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# PLATO AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES

VOLUME 1

GEORGE GROTE



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Best known for his influential *History of Greece*, the historian and politician George Grote (1794–1871) wrote this account of Plato's dialogues as a philosophical supplement to the *History*. First published in 1865 and written in dialogic form, Grote's account of Plato's works includes substantial footnotes and marginalia. This first volume focuses on Plato's early and transitional dialogues, all of which feature Socrates. It also includes a preface to the whole project which discusses the meaning and importance of philosophy itself, and extensive introductory material on Pre-Socratic philosophy, the life of Plato and history of the Platonic canon. With two volumes each running to over six hundred pages, Grote's scholarship is formidably comprehensive. The publication of *Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates* confirmed him as one of the greatest authorities on Plato in the nineteenth century.

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Other Companions  
of Sokrates

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# PLATO,

AND THE

## OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATÈS.

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Κάλλιστα γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ λέγεται καὶ λελέξεται, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὠφέλιμον  
καλὸν, τὸ δὲ βλαβερὸν αἰσχρόν. PLATO, *Republ.* v. 457 B.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν περιττὸν ἔχουσι πάντες οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι, καὶ τὸ κομψὸν  
καὶ τὸ καινοτόμον, καὶ τὸ ζητητικὸν· καλῶς δὲ πάντα ἴσως χαλεπὸν.

ARISTOTEL. *Polit.* ii. 6, 1265 a 10.  
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IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

LONDON:

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

1865.



## P R E F A C E.

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THE present work is intended as a sequel and supplement to my History of Greece. It describes a portion of Hellenic philosophy: it dwells upon eminent individuals, enquiring, theorising, reasoning, confuting, &c., as contrasted with those collective political and social manifestations which form the matter of history, and which the modern writer gathers from Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon.

Both Sokrates and Plato, indeed, are interesting characters in history as well as in philosophy. Under the former aspect, they were described by me in my former work as copiously as its general purpose would allow. But it is impossible to do justice to either of them—above all, to Plato, with his extreme variety and abundance—except in a book of which philosophy is the principal subject, and history only the accessory.

The names of Plato and Aristotle tower above all others in Grecian philosophy. Many compositions from both have been preserved, though only a small proportion of the total number left by Aristotle. Such preservation must be accounted highly fortunate, when we read in Diogenes Laertius and others, the long list of works on various topics of philosophy, now irrecoverably lost, and known by little except their titles. Respecting a few of them, indeed, we obtain some partial indications from fragmentary extracts and comments of later critics. But none of these once celebrated philosophers, except Plato and Aristotle, can be fairly appreciated upon evidence furnished by themselves. The



Platonic dialogues, besides the extraordinary genius which they display as compositions, bear thus an increased price (like the Sibylline books) as the scanty remnants of a lost philosophical literature, once immense and diversified.

Under these two points of view, I trust that the copious analysis and commentary bestowed upon them in the present work will not be considered as unnecessarily lengthened. I maintain, full and undiminished, the catalogue of Plato's works, as it was inherited from antiquity and recognised by all critics before the commencement of the present century. Yet since several subsequent critics have contested the canon, and set aside as spurious many of the dialogues contained in it,—I have devoted a chapter to this question, and to the vindication of the views on which I have proceeded.

The title of these volumes will sufficiently indicate that I intend to describe, as far as evidence permits, the condition of Hellenic philosophy at Athens during the half century immediately following the death of Sokrates in 399 B.C. My first two chapters do indeed furnish a brief sketch of Pre-Socratic philosophy: but I profess to take my departure from Sokrates himself, and these chapters are inserted mainly in order that the theories by which he found himself surrounded may not be altogether unknown. Both here, and in the sixty-ninth chapter of my History, I have done my best to throw light on the impressive and eccentric personality of Sokrates: a character original and unique, to whose peculiar mode of working on other minds I scarcely know a parallel in history. He was the generator, indirectly and through others, of a new and abundant crop of compositions—the “Socratic dialogues:” composed by many different authors, among whom Plato stands out as unquestionable coryphæus, yet amidst other names well deserving respectful mention as seconds, companions, or opponents.

It is these Socratic dialogues, and the various companions of

Sokrates from whom they proceeded, that the present work is intended to exhibit. They form the dramatic manifestation of Hellenic philosophy—as contrasted with the formal and systematising, afterwards prominent in Aristotle.

But the dialogue is a process containing commonly a large intermixture, often a preponderance, of the negative vein: which was more abundant and powerful in Sokrates than in any one. In discussing the Platonic dialogues, I have brought this negative vein into the foreground. It reposes upon a view of the function and value of philosophy which is less dwelt upon than it ought to be, and for which I here briefly prepare the reader.

Philosophy is, or aims at becoming, reasoned truth: an aggregate of matters believed or disbelieved after conscious process of examination gone through by the mind, and capable of being explained to others: the beliefs being either primary, knowingly assumed as self-evident—or conclusions resting upon them, after comparison of all relevant reasons favourable and unfavourable. “Philosophia” (in the words of Cicero), “ex rationum collatione consistit.” This is not the form in which beliefs or disbeliefs exist with ordinary minds: there has been no conscious examination—there is no capacity of explaining to others—there is no distinct setting out of primary truths assumed—nor have any pains been taken to look out for the relevant reasons on both sides, and weigh them impartially. Yet the beliefs nevertheless exist as established facts, generated by traditional or other authority. They are sincere and often earnest, governing men’s declarations and conduct. They represent a cause in which sentence has been pronounced, or a rule made absolute, without having previously heard the pleadings.<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Napoléon, qui de temps en temps, au milieu de sa fortune et de sa puissance, songeait à Robespierre et à sa triste fin—interrogeait un jour son archi-chancelier Cambacérés sur le neuf Thermidor. “*C’est un procès jugé et non plaidé,*” répondait Cambacérés, avec la finesse d’un jurisconsulte courtisan.—(Hippolyte Carnot—Notice sur Barère, p. 109; Paris, 1842.)

Now it is the purpose of the philosopher, first to bring this omission of the pleadings into conscious notice—next to discover, evolve, and bring under hearing the matters omitted, as far as they suggest themselves to his individual reason. He claims for himself, and he ought to claim for all others alike, the right of calling for proof where others believe without proof—of rejecting the received doctrines, if upon examination the proof given appears to his mind unsound or insufficient—and of enforcing instead of them any others which impress themselves upon his mind as true. But the truth which he tenders for acceptance must of necessity be *reasoned truth*: supported by proofs, defended by adequate replies against preconsidered objections from others. Only hereby does it properly belong to the history of philosophy: hardly even hereby has any such novelty a chance of being fairly weighed and appreciated.

When we thus advert to the vocation of philosophy, we see that (to use the phrase of an acute modern author<sup>b</sup>)

<sup>b</sup> Professor Ferrier, in his instructive volume, 'The Institutes of Metaphysic,' has some valuable remarks on the scope and purpose of Philosophy. I transcribe some of them, in abridgment.

(Sections 1-8;—"A system of philosophy is bound by two main requisitions: it ought to be true—and it ought to be reasoned. Philosophy, in its ideal perfection, is a body of reasoned truth. Of these obligations, the latter is the more stringent. It is more proper that philosophy should be reasoned, than that it should be true: because, while truth may perhaps be unattainable by man, to reason is certainly his province and within his power. . . . A system is of the highest value only when it embraces both these requisitions—that is, when it is both true, and reasoned. But a system which is reasoned without being true, is always of higher value than a system which is true without being reasoned. The latter kind of system is of no value: because

philosophy is the attainment of truth *by the way of reason*. That is its definition. A system therefore which reaches the truth but not by the way of reason, is not philosophy at all, and has therefore no scientific worth. Again, an unreasoned philosophy, even though true, carries no guarantee of its truth. It may be true, but it cannot be certain. On the other hand, a system, which is reasoned without being true, has always some value. It creates reason by exercising it. It is employing the proper means to reach truth, though it may fail to reach it." (Sections 38-41;—"The student will find that the system here submitted to his attention is of a very polemical character. Why? Because philosophy exists only to correct the inadvertencies of man's ordinary thinking. She has no other mission to fulfil. If man naturally thinks aright, he need not be taught to think aright. If he is already in possession of the truth, he does not require to be put in possession of it. The occupation of

it is by necessity polemical: the assertion of independent reason by individual reasoners, who dissent from the unreasoning belief which reigns authoritative in the social atmosphere around them, and who recognise no correction or refutation except from the counter-reason of others. We see besides, that these dissenters from the public will also be, probably, more or less dissenters from each other. The process of philosophy may be differently performed by two enquirers equally free and sincere, even of the same age and country: and it is sure to be differently performed, if they belong to agés and countries widely apart. It is essentially relative to the individual reasoning mind, and to the medium by which the reasoner is surrounded. Philosophy herself has every thing to gain by such dissent; for it is only thereby that the weak and defective points of each point of view are likely to be exposed. If unanimity is not attained, at least each of the dissentients will better understand what he rejects as well as what he adopts.

The number of individual intellects, independent, inquisitive, and acute, is always rare everywhere; but was comparatively less rare in these ages of Greece. The first topic, on which such intellects broke loose from the common consciousness of the world around them, and struck out new points of view for themselves, was in reference to the Kosmos or

philosophy is gone: her office is superfluous. Therefore philosophy assumes and must assume that man does not naturally think aright, but must be taught to do so: that truth does not come to him spontaneously, but must be brought to him by his own exertions. If man does not naturally think aright, he must think, we shall not say wrongly (for that implies malice prepense) but inadvertently: the native occupant of his mind must be, we shall not say falsehood (for that too implies malice prepense) but error. The original dowry then of universal man is inadvertency and error. This assumption is the ground and only

justification of the existence of philosophy. The circumstance that philosophy exists only to put right the oversights of common thinking—renders her polemical not by choice, but by necessity. She is controversial as the very tenure and condition of her existence: for how can she correct the slips of common opinion, the oversights of natural thinking, except by controverting them?"

Professor Ferrier deserves high commendation for the care taken in this volume to set out clearly Proposition and Counter-Proposition: the thesis which he impugns, as well as that which he sustains.

the Universe. The received belief, of a multitude of unseen divine persons bringing about by volitions all the different phenomena of nature, became unsatisfactory to men like Thales, Anaximander, Parmenides, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras. Each of these volunteers, following his own independent inspirations, struck out a new hypothesis, and endeavoured to commend it to others with more or less of sustaining reason. There appears to have been little of negation or refutation in their procedure. None of them tried to disprove the received point of view, or to throw its supporters upon their defence. Each of them unfolded his own hypothesis, or his own version of affirmative reasoned truth, for the adoption of those with whom it might find favour.

The dialectic age had not yet arrived. When it did arrive, with Sokrates as its principal champion, the topics of philosophy were altered, and its process revolutionised. We have often heard repeated the Ciceronian dictum—that Sokrates brought philosophy down from the heavens to the earth: from the distant, abstruse, and complicated phenomena of the Kosmos—in respect to which he adhered to the vulgar point of view, and even disapproved any enquiries tending to rationalise it—to the familiar business of man, and the common generalities of ethics and politics. But what has been less observed about Sokrates, though not less true, is, that along with this change of topics he introduced a complete revolution in method. He placed the negative in the front of his procedure; giving to it a point, an emphasis, a substantive value, which no one had done before. His peculiar gift was that of cross-examination, or the application of his Elenchus to discriminate pretended from real knowledge. He found men full of confident beliefs on these ethical and political topics—affirming with words which they had never troubled themselves to define—and persuaded that they required no farther teaching: yet at the same time

unable to give clear or consistent answers to his questions, and shown by this convincing test to be destitute of real knowledge. Declaring this false persuasion of knowledge, or confident unreasoned belief, to be universal, he undertook as the mission of his life to expose it: and he proclaimed that until the mind was disabused thereof and made painfully conscious of ignorance, no affirmative reasoned truth could be presented with any chance of success.

Such are the peculiar features of the Sokratic dialogue, exemplified in the compositions here reviewed. I do not mean that Sokrates always talked so; but that such was the marked peculiarity which distinguished his talking from that of others. It is philosophy, or reasoned truth, approached in the most polemical manner; operative at first only to discredit the natural, unreasoned intellectual growths of the ordinary mind, and to generate a painful consciousness of ignorance. I say this here, and I shall often say it again throughout these volumes. It is absolutely indispensable to the understanding of the Platonic dialogues; one half of which must appear unmeaning, unless construed with reference to this separate function and value of negative dialectic. Whether readers may themselves agree in such estimation of negative dialectic, is another question: but they must keep it in mind as the governing sentiment of Plato during much of his life, and of Sokrates throughout the whole of life: as being moreover one main cause of that antipathy which Sokrates inspired to many respectable orthodox contemporaries. I have thought it right to take constant account of this orthodox sentiment among the ordinary public, as the perpetual drag-chain, even when its force is not absolutely repressive, upon free speculation.

Proceeding upon this general view, I have interpreted the numerous negative dialogues in Plato as being really negative and nothing beyond. I have not presumed, still less

tried to divine, an ulterior affirmative beyond what the text reveals—neither *arcana cœlestia*, like Proklus and Ficinus,<sup>c</sup> nor any other *arcanum* of terrestrial character. While giving such an analysis of each dialogue as my space permitted and as will enable the reader to comprehend its general scope and peculiarities—I have studied each as it stands written, and have rarely ascribed to Plato any purpose exceeding what he himself intimates. Where I find difficulties forcibly dwelt upon without any solution, I imagine, not that he had a good solution kept back in his closet, but that he had failed in finding one: that he thought it useful, as a portion of the total process necessary for finding and authenticating reasoned truth, both to work out these unsolved difficulties for himself, and to force them impressively upon the attention of others.<sup>d</sup>

Moreover, I deal with each dialogue as a separate composition. Each represents the intellectual scope and impulse of a peculiar moment, which may or may not be in harmony with the rest. Plato would have protested not less earnestly

<sup>c</sup> F. A. Wolf, Vorrede, Plato, Sympos. p. vi.

“Ficinus suchte, wie er sich in der Zueignungsschrift seiner Version ausdrückt, im Platon allenthalben *arcana cœlestia*: und da er sie in seinem Kopfe mitbrachte, so konnte es ihm nicht sauer werden, etwas zu finden, was freilich jedem andern verborgen bleiben muss.”

<sup>d</sup> A striking passage from Bentham illustrates very well both the Sokratic and the Platonic point of view. (Principles of Morals and Legislation, vol. ii. ch. xvi. p. 57, ed. 1823.)

“Gross ignorance describes no difficulties. Imperfect knowledge finds them out and struggles with them. It must be perfect knowledge that overcomes them.”

Of the three different mental conditions here described, the first is that against which Sokrates made war, *i. e.* real ignorance, and false persuasion of knowledge, which therefore describes

no difficulties.

The second, or imperfect knowledge struggling with difficulties, is represented by the Platonic negative dialogues.

The third—or perfect knowledge victorious over difficulties—will be found in the following pages marked by the character τὸ δύνασθαι λόγον δίδουσι καὶ δέχεσθαι. You do not possess “perfect knowledge,” until you are able to answer, with unfaltering promptitude and consistency, all the questions of a Sokratic cross-examiner—and to administer effectively the like cross-examination yourself, for the purpose of testing others. “Ὅλως δὲ σημεῖον τοῦ εἰδότες τὸ δύνασθαι διδάσκειν ἔστιν. (Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 981, b. 8.)

Perfect knowledge, corresponding to this definition, will not be found manifested in Plato. Instead of it, we note in his latter years the lawgiver’s assumed infallibility.

than Cicero,\* against those who sought to foreclose debate, in the grave and arduous struggles for searching out reasoned truth—and to bind down the free inspirations of his intellect in one dialogue, by appealing to sentence already pronounced in another preceding. Of two inconsistent trains of reasoning, both cannot indeed be true—but both are often useful to be known and studied: and the philosopher, who professes to master the theory of his subject, ought not to be a stranger to either. All minds athirst for reasoned truth will be greatly aided in forming their opinions by the number of points which Plato suggests, though they find little which he himself settles for them finally.

There have been various critics, who, on perceiving inconsistencies in Plato, either force them into harmony by a subtle exegêsis, or discard one of them as spurious. I have not followed either course. I recognise such inconsistencies, when found, as facts—and even as very interesting facts—in his philosophical character. To the marked contradiction in the spirit of the *Leges*, as compared with the earlier Platonic compositions, I have called special attention. Plato has been called by Plutarch a mixture of Sokrates with Lykurgus. The two elements are in reality opposite, predominant at different times: Plato begins his career with the confessed ignorance and philosophical negative of Sokrates: he closes it with the peremptory, dictatorial, affirmative of Lykurgus.

To Xenophon, who belongs only in part to my present work, and whose character presents an interesting contrast with Plato, I have devoted a separate chapter. To the other less celebrated Sokratic Companions also, I have

\* Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* v. 11, 33.

The collocutor remarks, that what Cicero says is inconsistent with what he (Cicero) had written in the fourth book *De Finibus*. To which Cicero replies:—

“ Tu quidem tabellis obsignatis agis

mecum, et testificaris, quid dixerim aliquando aut scripserim. Cum aliis isto modo, qui legibus impositis disputant. Nos in diem vivimus: quodcumque nostros animos probabilitate percussit, id dicimus: itaque soli sumus liberi.”



endeavoured to do justice, as far as the scanty means of knowledge permit: to them, especially, because they have generally been misconceived and unduly depreciated.

The present volumes, however, contain only one half of the speculative activity of Hellas during the fourth century B.C. The second half, in which Aristotle is the hero, remains still wanting. If my health and energies continue, I hope one day to be able to supply this want: and thus to complete from my own point of view, the history, speculative as well as active, of the Hellenic race, down to the date which I prescribed to myself in the Preface of my History near twenty years ago.

The philosophy of the fourth century B.C. is peculiarly valuable and interesting, not merely from its intrinsic speculative worth—from the originality and grandeur of its two principal heroes—from its coincidence with the full display of dramatic, rhetorical, artistic genius—but also from a fourth reason not unimportant—because it is purely Hellenic; preceding the development of Alexandria, and the amalgamation of Oriental veins of thought with the inspirations of the Academy or the Lyceum. The Orontes<sup>f</sup> and the Jordan had not yet begun to flow westward, and to impart their own colour to the waters of Attica and Latium. Not merely the real world, but also the ideal world, present to the minds of Plato and Aristotle, were purely Hellenic. Even during the century immediately following, this had ceased to be fully true in respect to the philosophers of Athens: and it became less and less true with each succeeding century. New foreign centres of rhetoric and literature—Asiatic and Alexandrian Hellenism—were fostered into importance by regal encouragement. Plato and Aristotle are thus the special representatives of genuine Hellenic philosophy. The remarkable intellectual ascendancy acquired by them in their

<sup>f</sup> Juvenal iii. 62:—

“Jampridem Syrus in Tiberim defluxit Orontes,” &c.

own day, and maintained over succeeding centuries, was one main reason why the Hellenic vein was enabled so long to maintain itself, though in impoverished condition, against adverse influences from the East, ever increasing in force. Plato and Aristotle outlasted all their Pagan successors—successors at once less purely Hellenic and less highly gifted. And when Saint Jerome, near 750 years after the decease of Plato, commemorated with triumph the victory of unlettered Christians over the accomplishments and genius of Paganism—he illustrated the magnitude of the victory, by singling out Plato and Aristotle as the representatives of vanquished philosophy.‡

‡ The passage is a remarkable one, as marking both the effect produced on a Latin scholar by Hebrew studies, and the neglect into which even the greatest writers of classical antiquity had then fallen (about 400 A. D.).

Hieronymus — Comment. in Epist. ad Galatas, iii. 5, p. 486-487, ed. Venet. 1769 :—

“ Sed omnem sermonis elegantiam, et Latini sermonis venustatem, stridor lectionis Hebraicæ sordidavit. Nostis enim et ipsæ ” (i. e. Paula and Eustochium, to whom his letter is addressed) “ quod plus quam quindecim anni sunt, ex quo in manus meas nunquam Tullius, nunquam Maro, nunquam Gentilium literarum quilibet Auctor ascendit : et si quid forte inde,

dum loquimur, obrepit, quasi antiqui per nebulam somnii recordamur. Quod autem profecerim ex linguæ illius infatigabili studio, aliorum judicio derelinquo : *ego quid in meâ amiserim, scio. . . .* Si quis eloquentiam quærit vel declamationibus delectatur, habet in utrâque linguâ Demosthenem et Tullium, Polemonem et Quintilianum. Ecclesia Christi non de Academiâ et Lyceo, sed de vili plebeculâ congregata est. . . . Quotusquisque nunc Aristotelem legit ? Quanti Platonis vel libros novère vel nomen ? Vix in angulis otiosi eos senes recolunt. Rusticanos vero et piscatores nostros totus orbis loquitur, universus mundus sonat.”

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## ERRATUM.

In Vol. i. Ch. vii. p. 283, note <sup>d</sup>, the following sentence appears :—

“ It is not impossible that there may have been two distinct forms of indictment (against Sokrates), since there were three different accusers—Melætus, Anytus, and Lykon.”

This sentence ought to be omitted. The conjecture (I find) has no foundation : for the citation immediately preceding out of the Platonic Apology, though it is cast into the form of an indictment, is not a real indictment tendered at the archontic office as foundation for criminal procedure, but a summary extracted by Sokrates himself from the words of unofficial writers and speakers who had censured him. He chooses to put the summary into the phraseology common in the administration of criminal justice at Athens.



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# P L A T O .

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## PRE-SOKRATIC PHILOSOPHY.

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### CHAPTER I.

#### SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY IN GREECE, BEFORE AND IN THE TIME OF SOKRATES.

THE life of Plato extends from 427-347 B.C. He was born in the fourth year of the Peloponnesian war, and he died at the age of 80, about the time when Olynthus was taken by the Macedonian Philip. The last years of his life thus witnessed a melancholy breach in the integrity of the Hellenic world, and even exhibited data from which a far-sighted Hellenic politician might have anticipated something like the coming subjugation, realised afterwards by the victory of Philip at Chæroneia. But during the first half of Plato's life, no such anticipations seemed even within the limits of possibility. The forces of Hellas, though discordant among themselves, were superabundant as to defensive efficacy, and were disposed rather to aggression against foreign enemies, especially against a country then so little formidable as Macedonia. It was under this contemplation of Hellas self-acting and self-sufficing—an aggregate of cities, each a political unit, yet held together by strong ties of race, language, religion, and common feelings of various kinds—that the mind of Plato was both formed and matured.

Change in  
the political  
condition of  
Greece dur-  
ing the life  
of Plato.

In appreciating, as far as our scanty evidence allows, the circumstances which determined his intellectual and speculative character, I shall be compelled to touch briefly upon the various philosophical theories which were propounded

anterior to Sokrates—as well as to repeat some matters already brought to view in the sixteenth, sixty-seventh, and sixty-eighth chapters of my History of Greece.

To us, as to Herodotus in his day, the philosophical speculation of the Greeks begins with the theology and cosmology of Homer and Hesiod. The series of divine persons and attributes, and generations, presented by these poets, and especially the Theogony of Hesiod, supplied at one time full satisfaction to the curiosity of the Greeks respecting the past history and present agencies of the world around them. In the emphatic censure bestowed by Herakleitus on the poets and philosophers who preceded him, as having much knowledge but no sense—he includes Hesiod, as well as Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Hekataeus: upon Homer and Archilochus he is still more severe, declaring that they ought to be banished from the public festivals and scourged.<sup>a</sup> The sentiment of curiosity as it then existed was only secondary and derivative, arising out of some of the strong primary or personal sentiments—fear or hope, antipathy or sympathy,—impression of present weakness,—unsatisfied appetites and longings,—wonder and awe under the presence of the terror striking phenomena of nature, &c. Under this state of the mind, when problems suggested themselves for solution, the answers afforded by Polytheism gave more satisfaction than could have been afforded by any other hypothesis. Among the indefinite multitude of invisible, personal, quasi-human, agents, with different attributes and dispositions, some one could be found to account for every perplexing phenomenon. The question asked was, not, What are the antecedent conditions or causes of rain, thunder, or earthquakes, but, Who rains and thunders? Who produces earthquakes?<sup>b</sup> The Hesiodic Greek was satisfied when informed that it was Zeus or Poseidon. To be told of physical agencies would have appeared to him not merely unsatisfactory, but absurd, ridi-

Early Greek mind, satisfied with the belief in polytheistic personal agents, as the real producing causes of phenomena.

<sup>a</sup> Diogen. Laert. ix. 1. Πολυμαθητήν νόον οὐ διδάσκει (οὐ φύει, ap. Proclum in Platon. Timæ. p. 31 F., p. 72, ed. Schneider), 'Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδασκε καὶ Πυθαγόρην, ἀπὸς τε Ἑενοφάνεια καὶ

'Ἐκαταίων τὸν θ' "Ὀμηρον ἔφασκεν ἄξιον εἶναι βραπίζεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων, καὶ Ἀρχίλοχον ὁμοίως.

<sup>b</sup> Aristophanes, Nubes, 367, Ἄλλα τίς ἕει; Herodot. vii. 129.

culous, and impious. It was the task of a poet like Hesiod to clothe this general polytheistic sentiment in suitable details: to describe the various Gods, Goddesses, Demigods, and other quasi-human agents, with their characteristic attributes, with illustrative adventures, and with sufficient relations of sympathy and subordination among each other, to connect them in men's imaginations as members of the same brotherhood. Okeanus, Gæa, Uranus, Helios, Selênê,—Zeus, Poseidon, Hades—Apollo and Artemis, Dionysus and Aphroditê—these and many other divine personal agents, were invoked as the producing and sustaining forces in nature, the past history of which was contained in their filiations or contests. Anterior to all of them, the primordial matter or person, was Chaos.

Hesiod represents the point of view ancient and popular (to use Aristotle's expression<sup>c</sup>) among the Greeks, from whence all their philosophical speculation took its departure; and which continued throughout their history, to underlie all the philosophical speculations, as the faith of the ordinary public who neither frequented the schools nor conversed with philosophers.

Belief in such agency continued among the general public, even after the various sects of philosophy had arisen.

While Aristophanes, speaking in the name of this popular faith, denounces and derides Sokrates as a searcher, alike foolish and irreligious, after astronomical and physical causes—Sokrates himself not only denies the truth of the allegation, but adopts as his own the sentiment which dictated it; proclaiming Anaxagoras and others to be culpable for prying into mysteries which the Gods intentionally kept hidden.<sup>d</sup> The repugnance felt by a numerous public, against scientific explanation—as eliminating the divine agents and substituting in their place irrational causes,<sup>e</sup>—was a permanent fact of which philosophers were always obliged to take account,

<sup>c</sup> Aristotel. *Metaphys.* i. 7, p. 989, a. 10. Φησὶ δὲ καὶ Ἡσίοδος τὴν γῆν πρῶτην γενέσθαι τῶν σωματίων οὕτως ἀρχαίαν καὶ δημοτικὴν συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὴν ὑπόληψιν.

Again, in the beginning of the second book of the *Meteorologica*, Aristotle contrasts the ancient and primitive theology with the "human wisdom" which grew up subsequently:

Οἱ ἀρχαῖοι καὶ διατρίβοντες περὶ τὰς θεολογίας — οἱ σοφώτεροι τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην σοφίαν (*Meteor.* ii. i. p. 353, a.).

<sup>d</sup> Xenophon, *Memor.* iv. 7, 5; i. 11-15. Plato, *Apolog.* p. 26 E.

<sup>e</sup> Plutarch, *Perikles*, c. 23. Οὐ γὰρ ἤνειχοντο τοὺς φυσικοὺς καὶ μετεωρολόσχας τότε καλουμένους, ὡς εἰς αἰτίας ἀλόγους καὶ δυνάμεις ἀπροσότητος διατρίβοντας τὸ θεῖον.



and which modified the tone of their speculations without being powerful enough to repress them.

Even in the sixth century B.C., when the habit of composing in prose was first introduced, Pherekydes and Akusilaus still continued in their prose the theogony, or mythical cosmogony, of Hesiod and the other old poets: while Epimenides and the Orphic poets put forth different theogonies, blended with mystical dogmas. It was, however, in the same century, and in the first half of it, that Thales, of Miletus (620-560 B.C.), set the example of a new vein of thought. Instead of the Homeric Okeanus, father of all things, Thales assumed the material substance, Water, as the primordial matter and the universal substratum of everything in nature. By various transmutations, all other substances were generated from water; all of them, when destroyed, returned into water. Like the old poets, Thales conceived the surface of the earth to be flat and round; but he did not, like them, regard it as stretching down to the depths of Tartarus: he supposed it to be flat and shallow, floating on the immensity of the watery expanse or Ocean.<sup>f</sup> This is the main feature of the Thaletian hypothesis, about which, however, its author seems to have left no writing. Aristotle says little about Thales, and that little in a tone of so much doubt,<sup>g</sup> that we can hardly confide in the opinions and discoveries ascribed to him by others.<sup>h</sup>

<sup>f</sup> Aristotel. *Metaphys.* A. 3, p. 983, b. 21. *De Cælo*, ii. 13, p. 294, a. 29. *Θαλῆς, ὁ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχηγὸς φιλοσοφίας, &c.*, Seneca, *Natural. Quæst.* vi. 6.

Pherekydes, Epimenides, &c., were contemporary with the earliest Ionic philosophers (Brandis, *Handbuch der Phil.* s. 23).

According to Plutarch (*Aquæ et Ignis Comparatio*, p. 955, *init.*), most persons believed that Hesiod, by the word Chaos, meant Water. Zeno the Stoic adopted this interpretation (*Schol. Apollon. Rhod.* i. 498). On the other hand, Bacchylides the poet, and after him Zenodotus, called Air by the name Chaos (*Schol. Hesiod. Theogon.* p. 392, *Gaisf.*). Hermann considers that the Hesiodic Chaos means empty

space (see the note of Brandis, *Handb. Phil.* p. 71).

<sup>g</sup> See two passages in Aristotle *De Animâ*, i. 2, and i. 5.

<sup>h</sup> Cicero says (*De Naturâ Deorum*, i. 10), "Thales—*aquam dixit esse initium rerum, Deum autem eam mentem, quæ ex aquâ cuncta fingeret.*" That the latter half of this Ciceronian statement, respecting the doctrine of Thales, is at least unfounded, and probably erroneous, is recognised by Preller, Brandis, and Zeller. Preller, *Histor. Philos. Græc. ex Fontium Locis Contexta*, sect. 15; Brandis, *Handbuch der Gr.-R. Philos.* sect. 31, p. 118; Zeller, *Die Philos. der Griechen*, vol. i. p. 151, ed. 2.

It is stated by Herodotus that Thales foretold the year of the memorable solar

The next of the Ionic philosophers, and the first who published his opinions in writing, was Anaximander, of Miletus, the countryman and younger contemporary of Thales (570–520 B.C.). He too searched for an Ἀρχή, a primordial Something or principle, self-existent and comprehending in its own nature a generative, motive, or transmutative force. Not thinking that water, or any other known and definite substance fulfilled these conditions, he adopted as the foundation of his hypothesis a substance which he called the Infinite or Indeterminate. Under this name he conceived Body simply, without any positive or determinate properties, yet including the fundamental contraries, Hot, Cold, Moist, Dry, &c., in a potential or latent state, including farther a self-changing and self-developing force,<sup>i</sup> and being moreover immortal and indestructible.<sup>k</sup> By this inherent force, and by the evolution of one or more of these dormant contrary qualities, were generated the various definite substances of nature—Air, Fire, Water, etc. But every determinate substance thus generated was, after a certain time, destroyed and resolved again into the Indeterminate mass. “From thence all substances proceed, and into this they relapse: each in its turn thus making atonement to the others, and suffering the penalty of injustice.”<sup>l</sup> Anaximander conceived separate

Anaximander—laid down as ἀρχή the Infinite or Indeterminate—generation of the elements out of it, by evolution of latent, fundamental contraries—astronomical and geological doctrines.

eclipse which happened during the battle between the Medes and the Lydians (Herod. i. 74). This eclipse seems to have occurred in B.C. 585, according to the best recent astronomical enquiries by Professor Airy.

<sup>i</sup> See Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, vol. i. p. 157, seq. ed. 2nd.

Anaximander conceived τὸ ἄπειρον as *infinite matter*; the Pythagoreans and Plato conceived it as a distinct nature by itself—as a subject, not as a predicate (Aristotel. *Physic.* iii. 4, p. 203, a. 2).

About these fundamental contraries, Aristotle says (*Physic.* i. 4, init.): οἱ δ' ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐνούσας τὰς ἐναντιότητας ἐκκρίνεσθαι, ὡς περ Ἀναξίμανδρος φησι. Which Simplicius explains, ἐναντιότητές εἰσι, θερμὸν, ψυχρὸν, ξηρὸν, ὑγρὸν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι, &c.

Compare also Schleiermacher, “Ueber

Anaximandros,” in his *Vermischte Schriften*, vol. ii. p. 178, seq. Deutinger (*Gesch. der Philos.* vol. i. p. 165, *Regensb.* 1852) maintains that this ἐκκρίσις of contraries is at variance with the hypothesis of Anaximander, and has been erroneously ascribed to him. But the testimony is sufficiently good to outweigh this suspicion.

<sup>k</sup> Anaximander spoke of his ἄπειρον as ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον (Aristotel. *Physic.* iii. 4, 7, p. 203, b. 15).

<sup>l</sup> Simplicius ad Aristotel. *Physic.* fol. 6 a. apud Preller, *Histor. Philos. Graeco-Rom.* § 57, ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσις ἐστὶ τοῖς οὐσίω, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι, κατὰ τὸ χρεῶν διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ τίσιω κατὰ δίκην ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν. Simplicius remarks upon the poetical character of this phraseology, ποιητικωτέρους ὀνόμασιν, &c.

existence (determinate and particular existence, apart from the indeterminate and universal) as an unjust privilege, not to be tolerated except for a time, and requiring atonement even for that. As this process of alternate generation and destruction was unceasing, so nothing less than an Infinite could supply material for it. Earth, Water, Air, Fire, having been generated, the two former, being cold and heavy, remained at the bottom, while the two latter ascended. Fire formed the exterior circle, encompassing the air like bark round a tree: this peripheral fire was broken up and aggregated into separate masses, composing the sun, moon, and stars. The sphere of the fixed stars was nearest to the earth: that of the moon next above it: that of the sun highest of all. The sun and moon were circular bodies twenty-eight times larger than the earth: but the visible part of them was only an opening in the centre, through which<sup>m</sup> the fire or light behind was seen. All these spheres revolved round the earth, which was at first semi-fluid or mud, but became dry and solid through the heat of the sun. It was in shape like the section of a cylinder, with a depth equal to one-third of its breadth or horizontal surface, on which men and animals live. It was in the centre of the Kosmos; it remained stationary because of its equal distance from all parts of the outer revolving spheres; there was no cause determining it to move upward rather than downward or sideways, therefore it remained still.<sup>n</sup> Its exhalations nourished the fire in the

<sup>m</sup> Origen. *Philosophumena*. p. 11, ed. Miller; Plutarch ap. Eusebium *Præp. Evang.* i. 8, xv. 23-46-47; Stobæus *Eclog.* i. p. 510. Anaximander supposed that eclipses of the sun and moon were caused by the occasional closing of these apertures (Euseb. xv. 50-51). The part of the sun visible to us was, in his opinion, not smaller than the earth, and of the purest fire (Diogen. ii. 1).

Eudæmus, in his history of astronomy, mentioned Anaximander as the first who had discussed the magnitudes and distances of the celestial bodies (Simplikios ad Aristot. *De Cælo*, ap. Schol. Brand. p. 497, a. 12).

<sup>n</sup> Aristotel. *Meteorol.* ii. 2, p. 355, a. 21, which is referred by Alexander of Aphrodisias to Anaximander; also

*De Cælo*, ii. 13, p. 295, b. 12.

A doctrine somewhat like it is ascribed even to Thales. See Alexander's *Commentary on Aristotel. *Metaphys.* i. p. 983, b. 17.*

The reason here assigned by Anaximander why the Earth remained still, is the earliest example in Greek philosophy of that fallacy called the principle of the Sufficient Reason, so well analysed and elucidated by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his *System of Logic*, book v. ch. 3, sect. 5.

The remarks which Aristotle himself makes upon it are also very interesting, when he cites the opinion of Anaximander. Compare Plato, *Phædon*, p. 109, c. 132, with the citations in Wyttenbach's note.

peripheral regions of the Kosmos. Animals were produced from the primitive muddy fluid of the earth: first, fishes and other lower animals—next, in process of time man, when circumstances permitted his development.<sup>o</sup> We learn farther respecting the doctrines of Anaximander, that he proposed physical explanations of thunder, lightning, and other meteorological phenomena:<sup>p</sup> memorable as the earliest attempt of speculation in that department, at a time when such events inspired the strongest religious awe, and were regarded as the most especial manifestations of purposes of the Gods. He is said also to have been the first who tried to represent the surface and divisions of the earth on a brazen plate, the earliest rudiment of a map or chart.<sup>q</sup>

The third physical philosopher produced by Miletus, seemingly before the time of her terrible disasters suffered from the Persians after the Ionic revolt between 500–494 B.C., was Anaximenes, who struck out a third hypothesis. He assumed, as the primordial substance, and as the source of all generation or transmutation, Air, eternal in duration, infinite in extent. He thus returned to the principle of the Thaletian theory, selecting for his beginning a known substance, though not the same substance as Thales. To explain how generation of new products was possible (as Anaximander had tried to explain by his theory of evolution of latent contraries), Anaximenes adverted to the facts of condensation and rarefaction, which he connected respectively with cold and heat.<sup>r</sup> The Infinite

Anaximenes  
—adopted.  
Air as ἀρχή  
—rise of substances out of it, by condensation and rarefaction.

<sup>o</sup> Plutarch, *Placit. Philos.* v. 19.

<sup>p</sup> Plutarch, *Placit. Philos.* iii. 3; Seneca, *Quæst. Nat.* ii. 18-19.

<sup>q</sup> Strabo, i. p. 7. Diogenes Laertius (ii. 1) states that Anaximander affirmed the figure of the earth to be spherical; and Dr. Whewell, in his *History of the Inductive Sciences*, follows his statement. But Schleiermacher (*Ueber Anaximandros*, vol. ii. p. 204 of his *Sämmtliche Werke*) and Gruppe (*Die Kosmischen Systeme der Griechen*, p. 38) contest this assertion, and prefer that of Plutarch (ap. Eusebium *Præp. Evang.* i. 8, *Placit. Philos.* iii. 10), which I have adopted in the text. It is to be remembered that Diogenes

himself, in another place (ix. 21), affirms Parmenides to have been the first who propounded the spherical figure of the earth. See the facts upon this subject collected and discussed in the instructive dissertation of L. Oettinger, *Die Vorstellungen der Griechen und Römer ueber die Erde als Himmelskörper*, p. 38; Freiburg, 1850.

<sup>r</sup> Origen. *Philosophum.* c. 7; Simplicius in *Aristot. Physic.* f. 32; Brandis, *Gesch. Phil.* p. 145.

Cicero, *Academic.* ii. 37, 118. "Anaximenes infinitum aera, sed ea, quae ex eo orientur, definita."

The comic poet Philemon introduced in one of his dramas, of which a short

Air, possessing and exercising an inherent generative and developing power, perpetually in motion, passing from dense to rare or from rare to dense, became in its utmost rarefaction, Fire and Æther; when passing through successive stages of increased condensation it became first cloud, next water, then earth, and, lastly, in its utmost density, stone.<sup>8</sup> Surrounding, embracing, and pervading the Kosmos, it also embodied and carried with it a vital principle, which animals obtained from it by inspiration, and which they lost as soon as they ceased to breathe.<sup>9</sup> Anaximenes included in his treatise (which was written in a clear Ionic dialect) many speculations on astronomy and meteorology, differing widely from those of Anaximander. He conceived the Earth as a broad, flat, round plate, resting on the air.<sup>10</sup> Earth, Sun, and Moon were in his view condensed air, the Sun acquiring heat by the extreme and incessant velocity with which he moved. The Heaven was not an entire hollow sphere encompassing the Earth below as well as above, but a hemisphere covering the Earth above, and revolving laterally round it like a cap round the head.<sup>11</sup>

The general principle of cosmogony, involved in the hypothesis of these three Milesians—one primordial substance or Something endued with motive and transmutative force, so as to generate all the variety of products, each successive and transient, which our senses witness—was taken up with more or less modification by others, especially by Diogenes of Apollonia, of whom I shall speak presently. But there were three other men who struck out different veins of thought—Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Herakleitus: the two former seemingly contemporary with Anaximenes (550–490 B.C.) the latter somewhat later.

Of Pythagoras I have spoken at some length in the thirty-seventh chapter of my History of Greece. Speculative ori-

fragment is preserved (Frag. 2, Meineke), the omnipresent and omniscient Air, to deliver the prologue :

— οὐτος, εἰμ' ἐγὼ  
'Αἴρ, ὃν ἂν τις ὀνομάσειε καὶ Δία.  
ἐγὼ δ', ὃ θεοῦ ἴστω ἔργον, εἰμι πανταχοῦ—  
πάντ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης οἶδα, πανταχοῦ παρών.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, De Primo Frigido, p.

947; Plutarch, ap. Euseb. P. E. i. 8.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Placit. Philosophor. i. 3, p. 878.

<sup>3</sup> Aristotel. De Cœlo, ii. 13; Plutarch, Placit. Philosoph. iii. 10, p. 895.

<sup>4</sup> Origen. Philosophum. p. 12, ed. Miller: ὡσπερὶ περὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν κεφαλὴν στρέφεται τὸ πῆλιον.

ginality was only one among many remarkable features in his character. He was an inquisitive traveller, a religious reformer or innovator, and the founder of a powerful and active brotherhood, partly ascetic, partly political, which stands without parallel in Grecian history. The immortality of the soul, with its transmigration (metempsychosis) after death into other bodies, either of men or of other animals—the universal kindred thus recognised between men and other animals, and the prohibition which he founded thereupon against the use of animals for food or sacrifice—are among his most remarkable doctrines: said to have been borrowed (together with various ceremonial observances) from the Egyptians.<sup>1</sup> After acquiring much celebrity in his native island of Samos and throughout Ionia, Pythagoras emigrated (seemingly about 530 B.C.) to Kroton and Metapontum in Lower Italy, where the Pythagorean brotherhood gradually acquired great political ascendancy: and from whence it even extended itself in like manner over the neighbouring Greco-Italian cities. At length it excited so much political antipathy among the body of the citizens,<sup>2</sup> that its rule was violently put down, and its members dispersed about 509 B.C. Pythagoras died at Metapontum.

Though thus stripped of power, however, the Pythagoreans still maintained themselves for several generations as a social, religious, and philosophical brotherhood. They continued and extended the vein of speculation first opened by the founder himself. So little of proclaimed individuality was there among them, that Aristotle, in criticising their doctrine, alludes to them usually under the collective name Pythagoreans. Epicharmus, in his comedies at Syracuse (470 B.C.) gave occasional utterance to various doctrines of the sect; but the earliest of them who is known to have composed a book, was Philolaus,<sup>3</sup> the con-

Pythagoras—  
his life and  
career—  
Pythagorean  
brotherhood,  
great political  
influence  
which it ac-  
quired among  
the Greco-  
Italian cities  
—incurred  
great enmity,  
and was vio-  
lently put  
down.

The Pytha-  
goreans con-  
tinue as a  
recluse sect,  
without pol-  
itical power.

<sup>1</sup> Herodot. ii. 81; Isokrates, Busirid. Encom. s. 28.

<sup>2</sup> Polybius, ii. 39; Porphyry, Vit. Pythag. 54 seq.

<sup>3</sup> Diogen. Laert. viii. 7-15-78-85.

Some passages of Aristotle, however,

indicate divergences of doctrine among the Pythagoreans themselves (Metaphys. A. 5, p. 986, a. 22). He probably speaks of the Pythagoreans of his own time, when dialectical discussion had modified the original orthodoxy of the

temporary of Sokrates. Most of the opinions ascribed to the Pythagoreans originated probably among the successors of Pythagoras; but the basis and principle upon which they proceed seems undoubtedly his.

The problem of physical philosophy, as then conceived, was to find some primordial and fundamental nature, by and out of which the sensible universe was built up and produced; something which co-existed always underlying it, supplying fresh matter and force for generation of successive products. The hypotheses of Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, to solve this problem, have been already noticed: Pythagoras solved it by saying, That the essence of things consisted in Number. By this he did not mean simply that all things were numerable, or that number belonged to them as a predicate. Numbers were not merely predicates inseparable from subjects, but subjects in themselves: substances or magnitudes, endowed with active force, and establishing the fundamental essences or types according to which things were constituted. About water,<sup>b</sup> air, or fire, Pythagoras said nothing.<sup>c</sup> He conceived that sensible phenomena had greater resemblance to numbers than to any one of these substrata assigned by the Ionic philosophers. Number was (in his doctrine) the self-existent reality—the fundamental material and in-dwelling force pervading the universe. Numbers were not separate from things<sup>d</sup> (like the Platonic Ideas), but *fundamenta* of things—their essences or determining principles: they were moreover conceived as having magnitude and active force.<sup>e</sup> In the move-

Doctrine of  
the Pytha-  
goreans—  
Number the  
Essence of  
Things.

order. Compare Gruppe, Ueber die Fragmente des Archytas, cap. 5, p. 61-63. About the gradual development of the Pythagorean doctrine, see Brandis, Handbuch der Gr.-R. Philos. s. 74, 75.

<sup>b</sup> Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 5, p. 985, b. 27. N. 3, p. 1090, a. 21. 'Εν δὲ τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς, ἐδόκουν θεωρεῖν ὁμοιώματα πολλὰ τοῖς ὄσσι καὶ γιγνομένοις, μάλλον ἢ ἐν πυρὶ καὶ γῆ καὶ ὕδατι, &c.

<sup>c</sup> Aristotel. Metaph. i. p. 990, a. 18. Διὸ περὶ πυρὸς ἢ γῆς ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων σωμάτων οὐδ' ὅτι οὖν εἰρήκασιν, &c. (the Pythagoreans); also N. 3.

<sup>d</sup> Physic. iii. 4, p. 203 a. 6. Οὐ γὰρ χωριστὸν ποιοῦσι (the Pythagoreans) τὸν ἀριθμὸν, &c., Metaphys. M. 6, p. 1080, b. 18; τὰς μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἔχειν μέγεθος, M. 8, p. 1083, b. 17—ἐκείνοι (the Pythagoreans) τὸν ἀριθμὸν τὰ ὄντα λέγουσιν τὰ γούν θεωρήματα προσάπτουσι τοῖς σώμασιν ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνων ὄντων τῶν ἀριθμῶν.

<sup>e</sup> To illustrate the Pythagorean principle (Number as the fundamental substance and universal primary agent), I transcribe a passage from an eminent physical philosopher of the nineteenth century, Oken's Elements of Phy-

ments of the celestial bodies, in works of human art, in musical harmony—measure and number are the producing and directing agencies. According to the Pythagorean Philolaus, “the Dekad, the full and perfect number, was of supreme and universal efficacy as the guide and principle of life, both to the Kosmos and to man. The nature of number was imperative and lawgiving, affording the only solution of all that was perplexing or unknown; without number all would be indeterminate and unknowable.”<sup>f</sup>

The first principle or beginning of Number, was the One or Monas—which the Pythagoreans conceived as including both the two fundamental contraries—the Determining and the Indeterminate.<sup>g</sup> All particular numbers, and through them all things, were compounded from the harmonious junction

sio-Philosophy, translated by Tulk. Aphorism 57 :—“While numbers in a mathematical sense are positions and negations of nothing, in the philosophical sense they are positions and negations of the Eternal. Every thing which is real, posited, finite, has become this, out of numbers; or more strictly speaking, every Real is absolutely nothing else than a number. This must be the sense entertained of numbers in the Pythagorean doctrine—namely, that every thing, or the whole universe, had arisen from numbers. This is not to be taken in a merely quantitative sense, as it has hitherto been erroneously; but in an intrinsic sense, as implying that all things are numbers themselves, or the acts of the Eternal. The essence in numbers is nought else than the Eternal. The Eternal only is or exists, and nothing else is when a number exists. There is therefore nothing real but the Eternal itself; for every Real, or every thing that is, is only a number and only exists by virtue of a number.”

Ibid., Aphorism 105-107 :—“Arithmetic is the science of the second idea, or that of time or motion, or life. It is therefore the first science. Mathematics not only begin with it, but creation also, with the becoming of time and of life. Arithmetic is, accordingly, the truly absolute or divine science; and therefore every thing in it is also directly certain, because

every thing in it resembles the Divine. Theology is arithmetic personified.” —“A natural thing is nothing but a self-moving number. An organic or living thing is a number moving itself out of itself or spontaneously: an inorganic thing, however, is a number moved by another thing: now as this other thing is also a real number, so then is every inorganic thing a number moved by another number, and so on *ad infinitum*. The movements in nature are only movements of numbers by numbers: even as arithmetical computation is none other than a movement of numbers by numbers; but with this difference—that in the latter, this operates in an ideal manner, in the former after a real.”

<sup>f</sup> Philolaus, ed. Boeckh, p. 139 seqq.

Θεωρεῖν δεῖ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰν ἐσοίαν (οὐσίαν) τῷ ἀριθμῷ κατὰν φύσιν, ἅτις ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ δεκάδι· μεγάλα καὶ παντελής καὶ παντοεργὸς καὶ θέλω καὶ οὐρανίω βίω καὶ ἀνθρωπίνω ἀρχὰ καὶ ἡγεμονίῳ ἄνευ δὲ ταύτας πάντα ἄπειρα καὶ ἀδηλα καὶ ἀφανῆ· νομικὰ γὰρ ἡ φύσις τῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ ἀγεμονικὰ καὶ διδασκαλικὰ τῷ ἀπορουμένῳ παντὸς καὶ ἀγροουμένῳ παντί. Compare the Fr. p. 58, of the same work.

According to Plato, as well as the Pythagoreans, number extended to ten, and not higher: all above ten were multiples and increments of ten. (Aristot. Physic. iii. 6, p. 203, b. 30).

<sup>g</sup> See the instructive explanations of Boeckh, in his work on the Fragments of Philolaus, p. 54 seq.



and admixture of these two fundamental contraries.<sup>h</sup> All numbers being either odd or even, the odd numbers were considered as analogous to the Determining, the even numbers to the Indeterminate. In One or the Monad, the Odd and Even were supposed to be both contained, not yet separated: Two was the first indeterminate even number; Three, the first odd and the first determinate number, because it included beginning, middle, and end. The sum of the first four numbers—One, Two, Three, Four—Ten ( $1 + 2 + 3 + 4$ ) was the most perfect number of all.<sup>i</sup> To these numbers, one, two, three, four, were understood as corresponding the fundamental conceptions of Geometry—Point, Line, Plane, Solid. *Five* represented colour and visible appearance: *Six*, the phenomenon of Life: *Seven*, Health, Light, Intelligence, &c.: *Eight*, Love or Friendship.<sup>k</sup> Man, Horse, Justice and Injustice, had their representative numbers: that corresponding to Justice was a square number, as giving equal for equal.<sup>m</sup>

The Monas—*Ἀρχή*, or principle of Number—geometrical conception of number—symbolical attributes of the first ten numbers, especially of the Dekad.

The Pythagoreans conceived the Kosmos, or the universe, as one single system, generated out of numbers.<sup>n</sup> Of this system the central point—the determining or limiting One—was first in order of time, and in order of philosophical conception. By the determining influence of this central constituted One,

Pythagorean Kosmos and Astronomy—geometrical and harmonic laws guiding the movements of the cosmical bodies.

<sup>h</sup> Philolaus, Fr., p. 62, Boeckh.—Diogen. L. viii. 85.

By *ἁρμονία*, Philolaus meant the musical octave: and his work included many explanations and comparisons respecting the intervals of the musical scale. (Boeckh, p. 65 seq.)

<sup>i</sup> Aristotel. De Cœlo, i. 1, p. 268, a. 10. *καθάπερ γὰρ φασιν οἱ Πυθαγορεῖοι, τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὰ πάντα τοῖς τρισὶν ὄρισται· τελευτὴ γὰρ καὶ μέσον καὶ ἀρχὴ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἔχει τὸν τοῦ παντός. ταῦτα δὲ τὸν τῆς τριάδος. Διὸ παρὰ τῆς φύσεως εἰληφότες ὥσπερ νόμοις ἐκείνης, καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀγιστείας τῶν θεῶν χράμεθα τῷ ἀριθμῷ τούτῳ (i. e. three).* It is remarkable that Aristotle here adopts and sanctions, in regard to the number Three, the mystic and fanciful attributes ascribed by the Pythagoreans.

<sup>k</sup> Strümpell—Geschichte der theo-

retischen Philosophie der Griechen, s. 78. Brandis, Handbuch der Gr. Röm. Phil., sect. 80, p. 469 seq.

The number Five also signified marriage, because it was a junction of the first masculine number Three with the first feminine two. Seven signified also *καρπὸς* or Right Season. See Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 5, p. 985, b. 26, M. 4, p. 1078, b. 23, compared with the commentary of Alexander on the former passage.

<sup>m</sup> Aristotel. Ethica Magna, i. 1.

<sup>n</sup> Aristot. Metaph. M. p. 1080, b. 18. *τὸν γὰρ ὅλον οὐρανὸν κατασκευάζουσιν ἐξ ἀριθμῶν.* Compare p. 1075, b. 37, with the Scholia.

The tetraktys (consecrated as the sum total of the first four numbers  $1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10$ ) is called *πηγήν ἀέντου φύσεως βιζώματ' ἔχουσαν*. Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathematic. vii. 94.

portions of the surrounding Infinite were successively attracted and brought into system: numbers, geometrical figures, solid substances, were generated. But as the Kosmos thus constituted was composed of numbers, there could be no continuum: each numerical unit was distinct and separated from the rest by a portion of vacant space, which was imbibed, by a sort of inhalation, from the infinite space or spirit without.<sup>o</sup> The central point was fire, called by the Pythagoreans the Hearth of the Universe (like the public hearth or perpetual fire maintained in the prytaneum of a Grecian city), or the watch-tower of Zeus. Around it revolved from West to East, ten divine bodies, with unequal velocities, but in symmetrical movement or regular dance.<sup>p</sup> Outermost was the circle of the fixed stars, called by the Pythagoreans Olympus, and composed of fire like the centre. Within this came successively,—with orbits more and more approximating to the centre,—the five planets, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, Mercury: next, the Sun, the Moon, and the Earth. Lastly, between the Earth and the central fire, an hypothetical body, called the Antichthon or Counter-Earth, was imagined for the purpose of making up a total represented by the sacred number Ten, the symbol of perfection and totality. The Antichthon was analogous to a separated half of the Earth; simultaneous with the Earth in its revolutions, and corresponding with it on the opposite side of the central fire.

The inhabited portion of the Earth was supposed to be that which was turned away from the central fire and towards the Sun, from which it received light. But the Sun itself was

<sup>o</sup> Philolaus, ed. Boeckh, p. 91-95. τὸ πρῶτον ἄρμωσθῆν, τὸ ἐν ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τῆς σφαίρας ἐστία καλεῖται—βωμόν τε καὶ συνοχὴν καὶ μέτρον φύσεως—πρῶτον εἶναι φύσει τὸ μέσον.

Aristot. *Metaph.* N. p. 1091, a. 15. φανερώς γὰρ λέγουσιν (the Pythagoreans) ὡς τοῦ ἐνὸς συσταθέντος—εἰθὺς τὰ ἔγγιστα τοῦ ἀπείρου ὅτι εἴλκετο καὶ ἐπειραίνετο ὑπὸ τοῦ πέρατος.

Aristot. *Physic.* iv. 6, p. 213, b. 21.

Εἶναι δ' ἔφασαν καὶ οἱ Πυθαγορεῖοι κενόν, καὶ ἐπεισεῖν αὐτὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου πνεύματος, ὡς ἂν ἀναπνέοντι

καὶ τὸ κενόν, ὃ διορίζει τὰς φύσεις, ὡς ὄντος τοῦ κενοῦ χωρισμοῦ τινος τῶν ἐφεξῆς καὶ τῆς διορίσεως, καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι πρῶτον ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς· τὸ γὰρ κενόν διορίζει τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν. Stobæus (*Eclog. Phys.* i. 18, p. 381, Heer.) states the same, referring to the lost work of Aristotle on the Pythagorean philosophy.

Compare Præller, *Histor. Philos. Gr. ex fontibus context.* sect. 114-115.

<sup>p</sup> Philolaus, p. 94. Boeckh. *περὶ δὲ τοῦτο δέκα σώματα θεῖα χορεύειν, &c.* Aristot. *De Cælo*, ii. 13. *Metaphys.* i. 5.

not self-luminous: it was conceived as a glassy disk, receiving and concentrating light from the central fire, and reflecting it upon the Earth, so long as the two were on the same side of the central fire. The Earth revolved, in an orbit obliquely intersecting that of the Sun, and in twenty-four hours, round the central fire, always turning the same side towards that fire. The alternation of day and night was occasioned by the Earth being during a part of such revolution on the same side of the central fire with the Sun, and thus receiving light reflected from him: and during the remaining part of her revolution on the side opposite to him, so that she received no light at all, from him. The Earth, with the Antichthon, made this revolution in one day: the Moon, in one month:<sup>a</sup> the Sun, with the planets, Mercury and Venus, in one year: the planets Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn, in longer periods respectively, according to their distances from the centre: lastly, the outermost circle of the fixed stars (the Olympus, or the Aplanes), in some unknown period of very long duration.<sup>r</sup>

The revolutions of such grand bodies could not take place, in the opinion of the Pythagoreans, without producing a loud and powerful sound; and as their distances from the central fire were supposed to be arranged in musical ratios,<sup>s</sup> so the result of all these separate sounds was

Music of the  
Spheres.

<sup>a</sup> The Pythagoreans supposed that eclipses of the moon took place, sometimes by the interposition of the earth, sometimes by that of the Antichthon, to intercept from the moon the light of the sun (Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. i. 26, p. 560. Heeren). Stobæus here cites the history (*ιστοριαν*) of the Pythagorean philosophy by Aristotle, and the statement of Philippus of Opus, the friend of Plato.

<sup>r</sup> Aristot. de Coelo, ii. 13. Respecting this Pythagorean cosmical system, the elucidations of Boeckh are clear and valuable. Untersuchungen über das Kosmische System des Platon, Berlin, 1852, p. 99-102; completing those which he had before given in his edition of the fragments of Philolaus.

Martin (in his *Études sur le Timée de Platon*, vol. ii. p. 107) and Gruppe (*Die Kosmischen Systeme der Griechen*, ch. iv.) maintain that the original

system proposed by Pythagoras was a geocentric system, afterwards transformed by Philolaus and other Pythagoreans into that which stands in the text. But I agree with Boeckh (*Ueber das Kosmische System des Platon*, p. 89 seqq.), and with Zeller (*Gesch. der Philos.* i. p. 308, ed. 2), that this point is not made out. That which Martin and Gruppe (on the authority of Alexander Polyhistor, *Diog.* viii. 25, and others) consider to be a description of the original Pythagorean system as it stood before Philolaus, is more probably a subsequent transformation of it; introduced after the time of Aristotle, in order to suit later astronomical views.

<sup>s</sup> Playfair observes (in his *Dissertation on the Progress of Natural Philosophy*, p. 87) respecting Kepler—"Kepler was perhaps the first person who conceived that there must be

full and perfect harmony. To the objection—Why were not these sounds heard by us?—they replied, that we had heard them constantly and without intermission from the hour of our birth; hence they had become imperceptible by habit.<sup>t</sup>

Ten was, in the opinion of the Pythagoreans, the perfection and consummation of number. The numbers from One to Ten were all that they recognised as primary, original, generative. Numbers greater than ten were compounds and derivatives from the decad. They employed this perfect number not only as a basis on which to erect a bold astronomical hypothesis, but also as a sum total for their list of contraries. Many Hellenic philosophers<sup>u</sup> recognised pairs of opposing attributes as pervading nature, and as the fundamental categories to which the actual varieties of the sensible world might be reduced. While others laid down Hot and Cold, Wet and Dry, as the fundamental contraries, the Pythagoreans adopted a list of ten pairs. 1. Limit and Unlimited; 2. Odd and Even; 3. One and Many; 4. Right and Left; 5. Male and Female; 6. Rest and Motion; 7. Straight and Curve; 8. Light and Darkness; 9. Good and Evil; 10. Square and Oblong.<sup>x</sup> Of

Pythagorean list of fundamental Contraries—Ten opposing pairs.

always a law capable of being expressed by arithmetic or geometry, which connects such phenomena as have a physical dependance on each other." But this seems to be exactly the fundamental conception of the Pythagoreans; or rather a part of their fundamental conception, for they also considered their numbers as active forces bringing such law into reality. To illustrate the determination of the Pythagoreans to make up the number of Ten celestial bodies, I transcribe another passage from Playfair (p. 98). Huygens having discovered one satellite of Saturn, "believed that there were no more, and that the number of the planets was now complete. The planets, primary and secondary, thus made up twelve—the double of six, the first of the perfect numbers."

<sup>t</sup> Aristot. De Cælo, ii. 9; Pliny, H.N. ii. 20.

See the Pythagorean system fully set forth by Zeller, *Geschicht. der*

*Philosoph.*, vol. i. p. 302-310, ed. 2nd.

<sup>u</sup> Aristot. *Metaphys.* Γ. 2, p. 1004, b. 30. τὰ δ' ὄντα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὁμολογοῦσιν ἐξ ἐναντίων σχεδὸν ἅπαντες συγκείσθαι.

<sup>x</sup> Aristot. *Metaphys.* A. 5, p. 986, a. 22. He goes on to say that Alkmæon, a semi-Pythagorean and a younger contemporary of Pythagoras himself, while agreeing in the general principle that "human affairs were generally in pairs," (δύο εἶναι τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων), laid down pairs of fundamental contraries at random (τὰς ἐναντιότητας τὰς τυχεύουσας)—black and white, sweet and bitter, good and evil, great and little. All that you can extract from these philosophers is (continues Aristotle) the general axiom, that "contraries are the principia of existing things." ὅτι τὰναντία ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὄντων.

This axiom is to be noted as occupying a great place in the minds of the Greek philosophers.

these ten pairs, five belong to arithmetic or to geometry, one to mechanics, one to physics, and three to anthropology or ethics. Good and Evil, Regularity and Irregularity, were recognised as alike primordial and indestructible.<sup>y</sup>

The arithmetical and geometrical view of nature, to which such exclusive supremacy is here given by the Pythagoreans, is one of the most interesting features of Grecian philosophy. They were the earliest cultivators of mathematical science,<sup>z</sup> and are to be recognised as having paved the way for Euclid and Archimedes, notwithstanding the symbolical and mystical fancies with which they so largely perverted what are now regarded as the clearest and most rigorous processes of the human intellect. The important theorem which forms the forty-seventh Proposition of Euclid's first book, is affirmed to have been discovered by Pythagoras himself: but how much progress was made by him and his followers in the legitimate province of arithmetic and geometry, as well as in the applications of these sciences to harmonics,<sup>a</sup> which they seem to have diligently cultivated, we have not sufficient information to determine with certainty.

Contemporary with Pythagoras, and like him an emigrant from Ionia to Italy, was Xenophanes of Kolophon. He settled at the Phokæan colony of Elea, on the Gulf of Poseidonia; his life was very long, but his period of eminence appears to belong (as far as we can make out amidst conflicting testimony) to the last thirty years of the sixth century B.C. (530–500 B.C.). He was thus contemporary with Anaximander and Anaximenes, as well as with Pythagoras, the last of whom he may have personally known.<sup>b</sup> He composed, and recited in person, poems—epic, elegiac, and iambic—of which a very few fragments remain.

Eleatic Philosophy—  
Xenophanes.

<sup>y</sup> Theophrast. Metaphys. 9. Probably the recognition of one dominant antithesis—Τὸ Ἐν—ἡ ἀρίστος Δυὰς—is the form given by Plato to the Pythagorean doctrine. Eudorus (in Simplicius ad Aristot. Physic. fol. 39) seems to blend the two together.

<sup>z</sup> Aristot. Metaph. A. 5, p. 985, b. 23. οἱ Πυθαγορεῖοι τῶν μαθημάτων ἀψάμενοι πρῶτοι ταῦτα προή-

γαγον, καὶ ἐντραφέντες ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰς τούτων ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων ἀρχὰς φήθησαν εἶναι πάντων.

<sup>a</sup> Concerning the Pythagorean doctrines on Harmonics, see Boeckh's Philolaus, p. 60-84, with his copious and learned comments.

<sup>b</sup> Karsten. Xenophanis Fragm., s. 4, p. 9, 10.

Xenophanes takes his point of departure, not from Thales or Anaximander, but from the same ancient theogonies which they had forsaken. But he follows a very different road. The most prominent feature in his poems (so far as they remain), is the directness and asperity with which he attacks the received opinions respecting the Gods—and the poets Hesiod and Homer, the popular exponents of those opinions. Xenophanes not only condemns these poets for having ascribed to the Gods discreditable exploits, but even calls in question the existence of the Gods, and ridicules the anthropomorphic conception which pervaded the Hellenic faith. “If horses or lions could paint, they would delineate their Gods in form like themselves. The Ethiopians conceive their Gods as black, the Thracians conceive theirs as fair and with reddish hair.”<sup>c</sup> Dissatisfied with much of the customary worship and festivals, Xenophanes repudiated divination altogether, and condemned the extravagant respect shown to victors in Olympic contests,<sup>d</sup> not less than the lugubrious ceremonies in honour of Leukothea. He discountenanced all Theogony, or assertion of the birth of Gods, as impious, and as inconsistent with the prominent attribute of immortality ascribed to them.<sup>e</sup> He maintained that there was but one God, identical with, or a personification of the whole Uranus. “The whole Kosmos, or the whole God, sees, hears, and thinks.” The divine nature (he said) did not admit of the conception of separate persons one governing the other, or of want and imperfection in any way.<sup>f</sup>

His censures upon the received Theogony and religious rites.

Though Xenophanes thus appears (like Pythagoras) mainly as a religious dogmatist, yet theogony and cosmogony were so intimately connected in the sixth century B.C., that he at the same time struck out a new philosophical theory. His negation of theogony was tantamount to a negation of cosmogony.

His doctrine of Pankosmism, or Pantheism —The whole Kosmos is Ens Unum or God —<sup>e</sup>Εν και Πάν. Non-Ens inadmissible.

<sup>c</sup> Xenophanis Fragm. 5-6-7 p. 41 seq. ed. Karsten; Clemens Alexandr. Strom. v. p. 601; vii. p. 711.

<sup>d</sup> Xenophan. Fragm. 19, p. 63, ed. Karsten; Cicero Divinat. i. 3.

<sup>e</sup> Xenophanis Fragment. 34-35, p.

85, ed. Karsten; Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii. 23; Metaphys. i. 5, p. 986, b. 19.

<sup>f</sup> Xenoph. Frag. 1-2, p. 35.

ὄλος ὄρα, ὄλος δὲ νοεῖ, ὄλος δὲ τ' ἀκούει. Plutarch ap. Eusebium, Præp. Evang. i. 8; Diogen. Laert. ix. 19.

In substituting one God for many, he set aside all distinct agencies in the universe, to recognise only one agent, single, all-pervading, indivisible. He repudiated all genesis of new reality, all actual existence of parts, succession, change, beginning, end, etc., in reference to the universe as well as in reference to God. "Wherever I turned my mind (he exclaimed) everything resolved itself into One and the same: all things existing came back always and everywhere into one similar and permanent nature."<sup>g</sup> The fundamental tenet of Xenophanes was partly religious, partly philosophical, Pantheism, or Pan-kosmism: looking upon the universe as one real all-comprehensive Ens, which he would not call either finite or infinite, either in motion or at rest.<sup>h</sup> Non-Ens he pronounced to be an absurdity—an inadmissible and unmeaning phrase.

It was thus from Xenophanes that the doctrine of Pan-kosmism first obtained introduction into Greek philosophy, recognising nothing real except the universe as an indivisible and unchangeable whole.

Such a creed was altogether at variance with common perception, which apprehends the universe as a plurality of substances, distinguishable, divisible, changeable, &c. And Xenophanes could not represent his One and All, which excluded all change, to be the substratum out of which phenomenal variety was generated—as Water, Air, the Infinite, had been represented by the Ionic philosophers. The sense of this contradiction, without knowing how to resolve it, appears to have occasioned the mournful complaints of irremediable doubt and uncertainty, preserved as fragments from his poems. "No man (he exclaims) knows clearly about the Gods or the universe: even if he speak what is perfectly true,

<sup>g</sup> Timon, fragment of the Silli ap. Sext. Empiric. Hypot. Pyrrh. i. 33, sect. 22†.

ὅππῃ γὰρ ἔμῳ νόον εἰρύσαιμι,  
εἰς ἐν ταῦτό τε πᾶν ἄνελεύετο, πᾶν δὲ ὄν  
αἰεὶ  
πάντῃ ἀνελλκόμενον μίαν εἰς φύσιν ἴσταθ'  
ομοίαν.

Aἰεὶ here appears to be more conveniently construed with ἴσταθ', not (as Karsten construes it, p. 118) with ὄν.

It is fair to presume that these lines are a reproduction of the sentiments of Xenophanes, if not a literal transcript of his words.

<sup>h</sup> Theophrastus ap. Simplicium in Aristotel. Physic. f. 6, Karsten. p. 106; Aristot. Metaphys. A. 5. Ξενοφάνης δὲ πρῶτος τούτων ἐνίστας, ὃ γὰρ Παρμενίδης τούτου λέγεται μαθητῆς,—εἰς τὸν ὄλον οὐρανὸν ἀποβλέψας τὸ ἐν εἶναί φησι τὸν θεόν.

he himself does not know it to be true: all is matter of opinion."<sup>i</sup>

Nevertheless while denying all real variety or division in the universe, Xenophanes did not deny the variety of human perceptions and beliefs. But he allowed them as facts belonging to man, not to the universe—as subjective or relative, not as objective or absolute. He even promulgated opinions of his own respecting many of the physical and cosmological subjects treated by the Ionic philosophers.

Without attempting to define the figure of the Earth, he considered it to be of vast extent, and of infinite depth;<sup>k</sup> including, in its interior cavities, prodigious reservoirs both of fire and water. He thought that it had at one time been covered with water, in proof of which he noticed the numerous shells found inland and on mountain tops, together with the prints of various fish which he had observed in the quarries of Syracuse, in the island of Paros, and elsewhere. From these facts he inferred that the earth had once been covered with water, and even that it would again be so covered at some future time, to the destruction of animal and human life.<sup>l</sup> He supposed that the sun, moon, and stars were condensations of vapours exhaled from the Earth, collected into clouds, and alternately inflamed and extinguished.<sup>m</sup>

<sup>i</sup> Xenophan. Fragm. 14, p. 51, ed. Karsten.

καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὐτις ἀνὴρ γένηται  
οὔτε τις ἔσται  
εἰδὼς, ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω περὶ  
πάντων  
εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον  
εἶπών,  
αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε. δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι  
τέτκται.

Compare the extract from the Silli of Timon in Sextus Empiricus—Pyrrhon. Hypot. i. 224; and the same author, adv. Mathemat. vii. 48-52.

<sup>k</sup> Aristot. De Cœlo, ii. 13.

<sup>l</sup> Xenophan. Fragm. p. 178, ed. Karsten; Achilles Tatius, Εἰσαγωγή in Arat. Phœnom. p. 128, τὰ κάτω δ' ἐς ἄπειρον ἰκάνει.

This inference from the shells and prints of fishes is very remarkable for

so early a period. Compare Herodotus (ii. 12), who notices the fact, and draws the same inference, as to Lower Egypt: also Plutarch De Isid. et Osirid. c. 40, p. 367; and Strabo, i. p. 49-50, from whom we learn that the Lydian historian Xanthus had made the like observation, and also the like inference, for himself. Straton of Lampsakus, Eratosthenes, and Strabo himself, approved what Xanthus said.

<sup>m</sup> Xenophanes Frag. p. 161 seq. ed. Karsten.

Compare Lucretius, v. 458.

“per rara foramina terræ  
Partubus erumpens primus se sustulit æther  
Igneus et multos secum levis abstulit ignes—  
Sic igitur tum se levis ac diffusilis æther  
Corpore concreto circumdatus undique, sep-  
sit:

Hunc exordia sunt solis lunæque secuta.”



Parmenides, of Elea, followed up and gave celebrity to the Xenophanean hypothesis in a poem, of which the striking exordium is yet preserved. The two veins of thought, which Xenophanes had recognised and lamented his inability to reconcile, were proclaimed by Parmenides as a sort of inherent contradiction in the human mind—Reason or Cogitation declaring one way, Sense (together with the remembrances and comparisons of sense) suggesting a faith altogether opposite. Dropping that controversy with the popular religion which had been raised by Xenophanes, Parmenides spoke of many different Gods or Goddesses, and insisted on the universe as one, without regarding it as one God. He distinguished Truth from matter of Opinion.<sup>n</sup> Truth was knowable only by pure mental contemplation or cogitation, the object of which was Ens or Being, the Real or Absolute: here the Cogitans and the Cogitatum were identical, one and the same.<sup>o</sup> Parmenides conceived Ens not simply as existent, but as self-existent, without beginning or end,<sup>p</sup> as extended, continuous, indivisible, and unchangeable. The Ens Parmenideum comprised the two notions of Extension and Duration: <sup>q</sup> it was something Enduring and Extended; Extension including both space, and matter so far forth as filling space. Neither the contrary of Ens (Non-Ens), nor anything intermediate between Ens and Non-Ens, could be conceived, or named, or reasoned about. Ens comprehended all that was Real, without beginning or end, without parts or difference, without motion or change, perfect and uniform like a well turned sphere.<sup>r</sup>

In this subject Ens, with its few predicates, chiefly nega-

<sup>n</sup> Parmenides Frag. v. 29.

<sup>o</sup> Parm. Frag. v. 40-53.

τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι.  
Ἄλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' οὐδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε  
νόημα,  
μηδέ σ' ἔθος πολύπειρον ὄδον κατὰ τήνδε  
βιάσθω  
νομῶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχέσσαν  
ἀκουήν  
καὶ ἡλώσσαν κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηνν  
ἐλεγχον  
ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα.

<sup>p</sup> Parm. Frag. v. 81.

αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μέγαλον ἐν πείρασι δέσμων  
ἐστίν, ἀναρχόν, ἀπανστον, &c.

<sup>q</sup> Zeller (Geschichte der Griech. Philos. i. p. 403, ed. 2) maintains, in my opinion justly, that the Ens Parmenideum is conceived by its author as extended. Strümpell (Geschichte der theor. Phil. der Griech. s. 41) represents it as unextended: but this view seems not reconcilable with the remaining Fragments.

<sup>r</sup> Parm. Frag. v. 102.

tive, consisted all that Parmenides called Truth. Everything else belonged to the region of Opinion, which embraced all that was phenomenal, relative, and transient: all that involved a reference to man's senses, apprehension, and appreciation, all the indefinite diversity of observed facts and inferences. Plurality, succession, change, motion, generation, destruction, division of parts, &c., belonged to this category. Parmenides did not deny that he and other men had perceptions and beliefs corresponding to these terms, but he denied their application to the Ens or the self-existent. We are conscious of succession, but the self-existent has no succession: we perceive change of colour and other sensible qualities, and change of place or motion, but Ens neither changes nor moves. We talk of things generated or destroyed—things coming into being or going out of being—but this phrase can have no application to the self-existent Ens, which *is* always and cannot properly be called either past or future.<sup>5</sup> Nothing is really generated or destroyed, but only in appearance to us, or relatively to our apprehension.<sup>6</sup> In like manner we perceive plurality of objects, and divide objects into parts. But Ens is essentially One, and cannot be divided.<sup>7</sup> Though you may divide a piece of matter, you cannot divide the extension of which that matter forms part: you cannot (to use the expression of Hobbes<sup>x</sup>) pull asunder the first mile from the second, or the

He recognises a region of opinion, phenomenal and relative, apart from Ens.

<sup>5</sup> Parmenid. Fr. v. 97.

— ἐπεὶ τό γε μοῖρ' ἐπέθηνεν  
Ὅσον ἀκίνητον τελέθειν τῶ πάντ' ὄνομ' εἶναί τ',  
Ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο, πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ,  
γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ ἀλλυθῆναι, εἶναι τε καὶ οὐχί,  
καὶ τόπον ἀλλάσσειν, διὰ τε χροῶν καλὸν ἀμείβειν.

v. 75—

εἰ γε γένοιτ', οὐκ ἔστ' οὐδ' εἰ πότε μέλλει  
ἔσσεσθαι·  
τῶς γένεσις μὲν ἀπεσβέσται, καὶ ἄπιστος ὄλεθρος.

<sup>6</sup> Aristotel. De Cœlo, iii. 1. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀνείλον ὅλως γένεσιν καὶ φθοράν οὐδὲν γὰρ οὔτε γίγνεσθαι φασιν οὔτε φθεῖρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλὰ μόνον δοκεῖν ἡμῖν οἷον οἱ περὶ Μέλισσον καὶ Παρμενίδην, &c.

<sup>7</sup> Parm. Frag. v. 76.

Οὐδέ διαίρετόν ἐστί, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστὶν ὁμοιον,

οὐδέ τι τῇ μᾶλλον τό κεν εἴργου μιν ξυνέχουσαι

οὐδέ τι χειρότερον· πᾶν δὲ πλεόν ἐστὶν εἶόντος· τῷ ξυνεχῆς πᾶν ἐστίν· ἓν γὰρ εἶναι πελάζει.

Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 5, p. 986 b. 29, with the Scholia, and Physic. i. 2, 3. Simplikius Comm. in Physic. Aristot. (apud Tennemann Geschichte der Philos. b. i. s. 4, vol. i. p. 170) πάντα γάρ φησι (Παρμενίδης) τὰ ὄντα, καθὸ ὄντα, ἓν ἐστίν. This chapter, in which Tennemann gives an account of the Eleatic philosophy, appears to me one of the best and most instructive in his work.

<sup>x</sup> "To make parts,—or to part or divide, Space or Time,—is nothing else but to consider one and another within the same: so that if any man

first hour from the second. The milestone, or the striking of the clock, serve as marks to assist you in making a mental division, and in considering or describing one hour and one mile apart from the next. This, however, is your own act, relative to yourself: there is no real division of extension into miles, or of duration into hours. You may consider the same space or time as one or as many, according to your convenience: as one hour or as sixty minutes, as one mile or eight furlongs. But all this is a process of your own mind and thoughts; another man may divide the same total in a way different from you. Your division noway modifies the reality without you, whatever that may be—the Extended and Enduring Ens—which remains still a continuous One, undivided and unchanged.

The Ens of Parmenides thus coincided mainly with that which (since Kant) has been called the Noumenon—the Thing in itself—the Absolute: or rather with that which, by a frequent illusion, passes for the Absolute—no notice being taken of the cogitant and believing mind, as if cogitation and belief, *cogitata* and *credita*, would be had without it. By Ens was understood the remnant in his mind, after leaving out all that abstraction, as far as it had then been carried, could leave out. It was the minimum indispensable to the continuance of thought; you cannot think (Parmenides says) without think-

divide space or time, the diverse conceptions he has are more, by one, than the parts which he makes. For his first conception is of that which is to be divided—then, of some part of it—and again of some other part of it: and so forwards, as long as he goes in dividing. But it is to be noted, that here, by *division*, I do not mean the severing or pulling asunder of one space or time from another (for does any man think that one hemisphere may be separated from the other hemisphere, or the first hour from the second?), but *diversity of consideration*: so that division is not made by the operation of the hands, but of the mind.”—Hobbes, First Grounds of Philosophy,

chap. vii. 5, vol. i. p. 96, ed. Molesworth.

“Expansion and duration have this farther agreement, that though they are both considered by us as having parts, yet their parts are not separable one from another, not even in thought; though the parts of bodies from which we take our measure of the one—and the parts of motion, from which we take the measure of the other—may be interrupted or separated.”—Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, book ii. ch. 15, s. 11.

In the Platonic Parmenides, p. 157, we find the remarkable conception of what he calls τὸ ἐξαιφνης, ἔσποός τις φύσις—a break in the continuity of duration, an extra-temporal moment.

ing of Something, and that Something Extended and Enduring. Though he and others talk of this Something as an Absolute (*i.e.* apart from or independent of his own thinking mind), yet he also uses some juster language (*τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἔστω τε καὶ εἶναι*), showing that it is really relative: that if the Cogitans implies a Cogitatum, the Cogitatum also implies no less its correlative Cogitans: and that though we may divide the two in words, we cannot divide them in fact. It is to be remarked that Parmenides distinguishes the Enduring or Continuous from the Transient or Successive, Duration from Succession (both of which are included in the meaning of the word Time), and that he considers Duration alone as belonging to Ens or the Absolute—to the region of Truth—setting it in opposition or antithesis to Succession, which he treats as relative and phenomenal. We have thus (with the Eleates) the first appearance of Ontology, the science of Being or Ens, in Grecian philosophy. Ens is everything, and everything is Ens. In the view of Parmenides, Ontology is not merely narrow, but incapable of enlargement or application; we shall find Plato and others trying to expand it into numerous imposing generalities.<sup>7</sup>

Apart from Ontology, Parmenides reckons all as belonging to human opinions. These were derived from the observations of sense (which he especially excludes from Ontology) with the comparisons, inferences, hypotheses, &c., founded thereupon: the phenomena of Nature generally.<sup>2</sup> He does not attempt (as Plato and Aristotle do after him) to make Ontology serve as a principle or beginning for anything beyond itself,<sup>3</sup> or as a premiss

Parmenidean  
phenomeno-  
logy—rela-  
tive and  
variable.

<sup>7</sup> Leibnitz says, Réponse à M. Foucher, p. 117, ed. Erdmann, "Comment seroit il possible qu'aucune chose existât, si l'être même, ipsum Esse, n'avoit l'existence? Mais bien au contraire ne pourrait on pas dire avec beaucoup plus de raison, qu'il n'y a que lui qui existe véritablement, les êtres particuliers n'ayant rien de permanent? Semper generantur, et nunquam sunt."

<sup>2</sup> Karsten observes that the Parmenidean region of opinion comprised not

merely the data of sense, but also the comparisons, generalisations, and notions, derived from sense.

"*Δοξαστῶν* et *νοητῶν* vocantur duo genera inter se diversa, quorum alterum complectitur res externas et fluxas, *notionesque quae ex his ducuntur*—alterum res aeternas et à conspectu remotas," &c. (Parm. Fragm. p. 149).

<sup>3</sup> Marbach (Lehrbuch der Gesch. Philos. s. 71, not. 3), after pointing out the rude philosophical expression of the Parmenidean verses, has some just

from which the knowledge of nature is to be deduced. He treats the two—Ontology and Phenomenology, to employ an Hegelian word—as radically disparate, and incapable of any legitimate union. Ens was essentially one and enduring: Nature was essentially multiform, successive, ever changing and moving relative to the observer, and different to observers at different times and places. Parmenides approached the study of Nature from its own starting-point, the same as had been adopted by the Ionic philosophers—the data of sense, or certain agencies selected among them, and vaguely applied to explain the rest. Here he felt that he relinquished the full conviction, inseparable from his intellectual consciousness, with which he announced his few absolute truths respecting Ens and Non-Ens, and that he entered upon a process of mingled observation and conjecture, where there was great room for diversity of views between man and man.

Yet though thus passing from Truth to Opinions, from full certainty to comparative and irremediable uncertainty,<sup>b</sup>

remarks upon the double aspect of philosophy as there proclaimed, and upon the recognition by Parmenides of that which he calls the “illegitimate” vein of enquiry along with the “legitimate.”

“Learn from me (says Parmenides) the opinions of mortals, brought to your ears in the deceitful arrangement of my words. This is not philosophy (Marbach says): it is Physics. We recognise in modern times two perfectly distinct ways of contemplating Nature: the philosophical and the physical. Of these two, the second dwells in plurality, the first in unity: the first teaches everything as infallible truth, the second as multiplicity of different opinions. We ought not to ask why Parmenides, while recognising the fallibility of this second road of enquiry, nevertheless undertook to march in it,—any more than we can ask, Why does not modern philosophy render physics superfluous?”

The observation of Marbach is just and important, that the line of research—which Parmenides treated as illegitimate and deceitful, but which he nevertheless entered upon—is the analogon of modern Physics. Parmenides

(he says) indicated most truly the contrast and divergence between Ontology and Physics; but he ought to have gone further, and shown how they could be reconciled and brought into harmony. This (Marbach affirms) was not even attempted, much less achieved, by Parmenides; but it was afterwards attempted by Plato, and achieved by Aristotle.

Marbach is right in saying that the reconciliation was attempted by Plato; but he is not right (I think) in saying that it was achieved by Aristotle—nor by any one since Aristotle. It is the merit of Parmenides to have brought out the two points of view as radically distinct, and to have seen that the phenomenal world, if explained at all, must be explained upon general principles of its own, raised out of its own data of facts—not by means of an illusory Absolute and Real. The subsequent philosophers, in so far as they hid and slurred over this distinction, appear to me to have receded rather than advanced.

<sup>b</sup> Parmen. Fr. v. 109.

ἐν τῷ σοὶ παύῳ πιστὸν λόγον ἢ δὲ νόημα  
ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης· δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτέας  
μάνθανε, κόσμον ἑμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατητῶν ἀκούων.

Parmenides does not consider all opinions as equally true or equally untrue. He announces an opinion of his own—what he thinks most probable or least improbable—respecting the structure and constitution of the Kosmos, and he announces it without the least reference to his own doctrines about Ens. He promises information respecting Earth, Water, Air, and the heavenly bodies, how they work, and how they came to be what they are.<sup>c</sup> He recognises two elementary principles or beginnings, one contrary to the other, but both of them positive—Light, comprehending the Hot, the Light, and the Rare—Darkness, comprehending the Cold, the Heavy, and the Dense.<sup>d</sup> These two elements, each endowed with active and vital properties, were brought into junction and commixture by the influence of a Dea Genitalis analogous to Aphroditê,<sup>e</sup> with her first-born son Eros, a personage borrowed from the Hesiodic Theogony. From hence sprang the other active forces of nature, personified under

Parmenides recognises no truth, but more or less of probability, in phenomenal explanations.—His physical and astronomical conjectures.

<sup>c</sup> Parm. Frag. v. 133-141.

<sup>d</sup> Aristotle (Metaphys. A. 5, p. 987, a. 1) represents Parmenides as assimilating one of his phenomenal principles (Heat) to Ens, and the other (Cold) to Non-Ens. There is nothing in the fragments of Parmenides to justify this supposed analogy. Heat as well as Cold belongs to Non-Ens, not to Ens, in the Parmenidean doctrine. Moreover Cold or Dense is just as much a positive principle as Hot or Rare, in the view of Parmenides: it is the female to the male (Parm. Fragm. v. 129; comp. Karsten, p. 270). Aristotle conceives Ontology as a substratum for Phenomenology; and his criticisms on Parmenides imply (erroneously in my judgment) that Parmenides did the same. The remarks which Brücker makes both on Aristotle's criticism and on the Eleatic doctrine are in the main just, though the language is not very suitable.

Brücker, Hist. Philosoph. part ii. lib ii. ch. xi. p. 1153, about Xenophanes:—"Ex iis enim, quæ apud Aristotelem ex ejus mente contra motum disputantur, patet Xenophanem motûs notionem aliam quam quæ in physicis obtinet, sibi concepisse; et ad verum motum, progressum a non-

ente ad ens ejusque existentiam requisivisse. Quo sensu notionis hujus semel admissa, sequebatur (cum illud impossibile sit, ut ex nihilo fiat aliquid) universum esse immobile—adeoque et partes ejus non ita moveri, ut ex statu nihili procederent ad statum existentia. Quibus admissis, de rerum tamen mutationibus disserere poterat, quas non alterationes, generationes, et extinctiones, rerum naturalium, sed modificationes, esse putabat: hoc nomine indignas, eo quod rerum universi natura semper immutabilis maneret, soliusque materiae æternum fluentis particulae varie inter se modificarentur. Hâc ratione si Eleaticos priores explicemus de motu disserentes, rationem facile dabimus, qui de rebus physicis disserere et phenomena naturalia explicare, salvâ istâ hypothesi, poterint. Quod tamen de iis negat Aristoteles, *conceptum motûs metaphysicum ad physicum transferens*: ut, more suo, Eleatico systemate corrupto, eò vehementius illud premeret."

<sup>e</sup> Parmenides, ap. Simplic. ad Aristot. Physic. fol. 9 a.

ἐν δὲ μέσῳ τούτων Δαίμων, ἢ πάντα κυβερνᾷ. &c.

Plutarch, Amator, 13.

various names, and the various concentric circles or spheres of the Kosmos. Of those spheres, the outermost was a solid wall of fire—"flammanitia moenia mundi"—next under this the Æther, distributed into several circles of fire unequally bright and pure—then the circle called the Milky Way, which he regarded as composed of light or fire combined with denser materials—then the Sun and Moon, which were condensations of fire from the Milky Way—lastly, the Earth, which he placed in the centre of the Kosmos.<sup>f</sup> He is said to have been the first who pronounced the earth to be spherical, and even distributed it into two or five zones.<sup>g</sup> He regarded it as immovable, in consequence of its exact position in the centre. He considered the stars to be fed by exhalation from the Earth. Midway between the Earth and the outer flaming circle, he supposed that there dwelt a Goddess—Justice or Necessity—who regulated all the movements of the Kosmos, and maintained harmony between its different parts. He represented the human race as having been brought into existence by the power of the sun,<sup>h</sup> and he seems to have gone into some detail respecting animal procreation, especially in reference to the birth of male and female offspring. He supposed that the human mind, as well as the human body, was compounded of a mixture of the two elemental influences, diffused throughout all Nature: that like was perceived and known by like: that thought and sensation were alike dependent upon the body, and upon the proportions of its elemental composition: that a certain

<sup>f</sup> See especially the remarkable passage from Stobæus, *Eclg. Phys.* i. 23, p. 482, cited in Karsten, *Frag. Parm.* p. 241, and Cicero, *De Natur. Deor.* i. 11, s. 28, with the *Commentary of Kriese. Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der alten Philosophie*, viii. p. 98, seqq.

It is impossible to make out with any clearness the Kosmos and its generation as conceived by Parmenides. We cannot attain more than a general approximation to it.

<sup>g</sup> Diogen. Laert. ix. 21, viii. 48; Strabo, ii. p. 93 (on the authority of Poseidonius). Plutarch (*Placit. Philos.* iii. 11) and others ascribe to Parmenides the recognition not of five zones, but only of two. If it be true that Par-

menides held this opinion about the figure of the earth, the fact is honourable to his acuteness; for Leukippus, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Diogenes the Apolloniate, and Demokritus, all thought the earth to be a flat, round surface, like a dish or a drum: Plato speaks about it in so confused a manner that his opinion cannot be made out: and Aristotle was the first who both affirmed and proved it to be spherical. The opinion had been propounded by some philosophers earlier than Anaxagoras, who controverted it. See the dissertation of L. Oettinger, *Die Vorstellungen der Griechen über die Erde als Himmelskörper*, Freiburg, 1850, p. 42-46.

<sup>h</sup> Diogen. Laert. ix. 22.

limited knowledge was possessed by every object in Nature, animate or inanimate.<sup>1</sup>

Before we pass from Parmenides to his pupil and successor Zeno, who developed the negative and dialectic side of the Eleatic doctrine, it will be convenient to notice various other theories of the same century: first among them that of Herakleitus, who forms as it were the contrast and antithesis to Xenophanes and Parmenides.

Herakleitus of Ephesus, known throughout antiquity by the denomination of the Obscure, comes certainly after Pythagoras and Xenophanes—and apparently before Parmenides. Of the two first he made special mention, in one of the sentences, alike brief and contemptuous, which have been preserved from his lost treatise:—"Much learning does not teach reason: otherwise it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, Xenophanes and Hekataeus." In another passage Herakleitus spoke of the "extensive knowledge, cleverness, and wicked arts" of Pythagoras. He declared that Homer as well as Archilochus deserved to be scourged and expelled from the public festivals.<sup>k</sup> His thoughts were all embodied in one single treatise, which he is said to have deposited in the temple of the Ephesian Artemis. It was composed in a style most perplexing and difficult to understand, full of metaphor, symbolical illustration, and antithesis: but this very circumstance imparted to it an air of poetical impressiveness and oracular profundity.<sup>1</sup> It exercised a powerful

Herakleitus  
—his obscure  
style, impres-  
sive meta-  
phors, confi-  
dent and  
contemptu-  
ous dogma-  
tism.

<sup>i</sup> Parmen. Frag. v. 145; Theophrastus, De Sensu, Karsten, p. 268.

Parmenides (according to Theophrastus) thought that the dead body, having lost its fiery element, had no perception of light, or heat, or sound; but that it had perception of darkness, cold, and silence—*καὶ βλασ δὲ πᾶν τὸ ὄν ἔχειν τινα γνῶσιν.*

<sup>k</sup> Diogen. L. ix. 1. Πουλυμαθὴν νόον οὐ διδάσκει· Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδασκε καὶ Πυθαγόρην, αἰθῆς δὲ Ξεινοφάνεα καὶ Ἐκαταῖον, &c. Ib. viii. 6. Πυθαγόρης Μνησάρχου ἱστορίην ἤσκησεν ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα πάντων, καὶ ἐκλεξάμενος ταύτας τὰς συγγραφὰς ἐποίησεν ἐωῦτοῦ σοφίην, πολυμαθητὴν, κακοτεχνίην.

<sup>1</sup> Diogen. Laert. ix. 1-6. Theophrastus conceived that Herakleitus had left the work unfinished, from eccentricity of temperament (*ὕπὸ μελαγχολίας*). Of him, as of various others, it was imagined by some that his obscurity was intentional (Cicero, Nat. Deor. i. 26, De Finib. 2, 5). The words of Lucretius about Herakleitus are remarkable (l. 641):—

"Clarus ob obscuram linguam magis inter  
iuanes

Quamde graves inter Græcos qui vera re-  
quirunt:

Omnia enim stolidi magis admirantrur amanti-  
que

Inversis quæ sub verbis latitantia cernunt."

Even Aristotle complains of the diffi-



influence on the speculative minds of Greece, both in the Platonic age and subsequently: the Stoics especially both commented on it largely (though with many dissentient opinions among the commentators), and borrowed with partial modifications much of its doctrine.<sup>m</sup>

The expositors followed by Lucretius and Cicero conceived Herakleitus as having proclaimed Fire to be the universal and all-pervading element of nature;<sup>n</sup> as Thales had recognised water, and Anaximenes air. This interpretation was countenanced by some striking passages of Herakleitus: but when we put together all that remains from him, it appears that his main doctrine was not physical, but metaphysical or ontological: that the want of adequate general terms induced him to clothe it in a multitude of symbolical illustrations, among which fire was only one, though the most prominent and most significant.<sup>o</sup> Xenophanes and the Eleates had recognised, as the only objective reality, One extended Substance or absolute Ens, perpetual, infinite, indeterminate, incapable of change or modification. They denied the objective reality of motion, change, generation, and destruction—considering all these to be purely relative and phenomenal. Herakleitus on the contrary denied everything in the nature of a permanent and perpetual substratum: he laid down nothing as permanent and perpetual except the process of change—the alternate sequence of generation and destruction, without beginning or end—generation and destruction being in fact coincident or identical, two sides of the same process, since the generation of one particular state was the destruction of its antecedent contrary. All reality consisted in the succession and

culty of understanding Herakleitus, and even of determining the proper punctuation (Rhetoric. iii. 5).

<sup>m</sup> Cicero, Nat. Deor. iii. 14, 35.

<sup>n</sup> To some it appeared that Herakleitus hardly distinguished Fire from Air. Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2; Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathemat. vii. 127-129, ix. 360.

<sup>o</sup> Zeller's account of the philosophy of Herakleitus, in the second edition

of his Philosophie der Griechen, vol. i. p. 450-496, is instructive. Marbach also is useful (Gesch. der Phil. s. 46-49); and his (Hegelian) exposition of Herakleitus is further developed by Ferdinand Lassalle (Die Philosophie Herakleitos des Dunklen, published 1858). This last work is very copious and elaborate, throwing great light upon a subject essentially obscure and difficult.

transition, the coming and going, of these finite and particular states: what he conceived as the infinite and universal, was the continuous process of transition from one finite state to the next—the perpetual work of destruction and generation combined, which terminated one finite state in order to make room for a new and contrary state.

This endless process of transition, or ever-repeated act of generation and destruction in one, was represented by Herakleitus under a variety of metaphors and symbols—fire consuming its own fuel—a stream of water always flowing—opposite currents meeting and combating each other—the way from above downwards, and the way from below upwards, one and the same—war, contest, penal destiny or retributive justice, the law or decree of Zeus realising each finite condition of things and then destroying its own reality to make place for its contrary and successor. Particulars are successively generated and destroyed, none of them ever arriving at permanent existence:<sup>p</sup> the universal process of generation and destruction alone continues. There is no *Esse*, but a perpetual *Fieri*: a transition from *Esse* to *Non-Esse*, from *Non-Esse* to *Esse*, with an intermediate temporary halt between them: a ceaseless meeting and confluence of the stream of generation with the opposite stream of destruction: a rapid and instant succession, or rather coincidence and coalescence, of contraries. Living and dead, waking and sleeping, light and dark, come into one or come round into each other: everything twists round into its contrary: everything both is and is not.<sup>q</sup>

Variety of metaphors employed by Herakleitus, signifying the same general doctrine.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, *Kratylus*, p. 402, and *Theætet.* p. 152, 153.

Plutarch, *De Ei* apud Delphos, c. 18, p. 392. Ποταμὸν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι δις τῷ αὐτῷ, καθ' Ἡράκλειτον, οὐδὲ θνητῆς οὐσίας δις ἄψασθαι κατὰ ἔξιν· ἀλλ' ὀξύτητι καὶ τάχει μεταβολῆς σκιδνησι καὶ πάλιν συνάγει, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ πάλιν οὐδὲ ὕστερον, ἀλλ' ἅμα συνίσταται καὶ ἀπολείπει, πρόσσεισι καὶ ἄπεισι. "Ὅθεν οὐδ' εἰς τὸ εἶναι περαίνει τὸ γιγνόμενον αὐτῆς, τῷ μηδέποτε

λήγειν μηδ' ἴστασθαι τὴν γένεσιν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ σπέρματος αἰεὶ μεταβάλλουσιν—τὰς πρώτας φθέρουσαν γενέσεις καὶ ἡλικίας ταῖς ἐπιγιγνομένας.

Clemens Alex. *Strom.* v. 14, p. 711. Κόσμον τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτ' ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν· ἀλλ' ἦν αἰεὶ καὶ ἔσται πῦρ αἰέζων, ἀπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα. Compare also Eusebius, *Præpar. Evang.* xiv. 3, 8; Diogen. *L.* ix. 8.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, *Sophist.* p. 242. Διαφερόμενον γὰρ αἰεὶ ξυμφέρεται.

The universal law, destiny, or divine working (according to Herakleitus), consists in this incessant process of generation and destruction, this alternation of contraries. To carry out such law fully, each of the particular manifestations ought to appear and pass away instantaneously—to have no duration of its own, but to be supplanted by its contrary at once. And this happens to a great degree, even in cases where it does not appear to happen: the river appears unchanged, though the water which we touched a short time ago has flowed away:† we and all around us are in rapid movement, though we appear stationary: the apparent sameness and fixity is thus a delusion. But Herakleitus does not seem to have thought that his absolute universal force was omnipotent, or accurately carried out in respect to all particulars. Some positive and particular manifestations, when once brought to pass, had a certain measure of fixity, maintaining themselves for more or less time before they were destroyed. There was a difference between one particular and another, in this respect of comparative durability: one was more durable, another less.‡ But according to the universal law or destiny, each particular ought simply to make its appearance, then to be supplanted and re-absorbed: so that the time during which it continued on the scene was, as it were, an unjust usurpation, obtained by encroaching on the equal right of the next comer, and by suspending the negative agency of the universal. Hence arises an antithesis or hostility between the universal law or

Plutarch, Consolat. ad Apollonium c. 10, p. 106. Πότε γὰρ ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ θάνατος; καὶ ἢ φησὶν Ἡρακλείτους, ταῦτό τ' ἐνὶ ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκός, καὶ τὸ ἐγγρηγορός καὶ τὸ καθεύδων, καὶ νέον καὶ γηραιόν· τάδε γὰρ μεταπεσόντα ἐκεῖνά ἐστιν, κἀκεῖνα πάλιν μεταπεσόντα ταῦτα.

Pseudo-Origenes, Refut. Hær. ix. 10. Ὁ θεὸς ἡμέρη, εὐφρόνη—χείμων, θέρος—πόλεμος, εἰρήνη—κόρος, λιμός, &c.

† Aristot. De Cælo, iii. 1, p. 298, b. 30; Physic. viii. 3, p. 253, b. 9. Φασί τινες κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων οὐ τὰ μὲν τὰ δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ πάντα καὶ αἰεὶ, ἀλλὰ λαν-

θάμην τοῦτο τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀσθησιν— which words doubtless refer to Herakleitus. See Preller, Hist. Phil. Græc. Rom. s. 47.

‡ Lassalle, Philosophie des Herakleitos, vol. i. pp. 54, 55. "Andrerseits bieten die sinnlichen Existenzen graduelle oder Mass-Unterschiede dar, je nachdem in ihnen das Moment des festen Seins oder die Unruhe des Werdens vorwiegt oder nicht; und diese Graduation wird also zugleich den Leitfaden zur Classification der verschiedenen Existenz-formen bilden."

process on one side, and the persistence of particular states on the other. The universal law or process is generative and destructive, positive and negative, both in one: but the particular realities in which it manifests itself are all positive, each succeeding to its antecedent, and each striving to maintain itself against the negativity or destructive interference of the universal process. Each particular reality represented rest and fixity: each held ground as long as it could against the pressure of the constant cosmical force, essentially moving, destroying, and renovating. Herakleitus condemns such pretensions of particular states to separate stability, inasmuch as it keeps back the legitimate action of the universal force, in the work of destruction and renovation.

The theory of Herakleitus thus recognised no permanent substratum, or Ens, either material or immaterial—no category either of substance or quality—but only a ceaseless principle of movement or change, generation and destruction, position and negation, immediately succeeding, or coinciding with each other.<sup>†</sup> It is this principle or everlasting force which he denotes under so many illustrative phrases—"the common (τὸ ξυνὸν), the universal, the all-comprehensive

Illustrations by which Herakleitus symbolized his perpetual force, destroying and generating.

<sup>†</sup> Aristot. De Cælo, iii. 1, p. 298, b. 30. Οἱ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἅλλα πάντα γίνεσθαι τέ φασι καὶ βεῖν, εἶναι δὲ παγίως οὐδὲν, ἐν δὲ τι μόνον ὑπομένειν, ἐξ οὗ ταῦτα πάντα μετασχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκεν ὑπερ εὐοικασιν ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ λέγειν καὶ Ἡράκλειτος δ' Ἐφέσιος. See the explanation given of this passage by Lassalle, vol. ii. p. 21, 39, 40, founded on the comment of Simplicius. He explains it as an universal law or ideal force—die reine Idee des Werdens selbst; p. 24, 25, "eine unsinnliche Potenz." Yet, in p. 55 of his elaborate exposition, he does indeed say, about the theory of Herakleitus, "Hier sind zum erstenmale die sinnlichen Bestimmtheiten zu bloss verschiedenen und absolut in einander übergehenden Formen eines identischen, ihnen zu Grunde liegenden, Substrats herabgesetzt" (p. 55). But this last expression appears to me to contradict the whole tenor and peculiarity of Lassalle's own explanation of the He-

rakleitean theory. He insists almost in every page (compare ii. p. 156) that "das Allgemeine" of Herakleitus is "reines Werden; reiner, steter, erzeugender, Prozess." This process cannot with any propriety be called a *substratum*, and Herakleitus admitted no other. In thus rejecting any substratum he stood alone. Lassalle has been careful in shewing that Fire was not understood by Herakleitus as a substratum (as water by Thales), but as a symbol for the universal force or law. In the theory of Herakleitus no substratum was recognised—no τὸδε τι or οὐσία—in the same way as Aristotle observes about τὸ ἄπειρον (Physic. iii. 6, a. 22-31) ὥστε τὸ ἄπειρον οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνειν ὡς τὸδε τι, οἷον ἀνθρώπων ἢ οἰκίαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ἡμέρα λέγεται καὶ ὁ ἀγῶν, οἷς τὸ εἶναι οὐχ ὡς οὐσία τις γέγονεν, ἀλλ' ἅει ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ, εἰ καὶ πεπερασμένον, ἀλλ' ἅει ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον.

(τὸ *περιέχον*), the governing, the divine, the name or reason of Zeus, fire, the current of opposites, strife or war, destiny, justice, equitable measure, Time or the Succeeding," &c. The most emphatic way in which this theory could be presented was, as embodied in the coincidence or co-affirmation of contraries. Many of the dicta cited and preserved out of Herakleitus are of this paradoxical tenor.<sup>u</sup> Other dicta simply affirm perpetual flow, change, or transition, without express allusion to contraries: which latter however, though not expressed, must be understood, since change was conceived as a change from one contrary to the other.<sup>x</sup> In the Herakleitean idea, contrary forces come simultaneously into action: destruction and generation always take effect together: there is no negative without a positive, nor positive without a negative.<sup>y</sup>

Such was the metaphysical or logical foundation of the philosophy of Herakleitus: the idea of an eternal process of change, manifesting itself in the perpetual destruction and renovation of particular realities, but having itself no reality apart from these particulars, and existing only in them as an immanent principle or condition. This principle, from the want of appropriate abstract

<sup>u</sup> Aristotle or Pseudo-Aristotle, *De Mundo*, c. 5, p. 396, b. 20. Ταὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο ἦν καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῷ σκοτεινῷ λεγόμενον Ἡρακλειτῶ—συνάφειας οὐλα καὶ οὐχὶ οὐλα, συμφερόμενον καὶ διαφερόμενον, συνᾶδον καὶ διαδόν· καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα. Herakl. Allegor. ap. Schleiermacher (*Herakleitos*, p. 529), ποταμοῖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐμβαλνομέν τε καὶ οὐκ ἐμβαλνομεν, εἰμέν τε καὶ οὐκ εἰμέν: Plato, *Sophist*. p. 242, D., διαφερόμενον ἀεὶ ζυμφέρεται: Aristotle, *Metaphys.* iii. 8, p. 1012, b. 24, εἶκοι δ' ὁ μὲν Ἡρακλείτου λόγος, λέγων πάντα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἅπαντα ἀληθῆ ποιῆν: Aristotle, *Topic.* viii. 5, p. 155, b., οἶον ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν εἶναι ταῦτον, καθάπερ Ἡρακλειτὸς φησιν: also Aristotle, *Physic.* i. 2, p. 185, b. Compare the various Herakleitean phrases cited in Pseudo-Origen *Refut. Hæres. Fragm.* ix. 10; also Krische, *Forschungen auf dem Gebiete des alten Philosophie*, vol. i. p. 370-468.

<sup>x</sup> Bernays and Lassalle (*vol. i. p. 81*) contend, on reasonable grounds (though

in opposition to Zeller, p. 495), that the following verses in the Fragments of Parmenides refer to Herakleitus:

οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταῦτον γενόμεσται  
κοῦ ταῦτον, πάντων δὲ παλιέτροπος ἐστὶ  
κέλευθος.

The commentary of Alexander Aphrodis. on the *Metaphysica* says, "Herakleitus ergo cum diceret omnem rem esse et non esse et opposita simul consistere, contradictionem veram simul esse statuebat, et omnia dicebat esse vera" (*Lassalle*, p. 83).

One of the metaphors by which Herakleitus illustrated his theory of opposite and co-existent forces, was the pulling and pushing of two sawyers with the same saw. See Bernays, *Herakleitea*, part i. p. 16; Bonn, 1848.

<sup>y</sup> Aristotle, *Physic.* viii. 3, p. 253, b. 30, εἰς τοῦνάντιον γὰρ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις: also iii. p. 205, a. 6, πάντα γὰρ μεταβάλλει ἐξ ἐναντίου εἰς ἐνάντιον, οἶον ἐκ θερμοῦ εἰς ψυχρόν.

<sup>z</sup> Lassalle, *Herakleitus*, vol. i. p. 323.

terms, he expressed in a variety of symbolical and metaphorical phrases, among which Fire stood prominent.<sup>2</sup> But though Fire was thus often used to denote the principle or ideal process itself, the same word was also employed to denote that one of the elements which formed the most immediate manifestation of the principle. In this latter sense, Fire was the first stage of incipient reality: the second stage was water, the third earth. This progression, fire, water, earth, was in Herakleitean language “the road downwards,” which was the same as “the road upwards,” from earth to water and again to fire. The death of fire was its transition into water: that of water was, its transition partly into earth, partly into flame. As fire was the type of extreme mobility, perpetual generation and destruction—so earth was the type of fixed and stationary existence, resisting movement or change as much as possible.<sup>3</sup> Water was intermediate between the two.

Herakleitus conceived the sun and stars, not as solid bodies, but as meteoric aggregations perpetually dissipated and perpetually renewed or fed, by exhalation upward from the water and earth. The sun became extinguished and rekindled in suitable measure and proportion, under the watch of the Erinyes, the satellites of Justice. These celestial lights were contained in troughs, the open side of which was turned towards our vision. In case of eclipses the

Sun and Stars  
—not solid  
bodies, but  
meteoric ag-  
gregations  
dissipated  
and renewed  
—Eclipses—  
ἐκπύρωσις, or  
destruction of  
the Kosmos  
by fire.

<sup>2</sup> See a striking passage cited from Gregory of Nyssa by Lassalle (vol. i. p. 287), illustrating this characteristic of fire: the flame of a lamp appears to continue the same, but it is only a succession of flaming particles, each of which takes fire and is extinguished in the same instant:—ὡσπερ τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς θρυαλλίδος πῦρ τῶ μὲν δοκεῖν αἰετὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεται—τὸ γὰρ συνεχὲς αἰετὸ τῆς κινήσεως ἀδιάσπαστον αὐτὸ καὶ ἠνωμένον πρὸς ἑαυτὸ δείκνυσι—τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ πάντοτε αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ διαδεχόμενον, οὐδέποτε τὸ αὐτὸ μένει—ἡ γὰρ ἐξελκυσθεῖσα διὰ τῆς θερμότητος ἰκμᾶς δμοῦ τε ἐξεφλογάθη καὶ εἰς λιγυρὸν ἐκκαυθεῖσα μετεποιήθη, &c.

<sup>3</sup> Diogen. Laert. ix. 9; Clemens Alexand. Strom. v. 14, p. 599, vi. 2, p. 624. Πυρὸς τροπαὶ πρῶτον θάλασσα, θαλάττης δὲ τὸ μὲν ἡμῶν γῆ, τὸ δ' ἡμῶν πρηστήρ. A full explanation of the curious expression *πρηστήρ* is given by Lassalle (Herakl. vol. ii. p. 87-90). See Brandis (Handbuch der Gr. Philos. sect. xliii. p. 164), and Plutarch (De Primo Frigido, c. 17, p. 952, F.).

The distinction made by Herakleitus, but not clearly marked out or preserved, between the *ideal fire* or universal process, and the *elementary fire* or first stage towards realisation, is brought out by Lassalle (Herakleitos, vol. ii. p. 25-29).

trough was for the time reversed, so that the dark side was turned towards us; and the different phases of the moon were occasioned by the gradual turning round of the trough in which her light was contained. Of the phenomena of thunder and lightning also, Herakleitus offered some explanation, referring them to aggregations and conflagrations of the clouds, and violent currents of winds.<sup>b</sup> Another hypothesis was often ascribed to Herakleitus, and was really embraced by several of the Stoics in later times—that there would come a time when all existing things would be destroyed by fire (*ἐκπύρωσις*), and afterwards again brought into reality in a fresh series of changes. But this hypothesis appears to have been conceived by him metaphysically rather than physically. Fire was not intended to designate the physical process of combustion, but was a symbolical phrase for the universal process; the perpetual agency of conjoint destruction and renovation, manifesting itself in the putting forth and re-absorption of particulars, and having no other reality except as immanent in these particulars.<sup>c</sup> The determinate Kosmos of the present moment is perpetually destroyed, passing into fire or the indeterminate: it is perpetually renovated or passes out of fire into water, earth—out of the indeterminate, into the various determinate modifications. At the same time, though Herakleitus seems to have mainly employed these symbols for the purpose of signifying or typifying a metaphysical conception, yet there was no clear apprehension, even in his own mind, of this generality, apart from all symbols: so that the illustration came to count as a physical fact by itself, and has been so understood by many.<sup>d</sup>

<sup>b</sup> Aristot. Meteorol. ii. e. p. 355, a. Plato, Republ. vi. p. 498, c. 11; Plutarch, De Exilio, c. 11, p. 604 A.; Plutarch, De Isid. et Osirid. c. 48, p. 370, E.; Diogen. L. ix. 10; Plutarch, Placit. Philos. ii. 17-22-24-28, p. 889-891; Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. i. p. 594.

About the doctrine of the Stoics, built in part upon this of Herakleitus, see Cicero, Natur. Deor. ii. 46; Seneca, Quæst. Natur. ii. 5, vi. 16.

<sup>c</sup> Aristot. or Pseudo-Aristot. De

Mundo, ἐκ πάντων ἐν καὶ ἐξ ἐνὸς πάντα.

<sup>d</sup> See Lassalle, Herakleitos, vol. ii. s. 26-27, p. 254-258.

Compare about the obscure and debated meaning of the Herakleitean *ἐκπύρωσις*, Schleiermacher, Herakleitos, p. 103; Zeller, Gesch. der Philos. vol. i. p. 477-479.

The word *διακόσμησις* stands as the antithesis (in the language of Herakleitus) to *ἐκπύρωσις*. A passage from Philo Judæus is cited by Lassalle,

The line between what he meant as the ideal or metaphysical process, and the elementary or physical process, is not easy to draw, in the fragments which now remain.

The like blending of metaphysics and physics—of the abstract and notional with the concrete and sensible—is to be found in the statements remaining from Herakleitus respecting the human soul and human knowledge. The human soul, according to him, was an effluence or outlying portion of the Universal<sup>e</sup>—the fire—the perpetual movement or life of things. As such, its nature was to be ever in movement: but it was imprisoned and obstructed by the body, which represented the stationary, the fixed, the particular—that which resisted the universal force of change. So long as a man lived, his soul or mind, though thus confined, participated more or less in the universal movement: but when he died, his body ceased to participate in it, and became therefore vile, “fit only to be cast out like dung.” Every man, individually considered, was irrational:<sup>f</sup> reason belonged only to the universal or the whole, with which the mind of each living man was in conjunction, renewing itself by perpetual absorption, inspiration or inhalation, vaporous transition, impressions through the senses and the pores, &c. During sleep, since all the media of communication, except only those through respiration, were suspended, the mind became stupified and destitute of memory. Like coals when the fire is withdrawn, it lost its heat and tended towards extinction.<sup>g</sup> On waking, it recovered its full communication

His doctrines respecting the human soul and human knowledge. All wisdom resided in the Universal Reason—individual Reason is worthless.

illustrating the Herakleitean movement from ideal unity into totality of sensible particulars, forwards and backwards—*ὃ δὲ γονορροῆς (λόγος) ἐκ κόσμου πάντα καὶ εἰς κόσμον ἀνάγων, ὑπὸ θεοῦ δὲ μηδὲν οἰόμενος, Ἡρακλείτειου δόξης ἑταῖρος, κόρον καὶ χρησιμοσύνην, καὶ ἐν τῷ πᾶν καὶ πάντα ἀμοιβῆ εἰσάγων*—where *κόρος* and *χρησιμοσύνη* are used to illustrate the same ideal antithesis as *διακόσμησις* and *ἐκπύρωσις* (Lassalle, vol. i. p. 232).

<sup>e</sup> Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathem. vii. 130. *ἡ ἐπιξενωθείσα τοῖς ἡμετέροις σώμασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος μοῖρα.*

Plutarch, Symposion, p. 644. *νεκῆς κοπρίαν ἐκβλητότεροι.*

Plutarch, Placit. Philos. i. 23. *Ἡρακλείτος ἡρεμίαν καὶ στάσιν ἐκ τῶν ὄλων ἀνήρει· ἐστὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τῶν νεκρῶν.*

<sup>f</sup> See Schleiermacher, Herakleitos, p. 522; Sext. Empir. adv. Mathem. viii. 236.

<sup>g</sup> The passage of Sextus Empiricus (adv. Mathem. vii. 126-134) is curious and instructive about Herakleitus.

*Ἀρέσκει γὰρ τῷ φυσικῷ (Herakleitus) τὸ περιέχον ἡμᾶς λογικόν τε ἐν καὶ φρενῆρες—τούτον δὴ τὸν θεῖον λόγον, καθ' Ἡρακλείτον, δι' ἀναπνοῆς*



with the great source of intelligence without—the universal all-comprehensive process of life and movement. Still, though this was the one and only source of intelligence open to all waking men, the greater number of men could neither discern it for themselves, nor understand it without difficulty even when pointed out to them. Though awake, they were not less unconscious or forgetful of the process going on around them, than if they had been asleep.<sup>h</sup> The eyes and ears of men with barbarous or stupid souls, gave them false information.<sup>i</sup> They went wrong by following their own individual impression or judgment: they lived as if reason or intelligence belonged to each man individually. But the only way to attain truth was, to abjure all separate reason, and to follow the common or universal reason. Each man's mind must become identified and familiar with that common process which directed and transformed the whole: in so far as he did this, he attained truth: whenever he followed any private or separate judgment of his own, he fell into error.<sup>k</sup> The highest pitch of this severance of the indi-

σπάσαντες νοεροὶ γινόμεθα, καὶ ἐν μὲν ὕπνοις ληθαῖοι, κατὰ δὲ ἔγερσιν πάλιν ἔμψρονες. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὕπνοις μυσάντων τῶν αἰσθητικῶν πόρων χωρίζεται τῆς πρὸς τὸ περιέχον συμφύτας ὁ ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦς, μονῆς τῆς κατὰ ἀναπνοὴν πρὸς φύσεως σωζομένης οἰονεὶ τινὸς ῥίξης, χωρισθεὶς δὲ ἀποβάλλει ἢν πρότερον εἶχε μνημονικὴν δύναμιν ἐν δὲ ἔγρηγοροῦσι πάλιν διὰ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν πόρων ὥσπερ διὰ τινῶν θυρίδων προκύψας καὶ τῷ περιέχοντι συμβαλὼν λογικὴν ἐνδύεται δύναμιν. Then follows the simile about coals brought near to, or removed away from, the fire.

The Stoic version of this Herakleitean doctrine, is to be seen in Marcus Antonius, viii. 54. Μηκέτι μόνον συμπνεῖν τῷ περιέχοντι ἀέρι, ἀλλ' ἤδη καὶ συμψρονεῖν τῷ περιέχοντι πάντα νοερῶ. Οὐ γὰρ ἦττον ἢ νοερὰ δύναμις πάντῃ κέχρηται καὶ διαπεφοίτηκε τῷ σπᾶσι βουλομένῳ, ἥπερ ἢ ἀερώδης τῷ ἀναπνεῦσαι δυναμένῳ.

The Stoics, who took up the doctrine of Herakleitus with farther abstraction and analysis, distinguished and named separately matters which he

conceived in one and named together—the physical inhalation of air—the metaphysical supposed influx of intelligence—*inspiration* in its literal and metaphorical senses. The word τὸ περιέχον, as he conceives it, seems to denote, not any distinct or fixed local region, but the rotatory movement or circulation of the elements, fire, water, earth, reverting back into each other. Lassalle, vol. ii. p. 119-120; which transition also is denoted by the word *αναθυμίασις* in the Herakleitean sense—cited from Herakleitus by Aristotle. De Animâ, i. 2.

<sup>h</sup> Sextus Empiricus (adv. Math. vii. 132) here cites the first words of the treatise of Herakleitus (compare also Aristotle, Rhet. iii. 5). λόγου τοῦδε ἔντος ἀξύνεται γίνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκούσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον—τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λαμβάνει ὄκσοα ἐγερθέντες ποιοῦσιν, ὥσπερ ὕποσα εὔδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται.

<sup>i</sup> Sext. Empiric. ib. vii. 126, a citation from Herakleitus.

<sup>k</sup> Sext. Emp. ib. vii. 133 (the words of Herakleitus) διὸ δεῖ εἴπεσθαι τῷ ξυνῶ—τοῦ λόγου δε ἔντος ξυνού,

vidual judgment was seen during sleep, at which time each man left the common world to retire into a world of his own.<sup>1</sup>

By this denunciation of the mischief of private judgment, Herakleitus did not mean to say that a man ought to think like his neighbours or like the public. In his view the public were wrong, collectively as well as individually. The universal reason to which he made appeal, was not the reason of most men as it actually is, but that which, in his theory, ought to be their reason:<sup>m</sup> that which formed the perpetual and governing process throughout all nature, though most men neither recognised nor attended to it, but turned away from it in different directions equally wrong. No man was truly possessed of reason, unless his individual mind understood the general scheme of the universe, and moved in full sympathy with its perpetual movement and alternation or unity of contraries.<sup>n</sup> The universal process contained in itself a sum-total of particular contraries which were successively produced and destroyed: to know the universal was to know these contraries in one, and to recognise them as

By Universal Reason, he did not mean the Reason of most men as it is, but as it ought to be.

ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν· ἢ δ' ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἀλλ' ἐξήγησις τοῦ τρόπου τῆς τοῦ πάντος διοικήσεως· διὸ καθ' ὅ, τι ἂν αὐτοῦ τῆς μνήμης κοινωνήσωμεν, ἀληθεύομεν, ἂ δ' ἂν ἰδιάσωμεν, ψευδόμεθα.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, De Superstit. c. 3, p. 166, C. See also the passage in Clemens Alexandr. Strom. iv. 22, about the comparison of sleep to death by Herakleitus.

<sup>m</sup> Sextus Empiricus misinterprets the Herakleitean theory when he represents it (vii. 134) as laying down—τὰ κοινῇ φαινόμενα, πιστὰ, ὡς ἂν τῷ κοινῷ φαινόμενα λόγῳ, τὰ δὲ καθ' ἰδίαν ἐκάστῳ, ψευδῆ. Herakleitus denounces mankind generally as in error. Origen. Philosophum. i. 4; Diog. Laert. ix. 1.

<sup>n</sup> The analogy and sympathy between the individual mind and the cosmical process—between the knowing and the known—was reproduced in many forms among the ancient phi-

losophers. It appears in the Platonic Timæus, c. 20, p. 47 C.

Τὸ κινούμενον τῷ κινουμένῳ γιγνώσκεισθαι was the doctrine of several philosophers. Aristot. De Animâ, i. 2; Plato, Kratylus, p. 412 A; καὶ μὴν ἢ γε ἐπιστήμη μνηύει ὡς φερόμενοι τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπομένης τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἀξίας λόγου, καὶ οὔτε ἀπολειπομένης οὔτε προθεούσης. A remarkable passage from the comment of Philoponus (on the treatise of Aristotle De Animâ) is cited by Lassalle, ii. p. 330, describing the Herakleitean doctrine, διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς ἀναθυμιάσεως αὐτὴν ἔλεγεν (Herakleitus) τῶν γὰρ πραγμάτων ἐν κινήσει ὄντων δεῖν καὶ τὸ γίνωσκον τὰ πράγματα ἐν κινήσει εἶναι, ἵνα συμπαραθεῶν αὐτοῖς ἐφάπτηται καὶ ἐφαρμόσῃ αὐτοῖς—also Simplicius ap. Lassalle, p. 341, ἐν μεταβολῇ γὰρ συνεχεῖ τὰ ὄντα ὑποτιθέμενος ὁ Ἡράκλειτος, καὶ τὸ γνωσόμενον αὐτὰ τῇ ἐπαφῇ γίνωσκον, συνέπεσθαι ἐβούλετο ὡς αἰεὶ εἶναι κατὰ τὸ γνωστικὸν ἐν κινήσει.

transient, but correlative and inseparable, manifestations, each implying the other—not as having each a separate reality and each excluding its contrary.<sup>o</sup> In so far as a man's mind maintained its kindred nature and perpetual conjoint movement with the universal, he acquired true knowledge; but the individualising influences arising from the body usually overpowered this kindred with the universal, and obstructed the continuity of this movement, so that most persons became plunged in error and illusion.

The absolute of Herakleitus stands thus at the opposite pole as compared with that of Parmenides: it is absolute movement, change, generation and destruction — negation of all substance and stability,<sup>p</sup> except as a temporary and unbecoming resistance of each successive particular to the destroying and renewing current of the universal. The Real, on this theory, was a generalisation, not of substances, but of facts, events, changes, revolutions, destructions, generations, &c., determined by a law of justice or necessity which endured, and which alone endured, for ever. Herakleitus had many followers, who adopted his doctrine wholly or partially, and who gave to it developments which he had not adverted to, perhaps might not have acknowledged.<sup>q</sup> It was found an apt theme by those who,

<sup>o</sup> Stobæus, *Eclog. Phys.* p. 58; and the passage of Philo Judæus, cited by Schleiermacher, p. 437; as well as more fully by Lassalle, vol. ii. p. 265-267. (*Quis rerum divinar. hæres*, p. 503, Mangey), ἐν γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τῶν ἐναντίων, οὐ τηθέντος γνώριμα τὰ ἐναντία. Οὐ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὅ φασιν Ἕλληες τὸν μέγαν καὶ ἀοίδιμον παρ' αὐτοῖς Ἡράκλειτον, κεφαλαῖον τῆς αὐτοῦ προστησάμενον φιλοσοφίας, αὐχεῖν ὡς εὐρέσει κανὴ; παλαιὸν γὰρ εὐρημα Μωῦσεώς ἐστιν.

<sup>p</sup> The great principle of Herakleitus, which Aristotle states in order to reject (*Physic.* viii. 3, p. 253, b. 10, φασί τινας κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων οὐ τὰ μὲν τὰ δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ πάντα καὶ αἰε' ἀλλὰ λανθάνειν τοῦτο τὴν ἡμετέραν αἰσθησιν) now stands averred in modern physical philosophy. Mr. Grove observes, in his instructive Treatise on the Correlation of Physical Forces, p. 22.

"Of absolute rest, Nature gives us no evidence. All matter, as far as we can discern, is ever in movement: not merely in masses, as in the planetary spheres, but also molecularly, or throughout its intimate structure. Thus every alteration of temperature produces a molecular change throughout the whole substance heated or cooled: slow chemical or electrical forces, actions of light or invisible radiant forces, are always at play; so that as a fact, we cannot predicate of any portion of matter, that it is absolutely at rest."

<sup>q</sup> Many references to Herakleitus are found in the recently published books of the *Refutatio Hæresium* by Pseudo-Origen or Hippolytus—especially Book ix. p. 279-283, ed. Miller. To judge by various specimens there given, it would appear that his juxta-positions of contradictory predicates, with the

taking a religious or poetical view of the universe, dwelt upon the transitory and contemptible value of particular existences, and extolled the grandeur or power of the universal. It suggested many doubts and debates respecting the foundations of logical evidence, and the distinction of truth from falsehood; which debates will come to be noticed hereafter, when we deal with the dialectical age of Plato and Aristotle.

After Herakleitus, and seemingly at the same time with Parmenides, we arrive at Empedokles (about 500-430 B.C.) and his memorable doctrine of the Four Elements. This philosopher, a Sicilian of Agrigentum, and a distinguished as well as popular-minded citizen, expounded his views in poems, of which Lucretius<sup>r</sup> speaks with high admiration, but of which few fragments are preserved. He agreed with Parmenides, and dissented from Herakleitus and the Ionic philosophers, in rejecting all real generation and destruction.<sup>s</sup> That which existed had not been generated and could not be destroyed. Empedokles explained what that was, which men mistook for generation and destruction. There existed four distinct elements—Earth, Water, Air, and Fire—eternal, inexhaustible, simple, homogeneous, equal, and co-ordinate with each other. Besides these four substances, there also existed two moving forces, one contrary to the other—Love or Friendship, which brought the elements into conjunction—

Empedokles  
—his doctrine  
of the four  
elements,  
and two  
moving or  
restraining  
forces.

same subject, would be recognised as paradoxes merely in appearance, and not in reality, if we had his own explanation. Thus he says (p. 282) "the pure and the corrupt, the drinkable and the undrinkable, are one and the same." Which is explained as follows: "The sea is most pure and most corrupt: to fish, it is drinkable and nutritive; to men, it is undrinkable and destructive." This explanation appears to have been given by Herakleitus himself, *θάλασσα, φησιν*, &c.

These are only paradoxes in appearance—the relative predicate being affirmed without mention of its correlate. When you supply the correlate

to each predicate, there remains no contradiction at all.

<sup>r</sup> Lucretius, i. 733.

"Carmina quin etiam divini pectoris ejus  
Vociferantur, et exponunt præclara reperia:  
Ut vix humanâ videatur stirpe creatus."

<sup>s</sup> Empedokles, Frag. v. 76-83, ed. Karsten.

*φύσις οὐδένος ἐστὶν ἀπάντων  
βηγητῶν, οὐδέ τις οὐλομένου θανατοῦ τελευτῆ,  
ἀλλὰ μόνον μίξις τε διάλλαξις τε μιν γέντων  
ἐστί, φύσις δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνομάζεται ἀνθρώποισι.*

*φύσις* here is remarkable, in its primary sense, as derivative from *φύομαι*, equivalent to *γένησις*. Compare Plutarch adv. Koloten, p. 1111, 1112.

Enmity or Contest, which separated them. Here were alternate and conflicting agencies, either bringing together different portions of the elements to form a new product, or breaking up the product thus formed and separating the constituent elements. Sometimes the Many were combined into One; sometimes the One was decomposed into Many. Generation was simply this combination of elements already existing separately—not the calling into existence of any thing new: destruction was in like manner the dissolution of some compound, not the termination of any existent simple substance. The four simple substances or elements, (which Empedokles sometimes calls by names of the popular Deities—Zeus, Hêrê, Aidoneus, &c.), were the roots or foundations of every thing.<sup>t</sup>

From the four elements,—acted upon by these two forces, abstractions or mythical personifications,—Empedokles showed how the Kosmos was constructed. He supposed both forces to be perpetually operative, but not always with equal efficacy: sometimes the one was predominant, sometimes the other, sometimes there was equilibrium between them. Things accordingly pass through a perpetual and ever-renewed cycle. The complete preponderance of Love brings all the elements into close and compact unity, Enmity being for the time eliminated. Presently the action of the latter recommences, and a period ensues in which Love and Enmity are simultaneously operative; until at length Enmity becomes the temporary master, and all union is for the time dissolved. But this condition of things does not last. Love again becomes active, so that partial and increasing combination of the elements is produced, and another period commences—the simultaneous action of the two forces, which ends in renewed empire of Love, compact union of the elements, and temporary exclusion of Enmity.<sup>u</sup>

Construction of the Kosmos from these elements and forces—action and counter-action of love and enmity. The Kosmos alternately made and unmade.

<sup>t</sup> Emp. Fr. v. 55. Τέσσαρα τῶν πάντων ριζώματα. | <sup>u</sup> Zeller, Gesch. Philos. vol. i. p. 525-528, ed. 2nd.

This is the Empedoklean cycle of things,<sup>x</sup> divine or predestined, without beginning or end: perpetual substitution of new for old compounds,—constancy only in the general principle of combination and dissolution. The Kosmos which Empedokles undertakes to explain, takes its commencement from the period of complete empire of Love, or compact and undisturbed union of all the elements. This he conceives and divinises under the name of Sphærus—as One sphere, harmonious, uniform, and universal, having no motion, admitting no parts or separate existences within it, exhibiting no one of the four elements distinctly, “instabilis tellus, innabilis unda”—a sort of chaos.<sup>y</sup> At the time prescribed by Fate or Necessity, the action of Enmity recommenced, penetrating gradually through the interior of Sphærus, “agitating the members of the God one after another,”<sup>z</sup> disjoining the parts from each other, and distending the compact ball into a vast porous

Empedoklean predestined cycle of things—complete empire of Love—Sphærus—Empire of Enmity—disengagement or separation of the elements—astronomy and meteorology.

<sup>x</sup> Emp. Frag. v. 91, Karst.

Οὕτως ἢ μὲν ἐν ἐκ πλεόνων μεμάθηκε  
φύεσθαι  
ἠδὲ πάλιν διαφυντός ἐνός πλέου' ἐκτελέ-  
θουσιν,  
τῇ μὲν γίνονται τε καὶ οὐ σφισιν ἔμπεδος  
αἰών'  
ἢ δὲ τὰδ' ἀλλάσσοντα διαμπερὲς οὐκετι  
λήγει,  
ταῦτ' ὁ αἰὲν ἔασιν ἀκίνητα κατὰ κύκλον.  
καὶ γὰρ καὶ παρὸς ἦν τε καὶ ἔσεται οὐδὲ  
ποτ' οἶω,  
τούτων ἀμφοτέρων (Love and Discord)  
κεινώσεται ἄσπετος αἰών.

These are new Empedoklean verses, derived from the recently published fragments of Hippolytus (Hær. Refut.) and printed by Stein, v. 110, in his collection of the Fragments of Empedokles, p. 43. Compare another passage in the same treatise of Hippolytus, p. 251.

<sup>y</sup> Emped. Fr. v. 59.

Οὕτως ἀρμονίης πικινῶ κρυφῶ ἐστήρικται  
σφαῖρος κυκλοτέρης, μόνιῃ περιγηθεί γαίωι.  
Plutarch, De Facie in Orbe Lunæ,  
c. 12.

About the divinity ascribed by Empedokles to Sphærus, see Aristot. Metaphys. B. 4, p. 1000, a. 29. ἅπαντα γὰρ ἐκ τούτου (νείκου) τέλλα ἐστὶν πλὴν ὁ θεός (i. e. Sphærus). Εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἦν τὸ νείκος ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι, ἔν

ἐν ἦν ἅπαντα ὡς φησὶν, (Empedokles). See Preller, Hist. Philos. ex Fontibus Contexta, sect. 171, 172, ed. 3.

The condition of things which Empedokles calls Sphærus may be illustrated (translating his Love and Enmity into the modern phraseology of attraction and repulsion) from an eminent modern work on Physics:—

“Were there only atoms and attraction, as now explained, the whole material of creation would rush into close contact, and the universe would be one huge solid mass of stillness and death. There is heat or caloric, however, which directly counteracts attraction, and singularly modifies the results. It has been described by some as a most subtle fluid pervading all things as water does a sponge: others have accounted it merely a vibration among the atoms. The truth is, that we know little more of heat as a cause of repulsion, than of gravity as a cause of attraction: but we can study and classify the phenomena of both most accurately.” (Dr. Arnott, Elements of Physics, vol. i. p. 26.)

<sup>z</sup> Emp. Fr. 66-70, Karst.

πάντα γὰρ ἐξείης πελεμίζετο γαῖα θεοῖο.

mass. This mass, under the simultaneous and conflicting influences of Love and Enmity, became distributed partly into homogeneous portions where each of the four elements was accumulated by itself—partly into compounds or individual substances, where two or more elements were found in conjunction. Like had an appetite for Like—Air for Air, Fire for Fire, and so forth: and a farther extension of this appetite brought about the mixture of different elements in harmonious compounds. First, the Air disengaged itself, and occupied a position surrounding the central mass of Earth and Water: next, the Fire also broke forth, and placed itself externally to the air, immediately in contact with the outermost crystalline sphere, formed of condensed and frozen air, which formed the wall encompassing the Kosmos. A remnant of Fire and Air still remained embodied in the Earth, but the great mass of both so distributed themselves, that the former occupied most part of one hemisphere, the latter most part of the other.<sup>a</sup> The rapid and uniform rotation of the Kosmos, caused by the exterior Fire, compressed the interior elements, squeezed the water out of the earth like perspiration from the living body, and thus formed the sea. The same rotation caused the earth to remain unmoved, by counterbalancing and resisting its downward pressure or gravity.<sup>b</sup> In the course of the rotation, the light hemisphere of Fire, and the comparatively dark hemisphere of Air, alternately came above the horizon: hence the interchange of day and night. Empedokles (like the Pythagoreans) supposed the Sun to be not self-luminous, but to be a glassy or crystalline body which collected and reflected the light from the hemisphere of Fire. He regarded the fixed stars as fastened to the exterior crystalline sphere, and revolving along with it, but the planets as moving free and detached from any sphere.<sup>c</sup> He supposed the alternations of winter and summer to arise from a change in the proportions

<sup>a</sup> Plutarch ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang. i. 8, 10; Plutarch, Placit. Philos. ii. 6, p. 887; Aristot. Ethic. Nic. viii. 2.

<sup>b</sup> Emped. Fr. 185, Karsten. αἰθήρ σφίγγων περί κύκλον ἄπαντα. Aristot.

De Cælo, ii. 13, 14; iii. 2, 2. τὴν γῆν ὑπὸ τῆς δίνης ἠρεμεῖν, &c. Empedokles called the sea ἰδρώτα τῆς γῆς. Emp. Fr. 451, Karsten; Aristot. Meteor. ii. 3.

<sup>c</sup> Plutarch, Placit. Phil. ii. 20, p. 890.

of Air and Fire in the atmospheric regions: winter was caused by an increase of the Air, both in volume and density, so as to drive back the exterior Fire to a greater distance from the Earth, and thus to produce a diminution of heat and light: summer was restored when the Fire, in its turn increasing, extruded a portion of the Air, approached nearer to the Earth, and imparted to the latter more heat and light.<sup>d</sup> Empedokles farther supposed (and his contemporaries, Anaxagoras and Diogenes, held the same opinion) that the Earth was round and flat at top and bottom, like a drum or tambourine: that its surface had been originally horizontal, in reference to the rotation of the Kosmos around it, but that it had afterwards tilted down to the south and upward towards the north, so as to lie aslant instead of horizontal. Hence he explained the fact that the north pole of the heavens now appeared obliquely elevated above the horizon.<sup>e</sup>

From astronomy and meteorology Empedokles<sup>f</sup> proceeded to describe the Earth, its tenants, and its furniture; how men were first produced, and how put together. All were produced by the Earth: being thrown up under the stimulus of Fire still remaining within it. In its earliest manifestations, and before the influence of Discord had been sufficiently neutralized, the Earth gave birth to plants only, being as yet incompetent to produce animals.<sup>g</sup> After a certain time she gradually acquired power to produce animals, first imperfectly and piecemeal, trunks without limbs and limbs without trunks;

<sup>d</sup> Zeller, *Gesch. Phil.* i. p. 532-535, 2nd ed.: Karsten—*De Emped. Philos.* p. 424-431.

The very imperfect notices which remain, of the astronomical and meteorological doctrines of Empedokles, are collected and explained by these two authors.

<sup>e</sup> Plutarch, *Placit. Philos.* ii. 8; Schaubach, *Anaxag. Fragm.* p. 175; Compare the remarks of Gruppe (*Ueber die Kosmischen Systeme der Griechen*, p. 98) upon the obscure *Welt-Gebäude* of Empedokles.

<sup>f</sup> Hippokrates—*Περὶ ἀρχαίων ἰητρικῆς*—c. 20, p. 620, v. i. ed. Littre. καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἢ ἄλλοι οἱ περὶ φύσιος

γεγράφασιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὅ, τι ἔστιν ἀνθρώπος, καὶ ὅπως ἐγένετο πρῶτον, καὶ ὅπως ξυνεπάγη.

This is one of the most ancient allusions to Empedokles, recently printed by M. Littre, out of one of the MSS. in the Parisian library.

<sup>g</sup> Emp. *Fr.* v. 253, Kar. τοὺς μὲν πῦρ ἀνεπεμψ' ἔθελον πρὸς ὕμιον ἰκέσθαι, &c.

Aristot., or Pseudo-Aristot. *De Plantis*, i. 2. εἶπε πάλιν ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, ὅτι τὰ φυτὰ ἔχουσι γένεσιν ἐν κόσμῳ ἡλαττωμένῳ, καὶ οὐ τελείῳ κατὰ τὴν συμπλήρωσιν αὐτοῦ· ταύτης δὲ συμπληρουμένης, (while it is in course of being completed) οὐ γεννᾶται ζῶον.



next, discordant and monstrous combinations which did not last, such as creatures half man half ox; lastly, combinations with parts suited to each other, organizations perfect and durable, men, horses, &c., which continued and propagated.<sup>h</sup> Among these productions were not only plants, birds, fishes, and men, but also the "long-lived Gods."<sup>i</sup> All compounds were formed by intermixture of the four elements, in different proportions, more or less harmonious.<sup>k</sup> These elements remained unchanged: no one of them was transformed into another. But the small particles of each flowed into the pores of the others, and the combination was more or less intimate, according as the structure of these pores was more or less adapted to receive them. So intimate did the mixture of these fine particles become, when the effluvia of one and the pores of another were in symmetry, that the constituent ingredients, like colours compounded together by the painter,<sup>m</sup> could not be discerned or handled separately. Empedokles rarely assigned any specific ratio in which he supposed the four elements to enter into each distinct compound, except in the case of flesh and blood, which were formed of all the four in equal portions; and of bones, which he affirmed to be composed of one-fourth earth, one-fourth water, and the other half fire. He insisted merely on the general fact of

<sup>h</sup> Emp. Frag. v. 132, 150, 233, 240, ed. Karst.

πολλὰ μὲν ἀμφιπρόσωπα καὶ ἀμφίστερν' ἐγένοντο, βιογενῆ ἀνδρόπρωρα, &c. Οὐλοφύεις μὲν πρῶτα τύποι χθονὸς ἐξανέτελλον, &c.

Lucretius, v. 834; Aristotel. Gen. Animal. i. 18, p. 722, b. 20; Physic. ii. 8, 2, p. 198, b. 32; De Cælo, iii. 2, 5, p. 300, b. 29; with the commentary of Simplikius ap. Schol. Brand. b. 512.

<sup>i</sup> Emp. Fr. v. 135, Kar.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Menon. p. 76 A.; Aristot. Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 324, b. 30 seq.

<sup>m</sup> Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐξ ἀμεταβλήτων τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων ἠγείτο γίνεσθαι τὴν τῶν συνθέτων σαμάτων φύσιν, οὕτως ἀναμεμιγμένον ἀλλήλοις τῶν πρώτων, ὡς εἴ τις λειώσας ἀκριβῶς καὶ χρυσῆ ποιήσας ἰδὼν καὶ χαλκίτιν καὶ καθμίαν καὶ μισθὸν μίξειεν, ὡς μὴδὲν ἐξ αὐτοῦ μεταχειρίσασθαι χωρὶς ἑτέρου.

Galen, Comm. in Hippokrat. De Homin. Nat. t. iii. p. 101. See Karsten, De Emped. Phil. p. 407, and Emp. Fr. v. 155.

Galen says, however (after Aristot. Gen. et Corr. ii. 7, p. 334, a. 30), that this mixture, set forth by Empedokles, is not mixture properly speaking, but merely close proximity. Hippokrates (he says) was the first who propounded the doctrine of real mixture. But Empedokles seems to have intended a real mixture, in all cases where the structure of the pores was in symmetry with the inflowing particles. Oil and water (he said) would not mix together, because there was no such symmetry between them—δύως γὰρ ποιεῖ (Empedokles) τὴν μίξιν τῇ συμμετρῖα τῶν πόρων διόπερ ἔλαιον μὲν καὶ ὕδωρ οὐ μίγνυσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἰγρὰ καὶ περὶ ὕσων δὴ καταριθμεῖται τὰς ἰδίας κράσεις (Theophrastus, De Sensu

such combinations, as explaining what passed for generation of new substances—without pointing out any reason to determine one ratio of combination rather than another, and without ascribing to each compound a distinct ratio of its own. This omission in his system is much animadverted on by Aristotle.

Empedokles farther laid down many doctrines respecting physiology. He dwelt on the procreation of men and animals, entered upon many details respecting gestation and the fœtus, and even tried to explain what it was that determined the birth of male or female offspring. About respiration, alimentation, and sensation, he also proposed theories: his explanation of respiration remains in one of the fragments. He supposed that man breathed, partly through the nose, mouth, and lungs, but partly also through the whole surface of the body, by the pores wherewith it was pierced, and by the internal vessels connected with those pores. Those internal vessels were connected with the blood vessels, and the portion of them near the surface was alternately filled with blood or emptied of blood, by the flow outwards from the centre or the ebb inwards towards the centre. Such was the movement which Empedokles considered as constantly belonging to the blood: alternately a projection outwards from the centre and a recession backwards towards the centre. When the blood thus receded, the extremities of the vessels were left empty, and the air from without entered: when the outward tide of blood returned, the air which had thus entered was expelled.<sup>a</sup> Empedokles conceived this outward tide of blood to be occasioned by the effort of the internal fire to escape and join its analogous element without.<sup>o</sup>

Physiology of  
Empedokles  
—Procrea-  
tion—Respi-  
ration—  
movement of  
the blood.

et Sensili, s. 12, vol. i. p. 651, ed. Schneider).

<sup>a</sup> Emp. Fr. v. 275, seqq. Karst.

The comments of Aristotle on this theory of Empedokles are hardly pertinent: they refer to respiration by the nostrils, which was not what Empedokles had in view (Aristot. De Respirat. c. 3).

<sup>o</sup> Karsten, De Emp. Philosoph. p. 480.

Emp. Fr. v. 307—τό τ' ἐν μήνιξι  
ἐεργμῆνον ἀγύριον πῦρ—πῦρ δ' ἔξω δια-  
θρῶσκον, &c.

Empedokles illustrates this influx and efflux of air in respiration by the klepsydra, a vessel with one high and narrow neck, but with a broad bottom pierced with many small holes. When the neck was kept closed by the finger or otherwise, the vessel might be plunged into water, but no water would

The doctrine of pores and effluvia, which formed so conspicuous an item in the physics of Empedokles, was applied by him to explain sensation. He maintained the general doctrine (which Parmenides had advanced before him, and which Plato retained after him), that sensation was produced by like acting upon like: Herakleitus before him, and Anaxagoras after him, held that it was produced by unlike acting upon unlike. Empedokles tried (what Parmenides had not tried) to apply his doctrine to the various senses separately.<sup>p</sup> Man was composed of the same four elements as the universe around him; and since like always tended towards like, so by each of the four elements within himself, he perceived and knew the like element without. Effluvia from all bodies entered his pores, wherever they found a suitable channel: hence he perceived and knew earth by earth, water by water, and so forth.<sup>q</sup> Empedokles, assuming perception and knowledge to be produced by such intercommunication of the four elements, believed that not man and animals only, but plants and other substances besides, perceived and knew in the same way. Everything possessed a certain measure of knowledge, though less in degree than man, who was a more compound structure.<sup>r</sup> Perception and

ascend into it through the holes in the bottom, because of the resistance of the air within. As soon as the neck was freed from pressure, and the air within allowed to escape, the water would immediately rush up through the holes in the bottom.

This illustration is interesting. It shows that Empedokles was distinctly aware of the pressure of the air as countervailing the ascending movement of the water, and the removal of that pressure as allowing such movement.

οὐδέ τ' ἐξ ἄγγος δ' ὄμβρος ἐσέρχεται, ἀλλὰ  
μὲν εἴργει  
ἀέρος ὄγκος ἐσωθε πεσῶν ἐπὶ τρήματα πυκνά,  
&c.

This dealing with the klepsydra seems to have been a favourite amusement with children.

<sup>p</sup> Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 2, p. 647, Schneid.

<sup>q</sup> Emp. Frag. Karst. v. 265, seq.

γνώθ', ὅτι πάντων εἰσὶν ἀπορροαὶ, ὅσση  
ἐγένοντο, &c.

ib. v. 322.

γαίη μὲν γὰρ γαίαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ,  
αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα διόν, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ αἰδηλον,  
στοργῇ δὲ στοργήν, νεῖκος δὲ τε νεικεὶ λυγρῶν.

Theophrastus, de Sensu, c. 10, p. 650, Schneid.

Aristotle says that Empedokles regarded each of these six as a *ψυχὴ* (*soul, vital principle*) by itself. Sextus Empiricus treats Empedokles as considering each of the six to be a *κριτήριον ἀληθείας* (Aristot. De Animâ, i. 2; Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. vii. 116).

<sup>r</sup> Emp. Fr. v. 313, Karst. ap. Sext. Empir. cont. Mathem. viii. 286; also apud Diogen. L. viii. 77.

πάντα γὰρ ἴσθη φράνησιν ἔχειν καὶ νόματος  
αἰσαν.

Stein gives (Emp. Fr. v. 221) several lines immediately preceding this from

knowledge was more developed in different animals, in proportion as their elementary composition was more mixed and varied. The blood, as the most compound portion of the whole body, was the principal seat of intelligence.\*

In regard to vision, Empedokles supposed that it was operated mainly by the fire or light within the eye, though aided by the light without. The interior <sup>Sense of vision.</sup> of the eye was of fire and water, the exterior coat was a thin layer of earth and air. Colours were brought to the eye as effluvia from objects, and became apprehended as sensations by passing into the alternate pores or ducts of fire and water: white colour was fitted to (or in symmetry with) the pores of fire, black colour with those of water.<sup>t</sup> Some animals had the proportions of fire and water in their eyes better adjusted, or more conveniently located, than others: in some, the fire was in excess, or too much on the outside, so as to obstruct the pores or ducts of water: in others, water was in excess, and fire in defect. The latter were the animals which saw better by day than by night, a great force of external light being required to help out the deficiency of light within: the former class of animals saw better by night, because, when there was little light without, the watery ducts were less completely obstructed—or left more free to receive the influx of black colour suited to them.<sup>u</sup>

In regard to hearing, Empedokles said that the ear was like a bell or trumpet set in motion by the air with- <sup>Senses of hearing, smell, taste.</sup> out; through which motion, the solid parts were

the treatise of Hippolytus; but they are sadly corrupt.

Parmenides had held the same opinion before—*καὶ ἔλωσ πάν τὸ ὄν ἔχειν τινα γνώσιν*—ap. Theophrast. de Sensu, s. 4.

Theophrastus, in commenting upon the doctrine of Empedokles, takes as one of his grounds of objection—That Empedokles, in maintaining sensation and knowledge to be produced by influx of the elements into pores, made no difference between animated and inanimate substances (Theophr. De Sens. s. 12-23). Theophrastus puts this as if it were an inconsistency or

oversight of Empedokles: but it cannot be so considered, for Empedokles (as well as Parmenides) appears to have accepted the consequence, and to have denied all such difference, except one of degree, as to perception and knowledge.

\* Emp. Frag. 316, Karst. *αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιον ἔστι νόημα.* Comp. Theophrast. de Sensu, s. 11.

<sup>t</sup> Emp. Frag. v. 301-310, Karst. *τὸ τ' ἐν μήνι γίγνιν ἐεργμένον ἄγύγιον πύρ,* &c. Theophr. De Sensu, s. 7, 8; Aristot. De Sensu, c. 3; Aristot. De Gen. et Corrupt. i. 8.

<sup>u</sup> Theophrastus De Sensu, s. 7, 8.

brought into shock against the air flowing in, and caused the sensation of sound within.\* Smell was, in his view, an adjunct of the respiratory process: persons of acute smell were those who had the strongest breathing: olfactory effluvia came from many bodies, and especially from such as were light and thin. Respecting taste and touch, he gave no farther explanation than his general doctrine of effluvia and pores: he seems to have thought that such interpenetration was intelligible by itself, since here was immediate and actual contact. Generally, in respect to all the senses, he laid it down that pleasure ensued when the matter which flows in was not merely fitted in point of structure to penetrate the interior pores or ducts (which was the condition of all sensation), but also harmonious with them in respect to elementary mixture.<sup>y</sup>

Empedokles held various opinions in common with the Pythagoreans and the brotherhood of the Orphic mysteries—especially that of the metempsychosis. He represented himself as having passed through prior states of existence, as a boy, a girl, a shrub, a bird, and a fish. He proclaims it as an obligation of justice, absolute and universal, not to kill anything that had life: he denounces as an abomination the sacrificing or eating of an animal, in whom perhaps might dwell the soul of a deceased friend or brother.<sup>z</sup> His religious faith, however, and his opinions about Gods, Dæmons, and the human soul, stood apart (mostly in a different poem) from his doctrines on kos-

Empedokles declared that justice absolutely forbade the killing of anything that had life. His belief in the metempsychosis. Sufferings of life, are an expiation for wrong done during an antecedent life. Pretensions to magical power.

\* Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 9-21.

Empedokles described the ear under the metaphor of *σάρκινον ὄζον*, "the fleshy branch."

<sup>y</sup> Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 9, 10.

The criticisms of Theophrastus upon this theory of Empedokles are extremely interesting, as illustrating the change in the Grecian physiological point of view during a century and a half: but I reserve them until I come to the Aristotelian age. I may remark, however, that Theophrastus, disputing the doctrine of sensory effluvia generally, disputes the existence of the olfac-

tory effluvia not less than the rest (s. 20).

<sup>z</sup> Emp. Frag. v. 380-410, Karsten; Plutarch, De Esu Carnium, p. 998.

Aristot. Rhetoric. i. 13. *ἔστι γὰρ, ὃ μαντεύονται πάντες, φύσει κοινὸν δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον, κὰν μηδεμίᾳ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνία ᾗ, μηδὲ συνθήκη—ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει περὶ τοῦ μὴ κτείνειν τὸ ἐμψυχον· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ, τίσι μὲν δίκαιον, τίσι δ' οὐ δίκαιον, Ἄλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμιμον, διὰ τ' εὐνομέδοντος*  
Aithéros ἠνεκέως τέταται, διὰ τ' ἀπλέτου αὐγῆς.  
Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathem. ix. 127.

mology and physiology. In common with many Pythagoreans, he laid great stress on the existence of Dæmons (of intermediate order and power between Gods and men), some of whom had been expelled from the Gods in consequence of their crimes, and were condemned to pass a long period of exile, as souls embodied in various men or animals. He laments the misery of the human soul, in himself as well as in others, condemned to this long period of expiatory degradation, before they could regain the society of the Gods.<sup>a</sup> In one of his remaining fragments, he announces himself almost as a God upon earth, and professes his willingness as well as ability to impart to a favoured pupil the most wonderful gifts—powers to excite or abate the winds, to bring about rain or dry weather, to raise men from the dead.<sup>b</sup> He was in fact a man of universal pretensions; not merely an expositor of nature, but a rhetorician, poet, physician, prophet, and conjuror. Gorgias the rhetor had been personally present at his magical ceremonies.<sup>c</sup>

None of the remaining fragments of Empedokles are more remarkable than a few, in which he deplores the impossibility of finding out any great or comprehensive truth, amidst the distraction and the sufferings of our short life. Every man took a different road, confiding only in his own accidental experience or particular impressions; but no man could obtain or communicate satisfaction about the whole.<sup>d</sup>

Anaxagoras of Klazomenæ, a friend of the Athenian Perikles, and contemporary of Empedokles—was a man of far simpler and less ambitious character: devoted to physical

<sup>a</sup> Emp. Frag. v. 5-18, Karst.; compare Herod. ii. 123; Plato, Phædrus, 55, p. 246 C.; Plutarch, De Isid. et Osirid. c. 26.

Plutarch observes in another place on the large proportion of religious mysticism blended with the philosophy of Empedokles—*Σωκράτης φασμάτων και δεισιδαιμονίας ἐμπλέω φιλοσοφίαν ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου και Ἐμπεδοκλέους λαβῶν, εἰδ' ἄλλα βεβακχευμένην, &c.* (Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, t. ix. p. 312.)

See Fr. Aug. Ukert, Ueber Daemonen, Heroen, und Genien, p. 151.

<sup>b</sup> Emp. Fr. v. 390-425, Karst.

<sup>c</sup> Diog. Laert. viii. 59.

<sup>d</sup> Emp. Fr. v. 34.

παῦρον δὲ ζῶνς ἄβιον μέρος ἀθήσαντες ὠκύμοροι, κάπνοιο δίκην ἀρθέντες, ἀπέπταν, αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες ὅτι προσέκυρσεν ἑκάστος, πάντοσ' ἐλαινόμονοι· τὸ δὲ οἶλον ἐπέυχεται εὐρεῖν αὐτως, οὐτ' ἐπιδερκτὰ τοῦ ἀνδράσω οὐτ' ἐπακουστὰ οὔτε νόφ περιληπτὰ.

contemplation and geometry, without any of those mystical pretensions common among the Pythagoreans. His doctrines were set forth in prose, and in the Ionic dialect.<sup>e</sup> His theory, like all those of his age, was all-comprehensive in its purpose, starting from a supposed beginning, and shewing how heaven, earth, and the inhabitants of earth, had come into those appearances which were exhibited to sense. He agreed with Empedokles in departing from the point of view of Thales and other Ionic theorists, who had supposed one primordial matter, out of which, by various transformations, other sensible things were generated—and into which, when destroyed, they were again resolved. Like Empedokles, and like Parmenides previously, he declared that generation, understood in this sense, was a false and impossible notion: that no existing thing could have been generated, or could be destroyed, or could undergo real transformation into any other thing different from what it was.<sup>f</sup> Existing things were what they were, possessing their several inherent properties: there could be no generation except the putting together of these things in various compounds, nor any destruction except the breaking up of such compounds, nor any transformation except the substitution of one compound for another.

But Anaxagoras did not accept the Empedoklean four elements as the sum total of first substances. He reckoned all the different sorts of matter as original and primæval existences: he supposed them all to lie ready made, in portions of all sizes, whereof there was no greatest and no least.<sup>g</sup> Particles of the

Theory of Anaxagoras—denied generation and destruction—recognises only mixture and severance of pre-existing kinds of matter.

Homœomeries—small particles of diverse kinds of matter, all mixed together.

<sup>e</sup> Aristotel. Ethic. Eudem. i. 4, 5; Diogen. Laert. ii. 10.

<sup>f</sup> Anaxagor. Fr. 22, p. 135, ed. Schaubach.

τὸ δὲ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι οὐκ ὀρθῶς νομίζουσιν οἱ Ἕλληνες. Οὐδὲν γὰρ χρῆμα γίνεται, οὐδὲ ἀπόλλυται, ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἑόντων χρημάτων συμμίσγεται τε καὶ διακρίνεται· καὶ οὕτως ἔν ὀρθῶς καλοῖεν τὸ τε γίνεσθαι συμμίσγεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι διακρίνεσθαι.

<sup>g</sup> Anaxag. Fr. 5, ed. Schaub.

Τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ are the primordial particles themselves: ὁμοιομερεία is the abstract word formed from this concrete—existence in the form or condition of ὁμοιομερῆ. Each distinct substance has its own ὁμοιομερῆ, little particles like each other, and each possessing the characteristics of the substance. But the state called ὁμοιομερεία pervades all substances (Marbach, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, s. 53, note 3.).

same sort he called Homœomerics: the aggregates of which formed bodies of like parts; wherein the parts were like each other and like the whole. Flesh, bone, blood, fire,<sup>h</sup> earth, water, gold, &c., were aggregations of particles mostly similar, in which each particle was not less flesh, bone, and blood, than the whole mass.

But while Anaxagoras held that each of these Homœomerics<sup>i</sup> was a special sort of matter with its own properties, and each of them unlike every other: he held farther the peculiar doctrine, that no one of them could have an existence apart from the rest. Every thing was mixed with every thing: each included in itself all the others: not one of them could be obtained pure and unmixed. This was true of any portion however small. The visible and tangible bodies around us affected our senses, and received their denominations according to that one peculiar matter of which they possessed a decided preponderance and prominence. But each of them included in itself all the other matters, real and inseparable, although latent.<sup>k</sup>

In the beginning (said Anaxagoras) all things (all sorts of matter) were together, in one mass or mixture. Infinitely numerous and infinite in diversity of magnitude, they were so packed and confounded together that no one could be distinguished from the rest: no definite figure, or colour, or other property, could manifest itself. Nothing was distinguishable except

First condition of things —all the primordial varieties of matter were huddled together in confusion. Nous, or Reason, distinct from

<sup>h</sup> Lucretius, i. 836.  
 "Nunc et Anaxagoræ scrutemur Homœomeriam,  
 Quam Græci memorant, nec nostrâ dicere lingua  
 Concedit nobis patris sermonis egestas."

Lucretius calls this theory Homœomeria, and it appears to me that this name must have been bestowed upon it by its author. Zeller and several others after Schleiermacher conceive the name to date first from Aristotle and his physiological classification. But what other name was so natural or likely for Anaxagoras himself to choose?

<sup>i</sup> Anaxag. Fr. 8; Schaub. p. 101; compare p. 113. *ἕτερον δὲ οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ὅμοιον οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ.* 'Ἄλλ' ὅτε φ. πλείστα

*ἔνι, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἐν ἕκαστόν ἐστι καὶ ἦν.*

<sup>k</sup> Lucretius, i. 875.  
 "Id quod Anaxagoras sibi sumit, ut omnibus omnes

Res putet immistas rebus latitare, sed illud Apparere unum, cuius sint plura mista, Et magis in promptu primâque in sede locata."

Aristotel. Physic. i. 4-3. *Διὸ φασὶ πᾶν ἐν παντὶ μεμῖχθαι, διότι πᾶν ἐκ παντὸς ἑώρων γιγνόμενον· φαίνεσθαι δὲ διαφέροντα καὶ προσαγορεύεσθαι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, ἐκ τοῦ μάλιστα ὑπερέχοντος, διὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἐν τῇ μίξει τῶν ἀπείρων· εἰλικρινῶς μὲν γὰρ ὄλον λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἢ σάρκα ἢ ὄστρον, οὐκ εἶναι· ὅτου δὲ πλείστον ἕκαστον ἔχει, τοῦτο δοκεῖν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος—also Aristot. De Cœlo, iii. 3; Gen. Corr. i. 1.*



all of them, the infinite mass of Air and Æther (Fire), which supervened and acted upon this confused mass, setting the constituent particles in movement. Thus all things continued for an infinite time in a state of rest and nullity. The fundamental contraries,—wet, dry, hot, cold, light, dark, dense, rare,—in their intimate contact neutralised each other.<sup>m</sup> Upon this inert mass supervened the agency of Nous or mind. The characteristic virtue of mind was, that it alone was completely distinct, peculiar, pure in itself, unmixed with any thing else : thus marked out from all other things which were indissolubly mingled with each other. Having no communion of nature with other things, it was noway acted upon by them, but was its own master or autocratic, and was of very great force. It was moreover the thinnest and purest of all things ; possessing complete knowledge respecting all other things. It was like to itself throughout—the greater manifestations of mind similar to the less.<sup>n</sup>

But though other things could not act upon mind, mind could act upon them. It first originated movement in the quiescent mass. The movement impressed was that of rotation, which first began on a small scale, then gradually extended itself around, becoming more efficacious as it extended, and still continuing to extend itself around more and more.

<sup>1</sup> Anaxag. Frag. 1 ; Schaub. p. 65. Ὅμοῦ πάντα χρήματα ἦν, ἄπειρα καὶ πλήθος καὶ σμικρότητα. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ σμικρὸν ἄπειρον ἦν. Καὶ πάντων ὁμοῦ ἔόντων οὐδὲν εὐδηλον ἦν ὑπὸ σμικρότητος. Πάντα γὰρ ἄῤῥ τε καὶ αἰθὴρ κατεῖχεν, ἀμφοτέρα ἄπειρα ἔδντα. Ταῦτα γὰρ μέγιστα ἔνεστιν ἐν τοῖς συμπάσι πληθεῖ τε καὶ μεγέθει.

The first three words—ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα—were the commencement of the Anaxagorean treatise, and were more recollected and cited than any other words in it. See Fragm. 16, 17, Schaubach, and p. 66-68. Aristotle calls this primæval chaos τὸ μίγμα.

<sup>m</sup> Anax. Frag. 6, Schaub. p. 97 ; Aristotel. Physic. i. 4, p. 187, a, with the commentary of Simplicius ap. Scholia, p. 335 ; Brandis also, iii. 203, a. 25 ;

and De Cœlo, iii. 301, a. 12, ἐξ ἀκινήτων γὰρ ἄρχεται (Anaxagoras) κοσμοποιεῖν.

<sup>n</sup> Anaxag. Fr. 8, p. 100, Schaub. Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα παντὸς μοῖραν ἔχει, νοῦς δὲ ἐστὶν ἄπειρον καὶ αυτοκρατὴς καὶ μέμικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι, ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἑωῦτοῦ ἐστίν. Εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑωῦτοῦ ἦν, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐμέμικτο ἄλλω, μετεῖχεν ἂν ἀπάντων χρημάτων, εἴπερ ἐμέμικτό τῶν—Καὶ ἐκόλυεν ἂν αὐτὸν τὰ συμμιγμένα, ὥστε μηδεὸς χρήματος κρατεῖν ὁμοίως, ὡς καὶ μόνον ἔδντα ἐφ' ἑωῦτοῦ. Ἔστι γὰρ λεπτότατόν τε πάντων χρημάτων καὶ καθαρώτατον, καὶ γνώμην περὶ παντὸς πάσαν ἴσχει, καὶ ἰσχύει μέγιστον.

Compare Plato, Kratylus, c. 65, p. 413, c. νοῦν αυτοκράτορα καὶ οὐδενὶ μεμιγμένον (δ λέγει Ἀναξαγόρας).

Through the prodigious velocity of this rotation, a separation was effected of those things which had been hitherto undistinguishably huddled together.<sup>o</sup> Dense was detached from rare, cold from hot, dark from light, dry from wet.<sup>p</sup> The Homœomeric particles congregated together, each to its like; so that bodies were formed—definite and distinguishable aggregates, possessing such a preponderance of some one ingredient as to bring it into clear manifestation.<sup>q</sup> But while the decomposition of the multifarious mass was thus carried far enough to produce distinct bodies, each of them specialised, knowable, and regular—still the separation can never be complete, nor can any one thing be “cut away as with a hatchet” from the rest. Each thing, great or small, must always contain in itself a proportion or trace, latent if not manifest, of every thing else.<sup>r</sup> Nothing except mind can be thoroughly pure and unmixed.

Nevertheless other things approximate in different degrees to purity, according as they possess a more or less decided preponderance of some few ingredients over the remaining multitude. Thus flesh, bone, and other similar portions of the animal organism, were (according to Anaxagoras) more nearly pure (with one constituent more thoroughly preponderant, and all other coexistent natures more thoroughly subordinate and latent) than the four Empedoklean elements, Air, Fire, Earth, &c.; which were compounds wherein many of the numerous ingredients present were equally effective, so that the manifestations were more con-

gether—distinguishable aggregates are formed.

Nothing (except *Nous*) can be entirely pure or unmixed; but other things may be comparatively pure. *Flesh, Bone, &c.* are purer than *Air* or *Earth*.

<sup>o</sup> Anaxag. Fr. 8, p. 100, Sch. Καὶ τῆς περιχωρήσιος τῆς ξυμπάσης νοῦς ἐκράτησεν, ὥστε περιχωρῆσαι τὴν ἀρχήν. Καὶ πρῶτον ἀπὸ τοῦ συμκροῦ ἤρξατο περιχωρῆσαι, ἔπειτα πλείον περιχωρεῖ, καὶ περιχωρῆσει ἐπὶ πλείον. Καὶ τὰ συμμισγόμενα καὶ ἀποκρινόμενα καὶ διακρινόμενα, πάντα ἐγνω νοῦς. Also Fr. 18, p. 129; Fr. 21, p. 134, Schau.

<sup>p</sup> Anaxag. Fr. 8-19, Schaubach.

<sup>q</sup> Anaxag. Fr. 8, p. 101, Schaub. ὅτεω πλείστα ἐνι, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἐστὶ καὶ ἦν. Pseudo-Origen.

Philosophumen. 8. κινήσεως τε μετέχειν τὰ πάντα ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ κινούμενα, συνελθεῖν τε τὰ ὅμοια, &c. Simplikios ad Aristot. *Physic.* i. p. 188, a. 13 (p. 337, Schol. Brandis).

<sup>r</sup> Aristotel. *Physic.* iii. 4, 5, p. 203, a. 23, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι μόνιον εἶναι ὁμοίως μίγμα τῷ πάντι, &c. Anaxag. Fr. 16, p. 126, Schau.

Anaxag. Fr. 11, p. 119, Schaub. οὐ κεχώρισται τὰ ἐν ἐνὶ κόσμῳ, οὐδὲ ἀποκέκοπται πελέκει, &c. *Frag.* 12, p. 122. ἐν παντὶ πάντα, οὐδὲ χωρὶς ἐστὶν εἶναι.—Fr. 15, p. 125.

fused and complicated. In this way the four Empedoklean elements formed a vast seed-magazine, out of which many distinct developments might take place, of ingredients all pre-existing within it. Air and Fire appeared to generate many new products, while flesh and bone did not.<sup>s</sup> Amidst all these changes, however, the infinite total mass remained the same, neither increased nor diminished.<sup>t</sup>

In comparing the theory of Anaxagoras with that of Empedokles, we perceive that both of them denied not only the generation of new matter out of nothing (in which denial all the ancient physical philosophers concurred), but also the transformation of one form

Theory of Anaxagoras, compared with that of Empedokles.

<sup>s</sup> Aristotle, in two places (De Cœlo, iii. 3, p. 302, a. 28, and Gen. et Corr. i. 1, p. 314, a. 8) appears to state that Anaxagoras regarded flesh and bone as simple and elementary: air, fire, and earth, as compounds from these and other Homœomeries. So Zeller (Gesch. Philos. v. i. p. 670, ed. 2), with Ritter, and others, understand him. Schaubach (Anax. Fr. p. 81, 82) dissents from this opinion, but does not give a clear explanation. Another passage of Aristotle (Metaphys. i. 3, p. 984, a. 11) appears to contradict the above two passages, and to put fire and water, in the Anaxagorean theory, in the same general category as flesh and bone: the explanatory note of Bonitz, who tries to show that the passage in the *Metaphysica* is in harmony with the other two above named passages, seems to me not satisfactory.

Lucretius (i. 841, referred to in a previous note) numbers flesh, bone, fire, and water, all among the Anaxagorean Homœomeries; and I cannot but think that Aristotle, in contrasting Anaxagoras with Empedokles, has applied to the former language which could only have been used by the latter. Ἐναντίας δὲ φαίνονται λέγοντες οἱ περὶ Ἀναξαγόραν τοῖς περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ (Emp.) φησι πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα καὶ γῆν στοιχεῖα τέσσαρα καὶ ἀπλᾶ εἶναι, μᾶλλον ἢ σάρκα καὶ ὀστέον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν. Οἱ δὲ (Anaxag.) ταῦτα μὲν ἀπλᾶ καὶ στοιχεῖα, γῆν δὲ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ἀέρα σύνθετα πανσπερμίαν γὰρ εἶναι τούτων. (Gen. Corr. i. 1.) The last

words (πανσπερμίαν) are fully illustrated by a portion of the other passage, De Cœlo, iii. 3, ἀέρα δὲ καὶ πῦρ μίγμα τούτων (the Homœomeries, such as flesh and blood) καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σπερμάτων πάντων εἶναι γὰρ ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν ἐξ ἀοράτων ὁμοιομερῶν πάντων ἠθροισμένων διδὸν καὶ γίνεσθαι πάντα ἐκ τούτων.

Now it can hardly be said that Anaxagoras recognised one set of bodies as simple and elementary, and that Empedokles recognised another set of bodies as such. Anaxagoras expressly denied all *simple bodies*. In his theory, all bodies were compound: *Nous* alone formed an exception. Everything existed in everything. But they were compounds in which particles of one sort, or of a definite number of sorts, had come together into such positive and marked action, as practically to nullify the remainder. The generation of the Homœomeric aggregate was by disengaging these like particles from the confused mixture in which their agency had before lain buried (γένεσις, ἐκφανσις μόνον καὶ ἔκκρισις τοῦ πρὶν κρυπτομένου. Simplicius ap. Schaub. Anax. Fr. p. 115). The Homœomeric aggregates or bodies were infinite in number: for ingredients might be disengaged and recombined in countless ways, so that the result should always be some positive and definite manifestations. Considered in reference to the Homœomeric body, the constituent particles might in a certain sense be called elements.

<sup>t</sup> Anaxag. Fr. 14, p. 125, Schaub.

of matter into others, which had been affirmed by Thales and others. Both of them laid down as a basis the existence of matter in a variety of primordial forms. They maintained that what others called generation or transformation, was only a combination or separation of these pre-existing materials, in great diversity of ratios. Of such primordial forms of matter Empedokles recognised only four, the so-called Elements; each simple and radically distinct from the others, and capable of existing apart from them, though capable also of being combined with them. Anaxagoras recognised primordial forms of matter in indefinite number, with an infinite or indefinite stock of particles of each; but no one form of matter (except *Nous*) capable of being entirely severed from the remainder. In the constitution of every individual body in nature, particles of all the different forms were combined; but some one or a few forms were preponderant and manifest, all the others overlaid and latent. Herein consisted the difference between one body and another. The Homœomeric body was one in which a confluence of like particles had taken place so numerous and powerful, as to submerge all the coexistent particles of other sorts. The majority thus passed for the whole, the various minorities not being allowed to manifest themselves, yet not for that reason ceasing to exist: a type of human society as usually constituted, wherein some one vein of sentiment, ethical, æsthetical, religious, political, &c., acquires such omnipotence as to impose silence on dissentients, who are supposed not to exist because they cannot proclaim themselves without ruin.

The hypothesis of multifarious forms of matter, latent yet still real and recoverable, appears to have been suggested to Anaxagoras mainly by the phenomena of animal nutrition.<sup>21</sup> The bread and meat on which we feed nourishes all the different parts of our body—blood, flesh, bones, ligaments, veins, trachea, hair, &c. The nutriment must contain in itself different matters

Suggested partly by the phenomena of animal nutrition.

<sup>21</sup> See a remarkable passage in Plutarch, *Placit. Philosoph.* i. 3.

homogeneous with all these tissues and organs; though we cannot see such matters, our reason tells us that they must be there. This physiological divination is interesting from its general approximation towards the results of modern analysis.

Both Empedokles and Anaxagoras begin their constructive process from a state of stagnation and confusion tantamount to Chaos; which is not so much active discord, (as Ovid paints it) as rest and nullity arising from the equilibrium of opposite forces. The chaos of Anaxagoras is in fact almost a reproduction of the Infinite of Anaximander.<sup>x</sup> But Anaxagoras as well as Empedokles enlarged his hypothesis by introducing (what had not occurred or did not seem necessary to Anaximander) a special and separate agency for eliciting positive movement and development out of the negative and stationary Chaos. The Nous or Mind is the agency selected for this purpose by Anaxagoras: Love and Enmity by Empedokles. Both the one and the other initiate the rotatory cosmical motion; upon which follows as well the partial disgregation of the chaotic mass, as the congregation of like particles of it towards each other.

The Nous of Anaxagoras was understood by later writers as a God;<sup>y</sup> but there is nothing in the fragments now remaining to justify the belief that the author himself conceived it in that manner—or that he proposed it (according to Aristotle's expression <sup>z</sup>) as the cause of all that was good in the world, assigning other agencies as the causes of all evil. It is not characterised by him as a person—not so much as the Love and Enmity of Empedokles. It is not one but multitudinous, and all its separate manifestations are alike, differing only as greater or less. It is in fact identical with the

Nous, or mind, postulated by Anaxagoras—how understood by later writers—how intended by Anaxagoras himself.

<sup>x</sup> This is a just comparison of Theophrastus. See the passage from his *φυσικὴ ἰστορία*, referred to by Simplicius ad Aristot. Physic. i. p. 187, a. 21 (p. 335, Schol. Brand.).

<sup>y</sup> Cicero, Academ. iv. 37; Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathematicos, ix. 6, τὸν μὲν

νοῦν, ὅς ἐστι κατ' αὐτὸν θεός, &c.

Compare Schaubach, Anax. Frag. p. 153.

<sup>z</sup> Aristot. Metaphys. A. p. 984, b. 17. He praises Anaxagoras for this, οἶον νήφων παρ' εἰκῆ λέγοντας τοὺς πρότερον, &c.

soul, the vital principle, or vitality, belonging not only to all men and animals, but to all plants also.<sup>a</sup> It is one substance, or form of matter among the rest, but thinner than all of them (thinner than even fire or air), and distinguished by the peculiar characteristic of being absolutely unmixed. It has moving power and knowledge, like the Air of Diogenes the Apolloniate: it initiates movement; and it knows about all the things which either pass into or pass out of combination. It disposes or puts in order all things that were, are, or will be; but it effects this only by acting as a fermenting principle, to break up the huddled mass, and to initiate rotatory motion, at first only on a small scale, then gradually increasing. Rotation having once begun, and the mass having been as it were unpacked and liberated, the component Homœomeries are represented as coming together by their own inherent attraction.<sup>b</sup> The Anaxagorean Nous introduces order and symmetry into Nature, simply by stirring up rotatory motion in the inert mass, so as to release the Homœomeries from prison. It originates and maintains the great cosmical fact of rotatory motion; which variety of motion, from its perfect regularity and sameness, is declared by Plato also to be the one most consonant to Reason and Intelligence.<sup>c</sup> Such rotation being once set on foot, the other phenomena of the universe are supposed to be determined by its influence, and by their own tendencies and properties besides: but there is no farther agency of Nous, which only *knows* these phenomena as and when they occur. Anaxagoras tried to explain them as well as he could; not by reference to final causes, nor by

<sup>a</sup> Aristoteles (or Pseudo-Aristot.) De Plantis, i. 1.

Aristot. De Animâ, i. 2, 65-6-13.

Aristotle says that the language of Anaxagoras about νοῦς and ψυχὴ was not perfectly clear or consistent. But it seems also from Plato De Legg. xii. p. 967, B, that Anaxagoras made no distinction between νοῦς and ψυχὴ. Compare Plato, Kratylus, p. 400 A.

<sup>b</sup> Anaxag. Fr. 8, and Schaubach's Comm. p. 112-156.

"Mens erat id, quod movebat molem homœomeriarum: hæc ratione, per hunc motum à mente excitatum, secretio

facta est . . . . Materiæ autem propriæ insunt vires: proprio suo pondere hæc, quæ mentis vi mota et secreta sunt, feruntur in eum locum, quo nunc sunt."

Compare Alexand. Aphrod. ap. Scholia ad Aristot. Physic. ii. p. 194, a. (Schol. p. 348 a Brandis), Marbach, Lehrbuch der Gesch. Philos. s. 54, note 2, p. 82; Preller, Hist. Phil. ex fontibus contexta, s. 53, with his comment.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Phædo, c. 107, 108, p. 98; Plato, De Legg. xii. p. 967 B; Aristot. Metaphys. A. 4, p. 985, b. 18, Plato, Timæus, 34 A, 88 E.

assuming good purposes of *Nous* which each combination was intended to answer—but by physical analogies, well or ill chosen, and especially by the working of the grand cosmical rotation.<sup>d</sup>

This we learn from Plato and Aristotle, who blame Anaxagoras for inconsistency in deserting his own hypothesis, and in invoking explanations from physical agencies, to the neglect of *Nous* and its supposed optimising purposes. But Anaxagoras, as far as we can judge by his remaining fragments, seems not to have committed any such inconsistency. He did not proclaim his *Nous* to be a powerful extra-cosmical Architect, like the Demiurgus of Plato—nor an intra-cosmical, immanent, un-deliberating, instinct (such as Aristotle calls Nature), tending towards the production and renewal of regular forms and conjunctions, yet operating along with other agencies which produced concomitants irregular, unpredictable, often even obstructive and monstrous. Anaxagoras appears to conceive his *Nous* as one among numerous other real agents in Nature, material like the rest, yet differing from the rest as being powerful, simple, and pure from all mixture,<sup>e</sup> as being endued with universal cognizance, as being the earliest to act in point of time, and as furnishing the primary condition to the activity of the rest by setting on foot the cosmical rotation. The Homœomerics are coeternal with,

<sup>d</sup> Aristoph. Nub. 380, 828. αἰθέριος Δῖνος—Δῖνος βασιλεύει, τὸν Δῖ' ἐξεληλακώς—the sting of which applies to Anaxagoras and his doctrines—Anaxagoras δῖνος τινὰς ἀνοήτους ἀναξωγραφῶν—τῆ τοῦ νοῦ ἀπραξία καὶ ἀνοία (Clemens Alexandrin. Stromat. ii. p. 364).

To *move* (in the active sense, *i. e.* to cause movement in) and to *know*, are the two attributes of the Anaxagorean *Nous* (Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2, p. 405, a. 18).

<sup>e</sup> Anaxagoras, Fr. 8, p. 100, Schaub. ἐστὶ γὰρ λεπτότατόν τε πάντων χρημάτων, &c.

This means, not that *nous* was unextended or immaterial, but that it was thinner or more subtle than either fire

or air. Herakleitus regarded τὸ περιέχον as λογικὸν καὶ φρενήρες. Diogenes of Apollonia considered air as endued with cognition, and as imparting cognition by being inhaled. Compare Plutarch, De Placit. Philos. iv. 3.

I cannot think, with Brückner (Hist. Philosop. part ii. b. ii. De Sectâ Ionicâ, p. 504, ed. 2nd), and with Tennemann, Ges. Ph. i. 8, p. 312, that Anaxagoras was “primus qui Deî ideam inter Græcos à materialitate quasi purificavit,” &c. I agree rather with Zeller (Gesch. der Philos. i. p. 680-683, ed. 2nd), that the Anaxagorean *Nous* is not conceived as having either immateriality or personality.

if not anterior to, Nous. They have laws and properties of their own, which they follow, when once liberated, without waiting for the dictation of Nous. What they do is known by, but not ordered by, Nous.<sup>f</sup> It is therefore no inconsistency in Anaxagoras that he assigns to mind one distinct and peculiar agency, but nothing more; and that when trying to explain the variety of phenomena he makes reference to other physical agencies, as the case seems to require.<sup>g</sup>

In describing the formation of the Kosmos, Anaxagoras supposed, that as a consequence of the rotation initiated by mind, the primitive chaos broke up. Astronomy  
and physics  
of Anaxa-  
goras. "The Dense, Wet, Cold, Dark, Heavy, came together into the place where now Earth is: Hot, Dry, Rare, Light, Bright, departed to the exterior region of the revolving Æther."<sup>h</sup> In such separation each followed its spontaneous and inherent tendency. Water was disengaged from air and clouds, earth from water: earth was still farther consolidated into stones by cold.<sup>i</sup> Earth remained stationary in the centre, while fire and air were borne round it by the force and violence of the rotatory movement. The celestial bodies—Sun, Moon, and Stars—were solid bodies analogous to the earth, either caught originally in the whirl of the rotatory movement, or torn from the substance of the earth and carried away into the outer region of rotation.<sup>k</sup> They were rendered hot and luminous by the fiery fluid in the rapid whirl of which they were hurried along. The Sun was a stone thus made red-hot, larger than Peloponnesus: the Moon was of earthy matter, nearer to the Earth, deriving its light from the Sun, and including not merely plains and mountains but also cities and inhabitants.<sup>m</sup> Of the planetary

<sup>f</sup> Simplicius, in Physic. Aristot. p. 73. *καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ τὸν νοῦν ἐλάσας, ὡς φησιν Εὐδήμος, καὶ αὐτοματίζων τὰ πολλὰ συνίστησιν.*

<sup>g</sup> Diogen. Laert. ii. 8. *νοῦν—ἀρχὴν κινήσεως.*

Brücker, Hist. Philos. ut supra. "Scilicet, semel inducto in materiam à mente motu, sufficere putavit Anaxagoras, juxta leges naturæ motusque, rerum ortum describere."

<sup>h</sup> Anaxag. Fr. 19, p. 131, Schaub.; compare Fr. 6, p. 97; Diogen. Laert. ii. 8.

<sup>i</sup> Anaxag. Fr. 20, p. 133, Schaub.

<sup>k</sup> See the curious passage in Plutarch, Lysander 12, and Plato, Legg. xii. p. 967 B; Diogen. Laert. ii. 12; Plutarch, Placit. Philos. ii. 13.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Kratylus, p. 409 A; Plato, Apol. So. c. 14; Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 7.



movements, apart from the diurnal rotation of the celestial sphere, Anaxagoras took no notice.<sup>n</sup> He explained the periodical changes in the apparent course of the sun and moon by resistances which they encountered, the former from accumulated and condensed air, the latter from the cold.<sup>o</sup> Like Anaximenes and Demokritus, Anaxagoras conceived the Earth as flat, round in the surface, and not deep, resting on and supported by the air beneath it. Originally (he thought) the earth was horizontal, with the axis of celestial rotation perpendicular, and the north pole at the zenith, so that this rotation was then lateral, like that of a dome or roof; it was moreover equable and unchanging with reference to every part of the plane of the earth's upper surface, and distributed light and heat equally to every part. But after a certain time the Earth tilted over of its own accord to the south, thus lowering its southern half, raising the northern half, and causing the celestial rotation to appear oblique.<sup>p</sup>

Besides these doctrines respecting the great cosmical bodies, Anaxagoras gave explanations of many <sup>His geology, meteorology, physiology.</sup> among the striking phenomena in geology and meteorology—the sea, rivers, earthquakes, hurricanes, hail, snow, &c.<sup>q</sup> He treated also of animals and plants—their primary origin, and the manner of their propagation.<sup>r</sup> He thought that animals were originally produced by the hot and moist earth; but that being once produced, the breeds were continued by propagation. The seeds of plants he supposed to have been originally contained in the air, from whence they fell down to the warm and moist earth, where they took root and sprung up.<sup>s</sup> He believed that all plants,

<sup>n</sup> Schaubach, ad Anax. Fr. p. 165.

<sup>o</sup> Plutarch, Placit. Philosoph. ii. 23.

<sup>p</sup> Diogenes Laert. ii. 9. τὰ δ' ἄστρα κατ' ἀρχὰς θολοειδῶς ἐνεχθῆναι, ὥστε κατὰ κορυφὴν τῆς γῆς τὸν αἰὲρ φαιρόμενον εἶναι πόλον, ὕστερον δὲ τὴν (γῆν) ἐγκλισίω λαβεῖν. Plutarch, Placit. Phil. ii. 8.

<sup>q</sup> See Schaubach, ad Anax. Fr. p. 171-181.

Among the points to which Anaxagoras addressed himself was the an-

nual inundation of the Nile, which he ascribed to the melting of the snows in Æthiopia, in the higher regions of the river's course.—Diodor. i. 38. Herodotus notices this opinion (ii. 22), calling it plausible, but false, yet without naming any one as its author. Compare Euripides, Helen. 3.

<sup>r</sup> Aristotel. De Generat. Animal. iii. 6, iv. 1.

<sup>s</sup> Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. iii. 2; Diogen. Laert. ii. 9; Aristot. De Plantis, i. 2.

as well as all animals, had a certain measure of intelligence and sentiment, differing not in kind but only in degree from the intelligence and sentiment of men; whose superiority of intelligence was determined, to a great extent, by their possession of hands.<sup>†</sup> He explained sensation by the action of unlike upon unlike (contrary to Empedokles, who referred it to the action of like upon like<sup>‡</sup>), applying this doctrine to the explanation of the five senses separately. But he pronounced the senses to be sadly obscure and insufficient as means of knowledge. Apparently, however, he did not discard their testimony, nor assume any other means of knowledge independent of it, but supposed a concomitant and controlling effort of intelligence as indispensable to compare and judge between the facts of sense when they appeared contradictory.<sup>§</sup> On this point, however, it is difficult to make out his opinions.

<sup>†</sup> Aristot. De Plantis, i. 1; Aristot. Part. Animal. iv. 10.

<sup>‡</sup> Theophrastus, De Sensu, sect. 1—sect. 27-30.

This difference followed naturally from the opinions of the two philosophers on the nature of the soul or mind. Anaxagoras supposed it peculiar in itself, and dissimilar to the Homœomeries without. Empedokles conceived it as a compound of the four elements, analogous to all that was without: hence man knew each exterior element by its like within himself—earth by earth, water by water, &c.

<sup>§</sup> Anaxag. Fr. 19, Schaub.; Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathem. vii. 91-140; Cicero, Academ. i. 12.

Anaxagoras remarked that the contrast between black and white might be made imperceptible to sense by a succession of numerous intermediate colours, very finely graduated. He is said to have affirmed that snow was really black, notwithstanding that it appeared white to our senses: since water was black, and snow was only frozen water (Cicero, Academ. iv. 31; Sext. Empir. Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. i. 33). "Anaxagoras non modo id ita esse (sc. albam nivem esse) negabat, sed sibi, quia sciret, aquam nigram esse, unde illa concreta esset, albam ipsam esse

*ne videri quidem.*" Whether Anaxagoras ever affirmed that snow did not appear to him white, may reasonably be doubted: his real affirmation probably was, that snow, though it appeared white, was not really white. And this affirmation depended upon the line which he drew between the fact of sense, the phenomenal, the relative, on one side—and the substratum, the real, the absolute, on the other. Most philosophers recognise a distinction between the two: but the line between the two has been drawn in very different directions. Anaxagoras assumed as his substratum, real, or absolute, the Homœomeries—numerous primordial varieties of matter, each with its inherent qualities. Among these varieties he reckoned *water*, but he did not reckon *snow*. He also considered that water was really and absolutely black or dark (the Homeric μέλαν ὕδωρ)—that blackness was among its primary qualities. Water, when consolidated into snow, was so disguised as to produce upon the spectator the appearance of whiteness; but it did not really lose, nor could it lose, its inherent colour. A negro covered with white paint, and therefore looking white, is still really black: a wheel painted with the seven prismatic colours, and made to revolve rapidly, will look

Anaxagoras, residing at Athens and intimately connected with Perikles, incurred not only unpopularity, but even legal prosecution, by the tenor of his philosophical opinions, especially those on astronomy. To Greeks who believed in Helios and Selênê as not merely living beings but Deities, his declaration that the Sun was a luminous and fiery stone, and the Moon an earthy mass, appeared alike absurd and impious. Such was the judgment of Sokrates, Plato, and Xenophon, as well as of Aristophanes and the general Athenian public.<sup>7</sup> Anaxagoras was threatened with indictment for blasphemy, so that Perikles was compelled to send him away from Athens.

That physical enquiries into the nature of things, and attempts to substitute scientific theories in place of the personal agency of the Gods, were repugnant to the religious feelings of the Greeks, has been already remarked.<sup>2</sup> Yet most of the other contemporary philosophers must have been open to this reproach, not less than Anaxagoras; and we learn that the Apolloniate Diogenes left Athens from the same cause. If others escaped the like prosecution, which fell upon Anaxagoras, we may probably ascribe this fact to the state of political party at Athens, and to the intimacy of the latter with Perikles. The numerous political enemies of that great man might fairly hope to discredit him in the public mind—at the very least to vex and embarrass him—by procuring the trial and condemnation of Anaxagoras. Against other philosophers, even when propounding doctrines not less obnoxious respecting the celestial bodies, there was not the same collateral motive to stimulate the aggressive hostility of individuals.

Contemporary with Anaxagoras—yet somewhat younger, as far as we can judge, upon doubtful evidence—lived the philosopher Diogenes, a native of Apollonia in Krete. Of his life we know nothing, except that

Diogenes of Apollonia recognises one primordial element.

white, but it is still really septi-coloured: *i. e.* the state of rapid revolution would be considered as an exceptional state, not natural to it. Compare

Plato, *Lysis*, c. 32, p. 217 D.

<sup>7</sup> Plato, *Apol. So.* c. 14; Xenoph. *Memor.* iv. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, *Nikias*, 23.

he taught during some time at Athens, which city he was forced to quit on the same ground as Anaxagoras. Accusations of impiety were either brought or threatened against him:<sup>a</sup> physical philosophy being offensive generally to the received religious sentiment, which was specially awakened and appealed to by the political opponents of Pericles.

Diogenes the Apolloniate, the latest in the series of Ionic philosophers or physiologists, adopted, with modifications and enlargements, the fundamental tenet of Anaximenes. There was but one primordial element—and that element was air. He laid it down as indisputable that all the different objects in this Kosmos must be at the bottom one and the same thing: unless this were the fact, they would not act upon each other, nor mix together, nor do good and harm to each other, as we see that they do. Plants would not grow out of the earth, nor would animals live and grow by nutrition, unless there existed as a basis this universal sameness of nature. No one thing therefore has a peculiar nature of its own: there is in all the same nature, but very changeable and diversified.<sup>b</sup>

Now the fundamental substance, common to all, was air. Air was infinite, eternal, powerful; it was, besides, full of intelligence and knowledge. This latter property Diogenes proved by the succession of cli-

Air was the primordial, universal element.

<sup>a</sup> Diogen. Laert. ix. 52. The danger incurred by Diogenes the Apolloniate at Athens is well authenticated, on the evidence of Demetrius the Phalerean, who had good means of knowing. And the fact may probably be referred to some time after the year B.C. 440, when Athens was at the height of her power and of her attraction for foreign visitors—when the visits of philosophers to the city had been multiplied by the countenance of Perikles—and when the political rivals of that great man had set the fashion of assailing them in order to injure him. This seems to me one probable reason for determining the chronology of the Apolloniate Diogenes: another is, that his description of the veins in the human body is so minute and detailed as to betoken an advanced period of philosophy between B.C. 440–410. See the point discussed in Panzerbieter, Fragment. Diogen. Apoll.

c. 12-18 (Leipsic, 1830).

Simplikius (ad Aristot. Phys. fol. 6 A) describes Diogenes as having been *σχεδόν νεώτατος* in the series of physical theorists.

<sup>b</sup> Diogen. Ap. Fragm. ii. c. 29; Panzerb. Theophrastus De Sensu, s. 39. *εἰ γὰρ τὰ ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ οὐκ ἔδντα γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τέλλα, ὅσα φαίνεται ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ ἔδντα, εἰ τούτων τι ἦν τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου ἕτερον ἐδν τῇ ἰδίῃ φύσει, καὶ μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐδν μετέπιπτε πολλαχῶς καὶ ἤτεροιοῦτο· οὐδαμῇ οὔτε μίσησθαι ἀλλήλοις ἠδύνατο οὔτε ἀφέλησις τῷ ἑτέρῳ οὔτε βλαβή, &c.*

Aristotle approves this fundamental tenet of Diogenes, the conclusion that there must be one common Something out of which all things came—*ἐξ ἑνὸς ἅπαντα* (Gen. et Corrupt. i. 6-7, p. 322, a. 14) inferred from the fact that they acted upon each other.

matic and atmospheric phenomena of winter and summer, night and day, rain, wind, and fine weather. All these successions were disposed in the best possible manner by the air: which could not have laid out things in such regular order and measure, unless it had been endowed with intelligence. Moreover, air was the source of life, soul, and intelligence, to men and animals: who inhaled all these by respiration, and lost all of them as soon as they ceased to respire.<sup>c</sup>

Air, life-giving and intelligent, existed everywhere, formed the essence of everything, comprehended and governed everything. Nothing in nature could be without it: yet at the same time all things in nature partook of it in a different manner.<sup>d</sup> For it was distinguished by great diversity of properties and by many gradations of intelligence. It was hotter or colder—moister or drier—denser or rarer—more or less active and moveable—exhibiting differences of colour and taste. All these diversities were found in objects, though all at the bottom were air. Reason and intelligence resided in the warm air. So also to all animals as well as to men, the common source of vitality, whereby they lived, saw, heard, and understood, was air; hotter than the atmosphere generally, though much colder than that near the sun.<sup>e</sup> Nevertheless, in spite of this common characteristic, the air was in other respects so indefinitely modifiable, that animals were

Air possessed numerous and diverse properties; was eminently modifiable.

<sup>c</sup> Diogenes Apoll. Fr. iv.-vi. c. 36-42, Panz.

—Οὐ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω δέδασθαι οἶόν τε ἦν ἄνευ νύσσιος, ὥστε πάντων μέτρα ἔχειν, χειμῶνός τε καὶ θέρεος καὶ νυκτός καὶ ἡμέρης καὶ ὑετῶν καὶ ἀνέμων καὶ εὐδιῶν. καὶ τὰ ἄλλα εἴ τις βούλεται ἐννοεῖσθαι, εὐρισκοί ἂν οὕτω διακείμενα, ὡς ἀνυστὸν κάλλιστα. Ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τάδε μέγαρα σημεία ἀνθρώπος γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα ἀναπνέοντα ζῶει τῷ ἀέρι. Καὶ τοῦτο αὐτοῖς καὶ ψυχὴ ἐστὶ καὶ νόησις—

—Καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τὸ τὴν νόησιν ἔχον εἶναι ὃ ἄῤῥ καλεόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, &c.

Schleiermacher has an instructive

commentary upon these fragments of the Apolloniate Diogenes (Vermischte Schriften, vol. ii. p. 157-162; Ueber Diogenes von Apollonia).

<sup>d</sup> Diog. Ap. Fr. vi. καὶ ἐστὶ μηδὲ ἐν ὕ, τι μὴ μετέχει τούτου (αἶρ), μετέχει δὲ αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ ἐν ὁμοίως τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ; ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ τρόποι καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ τῆς νύσσιος εἰσιν.

Aristotel. De Animā, i. 2, p. 405, a. 21. Διογένης δ', ὥσπερ καὶ ἕτεροὶ τινες, ἀέρα (ὑπέλαβε τὴν ψυχὴν), &c.

<sup>e</sup> Diog. Ap. Fr. vi. καὶ πάντων ζῶων δὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστίν, ἀῤῥ θερμότερος μὲν τοῦ ἔξω ἐν δ' ἐσμὲν, τοῦ μέντοι παρὰ τῷ ἡλίῳ πολλὸν ψυχρότερος.

of all degrees of diversity, in form, habits, and intelligence. Men were doubtless more alike among themselves: yet no two of them could be found exactly alike, furnished with the same dose of aerial heat or vitality. All other things, animate and inanimate, were generated and perished, beginning from air and ending in air: which alone continued immortal and indestructible.<sup>f</sup>

The intelligence of men and animals, very unequal in character and degree, was imbibed by respiration, the inspired air passing by means of the veins and along with the blood into all parts of the body. Of the veins Diogenes gave a description remarkable for its minuteness of detail, in an age when philosophers dwelt almost exclusively in loose general analogies.<sup>g</sup> He conceived the principal seat of intelligence in man to be in the thoracic cavity, or in the ventricle of the heart, where a quantity of air was accumulated ready for distribution.<sup>h</sup> The warm and dry air concentrated round the brain, and reached by veins from the organs of sense, was the centre of sensation. Taste was explained by the soft and porous nature of the tongue, and by the number of veins communicating with it. The juices of sapid bodies were sucked up by it as by a sponge: the odorous stream of air penetrated from without through the nostrils: both were thus brought into conjunction with the sympathising cerebral air. To this air also the image impressed upon the eye was transmitted, thereby causing vision:<sup>i</sup> while pulsations and vibrations of the air without, entering through the ears and impinging upon the same centre, generated the sensation of sound. If the veins connecting the eye with the brain were inflamed,

<sup>f</sup> Diogen. Apoll. Fr. v. ch. 38, Panz.

<sup>g</sup> Diogen. Apoll. Fr. vii. ch. 48, Panz. The description of the veins given by Diogenes is preserved in Aristotel. Hist. Animal. iii. 2: yet seemingly only in a defective abstract, for Theophrastus alludes to various opinions of Diogenes on the veins, which are not contained in Aristotle. See Philipson, "Ἔλη ἀνθρώπων," p. 203.

<sup>h</sup> Plutarch, Placit. Philos. iv. 5. 'Εν

τῇ ἀρτηριακῇ κοιλίᾳ τῆς καρδίας, ἥτις ἐστὶ καὶ πνευματικῆ. See Panzerbieter's commentary upon these words, which are not very clear (c. 50), nor easy to reconcile with the description given by Diogenes himself of the veins.

<sup>i</sup> Plutarch, Placit. Philosoph. iv. 18. Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 39-41-43. Κριτικώτατον δὲ ἡδονῆς τὴν γλῶτταν ἀπαλώτατον γὰρ εἶναι καὶ μανθὸν καὶ τὰς φλέβας ἀπάσας ἀνῆκειν εἰς αὐτήν.

no visual sensation could take place;\* moreover if our minds or attention were absorbed in other things, we were often altogether insensible to sensations either of sight or of sound: which proved that the central air within us was the real seat of sensation.<sup>1</sup> Thought and intelligence, as well as sensation, was an attribute of the same central air within us, depending especially upon its purity, dryness, and heat, and impeded or deadened by moisture or cold. Both children and animals had less intelligence than men; because they had more moisture in their bodies, so that the veins were choked up, and the air could not get along them freely to all parts. Plants had no intelligence; having no apertures or ducts whereby the air could pervade their internal structure. Our sensations were pleasurable when there was much air mingled with the blood, so as to lighten the flow of it, and to carry it easily to all parts: they were painful when there was little air, and when the blood was torpid and thick.<sup>m</sup>

The structure of the Kosmos Diogenes supposed to have been effected by portions of the infinite air, taking upon them new qualities and undergoing various transformations. Some air, becoming cold, dense, and heavy, sunk down to the centre, and there remained stationary as earth and water: while the hotter, rarer, and lighter air ascended and formed the heavens, assuming through the intelligence included in it a rapid rotatory movement

Kosmology  
and Meteorology.

\* Plutarch, Placit. Philosoph. iv. 16; Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 40.

<sup>1</sup> Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 42. "Ὅτι δὲ ὁ ἐντὸς ἀὴρ αἰσθάνεται, μικρὸν ὄν μέρος τοῦ θεοῦ, σημείον εἶναι, ὅτι πολλάκις πρὸς ἄλλα τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντες οὐθ' ὀρώμεν οὐτ' ἀκούομεν. The same opinion—that sensation, like thought, is a mental process, depending on physical conditions—is ascribed to Strato (the disciple and successor of Theophrastus) by Porphyry, De Abstemitiâ, iii. 21. Στράτωνος τοῦ φυσικοῦ λόγος ἐστὶν ἀποδεικνύων, ὡς οὐδὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι τοπαράταν ἄνευ τοῦ νοεῖν ὑπάρχει καὶ γράμματα πολλάκις ἐπιπορευομένους τῇ ὄψει καὶ λόγοι προσπίπτοντες τῇ ἀκοῇ διαλανθάνουσιν ἡμᾶς καὶ διαφεύγουσιν πρὸς ἑτέρους τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντας—ἧ καὶ λέλεκται, νοὺς ὀρᾷ καὶ νοὺς ἀκούει, τῆλλα

κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά.

The expression ascribed to Diogenes by Theophrastus—ὁ ἐντὸς ἀὴρ, μικρὸν ὄν μέρος τοῦ θεοῦ—is so printed by Philipson; but the word θεοῦ seems not well avouched as to the text, and Schneider prints θυμοῦ. It is not impossible that Diogenes may have called the air God, without departing from his physical theory: but this requires proof.

<sup>m</sup> Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 43-46; Plutarch, Placit. Philos. v. 20. That moisture is the cause of dulness, and that the dry soul is the best and most intelligent, is cited among the doctrines of Herakleitus, with whom Diogenes of Apollonia is often in harmony. Αἴη ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη. See Schleiermach. Herakleitos, sect. 59-64.

round the earth, and shaping itself into sun, moon, and stars, which were light and porous bodies like pumice stone. The heat of this celestial matter acted continually upon the earth and water beneath, so that the earth became comparatively drier, and the water was more and more drawn up as vapour, to serve for nourishment to the heavenly bodies. The stars also acted as breathing-holes to the Kosmos, supplying the heated celestial mass with fresh air from the infinite mass without.<sup>n</sup> Like Anaxagoras, Diogenes conceived the figure of the earth as flat and round, like a drum; and the rotation of the heaven as lateral, with the axis perpendicular to the surface of the earth, and the north pole always at the zenith. This he supposed to have been the original arrangement; but after a certain time, the earth tilted over spontaneously towards the south—the northern half was elevated and the southern half depressed—so that the north pole was no longer at the zenith, and the axis of rotation of the heavens became apparently oblique.<sup>o</sup> He thought moreover that the existing Kosmos was only of temporary duration; that it would perish and be succeeded by future analogous systems, generated from the same common substance of the infinite and indestructible air.<sup>p</sup> Respecting animal generation—and to some extent respecting meteorological phenomena<sup>q</sup>—Diogenes also propounded several opinions, which are imperfectly known, but which appear to have resembled those of Anaxagoras.

<sup>n</sup> Plutarch ap. Eusebium Præp. Evang. i. 8; Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2; Diogen. Laert. ix. 53. Διογένης κισσηροειδῆ τὰ ἄστρα, διαπνοιᾶς δὲ αὐτὰ νομίζει τοῦ κόσμου, εἶναι δὲ διάπυρα συμπεριφέρεσθαι δὲ τοῖς φανεροῖς ἄστροις ἀφανεῖς λίθους καὶ παρ' αὐτῶ τούτ' ἀνωνήμους πίπτοντα δὲ πολλάκις ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς σβέννυσθαι καθάπερ τὸν ἐν Αἰγῶς ποταμοῖς πυρῶδ' καταεχθέντα ἄστέρων πέτρων. This remarkable anticipation of modern astronomy—the recognition of aerolites as a class of non-luminous earthy bodies revolving round the sun, but occasionally coming within the sphere of the earth's attraction, becoming luminous in our atmosphere, falling on the earth, and there being extinguished—is noticed by Alex. von Humboldt in his Kosmos, vol. i. p. 98-

104, Eng. trans. He says—"The opinion of Diogenes of Apollonia entirely accords with that of the present day," p. 110. The charm and value of that interesting book is greatly enhanced by his frequent reference to the ancient points of view on astronomical subjects.

<sup>o</sup> Plutarch, Placit. Philos. ii. 8; Panzerbieter, Diog. Ap. c. 76-78; Schaubach ad Anaxagor. Fr. p. 175.

<sup>p</sup> Plutarch ap. Eusebium, Præp. Evang. i. 8.

<sup>q</sup> Preller, Hist. Philosoph. Græc.-Rom. ex fontibus contexta, sect. 68. Preller thinks that Diogenes employed his chief attention "in animantium naturâ ex aeris principio repetendâ:" and that he was less full "in cognitione τῶν μετεώρων." But the fragments scarcely justify this.



Nearly contemporary with Anaxagoras and Empedokles, two other enquirers propounded a new physical theory very different from those already noticed—usually known under the name of the atomic theory. This theory, though originating with the Eleate Leukippus, obtained celebrity chiefly from his pupil Demokritus of Abdêra, its expositor and improver. Demokritus (born seemingly in B.C. 460, and reported to have reached extreme old age) was nine years younger than Sokrates, thirty-three years older than Plato, and forty years younger than Anaxagoras. The age of Leukippus is not known, but he can hardly have been much younger than Anaxagoras.<sup>†</sup>

Of Leukippus we know nothing: of Demokritus, very little —yet enough to exhibit a life, like that of Anaxagoras, consecrated to philosophical investigation, and neglectful not merely of politics, but even of inherited patrimony.<sup>‡</sup> His attention was chiefly turned towards the study of Nature, with conceptions less vague, and a more enlarged observation of facts, than any of his contemporaries had ever bestowed. He was enabled to boast that no one had surpassed him in extent of travelling over foreign lands, in intelligent research and converse with enlightened natives, or in following out the geometrical relations of lines.<sup>§</sup> He spent several years in visiting Egypt, Asia Minor, and Persia. His writings were numerous, and on many different subjects, including ethics, as well as physics; astronomy, and anthropology. None of them have been preserved. But we read even from critics like Dionysius of Halikarnassus and Cicero, that they were composed in an impressive and semi-poetical style, not unworthy to be mentioned in analogy with Plato; while in

<sup>†</sup> Diogen. Laert. ix. 41. See the chronology of Demokritus discussed in Mullach, Frag. Dem. p. 12-25; and in Zeller, Gesch. Philosoph. vol. i. p. 576-581, 2nd edit. The statement of Apollodorus as to the date of his birth, appears more trustworthy than the earlier date assigned by Thrasyllus (B.C. 470). Demokritus declared him-

self to be forty years younger than Anaxagoras.

<sup>‡</sup> Dionys. ix. 36-39.

<sup>§</sup> Demokrit. Fragm. 6, p. 238, ed. Mullach. Compare ib. p. 41; Diogen. Laert. ix. 35; Strabo, xv. p. 703.

Pliny, Hist. Natur. "Democritus—vitam inter experimenta consumpsit," &c.

range and diversity of subjects they are hardly inferior to Aristotle.<sup>u</sup>

The theory of Leukippus and Demokritus (we have no means of distinguishing the two) appears to have grown out of the Eleatic theory.\* Parmenides the Eleate (as I have already stated) in distinguishing Ens, the self-existent, real, or absolute, on one side—Relation between the theory of Demokritus and that of Parmenides.—from the phenomenal and relative on the other—conceived the former in such a way that its connection with the latter was dissolved. The real and absolute, according to him, was One, extended, enduring, continuous, unchangeable, immoveable: the conception of Ens included these affirmations, and at the same time excluded pre-emptorily Non-Ens, or the contrary of Ens. Now the plural, unextended, transient, discontinuous, changeable, and moving, implied a mixture of Ens and Non-Ens, or a partial transition from one to the other. Hence (since Non-Ens was inadmissible) such plurality, &c., could not belong to the real or absolute (ultra-phenomenal), and could only be affirmed as phenomenal or relative. In the latter sense, Parmenides *did* affirm it, and even tried to explain it: he explained the phenomenal facts from phenomenal assumptions, apart from and independent of the absolute. While thus breaking down the bridge between the phenomenal on one side and the absolute on the other, he nevertheless recognised each in a sphere of its own.

<sup>u</sup> Cicero, Orat. c. 20; Dionys. De Comp. Verbor. c. 24; Sextus Empir. adv. Mathem. vii. 265. Δημόκριτος, ὁ τῆ Διδος φάνη παρεκαζόμενος, &c.

Diogenes (ix. 45-48) enumerates the titles of the treatises of Demokritus, as edited in the days of Tiberius by the rhetor Thrasyllus: who distributed them into tetralogies, as he also distributed the dialogues of Plato. It was probably the charm of style, common to Demokritus with Plato, which induced the rhetor thus to edit them both. In regard to scope and spirit of philosophy, the difference between the two was so marked, that Plato is said to have had a positive antipathy to

the works of Demokritus, and a desire to burn them (Aristoxenus ap. Diog. Laert. ix. 40). It could hardly be from congeniality of doctrine that the same editor attached himself to both. It has been remarked that Plato never once names Demokritus, while Aristotle cites him very frequently, sometimes with marked praise.

\* Simplikios, in Aristotel. Physic. fol. 7 A. Λεύκιππος . . . κοινώσας Παρμενίδη τῆς φιλοσοφίας, οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐβάδισε Παρμενίδη καὶ Ξενοφάνει περὶ τῶν ὄντων δόξαν, ἀλλ', ὡς δοκεῖ, τὴν ἐναντίαν. Aristotel. De Gener. et Corr. i. 8, p. 251, a. 31, Diogen. Laert. ix. 30.

This bridge the atomists undertook to re-establish. They admitted that Ens could not really change—that there could be no real generation, or destruction—no transformation of qualities—no transition of many into one, or of one into many. But they denied the unity and continuity and immobility of Ens: they affirmed that it was essentially discontinuous, plural, and moving. They distinguished the extended, which Parmenides had treated as an *Unum continuum*, into extension with body, and extension without body: into *plenum* and *vacuum*, matter and space. They conceived themselves to have thus found positive meanings both for Ens and Non-Ens. That which Parmenides called Non-Ens or nothing, was in their judgment the *vacuum*; not less self-existent than that which he called Something. They established their point by showing, that Ens, thus interpreted, would become reconcilable to the phenomena of sense: which latter they assumed as their basis to start from. Assuming motion as a phenomenal fact, obvious and incontestable, they asserted that it could not even appear to be a fact, without supposing *vacuum* as well as body to be real: and the proof that both of them were real was, that only in this manner could sense and reason be reconciled. Farther, they proved the existence of a *vacuum* by appeal to direct physical observation, which showed that bodies were porous, compressible, and capable of receiving into themselves new matter in the way of nutrition. Instead of the Parmenidean Ens, one and continuous, we have a Demokritean Ens, essentially many and discontinuous: *plena* and *vacua*, spaces full and spaces empty, being infinitely intermingled.<sup>7</sup> There existed atoms innumerable,

Demokritean  
theory—  
Atoms—  
Plena and  
Vacua—Ens  
and Non-Ens.

<sup>7</sup> It is chiefly in the eighth chapter of the treatise De Gener. et Corr. (i. 8) that Aristotle traces the doctrine of Leukippus as having grown out of that of the Eleates. Λεύκιππος δ' ἔχειν φήθη λόγους, οἵτινες πρὸς τὴν αἰσθησιν ὁμολογούμενα λέγοντες οὐκ ἀναίρησιν οὔτε γένεσιν οὔτε φθορὰν οὔτε κίνησιν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὄντων, &c.

Compare also Aristotle. De Cælo, iii. 4, p. 303, a. 6; Metaphys. i. 4. p. 985,

b. 5; Physic. iv. 6. λέγουσι δὲ (Demokritus, in proving a vacuum) ἐν μὲν ὅτι ἡ κίνησις ἢ κατὰ τόπον οὐκ ἂν εἴη, οὐ γὰρ ἂν δοκοίη εἶναι κίνησις εἰ μὴ ἢ κενόν· τὸ γὰρ πλήρες ἀδύνατον εἶναι δέξασθαι, &c.

Plutarch adv. Colot. p. 1108. οἷς οὐδ' ἔναρ ἐντυχῶν ὁ Κολώτης, ἐσφάλη περὶ λέξις τοῦ ἀνδρὸς (Demokritus) ἐν ἧ διορίζεται, μὴ μᾶλλον τὸ δέν, ἢ τὸ μῆδέν εἶναι· δέν μὲν ὀνομάζων τὸ σῶμα,

each one in itself essentially a plenum, admitting no vacant space within it, and therefore indivisible as well as indestructible: but each severed from the rest by surrounding vacant space. The atom could undergo no change: but by means of the empty space around, it could freely move. Each atom was too small to be visible: yet all atoms were not equally small: there were fundamental differences between them in figure and magnitude: and they had no other qualities except figure and magnitude. As no atom could be divided into two, so no two atoms could merge into one. Yet though two or more atoms could not so merge together as to lose their real separate individuality, they might nevertheless come into such close approximation as to appear one, and to act on our senses as a phenomenal combination manifesting itself by new sensible properties.<sup>2</sup>

The bridge, broken down by Parmenides, between the real and the phenomenal world, was thus in theory re-established. For the real world, as described by Demokritus, differed entirely

*μηδὲν δὲ τὸ κενόν, ὡς καὶ τούτου φύσιν  
τινὰ καὶ ὑπόστασιν ἰδίαν ἔχοντος.*

The affirmation of Demokritus—That Nothing existed, just as much as Something—appears a paradox which we must probably understand as implying that he here adopted, for the sake of argument, the language of the Eleates, his opponents. They called the vacuum *Nothing*, but Demokritus did not so call it. If (said Demokritus) you call vacuum *Nothing*, then I say that *Nothing* exists as well as *Something*.

The direct observations by which Demokritus showed the existence of a vacuum were—1. A vessel with ashes in it will hold as much water as if it were empty: hence we know that there are pores in the ashes, into which the water is received. 2. Wine can be compressed in skins. 3. The growth of organised bodies proves that they have pores, through which new matter in the form of nourishment is admitted. (Aristot. *Physic.* iv. 6, p. 213, b.)

Besides this, Demokritus set forth motion as an indisputable fact, ascertained by the evidence of sense: and affirmed that motion was impossible, except on the assumption that vacuum

existed. Melissus, the disciple of Parmenides, inverted the reasoning, in arguing against the reality of motion. If it be real (he said), then there must exist a vacuum: but no vacuum does or can exist: therefore there is no real motion. (Aristot. *Physic.* iv. 6.)

Since Demokritus started from these facts of sense, as the base of his hypothesis of atoms and vacuum, so Aristotel. (Gen. et. Corr. i. 2; De Animâ, i. 2) might reasonably say that he took sensible appearances as truth. But we find Demokritus also describing reason as an improvement and enlightenment of sense, and complaining how little of truth was discoverable by man. See Mullach, Demokritus (p. 414, 415). Compare Philipson—*Ἔλη ἀνθρωπίνῃ*—Berlin, 1831.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotel. Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 325, a. 25, τὰ πρῶτα μεγέθη τὰ ἀδιαίρετα στέρεα. Diogen. Laert. ix. 44; Plutarch, adv. Koloten. p. 1110 seq.

Zeller, *Gesch. der Philos.* vol. i. p. 583-588, ed. 2nd; Aristotel. *Metaphys.* Z. 13, p. 1039, a. 10, ἀδύνατον εἶναι φησι Δημόκριτος ἐκ δύο ἐν ἡ ἕξ ἐνός δύο γενέσθαι τὰ γὰρ μεγέθη τὰ ἄτομα τὰς οὐσίας ποιεῖ.

from the sameness and barrenness of the Parmenidean Ens, and presented sufficient movement and variety to supply a basis of explanatory hypotheses, accommodated to more or less of the varieties in the phenomenal world. In respect of quality, indeed, all the atoms were alike, not less than all the vacua: such likeness was (according to Demokritus) the condition of their being able to act upon each other, or to combine as phenomenal aggregates.<sup>a</sup> But in respect to quantity or magnitude as well as in respect to figure, they differed very greatly: moreover, besides all these diversities, the ordination and position of each atom with regard to the rest were variable in every way. As all objects of sense were atomic compounds, so, from such fundamental differences—partly in the constituent atoms themselves, partly in the manner of their arrangement when thrown into combination—arose all the diverse qualities and manifestations of the compounds. When atoms passed into new combination, then there was generation of a new substance: when they passed out of an old combination there was destruction: when the atoms remained the same, but were merely arranged anew in order and relative position, then the phenomenon was simply change. Hence all qualities and manifestations of such compounds were not original, but derivative: they had no “nature of their own,” or law peculiar to them, but followed from the atomic composition of the body to which they belonged. They were not real and absolute, like the magnitude and figure of the constituent atoms, but phenomenal and relative—*i. e.* they were powers of acting upon correlative organs of sentient beings, and nullities in the absence of such organs.<sup>b</sup> Such were the

<sup>a</sup> Aristotel. Gener. et Corr. i. 7, p. 323, b. 12. It was the opinion of Demokritus, that there could be no action except where agent and patient were alike. Φησὶ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὁμοῖον εἶναι τὸ τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον· οὐ γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖν τὰ ἕτερα καὶ διαφέροντα πάσχειν ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων ἀλλὰ κἂν ἕτερα ὄντι ποιῆ τι εἰς ἕλληλα, οὐχ ἢ ἕτερα, ἀλλ’ ἢ ταῦτόν τι ὑπάρχει, ταύτη τοῦτο συμβαίνειν αὐτοῖς. Many contemporary

philosophers affirmed distinctly the opposite. Τὸ ὁμοῖον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου πᾶν ἀπαθές, &c. Diogenes the Apolloniate agreed on this point generally with Demokritus; see above, p. 63, note <sup>b</sup>. The facility with which these philosophers laid down general maxims is constantly observable.

<sup>b</sup> Aristot. Gen. et Corr. i. 2, p. 316, a. 1; Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 63, 64. Περὶ μὲν οὖν βαρέος καὶ κούφου καὶ

colour, sonorousness, taste, smell, heat, cold, &c. of the bodies around us: they were relative, implying correlative percipients. Moreover they were not merely relative, but perpetually fluctuating; since the compounds were frequently changing either in arrangement or in diversity of atoms, and every such atomic change, even to a small extent, caused it to work differently upon our organs.<sup>c</sup>

Among the various properties of bodies, however, there were two which Demokritus recognised as not merely relative to the observer, but also as absolute and belonging to the body in itself. These were weight and hardness—primary qualities (to use the phraseology of Locke and Reid), as contrasted with the secondary qualities of colour, taste, and the like. Weight, or tendency downward, belonged (according to Demokritus) to each individual atom separately, in proportion to its magnitude: the specific gravity of all atoms was supposed to be equal. In compound bodies one body was heavier than another, in proportion as its bulk was more filled with atoms and less with vacant space.<sup>d</sup> The hardness and softness of bodies Demokritus explained by the peculiar size and peculiar junction of their component atoms. Thus, comparing lead with iron, the former is heavier and softer, the latter is lighter and harder. Bulk for bulk, the lead contained a larger proportion of solid, and a smaller proportion of interstices, than the iron: hence it was heavier. But its structure was equable throughout; it had a greater multitude of minute atoms diffused through its bulk, equally close to

Combinations of atoms—generating different qualities in the compound.

σκληροῦ καὶ μαλακοῦ ἐν τούτοις ἀφορίζει τῶν δὲ ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν οὐδεὺς εἶναι φύσιν, ἀλλὰ πάντα πάθη τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀλλοιομένης, ἐξ ἧς γίνεσθαι τὴν φαντασίαν, &c.

Stobæus, Eclog. Physic. i. c. 17. Φύσιν μὲν μηδὲν εἶναι χρώμα, τὰ μὲν γὰρ στοιχεῖα ἄπιοι, τὰ τε μεστὰ καὶ τὸ κενόν τὰ δ' ἐξ αὐτῶν συγκρίματα κέχρωσθαι διαταγῇ τε καὶ ῥυθμῷ καὶ προτροπῇ, &c.

Demokritus restricted the term Φύσις—Nature—to the primordial atoms and vacua (Simplikius ad Aristot. Physic. p. 310 A.).

<sup>c</sup> Aristotel. Gen. et Corr. i. 2, p. 315, b. 10. Ὅστε ταῖς μεταβολαῖς τοῦ συγκειμένου τὸ αὐτὸ ἐναντίον δοκεῖν ἄλλω καὶ ἄλλω, καὶ μετακινεῖσθαι μικροῦ ἐμμιγνυμένου, καὶ ὅλως ἕτερον φαίνεσθαι ἐνδὸς μετακινήθ' ἐντος.

<sup>d</sup> Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 61. Βαρὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ κοῦφον τῷ μεγέθει διαίρει Δημόκριτος, &c.

Aristotel. De Cælo, iv. 2, 7, p. 309, a. 10; Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 326, a. 9. Καίτοι βαρύτερον γε κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν φησι Δημόκριτος ἕκαστον τῶν ἀδιαφρέτων, &c.

and coherent with each other on every side, but not more close and coherent on one side than on another. The structure of the iron, on the contrary, was unequal and irregular, including larger spaces of vacuum in one part, and closer approach of its atoms in other parts: moreover these atoms were in themselves larger, hence there was a greater force of cohesion between them on one particular side, rendering the whole mass harder and more unyielding than the lead.<sup>e</sup>

We thus see that Demokritus, though he supposed single atoms to be all of the same specific gravity, yet recognised a different specific gravity in the various compounds of atoms or material masses. It is to be remembered, that when we speak of contact or combination of atoms, this is not to be understood literally and absolutely, but only in a phenomenal and relative sense; as an approximation, more or less close, but always sufficiently close to form an atomic combination which our senses apprehended as one object. Still every atom was essentially separate from every other, and surrounded by a margin of vacant space: no two atoms could merge into one, any more than one atom could be divided into two.

Pursuant to this theory, Demokritus proclaimed that all the properties of objects, except weight, hardness, and softness, were not inherent in the objects themselves, but simply phenomenal and relative to the observer — “modifications of our sensibility.” Colour, taste, smell, sweet and bitter, hot and cold, &c., were of this description. In respect to all of them, man differed from other animals, one man from another, and even the same man from himself at different times and ages. There was no sameness of impression, no unanimity or constancy of judgment, because there was no real or objective “nature” corresponding to the impression. From none of these senses could we at all learn what the external thing was in itself.

All atoms essentially separate from each other.

All properties of objects, except weight and hardness, were phenomenal and relative to the observer. Sensation could give no knowledge of the real and absolute.

<sup>e</sup> Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 62.

“Sweet and bitter, hot and cold (he said) are by law or convention (*i. e.* these names designate the impressions of most men on most occasions, taking no account of dissentients): what really exists is, atoms and vacuum. The sensible objects which we suppose and believe to exist, do not exist in truth; there exist only atoms and vacuum. We know nothing really and truly about an object, either what it is or what it is not: our opinions depend upon influences from without, upon the position of our body, upon the contact and resistances of external objects. There are two phases of knowledge, the obscure and the genuine. To the obscure belong all our senses—sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. The genuine is distinct from these. When the obscure phase fails, when we can no longer see, nor hear, nor smell, nor taste, nor touch—from minuteness and subtlety of particles—then the genuine phase, or reason and intelligence, comes into operation.”<sup>f</sup>

True knowledge (in the opinion of Demokritus) was hardly at all attainable; but in so far as it could be attained, we must seek it, not merely through the obscure and insufficient avenues of sense, but by reason or intelligence penetrating to the ultimatum of corpuscular structure, farther than sense could go. His atoms were not pure Abstracta (like Plato’s Ideas and geometrical plane figures, and Aristotle’s *materia prima*), but concrete bodies, each with its own<sup>g</sup> magnitude, figure, and movement; too small to be seen or felt by us, yet not too small to be seen or felt by beings endowed with finer sensitive power. They were abstractions mainly in so far as all other qualities were supposed absent. Demokritus professed to show how the movements, approximations, and collisions of these atoms, brought them into such combi-

Reason alone gave true and real knowledge, but very little of it was attainable.

<sup>f</sup> Demokritus, Fr. p. 205, Mullach; Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathemat. vii. p. 135; Diogen. Laert. ix. 72.

<sup>g</sup> Aristotel. Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 325, a. 29. Ἄπειρα τὰ πλῆθος καὶ ἀόρατα διὰ τὴν σμικρότητα τῶν ὄγκων, &c.

Marbach observes justly that the Demokritean atoms, though not really objects of sense in consequence of their

smallness (of their disproportion to our visual power), are yet spoken of as objects of sense: they are as it were microscopic objects, and the *γνησίη γνώμη*, or intelligence, is conceived as supplying something of a microscopic power. (Marbach, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, sect. 58, vol. i. p. 94.)



nations as to form the existing Kosmos; and not that system alone, but also many other cosmical systems, independent of and different from each other, which he supposed to exist.

How this was done we cannot clearly make out, not having before us the original treatise of Demokritus, called the Great Diakosmos. It is certain, however, that he did not invoke any separate agency to set the atoms in motion—such as the Love and Discord of Empedokles—the Nous or Intelligence of Anaxagoras. Demokritus supposed that the atoms moved by an inherent force of their own: that this motion was as much without beginning as the atoms themselves:<sup>b</sup> that eternal motion was no less natural, no more required any special cause to account for it, than eternal rest. “Such is the course of nature—such is and always has been the fact,” was his ultimatum.<sup>1</sup> He farther maintained that all the motions of the atoms were necessary—that is, that they followed each other in a determinate order, each depending upon some one or more antecedents, according to fixed laws, which he could not explain.<sup>k</sup> Fixed laws, known or unknown, he recognised always.

No separate force required to set the atoms in motion—they moved by an inherent force of their own. Like atoms naturally tend towards like. Rotatory motion, the capital fact of the Kosmos.

<sup>b</sup> Aristotel. De Cælo, iii. 2, 3, p. 300, b. 9. *Λευκίππῳ καὶ Δημοκρίτῳ, τοῖς λέγουσιν ἅει κινεῖσθαι τὰ πρῶτα σώματα, &c.* (Physic. viii. 3, 3, p. 253, b. 12, viii. 9, p. 265, b. 23; Cicero, De Finib. i. 6, 17.)

<sup>1</sup> Aristot. Generat. Animal. ii. 6, p. 742, b. 20; Physic. viii. 1, p. 252, b. 32.

Aristotle blames Demokritus for thus acquiescing in the general course of nature as an ultimatum, and for omitting all reference to final causes. M. Lafaist, in a good dissertation Sur la Philosophie Atomistique (Paris, 1833, p. 78), shows that this is exactly the ultimatum of natural philosophers at the present day. “Un phénomène se passoit il, si on lui en demandoit la raison, il (Demokritus) répondoit, ‘La chose se passe ainsi, parcequ’elle s’est toujours passée ainsi.’ C’est, en d’autres termes, la seule réponse que font aujourd’hui les naturalistes. Suivant eux, une pierre, quand elle n’est pas soutenue, tombe en vertu de la loi de la pesanteur. Qu’est ce que la loi de la pesanteur? La généralisation de ce fait

plusieurs fois observé, qu’une pierre tombe quand elle n’est pas soutenue. Le phénomène dans un cas particulier arrive ainsi, parceque toujours il est arrivé ainsi. Le principe qu’implique l’explication des naturalistes modernes est celle de Démokrite, c’est que la nature demeure constante à elle-même. La proposition de Démokrite—‘Tel phénomène a lieu de cette façon, parceque toujours il a eu lieu de cette même façon’—est la première forme qu’ait revêtue le principe de la stabilité des lois naturelles.”

<sup>k</sup> Aristotle (Physic. ii. 4, p. 196, a. 25) says that Demokritus (he seems to mean Demokritus) described the motion of the atoms to form the cosmical system, as having taken place *ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου*. Upon which Mullach (Dem. Frag. p. 382) justly remarks—“Casu (ἀπὸ τὰυτομάτου) videntur fieri, quæ naturali quâdam necessitate cujus leges ignoramus, evenire dicuntur. Sed quamvis Aristoteles naturalem Abderitani philosophi necessitatem vitato ἀνάγκης vocabulo, quod alii aliter

Fortune or chance was only a fiction imagined by men to cover their own want of knowledge and foresight.<sup>m</sup> Demokritus seems to have supposed that like atoms had a spontaneous tendency towards like; that all, when uncombined, tended naturally downwards, yet with unequal force, owing to their different size, and weight proportional to size; that this unequal force brought them into impact and collision one with another, out of which was generated a rotatory motion, gradually extending itself, and comprehending a larger and larger number of them, up to a certain point, when an exterior membrane or shell was formed around them.<sup>n</sup> This rotatory motion was the capital fact which both constituted the Kosmos, and maintained the severance of its central and peripheral masses—Earth and Water in the centre—Air, Fire, and the celestial bodies, near the circumference. Demokritus, Anaxagoras, and Empedokles, imagined different preliminary hypotheses to get at the fact of rotation; but all employed the fact, when arrived at, as a basis from which to

usurpabant, casum et fortunam vocaret — ipse tamen Democritus abhorrens ab iis omnibus quæ destinatam causarum seriem tollerent rerumque naturam perturbarent, nihil juris fortunæ et casui in singulis rebus concessit.”

Zeller has a like remark upon the phrase of Aristotle, which is calculated to mislead as to the doctrine of Demokritus (Gesch. Philos. i. p. 600, 2nd. ed.).

Dugald Stewart, in one of the Dissertations prefixed to the Encyclopædia Britannica, has the like comment respecting the fundamental principle of the Epicurean (identical *quoad hoc* with the Demokritean) philosophy.

“I cannot conclude this note without recurring to an observation ascribed by Laplace to Leibnitz—‘that the *blind chance* of the Epicureans involves the supposition of an effect taking place without a cause.’ This is a very incorrect statement of the philosophy taught by Lucretius, which nowhere gives countenance to such a supposition. The distinguishing tenet of this sect was, that the order of the universe does not imply the existence of *intelligent* causes, but may be accounted for by the active powers belonging to the atoms of matter: which active powers, being exerted through an indefinitely

long period of time, might have produced, nay must have produced, exactly such a combination of things as that with which we are surrounded. This does not call in question the necessity of a cause to produce every effect, but, on the contrary, virtually assumes the truth of that axiom. It only excludes from these causes the attribute of intelligence. In the same way, when I apply the words *blind chance* to the throw of a die, I do not mean to deny that I am ultimately the cause of the particular event that is to take place: but only to intimate that I do not here act as a *designing* cause, in consequence of my ignorance of the various accidents to which the die is subjected while shaken in the box. If I am not mistaken, this Epicurean theory approaches very nearly to the scheme which it is the main object of the Essay on Probabilities (by Laplace) to inculcate.” (Stewart—First Dissertation, part ii. p. 139, note.)

<sup>m</sup> Demokrit. Frag. p. 167, ed. Mullach; Eusebius, Præp. Evang. xiv. 27. ἄνθρωποι τύχης εἰδωλον ἐπλάσαντο πρόφασιν ἰδίης ἀβουλήs.

<sup>n</sup> Zeller, Gesch. Phil. i. p. 604 seq.; Demokrit. Fragm. p. 207, Mull.; Sext. Empiricus adv. Mathem. vii. 117.

deduce the formation of the various cosmical bodies and their known manifestations.<sup>o</sup> In respect to these bodies—Sun, Moon, Stars, Earth, &c.—Demokritus seems to have held several opinions like those of Anaxagoras. Both of them conceived the Sun as a red-hot mass, and the Earth as a flat surface above and below, round horizontally like a drum, stationary in the centre of the revolving celestial bodies, and supported by the resistance of air beneath.<sup>p</sup>

Among the researches of Demokritus there were some relating to animal generation, and zoology; but we cannot find that his opinions on these subjects were in peculiar connection with his atomic theory.<sup>q</sup>

Nor do we know how far he carried out that theory into detail by tracing the various phenomenal manifestations to their basis in atomic reality, and by showing what particular magnitude, figure, and arrangement of atoms belonged to each. It was only in some special cases that he thus connected determinate atoms with compounds of determinate quality: for example, in regard to the four Empedoklean elements. The atoms constituting heat or fire he affirmed to be small and globular, the most mobile, rapid, and penetrating of all: those constituting air, water, and earth, were an assemblage of all varieties of figures, but differed from each other in magnitude—the atoms of air being apparently smallest, those of earth largest.<sup>r</sup>

In regard to mind or soul generally, he identified it with heat or fire, conceiving it to consist in the same very small, globular, rapidly moveable atoms, penetrating everywhere: which he illustrated by comparison with the fine dust seen in sunbeams when shining through a doorway. That these were the constituent atoms of mind, he proved by the fact, that its first and most essential property was to move the body, and to be itself moved.<sup>s</sup> Mind,

Researches of Demokritus on zoology and animal generation.

His account of mind—he identified it with heat or fire, diffused throughout animals, plants, and nature generally. Mental particles intermingled throughout all frame with corporeal particles.

<sup>o</sup> Demokrit. Fragm. p. 208, Mullach. Δημόκριτος ἐν οἷς φησὶ δίνῃ ἀπὸ παντὸς ἀποκρίνεσθαι παντοίων εἰδέων, &c.

Diog. Laert. ix. 31-44.

<sup>p</sup> Zeller, Gesch. Ph. i. p. 612, ed. 2nd.

<sup>q</sup> Mullach, Demokr. Fragm. p. 395 seqq.

<sup>r</sup> Aristotle, Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 326, a. 5; De Cælo, iii. 8, p. 306, b. 35; Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 64.

<sup>s</sup> Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2, 2-3, p. 403, b. 28; i. 3, p. 406, b. 20; Cicero, Tuscul. Disput. i. 11; Diogen. Laert. ix. 44.

soul, the vital principle, fire, heat, &c., were in the opinion of Demokritus, substantially identical—not confined to man or even to animals, but diffused in unequal proportions, throughout plants, the air, and nature generally. Sensation, thought, knowledge, were all motions of mind or of these restless mental particles, which Demokritus supposed to be distributed over every part of the living body, mingling and alternating with the corporeal particles.<sup>†</sup> It was the essential condition of life, that the mental particles should be maintained in proper number and distribution throughout the body; but by their subtle nature they were constantly tending to escape, being squeezed or thrust out at all apertures by the pressure of air on all the external parts. Such tendency was counteracted by the process of respiration, whereby mental or vital particles, being abundantly distributed throughout the air, were inhaled along with air, and formed an inward current which either prevented the escape, or compensated the loss, of those which were tending outwards. When breathing ceased, such inward current being no longer kept up, the vital particles in the interior were speedily forced-out, and death ensued.<sup>‡</sup>

Though Demokritus conceived these mental particles as distributed all over the body, yet he recognised different mental aptitudes attached to different parts of the body. Besides the special organs of sense, he considered intelligence as attached to the brain, passion to the heart, and appetite to the liver:<sup>x</sup> the same tripartite division afterwards adopted by Plato. He gave an explanation of perception or sensation in its different varieties, as well as of intelligence or thought. Sensation

Different mental aptitudes attached to different parts of the body.

<sup>†</sup> Aristotel. De Respirat. (c. 4, p. 472, a. 5), λέγει (Demokritus) ὡς ἡ ψυχή καὶ τὸ θερμὸν ταῦτων, τὰ πρῶτα σχήματα τῶν σφαιροειδῶν.

Lucretius, iii. 370.

“ Illud in his rebus nequaquam sumere possis, Democriti quod sancta viri sententia ponit; Corporis atque animi primordia singula privis Apposita alternis variare et nectere membra.”

<sup>‡</sup> Aristotel. De Respiratione, c. 4, p. 472, a. 10; De Animâ, i. 2, p. 404, a. 12.

<sup>x</sup> Zeller, Geschicht. Philos. i. p. 618, ed. 2nd.

Plutarch (Placit. Philos. iv. 4) ascribes a bipartite division of the soul to Demokritus: τὸ λογικόν, in the thorax: τὸ ἄλογον, distributed over all the body. But in the next section (iv. 5), he departs from this statement, affirming that both Demokritus and Plato supposed τὸ ἡγεμονικόν of the soul to be in the head.

and thought were, in his opinion, alike material, and alike mental. Both were affections of the same peculiar particles, vital or mental, within us: both were changes operated in these particles by effluvia or images from without; nevertheless the one change was different from the other.<sup>y</sup>

In regard to sensations, Demokritus said little about those of touch, smell, and hearing; but he entered at some length into those of sight and taste.<sup>z</sup>

Proceeding upon his hypothesis of atoms and vacua as the only objective existences, he tried to show what particular modifications of atoms, in figure, size, and position, produced upon the sentient the impressions of different colours. He recognised four fundamental or simple colours—white, black, red, and green—of which all other colours were mixtures and combinations.<sup>a</sup> White colour (he said) was caused by smooth surfaces, which presented strait pores and a transparent structure, such as the interior surface of shells: where these smooth substances were brittle or friable, this arose from the constituent atoms being at once spherical and loosely connected together, whereby they presented the clearest passage through their pores, the least amount of shadow, and the purest white colour. From substances thus constituted, the effluvia flowed out easily, and passed through the intermediate air without becoming entangled or confused with it. Black colour was caused by rough, irregular, unequal substances, which had their pores crooked and obstructed, casting much shadow, and sending forth slowly their effluvia, which became hampered and entangled with the intervening medium of air. Red colour

<sup>y</sup> Plutarch, *Placit. Philos.* iv. 8. Demokritus and Leukippus affirm, *τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὴν νόησιν γίνεσθαι, εἰδώλων ἔξωθεν προσιόντων· μηδὲν γὰρ ἐπιβάλλειν μηδετέραν χωρὶς τοῦ προσπίπτοντος εἰδώλου.*

Cicero, *De Finibus*, i. 6, 21, “*imagines, quæ idola nominant, quorum incursione non solum videamus, sed etiam cogitemus,*” &c.

<sup>z</sup> Theophrastus, *De Sensu*, s. 64.

<sup>a</sup> Theophrastus, *De Sensu*, s. 73 seq.; Aristotel. *De Sensu*. c. iv. p. 442, b. 10.

The opinions of Demokritus on colour are illustrated at length by Prantl in his *Uebersicht der Farbenlehre der Alten* (p. 49 seq.), appended to his edition of the Aristotelian or Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise, *Περὶ Χρωμάτων* (Munich, 1849).

Demokritus seems also to have attempted to show, that the sensation of cold and shivering was produced by the irruption of jagged and acute atoms. See Plutarch, *De Primo Frigido*, p. 947, 948, c. 8.

arose from the effluvia of spherical atoms, like those of fire, though of larger size: the connection between red colour and fire was proved by the fact that heated substances, man as well as the metals, became red. Green was produced by atoms of large size and wide vacua, not restricted to any determinate shape, but arranged in peculiar order and position. These four were given by Demokritus as the simple colours. But he recognised an infinite diversity of compound colours, arising from mixture of them in different proportions, several of which he explained—gold-colour, purple, blue, violet, leek-green, nut-brown, &c.<sup>b</sup>

Besides thus setting forth those varieties of atoms and atomic motions which produced corresponding varieties of colour, Demokritus also brought to view the intermediate stages whereby they realised the act of vision. All objects, compounds of the atoms, gave out effluvia or images resembling themselves. These effluvia stamped their impression, first upon the intervening air, next upon the eye beyond: which, being covered by a fine membrane, and consisting partly of water, partly of vacuum, was well calculated to admit the image. Such an image, the like of which any one might plainly see by looking into another person's eye, was the immediate cause of vision.<sup>c</sup> The air, however, was no way necessary as an intervening medium, but rather obstructive: the image proceeding from the object would be more clearly impressed upon the eye through a vacuum: if the air did not exist, vision would be so distinct, even at the farthest distance, that an object not larger than an ant might be seen in the heavens.<sup>d</sup> Demokritus believed that the visual image after having been impressed upon the eye, was distributed or multiplied over the remaining body.<sup>e</sup> In like manner, he believed, that in

Vision caused by the outflow of effluvia or images from objects. Hearing.

<sup>b</sup> Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 76-78. ἄπειρα τὰ χρώματα καὶ τοὺς χύλους κατὰ τὰς μίξεις—οὐδὲν γὰρ ὁμοιον εἶσθαι θάτερον θάτερον.

<sup>c</sup> Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 50. τὸν ἀέρα τὸν μεταξὺ τῆς ὕψεως καὶ τοῦ ὀρωμένου τυπούσθαι, &c. Aristotel. De Sensu, c. 2, p. 438, a. 6.

Theophrastus notices this intermediate ἀποτύπωσις ἐν τῷ ἀέρι as a doctrine peculiar (ἰδίως) to Demokritus: he himself proceeds to combat it (51, 52).

<sup>d</sup> Aristotel. De Animâ, ii. 7-9, p. 419, a. 16.

<sup>e</sup> Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 54.

hearing, the condensed air carrying the sound entered with some violence through the ears, passed through the veins to the brain, and was from thence dispersed over the body.<sup>f</sup> Both sight and hearing were thus not simply acts of the organ of sense, but concurrent operations of the entire frame: over all which (as has been already stated) the mental or vital particles were assumed to be disseminated.

Farther, Demokritus conceived that the diversities of taste were generated by corresponding diversities of atoms, or compounds of atoms, of particular figure, magnitude, and position. Acid taste was caused by atoms rough, angular, twisted, small, and subtle, which forced their way through all the body, produced large interior vacant spaces, and thereby generated great heat: for heat was always proportional to the amount of vacuum within.<sup>g</sup> Sweet taste was produced by spherical atoms of considerable bulk, which slid gently along and diffused themselves equably over the body, modifying and softening the atoms of an opposite character. Astringent taste was caused by large atoms with many angles, which got into the vessels, obstructing the movement of fluids both in the veins and intestines. Salt taste was produced by large atoms, much entangled with each other, and irregular. In like manner Demokritus assigned to other tastes particular varieties of generating atoms: adding, however, that in every actual substance, atoms of different figures were intermingled, so that the effect of each on the whole was only realised in the ratio of the preponderating figure.<sup>h</sup> Lastly, the working of all atoms, in the way of taste, was greatly modified by the particular system upon

<sup>f</sup> Theophrastus, De Sensu, 55, 56. *τὴν γὰρ φωνὴν εἶναι πυκνουμένου τοῦ αἵρος καὶ μετὰ βίας εἰσιόντος, &c.*

Demokritus thought that air entered into the system not only through the ears, but also through pores in other parts of the body, though so gently as to be imperceptible to our consciousness: the ears afforded a large aperture and admitted a considerable mass.

<sup>g</sup> Theophrast. De Sensu, 65-68.

<sup>h</sup> Theophrast. De Sensu, 67. *ἀπάν-*

*των δὲ τῶν σχημάτων οὐδὲν ἀκέραιον εἶναι καὶ ἀμιγῆς τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκάστῳ πολλὰ εἶναι . . . δ' ἐν ἑνῇ πλείστον, τοῦτο μάλιστα ἐνισχύει πρὸς τε τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν.*

This essential intermixture, in each distinct substance, of atoms of all different shapes, is very analogous to the essential intermixture of all sorts of Homœomerics in the theory of Anaxagoras.

which they were brought to act: effects totally opposite being sometimes produced by like atoms upon different individuals.<sup>i</sup>

As sensation, so also thought or intelligence, was produced by the working of atoms from without. But in what manner the different figures and magnitudes of atoms were understood to act, in producing diverse modifications of thought,—we do not find explained. It was, however, requisite that there should be a symmetry, or correspondence of condition between the thinking mind within and the inflowing atoms from without, in order that these latter might work upon a man properly: if he were too hot, or too cold, his mind went astray.<sup>k</sup> Though Demokritus identified the mental or vital particles with the spherical atoms constituting heat or fire, he nevertheless seems to have held, that these particles might be in excess as well as in deficiency, and that they required, as a condition of sound mind, to be diluted or attempered with others. The soundest mind, however, did not work by itself or spontaneously, but was put in action by atoms or effluvia from without: this was true of the intellectual mind, not less than of the sensational mind. There was an objective something without, corresponding to and generating every different thought—just as there was an objective something corresponding to every different sensation. But first, the object of sensation was an atomic compound having some appreciable bulk, while that of thought might be separate atoms or vacua so minute as to be invisible and intangible. Next, the object of sensation did not reveal itself as it was in its own nature, but merely produced changes in the percipient, and different changes in different percipients (except as to heavy and light, hard and soft, which were not simply modifications of our sensibility, but were also primary qualities inherent in the

Thought or  
Intelligence  
—was pro-  
duced by in-  
flux of atoms  
from with-  
out.

<sup>i</sup> Theophrast. De Sensu, 67. εἰς ὅποιαν ἔξιν ἂν εἰσέλθῃ, διαφέρειν οὐκ ὀλίγον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ αὐτὸ τάναντια, καὶ τάναντια τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ποιεῖν ἐνίοτε.

<sup>k</sup> Theophrast. De Sensu, 58. Περὶ

δὲ τοῦ φρονεῖν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἴρηκεν, ὅτι γίνεται συμμέτρως ἐχούσης τῆς ψυχῆς μετὰ τὴν κίνησιν ἕαν δὲ περιθέρμος τις ἢ περιψυχρος γένηται, μεταλλάττει φησί.



objects themselves<sup>1</sup>): while the object of thought, though it worked a change in the thinking subject, yet also revealed itself as it was, and worked alike upon all.

Hence Demokritus termed sensation, *obscure knowledge*—thought, *genuine knowledge*.<sup>m</sup> It was only by thought (reason, intelligence) that the fundamental realities of nature, atoms and vacua, could be apprehended: even by thought, however, only imperfectly, since there was always more or less of subjective movements and conditions, which partially clouded the pure objective apprehension—and since the atoms themselves were in perpetual movement, as well as inseparably mingled one with another. Under such obstructions, Demokritus proclaimed that no clear or certain knowledge was attainable: that the sensible objects, which men believed to be absolute realities, were only phenomenal and relative to us,—while the atoms and vacua, the true existences or things in themselves, could scarce ever be known as they were:<sup>n</sup> that truth was hidden in an abyss, and out of our reach.

As Demokritus supposed both sensations and thoughts to be determined by effluvia from without, so he assumed a similar cause to account for beliefs, comfortable or uncomfortable dispositions, fancies, dreams, presentiments, &c. He

<sup>1</sup> Theophrastus, De Sensu, 71. *ῥῶν δὲ σκληροῦ μὲν καὶ μαλακοῦ καὶ βαρέος καὶ κοῦφου ποιεῖ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὅπερ (ἄπερ) οὐχ ἥττον ἔδοξε λέγεσθαι πρὸς ἡμᾶς. θερμοῦ δὲ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενός.*

This is a remarkable point to be noted in the criticisms of Theophrastus on the doctrine of Demokritus. Demokritus maintains that *hot* and *cold* are relative to us: *hard* and *soft*, *heavy* and *light*, are not only relative to us, but also absolute, objective, things in their own nature,—though causing in us sensations which are like them. Theophrastus denies this distinction altogether: and denies it with the best reason. Not many of his criticisms on Demokritus are so just and pertinent as this one.

<sup>m</sup> Demokritus Frag. Mullach, p. 205, 206; ap. Sext. Empir. adv. Mathemat. vii. 135-139, *γνώμης δύο εἰσὶν ἰδέαι ἢ μὲν γνησίη, ἢ δὲ σκοτίη, &c.*

<sup>n</sup> Demokritus, ib. *Ἄπερ νομίζεται μὲν εἶναι καὶ δοξάζεται τὰ αἰσθητά, οὐκ ἐστὶ δὲ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ταῦτα· ἀλλὰ τὰ ἅτομα μόνον καὶ κενόν. ἡμεῖς δὲ τῶ μὲν ἐόντι οὐδὲν ἀτρεκέως ξυνίμεν, μετὰπιπτον δὲ κατὰ τὸ σώματος διαθιγῆν, καὶ τῶν ἐπεισιόντων, καὶ τῶν ἀντιστηριζόντων. . . . ἐπεὶ μὲν ῥῶν, ὅτι οἷον ἕκαστόν ἐστιν ἢ οὐκ ἐστίν, οὐ ξυνίμεν, πολλαχῆ δεδήλωται, &c.*

Compare Cicero, Acad. Quæst. i. 13, ii. 10; Diog. Laert. ix. 72; Aristot. Metaphys. iii. 5, p. 1009, b. 10.

supposed that the air contained many effluences, spectres, images, cast off from persons and substances in nature—sometimes even from outlying very distant objects which lay beyond the bounds of the Kosmos. Of these images, impregnated with the properties, bodily and mental, of the objects from whence they came, some were beneficent, others mischievous: they penetrated into the human body through the pores, and spread their influence all through the system.<sup>o</sup> Those thrown off by jealous and vindictive men were especially hurtful,<sup>p</sup> as they inflicted suffering corresponding to the tempers of those with whom they originated. Trains of thought and feeling were thus excited in men's minds; in sleep,<sup>q</sup> dreams, divinations, prophetic warnings and threats, were communicated: sometimes, pestilence and other misfortunes were thus begun. Demokritus believed that men's happiness depended much upon the nature and character of the images which might approach them, expressing an anxious wish that he might himself meet with such as were propitious.<sup>r</sup> It was from grand and terrific images of this nature, that he supposed the idea and belief of the Gods to have arisen: a supposition countenanced by the numerous tales, respecting appearances of the Gods both to dreaming and to waking men, current among the poets and in the familiar talk of Greece.

Idola or images were thrown off from objects, which determined the tone of thoughts, feelings, dreams, divinations, &c.

Among the lost treasures of Hellenic intellect, there are few which are more to be regretted than the works of Demokritus. Little is known of them except the titles: but these are instructive as well as multifarious. The number of different subjects which they embrace is astonishing. Besides his atomic theory, and its application to cosmogony and physics, whereby he is chiefly known, and from whence his title of *physicus* was derived

Universality of Demokritus—his ethical views.

<sup>o</sup> Demokriti Frag. p. 207, Mullach; Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathemat. ix. 19; Plutarch, Symposiac. viii. 10, p. 735 A.  
<sup>p</sup> Plutarch, Symposiac. v. 7, p. 683 A.  
<sup>q</sup> Aristotel. De Divinat. per Somnum, p. 464, a. 5; Plutarch, Symposiac. viii. 9, p. 733 E. *ἅτι καὶ κόσμων ἐκτὸς*

*φθαρέντων καὶ σωμάτων ἀλλοφύλων ἐκ τῆς ἀπορροίας ἐπιρρέοντων, ἐνταῦθα πολλάκις ἀρχαὶ παρεπίπτουσι λοιμῶν καὶ παθῶν οὐ συνήθων.*

<sup>r</sup> Plutarch, De Oraculor. Defectu, p. 419. *αὐτὸς εἶχεται εὐλόγων εἰδώλων τυγχάνειν.*

—we find mention of works on geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, optics, geography or geology, zoology, botany, medicine; music and poetry, grammar, history, ethics, &c.<sup>s</sup> In such universality he is the predecessor, perhaps the model, of Aristotle. It is not likely that this wide range of subjects should have been handled in a spirit of empty generality, without facts or particulars: for we know that his life was long, his curiosity insatiable, and his personal travel and observation greater than that of any contemporary. We know too that he entered more or less upon the field of dialectics, discussing those questions of evidence which became so rife in the Platonic age. He criticised, and is said to have combated, the doctrine laid down by Protagoras, “Man is the measure of all things.” It would have been interesting to know from what point of view he approached it: but we learn only the fact that he criticised it adversely.<sup>t</sup> The numerous treatises of Demokritus, together with the proportion of them which relate to ethical and social subjects, rank him with the philosophers of the Platonic and Aristotelian age. His *Summum Bonum*, as far as we can make out, appears to have been the maintenance of mental serenity and contentment: in which view he recommended a life of tranquil contemplation, apart from money-making, or ambition, or the exciting pleasures of life.<sup>u</sup>

<sup>s</sup> See the list of the works of Demokritus in Diogen. Laert. ix. 46, and in Mullach's edition of the Fragments, p. 105-107. Mullach mentions here (note 18) that Demokritus is cited seventy-eight times in the extant works of Aristotle, and sometimes with honourable mention. He is never mentioned by Plato. In the fragment of Philodemus de Musicâ, Demokritus is called *ἀνὴρ οὐ φυσιολογᾶτατος μόνον τῶν ἀρχαίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἰστορούμενα οὐδενὸς ἦττον πολυπράγμων* (Mullach, p. 237). Seneca calls him “Democritus, subtilissimus antiquorum omnium.”—Question. Natural. vii 2. And Dionysius of Hal. (De Comp. Verb. p. 187 R.) characterises Demokritus, Plato, and Aristotle (he arranges them in

that order), as first among all the philosophers, in respect of *σύνθεσις τῶν ὀνομάτων*.

<sup>t</sup> Plutarch, adv. Kolôten, p. 1108.

Among the Demokritean treatises, was one entitled Pythagoras, which contained probably a comment on the life and doctrines of that eminent man, written in an admiring spirit. (Diog. Laert. ix. 38.)

<sup>u</sup> Seneca, De Tranquill. Animæ, cap. 2. “Hanc stabilem animi sedem Græci *Εὐθυμίαν* vocant, de quo Democriti volumen egregium est.” Compare Cicero De Finib. v. 29; Diogen. Laert. ix. 45. For *εὐθυμία* Demokritus used as synonyms *εὐεστῶ, ἀθαμβία, ἀταραξία*, &c. See Mullach, p. 416.

## CHAPTER II.

GENERAL REMARKS ON THE EARLIER PHILOSOPHERS —  
GROWTH OF DIALECTIC — ZENO AND GORGIAS.

THE first feeling of any reader accustomed to the astronomy and physics of the present century, on considering the various theories noticed in the preceding chapter, is a sort of astonishment that such theories should have been ever propounded or accepted as true. Yet there can be no doubt that they represent the best thoughts of sincere, contemplative, and ingenious men, furnished with as much knowledge of fact, and as good a method, as was then attainable. The record of what such men have received as scientific truth or probability, in different ages, is instructive in many ways, but in none more than in showing how essentially relative and variable are the conditions of human belief; how unfounded is the assumption of those modern philosophers, who proclaim certain first truths or first principles as universal, intuitive, self-evident; how little any theorist can appreciate *à priori* the causes of belief in an age materially different from his own, or can lay down maxims as to what must be universally believed or universally disbelieved by all mankind. We shall have farther illustration of this truth as we proceed: here I only note variety of belief, even on the most fundamental points, as being the essential feature of Grecian philosophy even from its outset, long before the age of those who are usually denounced as the active sowers of discord, the Sophists and the professed disputants. Each philosopher followed his own individual reason, departing from traditional or established creeds, and incurring from the believing public more or less of obloquy; but no one among the philosophers acquired marked supremacy over the rest. There is no

Variety of  
sects and  
theories —  
multiplicity  
of individual  
authorities is  
the charac-  
teristic of  
Greek philo-  
sophy.

established philosophical orthodoxy, but a collection of Dissenters—*ἄλλη δ' ἄλλων γλῶσσα μεμυγμένη*—small sects, each with its own following, each springing from a special individual as authority, each knowing itself to be only one among many.

It is a misfortune that we do not possess any complete work, or even any considerable fragments, from either of these philosophers, so as to know what their views were when stated by themselves, and upon what reasons they insisted. All that we know is derived from a few detached notices, in very many cases preserved by Aristotle; who, not content (like Plato) with simply following out his own vein of ideas, exhibits in his own writings much of that polymathy which he transmitted to the Peripatetics generally, and adverts often to the works of predecessors. Being a critic as well as a witness, he sometimes blends together inconveniently the two functions, and is accused (probably with reason to a certain extent) of making unfair reports: but if it were not for him, we should really know nothing of the Hellenic philosophers before Plato. It is curious to read the manner in which Aristotle speaks of these philosophical predecessors as “the ancients” (*οἱ ἀρχαῖοι*), and takes credit to his own philosophy for having attained a higher and more commanding point of view.<sup>a</sup>

These early theorists are not known from their own writings, which have been lost. Importance of the information of Aristotle about them.

<sup>a</sup> Bacon ascribes the extinction of these early Greek philosophers to Aristotle, who thought that he could not assure his own philosophical empire, except by putting to death all his brothers, like the Turkish Sultan. This remark occurs more than once in Bacon (*Nov. Org. Aph.* 67; *Redargutio Philosoph.* vol. xi. p. 450, ed. Montagu). In so far as it is a reproach, I think it is not deserved. Aristotle's works, indeed, have been preserved, and those of his predecessors have not: but Aristotle, far from seeking to destroy their works, has been the chief medium for preserving to us the little which we know about them. His attention to the works of his predecessors is something very unusual among the theorists of the ancient world. His friends

Eudémus and Theophrastus followed his example, in embodying the history of the earlier theories in distinct works of their own, now unfortunately lost.

It is much to be regretted that no scholar has yet employed himself in collecting and editing the fragments of the lost scientific histories of Eudémus (the Rhodian) and Theophrastus. A new edition of the Commentaries of Simplicius is also greatly wanted: those which exist are both rare and unreadable.

Zeller remarks, that several of the statements contained in Proklus's commentary on Euclid, respecting the earliest Grecian mathematicians, are borrowed from the *γεωμετρικὰ ἱστορία* of the Rhodian Eudémus (Zeller—*De Hermodoro Ephesio et Hermodoro Platonicis*, p. 12).

During the century and a half between Thales and the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, we have passed in review twelve distinct schemes of philosophy—Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Xenophanes, Pythagoras, Parmenides, Herakleitus, Empedokles, Anaxagoras, the Apolloniate Diogenes, Leukippus, and Demokritus. Of most of these philosophers it may fairly be said that each speculated upon nature in an original vein of his own. Anaximenes and Diogenes, Xenophanes and Parmenides, Leukippus and Demokritus, may indeed be coupled together as kindred pairs—yet by no means in such manner that the second of the two is a mere disciple and copyist of the first. Such abundance and variety of speculative genius and invention is one of the most memorable facts in the history of the Hellenic mind. The prompting of intelligent curiosity, the thirst for some plausible hypothesis to explain the Kosmos and its generation, the belief that a basis or point of departure might be found in the Kosmos itself, apart from those mythical personifications which dwelt both in the popular mind and in the poetical Theogonies, the mental effort required to select some known agency and to connect it by a chain of reasoning with the result—all this is a new phenomenon in the history of the human mind.

Abundance of speculative genius and invention—a memorable fact in the Hellenic mind.

An early Greek philosopher found nothing around him to stimulate or assist the effort, and much to obstruct it. He found Nature disguised under a diversified and omnipresent Polytheistic agency, eminently captivating and impressive to the emotions—at once mysterious and familiar—embodied in the ancient Theogonies, and penetrating deeply all the abundant epic and lyric poetry, the only literature of the time. It is perfectly true (as Aristotle remarks <sup>b</sup>) that Hesiod and the other theological poets, who referred everything to

Difficulties which a Grecian philosopher had to overcome—prevalent view of Nature, established, impressive, and misleading.

<sup>b</sup> Aristot. Metaphys. B. 4, p. 1000, a. 10.

Οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ Ἡσίοδου, καὶ πάντες ὄσοι θεόλογοι, μόνον ἐφρόντισαν τοῦ πιθανοῦ τοῦ πρὸς αὐτοὺς, ἡμῶν δ' ἄλιγώρησαν· Θεοὺς γὰρ ποιοῦντες τὰς

ἀρχὰς καὶ ἐκ θεῶν γεγονέναι, &c. Aristotle mentions them a few lines afterwards as not worth serious notice. περὶ τῶν μυθικῶς σοφισσομένων οὐκ ἄξιον μετὰ σπουδῆς σκοπεῖν.

the generation and agency of the Gods, thought only of what was plausible to themselves, without enquiring whether it would appear equally plausible to their successors; a reproach which bears upon many subsequent philosophers also. The contemporary public, to whom they addressed themselves, knew no other way of conceiving Nature than under this religious and poetical view, as an aggregate of manifestations by divine personal agents, upon whose volition—sometimes signified beforehand by obscure warnings intelligible to the privileged interpreters, but often inscrutable—the turn of events depended. Thales and the other Ionic philosophers were the first who became dissatisfied with this point of view, and sought for some “causes and beginnings” more regular, knowable, and predictable. They fixed upon the common, familiar, widely-extended, material substances, water, air, fire, &c.; and they could hardly fix upon any others. Their attempt to find a scientific basis was unsuccessful; but the memorable fact consisted in their looking for one.

In the theories of these Ionic philosophers, the physical ideas of generation, transmutation, local motion, are found in the foreground: generation in the Kosmos to replace generation by the God. Pythagoras and Empedokles blend with their speculations a good deal both of ethics and theology, which we shall find yet more preponderant when we come to the cosmical theories of Plato. He brings us back to the mythical Prometheus, armed with the geometrical and arithmetical combinations of the Pythagoreans: he assumes a chaotic substratum, modified by the intentional and deliberate construction of the Demiurgus and his divine sons, who are described as building up and mixing like a human artisan or chemist. In the theory of Aristotle we find Nature half personified, and assumed to be perpetually at work under the influence of an appetite for good or regularity, which determines her to aim instinctively and without deliberation (like bees or spiders) at constant ends, though these regular tendencies are always accompanied, and often thwarted, by accessories

Views of the Ionic philosophers — compared with the more recent abstractions of Plato and Aristotle.

irregular, undefinable, unpredictable. Both Plato and Aristotle, in their dialectical age, carried abstraction farther than it had been carried by the Ionic philosophers.<sup>c</sup> Aristotle imputes to the Ionic philosophers that they neglected three out of his four causes (the efficient, formal, and final), and that they attended only to the material. This was a height of abstraction first attained by Plato and himself; in a way sometimes useful, sometimes misleading. The earlier philosophers had not learnt to divide substance from its powers or properties; nor to conceive substance without power as one thing, and power without substance as another. Their primordial substance, with its powers and properties, implicated together as one concrete and without any abstraction, was at once an efficient, a formal, and a material cause: a final cause they did not suppose themselves to want, inasmuch as they always conceived a fixed terminus towards which the agency was directed, though they did not conceive such fixed tendency under the symbol of an appetite and its end. Water, Air, Fire, were in their view not simply inert and receptive patients, impotent until they were stimulated by the active force residing in the ever revolving celestial spheres—but positive agents themselves, productive of important effects. So also a geologist of the present day, when he speculates upon the early condition<sup>d</sup> of the Kosmos, reasons upon

<sup>c</sup> Plato (*Sophistes*, 242-243) observes respecting these early theorists—what Aristotle says about Hesiod and the *Theogonies*—that they followed out their own respective veins of thought without caring whether we, the many listeners, were able to follow them or were left behind in the dark. I dare say that this was true (as indeed it is true respecting most writers on speculative matters), but I am sure that all of them would have made the same complaint if they had heard Plato read his *Timæus*.

<sup>d</sup> Bacon has some striking remarks on the contrast in this respect between the earlier philosophers and Aristotle.

Bacon, after commending the early Greek philosophers for having adopted as their first principle some known

and positive matter, not a mere abstraction, goes on to say:—

“Videntur antiqui illi, in expositione principiorum, rationem non admodum acutam instituisse, sed hoc solummodo egisse, ut ex corporibus apparentibus et manifestis, quod maximè excelleret, quærerent, et quod tale videbatur, principium rerum ponerent: tanquam per excellentiam, non verè aut realiter. . . . Quod si principium illud suum teneant non per excellentiam, sed realiter, videntur in duriorum tropum incidere: cum res planè deducatur ad æquivocum, neque de igne naturali, aut naturali aere, aut aquâ, quod asserunt, prædicari videatur, sed de igne aliquo phantastico et notionali (et sic de cæteris) qui nomen ignis retineat, definitionem abneget. . . . Principium statuunt secundum sensum, aliquid ens



gaseous, fluid, solid, varieties of matter, as manifesting those same laws and properties which experience attests, but manifesting them under different combinations and circumstances. The defect of the Ionic philosophers, unavoidable at the time, was, that possessing nothing beyond a superficial experience, they either ascribed to these physical agents powers and properties not real, or exaggerated prodigiously such as were real; so that the primordial substance chosen, though bearing a familiar name, became little better than a fiction. The Pythagoreans did the same in regard to numbers, ascribing to them properties altogether fanciful and imaginary.

Parmenides and Pythagoras, taking views of the Kosmos

verum : modum autem ejus dispensandi (liberius se gerentes) phantasticum." (Bacon, Parmenidis, Telesii, et Democriti Philosophia, vol. xi., p. 115-116, ed. Montagu.)

"Materia illa spoliata et passiva, prorsus humanæ mentis commentum quoddam videtur. Materia prima ponenda est conjuncta cum principio motûs primo, ut invenitur. Hæc tria (materia, forma, motus) nullo modo discernenda, sed tantummodo distinguenda, atque asserenda materia (qualiscunque ea sit), ita ornata et apparatus et formata, ut omnis virtus, essentia, actio, atque motus naturalis, ejus consecutio et emanatio esse possit. Omnes ferè antiqui, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Democritus, de materiâ primâ in cæteris dissidentes, in hoc conveniunt, quod materiam activam formâ nonnullâ, et formam suam dispensantem, atque intra se principium motûs habentem, posuerunt." (Bacon, De Parmenidis, Telesii, et Campanellæ, Philosoph., p. 653-654, t. v.)

Compare Aphorism I. 50 of the *Novum Organum*.

Bacon, Parmenidis, Telesii, et Democriti Philosophia, vol. xi. ed. Montagu, p. 106-107. "Sed omnes ferè antiqui (anteriori Plato), Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Democritus, de materiâ primâ in cæteris dissidentes, in hoc conveniunt, quod materiam activam, formâ nonnullâ, et formam suam dispensantem, atque intra se principia motûs

habentem, posuerunt. Neque aliter cuiquam opinari licebit, qui non experientiæ planè desertor esse velit. Itaque hi omnes mentem rebus submiserunt. At Plato mundum cogitationibus, Aristoteles verò etiam cogitationes verbis, adjudicaverunt." . . . "Omnino materia prima ponenda est conjuncta cum formâ primâ, ac etiam cum principio motûs primo, ut invenitur. Nam et motûs quoque abstractio infinitas phantasias peperit, de animis, vitis, et similibus—ac si iis per materiam et formam non satisfacerit, sed ex suis propriis penderent illa principia. Sed hæc tria nullo modo discernenda, sed tantummodo distinguenda : atque asserenda materia (qualiscunque ea sit) ita ornata et apparatus, et formata, ut omnis virtus, essentia, actio, atque motus naturalis, ejus consecutio et emanatio esse possit. Neque propterea metuendum, ne res torpescat, aut varietas ista, quam cernimus, explicari non possit—ut postea docebimus."

Playfair also observes, in his *Dissertation on the Progress of Natural Philosophy*, prefixed to the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, p. 31 :—

"Science was not merely stationary, but often retrograde; and the reasonings of Democritus and Anaxagoras were in many respects more solid than those of Plato and Aristotle."

See a good summary of Aristotle's cosmical views, in Ideler, *Comm. in Aristotel. Meteorologica*, i. 2, p. 323-329.

metaphysical and geometrical rather than physical, supplied the basis upon which Plato's speculations were built. Aristotle recognises Empedokles and Anaxagoras as having approached to his own doctrine—Parmenides and Pythagoras—more nearly akin to Plato and Aristotle. force abstracted or considered apart from substance, yet not absolutely detached from it. This is true about Empedokles to a certain extent, since his theory admits Love and Enmity as agents, the four elements as patients: but it is hardly true about Anaxagoras, in whose theory Noûs imparts nothing more than a momentary shock, exercising what modern chemists call a catalytic agency in originating movement among a stationary and stagnant mass of Homœomeries, which, as soon as they are liberated from imprisonment, follow inherent tendencies of their own, not receiving any farther impulse or direction from Noûs.

In the number of cosmical theories proposed, from Thales down to Demokritus, as well as in the diversity and even discordance of the principles on which they were founded—we note not merely the growth and development of scientific curiosity, but also the spontaneity and exuberance of constructive imagination.<sup>o</sup> Advantage derived from this variety of constructive imagination among the Greeks. This last is a prominent attribute of the Hellenic mind, displayed to the greatest advantage in their poetical, oratorical, historical, artistic, productions, and transferred from thence to minister to their scientific curiosity. None of their known contemporaries showed the like aptitudes, not even the Babylonians and Egyptians, who were diligent in the observation of the heavens. Now the constructive imagination is not less indispensable to the formation of scientific theories than to the compositions of art, although in the two departments it is subject to different conditions, and

<sup>o</sup> Karsten observes, in his account of the philosophy of Parmenides (sect. 23, p. 241):—

“Primum mundi descriptionem consideremus. Argumentum illustre et magnificum, cujus quanto major erat veterum in contemplando admiratio, tanto minor ferè in observando diligentia fuit. Quippe universi *ornatum*

*et pulcritudinem admirati, ejus naturam partiumque ordinem non sensu assequi studuerunt, sed mente informarunt ad eam pulcri perfectique speciem quæ in ipsorum animis insideret: sic ut Aristoteles ait, non sua cogitata suasque notiones ad mundi naturam, sed hanc ad illa accommodantes. Hujusmodi fuit Parmenidea ratio.”*

appeals to different canons and tests in the human mind. Each of these early Hellenic theories, though all were hypotheses and "anticipations of nature," yet as connecting together various facts upon intelligible principles, was a step in advance; while the very number and discordance of them (urged by Sokrates<sup>f</sup> as an argument for discrediting the purpose common to all), was on the whole advantageous. It lessened the mischief arising from the imperfections of each, increased the chance of exposing such imperfections, and prevented the consecration of any one among them (with that inveterate and peremptory orthodoxy which Plato so much admires<sup>g</sup> in the Egyptians) as an infallible dogma and an exclusive mode of looking at facts. All the theorists laboured under the common defect of a scanty and inaccurate experience: all of them were prompted by a vague but powerful emotion of curiosity to connect together the past and present of Nature by some threads intelligible and satisfactory to their own minds; each of them followed out some analogy of his own, such as seemed to carry with it a self-justifying plausibility; and each could find some phenomena which countenanced his own peculiar view. As far as we can judge, Leukippus and Demokritus greatly surpassed the others, partly in the pains which they took to elaborate their theory, partly in the number of facts which they brought into consistency with it. The loss of the voluminous writings of Demokritus is deeply to be regretted.<sup>h</sup>

In studying the writings of Plato and Aristotle, we must recollect that they found all these theories pre-existent or contemporaneous. We are not to imagine that they were the first who turned an enquiring eye on Nature. So far is this from being the case that Aristotle is, as it were, oppressed both by the multitude and by the discordance of his predecessors, whom he cites, with a sort of indulgent consciousness of superiority, as "the ancients" (*οἱ ἀρχαῖοι*).<sup>i</sup>

All these theories were found in circulation by Sokrates, Zeno, Plato, and the dialecticians. Importance of the scrutiny of negative Dialectic.

<sup>f</sup> Xenophon, Memor. i. 1-14.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. 656-657.

<sup>h</sup> About the style of Demokritus, see

Cicero De Orat. i. 11. Orator. c. 20.

<sup>i</sup> Aristot. Gen. et Corr. i. 314, a. 6; 323, a. 2; Metaphys. A. 1069,

The dialectic activity, inaugurated by Sokrates and Zeno, lowered the estimation of these cosmical theories in more ways than one: first, by the new topics of man and society, which Sokrates put in the foreground for discussion, and treated as the only topics worthy of discussion; next, by the great acuteness which each of them displayed in the employment of the negative weapons, and in bringing to view the weak part of an opponent's case. When we look at the number of these early theories, and the great need which all of them had to be sifted and scrutinised, we shall recognise the value of negative procedure under such circumstances, whether the negationist had or had not any better affirmative theory of his own. Sokrates, moreover, not only turned the subject-matter of discussion from physics to ethics, but also brought into conscious review the *method* of philosophising: which was afterwards still farther considered and illustrated by Plato. General and abstract terms and their meaning, stood out as the capital problems of philosophical research, and as the governing agents of the human mind during the process: in Plato and Aristotle, and the dialectics of their age, we find the meaning or concept corresponding to these terms invested with an objective character, and represented as a cause or beginning; by which, or out of which, real concrete things were produced. Logical, metaphysical, ethical, entities, whose existence consists in being named and reasoned about, are presented to us (by Plato) as the real antecedents and producers of the sensible Kosmos and its contents, or (by Aristotle) as coeternal with the Kosmos, but as its underlying constituents—the *ἀρχαί*, primordia or ultimata—into which it was the purpose and duty of the philosopher to resolve sensible things. The men of words and debate, the dialecticians or metaphysical speculators of the period since Zeno and Sokrates, who took little notice of the facts of Nature, stand contrasted in the language of Aristotle with the antecedent physical philosophers who meddled less with

a. 25. See the sense of *ἀρχαῖκός*, Met. N. 1089, a. 2, with the note of Bonitz.

Adam Smith, in his very instructive examination of the ancient systems of

Physics and Metaphysics, is too much inclined to criticise Plato and Aristotle as if they were the earliest theorizers, and as if they had no predecessors.

debate and more with facts. The contrast is taken in his mind between Plato and Demokritus.<sup>k</sup>

Both by Stoics and by Epikureans, during the third and second centuries B.C., Demokritus, Empedokles, Anaxagoras, and Herakleitus were studied along with Plato and Aristotle—by some, even more. Lucretius mentions and criticises all the four, though he never names Plato or Aristotle. Cicero greatly admires the style of Demokritus, whose works were arranged in tetralogies by Thrasyllus, as those of Plato were.<sup>l</sup>

In considering the early theorists above enumerated, there is great difficulty in finding any positive characteristic applicable to all of them. But a negative characteristic may be found, and has already been indicated by Aristotle. “The earlier philosophers (says he) had no part in dialectics: Dialectical force did not yet exist.”<sup>m</sup> And the period upon which we are now entering is distinguished mainly by the introduction and increasing preponderance of this new element—Dialectic—first made conspicuously manifest in the Eleatic Zeno and Sokrates: two memorable persons, very different from each other, but having this property in common.

It is Zeno who stands announced, on the authority of Aristotle, as the inventor of dialectic: that is, as the first person, of whose skill, in the art of cross-examination and refutation, conspicuous illustrative specimens were preserved. He was among the first who composed written dialogues on controversial matters of philosophy.<sup>n</sup> Both he, and his contemporary the Samian Me-

The early theorists were studied along with Plato and Aristotle, in the third and second centuries B.C.

Negative attribute common to all the early theorists—little or no dialectic.

Zeno of Elea—Melissus.

<sup>k</sup> Aristotel. Gen. et Corr. i. 316, a. 6.—*δὶ ὅσοι ἐνφκῆκασι μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, μᾶλλον δύνανται ὑποτίθεσθαι τὰς τοιαύτας ἀρχάς, αὐ ἐπὶ πολὺ δύνανται συνεῖρειν· οἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν λόγων ἀθεώρητοι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ὄντες, πρὸς ὀλίγα βλέψαντες, ἀποφαίνονται ῥᾶρον ἴδιοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅσον διαφέρουσιν οἱ φυσικῶς καὶ λογικῶς σκοποῦντες, &c.* This remark is thoroughly Baconian.

Οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις is the phrase by which Aristotle characterises the Platonici.—Metaphys. Θ. 1050, b. 36.

<sup>l</sup> Epikurus is said to have especially admired Anaxagoras (Diog. L. x. 7).

<sup>m</sup> Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 987, b. 32. Οἱ γὰρ πρότερον διαλεκτικῆς οὐ μετεῖχον.—M. 1078, b. 25.

διαλεκτικῆ γὰρ ἰσχυς οὕτω τότε ἦν, &c.

<sup>n</sup> Diogen. Laert. ix. 26-28.

The epithets applied to Zeno by Timon are remarkable.

Ἄμφοτερογλώσσου δὲ μέγα σθένος οὐκ ἀλαπαδῶν Ζήνωνος πάντων ἐπιλήπτορος, &c.

lissus, took up the defence of the Parmenidean doctrine. It is remarkable that both one and the other were eminent as political men in their native cities. Zeno is even said to have perished miserably, in generous but fruitless attempts to preserve Elea from being enslaved by the despot Nearchus.

We know the reasonings of Zeno and Melissus only through scanty fragments, and those fragments transmitted by opponents. But it is plain that both of them, especially Zeno, pressed their adversaries with grave difficulties, which it was more easy to deride than to elucidate. Both took their departure from the ground occupied by Parmenides. They agreed with him in recognising the phenomenal, apparent, or relative world, the world of sense and experience, as a subject of knowledge, though of uncertain and imperfect knowledge. Each of them gave, as Parmenides had done, certain affirmative opinions, or at least probable conjectures, for the purpose of explaining it.<sup>o</sup> But beyond this world of appearances, there lay the real, absolute, ontological, ultra-phenomenal, or Noumenal world, which Parmenides represented as *Ens unum continuum*, and which his opponents contended to be plural and discontinuous. These opponents deduced absurd and ridiculous consequences from the theory of the One. Herein both Zeno and Melissus defended Parmenides. Zeno, the better dialectician of the two, retorted upon the advocates of absolute plurality and discontinuousness, showing that their doctrine led to consequences not less absurd and contradictory than the *Ens unum* of Parmenides. He advanced many distinct arguments; some of them antinomies, deducing from the same premisses both the affirmative and the negative of the same conclusion.<sup>p</sup>

If things in themselves were many (he said) they must be both infinitely small and infinitely great. *Infinitely small*,

<sup>o</sup> Diog. Laert. ix. 24-29.

Zeller (Gesch. der Phil. i. p. 424, note 2) doubts the assertion that Zeno delivered probable opinions and hypotheses, as Parmenides had done before him, respecting phenomenal nature. But I see no adequate ground for such

doubt.

<sup>p</sup> Simplikius, in Aristotel. Physic. f. 30. ἐν μέντοι τῷ συγγράμματι αὐτοῦ, πολλά ἔχοντι ἐπιχειρήματα, καθ' ἕκαστον δείκνυσιν, ὅτι τῷ πολλὰ εἶναι λέγοντι συμβαίνει τὰ ἐνάντια λέγειν, &c.

because the many things must consist in a number of units, each essentially indivisible: but that which is indivisible has no magnitude, or is infinitely small—

Consequences  
of their as-  
sumption of  
Entia Plura  
Discontinua.  
Reductiones  
ad Absurd-  
um.

if indeed it can be said to have any existence whatever: <sup>9</sup> *Infinitely great*, because each of the many things, if assumed to exist, must have magnitude.

Having magnitude, each thing has parts which also have magnitude: these parts are, by the hypothesis, essentially discontinuous, but this implies that they are kept apart from each other by other intervening parts—and these intervening parts must be again kept apart by others. Each body will thus contain in itself an infinite number of parts, each having magnitude. In other words, it will be infinitely great.<sup>7</sup>

Again—If things in themselves were many, they would be both finite and infinite in number. *Finite*, because they are as many as they are, neither more nor less: and every number is a finite number. *Infinite*, because being essentially separate, discontinuous, units, each must be kept apart from the rest by an intervening unit; and this again by something else intervening. Suppose a multitude A, B, C, D, &c. A and B would be continuous unless they were kept apart by some intervening unit Z. But A and Z would then be continuous unless they were kept apart by something else—Y: and so on ad infinitum: otherwise the essential discontinuousness could not be maintained.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Aristotel. Metaphys. B. 4, p. 1001, b. 7. ἔτι εἰ ἀδιαίρετον αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν, κατὰ μὲν τὸ Ζήνωνος ἀξίωμα, οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη.

ὁ γὰρ μήτε προστιθέμενον μηδὲ ἀφαιρούμενον ποιεῖ μείζον μηδὲ ἔλαττον, οὐ φησὶν εἶναι τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων, ὡς δῆλον ἔστι ὄντος μεγέθους τοῦ ὄντος.

Seneca (Epistol. 88) and Alexander of Aphrodisias (see the passages of Themistius and Simplicius cited by Brandis, Handbuch Philos. i. p. 412-416), conceive Zeno as having dissented from Parmenides, and as having denied the existence, not only of τὰ πολλὰ, but also of τὸ ἐν. But Zeno seems to have adhered to Parmenides; and to have denied the existence of τὸ ἐν, only upon the hypothesis opposed to Parmenides—namely, that τὰ πολλὰ existed. Zeno argued thus:—Assum-

ing that the Real or Absolute is essentially divisible and discontinuous, divisibility must be pushed to infinity, so that you never arrive at any ultimum, or any real unit (ἀκριβῶς ἐν). If you admit τὰ πολλὰ, you renounce τὸ ἐν. The reasoning of Zeno, as far as we know it, is nearly all directed against the hypothesis of *Entia plura discontinua*. Tennemann (Gesch. Philos. i. 4, p. 205) thinks that the reasoning of Zeno is directed against the world of sense: in which I cannot agree with him.

<sup>7</sup> Scholia ad Aristotel. Physic. p. 334 a. cl. Brandis.

<sup>8</sup> See the argument cited by Simplicius in the words of the Zenonian treatise, in Preller, Hist. Philos. Græc. ex font. context. p. 101, sect. 156.

By these two arguments,<sup>t</sup> drawn from the hypothesis which affirmed perpetual divisibility and denied any Continuum, Zeno showed that such *Entia multa discontinua* would have contradictory attributes: they would be both infinitely great and infinitely small—they would be both finite and infinite in number. This he advanced as a *reductio ad absurdum* against the hypothesis.

Again—If existing things be many and discontinuous, each of these must exist in a place of its own. Nothing can exist except in some place. But the place is itself an existing something: each place must therefore have a place of its own to exist in: the second place must have a third place to exist in—and so forth ad infinitum.<sup>u</sup> We have here a farther *reductio ad impossibile* of the original hypothesis: for that hypothesis denies the continuity of space, and represents space as a multitude of discontinuous portions or places.

Each thing must exist in its own place  
—Grain of millet not sonorous.

Another argument of Zeno is to the following effect: “Does a grain of millet, when dropped upon the floor, make sound? No.—Does a bushel of millet make sound under the same circumstances? Yes.—Is there not a determinate proportion between the bushel and the grain? There is.—There must therefore be the same proportion between the sonorousness of the two. If one grain be not sonorous, neither can ten thousand grains be so.”<sup>x</sup>

To appreciate the contradiction brought out by Zeno, we must recollect that he is not here reasoning about facts of sense, phenomenal, and relative—but about things in themselves, absolute and ultra-phenomenal realities. He did not

<sup>t</sup> Simplicius ad Aristot. Physic. f. 30. καὶ οὕτω μὲν τὸ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἄπειρον ἐκ τῆς διχοτομίας ἔδειξε, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος πρότερον κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιχείρησιν. Compare Zeller, Gesch. Philos. i. p. 427.

<sup>u</sup> Aristotel. Physic. iv. 1, p. 209, a. 22; iv. 3, p. 210, b. 23.

Aristotle here observes that the Zenonian argument respecting *place* is easy to be refuted: and he proceeds to give the refutation. But his refutation

is altogether unsatisfactory. Those who despise these Zenonian arguments as *sophisms*, ought to look at the way in which they were answered, at or near the time.

Eudémus ap. Simplic. ad Aristot. Physic. f. 131. ἄξιον γὰρ πάντων ὄντων ποῦ εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ὁ τόπος τῶν ὄντων, ποῦ ἂν εἴη;

<sup>x</sup> Aristotel. Physic. vii. 5, p. 250, a. 20, with the Scholia of Simplicius on the passage, p. 423, ed. Brandis.



deny the fact of sense: to appeal to that fact in reply, would have been to concede his point. The adversaries against whom he reasoned (Protagoras is mentioned, but he can hardly have been among them, if we have regard to his memorable dogma, of which more will be said presently) were those who maintained the plurality of absolute substances, each for itself, with absolute attributes, apart from the fact of sense, and independent of any sentient subject. One grain of millet (Zeno argues) has no absolute sonorousness, neither can ten thousand such grains taken together have any. Upon the hypothesis of absolute reality as a discontinuous multitude, you are here driven to a contradiction which Zeno intends as an argument against the hypothesis. There is no absolute sonorousness in the ten thousand grains: the sound which they make is a phenomenal fact, relative to us as sentients of sound, and having no reality except in correlation with a hearer.<sup>1</sup>

Other memorable arguments of Zeno against the same hypothesis were those by which he proved that if it were admitted, motion would be impossible.

Upon the theory of absolute plurality and discontinuousness, every line or portion of distance was divisible into an infinite number of parts: before a moving body could get from the beginning to the end of this line, it must pass in succession over every one of these parts: but to do this in a finite time was impossible: therefore motion was impossible.<sup>2</sup>

A second argument of the same tendency was advanced in the form of comparison between Achilles and the tortoise—

<sup>1</sup> It will be seen that Aristotle in explaining this ἀπορία, takes into consideration the difference of force in the vibrations of air, and the different impressibility of the ear. The explanation is pertinent and just, if applied to the fact of sense: but it is no reply to Zeno, who did not call in question the fact of sense. Zeno is impugning the doctrine of absolute substances and absolute divisibility. To say that ten thousand grains are sonorous, but that no one of them separately taken is so, appears to him a contradiction, similar

to what is involved in saying that a real magnitude is made up of mathematical points. Aristotle does not meet this difficulty.

<sup>2</sup> Aristot. Physic. vi. 9, p. 239 b., with the Scholia, p. 412 seq. ed. Brandis; Aristotel. De Lineis Insecabilibus, p. 968, a. 19.

These four arguments against absolute motion caused embarrassment to Aristotle and his contemporaries. τέτταρες δ' εἰσι λόγοι Ζήνωνος αἱ παρέχοντες τὰς δυσκολίας τοῖς λύουσαι &c.

the swiftest and slowest movers. The two run a race, a certain start being given to the tortoise: Zeno contends that Achilles can never overtake the tortoise. It is plain indeed, according to the preceding argument, that motion both for the one and for the other is an impossibility. Neither one nor the other can advance from the beginning to the end of any line, except by passing successively through all the parts of that line: but those parts are infinite in number, and cannot therefore be passed through in any finite time. But suppose such impossibility to be got over: still Achilles will not overtake the tortoise. For while Achilles advances one hundred yards, the tortoise has advanced ten: while Achilles passes over these additional ten yards, the tortoise will have passed over one more yard: while Achilles is passing over this remaining one yard, the tortoise will have got over one-tenth of another yard: and so on ad infinitum, the tortoise will always be in advance of him by a certain distance, which, though ever diminishing, will never vanish into nothing.

The third Zenonian argument derived its name from the flight of an arrow shot from a bow. The arrow while thus carried forward (says Zeno) is nevertheless at rest.<sup>a</sup> For the time from the beginning to the end of its course consists of a multitude of successive instants. During each of these instants the arrow is in a given place of equal dimension with itself. But that which is during any instant in a given place, is at rest. Accordingly during each successive instant of its flight, the arrow is at rest. Throughout its whole flight, it is both in motion and at rest. This argument is a deduction from the doctrine of discontinuous time, as the preceding is a deduction from that of discontinuous space.

A fourth argument<sup>b</sup> was derived from the case of two equal bodies moved with equal velocity in opposite directions, and passing each other. If the body A B were at rest, the other body C D would move along the whole length of C D

<sup>a</sup> Aristotel. *Physic.* vi. p. 239, b. 8-30. *τρίτος ὁ νῦν ῥηθεις, ὅτι ἡ διαρκὸς φερομένη ἔστηκεν.* | ment at some length by Simplicius, especially the citation from Eudémus at the close of it—ap. Scholia ad Aristotel. p. 414, ed. Brandis.

<sup>b</sup> See the illustration of this argu-

in two minutes. But if C D be itself moving with equal velocity in the opposite direction, A B will pass along the whole length of C D in half that time, or one minute. Hence Zeno infers that the motion of A B is nothing absolute, or belonging to the thing in itself—for if that were so, it would not be varied according to the movement of C D. It is no more than a phenomenal fact, relative to us and our comparison.

This argument, so far as I can understand its bearing, is not deduced (as those preceding are) from the premisses of opponents: but rests upon premisses of its own, and is intended to prove that motion is only relative.

These Zenonian reasonings are memorable as the earliest known manifestations of Grecian dialectic, and are probably equal in acuteness and ingenuity to anything which it ever produced. Their bearing is not always accurately conceived. Most of them are *argumenta ad hominem*: consequences contradictory and inadmissible, but shown to follow legitimately from a given hypothesis, and therefore serving to disprove the hypothesis itself.<sup>c</sup> The hypothesis was one relating to the real, absolute, or ultra-phenomenal, which Parmenides maintained to be *Ens Unum Continuum*, while his opponents affirmed it to be essentially multiple and discontinuous. Upon

General purpose and result of the Zenonian Dialectic. Nothing is knowable except the relative.

<sup>c</sup> The scope of the Zenonian dialectic, as I have here described it, is set forth clearly by Plato, in his Parmenides, c. 3-6, p. 127, 128. Πῶς, ὦ Ζήνων, τοῦτο λέγεις; εἰ πολλά ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα, ὡς ἄρα δεῖ αὐτὰ ἑμοῖά τε εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ ἀδύνατον;—Ὁβκουν εἰ ἀδύνατον τὰ τε ἀνόμοια ἑμοῖα εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἑμοῖα ἀνόμοια, ἀδύνατον δὴ καὶ πολλά εἶναι; εἰ γὰρ πολλά εἴη, πάσχοι ἂν τὰ ἀδύνατα. Ἄρα τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλουται σοῦ οἱ λόγοι; οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαμαχεσθαι παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς οὐ πολλά ἐστίν; Agam., p. 128 D. Ἄντιλέγει οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα πρὸς τοὺς τὰ πολλά λέγοντας, καὶ ἀνταποδίδωσι ταῦτα καὶ πλείω, τοῦτο βουλόμενον δηλοῦν, ὡς ἔτι γελαιότερα πάσχοι ἂν αὐτῶν ἢ ὑπόθεσις, ἢ εἰ πολλά ἐστίν—ἢ ἢ τοῦ ἔν εἶναι—εἴ τις ἰκανῶς ἐπεξίηι.

Here Plato evidently represents Zeno as merely proving that contradictory conclusions followed, *if you assumed a given hypothesis*; which hypothesis was thereby shown to be inadmissible. But Plato alludes to Zeno in another place (Phædrus, c. 97, p. 261) under the name of the Eleatic Palamedes, as "showing his art in speaking, by making the same things appear to the hearers like and unlike, one and many, at rest and in motion." In this last passage, the impression produced by Zeno's argumentation is brought to view, apart from the scope and purpose with which he employed it: which scope and purpose are indicated in the passage above cited from the Parmenides.

So also Isokrates (Encom. Helen. init.) Ζήνωνα, τὸν ταῦτα δυνατὰ καὶ πάλιν ἀδύνατα πειρώμενον ἀποφαίνειν.

the hypothesis of Parmenides, the Real and Absolute, being a continuous One, was obviously inconsistent with the movement and variety of the phenomenal world: Parmenides himself recognised the contradiction of the two, and his opponents made it a ground for deriding his doctrine.<sup>d</sup> The counter-hypothesis, of the discontinuous many, appeared at first sight not to be open to the same objection: it seemed to be more in harmony with the facts of the phenomenal and relative world, and to afford an absolute basis for them to rest upon. Against this delusive appearance the dialectic of Zeno was directed. He retorted upon the opponents, and showed, that if the hypothesis of the *Unum Continuum* led to absurd consequences, that of the discontinuous many was pregnant with deductions yet more absurd and contradictory. He exhibits in detail several of these contradictory deductions, with a view to refute the hypothesis from whence they flow; and to prove that, far from performing what it promises, it is worse than useless, as entangling us in contradictory conclusions. The result of his reasoning, implied rather than announced, is—That neither of the two hypotheses are of any avail to supply a real and absolute basis for the phenomenal and relative world: That the latter must rest upon its own evidence, and must be interpreted, in so far as it can be interpreted at all, by its own analogies.

But the purport of Zeno's reasoning is mistaken, when he is conceived as one who wishes to delude his hearers by proving both sides of a contradictory proposition. His contradictory conclusions are elicited with the express purpose of disproving the premisses from which they are derived. For these premisses Zeno himself is not to be held responsible, since he borrows them from his opponents: a circumstance which Aristotle forgets, when he censures the Zenonian arguments as paralogisms, because they assume the Continua, Space and Time, to be discontinuous or divided into many distinct parts.<sup>e</sup> Now this absolute discontinuousness of matter,

Mistake of supposing Zeno's reductions ad absurdum of an opponent's doctrine to be contradictions of data generalized from experience.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Parmenides, p. 128 D. κείται δ χρόνος ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἀδιαίρετων,  
<sup>e</sup> Aristotel. Physic. vi. 9, p. 239 b. ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἄλλο μέγεθος οὐδέν, &c.  
 Ζήνων δὲ παραλογίζεται' οὐ γὰρ συγ- Aristotle, in the second and third

space, and time, was not advanced by Zeno as a doctrine of his own, but is the very doctrine of his opponents, taken up by him for the purpose of showing that it led to contradictory consequences, and thus of indirectly refuting it. The sentence of Aristotle is thus really in Zeno's favour, though apparently adverse to him. In respect to motion, a similar result followed from the Zenonian reasonings; namely, to show, That motion, as an attribute of the Real and Absolute, was no less inconsistent with the hypothesis of those who opposed Parmenides, than with the hypothesis of Parmenides himself:—That absolute motion could no more be reconciled with the doctrine of the discontinuous Many, than with that of the Continuous One:—That motion therefore was only a phenomenal fact, relative to our sensations, conceptions, and comparisons; and having no application to the absolute. In this phenomenal point of view, neither Zeno nor Parmenides nor Melissus disputed the fact of motion. They recognised it as a portion of the world of sensation and experience; which world they tried to explain, well or ill, by analogies and conjectures derived from itself.

Though we have not the advantage of seeing the Zenonian dialectics as they were put forth by their author, yet, if we compare the substance of them as handed down to us, with those dialectics which form the latter half of the Platonic dialogue called Parmenides, we shall find them not inferior in ingenuity, and certainly more intelligible in their purpose. Zeno furnishes no positive support to the Parmenidean doctrine, but he makes out a good negative case against the counter-doctrine.

Zeller and other able modern critics, while admitting the reasoning of Zeno to be good against this counter-doctrine, complain that he takes it up too exclusively; that One and Many did not exclude each other, and that the doctrines of Parmenides and his oppo-

views of historians of philosophy, respecting Zeno. chapters of his *Physica*, canvasses and refutes the doctrine of Parmenides and Zeno respecting *Ens* and *Unum*. He maintains that *Ens* and *Unum* are equivocal — *πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα*. He farther maintained that no one before him had succeeded in refuting Zeno. See the Scholia of Alexander ad *Sophistic. Elench.* p. 320 b. 6, ed. Brandis.

nents were both true together, but neither of them true to the exclusion of the other. But when we reflect that the subject of predication on both sides was the Real (*Ens per se*), it was not likely that either Parmenides or his opponents would affirm it to be both absolutely One and Continuous, and absolutely Many and Discontinuous.<sup>f</sup> If the opponents of Parmenides had taken this ground, Zeno need not have imagined deductions for the purpose of showing that their hypothesis led to contradictory conclusions; for the contradictions would have stood avowedly registered in the hypothesis itself. If a man affirms both at once, he divests the predication of its absolute character, as belonging unconditionally to *Ens per se*; and he restricts it to the phenomenal, the relative, the conditioned—dependant upon our sensations and our fluctuating point of view. This was not intended either by Parmenides or by his opponents.

If, indeed, we judge the question, not from their standing-point, but from our own, we shall solve the difficulty by adopting the last-mentioned answer. We shall admit that One and Many are predicates which do not necessarily exclude each other; but we shall refrain from affirming or denying either of them respecting the Real, the Absolute, the Unconditioned. Of an object absolutely one and continuous—or of objects absolutely many and discontinuous, apart from the facts of our own sense and consciousness, and independent of any sentient subject—we neither know nor can affirm anything. Both these predicates (One—Many) are relative and phenomenal, grounded on the facts and comparisons of our own senses and consciousness, and serving only to describe, to record, and to classify, those facts. Discrete quantity, or number, or succession of distinct unities—continuous quantity, or motion and extension—are two conceptions derived from comparison, abstracted and generalised from separate particular phenomena of our consciousness; the continuous, from our movements and the

<sup>f</sup> That both of them could not be true respecting *Ens per se*, seems to have been considered indisputable. | See the argument of Sokrates in the Parmenides of Plato, p. 129 B-E.

consciousness of persistent energy involved therein—the discontinuous, from our movements, intermitted and renewed, as well as from our impressions of sense. We compare one discrete quantity with another, or one continual quantity with another, and we thus ascertain many important truths: but we select our unit, or our standard of motion and extension, as we please, or according to convenience, subject only to the necessity of adapting our ulterior calculations consistently to this unit, when once selected. The same object may thus be considered sometimes as one, sometimes as many; both being relative, and depending upon our point of view. Motion, Space, Time, may be considered either as continuous or as discontinuous: we may reason upon them either as one or the other, but we must not confound the two points of view with each other. When, however, we are called upon to travel out of the Relative, and to decide between Parmenides and his opponents—whether the Absolute be One or Multitudinous—we have only to abstain from affirming either, or (in other words) to confess our ignorance. We know nothing of an absolute, continuous, self-existent One, or of an absolute, discontinuous Many.

Some critics understand Zeno to have denied motion as a fact—opposing sophistical reasoning to certain and familiar experience. Upon this view is founded the well-known anecdote, that Diogenes the Cynic refuted the argument by getting up and walking. But I do not so construe the scope of his argument. He did not deny motion as a fact. It rested with him on the evidence of sense, acknowledged by every one. It was therefore only a phenomenal fact relative to our consciousness, sensation, movements, and comparisons. As such, but as such only, did Zeno acknowledge it. What he denied was, motion as a fact belonging to the Absolute, or as deducible from the Absolute. He did not deny the Absolute or Thing in itself, as an existing object, but he struck out variety, divisibility, and motion, from the list of its predicates. He admitted only the Parmenidean Ens, one, continuous, unchanging, and immoveable, with none but negative predi-

Zeno did not deny motion, as a fact, phenomenal and relative.

cates, and severed from the relative world of experience and sensation.

Other reasoners, contemporary with Zeno, did not agree with him, in admitting the Absolute, even as an object with no predicates, except unity and continuity. They denied it altogether, both as substratum and as predicate. To establish this negation is the purpose of a short treatise ascribed to the rhetor or Sophist Gorgias, a contemporary of Zeno; but we are informed that all the reasonings, which Gorgias employed, were advanced, or had already been advanced, by others before him.<sup>g</sup> Those reasonings are so imperfectly preserved, that we can make out little more than the general scope.

Gorgias the Leontine—did not admit the Absolute, even as conceived by Parmenides.

Ens, or Entity *per se* (he contended), did not really exist. Even granting that it existed, it was unknowable by anyone. And even granting that it both existed, and was known by anyone, still such person could not communicate his knowledge of it to others.<sup>h</sup>

His reasonings against the Absolute, either as Ens or Entia.

As to the first point, Ens was no more real or existent than Non-Ens: the word Non-Ens must have an objective meaning, as well as the word Ens: it was Non-Ens, therefore it *was*, or existed. Both of them existed alike, or rather neither of them existed. Moreover, if Ens existed, it must exist either as One or as Many—either as eternal or as generated—either in itself, or in some other place. But Melisso, Zeno, and other previous philosophers, had shown sufficient cause against each of these alternatives separately taken. Each of the alternative essential predicates had been separately disproved; therefore the subject, Ens, could not exist under either of them, or could not exist at all.

<sup>g</sup> See the last words of the Aristotelian or Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise, De Melisso, Xenophane et Gorgiâ, p. 980.

Ἀπᾶσαι δὲ αὐταὶ καὶ ἑτέρων ἀρχαιοτέρων εἰσὶν ἀπόρριαι, ὥστε ἐν τῇ περὶ ἐκείνων σκέψει καὶ ταύτας ἐξεταστήον.

Ἀπᾶσαι is the reading of Mullach in his edition of this treatise (p. 79), in place of ἀπαντες or ἀπαντα.

<sup>h</sup> See the treatise of Aristotle or

Pseudo-Aristotle, De Melisso, Xenophane, et Gorgiâ, in Aristot. p. 979-980, Becker, also in Mullach's edition, p. 62-78. The argument of Gorgias is also abridged by Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathemat. vii. p. 384, sect. 65-86.

See also a copious commentary on the Aristotelian treatise in Foss, De Gorgiâ Leontino, p. 115 seq.

The text of the Aristotelian treatise is so corrupt as to be often unintelligible.



As to the second point, let us grant that Ens or Entia exist: they would nevertheless (argued Gorgias) be incogitable and unknowable. To be cogitated is no more an attribute of Ens than of Non-Ens. The fact of cogitation does not require Ens as a condition, or attest Ens as an absolute or thing in itself. If our cogitation required or attained Ens as an indispensable object, then there could be no fictitious *cogitata* nor any false propositions. We think of a man flying in the air, or of a chariot race on the surface of the sea. If our *cogitata* were realities, these must be so as well as the rest: if realities alone were the object of cogitation, then these could not be thought of. As Non-Ens was thus undeniably the object of cogitation, so Ens could not be its object: for what was true respecting one of these contraries, could not be true respecting the other.

As to the third point: Assuming Ens both to exist and to be known by you, you cannot (said Gorgias) declare or explain it to anyone else. You profess to have learnt what Ens is in itself, by your sight or other perceptions; but you declare to others by means of words, and these words are neither themselves the absolute Ens, nor do they bring Ens before the hearer. Even though you yourself know Ens, you cannot, by your words, enable *him* to know it. If he is to know Ens, he must know it in the same way as you. Moreover, neither your words, nor Ens itself, will convey to the hearer the same knowledge as to you; for the same cannot be at once in two distinct subjects; and even if it were, yet since you and the hearer are not completely alike, so the effect of the same object on both of you will not appear to be like.<sup>1</sup>

Such is the reasoning, as far as we can make it out, whereby Gorgias sought to prove that the absolute Ens was neither

<sup>1</sup> In this third branch of the argument, showing that Ens, even if known, cannot be communicable to others, Gorgias travels beyond the Absolute, and directs his reasoning against the communicability of the Relative or Phenomenal also. Both of his arguments against such communicability have some foundation, and serve to prove that the communicability cannot be exact or entire, even in the case of sensible facts. The sensations, thoughts, emotions, &c. of one person are not *exactly* like those of another.

existent, nor knowable, nor communicable by words from one person to another.

The arguments both of Zeno and of Gorgias (the latter presenting the thoughts of others earlier than himself), dating from a time coinciding with the younger half of the life of Sokrates, evince a new spirit and purpose in Grecian philosophy, as compared with the Ionians, the two first Eleates, and the Pythagoreans. Zeno and Gorgias exhibit conspicuously the new element of dialectic: the force of the negative arm in Grecian philosophy, brought out into the arena against those who dogmatized or propounded positive theories: the fertility of Grecian imagination in suggesting doubts and difficulties, for which the dogmatists, if they aspired to success and reputation, had to provide answers. Zeno directed his attack against one scheme of philosophy—the doctrine of the Absolute Many—leaving by implication the rival doctrine—the Absolute One of Parmenides—in exclusive possession of the field, yet not reinforcing it with any new defences against objectors. Gorgias impugned the philosophy of the Absolute in either or both of its forms—as One or as Many: not with a view of leaving any third form as the only survivor, or of providing any substitute from his own invention, but of showing that Ens, the object of philosophical research, could neither be found nor known. The negative purpose, disallowing altogether the philosophy of Nature (as then conceived, not as now conceived), was declared without reserve by Gorgias, as we shall presently find that it was by Sokrates also.

It is the opening of the negative vein which imparts from this time forward a new character to Grecian philosophy. The positive and negative forces, emanating from different aptitudes in the human mind, are now both of them actively developed, and in strenuous antithesis to each other. Philosophy is no longer exclusively confined to dogmatists, each searching in his imagination for the Absolute Ends of Nature, and each propounding what seems to him the only solution of the problem. Such thinkers still continue their vocation, but under new con-

Zeno and  
Gorgias—  
contrasted  
with the ear-  
lier Grecian  
philosophers.

New charac-  
ter of Grecian  
philosophy—  
antithesis of  
affirmative  
and negative  
—proof and  
disproof.

ditions of success, and subject to the scrutiny of numerous dissentient critics. It is no longer sufficient to propound a theory,<sup>k</sup> either in obscure, oracular metaphors and half-intelligible aphorisms, like Herakleitus—or in verse more or less impressive, like Parmenides or Empedokles. The theory must be sustained by proofs, guarded against objections, defended against imputations of inconsistency: moreover, it must be put in comparison with other rival theories, the defects of which must accordingly be shown up along with it. Here are new exigencies, to which dogmatic philosophers had not before been obnoxious. They were now required to be masters of the art of dialectic attack and defence, not fearing the combat of question and answer—a combat in which, assuming tolerable equality between the duellists, the questioner had the advantage of the sun, or the preferable position,<sup>l</sup> and the farther advantage of choosing where to aim his blows. To expose fallacy or inconsistency, was found to be both an easier process, and a more appreciable display of ingenuity, than the discovery and establishment of truth in such manner as to command assent. The weapon of negation, refutation, cross-examination, was wielded for its own results, and was found hard to parry by the affirmative philosophers of the day.

<sup>k</sup> The repugnance of the Herakleitæan philosophers to the scrutiny of dialectical interrogation is described by Plato in strong language, it is indeed even caricatured. (*Theætétus*, 179-180.)

<sup>l</sup> *Theokritus*, *Idyll.* xxii. 83; the description of the pugilistic contest between *Pollux* and *Amykus*:—

ἔνθα πάλυς σφισι μόχθος ἐπειγομένοισιν  
 ἐτύχθη,  
 ὀππότερος κατὰ νῶτα λάβη φάος ἡελίου·  
 ἀλλ' ἰδρίη μέγαν ἀνδρα παρήλυθε, ὃ Πο-  
 λυδέυκες  
 βάλλετο δ' ἀκτίνεσσιν ἅπαν Ἀμύκιο πρό-  
 σωπον.

To toss up for the sun, was a practice not yet introduced between pugilists.

## APPENDIX.

To illustrate by comparison the form of Grecian philosophy, before Dialectic was brought to bear upon it, I transcribe from two eminent French scholars (M. Barthélémy St. Hilaire and Professor Mohl) some account of the mode in which the Indian philosophy has always been kept on record and communicated.

M. Barthélémy St. Hilaire (in his *Prémier Mémoire sur le Sankhya*, pp. 5, 7, 8, 9, 11), gives the following observations upon the Sankhya or philosophy of Kapila, one of the principal systems of Sanskrit philosophy : date (as supposed) about 700 B.C.

There are two sources from whence the Sankhya philosophy is known :—

“ 1. Les Soûtras ou aphorismes de Kapila.

“ 2. Le traité déjà connu et traduit sous le nom de *Sankhya Karika*, c'est à dire *Vers Mémoires du Sankhya*.

“ Les Soûtras de Kapila sont en tout au nombre de 499, divisés en six lectures, et repartis inégalement entre chacune d'elles. Les Soûtras sont accompagnés d'un commentaire qui les explique, et qui est d'un brahmane nommé le Mendiant. Le commentateur explique avec des développemens plus ou moins longs les Soûtras de Kapila, qu'il cite un à un.

“ Les Soûtras sont en général très concis : parfois ils ne se composent que de deux ou trois mots, et jamais ils ne comprennent plus d'une phrase. Cette forme aphoristique, sous laquelle se présente à nous la philosophie Indienne—est celle qu'a prise la science Indienne dans toutes ses branches, depuis la grammaire jusqu' à la philosophie. Les Soûtras de Panini, qui a réduit toutes les règles de la grammaire en 3996 aphorismes, ne sont pas moins concis que ceux de Kapila. Ce mode étrange d'exposition tient dans l'Inde à la manière même dont la science s'est transmise d'âge en âge. Un maître n'a généralement qu'un disciple : il lui suffit, pour la doctrine qu'il communique, d'avoir des points de repère, et le commentaire oral qu'il ajoute à ces sentences pour les expliquer, met le disciple en état de les bien comprendre. Le disciple lui-même, une fois qu'il en a pénétré le sens véritable, n'a pas besoin d'un symbole plus développé, et la concision même des aphorismes l'aide à les mieux retenir. *C'est une initiation qu'il a reçue : et les sentences, dans lesquelles cette initiation se résume, restent toujours assez claires pour lui.*

“ Mais il n'en est pas de même pour les lecteurs étrangers, et il serait difficile de trouver rien de plus obscur que les Soûtras. Les commentaires mêmes ne suffisent pas toujours à les rendre parfaitement intelligibles.

“ Le seul exemple d'une forme analogue dans l'histoire de l'esprit humain et de la science en occident, nous est fourni par les Aphorismes d'Hippocrate : eux aussi s'adressaient à des adeptes, et ils réclamaient, comme les Soûtras Indiens, l'explication des maîtres pour être bien compris par les disciples. Mais cet exemple unique n'a point tiré à conséquence dans le monde occidental, tandis que dans le monde Indien l'aphorisme est resté pendant de longs siècles la forme spéciale de la science : et les développemens de pensée qui nous sont habituels, et qui nous paraissent indispensables, ont été réservés aux commentaires.

“ La Sankhya Karika est en vers : En Grèce, la poésie a été pendant quelque temps la langue de la philosophie ; Empedocles, Parménides, ont écrit leurs systèmes en vers. Ce n'est pas Kapila qui l'a écrite. Entre Kapila, et l'auteur de la Karika, Isvara Krishna, on doit compter quelques centaines d'années tout au moins : et le second n'a fait que rediger en vers, pour aider la mémoire des élèves, la doctrine que le maître avoit laissée sous la forme axiomatique.

“ On conçoit, du reste, sans peine, que l'usage des vers mémoriaux se soit introduit dans l'Inde pour l'enseignement et la transmission de la science : c'était une conséquence nécessaire de l'usage des aphorismes. Les sciences les plus abstraites (mathematics, astronomy, algebra) emploient aussi ce procédé, quoiqu'il semble peu fait pour leur austérité et leur précision. Ainsi, le rythme est, avec les aphorismes, et par le même motif, la forme à peu près générale de la science dans l'Inde.”

(Kapila as a personage is almost legendary ; nothing exact is known about him. His doctrine passes among the Indians “ comme une sorte de révélation divine.”—Pp. 252, 253.)

M. Mohl observes as follows :—

“ Ceci m'amène aux Pouranas. Nous n'avons plus rien du Pourana primitif, qui paraît avoir été une cosmogonie, suivie d'une histoire des Dieux et des familles héroïques. Les sectes ont finis par s'approprier ce cadre, après des transformations dont nous ne savons ni le nombre ni les époques : et s'en sont servies, pour exalter chacun son dieu, et y fondre, avec des débris de l'ancienne tradition, leur mythologie plus moderne. Ce que les Pouranas sont pour le peuple, les six systèmes de philosophie le sont pour les savants. Nous trouvons ces systèmes dans la forme abstruse que les Hindous aiment à donner à leur science : chaque école a ses aphorismes, qui, sous forme de vers mnémoniques, contiennent dans le moins grand nombre de mots possible tous les résultats d'une école. Mais nous n'avons aucun renseignement sur les commencemens de l'école, sur les discussions que l'élaboration du système a dû provoquer, sur les hommes qui y ont pris part, sur la marche et le développement des idées : nous avons le système dans sa dernière forme, et rien ne nous permet de remplir l'espace qui le sépare des théories plus vagues que l'on trouve dans les derniers écrits de l'époque védique, à laquelle pourtant tout prétend se rattacher. À partir de ces aphorismes, nous avons des commentaires et des traités d'exposition et d'interprétation : mais les idées premières, les termes techniques, et le système entier, sont fixés antérieurement. Tous ces systèmes reposent sur une analyse psychologique très raffinée ; chacun a sa terminologie précise, et à laquelle la notre ne répond que fort imparfaitement : il faut donc, sous peine de se tromper et de tromper ses lecteurs, que les traducteurs créent une foule de termes techniques, ce qui n'est pas la moindre difficulté de ce travail.”—Mohl, ‘ Rapport Annuel Fait à la Société Asiatique, 1863, pp. 103-105.

When the purpose simply is to imprint affirmations on the memory, and to associate them with strong emotions of reverential belief—mnemonic verses and aphorisms are suitable enough ; Empedokles employed verse, Herakleitus and the Pythagoreans expressed themselves in aphorisms—brief, half-intelligible, impressive symbols. But if philosophy is ever to be brought out of such twilight into the condition of “ reasoned truth,” this cannot be done without submitting all the affirmations to cross-examining opponents—to the scrutiny of a negative Dialectic. It is the theory and application of this Dialectic which we are about to follow in Sokrates and Plato.

CHAPTER III.

LIFE OF PLATO.

OF Plato's biography we can furnish nothing better than a faint outline. We are not fortunate enough to possess the work on Plato's life,<sup>a</sup> composed by his companion and disciple Xenokrates, like the life of Plotinus by Porphyry, or that of Proklus by Marinus. Though Plato lived eighty years, enjoying extensive celebrity—and though Diogenes Laertius employed peculiar care in collecting information about him—yet the number of facts recounted is very small, and of those facts a considerable proportion is poorly attested.<sup>b</sup>

Scanty information about Plato's life.

<sup>a</sup> This is cited by Simplikius, Schol. ad Aristot. De Cœlo, 470, a. 27 ; 474, a. 12, ed. Brandis.

<sup>b</sup> Diogen. Laert. iv. 1. The person to whom Diogenes addressed his biography of Plato was a female : possibly the wife of the Emperor Septimius Severus (see Philostr. Vit. Apoll. i. 3), who greatly loved and valued the Platonic philosophy (iii. 47). Menage (in his commentary on the Procemium) supposes the person signified to be Aeria : this also is a mere conjecture, and in my judgment less probable. We know that the empress gave positive encouragement to writers on philosophy. The article devoted by Diogenes to Plato is of considerable length, including both biography and exposition of doctrine. He makes reference to numerous witnesses—Speusippus, Aristotle, Hermodôrus, Aristippus, Dikæarchus, Aristoxenus, Klearchus, Herakleides, Theopompus, Timon in his Silli or satirical poem, Pamphila, Hermippus, Neanthes, Antileon, Favorinus, Athenodôrus, Timotheus, Idomeneus, Alexander ἐν διαδοχαῖς καθ' Ἡράκλειτον, Satyrus, Onêtôr, Alkimus, Euphorion, Panætius, Myronianus, Polemon, Aristophanes of Byzantium, the Alexandrine

critic, Antigonus of Karystus, Thrasyllus, &c.

Of the other biographers of Plato, Olympiodorus and the Auctor Anonymus cite no authorities. Apuleius, in his survey of the doctrine of Plato (De Habitudine doctrinarum Platonis, init. p. 567, ed. Paris) mentions only Speusippus, as having attested the early diligence and quick apprehension of Plato. "Speusippus, domesticis instructus documentis, et pueri ejus acre in percipiendo ingenium, et admirandæ verecundiæ indolem laudat, et pubescentis primitias labore atque amore studendi imbutas refert," &c.

Speusippus had composed a funeral Discourse or Encomium on Plato (Diogen. iii. 1, 2 ; iv. 1-11). Unfortunately Diogenes refers to it only once in reference to Plato. We can hardly make out whether any of the authors, whom he cites, had made the life of Plato a subject of attentive study. Hermodôrus is cited by Simplikius as having written a treatise περὶ Πλάτωνος. Aristoxenus, Dikæarchus, and Theopompus—perhaps also Hermippus and Klearchus—had good means of information.

See K. F. Hermann, Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie, p. 97, not. 45.

Plato was born at Ægina (in which island his father enjoyed an estate as kleruch or out-settled citizen) in the month Thargelion (May) of the year B.C. 427.<sup>c</sup> His family, belonging to the Dême Kollytus, was both ancient and noble, in the sense attached to that word at Athens. He was son of Ariston (or, according to some admirers, of the God Apollo) and Periktionê: his maternal ancestors had been intimate friends or relatives of the law-giver Solon, while his father belonged to a Gens tracing its descent from Kodrus, and even from the God Poseidon. He was also nearly related to Charmides and to Kritias—this last the well-known and violent leader among the oligarchy called the Thirty Tyrants.<sup>d</sup> Plato was first called Aristoklês, after

His birth, parentage, and early education.

<sup>c</sup> It was affirmed distinctly by Hermodôrus (according to the statement of Diogenes Laertius, iii. 6) that Plato was twenty-eight years old at the time of the death of Sokrates: that is, in May, 399 B.C. (Zeller, *Philos. der Griechen*, vol. ii. p. 39, ed. 2nd.) This would place the birth of Plato in 427 B.C. Other critics refer his birth to 428 or 429: but I agree with Zeller in thinking that the deposition of Hermodôrus is more trustworthy than any other evidence before us.

Hermodôrus was a friend and disciple of Plato, and is even said to have made money by publishing Plato's dialogues without permission (Cicero, *Epist. ad Attic.* xiii. 21). Suidas, Ἑρμοδόωρος. He was also an author: he published a treatise *Περὶ Μαθημάτων* (*Diog. L. Procem.* 2).

See the more recent Dissertation of Zeller, *De Hermodoro Ephesio et Hermodoro Platónico*, Marburg, 1859, p. 19 seq. He cites two important passages (out of the commentary of Simplicius on Aristot. *Physic.*) referring to the work of Hermodôrus ὁ Πλάτωνος ἑταῖρος—a work *Περὶ Πλάτωνος*, on Plato.

<sup>d</sup> The statements respecting Plato's relatives are obscure and perplexing: unfortunately the *domestica documenta*, which were within the knowledge of his nephew Speusippus, are no longer accessible to us. It is certain that he had two brothers, Glaukon and Adeimantus: besides which, it would appear from the Parmenides (126 B) that

he had a younger half-brother by the mother's side, named Antiphon, and son of Pylilampes (compare Charmides, p. 158 A, and Plutarch, *De Fraterno Amore*, 12, p. 484 E). But the age, which this would assign to Antiphon, does not harmonise well with the chronological postulates assumed in the exordium of the Parmenides. Accordingly, K. F. Hermann and Stallbaum are led to believe, that besides the brothers of Plato named Glaukon and Adeimantus, there must also have been two uncles of Plato bearing these same names, and having Antiphon for their younger brother. (See Stallbaum's *Prolegomena ad Charmidem*, pp. 84, 85, and *Prolegg. ad Parmenidem*, Part iii. pp. 304-307.) This is not unlikely: but we cannot certainly determine the point—more especially as we do not know what amount of chronological inaccuracy Plato might hold to be admissible, in the *personnel* of his dialogues.

It is worth mentioning, that in the discourse of Andokides de Mysteriis, persons named Plato, Charmides, Antiphon, are named among those accused of concern in the sacrileges of 415 B.C.—the mutilation of the Hermæ and the mock celebration of the mysteries. Speusippus is also named as among the Senators of the year (Andokides *Mys.* s. 15-18-35). Whether these persons belonged to the same family as the philosopher Plato, we cannot say. He himself was then only twelve years old.

his grandfather; but received when he grew up the name of Plato—on account of the breadth (we are told) either of his forehead or of his shoulders. Endowed with a robust physical frame, and exercised in gymnastics, not merely in one of the palæstræ of Athens (which he describes graphically in the *Charmides*) but also under an Argeian trainer, he attained such force and skill as to contend (if we may credit *Dikæarchus*) for the prize of wrestling among boys at the Isthmian festival.<sup>e</sup> His literary training was commenced under a schoolmaster named *Dionysius*, and pursued under *Drakon*, a celebrated teacher of music in the large sense then attached to that word. He is said to have displayed both diligence and remarkable quickness of apprehension, combined too with the utmost gravity and modesty.<sup>f</sup> He not only acquired great familiarity with the poets, but composed poetry of his own—dithyrambic, lyric, and tragic: and he is even reported to have prepared a tragic tetralogy, with the view of competing for victory at the Dionysian festival. We are told that he burned these poems, when he attached himself to the society of *Sokrates*. No compositions in verse remain under his name, except a few epigrams—amatory, affectionate, and of great poetical beauty. But there is ample proof in his dialogues that the cast of his mind was essentially poetical. Many of his philosophical speculations are nearly allied to poetry, and acquire their hold upon the mind rather through imagination and sentiment than through reason or evidence.

According to *Diogenes*<sup>g</sup> (who on this point does not cite his authority), it was about the twentieth year of Plato's age (407 B.C.) that his acquaintance with *Sokrates* began. It may possibly have begun earlier, but certainly not later—since at the time of the conversation (related by *Xenophon*) between *Sokrates* and Plato's younger brother *Glaukon*, there was already a friendship established

<sup>e</sup> *Diog. L. iii. 4*; *Epiktetus, i. 8-13*,  
 εἰ δὲ καλὸς ἦν Πλάτων καὶ ἰσχυρός, &c.  
 The statement of *Sextus Empiricus*  
 —that Plato in his boyhood had his  
 ears bored and wore ear-rings—indi-  
 cates the opulent family to which he  
 belonged. (*S. E. adv. Grammaticos*,

s. 258.) Probably some of the old  
 habits of the great Athenian families,  
 as to ornaments worn on the head or  
 hair, were preserved with the children  
 after they had been discontinued with  
 adults. See *Thucyd. i. 6*.

<sup>f</sup> *Diog. L. iii. 26*.

<sup>g</sup> *Ibid. 6*.



between Sokrates and Plato: and that time can hardly be later than 406 B.C., or the beginning of 405 B.C.<sup>b</sup> From 406 B.C. down to 399 B.C., when Sokrates was tried and condemned, Plato seems to have remained in friendly relation and society with him: a relation perhaps interrupted during the severe political struggles between 405 B.C. and 403 B.C., but revived and strengthened after the restoration of the democracy in the last-mentioned year.

But though Plato may have commenced at the age of twenty his acquaintance with Sokrates, he cannot have been exclusively occupied in philosophical pursuits between the nineteenth and the twenty-fifth year of his age—that is, between 409-403 B.C. He was carried, partly by his own dispositions, to other matters besides philosophy: and even if such dispositions had not existed, the exigencies of the time pressed upon him imperatively as an Athenian citizen. Even under ordinary circumstances, a young Athenian of eighteen years of age, as soon as he was enrolled on the public register of citizens, was required to take the memorable military oath in the chapel of Aglaurus, and to serve on active duty, constant or nearly constant, for two years, in various posts throughout Attica, for the defence of the country.<sup>1</sup> But the six years from 409-403 B.C. were years of an extraordinary character. They included the most strenuous public efforts, the severest suffering, and the gravest political revolution,

<sup>b</sup> Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 6, 1. Sokrates was induced by his friendship for Plato and for Charmides the cousin of Plato, to admonish the forward youth Glaukon (Plato's younger brother), who thrust himself forward obtrusively to speak in the public assembly before he was twenty years of age. The two discourses of Sokrates—one with the presumptuous Glaukon, the other with the diffident Charmides—are both reported by Xenophon.

These discourses must have taken place before the battle of Ægospotami: for Charmides was killed during the Anarchy, and Glaukon certainly would never have attempted such acts of presumption after the restoration of the democracy, at a time when the tide of

public feeling had become vehemently hostile to Kritias, Charmides, and all the names and families connected with the oligarchical rule just overthrown.

I presume the conversation of Sokrates with Glaukon to have taken place in 406 B.C. or 405 B.C.: it was in 405 B.C. that the disastrous battle of Ægospotami occurred.

<sup>i</sup> Read the oath sworn by the Ephēbi in Pollux viii. 105. Æschines tells us that he served his two epeheic years as *περίπολος τῆς χώρας*, when there was no remarkable danger or foreign pressure. See Æsch. De Fals. Legat. s. 178. See the facts about the Athenian Ephēbi brought together in a Dissertation by W. Dittenberger, p. 9-12.

that had ever occurred at Athens. Every Athenian citizen was of necessity put upon constant (almost daily) military service; either abroad, or in Attica against the Lacedæmonian garrison established in the permanent fortified post of Dekeleia, within sight of the Athenian Acropolis. So habitually were the citizens obliged to be on guard, that Athens, according to Thucydides,<sup>k</sup> became a military post rather than a city. It is probable that Plato by his family and its place on the census, belonged to the Athenian Hippeis or Horsemen, who were in constant employment for the defence of the territory. But at any rate, either on horseback, or on foot, or on shipboard, a robust young citizen like Plato, whose military age commenced in 409, must have borne his fair share in this hard but indispensable duty. In the desperate emergency, which preceded the battle of Arginusæ (406 B.C.), the Athenians put to sea in thirty days a fleet of 110 triremes for the relief of Mitylenê; all the men of military age, freemen, and slaves, embarking.<sup>1</sup> We can

Plato's youth  
—service as a  
citizen and  
soldier.

<sup>k</sup> Thucyd. vii. 27, viii. 69. *ὁσήμεραι ἐξελαυνόντων τῶν ἰππέων*, &c. Antiphon, who is described in the beginning of the *Parmenides*, as devoted to *ἰππική*, must have been either brother or uncle of Plato.

<sup>1</sup> Xenophon. *Hellen.* T. 6, 24. *Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰ γεγενημένα καὶ τὴν πολιορκίαν ἐπεὶ ἤκουσαν, ἐψηφίσαντο βοηθεῖν ναυσὶν ἑκατὸν καὶ δέκα, ἐσβιβάζοντες τοὺς ἐν ἡλικίᾳ ὄντας ἅπαντας, καὶ δούλους καὶ ἐλευθέρους· καὶ πληρώσαντες τὰς δέκα καὶ ἑκατὸν ἐν τριάκοντα ἡμέραις, ἀπῆραν εἰσέβησαν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἰππέων πολλοί.* In one of the anecdotes given by Diogenes (iii. 24) Plato alludes to his own military service. Aristoxenus (*Diog.* L. iii. 8) said that Plato had been engaged thrice in military expeditions out of Attica; once to Tanagra, a second time to Corinth, a third time to Delium, where he distinguished himself. Aristoxenus must have had fair means of information, yet I do not know what to make of this statement. All the three places named are notorious for battles fought by Athens; nevertheless chronology utterly forbids the supposition that Plato could have been present either

at the battle of Tanagra or at the battle of Delium. At the battle of Delium Sokrates was present, and is said to have distinguished himself; hence there is ground for suspecting some confusion between his name and that of Plato. It is however possible that there may have been, during the interval between 410-405 B.C., partial invasions of the frontiers of Bœotia by Athenian detachments: both Tanagra and Delium were on the Bœotian frontier. The great battle of Corinth took place in 394 B.C. Plato left Athens immediately after the death of Sokrates in 399 B.C., and visited several foreign countries during the years immediately following; but he may have been at Athens in 394 B.C., and may have served in the Athenian force at Corinth. See Mr. Clinton, *Fast. Hell.* ad ann. 395 B.C. I do not see how Plato could have been engaged in any battle of Delium after the battle of Corinth, for Athens was not then at war with the Bœotians.

At the same time I confess that the account given by or ascribed to Aristoxenus appears to me to have been founded on little positive information.

hardly imagine that at such a season Plato can have wished to decline service: even if he had wished it, the Strategi would not have permitted him. Assuming that he remained at home, the garrison-duty at Athens must have been doubled on account of the number of departures. After the crushing defeat of the Athenians at Ægospotami, came the terrible apprehension at Athens, then the long blockade and famine of the city (wherein many died of hunger); next the tyranny of the Thirty, who among their other oppressions made war upon all free speech, and silenced even the voice of Sokrates: then the gallant combat of Thrasybulus followed by the intervention of the Lacedæmonians—contingencies full of uncertainty and terror, but ending in the restoration of the democracy. After such restoration, there followed all the anxieties, perils of reaction, new enactments and provisions, required for the revived democracy, during the four years between the expulsion of the Thirty and the death of Sokrates.

From the dangers, fatigues, and sufferings of such an historical decad, no Athenian citizen could escape, whatever might be his feeling towards the existing democracy, or however averse he might be to public employment by natural temper. But Plato was not thus averse, during the earlier years of his adult life. We know, from his own letters, that he then felt strongly the impulse of political ambition usual with young Athenians of good family;<sup>m</sup> though probably not with any such premature vehemence as his younger brother Glaukon, whose impatience Sokrates is reported to have so judiciously moderated.<sup>n</sup> Whether Plato ever spoke with success in the public assembly, we do not know: he is said to have been shy by nature, and his voice was thin and feeble, ill adapted for the Pnyx.<sup>o</sup> However, when the oligarchy of Thirty was esta-

when we compare it with the military duty which Plato must have done between 410-405 B.C.

It is curious that Antisthenes also is mentioned as having distinguished himself at the battle of Tanagra (Diog. vi. 1). The same remarks are appli-

cable to him as have just been made upon Plato.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 324-325.

<sup>n</sup> Xenophon, Memor. iii. 6.

<sup>o</sup> Diogen. Laert. iii. 5. Ἰσχυρόφωνος δὲ ἦν, &c., iii. 7-21. αἰδημῶν καὶ κόσμιος.

blished, after the capture and subjugation of Athens, Plato was not only relieved from the necessity of addressing the assembled people, but also obtained additional facilities for rising into political influence, through Kritias (his near relative) and Charmides, leading men among the new oligarchy. Plato affirms that he had always disapproved the antecedent democracy, and that he entered on the new scheme of government with full hope of seeing justice and wisdom predominant. He was soon undeceived. The government of the Thirty proved a sanguinary and rapacious tyranny,<sup>p</sup> filling him with disappointment and disgust. He was especially revolted by their treatment of Sokrates, whom they not only interdicted from continuing his habitual colloquy with young men,<sup>q</sup> but even tried to implicate in nefarious murders, by ordering him along with others to arrest Leon the Salaminian, one of their intended victims: an order which Sokrates, at the peril of his life, disobeyed.

Thus mortified and disappointed, Plato withdrew from public functions. What part he took in the struggle between the oligarchy and its democratical assailants under Thrasybulus, we are not informed. But when the democracy was re-established, his political ambition revived, and he again sought to acquire some active influence on public affairs. Now however the circumstances had become highly unfavourable to him. The name of his deceased relative Kritias was generally abhorred, and he had no powerful partisans among the popular leaders. With such disadvantages, with anti-democratical sentiments, and with a thin voice, we cannot wonder that Plato soon found public life repulsive;<sup>r</sup> though he admits the remarkable moderation

He becomes  
disgusted  
with politics.

<sup>p</sup> History of Greece, vol. viii. ch. 65.

<sup>q</sup> Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 36; Plato, Apol. Sokrat. c. 20, p. 32.

<sup>r</sup> Ælian (V. H. iii. 27) had read a story to the effect, that Plato, in consequence of poverty, was about to seek military service abroad, and was buying arms for the purpose, when he was induced to stay by the exhortation of Sokrates, who prevailed upon him to devote himself to philosophy at home.

If there be any truth in this story, it must refer to some time in the interval between the restoration of the democracy (403 B.C.) and the death of Sokrates (399 B.C.). The military service of Plato, prior to the battle of Ægospotami (405 B.C.), must have been obligatory, in defence of his country, not depending on his own free choice. It is possible also that Plato may have been for the time impoverished, like

displayed by the restored Demos. His repugnance was aggravated to the highest pitch of grief and indignation by the trial and condemnation of Sokrates (399 B.C.), four years after the renewal of the democracy. At that moment doubtless the Sokratic men or companions were unpopular in a body. Plato, after having yielded his best sympathy and aid at the trial of Sokrates, retired along with several others of them to Megara. He made up his mind that for a man of his views and opinions, it was not only unprofitable, but also unsafe, to embark in active public life, either at Athens or in any other Grecian city. He resolved to devote himself to philosophical speculation, and to abstain from practical politics; unless fortune should present to him some exceptional case, of a city prepared to welcome and obey a renovator upon exalted principles.<sup>8</sup>

At Megara Plato passed some time with the Megarian Eukleides, his fellow-disciple in the society of Sokrates, and the founder of what is termed the Megaric school of philosophers. He next visited Kyrênê, where he is said to have become acquainted with the geometrician Theodôrus, and to have studied geometry under him. From Kyrênê he proceeded to Egypt, interesting himself much in the antiquities of the country as well as in the conversation of the priests. In or about 394 B.C.—if we may trust the statement of Aristoxenus about the military service of Plato at Corinth, he was again at Athens. He afterwards went to Italy and Sicily, seeking the society of the Pythagorean philosophers, Archytas, Echekrates, Timæus, &c. at Tarentum and Lokri, and visiting the volcanic manifestations of Ætna. It appears that his first visit to Sicily was made when he was about forty years of age, which would be 387 B.C. Here he made acquaintance with the youthful Dion, over whom he acquired great intel-

many other citizens, by the intestine troubles in Attica, and may have contemplated military service abroad, like Xenophon.

But I am inclined to think that the story is unfounded, and that it arises

from some confusion between Plato and Xenophon.

<sup>8</sup> The above account of Plato's proceedings, perfectly natural and interesting, but unfortunately brief, is to be found in his seventh Epistle, p. 325-326.

He retires from Athens after the death of Sokrates—his travels.

lectual ascendancy. By Dion Plato was prevailed upon to visit the elder Dionysius at Syracuse:<sup>t</sup> but that despot offended by the free spirit of his conversation and admonitions, dismissed him with displeasure, and even caused him to be sold into slavery at Ægina in his voyage home. Though really sold, however, Plato was speedily ransomed by friends. After farther incurring some risk of his life as an Athenian citizen, in consequence of the hostile feelings of the Æginetans, he was conveyed away safely to Athens, about 386 B.C.<sup>u</sup>

It was at this period, about 386 B.C., that the continuous and formal public teaching of Plato, constituting as it does so great an epoch in philosophy, commenced. But I see no ground for believing, as many authors assume, that he was absent from Athens during the entire interval between 399-386 B.C. I regard such long continued absence as extremely improbable. Plato had not been sentenced to banishment, nor was he under any compulsion to stay away from his native city. He was not born "of an oak-tree or a rock" (to use an Homeric phrase, strikingly applied by Sokrates in his Apology to the Dikasts<sup>x</sup>), but of a noble family at Athens, where he had brothers and other connections. A temporary retirement, immediately after the death of Sokrates, might be congenial to his feelings and interesting in many ways; but an absence of moderate length would suffice for such exigencies, and there were surely reasonable motives to induce him to revisit his friends at home. I conceive Plato as having visited Kyrênê, Egypt, and Italy during these thirteen years, yet as having also spent part of this long time at Athens. Had he been con-

<sup>t</sup> Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 324 A, 327 A.  
<sup>u</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 5; Cornelius Nepos, Dion, ii. 3; Diogen. Laert. iii. 19-20; Aristides, Or. xlvi. *Ἐπὶ τῶν Τεττάρων*, p. 305-306, ed. Dindorf.

Cicero (De Finib. v. 29; Tusc. Disp. i. 17), and others, had contracted a lofty idea of Plato's Travels, more than the reality seems to warrant. Valerius Maxim. viii. 7, 3; Plin. Hist. Nat. xxx. 2.

The Sophist Himerius repeats the same general statements about Plato's early education, and extensive subsequent travels, but without adding any new particulars (Orat. xiv. 21-25).

If we can trust a passage of Tzetzes, cited by Mr. Clinton (F. H. ad B.C. 366) and by Welcker, Trag. Gr. p. 1236, Dionysius the elder of Syracuse had composed (among his various dramas) a tragi comedy directed against Plato.

<sup>x</sup> Plato, Apol. So. p. 34 D.

His permanent establishment at Athens—386 B.C.

tinuously absent from that city he would have been almost forgotten, and would scarcely have acquired reputation enough to set up with success as a teacher.<sup>1</sup>

The spot selected by Plato for his lectures or teaching was a garden adjoining the precinct sacred to the Hero Hekadêmus or Akadêmus, distant from the gate of Athens called Dipylon somewhat less than a mile, on the road to Eleusis, towards the north. In this precinct there were both walks, shaded by trees, and a gymnasium for bodily exercise: close adjoining, Plato either inherited or acquired a small dwelling-house and garden, his own private property.<sup>2</sup> Here, under the name of the Academy, was founded the earliest of those schools of philosophy, which continued for centuries forward to guide and stimulate the speculative minds of Greece and Rome.

We have scarce any particulars respecting the growth of the Academy from this time to the death of Plato, in 347 B.C. We only know generally that his fame as a lecturer

<sup>1</sup> Stallbaum insists upon it as "certum et indubium" that Plato was absent from Athens continuously, without ever returning to it, for the thirteen years immediately succeeding the death of Sokrates. But I see no good evidence of this, and I think it highly improbable. See Stallbaum, *Proleg. ad Platon. Politicum*, p. 38, 39. The statement of Strabo (xvii. 806), that Plato and Eudoxus passed thirteen years in Egypt, is not admissible.

Ueberweg examines and criticises the statements about Plato's travels. He considers it probable that Plato passed some part of these thirteen years at Athens (*Ueber die Aechtheit und Zeitfolge der Platon. Schrift.* p. 126, 127). Mr. Fynes Clinton thinks the same. *F. H. B. c.* 394; *Append. c.* 21, p. 366.

<sup>2</sup> Diogen. Laert. iii. 7, 8; Cicero, *De Finib.* v. 1; Zumpt, *Ueber den Bestand der philosophischen Schulen zu Athen*, p. 8 (Berlin, 1843). The Academy was consecrated to Athênê; there was, however, a statue of Eros there, to whom sacrifice was offered, in conjunction with Athênê. *Athenæus*, xiii. 561 P.

At the time when Aristophanes

assailed Sokrates in the comedy of the *Nubes* (423 B.C.), the Academy was known and familiar as a place for gymnastic exercise; and Aristophanes (*Nub.* 995) singles it out as the proper scene of action for the honest and muscular youth, who despises rhetoric and philosophy. Aristophanes did not anticipate, that within a short time after the representation of his last comedy, the most illustrious disciple of Sokrates would select the Academy as the spot for his residence and philosophical lectures, and would confer upon the name a permanent intellectual meaning, as designating the earliest and most memorable of the Hellenic schools.

In 369 B.C., when the school of Plato was in existence, the Athenian hoplites, marching to aid the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus, were ordered by Iphikrates to make their evening meal in the Academy (*Xenoph. Hellen.* vi. 5, 49).

The garden, afterwards established by Epikurus, was situated between the gate of Athens and the Academy: so that a person passed by it, when he walked forth from Athens to the Academy (*Cicero, De Finib.* i. 1).

became eminent and widely diffused: that among his numerous pupils were included Speusippus, Xenokrates, Aristotle, Demosthenes, Hyperides, Lykurgus, &c.: that he was admired and consulted by Perdikkas in Macedonia and Dionysius at Syracuse: that he was also visited by listeners and pupils from all parts of Greece. Among them was Eudoxus of Knidus, who afterwards became illustrious both in geometry and astronomy. At the age of twenty-three, and in poor circumstances, Eudoxus was tempted by the reputation of the Sokratic men, and enabled by the aid of friends, to visit Athens; where, however, he was coldly received by Plato. Besides preparing an octennial period or octaetêris, and a descriptive map of the Heavens, Eudoxus also devised the astronomical hypothesis of Concentric Spheres—the earliest theory proposed to show that the apparent irregularity in the motion of the Sun and the Planets might be explained, and proved to result from a multiplicity of co-operating spheres or agencies, each in itself regular.\* This theory of Eudoxus is said to

Plato as a teacher—pupils numerous and wealthy, from different cities.

\* For an account of Eudoxus himself, of his theory of concentric spheres, and the subsequent extensions of it, see the instructive volume of the late lamented Sir George Cornewall Lewis, —Historical Survey of the Ancient Astronomy, ch. iii. sect. 3, p. 146 seq.

M. Boeckh also (in his recent publication, Ueber die vierjährigen Sonnenkreise der Alten, vorzüglich den Eudoxischen, Berlin, 1863) has given an account of the life and career of Eudoxus, not with reference to his theory of concentric spheres, but to his Calendar and Lunisolar Cycles or Periods, quadrennial and octennial. I think Boeckh is right in placing the voyage of Eudoxus to Egypt at an earlier period of the life of Eudoxus: that is about 378 B.C.; and not in 362 B.C., where it is placed by Letronne and others. Boeckh shows that the letters of recommendation from Agesilaus to Nektanebos, which Eudoxus took with him, do not necessarily coincide in time with the military expedition of Agesilaus to Egypt, but were more probably of earlier date. (Boeckh, p. 140-148.)

Eudoxus lived 53 years (406-353

B.C., about); being born when Plato was 21, and dying when Plato was 75. He was one of the most illustrious men of the age. He was born in poor circumstances; but so marked was his early promise, that some of the medical school at Knidus assisted him to prosecute his studies—to visit Athens and hear the Sophists, Plato among them—to visit Egypt, Tarentum (where he studied geometry with Archytas), and Sicily (where he studied τὰ ἰατρικὰ with Philistion). These facts depend upon the Πίνακες of Kallimachus, which are good authority. (Diog. L. viii. 86.)

After thus preparing himself by travelling and varied study, Eudoxus took up the profession of a Sophist, at Kyzikus and the neighbouring cities in the Propontis. He obtained great celebrity, and a large number of pupils. M. Boeckh says, "Dort lebte er als Sophist, sagt Sotion: das heisst, er lehrte, und hielt Vorträge. Dasselbe bezeugt Philostratos."

I wish to call particular attention to the way in which M. Boeckh here describes a Sophist of the fourth century B.C. Nothing can be more cor-



have originated in a challenge of Plato, who propounded to astronomers, in his oral discourse, the problem which they ought to try to solve.<sup>b</sup>

rect. Every man who taught and gave lectures to audiences more or less numerous, was so called. The Platonic critics altogether darken the history of philosophy, by using the word *Sophist* with its modern associations (and the unmeaning abstract *Sophistic* which they derive from it), to represent a supposed school of speculative and deceptive corruptors.

Eudoxus, having been coldly received when young and poor by Plato, had satisfaction in revisiting Athens at the height of his reputation, accompanied by numerous pupils—and in showing himself again to Plato. The two then became friends. Menæchmus and Helikon, geometrical pupils of Eudoxus, received instruction from Plato also; and Helikon accompanied Plato on his third voyage to Sicily (Plato, *Epist.* xiii. p. 360 D; Plutarch, *Dion*, c. 19). Whether Eudoxus accompanied him there also, as Boeckh supposes, is doubtful: I think it improbable.

Eudoxus ultimately returned to his native city of Knidus, where he was received with every demonstration of honour; a public vote of esteem and recognition being passed to welcome him. He is said to have been solicited to give laws to the city, and to have actually done so: how far this may be true, we cannot say. He also visited the neighbouring prince Mausölus of Karia, by whom he was much honoured.

We know from Aristotle, that Eudoxus was not only illustrious as an astronomer and geometer, but that he also proposed a theory of Ethics, similar in its general formula to that which was afterwards laid down by Epikurus. Aristotle dissents from the theory, but he bears express testimony, in a manner very unusual with him, to the distinguished personal merit and virtue of Eudoxus (*Ethic. Nikom.* x. 3, p. 1172, b. 16).

<sup>b</sup> Respecting Eudoxus, see *Diog. L.* viii. 86-91. As the life of Eudoxus probably extended from about 406-353 B.C., his first visit to Athens would be about 383 B.C., some three years after Plato commenced his school. Strabo

(xvii. 806), when he visited Heliopolis in Egypt, was shown by the guides certain cells or chambers which were said to have been occupied by Plato and Eudoxus, and was assured that the two had passed thirteen years together in Egypt. This account deserves no credit. Plato and Eudoxus visited Egypt, but not together, and neither of them for so long as thirteen years. Eudoxus stayed there sixteen months (*Diog. L.* viii. 87). *Simplikius*, *Schol. ad Aristot. De Cælo*, p. 497, 498, ed. Brandis, 498, a. 45. Καὶ πρῶτος τῶν Ἑλλήνων Εὐδόξος ὁ Κνίδιος, ὡς Εὐδήμος τε ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῆς Ἀστρολογικῆς Ἱστορίας ἀπεμνημόνευσε καὶ Σωσιγένης παρὰ Εὐδήμου τοῦ το λαβῶν, ἄψασθαι λέγεται τῶν τοιούτων ὑποθέσεων. Πλάτωνος, ὡς φησὶ Σωσιγένης, πρόβλημα τοῦτο ποιησαμένου τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα ἐσπουδακῶσι—τῶν ὑποθεθειῶν ἡμαλῶν καὶ τεταγμένων κινήσεων διασωθῆ τὰ περὶ τὰς κινήσεις τῶν πλανωμένων φαινόμενα. The Scholion of *Simplikius*, which follows at great length, is exceedingly interesting and valuable, in regard to the astronomical theory of Eudoxus, with the modifications introduced into it by *Kallippus*, *Aristotle*, and others. All the share in it which is claimed for Plato, is, that he described in clear language the problem to be solved: and even *that* share depends simply upon the statement of the *Alexandrine Sosigenes* (contemporary of *Julius Cæsar*), not upon the statement of *Eudæmus*. At least, the language of *Simplikius* affirms, that *Sosigenes* copied from *Eudæmus* the fact, that *Eudoxus* was the first Greek who proposed a systematic astronomical hypothesis to explain the motions of the planets—(παρ' Εὐδήμου τοῦ το λαβῶν) not the circumstance, that Plato propounded the problem afterwards mentioned. From whom *Sosigenes* derived this last information, is not indicated. About his time, various fictions had gained credit in Egypt respecting the connection of Plato with Eudoxus, as we may see by the story of *Strabo* above cited. If Plato impressed upon others that which is here ascribed to him, he

Though Plato demanded no money as fee for admission of pupils, yet neither did he scruple to receive presents from rich men such as Dionysius, Dion, and others.<sup>c</sup> In the jests of Ehippus, Antiphanes, and other poets of the middle comedy, the pupils of Plato in the Academy are described as finely and delicately clad, nice in their persons even to affectation, with elegant caps and canes; which is the more to be noticed because the preceding comic poets derided Sokrates and his companions for qualities the very opposite—as prosing beggars, in mean attire and dirt.<sup>d</sup> Such students must have belonged to opulent families; and we may be sure that they requited their master by some valuable present, though no fee may have been formally demanded from them. Some conditions (though we do not know what) were doubtless required for admission. Moreover the example of Eudoxus shows that in some cases even ardent and promising pupils were practically repelled. At any rate, the teaching of Plato formed a marked contrast with that extreme and indiscriminate publicity which cha-

must have done so in *conversation or oral discourse*—for there is nothing in his written dialogues to that effect. Moreover, there is nothing in the dialogues to make us suppose that Plato adopted or approved the theory of Eudoxus. When Plato speaks of astronomy, either in the Republic, or in *Leges*, or in *Epinomis*, it is in a totally different spirit—not manifesting any care to save the astronomical phenomena. Both Aristotle himself (*Metaphys. A. p. 1073 b.*) and Simplicius, make it clear that Aristotle warmly espoused and enlarged the theory of Eudoxus. Theophrastus, successor of Aristotle, did the same. But we do not hear that either Speusippus or Xenokrates (successor of Plato) took any interest in the theory. This is one remarkable point of divergence between Plato and the Platonists on one side—Aristotle and the Aristotelians on the other—and much to the honour of the latter: for the theory of Eudoxus, though erroneous, was a great step towards improved scientific conceptions on astronomy, and a great provocative to farther observation of astronomical facts.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, *Epistol. xiii. p. 361, 362.* We learn from this epistle that Plato received pecuniary remittances not merely from Dionysius, but also from other friends (*ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων*—361 C); that he employed these not only for choregies and other costly functions of his own, but also to provide dowry for female relatives, and presents to friends (363 A).

<sup>d</sup> See Meineke, *Historia Critica Comicorum Græcorum*, p. 288, 289—and the extracts there given from Ehippus and Antiphanes—*apud Athenæum*, xi. 509, xii. 544. About the poverty and dirt which was reproached to Sokrates and his disciples, see the fragment of Ameipsias in Meineke, *ibid.* p. 203. Also Aristophanes, *Aves*, 1555; *Nubes*, 827; and the *Fragm. of Eupolis* in Meineke, p. 552—*Μισῶ δ' ἐγὼ καὶ Σωκράτην, τὸν πτωχὸν ἀδολέσχην.*

Meineke thinks, that Aristophanes, in the *Ekklesiazusæ*, 646, and in the *Plutus*, 313, intends to ridicule Plato under the name of Aristyllus: Plato's name having been originally Aristokles. But I see no sufficient ground for this opinion.

acterised the conversation of Sokrates, who passed his days in the market-place or in the public porticoes or palæstræ; while Plato both dwelt and discoursed in a quiet residence and garden a little way out of Athens. The title of Athens, to be considered the training-city of Hellas (as Perikles had called her fifty years before), was fully sustained by the Athenian writers and teachers between 390-347; especially by Plato and Isokrates, the most celebrated and largely frequented. So many foreign pupils came to Isokrates, that he affirms most of his pecuniary gains to have been derived from non-Athenians. Several of his pupils stayed with him three or four years. The like is doubtless true about the pupils of Plato.\*

Visit of Plato to the younger Dionysius at Syracuse, 367 B.C. Second visit to the same—mortifying failure.

It was in the year 367-366 that Plato was induced, by the earnest entreaties of Dion, to go from Athens to Syracuse, on a visit to the younger Dionysius, who had just become despot, succeeding to his father of the same name. Dionysius II., then very young, had manifested some dispositions towards philosophy, and prodigious admiration for Plato: who was encouraged by Dion to hope that he would have influence enough to bring about an amendment or thorough reform of the government at Syracuse. This ill-starred visit, with its momentous sequel, has been described in my 'History of Greece.' It not only failed completely, but made matters worse rather than better: Dionysius became violently alienated from Dion, and sent him into exile. Though turning a deaf ear to Plato's recommendations, he never-

\* Perikles in the Funeral Oration (Thucyd. ii. 41) calls Athens τῆς Ἐλλάδος παίδευσις: the same eulogium is repeated, with greater abundance of words, by Isokrates in his Panegyric Oration (Or. iv. sect. 56, p. 51).

The declaration of Isokrates, that most of his money was acquired from foreign (non-Athenian) pupils, and the interesting fact that many of them not only stayed with him three or four years but were even then loth to depart, will be found in Orat. xv. De Permutatione, sect. 93-175. Plutarch (Vit. x. Orat. 838 E) goes so far as to say that Iso-

krates never required any pay from an Athenian pupil.

Nearly three centuries after Plato's decease, Cicero sent his son Marcus to Athens, where the son spent a considerable time, frequenting the lectures of the Peripatetic philosopher Kratippus. Young Cicero, in an interesting letter addressed to Tiro (Cicero, Epist. Fam. xvi. 23), describes in animated terms both his admiration for the person and abilities, and his delight in the private society, of Kratippus. Several of Plato's pupils probably felt as much or more towards him.

theless liked his conversation, treated him with great respect, detained him for some time at Syracuse, and was prevailed upon, only by the philosopher's earnest entreaties, to send him home. Yet in spite of such uncomfortable experience Plato was induced, after a certain interval, again to leave Athens and pay a second visit to Dionysius, mainly in hopes of procuring the restoration of Dion. In this hope too he was disappointed, and was glad to return, after a longer stay than he wished, to Athens.

It was in 359 B.C. that Dion, aided by friends in Peloponnesus, and encouraged by warm sympathy and co-operation from many of Plato's pupils in the Academy,<sup>f</sup> equipped an armament against Dionysius. Notwithstanding the inadequacy of his force he had the good fortune to make himself master of Syracuse, being greatly favoured by the popular discontent of the Syracusans against the reigning despot: but he did not know how to deal with the people, nor did he either satisfy their aspirations towards liberty, or realise his own engagements. Retaining in his hands a despotic power, similar in the main to that of Dionysius, he speedily became odious, and was assassinated by the treachery of Kallippus, his companion in arms as well as fellow-pupil of the Platonic Academy. The state of Syracuse, torn by the joint evils of anarchy and despotism, and partially recovered by Dionysius, became more unhappy than ever.

The visits of Plato to Dionysius were much censured, and his motives<sup>g</sup> misrepresented by unfriendly critics; and these reproaches were still further embittered

Expedition of Dion against Dionysius—sympathies of Plato and the Academy.

Success, misconduct, and death of Dion.

Death of Plato, aged 80, 347 B.C.

<sup>f</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 22.

Xenokrates as well as Speusippus accompanied Plato to Sicily (Diog. L. iv. 6).

To show the warm interest taken, not only by Plato himself but also by the Platonic pupils in the Academy in the conduct of Dion after he had become master of Syracuse, Plutarch quotes both from the letter of Plato to Dion (which now stands fourth among the *Epistolæ Platonicæ*, p. 320) and

also from a letter which he had read, written by Speusippus to Dion; in which Speusippus exhorts Dion emphatically to bless Sicily with good laws and government, "in order that he may glorify the Academy"—*ὅπως . . . εὐκλεῖα θήσει τὴν Ἀκαδημίαν* (Plutarch, De Adulator. et Amic. c. 29, p. 70 A).

<sup>g</sup> Themistius, Orat. xxiii. (Sophistes) p. 285 C; Aristides, Orat. xlv. (Τῆρ τῶν Τετάρων) p. 234-235; Apuleius, De Habit. Philos. Platon. p. 571.

by the entire failure of his hopes. The closing years of his long life were saddened by the disastrous turn of events at Syracuse, aggravated by the discreditable abuse of power and violent death of his intimate friend Dion, which brought dishonour both upon himself and upon the Academy. Nevertheless he lived to the age of eighty, and died in 348-347 B.C., leaving a competent property, which he bequeathed by a will still extant.<sup>a</sup> But his foundation, the Academy, did not die with him. It passed to his nephew Speusippus, who succeeded him as teacher, conductor of the school, or Scholarch; and was himself succeeded after eight years by Xenokrates of Chalkêdon: while another pupil of the Academy, Aristotle, after an absence of some years from Athens, returned thither and established a school of his own at the Lykeum, at another extremity of the city.

The latter half of Plato's life in his native city must have been one of dignity and consideration, though not of any political activity. He is said to have addressed the Dikastery as an advocate for the accused general Chabrias: and we are told that he discharged the expensive and showy functions of Chorêgus, with funds supplied by Dion.<sup>1</sup> Out of Athens also his reputation was

Scholars of  
Plato—Aristotle.

<sup>a</sup> Diogen. Laert. iii. 2-41. Seneca (Epist. 58) says that Plato died on the anniversary of his birth, in the month Thargelion.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Aristeides. c. 1; Diogen. Laert. iii. 3-24. Diogenes says that no other Athenian except Plato dared to speak publicly in defence of Chabrias; but this can hardly be correct, since Aristotle mentions another *συνήγορος* named Lykoleon (Rhetoric, iii. 10, p. 1411, b. 6). We may fairly presume that the trial of Chabrias alluded to by Aristotle is the same as that alluded to by Diogenes, that which arose out of the wrongful occupation of Orôpus by the Thebans. If Plato appeared at the trial, I doubt whether it could have occurred in 366 B.C., as Clinton supposes; Plato must have been absent during that year in Sicily.

The anecdote given by Diogenes, in relation to Plato's appearance at this trial, deserves notice. Krobylus, one

of the accusers, said to him, "Are you come to plead on behalf of another? Are not you aware that the hemlock of Sokrates is in store for you also?" Plato replied; "I affronted dangers formerly, when I went on military expedition, for my country, and I am prepared to affront them now in discharge of my duty to a friend" (iii. 24).

This anecdote is instructive, as it exhibits the continuance of the antipathological antipathies at Athens among a considerable portion of the citizens, and as it goes to attest the military service rendered personally by Plato.

Diogenes (iii. 46) gives a long list of hearers; and Athenæus (xi. 506-509) enumerates several from different cities in Greece: Euphræus of Oreus (in Eubœa), who acquired through Plato's recommendation great influence with Perdikkas king of Macedonia, and who

very great. When he went to the Olympic festival of B.C. 360, he was an object of conspicuous attention and respect: he was visited by hearers, young men of rank and ambition, from the most distant Hellenic cities; and his advice was respectfully invoked both by Perdikkas in Macedonia and by Dionysius II. at Syracuse. During his last visit to Syracuse, it is said that some of the students in the Academy, among whom Aristotle is mentioned, became dissatisfied with his absence, and tried to set up a new school; but were prevented by Iphikrates and Chabrias, the powerful friends of Plato at Athens. This story is connected with alleged ingratitude on the part of Aristotle towards Plato, and with alleged repugnance on the part of Plato towards Aristotle.<sup>k</sup> The fact itself—that during Plato's absence in Sicily his students sought to provide for themselves instruction and discussion elsewhere—is neither surprising nor blameable. And as to Aristotle, there is ground for believing that he passed for an intimate friend and disciple of Plato, even during the last ten years of Plato's life. For we read that Aristotle, following speculations and principles of teaching of his own, on the

is said to have excluded from the society of that king every one ignorant of philosophy and geometry; Euaeon of Lampsakus, Timæus of Kyzikus, Chæron of Pellênê, all of whom tried, and the last with success, to usurp the sceptre in their respective cities; Eudémus of Cyprus; Kallippus the Athenian, fellow-learner with Dion in the Academy, afterwards his companion in his expedition to Sicily, ultimately his murderer; Herakleides and Python from Ænus in Thrace, Chion and Leonides, also Klearchus the despot from the Pontic Herakleia (Justin, xvi. 5).

Several of these examples seem to have been cited by the orator Democharês (nephew of Demosthenes) in his speech at Athens vindicating the law proposed by Sophokles for the expulsion of the philosophers from Athens (Athenæ. xi. 508 F), a speech delivered about 306 B.C. Plutarch compliments Plato for the active political liberators and tyrannicides who came forth from the Academy: he considers

Plato as the real author and planner of the expedition of Dion against Dionysius, and expatiates on the delight which Plato must have derived from it—a supposition very incorrect (Plutarch, Non Posse Suav. p. 1097 B; adv. Kolôten, p. 1126 B-C).

<sup>k</sup> Aristokles, ap. Eusebium, Præp. Evang. xv. 2; Ælian, V. H. iii. 19; Aristeides, Or. 46; Ὑπὲρ τῶν Τετάρτων, vol. ii. p. 324-325, Dindorf.

The friendship and reciprocity of service between Plato and Chabrias is an interesting fact. Compare Stahr, Aristotelia, vol. i. p. 50 seqq.

Cicero affirms, on the authority of the Epistles of Demosthenes, that Demosthenes describes himself as an assiduous hearer as well as reader of Plato (Cicero, Brutus, 31, 121; Orator. 4, 15). I think this fact highly probable, but the epistles which Cicero read no longer exist. Among the five Epistles remaining, Plato is once mentioned with respect in the fifth (p. 1490), but this epistle is considered by most critics spurious.

subject of rhetoric, found himself at variance with Isokrates and the Isokratean school. Aristotle attacked Isokrates and his mode of dealing with the subject: upon which Kephisodôrus (one of the disciples of Isokrates) retaliated by attacking Plato and the Platonic Ideas, considering Aristotle as one of Plato's scholars and adherents.<sup>1</sup>

Such is the sum of our information respecting Plato.

Scanty as it is, we have not even the advantage of contemporary authority for any portion of it. We have no description of Plato from any contemporary

author, friendly or adverse. It will be seen that after the death of Sokrates we know nothing about Plato as a man and a citizen, except the little which can be learnt from his few Epistles, all written when he was very old, and relating almost entirely to his peculiar relations with Dion and Dionysius. His dialogues, when we try to interpret them collectively, and gather from them general results as to the character and purposes of the author, suggest valuable arguments and perplexing doubts, but yield few solutions. In no one of the dialogues does Plato address us in his own person. In the Apology alone (which is not a dialogue) is he alluded to even as present: in the Phædon he is mentioned as absent from illness. Each of the dialogues, direct or indirect, is conducted from beginning to end by the persons whom he introduces.<sup>m</sup> Not one of the dialogues affords any positive internal evidence showing the date of its composition. In a few there are allusions to prove that they must have been composed at a period later than others, or later than some given event of known date; but nothing more can be

<sup>1</sup> Numenius, ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. xiv. 6, 9. *οἰηθεὶς* (Kephisodôrus) *κατὰ Πλάτωνα Ἀριστοτέλην φιλοσοφεῖν, ἐπολέμει μὲν Ἀριστοτέλει, ἔβαλλε δὲ Πλάτωνα, &c.* This must have happened in the latter years of Plato's life, for Aristotle must have been at least twenty-five or twenty-six years of age when he engaged in such polemics. He was born in 384 B.C.

<sup>m</sup> On this point Aristotle, in the dialogues which he composed, did not

follow Plato's example. Aristotle introduced two or more persons debating a question, but he appeared in his own person to give the solution, or at least to wind up the debate. He sometimes also opened the debate by a proem or prefatory address in his own person (Cicero ad Attic. iv. 16, 2, xiii. 19, 4). Cicero followed the manner of Aristotle, not that of Plato. His dialogues are rhetorical rather than dramatic.

All the dialogues of Aristotle are lost.

positively established. Nor is there any good extraneous testimony to determine the date of any one among them. For the remark ascribed to Sokrates about the dialogue called *Lysis*<sup>n</sup> (which remark, if authentic, would prove the dialogue to have been composed during the life-time of Sokrates) appears altogether untrustworthy. And the statement of some critics, that the *Phædrus* was Plato's earliest composition, is clearly nothing more than an inference (doubtful at best, and, in my judgment, erroneous) from its dithyrambic style and erotic subject.

<sup>n</sup> Diog. L. iii. 38. Compare the | c. 24, in the Appendix Platonica of  
Prolegomena τῆς Πλάτωνος Φιλοσοφίας, | K. F. Hermann's edition, p. 217.



## CHAPTER IV.

## PLATONIC CANON, AS RECOGNISED BY THRASYLLUS.

As we know little about Plato except from his works, the first question to be decided is, Which *are* his real works? Where are we to find a trustworthy Platonic Canon?

Down to the close of the last century this question was not much raised or discussed. The catalogue recognised by the rhetor Thrasyllus (contemporary with the Emperor Tiberius) was generally accepted as including none but genuine works of Plato; and was followed as such by editors and critics, who were indeed not very numerous.<sup>a</sup> But the discussions carried on during the present century have taken a different turn. While editors, critics, and translators have been greatly multiplied, some of the most distinguished among them, Schleiermacher at the head, have either professedly set aside, or in practice disregarded, the Thrasylllean catalogue, as if it carried no authority and very faint presumption. They have reasoned upon each dialogue as if its title to be considered genuine were now to be proved for the first time; either by external

<sup>a</sup> The following passage from Wyttenbach, written in 1776, will give an idea of the state of Platonic criticism down to the last quarter of the last century. To provide a new Canon for Plato seems not to have entered his thoughts.

Wyttenbach, *Bibliotheca Critica*, vol. i. p. 28. Review of Fischer's edition of Plato's *Philæbus* and *Symposion*. "Quæ Ciceroni obtigit interpretum et editorum felicitas, eâ adeo caruit Plato, ut non solum paucos nactus sit qui ejus scripta typis ederent — sed qui ejus orationi nitorem restitueret, eamque a corruptelarum labe purgaret, et sensus obscuros atque abditos ex in-

teriore doctrinâ patefaceret, omnino repererit neminem. Et ex ipso hoc editionum parvo numero—nam sex omnino sunt—nulla est recentior anno superioris seculi secundo: ut mirandum sit, centum et septuaginta annorum spatio neminem ex tot viris doctis extitisse, qui ita suam crisin Platoni addiceret, ut intelligentiam ejus veræ eruditionis amantibus aperiret.

"Qui Platonem legant, pauci sunt: qui eum intelligant, paucissimi; qui vero, vel ex versionibus, vel ex jejuno historiæ philosophicæ compendio, de eo judicent et cum supercilio pronuncient, plurimi sunt."

testimony (mentioned in Aristotle or others), or by internal evidences of style, handling, and thoughts:<sup>b</sup> as if, in other words, the *onus probandi* lay upon any one who believed the printed works of Plato to be genuine—not upon an opponent who disputes the authenticity of any one or more among them, and rejects it as spurious. Before I proceed to examine the conclusions, alike numerous and discordant, which these critics have proclaimed, I shall enquire how far the method which they have pursued is warrantable. Is there any presumption at all—and if so, what amount of presumption—in favour of the catalogue transmitted from antiquity by Thrasyllus, as a canon containing genuine works of Plato and no others?

Upon this question I hold an opinion opposite<sup>a</sup> to that of the Platonic critics since Schleiermacher. The presumption appears to me particularly strong, instead of particularly weak: comparing the Platonic writings with those of other eminent writers, dramatists, orators, historians, of the same age and country.

Canon established by Thrasyllus. Presumption in its favour.

We have seen that Plato passed the last thirty-eight years of his life (except his two short visits to Syracuse) as a writer and lecturer at Athens; that he purchased and inhabited a fixed residence at the Academy, near the city. We know, moreover, that his principal pupils, especially (his nephew) Speusippus and Xenokrates, were constantly with him in this residence during his life; that after his death the residence became permanently appropriated as a philosophical school for lectures, study, conversation, and friendly meetings of studious men, in which capacity it served for more than two centuries;<sup>c</sup> that his nephew Speusippus succeeded him there

Fixed residence and school at Athens—founded by Plato and transmitted to successors.

<sup>b</sup> To see that this is the general method of proceeding, we have only to look at the work of Ueberweg, one of the most recent and certainly one of the ablest among the Platonic critics. *Untersuchungen über die Echtheit und Zeitfolge der Platonischen Schriften*, Wien, 1861, p. 130-131.

<sup>c</sup> The teaching and conversation of the Platonic school continued fixed in

the spot known as the Academy until the siege of Athens by Sylla in 87 B.C. The teacher was then forced to confine himself to the interior of the city, where he gave lectures in the gymnasium called Ptolemæum. In that gymnasium Cicero heard the lectures of the Scholarch Antiochus, B.C. 79: walking out afterwards to visit the deserted but memorable site of the

as teacher, and taught there for eight years, being succeeded after his death first by Xenokrates (for twenty-five years), afterwards by Polemon, Krantor, Krates, Arkesilaus, and others in uninterrupted series; that the school always continued to be frequented, though enjoying greater or less celebrity according to the reputation of the Scholarch.

By thus perpetuating the school which his own genius had originated, and by providing for it permanent support with a fixed domicile, Plato inaugurated a new epoch in the history of philosophy: this example was followed a few years afterwards by Aristotle, Zeno, and Epikurus. Moreover the proceeding was important in another way also, as it affected the preservation and authentication of his own manuscripts and compositions. It provided not only safe and lasting custody, such as no writer had ever enjoyed before, for Plato's original manuscripts, but also a guarantee of some efficacy against any fraud or error which might seek to introduce other compositions into the list. That Plato himself was not indifferent on this head we may fairly believe, since we learn from Dionysius of Halikarnassus, that he was indefatigable in the work of correction: and his disciples, who took the great trouble of noting down themselves what he spoke in his lectures, would not be neglectful as to the simpler duty of preserving his manuscripts.<sup>d</sup> Now Speusippus and Xenokrates (also Aristotle, Hestiaeus, the Opuntian Philippus, and the other

Academy (Cicero, De Fin. v. 1; Zumpt, Ueber den Bestand der Philosophischen Schulen zu Athen, p. 14, Berlin, 1843). The ground of the Academy, when once deserted, speedily became unhealthy, and continues to be so now, as Zumpt mentions that he himself experienced in 1835.

<sup>d</sup> Simplicius, Schol. Aristotel. Physic. f. 32, p. 334, b. 28, Brandis: λάβοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ παρὰ Σπευσίππου καὶ παρὰ Ξενοκράτους, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ παρεγένοντο ἐν τῇ περὶ Τάγαθου τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἀκρόασει πάντες γὰρ συνέγραψαν καὶ διεσώσαντο τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ. In another passage of the same Scholia (p. 362, a. 12) Simplicius mentions Herakleides (of Pontus), Hestiaeus, and even

Aristotle himself, as having taken notes of the same lectures.

Hermodorus appears to have carried some of Plato's dialogues to Sicily, and to have made money by selling them. See Cicero ad Atticum, xiii. 21; Suidas et Zenobius—λόγοισιν Ἑρμόδωρος ἐμπορεύεται. See Zeller, Dissert. De Hermodoro, p. 19. In the above-mentioned epistle Cicero compares his own relations with Atticus to those of Plato with Hermodorus. Hermodorus had composed a treatise respecting Plato, from which some extracts were given by Derkyllides (the contemporary of Thrasylus) as well as by Simplicius (Zeller, p. 20-21).

Platonic pupils) must have had personal knowledge of all that Plato had written, whether finished dialogues, unfinished fragments, or preparatory sketches. They had perfect means of distinguishing his real compositions from forgeries passed off in his name: and they had every motive to expose such forgeries (if any were attempted) wherever they could, in order to uphold the reputation of their master. If any one composed a dialogue and circulated it under the name of Plato, the school was a known place, and its occupants were at hand to give information to all who enquired about the authenticity of the composition. The original MSS. of Plato (either in his own handwriting or in that of his secretary, if he employed one,<sup>e</sup>) were doubtless treasured up in the school as sacred memorials of the great founder, and served as originals from which copies of unquestionable fidelity might be made, whenever the Scholarch granted permission. How long they continued to be so preserved we cannot say: nor do we know what was the condition of the MSS., or how long they were calculated to last. But probably many of the students frequenting the school would come for the express purpose of reading various works of Plato (either in the original MSS., or in faithful copies taken from them) with the exposition of the Scholarch; just as we know that the Roman M. Crassus (mentioned by Cicero), during his residence at Athens, studied the Platonic Gorgias with the aid of the Scholarch Charmadas.<sup>f</sup> The presidency of Speusippus and Xenocrates (taken jointly) lasted for thirty-three years; and even when they were replaced by successors who had enjoyed no personal intimacy with Plato, the motive to preserve the Platonic MSS. would still be operative, and the means of verifying what was really Platonic would still be possessed in the school. The original MSS. would be preserved, along with the treatises or dialogues which each

<sup>e</sup> We read in Cicero (*Academic. Priora*, ii. 11) that the handwriting of the Scholarch Philo, when his manuscript was brought from Athens to Alexandria, was recognised at once by his friends and pupils.

<sup>f</sup> Cicero, *De Oratore*, i. 11, 45-47; "florete tum Academiâ, quod eam Charmadas et Clitomachus et Æschines obtinebant; Platoni, cujus tum Athenis diligentius legi cum Charmadâ Gorgiam," &c.

successive Scholarch himself composed; thus forming a permanent and increasing school-library, probably enriched more or less by works acquired or purchased from others.

It appears to me that the continuance of this school—founded by Plato himself at his own abode, permanently domiciliated, and including all the MSS. which he left in it—gives us an amount of assurance for the authenticity of the so-called Platonic compositions, such as does not belong to the works of other eminent contemporary authors, Aristippus, Antisthenes, Isokrates, Lysias, Demosthenes, Euripides, Aristophanes. After the decease of these last-mentioned authors, who can say what became of their MSS.? Where was any certain permanent custody provided for them? Isokrates had many pupils during his life, but left no school or *μουσεῖον* after his death. If any one composed a discourse, and tried to circulate it as the composition of Isokrates, among the bundles of judicial orations which were sold by the booksellers<sup>g</sup> as his (according to the testimony of Aristotle)—where was the person to be found, notorious and accessible, who could say: “I possess all the MSS. of Isokrates, and I can depose that this is not among them!” The chances of success for forgery or mistake were decidedly greater, in regard to the works of these authors, than they could be for those of Plato.

Again, the existence of this school-library explains more easily how it is that unfinished, inferior, and fragmentary Platonic compositions have been preserved. That there must have existed such compositions I hold to be certain. How is it supposable that any author, even Plato, could have brought to completion such masterpieces as Republic, Gorgias, Protagoras, Symposium, &c., without tentative and preparatory sketches, each of course in itself narrow, defective, perhaps of little value, but serving as material to be worked up or worked in? Most of these would be destroyed, but probably not all. If (as I believe) it be the fact, that all the Platonic MSS. were

Security provided by the school for distinguishing what were Plato's genuine writings.

Unfinished fragments, and preparatory sketches, preserved and published after Plato's death.

<sup>g</sup> Dionys. Halic. De Isocrate, p. 576 R. δεσμὰς πάνυ πολλὰς δικανικῶν | λόγων Ἰσοκρατείων περιφέρεσθαι φησιν ὑπὸ τῶν βιβλιοπωλῶν Ἀριστοτέλης.

preserved as their author left them, some would probably be published (and some indeed are said to have been published) after his death; and among them would be included more or fewer of these unfinished performances, and sketches projected but abandoned. We can hardly suppose that Plato himself would have published fragments never finished, such as Kleitophon and Kritias<sup>b</sup>—the last ending in the middle of a sentence.

The second philosophical school, begun by Aristotle and perpetuated (after his death in 322 B.C.) at the Lykeum on the eastern side of Athens, was established on the model of that of Plato. That which formed the centre or consecrating point was a Museum or chapel of the Muses; with statues of those goddesses of the place, and also a statue of the founder. Attached to this Museum were a portico, a hall with seats (one seat especially for the lecturing professor), a garden, and a walk, together with a residence, all permanently appropriated to the teacher and the process of instruction.<sup>i</sup> Theophrastus, the friend and

Peripatetic school at the Lykeum—its composition and arrangement.

<sup>b</sup> Straton, the Peripatetic Scholarch who succeeded Theophrastus, B.C. 287, bequeathed to Lykon by his will both the succession to his school (*διατριβήν*) and all his books, except what he had written himself (*πλήν ὧν αὐτοὶ γεγράφαμεν*). What is to be done with these latter he does not say. Lykon, in his last will, says:—*καὶ δύο μνᾶς αὐτῷ* (Chares, a manumitted slave) *δίδωμι καὶ τὰ μὲν βιβλία τὰ ἀνεγνωσμένα τὰ δὲ ἀνέκδοτα Καλλίνῳ, ὅπως ἐπιμελῶς αὐτὰ ἐκδῶ.* See Diog. L. v. 62-73. Here Lykon directs expressly that Kallinos shall edit with care his (Lykon's) unpublished works. Probably Straton may have given similar directions during his life, so that it was unnecessary to provide in the will. *τὰ ἀνεγνωσμένα* is equivalent to *τὰ ἐκδεδομένα*. Publication was constituted by reading the MSS. aloud. Boeckh and other critics agree that both the Kleitophon and the Kritias were transmitted from antiquity in the fragmentary state in which we now read them: that they were compositions never completed. Boeckh affirms this with assurance respecting the Kleitophon, though he thinks that it is

not a genuine work of Plato; on which last point I dissent from him. He thinks that the Kritias is a real work of Plato, though uncompleted (Boeckh in *Platonis Minoem.* p. 11).

Compare the remarks of M. Littre respecting the unfinished sketches, treatises, and notes not intended for publication, included in the *Collectio Hippocratica* (*Œuvres d'Hippocrate*, vol. x. p. liv. seq.).

<sup>i</sup> Respecting the domicile of the Platonic school, and that of the Aristotelian or Peripatetic school which followed it, the particulars given by Diogenes are nearly coincident: we know more in detail about the Peripatetic, from what he cites out of the will of Theophrastus. See iv. 1-6-19, v. 51-53.

The *μουσείον* at the Academy was established by Plato himself. Speusippus placed in it statues of the Charites or Graces. Theophrastus gives careful directions in his will about repairing and putting in the best condition, the Peripatetic *μουσείον*, with its altar, its statues of the Goddesses, and its statue of the founder Aristotle. The *στοὰ, ἐξέδρα, κήπος, περίπατος*,

immediate successor of Aristotle, presided over the school for forty-five years, and his course, during part of that time at least, was prodigiously frequented by students.

Moreover, the school-library at the Lykeum acquired large development and importance. It not only included all the MS. compositions, published or unpublished, of Aristotle and Theophrastus, each of them a voluminous writer—but also a numerous collection (numerous for that day) of other works besides; since both of them were opulent and fond of collecting books. The value of the school-library is shown by what happened after the decease of Theophrastus, when Straton succeeded him in the school (B.C. 287). Theophrastus—thinking himself entitled to treat the library not as belonging to the school but as belonging to himself—bequeathed it at his death to Neleus, a favourite scholar, and a native of Skêpsis (in the Troad), by whom it was carried away to Asia, and permanently separated from the Aristotelian school at Athens. The manuscripts composing it remained in the possession of Neleus and his heirs for more than a century and a half, long hidden in a damp cellar, neglected, and sustaining great damage—until about the year 100 B.C., when they were purchased by a rich Athenian named Apellikon, and brought back to Athens. Sylla, after he had captured Athens (87 B.C.), took for himself the library of Apellikon, and transported it to Rome, where it became open to learned men (Tyrannion, Andronikus, and others), but under deplorable disadvantage—in consequence of the illegible state of the MSS. and the unskilful

attached to both schools, are mentioned: the most zealous students provided for themselves lodgings close adjoining. Cicero, when he walked out from Athens to see the deserted Academy, was particularly affected by the sight of the *exedra*, in which Charmadas had lectured (De Fin. v. 2, 4).

There were periodical meetings, convivial and conversational, among the members both of the Academic and Peripatetic schools; and *ἐμποτικοὶ νόμοι* by Xenokrates and Aristotle to

regulate them (Athenæus, v. 184).

Epikurus (in his interesting testament given by Diogen. Laert. x. 17-21) bequeaths to two Athenian citizens his garden and property, in trust for his principal disciple the Mitylenæan Hermarchus: *καὶ τοῖς συμφιλοσοφοῦσιν αὐτῷ, καὶ οἷς ἂν Ἐρμαρχὸς καταλίπη διαδόχους τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ἐνδιατρίβειν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν*. He at the same time directs all his books to be given to Hermarchus: they would form the school-library.

Peripatetic school-library, its removal from Athens to Skêpsis—its ultimate restitution in a damaged state to Athens, then to Rome.

conjectures and restitutions which had been applied, in the new copies made since it passed into the hands of Apellikon.<sup>k</sup>

If we knew the truth, it might probably appear that the transfer of the Aristotelian library, from the Peripatetic school at Athens to the distant and obscure town of Skêpsis, was the result of some jealousy on the part of Theophrastus; that he wished to secure to Neleus the honourable and lucrative post of becoming his successor in the school, and conceived that he was furthering that object by bequeathing the library to Neleus. If he entertained any such wish it was disappointed. The succession devolved upon another pupil of the school, Straton of Lampsakus. But Straton and his successors were forced to get on as well as they could without their library. The Peripatetic school at Athens suffered severely by the loss. Its professors possessed only a few of the manuscripts of Aristotle, and those too the commonest and best known. If

Incon-  
venience to the  
Peripatetic  
school from  
the loss of its  
library.

<sup>k</sup> The will of Theophrastus, as given in Diogenes (v. 52), mentions the bequest of all his books to Neleus. But it is in Strabo that we read the fullest account of this displacement of the Peripatetic school-library, and the consequences which ensued from it (xiii. 608, 609). *Νηλεὺς, ἀνὴρ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους ἠκραμένος καὶ Θεοφράστου, διαδεγεγμένος δὲ τὴν τοῦ Θεοφράστου βιβλιοθήκην, ἐν ἧ ἦν καὶ ἡ Ἀριστοτέλους· ὁ γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν ἑαυτοῦ Θεοφράστου παρέδωκεν, ᾤπερ καὶ τὴν σχολὴν ἀπέλιπε· πρῶτος, ὃν ἴσμεν, συναγαγὼν βίβλια, καὶ διδάξας τοὺς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βασιλέας βιβλιοθήκης σύνταξιν.*

The Kings of Pergamus, a few years after the death of Theophrastus, acquired possession of the town and territory of Skêpsis; so that the heirs of Neleus became numbered among their subjects. These kings (from about the year B.C. 230 downwards) manifested great eagerness to collect a library at Pergamus, in competition with that of the Ptolemies at Alexandria. The heirs of Neleus were afraid that these kings would strip them of their Aristotelian MSS., either for nothing or for a small price. They therefore concealed the MSS. in a

cellar, until they found an opportunity of selling them to a stranger out of the country. (Strabo, l. c.)

This narrative of Strabo is one of the most interesting pieces of information remaining to us about literary antiquity. He had himself received instruction from Tyrannion (xii. 548): he had gone through a course of Aristotelian philosophy (xvi. 757), and he had good means of knowing the facts from the Aristotelian critics, including his master Tyrannion. Plutarch (Vit. Syllæ, c. 26) and Athenæus (i. 3) allude to the same story. Athenæus says that Ptolemy Philadelphus purchased the MSS. from the heirs of Neleus, which cannot be correct.

Some critics have understood the narrative of Strabo, as if he had meant to affirm, that the works of Aristotle had never got into circulation until the time of Apellikon. It is against this supposition that Stahr contends (very successfully) in his work "*Aristotelia*." But Strabo does not affirm so much as this. He does not say anything to contradict the supposition that there were copies of various books of Aristotle in circulation, during the lives of Aristotle and Theophrastus.



a student came with a view to read any of the other Aristotelian works, (as Crassus went to read the *Gorgias* of Plato) the Scholarch was unable to assist him: as far as Aristotle was concerned, they could only expand and adorn, in the way of lecture, a few of his familiar doctrines.<sup>1</sup> We hear that the character of the school was materially altered. Straton deserted the track of Aristotle, and threw himself into speculations of his own (seemingly able and ingenious), chiefly on physical topics.<sup>m</sup> The critical study, arrangement, and exposition of Aristotle was postponed until the first century before the Christian era—the Ciceronian age, immediately preceding Strabo.

This history of the Aristotelian library illustrates forcibly, by way of contrast, the importance to the Platonic school of having preserved its MSS. from the beginning, without any similar interruption. What Plato left in manuscript we may presume to have never been removed: those who came to study his works had the means of doing so: those who wanted to know whether any composition was written by him, what works he had written altogether, or what was the correct reading in a case of obscurity or dispute—had always the means of informing themselves. Whereas the Peripatetic Scholarch, after the death of Theophrastus, could give no similar information as to the works of Aristotle.<sup>n</sup>

We thus see that the circumstances, under which Plato left

<sup>1</sup> Strabo, xiii. 609. *συνέβη δὲ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν περιπάτων τοῖς μὲν πάλαι, τοῖς μετὰ Θεοφράστου, οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅλως τὰ βιβλία πλὴν ὀλίγων, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν, μηδὲν ἔχει φιλοσοφεῖν πραγματικῶς, ἀλλὰ θέσεις ληκυθίζειν.*

<sup>m</sup> The change in the Peripatetic school, after the death of Theophrastus, is pointed out by Cicero, *Fin.* v. 5, 13. Compare *Academ. Poster.* i. 9.

<sup>n</sup> An interesting citation by Simplicius (in his commentary on the *Physica* of Aristotle, fol. 216, a. 7, p. 404, b. 11, *Schol.* Brandis) shows us that Theophrastus, while he was resident at Athens as Peripatetic Scholarch, had

custody of the original MSS. of the works of Aristotle, and that he was applied to by those who wished to procure correct copies. Eudémus (of Rhodes) having only a defective copy of the *Physica*, wrote to request that Theophrastus would cause to be written out a certain portion of the fifth book, and send it to him, *μαρτυροῦντος περὶ τῶν πρώτων καὶ Θεοφράστου, γράψαντος Εὐδήμῳ περὶ τίνος αὐτοῦ τῶν διημαρτημένων ἀντιγράφων ὑπέρω, φησὶν (sc. Theophrastus) ἐπέσειπας, κελεύων με γράφειν καὶ ἀποστεῖλαι ἐκ τῶν Φυσικῶν, ἥτοι ἐγὼ οὐ συνήμι, ἢ μικρόν τι παντελῶς ἔχει τοῦ ἀνάμεσον τοῦ ὑπερῆρεμῆιν καλῶ τῶν ἀκινήτων μόνον &c.*

his compositions, were unusually favourable (speaking by comparison with ancient authors generally) in regard to the chance of preserving them all, and of keeping them apart from counterfeits. We have now to enquire what information exists as to their subsequent diffusion.

Conditions favourable, for preserving the genuine works of Plato.

The earliest event of which notice is preserved, is, the fact stated by Diogenes, that "Some persons, among whom is the *Grammaticus* Aristophanes, distribute the dialogues of Plato into Trilogies; placing as the first Trilogy—Republic, Timæus, Kritias. 2. Sophistes, Politicus, Kratylyus. 3. Leges, Minos, Epinomis. 4. Theætētus, Euthyphron, Apology. 5. Kriton, Phædon, Epistolæ. The other dialogues they place one by one, without any regular grouping."<sup>o</sup>

Historical facts as to their preservation.

The name of Aristophanes lends special interest to this arrangement of the Platonic compositions, and enables us to understand something of the date and the place to which it belongs. The literary and critical students (*Grammatici*), among whom he stood eminent, could scarcely be said to exist as a class at the time when Plato died. Beginning with Aristotle, Herakleides of Pontus, Theophrastus, Demetrius Phalereus, &c., at Athens, during the half century immediately succeeding Plato's decease—these laborious and useful erudites were first called into full efficiency along with the large collection of books formed by the Ptolemies at Alexandria during a period beginning rather before 300 B.C.: which collection served both as model and as stimulus to the libraries subsequently formed by the kings at Pergamus and elsewhere. In those libraries alone could materials be found for their indefatigable application.

Arrangement of them into Trilogies, by Aristophanes.

<sup>o</sup> Diog. L. iii. 61. Ἐνιοὶ δὲ, ὧν ἔστι καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης ὁ γραμματικὸς, εἰς τριλογίας ἔλκουσι τοὺς διαλόγους· καὶ πρῶτην μὲν τίθειασιν ἧς ἡγείται Πολιτεία, Τίμαιος, Κριτίας· δευτέραν, Σοφιστῆς, Πολιτικὸς, Κράτυλος. τρίτην, Νόμοι, Μίνως, Ἐπινομίς. τετάρτην, Θεαίτητος, Εὐθύφρων, Ἀπολογία· Πέμπτην, Κρίτων, Φαίδων, Ἐπιστολαί· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα καθ' ἓν καὶ ἀτάκτως.

The word *γραμματικὸς*, unfortunately, has no single English word exactly cor-

responding to it.

Thrasylus, when he afterwards applied the classification by Tetralogies to the works of Demokritus (as he did also to those of Plato) could only include a certain portion of the works in his Tetralogies, and was forced to enumerate the remainder as *Ἀσύντακτα* (Diog. L. ix. 46, 47). It appears that he included all Plato's works in his Platonic Tetralogies.

Of these learned men, who spent their lives in reading, criticising, arranging, and correcting, the MSS. accumulated in a great library, Aristophanes of Byzantium was the most distinguished representative, in the eyes of men like Varro, Cicero, and Plutarch.<sup>p</sup> His life was passed at Alexandria, and seems to have been comprised between 260-184 B.C.; as far as can be made out. During the latter portion of it he became chief librarian—an appointment which he had earned by long previous studies in the place, as well as by attested experience in the work of criticism and arrangement. He began his studious career at Alexandria at an early age: and he received instruction, as a boy from Zenodotus, as a young man, from Kallimachus—both of whom were, in succession, librarians of the Alexandrine library.<sup>q</sup> We must observe that Diogenes does not expressly state the distribution of the Platonic works into trilogies to have been *first proposed* or originated by Aristophanes (as he states that the tetralogies were afterwards proposed by the rhetor Thrasylus, of which presently): his language is rather more consistent with the supposition, that it was first proposed by some one earlier, and adopted or sanctioned by the eminent authority of Aristophanes. But at any rate, the distribution was proposed either by Aristophanes himself, or by some one before him and known to him.

This fact is of material importance, because it enables us to infer with confidence, that the Platonic works were included in the Alexandrine library, certainly during the lifetime of Aristophanes, and probably before it. It is there only that Aristophanes could have known them; his whole life having been passed in

Plato's works in the Alexandrine library, before the time of Aristophanes.

<sup>p</sup> Varro, De Linguâ Latinâ, v. 9, ed. Müller. "Non solum ad Aristophanis lucernam, sed etiam ad Cleanthis lucubravi." Cicero, De Finibus, v. 19, 50; Vitruvius, Præf. Lib. vii. Plutarch, "Non posse suaviter vivi sec. Epicurum." p. 1095 E.

Aristophanes composed *Argumenta* to many of the Attic tragedies and comedies: he also arranged in a certain order the songs of Alkæus and the odes of Pindar. Boeckh (Præfat. ad Scholia

Pindari, p. x. xi.) remarks upon the mistake made by Quintilian as well as by others, in supposing that Pindar arranged his own odes. Respecting the wide range of erudition embraced by Aristophanes, see F. A. Wolf, *Proleg.* in Homer. pp. 218-220, and Schueidewin, *De Hypothes. Traged. Græc. Aristophani vindicandis*, p. 26, 27.

<sup>q</sup> Suidas, vv. Ἀριστοφάνης, Καλλιμαχος. Compare Clinton, *Fest. Hellen.* B.C. 256-200.

Alexandria. The first formal appointment of a librarian to the Alexandrine Museum was made by Ptolemy Philadelphus, at some time after the commencement of his reign in 285 B.C., in the person of Zenodotus; whose successors were Kallimachus, Eratosthenes, Apollonius, Aristophanes, comprising in all a period of a century.†

Kallimachus, born at Kyrênê, was a teacher of letters at Alexandria before he was appointed to the service and superintendence of the Alexandrine library or museum. His life seems to have terminated about 230 B.C.: he acquired reputation as a poet, by his hymns, epigrams, elegies, but less celebrity as a *Grammaticus* than Aristophanes: nevertheless the titles of his works still remaining indicate very great literary activity. We read as titles of his works:—

Kallimachus  
—predecessor  
of Aristophanes—his  
published  
Tables of authors whose  
works were  
in the library.

1. The Museum (a general description of the Alexandrine establishment).
2. Tables of the persons who have distinguished themselves in every branch of instruction, and of the works which they have composed—in 120 books.
3. Table and specification of the (Didaskalies) recorded dramatic representations and competitions; with dates assigned, and from the beginning.
4. Table of the peculiar phrases belonging to Demokritus, and of his works.
5. Table and specification of the rhetorical authors.‡

† See Ritschl, *Die Alexandrinischen Bibliotheken*, pp. 16-17, &c.; Nauck, *De Aristophanis Vita et Scriptis*, cap. i. (Halle, 1848) p. 68. "Aristophanis et Aristarchi opera, cum opibus Bibliothecæ Alexandrinæ digerendis et ad tabulas revocandis arcetè conjuncta, in eo substitisse censenda est, ut scriptores, in quovis dicendi genere conspicuos, aut breviori indice comprehenderent, aut uberiore enarratione describerent," &c.

When Zenodotus was appointed, the library had already attained considerable magnitude, so that the post and title of librarian was then conspicuous and dignified. But Demetrius Phalereus, who preceded Zenodotus, began his operations when there was no

library at all, and gradually accumulated the number of books which Zenodotus found. Heyne observes justly: "Primo loco Demetrius Phalereus præfuisse dicitur, forte re verius quam nomine, tum Zenodotus Ephesius, hic quidem sub Ptolemæo Philadelpho," &c. (Heyne, *De Genio Sæculi Ptolemæorum* in *Opuscul.* i. p. 129).

‡ See Blomfield's edition of the *Fragm. of Kallimachus*, p. 220-221. Suidas, v. *Καλλίμαχος*, enumerates a large number of titles of poetical, literary, historical, compositions of Kallimachus; among them are—

Μουσείον. Πίνακες τῶν ἐν πάσῃ παιδείᾳ διαλαμψάντων, καὶ ὧν συνέγραψαν, ἐν βιβλίοις κ' καὶ ρ'. Πίναξ

These tables of Kallimachus (of which one by itself, No. 2, reached to 120 books) must have been an encyclopædia, far more comprehensive than any previously compiled, of Greek authors and literature. Such tables indeed could not have been compiled before the existence of the Alexandrine Museum. They described what Kallimachus had before him in that museum, as we may see by the general title *Μουσείου* prefixed; moreover we may be sure that nowhere else could he have had access to the multitude of books required. Lastly, the tables also show how large a compass the Alexandrine Museum and library had attained at the time when Kallimachus put together his compilation: that is, either in the reign of Ptolemy II. Philadelphus (285-247 B.C.), or in the earlier portion of the reign of Ptolemy III., called Euergetes (247-222 B.C.). Nevertheless, large as the library then was, it continued to increase. A few years afterwards, Aristophanes published a work commenting upon the tables of Kallimachus, with additions and enlargements: of which work the title alone remains.<sup>t</sup>

Now, I have already observed, that the works of Plato were certainly in the Alexandrine library, at the time when Aristophanes either originated or sanctioned the distribution of them into Trilogies. Were they not also in the library, at the time when Kallimachus compiled his tables? I cannot but conclude that they were in it at that time also. When we are informed that the catalogue of enumerated authors filled so many books, we may be sure that it must have descended, and we know in fact that it did descend, to names far less important

*καὶ ἀναγραφὴ τῶν κατὰ χρόνους καὶ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς γενομένων διδασκαλιῶν. Πίναξ τῶν Δημοκρίτου γλωσσῶν καὶ συνταγμάτων. Πίναξ καὶ ἀναγραφὴ τῶν ῥητορικῶν.* See also Athenæus, xv. 669. It appears from Dionys. Hal. that besides the Tables of Kallimachus, enumerating and reviewing the authors whose works were contained in the Alexandrine library or museum, there existed also *Περγαμηνοὶ Πίνακες*, describing the contents of the library at Pergamus (Dion. H. de Adm. Vi Dic. in Demosthene, p. 994;

De Dinarcho, pp. 630, 653, 661).

Compare Bernhardy, Grundriss der Griech. Litteratur, sect. 36, p. 132-133 seq.

<sup>t</sup> Athenæus, ix. 408. Ἀριστοφάνης δὲ γραμματικὸς, ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς Καλλιμάχου πίνακας.

We see by another passage, Athenæus, viii. 336, that this work included an addition or supplement to the Tables of Kallimachus.

Compare Etymologicon Magn. v. Πίναξ.

and distinguished than that of Plato.<sup>a</sup> The name of Plato himself can hardly have been omitted. Demokritus and his works, especially the peculiar and technical words (*γλώσσαι*) in them, received special attention from Kallimachus: which proves that the latter was not disposed to pass over the philosophers. But Demokritus, though an eminent philosopher, was decidedly less eminent than Plato: moreover he left behind him no permanent successors, school, or *μουσείον*, at Athens, to preserve his MSS. or foster his celebrity. As the library was furnished at that time with a set of the works of Demokritus, so I infer that it could not have been without a set of the works of Plato. That Kallimachus was acquainted with Plato's writings (if indeed such a fact requires proof), we know, not only from his epigram upon the Ambrakiot Kleombrotus (whom he affirms to have killed himself after reading the Phædon), but also from a curious intimation that he formally impugned Plato's competence to judge or appreciate poets—alluding to the severe criticisms which we read in the Platonic Republic.<sup>x</sup>

It would indeed be most extraordinary if, among the hundreds of authors whose works must have been specified in the Tables of Kallimachus as constituting the treasures of the Alexandrine Museum,<sup>y</sup> the name of Plato had not been

<sup>a</sup> Thus the Tables of Kallimachus included a writer named Lysimachus, a disciple of Theodorus or Theophrastus, and his writings (Athenæ. vi. 252)—a rhetor and poet named Dionysius with the epithet of *χαλκοῦς* (Athenæ. xv. 669)—and even the treatises of several authors on cakes and cookery (Athenæ. xiv. 643). The names of authors absolutely unknown to us were mentioned by him (Athenæ. ii. 70). Compare Dionys. Hal. de Dinarcho, 630, 653, 661.

<sup>x</sup> Kallimachus, Epigram. 24.

Proklos in Timæum, p. 28 C. p. 64. Schneid. *μάτην οὖν φληραφοῦσι Καλλιμαχος καὶ Δούρις, ὡς Πλάτωνος οὐκ ἔντος ἰκανοῦ κρίνειν ποιητάς.*

Eratosthenes, successor of Kallimachus as librarian at Alexandria, composed a work (now lost) entitled *Πλατωνικόν*, as well as various treatises on philosophy and philosophers (Era-

tosthenica, Bernhardy, p. 168, 187, 197; Suidas, v. Ἐρατοσθένης). He had passed some time at Athens, had enjoyed the lessons and conversation of Zeno the Stoic, but expressed still warmer admiration of Arkesilaus and Ariston. He spoke in animated terms of Athens as the great centre of congregation for philosophers in his day. He had composed a treatise, *Περὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν*: but Strabo describes him as mixing up other subjects with philosophy (Strabo, i. p. 15).

<sup>y</sup> About the number of books, or more properly of *rolls* (*volumina*) in the Alexandrine library, see the enquiries of Parthey, *Das Alexandrinische Museum*, p. 76-84. Various statements are made by ancient authors, some of them with very large numbers; and no certainty is attainable. Many rolls would go to form one book. Parthey considers the

included. Moreover, the distribution of the Platonic compositions into Trilogies, pursuant to the analogy of the Didaskaliæ or dramatic records, may very probably have originated with Kallimachus; and may have been simply approved and continued, perhaps with some modifications, by Aristophanes. At least this seems more consonant to the language of Diogenes Laertius, than the supposition that Aristophanes was the first originator of it.

If we look back to the first commencement of the Alexandrine Museum and library, we shall be still farther convinced that the works of Plato, complete as well as genuine, must have been introduced into it before the days of Kallimachus. Strabo expressly tells us that the first stimulus and example impelling the Ptolemies to found this museum and library, were furnished by the school of Aristotle and Theophrastus at Athens.<sup>2</sup> I believe this to be perfectly true; and it is farther confirmed by the fact that the institution at Alexandria comprised the same constituent parts and arrangements, described by the same titles, as those which are applied to the Aristotelian and Platonic schools at Athens.<sup>a</sup> Though the terms library, museum, and lecture-room, have now become familiar, both terms and meaning were at that time alike novel. Nowhere, as far as we know, did there exist a known and fixed domicile, consecrated in perpetuity to these purposes, and to literary men who took interest therein. A special stimulus

First formation of the library — intended as a copy of the Platonic and Aristotelian *Μουσεία* at Athens.

statement made by Epiphanius not improbable—54,800 rolls in the library under Ptolemy Philadelphus (p. 83).

The magnitude of the library at Alexandria in the time of Eratosthenes, and the multitude of writings which he consulted in his valuable geographical works, was admitted by his opponent Hipparchus (Strabo, ii. p. 69).

<sup>2</sup> Strabo, xiii. 608. *ὁ γοῦν Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν ἑαυτοῦ (βιβλιοθήκην) Θεοφράστῳ παρέδωκεν, ᾧ περ καὶ τὴν σχολὴν ἀπέλιπε πρῶτος, ὧν ἴσμεν, συναγωγῶν βιβλία, καὶ διδάξας τοὺς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βασιλέας βιβλιοθήκης σύνταξιν.*

<sup>a</sup> Strabo (xvii. 793-794) describes the

Museum at Alexandria in the following terms—*τῶν δὲ βασιλείων μέρος ἔστι καὶ τὸ Μουσεῖον, ἔχον περιπάτον καὶ ἐξέδραν, καὶ οἶκον μέγαν ἐν ᾧ τὸ συσσίτιον τῶν μετεχόντων τοῦ Μουσείου φιλολόγων ἀνδρῶν, &c. Vitruvius, v. 11.*

If we compare this with the language in Diogenes Laertius respecting the Academic and Peripatetic school residences at Athens, we shall find the same phrases employed—*μουσεῖον, ἐξέδρα, &c.* (D. L. iv. 19, v. 51-54). Respecting Speusippus, Diogenes tells us (iv. 1)—*Χαρίτων τ' ἀγάλματ' ἀνεθήκεν ἐν τῷ μουσεῖῳ τῷ ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ ἰδρυθέντι.*

was needed to suggest and enforce the project on Ptolemy Soter. That stimulus was supplied by the Aristotelian school at Athens, which the Alexandrine institution was intended to copy: a *Μουσείον* (with *ἐξέδρα* and *περίπατος*, a covered portico with recesses and seats, and a walk adjacent), on a far larger scale and with more extensive attributions.<sup>b</sup> We must not however imagine that when this new museum was first begun, the founders entertained any idea of the vast magnitude to which it ultimately attained.

Ptolemy Soter was himself an author,<sup>c</sup> and himself knew and respected Aristotle, not only as a philosopher, but also as the preceptor of his friend and commander Alexander. To Theophrastus also, the philosophical successor of Aristotle, Ptolemy showed peculiar honour; inviting him by special message to come and establish himself at Alexandria, which invitation however Theophrastus declined.<sup>d</sup> Moreover Ptolemy appointed Stra-

Favour of  
Ptolemy  
Soter towards  
the philoso-  
phers at  
Athens.

<sup>b</sup> We see from hence what there was peculiar in the Platonic and Aristotelian literary establishments. They included something consecrated, permanent, and intended more or less for public use. The collection of books was not like a private library, destined only for the proprietor and such friends as he might allow—nor was it like that of a bookseller, intended for sale and profit. I make this remark in regard to the Excursus of Becker, in his Charikles, i. 206, 216, a very interesting note on the book-trade and libraries of ancient Athens. Becker disputes the accuracy of Strabo's statement that Aristotle was the first person at Athens who collected a library, and who taught the kings of Egypt to do the like. In the literal sense of the words Becker is right. Other persons before Aristotle had collected books (though I think Becker makes more of the passages which he cites than they strictly deserve); one example is the youthful Euthydemus in Xenophon. Memorab. iv. 2; and Becker alludes justly to the remarkable passage in the Anabasis of Xenophon, about books exported to the Hellenic cities in the Euxine (Anabas. vii. 5, 14). There clearly existed in Athens regular professional book-

sellors; we see that the bookseller read aloud to his visitors a part of the books which he had to sell, in order to tempt them to buy, a feeble foreshadowing of the advertisements and reviews of the present day (Diogen. L. vii. 2). But there existed as yet nothing of the nature of the Platonic and Aristotelian *μουσείον*, whereof the collection of books, varied, permanent, and intended for the use of inmates and special visitors, was one important fraction. In this sense it served as a model for Demetrius Phalereus and Ptolemy Soter in regard to Alexandria.

Vitruvius (v. 11) describes the *exhedra* as seats placed under a covered portico—"in quibus philosophi, rhetores, ceterique qui studiis delectantur, sedentes disputare possint."

<sup>c</sup> Respecting Ptolemy as an author, and the fragments of his work on the exploits of Alexander, see Geier, Alexandri M. Historiarum Scriptt. p. 4-26.

<sup>d</sup> Diog. L. v. 37. Probably this invitation was sent about 306 B.C., during the year in which Theophrastus was in banishment from Athens, in consequence of the restrictive law proposed by Sophokles against the schools of the philosophers, which law was repealed in the ensuing year.



ton (afterwards Scholarch in succession to Theophrastus) preceptor to his youthful son Ptolemy Philadelphus, from whom Straton subsequently received a large present of money:<sup>e</sup> he welcomed at Alexandria the Megaric philosophers, Diodorus Kronus, and Stilpon, and found pleasure in their conversation; he not only befriended, but often confidentially consulted, the Kyrenaic philosopher Theodôrus.<sup>f</sup> Kolôtes, the friend of Epikurus, dedicated a work to Ptolemy Soter. Menander, the eminent comic writer, also received an invitation from him to Egypt.<sup>g</sup>

These favourable dispositions, on the part of the first Ptolemy, towards philosophy and the philosophers at Athens, appear to have been mainly instigated and guided by the Phalerean Demetrius: an Athenian citizen of good station, who enjoyed for ten years at Athens (while that city was subject to Kassander) full political ascendancy, but who was expelled about 307 B.C., by the increased force of the popular party, seconded by the successful invasion of Demetrius Poliorkêtês. By these political events Demetrius Phalereus was driven into exile: a portion of which exile was spent at Thebes, but a much larger portion of it at Alexandria, where he acquired the full confidence of Ptolemy Soter, and retained it until the death of that prince in 285 B.C. While active in politics, and possessing rhetorical talent, elegant without being forcible—Demetrius Phalereus was yet more active in literature and philosophy. He employed his influence, during the time of his political power, to befriend and protect both Xenokrates the chief of the Platonic school, and Theophrastus the chief of the Aristotelian. In his literary and philosophical views he followed Theophrastus and the Peripatetic sect, and was himself among their most voluminous writers. The latter portion of his life was spent at Alexandria, in the service of

<sup>e</sup> Diog. L. v. 58. Straton became Scholarch at the death of Theophrastus in 287 B.C. He must have been preceptor to Ptolemy Philadelphus before this time, during the youth of the latter; for he could not have been at the same time Scholarch at Athens, and

preceptor of the king at Alexandria.

<sup>f</sup> Diog. L. ii. 102, 111, 115. Plutarch adv. Kolôten, p. 1107. The Ptolemy here mentioned by Plutarch may indeed be Philadelphus.

<sup>g</sup> Meineke, Menand. et Philem. Reliq. Præf. p. xxxii.

Ptolemy Soter ; after whose death, however, he soon incurred the displeasure of Ptolemy Philadelphus, and died, intentionally or accidentally, from the bite of an asp.<sup>h</sup>

The Alexandrine Museum or library first acquired celebrity under the reign of Ptolemy (II.) Philadelphus, by whom moreover it was greatly enlarged and its treasures multiplied. Hence that prince is sometimes entitled the founder. But there can be no doubt that its first initiation and establishment is due to Ptolemy (I.) Soter.<sup>i</sup> Demetrius Phalereus was his adviser and auxiliary, the link of connection between him and the literary or philosophical world of Greece. We read that Julius Cæsar, when he conceived the scheme (which he did not live to execute) of establishing a large public library at Rome, fixed upon the learned Varro to regulate the selection and arrangement of the books.<sup>k</sup> None but an eminent

He was chief agent in the first establishment of the Alexandrine Library.

<sup>h</sup> Diog. L. iv. 14, v. 39, 75, 80; Strabo, ix. 398; Plutarch, De Exilio, p. 601; Apophthegmat. p. 189; Cicero, De Finib. v. 19; Pro Rabirio, 30.

Diogenes says about Demetrius Phalereus, Πλήθει δὲ βιβλίων καὶ ἀριθμῷ τῶν στίχων, σχεδὸν ἅπαντας παρελήλακε τοὺς κατ' αὐτὸν Περιπατητικούς, ἐπαίδευτος ὢν καὶ πολύπειρος παρ' ὄντιον.

<sup>i</sup> Mr. Clinton says, Fast. Hell. App. 5, p. 380, 381 :

"Athenæus distinctly ascribes the institution of the *Μουσείον* to Philadelphus in v. 203, where he is describing the acts of Philadelphus." This is a mistake: the passage in Athenæus does not specify which of the two first Ptolemies was the founder: it is perfectly consistent with the supposition that Ptolemy Soter founded it. The same may be said about the passage cited by Mr. Clinton from Plutarch; that too does not determine, between the two Ptolemies, which was the founder. Perizonius was in error (as Mr. Clinton points out) in affirming that the passage in Plutarch determined the foundation to the first Ptolemy: Mr. Clinton is in error by affirming that the passage in Athenæus determines it to the second. Mr. Clinton has also been misled by Vitruvius and Scaliger, (p. 389), when he affirms that the

library at Alexandria was not formed until after the library at Pergamus. Bernhardt (Grundriss der Griechisch. Litteratur, Part i. p. 359, 367, 369) has followed Mr. Clinton too implicitly in recognising Philadelphus as the founder: nevertheless he too admits (p. 366) that the foundations were laid by Ptolemy Soter, under the advice and assistance of Demetrius Phalereus.

The earliest declared king of the Attalid family at Pergamus acquired the throne in 241 B.C. The library at Pergamus could hardly have been commenced before his time: and it is his successor, Eumenes II. (whose reign began in 197 B.C.), who is mentioned as the great collector and adorer of the library at Pergamus. See Strabo, xiii. 624; Clinton, Fast. Hellen. App. 6, p. 401-403. It is plain that the library at Pergamus could hardly have been begun before the close of the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus in Egypt, by which time the library of Alexandria had already acquired great extension and renown.

<sup>k</sup> Sueton. Jul. Cæs. c. 44.

Cicero replies in the following terms to his brother Quintus, who had written to him, requesting advice and aid in getting together for his own use a collection of Greek and Latin books. "De bibliothecâ tuâ Græcâ supplendâ,

literary man could carry such an enterprise into effect, even at Rome, when there existed the precedent of the Alexandrine library: much more when Ptolemy commenced his operations at Alexandria, and when there were only the two *Μουσεῖα* at Athens to serve as precedents. Demetrius, who combined an organising head and political experience, with an erudition not inferior to Varro, regard being had to the stock of learning accessible—was eminently qualified for the task. It procured for him great importance with Ptolemy, and compensated him for that loss of political ascendancy at Athens, which unfavourable fortune had brought about.

We learn that the ardour of Demetrius Phalereus was unremitting, and that his researches were extended everywhere, to obtain for the new museum literary monuments from all countries within contemporary

Proceedings of Demetrius in beginning to collect the library.

libris commutandis, Latinis comparandis—valde velim ista confici, præsertim cum ad meum quoque usum spectent. Sed ego, mihi ipsi ista per quem agam, non habeo. *Neque enim venalia sunt, quæ quidem placeant: et confici nisi per hominem et peritum et diligentem non possunt.* Chrysippo tamen imperabo, et cum Tyrannione loquar.” (Cicero, Epist. ad Q. Frat. iii. 4, 5.)

Now the circulation of books was greatly increased, and the book trade far more developed, at Rome when this letter was written (about three centuries after Plato's decease) than it was at Athens during the time of Demetrius Phalereus (320-300 B.C.). Yet we see the difficulty which the two brothers Cicero had in collecting a mere private library for use of the owner simply. *Good books, in a correct and satisfactory condition, were not to be had for money:* it was necessary to get access to the best MSS., and to have special copies made, neatly and correctly: and this could not be done, except under the superintendance of a laborious literary man like Tyrannion, by well taught slaves subordinate to him.

We may understand, from this analogy, the far greater obstacles which the collectors of the Alexandrine museum and library must have had to overcome, when *they* began their work. No one

could do it, except a practised literary man such as Demetrius Phalereus: nor even he, except by finding out the best MSS., and causing special copies to be made for the use of the library. Respecting the extent and facility of book-diffusion in the Roman world, information will be found in the late Sir George Cornewall Lewis's *Enquiry into the Credibility of Early Roman History*, vol. i. p. 196, seqq.; also, in the fifth chapter of the work of Adolf Schmidt, *Geschichte der Denk- und Glaubens-Freiheit im ersten Jahrhunderte der Kaiser-herrschaft*, Berlin, 1847; lastly, in a valuable review of Adolf Schmidt's work by Sir George Lewis himself, in Fraser's Magazine for April, 1862, pp. 432-439. Adolf Schmidt represents the multiplication and cheapness of books in that day as something hardly inferior to what it is now—citing many authorities for this opinion. Sir G. Lewis has shown, in my judgment most satisfactorily, that these authorities are insufficient, and that the opinion is incorrect: this might have been shown even more fully, if the review had been lengthened. I perfectly agree with Sir G. Lewis on the main question: yet I think he narrows the case on his own side too much, and that the number of copies of such authors as Virgil and Horace, in circulation at one time, cannot have been so small as he imagines.

knowledge.<sup>1</sup> This is highly probable: such universality of literary interest was adapted to the mixed and cosmopolitan character of the Alexandrine population. But Demetrius was a Greek, born about the time of Plato's death (347 B.C.), and identified with the political, rhetorical, dramatic, literary, and philosophical, activity of Athens, in which he had himself taken a prominent part. To collect the memorials of Greek literature would be his first object, more especially such as Aristotle and Theophrastus possessed in their libraries. Without doubt he would procure the works of Homer and the other distinguished poets, epic, lyric, and dramatic, as well as the rhetors, orators, &c. He probably would not leave out the works of the *virī Socratici* (Antisthenes, Aristippus, Æschines, &c.) and the other philosophers (Demokritus, Anaxagoras, Parmenides, &c.). But there are two authors, whose compositions he would most certainly take pains to obtain—Plato and Aristotle. These were the two commanding names of Grecian philosophy in that day: the founders of the two schools existing in Athens, upon the model of which the Alexandrine Museum was to be constituted.

Among all the books which would pass over to Alexandria as the earliest stock of the new library, I know nothing upon which we can reckon more certainly than upon the works of Plato.<sup>m</sup> For they were

Certainty  
that the  
works of  
Plato and  
Aristotle

<sup>1</sup> Josephus, Antiquit. xii. 2, 1. Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς, ὃς ἦν ἐπὶ τῶν βιβλιοθηκῶν τοῦ βασιλέως, σπουδάζων, εἰ δυνατὸν εἶη, πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην συναγεῖν βιβλία, καὶ συνωνόμενος, εἴτι που μόνον ἀκούσειε σπουδῆς ἄξιον ἢ ἡδὺν τῆ βασιλέως προαιρέσει, μάλιστα γὰρ περὶ τὴν συλλογὴν τῶν βιβλίων εἶχε φιλοκάλως, συνηγωνίζετο.

What Josephus affirms here, I apprehend to be perfectly true; though he goes on to state much that is fabulous and apocryphal, respecting the incidents which preceded and accompanied the translation of the Hebrew Scriptures. Josephus is also mistaken in connecting Demetrius Phalereus with Ptolemy Philadelphus. Demetrius Phalereus was disgraced, and died shortly after that prince's accession. His time of influence was

under Ptolemy Soter.

Respecting the part taken by Demetrius Phalereus in the first getting up of the Alexandrine Museum, see Valckenæer, Dissertat. De Aristobulo Judaico, p. 52-57; Ritschl, Die Alexandrin. Biblioth. p. 17, 18; Parthey, Das Alexandrinische Museum, p. 70, 71 seq.

<sup>m</sup> Stahr, in the second part of his work "Aristotelia," combats and refutes with much pains the erroneous supposition, that there was no sufficient publication of the works of Aristotle, until after the time when Apellikon purchased the MSS. from the heirs of Neleus—i. e. B.C. 100. Stahr shows evidence to prove, that the works, at least many of the works, of Aristotle were known and studied before the year 100 B.C.: that they were in the library at Alexandria, and that they were procured for that library by

were among the earliest acquisitions made by him for the library. acquisitions not only desirable, but also easily accessible. The writings of Aristippus or Demokritus—of Lysias or Isokrates—might require to be procured (or good MSS. thereof, fit to be specially copied) at different places and from different persons, without any security that the collection, when purchased, would be either complete or altogether genuine. But the manuscripts of Plato and of Aristotle were preserved in their respective schools at Athens, the Academic and Peripatetic: a collection complete as well as verifiable. Demetrius could obtain permission, from Theophrastus in the Peripatetic school, from Polemon or Krantor in the Academic school, to have these MSS. copied for him by careful and expert hands. The cost of such copying must doubtless have been considerable; amounting to a sum which few private individuals would have been either able or willing to disburse. But the treasures of Ptolemy were amply sufficient for the purpose;<sup>o</sup> and

Demetrius Phalereus. Stahr says, p. 59, "Is it indeed credible—is it even conceivable—that Demetrius, who recommended especially to his regal friend Ptolemy the study of the political works of the philosophers—that Demetrius, the friend both of the Aristotelian philosophy and of Theophrastus, should have left the works of the two great Peripatetic philosophers out of his consideration? May we not rather be sure, that he would take care to secure their works, before all others, for his nascent library—if indeed he did not bring them with him when he came to Alexandria?" The question here put by Stahr (and farther insisted on by Ravaisson, *Essai sur la Méta-physique d'Aristote*, Introd. p. 14) is very pertinent: and I put the like question, with slight change of circumstances, respecting the works of Plato. Demetrius Phalereus was the friend and patron of Xenokrates, as well as of Theophrastus.

"In respect to the Peripatetic school, this is true only during the lifetime of Theophrastus, who died 287 B.C. I have already mentioned that after the death of Theophrastus, the MSS. were withdrawn from Athens. But all the operations of Demetrius Phalereus were carried on during the

lifetime of Theophrastus; much of them, probably, in concert with Theophrastus, whose friend and pupil he was. The death of Theophrastus, the death of Ptolemy Soter, and the discredit and subsequent death of Demetrius are separated only by an interval of two or three years.

<sup>o</sup> We find interesting information, in the letters of Cicero, respecting the *librarii* or copyists whom he had in his service; and the still more numerous and effective band of *librarii* and *anaagnotæ* (slaves, mostly home-born) whom his friend Atticus possessed and trained (Cornel. Nepos, *Vit. Attici*, c. 13). See *Epist. ad Attic.* xii. 6; xiii. 21-44; v. 12 seq.

It appears that many of the compositions of Cicero were copied, prepared for publication, and published, by the *librarii* of Atticus: who, in the case of the *Academica*, incurred a loss, because Cicero—after having given out the work to be copied and published, and after progress had been made in doing this—thought fit to alter materially both the form and the speakers introduced (xiii. 13). In regard to the *Oration pro Ligario*, Atticus sold it well, and brought himself home ("*Ligarianum præclarè vendidisti: posthac, quicquid scripsero, tibi præconium deferam*," xiii.

when he once conceived the project of founding a Museum in his new capital, a large outlay, incurred for transcribing from the best MSS. a complete and authentic collection of the works of illustrious authors, was not likely to deter him. We know from other anecdotes,<sup>p</sup> what vast sums the third

12). Cicero compares the relation of Atticus towards himself, with that of Hermodorus towards Plato, as expressed in the Greek verse, *λόγοισιν Ἐρμόδωρος ἐμφορεύεται*, xiii. 21.

Private friends, such as Balbus and Cærellia (xiii. 21), considered it a privilege to be allowed to take copies of his compositions at their own cost, through *librarii* employed for the purpose. And we find Galen enumerating this among the noble and dignified ways for an opulent man to expend money, in a remarkable passage, *βλέπω γὰρ σε οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰ καλὰ τῶν ἔργων δαπανῆσαι τολμῶντα, μηδὲ εἰς βιβλίων ὄνην μηδὲ κατασκευὴν καὶ τῶν γραφόντων ἄσκησιν, ἥτοι γε εἰς τάχος διὰ σημείων, ἢ εἰς καλῶν ἀκρίβειαν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀναγινωσκόντων ὀρθῶς.* (*De Cognoscendis Curandisque Animi Morbis*, t. v. p. 48, Kühn.)

<sup>p</sup> Galen, *Comm. ad Hippokrat. Ἐπιδημίας*, vol. xvii. p. 606, 607, ed. Kühn.

Lykurgus, the contemporary of Demosthenes as an orator, conspicuous for many years in the civil and financial administration of Athens, caused a law to be passed, enacting that an official MS. should be made of the plays of Æschylus, Sophokles, and Euripides. No permission was granted to represent any of these dramas at the Dionysiac festival, except upon condition that the applicant and the actors whom he employed, should compare the MS. on which they intended to proceed, with the official MS. in the hands of the official secretary. The purpose was to prevent arbitrary amendments or omissions in these plays, at the pleasure of the *ὑποκριταί*.

Ptolemy Euergetes borrowed from the Athenians these public and official MSS. of Æschylus, Sophokles, and Euripides—on the plea that he wished to have exact copies of them taken at Alexandria, and under engagement to restore them as soon as this was done. He deposited with them the prodigious sum of fifteen talents, as a guarantee for the faithful restitution. When he

got the MSS. at Alexandria, he caused copies of them to be taken on the finest paper. He then sent these copies to Athens, keeping the originals for the Alexandrine library; desiring the Athenians to retain the deposit of fifteen talents for themselves. Ptolemy Euergetes here pays, not merely the cost of the finest copying, but fifteen talents besides, for the possession of official MSS. of the three great Athenian tragedians; whose works in other manuscripts must have been in the library long before.

Respecting these official MSS. of the three great tragedians, prepared during the administration and under the auspices of the rhetor Lykurgus, see Plutarch, *Vit. X. Orator*. p. 841, also Boeckh, *Græcæ Tragœd. Principia*, pp. 13-15. The time when Lykurgus caused this to be done, must have been nearly coincident with the decease of Plato, 347 B.C. See Boeckh, *Staats-haushaltung der Athener*, vol. i. p. 468, ii. p. 244; Welcker, *Griech. Trag.* iii. p. 908; Korn, *De Publico Æschylî, &c. Exemplari, Lykurgo Auctore confecto*, p. 6-9, Bonn, 1863.

In the passage cited above from Galen, we are farther informed, that Ptolemy Euergetes caused inquiries to be made, from the masters of all vessels which came to Alexandria, whether there were any MSS. on board: if there were, the MSS. were brought to the library, carefully copied out, and the copies given to the owners: the original MSS. being retained in the library, and registered in a separate compartment, under the general head of *τὰ ἐκ πλοίων*, and with the name of the person from whom the acquisition had been made, annexed. Compare Wolf, *Prolegg. ad Homerum*, p. clxxv. These statements tend to show the care taken by the Alexandrine librarians, not only to acquire the best MSS., but also to keep good MSS. apart from bad, and to record the person and the quarter from which each acquisition had been made.

Ptolemy spent, for the mere purpose of securing better and more authoritative MSS. of works which the Alexandrine library already possessed.

We cannot doubt that Demetrius could obtain permission, if he asked it, from the Scholarchs, to have such copies made. To them the operation was at once complimentary and lucrative; while among the Athenian philosophers generally, the name of Demetrius was acceptable, from the favour which he had shown to them during his season of political power—and that of Ptolemy popular from his liberalities. Or if we even suppose that Demetrius, instead of obtaining copies of the Platonic MSS. from the school, purchased copies from private persons or booksellers (as he must have purchased the works of Demokritus and others)—he could, at any rate, assure himself of the authenticity of what he purchased, by information from the Scholarch.

My purpose, in thus calling attention to the Platonic school and the Alexandrine Museum, is to show that the chance for preservation of Plato's works complete and genuine after his decease, was unusually favourable. I think that they existed complete and genuine in the Alexandrine Museum before the time of Kallimachus, and, of course, during that of Aristophanes. If there were in the Museum any other works obtained from private vendors and professing to be Platonic, Kallimachus and Aristophanes had the means of distinguishing these from such as the Platonic school had furnished and could authenticate, and motive enough for keeping them apart from the certified Platonic catalogue. Whether there existed any spurious works of this sort in the Museum, Diogenes Laertius does not tell us; nor, unfortunately, does he set forth the full list of those which Aristophanes, recognising as Platonic, distributed either in triplets or in units. Diogenes mentions only the principle of distribution adopted, and a select portion of the compositions distributed. But as far as his positive information goes, I hold it to be perfectly worthy of trust. I consider that all the compositions recognised by Aristophanes as works of Plato are unquestionably such; and

Large expenses incurred by the Ptolemies for procuring good MSS.

Catalogue of Platonic works, prepared by Aristophanes, is trustworthy.

that his testimony greatly strengthens our assurance for the received catalogue, in many of those items which have been most contested by critics, upon supposed internal grounds. Aristophanes authenticates, among others, not merely the *Leges*, but also the *Epinomis*, the *Minos*, and the *Epistolæ*.

There is another point also which I conceive to be proved by what we hear about Aristophanes. He (or Kallimachus before him) introduced a new order or distribution of his own—the *Trilogies*—founded on the analogy of the dramatic *Didaskalies*. This shows that the Platonic dialogues were not received into the library in any canonical or *exclusive order* of their own, or in any interdependance as first, second, third, &c., essential to render them intelligible as a system. Had there been any such order, Kallimachus and Aristophanes would no more have altered it, than they would have transposed the order of the books in the *Republic* and *Leges*. The importance of what is here observed will appear presently, when we touch upon the theory of Schleiermacher.

The distributive arrangement, proposed or sanctioned by Aristophanes, applied (as I have already remarked) to the materials in the Alexandrine library only. But this library, though it was the most conspicuous portion, was not the whole, of the Grecian literary aggregate. There were other great regal libraries (such as those of the kings of Pergamus and the Seleukid kings<sup>a</sup>) commenced after the Alexandrine library

No canonical or exclusive order of the Platonic dialogues, when arranged by Aristophanes.

Other libraries and literary centres, besides Alexandria, in which spurious Platonic works might get footing.

<sup>a</sup> The library of Antiochus the Great, or of his predecessor, is mentioned by Suidas, *Εἰδφορίων*. Euphron was librarian of it, seemingly about 230–220 B.C. See Clinton, *Fest. Hell.* B.C. 221.

Galen states (Comm. in Hippok. De Nat. Hom. vol. xv. p. 105, Kühn) that the forgeries of books, and the practice of tendering books for sale under the false names of celebrated authors, did not commence until the time when the competition between the kings of Egypt and the kings of Pergamus for their respective libraries became vehement. If this be ad-

mitted, there could have been no forgeries tendered at Alexandria until after the commencement of the reign of Euergetes (B.C. 247–222): for the competition from Pergamus could hardly have commenced earlier than 230 B.C. In the times of Soter and Philadelphus, there would be no such forgeries tendered. I do not doubt that such forgeries were sometimes successfully passed off: but I think Galen does not take sufficient account of the practice (mentioned by himself) at the Alexandrine library, to keep faithful record of the person and quarter from whence each book had been acquired.



had already attained importance, and intended to rival it: there was also an active literary and philosophising class, in various Grecian cities, of which Athens was the foremost, but in which Rhodes, Kyrênè, and several cities in Asia Minor, Kilikia, and Syria, were included: ultimately, the cultivated classes at Rome, and the Western Hellenic city of Massalia, became comprised in the number. Among this widespread literary public, there were persons who neither knew nor examined the Platonic school or the Alexandrine library, nor investigated what title either of them had to furnish a certificate authenticating the genuine works of Plato. It is not certain that even the great library at Pergamus, begun nearly half a century after that of Alexandria, had any such initiatory agent as Demetrius Phalereus, able as well as willing to go to the fountain-head of Platonism at Athens: nor could the kings of Pergamus claim aid from Alexandria, with which they were in hostile rivalry, and from which they were even forbidden (so we hear) to purchase papyrus. Under these circumstances, it is quite possible that spurious Platonic writings, though they obtained no recognition in the Alexandrine library, might obtain more or less recognition elsewhere, and pass under the name of Plato. To a certain extent, such was the case. There existed some spurious dialogues at the time when Thrasyllus afterwards formed his arrangement.

Moreover the distribution made by Aristophanes of the Platonic dialogues into Trilogies, and the order of priority which he established among them, was by no means universally accepted. Some rejected altogether the dramatic analogy of Trilogies as a principle of distribution. They arranged the dialogues into three classes: † 1. The Direct, or purely dramatic. 2. The Indirect, or narrative (diegematic). 3. The Mixed—partly one, partly the other. Respecting the order

Other critics, besides Aristophanes, proposed different arrangements of the Platonic dialogues.

† Diog. L. iii. 49. Schöne, in his commentary on the Protagoras (pp. 8-12) lays particular stress on this division into the direct or dramatic, and indirect or diegematic. He thinks it probable, that Plato preferred one method to the other at different periods of life: that all of one sort, and all of the other sort, come near together in time.

of priority, we read that while Aristophanes placed the Republic first, there were eight other arrangements, each recognising a different dialogue as first in order; these eight were, Alkibiades I., Theagês, Euthyphron, Kleitophon, Timæus, Phædrus, Theætêtus, Apology. More than one arrangement began with the Apology. Some even selected the Epistolæ as the proper commencement for studying Plato's works.<sup>3</sup>

We hear with surprise that the distinguished Stoic philosopher at Athens, Panætius, rejected the Phædon as not being the work of Plato.<sup>4</sup> It appears that he did not believe in the immortality of the soul, and that he profoundly admired Plato; accordingly, he thought it unworthy of so great a philosopher to waste so much logical subtlety, poetical metaphor, and fable, in support of such a conclusion. Probably he was also guided, in part, by one singularity in the Phædon: it is the only dialogue wherein Plato mentions

Panætius, the Stoic—considered the Phædon to be spurious—earliest known example of a Platonic dialogue disallowed upon internal grounds.

<sup>3</sup> Diog. L. iii. 62. Albinus, *Εισαγωγή*, c. 4, in K. F. Hermann's Appendix Platonica, p. 149.

<sup>4</sup> See the Epigram out of the Anthology, and the extract from the Scholia on the Categories of Aristotle, cited by Wyttenbach in his note on the beginning of the Phædon. A more important passage (which he has not cited) from the Scholia on Aristotle, is, that of Asklepius on the *Metaphysica*, p. 991; Scholia, ed. Brandis, p. 576, a. 38. "Ὅτι τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐστὶν ὁ Φαίδων, σαφῶς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης δηλοῖ—Παναίτιος γὰρ τις ἐτόλμησε νοθεῦσαι τὸν διάλογον. ἐπεὶ δὲ γὰρ ἔλεγε εἶναι θυγατρὴν τὴν ψυχὴν, ἐβούλετο συγκατασπᾶσαι τὸν Πλάτωνα: ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι σαφῶς ἀπιθανατίζει (Plato) τὴν λογικὴν ψυχὴν, τούτου χάριν ἐνόθευσε τὸν διάλογον. Wyttenbach vainly endeavours to elude the force of the passages cited by himself, and to make out that the witnesses did not mean to assert that Panætius had declared the Phædon to be spurious. One of the reasons urged by Wyttenbach is—"Nec illud neglegendum, quod dicitur ὑπὸ Παναϊτίου τινός, à *Panætio quodam*, neque per contemptum dici potuisse neque a Syriano

neque ab hoc anonymo; quorum neuter eâ fuit doctrinæ inopiâ, ut Panætii laudes et præstantiam ignoraret." But in the Scholion of Asklepius on the *Metaphysica* (which passage was not before Wyttenbach), we find the very same expression *Παναϊτῖός τις*, and plainly used *per contemptum*: for Asklepius probably considered it a manifestation of virtuous feeling to describe, in contemptuous language, a philosopher who did not believe in the immortality of the soul. We have only to read the still harsher and more contemptuous language which he employs towards the Manicheans, in another Scholion, p. 666, b. 5, Brandis.

Favorinus said (Diog. iii. 37) that when Plato read aloud the Phædon, Aristotle was the only person present who remained to the end: all the other hearers went away in the middle. I have no faith in this anecdote: I consider it, like so many others in Diogenes, as a myth: but the invention of it indicates, that there were many persons who had no sympathy with the Phædon, taking at the bottom the same view as Panætius.

himself in the third person.<sup>u</sup> If Panætius was predisposed, on other grounds, to consider the dialogue as unworthy of Plato, he might be induced to lay stress upon such a singularity, as showing that the author of the dialogue must be some person other than Plato. Panætius evidently took no pains to examine the external attestations of the dialogue, which he would have found to be attested both by Aristotle and by Kallimachus as the work of Plato. Moreover, whatever any one may think of the cogency of the reasoning—the beauty of Platonic handling and expression is manifest throughout the dialogue. This verdict of Panætius is the earliest example handed down to us of a Platonic dialogue disallowed on internal grounds—that is, because it appeared to the critic unworthy of Plato: and it is certainly among the most unfortunate examples.

But the most elaborate classification of the Platonic works was that made by Thrasyllus, in the days of Augustus or Tiberius, near to, or shortly after, the Christian era: a rhetor of much reputation, consulted and selected as travelling companion by the Emperor Augustus.\*

Thrasyllus adopted two different distributions of the Platonic works: one was dramatic, the other philosophical. The two were founded on perfectly distinct principles, and had no inherent connection with each other; but Thrasyllus combined them together, and noted, in regard to each dialogue, its place in the one classification as well as in the other.

One of these distributions was into Tetralogies, or groups of four each. This was in substitution for the Trilogies introduced by Aristophanes or by Kallimachus, and was founded upon the same dramatic analogy: the dramas, which contended for the prize at the Dionysiac festivals, having been sometimes exhibited in batches of three, or

<sup>u</sup> Plato, Phædon, p. 59. Plato is named also in the Apology: but this is a report, more or less exact, of the real defence of Sokrates.

\* Diog. L. iii. 56; Themistius, Orat. viii. (Περὶ τετραλῳγῶν) p. 108 B.

It appears that this classification by Thrasyllus was approved, or jointly constructed, by his contemporary Derkyllides. (Albinus, *Εἰσαγωγή*, c. 4, p. 149, in K. F. Hermann's Appendix Platonica.)

Trilogies—sometimes in batches of four, or Tetralogies, three tragedies, along with a satirical piece as accompaniment. Because the dramatic writer brought forth four pieces at a birth, it was assumed as likely that Plato would publish four dialogues all at once. Without departing from this dramatic analogy, which seems to have been consecrated by the authority of the Alexandrine Grammatici, Thrasyllus gained two advantages. First, he included ALL the Platonic compositions, whereas Aristophanes, in his Trilogies, had included only a part, and had left the rest not grouped. Thrasyllus included all the Platonic compositions, thirty-six in number, reckoning the Republic, the Leges, and the Epistolæ in bulk, each as one—in nine Tetralogies or groups of four each. Secondly, he constituted his first tetralogy in an impressive and appropriate manner—Euthyphron, Apology, Kriton, Phædon—four compositions really resembling a dramatic tetralogy, and bound together by their common bearing, on the last scenes of the life of a philosopher.<sup>7</sup> In Euthyphron, Sokrates appears as having been just indicted and as thinking on his defence; in the Apology, he makes his defence; in the Kriton, he appears as sentenced by the legal tribunal, yet refusing to evade the sentence by escaping from his prison; in the Phædon, we have the last dying scene and conversation. None of the other tetralogies present an equal bond

<sup>7</sup> Diog. L. iii. 57. *πρώτην μὲν οὖν τετραλογίαν τίθησι τὴν κοινὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἔχουσαν· παραδείξει γὰρ βούλεται ὅποιος ἐν εἰῆ ὁ τοῦ φιλοσόφου βίος.* Albinus, *Introduct. ad Plat. c. 4, p. 149*, in K. F. Hermann's *Append. Platon.*

Thrasyllus appears to have considered the Republic as ten dialogues, and the Leges as twelve, each book (of Republic and of Leges) constituting a separate dialogue, so that he made the Platonic works fifty-six in all. But for the purpose of his tetralogies he reckoned them only as thirty-six—nine groups.

The author of the *Prolegomena τῆς Πλάτωνος φιλοσοφίας* in Hermann's *Append. Platon.* p. 218-219, gives the same account of the tetralogies, and of the connecting bond which united the four members of the

first tetralogical group; but he condemns altogether the principle of the tetralogical division. He does not mention the name of Thrasyllus. He lived after Proklus (p. 218), that is after 480 A.D.

The argument urged by Wytenbach and others—that Varro must have considered the Phædon as *fourth* in the order of the Platonic compositions—an argument founded on a passage in Varro, *L. L. vii. 37*, which refers to the Phædon under the words *Plato in quarto*—this argument becomes inapplicable in the text as given by O. Müller—not *Varro in quarto* but *Varro in quattuor fluminibus*, &c. Mullach (*Democriti Frag. p. 98*) has tried unsuccessfully to impugn Müller's text, and to uphold the word *quarto* with the inference resting upon it.

of connection between their constituent items; but the first tetralogy was probably intended to recommend the rest, and to justify the system.

In the other distribution made by Thrasyllus,<sup>2</sup> Plato was regarded not as a quasi-dramatist, but as a philosopher. The dialogues were classified with reference partly to their method and spirit, partly to their subject. His highest generic distinction was into:—1. Dialogues of Investigation or Search. 2. Dialogues of Exposition or Construction. The Dialogues of Investigation he subdivided into two classes:—1. Gymnastic. 2. Agonistic. These were again subdivided, each into two sub-classes; the Gymnastic, into 1. Obstetric. 2. Peirastic. The Agonistic into 1. Probative. 2. Refutative. Again, the Dialogues of Exposition were divided into two classes:—1. Theoretical. 2. Practical. Each of these classes was divided into two sub-classes: the Theoretical into 1. Physical. 2. Logical. The Practical into 1. Ethical. 2. Political.

<sup>2</sup> The statement in Diogenes Laertius, in his life of Plato, is somewhat obscure and equivocal; but I think it certain that the classification which he gives in iii. 49, 50, 51, of the Platonic dialogues, was made by Thrasyllus. It is a portion of the same systematic arrangement as that given somewhat farther on (iii. 56-61), which is ascribed by name to Thrasyllus, enumerating the tetralogies. Diogenes expressly states that Thrasyllus was the person who annexed to each dialogue its double denomination, which it has since borne in the published editions—*Εὐθύφρων*—*περὶ δόξου*—*πειραστικός*. In the Dialogues of Examination or Search, one of these names is derived from the subject, the other from the method, as in the instance of *Euthyphron* just cited: in the Dialogues of Exposition both names are derived from the subject, first the special, next the general. *Φαίδων*, ἢ *περὶ ψυχῆς*, ἡθικός. *Παρμενίδης*, ἢ *περὶ ἰδεῶν*, λογικός.

Schleiermacher (in the *Einleitung* prefixed to his translation of Plato, p. 24) speaks somewhat loosely about "the well known dialectical distribu-

tions of the Platonic dialogues, which Diogenes has preserved without giving the name of the author." Diogenes gives only *one* such dialectical (or logical) distribution; and though he does not mention the name of Thrasyllus in direct or immediate connection with it, we may clearly see that he is copying Thrasyllus. This is well pointed out in an acute commentary on Schleiermacher, by Yxem, *Logos Protreptikos*, Berlin, 1841, p. 12-13.

Diogenes remarks (iii. 50) that the distribution of the dialogues into narrative, dramatic, and mixed, is made *πραγικῶς μᾶλλον ἢ φιλοσόφως*. This remark would seem to apply more precisely to the arrangement of the dialogues into trilogies and tetralogies. His word *φιλοσόφως* belongs very justly to the logical distribution of Thrasyllus, apart from the tetralogies.



Porphyrus tells us that Plotinus did not bestow any titles upon his own discourses. The titles were bestowed by his disciples; who did not always agree, but gave different titles to the same discourse (Porphyrus, *Vit. Plotin.* 4).

The following table exhibits this philosophical classification of Thrasyllus:—

TABLE I.

PHILOSOPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORKS OF PLATO  
BY THRASYLLUS.

<p>I. DIALOGUES OF INVESTIGATION. <i>Searching Dialogues.</i> <i>Ζητητικοί.</i></p>	<p>II. DIALOGUES OF EXPOSITION. <i>Guiding Dialogues.</i> <i>Ἐγρηγητικοί.</i></p>
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I now subjoin a second Table, containing the Dramatic Distribution of the Platonic Dialogues, with the Philosophical Distribution combined or attached to it.

## TABLE II.

DRAMATIC DISTRIBUTION.—PLATONIC DIALOGUES, AS  
ARRANGED IN TETRALOGIES BY THRASYLLUS.

Tetralogy 1.		
1. Euthyphron .....	On Holiness.....	Peirastic or Testing.
2. Apology of Sokrates .....	Ethical .....	Ethical.
3. Kriton .....	On Duty in Action .....	Ethical.
4. Phædon .....	On the Soul.....	Ethical.
2.		
1. Kratylus.....	On Rectitude in Naming ...	Logical.
2. Theætétus .....	On Knowledge .....	Logical.
3. Sophistês .....	On Ens or the Existent.....	Logical.
4. Politikus.....	On the Art of Governing ...	Logical.
3.		
1. Parmenidês .....	On Ideas .....	Logical.
2. Philêbus .....	On Pleasure.....	Ethical.
3. Symposion .....	On Good .....	Ethical.
4. Phædrus .....	On Love .....	Ethical.
4.		
1. Alkibiadês I. ....	On the Nature of Man .....	Obstetric or Evolving.
2. Alkibiadês II. ....	On Prayer .....	Ditto.
3. Hipparchus .....	On the Love of Gain .....	Ethical.
4. Erastæ .....	On Philosophy .....	Ethical.
5.		
1. Theagês .....	On Philosophy .....	Obstetric.
2. Charmidês .....	On Temperance .....	Peirastic.
3. Lachês .....	On Courage.....	Obstetric.
4. Lysis .....	On Friendship.....	Ditto.
6.		
1. Euthydêmus .....	The Disputatious Man .....	Refutative.
2. Protagoras.....	The Sophists .....	Probative.
3. Gorgias .....	On Rhetoric .....	Refutative.
4. Menon .....	On Virtue .....	Peirastic.
7.		
1. Hippias I. ....	On the Beautiful.....	Refutative.
2. Hippias II. ....	On Falsehood .....	Ditto.
3. Ion .....	On the Iliad.....	Peirastic.
4. Menexenus .....	The Funeral Oration .....	Ethical.
8.		
1. Kleitophon .....	The Impulsive.....	Ethical.
2. Republic .....	On Justice .....	Political.
3. Timæus .....	On Nature .....	Physical.
4. Kritias .....	The Atlantid .....	Ethical.
9.		
1. Minos .....	On Law .....	Political.
2. Leges .....	On Legislation .....	Ditto.
3. Epinomis .....	The Night-Assembly, or the Philosopher.	Political.
4. Epistolæ XIII. ....	.. .. .	Ethical.

The second Table, as it here stands, is given by Diogenes Laertius, and is extracted by him probably from the work of Thrasyllus, or from the edition of Plato as published by Thrasyllus. The reader will see that each Platonic composition has a place assigned to it in two classifications—1. The dramatic—2. The philosophical—each in itself distinct and independent of the other, but here blended together.

We may indeed say more. The two classifications are not only independent, but incongruous and even repugnant. The better of the two is only obscurely and imperfectly apprehended, because it is presented as an appendage to the worse. The dramatic classification, which stands in the foreground, rests upon a purely fanciful analogy, determining preference for the number *four*. If indeed this objection were urged against Thrasyllus, he might probably have replied that the group of four volumes together was in itself convenient, neither too large nor too small, for an elementary subdivision; and that the fanciful analogy was an artifice for recommending it to the feelings, better (after all) than selection of another number by hazard. Be that as it may, however, the fiction was one which Thrasyllus inherited from Aristophanes; and it does some honour to his ability, that he has built, upon so inconvenient a fiction, one tetralogy (the first), really plausible and impressive.\* But it does more honour to his ability that he

Incongruity and repugnance of the two classifications.

\* It is probable that Aristophanes, in distributing Plato into trilogies, was really influenced by the dramatic form of the compositions to put them in a class with real dramas. But Thrasyllus does not seem to have been influenced by such a consideration. He took the number *four* on its own merits, and adopted, as a way of recommending it, the traditional analogy sanctioned by the Alexandrine librarians.

That such was the case, we may infer pretty clearly when we learn, that Thrasyllus applied the same distribution (into tetralogies) to the works of Demokritus, which were *not* dramatic in form. (Diog. L. ix. 45; Mul-

lach, Demo. Frag. p. 100-107, who attempts to restore the Thrasyllian tetralogies.)

The compositions of Demokritus were not merely numerous, but related to the greatest diversity of subjects. To them Thrasyllus could not apply the same logical or philosophical distribution which he applied to Plato. He published, along with the works of Demokritus, a preface, which he entitled *Τὰ πρὸ τῆς ἀναγνώσεως τῶν Δημοκρίτου βιβλίων* (Diog. L. ix. 41).

Porphry tells us, that when he undertook, as literary executor, the arrangement and publication of the works of his deceased master Plotinus, he found fifty-four discourses: which



should have originated the philosophical classification; distinguishing the dialogues by important attributes truly belonging to each, and conducting the Platonic student to points of view which ought to be made known to him. This classification forms a marked improvement upon every thing (so far as we know) which preceded it.

That Thrasyllus followed Aristophanes in the principle of his classification, is manifest: that he adopted the dramatic ground and principle of classification (while amending its details), not because he was himself guided by it, but because he found it already in use and sanctioned by the high authority of the Alexandrines—is also manifest, because he himself constructed and tacked to it a better classification, founded upon principles new and incongruous with the dramatic. In all this we trace the established ascendancy of the Alexandrine library and its eminent literati. Of which ascendancy a farther illustration

Authority of the Alexandrine library—editions of Plato published, with the Alexandrine critical marks.

appears, when we read in Diogenes Laertius that editions of Plato were published, carrying along with the text the special marks of annotation applied by the Alexandrines to Homer and other poets: the obelus to indicate a spurious passage, the obelus with two dots to denote a passage which had been improperly declared spurious, the X to signify peculiar locutions, the double X or Diplê to mark important or characteristic opinions of Plato—and others in like manner. A special price was paid for manuscripts of Plato with these illustrative appendages:<sup>b</sup> which must have been applied either by Alex-

he arranged into six Euneads or groups of nine each. He was induced to prefer this distribution, by regard to the perfection of the number six (τελειότητι). He placed, in each Eunead, discourses akin to each other, or on analogous subjects (Porphyry, Vit. Plotin. 24).

<sup>b</sup> Diog. L. iii. 65, 66. Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ σημεῖα τινα τοῖς βιβλίοις αὐτοῦ παρατίθεται, φέρε καὶ περὶ τούτων τι εἰπωμεν, &c. He then proceeds to enumerate the σημεῖα.

It is important to note that Diogenes cites this statement (respecting the peculiar critical marks appended to

manuscripts of the Platonic works) from Antigonus of Karystus in his Life of Zeno the Stoic. Now the date of Antigonus is placed by Mr. Fynes Clinton in B.C. 225, before the death of Ptolemy III. Evergetes (see Fasti Hellen. B.C. 225, also Appendix, 12. 80). Antigonus must thus have been contemporary both with Kallimachus and with Aristophanes of Byzantium: he notices the marked manuscripts of Plato as something newly edited—(νεωστὶ ἐκδοθέντα): and we may thus see that the work of critical marking must have been performed either by

andrines themselves, or by others trained in their school. When Thrasyllus set himself to edit and re-distribute the Platonic works, we may be sure that he must have consulted one or more public libraries, either at Alexandria, Athens, Rome, Tarsus, or elsewhere. Nowhere else could he find all the works together. Now the proceedings ascribed to him show that he attached himself to the Alexandrine library, and to the authority of its most eminent critics.

Probably it was this same authority that Thrasyllus followed in determining which were the real works of Plato, and in setting aside pretended works. He accepted the collection of Platonic compositions sanctioned by Aristophanes and recognised as such in the Alexandrine library. As far as our positive knowledge goes, it fully bears out what is here stated: all the compositions recognised by Aristophanes (unfortunately Diogenes does not give a complete enumeration of those which he recognised) are to be found in the catalogue of Thrasyllus. And the evidentiary value of this fact is so much the greater, because the most questionable compositions (I mean, those which modern critics reject or even despise) are expressly included in the recognition of Aristophanes, and passed from him to Thrasyllus—*Leges*, *Epinomis*, *Minos*, *Epistolæ*, *Sophistês*, *Politikus*. Exactly on those points on which the authority of Thrasyllus requires to be fortified against modern objectors, it receives all the support which coincidence with Aristophanes can impart. When we know that Thrasyllus adhered to Aristophanes on so many disputable points of the catalogue, we may infer pretty certainly that he adhered to him in the remainder. In regard to the question, Which were Plato's genuine works? it was perfectly natural that Thrasyllus should accept the recognition of the greatest library then existing: a library, the written records of which

Thrasyllus followed the Alexandrine library and Aristophanes, as to genuine Platonic works.

Kallimachus and Aristophanes themselves (one or both) or by some of their contemporaries. Among the titles of the lost treatises of Kallimachus, one is—about the *γλωσσαι* or peculiar phrases of Demokritus. It is therefore noway improbable that Kallimachus should

bestow attention upon the peculiarities of the Platonic text, and the inaccuracies of manuscripts. The library had probably acquired several different manuscripts of the Platonic compositions, as it had of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, and of the Attic tragedies.

could be traced back to Demetrius Phalereus. He followed this external authority: he did not take each dialogue to pieces, to try whether it conformed to a certain internal standard—a “*platonisches Gefühl*”—of his own.

That the question between genuine and spurious Platonic dialogues was tried in the days of Thrasyllus, by external authority and not by internal feeling—we may see farther by the way in which Diogenes Laertius speaks of the spurious dialogues. “The following dialogues (he says) are declared to be spurious *by common consent*: 1. Eryxias or Erasis-tratus. 2. Akephali or Sisyphus. 3. Demodokus. 4. Axiochus. 5. Halkyon. 6. Midon or Hippotrophus. 7. Phæakes. 8. Chelidon. 9. Hebdomê. 10. Epimenides.”<sup>c</sup> There was, then, unanimity, so far as the knowledge of Diogenes Laertius reached, as to genuine and spurious. All the critics whom he valued, Thrasyllus among them, pronounced the above ten dialogues to be spurious: all of them agreed also in accepting the dialogues in the list of Thrasyllus as genuine.<sup>d</sup> Of course the ten spurious dialogues must have been talked of by some persons, or must have got footing in some editions or libraries, as real works of Plato: otherwise there could have been no trial had or sentence passed upon them. But what Diogenes affirms is, that Thrasyllus and all the critics whose opinion he esteemed, concurred in rejecting them. We may surely presume that this unanimity among the critics, both as to all that they accepted and all that they rejected, arose from common acquiescence in the authority of the Alexandrine library.<sup>e</sup> The ten rejected dialogues were not in the Alexandrine library—or at least not among the rolls therein recognised as Platonic.

<sup>c</sup> Diog. L. iii. *νοθεύονται δὲ τῶν διαλόγων ἠμολογουμένως.*

Compare Prolegomena τῆς Πλάτωνος Φιλοσοφίας, in Herman's Appendix Platonica, p. 219.

<sup>d</sup> It has been contended by some modern critics, that Thrasyllus himself doubted whether the Hipparchus was Plato's work. When I consider that dialogue, I shall show that there is no adequate ground for believing that

Thrasyllus doubted its genuineness.

<sup>e</sup> Diogenes (ix. 49) uses the same phrase in regard to the spurious works ascribed to Demokritus, τὰ δ' ἠμολογουμένως ἔστιν ἀλλότρια. And I believe that he means the same thing by it: that the works alluded to were not recognised in the Alexandrine library as belonging to Demokritus, and were accordingly excluded from the tetralogies (of Demokritus) prepared by Thrasyllus.

If Thrasyllus and the others did not proceed upon this evidence in rejecting the ten dialogues, and did not find in them any marks of time such as to exclude the supposition of Platonic authorship—they decided upon what is called internal evidence: a critical sentiment, which satisfied them that these dialogues did not possess the Platonic character, style, manner, doctrines, merits, &c. Now I think it highly improbable that Thrasyllus could have proceeded upon any such sentiment. For when we survey the catalogue of works which he recognised as genuine, we see that it includes the widest diversity of style, manner, doctrine, purpose, and merits: that the disparate epithets, which he justly applies to discriminate the various dialogues, cannot be generalised so as to leave any intelligible “Platonic character” common to all. Now since Thrasyllus reckoned among the genuine works of Plato, compositions so unlike, and so unequal in merit, as the Republic, Protagoras, Gorgias, Lysis, Parmenidês, Symposium, Philêbus, Menexenus, Leges, Epinomis, Hipparchus, Minos, Theagês, Epistolæ, &c., not to mention a composition obviously unfinished, such as the Kritias—he could have little scruple in believing that Plato also composed the Eryxias, Sisyphus, Demodokus, and Halkyon. These last-mentioned dialogues still exist, and can be appreciated.<sup>f</sup> Allowing, for the sake of argument, that we are entitled to assume our own

Thrasyllus did not follow an internal sentiment of his own in rejecting dialogues as spurious.

<sup>f</sup> The Axiochus, Eryxias, Sisyphus, and Demodokus, are printed as Apocrypha annexed to most editions of Plato, together with two other dialogues entitled De Justo and De Virtute. The Halkyon has generally appeared among the works of Lucian, but K. F. Hermann has recently printed it in his edition of Plato among the Platonic Apocrypha.

The Axiochus contains a mark of time (the mention of *Ἀκαδημία* and *Λυκεῖον*, p. 367), as F. A. Wolf has observed, proving that it was not composed until the Platonic and Peripatetic schools were both of them in full establishment at Athens—that is, certainly after the death of Plato, and probably after the death of Aristotle. It is possible that Thrasyllus may have

proceeded upon this evidence of time, at least as collateral proof, in pronouncing the dialogue not to be the work of Plato. The other four dialogues contain no similar evidence of date.

Favorinus affirmed that Halkyon was the work of an author named Leon.

Some said (Diog. iii. 37) that Philippus of Opus, one of the disciples of Plato, transcribed the Leges, which were on waxen tablets (*ἐν κηρώ*), and that the Epinomis was his work (*τούτου δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἐπινομίδα φασὶν εἶναι*). It was probably the work of Philippus only in the sense in which the Leges were his work—that he made a fair and durable copy of parts of it from the wax. Thrasyllus admitted it with the rest as Platonic.

sense of worth as a test of what is really Plato's composition, it is impossible to deny, that if these dialogues are not worthy of the author of Republic and Protagoras, they are at least worthy of the author of the Leges, Epinomis, Hipparchus, Minos, &c. Accordingly, if the internal sentiment of Thrasyllus did not lead him to reject these last four, neither would it lead him to reject the Eryxias, Sisyphus, and Halkyon. I conclude therefore that if he, and all the other critics whom Diogenes esteemed, agreed in rejecting the ten dialogues as spurious—their verdict depended not upon any internal sentiment, but upon the authority of the Alexandrine library.<sup>g</sup>

On this question, then, of the Canon of Plato's works (as compared with the works of other contemporary authors) recognised by Thrasyllus—I consider that its claim to trustworthiness is very high, as including all the genuine works, and none but the genuine works, of Plato: the following facts being either proved, or fairly presumable.

1. The Canon rests on the authority of the Alexandrine library and its erudite librarians;<sup>h</sup> whose written records went back to the days of Ptolemy Soter, and Demetrius Phalereus, within a generation after the death of Plato.

<sup>g</sup> Mullach (Democr. Fragm. p. 100) accuses Thrasyllus of an entire want of critical sentiment, and pronounces his catalogue to be altogether without value as an evidence of genuine Platonic works—because Thrasyllus admits many dialogues, “quos doctorum nostri seculi virorum judicium è librorum Platoniorum numero exemit.”

This observation exactly illustrates the conclusion which I desire to bring out. I admit that Thrasyllus had a critical sentiment different from that of the modern Platonic commentators; but I believe that in the present case he proceeded upon other evidence—recognition by the Alexandrine library. My difference with Mullach is, that I consider this recognition (in a question of genuine or spurious) as more trustworthy evidence than the critical sentiment of modern literati.

<sup>h</sup> Suckow adopts and defends the opinion here stated—that Thrasyllus,

in determining which were the genuine works of Plato and which were not genuine, was guided mainly by the authority of the Alexandrine library and librarians (Suckow, Form der Platonischen Schriften, pp. 170-175). Ueberweg admits this opinion as just (Untersuchungen, p. 195).

Suckow farther considers (p. 175) that the catalogue of works of esteemed authors, deposited in the Alexandrine library, may be regarded as dating from the Πύρακες of Kallimachus.

This goes far to make out the presumption which I have endeavoured to establish in favour of the Canon recognised by Thrasyllus, which, however, these two authors do not fully admit.

K. F. Hermann, too (see Gesch. und Syst. der Platon. Philos. p. 44), argues sometimes strongly in favour of this presumption, though elsewhere he entirely departs from it.

2. The manuscripts of Plato at his death were preserved in the school which he founded ; where they continued for more than thirty years under the care of Speusippus and Xenokrates, who possessed personal knowledge of all that Plato had really written. After Xenokrates, they came under the care of Polemon and the succeeding Scholarchs, from whom Demetrius Phalereus probably obtained permission to take copies of them for the nascent museum or library at Alexandria—or through whom at least (if he purchased from booksellers) he could easily ascertain which were Plato's works, and which, if any, were spurious.

3. They were received into that library without any known canonical order, prescribed system, or interdependence essential to their being properly understood. Kallimachus or Aristophanes devised an order of arrangement for themselves, such as they thought suitable.

## CHAPTER V.

PLATONIC CANON AS APPRECIATED AND MODIFIED BY  
MODERN CRITICS.

THE Platonic Canon established by Thrasyllus maintained its authority until the close of the last century, in regard to the distinction between what was genuine and spurious. The distribution indeed did not continue to be approved: the Tetralogies were neglected, and the order of the dialogues varied: moreover, doubts were intimated about Kleitophon and Epinomis. But nothing was positively removed from, or positively added to, the total recognised by Thrasyllus. The Neo-Platonists (from the close of the second century B.C., down to the beginning of the sixth century) introduced a new, mystic, and theological interpretation, which often totally changed and falsified Plato's meaning. Their principles of interpretation would have been strange and unintelligible to the rhetors Thrasyllus and Dionysius of Halikarnassus—or to the Platonic philosopher Charmadas, who expounded Plato to Marcus Crassus at Athens. But they still continued to look for Plato in the nine Tetralogies of Thrasyllus, in each and all of them. So also continued Ficinus, who, during the last half of the fifteenth century, did so much to revive in the modern world the study of Plato. He revived along with it the neo-platonic interpretation. The *Argumenta*, prefixed to the different dialogues by Ficinus, are remarkable, as showing what an ingenious student, interpreting in that spirit, discovered in them.

But the scholars of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, speaking generally—though not neglecting these neo-platonic refinements, were disposed to seek out,

The Canon of Thrasyllus continued to be generally acknowledged, by the Neo-Platonists, as well as by Ficinus and the succeeding critics after the revival of learning.

wherever they could find it, a more literal interpretation of the Platonic text, correctly presented and improved. The next great edition of the works of Plato was published by Serranus and Stephens, in the latter portion of the sixteenth century.

Serranus distributed the dialogues of Plato into six groups which he called Syzygies. In his first Syzygy were comprised Euthyphron, Apologia, Kriton, Phædon (coinciding with the first Tetralogy of Thrasyllus), as setting forth the defence of Sokrates and of his doctrine. The second Syzygy included the dialogues introductory to philosophy generally, and impugning the Sophists—Theagês, Erastæ, Theætêtus, Sophistês, Euthydêmus, Protagoras, Hippias II. In the third Syzygy were three dialogues considered as bearing on Logic,—Kratylus, Gorgias, Ion. The fourth Syzygy contained the dialogues on Ethics generally—(Philêbus, Menon, Alkibiadês I.); on special points of Ethics—(Alkibiadês II., Charmidês, Lysis, Hipparchus); and on Politics (Menexenus, Politikus, Minos, Republic, Leges, Epinomis). The fifth Syzygy included the dialogues on Physics, and Metaphysics (or Theology)—Timæus, Kritias, Parmenidês, Symposion, Phædrus, Hippias II. In the sixth Syzygy were ranged the thirteen epistles, the various dialogues which Serranus considered spurious (Kleitophon among them, which he regarded as doubtful), and the Definitions.

Serranus, while modifying the distribution of the Platonic works, left the entire Canon very much as he found it. So it remained throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: the scholars who devoted themselves to Plato were content with improvement of the text, philological illustration, and citations from the ancient commentators. But the powerful impulse, given by Kant to the speculative mind of Europe during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, materially affected the point of view from which Plato was regarded. Tennemann, both in his System of the Platonic Philosophy, and in dealing with Plato as a portion of his general history of philosophy, applied the doctrines of Kant largely

Serranus—  
his six Syzygies—left  
the aggregate Canon  
unchanged.  
Tennemann  
—importance  
assigned to  
the Phædrus.



and even excessively to the exposition of ancient doctrines. Much of his comment is instructive, greatly surpassing his predecessors. Without altering the Platonic Canon, he took a new view of the general purposes of Plato, and especially he brought forward the dialogue Phædrus into a prominence which had never before belonged to it, as an index or key-note (*ἐνδόσιμον*) to the whole Platonic series. Shortly after Tennemann, came Schleiermacher, who introduced a theory of his own, ingenious as well as original, which has given a new turn to all the subsequent Platonic criticism.

Schleiermacher begins by assuming two fundamental postulates, both altogether new. 1. A systematic unity of philosophic theme and purpose, conceived by Plato in his youth, at first obscurely—afterwards worked out through successive dialogues; each dialogue disclosing the same purpose, but the later disclosing it more clearly and fully, until his old age. 2. A peremptory, exclusive, and intentional order of the dialogues, composed by Plato with a view to the completion of this philosophical scheme. Schleiermacher undertakes to demonstrate what this order was, and to point out the contribution brought by each successive dialogue to the accomplishment of Plato's premeditated scheme.

To those who understand Plato, the dialogues themselves reveal (so Schleiermacher affirms) their own essential order of sequence—their own mutual relations of antecedent and consequent. Each presupposes those which go before:—each prepares for those which follow. Accordingly, Schleiermacher distributes the Platonic dialogues into three groups: the first, or elementary, beginning with Phædrus, followed by Lysis, Protagoras, Lachês, Charmidês, Euthyphron, Parmenidês: the second, or preparatory, comprising Gorgias, Theætêtus, Menon, Euthydêmus, Kratylus, Sophistês, Politikus, Symposium, Phædon, Philêbus: the third, or constructive, including Republic, Timæus, and Kritias. These groups or files are all supposed to be marshalled under Platonic authority: both the entire files as first, second,

Schleiermacher—new theory about the purposes of Plato. One philosophical scheme, conceived by Plato from the beginning—essential order and interdependence of the dialogues, as contributing to the full execution of this scheme. Some dialogues not constituent items in the series, but lying alongside of it. Order of arrangement.

third—and the dialogues composing each file, carrying their own place in the order, imprinted in visible characters. But to each file, there is attached what Schleiermacher terms an Appendix, containing one or more dialogues, each a composition by itself, and lying not in the series, but alongside of it (*Neben-werke*). The Appendix to the first file includes *Apologia*, *Kriton*, *Ion*, *Hippias II.*, *Hipparchus*, *Minos*, *Alkibiadês II.* The Appendix to the second file consists of—*Theagês*, *Erastæ*, *Alkibiadês I.*, *Menexenus*, *Hippias I.*, *Kleitophon*. That of the third file consists of the *Leges*. The Appendix is not supposed to imply any common positive character in the dialogues which it includes, but simply the negative attribute of not belonging to the main philosophical column, besides a greater harmony with the file to which it is attached than with the other two files. Some dialogues assigned to the Appendixes are considered by Schleiermacher as spurious; some however he treats as compositions on special occasions, or adjuncts to the regular series. To this latter category belong the *Apologia*, *Kriton*, and *Leges*. Schleiermacher considers the *Charmidês* to have been composed during the time of the Anarchy, B.C. 404: the *Phædrus* (earliest of all), in Olymp. 93 (B.C. 406), two years before: <sup>a</sup> the *Lysis*, *Protagoras*, and *Lachês*, to lie between them in respect of date.

Such is the general theory of Schleiermacher, which presents to us Plato in the character of a Demiurgus, contemplating from the first an Idea of philosophy, and constructing a series of dialogues (like a *Kosmos* of Schleiermacher), with the express purpose of giving embodiment to it as far as practicable. We next come to Ast, who denies this theory altogether. According to Ast, there never was any philosophical system, to the exposition and communication of which each successive dialogue was deliberately intended to contribute: there is no scientific or intentional connection between the dialogues,—no progressive arrangement of first and second,

Theory of Ast—he denies the reality of any preconceived scheme—considers the dialogues as distinct philosophical dramas.

<sup>a</sup> Schleierm. vol. i. p. 72; vol. ii. p. 8.

of foundation and superstructure: there is no other unity or connecting principle between them than that which they involve as all emanating from the same age, country, and author, and the same general view of the world (Welt-Ansicht) or critical estimate of man and nature.<sup>b</sup> The dialogues are dramatic (Ast affirms), not merely in their external form, but in their internal character: each is in truth a philosophical drama.<sup>c</sup> Their purpose is very diverse and many-sided: we mistake if we imagine the philosophical purpose to stand alone. If that were so (Ast argues), how can we explain the fact, that in most of the dialogues, there is no philosophical result at all? Nothing but a discussion without definite end, which leaves every point unsettled.<sup>d</sup> Plato is poet, artist, philosopher, blended in one. He does not profess to lay down positive opinions. Still less does he proclaim his own opinions as exclusive orthodoxy, to be poured ready-prepared into the minds of recipient pupils. He seeks to urge the pupils to think and investigate for themselves. He employs the form of dialogue, as indispensable to generate in their minds this impulse of active research, and to arm them with the power of pursuing it effectively.<sup>e</sup> But each Platonic dialogue is a separate composition in itself, and each of the greater dialogues is a finished and symmetrical whole, like a living organism.<sup>f</sup>

Though Ast differs thus pointedly from Schleiermacher in the enunciation of his general principle, yet he approximates to him more nearly when he comes to detail: for he recog-

<sup>b</sup> Ast, *Leben und Schriften Platon's*, p. 40.

<sup>c</sup> Ast, *ib.* p. 46.

<sup>d</sup> Ast, *ibid.* p. 39.

<sup>e</sup> Ast, *ib.* p. 42.

<sup>f</sup> Ast, pp. 38, 39. The general view here taken by Ast—dwelling upon the separate individuality as well as upon the dramatic character of each dialogue—calling attention to the purpose of intellectual stimulation, and of reasoning out different aspects of ethical and dialectical questions, as distinguished from endoctrinating purpose—this general view coincides more nearly with my own than that of any other critic.

But Ast does not follow it out consistently. If he were consistent with it, he ought to be more catholic than other critics, in admitting a large and undefinable diversity in the separate Platonic manifestations: instead of which, he is the most sweeping of all repudiators, on internal grounds. He is not even satisfied with the *Parmenides* as it now stands; he insists that what is now the termination was not the real and original termination; but that Plato must have appended to the dialogue an explanation of its *ἀνορία*, puzzles, and antinomies; which explanation is now lost.

nises three classes of dialogues, succeeding each other in a chronological order verifiable (as he thinks) by the dialogues themselves. His first class (in which he declares the poetical and dramatic element to be predominant), consists of Protagoras, Phædrus, Gorgias, Phædon. His second class, distinguished by the dialectic element, includes Theætétus, Sophistês, Politikus, Parmenidês, Kratylus. His third class, wherein the poetical and dialectic element are found both combined, embraces Philêbus, Symposion, Republic, Timæus, Kritias. These fourteen dialogues, in Ast's view, constitute the whole of the genuine Platonic works. All the rest he pronounces to be spurious. He rejects Leges, Epinomis, Menon, Euthydêmus, Lachês, Charmidês, Lysis, Alkibiadês I. and II., Hippias I. and II., Ion, Erastæ, Theagês, Kleitophon, Apologia, Kriton, Minos, Epistolæ—together with all the other dialogues which were rejected in antiquity by Thrasyllus. Lastly, Ast considers the Protagoras to have been composed in 408 B.C., when Plato was not more than 21 years of age—the Phædrus in 407 B.C.—the Gorgias in 404 B.C.<sup>§</sup>

His order of arrangement. He admits only fourteen dialogues as genuine, rejecting all the rest.

Socher agrees with Ast in rejecting the fundamental hypothesis of Schleiermacher—that of a preconceived scheme systematically worked out by Plato. But on many points he differs from Ast no less than from Schleiermacher. He assigns the earliest Platonic composition (which he supposes to be Theagês), to a date preceding the battle of Arginusæ, in 406 B.C., when Plato was about 22-23 years of age.<sup>h</sup> Assuming it as certain that Plato composed dialogues during the lifetime of Sokrates, he conceives that the earliest of them would naturally be the most purely Sokratic in respect of theme,—as well as the least copious, comprehensive, and ideal, in manner of handling. During the six and a half years between the battle of Arginusæ and the death of Sokrates, Socher registers the following succession of Platonic compositions:—Theagês, Lachês, Hip-

Socher agrees with Ast in denying preconceived scheme—his arrangement of the dialogues, differing from both Ast and Schleiermacher—he rejects as spurious Parmenidês, Sophistês, Politikus, Kritias, with many others.

<sup>§</sup> Ast, *Leben und Schriften Platon's*, p. 376. <sup>h</sup> Socher, *Ueber Platon's Schriften*, p. 102. These critics adopt 409 B.C. as the year of Plato's birth: I think 407 B.C. is the true year.

pias II., Alkibiadês I., Dialogus de Virtute (usually printed with the spurious, but supposed by Socher to be a sort of preparatory sketch for the Menon), Menon, Kratylus, Euthyphron. These three last he supposes to precede very shortly the death of Sokrates. After that event, and very shortly after, were composed the Apologia, Kriton, and Phædon.

These eleven dialogues fill up what Socher regards as the first period of Plato's life, ending when he was somewhat more than thirty years of age. The second period extends to the commencement of his teaching at the Academy, when about 41 or 42 years old (B.C. 386). In this second period were composed Ion, Euthydêmus, Hippias I., Protagoras, Theætêtus, Gorgias, Philêbus—in the order here set forth. During the third period of Plato's life, continuing until he was 65 or more, he composed Phædrus, Menexenus, Symposium, Republic, Timæus. To the fourth and last period, that of extreme old age, belongs the composition of the Leges.<sup>i</sup>

Socher rejects as spurious—Hipparchus, Minos, Kleitophon, Alkibiadês II., Erastæ, Epinomis, Epistolæ, Parmenidês, Sophistês, Politikus, Kritias: also Charmidês, and Lysis, these two last however not quite so decisively.

Both Ast and Schleiermacher consider Phædrus and Protagoras as among the earliest compositions of Plato. Herein Socher dissents from them. He puts Protagoras into the second period, and Phædrus into the third. But the most peculiar feature in his theory is, that he rejects as spurious Parmenidês, Sophistês, Politikus, Kritias.

From Schleiermacher, Ast, and Socher, we pass to K. F. Hermann<sup>k</sup>—and to Stallbaum, who has prefixed Prolegomena to his edition of each dialogue. Both these critics protest against Socher's rejection of the four dialogues last indicated: but they agree with Socher and Ast in denying the reality of any preconceived system, present to Plato's mind in his

<sup>i</sup> Socher, Ueber Platon's Schriften, pp. 301-459-460.

<sup>k</sup> K. F. Hermann, Geschichte und System der Platonischen Schriften, p.

368, seq. Stallbaum, Disputatio de Platonis Vitâ et Scriptis, prefixed to his edition of Plato's Works, p. xxxii. seq.

first dialogue, and advanced by regular steps throughout each of the succeeding dialogues. The polemical tone of K. F. Hermann against this theory, and against Schleiermacher, its author, is strenuous and even unwarrantably bitter.<sup>1</sup> Especially the position laid down by Schleiermacher—that Phædrus is the earliest of Plato's dialogues, written when he was 22 or 23 years of age, and that the general system presiding over all the future dialogues is indicated therein as even then present to his mind, afterwards to be worked out—is controverted by Hermann and Stallbaum no less than by Ast and Socher. All three concur in the tripartite distribution of the life of Plato. But Hermann thinks that Plato acquired gradually and successively, new points of view, with enlarged philosophical development: and that the dialogues as successively composed are expressions of these varying phases. Moreover, Hermann thinks that such variations in Plato's philosophy may be accounted for by external circumstances. He reckons Plato's first period as ending with the death of Sokrates, or rather at an epoch not long after the death of Sokrates: the second, as ending with the commencement of Plato's teaching at the Academy, after his return from Sicily—about 385 B.C.: the third, as extending from thence to his old age. To the first, or Sokratic stadium,

system—their arrangements of the dialogues—they admit new and varying philosophical points of view.

<sup>1</sup> Ueberweg (Untersuchung über die Zeitfolge der Platonischen Schriften, Wien, 1861, pp. 50-52) has collected several citations from K. F. Hermann, in which the latter treats Schleiermacher "wie einen Sophisten, der sich in absichtlicher Unwahrhaftigkeit gefalle, mitunter fast als einen Mann, der innerlich wohl wisse, wie die Sache stehe (nämlich, dass sie so sei, wie Hermann lehrt), der sich aber, etwa aus Lust, seine überlegene Dialektik zu beweisen, Mühe gebe, sie in einem anderen Lichte erscheinen zu lassen; also—τὸν ἤττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν—recht in rhetorisch sophistischer Manier."

We know well, from other and independent evidence, what Schleiermacher really was,—that he was not only one of the most accomplished scholars, but one of the most liberal and estimable men of his age. But how different would be our appreciation if we had

no other evidence to judge by except the dicta of opponents, and even distinguished opponents, like Hermann! If there be any point clear in the history of philosophy, it is the uncertainty of all judgments, respecting writers and thinkers, founded upon the mere allegations of opponents. Yet the Athenian Sophists, respecting whom we have no independent evidence (except the general fact that they had a number of approvers and admirers<sup>1</sup>), are depicted confidently by the Platonic critics in the darkest colours, upon the evidence of their bitter opponent Plato—and in colours darker than even his evidence warrants. The often-repeated calumny, charged against almost all debaters—τὸ τὸν ἤττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν—by Hermann against Schleiermacher, by Melétus against Sokrates, by Plato against the Sophists—is believed only against these last.

Hermann assigns the smaller dialogues: the earliest of which he declares to be—Hippias II., Ion, Alkibiadès I., Lysis, Charmidès, Lachès: after which come Protagoras and Euthydémus, wherein the batteries are opened against the Sophists, shortly before the death of Sokrates. Immediately after the last mentioned event, come a series of dialogues reflecting the strong and fresh impression left by it upon Plato's mind—Apologia, Kriton, Gorgias, Euthyphron, Menon, Hippias I.—occupying a sort of transition stage between the first and the second period. We now enter upon the second or dialectic period; passed by Plato greatly at Megara, and influenced by the philosophical intercourse which he there enjoyed, and characterised by the composition of Theætétus, Kratylus, Sophistès, Politikus, Parmenidès.<sup>m</sup> To the third, or constructive period, greatly determined by the influence of the Pythagorean philosophy, belong Phædrus, Menexenus, Symposium, Phædon, Philébus, Republic, Timæus, Kritias: a series composed during Plato's teaching at the Academy, and commencing with Phædrus, which last Hermann considers to be a sort of (Antritts-Programme) inaugural composition for the opening of his school of oral discourse or colloquy. Lastly, during the final years of the philosopher, after all the three periods, come the Leges or treatise de Legibus: placed by itself as the composition of his old age.

Hermann and Stallbaum reject (besides the dialogues already rejected by Thrasyllus) Alkibiadès II., Theagès,

<sup>m</sup> K. F. Hermann, *ibid.* p. 496, seq. Stallbaum (p. xxxiii.) places the Kratylus during the lifetime of Sokrates, a little earlier than Euthydémus and Protagoras, all three of which he assigns to Olymp. 94, 402-400 B.C. See also his Prolegomena to Kratylus, tom. v. p. 26.

Moreover, Stallbaum places the Menon and Ion about the same time—a few months or weeks before the trial of Sokrates (Proleg. ad Menonem, tom. vi. pp. 20, 21; Proleg. ad Ionem, tom. iv. p. 289). He considers the Euthyphron to have been actually composed at the moment to which it professes to refer (*viz.*, after Melétus had preferred his indictment against Sokrates), and with a view of defending Sokrates against the charge of impiety (Proleg. ad Euthyphron.

tom. vi. pp. 138-139-142). He places the composition of the Charmidès about six years before the death of Sokrates (Proleg. ad Charm. p. 86). He seems to consider, indeed, that the Menon and Euthydémus were both written for the purpose of defending Sokrates: thus implying that they too were written *after* the indictment was preferred (Proleg. ad Euthyphron. p. 145).

In regard to the date of the Euthyphron, Schleiermacher also had declared, prior to Stallbaum, that it was *unquestionably* (*unstreitig*) composed at a period between the indictment and the trial of Sokrates (Einleitung zum Euthyphron, vol. ii. p. 53, of his translation of Plato).

Erastæ, Hipparchus, Minos, Epinomis; Stallbaum rejects the Kleitophon: Hermann hesitates, and is somewhat inclined to admit it, as he also admits, to a considerable extent, the Epistles.<sup>n</sup>

Steinhart, in his notes and prefaces to H. Müller's translation of the Platonic dialogues, agrees in the main with K. F. Hermann, both in denying the fundamental postulate of Schleiermacher, and in settling the general order of the dialogues, though with some difference as to individual dialogues. He considers Ion as the earliest, followed by Hippias I., Hippias II., Alkibiadês I., Lysis, Charmidês, Lachês, Protagoras. These constitute what Steinhart calls

They reject several dialogues.

Steinhart—agrees in rejecting Schleiermacher's fundamental postulate—his arrangement of the dialogues—considers the Phædrus as late in order—rejects several.

the ethico-Sokratical series of Plato's compositions, having the common attributes—That they do not step materially beyond the philosophical range of Sokrates himself—That there is a preponderance of the mimic and plastic element—That they end, to all appearance, with unsolved doubts and unanswered questions.<sup>o</sup> He supposes the Charmidês to have been composed during the time of the Thirty, the Lachês shortly afterwards, and the Protagoras about two years before the death of Sokrates. He lays it down as incontestable that the Protagoras was not composed after the death of Sokrates.<sup>p</sup> Immediately prior to this last-mentioned event, and posterior to the Protagoras, he places the Euthydêmus, Menon, Euthyphron, Apologia, Kriton, Gorgias, Kratylyus: preparatory to the dialectic series consisting of Parmenidês, Theætetus, Sophistês, Politikus, the result of Plato's stay at Megara, and contact with the Eleatic and Megaric philosophers. The third series of dialogues, the mature and finished productions of Plato at the Academy, opens with Phædrus. Steinhart rejects as spurious Alkibiadês II., Erastæ, Theagês, &c.

Another author, also, Susemihl, coincides in the main with the principles of arrangement adopted by K. F. Hermann for the Platonic dialogues. First in the order of chrono-

<sup>n</sup> Stallbaum, p. xxxiv.; Hermann, pp. 424, 425.

<sup>o</sup> See Steinhart's Prolegomena to the Protagoras, vol. i. p. 430, of Müller's

translation of Plato.

<sup>p</sup> Steinhart, Prolegg. to Charmidês, p. 295.



logical composition he places the shorter dialogues — the Susemihl— exclusively ethical, least systematic; and he ranges coincides to a great degree with K. F. Hermann— his order of arrangement. them in a series, indicating the progressive development of Plato's mind, with approach towards his final systematic conceptions.<sup>a</sup> Susemihl begins this early series with *Hippias II.*, followed by *Lysis*, *Charmidês*, *Lachês*, *Protagoras*, *Menon*, *Apologia*, *Kriton*, *Gorgias*, *Euthyphron*. The seven first, ending with the *Menon*, he conceives to have been published successively during the lifetime of Sokrates: the *Menon* itself, during the interval between his indictment and his death:† the *Apologia* and *Kriton*, very shortly after his death; followed, at no long interval, by *Gorgias* and *Euthyphron*.<sup>b</sup> The *Ion* and *Alkibiadês I.* are placed by Susemihl among the earliest of the Platonic compositions, but as not belonging to the regular series. He supposes them to have been called forth by some special situation, like *Apologia* and *Kriton*, if indeed they be Platonic at all, of which he does not feel assured.‡

Immediately after *Euthyphron*, Susemihl places *Euthydêmus*, which he treats as the commencement of a second series of dialogues: the first series, or ethical, being now followed by the dialectic, in which the principles, process, and certainty of cognition are discussed, though in an indirect and preparatory way. This second series consists of *Euthydêmus*, *Kratylus*, *Theætêtus*, *Phædrus*, *Sophistês*, *Politikus*, *Parmenidês*, *Symposion*, *Phædon*. Through all these dialogues Susemihl professes to trace a thread of connection, each successively unfolding and determining more of the general subject: but all in an indirect, negative, roundabout manner. Allowing for this manner, Susemihl contends that the dialectical counter-demonstrations or Antinomies, occupying the last half of the *Parmenidês*, include the solution of those difficulties, which have come forward in various forms from the *Euthydêmus* up to the *Sophistês*, against Plato's theory of Ideas.<sup>c</sup> The *Phædon* closes the series of

<sup>a</sup> Susemihl, *Die Genetische Entwicklung der Platonischen Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1855, p. 9.

<sup>b</sup> Susemihl, *ibid.* pp. 40-61-89.

<sup>c</sup> Susemihl, *ib.* pp. 113-125.

<sup>d</sup> Susemihl, *ib.* p. 9.

<sup>e</sup> Susemihl, *ib.* p. 355, seq.

dialectic compositions, and opens the way to the constructive dialogues following, partly ethical, partly physical—Philébus, Republic, Timæus, Kritias.\* The Leges come last of all.

A more recent critic, Dr. Edward Munk, has broached a new and very different theory as to the natural order of the Platonic dialogues. Upon his theory, they were intended by Plato<sup>y</sup> to depict the life and working of a philosopher, in successive dramatic exhibitions, from youth to old age. The different moments in the life of Sokrates, indicated in each dialogue, mark the place which Plato intended it to occupy in the series. The Parmenidês is the first, wherein Sokrates is introduced as a young man, initiated into philosophy by the ancient Parmenidês: the Phædon is last, describing as it does the closing scene of Sokrates. Plato meant his dialogues to be looked at partly in artistic sequence, as a succession of historical dramas—partly in philosophical sequence, as a record of the progressive development of his own doctrine: the two principles are made to harmonise in the main, though sometimes the artistic sequence is obscured for the purpose of bringing out the philosophical, sometimes the latter is partially sacrificed to the former.<sup>z</sup> Taken in the aggregate, the dialogues from Parmenidês to Phædon form a Socratic cycle, analogous to the historical plays of Shakespeare, from King John to Henry VIII.<sup>a</sup> But Munk at the same time contends that this natural order of the dialogues—or the order in which Plato intended them to be viewed—is not to be confounded with the chronological order of their composition.<sup>b</sup> The Parmenidês, though constituting the opening Prologue of the whole cycle, was not composed first: nor the Phædon last. All of them were probably composed after Plato had attained the full maturity of his philosophy: that is, probably after the opening of his

Edward Munk—adopts a different principle of arrangement, founded upon the different period which each dialogue exhibits of the life, philosophical growth, and old age, of Sokrates—his arrangement, founded on this principle. He distinguishes the chronological order of composition from the place allotted to each dialogue in the systematic plan.

\* Susemihl, pp. 466-470. The first volume of Susemihl's work ends with the Phædon.

<sup>y</sup> Dr. Edward Munk. Die natürliche Ordnung der Platonischen Schriften

dargestellt, Berlin, 1857. His scheme of arrangement is explained generally, pp. 25-48, &c.

<sup>z</sup> Munk, ib. p. 29. \* Munk, ib. p. 27.

<sup>b</sup> Munk, *ibid.* p. 27.

school at the Academy in 386 B.C. But in composing each, he had always two objects jointly in view: he adapted the tone of each to the age and situation in which he wished to depict Sokrates:<sup>c</sup> he commemorated, in each, one of the past phases of his own philosophising mind.

The Cycle taken in its intentional or natural order, is distributed by Munk into three groups, after the *Parmenidês* as general prologue.<sup>d</sup>

1. Sokratic or Indirect Dialogues.—*Protagoras*, *Charmidês*, *Lachês*, *Gorgias*, *Ion*, *Hippias I.*, *Kratylus*, *Euthydêmus*, *Symposium*.

2. Direct or Constructive Dialogues.—*Phædrus*, *Philêbus*, *Republic*, *Timæus*, *Kritias*.

3. Dialectic and Apologetic Dialogues.—*Menon*, *Theætêtus*, *Sophistês*, *Politikus*, *Euthyphron*, *Apologia*, *Kriton*, *Phædon*.

The *Leges* and *Menexenus* stand apart from the Cycle, as compositions on special occasion. *Alkibiadês I.*, *Hippias II.*, *Lysis*, are also placed apart from the Cycle, as compositions of Plato's earlier years, before he had conceived the general scheme of it.<sup>e</sup>

The first of the three groups depicts Sokrates in the full vigour of life, about 35 years of age: the second represents him an elderly man, about 60: the third, immediately prior to his death.<sup>f</sup> In the first group he is represented as a combatant for truth: in the second, as a teacher of truth: in the third, as a martyr for truth.<sup>g</sup>

Lastly, we have another German author still more recent, Frederick Ueberweg, who has again investigated the order and authenticity of the Platonic dialogues, in a work of great care and ability: reviewing the theories of his predecessors, as well as proposing various modifications of his own.<sup>h</sup> Ueberweg compares the different opinions of Schleiermacher and K. F. Hermann, and admits both of them to a certain extent, each concurrent with and limiting the

Views of Ueberweg—attempt to reconcile Schleiermacher and Hermann—admits the preconceived purpose for the later dialogues, composed after the foundation of

<sup>c</sup> Munk, *ib.* p. 54; Preface, p. viii.

<sup>d</sup> Munk, *ib.* p. 50.

<sup>e</sup> Munk, *ib.* pp. 25-34.

<sup>f</sup> Munk, *ib.* p. 26.

<sup>g</sup> Munk, *ib.* p. 31.

<sup>h</sup> *Untersuchungen über die Echtheit und Zeitfolge Platonischer Schriften, und über die Hauptmomente aus Platon's Leben, von Dr. Friedrich Ueberweg, Wien, 1861.*

other.<sup>i</sup> The theory of a preconceived system and methodical series, proposed by Schleiermacher, takes its departure from the Phædrus, and postulates as an essential condition that that dialogue shall be recognised as the earliest composition.<sup>k</sup> This condition Ueberweg does not admit. He agrees with Hermann, Stallbaum, and others, in referring the Phædrus to a later date (about 386 B.C.), shortly after Plato had established his school in Athens, when he was rather above forty years of age. At this period (Ueberweg thinks) Plato may be considered as having acquired methodical views which had not been present to him before; and the dialogues composed after the Phædrus follow out, to a certain extent, these methodical views. In the Phædrus the Platonic Sokrates delivers the opinion that writing is unavailing as a means of imparting philosophy: that the only way in which philosophy can be imparted is through oral colloquy adapted by the teacher to the mental necessities, and varying stages of progress, of each individual learner: and that writing can only serve, after such oral instruction has been imparted, to revive it, if forgotten, in the memory both of the teacher and of the learner who has been orally taught. For the dialogues composed after the opening of the school, and after the Phædrus, Ueberweg recognises the influence of a preconceived method and of a constant bearing on the oral teaching of the school: for those anterior to that date, he admits no such influence: he refers them (with Hermann) to successive enlargements, suggestions, inspirations, either arising in Plato's own mind, or communicated from without. Ueberweg does not indeed altogether exclude the influence of this non-methodical cause, even for the later dialogues: he allows its operation to a certain extent, in conjunction with the methodical: what he excludes is, the influence of any methodical or preconceived scheme for the earlier dialogues.<sup>l</sup> He thinks that Plato composed the later portion of his dialogues (*i. e.* those

<sup>i</sup> Ueberweg, p. 111.

<sup>k</sup> Ueberweg, pp. 23-26.

<sup>l</sup> Ueberweg, pp. 107-110-111. "Sind beide Gesichtspunkte, der einer methodischen Absicht und der einer Selbst-Entwicklung Platon's durchweg

mit einander zu verbinden, so liegt es auch in der Natur der Sache und wird auch von einigen seiner Nachfolger (insbesondere nachdrücklich von Susemihl) anerkannt, dass der erste Gesichtspunkt vorzugsweise für die spä-

subsequent to the Phædrus and to the opening of his school), not for the instruction of the general reader, but as reminders to his disciples of that which they had already learnt from oral teaching: and he cites the analogy of Paul and the apostles, who wrote epistles, not to convert the heathen, but to admonish or confirm converts already made by preaching.<sup>m</sup>

Ueberweg investigates the means which we possess, either from external testimony (especially that of Aristotle) or from internal evidence, of determining the authenticity as well as the chronological order of the dialogues. He remarks that though, in contrasting the expository dialogues with those which are simply enquiring and debating, we may presume the expository to belong to Plato's full maturity of life, and to have been preceded by some of the enquiring and debating—yet we cannot safely presume *all* these latter to be of his early composition. Plato may have continued to compose dialogues of mere search, even after the time when he began to compose expository dialogues.<sup>n</sup> Ueberweg considers that the earliest of Plato's dialogues are, Lysis, Hippias Minor, Lachês, Charmidês, Protagoras, composed during the lifetime of Sokrates: next the Apologia, and Kriton, not long after his death. All these (even the Protagoras) he reckons among the "lesser Platonic writings."<sup>o</sup> None of them allude to the Platonic Ideas or Objective Concepts. The Gorgias comes next, probably soon after the death of Sokrates, at least at some time earlier than the opening of the school in 386 B.C.<sup>p</sup> The Menon and Ion may be placed about the same general period.<sup>q</sup> The Phædrus (as has been already observed) is considered by Ueberweg to be

His opinions as to authenticity and chronology of the dialogues. He rejects Hippias Major, Erastæ, Theagês, Kleitophon, Parmenidês: he is inclined to reject Euthyphron and Menexenus.

teren Schriften von der Gründung der Schule an—der andere vorzugsweise für die früheren—gilt."

<sup>m</sup> Ueberweg, pp. 80-86. "Ist unsere obige Deutung richtig, wonach Platon nicht für Fremde zur Belehrung, sondern wesentlich für seine Schüler zur Erinnerung an den mündlichen Unterricht, schrieb (wie die Apostel nicht für Fremde zur Bekehrung, sondern für die christlichen Gemeinden zur Stärke und Läuterung, nachdem denselben der

Glaube aus der Predigt gekommen war,—so folgt, dass jede Argumentation, die auf den Phædrus gegründet wird, nur für die Zeit gelten kann, in welcher bereits die Platonische Schule bestand."

<sup>n</sup> Ueberweg, p. 81.

<sup>o</sup> Ueberweg, pp. 100-105-296. "Eine Anzahl kleinerer Platonischer Schriften."

<sup>p</sup> Ueberweg, pp. 249-267-296.

<sup>q</sup> Ueberweg, pp. 226, 227.

nearly contemporary with the opening of the school: shortly afterwards, *Symposion* and *Euthydêmus*:<sup>r</sup> at some subsequent time, *Republic*, *Timæus*, *Kritias*, and *Leges*. In regard to the four last, *Ueberweg* does not materially differ from *Schleiermacher*, *Hermann*, and other critics: but on another point he differs from them materially, viz.: that instead of placing the *Theatêtus*, *Sophistês*, and *Politikus*, in the *Megaric* period or prior to the opening of the school, he assigns them (as well as the *Phædon* and *Philêbus*) to the last twenty years of *Plato*'s life. He places *Phædon* later than *Timæus*, and *Politikus* later than *Phædon*: he considers that *Sophistês*, *Politikus*, and *Philêbus* are among the latest compositions of *Plato*.<sup>s</sup> He rejects *Hippias Major*, *Erastæ*, *Theagês*, *Kleitophon*, and *Parmenidês*: he is inclined to reject *Euthyphron*. He scarcely recognises *Menexenus*, in spite of the direct attestation of *Aristotle*, which attestation he tries (in my judgment, very unsuccessfully) to invalidate.<sup>t</sup> He recognises the *Kratylus*, but without determining its date. He determines nothing about *Alkibiadês I.* and *II.*

The works above enumerated are those chiefly deserving of notice, though there are various others also useful, amidst the abundance of recent Platonic criticism. Other Platonic critics — great dissensions about scheme and order of the dialogues. All these writers, *Schleiermacher*, *Ast*, *Socher*, *K. F. Hermann*, *Stallbaum*, *Steinhart*, *Susemihl*, *Munk*, *Ueberweg*, have not merely laid down general schemes of arrangement for the Platonic dialogues, but have gone through the dialogues seriatim, each endeavouring to show that his own scheme fits them well, and each raising objections against the schemes earlier than his own. It is indeed truly remarkable to follow the differences of opinion among these learned men, all careful students of the Platonic writings. And the number of dissents would be indefinitely multiplied, if we took into the account the various historians of philosophy during the last few years. *Ritter* and *Brandis* accept, in the main, the theory of *Schleiermacher*: *Zeller* also, to a certain extent. But each of these authors has had

<sup>r</sup> *Ueberweg*, p. 265.

<sup>s</sup> *Ueberweg*, pp. 204-292.

<sup>t</sup> *Ueberweg*, pp. 143-176-222-250.

a point of view more or less belonging to himself respecting the general scheme and purpose of Plato, and respecting the authenticity, sequence, and reciprocal illustration of the dialogues.<sup>u</sup>

By such criticisms much light has been thrown on the dialogues in detail. It is always interesting to read the different views taken by many scholars, all careful students of Plato, respecting the order and relations of the dialogues: especially as the views are not merely different but contradictory, so that the weak points of each are put before us as well as the strong. But as to the large problem which these critics have undertaken to solve—though several solutions have been proposed, in favour of which something may be urged, yet we look in vain for any solution at once sufficient as to proof and defensible against objectors.

It appears to me that the problem itself is one which admits of no solution. Schleiermacher was the first who proposed it with the large pretensions which it has since embraced, and which have been present more or less to the minds of subsequent critics, even when they differ from him. He tells us himself that he comes forward as *Restitutor Platonis*, in a character which no one had ever undertaken before.<sup>x</sup> And he might fairly have claimed that title, if he had furnished proofs at all commensurate to his professions. As his theory is confessedly novel as well as comprehensive, it required greater support in the way of evidence. But when I read the Introductions (the general as well as the special) in which such evidence ought to be found, I am amazed to find that there is little else but easy and confident assumption.

<sup>u</sup> Socher remarks (Ueber Platon, p. 225) (after enumerating twenty-two dialogues of the Thrasyllean canon, which he considers the earliest) that of these twenty-two, there are *only two* which have not been declared spurious by some one or more critics. He then proceeds to examine the remainder, among which are Sophistés, Politikus, Parmenidés. He (Socher) declares

these three last to be spurious, which no critic had declared before.

<sup>x</sup> Schleiermacher, Einleitung, pp. 22-29. "Diese natürliche Folge (der Platonischen Gespräche) wieder herzustellen, diess ist, wie jedermann sieht, eine Absicht, welche sich sehr weit entfernt von allen bisherigen Versuchen zur Anordnung der Platonischen Werke," &c.

Contrast of different points of view instructive—but no solution has been obtained.

The problem incapable of solution. Extent and novelty of the theory propounded by Schleiermacher—slenderness of his proofs.

His hypothesis is announced as if the simple announcement were sufficient to recommend it<sup>v</sup>—as if no other supposition were consistent with the recognised grandeur of Plato as a philosopher—as if any one, dissenting from it, only proved thereby that he did not understand Plato. Yet so far from being of this self-recommending character, the hypothesis is really loaded with the heaviest antecedent improbability. That in 406 B.C., and at the age of 23, in an age when schemes of philosophy elaborated in detail were unknown—Plato should conceive a vast scheme of philosophy, to be worked out underground without ever being proclaimed, through numerous Sokratic dialogues one after the other, each ushering in that which follows and each resting upon that which precedes: that he should have persisted throughout a long life in working out this scheme, adapting the sequence of his dialogues to the successive stages which he had attained, so that none of them could be properly understood unless when studied immediately after its predecessors and immediately before its successors—and yet that he should have taken no pains to impress this one peremptory arrangement on the minds of readers, and that Schleiermacher should be the first to detect it—all this appears to me as improbable as any of the mystic interpretations of Jamblichus or Proklus. Like other improbabilities, it may be proved by evidence, if evidence can be produced: but here nothing of the kind is producible. We are called upon to grant the general hypothesis without proof, and to follow Schleiermacher in applying it to the separate dialogues.

Schleiermacher's hypothesis includes two parts. 1. A premeditated philosophical scheme, worked out continuously from the first dialogue to the last. 2. A peremptory canonical order, essential to this scheme, and determined thereby. Now as to the scheme, though on the one hand it cannot be proved, yet on the other hand it cannot be disproved. But as to the canonical order, I think it may be disproved. We know

Schleiermacher's hypothesis includes a preconceived scheme, and a peremptory order of interdependence among the dialogues.

<sup>v</sup> What I say about Schleiermacher | who reads his *Einleitung*, pp. 10, 11, here will be assented to by any one | seq.



that no such order was recognised in the days of Aristophanes, and Schleiermacher himself admits that before those days it had been lost.<sup>z</sup> But I contend that if it was lost within a century after the decease of Plato, we may fairly presume that it never existed at all, as peremptory and indispensable to the understanding of what Plato meant. A great philosopher such as Plato (so Schleiermacher argues) must be supposed to have composed all his dialogues with some preconceived comprehensive scheme: but a great philosopher (we may add), if he does work upon a preconceived scheme, must surely be supposed to take some reasonable precautions to protect the order essential to that scheme from dropping out of sight. Moreover, Schleiermacher himself admits that there are various dialogues which lie apart from the canonical order and form no part of the grand premeditated scheme. The distinction here made between these outlying compositions (*Nebenwerke*) and the members of the regular series, is indeed altogether arbitrary: but the admission of it tends still farther to invalidate the fundamental postulate of a grand Demiurgic universe of dialogues, each dovetailed and fitted in to its special place among the whole. The universe is admitted to have breaks: so that the hypothesis does not possess the only merit which can belong to gratuitous hypothesis—that of introducing, if granted, complete symmetry throughout the phenomena.

To these various improbabilities we may add another—that Schleiermacher's hypothesis requires us to admit that the *Phædrus* is Plato's earliest dialogue, composed about 406 B.C., when he was 21 years of age, on my computation, and certainly not more than 23: that it is the first outburst of the inspiration which Sokrates had imparted to him,<sup>a</sup> and that it embodies, though in a dim and poetical form, the lineaments of that philosophical system which he worked out during the ensuing half century. That Plato at this early age should have conceived so vast a system

Assumptions  
of Schleier-  
macher re-  
specting the  
*Phædrus* in-  
admissible.

<sup>z</sup> Schleiermacher, *Einleitung*, p. 24.

<sup>a</sup> See Schleiermacher's *Einleitung* to the *Phædrus*: "Der Phaidros, der erste

Ausbruch seiner Begeisterung vom Sokrates."

—that he should have imbibed it from Sokrates, who enun-  
 tiated no system, and abounded in the anti-systematic nega-  
 tive—that he should have been inspired to write the Phædrus  
 (with its abundant veins, dithyrambic,<sup>b</sup> erotic, and transcen-  
 dental) by the conversation of Sokrates, which exhibited acute  
 dialectic combined with practical sagacity, but neither poetic  
 fervour nor transcendental fancy,—in all this hypothesis of  
 Schleiermacher, there is nothing but an aggravation of impro-  
 babilities.

Against such improbabilities (partly external partly in-  
 ternal) Schleiermacher has nothing to set except internal reasons: that is, when he shall have arranged the dialogues and explained the inter-  
 dependance as well as the special place of each, the arrangement will impress itself upon all as being the intentional work of Plato himself.<sup>c</sup> But these  
 “internal reasons” (innere Gründe), which are to serve as constructive evidence (in the absence of positive de-  
 clarations) of Plato’s purpose, fail to produce upon other minds the effect which Schleiermacher demands. If we follow them as stated in his Introductions (prefixed to the successive Platonic dialogues), we find a number of approximations and comparisons, often just and ingenious, but always inconclusive for his point: proving, at the very best, what Plato’s intention may possibly have been—yet subject to be countervailed by other “internal reasons” equally specious, tending to different conclusions. And the various opponents of Schleiermacher prove just as much and no more, each on behalf of his own mode of arrangement, by the like constructive evidence—appeal to “internal reasons.” But the insufficient character of these “internal reasons” is more fatal to Schleiermacher than to any of his opponents: because his fundamental hypothesis—while it is the most ambitious of all and

Neither Schleiermacher, nor any other critic, has as yet produced any tolerable proof for an internal theory of the Platonic dialogues.

<sup>b</sup> If we read Dionysius of Halikar-  
 nassus (De Admirab. Vi Dic. in De-  
 mosth. pp. 968-971, Reisk), we shall  
 find that rhetor pointing out the  
 Phædrus as a signal example of Plato’s  
 departure from the manner and cha-  
 racter of Sokrates, and as a speci-  
 men of misplaced poetical exagger-  
 ation. Dikæarchus formed the same  
 opinion about the Phædrus (Diog. L.  
 iii. 38).

<sup>c</sup> See the general Einleitung, p. 11.

would be the most important, if it could be proved—is at the same time burthened with the strongest antecedent improbability, and requires the amplest proof to make it at all admissible.

Dr. Munk undertakes the same large problem as Schleiermacher. He assumes the Platonic dialogues to have been composed upon a preconceived system, beginning when Plato opened his school, about 41 years of age. This has somewhat less antecedent improbability than the supposition that Plato conceived his system at 21 or 23 years of age. But it is just as much destitute of positive support. That Plato intended his dialogues to form a fixed series, exhibiting the successive gradations of his philosophical system—that he farther intended this series to coincide with a string of artistic portraits, representing Sokrates in the ascending march from youth to old age, so that the characteristic feature which marks the place and time of each dialogue, is to be found in the age which it assigns to Sokrates—these are positions for the proof of which we are referred to “internal reasons;” but which the dialogues themselves do not even sanction, much less suggest.

In many dialogues, the age assigned to Sokrates is a circumstance neither distinctly brought out, nor telling on the debate. It is true that in the Parmenidês he is noted as young, and is made to conduct himself with the deference of youth, receiving hints and admonitions from the respected veteran of Elea. So too in the Protagoras, he is characterised as young, but chiefly in contrast with the extreme and pronounced old age of the Sophist Protagoras: he does not conduct himself like a youth, nor exhibit any of that really youthful or deferential spirit which we find in the Parmenidês; on the contrary, he stands forward as the rival, cross-examiner, and conqueror of the ancient Sophist. On the contrary, in the Euthydêmus,<sup>d</sup> Sokrates is announced as old; though that dialogue is indisputably very analogous to the

Munk's theory is the most ambitious, and the most gratuitous, next to Schleiermacher's.

The age assigned to Sokrates in any dialogue is a circumstance of little moment.

<sup>d</sup> Euthydêmus, c. 4, p. 272.

Protagoras, both of them being placed by Munk in the earliest of his three groups. Moreover in the *Lysis* also, Sokrates appears as old;—here Munk escapes from the difficulty by setting aside the dialogue as a youthful composition, not included in the consecutive Sokratic Cycle.<sup>e</sup> What is there to justify the belief, that the Sokrates depicted in the *Phædrus* (which dialogue has been affirmed by Schleiermacher and Ast, besides some ancient critics, to exhibit decided marks of juvenility) is older than the Sokrates of the *Symposium*? or that Sokrates in the *Philêbus* and *Republic* is older than in the *Kratylus* or *Gorgias*? It is true that the dialogues *Theætêtus* and *Euthyphron* are both represented as held a little before the death of Sokrates, after the indictment of Melêtus against him had already been preferred. This is a part of the hypothetical situation, in which the dialogists are brought into company. But there is nothing in the two dialogues themselves (or in the *Menon* which Munk places in the same category) to betoken that Sokrates is old. Holiness, in the *Euthyphron*—Knowledge, in the *Theætêtus*—is canvassed and debated, just as Temperance and Courage are debated in the *Charmidês* and *Lachês*. Munk lays it down that Sokrates appears as a Martyr for Truth in the *Euthyphron*, *Menon*, and *Theætêtus*—and as a Combatant for Truth in the *Lachês*, *Charmidês*, *Euthydêmus*, &c. But the two groups of dialogues, when compared with each other, will not be found to warrant this distinctive appellation. In the *Apologia*, *Kriton*, and *Phædon*, it may be said with propriety that Sokrates is represented as a martyr for truth: in all three he appears not merely as a talker, but as a personal agent: but this is not true of the other dialogues which Munk places in his third group.

I cannot therefore accede to this “natural arrangement of the Platonic dialogues,” assumed to have been intended by Plato, and founded upon the progress of Sokrates as he stands exhibited in each, from youth to age—which Munk has proposed in his

No intentional sequence or interdependence of the dialogues can be made out.

<sup>e</sup> *Lysis*, p. 223, ad fin. Καταγέλαστοι γηγόναμεν ἐγὼ τε, γερῶν ἀνὴρ, καὶ ἑμεῖς. See Munk, p. 25.

recent ingenious volume. It is interesting to be made acquainted with that order of the Platonic dialogues which any critical student conceives to be the "natural order." But in respect to Munk as well as to Schleiermacher, I must remark that if Plato had conceived and predetermined the dialogues, so as to be read in one natural peremptory order, he would never have left that order so dubious and imperceptible, as to be first divined by critics of the nineteenth century, and understood by them too in several different ways. If there were any peremptory and intentional sequence, we may reasonably presume that Plato would have made it as clearly understood as he has determined the sequence of the ten books of his Republic.

The principle of arrangement proposed by K. F. Hermann (approved also by Steinhart and Susemihl) is not open to the same antecedent objection. Not admitting any preconceived, methodical, intentional, system, nor the maintenance of one and the same philosophical point of view throughout—Hermann supposes that the dialogues as successively composed represent successive phases of Plato's philosophical development and variations in his point of view. Hermann farther considers that these variations may be assigned and accounted for: first pure Sokratism, next the modifications experienced from Plato's intercourse with the Megaric philosophers,—then the influence derived from Kyrênê and Egypt—subsequently that from the Pythagoreans in Italy—and so forth. The first portion of this hypothesis, taken generally, is very reasonable and probable. But when, after assuming that there must have been determining changes in Plato's own mind, we proceed to inquire what these were, and whence they arose, we find a sad lack of evidence for the answer to the question. We neither know the order in which the dialogues were composed,—nor the date when Plato first began to compose,—nor the primitive philosophical mind which his earliest dialogues represented,—nor the order of those subsequent modifications which his views underwent. We are informed, indeed, that Plato went from Athens to

Principle of arrangement adopted by Hermann is reasonable—successive changes in Plato's point of view: but we cannot explain either the order or the causes of these changes.

visit Megara, Kyrênê, Egypt, Italy; but the extent or kind of influence which he experienced in each, we do not know at all.<sup>f</sup> I think it a reasonable presumption that the points which Plato had in common with Sokrates were most preponderant in the mind of Plato immediately after the death of his master: and that other trains of thought gradually became more and more intermingled as the recollection of his master became more distant. There is also a presumption that the longer, more elaborate, and more transcendental dialogues (among which must be ranked the Phædrus), were composed in the full maturity of Plato's age and intellect: the shorter and less finished may have been composed either then or earlier in his life. Here are two presumptions, plausible enough when stated generally, yet too vague to justify any special inferences: the rather, if we may believe the statement of Dionysius, that Plato continued to "comb and curl his dialogues until he was eighty years of age."<sup>g</sup>

If we compare K. F. Hermann with Schleiermacher, we see that Hermann has amended his position by abandoning Schleiermacher's gratuitous hypothesis, of a preconceived Platonic system with a canonical order of the dialogues adapted to that system—and by admitting

Hermann's  
view more  
tenable than  
Schleierma-  
cher's.

<sup>f</sup> Bonitz (in his instructive volume, *Platonische Studien*, Wien, 1858, p. 5) points out how little we know about the real circumstances of Plato's intellectual and philosophical development: a matter which most of the Platonic critics are apt to forget.

I confess that I agree with Strümpell, that it is impossible to determine chronologically, from Plato's writings, and from the other scanty evidence accessible to us, by what successive steps his mind departed from the original views and doctrines held and communicated by Sokrates (Strümpell, *Gesch. der Praktischen Philosophie der Griechen*, p. 294, Leipsic, 1861).

<sup>g</sup> Dionys. Hal. *De Comp. Verbor.* p. 208, *Diog. L.* iii. 37; *Quintilian*, viii. 6.

F. A. Wolf, in a valuable note upon the *διασκευασταί* (*Prolegom.* *Homer*, p. clii.), declares, upon this ground, that it is impossible to determine the time when Plato composed his best dialogues. "Ex his collatis apparet

*διασκευάζειν* a veteribus magistris adscitum esse in potestatem verbi *ἐπι-διασκευάζειν*: ut in Scenicis propè idem esset quod *ἀναδιδάσκειν*—h. e. repetito committere fabulam, sed mutando, addendo, detrahendo, emendatam, reficendam, et secundis curis elaboratam. Id enim facere solebant illi poetæ sæpissime: mox etiam alii, ut Apollonius Rhodius. Neque aliter Plato fecit in optimis dialogis suis: *quam ob causam exquirere non licet, quando quisque compositus sit*: quum in scenicis fabulis saltem ex didascaliiis plerumque notum sit tempus, quo editæ sunt."

Preller has a like remark (*Historia Philos. ex Fontibus Context. sect. 250*).

In regard to the habit of correcting compositions, the contrast between Plato and Plotinus was remarkable. Porphyry tells us that Plotinus, when once he had written any matter, could hardly bear even to read it over—much less to review and improve it (*Porph. Vit. Plotini*, 8).

only a chronological order of composition, each dialogue being generated by the state of Plato's mind at the time when it was composed. This, taken generally, is indisputable. If we perfectly knew Plato's biography and the circumstances around him, we should be able to determine which dialogues were first, second, and third, &c., and what circumstances or mental dispositions occasioned the successive composition of those which followed. But can we do this with our present scanty information? I think not. Hermann, while abandoning the hypothesis of Schleiermacher, has still accepted the large conditions of the problem first drawn up by Schleiermacher, and has undertaken to decide the real order of the dialogues, together with the special occasion and the phase of Platonic development, corresponding to each. Herein, I think, he has failed.

It is, indeed, natural that critics should form some impression as to earlier and later in the dialogues. But though there are some peculiar cases in which such impression acquires much force, I conceive that in almost all cases it is to a high degree uncertain. Several dialogues proclaim themselves as subsequent to the death of Sokrates. We know from internal allusions that the *Theætétus* must have been composed after 394 B.C., the *Menexenus* after 387 B.C., and the *Symposium* after 385 B.C. We are sure, by Aristotle's testimony that the *Leges* were written at a later period than the *Republic*; Plutarch also states that the *Leges* were composed during the old age of Plato, and this statement, accepted by most modern critics, appears to me trustworthy.<sup>b</sup> The *Sophistês* proclaims itself as a second meeting, by mutual agreement, of the same persons who had conversed in the *Theætétus*, with the addition of a new companion, the Eleatic stranger. But we must remark that the subject of the *Theætétus*, though left unsettled at the close of that dialogue, is not resumed in the *Sophistês*: in which last, moreover, Sokrates acts only a subordinate part, while the Eleatic stranger, who did not appear in the *Theætétus*, is here put forward as the

Small number of certainties, or even reasonable presumptions, as to date or order of the dialogues.

<sup>b</sup> Plutarch, *Isid. et Osirid.* c. 48, p. 370.

prominent questioner or expositor. So too, the *Politikus* offers itself as a third of the same triplet; with this difference, that while the Eleatic stranger continues as the questioner, a new respondent appears in the person of Sokrates Junior. The *Politikus* is not a resumption of the same subject as the *Sophistês*, but a second application of the same method (the method of logical division and subdivision) to a different subject. Plato speaks also as if he contemplated a third application of the same method—the *Philosophus*: which, so far as we know, was never realised. Again, the *Timæus* presents itself as a sequel to the *Republic*, and the *Kritias* as a sequel to the *Timæus*: a fourth, the *Hermokrates*, being apparently announced, as about to follow—but not having been composed.

Here then are two groups of three each (we might call them *Trilogies*, and if the intended fourth had been realised, *Tetralogies*), indicated by Plato himself. A certain relative chronological order is here doubtless evident: the *Sophistês* must have been composed after the *Theætétus* and before the *Politikus*, the *Timæus* after the *Republic* and before the *Kritias*. But this is all that we can infer: for it does not follow that the sequence must have been immediate in point of time: there may have been a considerable interval between the three forming the so-called *Trilogy*.<sup>1</sup> We may add, that neither in the *Theætétus* nor in

Trilogies  
indicated  
by Plato  
himself.

<sup>1</sup> It may seem singular that Schleiermacher is among those who adopt this opinion. He maintains that the *Sophistês* does not follow *immediately* upon the *Theætétus*: that Plato, though intending when he finished the *Theætétus* to proceed onward to the *Sophistês*, altered his intention, and took up other views instead: that the *Menon* (and the *Euthydêmus*) come in between them, in immediate sequel to the *Theætétus* (*Einleitung zum Menon*, vol. iii. p. 326).

Here Schleiermacher introduces a new element of uncertainty, which invalidates yet more seriously the grounds for his hypothesis of a preconceived sequence throughout all the dialogues. In a case where Plato directly inti-

mates an intentional sequence, we are called upon to believe, on "internal grounds" alone, that he altered his intention, and introduced other dialogues. He may have done this: but how are we to prove it? How much does it attenuate the value of his intentions, as proofs of an internal philosophical sequence? We become involved more and more in unsupported hypothesis. I think that K. F. Hermann's objections against Schleiermacher, on the above ground, have much force; and that Ueberweg's reply to them is unsatisfactory. (*Hermann, Gesch. und Syst. der Platon, Phil.* p. 350. Ueberweg, *Untersuchungen über die Aechtheit und Zeitf. der Plat. Schriften*, p. 82, seq.)



the Republic, do we find indication that either of them is intended as the first of a Trilogy: the marks proving an intended Trilogy are only found in the second and third of the series.

While even the relative chronology of the dialogues is thus faintly marked in the case of a few, and left to fallible conjecture in the remainder—the positive chronology, or the exact year of composition, is not directly marked in the case of any one. Moreover, at the very outset of the enquiry, we have to ask, At what period of life did Plato begin to publish his dialogues? Did he publish any of them during the lifetime of Sokrates? and if so, which? Or does the earliest of them date from a time after the death of Sokrates?

Amidst the many dissentient views of the Platonic critics, it is remarkable that they are nearly unanimous in their mode of answering this question.<sup>k</sup> Most of them declare, without hesitation, that Plato published several dialogues before the death of Sokrates—that is, before he was 28 years of age—though they do not all agree in determining, which these dialogues were. I do not perceive that they produce any external proofs of the least value. Most of them disbelieve (though Stallbaum and Hermann believe) the anecdote about Sokrates and his criticism on the dialogue Lysis.<sup>m</sup> In spite of their unanimity,

<sup>k</sup> Valentine Rose (*De Aristotelis Librorum ordine*, p. 25, Berlin, 1854), Mullach (*Democriti Fragm.* p. 99), and Schöne, in his Commentary on the Platonic Protagoras, are among the critics known to me, who intimate their belief that Plato published no Sokratic dialogues during the lifetime of Sokrates. In discussing the matter, Schöne adverts to two of the three lines of argument brought forward in my text:—1. The too early and too copious “productivity” which the received supposition would imply in Plato. 2. The improbability that the name of Sokrates would be employed in written dialogues, as spokesman, by any of his scholars during his lifetime.

Schöne does not touch upon the im-

probability of the hypothesis, arising out of the early position and aspirations of Plato himself (Schöne, *Über Platon's Protagoras*, p. 64, Leipzig, 1862).

<sup>m</sup> *Diog. Laert.* iii. 35; Stallbaum, *Prolegg. ad Plat. Lys.* p. 90; K. F. Hermann, *System der Platon. Philos.* p. 370. Schleiermacher (*Einl. zum Lysis*, i. p. 175) treats the anecdote about the Lysis as unworthy of credence. *Diogenes* (iii. 38) mentions that some considered the Phædrus as Plato's earliest dialogue; the reason being that the subject of it was something puerile: *λόγος δὲ πρῶτον γράψαι αὐτὸν τὸν Φαῖδρον· καὶ γὰρ ἔχει μειρακιωδὲς τι τὸ πρόβλημα. Δικαίαρχος δὲ καὶ τὸν πρῶτον τῆς γραφῆς ὄλον ἐπιμέμφεται ὡς φορτικόν.* Olympiodorus also in his

I cannot but adopt the opposite conclusion. It appears to me that Plato composed no Sokratic dialogues during the lifetime of Sokrates.

All the information (scanty as it is) which we obtain from the rhetor Dionysius and others respecting the composition of the Platonic dialogues, announces them to have cost much time and labour to their author: a statement illustrated by the great number of inversions of words which he is said to have introduced successively in the first sentence of the Republic, before he was satisfied to let the sentence stand. This corresponds, too, with all that we read respecting the patient assiduity both of Isokrates and Demosthenes.<sup>a</sup> A first-rate Greek composition was understood not to be purchaseable at lower cost. I confess therefore to great surprise, when I read in Ast the affirmation that the Protagoras was composed when Plato was only 22 years old—and when I find Schleiermacher asserting, as if it were a matter beyond dispute, that Protagoras, Phædrus, and Parmenidês, all bear evident marks of Plato's youthful age (Jugendlichkeit). In regard to the

Reasons for this opinion. Labour of the composition—does not consist with youth of the author.

life of Plato mentions the same report, that the Phædrus was Plato's earliest composition, and gives the same ground of belief, "its dithyrambic character." Even if the assertion were granted, that the Phædrus is the earliest Platonic composition, we could not infer that it was composed during the lifetime of Sokrates. But that assertion cannot be granted. The two statements, above cited, give it only as a report, suggested to those who believed it by the character and subject-matter of the dialogue. I am surprised that Dr. Volquardsen, who in a learned volume, recently published, has undertaken the defence of the theory of Schleiermacher about the Phædrus (Phaidros, Erste Schrift Platon's, Kiel, 1862), can represent this as a "*feste historische Ueberlieferung*"—the rather as he admits that Schleiermacher himself placed no confidence in it, and relied upon other reasons (pp. 90-92-93). Comp. Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Phaidros, p. 76.

Whoever will read the Epistle of

Dionysius of Halikarnassus, addressed to Cneius Pompeius (pp. 751-765, Reisk), will be persuaded that Dionysius can neither have known, nor even believed, that the Phædrus was the first composition, and a youthful composition, of Plato. If Dionysius had believed this, it would have furnished him with the precise excuse which his letter required. For the purpose of his letter is to mollify the displeasure of Cn. Pompey, who had written to blame him for some unfavourable criticisms on the style of Plato. Dionysius justifies his criticisms by allusions to the Phædrus. If he had been able to add, that the Phædrus was a first composition, and that Plato's later dialogues were comparatively free from the like faults—this would have been the most effective way of conciliating Cn. Pompey.

<sup>a</sup> Timæus said that Alexander the Great conquered the Persian empire in less time than Isokrates required for the composition of his panegyrical oration (Longinus, De Sublimit. c. 4).

Phædrus and Parmenidès, indeed, Hermann and other critics contest the view of Schleiermacher; and detect, in those two dialogues, not only no marks of "juvenility," but what they consider plain proofs of maturity and even of late age. But in regard to the Protagoras, most of them agree with Schleiermacher and Ast, in declaring it to be a work of Plato's youth, some time before the death of Sokrates. Now on this point I dissent from them: and since the decision turns upon "internal grounds," each must judge for himself. The Protagoras appears to me one of the most finished and elaborate of all the dialogues: in complication of scenic arrangements, dramatic vivacity, and in the amount of theory worked out, it is surpassed by none—hardly even by the Republic.<sup>o</sup> Its merits as a composition are indeed extolled by all the critics; who clap their hands, especially, at the humiliation which they believe to be brought upon the great Sophist by Sokrates. But the more striking the composition is acknowledged to be, the stronger is the presumption that its author was more than 22 or 24 years of age. Nothing short of good positive testimony would induce me to believe that such a dialogue as the Protagoras could have been composed, even by Plato, before he attained the plenitude of his powers. No such testimony is produced or producible. I extend a similar presumption even to the Lysis, Lachès, Charmidès, and other dialogues: though with a less degree of confidence, because they are shorter and less artistic, not equal to the Protagoras. All of them, in my judgment, exhibit a richness of ideas and a variety of expression, which suggest something very different from a young novice as the author.

But over and above this presumption, there are other reasons which induce me to believe, that none of the Platonic dialogues were published during the lifetime of Sokrates. My reasons are partly connected with Sokrates, partly with Plato.

First, in reference to Sokrates—we may reasonably doubt whether any written reports of his actual conversations were

<sup>o</sup> "Als aesthetisches Kunstwerk ist | haftere unter den Werken Platon's." |  
der Dialog Protagoras das meister- | (Socher, Ueber Platon. p. 226.)

published during his lifetime. He was the most constant, public, and indiscriminate of all talkers: always in some frequented place, and desiring nothing so much as a respondent with an audience. Every one who chose to hear him, might do so without payment and with the utmost facility. Why then should any one wish to read written reports of his conversations? especially when we know that the strong interest which they excited in the hearers depended much upon the spontaneity of his inspirations, and hardly less upon the singularity of his manner and physiognomy. Any written report of what he said must appear comparatively tame. Again, as to fictitious dialogues (like the Platonic) employing the name of Sokrates as spokesman—such might doubtless be published during his lifetime by derisory dramatists for the purpose of raising a laugh, but not surely by a respectful disciple and admirer for the purpose of giving utterance to doctrines of his own. The greater was the respect felt by Plato for Sokrates, the less would he be likely to take the liberty of making Sokrates responsible before the public for what Sokrates had never said.<sup>p</sup> There is a story in Diogenes—to the effect that Sokrates, when he first heard the Platonic dialogue called *Lysis*, exclaimed—“What a heap of falsehoods does the young man utter about me!”<sup>q</sup> This story merits no credence as a fact: but it expresses the displeasure which Sokrates would be likely to feel, on hearing that one of his youthful companions had dramatised him as he appears in the *Lysis*. Xenophon tells us, and it is very probable, that inaccurate oral reports of the real colloquies of Sokrates may have got into circulation. But that the friends and disciples of Sokrates, during his life-

Reasons, founded on the personality of Sokrates, and his relations with Plato.

<sup>p</sup> Valentine Rose observes, in regard to a dialogue composed by some one else, wherein Plato was introduced as one of the interlocutors, that it could not have been composed until after Plato's death, and that the dialogues of Plato were not composed until after the death of Sokrates. “Platonis autem sermones antequam mortuus fuerit, scripto neminem tradidisse, neque magistri viventis personâ in dialogis abusus fuisse (non magis quam vivum Socratem

induxerunt Xenophon, Plato, cæteri Socratici), hoc veterum mori et religioni quivis facile concedet,” &c. (V. Rose, *Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus*, pp. 57-74, Leipsic, 1863.—Val. Rose expresses the same opinion (that none of the Sokratic dialogues, either by Plato or the other companions of Sokrates, were written until after the death of Sokrates, in his earlier work, *De Aristotelis Librorum Ordine et Auctoritate*, p. 25.)

<sup>q</sup> Diog. L. iii. 35.)

time, should deliberately publish fictitious dialogues putting their own sentiments into his mouth, and thus contribute to mislead the public—is not easily credible. Still less credible is it that Plato during the lifetime of Sokrates, should have published such a dialogue as the Phædrus, wherein we find ascribed to Sokrates, poetical and dithyrambic effusions utterly at variance with the real manifestations which Athenians might hear every day from Sokrates in the market-place.\* Sokrates in the Platonic Apology, complains of the comic poet Aristophanes for misrepresenting him. Had the Platonic Phædrus been then in circulation, or any other Platonic dialogues, he might with equally good reason have warned the Dikasts against judging of him, a real citizen on trial, from the titular Sokrates whom even disciples did not scruple to employ as spokesman for their own transcendental doctrine, and their own controversial sarcasms.

Secondly, in regard to Plato, the reasons leading to the same conclusion are yet stronger. Unfortunately, we know little of the life of Plato before he attained the age of 28, that is, before the death of Sokrates: but our best means of appreciating it are derived from three sources. 1. Our knowledge of the history of Athens from 409-399 B.C., communicated by Thucydides, Xenophon, &c.

Reasons, founded on the early life, character, and position of Plato.

\* In regard to the theory (elaborated by Schleiermacher, recently again defended by Volquardsen), that the Phædrus is the earliest among the Platonic dialogues, composed about 406 B.C., it appears to me inconsistent also with what we know about Lysias. In the Platonic Phædrus, Lysias is presented as a *λογογράφος* of the highest reputation and eminence (p. 228 A, 257 D, and indeed throughout the whole dialogue). Now this is quite inconsistent with what we read from Lysias himself in the indictment which he preferred against Eratosthenes, not long after the restoration of the democracy, 403 B.C. He protests therein strenuously that he had never had judicial affairs of his own, nor meddled with those of others; and he expresses the greatest apprehension from his own *ἀπειρία* (sects. 4-6). I cannot believe

that this would be said by a person whom Phædrus terms *δεινότατος ὁ τῶν νῦν γράφειν*. Moreover, Lysias, in that same discourse, describes his own position at Athens, anterior to the Thirty: he belonged to a rich metic family, and was engaged along with his brother Polemarchus in a large manufactory of shields, employing 120 slaves (s. 20). A person thus rich and occupied was not likely to become a professed and notorious *λογογράφος*, though he may have been a clever and accomplished man. Lysias was plundered and impoverished by the Thirty; and he is said to have incurred much expense in aiding the efforts of Thrasylbulus. It was after this change of circumstances that he took to rhetoric as a profession; and it is to some one of these later years that the Platonic Phædrus refers.

2. The seventh Epistle of Plato himself, written four or five years before his death (about 352 B.C.). 3. A few hints from the Memorabilia of Xenophon.

To these evidences about the life of Plato, it has not been customary to pay much attention. The Platonic critics seem to regard Plato so entirely as a spiritual person ("like a blessed spirit, visiting earth for a short time," to cite a poetical phrase applied to him by Göthe), that they disdain to take account of his relations with the material world, or with society around him. Because his mature life was consecrated to philosophy, they presume that his youth must have been so likewise. But this is a hasty assumption. You cannot thus abstract *any* man from the social medium by which he is surrounded. The historical circumstances of Athens from Plato's nineteenth year to his twenty-sixth (409-403 B.C.) were something totally different from what they afterwards became. They were so grave and absorbing, that had he been ever so much inclined to philosophy, he would have been compelled against his will to undertake active and heavy duty as a citizen. Within those years (as I have observed in a preceding chapter) fell the closing struggles of the Peloponnesian war; in which (to repeat words already cited from Thucydides) Athens became more a military post than a city—every citizen being almost habitually under arms: then the long blockade, starvation, and capture of the city, followed by the violences of the Thirty, the armed struggle under Thrasybulus, and the perilous, though fortunately successful and equitable, renovation of the democracy. These were not times for a young citizen, of good family and robust frame, to devote himself exclusively to philosophy and composition. I confess myself surprised at the assertion of Schleiermacher and Steinhart, that Plato composed the Charmidês and other dialogues under the Anarchy.<sup>s</sup> Amidst such disquietude and

<sup>s</sup> Steinhart, Einleitung zum Laches, p. 358, where he says that Plato composed the Charmidês, Lachês, and Protagoras, all in 404 B.C. under the Thirty. Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Charmidês, vol. ii. p. 8.

The lines of Lucretius (i. 42) bear emphatically upon this trying season:

"Nam neque nos agere hoc patriâ tempore iniquo  
 Possumus æquo animo: neque Memmi clara  
 propago  
 Talibus in rebus communi deesse saluti."

perils he could not have renounced active duty for philosophy, even if he had been disposed to do so.

But, to make the case stronger, we learn from Plato's own testimony, in his seventh Epistle, that he was not at that time disposed to renounce active political life. He tells us himself, that as a young man he was exceedingly eager, like others of the same age, to meddle and distinguish himself in active politics.<sup>†</sup> How natural such eagerness was, to a young citizen of his family and condition, may be seen by the analogy of his younger brother Glaukon, who was prematurely impatient to come forward: as well as by that of his cousin Charmides, who had the same inclination, but was restrained by exaggerated diffidence of character. Now we know that the real Sokrates (very different from the Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias), did not seek to deter young men of rank from politics, and to consign them to inactive speculation. Sokrates gives<sup>‡</sup> earnest encouragement to Charmides; and he does not discourage Glaukon, but only presses him to adjourn his pretensions until the suitable stock of preliminary information has been acquired. We may thus see that assuming the young Plato to be animated with political aspirations, he would certainly not be dissuaded,—nay, he would probably be encouraged—by Sokrates.

Plato farther tells us that when (after the final capitulation of Athens) the democracy was put down and the government of the Thirty established, he embarked in it actively under the auspices of his relatives (Kritias, Charmides, &c., then in the ascendant), with the ardent hopes of youth<sup>x</sup> that he should witness and promote the accomplishment of valuable reforms. Experience showed him that he was mistaken. He

<sup>†</sup> Plato, Epist. vii. p. 324 C. *Νέος ἐγὼ τότε ἂν πολλοῖς δὴ ταῦτον ἔπαθον φήθην, εἰ θάπτον ἑμαυτοῦ κύριος γενοίμην, ἐπὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῆς πόλεως εὐθὺς ἰέναι.* Again, 325 E: *ὥστε μὲ, τὸ πρῶτον πολλῆς μεστὸν ὄντα ὀρμῆς ἐπὶ τὸ πρᾶττεν τὰ κοινά, &c.*

<sup>‡</sup> See the two interesting colloquies of Sokrates, with Glaukon and Charmides (Xenop. Mem. iii. 6-7).

Charmides was killed along with Kritias during the eight months called

The Anarchy, at the battle fought with Thrasylbulus and the democrats (Xenop. Hellen. ii. 4-19). The colloquy of Sokrates with Charmides, recorded by Xenophon in the Memorabilia, must have taken place at some time before the battle of Ægospotami: perhaps about 407 or 406 B.C.

<sup>x</sup> Plato, Epist. vii. 324 D. *Καὶ ἐγὼ θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν ἔπαθον ὑπὸ νεότητος, &c.*

became disgusted with the enormities of the Thirty, especially with their treatment of Sokrates; and he then ceased to co-operate with them. Again, after the year called the Anarchy, the democracy was restored, and Plato's political aspirations revived along with it. He again put himself forward for active public life, though with less ardent hopes.<sup>7</sup> But he became dissatisfied with the march of affairs, and his relationship with the deceased Kritias was now a formidable obstacle to popularity. At length, four years after the restoration of the democracy, came the trial and condemnation of Sokrates. It was that event which finally shocked and disgusted Plato, converting his previous dissatisfaction into an utter despair of obtaining any good results from existing governments. From thenceforward, he turned away from practice and threw himself into speculation.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Plato, *Epistol.* vii. 325 A. Πάλιν δὲ βραδύτερον μὲν, εἴλικε δὲ με ὅμως, ἢ περὶ τὸ πράττειν τὰ κοινὰ καὶ πολιτικὰ ἐπιθυμία.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, *Epist.* vii. 325 B. Σκοποῦντι δὴ μοι ταῦτά τε καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πολιτικά, &c. 325 E. Καὶ τοῦ μὲν σκοπεῖν μὴ ἀποστήναι, πῆ ποτὲ ἄμεινον ἂν γίγνοιτο περὶ τε αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ περὶ τὴν πᾶσαν πόλιν· τοῦ δὲ πράττειν αὐτὸ περιμένειν ἅε καιροῦς, τελευτῶντα δὲ νοῆσαι περὶ πασῶν τῶν νῦν πόλεων ὅτι κακῶς ἐύμπασαι πολιτεύονται.

I have already stated in the 84th chapter of my History, describing the visit of Plato to Dionysius in Sicily, that I believe the *Epistles* of Plato to be genuine, and that the seventh *Epistle* especially contains valuable information. Some critics undoubtedly are of a different opinion, and consider them as spurious. But even among these critics, several consider that the author of the *Epistles*, though not Plato himself, was a contemporary and well informed: so that his evidence is trustworthy. See K. F. Hermann, *Gesammelt. Abhandlungen*, pp. 282-283. The question has been again discussed recently by Ueberweg (*Untersuch. über die Zeitfolge der Platon. Schriften*, pp. 120-123-125-129), who gives his own opinion that the letters are not by Plato, and produces various arguments

to the point. His arguments are noway convincing to me: for the mysticism and pedantry of the *Epistles* appear to me in full harmony with the *Timæus* and *Leges*, and with the Pythagorean bias of Plato's later years, though not in harmony with the *Protagoras*, and various other dialogues. Yet Ueberweg also declares his full belief that the seventh *Epistle* is the composition of a well-informed contemporary, and perfectly worthy of credit as to the facts; and K. F. Hermann declares the same! This is enough for my present purpose.

The statement, trusted by all the critics, that Plato's first visit to Syracuse was made when he was about 40 years of age, depends altogether on the assertion of the seventh *Epistle*. How numerous are the assertions made by Platonic critics respecting Plato, upon evidence far slighter than that of these *Epistles*! Boeckh considers the seventh *Epistle* as the genuine work of Plato. Valentine Rose also pronounces it to be genuine, though he does not consider the other *Epistles* to be so (*De Aristotelis Librorum Ordine*, p. 25, p. 114, Berlin, 1854). Tennemann admits the *Epistles* generally to be genuine (*System der Platon. Philos.* i. p. 106).

It is undeniable that these *Epistles* of Plato were recognised as genuine and trusted by all the critics of antiquity from Aristophanes downwards.



This very natural recital, wherein Plato (at the age of 75) describes his own youth between 21 and 28—taken in conjunction with the other reasons just enumerated—impresses upon me the persuasion, that Plato did not devote himself to philosophy, nor publish any of his dialogues, before the death of Sokrates: though he may probably have composed dramas, and the beautiful epigrams which Diogenes has preserved. He at first frequented the society of Sokrates, as many other aspiring young men frequented it (likewise that of Kratylus, and perhaps that of various Sophists<sup>a</sup>), from love of ethical debate, admiration of dialectic power, and desire to acquire a facility of the same kind in his own speech: not with any view to take up philosophy as a profession, or to undertake the task either of demolishing or constructing in the region of speculation. No such resolution was adopted until after he had tried political life and had been disappointed:—nor until such disappointment had been still more bitterly aggravated by the condemnation of Sokrates. It was under this feeling that Plato first consecrated himself to that work of philosophical meditation and authorship,—of inquisitive travel and converse with philosophers abroad,—and ultimately of teaching in the Academy—which filled up the remaining fifty years of his life. The death of Sokrates left that venerated name open to be employed as spokesman in his dialogues: and there was nothing in the political condition of Athens after 399 B.C., analogous to the severe and perilous struggle which tasked all the energies of her citizens from 409 B.C. down to the close of the war.

I believe, on these grounds, that Plato did not publish any dialogues during the life of Sokrates. An interval of fifty-

Cicero, Plutarch, Aristeides, &c., assert facts upon the authority of the Epistles. Those who declare the Epistles to be spurious and worthless, ought in consistency to reject the statements which Plutarch makes on the authority of the Epistles: they will find themselves compelled to discredit some of the best parts of his life of Dion. Compare

Aristeides, *Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς* Or. 45, pp. 90-106, Dindorf.

<sup>a</sup> Compare Plat. *Protagoras*, 312 A, 315 A, where the distinction is pointedly drawn between one who visited Protagoras ἐπὶ τέχνην, ὡς δημιουργὸς ἐσόμενος, and others who came simply ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ, ὡς τὴν ιδιώτην καὶ ἐλεύθερον πρέπει.

one year separates the death of Sokrates from that of Plato. Such an interval is more than sufficient for all the existing dialogues of Plato, without the necessity of going back to a more youthful period of his age. As to distribution of the dialogues, earlier or later, among these fifty-one years, we have little or no means of judging. Plato has kept out of sight—with a degree of completeness which is really surprising—not merely his own personality, but also the marks of special date and the determining circumstances in which each dialogue was composed. Twice only does he mention his own name, and that simply in passing, as if it were the name of a third person.<sup>b</sup> As to the point of time to which he himself assigns each dialogue, much discussion has been held how far Plato has departed from chronological or historical possibility: how far he has brought persons together in Athens who never could have been there together, or has made them allude to events posterior to their own decease. A speaker in Athenæus<sup>c</sup> dwells, with needless acrimony, on the anachronisms of Plato, as if they were gross faults. Whether they are faults or not, may fairly be doubted: but the fact of such anachronisms cannot be doubted, when we have before us the Menæxenus and the Symposium. It cannot be supposed, in the face of such evidence, that Plato took much pains to keep clear of anachronisms: and whether they be rather more or rather less numerous, is a question of no great moment.

All Plato's dialogues were composed during the fifty-one years after the death of Sokrates.

<sup>b</sup> In the Apologia, c. 28, p. 38, Sokrates alludes to Plato as present in court, and as offering to become guarantee, along with others, for his fine. In the Phædon, Plato is mentioned as being sick; to explain why he was not present at the last scene of Sokrates (Phædon, p. 59). Diog. L. iii. 37.

The pathos as well as the detail of the narrative in the Phædon makes one imagine that Plato really was present at the scene. But being obliged, by the uniform scheme of his compositions, to provide another narrator, he could not suffer it to be supposed that he was himself present.

I have already remarked, that this

mention of Plato in the third person (Πλάτων δὲ, ὄμαι, ἡσθέρει) was probably one of the reasons which induced Pannætius to declare the Phædon *not* to be the work of Plato.

<sup>c</sup> Athenæus, v. pp. 220, 221. Didymus also attacked Plato as departing from historical truth—ἐπιφύβμενος τῷ Πλάτωνι ὡς παριστοροῦντι—against which the scholiast (ad Leges, i. p. 630) defends him. Groen van Prinsteren, Protopogr. p. 16. The rhetor Aristides has some remarks of the same kind, though less acrimonious (Orat. xlvii. p. 435, Dind.) than the speaker in Athenæus.

I now conclude my enquiry respecting the Platonic Canon. The presumption in favour of that Canon, as laid down by Thrasyllus, is stronger (as I showed in the preceding Chapter) than it is in regard to ancient authors generally of the same age: being traceable, in the last result, through the Alexandrine Museum, to authenticating manuscripts in the Platonic school, and to members of that school who had known and cherished Plato himself.<sup>d</sup> I have reviewed the doctrines of several recent critics who discard this Canon as unworthy of trust, and who set up for themselves a type of what Plato *must have* been, derived from a certain number of items in the Canon—rejecting the remaining items as unbecomable to their hypothetical type. The different theories which they have laid down, respecting general and systematic purposes of Plato (apart from the purpose of each separate composition), appear to me uncertified and gratuitous. The “internal reasons,” upon which they justify rejection of various dialogues, are only another phrase for expressing their own different theories respecting Plato as a philosopher and as a writer. For my part, I decline to discard any item of the Thrasylllean Canon, upon such evidence as they produce: I think it a safer and more philosophical proceeding to accept the entire Canon, and to accommodate my general theory of Plato (in so far as I am able to frame one) to each and all of its contents.

Considering that Plato’s period of philosophical composition extended over fifty years, and that the circumstances of his life are most imperfectly known to us—it is surely hazardous to limit the range of his varieties, on the faith of a critical repugnance, not merely subjective and fallible, but withal entirely of modern growth: to assume, as basis of reasoning, the admiration raised by a

Unsafe grounds upon which those theories proceed.

<sup>d</sup> I find this position distinctly asserted, and the authority of the Thrasylllean catalogue, as certifying the genuine works of Plato, vindicated, by Yxem, in his able dissertation on the Kleitophon of Plato (pp. 1-3, Berlin, 1846). But Yxem does not set forth the grounds of this opinion so fully as the present state of the question demands. Moreover, he combines it with another opinion, upon which he insists even at greater length, and from which I altogether dissent—that the tetralogies of Thrasyllus exhibit the genuine order established by Plato himself among the Dialogues.

few of the finest dialogues—and then to argue that no composition inferior to this admired type, or unlike to it in doctrine or handling, can possibly be the work of Plato. “The *Minos*, *Theagês*, *Epistolæ*, *Epinomis*, &c., are unworthy of Plato: nothing so inferior in excellence can have been composed by him. No dialogue can be admitted as genuine which contradicts another dialogue, or which advocates any low or incorrect or un-Platonic doctrine. No dialogue can pass which is adverse to the general purpose of Plato as an improver of morality, and a teacher of the doctrine of Ideas.” On such grounds as these we are called upon to reject various dialogues: and there is nothing upon which, generally speaking, so much stress is laid as upon inferior excellence. For my part, I cannot recognise any of them as sufficient grounds of exception. I have no difficulty in believing, not merely that Plato (like *Aristophanes*) produced many successive novelties, “not at all similar one to the other, and all clever”<sup>e</sup>—but also that among these novelties, there were inferior dialogues as well as superior: that in different dialogues he worked out different, even contradictory, points of view—and among them some which critics declare to be low and objectionable: that we have among his works unfinished fragments and abandoned sketches, published without order, and perhaps only after his death.

It may appear strange, but it is true, that *Schleiermacher*, the leading champion of Plato’s central purpose and systematic unity from the beginning, lays down a doctrine to the same effect. He says, “Truly, nothing can be more preposterous, than when people demand that all the works even of a great master shall be of equal perfection—or that such as are not equal, shall be regarded as not composed by him.” *Zeller* expresses himself in the same manner, and with as little reserve.<sup>f</sup> These emi-

<sup>e</sup> *Aristophan. Nubes*, 539.  
 Ἄλλ’ αἰεὶ καινὰς ἰδέας εἰσφέρων σοφίζομαι,  
 οὐδὲν ἀλλήλοισιν ὁμοίας, καὶ πάσας δεξίας.

<sup>f</sup> *Schleiermacher*, *Einleitung zum Menon*, vol. iii. p. 337. “Und wahrlich, nichts ist wohl wunderlicher, als wenn

man verlangt, dass alle Werke auch eines grossen Meisters von gleicher Vollkommenheit seyn sollten—oder die es nicht sind, soll er nicht verfertigt haben.”

Compare *Zeller*, *Geschichte der Phi-*

nent critics here proclaim a general rule which neither they nor others follow out.

I find elsewhere in Schleiermacher, another opinion, not less important, in reference to disallowance of dialogues, on purely internal grounds. Take the Gorgias and the Protagoras: both these two dialogues are among the most renowned of the catalogue: both have escaped all suspicion as to legitimacy, even from Ast and Socher, the two boldest of all disfranchising critics. In the Protagoras, Sokrates maintains an elaborate argument to prove, against the unwilling Protagoras, that the Good is identical with the Pleasurable, and the Evil identical with the Painful: in the Gorgias, Sokrates holds an argument equally elaborate, to show that Good is essentially different from Pleasurable, Evil from Painful. What the one affirms, the other denies. Moreover, Schleiermacher himself characterises the thesis vindicated by Sokrates in the Protagoras, as

losophie der Griechen, vol. ii. p. 322, cd. 2nd.

It is to be remembered that this opinion of Schleiermacher refers only to *completed works* of the same master. You are not authorised in rejecting any completed work as spurious, on the ground that it is not equal in merit to some other. Still less, then, are you authorised in rejecting, on the like ground, an uncompleted work—a professed fragment, or a preliminary sketch. Of this nature are several of the minor items in the Thrasyllean canon.

M. Boeckh, in his Commentary on the dialogue called Minos, has assigned the reasons which induce him to throw out that dialogue, together with the Hipparchus, from the genuine works of Plato (and farther to consider both of them, and the pseudo-Platonic dialogues De Justo and De Virtute, as works of Σίμων ὁ σκυρεύς: with this latter hypothesis I have here no concern). He admits fully that the Minos is of the Platonic age and irreproachable in style—"veteris esse et Attici scriptoris, probus sermo, antiqui mores, totus denique character, spondent" (p. 32). Next, he not only admits that it is like Plato, but urges the *too great likeness* to Plato as one of the points of his case. He says that it is a bad, stupid, and unskilful imitation of dif-

ferent Platonic dialogues: "Pergamus ad alteram partem nostræ argumentationis, eamque etiam firmiorem, de *nimiâ similitudine* Platoniorum aliquid locorum. Nam de hoc quidem conveniet inter omnes doctos et indoctos, Platonem se ipsum haud posse imitari: ni forté quis dubitet de sanâ cjus mente" (p. 23). In the sense which Boeckh intends, I agree that Plato did not imitate himself; in another sense, I think that he did. I mean that his consummate compositions were preceded by shorter, partial, incomplete sketches, which he afterwards worked up, improved, and remodelled. I do not understand how Plato could have composed such works as Republic, Protagoras, Gorgias, Symposium, Phædrus, Phædon, &c., without having before him many of these preparatory sketches. That some of these sketches should have been preserved is what we might naturally expect; and I believe Minos and Hipparchus to be among them. I do not wonder that they are of inferior merit. One point on which Boeckh (pp. 7, 8) contends that Hipparchus and Minos are unlike to Plato is, that the *collocutor* with Sokrates is anonymous. But we find anonymous talkers in the Protagoras, Sophistês, Politikus, and Leges.

“entirely un-Socratic and un-Platonic.”<sup>g</sup> If internal grounds of repudiation are held to be available against the Thrasylllean canon, how can such grounds exist in greater force than those which are here admitted to bear against the Protagoras—That it exhibits Sokrates as contradicting the Sokrates of the Gorgias—That it exhibits him farther as advancing and proving, at great length, a thesis “entirely un-Socratic and un-Platonic”? Since the critics all concur in disregarding these internal objections, as insufficient to raise even a suspicion against the Protagoras, I cannot concur with them when they urge the like objections as valid and irresistible against other dialogues.

I may add, as farther illustrating this point, that there are few dialogues in the list against which stronger objections on internal grounds can be brought, than *Leges* and *Menexenus*. Yet both of them stand authenticated, beyond all reasonable dispute, as genuine works of Plato, not merely by the Canon of Thrasyllus, but also by the testimony of Aristotle.<sup>h</sup>

<sup>g</sup> Schleiermacher, *Einleitung zum Protagoras*, vol. i. p. 232. “Jene ganz unsokratische und unplatonische Ansicht, dass das Gute nichts anderes ist als das Angenehme.”

So also, in the *Parmenides*, we find a host of unsolved objections against the doctrine of Ideas, upon which in other dialogues Plato so emphatically insists. Accordingly, Socher, resting upon this discrepancy as an “internal ground,” declares the *Parmenides* not to be the work of Plato. But the other critics refuse to go along with this inference. I think they are right in so refusing. But this only shows how little such internal grounds are to be trusted, as evidence to prove spuriousness.

<sup>h</sup> See Ast, *Platon's Leben und Schriften*, p. 384; and still more, Zeller, *Platonische Studien*, pp. 1-131, Tübingen, 1839. In that treatise, where Zeller has set forth powerfully the grounds for denying the genuineness of the *Leges*, he relied so much upon the strength of this negative case, as to discredit the direct testimony of Aristotle affirming the *Leges* to be genuine. In his *History of Philosophy*,

Zeller altered this opinion, and admitted the *Leges* to be genuine.

Suckow mentions (*Form der Platonischen Schriften*, 1855, p. 135) that Zeller has in a subsequent work reverted to his former opinion, denying the genuineness of the *Leges*. Suckow himself denies it also; relying not merely on the internal objections against it, but also on a passage of *Isokrates* (ad *Philippum*, p. 84), which he considers to sanction his opinion, but which (in my judgment) entirely fails to bear him out.

Suckow attempts to show (p. 55), and Ueberweg partly countenances the same opinion, that the two passages in which Aristotle alludes to the *Menexenus* (*Rhetoric*, i. 9, iii. 14) do not prove that he (Aristotle) considered it as a work of Plato, because he mentions the name of Sokrates only, and not that of Plato. But this is to require from a witness such precise specification as we cannot reasonably expect. Aristotle, alluding to the *Menexenus*, says, *Σωκράτης ἐν τῷ Ἐπιταφίῳ*: just as, in alluding to the *Gorgias* in another place (*Sophist. Elench.* 12, p. 173), he says, *Καλλικλῆς ἐν τῷ Γοργίῳ*: and

While adhering therefore to the Canon of Thrasyllus, I do not think myself obliged to make out that Plato is either like to himself, or equal to himself, or consistent with himself, throughout all the dialogues included therein, and throughout the period of fifty years during which these dialogues were composed. Plato is to be found in all and each of the dialogues, not in an imaginary type abstracted from some to the exclusion of the rest. The critics reverence so much this type of their own creation, that they insist on bringing out a result consistent with it, either by interpretation specially contrived, or by repudiating what will not harmonise. Such sacrifice of the inherent diversity, and separate individuality, of the dialogues, to the maintenance of a supposed unity of type, style, or purpose, appears to me an error. In fact,<sup>1</sup> there exists, for us, no personal Plato any more than there is a personal Shakespeare. Plato (except in the *Epistolæ*) never

Any true theory of Plato must recognise all his varieties, and must be based upon all the works in the Canon, not upon some to the exclusion of the rest.

again, in alluding to the *Phædon*, *ὁ ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι Σωκράτης* (*De Gen. et Corrupt.* ii. 9, p. 335): not to mention his allusions in the *Politica* to the Platonic Republic, under the name of Sokrates. No instance can be produced in which Aristotle cites any Sokratic dialogue, composed by Antisthenes, *Æschines*, &c., or any other of the Sokratic companions except Plato. And when we read in Aristotle's *Politica* (ii. 3-3) the striking compliment paid—*Τὸ μὲν οὖν περιττὸν ἔχουσι πάντες οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι, καὶ τὸ κομψόν, καὶ τὸ καινόμορον, καὶ τὸ ζηητικόν· καλῶς δὲ πάντα ἴσως χαλεπὸν*—we cannot surely imagine that he intends to designate any other dialogues than those composed by Plato.

<sup>1</sup> The only manifestation of the personal Plato is in the *Epistolæ*. I have already said that I accept these as genuine, though most critics do not. I consider them valuable illustrations of his character, as far as they go. They are all written after he was more than sixty years of age. And most of them relate to his relations with Dionysius the younger, with Dion, and with Sicilian affairs generally. This was a peculiar and outlying

phase of Plato's life, during which (through the instigation of Dion, and at the sacrifice of his own peace of mind) he became involved in the world of political action: he had to deal with real persons, passions, and interests—with the feeble character, literary velleities, and jealous apprehensions of Dionysius—the reforming vehemence and unpopular harshness of Dion—the courtiers, the soldiers, and the people of Syracuse, all moved by different passions of which he had had no practical experience. It could not be expected that, amidst such turbulent elements, Plato as an adviser could effect much: yet I do not think that he turned his chances, doubtful as they were, to the best account. I have endeavoured to show this in the tenth volume of my *History of Greece*, c. 84. But at all events, these operations lay apart from Plato's true world—the speculation, dialectic, and lectures of the Academy at Athens. The *Epistolæ*, however, present some instructive points, bearing upon Plato's opinions about writing as a medium of philosophical communication and instruction to learners, which I shall notice in the suitable place.

appears before us, nor gives us any opinion as his own: he is the unseen prompter of different characters who converse aloud in a number of distinct dramas—each drama a separate work, manifesting its own point of view, affirmative or negative, consistent or inconsistent with the others, as the case may be. In so far as I venture to present a general view of one who keeps constantly in the dark—who delights to dive, and hide himself, not less difficult to catch than the supposed Sophist in his own dialogue called *Sophistês*—I shall consider it as subordinate to the dialogues, each and all: and above all, it must be such as to include and acknowledge not merely diversities, but also inconsistencies and contradictions.<sup>k</sup>

<sup>k</sup> I transcribe from the instructive work of M. Ernest Renan, *Averroës et l'Averroïsme*, a passage in which he deprecates the proceeding of critics who presume uniform consistency throughout the works of Aristotle, and make out their theory partly by forcible exegesis, partly by setting aside as spurious all those compositions which oppose them. The remark applies more forcibly to the dialogues of Plato, who is much less systematic than Aristotle:—

“On a combattu l'interprétation d'Averroës, et soutenu que l'intellect actif n'est pour Aristote qu'une faculté de l'âme. L'intellect passif n'est alors que la faculté de recevoir les *φαντάσματα*: l'intellect actif n'est que l'induction s'exerçant sur les *φαντάσματα* et en tirant les idées générales. Ainsi l'on fait concorder la théorie exposée dans le troisième livre du *Traité de l'Âme*, avec celle des *Seconds Analytiques*, où Aristote semble réduire le rôle de la raison à l'induction généralisant les faits de la sensation. Certes, je ne me dissimule pas qu'Aristote paraît souvent envisager le *νοûς* comme personnel à l'homme. Son attention

constante à répéter que l'intellect est identique à l'intelligible, que l'intellect passe à l'acte quand il devient l'objet qu'il pense, est difficile à concilier avec l'hypothèse d'un intellect séparé de l'homme. Mais il est dangereux de faire ainsi coïncider de force les différents aperçus des anciens. Les anciens philosophaient souvent sans se limiter dans un système—traitant le même sujet selon les points de vue qui s'offraient à eux, ou qui leur étaient offerts par les écoles antérieures—sans s'inquiéter des différences qui pouvaient exister entre ces divers tronçons de théorie. Il est puéril de chercher à les mettre d'accord avec eux mêmes, quand eux mêmes s'en sont peu souciés. Autant vaudrait, comme certains critiques Allemands, déclarer interpolés tous les passages que l'on ne peut concilier avec les autres. Ainsi, la théorie des *Seconds Analytiques* et celles du troisième livre de l'*Âme*, sans se contredire expressément, représentent deux aperçus profondément distincts et d'origine différente, sur le fait de l'intelligence.” (*Averroës et Averroïsme*, p. 97, Paris, 1852.)



## CHAPTER VI.

## PLATONIC COMPOSITIONS GENERALLY.

ON looking through the collection of works enumerated in the Thrasyllean Canon, the first impression made upon us respecting the author is, that which is expressed in the epithets applied to him by Cicero—"varius et multiplex et copiosus." Such epithets bring before us the variety in Plato's points of view and methods of handling—the multiplicity of the topics discussed—the abundance of the premisses and illustrations suggested:<sup>a</sup> comparison being taken with other literary productions of the same age. It is scarcely possible to find any one predicate truly applicable to all of Plato's works. Every predicate is probably true in regard to some:—none in regard to all.

Several critics of antiquity considered Plato as essentially a sceptic—that is, a Searcher or Enquirer, not reaching any assured or proved result. They denied to him the character of a dogmatist: they maintained that he neither established nor enforced any affirmative doctrines.<sup>b</sup> This latter statement is carried too far. Plato is sceptical in some dialogues, dogmatical in others. And the catalogue of Thrasyllus shows that the sceptical dialogues (Dialogues of Search or Investigation) are more numerous than the dogmatical (Dialogues of Exposition)—as they are also, speaking generally, more animated and interesting.

Again, Aristotle declared the writing of Plato to be some-

<sup>a</sup> The rhetor Aristoteles, comparing Plato with Æschines (*i. e.* Æschines Socraticus, disciple of Sokrates also), remarks that Æschines was more likely to report what Sokrates really said, from being inferior in productive ima-

gination. Plato (as he truly says Orat. xlvi. Ὑπὲρ τῶν Τεττάρων, p. 295, Dindorf), τῆς φύσεως χρηστὸς περιστάς, &c.

<sup>b</sup> Diogen. Laert. iii. 52. Prolegomen. Platon. Philosop. c. 10, vol. vi. 205, of K. F. Hermann's edition of Plato.

thing between poetry and prose, and even the philosophical doctrine of Plato respecting Ideas, to derive all its apparent plausibility from poetic metaphors. The affirmation is true, up to a certain point. Many of the dialogues display an exuberant vein of poetry, which was declared—not by Aristotle alone, but by many other critics contemporary with Plato—to be often misplaced and excessive—and which appeared the more striking because the dialogues composed by the other Sokratic companions were all of them plain and unadorned.<sup>c</sup> The various mythes, in the Phædrus and elsewhere, are announced expressly as soaring above the conditions of truth and logical appreciation. Moreover, we find occasionally an amount of dramatic vivacity, and of artistic antithesis between the speakers introduced, which might have enabled Plato, had he composed for the drama as a profession, to contend with success for the prizes at the Dionysiac festivals. But here again, though this is true of several dialogues, it is not true of others. In the Parmenidés, Timæus, and the Leges, such elements will be looked for in vain. In the Timæus, they are exchanged for a professed cosmical system, including much mystic and oracular affirmation, without proof to support it, and without

<sup>c</sup> See Dionys. Hal. Epist. ad Cn. Pomp. 756, De Adm. Vi Dic. Dem. 956, where he recognises the contrast between Plato and τὸ Σωκρατικὸν διδασκαλεῖον πάν. His expression is remarkable: Ταῦτα γὰρ οἱ τε κατ' αὐτὸν γενόμενοι πάντες ἐπιτιμῶσιν ὧν τὰ ὀνόματα οὐδὲν δεῖ με λέγειν. Epistol. ad Cn. Pomp. p. 761; also 757. See also Diog. L. iii. 37; Aristotel. Metaph. A. 991, a. 22.

Cicero and Quintilian say the same about Plato's style: "Multum supra prosam orationem, et quam Græci pedestrem vocant, surgit: ut mihi non hominis ingenio, sed quodam Delphico videatur oraculo instinctus." Quintil. x. 1; Cicero, Orator. c. 20, Lucian, Piscator. c. 22.

Sextus Empiricus designates the same tendency under the words τὴν Πλάτωνος ἀνειδωλοποίησιν. Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. iii. 189.

The Greek rhetors of the Augustan age—Dionysius of Halikarnassus and

Kækilius of Kalaktê—not only blamed the style of Plato for excessive, overstrained, and misplaced metaphor, but Kækilius goes so far as to declare a decided preference for Lysias over Plato. (Dionys. Hal. De Vi Demosth. pp. 1025-1037, De Comp. Verb. p. 196 R; Longinus, De Sublimitat. c. 32.) The number of critics who censured the manner and doctrine of Plato (critics both contemporary with him and subsequent) was considerable (Dionys. H. Ep. ad Pomp. p. 757). Dionysius and the critics of his age had before their eyes the contrast of the Asiatic style of rhetoric, prevalent in their time, with the Attic style represented by Demosthenes and Lysias. They wished to uphold the force and simplicity of the Attic, against the tumid, wordy, pretensive Asiatic; and they considered the Phædrus, with other compositions of Plato, as falling under the same censure with the Asiatic. See Burekhardt, Cæcili Rhetoris Fragm., Berlin, 1863, p. 15.

Poetical vein predominant in some compositions, but not in all.

opponents to test it: in the *Leges*, for ethical sermons, and religious fulminations, proclaimed by a dictatorial authority.

One feature there is, which is declared by Schleiermacher and others to be essential to all the works of Plato—the form of dialogue. Here Schleiermacher's assertion, literally taken, is incontestable. Plato always puts his thoughts into the mouth of some spokesman: he never speaks in his own name. All the works of Plato which we possess (excepting the *Epistles*, and the *Apology*, which last I consider to be a report of what Sokrates himself said) are dialogues. But under this same name, many different realities are found to be contained. In the *Timæus* and *Kritias* the dialogue is simply introductory to a continuous exposition—in the *Menexenus*, to a rhetorical discourse: while in the *Leges*, and even in *Sophistês*, *Politikus*, and others, it includes no antithesis nor interchange between two independent minds, but is simply a didactic lecture, put into interrogatory form, and broken into fragments small enough for the listener to swallow at once: he by his answer acknowledging the receipt. If therefore the affirmation of Schleiermacher is intended to apply to all the Platonic compositions, we must confine it to the form, without including the spirit, of dialogue.

It is in truth scarcely possible to resolve all the diverse manifestations of the Platonic mind into one higher unity; or to predicate, about Plato as an intellectual person, anything which shall be applicable at once to the *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Parmenidês*, *Phædrus*, *Symposion*, *Philêbus*, *Phædon*, *Republic*, *Timæus*, and *Leges*. Plato was sceptic, dogmatist, religious mystic and inquisitor, mathematician, philosopher, poet (erotic as well as satirical), rhetor, artist—all in one:<sup>d</sup> or at least, all in succession,

<sup>d</sup> Dikæarchus affirmed that Plato was a compound of Sokrates with Pythagoras. Plutarch calls him also a compound of Sokrates with Lykurgus. (Plutarch, *Symposiac*. viii. 2, p. 719 B.)

Nemesius the Platonist (Eusebius, *Præp. Evang.* xiv. 5-7-8) repeats the saying of Dikæarchus, and describes

Plato as midway between Pythagoras and Sokrates: *μεσέων Πυθαγόρου καὶ Σωκράτους*. No three persons could be more disparate than Lykurgus, Pythagoras, and Sokrates. But there are besides various other attributes of Plato, which are not included under either of the heads of this tripartite character.

throughout the fifty years of his philosophical life. At one time his exuberant dialectical impulse claims satisfaction, manifesting itself in a string of ingenious doubts and unsolved contradictions: at another time, he is full of theological antipathy against those who libel Helios and Selênê, or who deny the universal providence of the Gods: here, we have unqualified confessions of ignorance, and protestations against the false persuasion of knowledge, as alike wide-spread and deplorable—there, we find a description of the process of building up the Kosmos from the beginning, as if the author had been privy to the inmost purposes of the Demiurgus. In one dialogue the erotic fever is in the ascendant, distributed between beautiful youths and philosophical concepts, and confounded with a religious inspiration and *furore* which supersedes and transcends human sobriety (Phædrus): in another, all vehement impulses of the soul are stigmatised and repudiated, no honourable scope being left for anything but the calm and passionless Nous (Philêbus, Phædon). Satire is exchanged for dithyramb, and mythe,—and one ethical point of view for another (Protagoras, Gorgias). The all-sufficient dramatising power of the master gives full effect to each of these multifarious tendencies. On the whole—to use a comparison of Plato himself<sup>e</sup>—the Platonic sum total somewhat resembles those fanciful combinations of animals imagined in the Hellenic mythology—an aggregate of distinct and disparate individualities, which look like one because they are packed in the same external wrapper.

Furthermore, if we intend to affirm anything about Plato as a whole, there is another fact which ought to be taken into account.<sup>f</sup> We know him only from his dialogues, and

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Republ. ix. 588 C. Οἶαι μυθολογοῦνται παλαιὰ γενέσθαι φύσεις, ἢ τε Χιμαίρας καὶ ἢ Σκύλλης, καὶ ἢ Κερβέρον, καὶ ἄλλαι τινες συχνὰ λέγονται ἐμπεφυκυῖαι ἰδέαι πολλαὶ εἰς ἓν γενέσθαι.—Περὶ πλάσσειν δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐξωθεν ἓνα εἰκόνα, τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου—ὥστε τῶ μὴ δυναμένῳ τὰ ἐντὸς ὁρᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐξω μόνον ἔλντρον ὁρῶντι, ἐν ζῶον φαίνεσθαι—ἄνθρωπον.

<sup>f</sup> Trendelenburg not only adopts

Schleiermacher's theory of a preconceived and systematic purpose connecting together all Plato's dialogues, but even extends this purpose to Plato's oral lectures: "Id pro certo habendum est, sicut prioribus dialogis quasi præparat (Plato) posteriores, posterioribus evoluit priores—ita et in scholis continuasse dialogos; quæ reliquerit, ab solvisse; atque omnibus ad summa principia perductis, intima quasi se-

from a few scraps of information. But Plato was not merely a composer of dialogues. He was lecturer, and chief of a school, besides. The presidency of that school, commencing about 386 B.C., and continued by him with great celebrity for the last half (nearly forty years) of his life, was his most important function. Among his contemporaries he must have exercised greater influence through his school than through his writings.<sup>8</sup> Yet in this character of school-teacher and lecturer, he is almost unknown to us: for the few incidental allusions which have descended to us, through the Aristotelian commentators, only raise curiosity without satisfying it. The little information which we possess respecting Plato's lectures, relates altogether to those

mina aperuisse." (Trendelenburg, *De Ideis et Numeris Platonis*, p. 6.)

This opinion is surely not borne out—it seems even contradicted—by all the information which we possess (very scanty indeed) about the Platonic lectures. Plato delivered therein his Pythagorean doctrines, merging his Ideas in the Pythagorean numerical symbols: and Aristotle, far from considering this as a systematic and intended evolution of doctrine at first imperfectly unfolded, treats it as an additional perversion and confusion, introduced into a doctrine originally erroneous. In regard to the transition of Plato from the doctrine of Ideas to that of Ideal Numbers, see Aristotel. *Metaphys.* M. 1078, b. 9, 1080, a. 12 (with the commentary of Bonitz, pp. 539-541), A. 987, b. 20.

M. Boeckh, too, accounts for the obscure and enigmatical speaking of Plato in various dialogues, by supposing that he cleared up all the difficulties in his oral lectures. "Platon deutet nur an—spricht meinetthalben räthselhaft (in den Gesetzen); aber gerade so räthselhaft spricht er von diesen Sachen im *Timæus*: er pflegt mathematische Theoreme nur anzudeuten, nicht zu entwickeln: ich glaube, weil er sie in den Vorträgen ausführte," &c. (*Untersuchungen über das Kosmische System des Platon*, p. 50.)

This may be true about the mathematical theorems; but I confess that I

see no proof of it. Though Plato admits that his doctrine in the *Timæus* is ἀηθής λόγος, yet he expressly intimates that the hearers are instructed persons, able to follow him (*Timæus*, p. 53 C.).

<sup>8</sup> M. Renan, in his work, 'Averroes et l'Averroïsme,' pp. 257-325, remarks that several of the Italian professors of philosophy, at Padua and other universities, exercised far greater influence through their lectures than through their published works. He says respecting Cremonini (Professor at Padua, 1590-1620):—"Il a été jusqu'ici apprécié d'une manière fort incomplète par les historiens de la philosophie. On ne l'a jugé que par ses écrits imprimés, qui ne sont que des dissertations de peu d'importance, et ne peuvent en aucune manière faire comprendre la renommée colossale à laquelle il parvint. Cremonini n'est qu'un professeur: ses cours sont sa véritable philosophie. Aussi, tandis que ses écrits se vendaient fort mal, les rédactions de ses leçons se répandaient dans toute l'Italie et même au delà des monts. On sait que les élèves préfèrent souvent aux textes imprimés, les cahiers qu'ils ont ainsi recueillis de la bouche de leurs professeurs. En général, c'est dans les cahiers, beaucoup plus que dans les sources imprimées, qu'il faut étudier l'école de Padoue. Pour Cremonini, cette tâche est facile; car les copies de ses cours sont innombrables dans le nord de l'Italie."

which he delivered upon the *Ipsum Bonum* or *Summum Bonum* at some time after Aristotle became his pupil—that is, during the last eighteen years of Plato's life. Aristotle and other hearers took notes of these lectures: Aristotle even composed an express work now lost (*De Bono* or *De Philosophiâ*), reporting with comments of his own these oral doctrines of Plato, together with the analogous doctrines of the Pythagoreans. We learn that Plato gave continuous lectures, dealing with the highest and most transcendental concepts (with the constituent elements or factors of the Platonic Ideas or Ideal Numbers: the first of these factors being The One—the second, The Indeterminate Dyad, or The Great and Little, the essentially indefinite), and that they were mystic and enigmatical, difficult to understand.<sup>h</sup>

One remarkable observation, made upon them by Aristotle, has been transmitted to us.<sup>i</sup> There were lectures announced

<sup>h</sup> Aristotle (*Physic.* iv. p. 209, b. 34) alludes to τὰ λεγόμενα ἄγραφα δόγματα of Plato, and their discordance on one point with the *Timæus*.

Simplikius ad Aristot. *Physic.* f. 104 b. p. 362, a. 11, Brandis. Ἀρχὰς γὰρ καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὸ ἐν, καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην φασὶ δυάδα λέγειν τὸν Πλάτωνα. Τὴν δὲ ἀρίστην δυάδα καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς τιθεῖς, ἄπειρον εἶναι ἔλεγεν, καὶ τὸ μέγα δὲ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν ἀρχὰς τιθεῖς, ἄπειρα εἶναι ἔλεγεν ἐν τοῖς περὶ Τάγαθοῦ λόγοις, ὡς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Ἡρακλείδης καὶ Ἑστωταῖος καὶ ἄλλοι τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐταῖροι παραγενόμενοι ἀνεγράψαντο τὰ βηθέντα, αἰνιγματῶδ' ὡς ἐβῆθη. Πορφύριος δὲ διαρροῦν αὐτὰ ἐπαγγελλόμενος τάδε περὶ αὐτῶν ἔγραψε. Compare another passage of the same *Schol.* p. 334, b. 28, p. 371, b. 26. Τὰς ἀγράφους συνοουσίας τοῦ Πλάτωνος αὐτὸς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀπεγράψατο. 372, a. Τὸ μεθεκτικὸν ἐν μὲν ταῖς περὶ Τάγαθοῦ συνοουσίας μέγα καὶ μικρὸν ἐκάλει, ἐν δὲ τῷ Τιμαίῳ ἕλην, ἦν καὶ χῶραν καὶ τόπον ὠνόμαζε. *Comp.* 371, a. 5, and the two extracts from Simplikius, cited by Zeller, *De Hermodoro*, pp. 20, 21. By ἄγραφα δόγματα, or ἄγραφοι συνοουσίαι, we are to understand opinions or colloquies not written down (or not communicated to others as writings) by Plato himself: thus distinguished

from his written dialogues. Aristotle, in the treatise *De Animâ*, i. 2, p. 404, b. 18, refers to ἐν τοῖς περὶ Φιλοσοφίας: which Simplikius thus explains, περὶ φιλοσοφίας νῦν λέγει τὰ περὶ τοῦ Ἀγαθοῦ αὐτῷ ἐκ τῆς Πλάτωνος ἀναγεγραμμένα συνοουσίας, ἐν οἷς ἱστορεῖ τὰς τε Πυθαγορείους καὶ Πλατωνικάς περὶ τῶν ὄντων δόξας. Philoponus reports the same thing: see Trendelenburg's *Comm.* on *De Animâ*, p. 226. Compare Alexand. ad Aristot. *Met.* A. 992, p. 581, a. 2, Schol. Brandis.

<sup>i</sup> Aristoxenus, *Harmon.* ii. p. 30. Καθὰπερ Ἀριστοτέλης αἰεὶ διηγείτο τοὺς πλείστους τῶν ἀκουσάντων παρὰ Πλάτωνος τὴν περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀκρίσιν παθεῖν προσεῖναι γὰρ ἕκαστον ὑπολαμβάνοντα λήψεσθαι τι τῶν νομιζομένων ἀνθρωπίνων ἀγαθῶν—στε δὲ φανεῖσαν οἱ λόγοι περὶ μαθημάτων καὶ ἀριθμῶν καὶ γεωμετρίας καὶ ἀστρολογίας, καὶ τὸ πέρασ ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν ἐν, παντελῶς οἶμαι παράδοξον ἐφαίνετο αὐτοῖς.

Compare Themistius, *Orat.* xxi. p. 245 D. Proklus also alludes to this story, and to the fact that most of the πολλοὶ καὶ παντοῖοι ὄχλοι, who were attracted to Plato's ἀκρίσιν περὶ Τάγαθοῦ, were disappointed or unable to understand him, and went away. (*Proklus ad Platon. Parmen.* p. 92, Cousin. 528, Stallb.)

to be, On the Supreme Good. Most of those who came to hear, expected that Plato would enumerate and compare the various matters usually considered *good*—*i. e.* health, strength, beauty, genius, wealth, power, &c. But these hearers were altogether astonished at what they really heard: for Plato, omitting the topics expected, descanted only upon arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy; and told them that The Good was identical with the One (as contrasted with the Infinite or Indeterminate, which was Evil).

We see farther from this remark:—First, that Plato's lectures were often above what his auditors could appreciate—a fact which we learn from other allusions also: Next, that they were not confined to a select body of advanced pupils, who had been worked up by special training into a state fit for comprehending them.<sup>1</sup> Had such been the case, the surprise which Aristotle mentions could never have been felt. And we see farther, that the transcendental doctrine delivered in the lectures De Bono (though we find partial analogies to it in Philêbus, Epinomis, and parts of Republic) coincides more with what Aristotle states and comments upon

Plato's lectures on De Bono obscure and transcendental. Effect which they produced on the auditors.

They were delivered to miscellaneous auditors. They coincide mainly with what Aristotle states about the Platonic Ideas.

<sup>1</sup> Respecting Plato's lectures, see Brandis (Geschichte der Griech. Rom. Philos. vol. ii. p. 180 seq., 306-319); also Trendelenburg, Platonis De Ideis et Numeris Doctrina, pp. 3, 4, seq.

Brandis, though he admits that Plato's lectures were continuous discourses, thinks that they were intermingled with discussion and debate: which may have been the case, though there is no proof of it. But Schleiermacher goes further, and says (Einführung, p. 18), "Any one who can think that Plato in these oral *Vorträgen* employed the Sophistical method of long speeches, shows such an ignorance as to forfeit all right of speaking about Plato." Now the passage from Aristoxenus, given in the preceding note, is our only testimony; and it distinctly indicates a continuous lecture to an unprepared auditory, just as Protagoras or Prodikus might have given. K. F. Hermann protests, with good rea-

son, against Schleiermacher's opinion, (Ueber Plato's schrift-stellerische Motive, p. 289.)

The confident declaration just produced from Schleiermacher illustrates the unsound basis on which he and various other Platonic critics proceed. They find, in some dialogues of Plato, a strong opinion proclaimed, that continuous discourse is useless for the purpose of instruction. This was a point of view which, at the time when he composed these dialogues, he considered to be of importance, and desired to enforce. But we are not warranted in concluding that he must always have held the same conviction throughout his long philosophical life, and in rejecting as un-platonic all statements and all compositions which imply an opposite belief. We cannot with reason bind down Plato to a persistence in one and the same type of compositions.

as Platonic doctrine, than with any reasonings which we find in the Platonic dialogues. It represents the latest phase of Platonism: when the Ideas originally conceived by him as Entities in themselves, had become merged or identified in his mind with the Pythagorean numbers or symbols.

This statement of Aristotle, alike interesting and unquestionable, attests the mysticism and obscurity which pervaded Plato's doctrine in his later years. But whether this lecture on *The Good* is to be taken as a fair specimen of Plato's lecturing generally, and from the time when he first began to lecture, we may perhaps doubt:<sup>k</sup> since we know that as a lecturer and converser he acquired extraordinary ascendancy over ardent youth. We see this by the remarkable instance of Dion.<sup>l</sup>

The only occasions on which we have experience of Plato as speaking in his own person, and addressing himself to

The lectures De Bono may perhaps have been more transcendental than Plato's other lectures.

<sup>k</sup> Themistius says (Orat. xxi. p. 245 D) that Plato sometimes lectured in the Peiræus, and that a crowd then collected to hear him, not merely from the city, but also from the country around: if he lectured De Bono, however, the ordinary hearers became tired and dispersed, leaving only τούς συνήθεις ὁμιλητάς.

It appears that Plato in his lectures delivered theories on the principles of geometry. He denied the reality of geometrical points—or at least admitted them only as hypotheses for geometrical reasoning. He maintained that what others called a *point* ought to be called "an indivisible line." Xenokrates maintained the same doctrine after him. Aristotle controverts it (see *Metaphys. A.*, 992, b. 21). Aristotle's words in citing Plato's opinion (τούτῳ μὲν ὄν τῷ γένει καὶ διεμάχεται Πλάτων ὡς ὄντι γεωμετρικῶ δόγματι, ἀλλ' ἐκάλεί ἀρχὴν γραμμῆς· τοῦτο δὲ, πολλάκις ἐτίθει τὰς ἀτόμους γραμμὰς) must be referred to Plato's oral lectures; no such opinion occurs in the dialogues. This is the opinion both of Bonitz and Schwegler in their comments on the passage; also of Trendelenburg, *De Ideis et Numeris Platonis*, p. 66. That geometry and arithmetic were matters of study and reflection both to Plato himself and to

many of his pupils in the Academy, appears certain; and perhaps Plato may have had an interior circle of pupils, to which he applied the well-known exclusion—μηδεὶς ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσίτω. But we cannot make out clearly what was Plato's own proficiency, or what improvements he may have introduced, in geometry, nor what there is to justify the comparison made by Montucla between Plato and Descartes. In the narrative respecting the Delian problem—the duplication of the cube—Archytas, Menæchmus, and Eudoxus, appear as the inventors of solutions, Plato as the superior who prescribes and criticises (see the letter and epigram of Eratosthenes, Bernhardy, *Eratosthenica*, pp. 176-184). The three are said to have been blamed by Plato for substituting instrumental measurement in place of geometrical proof (Plutarch, *Problem. Sympos.* viii. 2, pp. 718, 719; Plutarch, *Vit. Marcellii*, c. 14.) The geometrical construction of the *Kóσμος*, which Plato gives us in the *Timæus*, seems borrowed from the Pythagoreans, though applied probably in a way peculiar to himself (see Finger, *De Primordiis Geometriæ ap. Græcos*, p. 38, Heidelberg. 1831).

<sup>l</sup> See *Epist.* vii. pp. 327, 328.



definite individuals, are presented by his few Epistles; all of them (as I have before remarked) written after he was considerably above sixty years of age, and nearly all addressed to Sicilians or Italians—Dionysius II., Dion, the friends of Dion after the death of the latter, and Archytas.<sup>m</sup> In so far as these letters bear upon Plato's manner of lecturing or teaching, they go to attest, first, his opinion that direct written exposition was useless for conveying real instruction to the reader—next, his reluctance to publish any such exposition under his own name, and carrying with it his responsibility. When asked for expo-

<sup>m</sup> Of the thirteen Platonic Epistles, Ep. 2, 3, 13, are addressed to the second or younger Dionysius; Ep. 4 to Dion; Ep. 7, 8, to the friends and relatives of Dion after Dion's death. The 13th Epistle appears to be the earliest of all, being seemingly written after the first voyage of Plato to visit Dionysius II. at Syracuse, in 367-366 B.C., and before his second visit to the same place and person, about 363-362 B.C. Epistles 2 and 3 were written after his return from that second visit, in 360 B.C., and prior to the expedition of Dion against Dionysius in 357 B.C. Epistle 4 was written to Dion shortly after Dion's victorious career at Syracuse, about 355 B.C. Epistles 7 and 8 were written not long after the murder of Dion in 354 B.C. The first in order, among the Platonic Epistles, is not written by Plato, but by Dion, addressed to Dionysius, shortly after the latter had sent Dion away from Syracuse. The fifth is addressed by Plato to the Macedonian prince Perdikkas. The sixth, to Hermeias of Atarneus, Erastus, and Koriskus. The ninth and twelfth, to Archytas of Tarentum. The tenth, to Aristodórus. The eleventh, to Laodamas. I confess that I see nothing in these letters which compels me to depart from the judgment of the ancient critics, who unanimously acknowledged them as genuine. I do not think myself competent to determine *à priori* what the style of Plato's letters *must* have been; what topics he *must* have touched upon, and what topics he *could not* have touched upon. I have no difficulty in believing that Plato,

writing a letter on philosophy, may have expressed himself with as much mysticism and obscurity as we now read in Epist. 2 and 7. Nor does it surprise me to find Plato (in Epist. 13) alluding to details which critics, who look upon him altogether as a spiritual person, disallow as mean and unworthy. His recommendation of the geometer, Helikon of Kyzikus, to Dionysius and Archytas, is to me interesting: to make known the theorems of Eudoxus, through the medium of Helikon, to Archytas, was no small service to geometry in those days. I have an interest in learning how Plato employed the money given to him by Dionysius and other friends: that he sent to Dionysius a statue of Apollo by a good Athenian sculptor named Leochares (this sculptor executed a bust of Isokrates also, Plut. Vit. x. Orat. p. 838); and another statue by the same sculptor for the wife of Dionysius, in gratitude for the care which she had taken of him (Plato) when sick at Syracuse; that he spent the money of Dionysius partly in discharging his own public taxes and liturgies at Athens, partly in providing dowries for poor maidens among his friends; that he was so beset by applications, which he could not refuse, for letters of recommendation to Dionysius, as to compel him to signify, by a private mark, to Dionysius, which among the letters he wished to be most attended to. "These latter" (he says) "I shall begin with *θεδς* (sing. number), the others I shall begin with *θεοι* (plural)." (Epist. xiii. 361, 362, 363.)

sition, he writes intentionally with mystery, so that ordinary persons cannot understand.

Knowing as we do that he had largely imbued himself with the tenets of the Pythagoreans (who designedly adopted a symbolical manner of speaking—published no writings—for Philolaus is cited as an exception to their rule—and did not care to be understood, except by their own adepts after a long apprenticeship) we cannot be surprised to find Plato holding a language very similar. He declares that the highest principles of his philosophy could not be set forth in writing so as to be intelligible to ordinary persons: that they could only be apprehended by a few privileged recipients, through an illumination kindled in the mind by multiplied debates and much mental effort: that such illumination was always preceded by a painful feeling of want, usually long-continued, sometimes lasting for nearly thirty years, and exchanged at length for relief at some unexpected moment.<sup>n</sup>

Plato during his second visit had had one conversation, and only one, with Dionysius respecting the higher mysteries of philosophy. He had impressed upon Dionysius the prodigious labour and difficulty of attaining truth upon these matters. The despot professed to thirst ardently for philosophy, and the conversation turned upon the *Natura Primi*—upon the first and highest principles of Nature.<sup>o</sup> Dionysius, after this conversation with Plato, intimated that he had already conceived in his own mind the solution of these difficulties, and the truth upon philosophy in its greatest mysteries. Upon which Plato expressed his satisfaction that such was the case,<sup>p</sup> so as to relieve him from the necessity of farther explanations, though the like had never happened to him with any previous hearer.

But Dionysius soon found that he could not preserve the explanation in his mind, after Plato's departure—that diffi-

<sup>n</sup> Plato, *Epistol.* ii. pp. 313, 314.

<sup>o</sup> Plat. *Epist.* ii. 312. *περὶ τῆς τοῦ πρώτου φύσεως*, 344 D. *τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἀκρῶν καὶ πρώτων*.—One con-

versation only—345 A.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, *Epist.* ii. 313 B. Plato asserts the same about Dionysius in *Epist.* vii. 341 B.

Intentional  
obscurity of  
his Epistles  
in reference to  
philosophical  
doctrine.

culties again crowded upon him—and that it was necessary to send a confidential messenger to Athens to entreat farther elucidations. In reply, Plato sends back by the messenger what is now numbered as the second of his Epistles. He writes avowedly in enigmatical language, so that, if the letter be lost, the finder will not be able to understand it; and he enjoins Dionysius to burn it after frequent perusal.<sup>a</sup> He expresses his hope that when Dionysius has debated the matter often with the best minds near him, the clouds will clear away of themselves, and the moment of illumination will supervene.<sup>r</sup> He especially warns Dionysius against talking about these matters to unschooled men, who will be sure to laugh at them; though by minds properly prepared, they will be received with the most fervent welcome.<sup>s</sup> He affirms that Dionysius is much superior in philosophical debate to his companions; who were overcome in debate with him, not because they suffered themselves designedly to be overcome (out of flattery towards the despot, as some ill-natured persons alleged), but because they could not defend themselves against the Elenchus as applied by Dionysius.<sup>t</sup> Lastly, Plato advises Dionysius to write down nothing, since what has once been written will be sure to disappear from the memory; but to trust altogether to learning by heart, meditation, and repeated debate, as a guarantee for retention in his mind. “It is for that reason” (Plato says)<sup>u</sup> “that I have never myself written anything upon these subjects. There neither is, nor shall

Letters of Plato to Dionysius II. about philosophy. His anxiety to confine philosophy to discussion among select and prepared minds.

<sup>a</sup> Plat. Epist. ii. 312 E. φραστέον δὲ σοι δι' αἰνιγμάτων, ἢ ἂν τι ἡ δελτος ἢ πόντου ἢ γῆς ἐν πτωχαῖς πάθῃ, ὁ ἀναγνούς μὴ γνῶ. 314 C. ἔββωσο καὶ πείθου, καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ταύτην νῦν πρῶτον πολ- λάκις ἀναγνούς κατακαύσον.

Proklus, in his Commentary on the Timæus (pp. 40, 41), remarks the fondness of Plato for τὸ αἰνιγματώδες.

<sup>r</sup> Plat. Epist. ii. 313 D.

<sup>s</sup> Plat. Epist. ii. 314 A. εὐλαβοῦ μέν- ται μὴ ποτε ἐκπέσῃ ταῦτα εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἀπαιδεύτους.

<sup>t</sup> Plat. Epist. ii. 314 D.

<sup>u</sup> Plat. Epist. ii. 314 C. μέγιστη δὲ

φυλακῆ, τὸ μὴ γράφειν, ἀλλ' ἐκμανθάνειν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τὰ γραφέντα μὴ οὐκ ἐκπεσεῖν. διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάποτε ἐγὼ περὶ τούτων γέγραφα, οὐδ' ἔστι σύγγραμμα Πλάτωνος οὐδὲν, οὐδ' ἔσται· τὰ δὲ νῦν λεγόμενα, Σακράτους ἔστι, καλοῦ καὶ νέου γεγονότος.

“Addamus ad superiora,” (says Wesseling, Epist. ad Venemam, p. 41, Utrecht, 1748), “Platonem videri semper voluisse, dialogos, in quibus de Philosophiâ, deque Republicâ atque ejus Legibus, inter confabulantes ac- tum fuit, non sui ingenii sed Socratici, foetus esse.”

there ever be, any treatise of Plato. The opinions called by the name of Plato are those of Sokrates, in his days of youthful vigour and glory."

Such is the language addressed by Plato to the younger Dionysius, in a letter written seemingly between 362-357 B.C. In another letter, written about ten years afterwards (353-352 B.C.), to the friends of Dion (after Dion's death), he expresses the like repugnance to the idea of furnishing any written authoritative exposition of his principal doctrines. "There never shall be any expository treatise of mine upon them" (he declares). "Others have tried, Dionysius among the number, to write them down; but they do not know what they attempt. I could myself do this better than any one, and I should consider it the proudest deed in my life, as well as a signal benefit to mankind, to bring forward an exposition of Nature luminous to all.\* But I think the attempt would be nowise beneficial, except to a few, who require only slight direction to enable them to find it for themselves: to most persons it would do no good, but would only fill them with empty conceit of knowledge, and with contempt for others.† These matters cannot be communicated in words as other sciences are. Out of repeated debates on them, and much social intercourse, there is kindled suddenly a light in the mind, as from fire bursting forth, which, when once generated, keeps itself alive."‡

He refuses to furnish any written, authoritative exposition of his own philosophical doctrine.

Plato then proceeds to give an example from geometry,

\* Plato, Epist. vii. 341, B, C. τί τοῦτον κάλλιον ἐπέπρακτ' ἂν ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἢ τοῖς τε ἀνθρώποισι μέγα ὄφελος γράψαι καὶ τὴν φύσιν εἰς φῶς παῖσι προαγαγεῖν:

† Plat. Epist. vii. 341 E.

‡ Plato, Epist. vii. 341 C. οὐκ οὖν ἐμὸν γε περὶ αὐτῶν ἔστι σύγγραμμα οὐδὲ μή ποτε γένηται· ῥητὸν γὰρ οὐδαμῶς ἔστιν ὡς ἄλλα μαθήματα, ἀλλ' ἐκ πολλῆς συνουσίας γυγνομένης περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ καὶ τοῦ συζῆν, ἐξαίφνης, οἷον ἀπὸ πυρὸς πηδῆσαντος, ἐξαφθὲν φῶς, ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γενόμενον αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἤδη τρέφει.

This sentence, as a remarkable one, I have translated literally in the text:

that which precedes is given only in substance.

We see in the Republic that Sokrates, when questioned by Glaukon, and urged emphatically to give some solution respecting ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα, and ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις, answers only by an evasion or a metaphor (Republic. vi. 506 E, vii. 533 A). Now these are much the same points as what are signified in the letter to Dionysius, under the terms τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἄκρα τῆς φύσεως—ἡ τοῦ πρώτου φύσις (312 E): as to which Plato, when questioned, replies in a mystic and unintelligible way.

illustrating the uselessness both of writing and of direct exposition. In acquiring a knowledge of the circle, he distinguishes five successive stages. 1. The Name. 2. The Definition, a proposition composed of nouns and verbs. 3. The Diagram. 4. Knowledge, Intelligence, True Opinion, *Noûs*. 5. The Noumenon — *Ἀπὸ-Κύκλος*—ideal or intelligible circle, the only true object of knowledge.<sup>a</sup> The fourth stage is a purely mental result, not capable of being exposed either in words or figure: it presupposes the three first, but is something distinct from them: and it is the only mental condition immediately cognate and similar to the fifth stage, or the self-existent idea.<sup>b</sup>

Now in all the three first stages (Plato says) there is great liability to error and confusion. The name is unavoidably equivocal, uncertain, fluctuating: the definition is open to the same reproach, and often gives special and accidental properties along with the universal and essential, or instead of them: the diagram cannot exhibit the essential without some variety of the accidental, nor without some properties even contrary to reality, since any circle which you draw, instead of touching a straight line in one point alone, will be sure to touch it in several points.<sup>c</sup> Accordingly no intelligent man will embody the pure concepts of his mind in fixed representation, either by words or by figures.<sup>d</sup> If we do this, we have the *quid* or essence, which we are searching for,

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Epistol. vii. 342 A, B. The geometrical illustration which follows is intended merely as an illustration, of general principles which Plato asserts to be true about all other enquiries, physical or ethical.

<sup>b</sup> Plat. Epist. vii. 342 C. *ὡς δὲ ἐν τούτῳ αὐτῷ πᾶν θετέον, οὐκ ἐν φωναῖς οὐδ' ἐν σωματίων σχήμασιν ἀλλ' ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐνόν, ᾧ δῆλον ἕτερόν τε ὄν αὐτοῦ τοῦ κύκλου τῆς φύσεως, τῶν τε ἐμπροσθεν λεχθέντων τριῶν. τούτων δὲ ἐγγύτατα μὲν ζυγγενεία καὶ ὁμοιότητι, τοῦ πέμπτου (ἰ. ε. τοῦ Ἀπὸ-κύκλου) νοῦς (the fourth stage) πεπλησίακε, τᾶλλα δὲ πλέον ἀπέχει.*

In Plato's reckoning, *ὁ νοῦς* is

counted as the fourth, in the ascending scale, from which we ascend to the fifth, τὸ νοούμενον, or νοητόν. 'Ο νοῦς and τὸ νοητόν are cognate or homogeneous—according to a principle often insisted on in ancient metaphysics—like must be known by like. (Aristot. De Animâ, i. 2, 404 b. 15.)

<sup>c</sup> Plat. Epist. vii. 343 B. This illustrates what is said in the Republic about the geometrical *ὑποθέσεις* (vi. 510 E, 511 A; vii. 533 B).

<sup>d</sup> Plat. Epist. vii. 343 A. *ὄν ἐνεκα νοῦν ἔχων οὐδεὶς τολμήσει ποτε εἰς αὐτὸ τιθέναι τὰ νενοημένα, καὶ ταῦτα εἰς ἀμετακίνητον, ὃ δὴ πάσχει τὰ γεγραμμένα τύποις.*

inextricably perplexed by accompaniments of the *quale* or accidents, which we are not searching for.<sup>e</sup> We acquire only a confused cognition, exposing us to be puzzled, confuted, and humiliated, by an acute cross-examiner, when he questions us on the four stages which we have gone through to attain it.<sup>f</sup> Such confusion does not arise from any fault in the mind, but from the defects inherent in each of the four stages of progress. It is only by painful effort, when each of these is naturally good—when the mind itself also is naturally good, and when it has gone through all the stages up and down, dwelling upon each—that true knowledge can be acquired.<sup>g</sup> Persons whose minds are naturally bad, or have become corrupt, morally or intellectually, cannot be taught to see even by Lynkeus himself. In a word, if the mind itself be not cognate to the matter studied, no quickness in learning nor force of memory will suffice. He who is a quick learner and retentive, but not cognate or congenial with just or honourable things—he who, though cognate and congenial, is stupid in learning or forgetful—will never effectually learn the truth about virtue or wickedness.<sup>h</sup> These can only be learnt along with truth and falsehood as it concerns entity generally, by long practice and much time.<sup>i</sup> It is only with difficulty,—after continued friction, one against another, of all the four intellectual helps, names and definitions, acts of sight and sense,—after application of the Elenchus by repeated question and answer, in a friendly temper and without spite—it is only after all these preliminaries, that cognition and intelligence shine out with as much intensity as human power admits.<sup>k</sup>

For this reason, no man of real excellence will ever write and publish his views, upon the gravest matters, into a world

<sup>e</sup> Plat. Epist. vii. 343 C.

<sup>f</sup> Plat. Epist. vii. 343 D.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Epistol. vii. 343 E. ἡ δὲ διὰ πάντων αὐτῶν διαγωγῆ, ἅνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαίνουσ' ἐφ' ἑκάστον, μόγις ἐπιστήμην ἔτεκεν ἐν πεφυκότος ἐν πεφυκότι.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Epistol. vii. 344 A.

<sup>i</sup> Plato, Epist. vii. 344 B. ἅμα γὰρ αὐτὰ ἀνάγκη μαθάνειν, καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος

ἅμα καὶ ἀληθὲς τῆς ὅλης οὐσίας.

<sup>k</sup> Plat. Epist. vii. 344 B. μόγις δὲ τριβόμενα πρὸς ἄλληλα αὐτῶν ἕκαστα, ὀνόματα καὶ λόγοι, ὄψεις τε καὶ αἰσθήσεις, ἐν εὐμενέσιν ἐλέγχοις ἐλεγχόμενα καὶ ἄνευ φθόνων ἐρωτήσεσι καὶ ἀποκρίσεσι χρωμένων, ἐξέλαμψε φρόνησις περὶ ἑκάστον καὶ νοῦς, συντείνων ὅτι μάλιστ' εἰς δύναμιν ἀνθρωπίνην.

of spite and puzzling contention. In one word, when you see any published writings, either laws proclaimed by the lawgiver or other compositions by others, you may be sure that, if he be himself a man of worth, these were not matters of first-rate importance in his estimation. If they really were so, and if he has published his views in writing, some evil influence must have destroyed his good sense.<sup>1</sup>

We see by these letters that Plato disliked and disapproved the idea of publishing for the benefit of readers generally, any written exposition of *philosophia prima*, carrying his own name, and making him responsible for it. His writings are altogether dramatic. All opinions on philosophy are enunciated through one or other of his spokesmen: that portion of the Athenian drama called the Parabasis, in which the Chorus addressed the audience directly and avowedly in the name of the poet, found no favour with Plato. We read indeed in several of his dialogues (Phædon, Republic, Timæus, and others) dogmas advanced about the highest and most recondite topics of philosophy: but then they are all advanced under the name of Sokrates, Timæus, &c., *Ὀὐκ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος*, &c. There never was any written programme issued by Plato himself, declaring the *Symbolum Fidei* to which he attached his own name.<sup>m</sup> Even in the *Leges*, the most dogmatical of all his works, the dramatic character and the borrowed voice are kept up. Probably at the time when Plato wrote his letter to the friends of the deceased Dion, from which I have just quoted—his aversion to written expositions was aggravated by the fact, that Dionysius II., or some friend in his name, had written and pub-

<sup>1</sup> Plat. Epist. vii. 344, C-D.

<sup>m</sup> The Platonic dialogue was in this respect different from the Aristotelian dialogue. Aristotle, in his composed dialogues, introduced other speakers, but delivered the principal arguments in his own name. Cicero followed his example, in the *De Finibus* and elsewhere: "Quæ his temporibus scripsi,

*Ἀριστοτέλειον* morem habent: in quo sermo ita inducitur cæterorum, ut penes ipsum sit principatus." (Cicero ad Atticum, xiii. 19.)

Herakleides of Pontus (Cicero, *ibid.*), in his composed dialogues, introduced himself as a *καφθὸν πρόσωπον*. Plato does not even do thus much.

lished a philosophical treatise of this sort, passing himself off as editor of a platonic philosophy, or of improved doctrines of his own built thereupon, from oral communication with Plato.<sup>n</sup> We must remember that Plato himself (whether with full sincerity or not) had complimented Dionysius for his natural ability and aptitude in philosophical debate:<sup>o</sup> so that the pretension of the latter to come forward as an expositor of Plato appears the less preposterous. On the other hand, such pretension was calculated to raise a belief that Dionysius had been among the most favoured and confidential companions of Plato: which belief Plato, writing as he was to the surviving friends of Dion the enemy of Dionysius, is most anxious to remove, while on the other hand he extols the dispositions and extenuates the faults of his friend Dion. It is to vindicate himself from misconception of his own past proceedings, as well as to exhort with regard to the future, that Plato transmits to Sicily his long seventh and eighth Epistles, wherein are embodied his objections against the usefulness of written exposition intended for readers generally.

These objections (which Plato had often insisted on,<sup>p</sup> and which are also, in part, urged by Sokrates in the Phædrus) have considerable force, if we look to the way in which Plato conceives them. In the first place, Plato conceives the exposition as not merely written but published: as being, therefore, presented to all minds, the large majority being ignorant, unprepared, and beset with that false persuasion of knowledge which Sokrates regarded as universal. In so far as it comes before these latter, nothing is gained, and something is lost; for derision is brought upon the attempt to teach.<sup>q</sup> In the next place, there probably existed, at that time, no elementary

Impossibility of teaching by written exposition assumed by Plato; the assumption intelligible in his day.

<sup>n</sup> We see this from Epist. vii. 341 B, 344 D, 345 A. Plato speaks of the impression as then prevalent (when he wrote) in the mind of Dionysius:—*πότερον Διονύσιος ἀκούσας μόνον ἀπαξ οὕτως εἰδέναί τε οἴεται καὶ ἰκανῶς οἶδεν*, &c.

<sup>o</sup> Plat. Epist. ii. 314 D.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Epist. vii. 342. *λόγος ἀλη-*

*θής, πολλάκις μὲν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ καὶ πρόσθεν ῥηθείς*, &c.

<sup>q</sup> Plato (Epist. ii. 314 A) remarks this expressly: also in the Phædrus, 275 E, 276 A.

<sup>r</sup> Ἄθρει δὴ περισκοπῶν, μή τις τῶν ἀμυήτων ἐπακούσῃ, is the language of the Platonic Sokrates as a speaker in the Theætétus (155 E).



work whatever for beginners in any science : the Elements of Geometry by Euclid were published more than a century after Plato's death, at Alexandria. Now, when Plato says that written expositions, then scarcely known, would be useless to the student—he compares them with the continued presence and conversation of a competent teacher ; whom he supposes not to rely upon direct exposition, but to talk much “about and about” the subject, addressing the pupil with a large variety of illustrative interrogations, adapting all that was said to his peculiar difficulties and rate of progress, and thus evoking the inherent cognitive force of the pupil's own mind. That any Elements of Geometry (to say nothing of more complicated inquiries) could be written and published, such that an *ἀγεωμέτρητος* might take up the work and learn geometry by means of it, without being misled by equivocal names, bad definitions, and diagrams exhibiting the definition as clothed with special accessories—this is a possibility which Plato contests, and which we cannot wonder at his contesting.\* The combination of a written treatise, with the oral exposition of a tutor, would have appeared to Plato not only useless but inconvenient, as restraining the full liberty of adaptive interrogation necessary to be exercised, different in the case of each different pupil.

Lastly, when we see by what standard Plato tests the efficacy of any expository process, we shall see yet more clearly how he came to consider written exposition unavailing. The

\* Some just and pertinent remarks, bearing on this subject, are made by Condorcet, in one of his Academic Éloges :—“ Les livres ne peuvent remplacer les leçons des maîtres habiles, lorsque les sciences n'ont pas encore fait assez de progrès, pour que les vérités, qui en forment l'ensemble, puissent étre distribuées et rapprochées entre elles suivant un ordre systématique : lorsque la méthode d'en chercher de nouvelles n'a pas été réduite à des procédés exacts et simples, à des règles sûres et précises. Avant cette époque, il faut étre déjà consommé dans une science pour lire avec utilité les ouvrages qui en traitent : et comme

cette espèce d'enfance de l'art est le temps où les préjugés y régissent avec le plus d'empire—où les savants sont les plus exposés à donner leurs hypothèses pour de véritables principes—on risquerait encore de s'égarer si on se bornoit aux leçons d'un seul maître, quand même on auroit choisi celui que la Renommée place au premier : car ce temps est encore celui des réputations usurpées. Les voyages sont donc alors le seul moyen de s'instruire, comme ils l'étoient dans l'antiquité et avant l'invention de l'imprimerie.” (Condorcet, Éloge de M. Margaaf, p. 349. Œuvres Complètes. Paris, 1804. Éloges, vol. ii.)

standard which he applies is, that the learner shall be rendered able both to apply to others, and himself to endure from others, a Sokratic Elenchus or cross-examination as to the logical difficulties involved in all the steps and helps to learning. Unless he can put to others and follow up the detective questions—unless he can also answer them, when put to himself, pertinently and consistently, so as to avoid being brought to confusion or contradiction—Plato will not allow that he has attained true knowledge.<sup>s</sup> Now, if we try knowledge by a test so severe as this, we must admit that no reading of written expositions will enable the student to acquire it. The impression made is too superficial, and the mind is too passive during such a process, to be equal to the task of meeting new points of view, and combating difficulties not expressly noticed in the treatise which has been studied. The only way of permanently arming and strengthening the mind, is (according to Plato) by long-continued oral interchange and stimulus, multiplied comment and discussion from different points of view, and active exercise in dialectic debate: not aiming at victory over an opponent, but reasoning out each question in all its aspects, affirmative and negative. It is only after a long course of such training—the living word of the competent teacher, applied to the mind of the pupil, and stimulating its productive and self-defensive force—that any such knowledge

Standard by which Plato tested the efficacy of the expository process.—Power of sustaining a Sokratic cross-examination.

<sup>s</sup> Plato, *Epist.* vii. 343 D. The difficulties which Plato had here in his eye, and which he required to be solved as conditions indispensable to real knowledge—are jumped over in geometrical and other scientific expositions, as belonging not to geometry, &c., but to logic. M. Jouffroy remarks, in the Preface to his translation of Reid's works (p. clxiv.):—"Toute science particulière qui, au lieu de prendre pour accordées les données à priori qu'elle implique, discute l'autorité de ces données—ajoute à son objet propre celui de la logique, confond une autre mission avec la sienne, et par cela même compromet la sienne: car nous verrons tout à-l'heure, et l'histoire de la philosophie montre, quelles diffi-

cultés présentent ces problèmes qui sont l'objet propre de la logique; et nous demeurerons convaincus que, si les différentes sciences avaient eu la prétention de les éclaircir avant de passer outre, toutes peut-être en seraient encore à cette préface, et aucune n'aurait entamé sa véritable tâche."

Remarks of a similar bearing will be found in the second paragraph of Mr. John Stuart Mill's *Essay on Utilitarianism*. It has been found convenient to distinguish the logic of a science from the expository march of the same science. But Plato would not have acknowledged *ἐπιστήμη*, except as including both. Hence his view about the uselessness of written expository treatises.

can be realised as will suffice for the exigencies of the Sokratic Elenchus.<sup>†</sup>

Since we thus find that Plato was unconquerably averse to publication in his own name and with his own responsibility attached to the writing, on grave matters of philosophy—we cannot be surprised that, among the numerous lectures which he must have delivered to his pupils and auditors in the Academy, none were ever published. Probably he may himself have destroyed them, as he exhorts Dionysius to destroy the Epistle which we now read as second, after reading it over frequently. And we may doubt whether he was not displeased with Aristotle and Hestæus<sup>u</sup> for taking extracts from his lectures *De Bono*, and making them known to the public: just as he was displeased with Dionysius for having published a work purporting to be derived from conversations with Plato.

That Plato would never consent to write for the public in his own name, must be taken as a fact in his character; probably arising from early caution produced by the fate of Sokrates, combined with preference for the Sokratic mode of handling. But to what extent he really kept back his opinions from the public, or whether he kept them back at all, by

Plato never published any of the lectures which he delivered at the Academy.

Plato would never publish his philosophical opinions in his own name; but he may have published them in the dialogues

<sup>†</sup> This is forcibly put by Plato, *Epistol.* vii. 344 B. Compare Plato, *Republic*, vi. 499 A. *Phædrus*, 276 A-E. τὸν τοῦ εἰδότης λόγον ζῶντα καὶ ἐμψυχον, &c.

Though Plato, in the *Phædrus*, declares oral teaching to be the only effectual way of producing a permanent and deep-seated effect—as contrasted with the more superficial effect produced by reading a written exposition: yet even oral teaching, when addressed in the form of continuous lecture or sermon (*ἄνευ ἀνακρίσεως καὶ διδαχῆς*, *Phædrus*, 277 E; τὸ νουθετητικὸν εἶδος, *Sophistês*, p. 230), is represented elsewhere as of little effect. To produce any permanent result, you must diversify the point of view—you must test by circumlocutory interrogation—you must begin by dispelling established errors, &c. See the careful

explanation of the passage in the *Phædrus* (277 E), given by Ueberweg, *Aechtheit der Platon. Schrift.* pp. 16-22. Direct teaching, in many of the Platonic dialogues, is not counted as capable of producing serious improvement.

When we come to the *Menon* and the *Phædon*, we shall hear more of the Platonic doctrine—that knowledge was to be evolved out of the mind, not poured into it from without.

<sup>u</sup> Themistius mentions it as a fact recorded (I wish he had told us where or by whom) that Aristotle stoutly opposed the Platonic doctrine of Objective Ideas, even during the lifetime of Plato. *ιστορεῖται δὲ ὅτι καὶ ζῶντος τοῦ Πλάτωνος καρπερώτατα περὶ τούτου τοῦ δόγματος ἐγένετο ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης πρὸ Πλάτωνι.* (*Scholia ad Aristotel. Analyt. Poster.* p. 228 b. 16 Brandis.)

design—I do not undertake to say. The borrowed names under which he wrote, and the veil of dramatic fiction, gave him greater freedom as to the thoughts enunciated, and were adopted for the express purpose of acquiring greater freedom. How far the lectures which he delivered to his own special auditory differed from the opinions made known in his dialogues to the general reader, or how far his conversation with a few advanced pupils differed from both—are questions which we have no sufficient means of answering. There probably was a considerable difference. Aristotle alludes to various doctrines of Plato which we cannot find in the Platonic writings: but these doctrines are not such as could have given peculiar offence, if published; they are, rather, abstruse and hard to understand. It may also be true (as Tennemann says) that Plato had two distinct modes of handling philosophy—a popular and a scientific: but it cannot be true (as the same learned author<sup>x</sup> asserts) that his published dialogues contained the popular and not the scientific. No one surely can regard the *Timæus*, *Parmenidês*, *Philêbus*, *Theætêtus*, *Sophistês*, *Politikus*, &c., as works in which dark or difficult questions are kept out of sight for the purpose of attracting the ordinary reader. Among the dialogues themselves (as I have before remarked) there exist the widest differences; some highly popular and attractive, others altogether the reverse, and many gradations between the two. Though I do not doubt therefore that Plato produced powerful effect both as lecturer to a special audience, and as talker with chosen students—yet in what respects such lectures and conversation differed from what we read in his dialogues, I do not feel that we have any means of knowing.

\* See Tennemann, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. ii. p. 205, 215, 221 seq. This portion of Tennemann's History is valuable, as it takes due account of the seventh Platonic Epistle, compared with the remarkable passage in the *Phædrus* about the inefficacy of written exposition for the purpose of teaching.

But I cannot think that Tennemann rightly interprets the *Epistol. vii.* I

see no proof that Plato had any secret or esoteric philosophy, reserved for a few chosen pupils, and not proclaimed to the public from apprehension of giving offence to established creeds; though I believe such apprehension to have operated as one motive, deterring him from publishing any philosophical exposition under his own name—any *Πλάτωνος σύγγραμμα*.

In judging of Plato, we must confine ourselves to the evidence furnished by one or more of the existing Platonic compositions, adding the testimony of Aristotle and a few others respecting Platonic views not declared in the dialogues. Though little can be predicated respecting the dialogues collectively, I shall say something about the various groups into which they admit of being thrown, before I touch upon them separately and *seriatim*.

The scheme proposed by Thrasyllus, so far as intended to furnish a symmetrical arrangement of all the Platonic works, is defective, partly because the apporportionment of the separate works between the two leading classes is in several cases erroneous—partly because the discrimination of the two leading classes, as well as the sub-division of one of the two, is founded on diversity of Method, while the sub-division of the other class is founded on diversity of Subject. But the scheme is nevertheless useful, as directing our attention to real and important attributes belonging in common to considerable groups of dialogues. It is in this respect preferable to the fanciful dramatic partnership of trilogies and tetralogies, as well as to the mystical interpretation and arrangement suggested by the Neo-platonists. The Dialogues of Exposition—in which one who knows (or professes to know) some truth, announces and developes it to those who do not know it—are contrasted with those of Search or Investigation, in which the element of knowledge and affirmative communication is wanting. All the interlocutors are at once ignorant and eager to know; all of them are jointly engaged in searching for the unknown, though one among them stands prominent both in suggesting where to look and in testing all that is found, whether it be really the thing looked for. Among the expository dialogues, the most marked specimens are Timæus and Epinomis, in neither of which is there any searching or testing debate at all. Republic, Phædon, Philêbus, exhibit exposition preceded or accompanied by a search. Of the dialogues of pure investigation, the most elaborate specimen is the Theætétus: Menon, Lachés, Charmidês, Lysis, Euthy-

Groups into which the dialogues admit of being thrown.

Distribution made by Thrasyllus defective, but still useful—Dialogues of Search, Dialogues of Exposition.

phron, &c., are of the like description, yet less worked out. There are also several others. In the *Menon*, indeed,<sup>7</sup> Sokrates goes so far as to deny that there can be any real teaching, and to contend that what appears teaching is only resuscitation of buried or forgotten knowledge.

Of these two classes of Dialogues, the Expository are those which exhibit the distinct attribute—an affirmative result or doctrine, announced and developed by a person professing to know, and proved in a manner more or less satisfactory. The other class—the Searching or Investigative—have little else in common except the absence of this property. We find in them debate, refutation, several points of view canvassed and some shown to be untenable; but there is no affirmative result established, or even announced as established, at the close. Often there is even a confession of disappointment. In other respects, the dialogues of this class are greatly diversified among one another: they have only the one common attribute—much debate, with absence of affirmative result.

Dialogues of Exposition—present affirmative result. Dialogues of Search are wanting in that attribute.

Now the distribution made by Thrasyllus of the dialogues under two general heads (1. Dialogues of Search or Investigation. 2. Dialogues of Exposition.) coincides, to a considerable extent, with the two distinct intellectual methods recognised by Aristotle as Dialectic and Demonstrative: Dialectic being handled by Aristotle in the *Topica*, and Demonstration in the *Posterior Analytica*. “Dialectic” (says Aristotle) “is tentative, respecting those matters of which philosophy aims at cognizance.” Accordingly, Dialectic (as well as Rhetoric) embraces all matters without exception, but in a tentative and searching way, recognising arguments *pro* as well as *con*, and bringing to view the antithesis between the two, without any preliminary assumption or predetermined direction, the questioner being bound to proceed only on the answers given by the respondent: while philosophy comes afterwards, dividing this large field into appropriate compartments, laying down authori-

The distribution coincides mainly with that of Aristotle—Dialectic, Demonstrative.

<sup>7</sup> Plato, *Menon*, p. 81-82.

tative *principia* in regard to each, and deducing from them, by logical process, various positive results.<sup>2</sup> Plato does not use the term Dialectic exactly in the same sense as Aristotle. He implies by it two things:—1. That the process shall be colloquial, two or more minds engaged in a joint research, each of them animating and stimulating the others. 2. That the matter investigated shall be general—some general question or proposition: that the premisses shall all be general truths, and that the objects kept before the mind shall be Forms or Species, apart from particulars.<sup>3</sup> Here it stands in contrast with Rhetoric, which aims at the determination of some particular case or debated course of conduct, judicial or political, and which is intended to end in some immediate practical verdict or vote. Dialectic, in Plato's sense, comprises the whole process of philosophy. His Dialogues of Search correspond to Aristotle's Dialectic, being machinery for generating arguments and for ensuring that every argument shall be subjected to the interrogation of an opponent: his Dialogues of Exposition, wherein some definite result is enunciated and proved (sufficiently or not), correspond to what Aristotle calls Demonstration.

If now we take the main scheme of distributing the Platonic Dialogues, proposed by Thrasyllus—1. Dialogues of Exposition, with an affirmative result; 2. Dialogues of Investigation or Search, without an affirmative result—and if we compare the number of Dialogues (out of the thirty-six in all), which he specifies as belonging to each—we shall find twenty-two specified under the former head,

Classification of Thrasyllus in its details. He applies his own principles erroneously.

<sup>2</sup> Aristot. Metaphys. A. 1004, b. 25. ἡ διαλεκτικὴ, πειραστικὴ, περὶ ὧν ἡ φιλοσοφία γνωριστικὴ. Compare also Rhetoric, i. 2, p. 1356, a. 33, i. 4, p. 1359, b. 12, where he treats Dialectic (as well as Rhetoric) not as methods of acquiring instruction on any definite matter, but as inventive and argumentative aptitudes—powers of providing premisses and arguments—*δυνάμεις τῶς τοῦ πορίσαι λόγους*. If (he says) you try to convert Dialectic from a method of discussion into a method of cognition, you will insen-

sibly eliminate its true nature and character:—*ὅσῳ δ' ἂν τις ἢ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἢ ταύτην, μὴ καθάπερ ἂν δυνάμεις ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμας πειράται κατασκευάζειν, λήσεται τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν ἀφανίσας, τῷ μεταβαίνειν ἐπισκευάζων εἰς ἐπιστήμας ὑποκειμένων τινῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ μόνον λόγων.*

The Platonic Dialogues of Search are *δυνάμεις τοῦ πορίσαι λόγους*. Compare the Proemium of Cicero to his *Paradoxa*.

<sup>3</sup> Plato, *Republ.* vi. 511, vii. 532.

and fourteen under the latter. Moreover, among the twenty-two are ranked Republic and Leges: each of them greatly exceeding in bulk any other composition of Plato. It would appear thus that there is a preponderance both in number and bulk on the side of the Expository. But when we analyse the lists of Thrasyllus, we see that he has unduly enlarged that side of the account, and unduly contracted the other. He has enrolled among the Expository—1. The Apology, the Epistolæ, and the Menexenus, which ought not properly to be ranked under either head. 2. The Theætétus, Parmenidês, Hipparchus, Erastæ, Minos, Kleitophon—every one of which ought to be transferred to the other head. 3. The Phædrus, Symposium, and Kratylus, which are admissible by indulgence, since they do indeed present affirmative exposition, but in small proportion compared to the negative criticism, the rhetorical and poetical ornament: they belong in fact to both classes, but more preponderantly to one. 4. The Republic. This he includes with perfect justice, for the eight last books of it are expository. Yet the first book exhibits to us a specimen of negative and refutative dialectic which is not surpassed by anything in Plato.

On the other hand, Thrasyllus has placed among the Dialogues of Search one, which might with equal or greater propriety, be ranked among the Expository—the Protagoras. It is true that this dialogue involves much of negation, refutation, and dramatic ornament: and that the question propounded in the beginning (Whether virtue be teachable?) is not terminated. But there are two portions of the dialogue which are, both of them, decided specimens of affirmative exposition—the speech of Protagoras in the earlier part (wherein the growth of virtue, without special teaching or professional masters, is elucidated)—and the argument of Sokrates at the close, wherein the identity of the Good and the Pleasurable is established.<sup>b</sup>

<sup>b</sup> We may remark that Thrasyllus, though he enrols the Protagoras under the class Investigative, and the subclass Agonistic, places it alone in a still lower class which he calls Ἐνδεικτικός. Now, if we turn to the Platonic dialogue Euthydêmus, p. 278 D, we shall see that Plato uses the words ἐνδείξομαι and ὑφηγησομαι as exact equivalents: so that ἐνδεικτικός would have the same meaning as ὑφηγητικός.



The classification, as it would stand, if his principles were applied correctly.

If then we rectify the lists of Thrasyllus, they will stand as follows, with the expository Dialogues much diminished in number:—

*Dialogues of Investigation or Search.*

Ζητητικοί.

1. Theætétus.
2. Parmenidès.
3. Alkibiadès I.
4. Alkibiadès II. —
5. Theagès. —
6. Lachès.
7. Lysis.
8. Charmidès.
9. Menon.
10. Ion.
11. Euthyphron.
12. Euthydémus.
13. Gorgias.
14. Hippias I.
15. Hippias II.
16. Kleitophon. —
17. Hipparchus. —
18. Erastè. —
19. Minos. —

*Dialogues of Exposition.*

Ἐξηγητικοί.

1. Timæus.
2. Leges.
3. Epinomis. —
4. Kritias.
5. Republic.
6. Sophistès.
7. Politikus.
8. Phædon.
9. Philèbus.
10. Protagoras.
11. Phædrus.
12. Symposion.
13. Kratylus.
14. Kriton.

—  
The Apology, Menexenus, Epistolæ, do not properly belong to either head.

Preponderance of the searching and testing dialogues over the expository and dogmatical.

It will thus appear, from a fair estimate and comparison of lists, that the relation which Plato bears to philosophy is more that of a searcher, tester, and impugner, than that of an expositor and dogmatist—though he undertakes both the two functions: more negative than affirmative—more ingenious in pointing out difficulties, than successful in solving them. I must again repeat that though this classification is just, as far as it goes, and the best which can be applied to the dialogues, taken as a whole—yet the dialogues have much which will not enter into the classification, and each has its own peculiarities.

The Dialogues of Search, thus comprising more than half of the Platonic compositions, are again distributed by Thrasyllus into two sub-classes—Gymnastic and Agonistic: the Gymnastic, again, into Obstetric and Peirastic; the Agonistic, into Probative and Refutative. Here, again, there is a pretence of symmetrical arrangement, which will not hold good if we examine

Dialogues of Search—sub-classes among them recognised by Thrasyllus—Gymnastic and Agonistic, &c.

it closely. Nevertheless, the epithets point to real attributes of various dialogues, and deserve the more attention, inasmuch as they imply a view of philosophy foreign to the prevalent way of looking at it. Obstetric and Tentative or Testing (Peirastic) are epithets which a reader may understand; but he will not easily see how they bear upon the process of philosophy.

The term *philosopher* is generally understood to mean something else. In appreciating a philosopher, it is usual to ask, What authoritative creed has he proclaimed, for disciples to swear allegiance to? What positive system, or positive truths previously unknown or unproved, has he established? Next, by what arguments has he enforced or made them good? This is the ordinary proceeding of an historian of philosophy, as he calls up the roll of successive names. The philosopher is assumed to speak as one having authority; to have already made up his mind; and to be prepared to explain what his mind is. Readers require positive results announced, and positive evidence set before them, in a clear and straightforward manner. They are intolerant of all that is prolix, circuitous, not essential to the proof of the thesis in hand. Above all, an affirmative result is indispensable.

Philosophy, as now understood, includes authoritative teaching, positive results, direct proofs.

When I come to the *Timæus*, and *Republic*, &c., I shall consider what reply Plato could make to these questions. In the mean time, I may observe that if philosophers are to be estimated by such a scale, he will not stand high on the list. Even in his expository dialogues, he cares little about clear proclamation of results, and still less about the shortest, straightest, and most certain road for attaining them.

But as to those numerous dialogues which are not expository, Plato could make no reply to the questions at all. There are no affirmative results:—and there is a process of enquiry, not only fruitless, but devious, circuitous, and intentionally protracted. The authoritative character of a philosopher is disclaimed. Not only Plato never delivers sentence in his own name, but his principal spokesman, far

The Platonic Dialogues of Search disclaim authority and teaching—assume truth to be unknown to all alike—follow a process devious as well as fruitless.

from speaking with authority, declares that he has not made up his own mind, and that he is only a searcher along with others, more eager in the chase than they are.<sup>c</sup> Philosophy is conceived as the search for truth still unknown; not as an explanation of truth by one who knows it, to others who do not know it. The process of search is considered as being in itself profitable and invigorating, even though what is sought be not found. The ingenuity of Sokrates is shown, not by what he himself produces, for he avows himself altogether barren—but by his obstetric aid: that is, by his being able to evolve, from a youthful mind, answers of which it is pregnant, and to test the soundness and trustworthiness of those answers when delivered: by his power, besides, of exposing or refuting unsound answers, and of convincing others of the fallacy of that which they confidently believed themselves to know.

To eliminate affirmative, authoritative exposition, which proceeds upon the assumption that truth is already known—and to consider philosophy as a search for unknown truth, carried on by several interlocutors all of them ignorant—this is the main idea which Plato inherited from Sokrates, and worked out in more than one-half of his dialogues. It is under this general head that the subdivisions of Thrasyllus fall—the Obstetric, the Testing or Verifying, the Refutative. The process is one in which both the two concurrent minds are active, but each with an inherent activity peculiar to itself. The questioner does not follow a predetermined course of his own, but proceeds altogether on the answer given to him. He himself furnishes only an indispensable stimulus to the parturition of something with which the respondent is already pregnant, and applies testing questions to that which he hears, until the respondent is himself satisfied that the answer will not

The questioner has no predetermined course, but follows the lead given by the respondent in his answers.

<sup>c</sup> In addition to the declarations of Sokrates to this effect in the Platonic Apology (pp. 21-23), we read the like in many Platonic dialogues. Gorgias, 506 A. οὐδὲ γάρ τοι ἔγωγε εἰδῶς λέγων ἄ λέγω, ἀλλὰ ζητῶ κοινῇ μεθ' ὑμῶν: and even in the Republic, in many parts of which there is much dogmatism and affirmation: v. p. 450 E. ἀπιστοῦντα δὲ καὶ ζητοῦντα ἔτι τοὺς λόγους ποιείσθαι, ὃ δὴ ἐγὼ δρῶ, &c. See Routh's note on the above passage of the Gorgias.

hold. Throughout all this, there is a constant appeal to the free, self-determining judgment of the respondent's own mind, combined with a stimulus exciting the intellectual productiveness of that mind to the uttermost.

What chiefly deserves attention here, as a peculiar phase in the history of philosophy, is, that the relation of teacher and learner is altogether suppressed. Sokrates not only himself disclaims the province and title of a teacher, but treats with contemptuous banter those who assume it. Now "the learner" (to use a memorable phrase of Aristotle<sup>d</sup>) "is under obligation to believe:" he must be a passive recipient of that which is communicated to him by the teacher. The relation between the two is that of authority on the one side, and of belief generated by authority on the other. But Sokrates requires from no man implicit trust: nay he deprecates it as dangerous.<sup>e</sup> It is one peculiarity in these Sokratic dialogues, that the sentiment of authority, instead of being invoked and worked up, as is generally done in philosophy, is formally disavowed and practically set aside. "I have not made up my mind: I am not prepared to swear allegiance to any creed: I give you the reasons for and against each: you must decide for yourself."<sup>f</sup>

Relation of teacher and learner. Appeal to authority is suppressed.

<sup>d</sup> Aristot. De Sophist. Elenchis, Top. ix. p. 165, b. 2. *δεῖ γὰρ πιστεῖν τὸν μαθητὸν.*

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Protagor. p. 314 B.

<sup>f</sup> The sentiment of the Academic sect—descending from Sokrates and Plato, not through Xenokrates and Polemon, but through Arkesilaus and Karneades—illustrates the same elimination of the idea of authority. "Why are you so curious to know what *I myself* have determined on the point? Here are the reasons *pro* and *con*: weigh the one against the other, and then judge for yourself."

See, for example, Cicero, Tusc. Disp. iv. 4-7. "Sed defendat quod quisque sentit: sunt enim judicia libera: nos institutum tenebimus, nulliusque unius disciplinæ legibus adstricti, quibus in philosophiâ necessario pareamus, quid sit in quâque re maximè probabile, semper requiremus."

Again, Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i. 5-10-13. "Qui autem requirunt, quid quâque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosius id faciunt quam necesse est. *Non enim tam auctoritatis in disputando quam rationis momenta quærenda sunt.* Quin etiam obest plerumque iis, qui discere volunt, auctoritas eorum qui se docere profitentur: desinunt enim suum iudicium adhibere; id habent ratum, quod ab eo quem probant indicatum vident. . . . Si singulas disciplinas percipere magnum est, quanto majus omnes? Quod facere iis necesse est, quibus propositum est, veri reperendi causâ, et contra omnes philosophos et pro omnibus dicere. Nec tamen fieri potest, ut qui hâc ratione philosophantur, ii nihil habeant quod sequantur. Non enim sumus ii quibus nihil verum esse videatur, sed ii, qui omnibus veris adjuncta quædam falsa esse dicamus, tantâ similitudine ut in iis nulla insit

This process—the search for truth as an unknown—is in the modern world put out of sight. All discussion is conducted by persons who profess to have found it or learnt it, and to be in condition to proclaim it to others. Even the philosophical works of Cicero are usually pleadings by two antagonists, each of whom professes to know the truth, though Cicero does not decide between them: and in this respect they differ from the groping and fumbling of the Platonic dialogues. Of course the search for truth must go on in modern times, as it did in ancient: but it goes on silently and without notice. The most satisfactory theories have been preceded by many infructuous guesses and tentatives. The theorist may try many different hypotheses (we are told that Kepler tried nineteen) which he is forced successively to reject; and he may perhaps end without finding any better. But all these tentatives, verifying tests, doubts, and rejections, are confined to his own bosom or his own study. He looks back upon them without interest, sometimes even with disgust; least of all does he seek to describe them in detail as objects of interest to others. They are probably known to none but himself: for it does not occur to him to follow the Platonic scheme of taking another mind into partnership, and entering upon that distribution of active intellectual work which we read in the *Theætētus*. There are cases in which two chemists have carried on joint researches, under many failures and disappointments, perhaps at last without success. If a record were preserved of their parley during the investigation, the grounds for testing and rejecting one conjecture, and for selecting what should be tried after it—this would be in many points a parallel to the Platonic process.

But at Athens in the fourth century B.C., the search for truth by two or more minds in partnership was not so rare a phenomenon. The active intellects of Athens were dis-

certa judicandi et assentiendi nota. Ex quo existit illud, multa esse probabilia, quæ quanquam non perciperentur, tamen quia visum habent quendam insignem et illustrem, iis sapientis vita regetur.”  
Compare Cicero, *Tuse. Disp.* ii. sect. 2-3-5-9. Quintilian, xii. 2-25.

tributed between Rhetoric, which addressed itself to multitudes, accepted all established sentiments, and handled for the most part particular issues—and Dialectic, in which a select few debated among themselves general questions.<sup>§</sup> Of this Dialectic, the real Sokrates was the greatest master that Athens ever saw: he could deal as he chose (says Xenophon<sup>h</sup>) with all disputants: he turned them round his finger. In this process, one person set up a thesis, and the other cross-examined him upon it: the most irresistible of all cross-examiners was, the real Sokrates. The nine books of Aristotle's *Topica* (including the book *De Sophisticis Elenchis*) are composed with the object of furnishing suggestions, and indicating rules, both to the cross-examiner and to the respondent, in such Dialectic debates. Plato does not lay down any rules: but he has given us, in his dialogues of search, specimens of dialectic procedure shaped in his own fashion. Several of his contemporaries, companions of Sokrates, like him, did the same each in his own way: but their compositions have not survived.<sup>i</sup>

Such compositions give something like fair play to the negative arm of philosophy; in the employment of which the

§ The habit of supposing a general question to be undecided, and of having it argued by competent advocates before auditors who have not made up their minds—is now so disused (everywhere except in a court of law), that one reads with surprise Galen's declaration that the different competing medical theories were so discussed in his day. His master Pelops maintained a disputation of two days with a rival:—*ἦνικα Πέλοψ μετὰ Φιλίππου τοῦ ἐμπειρικοῦ διελέχθη δυοῖν ἡμερῶν τοῦ μὲν Πέλοπος, ὡς μὴ δυναμένης τῆς ἰατρικῆς δι' ἐμπειρίας μόνης συστήναι, τοῦ Φιλίππου δὲ ἐπιδεικνύοντος δύνασθαι.* (Galen, *De Propriis Libris*, c. 2, p. 16, Kühn.)

Galen notes (ib. 2, p. 21) the habit of literary men at Rome to assemble in the temple of Pax, for the purpose of discussing logical questions, prior to the conflagration which destroyed that temple.

<sup>h</sup> Xenophon, *Memorab.* i. 2.

<sup>i</sup> The dialogues composed by Aristotle himself were in great measure

dialogues of search, exercises of argumentation *pro* and *con* (Cicero, *De Finib.* v. 4). "Aristoteles, ut solet, quaerendi gratiâ, quædam subtilitatis suæ argumenta excogitavit in Gryllo," &c. (Quintilian, *Inst. Rhet.* ii. 17.)

Bernays indicates the probable titles of many among the lost Aristotelian Dialogues (*Die Dialoge des Aristoteles*, pp. 132, 133, Berlin, 1863), and gives in his book many general remarks upon them.

The observations of Aristotle in *Metaphys.* (A. *ἐλάττων* 993, b. 1-16) are conceived in a large and just spirit. He says that among all the searchers for truth, none completely succeed, and none completely fail: those, from whose conclusions we dissent, do us service by exercising our intelligence—*τῆν γὰρ ἔξιν προήσκησαν ἡμῶν.* The enumeration of *ἀπόρριαι* in the following book B of the *Metaphysica* is a continuation of the same views. Compare *Scholia*, p. 604, b. 29, Brandis.

Eleate Zeno first became celebrated, and the real Sokrates yet more celebrated. This negative arm is no less essential than the affirmative, to the validity of a body of reasoned truth, such as philosophy aspires to be. To know how to disprove is quite as important as to know how to prove: the one is co-ordinate and complementary to the other. And the man who disproves what is false, or guards mankind against assenting to it,<sup>k</sup> renders a service to philosophy; even though he may not be able to render the ulterior service of proving any truth in its place.

By historians of ancient philosophy negative procedure is generally considered as represented by the Sophists and the Megarici, and is the main ground for those harsh epithets which are commonly applied to both of them. The negative (they think) can only be tolerated in small doses, and even then merely as ancillary to the affirmative. That is, if you have an affirmative theory to propose, you are allowed to urge such objections as you think applicable against rival theories, but only in order to make room for your own. It seems to be assumed as requiring no proof, that the confession of ignorance is an intolerable condition; which every man ought to be ashamed of in himself, and which no man is justified in inflicting on any one else. If you deprive the reader of one affirmative solution, you are required to furnish him with another which you are prepared to guarantee as the true one. "Le Roi est mort—Vive le Roi:" the throne must never be vacant. It is plain that under such a restricted application, the full force of the negative case is never brought out. The pleadings are left in the hands of counsel, each of whom takes up only such fragments of the negative case as suit the interests of his client, and suppresses or slurs over all such other fragments of it as make against his client. But to every theory (especially on the topics discussed by Sokrates and Plato) there

<sup>k</sup> The Stoics had full conviction of this. In Cicero's summary of the Stoic doctrine (*De Finibus*, iii. 21-72) we read:—"Ad easque virtutes, de quibus disputatum est, Dialecticam etiam adjuvant (Stoici) et Physicam: easque ambas virtutum nomine appellant: alteram (*sc.* Dialecticam), quod habeat rationem, ne cui falso adsentiamur, neve unquam captiosâ probabilitate fallamur; eaque, quæ de bonis malisque didicerimus, ut tenere tuerique possimus."

are more or less of objections applicable—even the best theory being true only on the balance. And if the purpose be to ensure a complete body of reasoned truth, all these objections ought to be faithfully exhibited, by one who stands forward as their express advocate, without being previously retained for any separate or inconsistent purpose.

How much Plato himself, in his dialogues of search, felt his own vocation as champion of the negative procedure, we see marked conspicuously in the dialogue called *Parmenidès*. This dialogue is throughout a protest against forward affirmation, and an assertion of independent *locus standi* for the negationist and objector. The claims of the latter must first be satisfied, before the affirmant can be considered as solvent. The advocacy of those claims is here confided to the veteran *Parmenides*, who sums them up in a formidable total: *Sokrates* being opposed to him under the unusual disguise of a youthful and forward affirmant. *Parmenides* makes no pretence of advancing any rival doctrine. The theories which he selects for criticism are the Platonic theory of intelligible Concepts, and his own theory of the *Unum*: he indicates how many objections must be removed—how many contradictions must be solved—how many opposite hypotheses must be followed out to their results—before either of these theories can be affirmed with assurance. The exigencies enumerated and do appear insurmountable:<sup>1</sup> but of that Plato takes no account. Such laborious exercises are inseparable from the process of searching for truth, and unless a man has strength to go through them, no truth, or at least no reasoned truth, can be found and maintained.<sup>m</sup>

Vocation of Sokrates and Plato for the negative procedure: absolute necessity of it as a condition of reasoned truth. *Parmenidès* of Plato.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Parmenid*, p. 136 B. δεῖ σκοπεῖν—εἰ μέλλεις τέλειως γυμνασάμενος κυρίως διόψεσθαι τὰ ληθές. Ἀμύχανον, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὦ Παρμενίδη, πραγμάτειαν, &c.

Aristotle declares that no man can be properly master of any affirmative truth without having examined and solved all the objections and difficulties—the negative portion of the enquiry. To go through all these ἀπορίας is the indispensable first stage, and perhaps

the enquirer may not be able to advance farther, see *Metaphysic. B.* 995, a. 26, 996, a. 16—one of the most striking passages in his works. Compare also what he says, *De Cœlo*, ii. 294, b. 10, διὸ δεῖ τὸν μέλλοντα καλῶς ζητήσῃν ἐνοστατικὸν εἶναι διὰ τῶν οἰκείων ἐνοστάσεων τῷ γένει, τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἐκ τοῦ πάσας τεθεωρηκέναι τὰς διαφορὰς.

<sup>m</sup> That the only road to trustworthy affirmation, lies through a string of negations, unfolded and appreciated by



It will thus appear that among the conditions requisite for philosophy, both Sokrates and Plato regarded the negative procedure as co-ordinate in value with the affirmative, and indispensable as a preliminary stage. But Sokrates went a step farther. He assigned to the negative an intrinsic importance by itself, apart from all implication with the affirmative; and he rested that opinion upon a psychological ground, formally avowed, and far larger than anything laid down by the Sophists. He thought that the natural state of the human mind, among established communities, was not simply ignorance, but ignorance mistaking itself for knowledge—false or uncertified belief—false persuasion of knowledge. The only way of dissipating such false persuasion was, the effective stimulus of the negative test, or cross-examining Elenchus; whereby a state of non-belief, or painful consciousness of ignorance, was substituted in its place. Such second state was indeed not the best attainable. It ought to

Sokrates considered the negative procedure to be valuable by itself, and separately. His theory of the natural state of the human mind; not ignorance, but false persuasion of knowledge.

systematic procedure, is strongly insisted on by Bacon, *Novum Organum*, ii. 15, "Omnino Deo (formarum inditori et opifici), aut fortasse angelis et intelligentiis, competit, formas per affirmationem immediatè nosse, atque ab initio contemplationis. Sed certè suprâ hominem est: cui tantum conceditur, procedere primo per negativas, et postremo loco desinere in affirmativas, post omnimodam exclusionem." Compare another Aphorism, i. 46.

The following passage, transcribed from the Lectures of a distinguished physical philosopher of the present day, is conceived in the spirit of the Platonic Dialogues of Search, though Plato would have been astonished at such patient multiplication of experiments:—

"I should hardly sustain your interest in stating the difficulties which at first beset the investigation conducted with this apparatus, or the numberless precautions which the exact balancing of the two powerful sources of heat, here resorted to, rendered necessary. I believe the experiments, made with atmospheric air alone, might be numbered by tens of thousands. Sometimes for a week, or

even for a fortnight, coincident and satisfactory results would be obtained: the strict conditions of accurate experimenting would appear to be found, when an additional day's experience would destroy this hope and necessitate a recommencement, under changed conditions, of the whole inquiry. It is this which daunts the experimenter. It is this preliminary fight with the entanglements of a subject so dark, so doubtful, so uncheering, without any knowledge whether the conflict is to lead to anything worth possessing, that renders discovery difficult and rare. But the experimenter, and particularly the young experimenter, ought to know that as regards his own moral manhood, he cannot but win, if he only contend aright. *Even with a negative result, the consciousness that he has gone fairly to the bottom of his subject, as far as his means allowed—the feeling that he has not shunned labour, though that labour may have resulted in laying bare the nakedness of his case—re-acts upon his own mind, and gives it firmness for future work.*" (Tyndall, Lectures on Heat, considered as a Mode of Motion, Lect. x. p. 332.)

be preliminary to a third, acquired by the struggles of the mind to escape from such painful consciousness; and to rise, under the continued stimulus of the tutelary Elenchus, to improved affirmative and defensible beliefs. But even if this third state were never reached, Sokrates declared the second state to be a material amendment on the first, which he deprecated as alike pernicious and disgraceful.

The psychological conviction here described stands proclaimed by Sokrates himself, with remarkable earnestness and emphasis, in his Apology before the Dikasts, only a month before his death. So deeply did he take to heart the prevalent false persuasion of knowledge, alike universal among all classes, mischievous, and difficult to correct—that he declared himself to have made war against it throughout his life, under a mission imposed upon him by the Delphian God; and to have incurred thereby wide-spread hatred among his fellow-citizens. To convict men, by cross-examination, of ignorance in respect to those matters which each man believed himself to know well and familiarly—this was the constant employment and the mission of Sokrates: not to teach—for he disclaimed the capacity of teaching—but to make men feel their own ignorance instead of believing themselves to know. Such cross-examination, conducted usually before an audience, however it might be salutary and indispensable, was intended to humiliate the respondent, and could hardly fail to offend and exasperate him. No one felt satisfaction except some youthful auditors, who admired the acuteness with which it was conducted. “I” (declared Sokrates) “am distinguished from others, and superior to others, by this character only—that I am conscious of my own ignorance: the wisest of men would be he who had the like consciousness; but as yet I have looked for such a man in vain.”<sup>n</sup>

In delivering this emphatic declaration, Sokrates himself intimates his apprehension that the Dikasts will treat his

<sup>n</sup> Plat. Apol. S. pp. 23-29. It is not easy to select particular passages for reference; for the sentiments which I have indicated pervade nearly the whole discourse.

Declaration of Sokrates in the Apology; his constant mission to make war against the false persuasion of knowledge.

discourse as mockery; that they will not believe him to be in earnest; that they will scarcely have patience to hear him claim a divine mission for so strange a purpose.<sup>o</sup> The declaration is indeed singular, and probably many of the Dikasts did so regard it; while those who thought it serious, heard it with repugnance. The separate value of the negative procedure or Elenchus was never before so unequivocally asserted, or so highly estimated. To disabuse men of those false beliefs which they mistook for knowledge, and to force on them the painful consciousness that they knew nothing—was extolled as the greatest service which could be rendered to them, and as rescuing them from a degraded and slavish state of mind.<sup>p</sup>

To understand the full purpose of Plato's dialogues of search—testing, exercising, refuting, but not finding or providing—we must keep in mind the Sokratic Apology. Whoever, after reading the Theætétus, Lachês, Charmidês, Lysis, Parmenidês, &c., is tempted to exclaim—"But, after all, Plato *must* have had in his mind some ulterior doctrine of conviction which he wished to impress, but which he has not clearly intimated," will see, by the Sokratic Apology, that such a presumption is noway justifiable. Plato is a searcher, and has not yet made up his own mind: this is what he himself tells us, and what I literally believe, though few or none of his critics will admit it. His purpose in the dialogues of search, is plainly and sufficiently enunciated in the words addressed by Sokrates to Theætétus—"Answer without being daunted: for if we prosecute our search, one of two alternatives is certain—either we shall find what we are looking for, or we shall get clear of the persuasion that we know what in reality we do not yet know. Now

<sup>o</sup> Plato, *Apol. S.* pp. 20-38.

<sup>p</sup> Aristotle, in the first book of *Metaphysica* (982. b. 18), when repeating a statement made in the Theætétus of Plato (155 D), that wonder is the beginning, or point of departure, of philosophy—explains the phrase by saying, that wonder is accompanied

by a painful conviction of ignorance and sense of embarrassment. *ὁ δὲ ἀπορῶν καὶ θαυμάζων οἴεται ἀγνοεῖν—διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν ἀγνοίαν ἐφιλοσόφησαν—οὐ χρήσεως τινὸς ἔνεκεν.* This painful conviction of ignorance is what Sokrates sought to bring about.

a recompense like this will leave no room for dissatisfaction."<sup>4</sup>

What those topics were, in respect to which Sokrates found this universal belief of knowledge, without the reality of knowledge—we know, not merely from the dialogues of Plato, but also from the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon. Sokrates did not touch upon recondite matters—upon the Kosmos, astronomy, meteorology. Such

False persuasion of knowledge—had reference to topics social, political, ethical.

<sup>4</sup> Plato, *Theætét.* 187 C. *ἐὰν γὰρ οὕτω δρώμεν, δυοῖν θάτερον—ἢ εἰρήσομεν ἐφ' ὃ ἐρχόμεθα, ἢ ἤττον οἰησόμεθα εἰδέναι ὃ μῆδαμῆ ἴσμεν· καίτοι οὐκ ἂν εἴη μὲν πρὸς μίσθος ὁ τοιοῦτος.* Bonitz (in his *Platonische Studien*, pp. 8, 9, 74, 76, &c.) is one of the few critics who deprecates the confidence and boldness with which recent scholars have ascribed to Plato affirmative opinions and systematic purpose which he does not directly announce. Bonitz vindicates the separate value and separate *locus standi* of the negative process in Plato's estimation, particularly in the example of the *Theætétus*. Susemihl, in the preface to his second part, has controverted these views of Bonitz—in my judgment without any success.

The following observations of recent French scholars are just, though they imply too much the assumption that there is always some affirmative jewel wrapped up in Plato's complicated folds. M. Egger observes (*Histoire de la Critique chez les Grecs*, Paris, 1849, p. 85):—

“La philosophie de Platon n'offre pas, en général, un ensemble de parties très rigoureusement liées entre elles. D'abord, il ne l'expose que sous forme dialoguée; et dans ses dialogues, où il ne prend jamais de rôle personnel, on ne voit pas clairement auquel des interlocuteurs il a confié la défense de ses propres opinions. Parmi ces interlocuteurs, Socrate lui-même, le plus ordinaire et le plus naturel interprète de la pensée de son disciple, use fort souvent des libertés de cette forme toute dramatique, pour se jouer dans les distinctions subtiles, pour exagérer certains arguments, pour couper court à une discussion embarrassante, au moyen de quelque plaisanterie, et pour se retirer d'un débat sans conclure. En un mot, il a—ou, ce qui est plus

vrai, Platon a, sous son nom—des opinions de circonstance et des ruses de dialectique, à travers lesquelles il est souvent difficile de retrouver le fond sérieux de sa doctrine. Heureusement ces difficultés ne touchent pas aux principes généraux du Platonisme. La critique Platonicienne en particulier dans ce qu'elle a de plus élevé et de plus original, se rattache à la grande théorie des idées et de la *réminiscence*. On la retrouve exposée dans plusieurs dialogues avec une clarté qui ne permet ni le doute ni l'incertitude.”

I may also cite the following remarks made by M. Vacherot (*Histoire Critique de l'École d'Alexandrie*, Book II. vol. ii. init.) after his instructive analysis of the doctrines of Plotinus. I think the words are as much applicable to Plato as to Plotinus: the rather, as Plato never speaks in his own name, Plotinus always:—“Combien faut il prendre garde d'ajouter à la pensée du philosophe, et de lui prêter un arrangement artificiel! Ce génie, plein d'enthousiasme et de fougue, n'a jamais connu ni mesure ni plan; jamais il ne s'est astreint à développer régulièrement une théorie, ni à exposer avec suite un ensemble de théories, de manière à en former un système. Fort incertain dans sa marche, il prend, quitte, et reprend le même sujet, sans jamais paraître avoir dit son dernier mot; toujours il répand de vives et abondantes clartés sur les questions qu'il traite, mais rarement il les conduit à leur dernière et définitive solution; sa rapide pensée s'effleure pas seulement le sujet sur lequel elle passe, elle le pénètre et le creuse toujours, sans toutefois l'épuiser. Fort inégale dans ses allures, tantôt ce génie s'échappe en inspirations rapides et tumultueuses, tantôt il semble se traîner péniblement, et se perdre dans un dédale de subtiles abstractions, &c.”

studies he discountenanced as useless, and even as irreligious.<sup>r</sup> The subjects on which he interrogated were those of common, familiar, every-day talk: those which every one believed himself to know, and on which every one had a confident opinion to give: the respondent being surprised that any one could put the questions, or that there could be any doubt requiring solution. What is justice? what is injustice? what are temperance and courage? what is law, lawlessness, democracy, aristocracy? what is the government of mankind, and the attributes which qualify any one for exercising such government? Here were matters upon which every one talked familiarly, and would have been ashamed to be thought incapable of delivering an opinion. Yet it was upon these matters that Sokrates detected universal ignorance, coupled with a firm, but illusory, persuasion of knowledge. The conversation of Sokrates with Euthydêmus, in the Xenophontic Memorabilia<sup>s</sup>—the first Alkibiadês, Lachês, Charmidês, Euthyphron, &c., of Plato—are among the most marked specimens of such cross-examination or Elenchus—a string of questions to which there are responses, in indefinite number, successively given, tested, and exposed as unsatisfactory.

The answers which Sokrates elicited and exposed were simple expressions of the ordinary prevalent belief upon matters on which each community possesses established dogmas, laws, customs, sentiments, fashions, points of view, &c., belonging to itself. When Herodotus passed over to Egypt, he was astonished to find the judgment, feelings, institutions, and practices, of the Egyptians, contrasting most forcibly with those of all other countries. He remarks the same (though less in degree) respecting Babylonians, Indians, Scythians, and others; and he is not less impressed with the veneration of each community for its own creed and habits, coupled with indifference or antipathy towards other creeds, disparate or discordant, prevailing elsewhere.<sup>t</sup>

To those topics, on which each community possesses established dogmas, laws, customs, sentiments, consecrated and traditional, peculiar to itself. The local creed, which is never formally proclaimed or taught, but is enforced unconsciously by every one upon every one else. Omnipotence of King Nomos.

<sup>r</sup> Xenoph. Memor. i. 1.

<sup>s</sup> Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2.

<sup>t</sup> Herodot. ii, 35-36-64; iii. 38-94,

seq. i. 196; iv. 76-77-80. The discordance between the various institutions established among the separate

This aggregate of beliefs and predispositions to believe, ethical, religious, æsthetical, social, respecting what is true

aggregations of mankind, often proceeding to the pitch of reciprocal antipathy—the imperative character of each in its own region, assuming the appearance of natural right and propriety—all this appears brought to view by the inquisitive and observant Herodotus, as well as by others (Xenophon, *Cyropæd.* i. 3-18) : but many new facts, illustrating the same thesis, were noticed by Aristotle and the Peripatetics, when a larger extent of the globe became opened to Hellenic survey. Compare Aristotle, *Éthic. Nik.* i. 3, 1094, b. 15; Sextus Empiric. *Pyrr. Hypotyp.* i. sect. 145-156, iii. sect. 198-234; and the remarkable extract from Bardesanes Syrus, cited by Eusebius, *Præp. Evang.* vi., and published in Orelli's collection, pp. 202-219, *Alexandri Aphrodis. et Aliorum De Fato*, Zurich, 1824.

Many interesting passages in illustration of the same thesis might be borrowed from Montaigne, Pascal, and others. But the most forcible of all illustrations are those furnished by the Oriental world, when surveyed or studied by intelligent Europeans, as it has been more fully during the last century. See especially Sir William Sleeman's *Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official*: two volumes which unfold with equal penetration and fidelity the manifestations of established sentiment among the Hindoos and Mahomedans. Vol. i. ch. iv., describing a *Suttee* on the *Nerbudda*, is one of the most impressive chapters in the work: the rather as it describes the continuance of a hallowed custom, transmitted even from the days of Alexander. I transcribe also some valuable matter from an eminent living scholar, whose extensive erudition comprises Oriental as well as Hellenic philosophy.

M. Barthelemy St. Hilaire (*Premier Mémoire sur le Sankhya*, Paris, 1852, pp. 392-395) observes as follows respecting the Sanscrit system of philosophy called *Sankhya*, the doctrine expounded and enforced by the philosopher Kapila—and respecting Buddha and Buddhism which was built upon the *Sankhya*, amending or modifying it. Buddha is believed to have lived

about 547 B.C. Both the system of Buddha, and that of Kapila, are atheistic, as described by M. St. Hilaire.

“Le second point où Bouddha se sépare de Kapila concerne la doctrine. L'homme ne peut rester dans l'incertitude que Kapila lui laisse encore. L'âme délivrée, selon les doctrines de Kapila, peut toujours renaître. Il n'y a qu'un moyen, un seul moyen, de le sauver,—c'est de l'anéantir. Le néant seul est un sûr asile; on ne revient pas de celui là.—Bouddha lui promet le néant; et c'est avec cette promesse inouïe qu'il a passionné les hommes et converti les peuples. Que cette monstrueuse croyance, partagée aujourd'hui par trois cents millions de sectateurs, révolte en nous les instincts les plus énergiques de notre nature—qu'elle soulève toutes les répugnances et toutes les horreurs de notre âme—qu'elle nous paraisse aussi incompréhensible que hideuse—peu importe. Une partie considérable de l'humanité l'a reçue,—prête même à la justifier par toutes les subtilités de la métaphysique la plus raffinée, et à la confesser dans les tortures des plus affreux supplices et les austérités homicides d'un fanatisme aveugle. Si c'est une gloire que de dominer souverainement, à travers les âges, la foi des hommes,—jamais fondateur de religion n'en eut une plus grande que le Bouddha: car aucun n'eut de prosélytes plus fidèles ni plus nombreux. Mais je me trompe: le Bouddha ne prétendait jamais fonder une religion. Il n'était que philosophe: et instruit dans toutes les sciences des Brahmins, il ne voulut personnellement que fonder, à leur exemple, un nouveau système. Seulement, les moyens qu'il employait durent mener ses disciples plus loin qu'il ne comptait aller lui-même. En s'adressant à la foule, il faut bientôt la discipliner et la régler. De là, cette ordination religieuse que le Bouddha donnait à ses adeptes, la hiérarchie qu'il établissait entre eux, fondée uniquement, comme la science l'exigeait, sur le mérite divers des intelligences et des vertus—la douce et sainte morale qu'il prêchait,—le détachement de toutes choses en ce monde, si convenable à des ascètes qui ne pensent

or false, probable or improbable, just or unjust, holy or unholy, honourable or base, respectable or contemptible, pure or impure, beautiful or ugly, decent or indecent, obligatory to do or obligatory to avoid, respecting the status and relations of each individual in the society, respecting even the admissible fashions of amusement and recreation—this is an established fact and condition of things, the real origin of which is for the most part unknown, but which each new member of the society is born to and finds subsisting. It is transmitted by tradition from parents to children, and is imbibed by the latter almost unconsciously from what they see and hear around, without any special season of teaching, or special persons to teach. It becomes a part of each person's nature—a standing habit of mind, or fixed set of mental tendencies, according to which, particular experience is interpreted and particular persons appreciated.<sup>u</sup> It is not set forth in systematic proclamation, nor impugned, nor defended: it is enforced by a sanction of its own, the same real sanction or force in all countries, by fear of displeasure from the Gods, and by certainty of evil from neighbours and fellow-citizens. The community hate, despise, or deride, any individual member who proclaims his dissent from their social creed, or even openly calls it in question. Their hatred manifests itself in different ways, at different times and occasions, sometimes by burning or excommunication, sometimes by banishment or

qu'au salut éternel—le vœu de pauvreté, qui est la première loi des Bouddhistes—et tout cet ensemble de dispositions qui constituent un gouvernement au lieu d'une école.

“ Mais ce n'est là que l'extérieur du Bouddhisme : c'en est le développement matériel et nécessaire. Au fond, son principe est celui du Sankhya : seulement, il l'applique en grand.— C'est la science qui délivre l'homme : et le Bouddha ajoute — Pour que l'homme soit délivré à jamais, il faut qu'il arrive au Nirvâna, c'est à dire, qu'il soit absolument anéanti. Le néant est donc le bout de la science : et le salut éternel, c'est l'anéantissement.”

The same line of argument is insisted

on by M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire in his other work—*Bouddha et sa religion*, Paris, 1862, ed. 2nd. : especially in his Chapter on the Nirvana : wherein moreover he complains justly of the little notice which authors take, of the established beliefs of those varieties of the human race which are found apart from Christian Europe.

<sup>u</sup> This general fact is powerfully set forth by Cicero, in the beginning of the third Tusculan Disputation. Chrysippus the Stoic, “ ut est in omni historia curiosus,” had collected striking examples of these consecrated practices, cherished in one territory, abhorrent elsewhere. (Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 45, 108.)

interdiction\* from fire and water; at the very least, by exclusion from that amount of forbearance, good-will, and estimation, without which the life of an individual becomes insupportable: for society, though its power to make an individual happy is but limited, has complete power, easily exercised, to make him miserable. The orthodox public do not recognise in any individual citizen a right to scrutinise their creed, and to reject it if not approved by his own rational judgment. They expect that he will embrace it in the natural course of things, by the mere force of authority and contagion—as they have adopted it themselves: as they have adopted also the current language, weights, measures, divisions of time, &c. If he dissents, he is guilty of an offence described in the terms of the indictment preferred against Sokrates—“Sokrates commits crime, inasmuch as he does not believe in the Gods, in whom the city believes, but introduces new religious beliefs,” &c.<sup>y</sup> “Nomos (Law and Custom), King of All” (to borrow the phrase which Herodotus cites from Pindar<sup>z</sup>), exercises plenary power, spiritual as well as

\* See the description of the treatment of Aristodémos, one of the two Spartans who survived the battle of Thermopylæ, after his return home, Herodot. vii. 231, ix. 71. The interdiction from communion of fire, water, eating, sacrifice, &c., is the strongest manifestation of repugnance: so insupportable to the person excommunicated, that it counted for a sentence of exile in the Roman law. (Deinarchus cont. Aristogeiton, s. 9. Heineccius, Ant. Rom. i. 16, 9, 10.)

<sup>y</sup> Xenophon, Memor. i. 1, 1. Ἰδικεῖ Σωκράτους, οὗς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς, οὐ νομίζων, ἔτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων, &c. Plato (Leges, x. 909, 910) and Cicero (Legib. ii. 19-25) forbid καινὰ δαιμόνια, “separatim nemo habessit Deos,” &c.

<sup>z</sup> Νόμος πάντων βασιλεὺς (Herodot. iii. 38). It will be seen from Herodotus, as well as elsewhere, that the idea really intended to be expressed by the word Νόμος is much larger than what is now commonly understood by Law. It is equivalent to that which Epiktétus calls τὸ δόγμα—πανταχοῦ ἀνίκη-

τον τὸ δόγμα (Epiktet. iii. 16). It includes what is meant by τὸ νόμιμον (Xenop. Memor. iv. 4, 13-24), τὰ νόμια, τὰ νομιζόμενα, τὰ πάτρια, τὰ νόμια, including both positive morality and social æsthetical precepts, as well as civil or political, and even personal habits, such as that of abstinence from spitting or wiping the nose (Xenop. Cyrop. viii. 8, 8-10). The case which Herodotus quotes to illustrate his general thesis is the different treatment which, among different nations, is considered dutiful and respectful towards senior relatives and the corpses of deceased relatives; which matters come under τὰ γραπτα κάσφαλλῆ Θεῶν Νόμια (Soph. Antig. 440)—of immemorial antiquity:—

Οὐ γὰρ τι νῦν γε κάχθεις, ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ ποτε  
Ζῆ ταῦτα, κούδεις οἶδεν ἐξ ἔτου φανῆ.  
Νόμος and ἐπιτήδευμα run together in Plato’s mind, dictating every hour’s proceeding of the citizen through life (Leges, vii. 807-808-823).

We find Plato, in the Leges, which represents the altered tone and compressive orthodoxy of his old age, ex-



temporal, over individual minds; moulding the emotions as well as the intellect according to the local type—determining the sentiments, the belief, and the predisposition in regard to new matters tendered for belief, of every one—fashioning thought, speech, and points of view, no less than action—and reigning under the appearance of habitual, self-suggested tendencies. Plato, when he assumes the function of Constructor, establishes special officers for enforcing in detail the authority of King Nomos in his Platonic variety. But even where no such special officers exist, we find Plato himself describing forcibly (in the speech assigned to Protagoras)<sup>a</sup> the working

tolling the simple goodness (*εὐθθεια*) of our early forefathers, who believed implicitly all that was told them, and were not clever enough to raise doubts, *ὥσπερ τανῦν* (Legg. iii. 679, 680). Plato dwells much upon the danger of permitting any innovation on the fixed modes of song and dance (Legg. v. 727, vii. 797-800), and forbids it under heavy penalties. He says that the lawgiver both *can* consecrate common talk, and ought to consecrate it—*καθιερώσαι τὴν φήμην* (Legg. 838), the dicta of *Νόμος Βασιλεύς*.

Pascal describes, in forcible terms, the wide-spread authority of *Νόμος Βασιλεύς*:—"Il ne faut pas se méconnaître, nous sommes automates autant qu'esprit: et delà vient que l'instrument, par lequel la persuasion se fait, n'est pas la seule démonstration. Combien y a-t-il peu de choses démontrées! Les preuves ne convainquent que l'esprit. La coutume fait nos preuves les plus fortes et les plus crues; elle incline l'automate, qui entraîne l'esprit sans qu'il y pense. Qui a démontré qu'il sera demain jour, et que nous mourrons—et qu'y a-t-il de plus cru? C'est donc la coutume qui nous en persuade, c'est elle qui fait tant de Chrétiens, c'est elle qui fait les Turcs, les Païens, les métiers, les soldats, &c. Enfin, il faut avoir recours à elle quand une fois l'esprit a vu où est la vérité, afin de nous abreuver et nous teindre de cette créance, qui nous échappe à toute heure; car d'en avoir toujours les preuves présentes, c'est trop d'affaire. Il faut acquérir une créance plus facile, qui est celle de l'habitude, qui, sans violence, sans art, sans argument, nous

fait croire les choses, et incline toutes nos puissances à cette croyance, en sorte que notre âme y tombe naturellement. Quand on ne croit que par la force de la conviction, et que l'automate est incliné à croire le contraire, ce n'est pas assez." (Pascal, *Pensées*, ch. xi. p. 237, ed. Louandre, Paris, 1854.)

Hercin Pascal coincides with Montaigne, of whom he often speaks harshly enough. "Comme de vray nous n'avons autre mir de la vérité et de la raison, que l'exemple et l'idée des opinions et usances du pays où nous sommes: là est toujours la parfaite religion, la parfaite police, parfait et accompli usage de toutes choses." (Essais de Montaigne, i. 30, p. 121.) Compare the same train of thought in Descartes (*Discours sur la Méthode*, pp. 132-139, ed. Cousin).

<sup>a</sup> Plat. *Protag.* 320-328. The large sense of the word *Νόμος*, as conceived by Pindar and Herodotus, must be kept in mind, comprising positive morality, religious ritual, consecrated habits, the local turns of sympathy and antipathy, &c. M. Salvador observes, respecting the Mosaic Law: "Qu'on écrive tous les rapports publics et privés qui unissent les membres d'un peuple quelconque, et tous les principes sur lesquels ces rapports sont fondés—il en résultera un ensemble complet, un véritable système plus ou moins raisonnable, qui sera l'expression exacte de la manière d'exister d'un peuple. Or, cet ensemble ou ce système est ce que les Hébreux appellent la *tora*, la loi ou la constitution publique—en prenant ce mot dans le sens le plus étendu." (Salvador,

of that spontaneous, ever-present police by whom the authority of King Nomos is enforced in detail—a police not the less omnipotent because they wear no uniform, and carry no recognised title.

There are, however, generally a few exceptional minds to whom this omnipotent authority of King Nomos is repugnant, and who claim a right to investigate and judge for themselves on many points already settled and foreclosed by the prevalent orthodoxy. In childhood and youth these minds must have gone through the ordinary influences,<sup>b</sup> but without

Small minority of exceptional individual minds, who do not yield to the established orthodoxy, but insist on exercising their own judgment.

Histoire des Institutions de Moÿse, ch. ii. p. 95.)

Compare also about the sense of the word *Lex*, as conceived by the Arabs, M. Renan, Averroes, p. 286, and Mr. Mill's chapter respecting the all-comprehensive character of the Hindoo law (Hist. of India, ch. iv., beginning): "In the law books of the Hindus, the details of jurisprudence and judicature occupy comparatively a very moderate space. The doctrines and ceremonies of religion; the rules and practice of education; the institutions, duties, and customs of domestic life; the maxims of private morality, and even of domestic economy; the rules of government, of war, and of negotiation; all form essential parts of the Hindu code of law, and are treated in the same style, and laid down with the same authority, as the rules for the distribution of justice."

Mr. Maine, in his admirable work on Ancient Law, notes both the all-comprehensive and the irresistible ascendancy of what is called *Law* in early societies. He remarks emphatically that "the stationary condition of the human race is the rule—the progressive condition the exception—a rare exception in the history of the world." (Chap. i. pp. 16-18-19; chap. ii. pp. 22-24.)

Again, Mr. Maine observes:—"The other liability, to which the infancy of society is exposed, has prevented or arrested the progress of far the greater part of mankind. The rigidity of ancient law, arising chiefly from its early association and identification with religion, has chained down the mass of the human race to those views of life

and conduct which they entertained at the time when their institutions were first consolidated into a systematic form. There were one or two races exempted by a marvellous fate from this calamity: and grafts from these stocks have fertilised a few modern societies. But it is still true that over the larger part of the world, the perfection of law has always been considered as consisting in adherence to the ground plan supposed to have been marked out by the legislator. *If intellect has in such cases been exercised upon jurisprudence, it has uniformly prided itself on the subtle perversity of the conclusions it could build on ancient texts, without discoverable departure from their literal tenor.*" (Maine, Ancient Law, ch. iv. pp. 77-78.)

<sup>b</sup> Cicero, Tusc. D. iii. 2; Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. x. 10, 1179, b. 23. ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδασχὴ μὴ ποτ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἰσχύει, ἀλλὰ δὲρ προδιειργάσθαι τοῖς ἔθεσι τὴν τοῦ ἀκρατοῦ ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν, ὥσπερ γῆν τὴν θρέψουσιν τὸ σπέρμα. To the same purpose Plato, Republ. iii. 402 A, Legg. ii. 653 B, 659 E, Plato and Aristotle (and even Xenophon, Cyrop. i. 2, 3), aiming at the formation of a body of citizens, and a community very different from anything which they saw around them—require to have the means of shaping the early sentiments, love, hatred, &c., of children, in a manner favourable to their own ultimate views. This is exactly what *Nóμος Βασιλεὺς* does effectively in existing societies, without need of special provision for the purpose. See Plato, Protagor. 325, 326.

the permanent stamp which such influences commonly leave behind. Either the internal intellectual force of the individual is greater, or he contracts a reverence for some new authority, or (as in the case of Sokrates) he believes himself to have received a special mission from the Gods—in one way or other the imperative character of the orthodoxy around him is so far enfeebled, that he feels at liberty to scrutinise for himself the assemblage of beliefs and sentiments around him. If he continues to adhere to them, this is because they approve themselves to his individual reason: unless this last condition be fulfilled, he becomes a dissenter, proclaiming his dissent more or less openly, according to circumstances. Such disengagement from authority traditionally consecrated (*ἐξαλλαγή τῶν εἰωθότων νομίμων*),<sup>c</sup> and assertion of the right of self-judgment, on the part of a small minority of *ιδιογνώμονες*,<sup>d</sup> is the first condition of existence for philosophy or “reasoned truth.”

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Phædrus, 265 A. In the *Timæus* (p. 40 E) Plato interrupts the thread of his own speculations on cosmogony, to take in all the current theogony on the authority of King Nomos. *ἀδύνατον οὖν θεῶν παισὶν ἀπιστεῖν, καίπερ ἄνευ τε εἰκότων καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἀποδείξεων λέγουσιν, μᾶλλον ὡς οἰκεία φάσκουσιν ἀπαγγέλλειν, ἐπομένους τῷ νόμῳ πιστευτέον.*

Hegel adverts to this severance of the individual consciousness from the common consciousness of the community, as the point of departure for philosophical theory:—“On one hand, we are now called upon to find some specific matter for the general form of Good; such closer determination of The Good is the criterion required. On the other hand, the exigencies of the individual subject come prominently forward: this is the consequence of the revolution which Sokrates operated in the Greek mind. So long as the religion, the laws, the political constitution, of any people, are in full force—so long as each individual citizen is in complete harmony with them all—no one raises the question, What has the Individual to do for himself? In a moralised and religious social harmony, each individual finds

his destination prescribed by the established routine; while this positive morality, religion, laws, form also the routine of *his own* mind. On the contrary, if the Individual no longer stands on the custom of his nation, nor feels himself in full agreement with the religion and laws—he then no longer finds what he desires, nor obtains satisfaction in the medium around him. When once such discord has become confirmed, the Individual must fall back on his own reflections, and seek his destination there. This is what gives rise to the question—What is the essential scheme for the Individual? To what ought he to conform—what shall he aim at? An *ideal* is thus set up for the Individual. This is, the Wise Man, or the Ideal of the Wise Man, which is, in truth, the separate working of individual self-consciousness, conceived as an universal or typical character.” (Hegel, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, Part ii. pp. 132, 133.)

<sup>d</sup> This is an expression of the learned Huët, Bishop of Avranches:—“Si quelqu’un me demande maintenant, ce que nous sommes, puisque nous ne voulons être ni Académiciens, ni Sceptiques, ni Eclectiques, ni d’aucune autre Secte, je répondrai que *nous sommes nôtres*—

Amidst the epic and lyric poets of Greece, with their varied productive impulse—as well as amidst the Gnostic philosophers, the best of whom were also poets—there are not a few manifestations of such freely judging individuality. Xenophanes the philosopher, who wrote in poetry, censured severely several of the current narratives about the Gods: and Pindar, though in more respectful terms, does the like. So too, the theories about the Kosmos, propounded by various philosophers, Thales, Anaximenes, Pythagoras, Herakleitus, Anaxagoras, &c., were each of them the free offspring of an individual mind. But these were counter-affirmations: novel theories, departing from the common belief, yet accompanied by little or no debate, or attack, or defence: indeed the proverbial obscurity of Herakleitus, and the recluse mysticism of the Pythagoreans, almost excluded discussion. These philosophers (to use the phrase of Aristotle<sup>e</sup>) had no concern with

Early appearance of a few free judging individuals, or freethinkers in Greece.

c'est à dire libres: ne voulans soumettre notre esprit à aucune autorité, et n'approuvans que ce qui nous paroît s'approcher plus près de la vérité. Que si quelqu'un, par moquerie ou par flatterie, nous appelle *ιδιογνώμονας*—c'est à dire, attachés à nos propres sentimens, nous n'y répugnerons pas." (Huet, *Traité Philosophique de la Foiblesse de l'Esprit Humain*, liv. ii. ch. xi. p. 224, ed. 1741.)

<sup>e</sup> Aristot. *Metaphys.* A. 987, b. 32. Eusebius, having set forth the dissentient and discordant opinions of the various Hellenic philosophers, triumphantly contrasts with them the steady adherence of Jews and Christians to one body of truth, handed down by an uniform tradition from father to son, from the first generation of man—*ἀπὸ πρώτης ἀνθρωπογονίας*. (*Præp.* Ev. xiv. 3.)

Cicero, in the treatise (not preserved) entitled *Hortensius*—set forth, at some length, an attack and a defence of philosophy; the former he assigned to Hortensius, the latter he undertook in his own name. One of the arguments urged by Hortensius against philosophy, to prove that it was not "vera sapientia," was, that it was both an human invention and a recent novelty, not handed down by tradition *a principio*, therefore not natural to man. "Quæ si secundum hominis naturam

est, cum homine ipso cœperit necesse est; si vero non est, nec capere quidem illum posset humana natura. Ubi apud antiquiores latuit amor iste investigandæ veritatis?" (*Lactantius, Inst. Divin.* iii. 16.) The loss of this Ciceronian pleading (*Philosophy versus Consecrated Tradition*) is much to be deplored. Lactantius and Augustin seem to have used it largely.

The *Hermotimus* of Lucian, manifesting all his lively Sokratic acuteness, is a dialogue intended to expose the worthlessness of all speculative philosophy. The respondent *Hermotimus* happens to be a Stoic, but the assailant expressly declares (c. 85) that the arguments would be equally valid against Platonists or Aristotelians. *Hermotimus* is advised to desist from philosophy, to renounce inquiry, to employ himself in some of the necessary affairs of life, and to acquiesce in the common received opinions, which would carry him smoothly along the remainder of his life (*ἀξίῳ πράττειν τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων, καὶ ὃ σε παραπέμψει ἐς τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ βίου, τὰ κοινὰ πάντα φρονοῦντα*, c. 72). Among the worthless philosophical speculations Lucian ranks geometry; the geometrical definitions (point and line) he declares to be nonsensical and inadmissible (c. 74).

Dialectic: which last commenced in the fifth century B.C., with the Athenian drama and dikastery, and was enlisted in the service of philosophy by Zeno the Eleate and Sokrates.

Both the drama and the dikastery recognise two or more different ways of looking at a question, and require that no conclusion shall be pronounced until opposing disputants have been heard and compared. The Eumenides plead against Apollo, Prometheus against the mandates and dispositions of Zeus, in spite of the superior dignity as well as power with which Zeus is invested: every Athenian citizen, in his character of dikast, took an oath to hear both the litigant parties alike, and to decide upon the pleadings and evidence according to law. Zeno, in his debates with the anti-Parmenidean philosophers, did not trouble himself to parry their thrusts. He assumed the aggressive, impugned the theories of his opponents, and exposed the contradictions in which they involved themselves. The dialectic process, in which there are (at the least) two opposite points of view both represented—the negative and the affirmative—became both prevalent and interesting.

I have in a former chapter explained the dialectic of Zeno, as it bore upon the theories of the anti-Parmenidean philosophers. Still more important was the proceeding of Sokrates, when he applied the like scrutiny to ethical, social, political, religious topics. He did not come forward with any counter-theories: he declared expressly that he had none to propose, and that he was ignorant. He put questions to those who on their side professed to know, and he invited answers from them. His mission, as he himself described it, was, to scrutinise and expose false pretensions to knowledge. Without such scrutiny, he declares life itself to be not worth having. He impugned the common and traditional creed, not in the name of any competing doctrine, but by putting questions on the familiar terms in which it was confidently enuntiated, and by making its defenders contradict themselves and feel the shame of their own contradictions. The persons who held it were shown to be incapable of defending it, when

Rise of Dialectic—Effect of the Drama and the Dikastery.

Application of Negative scrutiny to ethical and social topics by Sokrates.

tested by an acute cross-examiner; and their supposed knowledge, gathered up insensibly from the tradition around them, deserved the language which Bacon applies to the science of his day, conducting indirectly to the necessity of that remedial course which Bacon recommends. "Nemo adhuc tantâ mentis constantiâ et rigore inventus est, ut decreverit et sibi proposuerit, theorias et notiones communes penitus abolere, et intellectum abrasum et æquum ad particularia rursus applicare. Itaque ratio illa quam habemus, ex multâ fide et multo etiam casu, necnon ex puerilibus quas primo hausimus, notionibus, farrago quædam est et congeries." <sup>f</sup>

Never before (so far as we know) had the authority of King Nomos been exposed to such an enemy as this dialectic or cross-examination by Sokrates: the prescriptive creed and unconsciously imbibed sentiment ("ratio ex fide, casu, et puerilibus notionibus") being thrown upon their defence against negative scrutiny brought to bear upon them by the inquisitive reason of an individual citizen. In the *Apology*, Sokrates clothes his own strong intellectual *cæstrus* in the belief (doubtless sincerely entertained) of a divine mission. In the *Gorgias*, the Platonic Sokrates asserts it in naked and simple, yet not less emphatic, language. "You, Polus, bring against me the authority of the multitude, as well as that of the most eminent citizens, all of whom agree in upholding your view. But I, one man standing here alone, do *not* agree with you. And I engage to compel you, my one respondent, to agree with *me*." <sup>g</sup> The autonomy or independence of individual

Emphatic assertion by Sokrates of the right of satisfaction for his own individual reason.

<sup>f</sup> Bacon, *Nov. Org. Aph.* 97. I have already cited this passage in a note on the 68th chapter of my 'History of Greece,' pp. 612-613; in which note I have also alluded to other striking passages of Bacon, indicating the confusion, inconsistencies, and misapprehensions of the "*intellectus sibi permissus*." In that note, and in the text of the chapter, I have endeavoured to illustrate the same view of the Sokratic procedure as that which is here taken.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 472 A. καὶ νῦν, περὶ ὧν σὺ λέγεις, ὀλίγου σοὶ πάντες συμφήσουσι ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξένοι, καὶ ἐὰν βούλη κατ' ἐμοῦ μάρτυρας παρασχέσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγω, μαρτυρήσουσί σοι, ἐὰν μὲν βούλη, Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ—ἐὰν δὲ βούλη, Ἀριστοκράτης ὁ Σκελλίου—ἐὰν δὲ βούλη, ἡ Περικλέους ἕλη οἰκία, ἢ ἕλλη συγγένεια ἦν τιν ἐν βούλῃ τῶν ἐνθαδε ἐκλέξασθαι. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ σοὶ εἶς μόνος ὢν οὐχ ὀμολογῶ ὅ γάρ με σὺ ἀναγκάζεις, &c.

reason against established authority, and the title of negative reason as one of the litigants in the process of philosophising, are first brought distinctly to view in the career of Sokrates.

With such a career, we need not wonder that Sokrates, though esteemed and admired by a select band of adherents, incurred a large amount of general unpopularity. The public (as I have before observed) do not admit the claim of independent exercise for individual reason. In the natural process of growth in the human mind, belief does not follow proof, but springs up apart from and independent of it: an immature intelligence believes first, and proves (if indeed it ever seeks proof) afterwards.<sup>h</sup> This mental tendency is farther confirmed by the pressure and authority of King Nomos; who is peremptory in exacting belief, but neither furnishes nor requires proof. The community, themselves deeply persuaded, will not hear with calmness the voice of a solitary reasoner, adverse to opinions thus established; nor do they like to be required to explain, analyse, or reconcile those opinions.<sup>i</sup> They disapprove

Aversion of the Athenian public to the negative procedure of Sokrates. Mistake of supposing that that negative procedure belongs peculiarly to the Sophists and the Megarici.

<sup>h</sup> See Professor Bain's Chapter on Belief; one of the most original and instructive chapters in his volume on the Emotions and the Will, pp. 578-584.

<sup>i</sup> This antithesis and reciprocal repulsion—between the speculative reason of the philosopher who thinks for himself, and the established traditional convictions of the public—is nowhere more strikingly enforced than by Plato in the sixth and seventh books of the Republic; together with the corrupting influence exercised by King Nomos, at the head of his vehement and unanimous public, over those few gifted natures which are competent to philosophical speculation. See Plato, Rep. vi. 492-493.

The unfavourable feelings with which the attempts to analyse morality (especially when quite novel, as such attempts were in the time of Sokrates) are received in a community—are noticed by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his tract on Utilitarianism, ch. iii. pp. 38-39.

“The question is often asked, and properly so, in regard to any supposed

moral standard, What is its sanction? What are the motives to obey it? or more specifically, What is the source of its obligation? Whence does it derive its binding force? It is a necessary part of moral philosophy to provide the answer to this question: which though frequently assuming the shape of an objection to the utilitarian morality, as if it had some special applicability to that above others, really arises in regard to all standards. It arises in fact whenever a person is called on to adopt a standard, or refer morality to any basis on which he has not been accustomed to rest it. For the customary morality, that which education and opinion have consecrated, is the only one which presents itself to the mind with the feeling of being *in itself* obligatory: and when a person is asked to believe that this morality *derives* its obligation from some general principle round which custom has not thrown the same halo, the assertion is to him a paradox. The supposed corollaries seem to have a more binding force than the original

especially that dialectic debate which gives free play and efficacious prominence to the negative arm. The like disapprobation is felt even by most of the historians of philosophy; who nevertheless, having an interest in the philosophising process, might be supposed to perceive that nothing worthy of being called *reasoned truth* can exist, without full and equal scope to negative as well as to affirmative.

These historians usually speak in very harsh terms of the Sophists, as well as of Eukleides and the Megaric sect; who are taken as the great apostles of negation. But the truth is, that the Megarics inherited it from Sokrates, and shared it with Plato. Eukleides cannot have laid down a larger programme of negation than that which we read in the Apology of Sokrates,—nor composed a dialogue more ultranegative than the Platonic Parmenidês: nor, again, did he depart so widely, in principle as well as in precept, from existing institutions, as Plato in his Republic. The charges which historians of philosophy urge against the Megarics as well as against the persons whom they call the Sophists,—such as corruption of youth—perversion of truth and morality, by making the worse appear the better reason—subversion of established beliefs—innovation as well as deception—all these were urged against Sokrates himself by his contemporaries,<sup>k</sup> and

The same charges which the historians of philosophy bring against the Sophists were brought by contemporary Athenians against Sokrates. They represent the standing dislike of free inquiry, usual with an orthodox public.

theorem: the superstructure seems to stand better without than with what is represented as its foundation. . . . The difficulty has no peculiar application to the doctrine of utility, but is inherent in every attempt to analyse morality, and reduce it to principles; which, unless the principle is already in men's minds invested with as much sacredness as any of its applications, always seems to divest them of a part of their sanctity."

Epiktétus observes that the refined doctrines acquired by the self-reasoning philosopher, often failed to attain that intense hold on his conviction, which the "rotten doctrines" inculcated from childhood possessed over the conviction of ordinary men. Διὰ τί οὖν ἐκείνοι (οἱ πολλοί, οἱ ἰδιώται) ὁμών (τῶν φιλοσό-

φων) ἰσχυρότεροι; "Οτι ἐκείνοι μὲν τὰ σαφῆ τὰυτὰ ἀπὸ δογμάτων λαλοῦσι· ὁμοίως δὲ τὰ κομψὰ ἀπὸ τῶν χειλῶν. Οὕτως ἡμᾶς οἱ ἰδιῶται νικῶσι. Πανταχοῦ γὰρ ἰσχυροὺν τὸ δόγμα· ἀνικητοὺν τὸ δόγμα. (Epiktétus, iii. 16.)

<sup>k</sup> Themistius, in defending himself against contemporary opponents, whom he represents to have calumniated him, consoles himself by saying, among other observations, that these arrows have been aimed at all the philosophers successively—Sokrates, Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus. 'Ο γὰρ σοφιστῆς, καὶ ἀλαζὼν, καὶ καινότομος, πρῶτον μὲν Σωκράτους ὀνειδὴ ἦν, ἔπειτα Πλάτωνος ἐφεξῆς, εἰθ' ὕστερον Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου. (Orat. xxiii. p. 346, Dindorf.)

We read in Zeller's account of the



indeed against all the philosophers indiscriminately, as we

Platonic philosophy (Phil. der Griech. vol. ii. p. 368, ed. 2nd.),

“Die propädeutische Begründung der Platonischen Philosophie besteht im Allgemeinen darin, dass der unphilosophische Standpunkt aufgelöst, und die Erhebung zum philosophischen in ihrer Nothwendigkeit nachgewiesen wird. Im Besondern können wir drey Stadien dieses Wegs unterscheiden. Den Ausgangspunkt bildet das gewöhnliche Bewusstsein. Indem die Voraussetzungen, welche Diesem für ein Erstes und Festes gegolten hatten, dialektisch zersetzt werden, so erhalten wir zunächst das negative Resultat der *Sophistik*. Erst wenn auch diese überwunden ist, kann der philosophische Standpunkt positiv entwickelt werden.”

Zeller here affirms that it was the Sophists (Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias, and others) who first applied negative analysis to the common consciousness; breaking up by their dialectic scrutiny, those hypotheses which had before exercised authority therein, as first principles not to be disputed.

I dissent from this position. I conceive that the Sophists (Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias) did *not* do what Zeller affirms, and that Sokrates (and Plato after him) *did* do it. The negative analysis was the weapon of Sokrates, and not of Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias, &c. It was he who declared (see Platonic Apology) that false persuasion of knowledge was at once universal and ruinous, and who devoted his life to the task of exposing it by cross-examination. The conversation of the Xenophontic Sokrates with Euthydémus (Memor. iv. 2), exhibits a complete specimen of that aggressive analysis, brought to bear on the common consciousness, which Zeller ascribes to the Sophists: the Platonic dialogues, in which Sokrates cross-examines upon Justice, Temperance, Courage, Piety, Virtue, &c., are of the like character; and we know from Xenophon (Mem. i. 1-16) that Sokrates passed much time in such examinations with pre-eminent success.

I notice this statement of Zeller, not because it is peculiar to him (for most of the modern historians of philosophy affirm the same; and his history, which

is the best that I know, merely repeats the ordinary view), but because it illustrates clearly the view which I take of the Sophists and Sokrates. Instead of the unmeaning abstract “*Sophistik*,” given by Zeller and others, we ought properly to insert the word “*Sokratik*,” if we are to have any abstract term at all.

Again—The negative analysis, which these authors call “*Sophistik*,” they usually censure as discreditable and corrupting. To me it appears, on the contrary, both original and valuable, as one essential condition for bringing social and ethical topics under the domain of philosophy or “*reasoned truth*.”

Professor Charles Thurot (in his *Études sur Aristote*, Paris, 1860, p. 119) takes a juster view than Zeller of the difference between Plato and the Sophists (Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias). “*Les Sophistes, comme tous ceux qui dissertent superficiellement sur des questions de philosophie, et en particulier sur la morale et la politique, s'appuyaient sur l'autorité et le témoignage; ils alléguaient les vers des poètes célèbres qui passaient aux yeux des Grecs pour des oracles de sagesse: ils invoquaient l'opinion du commun des hommes. Platon récusait absolument ces deux espèces de témoignages. Ni les poètes ni le commun des hommes ne savent ce qu'ils disent, puisqu'ils ne peuvent en rendre raison. . . . . Aux yeux de Platon, il n'y a d'autre méthode, pour arriver au vrai et pour le communiquer, que la dialectique: qui est à la fois l'art d'interroger et de répondre, et l'art de définir et de diviser.*”

M. Thurot here declares (in my judgment very truly) that the Sophists appealed to the established ethical authorities, and dwelt upon or adorned the received common-places — that Plato denied these authorities, and brought his battery of negative cross-examination to bear upon them as well as upon their defenders. M. Thurot thus gives a totally different version of the procedure of the Sophists from that which is given by Zeller. Nevertheless he perfectly agrees with Zeller, and with Anytus, the accuser of Sokrates (Plat. Menon, pp. 91-92), in describing the Sophists as a class

learn from Sokrates himself in the Apology.<sup>1</sup> They are outbursts of feeling natural to the practical, orthodox citizen, who represents the common sense of the time and place; declaring his antipathy to these speculative, freethinking, innovations of theory, which challenges the prescriptive maxims of traditional custom and tests them by a standard approved by herself. The orthodox citizen does not feel himself in need of philosophers to tell him what is truth or what is virtue, nor what is the difference between real and fancied knowledge. On these matters he has already settled persuasions, acquired from his fathers and his ancestors, and from the acknowledged civic authorities, spiritual and temporal;<sup>m</sup> who are to him exponents of the creed guaranteed by tradition:—

“ Quod sapio, satis est mihi: non ego curo  
Esse quod Arcesilas ærumnosoque Solones.”

who made money by deceiving and perverting the minds of hearers (p. 120).

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Apol. So. p. 23 C. ἵνα δὲ μὴ δόκωσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ θεοῦς μὴ νομίζειν καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν, &c.

Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 31. τὸ κοινῇ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιτιμώμενον. The rich families in Athens severely reproached their relatives who frequented the society of Sokrates. Xenophon, Sympo. iv. 32.

<sup>m</sup> See this point strikingly set forth by Plato, Politikus, 299: also Plutarch, Ἐρωτικός, c. 13, 756 A.

This is the “*auctoritas majorum*,” put forward by Cotta in his official character of *Pontifex*, as conclusive *per se*; when reasons are produced to sustain it, the reasons fail. (Cicero, Nat. De. iii. 5, 6, 9.)

The “*auctoritas majorum*,” proclaimed by the *Pontifex* Cotta, may be illustrated by what we read in Father Paul’s History of the Council of Trent, respecting the proceedings of that Council when it imposed the duty of accepting the authoritative interpretation of Scripture:—“Lorsqu’on fut à opiner sur le quatrième Article, presque tous se rendirent à l’avis du Cardinal Pacheco, qui représenta: Que

l’Écriture ayant été expliquée par tant de gens éminens en piété et en doctrine, l’on ne pouvoit pas espérer de rien ajouter de meilleur: Que les nouvelles Hérésies étant toutes nées des nouveaux sens qu’on avoit donnés à l’Écriture, il étoit nécessaire d’arrêter la licence des esprits modernes, et de les obliger de se laisser gouverner par les Anciens et par l’Église: Et que si quelqu’un naissoit avec un esprit singulier, on devoit le forcer à le renfermer au dedans de lui-même, et à ne pas troubler le monde en publiant tout ce qu’il pensoit.” (Fra Paolo, Histoire du Concile de Trente, traduction Française, par Le Courayer, Livre II. p. 284, 285, in 1546, pontificate of Paul III.)

P. 289. “Par le second Décret, il étoit ordonné en substance, de tenir l’Édition Vulgate pour authentique dans les leçons publiques, les disputes, les prédications, et les explications; et défendre à qui que ce fut de la rejeter. On y défendoit aussi d’expliquer la Sainte Écriture dans un sens contraire à celui que lui donne la Sainte Église notre Mère, et au consentement unanime des Pères, quand bien-même on auroit intention de tenir ces explications secrètes; et on ordonnoit que ceux qui contreviendroient à cette défense fussent punis par les Ordinaires.”

He will not listen to ingenious sophistry respecting these consecrated traditions: he does not approve the tribe of fools who despise what they are born to, and dream of distant, unattainable novelties: he cannot tolerate the nice discourses, ingenious hair-splitters, priests of subtleties and trifles—dissenters from the established opinions, who corrupt the youth, teaching their pupils to be wise above the laws, to despise or even beat their fathers and mothers,<sup>o</sup> and

<sup>o</sup> Pindar, Pyth. iii. 21.

Ἔστι δὲ φύλον ἐν ἀνθρώποισι ματαιότατον,  
Ὅστις αἰσχύνων ἐπιχώρια παπταίνει τὰ πόρσω,  
Μεταμῶνια θηρεύων ἀκράτοις ἔλπισιν.

<sup>o</sup> Οὐδὲν σοφίζόμεσθα τοῖσι δαίμοσιν  
Πατρίους παραδοχάς, ἅς θ' ἠμέλικας χρόνῳ  
Κεκήμεθ', οὐδεὶς αὐτὰ καταβαλεῖ λόγος,  
Οὐδ' ἦν δι' ἀκρων τὸ σοφὸν εὐρηται φρενῶν.  
(Euripides, Bacchæ, 206.)

"Illum in his rebus vereor, ne fortè rearis  
Impia te rationis inire elementa, viamque  
Eudogredi sceleris." (Lucretius, i. 85.)

Compare Valckenæer, Diatrib. Eurip.  
pp. 38, 39, cap. 5.

About the accusations against Sokrates, of leading the youth to contract doubts and to slight the authority of their fathers, see Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 52; Plato, Gorgias, 522 B, p. 79, Menon, p. 70. A touching anecdote, illustrating this displeasure of the fathers against Sokrates, may be found in Xenophon, Cyropæd. iii. 1, 39, where the father of Tigranes puts to death the σοφιστής who had taught his son, because that son had contracted a greater attachment to the σοφιστής than to his own father.

Xenophon, Memor. i. 2, 9-49. Apolog. So. s. 20; compare the speech of Kleon in Thucyd. iii. 37. Plato, Politikus, p. 299 E.

Timon in the Silli bestows on Sokrates and his successors, the title of ἀριβόλογοι. Diogen. l. ii. 19. Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. vii. 8. Aristophan. Nubes, 130, where Strepsiadæes says—

πῶς οὐν γερὶν ὦν κάπλησιμων καὶ βραδὺς  
λόγων ἀκριβῶν σχυδαλάμου μαθήσομαι;

Compare 320-359 of the same comedy—  
—σύ δὲ λεπτοτάτων λήρων ἱερέυ—also  
Ranae, 149, b.

When Euripides (ὁ σκηνηκὸς φιλόσοφος) went down to Hades, he is described by Aristophanes as giving clever exhibitions among the male-

factors there, with great success and applause. Ranae, 773—

Ὅτε δὴ κατῆλθ' Εὐριπίδης, ἐπέεικντο  
τοῖς λυποδύταις καὶ τοῖς βαλαντιγητοῖς,  
ἄπερ ἔστ' ἐν Ἄδου πλήθος· οἱ δ' ἀκρωμένοι  
τῶν ἀντιλογίων καὶ λυγισμῶν καὶ στροφῶν  
ὑπερμάνησαν, κἀνέμισαν σοφώτατον.

These astute cavils and quibbles of Euripides are attributed by Aristophanes, and the other comic writers, to his frequent conversations with Sokrates. Ranae, 1490-1500. Dionys. Hal. Ars Rhetorica, p. 301-355. Valckenæer, Diatribe in Euripid. c. 4. Aristophanes describes Sokrates as having stolen a garment from the palaestra (Nubes, 180); and Eupolis also introduces him as having stolen a wine-ladle (Schol. ad loc. Eupolis, Fragm. Incert. ix. ed. Meineke). The fragment of Eupolis (xi. p. 553, Ἄδολεσχέιν αὐτὸν ἐκδίδαξον, ὃ σοφιστά) seems to apply to Sokrates. About the sympathy of the people with the attacks of the comic writers on Sokrates, see Lucian, Piscat. c. 25.

The rhetor Aristides (Orat. xlvi. Ἵπερ τῶν Τετάρων, pp. 406-407-408, Dindorf), after remarking on the very vague and general manner in which the title σοφιστής was applied among the Greeks (Herodotus having so designated both Solon and Pythagoras), mentions that Androtion not only spoke of the seven wise men as τοὺς ἑπτασοφιστάς, but also called Sokrates σοφιστήν τοῦτον τῶν πάντων: that Lysias called Plato σοφιστήν, and called Æschines (the Sokratic) by the same title; that Isokrates represented himself, and rhetors and politicians like himself, as φιλοσόφους, while he termed the dialecticians and critics σοφιστάς. Nothing could be more indeterminate than these names, σοφιστής and φιλόσοφος. It was Plato who applied himself chiefly to discredit the name so-

to cheat their creditors—mischievous instructors, whose appropriate audience are the thieves and malefactors, and who ought to be silenced if they display ability to pervert others.<sup>p</sup> Such feeling of disapprobation and antipathy against speculative philosophy and dialectic—against the *libertas philosophandi*—counts as a branch of virtue among practical and orthodox citizens, rich or poor, oligarchical or democratical, military or civil, ancient or modern. It is an antipathy common to men in other respects very different, to Nicias as well as Kleon, to Eupolis and Aristophanes as well as to Anytus and Demochares. It was expressed forcibly by the Roman Cato (the Censor), when he censured Sokrates as a dangerous and violent citizen; aiming, in his own way, to subvert the institutions and customs of the country, and poisoning the minds of his fellow-citizens with opinions hostile to the laws.<sup>q</sup> How much courage is required in any individual citizen, to proclaim conscientious dissent in the face of wide-spread and established convictions, is recognised by Plato himself, and that too in the most orthodox and intolerant of all his compositions.<sup>r</sup> He (and Aristotle after

φιότης (ὁ μάλιστα ἐπαναστὰς τῷ ὀνόματι); but others had tried to discredit φιλόσοφος and τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν in like manner. It deserves notice that in the restrictive or censorial law (proposed by Sophokles, and enacted by the Athenians in B.C. 307, but repealed in the following year) against the philosophers and their schools, the philosophers generally are designated as σοφισταί. Pollux, Onomast. ix. 42. ἔστι δὲ καὶ νόμος Ἀττικὸς κατὰ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων γραφεῖς, ὃν Σοφοκλῆς Ἀμφικλείδου Σουნიεύς εἶπεν, ἐν ᾧ τινα κατὰ αὐτῶν προειπῶν, ἐπήγαγε, μὴ ἐξείναι μηδὲν τῶν σοφιστῶν διατριβὴν κατασκευάσασθαι.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Euthyphron, p. 3 D. Ἀθηναίοις γὰρ οὐ σφόδρα μέλει, ἢν τινα δευρὸν ὀλωται εἶναι, μὴ μόντοι διδασκαλικὸν τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας· ὃν δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλους οἴωται ποιεῖν τοιοῦτους, θυμοῦνται, εἴτ' οὖν φθόνῳ ὡς σὺ λέγεις, εἴτε δι' ἄλλο τι.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, Menon, pp. 90-92. The antipathy manifested here by Anytus against the Sophists, is the same feel-

ing which led him to indict Sokrates, and which induced also Cato the Censor, to hate the character of Sokrates, and Greek letters generally. Plutarch, Cato 23.

Cato, Epistola ap. Pliny, H. N. xxix. 7. ὅλως φιλοσοφία προσεκρουκῶς, καὶ πᾶσαν Ἑλληνικὴν μούσαν ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας προσηλακίζων· ὃς γε καὶ Σωκράτη φησι, λάλον καὶ βίαιον γενόμενον, ἐπιχειρεῖν ᾧ τρῶψι δυνατὸν ἢν τυραννεῖν τῆς πατρίδος, καταλύοντα τὰ ἔθη, καὶ πρὸς ἐναντίας τοῖς νόμοις δόξας ἔλκοντα καὶ μεβίσταντα τοὺς πολίτας.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Legg. viii. p. 835 C. οὖν δὲ ἀνθρώπου τολμηροῦ κινδυνεύει δεῖσθαι τινοῦ, ὃς παρῆρσιαν διαφερόντως τιμῶν ἐρεῖ τὰ δοκούντα ἄριστ' εἶναι πόλει καὶ πολίταις, ἐν ψυχραῖς διεφθαρμέναις τὸ πρέπον καὶ ἐπόμενον πάσῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ τάττων, ἐναντία λέγων ταῖς μεγίσταισιν ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ οὐκ ἔχων βοηθὸν ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα, λόγῳ ἐπόμενος μόνῳ μόνος.

Here the dissenter who proclaims his sincere convictions is spoken of with respect: compare the contrary feeling,

him), far from recognising the infallibility of established King Nomos, were bold enough<sup>3</sup> to try and condemn him, and to imagine (each of them) a new Νόμος of his own, representing the political Art or Theory of Politics—a notion which would not have been understood by Themistokles or Aristeides.

The dislike so constantly felt by communities having established opinions, towards free speculation and dialectic, was aggravated in its application to Sokrates, because his dialectic was not only novel, but also public, obtrusive, and indiscriminate.<sup>4</sup> The name of Sokrates, after his death, was employed not merely by Plato, but by all the Sokratic companions, to cover their own ethical speculations: moreover, all of them either composed works or gave lectures. But in either case, readers or hearers were comparatively few in number, and were chiefly persons prompted by some special taste or interest: while Sokrates passed his day in the most public place, eager to

Aversion towards Sokrates aggravated by his extreme publicity of speech. His declaration, that false persuasion of knowledge is universal; must be understood as a basis in appreciating Plato's Dialogues of Search.

Leges, ix. 881 A, and in the tenth book generally. In the striking passage of the Republic, referred to in a previous note (vi. 492), Plato declares the lessons taught by the multitude—the contagion of established custom and tradition, communicated by the crowd of earnest assembled believers—to be of overwhelming and almost omnipotent force. The individual philosopher (he says), who examines for himself and tries to stand against it, can hardly maintain himself without special divine aid.

<sup>3</sup> In the dialogue called Politikus, Plato announces formally and explicitly (what the historical Sokrates had asserted before him, Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 10) the exclusive pretensions of the Βασιλεὺς Τεχνικός (representing political science, art, or theory) to rule mankind—the illusory nature of all other titles to rule—and the mischievous working of all existing governments. The same view is developed in the Republic and the Leges. Compare also Aristotel. Ethic. Nikom. x. p. 1180, b. 27 ad fin.

In a remarkable passage of the Leges (i. 637 D, 638 C., Plato observes, in

touching upon the discrepancy between different local institutions at Sparta, Krete, Keos, Tarentum, &c. — “If natives of different cities argue with each other about their respective institutions, each of them has a good and sufficient reason. This is the custom *with us*: *with you perhaps it is different*. But we, who are now conversing, do not apply our criticisms to the private citizen; we criticise the lawgiver himself, and try to determine whether his laws are good or bad.” ἡμῶν δὲ ἔστιν οὐ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἄλλων ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν αὐτῶν κακίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς. King Nomos was not at all pleased to be thus put upon his trial.

<sup>4</sup> Cicero, Tusc. Disp. ii. 3. “Est enim philosophia paucis contenta iudicibus, multitudinem consulto ipsa fugiens, eique ipsi et suspecta et invisæ,” &c.

The extreme publicity, and indiscriminate, aggressive conversation of Sokrates, is strongly insisted on by Themistius (Orat. xxvi. p. 384, Ὑπὲρ τοῦ λέγειν) as aggravating the displeasure of the public against him.

interrogate every one, and sometimes forcing his interrogations even upon reluctant hearers.<sup>u</sup> That he could have been allowed to persist in this course of life for thirty years, when we read his own account (in the Platonic Apology) of the antipathy which he provoked—and when we recollect that the Thirty, during their short dominion, put him under an interdict—is a remarkable proof of the comparative tolerance of Athenian practice.

However this may be, it is from the conversation of Sokrates that the Platonic Dialogues of Search take their rise, and we must read them under those same fundamental postulates which Sokrates enuntiates to the Dikasts “False persuasion of knowledge is almost universal: the Elenchus, which eradicates this, is salutary and indispensable: the dialectic search for truth between two active, self-working minds, both of them ignorant, yet both feeling their own ignorance, is instructive, as well as fascinating, though it should end without finding any truth at all, and without any other result than that of discovering some proposed hypotheses to be untrue.” The modern reader must be invited to keep these postulates in mind, if he would fairly appreciate the Platonic Dialogues of Search. He must learn to esteem the mental exercise of free debate as valuable in itself,<sup>x</sup> even though the goal recedes before him in proportion to the steps which he makes in advance. He perceives a lively antithesis of opinions, several distinct and dissentient points of view opened, various tentatives of advance made and broken off. He has the first half of the process of truth-seeking, without the last; and even without full certainty that the last half can be worked out, or that the problem as propounded is one which admits of an affirmative solution.<sup>y</sup> But Plato pre-

<sup>u</sup> Xenophon, Memor. iv. 2, 3-5-40.

<sup>x</sup> Aristotel. Topica. i. p. 101, a 29, with the Scholion of Alexander of Aphrodisias, who remarks that the habit of colloquial debate had been very frequent in the days of Aristotle, and afterwards; but had comparatively ceased in his own time, having been exchanged for written treatises. P. 254,

b. Schol. Brandis; also Plato, Parmenid. pp. 135, 136, and the Commentary of Proklus thereupon, p. 776 seqq., and p. 917, ed. Stallbaum.

<sup>y</sup> A passage in one of the speeches composed by Lysias, addressed by a plaintiff in court to the Dikasts, shows how debate and free antithesis of opposite opinions, were accounted as

sumes that the search will be renewed, either by the same interlocutors or by others. He reckons upon responsive energy in the youthful subject: he addresses himself to men of earnest purpose and stirring intellect, who will be spurred on by the dialectic exercise itself to farther pursuit—men who, having listened to the working out of different points of view, will meditate on these points for themselves, and apply a judicial estimate conformable to the measure of their own minds. Those respondents, who, after having been puzzled and put to shame by one cross-examination, became disgusted and never presented themselves again—were despised by Sokrates as lazy and stupid.<sup>2</sup> For him, as well

essential to the process τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν—καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ἄμην φιλοσοφούντας αὐτοὺς περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἀντιλέγειν τὸν ἐνάντιον λόγον· οἱ δ' ἄρα οὐκ ἀντέλεγον, ἀλλ' ἀντέπραπτον. (Lysias, Or. viii. Κακολογιῶν, s. 12, p. 273; compare Plat. Apolog. p. 28 E.)

Bacon describes his own intellectual cast of mind, in terms which illustrate the Platonic *διάλογοι ζητητικοί*,—the character of the searcher, doubter, and tester, as contrasted with that of the confident affirmer and expositor:—“Me ipsum autem ad veritatis contemplationes quam ad alia magis fabricatum deprehendi, ut qui mentem et ad rerum similitudinem (quod maximum est) agnoscendum satis mobilem, et ad differentiarum subtilitates observandas satis fixam et intentam habere—qui et *querendi desiderium*, et *dubitandi patientiam*, et *meditandi voluptatem*, et *asserendi cunctationem*, et *resipiscendi facilitatem*, et *disponendi sollicitudinem tenerem*—quique nec novitatem affectarem, nec antiquitatem admirarer, et omnem imposturam odissem. Quare naturam meam cum veritate quamdam familiaritatem et cognitionem habere judicavi.” (Impetus Philosophici, De Interpretatione Naturæ Proœmium.)

Σωκρατικῶς εἰς ἑκάτερον is the phrase of Cicero, ad Atticum., ii. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Xenop. Mem. iv. 2, 40.

Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his Essay on Liberty, has the following remarks illustrating Plato's Dialogues of Search. I should have been glad if I could have transcribed here many other

pages of that admirable Essay: which stands almost alone as an unreserved vindication of the rights of the searching individual intelligence, against the compression and repression of King Nomos (pp. 79-80-81):—

“The loss of so important an aid to the intelligent and living apprehension of a truth, as is afforded by the necessity of explaining it to or defending it against opponents, though not sufficient to outweigh, is no trifling drawback from the benefits of its universal recognition. Where this advantage cannot be had, I confess I should like to see the teachers of mankind endeavouring to provide a substitute for it: some contrivance for making the difficulties of the question as present to the learner's consciousness, as if they were pressed upon him by a dissentient champion eager for his conversion.

“But instead of seeking contrivances for this purpose, they have lost those they formerly had. The Socratic dialectics, so magnificently exemplified in the dialogues of Plato, were a contrivance of this description. They were essentially a discussion of the great questions of life and philosophy, directed with consummate skill to the purpose of convincing any one, who had merely adopted the commonplaces of received opinion, that he did not understand the subject—that he as yet attached no definite meaning to the doctrines he professed: in order, that becoming aware of his ignorance, he might be put in the way to attain a

as for Plato, the search after truth counted as the main business of life.

Another matter must here be noticed, in regard to these Dialogues of Search. We must understand how Plato conceived the goal towards which they tend: that is, the state of mind which he calls *knowledge* or *cognition*. Knowledge (in his view) is not attained until the mind is brought into clear view of the Universal Forms or Ideas, and intimate communion with them: but the test (as I have already observed) for determining whether a man has yet attained this end or not, is to ascertain whether he can give to others a full account of all that he professes to know, and can extract from them a full account of all that they profess to know: whether he can perform, in a manner exhaustive as well as unerring, the double and correlative function of asking and answering: in other words, whether he can administer the Sokratic cross-examination effectively to others, and reply to it without faltering or contradiction when administered to himself.<sup>a</sup> Such being the way in which

Result called *knowledge*, which Plato aspires to. Power of going through a Sokratic cross-examination: not attainable except through the Platonic process and method.

stable belief, resting on a clear apprehension both of the meaning of doctrines and of their evidence. The school-disputations of the middle ages had a similar object. They were intended to make sure that the pupil understood his own opinion, and (by necessary correlation) the opinion opposed to it—and could enforce the grounds of the one and confute those of the other. These last-mentioned contests had indeed the incurable defect, that the premisses appealed to were taken from authority, not from reason; and as a discipline to the mind they were in every respect inferior to the powerful dialectics which formed the intellects of the ‘Socratici viri.’ But the modern mind owes far more to both than it is generally willing to admit; and the present modes of instruction contain nothing which in the smallest degree supplies the place either of the one or of the other. . . . It is the fashion of the present time to disparage negative logic—that which points out weak-

nesses in theory or errors in practice, without establishing positive truths. Such negative criticism would indeed be poor enough as an ultimate result, but as a means to attaining any positive knowledge or conviction worthy the name, it cannot be valued too highly; and until people are again systematically trained to it, there will be few great thinkers, and a low general average of intellect, in any but the mathematical and physical departments of speculation. On any other subject no one’s opinions deserve the name of knowledge, except so far as he has either had forced upon him by others, or gone through of himself, the same mental process which would have been required of him in carrying on an active controversy with opponents.”

<sup>a</sup> See Plato, Republic, vii. 518, B, C, about παιδεία, as developing τὴν ἐνοῦσαν ἐκάστου δύναμιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ; and 534, about ἐπιστήμη, with its test, τὸ δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον. Compare also Republic, v. 477, 478, with Θεαῖτες.



Plato conceives knowledge, we may easily see that it cannot be produced, or even approached, by direct, demonstrative, didactic, communication: by simply announcing to the hearer, and lodging in his memory, a theorem to be proved, together with the steps whereby it is proved. He must be made familiar with each subject on many sides, and under several different aspects and analogies: he must have had before him objections with their refutation, and the fallacious arguments which appear to prove the theorem, but do not really prove it:<sup>b</sup> he must be introduced to the principal counter-theorems, with the means whereby an opponent will enforce them: he must be practised in the use of equivocal terms and sophistry, either to be detected when the opponent is cross-examining him, or to be employed when he is cross-examining an opponent. All these accomplishments must be acquired, together with full promptitude and flexibility, before he will be competent to perform those two difficult functions, which Plato considers to be the test of knowledge. You may say that such a result is indefinitely distant and hopeless: Plato considers it attainable, though he admits the arduous efforts which it will cost. But the point which I wish to show is, that if attainable at all, it can only be attained through a long and varied course of such dialectic discussion as that which we read in the Platonic Dialogues of Search. The state and aptitude of mind called knowledge, can only be generated as a last result of this continued prac-

175. C, D; Phædon, 76, B; Phædrus, 276; and Sympos. 202 A. τὸ ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔχειν λόγον δοῦναι, οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐτε ἐπίστασθαι ἔστιν; ἄλογον γὰρ πρᾶγμα πῶς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμη;

<sup>b</sup> On this point the scholastic manner of handling in the Middle Ages furnishes a good illustration for the Platonic dialectic. I borrow a passage from the treatise of M. Haureau.

“Saint Thomas pouvait s'en tenir là: nous le comprenons, nous avons tout son système sur l'origine des idées, et nous pouvons croire qu'il n'a plus rien à nous apprendre à ce sujet. Mais en

scholastique, il ne suffit pas de démontrer, par deux ou trois argumens, réputés invincibles, ce que l'on suppose être la vérité. Il faut, en outre, répondre aux objections première, seconde, troisième, &c., &c., de divers interlocuteurs, souvent imaginaires: il faut établir la parfaite concordance de la conclusion énoncée, et des conclusions précédentes ou subséquentes: il faut reproduire, à l'occasion de tout problème controversé, l'ensemble de la doctrine pour laquelle on s'est déclaré.”

B. Hauréau, De la Philosophie Scholastique, vol. ii. p. 190.

tice (to borrow an expression of Longinus).<sup>c</sup> The Platonic method is thus in perfect harmony and co-ordination with the Platonic result, as described and pursued.

Moreover, not merely method and result are in harmony, but also the topics discussed. These topics were ethical, social, and political: matters especially human<sup>d</sup> (to use the phrase of Sokrates himself) familiar to every man, — handled, unphilosophically, by speakers in the assembly, pleaders in the dikastery, dramatists in the theatre. Now it is exactly upon such topics that debate can be made most interesting, varied, and abundant. The facts, multifarious in themselves, connected with man and society, depend upon a variety of causes, co-operating and conflicting. Account must be taken of many different points of view, each of which has a certain range of application, and each of which serves to limit or modify the others: the generalities, even when true, are true only on the balance, and under ordinary circumstances; they are liable to exception, if those circumstances undergo important change. There are always objections, real as well as apparent, which require to be rebutted or elucidated. To such changeful and complicated states of fact, the Platonic dialectic was adapted: furnishing abundant premisses and comparisons, bringing into notice many distinct points of view, each of which must be looked at and appreciated, before any tenable principle can be arrived at. Not only Platonic method and result, but also Platonic topics, are thus well suited to each other. The general terms of ethics were familiar but undefined: the tentative definitions suggested, followed up by objections available against each, included a large and instructive survey of ethical phenomena in all their bearings.

The negative procedure is so conspicuous, and even so preponderant, in the Platonic dialogues, that no historian of philosophy can omit to notice it. But many of them (like Xenophon in describing So-

Platonic process adapted to Platonic topics — man and society.

Plato does not provide solutions for the difficulties which he has

<sup>c</sup> Longinus, De Sublim. s. 6. *καίτοι τὸ πρᾶγμα δύσληπτον· ἡ γὰρ τῶν λόγων κρίσις πολλῆς ἔστι πείρας τελευταίων ἐπιγέννημα.* Compare what is said in

a succeeding chapter about the *Hippias Minor*.

<sup>d</sup> Xenop. Mem. i. 1, 12-15.

raised. The affirmative and negative veins are in him completely distinct. His dogmas are enunciations *à priori* of some impressive sentiment.

krates) assign to it only a subordinate place and a qualified application: while some (and Schleiermacher especially) represent all the doubts and difficulties in the negative dialogues as exercises to call forth the intellectual efforts of the reader, preparatory to full and satisfactory solutions which Plato has given in the dogmatic dialogues at the end. The first half of this hypothesis I accept: the last half I believe to be unfounded. The doubts and difficulties were certainly exercises to the mind of Plato himself, and were intended as exercises to his readers: but he has nowhere provided a key to the solution of them. Where he propounds positive dogmas, he does not bring them face to face with objections, nor verify their authority by showing that they afford satisfactory solution of the difficulties exhibited in his negative procedure. The two currents of his speculation, the affirmative and the negative, are distinct and independent of each other. Where the affirmative is especially present (as in *Timæus*), the negative altogether disappears. *Timæus* is made to proclaim the most sweeping theories, not one of which the real Sokrates would have suffered to pass without abundant cross-examination: but the Platonic Sokrates hears them with respectful silence, and commends afterwards. The declaration so often made by Sokrates that he is a searcher, not a teacher—that he feels doubts keenly himself, and can impress them upon others, but cannot discover any good solution of them—this declaration, which is usually considered mere irony, is literally true.<sup>e</sup> The Platonic theory of Objective Ideas separate and absolute, which the commentators often announce as if it cleared up all difficulties—not only clears up none, but introduces fresh ones belonging to itself. When Plato comes forward to affirm, his dogmas are altogether *à priori*: they enunciate preconceptions or hypotheses, which derive their hold upon his belief, not from any aptitude for solving the objections which he has raised, but from deep and solemn sentiment of some

<sup>e</sup> See the conversation between Menippus and Sokrates. (Lucian, *Dialog. Mortuor.* xx.)

kind or other—religious, ethical, æsthetic, poetical, &c., the worship of numerical symmetry or exactness, &c. The dogmas are enuntiations of some grand sentiment of the divine, good, just, beautiful, symmetrical, &c.,<sup>f</sup> which Plato follows out into corollaries. But this is a process of itself; and while he is performing it, the doubts previously raised are not called up to be solved, but are forgotten or kept out of sight. It is therefore a mistake to suppose<sup>g</sup> that Plato

<sup>f</sup> Dionysius of Halikarnassus remarks that the topics upon which Plato renounces the character of a searcher, and passes into that of a vehement affirmative dogmatist, are those which are above human investigation and evidence—the transcendental: *καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος (Plato) τὰ δόγματα οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀποφαίνεται, εἶτα περὶ αὐτῶν διαγωνίζεται· ἀλλ' ἐν μέσῳ τὴν ζήτησιν ποιοῦμενος πρὸς τοὺς διαλεγόμενους, εὐρίσκων μᾶλλον τὸ δέον δόγμα, ἢ φιλονεικῶν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ φαίνεται· πλὴν ὅσα περὶ τῶν κρειττόνων, ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς, λέγεται.* (Dion. Hal. *Ars Rhetoric.* c. 10, p. 376, Reisk.)

M. Arago, in the following passage, points to a style of theorising in the physical sciences, very analogous to that of Plato, generally:—

Arago, *Biographies*, vol. i. p. 149. Vie de Fresnel. “De ces deux explications des phénomènes de la lumière, l’une s’appelle la théorie de l’émission; l’autre est connu sous le nom de système des ondes. On trouve déjà des traces de la première dans les écrits d’Empédocles. Chez les modernes, je pourrais citer parmi ses partisans Képler, Newton, Laplace. Le système des ondes ne compte pas des partisans moins illustres—Aristote, Descartes, Huygens, Hooke, Euler, l’avaient adopté.

“Au reste, si l’on s’étonnait de voir d’aussi grands génies ainsi divisés, je dirais que de leurs temps la question en litige ne pouvait être résolue; que les expériences nécessaires manquaient; qu’alors les différens systèmes sur la lumière étaient, non des *deductions logiques des faits*, mais, si je puis m’exprimer ainsi, de *simples vérités de sentiment*; qu’enfin, le don de l’infailibilité n’est pas accordé même aux plus habiles, des qu’en sortant du domaine des observations, et se jetant dans celui

des conjectures, ils abandonnent la marche sévère et assurée dont les sciences se prévalent de nos jours avec raison, et qui leur a fait faire de si incontestables progrès.”

<sup>g</sup> Several of the Platonic critics speak as if they thought that Plato would never suggest any difficulty which he had not, beforehand and ready-made, the means of solving; and Munk treats the idea which I have stated in the text as ridiculous. “Plato (he observes) must have held preposterous doctrines on the subject of pedagogy. He undertakes to instruct others by his writings, before he has yet cleared up his own ideas on the question; he proposes, in propædentic writings, enigmas for his scholars to solve, while he has not yet solved them himself; and all this for the praiseworthy (*ironically said*) purpose of correcting in their minds the false persuasion of knowledge.” (Die natürliche Ordnung der Platon. Schrift. p. 515.)

That which Munk here derides, appears stated, again and again, by the Platonic Sokrates, as his real purpose. Munk is at liberty to treat it as ridiculous; but the ridicule falls upon Plato himself. The Platonic Sokrates disclaims the pædagogic function, describing himself as nothing more than a fellow searcher with the rest.

So too Munk declares (p. 79-80, and Zeller also, *Philos. der Griech.* vol. ii. p. 472, ed. 2nd) that Plato could not have composed the Parmenidés, including, as it does, such an assemblage of difficulties and objections against the theory of Ideas, until he possessed the means of solving all of them himself. This is a bold assertion, altogether conjectural; for there is no solution of them given in any of Plato’s writings, and the solutions to

ties knots in one dialogue only with a view to untie them in another; and that the doubts which he propounds are already fully solved in his own mind, only that he defers the announcement of the solution until the embarrassed hearer has struggled to find it for himself.

Some critics, assuming confidently that Plato must have produced a full breadth of positive philosophy to countervail his own negative fertility, yet not finding enough of it in the written dialogues—look for it elsewhere. Tennemann thinks, and his opinion is partly shared by Boeckh and K. F. Hermann, that the direct, affirmative, and highest principles of Plato's philosophy were enunciated only in his lectures: that the core, the central points, the great principles of his system (*der Kern*) were revealed thus orally to a few select students in plain and broad terms, while the dialogues were intentionally written so as to convey only indirect hints, illustrations, applications of these great principles, together with refutation of various errors opposed to them: that Plato did not think it safe or prudent to make any full, direct, or systematic revelation to the general public.<sup>h</sup>

which Munk alludes as given by Zeller and Steinhart (even assuming them to be satisfactory, which I do not admit) travel much beyond the limits of Plato.

Ueberweg maintains the same opinion (*Ueber die Aechtheit der Platon. Schriften*, p. 103-104); that Sokrates, in the Platonic Dialogues, though he appears as a Searcher, must nevertheless be looked upon as a matured thinker, who has already gone through the investigation for himself, and solved all the difficulties, but who goes back upon the work of search over again, for the instruction of the interlocutors. "The special talent and dexterity (*Virtuosität*) which Sokrates displays in conducting the dialogue, can only be explained by supposing that he has already acquired for himself a firm and certain conviction on the question discussed."

This opinion of Ueberweg appears to me quite untenable, as well as inconsistent with a previous opinion

which he had given elsewhere (*Platonische Welt-seele*, p. 69-70).—That the Platonic Ideenlehre was altogether insufficient for explanation. The impression which the Dialogues of Search make upon me is directly the reverse. My difficulty is, to understand how the constructor of all these puzzles, if he has the answer ready drawn up in his pocket, can avoid letting it slip out. At any rate, I stand upon the literal declarations, often repeated, of Sokrates; while Munk and Ueberweg contradict them.

For the doubt and hesitation which Plato puts into the mouth of Sokrates (even in the Republic, one of his most expository compositions) see a remarkable passage, *Rep.* v. p. 450 E. *ἀπιστοῦντα δὲ καὶ ζητοῦντα ἅμα τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ὃ δὴ ἐγὼ δρῶ. &c.*

<sup>h</sup> Tennemann, *Gesch. der Philos.* ii. pp. 205-220. Hermann, *Ueber Plato's Schriftsteller Motive*, pp. 290-294.

Hermann considers this reserve and double doctrine to be unworthy of

I have already said that I think this opinion untenable. Among the few points which we know respecting the oral lectures, one is, that they were delivered not to a select and prepared few, but to a numerous and unprepared audience: while among the written dialogues, there are some which, far from being popular or adapted to an ordinary understanding, are highly perplexing and abstruse. The *Timæus* does not confine itself to indirect hints, but delivers positive dogmas about the super-sensible world: though they are of a mystical cast, as we know that the oral lectures *De Bono* were also.

Towards filling up this gap, then, the oral lectures cannot be shown to lend any assistance. The cardinal point of difference between them and the dialogues was, that they were delivered by Plato himself, in his own name; whereas he never published any written composition in his own name. But we do not know enough to say, in what particular way this difference would manifest itself. Besides the oral lectures, delivered to a numerous auditory, it is very probable that Plato held special communications upon philosophy with a few advanced pupils. Here however we are completely in the dark. Yet I see nothing, either in these supposed private communications or in the oral lectures, to controvert what was said in the last page—that Plato’s affirmative philosophy is not fitted on to his negative philosophy, but grows out of other mental impulses, distinct and apart. Plato (as Aristotle tells us<sup>1</sup>) felt it difficult to determine, whether the march of philosophy was an ascending one toward the *principia* (*ἀρχάς*), or a descending one down from the *principia*. A good philosophy ought to suffice for both, conjointly and alternately: in Plato’s philosophy, there is no road explicable either upwards or downwards, between the two: no justifiable mode

Characteristic of the oral lectures— That they were delivered in Plato’s own name. In what other respects they departed from the dialogues, we cannot say.

Plato, and ascribes it to Protagoras and other Sophists, on the authority of a passage in the *Theætétus* (152 C), which does not at all sustain his allegation.

Hermann considers “die akroamatischen Lehren als Fortsetzung und Schlusstein der schriftlichen, die dort erst zur vollen Klarheit principieller

Auffassung erhoben wurden, ohne jedoch über den nämlichen Gegenstand, soweit die Rede auf denselben kommen musste, etwas wesentlich Verschiedenes zu lehren” (p. 293).

<sup>1</sup> Aristot. *Eth. Nikom.* i. 4. εὖ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐζήτει, πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδός.

of participation (*μέθεξις*) between the two disparate worlds—intellect and sense. The *principia* of Plato take an impressive hold on the imagination: but they remove few or none of the Platonic difficulties; and they only seem to do this because the Sokratic Elenchus, so effective whenever it is applied, is never seriously brought to bear against them.

With persons who complain of prolixity in the dialogue—  
 of threads which are taken up only to be broken off, devious turns and “passages which lead to nothing”—of much talk “about it and about it,” without any peremptory decision from an authorised judge—  
 with such complainants Plato has no sympathy. He feels a strong interest in the process of enquiry, in the debate *per se*: and he presumes a like interest in his readers. He has no wish to shorten the process, nor to reach the end and dismiss the question as settled.<sup>k</sup> On the contrary, he claims it as the privilege of philosophical research, that persons engaged in such discussions are noway tied to time; they are not like judicial pleaders, who, with a klepsydra or water-clock to measure

Apart from any result, Plato has an interest in the process of search and debate *per se*. Protracted enquiry is a valuable privilege, not a tiresome obligation.

<sup>k</sup> As an illustration of that class of minds which take delight in the search for truth in different directions, I copy the following passage respecting Dr. Priestley, from an excellent modern scientific biography. “Dr. Priestley had seen so much of the evil of obstinate adherence to opinions which time had rendered decrepit, not venerable—and had been so richly rewarded in his capacity of natural philosopher, by his adventurous explorations of new territories in science—that he unavoidably and unconsciously over-estimated the value of what was novel, and held himself free to change his opinions to an extent not easily sympathised with by minds of a different order. Some men love to rest in truth, or at least in settled opinions, and are uneasy till they find repose. They alter their beliefs with great reluctance, and dread the charge of inconsistency, even in reference to trifling matters. Priestley, on the other hand, was a *follower after truth, who delighted in the chase, and was all his life long pursuing, not resting in it.*

On all subjects which interested him he held by certain cardinal doctrines, but he left the outlines of his systems to be filled up as he gained experience, and to an extent very few men have done, disavowed any attempt to reconcile his changing views with each other, or to deprecate the charge of inconsistency. . . . I think it must be acknowledged by all who have studied his writings, that in his scientific researches at least he carried this feeling too far; and that often when he had reached a truth in which he might and should have rested, his dread of anything like a too hasty stereotyping of a supposed discovery, induced him to welcome whatever seemed to justify him in renewing the *pursuit* of truth, and thus led him completely astray. Priestley indeed missed many a discovery, the clue to which was in his hands and in his alone, by not knowing where to stop.”

(Dr. Geo. Wilson—Life of the Hon. H. Cavendish, among the publications of the Cavendish Society, 1851, p. 110-111.)

the length of each speech, are under slavish dependance on the feelings of the Dikasts, and are therefore obliged to keep strictly to the point.<sup>m</sup> Whoever desires accurate training of mind must submit to go through a long and tiresome circuit.<sup>n</sup> Plato regards the process of enquiry as being in itself, both a stimulus and a discipline, in which the minds both of questioner and respondent are implicated and improved, each being indispensable to the other : he also represents it as a process, carried on under the immediate inspiration of the moment, without reflection or foreknowledge of the result.<sup>o</sup> Lastly, Plato has an interest in the dialogue,

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Theættét. p. 172.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Republic, v. 450 B. μέτρον δέ γ', ἔφη ὁ Γλαῦκων, ὃ Σώκρατες, τοιούτων λόγων ἀκούειν, ὕλος ὁ βίος οὖν ἔχουσιν. vi. 504. Τὴν μακροτέραν περίτεον τῷ τοιούτῳ, καὶ οὐκ ἦττον μιν θάνοντι πονητέον ἢ γυμναζομένῳ. Also Phædrus, 274 A ; Parmenid. p. 135 D, 136 D, ἀμήχανον πραγματεῖαν—ἀδολεσχίας, &c. Compare Politikus, 286, in respect to the charge of prolixity against him.

In the Hermetimus of Lucian, the assailant of philosophy draws one of his strongest arguments from the number of years required to examine the doctrines of all the philosophical sects : the whole of life would be insufficient (Lucian, Hermet. c. 47-48). The passages above cited, especially the first of them, show that Sokrates and Plato would not have been discouraged by this protracted work.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Republic, iii. 394 D. Μαρτυρομαι (says Glaukon) σκοπεῖσθαι σε, εἴτε παραδεξιόμεθα τραγωδίαν τε καὶ κωμῶδιαν εἰς τὴν πόλιν, εἴτε καὶ οὐ. Ἰσως (says Sokrates) καὶ πλεῖα ἐστὶ τούτων· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγω γέ πω οἶδα, ἀλλ' ὅπῃ ἂν ὁ λόγος ὡσπερ πνεῦμα φέρη, ταύτῃ ἰτέον. Καὶ καλῶς γ', ἔφη, λέγεις.

The Republic, from the second book to the close, is one of those Platonic compositions in which Sokrates is most expository.

We find a remarkable passage in Des Cartes, wherein that very self-working philosopher expresses his conviction that the longer he continued enquiring the more his own mind would become armed for the better ap-

preciation of truth—and in which he strongly protests against any barrier restraining the indefinite liberty of enquiry.

“Et encore qu'il y en ait peut-être d'aussi bien sensés parmi les Perses ou les Chinois que parmi nous, il me sembloit que le plus utile étoit, de me régler selon ceux avec lesquels j'aurois à vivre; et que pour savoir quelles étoient véritablement leurs opinions, je devois plutôt prendre garde à ce qu'ils pratiquaient qu'à ce qu'ils disaient; non seulement à cause qu'en la corruption de nos mœurs, il y a peu de gens qui veuillent dire tout ce qu'ils croient—mais aussi à cause que plusieurs ignorent eux mêmes. Car l'action de la pensée, par laquelle on croit une chose, étant différente de celle par laquelle on connoit qu'on la croit, elles sont souvent l'une sans l'autre. Et entre plusieurs opinions également reçues, je ne choisissois que les plus modérées; tant à cause que ce sont toujours les plus commodes pour la pratique, et vraisemblablement les meilleures—tous excès ayans coutume d'être mauvais—comme aussi afin de me détourner moins du vrai chemin, en cas que je faillisse, que si, ayant choisi l'un des deux extrêmes, c'eût été l'autre qu'il eut fallu suivre.

“Et particulièrement, je mettois entre les excès toutes les promesses par lesquelles on retranche quelque chose de sa liberté; non que je désapprouvasse les lois, qui pour remédier à l'inconstance des esprits foibles, permettent, lorsqu'on a quelque bon dessein (ou même, pour la sûreté du commerce, quelque dessein qui n'est qu'indifférent), qu'on fasse des vœux ou des contrats qui obligent à y



not merely as a mental discipline, but as an artistic piece of workmanship, whereby the taste and imagination are charmed. The dialogue was to him what the tragedy was to Sophoklēs, and the rhetorical discourse to Isokrates. He went on "combining and curling it" (to use the phrase of Dionysius) for as many years as Isokrates bestowed on the composition of the Panegyric Oration. He handles the dialectic drama so as to exhibit some one among the many diverse ethical points of view, and to show what it involves as well as what it excludes in the way of consequence. We shall not find the ethical point of view always the same: there are material inconsistencies and differences in this respect between one dialogue and another.

But amidst all these differences—and partly indeed by reason of these differences—Plato succeeds in inspiring his readers with much of the same interest in the process of dialectic enquiry which he evidently felt in his own bosom. The charm, with which he invests the process of philosophising, is one main cause of the preservation of his writings from the terrible shipwreck which has overtaken so much of the abundant contemporary literature. It constitutes also one of his principal titles to the gratitude of intellectual men. This is a merit which may be claimed for Cicero also, but hardly for Aristotle, in so far as we can judge from the preserved portion of the Aristotelian writings: whether for the other *virī Socratici* his contemporaries, or in what proportion, we are unable to say. Plato's works charmed and instructed all; so that they were read not merely by disciples and admirers (as the Stoic and Epikurean treatises were), but by those who dissented from him as well as by those who agreed with him.<sup>p</sup> The process of philosophising is one not naturally

persévérer—mais à cause que je ne voyois au monde aucune chose qui demeurât toujours en même état, et que comme pour mon particulier, je me promettois de perfectionner de plus en plus mes jugemens, et non point de les rendre pires, j'eusse pensé commettre une grande faute contre le bon sens, si, parceque j'approuvois alors quelque

*chose, je me fusse obligé de la prendre pour bonne encore après, lorsqu'elle auroit peut-être cessé de l'être, ou que j'aurois cessé de l'estimer telle."* Discours de la Méthode, part iii, p. 147-148, Cousin edit.

<sup>p</sup> Cicero, Tusc. Disp. ii. 3, 8.

Cicero farther commends the Stoic Pauetius for having relinquished the

attractive except to a few minds: the more therefore do we owe to the colloquy of Sokrates and the writing of Plato, who handled it so as to diffuse the appetite for enquiry, and for sifting dissentient opinions. The stimulating and suggestive influence exercised by Plato—the variety of new roads pointed out to the free enquiring mind—are in themselves sufficiently valuable—whatever we may think of the positive results in which he himself acquiesced.<sup>4</sup>

I have said thus much respecting what is common to the Dialogues of Search, because this is a species of composition now rare and strange. Modern readers do not understand what is meant by publishing an enquiry without any result—a story without an end. Respecting the Dialogues of Exposition, there is not the like difficulty. This is a species of composition, the purpose of which is generally understood. Whether the exposition be clear or obscure—orderly or confused—true or false—we shall see when we come to examine each separately. But these Dialogues of Exposition exhibit Plato in a different character: as the counterpart, not of Sokrates, but of Lykurgus (Republic and Leges) or of Pythagoras (in Timæus).<sup>r</sup>

A farther remark which may be made, bearing upon most of the dialogues, relates to matter and not to manner. Everywhere (both in the Dialogues of Search and in those of exposition) the process of generalisation is kept in view and brought into conscious notice, directly or indirectly. The relation of the universal to its particulars, the contrast of the constant and essential with the variable and accidental, are turned and returned in a thousand different ways. The principles of classification, with

Process of generalisation always kept in view and illustrated throughout the Platonic Dialogues of Search—general terms and propositions made subjects of conscious analysis.

“tristitiam et asperitatem” of his Stoic predecessors, Zeno, Chrysippus, &c., and for endeavouring to reproduce the style and graces of Plato and Aristotle, whom he was always commending to his students (De Finib. iv. 28).

<sup>4</sup> The observation which Cicero applies to Varro, is applicable to the Platonic writings also. “Philosophiam

multis locis *inchoasti*: ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum parum” (Academ. Poster. i. 3, 9).

I shall say more about this when I touch upon the Platonic Kleitophon; an unfinished dialogue which takes up the point of view here indicated by Cicero.

<sup>r</sup> See the citation from Plutarch in an earlier note of this chapter.

the breaking down of an extensive genus into species and sub-species, form the special subject of illustration in two of the most elaborate Platonic dialogues, and are often partially applied in the rest. To see the One in the Many, and the Many in the One, is represented as the great aim and characteristic attribute of the real philosopher. The testing of general terms, and of abstractions already embodied in familiar language, by interrogations applying them to many concrete and particular cases—is one manifestation of the Sokratic cross-examining process, which Plato multiplies and diversifies without limit. It is in his writings and in the conversation of Sokrates, that general terms and propositions first become the subject of conscious attention and analysis: and Plato was well aware that he was here opening the new road towards formal logic, unknown to his predecessors, unfamiliar even to his contemporaries. This process is indeed often overlaid in his writings by exuberant poetical imagery and by transcendental hypothesis: but the important fact is, that it was constantly present to his own mind and is impressed upon the notice of his readers.

After these various remarks, having a common bearing upon all, or nearly all, the Platonic dialogues, I shall proceed to give some account of each dialogue separately. It is doubtless both practicable and useful to illustrate one of them by others, sometimes in the way of analogy, sometimes in that of contrast. But I shall not affect to handle them as contributories to one positive doctrinal system—nor as occupying each an intentional place in the gradual unfolding of one preconceived scheme—nor as successive manifestations of change, knowable and determinable, in the views of the author. For us they exist as distinct imaginary conversations, composed by the same author at unknown times and under unknown specialties of circumstance. Of course it is necessary to prefer some one order for reviewing the Dialogues, and for that purpose more or less of hypothesis must be admitted; but I shall endeavour to assume as little as possible.

The Dialogues must be reviewed as distinct compositions by the same author, illustrating each other, but without assignable inter-dependence.

The order which I shall adopt for considering the dialogues coincides to a certain extent with that which some other expositors have adopted. It begins with those dialogues which delineate Sokrates, and which confine themselves to the subjects and points of view belonging to him, known as he is upon the independent testimony of Xenophon. First of all will come the Platonic Apology, containing the explicit negative programme of Sokrates, enunciated by himself a month before his death, when Plato was 28 years of age.

Order of the Dialogues, chosen for bringing them under separate review. Apology will come first; Timæus, Kritias, Leges, Epinomis, last.

Last of all, I shall take those dialogues which depart most widely from Sokrates, and which are believed to be the products of Plato's most advanced age—Timæus, Kritias, and Leges, with the sequel, Epinomis. These dialogues present a glaring contrast to the searching questions, the negative acuteness, the confessed ignorance, of Sokrates: Plato in his old age has not maintained consistency with his youth, as Sokrates did, but has passed round from the negative to the affirmative pole of philosophy.

Between the Apology—and the dialogues named as last—I shall examine the intermediate dialogues according as they seem to approximate or recede from Sokrates and the negative dialectic. Here, however, the reasons for preference are noway satisfactory. Of the many dissentient schemes, professing to determine the real order in which the Platonic dialogues were composed, I find a certain plausibility in some, but no conclusive reason in any. Of course the reasons in favour of each one scheme, count against all the rest. I believe (as I have already said) that none of Plato's dialogues were composed until after the death of Sokrates: but at what dates, or in what order, after that event, they were composed, it is impossible to determine. The Republic and Philébus rank among the constructive dialogues, and may suitably be taken immediately before Timæus: though the Republic belongs to the highest point of Plato's genius, and includes a large measure of his

Kriton and Euthyphron come immediately after Apology. The intermediate dialogues present no convincing grounds for any determinate order.

negative acuteness combined with his most elaborate positive combinations. In the *Sophistês* and *Politikus*, Sokrates appears only in the character of a listener: in the *Parmenidês* also, the part assigned to him, instead of being aggressive and victorious, is subordinate to that of Parmenides and confined to an unsuccessful defence. These dialogues, then, occupy a place late in the series. On the other hand, *Kriton* and *Euthyphron* have an immediate bearing upon the trial of Sokrates and the feelings connected with it. I shall take them in immediate sequel to the *Apology*.

For the intermediate dialogues, the order is less marked and justifiable. In so far as a reason can be given, for preference as to former and later, I shall give it when the case arises.

## CHAPTER VII.

## APOLOGY OF SOKRATES.

ADOPTING the order of precedence above described, for the review of the Platonic compositions, and taking the point of departure from Sokrates or the Sokratic point of view, I begin with the memorable composition called the Apology.

I agree with Schleiermacher<sup>a</sup>—with the more recent investigations of Ueberweg—and with what (until recent times) seems to have been the common opinion,—that this is in substance the real defence pronounced by Sokrates; reported, and of course drest up, yet not intentionally transformed, by Plato.<sup>b</sup> If such be the case, it is likely to have

The Apology is the real defence delivered by Sokrates before the Dikasts, reported by Plato, without intentional transformation.

<sup>a</sup> Zeller is of opinion that the Apology, as well as the Kriton, were put together at Megara by Plato, shortly after the death of Sokrates. (Zeller, *De Hermodoro Ephesio*, p. 19.)

Schleiermacher, *Einleitung zur Apologie*, vol. ii. pp. 182-185. Ueberweg, *Ueber die Aechtheit der Plat. Schrift.* p. 246.

Steinhart thinks (*Einleitung*, pp. 236-238) that the Apology contains more of Plato, and less of Sokrates: but he does not make his view very clear to me. Ast, on the contrary, treats the Apology as spurious and unworthy of Plato. (*Ueber Platon's Leben und Schriften*, p. 477, seq.) His arguments are rather objections against the merits of the composition, than reasons for believing it not to be the work of Plato. I dissent from them entirely: but they show that an acute critic can make out a plausible case, satisfactory to himself, against any dialogue. If it be once conceded that the question of genuine or spurious is to be tried upon such purely internal grounds of critical admiration and complete harmony of sentiment,

Ast might have made out a case even stronger against the genuineness of the Phædrus, *Symposion*, *Philèbus*, *Parmenidès*.

<sup>b</sup> See chapter lxxviii. of my *History of Greece*.

The reader will find in that chapter a full narrative of all the circumstances known to us respecting both the life and the condemnation of Sokrates.

A very admirable account may also be seen of the character of Sokrates, and his position with reference to the Athenian people, in the article entitled *Sokrates und Sein Volk*, *Akademischer Vortrag*, by Professor Herman Köchly: a lecture delivered at Zurich in 1855, and published with enlargements in 1859.

Professor Köchly's article (contained in a volume entitled *Akademische Vorträge*, Zurich, 1859) is eminently deserving of perusal. It not only contains a careful summary of the contemporary history, so far as Sokrates is concerned, but it has farther the great merit of fairly estimating that illustrious man in reference to the actual feeling of the time, and to the real

been put together shortly after the trial, and may thus be ranked among the earliest of the Platonic compositions: for I have already intimated my belief that Plato composed no dialogues under the name of Sokrates, during the lifetime of Sokrates.

Such, in my judgment, is the most probable hypothesis respecting the Apology. But even if we discard this hypothesis; if we treat the Apology as a pure product of the Platonic imagination (like the dialogues), and therefore not necessarily connected in point of time with the event to which it refers—still there are good reasons for putting it first in the order of review. For it would then be Plato's own exposition, given more explicitly and solemnly than anywhere else, of the Sokratic point of view and life-purpose. It would be an exposition embodying that union of generalising impulse, mistrust of established common places, and aggressive cross-examining ardour—with eccentric religious persuasion, as well as with perpetual immersion in the crowd of the palæstra and the market-place; which immersion was not less indispensable to Sokrates than repugnant to the feelings of Plato himself. An exposition, lastly, disavowing all that taste for cosmical speculation, and that transcendental dogmatism, which formed one among the leading features of Plato as distinguished from Sokrates. In whichever way we look at the Apology, whether as a real or as an imaginary defence, it contains more of pure Sokratism than any other composition of Plato, and as such will occupy the first place in the arrangement which I adopt.<sup>c</sup>

public among whom he moved. I feel much satisfaction in seeing that Professor Köchly's picture, composed without any knowledge of my History of Greece, presents substantially the same view of Sokrates and his contemporaries as that which is taken in my sixty-eighth chapter.

Köchly considers that the Platonic Apology preserves the Sokratic character more faithfully than any of Plato's writings; and that it represents what Sokrates said, as nearly as the

“dichterische Natur” of Plato would permit. (Köchly, pp. 302-364.)

<sup>c</sup> Dionysius Hal. regards the Apology, not as a report of what Sokrates really said, nor as approximating thereunto, but as a pure composition of Plato himself, for three purposes combined:—1. To defend and extol Sokrates. 2. To accuse the Athenian public and Dikasts. 3. To furnish a picture of what a philosopher ought to be.—All these purposes are to a certain extent included and merged in a fourth,

Even if it be Plato's own composition, it comes naturally first in the review of his dialogues.

In my History of Greece, I have already spoken of this impressive discourse as it concerns the relations between Sokrates himself and the Dikasts to whom he addressed it. I here regard it only as it concerns Plato; and as it forms a convenient point of departure for entering upon and appreciating the Platonic dialogues.

The Apology of Sokrates is not a dialogue, but a continuous discourse addressed to the Dikasts, containing nevertheless a few questions and answers interchanged between him and the accuser Melétus in open court. It is occupied, partly, in rebutting the counts of the indictment (viz. 1. That Sokrates did not believe in the Gods or in the Dæmones generally recognised by his countrymen: 2. That he was a corruptor of youth<sup>a</sup>)—partly in setting forth those proceedings of his life out of which such charges had grown, and by which he had become obnoxious to a wide-spread feeling of personal hatred. By his companions, by those who best knew him, and by a considerable number of ardent young men, he was greatly esteemed and admired: by the general public, too, his acuteness as well as his self-sufficing and independent character, were appreciated with a certain respect. Yet he was at the same time disliked, as an aggressive disputant who “tilted at all he met”—who raised questions novel as well as perplexing, who pretended to special intimations from the Gods—and whose views no one could distinctly make out.<sup>e</sup> By the eminent citizens of all varieties—politicians, rhetors,

General character of the Apology — Sentiments entertained towards Sokrates at Athens.

which I hold to be the true one,—to exhibit what Sokrates was and had been, in relation to the Athenian public.

The comparison drawn by Dionysius between the Apology and the oration De Coronâ of Demosthenes, appears to me unsuitable. The two are altogether disparate, in spirit, in purpose, and in execution. (See Dion. H. Ars Rhetorica, pp. 295-298; De Admir. Vi Dic. Demosth. p. 1026.)

<sup>a</sup> Xenoph. Memorab. i. 1. Ἄδικεὶ Σωκράτης, οὐδὲ μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοῦς, οὐ νομίζων ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν ἄδικεὶ δὲ τοὺς νέους διαφθεῖρων.

Plato, Apolog. c. 3, p. 19 B. Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεται, ζητῶν τὰ τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ τὰ ἐπουράνια, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν, καὶ ἄλλους ταῦτα ταῦτα διδάσκων.

The reading of Xenophon was conformable to the copy of the indictment preserved in the Metroon at Athens in the time of Favorinus. It is not impossible that there may have been two distinct forms of indictment, since there were three different accusers—Melétus, Anytus, and Lykon.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Apol. c. 28, p. 38 A, c. 23, p. 35 A.



Sophists, tragic and comic poets, artisans, &c.—he had made himself both hated and feared.<sup>f</sup> He emphatically denies the accusation of general disbelief in the Gods, advanced by Melétus: and he affirms generally (though less distinctly) that the Gods, in whom he believed, were just the same as those in whom the whole city believed. Especially does he repudiate the idea, that he could be so absurd as to doubt the divinity of Helios and Selênê, in which all the world believed;<sup>g</sup> and to adopt the heresy of Anaxagoras, who degraded these Divinities into physical masses. Respecting his general creed, he thus puts himself within the pale of Athenian orthodoxy. He even invokes that very sentiment (with some doubt whether the Dikasts will believe him<sup>h</sup>) for the justification of the obnoxious and obtrusive peculiarities of his life; representing himself as having acted under the mission of the Delphian God, expressly transmitted from the oracle.

According to his statement, his friend and earnest admirer Chærephon, had asked the question at the oracle of Delphi, whether any one was wiser than Sokrates? The reply of the oracle declared, that no one was wiser. On hearing this declaration from an infallible authority, Sokrates was greatly perplexed: for he was conscious to himself of not being wise upon any matter, great or small.<sup>1</sup> He at length concluded, that the declaration of the oracle could be proved true, only on the hypothesis that other persons were less wise than they seemed to be or fancied themselves. To verify this hypothesis, he proceeded to cross-examine the most eminent persons in many different walks—political men, rhetors, Sophists, poets, artisans. On

Declaration from the Delphian oracle respecting the wisdom of Sokrates, interpreted by him as a mission to cross-examine the citizens generally—  
The oracle is proved to be true.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Apol. c. 8-9, p. 22. ἐκ ταυ-  
τησι δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως πολλὰ μὲν  
ἀπέχθειαι μοι γέγονασι καὶ οἷα χαλε-  
πώταται καὶ βαρύταται, ὥστε πολλὰς  
διαβολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὄνομα δὲ  
τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Apol. c. 14, p. 26. ὦ θαυ-  
μάσιε Μέλῃτε, ἵνατί ταῦτα λέγεις; οὐδὲ  
ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεοὺς  
εἶναι, ὡσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι;

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Apol. c. 5, p. 20 D.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Apol., c. 6, p. 21. ταῦτα γὰρ  
ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμούμην οὕτως, τί  
πότε λέγει ὁ θεὸς καὶ τί ποτε ἀνίτ-  
τεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμι-  
κρὸν ξύνουδα ἐμαντῶ σοφὸς ἂν τί οὖν  
ποτὲ λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι;  
οὐ γὰρ δὴ που ψεύδεται γε; οὐ γὰρ  
θέμις αὐτῶ. Καὶ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον  
ἠπόρου, &c.

applying his Elenchus, and putting to them testing interrogations, he found them all without exception destitute of any real wisdom, yet fully persuaded that they *were* wise, and incapable of being shaken in that persuasion. The artisans indeed did really know each his own special trade; but then, on account of this knowledge, they believed themselves to be wise on other great matters also. So also the poets were great in their own compositions; but on being questioned respecting these very compositions, they were unable to give any rational or consistent explanations: so that they plainly appeared to have written beautiful verses, not from any wisdom of their own, but through inspiration from the Gods, or spontaneous promptings of nature. The result was, that these men were all proved to possess no more real wisdom than Sokrates: but *he* was aware of his own deficiency; while *they* were fully convinced of their own wisdom, and could not be made sensible of the contrary. In this way Sokrates justified the certificate of superiority vouchsafed to him by the oracle. He, like all other persons, was destitute of wisdom; but he was the only one who knew, or could be made to feel, his own real mental condition. With others, and most of all with the most conspicuous men, the false persuasion of their own wisdom was universal and inexpugnable.<sup>k</sup>

This then was the philosophical mission of Sokrates, imposed upon him by the Delphian oracle, and in which he passed the mature portion of his life: to cross-examine every one, to expose that false persuasion of knowledge which every one felt, and to demonstrate the truth of that which the oracle really meant declaring the superior wisdom of Sokrates. “People suppose me to be wise myself” (says Sokrates) “on those matters on which I detect and prove the non-wisdom of others.<sup>l</sup> But that is a mistake. The God alone is wise, and his oracle declares human wisdom to be worth little or nothing, employing the name of Sokrates as an example. He is the wisest of men, who, like Sokrates, knows well that he is in truth

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Apolog. c. 8-9, pp. 22-23.

<sup>l</sup> Plato, Apol. c. 9, p. 23. οἴονται γὰρ | με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφόν, & ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω.

False persuasion of wisdom is universal—the God alone is wise.

worthless so far as wisdom is concerned.<sup>m</sup> The really disgraceful ignorance is—to think that you know what you do not really know.”<sup>n</sup>

“The God has marked for me my post, to pass my life in the search for wisdom, cross-examining myself as well as others: I shall be disgraced, if I desert that post, from fear either of death or of any other evil.”<sup>o</sup>

“Even if you Dikasts acquit me, I shall not alter my course: I shall continue, as long as I hold life and strength, to exhort and interrogate in my usual strain, telling every one whom I meet<sup>p</sup>—You, a citizen of the great and intelligent Athens, are you not ashamed of busying yourself to procure wealth, reputation, and glory, in the greatest possible quantity—while you take neither thought nor pains about truth, or wisdom, or the fullest measure of goodness for your mind? If any one denies the charge, and professes that he *does* take thought for these objects,—I shall not let him off without questioning, cross-examining, and exposing him.<sup>q</sup> And if he appears to me to affirm that he is virtuous without being so in reality, I shall reproach him for caring least about the greater matter, and most about the smaller. This course I shall pursue with every one whom I meet, young or old, citizen or non-citizen: most of all with you citizens, because you are most nearly connected with me. For this, you know, is what the God commands, and I think that no greater blessing has ever happened to the city than this ministration of mine under orders from the God. For I go about incessantly persuading you all, old as well as young, not to care about your bodies, or about riches, so much as about acquiring the largest measure of virtue for your minds. I urge upon you that virtue is not the fruit of

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Apol. c. 9, p. 23 A, c. 17, p. 28 E.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 29 B. *καὶ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὐτῇ ἢ ἐπονειδιστος, ἢ τοῦ οἰεσθαι εἰδέναι ἔ οὐκ οἶδεν:*

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 28 E.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 29. *οὐ μὴ παύσομαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῶν παρακε-*

*λευόμενος καὶ ἐνδευκνόμενος, ὅτω ἂν αἰεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἴαμι εἶωθα, &c.*

<sup>q</sup> Plato, Apol. ib. *καὶ εἴαν τις ὑμῶν ἀμφισβητήσῃ καὶ φῆ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀφήσω αὐτὸν οὐδ' ἄπειμι, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ εἴαν μοι μὴ δοκῆ κεκτῆσθαι ἀρετὴν φάναι δὲ, ὀνειδιῶ, &c.*

wealth,—but that wealth, together with all the other things good for mankind publicly and privately, are the fruits of virtue.<sup>r</sup> If I am a corruptor of youth, it is by these discourses that I corrupt them: and if any one gives a different version of my discourses, he talks idly. Accordingly, men of Athens, I must tell you plainly:—decide with Anytus, or not,—acquit me or not—I shall do nothing different from what I have done, even if I am to die many times over for it.”

Such is the description given by Sokrates of his own profession and standing purpose, imposed upon him as a duty by the Delphian God. He neglected all labour either for profit, or for political importance, or for the public service; he devoted himself, from morning till night, to the task of stirring up the Athenian public, as the gadfly worries a large and high-bred but over-sleek, horse:<sup>s</sup> stimulating them by interrogation, persuasion, reproach, to render account of their lives and to seek with greater energy the path of virtue. By continually persisting in such universal cross-examination, he had rendered himself obnoxious to the Athenians generally;<sup>t</sup> who were offended when called upon to render account, and when reproached that they did not live rightly. Sokrates predicts that after his death, younger cross-examiners, hitherto kept down by his celebrity, would arise in numbers,<sup>u</sup> and would pursue the same process with greater keenness and acrimony than he had done.

He had devoted his life to the execution of this mission, and he intended to persevere in spite of obloquy or danger.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Apol. ib. λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τᾶλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ.

<sup>s</sup> Plato, Apol. c. 18, p. 30 E. ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γελαιότερον εἰπεῖν, προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ὡσπερ ἴππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωθεστέρω καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγειρῆσθαι ὑπὸ μύωπος τινος· οἷον δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι τοιοῦτόν τινα, ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὀνειδίζων ἕνα ἕκαστον οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὄλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων. Also c. 26, p. 36 D.

<sup>t</sup> Plato, Apol. c. 6, p. 21 D; c. 16, p. 28 A; c. 30, p. 39 C.

<sup>u</sup> Plato, Apol. c. 30, p. 39 C. νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἰργασθε (i. e. ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε) οἰόμενοι ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἐλέγχον τοῦ βίου. τὸ δὲ ὑμῖν πολὺ ἐναντίον ἀποβήσεται, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι. πλείους ἔσονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχοντες, οὓς νῦν ἐγὼ κατείχον, ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ᾔσθάνεσθε· καὶ χαλεπότεροι ἔσονται ὡσφ νεώτεροί εἰσι, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε, &c.

I have already remarked (in chapter lxviii. of my general History of Greece relating to Sokrates) that this prediction was not fulfilled.

While Sokrates thus extols, and sanctifies under the authority of the Delphian God, his habitual occupation of interrogating, cross-examining, and stimulating to virtue, the Athenians indiscriminately—he disclaims altogether the function of a teacher. His disclaimer on this point is unequivocal and emphatic. He cannot teach others, because he is not at all wiser than they. He is fully aware that he is not wise on any point, great or small—that he knows nothing at all, so to speak.<sup>x</sup> He can convict others, by their own answers, of real though unconscious ignorance, or (under another name) false persuasion of knowledge: and because he can do so, he is presumed to possess positive knowledge on the points to which the exposure refers. But this presumption is altogether unfounded: he possesses no such positive knowledge. Wisdom is not to be found in any man, even among the most distinguished: Sokrates is as ignorant as others; and his only point of superiority is, that he is fully conscious of his own ignorance, while others, far from having the like consciousness, confidently believe themselves to be in possession of wisdom and truth.<sup>y</sup> In this consciousness of his own ignorance Sokrates stands alone; on which special ground he is proclaimed by the Delphian God as the wisest of mankind.

Being thus a partner in the common ignorance, Sokrates cannot of course teach others. He utterly disclaims having ever taught, or professed to teach. He would be proud indeed, if he possessed the knowledge of human and social virtue: but he does not know it himself, nor can he find out who else knows it.<sup>z</sup> He is certain that there cannot be more than a few select indi-

<sup>x</sup> Plato, Apol. c. 6, p. 21 C. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν ξύνοίδα ἑμαυτῷ σοφὸς εἶναι, &c.: c. 8, p. 22 D. ἑμαυτῷ γὰρ ξυνήθη οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν.

<sup>y</sup> Plato, Apol. c. 9, p. 23 A-B. Οὐτός ἡμῶν, ὃ ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ὡσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἑξίως ἐστὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν.

<sup>z</sup> Plato, Apol. c. 4, p. 20 B. τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν;—ἐγὼ γοῦν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυνόμεν τε καὶ ἡβρυνόμεν ἄν, εἰ ἠπιστάμην ταῦτα: ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

c. 21, p. 33 A. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν. οὐδενὸς πάποσ' ἐγενόμεν: c. 4, p. 19 E.

viduals who possess the art of making mankind wiser or better—just as in the case of horses, none but a few practised trainers know how to make them better, while the handling of these or other animals, by ordinary men, certainly does not improve the animals, and generally even makes them worse.<sup>a</sup> But where any such select few are to be found, who alone can train men,—Sokrates is obliged to inquire from others; he cannot divine for himself.<sup>b</sup> He is perpetually going about, with the lantern of cross-examination, in search of a wise man: but he can find only those who pretend to be wise, and whom his cross-examination exposes as pretenders.<sup>c</sup>

This then is the mission and vocation of Sokrates—1. To cross-examine men, and to destroy that false persuasion of wisdom and virtue which is so widely diffused among them. 2. To reproach them, and make them ashamed of pursuing wealth and glory more than wisdom and virtue.<sup>d</sup>

But Sokrates is not empowered to do more for them. He cannot impart any positive knowledge to heal their ignorance. He cannot teach them what WISDOM OR VIRTUE is.

Such is the substance of the Platonic Apology of Sokrates. How strong was the impression which it made, on many philosophical readers, we may judge from the fact, that Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, being a native of Kition in Cyprus, derived from the perusal of the Apology his first inducement to come over to Athens, and devote himself to the study and teaching of philosophy in that city.<sup>e</sup> Sokrates depicts, with fearless sin-

Impression  
made by the  
Platonic  
Apology on  
Zeno the  
Stoic.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Apol. c. 12, p. 25 B.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Apol. c. 4, p. 20.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Apol. c. 9, p. 23 B. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιῶν ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀσπῶν καὶ τῶν ξένων ἂν τινα οἴωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι καὶ ἐπειδὴ μοι μὴ δοκῆ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. c. 32, p. 41 B.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Apol. c. 33, p. 41 E.

<sup>e</sup> Themistius, Orat. xxiii. (Sophistês) p. 357, Dindorf. Τὰ δὲ ἀμφὶ Ζήνωνος ἀριθηλά τέ ἐστι καὶ ἀδόμενα ὑπὸ πολλῶν, ὅτι αὐτὸν ἡ Σωκράτους ἀπολογία ἐκ Φοινίκης ἤγαγεν εἰς τὴν Ποικίλην.

This statement deserves full belief:

it probably came from Zeno himself, a voluminous writer. The father of Zeno was a merchant who traded with Athens, and brought back books for his son to read, Sokratic books among them. Diogen. Laert. vii. 31.

Respecting another statement made by Themistius in the same page, I do not feel so certain. He says that the accusatory discourse pronounced against Sokrates by Anytus was composed by Polykrates, as a λογόγραφος, and paid for. This may be the fact: but the words of Isokrates in the Busiris rather lead me to the belief that the κατηγορία Σωκράτους composed by Poly-

cerity, what he regards as the intellectual and moral deficiencies of his countrymen, as well as the unpalatable medicine and treatment which he was enjoined to administer to them. With equal sincerity does he declare the limits within which that treatment was confined.

But neither of his two most eminent companions can endure to restrict his competence within such narrow limits. Xenophon<sup>f</sup> affirms that Sokrates was assiduous in communicating useful instruction and positive edification to his hearers. Plato sometimes, though more rarely, intimates the same: but for the most part, and in the Dialogues of Search throughout, he keeps Sokrates within the circle of procedure which the Apology claims for him. These dialogues exemplify in detail the aggressive operations, announced therein by Sokrates in general terms as his missionary life-purpose, against contemporaries of note, very different from each other—against aspiring youths, statesmen, generals, Rhetors, Sophists, orthodox pietists, poets, rhapsodes, &c. Sokrates cross-examines them all, and convicts them of humiliating ignorance: but he does not furnish, nor does he profess to be able to furnish, any solution of his own difficulties. Many of the persons cross-examined bear historical names: but I think it necessary to warn the reader, that all of them speak both language and sentiments provided for them by Plato, and not their own.<sup>g</sup>

Extent of efficacious influence claimed by Sokrates for himself—exemplified by Plato throughout the dialogues of search—Xenophon and Plato enlarge it.

krates was a sophistical exercise, composed to acquire reputation and pupils, not a discourse really delivered in the *Dikastery*.

<sup>f</sup> Xenophon, *Memor.* i. 2-64, i. 3-1, i. 4-2, iv. 2-40, iv. 3-4.

<sup>g</sup> It might seem superfluous to give such a warning; but many commentators speak as if they required it. They denounce the Platonic speakers in harsh terms, which have no pertinence, unless supposed to be applied to a real man expressing his own thoughts and feelings.

It is useless to enjoin us, as Stallbaum and Steinhart do, to mark the aristocratical conceit of Menon!—the pompous ostentation and pretensive

verbosity of Protagoras and Gorgias!—the exorbitant selfishness of Polus and Kalliklès!—the impudent brutality of Thrasymachus!—when all these persons speak entirely under the prompting of Plato himself.

You might just as well judge of Sokrates by what we read in the *Nubes* of Aristophanes, or of Meton by what we find in the *Aves*, as describe the historical characters of the above-named personages out of the Platonic dialogues. They ought to be appreciated as dramatic pictures, dressed up by the author for his own purpose, and delivering such opinions as he assigns to them—whether he intends them to be refuted by others, or not.

The disclaimer, so often repeated by Sokrates,—that he possessed neither positive knowledge nor wisdom in his own person,—was frequently treated by his contemporaries as ironical. He was not supposed to be in earnest when he made it. Every one presumed that he must himself know that which he proved others not to know, whatever motive he might have for affecting ignorance.<sup>h</sup> His personal manner and homely vein of illustration seemed to favour the supposition that he was bantering. This interpretation of the character of Sokrates appears in the main to be preferred by modern critics. Of course (they imagine) an able man who cross-questions others on the definitions of Law, Justice, Democracy, &c., has already meditated on the subject, and framed for himself unimpeachable definitions of these terms. Sokrates (they suppose) is a positive teacher and theorist, employing a method, which, though indirect and circuitous, is nevertheless calculated deliberately beforehand for the purpose of introducing and inculcating premeditated doctrines of his own. Pursuant to this hypothesis, it is presumed that the positive theory of Sokrates is to be found in his negative cross-examinations,—not indeed set down clearly in any one sentence, so that he who runs may read—yet disseminated in separate syllables or letters, which may be distinguished, picked out, and put together into propositions, by an acute detective examiner. And the same presumption is usually applied to the Sokrates of the Platonic dialogues: that is, to Plato employing Sokrates as spokesman. Interpreters sift with microscopic accuracy the negative dialogues of Plato, in hopes of detecting the ultimate elements of that positive

Assumption by modern critics, that Sokrates is a positive teacher, employing indirect methods for the inculcation of theories of his own.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Apol. c. 5, p. 20 D, c. 9, p. 23 A.

Aristeides the Rhetor furnishes a valuable confirmation of the truth of that picture of Sokrates, which we find in the Platonic Apology. All the other companions of Sokrates who wrote dialogues about him (not preserved to us), presented the same general features. 1. Avowed ignorance. 2. The same declaration of

the oracle concerning him. 3. The feeling of frequent signs from τὸ δαιμόνιον.

Ὁμολογεῖται μὲν γε λέγειν αὐτὸν (Sokrates) ὡς ἄρα οὐδὲν ἐπίσταιτο, καὶ πάντες τοῦτ' ὅφασιν οἱ συγγενόμενοι· ὁμολογεῖται δ' αὖ καὶ τοῦτο, σφάτατον αὐτὸν Σωκράτη τὴν Πυθίαν εἰρηκέναι, &c.

(Aristeides, Orat. xlv. Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς, p. 23, 24, 25, Dindorf.)



solution which he is supposed to have 'lodged therein, and which, when found, may be put together so as to clear up all the antecedent difficulties.

I have already said (in the preceding chapter) that I cannot take this view either of Sokrates or of Plato. Without doubt, each of them had affirmative doctrines and convictions, though not both the same. But the affirmative vein, with both of them, runs in a channel completely distinct from the negative. The affirmative theory has its roots *abunde*, and is neither generated, nor adapted, with a view to reconcile the contradictions, or elucidate the obscurities, which the negative Elenchus has exposed. That exposure does indeed render the embarrassed respondent painfully conscious of the want of some rational, consistent, and adequate theoretical explanation: it farther stimulates him to makes efforts of his own for the supply of that want. But such efforts must be really his own; the Elenchus gives no farther help: it furnishes problems, but no solutions, nor even any assurance that the problems as presented admit of affirmative solutions. Whoever expects that such consummate masters of the negative process as Sokrates and Plato, when they come to deliver affirmative dogmas of their own, will be kept under restraint by their own previous Elenchus, and will take care that their dogmas shall not be vulnerable by the same weapons as they had employed against others—will be disappointed. They do not employ any negative test against themselves. When Sokrates preaches in the Xenophontic Memorabilia, or the Athenian Stranger in the Platonic Leges, they jump over, or suppose to be already solved, the difficulties under the pressure of which other disputants had been previously discredited: they assume all the undefinable common-places to be clearly understood, and all the inconsistent generalities to be brought into harmony. Thus it is that the negative cross examination, and the affirmative dogmatism, are (both in Sokrates and in Plato) two unconnected operations of thought: the one does not lead to, or involve, or verify, the other.

Incorrectness of such assumption—the Sokratic Elenchus does not furnish a solution, but works upon the mind of the respondent, stimulating him to seek for a solution of his own.

Those who depreciate the negative process simply, unless followed up by some new positive doctrine which shall be proof against all such attack—cannot be expected to admire Sokrates greatly, even as he stands rated by himself. Even if I concurred in this opinion, I should still think myself obliged to exhibit him as he really was. But I do not concur in the opinion. I think that the creation and furtherance of individual, self-thinking minds, each instigated to form some rational and consistent theory for itself, is a material benefit, even though no farther aid be rendered to the process except in the way of negative suggestion. That such minds should be made to feel the arbitrary and incoherent character of that which they have imbibed by passive association as ethics and æsthetics,—and that they should endeavour to test it by some rational and consistent standard—would be an improving process, though no one theory could be framed satisfactory to all. The Sokratic Elenchus went directly to this result. Plato followed in the same track, not of pouring new matter of knowledge into the pupil, but of eliciting new thoughts and beliefs out of him, by kindling the latent forces of his intellect. A large proportion of Plato's dialogues have no other purpose or value. And in entering upon the consideration of these dialogues, we cannot take a better point of departure than the Apology of Sokrates, wherein the speaker, alike honest and decided in his convictions, at the close of a long cross-examining career, re-asserts expressly his devoted allegiance to the negative process, and disclaims with equal emphasis all power over the affirmative.

In that touching discourse, the Universal Cross-Examiner declares a thorough resolution to follow his own individual conviction and his own sense of duty—whether agreeing or disagreeing with the convictions of his countrymen, and whether leading to danger or to death for himself. “Where a man may have posted himself—either under his own belief that it is best, or under orders from the magistrate—there he must stay and affront danger, not caring for death

Value and importance of this process—stimulating active individual minds to theorise each for itself.

View taken by Sokrates about death. Other men profess to know what it is, and think it a great misfortune: he does not know.

or anything else in comparison with disgrace.”<sup>i</sup> As to death, Sokrates knows very little what it is, nor whether it is good or evil. The fear of death, in his view, is only one case of the prevalent mental malady—men believing themselves to know that of which they really know nothing. If death be an extinction of all sensation, like a perpetual and dreamless sleep, he will regard it as a prodigious benefit compared with life: even the Great King will not be a loser by the exchange.<sup>k</sup> If on the contrary death be a transition into Hades, to keep company with those who have died before—Homer, Hesiod, the heroes of the Trojan war, &c.—Sokrates will consider it supreme happiness to converse with and cross-examine the potentates and clever men of the past—Agamemnon, Odysseus, Sisyphus; thus discriminating which of them are really wise, and which of them are only unconscious pretenders. He is convinced that no evil can ever happen to the good man; that the protection of the gods can never be wanting to him, whether alive or dead.<sup>l</sup> “It is not lawful for a better man to be injured by a worse. He may indeed be killed, or banished, or disfranchised; and these may appear great evils, in the eye of others. But I do not think them so. It is a far greater evil to do what Melétus is now doing—trying to kill a man unjustly.”<sup>m</sup>

Sokrates here gives his own estimate of comparative good and evil. Death, banishment, disfranchisement, &c., are no great evils: to put another man to death unjustly, is a

<sup>i</sup> Plato, Apol. S. c. 16, p. 28 D.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 29 A.; c. 32, p. 40 D. *καὶ εἶτε δὴ μηδεμία ἀσθησις ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ οἶον ὕπνος, ἐπειδὴν τις καθεύδων μὴδ’ ὄναρ μὴδὲν ὄρα, θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἢν εἴη ὁ θάνατος.*

Ast remarks (Plat. Leb. und Schrift, p. 488) that the language of doubt and uncertainty in which Sokrates here speaks of the consequences of death, is greatly at variance with the language which he is made to hold in the Phædon. Ast adduces this as one of his arguments for disallowing the authenticity of the Apology. I do not admit the inference. I am prepared for divergence between the opinions of Sokrates in different dialogues; and

I believe, moreover, that the Sokrates of the Phædon is spokesman chosen to argue in support of the main thesis of that dialogue. But it is impossible to deny the variance which Ast points out, and which is also admitted by Stallbaum. Steinhart indeed (Einleitung, p. 246) goes the length of denying it, in which I cannot follow him. The sentiment of Sokrates in the Apology embodies the same alternative uncertainty, as what we read in Marcus Antoninus, v. 33. *Τί οὖν; περιμένεις ἰλέως τὴν εἴτε σβέσειν εἴτε μετέστασιν, &c.*

<sup>l</sup> Plato, Apol. c. 32, p. 41 A-B.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Apol. c. 18, p. 30 C.

great evil to the doer: the good man can suffer no evil at all. These are given as the judgments of Sokrates, and as dissentient from most others. Whether they are Sokratic or Platonic opinions, or common to both—we shall find them reappearing in various other Platonic dialogues, hereafter to be noticed. We have also to notice that marked feature in the character of Sokrates<sup>n</sup>—the standing upon his own individual reason and measure of good and evil: nay, even pushing his confidence in it so far, as to believe in a divine voice informing and moving him. This reliance on the individual reason is sometimes recognised, at other times rejected, in the Platonic dialogues. Plato rejects it in his comments (contained in the dialogue *Theætétus*) on the doctrine of Protagoras: he rejects it also in the constructive dialogues, *Republic* and *Leges*, where he constitutes himself despotic legislator, prescribing a standard of orthodox opinion: he proclaims it in the *Gorgias*, and implies it very generally throughout the negative dialogues.

Reliance of Sokrates on his own individual reason, whether agreeing or disagreeing with others.

Lastly, we find also in the *Apology* distinct notice of the formidable efficacy of established public impressions, generated without any ostensible author, circulated in the common talk, and passing without examination from one man to another, as portions of accredited faith. “My accusers Melétus and

Formidable efficacy of established public beliefs, generated without any ostensible author.

“ Plato, *Apol. S.* p. 28 D. οὐδ' ἂν τις αὐτὸν τάξη ἢ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιον, ἢ ἔμπροσθεν ταχθῆ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κινδυνεύειν, &c.

Xenophon, *Memorab.* iv. 8, 11. φρόνιμος δὲ, ὥστε μὴ διαμαρτάνειν κρίνων τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ χεῖρω, μηδὲ ἄλλου προσδέεσθαι, ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης εἶναι πρὸς τὴν τούτων γνώσιν, &c.

Compare this with *Memor.* i. 1, 3, 4, 5, and the *Xenophontic Apology*, 4, 5, 13, where this *αὐταρκεία* finds for itself a justification in the hypothesis of a divine monitor without.

The debaters in the treatise of Plutarch (*De genio Socratis*), upon the question of the Sokratic *δαιμόνιον*, insist upon this resolute persuasion and self-determination as the most indisputable fact in the case (c. 11, p. 581 C.).

Αἱ δὲ Σωκράτους ὀρμαὶ τὸ βέβαιον ἔχουσαι καὶ σφοδρότητα φαίνονται πρὸς ἅπαν, ὡς ἂν ἐξ ὀρθῆς καὶ ἰσχυρᾶς ἀφαιμέναι κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς. Compare p. 589 E. The speculations of the speakers upon the *οὐσία* and *δύναμις* τοῦ Σωκράτους *δαιμονίου*, come to little result.

There is a curious passage in Plutarch's life of Coriolanus (c. 32), where he describes the way in which the Gods act upon the minds of particular men, under difficult and trying circumstances. They do not inspire new resolutions or volitions, but they work upon the associative principle, suggesting new ideas which conduct to the appropriate volition—οὐχ ὀρμὰς ἐνεργαζόμενον, ἀλλὰ φαντασίας ὀρμῶν ἀγωγούς, &c.

Anytus (says Sokrates) are difficult enough to deal with: yet far less difficult than the prejudiced public, who have heard false reports concerning me for years past, and have contracted a settled belief about my character, from nameless authors whom I cannot summon here to be confuted.”<sup>o</sup>

It is against this ancient, established belief, passing for knowledge—communicated by unconscious contagion without any rational process—against the “procès jugé mais non plaidé,” whereby King Nomos governs—that the general mission of Sokrates is directed. It is against the like belief, in one of its countless manifestations, that he here defends himself before the Dikastery.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Apol. c. 2, p. 18 C-D.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## KRITON.

THE dialogue called Kriton is, in one point of view, a second part or sequel—in another point of view, an anti-thesis or corrective—of the Platonic Apology. For that reason, I notice it immediately after the Apology: though I do not venture to affirm confidently that it was composed immediately after: it may possibly have been later, as I believe the Phædon also to have been later.\*

The Kriton describes a conversation between Sokrates and his friend Kriton in the prison, after condemnation, and two days before the cup of hemlock was administered. Kriton entreats and urges Sokrates (as the sympathising friends had probably done frequently during the thirty days of imprisonment) to make his escape from the prison, informing him that arrangements have already been made for enabling him to escape with ease and safety, and that money as well as good recommendations will be provided, so that he may dwell comfortably either in Thessaly, or wherever else he pleases. Sokrates ought not, in justice to his children and his friends, to refuse the opportunity offered, and thus to throw away his life. Should he do so, it will appear to every one as if his friends had shamefully failed in their duty, when intervention on their part might easily have saved him. He might have avoided the trial altogether: even when on trial, he might easily have escaped the capital sentence. Here is now a third opportunity of rescue, which if he declines, it will turn this grave and painful

\* Steinhart affirms with confidence that the Kriton was composed immediately after the Apology, and shortly after the death of Sokrates (Einleitung, p. 303). The fact may be so, but I do not feel thus confident of it when I look to the analogy of the later Phædon.

affair into mockery, as if he and his friends were impotent simpletons.<sup>b</sup> Besides the mournful character of the event, Sokrates and his friends will thus be disgraced in the opinion of every one.

“Disgraced in the opinion of every one” replies Sokrates?

Answer of  
Sokrates to  
the appeal  
made by  
Kriton.

That is not the proper test by which the propriety of your recommendation must be determined. I am now, as I always have been, prepared to follow nothing but that voice of reason which approves itself to me in discussion as the best and soundest.<sup>c</sup> We have often discussed this matter before, and the conclusions on which we agreed are not to be thrown aside because of my impending death. We agreed that the opinions general among men ought not to be followed in all cases, but only in some: that the good opinions, those of the wise men, were to be followed—the bad opinions, those of the foolish men, to be disregarded. In the treatment and exercise of the body, we must not attend to the praise, the blame, or the opinion of every man, but only to those of the one professional trainer or physician. If we disregard this one skilful man, and conduct ourselves according to the praise or blame of the unskilful public, our body will become corrupted and disabled, so that life itself will not be worth having.

In like manner, on the question what is just and unjust, honourable or base, good or evil, to which our present subject belongs—we must not yield to the praise and censure of the many, but only to that of

He declares  
that the  
judgment of  
the general  
public is not

<sup>b</sup> Plato, *Krito*. c. 5, p. 45 E. ὡς ἔγωγε καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι, μὴ δόξη ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ ἀνανδρία τιλ τῆ ἡμετέρα πεπραχθαι—καὶ ἡ εἰσοδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ὡς εἰσηλθες, ἔξδν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν—καὶ αὐτὸς δ ἀγῶν τῆς δίκης ὡς ἐγένετο—καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τουτί, ὡσπερ καταγέλωσ τῆς πράξεως, κακία τιλ καὶ ἀνανδρία τῆ ἡμετέρα διαπεφευγῆναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν, οἰτινές σε οὐχὶ ἐσώσαμεν οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτὸν, οἷόν τε ὄν καὶ δυνατὸν, εἴτι καὶ μικρὸν ἡμῶν ὄφελος ἦν.

This is a remarkable passage, as

evinced that both the trial and the death of Sokrates, even in the opinion of his own friends, might have been avoided without anything which they conceived to be dishonourable to his character.

Professor Köchly puts this point very forcibly in his *Vortrag*, referred to in my notes on the Platonic Apology, p. 361 seq.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, *Krito*. c. 6, p. 46 B. ὡς ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον νῦν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος, οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἕλληφ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ, ὅς ἂν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνηται.

the one, whoever he may be, who is wise on these matters.<sup>d</sup> We must be afraid and ashamed of him more than of all the rest. Not the verdict of the many, but that of the one man skilful about just and unjust, and that of truth itself, must be listened to. Otherwise we shall suffer the like debasement and corruption of mind as of body in the former case. Life will become yet more worthless. True—the many may put us to death. But what we ought to care for most, is, not simply to live, but to live well, justly, honourably.<sup>e</sup>

worthy of trust: he appeals to the judgment of the one Expert, who is wise on the matter in debate.

Sokrates thus proceeds :

The point to be decided, therefore, with reference to your proposition, Kriton, is, not what will be generally said if I decline, but whether it will be just or unjust—right or wrong—if I comply; that is, if I consent to escape from prison, against the will of the Athenians and against the sentence of law.

To decide the point, I assume this principle, which we have often before agreed upon in our reasonings, and which must stand unshaken now.<sup>f</sup>

Principles laid down by Sokrates for determining the question with Kriton. Is the proceeding recommended just or unjust? Never in any case to act unjustly.

We ought not in any case whatever to act wrong or unjustly. To act so is in every case both bad for the agent and dishonourable to the agent, whatever may be its consequences. Even though others act wrong to us, we ought not to act wrong to them in return. Even though others do evil to us, we ought not to do evil to them in return.<sup>g</sup>

This is the principle which I assume as true, though I know that very few persons hold it, or ever will hold it. Most men say the contrary—that when other persons do wrong or harm to us, we may do

Sokrates admits that few will agree with him, and that

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Krito, c. 7, p. 47 D. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν, καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ ὧν νῦν ἔστιν ἡ βουλή, πότερον τῆ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἔπεισθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτήν, ἢ τῆ τοῦ ἐνός, εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἐπαίων, ὃν δεῖ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ξύμπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους;

c. 8, p. 48 A. Οὐκ ἄρα πάνυ ἡμῖν

οὕτω φροντιστέον ὁ, τι ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὅ, τι ὁ ἐπαίων περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὁ εἶς, καὶ αὐτῆ ἡ ἀληθεία.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Krito, c. 7-8, p. 47-48.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Krito, c. 9, p. 48 E. ἆρα δὲ δὴ τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχὴν, &c.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Krito, c. 10, p. 49 B. Οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν, &c.



most persons hold the opposite opinion: but he affirms that the point is cardinal.

wrong or harm to them in return. This is a cardinal point. Between those who affirm it, and those who deny it, there can be no common measure or reasoning. Reciprocal contempt is the sentiment with which, by necessity, each contemplates the other's resolutions.<sup>b</sup>

Pleading supposed to be addressed by the Laws of Athens to Sokrates, demanding from him implicit obedience.

Sokrates then delivers a well-known and eloquent pleading, wherein he imagines the Laws of Athens to remonstrate with him on his purpose of secretly quitting the prison, in order to evade a sentence legally pronounced. By his birth, and long residence in Athens, he has entered into a covenant to obey exactly and faithfully what the laws prescribe. Though the laws should deal unjustly with him, he has no right of redress against them—neither by open disobedience, nor force, nor evasion. Their rights over him are even more uncontrolled and indefeasible than those of his father and mother. The laws allow to every citizen full liberty of trying to persuade the assembled public: but the citizen who fails in persuading, must obey the public when they enact a law adverse to his views. Sokrates having been distinguished beyond all others for the constancy of his residence at Athens, has thus shown that he was well satisfied with the city, and with those laws without which it could not exist as a city. If he now violates his covenants and his duty, by breaking prison like a runaway slave, he will forfeit all the reputation to which he has pretended during his long life, as a preacher of justice and virtue.<sup>i</sup>

This striking discourse, the general drift of which I have briefly described, appears intended by Plato—as far as I can

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Krito. c. 10, p. 49 D. Οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ἀλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δεῖξει. Οἷς οὖν οὕτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μὴ, τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλῆ, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τούτους ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν, ὁρώνας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλευματα. Σκοπεῖ δὴ οὖν καὶ σὺ εὖ μάλα, πότερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ ξυνοκεῖ σοὶ καὶ ἀρχώμεθα ἐν τε εὖθεν βουλευόμενοι, ὡς οὐδέποτε ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν, οὔτε κα-

κῶς πάσχοντα ἀμύνεσθαι ἀντιδρώντα κακῶς;

Compare the opposite impulse, to revenge yourself upon your country from which you believe yourself to have received wrong, set forth in the speech of Alkibiades at Sparta after he had been exiled by the Athenians. Thucyd. vi. 92. καὶ τὸ φιλόπολι οὐκ ἐν φ' ἀδικοῦμαι ἔχω, ἀλλ' ἐν φ' ἀσφαλῶς ἐπολιτεύθην.

<sup>i</sup> Plato, Krito. p. 50-54.

pretend to guess at his purpose—to set forth the personal character and dispositions of Sokrates in a light different from that which they present in the Apology. In defending himself before the Dikasts, Sokrates had exalted himself into a position which would undoubtedly be construed by his auditors as disobedience and defiance to the city and its institutions. He professed to be acting under a divine mission, which was of higher authority than the enactments of his countrymen: he warned them against condemning him, because his condemnation would be a mischief, not to him, but to them—and because by doing so they would repudiate and maltreat the missionary sent to them by the Delphian God as a valuable present.<sup>k</sup> In the judgment of the Athenian Dikasts, Sokrates by using such language had put himself above the laws; thus confirming the charge which his accusers advanced, and which they justified by some of his public remarks. He had manifested by unmistakable language the same contempt for the Athenian constitution as that which had been displayed in act by Kritias and Alkibiades,<sup>l</sup> with whom his own name was associated as teacher and companion.<sup>m</sup> Xenophon in his Memo-

Purpose of Plato in this pleading—to present the dispositions of Sokrates in a light different from that which the Apology had presented—unqualified submission instead of defiance.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Apol. S. c. 17-18, p. 29-30.

<sup>l</sup> This was among the charges urged against Sokrates by Anytus and the other accusers (Xen. Mem. i. 2, 9. *ἡπερορᾶν ἐποίει τῶν καθεστώτων νόμων τοὺς συνόντας*). It was also the judgment formed respecting Sokrates by the Roman censor, the elder Cato; a man very much like the Athenian Anytus, constitutional and patriotic as a citizen, devoted to the active duties of political life, but thoroughly averse to philosophy and speculative debate, as Anytus is depicted in the Menon of Plato.—Plutarch, Cato c. 23, a passage already cited in a note on the chapter next but one preceding.

The accusation of “putting himself above the laws,” appears in the same way in the Nubes of Aristophanes, 1035-1402, &c. :—

ὡς ἤδὺν καινοῖς πράγμασιν καὶ δεξιῖσι  
 ὀμιλεῖν  
 καὶ τῶν καθεστώτων νόμων ὑπερ-  
 ρρονεῖν δύνασθαι.

Compare the rhetor Aristeides—*ὑπὲρ τῶν Τετάρτων*, p. 133; vol. iii. p. 480, Dindorf.

<sup>m</sup> The dramatic position of Sokrates has been compared by Koechly, p. 382, very suitably with that of Antigone, who, in burying her deceased brother, acts upon her own sense of right and family affections, in defiance of an express interdict from sovereign authority. This tragical conflict of obligations, indicated by Aristotle as an ethical question suited for dialectic debate (Topic i. p. 105, b. 22), was handled by all the three great tragedians; and has been ennobled by Sophokles in one of his best remaining tragedies. The Platonic Apology presents many points of analogy with the Antigone, while the Platonic Kriton carries us into an opposite vein of sentiment. Sokrates after sentence, and Antigone after sentence, are totally different persons. The young maiden, though adhering with unshaken con-

rabilia recognises this impression as prevalent among his countrymen against Sokrates, and provides what he thinks a suitable answer to it. Plato also has his way of answering it; and such I imagine to be the dramatic purpose of the Kriton.

This dialogue puts into the mouth of Sokrates a rhetorical harangue forcible and impressive, which he supposes himself to hear from personified Nomos or Athens, claiming for herself and her laws plenary and unmeasured obedience from all her citizens, as a covenant due to her from each. He declares his own heartfelt adhesion to the claim. Sokrates is thus made to express the feelings and repeat the language of a devoted democratical patriot. His doctrine is one which every Athenian audience would warmly applaud—whether heard from speakers in the assembly, from litigants in the Dikastery, or from dramatists in the theatre. It is a doctrine which orators of all varieties (Perikles, Nikias, Kleon, Lysias, Isokrates, Demosthenes, Æschines, Lykurgus) would be alike emphatic in upholding: upon which probably Sophists habitually displayed their own eloquence, and tested the talents of their pupils. It may be considered as almost an Athenian commonplace. Hence it is all the better fitted for

viction to the rectitude of her past disobedience, cannot submit to the sentence of death without complaint and protestation. Though above all fear, she is clamorous in remonstrances against both the injustice of the sentence and the untimely close of her career: so that she is obliged to be dragged away by the officers (Soph. Antig. 870-877; compare 497-508, with Plato, Kriton, p. 49 C; Apolog. p. 28 D, 29 C). All these points enhance the interest of the piece, and are suited to a destined bride in the flower of her age. But an old philosopher of seventy years of age has no such attachment to life remaining. He contemplates death with the eye of calm reason: he has not only silenced "the child within us who fears death" (to use the remarkable phrase of Plato, Phædon, p. 77 E), but he knows well that what remains to him of life must be short;

that it will probably be of little value, with diminished powers, mental as well as bodily; and that if passed in exile, it will be of no value at all. To close his life with dignity is the best thing which can happen to him. While by escape from the prison he would have gained little or nothing; he is enabled, by refusing the means of escape, to manifest an ostentatious deference to the law, and to make peace with the Athenian authorities after the opposition which had been declared in his Apology. Both in the Kriton and in the Phædon, Sokrates exhibits the specimen of a man adhering to previous conviction, unaffected by impending death, and by the apprehensions which that season brings upon ordinary minds; estimating all things then as before, with the same tranquil and independent reason.

Harangue of Sokrates, delivered in the name of the Laws, would have been applauded by all the democratical patriots of Athens.

Plato's purpose of restoring Sokrates to harmony with his fellow citizens. It serves as his protestation of allegiance to Athens, in reply to the adverse impressions prevalent against him. The only singularity which bestows special pertinence, on that which is in substance a discourse of venerated common-place, is—that Sokrates proclaims and applies his doctrine of absolute submission, under the precise circumstances in which many others, generally patriotic, might be disposed to recede from it—where he is condemned (unjustly, in his own persuasion) to suffer death—yet has the opportunity of escape. He is thus presented as a citizen not merely of ordinary loyalty, but of extraordinary patriotism. Moreover his remarkable constancy of residence at Athens is produced as evidence, showing that the city was eminently acceptable to him, and that he had no cause of complaint against it.<sup>n</sup>

Throughout all this eloquent appeal addressed by Athens to her citizen Sokrates, the points insisted on are those common to him with other citizens: the marked specialties of his character being left unnoticed. Such are the points suitable to the purpose (rather Xenophontic than Platonic, herein) of the Kriton; when Sokrates is to be brought back within the pale of democratical citizenship, and exculpated from the charge of incivism. But when we read the language of Sokrates both in the Apology and in the Gorgias, we find a very different picture given of the relations between him and Athens. We find him there presented as an isolated and eccentric individual, a dissenter, not only departing altogether from the character and purposes general among his fellow-citizens, but also certain to incur dangerous antipathy, in so far as he publicly proclaimed what he was. The Kriton takes him up as having become a victim to such antipathy; yet as reconciling himself with the laws by voluntarily accepting the sentence; and as persuaded to do so, moreover, by a piece of rhetoric imbued with the most genuine

The harangue insists upon topics common to Sokrates with other citizens, overlooking the specialties of his character.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Kriton, c. 14, p. 52 B. οὐ μὴ σοι διαφερόντως ἤρεσκε: c. 12, p. γὰρ ἂν ποτε τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἀπάντων διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις, εἰ 50 D. φέρε γὰρ, τί ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν τε καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύνας;

spirit of constitutional democracy. It is the compromise of his long-standing dissent with the reigning orthodoxy, just before his death. Ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρῆ τελευτᾶν.<sup>o</sup>

Still, however, though adopting the democratical vein of sentiment for this purpose, Sokrates is made to adopt it on a ground peculiar to himself. His individuality is thus upheld. He holds the sentence pronounced against him to have been unjust, but he renounces all use of that plea, because the sentence has been legally pronounced by the judicial authority of the city, and because he has entered into a covenant with the city. He entertains the firm conviction that no one ought to act unjustly, or to do evil to others, in any case: not even in the case in which they have done injustice or evil to him. "This" (says Sokrates) "is my conviction, and the principle of my reasoning. Few persons do accept it, or ever will: yet between those who do accept it, and those who do not—there can be no common counsel: by necessity of the case, each looks upon the other, and upon the reasonings of the other, with contempt."<sup>p</sup>

This general doctrine, peculiar to Sokrates, is decisive *per se*, in its application to the actual case, and might have been made to conclude the dialogue. But Sokrates introduces it as a foundation to the arguments urged by the personified Athenian Nomos:—which, however, are not corollaries from it, nor at all peculiar to Sokrates, but represent sentiments held by the Athenian democrats more cordially than they were by Sokrates. It is thus that the dialogue Kriton embodies, and tries to reconcile, both the two distinct elements—constitutional allegiance, and Sokratic individuality.

Apart from the express purpose of this dialogue, however, the general doctrine here proclaimed by Sokrates deserves attention, in regard to the other Platonic dialogues which we shall soon review. The doctrine involves an emphatic declaration of the paramount authority of individual reason and conscience; for

Still Sokrates is represented as adopting the resolution to obey, from his own conviction; by a reason which weighs with him, but which would not weigh with others.

The harangue is not a corollary from this Sokratic reason, but represents feelings common among Athenian citizens.

Emphatic declaration of the authority of individual reason and conscience, for the individual himself.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Phædon, p. 117 D.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Kriton, c. 10, p. 49 D.

the individual himself—but for him alone. “This” (says Sokrates) “is, and has long been *my* conviction. It is the basis of the whole reasoning. Look well whether you agree to it: for few persons do agree to it, or ever will: and between those who do, and those who do not, there can be no common deliberation: they must of necessity despise each other.” Here we have the Protagorean dogma, *Homo Mensura*—which Sokrates will be found combating in the *Theætétus*,—proclaimed by Sokrates himself. As things appear to me, so they are to me: as they appear to you, so they are to you. My reason and conscience is the measure for me: yours for you. It is for you to see whether yours agrees with mine.

I shall revert to this doctrine in handling other Platonic dialogues, particularly the *Theætétus*.

I have already observed that the tone of the *Kriton* is rhetorical, not dialectical—especially the harangue ascribed to Athens. The business of the rhetorician is to plant and establish some given point of persuasion, whether as to a general resolution or a particular fact, in the bosoms of certain auditors before him: hence he gives prominence and emphasis to some views of the question, suppressing or discrediting others, and especially keeping out of sight all the difficulties surrounding the conclusion at which he is aiming. On the other hand, the business of the dialectician is, not to establish any foreknown conclusion, but to find out which among all supposable conclusions are untenable, and which is the most tenable or best. Hence all the difficulties attending every one of them must be brought fully into view and discussed: until this has been done, the process is not terminated, nor can we tell whether any assured conclusion is attainable or not.

The *Kriton* is rhetorical, not dialectical. Difference between Rhetoric and Dialectic.

Now Plato, in some of his dialogues, especially the *Gorgias*, greatly depreciates rhetoric and its purpose of persuasion: elsewhere he employs it himself with ability and effect. The discourse which we read in the *Kriton* is one of his best specimens: appealing to pre-established and wide spread emotions, veneration for parents, love of country, respect for covenants—to justify the resolution of Sokrates in the actual

case: working up these sentiments into fervour, but neglecting all difficulties, limits, and counter-considerations: assuming that the familiar phrases of ethics and politics are perfectly understood and indisputable.

But these last-mentioned elements—difficulties, qualifications, necessity for definitions even of the most hackneyed words—would have been brought into the foreground had Sokrates pursued the dialectical path, which (as we know both from Xenophon and Plato) was his real habit and genius. He was perpetually engaged (says Xenophon<sup>9</sup>) in dialectic enquiry. “What is the Holy, what is the Unholy? What is the Honourable and the Base? What is the Just and the Unjust? &c.” Now in the rhetorical appeal embodied in the

The Kriton makes powerful appeal to the emotions, but overlooks the ratiocinative difficulties, or supposes them to be solved.

<sup>9</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 16. *Αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπειῶν ἀεὶ διελέγετο, σκοπῶν, τί εἰσεβές, τί ἀσεβές· τί καλόν, τί αἰσχρὸν· τί δίκαιον, τί ἄδικον· τί σωφροσύνη, τί μανία· τί ἀνδρία, τί δειλία· τί πόλις, τί πολιτικός· τί ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπων, τί ἀρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων, &c.*

We see in Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 40-46, iv. 2, 37, in the Platonic dialogue *Minos* and elsewhere, the number of dialectic questions which Sokrates might have brought to bear upon the harangue in the *Kriton*, had it been delivered by any opponent whom he sought to perplex or confute. What is a law? What are the limits of obedience to the laws? Are there no limits (as Hobbes is so much denounced for maintaining)? While the oligarchy of Thirty were the constituted authority at Athens, they ordered Sokrates himself, together with four other citizens, to go and arrest a citizen whom they considered dangerous to the state, the Salaminian Leon. The other four obeyed the order: Sokrates alone disobeyed, and takes credit for having done so, considering Leon to be innocent. Which was in the right here? the four obedient citizens, or the one disobedient? Might not the four have used substantially the same arguments to justify their obedience, as those which Sokrates hears from personified Athens in the *Kriton*? We must remember that the Thirty had come into authority by resolutions passed under constitutional forms, though fear of

enemies induced the people to sanction the resolutions proposed by a party among themselves. The Thirty also ordered Sokrates to abstain from discourse with young men: he disobeyed (Xenoph. Memor. iv. 4-3). Was he right in disobeying?

I have indicated briefly these questions, to show how completely the rhetorical manner of the *Kriton* submerges all those difficulties, which would form the special matter of genuine Socratic dialectics.

Schleiermacher (Einleitung zum *Kriton*, pp. 233, 234) considers the *Kriton* as a composition of special occasion—*Gelegenheitschrift*—which I think is true; but which may be said also, in my judgment, of every Platonic dialogue. The term, however, in Schleiermacher's writing, has a peculiar meaning, viz. a composition for which there is no place in the regular rank and file of the Platonic dialogues, as he marshals them. He remarks the absence of dialectic in the *Kriton*, and he adduces this as one reason for supposing it not to be genuine.

But it is no surprise to me to find Plato rhetorical in one dialogue, dialectical in others. Variety, and want of system, seem to me among his most manifest attributes.

The view taken of the *Kriton* by Steinhart (Einleit. pp. 291-302), in the first page of his very rhetorical Introduction, coincides pretty much with mine.

Kriton, the important question, What is the Just and the Unjust? (*i. e.* Justice and Injustice in general) is assumed to be already determined and out of the reach of dispute. We are called upon to determine what is just and unjust in a particular case, as if we already knew what justice and injustice meant generally: to enquire about modifications of justice, before we have ascertained its essence. This is the fundamental assumption involved in the rhetorical process; which assumption we shall find Plato often deprecating as unphilosophical and preposterous.

So far indeed Sokrates goes in this dialogue, to affirm a positive analogy. That Just and Honourable are, to the mind, what health and strength are to the body:—Unjust and Base, what distemper and weakness are to the body. And he follows this up by saying, that the general public are incompetent to determine what is just or honourable—as they are incompetent to decide what is wholesome or unwholesome. Respecting both one and the other, you must consult some one among the professional Experts, who alone are competent to advise.<sup>r</sup>

Both these two doctrines will be found recurring often, in our survey of the dialogues. The first of the two is an obscure and imperfect reply to the great Sokratic problem—What is Justice? What is Injustice? but it is an analogy useful to keep in mind, as a help to the exposition of many passages in which Plato is yet more obscure. The second of the two will also recur frequently. It sets out an antithesis of great moment in the Platonic dialogues—“The one specially instructed, professional, theorising, Expert—*versus* (the *ιδιώται* of the time and place, or) common sense, common sentiment, intuition, instinct, prejudice,” &c. (all these names meaning the same objective reality, but diversified according as the speaker may happen to regard the particular case to which he is alluding). This antithesis appears as an answer when we put the question—What is the ultimate authority? where

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Kriton, c. 7, p. 47. τοῦ ἐνδὸς, εἴ τις ἐστὶν ἐπαίων, &c.



does the right of final decision reside, on problems and disputes ethical, political, æsthetic? It resides (Sokrates here answers) with some one among a few professional Experts. They are the only persons competent.

I shall go more fully into this question elsewhere. Here I shall merely notice the application which Sokrates makes (in the *Kriton*) of the general doctrine. We might anticipate that after having declared that none was fit to pronounce upon the Just and the Unjust, except a professional Expert,—he would have proceeded to name some person corresponding to that designation—to justify the title of that person to confidence by such evidences as Plato requires in other dialogues—and then to cite the decision of the judge named, on the case in hand. This is what Sokrates would have done, if the case had been one of health or sickness. He would have said—“I appeal to Hippokrates, Akumenus, &c., as professional Experts on medicine: they have given proof of competence by special study, successful practice, writing, teaching, &c.: they pronounce so and so.” He would not have considered himself competent to form a judgment or announce a decision of his own.

But here, when the case in hand is that of Just and Unjust, the conduct of Sokrates is altogether different. He specifies no professional Expert, and he proceeds to lay down a dogma of his own; in which he tells us that few or none will agree, though it is fundamental, so that dissenters on the point must despise each other as heretics. We thus see that it is he alone who steps in to act himself the part of professional Expert, though he does not openly assume the title. The ultimate authority is proclaimed in words to reside with some unnamed Expert: in fact and reality, he finds it in his own reason and conscience. You are not competent to judge for yourself: you must consult the professional Expert: but your own reason and conscience must signify to you who the Expert is.

The analogy here produced by Plato—of questions about

Procedure of Sokrates after this comparison has been declared—he does not name who the trustworthy Expert is.

Sokrates acts as the Expert himself: he finds authority in his own reason and conscience.

health and sickness—is followed out only in its negative operation; as it serves to scare away the multitude, and discredit the Vox Populi. But when this has been done, no oracular man can be produced or authenticated. In other dialogues, we shall find Sokrates regretting the absence of such an oracular man, but professing inability to proceed without him. In the *Kriton*, he undertakes the duty himself: unmindful of the many emphatic speeches in which he had proclaimed his own ignorance, and taken credit for confessing it without reserve.

## CHAPTER IX.

## EUTHYPHRON.

THE dialogue called Euthyphron, over and above its contribution to the ethical enquiries of Plato, has a certain bearing on the character and exculpation of Sokrates. It will therefore come conveniently in immediate sequel to the Apology and the Kriton.

The indictment by Melétus against Sokrates is assumed to have been formally entered in the office of the King Archon. Sokrates has come to plead to it. In the portico before that office, he meets Euthyphron: a man of ultra-pious pretensions, possessing special religious knowledge (either from revelation directly to himself, or from having been initiated in the various mysteries consecrated throughout Greece), delivering authoritative opinions on doubtful theological points, and prophesying future events.<sup>a</sup>

What brings you here, Sokrates (asks Euthyphron), away from your usual haunts? Is it possible that any one can have preferred an indictment against you?

Yes (replies Sokrates), a young man named Melétus. He takes commendable interest in the training of youth, and has indicted me as a corruptor of youth. He says that I corrupt them by teaching belief in new gods, and unbelief in the true and ancient gods.

*Euthyphr.*—I understand: it is because you talk about the Dæmon or Genius often communicating with you, that Melétus calls you an innovator in religion. He knows that such calumnies find ready admission with most minds.<sup>b</sup> So also, people laugh at me, when I talk about

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Euthyphr. c. 2, p. 3 D; compare Herodot. ii. 51.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Euthyphr. c. 2, p. 3 C: φησι γάρ με ποιητήν ὄντα θεῶν καὶ ὡς καινοῦς ποιοῦντα θεοῦ, τοὺς δ' ἀρχαίους οὐ

νομίζοντα, ἐγράψατο τούτων αὐτῶν ἕνεκα, ὡς φησι. P. 5 A.: αὐτοσχεδιάζοντα καὶ καινοτομοῦντα περὶ τῶν θείων ἐξαμαρτάνειν.

religion, and when I predict future events in the assembly. It must be from jealousy; because all that I have predicted has come true.

*Sokr.*—To be laughed at is no great matter. The Athenians do not care much when they regard a man as overwise, but as not given to teach his wisdom to others: but when they regard him besides, as likely to make others such as he is himself, they become seriously angry with him—be it from jealousy, as you say, or from any other cause. You keep yourself apart, and teach no one: for my part, I delight in nothing so much as in teaching all that I know. If they take the matter thus seriously, the result may be very doubtful.<sup>c</sup>

Socrates now learns what is Euthyphron's business at the archontic office. Euthyphron is prosecuting an indictment before the King Archon, against his own father; as having caused the death of a dependant workman, who in a fit of intoxication had quarrelled with and killed a fellow-servant. The father of Euthyphron, upon this occurrence, bound the homicide hand and foot, and threw him into a ditch: at the same time sending to the Exêgêtês (the canonical adviser, supposed to be conversant with the divine sanctions, whom it was customary to consult when doubts arose about sacred things) to ask what was to be done with him. The incident occurred at Naxos, and the messenger was sent to the Exêgêtês at Athens: before he could return, the prisoner had perished, from hunger, cold, and bonds. Euthyphron has indicted his father for homicide, as having caused the death of the prisoner: who (it would appear) had remained in the ditch, tied hand and foot, without food, and with no more than his ordinary clothing, during the time occupied in the voyage from Naxos to Athens, in obtaining the answer of the Exêgêtês, and in returning to Naxos.

My friends and relatives (says Euthyphron) cry out against me for this proceeding, as if I were mad. They say that my

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Euthyphr. c. 3, p. 3 D. ἄλλους οἴωνται ποιεῖν τοιοῦτους, θυμούνται, εἴτ' οὖν φθόνῳ, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, εἶτε δὲ ἄλλο τι.

Euthyphron recounts that he is prosecuting an indictment for murder against his own father—Displeasure of his friends at the proceeding.

father did not kill the man :<sup>d</sup> that even if he had, the man had committed murder : lastly, that however the case may have been, to indict my own father is monstrous and inexcusable. Such reasoning is silly. The only point to be considered is, whether my father killed the deceased justly or unjustly. If justly, there is nothing to be said ; if unjustly, then my father becomes a man tainted with impiety and accursed. I and every one else who, knowing the facts, live under the same roof and at the same table with him, come under the like curse ; unless I purify myself by bringing him to justice. The course which I am now taking is prescribed by piety or holiness. My friends indeed tell me that it is unholy for a son to indict his father. But I know better than they, what holiness is : and I should be ashamed of myself if I did not.<sup>e</sup>

I confess myself (says Sokrates) ignorant respecting the question,<sup>f</sup> and I shall be grateful if you will teach me : the rather as I shall be able to defend myself better against Melétus. Tell me what is the general constituent feature of *Holiness*? What is that common essence, or same character, which belongs to and distinguishes all holy or pious acts? What is that common opposite essence, which distinguishes all unholy or impious acts?<sup>g</sup>

Euthyphron expresses full confidence that this step of his is both required and warranted by piety or holiness. Sokrates asks him—What is Holiness?

<sup>d</sup> According to the Attic law every citizen was bound, in case any one of his relatives (*μέχρις ἀνεψιῶδων*) or any member of his household (*οἰκέρτης*) had been put to death, to come forward as prosecutor and indict the murderer. This was binding upon the citizen alike in law and in religion.

Demosthen. cont. Euerg. et Mnesibul. p. 1161. Jul. Pollux viii. 118.

Euthyphron would thus have been considered as acting with propriety, if the person indicted had been a stranger.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Euthyphron, c. 4, p. 4. Respecting the *μίαισμα*, which a person who had committed criminal homicide was supposed to carry about with him wherever he went, communicating it both to places and to companions, see Antiphon. Tetralog. i. 2, 5, 10; iii. s. 7, p. 116; and De Herodis Cæde, s. 81, p. 139. The argument here em-

ployed by Euthyphron is used also by the Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias, 480 C-D. If a man has committed injustice, punishment is the only way of curing him. That he should escape unpunished is the worst thing that can happen to him. If you yourself, or your father, or your friend, have committed injustice, do not seek to avert the punishment either from yourself or them, but rather invoke it. This is exactly what Euthyphron is doing, and what the Platonic Sokrates (in dialogue Euthyphron) calls in question.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 6 B. τί γὰρ καὶ φήσομεν, οἳ γε καὶ αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν περὶ πάντων μηδὲν εἶδέναι :

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 5 D. Among the various reasons (none of them valid in my judgment) given by Ueberweg (Untersuch. p. 251) for suspecting the authenticity of the

It is holy (replies Euthyphron) to do what I am now doing: to bring to justice the man who commits impiety, either by homicide or sacrilege or any other such crime, whoever he be—even though it be your own father. The examples of the gods teach us this. Kronus punished his father Uranus for wrong doing: Zeus, whom every one holds to be the best and justest of the Gods, did the like by his father Kronus. I only follow their example. Those who blame my conduct contradict themselves when they talk about the Gods and about me.<sup>b</sup>

Do you really confidently believe these stories (asks Sokrates), as well as many others about the discord and conflicts among the Gods, which are circulated among the public by poets and painters? For my part, I have some repugnance in believing them; <sup>i</sup> it is for this reason probably, I am now to be indicted, and proclaimed as doing wrong. If you tell me that you are persuaded of their truth, I must bow to your superior knowledge. I cannot help doing so, since for my part I pretend to no knowledge whatever about them.

Euthyphron alludes to the punishment of Uranus by his son Kronus, and of Kronus by his son Zeus.

Sokrates intimates his own hesitation in believing these stories of discord among the Gods. Euthyphron declares his full belief in them, as well as in many similar narratives, not in so much circulation.

I am persuaded that these narratives are true (says Euthyphron): and not only they, but many other narratives yet more surprising, of which most persons are ignorant. I can tell you some of them, if you like to hear. You shall tell me another time (replies Sokrates): now let me repeat my question to you respecting holiness.<sup>k</sup>

Euthyphron, one is that τὸ ἀνόσιον is reckoned as an εἶδος as well as τὸ ὅσιον. Ueberweg seems to think this absurd, since he annexes to the word a note of admiration. But Plato expressly gives τὸ ἀδίκον as an εἶδος, along with τὸ δίκαιον (Repub. v. 476 A); and one of the objections taken against his theory by Aristotle was, that it would assume substantive Ideas corresponding to negative terms—τῶν ἀποφάσεων ἰδέας. See Aristot. Metaphys. A. 990, b. 13, with the Scholion of Alexander, p. 565, a. 81, r.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Euthyphron, p. 5-6.

We see here that Euthyphron is

made to follow out the precept delivered by the Platonic Sokrates in the Theætétus and elsewhere—to make himself as like to the Gods as possible—(μοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. Theætét. p. 176 B; compare Phædrus, 252 C)—only that he conceives the attributes and proceedings of the Gods differently from Sokrates.

<sup>i</sup> Plato, Euthyphron, c. 7, p. 6 A. Ἄρα γε τοῦτ' ἔστιν, οὐ ἔνεκα τὴν δίκην φεύγω, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπειδὴν τις περὶ τῶν θεῶν λέγει. δυσχερῶς πῶς ἀποδέχομαι; δι' ἃ δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, φήσει τίς με ἐξαμαρτάνειν.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Euthyphron, p. 6 C.

Before we pursue this enquiry respecting holiness, which is the 'portion of the dialogue bearing on the Platonic ethics, I will say one word on the portion which has preceded, and which appears to bear on the position and character of Sokrates. He (Sokrates) has incurred odium from the Dikastery and the public, because he is heretical and incredulous. "He does not believe in those Gods in whom the city believes, but introduces religious novelties"—to use the words of the indictment preferred against him by Melêtus. The Athenian public felt the same displeasure and offence in hearing their divine legends, such as those of Zeus and Kronus,<sup>1</sup> called in question or criticised in an ethical spirit different from their own—as is felt by Jews or Christians when various narratives of the Old Testament are criticised in an adverse spirit, and when the proceedings ascribed to Jehovah are represented as unworthy of a just and beneficent god. We read in Herodotus what was the sentiment of pious contemporaries respecting narratives of divine matters. Herodotus keeps back many of them by design, and announces that he will never recite them except in case of necessity: while in one instance, where he has been betrayed into criticism upon a few of them, as inconsiderate and incredible, he is seized with misgivings, and prays that gods and heroes will not be offended with him.<sup>m</sup> The freethinkers, among whom Sokrates was numbered, were the persons from whom adverse criticism came. It is these men who are depicted by orthodox oppo-

<sup>1</sup> I shall say more about Plato's views on the theological legends generally believed by his countrymen, when I come to the language which he puts into the mouth of Sokrates in the second and third books of the Republic. Eusebius considers it matter of praise when he says "that Plato rejected all the opinions of his countrymen concerning the Gods and exposed their absurdity"—*ὅπως τε πάσας τὰς πατρίους περὶ τῶν θεῶν ὑπολήψεις ἠθέτει, καὶ τὴν ἀτοπίαν αὐτῶν διήλεγχεν*" (Præp. Evan. xiii. 1)—the very same thing which is averred in the indictment laid by Melêtus against Sokrates.

<sup>m</sup> Herodot. ii. 65: τῶν δὲ ἐνέκεν

*ἀνεῖται τὰ ἱρὰ, εἰ λέγοιμι, καταβαίην ἂν τῷ λόγῳ ἐς τὰ θεῖα πρήγματα, τὰ ἐγὼ φεύγω μάλιστα ἀπηγγέσθαι. τὰ δὲ καὶ εἴρηκα αὐτῶν ἐπιναύσας, ἀναγκαίῃ καταλαμβανόμενος εἶπον . . . 45. Λέγουσι δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἄλλα ἀνεπισκέπτως οἱ Ἕλληνες, εὐσηθῆς δὲ αὐτέων καὶ ἴδε ὁ μῦθος ἐστὶ, τὸν περὶ τοῦ Ἡράκλειος λέγουσι . . . ἔτι δὲ ἕνα εἶντα τὸν Ἡράκλεα, καὶ ἔτι ἄνθρωπον, ὡς δὴ φασι, κῶς φύσιν ἔχει πολλοὺς μυριάδας φονεύσαι; καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων τσαῦτα ἡμῖν εἰποῦσι, καὶ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἡρώων εὐμένεια εἶη.*

About the *ἱρὸι λόγοι* which he keeps back, see cap. 51-61-62-81-170, &c.

nents as committing lawless acts, and justifying themselves by precedents drawn from the proceedings of Zeus.<sup>n</sup> They are besides, especially accused of teaching children to despise or even to ill-use their parents.<sup>o</sup>

Now in the dialogue here before us, Plato retorts this attack. Euthyphron possesses in the fullest measure the virtues of a believer. He believes not only all that orthodox Athenians usually believed respecting the Gods, but more besides.<sup>p</sup> His faith is so implicit, that he proclaims it as accurate knowledge, and carries it into practice with full confidence; reproaching other orthodox persons with inconsistency and short coming, and disregarding the judgment of the multitude, as Sokrates does in the Kriton.<sup>q</sup> Euthyphron stands forward as the champion of the Gods, determined not to leave unpunished the man who has committed impiety, let him be who he may.<sup>r</sup> These lofty religious pretensions impel him, with full persuasion of right, to indict his own father for homicide, under the circumstances above described. Now in the eyes of the Athenian public, there could hardly be any act more abhorrent, than that of a man thus invoking upon his own father the severest penalties of law. It would probably be not less abhorrent than that of a son beating his own father. When therefore we read, in the Nubes of Aristophanes, the dramatic moral set forth against Sokrates, "See the consequences to which free-thinking and the new system of education lead<sup>s</sup>—the son Pheidippides beating his own father, and justifying the action as right, by citing the violence of Zeus towards his father Kronus"—we may take

Dramatic moral set forth by Aristophanes against Sokrates and the free-thinkers, is here retorted by Plato against the orthodox champion.

<sup>n</sup> Aristophan. Nubes. 905-1080.

<sup>o</sup> Aristophanes, Nubes, 994-1333-1444. Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 49. Σακράτης—τούς πατέρας προσηλακίζων ἐδίδασκε (accusation by Melétus).

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 6 B. καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων θαυμασιώτερα, ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ οὐκ ἴσασιν.

Euthyphron belonged to the class described in Euripides, Hippol. 453:—

"Ὅσοι μὲν οὖν γραφάς τε τῶν παλαιτέρων

ἔχουσιν, αὐτοὶ τ' εἰσιν ἐν μόσαις αἰεὶ,

ἴσασιν, &c.

Compare also Euripid. Herakleida, 404.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, Euthyphron, c. 4, p. 5 A, c. 6, p. 6 A.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Euthyphron, p. 5 E. μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν τῷ ἀσεβοῦντι μηδ' ἂν ὅστις οὖν τυγχάνῃ ὢν.

<sup>s</sup> Aristophanes, Nubes, 937. τὴν καινὴν παιδευσιν, &c.



the Platonic Euthyphron as an antithesis to this moral, propounded by a defender of Sokrates, "See the consequences to which consistent orthodoxy and implicit faith conduct. The son Euthyphron indicts his own father for homicide; he vindicates the step as conformable to the proceedings of the gods; he even prides himself on it as championship on their behalf, such as all religious men ought to approve."<sup>t</sup>

<sup>t</sup> Schleiermacher (Einleitung zum Euthyphron, vol. ii. pp. 51-54) has many remarks on the Euthyphron in which I do not concur; but his conception of its "unverkennbare apologetische Absicht" is very much the same as mine. He describes Euthyphron as a man "der sich besonders auf das Göttliche zu verstehen vorgab, und die rechtgläubigen aus den alten theologischen Dichtern gezogenen Begriffe tapfer vertheidigte. Diesen nun gerade bei der Anklage des Sokrates mit ihm in Berührung, und durch den unsittlichen Streich, den sein Eifer für die Frömmigkeit veranlassete, in Gegensatz zu bringen—war ein des Platon nicht unwürdiger Gedanke" (p. 54). But when Schleiermacher affirms that the dialogue was indisputably composed (unstreitig) between the indictment and the trial of Sokrates,—and when he explains what he considers the defects of the dialogue, by the necessity of finishing it in a hurry (p. 53), I dissent from him altogether, though Steinbart adopts the same opinion. Nor can I perceive in what way the Euthyphron is (as he affirms) either "a natural out-growth of the Protagoras," or "an approximation and preparation for the Parmenides" (p. 52). Still less do I feel the force of his reasons for hesitating in admitting it to be a genuine work of Plato.

I have given my reasons, in a preceding chapter, for believing that Plato composed no dialogues at all during the lifetime of Sokrates. But that he should publish such a dialogue while the trial of Sokrates was impending, is a supposition altogether inadmissible, in my judgment. The effect of it would be to make the position of Sokrates much worse on his trial. Herein I agree with Ueberweg (Untersuch. p. 250), though I do not

share his doubts of the authenticity of the dialogue.

The confident assertion of Stallbaum surprises me. "Constat enim Platonem eo tempore, quo Socrati tantum erat odium confutatum, ut ei iudicii immineret periculum, complures dialogos composuisse; in quibus id egit, ut viri sanctissimi adversarios in eo ipso genere, in quo sibi plurimum sapere videbantur, inscitiae et ignorantiae coargueret. Nam Euthyphronem novinus, ad vates ignorantiae rerum gravissimarum convincendos, esse compositum; ut in quo eos ne pietatis quidem notionem tenere ostenditur. In Menone autem id agit, ut sophistas et viros civiles non scientiâ atque arte, sed cæco quodam impetu mentis et sorte divinâ duci demeretur: quod quidem ita fit, ut colloquium ex parte cum Anyto, Socratis accusatore, habeatur. . . . Nam Menonem quidem et Euthyphronem Plato eo confecit tempore, quo Socratis causa haud ita pridem in iudicio versabatur, nec tamen jam tanta ei videbatur imminere calamitas, quanta postea consecuta est. Ex quo sanè verisimiliter colligere licet Ionem, eujus simile argumentum et consilium est, circa idem tempus literis consignatum esse." Stallbaum, Prolegom. ad Platonis Ionem, pp. 288-289, vol. iv.

"Imo uno exemplo Euthyphronis, boni quidem hominis ideoque ne Socrati quidem inimici, sed ejusdem *superstitiosi, vel, ut hodie loquuntur, orthodoxi*, qualis Athenis vulgò esset religionis conditio declarare instituit. Ex quo quidem clarissimè videtur apparere, Platonem hoc unum spectavisse, ut iudices admonerentur, ne populari superstitioni in sententiis ferendis plus justo tribuerent." Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Euthyphron. T. vi. p. 146.

Steinbart also (in his *Einleitung*, p. 190) calls Euthyphron "ein rechtgläui-

I proceed now with that which may be called the Platonic purpose in the dialogue—the enquiry into the general idea of Holiness. When the question was first put to Euthyphron, What is the Holy?—he replied—“That which I am now doing.”—*Sokr.* That may be: but many other things besides are also holy.—*Euthyph.* Certainly.—*Sokr.* Then your answer does not meet the question. You have indicated one particular holy act, among many. But the question asked was—What is Holiness generally? What is that specific property, by the common possession of which all holy things are entitled to be called holy? I want to know this general Idea, in order that I may keep it in view as a type wherewith to compare each particular case, thus determining whether the case deserves to be called holy or not.”

Sequel of the dialogue—Euthyphron gives a particular example as the reply to a general question.

Here we have a genuine specimen of the dialectic interrogatory in which Xenophon affirms\* Sokrates to have passed his life, and which Plato prosecutes under his master’s name. The question is generalised much more than in the *Kriton*.

It is assumed that there is one specific Idea or essence—one objective characteristic or fact—common to all things called Holy. The purpose of the questioner is, to determine what this Idea is: to provide a good definition of the word. The first mistake made by the respondent is, that he names simply one particular case,

Such mistake frequent in dialectic discussion.

biger von reinsten Wasser—ein ueberfrommer, fanatischer, Mann,” &c.

In the two preceding pages Stallbaum defends himself against objections made to his view, on the ground that Plato, by composing such dialogues at this critical moment, would increase the unpopularity and danger of Sokrates, instead of diminishing it. Stallbaum contends (p. 145) that neither Sokrates nor Plato nor any of the other Sokratic men, believed that the trial would end in a verdict of guilty: which is probably true about Plato, and would have been borne out by the event if Sokrates had made a different defence. But this does not assist the conclusion which Stallbaum wishes to bring out;

for it is not the less true that the dialogues of Plato, if published at that moment, would increase the exasperation against Sokrates, and the chance, whatever it was, that he would be found guilty. Stallbaum refers by mistake to a passage in the Platonic *Apology* (p. 36 A), as if Sokrates there expressed his surprise at the verdict of guilty, anticipating a verdict of acquittal. The passage declares the contrary: Sokrates expresses his surprise that the verdict of guilty had passed by so small a majority as five; he had expected that it would pass by a larger majority.

\* Plato, *Euthyphron*, c. 7, p. 6 E.

\* Xenoph. *Memor.* i. 1-16.

coming under the general Idea. This is a mistake often recurring, and often corrected, in the Platonic dialogues. Even now, such a mistake is not unfrequent: and in the time of Plato, when general ideas, and the definition of general terms, had been made so little the subject of direct attention, it was doubtless perpetually made. When the question was first put, its bearing would not be properly conceived. And even if the bearing were properly conceived, men would find it easier then, and do find it easier now, to make answer by giving one particular example than to go over many examples, and elicit what is common to all.

Euthyphron next replies—That which is pleasing to the Gods is holy: that which is not pleasing, or which is displeasing to the Gods, is unholy.—*Sokr.* That is the sort of answer which I desired to have: now let us examine it. We learn from the received theology, which you implicitly believe, that there has been much discord and quarrel among the Gods. If the Gods quarrel, they quarrel about the same matters as men. Now men do not quarrel about questions of quantity—for such questions can be determined by calculation and measurement: nor about questions of weight—for there the balance may be appealed to. The questions about which you and I and other men quarrel are, What is just or unjust, honourable or base, good or evil? Upon these there is no accessible standard. Some men feel in one way, some in another; and each of us fights for his own opinions.<sup>1</sup> We all indeed agree that the wrong-doer ought to be punished: but we do not agree *who* the wrong-doer is, nor what *is* wrong doing. The same action which some of us pronounce to be just, others stigmatise as unjust.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Euthyphron, c. 8, p. 7 D. Περὶ τίνος δὲ δὴ διενεχθέντες καὶ ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν οὐ δυνάμενοι ἀφικέσθαι ἐχθροὶ γε ἂν ἀλλήλοις εἶμεν καὶ ὀργιζόμεθα; ἴσως οὐ πρόχειρόν σοι ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ λέγοντος σκόπει, εἰ τὰδ' ἔστι τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον, καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν. Ἄρ' οὐ ταυτὰ ἔστι περὶ ὧν διενεχθέντες καὶ

οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπὶ ἰκανῇ κρίσιν αὐτῶν ἔλθειν ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλοις γιγνόμεθα, ὅταν γιγνόμεθα, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι πάντες;

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Euthyphron, c. 9, p. 8 D. Οὐκ ἔρα ἐκεῖνό γε ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὡς οὐ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ διδοῖναι δίκην ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἴσως ἀμφισβητοῦσι, τὸ, τίς ἔστιν ὁ ἀδικῶν, καὶ τίς δρῶν,

So likewise the quarrels of the Gods must turn upon these same matters—just and unjust, right and wrong, good and evil. What one God thinks right, another God thinks wrong. What is pleasing to one God, is displeasing to another. The same action will be both pleasing and displeasing to the Gods.

According to your definition of holy and unholy, therefore, the same action may be both holy and unholy. Your definition will not hold, for it does not enable me to distinguish the one from the other.<sup>2a</sup>

*Euthyph.*—I am convinced that there are some things which *all* the Gods love, and some things which *all* the Gods hate. That which I am doing, for example—indicting my father for homicide—belongs to the former category. Now that which all the Gods love, is the holy: that which they all hate, is the unholy.<sup>a</sup>

*Sokr.*—Do the Gods love the holy, because it *is* holy? Or is it holy for this reason, because they do love it?

*Euthyph.*—They love it because it is holy.<sup>b</sup> *Sokr.*—Then the holiness is one thing; the fact of being loved by the Gods is another. The latter fact is not of the essence of holiness: it is true, but only as an accident and an accessory. You have yet to tell me what that essential character is, by virtue

To be loved by the Gods is not the essence of the Holy—they love it because it is holy. In what then does its essence consist? Perplexity of Euthyphron.

καὶ πότε; Πράξεώς τινος περὶ διαφερόμενοι, οἱ μὲν δίκαιως φασὶν αὐτὴν πεπράχθαι, οἱ δὲ ἀδίκως.

<sup>2a</sup> In regard to Plato's ethical enquiries generally, and to what we shall find in future dialogues, we must take note of what is here laid down,—that mankind are in perpetual dispute, and have not yet any determinate standard for just and unjust, right and wrong, honourable and base, good and evil. Plato had told us, somewhat differently, in the *Kriton*, that on these matters, though the judgment of the many was not to be trusted, yet there was another trustworthy judgment, that of the one wise man. This point will recur for future comment.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, *Euthyphron*, c. 11, p. 9.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, *Euthyphron*, c. 12, p. 10 A-D. The manner in which Sokrates

conducts this argument is over-subtle. Οὐκ ἔρα διότι ὀρώμενόν γέ ἐστι διὰ τοῦτο ὀράται, ἀλλὰ τοῦνάντιον, διότι ὀράται, διὰ τοῦτο ὀρώμενον οὐδὲ διότι ἀγόμενόν ἐστι, διὰ τοῦτο ἀγεται, ἀλλὰ διότι ἀγεται, διὰ τοῦτο ἀγόμενον οὐδὲ διότι φερόμενον, φέρεται, ἀλλὰ διότι φέρεται, φερόμενον.

The difference between the meaning of *φέρεται* and *φερόμενόν ἐστι* is not easy to see. The former may mean to affirm the beginning of an action, the latter the continuance: but in this case the inference would not necessarily follow.

Compare *Aristotel. Physica*, p. 185, b. 25, with the Scholion of *Simplikius*, p. 330, a. 2d ed. Bekk., where *βαδίζων ἐστι* is recognised as equivalent to *βαδίζει*.

of which the holy comes to be loved by all the Gods, or to be the subject of various other attributes.<sup>c</sup>

*Euthyph.*—I hardly know how to tell you what I think. None of my explanations will stand. Your ingenuity turns and twists them in every way. *Sokr.*—If I am ingenious, it is against my own will;<sup>d</sup> for I am most anxious that some one of the answers should stand unshaken. But I will now put you in the way of making a different answer. You will admit that all which is holy is necessarily just. But is all that is just necessarily holy?

Euthyphron does not at first understand the question. He does not comprehend the relation between two words, generic and specific with reference to each other: the former embracing all that the latter embraces, and more besides (denoting more objects, connoting fewer attributes). This is explained by analogies and particular examples, illustrating a logical distinction highly important to be brought out, at a time when there were no treatises on Logic.<sup>e</sup> So much therefore is made out—That the Holy is a part, or branch, of the Just. But what part? or how is it to be distinguished from other parts or branches of the just? Euthyphron answers. The Holy is that portion or branch of the Just which concerns ministration to the Gods: the remaining branch of the Just is, what concerns ministration to men.<sup>f</sup>

*Sokr.*—What sort of ministration? Other ministrations, to horses, dogs, working cattle, &c., are intended for the improvement or benefit of those to whom they are rendered:—besides, they can only be rendered by a few trained persons. In what manner does the

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Euthyphron, c. 12, p. 11 A. *κινδυνεύεις, ἐρωτώμενος τὸ ὅσιον, ὅ, τι πότ' ἔστιν, τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν μοι αὐτοῦ οὐ βούλεσθαι δηλώσαι, πάθος δέ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν, ὅ, τι ἐπόνθη τοῦτο τὸ ὅσιον, φιλείσθαι ὑπὸ πάντων τῶν θεῶν ὅ, τι δὲ ἂν, οὐπω εἶπες. . . πάλιν εἶπε ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τί ποτε ἂν τὸ ὅσιον εἶτε φιλείται ὑπὸ*

*θεῶν, εἶτε ὅτι δὴ πάσχει.*

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Euthyphron, c. 12, p. 11 D. *ἄκων εἰμὶ σοφός, &c.*

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Euthyphron, c. 13, p. 12.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Euthyphron, c. 14, p. 12 E. *τὸ μέρος τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι εὐσεβές τε καὶ ὅσιον, τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι τοῦ δικαίου μέρος.*

ministration, called *holiness*, benefit or improve the Gods? *Euthyph.*—In no way: it is of the same nature as that which slaves render to their masters. *Sokr.*—You mean, that it is work done by us for the Gods. Tell me—to what end does the work conduce? What is that end which the Gods accomplish, through our agency as workmen? Physicians employ their slaves for the purpose of restoring the sick to health: shipbuilders put their slaves to the completion of ships. But what are those great works which the Gods bring about by our agency? *Euthyph.*—Their works are numerous and great. *Sokr.*—The like may be said of generals: but the summary and main purpose of all that generals do is—to assure victory in war. So too we may say about the husbandman: but the summary of his many proceedings is, to raise corn from the earth. State to me, in like manner, the summary of that which the Gods perform through our agency.<sup>g</sup>

*Euthyph.*—It would cost me some labour to go through the case fully. But so much I tell you in plain terms. If a man, when sacrificing and praying, knows what deeds and what words will be agreeable to the Gods, that is holiness: this it is which upholds the security both of private houses and public communities. The contrary is unholiness, which subverts and ruins them.<sup>h</sup> *Sokr.*—Holiness then, is the knowledge of rightly sacrificing and praying to the Gods; that is, of giving to them, and asking from them: to give rightly, is to give to them what they want from us. Holiness will thus be an art of right traffic between Gods and men. Still, you must tell me how the Gods are gainers by that which we give to them. That we are gainers by what they give, is clear enough; but what do they gain on their side?

*Euthyph.*—The Gods gain nothing. The gifts which we present to them consist in honour, marks of respect, gratitude. *Sokr.*—The holy, then, is that

Holiness—  
rectitude in  
sacrifice and  
prayer—  
right traffic  
between men  
and the Gods.

This will not  
stand—the  
Gods gain  
nothing—  
they receive  
from men  
marks of  
honour and

<sup>g</sup> Plato, *Euthyphron*, c. 16, pp. 13, 14. <sup>h</sup> Plato, *Euthyphron*, c. 16, p. 14 B. Compare this third unsuccessful answer of *Euthyphron* with the third answer assigned to Hippias (*Hipp. Maj.* 291 C-E). Both of them appear lengthened, emphatic, as if intended to settle a question which had become vexatious.

gratitude—  
they are  
pleased there-  
with—the  
Holy there-  
fore must be  
that which  
is pleasing to  
the Gods.

which obtains favour from the Gods: not that which is gainful to them, nor that which they love. *Euthyphr.*—Nay: I think they love it especially. *Sokr.*—Then it appears that the holy is what the Gods love? *Euthyphr.*—Unquestionably.

This is the  
same explana-  
tion which  
was before  
declared  
insufficient.  
A fresh  
explanation is  
required from  
Euthyphron.  
He breaks off  
the dialogue.

*Sokr.*—But this is the very same explanation which we rejected a short time ago as untenable.<sup>1</sup> It was agreed between us, that to be loved by the Gods was not of the essence of holiness, and could not serve as an explanation of holiness: though it might be truly affirmed thereof as an accompanying predicate. Let us therefore try again to discover what holiness is. I rely upon you to help me, and I am sure that you must know, since under a confident persuasion that you know, you are indicting your own father for homicide.

*Euthyphr.*—“The investigation must stand over to another time, I have engagements now which call me elsewhere.”

So Plato breaks off the dialogue. It is conceived in the truly Socratic spirit:—an Elenchus applied to implicit and unexamined faith, even though that faith be accredited among the public as orthodoxy: warfare against the confident persuasion of knowledge, upon topics familiar to every one, and on which deep sentiments, and confused notions have grown up by association in every one’s mind, without deliberate study, systematic teaching, or testing cross-examination. Euthyphron is a man who feels unshaken confidence in his own knowledge, and still more in his own correct religious belief. Sokrates appears in his received character as confessing ignorance, soliciting instruction, and exposing inconsistencies and contradiction in that which is given to him for instruction.

We must (as I have before remarked) take this ignorance on the part of the Platonic Sokrates not as assumed, but as very real. In no part of the Platonic writings do we find any tenable definition of the Holy and the Unholy, such as is here demanded from

Socratic  
spirit of the  
dialogue—  
confessed  
ignorance  
applying the  
Elenchus to  
false per-  
suation of  
knowledge.

The questions  
always  
difficult, often  
impossible to  
answer.  
Sokrates is  
unable to

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Euthyphron*, c. 19, p. 15. | τό τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ θεοφιλὲς οὐ ταῦτ' ἐν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη, ἀλλ' ἕτερα ἀλλήλων.

Euthyphron. The talent of Sokrates consists in exposing bad definitions, not in providing good ones. This negative function is all that he claims for himself—with deep regret that he can do no more. “Sokrates” (says Aristotle<sup>k</sup>) “put questions, but gave no answers: for he professed not to know.” In those dialogues where Plato makes him attempt more (there also, against his own will and protest, as in the *Philêbus* and *Republic*), the affirmative Sokrates will be found only to stand his ground because no negative Sokrates is allowed to attack him. I insist upon this the rather, because the Platonic commentators usually present the dialogues in a different light, as if such modesty on the part of Sokrates was altogether simulated; as if he was himself,<sup>l</sup> from the beginning, aware of the proper answer to his own questions, but refrained designedly from announcing it: nay, sometimes as if the answers were in themselves easy, and as if the respondents who failed must be below par in respect of intelligence. This is an erroneous conception. The questions put by Sokrates, though relating to familiar topics, are always difficult; they are often even impossible to answer, because they postulate and require to be assigned a common objective concept which is not to be found. They only appear easy to one who has never attempted the task of answering under the pressure of cross-examination. Most persons indeed never make any such trial, but go on affirming confidently as if they knew, without trial. It is exactly against such illusory confidence of knowledge that Sokrates directs his questions: the fact belongs to our days no less than to his.<sup>m</sup>

The assumptions of some Platonic commentators—that Sokrates and Plato of course knew the answers to their own

<sup>k</sup> Aristotel. *Sophist. Elench.* p. 183, b. 7. *ἐπεὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Σωκράτης ἠρώτα καὶ οὐκ ἀπεκρίνετο ὡμολόγει γὰρ οὐκ εἰδέναι.*

<sup>l</sup> See Stallbaum, *Prolegg. ad Euthyphron.* p. 140.

<sup>m</sup> Adam Smith observes, in his *Essay on the Formation of Languages* (p. 20 of the fifth volume of his collected Works), “Ask a man what relation is

expressed by the preposition *of*: and if he has not beforehand employed his thoughts a good deal upon these subjects, you may safely allow him a week to consider of his answer.”

The Platonic problem assumes, not only that he shall give an answer, but that it shall be an answer which he can maintain against the *Elenchus* of Sokrates.



questions—that an honest and pious man, of ordinary intelligence, has the answer to the question in his heart, though he cannot put it in words—these assumptions were also made by many of Plato's contemporaries, who depreciated his questions as frivolous and unprofitable. The rhetor and historian Theopompus (one of the most eminent among the numerous pupils of Isokrates, and at the same time unfriendly to Plato, though younger in age), thus criticised Plato's requirement, that these familiar terms should be defined: "What! (said he) have none of us before your time talked about the Good and the Just? Or do you suppose that we cannot follow out what each of them is, and that we pronounce the words as empty and unmeaning sounds?" Theopompus was the scholar of Isokrates, and both of them probably took the same view, as to the uselessness of that colloquial analysis which aims at determining the definition of familiar ethical or political words.<sup>o</sup> They considered that Plato and Sokrates, instead of clearing up what was confused, wasted their ingenuity in perplexing what was already clear. They preferred the rhetorical handling (such as we noticed in the Kriton) which works upon ready-made pre-established sentiments, and impresses a strong emotional conviction, but presumes that all the intellectual problems have already been solved.

All this shows the novelty of the Sokratic point of view:

Objective view of Ethics, distinguished by Sokrates from the subjective.	the distinction between the essential constituent and the accidental accompaniment, <sup>p</sup> and the search for a definition corresponding to the former: which search was first prosecuted by Sokrates (as Aristotle <sup>q</sup> points out) and was taken up from him by Plato. It was
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<sup>n</sup> Epiktétus, ii. 17, 4-10. Τὸ δ' ἐξαπατῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ὅπερ καὶ Θεόπομπον τὸν ῥήτορα ὅς που καὶ Πλάτωνι ἐγκαλεῖ, ἐπὶ τῷ βούλεσθαι ἕκαστα ὀρίζεσθαι. Τί γὰρ λέγει; Οὐδείς ἡμῶν πρὸ σοῦ ἔλεγεν ἀγαθὸν ἢ δίκαιον; ἢ μὴ παρακολουθοῦντες τί ἐστὶ τούτων ἕκαστον, ἀσήμεως καὶ κενῶς ἐφθεγγόμεθα τὰς φωνάς;

Respecting Theopompus, compare Dionys. Hal. Epistol. ad Cn. Pompeium

de Platone, p. 757; also De Præcip. Historicis, p. 782.

<sup>o</sup> Isokrates, Helen. Encom. Or. x. init. De Permut. Or. xv. sect. 90.

These passages do not name Sokrates and Plato, but have every appearance of being intended to allude to them.

<sup>p</sup> This distinction is pointedly noticed in the Euthyphron, p. 11 A.

<sup>q</sup> Aristotle, Metaphys. A. 987, b. 2; M. 1078, b. 28.

Sokrates who first brought conspicuously into notice the objective, intellectual, scientific view of ethics—as distinguished from the subjective, emotional, incoherent, and uninquiring. I mean that he was the first who proclaimed himself as feeling the want of such an objective view, and who worked upon other minds so as to create the like want in them: I do not mean that he provided satisfaction for this requirement.

Undoubtedly (as Theopompus remarked) men had used these ethical terms long before the time of Sokrates, and had used them, not as empty and unmeaning, but with a full body of meaning (*i. e.* emotional meaning). Strong and marked emotion had become associated with each term; and the same emotion, similar in character, though not equal in force—was felt by the greater number of different minds. Subjectively and emotionally, there was no difference between one man and another, except as to degree. But it was Sokrates who first called attention to the fact as a matter for philosophical recognition and criticism,—that such subjective and emotional unanimity does not exclude the widest objective and intellectual dissension.<sup>r</sup>

Subjective unanimity coincident with objective dissent.

<sup>r</sup> It is this distinction between the subjective and the objective which is implied in the language of Epiktétus, when he proceeds to answer the objection cited from Theopompus (see note "b"): *Τίς γάρ σοι λέγει, Θεόπομπε, ὅτι ἐννοίας οὐκ εἶχομεν ἐκάστου τούτων φυσικάς, καὶ προλήψεις; Ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷον τε ἐφάρμοξεν τὰς προλήψεις ταῖς καταλλήλοις οὐσίαις, μὴ διαρθρώσαντα αὐτάς, καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο σκεψάμενον, ποῖαν τινα ἐκάστη αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ὑποτακτέον.*

To the same purpose Epiktétus, in another passage, l. 22, 1-9: *Αὐτὴ ἔστιν ἡ τῶν Ἰουδαίων, καὶ Σύρων, καὶ Αἰγυπτίων, καὶ Ῥωμαίων μάχη' οὐ περὶ τοῦ, ὅτι τὸ ὅσον πάντων προτιμητέον, καὶ ἐν παντὶ μεταδιωκτέον—ἀλλὰ πότερόν ἐστιν ὅσον τοῦτο, τὸ χειρείου φαγεῖν, ἢ ἀνόσιον.*

Again, Origen also, in a striking passage of his reply to Celsus (v. p. 263, ed. Spencer), observes that the name *Justice* is the same among all Greeks (he means, the name with the emotional associations inseparable from it),

but that the thing designated was very different, according to those who pronounced it:—*λεκτέον, ὅτι τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ὄνομα ταῦτῶν μὲν ἔστιν παρὰ πᾶσιν Ἕλλησιν· ἤδη δὲ ἀποδείκνυται ἄλλη μὲν ἢ κατ' Ἐπίκουρον δικαιοσύνη, ἄλλη δὲ ἢ κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Στωῆς, ἀρτυμένων τὸ τριμερὲς τῆς ψυχῆς, ἄλλη δὲ κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος, ἰδιοπραγίαν τῶν μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς φασκόντων εἶναι τὴν δικαιοσύνην. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἄλλη μὲν ἢ Ἐπικούρου ἀνδρία, &c.*

"Je n'aime point les mots nouveaux," (said Saint Just, in his *Institutions*, composed during the sitting of the French Convention, 1793), "je ne connais que le juste et l'injuste: ces mots sont entendus par toutes les consciences. Il faut ramener toutes les définitions à la conscience: l'esprit est un sophiste qui conduit les vertus à l'échafaud." (*Histoire Parlementaire de la Révolution Française*, t. xxxv. p. 277.) This is very much the language which honest and vehement *ἰδιώται* of Athens would hold towards Sokrates and Plato.

As the Platonic Sokrates here puts it in the Euthyphron—

Cross-examination brought to bear upon this mental condition by Sokrates—  
Position of Sokrates and Plato in regard to it.

all men agree that the person who acts unjustly must be punished; but they dispute very much *who it is* that acts unjustly—*which* of his actions are unjust—or under *what* circumstances they are so. The emotion in each man's mind, as well as the word by which it is expressed, is the same:<sup>a</sup> but the person, or the acts, to which it is applied by each, although partly the same, are often so different, and sometimes so opposite, as to occasion violent dispute. There is subjective agreement, with objective disagreement. It is upon this disconformity that the Sokratic cross-examination is brought to bear, making his hearers feel its existence, for the first time, and dispelling their fancy of supposed knowledge as well as of supposed unanimity. Sokrates required them to define the general word—to assign some common objective characteristic, corresponding in all cases to the common subjective feeling represented by the word. But no man could comply with his requirement, nor could he himself comply with it, any more than his respondents. So far Sokrates proceeded, and no farther, according to Aristotle. He never altogether lost his hold on particulars: he assumed that there must be something common to them all, if you could but find out what it was, constituting the objective meaning of the general term. Plato made a step beyond him, though

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Euthyphron, p. 8, C-D. Euripides, Phœnissæ, 498—

εἰ πάνσι ταῦτον καλὸν ἔφν, σοφὸν θ' ἄμα,  
οὐκ ἦν ἂν ἀμφιλεκτὸς ἀνθρώποις ἔρις·  
νῦν δ' οὐχ ὅμοιον οὐδὲν, οὐτ' ἴσον,  
βρότοις  
πλήν ὀνομάσαι τὸ δ' ἔργον οὐκ ἔστιν  
τόδε.

Hobbes expresses, in the following terms, this fact of subjective similarity coexistent with great objective dissimilarity among mankind.

“For the similitude of the thoughts and passions of one man, to the thoughts and passions of another, whoever looketh into himself and considereth what he does when he does

*think, opine, reason, hope, fear, &c.* and upon what grounds, he shall thereby read and know what are the thoughts and passions of all other men upon the like occasions. I say the similitude of *passions*, which are the same in all men, *desire, fear, hope, &c.*, not the similitude of the *objects* of the passions, which are the things *desired, feared, hoped, &c.*, for these the constitution individuall, and particular education do so vary, and they are so easy to be kept from our knowledge, that the characters of man's heart, blotted and confounded as they are with lying, dissembling, counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines, are legible only to him that searcheth hearts.”—Introduction to Leviathan.

under the name of Sokrates as spokesman. Not being able (any more than Sokrates) to discover or specify any real objective characteristic, common to all the particulars—he objectivised<sup>1</sup> the word itself: that is, he assumed or imagined a new objective Ens of his own, the Platonic Idea, corresponding to the general word: an idea not common to the particulars, but existing apart from them in a sphere of its own—yet nevertheless lending itself in some inexplicable way to be participated by all the particulars. It was only in this way that Plato could explain to himself how knowledge was possible: this universal Ens being the only object of knowledge: particulars being an indefinite variety of fleeting appearances, and as such in themselves unknowable. The imagination of Plato created a new world of Forms, Ideas, Concepts, or objects corresponding to general terms: which he represents as the only objects of knowledge, and as the only realities.

In the Euthyphron, however, we have not yet passed into this Platonic world, of self-existent Forms—objects of conception—concepts detached from sensible particulars. We are still with Sokrates and with ordinary men among the world of particulars, only that Sokrates introduced a new mode of looking at all the particulars, and searched among them for some common feature which he did not find. The Holy (and the Unholy) is a word freely pronounced by every speaker, and familiarly understood by every hearer, as if it denoted something one and the same in all these particulars.<sup>2</sup> What is that something—the common essence or idea? Euthyphron cannot tell; though he agrees with Sokrates that there must be such essence. His attempts to explain it prove failures.

The definition of the Holy—that it is what the Gods love—is suggested in this dialogue, but rejected. The Holy is not Holy because the Gods love it: on the contrary, its holiness is an independent fact, and the Gods love it because it is

The Holy—  
it has an  
essential  
characteristic  
—what is  
this?—not  
the fact that  
it is loved by  
the Gods—  
this is true,  
but is not its  
constituent  
essence.

<sup>1</sup> Aristot. *Metaphys.* M. 1078, b. 30. 1086, b. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, *Euthyphron*, p. 5 D, 6 E.

Holy. The Holy is thus an essence, *per se*, common to, or partaken by, all holy persons and things.

So at least the Platonic Sokrates here regards it. But the Xenophontic Sokrates, if we can trust the Memorabilia, would not have concurred in this view: for we read that upon all points connected with piety or religious observance, he followed the precept which the Pythian priestess delivered as an answer to all who consulted the Delphian oracle on similar questions—You will act piously by conforming to the law of the city. Sokrates (we are told) not only acted upon this precept himself, but advised his friends to do the like, and regarded those who acted otherwise as foolish and over-subtle triflers.\* It is plain that this doctrine disallows all supposition of any general essence, called the Holy, to be discovered and appealed to, as type in cases of doubt; and recognises the equal title of many separate local, discordant, and variable types, each under the sanction of King Nomos. The procedure of Sokrates in the Euthyphron would not have been approved by the Xenophontic Sokrates. It is in the spirit of Plato, and is an instance of that disposition which he manifests yet more strongly in the Republic and elsewhere, to look for his supreme authority in philosophical theory and not in the constituted societies around him: thus to innovate in matters religious as well as political—a reproach to him among his own contemporaries, an honour to him among various subsequent Christian writers. Plato, not conforming to any one of the modes of religious belief actually prevalent in his contemporary world, postulates a canon, suitable to the exigencies of his own mind, of that which the Gods ought to love and must love. In this respect as in others, he is in marked contrast with Herodotus—a large observer of mankind, very pious in his own way, curious in comparing the

Views of the Xenophontic Sokrates respecting the Holy—different from those of the Platonic Sokrates—he disallows any common absolute general type of the Holy—he recognises an indefinite variety of types, discordant and relative.

\* Compare Xenophon, Memorab. i. 3, 1. ἢ τε γὰρ Πυθία—Νόμῳ πόλεως—ἀναρῆι ποιούντας εὐσεβῶς ἂν ποιεῖν. Σωκράτης τε οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ἐποίει καὶ

τοῖς ἄλλοις παρήγει, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως πως ποιούντας περιέρχους καὶ ματαίους ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι.

actual practices consecrated among different nations, but not pretending to supersede them by any canon of his own.

Though the Holy, and the Unholy, are pronounced to be each an essence, partaken of by all the particulars so-called; yet what that essence is, the dialogue Euthyphron noway determines. Even the suggestion of Sokrates—that the Holy is a branch of the Just, only requiring to be distinguished by some assignable mark from the other branches of the Just—is of no avail, since the Just itself had been previously declared to be one of the matters in perpetual dispute. It procures for Sokrates however the opportunity of illustrating the logical subordination of terms; the less general comprehended in the more general, and requiring to be parted off by some *differentia* from the rest of what this latter comprehends. Plato illustrates the matter at some length;<sup>7</sup> and apparently with a marked purpose of drawing attention to it. We must keep in mind, that logical distinctions had at that time received neither special attention nor special names—however they may have been unconsciously followed in practice.

What I remarked about the Kriton, appears to me also true about the Euthyphron. It represents Plato's manner of replying to the charge of impiety advanced by Melétus and his friends against Sokrates, just as the four first chapters of the Memorabilia represent Xenophon's manner of repelling the same charge. Xenophon joins issue with the accusers,—describes the language and proceedings of Sokrates, so as to show that he was orthodox and pious, above the measure of ordinary men, in conduct, in ritual, and in language; and expresses his surprise that against such a man the verdict of guilty could have been returned by the Dikasts.<sup>8</sup> Plato handles the charge in the way in which Sokrates himself would have handled it, if he had been commenting on the same accusation against another person—and as he does in fact deal with Melétus, in the Platonic

The Holy a branch of the Just—not tenable as a definition, but useful as bringing to view the subordination of logical terms.

The Euthyphron represents Plato's way of replying to the charge of impiety, preferred by Melétus against Sokrates—comparison with Xenophon's way of replying.

<sup>7</sup> Plato, Euthyphron, p. 12.

<sup>8</sup> Xenoph. Memor. i. 1-4; also iv. 8-11.

Apology. Plato introduces Euthyphron, a very religious man, who prides himself upon being forward to prosecute impiety in whomsoever it is found, and who in this case, under the special promptings of piety, has entered a capital prosecution against his own father.<sup>a</sup> The occasion is here favourable to the Sokratic interrogatories, applicable to Melétus no less than to Euthyphron. "Of course, before you took this grave step, you have assured yourself that you are right, and that you know what piety and impiety are. Pray tell me, for I am ignorant on the subject: that I may know better and do better for the future.<sup>b</sup> Tell me, what is the characteristic essence of piety as well as impiety?" It turns out that the accuser can make no satisfactory answer:—that he involves himself in confusion and contradiction:—that he has brought capital indictments against citizens, without having ever studied or appreciated the offence with which he charges them. Such is the manner in which the Platonic Sokrates is made to deal with Euthyphron, and in which the real Sokrates deals with Melétus:<sup>c</sup> rendering the questions instrumental to two larger purposes—first, to his habitual crusade against the false persuasion of knowledge—next, to the administering of a logical or dialectical lesson. When we come to the Treatise De Legibus (where Sokrates does not appear) we shall find Plato adopting the dogmatic and sermonising manner of the first chapters of the Xenophontic Memorabilia. Here, in the Euthyphron and in the Dialogues of Search generally, the Platonic Sokrates is something entirely different.<sup>d</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Euthyphron, p. 5 E.

<sup>b</sup> Compare, even in Xenophon, the conversation of Sokrates with Kritias and Chariklès—Memorab. i. 2, 32-38: and his cross-examination of the presumptuous youth Glaukon, Plato's brother (Mem. iii. 7).

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Apol. Sokrat. p. 24 C. ἀδικεῖν φημι Μέλητρον, ὅτι σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται, βλάβως εἰς ἀγῶνας καθίστας ἀνθρώπους, &c.

<sup>d</sup> Steinhart (Einleitung, p. 199)

agrees with the opinion of Schleiermacher and Stallbaum, that the Euthyphron was composed and published during the interval between the lodging of the indictment and the trial of Sokrates. K. F. Hermann considers it as posterior to the death of Sokrates.

I concur on this point with Hermann. Indeed I have already given my opinion, that not one of the Platonic dialogues was composed before the death of Sokrates.

## CHAPTER X.

## ALKIBIADES I. AND II.

## ALKIBIADES I.—ON THE NATURE OF MAN.

THIS dialogue is carried on between Sokrates and Alkibiades. It introduces Alkibiades as about twenty years of age, having just passed through the period of youth, and about to enter on the privileges and duties of a citizen. The real dispositions and circumstances of the historical Alkibiades (magnificent personal beauty, stature, and strength, high family and connections,—great wealth already possessed, since his father had died when he was a child,—a full measure of education and accomplishments— together with exorbitant ambition and insolence, derived from such accumulated advantages) are brought to view in the opening address of Sokrates. Alkibiades, during the years of youth which he had just passed, had been surrounded by admirers who tried to render themselves acceptable to him, but whom he repelled with indifference, and even with scorn. Sokrates had been among them, constantly present and near to Alkibiades, but without ever addressing a word to him. The youthful beauty being now exchanged for manhood, all these admirers had retired, and Sokrates alone remains. His attachment is to Alkibiades himself:—to promise of mind rather than to attractions of person. Sokrates has been always hitherto restrained, by his divine sign or Dæmon, from speaking to Alkibiades. But this prohibition has now been removed; and he accosts him for the first time, in the full belief that he shall be able to give improving counsel, essential to the success of that political career upon which the youth is about to enter.<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Plato, *Alkib.* i. 103, 104, 105. Perikles is supposed to be still alive and political leader of Athens—104 D.

I have briefly sketched the imaginary situation to which this dialogue is made to apply. The circumstances of it belong to Athenian manners of the Platonic age.

Some of the critics, considering that the relation supposed between Sokrates



You are about to enter on public life (says Sokrates to Alkibiades) with the most inordinate aspirations for glory and aggrandisement. You not only thirst for the acquisition of ascendancy such as Perikles possesses at Athens, but your ambition will not be satisfied unless you fill Asia with your renown, and put yourself upon a level with Cyrus and Xerxes. Now such aspirations cannot be gratified except through my assistance. I do not deal in long discourses, such as you have been accustomed to hear from others: I shall put to you only some short interrogatories, requiring nothing more than answers to my questions.<sup>b</sup>

*Sokr.*—You are about to step forward as adviser of the public assembly. Upon what points do you intend to advise them? Upon points which you know better than they? *Alk.*—Of course. *Sokr.*—All that you know, has been either learnt from others or found out by yourself. *Alk.*—Certainly. *Sokr.*—But you would neither have learnt any thing, nor found out any thing, without the desire to learn or find out: and you would have felt no such desire, in respect to that which you believed yourself to know already. That which you now know, therefore, there was a time when you believed yourself not to know? *Alk.*—Necessarily so. *Sokr.*—Now all that you have learnt, as I am well aware, consists of three things—letters, the harp, gymnastics. Do you intend to advise the Athenians when they are debating about letters, or about harp-playing, or about gymnastics? *Alk.*—Neither of the three. *Sokr.*—Upon what occasions,

and Alkibiades is absurd and unnatural, allege this among their reasons for denying the authenticity of the dialogue. But if any one reads the concluding part of the *Symposium*—the authenticity of which has never yet been denied by any critic—he will find something a great deal more abnormal in what is there recounted about Sokrates and Alkibiades.

In a dialogue composed by Æschines Socraticus (cited by the rhetor Aristides—*Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς*, Or. xlv. p.

23-24), expressions of intense love for Alkibiades are put into the mouth of Sokrates. Æschines was γνήσιος ἑταῖρος Σωκράτους, not less than Plato. The different companions of Sokrates thus agreed in their picture of the relation between him and Alkibiades.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, *Alkib.* i. c. 6, p. 106 A. Ἐὰρ ἐρωτῆς εἴ τινα ἔχω εἰπεῖν λόγον μακρὸν, οἷους δὴ ἀκούειν εἰθίσαι; οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τοιοῦτον τὸ ἐμὸν. I give here, as elsewhere, not an exact translation, but an abstract.

then, do you propose to give advice? Surely, not when the Athenians are debating about architecture, or prophetic warnings, or the public health: for to deliver opinions on each of these matters, belongs not to you but to professional men—architects, prophets, physicians; whether they be poor or rich, high-born or low-born? If not *then*, upon what other occasions will you tender your counsel? *Alk.*—When they are debating about affairs of their own.

*Sokr.*—But about what affairs of their own? Not about affairs of shipbuilding: for of that you know nothing.

*Alk.*—When they are discussing war and peace, or any other business concerning the city. *Sokr.*—You mean when they are discussing the question with whom they shall make war or peace, and in what manner? But it is certain that we must fight those whom it is best to fight—also *when* it is best—and *as long as* it is best. *Alk.*—Certainly. *Sokr.*—Now, if the Athenians wished to know whom it was best to wrestle with, and when or how long it was best—which of the two would be most competent to advise them, you or the professional trainer? *Alk.*—The trainer, undoubtedly. *Sokr.*—So, too, about playing the harp or singing. But when you talk about *better*, in wrestling or singing, what standard do you refer to? Is it not to the gymnastic or musical art? *Alk.*—Yes. *Sokr.*—Answer me in like manner about war or peace, the subjects on which you are going to advise your countrymen, whom, and at what periods, it is *better* to fight, and *better* not to fight? What in this last case do you mean by *better*? To what standard, or to what end, do you refer?<sup>c</sup> *Alk.*—I cannot say. *Sokr.*—But is it not a disgrace, since you profess to advise your countrymen when and against whom it is better for them to war,—not to be able to say to what end your *better* refers?

Alkibiades intends to advise the Athenians on questions of war and peace. Questions of Sokrates thereupon. We must fight those whom it is better to fight—to what standard does better refer? To just and unjust.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, *Alkib.* i. c, d. 1-12, p. 108-109.

ἴθι δὴ καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ πολυμῆν βέλτιον καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ εἰρήνην ἔχειν, τοῦτο τὸ βέλτιον τί ὀνομάσεις; ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ ἔλεγεσ τὸ ἄμεινον, ὅτι

μουσικώτερον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ἑτέρῳ, ὅτι γυμναστικώτερον πειρῶ δὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα λέγειν το βέλτιον . . . πρὸς τί τρεῖναι τὸ ἐν τῷ εἰρήνην τε ἔχειν ἄμεινον καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ πολυμῆν οἷς δεῖ; *Alkib.* Ἄλλὰ σκοπῶν οὐ δύναμαι ἐννοῆσαι.

Do not you know what are the usual grounds and complaints urged when war is undertaken? *Alk.*—Yes: complaints of having been cheated, or robbed, or injured. *Sokr.*—Under what circumstances? *Alk.*—You mean, whether justly or unjustly? That makes all the difference. *Sokr.*—Do you mean to advise the Athenians to fight those who behave justly, or those who behave unjustly? *Alk.*—The question is monstrous. Certainly not those who behave justly. It would be neither lawful nor honourable. *Sokr.*—Then when you spoke about *better*, in reference to war or peace, what you meant was *juster*—you had in view justice and injustice? *Alk.*—It seems so.

*Sokr.*—How is this? How do you know, or where have you learnt, to distinguish just from unjust? Have you frequented some master, without my knowledge, to teach you this? If you have, pray introduce me to him, that I also may learn it from him. *Alk.*—You are jesting. *Sokr.*—Not at all: I love you too well to jest. *Alk.*—But what if I had no master? Cannot I know about justice and injustice, without a master? *Sokr.*—Certainly: you might find out for yourself, if you made search and investigated. But this you would not do, unless you were under the persuasion that you did not already know. *Alk.*—Was there not a time when I really believed myself not to know it? *Sokr.*—Perhaps there may have been: tell me *when* that time was. Was it last year? *Alk.*—No: last year I thought that I knew. *Sokr.*—Well, then—two years, three years, &c., ago? *Alk.*—No: the case was the same—then, also, I thought that I knew. *Sokr.*—But before that, you were a mere boy; and during your boyhood you certainly believed yourself to know what was just and unjust; for I well recollect hearing you then complain confidently of other boys, for acting unjustly towards you. *Alk.*—Certainly: I was not then ignorant on the point: I knew distinctly that they were acting unjustly towards me. *Sokr.*—You knew, then, even in your boyhood, what was just and what was unjust? *Alk.*—Certainly: I knew even then. *Sokr.*—At what moment did you first find

How, or from whom, has Alkibiades learnt to discern or distinguish Just and Unjust? He never learnt it from any one: he always knew it, even as a boy.

it out? Not when you already believed yourself to know: and what time was there when you did not believe yourself to know? *Alk.*—Upon my word, I cannot say.

*Sokr.*—Since, accordingly, you neither found it out for yourself, nor learnt it from others, how come you to know justice or injustice at all, or from what quarter?

*Alk.*—I was mistaken in saying that I had not learnt it. I learnt it, as others do, from the multitude.<sup>d</sup>

*Sokr.*—Your teachers are none of the best: no one can learn from them even such small matters as playing at draughts: much less, what is just and unjust.

*Alk.*—I learnt it from them as I learnt to speak Greek, in which, too, I never had any special teacher.

*Sokr.*—Of that the multitude are competent teachers, for they are all of one mind. Ask which is a tree or a stone,—a horse or a man,

—you get the same answer from every one. But when you ask not simply which are *horses*, but also which horses are fit to run well in a race—when you ask not merely which are *men*, but which men are healthy or unhealthy—are the multitude all of one mind, or all competent to answer?

*Alk.*—Assuredly not. *Sokr.*—When you see the multitude differing among themselves, that is a clear proof that they are not competent to teach others.

*Alk.*—It is so. *Sokr.*—Now, about the question, What is just and unjust—are the multitude all of one mind, or do they differ among themselves?

*Alk.*—They differ prodigiously: they not only dispute, but quarrel and destroy each other, respecting justice and injustice, far more than about health and sickness.<sup>e</sup>

*Sokr.*—How, then, can we say that the multitude know what is just and unjust, when they thus fiercely dispute about it among themselves?

*Alk.*—I now perceive that we cannot say so.

*Sokr.*—How can we say, therefore, that they are fit to teach

Answer amended. Alkibiades learnt it from the multitude, as he learnt to speak Greek. —The multitude cannot teach just and unjust, for they are at variance among themselves about it. Alkibiades is going to advise the Athenians about what he does not know himself.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, *Alkib.* i, c. 16, p. 110 D. *ἐμαθον, οἶμαι, καὶ ἐγὼ ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν.*

<sup>e</sup> Plato, *Alkib.* i. c. 18, p. 112 A.

*Sokr.* τί δὲ δὴ; νῦν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ἀνθρώπων καὶ πραγμάτων,

οἱ πολλοὶ δοκοῦσί σοι ὁμολογεῖν αὐτοὶ εἰναι εἴτε ἢ ἀλλήλοισι; *Alkib.* ἠκίστα, νῆ Δ', ὦ Σώκρατες. *Sokr.* τί δαί; μάλιστα περὶ αὐτῶν διαφέρεσθαι; *Alkib.* πολὺ γε.

others: and how can you pretend to know, who have learnt from no other teachers? *Alk.*—From what you say, it is impossible.

*Sokr.*—No: not from what *I* say, but from what *you* say yourself. I merely ask questions: it is you who give all the answers.<sup>f</sup> And what you have said amounts to this—that Alkibiades knows nothing about what is just and unjust, but believes himself to know, and is going to advise the Athenians about what he does not know himself?

*Alk.* But Sokrates, the Athenians do not often debate about what is just and unjust. They think that question self-evident: they debate generally about what is expedient or not expedient. Justice and expediency do not always coincide. Many persons commit great crimes, and are great gainers by doing so: others again behave justly, and suffer from it.<sup>g</sup> *Sokr.*—Do you then profess to know what is expedient or inexpedient? From whom have you learnt—or when did you find out for yourself? I might ask you the same round of questions, and you would be compelled to answer in the same manner. But we will pass to a different point. You say that justice and expediency are not coincident. Persuade *me* of this, by interrogating me as I interrogated you. *Alk.*—That is beyond my power. *Sokr.*—But when you rise to address the assembly, you will have to persuade *them*. If you can persuade them, you can persuade me. Assume *me* to be the assembly, and practise upon me.<sup>h</sup> *Alk.*—You are too hard upon me, Sokrates. It is for you to speak, and prove the point. *Sokr.*—No: I can only question: you must answer. You will be most surely persuaded when the point is determined by your own answers.<sup>i</sup>

<sup>f</sup> Plato, *Alkib.* i. c. 19, p. 112; c. 20, p. 113.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, *Alkib.* i. c. 20, p. 113. Οἶμαι μὲν ἀλιγὰς Ἀθηναίους βουλευέσθαι πότερα δικαιοτέρα ἢ ἀδικοτέρα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἡγούνται δῆλα εἶναι, &c.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, *Alk.* i. p. 114 B-C. This same argument is addressed by Sokrates to Glaukon, in *Xenop. Memor.* iii. 6, 14-15.

<sup>i</sup> Plato, *Alkib.* i. c. 23, p. 114 E. Οὐκοῦν εἰ λέγεις ὅτι ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, μάλιστ' ἂν εἴης πεπεισμένος;

Such is the commencing portion (abbreviated or abstracted) of Plato's First Alkibiadês. It exhibits a very characteristic specimen of the Sokratico-Platonic method: both in its negative and positive aspect. By the negative, false persuasion of knowledge is exposed. Alkibiades believes himself competent to advise about just and unjust, which he has neither learnt from any teacher nor investigated for himself—which he has picked up from the multitude, and supposes to be clear to every one, but about which nevertheless there is so much difference of appreciation among the multitude, that fierce and perpetual quarrels are going on. On the positive side, Sokrates restricts himself to the function of questioning: he neither affirms nor denies any thing. It is Alkibiades who affirms or denies every thing, and who makes all the discoveries for himself out of his own mind, instigated indeed, but not taught, by the questions of his companion.

Comment on the preceding.—Sokratic method—the respondent makes the discoveries for himself.

By a farther series of questions, Sokrates next brings Alkibiades to the admission that what is just, is also honourable, good, expedient—what is unjust, is dishonourable, evil, inexpedient: and that whoever acts justly and honourably, thereby acquires happiness. Admitting, first, that an act which is good, honourable, just, expedient, &c., considered in one aspect or in reference to some of its conditions—may be at the same time bad, dishonourable, unjust, inexpedient, &c., considered in another aspect or in reference to other conditions; Sokrates nevertheless brings his respondent to admit, that every act, *in so far as it is just and honourable*, is also good and expedient.<sup>k</sup> And he contends farther, that whoever acts honourably, does

Alkibiades is brought to admit that whatever is just, is good, honourable, expedient: and that whoever acts honourably, both does well, and procures for himself happiness thereby. Equivocal reasoning of Sokrates.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Alkib. i. c. 24-25, p. 115.

Οὐκοῦν ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν καλὴν μὲν λέγεις κατὰ τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν τοῦ σώσασαι οὐδ' ἔδει, τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἀνδρία. . . . κακὴν δέ γε κατὰ τοὺς θανάτους τε καὶ τὰ ἔλκη.

Οὐκοῦν ἄδε δίκαιον προσαγορεύειν ἐκάστην τῶν πράξεων εἴπερ ἢ κακὸν ἀπεργάζεται, κακὴν καλεῖς, καὶ ἢ ἀγαθὸν, ἀγαθὴν κλητέον.

<sup>7</sup> Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἢ ἀγαθὸν, καλὸν, — ἢ δὲ κακὸν, αἰσχρόν; Ναί.

Compare Plato, Republic, v. p. 479, where he maintains that in every particular case, what is just, honourable, virtuous, &c., is also unjust, dishonourable, vicious, &c. Nothing remains unchanged, nor excludes the contrary, except the pure, self-existent, Idea or general Concept.—*ἀπὸ-δικαιοσύνη*, &c.

well: now every man who does well, becomes happy, or secures good things thereby: therefore the just, the honourable, and the good or expedient, coincide.<sup>1</sup> The argument, whereby this conclusion is here established, is pointed out by Heindorf, Stallbaum, and Steinhart, as not merely inconclusive, but as mere verbal equivocation and sophistry—the like of which, however, we find elsewhere in Plato.<sup>m</sup>

Alkibiades is thus reduced to a state of humiliating embarrassment, and stands convicted, by his own contradictions and confession, of ignorance in its worst form: that is, of being ignorant, and yet confidently believing himself to know.<sup>n</sup> But other Athenian statesmen are no wiser. Even Perikles is proved to be equally deficient—by the fact that he has never been able to teach or improve any one else, not even his own sons and those whom he loved best.<sup>o</sup> “At any rate” (contends Alkibiades) “I am as good as my competitors, and can hold my ground against them.” But Sokrates reminds him that the real competitors with whom he ought to compare himself, are foreigners, liable to become the enemies of Athens, and against whom he, if he pretends to lead Athens, must be able to contend. In an harangue of unusual length, Sokrates shows that the kings of Sparta and Persia are of nobler breed, as well as more highly and carefully trained, than the Athenian statesmen.<sup>p</sup> Alkibiades must be rescued from his present ignorance, and exalted so as to be capable of competing with these kings: which object cannot be attained except through the auxiliary interposition of Sokrates. Not that Sokrates professes to be himself already on this elevation, and to stand in need of no

Humiliation of Alkibiades. Other Athenian statesmen are equally ignorant. But the real opponents, against whom Alkibiades is to measure himself, are, the kings of Sparta and Persia. Enlogistic description of those kings. To match them, Alkibiades must make himself as good as possible.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Alkib. i. c. 26, p. 116 E.

<sup>m</sup> The words *εὖ πράττειν*—*εὐπραγία* have a double sense, like our “doing well.” Stallbaum, Proleg. p. 175; Steinhart, Einl. p. 149.

We have, c. 26, p. 116 B., the equivocation between *καλῶς πράττειν* and *εὖ πράττειν*, also with *κακῶς πράττειν*, p. 134 A., 135 A.; compare Heindorf

ad Platon. Charmid. c. 42, p. 172 A. c. 48, p. 174 B.; also Platon. Gorgias p. 507 C., where similar equivocal meanings occur.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Alkib. i. c. 29-30, p. 118.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Alkibiad. i. c. 31, p. 118-119.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Alkib. i. c. 34-42, p. 120-124.

farther improvement. But he can, nevertheless, help others to attain it for themselves, through the discipline and stimulus of his interrogatories.<sup>1</sup>

The dialogue then continues. *Sokr.*—We wish to become as good as possible. But in what sort of virtue?

*Alk.*—In that virtue which belongs to good men.

*Sokr.*—Yes, but *good*, in what matters? *Alk.*—

Evidently, to men who are good in transacting business. *Sokr.*—Ay, but what kind of business? busi-

ness relating to horses, or to navigation? If that be meant, we must go and consult horse-trainers or mariners? *Alk.*—No,

I mean such business as is transacted by the most esteemed leaders in Athens. *Sokr.*—You mean the intelligent men.

Every man is good, in reference to that which he understands: every man is bad, in reference to that which he does not understand. *Alk.*—Of course. *Sokr.*—The cobbler under-

stands shoemaking, and is therefore good at *that*: he does not understand weaving, and is therefore bad at that. The

same man thus, in your view, will be both good and bad?<sup>2</sup>

*Alk.*—No: that cannot be. *Sokr.*—Whom then do you mean, when you talk of *the good*? *Alk.*—I mean those who

are competent to command in the city. *Sokr.*—But to command, whom or what—horses or men? *Alk.*—To command

men. *Sokr.*—But what men, and under what circumstances? sick men, or men on shipboard, or labourers engaged in

harvesting, or in what occupations? *Alk.*—I mean, men living in social and commercial relation with each other, as

we live here; men who live in common possession of the same laws and government. *Sokr.*—When men are in com-

munion of a sea voyage and of the same ship, how do we name the art of commanding them, and to what purpose does it tend? *Alk.*—It is the art of the pilot; and the pur-

pose towards which it tends, is, bringing them safely through the dangers of the sea. *Sokr.*—When men are in social and

political communion, to what purpose does the art of com-

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Alkib.* i. c. 42-43, p. 124.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, *Alk.* i. c. 43, p. 125 B.

Ὁ αὐτὸς ἀρα τοῦτ' ἔχει τῶν λόγων κακὸς  
τε καὶ ἀγαθός.

Plato slides unconsciously here, as  
in other parts of his reasonings, *à dicto*  
*secundum quid*, *ad dictum simpliciter*.



manding them tend? *Alk.*—Towards the better preservation and administration of the city.<sup>s</sup> *Sokr.*—But what do you mean by *better*? What is that, the presence or absence of which makes *better* or *worse*? If in regard to the management of the body, you put to me the same question, I should reply, that it is the presence of health, and the absence of disease. What reply will you make, in the case of the city? *Alk.*—I should say, when friendship and unanimity among the citizens are present, and when discord and antipathy are absent. *Sokr.*—This unanimity, of what nature is it? Respecting what subject? What is the art or science for realising it? If I ask you what brings about unanimity respecting numbers and measures, you will say, the arithmetical and the metrêtic art. *Alk.*—I mean that friendship and unanimity which prevails between near relatives, father and son, husband and wife. *Sokr.*—But how can there be unanimity between any two persons, respecting subjects which one of them knows, and the other does not know? For example, about spinning and weaving, which the husband does not know,—or about military duties, which the wife does not know,—how can there be unanimity between the two? *Alk.*—No: there cannot be. *Sokr.*—Nor friendship, if unanimity and friendship go together? *Alk.*—Apparently there cannot. *Sokr.*—Then when men and women each perform their own special duties, there can be no friendship between them. Nor can a city be well administered, when each citizen performs his own special duties? or (which is the same thing) when each citizen acts justly? *Alk.*—Not so: I think there may be friendship, when each person performs his or her own business. *Sokr.*—Just now you said the reverse. What is this friendship or unanimity which we must understand and realise, in order to become good men?

*Alk.*—In truth, I am puzzled myself to say. I find myself in a state of disgraceful ignorance, of which I had no previous suspicion. *Sokr.*—Do not be discouraged. If you had made this discovery when you were fifty

Alkibiades,  
puzzled and  
humiliated,  
confesses his  
ignorance.

<sup>s</sup> Plato, *Alkib.* i. c. 45, p. 126 A. | διοικεῖν καὶ σώζεσθαι. *Sokr.* "Ἀμεινον  
τί δέ; ἤν σὺ καλεῖς εὐβουλίαν, εἰς τί | δὲ διοικεῖται καὶ σώζεται τίνος παραγι-  
έστιν; *Alk.* Εἰς τὸ ἄμεινον τὴν πόλιν | γνομένου ἢ ἀπογνομένου.

years old, it would have been too late for taking care of yourself and applying a remedy: but at your age, it is the right time for making the discovery. *Alk.*—What am I to do, now that I have made it? *Sokr.*—You must answer my questions. If my auguries are just, we shall soon be both of us better for the process.<sup>t</sup>

Encouragement given by Sokrates. —It is an advantage to make such discovery in youth.

Here we have again, brought into prominent relief, the dialectic method of Plato, under two distinct aspects: 1. Its actual effects, in exposing the false supposition of knowledge, in forcing upon the respondent the humiliating conviction, that he does not know familiar topics which he supposed to be clear both to himself and to others. 2. Its anticipated effects, if continued, in remedying such defect; and in generating out of the mind of the respondent, real and living knowledge. Lastly, it is plainly intimated, that this shock of humiliation and mistrust, painful but inevitable, must be undergone in youth.

Platonic Dialectic—its actual effect —its anticipated effect — applicable to the season of youth.

The dialogue continues, in short questions and answers, of which the following is an abstract. *Sokr.*—What is meant by a man *taking care of himself*? Before I can take care of myself, I must know what *myself* is: I must *know myself*, according to the Delphian motto. I cannot make myself better, without knowing what *myself* is.<sup>u</sup> That which belongs to me is not *myself*: my body is not myself, but an instrument governed by myself.<sup>x</sup> My mind or soul only, is myself. To take care of myself is, to take care of my mind. At any rate, if this be not

Know Thyself—Delphian maxim —its urgent importance—What is myself? My mind is myself.

<sup>t</sup> Plato, *Alkib.* i. c. 48, p. 127 E. *Alk.* Ἄλλα μὰ τοὺς θεοὺς, οὐδ' αὐτὸς οἶδα ὅτι λέγω, κινδυνεύω δε καὶ πάλαι λεληθέναι ἐμαυτὸν αἰσχιστ' ἔχω.

*Sokr.* Ἄλλα χρὴ θαρρῆν εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ ἥσθου πεπονηθῶς πεντηκονταέτης, χαλεπὸν ἂν ἦν σοι ἐπιμεληθῆναι σαυτοῦ νῦν δὲ ἦν ἔχεις ἡλικίαν, αὐτῆ ἔστιν ἐν ἧ δεῖ αὐτὸ αἰσθεσθαι.

*Alk.* Τί οὖν τὸν αἰσθόμενον χρὴ ποιεῖν;

*Sokr.* Ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὰ ἐρωτώμενα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ποιῆς, ἂν θεὸς ἐβῆλῃ, εἴ τι δεῖ καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ μαντείᾳ

πιστεύειν, σύ τε κἀγὼ βελτιώως σχήσομεν.

<sup>u</sup> Plato, *Alkib.* i. c. 50-51, p. 129. τίς ἂν τρόπον εὔρεθείη αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό;

<sup>x</sup> Plato, *Alkib.* i. c. 49-53, p. 128-130. All this is greatly expanded in the dialogue.

Ὅκ ἄρα ὅταν τῶν σαυτοῦ ἐπιμέλῃ, σαυτοῦ ἐπιμέλῃ. This same antithesis is employed by Sokrates; De Permutatione, sect. 309, p. 492, Bekker. He recommends αὐτοῦ πρότερον ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν.

strictly true,<sup>y</sup> my mind is the most important and dominant element within me. The physician who knows his own body, does not for that reason know himself: much less do the husbandman or the tradesman, who know their own properties or crafts, know themselves, or perform what is truly their own business.

Since temperance consists in self-knowledge, neither of these professional men, as such, is temperate: their professions are of a vulgar cast, and do not belong to the virtuous life.<sup>z</sup> How are we to know our own minds? We know it by looking into another mind, and into the most rational and divine portion thereof: just as the eye can only know itself by looking into another eye, and seeing itself therein reflected.<sup>a</sup> It is only in this way that we can come to know ourselves, or become temperate: and if we do not know ourselves, we cannot even know what belongs to ourselves, or what belongs to others: all these are branches of one and the same cognition. We can have no knowledge of affairs, either public or private: we shall go wrong, and shall be unable to secure happiness either for ourselves or for others. It is not wealth or power which are the conditions of happiness, but justice and temperance. Both for ourselves individually, and for the public collectively, we ought to aim at justice and temperance, not at wealth and power. The evil and unjust man ought to have no power, but to be the slave of those who are better than himself.<sup>b</sup> He is fit for nothing but to be a slave: none deserve freedom except the virtuous.

*Sokr.*—How do you feel your own condition now, Alkibiades. Are you worthy of freedom? *Alk.*—I feel but too keenly that I am not. I cannot emerge from this degradation except by your society and help. From this time forward I shall never leave you.<sup>c</sup>

<sup>y</sup> Plato considers this point to be not clearly made out. *Alkib.* i. c. 53, p. 130.

<sup>z</sup> Plato, *Alkib.* i. c. 54, p. 131 B.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, *Alkib.* i. c. 57, p. 133.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, *Alkib.* i. c. 58-60, p. 134-135.

Πρὶν δὲ γε ἀρετὴν ἔχειν, τὸ ἀρχεσθαι ἄμεινον ὑπὸ τοῦ βελτίους ἢ τὸ ἀρχεῖν ἀνδρὶ, οὐ μόνον παιδί. . . . Πρέπει ἄρα τῷ κακῷ δουλεύειν ἄμεινον γάρ.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, *Alkib.* i. c. 61, p. 135.

The other Platonic dialogue, termed the Second Alkibiadês, introduces Alkibiades as about to offer prayer and sacrifice to the Gods.

Second Alkibiadês—situation supposed.

*Sokr.*—You seem absorbed in thought, Alkibiades, and not unreasonably. In supplicating the Gods, caution is required not to pray for gifts which are really mischievous. The Gods sometimes grant men's prayers, even when ruinously destructive; as they granted the prayers of Œdipus, to the destruction of his own sons.

Danger of mistake in praying to the Gods for gifts which may prove mischievous. Most men are unwise. Unwise is the generic word: madmen, a particular variety under it.

*Alk.*—Œdipus was mad: what man in his senses would put up such a prayer?

*Sokr.*—You think that madness is the opposite of good sense or wisdom. You recognise men wise and unwise: and you farther admit that every man must be one or other of the two,—just as every man must be either healthy or sick: there is no third alternative possible? *Alk.*—I think so. *Sokr.*—But each thing can have but one opposite: <sup>d</sup> to be unwise, and to be mad, are therefore identical? *Alk.*—They are. *Sokr.*—Wise men are only few, the majority of our citizens are unwise: but do you really think them mad? How could any of us live safely in the society of so many madmen? *Alk.*—No: it cannot be so: I was mistaken. *Sokr.*—Here is the illustration of your mistake. All men who have gout, or fever, or ophthalmia, are sick: but all sick men have not gout, or fever, or ophthalmia. So, too, all carpenters, or shoemakers, or sculptors, are craftsmen; but all craftsmen are not carpenters, or shoemakers, or sculptors. In like manner, all madmen are unwise; but all unwise men are not mad. *Unwise* comprises many varieties and gradations—of which the extreme is, being mad: but these varieties are different among themselves, as one disease differs from another, though all agree in being disease—and one art differs from another, though all agree in being art.<sup>e</sup>

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Alkib. ii. c. 3, p. 139 C. Καὶ μὴν δύο γε ὑπενάντια ἐνὶ πράγματι πῶς ἂν εἴη;

That each thing has one opposite, and no more, is asserted in the Protagoras also, c. 57, p. 192-193.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Alkib. ii. c. 4-5, p. 139-140. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ πυρέττοντες πάντες νοσοῦ-

σιν, οὐ μέντοι οἱ νοσοῦντες πάντες πυρέττουσιν οὐδὲ ποδαγρῶσιν οὐδέ γε ὀφθαλμιῶσιν· ἀλλὰ νόσος μὲν πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι, διαφέρειν δὲ φασιν οὓς δὴ καλοῦμεν ἰατροὺς τὴν ἀπεργασίαν αὐτῶν· οὐ γὰρ πᾶσαι οὐθ' ὅμοιοι ὅτε ὅμοιος διαπράττονται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῆς δύναμιν ἐκάστη.

(We may remark that Plato here, as in the *Euthyphron*, brings under especial notice one of the most important distinctions in formal logic—that between a generic term and the various specific terms comprehended under it. Possessing as yet no technical language for characterising this distinction, he makes it understood by an induction of several separate but analogous cases. Because the distinction is familiar now to instructed men, we must not suppose that it was familiar then.)

*Sokr* —Whom do you call wise and unwise? Is not the wise man, he who knows what it is proper to say and do—and the unwise man, he who does not know? *Alk.*—Yes. *Sokr.*—The unwise man will thus often unconsciously say or do what ought not to be said or done? Though not mad like *Œdipus*, he will nevertheless pray to the Gods for gifts, which will be hurtful to him if obtained. You, for example, would be overjoyed if the Gods were to promise that you should become despot not only over Athens, but also over Greece. *Alk.*—Doubtless I should: and every one else would feel as I do. *Sokr.*—But what if you were to purchase it with your life, or to damage yourself by the employment of it? *Alk.*—Not on those conditions.† *Sokr.*—But you are aware that many ambitious aspirants, both at Athens and elsewhere (among them, the man who just now killed the Macedonian King *Archelaus*, and usurped his throne), have acquired power and aggrandisement, so as to be envied by every one: yet have presently found themselves brought to ruin and death by the acquisition. So, also, many persons pray that they may become fathers; but discover presently that their children are the source of so much grief to them, that they wish themselves again childless. Nevertheless, though such reverses are perpetually happening, every one is still not only eager to obtain these supposed benefits, but importunate with the Gods in asking for them. You see that it is not safe even to accept

Relation between a generic term, and the specific terms comprehended under it, was not then familiar.

Frequent cases, in which men pray for supposed benefits, and find that when obtained, they are misfortunes. Every one fancies that he knows what is beneficial: mischiefs of ignorance.

† Plato, *Alkib.* ii. c. 6, p. 141.

without reflection boons offered to you, much less to pray for boons to be conferred.<sup>s</sup> *Alk.*—I see now how much mischief ignorance produces. Every one thinks himself competent to pray for what is beneficial to himself; but ignorance makes him unconsciously imprecate mischief on his own head.

*Sokr.* You ought not to denounce ignorance in this unqualified manner. You must distinguish and specify—  
 Ignorance of what? and under what modifications of persons and circumstances? *Alk.*—How? Are there *any* matters or circumstances in which it is better for a man to be ignorant, than to know?

Mistake in predications about ignorance generally. We must discriminate. Ignorance of what? Ignorance of good, is always mischievous: ignorance of other things, not always.

*Sokr.*—You will see that there are such. Ignorance of good, or ignorance of what is best, is always mischievous: moreover, assuming that a man knows what is best, then all other knowledge will be profitable to him. In his special case, ignorance on any subject cannot be otherwise than hurtful. But if a man be ignorant of good, or of what is best, in his case knowledge on other subjects will be more often hurtful than profitable. To a man like Orestes, so misguided on the question, “What is good?” as to resolve to kill his mother,—it would be a real benefit, if for the time he did not know his mother. Ignorance on that point, in his state of mind, would be better for him than knowledge.<sup>h</sup>  
*Alk.*—It appears so.

*Sokr.*—Follow the argument farther. When we come forward to say or do any thing, we either know what we are about to say and do, or at least believe ourselves to know it. Every statesman who gives counsel to the public, does so in the faith of such knowledge. Most citizens are unwise, and ignorant of good as well as of other things. The wise are but few, and by their advice the city is conducted. Now upon what ground do we call these few, wise and useful public counsellors? If a statesman knows war, but does not know whether it is best to go to war, or at what juncture it is best—should we call him wise? If he knows how to kill men, or dis-

Wise public counsellors are few. Upon what ground do we call these few wise? Not because they possess merely special arts or accomplishments, but because they know, besides, upon what occasions and under what limits each of these accomplishments ought to be used.

<sup>s</sup> Plato, *Alkib.* ii. c. 7, p. 141-142.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, *Alkibiad.* ii. p. 144, c. 11.

possess them, or drive them into exile,—but does not know upon whom, or on what occasions, it is good to inflict this treatment,—is he a useful counsellor? If he can ride, or shoot, or wrestle, well,—we give him an epithet derived from this special accomplishment: we do not call him wise. What would be the condition of a community composed of bowmen, horsemen, wrestlers, rhetors, &c., accomplished and excellent each in his own particular craft, yet none of them knowing what is good, nor when, nor on what occasions, it is good to employ their craft? When each man pushes forward his own art and specialty, without any knowledge whether it is good on the whole either for himself or for the city, will not affairs thus conducted be reckless and disastrous?<sup>i</sup> *Alk.*—They will be very bad indeed.

*Sokr.*—If, then, a man has no knowledge of good or of the better—if upon this cardinal point he obeys fancy without reason—the possession of knowledge upon special subjects will be oftener hurtful than profitable to him; because it will make him more forward in action, without any good result. Possessing many arts and accomplishments,—and prosecuting one after another, but without the knowledge of good,—he will only fall into greater trouble, like a ship sailing without a pilot. Knowledge of good is, in other words, knowledge of what is useful and profitable. In conjunction with this, all other knowledge is valuable, and goes to increase a man's competence as a counsellor: apart from this, all other knowledge will not render a man competent as a counsellor, but will be more frequently hurtful than beneficial.<sup>k</sup> Towards

Special accomplishments, without the knowledge of the good or profitable, are oftener hurtful than beneficial.

<sup>i</sup> Plato, *Alkib.* ii. c. 12-13, p. 145.  
<sup>k</sup> Plato, *Alkib.* ii. c. 13-15, p. 145-146.  
 \* Οσπισ ἔρα τι τῶν τοιοῦτων οἶδεν, εἰάν μὲν παρέπηται αὐτῷ ἢ τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμης—αὐτῷ δ' ἦν ἢ αὐτῇ δὴ που ἤπερ καὶ ἢ τοῦ ὠφελίμου—φρόνιμόν γε αὐτὸν φήσομεν καὶ ἀποχρώντα ξύμβουλον καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ αὐτὸν αὐτῷ τὸν δὲ μη τοιοῦτον, τάναντια τούτων. (Τοιοῦτον is Schneider's emendation for ποιοῦντα.) . . . Οὐκοῦν φαιμέν πάλιν τοὺς πολλοὺς διημαρτηκέναι τοῦ βελτίστου, ὡς τὰ πολλά γε, οἶμαι, ἄνευ

νοῦ δόξης πεπιστευκότας . . . Ὅρῶς οὖν, ὅτε γ' ἔφην κινδυνεύειν τό γε τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν κτῆμα, εἴαν τις ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμης κεκτημένος ᾖ, ὀλιγάκις μὲν ὠφελείν, βλάπτειν δὲ τὰ πλείω τὸν ἔχοντ' αὐτό . . . Ὅ δὲ τὴν καλουμένην πολυμαθειάν καὶ πολυτεχνίαν κεκτημένος, ὄφρανος δὲ ὢν ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ἀγόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἐκείτης τῶν ἄλλων, ἄρ' οὐχὶ τῷ ἄντι δικαίως πολλῶν χειμῶνι χρήσεται, ἄτ', οἶμαι, ἄνευ κυβερνήτου διατελών ἐν πελάγει, &c.

right living, what we need is, the knowledge of good : just as the sick stand in need of a physician, and the ship's crew of a pilot. *Alk.*—I admit your reasoning. My opinion is changed. I no longer believe myself competent to determine what I ought to accept from the Gods, or what I ought to pray for. I incur serious danger of erring, and of asking for mischiefs, under the belief that they are benefits.

*Sokr.*—The Lacedæmonians when they offer sacrifice, pray simply that they may obtain what is honourable and good, without farther specification. This language is acceptable to the Gods, more acceptable than the costly festivals of Athens. It has procured for the Spartans more continued prosperity than the Athenians have enjoyed.<sup>1</sup> The Gods honour wise and just men,—that is, men who know what they ought to say and do both towards Gods and towards men—more than numerous and splendid offerings.<sup>m</sup>

It is unsafe for Alkibiades to proceed with his sacrifice, until he has learnt what is the proper language to address to the Gods. He renounces his sacrifice, and throws himself upon the counsel of Sokrates.

You see, therefore, that it is not safe for you to proceed with your sacrifice, until you have learnt what is the proper language to be used, and what are the really good gifts to be prayed for. Otherwise your sacrifice will not prove acceptable, and you may even bring upon yourself positive mischief.<sup>n</sup>

*Alk.*—When shall I be able to learn this, and who is there to teach me? I shall be delighted to meet him. *Sokr.*—There is a person at hand most anxious for your improvement. What he must do is, first to disperse the darkness from your mind,—next, to impart that which will teach you to discriminate evil from good, which at present you are unable to do.

*Alk.*—I shall shrink from no labour to accomplish this object. Until then, I postpone my intended sacrifice: and I tender my sacrificial wreath to you, in gratitude for your counsel.<sup>o</sup>

*Sokr.*—I accept the wreath as a welcome augury of future friendship and conversation between us, to help us out of the present embarrassment.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Alkib.* ii. c. 19, p. 148.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, *Alkib.* ii, c. 22, p. 150.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, *Alkib.* ii. c. 22, p. 150.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, *Alkib.* ii. c. 23-24, p. 151.



The two dialogues, called First and Second Alkibiadês, of which I have just given some account, resemble each other more than most of the Platonic dialogues, not merely in the personages introduced, but in general spirit, in subject, and even in illustrations. The First Alkibiadês was recognised as authentic by all critics without exception, until the days of Schleiermacher. Nay, it was not only recognised, but extolled as one of the most valuable and important of all the Platonic compositions; proper to be studied first, as a key to all the rest. Such was the view of Jamblichus and Proklus, transmitted to modern times; until it received a harsh contradiction from Schleiermacher, who declared the dialogue to be both worthless and spurious. The Second Alkibiadês was also admitted both by Thrasyllus, and by the general body of critics in ancient times: but there were some persons (as we learn from Athenæus)<sup>p</sup> who considered it to be a work of Xenophon; perceiving probably (what is the fact) that it bears much analogy to several conversations which Xenophon has set down. But those who held this opinion are not to be considered as of one mind with critics who reject the dialogue as a forgery or imitation of Plato. Compositions emanating from Xenophon are just as much Sokratic, probably even more Sokratic, than the most unquestioned Platonic dialogues, besides that they must of necessity be contemporary also. Schleiermacher has gone much farther: declaring the Second as well as the First to be an unworthy imitation of Plato.<sup>q</sup>

Here Ast agrees with Schleiermacher fully, including both the First and Second Alkib. in his large list of the spurious. Most of the subsequent critics go with Schleiermacher only half-way: Socher, Hermann, Stallbaum, Steinhart, Susemihl, recognise the First Alkibiadês, but disallow the Second.<sup>r</sup> In my judgment,

Grounds for disallowing them—less strong against the Second than against the First.

<sup>p</sup> Athenæus, xi. p. 506.

<sup>q</sup> See the Einleitung of Schleiermacher to Alkib. i. part ii. vol. iii. p. 293 seq. Einleitung to Alkib. ii. part i. vol. ii. p. 365 seq. His notes on the two dialogues contain various additional

reasons, besides what is urged in his Introduction.

<sup>r</sup> Socher, *Über Platon's Schriften*, p. 112. Stallbaum, *Prolegg. to Alkib. i. and ii. vol. v. pp. 171-304.* K. F. Hermann, *Gesch. und Syst. der Platon.*

Schleiermacher and Ast are more consistently right, or more consistently wrong, in rejecting both, than the other critics who find or make so capital a distinction between the two. The similarity of tone and topics between the two is obvious, and is indeed admitted by all. Moreover, if I were compelled to make a choice, I should say that the grounds for suspicion are rather less strong against the Second than against the First; and that Schleiermacher, reasoning upon the objections admitted by his opponents as conclusive against the Second, would have no difficulty in showing that his own objections against the First were still more forcible. The long speech assigned in the First Alkibiadês to Sokrates, about the privileges of the Spartan and Persian kings,<sup>5</sup> including the mention of Zoroaster, son of Oromazes, and the Magian religion, appears to me more unusual with Plato than anything which I find in the Second Alkibiadês. It is more Xenophontic<sup>6</sup> than Platonic.

But I must here repeat, that because I find, in this or any other dialogue, some peculiarities not usual with Plato, I do not feel warranted thereby in declaring the dialogue spurious. In my judgment, we must look for a large measure of diversity in the various dialogues; and I think it an injudicious novelty, introduced by Schleiermacher, to set up a canonical type of Platonism, all deviations from which are to be rejected as forgeries. Both the First and the Second Alkibiadês appear to me genuine, even upon the showing of those very critics who disallow them. Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and Steinhart, all admit that there is in both the dialogues a considerable proportion of Sokratic and Platonic ideas: but they maintain that there are also other ideas which are not Sokratic

The supposed grounds for disallowance are in reality only marks of inferiority.

Philos. p. 420-439. Steinhart, Einleitungen to Alk. i. and ii. in Hieronymus Müller's Uebersetzung des Platon's Werke, vol. i. pp. 135-509.

<sup>5</sup> Plato, Alkib. i. p. 121-124.

Whoever reads the objections in Steinhart's Einleitung (p. 148-150) against the First Alkibiadês, will see that they are quite as forcible as what

he urges against the Second; only, that in the case of the First, he gives to these objections their legitimate bearing, allowing them to tell against the merit of the dialogue, but not against its authenticity.

<sup>6</sup> See Xenop. (Econom. c. 4; Cyropæd. vii. 5, 58-64, viii. 1, 5-8-45; Laced. Republic, c. 15.

or Platonic, and that the texture, style, and prolixity of the Second Alkibiadês (Schleiermacher maintains this about the First also) are unworthy of Plato. But if we grant these premisses, the reasonable inference would be, not to disallow it altogether, but to admit it as a work by Plato, of inferior merit; perhaps of earlier days, before his powers of composition had attained their maturity. To presume that because Plato composed many excellent dialogues, therefore all that he composed must have been excellent,—is a pretension formally disclaimed by many critics, and asserted by none." Steinhart himself allows that the Second Alkibiadês, though not composed by Plato, is the work of some other author contemporary, an untrained Sokratic disciple attempting to imitate Plato.<sup>3</sup> But we do not know that there were any contemporaries who tried to imitate Plato: though Theopompus accused him of imitating others, and called most of his dialogues useless as well as false: while Plato himself, in his inferior works, will naturally appear like an imitator of his better self.

I agree with Schleiermacher and the other recent critics in considering the First and Second Alkibiadês to be inferior in merit to Plato's best dialogues; and I contend that their own premisses justify no more. They may probably be among his earlier productions, though I do not believe that the First Alkibiadês was composed during the lifetime of Sokrates, as Socher, Stein-

The two dialogues may probably be among Plato's earlier compositions.

<sup>3</sup> Stallbaum (Prolegg. ad Alcib. i. p. 186) makes this general statement very justly, but he as well as other critics are apt to forget it in particular cases.

<sup>3</sup> Steinhart, Einleitung, p. 516-519. Stallbaum and Boeckh indeed assign the dialogue to a later period. Heindorf (ad Lysin, p. 211) thinks it the work "antiqui auctoris, sed non Platonis."

Steinhart and others who disallow the authenticity of the Second Alkibiadês, insist much (p. 518) upon the enormity of the chronological blunder, whereby Sokrates and Alkibiades are introduced as talking about the death of Archelaus king of Macedonia, who

was killed in 399 B.C., in the same year as Sokrates, and four years after Alkibiades. Such an anachronism (Steinhart urges) Plato could never allow himself to commit. But when we read the *Symposion*, we find Aristophanes in a company of which Sokrates, Alkibiades, and Agathon form a part, alluding to the *διοικησις* of Mantinea, which took place in 386 B.C. No one has ever made this glaring anachronism a ground for disallowing the *Symposion*. Steinhart says that the style of the Second Alkibiadês copies Plato too closely (die ängstlich platonisirende Sprache des Dialogs, p. 515), yet he agrees with Stallbaum that in several places it departs too widely from Plato.

hart, and Stallbaum endeavour to show.<sup>7</sup> I have already given my reasons, in a previous chapter, for believing that Plato composed no dialogues at all during the lifetime of Sokrates; still less in that of Alkibiades who died four years earlier. There is certainly nothing in either Alkibiadês I. or II., to shake this belief.

If we compare various colloquies of Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia, we shall find Alkibiadês I. and II. very analogous to them both in purpose and spirit. In Alkibiadês I. the situation conceived is the same as that of Sokrates and Glaukon, in the third book of the Memorabilia. Xenophon recounts how the presumptuous Glaukon, hardly twenty years of age, fancied himself already fit to play a conspicuous part in public affairs, and tried to force himself, in spite of rebuffs and humiliations, upon the notice of the assembly.<sup>8</sup> No remonstrances of friends could deter him, nor could anything, except the ingenious dialectic of Sokrates, convince him of his own impertinent forwardness and exaggerated self-estimation. Probably Plato (Glaukon's elder brother)

Analogy with various dialogues in the Xenophontic Memorabilia — Purpose of Sokrates to humble presumptuous young men.

<sup>7</sup> Stallbaum refers the composition of Alkib. i. to a time not long before the accusation of Sokrates, when the enemies of Sokrates were calumniating him in consequence of his past intimacy with Alkibiades (who had before that time been killed in 404 B.C.) and when Plato was anxious to defend his master (Prolegg. p. 186). Socher and Steinhart (p. 210) remark that such writings would do little good to Sokrates under his accusation. They place the composition of the dialogue earlier, in 406 B.C. (Steinhart, p. 151-152, and they consider it the first exercise of Plato in the strict dialectic method. Both Steinhart and Hermann (Gesch. Plat. Phil. p. 440) think that the dialogue has not only a speculative but a political purpose; to warn and amend Alkibiades, and to prevent him from surrendering himself blindly to the democracy.

I cannot admit the hypothesis that the dialogue was written in 406 B.C. (when Plato was twenty-one years of age, at most twenty-two), nor that it had any intended bearing upon the

real historical Alkibiades, who left Athens in 415 B.C. at the head of the armament against Syracuse, was banished three months afterwards, and never came back to Athens until May 407 B.C. (Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 13, i. 5, 17). He then enjoyed four months of great ascendancy at Athens, left it at the head of the fleet to Asia in Oct. 407 B.C., remained in command of the fleet for about three months or so, then fell into disgrace and retired to Chersonese, never revisiting Athens. In 406 B.C. Alkibiades was again in banishment, out of the reach of all such warnings as Hermann and Steinhart suppose that Plato intended to address to him in Alkib. i.

Steinhart says (p. 152), "In dieser Zeit also, *wenige Jahre nach seiner triumphirenden Rückkehr*, wo Alkibiades," &c. Now Alkibiades left the Athenian service, irrevocably, within less than one year after his triumphant return.

Steinhart has not realised in his mind the historical and chronological conditions of the period.

<sup>8</sup> Xenoph. Memor. iii. 6.

had heard of this conversation, but whether the fact be so or not, we see the same situation idealised by him in Alkibiadès I., and worked out in a way of his own. Again, we find in the Xenophontic Memorabilia another colloquy, wherein Sokrates cross-questions, perplexes, and humiliates, the studious youth Euthydemus,<sup>a</sup> whom he regards as overconfident in his persuasions and too well satisfied with himself. It was among the specialties of Sokrates to humiliate confident young men, with a view to their future improvement. He made his conversation "an instrument of chastisement," in the language of Xenophon: or (to use a phrase of Plato himself in the Lysis) he conceived "that the proper way of talking to youth whom you love, was, not to exalt and puff them up, but to subdue and humiliate them."<sup>b</sup>

If Plato wished to idealise this feature in the character of Sokrates, no name could be more suitable to his purpose than that of Alkibiades: who, having possessed as a youth the greatest personal beauty (to which Sokrates was exquisitely sensible) had become in his mature life distinguished not less for unprincipled ambition and insolence, than for energy and ability. We know the real Alkibiades both from Thucydides and Xenophon, and we also know that Alkibiades had in his youth so far frequented the society of Sokrates as to catch some of that dialectic ingenuity, which the latter was expected and believed to impart.<sup>c</sup> The contrast, as well as the companionship, between Sokrates and Alkibiades was eminently suggestive to the writers of Sokratic dialogues, and nearly all

Fitness of the name and character of Alkibiades for idealising this feature in Sokrates.

<sup>a</sup> Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2.

<sup>b</sup> Xenoph. Mem. i. 4, 1. *σκεψάμενοι μὴ μόνον ἃ ἐκείνος (Sokrates) κολασσηρίου ἔνεκα τοὺς πάντ' οιομένους εἶδέναι ἤλεγχεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἃ λέγων συνδιημέρευε τοῖς συνδιατρίβουσιν, &c.* So in the Platonic Lysis, the youthful Lysis says to Sokrates, "Talk to Menexenus, ἴψ' αὐτὸν κολλάσης" (Plat. Lysis, 211 B. And Sokrates himself says, a few lines before (210 E). *Οὕτω χρὴ τοῖς παιδικοῖς διαλέγεσθαι, ταπεινῶντα καὶ συστέλλοντα, καὶ μὴ, ὥσπερ σὺ, χαννοῦντα καὶ διαθρύπτοντα.*

<sup>c</sup> The sensibility of Sokrates to youthful beauty is as strongly declared in the Xenophontic Memorabilia (i. 3-8-14), as in the Platonic Lysis, Charmides, or Symposium.

The conversation reported by Xenophon between Alkibiades, when not yet twenty years of age, and his guardian Perikles, the first man in Athens—wherein Alkibiades puzzles Perikles by a Sokratic cross-examination—is likely enough to be real, and was probably the fruit of his society with Sokrates (Xen. Memor. i. 2, 40).

of them made use of it, composing dialogues in which Alkibiades was the principal name and figure.<sup>d</sup> It would be surprising indeed if Plato had never done the same: which is what we must suppose, if we adopt Schleiermacher's view, that both Alkibiadês I. and II. are spurious. In the Protagoras as well as in the Symposium, Alkibiades figures; but in neither of them is he the principal person, or titular hero, of the piece. In Alkibiadês I. and II., he is introduced as the solitary respondent to the questions of Sokrates—*κολαστηρίου ἔνεκα*: to receive from Sokrates a lesson of humiliation such as the Xenophontic Sokrates administers to Glaukon and Euthydemus, taking care to address the latter when alone.<sup>e</sup>

I conceive Alkibiadês I. and II. as composed by Plato among his earlier writings (perhaps between 399–390 B.C.)<sup>f</sup> giving an imaginary picture of the way in which “Sokrates

<sup>d</sup> Stallbaum observes (Proleg. ad Alc. i. p. 188), “Cæterum etiam Æschines, Euclides, Phædon, Antisthenes, dialogos *Alcibiadis* nomine inscriptos composuisse narrantur.”

Respecting the dialogues composed by Æschines, see the first note to this chapter.

<sup>e</sup> Xenop. Mem. iv. 2, 8.

<sup>f</sup> The date which I here suppose for the composition of Alkib. i. (*i. e.* after the death of Sokrates, but early in the literary career of Plato), is farther sustained (against those critics who place it in 406 B.C. or 402 B.C. before the death of Sokrates) by the long discourse (p. 121-124) of Sokrates about the Persian and Spartan kings. In reference to the Persian monarchy Sokrates says (p. 123 B), *ἐπεὶ ποτ' ἐγὼ ἤκουσα ἀνδρὸς ἀξιολίστου τῶν ἀναβηγκότων παρὰ βασιλεία, ὃς ἔφη παρελθεῖν χάραν πᾶν πολλὴν καὶ ἀγαθὴν—ἦν καλεῖν τοὺς ἐπιχωρίους ζῶντην τῆς βασιλείας γυναικός, &c.* Olympiodorus and the Scholiast both suppose that Plato here refers to Xenophon and the Anabasis, in which a statement very like this is found (i. 4, 9). It is plain, therefore, that *they* did not consider the dialogue to have been composed before the death of Sokrates. I think it very probable that Plato had in his mind Xenophon (either his Ana-

basis, or personal communications with him); but at any rate visits of Greeks to the Persian court became very numerous between 399-390 B.C., whereas Plato can hardly have seen any such visitors at Athens in 406 B.C. (before the close of the war), nor probably in 402 B.C., when Athens, though relieved from the oligarchy, was still in a state of great public prostration. Between 399 B.C. and the peace of Antalkidas (387 B.C.), visitors from Greece to the interior of Persia became more and more frequent, the Persian kings interfering very actively in Grecian politics. Plato may easily have seen during these years intelligent Greeks who had been up to the Persian court on military or political business. Both the Persian kings and the Spartan kings were then in the maximum of power and ascendancy—it is no wonder therefore that Sokrates should here be made to dwell upon their prodigious dignity in his discourse with Alkibiades. Steinhart (Einl. p. 150) feels the difficulty of reconciling this part of the dialogue with his hypothesis that it was composed in 406 B.C.; yet he and Stallbaum both insist that it *must* have been composed before the death of Sokrates, for which they really produce no grounds at all.

handled every respondent just as he chose" (to use the literal phrase of Xenophon<sup>e</sup>): taming even that most overbearing youth, whom Aristophanes characterises as the lion's whelp.<sup>h</sup> In selecting Alkibiades as the sufferer under such a chastising process, Plato rebuts in his own ideal style that charge which Xenophon answers with prosaic directness—the charge made against Sokrates by his enemies, that he taught political craft without teaching ethical sobriety; and that he had encouraged by his training the lawless propensities of Alkibiades.<sup>i</sup> When Schleiermacher, and others who disallow the dialogue, argue that the inordinate insolence ascribed to Alkibiades, and the submissive deference towards Sokrates also ascribed to him, are incongruous and incompatible attributes,—I reply that such a conjunction is very improbable in any real character. But this does not hinder Plato from combining them in one and the same ideal character, as we shall farther see when we come to the manifestation of Alkibiades in the Symposium: in which dialogue we find a combination of the same elements, still more extravagant and high-coloured. Both here and there we are made to see that Sokrates, far from encouraging Alkibiades, is the only person who ever succeeded in humbling him. Plato attributes to the personality and conversation of Sokrates an influence magical and almost superhuman: which Cicero and Plutarch, proceeding probably upon the evidence of the Platonic dialogues, describe as if it were historical fact. They represent Alkibiades as shedding tears of sorrow and shame, and entreating Sokrates to rescue him from a sense of degradation insupportably painful.<sup>k</sup> Now Xenophon mentions Euthydemus and other young men as having really experienced these profound and distressing emotions.<sup>l</sup>

<sup>e</sup> Xen. Mem. i. 2, 14. τοῖς δὲ διαλεγόμενοις αὐτῷ πᾶσι χρώμενον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὅπως ἐβούλετο.

<sup>h</sup> Aristoph. Ran. 1427. οὐ χρὴ λέοντος σκύμον ἐν πόλει τρέφειν. Thucyd. vi. 15. φοβηθέντες γὰρ αὐτοῦ (Alkib.) οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σώμα παρανομίας ἐς τὴν δίαταν, καὶ τῆς διανοίας ὧν καθ'

ἐν ἑκάστῳ, ἐν ὅτῳ γίγνεται, ἐπρασσεν, ὡς τυραννίδος ἐπιθυμοῦντι πολέμοι καθέστασαν, &c.

<sup>i</sup> Xenoph. Memorab. i. 2, 17.

<sup>k</sup> Cicero, Tusc. Dis. iii. 32; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 4-6. Compare Plato, Alkib. i. p. 127 D, 135 C; Symposium, p. 215-216.

<sup>l</sup> Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2, 39-40.

But he does not at all certify the same about Alkibiades, whose historical career is altogether adverse to the hypothesis. The Platonic picture is an *ideal*, drawn from what may have been actually true about other interlocutors of Sokrates, and calculated to reply to Melêtus and his allies.

Looking at Alkibiadês I. and II. in this point of view, we shall find both of them perfectly Sokratic both in topics and in manner—whatever may be said about unnecessary prolixity and common-place here and there. The leading ideas of Alkibiadês I. may be found, nearly all, in the Platonic Apology. That warfare, which Sokrates proclaims in the Apology as having been the mission of his life, against the false persuasion of knowledge, or against beliefs ethical and æsthetic, firmly entertained without having been preceded by conscious study or subjected to serious examination—is exemplified in Alkibiadês I. and II. as emphatically as in any Platonic composition. In both these dialogues, indeed (especially in the first), we find an excessive repetition of specialising illustrations, often needless and sometimes tiresome: a defect easily intelligible if we assume them to have been written when Plato was still a novice in the art of dialogic composition. But both dialogues are fully impregnated with the spirit of the Sokratic process, exposing, though with exuberant prolixity, the firm and universal belief, held and affirmed by every one even at the age of boyhood, without any assignable grounds or modes of acquisition, and amidst angry discordance between the affirmation of one man and another. The emphasis too with which Sokrates insists upon his own single function of merely questioning, and upon the fact that Alkibiades gives all the answers and pronounces all the self-condemnation with his own mouth<sup>m</sup>—is remarkable in this dialogue: as well as the confidence with which he proclaims the dialogue as affording the only, but effective, cure.<sup>n</sup> The ignorance of which Alkibiades stands unexpectedly convicted, is expressly declared to be common to him with the other Athenian politicians: an exception being

The purpose proclaimed by Sokrates in the Apology is followed out in Alkib. I. Warfare against the false persuasion of knowledge.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Alkib. i. p. 112-113.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Alkib. i. p. 127 E.



half allowed to pass in favour of the semi-philosophical Perikles, whom Plato judges here with less severity than elsewhere<sup>o</sup>—and a decided superiority being claimed for the Spartan and Persian kings, who are extolled as systematically trained from childhood.

The main purpose of Sokrates is to drive Alkibiades into self-contradictions, and to force upon him a painful consciousness of ignorance and mental defect, upon grave and important subjects, while he is yet young enough to amend it. Towards this purpose he is made to lay claim to a divine mission similar to that which the real Sokrates announces in the Apology.<sup>p</sup> A number of perplexing questions and difficulties are accumulated: it is not meant that these difficulties are insoluble, but that they cannot be solved by one who has never seriously reflected on them—by one who (as the Xenophonic Sokrates says to Euthydemus)<sup>q</sup> is so confident of knowing the subject that he has never meditated upon it at all. The disheartened Alkibiades feels the necessity of improving himself and supplicates the assistance of Sokrates:<sup>r</sup> who reminds him that he must first determine what “Himself” is. Here again we find ourselves upon the track of Sokrates in the Platonic Apology, and under the influence of the memorable inscription at Delphi—*Nosce teipsum*. Your mind is yourself: your body is a mere instrument of your mind: your wealth and power are simple appurtenances or adjuncts. To know yourself, which is genuine Sophrosynê or temperance, is to know your mind: but this can only be done by looking into another mind, and into its most intelligent compartment: just as the eye can only see itself by looking into the centre of vision of another eye.<sup>s</sup>

At the same time, when, after having convicted Alkibiades of deplorable ignorance, Sokrates is called upon to prescribe remedies—all distinctness of indication disappears. It is

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Alkib. i. p. 118-120.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Alkib. i. p. 124 C-127 E.

<sup>q</sup> Xenop. Mem. iv. 2, 36. ἄλλα ταῦτα μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἴσως, διὰ τὸ σφόδρα πιστεῦναι εἶδέναι, οὐδ' ἔσκεψαι.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Alkib. p. 128-132 A.

<sup>s</sup> Plato, Alk. i. p. 133.

A Platonic metaphor, illustrating the necessity for two separate minds co-operating in dialectic colloquy.

exacted only when the purpose is to bring difficulties and contradictions to view: it is dispensed with, when the purpose is to solve them. The conclusion is, that assuming happiness as the acknowledged ultimate end,<sup>†</sup> Alkibiades cannot secure this either for himself or for his city, by striving for wealth and power, private or public: he can only secure it by acquiring for himself, and implanting in his countrymen, justice, temperance, and virtue. This is perfectly Sokratic, and conformable to what is said by the real Sokrates in the Platonic Apology. But coming at the close of Alkibiadês I., it presents no meaning and imparts no instruction: because Sokrates had shown in the earlier part of the dialogue, that neither he himself, nor Alkibiades, nor the general public, knew what justice and virtue were. The positive solution which Sokrates professes to give, is therefore illusory. He throws us back upon those old, familiar, emotional, associations, unconscious products and unexamined transmissions from mind to mind—which he had already shown to represent the fancy of knowledge without the reality—deep-seated belief without any assignable intellectual basis, or outward standard of rectitude.

Sokrates furnishes no means of solving these difficulties. He exhorts to Justice and Virtue—but these are acknowledged Incognita.

Throughout the various Platonic dialogues, we find alternately two distinct and opposite methods of handling—the generalising of the special, and the specialising of the general. In Alkibiadês I., the specialising of the general preponderates—as it does in most of the conversations of the Xenophontic Memorabilia: the number of exemplifying particulars is unusually great. Sokrates does not accept as an answer a general term, without illustrating it by several of the specific terms comprehended under it: and this several times on occasions when an instructed reader thinks it superfluous and tiresome: hence, partly, the inclination of some modern critics to disallow the dialogue. But we must recollect that though a modern reader practised in the use of general terms may seize the

Prolixity of Alkibiadês I.—Extreme multiplication of illustrative examples—How explained.

<sup>†</sup> Plat. Alkibiad. i. p. 134.

meaning at once, an Athenian youth of the Platonic age would not be sure of doing the same. No conscious analysis had yet been applied to general terms : no grammar or logic then entered into education. Confident affirmation, without fully knowing the meaning of what is affirmed, is the besetting sin against which Plato here makes war : and his precautions for exposing it are pushed to extreme minuteness. So, too, in the *Sophistês* and *Politikus*, when he wishes to illustrate the process of logical division and subdivision, he applies it to cases so trifling and so multiplied, that Socher is revolted and rejects the dialogues altogether. But Plato himself foresees and replies to the objection ; declaring expressly that his main purpose is, not to expound the particular subject chosen, but to make manifest and familiar the steps and conditions of the general classifying process—and that prolixity cannot be avoided.<sup>u</sup> We must reckon upon a similar purpose in *Alkibiadês I.* The dialogue is a specimen of that which Aristotle calls *Inductive Dialectic*, as distinguished from *Syllogistic* : the *Inductive* he considers to be plainer and easier, suitable when you have an ordinary collocator—the *Syllogistic* is the more cogent, when you are dealing with a practised disputant.<sup>x</sup>

It has been seen that *Alkib. I.*, though professing to give something like a solution, gives what is really no solution at all. *Alkib. II.*, similar in many respects, is here different, inasmuch as it does not even profess to solve the difficulty which had been raised. The general mental defect—false persuasion of knowledge without the reality—is presented in its application to a particular case. *Alkibiades* is obliged to admit that he does not know what he ought to pray to the Gods for : neither what is *good*, to be granted, nor what is *evil*, to be averted. He relies upon *Sokrates* for dispelling this mist from his mind :

*Alkibiadês II.* leaves its problem avowedly undetermined.

<sup>u</sup> Plato, *Politikus*, 285-286.  
<sup>x</sup> Aristotel. *Topic.* i. 104, a. 16. Πόσα τῶν λόγων εἶδη τῶν διαλεκτικῶν —ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν, ἐπαγωγή, τὸ δὲ, συλλογισμός . . . ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐπα-

γωγή, πιθανώτερον καὶ σαφέστερον καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν γνωριμώτερον καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς κοινόν ὃ δὲ συλλογισμός, βιαστικώτερον καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιλογικούς ἐνεργέστερον.

which Sokrates promises to do, but adjourns for another occasion.

Sokrates here ascribes to the Spartans, and to various philosophers, the practice of putting up prayers in undefined language, for good and honourable things generally. He commends that practice. Xenophon tells us that the historical Sokrates observed it:<sup>1</sup> but he tells us also that the historical Sokrates, though not praying for any special presents from the Gods, yet prayed for and believed himself to receive special revelations and advice as to what was good to be done or avoided in particular cases. He held that these special revelations were essential to any tolerable life: that the dispensations of the Gods, though administered upon regular principles on certain subjects and up to a certain point, were kept by them designedly inscrutable beyond that point: but that the Gods would, if properly solicited, afford premonitory warnings to any favoured person, such as would enable him to keep out of the way of evil, and put himself in the way of good. He declared that to consult and obey oracles and prophets was not less a maxim of prudence than a duty of piety: for himself, he was farther privileged through his divine sign or monitor, which he implicitly followed.<sup>2</sup> Such premonitory warnings were the only special favour which he thought it suitable to pray for—besides good things generally. For special presents he did not pray, because he professed not to know whether any of the ordinary objects of desire were good or bad. He proves in his conversation with Euthydêmus, that all those acquisitions which are usually accounted means of happiness—beauty, strength, wealth, reputation, nay, even good health and wisdom—are sometimes good or causes of happiness, sometimes evil or causes of misery; and therefore cannot

Sokrates commends the practice of praying to the Gods for favours undefined—His views about the semi-regular, semi-irregular agency of the Gods—He prays to them for premonitory warnings.

<sup>1</sup> Xenop. Mem. i. 3, 2; Plat. Alk. ii. p. 143-148.

<sup>2</sup> These opinions of Sokrates are announced in various passages of the Xenophontic Memorabilia, i. 1, 1-10—*ἔφη δὲ δεῖν, ἃ μὲν μαθόντας ποιεῖν*

*ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ, μαθάνειν· ἃ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἔστι, πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυθάνεσθαι· τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ, οἷς ἂν ὦσιν ἰλέω, σημαίνειν*—i. 3, 4, i. 4, 2-15, iv. 3, 12, iv. 7, 10, iv. 8, 5-11.

be considered either as absolutely the one or absolutely the other.<sup>a</sup>

This impossibility of determining what is good and what is evil, in consequence of the uncertainty in the dispensations of the Gods and in human affairs—is a doctrine forcibly insisted on by the Xenophontic Sokrates in his discourse with Euthydêmus, and much akin to the Platonic Alkibiadês II., being applied to the special case of prayer. But we must not suppose that Sokrates adheres to this doctrine throughout all the colloquies of the Xenophontic Memorabilia: on the contrary, we find him, in other places, reasoning upon such matters, as health, strength, and wisdom, as if they were decidedly good.<sup>b</sup> The fact is, that the arguments of Sokrates, in the Xenophontic Memorabilia, vary materially according to the occasion and the person with whom he is discoursing: and the case is similar with the Platonic dialogues: illustrating farther the questionable evidence on which Schleiermacher and other critics proceed, when they declare one dialogue to be spurious, because it contains reasoning inconsistent with another.

We find in Alk. II. another doctrine which is also proclaimed by Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia: that the Gods are not moved by costly sacrifice more than by humble sacrifice, according to the circumstances of the offerer: <sup>c</sup> they attend only to the mind of the offerer, whether he be just and wise: that is, “whether he knows what ought to be done both towards Gods and towards men.”<sup>d</sup>

But we find also in Alk. II. another doctrine, more remarkable. Sokrates will not proclaim absolutely that knowledge is good, and that ignorance is evil. In some cases, he contends, ignorance is good; and he discriminates which the cases are. That which we are principally interested in knowing, is, *Good*, or

Remarkable doctrine of Alkibiadês II.—That knowledge is not always Good. The knowledge of Good itself

<sup>a</sup> Xenop. Memor. iv. 2, 31-32-36. Ταῦτα οὐν ποτὲ μὲν ὠφελούντα ποτὲ δὲ βλάπτοντα, τί μᾶλλον ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ εἶσιν:

<sup>b</sup> For example, Xen. Mem. iv. 5-6—

σοφίαν, τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν, &c.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 149-150; Xen. Mem. i. 3. Compare Plato, Legg. x. p. 885; Isokrat. ad Nikok.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Alk. ii. p. 149 E, 150 B.

The *Best*—The *Profitable*:<sup>e</sup> phrases used as equivalent. The knowledge of this is good, and the ignorance of it mischievous, under all supposable circumstances. And if a man knows good, the more he knows of every thing else, the better; since he will be sure to make a good use of his knowledge. But if he does not know good, the knowledge of other things will be hurtful rather than beneficial to him. To be skilful in particular arts and accomplishments, under the capital mental deficiency supposed, will render him an instrument of evil and not of good. The more he knows—and the more he believes himself to know—the more forward will he be in acting, and therefore the greater amount of harm will he do. It is better that he should act as little as possible. Such a man is not fit to direct his own conduct, like a freeman: he must be directed and controlled by others, like a slave. The greater number of mankind are fools of this description—ignorant of good: the wise men who know good, and are fit to direct, are very few. The wise man alone, knowing good, follows reason: the rest trust to opinion without reason.<sup>f</sup> He alone is competent to direct both his own conduct and that of the society.

is indispensable: without that, the knowledge of other things is more hurtful than beneficial.

The stress which is laid here upon the knowledge of good, as distinguished from all other varieties of knowledge—the identification of the good with the profitable, and of the knowledge of good with reason (*νοῦς*), while other varieties of knowledge are ranked with opinion (*δόξα*)—these are points which, under one phraseology or another, pervade many of the Platonic dialogues. The old phrase of Herakleitus—*Πολυμαθίη νόον οὐ διδάσκει*—“much learning does not teach reason”—seems to have been present to the mind of Plato in composing this dialogue. The man of much learning and art, without the knowledge of good, and surrendering himself to the guidance of one or other among his accom-

<sup>e</sup> Plato, *Alk.* ii. p. 145 B. Ὅστις ἢ τοῦ ἀφελίμου—also 146 B.  
 ἄρα τι τῶν τοιούτων οἶδεν, ἐὰν μὲν παρέπηται αὐτῷ ἢ τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμη—αὐτῆ δ' ἢν ἢ αὐτῆ δὴ που ἤπερ καὶ  
<sup>f</sup> Plato, *Alk.* ii. p. 146 A-D. ἄνευ νοῦ δόξῃ πεπιστευκότα.

plishments, is like a vessel tossed about at sea without a pilot.<sup>g</sup>

What Plato here calls the knowledge of Good, or Reason—the just discrimination and comparative appreciation, of Ends and Means—appears in the *Politikus* and *Euthydêmus*, under the title of the Regal or Political Art, of employing or directing<sup>h</sup> the results of all other arts, which are considered as subordinate: in the *Protagoras*, under the title of art of calculation or mensuration: in the *Philêbus*, as measure and proportion: in the *Phædrus* (in regard to rhetoric) as the art of turning to account, for the main purpose of persuasion, all the special processes, stratagems, decorations, &c., imparted by professional masters. In the *Republic*, it is personified in the few venerable Elders who constitute the Reason of the society, and whose directions all the rest (Guardians and Producers) are bound implicitly to follow: the virtue of the subordinates consisting in this implicit obedience. In the *Leges*, it is defined as the complete subjection in the mind, of pleasures and pains to right Reason,<sup>i</sup> without which, no special aptitudes are worth having. In the *Xenophontic Memorabilia*, it stands as a Sokratic authority under the title of *Sophrosynê* or *Temperance*:<sup>k</sup> and the Profitable is declared identical with the Good, as the directing and limiting principle for all human pursuits and proceedings.<sup>l</sup>

But what are we to understand by the *Good*, about which there are so many disputes, according to the acknowledgment of Plato as well as of Sokrates? And what are we to understand by the Profitable? In what relation does it stand to the Pleasurable and the Painful?

These are points which Plato here leaves undetermined. We shall find him again touching them, and trying different

<sup>g</sup> Plato, *Alk.* ii. p. 147 A. ὁ δὲ δὴ τὴν καλουμένην πολυμάθειαν καὶ πολυτεχνίαν κεκτημένους, ὄρφανος δὲ ὦν ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ἀγόμενος δὲ ἐπὶ μίας ἐκάστης τῶν ἄλλων, &c.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, *Politikus*, 292 B, 304 B,

305 A; *Euthydêmus*, 291 B, 292 B. Compare Xenophon, *Œconomicus*, i. 8, 13.

<sup>i</sup> *Leges*, iii. 689 A-D, 691 A.

<sup>k</sup> Xenoph. *Memor.* i. 2, 17, iv. 3 1.

<sup>l</sup> Xenoph. *Memor.* iv. 6, 8, iv. 7. 7.

ways of determining them, in the Protagoras, the Gorgias, the Republic, and elsewhere. We have here the title and the postulate, but nothing more, of a comprehensive Teleology, or right comparative estimate of ends and means one against another, so as to decide when, how far, under what circumstances, &c., each ought to be pursued. We shall see what Plato does in other dialogues to connect this title and postulate with a more definite meaning.



## CHAPTER XI.

## HIPPIAS MAJOR — HIPPIAS MINOR.

**BOTH** these two dialogues are carried on between Sokrates and the Eleian Sophist Hippias. The general conception of Hippias—described as accomplished, eloquent, and successful, yet made to say vain and silly things—is the same in both dialogues: in both also the polemics of Sokrates against him are conducted in a like spirit, of affected deference mingled with insulting sarcasm. Indeed the figure assigned to Hippias is so contemptible, that even an admiring critic like Stallbaum cannot avoid noticing the “petulans pene et proterva in Hippia oratio,” and intimating that Plato has handled Hippias more coarsely than any one else. Such petulance Stallbaum attempts to excuse by saying that the dialogue is a youthful composition of Plato:<sup>a</sup> while Schleier-

Hippias  
Major—Situation supposed  
—Character of the dialogue. Sarcasm and mockery against Hippias.

<sup>a</sup> Stallbaum, Prolegg. in Hipp. Maj. p. 149-150; also Steinhart (Einleitung, p. 42-43), who says, after an outpouring of his usual invective against the Sophist:—“Nevertheless the coarse jesting of the dialogue seems almost to exceed the admissible limit of comic effect,” &c. Again, p. 50, Steinhart talks of the banter which Sokrates carries on with Hippias, in a way not less cruel (grausam) than purposeless, tormenting him with a string of successive new propositions about the definition of the Beautiful, which propositions, as fast as Hippias catches at them he again withdraws of his own accord, and thus at last dismisses him (as he had dismissed Ion) uninstructed and unimproved, without even leaving behind in him the sting of anger, &c.

It requires a powerful hatred against the persons called Sophists, to make a critic take pleasure in a comedy wherein silly and ridiculous speeches are fastened upon the name of one of

them, in his own day not merely honoured but acknowledged as deserving honour by remarkable and varied accomplishments—and to make the critic describe the historical Hippias (whom we only know from Plato and Xenophon—see Steinhart, note 7, p. 89; Socher, p. 221) as if he had really delivered these speeches, or something equally absurd.

How this comedy may be appreciated is doubtless a matter of individual taste. For my part, I agree with Ast in thinking it misplaced and unbecoming; and I am not surprised that he wishes to remove the dialogue from the Platonic canon, though I do not concur either in this inference, or in the general principle on which it proceeds, viz., that all objections against the composition of a dialogue are to be held as being also objections against its genuineness as a work of Plato. The Nubes of Aristophanes, greatly superior as a comedy to the Hippias of Plato,

macher numbers it among the reasons for suspecting the dialogue, and Ast, among the reasons for declaring positively that Plato is not the author.<sup>b</sup> This last conclusion I do not at all accept: nor even the hypothesis of Stallbaum, if it be tendered as an excuse for improprieties of tone: for I believe that the earliest of Plato's dialogues was composed after he was twenty-eight years of age—that is, after the death of Sokrates. It is however noway improbable, that both the Greater and Lesser Hippias may have been among Plato's earlier compositions. We see by the Memorabilia of Xenophon that there was repeated and acrimonious controversy between Sokrates and Hippias: so that we may probably suppose feelings of special dislike, determining Plato to compose two distinct dialogues, in which an imaginary Hippias is mocked and scourged by an imaginary Sokrates.

One considerable point in the Hippias Major appears to have a bearing on the debate between Sokrates and Hippias in the Xenophontic Memorabilia: in which debate, Hippias taunts Sokrates with always combating and deriding the opinions of others, while evading to give opinions of his own. It appears that some antecedent debates between the two had turned upon the definition of the Just, and that on these occasions Hippias had been the respondent, Sokrates the objector. Hippias professes to have reflected upon these debates, and to be now prepared with a definition which neither Sokrates nor any one else can successfully assail, but he will not say what the definition is, until Sokrates has laid down one of his own. In reply to this challenge, Sokrates declares the Just to be equivalent to the Lawful or

Real debate between the historical Sokrates and Hippias in the Xenophontic Memorabilia—Subject of that debate.

is turned to an abusive purpose when critics put it into court as evidence about the character of the real Sokrates.

K. F. Hermann, in my judgment, takes a more rational view of the Hippias Major (Gesch. und Syst. der Plat. Phil. p. 487-647). Instead of expatiating on the glory of Plato in deriding an accomplished contemporary, he dwells upon the logical mistakes and confusion which the dialogue brings to

view; and he reminds us justly of the intellectual condition of the age, when even elementary distinctions in logic and grammar had been scarcely attended to.

Both K. F. Hermann and Socher consider the Hippias to be not a juvenile production of Plato, but to belong to his middle age.

<sup>b</sup> Schleierm. Einleitung, p. 401; Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, p. 457-459.

Customary: he defends this against various objections of Hippias, who concludes by admitting it.<sup>c</sup> Probably this debate, as reported by Xenophon, or something very like it, really took place. If so, we remark with surprise the feebleness of the objections of Hippias, in a case where Sokrates, if he had been the objector, would have found such strong ones—and the feeble replies given by Sokrates, whose talent lay in starting and enforcing difficulties, not in solving them.<sup>d</sup> Among the remarks which Sokrates makes in illustration to Hippias, one is—that Lykurgus had ensured superiority to Sparta by creating in the Spartans a habit of implicit obedience to the laws.<sup>e</sup> Such is the character of the Xenophontic debate.

Here, in the beginning of the Hippias Major, the Platonic Sokrates remarks that Hippias has been long absent from Athens: which absence the latter explains, by saying that he has visited many cities in Greece, giving lectures with great success, and receiving high pay: and that especially he has often visited Sparta, partly to give lectures, but partly also to transact diplomatic business for his countrymen the Eleians, who trusted him more than any one else for such duties. His lectures (he says) were eminently instructive and valuable for the training of youth: moreover they were so generally approved, that even from a small Sicilian town called Inykus, he obtained a considerable sum in fees.

Upon this Sokrates asks—In which of the cities were your gains the largest: probably at Sparta? *Hip.*—No: I received nothing at all at Sparta. *Sokr.*—How? You amaze me! Were not your lectures calculated to improve the Spartan youth? or did not the Spartans desire to have their youth improved? or

Opening of the Hippias Minor—Hippias describes the successful circuit which he had made through Greece, and the renown as well as the gain acquired by his lectures.

Hippias had met with no success at Sparta. Why the Spartans did not admit his instructions. Their law forbids.

<sup>c</sup> Xenoph. Memor. iv. 4-12-25.

<sup>d</sup> Compare the puzzling questions which Alkibiadés when a youth is reported to have addressed to Perikles, and which he must unquestionably have heard from Sokrates himself, respecting the meaning of the word

*Nómos* (Xen. Memor. i. 2, 42). All the difficulties in determining the definition of *Nómos*, occur also in determining that of *Nóμιμον*, which includes both *Jus Scriptum* and *Jus Moribus* Receptum.

<sup>e</sup> Xenoph. Memor. iv. 4, 15.

had they no money? *Hip.*—Neither one nor the other. The Spartans, like others, desire the improvement of their youth; they also have plenty of money: moreover my lectures were very beneficial, to them as well as to the rest.<sup>f</sup> *Sokr.*—How could it happen then, that at Sparta, a city great and eminent for its good laws, your valuable instructions were left unrewarded; while you received so much at the inconsiderable town of Inykus? *Hip.*—It is not the custom of the country, Sokrates, for the Spartans to change their laws, or to educate their sons in a way different from their ordinary routine. *Sokr.*—How say you? It is not the custom of the country for the Spartans to do right, but to do wrong? *Hip.*—I shall not say *that*, Sokrates. *Sokr.*—But surely they would do right, in educating their children better and not worse? *Hip.*—Yes, they would do right: but it is not lawful for them to admit a foreign mode of education. If any one could have obtained payment there for education, I should have obtained a great deal: for they listen to me with delight and applaud me: but, as I told you, their law forbids.

*Sokr.*—Do you call law a hurt or benefit to the city?—*Hip.*—Law is enacted with a view to benefit; but it sometimes hurts, if it be badly enacted.<sup>g</sup> *Sokr.*—But what? Do not the enactors enact it as the maximum of good, without which the citizens cannot live a regulated life? *Hip.*—Certainly: they do so. *Sokr.*—Therefore, when those who try to enact laws miss the attainment of good, they also miss the lawful and law itself. How say you?—*Hip.*—They do so, if you speak with strict propriety: but such is not the language which men commonly use. *Sokr.*—What men? the knowing? or the ignorant? *Hip.*—The Many. *Sokr.*—The Many: is it *they* who know what truth is? *Hip.*—Assuredly not. *Sokr.*—But surely those who do know, account the profitable to be in truth more lawful than the unprofitable, to all men. Don't you admit this? *Hip.*—Yes, I admit they account it

Question,  
What is law?  
The law-  
makers al-  
ways aim at  
the Profit-  
able, but  
sometimes  
fail to attain  
it. When  
they fail,  
they fail to  
attain law.  
The lawful  
is the Profit-  
able: the  
Unprofitable  
is also un-  
lawful.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Hipp. Maj. 283-284.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Hipp. Maj. 284 C-D.

so in truth. *Sokr.*—Well, and it is so, too: the truth *is* as the knowing men account it. *Hip.*—Most certainly. *Sokr.*—Now you affirm, that it is more profitable to the Spartans to be educated according to your scheme, foreign as it is, than according to their own native scheme. *Hip.*—I affirm it, and with truth too. *Sokr.*—You affirm besides, that things more profitable are at the same time more lawful? *Hip.*—I said so. *Sokr.*—According to your reasoning, then, it is more lawful for the Spartan children to be educated by Hippias, and more unlawful for them to be educated by their fathers—if in reality they will be more benefited by you? *Hip.*—But they *will* be more benefited by me. *Sokr.* The Spartans therefore act unlawfully, when they refuse to give you money and to confide to you their sons? *Hip.*—I admit that they do: indeed your reasoning seems to make in my favour, so that I am noway called upon to resist it. *Sokr.*—We find then, after all, that the Spartans are enemies of law, and that too in the most important matters—though they are esteemed the most exemplary followers of law.<sup>h</sup>

Perhaps Plato intended the above argument as a derisory taunt against the Sophist Hippias, for being vain enough to think his own tuition better than that of the Spartan community. If such was his intention, the argument might have been retorted against Plato himself, for his propositions in the Republic and Leges: and we know that the enemies of Plato did taunt him with his inability to get these schemes adopted in any actual community. But the argument becomes interesting when we compare it with the debate before referred to in the Xenophontic Memorabilia, where Sokrates maintains against Hippias that the Just is equivalent to the Lawful. In that Xenophontic dialogue, all the difficulties which embarrass this explanation are kept out of sight, and Sokrates is represented as gaining an easy victory over Hippias. In this Platonic dialogue, the equivocal use of the word νόμιμον

Comparison of the argument of the Platonic Sokrates, with that of the Xenophontic Sokrates.

<sup>h</sup> Plat. Hipp. Maj. 285.

is expressly adverted to, and Sokrates reduces Hippias to a supposed absurdity, by making him pronounce the Spartans to be enemies of law:—*παρανόμους* bearing a double sense, and the proposition being true in one sense, false in the other. In the argument of the Platonic Sokrates, a law which does not attain its intended purpose of benefiting the community, is no law at all,—not lawful:<sup>1</sup> so that we are driven back again upon the objections of Alkibiades against Perikles (in the Xenophontic Memorabilia) in regard to what constitutes a law. In the argument of the Xenophontic Sokrates, law means a law actually established, by official authority or custom—and the Spartans are produced as eminent examples of a lawfully minded community. As far as we can assign positive opinion to the Platonic Sokrates in the Hippias Major, he declares that the profitable or useful (being that which men always aim at in making law), is The Lawful, whether actually established or not: and that the unprofitable or hurtful (being that which men always intend to escape) is The Unlawful, whether prescribed by any living authority or not. This (he says) is the opinion of the wise men who know: though the ignorant vulgar hold the contrary opinion. The explanation of τὸ δίκαιον given by the Xenophontic Sokrates (τὸ δίκαιον = τὸ νόμιμον), would be equivalent, if we construe τὸ νόμιμον in the sense of the Platonic Sokrates (in Hippias Major) to an affirmation that The Just was the generally useful—Τὸ δίκαιον = τὸ κοινῇ σύμφερον.

There exists however in all this, a prevalent confusion between Law (or the Lawful) as actually established—and Law (or the Lawful) as it ought to be established, in the judgment of the critic, or of those whom he follows: that is (to use the phrase of Mr. Austin in his 'Province of Jurisprudence') Law as it would be, if it conformed to its assumed measure or test. In the first of these senses, τὸ νόμιμον is not one and the same, but variable according to place and time—one thing at Sparta, another thing elsewhere: accordingly it

The Just or Good is the beneficial or profitable. This is the only explanation which Plato ever gives—and to this he does not always adhere.

<sup>1</sup> Compare a similar argument of Sokrates against Thrasymachus—Republic, i. 339.

would not satisfy the demand of Plato's mind, when he asks for an explanation of τὸ δίκαιόν. It is an explanation in the second of the two senses which Plato seeks—a common measure or test applicable universally, at all times and places. In so far as he ever finds one, it is that which I have mentioned above as delivered by the Platonic Sokrates in this dialogue: viz., the Just or Good, that which ought to be the measure or test of Law and Positive Morality, is, the beneficial or profitable. This (I repeat) is the only approach to a solution which we ever find in Plato. But this is seldom clearly enunciated, never systematically followed out, and sometimes, in appearance, even denied.

I resume the thread of the Hippias Major. Sokrates asks

Lectures of Hippias at Sparta—not upon geometry, or astronomy, &c., but upon the question—What pursuits are beautiful, fine, and honourable for youth.

Hippias what sort of lectures they were that he delivered with so much success at Sparta? The Spartans (Hippias replies) knew nothing and cared nothing about letters, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy: but they took delight in hearing tales about heroes, early ancestors, foundation-legends of cities, &c., which his mnemonic artifice enabled him to deliver.<sup>k</sup> The Spartans delight in you (observes Sokrates) as children delight in old women's tales. Yes (replies Hippias), but that is not all: I discoursed to them also, recently, about fine and honourable pursuits, much to their admiration: I supposed a conversation between Nestor and Neoptolemus, after the capture of Troy, in which the veteran, answering a question put by his youthful companion, enlarged upon those pursuits which it was fine, honourable, beautiful, for a young man to engage in. My discourse is excellent, and obtained from the Spartans great applause. I am going to deliver it again here at Athens, in the school-room of Pheidostratus; and I invite you, Sokrates, to come and hear it, with as many friends as you can bring.<sup>l</sup>

I shall come willingly (replies Sokrates). But first answer me one small question, which will rescue me from a present

<sup>k</sup> Plat. Hipp. Maj. 285 E.

<sup>l</sup> Plat. Hipp. Maj. 286 A-B.

embarrassment. Just now, I was shamefully puzzled in conversation with a friend, to whom I had been praising some things as honourable and beautiful,—blaming other things as mean and ugly. He surprised me by the interrogation—How do you know, Sokrates, what things are beautiful, and what are ugly? Come now, can you tell me, What is the Beautiful?

Question put by Sokrates, in the name of a friend in the background, who has just been puzzling him with it—  
What is the Beautiful?

I, in my stupidity, was altogether puzzled, and could not answer the question. But after I had parted from him, I became mortified and angry with myself; and I vowed that the next time I met any wise man like you, I would put the question to him, and learn how to answer it; so that I might be able to renew the conversation with my friend. Your coming here is most opportune. I entreat you to answer and explain to me clearly what the Beautiful is; in order that I may not again incur the like mortification. You can easily answer: it is a small matter for you, with your numerous attainments.

Oh—yes—a small matter (replies Hippias); the question is easy to answer. I could teach you to answer many questions harder than that; so that no man shall be able to convict you in dialogue.<sup>m</sup>

Hippias thinks the question easy to answer.

Sokrates then proceeds to interrogate Hippias, in the name of the absentee, starting one difficulty after another as if suggested by this unknown prompter, and pretending to be himself under awe of so impracticable a disputant.

All persons are just, through Justice—wise, through Wisdom—good, through Goodness or the Good—beautiful, through Beauty or the Beautiful. Now Justice, Wisdom, Goodness, Beauty or the Beautiful, must each be *something*. Tell me what the Beautiful is?

Justice, Wisdom, Beauty must each be something. What is Beauty, or the Beautiful?

Hippias does not conceive the question. Does the man want to know, What is a beautiful thing? *Sokr.*—No; he wants to know what is *The Beautiful*. *Hip.*—I do not see the difference. I answer that a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing. No one can deny that.<sup>n</sup>

<sup>m</sup> Plat. Hipp. Maj. 286 C-D.

<sup>n</sup> Plat. Hipp. Maj. 287 A.



*Sokr.*—My disputatious friend will not accept your answer. He wants you to tell him, What is the Self-Beautiful?—that Something through which, or by reason of which, all beautiful things become beautiful. Am I to tell him, it is because a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing? He will say—Is not a beautiful mare, a beautiful thing also? and a beautiful lyre as well? *Hip.*—Yes; both of them are so. *Sokr.*—Ay, and a beautiful pot, my friend will add, well moulded and rounded by a skilful potter, is a beautiful thing too. *Hip.*—How, Sokrates? Who can your disputatious friend be? Some ill-taught man, surely; since he introduces such trivial names into a dignified debate. *Sokr.*—Yes; that is his character: not polite, but vulgar, anxious for nothing else but the truth. *Hip.*—A pot, if it be beautifully made, must certainly be called beautiful; yet still, all such objects are unworthy to be counted as beautiful, if compared with a maiden, a mare, or a lyre.

*Sokr.*—I understand. You follow the analogy suggested by Herakleitus in his dictum—That the most beautiful ape is ugly, if compared with the human race. So you say, the most beautiful pot is ugly, when compared with the race of maidens. *Hip.*—Yes. That is my meaning. *Sokr.*—Then my friend will ask you in return, whether the race of maidens is not as much inferior to the race of Gods, as the pot to the maiden? whether the most beautiful maiden will not appear ugly, when compared to a Goddess? whether the wisest of men will not appear an ape, when compared to the Gods, either in beauty or in wisdom.° *Hip.*—No one can dispute it. *Sokr.*—My friend will smile and say—You forget what was the question put. I asked you, What is the Beautiful?—the Self-Beautiful: and your answer gives me, as the Self-Beautiful, something which you yourself acknowledge to be no more beautiful than ugly? If I had asked you, from the first, what it was that was both beautiful and ugly, your answer would have been pertinent to the question. Can you still think that the Self-Beautiful,

Hippias does not understand the question. He answers by indicating one particularly beautiful object.

Cross-questioning by Sokrates—Other things also are beautiful, but each thing is beautiful only by comparison, or under some particular circumstances: it is sometimes beautiful, sometimes not beautiful.

° Plat. Hipp. Maj. 283.

—that Something, by the presence of which all other things become beautiful,—is a maiden, or a mare, or a lyre ?

*Hip.*—I have another answer to which your friend can take no exception. That, by the presence of which all things become beautiful, is Gold. What was before ugly, will (we all know), when ornamented with gold, appear beautiful. *Sokr.*—You little know what sort of man my friend is. He will laugh at your answer, and ask you—Do you think, then, that Pheidias did not know his profession as a sculptor? How came he not to make the statue of Athênê all gold, instead of making (as he has done) the face, hands, and feet of ivory, and the pupils of the eyes of a particular stone? Is not ivory also beautiful, and particular kinds of stone? *Hip.*—Yes, each is beautiful, where it is becoming. *Sokr.*—And ugly, where it is not becoming.<sup>p</sup> *Hip.*—Doubtless. I admit that what is becoming or suitable, makes that to which it is applied appear beautiful: that which is not becoming or suitable, makes it appear ugly. *Sokr.*—My friend will next ask you, when you are boiling the beautiful pot of which we spoke just now, full of beautiful soup, what sort of ladle will be suitable and becoming—one made of gold, or of fig-tree wood? Will not the golden ladle spoil the soup, and the wooden ladle turn it out good? Is not the wooden ladle, therefore, better than the golden? *Hip.*—By Hêraklês, Sokrates! what a coarse and stupid fellow your friend is! I cannot continue to converse with a man who talks of such matters. *Sokr.*—I am not surprised that you, with your fine attire and lofty reputation, are offended with these low allusions. But I have nothing to spoil by intercourse with this man; and I entreat you to persevere, as a favour to me. He will ask you whether a wooden soup-ladle is not more beautiful than a ladle of gold,—since it is more suitable and becoming? So that though you said—The Self-Beautiful is Gold—you are now obliged to acknowledge that gold is not more beautiful than fig-tree wood?

*Hip.*—I acknowledge that it is so. But I have another

Second answer of Hippias—Gold, is that by the presence of which all things become beautiful. Scrutiny applied to the answer. Complaint by Hippias about vulgar analogies.

<sup>p</sup> Plat. Hipp. Maj. 290.

answer ready which will silence your friend. I presume you wish me to indicate as The Beautiful, something which will never appear ugly to any one, at any time, or at any place.<sup>1</sup> *Sokr.*—That is exactly what I desire. *Hip.*—Well, I affirm, then, that to every man, always, and everywhere, the following is most beautiful. A man being healthy, rich, honoured by the Greeks—having come to old age and buried his own parents well—to be himself buried by his own sons well and magnificently. *Sokr.*—Your answer sounds imposing; but my friend will laugh it to scorn, and will remind me again, that his question pointed to the Beautiful *itself*<sup>2</sup>—something which, being present as attribute in any subject, will make that subject (whether stone, wood, man, God, action, study, &c.) beautiful. Now that which you have asserted to be beautiful to every one everywhere, was not beautiful to Achilles, who accepted by preference the lot of dying before his father—nor is it so to the heroes, or to the sons of Gods, who do not survive or bury their fathers. To some, therefore, what you specify is beautiful—to others, it is not beautiful but ugly: that is, it is both beautiful and ugly, like the maiden, the lyre, the pot, on which we have already remarked. *Hip.*—I did not speak about the Gods or Heroes. Your friend is intolerable, for touching on such profanities.\* *Sokr.*—However, you cannot deny that what you have indicated is beautiful only for the sons of men, and not for the sons of Gods. My friend will thus make good his reproach against your answer. He will tell me, that all the answers, which we have as yet given, are too absurd. And he may perhaps at the same time himself suggest another, as he sometimes does in pity for my embarrassment.

Sokrates then mentions, as coming from hints of the absent friend, three or four different explanations of the Self-Beautiful: each of which, when first introduced, he approves, and Hippias approves also: but each of which he proceeds successively to test and con-

Third answer  
of Hippias—  
questions  
upon it—  
proof given  
that it falls  
of universal  
application.

Farther an-  
swers, sug-  
gested by  
Sokrates  
himself—  
1. The Suit-  
able or Be-

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Hipp. Maj. 291 C-D.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Hipp. Maj. 292 D.

\* Plato, Hipp. Maj. 293 B.

demn. It is to be remarked that all of them are general explanations: not consisting in conspicuous particular instances, like those which had come from Hippias. His explanations are the following:—

coming —  
Objections  
thereunto—  
it is re-  
jected.

1. The suitable or becoming (which had before been glanced at). It is the suitable or becoming which constitutes the Beautiful.<sup>†</sup>

To this Sokrates objects: The suitable, or becoming, is what causes objects to *appear* beautiful—not what causes them to *be really* beautiful. Now the latter is that which we are seeking. The two conditions do not always go together. Those objects, institutions, and pursuits which *are really* beautiful (fine, honourable) very often do not appear so, either to individuals or to cities collectively; so that there is perpetual dispute and fighting on the subject. The suitable or becoming, therefore, as it is certainly what makes objects appear beautiful, so it cannot be what makes them really beautiful.<sup>‡</sup>

2. The useful or profitable.—We call objects beautiful, looking to the purpose which they are calculated or intended to serve: the human body, with a view to running, wrestling, and other exercises—a horse, an ox, a cock, looking to the service required from them—implements, vehicles on land and ships at sea, instruments for music and other arts—all upon the same principle, looking to the end which they accomplish or help to accomplish. Laws and pursuits are characterised in the same way. In each of these, we give the name Beautiful to the useful, in so far as it is useful, when it is useful, and for the purpose to which it is useful. To that which is useless or hurtful, in the same manner, we give the name Ugly.<sup>§</sup>

2. The useful  
or profitable  
—Objections  
—It will not  
hold.

Now that which is capable of accomplishing each end, is useful for such end: that which is incapable, is useless. It is therefore capacity, or power, which is beautiful: incapacity, or impotence, is ugly.<sup>¶</sup>

Most certainly (replies Hippias): this is especially true in

† Plato, Hipp. Maj. 293 E.

‡ Plato, Hipp. Maj. 294 B-E.

§ Plat. Hipp. Maj. 295 C-D.

¶ Plat. Hipp. Maj. 295 E. Οὐκοῦν

τὸ δυνατόν ἕκαστον ἀπεργάζεσθαι, εἰς ὑπερδυνατόν, εἰς τοῦτο καὶ χρῆσιμον· τὸ δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἔχρηστον; . . . Δύναμις μὲν ἄρα, καλόν—ἀδυναμία δὲ, αἰσχρόν;

our cities and communities, wherein political power is the finest thing possible—political impotence, the meanest.

Yet, on closer inspection (continues Sokrates), such a theory will not hold. Power is employed by all men, though unwillingly, for bad purposes: and each man, through such employment of his power, does much more harm than good, beginning with his childhood. Now power, which is useful for the doing of evil, can never be called beautiful.<sup>2</sup>

You cannot therefore say that Power, taken absolutely, is beautiful. You must add the qualification—Power used for the production of some good, is beautiful. This, then, would be the profitable—the cause or generator of good.<sup>3</sup> But the cause is different from its effect:—the generator or father is different from the generated or son. The beautiful would, upon this view, be the cause of the good. But then the beautiful would be different from the good, and the good different from the beautiful? Who can admit this? It is obviously wrong: it is the most ridiculous theory which we have yet hit upon.<sup>b</sup>

3. The Beautiful is a particular variety of the agreeable or pleasurable: that which characterises those things which cause pleasure to us through sight and hearing. Thus the men, the ornaments, the works of painting or sculpture, upon which we look with admiration,<sup>c</sup> are called beautiful: also songs, music, poetry, fable, discourse, in like manner: nay even laws, customs, pursuits, which we consider beautiful, might be brought under the same head.<sup>d</sup>

The objector, however, must now be dealt with. He will ask us—Upon what ground do you make so marked a distinction between the pleasures of sight and hearing, and other pleasures? Do you deny that

Objections to this last—  
What property is there common to

<sup>2</sup> Plat. Hipp. Maj. 296 C-D.

<sup>3</sup> Plat. Hipp. Maj. 297 B.

<sup>b</sup> Plat. Hipp. Maj. 297 D-E. εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐκείνων εἶναι (κινδυνεύει) ἔτι γελαιότερος τῶν πρώτων.

<sup>c</sup> Plat. Hipp. Maj. 298 A-B.

<sup>d</sup> Plat. Hipp. Maj. 298 D.

Professor Bain observes:—"The eye and the ear are the great avenues to the mind for the æsthetic class of in-

fluences. The other senses are more or less in the monopolist interest. But the blue sky, the green wood, and all the beauties of the landscape, can fill the vision of a countless throng of admirers. So with the pleasing sounds, &c." (Bain, 'The Emotions and the Will,' ch. xiv. p. 248. The Æsthetic Emotions.)

these others (those of taste, smell, eating, drinking, sex) are really pleasures? No, surely (we shall reply); we admit them to be pleasures,—but no one will tolerate us in calling them beautiful: especially the pleasures of sex, which as pleasures are the greatest of all, but which are ugly and disgraceful to behold. He will answer—I understand you: you are ashamed to call these pleasures beautiful, because they do not seem so to the multitude: but I did not ask you, what *seems* beautiful to the multitude—I asked you, what *is* beautiful.<sup>e</sup> You mean to affirm, that all pleasures which do not belong to sight and hearing, are not beautiful: Do you mean, all which do not belong to both? or all which do not belong to one or the other? We shall reply—To either one of the two—or to both the two. Well! but, why (he will ask) do you single out these pleasures of sight and hearing, as beautiful exclusively? What is there peculiar in them, which gives them a title to such distinction? All pleasures are alike, so far forth as pleasures, differing only in the more or less. Next, the pleasures of sight cannot be considered as beautiful by reason of their coming through sight—for that reason would not apply to the pleasures of hearing: nor again can the pleasures of hearing be considered as beautiful by reason of their coming through hearing.<sup>f</sup> We must find something possessed as well by sight as by hearing, common to both, and peculiar to them,—which confers beauty upon the pleasures of both and of each. Any attribute of one, which does not also belong to the other, will not be sufficient for our purpose.<sup>g</sup> Beauty must depend upon some essential

both sight and hearing, which confers upon the pleasures of these two senses the exclusive privilege of being beautiful?

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Hipp. Maj. 298 E, 299 A.

Μανθάνω, ἢν ἴσως φαίη, καὶ ἐγὼ, ὅτι πάλαι αἰσχύνεσθε ταύτας τὰς ἡδονὰς φάναί καλὰς εἶναι, ὅτι οὐ δοκεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐ τοῦτο ἡρώτων, ὃ δοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς καλὸν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅ, τι ἔστιν.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Hipp. Maj. 299 D-E.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Hipp. Maj. 300 B. A separate argument between Sokrates and Hippias is here as it were interpolated; Hippias affirms that he does not see how any predicate can be true

of both which is not true of either separately. Sokrates points out that two men are Both—two men are even in number: while each is One, an odd number. You cannot say of the two that they are one, nor can you say of either that he is Both. There are two classes of predicates; some which are true of either but not true of the two together, or *vice versa*; some again which are true of the two and true also of each one—such as just, wise, handsome, &c. p. 301-303 B.

characteristic which both have in common.<sup>h</sup> We must therefore look out for some such characteristic, which belongs to both as well as to each separately.

Now there is one characteristic which may perhaps serve. The pleasures of sight and hearing, both and each, are distinguished from other pleasures by being the most innocuous and the best.<sup>i</sup> It is for this reason that we call them beautiful. The Beautiful, then, is profitable pleasure—or pleasure producing good—for the profitable is, that which produces good.<sup>k</sup> Nevertheless the objector will not be satisfied even with this. He will tell us—You declare the Beautiful to be Pleasure producing good. But we before agreed, that the producing agent or cause, is different from what is produced or the effect. Accordingly, the Beautiful is different from the Good: or, in other words, the Beautiful is not good, nor is the Good beautiful—if each of them is a different thing.<sup>l</sup> Now these propositions we have already pronounced to be inadmissible, so that your present explanation will not stand better than the preceding.

Answer—  
There is, belonging to each and to both in common, the property of being innocuous and profitable pleasures—  
Upon this ground they are called beautiful.

This will not hold—The Profitable is the cause of Good, and is therefore different from Good—  
To say that the Beautiful is the Profitable, is to say that it is different from Good—  
But this has been already declared inadmissible.

Thus finish the three distinct explanations of *Τὸ καλὸν*, which Plato in this dialogue causes to be first suggested by Sokrates, successively accepted by Hippias, and successively refuted by Sokrates. In

Remarks upon the Dialogue—  
The explanations ascribed

<sup>h</sup> Plat. Hipp. Maj. 302 C. *τῆ οὐσία τῆ ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα ἐπομένη φῆμιν, εἴπερ ἀμφοτέρα ἔστι καλὰ, ταύτη δὲ αὐτὰ καλὰ εἶναι, τῆ δὲ κατὰ τὰ ἕτερα ἀπολειπομένη, μή, καὶ ἔτι νῦν οἴομαι.*

<sup>i</sup> Plat. Hipp. Maj. 303 E. *ὅτι ἀσινέσταται αὐται τῶν ἡδονῶν εἰς καὶ βέλτισται, καὶ ἀμφοτέραι καὶ ἑκατέραι.*

<sup>k</sup> Plat. Hipp. Maj. 303 E. *λέγετε δὴ τὸ καλὸν εἶναι, ἡ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ἐλεμὸν.*

<sup>l</sup> Plat. Hipp. Maj. 304 A. *οὐκ οὐκ ὠφέλιμον, φήσει, τὸ ποιοῦν τὰγαθὸν τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ ποιούμενον, ἕτερον νῦν δὴ ἐφάνη, καὶ εἰς τὸν πρότερον λόγον ἡκει ὑμῖν ὁ λόγος· οὐτε γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἂν εἴη καλὸν, οὐτε τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ ἄλλο αὐτῶν ἐκάτερον ἔστιν.*

These last words deserve attention,

because they coincide with the doctrine ascribed to Antisthenes, which has caused so many hard words to be applied to him and Stilpon by critics, from Plato, Aristotle, and Kolotés down to modern times. The general principle here laid down by Plato is—A is something different from B, therefore A is not B and B is not A. In other words A cannot be predicated of B nor B of A. Antisthenes said in like manner—*Ἄνθρωπος* and *Ἄγαθός* are different from each other, therefore you cannot say *Ἄνθρωπος ἔστιν ἀγαθός*. You can only say *Ἄνθρωπος ἔστιν Ἄνθρωπος—Ἄγαθός ἔστιν ἀγαθός*.

I shall touch farther upon this point in my chapter upon Antisthenes and the other *Viri Sokratici*.

comparing them with the three explanations which he puts into the mouth of Hippias, I noted this distinction: That the explanations proposed by Hippias are conspicuous particular exemplifications of the Beautiful, substituted in place of the general concept: as we remarked, in the dialogue Euthyphron, that the explanations of the Holy given by Euthyphron in reply to Sokrates, were of the same exemplifying character. On the contrary, those suggested by Sokrates keep in the region of abstractions, and seek to discover some more general concept, of which the Beautiful is only a derivative or a modification, so as to render a definition of it practicable. To illustrate this difference by the language of Dr. Whewell respecting many of the classifications in Natural History, we may say—That according to the views here represented by Hippias, the group of objects called beautiful is given by Type, not by Definition:<sup>m</sup> while Sokrates proceeds like one convinced that some common characteristic attribute may be found, on which to rest a Definition. To search for Definitions of general words, was (as Aristotle remarks) a novelty, and a valuable novelty, introduced by Sokrates. His contemporaries, the Sophists among them, were not accustomed to it: and here the Sophist Hippias (according to Plato's frequent manner) is derided as talking nonsense,<sup>n</sup> because, when asked for an explanation of The Self-Beautiful, he answers by citing special instances of beautiful objects. But we must remember, first, that Sokrates, who is introduced as trying several general explanations of the Self-Beautiful, does not find one which will stand: next, that even, if one such could be found, particular instances can never be dispensed with, in the way of illustration; lastly, that there are many general terms (the Beautiful being one of them) of which no definitions can be provided, and

to Hippias are special conspicuous examples: those ascribed to Sokrates are attempts to assign some general concept.

<sup>m</sup> See Dr. Whewell's 'History of the Inductive Sciences,' ii. 120 seq.; and Mr. John Stuart Mill's 'System of Logic,' iv. 8, 3.

I shall illustrate this subject farther when I come to the dialogue called

Lysis.

<sup>n</sup> Stallbaum, in his notes, bursts into exclamations of wonder at the incredible stupidity of Hippias—"En stuporem hominis prorsus admirabilem," p. 289 E.



which can only be imperfectly explained, by enumerating a variety of objects to which the term in question is applied.<sup>o</sup> Plato thought himself entitled to objectivise every general term, or to assume a substantive Ens, called a Form or Idea, corresponding to it. This was a logical mistake quite as serious as any which we know to have been committed by Hippias or any other Sophist. The assumption that wherever there is a general term, there must also be a generic attribute corresponding to it—is one which Aristotle takes much pains to negative: he recognises terms of transitional analogy, as well as terms equivocal: while he also especially numbers the Beautiful among equivocal terms.<sup>p</sup>

We read in the Xenophontic Memorabilia a dialogue between Sokrates and Aristippus, on this same subject —What is the Beautiful? which affords a sort of contrast between the Dialogues of Search and those of Exposition. In the Hippias Major, we have seen the

Analogy between the explanations here ascribed to Sokrates, and those given by the

<sup>o</sup> Mr. John Stuart Mill observes in his System of Logic, i. 1, 5, p. 39-40. "One of the chief sources of lax habits of thought is the custom of using connotative terms without a distinctly ascertained connotation, and with no more precise notion of their meaning than can be loosely collected from observing what objects they are used to denote. It is in this manner that we all acquire, and inevitably so, our first knowledge of our vernacular language. A child learns the meaning of Man, White, &c., by hearing them applied to a number of individual objects, and finding out, by a process of generalisation of which he is but imperfectly conscious, what those different objects have in common. In many cases objects bear a general resemblance to each other, which leads to their being familiarly classed together under a common name; while it is not immediately apparent what are the particular attributes, upon the possession of which in common by them all their general resemblance depends. In this manner names creep on from subject to subject, until all traces of a common meaning sometimes disappear, and the word comes to denote a number of things not only independently of any common attribute, but which

have actually no attribute in common, —or none but what is shared by other things to which the name is capriciously refused. It would be well if this degeneracy of language took place only in the hands of the untaught vulgar; but some of the most remarkable instances are to be found in terms of art, and among technically educated persons, such as English lawyers. *Felony*, e. g., is a law-term with the sound of which all are familiar: but there is no lawyer who would undertake to tell what a felony is, otherwise than by enumerating the various offences so called. Originally the word *felony* had a meaning; it denoted all offences, the penalty of which included forfeiture of lands or goods; but subsequent Acts of Parliament have declared various offences to be felonies without enjoining that penalty, and have taken away that penalty from others which continue nevertheless to be called felonies—inso-much that the acts so called have now no property whatever in common, save that of being unlawful and punishable."

<sup>p</sup> Aristot. Topic. i. 106, a. 21. Τὰ πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα — τὰ πλεοναχῶς λεγόμενα—are perpetually noted and distinguished by Aristotle.

problem approached on several different sides—various suggestions being proposed, and each successively disallowed, on reasons shown, as failures: while in the Xenophontic dialogue, Sokrates declares an affirmative doctrine, and stands to it—but no pains are taken to bring out the objections against it and rebut them. The doctrine is, that the Beautiful is coincident with the Good, and that both of them are resolvable into the Useful: thus all beautiful objects, unlike as they may be to the eye or touch, bear that name because they have in common the attribute of conducing to one and the same purpose—the security, advantage, or gratification, of man, in some form or other. Now this is one of the three explanations broached by the Platonic Sokrates, and afterwards refuted by himself, in the Hippias: while his declaration (which Hippias puts aside as unseemly)—that a pot and a wooden soup-ladle conveniently made are beautiful—is perfectly in harmony with that of the Xenophontic Sokrates, that a basket for carrying dung is beautiful, if it performs its work well.<sup>4</sup> We must moreover remark, that the objections whereby the Platonic Sokrates, after proposing the doctrine and saying much in its favour, finds himself compelled at last to disallow it—these objections are not produced and refuted, but passed over without notice, in the Xenophontic dialogue, wherein Sokrates affirms it decidedly.<sup>5</sup> The affirming So-

Xenophontic  
Sokrates  
in the Me-  
morabilia.

<sup>4</sup> Xenoph. Memor. iii. 6, 2-7, iv. 6, 8. Plato, Hipp. Maj. 288 D, 290 D.

I am obliged to translate the words τὸ Καλόν by the Beautiful or beauty, to avoid a tiresome periphrasis. But in reality the Greek words include more besides; they mean also the *fine*, the *honourable* or *that which is worthy of honour*, the *exalted*, &c. If we have difficulty in finding any common property connoted by the English word, the difficulty in the case of the Greek word is still greater.

<sup>5</sup> In regard to the question, Wherein consists τὸ Καλόν? and to objections against the theory of the Xenophontic Sokrates—it is worth while to compare the views of modern philosophers. Dugald Stewart says (on the Beautiful, 'Philosophical Essays,' p. 214 seq.), "It has long been a favourite problem

with philosophers to ascertain the common quality or qualities which entitle a thing to the denomination of Beautiful. But the success of their speculations has been so inconsiderable, that little can be inferred from them except the impossibility of the problem to which they have been directed. The speculations which have given occasion to these remarks have evidently originated in a prejudice which has descended to modern times from the scholastic ages—That when a word admits of a variety of significations, these different significations must all be species of the same genus, and must consequently include some essential idea common to every individual to which the generic term can be applied. Of this principle, which has been an abundant source of obscurity

krates, and the objecting Sokrates, are not on the stage at once.

The concluding observations of this dialogue, interchanged between Hippias and Sokrates, are interesting as bringing out the antithesis between rhetoric and dialectic—between the concrete and exemplifying, as contrasted with the abstract and analytical. Immediately after Sokrates has brought his own third suggestion to an inextricable embarrassment, Hippias remarks—

“ Well, Sokrates, what do you think now of all these reasonings of yours? They are what I declared them to be just now,—scrapings and parings of discourse, divided into minute fragments. But the really beautiful and precious acquirement is, to be able

Concluding  
through ex-  
changed be-  
tween Hip-  
pias and  
Sokrates.

and mystery in the different sciences, it would be easy to expose the unsoundness and futility. Sokrates, whose plain good sense appears, on this as on other occasions, to have fortified his understanding to a wonderful degree against the metaphysical subtleties which misled his successors—was evidently apprised fully of the justice of the foregoing remarks, if any reliance can be placed on the account given by Xenophon of his conversation with Aristippus about the Good and the Beautiful,” &c.

Stewart then proceeds to translate a portion of the Xenophontic dialogue (Memorab. iii. 8). But unfortunately he does not translate the whole of it. If he had, he would have seen that he has misconceived the opinion of Sokrates, who maintains the very doctrine here disallowed by Stewart. Sokrates holds, That there is an essential idea common to all beautiful objects, viz. : the fact of being conducive to human security, comfort, or enjoyment. This is unquestionably an important common property, though the multifarious objects which possess it may be unlike in all other respects.

As to the general theory, I think that Stewart is right. It is his compliment to Sokrates, on this occasion, which I consider misplaced. He certainly would not have agreed with Sokrates (nor should I agree with him) in calling by the epithet *beautiful* a basket for carrying dung when well

made for its own purpose—or a convenient boiling pot—or a soup-ladle made of fig-tree wood—as the Platonic Sokrates affirms in the Hippias (288 D, 290 D). The Beautiful and the Useful sometimes coincide; more often, or at least very often, they do not. Hippias is made to protest, in this dialogue, against the mention of such vulgar objects as the pot and the ladle; and this is apparently intended by Plato as a defective point in his character, denoting silly affectation and conceit, like his fine apparel. But Dugald Stewart would have agreed in the sentiment ascribed to Hippias—that vulgar and mean objects have no place in an inquiry into the Beautiful; and that they belong, when well-formed for their respective purposes, to the category of the Useful.

The Xenophontic Sokrates in the Memorabilia is mistaken in confounding the Beautiful with the Good and the Useful. But his remarks are valuable in another point of view, as they insist most forcibly on the essential relativity both of the Beautiful and the Good.

The doctrine of Dugald Stewart is supported by Mr. John Stuart Mill ('System of Logic,' iv. 4, 5, p. 220 seq.); and Professor Bain has expounded the whole subject still more fully in a chapter (xiv. p. 247 seq., on the *Æsthetic Emotions*) of his work on the Emotions and the Will.

to set out well and finely a regular discourse before the Dikastery or the public assembly, to persuade your auditors, and to depart carrying with you not the least but the greatest of all prizes—safety for yourself, your property, and your friends. These are the real objects to strive for. Leave off your petty cavils, that you may not look like an extreme simpleton, handling silly trifles as you do at present.”<sup>s</sup>

“My dear Hippias,” (replies Sokrates) “you are a happy man; since you know what pursuits a man ought to follow, and have yourself followed them, as you say, with good success. But I, as it seems, am under the grasp of an unaccountable fortune: for I am always fluctuating and puzzling myself, and when I lay my puzzle before you wise men, I am requited by you with hard words. I am told just what you have now been telling me, that I busy myself about matters silly, petty, and worthless. When on the contrary, overborne by your authority, I declare as you do, that it is the finest thing possible to be able to set out well and beautifully a regular discourse before the public assembly, and bring it to successful conclusion—then there are other men at hand who heap upon me bitter reproaches: especially that one man, my nearest kinsman and inmate, who never omits to condemn me. When on my return home he hears me repeat what you have told me, he asks, if I am not ashamed of my impudence in talking about beautiful (honourable) pursuits, when I am so manifestly convicted upon this subject, of not even knowing what the Beautiful (Honourable) is. How can you (he says), being ignorant what the Beautiful is, know *who* has set out a discourse beautifully and *who* has not—*who* has performed a beautiful exploit and *who* has not? Since you are in a condition so disgraceful, can you think life better for you than death? Such then is my fate—to hear disparagement and reproaches from you on the one side, and from him on the other. Necessity however perhaps requires that I should endure all these discomforts: for it will be nothing strange if I profit by them. Indeed I think that I have already profited both by your society, Hip-

<sup>s</sup> Plat. Hipp. Maj. 304 A.

pias, and by his: for I now think that I know what the proverb means—Beautiful (Honourable) things are difficult.”<sup>†</sup>

Here is a suitable termination for one of the Dialogues of Rhetoric against Dialectic. Search: “My mind has been embarrassed by contradictions as yet unreconciled: but this is a stage indispensable to future improvement.” We have moreover an interesting passage of arms between Rhetoric and Dialectic: two contemporaneous and contending agencies, among the stirring minds of Athens, in the time of Plato and Isokrates. The Rhetor accuses the Dialectician of departing from the conditions of reality—of breaking up the integrity of those concretes, which occur in nature each as continuous and indivisible wholes. Each of the analogous particular cases forms a continuum or concrete by itself, which may be compared with the others, but cannot be taken to pieces, and studied in separate fragments.” The Dialectician on his side treats the Abstract (τὸ καλὸν) as the real Integer, and the highest abstraction as the first of all integers, containing in itself and capable of evolving all the subordinate integers: the various accompaniments, which go along with each Abstract to make up a concrete, he disregards as shadowy and transient disguises.

Hippias accuses Sokrates of never taking into his view Wholes, and of confining his attention to separate parts and fragments, obtained by logical analysis and subdivision. Aristophanes, when he attacks the Dialectic of Sokrates, takes the same ground, employing numerous comic metaphors to illustrate the small and impalpable fragments handled, and the subtle transpositions which they underwent in the reasoning. Isokrates again deprecates the over-subtlety of dialectic debate,

Men who dealt with real life, contrasted with the speculative and analytical philosophers.

<sup>†</sup> Plat. Hipp. Maj. 304 D-E.  
<sup>u</sup> Plat. Hipp. Maj. 301 B. Ἄλλὰ γὰρ δὴ σὺ, ὦ Σώκρηντες, τὰ μὲν ὅλα τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ σκοπεῖς, οὐδ' ἐκείνοι, οἷς σὺ εἰώθης διαλέγεσθαι· κρούετε δὲ ἀπολαμβάνοντες τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κατατέμνοντες· διὰ ταῦτα οὕτω μέγαρα λανθάνει ὑμῶς

καὶ διανεκῆ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας πεφυκότα. Compare 301 E.

The words διανεκῆ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας πεφυκότα, correspond as nearly as can be to the logical term *Concrete*, opposed to *Abstract*. Nature furnishes only *Concreta*, not *Abstracta*.

contrasting it with discussions (in his opinion) more useful ; wherein entire situations, each with its full clothing and assemblage of circumstances, were reviewed and estimated.\* All these are protests—by persons accustomed to deal with real life, and to talk to auditors both numerous and commonplace—against that conscious analysis and close attention to general and abstract terms, which Sokrates first insisted on and transmitted to his disciples. On the other side, we have the emphatic declaration made by the Platonic Sokrates (and made still earlier by the Xenophontic<sup>y</sup> or historical Sokrates) —That a man was not fit to talk about beautiful things in the concrete—that he had no right to affirm or deny such an attribute, with respect to any given subject—that he was not even fit to live—unless he could explain what was meant by The Beautiful, or Beauty in the abstract. Here are two distinct and conflicting intellectual habits ; the antithesis between which, indicated in this dialogue, is described at large and forcibly in the Theætétus.<sup>z</sup>

When Hippias accuses Sokrates of neglecting to notice Wholes or Aggregates, this is true in the sense of Concrete Wholes—the phenomenal sequences and co-existences, perceived by sense or imagined. But the Universal (as Aristotle says)<sup>a</sup> is one kind of Whole : a Logical Whole, having logical parts. In the minds of Sokrates and Plato, the Logical Whole, separable into its logical parts and into them only, was preponderant.

Concrete Aggregates—Abstract or logical Aggregates. Distinct aptitudes required by Aristotle for the Dialectician.

\* Aristophan. Nubes, 130. *λόγων ἀκριβῶν σχινδαλίμους—παιπάλη*. Nub. 261. Aves. 430. *λεπτοτάτων λήρων ιερῶ*. Nub. 357. *γνώμαις λεπταῖς*. Nub. 1386. *σκαριφισμοῖσι λήρων*. Ran. 1493. *σμιλέματα*—id. 819. Isokrates, Πρὸς Νικόκλεα, s. 69, antithesis of the *λόγοι πολιτικοί* and *λόγοι ἐριστικοί—μάλιστα μὲν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καιρῶν θεωρεῖν συμβουλευόντας, εἰ δὲ μὴ, καθ' ἕλων τῶν πραγμάτων λέγοντας*—which is almost exactly the phrase ascribed to Hippias by Plato in this Hippias Major. Also Isokrates, Contra Sophistas, s. 24-25, where he contrasts the useless *λογίδια*, debated

by the contentious dialecticians (Sokrates and Plato being probably included in this designation), with his own *λόγοι πολιτικοί*. Compare also Isokrates, Or. xv. De Permutatione, s. 211-213-285-287, and Isokr. Nikoklés, s. 67.

<sup>y</sup> Xen. Mem. i. 1, 16.

<sup>z</sup> Plato, Theætét. pp. 173-174-175.

<sup>a</sup> Aristot. Physic. i. 1. *τὸ γὰρ ἕλον κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν γνωριμώτερον, τὸ δὲ καθόλου ἕλον τί ἐστίν· πολλὰ γὰρ περιλαμβάνει ὡς μέρη τὸ καθόλου*. Compare Simplicius, Schol. Brandis ad loc. p. 324, a. 10-26.

One other point deserves peculiar notice, in the dialogue under our review. The problem started is, What is the Beautiful—the Self-Beautiful, or Beauty *per se*: and it is assumed that this must be Something<sup>b</sup>—that from the accession of which, each particular beautiful thing becomes beautiful. But Sokrates presently comes to make a distinction between that which is really beautiful and that which appears to be beautiful. Some things (he says) appear beautiful, but are not so in reality: some are beautiful, but do not appear so. The problem, as he states it, is, to find, not what it is that makes objects *appear* beautiful, but what it is that makes them *really* beautiful. This distinction, as we find it in the language of Hippias, is one of degree only:<sup>c</sup> that *is* beautiful, which appears so to every one and at all times. But in the language of Sokrates, the distinction is radical: to *be* beautiful is one thing, to *appear* beautiful is another: whatever makes a thing appear beautiful without being so in reality, is a mere engine of deceit, and not what Sokrates is enquiring for.<sup>d</sup> The Self-Beautiful or real Beauty is so, whether any one perceives it to be beautiful or not: it is an Absolute, which exists *per se*, having no relation to any sentient or percipient subject.<sup>e</sup> At any rate, such is the manner in which Plato conceives it, when he starts here as a problem to enquire, What it is.

Herein we note one of the material points of disagreement between Plato and his master: for Sokrates (in the Xeno-

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Hipp. Maj. 286 E. *αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ἢ, τι ἔστιν*; 287 D, 289 D.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Hipp. Maj. 291 D, 292 E.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Hipp. Maj. 294 A-B, 299 A.

<sup>e</sup> Dr. Hutcheson, in his inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, observes (sect. i. and ii. p. 14-16):—

“Beauty is either original or comparative, or, if any like the terms better, absolute or relative; only let it be observed, that by *absolute* or *original*, is not understood any quality supposed to be in the object, which should of itself be beautiful, without relation to any mind which perceives

it. For Beauty, like other names of sensible ideas, properly denotes the perception of some mind. . . . Our inquiry is only about the qualities which are beautiful to men, or about the foundation of their sense of beauty, for (as above hinted) Beauty has always relation to the sense of some mind; and when we afterwards show how generally the objects that occur to us are beautiful, we mean that such objects are agreeable to the sense of men, &c.”

The same is repeated, sect. iv. p. 40, sect. vi. p. 72.

phonic Memorabilia) affirms distinctly that beauty is altogether relative to human wants and appreciations. The Real and Absolute, on the one hand, wherein alone reside truth and beauty—as against the phenomenal and relative, on the other hand, the world of illusion and meanness—this is an antithesis which we shall find often reproduced in Plato. I shall take it up more at large, when I come to discuss his argument against Protagoras in the Theatêtus.

I now come to the Lesser Hippias: in which (as we have already seen in the Greater) that Sophist is described by epithets, affirming varied and extensive accomplishments, as master of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, poetry (especially that of Homer), legendary lore, music, metrical and rhythmical diversities, &c. His memory was prodigious, and he had even invented for himself a technical scheme for assisting memory. He had composed poems, epic, lyric, and tragic, as well as many works in prose: he was, besides, a splendid lecturer on ethical and political subjects, and professed to answer any question which might be asked. Furthermore, he was skilful in many kinds of manual dexterity: having woven his own garments, plaited his own girdle, made his own shoes, engraved his own seal-ring, and fabricated for himself a curry-comb and oil-flask.<sup>f</sup> Lastly, he is described as wearing fine and showy apparel. What he is made to say is rather in harmony with this last point of character, than with the preceding. He talks with silliness and presumption, so as to invite and excuse the derisory sting of Sokrates. There is a third interlocutor, Eudikus: but he says very little, and other auditors are alluded to generally, who say nothing.<sup>g</sup>

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Hipp. Minor, 368.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Hipp. Minor, 369 D, 373 B.

Ast rejects both the dialogues called by the name of Hippias, as not composed by Plato. Schleiermacher doubts about both, and rejects the Hippias Minor (which he considers as perhaps worked up by a Platonic scholar from a genuine sketch by Plato himself) but

will not pass the same sentence upon the Hippias Major (Schleierm. Einleit. vol. ii. pp. 293-296, vol. v. 399-403. Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften. pp. 457-464).

Stallbaum defends both the dialogues as genuine works of Plato, and in my judgment with good reason (Prolegg. ad Hipp. Maj. vol. iv. pp. 145-150



In the *Hippias Minor*, that Sophist appears as having just concluded a lecture upon Homer, in which he had extolled Achilles as better than Odysseus: Achilles being depicted as veracious and straightforward, Odysseus as mendacious and full of tricks. Sokrates, who had been among the auditors, cross-examines Hippias upon the subject of this affirmation.

Homer (says Hippias) considers veracious men, and mendacious men, to be not merely different, but opposite: and I agree with him. Permit me (Sokrates remarks) to ask some questions about the meaning of this from you, since I cannot ask any from Homer himself. You will answer both for yourself and him.<sup>h</sup>

Hippias has just delivered a lecture, in which he extols Achilles as better than Odysseus—the veracious and straightforward here, better than the mendacious and crafty.

ad Hipp. Minor, pp. 227-235). Steinhart (Einleit. p. 99) and Socher (Ueber Platon, p. 144 seq., 215 seq.) maintain the same opinion on these dialogues as Stallbaum. It is to be remarked that Schleiermacher states the reasons both for and against the genuineness of the dialogues; and I think that even in his own statement the reasons for preponderate. The reasons which both Schleiermacher and Ast produce as proving the spuriousness, are in my view quite insufficient to sustain their conclusion. There is bad taste, sophistry, an overdose of banter and derision (they say very truly), in the part assigned to Sokrates; there are also differences of view, as compared with Sokrates in other dialogues; various other affirmations (they tell us) are *not* Platonic. I admit much of this, but I still do not accept their conclusion. These critics cannot bear to admit any Platonic work as genuine unless it affords to them ground for superlative admiration and glorification of the author. This postulate I altogether contest; and I think that differences of view, as between Sokrates in one dialogue and Sokrates in another, are both naturally to be expected and actually manifested (witness the *Protagoras* and *Gorgias*). Moreover Ast designates (p. 404) a doctrine as “*durchaus unsokratisch*” which Stallbaum justly remarks (p. 233) to have been actually affirmed by Sokrates in the *Xenophontic Memorabilia*. Stall-

baum thinks that both the two dialogues (Socher, that the *Hippias Minor* only) were composed by Plato among his earlier works, and this may probably be true. The citation and refutation of the *Hippias Minor* by Aristotle (*Metaphys.* Δ. 1025, a. 6) counts with me as a strong corroborative proof that the dialogue is Plato's work. Schleiermacher and Ast set this evidence aside because Aristotle does not name Plato as the author. But if the dialogue had been composed by any one less celebrated than Plato, Aristotle would have named the author. Mention by Aristotle, though without Plato's name, is of greater value to support the genuineness than the purely internal grounds stated by Ast and Schleiermacher against it.

<sup>h</sup> Plat. Hipp. Minor, 365 C-D.

The remark here made by Sokrates —“The poet is not here to answer for himself, so that you cannot put any questions to him”—is a point of view familiar to Plato: insisted upon forcibly in the *Protagoras* (347 E), and farther generalised in the *Phædrus*, so as to apply to all written matter compared with personal converse (*Phædrus*, p. 275 D).

This ought to count, so far as it goes, as a fragment of proof that the *Hippias Minor* is a genuine work of Plato, instead of which Schleiermacher treats it (p. 295) as evincing a poor copy, made by some imitator of Plato, from the *Protagoras*.

Mendacious men (answers Hippias, to a string of questions, somewhat prolix) are capable, intelligent, wise : they are not incapable or ignorant. If a man be incapable of speaking falsely, or ignorant, he is not mendacious. Now the capable man is one who can make sure of doing what he wishes to do, at the time and occasion when he does wish it, without let or hindrance.<sup>1</sup>

You, Hippias (says Sokrates), are expert on matters of arithmetic : you can make sure of answering truly any question put to you on the subject. You are *better* on the subject than the ignorant man, who cannot make sure of doing the same. But as you can make sure of answering truly, so likewise you can make sure of answering falsely, whenever you choose to do so. Now the ignorant man cannot make sure of answering falsely. He may, by reason of his ignorance, when he wishes to answer falsely, answer truly without intending it. You, therefore, the intelligent man and the good in arithmetic, are better than the ignorant and the bad for both purposes—for speaking falsely, and for speaking truly.<sup>k</sup>

This is contested by Sokrates. The veracious man and the mendacious man are one and the same. The only man who can answer truly if he chooses, is he who can also answer falsely if he chooses—*i. e.* the knowing man. The ignorant man cannot make sure of doing either one or the other.

What is true about arithmetic, is true in other departments also. The only man who can speak falsely whenever he chooses, is the man who can speak truly whenever he chooses. Now, the mendacious man, as we agreed, is the man who can speak falsely whenever he chooses. Accordingly, the mendacious man, and the veracious man, are the same. They are not different, still less opposite:—nay, the two epithets belong only to one and the same person. The veracious man is not better than the mendacious—seeing that he is one and the same.<sup>1</sup>

Analogy of special arts—It is only the arithmetician who can speak falsely on a question of arithmetic when he chooses.

<sup>i</sup> Plat. Hipp. Minor, 366 B-C.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Hippias Minor, 366 E. Πότερον σὺ ἂν μάλιστα ψεύδοιο καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ψευδῆ λέγοις περὶ τούτων, βουλόμενος ψεύδεσθαι καὶ μηδέποτε ἀληθῆ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ; ἢ ὁ ἀμαθὴς εἰς λογισμοὺς δύναται ἂν σοῦ μᾶλλον ψεύδεσθαι βουλομένου ; ἢ ὁ μὲν ἀμαθὴς πολ-

λάκις ἂν βουλόμενος ψευδῆ λέγειν, τᾶληθῆ ἂν εἴποι ἄκων, εἰ τύχοι, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι—σὺ δὲ ὁ σοφὸς, εἴπερ βούλοιο ψεύδεσθαι, ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ψεύδοιο ;

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Hipp. Minor, 367 C, 368 E, 369 A-B.

You see, therefore, Hippias, that the distinction which you drew and which you said that Homer drew, between Achilles and Odysseus, will not hold. You called Achilles veracious, and Odysseus veracious: but if one of the two epithets belongs to either of them, the other must belong to him also.<sup>m</sup>

Sokrates then tries to make out that Achilles speaks falsehood in the Iliad, and speaks it very cleverly, because he does so in a way to escape detection from Odysseus himself. To this Hippias replies, that if Achilles ever speaks falsehood, he does it innocently, without any purpose of cheating or injuring any one; whereas the falsehoods of Odysseus are delivered with fraudulent and wicked intent.<sup>n</sup> It is impossible (he contends) that men who deceive and do wrong wilfully and intentionally, should be better than those who do so unwillingly and without design. The laws deal much more severely with the former than with the latter.<sup>o</sup>

Upon this point, Hippias (says Sokrates), I dissent from you entirely. I am, unhappily, a stupid person, who cannot find out the reality of things: and this appears plainly enough when I come to talk with wise men like you, for I always find myself differing from you. My only salvation consists in my earnest anxiety to put questions and learn from you, and in my gratitude for your answers and teaching. I think that those who hurt mankind, or cheat, or lie, or do wrong, *wilfully*—are better than those who do the same *unwillingly*. Sometimes, indeed, from my stupidity, the opposite view presents itself to me, and I become confused. But now, after talking with you, the fit of confidence has come round upon me again—to pronounce and characterise the persons who do wrong *unwillingly*, as worse than those who do wrong *wilfully*. I entreat you to heal this disorder of my mind. You will do me much more good than if you cured my body of a distemper. But it will be useless for

View of Sokrates respecting Achilles in the Iliad. He thinks that Achilles speaks falsehood cleverly. Hippias maintains that if Achilles ever speaks falsehood, it is with an innocent purpose, whereas Odysseus does the like with fraudulent purpose.

Issue here taken. Sokrates contends that those who hurt, or cheat, or lie wilfully, are better than those who do the like unwillingly. He entreats Hippias to enlighten him and answer his questions.

<sup>m</sup> Plat. Hipp. Minor, 369 B.

<sup>n</sup> Plat. Hipp. Minor, 370 E.

<sup>o</sup> Plat. Hipp. Minor, 372 A.

you to give me one of your long discourses: for I warn you that I cannot follow it. The only way to confer upon me real service, will be to answer my questions again, as you have hitherto done. Assist me, Eudikus, in persuading Hippias to do so.

Assistance from me (says Eudikus) will hardly be needed, for Hippias professed himself ready to answer any man's questions.

Yes—I did so (replies Hippias)—but Sokrates always brings trouble into the debate, and proceeds like one disposed to do mischief.

Eudikus repeats his request, and Hippias, in deference to him, consents to resume the task of answering.<sup>p</sup>

Sokrates then produces a string of questions, with a view to show that those who do wrong wilfully, are better than those who do wrong unwillingly. He appeals to various analogies. In running, the good runner is he who runs quickly, the bad runner is he who runs slowly. What is evil and base in running, is, to run slowly. It is the good runner who does this evil wilfully: it is the bad runner who does it unwillingly.<sup>q</sup> The like is true about wrestling and other bodily exercises. He that is good in the body, can work either strongly or feebly,—can do either what is honourable or what is base; so that when he does what is base, he does it wilfully. But he that is bad in the body does what is base unwillingly, not being able to help it.<sup>r</sup>

Questions of Sokrates—multiplied analogies of the special arts. The unskillful artist, who runs, wrestles, or sings badly, whether he will or not, is worse than the skilful, who can sing well when he chooses, but can also sing badly when he chooses.

What is true about the bodily movements depending upon strength, is not less true about those depending on grace and elegance. To be wilfully ungraceful, belongs only to the well-constituted body: none but the badly-constituted body is ungraceful without wishing it. The same also, about the feet, voice, eyes, ears, nose: of these organs, those which act badly through will and intention, are preferable to those which act badly without will or intention. Lameness of feet is a misfortune and disgrace: feet which go lame only by intention are much to be preferred.<sup>s</sup>

<sup>p</sup> Plat. Hipp. Min. 373 B.

<sup>q</sup> Plat. Hipp. Min. 373 D-E.

<sup>r</sup> Plat. Hipp. Min. 374 B.

<sup>s</sup> Plat. Hipp. Min. 374 C-D.

Again, in the instruments which we use, a rudder or a bow,—or the animals about us, horses or dogs,—those are better, with which we work badly when we choose; those are worse, with which we work badly without design, and contrary to our own wishes.

It is better to have the mind of a bowman who misses his mark by design, than that of one who misses when he tries to hit. The like about all other arts—the physician, the harper, the flute-player. In each of these artists, *that* mind is better, which goes wrong wilfully—*that* mind is worse, which goes wrong unwillingly, while wishing to go right. In regard to the minds of our slaves, we should all prefer those which go wrong only when they choose, to those which go wrong without their own choice.<sup>t</sup>

Having carried his examination through this string of analogous particulars, and having obtained from Hippias successive answers—“Yes—true in that particular case,” Sokrates proceeds to sum up the result :

*Sokr.*—Well! should we not wish to have our own minds as good as possible? *Hip.*—Yes. *Sokr.*—We have seen that they will be better if they do mischief and go wrong wilfully, than if they do so unwillingly? *Hip.*—But it will be dreadful, Sokrates, if the willing wrong-doers are to pass for better men than the unwilling.

*Sokr.*—Nevertheless—it seems so:—from what we have said: *Hip.*—It does not seem so to me. *Sokr.*—Dissent and repugnance of Hippias. I thought that it would have seemed so to you, as it does to me. However, answer me once more—Is not justice either a certain mental capacity? or else knowledge? or both together?<sup>u</sup> *Hip.*—Yes! it is. *Sokr.*—If justice be a capacity of the mind, the more capable mind will also be the juster: and we have already seen that the more capable soul is the better. *Hip.*—We have. *Sokr.*—If it be knowledge, the more knowing or wiser mind will of course be the juster: if it be a combination of both capacity and know-

<sup>t</sup> Plat. Hipp. Min. 375 B-D.

<sup>u</sup> Plat. Hipp. Min. 375 D.

ή δι- | καισύνη οὐχί ἢ δύναμις τίς ἐστιν,  
ἐπιστήμη, ἢ ἀμφότερα :

ledge, that mind which is more capable as well as more knowing, will be the juster—that which is less capable and less knowing, will be the more unjust. *Hip.*—So it appears. *Sokr.*—Now we have shown that the more capable and knowing mind is at once the better mind, and more competent to exert itself both ways—to do what is honourable as well as what is base—in every employment. *Hip.*—Yes. *Sokr.*—When, therefore, such a mind does what is base, it does so wilfully, through its capacity or intelligence, which we have seen to be of the nature of justice? *Hip.*—It seems so. *Sokr.*—Doing base things, is acting unjustly: doing honourable things, is acting justly. Accordingly, when this more capable and better mind acts unjustly, it will do so wilfully; while the less capable and worse mind will do so without willing it? *Hip.*—Apparently.

*Sokr.*—Now the good man is he that has the good mind: the bad man is he that has the bad mind. It belongs therefore to the good man to do wrong wilfully, to the bad man, to do wrong without wishing it—that is, if the good man be he that has the good mind? *Hip.*—But that is unquestionable—that he has it. *Sokr.*—Accordingly, he that goes wrong and does base and unjust things wilfully, if there be any such character—can be no other than the good man. *Hip.*—I do not know how to concede *that* to you, Sokrates.<sup>x</sup> *Sokr.*—Nor I, how to concede it to myself, Hippias: yet so it must appear to us, now at least, from the past debate. As I told you long ago, I waver hither and thither upon this matter; my conclusions never remain the same. No wonder indeed that I and other vulgar men waver: but if you wise men waver also, that becomes a fearful mischief to us also, since we cannot even by coming to you escape from our embarrassment.<sup>y</sup>

Conclusion —  
that none  
but the good  
man can do  
evil wilfully:  
the bad man  
does evil  
unwillingly.  
Hippias can-  
not resist the  
reasoning,  
but will not  
accept the  
conclusion.  
Sokrates con-  
fesses his  
perplexity.

I will here again remind the reader, that in this, as in the other dialogues, the real speaker is Plato throughout: and

<sup>x</sup> Plat. Hipp. Min. 375 E, 376 B.

<sup>y</sup> Plato, Hipp. Min. 376 C.

that it is he alone, who prefixes the different names to words determined by himself.

Now, if the dialogue just concluded had come down to us with the parts inverted, and with the reasoning of Sokrates assigned to Hippias, most critics would probably have produced it as a tissue of sophistry justifying the harsh epithets which they bestow upon the Athenian Sophists—as persons who considered truth and falsehood to be on a par—subverters of morality—and corruptors of the youth of Athens.<sup>2</sup> But as we read it, all that, which in the mouth of Hippias would have passed for sophistry, is here put forward by Sokrates; while Hippias not only resists his conclusions, and adheres to the received ethical sentiment tenaciously, even when he is unable to defend it—but hates the propositions forced upon him, protests against the perverse captiousness of Sokrates, and requires much pressing to induce him to continue the debate. Upon the views adopted by the critics, Hippias ought to receive credit for this conduct, as a friend of virtue and morality. To me, such reluctance to debate appears a defect rather than a merit; but I cite the

Remarks on the dialogue. If the parts had been inverted, the dialogue would have been cited by critics as a specimen of the sophistry and corruption of the Sophists.

<sup>2</sup> Accordingly one of the Platonic critics, Schwalbe (*Œuvres de Platon*, p. 116), explains Plato's purpose in the *Hippias Minor* by saying, that Sokrates here serves out to the Sophists a specimen of their own procedure, and gives them an example of sophistical dialectic, by defending a sophistical thesis in a sophistical manner: That he chooses and demonstrates at length the thesis—the liar is not different from the truth-teller—as an exposure of the sophistical art of proving the contrary of any given proposition, and for the purpose of deriding and unmasking the false morality of Hippias, who in this dialogue talks reasonably enough.

Schwalbe, while he affirms that this is the purpose of Plato, admits that the part here assigned to Sokrates is unworthy of him; and Steinhart maintains that Plato never could have had any such purpose—"however frequently" (Steinhart says), "sophistical artifices may occur in this conversation

of Sokrates, which artifices Sokrates no more disdained to employ than any other philosopher or rhetorician of that day" ("so häufig auch in seinen Erörterungen sophistische Kunstgriffe vorkommen mögen, die Sokrates eben so wenig verschmäht hat, als irgend ein Philosoph oder Redekünstler dieser Zeit"). Steinhart, *Einleitung zum Hipp. Minor*, p. 109.

I do not admit the purpose here ascribed to Plato by Schwalbe, but I refer to the passage as illustrating what Platonic critics think of the reasoning assigned to Sokrates in the *Hippias Minor*, and the hypotheses which they introduce to colour it.

The passage cited from Steinhart also—that Sokrates no more disdained to employ sophistical artifices than any other philosopher or rhetorician of the age—is worthy of note, as coming from one who is so very bitter in his invectives against the sophistry of the persons called Sophists, of which we have no specimens left.

dialogue as illustrating what I have already said in another place—that Sokrates and Plato threw out more startling novelties in ethical doctrine, than either Hippias or Protagoras, or any of the other persons denounced as Sophists.

That Plato intended to represent this accomplished Sophist as humiliated by Sokrates, is evident enough: and the words put into his mouth are suited to this purpose. The eloquent lecturer, so soon as his admiring crowd of auditors has retired, proves unable to parry the questions of a single expert dialectician who remains behind, upon a matter which appears to him almost self-evident, and upon which every one (from Homer downward) agrees with him. Besides this, however, Plato is not satisfied without making him say very simple and absurd things. All this is the personal, polemical, comic, scope of the dialogue. It lends (whether well-placed or not) a certain animation and variety, which the author naturally looked out for, in an aggregate of dialogues all handling analogous matters about man and society.

Polemical  
purpose of  
the dialogue  
—Hippias  
humiliated  
by Sokrates.

But though the polemical purpose of the dialogue is thus plain, its philosophical purpose perplexes the critics considerably. They do not like to see Sokrates employing sophistry against the Sophists: that is, as they think, casting out devils by the help of Beelzebub. And certainly, upon the theory which they adopt, respecting the relation between Plato and Sokrates on one side, and the Sophists on the other, I think this dialogue is very difficult to explain. But I do not think it is difficult, upon a true theory of the Platonic writings.

In a former chapter, I tried to elucidate the general character and purpose of those Dialogues of Search, which occupy more than half the Thrasylllean Canon, and of which we have already reviewed two or three specimens—Euthyphron, Alkibiadês, &c. We have seen that they are distinguished by the absence of any affirmative conclusion: that they prove nothing, but only, at the most, disprove one or more supposable solutions: that they are not processes in which one man who knows communicates his knowledge to ignorant hearers, but

Philosophical  
purpose of  
the dialogue  
—theory of  
the Dialogues  
of Search  
generally,  
and of  
Knowledge  
as understood  
by Plato.



in which all are alike ignorant, and all are employed, either in groping, or guessing, or testing the guesses of the rest. We have farther seen that the value of these Dialogues depends upon the Platonic theory about knowledge; that Plato did not consider any one to know, who could not explain to others all that he knew, reply to the cross-examination of a Sokratic Elenchus, and cross-examine others to test their knowledge: that knowledge in this sense could not be attained by hearing, or reading, or committing to memory a theorem, together with the steps of reasoning which directly conducted to it:—but that there was required, besides, an acquaintance with many counter-theorems, each having more or less appearance of truth; as well as with various embarrassing aspects and plausible delusions on the subject, which an expert cross-examiner would not fail to urge. Unless you are practised in meeting all the difficulties which he can devise, you cannot be said *to know*. Moreover, it is in this last portion of the conditions of knowledge, that most aspirants are found wanting.

Now the Greater and Lesser Hippias are peculiar specimens of these Dialogues of Search, and each serves the purpose above indicated. The Greater Hippias enumerates a string of tentatives, each one of which ends in acknowledged failure: the Lesser Hippias enunciates a thesis, which Sokrates proceeds to demonstrate, by plausible arguments such as Hippias is forced to admit. But though Hippias admits each successive step, he still mistrusts the conclusion, and suspects that he has been misled—a feeling which Plato<sup>a</sup> describes elsewhere as being frequent among the respondents of Sokrates. Nay, Sokrates himself

The Hippias is an exemplification of this theory—Sokrates sets forth a case of confusion, and avows his inability to clear it up. Confusion—shown up in the Lesser Hippias—Error in the Greater.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Republ. vi. 487 B.

Καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, πρὸς μὲν ταῦτα σοὶ οὐδεὶς ἂν οἶδός τ' εἴη ἀντεπεῖν· Ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοιόνδε τι πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες ἐκάστοτε ἃ νῦν λέγεις· ἠγούνηται δι' ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ἐρωτῶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παρ' ἑκάστον τὸ χρέμα σμικρὸν παραγόμενοι, ἀβροισθέντων τῶν σμικρῶν ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τῶν λόγων, μέγα τὸ

σφάλμα καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς πρώτοις ἀναφαίνεσθαι . . . ἐπεὶ τότε ἀληθὲς οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον ταύτῃ ἔχειν.

This passage, attesting the effect of the Sokratic examination upon the minds of auditors, ought to be laid to heart by those Platonic critics who denounce the Sophists for generating scepticism and uncertainty.

shares in the mistrust—presents himself as an unwilling propounder of arguments which force themselves upon him<sup>b</sup>—and complains of his own mental embarrassment. Now you may call this sophistry, if you please; and you may silence its propounders by calling them hard names. But such ethical prudery—hiding all the uncomfortable logical puzzles which start up when you begin to analyse an established sentiment, and treating them as non-existent because you refuse to look at them—is not the way to attain what Plato calls knowledge. If there be any argument, the process of which seems indisputable, while yet its conclusion contradicts, or seems to contradict, what is known upon other evidence—the full and patient analysis of that argument is indispensable, before you can become master of the truth and able to defend it. Until you have gone through such analysis, your mind must remain in that state of confusion which is indicated by Sokrates at the end of the Lesser Hippias. As it is a part of the process of Search, to travel in the path of the Greater Hippias—that is, to go through a string of erroneous solutions, each of which can be proved, by reasons shown, to be erroneous: so it is an equally important part of the same process, to travel in the path of the Lesser Hippias—that is, to acquaint ourselves with all those arguments, bearing on the case, in which two contrary conclusions appear to be both of them plausibly demonstrated, and in which therefore we cannot as yet determine which of them is erroneous—or whether both are not erroneous. The Greater Hippias exhibits errors,—the Lesser Hippias puts before us confusion. With both these enemies the Searcher for truth must contend: and Bacon tells us, that confusion is the worst enemy of the two—“*Citius emergit veritas ex errore, quam ex confusione.*” Plato, in the Lesser Hippias, having in hand a genuine Sokratic thesis, does not disdain to invest Sokrates with the task (sophistical, as some call it, yet not the less useful and instructive) of setting forth at large this case of confusion, and avowing his inability to clear it up. It is enough for

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Hipp. Minor, 373 B; also the last sentence of the dialogue.

Sokrates that he brings home the painful sense of confusion to the feelings of his hearer as well as to his own. In that painful sentiment lies the stimulus provocative of farther intellectual effort.<sup>c</sup> The dialogue ends; but the process of search, far from ending along with it, is emphatically declared to be unfinished, and to be in a condition not merely unsatisfactory but intolerable, not to be relieved except by farther investigation, which thus becomes a necessary sequel.

There are two circumstances which lend particular interest to this dialogue—Hippias Minor. 1. That the thesis out of which the confusion arises, is one which we know to have been laid down by the historical Sokrates himself. 2. That Aristotle expressly notices this thesis, as well as the dialogue in which it is contained, and combats it.

Sokrates in his conversation with the youthful Euthydemus (in the Xenophontic Memorabilia) maintains, that of two persons, each of whom deceives his friends in a manner to produce mischief, the one who does so wilfully is not so unjust as the one who does so unwillingly.<sup>d</sup> Euthydemus (like Hippias in this dialogue) maintains the opposite, but is refuted by Sokrates; who argues that justice is a matter to be learnt and known like letters; that the lettered man, who has learnt and knows letters, can write wrongly when he chooses, but never writes wrongly unless he chooses—while it is only the unlettered man who writes wrongly unwillingly and without intending it: that in like manner the just man, he that has learnt and knows justice, never commits injustice unless when he intends it—while the unjust man, who has not learnt and does not know justice, commits injustice whether he will or not. It is the just man therefore, and

The thesis maintained here by Sokrates, is also affirmed by the historical Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia.

<sup>c</sup> See the passage in Republic, vii. 523-524, where the τὸ παρακλητικὸν καὶ ἐγερτικὸν τῆς νοήσεως is declared to arise from the pain of a felt contradiction.

<sup>d</sup> Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2, 19. τῶν δὲ δὴ τοὺς φίλους ἐξαπατῶντων ἐπὶ βλαβῇ (ἵνα μὴδὲ τοῦτο παραλείπωμεν ἄσκητον) πότερος ἀδικώτερός ἐστιν, ὁ

ἐκὼν, ἢ ὁ ἄκων;

The natural meaning of ἐπὶ βλαβῇ would be, "for the purpose of mischief;" and Schneider, in his Index, gives "nocendi causâ." But in that meaning the question would involve an impossibility, for the words ὁ ἄκων exclude any such purpose.

none but the just man (Sokrates maintains), who commits injustice knowingly and wilfully: it is the unjust man who commits injustice without wishing or intending it.<sup>e</sup>

This is the same view which is worked out by the Platonic Sokrates in the *Hippias Minor*: beginning with the antithesis between the veracious and mendacious man (as Sokrates begins in *Xenophon*); and concluding with the general result—that it belongs to the good man to do wrong wilfully, to the bad man to do wrong unwillingly.

Aristotle,<sup>f</sup> in commenting upon this doctrine of the *Hippias Minor*, remarks justly, that Plato understands the epithets *veracious* and *mendacious* in a sense different from that which they usually bear. Plato understands the words as designating one who *can* tell the truth if he chooses—one who *can* speak falsely if he chooses: and in this sense he argues plausibly that the two epithets go together, and that no man can be mendacious unless he be also veracious. Aristotle points out that the epithets in their received meaning are applied, not to the power itself, but to the habitual and intentional use of that power. The power itself is doubtless presupposed or implied as one condition to the applicability of the epithets, and is one common condition to the applicability of both epithets: but the distinction, which they are intended to draw, regards the intentions and dispositions with which the power is employed. So also Aristotle observes that Plato's conclusion—"He that does wrong wilfully is a better man than he that does wrong unwillingly," is falsely collected from induction or analogy. The analogy of the special arts and accomplishments, upon which the argument is built, is not applicable. *Better* has reference, not to the amount of intelligence but to the dispositions and habitual intentions; though it presupposes a certain state and amount of intelligence as indispensable.

Both Sokrates and Plato (in many of his dialogues) commit the error of which the above is one particular manifestation—that of dwelling exclusively on the intellectual conditions

<sup>e</sup> *Xenoph. Memor.* iv. 2, 19-22.

<sup>f</sup> *Aristotel. Metaphys.* Δ. p. 1025,

| a. 8; compare *Ethic. Nikomach.* iv. p. 1127, b. 16.

Aristotle  
combats the  
thesis. Ar-  
guments  
against it.

of human conduct,<sup>g</sup> and omitting to give proper attention to the emotional and volitional, as essentially co-operating or preponderating in the complex meaning of ethical attributes. The reasoning ascribed to the Platonic Sokrates in the *Hippias Minor* exemplifies this one-sided view. What he says is true, but it is only a part of the truth. When he speaks of a person "who does wrong unwillingly," he seems to have in view one who does wrong without knowing that he does so: one whose intelligence is so defective that he does not know when he speaks truth and when he speaks falsehood. Now a person thus unhappily circumstanced must be regarded as half-witted or imbecile, coming under that head which the Xenophontic Sokrates called *madness*:<sup>h</sup> unfit to perform any part in society, and requiring to be placed under tutelage. Compared with such a person, the opinion of the Platonic Sokrates may be defended; that the mendacious person, who *can* tell truth when he chooses, is the better of the two—in the sense of less mischievous or dangerous. But he is the object of a very different sentiment; moreover, this is not the comparison present to our minds when we call one man veracious, another man mendacious. We always assume, in every one, a measure of intelligence equal or superior to the admissible minimum; under such assumption, we compare two persons, one of whom speaks to the best of his knowledge and belief—the other, contrary to his knowledge and belief. We approve the former and disapprove the latter, according to the different intention and purpose of each (as Aristotle observes); that is, looking at them under the point of view of emotion and volition—which is logically distinguishable from the intelligence, though always acting in conjunction with it.

Again, the analogy of the special arts, upon which the

<sup>g</sup> Aristotle has very just observations on these views of Sokrates, and on the incompleteness of his views when he resolved all virtue into knowledge, all vice into ignorance. See, among other passages, *Aristot. Ethica Magna*, i. 1182, a. 16, 1183, b. 9, 1190, b. 28; *Ethic. Eudem.* i. 1216, b. 4. The remarks of Aristotle upon Sokrates and Plato evince a real progress in ethical theory.

<sup>h</sup> Xenop. *Memor.* iii. 9, 7. τὸς διημαρτηκότας, ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ γιγνώσκουσι, μανομένους καλεῖν, &c.

Platonic Sokrates dwells in the *Hippias Minor*, fails in sustaining his inference. By a good runner, wrestler, harper, singer, speaker, &c., we undoubtedly mean one who can, if he pleases, perform some one of these operations well; although he can also, if he pleases, perform them badly. But the epithets *good* or *bad*, in this case, consider exclusively that element which was left out, and leave out that element which was exclusively considered, in the former case. The good singer is declared to stand distinguished from the bad singer, or from the *ιδιώτης* (who, if he sings at all, will certainly sing badly), by an attribute belonging to his intelligence and vocal organs. To sing well, is a special accomplishment, which is possessed only by a few, and which no man is blamed for not possessing. The distinction between such special accomplishments, and justice or rectitude of behaviour, is well brought out in the speech which Plato puts into the mouth of the Sophist Protagoras (*dialogue Protagoras*).<sup>i</sup> “The special artists” (he says) “are few in number: one of them is sufficient for many private citizens. But every citizen, without exception, must possess justice and a sense of shame: if he does not, he must be put away as a nuisance—otherwise, society could not be maintained.” The special artist is a citizen also; and as such, must be subject to the obligations binding on all citizens universally. In predicating of him that he is *good* or *bad* as a citizen, we merely assume him to possess the average intelligence of the community; and the epithet declares whether his emotional and volitional attributes exceed, or fall short of, the minimum required in the application of that intelligence to his social obligations. It is thus that the words *good* or *bad* when applied to him as a citizen, have a totally different bearing from that which the same words have when applied to him in his character of special artist.

They rely too much on the analogy of the special arts—They take no note of the tacit assumptions underlying the epithets of praise and blame.

The value of these debates in the Platonic dialogues consists in their raising questions like the preceding, for the

<sup>i</sup> Plato, *Protagoras*, p. 322.

reflection of the reader—whether the Platonic Sokrates may or may not be represented as taking what we think the right view of the question. For a Dialogue of Search, the great merit is, that it should be suggestive; that it should bring before our attention the conditions requisite for a right and proper use of these common ethical epithets, and the state of circumstances which is tacitly implied whenever any one uses them. No man ever learns to reflect upon the meaning of such familiar epithets, which he has been using all his life—unless the process be forced upon his attention by some special conversation which brings home to him an uncomfortable sentiment of perplexity and contradiction. If a man intends to acquire any grasp of ethical or political theory, he must render himself master, not only of the sound arguments and the guiding analogies, but also of the unsound arguments and the misleading analogies, which bear upon each portion of it.

There is one other point of similitude deserving notice, between the Greater and Lesser Hippias. In both of them, Hippias makes special complaint of Sokrates, for breaking the question in pieces and picking out the minute puzzling fragments—instead of keeping it together as a whole, and applying to it the predicates which it merits when so considered.<sup>k</sup> Here is the standing antithesis between Rhetoric and Dialectic: between those unconsciously acquired mental combinations, which are poured out in eloquent, impressive, unconditional, and undistinguishing generalities—and the logical analysis which resolves the generality into its specialties, bringing to view inconsistencies, contradictions, limits, qualifications, &c. I have already touched upon this at the close of the Greater Hippias.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Hippias Min. 369 B. ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀεὶ σὺ τινὰς τοιούτους πλέκεις λόγους, καὶ ἀπολαμβάνων ὃ ἂν ᾗ δυσχερέστατον τοῦ λόγου, τούτου ἔχει κατὰ μικρὸν ἐφαπτόμενος, καὶ οὐχ ὅλη ἀγωνίζεαι τῷ πράγματι, περὶ οὗτου ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾗ, &c.

A remark of Aristotle (Topica, viii. 164, b. 2) illustrates this dissecting

function of the Dialectician.

ἔστι γὰρ, ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, διαλεκτικὸς, ὁ προτατικὸς καὶ ἐνστατικὸς. ἔστι δὲ τὸ προτείνεσθαι, ἐν ποιεῖν τὰ πλείω (δεῖ γὰρ ἐν ὅλῳ ληφθῆναι πρὸς ὃ ὁ λόγος), τὸ δ' ἐνίστασθαι, τὸ ἐν πολλὰ ἢ γὰρ διαίρει, ἢ ἀναιρεῖ, τὸ μὲν διδοῦς, τὸ δὲ οὐ, τῶν προτεινομένων.

CHAPTER XII.

HIPPARCHUS — MINOS.

IN these two dialogues, Plato sets before us two farther specimens of that error and confusion which beset the enquirer during his search after “reasoned truth.” Sokrates forces upon the attention of a companion two of the most familiar words of the market-place, to see whether a clear explanation of their meaning can be obtained.

In the dialogue called Hipparchus, the debate turns on the definition of τὸ φιλοκερδῆς or ὁ φιλοκερδῆς—the love of gain or the lover of gain. Sokrates asks his companion to define the word. The companion replies—He is one who thinks it right to gain from things worth nothing.<sup>a</sup> Does he do this (asks Sokrates) knowing that the things are worth nothing? or not knowing? If the latter, he is simply ignorant. He knows it perfectly well (is the reply). He is cunning and wicked; and it is because he cannot resist the temptation of gain, that he has the impudence to make profit by such things, though well aware that they are worth nothing. *Sokr.*—Suppose a husbandman, knowing that the plant which he is tending is worthless—and yet thinking that he ought to gain by it: does not that correspond to your description of the lover of gain? *Comp.*—The lover of gain, Sokrates, thinks that he ought to gain from every thing. *Sokr.*—Do not answer in that reckless manner,<sup>b</sup> as if you had been wronged by any one; but answer with attention. You agree that the lover of gain knows the value of that from which he intends to derive profit; and that the husband-

Hipparchus — Question — What is the definition of Lover of Gain? He is one who thinks it right to gain from things worth nothing. Sokrates cross-examines upon this explanation. No man expects to gain from things which he knows to be worth nothing: in this sense, no man is a lover of gain.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Hipparch. 225. οἱ δὲν κερδαίνειν ἀξιῶσιν ἀπὸ τῶν μηδενὸς ἀξίων.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Hipparch. 225 E.



man is the person cognizant of the value of plants. *Comp.*—Yes: I agree. *Sokr.*—Do not therefore attempt, you are so young, to deceive an old man like me, by giving answers not in conformity with your own admissions: but tell me plainly, Do you believe that the experienced husbandman, when he knows that he is planting a tree worth nothing, thinks that he shall gain by it? *Comp.*—No, certainly: I do not believe it.

Sokrates then proceeds to multiply illustrations to the same general point. The good horseman does not expect to gain by worthless food given to his horse: the good pilot, by worthless tackle put into his ship: the good commander, by worthless arms delivered to his soldiers: the good fifer, harper, bowman, by employing worthless instruments of their respective arts, if they know them to be worthless.

None of these persons (concludes Sokrates) correspond to your description of the lover of gain. Where then can you find a lover of gain? On your explanation, no man is so.<sup>c</sup> *Comp.*—I mean, Sokrates, that the lovers of gain are those, who, through greediness, long eagerly for things altogether petty and worthless; and thus display a love of gain.<sup>d</sup> *Sokr.*—Not surely knowing them to be worthless—for this we have shown to be impossible—but ignorant that they are worthless, and believing them to be valuable. *Comp.*—It appears so. *Sokr.*—Now gain is the opposite of loss: and loss is evil and hurt to every one: therefore gain (as the opposite of loss) is good. *Comp.*—Yes. *Sokr.*—It appears then that the lovers of good are those whom you call lovers of gain? *Comp.*—Yes: it appears so. *Sokr.*—Do not you yourself love good—all good things? *Comp.*—Certainly. *Sokr.*—And I too, and every one else. All men love good things, and hate evil. Now we agreed that gain was a good: so that by this reasoning, it appears that all men are lovers of gain—while by the former reasoning, we made out that

<sup>c</sup> Plat. Hipparch. 226 D.

<sup>d</sup> Plat. Hipparch. 226 E. 'Αλλ' ἐγὼ, ὃ Σώκρατες, βούλομαι λέγειν τοῦτους φιλοκερδεῖς εἶναι, οἱ ἐκάστοτε ὑπὸ

ἀπληστίας καὶ πανὸν σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγον ἄξια καὶ οὐδενὸς, γλίχονται ὑπερφυῶς καὶ φιλοκερδοῦσιν.

none were so.<sup>e</sup> Which of the two shall we adopt, to avoid error? *Comp.*—We shall commit no error, Sokrates, if we rightly conceive the lover of gain. He is one who busies himself upon, and seeks to gain from, things from which good men do not venture to gain.

*Sokr.*—But, my friend, we agreed just now, that gain was a good, and that all men always love good. It follows therefore, that good men, as well as others, love all gains, if gains are good things. *Comp.*—Not, certainly, those gains by which they will afterwards be hurt. *Sokr.*—Be hurt: you mean, by which they will become losers. *Comp.*—I mean that and nothing else. *Sokr.*—Do they become losers by gain, or by loss? *Comp.*—By both: by loss, and by evil gain. *Sokr.*—Does it appear to you that any useful and good thing is evil? *Comp.*—No. *Sokr.*—Well! we agreed just now that gain was the opposite of loss, which was evil; and that, being the opposite of evil, gain was good. *Comp.*—That was what we agreed. *Sokr.*—You see how it is: you are trying to deceive me; you purposely contradict what we just now agreed upon. *Comp.*—Not at all, by Zeus: on the contrary it is you, Sokrates, who deceive me, wriggling up and down in your talk, I cannot tell how.<sup>f</sup> *Sokr.*—Be careful what you say: I should be very culpable, if I disobeyed a good and wise monitor. *Comp.*—Whom do you mean? and what do you mean? *Sokr.*—Hipparchus, son of Peisistratus.

Apparent contradiction. Sokrates accuses the companion of trying to deceive him. Accusation is retorted upon Sokrates.

Sokrates then describes at some length the excellent character of Hipparchus: his beneficent rule, his wisdom, his anxiety for the moral improvement of the Athenians: the causes, different from what was commonly believed, which led to his death; and the wholesome precepts which he during his life had caused to be inscribed on various busts of Hermes

Precept inscribed formerly by Hipparchus the Peisistratid—never deceive a friend. Eulogy of Hipparchus by Sokrates.

<sup>e</sup> Plat. Hipparch. 227 C.

<sup>f</sup> Plat. Hipparch. 228 A.

*So.* Ὅρας οὖν, ἐπιχειρεῖς με ἐξαπατᾶν, ἐπιτηδὲς ἐνάντια λέγων οἷς ἄρτι ὁμολογήσαμεν.

Ἐταῖρ. Οὐ μὰ Δι, ὃ Σώκρᾰτες· ἀλλὰ τοῦνάντιον σὺ ἐμὲ ἐξαπατᾶς, καὶ οὐκ οἶδα ὅπῃ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὄνω καὶ κάτω στρέφεις.

throughout Attica. One of these busts or *Hermæ* bore the words—Do not deceive a friend.<sup>g</sup>

The Companion resumes:—Apparently, Sokrates, either you do not account me your friend, or you do not obey Hipparchus: for you are certainly deceiving me in some unaccountable way in your talk. You cannot persuade me to the contrary.

*Sokr.*—Well then! in order that you may not think yourself deceived, you may take back any move that you choose—as if we were playing at draughts. Which of your admissions do you wish to retract—That all men desire good things? That loss (to be a loser) is evil? That gain is the opposite of loss; that to gain is the opposite of to lose? That to gain, as being the opposite of evil, is a good thing? *Comp.*—No. I do not retract any one of these. *Sokr.*—You think then, it appears, that some gain is good, other gain evil? *Comp.*—Yes, that is what I do think.<sup>h</sup> *Sokr.*—Well, I give you back that move: let it stand as you say. Some gain is good: other gain is bad. But surely the good gain is no more *gain*, than the bad gain: both are *gain*, alike and equally. *Comp.*—How do you mean?

Sokrates then illustrates his question by two or three analogies. Bad food is just as much *food*, as good food:

<sup>g</sup> Plat. Hipparch. 228 B-229 D.

The picture here given of Hipparchus deserves notice. We are informed that he was older than his brother Hippias, which was the general belief at Athens, as Thucydides (i. 20, vi. 58) affirms, though himself contradicting it, and affirming that Hippias was the elder brother. Plato however agrees with Thucydides in this point, that the three years after the assassination of Hipparchus, during which Hippias ruled alone, were years of oppression and tyranny; and that the hateful recollection of the Peisistratide, which always survived in the minds of the Athenians, was derived from these three last years.

The picture which Plato here gives

of Hipparchus is such as we might expect from a philosopher. He dwells upon the pains which Hipparchus took to have the recitation of the Homeric poems made frequent and complete; also upon his intimacy with the poets Anakreon and Simonides. The colouring which Plato gives to the intimacy between Aristogeiton and Harmodius is also peculiar. The *ἐπαρρησία* is represented by Plato as eager for the education and improvement of the *ἐρπόμενος*; and the jealousy felt towards Hipparchus is described as arising from the distinguished knowledge and abilities of Hipparchus, which rendered him so much superior and more effective as an educator.

<sup>h</sup> Plat. Hipparch. 229 E, 230 A.

bad drink, as much as good drink: a good man is no more *man* than a bad man.<sup>1</sup>

*Sokr.*—In like manner, bad gain, and good gain, are (both of them) *gain* alike—neither of them more or less than the other. Such being the case, what is that common quality possessed by both, which induces you to call them by the same name *Gain*?<sup>k</sup> Would you call *Gain* any acquisition which one makes either with a smaller outlay or with no outlay at all?<sup>l</sup> *Comp.*—Yes. I should call that gain.

*Sokr.*—For example, if after being at a banquet, not only without any outlay, but receiving an excellent dinner, you acquire an illness? *Comp.*—Not at all: that is no gain. *Sokr.*—But if from the banquet you acquire health, would that be gain or loss? *Comp.*—It would be gain. *Sokr.*—Not every acquisition therefore is gain, but only such acquisitions as are good and not evil: if the acquisition be evil, it is loss. *Comp.*—Exactly so. *Sokr.*—Well now, you see, you are come round again to the very same point: Gain is good. Loss is evil. *Comp.*—I am puzzled what to say.<sup>m</sup> *Sokr.*—You have good reason to be puzzled.

But tell me: you say that if a man lays out little and acquires much, that is gain? *Comp.*—Yes: but not if it be evil: it is gain, if it be a good, like gold or silver. *Sokr.*—I will ask you about gold and silver. Suppose a man by laying out one pound of gold acquires two pounds of silver, is it gain or loss? *Comp.*—It is loss, decidedly, Sokrates: gold is twelve times the value of silver. *Sokr.*—Nevertheless he has acquired more: double is more than half. *Comp.*—Not in value: double silver is not more than half gold. *Sokr.*—It appears then that we must include value as essential to gain, not merely

Questions by Sokrates—Bad gain is *gain*, as much as good gain. What is the common property, in virtue of which both are called Gain? Every acquisition, made with no outlay, or with a smaller outlay, is gain. Objections—the acquisition may be evil. Embarrassment confessed.

It is essential to gain, that the acquisition made shall be greater not merely in quantity, but also in value, than the outlay. The valuable is the profitable—the profitable is the good. Conclusion comes back, That Gain is Good.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Hipparch. 230 C.

<sup>k</sup> Plat. Hipparch. 230 E. διὰ τί ποτε ἀμφοτέρα αὐτὰ κέρδος καλεῖς; τί ταῦτ' ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ὄρων;

<sup>l</sup> Plat. Hipparch. 231 A.

<sup>m</sup> Plat. Hipparch. 231 C. *So.* Ὅρας

ὄν, ὡς πάλιν περιτρέχεις εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ—τὸ μὲν κέρδος ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται, ἡ δὲ ζημία κακόν;

Ἐταῖρ. Ἀπορῶ ἐγωγε ὃ, τι εἶπω.

*So.* Οὐκ ἀδίκα γε σὺ ἀπορῶν.

quantity. The valuable is gain: the valueless is no gain. The valuable is that which is valuable to possess: is that the profitable, or the unprofitable? *Comp.*—It is the profitable. *Sokr.*—But the profitable is good? *Comp.*—Yes: it is. *Sokr.*—Why then, here the same conclusion comes back to us as agreed, for the third or fourth time. The gainful is good. *Comp.*—It appears so.<sup>n</sup>

*Sokr.*—Let me remind you of what has passed. You contended that good men did not wish to acquire all sorts of gain, but only such as were good, and not such as were evil. But now, the debate has compelled us to acknowledge that all gains are good, whether small or great. *Comp.*—As for me, Sokrates, the debate has compelled me rather than persuaded me.<sup>o</sup> *Sokr.*—Presently, perhaps, it may even persuade you. But now, whether you have been persuaded or not, you at least concur with me in affirming that all gains, whether small or great, are good. That all good men wish for all good things. *Comp.*—I do concur. *Sokr.*—But you yourself stated that evil men love all gains, small and great? *Comp.*—I said so. *Sokr.*—According to your doctrine, then, all men are lovers of gain, the good men as well as the evil? *Comp.*—Apparently so. *Sokr.*—It is therefore wrong to reproach any man as a lover of gain: for the person who reproaches is himself a lover of gain, just as much.

The Minos, like the Hipparchus, is a dialogue carried on between Sokrates and a companion not named. It relates to Law, or The Law—'Ο Νόμος:—*Sokr.*—What is Law (asks Sokrates)? *Comp.*—Respecting what sort of Law do you enquire (replies the Companion)? *Sokr.*—What! is there any difference between one law and another law, as to that identical circumstance, of being Law? Gold

Recapitulation. The debate has shown that all gain is good, and that there is no evil gain. All men are lovers of gain. No man ought to be reproached for being so. The companion is compelled to admit this, though he declares that he is not persuaded.

Minos. Question put by Sokrates to the companion, What is Law, or The Law? All law is the same, *quatenus* law: What is the common constituent attribute?

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Hipparch. 231 D-E, 232 A.

<sup>o</sup> Plat. Hipparch. 232 B. Οὐκοῦν οὖν πάντα τὰ κέρδη ὁ λόγος ἡμᾶς ἠνάγκακε καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ μέγαρα ὁμολογεῖν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι:

Ἐταῖρ. Ἠνάγκακε γὰρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον ἐμέ γε ἢ πέπεικεν.

So. 'Αλλ' ἕως μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ πείσειεν ἂν.

does not differ from gold, so far as the being gold is concerned —nor stone from stone, so far as being stone is concerned. In like manner, one law does not differ from another, all are the same, in so far as each is Law alike :—not, one of them more, and another less. It is about this as a whole that I ask you—What is Law?

*Comp.*—What should Law be, Sokrates, other than the various assemblage of consecrated and binding customs and beliefs?<sup>p</sup> *Sokr.*—Do you think, then, that discourse is, the things spoken: that sight is, the things seen? that hearing is, the things heard? Or are they not distinct, in each of the three cases—and is not Law also one thing, the various customs and beliefs another? *Comp.*—Yes! I now think that they are distinct.<sup>q</sup> *Sokr.*—Law is that whereby these binding customs become binding. What is it? *Comp.*—Law can be nothing else than the public resolutions and decrees promulgated among us. Law is the decree of the city.<sup>r</sup> *Sokr.*—You mean, that Law is social opinion. *Comp.*—Yes—I do.

Answer—  
Law is,  
1. The consecrated and binding customs. 2. The decree of the city. 3. Social or civic opinion.

*Sokr.*—Perhaps you are right; but let us examine. You call some persons wise:—they are wise through wisdom. You call some just:—they are just, through justice. In like manner, the lawfully-behaving men are so, through law: the lawless men are so, through lawlessness. Now the lawfully-behaving men are just: the lawless men are unjust. *Comp.*—It is so. *Sokr.*—Justice, and law, are highly honourable: injustice and lawlessness, highly dishonourable: the former preserves cities, the latter ruins them. *Comp.*—Yes—it does. *Sokr.*—Well, then! we must consider law as something honourable; and seek after it, under the assumption that it is a good thing. You defined law to be the decree of the city: Are not some decrees good, others evil? *Comp.*—

Cross-examination by Sokrates—  
Just and lawfully-behaving men are so through law: unjust and lawless men are so through the absence of law. Law is highly honourable and useful: lawlessness is ruinous. Accordingly, bad decrees of the city—or bad social opinion—cannot be law.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, *Minos*, 313 E. Τί οὖν ἄλλο νόμος εἶη ἄν, ἀλλ' ἢ τὰ νομιζόμενα;

<sup>q</sup> Plato, *Minos*, 314 B-C.

<sup>r</sup> I pass over here an analogy started by Sokrates in his next question;—as

ἄψις το τὰ ὀρώμενα, so νόμος το τὰ νομιζόμενα, &c.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, *Minos*, 314 B. ἐπειδὴ νόμος τὰ νομιζόμενα νομίζεται, τίνι ὄντι τῶ νόμῳ νομίζεται;

Unquestionably. *Sokr.*—But we have already said that law is not evil. *Comp.*—I admit it. *Sokr.*—It is incorrect therefore to answer, as you did broadly, that law is the decree of the city. An evil decree cannot be law. *Comp.*—I see that it is incorrect.<sup>8</sup>

*Sokr.*—Still—I think, myself, that law is opinion of some sort: and since it is not evil opinion, it must be good opinion. Now good opinion is true opinion: and true opinion is, the finding out of reality. *Comp.*—I admit it. *Sokr.*—Law therefore wishes or tends to be, the finding out of reality.<sup>9</sup> *Comp.*—But, Sokrates, if law is the finding out of reality—if we have therein already found out realities—how comes it that all communities of men do not use the same laws respecting the same matters? *Sokr.*—The law does not the less wish or tend to find out realities; but it is unable to do so. That is, if the fact be true as you state—that we change our laws, and do not all of us use the same. *Comp.*—Surely, the fact as a fact is obvious enough.<sup>10</sup>

(The Companion here enumerates some remarkable local rites, venerable in one place, abhorrent in another, such as the human sacrifices at Carthage, &c., thus lengthening his answer much beyond what it had been before. Sokrates then continues):—

*Sokr.*—Perhaps you are right, and these matters have escaped me. But if you and I go on making long speeches each for ourselves, we shall never come to an agreement. If we are to carry on our research together, we must do so by question and answer. Question me, if you prefer:—if not, answer me. *Comp.*—I am quite ready, Sokrates, to answer whatever you ask.

*Sokr.*—Well, then! do you think that just things are just, and that unjust things are unjust? *Comp.*—I think they are. *Sokr.*—Do not all men in all communities, among the

<sup>8</sup> Plato, *Minos*, 314, B-C-D.

<sup>9</sup> Plato, *Minos*, 315 A. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ἀληθῆς δόξα τοῦ ὄντος ἔστιν ἐξεύρεσις;

ὁ νόμος ἔρα βούλεται τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι ἐξεύρεσις;

<sup>10</sup> Plato, *Minos*, 315 A-B.

Persians as well as here, now as well as formerly, think so too ?

*Comp.*—Unquestionably they do. *Sokr.*—Are not things which weigh more, accounted heavier ; and things which weigh less, accounted lighter, here, at Carthage, and everywhere else ?\* *Comp.*—Certainly. *Sokr.*—It seems, then, that honourable things are accounted honourable everywhere, and dishonourable things dishonourable ? not the reverse. *Comp.*—Yes, it is so. *Sokr.*—Then, speaking universally, existent things or realities (not non-existents) are accounted existent and real, among us as well as among all other men ? *Comp.*—I think they are. *Sokr.*—Whoever therefore fails in attaining the real, fails in attaining the lawful.† *Comp.*—As you now put it, Sokrates, it would seem that the same things are accounted lawful both by us at all times, and by all the rest of mankind besides. But when I reflect that we are perpetually changing our laws, I cannot persuade myself of what you affirm.

*Sokr.*—Perhaps you do not reflect that pieces on the draught-board, when their position is changed, still remain the same. You know medical treatises : you know that physicians are the really knowing about matters of health : and that they agree with each other in writing about them. *Comp.*—Yes—I know that. *Sokr.*—The case is the same whether they be Greeks or not Greeks : Those who know, must of necessity hold the same opinion with each other, on matters which they know : always and everywhere. *Comp.*—Yes—always and everywhere. *Sokr.*—Physicians write respecting matters of health what they account to be true, and these writings of theirs are the medical laws ? *Comp.*—Certainly they are. *Sokr.*—

Farther questions by Sokrates— Things heavy and light, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable, &c., are so and are accounted so. everywhere. Real things are always accounted real. Whoever fails in attaining the real, fails in attaining the lawful.

There are laws of health and of cure, composed by the few physicians wise upon those subjects, and unanimously declared by them. So also there are laws of farming, gardening, cookery, declared by the few wise in those respective pursuits. In like manner, the laws of a city are the judgments

\* Plato, Minos, 316 A. Πότερον δὲ τὰ πλείον ἔλκοντα βαρύτερα νομίζεται ἐνθάδε, τὰ δὲ ἕλαττον, κουφότερα, ἢ τοῦναντίων ;

The verb *νομίζεται* deserves attention here, being the same word as has been employed in regard to law, and derived from νόμος.

† Plato, Minos, 316 B. οὐκ οὖν, ὡς κατὰ πάντων εἰπεῖν, τὰ ὄντα νομίζεται εἶναι, καὶ οὐ τὰ μὴ ὄντα, καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄπασιν ;

\* Ε.τ. ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

So. \*Ὁς ἐν ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἀμαρτάνη, τοῦ νομίμου ἀμαρτάνει ;



declared by  
the few wise  
men who  
know how  
to rule.

The like is true respecting the laws of farming—the laws of gardening—the laws of cookery. All these are the writings of persons, knowing in each of the respective pursuits? *Comp.*—Yes.<sup>2</sup> *Sokr.*—In like manner, what are the laws respecting the government of a city? Are they not the writings of those who know how to govern—kings, statesmen, and men of superior excellence? *Comp.*—Truly so. *Sokr.*—Knowing men like these will not write differently from each other about the same things, nor change what they have once written. If, then, we see some doing this, are we to declare them knowing or ignorant? *Comp.*—Ignorant—undoubtedly.

*Sokr.*—Whatever is right, therefore, we may pronounce to be lawful; in medicine, gardening, or cookery: whatever is not right, not to be lawful but lawless. And the like in treatises respecting just and unjust, prescribing how the city is to be administered: That which is right, is the regal law—that which is not right, is not so, but only seems to be law in the eyes of the ignorant—being in truth lawless. *Comp.*—Yes. *Sokr.*—We were correct therefore in declaring Law to be the finding out of reality. *Comp.*—It appears so.<sup>3</sup> *Sokr.*—It is the skilful husbandman who gives right laws on the sowing of land: the skilful musician on the touching of instruments: the skilful trainer, respecting exercise of the body, the skilful king or governor, respecting the minds of the citizens. *Comp.*—Yes—it is.<sup>b</sup>

*Sokr.*—Can you tell me which of the ancient kings has the glory of having been a good lawgiver, so that his laws still remain in force as divine institutions? *Comp.*—I cannot tell. *Sokr.*—But can you not say which among the Greeks have the most ancient laws? *Comp.*—Perhaps you mean the Lacedæmonians and Lykurgus? *Sokr.*—Why the Lacedæmonian laws are hardly more than three hundred years old: besides,

Minos, King  
of Krete—his  
laws were  
divine and  
excellent,  
and have  
remained un-  
changed from  
time imme-  
morial.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Minos, 316 D-E.

<sup>3</sup> Plato, Minos, 317 D-E. τὸ μὲν ὀρθόν, οὐδ' ὃ δοκεῖ νόμος εἶναι τοῖς οὐκ εἰδῶσιν· ἔστι γὰρ ἄνομον.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Minos, 318 A.

whence is it that the best of them come? *Comp.*—From Krete, they say. *Sokr.*—Then it is the Kretans who have the most ancient laws in Greece? *Comp.*—Yes. *Sokr.*—Do you know those good kings of Krete, from whom these laws are derived—Minos and Rhadamanthus, sons of Zeus and Europa? *Comp.*—Rhadamanthus certainly is said to have been a just man, Sokrates; but Minos quite the reverse—savage, ill-tempered, unjust. *Sokr.*—What you affirm, my friend, is a fiction of the Attic tragedians. It is not stated either by Homer or Hesiod; who are far more worthy of credit than all the tragedians put together. *Comp.*—What is it that Homer and Hesiod say about Minos? <sup>c</sup>

Sokrates replies by citing, and commenting upon, the statements of Homer and Hesiod respecting Minos, as the cherished son, companion, and pupil, of Zeus; who bestowed upon him an admirable training, teaching him wisdom and justice, and thus rendering him consummate as a lawgiver and ruler of men. It was through these laws, divine as emanating from the teaching of Zeus, that Krete (and Sparta as the imitator of Krete) had been for so long a period happy and virtuous. As ruler of Krete, Minos had made war upon Athens, and compelled the Athenians to pay tribute. Hence he had become odious to the Athenians, and especially odious to the tragic poets who were the great teachers and charmers of the crowd. These poets, whom every one ought to be cautious of offending, had calumniated Minos as the old enemy of Athens. <sup>d</sup>

Question about the character of Minos—Homer and Hesiod declare him to have been admirable, the Attic tragedians defame him as a tyrant, because he was the enemy of Athens.

But that these tales are mere calumny (continues Sokrates), and that Minos was truly a good lawgiver, and a good shepherd (*νομευς αγαθός*) of his people—we have proof through the fact, that his laws still remain unchanged: which shows that he has really found out truth and reality respecting the administration of a city. <sup>e</sup> *Comp.*—Your view seems

That Minos was really admirable—and that he has found out truth and reality respecting the administration of the city—we may

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Minos, 318 E.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Minos, 319-320.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Minos, 321 A.

τούτο μέ- | γιστον σημειον, οτι ακίνητοι αυτοου οι νόμοι εισιν, απε του ουτος περι πόλεως οικήσεως εξευρόντος την αλήθειαν.

be sure from the fact that his laws have remained so long unaltered.

plausible, Sokrates. *Sokr.*—If I am right, then, you think that the Kretans have more ancient laws than any other Greeks? and that Minos and Rhadamanthus are the best of all ancient lawgivers, rulers, and shepherds of mankind? *Comp.*—I think they are.

*Sokr.*—Now take the case of the good lawgiver and good shepherd for the body—If we were asked, what it is that he prescribes for the body, so as to render it better? we should answer, at once, briefly and well, by saying—food and labour: the former to sustain the body, the latter to exercise and consolidate it. *Comp.*—Quite correct. *Sokr.*—And if after that we were asked, What are those things which the good lawgiver prescribes for the mind to make it better, what should we say, so as to avoid discrediting ourselves? *Comp.*—I really cannot tell. *Sokr.*—

But surely it is discreditable enough both for your mind and mine—to confess, that we do not know upon what it is that good and evil for our minds depends, while we can define upon what it is that the good or evil of our bodies depends?†

I have put together the two dialogues, Hipparchus and Minos, partly because of the analogy which really exists between them, partly because that analogy is much insisted on by Boeckh, Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and other recent critics; who not only strike them both out of the list of Platonic works, but speak of them with contempt as compositions. On the first point, I dissent from them altogether: on the second, I agree with them thus far—that I consider the two dialogues inferior works of Plato:—much inferior to his greatest and best compositions,—certainly displaying both less genius and less careful elaboration—probably among his early performances—perhaps even unfinished projects, destined for a farther elaboration, which they never received, and not published until after his decease. Yet in Hipparchus

The Hipparchus and Minos are analogous to each other, and both of them inferior works of Plato, perhaps unfinished.

† Plato, Minos, 321 C-D.

as well as in *Minos*, the subjects debated are important as regards ethical theory. Several questions are raised and partially canvassed: no conclusion is finally attained. These characteristics they have in common with several of the best Platonic dialogues.

In *Hipparchus*, the question put by *Sokrates* is, about the definition of ὁ φιλοκερδής (the lover of gain), and of κέρδος itself—gain. The first of these two words (like many in Greek as well as in English) is used in two senses. In its plain, etymological, sense, it means an attribute belonging to all men: all men love gain, hate loss. But since this is predicable of all, there is seldom any necessity for predicating it of any one man or knot of men in particular. Accordingly, when you employ the epithet as a predicate of A or B, what you generally mean is, to assert something more than its strict etymological meaning: to declare that he has the attribute in unusual measure; or that he has shown himself, on various occasions, wanting in other attributes, which on those occasions ought, in your judgment, to have countervailed it. The epithet thus comes to connote a sentiment of blame or reproach, in the mind of the speaker.<sup>ε</sup>

The Companion or Collocutor, being called upon by *Sokrates* to explain τὸ φιλοκερδές, defines it in this last sense, as conveying or connoting a reproach. He gives three different explanations of it (always in this sense), loosely worded, each of which *Sokrates* shows to be untenable. A variety of parallel cases are compared, and the question is put (so constantly recurring in *Plato's* writings), what is the state of the agent's mind as to knowledge? The cross-examination makes out, that if the agent be supposed to know,—then there is no man corresponding to the definition of a φιλοκερδής: if the agent be supposed not to know—then, on the contrary, every man will come under the definition. The Companion is persuaded

State of mind of the agent, as to knowledge, frequent inquiry in *Plato*. No tenable definition found.

<sup>ε</sup> Aristotle adverts to this class of ethical epithets, connoting both an attribute in the person designated, and an unfavourable sentiment in the speaker (*Ethic. Nikom. ii. 6, p. 1107,*

a. 9). Οὐ πάντα δ' ἐπιδέχεται πράξις, οἷδὲ πᾶν πάθος, τὴν μεσότητά· ἐνια γὰρ εὐθὺς ἠνόμασται συνειλημμένα μετὰ τῆς φαιλότητος, οἶον, &c.

that there is such a thing as "love of gain" in the blamable sense. Yet he cannot find any tenable definition, to discriminate it from "love of gain" in the ordinary or innocent sense.

The same question comes back in another form, after Sokrates has given the liberty of retraction. The Collocutor maintains that there is *bad* gain, as well as *good* gain. But what is that common, generic, quality, designated by the word *gain*, apart from these two distinctive epithets? He cannot find it out or describe it. He gives two definitions, each of which is torn up by Sokrates. To deserve the name of *gain*, that which a man acquires must be good; and it must surpass, in value as well as in quantity, the loss or outlay which he incurs in order to acquire it. But when thus understood, all gains are good. There is no meaning in the distinction between good and bad gains: all men are lovers of gain.

With this confusion, the dialogue closes. The Sokratic notion of *good*, as what every one loves—*evil* as what every one hates—also of *evil-doing*, as performed by every evil-doer only through ignorance or mistake—is brought out and applied to test the ethical phraseology of a common-place respondent. But it only serves to lay bare a state of confusion and perplexity, without clearing up any thing. Herein, so far as I can see, lies Plato's purpose in the dialogue. The respondent is made aware of the confusion, which he did not know before; and this, in Plato's view, is a progress. The respondent cannot avoid giving contradictory answers, under an acute cross-examination: but he does not adopt any new belief. He says to Sokrates at the close—"The debate has constrained rather than persuaded me."<sup>h</sup> This is a simple but instructive declaration of the force put by Sokrates upon his collocutors; and of the reactionary effort likely to be provoked in their minds, with a view to extricate themselves

Admitting that there is bad gain, as well as good gain, what is the meaning of the word *gain*? None is found.

Purpose of Plato in the dialogue—To lay bare the confusion, and to force the mind of the respondent into efforts for clearing it up.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Hipparch. 232 B. ἠνάγκακε γὰρ (ὁ λόγος) μᾶλλον ἐμέ γε ἢ πέπεικεν.

from a painful sense of contradiction. If such effort be provoked, Plato's purpose is attained.

One peculiarity there is, analogous to what we have already seen in the *Hippias Major*. It is not merely the Collocutor who charges Sokrates, but also Sokrates who accuses the Collocutor—each charging the other with attempts to deceive a friend.<sup>i</sup> This seems intended by Plato to create an occasion for introducing what he had to say about Hipparchus—*απροσως* of the motto on the Hipparchean *Hermes*—*μὴ φιλον ἐξαπάτα*.

The modern critics, who proclaim the *Hipparchus* not to be the work of Plato, allege as one of the proofs of spuriousness, the occurrence of this long narrative and comment upon the historical Hipparchus and his behaviour; which narrative (the critics maintain) Plato would never have introduced, seeing that it contributes nothing to the settlement of the question debated. But to this we may reply, first, That there are other dialogues<sup>k</sup> (not to mention the *Minos*) in which Plato introduces recitals of considerable length, historical or quasi-historical recitals; bearing remotely, or hardly bearing at all, upon the precise question under discussion; next,—That even if no such analogies could be cited, and if the case stood single, no modern critic could fairly pretend to be so thoroughly acquainted with Plato's views and the surrounding circumstances, as to put a limit on the means which Plato might choose to take, for rendering his dialogues acceptable and interesting. Plato's political views made him disinclined to popular government generally, and to the democracy of Athens in particular. Conformably with such sentiment, he is disposed to surround the rule of

Historical narrative and comments given in the dialogue respecting Hipparchus—afford no ground for declaring the dialogue to be spurious.

<sup>i</sup> Plato, *Hipparch.* 225 E, 228 A.

<sup>k</sup> See *Alkibiad.* ii. pp. 142-149-150; *Alkibiad.* i. pp. 121-122; *Protagoras*, 342-344; *Politikus*, 268 D. *σχεδὸν παιδῶν ἐγκρασαμένους*, and the two or three pages which follow.

F. A. Wolf, and various critics after him, contend that the genuineness of the *Hipparchus* was doubted in antiquity, on the authority of *Ælian*, V. H. viii. 2. But I maintain that this is not the meaning of the passage, unless

upon the supposition that the word *μαθητῆς* is struck out of the text conjecturally. The passage may be perfectly well construed, leaving *μαθητῆς* in the text: we must undoubtedly suppose the author to have made an assertion historically erroneous: but this is nowise impossible in the case of *Ælian*. If you construe the passage as it stands, without such conjectural alteration, it does not justify Wolf's inference.

the Peisistratidæ with an ethical and philosophical colouring: to depict Hipparchus as a wise man busied in instructing and elevating the citizens; and to discredit the renown of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, by affirming them to have been envious of Hipparchus, as a philosopher who surpassed themselves by his own mental worth. All this lay perfectly in the vein of Plato's sentiment; and we may say the same about the narrative in the Minos, respecting the divine parentage and teaching of Minos, giving rise to his superhuman efficacy as a lawgiver and ruler. It is surely very conceivable, that Plato, as a composer of ethical dialogues or dramas, might think that such recitals lent a charm or interest to some of them. Moreover, something like variety, or distinctive features as between one dialogue and another, was a point of no inconsiderable moment. I am of opinion that Plato did so conceive these narratives. But at any rate, what I here contend is, that no modern critics have a right to assume as certain that he did not.

I now come to the Minos. The subject of this dialogue is, the explanation or definition of Law. Sokrates says to his Companion or Collocutor,—Tell me what is the generic constituent of Law: All Laws are alike *quatenus* Law. Take no note of the difference between one law and another, but explain to me what characteristic property it is, which is common to all Law, and is implied in or connoted by the name Law.

This question is logically the same as that which Sokrates asks in the Hipparchus with reference to *κέρδος* or gain.

That the definition of *Νόμος* or Law was discussed by Sokrates, we know, not only from the general description of his debates given in Xenophon, but also from the interesting description (in that author) of the conversation between the youthful Alkibiades and Perikles.<sup>m</sup> The interrogations employed by Alkibiades on that occasion are Sokratic, and must have been derived, directly or indirectly, from Sokrates. They are partially

Minos—  
Question—  
What is the  
characteristic  
property con-  
noted by the  
word *Νόμος*  
or law?

This question  
was discussed  
by the his-  
torical So-  
krates, *Me-  
morabilia* of  
Xenophon.

<sup>m</sup> Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 16, i. 2, 42-46.

analogous to the questions of Sokrates in the dialogue *Minos*, and they end by driving Perikles into a confusion, left unexplained, between Law and Lawlessness.

Definitions of *Nómos* are here given by the Companion, who undergoes a cross-examination upon them. First, he says, that *Nómos* = τὰ νομιζόμενα. But this is rejected by Sokrates, who intimates that Law is not the aggregate of laws enacted or of customs held binding: but that which lies behind these laws and customs, imparting to them their binding force.<sup>n</sup> We are to enquire what this is. The Companion declares that it is the public decree of the city: political or social opinion. But this again Sokrates contests: putting questions to show that Law includes, as a portion of its meaning, justice, goodness, beauty, and preservation of the city with its possessions; while lawlessness includes injustice, evil, ugliness, and destruction. There can be no such thing as bad or wicked law.<sup>o</sup> But among decrees of the city, some are bad, some are good. Therefore to define Law as a decree of the city, thus generally, is incorrect. It is only the good decree, not the bad decree, which is Law. Now the good decree or opinion, is the true opinion: that is, it is the finding out of reality. Law therefore wishes or aims to be the finding out of reality: and if there are differences between different nations, this is because the power to find out does not always accompany the wish to find out.

As to the assertion—that Law is one thing here, another thing there, one thing at one time, another thing at another—Sokrates contests it. Just things are just (he says), everywhere and at all times: unjust things are unjust, also. Heavy things are heavy, light things light, at one time as well as at another. So also honourable things are everywhere honourable, base things everywhere base. In general phrase, existent things are everywhere existent,<sup>p</sup>

Definitions of law—suggested and refuted. Law includes, as a portion of its meaning, justice, goodness, usefulness, &c. Bad decrees are not laws.

Sokrates affirms that law is everywhere the same—It is the declared judgment and command of the Wise man, upon the subject to which it refers—It is truth and reality, found out and certified by him.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, *Minos*, 314 B. ἐπειδὴ νόμος τὰ νομιζόμενα νομίζεται, τίτι ὄντι τῶ νόμῳ νομίζεται;

<sup>o</sup> Plato, *Minos*, 314 D. καὶ μὴν

νόμος γ' οὐκ ἦν πονηρός.

<sup>p</sup> M. Boeckh remarks justly in his note on this passage—"neque enim illud demonstratum est, eadem om-



non-existent things are not existent. Whoever therefore fails to attain the existent and real, fails to attain the lawful and just. It is only the man of art and knowledge, in this or that department, who attains the existent, the real, the right, true, lawful, just. Thus the authoritative rescripts or laws in matters of medicine, are those laid down by practitioners who know that subject, all of whom agree in what they lay down: the laws of cookery, the laws of agriculture and of gardening—are rescripts delivered by artists who know respectively each of those subjects. So also about Just and Unjust, about the political and social arrangements of the city—the authoritative rescripts or laws are, those laid down by the artists or men of knowledge in that department, all of whom agree in laying down the same: that is, all the men of art called kings or lawgivers. It is only the right, the true, the real—that which these artists attain—which is properly a law and is entitled to be so called. That which is not right is not a law,—ought not to be so called—and is only supposed to be a law by the error of ignorant men.<sup>4</sup>

That the reasoning of Sokrates in this dialogue is confused and unsound (as M. Boeckh and other critics have remarked), I perfectly agree. But it is not the less completely Platonic; resting upon views and doctrines much cherished and often reproduced by Plato. The dialogue Minos presents, in a rude and awkward manner, without explanation or amplification, that worship of the Abstract and the Ideal, which Plato, in other and longer dialogues, seeks to diversify as well as to elaborate. The definitions of Law here combated and given by Sokrates, illustrate this. The good, the true, the right, the beautiful, the real—all coalesce in the mind of Plato. There is nothing (in his view) real, except *The Good, The Just, &c.* (τὸ αὐτο-ἀγαθὸν; αὐτο-δικαίον—Absolute Goodness and Justice): particular good and just things have no reality, they are no more good and

Reasoning of Sokrates in the Minos is unsound, but Platonic. The Good, True, and Real, coalesce in the mind of Plato. He acknowledges nothing to be Law, except what he thinks ought to be Law.

nibus legitima esse — sed tantum, | esse. Sed omnia scriptor hic con-  
*notionem*” (rather the sentiment or | fundit.”  
 emotion) “*legitimi* omnibus eandem | <sup>4</sup> Plato, Minos, 317 C.

just than bad and unjust—they are one or the other, according to circumstances—they are ever variable, floating midway between the real and unreal.<sup>r</sup> The real alone is knowable, correlating with knowledge or with the knowing Intelligence *Noûs*. As Sokrates distinguishes elsewhere τὸ δίκαιον or αὐτο-δίκαιον from τὰ δίκαια—so here he distinguishes (νόμος from τὰ νομιζόμενα) Law, from the assemblage of actual commands or customs received as laws among mankind. These latter are variable according to time and place; but Law is always one and the same. Plato will acknowledge nothing to be Law, except that which (he thinks) ought to be Law; that which emanates from a lawgiver of consummate knowledge, who aims at the accomplishment of the good and the real, and knows how to discover and realise that end. So far as “the decree of the city” coincides with what would have been enacted by this lawgiver (*i. e.*, so far as it is good and right), Sokrates admits it as a valid explanation of Law; but no farther. He considers the phrase *bad law* to express a logical impossibility, involving a contradiction *in adjecto*.<sup>s</sup> What others call a bad law, he regards as being no real law, but only a fallacious image, mistaken for such by the ignorant. He does not consider such ignorant persons as qualified to judge: he recognises only the judgment of the knowing one or few, among whom he affirms that there can be no difference of opinion. Every one admits just things to be just,—unjust things to be unjust,—heavy things to be heavy,—the existent and the real, to be the existent and the real. If then the lawgiver in any of his laws fails to attain this reality, he fails in the very purpose essential to the conception of law: <sup>t</sup> *i. e.*, his pretended law is no law at all.

By *Law*, then, Plato means—not the assemblage of actual positive rules, nor any general property common to and cha-

<sup>r</sup> See the remarkable passage in the fifth book of the Republic, pp. 479-480; compare vii. 538 E.

<sup>s</sup> Plato, *Minos*, 314 D.

The same argument is brought to bear by the Platonic Sokrates against Hippias in the *Hippias Major*, 284-285. If the laws are not really profit-

able, which is the only real purpose for which they were established, they are no laws at all. The Spartans are *παράνομοι*. Some of the answers assigned to Hippias (284 D) are pertinent enough; but he is overborne.

<sup>t</sup> Plato, *Minos*, 316 B. \*Ὅς ἂν ἴρα τοῦ ὄντος ἁμαρτάνῃ, τοῦ νομίμου ἁμαρτάνει.

racteristic of them, nor the free determination of an assembled Demos as distinguished from the mandates of a despot—but the Type of Law as it ought to be, and as it would be, if prescribed by a perfectly wise ruler, aiming at good and knowing how to realise it. This, which is the ideal of his own mind, Plato worships and reasons upon as if it were the only reality: as Law by nature, or natural Law, distinguished from actual positive laws: which last have either been set by some ill-qualified historical ruler, or have grown up insensibly. Knowledge, art, philosophy, systematic and constructive, applied by some one or few exalted individuals, is (in his view) the only cause capable of producing that typical result which is true, good, real, permanent, and worthy of the generic name.

Plato worships the Ideal of his own mind—the work of systematic constructive theory by the Wise Man.

In the Minos, this general Platonic view is applied to Law: in the Politikus, to government and social administration: in the Kratylus, to naming or language. In the Politikus, we find the received classification of governments (monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy) discarded as improper, and the assertion advanced, That there is only one government right, true, genuine, really existing—government by the uncontrolled authority and superintendance of the man of exalted intelligence: he who is master in the art of governing, whether such man do in fact hold power anywhere or not. All other governments are degenerate substitutes for this type, some receding from it less, some more.<sup>u</sup> Again, in the Kratylus, where names and name-giving are

Different applications of this general Platonic view, in the Minos, Politikus, Kratylus, &c. Natural Rectitude of Law, Government, Names, &c.

<sup>u</sup> Plato, Politikus, 293 C-D. ταύτην διαφερόντως ὀρθὴν εἶναι καὶ μόνην πολιτείαν, ἐν ἣ τῆς ἀν εὕρισκοι τοὺς ἀρχοντας ἀληθῶς ἐπιστήμονας καὶ οὐ δοκοῦντας μόνον—τότε καὶ κατὰ τοὺς τοιοῦτους ὄρους ἡμῶν μόνην ὀρθὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι ῥητέον. ὅσας δὲ ἄλλας λέγομεν, οὐ γνησίας οὐδ' ὄντως οὐσας λεκτέον, ἀλλὰ μεμιμημένας ταύτην, ὅς μὲν εἰνόμους λέγομεν, ἐπὶ τὰ καλλίω, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσχίονα μεμιμῆσθαι.

The historical (Xenophontic) Sokrates asserts this same position in Xenophon's Memorabilia (iii. 9, 10). "Sokrates said that Kings and Rulers were those who knew how to command, not those who held the sceptre or were chosen by election or lot, or had acquired power by force or fraud," &c.

The Kings of Sparta and Macedonia, the Βουλῆ and Δῆμος of Athens, the Despot of Syracuse or Pheræ, are here declared to be not real rulers at all.

discussed, Sokrates <sup>x</sup> maintains that things can only be named according to their true and real nature—that there is, belonging to each thing, one special and appropriate Name-Form, discernible only by the sagacity of the intelligent Lawgiver: who alone is competent to bestow upon each thing its right, true, genuine, real name, possessing rectitude by nature (*ὀρθότητος φύσει*).<sup>y</sup> This Name-Form (according to Sokrates) is the same in all languages in so far as they are constructed by different intelligent Lawgivers, although the letters and syllables in which they may clothe the Form are very different.<sup>z</sup> If names be not thus apportioned by the systematic purpose of an intelligent Lawgiver, but raised up by insensible and unsystematic growth—they will be unworthy substitutes for the genuine type, though they are the best which actual societies possess: according to the opinion announced by Kratylus in that same dialogue, they will not be names at all.<sup>a</sup>

The Kretan Minos (we here find it affirmed),<sup>1</sup> son, companion, and pupil of Zeus, has learnt to establish laws of this divine type or natural rectitude: the proof of which is, that the ancient Kretan laws have for immemorial ages remained, and still do remain,<sup>b</sup> unchanged. But when Sokrates tries to determine, Wherein consists this Law-Type? What is it that the wise Lawgiver prescribes for the minds of the citizens—as the wise gymnastic trainer prescribes proper measure of nourishment and exercise for their bodies?—the question is left unanswered. Sokrates confesses with shame that he cannot answer it: and the dialogue ends in a blank. The reader—

Eulogy on Minos, as having established laws on this divine type or natural rectitude.

<sup>x</sup> Plato, Kratylus, 387 D.

<sup>y</sup> Plato, Kratyl. 388 A-E.

<sup>z</sup> Plato, Kratyl. 389 E, 390 A, 432 E.

*Οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀξιόσεις καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην τὸν τε ἐνθάδε καὶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις, ἕως ἂν τὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος εἶδος ἀποδιδῶ τὸ προσῆκον ἐκάστῳ ἐν ὁμοιοσούν συναβαίς, οὐδὲν χεῖρω νομοθέτην εἶναι τὸν ἐνθάδε ἢ τὸν ὅπουσιν ἕλλοθι;* Compare this with the Minos, 315 E, 316 D, where Sokrates evades, by an hypothesis very similar, the objection made

by the collocutor, that the laws in one country are very different from those in another—*ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ταῦτα μεταπεπτευόμενα ὅτι ταῦτά ἐστιν.*

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Kratyl. 430 A, 432 A, 433 D, 435 C.

Kratylus says that a name badly given is no name at all; just as Sokrates says in the Minos that a bad law is no law at all.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Minos, 319 B, 321 A.

according to Plato's manner—is to be piqued and shamed into the effort of meditating the question for himself.

An attempt to answer this question will be found in Plato's Treatise De Legibus—in the projected Kretan colony, of which he there sketches the fundamental laws. Aristophanes of Byzantium very naturally placed this treatise as sequel to the Minos; second in the Trilogy of which the Minos was first.<sup>c</sup>

The Minos was arranged by Aristophanes at first in a Trilogy along with the Legés.

Whoever has followed the abstract of the Minos, which I have just given, will remark the different explanations of the word Law—both those which are disallowed, and that which is preferred, though left incomplete, by Sokrates. On this same subject, there are in many writers, modern as well as ancient, two distinct modes of confusion traceable—pointed out by eminent recent jurists, such as Mr. Bentham, Mr. Austin, and Mr. Maine. 1. Between Law as it is, and Law as it ought to be. 2. Between Laws Imperative, set by intelligent rulers, and enforced by penal sanction—and Laws signifying uniformities of fact expressed in general terms, such as the Law of Gravitation, Crystallization, &c. We can hardly say that in the dialogue Minos, Plato falls into the first of these two modes of confusion: for he expressly says that he only recognises the Ideal of Law, or Law as it ought to be (actual Laws everywhere being disallowed, except in so far as they conform thereunto). But he does fall into the second, when he identifies the Lawful with the Real or Existent. His Ideal stands in place of generalisations of fact.

There is also much confusion, if we compare the Minos with other dialogues: wherein Plato frequently talks of Laws as the laws and customs actually existing or imperative in any given state—Athens, Sparta, or elsewhere (*Νόμος = τὰ νομιζόμενα*, according to the first words in the Minos). For example, in the harangue which he supposes to be addressed to Sokrates in the Kriton, and which he invests with so im-

<sup>c</sup> I reserve for an Appendix some further remarks upon the genuineness of Hipparchus and Minos.

pressive a character—the Laws of Athens are introduced as speakers: but according to the principles laid down in the *Minos*, three-fourths of the Laws of Athens could not be regarded as Laws at all. If therefore we take Plato's writings throughout, we shall not find that he is constant to one uniform sense of the word Law, or that he escapes the frequent confusion between Law as it actually exists and Law as it ought to be.<sup>d</sup>

<sup>d</sup> The first explanation of *Nómos* advanced by the Companion in reply to Sokrates (viz. *Nómos = τὰ νομιζόμενα*), coincides substantially with the meaning of *Nómos βασιλεὺς* in Pindar and Herodotus (see above, chap. vi.), who is an imaginary ruler, occupying a given region, and enforcing *τὰ νομιζόμενα*. It coincides also with the precept *Nóμος πόλεως*, as prescribed by the Pythian priestess to applicants who asked advice about the proper forms of religious worship (Xenop. Memor. i. 3, 1); though this precept, when Cicero comes to report it (Legg. ii. 16, 40), appears divested of its simplicity, and overclouded with the very confusion touched upon in my text. Aristotle does not keep clear of the confusion (compare Ethic. Nikom. i. 1, 1094, b. 16, and v. 5, 1130, b. 24). I shall revert again to the distinction between *νόμος* and *φύσις*, in touching on other Platonic dialogues. Cicero expressly declares (Legg. ii. 5, 11), conformably to what is said by the Platonic Sokrates in the *Minos*, that a bad law,

however passed in regular form, is no law at all; and this might be well if he adhered consistently to the same phraseology, but he perpetually uses, in other places, the words *Lex* and *Leges* to signify laws actually in force at Rome, good or bad.

Mr. Bentham gives an explanation of Law or The Law, which coincides with *Nómos = τὰ νομιζόμενα*. He says (Principles of Morals and Legislation, vol. ii. ch. 17, p. 257, ed. 1823), "Now Law, or The Law, taken indefinitely, is an abstract and collective term, which, when it means anything, can mean neither more nor less than the sum total of a number of individual laws taken together."

Mr. Austin in his Lectures, 'The Province of Jurisprudence Determined,' has explained more clearly and copiously than any antecedent author, the confused meanings of the word Law adverted to in my text. See especially his first lecture and his fifth, pp. 113-163 seq.

## APPENDIX.

In continuing to recognise Hipparchus and Minos as Platonic works, contrary to the opinion of many modern critics, I have to remind the reader, not only that both are included in the Canon of Thrasyllus, but that the Minos was expressly acknowledged by Aristophanes of Byzantium, and included by him among the Trilogies: showing that it existed then (220 B.C.) in the Alexandrine Museum as a Platonic work. The similarity between the Hipparchus and Minos is recognised by all the Platonic critics, most of whom declare that both of them are spurious. Schleiermacher affirms and vindicates this opinion in his Einleitung and notes: but it will be convenient to take the arguments advanced to prove the spuriousness, as they are set forth by M. Boeckh, in his "Comment. in Platonis qui vulgo fertur Minoem:" in which treatise, though among his early works, the case is argued with all that copious learning and critical ability, which usually adorn his many admirable contributions to the improvement of philology.

M. Boeckh not only rejects the pretensions of Hipparchus and Minos to be considered as works of Plato, but advances an affirmative hypothesis to show what they are. He considers these two dialogues, together with those De Justo, and De Virtute (two short dialogues in the Pseudo-platonic list, not recognised by Thrasyllus) as among the dialogues published by Simon; an Athenian citizen and a shoemaker by trade, in whose shop Sokrates is said to have held many of his conversations. Simon is reported to have made many notes of these conversations, and to have composed and published, from them, a volume of thirty-three dialogues (Diog. L. ii. 122), among the titles of which there are two—*Περὶ Φιλοκερδοῦς* and *Περὶ Νόμου*. Simon was, of course, contemporary with Plato; but somewhat older in years. With this part of M. Boeckh's treatise, respecting the supposed authorship of Simon, I have nothing to do. I only notice the arguments by which he proposes to show that Hipparchus and Minos are not works of Plato.

In the first place, I notice that M. Boeckh explicitly recognises them as works of an author contemporary with Plato, not later than 380 B.C. (p. 46). Hereby many of the tests, whereby we usually detect spurious works, become inapplicable.

In the second place, he admits that the dialogues are composed in good Attic Greek, suitable to the Platonic age both in character and manners—"At veteris esse et Attici scriptoris, probus sermo, antiqui mores, totus denique character, spondeat," p. 32.

The reasons urged by M. Boeckh to prove the spuriousness of the Minos, are first, that it is unlike Plato—next, that it is too much like Plato. "Dupliciter dialogus a Platonis ingenio discrepat: partim quod parum, partim quod nimium, similis ceteris ejusdem scriptis sit. Parum similis est in rebus permultis. Nam cum Plato adhuc vivos ac videntes aut nuper defunctos notosque homines, ut scenicus poeta actores, moribus ingenisque accurate descriptis, nominatim producat in medium—in isto opusculo cum Socrate colloquens persona planè incerta est ac nomine carens: quippe cum imperitus scriptor esset

artis illius colloquiis suis *dulcissimas veneres* illas inferendi, quæ ex peculiaribus personarum moribus pingendis redundant, atque à Platone ut flores per amplios dialogorum hortos sunt disseminatæ" (pp. 7-8): again, p. 9, it is complained that there is an "infinite secundarius collocutor" in the Hipparchus.

Now the sentence, just transcribed from M. Boeckh, shows that he had in his mind as standard of comparison, a certain number of the Platonic works, but that he did not take account of all of them. The Platonic Protagoras begins with a dialogue between Sokrates and an unknown, nameless, person; to whom Sokrates, after a page of conversation with him, recounts what has just passed between himself, Protagoras, and others. Next, if we turn to the Sophistês and Politikus, we find that in both of them, not simply the secundarius collocutor, but even the principal speaker, is an unknown and nameless person, described only as a Stranger from Elea, and never before seen by Sokrates. Again, in the Leges, the principal speaker is only an *Ἀθηναῖος ξένος*, without a name. In the face of such analogies, it is unsafe to lay down a peremptory rule, that no dialogue can be the work of Plato, which acknowledges as *collocutor* an unnamed person.

Then again—when M. Boeckh complains that the Hipparchus and Minos are destitute of those "*flores et dulcissimæ Veneres*" which Plato is accustomed to spread through his dialogues—I ask, Where are the "*dulcissimæ Veneres*" in the Parmenidês, Sophistês, Politikus, Leges, Timæus, Kritias? I find none. The presence of "*dulcissimæ Veneres*" is not a condition *sine quâ non*, in every composition which pretends to Plato as its author: nor can the absence of them be admitted as a reason for disallowing Hipparchus and Minos.

The analogy of the Sophistês and Politikus (besides Symposium, Republic, and Leges) farther shows, that there is nothing wonderful in finding the titles of Hipparchus and Minos derived from the subjects (*Περὶ Φιλοκερδοῦς* and *Περὶ Νόμου*), not from the name of one of the collocutors:—whether we suppose the titles to have been bestowed by Plato himself, or by some subsequent editor (Boeckh, p. 10).

To illustrate his first ground of objection—Dissimilarity between the Minos and the true Platonic writings—M. Boeckh enumerates (pp. 12-23) several passages of the dialogue which he considers unplatonic. Moreover, he includes among them (p. 12) examples of confused and illogical reasoning. I confess that to me this evidence is noway sufficient to prove that Plato is not the author. That certain passages may be picked out which are obscure, confused, inelegant—is certainly no sufficient evidence. If I thought so, I should go along with Ast in rejecting the Euthydêmus, Menon, Lachês, Charmidês, Lysis, &c., against all which Ast argues as spurious, upon evidence of the same kind. It is not too much to say, that against almost every one of the dialogues, taken severally, a case of the same kind, more or less plausible, might be made out. You might in each of them find passages peculiar, careless, awkwardly expressed. The expression *τὴν ἀνθρωπεῖαν ἀγέλην τοῦ σώματος*, which M. Boeckh insists upon so much as improper, would probably have been considered as a mere case of faulty text, if it had occurred in any other dialogue: and so it may fairly be considered in the Minos.

Moreover as to faults of logic and consistency in the reasoning, most certainly these cannot be held as proving the Minos not to be Plato's work. I would engage to produce, from most of his dialogues, defects of reasoning quite as grave as any which the Minos exhibits. On the principle assumed by M. Boeckh, every one who agreed with Panætius in considering the elaborate



proof given in the Phædon, of the immortality of the soul, as illogical and delusive—would also agree with Panætius in declaring that the Phædon was not the work of Plato. It is one question, whether the reasoning in any dialogue be good or bad: it is another question, whether the dialogue be written by Plato or not. Unfortunately, the Platonic critics often treat the first question as if it determined the second.

M. Boeckh himself considers that the evidence arising from dissimilarity (upon which I have just dwelt) is not the strongest part of his case. He relies more upon the evidence arising from *too much similarity*, as proving still more clearly the spuriousness of the Minos. “Jam pergamus ad alteram partem nostræ argumentationis, eamque etiam firmiorem, de nimia similitudine Platoniorum aliquot locorum, quæ imitationem doceat subesse. Nam de hoc quidem conveniet inter omnes doctos et indoctos, Platonem se ipsum haud posse imitari: nisi si quis dubitet de sanâ ejus mente” (p. 23). Again, p. 26, “Jam vero in nostro colloquio Symposium, Politicum, Euthyphronem, Protagoram, Gorgiam, Cratylum, Philëbum, dialogos expressos ac tantum non compilatos reperies.” And M. Boeckh goes on to specify various passages of the Minos, which he considers to have been imitated, and badly imitated, from one or other of these dialogues.

I cannot agree with M. Boeckh in regarding this *nimia similitudo* as the strongest part of his case. On the contrary, I consider it as the weakest: because his own premisses (in my judgment) not only do not prove his conclusion, but go far to prove the opposite. When we find him insisting, in such strong language, upon the great analogy which subsists between the Minos and seven of the incontestable Platonic dialogues, this is surely a fair proof that its author is the same as their author. To me it appears as conclusive as internal evidence ever can be; unless there be some disproof *alivunde* to overthrow it. But M. Boeckh produces no such disproof. He converts these analogies into testimony in his own favour, simply by bestowing upon them the name *imitatio*,—*stulta imitatio* (p. 27). This word involves an hypothesis, whereby the point to be proved is assumed—viz.: difference of authorship. “Plato cannot have imitated himself” (M. Boeckh observes). I cannot admit such impossibility, even if you describe the fact in that phrase: but if you say “Plato in one dialogue thought and wrote like Plato in another”—you describe the same fact in a different phrase, and it then appears not merely possible but natural and probable. Those very real analogies, to which M. Boeckh points in the word *imitatio*, are in my judgment cases of the Platonic thought in one dialogue being like the Platonic thought in another. The *similitudo*, between Minos and these other dialogues, can hardly be called *nimia*, for M. Boeckh himself points out that it is accompanied with much difference. It is a similitude, such as we should expect between one Platonic dialogue and another: with this difference, that whereas, in the Minos, Plato gives the same general views in a manner more brief, crude, abrupt—in the other dialogues he works them out with greater fulness of explanation and illustration, and some degree of change not unimportant. That there should be this amount of difference between one dialogue of Plato and another appears to me perfectly natural. On the other hand—that there should have been a contemporary falsarius (scriptor miser, insulsus, villissimus, to use phrases of M. Boeckh), who studied and pillaged the best dialogues of Plato, for the purpose of putting together a short and perverted abbreviation of them—and who contrived to get his miserable abbreviation recognized by the Byzantine Aristophanes among the genuine dialogues not-

withstanding the existence of the Platonic school—this, I think highly improbable.

I cannot therefore agree with M. Boeckh in thinking, that “ubique se prodens Platonis imitatio” (p. 31) is an irresistible proof of spuriousness: nor can I think that his hypothesis shows itself to advantage, when he says, p. 10—“Ipse autem dialogus (Minos) quum post Politicum compositus sit, quod quædam in eo dicta rebus ibi expositis manifestè nitantur, ut paullo post ostendemus—quis est qui artificiosissimum philosophum, postquam ibi (in Politico) accuratius de naturâ legis egisset, de eâ iterum putet negligenter egisse?”—I do not think it so impossible as it appears to M. Boeckh, that a philosopher, after having *written* upon a given subject *accuratius*, should subsequently write upon it *negligenter*. But if I granted this ever so fully, I should still contend that there remains another alternative. The negligent workmanship may have preceded the accurate: an alternative which I think is probably the truth, and which has nothing to exclude it except M. Boeckh’s pure hypothesis, that the Minos must have been copied from the Politikus.

While I admit then that the Hipparchus and Minos are among the inferior and earlier compositions of Plato, I still contend that there is no ground for excluding them from the list of his works. Though the Platonic critics of this century are for the most part of an adverse opinion, I have with me the general authority of the critics anterior to this century—from Aristophanes of Byzantium down to Bentley and Ruhnken—see Boeckh, pp. 7-32.

Yxem defends the genuineness of the Hipparchus—(Ueber Platon’s Kleitophon, p. 8. Berlin, 1846).

## CHAPTER XIII.

## THEAGES.

THIS is among the dialogues declared by Schleiermacher, Theagès— Ast, Stallbaum, and various other modern critics, has been declared spurious by some modern critics— grounds for such opinion not sufficient. to be spurious and unworthy of Plato: the production of one who was not merely an imitator, but a bad and silly imitator.<sup>a</sup> Socher on the other hand defends the dialogue against them, reckoning it as a juvenile production of Plato.<sup>b</sup> The arguments which are adduced to prove its spuriousness appear to me altogether insufficient. It has some features of dissimilarity with that which we read in other dialogues—these the above-mentioned critics call un-platonic: it has other features of similarity—these they call bad imitation by a *falsarius*: lastly, it is inferior, as a performance, to the best of the Platonic dialogues. But I am prepared to expect (and have even the authority of Schleiermacher for expecting) that some dialogues will be inferior to others. I also reckon with certainty, that between two dialogues, both genuine, there will be points of similarity as well as points of dissimilarity. Lastly, the critics find marks of a bad, recent, un-platonic style: but Dionysius of Halikarnassus—a judge at least equally competent upon such a matter—found no such marks. He expressly cites the dialogue as the work of Plato,<sup>c</sup> and explains the peculiar

<sup>a</sup> Stallbaum, Proleg, pp. 220-225, "ineptus tenebrio," &c. Schleiermacher, Einleitung, part ii. v. iii. pp. 247-252. Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, pp. 495-497.

Ast speaks with respect (differing in this respect from the other two, of the Theagès as a composition, though he does not believe it to be the work of Plato. Schleiermacher also admits (see the end of his Einleitung) that the style in general has a good Platonic

colouring, though he considers some particular phrases as un-Platonic.

<sup>b</sup> Socher, Ueber Platon, pp. 92-102. M. Cobet also speaks of it as a work of Plato (Novæ Lectiones, &c., p. 624. Lugd. Bat. 1858).

<sup>c</sup> Dionys. Hal. Ars Rhetor. p. 405, Reisk. Compare Theagès, 121 D. εἰς τὸ ἄστυ καταβαίνοντες.

In general, in discussions on the genuineness of any of the Platonic dialogues, I can do nothing but reply

phraseology assigned to Demodokus by remarking, that the latter is presented as a person of rural habits and occupations.

Demodokus, an elderly man (of rank and landed property), and his youthful son Theagês, have come from their Deme to Athens, and enter into conversation with Sokrates: to whom the father explains, that Theagês has contracted, from the conversation of youthful companions, an extraordinary ardour for the acquisition of wisdom. The son has importuned his father to put him under the tuition of one of the Sophists, who profess to teach wisdom. The father, though not unwilling to comply with the request, is deterred by the difficulty of finding a good teacher and avoiding a bad one. He entreats the advice of Sokrates, who invites the young man to explain what it is that he wants, over and above the usual education of an Athenian youth of good family (letters, the harp, wrestling, &c.), which he has already gone through.<sup>d</sup>

Persons of the dialogue — Sokrates, with Demodokus and Theagês, father and son. Theagês (the son), eager to acquire knowledge, desires to be placed under the teaching of a Sophist.

*Sokr.*—You desire wisdom: but what kind of wisdom? That by which men manage chariots? or govern horses? or pilot ships? *Theag.*—No: that by which men are governed. *Sokr.*—But what men? those in a state of sickness—or those who are singing in a chorus—or those who are under gymnastic training? Each of these classes has its own governor, who bears a special

Sokrates questions Theagês, inviting him to specify what he wants.

to the arguments of those critics who consider them spurious. But in the case of the Theagês there is one argument which tends to mark Plato positively as the author.

In the Theagês, p. 125, the senarius *σοφοὶ τύραννοι τῶν σοφῶν συνοουσία* is cited as a verse of *Euripides*. Now it appears that this is an error of memory, and that the verse really belongs to *Sophokles*, ἐν Αἴαντι Δοκρῶ. If the error had only appeared in this dialogue, Stallbaum would probably have cited it as one more instance of stupidity on the part of the *ineptus tenebrio* whom he supposes to have written the dialogue. But unfortunately the error does not belong to the Theagês alone. It is found also in the Republic (viii.

568 B), the most unquestionable of all the Platonic compositions. Accordingly, Schleiermacher tells us in his note that the *falsarius* of the Theagês has copied this error out of the above-named passage of the Republic of Plato (notes, p. 500).

This last supposition of Schleiermacher appears to me highly improbable. Since we know that the mistake is one made by Plato himself, surely we ought rather to believe that he made it in two distinct compositions. In other words the occurrence of the same exact mistake in the Republic and the Theagês affords strong presumption that both are by the same author—Plato.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Theagês, 122.

title, and belongs to a special art by itself—the medical, musical, gymnastic, &c. *Theag.*—No: I mean that wisdom by which we govern, not these classes alone, but all the other residents in the city along with them—professional as well as private—men as well as women.<sup>e</sup>

Sokrates now proves to Theagês, that this function and power which he is desirous of obtaining, is, the function and power of a despot: and that no one can aid him in so culpable a project. I might yearn (says Theagês) for such despotic power over all: so probably would you and every other man. But it is not *that* to which I now aspire. I aspire to govern freemen, with their own consent; as was done by Themistokles, Perikles, Kimon, and other illustrious statesmen,<sup>f</sup> who have been accomplished in the political art.

*Sokr.*—Well, if you wished to become accomplished in the art of horsemanship, you would put yourself under able horsemen: if in the art of darting the javelin, under able darters. By parity of reasoning, since you seek to learn the art of statesmanship, you must frequent able statesmen.<sup>g</sup>

*Theag.*—No, Sokrates. I have heard of the language which you are in the habit of using to others. You pointed out to them that these eminent statesmen cannot train their own sons to be at all better than curriers: of course therefore they cannot do *me* any good.<sup>h</sup> *Sokr.*—But what can your father do for you

Theagês desires to acquire that wisdom by which he can govern freemen with their own consent.

Incompetence of the best practical statesmen to teach any one else. Theagês requests that Sokrates will himself teach him.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, *Theagês*, 124 A-B. Schleiermacher (*Eînleit.* p. 250) censures the prolixity of the inductive process in this dialogue, and the multitude of examples here accumulated to prove a general proposition obvious enough without proof. Let us grant this to be true; we cannot infer from it that the dialogue is not the work of Plato. By very similar arguments Socher endeavours to show that the *Sophistês* and the *Politikus* are not works of Plato, because in both these dialogues logical division and differentiation is accumulated with tiresome prolixity, and applied to most trivial subjects. But Plato himself (in *Politikus*, pp.

285-286) explains why he does so, and tells us that he wishes to familiarise his readers with logical subdivision and classification as a process. In like manner I maintain that prolixity in the *λόγοι ἐπακτικοί* is not to be held as proof of spurious authorship, any more than prolixity in the process of logical subdivision and classification.

I noticed the same objection in the case of the *First Alkibiadês*.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, *Theagês*, 126 A.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, *Theagês*, 126 C.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, *Theagês*, 126 D. Here again Stallbaum (p. 222) urges, among his reasons for believing the dialogue to be spurious.—How absurd to represent

better than this, Theagês? 'What ground have you for complaining of him? He is prepared to place you under any one of the best and most excellent men of Athens, whichever of them you prefer. *Theag.*—Why will not you take me yourself, Sokrates? I look upon you as one of these men, and I desire nothing better.<sup>1</sup>

Demodokus joins his entreaties with those of Theagês to prevail upon Sokrates to undertake this function. But Sokrates in reply says that he is less fit for it than Demodokus himself, who has exercised high political duties, with the esteem of every one: and that if practical statesmen are considered unfit, there are the professional Sophists, Prodikus, Gorgias, Polus, who teach many pupils, and earn not merely good pay, but also the admiration and gratitude of every one—of the pupils as well as their senior relatives.<sup>k</sup>

*Sokr.*—I know nothing of the fine things which these Sophists teach: I wish I did know. I declare everywhere, that I know nothing whatever except one small matter—what belongs to love. In that, I surpass every one else, past as well as present.<sup>1</sup> *Theag.*—Sokrates is only mocking us. I know youths (of my own age and somewhat older), who were altogether worthless and inferior to every one, before they went to him; but who, after they had frequented his society, became in a short time superior to all their former rivals. The like will happen with me, if he will only consent to receive me.<sup>m</sup>

Sokrates declares that he is not competent to teach—that he knows nothing except about matters of love. Theagês maintains that many of his young friends have profited largely by the conversation of Sokrates.

*Sokr.*—You do not know how this happens; I will explain it to you. From my childhood, I have had a peculiar superhuman something attached to me by divine appointment: a voice, which, whenever it occurs,

Sokrates explains how this has sometimes happened—

the youthful Theagês as knowing what arguments Sokrates had addressed to others! But the youthful Theatêtus is also represented as having heard from others the cross-examinations made by Sokrates (*Theatêt.* 148 E). So likewise the youthful sons of Lysimachus—(*Lachês*, 181 A) compare also Lysis, 211 A.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Theagês*, 127 A.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, *Theagês*, 127 D-E, 128 A.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Theagês*, 128 B. ἀλλὰ καὶ λέγω δήπου ἄει, ὅτι ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν ἐπιστάμενος πλὴν γε σμικροῦ τινὸς μαθήματος, τῶν ἐρωτικῶν. τοῦτο μέντοι τὸ μάθημα παρ' ὀντινωῶν ποιῶμαι δεινὸς εἶναι, καὶ τῶν προγεγονότων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν νῦν.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, *Theagês*, 128 C.

He recites his experience of the divine sign or Dæmon.

warns me to abstain from that which I am about to do, but never impels me.<sup>n</sup> Moreover, when any one of my friends mentions to me what he is about to do, if the voice shall then occur to me, it is a warning for him to abstain. The examples of Charmides and Timarchus (here detailed by Sokrates) prove what I say: and many persons will tell you how truly I forewarned them of the ruin of the Athenian armament at Syracuse.<sup>o</sup> My young friend Sannion is now absent, serving on the expedition under Thrasyllus to Ionia: on his departure, the divine sign manifested itself to me, and I am persuaded that some grave calamity will befall him.

The Dæmon is favourable to some persons, adverse to others. Upon this circumstance it depends how far any companion profits by the society of Sokrates. Aristeides has not learnt anything from Sokrates, yet has improved much by being near to him.

These facts I mention to you (Sokrates continues) because it is that same divine power which exercises paramount influence over my intercourse with companions.<sup>p</sup> Towards many, it is positively adverse; so that I cannot even enter into companionship with them. Towards others, it does not forbid, yet neither does it co-operate; so that they derive no benefit from me. There are others again in whose case it co-operates; these are the persons to whom you allude, who make rapid progress.<sup>q</sup> With some, such improvement is lasting: others, though they improve wonderfully while in my society, yet relapse into commonplace men when they leave me. Aristeides, for example (grandson of Aristeides the Just), was one of those who made rapid progress while he was with me. But he was forced to absent himself on military service; and on returning, he found as my companion Thucydides (son of Melesias), who however had quarrelled with me for some debate of the day before. I understand (said Aristeides to me) that Thucy-

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Theagès, 128 D. ἔστι γὰρ τι θεία μοῖρα παρεπόμενον ἐμοὶ ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον δαμόνιον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο φωνή, ἣ ὅταν γένηται, ἀεὶ μοι σημαίνει, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, τούτου ἀποτροπήν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐδέποτε.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Theag. 129.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Theagès, 129 E. ταῦτα δὴ πάντα εἰρηκά σοι, ὅτι ἡ δύναμις αὐτῆ τοῦ δαιμονίου τούτου καὶ εἰς τὰς συνου-

σίας τῶν μετ' ἐμοῦ συνδιατριβόντων τὸ ἅπαν δύναται. πολλοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐναντιοῦνται, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτοις ὠφελήθηται μετ' ἐμοῦ διατρίβουσιν.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, Theag. 129 E. οἷς δ' ἂν συλλάβηται τῆς συνουσίας ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου δύναμις, οὗτοι εἰσιν ὧν καὶ σὺ ἤσθησαι. ταχὺ γὰρ παραχρῆμα ἐπιιδύσασιν.

dides has taken offence and gives himself airs; he forgets what a poor creature he was, before he came to you.<sup>7</sup> I myself, too, have fallen into a despicable condition. When I left you, I was competent to discuss with any one and make a good figure, so that I courted debate with the most accomplished men. Now, on the contrary, I avoid them altogether—so thoroughly am I ashamed of my own incapacity. Did the capacity (I, *Sokrates*, asked *Aristeides*) forsake you all at once, or little by little? Little by little, he replied. And when you possessed it (I asked), did you get it by learning from me? or in what other way? I will tell you, *Sokrates* (he answered), what seems incredible, yet is nevertheless true.<sup>8</sup> I never learnt from you any thing at all. You yourself well know this. But I always made progress, whenever I was along with you, even if I were only in the same house without being in the same room; but I made greater progress, if I was in the same room—greater still, if I looked in your face, instead of turning my eyes elsewhere—and the greatest of all, by far, if I sat close and touching you. But now (continued *Aristeides*) all that I then acquired has dribbled out of me.<sup>9</sup>

*Sokr.*—I have now explained to you, *Theages*, what it is to become my companion. If it be the pleasure of the God, you will make great and rapid progress: if not, not. Consider, therefore, whether it is not safer for you to seek instruction from some of those who are themselves masters of the benefits which they impart, rather than to take your chance of the result with me.<sup>10</sup> *Theag.*—I shall be glad, *Sokrates*, to become your companion, and to make trial of this divine coadjutor. If he shows him-

Theagès expresses his anxiety to be received as the companion of *Sokrates*.

<sup>7</sup> Plato, *Theag.* 130 A-B. τί δαί; οὐκ οἶδεν, ἔφη, πρὶν σοὶ συγγενέσθαι, οἷον ἦν τὸ ἀνδράποδον;

<sup>8</sup> "Ἦνικα δέ σοι παρεγένετο (ἡ δύναμις), πότερον μαθόντι παρ' ἐμοῦ τι παρεγένετο, ἢ τινι ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ; Ἐγὼ σοι, ἔφη, ἐρῶ, ὦ Σώκρᾳτες, ἂπιστον μὲν, νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἀληθές δέ. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἔμαθον μὲν παρὰ σοῦ οὐδὲν πάποτε, ὡς σὺ οἶσθα· ἐπιδίδουν δέ σποτέ σοι συνείην, κἂν εἰ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ μόνον οἰκίᾳ εἶην, μὴ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ οἰκῆματι, &c.

<sup>9</sup> Plato, *Theagès*, 130 E. πολὺν δὲ μάλιστα καὶ πλείστον ἐπεδίδουν, ὅποτε παρ' αὐτόν σε καθιζοίμην ἐχόμενός σου καὶ ἀπτόμενος. Νῦν δὲ ἢ δ' ὄς, πᾶσα ἐκείνη ἢ ἕξις ἐξεβρόθηκεν.

<sup>10</sup> Plato, *Theag.* 130 E. ὅρα οὖν μὴ σοὶ ἀσφαλέστερον ἢ παρ' ἐκείνων τινὲ παιδεύεσθαι, οἱ ἐγκρατεῖς αὐτοὶ εἰσι τῆς ἀφελείας, ἦν ἀφελοῦσι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, μᾶλλον ἢ παρ' ἐμοῦ ὅ, τι ἀν τύχῃ, τοῦτο πρᾶξαι.



self propitious, that will be the best of all: if not, we can then take counsel, whether I shall try to propitiate him by prayer, sacrifice, or any other means which the prophets may recommend—or whether I shall go to some other teacher.\*

The Theagês figured in the list of Thrasyllus as first in the fifth Tetralogy: the other three members of the same Tetralogy being Charmidês, Lachês, Lysis. Some persons considered it suitable to read as first dialogue of all.<sup>†</sup> There are several points of analogy between the Theagês and the Lachês, though with a different turn given to them. Aristeides and Thucydides are mentioned in both of them: Sokrates also is solicited to undertake the duty of teacher. The ardour of the young Theagês to acquire wisdom reminds us of Hippokrates at the beginning of the Protagoras. The string of questions put by Sokrates to Theagês, requiring that what is called wisdom shall be clearly defined and specialised, has its parallel in many of the Platonic dialogues. Moreover the declaration of Sokrates, that he knows nothing except about matters of love, but that in them he is a consummate master—is the same as what he explicitly declares both in the Symposion and other dialogues.<sup>‡</sup>

But the chief peculiarity of the Theagês consists in the stress which is laid upon the Dæmon, the divine voice, the inspiration of Sokrates. This divine auxiliary is here described, not only as giving a timely check or warning to Sokrates, when either he or his friends contemplated any inauspicious project—but also as intervening, in the case of those youthful companions with whom he conversed, to promote the improvement of one, to

\* Plato, Theag. 131 A.

† Diog. L. iii. 59-61.

‡ Symposion, 177 E. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ποῦ ἐγὼ ἀποφῆσαιμι, δε οὐδὲν φημι ἄλλο ἐπίστασθαι ἢ τὰ ἐρωτικά. Compare the same dialogue, p. 212 B, 216 C. Phædrus, 227 E, 257 A; Lysis, 204 B. Compare also Xenoph. Memor. ii. 6, 28;

Xenoph. Sympos. iv. 27.

It is not reasonable to treat this declaration of Sokrates, in the Theagês, as an evidence that the dialogue is the work of a falsarius, when a declaration quite similar is ascribed to Sokrates in other Platonic dialogues.

obstruct that of others; so that whether Sokrates will produce any effect or not in improving any one, depends neither upon his own efforts nor upon those of the recipient, but upon the unpredictable concurrence of a divine agency.<sup>a</sup>

Plato employs the Sokratic Dæmon, in the Theagês, for a philosophical purpose, which, I think, admits of reasonable explanation. During the eight (perhaps ten) years, of his personal communion with Sokrates, he had had large experience of the variable and unaccountable effect produced by the Sokratic conversation upon different hearers: a fact which is also attested by the Xenophontic Memorabilia. This difference of effect was in no way commensurate to the intelligence of the hearers. Chærephon, Apollodôrus, Kriton, seem to have been ordinary men:—<sup>b</sup> while Kritias and Alkibiades, who brought so much discredit both upon Sokrates and his teaching, profited little by him, though they were among the ablest pupils that he ever addressed: moreover Antisthenes, and Aristippus, probably did not appear to Plato (since he greatly dissented from their philosophical views) to have profited much by the common companionship with Sokrates. Other companions there must have been also personally known to Plato, though not to us: for we must remember that Sokrates passed his whole day in talking with all listeners. Now when Plato in after life came to cast the ministry of Sokrates into dramatic scenes, and to make each scene subservient to the illustration of some philosophical point of view, at least a negative—he was naturally led to advert to the Dæmon or divine inspiration, which formed so marked a feature in the character of his master. The concurrence or prohibition of this divine auxiliary served to explain why it was that the seed, sown broadcast by Sokrates, sometimes fructified, and sometimes did not fructify, or speedily perished afterwards—when no sufficient explanatory peculiarity could be pointed out in the ground on which it

<sup>a</sup> See some remarks on this point in Appendix.

<sup>b</sup> Xenophon, Apol. So. 28. Ἄπολ.

λόδαρος — ἐπιθυμήτης μὲν ἰσχυρῶς αὐτοῦ, ἄλλως δὲ εὐήθης—Plat. Phædon, 117 D.

fell. It gave an apparent reason for the perfect singularity of the course pursued by Sokrates: for his preternatural acuteness in one direction, and his avowed incapacity in another: for his mastery of the Elenchus, convicting men of ignorance, and his inability to supply them with knowledge: for his refusal to undertake the duties of a teacher. All these are mysterious features of the Sokratic character. The intervention of the Dæmon appears to afford an explanation, by converting them into religious mysteries: which, though it be no explanation at all, yet is equally efficacious by stopping the mouth of the questioner, and by making him believe that it is guilt and impiety to ask for explanation—as Sokrates himself declared in regard to astronomical phenomena, and as Herodotus feels, when his narrative is crossed by strange religious legends.<sup>c</sup>

In this manner, the Theagês is made by Plato to exhibit one way of parrying the difficulty frequently addressed to Sokrates by various hearers: “You tell us that the leading citizens cannot even teach their own sons, and that the Sophists teach nothing worth having: you perpetually call upon us to seek for better teachers, without telling us where such are to be found. We entreat you to teach us yourself, conformably to your own views.”

If a leader of political opposition, after years employed in denouncing successive administrators as ignorant and iniquitous, refuses, when invited, to take upon himself the business of administration—an intelligent admirer must find some decent pretence to colour the refusal. Such a pretence is found for Sokrates in the Theagês: “I am not my own master on this point. I am the instrument of a divine ally, without whose active working I can accomplish nothing: who forbids altogether my teaching of one man—tolerates, without assisting, my unavailing lessons to another—assists efficaciously in my teaching of a third, in which case alone the pupil receives any real benefit. The assistance of this divine

Sokrates, while continually finding fault with other teachers, refused to teach himself. Difficulty of finding an excuse for his refusal. The Theagês furnishes an excuse.

<sup>c</sup> Xenop. Memor. iv. 7, 5-6; Herodot. ii. 3, 45-46.

ally is given or withheld according to motives of his own, which I cannot even foretel, much less influence. I should deceive you therefore if I undertook to teach, when I cannot tell whether I shall do good or harm."

The reply of Theagês meets this scruple. He asks permission to make the experiment, and promises to propitiate the divine auxiliary by prayer and sacrifice: under which reserve Sokrates gives consent.

It is in this way that the Dæmon or divine auxiliary serves the purpose of reconciling what would otherwise be an inconsistency in the proceedings of Sokrates. I mean, that such is the purpose served in *this* dialogue: I know perfectly that Plato deals with the case differently elsewhere: but I am not bound (as I have said more than once) to force upon all the dialogues one and the same point of view. That the agency of the Gods was often and in the most important cases, essentially undiscoverable and unpredictable, and that in such cases they might sometimes be prevailed on to give special warnings to favoured persons—were doctrines which the historical Sokrates in Xenophon<sup>d</sup> asserts with emphasis.<sup>d</sup> The Dæmon of Sokrates was believed, both by himself and his friends, to be a special privilege and an extreme case of divine favour and communication to him.<sup>e</sup> It was perfectly applicable to the scope of the Theagês, though Plato might not choose always to make the same employment of it. It is used in the same general way in the Theætêtus; <sup>f</sup> doubtless with less expansion, and blended with another analogy (that of the midwife) which introduces a considerable difference.<sup>g</sup>

Plato does not always, nor in other dialogues, allude to the divine sign in the same way. Its character and working essentially impenetrable. Sokrates a privileged person.

<sup>d</sup> Xenop. Memor. i. 1, 8-9-19.

Euripid. Hecub. 944.

φύρουσι δ' αὐτὰ θεοὶ πάλιν τε καὶ πρόσω, ταραγμὸν ἐντιθέντες, ὡς ἀγνωσίᾳ σέβωμεν αὐτούς.

<sup>e</sup> Xenop. Mem. iv. 3, 12.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Theætêt. p. 150 D-E.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Apolog. S. p. 33 C. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαρτειῶν

καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ᾧ ἕρ τις ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὀτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν. p. 40 A. ἢ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαρτικὴ ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ ἄει ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιουμένην, εἰ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν. Compare Xenophon, Memor. iv. 8, 5; Apol. So. c. 13.

## APPENDIX.

## Τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον.

Here is one of the points most insisted on by Schleiermacher and Stallbaum, as proving that the Theagès is not the work of Plato. These critics affirm (to use the language of Stallbaum, Proleg. p. 220) "*Quam Plato alias de Socratis dæmonio prodidit sententiam, ea longissimè recedit ab illâ ratione, quæ in hoc sermone exposita est.*" He says that the representation of the Dæmon of Sokrates, given in the Theagès, has been copied from a passage in the Theætétus, by an imitator who has not understood the passage, p. 150, D, E. But Socher (p. 97) appears to me to have shown satisfactorily, that there is no such material difference as these critics affirm between this passage of the Theætétus and the Theagès. In the Theætétus, Sokrates declares, that none of his companions learnt any thing from him, but that all of them οἷσπερ ἂν ὁ θεὸς παρέϊκη (the very same term is used at the close of the Theagès—131 A, ἐὰν μὲν παρέϊκη ἡμῶν—τὸ δαιμόνιον) made astonishing progress and improvement in his company. Stallbaum says, "*Itaque ὁ θεὸς, qui ibi commemoratur, non est Socratis dæmonium, sed potius deus, i. e. sors divina. Quod non perspicuens noster tenebrio protenus illud dæmonium, quod Sokrates sibi semper adesse dicitabat, ad eum dignitatis et potentiae gradum evexit, ut, &c.*" I agree with Socher in thinking that the phrase ὁ θεὸς in the Theætétus has substantially the same meaning as τὸ δαιμόνιον in the Theagès. Both Schleiermacher (Notes on the Apology, p. 432) and Ast (p. 482), have notes on the phrase τὸ δαιμόνιον—and I think the note of Ast is the more instructive of the two. In Plato and Xenophon, the words τὸ δαιμόνιον, τὸ θεῖον, are in many cases undistinguishable in meaning from ὁ δαίμων, ὁ θεός. Compare the Phædrus, 242 E, about θεὸς and θεῖον τι. Sokrates, in his argument against Meletus in the Apology (p. 27) emphatically argues that no man could believe in any thing δαιμόνιον, without also believing in δαίμονες. The special θεῖον τι καὶ δαιμόνιον (Apol. p. 31 C), which presented itself in regard to him and his proceedings, was only one of the many modes in which (as he believed) ὁ θεός commanded and stimulated him to work upon the minds of the Athenians:—ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντειῶν καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ἧπὲρ τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ δτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν (Apol. p. 33 C). So again in Apol. p. 40 A, B, ἡ εἰωθὴά μοι μαντικὴ ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου—and four lines afterwards we read the very same fact intimated in the words, τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, where Sokrates dæmonium—and Deus—are identified: thus refuting the argument above cited from Stallbaum. There is therefore no such discrepancy, in reference to τὸ δαιμόνιον, as Stallbaum and Schleiermacher contend for. We perceive indeed this difference between them—that in the Theætétus, the simile of the obstetric art is largely employed, while it is not noticed in the Theagès. But we should impose an unwarrantable restriction upon Plato's fancy, if we hindered him from working out his variety and exuberance of metaphors, and from accommodating each dialogue to the metaphor predominant with him at the time.

Moreover, in respect to what is called the Dæmon of Sokrates, we ought hardly to expect that either Plato or Xenophon would always be consistent

even with themselves. It is unsafe for a modern critic to determine beforehand, by reason or feelings of his own, in what manner either of them would speak upon this mysterious subject. The belief and feeling of a divine intervention was very real on the part of both, but their manner of conceiving it might naturally fluctuate: and there was, throughout all the proceedings of Sokrates, a mixture of the serious and the playful, of the sublime and the eccentric, of ratiocinative acuteness with impulsive superstition—which it is difficult to bring into harmonious interpretation. Such heterogeneous mixture is forcibly described in the Platonic Symposium, pp. 215-222. When we consider how undefined, and undefinable, the idea of this *δαμόνιον* was, we cannot wonder if Plato ascribes to it different workings and manifestations at different times. Stallbaum affirms that it is made ridiculous in the Theagês: and Kühner declares that Plutarch makes it ridiculous, in his treatise *De Genio Sokratis* (Comm. ad. Xenop. Memor. p. 23). But this is because its agency is described more in detail. You can easily present it in a ridiculous aspect, by introducing it as intervening on petty and insignificant matters. Now it is remarkable, that in the Apology, we are expressly told that it actually did intervene on the most trifling occasions—*πάνυ ἐπὶ μικροῖς ἐναντιουμένη*. The business of an historian of philosophy, is, to describe it as it was really felt and believed by Sokrates and Plato—whether a modern critic may consider the description ridiculous or not.

When Schleiermacher says (Einleitung, p. 248), respecting the *falsarius* whom he supposes to have written the Theagês—"Damit ist ihm begegnet, auf eine höchst verkehrte Art wunderbar zusammenzurühren diese göttliche Schickung, und jenes persönliche Vorgefühl welches dem Sokrates zur göttlichen Stimme ward."—I contend that the mistake is chargeable to Schleiermacher himself, for bisecting into two phenomena that which appears in the Apology as the same phenomenon under two different names—*τὸ δαμόνιον*—*τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον*. Besides, to treat the Dæmon as a mere "personal presentiment" of Sokrates, may be a true view:—but it is the view of one who does not inhale the same religious atmosphere as Sokrates, Plato, and Xenophon. It cannot therefore be properly applied in explaining their sayings or doings.—Kühner, who treats the Theagês as not composed by Plato, grounds this belief partly on the assertion, that the *δαμόνιον* of Sokrates is described therein as something peculiar to Sokrates; which according to Kühner, was the fiction of a subsequent time. By Sokrates and his contemporaries (Kühner says) it was considered "non sibi soli tanquam proprium quoddam beneficium a Diis tributum, sed commune sibi esse cum cæteris hominibus" (pp. 20-21). I dissent entirely from this view, which is contradicted by most of the passages noticed even by Kühner himself. It is at variance with the Platonic Apology, as well as with the Theætétus (150 D, and Republic, vi. 496 C). Xenophon does indeed try, in the first Chapter of the Memorabilia, as the defender of Sokrates, to soften the *invidia* against Sokrates, by intimating that other persons had communications from the Gods as well as he. But we see plainly, even from other passages of the Memorabilia, that this was not the persuasion of Sokrates himself, nor of his friends, nor of his enemies. They all considered it (as it is depicted in the Theagês also) to be a special privilege and revelation.

## CHAPTER XIV.

## ERASTÆ OR ANTERASTÆ—RIVALES.

THE main subject of this short dialogue is—What is philosophy? ἡ φιλοσοφία—τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν. How are we to explain or define it? What is its province and purport?

Instead of the simple, naked, self-introducing, conversation, which we read in the Menon, Hipparchus, Minos, &c., Sokrates recounts a scene and colloquy, which occurred when he went into the house of Dionysius the grammarist or school-master,<sup>a</sup> frequented by many elegant and high-born youths as pupils. Two of these youths were engaged in animated debate upon some geometrical or astronomical problem, in the presence of various spectators; and especially of two young men, rivals for the affection of one of them. Of these rivals, the one is a person devoted to music, letters, discourse, philosophy:—the other hates and despises these pursuits, devoting himself to gymnastic exercise, and bent on acquiring the maximum of athletic force.<sup>b</sup> It is much the same contrast as that between the brothers Amphion and Zethus in the Antiopê of Euripides—which is beautifully employed as an illustration by Plato in the Gorgias.<sup>c</sup>

As soon as Sokrates begins his interrogatories, the two youths relinquish<sup>d</sup> their geometrical talk, and turn to him as attentive listeners: their approach affects his emotions hardly less than those of the Erastes. He first enquires from the athletic Erastes, What is it that these two youths are so intently engaged

Two rival Erastæ— one of them literary, devoted to philosophy— the other gymnastic, hating philosophy.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Erastæ, 132. εἰς Διονυσίου τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ εἰσῆλθον, καὶ εἶδον αὐτῷ τῶν τε νέων τοὺς ἐπιεικεστάτους δοκοῦντας εἶναι τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ πατέρων εὐδοκίμων καὶ τούτων ἐραστάς.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Erast. 132 E.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Gorgias, 485-486. Compare

Cicero De Oratore, ii. 37, 156.

<sup>d</sup> The powerful sentiment of admiration ascribed to Sokrates in the presence of these beautiful youths deserves notice as a point in his character. Compare the beginning of the Charמידēs and the Lysis.

upon? It must surely be something very fine, to judge by the eagerness which they display? How do you mean *fine* (replies the athlete)? They are only prosing about astronomical matters—talking nonsense—philosophising! The literary rival, on the contrary, treats this athlete as unworthy of attention, speaks with enthusiastic admiration of philosophy, and declares that all those to whom it is repugnant are degraded specimens of humanity.

*Sokr.*—You think philosophy a fine thing? But you cannot tell whether it is fine or not, unless you know what it is?<sup>e</sup> Pray explain to me what philosophy is. *Erast.*—I will do so readily. Philosophy consists in the perpetual growth of a man's knowledge—in his going on perpetually acquiring something new, both in youth and old age, so that he may learn as much as possible during life. Philosophy is poly-mathy.<sup>f</sup> *Sokr.*—You think philosophy not only a fine thing, but good? *Erast.*—Yes—very good. *Sokr.*—But is the case similar in regard to gymnastic? Is a man's bodily condition benefited by taking as much exercise, or as much nourishment, as possible? Is such very great quantity good for the body?<sup>g</sup>

Question put by Sokrates, What is philosophy? It is the perpetual accumulation of knowledge, so as to make the largest sum total.

It appears after some debate (in which the other or athletic Erastes sides with Sokrates<sup>h</sup>) that in regard to exercise and food, it is not the great quantity, or the small quantity, which is good for the body—but the moderate or measured quantity.<sup>i</sup> For the mind, the case is admitted to be similar. Not the *much*, nor the *little*, of learning is good for it—but the right or measured amount. *Sokr.*—And who

In the case of the body, it is not the maximum of exercise which does good, but the proper, measured, quantity. For the mind also, it is not the maxi-

<sup>e</sup> Plat. *Erast.* 133 A-B.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, *Erast.* 133 C. τὴν φιλοσοφίαν—πολυμάθειαν.

<sup>g</sup> Plat. *Erast.* 133 E.

<sup>h</sup> Plat. *Erast.* 134 B-C. The literary Erastes says to Sokrates, "To you I have no objection to concede this point, and to admit that my previous answer must be modified. But if I were to debate the point only with *him* (the athletic rival), I could perfectly well

have defended my answer, and even a worse answer still, for *he* is quite worthless (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔστι)."

This is a curious passage, illustrating the dialectic habits of the day, and the pride felt in maintaining an answer once given.

<sup>i</sup> Plato, *Erastæ*, 134 B-D. τὰ μέτρια μάλιστα ὠφελεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ πολλά, μηδὲ τὰ ὀλίγα.



mum of knowledge, but the measured quantity which is good. Who is the judge to determine this measure?

is the competent judge, how much of either is right measure for the body? *Erast.*—The physician and the gymnastic trainer. *Sokr.*—Who is the competent judge, how much seed is right measure for sowing a field? *Erast.*—The farmer. *Sokr.*—Who is the competent judge, in reference to the sowing and planting of knowledge in the mind, which varieties are good, and how much of each is right measure?

The question is one which none of the persons present can answer.<sup>k</sup> None of them can tell who is the special referee, about training of mind; corresponding to the physician or the farmer in the analogous cases. Sokrates then puts a question somewhat different: *Sokr.*—Since we have agreed, that the man who prosecutes philosophy ought not to learn many things, still less all things—what is the best conjecture that we can make, respecting the matters which he ought to learn? *Erast.*—The finest and most suitable acquirements for him to aim at, are, those which will yield to him the greatest reputation as a philosopher. He ought to appear accomplished in every variety of science, or at least in all the more important; and with that view, to learn as much of each as becomes a freeman to know:—that is, what belongs to the intelligent critic, as distinguished from the manual operative: to the planning and superintending architect, as distinguished from the working carpenter.<sup>l</sup> *Sokr.*—But you cannot learn even two different arts to this extent—much less several considerable arts. *Erast.*—I do not of course mean that the philosopher can be supposed to know each of them accurately, like the artist himself—but only as much as may be expected from the free and cultivated citizen. That is, he shall be able to appreciate, better than other hearers, the observations made by the artist; and farther to deliver a reasonable opinion of his own, so as to be accounted, by all the hearers, more accomplished in the affairs of the art than themselves.<sup>m</sup>

No answer given. What is the best conjecture? Answer of the literary Erastes. A man must learn that which will yield to him the greatest reputation as a philosopher—as much as will enable him to talk like an intelligent critic, though not to practise.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, *Erast.* 134 E, 135 A.

<sup>l</sup> Plat. *Erast.* 135 B. ὅσα ξυνέσεως | ἐχεται, μὴ ὅσα χειρουργίας.

<sup>m</sup> Plat. *Erast.* 135 D.

*Sokr.*—You mean that the philosopher is to be second-best in several distinct pursuits: like the Pentathlus, who is not expected to equal either the runner or the wrestler in their own separate departments, but only to surpass competitors in the five matches taken together.<sup>n</sup> *Erast.*—Yes—I mean what you say. He is one who does not enslave himself to any one matter, nor works out any one with such strictness as to neglect all others: he attends to all of them in reasonable measure.<sup>o</sup>

The philosopher is one who is second-best in several different arts—a Pentathlus—who talks well upon each.

Upon this answer Sokrates proceeds to cross-examine:—

*Sokr.*—Do you think that good men are useful, bad men useless? *Erast.*—Yes—I do. *Sokr.*—You think that philosophers, as you describe them, are useful? *Erast.*—Certainly: extremely useful. *Sokr.* But tell me on what occasions such second-best men are useful: for obviously they are inferior to each separate artist. If you fall sick, will you send for one of *them*, or for a professional physician? *Erast.*—I should send for both. *Sokr.*—That is no answer: I wish to know, which of the two you will send for, first and by preference? *Erast.*—No doubt—I shall send for the professional physician. *Sokr.*—The like also, if you are in danger on shipboard, you will entrust your life to the pilot rather than to the philosopher: and so as to all other matters, so long as a professional man is to be found, the philosopher is of no use? *Erast.*—So it appears. *Sokr.*—Our philosopher then is one of the useless persons: for we assuredly have professional men at hand. Now we agreed before, that good men were useful, bad men useless.<sup>p</sup> *Erast.*—Yes; that was agreed.

On what occasions can such second-best men be useful? There are always regular practitioners at hand, and no one will call in the second-best man when he can have the regular practitioner.

*Sokr.*—If then you have correctly defined a philosopher to be one who has a second-rate knowledge on many subjects, he is useless so long as there exist professional artists on each subject. Your definition cannot

Philosophy cannot consist in multiplication of learned acquirements.

<sup>n</sup> Plat. *Erast.* 135 E, 136 A. καὶ οὐτῶ γίγνεσθαι περὶ πάντα ὑπακρόν τινα ἄνδρα τῶν πεφιλοσοφηκότα. The five matches were leaping, running, throw-

ing the quoit and the javelin, wrestling.

<sup>o</sup> Plat. *Erast.* 136 B. ἀλλὰ πάντων μετρίως ἐφήθηται.

<sup>p</sup> Plat. *Erast.* 136 C-D.

not therefore be correct. Philosophy must be something quite apart from this multifarious and busy meddling with different professional subjects, or this multiplication of learned acquirements. Indeed I fancied, that to be absorbed in professional subjects and in variety of studies, was vulgar and discreditable rather than otherwise.<sup>9</sup>

Let us now however (continues Sokrates), take up the matter in another way. In regard to horses and dogs, those who punish rightly are also those who know how to make them better, and to discriminate with most exactness the good from the bad? *Erast.*—Yes: such is the fact.

*Sokr.*—Is not the case similar with men? Is it not the same art, which punishes men rightly, makes them better, and best distinguishes the good from the bad? whether applied to one, few, or many? *Erast.*—It is so.<sup>r</sup> *Sokr.*—The art or science, whereby men punish evil doers rightly, is the judicial or justice: and it is by the same that they know the good apart from the bad, either one or many. If any man be a stranger to this art, so as not to know good men apart from bad, is he not also ignorant of himself, whether he be a good or a bad man? *Erast.*—Yes: he is. *Sokr.*—To be ignorant of yourself, is to be wanting in sobriety or temperance; to know yourself is to be sober or temperate. But this is the same art as that by which we punish rightly—or justice. Therefore justice and temperance are the same: and the Delphian rescript, *Know thyself*, does in fact enjoin the practice both of justice and of sobriety.<sup>s</sup> *Erast.*—So it appears. *Sokr.*—Now it is by this same art, when practised by a king, rightly punishing evil-doers, that cities are well governed; it is by the same art practised by a private citizen or house-master, that the house is well-governed: so that this art, justice or sobriety, is at the same time political, regal, economical; and the just and sober man is at once the true king, statesman, house-master.<sup>t</sup> *Erast.*—I admit it.

*Sokr.*—Now let me ask you. You said that it was dis-

Sokrates changes his course of examination. Questions put to show that there is one special art, regal and political, of administering and discriminating the bad from the good.

<sup>9</sup> Plat. *Erast.* 137 B.  
<sup>r</sup> Plato, *Erast.* 137 C-D.

<sup>s</sup> Plato, *Erast.* 138 A.  
<sup>t</sup> Plato, *Erast.* 138 C.

creditable for the philosopher, when in company with a physician or any other craftsman talking about matters of his own craft, not to be able to follow what he said and comment upon it. Would it not also be discreditable to the philosopher, when listening to any king, judge, or house-master, about professional affairs, not to be able to understand and comment?

In this art the philosopher must not only be second-best, competent to talk—but he must be a fully qualified practitioner, competent to act.

*Erast.*—Assuredly it would be most discreditable upon matters of such grave moment. *Sokr.*—Shall we say then, that upon these matters also, as well as all others, the philosopher ought to be a Pentathlus or second-rate performer, useless so long as the special craftsman is at hand? or shall we not rather affirm, that he must not confide his own house to any one else, nor be the second-best within it, but must himself judge and punish rightly, if his house is to be well administered? *Erast.*—That too I admit. *Sokr.* Farther, if his friends shall entrust to him the arbitration of their disputes,—if the city shall command him to act as Dikast or to settle any difficulty,—in those cases also it will be disgraceful for him to stand second or third, and not to be first-rate? *Erast.*—I think it will be. *Sokr.*—You see then, my friend, philosophy is something very different from much learning and acquaintance with multifarious arts or sciences.<sup>x</sup>

Upon my saying this (so Sokrates concludes his recital of the conversation) the literary one of the two rivals was ashamed and held his peace; while the gymnastic rival declared that I was in the right, and the other hearers also commended what I had said.

Close of the dialogue — Humiliation of the literary Erastes.

The antithesis between the philo-gymnast, hater of philosophy,—and the enthusiastic admirer of philosophy, who nevertheless cannot explain what it is—gives much point and vivacity to this short dialogue.

Remarks— Animated manner of the dialogue.

<sup>u</sup> Plato, *Erast.* 138 E. Πότερον οὖν καὶ περὶ ταῦτα λέγωμεν, πένταθλον αὐτὸν δεῖν εἶναι καὶ ὑπακρον, τὰ δευτερεία ἔχοντα πάντων, τὸν φιλόσοφον, καὶ ἀρχαίον εἶναι ἕως ἂν τούτων τις ᾖ; ἢ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν οὐκ ἄλλω ἐπιτροπέτον οὐδὲ τὰ δευτερεία ἐν τούτῳ

ἐκτέον, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν κολαστέον δικάζοντα ὀρθῶς, εἰ μέλλει εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι αὐτοῦ ἢ οἰκία;

<sup>x</sup> Plato, *Erast.* 139 A. Πολλοὺ ἔρα δεῖ ἡμῖν, ὃ βέλτιστε, τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν πολυμάθειά τε εἶναι καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰς τέχνας πραγματεία.

This last person is exhibited as somewhat presumptuous and confident; thus affording a sort of excuse for the humiliating cross-examination put upon him by Sokrates, to the satisfaction of his stupid rival. Moreover, the dramatic introduction is full of animation, like that of the Charmidês and Lysis.

Besides the animated style of the dialogue, the points raised for discussion in it are of much interest. The word philosophy has at all times been vague and ambiguous. Certainly no one before Sokrates—probably no one before Plato—ever sought a definition of it. In no other Platonic dialogue than this, is the definition of it made a special topic of research.

It is here handled in Plato's negative, elenctic, tentative, manner. By some of his contemporaries, philosophy was really considered as equivalent to polymathy, or to much and varied knowledge: so at least Plato represents it as being considered by Hippias the Sophist, contrary to the opinion of Protagoras.<sup>7</sup> The exception taken by Sokrates to a definition founded on simple quantity, without any standard point of sufficiency by which much or little is to be measured, introduces that governing idea of τὸ μέτριον (the moderate, that which conforms to a standard measure) upon which Plato insists so much in other more elaborate dialogues. The conception of a measure, of a standard of measurement—and of conformity thereunto, as the main constituent of what is good and desirable—stands prominent in his mind,<sup>8</sup> though it is not always handled in the same way. We have seen it, in the Second Alkibiadês, indicated under another name as knowledge of Good or of the Best: without which, knowledge on special matters was declared to be hurtful rather than useful.<sup>9</sup> Plato considers that this Measure is neither discernible nor applicable except by a specially trained intelligence. In the Erastæ, as elsewhere, such an intelligence is called for

<sup>7</sup> Plato, Protag. 318 E. Compare too, the Platonic dialogues, Hippias Major and Minor.

<sup>8</sup> See about ἡ τοῦ μετρίου φύσις, as οὐσία—as ὄντως γινόμενον.—Plato, Politikus, 283-284. Compare also the

Philêbus, p. 64 D, and the Protagoras, pp. 356-357, where ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη is declared to be the principal saviour of life and happiness.

<sup>9</sup> Plato, Alkib. ii. 145-146; supra, ch. x. p. 346.

in general terms: but when it is asked, Where is the person possessing such intelligence, available in the case of mental training—neither Sokrates nor any one else can point him out. To suggest a question, and direct attention to it, yet still to leave it unanswered—is a practice familiar with Plato. In this respect the *Erastæ* is like other dialogues. The answer, if any, intended to be understood or divined, is, that such an intelligence is the philosopher himself.

The second explanation of philosophy here given—that the philosopher is one who is second-best in many departments, and a good talker upon all, but inferior to the special master in each—was supposed by Thrasyllus in ancient times to be pointed at Demokritus. By many Platonic critics, it is referred to those persons whom they single out to be called Sophists. I conceive it to be applicable (whether intended or not) to the literary men generally of that age, the persons called Sophists included. That which Perikles expressed by the word, when he claimed the love of wisdom and the love of beauty as characteristic features of the Athenian citizen—referred chiefly to the free and abundant discussion, the necessity felt by every one for talking over every thing before it was done, yet accompanied with full energy in action as soon as the resolution was taken to act.<sup>b</sup> Speech, ready and pertinent, free conflict of opinion on many different topics—was the manifestation and the measure of knowledge acquired. Sokrates passed his life in talking, with every one indiscriminately, and upon each man's particular subject; often perplexing the artist himself. Xenophon recounts conversations with various professional men—a painter, a sculptor, an armourer—and informs us that it was instructive to all of them, though Sokrates was no practitioner in any craft.<sup>c</sup> It was not merely Demokritus, but Plato and Aristotle also, who talked or wrote upon almost every subject included in

View taken of the second-best critical talking man, as compared with the special proficient and practitioner.

<sup>b</sup> Thucyd. ii. 40. *καὶ ἐν τε τοῦτοις τὴν πόλιν ἀξίαν εἶναι θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ ἔτι ἐν ἄλλοις. φιλοκαλοῦμεν γὰρ μετ' εὐτελείας, καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἕνευ μαλακίας, &c.*, and the remarkable sequel of

the same chapter about the intimate conjunction of abundant speech with energetic action in the Athenian character. <sup>c</sup> Xenophon, Memor. iii. 10, iii. 11, iii. 12.

contemporary observation. The voluminous works of Aristotle,—the *Timæus*, *Republic*, and *Leges*, of Plato,—embrace a large variety of subjects, on each of which, severally taken, these two great men were second-best or inferior to some special proficient. Yet both of them had judgments to give, which it was important to hear, upon all subjects:<sup>d</sup> and both of them could probably talk better upon each than the special proficient himself. Aristotle, for example, would write better upon rhetoric than Demosthenes—upon tragedy, than Sophokles. Undoubtedly, if an oration or a tragedy were to be composed—if resolution or action were required on any real state of particular circumstances—the special proficient would be called upon to act: but it would be a mistake to infer from hence, as the Platonic Sokrates intimates in the *Erastæ*, that the second-best, or theorizing reasoner, was a useless man. The theoretical and critical point of view, with the command of language apt for explaining and defending it, has a value of its own; distinct from, yet ultimately modifying and improving, the practical. And such comprehensive survey and comparison of numerous objects, without having the attention exclusively fastened or enslaved to any one of them, deserves to rank high as a variety of intelligence—whether it be adopted as the definition of a philosopher, or not.

Plato undoubtedly did not conceive the definition of the philosopher in the same way as Sokrates. The close of the *Erastæ* is employed in opening a distant and dim view of the Platonic conception. We are given to understand, that the philosopher has a province of his own, wherein he is not second-best, but a first-rate actor and adviser. To indicate, in many different ways, that there is or must be such a peculiar, appertaining to philosophy—distinct from, though analogous to, the peculiar of each several art—is one leading

Plato's view  
—that the  
philosopher  
has a pro-  
vince special  
to himself,  
distinct from  
other special-  
ties—dimly  
indicated—  
regal or poli-  
tical art.

<sup>d</sup> The *πένταθλος* or *ἕπακτος*, whom Plato criticises in this dialogue, coincides with what Aristotle calls “the man of universal education or culture.”—*Ethic. Nikom.* I. i. 1095 a. 1.

ἕκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἃ γινώσκει, καὶ τούτων ἔστιν ἀγαθὸς κριτῆς· καθ' ἕκαστον ἄρα, ὁ πεπαιδευμένος· ἀπλῶς δὲ, ὁ περὶ πάντων πεπαιδευμένος.

purpose in many Platonic dialogues. But what is the peculiar of the philosopher? Here, as elsewhere, it is marked out in a sort of misty outline, not as by one who already knows and is familiar with it, but as one who is trying to find it without being sure that he has succeeded. Here, we have it described as the art of discriminating good from evil, governing, and applying penal sanctions rightly. This is the supreme art or science, of which the philosopher is the professor; and in which, far from requiring advice from others, he is the only person competent both to advise and to act: the art which exercises control over all other special arts, directing how far, and on what occasions, each of them comes into appliance. It is philosophy, looked at in one of its two aspects: not as a body of speculative truth, to be debated, proved, and discriminated from what cannot be proved or can be disproved—but as a critical judgment bearing on actual life, prescribing rules or giving directions in particular cases, with a view to the attainment of foreknown ends, recognised as *expetenda*.<sup>e</sup> This is what Plato understands by the measuring or calculating art, the regal or political art, according as we use the language of the Protagoras, Politikus, Euthydêmus, Republic. Both justice and sobriety are branches of this art; and the distinction between the two loses its importance when the art is considered as a whole—as we find both in the Erastæ and in the Republic.<sup>f</sup>

Here, in the Erastæ, this conception of the philosopher as the supreme artist controlling all other artists, is darkly indicated and crudely sketched. We shall find the same conception more elaborately illustrated in other dialogues; yet never passing out of that state of dreamy grandeur which characterises Plato as an expositor.

<sup>e</sup> The difference between the second explanation of philosophy and the third explanation, suggested in the Erastæ, will be found to coincide pretty nearly with the distinction which Aristotle takes much pains to draw between σοφία and φρόνησις.—Ethic. Nikomach.

vi. 5, pp. 1140-1141; also Ethic. Magn. i. pp. 1197-1198.

<sup>f</sup> See Republic, iv. 433 A; Gorgias, 526 C; Charmidês, 164 B; and Heindorf's note on the passage in the Charmidês.



## APPENDIX.

This is one of the dialogues declared to be spurious by Schleiermacher, Ast, Socher, and Stallbaum,—all of them critics of the present century. In my judgment, their grounds for such declaration are altogether inconclusive. They think the dialogue an inferior composition, unworthy of Plato; and they accordingly find reasons, more or less ingenious, for relieving Plato from the discredit of it. I do not think so meanly of the dialogue as they do; but even if I did, I should not pronounce it to be spurious, without some evidence bearing upon that special question. No such evidence, of any value, is produced.

It is indeed contended, on the authority of a passage in Diogenes (ix. 37), that Thrasyllus himself doubted of the authenticity of the Erastæ. The passage is as follows, in his life of Demokritus—*εἶπερ οἱ Ἀντερασταὶ Πλάτωνός εἰσι, φησὶ Θράσυλλος, οὗτος δὲν εἶη ὁ παραγενόμενος ἀνώνυμος, τῶν περὶ Οἰνοσίδην καὶ Ἀναξάγοραν ἔτερος, ἐν τῇ πρὸς Σωκράτην ὁμιλίᾳ διαλεγόμενος περὶ φιλοσοφίας· φησὶν, ὡς πεντάθλαφ ἔοικεν ὁ φιλόσοφος· καὶ ἦν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ πένταθλος* (Demokritus).

Now, in the first place, Schleiermacher and Stallbaum both declare that Thrasyllus can never have said that which Diogenes here makes him say (Schleierm. p. 510; Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad Erast. p. 266, and not. p. 273).

Next, it is certain that Thrasyllus did consider it the undoubted work of Plato, for he enrolled it in his classification, as the third dialogue in the fourth tetralogy (Diog. L. iii. 59).

Yxem, who defends the genuineness of the Erastæ (Ueber Platon's Kleitophon, pp. 6-7, Berlin, 1846), insists very properly on this point; not merely as an important fact in itself, but as determining the sense of the words *εἶπερ οἱ Ἀντερασταὶ Πλάτωνός εἰσι*, and as showing that the words rather affirm, than deny, the authenticity of the dialogue. "If the Anterastæ are the work of Plato, *as they are universally admitted to be.*" You must supply the parenthesis in this way, in order to make Thrasyllus consistent with himself. Yxem cites a passage from Galen, in which *εἶπερ* is used, and in which the parenthesis must be supplied in the way indicated: no doubt at all being meant to be hinted. And I will produce another passage out of Diogenes himself, where *εἶπερ* is used in the same way; not as intended to convey the smallest doubt, but merely introducing the premiss for a conclusion immediately following. Diogenes says, respecting the Platonic Ideas, *εἶπερ ἐστὶ μνήμη, τὰς ἰδέας ἐν τοῖς οὐδὲν ὑπάρχειν* (iii. 15). He does not intend to suggest any doubt whether there be such a fact as memory. *Εἶπερ* is sometimes the equivalent of *ἐπειδήπερ*: as we learn from Hermann ad Viger. VIII. 6 p. 512.

There is therefore no fair ground for supposing that Thrasyllus doubted the genuineness of the Erastæ. And when I read what modern critics say in support of their verdict of condemnation, I feel the more authorised in dissenting from it. I will cite a passage or two from Stallbaum.

Stallbaum begins his Prolegomena as follows, pp. 205-206: "Quamquam hic libellus genus dicendi habet purum, castum, elegans, nihil ut inveniri queat quod à Platonis aut Xenophontis elegantia abhorreat—tamen quin à Boeckhio, Schleiermachero, Astio, Sochero, Knebelio, aliis jure meritoque pro suspectio-

habitus sit, haudquaquam dubitamus. Est enim materia operis adeo non ad Platonis mentem rationemque elaborata, ut potius cuivis alii Socraticorum quam huic rectè ascribi posse videatur."

After stating that the Erastæ may be divided into two principal sections, Stallbaum proceeds:—"Neutra harum ita tractata est, ut nihil desideretur, quod ad justam argumenti explicationem merito requiras—nihil inculcatum reperiatur, quod vel alio modo illustratum vel omnino omissum esse cupias."

I call attention to this sentence as a fair specimen of the grounds upon which the Platonic critics proceed when they strike dialogues out of the Platonic Canon. If there be anything wanting in it which is required for what they consider a proper setting forth of the argument—if there be anything which they would desire to see omitted or otherwise illustrated—this is with them a reason for deciding that it is not Plato's work. That is, if there be any defects in it of any kind, it cannot be admitted as Plato's work;—*his genuine works have no defects*. I protest altogether against this *ratio decidendi*. If I acknowledged it and applied it consistently I should strike out every dialogue in the Canon. Certainly, the presumption in favour of the Catalogue of Thrasyllus must be counted as *nil*: if it will not outweigh such feeble counter-arguments as these.

One reason given by Stallbaum for considering the Erastæ as spurious is, that the Sophists are not derided in it. "Quis est igitur, qui Platonem sibi persuadeat illos non fuisse castigatum, et omnino non significatum, quinam illi essent, adversus quos hanc disputationem instituisset?" It is strange to be called on by learned men to strike out all dialogues from the Canon in which there is no derision of the Sophists. Such derision exists already in excess: we hear until we are tired how mean it is to receive money for lecturing. Again, Stallbaum says that the persons whose opinions are here attacked are not specified by name. But who are the εἰδῶν φίλοι attacked in the Sophistês? They are not specified by name, and critics differ as to the persons intended.

## CHAPTER XV.

## I O N.

THE dialogue called Ion is carried on between Sokrates and the Ephesian rhapsode Ion. It is among those disallowed by Ast, first faintly defended, afterwards disallowed, by Schleiermacher,<sup>a</sup> and treated contemptuously by both. Subsequent critics, Hermann,<sup>b</sup> Stallbaum, Steinhart, consider it as genuine, yet as an inferior production, of little worth, and belonging to Plato's earliest years.

Ion. Persons of the dialogue. Difference of opinion among modern critics, as to its genuineness.

I hold it to be genuine, and it may be comparatively early :

Rhapsodes as a class in Greece. They competed for prizes at the festivals. Ion has been triumphant.

but I see no ground for the disparaging criticism which has often been applied to it. The personage whom it introduces to us as subjected to the cross-examination of Sokrates is, a rhapsode of celebrity ; one among a class of artists at that time both useful and esteemed. They recited or sang,<sup>c</sup> with appropriate accent and gesture, the compositions of Homer and of other epic poets : thus serving to the Grecian epic, the same purpose as the actors served to the dramatic, and the harp-singers (*κιθαρῳδοὶ*) to the lyric. There were various solemn festivals, such as that of Æsculapius at Epidaurus, and (most especially) the Panathenæa at Athens, where prizes were awarded for the competition of the rhapsodes. Ion is described as having competed triumphantly in the festival at Epidaurus, and carried off the first prize. He appeared there in a splendid costume, crowned with a golden wreath, amidst a crowd which is described as containing more than 20,000 persons.<sup>d</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Schleiermacher, Einleit. zum Ion, pp. 261-266 ; Ast, Leben und Schriften des Platon, p. 466.

<sup>b</sup> K. F. Hermann, Gesch. und Syst. der Plat. Phil. pp. 437-438 ; Steinhart,

Einleitung, p. 15.

<sup>c</sup> The word ῥᾷεν is in this very dialogue (532 E, 535 A) applied to the rhapsodizing of Ion.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Ion, 535 D.

Much of the acquaintance of cultivated Greeks with Homer and the other epic poets was both acquired and maintained through such rhapsodes; the best of whom contended at the festivals, while others, less highly gifted as to vocal power and gesticulation, gave separate declamations and lectures of their own, and even private lessons to individuals.<sup>e</sup>

Functions of the Rhapsodes. Iticitation—Exposition of the poets. Arbitrary exposition of the poets was then frequent.

Euthydêmus, in one of the Xenophontic conversations with Sokrates, and Antisthenes in the Xenophontic Symposium, are made to declare that the rhapsodes as a class were extremely silly. This, if true at all, can apply only to the expositions and comments with which they accompanied their recital of Homer and other poets. Moreover we cannot reasonably set it down (though some modern critics do so) as so much incontestable truth: we must consider it as an opinion delivered by one of the speakers in the conversation, but not necessarily well founded.<sup>f</sup> Unquestionably, the comments made upon Homer (both in that age and afterwards) were often fanciful and misleading. Metrodorus, Anaxagoras, and others, resolved the Homeric narrative into various allegories, physical, ethical, and theological: and most men who had an opinion to defend, rejoiced to be able to support or enforce it by some passages of Homer, well or ill-explained—just as texts of the Bible are quoted in modern times. In this manner, Homer was pressed into the service of every disputant; and the Homeric poems were presented as containing, or at least as implying, doctrines quite foreign to the age in which they were composed.<sup>g</sup>

The rhapsodes, in so far as they interpreted Homer, were probably not less disposed than others to discover in him

<sup>e</sup> Xenoph. Sympos. iii. 6. Nikêratus says that he heard the rhapsodes nearly every day. He professes to be able to repeat both the Iliad and the Odyssey from memory.

<sup>f</sup> Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 2, 10; Sympos. iii. 6; Plato, Ion, 530 E.

Steinhart cites this judgment about the rhapsodes as if it had been pronounced by the Xenophontic Sokrates himself, which is not the fact (Stein-

hart, Einleitung, p. 3).

<sup>g</sup> Diogenes Laert. ii. 11; Nitzsch, Die Heldensage der Griechen, pp. 74-78; Lobeck, Aglaophamus, p. 157.

Seneca, Epistol. 88: "modo Stoicum Homerum faciunt—modo Epicureum . . . modo Peripateticum, tria genera bonorum inducentem: modo Academicum, incerta omnia dicentem. Apparet nihil horum esse in illo, cui omnia iusunt: ista enim inter se dissident."

their own fancies. But the character in which they acquired most popularity, was, not as expositors, but as reciters, of the poems. The powerful emotion which, in the process of reciting, they both felt themselves, and communicated to their auditors, is declared in this dialogue: "When that which I recite is pathetic" (says Ion), "my eyes are filled with tears: when it is awful or terrible, my hair stands on end, and my heart leaps. Moreover I see the spectators also weeping, sympathising with my emotions, and looking aghast at what they hear."<sup>h</sup> This assertion of the vehement emotional effect produced by the words of the poet as declaimed or sung by the rhapsode, deserves all the more credit—because Plato himself, far from looking upon it favourably, either derides or disapproves it. Accepting it as a matter of fact, we see that the influence of rhapsodes, among auditors generally, must have been derived more from their efficacy as actors than from their ability as expositors.

The popularity of the Rhapsodes was chiefly derived from their recitation. Powerful effect which they produced.

Ion however is described in this dialogue as combining the two functions of reciter and expositor: a partnership like that of Garrick and Johnson, in regard to Shakspeare. It is in the last of the two functions, that Sokrates here examines him: considering Homer, not as a poet appealing to the emotions of hearers, but as a teacher administering lessons and imparting instruction. Such was the view of Homer entertained by a large proportion of the Hellenic world. In that capacity, his poems served as a theme for rhapsodes, as well as for various philosophers and Sophists who were not rhapsodes, nor accomplished reciters.

Ion both reciter and expositor—Homer was considered more as an instructor than as a poet.

The reader must keep in mind, in following the questions put by Sokrates, that this pædagogic and edifying view of Homer is the only one present to the men of the Sokratic school—and especially to Plato. Of the genuine functions of the gifted poet, who touches

Plato disregards and disapproves the poetic or emotional working.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Ion, 535 D-E.

The description here given is the more interesting because it is the only intimation remaining of the strong effect produced by these rhapsodic representations.

the chords of strong and diversified emotion—"qui pectus inaniter angit, Irritat, mulcet, falsis terroribus implet" (Horat. Epist. II. 1, 212) — Plato takes no account: or rather, he declares open war against them, either as childish delusions,<sup>i</sup> or as mischievous stimulants, tending to exalt the unruly elements of the mind, and to overthrow the sovereign authority of reason. We shall find farther manifestations on this point in the Republic and Leges.

Ion professes to have devoted himself to the study of Homer exclusively, neglecting other poets: so that he can interpret the thoughts, and furnish reflexions upon them, better than any other expositor.<sup>k</sup> How does it happen (asks Sokrates) that you have so much to say about Homer, and nothing at all about other poets? Homer may be the best of all poets: but he is still only one of those who exercise the poetic art, and he must necessarily talk about the same subjects as other poets. Now the art of poetry is *One* altogether—like that of painting, sculpture, playing on the flute, playing on the harp, rhapsodizing, &c.<sup>l</sup> Whoever is competent to judge and explain one artist,—what he has done well and what he has done ill,—is competent also to judge any other artist in the same profession.

Ion devoted himself to Homer exclusively. Questions of Sokrates to him—How happens it that you cannot talk equally upon other poets? The poetic art is one.

I cannot explain to you how it happens (replies Ion): I only know the fact incontestably—that when I talk about Homer, my thoughts flow abundantly, and every one tells me that my discourse is excellent. Quite the reverse, when I talk of any other poet.<sup>m</sup>

I can explain it (says Sokrates). Your talent in expounding Homer is not an art, acquired by system and method—otherwise it would have been applicable to other poets besides. It is a special gift, imparted to you by divine power and inspiration. The like

Explanation given by Sokrates. Both the Rhapsode and the Poet work, not by art and

<sup>i</sup> The question of Sokrates (Ion, 535 D), about the emotion produced in the hearers by the recital of Homer's poetry, bears out what is here asserted.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Ion, 536 E.

<sup>l</sup> Plato, Ion, 531 A, 532 D. ποιη-

τικη γάρ που ἔστι τὸ ἄλουν. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴν λάβῃ τις καὶ ἕλλην τέχνην ἤντιν' οὖν ἄλην, ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος τῆς σκέψεως ἔστι περὶ ἀπασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν, 533 A.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Ion, 533 C.

system, but by divine inspiration. Fine poets are bereft of their reason, and possessed by inspiration from some God.

is true of the poet whom you expound. His genius does not spring from art, system, or method: it is a special gift emanating from the inspiration of the Muses.<sup>a</sup> A poet is a light, airy, holy, person, who cannot compose verses at all, so long as his reason remains within him.<sup>o</sup> The Muses take away his reason, substituting in place of it their own divine inspiration and special impulse, either towards epic, dithyramb, encomiastic hymns, hyporchemata, &c., one or other of these. Each poet receives one of these special gifts, but is incompetent for any of the others: whereas, if their ability had been methodical or artistic, it would have displayed itself in all of them alike. Like prophets, and deliverers of oracles, these poets have their reason taken away, and become servants of the Gods.<sup>p</sup> It is not *they* who, bereft of their reason, speak in such sublime strains: it is the God who speaks to us, and speaks through them. You may see this by Tynnichus of Chalkis; who composed his Pæan, the finest of all Pæans, which is in every one's mouth, telling us himself, that it was the invention of the Muses—but who never composed any thing else worth hearing. It is through this worthless poet that the God has sung the most sublime hymn:<sup>q</sup> for the express purpose of showing us that these fine compositions are not human performances at all, but divine: and that the poet is only an interpreter of the Gods, possessed by one or other of them, as the case may be.

Homer is thus (continues Sokrates) not a man of art or reason, but the interpreter of the Gods; deprived of his

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Ion, 533 E. πάντες γὰρ οἱ τε τῶν ἐπῶν ποιητὰ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οὐκ ἐκ τέχνης ἀλλ' ἐνθεοὶ ὄντες καὶ κατεχόμενοι πάντα ταῦτα τὰ καλὰ λέγουσι ποιήματα, καὶ οἱ μελοποιοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὡσαύτως ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες οὐκ ἔμφρονες ὄντες ὀρχοῦνται, οὕτω καὶ οἱ μελοποιοὶ οὐκ ἔμφρονες ὄντες τὰ καλὰ μέλη ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, &c.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Ion, 531 A. κοῦφον γὰρ χρῆμα ποιητῆς ἔστι καὶ πτηνὸν καὶ ἱερὸν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον οἷός τε ποιεῖν πρὶν ἂν ἐνθεὸς τε γένηται καὶ ἔκφρων καὶ ὁ νοῦς μηκέτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνῆ: ἕως δ' ἂν

τοῦτ' ἔχη τὸ κτῆμα, ἀδύνατος πᾶς ποιεῖν ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος καὶ χρησμοφθεῖν.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Ion, 534 C. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἐξαιρούμενος τούτων τὸν νοῦν τούτους χρῆται ἐπηρέταις καὶ τοῖς χρησμοφοῖς καὶ τοῖς μάντεσι τοῖς θεοῖς, ἵν' ἡμεῖς οἱ ἀκούοντες εἰδῶμεν, ὅτι οὐχ οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες οὕτω πολλοῦ ἄξια, ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἔστιν ὁ λέγων, διὰ τούτων δὲ φθέγγεται πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, Ion, 534 E. ταῦτ' ἐνδεικνύμενος ὁ θεὸς ἐξεπίτηδες διὰ τοῦ φανλοτάτου ποιητοῦ τὸ κάλλιστον μέλος ᾄσεν.

reason, but possessed, inspired, by them. You, Ion, are the interpreter of Homer: and the divine inspiration, carrying away your reason, is exercised over you through him. It is in this way that the influence of the Magnet is shown, attracting and holding up successive stages of iron rings.<sup>f</sup> The first ring is in contact with the Magnet itself: the second is suspended to the first, the third to the second, and so on. The attractive influence of the Magnet is thus transmitted through a succession of different rings, so as to keep suspended several which are a good way removed from itself. So the influence of the Gods is exerted directly and immediately upon Homer: through him, it passes by a second stage to you: through him and you, it passes by a third stage to those auditors whom you so powerfully affect and delight, becoming however comparatively enfeebled at each stage of transition.

Analogy of the Magnet, which holds up by attraction successive stages of iron rings. The Gods first inspire Homer, then act through him and through Ion upon the auditors.

This remarkable passage—with the comparison given by Sokrates, curious for its early description of the working of the Magnet—forms the central point or kernel of the dialogue called Ion. It is an expansion of a judgment delivered by Sokrates himself in his Apology to the Dikasts, and it is repeated in more than one place by Plato.<sup>g</sup> Sokrates declares in his Apology that he had applied his testing cross-examination to several excellent poets, and that finding them unable to give any rational account of their own compositions, he concluded that they composed without any wisdom of their own, under the same inspiration as prophets and declarers of oracles. In the dialogue before us, this thought is strikingly illustrated and amplified.

This comparison forms the central point of the dialogue. It is an expansion of a judgment delivered by Sokrates in the Apology.

The contrast between systematic, professional, procedure, deliberately taught and consciously acquired, capable of being defended at every step by appeal to intelligible rules founded upon scientific theory, and enabling the person so qualified to impart his quali-

Platonic antithesis: Systematic procedure distinguished from unsystematic:

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Ion, 533 E.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Apol. Sokr. p. 22 D; Plato, Menon, p. 99 D.



which latter was either blind routine, or madness inspired by the Gods. Varieties of madness, good and bad.

fication to others—and a different procedure purely impulsive and unthinking, whereby the agent, having in his mind a conception of the end aimed at, proceeds from one intermediate step to another, without knowing why he does so or how he has come to do so, and without being able to explain his practice if questioned or to impart it to others—this contrast is a favourite one with Plato. The last-mentioned procedure—the unphilosophical or irrational—he conceives under different aspects: sometimes as a blind routine or insensibly acquired habit,<sup>†</sup> sometimes as a stimulus applied from without by some God, superseding the reason of the individual. Such a condition Plato calls *madness*, and he considers those under it as persons out of their senses. But he recognises different varieties of madness, according to the God from whom it came: the bad madness was a disastrous visitation and dis-temper—the good madness was a privilege and blessing, an inspiration superior to human reason. Among these privileged madmen he reckoned prophets and poets; another variety under the same genus, is, that mental love, between a well-trained adult and a beautiful, intelligent, youth, which he regards as the most exalted of all human emotions.<sup>‡</sup> In the *Ion*, this idea of a privileged madness—inspiration from the Gods superseding reason—is applied not only to the poet, but also to the rhapsode who recites the poem, and even to the auditors whom he addresses. The poet receives the inspiration directly from the Gods: he inoculates the rhapsode with it, who again inoculates the auditors—the fervour is, at each successive communication, diminished. The auditor represents the last of the rings; held in suspension, through the intermediate agency of other rings, by the inherent force of the magnet.<sup>§</sup>

We must remember, that privileged communications from the Gods to men, and special persons recipient thereof, were

<sup>†</sup> Plato, *Phædon*, p. 82 A; *Gorgias*, 463 A, 465 A.

<sup>‡</sup> This doctrine is set forth at length by Sokrates in the Platonic *Phædrus*, in the second discourse of Sokrates

about Eros, pp. 244-245-249 D.

<sup>§</sup> Plato, *Ion*, 535 E. οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ θεατῆς τῶν δακτυλίων ὁ ἔσχατος . . . ὁ δὲ μέσος σὺ ὁ ραψωδὸς καὶ ὑποκριτής, ὁ δὲ πρῶτος, αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητής.

acknowledged and witnessed everywhere as a constant phenomenon of Grecian life. There were not only numerous oracular temples, which every one could visit to ask questions in matters of doubt—but also favoured persons who had received from the Gods the gift of predicting the future, of interpreting omens, of determining the good or bad indications furnished by animals sacrificed.<sup>γ</sup> In every town or village,—or wherever any body of men were assembled,—there were always persons who prophesied or delivered oracles, and to whom special revelations were believed to be vouchsafed, during periods of anxiety. No one was more familiar with this fact than the Sokratic disciples: for Sokrates himself had perhaps a greater number of special communications from the Gods than any man of his age: his divine sign having begun when he was a child, and continuing to move him frequently, even upon small matters, until his death: though the revelations were for the most part negative, not affirmative—telling him often what was not to be done—seldom what was to be done—resembling in this respect his own dialogues with other persons. Moreover Sokrates inculcated upon his friends emphatically, that they ought to have constant recourse to prophecy: that none but impious men neglected to do so: that the benevolence of the Gods was nowhere more conspicuous than in their furnishing such special revelations and warnings, to persons whom they favoured: that the Gods administered the affairs of the world partly upon principles of regular sequence, so that men by diligent study might learn what they were to expect,—but partly also, and by design, in a manner irregular and undecipherable, such that it could not be fathomed by any human

Special inspiration from the Gods was a familiar fact in Grecian life. Privileged communications from the Gods to Sokrates—his firm belief in them.

<sup>γ</sup> Not only the *χρησμόλογοι, μάντις*, oracular temples, &c., are often mentioned in Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, &c., but Aristotle also recognises *οἱ νυμφόληπτοι καὶ θεόληπτοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπιτροπία δαιμονίου τινος ὡς περ ἐνθουσιάζοντες*, as a real and known class of persons. See Ethic. Eudem. i. p. 1214, a. 23; Ethic. Magna,

ii. p. 1207, b. 8.

The *μάντις* is a recognised profession, the gift of Apollo, not merely according to Homer, but according to Solon (Frag. xi. 52, Schn.).

<sup>δ</sup> Ἄλλου μάντιν ἔθηκεν ἄναξ ἐκάεργος  
<sup>ε</sup> Ἀπόλλων,  
 ἔγνω δ' ἀνδρὶ κακὸν τήλοθεν ἐρχόμενον, &c.

study, and could not be understood except through direct and special revelation from themselves.<sup>2</sup>

Here, as well as elsewhere, Plato places inspiration, both of the prophet and the poet, in marked contrast with reason and intelligence. Reason is supposed to be for the time withdrawn or abolished, and inspiration is introduced by the Gods into its place. "When Monarch Reason sleeps, this mimic wakes." The person inspired (prophet or poet) becomes for the time the organ of an extraneous agency, speaking what he neither originates nor understands. The genuine gift of prophecy<sup>a</sup> (Plato says) attaches only to a disabled, enfeebled, distempered, condition of the intelligence: the gift of poetry is conferred by the Gods upon the most inferior men, as we see by the case of Tynnichus—whose sublime pæan shows us, that it is the Gods alone who utter fine poetry through the organs of a person himself thoroughly incompetent.

It is thus that Plato, setting before himself a process of systematised reason,—originating in a superior intellect, laying down universal principles and deducing consequences from them—capable of being consistently applied, designedly taught, and defended against objections—enumerates the various mental conditions opposed to it, and ranks inspiration as one of them. In this dialogue, Sokrates seeks to prove that the success of Ion as a rhapsode depends upon his being out of his mind or inspired. But Ion does not accept the compliment: *Ion*.—You speak well, Sokrates; but I should be surprised if you spoke well enough to create in me the new conviction, that I am possessed and mad when I eulogize Homer. I do not

<sup>2</sup> These views of Sokrates are declared in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon, i. 1, 6-10, i. 4, 2-18, iv. 3, 12.

It is plain from Xenophon (*Mem. i. 1, 3*) that many persons were offended with Sokrates because they believed—or at least because he affirmed—that he received more numerous and special revelations from the Gods than any one else.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, 71 E. *ικανὸν δὲ*

*σημείον ὡς μαντικὴν ἀφροσύνη θεὸς ἀνθρωπίνῃ δέδωκεν· οὐδέ τις γὰρ ἔννοος ἐφάπτεται μαντικῆς ἐνθέου καὶ ἀληθοῦς, ἀλλ' ἢ καθ' ἕπνον τὴν τῆς προλήσεως πεδηθεὶς δύναμιν, ἢ διὰ νόσον ἢ τινα ἐνθουσιασμὸν παραλλάξας.*

Compare Plato, *Menon*, pp. 99-100. *οἱ χρησμοφοδοὶ τε καὶ οἱ θεομάντεις . . . λέγουσι μὲν ἀληθῆ καὶ πολλὰ, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι.* Compare Plato, *Leg. iv. 719.*

think that you would even yourself say so, if you heard me discourse on the subject.<sup>b</sup>

*Sokr.*—But Homer talks upon all subjects. Upon which of them can you discourse? *Ion.*—Upon all. *Sokr.*—Not surely upon such as belong to special arts, professions. Each portion of the matter of knowledge is included under some special art, and is known through that art by those who possess it. Thus, you and I, both of us, know the number of our fingers; we know it through the same art, which both of us possess—the arithmetical. But Homer talks of matters belonging to many different arts or occupations, that of the physician, the charioteer, the fisherman, &c. You cannot know these; since you do not belong to any of these professions, but are a rhapsode. Describe to me what are the matters included in the rhapsodic art. The rhapsodic art is one art by itself, distinct from the medical and others: it cannot know every thing; tell me what matters come under its special province.<sup>c</sup> *Ion.*—The rhapsodic art does not know what belongs to any one of the other special arts: but that of which it takes cognizance, and that which I know, is, what is becoming and suitable to each variety of character described by Homer: to a man or woman—to a freeman or slave—to the commander who gives orders or to the subordinate who obeys them, &c. This is what belongs to the peculiar province of the rhapsode to appreciate and understand.<sup>d</sup> *Sokr.*—Will the rhapsode know what is suitable for the commander of a ship to say to his seamen, during a dangerous storm, better than the pilot? Will the rhapsode know what is suitable for one who gives directions about the treatment of a sick man, better than the physician? Will the rhapsode know what is suitable to be said by the herdsman when the cattle are savage and distracted, or to the female slaves when busy in spinning? *Ion.*—No: the rhapsode will not know these things so well as the pilot, the

Homer talks upon all subjects—is Ion competent to explain what Homer says upon all of them? Rhapsodic art. What is its province?

<sup>b</sup> Plato, *Ion*, 536 E.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, *Ion*, 538-539.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, *Ion*, 540 A. ἂ τῷ ῥαψωδῶ

προσῆκει καὶ σκοπεῖσθαι καὶ διακρίνειν  
παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους, 539 E.

physician, the grazier, the mistress, &c.<sup>e</sup> *Sokr.*—Will the rhapsode know what is suitable for the military commander to say, when he is exhorting his soldiers? *Ion.*—Yes: the rhapsode will know this well: at least I know it well.

*Sokr.*—Perhaps, Ion, you are not merely a rhapsode, but possess also the competence for being a general. If you know matters belonging to military command, do you know them in your capacity of general, or in your capacity of rhapsode? *Ion.*—I think there is no difference. *Sokr.*—How say you? Do you affirm that the rhapsodic art, and the strategic art, are one? *Ion.*—I think they are one. *Sokr.*—Then whosoever is a good rhapsode, is also a good general? *Ion.*—Unquestionably. *Sokr.*—And of course, whoever is a good general, is also a good rhapsode? *Ion.*—No: I do not think that. *Sokr.*—But you do maintain, that whosoever is a good rhapsode, is also a good general? *Ion.*—Decidedly. *Sokr.*—You are yourself the best rhapsode in Greece? *Ion.*—By far. *Sokr.*—Are you then also the best general in Greece? *Ion.*—Certainly I am, Sokrates: and that too, by having learnt it from Homer.<sup>f</sup>

After putting a question or two, not very forcible, to ask how it happens that Ion, being an excellent general, does not obtain a military appointment from Athens, Sparta, or some other city, Sokrates winds up the dialogue as follows:—

Well, Ion, if it be really true that you possess a rational and intelligent competence to illustrate the beauties of Homer, you wrong and deceive me, because, after promising to deliver to me a fine discourse about Homer, you will not even comply with my preliminary entreaty—that you will first tell me what those matters are, on which your superiority bears. You twist every way like Proteus, until at last you slip through

The rhapsode does not know special matters, such as the craft of the pilot, physician, farmer, &c., but he knows the business of the general, and is competent to command soldiers, having learnt it from Homer.

Conclusion. Ion expounds Homer, not with any knowledge of what he says, but by divine inspiration.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Ion, 540 B-C.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Ion, 540 D-541 B.

my fingers and appear as a general. If your powers of expounding Homer depend on art and intelligence, you are a wrong doer and deceiver, for not fulfilling your promise to me. But you are not chargeable with wrong, if the fact be as I say; that is, if you know nothing about Homer, but are only able to discourse upon him finely and abundantly, through a divine inspiration with which you are possessed by him. Choose whether you wish me to regard you as a promise-breaker, or as a divine man. *Ion*.—I choose the last: it is much better to be regarded as a divine man.<sup>ε</sup>

It seems strange to read such language put into Ion's mouth (we are not warranted in regarding it as what any rhapsode ever did say), as the affirmation—that every good rhapsode was also a good general, and that he had become the best of generals simply through complete acquaintance with Homer. But this is only a caricature of a sentiment largely prevalent at Athens, according to which the works of the poets, especially the Homeric poems, were supposed to be a mine of varied instruction, and were taught as such to youth.<sup>η</sup> In Greece, the general was not often required (except at Sparta, and not always even there) to possess professional experience.<sup>ι</sup> So

The generals in Greece usually possessed no professional experience—Homer and the poets were talked of as the great teachers—Plato's view of the poet, as pretending to know everything, but really knowing nothing.

<sup>ε</sup> Plato, *Ion*, 541 E-542 A. *εἰ μὲν ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὡς τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη οἶός τε εἶ? Ὀμηρον ἐπαινεῖν, ἀδικεῖς . . . εἰ δὲ μὴ τεχνικός εἶ, ἀλλὰ θεῖα μοῖρα κατεχόμενος ἐξ Ὀμήρου μηδὲν εἰδὼς πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ λέγεις περὶ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ὡσπερ εἶπον ἐγὼ περὶ σοῦ, οὐδὲν ἀδικεῖς· ἐλοῦ ὄν, πότῃρα βούλει νομίζεσθαι ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἀδικὸς ἀνὴρ εἶναι ἢ θεῖος.*

<sup>η</sup> Aristophan. *Ranæ*, 1032.

*Ὀρφεὺς μὲν γὰρ τελετὰς θ' ἡμῖν κατέδειξε φόναν τ' ἀπέχεσθαι Μουσαῖος δ' ἐξακέσεις τε νόσων καὶ χρησμοῦς, Ἡσιόδος τε Γῆς ἐργασίας, καρπῶν ὄρας, ἀρότους δὲ θεῖος Ὀμηρος*

*Ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμῆν καὶ κλέος ἔσχεν, πλὴν τοῦθ', ὅτι χρῆστ' ἐδίδασκεν, Τάξεις, ἀρετὰς, ὀπλίσειε ἀνδρῶν—*

*Ἄλλ' ἄλλους τοὶ πολλοὺς ἀγαθοὺς (ἐδίδασκεν), ὧν ἦν καὶ Λάμαχος ἦρωσ.*

See these views combated by Plato, *Republ.* x. 599-600-606 E.

The exaggerated pretension here ascribed to Ion makes him look contemptible—like the sentiment ascribed to him, 535 E, “If I make the auditors weep, I myself shall laugh and pocket money;” &c.

<sup>ι</sup> Xenop. *Memor.* iii. 5, 21, in the conversation between the younger Periklēs and Sokrates—*τῶν δὲ στρατηγῶν οἱ πλείστοι αὐτοσχεδιάζουσιν;* also iii. 5, 24.

Compare, respecting the generals, the striking lines of Euripides, *Androm.* 698, and the encomium of Cicero (*Academ. Prior.* ii. 1) respecting the quickness and facility with which Lucullus made himself an excellent general.

krates, in one of the Xenophontic conversations, tries to persuade Nikomachides, a practised soldier (who had failed in getting himself elected general, because a successful Chorêgus had been preferred to him), how much the qualities of an effective Chorêgus coincided with those of an effective general.<sup>k</sup> The poet Sophokles was named by the Athenians one of the generals of the very important armament for reconquering Samos: though Perikles, one of his colleagues, as well as his contemporary Ion of Chios, declared that he was an excellent poet, but knew nothing of generalship.<sup>m</sup> Plato frequently seeks to make it evident how little the qualities required for governing numbers, either civil or military, were made matter of professional study or special teaching. The picture of Homer conveyed in the tenth book of the Platonic Republic is, that of a man who pretends to know every thing, but really knows nothing: an imitative artist, removed by two stages from truth and reality, —who gives the shadows of shadows, resembling only enough to satisfy an ignorant crowd. This is the picture there presented of poets generally, and of Homer as the best among them. The rhapsode Ion is here brought under the same category as the poet Homer, whom he has by heart and recites. The whole field of knowledge is assumed to be distributed among various specialties, not one of which either of the two can claim. Accordingly, both of them, under the mask of universal knowledge, conceal the reality of universal ignorance.

Ion is willing enough (as he promises) to exhibit before Sokrates one of his eloquent discourses upon Homer. But Sokrates never permits him to arrive at it: arresting him always by preliminary questions, and requiring him to furnish an intelligible description of

Knowledge, opposed to divine inspiration without knowledge.

<sup>k</sup> Xenop. Memor. iii. 4, especially iii. 4, 6, where Nikomachides asks with surprise, λέγεις σύ, ὦ Σώκρηντες, ὡς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἔστι χορηγεῖν τε καλῶς καὶ στρατηγεῖν;

<sup>m</sup> See the very curious extract from the contemporary Ion of Chios, in Athenæus, xiii. 604. Aristophanes of

Byzantium says that the appointment of Sophokles to this military function (about B.C. 440) arose from the extraordinary popularity of his tragedy Antigone, exhibited a little time before. See Boeckh's valuable 'Dissertation on the Antigone,' appended to his edition thereof, pp. 121-124.

the matter which his discourse is intended to embrace, and thus to distinguish it from other matters left untouched. A man who cannot comply with this requisition,—who cannot (to repeat what I said in a previous chapter) stand a Sokratic cross-examination on the subject—possesses no rational intelligence of his own proceedings: no art, science, knowledge, system, or method. If as a practitioner he executes well what he promises (which is often the case), and attains success—he does so either by blind imitation of some master, or else under the stimulus and guidance of some agency foreign to himself—of the Gods or Fortune.

This is the Platonic point of view; developed in several different ways and different dialogues, but hardly anywhere more conspicuously than in the *Ion*.

I have observed that in this dialogue, *Ion* is anxious to embark on his eloquent expository discourse, but Sokrates will not allow him to begin: requiring as a preliminary stage that certain preliminary difficulties shall be first cleared up. Here we have an illustration of Plato's doctrine, to which I adverted in a former chapter,<sup>n</sup>—that no written geometrical treatise could impart a knowledge of geometry to one ignorant thereof. The geometrical writer begins by laying down a string of definitions and axioms; and then strikes out boldly in demonstrating his theorems. But Plato would refuse him the liberty of striking out, until he should have cleared up the preliminary difficulties about the definitions and axioms themselves. This the geometrical treatise does not even attempt.<sup>o</sup>

Illustration of Plato's opinion respecting the uselessness of written geometrical treatises.

<sup>n</sup> Chap. vi. p. 229.

<sup>o</sup> Compare Plato, *Republic*, vi. 510 C; vii. 533 C-D.



## CHAPTER XVI.

## LACHES.

THE main substance of this dialogue consists of a discussion, carried on by Sokrates with Nikias and Lachês, respecting Courage. Each of the two latter proposes an explanation of Courage : Sokratês criticises both of them, and reduces each to a confessed contradiction.

The discussion is invited, or at least dramatically introduced, by two elderly men—Lysimachus, son of Aristeides the Just,—and Melêsias, son of Thucydides the rival of Perikles. Lysimachus and Melêsias, confessing with shame that they are inferior to their fathers, because their education has been neglected, wish to guard against the same misfortune in the case of their own sons : respecting the education of whom, they ask the advice of Nikias and Lachês. The question turns especially upon the propriety of causing their sons to receive lessons from a master of arms just then in vogue. Nikias and Lachês, both of them not merely distinguished citizens but also commanders of Athenian armies, are assumed to be well qualified to give advice. Accordingly they deliver their opinions : Nikias approving such lessons as beneficial, in exalting the courage of a young man, and rendering him effective on the field of battle : while Lachês takes an opposite view, disparages the masters of arms as being no soldiers, and adds that they are despised by the Lacedæmonians, to whose authority on military matters general deference was paid in Greece.<sup>a</sup> Sokratês,—commended greatly by Nikias for his acuteness and sagacity, by Lachês for his courage in the battle of Delium,—is invited to take part in the consultation. Being younger than both, he

Lachês. Subject and persons of the dialogue. Whether it is useful that two young men should receive lessons from a master of arms. Nikias and Lachês differ in opinion.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Lachês, c. 6-7, pp. 182-183.

waits till they have delivered their opinions, and is then called upon to declare with which of the two his own judgment will concur.<sup>b</sup>

*Sokr.*—The question must not be determined by a plurality of votes, but by superiority of knowledge.<sup>c</sup> If we were debating about the proper gymnastic discipline for these young men, we should consult a known artist or professional trainer, or at least some one who had gone through a course of teaching and practice under the trainer. The first thing to be enquired therefore is, whether, in reference to the point now under discussion, there be any one of us professionally or technically competent, who has studied under good masters, and has proved his own competence as a master by producing well-trained pupils. The next thing is, to understand clearly what it is, with reference to which such competence is required.<sup>d</sup> *Nikias.*—Surely the point before us is, whether it be wise to put these young men under the lessons of the master of arms? That is what we want to know. *Sokr.*—Doubtless it is: but that is only one particular branch of a wider and more comprehensive enquiry. When you are considering whether a particular ointment is good for your eyes, it is your eyes, and their general benefit, which form the subject of investigation—not the ointment simply. The person to assist you will be, he who understands professionally the general treatment of the eyes. So in this case, you are enquiring whether lessons in arms will be improving for the minds and character of your sons. Look out therefore for some one who is professionally competent, from having studied under good masters, in regard to the general treatment of the mind.<sup>e</sup> *Lachés.*—But there are various persons who, without ever having studied under masters, possess greater technical competence than

Sokrates is invited to declare his opinion. He replies that the point cannot be decided without a competent professional judge.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, *Lachés*, c. 10, p. 184 D. Nikias is made to say that Sokrates has recently recommended to him Damon, as a teacher of μουσική to his sons, and that Damon had proved an admirable teacher as well as companion (180 D). Damon is mentioned by Plato generally with much eulogy.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, *Lachés*, c. 10, p. 184 E.

ἐπιστήμη δεῖ κρίνεσθαι ἀλλ' οὐ πλήθει τῶ μέλλον καλῶς κριθήσεσθαι.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, *Lachés*, c. 11, p. 185 C.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, *Lachés*, c. 11, p. 185 E. εἴ τις ἡμῶν τεχνικὸς περὶ ψυχῆς θεραπείαν, καὶ οἷός τε καλῶς τοῦτο θεραπεύσαι, καὶ ὅτω διδάσκαλοι ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασι, τοῦτο σκεπτέον.

others who have so studied. *Sokr.*—There are such persons : but you will never believe it upon their own assurance, unless they can show you some good special work actually performed by themselves.

*Sokr.*—Now then, Lysimachus, since you have invited Lachês and Nikias, as well as me, to advise you on the means of most effectively improving the mind of your son, it is for us to show you that we possess competent professional skill respecting the treatment of the youthful mind. We must declare to you who are the masters from whom we have learnt, and we must prove their qualifications. Or if we have had no masters, we must demonstrate to you our own competence by citing cases of individuals, whom we have successfully trained, and who have become incontestably good under our care. If we can fulfil neither of these two conditions, we ought to confess our incompetence and decline advising you. We must not begin to try our hands upon so precious a subject as the son of a friend, at the hazard of doing him more harm than good.<sup>f</sup>

As to myself, I frankly confess that I have neither had any master to impart to me such competence, nor have I been able to acquire it by my own efforts. I am not rich enough to pay the Sophists, who profess to teach it. But as to Nikias and Lachês, they are both older and richer than I am : so that they may well have learnt it from others, or acquired it for themselves. They must be thoroughly satisfied of their own knowledge on the work of education ; otherwise they would hardly have given such confident opinions, pronouncing what pursuits are good or bad for youth. For my part, I trust them implicitly : the only thing which surprises me, is, that they dissent from each other.<sup>g</sup> It is for you therefore, Lysimachus, to ask Nikias and Lachês,—Who have been their masters ? Who have been their fellow-pupils ? If

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Lachês, c. 12, p. 186 B.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Lachês, c. 13, p. 186. δοκούσι δὴ μοι δυνατοὶ εἶναι παιδεύσθαι ἄνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε ἀδεῶς ἀπεφαινοῦτο περὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων νέφ γον-

σῶν τε καὶ πονηρῶν, εἰ μὴ αὐτοῖς ἐπίστευον ἰκανῶς εἰδέναι. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα, ἔγωγε τοῦτοις πιστεύω, ὅτι δὲ διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, θαυμάζω.

they have been their own masters, what proof can they produce of previous success in teaching, and what examples can they cite of pupils whom they have converted from bad to good? <sup>h</sup>

*Nikias*.—I knew from the beginning that we should both of us fall under the cross-examination of Sokrates, and be compelled to give account of our past lives. For my part, I have already gone through this scrutiny before, and am not averse to undergo it again.

Nikias and Lachês submit to be cross-examined by Sokrates.

*Lachês*.—And I, though I have never experienced it before, shall willingly submit to learn from Sokrates, whom I know to be a man thoroughly courageous and honest in his actions. I hate men whose lives are inconsistent with their talk.<sup>1</sup>—Thus speak both of them.

This portion of the dialogue, which forms a sort of pre-  
amble to the main discussion, brings out forcibly some of the Platonic points of view. We have seen it laid down in the *Kriton*—That in questions about right and wrong, good and evil, &c., we ought not to trust the decision of the Many, but only that of the One Wise Man. Here we learn something about the criteria by which this One man may be known. He must be one who has gone through a regular training under some master approved in ethical or educational teaching: or, if he cannot produce such a certificate, he must at least cite sufficient examples of men whom he has taught well himself. This is the Sokratic comparison, assimilating the general art of living well to the requirements of a special profession, which a man must learn through express teaching, from a master who has proved his ability, and through conscious application of his own. *Nikias* and *Lachês* give their opinions offhand and confidently, upon the question whether lessons from the master of arms be profitable to youth or not. Plato, on the contrary, speaking through Sokrates, points out that this is only one branch of the more

Both of them give opinions offhand, according to their feelings on the special case—Sokrates requires that the question shall be generalised, and examined as a branch of education.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, *Lachês*, 186-187.

<sup>i</sup> Plato, *Lachês*, c. 14, p. 188.

“Ego odi homines ignavâ operâ et

philosophâ sententiâ,” is a line cited by Cicero out of one of the Latin comic writers.

comprehensive question as to education generally—"What are the qualities and habits proper to be imparted to youth by training? What is the proper treatment of the mind? No one is competent to decide the special question, except he who has professionally studied the treatment of the mind." To deal with the special question, without such preliminary general preparation, involves rash and unverified assumptions, which render any opinion so given dangerous to act upon. Such is the judgment of the Platonic Sokrates, insisting on the necessity of taking up ethical questions in their most comprehensive aspect.

Consequent upon this preamble, we should expect that Lachês and Nikias would be made to cite the names of those who had been their masters; or to produce some examples of persons effectively taught by themselves. This would bring us a step nearer to that One Wise Man—often darkly indicated, but nowhere named or brought into daylight—from whom alone we can receive a trustworthy judgment. But here, as in the Kriton and so many other Platonic dialogues, we get only a Pisgah view of our promised adviser—nothing more. The discussion takes a different turn.

Appeal of Sokrates to the judgment of the One Wise Man. This man is never seen or identified.

*Sokr.*—"We will pursue a line of enquiry which conducts to the same result, and which starts even more decidedly from the beginning.<sup>k</sup> We are called upon to advise by what means virtue can be imparted to these youths, so as to make them better men. Of course this implies that we know what virtue is: otherwise how can we give advice as to the means of acquiring it? *Lachês.*—We could give no advice at all. *Sokr.*—We affirm ourselves therefore to know what virtue is? *Lachês.*—We do. *Sokr.*—Since therefore we know, we can farther declare what it is.<sup>l</sup> *Lachês.*—Of course

We must know what virtue is, before we give an opinion on education. Virtue, as a whole, is too large a question. We will enquire about one branch of virtue—courage.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, *Lachês*, c. 17, p. 189 E. και η τοιαυτε σκεψις εις ταυτων φερει, σχεδον δε τι και μαλλον εξ αρχης ειη αυ.

<sup>l</sup> Plato, *Lachês*, c. 17, p. 190 B.

φαιμεν ορα, ω Λαχης, ειδεναι αυτο (την αρετην) ο, τι εστιν. Φαιμεν μεντοι. Ουκουν ο γε γωμεν, κων ελπομεν δεη ποι τι εστιν. Πωσ γαρ ου;

we can. *Sokr.*—Still, we will not at once enquire as to the whole of virtue, which might be an arduous task, but as to a part of it—Courage: that part to which the lessons of the master of arms are supposed to tend. We will first enquire what courage is: after that has been determined, we will then consider how it can best be imparted to these youths.”

“Try then if you can tell me, Lachês, what courage is. *Lachês.*—There is no difficulty in telling you that. Whoever keeps his place in the rank, repels the enemy, and does not run away, is a courageous man.”<sup>m</sup>

Here is the same error in replying, as was committed by Euthyphron when asked, What is the Holy? and by Hippias about the Beautiful. One particular case of courageous behaviour, among many, is indicated, as if it were an explanation of the whole: but the general feature common to all acts of courage is not declared. Sokrates points out that men are courageous, not merely among hoplites who keep their rank and fight, but also among the Scythian horsemen who fight while running away; others also are courageous against disease, poverty, political adversity, pain and fear of every sort: others moreover, against desires and pleasures. What is the common attribute which in all these cases constitutes Courage? If you asked me what is *quickness*—common to all those cases when a man runs, speaks, plays, learns, &c., quickly—I should tell you that it was that which accomplished much in a little time. Tell me in like manner, what is the common fact or attribute pervading all cases of courage?

Lachês at first does not understand the question:<sup>n</sup> and Sokrates elucidates it by giving the parallel explanation of quickness. Here, as elsewhere, Plato takes great pains to impress the conception in its full generality, and he seems to have found difficulty in making others follow him.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, *Lachês*, c. 18, p. 190 D.  
<sup>n</sup> Plato, *Lachês*, c. 19-20, pp. 191-192.  
 πάλιν οὖν πειρῶ εἰπεῖν ἀνδρίαν πῶ-  
 τον, τί ὄν ἐν πᾶσι τοῦτοις ταῦτόν ἐστιν.  
 ἢ οὐπω καταμανθάνεις ὃ λέγω; *Luchês.*  
 Οὐ πάνυ τι. . . . .

πειρῶ δὴ τὴν ἀνδρίαν οὕτως εἰπεῖν.  
 τίς οὐσα δύναμις ἢ αὐτὴ ἐν ἡδονῇ καὶ  
 ἐν λύπῃ καὶ ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέ-  
 γομεν αὐτὴν εἶναι, ἔπειτ' ἀνδρία κέκκλη-  
 ται;

Question,  
 What is  
 courage?  
*Lachês* an-  
 swers by  
 citing one  
 particularly  
 manifest case  
 of courage.  
 Mistake of  
 not giving  
 a general  
 explanation.

Lachês then gives a general definition of courage. It is a sort of endurance of the mind.<sup>o</sup>

Second answer. Courage is a sort of endurance of the mind. Sokrates points out that the answer is vague and incorrect. Endurance is not always courage: even intelligent endurance is not always courage.

Surely not *all* endurance (rejoins Sokrates)? You admit that courage is a fine and honourable thing. But endurance without intelligence is hurtful and dishonourable: it cannot therefore be courage. Only intelligent endurance, therefore, can be courage. And then what is meant by *intelligent*? Intelligent—of what—or to what end? A man, who endures the loss of money, understanding well that he will thereby gain a larger sum, is he courageous?

No. He who endures fighting, knowing that he has superior skill, numbers, and all other advantages on his side, manifests more of intelligent endurance, than his adversary who knows that he has all these advantages against him, yet who nevertheless endures fighting. Nevertheless this latter is the most courageous of the two.<sup>p</sup> Unintelligent endurance is in this case courage: but unintelligent endurance was acknowledged to be bad and hurtful, and courage to be a fine thing. We have entangled ourselves in a contradiction. We must at least show our own courage, by enduring until we can get right. For my part (replies Lachês) I am quite prepared for such endurance. I am piqued and angry that I cannot express what I conceive. I seem to have in my mind clearly what courage is: but it escapes me somehow or other, when I try to put it in words.<sup>q</sup>

Sokrates now asks aid from Nikias. *Nikias*.—My explanation of courage is, that it is a sort of knowledge or intelligence. *Sokr*.—But what sort of intelligence? Not certainly intelligence of piping or playing the harp. Intelligence of what?

*Nikias*.—Courage is intelligence of things terrible, and things not terrible, both in war and in all other conjunctures. *Lachês*.—What nonsense! Courage is a thing totally apart from knowledge or intelli-

Confusion. New answer given by Nikias. Courage is a sort of Intelli-

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Lachês, c. 20, p. 192 B. καρτερία τις τῆς ψυχῆς.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Lachês, c. 21, pp. 192-193. ἡ φρόνιμος καρτερία—ἴδωμεν δὲ, ἡ εἰς

τί φρόνιμος; ἡ ἢ εἰς ἅπαντα καὶ τὰ μέγαρα καὶ τὰ μικρά;

<sup>q</sup> Plato, Lachês, 193 C, 194 B.

gence.\* The physician knows best what is terrible, and what is not terrible, in reference to disease: the husbandman, in reference to agriculture. But they are not for that reason courageous. *Nikias*.—They are not; but neither do they know what is terrible, or what is not terrible. Physicians can predict the result of a patient's case: they can tell what may cure him, or what will kill him. But whether it be better for him to die or to recover—that they do not know, and cannot tell him. To some persons, death is a less evil than life:—defeat, than victory:—loss of wealth, than gain. None except the person who can discriminate these cases, knows what is really terrible and what is not so. He alone is really courageous.<sup>3</sup> *Lachês*.—Where is there any such man? It can be only some God. *Nikias* feels himself in a puzzle, and instead of confessing it frankly as I have done, he is trying to help himself out by evasions more fit for a pleader before the *Dikastery*.<sup>†</sup>

*Sokr.*—You do not admit, then, *Nikias*, that lions, tigers, boars, &c., and such animals, are courageous? *Nikias*.—No: they are without fear—simply from not knowing the danger—like children: but they are not courageous, though most people call them so. I may call them bold, but I reserve the epithet courageous for the intelligent. *Lachês*.—See how *Nikias* strips those, whom every one admits to be courageous, of this honourable appellation! *Nikias*.—Not altogether, *Lachês*: I admit you, and *Lamachus*, and many other Athenians, to be courageous, and of course therefore intelligent. *Lachês*.—I feel the compliment: but such subtle distinctions befit a Sophist rather than a general in high command.<sup>‡</sup> *Sokr.*—The highest measure of

gence—the intelligence of things terrible and not terrible. Objections of *Lachês*.

Questions of *Sokrates* to *Nikias*. It is only future events, not past or present, which are terrible. But intelligence of future events cannot be had without intelligence of past or present.

\* Plato, *Lachês*, c. 24, p. 195 A. τὴν τῶν δειῶν καὶ θαρβάλων ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἁπασιν.

*Lachês*.—Ὡς ἄτοπα λέγει!—χωρὶς δὴ που σοφία ἐστὶν ἀνδρίας.

It appears from two other passages (c. 26, p. 195 D, and c. 29, p. 198 B) that *θαρβάλειος* here is simply the negation of *δεινός*, and cannot be

translated by any affirmative word.

<sup>3</sup> Plato, *Lachês*, c. 26, pp. 195-196.

<sup>†</sup> Plato, *Lachês*, c. 26, p. 196 B.

<sup>‡</sup> Plato, *Lachês*, c. 28, p. 197. Καὶ γὰρ πρέπει, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοφιστῆ τὰ τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον κομψεύεσθαι, ἢ ἀνδρὶ ὃν ἡ πόλις ἀξιοῖ αὐτῆς προϊστάναι.

Assuredly the distinctions which *Plato* puts into the mouth of *Nikias* are nowise more subtle than those



intelligence befits one in the highest command. What you have said, Nikias, deserves careful examination. You remember that in taking up the investigation of courage, we reckoned it only as a portion of virtue: you are aware that there are other portions of virtue, such as justice, temperance, and the like. Now you define courage to be, intelligence of what is terrible or not terrible: of that which causes fear, or does not cause fear. But nothing causes fear, except future or apprehended evils: present or past evils cause no fear. Hence courage, as you define it, is intelligence respecting future evils, and future events not evil. But how can there be intelligence respecting the future, except in conjunction with intelligence respecting the present and the past? In every special department, such as medicine, military proceedings, agriculture, &c., does not the same man, who knows the phenomena of the future, know also the phenomena of present and past? Are they not all inseparable acquirements of one and the same intelligent mind?<sup>x</sup>

Since therefore courage, according to your definition, is the knowledge of futurities evil and not evil, or future evil and good—and since such knowledge cannot exist without the knowledge of good and evil generally—it follows that courage is the knowledge of good and evil generally.<sup>y</sup> But a man who knows thus much, cannot be destitute of any part of virtue. He must possess temperance and justice as well as courage. Courage, therefore, according to your definition, is not a part of virtue, it is the whole. Now we began the enquiry by stating that it was only a

Courage therefore must be intelligence of good and evil generally. But this definition would include the whole of virtue, and we declared that courage was only a part thereof. It will not hold therefore as a definition of courage.

which he is perpetually putting into the mouth of Sokrates. He cannot here mean to distinguish the Sophists from Sokrates, but to distinguish the dialectic talkers, including both one and the other, from the active political leaders.

<sup>x</sup> Plato, *Lachês*, c. 30, p. 198 D. *περὶ ὅσων ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, οὐκ ἄλλη μὲν εἶναι περὶ γεγονότος, ἄλλη δὲ περὶ γιγνομένων, ὅπῃ γίγνεται, ἄλλη δὲ ὅπῃ ἂν κάλλιστα γένοιτο καὶ γενήσεται τὸ μήπω γεγονός—ἀλλ' ἡ αὐτή. οἶον περὶ*

*τὸ ὑγιεινὸν εἰς ἅπαντας τοὺς χρόνους οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ ἡ ἰατρικὴ, μία οὖσα, ἐφορᾷ καὶ γιγνόμενα καὶ γεγονότα καὶ γενησόμενα, ὅπῃ γενήσεται.*

P. 199 C. *ἢ δὲ γ' αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μελλόντων καὶ πάντως ἔχόντων ἔσται.*

<sup>y</sup> Plato, *Lachês*, c. 31, p. 199 D. *κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον οὐ μόνον δεῖνῶν τε καὶ θαβραλέων ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἀνδρία ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ἢ περὶ πάντων ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ πάντως ἔχόντων, &c.*

part of virtue, and that there were other parts of virtue which it did not comprise. It is plain therefore that your definition of courage is not precise, and cannot be sustained. We have not yet discovered what courage is.\*

Here ends the dialogue called *Lachês*, without any positive result. Nothing is proved except the ignorance of two brave and eminent generals respecting the moral attribute known by the name *Courage*: which nevertheless they are known to possess, and have the full sentiment and persuasion of knowing perfectly; so that they give confident advice as to the means of imparting it. "I am unaccustomed to debates like these" (says *Lachês*): "but I am piqued and mortified—because I feel that I know well what *Courage* is, yet somehow or other I cannot state my own thoughts in words." Here is a description<sup>a</sup> of the intellectual deficiency which *Sokrates* seeks to render conspicuous to the consciousness, instead of suffering it to remain latent and unknown, as it is in the ordinary mind. Here, as elsewhere, he impugns the false persuasion of knowledge, and the unconscious presumption of estimable men in delivering opinions upon ethical and social subjects, which have become familiar and interwoven with deeply rooted associations, but have never been studied under a master, nor carefully analysed and discussed, nor looked at in their full generality. This is a mental defect which he pronounces to be universal: belonging not less to men of action like *Nikias* and *Lachês*, than to *Sophists* and *Rhetors* like *Protagoras* and *Gorgias*.

Remarks.  
Warfare of *Sokrates* against the false persuasion of knowledge. Brave generals deliver opinions confidently about courage, without knowing what it is.

Here, as elsewhere, *Plato* (or the *Platonic Sokrates*) exposes the faulty solutions of others, but proposes no better solution of his own, and even disclaims all ability to do so. We may

\* *Plato*, *Lachês*, c. 32, p. 199 E. Οὐκ ἄρα εὐρήκαμεν, ἀνδρία ὅ, τι ἔστιν.

<sup>a</sup> *Plato*, *Lachês*, 194. Καίτοι ἀηθής γ' εἰμι (*Lachês*) τῶν τοιοῦτων λόγων· ἀλλὰ τίς με καὶ φιλονεκία εἴληφε πρὸς τὰ εἰρημένα, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγανακτῶ εἰ οὕτως ἃ νοῶ μὴ οἶός τ' εἰμι εἰπεῖν· νοεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἐμοίγε δοκῶ περὶ ἀνδρίας

ὅ, τι ἔστιν, οὐκ οἶδα δὲ ὅπῃ με ἔρρι διέφυγεν, ὥστε μὴ ξυλλαβεῖν τῷ λόγῳ αὐτὴν καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅ, τι ἔστιν.

Compare the *Charmidês*, p. 159 A, 160 D, where *Sokrates* professes to tell *Charmidês*, If temperance is really in you, you can of course inform us what it is.

nevertheless trace, in the refutation which he gives of the two unsatisfactory explanations, hints guiding the mind into that direction in which Plato looks to supply the deficiency. Thus when Lachês, after having given as his first answer (to the question, What is Courage?) a definition not even formally sufficient, is put by Sokrates upon giving his second answer,—That Courage is intelligent endurance: Sokrates asks him<sup>b</sup>—“Yes, *intelligent*: but intelligent to *what end*? Do you mean, to all things alike, great as well as little?” We are here reminded that *intelligence*, simply taken, is altogether undefined; that intelligence must relate to *something*—and when human conduct is in question, must relate to some end; and that the Something, and the End, to which it relates, must be set forth, before the proposition can be clearly understood.

Coming to the answer given by Nikias, we perceive that this deficiency is in a certain manner supplied. Courage is said to consist in knowledge: in knowledge of things terrible, and things not terrible. When Lachês applies his cross-examination to the answer, the manner in which Nikias defends it puts us upon a distinction often brought to view, though not always adhered to, in the Platonic writings. There can be no doubt that death, distemper, loss of wealth, defeat, &c., are terrible things (*i. e.* the prospect of them inspires fear) in the estimation of mankind generally. Correct foresight of such contingencies, and of the antecedents tending to produce or avert them, is possessed by the physician and other professional persons: who would therefore, it should seem, possess the knowledge of things terrible and not terrible. But Nikias denies this. He does not admit that the contingencies here enumerated are, always or necessarily, proper objects of fear. In some cases, he contends, they are the least of two evils. Before you can be said to possess the knowledge of things terrible and not terrible, you must be

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Lachês, c. 21, p. 192 D. { ἡ εἰς τι φρόνιμος; ἢ ἡ εἰς ἅπαντα καὶ ἡ φρόνιμος καρτερία . . . ἴδωμεν δὴ { τὰ μέγαρα καὶ τὰ μικρά;

able to take correct measure not only of the intervening antecedents or means, but also of the end itself as compared with other alternative ends: whether, in each particular case, it be the end most to be feared, or the real evil under the given circumstances. The professional man can do the former, but he cannot do the latter. He advises as to means, and executes: but he assumes his own one end as an indisputable datum. The physician seeks to cure his patient, without ever enquiring whether it may not be a less evil for such patient to die than to survive.

The ulterior, yet not less important, estimate of the comparative worth of different ends, is reserved for that unknown master whom Nikias himself does not farther specify, and whom Lachês sets aside as nowhere to be found, under the peculiar phrase of "some God." Subjectively considered, this is an appeal to the judgment of that One Wise Man, often alluded to by Plato as an absent Expert who might be called into court—yet never to be found at the exact moment, nor produced in visible presence: Objectively considered, it is a postulate or divination of some yet undiscovered Teleology or Science of Ends: that Science of the Good, which (as we have already noticed in *Alkib. II.*) Plato pronounces to be the crowning and capital science of all—and without which he there declared, that knowledge on all other topics was useless and even worse than useless.<sup>c</sup> The One Wise Man—the *Science of Good*—are the Subject and Object corresponding to each other, and postulated by Plato. None but the One Wise Man can measure things terrible and not terrible: none else can estimate the good or evil, or the comparative value of two alternative evils, in each individual case. The items here directed to be taken into the calculation, correspond with what is laid down by Sokrates in the *Protagoras*, not with that laid down in the *Gorgias*: we find here none of that marked antithesis between pleasure and good—between pain and evil—upon which Sokrates expatiates in the *Gorgias*.

Postulate of a Science of Ends, or Teleology, dimly indicated by Plato. The Unknown Wise Man—correlates with the undiscovered Science of Ends.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, *Alkib. ii.* pp. 146-147. See above, ch. x. p. 362.

This appears still farther when the cross-examination is taken up by Sokrates instead of by Lachês. We are then made to perceive, that the knowledge of things terrible and not terrible is a part, but an inseparable part of the knowledge of good and evil generally: the lesser cannot be had without the greater—and the greater carries with it not merely courage, but all the other virtues besides. None can know good or evil generally except the perfectly Wise Man. The perfect condition of the Intelligence, is the sole and all-sufficient condition of virtue. None can possess one mode of virtue separately.

This is the doctrine to which the conclusion of the *Lachês* points, though the question debated is confessedly left without solution. It is a doctrine which seems to have been really maintained by the historical Sokrates, and is often implied in the reasonings of the Platonic Sokrates, but not always nor consistently.

In reference to this dialogue, the dramatic contrast is very forcible, between the cross-examination carried on by Lachês, and that carried on by Sokrates. The former is pettish and impatient, bringing out no result, and accusing the respondent of cavil and disingenuousness: the latter takes up the same answer patiently, expands it into the full generality wrapped up in it, and renders palpable its inconsistency with previous admissions.

Perfect condition of the intelligence —is the one sufficient condition of virtue.

Dramatic contrast between Lachês and Sokrates, as cross-examiners.

## APPENDIX.

Ast is the only critic who declares the *Lachês* not to be Plato's work (Platon's *Leben* [und *Schr.* pp. 451-456). He indeed even finds it difficult to imagine how Schleiermacher can accept it as genuine (p. 454). He justifies this opinion by numerous reasons—pointing out what he thinks glaring defects, absurdity, and bad taste, both in the ratiocination and in the dramatic handling, also *dicta* alleged to be *un-Platonic*. Compare Schleiermacher's *Einleitung zum Lachês*, p. 324 seq.

I do not concur with Ast in the estimation of those passages which serve as premisses to his conclusion. But even if I admitted his premisses, I still should not admit his conclusion. I should conclude that the dialogue was an inferior work of Plato, but I should conclude nothing beyond. Stallbaum (*Proleg. ad Lachet.* p. 5) and Socher discover "*adolescentiæ vestigia*" in it, which are not apparent to me.

Socher, Stallbaum, and K. F. Hermann pass lightly over the objections of Ast; and Steinhart (*Einleit.* p. 355) declares them to be unworthy of a serious answer. For my part, I draw from these dissensions among the Platonic critics a conviction of the uncertain evidence upon which all of them proceed. Each has his own belief as to what Plato *must* say, *ought* to say, and *could not* have said; and each adjudicates thereupon with a degree of confidence which surprises me. The grounds upon which Ast rejects *Lachês*, *Charmidês*, and *Lysis*, though inconclusive, appear to me not more inconclusive than those on which he and other critics reject the *Erastæ*, *Theagês*, *Hippias Major*, *Alkibiadês II.*, &c.

The dates which Stallbaum, Schleiermacher, Socher, and Steinhart assign to the *Lachês* (about 406-404 B.C.) are in my judgment erroneous. I have already shown my reasons for believing that not one of the Platonic dialogues was composed until after the death of Sokrates. The hypotheses also of Steinhart (p. 357) as to the special purposes of Plato in composing the dialogue are unsupported by any evidence; and are all imagined so as to fit his supposition as to the date. So also Schleiermacher tells us that a portion of the *Lachês* is intended by Plato as a defence of himself against accusations which had been brought against him, a young man, for impertinence in having attacked *Lysias* in the *Phædrus*, and *Protagoras* in the *Protagoras*, both of them much older than Plato. But Steinhart justly remarks that this explanation can only be valid if we admit Schleiermacher's theory that the *Phædrus* and the *Protagoras* are earlier compositions than the *Lachês*, which theory Steinhart and most of the others deny. Steinhart himself adapts his hypotheses to his own idea of the date of the *Lachês*; and he is open to the same remark as he himself makes upon Schleiermacher.

## CHAPTER XVII.

## CHARMIDES.

As in Lachês, we have pursued an enquiry into the nature of Courage—so in Charmidês, we find an examination of Temperance, Sobriety, Moderation.<sup>a</sup> Both dialogues conclude without providing any tenable explanation. In both there is an abundant introduction—in Charmidês, there is even the bustle of a crowded palæstra, with much dramatic incident—preluding to the substantive discussion. I omit the notice of this dramatic incident, though it is highly interesting to read.

The two persons with whom Sokrates here carries on the discussion, are Charmides and Kritias; both of whom, as historical persons, were active movers in the oligarchical government of the Thirty, with its numerous enormities. In this dialogue, Charmides appears as a youth just rising into manhood, strikingly beautiful both in face and stature: Kritias his cousin is an accomplished literary man of mature age. The powerful emotion which Sokrates describes himself as experiencing,<sup>b</sup> from the sight and close neighbourhood of the beautiful Charmides, is remarkable, as a manifestation of Hellenic sentiment. The same exaltation of the feelings and imagination, which is now produced only by beautiful women, was then excited chiefly by fine youths. Charmides is described by Kritias as exhibiting dispositions at once philosophical and poetical:<sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> I translate *σωφροσύνη* Temperance, though it is very inadequate, but I know no single English word better suited.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Charmidês, c. 3, p. 154 C.

Ficinus, in his *Argumentum* to this dialogue (p. 767), considers it as mainly allegorical, especially the warm expressions of erotic sentiment contained therein, which he compares to the

Song of Solomon. “Etsi omnia in hoc dialogo mirificam habeant allegoriam, amatoria maxime, non aliter quam Cantica Salomonis — mutavi tamen nonnihil—nonnihil etiam prætermisi. Quæ enim consonabant castigatissimis auribus Atticorum, rudioribus fortè auribus minimè consonarent.”

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Charmidês, c. 5, p. 155 A.

illustrating the affinity of these two intellectual veins, as Plato conceived them. He is also described as eminently temperate and modest: <sup>d</sup> from whence the questions of Sokrates take their departure.

You are said to be temperate, Charmides (says Sokrates). If so, your temperance will surely manifest itself within you in some way, so as to enable you to form and deliver an opinion, What Temperance is. Tell us in plain language what you conceive it to be. Temperance, replies Charmides (after some hesitation), <sup>e</sup> consists in doing every thing in an orderly and sedate manner, when we walk in the highway, or talk, or perform other matters in the presence of others. It is, in short, a kind of sedateness or slowness.

Question, What is Temperance? addressed by Sokrates to the temperate Charmides. Answer, It is a kind of sedateness or slowness.

Sokrates begins his cross-examination upon this answer, in the same manner as he had begun it with Laches in respect to courage. *Sokr.*—Is not temperance a fine and honourable thing? Does it not partake of the essence, and come under the definition, of what is fine and honourable? <sup>f</sup> *Char.*—Undoubtedly it does. *Sokr.*—But if we specify in detail our various operations, either of body or mind—such as writing, reading, playing on the harp, boxing, running, jumping, learning, teaching, recollecting, comprehending, deliberating, determining, &c.—we shall find that to do them quickly is more fine and honourable than to do them slowly. Slowness does not, except by accident, belong to the fine and honourable: therefore temperance, which does so belong to it, cannot be a kind of slowness. <sup>g</sup>

But Temperance is a fine or honourable thing, and slowness is, in many or most cases, not fine or honourable, but the contrary. Temperance cannot be slowness.

Charmides next declares Temperance to be a variety of the feeling of shame or modesty. But this (observes Sokrates) will not hold, more than the former explanation: since Homer has pronounced shame

Second answer. Temperance is a variety of the feeling of

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Charm. c. 11, p. 157 D.

About the diffidence of Charmides in his younger years, see Xenoph. Memor. iii. 7, 1.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Charmidès, c. 14, p. 159 B.

<sup>f</sup> τὸ κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ, ἔν τε ταῖς ὁδοῖς βαδίσειν καὶ διαλέγεσθαι

συλλήβδην ἡσυχίῳτις τις.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Charmidès, c. 14, p. 159 C-160 D. οὐ τῶν καλῶν μὲν τι ἡ σωφροσύνη ἔστιν; ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῶν καλῶν τι ἡμῖν ἡ σωφροσύνη ὑπέθῃ.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Charmid. c. 17, p. 160 C.



shame. Re- not to be good, for certain persons and under cer-  
futed by tain circumstances.<sup>h</sup>  
Sokrates.

“Temperance consists in doing one’s own business.” Here we have a third explanation, proposed by Charmides and presently espoused by Kritias. Sokrates professes not to understand it, and pronounces it to be like a riddle.<sup>i</sup> Every tradesman or artisan does the business of others as well as his own. Are we to say for that reason that he is not temperate? I distinguish (says Kritias) between *making* and *doing*: the artisan *makes* for others, but he does not *do* for others, and often cannot be said to *do* at all. *To do*, implies honourable, profitable, good, occupation: this alone is a man’s own business, and this I call temperance. When a man acts so as to harm himself, he does not do his own business.<sup>k</sup> The doing of good things, is temperance.<sup>l</sup>

*Sokr.*—Perhaps it is. But does the well-doer always and certainly know that he is doing well? Does the temperate man know his own temperance? *Krit.*—He certainly must. Indeed I think that the essence of temperance is, *Self-knowledge*. *Know thyself*—is the precept of the Delphian God, who means thereby the same as if he had said—Be temperate. I now put aside all that I have said before, and take up this new position, That temperance consists in a man’s knowing himself. If you do not admit it, I challenge your cross-examination.<sup>m</sup>

*Sokr.*—I cannot tell you whether I admit it or not, until I have investigated. You address me as if I professed to know the subject: but it is because I do not know, that I

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Charmid. c. 18, p. 161 A.

<sup>i</sup> Plato, Charmid. c. 19, p. 161 C. *σωφροσύνη—τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν—αἰνίγματι τινι ζοικειν*, p. 162 B.

There is here a good deal of playful vivacity in the dialogue: Charmides gives this last answer, which he has heard from Kritias, who is at first not forward to defend it, until Charmides forces him to come forward, by hints and side-insinuations. This is the dramatic art and variety of Plato,

charming to read, but not bearing upon him as a philosopher.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Charmid. c. 23-24, p. 163 D. *τὰ καλῶς καὶ ὠφελίμως ποιούμενα . . . οἰκεία μόνον τὰ τοιαῦτα ἡγείσθαι, καὶ τὰ βλαβερά πάντα, ἀλλότρια. ὅτι τὰ οἰκεία καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ, ἀγαθὰ καλοῦσι, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήσεις, πράξεις.*

<sup>l</sup> Plato, Charmid. p. 164 A. *τῶν ἀγαθῶν πράξιν σωφροσύνην εἶναι σαφῶς σοι διορίζομαι.*

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Charmid. c. 27, pp. 164-165.

examine, in conjunction with you, each successive answer.<sup>n</sup>  
 If temperance consists in knowing, it must be a  
 knowledge of something. *Krit.*—It is so: it is know-  
 ledge of a man's self. *Sokr.*—What good does this  
 knowledge procure for us? as medical knowledge  
 procures for us health—architectural knowledge,  
 buildings, &c.? *Krit.*—It has no positive result of  
 analogous character: but neither have arithmetic  
 nor geometry. *Sokr.*—True, but in arithmetic and  
 geometry, we can at least indicate a something  
 known, distinct from the knowledge. Number and  
 proportion are distinct from arithmetic, the science which takes  
 cognizance of them. Now what is that, of which temperance  
 is the knowledge,—distinct from temperance itself? *Krit.*—  
 It is on this very point that temperance differs from all the  
 other cognitions. Each of the others is knowledge of some-  
 thing different from itself, but not knowledge of itself: while  
 temperance is knowledge of all the other sciences and of  
 itself also.<sup>o</sup> *Sokr.*—If this be so, it will of course be a know-  
 ledge of ignorance, as well as a knowledge of knowledge?  
*Krit.*—Certainly.

Questions  
 of Sokrates  
 thereupon.  
 What good  
 does self-  
 knowledge  
 procure for  
 us? What is  
 the object  
 known, in  
 this case?  
 Answer:  
 There is no  
 object of  
 knowledge,  
 distinct from  
 the know-  
 ledge itself.

*Sokr.*—According to your explanation, then, it is only the  
 temperate man who knows himself. He alone is  
 able to examine himself, and thus to find out what  
 he really knows and does not know: he alone is  
 able to examine others, and thus to find out what  
 each man knows, or what each man only believes  
 himself to know without really knowing. Temper-  
 ance, or self-knowledge, is the knowledge what a  
 man knows, and what he does not know.<sup>p</sup> Now Two ques-  
 tions arise upon this: First, is it possible for a man to know,  
 that he knows what he does know, and that he does not know  
 what he does not know? Next, granting it to be possible, in  
 what way do we gain by it? The first of these two questions  
 involves much difficulty. How can there be any cognition,

Sokrates  
 doubts the  
 possibility  
 of any know-  
 ledge, with-  
 out a given  
 cognitum as  
 its object.  
 Analogies to  
 prove that  
 knowledge of  
 knowledge is  
 impossible.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Charmid. c. 28, p. 165 C.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Charmidēs, c. 30, p. 166 B.  
 αἱ μὲν ἄλλα πᾶσαι ἄλλου εἰσὶν ἐπιστή-  
 μαι, ἐαυτῶν δ' οὐ· ἡ δὲ μόνη τῶν τε

ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη ἔστι καὶ  
 αὐτὴ ἐαυτῆς, p. 166 E.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Charmid. c. 31, p. 167 A.

which is not cognition of a given *cognitum*, but cognition merely of other cognitions and non-cognitions? There is no vision except of some colour; no audition except of some sound: there can be no vision of visions, or audition of auditions. So likewise, all desire is desire of some pleasure; there is no desire of desires. All volition is volition of some good; there is no volition of volitions: all love applies to something beautiful—there is no love of other loves. The like is true of fear, opinion, &c. It would be singular therefore if, contrary to all these analogies, there were any cognition not of some *cognitum*, but of itself and other cognitions.<sup>1</sup>

It is of the essence of cognition to be cognition of something, and to have its characteristic property with reference to some correlate.<sup>2</sup> What is greater, has its property of being greater in relation to something else, which is less—not in relation to itself. It cannot be greater than itself, for then it would also be less than itself. It cannot include in itself the characteristic property of the *correlatum* as well as that of the *relatum*. So too about what is older, younger, heavier, lighter: there is always a something distinct, to which reference is made. Vision does not include in itself both the property of seeing, and that of being seen: the *videns* is distinct from the *visum*. A movent implies something else to be moved: a heater something else to be heated.

In all these cases (concludes Sokrates) the characteristic property is essentially relative, implying something distinguishable from, yet correlating with, itself. May we generalise the proposition, and affirm, That all properties are relative, and that every thing in nature has its characteristic property with reference to something else? Or is this true only of some things and not of all—so that cognition may be in the latter category?

This is an embarrassing question, which I do not feel qualified to decide: neither the general question, whether there

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Charmid. c. 33-34, pp. 167-168. | ἔστι μὲν αὐτῇ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῶς ἐπιστήμῃ, καὶ ἔχει τινα τοιαύτην δύναμιν ὥστε τῶς εἶναι.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Charmid. c. 34, p. 168 B.

be any cases of characteristic properties having no reference to any thing beyond themselves, and therefore not relative, but absolute—nor the particular question, whether cognition be one of those cases, implying no separate *cognitum*, but being itself both *relatum* and *correlatum*—cognition of cognition.<sup>3</sup>

But even if cognition of cognition be possible, I shall not admit it as an explanation of what temperance is, until I have satisfied myself that it is beneficial. For I have a presentiment that temperance must be something beneficial and good.<sup>4</sup>

Let us concede for the present discussion (continues Socrates) that cognition of cognition is possible. Still how does this prove that there can be cognition of non-cognition? that a man can know both what he knows and what he does not know? For this is what we declared self-knowledge and temperance to be.<sup>5</sup> To have\* cognition of cognition is one thing: to have cognition of non-cognition is a different thing, not necessarily connected with it. If you have cognition of cognition, you will be enabled to distinguish that which is cognition from that which is not—but no more. Now the knowledge or ignorance of the matter of health is one thing, known by medical science: that of justice is a different thing, known by political science. The knowledge of knowledge simply—cognition of cognition—is different from both. The person who possesses this last only, without knowing either medicine or politics, will become aware that he knows something and possesses some sort of knowledge, and

Even if cognition of cognition were possible, cognition of non-cognition would be impossible. A man may know what he knows, but he cannot know what he is ignorant of. He knows the fact that he knows: but he does not know how much he knows, and how much he does not know.

<sup>3</sup> Plato, Charmidēs, c. 35-36, pp. 168-169.

μεγάλου τινος ἀνδρὸς δεῖ, ὅστις τοῦτο κατὰ πάντων ἰκανῶς διαιρήσεται, πότερον οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ πέφυκεν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄλλῃ—ἢ τὰ μὲν, τὰ δ' οὐ· καὶ εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὰ πάντα αὐτὰ πρὸς ἑαυτὰ ἔχει, ἄρ' ἐν οὗτοις ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, ἣν δὴ ἡμεῖς σωφροσύνην φημὲν εἶναι. ἐγὼ μὲν οὐ πιστεύω ἐμαντῶ ἰκανὸς εἶναι ταῦτα

διελέσθαι.

<sup>4</sup> Plato, Charmid. c. 36, p. 169 B. ὠφελιμὸν τι κάγαθον μαρτεῦμαι εἶναι.

<sup>5</sup> Plato, Charmidēs, c. 37, p. 169 D. νῦν μὲν τοῦτο ξυγχωρήσωμεν, δυνατὸν εἶναι γενέσθαι ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης—ἴθι δὴ οὖν, εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα δυνατὸν τοῦτο, τί μᾶλλον οἶδόν τε ἔστιν εἶδέναι ἢ τί τις οἶδε καὶ ἄ μή; τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ που ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὸ γινώσκκειν αὐτὸν καὶ σωφρονεῖν.

will be able to verify so much with regard to others. But *what* it is that he himself knows, or that others know, he will not thereby be enabled to find out: he will not distinguish whether that which is known belong to physiology or to politics; to do this, special acquirements are needed. You, a temperate man therefore, as such, do not know *what* you know and *what* you do not know: you know the bare fact, *that* you know and *that* you do not know. You will not be competent to cross-examine any one who professes to know medicine or any other particular subject, so as to ascertain whether the man really possesses what he pretends to possess. There will be no point in common between you and him. You, as a temperate man, possess cognition of cognition, but you do not know any special *cognitum*: the special man knows his own special *cognitum*, but is a stranger to cognition generally. You cannot question him, nor criticise what he says or performs, in his own specialty—for of that you are ignorant:—no one can do it except some fellow *expert*. You can ascertain that he possesses *some* knowledge: but whether he possesses that particular knowledge to which he lays claim, or whether he falsely pretends to it, you cannot ascertain:—since, as a temperate man, you know only cognition and non-cognition generally. To ascertain this point, you must be not only a temperate man, but a man of special cognition besides.\* You can question and test no one, except another temperate man like yourself.

But if this be all that temperance can do, of what use is it to us (continues Sokrates)? It is indeed a great benefit to know how much we know, and how much we do not know: it is also a great benefit to know respecting others, how much *they* know, and how much they do not know. If thus instructed, we should make fewer mistakes: we should do by ourselves only what we knew how to do,—we should commit to others that which

Temperance therefore as thus defined, would be of little or no value.

\* Plato, Charmidès, c. 40-41, pp. 170-171.

Παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον, εἰ ἢ σωφροσύνη ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη μόνον ἔστι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης, οὔτε ἰατρὸν διακρίναι οἷα

τε ἔσται ἐπιστάμενον τὰ τῆς τέχνης, ἢ μὴ ἐπιστάμενον προσποιούμενον δὲ ἢ οἰόμενον—οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδένα τῶν ἐπισταμένων καὶ ὀτιοῦν, πλὴν γε τὸν αὐτοῦ ὁμότεχρον, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί.

they knew how to do, and which we did not know. But temperance (meaning thereby cognition of cognition and of non-cognition generally) does not confer such instruction, nor have we found any science which does.<sup>7</sup> How temperance benefits us, does not yet appear.

But let us even concede—what has been just shown to be impossible—that through temperance we become aware of what we do know and what we do not know. Even upon this hypothesis, it will be of little service to us. We have been too hasty in conceding that it would be a great benefit if each of us did only what he knew, committing to others to do only what they knew. I have an awkward suspicion (continues Sokrates) that after all, this would be no great benefit.<sup>2</sup> It is true that upon this hypothesis, all operations in society would be conducted scientifically and skilfully. We should have none but competent pilots, physicians, generals, &c., acting for us, each of them doing the work for which he was fit. The supervision exercised by temperance (in the sense above defined) would guard us against all pretenders. Let us even admit that as to prediction of the future, we should have none but competent and genuine prophets to advise us; charlatans being kept aloof by this same supervision. We should thus have every thing done scientifically and in a workmanlike manner. But should we for that reason do well and be happy? Can that be made out, Kritias?<sup>a</sup>

But even granting the possibility of that which has just been denied, still Temperance would be of little value. Suppose that all separate work were well performed, by special practitioners, we should not attain our end—Happiness.

*Krit.*—You will hardly find the end of well-doing anywhere else, if you deny that it follows on doing scientifically or according to knowledge.<sup>b</sup> *Sokr.*—But according to

<sup>7</sup> Plato, Charmid. c. 43, p. 172 A.  
ὄρεῖς, ὅτι οὐδαμῶς ἐπιστήμη οὐδεμία  
τοιούτη ὄσα πέφανται.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Charmid. c. 44-45, pp. 172-173.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Charmid. c. 46, p. 173 D.  
κατεσκευασμένον δὴ οὕτω τὸ ἀνθρώ-  
πινον γένος ὅτι μὲν ἐπιστημόνως ἂν  
πράττοι καὶ ζῆν, ἔπομαι—ὅτι δ' ἐπιστη-  
μόνως ἂν πράττοντες εὖ ἂν πράττοιμεν  
καὶ εὐδαιμονοῖμεν, τοῦτο δὲ οὕτω δυνά-  
μεθα μαθεῖν, ᾧ φίλε Κριτία.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Charmid. c. 46, p. 173 D.  
'Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ βραδίως  
εὐρήσεις ἄλλο τι τέλος τοῦ εὖ πράττειν  
ἢ ἂν τὸ ἐπιστημόνως ἀτιμάσης. The  
course of argument here pursued by  
Sokrates is sufficiently plain from what  
precedes and follows, but the literal  
sense of these words hardly falls in  
with it. The argument requires some  
such words as οὐ βραδίως εὐρήσεις  
ἄλλοτι τὸ τέλος τοῦ εὖ πράττειν.

knowledge, of *what*? Of leather-cutting, brazen work, wool-wood, &c.? *Krit.*—No none of these. *Sokr.*—Well then, you see, we do not follow out consistently your doctrine—That the happy man is he who lives scientifically, or according to knowledge. For all these men live according to knowledge, and still you do not admit them to be happy. Your definition of happiness applies only to some portion of those who live according to knowledge, but not to all. How are we to distinguish which of them? Suppose a man to know every thing past, present, and future; which among the fractions of such omniscience would contribute most to make him happy? Would they all contribute equally? *Krit.*—By no means. *Sokr.*—Which of them then would contribute most? Would it be that by which he knew the art of gaming? *Krit.*—Certainly not. *Sokr.*—Or that by which he knew the art of computing? *Krit.*—No. *Sokr.*—Or that by which he knew the conditions of health? *Krit.*—That will suit better. *Sokr.*—But which of them most of all? *Krit.*—That by which he knew good and evil.<sup>c</sup>

*Sokr.*—Here then, you have been long dragging me round in a circle, keeping back the fact, that well-doing and happiness does not arise from living according to science generally, not of all other matters taken together—but from living according to the science of this one single matter, good and evil. If you exclude this last, and leave only the other sciences, each of these others will work as before: the medical man will heal, the weaver will prepare clothes, the pilot will navigate his vessel, the general will conduct his army—each of them scientifically. Nevertheless that each of these things shall conduce to our well-being and profit, will be an impossibility, if the science of good and evil be wanting.<sup>d</sup> Now this science of good and evil, the

Which of the varieties of knowledge contributes most to well-doing or happiness? That by which we know good and evil.

Without the science of good and evil, the other special science will be of little or no service. Temperance is not the science of good and evil, and is of little service.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Charm. c. 47-48, p. 174.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Charmidés, c. 48, p. 174 D. ἐπεὶ εἰ θέλεις ἐξελεῖν ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην (of good and evil); ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ἥττόν τι ἢ μὲν

ἰατρικὴ ὑγιαίνειν ποιήσει, ἢ δὲ σκοπτικὴ ὑποδεέσθαι, ἢ δὲ ὕφαντικὴ ἡμφιέσθαι, ἢ δὲ κυβερνητικὴ κωλύσει ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ ἀποθνήσκειν καὶ ἡ στρατηγικὴ ἐν πολέμῳ; Οὐδὲν ἦττον, ἔφη. Ἄλλὰ τὸ

special purpose of which is to benefit us,<sup>e</sup> is altogether different from temperance; which you have defined as the science of cognition and non-cognition, and which appears not to benefit us at all. *Krit.*—Surely it does benefit us: for it presides over and regulates all the other sciences, and of course regulates this very science, of good and evil, among the rest. *Sokr.*—In what way can it benefit us? It does not procure for us any special service, such as good health: that is the province of medicine: in like manner, each separate result arises from its own producing art. To confer benefit is, as we have just laid down, the special province of the science of good and evil.<sup>f</sup> Temperance, as the science of cognition and non-cognition, cannot work any benefit at all.

Thus then, concludes Sokrates, we are baffled in every way: we cannot find out what temperance is, nor what that name has been intended to designate. All our tentatives have failed; although, in our anxiety to secure some result, we have accepted more than one inadmissible hypothesis. Thus we have admitted that there might exist cognition of cognition, though our discussion tended to negative such a possibility. We have farther granted, that this cognition of cognition, or science of science, might know all the operations of each separate and special science: so that the temperate man (*i. e.* he who possesses cognition of cognition) might know both what he knows and what he does not know: might know, namely, that he knows the former and that he does not know the latter. We have granted this, though it is really an absurdity to say, that what a man does not know at all, he nevertheless does know after a certain fashion.<sup>g</sup>

Sokrates confesses to entire failure in his research. He cannot find out what temperance is: although several concessions have been made which cannot be justified.

ἐδ τε τούτων ἕκαστα γίνεσθαι καὶ ὠφελίμως, ἀπολειποῦς ἡμᾶς ἔσται ταύτης ἀπόουσης.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Charmid. p. 174 D. ἡς ἔργον ἔστι τὸ ὠφελεῖν ἡμᾶς, &c.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Charmid. c. 49, p. 175 A.

Οὐκ ἄρα ὑγιείας ἔσται δημιουργός; (ἡ σωφροσύνη). Οὐδὲν δὲ. Ἄλλης γὰρ ἦν τέχνης ὑγιεία ἢ οὐ; Ἄλλης. Οὐδ' ἄρα ὠφελείας, ὧ ἔταίρε; ἄλλη γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀπέδομεν τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον τέχνη νῦν δὲ ἢ γὰρ; Πάνυ γε. Πῶς οὖν ὠφέλιμος

ἔσται ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελείας οὐσα δημιουργός; Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σωκράτες, εἰκέ γέ.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Charmidès, c. 50, p. 175 B.

καὶ γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης εἶναι ξυνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐκ ἑἴς τὸν λόγον οὐδὲ φάσκοντος εἶναι καὶ ταύτη τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἔργα γινώσκειν ξυνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἑἴς τὸν λόγον—ἴνα δὲ ἡμῖν γένοιτο ὁ σάφρων ἐπιστήμων ὧν τε οἶδεν, ὅτι οἶδε, καὶ ὧν μὴ οἶδεν, ὅτι οὐκ



Yet after these multiplied concessions against strict truth, we have still been unable to establish our definition of temperance: for temperance as we defined it has, after all, turned out to be thoroughly unprofitable.

It is plain that we have taken the wrong road, and that I (Sokrates) do not know how to conduct the enquiry. For temperance, whatever it may consist in, must assuredly be a great benefit: and you, Charmides, are happy if you possess it. How can I tell (rejoins Charmides) whether I possess it or not: since even men like you and Kritias cannot discover what it is?<sup>h</sup>

Temperance is and must be a good thing: but Charmides cannot tell whether he is temperate or not; since what temperance is remains unknown.

Here ends the dialogue called Charmidês,<sup>1</sup> after the interchange of a few concluding compliments, forming part of the great dramatic richness which characterises this dialogue from the beginning. I make no attempt to reproduce this latter attribute; though it is one of the peculiar merits of Plato in reference to ethical enquiry, imparting to the subject a charm which does not naturally belong to it. I confine myself to the philosophical bearing of the dialogue. According to the express declaration of Sokrates, it ends in nothing but disappointment. No positive result is attained. The problem—What is Temperance?—remains unsolved, after four or five different solutions have been successively tested and repudiated.

Expressions both from Charmides and Kritias of praise and devotion to Sokrates, at the close of the dialogue. Dramatic ornament throughout.

The Charmidês (like the Lachês) is a good illustrative specimen of those Dialogues of Search, the general character and purpose of which I have explained in my sixth chapter. It proves nothing: it disproves several hypotheses: but it exhibits (and therein consists its value) the anticipating, guessing, tentative and eliminating process, without which no defensible

The Charmidês is an excellent specimen of Dialogues of Search. Abundance of guesses and tentatives, all ultimately disallowed.

οἶδε. τοῦτο μὲν δὴ καὶ παντάσῃ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἐνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐδ' ἐπισκεψάμενοι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ἃ τις μὴ οἶδε μηδαμῶς ταῦτα εἶδέναι ἅμῶς γέ πως: ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ οἶδε, φησὶν αὐτὰ εἶδέναι ἢ ἡμετέρα ὁμολογία. καίτοι, ὡς ἐγφῶμαι,

οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐχὶ ἀλογώτερον τοῦτ' ἀφανείη. This would not appear an absurdity to Aristotle. See *Analyt. Priora*, ii. p. 67, a. 21; *Anal. Post.* i. 71. a. 28.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, *Charmid.* c. 51, p. 176 A.

<sup>i</sup> See Appendix at end of chapter.

conclusions can be obtained—without which, even if such be found, no advocate can be formed capable of defending them against an acute cross-examiner. In most cases, this tentative process is forgotten or ignored: even when recognised as a reality, it is set aside with indifference, often with ridicule. A writer who believes himself to have solved any problem, publishes his solution together with the proofs; and acquires deserved credit for it, if those proofs give satisfaction. But he does not care to preserve, nor do the public care to know, the steps by which such solution has been reached. Nevertheless in most cases, and in all cases involving much difficulty, there has been a process, more or less tedious, of tentative and groping—of guesses at first hailed as promising, then followed out to a certain extent, lastly discovered to be untenable. The history of science,<sup>\*</sup> astronomical, physical, chemical, physiological, &c., wherever it has been at all recorded, attests this constant antecedence of a period of ignorance, confusion, and dispute, even in cases where ultimately a solution has been found com-

<sup>\*</sup> It is not often that historians of science take much pains to preserve and bring together the mistaken guesses and tentatives which have preceded great physical discoveries. One instance in which this has been ably and carefully done is in the 'Biography of Cavendish,' the chemist and natural philosopher, by Dr. Geo. Wilson.

The great chemical discovery of the composition of water, accomplished during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, has been claimed as the privilege of three eminent scientific men—Cavendish, Watt, and Lavoisier. The controversy on the subject, voluminous and bitter, has been the means of recording each successive scientific phase and point of view. It will be found admirably expounded in this biography. Wilson sets forth the misconceptions, confusion of ideas, approximations to truth seen but not followed out, &c., which prevailed upon the scientific men of that day, especially under the misleading influence of the "phlogiston theory," then universally received.

To Plato such a period of mental

confusion would have been in itself an interesting object for contemplation and description. He might have dramatised it under the names of various disputants, with the cross-examining Elenchus, personified in Sokrates, introduced to stir up the debate, either by first advocating, then refuting, a string of successive guesses and dreams (Charmidès, 173 A) of his own, or by exposing similar suggestions emanating from others; especially in regard to the definition of *phlogiston*, an entity which then overspread and darkened all chemical speculation, but which every theorist thought himself obliged to define. The dialogues would have ended (as the Protagoras, Lysis, Charmidès, &c. now end) by Sokrates deriding the ill success which had attended them in the search for an explanation, and by his pointing out that while all the theorists talked familiarly about *phlogiston* as a powerful agent, none of them could agree what it was.

See Dr. Wilson's 'Biography of Cavendish,' pp. 36-198-320-325, and elsewhere.

manding the nearly unanimous adhesion of the scientific world. But on subjects connected with man and society, this period of dispute and confusion continues to the present moment. No unanimity has ever been approached, among nations at once active in intellect and enjoying tolerable liberty of dissent. Moreover—apart from the condition of different sciences among mature men—we must remember that the transitive process, above described, represents the successive stages by which every adult mind has been gradually built up from infancy. Trial and error—alternate guess and rejection, generation and destruction of sentiments and beliefs—is among the most widespread facts of human intelligence.<sup>1</sup> Even those ordinary minds, which in mature life harden with the most exemplary fidelity into the locally prevalent type of orthodoxy,—have all in their earlier years gone through that semi-fluid and indeterminate period, in which the type to come is yet a matter of doubt—in which the head might have been permanently lengthened or permanently flattened, according to the direction in which pressure was applied.

We shall follow Plato, towards the close of his career (Treatise De Legibus), into an imperative and stationary orthodoxy of his own: but in the dialogues which I have already reviewed, as well as in several others which I shall presently notice, no mention is made of any given affirmative doctrine as indispensable to arrive at ultimately. Plato here concentrates his attention upon the indeterminate period of the mind: looking upon the mind not as an empty vessel, requiring to be filled by ready-made matter from without—nor as a blank sheet, awaiting a foreign hand to write characters upon it—but as an assemblage of latent capacities, which must be called into action by stimulus and example, but which can only attain improvement through multiplied trials and multiplied failures. Whereas in most cases these failures are forgotten, the peculiarity of Plato consists in his bringing them to view with full detail, explain-

Trial and Error, the natural process of the human mind. Plato stands alone in bringing to view and dramatising this part of the mental process. Sokrates accepts for himself the condition of conscious ignorance.

<sup>1</sup> It is strikingly described by Plato of the speech of Diotima in the Symposium, pp. 207-208.

ing the reasons of each. He illustrates abundantly, and dramatises with the greatest vivacity, the intellectual process whereby opinions are broached, at first adopted, then mistrusted, unmade, and re-made—or perhaps not re-made at all, but exchanged for a state of conscious ignorance. The great hero and operator in this process is the Platonic Sokrates, who accepts for himself this condition of conscious ignorance, and even makes it a matter of comparative pride, that he stands nearly alone in such confession.<sup>m</sup> His colloquial influence, working powerfully and almost preternaturally,<sup>n</sup> not only serves both to spur and to direct the activity of hearers still youthful and undecided, but also exposes those who have already made up their minds and confidently believe themselves to know. Sokrates brings back these latter from the false persuasion of knowledge to the state of conscious ignorance, and to the prior indeterminate condition of mind, in which their opinions have again to be put together by the tentative and guessing process. This tentative process, prosecuted under the drill of Sokrates, is in itself full of charm and interest for Plato, whether it ends by finding a good solution or only by discarding a bad one.

The Charmidès is one of the many Platonic dialogues wherein such intellectual experimentation appears depicted without any positive result: except as it adds fresh matter to illustrate that wide-spread mental fact,—(which has already come before the reader, in Euthyphron, Alkibiadès, Hippias, Erastæ, Lachês, &c., as to holiness, beauty, philosophy, courage, &c., and is now brought to view in the case of *temperance* also; all of them words in every one's mouth, and tacitly assumed by every one as known quantities)—the perpetual and confident judgments which mankind are in the habit of delivering—their apportionment of praise and blame, as well as of reward and punishment consequent on praise and blame—without any better basis than that of strong emotion imbibed they know not how, and without being able

Familiar words—constantly used, with much earnest feeling, but never understood nor defined—ordinary phenomenon in human society.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Apolog. Sokr. pp. 21-22-23.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Symposion, 213 E, 215-216; Menon, 80 A-B.

to render any rational explanation even of the familiar words round which such emotions are grouped. No philosopher has done so much as Plato to depict in detail this important fact—the habitual condition of human society, modern as well as ancient, and for that very reason generally unnoticed.<sup>o</sup> The emotional or subjective value of temperance is all that Sokrates determines, and which indeed he makes his point of departure. Temperance is essentially among the fine, beautiful, honourable, things:<sup>p</sup> but its rational or objective value (*i. e.* what is the common object characterising all temperate acts or persons), he cannot determine. Here indeed Plato is not always consistent with himself: for we shall come to other dialogues wherein he professes himself incompetent to say whether a thing be beautiful or not, until it be determined what the thing is:<sup>q</sup> and we have already found Sokrates declaring (in the *Hippias Major*), that we cannot determine whether any particular object is beautiful or not, until we have first determined, What is Beauty in the Absolute, or the Self-Beautiful? a problem nowhere solved by Plato.

Among the various unsuccessful definitions of temperance propounded, there is more than one which affords farther example to show how differently Plato deals with the same subject in different dialogues. Here we have the phrase—"to do one's own business"—treated as an unmeaning puzzle, and exhibited as if it were analogous to various other phrases, with which the analogy is more verbal than real. But in the *Republic*, Plato admits

Different ethical points of view in different Platonic dialogues.

o "Whoever has reflected on the generation of ideas in his own mind, or has investigated the causes of misunderstandings among mankind, will be obliged to proclaim as a fact deeply seated in human nature—That most of the misunderstandings and contradictions among men, most of the controversies and errors both in science and in society, arise usually from our assuming (consciously or unconsciously) fundamental maxims and fundamental facts as if they were self-evident, and as if they must be assumed by every one else besides. Accordingly we never think of closely examining them, until at length experience has taught us

that these *self-evident* matters are exactly what stand most in need of proof, and what form the special root of divergent opinions."—(L. O. Bröcker—*Untersuchungen über die Glaubwürdigkeit der alt-Römischen Geschichte*, p. 490.)

<sup>p</sup> Plato, *Charmid.* c. 14, p. 159 B. c. 17, p. 160 D. *ἡ σωφροσύνη—τῶν καλῶν τι—ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῶν καλῶν τι.* So also Sokrates, in the *Lachês* (192 C), assumes that courage is *τῶν πάντων καλῶν πραγμάτων*, though he professes not to know nor to be able to discover what courage is.

<sup>q</sup> See *Gorgias*, 462 B, 448 E; *Menon*, 70 B.

this phrase as well understood, and sets it forth as the constituent element of justice; in the *Gorgias*, as the leading mark of philosophical life.<sup>r</sup>

Again, another definition given by Kritias is, That temperance consists in knowing yourself, or in self-knowledge. In commenting upon this definition, Sokrates makes out—first, that self-knowledge is impossible; next, that if possible, it would be useless. You cannot know yourself, he argues: you cannot know what you know, and what you do not know: to say that you know what you know, is either tautological or untrue—to say that you know what you do not know, is a contradiction. All cognition must be cognition of something distinct from yourself: it is a relative term which must have some correlate, and cannot be its own correlate: you cannot have cognition of cognition, still less cognition of non-cognition.

This is an important point of view, which I shall discuss more at length when I come to the Platonic *Theætetus*. I bring it to view here only as contrasting with the different language held by the Platonic Sokrates in other dialogues; where he insists on the great value and indispensable necessity of self-knowledge, as a preliminary to all other knowledge—upon the duty of eradicating from men's minds that false persuasion of their own knowledge which they universally cherished—and upon the importance of forcing them to know their own ignorance as well as their own knowledge. In the face of this last purpose, so frequently avowed by the Platonic Sokrates (indirectly even in this very dialogue),<sup>s</sup> we remark a material discrepancy, when he here proclaims self-knowledge to be impossible. We must judge every dialogue by itself, illustrating it when practicable by comparison with others, but not assuming consistence between them as a postulate *à priori*. It is a part of Plato's dramatic and tentative mode of philosophising to work out

Self-knowledge is here declared to be impossible.

In other dialogues, Sokrates declares self-knowledge to be essential and inestimable. Necessity for the student to have presented to him dissentient points of view.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, *Republ.* iv. 10, p. 433, vi. 496 C, viii. 550 A; *Gorgias*, p. 526 C. Compare also *Timæus*, p. 72 A.

*Xenop. Memor.* ii. 9, 1. <sup>s</sup> Plato, *Charmid.* c. 30, p. 166 D.

different ethical points of view, and to have present to his mind one or other of them, with peculiar force in each different dialogue. The subject is thus brought before us on all its sides, and the reader is familiarised with what a dialectician might say, whether capable of being refuted or not. Inconsistency between one dialogue and another is not a fault in the Platonic Dialogues of Search; but is, on the contrary, a part of the training process, for any student who is destined to acquire that full mastery of question and answer which Plato regards as the characteristic test of knowledge. It is a puzzle and provocative to the internal meditation of the student.

In analyzing the *Lachês*, we observed that the definition of courage given by Nicias was shown by Sokrates to have no meaning, except in so far as it coincided with the general knowledge or cognition of good and evil. Here too, in the *Charmidês*, we are brought in the last result to the same terminus—the general cognition of good and evil. But Temperance, as previously defined, is not comprehended under that cognition, and is therefore pronounced to be unprofitable.

This cognition of good and evil—the science of the profitable—is here (in the *Charmidês*) proclaimed by Sokrates to have a place of its own among the other sciences; and even to be first among them, essentially necessary to supervise and direct them, as it had been declared in *Alkibiadês II.* Now the same supervising place and directorship had been claimed by Kritias for Temperance as he defines it—that is, self-knowledge, or the cognition of our cognitions and non-cognitions. But Sokrates doubts even the reality of such self-knowledge: and granting for argument's sake that it exists, he still does not see how it can be profitable. For the utmost which its supervision can ensure would be, that each description of work shall be scientifically done, by the skilful man, and not by the unskilful. But it is not true, absolutely speaking (he argues), that acting scientifically or with knowledge is sufficient for well-doing or for happiness: for the

Courage and Temperance are shown to have no distinct meaning, except as founded on the general cognizance of good and evil.

Distinction made between the special sciences and the science of Good and Evil. Without this last, the special sciences are of no use.

question must next be asked—Knowledge—of what? Not knowledge of leather-cutting, carpenter's or brazier's work, arithmetic, or even medicine: these, and many others, a man may possess, and may act according to them; but still he will not attain the end of being happy. All cognitions contribute in greater or less proportion towards that end: but what contributes most, and most essentially, is the cognition of good and evil, without which all the rest are insufficient. Of this last-mentioned cognition or science, it is the special object to ensure profit or benefit:<sup>t</sup> to take care that everything done by the other sciences shall be done well or in a manner conducing towards the end Happiness. After this, there is no province left for temperance—*i. e.*, self-knowledge, or the knowledge of cognitions and non-cognitions: no assignable way in which it can yield any benefit.<sup>u</sup>

Two points are here to be noted, as contained and debated in the handling of this dialogue. 1. Knowledge absolutely, is a word without meaning: all knowledge is relative, and has a definite object or *cognitum*: there can be no *scientia scientiarum*. 2. Among the various objects of knowledge (*cognita* or *cognoscenda*), one is, *good and evil*. There is a science of good and evil, the function of which is, to watch over and compare the results of the other sciences, in order to promote results of happiness, and to prevent results of misery: without the supervision of this latter science, the other sciences might be all exactly followed out, but no rational comparison could be had between them.<sup>x</sup> In other words, there is a science of Ends, estimating the comparative worth of each End in relation to other Ends (Teleology): distinct from those other more special sciences, which study the means

Knowledge, always relative to some object known. Postulate or divination of a Science of Teleology.

<sup>t</sup> Plato, Charmidēs, c. 48, p. 174 D. Οὐκ αὐτῆ δέ γε, ὡς εἴοικεν, ἔστιν ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἀλλ' ἥς ἔργον ἔστιν ὠφελεῖν ἡμᾶς. Οὐ γὰρ ἐπιστημῶν γε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσυνῶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ.

<sup>u</sup> Plato, Charmid. c. 49, p. 174 E. Οὐκ ἔρα ὑγίειας ἔσται δημιουργός; Οὐ δῆτα. Ἄλλης γὰρ ἦν τέχνης ὑγίεια;

ἡ οὐ; Ἄλλης. Οὐδ' ἔρα ὠφελείας, ὡς ἑταίρε' ἄλλη γὰρ αὐ ἀπέδομεν τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον τέχνη νῦν δὴ. Ἥ γὰρ; Πάνυ γε. Πῶς οὖν ὠφελιμὸς ἔσται ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελείας οὕσα δημιουργός; Οὐδαμῶς, ὡς Σώκρατες, εἰοικέ γε.

<sup>x</sup> Compare what has been said upon the same subject in my remarks on Alkib. i. and ii., ante p. 362.



each towards a separate End of its own. Here we fall into the same track as we have already indicated in *Lachês* and *Alkibiadês II*.

These matters I shall revert to in other dialogues, where we shall find them turned over and canvassed in many different ways. One farther observation remains to be made on the *Lachês* and *Charmidês*, discussing as they do Courage (which is also again discussed in the *Protagoras*) and Temperance. An interesting comparison may be made between them and the third book of the *Nikomachean Ethics* of Aristotle,<sup>7</sup> where the same two subjects are handled in the Aristotelian manner. The direct, didactic, systematising, brevity of Aristotle contrasts remarkably with the indirect and circuitous prolixity, the multiplied suggestive comparisons, the shifting points of view, which we find in Plato. Each has its advantages: and both together will be found not more than sufficient, for any one who is seriously bent on acquiring what Plato calls knowledge, with the cross-examining power included in it. Aristotle is greatly superior to Plato in one important attribute of a philosopher: in the care which he takes to discriminate the different significations of the same word: the univocal and the equivocal, the generically identical from the remotely analogical, the proper from the improper, the literal from the metaphorical. Of such precautions we discover little or no trace in Plato; who sometimes seems not merely to neglect, but even to deride them. Yet Aristotle, assisted as he was by all Plato's speculations before us, is not to be understood as having superseded the necessity for that negative *Elenchus* which animates the Platonic Dialogues of Search: nor would his affirmative doctrines have held their grounds before a cross-examining *Sokrates*.

<sup>7</sup> *Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. iii. p. 1115-1119; also Ethic. Eudem. iii. 1229-1231.* doctrine of *Sokrates* respecting Courage, seem to relate rather to the *Protagoras* than to the *Lachês* of Plato. See *Eth. Nik. 1116, 6, 4; Eth. Eud. 1229, a. 15.*

The comments of Aristotle upon the

## APPENDIX.

The dialogue *Charmidès* is declared to be spurious, not only by Ast, but also by Socher (*Ast, Platon's Leb.* pp. 419-428; *Socher, Ueber Platon*, pp. 130-137), Steinhart maintains the genuineness of the dialogue against them; declaring (as in regard to the *Lachès*) that he can hardly conceive how critics can mistake the truly Platonic character of it, though here too, as in the *Lachès*, he detects "*adolescenciæ vestigia*" (*Steinhart, Einleit. zum Charmidès*, pp. 290-293).

Schleiermacher considers *Charmidès* as well as *Lachès* to be appendixes to the *Protagoras*, which opinion both Stallbaum (*Proleg.* p. 98) and Steinhart controvert.

The views of Stallbaum respecting the *Charmidès* are declared by Steinhart (p. 290) to be "*recht äusserlich und oberflächlich.*" To me they appear much nearer the truth than the profound and recondite meanings, the far-sighted indirect hints, which Steinhart himself perceives or supposes in the words of Plato.

These critics consider the dialogue as composed during the government of the Thirty at Athens, in which opinion I do not concur.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

## LYSIS.

THE *Lysis*, as well as the *Charmidês*, is a dialogue recounted by Sokrates himself, describing both incidents and a conversation in a crowded palæstra; wherein not merely bodily exercises were habitually practised, but debate was carried on and intellectual instruction given by a Sophist named Mikkus, companion and admirer of Sokrates. There is a lively dramatic commencement, introducing Sokrates into the palæstra, and detailing the preparation and scenic arrangements, before the real discussion opens. It is the day of the *Hermæa*, or festival of *Hermes*, celebrated by sacrifice and its accompanying banquets among the frequenters of gymnasia.

*Lysis*, like *Charmides*, is an Athenian youth, of conspicuous beauty, modesty, and promise. His father Demokrates represents an ancient family of the *Æxonian Deme* in Attica, and is said to be descended from Zeus and the daughter of the *Archêgetês* or Heroic Founder of that Deme. The family moreover are so wealthy, that they have gained many victories at the Pythian, Isthmian, and Nemean games, both with horses and with chariots and four. Menexenus, companion of *Lysis*, is somewhat older, and is his affectionate friend. The persons who invite Sokrates into the palæstra, and give occasion to the debate, are *Ktesippus* and *Hippothalês*: both of them adults, yet in the vigour of age. *Hippothalês* is the *Erastes* of *Lysis*, passionately attached to him. He is ridiculed by *Ktesippus* for perpetually talking about *Lysis*, as well as for addressing to him compositions both in prose and verse, full of praise and flattery; extolling not only his personal beauty, but also his splendid ancestry and position.<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Plato, *Lysis*, p. 203-205.

Analogy between *Lysis* and *Charmidês*. Richness of dramatic incident in both. Youthful beauty.

Scenery and personages of the *Lysis*.

In reference to these addresses, Sokrates remonstrates with Hippothalês on the imprudence and mischief of addressing to a youth flatteries calculated to turn his head. He is himself then invited by Hippothalês to exhibit a specimen of the proper mode of talking to youth; such as shall be at once acceptable to the person addressed, and unobjectionable. Sokrates agrees to do so, if an opportunity be afforded him of conversing with Lysis.<sup>b</sup> Accordingly after some well-imagined incidents, interesting as marks of Greek manners—Sokrates and Ktesippus with others seat themselves in the palæstra, amidst a crowd of listeners.<sup>c</sup> Lysis, too modest at first to approach, is emboldened to sit down by seeing Menexenus seated by the side of Sokrates: while Hippothalês, not daring to put himself where Lysis can see him, listens, but conceals himself behind some of the crowd. Sokrates begins the conversation with Menexenus and Lysis jointly: but presently Menexenus is called away for a moment, and he talks with Lysis singly.

Origin of the conversation. Sokrates promises to give an example of the proper way of talking to a youth, for his benefit.

*Sokr.*—Well—Lysis—your father and mother love you extremely. *Lysis.*—Assuredly they do. *Sokr.*—Conversation of Sokrates with Lysis. They would wish you therefore to be as happy as possible. *Lysis.*—Undoubtedly. *Sokr.*—Do you think any man happy, who is a slave, and who is not allowed to do any thing that he desires? *Lysis.*—I do not think him happy at all. *Sokr.*—Since therefore your father and mother are so anxious that you should be happy, they of course allow you to do the things which you desire, and never reprove nor forbid you. *Lysis.*—Not at all, by Zeus, Sokrates: there are a great many things that they forbid me. *Sokr.*—How say you! they wish you to be happy—and they hinder you from doing what you wish! Tell me, for example, when one of your father's chariots is going to run a race, if you wished to mount and take the reins, would not they allow you to do so? *Lysis.*—No—certainly: they would not allow me. *Sokr.*—But whom do they allow then? *Lysis.*—My father employs a paid charioteer. *Sokr.*—What! do they permit a hireling, in

<sup>b</sup> Plato, *Lysis*, p. 206.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, *Lysis*, pp. 206-207.

preference to *you*, to do what he wishes with the horses ? and do they give him pay besides for doing so ? *Lysis*.—Why—to be sure. *Sokr.*—But doubtless, I imagine, they trust the team of mules to your direction ; and if you chose to take the whip and flog, they would allow you ? *Lysis*.—Allow me ? not at all. *Sokr.*—What ! is no one allowed to flog them ? *Lysis*.—Yes—certainly—the mule-groom. *Sokr.*—Is he a slave or free ? *Lysis*.—A slave. *Sokr.*—Then, it seems, they esteem a slave higher than you their son ; trusting their property to him rather than to you, letting *him* do what he pleases, while they forbid you. But tell me farther : do they allow you to direct yourself—or do not they even trust you so far as that ? *Lysis*.—How can you imagine that they trust me ? *Sokr.*—But does any one else direct you ? *Lysis*.—Yes—this tutor here. *Sokr.*—Is he a slave ? *Lysis*.—To be sure : belonging to our family. *Sokr.*—That is shocking : one of free birth to be under the direction of a slave ! But what is it that he does, as your director ? *Lysis*.—He conducts me to my teacher's house. *Sokr.*—What ! do *they* govern you also, these teachers ? *Lysis*.—Undoubtedly they do. *Sokr.*—Then your father certainly is bent on putting over you plenty of directors and governors. But surely, when you come home to your mother, she at least, anxious that you should be happy as far as she is concerned, lets you do what you please about the wool or the web, when she is weaving : she does not forbid you to meddle with the bodkin or any of the other instruments of her work ? *Lysis*.—Ridiculous ! not only does she forbid me, but I should be beaten if I did meddle. *Sokr.*—How is this, by Heraklès ? Have you done any wrong to your father and mother ? *Lysis*.—Never at all, by Zeus. *Sokr.*—From what provocation is it, then, that they prevent you in this terrible way, from being happy and doing what you wish ? keeping you the whole day in servitude to some one, and never your own master ? so that you derive no benefit either from the great wealth of the family, which is managed by every one else rather than by you—or from your own body, noble as it is. Even *that* is consigned to the watch and direction of another : while you,

Lysis, are master of nothing, nor can do any one thing of what you desire. *Lysis*.—The reason is, Sokrates, that I am not yet old enough. *Sokr*.—That can hardly be the reason; for to a certain extent your father and mother do trust you, without waiting for you to grow older. If they want any thing to be written or read for them, they employ you for that purpose in preference to any one in the house: and you are then allowed to write or read first, whichever of the letters you think proper. Again, when you take up the lyre, neither father nor mother hinder you from tightening or relaxing the strings, or striking them either with your finger or with the plectrum. *Lysis*.—They do not. *Sokr*.—Why is it then, that they do not hinder you in this last case, as they did in the cases before mentioned? *Lysis*.—I suppose it is because I know this last, but did not know the others. *Sokr*.—Well, my good friend, you see that it is not your increase of years that your father waits for; but on the very day that he becomes convinced that you know better than he, he will entrust both himself and his property to your management. *Lysis*.—I suppose that he will. *Sokr*.—Ay—and your neighbour too will judge in the same way as your father. As soon as he is satisfied that you understand house-management better than he does, which do you think he will rather do—confide his house to you, or continue to manage it himself? *Lysis*.—I think he will confide it to me. *Sokr*.—The Athenians too: do not you think that they also will put their affairs into your management, as soon as they perceive that you have intelligence adequate to the task? *Lysis*.—Yes: I do. *Sokr*.—What do you say about the Great King also, by Zeus! When his meat is being boiled, would he permit his eldest son who is to succeed to the rule of Asia, to throw in any thing that he pleases into the sauce, rather than us, if we come and prove to him that we know better than his son the way of preparing sauce? *Lysis*.—Clearly, he will rather permit us. *Sokr*.—The Great King will not let his son throw in even a pinch of salt: while we, if we chose to take up an entire handful, should be allowed to throw it in. *Lysis*.—No doubt. *Sokr*.—What if his son has

a complaint in his eyes ; would the Great King, knowing him to be ignorant of medicine, allow him even to touch his own eyes—or would he forbid him? *Lysis*.—He would forbid him. *Sokr*.—As to us, on the contrary, if he accounted us good physicians, and if we desired even to open the eyes and drop a powder into them, he would not hinder us, in the conviction that we understood what we were doing. *Lysis*.—You speak truly. *Sokr*.—All other matters, in short, on which he believed us to be wiser than himself or his son, he would entrust to us rather than to himself or his son? *Lysis*.—Necessarily so, Sokrates. *Sokr*.—This is the state of the case then, my dear Lysis : On those matters on which we shall have become intelligent, all persons will put trust in us—Greeks as well as barbarians, men as well as women. We shall do whatever we please respecting them : no one will be at all inclined to interfere with us on such matters ; not only we shall be ourselves free, but we shall have command over others besides. These matters will be really ours, because we shall derive real good from them.<sup>d</sup> As to those subjects, on the contrary, on which we shall not have acquired intelligence, no one will trust us to do what we think right : every one,—not merely strangers, but father and mother and nearer relatives if there were any,—will obstruct us as much as they can : we shall be in servitude so far as these subjects are concerned ; and they will be really alien to us, for we shall derive no real good from them. Do you admit that this is the case?<sup>e</sup> *Lysis*.—I do admit it. *Sokr*.—Shall we then be friends to any one, or will any one love us, on those matters on which we are unprofitable? *Lysis*.—Certainly not. *Sokr*.—You see that neither does your father love you, nor does any man love another, in so far as he is useless? *Lysis*.—Apparently not. *Sokr*.—If then you become intelligent, my boy, all persons will be your friends and all persons will be your kinsmen : for you will be useful

<sup>d</sup> Plato, *Lysis*, 210 C. καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡμᾶς ἐκὼν εἶναι ἐμποδιεῖ, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ τε ἐλεύθεροι ἐσόμεθα ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλων ἔρχοντες, ἡμέτερά τε ταῦτα ἔσται ὀνησόμεθα γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, *Lysis*, 210 C-D. αὐτοὶ τε ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐσόμεθα ἄλλων ὑπήκοοι, καὶ ἡμῖν ἔσται ἀλλότρια· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὀνησόμεθα. Συγχαρεῖς οὕτως ἔχειν ; Συγχαρῶ.

and good : if you do not, no one will be your friend,—not even your father nor your mother nor your other relatives.

Is it possible then, Lysis, for a man to think highly of himself on those matters, on which he does not yet think aright? *Lysis*.—How can it be possible? *Sokr.*—If you stand in need of a teacher, you do not yet think aright? *Lysis*.—True. *Sokr.*—Accordingly, you are not presumptuous on the score of intelligence, since you are still without intelligence. *Lysis*.—By Zeus, Sokrates, I think not.<sup>f</sup>

When I heard Lysis speak thus (continues Sokrates, who is here the narrator), I looked towards Hippothalès, and I was on the point of committing a blunder: for it occurred to me to say, That is the way, Hippothalès, to address a youth whom you love: you ought to check and humble him, not to puff him up and spoil him, as you have hitherto done. But when I saw him agitated and distressed by what had been said, I called to mind that though standing close by, he wished not to be seen by Lysis. Accordingly, I restrained myself and said nothing of the kind.<sup>g</sup>—Lysis accepts this as a friendly lesson, inculcating humility: and seeing Menexenus just then coming back, he says aside to Sokrates, Talk to Menexenus as you have been talking to me. You can tell him yourself (replies Sokrates) what you have heard from me: you listened very attentively. Most certainly I shall tell him (says Lysis): but meanwhile pray address to him yourself some other questions, for me to hear. You must engage to help me if I require it (answers Sokrates): for Menexenus is a formidable disputant, scholar of our friend Ktesippus, who is here ready to assist him. I know he is—(rejoined Lysis), and it is for that very reason that I want you to talk to him—that you may chasten and punish him.<sup>h</sup>

*Lysis is humiliated. Distress of Hippothalès.*

*Lysis entreats Sokrates to talk in the like strain to Menexenus.*

<sup>f</sup> Plato, *Lysis*, p. 210 D. Οἶόν τε οὖν ἐπὶ τοῦτοις, ὃ Λύσι μέγα φρονεῖν ἐν οἷς τις μὴ πω φρονεῖ; Καὶ πῶς ἂν, ἔφη; Εἰ δ' ἄρα σὺ διδασκάλου δέει, οὐ πω φρονεῖς; Ἀληθῆ.

Οὐδ' ἄρα μεγαλόφρων εἶ, εἶπερ ἄφρων ἔτι; Μὰ Δῖ, ἔφη, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

There is here a double sense of μέγα φρονεῖν, μεγαλόφρων, which cannot easily be made to pass into any other language,

<sup>g</sup> Plato, *Lysis*, p. 210 E.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, *Lysis*, p. 211 A-B. ἀλλ' ἄρα ὅπως ἐπικουρήσεις μοι, ἐάν με ἐλέγχειν ἐπιχειρήῃ ὁ Μενέξενος. ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι



I have given at length, and almost literally (with some few abbreviations), this first conversation between Sokrates and Lysis, because it is a very characteristic passage, exhibiting conspicuously several peculiar features of the Platonico-Sokratic interrogation. Facts common and familiar are placed in a novel point of view, ingeniously contrasted, and introduced as stepping-stones to a very wide generality. Wisdom or knowledge is exalted into the ruling force, with liberty of action not admissible except under its guidance: the questions are put in an inverted half-ironical tone (not uncommon with the historical Sokrates<sup>1</sup>), as if an affirmative answer were expected as a matter of course, while in truth the answer is sure to be negative: lastly, the purpose of checking undue self-esteem is proclaimed. The rest of the dialogue, which contains the main substantive question investigated, I can report only in brief abridgment, with a few remarks following.

Sokrates begins, as Lysis requests, to interrogate Menexenus—first premising—Different men have different tastes: some love horses and dogs, others wealth or honours. For my part, I care little about all such acquisitions: but I ardently desire to possess friends, and I would rather have a good friend than all the treasures of Persia. You two, Menexenus and Lysis, are much to be envied, because at your early age, each of you has made an attached friend of the other. But I am so far from any such good fortune, that I do not even know how any man becomes the friend of another. This is what I want to ask from you, Menexenus, as one who must know,<sup>k</sup> having acquired such a friend already.

When one man loves another, which becomes the friend of which? Does he who loves, become the friend of him whom he loves, whether the latter returns the affection or not? Or

πάνυ ἐριστικός ἐστὶ; Ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, σφόδρα γε. διὰ ταῦτά τοι καὶ βούλομαι σε αὐτῷ διαλέγεσθαι—ἢ αὐτὸν κολάσθαι.

Compare Xenophon, Memor. i. 4, 1, where he speaks of the chastising purpose often contemplated by Sokrates in his conversation—ἢ ἐκείνος κολαστηρίου

ἕνεκα τοὺς πάντ' οἰομένους εἰδέναι ἤλεγχεν.

<sup>1</sup> See the conversation of Sokrates with Glaukon in Xenophon, Memor. iii. 6; also the conversation with Perikles, iii. 5, 23-24.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Lysis, pp. 211-212.

is the person loved, whatever be his own dispositions, the friend of the person who loves him? Or is reciprocity of affection necessary, in order that either shall be the friend of the other?

The speakers cannot satisfy themselves that the title of *friend* fits either of the three cases;<sup>1</sup> so that this line of interrogating comes to a dead lock. Menexenus avows his embarrassment, while Lysis expresses himself more hopefully.

Sokrates now takes up a different aspect of the question, and turns to Lysis, inviting him to consider what has been laid down by the poets, "our fathers and guides in respect of wisdom."<sup>m</sup> Homer says that the Gods originate friendship, by bringing the like man to his like: Empedokles and other physical philosophers have also asserted, that like must always and of necessity be the friend of like. These wise teachers cannot mean (continues Sokrates) that bad men are friends of each other. The bad man can be no one's friend. He is not even like himself, but ever wayward and insane:—much less can he be like to any one else, even to another bad man. They mean that the good alone are like to each other, and friends to each other.<sup>n</sup> But is this true? What good, or what harm, can like do to like, which it does not also do to itself? How can there be reciprocal love between parties who render to each other no reciprocal aid? Is not the good man, so far forth as good, sufficient to himself—standing in need of no one—and therefore loving no one? How can good men care much for each other, seeing that they thus neither regret each other when absent, nor have need of each other when present?°

Questions addressed to Lysis. Appeal to the maxims of the poets. Like is the friend of like. Canvassed and rejected.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Lysis, c. 21-23, pp. 212-213. εἰ μήτε οἱ φιλοῦντες (1) φίλοι ἔσονται, μήτε οἱ φιλούμενοι (2), μήθ' οἱ φιλοῦντές τε καὶ φιλούμενοι (3), &c. Sokrates here professes to have shown grounds for rejecting all these three suppositions. But if we follow the preceding argument, we shall see that he has shown grounds only against the first two, not against the third.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Lysis, c. 24, p. 213 E. σκοποῦντα κατὰ τοὺς ποιητὰς, οὗτοι γὰρ ἡμῖν ὡσπερ πατέρες τῆς σοφίας εἰσι καὶ ἡγεμόνες.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Lysis, c. 26, p. 214.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Lysis, c. 27, p. 215. Ὅ δὲ μή του δεόμενος, οὐδέ τι ἀγαπήνῃ ἄν. Ὅ δὲ μή ἀγαπήνῃ, οὐδέ ἂν φιλοῖ; Πῶς οὖν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἡμῖν φίλοι ἔσονται τὴν ἀρχὴν, οἱ μήτε ἀπόντες

It appears therefore, Lysis (continues Sokrates), that we are travelling in the wrong road, and must try another direction. I now remember to have recently heard some one affirming—contrary to what we have just said—that likeness is a cause of aversion, and unlikeness a cause of friendship. He too produced evidence from the poets: for Hesiod tells us, that “potter is jealous of potter, and bard of bard.” Things most alike are most full of envy, jealousy, and hatred to each other: things most unlike, are most full of friendship. Thus the poor man is of necessity a friend to the rich, the weak man to the strong, for the sake of protection: the sick man, for similar reason, to the physician. In general, every ignorant man loves, and is a friend to, the man of knowledge. Nay, there are also physical philosophers, who assert that this principle pervades all nature; that dry is the friend of moist, cold of hot, and so forth: that all contraries serve as nourishment to their contraries. These are ingenious teachers: but if we follow them, we shall have the cleverest disputants attacking us immediately, and asking—What! is the opposite essentially a friend to its opposite? Do you mean that unjust is essentially the friend of just—temperate of intemperate—good of evil? Impossible: the doctrine cannot be maintained.<sup>p</sup>

My head turns (continues Sokrates) with this confusion and puzzle—since neither like is the friend of like, nor contrary of contrary. But I will now hazard a different guess of my own.<sup>q</sup> There are three genera in all: the good—the evil—and that which is neither good nor evil, the indifferent. Now we have found that good is not a friend to good—nor evil to evil—nor good to evil—nor evil to good. If therefore there exist any friendship at all, it must be the indifferent that is friend, either to its like, or to the good; for nothing whatever can

Other poets declare that likeness is a cause of aversion; unlikeness, of friendship. Reasons *pro* and *con*. Rejected.

Confusion of Sokrates. He suggests, That the Indifferent (neither good nor evil) is friend to the Good.

ποθνεῖν ἀλλήλοις—ἱκανοὶ γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς  
καὶ χωρὶς ὄντες—μήτε παρόντες χρεῖαν  
αὐτῶν ἔχουσιν; τοὺς δὴ τοιοῦτους τις  
μηχανὴ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι ἀλλή-  
λους;

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Lysis, c. 29, pp. 215-216.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, Lysis, p. 216C. τῶ ὄντι αὐτῶν—  
ἰλιγγιωῦ ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ λόγου ἀπορίας—  
λέγω τοίνυν ἀπομαντευόμενος, &c.

be a friend to evil. But if the indifferent be a friend at all, it cannot be a friend to its own like; since we have already shown that like generally is not friend to like. It remains therefore, that the indifferent, in itself neither good nor evil, is friend to the good.<sup>r</sup>

Yet hold! Are we on the right scent? What reason is there to determine, on the part of the indifferent, attachment to the good? It will only have such attachment under certain given circumstances: when, though neither good nor evil in itself, it has nevertheless evil associated with it, of which it desires to be rid. Thus the body, in itself, is neither good nor evil: but when diseased, it has evil clinging to it, and becomes in consequence of this evil, friendly to the medical art as a remedy. But this is true only so long as the evil is only apparent, and not real: so long as it is a mere superficial appendage, and has not become incorporated with the essential nature of the body. When evil has become engrained, the body ceases to be indifferent (*i. e.*, neither good nor evil), and loses all its attachment to good. Thus that which determines the indifferent to become friend of the good, is, the contact and pressure of accessory evil not in harmony with its own nature, accompanied by a desire for the cure of such evil.<sup>s</sup>

Suggestion canvassed. If the Indifferent is friend to the Good, it is determined to become so by the contact of felt evil, from which it is anxious to escape.

Under this head comes the explanation of the philosopher—the friend or lover of wisdom. The man already wise is not a lover of wisdom: nor the man thoroughly bad and stupid, with whose nature ignorance is engrained. Like does not love like, nor does contrary love contrary. The philosopher is intermediate between the two: he is not wise, but neither has he yet become radically stupid and unteachable. He has ignorance cleaving to him as an evil, but he

Principle illustrated by the philosopher. His intermediate condition—not wise, yet painfully feeling his own ignorance.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, *Lysis*, c. 30, p. 216 D.  
<sup>s</sup> Plato, *Lysis*, c. 32, p. 217. Τὸ μῆτε κακὸν ἄρα μῆτε ἀγαθὸν ἐνίστε κακοῦ παρόντος οὕτω κακὸν ἔστιν, ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἤδη τὸ τοιοῦτον γέγονεν. Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν μῆπω κακὸν ἦ κακοῦ

παρόντος, αὐτὴ μὲν ἡ παρουσία ἀγαθοῦ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ ἐπιθυμείν· ἢ δὲ κακὸν ποιούσα ἀποστερεῖ αὐτὸ τῆς τε ἐπιθυμίας ἅμα καὶ τῆς φιλίας τὰγαθοῦ. Οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἔστιν οὔτε κακὸν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν, ἀλλὰ κακὸν· φίλον δὲ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐκ ἦν.

knows his own ignorance, and yearns for wisdom as a cure for it.<sup>t</sup>

The two young collocutors with Sokrates welcome this explanation heartily, and Sokrates himself appears for the moment satisfied with it. But he presently bethinks himself, and exclaims, Ah! Lysis and Menexenus, our wealth is all a dream! we have been yielding again to delusions! Let us once more examine. You will admit that all friendship is on account of something and for the sake of something: it is relative both to some producing cause, and to some prospective end. Thus the body, which is in itself neither good nor evil, becomes when sick a friend to the medical art: on account of sickness, which is an evil—and for the sake of health, which is a good. The medical art is dear to us, because health is dear: but is there any thing behind, for the sake of which health also is dear? It is plain that we cannot push the series of references onward for ever, and that we must come ultimately to something which is dear *per se*, not from reference to any ulterior *aliud*—to some *primum amabile*, dear by its own nature, to which all other dear things refer, and from which they are derivatives.<sup>u</sup> It is this *primum amabile* which is the primitive, essential, and constant object of our affections: we love other things only from their being associated with it. Thus suppose a father tenderly attached to his son, and that the son has drunk hemlock, for which wine is an antidote; the father will come by association to prize highly, not merely the wine which saves his son's life, but even the cup in which the wine is contained. Yet it would be wrong to say that he prizes

Sokrates dissatisfied. He originates a new suggestion. The *Primum Amabile*, or Object originally dear to us, *per se*: by relation or resemblance to which other objects become dear.

<sup>t</sup> Plato, Lysis, c. 33, p. 218 A.

διὰ ταῦτα δὴ φαίμεν ἂν καὶ τοὺς ἤδη σοφοὺς μηκέτι φιλοσοφεῖν, εἴτε θεοὶ εἴτε ἄνθρωποι εἰσιν οὗτοι· οὐδ' αὖ ἐκείνους φιλοσοφεῖν τοὺς οὕτως ἄγνοιαν ἔχοντας ὥστε κακοὺς εἶναι; κακὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀμαθῆ οὐδένα φιλοσοφεῖν. λείπονται δὲ οἱ ἔχοντες μὲν τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο, τὴν ἄγνοιαν, μήπω δὲ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὄντες ἀγνώμονες μηδὲ ἀμαθεῖς, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἡγούμενοι μὴ εἰδέναι & μὴ ἴσασιν. Διὸ δὲ φιλοσο-

φοῦσιν οἱ οὔτε ἀγαθοὶ οὔτε κακοὶ πῶ ὄντες. ὅσοι δὲ κακοὶ, οὐ φιλοσοφοῦσιν, οὔτε οἱ ἀγαθοὶ.

Compare Plato, Symposium, p. 204.

<sup>u</sup> Plato, Lysis, c. 36, p. 219 D. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἀπειπεῖν ἡμᾶς οὕτως ἰόντας, καὶ ἀφικέσθαι ἐπὶ τινα ἀρχὴν, ἢ οὐκέτ' ἐπανόσειε ἐπ' ἄλλο φίλον, ἀλλ' ἤξει ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἔστι πρῶτον φίλον, οὗ ἔνεκα καὶ τἄλλα φαμέν πάντα φίλα εἶναι;

the wine or the cup as much as his son : for the truth is, that all his solicitude is really on behalf of his son, and extends only in a derivative and secondary way to the wine and the cup. So about gold and silver: we talk of prizing highly gold and silver—but this is incorrect, for what we really prize is, not gold, but the ulterior something, whatever it be, for the attainment of which gold and other instrumental means are accumulated. In general terms—when we say that B is dear on account of A, we are really speaking of A under the name of B. What is really dear, is that primitive object of love, *primum amabile*, towards which all the affections which we bear to other things, refer and tend.\*

Is it then true (continues Sokrates) that good is our *primum amabile*, and dear to us in-itself? If so, is it dear to us on account of evil? that is, only as a remedy for evil; so that if evil were totally banished, good would cease to be prized? Is it true that evil is the cause why any thing is dear to us?<sup>y</sup> This cannot be: because even if all evil were banished, the appetites and

\* Plato, Lysis, c. 37, p. 220 B. "Ὅσα γὰρ φάμεν φίλα εἶναι ἡμῖν ἕνεκα φίλου τινος, ἐτέρω ῥήματι φαινόμεθα λέγοντες αὐτό· φίλον δὲ τῷ ὄντι κινδυνεύει ἐκείνῳ αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἰς ὃ πάσαι αὐται, αἱ λεγόμεναι φίλαι τελευτῶσιν.

<sup>y</sup> Plato, Lysis, c. 38, p. 220 D. We may see that in this chapter Plato runs into a confusion between τὸ διὰ τι and τὸ ἕνεκά του, which two he began by carefully distinguishing. Thus in c. 34, p. 218 D he says, ὁ φίλος ἔστι τῷ φίλος—ἕνεκά του καὶ διὰ τι. Again c. 35, p. 219 A, he says—τὸ σώμα τῆς ἰατρικῆς φίλον ἔστιν, διὰ τὴν νόσον, ἕνεκα τῆς ὑγείας. This is a very clear and important distinction.

It is continued in c. 38, p. 220 C—ὅτι διὰ τὸ κακὸν τὰγαθὸν ἠγαπῶμεν καὶ ἐφιλοῦμεν, ὡς φάρμακον ὃν τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κακὸν νόσημα. But in c. 39, p. 220 E—τὸ δὲ τῷ ὄντι φίλον πᾶν τοῦνάντιον τούτου φαίνεται πεφυκός· φίλον γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀνεφάνη ὃν ἐχθροῦ ἕνεκα. To make the reasoning consistent with what had gone before, these two last words ought

to be exchanged for διὰ τὸ ἐχθρόν. Plato had laid down the doctrine that good is loved—διὰ τὸ κακόν, not ἕνεκα τοῦ κακοῦ. Good is loved on account of evil, but for the sake of obtaining a remedy to or cessation of the evil.

Steinhart (in his note on Hieron. Müller's translation of Plato, p. 268) calls this a "sophistisches Räthsel-spiel;" and he notes other portions of the dialogue which "remind us of the deceptive tricks of the Sophists" (die Trugspiele der Sophisten, see pp. 222-224-227-230). He praises Plato here for his "fine pleasantry on the deceptive arts of the Sophists." Admitting that Plato puts forward sophistical quibbles with the word φίλος, he tells us that this is suitable for the purpose of puzzling the contentious young man Menexenus. The confusion between ἕνεκά του and διὰ τι (noticed above) appears to be numbered by Steinhart among the fine jests against Protagoras, Prodikus, or some of the Sophists. I can see nothing in it except an unconscious inaccuracy in Plato's reasoning.

desires, such of them as were neither good nor evil, would still remain: and the things which gratify those appetites will be dear to us. It is not therefore true that evil is the cause of things being dear to us. We have just found out another cause for loving and being loved—desire. He who desires, loves what he desires and as long as he desires: he desires moreover that of which he is in want, and he is in want of that which has been taken away from him—of his own.<sup>2</sup> It is therefore this *own* which is the appropriate object of desire, friendship, and love. If you two, Lysis and Menexenus, love each other, it is because you are somehow of kindred nature with each other. The lover would not become a lover, unless there were, between him and his beloved, a certain kinship or affinity in mind, disposition, tastes, or form. We love, by necessary law, that which has a natural affinity to us; so that the real and genuine lover may be certain of a return of affection from his beloved.<sup>a</sup>

But is there any real difference between what is akin and what is like? We must assume that there is: for we showed before, that like was useless to like, and therefore not dear to like. Shall we say that good is of a nature akin to every one, and evil of a nature foreign to every one? If so, then there can be no friendship except between one good man and another good man. But this too has been proved to be impossible. All our tentatives have been alike unsuccessful.

In this dilemma (continues Sokrates, the narrator) I was about to ask assistance from some of the older men around. But the tutors of Menexenus and Lysis came up to us and insisted on conveying their pupils home—the hour being late. As the youths were departing

Good is of a nature akin to every one, evil is alien to every one. Inconsistency with what has been previously laid down.

Failure of the enquiry. Close of the dialogue.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, *Lysis*, p. 221 E. τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν, οὐδ' ἂν ἐνδεές ᾗ, τοῦτου ἐπιθυμεί—ἐνδεές δὲ γίγνεται οὐδ' ἂν τις ἀφαιρῆται—τοῦ οἰκείου δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅ τε ἔρωσ καὶ ἡ φιλία καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τυγχάνει οἴσα. This is the same doctrine as that which we read, expanded and cast into a mythe with comic turn, in the speech of Aristophanes in the *Symposion*, pp.

191-192-193. ἕκαστος οὐδὲν ἡμῶν ἔστιν ἀνθρώπου σύμβολον, ἅτε τετμημένος ὡσπερ αἱ ψῆται ἐξ ἐνός δύο. ζητεῖ δὴ αἰετὸν τοῦ ἀποῦ ἕκαστος ξύμβολον (191 D) —δικαίως ἂν ὑμνοῖμεν Ἐρωτα, ὃς ἐν τε τῷ παρόντι πλείστα ἡμᾶς δὴνήσῃσιν εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἄγων, &c. (193 D).

<sup>a</sup> Plato, *Lysis*, pp. 221-222.

I said to them—Well, we must close our dialogue with the confession, that we have all three made a ridiculous figure in it: I, an old man, as well as you two youths. Our hearers will go away declaring, that we fancy ourselves to be friends each to the other two; but that we have not yet been able to find out what a friend is.<sup>b</sup>

Thus ends the main discussion of the *Lysis*: not only without any positive result, but with speakers and hearers more puzzled than they were at the beginning: having been made to feel a great many difficulties which they never felt before. Nor can I perceive any general purpose running through the dialogue, except that truly Socratic and Platonic purpose—To show, by cross-examination on the commonest words and ideas, that what every one appears to know, and talks about most confidently, no one really knows or can distinctly explain.<sup>c</sup> This is the meaning of the final declaration put into the mouth of Sokrates. “We believe ourselves to be each other’s friends, yet we none of us know what a

Remarks. No positive result. Socratic purpose in analysing the familiar words—to expose the false persuasion of knowledge.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, *Lysis*, p. 223 A. *Nῦν μὲν καταγέλαστοι γεγόναμεν ἐγὼ τε, γερῶν ἀνὴρ, καὶ ὑμεῖς, &c.*

<sup>c</sup> Among the many points of analogy between the *Lysis* and the *Charmidēs*, one is, That both of them are declared to be spurious and unworthy of Plato, by Socher as well as by Ast (Ast, *Platon’s Leben*, pp. 429-434; Socher, *Ueber Platon*, pp. 137-144).

Schleiermacher ranks the *Lysis* as second in his Platonic series of dialogues, an appendix to the *Phædrus* (*Einl.* p. 174 seq.); K. F. Hermann, Stallbaum, and nearly all the other critics dissent from this view; they place the *Lysis* as an early dialogue, along with *Charmidēs* and *Lachiēs*, anterior to the *Protagoras* (K. F. Hermann, *Gesch. und Syst. Pl. Phil.* pp. 447-448; Stallbaum, *Proleg. ad Lys.* p. 90; Steinhart, *Einl.* p. 221), near to or during the government of the Thirty. All of them profess to discover in the *Lysis* “*adolescētiæ vestigiā.*”

Ast and Socher characterise the dialogue as a tissue of subtle sophistry

and eristic contradiction, such as (in their opinion) Plato cannot have composed. Stallbaum concedes the sophistry, but contends that it is put by Plato intentionally, for the purpose of deriding, exposing, disgracing, the Sophists and their dialectical tricks: “*ludibrii causā*” (p. 88); “*ut illustri aliquo exemplo demonstretur dialecticam istam, quam adolescentes magno quodam studio sectabantur, nihil esse aliud, nisi inanem quandam argutiarum captatricem,*” &c. (p. 87). Nevertheless he contends that along with this derisory matter there is intermingled serious reasoning which may be easily distinguished (p. 87), but which certainly he does not clearly point out. Schleiermacher and Steinhart also (pp. 222-224-227) admit the sophistry in which Sokrates is here made to indulge. But Steinhart maintains that there is an assignable philosophical purpose in the dialogue, which Plato purposely wrapped up in enigmatical language, but of which he (Steinhart) professes to give the solution (p. 228).



friend is." The question is one, which no one had ever troubled himself to investigate, or thought it requisite to ask from others. Every one supposed himself to know, and every one had in his memory an aggregate of conceptions and beliefs which he accounted tantamount to knowledge: an aggregate generated by the unconscious addition of a thousand facts and associations, each separately unimportant and often inconsistent with the remainder: while no rational analysis had ever been applied to verify the consistency of this spontaneous product, or to define the familiar words in which it is expressed. The reader is here involved in a cloud of confusion respecting Friendship. No way out of it is shown, and how is he to find one? He must take the matter into his own active and studious meditation: which he has never yet done, though the word is always in his mouth, and though the topic is among the most common and familiar, upon which "the swain treads daily with his clouted shoon."

This was a proper subject for a Dialogue of Search. In the dialogue Lysis, Plato describes Sokrates as engaged in one of these searches, handling, testing, and dropping, one point of view after another, respecting the idea and foundation of friendship. He speaks, professedly, as a diviner or guesser; following out obscure promptings which he does not yet understand himself.<sup>d</sup> In this character, he suggests several different explanations, not only distinct but inconsistent with each other; each of them true to a certain extent, under certain conditions and circumstances: but each of them untrue, when we travel beyond those limits: other contradictory considerations then interfering. To multiply defective explanations, and to indicate why each is defective, is the whole business of the dialogue.

Schleiermacher discovers in this dialogue indications of a positive result not plainly enunciated: but he admits that Aristotle did not discover them—nor can I believe them to have been intended by the author.<sup>e</sup>

The process of trial and error is better illustrated by a search

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Lysis, p. 216 D. λέγω τοί-  
νον ἀπομαντευόμενος, &c.

<sup>e</sup> Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Lysis, i. p. 177.

But most critics speak slightly of it, as alike sceptical and sophistical: and some even deny its authenticity on these grounds. Plato might have replied by saying that he intended it as a specimen illustrating the process of search for an unknown *quæsitum*; and as an exposition of what can be said for, as well as against, many different points of view. The process of trial and error, the most general fact of human intelligence, is even better illustrated when the search is unsuccessful: because when a result is once obtained, most persons care for nothing else and forget the antecedent blunders. To those indeed, who ask only to hear the result as soon as it is found, and who wait for others to look for it—such a dialogue as the *Lysis* will appear of little value. But to any one who intends to search for it himself, or to study the same problem for himself, the report thus presented of a previous unsuccessful search, is useful both as guidance and warning. Every one of the tentative solutions indicated in the *Lysis* has something in its favour, yet is nevertheless inadmissible. To learn the grounds which ultimately compel us to reject what at first appears admissible, is instruction not to be despised; at the very least, it helps to preserve us from mistake, and to state the problem in the manner most suitable for obtaining a solution.

In truth, no one general solution is attainable, such as Plato here professes to search for.<sup>f</sup> In one of the three *Xeno-*

† Turgot has some excellent remarks on the hopelessness of such problems as that which Plato propounds, here as well as in other dialogues, to find definitions of common and vague terms.

We read in his article *Etymologie*, in the *Encyclopédie* (vol. iii. pp. 70-72 of his *Œuvres Complètes*).

“Qu'on se représente la foule des acceptions du mot *esprit*, depuis son sens primitif *spiritus*, *haleine*, jusqu'à ceux qu'on lui donne dans la chimie, dans la littérature, dans la jurisprudence, *esprit acide*, *esprit de Montaigne*, *esprit des loix*, &c.—qu'on essaie d'extraire de toutes ces acceptions une idée qui soit commun à toutes—on verra s'évanouir tous les caractères qui dis-

tinguent *l'esprit* de toute autre chose, dans quelque sens qu'on le prenne. . . La multitude et l'incompatibilité des acceptions du mot *esprit*, sont telles, que personne n'a été tenté de les comprendre toutes dans une seule *définition*, et de définir *l'esprit* en général. Mais le vice de cette méthode n'est pas moins réel lorsqu'il n'est pas assez sensible pour empêcher qu'on ne la suive.

“A mesure que le nombre et la diversité des acceptions diminue, l'absurdité s'affaiblit: et quand elle disparaît, il reste encore l'erreur. J'ose dire, que presque toutes les *définitions* où l'on annonce qu'on va définir les choses *dans le sens le plus général*, ont

without result than with result. Usefulness of the dialogue for self-working minds.

phontic dialogues wherein the subject of friendship is discussed, we find the real Sokrates presenting it with a juster view of its real complications.<sup>g</sup> The same remark may be made upon Aristotle's manner of handling friendship in the Ethics. He seems plainly to allude to the Lysis (though not mentioning it by name); and to profit by it at least in what he puts out of consideration, if not in what he brings forward.<sup>h</sup> He discards the physical and cosmical analogies, which Plato borrows from Empedokles and Herakleitus, as too remote and inapplicable: he considers that the question must be determined by facts and principles relating to human dispositions and conduct. In other ways, he circumscribes the problem, by setting aside (what Plato includes) all objects of attachment which are not capable of reciprocating attachment.<sup>i</sup> The problem, as set forth here by Plato, is conceived in great generality. In what manner does one man become the friend of another?<sup>k</sup> How does a man become the object of friendship or love from another? What is that object towards which our love or friendship is determined? These terms are so large, that they include everything belonging to the Tender Emotion generally.<sup>l</sup>

ce défaut, et ne définissent véritablement rien : parceque leurs auteurs, en voulant renfermer toutes les acceptions d'un mot, ont entrepris une chose impossible : je veux dire, de rassembler sous une seule idée générale des idées très différentes entre elles, et qu'un même nom n'a jamais pu désigner que successivement, en cessant en quelque sorte d'être le même mot."

See also the remarks of Mr. John Stuart Mill on the same subject. System of Logic, Book IV. chap. 4, s. 5, p. 223 seq.

<sup>g</sup> See Xenophon, Memor. ii. 4-5-6. In the last of these three conversations (s. 21-22), Sokrates says to Kritobulus—'ΑΛΛ' ἔχει μὲν ποικίλως πως ταῦτα, ὦ Κριτόβουλε· φύσει γὰρ ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὰ μὲν φιλικὰ· δέονται τε γὰρ ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἐλεοῦσι, καὶ συνεργοῦντες ὠφελοῦσι, καὶ τοῦτο συνιέντες χάριν ἔχουσιν ἀλλήλοις—τὰ δὲ πολεμικά· τὰ τε γὰρ αὐτὰ κατὰ καὶ ἡδέα νομίζοντες ὑπὲρ τούτων μάχονται, καὶ διχογνω-

μοῦντες ἐναντιοῦνται· πολεμικὸν δὲ καὶ ἔρις καὶ ὀργή· καὶ δυσμενὲς μὲν ὁ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἔρως, μισητὸν δὲ ὁ φθόνος.

This observation of Sokrates is very true and valuable—that the causes of friendship and the causes of enmity are both of them equally natural, *i. e.* equally interwoven with the constant conditions of individual and social life. This is very different from the vague, partial, and encomiastic predicates with which τὸ φύσει is often decorated elsewhere by Sokrates himself, as well as by Plato and Aristotle.

<sup>h</sup> Aristot. Eth. Nikom. viii. 1, p. 1155 b. Compare Plato, Lysis, pp. 214 A-215 E.

<sup>i</sup> Aristot. Ethic. Nik. viii. 2, p. 1155, b. 28; Plato, Lysis, p. 212 D.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Lysis, p. 212 A. *ἄντινα τρόπον γίγνεται φίλος ἕτερος ἑτέρου—223 ad fin. ὅ, τι ἔστιν ὁ φίλος.*

<sup>l</sup> See the chapter on Tender Emotion in Mr. Bain's elaborate classifica-

The debate in the *Lysis* is partly verbal: *i. e.*, respecting the word *φίλος*, whether it means the person loving, or the person loved, or whether it shall be confined to those cases in which the love is reciprocal, and then applied to both. Herein the question is about the meaning of words—a word and nothing more. The following portions of the dialogue enter upon questions not verbal but real—“Whether we are disposed to love what is like to ourselves, or what is unlike or opposite to ourselves?” Though both these are occasionally true, it is shown that as general explanations neither of them will hold. But this is shown by means of the following assumptions, which not only those whom Plato here calls the “very clever Disputants,”<sup>m</sup> but Sokrates himself at other times, would have called in question, viz.: “That bad men cannot be friends to each other—that men like to each other (therefore good men as well as bad) can be of no use to each other, and therefore there can be no basis of friendship between them—that the good man is self-sufficing,

Debate in the *Lysis* partly verbal, partly real. Assumptions made by the Platonic Sokrates, questionable, such as the real Sokrates would have found reason for challenging.

tion and description of the Emotions. ‘The Emotions and the Will,’ ch. vii. p. 94 seq.

In the *Lysis*, p. 216 B we read, among the suppositions thrown out by Sokrates, about τὸ φίλον—κινδυνεύει κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν παροιμίαν τὸ καλὸν φίλον εἶναι. εἶοικε γοῦν μαλακῶ τινι καὶ λείψ καὶ λιπαρῶ· διὰ καὶ ἴσως ῥαδίως διολισθαίνει καὶ διαδύεται ἡμᾶς, ἅτε τοιοῦτον ὄν λέγω γὰρ τὰγαθὸν καλὸν εἶναι. This allusion to the soft and the smooth is not very clear; a passage in Mr. Bain’s chapter serves to illustrate it.

“Among the sensations of the senses we find some that have the power of awakening tender emotion. The sensations that incline to tenderness are, in the first place, the effects of very gentle or soft stimulants, such as soft touches, gentle sounds, slow movements, temperate warmth, mild sunshine. These sensations must be felt in order to produce the effect, which is mental and not simply organic. We have seen that an acute sensation raises a vigorous muscular expression, as in wonder; a contrast to this is exhibited

by gentle pressure or mild radiance. Hence tenderness is passive emotion by pre-eminence: we see it flourishing best in the quiescence of the moving members. Remotely there may be a large amount of action stimulated by it, but the proper outgoing accompaniment of it is organic not muscular.”

That the sensations of the soft and the smooth dispose to the Tender Emotion is here pointed out as a fact in human nature, agreeably to the comparison of Plato. Mr. Bain’s treatise has the rare merit of describing fully the physical as well as the mental characteristics of each separate emotion.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, *Lysis*, p. 216 A. οἱ πάνσοφοι ἄνδρες οἱ ἀντιλογικοί, &c. Yet Plato, in the *Phædrus* and *Symposium*, indicates colloquial debate as the great generating cause of the most intense and durable friendship. Aristeides the Rhetor says, *Orat.* xlvii. Πρὸς Καπίωνα—p. 418, Dindorf, ἐπεὶ καὶ Πλάτων τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀπανταχοῦ τιμᾶ, καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις συνουσίας ἀφορμὴν φιλίας ἀληθινῆς ὑπολαμβάνει.

stands in need of no one, and therefore will not love any one."<sup>a</sup> All these assumptions Sokrates would have found sufficient reason for challenging, if they had been advanced by Protagoras or any other opponents. They stand here as affirmed by him; but here, as elsewhere in Plato, the reader must apply his own critical intellect, and test what he reads for himself.

It is thus shown, or supposed to be shown, that the persons who love are neither the Good, nor the Bad: and that the objects loved, are neither things or persons similar, nor opposite, to the persons loving. Sokrates now adverts to the existence of a third category—Persons who are neither good, nor bad, but intermediate between the two—Objects which are intermediate between likeness and opposition. He announces as his own conjecture,<sup>o</sup> that the Subject of friendly or loving feeling, is, that which is neither good nor evil: the Object of the feeling, Good: and the cause of the feeling, the superficial presence of evil, which the subject desires to see removed.<sup>p</sup> The evil must be present in a superficial and removable manner—like whiteness in the hair caused by white paint, not by the grey colour of old age. Sokrates applies this to the state of mind of the philosopher, or lover of knowledge: who is not yet either thoroughly good or thoroughly bad,—either thoroughly wise or thoroughly unwise—but in a state intermediate between the two: ignorant, yet conscious of his own ignorance, and feeling it as a misfortune which he was anxious to shake off.<sup>q</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Plato, *Lysis*, pp. 214-215. The discourse of Cicero, *De Amicitia*, is composed in a style of pleasing rhetoric; suitable to Lælius, an ancient Roman senator and active politician, who expressly renounces the accurate subtlety of Grecian philosophers (v. 18). There is little in it which we can compare with the Platonic *Lysis*; but I observe that he too, giving expression to his own feelings, maintains that there can be no friendship except between the good and virtuous: a position which is refuted by the "nefaria vox," cited by himself as spoken by C. Blossius, xi. 37.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, *Lysis*, c. 30, p. 216 D. λέγω τοίνυν ἀπομαντευόμενος, &c.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, *Lysis*, pp. 216-217, c. 30-32.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, *Lysis*, c. 33, p. 218 C. λέγονται δὴ οἱ ἔχοντες μὲν τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο, τὴν ἀγνοίαν, μήπω δ' ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὄντες ἀγνώμονες μηδὲ ἀμαθεῖς, ἀλλ' ἐπιηγούμενοι μὴ εἶδέναι ἢ μὴ ἴσασιν διὸ δὴ φιλοσοφοῦσιν οἱ οὔτε ἀγαθοὶ οὔτε κακοὶ πῶ ὅντες: ὅσοι δὲ κακοὶ, οὐ φιλοσοφοῦσιν, οὔτε οἱ ἀγαθοὶ. Compare the phrase of Seneca, *Epist.* 59, p. 211, Gronov. "Elui difficile est: non enim inquinati sumus, sed infecti."

Peculiar theory about friendship broached by Sokrates. Persons neither good nor evil by nature, yet having a superficial tinge of evil, and desiring good, to escape from it.

This meaning of philosophy, though it is not always and consistently maintained throughout the Platonic writings, is important as expanding and bringing into system the position laid down by Sokrates in the Apology. He there disclaimed all pretensions to wisdom, but he announced himself as a philosopher, in the above literal sense: that is, as ignorant, yet as painfully conscious of his own ignorance, and anxiously searching for wisdom as a corrective to it: while most men were equally ignorant, but were unconscious of their own ignorance, believed themselves to be already wise, and delivered confident opinions without ever having analysed the matters on which they spoke. The conversation of Sokrates (as I have before remarked), was intended, not to teach wisdom, but to raise men out of this false persuasion of wisdom, which he believed to be the natural state of the human mind, into that mental condition which he called philosophy. His Elenchus made them conscious of their ignorance, anxious to escape from it, and prepared for mental efforts in search of knowledge: in which search Sokrates assisted them, but without declaring, and even professing inability to declare, where that truth lay in which the search was to end. He considered that this change was in itself a great and serious improvement, converting what was evil, radical, and engrained—into evil superficial and removeable; which was a preliminary condition to any positive acquirement. The first thing to be done was to create searchers after truth, men who would look at the subject for themselves with earnest attention, and make up their own individual convictions. Even if nothing ulterior were achieved, that alone would be a great deal. Such was the scope of the Sokratic conversation; and such the conception of philosophy (the capital peculiarity which Plato borrowed from Sokrates), which is briefly noted in this passage of the Lysis, and developed in other Platonic dialogues, especially in the Symposium,<sup>r</sup> which we shall reach presently.

This general theory illustrated by the case of the philosopher or lover of wisdom. Painful consciousness of ignorance the attribute of the philosopher. Value set by Sokrates and Plato upon this attribute.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Sympos. pp. 202-203-204. Phædrus, p. 278 D.

Still, however, Sokrates is not fully satisfied with this hypothesis, but passes on to another. If we love anything, we must love it (he says) for the sake of something. This implies that there must exist, in the background, a something which is the primitive and real object of affection. The various things which we actually love, are not loved for their own sake, but for the sake of this *primum amabile*, and as shadows projected by it: just as a man who loves his son, comes to love by association what is salutary or comforting to his son—or as he loves money for the sake of what money will purchase. The *primum amabile*, in the view of Sokrates, is *Good*; particular things loved, are loved as shadows of good.

This is a doctrine which we shall find reproduced in other dialogues. We note with interest here, that it appears illustrated, by a statement of the general law of mental association—the calling up of one idea by other ideas or by sensations, and the transference of affections from one object to others which have been apprehended in conjunction with it, either as antecedents or consequents. Plato states this law clearly in the *Phædon* and elsewhere:<sup>s</sup> but he here conceives it imperfectly: for he seems to believe that, if an affection be transferred by association from a primitive object A, to other objects, B, C, D, &c., A always continues to be the only real object of affection, while B, C, D, &c., operate upon the mind merely by carrying it back to A. The affection towards B, C, D, &c., therefore is, in the view of Plato, only the affection for A under other denominations and disguises.<sup>t</sup> Now this is doubtless often the case; but often also, perhaps even more generally, it is not the case. After a certain length of repetition and habit, all conscious reference to the primitive object of affection will commonly be left out, and the affection towards the secondary object

Another theory of Sokrates. The *Primum Amabile*, or original and primary object of Love. Particular objects are loved through association with this. The object is, Good.

Statement by Plato of the general law of mental association.

<sup>s</sup> Plato, *Phædon*, pp. 73-74.

It is declared differently, and more clearly, by Aristotle in the treatise *Περὶ Μνήμης καὶ Ἀναμνήσεως*, pp. 451-452.

<sup>t</sup> Plato, *Lysis*, c. 37, p. 220 A. ὅσα

γὰρ φάμεν φίλα εἶναι ἡμῖν ἕνεκα φίλου τινός, ἑτέρῳ ῥήματι φαινόμεθα λέγοντες αὐτό· φίλον δὲ τῷ ὄντι κινδυνεύει ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἰς δὲ πᾶσαι αὐταὶ αἱ λεγόμεναι φίλιαὶ τελευτῶσιν.

will become a feeling both substantive and immediate. What was originally loved as means, for the sake of an ulterior end, will in time come to be loved as an end for itself; and to constitute a new centre of force, from whence derivatives may branch out. It may even come to be loved more vehemently than any primitive object of affection, if it chance to accumulate in itself derivative influences from many of those objects.<sup>u</sup> This remark naturally presents itself, when we meet here for the first time, distinctly stated by Plato, the important psychological doctrine of the transference of affections by association from one object to others.

The *primum amabile*, here introduced by Sokrates, is described in restricted terms, as valuable merely to correct evil, and as having no value *per se*, if evil were assumed not to exist. In consequence chiefly of this restriction, Sokrates discards it as unsatisfactory. Such restriction, however, is noway essential to the doctrine: which approaches to, but is not coincident with, the Ideal Good or Idea of Good, described in other dialogues as what every one yearns after and aspires to, though without ever attaining it and without even knowing what it is.<sup>x</sup> The Platonic Idea was conceived as a substantive, intelligible, Ens, distinct in its nature from all the particulars bearing the same name, and separated from them all by a gulf which admitted no gradations of nearer and farther—yet communicating itself to, or partaken by, all of them, in some inexplicable way. Aristotle combated this doctrine, denying the separate reality of the Idea, and admitting only a common generic essence, dwelling in and pervading the particulars, but pervading them all equally. The general word connoting this generic unity was said by Aristotle (retaining the Platonic phraseology) to be *λεγόμενον κατὰ μίαν ιδέαν* or *καθ' ἓν*.

Theory of the Primum Amabile, here introduced by Sokrates, with numerous derivative objects of love. Platonic Idea. Generic communion of Aristotle, distinguished by him from the feebler analogical communion.

<sup>u</sup> There is no stronger illustration of this than the love of money, which is the very example that Plato himself here cites.

The important point to which I here call attention, in respect to the law of Mental Association, is forcibly illustrated by Mr. James Mill in his

'Analysis of the Human Mind,' chapters xxi. and xxii., and by Professor Bain in his works on the Senses and the Intellect,—Intellect, chap. i. sect. 47-48, p. 407 seq. ed. 2; and on the Emotions and the Will, chap. iv. sect. 4-5, p. 428 seq.

<sup>x</sup> Plato, *Republ.* vi. pp. 505-506.



But apart from and beyond such generic unity, which implied a common essence belonging to all, Aristotle recognised a looser, more imperfect, but more extensive, communion, founded upon common relationship towards some Ἀρχή—First Principle—or First Object. Such relationship was not always the same in kind: it might be either resemblance, concomitance, antecedence or consequence, &c.: it might also be different in degree, closer or more remote, direct or indirect. Here then there was room for graduation, or ordination of objects as former and latter, first, second, third, &c., according as, when compared with each other, they were more or less related to the common root. This imperfect communion was designated by Aristotle under the title κατ' ἀναλογίαν, as contrasted with κατὰ γένος: the predicate which affirmed it was said to be applied, not κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν or καθ' ἓν, but πρὸς μίαν φύσιν or πρὸς ἓν:<sup>y</sup> it was affirmed neither

<sup>y</sup> Arist. Metaphys. A. 1072, a. 26-29; Bonitz, Comm. p. 497 id. Πρῶτον ὀρεκτὸν—Πρῶτον νοητὸν (πρῶτον ὀρεκτὸν—“quod *per se* appetibile est et concupiscitur”). “Quod autem primum est in aliquâ serie, id præcipue etiam habet qualitatem, quæ in reliquâ cernitur serie, c. a. 993, b. 24: ergo prima illa substantia est τὸ ἄριστον”—also F. 1004, a. 25-26, 1005, a. 7, about the πρῶτον ἓν—πρῶτον ὄν. These were τὰ πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα—τὰ πλεοναχῶς λεγόμενα—which were something less than συνώνυμα and more than ὁμώνυμα; intermediate between the two, having no common λόγος or general unity, and yet not entirely equivocal, but designating a κοινὴν κατ' ἀναλογίαν: not κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν λεγόμενα, but πρὸς ἓν or πρὸς μίαν φύσιν; having a certain relation to one common φύσις called τὸ πρῶτον. See the Metaphys. F. 1003, a. 33—τὸ δὲ ὄν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἓν καὶ μίαν τιὰ φύσιν, καὶ οὐχ ὁμωνύμως, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν ἅπαν πρὸς ὑγίειαν, τὸ μὲν τῷ φυλάττειν, τὸ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ τῷ σημείον εἶναι τῆς ὑγείας, τὸ δ' ὅτι δεκτικὸν αὐτῆς—καὶ τὸ ἱατρικὸν πρὸς ἱατρικὴν, &c. The Scholion of Alexander upon this passage is valuable (p. 638, a. Brandis); and a very copious explanation of the whole doctrine is given by M. Brentano, in his valuable treatise, ‘Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden

nach Aristoteles,’ Freiburg, 1862, pp. 85-103-147.

The distinction drawn by Aristotle between τὸ κοινὸν κατ' ἰδέαν and τὸ κοινὸν κατ' ἀναλογίαν—between τὰ κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν λεγόμενα, and τὰ πρὸς ἓν or πρὸς μίαν φύσιν λεγόμενα—this distinction corresponds in part to that which is drawn by Dr. Whewell between classes which are given by Definition, and natural groups which are given by Type. “Such a natural group” (says Dr. Whewell) “is steadily fixed, though not precisely limited; it is given, though not circumscribed; it is determined, not by a boundary without but by a central point within, &c.” The coincidence between this doctrine and the Aristotelian is real, though only partial: τὸ πρῶτον φίλον, τὸ πρῶτον ὀρεκτὸν, may be considered as types of *objects loveable, objects desirable*, &c., but ἡ ὑγίεια cannot be considered as a type of τὰ ὑγιεινὰ, nor ἡ ἱατρικὴ as a type of τὰ ἱατρικά, though it is “the central point” to which all things so called are referred. See Dr. Whewell's doctrine stated in the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, i. 476-477; and the comments of Mr. John Stuart Mill on the doctrine—‘System of Logic,’ Book iv. ch. 7, pp. 264-267. I have adverted to this same doctrine in remarking on the Hippias Major, supra, p. 379.

entirely *συνωνύμως* (which would imply generic communion), nor entirely *ὁμωνύμως* (which would be casual and imply no communion at all), but midway between the two, so as to admit of a graduated communion, and an arrangement as former and later, first cousin, or second, third cousin. Members of the same Genus were considered to be brothers, all on a par: but wherever there was this graduated cousinship or communion (signified by the words Former and Later, more or less in degree of relationship), Aristotle did not admit a common Genus, nor did Plato admit a Substantive Idea.<sup>2</sup>

Now the *Πρώτου φίλον* or Primum Amabile which we find in the Lysis, is described as the principium or initial root of one of these imperfectly united aggregates ramifying into many branches more or less distant, in obedience to one or other of the different laws of association. Aristotle expresses the same idea in another form of words: instead of a Primum Amabile, he gives us a Prima Amicitia—affirming that the diversities of friendship are not species comprehended under the same genus, but gradations or degeneracies departing in one direction or other from the First or pure Friendship. The Primum Amabile, in Plato's view, appears to be the Good, though he does not explicitly declare it: the Prima Amicitia, with Aristotle, is friendship subsisting between two good persons, who have had sufficient experience to know, esteem, and trust, each other.<sup>3</sup>

Primum Amabile of Plato, compared with the Prima Amicitia of Aristotle. Each of them is head of an analogical aggregate, not member of a generic family.

<sup>2</sup> This is attested by Aristotle, Eth. Nik. i. 64, p. 1096, a. 16. Οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην, οὐκ ἐπιούουν ἰδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον ἔλεγον· διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἰδέαν κατασκευάζον: compare Ethic. Eudem. i. 8, 1218, a. 2. He goes on to object that Plato, having laid this down as a general principle, departed from it in recognizing an ἰδέαν ἀγαθοῦ, because ἀγαθὸν was predicated in all the categories, in that of οὐσία as well as in that of πρὸς τι—τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρὸς τι—ἴσπερ οὐκ ἔν ἐν κινή τις ἐπὶ τοῦτων ἰδέα.

<sup>3</sup> Aristotel. Eth. Nikom. viii. 2, 1155, b. 12, viii. 5, 1157, a. 30, viii. 4;

Eth. Eudem. vii. 2, 1236, a. 15. The statement is more full in the Eudemian Ethics than in the Nikomachean; he begins the seventh book by saying that φιλία is not said μοναχῶς but πλεοναχῶς; and in p. 1236 he says Ἀνάγκη ἔρα τρία φιλίας εἶδη εἶναι, καὶ μῆτε καθ' ἐν ἀπάσας μῆθ' ὡς εἶδη ἐνδὸς γένους, μῆτε πάμπαν λέγεσθαι ὁμωνύμως πρὸς μίαν γάρ τινα λέγονται καὶ πρώτην, ὡσπερ τὸ ἱατρικόν, &c. The whole passage is instructive, but is too long to cite.

Bonitz gives some good explanations of these passages. Observationes Criticæ in Aristotelis quæ feruntur Magna Moralia et Eudemia, pp. 55-57.

In regard to the Platonic Lysis, I have already observed that no positive result can be found in it, and that all the hypotheses broached are successively negatived. What is kept before the reader's mind, however, more than anything else, though not embodied in any distinct formula, is—The Good and the Beautiful considered as objects of love or attachment.

## CHAPTER XIX.

## EUTHYDEMUS.

DRAMATIC vivacity, and comic force, holding up various persons to ridicule or contempt, are attributes which Plato manifests often and abundantly. But the dialogue in which these qualities reach their maximum, is, the Euthydêmus. Some portions of it approach to the Nubes of Aristophanes: so that Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and other admiring critics have some difficulty in explaining, to their own satisfaction,<sup>a</sup> how Plato, the sublime moralist and lawgiver, can here have admitted so much trifling and buffoonery. Ast even rejects the dialogue as spurious; declaring it to be unworthy of Plato and insisting on various peculiarities, defects, and even absurdities, which offend his critical taste. His conclusion in this case has found no favour: yet I think it is based on reasons quite as forcible as those upon which other dialogues have been condemned:<sup>b</sup> upon reasons, which, even if admitted, might prove that the dialogue was an inferior performance, but would not prove that Plato was not the author.

Dramatic and comic exuberance of the Euthydêmus. Judgments of various critics.

Sokrates recounts (to Kriton) a conversation in which he has just been engaged with two Sophists, Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus, in the undressing-room belonging to the gymnasium of the Lykeium. There were present, besides, Kleinias, a youth of remarkable beauty and intelligence, cousin of the great Alkibiades—Ktesippus, an adult man, yet still young, friend of Sokrates and devotedly attached to Kleinias—and a crowd of unnamed persons, partly friends of Kleinias, partly admirers and supporters of the two Sophists.

Scenery and personages.

<sup>a</sup> Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Euthydemus, vol. iii. pp. 400-403-407; Stallbaum, Proleg. in Euthydem. p. 14. | <sup>b</sup> Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, pp. 408-418.

This couple are described and treated throughout by Sokrates, with the utmost admiration and respect: that is, in terms designating such feelings, but intended as the extreme of irony or caricature. They are masters of the art of Contention, in its three varieties<sup>c</sup>—1. Arms, and the command of soldiers. 2. Judicial and political rhetoric, fighting an opponent before the assembled Dikasts or people. 3. Contentious Dialectic—they can reduce every respondent to a contradiction, if he will only continue to answer their questions—whether what he says be true or false.<sup>d</sup> All or each of these accomplishments they are prepared to teach to any pupil who will pay the required fee: the standing sarcasm of Plato against the paid teacher, occurring here as in so many other places. Lastly, they are brothers, old and almost toothless—natives of Chios, colonists from thence to Thurii, and exiles from Thurii and resident at Athens, yet visiting other cities for the purpose of giving lessons.<sup>e</sup> Their dialectic skill is described as a recent acquisition,—made during their old age, only in the preceding year,—and completing their excellence as professors of the tripartite Eristic. But they now devote themselves to it more than to the other two parts. Moreover they advertise themselves as teachers of virtue.

The two Sophists, having announced themselves as competent to teach virtue and stimulate pupils to a virtuous life, are entreated by Sokrates to exercise their beneficent influence upon the youth Kleinias, in whose improvement he as well as Ktesippus feels the warmest interest. Sokrates gives a specimen of what he

Conversation carried on with Kleinias, first by Sokrates, next by the two Sophists.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Euthyd. pp. 271-272.

<sup>d</sup> Plat. Euthyd. p. 272 B. ἐξελέγχειν τὸ ἀεὶ λεγόμενον, εἴαν τε ψεῦδος εἴαν τ' ἀληθὲς ἦ:—p. 275 C. οὐδὲν διαφέρει, εἴαν μόνον ἐθέλη ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὁ νεανίσκος.

<sup>e</sup> Plat. Euthyd. p. 273 B-C. "quamvis essent grandiores natu et edentuli," says Stallbaum in his Proleg. p. 10. He seems to infer this from page 294 C: the inference though not very certain is plausible.

Steinhart, in his Einleitung zum

Euthydemus (vol. ii. p. 2 of Hieronym. Müller's translation of Plato) repeats these antecedents of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, as recited in the dialogue before us, as if they were matter of real history, exemplifications of the character of the class called Sophists. He might just as well produce what is said by the comic poets Eupolis and Aristophanes—the proceedings as recounted by the Sokratic disciple in the *φροντιστήριον* (Nubes)—as evidence about the character of Sokrates.

wishes by putting a series of questions himself. Euthydêmus follows, and begins questioning Kleinias; who, after answering three or four successive questions, is forced to contradict himself. Dionysodorus then takes up the last answer of Kleinias, puts him through another series of interrogations, and makes him contradict himself again. In this manner the two Sophists toss the youthful respondent backwards and forwards to each other, each contriving to entangle him in some puzzle and contradiction. They even apply the same process to Sokrates, who cannot avoid being entangled in the net; and to Ktesippus, who becomes exasperated, and retorts upon them with contemptuous asperity. The alternate interference of the two Sophists is described with great smartness and animation; which is promoted by the use of the dual number, peculiar to the Greek language, employed by Plato in speaking of them.

This mode of dialectic, conducted by the two Sophists, is interrupted on two several occasions by a counter-Contrast between the two different modes of interrogation. exhibition of dialectic on the part of Sokrates: who, under colour of again showing to the couple a specimen of that which he wishes them to do, puts two successive batches of questions to Kleinias in his own manner.<sup>f</sup> The contrast between Sokrates and the two Sophists, in the same work, carried on respectively by him and by them, of interrogating Kleinias, is evidently meant as one of the special matters to arrest attention in the dialogue. The questions put by the couple are made to turn chiefly on verbal quibbles and ambiguities: they are purposely designed to make the respondent contradict himself, and are proclaimed to be certain of bringing about this result, provided the respondent will conform to the laws of dialectic—by confining his answer to the special point of the question, without adding any qualification of his own, or asking for farther explanation from the questioner, or reverting to any antecedent answer lying apart from the actual question of the moment.<sup>g</sup> Sokrates, on the contrary, addresses interrogations, each of which has

<sup>f</sup> Plat. Euthydêm. pp. 279-288.

<sup>g</sup> Plat. Euthyd. pp. 275 E-276 E. | Πάντα τοιαῦτα ἡμεῖς ἐρωτῶμεν ἄφικτα, pp. 287 B-295 B-296 A, &c.

a clear and substantive meaning, and most of which Kleinias is able to answer without embarrassment: he professes no other design except that of encouraging Kleinias to virtue, and assisting him to determine in what virtue consists: he resorts to no known quibbles or words of equivocal import. The effect of the interrogations is represented as being, not to confound and silence the youth, but to quicken and stimulate his mind and to call forth an unexpected amount of latent knowledge: insomuch that he makes one or two answers very much beyond his years, exciting the greatest astonishment and admiration, in Sokrates as well as in Kriton.<sup>h</sup> In this respect, the youth Kleinias serves the same illustrative purpose as the youthful slave in the *Menon*:<sup>i</sup> each is supposed to be quickened by the interrogatory of Sokrates, into a manifestation of knowledge noway expected, nor traceable to any teaching. But in the *Menon*, this magical evocation of knowledge from an untaught youth is explained by the theory of reminiscence, pre-existence, and omniscience, of the soul: while in the *Euthydêmus*, no allusion is made to any such theory, nor to any other cause except the stimulus of the Socratic cross-questioning.

In the dialogue *Euthydêmus*, then, one main purpose of Wherein this contrast does not consist. Plato is to exhibit in contrast two distinct modes of questioning: one practised by Euthydemus and Dionysodorus; the other, by Sokrates. Of these two, it is the first which is shown up in the most copious and elaborate manner: the second is made subordinate, serving mainly as a standard of comparison with the first. We must take care however to understand in what the contrast between the two consists, and in what it does not consist.

The contrast does not consist in this—that Sokrates so contrives his string of questions as to bring out some established and positive conclusion, while Euthydemus and his

<sup>h</sup> Plat. *Euthydêm.* pp. 290-291. The unexpected wisdom, exhibited by the youth Kleinias in his concluding answer, can be understood only as illustrating the obstetric efficacy of Socratic interrogations. See Winckelmann, *Proleg. ad Euthyd.* pp. xxxiii.

xxxiv. The words τῶν κρείττωνων must have the usual signification, as recognised by Routh and Heindorf, though Schleiermacher treats it as absurd, p. 552, notes.

<sup>i</sup> Plato, *Menon*, pp. 82-85.

brother leave everything in perplexity. Such is not the fact. Sokratés ends without any result, and with a confession of his inability to find any. Professing earnest anxiety to stimulate Kleinias in the path of virtue, he is at the same time unable to define what the capital condition of virtue is.<sup>k</sup> On this point, then, there is no contrast between Sokrates and his competitors: if they land their pupil in embarrassment, so does he. Nor again, does Sokrates stand distinguished from them by affirming (or rather implying in his questions) nothing but what is true and indisputable.<sup>l</sup>

The real contrast between the competitors, consists first, in the pretensions, next in the method. The two Sophists are described as persons of exorbitant arrogance, professing to teach virtue,<sup>m</sup> and claiming a fee as if they did teach it: Sokrates disdains the fee, doubts whether such teaching is possible, and professes only to encourage or help forward on the road a willing pupil. The pupil in this case is a given subject, Kleinias, a modest and intelligent youth: and the whole scene passes in public before an indiscriminate audience. To such a pupil, what is needed is, encouragement and guidance. Both of these are really administered by the questions of Sokrates, which are all suggestive and pertinent to the matter in hand, though failing to reach a satisfactory result: moreover, Sokrates attends only to Kleinias, and is indifferent to the effect on the audience around. The two Sophists, on the contrary, do not say a word pertinent to the object desired. Far from seeking (as they promised) to encourage Kleinias,<sup>n</sup> they confuse and humiliate him from the beginning: all their implements for teaching consist only of logical puzzles; lastly, their main purpose is to elicit applause from the by-standers, by reducing both the modest Kleinias and every other respondent to contradiction and standstill.

<sup>k</sup> Plat. Euthydém. pp. 291 A-293 A; Plat. Kleitophon, pp. 409-410.

<sup>l</sup> See Plat. Euthydém. p. 281 C-D, where undoubtedly the positions laid down by Sokrates would not have passed without contradiction by an opponent.

<sup>m</sup> Plat. Euthydém. pp. 273 D, 275 A, 304 B.

<sup>n</sup> Plat. Euthyd. p. 278 D. *ἐφάτην γὰρ ἐπιδείξασθαι τὴν προτρεπτικὴν σοφίαν.*



Such is the real contrast between Sokrates and the two Sophists, and such is the real scene which we read in the dialogue. The presence, as well as the loud manifestations of an indiscriminate crowd in the Lykeium, are essential features of the drama.<sup>o</sup> The point of view which Plato is working out, is, the abusive employment, the excess, and the misplacement, of logical puzzles: which he brings before us as administered for the humiliation of a youth who requires opposite treatment,—in the prosecution of an object which they do not really promote—and before undiscerning auditors, for whose applause the two Sophists are bidding.<sup>p</sup> The whole debate upon these fallacies is rendered ridiculous; and when conducted with Ktesippus, degenerates into wrangling and rildry.

The bearing of the Euthydémus, as I here state it, will be better understood if we contrast it with the Parmenidés. In this last-mentioned dialogue, the amount of negative dialectic and contradiction is greater and more serious than that which we read in the Euthydémus. One single case of it is elaborately built up in the long Antinomies at the close of the Parmenidés (which occupy as much space, and contain nearly as much sophistry, as the speeches assigned to the two Sophists in Euthydémus), while we are given to understand that many more remain behind.<sup>q</sup> These perplexing Antinomies (addressed by the veteran Parmenides to Sokrates as his junior), after a variety of other objections against the Platonic theory of Ideas, which theory Sokrates has been introduced as affirming,—are drawn up for the avowed purpose of checking premature affirmation, and of illustrating the difficult exercises and problems which must be solved, before affirmation can become justifiable. This task, though long and laborious, cannot be evaded (we are here told) by aspirants in philosophy. But it is a task which ought only

<sup>o</sup> The *ἄλλος* (surrounding multitude) is especially insisted on in the first sentence of the dialogue, and is perpetually adverted to throughout all the recital of Sokrates to Kriton, pp.

276 B-D, 303 B.

<sup>p</sup> Plat. Euthydém. p. 303 B.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 B. I shall revert to this point when I notice the Parmenidés.

to be undertaken in conjunction with a few select companions. "Before any large audience, it would be unseemly and inadmissible: for the public are not aware that without such roundabout and devious journey in all directions, no man can hit upon truth or acquire intelligence."<sup>r</sup>

This important proposition—That before a man can be entitled to lay down with confidence any affirmative theory, in the domain of philosophy or "reasoned truth," he must have had before him the various knots tied by negative dialectic, and must find out the way of untying them—is a postulate which lies at the bottom of Plato's Dialogues of Search, as I have remarked in the sixth chapter of this work. But there is much difference in the time, manner, and circumstances, under which such knots are brought before the student for solution. In the Parmenidês, the process is presented as one both serious and indispensable, yet requiring some precautions: the public must be excluded, for they do not understand the purpose: and the student under examination must be one who is competent or more than competent to bear the heavy burthen put upon him, as Sokrates is represented to be in the Parmenidês.<sup>s</sup> In the Euthydêmus, on the contrary, the process is intended to be made ridiculous; accordingly these precautions are disregarded. The crowd of indiscriminate auditors are not only present, but are the persons whose feelings the two Sophists address—and who either admire what is said as dexterous legerdemain, or laugh at the interchange of thrusts, as the duel becomes warmer: in fact, the debate ends with general mirth, in which the couple themselves are among the loudest.<sup>t</sup>

Necessity of settling accounts with the negative, before we venture upon the affirmative, is common to both: in the one the process is solitary and serious; in the other, it is vulgarised and ludicrous.

<sup>r</sup> Plat. Parmen. pp. 135-136. ἔλκυσον δὲ σαυτὸν καὶ γύμνασαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλομένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας, ἕως ἔτι νέος εἶ—εἰ μὲν οὖν πλείους ἤμεν, οὐκ ἂν ἄξιον ἦν δεῖσθαι (to request Parmenides to give a specimen of dialectic) ἀπρεπὴ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῶν ἐνάντιον λέγειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τηλικούτῳ ἄγνοοῦσι γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης, ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ

ἀληθεῖ νοῦν σχεῖν.

<sup>s</sup> See the compliments to Sokrates on his strenuous ardour and vocation for philosophy addressed by Parmenides, p. 135 D.

<sup>t</sup> Plato, Euthydêm. p. 303. Ἐνταῦθα μέντοι, ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, οὐδεὶς ὄστις οὐ τῶν παρόντων ὑπερεπήνεσε τὸν λόγον, καὶ τῷ ἄνδρῳ (Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus) γελῶντε καὶ κροτοῦντε καὶ χαίροντε ὀλίγου παρατάθησαν.

Lastly, Kleinias, the youth under interrogation, is a modest novice; not represented, like Lysis in the dialogue just reviewed, as in danger of corruption from the exorbitant flatteries of an Erastes, nor as requiring a lowering medicine to be administered by a judicious friend. When the Xenophontic (historical) Sokrates cross-examines and humiliates Euthydêmus (a youth, but nevertheless more advanced than Kleinias in the Platonic Euthydêmus is represented to be), we shall see that he not only lays a train for the process by antecedent suggestions, but takes especial care to attack Euthydêmus when alone.<sup>u</sup> The cross-examination pursued by Sokrates inflicts upon this accomplished young man the severest distress and humiliation, and would have been utterly intolerable, if there had been by-standers clapping their hands (as we read in the Platonic Euthydêmus) whenever the respondent was driven into a corner. We see that it was hardly tolerable even when the respondent was alone with Sokrates: for though Euthydêmus bore up against the temporary suffering, cultivated the society of Sokrates, and was handled by him more gently afterwards; yet there were many other youths whom Sokrates cross-examined in the same way, and who suffered so much humiliation from the first solitary colloquy, that they never again came near him (as Xenophon expressly tells us)<sup>v</sup> for a second. This is quite enough to show us how important is the injunction delivered in the Platonic Parmenidês—to carry on these testing colloquies apart from indiscriminate auditors, in the presence, at most, of a few select companions.

Stallbaum, Steinhart, and other commentators denounce in severe terms the Eristics or controversial Sophists of Athens, as disciples of Protagoras and Gorgias, infected with the mania of questioning and disputing every thing, and thereby corrupting the minds of youth. They tell us that Sokrates was the

Opinion of Stallbaum and other critics about the Euthydêmus, that Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus repre-

<sup>u</sup> Xenophon, Memor. iv. 2, 5-8. ὡς δ' ἦσθετο (Sokrates) αὐτὸν ἐτοιμότερον ὑπομένοντα, ὅτε διαλέγοιτο, καὶ προθυμότερον ἀκούοντα, μόνος ἦλθεν εἰς τὸ ἡγιοποιεῖον, παρακαθεζομένου δ' αὐτῷ τοῦ Εὐθυδήμου, εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, &c.

<sup>v</sup> Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2, 39-40. Compare the remarks of Sokrates in Plato, Theætétus, p. 151 C.

constant enemy of this school, but that nevertheless he was unjustly confounded with them by the comic poets, and others, from which confusion alone his unpopularity with the Athenian people arose.<sup>y</sup> In the Platonic dialogue of Euthydêmus, the two Sophists (according to these commentators) represent the way in which Protagoras and Gorgias with their disciples reasoned: and the purpose of the dialogue is to contrast this with the way in which Sokrates reasoned.

Now, in this opinion, I think that there is much of unfounded assumption, as well as a misconception of the real contrast intended in the Platonic Euthydêmus. Comparing Protagoras with Sokrates, I maintain that Sokrates was decidedly the more Eristic of the two, and left behind him a greater number of active disciples. In so far as we can trust the picture given by Plato in the dialogue called Protagoras, we learn that the Sophist of that name chiefly manifested himself in long continuous speeches or rhetoric; and though he also professed, if required, to enter into dialectic colloquy, in this art he was no match for Sokrates.<sup>z</sup> Moreover, we know by the evidence of Sokrates himself, that *he* was an Eristic not only by taste, but on principle, and by a sense of duty. He tells us, in the Platonic Apology, that he felt himself under a divine mission to go about convicting men of ignorance, and that he had prosecuted this vocation throughout many years of a long life. Every one of these convictions must have been brought about by one or more disputes of his own seeking: every such dispute, with occasional exceptions, made him unpopular, in the outset at least, with the person convicted: the rather, as his ability in the process, is known, upon the testimony of Xenophon<sup>a</sup> as well as of Plato, to have been consummate. It is therefore a mistake to decry Protagoras and the Protagoreans

sent the way in which Protagoras and Gorgias talked to their auditors.

That opinion is unfounded. Sokrates was much more Eristic than Protagoras, who generally manifested himself by continuous speech or lecture.

<sup>y</sup> Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad Plat. Euthydêm. pp. 9-11-13; Winckelmann, Prolegg. ad eundem, pp. xxxiii.-xxxiv.

<sup>z</sup> See Plat. Protag. especially pp. 329 and 336. About the eristic dis-

position of Sokrates, see the striking passage in Plato, Theætét. p. 169 B-C; also Lachês, pp. 187, 188.

<sup>a</sup> Xenoph. Memorab. i. 2.

(if there were any) as the special Eristics, and to represent Sokrates as a tutelary genius, the opponent of such habits. If the commentators are right (which I do not think they are) in declaring the Athenian mind to have been perverted by Eristic, Sokrates is much more chargeable with the mischief than Protagoras. And the comic poets, when they treated Sokrates as a specimen and teacher of Eristic, proceeded very naturally upon what they actually saw or heard of him.<sup>b</sup>

The fact is, that the Platonic Sokrates when he talks with the two Sophists in the dialogue Euthydêmus, is a character drawn by Plato for the purpose of that dialogue, and is very different from the real historical Sokrates, whom the public of Athens saw and heard in the market-place or gymnasia. He is depicted as a gentle, soothing, encouraging talker, with his claws drawn in, and affecting inability even to hold his own against the two Sophists: such indeed as he sometimes may have been in conversing with particular persons (so Xenophon<sup>c</sup> takes pains to remind his readers in the Memorabilia), but with entire elimination of that characteristic aggressive Elenchus for which he himself (in the Platonic Apology) takes credit, and which the auditors usually heard him exhibit.

This picture, accurate or not, suited the dramatic scheme of the Euthydêmus. Such, in my judgment, is the value and meaning of the Euthydêmus, as far as regards personal contrasts. One style of reasoning is represented by Sokrates, the other by the two Sophists: both are the creatures of Plato, having the same dramatic reality as Sokrates and Strepsiades, or the *Δίκαιος Λόγος* and *Ἄδικος Λόγος*, of Aristophanes, but no more. That they correspond to any actual persons at Athens, is neither proved nor probable. The comic poets introduce Sokrates as talking what was either nonsensical, or offensive to the feelings of the Athenians: and

The two Sophists in the Euthydêmus are not to be taken as real persons, or representatives of real persons.

<sup>b</sup> Stallbaum, Proleg. in Platon Euthydem. pp. 50-51. "Sed hoc utrumque se habet, illud quidem ex Aristophane pariter atque ex ipso Platone evidenter apparet, Socratem non tantum ab orationum scriptoribus, sed etiam ab aliis, in vanissimorum sophistarum loco habitum fuisse."  
<sup>c</sup> Xenop. Mem. i. 4, 1, iv. 2, 40.

Sokrates (in the Platonic Apology) complains that the Dikasts judged him, not according to what he had really said or done, but according to the impression made on them by this dramatic picture. The Athenian Sophists would have equal right to complain of those critics, who not only speak of Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus with a degree of acrimony applicable only to historical persons, but also describe them as representative types of Protagoras, Gorgias, and their disciples.<sup>d</sup>

The conversation of Sokrates with the youth Kleinias is remarkable for its plainness and simplicity. His purpose is to implant or inflame in the youth the aspiration and effort towards wisdom or knowledge (*φιλοσοφία*, in its etymological sense). "You, like every one else, wish to do well or to be happy. The way to be happy is, to have many good things. Every one knows this: every one knows too, that among these good things, wealth is an indisputable item: <sup>e</sup> likewise health, beauty, bodily activity, good birth, power over others, honour in our city, temperance, justice, courage, wisdom, &c. Good fortune does not count as a distinct item, because it resolves itself into wisdom.<sup>f</sup>—But it is not enough to have all these good things: we must not only have them but use them: moreover, we must use them not wrongly, but rightly. If we use them wrongly, they will not produce their appropriate consequences. They will even make us more miserable than if we had them not, because the possession of them will prompt us to be active and meddling: whereas, if we have them not, we shall keep in the back-ground and do little.<sup>g</sup>

<sup>d</sup> The language of Schleiermacher is more moderate than that of Stallbaum, Steinhart, and others. He thinks moreover, that the polemical purpose of this dialogue is directed not against Protagoras or Gorgias, but against the Megarics and against Antisthenes, who (so Schleiermacher supposes) had brought the attack upon themselves by attacking Plato first (Einleitung zum Euthyd. p. 404 seq.). Schleiermacher cannot make out who the two Sophists were personally, but he conceives them as obscure persons, deserving no notice.

This is a conjecture which admits of no proof; but if any real victim is here intended by Plato, we may just as reasonably suppose Antisthenes as Protagoras.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Euthydêm. p. 279 A. ἀγαθὰ δὲ ποῖα ἔρα τῶν ὄντων ἡμῖν τυγχάνει ὄντα; ἢ οὐ χαλεπὸν οὐδὲ σεμνοῦ ἀνδρὸς πάνυ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἕτοιμον εἶναι εὐρεῖν; πᾶς γὰρ ἂν ἡμῖν εἴποι ὅτι τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀγαθόν;

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Euthydêm. pp. 279-280.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Euthydêm. p. 281 C. ἥττον δὲ κακῶς πράττων, ἕθλιος ἥττον ἂν εἴη.

Colloquy of Sokrates with Kleinias—possession of good things is useless, unless we also have intelligence how to use them.

But to use these good things rightly, depends upon wisdom, knowledge, intelligence. It thus appears that the enumerated items are not really good, except on the assumption that they are under the guidance of intelligence: if they are under the guidance of ignorance, they are not good; nay, they even produce more harm than good, since they are active instruments in the service of a foolish master.<sup>h</sup>

“But what intelligence do we want for the purpose? Is it all intelligence? Or is there any one single variety of intelligence, by the possession of which we shall become good and happy?<sup>i</sup> Obviously, it must be such as will be profitable to us.<sup>k</sup> We have seen that there is no good in possessing wealth—that we should gain nothing by knowing how to acquire wealth or even to turn stones into gold, unless we at the same time knew how to use it rightly. Nor should we gain any thing by knowing how to make ourselves healthy, or even immortal, unless we knew how to employ rightly our health or immortality. We want knowledge or intelligence, of such a nature, as to include both acting, making, or construction—and rightly using what we have done, made, or constructed.<sup>l</sup> The makers of lyres and flutes may be men of skill, but they cannot play upon the instruments which they have made: the logographers compose fine discourses, but hand them over for others to deliver. Even masters in the most distinguished arts—such as military commanders, geometers, arithmeticians, astronomers, &c., do not come up to our requirement. They are all of them varieties under the general class *hunters*: they find and seize, but hand over what they have seized for others to use. The hunter, when he has caught or killed game, hands it over to the

But intelligence—of what? It must be such intelligence, or such an art, as will include both the making of what we want, and the right use of it when made.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Euthyd. p. 282 E. If we compare this with p. 279 C-D we shall see that the argument of Sokrates is open to the exception which he himself takes in the case of εὐτυχία—δὲς ταῦτὰ λέγειν. Wisdom is counted twice over.

<sup>i</sup> Plato, Euthydém. p. 282 E. Sokrates here breaks off the string of questions to Kleinias, but resumes

them, p. 288 E.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Euthydém. p. 288 E. τίνα ποτ' οὖν ἂν κτησάμενοι ἐπιστήμην ὀρθῶς κησαίμεθα; ἀρ' οὐ τοῦτο μὲν ἀπλοῦν, ὅτι ταύτην ἦτις ἡμᾶς ὀνήσει;

<sup>l</sup> Plato, Euthyd. p. 289 B. τοιαύτης τινὸς ἀρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμης δεῖ, ἐν ᾗ συμπέπτακεν ἅμα τὸ τε ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι χρῆσθαι ἢ ἂν ποιῆ.

cook: the general, when he has taken a town, delivers it to the political leader or minister: the geometer makes over his theorems to be employed by the dialectician or comprehensive philosopher.<sup>m</sup>

“Where then can we find such an art—such a variety of knowledge or intelligence—as we are seeking? The regal or political art looks like it: that art which regulates and enforces all the arrangements of the city. But what is the work which this art performs? What product does it yield, as the medical art supplies good health, and the farmer’s art, provision? What good does it effect? You may say that it makes the citizens wealthy, free, harmonious in their intercourse. But we have already seen that these acquisitions are not good, unless they be under the guidance of intelligence: that nothing is really good, except some variety of intelligence.<sup>n</sup> Does the regal art then confer knowledge? If so, does it confer every variety of knowledge—that of the carpenter, currier, &c., as well as others? Not certainly any of these, for we have already settled that they are in themselves neither good nor bad. The regal art can thus impart no knowledge except itself; and what is *itself*? how are we to use it? If we say, that we shall render other men *good*—the question again recurs, *Good*—in what respect? *useful*—for what purpose?°

“Here then” (concludes Sokrates), “we come to a dead lock: we can find no issue.<sup>p</sup> We cannot discover what the regal art does for us or gives us: yet this is the art which is to make us happy.” In this difficulty, Sokrates turns to the two Sophists, and implores their help. The contrast between him and them is thus brought out.

The argument of Sokrates, which I have thus abridged from the Euthydêmus, arrives at no solution: but it is nevertheless eminently suggestive, and puts the question in a

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Euthyd. p. 290 C-D.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Euthyd. p. 292 A. Ἄγαθόν δέ γέ που ὠμολογήσαμεν ἀλλήλοις—οὐδέν εἶναι ἄλλο ἢ ἐπιστήμην τινά.

<sup>o</sup> Plat. Euthydêm. p. 292 D. Ἄλλὰ τίνα δὴ ἐπιστήμην; ἢ τί χρῆσόμεθα; τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἔργων οὐδενὸς αὐτὴν δεῖ

Where is such an art to be found? The regal or political art looks like it; but what does this art do for us? No answer can be found. Ends in puzzle.

δημιουργὸν εἶναι τῶν μῆτε κακῶν μῆτε ἀγαθῶν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ παραδιδόναι μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἢ αὐτὴν ἑαυτῆν· λέγωμεν δὴ οὖν, τίς ποτε ἔστιν αὐτή; ἢ τί χρῆσόμεθα;

<sup>p</sup> Plat. Euthyd. p. 292 E.



way to receive solution. What is the regal or political art which directs or regulates all others? A man has many different impulses, dispositions, qualities, aptitudes, advantages, possessions, &c., which we describe by saying that he is an artist, a general, a tradesman, clever, just, temperate, brave, strong, rich, powerful, &c. But in the course of life, each particular situation has its different exigencies, while the prospective future has its exigencies also. The whole man is one, with all these distinct and sometimes conflicting attributes: in following one impulse, he must resist others—in turning his aptitudes to one object, he must turn them away from others—he must, as Plato says, distinguish the right use of his force from the wrong, by virtue of knowledge, intelligence, reason. Such discriminating intelligence, which in this dialogue is called the Regal or political art,—what is the object of it? It is intelligence or knowledge—but *of what?* Not certainly of the way how each particular act is to be performed—how each particular end is to be attained. Each of these separately is the object of some special knowledge. But the whole of a man's life is passed in a series of such particular acts, each of which is the object of some special knowledge: what then remains as the object of Regal or political intelligence, upon which our happiness is said to depend? Or how can it have any object at all?

The question here raised is present to Plato's mind in other dialogues, and occurs under other words, as for example, What is good? Good is the object of the Regal or political intelligence; but what is Good? In the Republic, he raises this question, but declines to answer it, confessing that he could not make it intelligible to his hearers:<sup>1</sup> in the Gorgias, he takes pains to tell us what it *is not*: in the Philêbus, he does indeed tell us what it is, but in terms which need explanation quite as much as the term which they are brought to explain. There is only one dialogue in which the question is answered affirmatively, in clear and unmistakeable language, and with

Review of the cross-examination just pursued by Sokrates. It is very suggestive—puts the mind upon what to look for.

Comparison with other dialogues—Republic, Philêbus, Protagoras. The only distinct answer is found in the Protagoras.

considerable developement — and that is, the Protagoras : where Sokrates asserts and proves at length, that Good is at the bottom identical with pleasure, and Evil with pain : that the measuring or calculating intelligence is the truly regal art of life, upon which the attainment of Good depends : and that the object of that intelligence—the items which we are to measure, calculate, and compare—is pleasures and pains, so as to secure to ourselves as much as possible of the former, and escape as much as possible of the latter.

In my remarks on the Protagoras, I shall state the view which I take of the doctrine laid down in that dialogue by Sokrates. Persons may think the answer insufficient : most of the Platonic critics declare it to be absolutely wrong. But at any rate, it is the only distinct answer which Plato ever gives, to the question raised by Sokrates in the Euthydêmus and elsewhere.

From the abstract just given of the argument of Sokrates in the Euthydêmus, it will be seen to be serious and pertinent, though ending with a confession of failure. The observations placed in contrast with it and ascribed to the two Sophists, are distinguished by being neither serious nor pertinent ; but parodies of debate for the most part, put together for the express purpose of appearing obviously silly to the reader. Plato keeps up the dramatic or ironical appearance, that they are admired and welcomed not only by the hearers, but even by Sokrates himself. Nevertheless, it is made clear at the end that all this is nothing but irony, and that the talk which Plato ascribes to Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus produced, according to his own showing, no sentiment of esteem for their abilities among the by-standers, but quite the reverse. Whether there were individual Sophists at Athens who talked in that style, we can neither affirm nor deny : but that there were an established class of persons who did so, and made both money and reputation by it, we may securely deny. It is the more surprising that the Platonic commentators should desire us to regard Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus as representative samples of a special class

The talk of the two Sophists, though ironically admired while it is going on, is shown at the end to produce no real admiration, but the contrary.

named Sophists, since one of the most eminent of those commentators (Stallbaum),<sup>r</sup> both admits that Sokrates himself was generally numbered in the class and called by the name—and affirms also (incorrectly, in my opinion) that the interrogations of Sokrates, which in this dialogue stand contrasted with those of the two Sophists, do not enuntiate the opinions either of Sokrates or of Plato himself, but the opinions of these very Sophists, which Plato adopts and utters for the occasion.<sup>s</sup>

The received supposition that there were at Athens a class of men called Sophists who made money and reputation by obvious fallacies employed to bring about contradictions in dialogue—appears to me to pervert the representations given of ancient philosophy. Aristotle defines a Sophist to be “one who seeks to make money by apparent wisdom which is not real wisdom:”—the Sophist (he says) is an Eristic who, besides money-making, seeks for nothing but victory in debate and humiliation of his opponent:—Distinguishing the Dialectician from the Sophist (he says), the Dialectician im-

Mistaken representations about the Sophists — Aristotle's definition — no distinguishable line can be drawn between the Sophist and the Dialectician.

<sup>r</sup> Stallbaum, Proleg. in Platon. Euthydem. p. 50. “Illud quidem ex Aristophane pariter atque ipso Platone evidenter apparet, Socratem non tantum ab orationum scriptoribus, sed etiam ab aliis in vanissimorum sophistarum numero habitum fuisse.” *Ib.* p. 49 (cited in a previous note). “Videtur pervulgata fuisse hominum opinio, quâ Socratem inter vanos sophistas numerandum esse existimabant.” Again p. 44, where Stallbaum tells us that Sokrates was considered by many to belong “misello Sophistarum gregi.”

<sup>s</sup> Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Plat. Euthydem. p. 30. “Cavendum est magnopere, ne quæ hic à Socrate dicuntur, pro ipsius decretis habeamus: sunt enim omnia ad mentem Sophistarum disputata, quos ille, reprehensis eorum opinionibus, sperat eo adductum iri, ut gravem prudentemque earum defensionem suscipiant.” Compare p. 66. Stallbaum says that Plato often reasons, adopting for the occasion the doctrine of the Sophists. See his Prolegg. to the Lachês and Charmidês,

and still more his Proleg. to the Protagoras, where he tells us that Plato introduces his spokesman Sokrates not only as arguing *ex mente Sophistarum*, but also as employing captious and delusive artifice, such as in this dialogue is ascribed to Euthydemus and Dionysodoros.—pp. 23-24. “Itaque Sokrates, missâ hujus rei disputatione, repente ad alia progreditur, scilicet *similibus laqueis* hominem denuo irretiturus. Nemini facilè obscurum erit, hoc quoque loco Protagoram *argutis conclusiunculis deludi*” (*i. e.* by Sokrates) “atque *callidè eo permoveri*,” &c. “Quamquam nemo erit, quin videat, *callidè deludi Protagoram*, ubi ex eo, quod qui injushtë faciat, is neutiquam agat *σωφρόνας*, protinus colligitur justitiam et *σωφροσύνην* unum idemque esse.”—p. 25. “Disputat enim Sokrates pleraque omnia ad mentem ipsius Protagoræ.”—p. 30. “Platonem ipsum hæc non probasse, sed e vulgi opinione et mente explicasse, vel illud non obscurè significat,” &c.—p. 33.

pugns or defends, by probable arguments, probable tenets—that is, tenets which are believed by a numerous public or by a few wise and eminent individuals:—while the Sophist deals with tenets which are probable only in appearance and not in reality—that is to say, tenets which almost every one by the slightest attention recognises as false.<sup>t</sup> This definition is founded, partly on the personal character and purpose ascribed to the Sophist: partly upon the distinction between apparent and real wisdom, assumed to be known and permanent. Now such pseudo-wisdom was declared by Sokrates to be the natural state of all mankind, even the most eminent, which it was his mission to expose: moreover, the determination, what is to be comprised in this description, must depend upon the judges to whom it is submitted, since much of the works of Aristotle and Plato would come under the category, in the judgment of modern readers both vulgar and instructed. But apart from this relative and variable character of the definition, when applied to philosophy generally—we may confidently assert, that there never was any real class of intellectual men, in a given time or place, to whom it could possibly apply. Of individuals, the varieties are innumerable: but no professional body of men ever acquired gain or celebrity by maintaining theses, and employing arguments, which every one could easily detect as false. Every man employs sophisms more or less; every man does so inadvertently, some do it by design also: moreover, almost every reasoner does it largely, in the estimation of his opponents. No distinct line can be drawn between the Sophist and the

<sup>t</sup> Aristotel. *Topic.* i. 1, p. 100, b. 21. ἔνδοξα δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τούτοις ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς—καὶ τούτοις ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδόξοις. Ἐριστικὸς δὲ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς ὁ ἐκ φαινομένων ἐνδόξων, μὴ ὄντων δὲ—καὶ ὁ ἐξ ἐνδόξων ἢ φαινομένων ἐνδόξων φαινόμενος. Οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν λεγομένων ἐνδόξων ἐπιπόλαιον ἔχει παντελῶς τὴν φαντασίαν, καθάπερ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἐριστικῶν λόγων ἀρχὰς συμβέβηκεν ἔχειν. Παραχρῆμα γὰρ καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῖς

καὶ μικρὰ συνορῶν δυναμένοις κατάδηλος ἐν αὐτοῖς ἢ τοῦ ψεύδους ἔστι φύσις.

De *Sophisticis Elenchis*, i. p. 165, a. 21. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ σοφιστικὴ φαινόμενη σοφία, ὅσα δ' οὐ καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς χρηματιστὴς ἀπὸ φαινομένης σοφίας, ἀλλ' οὐκ οὐσίας, p. 165, b. 10, p. 171, b. 8-27. Οἱ φιλέριδες, ἐριστικοὶ, ἀγανιστικοὶ, are persons who break the rules of dialectic (*ἀδικομαχίαι*) for the purpose of gaining victory; οἱ σοφισταὶ are those who do the same thing for the purpose of getting money. See also *Metaphys.* iii. 1004, b. 17.

Dialectician: the definition given by Aristotle applies to an ideal in his own mind, but to no reality without: Protagoras and Prodikus no more correspond to it than Sokrates and Plato. Aristotle observes, with great truth, that all men are dialecticians and testers of reasoning, up to a certain point: he might have added, that they are all Sophists also, up to a certain point.<sup>u</sup> Moreover, when he attempts to found a scientific classification of intellectual processes upon a difference in the purposes of different practitioners—whether they employ the same process for money or display, or beneficence, or mental satisfaction to themselves—this is altogether unphilosophical. The medical art is the same, whether employed to advise gratis, or in exchange for a fee.<sup>x</sup>

Though I maintain that no class of professional Sophists (in the meaning given to that term by the Platonic critics after Plato and Aristotle) ever existed—and though the distinction between the paid and the gratuitous discourses is altogether unworthy to enter into the history of philosophy—yet I am not the less persuaded that the Platonic dialogue Euthydēmus, and the treatise of Aristotle *De Sophisticis Elenchis*, are very striking and useful compositions. This last-mentioned treatise was composed by Aristotle very much under the stimulus of the Platonic dialogue Euthydēmus, to which it refers several times—and for the purpose of distributing the variety of possible fallacies under a limited number of general heads, each described by its appropriate characteristic, and represented by its illustrative type. Such attempt at arrangement—one of the many valuable contributions of Aristotle to the theory of reasoning—is expressly claimed by him as his own. He takes a just pride in having been the first to introduce system where none had introduced it before.<sup>y</sup>

<sup>u</sup> Aristot. *Sophist. Elench.* p. 172, a. 30.

<sup>x</sup> Aristot. *Rhetor.* i. 1, 1355, b. 18. He here admits that the only difference between the Dialectician and the Sophist lies in their purposes—that the mental activity employed by both is the same. *ὁ γὰρ σοφιστικὸς οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαίρεισει πλὴν*

*ἐνταῦθα μὲν (in Rhetoric) ἔσται ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν, ῥήτωρ—ἐκεῖ δὲ (in Dialectic) σοφιστὴς μὲν κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, διαλεκτικὸς δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν.*

<sup>y</sup> See the last chapter of the treatise *De Sophisticis Elenchis*.

Philosophical purpose of the Euthydēmus—exposure of fallacies, in Plato's dramatic manner, by multiplication of particular examples.

No such system was known to Plato, who (in the Euthydêmus) enumerates a string of fallacies one after another without any project of classifying them, and who presents them as it were in concrete, as applied by certain disputants in an imaginary dialogue. The purpose is, to make these fallacies appear conspicuously in their character of fallacies: a purpose which is assisted by presenting the propounders of them as ridiculous and contemptible. The lively fancy of Plato attaches suitable accessories to Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus. They are old men, who have been all their lives engaged in teaching rhetoric and tactics, but have recently taken to dialectic, and acquired perfect mastery thereof without any trouble—who make extravagant promises—and who as talkers play into each other's hand, making a shuttlecock of the respondent, a modest novice every way unsuitable for such treatment.

Thus different is the Platonic manner, from the Aristotelian manner, of exposing fallacies. But those exhibited in the former appear as members of one or more among the classes framed by the latter. The fallacies which we read in the Euthydêmus are chiefly verbal: but some are verbal, and something beyond.

Aristotle (Soph. Elench.) attempts a classification of fallacies: Plato enumerates them without classification.

Thus, for example, if we take the first sophism introduced by the two exhibitors, upon which they bring the youth Kleinias, by suitable questions, to declare successively both sides of the alternative—"Which of the two is it that learn, the wise or the ignorant?"—Sokrates himself elucidates it by pointing out that the terms used are equivocal: "You might answer it by using the language ascribed to Dionysodorus in another part of this dialogue—"Neither and Both."<sup>a</sup> The like may be said about the fallacy in page 284 D—"Are there persons who speak of things as they are? Good men speak of things as they are: they speak of good men

Fallacies of equivocation propounded by the two Sophists in the Euthydêmus.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Euthydêmus. pp. 275 D-278 D. Aristotle also adverts to this fallacy, but without naming the Euthydêmus. | See Soph. El. 4. 165, b. 30. <sup>a</sup> Plato, Euthydêmus. p. 300 D. ὁδδές, τερα καὶ ἀμφοτέρω.

well, of bad men badly: therefore, of course, they speak of stout men stoutly, and of hot men hotly. Ay! rejoins the respondent Ktesippus, angrily—they speak of cold men coldly, and say that they talk coldly.”<sup>b</sup> These are fallacies of double meaning of words—or double construction of phrases: as we read also in page 287 D, where the same Greek verb (*νοεῖν*) may be construed either to *think* or to *mean*: so that when Sokrates talks about what a predication *means*—the Sophists ask him—“Does anything *think*, except things having a soul? Did you ever know any predication that had a soul?”

Again, the two Sophists undertake to prove that Sokrates, as well as the youth Kleinias and indeed every one else, knows everything. “Can any existing thing *be* that which it is, and at the same time, *not be* that which it is?—No.—You know some things?—Yes. —Then if you know, *you are knowing*?—Certainly. I am knowing of those particular things.—That makes no difference: if you are knowing, you necessarily know everything. —Oh! no: for there are many things which I do not know. —Then if there be any thing which you do not know, *you are not knowing*?—Yes, doubtless—of that particular thing.—Still you are *not knowing*: and just now you said that you were *knowing*: and thus, at one and the same time, you are what you are, and you are not what you are.”

“But *you* also” (retorts Sokrates upon the couple), “do not you also know some things, not know others?—By no means. —What! do you know nothing?—Far from it.—Then you know all things?—Certainly we do,—and you too: if you know one thing, you know all things.—What! do you know the art of the carpenter, the currier, the cobbler—the number of stars in the heaven, and of grains of sand in the desert, &c.?—Yes: we know all these things.”

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Euthydém. p. 284 E. τοὺς γοῦν ψυχρῶς ψυχρῶς λέγουσὶ τε καὶ φασὶ διαλέγεσθαι. The metaphorical sense of ψυχρῶς in criticism is *pointless, stupid, out of taste, out of place, &c.*

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Euthydém. p. 293 C. Ari-

stotle considers *know* to be an equivocal word; he admits that in certain senses you may both *know* and *not know* the same thing. Anal. Prior. ii. 67, b. 8. Anal. Post. i. 71, a. 25.

The two Sophists maintain their consistency by making reply in the affirmative to each of these successive questions: though Ktesippus pushes them hard by enquiries as to a string of mean and diverse specialties.<sup>d</sup> This is one of the purposes of the dialogue: to represent the two Sophists as willing to answer any thing, however obviously wrong and false, for the purpose of avoiding defeat in the dispute—as using their best efforts to preserve themselves in the position of questioners, and to evade the position of respondents—and as exacting a categorical answer—Yes or No—to every question which they put, without any qualifying words, and without any assurance that the meaning of the question was understood.<sup>e</sup>

Obstinacy shown by the two Sophists in their replies—determination not to contradict themselves.

The base of these fallacious inferences is, That respecting the same subject, you cannot both affirm and deny the same predicate: you cannot say, A is knowing—A is not knowing (*ἐπιστήμων*). This is a fallacy more than verbal: it is recognised by Aristotle (and by all subsequent logicians) under the name—*à dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter*.

It is very certain that this fallacy is often inadvertently committed by very competent reasoners, including both Plato and Aristotle.

Again—Sophroniskus was my father—Chæredemus was the father of Patrokles.—Then Sophroniskus was different from a father: therefore he was not a father. You are different from a stone, therefore you are not a stone: you are different from gold, therefore you are not gold. By parity of reasoning, Sophroniskus is different from a father—therefore he is not a father. Accordingly, you, Sokrates, have no father.<sup>f</sup>

Farther verbal equivalences.

But (retorts Ktesippus upon the couple) your father is different from my father.—Not at all.—How can that be?—What! is your father, then, the father of all men and of all animals?—Certainly he is. A man cannot be at the same time a father, and not a father. He cannot be at the same time a man, and not a man—gold, and not gold.<sup>g</sup>

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Euthydém. pp. 293-294.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Euthydém. pp. 295-296.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Euthydém. pp. 297-298.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Euthydém. p. 298. Some of the fallacies in the dialogue (*Πότερον ὁρῶσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὰ δυνατόν ὁρᾶν ἢ τὰ*



You have got a dog (Euthydêmus says to Ktesippus).—Yes.—The dog is the father of puppies?—Yes.—The dog, being a father, is yours?—Certainly.—Then your father is a dog, and you are brother of the puppies.

You beat your dog sometimes? Then you beat your father.<sup>b</sup>

Those animals, and those alone are *yours* (sheep, oxen, &c.), which you can give away, or sell, or sacrifice at pleasure. But Zeus, Apollo, and Athênê are *your* Gods. The Gods have a soul and are animals. Therefore your Gods are your animals. Now you told us that those alone were your animals, which you could give away, or sell, or sacrifice at pleasure. Therefore you can give away, or sell, or sacrifice at pleasure, Zeus, Apollo, and Athênê.<sup>1</sup>

This fallacy depends upon the double and equivocal meaning of *yours*—one of its different explanations being treated as if it were the only one.

Other puzzles cited in this dialogue go deeper:—Contradiction is impossible—To speak falsely is impossible.<sup>k</sup> These paradoxes were maintained by Antisthenes and others, and appear to have been matters of dialectic debate throughout the fourth and third centuries. I shall say more of them when I speak about the Megarics and Antisthenes. Here I only note, that in this dialogue, Ktesippus is represented as put to silence by them, and Sokrates as making an answer which is no answer at all.<sup>1</sup> We see how much trouble these paradoxes gave to Plato, when we read the Sophistês, in which he handles the last of the two in a manner elaborate, but (to my judgment) unsatisfactory.

The Euthydêmus of Plato is memorable in the history of philosophy as the earliest known attempt to set out, and exhibit to attention, a string of fallacious modes of reasoning. Plato makes them all absurd and

Fallacies involving deeper logical principles—contradiction is impossible.—To speak falsely is impossible.

Plato's Euthydêmus is the earliest known attempt to set out and

ἀδύνατα; ἢ οἶόν τε σιγῶντα λέγειν; p. 300 A) are hardly translatable into English, since they depend upon equivocal constructions peculiar to the Greek language. Aristotle refers them to the general head παρ' ἀμφιβολίαν. The same about προσήκει τὸν μάγειρον κατακόπτειν, p. 301 D.

<sup>b</sup> Plat. Euthyd. p. 298.

<sup>1</sup> Plat. Euthydêm. p. 302. This same fallacy, in substance, is given by Aristotle, De Sophist, El. 17. 176 a. 3, 179, a. 5, but with different exemplifying names and persons.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Euthydêm. pp. 285-286.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Euthydêm. pp. 286 B-287 A.

ridiculous. He gives a caricature of a dialectic debate, not unworthy of his namesake Plato Comicus—or of Aristophanes, Swift, or Voltaire. The sophisms appear for the most part so silly, as he puts them, that the reader asks himself how any one could have been ever imposed upon by such a palpable delusion? Yet such confidence is by no means justified. A sophism, perfectly analogous in character to those which Plato here exposes to ridicule, may, in another case, easily escape detection from the hearer, and even from the reasoner himself. People are constantly misled by fallacies arising from the same word bearing two senses, from double construction of the same phrase, from unconscious application of a *dictum secundum quid*, as if it were a *dictum simpliciter*; from *Petitio Principii*, &c., *Ignoratio Elenchi*, &c. Neither Plato himself, nor Aristotle, can boast of escaping them.<sup>m</sup> If these fallacies appear, in the examples chosen by Plato for the *Euthydêmus*, so obviously inconclusive that they can deceive no one—the reason lies not in the premisses themselves, but in the particular conclusions to which they lead: which conclusions are known on other grounds to be false, and never to be seriously maintainable by any person. Such conclusions as—“Sokrates had no father: Sophroniskus, if father of Sokrates, was father of all men and all animals: In beating your dog, you beat your father: If you know one thing, you know every thing,” &c., being known *aliunde* to be false, prove that there has been some fallacy in the premisses whereby they have been established. Such cases serve as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the antecedent process. They make us aware of one mode of liability to error, and put us on our guard against it in analogous cases. This is a valuable service, and all the more valuable, because the liability to error is real and widespread, even from fallacies perfectly analogous to those which seem so silly under the particular exemplifications which Plato selects and exposes.

expose fallacies—the only way of exposing fallacies is to exemplify the fallacy by particular cases, in which the conclusion proved is known *aliunde* to be false and absurd.

<sup>m</sup> See a passage in Plato's *Charmides*, where Heindorf remarks with propriety upon his equivocal use of the words *εἰ ζῆν* and *εἰ πάντεσσιν*—also the *Gorgias*, p. 507 D, with the notes of Routh and Heindorf. I have noticed both passages in discussing these two dialogues.

Many of the illustrations of the Platonic Euthydêmus are reproduced by Aristotle in the Treatise De Sophisticis Elenchis, together with other fallacies, discriminated with a certain method and system.<sup>1</sup>

The true character of these fallacies is very generally overlooked by the Platonic critics, in their appreciation of the Euthydêmus; when they point our attention to the supposed tricks and frauds of the persons whom they called Sophists, as well as to mischievous corruptions alleged to arise from Eristic or formal contentious debate. These critics speak as if they thought that such fallacies were the special inventions of Athenian Sophists for the purposes of Athenian Eristic: as if such causes of error were inoperative on persons of ordinary honesty or intelligence, who never consulted or heard the Sophists. It has been the practice of writers on logic, from Aristotle down to Whately, to represent logical fallacies as frauds devised and maintained by dishonest practitioners, whose art Whately assimilates to that of jugglers.

This view of the case appears to me incomplete and misleading. It substitutes the rare and accidental in place of the constant and essential. The various sophisms, of which Plato in the Euthydêmus gives the *reductio ad absurdum*, are not the inventions of Sophists. They are erroneous tendencies of the reasoning process, frequently incident to human thought and speech: specimens of those ever-renewed "inadvertencies of ordinary thinking" (to recur to a phrase cited in my preface), which it is the peculiar mission of philosophy or "reasoned truth" to rectify. Moreover the practice of formal debate, which is usually denounced with so much asperity—if it affords on some occasions opportunity to produce such fallacies, presents not merely equal opportunity, but the only effective means, for exposing and confuting them. Whately in his Logic,<sup>2</sup> like Plato in the Euthydêmus, when bringing these

<sup>1</sup> Aristotle, De Sophisticis Elenchis; also Aristotle's Rhetoric, ii. p. 1401, a-b. | Though Whately, like other logicians, keeps the Sophists in the foreground, as the fraudulent enemy who sow tares

<sup>2</sup> Whately's Logic, ch. v. sect. 5.

Mistake of supposing fallacies to have been invented and propagated by Athenian Sophists—they are inherent inadvertencies and liabilities to error, in the ordinary process of thinking. Formal debate affords the best means of correcting them.

fallacies into open daylight in order that every one may detect them, may enliven the theme by presenting them as the deliberate tricks of a Sophist. Doubtless they are so by accident: yet their essential character is that of infirmities incident to the *intellectus sibi permissus*: operative at Athens before Athenian Sophists existed, and in other regions also, where these persons never penetrated.

The wide diffusion and constant prevalence of such infirmities is attested not less by Sokrates in his last speech, wherein he declares real want of knowledge and false persuasion of knowledge to be universal, the mission of his life being to expose them, though he could not correct them—than by Bacon in his reformatory projects, where he enumerates the various Idola worshipped by the human intellect, and the false tendencies acquired “*in primâ digestionem mentis.*” The psychological analysis of the sentiment of belief with its different sources, given in Mr. Alexander Bain’s recent work on the Emotions and the Will, shows how this takes place; and exhibits true or sound belief, in so far as it ever is acquired, as an acquisition only attained after expulsion of earlier antecedent error.<sup>p</sup> Of

Wide-spread prevalence of erroneous belief, misguided by one or other of these fallacies, attested by Sokrates, Plato, Bacon, &c.—complete enumeration of heads of fallacies by Mill.

among that which would otherwise come up as a clean crop of wheat—yet he intimates also incidentally how widespread and frequent such fallacies are, quite apart from dishonest design. He says—“It seems by most persons to be taken for granted, that a Fallacy is to be dreaded merely as a weapon fashioned and wielded by a skilful Sophist: or, if they allow that a man may with honest intentions slide into one, unconsciously, in the heat of *argument*—still they seem to suppose, that where there is no *dispute*, there is no cause to dread Fallacy. Whereas there is much danger, even in what may be called *solitary reasoning*, of sliding unawares into some Fallacy, by which one may be so far deceived as even to act upon the conclusion so obtained. By *solitary reasoning*, is meant the case in which we are not seeking for arguments to prove a given question, but labouring to elicit from our previous stock of knowledge some useful inference.”

“To speak of all the fallacies that have ever been enumerated, as too glaring and obvious to need even being mentioned—because the simple instances given in books, and there stated in the plainest and consequently most easily detected form, are such as (in that form) would deceive no one—this, surely, shows either extreme weakness or extreme unfairness.”—Aristotle himself makes the same remark as Whately—That the man who is easily taken in by a Fallacy advanced by another, will be easily misled by the like Fallacy in his own solitary reasoning. Sophist. Elench. 16, 175, a. 10.

<sup>p</sup> See the instructive and original chapter on the generation, sources, and growth of Belief, in Mr. Bain’s work, ‘Emotions and Will,’ p. 568 seq. After laying down the fundamental characteristic of Belief, as referable altogether to intended action, either certain to come or contingent under supposed circumstances, and enumerating

such error, and of the different ways in which apparent evidence is mistaken for real evidence, a comprehensive philosophical exposition is farther given by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in the fifth book of his *System of Logic*, devoted to the subject of Fallacies. Every variety of erroneous procedure is referable to some one or more of the general heads of Fallacy there enumerated. It is the Fallacies of Ratiocination, of which the two Sophists, in the Platonic Euthydêmus, are made to exhibit specimens: and when we regard such Fallacies, as one branch among several in a complete logical scheme, we shall see at once that they are not inventions of the Athenian Sophists—still less inventions for the purpose of Eristic or formal debate. For every one of these Fallacies is of a nature to ensnare men, and even to ensnare them more easily, in the common, informal, conversation of life—or in

ing the different Sources of Belief.—1. Intuitive or Instinctive. 2. Experience. 3. The Influence of the Emotions (sect. x. p. 579) Mr. Bain says: "Having in our constitution primordial fountains of activity in the spontaneous and voluntary impulses, we follow the first clue that experience gives us, and accept the indication with the whole force of these natural promptings. Being under the strongest impulses to act somehow, an animal accepts any lead that is presented, and if successful, abides by that lead with unshaken confidence. This is that instinct of credulity so commonly attributed to the infant mind. It is not the single instance, or the repetition of two or three, that makes up the strong tone of confidence; it is the mind's own active determination, finding some definite vent in the gratification of its ends, and abiding by the discovery with the whole energy of the character, until the occurrence of some check, failure, or contradiction. The force of belief, therefore, is not one rising from zero to a full development by slow degrees, according to the length of the experience. We must treat it rather as a strong primitive manifestation, derived from the natural activity of the system, and taking its direction and rectification from experience (p. 583). The anticipation of nature,

so strenuously repudiated by Bacon, is the offspring of this characteristic of the mental system. With the active tendency at its maximum, and the exercise of intelligence and acquired knowledge at the minimum, there can issue nothing but a quantity of rash enterprises. The respectable name *generalisation*, implying the best products of enlightened scientific research, has also a different meaning, expressing one of the most erroneous impulses and crudest determinations of untutored human nature. To extend some familiar and narrow experience, so as to comprehend cases the most distant, is a piece of mere reckless instinct, demanding severe discipline for its correction. I have mentioned the case of our supposing all other minds constituted like our own. The veriest infant has got this length in the career of fallacy. Sound belief, instead of being a pacific and gentle growth, is in reality the battering of a series of strongholds, the conquering of a country in hostile occupation. This is a fact common both to the individual and to the race. Observation is unanimous on the point. It will probably be long ere the last of the delusions attributable to this method of believing first and proving afterwards can be eradicated from humanity."

their separate thoughts. Besides mistakes on matters of fact, the two main causes which promote the success and encourage the multiplication of Fallacies generally, are first, the emotional bias towards particular conclusions, which disposes persons to accept any apparent evidence, favourable to such conclusion, as if it were real evidence: next, the careless and elliptical character of common speech, in which some parts of the evidence are merely insinuated, and other parts altogether left out. It is this last circumstance which gives occasion to the very extensive class of Fallacies called by Mr. Mill Fallacies of Confusion: a class so large, that the greater number of Fallacies might plausibly be brought under it.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Mill, 'System of Logic,' Book V., to which is prefixed the following citation from Hobbes's 'Logica,' "Errare non modo affirmando et negando, sed etiam in sentiendo, et in tacitâ hominum cogitatione, contingit."

Mr. Mill points out forcibly both the operation of moral or emotional bias in perverting the intellect, and causing sophisms or fallacies to produce conviction; and the increased chance afforded for the success of a sophism by the suppression of part of the premisses, which is unavoidable in informal discussions.

"Bias is not a direct source of wrong conclusions (v. 1-3). We cannot believe a proposition only by wishing, or only by dreading, to believe it. Bias acts indirectly by placing the intellectual grounds of belief in an incomplete or distorted shape before a man's eyes. It makes him shrink from the irksome labour of a rigorous induction. It operates too by making him look out eagerly for reasons, or apparent reasons, to support opinions which are conformable, or resist those which are repugnant, to his interests or feelings; and when the interests or feelings are common to great numbers of persons, reasons are accepted or pass current which would not for a moment be listened to in that character, if the conclusion had nothing more powerful than its reasons to speak in its behalf. The natural or acquired prejudices of mankind are perpetually throwing up

philosophical theories, the sole recommendation of which consists in the premisses which they afford for proving cherished doctrines, or justifying favourite feelings; and when any one of these theories has become so thoroughly discredited as no longer to serve the purpose, another is always ready to take its place."—"Though the opinions of the generality of mankind, when not dependant upon mere habit and inculcation, have their root much more in the inclinations than in the intellect, it is a necessary condition to the triumph of the moral bias that it should first pervert the understanding."

Again in v. 2, 3. "It is not in the nature of bad reasoning to express itself unambiguously. When a sophist, whether he is imposing upon himself or attempting to impose upon others, can be constrained to throw his argument into so distinct a form, it needs, in a large number of cases, no farther exposure. In all arguments, everywhere but in the schools, some of the links are suppressed: *à fortiori*, when the arguer either intends to deceive, or is a lame and inexperienced thinker, little accustomed to bring his reasoning processes to any test; and it is in those steps of the reasoning which are made in this tacit and half-conscious, or even wholly unconscious, manner, that the error oftenest lurks. In order to detect the fallacy, the proposition thus silently assumed must be supplied, but the reasoner, most likely, has never

We thus see not only that the fallacious agencies are self-operative, generating their own weeds in the common soil of human thought and speech, without being planted by Athenian Sophists or watered by Eristic—but that this very Eristic affords the best means of restraining their diffusion. It is only in formal debate that the disputant can be forced to make clear to himself and declare explicitly to others, without reserve or omission, all the premisses upon which his conclusion rests—that every part of these premisses becomes liable to immediate challenge by an opponent—that the question comes distinctly under consideration, what is or is not sufficient evidence—that the premisses of one argument can be compared with the premisses of another, so that if in the former you are tempted to acquiesce in them as sufficient because you have a bias favourable to the conclusion, in the latter you may be made to feel that they are *insufficient*, because the conclusion which they prove is one which you know to be untrue (*reductio ad absurdum*). The habit of formal debate (called by those who do not like it, Eristic<sup>r</sup>) is thus an indispensable condition both for the exposure and confutation of fallacies, which exist

Value of formal debate as a means for testing and confuting fallacies.

really asked himself what he was assuming; his confuter, unless permitted to extort it from him by the Socratic mode of interrogation, must himself judge what the suppressed premiss ought to be, in order to support the conclusion." Mr. Mill proceeds to illustrate this confusion by an excellent passage cited from Whately's 'Logic.' I may add, that Aristotle himself makes a remark substantially the same—That the same fallacy may be referred to one general head or to another, according to circumstances. *Sophist. Elench.* 33. 182, b. 10.

The Platonic critics talk about the Eristics (as they do about the Sophists) as if that name designated a known and definite class of persons. This is altogether misleading. The term is vituperative, and was applied by different persons according to their own tastes.

Ueberweg remarks with great justice, that Isokrates called all speculators on

philosophy by the name of Eristics. "Als ob jener Rhetor nicht (wie jedoch Spengel selbst gut nachgewiesen hat) alle und jede Spekulation mit dem Nahmen der Eristik bezeichnet." (*Untersuchungen über die Zeitfolge der Plat. Schriften*, p. 257.) In reference to the distinction which Aristotle attempts to draw between Dialectic and Eristic—the former legitimate, the latter illegitimate—we must remark that even in the legitimate Dialectic the purpose prominent in his mind is that of victory over an opponent. He enjoins that you are not only to guard against your opponent, lest he should out-manceuvre you, but you are to conceal and disguise the sequence of your questions so as to out-manceuvre him. *Χρή δ' ὕπερ φυλάττεσθαι παραγγέλλομεν ἀποκρινόμενος, αὐτοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας πειρᾶσθαι λανθάνειν.* *Analyt. Prior.* ii. 66, a. 32. Compare *Topic.* 108, a. 25, 156, a. 23, 164, b. 35.

quite independent of that habit—owing their rise and prevalence to deep-seated psychological causes.

Without the experience acquired by this habit of dialectic debate at Athens, Plato could not have composed his Euthydémus, exhibiting a *reductio ad absurdum* of several verbal fallacies—nor could we have had the logical theories of Aristotle, embodied in the Analytica and Topica with its annexed treatise De Sophisticis Elenchis, in which various fallacies are discriminated and classified. These theories, and the corollaries connected with them, do infinite honour to the comprehensive intellect of Aristotle: but he could not have conceived them without previous study of the ratiocinative process. He, as the first theorizer, must have had before him abundant arguments explicitly laid out, and contested, or open to be contested, at every step by an opponent.<sup>s</sup> Towards such habit of formal argumentation, a strong repugnance was felt by many of the Athenian public, as there is among modern readers generally: but those who felt thus, had probably little interest in the speculations either of Plato or of Aristotle. That the Platonic critics should themselves feel this same repugnance, seems to me not consistent with their admiration for the great dialectician and logician of antiquity: nor can I at all subscribe to their view, when they present to us the inherent infirmities of the human intellect as factitious distempers generated by the habit of formal debate, and by the rapacity of Protagoras, Prodikus, and others.

I think it probable that the dialogue of Euthydémus, as far as the point to which I have brought it (*i. e.*, where Sokrates finishes his recital to Kriton of the conversation which he had had with the two Sophists), was among the most popular of all the Platonic dialogues: not merely because of its dramatic vivacity and charm of expression, but because it would be heartily welcomed by the numerous enemies of Dialectic at

Without the habit of formal debate, Plato could not have composed his Euthydémus, nor Aristotle the treatise De Sophisticis Elenchis.

Probable popularity of the Euthydémus at Athens—welcomed by all the enemies of Dialectic.

<sup>s</sup> Mill, 'System of Logic,' Book VI. 1, 1. "Principles of Evidence and Theories of Method, are not to be constructed *à priori*. The laws of our rational faculty, like those of every other natural agency, are only got by seeing the agent at work."



Athens. We must remember that in the estimation of most persons at Athens, Dialectic included Sokrates and all the *virī Sokratici* (Plato among them), just as much as the persons called Sophists. The discreditable picture here given of Euthydēmus and Dionysodoros, would be considered as telling against Dialectic and the Sokratic Elenchus generally: while the rhetors, and others who dealt in long continuous discourse, would treat it as a blow inflicted upon the rival art of dialogue, by the professor of the dialogue himself. In Plato's view, the dialogue was the special and appropriate manifestation of philosophy.

Epilogue of  
Plato to the  
Dialogue,  
trying to ob-  
viate this  
inference by  
opponents—  
Conversation  
between So-  
krates and  
Kriton.

That the natural effect of the picture here drawn by Plato was, to justify the antipathy of those who hated philosophy—we may see by the epilogue which Plato has thought fit to annex: an epilogue so little in harmony with what has preceded, that we might almost imagine it to be an afterthought—yet obviously intended to protect philosophy against imputations. Sokrates having concluded the recital, in his ironical way, by saying that he intended to become a pupil under the two Sophists, and by inviting Kriton to be a pupil along with him—Kriton replies by saying that he is anxious to obtain instruction from any one who can give it, but that he has no sympathy with Euthydēmus, and would rather be refuted by him, than learn from him to refute in such a manner. Kriton proceeds to report to Sokrates the remarks of a by-stander (an able writer of discourses for the Dikastery) who had heard all that passed; and who expressed his surprise that Sokrates could have remained so long listening to such nonsense, and manifesting so much deference for a couple of foolish men. Nevertheless (continued the by-stander) this couple are among the most powerful talkers of the day upon philosophy. This shows you how worthless a thing philosophy is: prodigious fuss, with contemptible result—men careless what they say, and carping at every word that they hear.<sup>t</sup>

Now, Sokrates, (concludes Kriton) this man is wrong for

depreciating philosophy, and all others who depreciate it are wrong also. But he was right in blaming *you*, for disputing with such a couple before a large crowd.

*Sokr.*—What kind of person is this censor of philosophy? Is he a powerful speaker himself in the Dikastery? Or is he only a composer of discourses to be spoken by others? *Krit.*—The latter. I do not think that he has ever spoken in court: but every one says that he knows judicial practice well, and that he composes admirable speeches.<sup>u</sup>

*Sokr.*—I understand the man. He belongs to that class whom Prodikus describes as the border-men between philosophy and politics. Persons of this class account themselves the wisest of mankind, and think farther that besides being such in reality, they are also admired as such by many: insomuch that the admiration for them would be universal, if it were not for the professors of philosophy. Accordingly they fancy, that if they could once discredit these philosophers, the prize of glory would be awarded to themselves, without controversy, by every one: they being in truth the wisest men in society, though liable, if ever they are caught in dialectic debate, to be overpowered and humbled by men like Euthydêmus.<sup>x</sup> They have very plausible grounds for believing in their own wisdom, since they pursue both philosophy and politics to a moderate extent, as far as propriety enjoins; and thus pluck the fruit of wisdom without encountering either dangers or contests. *Krit.*—What do you say to their reasoning, Sokrates? It seems to me specious. *Sokr.*—Yes, it is specious, but not well founded. You cannot easily persuade them, though nevertheless it is true, that men who take a line midway between two pursuits, are *better* than either, if both pursuits be bad—*worse* than either, if both pursuits be good, but tending to different ends—*better* than one and *worse* than the other, if one of the pursuits be bad and the other good—*better*

Altered tone in speaking of Euthydêmus—Disparagement of persons half-philosophers, half-politicians.

<sup>u</sup> Plat. Euthyd. p. 305.

<sup>x</sup> Plat. Euthyd. p. 305 E. εἶναι μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ σφᾶς σφαωτάτους, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις λόγοις θῶαν ἀποληφθῶσιν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφὶ Εὐθύδημον κολούεσθαι.

Οἱ ἀμφὶ Εὐθύδημον may mean Euthydêmus himself and alone; yet I incline to think that it here means Euthydêmus and his like.

than both, if both be bad, but tending to different ends. Such being the case, if the pursuit of philosophy and that of active politics be both of them good, but tending to different objects, these men are inferior to the pursuers of one as well as of the other: if one be good, the other bad, they are worse than the pursuers of the former, better than the pursuers of the latter: if both be bad, they are better than either. Now I am sure that these men themselves account both philosophy and politics to be good. Accordingly, they are inferior both to philosophers and politicians:<sup>7</sup> they occupy only the third rank, though they pretend to be in the first. While we pardon such a pretension, and refrain from judging these men severely, we must nevertheless recognise them for such as they really are. We must be content with every one, who announces any scheme of life, whatever it be, coming within the limits of intelligence, and who pursues his work with persevering resolution.<sup>2</sup>

*Krit.*—I am always telling you, Sokrates, that I too am embarrassed where to seek instructors for my sons. Conversation with you has satisfied me, that it is madness to bestow so much care upon the fortune and position of sons, and so little upon their instruction. Yet when I turn my eyes to the men who make profession of instructing, I am really astonished. To tell you the truth, every one of them appears to me extravagantly absurd,<sup>a</sup> so that I know not how to help forward my son towards philosophy. *Sokr.*—Don't you know, Kriton, that in every different pursuit, most of the professors are foolish and worthless, and that a few only are excellent and above price? Is not this the case with gymnastic, commercial business, rhetoric, military command? Are not most of those who undertake these pursuits ridiculously silly?<sup>b</sup> *Krit.*—Unquestionably: nothing can be more

Kriton asks Sokrates for advice about the education of his sons—Sokrates cannot recommend a teacher—tells him to search for himself.

<sup>7</sup> Plat. Euthyd. p. 306 B.  
<sup>2</sup> Plat. Euthyd. p. 306 C. συγγινώσκειν μὲν οὖν αὐτοῖς χρὴ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ χυλεπαίνειν, ἠγείσθαι μὲντοι τοιοῦτους εἶναι οἳ εἰσι πάντα γὰρ ἄνδρα χρὴ ἀγαπᾶν, ὅστις καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν λέγει ἐχόμενον φρονήσεως πρᾶγμα, καὶ ἀνδρείως ἐπεξίων διαπονεῖται.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Euthyd. p. 306 E. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ εἰς ἕκαστος αὐτῶν σκοποῦντι πᾶν ἀλλόκοτος εἶναι, &c.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Euthyd. p. 307 A. ἐν ἑκάστη τούτων τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς ἕκαστον τὸ ἔργον οὐ καταγελάστους ὄρας;

true. *Sokr.*—Do you think *that* a sufficient reason for avoiding all these pursuits yourself, and keeping your son out of them also? *Krit.*—No: it would be wrong to do so. *Sokr.*—Well then, don't do so. Take no heed about the professors of philosophy, whether they are good or bad; but test philosophy itself, well and carefully. If it shall appear to you worthless, dissuade not merely your sons, but every one else also, from following it.<sup>c</sup> But if it shall appear to you as valuable as I consider it to be, then take courage to pursue and practise it, you and your children both, according to the proverb.—

The first part of this epilogue, which I have here given in abridgment, has a bearing very different from the rest of the dialogue, and different also from most of the other Platonic dialogues. In the epilogue, Euthydēmus is cited as the representative of true dialectic and philosophy: the opponents of philosophy are represented as afraid of being put down by Euthydēmus: whereas, previously, he had been depicted as contemptible,—as a man whose manner of refuting opponents was more discreditable to himself than to the opponent refuted; and who had no chance of success except among hearers like himself. We are not here told that Euthydēmus was a bad specimen of philosophers, and that there were others better, by the standard of whom philosophy ought to be judged. On the contrary, we find him here announced by Sokrates as among those dreaded by men adverse to philosophy,—and as not undeserving of that epithet which the semi-philosopher cited by Kriton applies to “one of the most powerful champions of the day.”

Plato therefore, after having applied his great dramatic talent to make dialectic debate ridiculous, and thus said much to gratify its enemies—changes his battery, and says something against these enemies, without reflecting whether it is consistent or not with what had preceded. Before the close,

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Euthyd. p. 307 B. *έάσας* | *αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα βασανίσας καλῶς τε*  
*χαίρειν τοὺς ἐπιτηδεύοντας φιλοσο-* | *καὶ ἐδ, ἐὰν μὲν σοι φαίνεται φαυλὸν*  
*φίαν, εἴτε χρηστοὶ εἰσιν εἴτε πονηροί,* | *ὄν, &c.*

Euthydēmus  
 is here cited  
 as representa-  
 tive of  
 Dialectic and  
 philosophy.

however, he comes again into consistency with the tone of the earlier part, in the observation which he assigns to Kriton, that most of the professors of philosophy are worthless; to which Sokrates rejoins that this is not less true of all other professions. The concluding inference is, that philosophy is to be judged, not by its professors, but by itself; and that Kriton must examine it for himself, and either pursue it or leave it alone, according as his own convictions dictated.

This is a valuable admonition, and worthy of Sokrates, laying full stress as it does upon the conscientious conviction which the person examining may form for himself. But it is no answer to the question of Kriton; who says that he had already heard from Sokrates, and was himself convinced, that philosophy was of first-rate importance—and that he only desired to learn where he could find teachers to forward the progress of his son in it. As in so many other dialogues, Plato leaves the problem started, but unsolved. The impulse towards philosophy being assured, those who feel it ask Plato in what direction they are to move towards it. He gives no answer. He can neither perform the service himself, nor recommend any one else, as competent. We shall find such silence made matter of pointed animadversion, in the fragment called Kleitophon.

The person, whom Kriton here brings forward as the censor of Sokrates and the enemy of philosophy, is peculiarly marked. In general, the persons whom Plato ranks as enemies of philosophy are the rhetors and politicians: but the example here chosen is not comprised in either of these classes: it is a semi-philosopher, yet a writer of discourses for others. Schleiermacher, Heindorf, and Spengel, suppose that Isokrates is the person intended: Winkelmann thinks it is Thrasymachus: others refer it to Lysias, or Theodorus of Byzantium: <sup>d</sup> Socher and Stall-

Who is the person here intended by Plato, half-philosopher, half-politician? Is it Isokrates?

<sup>d</sup> Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Euthyd. p. 47; Winkelmann, Proleg. p. xxxv.

Heindorf, in endeavouring to explain the difference between Plato's language in the Phædrus and in the Euthydemus respecting Isokrates, assumes

as a matter beyond question the theory of Schleiermacher, that the Phædrus was composed during Plato's early years. I have already intimated my dissent from this theory.

baum doubt whether any special person is intended, or any thing beyond some supposed representative of a class described by attributes. I rather agree with those who refer the passage to Isokrates. He might naturally be described as one steering a middle course between philosophy and rhetoric: which in fact he himself proclaims in the Oration *De Permutatione*, and which agrees with the language of Plato in the dialogue *Phædrus*, where Isokrates is mentioned by name along with *Lysias*. In the *Phædrus*, moreover, Plato speaks of Isokrates with unusual esteem, especially as a favourable contrast with *Lysias*, and as a person who, though not yet a philosopher, may be expected to improve, so as in no long time to deserve that appellation.<sup>e</sup> We must remember that Plato in the *Phædrus* attacks by name, and with considerable asperity, first *Lysias*, next *Theodorus* and *Thrasymachus* the rhetors—all three persons living and of note. Being sure to offend all these, Plato might well feel disposed to avoid making an enemy of Isokrates at the same time, and to except him honourably by name from the vulgar professors of rhetoric. In the *Euthydêmus* (where the satire is directed not against the rhetors, but against their competitors the dialecticians

<sup>e</sup> Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 278 D.

I have already observed that I do not agree with Schleiermacher and the other critics who rank the *Phædrus* as the earliest or even among the earliest compositions of Plato. That it is of much later composition I am persuaded, but of what particular date can only be conjectured. The opinion of K. F. Hermann, Stallbaum, and others, that it was composed about the time when Plato began his school at Athens (387-386 B.C.) is sufficiently probable.

The *Euthydêmus* may be earlier or may be later than the *Phædrus*. I incline to think it later. The opinion of Stallbaum (resting upon the mention of *Alkibiadês*, p. 275 A), that it was composed in or before 404 B.C., appears to me untenable (Stallbaum, *Proleg.* p. 64). Plato would not be likely to introduce Sokrates speaking of *Alkibiadês* as a deceased person, at whatever time the dialogue was composed. Nor can I agree with Steinhart, who refers it to 402 B.C. (*Einleitung*,

p. 26). Ueberweg (*Untersuch. über die Zeitfolge der Plat. Schr.* pp. 265-267) considers the *Euthydêmus* later (but not much later) than the *Phædrus*, subsequent to the establishment of the Platonic school at Athens (387-386 B.C.). This seems to me more probable than the contrary.

Schleiermacher, in arranging the Platonic dialogues, ranks the *Euthydêmus* as an immediate sequel to the *Menon*, and as presupposing both *Gorgias* and *Theætétus* (*Einl.* pp. 400-401). Socher agrees in this opinion, but Steinhart rejects it (*Einleit.* p. 26), placing the *Euthydêmus* immediately after the *Protagoras*, and immediately before the *Menon* and the *Gorgias*; according to him, *Euthydêmus*, *Menon*, and *Gorgias*, form a well marked Trilogy.

Neither of these arrangements rests upon any sufficient reasons. The chronological order cannot be determined.

or pseudo-dialecticians) he had no similar motive to address compliments to Isokrates: respecting whom he speaks in a manner probably more conformable to his real sentiments, as the unnamed representative of a certain type of character—a semi-philosopher, fancying himself among the first men in Athens, and assuming unwarrantable superiority over the genuine philosopher; but entitled to nothing more than a decent measure of esteem, such as belonged to sincere mediocrity of intelligence.

That there prevailed at different times different sentiments, more or less of reciprocal esteem or reciprocal jealousy, between Plato and Isokrates, ought not to be matter of surprise. Both of them were celebrated teachers of Athens, each in his own manner, during the last forty years of Plato's life: both of them enjoyed the favour of foreign princes, and received pupils from outlying, sometimes distant, cities—from Bosphorus and Cyprus in the East, and from Sicily in the West. We know moreover that during the years immediately preceding Plato's death (347 B.C.), his pupil Aristotle, then rising into importance as a teacher of rhetoric, was engaged in acrimonious literary warfare, seemingly of his own seeking, with Isokrates (then advanced in years) and some of the Isokratean pupils. The little which we learn concerning the literary and philosophical world of Athens, represents it as much distracted by feuds and jealousies. Isokrates on his part has in his compositions various passages which appear to allude (no name being mentioned) to Plato among others, in a tone of depreciation.<sup>f</sup>

Isokrates seems, as far as we can make out, to have been in early life, like Lysias, a composer of speeches to be spoken by clients in the Dikastery. This lucrative profession was tempting, since his family had been nearly ruined during the misfortunes of Athens at the close of the Peloponnesian war. Having gained reputation by such means, Isokrates became

<sup>f</sup> Isokrates, ad Philipp. Or. v. s. 14, p. 84; contra Sophistas, Or. xiii.; Or. xiii. s. 2-24, pp. 291-295; Encom. Helenæ, Or. x. init.; Panathenaic. Or. xii. s. 126, p. 257; Or. xv. De Permutatione, s. 90, p. 440, Bekk.

in his mature age a teacher of Rhetoric, and a composer of discourses, not for private use by clients, but for the general reader, on political or educational topics. In this character, he corresponded to the description given by Plato in the *Euthydêmus*: being partly a public adviser, partly a philosopher. But the general principle under which Plato here attacks him, though conforming to the doctrine of the Platonic Republic, is contrary to that of Plato in other dialogues. "You must devote yourself either wholly to philosophy, or wholly to politics: a mixture of the two is worse than either"—this agrees with the Republic, wherein Plato enjoins upon each man one special and exclusive pursuit, as well as with the doctrine maintained against Kalliklês in the *Gorgias*—but it differs from the *Phædrus*, where he ascribes the excellence of Perikles as a statesman and rhetor, to the fact of his having acquired a large tincture of philosophy.<sup>g</sup> Cicero quotes this last passage as applicable to his own distinguished career, a combination of philosophy with politics.<sup>h</sup> He dissented altogether from the doctrine here laid down by Plato in the *Euthydêmus*, and many other eminent men would have dissented from it also.

As a doctrine of universal application, in fact, it cannot be defended. The opposite scheme of life (which is maintained by Isokrates in *De Permutatione* and by Kalliklês in the Platonic *Gorgias*)<sup>i</sup>—that philosophy is to be attentively studied in the earlier years of life as an intellectual training, to arm the mind with knowledge and capacities which may afterwards be applied to the active duties of life—is at least equally defensible, and suits better for other minds of a very high order. Not only Xenophon and other distinguished Greeks, but also most of the best Roman citizens, held the opinion which Plato in the *Gorgias* ascribes to Kalliklês and reprobates through the organ of Sokrates—That philosophical study, if prolonged beyond what was necessary for

<sup>g</sup> See the facts about Isokrates in a good Dissertation by H. P. Schroder, Utrecht, 1859, *Quæstiones Isocrateæ*, p. 51, seq.

Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 270; Plutarch, *Periklês*, c. 23; Plato, *Republic*, iii.

p. 397.

<sup>h</sup> Cicero, *De Orator.* iii. 34, 138; *Orator.* iv. 14; *Brutus*, 11, 44.

<sup>i</sup> Isokrates, *De Permutatione.* Or. xv. sect. 278-288, pp. 485-486, Bekk.; Plato, *Gorgias*, pp. 484-485.



this purpose of adequate intellectual training, and if made the permanent occupation of life, was more hurtful than beneficial.<sup>k</sup> Certainly, a man may often fail in the attempt to combine philosophy with active politics. No one failed in such a career more lamentably than Dion, the friend of Plato—and Plato himself, when he visited Sicily to second Dion. Moreover Alkibiadês and Kritias were cited by Anytus and the other accusers of Sokrates as examples of the like mischievous conjunction. But on the other hand, Archytas at Tarentum (another friend of Plato and philosopher) administered his native city with success, as long (seemingly) as Periklês administered Athens. Such men as these two are nowise inferior either to the special philosopher or to the special politician. Plato has laid down an untenable generality, in this passage of the Euthydêmus, in order to suit a particular point which he wished to make against Isokrates, or against the semi-philosopher indicated, whoever else he may have been.

<sup>k</sup> The half-philosophers and half-politicians to whom Sokrates here alludes, are characterised by one of the Platonic critics as “jene oberflächlichen und schwächlichen Naturen die sich zwischen beiden Richtungen stellen, und zur Erreichung selbststüchtiger und beschränkter Zwecke von beiden aufnehmen was sie verstehen und was ihnen gefällt” (Steinhart, Einleit. p. 25). On the other hand we find in Tacitus a striking passage respecting the studies of Agricola in his youth at Massilia. “Memoriâ teneo, solitum ipsum narrare, se in primâ juventâ studium philosophiæ acrius, ultra quam concessum Romano ac senatori, hausisse—ni prudentia matris inceusum ac flagrantem animum exercuisset: Scilicet sublime et erectum iugeium, pulchritudinem ac speciem excelsæ magnæque gloriæ vehementius quam cautè appetebat: retinuitque, quod est

difficillimum, ex sapientiâ modum” (Vit. Agr. c. 4).

Tacitus expresses himself in the same manner about the purpose with which Helvidius Priscus applied himself to philosophy (Hist. iv. 6), “non, ut plerique, ut nomine magnifico segne otium velaret, sed quo constantior adversus fortuna, rempublicam capesseret.”

Compare also the memorable passage in the Funeral Oration pronounced by Periklês (Thuc. ii. 40)—*φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας*, &c., which exhibits the like views.

Aulus Gellius (x. 22), who cites the doctrine which Plato ascribes to Kalliklês in the Gorgias (about the propriety of confining philosophy to the function of training and preparation for active pursuits), tries to make out that this was Plato's own opinion.