me a paycheck for that amount of time an' then I
   quit after that.'=Wull they don't wanna do that. Wull they don't
   wanna give me a paycheck today if I were to take a vacation next
   week they're like 'Wull, we'd hafta like- we'd hafta like mail it to
   you::: **an' blah blah blah.**' An' I'm like 'Hhhh! //Nevermind.'

R: Uh huh.

* *

MO:T36   S = Sara; R = Roger

S: So, anyway, um i- They're not gonna hafta lug that up there, so
   anything else- um what I'll do is I'm gonna go up there Sunday
   morning an' then we're gonna come back Sunday afternoon or

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Sunday evening an' take what- y'know load up whatever's left in the tru::ck, an' uh (.) or they may come down on S<u>a</u>turday .hh an' (.) load the rest of the stuff in the tru::ck an' then me: come up there S<u>u</u>nday morning or:: S<u>a</u>turday night **or:: whatever** an' bring me back down here in the car an' then we're gonna stay in a hotel:

R: Uh huh

S: Su:nday ni:::ght // an' then

R: Right.

S: mu' ma:::ma an' da:::ddy 're insisting on taking me to the <u>ai</u>rport M<u>o</u>//nday m<u>o</u>rning

R: hhhh. He:::y!

S: to g//et on-

R: Good move!

S: to get on my pla:::ne

R: to Hawaii::::!

S: Yeah.

R: Good Bye::::!

S: Bye bye!

R: huh huh huh huh

* *

MO:T37   S = Sara; R = Roger

S: If I don't find a place to li:ve, like immediately, if I don't find a place that I can I can afford or a place that I can like (.) abi::de whoever else is gonna be living there I'll go stay in the fuckin' Y.M.C.A. an' I'll just l<u>oa::</u>d everything that you leave there into the room with me.

R: Uh huh.

S: I mean I can stay the:re, an' I'm sure it's not th<u>at</u> expensive.

R: Right.

S: So-

R: Right.

S: I mean I- I // don't think that-

R: Don't worry about it.

S: I truly believe that the people I know don't know me very well.

R: That's it.

S: Like 'cause 'cause I'm pretty resourceful, an' I don't think anybody realizes that.=My mom was tellin' me last night- She watched some stupid fuckin' show on .hhh (.) like Haw-w-Waikiki five O, **o r something**, I dunno=There was some stupid ass like ne:w detective show or

R: Uh // huh

S: like horror show, or so//ap opera, **or whatever**

R: huh huh huh huh huh

S: that's s- set in fuckin' Waikiki. An' so my mom calls me this evening an' says 'I watched this show last night an' there were these (.) o- oriental girls who wound up givin' up a kidney for a//ll the

R: huh huh huh huh

S: an' I was like 'What the fuck are you talkin' about?' hhh! My mom's like worried I'm gonna get out there an' get involved with like the skin tra::de **or something**, I du//nno.

R: Ahhhhhh! huh huh // like gonna have to give up a kidney, right

S: So I'm not gonna have any money, next thing you know I'm gonna have some big burly Samoan pimp // y'know

R: heh heh removing your kidneys huh huh // huh huh huh

S: huh huh huh huh Exactly! or or worse! y'kno//w

R: (*****) should ca//ll your mom

S: Removing my:: removing my:: innocence or- I dunno, I have no idea what she's // thinkin'

R: ((Japanese accent:)) Ho:::! Take away yo' wirginity!

S: hah! heh heh Sorry, mom! huh huh That was years ago. I mean it's like 'Jesus!'

R: huh huh huh huh huh huh

S: So // y'know they're all- Everyone I know is spa:stic!

R: Uh (.) well

* *

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MO:T38 S = Sara; R = Roger

S: Man! So what on earth possessed you to get married?

R: U:::m, y'know=like, it just seemed like a good idea at the time.=It's really si//mple

S: W- uh heh heh So I'm to//ld! heh heh heh

R: It's remarkably simple.=It takes no effort- hardly any money::

S: U//h huh huh huh huh

R: An' um a- almost no time. You go down in the judge's lunch hour an' he comes out an' marries you.

S: hah hah hah hah hah hah hah // hah hah

R: huh huh Actually, they've got a- a stand-in-line number system. We we//re number five.

S: O::h my: Go:::d! So s//o wait a minute, w-

R: Take a number!

S: When do you mail out the wedding announcements?

R: U:://h

S: I:: jus' can't- I would love to see the faces of some people wh//en they find

R: (W- you)

S: that news out.

R: Wull you mustn't tell anybody a- in B//aton Rouge.

S: Oh, I'm not tellin' anybody.

R: Oh, you can- yeah. You can tell Masters **an' people like that**. But you mustn't- I haven't told Billy yet. I'm waiting for him to find that out when I get back.

S: .hhhh That's amazing. heh heh heh heh That's- that- That's great, man. Better you than me.

R: hah hah hah // hah

S: That's all I have to say.

R: .hh uh!

S: I am-

R: hhhh!

S: Congratulations w- y'all!

R: 'kay.

* *

MO:T39   S = Sara; R = Roger

S: I'll take your word for it.

R: Right.

S: We'll see. I'm just gonna play it by ear.

R: Okay wa//it.

S: I don't know like Okay, okay, I- jus- I- I- Oh, nevermind.

R: Back to business.

S: Yeah.

R: Um I- When I call the phone company I'm gonna probably um call 'em an' sa:::y um discontinue my service like about August the thirti//eth

S: Oka::y=

R: =an' // I'll probably do the same-

S: Could you tell 'em I want your phone number:: 'cause I started givin' people your phone number:: .hhh an' so, we::ll, no:: probably if I move in with somebody they'll have a phone number, nevermi:nd.

R: You'll have th<u>a</u>t number until like August the thirtieth

S: Yea::h.

R: But you- you can't take the phone number to a different area. An' like you c//ould if you

S: A-

R: just stayed in this area // but

S: W-

R: if you move somewhere else,

S: So what's the story on that apartment, has anybody come by an' looked at it?

R: No, we've had a call from the u::m (.) like the agent saying somebody <u>i</u>s planning to come, a::n' would that- would it be okay if they call us, an' an' an' **and s<u>o</u> on**=the person come an' look at it // (it's **)

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S: I can't beli//eve that, man. When you've got somebody li:ned up who's willin' to like plunk down their money an' they don't like- Wull, nevermind.

R: Yeah.

S: I'm not gonna get on my high horse **or anything.** =

R: =N- no, I think i- it's like w- the rent's what's gonna y'know=like // (****)

S: .hhh Oh, yeah. Somebody's gonna like snap that apartment up in no time.=I'm sure they're gonna be knockin' on the door on August the twenty seventh goin' 'Can I move in yet?'

R: No, no no//::. The um-

S: an' I'm gonna be standin' there with like a machete goin' 'Get the fuck away!'

R: Right, right. That's- that's you:r- your privilege. hhh. // heh heh

S: hhh. Really.

R: W//ell w-

S: They're gonna drag me outta there kickin' an' screaming // an'

R: Apart from that, I'll do the same with the um utilities.

＊ ＊

MO:T40 S = Sara; R = Roger

S: I dunno. I- I'm- I'm planning to have a place to sta::y I mean a place to li::ve, either the::re, I mean provided nobody wants it, which hhh. is a laugh, or um I'm gonna have found a roommate by then=because really what I'm planning on doing is when I get out there .hhh I'm first going to focus my energy on like finding a place to li:::ve =

R: =Right=

S: =for the first couple of da::ys

R: Ri//ght

S: an' the::n I'm gonna go do::wn (.) or I might go down to a temporary place an' like do a little testing .hhh a//n'

R: Right.

S: start sendin' out my resumé, **an' stuff like that,** but, I me//an,

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R: Right.

S: the first (.) order of importance is to find a place to li::ve.

R: Right. (.) Ah, yeah. We've made a list of you- for you of like doctors a::nd connections, an' thi//ngs

S: Yea:::h.

R: Yea::h You'll find a place to live, and you'll find a job. Don't worry about that.

S: Oh, no. I'm not worried about that at all.

R: U:::m=

S: =That's the least of my worries.

R: Okay.

S: Finding people I wanna hang out with is gonna be a harder problem.

* *

MO:T41   S = Sara; R = Roger

S: I'm gonna um (.) I'm gonna check out like on that- like not the Sierra Club, but I'm sure there's like people who go hiking around there // an' (*) like

R: Oh, that's very interesting

S: look in the personals **an' stuff** // (I mean I've h-)

R: Ma- No. Malia said that. There's loads of um hikes get organized to different places an' she said if you're interested in that, you- you'll end up meeting people instantly.

S: Wull, yeah, 'cause I bought a pair of hiking boots just to go out there.

R: Coo:::l.

S: So I mean that's- I really wanna get into that 'cause that's like o- o//ne of the things that really

R: This is hiking heaven.

S: Exactly. I- I- It's one of the things that really attracted me to:: moving out there. // (**)

R: Last Sunday I hiked twelve miles.

S: Yeah, lotsa like stomping around in the woods to be done.

R: Right.

S: An' uh, so I'm lookin' forward to tha:t=

R: =Yea://h

S: an' y'know

R: Not only that you hike to grea:t looking places h<u>e</u>re.

S: Yea::h

R: An' at the // end of the hike you

S: heh hah hah hah Not like hiking up near like the Lousiana State
    Penitentiary **or anyth//ing**

R: Na::h. No::, it's like you hike to a w<u>a</u>terfall here,

S: hhh.

R: an' at the bottom of the waterfall there's a pool, an' you .hh //
    di::ve i::n

S: (sploosh) right on in

R: kick off all your hot sweaty clothes an' dive in n::aked! // An' you:

S: U:::h, yeah! hh. with people you don't know at all.

R: Yeah that's wha//t happens here

S: Sounds like fun.

R: Right.

* *

MO:T42   S = Sara; R = Roger

R: so that you um (.) at your l<u>ei</u>sure, um transfer into your name
    y'know like=

S: =Yeah

R: Uh like there'll just be a // (***)

S: Lemme ask you thi::s .hh this is just somethin' that dawned on me
    the other day = y'know in Louisiana it's kinda hard to open a bank
    account without a Louisiana driver's license // .hhh

R: N//o::.

S: Do you run into that sa://::me

R: That's absolutely no problem

S: Okay.

R: No, I never had any problem doi//ng that

S: Because I know when I:: first moved down here in like (.) what? nineteen eighty six or whatever, um I had to go get a Louisiana driver's license before they would let me open a bank account.=

R: =Nope.

S: Oka//y.

R: Nope. Absolutely no problem here.

* *

MO:T43   S = Sara; R = Roger

S: .Who did you have your bank- I mean, who'd you have your account wi::th?

R: Bank of Hawai`i.

S: Is that the good one?

R: Not- uh em, Malia has hers with First Hawaiian Bank an' i- it seems like (.) they're better.

S: Oh, really, ho//(w long've)

R: They're actually bigger.

S: Lemme write that down, be//cause like

R: First Hawaiian Bank

S: there's a zi:llion banks out there an' I don't wanna go bank shopping, I just want somebody to say 'Yeah, it's a good bank' an' g//o-

R: Recently (.) the Bank of America- Because they've deregulated y'know=like state banking- interstate banking

S: Uh // huh

R: Bank of America's moved in here an' I noticed stuff in the paper y'know of them offering 'Open an account with us. Get a toaster!' **That kind of stuff.**

S: hah hah hah That's what I nee::d!=

R: =R::i//ght

S: Go::d!

R: No no no- Your gonna have a toaster, you don't need a toaster

S: A:::h hah hah hah

R: But they may offer y'know=like (.) a // scu:ba kit.

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S: hhh. I- Oh Oo::::: I // I'll check

R: I don't know what they'll offer

S: the paper

R: But check the news//paper

S: First Hawaiian

R: in the first couple of days if um

S: Okay

* *

MO:T44   S = Sara;   R = Roger

S: Ha::h you've been away for // too long

R: How much st<u>u</u>ff do you like- I need to b- I want you to- How much stuff are you willing to ha::ve me leave here, an' if you don't want it you pitch it?

S: Um, w//ull-

R: Is tha- Is that // good deal for you?

S: I pretty much want everything. An' if you don't want it, I want it.

R: Because li//ke I can-

S: Becau::se-

R: get r<u>i</u>d of everything // (*) like

S: Don't 'cause- Wull like the thing is like the mo:re stuff you leave me the less stuff I have to get.=

R: =Okay. So I've got like a po::t an' two pa:- like a pa::n, an' what're they called? P<u>o</u>ts. A pot for cooking like (.) boiling an egg in, or- or mixing up- like (.) s::paghetti.

S: Uh hu://:h

R: An then I've got like little frying pans, a couple of tho:se. Do you jus' want me to leave them?

S: Yeah, just leave 'em. = If you're gonna throw 'em awa::y **or whatever**, just leave 'em. .hh // an' what you

R: Yeah

S: don't leave an' I feel like I need I'll just like head on down to the Goodwill **or somethin'** an' pick up.

R: Okay. B//ut

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S: U::m

R: I'm thinking more from the perspective of you're willing to ha::ve them sitting here when you arrive, an' when you:: leave the apartment, the:y all have to leave becau//se like I-

S: Oh, yeah, that's fine.

R: I was leaving the apartment =

S: =No way, man// I-

R: I would // completely clear it out for the next person

S: I- I- I- Oh, no::, leave whatever you want to because I'll cert- I certainly have no qualms in clearing it out

R: Okay.

S: J- w- Just from the convenience of not having to go get it.

R: Right.

S: A- a//nd

R: So there's an awful lot of stuff that // we'll save you money o::n

S: an' saving the expense=

R: =Right

S: Uh huh

R: The: like- like piddly stuff. Y'know like stuff that wouldn't cost you a lo::t but jus- b- jus- like // it saves two, three bu::cks, five bucks, **whatever.**

S: Yeah, y'mean:: (.5) Exactly.

R: Right.

* *

MO:T45 S = Sara; R = Roger

R: When are you telling the: landlord that you're (.) bailing, you're not?

S: I haven't told him yet, so:: hhh. huh h//uh

R: What 're you gonna wait till you get to Hawaii an' say 'Hey! By the way, I aint there no mo:://re.'

S: No, mail 'em the ke::ys

R: huh huh huh huh huh huh huh (.) .hhh Right. //U::m

S: hhh. .hhh Better yet I'll give you an addressed envelope, postage an' everything an' when you're done here, you can mail 'em the ke::y=

R: =That would probably work better, yeah=

S: =Jus' drop 'em in the mail

R: Mmmm

S: I left a little note in there sayin' I mo::ved out, I'm sorry to ditch it like this but I had to leave, an' you were a fuckin' awful landlord s//o:

R: You're gonna hafta also um cut off your po:wer an' your pho::ne

* *

MO:T46   S = Sara; R = Roger

S: Wull I'm just- I'm I'm I'm just really excited about it.

R: Okay.

S: U:h, but u:h- Well I'm gonna go:: 'cause I'm just like // burning up

R: Yes. Time for you to go have fun.

S: An uh uh- I'll see ya:: (.) I- may talk to y'all sometime next week, but if not, I'll see y'all Friday a- probably Friday afternoon = Friday evening when y'all get in

R: Okay.=

S: =I know y'all 'll be real tired, but (.5) hopefully we'll like hookup **or something.** // .hhh

R: Sure.=

S: =An' uh I'll talk to you (.) la//ter

R: All right.

S: Okay.

R: Ta//ke care.

S: Bye bye.

* *

MO:T47   R = Rosie; J = Julie

R: Um, so what do you think, do you want me to just come by there **or something?** Or I du//nno::

J: If that's okay with you, I dunno if that's (.) a busy:: (.) I mean if you're too bu:sy or

R: Wull what's your schedule this week?

J: Hu:::::h busy=busy=busy

R: W- you're leaving Thurs//day?

J: Yeah. (1.5) Um you don- didn't bring the pictures, did you?

R: U::m yea::h I have 'em

J: U:m (.5) wull:: (.5) ma:://yb- hhh.

R: W- what are you doin' tomorrow?

J: .hh Um::: (.) we're (.) don't know where we're go//nna be at certain times, because

R: heh heh heh heh heh heh

J: we have so much to do

R: Oka::y

J: U://m

R: So is it better for you to come by here on your w//ay running around?

J: I don't kno::w. Unless you wanna stop by here on your way home. (1.0)

R: What's a good time for you?

J: Y- uh- like toda::y.

R: Oh, toda::y

J: Are you too hectic?

R: U::m (1.5) 'kay. No, I don't (.) think- think that's too big of a problem.

* *

MO:T48   S = Shirley; J = Julie

J: You know those mailing address cards where you change an address?

S: Yeah, you get 'em at the post office.

J: Yeah, I know that.

S: Um, what was I gonna ask you (.) If I put my name on (.) saying the stuff should go to Louisiana, do you think they'll start sending

your mail to Louisiana? (.5) 'Cause we have the same last name.
(2.0)

S: Wull no, 'cause you're gonna put your own name on it- I don't thi::nk

J: That's what I'm worried about.

S: Wull write down at the bottom 'Please note' huh huh **or somethin'**

J: I don't know if it's worth it or whether I should- I probably won't
   get very much with you.=Maybe it's better if once an' a while you
   just stick it in a big envelope to me, an' I'll (.) change all the
   things that're coming to me, so they'll just stop coming there-

S: Umhm

J: I think that might be safer 'cause if dad has important forms that
   start to come to Louisiana it could be a problem.

S: Yeah it could be

J: So let's do it like tha:t, okay?

S: Whatever you sa:::y

* *

MO:T49   R = Roger;   A = Anne

A: No, it's good I'm- I'm planning to uh hhh. (.) y'know take more-
    take more breaks.

R: Yeah. (.5) Well- well It's like a lot of the other stuff ends up being
   busy work if you think about it. (.5)

A: Wull=

R: =As opposed to cl<u>ea</u>r work. I mean it's not that you don't-
   y'know=like it's not important, an' .hhh um heh heh .hhh w- heh heh
   all that stuff. But um (.) you can find that y- you don't do some
   of it, that (.) <u>a</u>ctually it doesn't make a damn bit of difference.
   (.5)

A: No I kn- w- I hadn't been doing a lot of it re//cently an' it hasn't
   made a damn bit of difference. huh

R: There's- hhh. (.) There you are. See.=

A: =Yeah.=

R: =.hhh It's kind of really interesting when you realize it you say
   'Whoa. Hey. // That

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A: Yea:h.

R: wasn't important at all.' // huh huh

A: An' this- y'know this year- this year for us lots (.) y'know, I just
   don't know how it's gonna pan out with this Europea::n

R: A::h, right.

A: thing, so that's a://ll

R: A year in Paris.

A: Rome.

R: Rome. S//orry. Rome.

A: But I might have a year in (.) hh//hhhh. heh

R: Y(huh)ear in P(huh)aris huh huh

A: a year in Paris! .hhhh Everybody el//se is going to Rome!

R: Oh I don't know, Rome's pretty good.=

A: =I li:ke Paris, huh huh huh

* *

MO:T50   R = Roger;   A = Anne

A: I wanna get back to Ireland. I really hhh. um:

R: Need it? (1.0)

A: Yeah, I was g- uh o:h that- some (.) y'know- some ni:ght I'll - if I
   c'n still remember um (.) I'll tell you some of the stuff that
   happened (.) // there

R: Uh huh

A: It's just spending time alo::ne, like I really- I travelled all over
   the country but I did it by myself // I just

R: Right

A: y'know (.) and um (.) not to try to get too mystical **or anything**,
   but a lot of the s- I didn't- I:: didn't ta:lk to anybody, // huh huh
   huh

R: Uh huh

A: b- but a lot of the stuff was just (.) It's a long time since I've (.5)
   had a lot of experiences at a sort of non-verbal non-neocortex
   level (.) // y'know

R: Uh huh

A: It was just um - I just find (.) myself (1.5) f<u>ee</u>ling something. Whatever it wa://s

R: Ri//ght.

A: like y'know, just f<u>ee</u>ling a::nd (.) I wouldn't have- I wouldn't be aware of the stimulus even, y'know? It was like // u::m

R: Right. (2.5) I know all about that Anne. hhhh. .hhhh

A: Wull that's the way- that's who I was until

R: Uh huh

A: I got a P.h.D. **or s<u>o</u>mething**=

R: =Oh, okay. Right.

A: So it was u::m=

R: =Yeah, I- I know what you mean. Yeah.

A: It was just like (.) s- s- in ma:ny wa::ys having this kind've uh (.5)

R: Ri::ght

A: re- I dunno, return to another time? (.5)

R: Location helps.

A: Oh, it certainly helped=Yeah, and (.) it was like (.) speaking in to<u>:</u>ngues, because I was (.5) I could hear myself- People refused to believe I wasn't Irish and I could hear myself and I thought like

R: hhhhh. // huh huh

A: I was u::::m (.) I thought it was like I was taking the p<u>i</u>ss right out of the Irish, 'cause I could h<u>ea</u>r it coming out of my m<u>ou</u>//th

R: huh huh huh huh huh

A: huh huh!

R: Right.

A: But (.5) it (.) was um (.5) But it just w<u>a:</u>s. Y'know?

R: Mm//hm

A: I mean it was quite a strange thing an' I (.) just went with it. I decided not to try to (2.5) f//igure this one out.

R: fight it. Right.

A: So it was uh (.) // good. Yeah.

R: Excellent!

MO:T51   R = Roger;   A = Anne

A: When do you leave?

R: Um, tomorrow.

A: Oh, really?

R: Ye//ah.

A: Oh well, I'm glad I caught you.

R: Yeah.

A: Okay, so um:: (1.5) when y//ou get out

R: Oh I won't be able to read any email you've sent- we've packed the com//puter away

A: Oh, oka//y

R: I- I may be like // I'll be able to read it from Louisiana

A: That's o::h, well you've got the gist of it- You'll see it. It just sorta says that's great I'm // thrilled

R: Right.

A: um // y'know

R: Okay

A: I'm happy you're happy stay happy

R: ⌜Right

A: ⌞Y'know. Be happy for everybody. It's like hhh. huh huh huh Go with it **an' all that stuff** and u://m

R: Uh huh (1.0)

A: have a good one.

R: He::y! Yeah. We're havin' a good time.

A: Wull (.) i- y'know a year ago when we were in Amsterdam, who:: would've thought (.) what this year's brought for you?

R: Uh huh. (1.0) Okay. (1.0) I kinda d- tend to not think like that.

A: .hh Wull I do=I mean that makes- uh, ya jus' d- One never knows what's- y'know

R: Ri::://ght.

A: lies ahead, right?

R: O:::h, u::m (.) I knew what lay ahead was gonna be better than what had been befo::re

A: Yeah. .hhh

R: huh huh huh huh huh

* *

MO:T52   S = Sara;   R = Roger

S: Th- that truck makes the most amazing sno_rting noises //
       sometimes

R: huh huh huh huh

S: like when you're goin' up a hill,

R: Right.=

S: =it makes a noise exactly- it sounds exactly like (.) I dunno like a
       do_::g or a ho_:rse **or something** like like when it's when it's u::h
       discontent.   heh heh heh heh It m(h)akes the str(h)a_ngest noise-
       everytime it does it I just bust out laughing.

R: huh huh huh ha:::::h=okay

S: Yeah. I went to the library yesterday, and got a card

* *

MO:T53   S = Sara;   R = Roger

S: I went an' had to reset the (.) timers on the water heater. Like
       I found that I was getting u:p (.5) probably about fi_fteen minutes
       before the actual timer kicked on?

R: Oh, bu_//mmer

S: An' I would go an get in the sho(hh)wer heh an' it'd b(h)e co::ld. huh
       huh! I'd be like 'Go::d damn it!' hhhh. An' so: //uh

R: What time you getting up?

S: Um, I'm getting up abou:t six thirty.

R: Excellent!

S: So:=

R: =I'm impressed. hh//hhh.

S: Wull I start work at ei:ght

R: .hhh I'//m su_per impressed. huh

S: An I have to catch the bu:s.

R: huh huh huh huh // huh huh

S: Yeah. I don't like it // so

R: huh huh huh huh huh huh huh huh Six thirty. Excellent. hhh.

S: Yeah.

R: Ah, you- you'll be a new person.

S: Oh no man, I'//m getting wrinkles under my eyes

R: I believe you'll probably take up religion as well hhh!

S: (my) butt's gonna start to sag, 'n (.) everything from gettin' up that early

R: heh heh heh heh .hhh//hh

S: I was thinkin' I- maybe I should get into Buddhism maybe that would like (1.0)

R: Buddhism- B//uddhism-

S: cure some of my attitudes about the world.

R: is an excellent choice.

* *

MO:T54   S = Sara; R = Roger

S: I went to the animal quarantine center yesterday to check out the kennels,

R: Umhm

S: an' they weren't so bad at all.

R: A::::h.

S: They- they're actually quite spacious.

R: All right.

S: An' so I- I (.) don't really have- Of course I'm not supposed to have pets in this apartment. // heh heh heh heh heh heh

R: Oh that's true, that's another huh huh=

S: =But uh=

R: =twist.

S: But uh (.) How often did you see the landlord?

R: Saw (.) her a lot r- u::m (.) jus' before we left, like in about the two months before we left? S//aw her constantly

S: Uh huh

R: because they were (1.0) like they- they- they were re::: (.)
y'know=like red<u>o</u>ing all that stuff about the // building
S: Right.
R: next door?
S: Uh h<u>u</u>h?
R: A::nd uh- the place downstairs from you was completely
redone.=an' she was just over constantly=<u>a</u>nd her husband.
S: Uh huh
R: They were around a lot. I guess once they y'know=like things
s<u>e</u>ttle an' (.) everyone's in where they're gonna be and they've
finished all the repairs, .hhh that you w<u>o</u>n't see 'em again=You'll
see 'em- Fr<u>i</u>day morning was her typical morning for turning up
S: Ri::://ght
R: She'd come 'round an' sweep up. But she would n<u>e</u>ver come into the
apartment. (2.0)
S: Ri::ght.
R: So I mean like i- .hhh One c<u>ou</u>ld have been doing all kinds of um
(.5) u//nacceptable // things
S: W- that's w- what I'm thinking Oh=y- My kitty is quiet. It's not
like he sits in the window and y<u>o</u>:wls **or anything**
R: There is one next door does that. Have you heard it?
S: Um yea:h, actually.

* *

MO:T55   D = Dwight; J = Julie
J: Hello?
D: Hi Julie.
J: Hi:
D: U::m (.) my new roommate has gotten me an ((email)) account at
the U.H.
J: O:::h
D: So um // uh
J: How'd he do that?

D: He's got two: He's in the comp- He's in u:m engineering **or
something like that.** // He works with computers

J: Oh //wo:::::w!

D: **an' whatnot.**

J: Co//ol

D: Wull he's letting me use- he's just letting me use h<u>i</u>s account.

J: Oh, I see.

D: One of his two accounts. So

J: Hm//mm

D: I thought I'd ask you um (.) how to get in touch with you uh via
email an' I'll try practice before you leave // so we can

J: Okay. Coo::l. Wull then you can just use that to write um (.) write
me in the mainland.

D: Uh huh.

* *

MO:F56   L = Lucy; H = Henry

L: The cat litter's gonna be::- the new cat's cat litter's gonna be:: //
in the bathroom

H: It sh<u>ou</u>ld be in the bathroom.

L: I'm gonna put it where the trash is I think. Right there next to the
toilet.

H: An' what you gonna do with the trash?

L: Wear it on my head. (.5)

H: Put it in our bedroom (.) somewhere.

L: Yeah maybe

H: Okay.=

L: =Right inside the door **or something**.

H: All right. (.5) Sounds great.

MO:F57   L = Lucy; B = Bruce

((Bruce is Lucy's close (gay) friend))

L: So what was I just- Oh. So Henry and I were talking last night an'
   he was saying 'I can ne:ver- (.) I::' Here's what he did. This is his
   hand motions. He goes

B: Wait.=

L: ='Your intelligence level is up he::re, and I am down he::re.'=

B: =He said that?=

L: =Yes. An he goes 'I can never ho:pe to be as intelligent as you are'
   This is when we're really heavily into it.

B: Uh huh

L: I'm taking you to the middle of the discussion.=

B: =Okay.

L: .hhh He goes (.5) 'Uh- You:: and Bruce are really intelligent, and you
   can talk with him **an' dadada**, and I:: can't do that.' **Or**
   something, I mean this is his excuse for (.5) why we can't (.)
   I dunno be closer in terms of that kind of relationship.

B: Uh huh.

L: It's like poo::r excu::se. (2.0) Y'//know?

B: I didn't think he was unintelligent. // I never thought tha:t

L: W- I didn't- Ri::ght!

B: .hhh

L: It's rea:::lly annoying. (1.5) So:: (1.0) Such is my dilemma::::s.

MO:F58   L = Lucy; B = Bruce

((Bruce and Lucy are in the kitchen preparing dinner))

L: That's just a big sho::w that you're mister a:: // (**)

B: No it's not. ((burps 'roger'))

L: I think so.

B: It's not.

L: I:: think so.

B: No:: // I mean it could be like

L: 'Cause you (*)

B: s<u>e</u>ven da::ys an' I'm-

L: O:H S<u>E</u>VEN DA::YS MY HEART BLEE::::DS! (2.0)

B: You get it less than that // Oh I kn<u>o</u>w you get it less than that

L: I get it like seven to t<u>e</u>:n da:ys. (.5) An I was talkin' to Henry last
   night a//n' I looked right into his face

B: An' then only after you've like-

L: an' I said I'm unhappy about this this this and this= .hh an' I said-
   j u s - =

B: =recycle?=

L: =Jus-put it in and shove it. Oh no. Yeah. .hhh An' then I said (.) 'Let
   this be a bi:g (.) I'm sending up a fla:re, red flare right now. T//o
   alert you

B: W- Is it tha<u>::</u>t s<u>e</u>rious?!

L: to alert you to the fa:ct (.5) that there's some things I'm unhappy
   about. I said 'Basically, we have an okay relationship.=

B: =Umhm=

L: =but I don't wanna jus' (.) s<u>e</u>ttle (.5) for something. I want this to
   be: th<u>e</u>: relationship an' an' y'know I wanna work on this an"=But
   see h- he's not interested in some of the things I'm interested in
   an' to hi:m, this is a gr<u>ea</u>:t relationship. Me, I want mo::(hh)re!
   Y'know?

B: Right.

L: There's garlic salt an' onion powder **an' things like (that)**-

B: Okay.

L: An'

B: Ble:::ch! There's Lima beans in he:::re!

L: I'll eat 'em.

B: Ble::::ch! (1.0)

L: Um (1.5) Y'know?

B: Uh huh.

L: He's uh- he's cont<u>e</u>nt with- oops- the way things are going=

B: =Wull-=

L: =an' I said y'know 'I:-' An' he said 'Wull we can go do things.' An' I
   said 'Yeah. An' when we do: thi:ngs, we're (.5) like at dinner (1.0)
   an' I start to talk' an' he immediately go- 'Not immedately but
   pretty soon, you go 'Yeah yeah yeah' an' turn your hea::d' an' he
   goes 'But you talk about anything=You'll just talk about anything.'
   An' I said (.) 'Th(h)at's how c(h)onversations u(hh)sually a(hh)re!'
B: huh huh huh
L: Y'know, I mean (.) some people talk to TALK=
B: =Um//hm
L: to- to uh bo//nd **or whatever**. (1.0)
B: ((burps))
L: Y'know. (2.0) An' (.5) of course (.5) he's just like 'We::ll-' it's like
   he's gotta // talk about (*)
B: Wull he's also not much of a ta//lker
L: an' **an' thi//ngs like that**
B: unless he's in a situation where he has to.=
L: =or he doesn't know you.=Things that kept coming up were 'I'm
   there if you nee::d me. If there's a problem I'm by your side.'=It
   was like (.) he::'s the::re if he's nee::ded.=
B: =Bare minimum.=
L: =But he's not there like (.) just to be there? just like- you are.
   hhhhh. heh
B: Hmm.
L: He's good enough to put up with me::. And I mentioned that
   comment to him about him saying (.) .hhh takin' up the slack,
   'member when he said that to you?
B: Mmhm
L: Which, y'know, you could think- (2.0) There. Behind you.
B: Wull no, I'm-
L: You could be a:://ll uh um-
B: I'm perfect.
L: (**) 'O::h that was a cute comment. ha ha ha!' But think how
   ho::rrible that is to say about your wife. 'To take up the sla::ck.'
   (2.0) Like I'm a ch//o:::re

B: I'm gonna put this on top.

L: Like I'm a ch<u>o</u>re. Y'know?

B: He does joke about that. And that 'Help call 911' thing comes up. huh huh huh someti//mes. .hhh

L: Yeah.

B: I think he's just playing.

L: Yea:::h, but-

B: But it probably bugs you.

* *

MO:F59　　L = Lucy;　B = Bruce

L: Like right no::w, the marriage is okay because of its s<u>:e</u>x an'

B: hhhm hhhm hhhm=

L: =y'know fin<u>a</u>ncial (.5) whatever- minimal. support,

B: Right.

L: from Henry. An I I get <u>e</u>verything I said I g- get <u>e</u>verything else from Bruce.

B: Oh wo::w, I'm playin' a bigger role in this than I thought. (3.5)

L: An' he's like 'Wha::-' That's when the conversation came in- 'Wull I can't do all the things he does an' I'm not your .hhh intellectual pee::r **bluh=bluh bluh=bluh**' (.5) ø 'You're not, so go to school.' I said 'Henry, (.5) you ca::n be.' I said 'I am a student a:::ll the time. I <u>a</u>lways wanna learn. An' I don't think my way is the:: way.'=

B: =Umhm.=

L: ='If you tell me something I'm doing is wrong I'll l<u>oo</u>k at what you're talking about and maybe adapt my way'=He- Henry tends to say 'I know how people are.' You know what I mean?

B: This cat lo::ves people. Sorry.

L: hhh! hhh! (1.0)

B: Yeah but also:

L: Am I starting the mov//ie?

B: ((to cat:)) Did you just fart? (1.0) The c(h)at j(h)ust f(h)arte//d! huh huh

L: I thought she made a doodalay

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B: No //no. 'Cause it was a wa:fting,

L: Are we gonna watch this movie?

B: Yeah, start it

* *

MO:F60   L = Lucy; B = Bruce

((Bruce and Lucy are watching the film My Own Private Idaho))

L: Can I just say that Keanu Reeves is (2.0) glo::rious.

B: Yes you may. (3.0)

L: Anyway. (1.0) hhhh. He was really ti::red, and I was frustrated at the fact th- I said 'Honey, I just worked a twe::lve hour shift, and it's important for me to come home and talk to you- be with you. An' it's- I feel like it's really sad that there are certain activities that are going on that ma- You choose to do knowing they'll make you tired so when-' Y'know an' I jus' // (**)

B: You're thinking he's doing them to make himself tired so that when he co//mes home he doesn't have to talk to you?

L: No:: but it's like it's more important to do these thi::ngs, so that (.) um (1.0) // like

B: To do what things?

L: Go::lf **or whatever**. I mean it's (.) golf - like he was in a golf um (1.5) s- He's in golf school. ((to cat:)) Hi, honey! You're such a sweet baby. (.5) She's a:do:::rable! (1.5)

B: How come it's bouncing like that? (1.0)

L: 'Cause Keanu's a foo-foo-la::y! (4.5)

B: Fast forward through these. We don't wanna watch these.

L: Okay. Anyway, (.5) um (3.5) I have to take my clothes off.

B: A(hh)ll ri(hh)//ght th(hh)en. ((burps))

L: (******) get really exci//ted

B: Is this Night in the City?

L: I don't know. Moundell!

B: What?

L: Um (2.0) So I don't know after today's conversation.

B: What brought it up?

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L: An' he's all 'Wull y'know babe you know how I feel about that-' I've
   just been fee::ling this way, especially when I- Now he thinks it's
   because I talked to Malia and Malia told me like 'Leave Henry' **or**
   something, an' I said
B: Did she?=
L: =No:::. I t<u>a</u>lked, Malia l<u>i</u>stened, and she said, 'Well, those are things
   to think about.' She didn't tell me 'Leave Henry.'
B: Mhhm

* *

MO:F61   L = Lucy;   K = Karen
((Emergency Room, staff lounge))
K: So (1.0) a::nyway, no I sta- I sa- I got out of here by a quarter till
   yesterday **an' stuff**. I didn't (1.0) see that l<u>a</u>st patient.
L: You mean quarter to four.
K: Yeah, **an' stuff** - <u>a</u>fter I took care- <u>a</u>fter I took care of the body,
   so. I just figured I didn't wanna leave that ha//nging till the
   evening shift.
L: Now we kne::w him, didn't we?
K: Yea::h
L: 'Cause I 'member with his na:me.
K: Yeah **an' stuff** // He was-
L: He didn't l<u>oo</u>k familiar, but I mean in his condition::, hhh.
K: No. He was a nice- he // was a n<u>i</u>ce- patient
L: I 'member I had a nice memory about him though.
K: Yeah. He was- he was really ni::ce. He wa//sn't uh
L: I felt so sa::d for hi::m, an' no fami//ly
K: Yea:h
L: **or anythi::ng**, y//ea:h?
K: Yeah.
L: S//o sa::d.
K: He didn't-**an' stuff**- He didn't have any uh (.) **an' stuff**- So that's
   why I referred it to social work. So she was gonna follow up an' I

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guess he had a lawyer:: **an' everything** so that lady was gonna .hhh call the lawyer.

L: Patty

K: Yeah. Uh- wu- no. There's- She contacted the frie:nd an' then the friend was gonna call the guy's lawyer. (1.0) **An' stuff**=so that way it'd be taken care of. (2.0)

L: That's terrible. (1.0) Oh, well. (1.0) Did you ever find out // if he

K: hhhhh.

L: coded d<u>u:</u>ring

K: .hhh Yeah. He went unresponsive=he was one hour into dia//lysis

L: Whi::le he was on the machine.

K: Yeah. **an' stuff** an' 'cause I had to call the M.E. so I had to find out what was the circumstances. An' so::, (.5) an' s- I called and talked to Cindy. (3.0) Oka:://y,

L: Hmmm. So who's our other person this morning?

K: Judy. Has to be.

* *

MO:F62 L = Lucy; K = Karen; S = Sharlene
((Emergency Room, staff lounge. Participants are eating; the O.J. Simpson case is being covered on T.V.))

L: They were just (1.0) presenting all the evidence. (2.5) Look at his fa:ce.

S: I kno:::w. (1.0)

K: He looks a little more awake than yesterday morning, doesn't he? Or the other morning I should say // that they-

L: He's toast. (3.0)

K: O::h we::ll. (1.0) That's going to be an interesting: (1.0) w//-

S: He's on the cover of like so many magazines al//ready

K: Yeah. (.) Yeah. Yeah.

L: I kno::w, how're we gonna have an unbiased- whattayacall- (1.5) a ju:ry? (3.0)

K: Well for people who l<u>i</u>ve there in particular **an' stuff** y'know I think it's gonna make it even harder to get the- a jury // for

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L: hafta ship 'em in from (.) Peru:: or somewh//ere
K: Or something or other. y'know.
S: Maybe that's what I'll go an' do. No. huh huh huh huh
K: hah hah hah

* *

MO:F63   L = Lucy; K = Karen
((Emergency Room, Staff Lounge. Participants are eating.))
K: Yeah. Uh n- we::ll, u::h whatever. Yeah. An' so she's on a part time
   position right now 'cause she said // twenty hou:rs
L: Oh, it'll cha:nge-
K: an' I said 'That's wonderful.' (1.5) I said jus- that's absolutely
   great.
L: ((with Tagalog speaker's accent:)) O::h I'm so jea:lous! (2.0)
K: Mmm? Mmhm. // (***)
L: hhhhhh! (.5) Tha- See, now that was easy for her to get a job. I
   don't know how hard sh- she sold herself or she pu:shed, but tha:t
   sounds like it was pretty easy=an' people are jus' tryin' to scare
   us about how there's 'n(h)o:: jobs // for nu:rses'
K: Well hhh. I think y'know I mean she was out there really lookin'
   too.=She didn't sit back like some of the others- y'know (.) people
   an' stuff=I mean she (.) rea//lly wanted it
L: An' she: was pretty bright, yeah?
K: Yeah, she really wanted to get out there an' an' y'know an' look for
   something
L: 'Cause you had that other girl=not the haole girl but somebody
   befo:re her.=
K: =Umhm=
L: =that- 'member when you said 'the pathway of the blood through
   the hea//rt'?
K: Umhm=
L: =an' she was- no:t only was she li//ke
K: She was goin' to work at Kapiolani.
L: O::h go//od.

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K: I found that out.

L: But she didn'- It's one thing to be like 'Oh, yeah. I learned that an' I can't- is it the ri::ght-' y'know and at least know you learned it an' maybe know the vessels but maybe screw up the pulmonary artery an' pulmonary vein **or something**. .hhh But she was just like 'Huh?' (.5) hhh. wh=heh! as though she'd never:: heard of it **or something**.

K: Hmmm

L: (I'm) thinkin' 'W(h)e::ll' huh!

K: Yes.

L: 'You're gonna graduate? //An' you don't even know'

K: Yep. But, we//ll

L: They showed the s- murder scene yesterday. It's gro::::ss!

* *

MY:F64 S = Sara; M = Maya

M: I had an argument with Wendy but (.5) that's all better. (2.0) I don't know why: I always have arguments with Wendy=well, not really arguments. I- I call her (.) and I'm not perfectly happy with her and I'm not even yelling=and I'm not even arguing. I'm just like 'Okay, that's fine. I- I misunderstood you and you said you were gonna do this (.5) and I'm a little angry but that's okay and I'm gonna be over it in a minute' and I mean it. 'A- I- uh Okay, I'm a little peeved but I'll get over it.'=An' five minutes later I've forgotten it. Wendy goes into the bathroom- gets so scared sh//e takes a shi::t

S: ((burps))

M: .hhh! and then dr(h)ives to my house because she thinks she's in major trouble. I'm like (.5) 'Me not liking everything you do doesn't mea:n (.) that (.) I'm mad at you.' You know, it's like (.) she comes over an' she's like '(h)I- I ran over here' an' I'm like 'Why? Why did-' ø 'I'm not gonna go with Sara because .hh you're upset with-' I'm like 'No, I'm not upset with you. I'm over it.=I'm completely

over it.'=I said 'That pisses me off', and that got me over it.'
An'=she's like (.5) 'Oh, (.5) I took a shit **and everything** 'cause
I was so scared.' heh heh ø 'Wo//w, a crapper'.

S: Yea:h

M: I- I just um sh<u>a</u>ke when I get nervous. I don't go and empty
anything unl<u>e::</u>ss I'm in a house that's being broken into an' then

S: huh=an' then I- // lose <u>a:</u>ll bowel control

M: all hell breaks loose. huh huh Yeah. All of my body functions
become <u>e</u>xcretory // huh huh r<u>ea</u>l quick.

S: huh huh (.5) Even your nose begins to run.=

M: =huh My nose ru:ns and (.) my eyeballs oo:ze **an'** (.) **things like
that that aren't real attractive.**

S: I don't usually get s- scared of anybody being mad at me unless
I've done something (.) r<u>ea</u>lly ba:d. If I've just kinda like- if
they're put out with me:: a::nd it's th<u>ei</u>r problem- like if it's just
like something I'm gonna do: (.)

M: Uh- yeah=

S: =<u>a</u>nyway you know, and they just take it (.) like 'Ahhh!' then that-
I feel ba:d and try to make it up to them, but I didn't do it on
purpose.=If I do something .hhh like on p<u>u</u>rpose or if I do
something kn<u>o</u>wingly an' it's real shitty an' they get mad at me,
then I get nervous

* *

MY:F65   S = Sara; M = Maya

M: My d(h)ad was a b<u>a</u>gworm.

S: Eu::w.=

M: =huh huh=

S: =Bagworm.

M: Yeah. They get in trees. He- he // uh

S: They do?

M: Yeah. They're these little (.) bugs that actually make a bag. They're
mighty interesting and disgusting. That was one of his scams. He
filled- he got this tanker- (.) this small tanker tru:ck and filled it

with green dyed water and then went around and put and- I would take out flyers for him when I was a kid and the people would call and it said 'Insec- Insecticide' you know 'We'll spray your lawn and your trees and get rid of all your bugs for forty bucks.' So: we'd get calls ba::ck an' we'd go spray their tree- an' their trees and their lawn green with (.) dyed water basically, and get forty bucks an' then (.) do that for a couple days an' then (.) change our phone number. huh huh Put it under my mother's (.) maiden name **an' stuff.** So he was the 'bagworm' because he thought (.) he should (.) get that title // for offending

S: huh huh

M: so many bugs with green paint. // That was one of his- his big job scams.

S: huh huh huh

M: He liked to do that. He'd paint cartoons of bugs all over the- I mean he really got into it and he'd make back a little bit more than he put into it and stop and do something else like c<u>a</u>rpet cleaning. He did that for a while. hhh! He'd go to people's hou//ses

S: Just for amusement?

M: Umhm.

S: Wow.

M: In lieu of a real job.

S: huh huh huh

M: He's always pretty colorful. Oh, well. I don't know what he does now. Probably macrames- (2.0) ma- makes potholders **or something.** .hhh L<u>a</u>tchhook- that's what he d(h)oes. (1.0) I actually like those though, so:

S: I latchhooked something once- latchhooked a pillow- It took me three // years to complete.

M: huh huh huh

MY:F66   S = Sara; M = Maya

S: Did you ever see the movie creep show?

M: Yeah=

S: =Creep sho::w // two:: the- the-

M: Yeah. I have. No I didn't see two.

S: the giant hefty bag that came out // and (**) the guy

M: Oh yeah. The huge tarp- // the carniverous tarp that came out of the water.

S: Yeah. huh huh Carnivorous. (.5) Classic tarp.

M: hhh. huh huh huh (Oh.)=

S: ='I'm gonna get you fucker!' 'I'll // beat you' ((sound effects))

M: huh huh huh. Those are grea:t special effects.

S: (Yea:h)

M: I like the one where they have the- the animal locked in a bo:x and the- the woman (.5) what's- her name his wife is real bitchy an' he was having fantasies of ways to kill her? He was like a scie//ntist **or something?**

S: That was in the first o:ne // I didn't see it

M: That was the first one- an' um (.) He would like have fantasies- He'd be talkin' then all of a sudden without any change in th- in the filming he was having a fantasy about killing her like he was talking to her an' all of a sudden an arrow goes through her head (.) and a second later he's talking to her again. It was really funny. An' he had this Tazmanian Devil **or so:mething** in a bo̲x underneath the stairwell that he'd just gotten for some experiment **or something** .hhh an' he just kinda like slit her in there hhh! Sat there going 'Ah hah!' She was really obnoxious though. Somebody hated (for him-) I think they show (*) **or somethi//n g**

S: Oh Go:d.

M: (**)

S: In the second one there was one about the woman who hit the hitchhiker

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MY:F67   S = Sara; M = Maya

M: You know that girl? I don't know her name. I can't remember her
   name I don't know why. The girl that has braids in her hair all the
   ti:me that used to sing for Andy's band, and an' Margaret has the
   hots fo:r **an' a//ll that stuff?**

S: O:h yeah. We- her Wendy=

M: =Wendy. That's right.

S: Wendy. Wendy-O! Nah.

M: I saw her downstairs in the English building today an' she's
   actually taking the braids out of her hair now so her hair looks
   normal again. An' I think she's pretty. I don't think she's gorgeous
   // (I think-)

S: I think uh- I think from what I've seen of her that she's really
   pretty.

M: She do- she w- she is pretty. She's real dark complected- an' she's
   pretty. She's not real bright either. An' she does so:: many dru:gs
   that she's like (.) almost incoherent every time I see her. But um
   (.) I went up an' got a light from her an' she's just (.) talking about
   Theresa and her girlfriend **and stuff** who (.) I think Theresa's
   real cute too.

S: Theresa- she's the one with the hairy ass.

M: Yeah. She's the one who brought in the (.5) motorcycle helmet-

S: Yeah, ye-, she's got- Yeah, she is cute.

MY:F68   S = Sara; M = Maya

M: Alice cracks me up. She came in (.5) today from like (.) job- in
   between job interviews an' (.) and she's just not happy right now.
   She's like 'Yeah, I see a bus and I wanna jump in front of it.' I'm
   like 'But u:h (.) that might not be too much fun.' So she's like
   vaguely suicidal but not really (.) and um sitting in my house
   hungry and Toni made her a (.) sandwich with cream cheese an'
   honey on it and just like fixed her all up. She's like 'Oh, okay.' And

then she was okay after that. So she went on like five job
interviews today. (1.0) So: She looks so cute when she wears
shoes. huh huh Her little fee:t c-
S: The night that we saw her in the bar- the night- Saint Patrick's
Day night she was in there an' she was wearing (.) shoes
M: Y//eah.
S: I don't know why: ((clears throat)) She was wearing like this
yellow jacket- an' she looked (.) g<u>o</u>rgeous an' she said- ((clears
throat)) I thought her eyes looked really weird- but then when I
talked to her she said that she was fucked up=that they had (done
like double *) **or someth//ing like that**.
M: Right.
S: An so she was sittin' there an' i think that's probably why her eyes
looked weird 'cause I think if I remember- like I r<u>ea</u>lly can't
remember- but it was something like one of her pupils were
really tiny **or somethi//ng** an'
M: Right.
S: her eyes were really bizarre.
M: huh huh
S: She looked like (.) poss<u>e</u>ssed. Course I think that was 'cause I was
trippin' too.
M: Well th<u>a</u>t could do it.

* *

MY:F69 S = Sara; M = Maya
M: she told her boss you know 'Well look, you- you've trained me,
and I really would like to be paid for it.' And he's like 'Well I even
talked to my (.) psychiatrist about giving you some money and he
doesn't think I should either.' (.5) And she's like 'Oh, okay.'=
S: =Huh! 'F<u>u</u>ck o//ff!'
M: An' so she called him a p<u>u</u>ssy.
S: Really.
M: She's like 'What a pussy.'=
S: ='St<u>i</u>ck the first (.5) // four (.5)

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M: huh huh

S: toes on your left foot up my ass and wiggle them around.'

M: She- // she's-

S: 'I'll break them off.'

M: I- uh tried to call like (.) somebody like the um (.) labor board **or something** but they discontinued that program a year ago so now it's called the wages and hours committee and it's loca//ted in

S: Um hm.

M: Bon Marche Mall.

S: A(h)ll right.=

M: =Yeah. Oo::/h.

S: Hmm. High class operation.=

M: =Pretty neat=and the phone was busy so I was just like 'Alice I don't //know what

M: 'Don't think you're gonna get any re- kinda compensation for that.'

S: I'd quit.

* *

MY:F70 S = Sara; M = Maya

((M is telling S about a fight Tracy had with her boyfriend))

M: If she'd get mad at somebody, she'd want to have sex with them. I don't understand he- (.5) the equation there, but-=

S: =No when I get mad at somebody, I want to hit them in the head with a baseball ba:t. // (**)

M: So he ca:lled like two hours later an' she was in bed an' she woke up an' um (.) he was like 'Tracy, Tracy' and she was like 'What? What happened? Wha- what happened? Is something wrong?'=And he wouldn't talk and she said 'You fucked someone else' and he started crying- He's like (.) 'I'm sorry- I just blah blah blah blah' an' she's like 'I can't believe- How could you do this to me? How the fuck could you do-' and just cursed at him=hung up the phone=he came home (.) an' he was so upset an' so freaked out by it and had told her immediately after it had happened and like obviousy felt real bad and wasn't tryin' to like (.) y'know see

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someone on the side **or anything.**=He just fucked up and felt ba:d.
An' she let him go to sleep and then sh(h)e s(h)aid she woke up in
the middle of the night and realized how pissed she was so she
huh rolled over and started b(h)eating him up in his sleep hh! and
he woke up an' she's hittin' him and sh- huh she- I don't know if I
reeally should say this- it's kinda vulgar- but then she made him
get down on his knees and take (.) her tampon out (.) with his
teeth and she beat him with her fists in the balls until she felt
better. A//nd that was-

S: All RIGHT!

M: Yeah. huh huh

* *

MY:F71   S = Sara; M = Maya

((The participants are talking about a mutual acquaintance they
dislike))

S: There's no way of getting past it. // The only thing

M: No.

S: is is though most of those people don't have anything to do with
her now.

M: Yeah. They don't. //And it'll continue to happen an'

S: (***)

M: anybody who's interested in her no:w will find out that the best
way to keep her out of my life is to exclude tho:se persons who
decide to know Patricia Kersey from my life and to let them know
I'm going to do so. So it won't be a sho:ck.

S: That (.) Saint Patrick's day ni:ght the night we were all drunk an'
fucked up **an' everything**=We were at the bar and Robert was at
the bar .hhh an' I was standing there an' he: was sitting in his
chai:r, an' Sally was off somewhere she'd (*)- an' Patricia came
an' sat down next to him an' I was standing on the other side
I was getting a- another bee:r, heh! // Yeah, more beer!

M: hhh. huh Yea:h

* *

MY:F72   S = Sara;   M = Maya

S: I dunno if you do this= You really don't 'cause you're a lot more
   social than' um-many people- but I think I sometimes tend to
   isolate mys<u>e</u>lf, too, 'cause I just talk to people I know an' an' an'
   drink shots an' drink beer an' kinda wander around doing this
   an' .hhh an' so therefore I'm not- I don't really make much of an
   effort to meet people=

M: =Right. (1.0) I d//o now.

S: (I'm sure) ((clears throat))

M: 'Cause when I see somebody I w<u>a</u>nna meet- like I wanted to meet
   Heidi and Craig, so I like made an effort like when I saw you an'
   Kristie=I wanted to meet y'all- that's how I- y'kno//w hh.

S: Umhm. 'He//y!'

M: (*** y'all) like 'He::y! How ya'll doin'? Lemme buy you some
   alcohol' y'know 'I'm going to bother you a:ll ni:ght.' huh huh I'll do
   th<u>a</u>t until they go 'You're all right!' or 'Get the fuck out of my
   face,' so. And one or the other always happens (.) s//o.

S: Hm:.=

M: =If someone tells me to fuck off then I can have an excuse to drink
   some more!

S: R(h)eally!

M: 'Somebody just told me to fuck myself. Pass the bottle.' // huh huh

S: huh huh

M: I think that happened to me once when I w(h)as I(h)ike really
   really ru:de so- I'm not having a bad average. An' I kinda like
   watchin' to make sure that they're not gonna spit on me **or
   something**. (.5) So (.5) make sure they're not (.) l<u>e</u>sbian
   s<u>e</u>paratist ha<u>:</u>ters **or something**.

S: huh R(h)ea://lly.

M: hhhhh!

S: Straight-Straight girl from hell.

M: Yeah, really.

S: 'You're what?' bang bang bang bang=

M: =Queer, but-

S: 'You're that way.' I don't really think you have that much to worry
   about in Ceasar's though.
M: No. Uh uh.

****

MY:F73   S = Sara; M = Maya
((The participants are talking about a deejay at a nightclub))
S: An' that's the reason he plays all that terrible music I'm like
   Chris, what are you doing?' an' he's like 'I have to take care of my
   queens.' an' I'm like (1.0)
M: 'Fuck your queens.' // huh
S: huh 'Fuck your queens.' huh A- an' he's like 'Well' (he'll say) 'They're
   the ones who drink.' I'm like 'What am I doing all night?' huh
   Y'know because like like I'll do sho::ts, but most of like- all the
   other drinks I: buy
M: Ri::ght.
S: Everybody I know drinks an' buy their own drinks an' they don't-
   they don't- we're not all (***)
M: everybody except (.) huh huh of course. 'Cause all straight shots
   'whoop' I don't know
S: But uh // (******)
M: Well tha//t's not fair because there's so many different groups in
   the:re he really has to divers-=I don't mi://nd-
S: an' if you- an' if you wa:tch when he plays the kinda music they
   listen to everybody da:nces. He just- he won't do it 'cause all the
   queens are standing around doing this.
M: Right.=
S: =Y'kno//w
M: Yeah, an' he's part of the sisterhood, s//o:
S: Yeah, he's a sister, so::
M: I mean I don't mind. I would no:t I don't mind listening to a couple
   of queen (.) songs if they mix like other stuff in too: I mean
   they've got crowds there that just listen to The Cure **an' stuff** so
   he should play something for them and play (***) an' play qu-

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=I mean, you could do that. An' he like (.) especially when he gets fucked up=I like when he gets fucked up though 'cause he'll play the weirdest stuff.=

S: =Mm//hm

M: He'll play like uh (.) Heart of Glass

* *

MY:F74   S = Sara;   M = Maya

((The participants are talking about a deejay at a nightclub))

M: I don't know why he plays that stuff- He sits there an' makes fun of the lead singer the whole time he's playin' it. I'm like 'Then why: are we // listening

S: (**)

M: to these lovely melodic // (things)'

S: People are- w- because they're out there dancing.

M: Right.=

S: =An' there- it's funny. He's like 'Wull I know what they are waiting to hear- all those people out there-' an' he'll be right he'll play it and the dance floor will just go 'Whoo' // while they're playin'.

M: Hm hm hm

S: Eh!

M: I think I've had plenty, thanks.

S: An' he's like 'If y'all would come out on Fridays **or something** I would play tha-' but we come on Fridays an' he doesn't play it, so:=

M: =No he doesn't.=

S: =An' I told him that one night I 's like 'Y'know you tell me to start coming out on Fridays, because' An' he's like 'Well (1.5) h- I can't do it tonight 'cause' I mean an' queens show up at the bar every night. I'll be glad when he I- I mean in that sense I'll be glad when he leaves, because John is gonna start // an'

M: Yeah, John does play better stu//ff.

S: John is an e- (.) like=

M: =He's a // good deejay.

S: He's a really good deejay.=

M: =He's a really good deejay.

* *

MY:F75   S = Sara; M = Maya

S: John's looking for a girlfriend.

M: Oh, a cover girlfriend?

S: Yeah.

M: Co//ol.

S: No. W- he's like (.) like 'You know', he's like 'Can you help me out here?' an' I huh I went 'John' ø 'I'm looking for a girlfriend' an' I was like

M: 'Why?'

S: Hey. ø 'Well just one to hang out with you know somebody just to hang out an' do stuff with an' **an' everything** you know maybe I dunno, maybe once in a while get drunk and make out with- n<u>o</u>t to have se:x, I wouldn't want to have s<u>e</u>x, y'know, just y'know, some girl to hang out with'. I'm like (.) // 'I don't know man.'

M: huh 'I: can't even do that. Whatta ya-' huh huh 'Whatta you want from me, bl<u>oo</u>d?' Oh well.

S: Heh! He's like 'Do you know anybody? who - who would be into that?' ø 'No I sure don't. Everybody I know wants sex.'

M: 'Everybody I know wants some kind of soft parts rubbed up against their soft parts. Or in their facial area **or something.**'

S: Yea//h.

M: 'Something- something in the p<u>oo</u>ntang arena.'

* *

MY:F76   S = Sara; M = Maya

S: I always- I often wonder what goes on in crazy peoples' heads.

M: Ye//ah

S: I'd love to just get in an' s<u>ee:</u> what they're thinking- see how it works.=

M: =Right. I mean like (.) even what goes on in your sister's head=a-
   an' extremely (.) intelligent disturbed person. What h<u>a</u>s to go on in
   their head=I mean just from (.) being a n<u>o</u>rmal person an' knowing
   what goes on in m<u>y:</u> head, when I'm distressed // or just

S: Umhm

M: everyday. I can't even imagine the kind of explosive (.) garbage
   that's goin' on in theirs. Especially if they're having some kind of
   episode- or getting ready to have an episode. Y'know they'll like
   (.5) right before

S: I know when my sister is depressed I can't (.) imagine- I mean I
   think I get miserable an' (.) like my mom told me though- w- They
   talked with the psychiatrist **an' all**- but she said y- uh know as
   depressed as you ever get, you know she's three times that
   depressed an' c<u>a</u>n't get out of it.= An' doesn't know that there's
   any end to it. You know when I'm at the b<u>o</u>ttom of the pi<u>:</u>//le
   I'm like

M: Right.

S: 'Hey man it gets better' an' it's (*) gonna get better- But they can't
   think like that an' they don't see an end to it. It's no wonder so
   many depressives kill themselves .hh because they're .hhh so:
   utterly miserable it just like (.) t<u>a</u>kes over like they can feel it in
   their fingerti//ps an'

M: Right.

S: y'know they don't see any end to it.

* *

MY:F77 S = Sara; M = Maya

S: I think (.) my m<u>o</u>m thinks- Well she doesn't think I should drink
   and I don't think my dad cares one way or the other as long as he
   dudn't know about it=as long as it dudn't get thrown in his face,
   like I don't get picked up for D.W.I. or (.) // or

M: throw up on his shoe:s.

S: =throw up on his shoes, or come home **and stuff**. I get up the next
   morning // an' I'm-

M: hnh! hnh!

S: an' I'm like (.) 'Hey dad. // How ya doin'?'

M: hnh! hnh!

* *

MY:F78   S = Sara; M = Maya

S: Doug was (.) spaz- spasmodying on the ((dance)) f(h)loor.

M: An' doing something real twitchy.

S: Yeah.

M: He- he always looks like (.) he has really bad bedhead (.5) now that he's got more hair or less hair **or something** // (He's *)

S: He's got like more hair.

M: More hair?

S: Mmhm.

M: But he always looks like (.) he- he slept on one side really really heavy and he kinda twisted his neck around an' (.) just enough to make it stick out the other s(h)ide.

S: He really looks a lot older than he did. I guess

M: Yeah he does.

S: travelling around London with (.) the- the elephant Kellie Simpson would do that to you.

M: Oh, is that what he was doin'?

S: Yeah. He went to Lo//ndon

M: Oh ma:n=

S: =to live with he:r. I think they must have broke up **or something** 'cause he's back no//w.

M: Yeah, they must of.

* *

MY:F79   S = Sara; M = Maya

S: I remember when the Heavenly Body's song whatever it was came out // an'

M: Yeah.

S: she would always run out to the floor an' dance to it?=I // could
   not-
M: and si:ng.
S: an' I could not go: an run on the dance=If I had a song out I could
   not run to the dance floor an' dance to it.
M: Yeah.
S: I'd hide under the pooltable // **or something**
M: huh huh
S: going 'Oh (sh- you) will probably hate it.'
M: huh huh huh That is not a good song. The entire C.D. was not good.
   (1.0) They were- I mean the stuff she did for This Mortal Coil was
   really good. Her voice was right. I mean 'cause they obviously put
   all the pieces out and everybody y'know chose who would (.) suit a
   certain song but (.5) that album (.5) that she made here was
   rea:lly bad. H<u>o</u>rrible in fact. (1.0) She hung out with Mel and Tracy
   a lot when she first got here. 'Cause I saw her one night and she
   was cryin' an' I don't know what was wrong with her but she was
   ups//et an' and Tammy was like hanging on her arm
S: hnh! (*******)
M: going 'O:::h' you know because she had a (.) foreign accent and (.)
   that was really cool. // huh huh huh
S: Oh oh probably ol' probably ol' Walter dumbass- probably really
   dicked them over when they got here apparently.
M: Well ye//ah.
S: So you kinda can't blame them for bein' a little bit of assholes but
   not just to the general public.
M: Ri::ght.
S: And not thinking they're some really great hot shit.
M: I wonder what he did to 'em. D//o you know?
S: He got them here and wouldn't give them their money.
M: Oh, really?
S: He told them to come he:re and he would set them up and like the
   album w- came out **and whatever** and then he wouldn't give them
   th- their money.

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M: Hmm

S: And they didn't have enough money to go back to England.

M: Oh God.

S: So they were just kinda stuck here.

* *

MY:F80   S = Sara; M = Maya

S: I don't trust Wendy with animals because Wendy

M: She doesn't know how to deal with anima//ls.

S: She doesn't know how to deal with them and to Wendy animals-
they're objects and they don't have feelings o//r

M: Right.

S: or they- they don't have feelings and they're not- they're almost
like inanimate objects to her // 'cause I watched

M: Right.

S: the way she does those cats an' I'm like (.) 'You're pissin' the cat
o//ff' y'know 'You're sca:ring=

M: It's like it's a to:y.

S: =the cat to death.'

M: Yeah, she // (treats 'em like a toy)

S: An' she- like when she had that thi:ng in that- shaking it in that
frisbee and the kitten was like 'Wa:::::h!' I'm // like-

M: Yeah. (.5) I had to like watch her- I'm just like (.) y'know 'C'mon!'
I mean i- it's partially understandable because she was raised on
a farm **and everything** and animals a:re (.) you know there for a
specific purpose and nothing else. But I mean (.) I just can't
believe- That's real- That's a really a strange twist in her
persona//lity

S: Umhm

M: too 'cause I would never thi://nk

S: think that she would be th//at way

M: No:::

S: with animals.

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M: No but you know an' an' she's like (.5) and she's just really weird
with them- she doesn't- I mean I- I think she's alm//ost like-

S: It's like a completely unconscious sadistic str//eak.

M: Yeah it is. It's very sadistic. It's really mean. (.5) The whole thing
is r(h)eally m(h)ean when you watch her and she's like- gets kind
of absorbed with it but she's not really.= I don't think she believes
that they're living at all.

S: Um//hm

M: I don't think she believes that they'll like (.) bleed **an' stuff.**
I don't think she understands that (.) when she gassed her dog that
the dog bloated and lost oxygen and choked to death and (.)
twitched and then died you know. I think she thinks they (.) put it
in a I dunno Vegematic **or something** and just kind of pureed it
and poured it outside. I don't know. Or took the battery out. I don't
know. It really disturbs me 'cause I'm so (1.0) picky about animals
and (.5)

S: Well I can- I mean (.5) I can- (.5) I don't know- I mean I almost
understand like she said- What she told me was she said the dog
(.) had heartworms (.) a::nd=

M: =Heartworms can be cured thou//gh

S: Yeah, but- but it requires surgery **and all** and she didn't have that
kind of money to shell out I mean // she didn't have-

M: It wasn't even to that stage.

S: Umhm.=

M: =There wasn't even a worm formed yet. It was a baby which they
can do with medication. You know and it's like (.) twenty thirty
bucks. (.5) Um- no. I- I ag//ree:

S: I know a lot of people though who just gas their animals because
they're inconvenient.

M: Well that's why Wendy- That's why Wendy did it. She was just like
(.) the- the thing was (.) she was like 'I can't take care of this dog.
I can't take it with me. It's- you know (.) it was- it was a bad
choice.=I think I'm gonna put it to sleep.' And I'm like 'Well it's
your dog, you know, it's your choice.' And I didn't think that it was

especially sh<u>i</u>tty of her and she's like 'Well if it has- if it's
healthy then I know someone who'll take- But if it's not, you
know, I'm just gonna gas it because it's gonna cost money.' And um
(.) so I mean it was (.) the fact that the dog was inconvenient-
n<u>o</u>t that the dog was s<u>i</u>ck. 'Cause she didn't even know the dog was
sick until two days before she did it. She was just like 'This dog's
annoying me.' And I mean (.) she is the- the caretaker of the dog
and all that but I- I'm real serious about it. If she gets a pe:t in
the next few years I'm gonna (.) sl<u>a</u>p her 'cause I mean you
shouldn't take on the responsibility if you can't

S: Umum

M: You know, that's- You just shouldn't. And if you make a mistake
once- that's fine you know. Maybe she didn't realize that she
couldn't take care of a do:g and now she knows

S: Umhm

M: and I don't think you know (.) one less dog on the earth is going to
upset the balance of the- of nature **or anythi//ng**

S: No:.

M: but y(h)ou kn(h)ow hhh.- and the dog was very obn(h)oxious. hnh! It
wrapped its chain around Teresa's legs a few times once. I wudn't
here for it but like (.) you know it was p<u>u</u>lling so it was like hnh!
Teresa's legs were all wound up and she was like about to cry.
.hhhh It was really really // sad.

S: (Man.)

M: Yeah.

* *

MY:F81   S = Sara; M = Maya

M: I love cats. I like (.) dogs, too. I just think animals. But I h<u>a</u>te
wooley catepillars.

S: Kill the wooley catepillars.

M: I get so:- It's so weird when I'm here in the summer I'm like (.5)
suffocating from the heat and in- in the spring the <u>o</u>nly season I
like here (.) th//e only one-

S: Umhm

M: 'cause winter's just like- something's kinda lackluster it's just a
   bit under par. I'm like enjoying the spring, sitting in the grass
   and I get up and I'm covered in those beasts. hhh.=I'm like 'A:::h!
   Catepillar! // Wa:::h!'

S: huh huh

M: and they look like (.) punk rock catepillars // 'cause

S: Yeah.

M: they like come up to a point all over.

S: (An' those are just-)

M: I like got in the ca:r (.) t(h)oda- Well no, yesterday- and there's
   this weed growing- there's no tree: there's nothing over my car (.)
   nothing. You know. And I get in the car and I'm getting ready to
   close the door an' the weed is kinda caught in the car an' there's
   three: of the fuckers on the doo:r.=

S: =They're following you Ma//ya.

M: They are. They can smell fear (.) and um they're following me. I've
   been having nightmares about hhh.='em I been dreaming about 'em
   like turning up in my bed **and stuff.**

S: God. I don't think they can get- I've never seen one in the house.

M: I haven't either. I mean i know they have to be outside, but-

S: Yeah, it's- it's a thought.

* *

MY:F82 S = Sara; M = Maya

S: That's uh why I- another reason why I can't have a baby I can't (.)
   get committed to something for that length of time // hnh!

M: Well and the physical // deformities

S: Mess up my life!

M: the physical deformities part of it is for almost the next year of
   her life you know and she is gonna get fa:t and that's gonna stress
   her out. (1.0) I like Mark fi:ne and I really think that he's being (.)
   all right about this but I mean when I went over there last night

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I was like lookin' at him you know (.) knowin' that he was gonna
like (.) marry her an' **stuff**. It ma- it just- it kinda grosses me
out you know. His feet were- were grossin' me out. hnh! 'Cause I
could see 'em and they were naked (1.0) and just like 'Gross!'

S: He kinda- he kinda when I- when I think about it just generally he
kinda grosses me out 'cause I don't know what it is I don't like
about him. (1.0) An' he's just he's too- he's goo:fy.

M: Well he's goofy and he's just like (1.0) uh one- a- a guy type guy
and he's not attractive and he's not especially smart he's not
especially charismatic (.) he's not especially talent//ed.

S: He has no coo:l.

M: No he isn't- He's a big geek. He really is. (.5) That's the truth. Their
marriage (.) I don't think it will last very long.

S: Well then she's gonna be a divorcee with a baby.

M: Umhm.

* *

MY:F83   S = Sara; M = Maya

M: I really think as soon as she moves to Conneticut I won't know
her anymore. I'm sure she's not gonna call me or you know write
me **or anything like th//at**.

S: I have a feeling she's gonna- sh- I'm not gonna know her much
anymore either

M: I think // I think (sh-)

S: she's gonna get very involved because I mean look at the way it's
gone since she's been dating him.=I never do anything with her
anymore.=We never do any//thing.=

M: Right.

S: =We never ta:lk (.) // **or anything**.

M: But she'll call you. She won't call me. She won't call Wendy. She
won't have any contact with (*)- I predict you and Sally will be
the only people (.) I really do- until she gets really bored (1.0) you
know with her life or confused **or whatever**. And I mean I don't
approve of what she's doing (.5) but (1.5) I'd really like to like if

she's g<u>o</u>nna go through labor and delivery and she's g<u>o</u>nna have a baby **and all this stuff** (.5) you know I'd // like to be able to be there.

S: I- I- I think she- I think she'll keep in touch with you. Actually I do.

M: We'll see. I don't know.

S: I don't kno:w. I mean I don't even kno:w if she's plannin' to get married here or in Conneticut.

M: I know.

* *

MY:F84   S = Sara; M = Maya

S: What she told me last week she said 'Well'- and this was before she took the test **or anything**-' She's like 'Well I haven't- I haven't started my period yet but I'm ovulating.' and I'm like 'Well what d'ya mean?' She's like 'Well my body is doing all the funky stuff that you do when you ovulate.'=I was like 'A::::h // huh!'=

M: =Hm

S: 'Well you kno::w // hnh!'

M: 'You know that also go//es with pregnancy.'

S: 'Your body does- your body does the very same thing' and she's like 'Wull (.5) I got this whacky discharge' I'm like 'Yep.'

M: 'Anyway, you also have discharge when you get pregnant.'

S: Yeah.

* *

MY:F85   S = Sara; M = Maya

M: it's really wei:rd to get a- to catch a glimpse of the fact that you are getting older when you're young 'cause it's so foreign. I've been like (.) I've not been p<u>a</u>nicking about dying (.) 'cause I- it doesn't panic me: uh- people dying around me panics me=really scares me .hhh but I just can't imagine n<u>o</u>t existing (.) you know- I've been thinking about that a lot. What is not existing? Like what is (.5) // y'know=

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S: Umhm.

M: =is there consciousness **and all this stuff** and it's not even that I care- It's just I don't think about mortality and I // don't-

S: I don't think about it ei//ther.

M: Yea:h.=

S: =I tend to wander through in this this little haze of (.) I don't think about it so therefore I just kinda keep this (.5) thought in my head that no I'm not going // to die:.

M: It's not gonna happe//n.

S: And every once in a while something- jus' not even somebody dying just every once in a while something out of the blue: will trigger the thought that I am going to die some day and then I'll start to go 'Wa::::h!'// huh huh=

M: Yeah.

S: ='I don't wanna die.'

M: I don't wanna die either but it's- and it's so strange because I'm su:re- I'm ho:ping that um (.) along with (.) being more aware of it as you get older you'll get more at peace with it because I kno:w=

S: =I think you do.=

M: =You must. Because I mean looking at my grandma and my grandpa: I- they're not freaked out about dying even (.) my grandmother who doesn't have religion is (.5) you know I mean they have like little (.) bizarre times in their lives where they're like kinda shaky and I think that's dealing with it but (.) they seem to have a much better grip on the fact (.) that they're gonna die and much more at peace with it regardless of (.) affiliations or like intelligence **or any//thing.**

S: Mmhm.

M: I'm sure it's all (.) real biological but (.) hnh!=

S: =Well also I think it has something to do with that they've seen a lot more and done a lot more and there's so much y'know (.) that I haven't seen or done and you haven't seen or done that 'No I'm not ready to die yet I haven't do:ne anything y//et'. And=

M: Ri:ght.

S: =I think a lot of people are like 'Okay. Well I've done this and this and this and this.' an' an' especially the people that are satisfied with the way their life has go:ne.=It's like 'Okay I've done this and now if it's time for me to go well then (.) that's okay 'cause you know (.5) I had (.) a // wholloping good=

M: (**)

S: =time on the roa:d you know.'=

M: =huh Really.

* *

MY:F86   S = Sara; M = Maya

M: My grandmas- both of them have been calling me and talking about their childhoods (.) you know on their (.5) on their um (.5) on the telephone and it's really weird 'cause neither one of them ever did that when I was younger=even a couple of yea:rs younger.=They would- they'd never do that. And she said it's just them like (.) tying up their lives.=It's like a stage adults are supposed to go in (.) through where they decide whether or not what they've done is worthwhile (.) and getting closure to their life and feeling like you know they've accomplished something. .hhh And I can tell that one of them feels like she has and one of them feels like she hasn't and it's jus' like this hu:ge difference. And (.) neither one has accomplished more than the other I- in my opinion. Y'kno//w=

S: Mmhm.

M: =they're both rea:lly ni:ce wo:men. It's all in their perspective of what they've done and what they wanted to do. And unfortunately the grandma I like best is not- dudn't feel like you know her life has been (.) any good so:

S: Well I- I- I hope that if I get to that age- if I make it to that age and I look back and start (.) thinking that what I've done has not been you know that I will have the ba:lls **or the- the whatever-** the gumption // to=

M: hnh!

S: =get up and go do something no:w (.) rather than just sit there and
   go=

M: (**)

S: ='Oh well. I never did anything. I guess that's okay.' I mean (.)
   you're gonna keel over and die within the next couple of weeks
   then 'cause you've lost your will.

M: Ri:ght.

* *

MY:F87   S = Sara;   M = Maya

M: it's weird to go to the cemetary .hhh because m//ost of-

S: And see your name down the//re.

M: Ri//ght. I mean can you-

S: 'Wha:::!'

M: I can't imagine-=

S: =I couldn't go- and if I like went to a cemetary and saw my na:me
   on a gravestone I would fall down on the ground. I'd spasm 'Wu:h!'

M: It's really strange and um the way our- the cemetary holds both
   sides of the family but they're comp- real far away 'cause both
   sides hate each other you know so we go to this one section and
   it's my mother (.) and um (.5) my grandmother's husband and the (.)
   great grandparents from that side and all that side an' there's two
   empty plots, (.) and like on the other side of the family you know
   there's all their side of the family **and all that shit** and then (.)
   you know six empty plots and I just like looked at those empty
   plots going 'I wonder where I'm gonna end up?' huh y(h)ou know
   and I looked down on my grandmother's and I'm like ' Well there's
   grandma-' an' I went 'Fu:::ck!' 'c- I mean it even freaked me: out
   and I know that (1.0) you know she's- she's-(1.0) she does stuff
   like that and it still really (.) bothered me 'cause I think that's
   the frame of mind she's in. She's like waiting around you know
   'Gonna die someday' and sh- it's gonna take her a really long time
   to die unless she kills herself because she's really healthy.

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* *

MO:T88   W= William; J= Julie

((It is Fall; W is in Hawai`i, and J is in Louisiana))

W: Are any of the uh trees turning?

J: U:m they don't really turn much here I don't think.

W: They don't

J: Yeah.

W: Yeah most of 'em are evergreens around there I guess. Pine trees
    an' stuff.

J: Right.

* *

MO:T89   W= William; J= Julie

W: So (1.0) how come you called?

J: I like boddah you:: is why.

W: huh huh huh huh // huh

J: hhh! // .hhh

W: (Late // over there)

J: No mo' nating fo' do ova hea but boddah you.

W: Yeah late over there.

J: huh huh huh .hhh W//e just-

W: It's almost midnight.

J: We just watched To Kill a Mockingbird.

W: Oh you did?=With Gregory Peck.

J: Yep. Macon Georgia.

W: Yep.

J: Yeah.

W: No: bu- w- that's not supposed to be in Macon is it?

J: Yep. A//nd it-

W: I'd forgotten that part.

J: The scene looks exactly like our street. (1.5) It's probably what
    made Roger think of it (.) but (.) h//e'd seen it

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W: I thought it was supposed to be in uh (1.0) in Alabama **or**
    sump'n=I didn't realize it was supposed to be Macon.
J: Mmhm. It's Macon. (1.0) I'm su::re.

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